As many policy experts know, the true dividing line between fact and fiction in international security is drawn in the budget.

You want to know the real policy priorities? Follow the money.

And that is exactly what policy experts are doing now in the United States, as the Trump administration unveils its FY2018 budget to Congress this month.

A few weeks ago, guidance documents hinted at cuts to international organizations that are the backbone of the international order that the U.S. has championed for seventy years. The U.S. budget, according to the Trump administration, should “reduce or end funding for international organizations whose missions do not substantially advance U.S. foreign policy interests, are duplicative, or are not well-managed.”

This not-so-subtle threat to slash annual U.S. contributions to the United Nations and all other international regimes would be a very dangerous step backwards in global security and sustainability.

Most Americans would agree that promoting global health, regulating arms sales, banning nuclear weapons tests, safeguarding nuclear bomb-making materials, abolishing chemical weapons, and promoting surveillance of deadly diseases, among many other worthy goals, are all important efforts vital to national and global security, and therefore advance U.S. foreign policy interests. And yet the FY18 State Department budget documents show contributions to International Organizations dropping 44%, to Nonproliferation and Disarmament 83%, and to Anti-terrorism and Demining 33%.

THE KORLE BU Teaching Hospital in Accra, Ghana—the third largest hospital in Africa—houses two radiation machines for treating cancer patients. Both are relatively new, purchased by Ghana’s Ministry of Health in the last few years. Both produce powerful X-rays that can penetrate your skin to kill tumor cells in your body. People from all over Ghana, even outside the country, come to the hospital to use the machines for cancer therapy.

“We have patients from Nigeria, Togo, and the Ivory Coast coming to us for treatment,” says Joel Yarney, an oncologist at the hospital.

One machine produces X-rays by accelerating electrons close to the speed of light through an intricately built copper pipe, then slamming them into a heavy metal target. It’s called a linear accelerator, or linac for short, and it's a cousin of the Higgs boson-discovering Large Hadron Collider. The other, known as an isotopic teletherapy machine, produces X-rays as silvery cobalt-60 chunks inside a small canister eject X-rays and transform into nickel through radioactive decay. Doctors then direct the X-rays toward a patient’s tumor.

The isotopic technology saves lives. But it’s also responsible for some of the most serious radiation accidents in history aside from the nuclear reactor meltdowns at Chernobyl and Fukushima.

Invented more than 60 years ago, these radioactive material-based machines soon became a fundamental tool for cancer treatment. They usually use cobalt-60 as a radioactive source, although some versions use a compound of cesium-137, cesium chloride. Around 40 years ago, American hospitals started to replace them with linacs, whose X-ray beam is much easier to shape—and today, US hospitals use them pretty much exclusively. “All else being equal, a doctor would prefer to have a linac than a cobalt machine because it’s better cancer treatment,” says Miles Pomper of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

On Tuesday, May 23, the Trump administration released its Fiscal Year 2018 (FY2018) budget request. In an overall federal budget where many, many programs faced severe budget cuts, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is on the receiving end of a proposed 11 percent budget increase (at least by the Trump administration’s accounting – more on that in a following post).

The NNSA is responsible for maintaining US nuclear weapons, controlling the spread of nuclear weapons, and producing, handling and disposing of fissile materials as needed. Much of the agency’s increase is under “Weapons Activities” – the programs designed to maintain US nuclear weapons and related efforts – while funding for efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons face budget cuts. That continues a trend that began in the Obama administration: more funding for weapons, less funding for nonproliferation.

In this post and the following two (The Bad and The Ugly), I take a closer look at NNSA’s budget. Let’s start with the good news.

The proposed budget cuts International Nuclear Security by 58% and Nuclear Material Removal by 74% below what those programs intended to spend in 2018, hampering efforts to prevent non-state actors from getting their hands on nuclear weapons material.

“There is still a great deal to be done to keep terrorists from getting the essential ingredients of nuclear or radiological bombs. U.S. nuclear security programs should be strengthened and revitalized, not savagely cut, as this budget proposes,” said Matthew Bunn, professor of practice and head of Harvard’s Project on Managing the Atom.

However, the budget does take a positive step by terminating the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility and invests $9 million to pursue the “dilute and dispose” alternative.

For several years, nuclear material security experts have raised concerns over the runaway costs and security risks of the unfinished MOX facility at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina and have advocated for a more achievable and efficient way of disposing of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons— dilute and dispose method.

“The dilute and dispose process is far more secure than the MOX approach because it is simpler and will provide fewer opportunities for terrorists to divert or steal U.S. weapons plutonium,” said Edwin Lyman, a senior scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists.

Last year, the Obama administration also attempted to terminate the MOX facility but Congress, led by Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.), authorized $340 million for continuing construction on the MOX facility.

“In a tight budget environment, Congress should be spending money in ways that will truly enhance national security, not waste money on pork-barrel funding. The Trump administration should be commended for this action which was also supported by President Obama,“ said Fissile Materials Working Group Chair Miles Pomper, a senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

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The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) is a coalition of 80 civil society organizations from around the world working to provide actionable policy solutions to keep the world safe from nuclear terrorism.

Professor Bunn provides guidance on how one can have an impact on policy, which is useful to policy professionals and those just entering the field, and shares his advice for young scholars who are interested in nuclear weapons and international security. Listen to our conversation, and follow the work of the Project on Managing the Atom @ManagingtheAtom.

Cyber security is the next frontier for nuclear risk managers. Within a short span of time cyber attacks have evolved in sophistication and stealth, making it difficult to develop an effective and adaptive risk management approach. While there is consensus within nuclear industry that it must bolster its capacity to “remain ahead of the dynamic cyber threat curve,” it is important to determine what this looks like in practice: what constitutes a reasonable application of cyber security measures such that it sufficiently attempts to reduce vulnerabilities and associated risks?

In November 2016, the Stimson Center, along with the Security Awareness Special Interest Group (SASIG) and the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS), hosted The Nuclear Security Roundtable on Executive and Corporate Responsibility in London, bringing together fifty industry stakeholders and cyber security experts to discuss the inherent challenges in managing cyber security risks in the nuclear sector. Participants examined a hypothetical cyber attack scenario in a nuclear power plant that undermined the security posture of the facility, cascading into a major power outage and consequently resulting in first-party property damage, reputational fallout, and significant third-party business interruption losses. Under this scenario, participants considered potential negligence claims and cor porate liability, and how a “model of accountability” – demonstrating compliance to high industry standards – might be structured in order to mitigate such liability.

The nuclear governance system is facing an unprecedented challenge as traditional nuclear suppliers that have built the backbone of the safety, security, and nonproliferation regime face new competition to provide technology to emerging nations. As this policy report notes, the locus of new nuclear plant construction has shifted to fast growing nations in Asia and the Middle East, and traditional suppliers, including the U.S., France and Japan, are giving way to Russia and China, which have the most active nuclear production lines, the capacity to increase manufacturing and the state financing to support it. China alone has 21 reactors under construction and another 40 planned; Russia has 7 under construction and another 25 planned. South Korea, a key U.S. ally and another emerging global nuclear supplier, has three reactors under construction and is building four new plants abroad in the United Arab Emirates.

Neither Russia nor China has been leaders in the nuclear governance area, and many of the emerging economy nations with ambitious nuclear power development plans face challenges in effectively governing the plants and materials they seek.

The current nuclear governance system encompasses the critically important nuclear safety, security, and safeguards regimes and essential issues related to environmental impacts. It covers a wide range of national regulations and laws, international agreements and guidance, and facility operations and practices, and this report offers nine recommendations for strengthening this system.

One night last spring, Amiran Chaduneli, a flea-market trader in the ex-Soviet Republic of Georgia, met with two strangers on a bridge at the edge of Kobuleti, a small town on the country's Black Sea coast.

Over the phone, the men had introduced themselves as foreigners—one Turkish, the other Russian—and they were looking for an item so rare on the black market that it tends to be worth more, ounce for ounce, than gold. Chaduneli knew where to get it. He didn't know that his clients were undercover cops.

From the bridge, he took them to inspect the merchandise at a nearby apartment where his acquaintance had been storing it: a lead box about the size of a smartphone, containing a few pounds of radioactive uranium, including small amounts of the weapons-grade material known as uranium-235. The stash wasn't nearly enough to make a nuclear weapon. But if packed together with high explosives, these metallic lumps could produce what's known as a dirty bomb—one that could poison the area around the blast zone with toxic levels of radiation.

In the popular culture, the dealers who traffic in such cargo are usually cast as lords of war with tailored suits and access to submarines. The reality is much less cinematic. According to police records reviewed by TIME in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, Chaduneli's associates in the attempted uranium sale last spring included construction workers and scrap-metal traders. Looking at the sunken cheeks and lazy left eye in his mug shot, it seems improbable that lousy capers like this one could rise to the level of a national-security threat. But the ease of acquiring ingredients for a dirty bomb is precisely what makes them so worrying.

[...]

There have already been plenty of signs that ISIS would like to go nuclear. After the series of ISIS-linked bombings in Brussels killed at least 32 people in March 2016, Belgian authorities revealed that a suspected member of a terrorist cell had surveillance footage of a Belgian nuclear official with access to radioactive materials. The country's nuclear-safety agency then said there were "concrete indications" that the cell intended "to do something involving one of our four nuclear sites." About a year earlier, in May 2015, ISIS suggested in an issue of its propaganda magazine that it was wealthy enough to purchase a nuclear device on the black market—and to "pull off something truly epic."

Though the group is unlikely to possess the technical skill to build an actual nuclear weapon, there are indications it could already possess nuclear materials. After the group's fighters took control of the Iraqi city of Mosul in 2014, they seized about 40 kg of uranium compounds that were stored at a university, according to a letter an Iraqi diplomat sent to the U.N. in July of that year. But the U.N.'s nuclear agency said the material was likely "low grade" and not potentially harmful. "In a sense we've been lucky so far," says Sharon Squassoni, who heads the program to stop nuclear proliferation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. "I honestly think it is only a matter of time before we see one of these dirty-bomb attacks."

Thanks to disputes over Ukraine, Syria, and elsewhere, the United States and Russia — the two countries that hold the vast majority of worldwide fissile material — have ceased nearly all cooperation that could thwart a nuclear terror attack.

Such a scenario is not farfetched. There is documented evidence that al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups have pursued weapons-grade nuclear materials, and smugglers have been caught attempting to distribute them to the wrong hands. Just 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium could fuel a crude, 15-kiloton nuclear weapon. If al-Qaeda had detonated such a device in lower Manhattan instead of flying airplanes into towers, the toll in history’s deadliest terror attack would have been not 3,000 souls but forty times as many.

The current U.S.-Russia relationship is plagued by big and difficult issues. They include, but are not limited to, Russia’s violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, alleged interference in the U.S. presidential election, annexation of Crimea, attempts to undermine the government of Ukraine, and military actions in Syria.

Despite these differences, there are still some areas of cooperation between the two countries. For example, NASA pays the Russian space program to give American astronauts a ride to the International Space Station while the U.S. develops its next-generation space capabilities. The countries are also working together to enforce the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran nuclear deal.

Thwarting nuclear terrorism should be added to the list. The risk of a nuclear terror attack in Washington or Moscow — or anywhere on the planet — cannot be ignored due to other disagreements.

Such cooperation has a track record of success. In 1991, as the Soviet Union was nearing its dissolution, global concern focused on an unthinkable danger: the soon-to-be-independent Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan stood to inherit Soviet nuclear weapons, along with fissile material that could be used to make more nuclear arms. In response, my former colleagues, senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, passed an amendment to provide funding for these new states — and Russia itself — to help secure and remove the missiles, warheads, and material.

It’s not hard to start an argument these days in Washington. President Donald Trump’s newly released budget will surely spark thousands of them, as analysts, partisans, Big Bird, and eventually members of Congress debate both sides of every issue. But there are some things to which most reasonable people can and should agree. Chief among these is that the United States has a long-standing and continuing interest in preventing countries and terrorists from building nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the only way to interpret Trump’s proposed budget cuts for the State Department and the international programs they fund is that he couldn’t care less.

One of the critical investments the State Department makes is funding our obligations, and then some, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a U.N.–affiliated agency the United States helped create in 1957. Yes, you heard a lot about the IAEA during the Iran nuclear agreement debate. You may also remember them from the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, when they correctly stated Iraq had no nuclear program — warnings ignored by the previous GOP administration.

Regardless of what you may have heard about the United Nations or the IAEA itself, the agency may be the greatest national security bargain the United States has.As the old cliché goes, if we didn’t have it, we have to invent it. Washington provides a significant percentage of the IAEA’s annual budget and, on top of that, additional resources known as voluntary contributions. This money ensures that the IAEA can handle its current responsibilities by having the tools, people, skills, and resources needed to do its job — which is, to put it bluntly, to help keep us and other countries safe and enable all to benefit from the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology.

So in plain English, what does that mean? IAEA inspectors are on the ground in Iran monitoring that Tehran fully complies with its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It helps monitor nuclear materials in over 50 countries to deter diversion and to certify that none have been syphoned off for illicit weapon programs. It helps ensure the safety of nuclear facilities all over the world. It’s increasingly on the front lines of preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. Oh, and it’s also part of the fight against the Zika virus and other deadly insect-borne diseases (they nuke male insects so they can’t breed, poor guys).

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 27 Mar 2017 00:00:00 CSTWithout the town of Korolev, Russia, Houston would have had a problem. That suburb of Moscow, named after the father of the Soviet space program, produces capsules that are now the only way NASA can transport its astronauts to space and back. America also remains dependent on Russia for engines to power rockets that launch US government payloads—including satellites that spy on Moscow. Russia, too, depends on the United States: Its spacecraft and rocket makers earn billions of dollars launching American astronauts and cargo into space, while Russia’s strategic aviation—part of the force meant to deter America—reportedly continued to use signals beamed by US GPS satellites even after relations between the two countries began to deteriorate in 2012. (Link in Russian.)

This interdependence between the US and Russian space programs persists even though the two countries are now living through what some pundits describe as a new Cold War. There was a time not so long ago, however, when the two nations viewed space solely as an area of strategic competition. The steps that Washington and Moscow took to transform their space rivalry into cooperation can serve today as a model for working together to help prevent nuclear terrorism, no matter how strained relations may seem.

In the early 1960s, manned space flight became emblematic of US-Russian competition, with each country sacrificing blood and treasure to beat the other. Space flight involved the most advanced technologies and sensitive secrets of the time. Bilateral cooperation was unthinkable. Yet, by the summer of 1975, the two countries had launched their joint Apollo-Soyuz mission. Today, the two space programs are not just cooperative but interdependent, although the United States is developing alternatives to Russian space systems.

While continuing to work together in exploring the cosmos, the United States and Russia have all but ended cooperation in a sphere where a failure to work together could lead to catastrophe not only for the two countries but globally. Reacting to Russia’s use of force in Ukraine, the Obama administration restricted nuclear energy and technology cooperation between the two countries. Russia responded by effectively ending a range of projects aimed at improving nuclear security. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov called the measures a response to Washington's "hostile" move to freeze nuclear-energy cooperation. Such a rollback is all the more regrettable given that top statesmen on both sides have described nuclear terrorism as one of the greatest threats to their respective countries and humanity as a whole.

PHYSICISTS THOUGHT THEY had built the detector to rule them all. A mile underground in a former South Dakota gold mine, the Large Underground Xenon detector was the latest, greatest attempt to find dark matter, the elusive material that physicists think makes up a missing 25 percent of the universe’s mass. But last September, LUX retired after spending three years on its unsuccessful search. Its creators dismantled its computers and electronics and emptied 800 pounds of liquid xenon from its six-and-a-half-foot-tall tank. They pulled the equipment piece by piece up through a mine shaft.

No one has found evidence of dark matter, despite the fact that physicists' measurements are more precise than ever. They’re already building LUX’s more-sensitive successor, LUX-ZEPLIN, which will search for weakly interacting massive particles, or WIMPs. But even if these ever-more-monstrous machines don’t find dark matter, physicists have found a client for their detector technology: the nuclear security industry.

Physicist Adam Bernstein of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory studies dark matter with LUX. But he also adapts dark matter detectors into technology that's a bit more practical. Watchdog agencies like the International Atomic Energy Agency, for example, can use dark matter detectors to look for missing nuclear material. “From a distance they seem like two totally different occupations,” says Bernstein. “But intellectually, making a dark matter detector is very similar to making a nuclear security detector.”

[...]

Now, LUX in its current form could never be used as a nuclear detector. For one thing, it's not portable. And nuclear security agents run their tests on Earth's surface, not a mile underground. The dirt and rock above LUX shields it from cosmic rays and other particles raining down on Earth, and it wouldn't work above ground. "There would be so much noise," says Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, who works on nuclear nonproliferation at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies.

Physicists have to make these detectors affordable, too: LUX cost $10 million to develop and construct. “A dark matter detector is really the Cadillac of detectors,” says Dalnoki-Veress. “But sometimes what you really want is a Ford. Something that is cheap but still does the same thing.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 27 Feb 2017 00:00:00 CSTOn February 6–10, 2017, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and the African Center for Science and International Security (AFRICSIS) conducted their second joint capacity-building workshop, titled “Nuclear Security Policy and Practice in the African Continent.” AFRICSIS, an independent, science-based non-profit organization established by Mr. Hubert Foy—an alumnus of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey—hosted the workshop in Accra, Ghana.

Building on the successful outcome of the first CNS-AFRICSIS workshop in 2016 and the need to meet a growing demand for nuclear security training and capacity building on the African continent, the agenda for this follow-up workshop was developed to benefit a wide range of practitioners. It targeted professionals who currently work in the fields of nuclear and radioactive security, or whose professional activities have an impact on fostering and strengthening nuclear security in the region. This event brought together thirty participants from twelve countries, including inspectors and officials from nuclear regulatory authorities, foreign ministries, law enforcements agencies, medical and cancer treatment facilities, and universities. Burundi, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, South Africa, and Togo were all represented at the workshop. A number of representatives from regional and international organizations in Africa also attended the workshop, including the African Union, African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), Interpol, and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC). Workshop presentations featured experts from CNS, Nigeria, and South Africa, as well as international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Group of Experts established to support United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540.

Lord Browne of Ladyton (Des Browne) has been serving as Nuclear Threat Initiative’s (NTI) Vice Chairman since 2014. He also serves as Chair of the European Leadership Network. Formerly, he was a Member of the British Parliament for Kilmarnock and Loudoun from 1997 to 2010. Lord Browne was appointed Secretary of State for Defence in 2006 and from 2007 to 2008, he served as the Secretary of State for Scotland. From 2009 to 2014, he served as Convenor of the top level group of parliamentarians for multi-lateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

In this interview, Lord Browne provides an overview of cyber threats to nuclear weapon command, control and communications systems in the United States and abroad, outlines the safeguards in place to address cyber vulnerabilities, and stresses the importance of organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in monitoring threats to nuclear materials and industry.

Viewers of television cop shows like “CSI” or its many imitators are familiar with the idea of how forensics can be used to track down a culprit. If you watch and listen closely, you will notice that the detectives often refer to a national collection of crime scene DNA “fingerprints” held on file in a US federal database called CODIS, which helps to narrow down suspects. For example, after DNA has been picked up from a crime scene, it is entered into the system, and software then scans the voluminous database for a match to known previous offenders.

The benefits of such a system in helping to narrow down and identify a list of likely suspects are obvious.

A similar, if less well-known, system has been slowly emerging in nations across the world that could aid in identifying the origin, processing history, and intended use of nuclear materials lost, missing, stolen, or smuggled—a status technically known as “out of regulatory control.” This approach involves the development of a national nuclear forensics library, which uses the identifying characteristics of nuclear materials—their individual “DNA,” if you will—to aid nuclear security investigators. Though this capability has existed in the United States for some years now, it is only now starting to really catch on elsewhere.

Terrorism involving nuclear or radiological materials remains one of the gravest threats to humanity and to global stability. It was a central concern throughout President Obama’s tenure, with efforts to harness international initiatives coming to the fore at the Nuclear Security Summits. The incoming administration, however, should take a fresh look at a region of the world that hosts two states with nuclear weapons and a serious terrorism problem: South Asia.

Analysis on South Asia tends to occur in silos that focus on either nuclear risks or terrorism risks; fewer studies investigate the overlap between the two.

But we've mapped the geography of high-risk locations and violence by non-state actors—that is, the target threat environment—in South Asia’s two states with advancing nuclear weapons programs, India and Pakistan. The low probability but high potential cost of an incident of nuclear or radiological terror merits greater attention from citizens and policy makers alike, and the requisite means, motive, and opportunities for an incident of terror via weapons of mass destruction or disruption converge in South Asia.

Yesterday, UCS sent a letter to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) chairman Stephen Burns urging the NRC to quickly issue new versions of two outdated security documents that play a critical role in defining how nuclear plants can be adequately protected against terrorist attacks.

The NRC requires nuclear power plants to be protected against radiological sabotage. The design basis threat, or DBT, specifies the characteristics of the attackers that a nuclear plant’s security plan must be designed to protect against (e.g., how many attackers and what sort of equipment they may have). The DBT includes both physical attacks and cyber attacks, and specifies that the attackers can include both outsiders and insiders.

In addition, the 2005 Energy Policy Act requires that every three years the NRC must stage mock attacks (known as “force-on-force” exercises) at each nuclear power plant to demonstrate that plant security forces can protect against the DBT.

President Barack Obama headed into the final days of his presidency with an unfinished nuclear weapons risk-reduction agenda. But as he prepared to hand off control of the nuclear arsenal to President-elect Donald Trump, his administration announced a further reduction to the U.S. nuclear-weapons stockpile.

In a Jan. 11 speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Vice President Joe Biden revealed that the administration had removed 553 reserve warheads from the military stockpile during the past year, reducing the arsenal to 4,018 warheads. Overall, the administration reduced the stockpile by more than 1,000 warheads since taking office in 2009. In periodically making public the warhead numbers over the past eight years, the Obama administration has been more open about the size of the nuclear stockpile than any previous administration.

The decision to retire additional reserve warheads came after Obama and his national security team for months had discussed measures to advance the nuclear risk-reduction goals the president first outlined in his April 2009 address in Prague.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) hosted its second triennial meeting on nuclear security in December. Several participants said that the meeting made some progress but was less successful than President Barack Obama’s series of nuclear security summits.

Representatives from 139 states attended the ministerial-level conference Dec. 5-9 in Vienna, the first high-level gathering on the topic since the end of the separate nuclear security summit process in April 2016.

JUST after Christmas, the Times’s science correspondent Oliver Moody provided a public and political service in exposing the worrying inadequacies of Britain’s nuclear safety and security regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

But while the article concentrated mainly on safety concerns, there are several security issues unresolved.

[...]

A report titled Outpacing Cyber Threats: Priorities for Cybersecurity at Nuclear Facilities, issued by the Washington DC-based Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) at the same IAEA conference, reveals that Britain’s nuclear sector has suffered two significant cyber security failures in the past: one in June 1999 at the Bradwell Nuclear Power Plant — when an employee intentionally “altered/destroyed data” — and in September 1991 at Sellafield — when a software bug led to “unauthorised opening of doors.”

The report asserts worryingly that: “The global community is in the early stages of understanding the magnitude of the cyber threat. In many ways, humans have created systems that are too complex to manage, in most cases, risks cannot even be quantified.”

In a forward to the report, experienced former US senator Sam Nunn, now co-chair of NTI, writes: “Governments and industry simply must get ahead of this rapidly evolving global threat.

“There’s no doubt that nuclear facility operators and regulators are aware of the threat.

“Unfortunately, many of the traditional methods of cyber defence at nuclear facilities — including firewalls, antivirus technology, and air gaps — are no longer enough to match today’s dynamic threats.

Renewing U.S.-Russian nonproliferation ties is vital since both countries have large stocks of nuclear weapons, advanced civilian and military nuclear complexes, and expertise in many nuclear and terrorism-related areas. Their cooperation has been responsible for important nuclear security successes, such as removing fissile material from vulnerable former Soviet bloc nuclear facilities.

Yet, while both powers want to deny other countries nuclear weapons, they often differ in their proliferation-related threat perceptions, preferred nonproliferation tactics, and the costs they are prepared to incur to avert further nuclear proliferation. For example, U.S. officials are more willing to sanction countries that pose a proliferation risk, while Russians are more worried about regime instability.

Russia’s exclusion from the G8 has weakened that Group’s nonproliferation functions, including its management of the Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. For more than a decade, the Global Partnership has conducted billions of dollars’ worth of nonproliferation projects in Russia, but now these have been completed or frozen due to tensions between Moscow and the West.

Washington and Moscow can, however, rely more on strengthening the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The GICNT endorses multinational training, exercises, and sharing of best practices in the prevention, detection, and response to nuclear incidents triggered by non-state actors. It also promotes use of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in civilian activities and enhancing the security of radiological sources that could be used to make dirty bombs. Importantly, while China is not a member of the G8, it is a leading player in the GICNT.

The threat of nuclear weapons has evolved and intensified over recent years. For the nuclear policy community, what opportunities for advocacy does this difficult strategic environment present? How should the community adapt to seize them?

To explore these questions, the Stanley Foundation commissioned an interview-based external assessment and convened a diverse group of experts for a two-day Policy Lab on Nuclear Security in September 2016. This report details the critical nuclear risks identified and provides an overview for the policy community of potential strategies, opportunities, and places for collaboration.

Nuclear weapons risks are manifold and can be seen through mounting pressure on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the deterioration of US-Russia relations, the fragility of the Iran nuclear agreement, brinkmanship in South Asia, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, complacency in global nuclear security governance, and challenges posed by emerging technologies.

As this Insights Summary highlights, this difficult environment increases the need for the nuclear policy community to identify strategies and adapt to address these complicated risks. Yet common problems within the community often make collaboration and seizing opportunities difficult. The field tends to be siloed, hindered by competing priorities, and lacks a broad base of public understanding and support. This makes unifying strategies and coordinated action elusive for stakeholders in the nuclear policy community.

A concerted, collaborative effort among key partners—including industry, nongovernmental organizations, national governments, and international institutions—will be essential to realize impactful strategies. This report aims to advance this effort by promoting shared perspectives of the strategic environment and the opportunities for action.

Reviewing recent developments in nuclear energy, it is clear that Northeast Asian countries have become the leading customers and suppliers of nuclear technology worldwide. However, regional cooperation in the nuclear field remains inadequate when compared to the close economic interaction between these states and their need for solutions to pressing issues, such as supply assurance and spent fuel management. At the same time, with events like the Fukushima accident or the ongoing nuclear crisis in North Korea, there is an urgent demand for Northeast Asia to improve the safety, security, and nonproliferation status of the regional nuclear programs as any nuclear-related incident in any regional state will have transnational impact on the economic and social stability of the whole region. Based on the status of nuclear power development and regional nuclear cooperation in Northeast Asia, this paper analyzes the common need for better safety, security, and nonproliferation of nuclear materials and facilities in the region. Just as cooperation in improving these issues can serve as a breakthrough for broader regional cooperation in the nuclear field, several opportunities for the establishment of a regional framework for nuclear cooperation are also identified based on current cooperation mechanisms like the Nuclear Security Summit or the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI). Such cooperative efforts will likely face challenges from the political animosity among Northeast Asian states. But consistent efforts from all parties, with focus on practical issues, will increase its chance of success, thus creating a safer, more secure atmosphere in nuclear Northeast Asian facilities, eliminating any proliferation purpose and serving as the basis for sustainable development of nuclear power, both regionally and globally.

While smugglers try to sell radioactive material for terrorists, Western spy services battle on several fronts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, uranium smuggling and drones, while at the same time combat terrorist attacks, for example, the truck attack in Berlin this week.

[...]

"People with knowledge on the area are surprised that there has not been a large scale attack with radioactive material. Certainly this is not due to the lack of supply," says Miles Pomper, an expert in radiological weapons at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington, D.C.

On December 7, 2016, the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) organized a lunch event during the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “International Conference Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions” in Vienna, Austria. The luncheon was a unique event for IAEA member states to interact with prominent nuclear security experts and establish new partnerships.

The panel was chaired by Ms. Irma Arguello, Founder and Chair of the Nonproliferation for Global Security Foundation and the Head of the Secretariat of the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network for Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation. The panel was composed of:

Dr. Matthew Bunn, Co-Principal Investigator of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs;

Mr. Hubert Foy, Senior Research Scientist of the African Centre for Science and International Security in Ghana;

Dr. Anita Nilsson, former Director of the Office of Nuclear Security for the IAEA and currently President of AN & Associates, an Associate Fellow of International Security at Chatham House and at the Partnership for Global Security;

Mr. Miles Pomper, Senior Fellow in the Washington D.C. office of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and Chair of the FMWG; and,

Ms. Elena Sokova, Deputy Director of CNS at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

How would our lives be affected, if terrorists managed to detonate a nuclear bomb in a capital city anywhere in the world? To what extent, and in which way, such act would change our present and our future, that of our country and of others?

Terror Unleashed is a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary Expert Group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for its project, the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network (LALN). It shows through systematic analysis how, if a nuclear detonation by terrorists were to take place, multiple negative impacts would spread promptly around the globe. It also estimates the dimension of those impacts.

The attack would trigger deep changes in all the meaningful dimensions of human activity, and in the way that countries and individuals relate to one another. Global disruption would affect, not only the balance of global and regional power and the levels of confidence between states, but also the legal framework that regulates international relations. Implications would surely reach military affairs, the global economy and the international trade with devastating consequences. As a result of panic, the behavior of individuals and societies worldwide also would be seriously affected. In the worst scenario, the escalation of conflicts could even lead to the use of nuclear weapons by states.

Last week I had the opportunity to attend the conference on nuclear security in Vienna sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The conference was enormous, with 2,000 participants from 130 countries. The US official delegation alone had over 100 people. I heard (but have not substantiated) that the ministerial meeting that preceded the technical meeting attracted a larger number of national delegations than any other IAEA conference in its history. By one measure—inclusivity—the conference seems to have been a success.

However, that success came at a price: a reduction of focus on the most serious nuclear threat—the theft of fissile materials (highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium) that terrorists could use to make improvised nuclear weapons.

The “nightmare scenario” of radioactive material being released from nuclear power stations using a cyber attack is being attempted by terrorist groups, the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) has warned.

[...]

Dr Patricia Lewis, Research Director of the International Security Department at Chatham House, told The Independent a cyber-attack on a nuclear power station was “a real risk”.

She said: “There’s an idea that the systems are protected…and that is a myth. Every system has vulnerabilities. We are seriously straying into what sounds like science fiction but isn’t. We are there now.”

Brian Finlay, president of the Stimson Center in Washington, which has been supporting the work of the Security Council committee since 2004, said the resolution requiring all countries to take action to prevent non-state actors from getting WMD "has provided a near unprecedented rallying point for global efforts to prevent terrorist acquisition of these weapons."

But challenges remain, he said, citing a steady increase in nuclear, biological and chemical incidents around the globe, "including notably by non-state actors." He also cited growing access to the internet and potentially illegal technology transfers, saying there is "evidence that terrorist groups with regional or global ambitions continue to seek weapons of mass destruction."

He called for civil society, industry and the general public to support the campaign against the growing threat of the world's most dangerous weapons falling into the wrong hands.

A former governor of Texas — the state that produces more crude oil, lignite coal, natural gas, refined petroleum products, and wind power than any other — would seem to be a natural choice for secretary of energy. Yet, assuming he is confirmed by the Senate, Rick Perry will face a paradox.

While the Department of Defense defends the country, and the Department of Treasury manages federal finances and supervises banks, the Department of Energy does not provide America’s energy. Yes, it markets hydroelectric power from dams run by the Army Corps of Engineers, but U.S. energy production is overwhelmingly a job for the private sector.

The Energy Department is a hodgepodge of organizations, some of which existed decades before the creation of the department in 1977. But it has two core missions: nuclear energy, weapons, and cleanup, which account for 68 percent of the department’s fiscal year 2016 budget; and research and development (including basic science) to advance cleaner or more efficient ways to produce and use energy, which constitutes 28 percent of its budget. The incoming secretary will need to marshal these nuclear and scientific capabilities to meet key national security challenges, including a resurgent Russia and the threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

The United States maintains stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile materials—plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)—that are much larger than needed. This material is a security risk, and is also expensive to store safely. Some of this fissile material has already been declared “excess to military needs” and is awaiting disposition. Even after that excess material is disposed of, however, the United States will still have far more material than it needs for its current or future arsenal. President Obama should declare additional material excess and schedule it for disposition as soon as possible. If done correctly, this would reduce opportunities for nuclear terrorism. It would also be a step toward making nuclear reductions more difficult to reverse.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 12 Dec 2016 00:00:00 CSTThe long awaited Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) entered into force on 8 May 2016. The tension between State sovereignty and the need for clear international guidance and standards has made the nuclear security journey a long one that still continues. The Amendment, in codifying a set of core nuclear security objectives and principles, strengthens nuclear security by extending the Convention beyond nuclear materials in transit and building additional (and much-needed) international norms for protection of nuclear material and facilities. However, the Amendment’s provisions are broad, with few specifics. The vague treaty language qualifies the requirements in that physical protection measures are applied only “insofar as reasonable and practicable”. While this provides States with flexibility in implementing their physical protection regimes, it leaves many issues open for later interpretation.

States are expected to interpret the Convention requirements and as necessary enact in their domestic context the primarily legislative and administrative requirements of the Amendment and its principles. Industry will be important to satisfying these requirements, especially because the Amendment states, “The prime responsibility for the implementation of physical protection of nuclear material or of nuclear facilities rests with the holders of the relevant licenses or of other authorizing documents (e.g., operators or shippers)”. This means industry will be called on to enact the relevant principles, which have been further detailed in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidance. Industry can either be passive and react to regulatory developments, or take the initiative to help establish cost-effective approaches to evidence compliance with the Convention and its amendments.

Participation at 3 side events: the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) lunch briefing; a panel on information sharing and the Consolidated National Nuclear Security Report sponsored by NTI, VERTIC, and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and a panel at a showing of the movie Last Best Chance

VIENNA – The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the global nuclear security architecture is taking further shape as it inherits the commitments of its member states from the defunct Nuclear Security Summit process and adapts to expectations for a mission expanding beyond its traditional nuclear safeguards and security work.

[...]

Joan Rohlfing, president and chief operating officer of the nongovernmental Nuclear Threat Initiative, said in an interview with NS&D Monitor that the declaration language is open to interpretation. She noted that the references to “all” nuclear material invite a reading that this includes military nuclear material. “States have been uncomfortable in making an explicit reference to so-called military materials, so they came up with some compromise language,” Rohlfing said. Otherwise, “I read this as being comprehensive and inclusive,” she said of the 2016 declaration.

[...]

Rohlfing agreed that the state should have ultimate control and responsibility over its nuclear materials, and added that institutions like the IAEA should play a leadership role in creating an accountability process. “Russia has been consistently promoting the centrality of the IAEA in nuclear material security, which is important,” she said.

“The reference to disarmament [in this week’s ministerial declaration] is interesting,” Rohlfing said. “There’s been an ongoing tension, first in the summit series, and now in the context of this forum, [on the] relationship between disarmament and nuclear material security.”

One of the reasons behind the success of the summit process, she said, is that it separated the two issues so the meetings could retain focus on nuclear material security without the “controversial nature of disarmament” getting in the way. The reference to disarmament in the latest ministerial declaration “really stood out for me,” Rohlfing said, because it is “an introduction of a concept that has been a divisive concept within the community into this nuclear security forum.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 09 Dec 2016 00:00:00 CSTThe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is abandoning its own staff’s proposal to withhold public disclosure of information regarding proposed and approved nuclear exports, including of nuclear weapons-usable material, according to a reply from the Commission to a complaint by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project (NPPP) at the University of Texas at Austin. The NPPP’s coordinator, Alan J. Kuperman, had urged the Commission, in an email dated October 11, 2016, to reject an NRC staff proposal that nuclear export applicants be encouraged to withhold public disclosure of such information and that “If an applicant does not withhold this type of information the NRC will withhold it on the issued license.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 08 Dec 2016 00:00:00 CSTIn 2014, the Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation initiative transitioned from a Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) product to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Information Circular 869 (INFCIRC/869). It has the support of 38 states that have committed to fully implement the IAEA’s nuclear and radiological security documents, continuously improve national and operators’ systems, and ensure that all nuclear management and staff are competent and accountable. The INFCIRC/869 has the potential to enhance international nuclear security norms, but it currently lacks a method for states to report on their progress.

The Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation Checklist was developed by the Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group (NSGEG) to help states understand, and share information on, the activities required to fully implement INFCIRC/869. It offers a practical tool for states to self-assess their national nuclear security systems and build confidence in their stewardship of nuclear assets. The three-page document was sent to the Washington, D.C.-based embassies of all 38 participating nations in June 2016, with a request to return completed checklists by October 2016.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 07 Dec 2016 00:00:00 CSTDuring the past decade, the international community and the Nuclear Security Summit process have given high priority to strengthening nuclear security world-wide. International peer reviews of national nuclear security regimes and of physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials has been identified as of key value for continuous improvement of nuclear security. The IAEA offers a number of advisory services, peer reviews, for various purposes. The International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) is the prevailing peer review service for nuclear security implementation, in parallel with other, more specified services. IPPAS has evolved through the past ten years into a broadly accepted service, available for all states. However, general and recurring periodic application of IPPAS will require a significant strengthening and increased capacity of the system to enable general and periodic and systematic implementation.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 07 Dec 2016 00:00:00 CSTEnsuring the security of nuclear facilities is a critical element in preventing theft of nuclear materials and sabotage that could result in a radiological release. While the international community has traditionally focused on improving physical security to prevent these outcomes by investing in the “guns, guards, and gates” trifecta, a newer threat has gained attention: the cyber threat. A cyber-attack perpetrated by a terrorist group on a nuclear facility could have physical consequences leading to either an act of theft or sabotage. This threat presents new challenges to facility operators as well as national authorities. Given the increasing reliance upon digital controls, it is expected that these challenges will only continue to grow.

A security lapse at a nuclear facility leading to theft of nuclear material or a catastrophic radiological release would have global implications—an incident anywhere would have consequences everywhere, and would cast doubt on industry-wide security practices. Therefore, all countries must have effective cybersecurity measures in place. Currently, government authorities and facility operators are struggling to keep pace with this new threat, battling issues such as high costs, bureaucratic inertia, highly complex systems, cultures of compliance, and a shortage of demonstrably qualified personnel. National and international guidance has evolved over the past year, but not quickly enough to address the growing gap between attacker and defender capabilities in cyberspace.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 07 Dec 2016 00:00:00 CSTToday, there are tens of thousands of radioactive sources in more than 100 countries that are used throughout medicine, industry, agriculture, academia, and government facilities for a variety of purposes, stored in thousands of facilities—many of which are poorly secured and vulnerable to theft by terrorists seeking to detonate a dirty bomb. These sources pose a serious threat and could be readily employed for use in a radiological dispersal device. Radiological terrorism is an increasing threat and states as well as the private sector must do more to secure these dangerous materials and keep them out of the hands of terrorists. A dirty bomb detonated in a major metropolitan area could result in economic losses in the billions of dollars as a result of evacuations, relocations, cleanup, and lost wages. In addition, panic and psychological impacts may contribute to the impact of a dirty bomb. Progress has been made in the past decade on securing radiological sources through efforts by the IAEA and various national and international programs. World leaders also have placed increased attention on radiological materials security in recent years through a series of Nuclear Security Summits. During the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, 23 countries issued a Statement on Enhancing Radiological Security and committed to secure their IAEA Category I radioactive sources by 2016. At the 2016 Summit in Washington, D.C., 28 countries and 1 international organization signed the Joint Statement on Strengthening the Security of High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources, demonstrating countries’ continued commitment to securing radiological sources. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) released a Radiological Security Progress Report in March 2016 that evaluated the progress of the 23 countries that agreed to secure their IAEA Category I sources by 2016. In addition, the NTI report provided an opportunity to encourage additional countries to similarly secure their vulnerable radiological materials. NTI’s report included eight specific recommendations on how to further improve radiological security around the world, such as by strengthening the international framework, accelerating the development and use of alternative technologies, and strengthening the role of the private sector. This paper highlights the key challenges in securing radiological materials and provides an update on opportunities to implement the eight recommendations from the March 2016 NTI Radiological Security Progress Report.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 07 Dec 2016 00:00:00 CSTWith entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) on May 8, 2016, and the culmination of the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities (CPP), as the amended convention is now known, can play an increasingly important role in efforts to strengthen the international nuclear security architecture. The CPP significantly enhances the international legal framework for nuclear security by expanding the scope of physical protection requirements and providing a direct linkage to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security guidance through incorporation of the Fundamental Principles.1 The CPP’s entry into force requires states parties to submit reports to the IAEA under Article 14 informing the IAEA of its laws and regulations giving effect to the convention—states parties were required to do so under the original CPPNM, but the scope of the reports will need to expand to reflect the expanded scope of the convention. Reporting builds confidence in the effectiveness of states’ security. In addition, entry into force of the CPP requires the IAEA, under Article 16, to convene a review conference in five years to assess the implementation and adequacy of the convention “in light of the then prevailing situation.” The review conference will provide an opportunity for states parties to assess the status of nuclear security progress and will provide a forum for dialogue on how to strengthen the global architecture and address remaining gaps in the system. Article 16 also provides for additional review conferences at periods of at least five years if requested by a majority of states parties. Regular review conferences would be an important mechanism for sustaining attention on nuclear security and ensuring continued nuclear security progress. For the CPP to fulfill its potential to play an important role in strengthening the international nuclear security architecture requires universalization and implementation of the CPP, including its reporting and review conference provisions. As a first step, states parties should agree to continue convening review conferences every five years indefinitely, without the need for a request from a majority of states parties on an ad hoc basis. In addition, for the review conference to be an effective tool for sustaining attention on nuclear security and ensuring continued nuclear security progress, states parties must carefully design the review conference process. This paper identifies key issues that states parties should consider when doing so, drawing lessons learned from review conference processes under other treaty regimes, and provides recommendations for the 2021 review conference, as well as for subsequent conferences.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 07 Dec 2016 00:00:00 CSTThe Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process was successful in raising awareness and in urging countries to move forward on issues such as the adoption of relevant treaties on nuclear security and improving accountability of fissile material. The entry into force of the amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), acceptance of the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC 869) by several states, and the removal of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from several countries were important results of the process.

Despite these achievements, the summit process failed to fully address important issues, including plutonium accumulation, military fissile materials, sabotage, and cyber security. The final NSS also failed to outline a clear post-summit strategy, leaving the future of nuclear security governance uncertain. Some participants attributed this failure to the lack of participation of countries like Russia at the 2016 summit. Other participants noted that Russia's absence reflected differences in views on the NSS agenda and on how to move forward but that, nonetheless, Moscow has economically contributed to the nuclear security fund and has continued to cooperate with the United States on nuclear security issues.

Winter is in the air in the glorious city of Vienna—but despite the allure of its traditional Christmas markets, the beauty of its Christmas decorations, and the hot Glühwein available on every corner, 2,000 government officials and experts from more than 130 countries and 17 organizations are hard at work just outside the town center at the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) second nuclear security conference—the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions (ICNS).

If a nuclear security agreement dies, but it wasn’t really about the nuclear security, does it matter who killed it? That depends on whom you ask.

In early October, the Kremlin decided to suspend its implementation of the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, which called for the bilateral elimination of American and Russian excess plutonium stocks. Key among the reasons cited by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his administration [link in Russian] for Russia’s unilateral suspension of the agreement, was the allegation that the United States had long ago violated the terms of the agreement by undertaking a plutonium disposition method not authorized by the agreement—a method that makes the disposed plutonium easily accessible for future weaponization. In other words, the United States chose to nix the agreement; Russia was simply making it official. The bilateral agreement thus became another victim in what has become an increasingly confrontational Russo-American relationship.

Technically speaking, Moscow is not wrong. The United States was well on its way to breaching the agreement, if not already in violation, because the plutonium disposition method that the Obama administration decided to adopt is far from proliferation-proof. Yet while this may be enough to satisfy the Kremlin’s narrative of Washington’s obstinate refusal to cooperate on critical security issues, the accusations hold little weight when placed in the larger context of plutonium disposition methods, and of Russo-American relations more generally. For this reason, it is worth taking apart the Kremlin’s allegations, to both test their validity from a technological perspective, and to draw lessons for the future of similar bilateral frameworks and for the future of US-Russia relations under a new administration in Washington.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 01 Dec 2016 00:00:00 CSTThis special report is a result of an FAS task force on French naval nuclear propulsion and explores France’s decision to switch from highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU). By detailing the French Navy’s choice to switch to LEU fuel, author Alain Tournyol du Clos — a lead architect of France’s nuclear propulsion program — explores whether France’s choice is fit for other nations.

Now that conferees have hammered out a 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, the House and Senate must vote on the final product. They may want to read this before casting their votes. Read on. The Editor.

Buried in the fine print of the defense authorization bills is a $50 billion earmark for an obscure facility in South Carolina. The facility, called the Mixed Oxide Facility or “MOX”, is a classic example of a good idea gone awry. Initially estimated to cost $1 billion to $2 billion, MOX is now estimated to cost $50 billion. On top of that, the Russians have just withdrawn from the arms control agreement on which MOX is based. So why is Congress funding this?

The program began in 2000 to fulfill a U.S. executive agreement with Russia. Under the agreement both countries would dispose of 34 metric tons of excess — and highly dangerous — weapons plutonium. The United States proposed converting it into a form called mixed oxide that could be burned in commercial reactors to generate electricity. That provided a double advantage: the plutonium would be physically converted into a form that was unusable in nuclear weapons, and the United States could sell the material to offset costs of production. Sales would pay for production. Plutonium disposition would begin in 2007 and finish by 2020.

Delays and Ballooning Costs

Construction did not begin until 2007, with cost then estimated at $5 billion. From there, cost estimates rose steadily. By 2013 the estimated cost had risen to $24 billion for both construction and operation. In early 2014 the high cost caused the Obama administration to propose putting the facility into cold standby and to assess alternative technologies. However, Congress kept adding money to keep the program going, arguing that more study was needed.

President-elect Donald Trump has promised to renegotiate international agreements to get “better deals” for the United States. A good place for him to start would be the U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), which obligates each country to dispose of 34 metric tons of excess plutonium from their military stockpiles, so the dangerous material cannot easily be reused for nuclear weapons. Collectively, this plutonium is enough for more than 15,000 nuclear bombs.

The agreement was originally signed by the Clinton administration in 2000 and amended in 2010, partly in response to a request by Russia. The agreement is a bad deal, at least for the United States. It commits the U.S. government to dispose of the plutonium by converting it into “mixed oxide” (MOX) reactor fuel and burning it in commercial nuclear reactors—a program that is now estimated to eventually cost U.S. taxpayers more than $50 billion and last 50 years or more.

There’s a sticking point, however. Under the terms of the agreement, the United States would have to obtain Russia’s consent to change its plutonium disposal method, just as Russia needed to obtain U.S. consent in 2010 when it wanted to pursue use of its plutonium as fuel for fast reactors instead of light-water reactors. Because the United States accommodated Russia’s request, it was hopeful that Russia would reciprocate, but instead Russia has criticized the U.S. proposal to switch to the cheaper, faster approach. Russia claims the method is reversible, implying that the United States could easily recover the plutonium to increase its nuclear weapon stockpile. That objection has little technical basis, however, and there are ways to address Russian concerns.

The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) is hosting an event this week in Virginia to bring together international government officials and nuclear industry experts to discuss radiological, nuclear and cyber security priorities.

[...]

Earlier this year, NTI’s Global Dialogue on Nuclear Security Priorities group began making recommendations to build an effective security system for all weapons-usable nuclear materials materials, which include highly enriched uranium and plutonium needed to build nuclear bombs.

The focus this week is to expand the number of participants from the industry in order to increase interaction between state-level officials and experts. Talks will build on work done by previous Global Dialogues on nuclear materials security, but also will explore various proposals for addressing cyber security at nuclear facilities and the security of radiological materials.

“Since its inception, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has encouraged governments to take ambitious action to reduce global threats posed by weapons of mass destruction, including the threat of catastrophic nuclear terrorism,” Joan Rohlfing, NTI president and chief operating officer, said previously in a paper on nuclear security priorities.

This week NTI is bringing international government officials, experts, and industry participants together to discuss nuclear, radiological, and cyber security priorities at the seventh Global Dialogue on Nuclear Security Priorities. This project is an international, cross-sector dialogue among leading government officials, experts, nuclear security practitioners, and other stakeholders. It was launched initially to help shape the Nuclear Security Summit process and strengthen global nuclear materials security. Since the conclusion of the Nuclear Security Summit process in early 2016, the Global Dialogue has made recommendations for sustaining high-level political attention and momentum on nuclear security.

This week’s event commences the third series of the Global Dialogue meetings, focused on bringing in more participants from industry to interact with experts and state-level officials for cross-sector dialogue. The two and half day event will build off of the work done by previous Global Dialogues on nuclear materials security, but it will also focus on radiological materials and cyber security. Overall, the aims of the Global Dialogue are to:

The US Department of Energy (DOE) has agreed to sell around 300,000 tonnes of depleted uranium hexafluoride to GE Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) for re-enrichment at a proposed plant to be built near DOE's Paducah site in Kentucky. The agreement paves the way for commercialisation of Silex laser enrichment technology.

GLE was selected by the DOE in 2013 to enter contract negotiations on the construction of a laser enrichment plant former at the former gaseous enrichment site at Paducah, Kentucky to re-enrich its inventory of high-assay depleted uranium tails. The tails, left over from previous enrichment operations, contain a lower proportion of uranium-235 than in naturally occurring uranium but can potentially be re-enriched for use in nuclear fuel.

GLE would finance, construct, own and operate the Paducah Laser Enrichment Facility, which would be a commercial enrichment plant licensed by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Re-enrichment of the 300,000 tonnes of tails would take place over 40 years, producing around 100,000 tonnes of "natural-grade" uranium which would be sold into the world uranium market. The balance of the material - low assay tails - would be returned to the DOE for disposition.

President Putin’s October 3rd executive order suspending the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) is the latest manifestation of the rising tensions between Russia and the United States. Signed in 2000, the PMDA committed Russia and the United States to the disposal of at least 34 tons of their respective stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium. Plutonium can be a central element in the creation of a nuclear weapon, and removing excess plutonium prevents it from falling into the hands of terrorists or from being used to build more nuclear weapons. Thus, the PMDA had a sound objective and the agreement was a valuable component of U.S.-Russia nuclear non-proliferation cooperation.

Russia’s PMDA withdrawal is an ominous sign for non-proliferation, once seen as an untouchable aspect of the U.S.-Russia relationship despite times of animosity. Though President Putin announced that he would not use any excess plutonium for the development of new nuclear weapons, there are no official oversight mechanisms for ensuring that both countries are, in fact, disposing of their weapons-grade plutonium. That opens the possibility that plutonium disposal could stall, leaving weapons-grade plutonium at risk of theft or being used to create additional nuclear weapons.

Russia cites various U.S. actions as the cause for suspending the agreement, including the Magnitsky Act, economic sanctionsrelating to Russia’s activity in Ukraine, and the increased presence of NATO in Europe. This signifies further muddling of nuclear non-proliferation issues with conventional bilateral disputes. Non-proliferation commitments have traditionally transcended conventional diplomatic disagreements, but now Mr. Putin has brought nuclear security back to a place of uncertainty where, considering its importance, it simply does not belong. Moreover, the collapse of the PMDA represents a dangerous step backward for nuclear security cooperation because it sends a global message that international non-proliferation is less important than bilateral disputes, and can be made less of a priority by other countries as well.

In October 2016, CNS expert Margarita Kalinina-Pohl traveled to the Republic of Moldova for discussions with the National Agency for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activities (NARNRA) on the implementation phase of the CNS-NARNRA collaborative project on tracking and locating orphaned and legacy radioactive sources in Moldova using new media tools. CNS launched this project in February and reported its initial findings in July.

In the earlier research phase of the project, NARNRA provided CNS with a list of 101 Soviet-era facilities known or suspected of working with or hosting radioactive sources. Using basic facility information, CNS researchers then collected former employees’ information from social media profiles, developed a database to organize this data, and used network analysis to identify the key individuals. The CNS team, composed of William Potter, Bryan Lee, Michael Duitsman, and Margarita Kalinina-Pohl, also developed an interview template—including guidelines, questions, and a set of visual aids featuring various radioactive sources—for NARNRA to use when interviewing subjects in the project’s implementation phase. At the October meeting, CNS and NARNRA experts revised and finalized the interview template. In addition to refining the template, NARNRA also added images of some sources which are likely to be found in Moldova.

The project implementation phase will include interviews by NARNRA representatives of those whose names were identified through network analysis and who have the highest degree of being “connected” to others through their shared experiences at the former Soviet enterprises where radioactive sources were used for research and commercial applications.

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has sought to remove weapons-useable highly enriched uranium (HEU) containing 20 percent or more uranium-235 from as many locations as possible because of concerns about the possibility of nuclear terrorism.

President Barack Obama worked to make this effort a global priority with biennial nuclear security summits between 2010 and 2016.

The primary focus of this HEU cleanout strategy has been on replacing HEU civilian research reactor fuel and uranium “targets” used in the production of medical radioisotopes with non-weapons-usable low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and targets. Eliminating the use of HEU in naval fuel was not on the agenda. Yet, naval reactors account for more than half of global HEU use and most of the global stockpile of HEU for nonweapons use.1 As the phase-out of other uses continues, naval reactors will become increasingly dominant among nonweapon users of HEU unless actions are taken to convert them as well.

Given the focus after the September 11 attacks on reducing the possibility of nuclear terrorism, prioritizing the elimination of civilian uses of HEU was understandable. The security at most civilian sites is typically much lower than at sites where naval fuel is fabricated and stored, but the continued use of HEU for nonweapons purposes has implications for nuclear weapons proliferation.

Russia announced last month that it is suspending cooperation under a 16-year-old agreement with the United States to dispose of 68 metric tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium as relations between the two countries continue to deteriorate.

In an Oct. 3 presidential decree, Russian President Vladimir Putin suspended the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, citing “unfriendly actions” by the United States and the “inability” of Washington to fulfill its obligations under the agreement.

Putin also submitted a draft law to the Russian parliament outlining conditions that would have to be met for Russia to resume cooperation. These include lifting all U.S. sanctions against Russia enacted in response to Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, compensating Russia for the damage caused by the sanctions, and reducing the U.S. military presence on the territory of NATO member states that joined the alliance after 2000, which covers eight neighboring countries that were part of the Soviet Union or its Warsaw Pact military alliance. The parliament approved the law on Oct. 19.

White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest told reporters on Oct. 3 that Russia’s decision to unilaterally withdraw from the agreement was “disappointing.” The United States “has been steadfast since 2011 in implementing our side of the bargain, and we would like to see the Russians continue to do the same,” he said.

North Carolina Sen. Richard Burr, whose prime mission as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee is to ensure the government wages an effective fight against terrorism, played a central role 11 years ago in relaxing U.S. controls over the export of bomb-grade uranium.

In 2005, the Republican lawmaker won passage of controversial legislation to ease restrictions on U.S. shipments abroad of highly enriched uranium – material that terrorists could employ to build a Hiroshima-type nuclear bomb.

[...]

The senator, who is seeking a third term, premised his 2005 legislation on fears that if Congress failed to ease particular export restrictions, it could impair Canada and four European countries from producing a crucial isotope, molybdenum-99, that’s used in making diagnoses. He warned that could lead to a shortage: Without the isotope, thousands of patients could be delayed in learning whether they had cancer or heart disease.

[...]

While it may have appeared to Burr and others in 2005 that isotope shortages were looming, a recent study of Medicare data by Harvard University’s Health Policy Institute found that expenditures on nuclear diagnostic procedures plummeted from a peak of $1.77 billion in 2006 to $641 million in 2014.

Twenty-six countries have stocks of highly enriched uranium. In addition to military use, HEU has numerous civilian applications. According to a 2015 report by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), global stocks of civilian HEU are as high as 137 tons, but this estimate has significant error margins given that no comprehensive inventory of civil HEU exists (total global HEU, including military stockpiles, is estimated at 1,377 tons). [1] Civil HEU reduction efforts are greatly hindered by poor global accounting. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), even the United States has failed to maintain an accurate inventory of the HEU that it has exported over the years, and attempts to balance the books could only account for 10 percent of the material. [2]

The global inventory of civil HEU is sufficient to build nearly 5,000 nuclear bombs. [3] Many civilian facilities that use or store HEU on-site lack adequate security. These facilities are often located in universities or other publicly accessible research centers. Given the difficulty posed by reconfiguring sites that were not built with physical protection in mind, upgrading security measures is not a simple task and can be cost-prohibitive.

The candidates for president of the United States continue to discuss preventing nuclear proliferation and the threat of nuclear terrorism, yet we hear little about how well prepared the nation is to manage the aftermath of terrorist use of an improvised nuclear device. Some may think the notion of such an attack is apocryphal. So allow me to explain just how likely such a possibility is, how devastating the result of such a detonation would be, and—in particular—just how poorly prepared the United States is to respond.

In 2005, Kofi Annan, former secretary general of the United Nations, said, “Nuclear terrorism is still often treated as science fiction. I wish it were. But unfortunately we live in a world of excess hazardous materials and abundant technological know-how, in which some terrorists clearly state their intention to inflict catastrophic casualties. Were such an attack to occur, it would not only cause widespread death and destruction, but would stagger the world economy ... [creating] a second death toll throughout the developing world.

In 2007, US Sen. John McCain was quoted as saying, “My greatest fear is the Iranians acquire a nuclear weapon or North Korea and pass enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) to a terrorist organization. And there is a real threat of them doing that. Just 55 kilograms, roughly 122 pounds of HEU, can be used to make a 10 kiloton IND, similar to the bomb dropped over Hiroshima."

In 2005, Graham Allison, director of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, asked, "Is nuclear mega-terrorism inevitable? Harvard professors are not known for being subtle or ambiguous, but I'll try to the clear. Is the worst yet to come? My answer: Bet on it. Yes.

Russia’s announcement on 3 October that it was suspending the 2000 agreement with the US to each dispose of 34 tonnes of excess military-use plutonium is an unfortunate departure from what had been the heyday of cooperation between the two superpowers in reducing nuclear dangers. The 68 tonnes of plutonium in question could produce on the order of 17,000 nuclear weapons. Removing it from military arsenals and making it unusable means that much less material would be potentially available to terrorists or anybody else intent on destructive purpose.

As argued in a recent joint report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Monterey, CA-based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Russia and the US should be doing the exact opposite, by ‘getting back on track’ with efforts to minimise and eliminate stocks of plutonium that had been produced for weapons purposes. Although the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), as it was called, has long been stalled over disputes over the disposition path and cost factors, it provided a good example of how the two powers could find ways verifiably to turn nuclear swords into ploughshares without harm to security considerations.

Russia’s complaint that the US was not fulfilling its part of the deal was correct in terms of debating points. The parties had agree to mix their excess plutonium with uranium to produce mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for use in certain nuclear power reactors. But the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility that the US was building at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina is behind schedule and at least $12 billion dollars over budget. It also turns out that MOX fuel is several times more expensive to produce than regular nuclear fuel, so the economics make no sense. Instead, the Obama Administration sought alternative methods of disposing of the excess plutonium, including by diluting it with a secret ingredient (literally – the inert compound called ‘stardust’ is classified) and burying it in an underground repository. But unless and until Russia agrees to this form of disposal, the US would technically be in violation of the agreement.

All sensitive nuclear materials must be protected to the highest standards, irrespective of origin or purpose, argues Mark Fitzpatrick, Executive Director, IISS–Americas, and co-author of a new report on this subject. Efforts to regulate the security of nuclear materials currently focus on the small proportion that are in the civilian sector, whereas the vast bulk are in fact in the non-civilian sector. The report demonstrates why strengthening the security of all weapons-usable nuclear materials is so important and suggests ways that this can be achieved.

When summit communiqués and international guidelines state that all nuclear material must be accorded the highest standard of security, it does not just mean the less than one-fifth of such material that is in the civilian sector. It means the standards also apply to nuclear material in the non-civilian sector, which is where the vast bulk of it is found.

Steve Brill’s terrific article “Are We Any Safer?” – the cover of the September Atlantic– describes both the progress and the follies of homeland security in the 15 years since the tragedy of 9/11. Brill provides a readable (and highly opinionated) overview of vulnerabilities that have been largely fixed, areas where hundreds of billions have been wasted, and remaining gaps.

One of the gaps that concerns him most is the ongoing danger of radiological terrorism. Brill notes the long-standing dispute in which the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) thinks radiological sources require a good bit more security than the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is willing to require its licensees to provide, leaving many dangerous radioactive sources far less secure than they ought to be. NNSA has offered help to facilities such as hospitals to enable them to voluntarily beef up security more than the NRC requires, but Brill reports that only 796 of the 1,503 hospitals using dangerous radiological material in the United States have gone ahead with the NNSA-funded upgrades.

There are a number of steps that can and should be taken quickly – not only in the United States, but around the world. Where a radiological source is part of a large machine such as a blood irradiator, the machines should be modified so that terrorists cannot take the source out without special equipment available only to the company technicians (something NNSA has been working with the companies that make such machines to do). Every dangerous source should have a camera on it and an alarm going to the local police, and should be in a locked room. Given the huge number of sources in use, and the open environments where they are used, it will never be possible to provide them with the kind of security that should be in place for highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium that could be used to make a nuclear bomb – but there’s a great deal more that states around the world can do to reduce the risk, for relatively low cost. And because plausible security measures for many of these sources will always be limited, it makes sense to replace the most dangerous sources with less dangerous technology wherever possible – such as machines that only create a beam of radiation when their electrical switch is flicked on.

Although some are cutting nuclear power reliance, others are embracing it in Europe and elsewhere. It is a stable non-carbon baseload source of electricity. Based on our research, many in the industry are worried about security issues, including what is getting built into new plants or into software and hardware upgrades of existing plants. This issue is increasingly important with the drive for plant efficiencies and digitalization as analog systems become obsolete. And nuclear facilities are indeed terrorist targets. Sabotage of a plant or theft and use of materials would make good theater – al-Qaeda knew this and ISIS knows this. Yet what we don’t know is how to address that threat and reduce our nuclear vulnerabilities across all nuclear facilities and related materials transport.

The annual London symposium of the World Nuclear Association will be held this week, the week of September 11. New leadership in the United Kingdom has put off its approval of a major new nuclear power facility - Hinkley Point – that had as lead investors/builders Electricite de France (EDF) and China General Nuclear Power (CGN) . The question is whom can you trust with critical national facilities? Even the US and others have restrictions on Chinese participation in certain critical industries. Many are watching as EDF and CGN will participate in the industry meetings. The bigger issue is the lack of good industry standards and ways to verify compliance with those.

Some industry leaders there will be trying to develop a broader consensus around industry’s role in improving security going forward. Especially with the end of the Obama-initiated nuclear security summits, most of the responsibility for driving security falls to international organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and national regulators. Industry is more agile than national and international bureaucracies and can help develop best operating standards, including ones that can be part of new plant designs – such as Hinkley Point. That agility in developing standards and good approaches to managing fast-emerging security risks is indeed what is needed – and the public should demand it. Industry needs to do more than simply seek invitations into the halls of the IAEA and other institutions to be part of their plays. Industry needs to be proactive on its own in addressing critical risks and invite in the IAEA and others to participate. Otherwise, our power plants risk being part of a production few want to see.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 dismantled a highly centralized multi-national government, leaving behind 15 newly independent states, an economy in chaotic transition, and an enormous nuclear weapons complex. The sudden meltdown of the military structures that had managed the Soviet nuclear arsenal for decades left destructive weapons, technologies, and materials exposed and vulnerable. Guards went for months without payment, leading some to desert their posts and leave tons of nuclear material and weapons entirely unguarded. Electricity shutoffs at facilities that could not afford to pay for basic utilities rendered entire security systems (alarms, surveillance cameras, etc.) useless. As security measures deteriorated, the risk posed by “loose nukes” intensified.

The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) was established in 1991 in order to assist the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union in transporting, safeguarding, and destroying its weapons of mass destruction. For over two decades the United States contributed funding and expertise to collaborative projects that prevented Soviet weapons, materials, technologies, and bodies of knowledge from falling into the wrong hands, but recent years have seen cooperation between the U.S. and Russia slow to a halt. While the two nuclear superpowers decrease cooperation on nuclear security and non-proliferation, the security threats posed by unsecured nuclear material, technology, and expertise still loom large.

The concept behind CTR originated as the USSR was thrust into a period of political crisis in the late 1980s and the stability and longevity of the Soviet Union became an open question. Prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the threat posed by nuclear material existing outside of command and control systems was not thoroughly considered or well understood. The fragmentation of the USSR therefore created a new nuclear risk for states to manage.

Editor's note: What follows is the text of an address given at the Asahi Shimbun Symposium in Nagasaki, Japan, late in July 2016.

Nuclear terrorism. My remarks, until now, have been about nation states and nuclear weapons. I want to turn now to the topics of nuclear terrorism and nuclear power.

At least in the United States, it is common for presidents and candidates for president to assert that the greatest threat to the national security would come from a non-national group, armed with a nuclear weapon, wishing to commit an act of terrorism in an American city. While concerns about that scenario have been with us for many decades, it is only since the end of the Cold War that they have replaced the specter of a nuclear exchange between nation states as the principal threat.

No one in America seems to doubt that there are homegrown terrorists, as well as terrorists from abroad, who quite plausibly would detonate a nuclear explosive device in an American city, if they could get their hands on one. Recall the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, which killed 168 people and was perpetrated by two Americans, and the attacks of September 11, 2001, committed by Al Qaeda and killing nearly 3,000 people. I would note that Japan had its own terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo, that launched fatal attacks 20 years ago against Japanese citizens using sarin gas, and dreamed of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device, going as far as making efforts to acquire the necessary nuclear material to build one.

The threat of nuclear terrorism has a different character than the threat arising form nation states launching a nuclear attack. As noted earlier, no one has any real defense against a nuclear strike conducted with ballistic missiles, but we have developed deterrence, as unsatisfactory as it may be, as a way to address that threat. Terrorism is also not amenable to any defense in which we should have confidence, but for a different reason than a ballistic-missile attack. The terrorist’s delivery system almost always involves an unconventional mode of attack, from a military perspective, such as a bus, train, truck, car, boat, or civilian airliner, all of which are regarded as essential means of transport in modern societies. But unlike a potential attack from a nation state, a terrorist attack may not be discouraged by deterrence, the threat of retaliation. Terrorist attacks are often conducted by those who are suicidal, and directed by those who do not have territory or a population that can be put at risk. Simply put, terrorists may value the deaths of those they wish to kill more than preserving their own lives or the lives of their followers. Such individuals and groups are with us today—ISIS comes to mind—and they are not good candidates for deterrence.

In mid-July, as an attempted coup was taking place in Turkey, many in the United States wondered whether U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stored at the Turkish airbase, Incirlik, were adequately protected against theft. Congressional Research Service Nuclear Weapons Policy Specialist, Amy Woolf, recently published a short article describing some of the security systems surrounding those weapons.

She identified that the 50 U.S. B61 nuclear bombs “are stored on racks in secure underground vaults, inside protective aircraft shelters. The shelters are within a heavily guarded security perimeter, with U.S. forces responsible for their security. Reports indicate that the security perimeter at Incirlik was upgraded in 2015, and includes double fencing, lighting, cameras, and intrusion detection devices. The bombs are reported to be 12 feet long and heavy. Even if someone gained access to the shelters and vaults, it would be difficult to move the bombs without proper equipment. The bombs are reportedly also equipped with Permissive Action Links (PALs), which prevent the arming and use of the weapons in the absence of an authorization code.

Most experts agree the bombs are generally secure from unauthorized use and that U.S. forces would likely thwart most attempts to access or damage the weapons. But experts note the base is not impenetrable, and the safety, storage, and use control features are designed to delay unauthorized intrusion, access, and use while security forces defeat the threat and restore control. Some have speculated that a determined actor, particularly one with inside assistance, might be able to access to the vaults and eventually disable the PALs and, possibly, employ a weapon. At the same time, others note that, even if this scenario were possible, the perpetrators would have to achieve this goal while U.S. and NATO forces employed all means necessary, including deadly force, to recover the weapon. In other words, while one can imagine a scenario in which the weapons might be at risk, the probability of such a scenario succeeding is extremely low.”

Nuclear terrorism – the threat by a terrorist group to obtain and use a nuclear weapon, or to acquire enough nuclear material to create and use a crude weapon or dirty bomb – poses a serious threat to the United States and its allies. A Pentagon review of U.S. nuclear policy indicated that nuclear terrorism is the “most immediate and extreme danger” facing the United States. With just 25 kilograms worth of highly enriched uranium (HEU), small enough to fit in a suitcase, terrorists could make a nuclear weapon capable of inflicting the same devastation as the bombs used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Terrorists could also lace conventional explosives with radiological material to create a dirty bomb. A dirty bomb, while not as lethal as a nuclear weapon, is considered a weapon of mass disruption due to the widespread panic associated with the weapon’s radiological fallout. According to a 2011 Congressional Research report, a dirty bomb detonation would have six major consequences: immediate casualties from conventional detonation, panic, economic disruption, long-term evacuations, exorbitant decontamination costs, and long-term casualties from cancer.

What Can Be Done?

To address these threats, the United States and Russia, the two countries with the largest stockpiles of nuclear material, have worked together to secure nuclear weapons and facilities. These programs have also been extended to other countries with nuclear facilities and materials that could be at risk.

There has been considerable progress over the last several decades to reduce the probability that terrorists might acquire nuclear material. These efforts include the complete removal of civilian highly enriched uranium from 30 countries and Taiwan and the conversion or closure of at least 94 research reactors that formerly used highly enriched materials.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 01 Aug 2016 00:00:00 CSTWith the rising threat of nuclear terrorism, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is poised to assume more responsibilities to help secure thousands of tons of nuclear materials around the world, in particular because the Nuclear Security Summits have ended. Yet the Agency is already short of funding for existing projects. An international Working Group convened by Partnership for a Secure America (PSA) released its final report examining ways in which non-state sources can help fund the IAEA nuclear security and technical cooperation activities.

The report, Strengthening the IAEA: Technical Cooperation and Nuclear Security, includes ten recommendations on how the IAEA can partner more effectively with the private sector, the nonprofit and donor communities, and with other international governmental organizations. The report notes that IAEA’s budgets, comprised almost exclusively of contributions from its Member States, have not kept pace with new mandates and growing demands for its services, including those in nuclear security and technical assistance. The Working Group believes that the IAEA should develop “a comprehensive strategy to diversify its revenue stream beyond reliance on state-based contributions.” The report’s completion and publication is an important milestone in a two-year project funded by Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY).

The Working Group was composed of individuals from seventeen countries, including former senior officials from the IAEA Secretariat, former Governors or Ambassadors who represented their countries at the IAEA, and other experts with IAEA experience.

“These experts have been working tirelessly for the past several months to complete this project,” said Dr. Andrew Semmel, Project Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of PSA, “and we are happy to have completed such a challenging and worthy task.”

Although President Obama trumpeted his commitment to nuclear disarmament at this year’s Washington Nuclear Security Summit and more recently during his visit to Hiroshima, the White House has so far only discussed in whispers a far more pressing nuclear weapons-related danger—that Japan and China may soon be separating thousands of nuclear bombs worth of plutonium from nuclear spent fuel each year. If this level of production occurs, South Korea and other countries will likely try to go the plutonium route. If President Obama is to have a lasting legacy of nuclear threat reduction, his administration needs to do far more than it has to clarify just how harmful this plutonium proliferation would be to keeping peace in East Asia and the world.

Japan has already accumulated about 11 metric tons of separated plutonium on its soil—enough for about 2,500 nuclear bombs. It also plans to open a nuclear spent fuel reprocessing plant at Rokkasho designed to separate eight tons of plutonium—enough to make roughly 1,500 nuclear warheads a year—starting late in 2018. The Japanese plutonium program has raised China’s hackles. China’s new five-year plan includes a proposal to import a reprocessing plant from France with the same capacity as Rokkasho. Meanwhile, South Korea insists that it should have the same right to separate plutonium as Japan has.

Each of these countries emphasizes that it wants to separate plutonium for peaceful purposes. Yet in each country, there are skeptics who respond whenever this argument is made by a neighbor. China and South Korea suspect that Japan’s large stockpile of plutonium and its plans to operate the Rokkasho plant are designed to afford Tokyo some latent form of nuclear deterrence, i.e. a nuclear weapon option. A huge new Chinese commercial plutonium separation program could give Beijing an option to make far more nuclear weapons than it already has. It is unclear what Russia might make of all of this, or North Korea. One possibility is that either might use such “peaceful” plutonium production as an excuse to further expand its own nuclear arsenal. China might do the same as deterrence to Japan. If Seoul joined in, it would be even more difficult to cap North Korea’s nuclear program.

Technology for Global Security is announcing the Global Nuclear Security Grand Challenge to answer the question: “What is the best system design for countries, companies, and other organizations to confidentially and securely verify in real time that 100 percent of their nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile material remains in their control and to aid in the recovery of any loss if it occurs?”

A great deal of progress has been made since the launch of the Nuclear Security Summits initiated by President Obama in 2010. The equivalent of 130 nuclear weapons' worth of highly enriched uranium (HEU) have been removed, and 14 countries have eliminated nuclear materials entirely. The summits have resulted in stronger cooperation and improved security practices around the world, and the legal basis for prevention of nuclear terrorism has been strengthened.

Nonetheless, stockpiles of material and weapons—and the consequent threat of nuclear terrorism—remains with us in 2016. The consumer internet services we use every day also empower terrorists to finance and organize themselves at an unprecedented global scale. The growth of nonstate actors and risk of divided loyalties among officials responsible for the security of nuclear material lingers. It remains unclear today how quickly or reliably the theft of such materials would be detected or recovered.

An act of nuclear terrorism resulting from such a theft could trigger war or an act of retribution, even if questions remain as to the origin of the stolen weapons or materials. Benjamin Rhodes, U.S. deputy national security advisor for strategic communications, noted the U.S. position at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit: “We embrace the notion that those nations that do pass nuclear materials to terrorists will be held accountable for that action through our nuclear deterrent.”

Russia has fulfilled is agreement under the US-Russia surplus weapons plutonium disposition agreement of 2000, Sergei Kirienko, head of Russia’s state nuclear corporation said. (Bellona, 06.15.16).

Russian President Vladimir Putin has sent a message of greeting to the participants in and guests of the high level meeting timed for the tenth anniversary of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, noting the need “to guarantee the safe keeping of nuclear materials, prevent their illegal circulation and protect them from encroachments by terrorists.” (Tass, 06.15.17).

“Since the early 1990s, there are multiple instances of collaboration among countries to minimize the threat of nuclear terrorism, including collaborations between the United States and Russia,” according to the U.S. Department of Defense’s new Nuclear Matters Handbook. (DoD.gov, June 2016).

On 11 April 2016, the VCDNP hosted Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs at the US State Department Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, for a seminar on the recently concluded Nuclear Security Summit process.

Ambassador Jenkins, in listing the many accomplishments of the six-year process, stressed that the Washington event that had just taken place (31 March to 1 April 2016) was not necessarily the last Summit, but only the “last in the current format”. What came next, however, was still mostly unclear.

The focus of the Washington 2016 Summit had been one of transition, Ambassador Jenkins said. It had looked both at what achievements had been made since the first Summit in 2010, and how those achievements might be sustained going forward. She pointed in particular to the five “Action Plans” (for the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), INTERPOL, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction) as vehicles for maintaining summit accomplishments, noting that sustainability would be at least partially achieved by strengthening international organizations such as the IAEA.

The Mayak Production Association in Ozersk, Russia is preparing to launch a production line that will allow its RT-1 reprocessing plant to handle spent fuel of VVER-1000 reactors at the end of 2016. (IPFM, 06.09.16).

Northwest Russia’s nuclear waste handler SevRAO has staged an exercise at Andreeva Bay to simulate an emergency situation, in which helicopter careens out of control, striking a truck carrying casks of spent nuclear fuel. (Bellona, 06.08.16).

Ukraine’s Khmelnitsky nuclear power plant hosted a full-scale exercise of response teams and forces on May 31-June 2 to practice prevention, response, protection, and assistance measures and enhancing the interface of nuclear safety and security, according to Energoatom. (Belfer Center, 06.08.16).

A shipment of plutonium from Japan arrived Monday at a South Carolina nuclear site, despite objections from Gov. Nikki Haley to her state being used as storage for such materials. (AP, 06.06.16).

"There are some problems of a cybernetic nature; [that is] when information about the orders given to use (nuclear) weapons could be deliberately corrupted,” former Ambassador of Russia Vladimir Lukin said. (Interfax, 06.08.16).

Head of the Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe Moshe Kantor noted chemical weapons attacks carried out by Islamic State in Iraq, their stated desire to carry out more attacks in Europe, and evidence militants linked to the attacks in Paris had also been studying a Belgian nuclear power plant. “This, combined with poor levels of security at a host of nuclear research centers in the former Soviet Union means the threat of a possible ‘dirty-bomb’ attack on a Western capital is high," Kantor said. (Reuters, 06.07.16).

This week the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced that 546 kilograms of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) shipped from Japan arrived in the United States.

The 331 kilograms of plutonium and 214.5 kilograms of weapons-grade HEU stored at the Fast Critical Assembly at Tokai-mura was one of the most attractive targets in the world for would-be nuclear thieves. The removal of this nuclear weapons-useable material was an important achievement in reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism (although Japan still possesses 10.8 tons of separated plutonium and 1.8 tons of HEU).

The U.S.-Japanese agreement to ship the material to the United States was first announced at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague. Two years later, in the days leading up to the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., the material was loaded onto the Pacific Egret and Pacific Heron, transport ships bound for the United States.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism meeting, which will take place in the Netherlands on June 15-16, coincides with the 10th anniversary of the initiative’s founding by the United States and Russia. (Arms Control Today, June 2016).

“Nuclear weapons, as in North Korea, and the specter of nuclear terrorism still threaten us all,” U.S. President Barack Obama said. (WHPR, 06.02.16).

The sports world was recently in a tizzy over revelations by the former head of Russia’s anti-doping laboratory – who has now fled the country – that he helped run a massive doping operation and cover-up that contributed to Russia’s impressive haul of medals at the 2014 Olympics. (Russian officials and athletes denied the charges.)

Many have expressed surprise that the special sealed urine bottles used for testing, believed to be “tamper-proof,” were not – Russian agencies were apparently able to open them and reseal them without the tampering being detected. They shouldn’t have been surprised. In an article(subscription required) seven years ago, a team examined 23 allegedly tamper-resistant products for collecting urine for drug testing and showed that all could be defeated easily. Tampering is especially possible when it isn’t the athlete alone trying to beat the system, but a concerted effort that includes insiders in the testing program, as in the alleged Russian case.

In fact, this is just one example of a much more widespread problem. With sufficient creativity, most types of seals, or tamper-indicating devices (TIDs) can be hacked. A study of 120 types of seals in common commercial and government use found that all 120 could be defeated in ways that would not be detected by the seal inspection protocols in use. Tampering was possible with materials available from any hardware store, and with defeat times averaging about five minutes. (That was the time to actually implement the scheme for defeating the seal; the time to figure out a workable scheme was much longer.) Seals and protocols for using them have improved since then, but the point remains: many seals are more vulnerable than people think, and the implications for nuclear security are even more important than the implications for keeping sports competitions fair.

Participating countries in a voluntary initiative to strengthen global capacities to prevent nuclear terrorism will meet in the Netherlands this month to discuss areas for future activities to strengthen nuclear security.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) meeting, which will take place June 15-16, coincides with the 10th anniversary of the initiative’s founding by the United States and Russia. Since 2006, the GICNT has grown to include 86 countries and five international organizations and conducted more than 80 multilateral activities.

Officials involved in the GICNT highlighted the meeting as an opportunity to expand regional cooperation among partner countries over the coming year and build on the three areas of focus for the initiative: nuclear forensics, nuclear detection, and response and mitigation. Working groups exist for each of these areas, in addition to an implementation and assessment group led by the Netherlands that oversees GICNT activities and coordinates other international efforts to prevent duplication.

According to Kees Nederlof, the Dutch coordinator for the implementation and assessment group, the value of the GICNT is that it is a practical, “hands-on partnership” that “provides fora that do not otherwise exist for facilitating dialogue and cooperation among communities of experts within and across governments to identify needs and build national capacities in applying nuclear security principles.”

The fourth and final nuclear security summit saw some serious progress, but also some missed opportunities.

On the progress side:

Enough states ratified the 2005 amendment to the Physical Protection Convention to finally bring the amendment into force. That will provide a somewhat stronger legal foundation for nuclear security efforts – and will trigger a review conference that some hope could be a key new element of the nuclear security architecture.

China and India joined in the Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation Initiative, thereby committing to achieve the objectives of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security recommendations and accept peer reviews of their security arrangements.

Japan and the United States removed hundreds of kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium from the Fast Critical Assembly in Japan, as promised at the last summit.

States agreed to 18 new group commitments or “gift baskets,” on topics ranging from protecting against insider threats to replacing radiological sources with less dangerous technologies. Probably the most important of these was the commitment to create a “Nuclear Security Contact Group”—a set of senior officials that will keep meeting on the margins of the IAEA General Conference—to keep at least moderately high-level attention focused on nuclear security.

On the missed opportunity side:

We still have no progress toward building a global commitment that all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials, wherever they may be, need to be secured against the full spectrum of plausible adversary threats.

During the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Belfer Center experts published reports and provided commentary and analysis on successes and continuing challenges in nuclear security around the world. Following are some actions they believe are needed to improve the security of nuclear facilities and reduce the possibility of nuclear theft and terrorism.

The role the IAEA plays in global nuclear governance…makes it an indisput­able bargain…The IAEA deserves the continuing financial and material support of the international community in fulfilling all aspects of its mandate.

In the foreword of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Index 2016, Sam Nunn, NTI Co-Chairman and CEO, asked an important question in the context of the last Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) held in Washington, DC: “Without the high-level attention and impetus provided by the summits and with so many competing priorities in a deeply unsettled world, can governments remain focused on the need to tighten nuclear materials security?”

It is true that the global threat environment has worsened over the last decade but measuring the performance of mature and stable nuclear weapons states (NWS) against new and developing NWS seems like an unfair comparison. India and Pakistan are in their eighteenth year of nuclearisation and in this time period, these two countries have not only institutionalised robust command and control structures but have also developed an efficient nuclear security culture, established export control regimes in their respective countries, and have worked with the IAEA and other nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives to strengthen the very regime that has kept them out as pariahs.

Between the de jure nuclear weapons states, there is rich nuclear experience equivalent to a cumulative 310 years, broken down individually to: 71 years of US nuclearisation; 67 of Soviet/Russian; 64 of British; 56 of French and; 52 of Chinese. Moreover, the US has provided nuclear weapons to non-nuclear NATO countries as part of nuclear sharing, a practice that violates the principles of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) by transferring direct or indirect control over nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 25 May 2016 00:00:00 CSTBulletin of the Atomic Scientists

What keeps me up at night—US East Coast time—is reading Turkey's morning news concerning Syria and Iraq. The insomnia is especially severe when my thoughts turn to nuclear security not just in Syria and Iraq but in countries throughout the Middle East.

All participants in this roundtable agree that, despite the achievements of the Nuclear Security Summits, the threat of nuclear terrorism is not necessarily diminishing. In the Middle East, nuclear terrorism seems a particularly immediate concern. True, the region lacks large quantities of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. But its political instability and its tendency toward violent extremism are conditions that can enable nuclear terrorism.

According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index, published by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), Middle Eastern nations rank poorly when it comes to safeguarding their nuclear materials from theft. Of the 24 countries that possess at least 1 kilogram of weapons-usable nuclear materials, two are Middle Eastern: Israel and Iran. The Index ranks these countries near the bottom of the theft-protection list. Israel comes in at number 20 and Iran at 23.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 23 May 2016 00:00:00 CSTCenter for Public Integrity

Ninety-six aboveground, aquamarine pools around the country that hold the nuclear industry’s spent reactor fuel may not be as safe as U.S. regulators and the nuclear industry have publicly asserted, a study released May 20 by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine warned.

Citing a little-noticed study by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Academies said that if an accident or an act of terrorism at a densely-filled pool caused a leak that drains the water away from the rods, a cataclysmic release of long-lasting radiation could force the extended evacuation of nearly 3.5 million people from territory larger than the state of New Jersey. It could also cause thousands of cancer deaths from excess radiation exposure, and as much as $700 billion dollars in costs to the national economy.

[...]

Panel member Frank von Hippel, an emeritus professor and senior research physicist at Princeton University, said that in its “deeply-flawed” cost-benefit analysis, the NRC also excluded consideration of the consequences of property contamination more than 50 miles from a radiation release, even though a broader release is clearly possible. He said the NRC further used outmoded statistical estimates for the value of a human life, did not incorporate potential tourism losses after an accident, or consider the potential costs to the economy if a major accident forced multiple reactors to be shut down.

Barack Obama has placed two goals at the heart of his presidency: the reduction of global nuclear weapons and the stemming of nuclear proliferation. But his budgets have moved America away from both objectives, critics say.

[...]

Spending on the International Nuclear Security Program, in particular, an effort to help other countries control their nuclear materials, is poised to be halved from its fiscal 2012 level, according to Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

[...]

"The fiscal year 2017 budget request once against demonstrates the disturbing trend of cuts to critical nuclear security and nonproliferation programs being a bill payer for major increases to nuclear weapons programs," says Kingston Reif, a nonproliferation expert with the Arms Control Association. "Not only does this not make smart national security sense, it also contradicts the administration's stated priorities, which are that nuclear terrorism and nonproliferation are the highest nuclear priorities, not nuclear weapons modernization."

[...]

“You could spend additional money very well on programs that could reduce the threat to the United States from terrorists,” said Miles Pomper, a senior fellow with the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and a leading expert on nuclear proliferation.

WASHINGTON: Just before President Barack Obama hosted the last biennial Nuclear Security Summit of his presidency, Belgian authorities reported chilling evidence. Affiliates of the terrorists who attacked the Brussels airport and subway system had also installed a surveillance camera outside the house of a senior nuclear worker. This incident follows other instances of sabotage and extremism within the country’s nuclear industry, raising fears that terrorists want to cause a major nuclear accident or seize nuclear material that could perhaps be turned into a "dirty bomb."

The nuclear summits, among Obama’s most successful national security innovations, have made considerable progress in raising awareness about this post–Cold War danger and securing measures to avert it, but the discovery in Brussels serves as a reminder how serious the global threat remains.

Since the end of the Cold War, a variety of terrorist groups have tried to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and the threat has increased in recent years. The so-called Islamic State and other contemporary terrorists have employed chemical weaponsin several countries and seek even more powerful nuclear weapons.

The March 31-April 1 Nuclear Security Summit exhibited all the pomp and fanfare characteristic of such events—the “family photos” of 50 odd world leaders, the motorcades, fancy dinners, and bustling entourages. Yet, the motorcades departed Washington without building a sufficiently strong framework for nuclear security and the end of such meetings raises doubts about whether it will be built in the future.

To be sure, the fourth and final summit made important progress in developing a genuine international regime to prevent nuclear terrorism. In particular, President Obama announced that an important nuclear treaty—an amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) would soon enter into force, more than a decade after it was opened for signature. The amendment broadens the scope of the underlying international treaty which was previously limited to ensuring sufficient locks and guards for nuclear material while it was international transit. States that sign up to the amendment also pledge that they will provide sufficient guns, guards, and gates while the material is on their own soil.

Other notable achievements came in the form of “gift baskets” or “joint statements.” Such commitments brought together subgroups of summit members who pledged to take faster action on particular issues. For instance, a gift basket signed by 22 countries built on one of the summits’ prime areas of progress: minimization of highly enriched uranium (HEU) used in research reactors and other non-military applications The statement, which calls for the ultimate elimination of HEU from civil uses, committed the signatories to a number of specific goals, including short-term efforts to curb trade in HEU and its use in medical isotope production. It also established several mechanisms for monitoring further progress in the area including voluntary reporting to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a 2018 international conference organized by Norway.

The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) was an international politics extravaganza involving leaders from more than 50 countries. And it didn't make a ton of sense.

[...]

"A radiological dirty bomb is a psychological weapon and it's an economic weapon. It's not going to kill thousands of people, but it is going to contaminate pieces of economic value that will need to be rebuilt," explained Ken Luongo, currently president of the Partnership for Global Security and formerly a nonproliferation expert at the US Department of Energy.

[...]

"The real problem is that... there are literally tens of thousands of radioactive sources that are used in medicine, energy exploration, and a variety of other applications that go missing with regularity," Luongo said. "Most of these are no bigger than your thumb."

[...]

Nor are they kept very good track of. The rules governing such radioactive sources are "a patchwork of various recommendations, guidelines, but nothing binding," said John Bernhardt [sic], a Danish diplomat with decades of experience in various organizations dedicated to monitoring, controlling, and eliminating WMD of various sorts. "There's an obvious lack of common binding standards how one should establish and maintain their nuclear security."

April 7, 2016—At last week’s 2016 Nuclear Industry Summit, hundreds of senior nuclear industry leaders from around the world gathered in Washington, D.C., to discuss the industry’s global role in securing nuclear materials and installations. Organized by the Nuclear Energy Institute, the NIS was an official side event of 2016’s intergovernmentalNuclear Security Summit that brought together the heads of state from more than 50 countries to discuss similar topics.

Partnership for Global Security President Kenneth Luongo spoke at the joint session. Luongo shares with Nuclear Energy Overview his thoughts on the most pressing security issues at nuclear energy facilities at home and abroad.

The nuclear weapon used by the United States on August 6, 1945, to destroy the Japanese city of Hiroshima contained about 60 kilograms of enriched uranium. It was simple: One piece of uranium metal was fired at another to make a supercritical mass and generate the nuclear explosion. Starting in the 1970s, but especially since the attacks on the United States in September 2001, there has been concern that terrorists could acquire enriched uranium and make such a simple weapon. To do so, they would need to gain access to several tens of kilograms of material enriched to more than 20 percent uranium 235, i.e., highly enriched uranium (HEU). As of the end of 2014, the global stockpile of HEU was estimated to be about 1,370 tons, sufficient for more than 20,000 Hiroshima type weapons. A new report from the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) proposes that it is necessary and feasible for all production of HEU for military and civilian purposes to be banned.

The Nuclear Security Summits of 2010, 2012, and 2014 sought to focus the attention of world leaders on increasing the security of HEU (and separated plutonium, the other material that can be used to make a nuclear weapon) and minimizing the use of HEU. The primary concern has not been on reducing the almost 1,000 tons of HEU that is in operational and retired nuclear weapons and in nuclear weapon complexes—about 90 percent of which is in Russia and the United States—or the about 300 tons of HEU in naval fuel or set aside for this use. The target has been the smaller amounts of relatively less secure HEU that is used for civilian purposes: as research-reactor fuel and neutron “targets” for producing medical radioisotopes.

President Barack Obama on Thursday will convene a fourth and final global nuclear security summit – an initiative that began six years ago principally as a result of his passion for the issue.

But while the president prepares to cajole participating leaders from 52 countries into making new commitments to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism, U.S. experts are frustrated by his administration’s reduced spending on international nuclear security.

“I think we should have a basic policy that no project that offers any significant promise of reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism should ever be delayed by lack of funds,” said Matthew Bunn, a former adviser to President Bill Clinton on nuclear security in the former Soviet Union, at a forum last week organized by the Fissile Materials Working Group. “The next president and Congress should work together to make sure that that’s true.”

[...]

In its fiscal 2017 budget proposal, the administration asked for $185 million less than it projected it would request in last year’s budget request for counterterrorism and nonproliferation programs in the National Nuclear Security Administration, said Kingston Reif, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association.

[...]

“These budget requests do not match the growing threat and they certainly don’t match the fact that you are having a presidential nuclear security summit,” said Andrew Bieniawski, a former deputy assistant secretary of Energy who ran the NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative during both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations.

[...]

Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security, which advocates for U.S.-Russia nuclear security cooperation, made a plea for Congress to ignore the president’s NNSA nuclear security budget proposal and to provide much more funding, particularly for securing vulnerable radiological materials.

In his oft-cited Prague speech of 2009, Barack Obama announced "a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years." The effort's highest-profile element was a series of Nuclear Security Summits that began in Washington in 2010 and concludes, again in Washington, in 2016. Clearly the initiative hasn't "secure[d] all vulnerable nuclear material," much less done so within four years. But that isn't necessarily to say that the effort has failed—or that it shouldn't be perpetuated. Below, experts from Ghana, Turkey, and the United States debate how much the Nuclear Security Summits have accomplished; what still must be achieved to ensure the security of nuclear materials worldwide; and whether, after the final scheduled summit, the international community should seek to continue the process.

[...]

25 MARCH 2016

Sustaining progress in nuclear security without the summits—an African view

Some—the Russian government, for example—argue that the Nuclear Security Summits have exhausted their ability to mobilize the international com­munity to secure nuclear materials.This argument is incorrect and dangerous. Nuclear and radiological terrorism continues to pose a threat and will do so for the foreseeable future. And though the summits have made good progress toward achieving their agenda, much unfinished business remains.

The renewal of armed conflict between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave can potentially have global ramifications, participants at the recent nuclear security summit in Washington cautioned.

A concern articulated in national progress reports prepared for the March 31-April 1 summit by several Eurasian governments was how corrosive the region’s ethnic and border disputes are to global nuclear security. The chaotic conditions that accompany such conflicts can make it easier for terrorists and criminal groups to get their hands on, and transport, nuclear or radioactive materials that can subsequently be used in a terror operation.

The most alarming report came from Ukraine, which stated that “Russian military aggression in eastern Ukraine and … [the illegal annexation of] Crimea pose new threats to the national system of nuclear and radiation security.” Such threats include the possibility of sabotage at nuclear facilities, the loss of regulatory authority over radioactive waste storage sites, and degraded border security and social stability.

The just-concluded fourth and final nuclear security summit saw some serious progress, but also some missed opportunities.

On the progress side:

Enough states ratified the 2005 amendment to the physical protection convention to finally bring the amendment into force. That will provide a somewhat stronger legal foundation for nuclear security efforts – and will trigger a review conference that some hope could be a key new element of the nuclear security architecture.

China joined in the strengthening nuclear security implementation initiative, thereby committing to achieve the objectives of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security recommendations and accept peer reviews of its nuclear security arrangements.

AT THE outset of his presidency, Barack Obama laid out a vision of a nuclear-free world in what became known as the Prague speech. Such was the mood of optimism that Mr Obama was prematurely awarded the Nobel peace prize. Mr Obama did manage to get a new strategic arms-control agreement with Russia soon after and last year saw what the president almost certainly regards as his greatest foreign-policy achievement: the nuclear deal with Iran. Those apart, there is not much to show for that early statement of intent other than a series of four Nuclear Security Summits, the last of which wrapped up in Washington on April 1st.

The main aim of the summits has been to create a better system of global safeguards to ensure that nuclear material, specifically highly enriched uranium and plutonium, which could be used by terrorists to construct a so-called “dirty bomb”—or even a fission bomb—does not get into the wrong hands.

[...]

That said, evidence of terrorist outfits actively seeking nuclear capability is scant. Mark Fitzpatrick, director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the Americas and a nuclear non-proliferation expert, points out that nothing resembling a black market for nuclear material has yet emerged. In the overwhelming majority of known cases involving the attempted sale of nuclear or

The Russian decision to boycott this week’s Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. will probably not have much of an impact, negatively or positively, on the future of the nuclear nonproliferation architecture. After all, Russian experts continue to contribute helpful insights to nuclear security studies and dialogue.

Meanwhile, the Russian government has not tried to sabotage the summit by encouraging (or coercing) other governments to skip the session — as the Soviet government did in 1947, with the conference that launched the Marshall Plan.

Yet, the Russian absence has not made it noticeably easier to achieve better results at this meeting — unlike Moscow’s boycott of the UN Security Council in the summer of 1950, which allowed the United States and its allies to use the United Nations to support their military defense of South Korea from the Soviet-backed invasion.

“The insider threat is one of the most difficult to deal with, as this hinges on the ability to screen employees and figure out the nature of their intentions,” said Page Stoutland at the U.S.-based Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), citing recent reported incidents in Belgium.

[...]

The risk of cyber attacks is also increasing. Most nuclear plants were built before the internet or even the computer age, and their control rooms run on 20th-century analog technology. But the NTI says that nuclear plants are now digitalising quickly, increasing the risk that hackers could commandeer them.

Experts available for comment at the Summit and for post-summit analysis.

Washington, D.C. – Friday, April 1, 2016 – As the final Nuclear Security Summit concludes with several key announcements and action plans to safeguard the world from nuclear terrorism, leading experts from the Fissile Materials Working Group(FMWG), a coalition of 80 international organizations, today called for further immediate action on a global effort to prevent radiological materials from being acquired by terrorists and used in a dirty bomb, in addition to other steps to prevent nuclear terrorism.

Matthew Bunn, of Harvard University’s Belfer Center noted, “with very troubling indicators emerging from the investigation in Belgium that the Islamic State may be pursuing nuclear or radiological attacks, new and immediate international actions are needed. ”

Bunn was joined in his assessment or the urgency of the issue by Andrew Bieniawski, of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, who emphasized, “Once again a terrorism issue of the most urgent nature – radiological material and the threat of ‘dirty bombs’ – has not received the priority it needs, given the growing threat. We need a new global effort to secure the most vulnerable sources in the next two to three years.”

The FMWG applauded the long-awaited final ratifications of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) that will allow it to enter into force in 30 days. The group was also pleased to see their specific recommendations incorporated into the Gift Basket on Minimizing and Eliminating the Use of HEU announced today. It also lauded the affirmative move by China to join the Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation initiative, which makes the voluntary nuclear security recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency politically binding. Both are direct results of the Nuclear Security Summit process initiated by President Obama.

However, despite progress on a variety of fronts during the past four summits, serious gaps in the nuclear security system will still remain after the last NSS ends on Friday. The current US administration, as well as the next, should commit themselves to immediately pursuing policies that will address the gaps in nuclear security that remain.

“We need a global commitment that all nuclear weapons and all materials that could be used to make a nuclear weapon, wherever they may be, must be secured against the full spectrum of plausible adversary threats,” said Bunn. “For nuclear weapons and military materials, one possibility would be a discussion among technical experts of the Permanent Five to lay out essential elements of an effective nuclear security system.”

Ken Luongo, co-chair of FMWG and president, Partnership for Global Security pointed out that “the bridge to addressing these issues is a political one, not a bureaucratic one, and it requires sustained leadership at the highest level.”

Following are additional commentaries and observations on the 2016 Summit outcomes from the FMWG and several of its experts:

FMWG Statement:

Nuclear and radiological terrorism remain real and serious threats to the global community. Any nuclear terrorist event anywhere in the world will have profoundly negative consequences for the economies, societies, and security of all nations. The Nuclear Security Summit process has resulted in substantial progress in improving nuclear and radiological security and strengthened barriers against nuclear terrorism. But there is much more to be done, building on the value created by the nuclear security summits, and international institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. See the full statement of the 2016 Nuclear Knowledge Summit: Solutions for a Secure Nuclear Future here.

“On day one, the next President must have a specific action plan to address the threat posed by ISIS and other terrorists. That plan must absolutely include plans to secure the nuclear materials that can be potentially used to make a dirty bomb or crude nuclear device.”

“Although the entry into force of the CPPNM amendment is welcome and long overdue, it is only a first step in building a true nuclear security regime. It doesn’t cover important threats—radiological and military materials—or provide sufficient standards on how to protect against those it covers. Leaders have put down a cornerstone but the rest of the building still needs to be built.”

Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association:

“Russia’s withdrawal from the final summit was unfortunate, and an enormous missed opportunity for international leadership. With the summits ending, leaders cannot afford to let nuclear security fall off the political radar. New threats to the nuclear security system will continue to emerge, and without decisive action to build a comprehensive regime, the risks of nuclear terrorism will grow unchecked. ”

About the Fissile Materials Working Group:

The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) is a non-governmental coalition of 80 civil society organizations from around the world working to provide actionable policy solutions to keep the world safe from nuclear terrorism. The internationally recognized experts affiliated with the FMWG have agreed upon 5 Priorities that outline smart, common sense criteria that should guide the international response to this shared global threat.

Mounting fears that terrorist groups such as ISIS are pursuing nuclear weapons are looming over President Barack Obama's Nuclear Security Summit, with a session devoted exclusively to the organization on the final day of meetings on Friday.

[...]

The Belfer Center's Matthew Bunn also noted the case of Ilyass Boughalab, a former worker in "the vital area" of a Belgian nuclear power plant who traveled to Syria to join a militant group.

He acknowledged that the Belgians have since taken some action to secure their nuclear facilities, including adding cameras, regulations and armed guards, but he said a "more intense effort to lock down this nuclear material" was needed worldwide.

This is why the report said leaders gathering at this year's Nuclear Security Summit face "an important crossroads," with additional cooperation and funding to enhance nuclear security badly needed.

We don't know what the terrorist threat is going to look like two years, five years, 10 years from now," Bunn said. "And to me that's even stronger reason to lock down all the ingredients of a potential nuclear recipe, wherever they may be so that whatever that terrorist threat is, they can't get access to that kind of material."

WASHINGTON-- Still reeling from attacks in Brussels and Paris, world leaders are wrestling this week with the chilling prospect of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or other extremists unleashing a nuclear attack on a major Western city.

The terror attacks in Brussels are raising new questions about the security of nuclear plants, CBS News correspondent Jericka Duncan reported.

[...]

Detonated in a major city, a dirty bomb could cause tens of billions of dollars in economic damage, said Andrew Bieniawski, who studies materials security at the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

[...]

Detonated in a major city, a dirty bomb could cause tens of billions of dollars in economic damage, said Andrew Bieniawski, who studies materials security at the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

World leaders can make progress in preventing nuclear terrorism and simultaneously support the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement if they can connect the dots between the carbon-free world that we need and the strengthened nuclear security regime that is required to support it. These interconnected issues need to be the focus at the upcoming and final Nuclear Security Summit in Washington on April 1.

There is little doubt that if terrorists acquire nuclear material they will use it. Al Qaeda long ago pledged to obtain a nuclear device. ISIS recently shadowed a nuclear official in Belgium, a country with fissionable nuclear material. High intensity radioactive sources used for medical and industrial purposes - and the key component of a dirty bomb - go missing with regularity.

These threats, fed by serious gaps in the global nuclear security system, undermine international confidence in nuclear power, an essential non-carbon emitting energy source that is growing to meet climate pledges in Asia and expanding to conflict ridden regions like the Middle East.

Washington, D.C. – Nuclear security experts representing a coalition of 80 international organizations called for immediate and strong action by the Obama administration and world leaders to prevent nuclear and radiological materials from being acquired by terrorists.

Speaking at a press briefing at the National Press Club hosted by the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), five experts cited the urgency of action now – action that was promised seven years ago but has fallen dangerously short of safeguarding against nuclear terrorism.

Each speaker echoed the theme that the threat of nuclear terrorism cannot be overstated. They urged action that is rigorous, comprehensive and sustainable, and outlined what the policy community sees as the five priorities governments should take at the Nuclear Security Summit and beyond to prevent a nuclear or radiological terrorist attack. The speakers pointed to recent nuclear-security related incidents in Belgium as a tangible example of the potential cost of delay.

Miles Pomper, senior fellow, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and co-chair, FMWG:

“The tragic events in Brussels brought home again the danger of terrorism. Belgium is not alone; this is a global problem. Since President Obama inaugurated the Nuclear Security Summit, world leaders have taken some important actions to stop terrorists from getting nuclear materials… Frankly, they have not done enough.”

“The uncertainty around terrorist threats makes it all the more important to lock down everywhere in the world the essential ingredients of a nuclear recipe.”

Bunn announced the release of a new Harvard Belfer Center report that documents the threats and gaps in nuclear security, noting that “substantial progress has been made in the last 25 years, but it has slowed recently, and budgets to fund further progress are being cut.”

An issue of significant urgency and danger is the threat of nuclear terrorism from radiological sources – a ‘dirty bomb.’ Radiological material is abundant around the world in medical facilities, academic institutions and research locations – in thousands of sites – in over 130 countries around the world. The recent attacks in Belgium should serve as a warning and wake up call to do more. Many more countries must take urgent steps to meet the growing threat.”.

“No country can achieve nuclear security in a vacuum. Countries are affected by the choices of their neighbors and by global shipping, supply chains, and financial systems. National measures to strengthen nuclear security are essential, but most effective when paired with regional and international actions. With the end of the summit process imminent, we cannot afford to let nuclear security fall off the political radar.”

“Ultimately, I think we’re going to end up insufficiently prepared for how this problem is evolving and what the challenge is going to be after the Summits end. Nuclear terrorism is real. There are no barriers to what terrorists will do to kill and destroy, and we need to build higher and stronger barriers to prevent them from doing the unthinkable.”

A report examining Nuclear Security Summit commitments since the first summit in 2010, co- authored by the Partnership for Global Security and the Arms Control Association, was released at the press briefing, along with Harvard Belfer Center’s report outlining six recommendations for improving nuclear security to prevent terrorism. In addition, Nuclear Threat Initiative released their latest radiological security progress report.

The FMWG will host the official non-governmental expert side summit, Solutions for a Secure Nuclear Future (SSNF), at the JW Marriott Hotel in Washington, DC on March 30, 2016 the day before the Nuclear Security Summit begins. The NGO summit will convene 200 experts representing nearly 50 countries to focus on how governments and other nuclear security stakeholders can continue to work toward a global nuclear security system that will prevent nuclear terrorism.

A live stream of the NGO summit will be available on Wednesday, March 30th beginning at 9:00 am EST.

About the Fissile Materials Working Group

The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) is a non-governmental coalition of 80 civil society organizations from around the world working to provide actionable policy solutions to keep the world safe from nuclear terrorism. For more information, visit www.fmwg.org.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 29 Mar 2016 00:00:00 CST

Huffington Post

Creating a global coalition to stop nuclear terrorism

The past few years have seen a spike in “origin stories.” How did James Bond become 007? How did Wolverine’s childhood shape who he is today? These stories are important because they remind us what it took to get us where we are. As the six-year-old Nuclear Security Summit process culminates in Washington this month, it’s only appropriate that we tell its origin story.

The NSS is a global effort to prevent terrorists from getting their hands on nuclear materials. Osama bin Laden once said it was al Qaeda’s religious duty to acquire either a nuclear weapon or the materials to build one and to detonate it in America. The effort to prevent that has succeeded so far because of an unusual partnership between policymakers and non-governmental experts.

If working together can keep nuclear terrorism at bay, what other 21st century security challenges can we not tackle?

The NSS story begins a month after President Obama’s famous speech in Praguethat envisioned a world without nuclear weapons. At a brown-bag lunch in a conference room on K Street in May 2009, we were two dozen nuclear security experts trying to figure out how to get it done. We knew that our silos - funders, advocates, academics and a splintered government - were hampering us from coming up with creative, high-impact solutions to stop nuclear terrorism.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 29 Mar 2016 00:00:00 CSTWashington, DC – In a letter today, 35 Nobel Laureates from physics, chemistry, and medicine urge national leaders attending President Obama’s fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit on March 31st to reduce the risk of nuclear or radiological terrorism to near-zero by:

1) Commissioning technical studies to investigate the transition from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuels that are most easily used in an improvised nuclear explosive to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels (that cannot be used directly in weapons) in naval nuclear propulsion;

2) Devoting resources to address the remaining HEU-fuelled research reactors over the next decade by converting them from weapons-usable uranium or shutting down reactors where conversion is not feasible; and

3) Developing commercially-viable technologies that do not use highly radioactive sources for blood and cancer treatment, as well as scientific research and industrial applications.

Alan J. Kuperman offers his opinion on the report published by National Academy of Sciences titled "Reducing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors." Kuperman believes the science behind the report is adequate, but the potential for implementation is not as successful. After describing the report, Kuperman explains the potential consequences of implementing such a report and warns to not follow the path suggested by the NAS.

WASHINGTON — As President Obama gathers world leaders in Washington this week for his last Nuclear Security Summit, tons of materials that terrorists could use to make small nuclear devices or dirty bombs remain deeply vulnerable to theft.

[...]

“The key question for this summit,” said Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at Harvard and a former White House science adviser, “is whether they’ll agree on approaches to keep the improvements coming.”

[...]

In a recent report, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a private advocacy group in Washington that tracks nuclear weapons and materials, warned that many radioactive sources were “poorly secured and vulnerable to theft.” The report called the probability of a terrorist’s detonating a dirty bomb “much higher than that of an improvised nuclear device.”

[...]

“We had vodka,” recalled Andrew J. Bieniawski, then a United States Energy Department official central to the elimination. “It was amazing.”

[...]

“The summit process has achieved some very important objectives,” said Kenneth N. Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security, a private group that advocates new nuclear safeguards. “But it needed to aim higher. The world is not becoming any easier to deal with. There’s still a responsibility to think big.”

WASHINGTON — When President Barack Obama kicks off the fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington on Thursday, he will tell delegations from 51 nations, plus major groups such as the European Union and United Nations, about successes made in ensuring nuclear material does not fall into the hands of terrorists.

[...]

In a March 21 report from Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom, a quartet of experts warned that while the NSS has resulted in some gains, the threat of nuclear terrorism remains very real.

“In the two years since the last nuclear security summit, security for nuclear materials has improved modestly,” the authors wrote, “but the capabilities of some terrorist groups, particularly the Islamic State, have grown dramatically, suggesting that in the net, the risk of nuclear terrorism may be higher than it was two years ago.”

But just as the threat of nuclear terrorism is increasingly viewed as an urgent concern, nonproliferation experts fear, world leaders will lose focus on the threat and the issue of securing fissile material will cease to be a top focus for the nations.

Kingston Reif, director for disarmament and threat-reduction policy at the Arms Control Association, said about the summit,“greatly raised the awareness of the nuclear terrorism threat.” But, he said, there are “absolutely” concerns about whether future discussions will be given the same weight without the NSS format.

Those concerns were echoed at a March 23 event by Matthew Bunn, one of the authors of the Harvard study, who noted the “key question this summit has to address is will they take enough action to put a world on a path toward continuously improving nuclear security, even after we’re not meeting at the summit level anymore.”

Kenneth Luongo, president and founder of the Partnership for Global Security, added that the discussions cannot be allowed to “fall back to the technocrats.”

“That’s where we were in 2010, and if that’s where we end up in 2016, that’s going to be a major mistake in my opinion,” Luongo said. “So continuing political engagement is absolutely critical, in my view.”

BRUSSELS — As a dragnet aimed at Islamic State operatives spiraled across Brussels and into at least five European countries on Friday, the authorities were also focusing on a narrower but increasingly alarming threat: the vulnerability of Belgium’s nuclear installations.

[...]

Matthew Bunn, a specialist in nuclear security at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, said another worry was the byproducts of the isotopes made at Mol, such as Cesium-137.

“It’s like talcum powder,” he said. “If you made a dirty bomb out of it, it’s going to provoke fear, you would have to evacuate and you have to spend a lot of money cleaning it up; the economic destruction cost could be very high.”

The discovery of the surveillance video in November set off alarm bells across the small nuclear-security community, with fresh worries that terror groups could kidnap, extort or otherwise coerce a nuclear scientist into helping them. The official whose family was watched works at Mol, one of five research reactors worldwide that produce 90 percent of the radio isotopes used for medical diagnosis and treatment.

Professor Bunn of Harvard noted that the Islamic State “has an apocalyptic ideology and believes there is going to be a final war with the United States,” expects to win that war and “would need very powerful weapons to do so.”

“And if they ever did turn to nuclear weapons,” he added, “they have more people, more money and more territory under their control and more ability to recruit experts globally than Al Qaeda at its best ever had.”

NEXT week President Obama will welcome world leaders to Washington for his fourth Nuclear Security Summit, a biennial event he initiated to mobilize global action to prevent terrorists from acquiring atomic bombs.

As this is Mr. Obama’s last such meeting on an issue that he professes to care about deeply, one might expect him to seize the opportunity to announce a major nonproliferation initiative, then brace for resistance from congressional Republicans skeptical of arms control.

But reality is exactly the opposite. It is the Republican-controlled Congress that is pushing the most ambitious arms control project in recent memory. Inexplicably, President Obama is the one resisting.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 25 Mar 2016 00:00:00 CSTThe New York Times

NEXT week President Obama will welcome world leaders to Washington for his fourth Nuclear Security Summit, a biennial event he initiated to mobilize global action to prevent terrorists from acquiring atomic bombs.

As this is Mr. Obama’s last such meeting on an issue that he professes to care about deeply, one might expect him to seize the opportunity to announce a major nonproliferation initiative, then brace for resistance from congressional Republicans skeptical of arms control.

But reality is exactly the opposite. It is the Republican-controlled Congress that is pushing the most ambitious arms control project in recent memory. Inexplicably, President Obama is the one resisting.

BRUSSELS — Ilyass Boughalab may be dead, but his brief stint working in Belgium’s nuclear industry is still very much alive in the minds of this country’s nuclear security officials worried about the Islamic State.

[...]

Many security experts say it’s about time. “The protections that were in place in Belgium in 2014 were clearly inadequate to prevent a major sabotage,” wrote a group of nuclear experts at Harvard University’s Belfer Center in a new report on preventing nuclear terrorism. They said that improvements had been made since then and that dispatching troops was “perhaps one of the most significant nuclear security upgrades in recent years.”

[...]

“This focused, extended monitoring of a nuclear official at a sensitive site is the most worrying indicator of [Islamic State] nuclear intent to date,” the Belfer Center group said. Matthew Bunn, a nuclear proliferation expert at the center, speculated that a kidnapping might have been planned to gain access or to coerce the official into turning over material.

Alan J. Kuperman submitted two petitions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to reassess the proposed Belgian and French desire to received highly enriched uranium from the United States for their respective reactors. While Belgium recently withdrew its request, Kuperman is still pursuing a petition to impede the export of HEU to France. He believes a plan to export HEU to any nation would directly violate the United States mission for global nonproliferation.

World leaders face a stark choice at the final nuclear security summit later this month: Will they commit to continuous improvement, or will nuclear security efforts stall and potentially decline? Their answer will shape the chances that terrorist groups, including the Islamic State, could get their hands on the materials they need to build a crude nuclear bomb.

In this new report, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous Decline?, Matthew Bunn, Martin Malin, Nickolas Roth, and William Tobey provide a global reality check on nuclear security. They note that effective and sustainable nuclear security capable of addressing plausible threats is the single most effective chokepoint preventing terrorists from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In recent years, significant progress has been made securing vulnerable nuclear weapons-usable material—reducing the number of countries with these materials by more than half, securing scores of sites around the world, and much more. But the work is not done.

Threats are constantly evolving, and there are new, worrying trends. Two years ago, the Islamic State was one of many small extremist groups. Today, it controls swaths of Iraq and Syria, is recruiting globally, has demonstrated a desire and capability to strike far beyond its borders, and espouses apocalyptic rhetoric.

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, there has only been modest progress securing vulnerable nuclear-weapons usable material around the globe, and some efforts have lost ground. At the end of 2014, Russia cut off most nuclear security cooperation with the United States. The Obama administration is proposing its lowest-ever budget for programs to improve nuclear security around the world. Fewer countries are announcing major security improvements at nuclear facilities, and some are hanging on to highly enriched uranium or plutonium stocks they clearly do not need. The nuclear security summit process is coming to an end—potentially decreasing international attention to this issue.

The article discussses the growing concern surrounding the civilian use of highly enriched uranium and the potential to rid the world of such material. While the Nuclear Security Summit should be focusing their efforts in discussing the potential to limit the use of HEU in the largest consumers - naval reactors. With the United States supplying a large majority of naval reactors fueled by HEU, the potential for switching to low enriched uranium proves inefficient and costly. However, if the United States set the precedent by switching to a LEU naval fleet, the rest of the world would most likely follow. The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty proposed by the International Panel on Fissile Materals suggests a complete elimination of HEU material. Furthermore, the panel suggests banning and elimination all fissile material. Ultimately, the International Panel on Fissile Materials believes it is easier to have a complete ban rather than a partial or limited elimination of materials.

WHEN BELGIAN police searched the home of a suspected member of the Islamic State after the Paris terror attacks in November, they found in the suspect’s apartment a curious video. It appeared to be a surveillance recording, made by the suspect, of a senior researcher at a Belgian nuclear center. The authorities speculate that it might have been part of a terrorist plot to capture nuclear materials from the center, perhaps by kidnapping the researcher. The episode has prompted Belgian authorities to deploy armed troops to protect nuclear sites, replacing a private security force.

[...]

A detailed index published by the Nuclear Threat Initiative shows tangible progress was achieved between 2012 and 2014, but since then efforts havestalled, due to political issues that have diverted attention, bureaucratic inertia, lack of resources and cultural factors. None of these are going away any time soon.

The rapid deterioration of U.S. relations with Moscow has taken a toll, too. Russia has declared it will not attend the summit. Cooperation on nuclear security has all but collapsed under the weight of President Vladimir Putin’s ill-fated adventure in Ukraine. Former senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), who pioneered that cooperation, said recently there is a “corrosive lack of trust”between Washington and Moscow, and channels of communication are “few and far between.” Without in any way easing the pressure on Mr. Putin over Ukraine or Syria, the United States and Russia ought to realize that Islamic State terrorists interested in nuclear materials in Belgium are a threat to all countries, and one worth talking about.

The U.S. government should seek to convert some civilian research reactors currently using weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to lower-enriched HEU fuel as an interim step on the way to fueling the reactors with a new kind of low-enriched uranium (LEU), according to a new report from a committee of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

Within the budget for fiscal year 2017, there is financial support for a domestic site to manage the excess plutonium that has resulted from the national nuclear weapons program. The budget for this will be presented under the FY17 budget through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) budget and will roughly cost $15 million for the prelimenary work. The facility is being constructed at the Savannah River Site in South Caroline and will focus on creating mixed-oxide fuel (MOX fuel) to use in nuclear energy reactors.

However, there has been a new trend in diminishing funds for nonproliferation and security activities. Although Obama has not intentions to affected the MOX fuel program, Obama has requested a significant decrease in the NNSA budget, which will mostly affect the Global Material Security program, the Nonproliferation and Arms Control activities, and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Department activities. However, more funding will be attributed to the Material Management and Minimization program to help remove highly enriched uranium worldwide and convert other facilities to function on low-enriched uranium.

Many are weary of the administration's decision to reduce spending for nonproliferation activities. For example, "Matthew Bunn, a professor of practice at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, said in a Feb. 19 interview that 'to propose big cuts in nuclear security spending weeks before hosting the last nuclear security summit is a mistake that will undermine U.S. leadership.'

'Congress should act to correct President [Barack] Obama's mistake,' added Bunn, a member of the Arms Control Association Board of Directors.'"

A small video camera stashed in a row of bushes silently recorded the comings and goings of the family of a Brussels-area man with an important scientific pedigree last year, producing a detailed chronology of the family's movements

[...]

The Belgian police discovered the secret film on Nov. 30 while searching the Auvelais home of a man with ties to the Islamic State terror group. But they became far more alarmed when they figured out that its star was a senior researcher at a Belgian nuclear center that produces a signficant portion of the world's supply of radioisotopes.

[...]

"The potential for a bad outcome when you have ISIS looking at nuclear people is substantial," said William H. Tobey, a former deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration. Several other experts said that they are particularly alarmed that the incident occured in Belgium, which they say has a troubled record on nuclear safety issues and lacks armed ugards at its nculear facilities.

[...]

Matt Bunn, a nuclear security expert and former White House official who is now at Harvard University, said Belgium needs to do more - much more.

"Every country, no matter how safe it thinks it is, needs to protect nuclear weapons and the materials you could use to make them against the full spectrum of plausible threats. And wherever there are potential nuclear bomb materials, they need to have armed guards," Bunn said.

Government studies have shown that in many cases, he explained, attackers can reach sensitive areas at nuclear sites quickly,a nd that "it's really hard to design systems" capabale of significantly delaying a concerted assault. That's why Britain, Canada, France, Germany and the United States have posted armed guards at sensitive nuclear sites.

In November, Iraq reported missing radioactive materials and feared the work of ISIS. The material has recently been found, untouched and intact. Although material stolen was the material stolen, Ir-192, was unsuitable for a dirty bomb, the material is considered a Category 2 radioactive material. FMWG members were cited discussing the dangerous situation of radioactive materials falling into the wrong hands.

"Miles Pomper, senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, noted that the Ir-192 was in pellet form, which would cause less contamination if dispersed than a powder. He is particulary concerned about the threat from another radioactive substance that is used in medical treatment, cesium chloride. It is stronger, has a 30-year half-life, and is in powder form. 'It's sort of the ultimate dirty bomb material,' Pomper said. Although such materials may be easy to find, they are not necessarily easy or safe to work with, observed Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association. Handling these materials can cause illness or death for a terrorist trying to build a bomb.

[...]

There would also be economic damage in the wake of a dirty bomb attack, both in the cost of clean-up and the temporary loss of use of a large contaminated area. 'Depending on its chemstry, form and location, it could leave billions of dollors in damage due to the costs of evacuation, relocation and cleanup and the inevitable follow-on threats could have severe economic and psychological repercussions.' Sam Nunn and Andrew Bieniawski of the Nuclear Threat Initiative wrote in a Washington Post op-ed last year. 'Buildings would likely have to be demolished and the debris removed.'

[...]

Davenport also suggested working with governments to guarantee they register and track materials, and to put response plans in place for when they are lost or stolen."

This volume aims to improve understanding of nuclear security and the prevention of nuclear terrorism.

Nuclear terrorism is perceived as one of the most immediate and extreme threats to global security today. While the international community has made important progress in securing fissile material, there are still important steps to be made with nearly 2,000 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material spread around the globe. The volume addresses this complex phenomenon through an interdisciplinary approach: legal, criminal, technical, diplomatic, cultural, economic, and political. Despite this cross-disciplinary approach, however, the chapters are all linked by the overarching aim of enhancing knowledge of nuclear security and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. The volume aims to do this by investigating the different types of nuclear terrorism, and subsequently discussing the potential means to prevent these malicious acts. In addition, there is a discussion of the nuclear security regime, in general, and an important examination of both its strengths and weaknesses. In summary, the book aims to extend the societal and political debate about the threat of nuclear terrorism.

This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, nuclear governance, terrorism studies, international organizations, and security studies in general.

U.S. President Barack Obama’s commitment to preventing and rolling back the spread of nuclear weapons was clear from the first days of his administration, when he pledged in Prague in April 2009 “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” The historic vow shattered precedent, seized international attention and helped him win the Nobel Peace Prize later that year. Yet as he prepares to leave office seven years later, it appears that with the exception of a fledgling nuclear deal with Iran, Obama will leave an arms control legacy that is arguably little better than that of his Republican predecessor, George W. Bush.

Indeed, in many ways, Obama’s presidency has served as an object lesson in the limits of a U.S. president’s ability to shape a global nuclear order amid competing tugs from foreign competitors and allies, domestic politics and bureaucratic factions. In the past several years, forces abroad—Russian President Vladimir Putin, North Korea—and at home—congressional Republicans, elements in the Defense and Energy Departments—have all challenged Obama’s vision to the point where his successor is now likely to be pressured to give nuclear weapons a renewed role in U.S. national security policy.

Since 1978, the United States and other nations have been pushing to eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU)—the kind of stuff that terrorists or a rogue nation might use to make an atomic bomb—from dozens of civilian research reactors around the world. However, achieving that goal will take far longer than officials had previously hoped, according to a new study by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Only a few years ago experts had hoped to eliminate the use of HEU in civilian research reactors by 2018. But that objective cannot be reached until 2035 at the earliest, the report concludes.

"Clearly there have been unexpected challenges, both technical and nontechnical, that have led to the significant extension of the timeframe," said Julia Phillips, a former vice president of Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, who chaired the report committee at a webcast press briefing today. A follow-up to a 2009 report, the new study was requested by Congress in 2012.

[...]

On the nontechnical side, Russia, which has 32 of the 74 research reactors still using or planning to use HEU, has expressed little interest in converting them to LEU. In fact, Russia has converted only one civilian research reactor to LEU, and that one with assistance from the United States. "This is not a priority with the Russian government," said William Tobey, an expert on nuclear nonproliferation at Harvard University and a member of the report committee at the press conference.

The United States has designated 20 tons of 93% enriched weapons-grade uranium for civilian research. The report recommends diluting that supply to 45% enrichment and using it until LEU fuel is available.

That’s a bad idea, says Alan Kuperman, a political scientist at the University of Texas, Austin. Using 45% enriched HEU would perpetuate commerce in HEU and undermine efforts to develop LEU fuel, he says. Simply put, Kuperman says, “it’s incredibly stupid from a policy perspective.”

Last week, a National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine panelaffirmed the goal of eliminating highly enriched uranium (HEU) from civilian use, while recommending step-wise conversion of high performance research reactors using weapon-grade uranium fuel and that the White House coordinate a 50-year national roadmap for neutron-based research. (Full disclosure: I sat on that committee, and oversaw the NNSA reactor conversion program from 2006-9; this post, however, represents my views, not necessarily those of the committee or NNSA.)

Before the dangers of proliferation and nuclear terrorism were fully and widely understood, over two hundred research reactors (including some defense-related facilities) in dozens of countries were fueled with HEU—much of it weapons grade—mostly with U.S. or Soviet assistance. Beginning in 1978, the United States reversed course, and at first in parallel with the Soviet Union (which pursued lower enrichment levels, but still above 20% U-235), and later in cooperation with Russia, began to assist countries to convert the reactors to low enriched uranium fuel (LEU) (below 20% U-235), and to repatriate the fresh and spent fuel to secure storage in the United States or Russia. These efforts proceeded with great urgency after the September 11, 2001 attacks, as the specter of nuclear terrorism suddenly loomed larger.

Denmark and Greenland agreed upon a deal addressing uranium, nuclear safeguards, and export controls to promote and support the Rigsfaellesskab's international non-proliferation obligations. The deal will be supported by European Union regulations in order to achieve the highest international standards. Both countries will need to pass the deal through parliament before solidifying joint regulations, guidances, safeguars, and export controls.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 01 Feb 2016 00:00:00 CSTThe "Doomsday Clock," a project of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that is designed to convey existential threats to human civilization, is at "three minutes to midnight."

The Doomsday Dashboard provides some information about what is considered when setting the clock, including nuclear security and materials stored.

William Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian professor emeritus at Stanford University and a senior fellow at the university’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997, having previously served as deputy secretary of defense and undersecretary of defense for research and engineering. He is the author of My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (2015).

Perry spoke by telephone with Arms Control Todayon December 8, 2015.

[...]

ACT: I want to go back to the issue of nuclear terrorism, which we touched on briefly a few minutes ago. You wrote in your book that the threat of nuclear terrorism is the “gravest threat of our time.” Why do you think that’s the case?

Perry: The threat of nuclear weapons is the greatest threat of our time, and nuclear terrorism is the most likely form of it. If you consider the deterrent we have to somebody attacking us with nuclear weapons, it’s very powerful. But we have no deterrent to nuclear terrorism, and it’s relatively easy to imagine how such an attack could happen. So it’s not that it’s as catastrophic as a nuclear war; it’s just it has a much higher probability.

ACT: You mentioned the nuclear security summit process. How successful do you think that’s been in addressing this problem of nuclear terrorism?

Perry: I think it’s the most effective thing we can do because the most likely way for a terrorist to get a nuclear weapon is to get the fissile material and then build a crude, improvised bomb himself. So the biggest obstacle to a terrorist getting a nuclear weapon is getting the fissile material, and the nuclear summit process is specifically addressed to putting fissile material all over the world under much better control or eliminating it.

ACT: So as a result of the nuclear summit process, do you feel less troubled or less concerned than you did, say, seven years ago before the process started?

Perry: Yes, I do. I mean, there are just fewer opportunities now for a terrorist group to get ahold of the fissile material. But I don’t feel by any means relaxed about this because there’s still a lot of it out there not under really good control. That’s why I think this final nuclear summit next year is so important. It gives us an opportunity to take even stronger actions than we’ve taken in the previous summits, including the opportunity for setting an international standard for the control and protection of fissile material.

The Nuclear Threat Initiative’s security index rightly criticizes other countries for failing to address the threat of cyberattack against their nuclear facilities but overlooks the failings of our own country [...]

EDWIN LYMAN

Senior Scientist

Union of Concerned Scientists

Washington

To the Editor:

Kudos to the Nuclear Threat Initiative for its 2016 nuclear security index. Your article’s emphasis on its cybersecurity findings, while valid, is skewed.

The lack of cybersecurity regulations is in fact a small piece of a larger problem that the initiative notes. There are no internationally binding standards or related regulations at all in nuclear security. Cyber is the tip of an iceberg that is melting fast [...]

KATHRYN RAUHUT

DEBRA DECKER

Washington

The writers are with the Stimson Center’s Managing Across Boundaries Initiative. Ms. Rauhut is a nonresident fellow in Vienna, and Ms. Decker is a senior adviser.

Sure, sometimes it gets brought up. In the openings of disaster movies and in the plots of video games, we’re reminded of the horrors that would accompany any major exchange of nuclear weapons. But this makes ICBMs seem science-fictional. In politics and technology coverage—when we discus the realistic future of copious student-loan debt and the occasional self-driving car—nuclear weapons appear only sometimes, in incoherent debate answers or bizarre warmongering. It can feel like we lack even the tools to talk about nuclear war.

For 70 years, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has tried to get people to talk more about it. The centerpiece of its approach is the Doomsday Clock, a giant timepiece that metaphorically shows how close humanity is to global catastrophe.

[...]

In a post for the Bulletin in December, Perry, the former secretary of defense, laid out five “nuclear nightmares” for 2016. Chief among these is still a NATO war with Russia, followed by American conflict with China, an erratic launch by North Korea, an India-Pakistan war, and a nuclear-enabled ISIS. “These five nuclear nightmares add up to a danger to our people that is greater in some ways than the nuclear dangers we faced during the Cold War. But most Americans—especially our youth—are blissfully unaware of those dangers,” he writes.

Elsewhere, Perry has said he believes that the clock stands at five minutes to midnight for nuclear conflict, but only one minute to midnight for nuclear terrorism.

On December 2, 2015, the Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a workshop in Singapore on Nuclear Security and Regional Fuel Cycle Decisions. The purpose of the workshop was to explore how nuclear security objectives can influence regional fuel cycle decisions of China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and to identify potential avenues for collaboration. The participants included experts from governments, academia, industry and think-tanks. This report describes the discussions and recommendations.

The minute hand of the "Doomsday Clock," which indicates how close the world's leading scientists think we are from destroying the planet, remains at "three minutes to midnight," scientists announced in Washington, D.C., today.

Midnight on the clock represents "doomsday." The closer the minute hand is to midnight, the higher the chance of a global cataclysm, according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the group of scientists who set the "time" on the symbolic clock.

The clock's minute hand is assessed each year, and the clock's time "conveys how close we are to destroying our civilization with dangerous technologies of our own making," the Bulletin explained on its website.

The debate over the relevance of nuclear power in a carbon-constrained world must confront two realities. First, nuclear power has an important role in the battle against climate change, along with other low-carbon energy sources. Without it, there is little chance of holding global temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius or lower in this century. Second, by mid-century, developing nations will likely be the largest community of nuclear operators. A number of these nations are not democracies, and collectively they will have amassed less operational experience than the developed world has today. This places a great responsibility on all nations to ensure that nuclear energy is effectively managed everywhere. These facts need to form the foundation of a modernized nuclear policy in the 21st century.

At present, nuclear power is one of the key ways to avoid carbon emissions, eliminating the equivalent of 2.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide per year. In 2012, the world emitted roughly 45 billion tons of greenhouses gasses. By 2030, that number needs to decline to around 35 billion tons to meet the global-temperature goal by the end of the century. Nuclear power will therefore play a major role in this process for at least the next 50 years.

The role of nuclear power in the energy mix of the world’s largest carbon emitters—China, the United States, the European Union, and India—is clear, but it is not similar in all cases.

The nuclear agreement that Iran and six major world powers signed in 2015 has focused the international community’s attention on Middle Eastern nuclear politics. But that deal is only part of an unfolding nuclear story that begins with the need for more energy in the region to reduce reliance on fossil fuels and to power desalination plants, new industry, and air conditioning. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates all have ambitious plans to build nuclear power plants to generate electricity. This Middle East nuclear power boom is greatly complicated by the challenges of keeping civilian nuclear power safe, protected from terrorists, and delinked from a nuclear weapons programme. If Washington can offer ways to safely and cleanly provide for the growing energy needs of local populations, it has the potential to play a major role in reducing the risk of nuclear breakdown. But it is Moscow, not Washington, that seems to be providing the most compelling energy answers.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 15 Jan 2016 00:00:00 CSTThe New York Times

WASHINGTON — Twenty nations with significant atomic stockpiles or nuclear power plants have no government regulations requiring minimal protection of those facilities against cyberattacks, according to a study by the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

The findings build on growing concerns that a cyberattack could be the easiest and most effective way to take over a nuclear power plant and sabotage it, or to disable defenses that are used to protect nuclear material from theft. The countries on the list include Argentina, China, Egypt, Israel, Mexico and North Korea.

The survey, by one of the nation’s leading nuclear nonproliferation watchdogs, was based on a nation-by-nation review of basic, publicly available data, and some of the countries may claim they have classified protections in place.

[...]

“Twenty countries failed on all the indicators,” said Page Stoutland, one of the authors of the report. Because of the secrecy surrounding military nuclear facilities, it was impossible to determine the levels of cyberprotection used to protect nuclear weapons in the nine countries known to possess them.

What keeps you up at night? For most of us, it’s thoughts of the future. We do our best to make responsible investments of our time, money and energy, and we hold ourselves to high personal standards. However, the restless nights return, and we find ourselves searching for new and different strategies that ensure a secure future for ourselves and our families.

It’s rare that rhetoric from Donald Trump—currently the leading contender for the Republican nomination for president—legitimately touches on a variant of the sleepless nights question, but he did so during the recent GOP debate in Las Vegas.

“The biggest problem this world has today,” he said, is “having some madman go out and get a nuclear weapon.”

et there be no doubt: If the radical jihadists responsible for the latest assault on innocents in Paris get their hands on weapons of mass destruction, they will not hesitate to use them. There is no limit to the horrible acts terrorists will carry out in pursuit of their ideological agenda. The best way to stop a WMD attack is to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear materials in the first place.

If terrorists were able to detonate a crude nuclear weapon built with materials they stole or bought on the black market, the catastrophic consequences could easily include the deaths of tens or hundreds of thousands of people, the wide-scale destruction of property, the disruption of global commerce and restrictions on civil liberties worldwide. Citizens and leaders alike would be left to ask: “What could we have done, and what should we have done, to prevent it?”

The good news is that leaders and governments have been focused on this concern for a number of years and can point to progress in better securing and removing some of the world’s most dangerous nuclear material—the highly enriched uranium and plutonium that could be used to build a bomb—scattered across the globe. Thanks to work that began in the early 1990s and has intensified through biennial Nuclear Security Summits since 2010, we’ve reduced the number of countries possessing nuclear materials from 52 in 1992 to 24 today.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 17 Nov 2015 00:00:00 CSTA new YouTube video, released ahead of a government planning meeting for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, charges that stronger nuclear security can be as simple as five words. These five words are the 5 Priorities, a concept born in 2014 when a diverse group of nuclear security experts identified the most impactful policy changes that could advance global nuclear security. After rallying supporters and polishing their ideas, the 5 Priorities effort was launched to garner the attention of world leaders and help the broader public understand how the decisions made at the 2016 summit will impact them.

Nuclear security has never been an issue to ignite heated kitchen table debates at Thanksgiving, but the 5 Priorities for Global Nuclear Security campaign aims to make more people understand why they should care how the issue is being handled. The 5 Priorities are objective; they are not ideologically aligned as either “pro” or “anti” nuclear. Instead, they focus on the practical reality that as long as radioactive materials and technologies exist, they should be as safe and secure as possible.

5 Priorities supporters want the public to understand that radioactive materials are not only sequestered away in secluded military complexes or in remote locations in the snow drifts of Siberia. They are used every day, all around the world in medicine, research, and energy production. Nuclear power plants in 30 countries provide more than 10 percent of the world’s electricity production, and more than 60 new reactors are currently under construction in 15 countries. The majority of nuclear materials resides nuclear weapons programs, but the civil sector has accumulated stockpiles of separated plutonium that exceed 230 metric tons and more than 60 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU). That is enough material to make thousands of nuclear weapons. Ensuring that these materials remain secure is critical for the normal functioning of daily life.

This report discusses the significance of the the initiative, the importance of expanding its signatories, and the need to demonstrate its implementation. It benefits from the insights and experience of Nuclear Security Governance Expert Group (NSGEG) members and draws upon major themes of discussion at NSGEG workshops in Vienna, Austria (2014) and Washington, D.C. (2015).

The AP story is a reminder that the international community has not done enough to combat the risks of nuclear terrorism.

"These [radioactive] materials are scattered all around the globe, including in the United States. We need to do far more to get these materials out of circulation before they fall into the hands of terrorists.” - Miles Pomper

A global coalition of nuclear security experts is promoting 5 priorities to close global nuclear security gaps at the next Nuclear Security Summit early next year in Washington, DC.

The Associated Press published an important investigative piece on Wednesday documenting that nuclear smugglers had made at least four attempts in five years to sell radioactive materials and even bomb-usable uranium to extremists in the Middle East.

The material included highly enriched uranium (HEU), which can be used in nuclear weapons, as well as a surrogate for the highly radioactive material cesium-137. The AP reported that the sellers sought to sell the HEU to unidentified buyers in the Middle East as well as a Sudanese doctor and the cesium 137, capable of being used in a dirty bomb, to members of ISIL.

“In wiretaps, videotaped arrests, photographs of bomb-usable material, documents and interviews, AP found that smugglers are explicitly targeting buyers who are enemies of the West,” the AP reported. “The developments represent the fulfillment of a long-feared scenario in which organized crime gangs are trying to link up with groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qaida — both of which have made clear their ambition to use weapons of mass destruction.”

The investigation highlights the obvious lingering risks of nuclear terrorism. It also should serve as a reminder that the international community has not done enough to combat those risks.

“We are fortunate that investigators in this case detected these attempts, but what we should be concerned about are the plots that have gone undetected,” said Miles Pomper, a senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG). "These materials are scattered all around the globe, including in the United States. We need to do far more to get these materials out of circulation before they fall into the hands of terrorists.”

“There is a clear need for the United States and other international agencies to beef up their intelligence capabilities focused on nuclear smuggling and terrorism,” said Nickolas Roth, a Research Associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

The FMWG, a global coalition of nuclear security experts, is promoting 5 priorities for global nuclear security that seek to close the gaps and influence outcomes at the next Nuclear Security Summit early next year in Washington, DC.

“It's critical for countries to secure materials at their source and expand the types of cooperation that thwarted the Moldovan smugglers,” said Michelle Cann, an expert at the Partnership For Global Security. “As long as uneven nuclear security protections around the world exist, terrorists will continue to try to exploit them.”

With the nuclear security summit process winding down but much work remaining, it is vital to initiate a process by which states can continue and expand on the substantial progress that already has been made.

Within the Nuclear Security Summit process and outside of it, the human element has been recognized as a key factor in strengthening nuclear security systems. A number of countries have established or are in the process of establishing centers to serve as hubs or coordinating mechanisms for providing nuclear security training, education, and technical services to a range of relevant stakeholders, including facility managers, regulatory staff, scientists, engineers, or technicians.

Salisbury and Hobbs provide an overview of the diversity of the centers and the type of training they offer, assess their efforts at regional and international collaboration and the challenges of metrics in this regard, and develop recommendations for further sustainable development of COE and NSSC in the region. Among these recommendations, the authors highlight the opportunities for centers to provide a significant contribution to international nuclear security initiatives through activities such as the development of scenarios for use in tabletop exercises for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, collaboration on new and revised guidance documents under development at the IAEA, and improvement of the quality and frequency of nuclear-security-related reporting and information sharing in UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radiological Sources.

Nuclear terrorism remains one of the gravest threats to international security. Nuclear security, as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), concerns measures aimed at the "prevention of, detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities" (Objective and Essential Elements of a State's Nuclear Security Regime, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20). In 2009, recognizing the urgent need to take action to address the threat of nuclear terrorism, U.S. President Obama launched the Nuclear Security Summit process through which a group of more than 50 countries has committed to various actions to strengthen the international nuclear security regime. While much has been done to enhance the global nuclear security architecture, more work is needed, particularly as the threat continues to evolve.

International law - comprised of rules, principles, guidelines, and institutional arrangements - is a fundamental instrument of nuclear security governance. On this page, you will find a number of publications, papers, and presentations by CCSL on the various aspects of the international legal framework applicable to nuclear security.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on Thursday to locate the first internationally-controlled bank of low-enriched uranium in the ex-Soviet nation to ensure fuel supplies for power stations and prevent nuclear proliferation.

[...]

"This IAEA fuel bank will enable and encourage peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while reducing the risks of proliferation and reducing the risks of catastrophic terrorism," former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn said in a speech after the signing in the Kazakh capital Astana.

Nunn is co-chairman and chief executive officer of Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a non-profit and non-partisan organization with a mission to assist the fulfillment of the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s goals.

NTI played a key role in establishing the fuel bank. One of NTI's supporters, U.S. billionaire investor Warren Buffett, contributed $50 million to "jumpstart" the project, Nunn said.

"I look forward to the time soon when the fuel bank will become an operational reality," Buffett said in a message read by Nunn.

"Please tell all the decision makers that I am a patient and long-term investor and I know that international agreements take a considerable amount of time. But please also tell them that I am 84 years old."

This new threat originates overseas, but the potential for disaster posed by dangerous radiological materials here at home is just as serious. Radiological materials used in medical equipment and scientific research are at risk.Concerns have been brewing for years because the very same isotopes that can make life-saving blood transfusions and cancer treatments possible — such as cesium-137, cobalt-60 and iridium-192 — could be used to build a bomb that would spread radioactive material and contaminate significant portions of a major U.S. city. We are exposed, and the clock is ticking.

Unlike a nuclear weapon, a radioactive dirty bomb would not cause catastrophic levels of death and injury, but depending on its chemistry, form and location, it could leave billions of dollars in damage due to the costs of evacuation, relocation and cleanup — and the inevitable follow-on threats could have severe economic and psychological repercussions. Buildings would likely have to be demolished and the debris removed. Access to a contaminated area could be denied for years as a site is cleaned well enough to meet even minimum environmental guidelines for protecting the public.

America is reconsidering how it will dispose of 34 tonnes of plutonium as the previous plan involving a MOX plant has been said to be twice as costly as a dilution and disposal option in a leaked Department of Energy (DOE) report.

The plutonium arises from a June 2000 nuclear weapons reduction agreement with Russia under which both countries would put 34 tonnes of plutonium beyond military use. Russia opted to use its plutonium as fuel for fast reactors generating power at Beloyarsk.

[...]

The Union of Concerned Scientists yesterday published what it said was an unreleased DOE report that compared the cost of completing the MOX plant to other options. Use in fast reactors was considered briefly, but with this technology not readily available in the near term, the prime comparison was against a 'dilution and disposal' option which would see the plutonium mixed with inert materials and disposed of in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, or WIPP, in New Mexico.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 21 Aug 2015 00:00:00 CSTWashington (August 20, 2015) — A new, yet-to-be-released Energy Department-commissioned study concludes that it would be cheaper and far less risky to dispose of 34 metric tons of U.S. surplus plutonium at a federal nuclear waste repository in New Mexico than convert it into mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel for commercial nuclear power plants at the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility in South Carolina.

A two-year initiative announced by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and the Partnership for Global Security (PGS) aims to encourage international policy experts to work together to find ways to address climate change, nuclear energy and global security challenges.

The Global Nexus Initiative (GNI) aims to explore the links between these challenges through a working group of 17 multidisciplinary policy experts from the non-governmental, academic and private sectors in Denmark, France, Japan, Sweden, the United Arab Emirates and the USA. The group will convene for a series of meetings and workshops, through which it aims to produce policy memoranda identifying the challenges and offering recommendations. These will feed into a cumulative report at the end of the project.

[...]

PGS president Kenneth Luongo, a former senior advisor on non-proliferation policy to the US Secretary of Energy, said the GNI represented a "new level of real world collaboration between non-traditional partners" to address complex global challenges. "These aren't issues that can wait. We need experienced people, thinking through credible solutions today," he said.

When President Barack Obama this week repeated John F. Kennedy’s 1963 call for a “more practical, more attainable peace” in his pitch for the Iran nuclear agreement, absent was any mention of the broader mission both presidents proclaimed: “global disarmament.”

In 2009, Obama electrified much of the global nonproliferation movement by promising to work toward a “world without nuclear weapons.” That April, in Prague, Obama’s soaring language and concrete goals proved so convincing that the Nobel Committee “attached special importance to Obama’s vision of and work for” a nuclear-free globe when it awarded him the Peace Prize less than a year after his election. Now, as Obama looks toward the end of his presidency with the aim of checking off agenda items, curbing nuclear proliferation is one goal that remains out of reach, despite some promising work earlier in his term.

[...]

“The public came to recognize that that was a campaign line,” said Graham Allison, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and a top Defense Department official on nuclear issues in the Reagan and Clinton administrations. “Easy to say but hard to do.’’

[...]

Obama organized the first of three high-level Nuclear Security Summits in 2010, and those, along with the U.S.’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative begun in 2004, “significantly boosted efforts to secure nuclear material around the world,” said a report out in May from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a bipartisan group of former lawmakers and officials who promote arms control.

[...]

“After that initial flurry in the first couple of years of Obama’s presidency, the larger non-Iran piece of the nuclear nonproliferation agenda has stalled, and has lost momentum,” said Kingston Reif of the Arms Control Association.

[...]

In addition, the possibility that terrorists could acquire enough radioactive material to create a nuclear weapon or so-called dirty bomb is “one of the greatest dangers facing the global community,” according to a report released in June from the 80-member Fissile Materials Working Group. Nuclear experts warn that highly enriched uranium at civilian sites — enough for hundreds of nuclear weapons spread over 100 facilities in the remaining 25 countries that possess it — tends to be less secure than that used in military applications. It’s generally up to the states that have those materials, including South Africa, Belarus and Kazakhstan, to keep them safe.

When President Barack Obama this week repeated John F. Kennedy’s 1963 call for a “more practical, more attainable peace” in his pitch for the Iran nuclear agreement, absent was any mention of the broader mission both presidents proclaimed: “global disarmament.”

[...]

Obama organized the first of three high-level Nuclear Security Summits in 2010, and those, along with the U.S.’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative begun in 2004, “significantly boosted efforts to secure nuclear material around the world,” said a report out in May from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a bipartisan group of former lawmakers and officials who promote arms control.

[...]

In addition, the possibility that terrorists could acquire enough radioactive material to create a nuclear weapon or so-called dirty bomb is “one of the greatest dangers facing the global community,” according to a report released in June from the 80-member Fissile Materials Working Group. Nuclear experts warn that highly enriched uranium at civilian sites — enough for hundreds of nuclear weapons spread over 100 facilities in the remaining 25 countries that possess it — tends to be less secure than that used in military applications. It’s generally up to the states that have those materials, including South Africa, Belarus and Kazakhstan, to keep them safe.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgSat, 08 Aug 2015 00:00:00 CSTAlgeria’s position on nuclear and WMD proliferation must be understood in the context of, on
the one hand, the country’s commitment to both nuclear non-proliferation and the on-going
struggle against CBRN terrorism in North Africa, and, on the other hand, its development of a
civil nuclear program. Algeria’s policy direction is supportive of a ME WMD Free Zone,
leaving open the possibility of North African regional participation to bolster the initiative.

There has been a marked increase in international and domestic attention to the need to replace high-risk radioactive sources with less risky and non-isotopic alternatives in order to forestall an act of radiological terrorism.

In response to this need, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey, with the support of the US and UK governments, hosted three, closed-door workshops with governmental and nongovernmental experts in Washington, London, and Vienna to propose appropriate policies.

Through these workshops and additional research, CNS has developed the new occasional paper, “Permanent Risk Reduction: A Roadmap for Replacing High-Risk Radioactive Sources and Materials,” which offers a series of actions that governments could take to help expedite and encourage the substitution of high-risk sources with non-isotopic alternatives as an important contribution to the nuclear security framework.

Last week, the news emerged that ISIS terrorists have reportedly obtained radioactive materials from hospitals and research facilities captured in Iraq with a view to developing a radioactive "dirty bomb."

Unsurprisingly, the prospect of ISIS dabbling with unconventional weapons has been greeted with considerable concern. The Iraqi government has appealed to the United Nations for international help to "stave off the threat" in this regard and Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop recently acknowledged that NATO countries are deeply concerned by the situation.

But what can ISIS actually do with these newly acquired radioactive materials? What is the nature of the threat?

The risk of terrorists obtaining the materials to build a nuclear bomb or a radioactive "dirty" bomb is one of the greatest dangers facing the global community.

The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) must result in bold, concrete commitments that will keep the world safe from nuclear terrorism. To help achieve this goal, a group of international nuclear security experts developed new recommendations that can help prevent such a tragedy:

In this report, civil society experts from the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) outline practical steps to phase out and eventually eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian applications. They discuss how to enhance the security of military nuclear materials. Finally, they offer recommendations for improving security through the interconnected issues of information-sharing, standards and best practices, and security culture.

The report will be publicly released at events in Washington and Vienna:

The NSS process has made the world a safer place for people across every continent, but this mission is not yet complete. It is imperative that the 2016 summit results in a legacy that will sustain achievements and close remaining gaps.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 16 Jun 2015 00:00:00 CSTToday, as part of the USA Freedom Act, the Senate passed language to implement key requirements of two important, and long overdue agreements that strengthen global efforts to prevent and counter nuclear terrorism, paving the way for their ratification.

The two agreements —the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the 2005 International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) – require state parties to better protect nuclear materials and to punish acts of nuclear terrorism. While the United States already has strong measures to prevent and prosecute nuclear terrorism, these agreements will help to ensure that all signatories adhere to similarly robust measures.

The amendment to the CPPNM expands the original treaty to require parties not only to protect nuclear material in international transit, but also to protect nuclear facilities and nuclear material that is domestically in storage, use, or in transit. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the depository for the original treaty and the amendment. ICSANT, a UN convention, establishes a framework to strengthen cooperation among countries in combating nuclear terrorism, and provides details on how offenders and illicit materials should be handled by states when seized.

Congress cleared legislation on Tuesday that would implement several nuclear security treaties that were approved by the Senate years ago but were then bottled up due to objections from a single lawmaker, Charles E. Grassley.

[...]

However, then-panel Chairman Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt. refused to consider the two changes, in part because they would have been unacceptable to House Democrats during the ensuing conference committee, according to Kingston Reif, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association.

The decision by the House Judiciary Committee to include the nuclear provisions in the USA Freedom Act was made as the surveillance legislation was seen as a must-pass bill that would be difficult to successfully amend in the Senate, according to Miles Pomper, a senior research associate with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

[...]

“The [Obama] administration has been strongly supportive of the legislation but they haven’t been coordinating with the House on this,” Reif said. “This has been a House-driven effort. In the past, the administration has been . . . at least in the Senate, they have not been playing an active role at the highest level in terms of trying to adjudicate the dispute.”

Andrew Semmel, executive director of the Partnership for a Secure America, a nonprofit that advocates bipartisan solutions to national security, said there was a perception in the House that having the bill authorize the death penalty was unnecessary as existing U.S. law already allows for the execution of terrorists, as evidenced most recently by the death sentence that Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev received in May.

WASHINGTON – The Senate on Tuesday passed the USA Freedom Act, which includes a critically important measure that will help prevent nuclear terrorism.

The legislation includes language to implement requirements of two international treaties that enhance global efforts to counter nuclear terrorism. Failure to pass these implementing pieces of legislation has been blocking full ratification of these important treaties for years.

Nuclear security experts from the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), a coalition of 80 organizations dedicated to preventing nuclear terrorism, praised this step forward.

"It took a decade, but Congress has finally passed legislation vital to global efforts to prevent and punish nuclear terrorism. This measure will make us safer by helping to secure material that could be used to make a nuclear bomb and by punishing nuclear terrorists," said Angela Canterbury of the Council for a Livable World and the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

The two treaties, the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the 2005 International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), set standards on protecting materials that could be used to make a nuclear bomb. They also include requirements for punishing acts of nuclear terrorism.

The risk from terrorists or other criminals getting their hands on the materials to make a nuclear bomb is a global threat that requires global solutions. While the United States already has strong measures to prevent and prosecute nuclear terrorism, the agreements will help to ensure that other countries do the same.

“These rules need to be universal to work, but other countries have had a ready excuse for inaction in the absence of U.S. leadership" said FMWG Co-Chair Miles Pomper. “More than a dozen countries still need to ratify the important 2005 CPPNM amendment for it to enter into force.”

Implementing legislation has been mired for years over death penalty and wiretapping provisions that experts agree have little relevance to the legislation’s substance and outcomes.

To overcome deadlock in the Senate, the House Judiciary Committee attached the implementing language to the USA Freedom Act, which passed in the House on May 14 by a vote of 338-88.

“The leadership of the House Judiciary Committee deserves enormous credit for its bipartisan persistence in support of the treaties and passage of implementing legislation,” according to Kingston Reif, Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association.

When smugglers carrying deadly radioactive cesium-137 emerged from the woods near the Armenian-Georgian border in August 2014, the police were waiting. They were far from any fixed radiation detector. But the Georgian security services learned the smugglers chose not to use the official border crossing because there was a radiation detector there — driving them right into the police’s arms on the wild border. Had there been no radiation detector at the official border crossing, the smugglers would have passed through without detection.

The possibility of a terrorist detonating a “dirty bomb” or even a crude nuclear bomb is one of the gravest threats facing the United States today. Yet the House Armed Services Committee is pushing a bill that would prohibit funding for fixed radiation detectors to catch nuclear smugglers – both for installing new ones and even for maintaining the ones U.S. taxpayers have already paid billions to install.

Radiation detection is a highly imperfect line of defense. Once nuclear material has left the facility where it is supposed to be, it could be anywhere, and recovering it poses an enormous challenge. The immense length of national borders, the huge scale of legitimate traffic, the myriad pathways across these borders, and the small size and sometimes weak radiation signal of the nuclear and radiological materials terrorists might be seeking combine to make nuclear smuggling extraordinarily difficult to stop.

The Energy Department should expand its nonproliferation efforts and augment funding for the nonproliferation programs carried out by its semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), according to an Energy Department task force charged with advising the department on its nonproliferation strategy.

The report, which was released March 31, makes a total of 17 recommendations for modifying or expanding the department’s nonproliferation efforts in areas such as preventing nuclear and radiological terrorism, halting illicit transfers of nuclear technology, and developing new detection and monitoring technologies and approaches to verify future nuclear arms reductions.

The task force expressed concern about the recent trend of falling budgets for the department’s nonproliferation programs, noting that appropriations declined from $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2013 to $1.6 billion for fiscal year 2015, a reduction of 25 percent. “The need to counter current and likely future challenges to nonproliferation justifies increased, rather than reduced, investment in this area,” the report said.

Even before the Ukraine crisis strained relations between Russia and the United States in 2014, their engagement on nuclear materials security was in need of new, creative, and sustainable approaches.

This policy analysis brief by Anton Khlopkov, director of the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies and editor in chief of the journal Nuclear Club, outlines Russia’s domestic and international policy priorities and offers recommendations for bilateral nuclear security cooperation between Moscow and Washington.

The brief introduces key principles of Russia’s nuclear security policy and recent improvements in Russia’s legislative and regulatory frameworks. It gives an overview of ongoing and planned efforts to eliminate Russia’s nuclear legacy, including spent fuel removal, decommissioning of nuclear research facilities, and the consolidation and conversion program. The brief also highlights the improvement of nuclear security standards as part of Russia’s international peaceful nuclear cooperation projects.

Nuclear value chains are globally dispersed and largely opaque to the general public and other stakeholders. At the national level, regulatory frameworks can be robust, particularly on issues of safety which in practice can provide a form of industry engagement on non-proliferation. Nevertheless, two significant changes in the global economy of nuclear material have taken place over the past two decades which should be considered when looking at the relevance of non-proliferation for companies along the nuclear value chain: 1) the globalisation of supply chains and growing need for nuclear energy from emerging economies (notably China, Brazil, India, South Africa) and; 2) an opening of uranium supply from regulated markets to states with relatively weak governance and little regulation (e.g. Malawi, Tanzania). Together, these dynamics bring into question the strength of the current nuclear governance regime and potentially place additional responsibility on multinational companies mining uranium in these areas.

Companies operating in these countries have by and large not identified non-proliferation as a material issue to their risk portfolio. Rather, the issue is seen as being the remit of states and companies pledge their compliance to currently existing regulatory structures. This report, the latest in the Governing Uranium series, presents an overview of current corporate engagement on the issue of non-proliferation for three key sectors within the nuclear supply chain: uranium mining, civilian nuclear power, and finance.

Albert Carnesale, Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,

John M. Deutch, International Council Member, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Joan Rohlfing, Nuclear Threat Initiative

Gary Samore, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

The Secretary of Energy on December 20, 2013 established the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) Task Force on Nuclear Nonproliferation (TFNN) and charged it to “advise the DOE on future areas of emphasis for its nuclear nonproliferation activities by addressing the following questions:

1. What are the current and likely future challenges to nuclear nonproliferation?

2. What should DOE be doing to help the United States Government prepare to meet those challenges?

3. What are DOE’s current areas of emphasis in nuclear nonproliferation?

4. In what ways should DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts be modified and/or expanded?

5. What obstacles stand in the way of making the recommended changes in DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation activities, and how might they be overcome?"

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 23 Apr 2015 00:00:00 CSTAt the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, countries built on a model established at the 2012 Seoul summit, which advances critical nuclear security goals through voluntary collaboration on multilateral actions. In Seoul, groups of countries pledged to collaborate on priority issues, and to strengthen and improve these areas in voluntary joint statements, also referred to as “gift baskets.”

“Gift basket diplomacy” has been one of the most important and unique innovations of the summit process. These multilateral political commitments cover a wide range of technical, educational, and legislative issues that are necessary for improving global nuclear security. They emphasize the importance of regional and international cooperation and allow states to effectively cooperate on issues of mutual concern. The joint statements have no predefined format, structure, or reporting mechanisms. Instead, they encourage creativity, dynamism and new leadership to address the transnational challenge of nuclear security. The success of these multilateral efforts led to a continuation and expansion of the practice at the 2014 summit.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 01 Apr 2015 00:00:00 CSTMajor multilateral summits typically end with a communiqué reflecting grand ideas and big-picture goals that all participants can agree on. Lately, however, a new trend has emerged: “gift-basket diplomacy.” This approach focuses less on members’ ideals and overarching aims than on how states can work together on issues of mutual concern. It is a form of multilateral, voluntary commitment-making that supplements broad statements with practical, near-term objectives.

Gift-basket diplomacy has already achieved results, and this approach gained momentum after the success of national commitment-making at the first summit. In April 2010, 29 of the 47 nations that attended the Washington Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) made unilateral voluntary commitments—and these were more than just promises inked on paper. Within a year, approximately 60 percent of those commitments had been fulfilled, with notable progress on another 30 percent: Chile eliminated all highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from its territory; Kazakhstan secured its stockpiles of HEU and plutonium (large enough to make 775 nuclear weapons); and Ukraine repatriated more than half of its HEU to Russia, which put it on track to achieve a full clean-out of its HEU in time for the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. More than 90 percent of the Washington summit’s national commitments had been completed by the 2012 summit.

This approach to diplomacy has been responsible for many such achievements at NSS meetings, and could accomplish even more at the next summit in 2016—and leave an enduring legacy. When world leaders convene in the United States for the fourth summit, participants could use the voluntary commitment-making model to establish a broader, more durable approach to securing vulnerable fissile material and preventing nuclear terrorism.

South Korean and U.S. negotiators are on the verge of concluding a new bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement to replace the current outdated one, which has been in place since 1974. This new agreement undoubtedly will be criticized by some in South Korea because it does not give Seoul unconditional approval to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel. But such narrowly-focused criticism is misplaced, for it overlooks the importance of the agreement to Korea’s energy security and the future of its nuclear program.

Judging the new nuclear cooperation agreement solely on single issues—such as the desire of some in Korea to puruse so-called pyroprocessing technology—obscures the very broad benefits it delivers to both Korea and the United States. It will satisfy President Park Geun-hye’s goals to enhance cooperation in assuring Korea’s fuel supply, managing nuclear waste, and promoting exports of South Korean nuclear power plants. It also will enable collaboration in the areas of safety, scientific research, and global nuclear nonproliferation policy. In some respects, the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement functions as a load-bearing beam, supporting the entire infrastructure of U.S.-ROK nuclear partnership.

U.S.-ROK cooperation on nuclear safety is currently the most valuable dimension of nuclear partnership between the two countries that is enabled by the nuclear cooperation agreement. Though such collaboration is probably underappreciated, the recent debate about re-licensing the Wolsong nuclear power station demonstrates that the safe operation of nuclear reactors is arguably the most important issue for the Korean public as they evaluate dependence on nuclear power. Approval of future construction of nuclear facilities in Korea increasingly will turn on whether local residents believe the facilities can be operated safely.

An initiative to address a persistent and potentially catastrophic threat to global security is a terrible thing to waste. But that is what’s about to happen to President Obama’s effort to prevent nuclear terrorism by securing the world’s most dangerous materials.

In 2010, Obama launched the Nuclear Security Summits to galvanize world leaders on this issue. In Washington that year, Seoul in 2012 and The Hague in 2014, the leaders of 53 countries agreed to steps designed to improve the security of nuclear and other radioactive material. Some 6,000 tons of nuclear material have been permanently secured as a result of the three summits, and participating countries developed other initiatives to strengthen nuclear security practices. But all these initiatives are voluntary; countries are free to implement them or not, as they deem fit.

The summit process is expected to conclude next year, when Obama will again host the gathering in the United States. Early indications are that the 2016 event will lead to the announcement of additional voluntary proposals, along with a declaration that responsibility for further work on nuclear security issues will revert to the patchwork of institutions and mostly voluntary arrangements that predate the summit process, such as Interpol, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the G-8 Global Partnership. and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Four years ago, a devastating tsunami crashed into the coast of Japan. Fifty-foot waves breached the seawall of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, cutting off its emergency power supply and disabling its cooling systems.

The nuclear accident was the worst since the meltdown of the Chernobyl power plant in 1986. Investigators concluded that one of the underlying causes was complacency: those in charge of the facility believed that their safety systems were robust, and there was no effective independent oversight.

The disaster in Japan has spurred reforms in the field of nuclear safety. But when it comes to nuclear security, complacency remains a major problem. We must not wait until tragedy strikes to do something about it.

Four years after the meltdown at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power station paralyzed the sector, nuclear energy is again gearing up globally for what appears to be a long-awaited renaissance.

But while nuclear power’s rebirth from China to Argentina is driven by the imperative of finding clean and reliable power, it must still overcome a host of obstacles, including lingering concerns over safety, lousy economics, and growing worries about the risks of nuclear proliferation. And all of that could strangle the latest nuclear rebound before it really gets started.

“Right now, the nuclear renaissance is happening, and it’s happening in East Asia,” said Geoffrey Rothwell, principal economist at the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency in Paris. Asia alone could invest as much as three-quarters of a trillion dollars in new nuclear reactors in the next 15 years as the region seeks to meet growing energy demand while grappling with rising concerns about pollution.

[...]

“When you look at the situation with respect to safety in a lot of other industries, it starts to make you nervous,” said Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. “But when you talk to people who have worked with the Chinese nuclear industry, they say they understand this completely and understand they have to be different from other industries,” he said.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgSun, 22 Mar 2015 00:00:00 CSTIn 2014, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Proliferation Prevention Program, with generous support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the Stanley Foundation co-hosted two workshops to explore the potential for collaboration among the existing and planned centers of excellence (COE) for nuclear security in Asia.

An innovation of the Nuclear Security Summit process, the COE are dedicated to improving nuclear security through training, education, technology research and development, and other activities. Although many of these centers (which now number in the dozens) are purely national in their scope, others have taken on regional and collaborative activities.

This report presents a summary of our joint workshops, held in July and October 2014. The first workshop was a closed meeting held on the sidelines of a public forum titled Nuclear Centers of Excellence in Asia: Next Steps in July in Washington, DC. At this workshop, participants identified a few key themes, such as balancing transparency and consistency and promoting culture, consistency, and best practices, through which to evaluate the activities of the existing centers and the longer term potential of COE networks. The second workshop, organized in collaboration with the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP), took place in October in Vienna. This workshop sought to identify lessons from models of collaboration from the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) experiences with COE and explore how to build consistency and sustainability into the nuclear security regime beyond the last summit in 2016.

The workshops conclude that the COE are evolving into missions and responsibilities, and their potential for carrying forward the Nuclear Security Summit process should not be underestimated. In particular, certain actions to promote transparency, consistency, and sustainability may be desirable. These could be as simple as peer reviewing training courses, collaborating to establish training standards or certification requirements for individuals, developing an accreditation process through the IAEA, and a joint gift basket on reporting post-summit implementation of initiatives among the COE.

PELINDABA, South Africa — Shortly after midnight on a cold Thursday morning, four armed men sliced through the chain-link fence surrounding this storage site for nuclear explosives on the banks of the Crocodile River, west of the administrative capital, Pretoria.

[...]

William H. Tobey, the deputy administrator of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration at the time of the break-in, is among many U.S. experts disturbed by the episode. While he remains uncertain of the raiders’ objectives, he said he was convinced “there was insider participation.” Rather than face the implications of the assault, he said, South African officials are in denial about it.

[...]

Matthew Bunn, a Clinton White House nuclear security official who also advised the Bush administration on the issue, called the view that the raiders were common criminals “utterly nonsensical.”

“Nobody breaks through a 10,000-volt security fence to steal someone’s cellphone,” Bunn said. The assumption “to be disproved,” he added, was that they were after the weapons uranium.

Since the start of the Manhattan Project in 1942, the world has accumulated 1,875 tons of nuclear explosive materials, the equivalent of tens of thousands of enormously powerful bombs. An estimated 25 countries hold these materials today at hundreds of sites, sometimes in facilities with questionable security.

Terrorists could engineer a devastating attack against a civilian population or a large military installation merely by gaining access to a few pounds of these materials, because the designs of simple nuclear weapons are no longer secret. A stock of enriched uranium the size of a six-pack is all they would need to fuel a crude bomb as powerful as the one that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945.

Anxious officials in the United States have sought as a result to eliminate or at least better secure stocks of nuclear explosive materials around the world, with mixed results.

After months of signals that U.S.-Russian nuclear security cooperation beyond 2014 was in jeopardy, most work in that area now has ended, according to news reports and Energy Department budget documents. But some limited work will continue in 2015, according to Energy Department officials.

In a meeting last December in Moscow, Russian officials informed their U.S. counterparts that Moscow was ending U.S. cooperation with Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, and U.S. access to Rosatom facilities, the Boston Globe reported Jan. 19.

Joint work to upgrade the security of eight Rosatom sites containing weapons-usable nuclear material “will not be completed with U.S. funding, due to Russia’s discontinuation of this joint work,” according to the Energy Department’s detailed justification of its budget request for fiscal year 2016. Joint work to sustain previous upgrades also is ending, said the document, which was released Feb. 2.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 09 Mar 2015 00:00:00 CSTAfter proposing major spending cuts for Energy Department nuclear nonproliferation programs in last year’s budget request, the Obama administration is asking for $1.7 billion for these efforts in its fiscal year 2016 budget request, an increase of $90.7 million, or 5.6 percent, above the fiscal year 2015 appropriation.

In a Feb. 4 telephone interview with two reporters, Anne Harrington, deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation in the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), said the NNSA had been disappointed with last year’s proposed budget and that “there was a commitment that we would not have that happen again this year.” She added, “Not only did we keep that commitment, but we got a small increase.”

The nonproliferation programs are part of the semiautonomous NNSA, which also is responsible for maintaining and modernizing U.S. nuclear warheads. Funding for NNSA activities in that area would rise to $8.9 billion in fiscal year 2016, up $667 million from the fiscal year 2015 appropriation (see page 27).

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 09 Mar 2015 00:00:00 CSTSam Nunn is co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and a former U.S. senator from Georgia. Richard Lugar is president of the Lugar Center and a former U.S. senator from Indiana.

For more than two decades, the United States and Russia partnered to secure and eliminate dangerous nuclear materials — not as a favor to one another but as a common-sense commitment, born of mutual self-interest, to prevent catastrophic nuclear terrorism. The world’s two largest nuclear powers repeatedly set aside their political differences to cooperate on nuclear security to ensure that terrorists would not be able to detonate a nuclear bomb in New York, Moscow, Paris, Tel Aviv or elsewhere.

Unfortunately, this common-sense cooperation has become the latest casualty of the spiraling crisis in relations among the United States, Europe and Russia.

In December, Congress voted — for the first time in nearly a quarter-century — to defund U.S. efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear materials in the Russian Federation. Days later, Russian officials, following up on previous signals, informed their U.S. counterparts that Russia was cutting off most aspects of its nuclear security cooperation with the United States. These shortsighted actions send a dangerous message to the international community and represent a major setback in the global effort to secure nuclear materials.

Sam Nunn is co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and a former U.S. senator from Georgia. Richard Lugar is president of the Lugar Center and a former U.S. senator from Indiana.

For more than two decades, the United States and Russia partnered to secure and eliminate dangerous nuclear materials — not as a favor to one another but as a common-sense commitment, born of mutual self-interest, to prevent catastrophic nuclear terrorism. The world’s two largest nuclear powers repeatedly set aside their political differences to cooperate on nuclear security to ensure that terrorists would not be able to detonate a nuclear bomb in New York, Moscow, Paris, Tel Aviv or elsewhere.

Unfortunately, this common-sense cooperation has become the latest casualty of the spiraling crisis in relations among the United States, Europe and Russia.

In December, Congress voted — for the first time in nearly a quarter-century — to defund U.S. efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear materials in the Russian Federation. Days later, Russian officials, following up on previous signals, informed their U.S. counterparts that Russia was cutting off most aspects of its nuclear security cooperation with the United States. These shortsighted actions send a dangerous message to the international community and represent a major setback in the global effort to secure nuclear materials.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 23 Jan 2015 00:00:00 CSTThe New York Times

Next week, if all goes as planned, the 42-year-old nuclear reactor at the Vermont Yankee generating station will be shut down for the last time. The steam turbine at the plant, which at its peak could make enough electricity for about half a million homes with virtually no greenhouse gas emissions, will grind to a halt.

[...]

But as Vermont Yankee illustrates, the nuclear industry in the United States is having trouble maintaining the status quo, much less expanding. “It’s going nowhere quickly,” said Sharon Squassoni, who studies energy and climate change at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Overseas, the outlook is not much better.

[...]

Even China, with more than two dozen nuclear plants under construction, faces uncertainties. If the country is able to exploit its abundant reserves of shale gas, its nuclear plans may be derailed, Ms. Squassoni said.

An even bigger question is whether China’s current rate of economic growth is going to continue. “If it doesn’t, what is that going to do to its energy demand?” she said. The impetus for developing more nuclear power may dissipate.

[...]

In a report she prepared in 2009, Ms. Squassoni wrote that in light of steep construction costs, only a handful of new reactors would come on line by 2015, even in the best of circumstances.

“If you really wanted to reduce carbon emissions through nuclear, it was going to be incredibly expensive,” she said. “You’d have to build an incredible number of power plants.”

After more than a few budget antics this weekend, both the FY15 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, H.R. 3979) and FY15 Omnibus (H.R. 83), or “Cromnibus,” have cleared Congress.

The House and Senate Armed Services Committees completed behind-the-scenes negotiations on the NDAA on December 1st then moved on to a vote in the House on December 5th, where the bill passed 300-119. On December 12th, the Senate lent its approval to the bill by a vote of 89-11, marking the 53rd consecutive NDAA approved by Congress. Though given the usual delay and 10 months without the opportunity for amendments in the Senate, the legislation was finalized mostly behind closed doors.

The bill, which includes $495.9 billion for the base defense budget plus $17.5 billion for nuclear weapons-related activities at the Department of Energy and another $63.7 billion for the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account, technically comes in under the Murray-Ryan budget caps. But that’s before you consider any spending that shifted in the mix.

Senior lawmakers alarmed by Russia's collapsing economy fear some of the nuclear power's atomic arsenal could fall into the wrong hands.

While officials say there's no immediate reason to think Russia's weapons could be sold off to the highest bidder or stolen, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) intends to hold hearings next year on what Moscow is doing to keep its nukes safe.

[...]

Collaboration between the Washington and Moscow on nuclear security is “in the process of unraveling as a result of the decisions the Russians have made,” said Ken Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security.

But Russia’s nuclear assets are not nearly as vulnerable as during the breakup of the Soviet Union, he said.

Luongo said it would be “politically unthinkable” for Russia to sell atomic weapons, and that the global community would likely view it as the “ultimate crime against humanity.”

But, “it doesn’t take much of this stuff to become a problem,” he noted.

At the end of the Cold War the United States and the USSR had more than 70,000 nuclear warheads between them. Many of these weapons have now been dismantled.

What is not generally known, however, is that in addition to the actual nuclear warheads both the United States and USSR produced a mind-boggling amount of additional nuclear bomb material that could, if stolen, be fashioned into a major nuclear terrorist weapon. We are talking about a device with the explosive capability of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

Such a weapon would require approximately 100 pounds of highly enriched uranium (HEU). A nuclear device using plutonium, like the other nuclear bomb employed by the U.S. in 1945, would require little more than 10 pounds of that material.

Experts say that the Islamic State have acquired the materials necessary to make a dirty bomb - a device that uses radiological or chemical materials along with conventional explosive - but that any weapon they can develop is likely more effective as a means of causing fear than causing damage.

[...]

Dina Esfandiary, a research associate with the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), who recently published a paper on ISIS’s potential acquisition of weapons of mass destruction with colleague Matthew Cottee, confirms that they did likely acquire 40 kilograms of uranium from Mosul university, but is keen to point out that they almost certainly lack the knowledge to be able to turn the low-grade material into a nuclear device.

“The materials they have are not radioactive enough to cause a great deal of damage or function as a working device,” says Esfandiary. “Where the weapon is effective is to cause fear.”

[...]

However, Esfandiary also warns that “nothing is impossible. If they’re determined enough then they’ll find a way to develop a radiological weapon and use it.”

The Russian decision to curtail nuclear cooperation with the United States and to withdraw from the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) is a major setback for global efforts to manage nuclear security. A consequence of the general downturn in relations following the Ukraine crisis, Moscow’s decision will undermine over two decades of successful US-Russia cooperation aimed at ensuring that loose nuclear weapons, materials, and know-how do not fall into the hands of terrorists. It will also diminish the NSS process, which has enhanced nuclear security worldwide since its launch in 2010.

While every effort should be made to reverse the Russian decision, this should not distract from investing in the momentum that has been building for better nuclear governance. It is especially important to focus on the Asia Pacific. Despite the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, this region is on the cusp of a considerable expansion in nuclear power plants and with it an increase in nuclear materials, adding to worries about the safety and security of radioactive sources. This is worrisome for a region that hosts several nuclear-armed states, has been involved in illicit trafficking networks, and continues to experience significant terrorist, insurgent, and pirate activity.

Fortunately, in recent years, there has been a growing regional willingness to cooperate in addressing nuclear dangers. In addition to leading implementation of the Bangkok Treaty, which establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia, the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has enhanced nonproliferation and counter-terrorism cooperation. In 2012, it launched the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM), which creates a forum for Southeast Asian regulators to share information and build capacity on nuclear safety, security, and safeguards. Comprised of ASEAN members and states from neighboring regions, the 27-member ASEAN Regional Forum has hosted an “inter-sessional meeting on nonproliferation and disarmament” since 2009 to discuss ways to combat nuclear proliferation, promote disarmament, and enhance the peaceful use of nuclear technology. It has also convened workshops on implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires states to develop and enforce legal and regulatory measures against proliferation, and on nuclear forensics cooperation. Meanwhile, other regional organizations have begun to focus on building norms and standards on nuclear-energy development. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, a forum for 21 Pacific Rim member economies, and ASEAN Plus Three, a grouping that links ASEAN states with China, Japan, and South Korea, are developing recommendations for organizing regional cooperation on nuclear energy.

The Russian decision to curtail nuclear cooperation with the United States and to withdraw from the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) is a major setback for global efforts to manage nuclear security. A consequence of the general downturn in relations following the Ukraine crisis, Moscow’s decision will undermine over two decades of successful US-Russia cooperation aimed at ensuring that loose nuclear weapons, materials, and know-how do not fall into the hands of terrorists. It will also diminish the NSS process, which has enhanced nuclear security worldwide since its launch in 2010.

While every effort should be made to reverse the Russian decision, this should not distract from investing in the momentum that has been building for better nuclear governance. It is especially important to focus on the Asia Pacific. Despite the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan, this region is on the cusp of a considerable expansion in nuclear power plants and with it an increase in nuclear materials, adding to worries about the safety and security of radioactive sources. This is worrisome for a region that hosts several nuclear-armed states, has been involved in illicit trafficking networks, and continues to experience significant terrorist, insurgent, and pirate activity.

Fortunately, in recent years, there has been a growing regional willingness to cooperate in addressing nuclear dangers. In addition to leading implementation of the Bangkok Treaty, which establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia, the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has enhanced nonproliferation and counter-terrorism cooperation. In 2012, it launched the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM), which creates a forum for Southeast Asian regulators to share information and build capacity on nuclear safety, security, and safeguards. Comprised of ASEAN members and states from neighboring regions, the 27-member ASEAN Regional Forum has hosted an “inter-sessional meeting on nonproliferation and disarmament” since 2009 to discuss ways to combat nuclear proliferation, promote disarmament, and enhance the peaceful use of nuclear technology. It has also convened workshops on implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires states to develop and enforce legal and regulatory measures against proliferation, and on nuclear forensics cooperation. Meanwhile, other regional organizations have begun to focus on building norms and standards on nuclear-energy development. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, a forum for 21 Pacific Rim member economies, and ASEAN Plus Three, a grouping that links ASEAN states with China, Japan, and South Korea, are developing recommendations for organizing regional cooperation on nuclear energy.

Russia did not attend a planning session held in Washington in late October for the 2016 nuclear security summit, casting doubt on its participation in the summit.

In a Nov. 5 statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry said Moscow “does not see any possibility to take part in the preparations” for the upcoming summit, which would be the fourth installment of the biennial meetings.

The summits are the most visible feature of an accelerated international effort to prevent nuclear terrorism. U.S. President Barack Obama launched the effort as part of his speech in Prague in April 2009. Summits have been held in Washington in 2010, Seoul in 2012, and The Hague last March.

The faltering international response to the Ebola epidemic and the rise of ISIS in the Middle East starkly highlight the need for a modernized global architecture that can effectively address rapidly mutating challenges to the world order. In response to the recent cascade of global instability, President Obama acknowledged that, “to keep pace with an interconnected world . . . we cannot rely on a rule book written for a different century.” He should heed his own advice. The international forum he created to strengthen the security of vulnerable nuclear materials and facilities is heading into its endgame, still relying on twentieth-century rules that leave glaring gaps unaddressed.

The United States will host the fourth and likely final Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in 2016, and later this month, representatives from over fifty nations will start planning the agenda. They need to overcome the prevailing complacency about the strength of the current security system and its ability to prevent a nuclear nightmare.

The current system suffers from three fundamental weaknesses. It mostly relies on voluntary obligations that nations can take or leave. There are no mandatory international standards that would allow for effective evaluation of security consistency and competency across borders. And, there is no requirement for peer review or even communication among countries about their security strategy and practices. The result is an opaque global patchwork, with the weakest links offering tempting targets for increasingly emboldened terrorists.

Most U.S. policymakers support critical U.S. investments in improving security to prevent the theft of nuclear weapons and weapons usable material in Russia. A few, however, are starting to raise doubts about whether this cooperation is a good idea. Skeptics argue that, because of Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, the federal government needs to make a stronger case for nuclear security cooperation with Russia. They argue that the U.S. case needs to address issues like the cost of nuclear security programs, the fungibility of money given to Russia for security upgrades, and the marginal benefit of nuclear security spending in Russia. The problem with these concerns is that they do not acknowledge the purpose of nuclear security cooperation: reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Instead, they appear to be grounded in the mistaken belief that such cooperation is a favor the United States does for Russia, not something that both countries do because it’s in their interests. If skeptics had a sufficient appreciation of the threat, they would likely have a better understanding of why cooperation is in the United States’ interests.

As described in detail below, nuclear terrorism poses a threat to U.S security; nuclear security cooperation with Russia can reduce that threat; the cost of addressing the threat is tiny by comparison to what’s at stake; there is little danger that U.S. support for nuclear security in Russia will allow Russia to undertake a larger nuclear weapons modernization program; and the marginal benefit of spending money on nuclear security in Russia or elsewhere is easily high enough to justify the expenditure.

A bad year for nuclear power producers has Belgians and Britons shivering more vigorously as summer heat fades into fall. Multiple reactor shutdowns in both countries have heightened concern about the security of power supplies when demand spikes this winter.

In Belgium, rolling blackouts are already part of this winter's forecast because three of the country's largest reactors—reactors that normally provide one-quarter of Belgian electricity—are shut down.

Belgium's troubles started brewing two years ago during inspections at the country's seven nuclear reactors, all operated by Belgian utility Electrabel. Ultrasound inspection of the reactor pressure vessels at the utility's Doel power station near Antwerp revealed previously unrecognized defects at its 1,000-megawatt reactor #3.

[...]

Sabotage of the sort that may have sidelined Electrabel's Doel 4 reactor was a key part of the Lovins' analysis. Despite all of the attention paid to terrorist threats, insider threats remain the "most serious challenge confronting nuclear facilities" according to political scientists Scott Sagan at Stanford University and Matthew Bunn of Harvard. They made that case in an April 2014 article in the Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

The federal agent spotted Patrick Campbell as soon as he walked off the jetway at JFK. A slight 33-year-old African, he wore a business suit and a backpack. It was Aug. 21, 2013. Campbell was exhausted. He’d already spent more than 12 hours in the air, flying from his native Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, to Paris and then New York, and he had a reservation for a flight to Miami later that day. As he passed through immigration, retrieved his suitcase, and cleared customs, a surveillance team followed his every move. On the concourse, agents surrounded him. “Are you Mr. Campbell?” one asked. Then they threw on handcuffs.

[...]

For the past 15 months, [Sammy] Cruzcoriano had posed as a businessman looking to ship 1,000 tons of uranium to Iran, which has been slapped with strict sanctions for its alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons. Campbell, Cruzcoriano recalled, “just looked at me and hunched down.” It had all been a sting.

[...]

When Matthew Bunn, a nuclear security expert at Harvard Kennedy School, hears that figure, he bursts into laughter. “If I were Iran, I’d mine elsewhere,” he says. Usually, for rock to be commercially viable, uranium must exist in concentrations above 500 parts per million. Campbell’s sample, as Serafini put it to the jury, “was literally garden-variety dirt.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 11 Sep 2014 00:00:00 CSTCAMBRIDGE, Mass. — “I continue to be much more concerned, when it comes to our security, with the prospect of a nuclear weapon going off in Manhattan.” So said President Obama last March, weighing the danger of nuclear terrorism against that of Russian aggression in Ukraine. Yet our research shows that his administration proposes cutting the amount of money spent on an array of programs to secure nuclear bomb materials around the world and keep them out of terrorists’ hands — to $555 million next year from $700 million in fiscal 2014. And in both houses of Congress, there are efforts to legislate a suspension of nuclear security cooperation with Russia.

None of this makes sense, given the growing power of terrorist movements in the Middle East, the consequences if such terrorists made a crude nuclear bomb, and how modest the price of nuclear security has been — never more than two out of every $1,000 in America’s defense budget. Slowing these efforts would be penny-wise and pound-foolish. And cutting off cooperation now, when urgent tasks to improve nuclear security remain, would only add nuclear security to the list of victims of Russian aggression.

This cooperation is not a favor to Russia. It is an investment in vital American security interests. Yet under the president’s proposed 2015 budget, funding for removing nuclear materials from vulnerable locations would be halved, to $58 million from $115 million, allowing fewer such removals than in any year in the past decade. Converting research reactors from high-enriched to low-enriched uranium fuel would be extended five more years; deploying border equipment to detect smuggling would be delayed; work to better protect sites where radiological material (useful for dirty bombs) is stored could slow so much that the task wouldn’t be finished until 2074.

Former Senator Richard Lugar joins HuffPost Live to discuss whether nuclear nonproliferation cooperation with Russia is possible in the current diplomatic climate—and whether the world is in nuclear danger.

Hosted by: Alyona Minkovski

Guests:

Fmr. Sen. Richard Lugar @TheLugarCenter (Washington, DC) Former United States Senator From Indiana

The substantial nuclear security budget cuts proposed by the Obama administration for fiscal
year (FY) 2015, if approved, would slow progress toward preventing the essential ingredients of nuclear bombs from falling into terrorist hands. Many of the proposed cutbacks are not the result of completing projects under the four-year effort to secure vulnerable nuclear materials or putting the mixed oxide (MOX) fuel program for plutonium in cold standby. The drop in funding would result in real and significant cuts to important ongoing nuclear security programs. Congress should act to reduce the scale of the proposed cut for nuclear security programs by at least $100 million, and should consider other substantial increases in funding for nonproliferation programs.

Since the start of his presidency, Barack Obama has been clear that one of his major goals was to secure nuclear weapons and materials. As recently as March, at the Nuclear Security Summit in Holland, the president declared: “It is important for us not to relax but rather accelerate our efforts over the next two years.”

Instead, to little notice, the administration has decided to spend money at an even greater rate than before to refurbish and modernize nuclear weapons while slashing the amount it is spending to prevent terrorists from getting or making their own.

According to a new analysis of nuclear security spending by a bipartisan group at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, the administration in its 2015 budget chose to cut nuclear nonproliferation programs in the Energy Department by $399 million while increasing spending on nuclear weapons by $534 million.

[...]

Matthew Bunn, a former White House official and one of the authors of the Kennedy School of Government analysis, described the internal administration discussions this way: “Should they provide more money for nonproliferation, or more money for weapons? It’s clear that weapons won that debate.”

[...]

“Despite President Obama’s well-deserved reputation as an advocate for nuclear security, the Obama administration has been cutting nuclear security programs year after year for most of its term in office,” wrote Bunn, a Harvard professor; William Tobey, deputy administrator for the NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation office during the Bush administration; and Nickolas Roth, a Harvard researcher, in their 32-page analysis.

[...]

Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, said it is clear “there is a mismatch between the administration’s budget request and their statements about the urgent need to accelerate efforts to work globally to secure weapons-usable nuclear materials. We think this mismatch needs to be corrected. The administration needs to put its money where its mouth is.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 30 Jul 2014 00:00:00 CSTA key Senate committee on Tuesday endorsed a U.S. nuclear trade pact with Vietnam, but constrained its length to 30 years and added new requirements for most such future pacts.

The joint resolution, offered by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez, passed in a bipartisan voice vote in an afternoon business meeting of the panel.

As negotiated by the Obama administration, the new agreement to allow U.S. nuclear technologies, atomic materials and technological know-how to be shared with Vietnam could be automatically extended -- a departure from typical past practice with Washington's trade partners that has troubled some lawmakers.

[...]

"The bipartisan nature of the [Menendez] committee vote augurs well for Senate support," agreed Miles Pomper of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies on Wednesday. "But given the failure of Congress to pass any legislation these days and the upcoming campaign season, I wouldn't bet on a joint resolution making its way to the president."

Building Global Capacity considers the value of expanded international participation in the verification of nuclear arms reductions and how this participation can increase confidence in nuclear threat reduction efforts among all states.

The reports call for the international community to fundamentally rethink the design, development, and implementation of arms control verification. An international initiative pursued with creativity, broad participation from states with and without nuclear weapons, and a sense of urgency and common purpose could make a significant contribution to global security.

NTI identified the following common themes in all four reports:

The international community must work to build and sustain a global cadre of verification experts by identifying core competencies, investing in national expertise, and seeking opportunities to develop and participate in international verification efforts.

Collaborative international work on verification should start now to develop new tools and approaches that can give policymakers confidence that nuclear reductions are verifiable.

Future research and development should cross disciplines, communities, and nations to prevent stove-piping and innovate new solutions to difficult verification problems.

A new framework is needed for sensitive information and states should reevaluate what information should be protected and what information could be shared openly or on a limited basis.

No single verification approach is enough, and countries should work to build the strongest set of verification measures to detect or deter cheating.

Verification is an area where all can contribute, and all states—both with and without nuclear weapons—have something to gain by expanding the circle of experts who can verify nuclear arms reductions.

Participants in a landmark international conference said the world's ability to trace incriminating nuclear materials to their origins could improve substantially if governments work together on the matter, the U.N. nuclear watchdog said on Tuesday.

They argued such collaboration would prove "essential" for nuclear forensics capabilities to keep up with the growing reach and sophistication of criminal and terror networks, the International Atomic Energy Agency added in a statement.

[...]

Such databases would include "information ... and in some cases samples," Elena Sokova, executive director of the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation, told Global Security Newswire.

She added, though, that she had not heard of any specific "proposals for cooperation" in the works. In the past, governments have proven reluctant to offer up samples of sensitive atomic substances for international databases.

Sokova also suggested governments could cooperate on nuclear-forensics efforts by helping others to carry out investigations.

Workers and scientists have carved a sprawling laboratory deep below this sleep dairy town that, despite government reassurances, some of Horonobe's 2,500 residents fear could turn their neighborhood into a nuclear waste storage site.

"I'm worried," said 54-year-old reindeer handler Atsushi Arase. "If the government already has its eye on us as a potential site, it may eventually come here even if we refuse."

[...]

"Therefore when you separate the plutonium from spent fuel you are creating an international security danger," says Frank von Hippel, a Princeton University nuclear physicist and waste disposal expert.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 14 Jul 2014 00:00:00 CSTThe Iraqi government has told the United Nations that when the group now calling itself the Islamic State (formerly the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, sometimes referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL) seized the city of Mosul, it also acquired some 40 kilograms of uranium compounds from the university there. Iraq’s ambassador to the United Nations, Mohammad Ali al-Hakim, warned that “terrorist groups have seized control of nuclear material at the sites that came out of the control of the state.” (See the excellent account from Frederik Dahl of Reuters here.)

This has provoked a bit of a hullabaloo on the internet (see, for example, hereand here) – but I would argue it’s time for everyone to calm down. All of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) that once existed in Iraq – the material that could really be used for a nuclear bomb, which Iraq had as fuel for research reactors provided by Russia and France – was removed after the 1991 war. (Saddam Hussein launched a “crash program” to make a bomb out of that HEU after the invasion of Kuwait, but didn’t succeed before the war intervened.) Iraq’s most dangerous radiological sources that could be used in a so-called “dirty bomb” were largely removed in a cooperative effort after the 2003 war. Former IAEA safeguards chief Olli Heinonen has confirmed that there should be no enriched uranium in Mosul. IAEA spokeswoman Gill Tudor told Dahl that “on the basis of initial information we believe the material involved is low grade and would not present a significant safety, security, or nuclear proliferation risk.”

What we appear to be talking about here is 40 kilograms of compounds of natural or depleted uranium – useless for a terrorist group trying to make a nuclear bomb. It’s of no significant use for a “dirty bomb” either, as uranium is only very weakly radioactive. Even if intentionally dispersed in a city, it would pose only a modest health hazard (far less than the risk to human life from virtually everything else the Islamic State has been doing). It’s not clear this even demonstrates an interest by the Islamic State in getting materials for a nuclear bomb – they may have just seized whatever happened to be lying around at the university, without thinking in any detail about what they were going to use it for.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 11 Jul 2014 00:00:00 CSTIraqi jihadists have grabbed 88 pounds of uranium compounds from a Mosul University science lab, but U.S. and international weapons experts are downplaying the possibility the deadly toxins could be used to make a so-called "dirty bomb."

The material, believed to be low-grade, unenriched uranium mixed with other elements, was taken from a science lab at Mosul University by ISIS, the terrorist group that took over Iraq's second-largest city last month and has vowed to attack Baghdad. Iraq notified the UN in a July 8 letter which sought international help to "stave off the threat of their use by terrorists in Iraq or abroad," according to Reuters, which saw the letter.

Although the material is not believed to be weaponized, and ISIS does not have known missile delivery capability, the theft stoked fear that a dirty bomb - a primitive explosive used to disseminate radioactive material - could be fashioned from the uranium compounds.

[...]

"There is theoretically the potential for a dirty bomb,” Daryl Kimball, of the Arms Control Association in Washington, told FoxNews.com, explaining that such bombs are more effective at scaring people than killing them. "It explodes and the terrorist is banking on the fear factor of radiation. That’s what we are looking at here at worst.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 10 Jul 2014 00:00:00 CSTAn international pact on heightened security standards for nuclear materials got one step closer to being implemented when Japan signed on late last month.

The island nation's signing of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material means that another 22 countries are required to do the same before the pact can enter into force, according to a Friday International Atomic Energy Agencypress release.

To date, 77 nations have signed the amendment, which was drafted in 2005 and requires signatories to take certain steps to safeguard civilian atomic facilities and stockpiles of nuclear material. The measures apply to material in active use, in storage and in transit. The amendment also provides a framework for nations to cooperate in rapidly responding to incidents where atomic materials go missing or are stolen.

[...]

Miles Pomper, a senior research associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, in a Monday phone interview said the immediate impact of Japan signing the amendment would be minimal until the accord goes into effect. "These things are only as good as your domestic regulations are," he said. "But it's one more sign that the Japanese are taking nuclear security more seriously."

[...]

Pomper said Japan's signing of the amendment could help build critical momentum toward getting the remaining holdouts, such as Washington, to ratify the 2005 provision.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 07 Jul 2014 00:00:00 CSTRepublicans and Democrats alike have traditionally understood that investing in nuclear security is a small price to pay compared with the devastating economic, political and social costs of nuclear terrorism. That’s why U.S. cooperation with Russia and other countries to secure vulnerable nuclear material has enjoyed bipartisan support.

Unfortunately, the House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee—whose chairman, Congressman Mike Simpson (R-ID), acknowledged in April that nuclear security cooperation with Russia was “in our own interest, not just Russian interest and the world's interest”—recently approved a bill that would block this cooperation. Citing the situation in Ukraine, his Committee recommended stripping funding for nuclear-security cooperation between the United States and Russia.

For more than twenty years, Russia, which has the most nuclear material in the most facilities of any country in the world, worked with the United States on improving its own nuclear security through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. As a result of this collaboration, Russia has made significant progress in improving security for its nuclear material, and the most egregious problems have been fixed.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 03 Jul 2014 00:00:00 CSTAn influential world body that controls nuclear exports will address the sensitive issue of closer ties with India - which is outside the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - at an annual meeting this week, a draft agenda obtained by Reuters showed.

The United States, Britain and others have argued that nuclear-armed India should join the secretive 48-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group - established in 1975 to ensure that civilian atomic trade is not diverted for military purposes.

But other NSG states have voiced doubt about accepting a country that built up a nuclear arsenal outside a 189-nation treaty set up four decades ago to prevent states from acquiring such weapons of mass destruction.

[...]

"India's version of the Additional Protocol is a paper tiger," said Daryl Kimball of the U.S.-based Arms Control Association, a research and advocacy group.

GTRI has been remarkably successful. Since its May 2004 launch, it has removed over four tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium from countries around the world (or in a few cases, confirmed that they had eliminated the materials themselves), helped eighteen countries to eliminate all of the weapons-usable nuclear material on their soil, converted forty-eight reactors so they no longer use potential bomb material as fuel,removed 36,000 dangerous radiological sources, and upgraded security for some 1,600 buildings where dangerous radiological or nuclear material resides. These successes represent bombs unmade that will never go off—real and permanent threat reduction. At an annual cost that is less than one part in a thousand of the U.S. defense budget, all Americans are safer because of GTRI’s work.

GTRI has been a bipartisan effort from its inception. I first proposed the idea, suggesting that a number of small programs working on pieces of the problem of removing vulnerable nuclear material be combined into a single effort with enough heft to get the job done. A wide range of Washington nongovernment organizations worked to push it forward, particularly the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), led by former Senator Sam Nunn. When the government had no program with the flexibility needed to get dangerous potential bomb material out of the former Yugoslavia, NTI stepped in with a $5 million private gift—solving one problem at one site, but highlighting the need for a broader government effort. Congress passed bipartisan legislation supporting the launch of the initiative; Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency at the time (and no friend of the Bush administration, given his inconvenient conclusion that there was no longer any nuclear-weapons program in Iraq before the 2003 war), helped convince President Bush such an initiative was needed.

Winning global support to phase out the civilian use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) has been one of the seminal achievements of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process that President Barack Obama started four years ago.

For decades, the United States has sought to secure and minimize the worldwide use of this dangerous material. Important US-led efforts such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative have successfully eliminated civilian HEU in over two dozen countries, removing enough material to build 200 nuclear weapons. However, broader international efforts have been too often hampered by a lack of multilateral support.

As the final summit approaches in 2016, the world needs a comprehensive strategy to eliminate HEU from the civilian sector, write Miles Pomper and Philippe Mauger of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

In a new policy analysis brief commissioned by the Stanley Foundation, Pomper and Mauger argue that the United States, the Netherlands, and South Korea should take full advantage of the NSS mechanisms—while they have them—to build sustained support for civilian HEU elimination.

Analysts warn that entrenched political obstacles may stand in the way of any new multilateral effort to curb nonmilitary uses of bomb-grade uranium.

World leaders have achieved a degree of success since 2010 in reducing the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian needs, such as fueling nuclear reactors and manufacturing medical isotopes, says a May analysis by Miles Pomper and Philippe Mauger of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

They argued, though, that dangers from the material persist. The authors said roughly 54 tons of highly enriched uranium is being used for peaceful purposes across 29 nations, and a U.N. estimate suggests a would-be nuclear terrorist may need to steal as little as 55 pounds to construct a bomb.

[...]

"Further HEU stock minimization remains blocked by a few recalcitrant countries, and establishing broader legal principles on HEU management is proving to be difficult," they wrote in the Stanley Foundation assessment.

The proposed legislative measure also includes a rider that would make it difficult to implement nearly any new nuclear trade deals beyond 30 years -- a move almost certain to rile a White House that increasingly prefers no expiration dates at all for such pacts.

[...]

His joint resolution essentially is "about assuring a congressional role in governing nuclear trade in the future, and a warning shot not to try to block [congressional oversight of] future agreements with such automatic extensions," Miles Pomper of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies said in an email response to questions.

[...]

"Hanoi has already concluded negotiations with Russia and Japan on buying reactors without the gold standard, so we don't have leverage in the nuclear sphere," Pomper told GSN.

In March of this year, US President Barack Obama told a group of campaign donors that “loose nukes” were the main thing keeping him up at night. This sentiment is consistent with his administration’s stated policy, which is to keep wayward nuclear weapons and radioactive material out of the hands of terrorists.

In fact, though, the administration is doing just the opposite, cutting money for nuclear nonproliferation programs, where even the Republican-led House Armed Services Committee wants to spend more. If the White House doesn’t reverse course, this could be a great setback for the cause it claims to embrace.

How is it that the administration has chosen to be stingier on nonproliferation than a Republican party typically more inclined to fund weapons than weapons reductions? In early 2014, as the administration was in the final stages of preparing its budget request for fiscal 2015, Pentagon officials objected to what they said was inadequate funding for the nuclear weapons programs overseen by the Energy Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Energy Secretary Ernie Moniz and acting NNSA Administrator Bruce Held stood their ground, defending the proposed funding level, so Pentagon officials then appealed to the White House. The nonproliferation coordinator on the National Security Council, Liz Sherwood-Randall, and the Office of Management and Budget director, Sylvia Burwell, sided with the Pentagon and directed the NNSA to increase the nuclear weapons account. In short, Moniz got rolled by Obama’s advisors.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 22 May 2014 00:00:00 CSTBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University

Funding U.S. programs that enhance nuclear security has been a controversial issue this year in Congress. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) recently released its version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015. The results are a mixed bag on the nuclear security front. The committee proposes picking up some of the slack the Obama administration left for nonproliferation programs — increasing the administration’s request by $10 million overall — but it also slashed a key nuclear security effort and called for putting all nuclear security cooperation with Russia on hold.

If the HASC mark prevails, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative — which removes or disposes of civilian weapons-usable nuclear material, converts HEU reactors to LEU, and helps with security for research reactors in developing countries—would increase from $333 million to $413 million. This is still a reduction from the program’s current budget, but much less of a cut than the Obama administration was proposing.

The biggest reduction in nuclear security programs was to the International Material Protection and Cooperation (IMPC) program, which helps to upgrade security for nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials in Russia, China, South Asia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, and also includes the Second Line of Defense effort that installs radiation detectors at key sites around the world. The Obama administration requested $305 million, which was already a 25% reduction from the previous year’s budget. The HASC proposed to reduce that amount to $129 million, or more than a 70% cut from the previous year’s budget. A little more than half of those proposed cuts were to Second Line of Defense and the rest of the cuts impact programs to upgrade security at facilities with nuclear material.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 22 May 2014 00:00:00 CSTIn March, more than 50 heads of state met in The Hague for the third nuclear security summit. By far, the highlight of the summit was Japan’s decision to give up about 50 bombs’
worth of weapons-grade material. This material, held for decades at the Tokai facility, was so lightly irradiated that it was considered fresh—about 170 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and about 330 kilograms of plutonium. Reportedly, Japan traded a 10-year extension to ship back spent fuel from other facilities to the United States for the fresh weapons-grade fuel. Some wondered why it needed to be shipped at all, raising questions about U.S. priorities and tactics in the summit process.

Nuclear terrorism has been a high priority for the United States since 2001, but the perception of threat isn’t widely shared. The summit process was designed to change that, but it’s been slow. President Obama has one last shot—in 2016—to persuade other leaders that nuclear security is important enough to keep applying pressure.

After that basic goal, the priorities get murky. What about plutonium? Material in military stockpiles? Nuclear weapons? Radiological sources used in dirty bombs?

Multilateral commitments “broke significant ground” at the recent nuclear security summit and are key to strengthening nuclear security worldwide, a European official who attended the event said last month.

He was referring to the joint state-ments, or “gift baskets,” which were endorsed by varying groups of countries at the March 24-25 summit in The Hague. The meeting also produced a communiqué, which was endorsed by all participants—53 countries and four international organizations.

In an April 11 e-mail, the official said that the communiqué, while outlining “positive actions,” does not represent the “most forward thinking on advancing nuclear security” because not all countries are ready to take certain steps. “Achieving consensus required compromise,” he said, whereas the joint statements “allowed countries to go beyond the least common denominator.”

They were developed as life-saving devices, ensuring that blood is properly treated before patients receive a transfusion. Massachusetts, because of its concentration of medical facilities, has one of the nation’s highest number of the machines.

But now federal officials worry the material that makes these devices dubbed blood irradiator machines so effective — a highly radioactive powder known as cesium chloride — could threaten public safety. Some fear that people could be exposed in an accident or, in a worst-case scenario, that the material could be stolen by terrorists to make a “dirty bomb” spewing radiation.

[...]

“If we could make headway on this — if you could get all the cesium chloride off the market — it would be permanent risk reduction,” said Charles Ferguson, president of the Federation of American Scientists, a nonprofit dedicated to finding solutions to international security problems.

[...]

‘There are going to be winners and losers,” said Miles Pomper, a senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and an expert on radiological materials. “The people who only make cesium chloride aren’t going to like it.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgSun, 11 May 2014 00:00:00 CSTA group of 100 former officials, peace advocates and issue experts criticized the White House for planning to cut nuclear security funding next year.

In a letter to President Obama, the mainly left-leaning critics argued that the fiscal 2015 budget request would signal a "major retreat" in efforts to secure nuclear materials worldwide.

Specifically, the experts lamented a planned reduction to the Global Threat Reduction Initiative of 25 percent, and cuts to the International Nuclear Materials Protection Program totaling 27 percent. Also affected: The Pentagon's Cooperative Threat Reduction budget, which is slated to be cut by 27 percent, according to the signers.

Insider threats are the most serious challenge confronting nuclear facilities in today’s world, a new study says.

In every case of theft of nuclear materials where the circumstances of the theft are known, the perpetrators were either insiders or had help from insiders, according to Scott Sagan of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and his co-author, Matthew Bunn of Harvard University, in a research paper published this month by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

“Given that the other cases involve bulk material stolen covertly without anyone being aware the material was missing, there is every reason to believe that they were perpetrated by insiders as well,” they wrote.

As the Soviet Union was unraveling and the Cold War was winding down in the early 1990s, negotiators in Washington and Moscow began talking about how best to dispose of the plutonium inside thousands of nuclear warheads the two nations had agreed to dismantle. The cheapest and easiest method was to immobilize the radioactive material by encasing it in molten glass and burying it. But the Russians balked at that, likening it to flushing gold down the toilet. Ultimately, it was decided that the plutonium would be converted into fuel for nuclear power plants. In September 2000, the U.S. and Russia signed an agreement under which each side would turn 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium into mixed-oxide fuel, or MOX, that could be combined with uranium for use in commercial reactors.

[...]

The project is vastly over budget: The Department of Energy has sunk about $5 billion into it so far and estimates it will cost an additional $6 billion to $7 billion to finish the plant, plus an additional $20 billion or so to turn the plutonium into fuel over 15 years. In its 2015 budget request released in March, the Department of Energy announced it will place the MOX project on “cold standby,” effectively mothballing the project for the foreseeable future. “It’s a major fiasco,” says Edwin Lyman, a senior scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists. “Billions of taxpayer dollars have been wasted. It’s a classic boondoggle.”

[...]

Construction snafus weren’t the only problem. In late 2008, not long after construction got under way, Duke Energy pulled out of the program because the government couldn’t guarantee a steady supply of the plutonium mixture. The price of uranium, the most common nuclear fuel, has since fallen by about 70 percent, giving other utilities even less incentive to buy the costlier MOX. “U.S. utilities weren’t wild about using MOX fuel to begin with,” Sharon Squassoni, director of the nuclear proliferation prevention program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in an e-mail. “It is an exceedingly expensive way to dispose of plutonium.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 24 Apr 2014 00:00:00 CSTThe possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack has been called a black swan occurrence, an unlikely but possible event that is the national security nightmare that keeps President Obama— and other world leaders—up at night. At a closed-door session of the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague last month, the assembled leaders were challenged to respond to terrorist nuclear attack scenarios. The goal was to focus them on the serious security and financial consequences that would affect all nations if poorly secured nuclear materials fell into the wrong hands.

They defeated the virtual dangers through collective action. After three summits and six years, however, it is clear that real-world international cooperation and consensus on nuclear security remains weak. And focusing on the threat alone has proven insufficient motivation for significantly improving global defenses against nuclear terrorism.

In advance of the likely final summit in 2016, the fear of nuclear terrorism should be redirected into a global nuclear security “race to the top.” The concept of a race to the top would flip the incentives in favor of showcasing nuclear security improvement and raise the overall expectation of what can and should be done. Posing this challenge could eradicate the lowest-common-denominator approach of past summits, and help eliminate the significant security vulnerabilities that now exist. A “race to the top” should change the narrative from risk to responsibility, and incorporate regional cooperation and competition, incentives for action, and rewards for superior performance. The rewards for demonstrating maximally effective nuclear security can include a special acknowledgment at the next summit, a certification for those nations that confirm their improved performance, and an opportunity to address their peers and the media on why and how they chose to improve.

The U.S. government lately is sharing less information with Congress about weapons-of-mass-destruction proliferation concerns, a new Capitol Hill study finds.

[...]

John Isaacs, executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, said lawmakers' access to official assessments on WMD matters could help them make informed decisions in votes on proliferation-related issues, such as sanctions bills, military- and intelligence-spending proposals, and annual defense-authorization legislation.

Still, Isaacs said providing lawmakers with more information would offer no guarantee they would make reasoned voting decisions.

"Congress should get more facts [about weapons of mass destruction], but that wouldn't necessarily say much," he said. "Members of Congress with or without complete information ... tend to vote on ideology and not facts."

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 22 Apr 2014 00:00:00 CSTThankfully, US-Russia cooperation on nuclear security will continue—for now. Since 1993, the United States has spent $1.6 billion on Cooperative Threat Reduction (known as the Nunn-Lugar pact), a program designed to increase safety and security at nuclear and chemical-weapons facilities of former Cold War antagonists. But last June, the pact expired after twenty years, and despite pledges from the Obama administration that work would continue “unfettered,” recent events in Ukraine have introduced enough friction into the relationship to cause alarm.

Cooperative Threat Reduction includes treatment of nuclear and radiological material and facilities, as well as efforts to destroy chemical weapons and keep smugglers from secreting weaponry across the Russian border. The necessity to stay on top of this delicate—in every sense of the word—work cannot be understated. Paul Walker, international program director of the environmental security and sustainability program of Green Cross and Global Green, expressed concern about Russia’s ability to safely deal with its chemical and nuclear arsenals without US assistance quite bluntly. “I worry about the Russians going off on their own and making some unintentional mistakes, having some accidents,” he said. Unfortunately, unintentional mistakes and accidents have been part of both the Soviet and American nuclear programs since the Manhattan Project.

"A lot of what's constraining nuclear power is economics," says Matthew Bunn, a professor of practice at the Harvard Kennedy School. It's much easier for a large, centralized state than for a private utility to absorb the billions in upfront costs necessary to build a reactor. That, says Bunn, is largely why growth is concentrated in Asia and Russia.

More countries should work towards properly securing nuclear material and radioactive sources because of the evolving threat of nuclear terrorism, experts at the Nuclear Security Summit said on Monday.

[...]

“There are 2,000 metric tonnes of weapons-usable nuclear material that is highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium,” said Deepti Choubey, senior director of nuclear and bio-security at the Nuclear Threat Initiative in Washington.

“These are the materials that a terrorist would use to make a kind of bomb that you would use for nuclear terrorism attacks and they are currently spread across hundreds of sites in 25 countries around the world.”

Ms Choubey was speaking on the sidelines of the summit’s opening day in The Hague, on Monday.

[...]

“This is an issue where all countries can agree on,” said Miles Pomper, a senior research associate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Washington. “We know it needs to be done, to secure the material and improve communications on the global system.”

Progress had been made in minimising and securing materials. By the time of the summit, there were 25 countries in possession of these materials, down from 39 in 2009. Japan also announced on Monday that it would return 331 kilograms of weapons-usable nuclear material to the US. However, Mr Pomper said it was a global effort that needed global cooperation.

“We want to transform this into a legal mechanism to make sure these last beyond 2016 and we don’t forget about the issue when leaders go home,” he said.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 10 Apr 2014 00:00:00 CSTJust weeks after Japan agreed to give up a cache of weapons-grade plutonium, the country is set to push ahead with a program that would produce new stockpiles of the material, creating a proliferation risk for decades to come.

Though that additional plutonium would not be the grade that is most desirable for bombs, and is therefore less of a threat, it could — in knowledgeable hands and with some work and time — be used to make a weapon. The newly created stockpiles would add to tons of other plutonium already being stored in Japan.

“The government made a big deal out of returning several hundred kilograms of plutonium, but it brushes over the fact that Japan has so much more,” said Sumio Mabuchi, an opposition lawmaker who served as adviser to the government in the early days of the 2011 Fukushima disaster. “It’s hypocritical.”

[...]

The plutonium that will remain is dedicated to the recycling project, which is decades behind schedule because of technical problems and opposition to recycling. “It is absurd that Japan is still seeing plutonium recycling as a ticket to energy security,” said Matthew Bunn, an associate professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.

The United States is resuming nuclear-security work in Russia despite ongoing disagreements over Moscow's annexation of the Crimea region of Ukraine, a Washington official says.

[...]

Harvard University's Matthew Bunn, a former aide to President Clinton, warned last month that an end to the U.S. work in Russia -- which is aimed at preventing terrorists from obtaining weapons-usable nuclear material -- could introduce higher risks.

"There's a huge problem of sustainability, there are problems of security culture, there's still weakness in insider protection and we still need to be working together," Bunn said.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has warned that there were 140 cases of missing or unauthorized nuclear and radioactive material in 2013 — a pressing reminder that the possibility of possession of nuclear materials by terrorist organizations is both real and current.

[...]

Matthew Bunn, a professor at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, also echoed this, explaining that the lack of U.S. involvement has made it harder for the country to reinforce responsible safety measures.

He concluded that overall “The problem appears to be a combination of lack of sustained high-level attention by both the administration and Congress and disputes over unrelated issues.”

The U.S. Energy Department's nuclear-security arm is reviewing its assistance to Russia amid continuing tensions with Moscow over Ukraine.

The National Nuclear Security Administration assessment is part of an Energy-wide "ongoing internal review of Russian-related activities," department spokesman Bill Gibbons said in a statement last week. The review comes against a backdrop of Western concerns that Russian President Vladimir Putin's forces might seek to further encroach on former Soviet or Warsaw Pact territory following the annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula.

[...]

Kingston Reif, a policy analyst with the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, said in an email that the decision to rescind the request for the laser technology "raises questions" about whether Pentagon and NNSA officials are reconsidering moving forward with other nonproliferation projects in Russia.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 01 Apr 2014 00:00:00 CSTA little past midnight at a gas station in Mexico a man approached a car, forced the driver and passenger out at gunpoint and bound them in an empty parking lot before driving off. In the carjacked vehicle was Cobalt-60, a highly radioactive material that could be used to make a dirty bomb. The radioactive cargo disappeared for two days before eventually being recovered.

The Mexico incident, which took place in December, is part of a troubling pattern of loss and theft of weapons-usable materials worldwide. The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that more than a hundred thefts and other incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material occur every year. Fortunately, there was some real progress made in preventing nuclear terrorism when President Barack Obama and more than 50 world leaders gathered for the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague in late March. Now, Congress must rise to the challenge and do its part.

Around the world the global stockpile of nuclear materials is large enough to build 80,000 weapons like the one that destroyed Nagasaki. It doesn’t take much to do damage: A grapefruit-sized amount of plutonium or enough weapons-grade uranium to fit into a 5-pound bag of sugar can be fashioned into a weapon. Terrorist groups from Afghanistan to the North Caucasus to Japan have sought to acquire nuclear materials over the past two decades.

HINDERSTEIN
Well, this really dates back to the president's Prague speech of 2009 in which he articulated the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years. As the first step towards that goal, he convened the first Nuclear Security Summit here in Washington, D.C. in 2010. And this is the second summit to really pursue that agenda. And I think what you've said is important.

HINDERSTEIN
Previous to this effort, there really wasn't any sort of international consensus on either the reality or the urgency of addressing the nuclear terrorist threat, and this Nuclear Security Summit process has brought many countries together around that threat to set up a series of activities. What that, when taken together, can make the world more safe and to really secure the nuclear material that could be the basis for a terrorist nuclear weapon.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 27 Mar 2014 00:00:00 CSTTHE HAGUE, Netherlands — World leaders meeting in The Hague for the Nuclear Security Summit took important steps to strengthen nuclear security with 35 of the 53 participating states committing to fully implement international recommendations for securing nuclear and radiological materials. All states at the summit signed on to a consensus statement that built on the work done at two previous summits in Washington and Seoul. It specifies voluntary measures that countries should take to build confidence in the effectiveness of their national nuclear security systems.

The Nuclear Security Summit process was launched by President Barack Obama during a speech in Prague in 2009 where he called for “an international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years.” At the closing press conference on Tuesday, President Obama touted the accomplishments of the summit process, but acknowledged that significant work remains to prevent nuclear terrorism. In 2016, the United States will host the fourth and likely final summit.

“I think it is important for us not to relax, but rather accelerate our efforts over the next two years, sustain momentum so that we finish strong in 2016,” Obama told leaders in The Hague.

Twenty-three nations participating in the Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands this week said they intend to comply with international guidelines regarding the security of so-called "dirty bomb" material.

[...]

In a Tuesday blog post, Matthew Bunn of Harvard University noted that the participating countries had previously committed to implementing the IAEA guidelines.

Still, the summit pledge "goes further, calling for measures such as checking the trustworthiness of people with access to radiological sources, providing a rapid response to any attempt to gain access to them (and carrying out regular exercises of that response capability), and developing a national-level response plan based on an in-depth assessment of the threat," Bunn wrote.

The gift basket also identifies "best practices" that participating nations "may consider," such as requiring "multiple factors" to be confirmed before a person is permitted to access sensitive materials, along with the installation of monitoring systems with "redundant and timely alarms … sent to a centralized monitoring facility."

Bunn called these practices "more venturesome" than other initiatives to which nations had previously committed. The former nuclear security adviser to President Clinton criticized the pledge for not including language regarding the transport of radiological sources, though.

Contact: Lesley McNiesh, lmcniesh@partnershipforglobalsecurity.org +1 (202) 332-1412* Experts Available for comment at the Hague Media Center (WP-A room, near the Berlage restaurant and right behind the media hospitality center)*

THE HAGUE – World leaders have taken moderate steps toward stopping dangerous weapons-usable nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands, but more bold and concerted action is needed to make the world safer, an international coalition of over 70 security experts said.

Today’s nuclear security system—a hodgepodge of voluntary national pledges without global standards to lockdown nuclear materials—needs more than just patching up to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack, according to the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG).

“Just as you can’t download anti-virus software once and call your system secure, countries can’t simply subscribe to the existing nuclear security measures and still be prepared for new and emerging threats,” Michelle Cann, a senior policy analyst at the Partnership for Global Security, said.

The Nuclear Security Summits—launched by US President Barack Obama in 2010—have promoted international action to prevent terrorists from obtaining bomb-grade nuclear material or other radioactive substances, but the need for action remains urgent.

In The Hague, Obama broke important ground by announcing the necessity of an architecture for continuous improvement in nuclear security beyond the 2016 summit in the United States.

“Obama is thinking about a sustainable nuclear security system post-2016 so creating the architecture will be his homework,” said Chang-Hoon Shin, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. “Sustainable, global nuclear security architecture is a long-term aim. The short-term and practical approaches, as Obama said, are to keep carrying out what was agreed to in the previous three summits.”

The opportunity to craft a legacy of a nuclear-terrorism-free world cannot be missed, security experts said.

“President Obama has committed to keeping the political element in the process after 2016. We need that kind of spur to action,” said Miles Pomper, a senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

Today, around 2,000 metric tons of the highly-radioactive materials are spread across hundreds of sites in 25 countries. The majority is under the control of militaries, but a significant quantity is also at civilian locations.

"We need to build global understanding of the continuing danger of nuclear and radiological terrorism, including through expanded intelligence cooperation; shared databases of real incidents and lessons learned; and realistic testing to help find and fix weaknesses that terrorists or thieves could exploit," said Matthew Bunn, a professor at Harvard University.

TOWARD A SAFER WORLD

A progressive innovation at this year’s summit was an initiative led by the Netherlands, the United States and South Korea, in which the three countries plus 32 others committed to fully implement recommendations from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and engage in peer reviews.

“The initiative shows commitment to take the lead when it comes to voluntary implementation of a number of IAEA recommendations and guidelines,” John Bernhard, a former Danish ambassador to the IAEA, said.

“Hopefully, there will be an ambitious follow-up in the United States in 2016 aiming at the continuous improvement of nuclear security,” Bernhard said.

The FMWG welcomes and applauds the initiative, but regrets the statement does not explicitly recognize that nuclear security is an international, not only a national, responsibility.

“At the 2016 summit in the United States, leaders must lay the foundation for an efficient, adaptable, inclusive, and harmonized nuclear security system that can become the enduring legacy of the process,” Irma Arguello, president of the Argentina-based NPSGlobal Foundation, said.

The absence of Russia, China, Pakistan, and India—all nuclear weapons states with large amounts of nuclear material—as well as others, however, weakens the initiative’s impact.

In the lead up to the 2016 summit, the US, Dutch, and Korean initiative could set the stage for establishing a comprehensive system for securing dangerous nuclear materials based on global standards and rules.

“If The Hague Summit made the world ‘a bit safer’ from nuclear terrorism, as the Dutch prime minister said, the challenge for the Obama Administration at the 2016 summit will be to make the world ‘much more safe’ from the catastrophic threat of nuclear terrorism,” Kenneth Brill, the former director of the US National Counterproliferation Center, said.

“The process must move to a higher level of commitment and action in 2016, including by establishing a process that leads to legally-binding global standards,” Brill said.

Leaders need to build effective accountability mechanisms as well as the means for continuing the dialogue and maintaining momentum after the process likely ends in 2016—a system is only as strong as its weakest link.

“This summit has delivered concrete results. All states now recognize their dual nuclear security responsibilities to secure materials and assure others. And giving us a head start, two-thirds of the summit countries have committed to putting crucial principles into practice, making us all safer,” said Deepti Choubey, a senior director at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI).

The Fissile Materials Working Group is a coalition of more than 70 leading experts and non-governmental organizations around the world in nuclear security. It was formed to support and help implement the goal of promptly securing all vulnerable fissile materials globally. For more information, visit www.fmwg.org.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 25 Mar 2014 00:00:00 CSTBloomberg

Japan agreed to give some of its uranium and plutonium stockpiles back to the U.S. in a nod to Chinese concerns that the material could be used for nuclear weapons.

Today’s deal will repatriate “hundreds of kilograms” of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium from Japan to the U.S., according to a White House statement. President Barack Obama and Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe are making the announcement today at the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, Netherlands.

“It’s very clearly the first give of this summit,” Ken Brill, the former U.S. ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, said in an interview. The agreement transfers more than 300 kilograms (661 pounds) of plutonium and over 200 kilograms of uranium, according to the International Panel on Fissile Materials.

[...]

“What Japan needs to do immediately is to make sure that stockpile doesn’t grow unless there is a demand,” Miles Pomper, a researcher at the Washington-based Center for Nonproliferation, said in an interview. “The Chinese are right.”

The Hague, Netherlands — Japan will hand over to the United States more than 700 pounds of weapons-grade plutonium and a supply of highly enriched uranium — a victory for U.S. President Barack Obama’s efforts to secure nuclear materials around the world.

[...]

Kenneth Brill, a former U.S. ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, welcomed the Japan deal.

“Any time you can start to strengthen security around any fissile material it is a good thing,” he said.

[...]

Miles Pomper, a nuclear expert at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, called the return of the materials “a step in the right direction.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 24 Mar 2014 00:00:00 CSTHow did an 82-year-old nun come so close to getting her hands on highly enriched uranium?

In September 2009, a group of masked men armed with automatic weapons and explosives arrived on the roof of a cash depot in Vastberg, Sweden in a helicopter. The men blasted their way through a skylight and hoisted millions of dollars up to the hovering aircraft — the operation took less than 20 minutes. When police rushed to respond they discovered a bag with the word “bomb” at their heliport — a diversion planted by the thieves — and caltrops (road spikes) near the depot to slow down their response on the ground. While many of the thieves were caught after an investigation, most of the money was never recovered.

The Vastberg heist was not a nuclear event, but a new report from my colleagues at Harvard University makes the case that the incident should have deeply troubling implications for the leaders from over 50 countries convening in the Netherlands on March 24-25 for a summit on nuclear security. The stark truth is that many locations around the world that store highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium — the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons — would not be able to repel an attack from adversaries using tactics and weapons as sophisticated as those used by the Vastberg thieves. An amount of plutonium that would fit in a soda can would be enough for terrorists to construct a crude nuclear bomb capable of reducing the heart of a major city to rubble (it wouldn’t require much HEU, either). Today, there are approximately 1440 tons of HEU and 500 tons of separated plutonium in hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries around the world; the theft of only .001 percent of this stockpile could lead to hundreds of thousands of deaths.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 24 Mar 2014 00:00:00 CSTThe crisis in Ukraine underscores the prescience of the international efforts to eliminate all nuclear weapons and weapon-grade material there after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their success lowered the danger of deadly nuclear assets falling into the wrong hands.

President Barack Obama and the more than 50 world leaders meeting at the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague on Monday need to show the same vision. They must seek to eliminate the persistent weak links in the global nuclear security system that can make dangerous materials vulnerable to nuclear terrorists.

There has been progress in securing nuclear materials because of the two previous nuclear summits. Removal of weapons-grade material, for example, has accelerated in 12 countries. But, unfortunately, the earlier summits focused on what is acceptable by consensus rather than on what is needed to prevent nuclear terrorism.

AMSTERDAM – Nuclear terrorism is officially the main topic for world leaders at a two-day summit in the Netherlands starting Monday. In practice, the Ukraine crisis will likely overshadow those talks.

[...]

"International attention can turn in a moment," said Deepti Choubey, a senior director at the non-government Nuclear Threat Initiative. "The attentions of terrorists do not."

[...]

Kenneth Luongo, of the Partnership for Global Security, said that the willingness of countries to commit to "essentially what's already on the books" will act as a litmus test to show which countries are taking security seriously.

"I would hope that by 2016 everybody would be on board," he said.

[...]

Choubey of the NTI said that underlines the importance of the process.

"How much more concerned would the world be today (about the crisis in Ukraine) if that material were still there?" she said.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgSun, 23 Mar 2014 00:00:00 CSTThe speech below is as delivered by MacArthur President Robert Gallucci at the Nuclear Knowledge Summit on March 22.

I was going to open my presentation by telling you that I feared I might be “preaching to the choir.” But Han Sung-Joo said just that in his keynote presentation yesterday. So now I'mm going to claim that my task is even harder—I am presenting the second sermon to the choir. So what you say in the second sermon to the choir?

I know you are already convinced of the nuclear terrorism problem and that something must be done about it. Like you, I’m an insider. Or was once. Before joining the MacArthur Foundation I'd spent my life in the security community and I am persuaded by the threat, and of the need for urgent action. In fact, it seems so obvious to me that it hardly needs explaining.

When I began as the head of a foundation, I thought I could take this issue on the road and people would be persuaded by it. I was wrong. Dead wrong. I meet very smart and worldly people every day, who hold important jobs, but they do not all buy the nuclear terrorism threat. And because of that, they are not as motivated as you to take action to prevent nuclear terrorism. It’s not that they do not agree that a nuclear terrorist attack would be a terrible thing; it’s that they think the likelihood is so remote and, perhaps, difficult to prevent, that they find other problems more compelling to tackle.

NEXT week President Obama will join 57 world leaders in The Hague for the third biannual Nuclear Security Summit. The first two summits played a critical role in phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium as fuel in research reactors to prevent its misuse by states or terrorists to make nuclear weapons.

But the previous conclaves have failed to address the single largest use of such fuel: in nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers. At this summit, world powers must take an important first step toward ending that dangerous and unnecessary practice.

International efforts to end the use of H.E.U. in research reactors began in the 1970s. In its place, engineers developed low-enriched uranium fuels — enriched to less than 20 percent — unsuitable for weapons. These efforts have eliminated half the annual worldwide use of H.E.U. in research reactors, or about 1,700 pounds, enough for 30 nuclear weapons.

AMSTERDAM – The Nuclear ­Security Summit in The Hague offers an unique opportunity for world leaders to leave a lasting mark on nuclear security by fortifying the hodgepodge system of today to prevent a terrorist attack of tomorrow, according to an independent coalition of more than 70 experts.

With more than 2,000 metric tons of dangerous material in hundreds of sites globally, the risk that terrorists could get their hands on enough highly-enriched uranium or plutonium to make a crude nuclear device is one of the greatest threats facing the world.

“Nuclear terrorism is about intent, capability, and opportunity. It doesn't take a Manhattan project to make a crude nuclear bomb, if you have the material,” Matthew Bunn, a professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, said.

The global stockpile of nuclear material is large enough to build more than 20,000 new weapons like the one that leveled Hiroshima and almost 80,000 more like the one that destroyed Nagasaki during the Second World War.

Since the early 1990s, there have been more than 2,300 cases of theft or loss of nuclear or other radioactive material reported to International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Nuclear Security Summits—started by US President Barack Obama in 2010—have galvanized support for locking down the world’s radioactive materials, but the process has yet to tackle many key governance challenges that allow weak links to persist.

“The leaders’ summits are, of course, very important because at the end of the day they’ll be making the decisions, but for me the most important accomplishment is that industry is meeting for the third time to discuss how to improve nuclear security,” Paul Wilke, a senior research fellow at the Clingendael Institute, said. “You have to look at the whole picture to assess the summit process,” Wilke said.

The outcomes of the summits so far have largely been driven by national pledges to strengthen individual aspects of nuclear security, not global standards to make a truly sustainable and secure system.

Michelle Cann, a senior policy analyst at the Partnership for Global Security, said that concrete improvements had been made through the process, but “the system cannot rely only on limited multilateral commitments.”

Leaders meeting in The Hague next week for the third summit should craft a long-lasting legacy of nuclear security improvement, robustness, and adaptability.

“The summit is a unique opportunity for leaders to work collaboratively at addressing the transnational threat of nuclear terrorism,” Deepti Choubey, a senior director at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), said.

The Hague meeting on March 24-25 can act as a springboard toward the creation of a forward-looking system in 2016 at the fourth, and likely final, summit in the United States.

“President Obama has added crucial time to the clock by hosting the 2016 summit, and leaders need to take on the challenge of building the needed global nuclear security architecture that will give us confidence that all nuclear materials are effectively secured around the world,” Choubey said.

The FMWG calls on countries to implement all the existing nuclear security agreements; support additional standards in the short term beyond the current legal requirements; and crucially for long-term security, pursue a framework that unifies today’s fragmented arrangements.

“Fixing the weak links in nuclear security is not a technical problem, it's a political problem,” said Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security. “If you are going to bring home the summit as a legacy issue, you better make a legacy,” Luongo said.

The Fissile Materials Working Group is a coalition of more than 70 leading experts and non-governmental organizations around the world in nuclear security. It was formed to support and help implement the goal of promptly securing all vulnerable fissile materials globally.For more information, visit www.fmwg.org.

Security experts the world over agree that nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to international peace and security in the 21st century. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been more that 20 confirmed cases of illicit or unauthorized trafficking of fissile materials. Fissile materials for more than 100,000 additional nuclear weapons is spread across the globe. If obtained in sufficient quantities, a capable terrorist group could construct a crude nuclear device capable of killing hundreds of thousands, which would have a far-reaching impact on the global economy, the environment, as well as civil liberties. International efforts to combat this threat are inadequate because nuclear security needs binding international guidelines, international oversight and a proper mechanism to halt fissile material production

With the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit less than a week away, the Obama administration and outside observers already are beginning to look toward the next -- and possibly final -- installment of the global gathering in 2016.

In particular, administration officials and issue experts hope to make progress on what have proven to be two of the most difficult issues to tackle during the summits: The vulnerability of civilian plutonium stocks, specifically, and the security of military nuclear materials, more generally, to possible theft and use by terrorists.

[...]

The Dutch hosts of next week's gathering of world leaders in The Hague sought to include language specific to both the security of military materials and civilian plutonium in the official 2014 summit communique to be signed by all 53 participating nations, according to Harvard University Professor Matthew Bunn.

The provisions were watered down, however, as countries sensitive to issues pertaining to the two topics began to resist, the former adviser to President Clinton said.

"Since I haven't seen the final language, I don't know how unsuccessful they were," Bunn told Global Security Newswire. "My understanding is they got something, but not as much as they had originally wanted."

[...]

Others are arguing for more aggressive action. In a separate report released on Tuesday, the University of Texas-Austin's Nuclear Proliferation Project urges summit participants to freeze the expansion of spent-fuel recycling altogether. The idea, according to the recommendations, would be "to avoid creating more reprocessing and [mixed-oxide] fuel facilities that cannot be adequately safeguarded against nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism."

The world's supply of weapons-usable nuclear material must be locked down to keep it out of the hands of terrorists.

Ahead of a key antiterrorism meeting this month, the Stanley Foundation produced a 13-minute video looking at what needs to be done to stop terrorist groups from acquiring enough fissile material to make a nuclear bomb.

The Nuclear Security Summit process—started by President Barack Obama five years ago—must generate decisive action to improve global nuclear security. The threat of nuclear terrorism is too clear, present, and dangerous to ignore.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 17 Mar 2014 00:00:00 CSTA new initiative to be launched at this month’s nuclear security summit in The Hague will commit participating states to the “highest standards” of nuclear security, the White House’s top official for countering weapons of mass destruction said in a March 6 interview.

The initiative will demonstrate the importance of adherence to nuclear security best practices and international guidelines, Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, special assistant to the president and White House coordinator for defense policy, countering weapons of mass destruction, and arms control, said in the interview.

The initiative, sponsored by the Netherlands, South Korea, and the United States, will be opened for states to join at the March 24-25 summit. This will be the third summit to be convened since President Barack Obama in 2009 announced an effort to lock down all vulnerable nuclear material.

The Netherlands -- host of this month's biennial Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague -- will likely be unable to meet a commitment it made at the last such meeting of world leaders in South Korea, documents released Thursday by a watchdog group show.

[...]

Company and Dutch government officials subsequently confirmed the delay in Jan. 27 and Feb. 16 letters to Alan Kuperman, coordinator for the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project.

Kuperman, an associate professor at the University of Texas-Austin and a former congressional aide, said Brown reiterated the delay again on Wednesday at a White House meeting. Kuperman, who was present at the meeting, said company officials cited a new 2017 target date for LEU conversion, but implied that there could even be further delays beyond that.

[...]

"It would be a grave embarrassment for your country at the forthcoming summit if the Netherlands were not perceived as doing everything possible to meet its commitment from the preceding summit," said the letter, signed by Kuperman, Princeton University Senior Research Physicist Frank von Hippel and Union of Concerned Scientists Senior Scientist Edwin Lyman.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 14 Mar 2014 00:00:00 CSTThe March Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in The Hague is the beginning of the end of a unique summit process initiated by U.S. President Barak Obama in 2010. The likely end of this series will be at the 2016 summit in the U.S. In order to leave a lasting legacy worthy of the costs, and involvement of over 50 world leaders, the final two summits must act decisively to eliminate the weak links that exist and persist in the current nuclear security system.

The challenges posed by the current nuclear control system are clear. The architecture is a patchwork of voluntary recommendations and a few binding agreements; countries are free to accept or reject any of these at will. There are no standards for security performance, no regularized and objective assessment of security effectiveness on a global basis, and no requirement that nations take any steps to build international confidence in their security system by providing non-sensitive information on their planning and practices.

This is a very different system from nuclear safety where regular reporting and peer review are mandatory under the nuclear safety convention and is widely considered to be both important and the price of doing business for nations with nuclear power. As the Fukushima Daiichi accident has illustrated, even a rigorous safety regime is imperfect and cannot prevent catastrophic accidents if governments and nuclear operators do not exercise high levels of responsibility.

The evolution of the administration’s position may push world leaders—who will meet later this month in The Hague for the third summit—to adopt mandatory rules that prevent weapons-usable material from falling into the wrong hands, the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) said in a statement on Wednesday.

“This new perspective from the administration clearly acknowledges that the global nuclear security regime needs strengthening and that improvements have to be global,” Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security, said. “Common international standards for nuclear security will give the summit process a worthy legacy,” Luongo said.

Launched by President Obama five years ago, the Nuclear Security Summits have made progress in locking down vulnerable nuclear material, notably eliminating the weapons-usable stockpiles of 12 countries including Ukraine.

Today there are still nearly 2,000 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material across hundreds of sites around the globe--large enough to build at least 80,000 nuclear bombs like the device that destroyed Nagasaki during World War II. The majority of the materials are under the control of militaries but significant amounts are also housed in civilian sites.

The existing system to prevent nuclear terrorism is a hodgepodge of voluntary national pledges and lacks globally agreed-upon mandatory standards for comprehensively securing dangerous nuclear materials such as highly-enriched uranium and plutonium as well as radioactive sources.

“Civil society must continue to pressure governments to ensure that this month’s summit and the next one in 2016 advance desperately-needed improvements to the tattered patchwork that makes up the current international regime,” Miles Pomper, a senior research associate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, said.

The FMWG recommends additional steps to fortify defenses against nuclear terrorism, including implementing all the existing nuclear security agreements; supporting additional standards in the short term beyond the current legal requirements; and crucially for long-term security, pursuing a framework that unifies today’s fragmented arrangements.

The FMWG will co-host the Nuclear Knowledge Summit in Amsterdam, March 21-22, 2014—which is an official experts' event ahead of the Nuclear Security Summit, March 24-25, in The Hague.

The Fissile Materials Working Group is a coalition of more than 70 leading experts and non-governmental organizations around the world in nuclear security. It was formed to support and help implement the goal of promptly securing all vulnerable fissile materials globally.For more information, visit www.fmwg.org.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 12 Mar 2014 00:00:00 CSTFMWG experts discuss the threat of nuclear terrorism and what actions world leaders must take to prevent it.

Kelsey Davenport from the Arms Control Association discussed a new report released at the press conference: "Nuclear Security Summit: Assessment of Joint Statements."

Kenneth Brill, a former U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, discussed the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Kenneth Luongo from the Partnership for Global Security discussed how President Obama and other world leaders can ensure the legacy of a future free from nuclear terrorism, including how the U.S. administration's recent budget request is a retreat on that agenda.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 11 Mar 2014 00:00:00 CSTJust weeks before he heads to The Hague to meet with world leaders for the third Nuclear Security Summit, President Obama has unveiled a budget that includes more than $220 million in cuts for nuclear security programs in the next fiscal year.

[...]

"What I take away from this budget is that there was a lack of leadership in trying to maintain the prioritization of the funding of this issue," said Kenneth Luongo, who served as senior adviser in the Energy Department on non-proliferation issues during the Clinton administration and is now the president of the Partnership for Global Security. "The signal … is we are in retreat on this issue, and I think that is a huge mistake."

[...]

Luongo, the former Energy Department official, said there is no doubt that progress has been made on nuclear security during the Obama administration.

"But the real question is, 'Is it enough?'" Luongo said. "Are we doing enough … to prevent nuclear terrorism — not just putting together fences that have holes in them, but they look okay."

WASHINGTON, DC – President Obama’s proposed budget slashes funding for key programs that prevent nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands. The funding cuts come less than a month ahead of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, an initiative started by President Obama in 2010 to strengthen efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism.

Among the hard-hit programs in the budget released today is the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), which was cut by 30% from $442 million last year to $335.5 million in this year’s request. GTRI removes and disposes material from around the world that could be used by terrorists to make a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon. In March 2012, GTRI secured highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Ukraine, ensuring that state was free of all weapons-usable nuclear material before the recent turmoil. International Materials Protection and Cooperation was also slashed from $420 million to $305 million.

According to Kingston Reif, the director of nuclear non-proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “This budget is a step backwards in America’s best efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism and belies the administration’s claim that securing vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials is one of its tops national security priorities.”

Since 2009, GTRI has removed or disposed of almost 3,000 kilograms of HEU and plutonium, bringing the lifetime program total to over 5,060 kilograms. That is enough to make more than 200 nuclear weapons. The program has removed all weapons-usable nuclear material from 11 countries plus Taiwan: Austria, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Libya, Mexico, Romania, Serbia, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Vietnam.

The global stockpile of nuclear materials is large enough to build more than 20,000 new weapons like the one that leveled Hiroshima and almost 80,000 like the one that destroyed Nagasaki. More than a hundred thefts and other incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material are reported to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) every year in regions ranging from Latin America and Europe, to Central Asia and Africa. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups have repeatedly demonstrated interest in acquiring weapons-grade material.

“The administration is wrong in thinking that it has accomplished its nuclear security goals and they can now reap a success dividend. They have made important strides but much more remains to be done,” said Kenneth Luongo, the president of the Partnership for Global Security and a former senior adviser at the U.S. Department of Energy.

“The significant impression this budget leaves is that the administration does not understand that without continued and strong U.S. leadership and funding this agenda will fade from the global stage – and that is a major international security threat,” Luongo said.

Luongo will discuss the budget and other nuclear terrorism issues at a press conference at noon on Wednesday, March 5, 2014 at the National Press Club in Washington, DC.

The Fissile Materials Working Group is a coalition of more than 70 leading experts and non-governmental organizations around the world in nuclear security. It was formed to support and help implement the goal of promptly securing all vulnerable fissile materials globally. For more information, visit www.fmwg.org.

WASHINGTON, DC – President Barack Obama must take bold action to secure a legacy free from the specter of nuclear terrorism when he meets with world leaders later this month, according to security experts representing a coalition of more than 70 bipartisan non-governmental organizations.

On March 24-25, leaders from 53 countries will gather in The Hague for the third Nuclear Security Summit in a move to reduce the risk that weapons-usable nuclear materials fall into the wrong hands.

“Nuclear terrorism is not a Hollywood fantasy,” Kenneth Brill, a former US Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said at a press conference on Wednesday. “A variety of terrorist groups has ambitions to use nuclear or radioactive material in an explosive device. The material that terrorists need is vulnerable because security practices vary widely,” Brill said.

Protecting the vast amount of nuclear material globally is a mammoth task, but maintaining the status-quo is inadequate and dangerous. World-wide there is enough nuclear material to build 20,000 weapons similar to the one that leveled Hiroshima during WWII and almost 80,000 more like the one that destroyed Nagasaki.

“Preventing nuclear terrorism is a global problem,” said Kelsey Davenport, a nonproliferation analyst at the Arms Control Association and co-author of a new report: “Nuclear Security Summit: Assessment of Joint Statements.” "Multilateral initiatives from the previous nuclear security summits are improving some targeted areas, but broader and more ambitious action is needed to strengthen the global nuclear security system,” Davenport said.

In the five years since President Obama launched the nuclear security summit process, there has been progress locking down the global supply of weapons-usable materials, but the key challenge remains—transforming the current opaque and voluntary scheme into a transparent and legally-binding system.

“It is clear from the past two summits that that none of the other participating nations will be more ambitious than the United States in pushing for needed new policies,” said Kenneth Luongo, the president of the Partnership for Global Security.

“President Obama needs to offer bold, new ideas that can eliminate persistent weak links in the nuclear security system and sell them to his reluctant partners. That will create a legacy worthy of the high expectations and costs of the summits,” Luongo said.

There are more than a hundred thefts and other incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material each year, according to the IAEA, in regions ranging from Latin America and Europe to Central Asia and Africa. Since the 1990s, there have been more than 2,300 cases of illicit or unauthorized trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials logged by the IAEA.

“The nuclear summits have spurred progress, but there is a clear need for leaders to develop an effective global system to secure all materials and give countries the capacity to assess nuclear security globally while holding each other accountable,” said Page Stoutland, a vice president at the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

World leaders need to develop a plan for handling nuclear material security after what is likely the final summit in the United States in 2016 and should include military stockpiles, which account for the vast majority of weapons-useable material, in the summit process.

"Innovations need to be turned into action and we need a platform to extend beyond 2016," Luongo told journalists. "

There's a cliff coming in 2016 and we need to build a bridge to the future," Luongo said.

Find the conversation from the press conference on Twitter at #NSSLegacy and #NSS2014 or @FMWG. A video will be uploaded later on multimedia.cfm.

FMWG experts are also available for interviews in the United States and The Hague before, during, and after the summit.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 05 Mar 2014 00:00:00 CSTProject on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Leaders at the 2010 nuclear security summit agreed on the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material in four years. This goal implied that many countries would change their nuclear security policies. But the factors that drive changes in nuclear security policies, and that constrain those changes, are not well understood. Matthew Bunn and Eben Harrell conducted a survey of selected nuclear security experts in countries with nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU), or separated plutonium, to explore this issue. The survey included: (a) perceptions of which threats are credible; (b) approaches to nuclear security based on a design basis threat (DBT); (c) changes in nuclear security policy in the last 15 years; (d) factors causing and constraining changes in nuclear security policy; and (e) policy on how much information to release about nuclear security. This paper describes the survey, its results, and implications for next steps to strengthen global nuclear security.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 04 Mar 2014 00:00:00 CSTThe FMWG has created a press kit to help explain what the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit is all about and why preventing nuclear terrorism needs to be a top priority for world leaders.

Media Backgrounder
Read this backgrounder to better understand what the summit is and why it's important.

Key Facts
If you only a moment, but want a snapshot about why nuclear security is so important, take a look at this one page fact sheet.

In just four weeks, leaders from 53 countries will gather in The Hague for the third Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) aimed at preventing nuclear terrorism. Many think that all decisions are made and there is no time for action. The opposite is the case: the coming weeks provide time for countries to take key steps and ensure the Summit’s full potential is tapped.

Leaders will announce new approaches and measures to counter the global threat of terrorist, criminal or other unauthorized access to nuclear materials. The Summit also will offer a rare “accountability” moment when countries report on commitments made previously. All of these are important steps but they risk falling short of building the global nuclear security architecture needed to protect everyone, even after Summits are a memory. There is still time to mitigate that risk.

Over the last four years, many countries have made meaningful contributions and commitments to improve nuclear security. Taken together, however, they still do not add up to an effective security and control system for nuclear materials at the global level. The international community remains inadequately organized to combat the threat.

In March, world leaders will gather in The Hague for the third Nuclear Security Summit, with the goal of reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism. Since the last summit, which took place in Seoul in 2012, many nations have shown improvement in securing nuclear materials, but incidents like the December truck-jacking of radioactive material in Mexico show how crucial it is to keep working toward a comprehensive system to battle the problem.

At the Seoul summit, participants issued 13 joint statements setting forth multilateral efforts that self-selected groups of countries would undertake to reinforce the goal of increased international cooperation. The joint statements have made a positive contribution to global security, but unfortunately, most were narrowly focused and did not define implementation and follow-up measures. They have demonstrated that small-scale projects lacking a long-term strategy are not enough to address the major challenges confronting the world's nuclear security regime, which include a lack of cohesiveness and transparency.

That’s not to say that the Nuclear Security Summit process hasn’t been effective. When more than 50 world leaders met at the first gathering, which took place in Washington in 2010, they brought international attention to a growing concern. The summit motivated countries to focus high levels of political attention on the possibility of nuclear terrorism, and in the years since, governments have made significant progress toward harmonizing and improving their national nuclear security systems.

William Walker and Nicholas Wheeler’s article (“The Problem of Weak Nuclear States,” 20.3, November 2013, pp. 411-32) offers a timely reminder of why we need to ensure that the Nuclear Security Summit process is successful. The third summit, which will be held in the Netherlands in March 2014, provides an opportunity to monitor and advance the security of nuclear weapons and fissile materials in states with the most extensive nuclear infrastructure, reducing the risk that they’ll fall into the hands of malicious actors.

The upcoming Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague will bring together more than 50 world leaders to focus top-level attention on preventing nuclear terrorism. Ahead of the event, a coalition of nonpartisan security experts representing more than 70 non-governmental organizations will brief journalists on progress and shortcomings in nuclear security since President Obama launched this major initiative four years ago. Experts will discuss expectations for the March summit and evaluate Obama’s legacy in the fight against nuclear terrorism.

WHAT: Press briefing with experts from the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) and the release of a report on the Nuclear Security Summit by the Arms Control Association and the Partnership for Global Security.

TWITTER: Follow us at @FMWG and the event through #NSSLegacy and #NSS2014

Kenneth Brill, former US Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Brill was the founding director of the National Counterproliferation Center, part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Kenneth Luongo, president and founder of the Partnership for Global Security. Luongo previously served as the senior advisor to the Secretary of Energy for Nonproliferation Policy and the director of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation at the US Department of Energy.

Kelsey Davenport, non-proliferation analyst at the Arms Control Association. Davenport previously worked for a think tank in Jerusalem researching regional security issues and holds a masters degree in peace studies from the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

Page Stoutland, vice president of Nuclear Materials Security at the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Prior to NTI, Stoutland spent ten years at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory where he held a number of senior positions, including the director of strategy and division leader for Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures.

FMWG experts will be available for interviews in the United States and The Hague before, during, and after the summit. For more information, please visit www.fmwg.org.

The biennial nuclear security summit process is entering its third round, but despite the significant progress made thus far, nuclear security still is not dramatic or “sexy” enough to sustain top-level attention and interest.

The nuclear security summits, launched by U.S. President Barack Obama, began in Washington in 2010. Before the second summit, which took place in Seoul two years later, summit fatigue already had begun to set in despite the expanded participation list and agenda at the 2012 event.

On March 24, the leaders of 53 countries, the European Union, the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Interpol will gather in The Hague to continue their discussion on ways to prevent nuclear terrorism. The challenge going into The Hague summit and the 2016 U.S. summit is finding ways to sustain the momentum and political attention they have generated at the highest levels on nuclear security issues. At the start of preparations for every meeting, the discourse still begins with, “What is nuclear security, and why does it matter?”

President Barack Obama surprised virtually everyone when he announced last June that the United States would host another, and probably final, nuclear security summit in 2016. In doing so, he created the opportunity to significantly improve the nuclear security regime by the end of the decade and create an enduring and signature legacy for the summit process he initiated.

The upcoming summit in The Hague in March and the subsequent summit in the United States offer an opportunity to eliminate persistent weak links in the regime and improve nuclear security governance. By linking these two events in a strategic endgame, the summit participants can significantly strengthen the existing system and create a platform for continuous nuclear security progress after the series of summits ends.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 20 Feb 2014 00:00:00 CSTA confidential study by the U.S. Energy Department has concluded that completing a controversial nuclear fuel factory in South Carolina may cost billions of dollars more than the department has previously promised, according to government officials and industry sources briefed on its results.

[...]

Matthew Bunn, now at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, was a White House official during Bill Clinton's administration, when he helped develop the plutonium disposal program, and has followed it closely ever since. Bunn hasn't seen the latest Energy agency report, but said that the cost of the Savannah River MOX plant has spun out of control.

"The things we're trying to accomplish aren't worth that amount of money," he said Feb. 13. "To me, in an environment of extreme budget constraints and sequesters, there has got to be a better way."

The beginning of February 2014 witnessed a disturbing event regarding nuclear issues, in which about 30 instructors were suspended in the United States (US). These instructors were involved in cheating. These instructors are known as engineering watch supervisors. These supervisors are supposed to direct operators of nuclear reactors powering navy vessels. Earlier in January 2014, around 100 missiliers of the US Navy too were caught cheating in their exams. Analysts in the US are alarmed over these serious nuclear related incidents in the US. Many describe these incidents as the systemic failure in the US nuclear establishment.

The general alarm was raised because the Montana base where this incident took place apparently has 450 ICBMs at three bases. These nuclear weapons encased in steel boxes are located in these bases. Media reported the rampant use of drugs and alcohol among people responsible for security of nuclear weapons installations. Several watchmen were also detected working under the influence of alcohol. Worse, the US government had to take action against General Michael Carey, the commander of the US intercontinental nuclear missile force for indulging in a drunken fling in Russia. The General was on duty and taking part in a joint nuclear security training exercise. The American newspaper, the Boston Globe made a very interesting remark: “On a mission that was intended to convey the seriousness of nuclear security, Carey’s behaviour did just the opposite.”

Worse still, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), an American non-proliferation institute, has published the second edition of NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index in January 2014. The objective of the report is to instigate discussions on key areas and progress on these areas by the concerned countries. This report has ranked the US 11th. The 2014 report itself mentions breaching of nuclear weapons manufacturing facility Y-12 National Security Complex by a group of activists. And India which has never witnessed this kind of incident has been ranked 23rd among 25 countries. The NTI even below China and Pakistan which had horrible track record as for safeguards and security are concerned. These countries participated in global clandestine proliferation activities.

Next month’s Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands may come closer to establishing international standards for how to lock down dangerous nuclear materials than did the two prior gatherings of the biennial confab, sources say.

[...]

Miles Pomper, a senior research associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, told GSN that in some respects the IAEA guidelines are not as strong as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material as it was amended in 2005.

For one thing, the amended convention would be legally binding in more countries once it is ratified by two-thirds of its members. The convention has 148 signatories -- more than double the number of countries participating in the summits.

On the other hand, the IAEA guidelines -- while not perfect in the view of Pomper and other issue experts -- provide more technical detail regarding precisely what must be done in order to secure dangerous nuclear materials. The convention provides more in the way of general principles without the same degree of detail, Pomper noted.

The United States already has physical-protection standards that are arguably even stronger than what the IAEA guidelines call for, but the idea behind the pledge initiative is “to get other countries to do that by leading by example,” according to Pomper.

It is “one of the more positive” developments expected to come out of the March 24-25 summit, Pomper said.

[...]

“It’s going to be embarrassing when [the U.S. delegation] shows up [to the summit] without having this approved,” given that the United States is pushing other countries to adopt an even more detailed pledge relevant to the physical protection issue, Pomper said.

[...]

Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security and a former arms control official in the U.S. Energy Department, told GSN that these initiatives showed that countries participating in the summit recognize that the current nuclear security regime is insufficient. At the same time, it appears that participating nations believeit is too difficult to draft and agree to new standards at such a high-level forum.

“I think that the thinking is that if you can get countries to sign up to what is in essence on the books, then you are on your way to improving your regime,” Luongo said. “I think this initiative, if it goes forward, will very beneficial and I’m very supportive of it.”

Nearly three years after the Fukushima accident, the fate of nuclear power in Japan remains highly uncertain, with government officials still unable to settle on a new nuclear energy policy. Yet perhaps the most risky element of the Japanese nuclear complex appears to be moving forward with little official consideration: the operation of a massive facility in Rokkasho to separate plutonium in spent nuclear fuel.

Japanese officials need to put a stop to plans to open this reprocessing facility - at least until they can show that this potential nuclear weapons fuel will be re-used rapidly in the country's now-shuttered nuclear reactors rather than serve as a tempting target for terrorists and a means of undermining nonproliferation objectives in Northeast Asia.

At next month's Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands, Tokyo should make a commitment to delay opening the Rokkasho facility at least until the next Nuclear Security Summit two years hence.

No country can afford to be complacent about the risk of nuclear and radiological terrorism. Although they should be kept in perspective, Australia faces internal and external risks in this area. Its nuclear infrastructure is modest for a country of its size, but Australian nuclear facilities do exist and at least one domestic group has shown interest in targeting them. While the absence of a land border makes Australia less vulnerable to external threats, its busy ports and proximity to weakly governed spaces in Southeast Asia mean that the potential for external attacks also needs to be taken seriously. Moreover, a nuclear or radiological incident in Southeast Asia would not be without consequences for Australia.

Over the years, Australian nuclear experts have honed their expertise and transformed Australia into a world leader in nuclear security practices, both in securing materials and facilities at home and in helping to build nuclear security capacity abroad. A lack of publicity for this work means that most Australians, including many in the political and strategic realms, don’t fully appreciate the extent to which Australia’s expertise and outreach efforts are respected and relied upon around the world.

The paper suggests the new Abbott government should launch a nuclear security strategy and puts forward initiatives that would help to reduce nuclear dangers, achieve Australia’s broader strategic objectives, and fulfil its international obligations—and all at a very modest cost.

If a major nuclear security incident happens, no one can say we were not warned. Over the last two decades, there have been repeated breakdowns in our ability to protect weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and plutonium despite enormous efforts and genuine accomplishments.

The threat of nuclear terrorism remains urgent and real. Ambition is essential. And complacency will doom us to failure, writes William Tobey, a senior fellow at Harvard University and a former deputy administrator at the US National Nuclear Security Administration.

In a detailed analysis published on Monday, Tobey argues that world leaders need to act boldly at the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit in 2014 and offers detailed recommendations to ensure the process results in effective and sustainable improvements to the current system.

The world is rightly worried about Iran's uranium enrichment program. Iran claims this technology is for producing fuel for nuclear power plants, but it could be quickly shifted to making nuclear bomb material. Unfortunately, some in Congress, in their eagerness to stem the spread of such technologies, have introduced legislation — separate from their effort to slap further sanctions on Iran — that probably would make stopping nuclear proliferation harder, not easier.

Their idea is to limit future U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation only to countries that make a legal commitment to forgo building facilities for either uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing (the other path to nuclear bomb material). The idea sounds good, but it is likely to be both ineffective and counterproductive.

Why? First, all but a few countries are likely to reject making such a commitment, signing away what they consider to be their rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Getting into an argument over national sovereignty and national rights would make it very difficult or impossible to discuss practical steps that countries might otherwise take to meet their nuclear fuel needs.

Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. used an appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee this week to make a new push for an obscure counterterrorism bill that has languished in the Senate after the House passed it 390-3 last May.

[...]

“Since we’re the leader of the summit process . . . and because we need to pass the implementing legislation, it would be pretty embarrassing for Obama to show up with the U.S. not having done it,” said Miles Pomper, a bill supporter and senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

[...]

Pomper, meanwhile, said the broader purpose of the legislation is being lost in the political debate and that the onus is on the Senate to act.
“Resolve those issues in conference if you need to,” he said. “The important thing is to get this issue through the Senate.”

At 1:30 a.m. on December 2, gunmen forced two truck drivers who had taken a nap at a gas station on the outskirts of Mexico City to surrender their vehicle. The thieves took off with the truck’s heavy and hazardous cargo: a decommissioned teletherapy unit that was once used for cancer treatment and still contained a small capsule of highly radioactive material. It’s unclear whether the thieves fully understood what they were stealing. According to statements by the Mexican authorities, they probably didn’t.

The capsule’s contents—some 3,000 curies of cobalt-60—made it a “category 1” radiation source, the most dangerous of five categories defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to rank radioactive materials according to the risk they pose to people working with them. Taken out of their shielding containers, category-1 sources can kill anyone who is exposed to them at close range for a few minutes to an hour.

Two days later, the police found the radioactive capsule abandoned in a corn field. Although someone had extracted the capsule from its shielding (and likely received an unhealthy radiation dose in the process), there were no immediate reports of serious injuries and no contamination found in the area nearby. Thus the consequences of this incident appeared to be less grave than in two earlier cases—in Brazil in 1987, and in Thailand in 2000—when unsuspecting scavengers who dismantled old radiotherapy machines exposed themselves and their families to very high doses of radiation. Four of the exposed people died in Brazil, and three in Thailand, and more were seriously injured. The cost of cleanup and recovery for their communities was substantial.

The 2014 Nuclear Threat Initiative Nuclear Materials Security Index is the second edition of a unique public assessment of nuclear materials security conditions around the world. Developed with the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the NTI Index was created to assess the security of nuclear materials around the world and to encourage governments to take actions and provide assurances about the security of the world’s deadliest materials. It has sparked international discussions about priorities required to strengthen security.

The NTI Index draws on NTI’s nuclear expertise, the EIU’s experience in constructing indices, and the reach of the EIU’s global network of hundreds of analysts and contributors. NTI—together with an international panel of nuclear security experts and a number of technical advisors—developed the framework and priorities that define effective nuclear materials security conditions. The EIU was responsible for developing the analytic model and gathering the data.

The NTI Index assesses the contributions of 25 states with one kilogram or more of weapons-usable nuclear materials toward improved global nuclear materials security conditions. It assesses states in five categories: (a) Quantities and Sites, (b) Security and Control Measures, (c) Global Norms, (d) Domestic Commitments and Capacity, and (e) Risk Environment. An additional 151 states, with less than one kilogram of weapons-usable nuclear materials or none at all, are assessed on the final three of the categories. The NTI Index is presented in three ways:

This website with high-level results

The print report, which contains NTI observations and recommendations, a complete discussion of the EIU methodology, selected data, and country profiles

A downloadable version of the 2014 NTI Index, which is available through the website and shows detailed results and data and provides extended interactive features in an Excel format.

Since the release of the 2012 NTI Index, seven states—Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Sweden, Ukraine, and Vietnam—have removed all or most of the stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials from their territories, according to the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration. In doing so, they have taken the most important step a state can take toward ensuring that terrorists cannot gain access to the materials needed to build a nuclear bomb. As a result, the number of states with one kilogram or more of weapons- usable nuclear materials is now 25, down from 32 when the 2012 NTI Index was released. This three-minute video highlights the actions of seven countries to remove their weapons-usable nuclear materials.

Since the release of the 2012 NTI Index, seven states—Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Sweden, Ukraine, and Vietnam—have removed all or most of the stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials from their territories, according to the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration. In doing so, they have taken the most important step a state can take toward ensuring that terrorists cannot gain access to the materials needed to build a nuclear bomb. As a result, the number of states with one kilogram or more of weapons- usable nuclear materials is now 25, down from 32 when the 2012 NTI Index was released. This three-minute video highlights the actions of seven countries to remove their weapons-usable nuclear materials.

There’s been a long-running debate on The Strategist about whether Australia should be content with middle-power status. It’s a term that many Australians think downplays their country’s strategic importance, especially its growing centrality to the security and stability of the dynamic Asia-Pacific region. This debate might appear self-absorbed and parochial to many outside Australia, but it has important implications for international security cooperation.

No country can afford to be complacent about nuclear and radiological terrorism. Even countries with little or no nuclear infrastructure could fall victim to groups that have procured radioactive materials from poorly secured foreign facilities. Over the years, Australia has emerged as a world leader in nuclear security, both by enhancing control over radioactive materials and facilities at home, and by helping countries from its near neighborhood (Southeast Asia and the South Pacific) develop the capacity to do the same. Its officials and nuclear-industry leaders have learned key lessons along the way and conducted security-building activities that, unfortunately, have not been valued as much as they should have been in Australia’s decision-making circles. Rather than neglect Canberra's past advances, the government of new Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott should launch a nuclear security strategy that builds on the country's successful track record and the lessons it has learned.

Pace Matters. Building consensus among governments on how to prevent nuclear terrorism may be frustrating and time-consuming, but it is vital. Yet different states have different priorities, capabilities, and approaches to security, and the global regime-building process needs to occur at a pace and through a process acceptable to the majority. This lesson is not new; many states that recognize the urgency of different security threats have had to fight an uphill battle to bring other nations on board through the United Nations system. At the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the years, Australia has found the slow uptake of strengthened nonproliferation measures at times exasperating. But Australia’s experience of the Nuclear Security Summits—a series of regular meetings among heads of state and international organizations aimed at preventing nuclear terrorism—has shown that even outside the UN system, building consensus is a laborious process that cannot be rushed. Australian attempts to encourage states to share sensitive information, provide briefings on their nuclear security risks, and establish a tracking mechanism to monitor implementation of summit commitments, proved to be too politically controversial. Plainly, many of the same dynamics that have obstructed advancement in nonproliferation and disarmament also exist in the nuclear security domain.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 18 Dec 2013 00:00:00 CST
When highly radioactive material that can be used in a “dirty bomb” is moved to or from a hospital in New York City, it is done in the dead of night on cordoned streets with high security.

In Mexico two weeks ago, a truck moving a large canister containing radioactive material was hijacked at a gas station — where it had been parked with no security. The cobalt-60 that was stolen from the vehicle and then extracted from its protective lead shield is so potent that it is considered a significant national security threat under U.S. guidelines.

There are now no international mandatory requirements for how to control these dangerous materials — including how they should be transported. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the international nuclear watchdog, has only issued recommendations, in the form of a voluntary Code of Conduct.This disconnect between how nations manage extremely dangerous nuclear materials sought by terrorists creates significant security vulnerabilities. If a dirty bomb is exploded anywhere in the world, it would cross the nuclear terrorism threshold and open the door to further attacks.

The Nuclear Energy Experts Group (NEEG) of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) met at the Saigon Da Lat Hotel in Da Lat, Vietnam on November 11-12, 2013, under the auspices of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific (the WMD Study Group). It brought together 36 specialists from 18 countries from throughout the Asia Pacific region and beyond, all attending in their private capacity. They joined two days of off-the-record discussions on the nuclear safety and security regimes, the Nuclear Security Summit process, the Northeast Asian nuclear security centers of excellence, and the role of regional organizations to address nuclear safety and security. Participants also visited the Da Lat Nuclear Research Reactor, where they received briefings from various scientists and technical staff from the facility.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 09 Dec 2013 00:00:00 CST
This week's incident in Mexico, in which highly lethal cobalt-60 was stolen in a truck theft and not recovered for two days, may have been unusually disquieting, but it was not unusual. Nuclear material is stolen or lost two to four dozen times a year every year. Sometimes small amounts, sometimes large. It happens an awful lot in Russia and other former Soviet states; it happens in poorer, nuclear-capable countries such as Mexico, India and South Africa; and you'd better believe it happens in rich countries, as well, particularly in France.

[...]

A group called the Nuclear Threat Initiative tracks open-source reports of these incidents. They don't catch everything, but they've recorded enough to show the alarming frequency with which dangerous nuclear materials are lost or go missing.

“If that was the only thing you did, to make the code binding, I’m not sure that would necessarily suffice,” Miles Pomper, a senior research associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, told Global Security Newswire. “The problem is that this tends to be the poor step-child of nuclear security.

“The radiological-security issue even here in [U.S.] budgets tends to get cut first when there’s a budget problem and doesn’t get the resources it needs,” Pomper added. “So even if you’ve got these laws on the books, the implementation would be a lot of the problem.”

...

Pomper said international leaders should place greater emphasis -- and provide more funding for -- efforts to replace technologies that rely on dangerous radioactive sources with alternative equipment that is not dependent on the material.

“You can use x-ray technology instead of cesium chloride in blood irradiators,” Pomper said. “Or you can use accelerators instead of these cobalt-60 machines." However,“some of this technology has just come along; some of it is a question of expense -- particularly for developing countries,” he added.

In Europe, some countries have already phased out the use of cesium chloride blood irradiators, Pomper said. In October, the World Institute for Nuclear Security hosted a meeting on expanding the use of such alternative technologies. NNSA officials had planned to attend but were not able due to the federal government shutdown, according to Pomper.

It is not clear, however, that an international law on radiological security is the appropriate response to this week’s incident in Mexico, Pomper said. The cobalt-60 was on its way to a proper disposal facility when it was stolen, but whether adequate security precautions were made en route could be in question, he said.

“You could say they need better procedures -- does that have to be an international standard or does Mexico in particular have to look at this because Mexico has a crime problem?” Pomper asked. “Does Switzerland need to do this? I don’t know.”

...

Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security, told GSN the arguments against pursuing a legally binding accord were overstated and that a convention is needed.

“The problem, as the report freely admits, is that the current international radiological security system based on the code of conduct is completely voluntary, and adherence is not uniform across borders and assessments of its implementation are difficult as a result,” he said.

Still, Luongo, who served as senior adviser to the Energy secretary on nonproliferation policy issues during the Clinton administration, said an IAEA study of a potentially legally binding accord was not enough.

“Kicking the ball to the IAEA staff for further evaluation is not going to make anything new happen anytime soon,” said Luongo. He argued that more “political leadership” is needed on the issue and that the matter should receive significant attention -- both domestically and during the Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands next year.

“My feeling has always been that the top levels of [the Obama] administration have not accorded the radiological security issue the attention it needs and deserves, and have done little to defend the NNSA efforts from budget cuts,” he said. “But, what NNSA is doing -- both domestically and internationally -- is very important.”

A 20-year-old deal that has powered American homes while reducing the risk of Russian nuclear material falling into the wrong hands approached its end on Thursday when the final shipment of uranium left St Petersburg for Baltimore.

[...]

It was "crucial for stabilizing the Russian nuclear complex at a critical time in the 1990s," said Matthew Bunn, a Harvard University professor and expert on nuclear security and proliferation.

He called it "perhaps the most successful U.S.-Russian cooperative effort to reduce nuclear dangers".

But times have changed. A richer Russia, while seeking to expand its nuclear energy industry, has resisted U.S. efforts to extend the agreement or come up with another one to continue blending down HEU, Bunn said.

The deal was done when Russia wanted financial aid from the West. President Vladimir Putin, in power since 2000, has made a point of rejecting handouts and demanded that the United States treat Russia as an equal.

"It is too bad ... that Russia has not decided to blend down substantial additional quantities of highly enriched uranium," Bunn said. "They still have far more than is plausibly needed for their military programs."

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 14 Nov 2013 00:00:00 CST
International organizations and heads of state have gathered twice since 2010 to tackle the problem of nuclear security, working to prevent the theft, sabotage, and illegal transfer of dangerous radioactive material.

Five months from now, these leaders will meet again at the third of four planned biannual Nuclear Security Summits, this time in the Netherlands. Up until now, participant countries have focused on implementing existing treaties and recommendations and improving international cooperation. To further the summits' goals, they should also think about embracing voluntary compliance regimes.

Voluntary systems encourage companies and governments to comply with standards not covered by legal mandates. They've been used in the healthcare and chemical industries; helped develop new norms in energy-efficient building design; and allowed organizations to track how extractive industries compensate developing countries. Right now, the Obama administration is gathering reports from various agencies on how to encourage industries to follow stricter cyber-security regulations. While these initiatives are often spurred by particular events, they have also been pushed by visionary leaders. The summits provide an opportunity for US President Barack Obama or others to pursue a similar strategy on nuclear security.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 08 Nov 2013 00:00:00 CST
Earlier this month, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh signed an agreement to enable future civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. While the text has not been made public, it appears that the agreement will not include a so-called Gold Standard provision proscribing Vietnam from enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium.

The agreement marks the latest installment in a decade-long effort by the United States and other major nuclear powers to limit the further spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies (ENR), which can provide both fuel for nuclear power and fissile material for nuclear weapons. Controversies over the terms of this and potential future U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements illustrate that such efforts are likely to be contentious and partially successful at best.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 21 Oct 2013 00:00:00 CSTA plan partly funded by Warren Buffett to set up a U.N. nuclear fuel bank to help prevent the spread of atomic weapons could still be inaugurated by late 2014 despite slower-than-expected progress, according to one of its main backers.

Almost three years after member states of the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved the U.S.-backed scheme to establish a reserve of low-enriched uranium (LEU), the IAEA has yet to conclude negotiations with Kazakhstan, the country that will host the fuel bank.

The LEU bank is partly funded by U.S. billionaire and philanthropist Buffett, whose $50 million donation through the non-governmental Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) was supplemented by the United States and other countries, bringing the total to more than $150 million.

Corey Hinderstein, an NTI vice president, said there were still some "uncertainties" around implementation, including how to define the relationship between the IAEA and Kazakhstan and the responsibilities of each party.

"Certainly there was an expectation that we might have been able to see more progress by now. I think it has been delayed as compared to expectation," Hinderstein told Reuters.

But she added: "I think both sides recognise that the process has been quite drawn out and want to see it come to successful conclusion."

...

Hinderstein, who was a deputy director and senior analyst at the Institute for Science and International Security before joining NTI, said she was "optimistic that I will be able to see the cutting of the ribbon of the fuel bank by the end of 2014".

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 02 Oct 2013 00:00:00 CST
Former top Russian and U.S. officials contend in a new report their countries should do more to counter feared nuclear-terrorism attacks by being willing to share sensitive technical data and to help other nations improve their fissile-material-protection standards.

The “Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism” document -- released Wednesday and jointly produced by Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies, or ISKRAN -- has the backing of prominent retired U.S. and Russian military and intelligence officials.

The recommendations are intended to influence planning for next year’s Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands, which is slated to be the second-to-last gathering of its kind and thus one of the final high-profile opportunities to secure concrete commitments by nation states to improve their nuclear security.

...

Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert who co-authored the report, suggested any agreement on new voluntary standards could be announced at the upcoming nuclear summit.

Nations interesting in adopting these heightened nuclear security standards but lacking the resources to implement them on their own might be able to receive financial assistance from other nations participating in the nuclear security summit process, Bunn said in an interview with Global Security Newswire.

...

Bunn, an associate professor of public policy at Harvard University, said while improvements have been seen in recent years in the security of nuclear stockpiles held worldwide, there is still more that can be done.

“You shouldn’t think of it as something you flip a switch and it’s done, rather it’s something that requires ... continual improvement,” Bunn said.

...

Miles Pomper, a senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said he found the recommendations to be strong and noteworthy because of their endorsement by well-respected former military and security professionals in both nations.

The question, however, is “will the two governments actually be willing to undertake this -- particularly on issues such as forensics and inventories that require a lot of transparency and cooperation and could prove diplomatically embarrassing,” Pomper said in an e-mail.

Pomper said he was particularly appreciative of the recommendation for forming a bilateral subgroup to encourage the sharing of information related to nuclear forensics -- a field that encompasses a range of technical capabilities that can determine where a particular amount of nuclear material was produced. It is hoped that rogue actors would be deterred from carrying out a nuclear terror attack if they know the international community possesses the scientific skills to trace back the source of the bomb material.

“The forensic suggestions are excellent and hopefully spur action,” Pomper said. “But it is not clear if the Kremlin would be willing to implement them given that in the past a significant portion of smuggled HEU appears to have come from Russia and there is a lot of leeriness about providing information about forensic signatures.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 02 Oct 2013 00:00:00 CST
An American anti-chemical weapons advocate, a Palestinian human rights campaigner, a Congolese surgeon who helps wartime rape victims and a Swiss pioneer of pest control for sustainable agriculture have been named winners of this year's Right Livelihood Awards.

Paul Walker, the U.S. director of environmental security at Green Cross International, will share the 2 million Swedish kronor ($312,000) prize with Palestinian lawyer Raji Sourani, surgeon Denis Mukwege and Hans Rudolf Herren and the Biovision Foundation he founded 15 years ago. The prize is also known as the "alternative Nobels."

The awards jury on Thursday cited the 67-year-old Walker for "working tirelessly to rid the world of chemical weapons." It said since 1995, Walker has led the U.S. branch of an organization set up by former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev aimed at safely securing and eliminating nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional weapons globally. The jury said his leadership has helped eliminate more than 55,000 tons of chemical weapons.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 26 Sep 2013 00:00:00 CST
Thirty-five years ago, Washington launched a program to minimize the civilian use of highly enriched uranium (HEU)—a terrorist’s material of choice for constructing nuclear weapons. Though the program struggled for funding, nongovernmental organizations and several Congressional champions kept it alive, and in 2004, attempts to reduce HEU stores began to blossom. That’s when the National Nuclear Security Administration launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which works to remove weapons-grade fuel and convert HEU-powered research reactors to reliance on less-enriched fuels. In 2009, these efforts received a boost when US President Barack Obama announced a new goal to lock down all “vulnerable nuclear material around the world in four years” and Washington launched a series of head-of-state-level meetings, the Nuclear Security Summits.

Programs to minimize the civilian use of HEU will soon reach an important milestone: the near-completion of removals, under which governments repatriate fresh and spent HEU fuel to the country where it was originally produced, usually Russia or the United States, for eventual disposition. Obama’s ambitious four-year goal is unlikely to be met, but by October 2014, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative plans to complete 85 percent of all Russian-origin removals, 80 percent of all US-origin removals, and 89 percent of other (so-called “gap material”) removals. Thus, with more than a year and a half to go before the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, all but 16 percent of the total 5,244 kilograms of targeted materials will have been repatriated. This success, in turn, will present a new challenge: Whereas it was relatively easy to track the removal of nuclear materials, it’s not clear how policymakers will measure nuclear security progress in the future.

The goal of global nuclear security involves more than just removal of weapons-usable material from civilian operations. Nations participating in the Nuclear Security Summit process also strive to counter smuggling and improve physical security at nuclear facilities. But removing civilian HEU has been the most tangible success to emerge from the US-led effort.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 10 Sep 2013 00:00:00 CST
The Nuclear Security Summits (NSS), an important innovation in the fight against nuclear terrorism, have not yet reached their full potential of eliminating weak links in the global nuclear control system. The upcoming summit in The Hague in 2014 followed by the final summit in Washington in 2016 offers a tandem opportunity to strengthen the existing system and set the foundation for a significantly improved nuclear security regime by the end of the decade. This result would be the signature achievement of the summit process.

The NSS participants have proceeded cautiously at the first two summits in Washington in 2010 and Seoul in 2012. However, an important hallmark of the process has been that the scope of the nuclear security issue has grown with each event. Washington focused almost exclusively on fissile materials. Seoul expanded the scope to include the interface between safety and security at nuclear facilities and the protection of high activity radioactive sources that can be used in “dirty bombs.” But, the security governance system for the global nuclear enterprise is in need of substantial improvement and this issue should be the major addition to The Hague Summit in March.

The groundwork for a nuclear security governance initiative is already being laid. In Seoul in 2012, the experts symposium held on the margin of the official summit was titled “Innovating Global Nuclear Security Governance”. After that summit, almost two dozen global experts created the “Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group” which has released four reports with recommendations on how to improve the nuclear security system. And a number of former government officials from around the world are calling for security system enhancements.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 04 Sep 2013 00:00:00 CST
Just days after the March 2011 Fukushima accident, China’s State Council suspended approvals of new nuclear power plants and created a range of rigorous measures aimed at improving the country’s nuclear-safety provisions. It was not until October 2012 that the council cautiously lifted the ban on new construction. Then-Premier Wen Jiabao announced that all newly approved reactors would need to meet third-generation criteria, meaning
that they should have certain advanced inbuilt safety features lacking in most conventional second-generation reactors. China’s actions demonstrate a new resolve among its leadership to give greater consideration to the safety, rather than the economic benefits, of nuclear power. Fukushima caused concern that a similar accident in China would put the government’s nuclear programme, which is the fastest growing in the world, at serious
risk. Of even greater concern was the possibility that an accident could strengthen opposition to the rule of the Communist Party.

Far-reaching changes in China’s nuclear-energy policy have been made, but the country has not moved away from its longstanding commitment to developing a plutonium-based nuclear fuel cycle, with spent-fuel reprocessing and fast-neutron reactors. The security and proliferation risks of conventional, uranium-fuelled light-water reactors (LWRs) are considered manageable. But nuclear reprocessing and fast reactors operating with
plutonium-based fuel would create considerable proliferation challenges for China. This is because the plutonium could, in principle, be used in nuclear weapons.

One concern is that this kind of nuclear-energy fuel cycle could support China’s strategic-weapons programme. A related worry is that the subsequent export of reprocessing and fast-reactor technologies by China, running counter to international non-proliferation goals, would increase access to know-how and materials connected with nuclear weapons. Additionally, having a larger amount of weapons-usable fissile material in circulation
would increase the challenge of protecting it from terrorists and other malicious actors.

In a wide-ranging speech delivered in June at Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate, US President Barack Obama said that "complacency is not the character of great nations." In the same speech, he announced that the United States will again host the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in 2016.

While this is welcome news, treating the summits themselves as an end goal would amount to falling into the very complacency Obama warned against. Facing the threat of nuclear terrorism requires more than just talk among leaders.

Year after year, nuclear terrorism remains the number one national security threat to the United States and many other countries. And year after year, world leaders don't do nearly enough to ensure citizens’ safety against this potential catastrophe. Policymakers in Washington continue to slash budgets for securing loose nuclear materials. Other countries continue to produce them. Like both Republican and Democratic US presidents before him, Obama promised to protect America and its allies from nuclear terrorism. In April 2009, he pledged to "secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years." The deadline passed earlier this year and the goal has not been met.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 08 Aug 2013 00:00:00 CST
This former Soviet republic’s location in an obscure corner of the world has not stopped it from becoming a leader on the frontiers of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, but some issue experts say the biggest risk to the nation might be the prospect of resting on its laurels.

“Complacency is the major threat,” said Dauren Aben, a senior research fellow with the national Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies. Any deficit in attention could lead Kazakhstan’s government in Astana to overlook a gap in its nuclear security defenses, he said in a phone interview last week.

“When I talk to people in the field [in Kazakhstan] they will say, ‘Well, you see we’ve done everything possible. We are satisfied with what we’ve done,’” said Aben, whose organization provides official advice to the president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, according to its website.

...

Absent academic research into whether complacency has, in fact, become an issue, it “would be more useful not to attempt to single out one challenge but reflect on the complexity of challenges,” said Togzhan Kassenova, an associate in the Nuclear Policy Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in an e-mail last week.

“Kazakhstan faces the same challenges as any nation with ambitious plans in the field of nuclear energy -- training and educating personnel, maintaining the highest nuclear safety and security standards at its nuclear facilities, and investing in strengthened border and customs controls,” she wrote.

...

“I think, in theory, corruption is more of a potential risk at the lower level” of the atomic sector, where industry personnel may be tempted to accept bribes in exchange for ignoring the possible diversion of sensitive materials, Kassenova said in a phone interview.

Aben agreed that corruption is not presently a serious problem inside the nation’s nuclear sites, though it becomes a bigger worry in terms of the records of the customs office, police and border enforcement agencies.

...

“Of course, some of these drug cartels, they bribe officials on the border; they bribe border control [and] customs officials. What could prevent them [from bribing] officials when they are taking, for example, radiological materials?” he pondered.

“You can never exclude the possibility that there could be some people willing to just close their eyes” and allow proliferation to occur, said Aben, speaking by phone from Almaty last week.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 05 Aug 2013 00:00:00 CST
Shocked and confused. That’s how the international community is reacting to news that a major Australian radiological security initiative has just been canned. The corridors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were abuzz with this news during a recent conference on nuclear security, held at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna from 1–5 July. The conference was attended by many hundreds of officials and analysts from all over the world, who gathered to discuss nuclear and radiological challenges, including the risk that individuals or groups could acquire and use these materials in terrorist and other malicious attacks. The goal of the conference was to encourage states to cooperate to prevent such attacks, and the Australian initiative was regarded as an important trailblazer and a highly respected contribution to this global effort.

The details of the initiative are worth explaining; it’s a safe bet that few people in Australia were aware of its existence, let alone its sudden cancellation. Known as the Southeast Asia Regional Security of Radioactive Sources (RSRS) Project, it was launched in 2004 as part of the Australian Government’s commitment to international counter-terrorism cooperation. It was run by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (known by its acronym ANSTO), in cooperation with the US Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security. Under ANSTO’s leadership, international experts from these organizations worked with relevant regulatory bodies across Southeast Asia to help secure dangerous radioactive sources used in the health and industrial sectors, and to develop strategies for responding to sabotage and other malicious attacks. The focus was mainly on in-country training and workshop programs, including practical exercises, supplemented by regional review meetings (held in Indonesia in 2008, Vietnam in 2010, and the Philippines in 2012).

The RSRS Program helped transfer Australian and international knowledge and skills to local country experts in Southeast Asia, where radiological materials are widely in use and yet controls are weak and often poorly enforced. In transferring this knowledge, Australia’s initiative began to build the local capacity to prevent dangerous materials falling into the hands of malicious actors, who could use them to construct radiological devices known as ‘dirty bombs’.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 05 Aug 2013 00:00:00 CST
Some of the members are expressing unnecessary apprehensions regarding India’s membership. Unlike China, India has a track record of complying with obligations of any treaty or agreement it signs.

The 2013 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) plenary meeting in Prague, from June 13-14, assumed significance in the context of the ongoing crises relating to Iran and North Korea as well the legitimacy crisis faced by the group because of the Chinese proliferation behaviour. Equally important challenges before the NSG have been the advancement in global nuclear technology as well as the expansion of its membership whereby its goals and objectives are promoted not compromised.

The customary press release soon after the end of the plenary meeting underlined the resolve of the member countries to fight proliferation and expressed concern about ‘the proliferation implications’ of the North Korean and Iran nuclear programmes. Surprisingly, the press release did not express concern about proliferation and defiance of its member—China, which is blatantly undertaking nuclear business with Pakistan. The release also informed about the revision of NSG control lists to adjust to the advancement in global nuclear technology. Soon, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will publish the list.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 29 Jul 2013 00:00:00 CST
A top Obama administration official on Tuesday voiced support for the International Atomic Energy Agency expanding its role in the global nuclear security realm.

“We are strongly supportive of the increased attention at IAEA on nuclear security,” Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz said in remarks at a State Department conference. “We believe it’s an important mission and we believe they have an important role.”

Earlier this month, representatives from 125 IAEA member states convened in Vienna, Austria, for a ministerial-level conference focused on improving efforts to secure nuclear materials from potential acquisition by terrorists. The agency serves as a nuclear watchdog for the United Nations.

....

Miles Pomper, a senior research associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said if the ministerial statement “was any indication of the IAEA’s ability to take a leadership role in this issue, it’s not saying much.”

“The problem is, it’s a political problem, particularly on the funding level,” explained Pomper, who supports additional such work. For the International Atomic Energy Agency to expand its role in nuclear security, member states would have to agree to fund such activities through the body’s regular budget. Presently nations underwrite IAEA atomic protections work through voluntary contributions made on an irregular basis.

“I would look for what countries are willing to pledge in next year’s security summit in this regard,” Pomper said, referring to a global nuclear security gathering set to take place in the Netherlands in March 2014.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 19 Jul 2013 00:00:00 CST
The Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant, whose 2011 triple-meltdown forced the relocation of 160,000 people, may provide a new blueprint for terrorists seeking to inflict mass disruption, security analysts said Monday at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The U.N. atomic agency convened a weeklong meeting of 1,300 diplomats, scientists and security analysts in Vienna to examine ways to boost protection against nuclear terrorism. The meeting is the IAEA’s first ministerial conference.

“Fukushima sent a message to terrorists that if you manage to cause a nuclear power plant to melt down, that really causes major panic and disruption in a society,” Matthew Bunn, a Harvard University professor and former White House adviser, said at a briefing. “All you need to do is cut off the power for an extended period of time.”

...

“Fukushima is a nuclear security problem as much as it was a nuclear safety problem,” said Kenneth Luongo, who with the U.S. Department of Energy helped secure atomic material in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

...

Even a low-level radiological or dirty-bomb attack on Washington, while causing a limited number of deaths, would lead to damages of $100 billion, according to Igor Khripunov, the former Soviet arms-control envoy to the U.S., who’s now at the Athens, Georgia-based Center for International Trade and Security.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 03 Jul 2013 00:00:00 CST
A half-finished monolith of raw concrete and rebar rises suddenly from slash pine forests as the public tour bus crests a hill at this heavily-secured site south of rural Aiken.

Dozens of hard-hatted workers in bright green and orange vests slog through the damp clay and clamber over a half-finished roof five floors up. Others filter in and out of openings cut into the windowless, half-a-million square-foot box, where towering construction cranes are clustered.

Guide Laurie Posey uses the bus loudspeaker to describe the project’s 6,800 miles of cable, 80 miles of radiation-resistant piping and double walls of reinforced concrete. Recently, she said the government factory would cost $4.86 billion, then coughed into her fist and shot a glance at the bus’ driver.

...

But the U.S.-Russia plutonium disposition program, which includes the Savannah River plant, is the U.S. government’s single most expensive nonproliferation project now, according to Michelle Cann, senior budget analyst with a nonprofit group called Partnership for Global Security.

...

The United States and its allies worried these cases were the tip of an iceberg. Princeton physicist Frank von Hippel, a key player in the early push for a disposal agreement, recalls his surprise on visiting the huge Mayak nuclear complex in western Siberia in 1994. There, he found thirty metric tons of plutonium oxide from civilian reactors capable of being fashioned into bombs, stored in 12,000 tea-kettle-sized containers. A fence surrounded the reservation, but inside the gates all that stood between a thief and the plutonium was a padlock on the warehouse door and a nervous conscript guard.

...

Joan Rohlfing, president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nonprofit group that promotes aggressive action to reduce nuclear explosive risks, said she believes the project is still worth completing. “I am both surprised and disappointed” that the administration is questioning its investment, she said.

...

“Down the road, we could see the MOX program in Russia lead to the creation of more separated plutonium, not less,” said Tom Z. Collina, a senior official with the Arms Control Association. “That’s one of the dangers of the agreement. It could ultimately defeat the original purpose … which is to eliminate stocks of separated plutonium.”

...

Von Hippel said the MOX plant has “become from my point of view a pretty meaningless program” that should now be killed. “The problem … is that Russia doesn’t intend to dispose of its plutonium permanently, right?” he said. “In fact, it’s setting itself up to produce and recycle its plutonium indefinitely.” That creates risks “that this stuff will get stolen, so in fact the security situation gets worse.”

A non-partisan coalition of leading international security experts representing 75 organizations, the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), applauds President Obama’s continued commitment to galvanize the international community around nuclear security by hosting a fourth Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in 2016, but cautions that words must be followed by concrete actions to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism.

The NSS process – which has its next meeting in 2014 in The Hague – has been a signature success of Obama’s administration, drawing political attention at the highest level to preventing nuclear terrorism and leading more than 50 participating countries to make concrete commitments to reduce the threat.

“Obama’s leadership has been essential, and continuing the summit process is key. But, to be successful, the summits in 2014 and 2016 must focus on eliminating the persistent weak links in security and governance for all nuclear materials and facilities, including protection from physical and cyber threats,” said Kenneth Luongo, FMWG Co-Chair and president of the Partnership for Global Security.

“Building a durable and effective global nuclear security system will require significant vision and unflagging political commitment,” said Luongo, a former senior energy department official.

In the Berlin speech on Wednesday, Obama said that "complacency is not in the character of great nations." The FMWG urges Obama to use the continuation of the NSS process through 2016 to lead the world to bold solutions that are critical to address the threat from unsecured fissile materials, such as developing a cohesive and integrated global nuclear security framework.

“If the US is hosting what we have to presume will be the final Nuclear Security Summit, then there’s a burden of leadership on Obama to make certain that the boldest, strongest possible steps are taken to ensure the legacy of a secure nuclear future,” said Jennifer Smyser, the director of policy programming at the Stanley Foundation and a member of the FMWG steering committee.

According to Matthew Bunn at Harvard University’s Project on Managing the Atom, "Another nuclear security summit in 2016 creates an opportunity to put an effective international nuclear security framework in place, focused on continual improvement in the face of ever-changing technologies and threats.”

“The 2014 summit must set the direction so that by 2016, the international community can build a structure that will work and will last," said Bunn, an FMWG steering committee member.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 19 Jun 2013 00:00:00 CST
U.S. efforts to dismantle and secure nuclear and chemical weapons in Russia will be substantially limited under a new bilateral agreement the White House announced Monday, experts say.

Kenneth Luongo, a former nonproliferation advisor for the Energy Department, said the Defense Department’s Cooperative Threat Reduction effort within Russia’s borders would be “totally different,” under the new accord announced Monday. “This agreement is a continuation of a program in a very truncated form,” said Luongo, now president of the Partnership for Global Security.

Since the early 1990s, the CTR program actively worked in Russia to dismantle and secure Cold War-era weapons of mass destruction. Among the activities the Defense program was directly involved with was the destruction of Russian bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles, along with the construction of facilities needed to destroy Soviet-era chemical weapons.

...

“It’s all over,” Thomas Moore, a senior fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said Monday regarding the physical dismantlement efforts in Russia that the Defense Department had been involved with for two decades. Until earlier this year, Moore was a top aide to now-retired Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), who along with retired Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), helped establish the CTR program in the early 1990s.

...

Given that Pentagon efforts to destroy Russian weapons leftover from the Cold War had already been winding down in recent years, Luongo suggested that the most significant impact of the new arrangement could be its political effect on Capitol Hill. Luongo said the Defense Department’s CTR efforts in Russia had historically formed the “political core” of the program’s broader initiatives across other countries and raised concerns that lawmakers could use its discontinuation as justification for budget cuts to nonproliferation programs.

Luongo said it would be important for the Obama administration to explain the details of the change to Congress and convey to lawmakers that the program is doing crucial security work outside of Russia that merits continued funding.

“If you let that go, you’re never going to get that back under the current fiscal circumstances,” Luongo said. “The political poles holding up this tent have taken a bit a hit.”

Given that concern, Luongo said he found it “amazing” that the new agreement was apparently signed last week and “no one said a word” about it until Monday. Moore speculated the Obama administration was seeking to downplay the limitations of the new agreement so as not to be seen as criticizing Russia, as the two nations grapple with other high-profile disagreements such as the Syrian civil war.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 18 Jun 2013 00:00:00 CST
On May 20, the US House of Representatives approved legislation that would implement two major international nuclear security accords. The move should be cause for celebration among those fighting the spread of nuclear weapons and related materials around the world. In fact, though, the nonproliferation community is in the doldrums, as Washington is consumed by budget battles that threaten US national security.

In the United States, nuclear nonproliferation programs are housed under the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration, where their goals are to "detect nuclear and radiological materials, and [Weapons of Mass Destruction]-related equipment; secure vulnerable nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear and radiological materials; [and] dispose of surplus weapons-usable nuclear and radiological materials." The programs are critical to keeping the United States and the world safe.

On March 1, unfortunately, across-the-board cuts known as "sequestration" were applied to the majority of government budgets, including the Energy Department's nonproliferation programs.

The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), a non-partisan coalition of 75 leading national security experts, applauded the House of Representatives for passing legislation last night that strengthens U.S. efforts to prevent and counter nuclear terrorism. The Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act of 2013 (H.R. 1073) passed on May 20 by a vote of 390-3.

This bipartisan legislation implements key requirements of the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The Republican-led House approved similar implementing legislation last year, but the Senate failed to act on it before the end of the 112th Congress.

“The House deserves our applause and thanks for taking an important step to keep our nation safe from the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism,” said Miles Pomper, Senior Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and FMWG co-chair. “Now it’s up to the Senate to act so that the United States can finally ratify these vital treaties.”

Congressional approval of the implementing legislation would enhance U.S. security. The amendment to the CPPNM expands the original treaty to require parties not only to protect nuclear material in international transit, but also to protect nuclear facilities and nuclear material that is stored, in transit or used domestically. ICSANT would establish a framework to strengthen cooperation among countries in combating nuclear terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Together the treaties update and strengthen the legal tools to prevent WMD terrorism and will help ensure that states treat nuclear security not only as a domestic concern but an international responsibility. They also complement other tools in the anti-nuclear terrorism toolkit, such as anti-smuggling efforts.

The George W. Bush administration submitted the treaties to the Senate in September 2007, and the Senate overwhelmingly approved them in September 2008. But prior to U.S. ratification, the agreements require the United States to pass legislation to criminalize specific offenses, many but not all of which are already covered under U.S. law. Last year, the Senate failed to pass the implementing legislation in large part because of a dispute between Judiciary Committee Chairman Sen. Patrick Leahy and Ranking Member Charles Grassley (R-IA) over whether the death penalty should be applicable to certain offenses.

“The Senate’s failure to approve the implementing legislation is having real-world consequences,” said Kingston Reif, Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington D.C. “Many other countries have indicated that they are waiting for the United States to complete ratification before moving ahead with their own ratification processes, since it was the United States that pushed for the amendment in the first place.”

In a May 17 opinion piece published in World Politics Review, Pomper and Reif explain that under existing law an attack involving radiological or nuclear material would allow prosecutors plenty of latitude to seek the death penalty. In other words, the dispute between Leahy and Grassley over the pending legislation would not matter in practice.

At the March 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, more than 50 countries pledged to seek the entry into force of the CPPNM amendment by the March 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands. The longer it takes the United States to ratify the amendment, the more difficult it will be for other countries to do so. The amendment will only enter into force after it has been ratified by two-thirds of the parties to the original convention. As of April 2013, 67 out of 148 states had approved the amendment; 99 are required to do so before entry into force. The goal of ensuring every country signs on to the ICSANT has also been slowed by the lack of U.S. leadership.

While the United States already has strong measures to prevent and prosecute nuclear terrorism, congressional leadership is needed to ensure that all states adhere to similarly robust measures.

The FMWG, a coalition of U.S. and international experts, was formed to improve fissile material security through the development of actionable policy proposals and advocacy for government adoption and implementation of improved policies. For more information, visit www.fmwg.org.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 21 May 2013 00:00:00 CST
The government’s decision to charge surviving Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev with the use of a weapon of mass destruction struck many Americans as peculiar. At first glance, the Tsarnaev brothers’ bombs do not seem to match the definition or popular perception of a WMD. For decades, that term has been interpreted as referring to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which uniquely possess the ability to kill people in numbers large enough to be considered massive.

Two factors, among others, help explain the government’s decision: The charge is seen by prosecutors as relatively easy to level—and prove—compared to other possible crimes, and it is one of the few federal crimes that can be punished by the death penalty.

The ease with which the government can pursue capital punishment in this instance, if it so desires, highlights the increasing irrelevance of a dispute between Senate Judiciary Chairman Sen. Patrick Leahy, a Democrat, and, Sen. Charles Grassley, the ranking Republican committee member, that is holding up important new anti-nuclear and anti-radiological terrorism legislation. The tragic attacks in Boston should encourage the lawmakers to find a compromise to protect U.S. and global security against the very real threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. As horrible as the events in Boston were, had the Tsarnaev brothers actually gained access to nuclear materials, the result would have been much more recognizable as a WMD attack and would have caused far greater casualties.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 17 May 2013 00:00:00 CST
Years of international efforts to lock down nuclear material that could be exploited by terrorists risk failing to deal with hundreds of tons of plutonium dispersed across the globe, according to an international coalition of nongovernmental organizations.

Roughly 490 metric tons of separated plutonium held by a handful of nations would be sufficient to fuel 100,000 nuclear weapons, the Fissile Materials Working Group said. Processing of waste from nuclear reactors continues to expand nations’ stocks of the substance.

“Through the Nuclear Security Summit process initiated in 2010, countries have started securing some of the most vulnerable nuclear materials. But they have largely left plutonium untouched,” the organization said in a May 6 article published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

...

The “communique” delivered by nearly 50 states at the end of the 2010 summit cited the need to secure both plutonium and weapon-grade uranium. While leaders also encouraged consideration of reduced use of highly enriched uranium in powering reactors and producing medical isotopes, there was no corresponding language on curbing reprocessing of plutonium for nuclear fuel, said article co-author Sharon Squassoni, director of the Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security.

...

“In my opinion, the summit started out about one thing in 2010: let’s secure the world’s most vulnerable material. We’re not going to say exactly what it is, but really it’s highly enriched uranium,” she said. “In all the documents we’ve seen so far there has been very little attention paid to plutonium.”

Taking up the matter seriously would require leaders to address associated sensitive questions that they might rather avoid, such as how to deal with nuclear waste if not by reprocessing, Squassoni said, emphasizing that she was expressing her opinion rather than that of the Fissile Materials Working Group.

...

“I think the conventional wisdom is that for a terrorist highly enriched uranium is easier to work with and you can more easily make a gun-assembly type device like what we exploded over Hiroshima,” Squassoni said in an interview.

...

The coalition is in regular contact with policy-makers and stakeholders in plutonium reprocessing and is planning side events on the issue at a nuclear security conference scheduled for early July in Vienna, Austria, McNiesh said.

An “international knowledge summit” is being planned with Dutch and South Korean partners to convene alongside the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, she said in an interview.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 CST
Four years ago in Prague, President Barack Obama focused the world's attention on a "strange turn of history:" Even as the danger of global nuclear war has lessened, the threat we face from nuclear materials is greater than ever, because of international terrorist networks, a global black market trade, and the spread of technology that could help build a bomb.

Through the Nuclear Security Summit process initiated in 2010, countries have started securing some of the most vulnerable materials. But they have largely left plutonium untouched. As Obama warned in a later speech, this time on the margins of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, "We know that just the smallest amount of plutonium -- about the size of an apple -- could kill hundreds of thousands and spark a global crisis."

Of the two materials that can be used to construct nuclear weapons, it's easy to see why so much effort has been focused on highly enriched uranium (HEU), widely considered to pose the most urgent threat from terrorist use. There are about 1,440 tons of HEU in more than 32 countries, spread across a difficult-to-determine number of military sites and more than 100 research reactors and other civilian facilities. Unlike plutonium, HEU can be used to make the simplest kind of nuclear weapon -- a device that shoots one piece of HEU into another, causing a nuclear explosion.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 06 May 2013 00:00:00 CST
While the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit is unlikely to lead to comprehensive, international standards for locking down vulnerable atomic materials, nations could still take steps that failed to materialize in two previous gatherings, a key diplomat said on Thursday.

Security advocates outside of government have argued that initiating a comprehensive framework that would be binding across all participating nations would be a logical next step for the summit process that began in 2010 in Washington and could end next year in The Hague.

Such a system would set global security standards and universalize a regime that observers say is now a patchwork of agreements, many of which are voluntary, Togzhan Kassenova, a nuclear policy associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted during a discussion at the organization’s headquarters.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 CST
In the winter of 2012, President Obama stood on a podium at the National Defense University to honor the 20th anniversary of a program that successfully dismantled nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union, declaring, "We simply cannot allow the 21st century to be darkened by the worst weapons of the 20th century." He reaffirmed his commitment to continue investing in nonproliferation, because "our national security depends on it," he said. But his administration's recently released budget proposal reflects the opposite agenda: It makes big cuts to nuclear nonproliferation programs while beefing up funding for the United States' nuclear weapons stockpile.

"I'm baffled as to why they would do that," says Barry Watts, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a national-security policy think tank, said of the Obama administration. "Nonproliferation goes straight to the heart of their policy." Obama's budget proposal for 2014 would cut $400 million from nonproliferation programs compared while spending an additional $560 million on extending the life of our atomic arsenal (compared with the fiscal 2012 budget).

...

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative is a "core material security program to ensure that terrorists can't their hands on nuclear weapons-usable material," explains Kingston Reif, director of nonproliferation programs at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. In 2012, the administration projected that it would spend $630 million on the GTRI in 2014. Obama's current budget proposal requests $424 million. Obama's 2013 budget proposal for GTRI was so low that Congress voted to increase funding by $35 million beyond the level that the administration requested. "We are hoping for the same thing this year," Reif says.

...

The shift away from nonproliferation efforts is likely the result of austerity policies crimping the president's agenda, says Reif.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 23 Apr 2013 00:00:00 CST
WASHINGTON -- The Obama administration’s new budget would cut more than $300 million from programs intended to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear materials or other ingredients for weapons of mass destruction, according to a new analysis by an organization that advocates the work.

“If enacted by Congress, these cuts will undermine global U.S. leadership to prevent nuclear terrorism,” the Partnership for Global Security said in the report. “They also threaten the foundation of threat reduction programs that have been built up over two decades to protect the public from the misuse of nuclear and radiological materials.”

Warnings from the nongovernmental organization and like-minded groups came days – or, in one case, just hours -- before two bombs detonated Monday along the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing three and injuring close to 200. While post-Sept. 11 terrorist plots against the United States have focused on conventional means, issue specialists say now is not the time for leaders to let their guard down against the WMD threat.

...

Partnership for Global Security President Kenneth Luongo said there is cause for worry that go beyond the numbers. For example, the Energy Department’s new budget plan affirms Washington’s intent to protect the world’s “most vulnerable nuclear materials” as of this year. That seems a step back from President Obama’s pledge in April 2009 to secure “all vulnerable nuclear material” within four years, he said.

“Changing ‘all’ to ‘most’ is moving the goal posts when no one knew where the goal line was to begin with,” Luongo asserted by e-mail. “They were let off the hook in the first term when no one pressed them to define ‘all,’ but that goodwill evaporated a long time ago. Now we are confronted with a major policy change buried in the bowels of a budget document with no explanation.”

...

The Center for Public Integrity reported before last week’s federal budget rollout that reduced nonproliferation funding was proposed primarily to allow more money to flow into nuclear arms modernization projects.

“Is it true? I don’t know if anyone in the administration will admit it, but it certainly seems like it might be true,” Luongo told Global Security Newswire. “If it is it is a much bigger issue than just cuts -- it is an issue of prioritization.”

...

"While the administration has achieved a great deal over the past four years ... by NNSA's own admission there is more material to remove, reactors to convert and/or shut down, and buildings with radiological and nuclear material to protect," Kingston Reif, of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, said by e-mail on Thursday. "As recently as two years ago NNSA gave no indications that it was planning to significantly reduce the scope of its work. ... It's difficult to escape the conclusion that weapons programs are being prioritized over the nuclear and radiological material security and nonproliferation budget."

WASHINGTON, DC – Four months after pledging to invest in nuclear terrorism prevention efforts, the Obama administration cut funding for a key program designed to stop nuclear material from falling into the wrong hands, according to the Fissile Materials Working Group – an international coalition of more than 70 leading non-governmental organizations in nuclear security.

Released last week, the Obama Administration’s budget cuts $76.5 million for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which secures vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials worldwide that could be fashioned into a crude nuclear device or dirty bomb. The reduction in funding comes four months after a pledge to invest in nuclear security efforts and four years after the President’s Prague speech where he pledged to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years.

At a December event celebrating the 20-year anniversary of U.S threat reduction efforts, President Obama said, “even as we make some very tough fiscal choices, we're going to keep investing in these programs—because our national security depends on it.” The $424.5 million budget request represents a 15 percent drop from the pre-sequester budget.

“If we’re serious about keeping nuclear materials off the black market, we need to support efforts that go out there and get the job done,” said Kingston Reif, Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation. “For the second year in a row the President’s budget has not matched his rhetoric,” Reif said.

Since 2009, GTRI has removed more than 1,400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, enough for dozens of nuclear weapons. Earlier this month the program removed two nuclear weapons worth of material from the Czech Republic. The removal eliminated the country’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium.

"The administration says that their four year nuclear security effort is a sprint, but this budget slows the pace before the race has been won,” said Kenneth Luongo, President of Partnership for Global Security.

The budget request also significantly reduces funding for the controversial Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel program. Mox disposes of excess weapons-grade plutonium by mixing it with uranium and burning it in civilian reactors. The program has been plagued by cost overruns and schedule delays.

Alan Kuperman, director of the Proliferation Prevention Project at the University of Texas at Austin said the review should lead to adopting a different approach. “Disposing of plutonium is vital, but doing so by fabricating it into MOX fuel could encourage worldwide civilian use of plutonium as fuel, which would magnify risks of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. “

The Fissile Materials Working Group is an international coalition of more than 70 leading experts and non-governmental organizations in nuclear security. It was formed to support and help implement the goal of promptly securing all vulnerable fissile materials globally. For more information, visit www.fmwg.org.

###

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 15 Apr 2013 00:00:00 CST
Three years ago this week, President Barack Obama signed the New START treaty with Russia.

The stroke of a pen ended the lull in inspections of Russia’s nuclear stockpile and allowed the U.S. and Russia to start eliminating excess Cold War nuclear capabilities in a mutual, verifiable way.

Reflective of its name, the treaty was a new start in a much more aggressive global effort to decrease the modern risk posed by nuclear weapons: preventing terrorists from acquiring a nuclear weapon, a commitment shared by former Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, as well as national security officials from both political parties. So just what more can we do to keep America and her allies safe from the modern threat posed by nuclear terrorism?

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 10 Apr 2013 00:00:00 CST
The Obama administration will propose a deep cut in funding for nuclear nonproliferation programs at the Energy Department largely so it can boost the department's spending to modernize its stockpile of nuclear weapons, according to government officials familiar with the proposed 2014 federal budget to be unveiled Wednesday, April 10.

The half-billion-dollar shift in spending priorities reflects an administration decision that nuclear explosives work the Energy Department performs for the military should be both accelerated and expanded. But Democrats on Capitol Hill and independent arms control groups predicted the decision will provoke controversy and a substantial budget fight this year.

Under the 2014 proposal, the Energy Department's nuclear weapons activities funding -- which includes modernization efforts for bomber-based and missile-based warheads -- would be increased roughly 7 percent, or around $500 million, above the current level of $7.227 billion for these activities.

...

Tom Collina, research director for the Arms Control Association, a Washington-based nonprofit group, said "in a way," it seems inconsistent for the administration to promote arms control while cutting the DOE's nonproliferation budget. But he said officials may have calculated that they cannot win congressional support for further cuts in nuclear arsenals with Russia without spending billions more to refurbish America's remaining stockpile of nuclear weapons, under a bargain Obama struck during his first term.

On April 5, 2009, Obama stood before tens of thousands of people in Prague, where he declared a series of steps his administration would take to advance the vision of a world without nuclear weapons.

Among those measures: “A new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.”

...

“I think even the White House would admit that the four-year pledge is not going to be reached in four years, in part because they never defined what the goal of that four-year pledge was,” said Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security.

“That four years was a sprint within a marathon to get a plan in place for how we do this,” Deepti Choubey, senior director for nuclear and biosecurity at the Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative, told Global Security Newswire.

...

"Any act of nuclear terrorism anywhere, no matter where it is, is going to have a reverberation around the world that is extremely negative," Luongo said. "I think that’s the way you have to look at this. Not what can’t be done but what needs to be done."

...

“This is a never-ending process. As long as nuclear materials that are weapons usable are in use there’s always going to be a need for maintaining high security on those materials,” said Charles Ferguson, president of the Federation of American Scientists. “There will be new threats developing, there will be new terrorist groups or even new state-level threats.”

Washington has stepped up existing defense projects, particularly removal of fissile materials from other nations and converting foreign reactors to use proliferation-resistant low-enriched uranium, but has not instituted new practices, Luongo said in an interview. Federal funding for the work has also remained largely frozen from Bush-era levels.

Luongo said he suspects the White House believes it cannot persuade nations to accept more aggressive measures or greater transparency about what actions are already being taken. Anticipating that some nations would not join a stepped-up global regime is no cause for not trying, he argued.

...

“There are no standards, nobody has to do anything, nobody has to report to anybody, nobody has to provide any transparency,” Luongo said. “There’s no requirement that any country do anything.”

...

“I think we’ve had some tentative success and we will see where some of these ideas have landed in the official process, whether they will make their way to the end,” Choubey said. “There’s a lot of careful tending and further development that needs to be done.”

...

A new security framework does not have to be established from the start, but rather could be rolled out over a period of years as states work alone or in groups toward an accepted goal, Luongo stated. In that, it would be similar to agreements on fluorocarbons or climate change, he said.

“I understand the danger and the concern that people have about entering into a big new international negotiation, and I don’t think that’s what we’re arguing,” he said. “What we’re arguing is there needs to be a process by which you actually improve the nuclear security system in reality, over a period of time. And we’ve put that date as 2020.”

Ferguson said his discussions with officials from Nuclear Security Summit participant states suggest the process will end in 2014. He and others also played down the likelihood that leaders would agree to an overarching security framework.

...

The priority should be on strengthening existing measures, including pushing for universal membership in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Ferguson said.

The United States has not ratified the nuclear terror accord, and is among more than 30 nations that must still approve an amendment to the physical protection pact before it can be enacted.

Bringing the amendment into force before the 2014 summit “would be a powerful statement,” Ferguson said.

In the absence of the biannual summits, nations and international organizations will have to ensure they maintain the personnel and resources to continue safeguarding or eliminating nuclear materials and weaning more facilities off weapon-grade uranium, he added.

Each government should have one senior official who could track progress and threats and then have access to the head of state, according to Ferguson. “There has to be someone minding the ship,” he said.

Luongo warned that the issue could slip from top-level focus should the summits come to a final end next year.

“If it falls back to the technical level again, I’m not sure you’re ever going to get it back up,” he said.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 05 Apr 2013 00:00:00 CSTDefense Department leaders should help groom new "champions" in Congress for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program following Sen. Richard Lugar's (R-IN) exit from politics earlier this year, according to a group of Pentagon advisers.

The recommendation is included in the unclassified minutes of a secret December 2012 meeting of the DOD Threat Reduction Advisory Committee, which were published in February. "The retirement of Senator Lugar leaves a huge void to be filled," according to the minutes. "The CTR program needs to appoint leaders that will maintain the program's momentum."

Lugar lost his primary election to Tea Party-backed Indiana State Treasurer Richard Mourdock in May 2012, bringing his 36-year career in the Senate to a close when the 112th Congress ended on Jan 3, 2013. Led by former Sen. Gary Hart (D-CO), the TRAC advises the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, Frank Kendall, on issues related to weapons of mass destruction and their disposal.

...

"[T]he original Nunn-Lugar era is close to over and the question is what comes next," said Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security. "There are no Nunns or Lugars in the current Congress who are invested in the CTR program the way those two were."

Still, modernizing the program is possible by modifying the founding legislation, taking into account that most CTR projects are now focused on bio-weapons outside Russia and a more global program orientation not only at DOD but also the Energy and State departments, Luongo wrote in an email to Inside the Pentagon.

As for a new agreement with Russia -- "assuming there is one" -- the pact would no longer have that country as the major recipient, according to Luongo. In addition, "Russia will not be accepting liability for any catastrophe that occurs under the program," he added. Moscow has had longstanding concerns over what were essentially blanket liability protections for U.S. personnel working in Russia that were carried forward since the program's beginning.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 03 Apr 2013 00:00:00 CST
North Korea has been a big headache for the United States, with the new leader there saying almost daily that his country is ready to go to war.

Speaking in Washington on Wednesday, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said the U.S. can't afford to dismiss that talk as bluster.

"It only takes being wrong once, and I don't want to be the secretary of defense who was wrong once, so we will continue to take these threats seriously," he said.

...

William Tobey, who worked on nonproliferation issues in the George W. Bush administration, says he's not convinced by the South Koreans' arguments — that reprocessing nuclear fuel makes sense for economic and energy reasons.

"I wouldn't question South Korean motives," he said. "On the other hand, as you go through the arguments that have been advanced in favor of reprocessing, it's really possible to knock them down one by one."

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 03 Apr 2013 00:00:00 CSTThe United States and three other big powers this week argued for allowing nuclear-armed India into an atomic export control group, but China and several European states appeared doubtful about the move, diplomats said on Wednesday.

They said the divisions were in evidence during closed-door talks of the 46-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group on the sensitive issue of whether India could join and become the NSG's only member that is outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The United States, France, Britain and Russia were among those which backed membership for India - Asia's third-largest economy - while smaller European states such as Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland had reservations, the envoys said.

...

Nuclear expert Daryl Kimball said India wanted to join the NSG because of prestige but that this would undercut the group's ability to ensure that New Delhi respects the non-proliferation commitments it made to win support for the 2008 exemption.

"Those commitments included no further nuclear weapons testing, compliance with site-specific safeguards, and support for a fissile material production moratorium," said Kimball, of the Washington-based Arms Control Association.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 21 Mar 2013 00:00:00 CST
A U.S. House of Representatives panel on Thursday passed new legislation to ensure the nation is in compliance with two international nuclear security agreements, but it does not address points of contention from an earlier draft blocked in the Senate last year.

The latest bill would not extend federal wiretapping authorities to specifically include investigations related to a nuclear incident and would not permit execution of a person convicted of an “act of nuclear terrorism” resulting in death, Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.) said during the bill's mark-up by the House Judiciary Committee. "These controversial provisions are not necessary in order to implement the underlying treaties," Conyers said.

Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) opposed a version of the bill in the previous Congress in part because it lacked such language. An anonymous hold by a GOP lawmaker prevented the earlier proposal from advancing through the Senate after it cleared the House of Representatives.

...

“We hope that the full House will quickly follow the Judiciary Committee’s lead in approving the legislation. Then, as was the case at the end of last year, the ball will be in the Senate’s court,” Miles Pomper, a senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said in an e-mailed statement by the Fissile Materials Working Group.

WASHINGTON, DC – The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), a non-partisan coalition of 65 leading national security experts, commends the House Judiciary Committee for promptly passing legislation at the beginning of the 113th Congress that strengthens U.S. efforts to prevent and counter nuclear terrorism. The Committee approved the Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act of 2013 (H.R. 1073) today by a voice vote.

The Republican-led House of Representatives approved similar implementing legislation last year, but the Senate failed to act on it before the end of the 112th Congress.

“We applaud the House Judiciary Committee for promptly passing bipartisan legislation to implement these critical treaties,” said Miles Pomper, Senior Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and FMWG co-chair. “We hope that the full House will quickly follow the Judiciary Committee’s lead in approving the legislation. Then, as was the case at the end of last year, the ball will be in the Senate’s court.”

The legislation would enhance U.S. security by implementing key requirements of the 2005 International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the essential 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). The Amendment to the CPPNM requires parties to protect nuclear facilities and material that is stored, in transit, and used domestically. ICSANT would establish a framework to strengthen cooperation among countries in combating nuclear terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The George W. Bush administration submitted the treaties to the Senate in September 2007 and the Senate overwhelmingly approved them in September 2008. Prior to U.S. ratification, the agreements require the United States to pass legislation to criminalize specific offenses. There is substantial overlap between existing U.S. anti-terrorism laws (including those implementing anti-terrorism treaties) and the crimes covered by the legislation. However, some crimes are not prohibited by existing law, such as certain acts relating to the possession and use of radioactive material and radiological dispersal devices and damage to nuclear facilities.

Swift Congressional approval of implementing legislation is important not only to ensure U.S. laws are sufficient but also to help prod other countries into action. At the Nuclear Security Summit held in Seoul in March 2012, more than 50 countries pledged to seek the entry into force of the CPPNM Amendment by the next Nuclear Security Summit in 2014. The longer the United States is unable to ratify the Amendment, the more difficult it will be for other countries to do so, and therefore, to ensure entry into force of the Amendment by 2014.

“While the United States already has strong measures in place to prevent and prosecute nuclear terrorism, the goal is to ensure that more states adhere to similarly robust measures,” said Kingston Reif, Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington D.C. “Many other countries have indicated that they are waiting for the United States to complete ratification of the two treaties before moving ahead with their own ratification processes, since it was the United States that pushed for their negotiation in the first place.”

Achieving entry into force of the CPPNM amendment will require a major effort, as it will only enter into force after it has been ratified by two-thirds of the parties to the original Convention. As of March 2013, 66 out of 148 states had approved the Amendment; 99 are required to do so before entry into force.

The FMWG, a coalition of U.S. and international experts, was formed to improve fissile material security through the development of actionable policy proposals and advocacy for government adoption and implementation of improved policies. For more information, visit www.fmwg.org.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 14 Mar 2013 00:00:00 CST
Since the early 1990s, the nonproliferation community has obsessed over the annual appropriations to programs at the US defense, state, and energy departments that are designed to keep weapons of mass destruction (WMD) out of the wrong hands. While the budgets of individual programs have fluctuated, the unmistakable trend in US nonproliferation spending was upward. Program managers could generally count on this year's budget being higher than last year's, and next year's being higher still.

On the whole this was a good thing. As threats grew and evolved, governments had to keep pace. But today, amid the global economic downturn, nonproliferation budgets around the world are shrinking. Just this month, the White House announced a $57 million funding cut to the Defense Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Though some will lament the passing of the golden era of nonproliferation spending, more judicious outlays may not be all bad. One unforeseen byproduct of perpetually growing budgets was a sapping of the motivation of the governmental and nongovernmental organizations that make up the "nonproliferation complex" to adapt to changed circumstances. Nowhere has this flagging of innovation been more evident than in attempts to address the proliferation challenges emanating from the next generation of potential nuclear states in the developing world.

Despite the ebb and flow of the global economy and the countless headline-grabbing security threats that occupy popular attention, the world is a safer and more prosperous place than ever before. The past decade has witnessed fewer deaths from violent conflict than any in the previous century. And over the past 15 years alone, the lives of even the world's poorest citizens have improved more rapidly than during any other period in human history. By virtually every measure, we are living longer, healthier, and more productive lives, according to a report from the UN Development Programme PDF. Much of this success is directly attributable to an unprecedented era of globalization and innovation. Worldwide prosperity has spread along with the flow of advanced technologies from richer to poorer nations.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 12 Mar 2013 00:00:00 CST
President Obama will renew his push for a nuclear treaty at the United Nations in his second term, administration officials say.

The president made banning the further production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium a priority in an April 2009 speech in Prague, but progress on a treaty stalled due to opposition from Pakistan.

Administration officials and arms control activists believe they now have a new window for action. They point to increased cooperation on the UN Security Council and the beginning of John Kerry’s tenure as secretary of State as reasons for optimism.

“John Kerry comes to the position with an immense depth of experience on nuclear, non-proliferation and disarmament issues and he has long supported the risk-reduction measures that the Obama administration has committed itself to,” said Daryl Kimball, the executive director of the Arms Control Association.

“He is going to be a very active and creative force for advancing the president's nuclear risk reduction agenda, which remains unfinished.”

Kimball said progress on Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) would depend on cooperation from Pakistan, which harbors fears of archrival India having more access to fissile material. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council might hold side talks with India and Pakistan in April to try and move the treaty forward, he said.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgSat, 09 Feb 2013 00:00:00 CST
Four years ago, President Barack Obama called preventing nuclear terrorism a top security priority, but the U.S. is only marginally safer from that threat today. Obama has a limited window in his second term to achieve his nuclear security vision. If missed, the opportunity may only recur after a nuclear catastrophe — one that could have been prevented.

It was only last April in the casino town of Batumi, Georgia, that a cigarette-smoking man wearing a suit expressed interest in buying uranium for his Turkish boss. Fortunately, Georgian police were tapping the room and arrested him and others, halting any potential sale. This incident was the latest in a long line illustrating ongoing black-market demand for nuclear materials that could be fashioned into a “dirty” bomb or nuclear device.

Since 1993, there have been roughly 2,000 cases of illicit or unauthorized trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material logged by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thirty illicit radioactive trafficking incidents were reported in the former Soviet region alone from 2009-11. As Obama said in December, “Make no mistake, if [terrorists] get [nuclear material], they will use it."

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 18 Jan 2013 00:00:00 CST
When former Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) appears before the Senate Armed Services Committee as President Barack Obama’s choice to replace Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, he will likely be grilled on his past statements about Iran, Israel and maybe even his views about sexual orientation. But former colleagues in the Republican Party are also likely to take him to task for his support for downsizing the U.S. nuclear force.

Even President Ronald Reagan called for a world without nuclear weapons. But Hagel, who served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with then-Sen. Obama (D-Ill.), has taken the talking point further than others in the party. He has signed onto a report by Global Zero that would reduce the U.S. and Russian stockpiles to a maximum of 900 total nuclear weapons over 10 years, on the way to completely eliminating the world’s deadliest weapons by 2030.

Coupled with the nomination of fellow foreign relations colleague Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) as secretary of state, Obama has created “a very strong team on arms control,” says John Isaacs, executive director of the disarmament advocacy group, Council for a Livable World.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 14 Jan 2013 00:00:00 CST
When Chuck Hagel arrives at the Pentagon, pending Senate confirmation, near the top of his E-Ring inbox will be President Obama’s plans to reduce and upgrade America’s nuclear arsenal.

The 2013 nuclear agenda could be quite full. The Pentagon has yet to release its plan to implement the Nuclear Posture Review, and amid continuing resolutions funding the fiscal year and the sequester-delayed budget request for 2014, the new defense secretary must decide the pace of building new nuclear submarines and strategic bombers. Additionally, the Obama administration is poised to start pushing below the caps established by the New START treaty, which limits the United States and Russia to 1,550 warheads each. With that agenda already penciled in, Hagel’s nomination has both thrilled nuclear disarmament advocates and concerned nuclear hawks in Congress.

Conservatives already have tried to block Hagel’s path to the Pentagon by labeling him soft on Israel, Iran, and war in general. And now they're trying a new angle: he’s soft on nuclear weapons.

...

Other advocates agree. “There is a mainstream point of view” on nuclear arms reductions, said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, which advocates for fewer nuclear weapons. A 2012 Pentagon white paper already has called specifically for a smaller nuclear force, Kimball said.

...

“Hagel will be part of that equation as Washington and Moscow try to go forward to try and go beyond New START,” Kimball said.

...

So how many warheads, submarines, bombers, and missiles are enough? Russia is the only other country with enough nuclear weapons to challenge the U.S. arsenal, yet arms trackers say Russia’s arsenal is likely going to shrink because of cost. “The last I heard, the Cold War is over. We’re no longer enemies. There’s virtually no chance of a bolt from the blue,” Kimball said.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 11 Jan 2013 00:00:00 CST
For years, American politicians on both sides of the aisle have agreed that nuclear terrorism is one of the most serious national security threats the United States faces. In 2013, President Obama must capitalize on this rare consensus point and on his own power as a second-term president. After all, despite ongoing polarization in Washington, bipartisan cooperation has been the norm for nuclear security since the launch of the Nunn-Lugar program more than two decades ago, making the issue a unique outlier in Washington -- and for good reason. Nuclear terrorism is a real possibility that would cause catastrophic damage.

The problem. A fascinating and largely overlooked report issued a year ago by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assesses the damage that would befall Washington, DC, in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack. The report, presented as a case study in disaster response, assumes that a terrorist detonates a 10-kiloton improvised nuclear device -- that is, a crude nuclear bomb -- in downtown Washington. Unfortunately, the basis for such a study is all too sound.

Fissile material is widespread and has been sold on the black market: There is currently enough fissile material across the globe for more than 100,000 additional nuclear weapons, and there are 20 known cases of unauthorized possession. These days, should a capable terrorist group acquire sufficient quantities of highly enriched uranium, it could produce an improvised nuclear device using a "gun-type" design and still have an impact similar to that of Hiroshima. (Modern-day strategic nuclear weapons are orders of magnitude more powerful than those used during World War II.)

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 08 Jan 2013 00:00:00 CST
Nuclear experts in the US and Middle East have raised concerns about the security of up to 50 tonnes of unenriched uranium in Syria amid fears that civil war could put the stockpile at risk.

Since the start of the uprising against Bashar al-Assad two years ago, western governments have been heavily focused on the fate of Syria’s chemical weapons and worry that those stocks might be taken over by militant groups.

But government officials and nuclear experts have also expressed fears to the Financial Times about what may be a significant stockpile of uranium inside Syria.

...

Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies think-tank said: “It has always been a mystery where the fuel was coming from for Al-Kibar. There is reason to believe there is uranium in Syria and that would be of value to Iran.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 08 Jan 2013 00:00:00 CST
North Korean ruler Kim Jong Un’s call on Tuesday for warmer relations with South Korea was met skeptically, with issue experts saying Pyongyang remains unlikely to shut down the missile and nuclear arms programs that have so long undermined efforts to improve relations between the neighboring states.

...

Experts told Global Security Newswire the Kim regime is likely seeking to capitalize on the election of a new South Korean president [Park Geun-hye].

...

“Park is untested right now so it is really too soon to tell” what she will do on North Korea, Sharon Squassoni, director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Proliferation Prevention Program told GSN. “I think that delinking some of the humanitarian aid from the security situation, I think you could have some positive benefits there,” Squassoni said.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 02 Jan 2013 00:00:00 CST
In the years since it was established in 1975, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has emerged as a comprehensive multilateral export-control regime for nuclear materials and technology. Another regime, the Zangger Committee, held its first meeting four years before the NSG came into existence, but it is the NSG that has demonstrated greater dynamism and has emerged as more relevant since the end of the Cold War.

The Zangger Committee was established to help signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) understand the technical issues related to transfers of nuclear materials and technology. But the committee did not include countries that were not signatories to the treaty; one such nation was France. The NSG, established as a complement to the committee, brought nations like France into the control regime. (France would accede to the treaty and also join the Zangger Committee in 1992).

In my own country of India, many people believed that the entire idea of bringing France into the nuclear control framework was to neutralize the power of Gaullism in France's economic and technology policies abroad. That is, France had often resisted the policies toward the developing world of other Western nations, and Paris's Gaullist impulses could be co-opted by bringing France into the NSG. In India, the Zangger Committee and the NSG were both understood as regimes for denying technology to the developing world -- as undesirable barricades that blocked the flow of goods and technology to countries pursuing economic development through peaceful nuclear energy programs. A segment of Indian government and civil society continues to understand the systems in this fashion.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 19 Dec 2012 00:00:00 CST
WASHINGTON -- The Obama administration has sharply reduced spending on a program to combat smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials through foreign seaports, and it has yet to disclose findings from a recently completed review expected to shape the effort's future, a Senate Appropriations Committee staffer told Global Security Newswire.

Obama officials have implemented an 85 percent funding curb they requested for the Megaports Initiative in the current budget year, capping fiscal 2013 expenditures at $19.6 million and suspending any expansion of the effort that originally aimed to place radiation detection gear at 100 foreign seaports by 2018.The number of seaports covered by the project stood at 42 as of August.

In calling for the cut, the White House Management and Budget Office said the program's impact was "diminishing" as it completed deployments at higher-priority facilities, according to a Government Accountability Office report issued last month. Management and Budget personnel cited other issues including a shortage of data for measuring the effort's success, and the possibility of overlap between Megaports activities and nonproliferation efforts such as the Homeland Security Department's Container Security Initiative.

...

One independent expert said the Megaports funding reduction was "a very abrupt, precipitous and dramatic cut with no forewarning and not a very good explanation."

"This is about a bigger issue of engagement globally on the prevention of nuclear terrorism," said Kenneth Luongo, who heads the Partnership for Global Security. "If the U.S. doesn’t press this kind of cooperation, other countries are not going to."

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 11 Dec 2012 00:00:00 CST
BATUMI, Georgia -- On the gritty side of this casino resort town near the Turkish border, three men in a hotel suite gathered in secret to talk about a deal for radioactive material.

The Georgian seller offered cesium, a byproduct of nuclear reactors that terrorists can use to arm a dirty bomb with the power to kill. But one of the Turkish men, wearing a suit and casually smoking a cigarette, made clear he was after something even more dangerous: uranium, the material for a nuclear bomb.

The would-be buyers agreed to take a photo of the four cylinders and see if their boss in Turkey was interested. They did not know police were watching through a hidden camera. As they got up to leave, the police rushed in and arrested the men, according to Georgian officials, who were present.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 10 Dec 2012 00:00:00 CST
Nuclear security summits held in 2010 and this year have achieved a great deal by focusing world leaders’ attention on the issue of securing nuclear materials, but there are ways to preserve much of that focus once the series of summits ends, a senior U.S. nuclear policy official said last month.

Speaking Nov. 5 in Arlington, Va., Laura Holgate, senior director for weapons of mass destruction terrorism and threat reduction at the National Security Council, said a main U.S. goal is to “leave behind a strengthened web of treaties, institutions, norms, and practices that will reliably secure nuclear materials.” She emphasized the roles of international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and of national regulatory bodies.

The first nuclear security summit, which sprang from a commitment President Barack Obama made in his April 2009 Prague speech on nuclear weapons policy, took place in Washington in April 2010. The second one was in Seoul last March.

For more than two decades, the United States and Russia have worked together to secure Soviet stockpiles of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and materials, but now the future of this unprecedented partnership, the Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement, is in jeopardy. After several months of negotiations, Russian officials have publicly stated that they will not renew the current agreement, which forms the legal basis for cooperation between the two countries and is set to expire in July 2013. In early October, a Russian Foreign Ministry statement explained: "Our American partners know that their proposal is at odds with our ideas about the forms and basis for building further cooperation in that area. To this end, we need a more modern legal framework." And yet, the Russian vision for the future is not clear.

American officials are stressing the national security value of Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and the administration's sincere desire to continue working with Russia to reduce the vulnerability of weapons of mass destruction and related materials to theft, proliferation, and sabotage. US-Russian weapons security and dismantlement programs were created at the end of the Cold War and have been hailed as successful models of international cooperation for extremely sensitive security issues. Cooperative Threat Reduction collaborations underscore both the transnational nature of the weapons security threat and the ability of even the staunchest of adversaries to put aside other issues to address it. These are critical concepts to sustain.

The US Defense Department and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) spent nearly $650 million in 2012 on Russia-focused threat-reduction programs. Under the Obama administration's 2013 budget request, this figure is closer to $500 million. Most of this funding is provided through the National Nuclear Security Administration, not the original suite of Defense Department programs that were created to deal with loose nukes in the early 1990s. The amount that the Defense Department invests in the program is not trivial, but the program has significantly diversified its focus to include threats outside Russia and to secure cooperation around global biosecurity. The NNSA's International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program, which is responsible for nuclear material security in more than 40 nations, however, invested some $300 million in Russian activities in 2012 alone; this program will be devastated if the Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement lapses without a new accord in place. For 2013, the administration requested a dramatic cutback of the program's global focus that would leave the initiative almost entirely -- 70 percent -- Russia-focused. It is clear that the United States had no intention of wrapping up threat-reduction activities with Russia next year.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 07 Dec 2012 00:00:00 CST
In his first foreign policy-related address since his reelection, on Monday Dec. 3 President Obama praised the architects of the highly-successful Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, he reaffirmed his commitment to the action plan toward a world without nuclear weapons, and he underscored his commitment to achieve further progress to reduce the threats posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

While Obama did not break new ground, his remarks are an important signal to his national security team, the Congress, the American public, and the world that he intends to complete unfinished nuclear risk reduction tasks that he set out in his historic Prague address in April 2009.

In the speech which capped a day-long conference titled “Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction: Partnering for a More Secure World” at the National Defense University, Obama praised former Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Dick Lugar (R-Ind.) for their visionary and bipartisan leadership to conceive of and support the program.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 04 Dec 2012 00:00:00 CST
Today (December 3) President Obama spoke at the National Defense University (NDU) as part of a day-long symposium to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and honor the two men most responsible for its extraordinary achievements: former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and outgoing Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN). Your humble blogger was lucky enough to attend both the symposium and the President's speech.

In general, there wasn't anything earth-shatteringly new in the address (save for some good jokes from the President about traveling with Senator Lugar back when they were both Senators). The part of his comments that appears to have grabbed the most press attention was the President's clear message that the use of chemical weapons "would be totally unacceptable" that "there would be consequences." As I recall President Obama sent a similar message last August.

In his remarks the President commended the phenomenal success of CTR, reiterated that nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to US national security, warned that far too much nuclear material lacks adequate protection, pledged to continue investments in nuclear material security programs, expressed a willingness to work with Russia as an equal partner to update CTR to comport with current realities, and book-ended the speech with his commitment to seek a world without nuclear weapons. Obama was lean on specifics about what he hopes to accomplish in his second term on the nuclear threat reduction front - though he said at the outset of his comments that his intent was not to give a major speech, but to honor Senators Nunn and Lugar.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 03 Dec 2012 00:00:00 CST
As the 112th Congress enters its final days, one of its critical priorities should be approving implementing legislation for two treaties that help raise the barriers against nuclear terrorism.

For more than a decade, U.S. defense and security leaders have warned that nuclear terrorism poses a severe threat to American security. The 9/11 Commission report stated, "The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world's most dangerous terrorists acquire the world's most dangerous weapons."

During the 2004 presidential debates, the two candidates agreed that "the biggest threat facing the country is weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist network." At the Cooperative Threat Reduction symposium in Washington, D.C., December 3, President Obama reiterated that "nuclear terrorism remains one of the greatest threats to global security."

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 03 Dec 2012 00:00:00 CST
HONOLULU — At a recent international conference, a colleague asked, somewhat irreverently (but not irrelevantly), "Now that Obama has been re-elected, will he finally earn his Nobel Prize?"

It's a fair question. Hopes were high in the international disarmament community after President Barack Obama's 2009 Prague speech when he pledged to move toward a nuclear weapons-free world. But those who cheered the loudest then are among the most disappointed now, frustrated over the slow progress toward this goal.

...

Finally, the U.S. ability to combat the proliferation-terrorism nexus has proved limited. Although U.S. endorsement of nuclear disarmament has improved the atmospherics, little tangible progress has been achieved on the nonproliferation and nuclear security fronts. Many Non-Aligned Movement members in Asia (and beyond) continue to argue that the "baby steps" undertaken thus far do not justify more efforts from them on nonproliferation and nuclear security. This seems remarkably shortsighted since proliferation and especially acts of nuclear terrorism will have a much greater impact on their societies and economies than most seem willing to acknowledge. But the quid pro quo mentality remains nonetheless.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 29 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST
THIS year has seen a lot of concern about the confrontation between China and Japan over a group of islets in the East China Sea.

Less attention, though, is being paid to what may be a more destabilizing development: next year Japan plans to bring its long-delayed Rokkasho reprocessing plant online, which could extract as much as eight tons of weapons-usable plutonium from spent reactor fuel a year, enough for nearly 1,000 warheads. That would add to Japan’s existing stockpile of 44 tons, 9 of which are stored in domestic facilities.

Japan has repeatedly vowed never to develop nuclear weapons, and there’s no reason to doubt that now. But there’s more to worry about: reprocessing not only creates a tempting target for terrorists, it also sets a precedent for countries around the world to follow suit — and pushes the world toward rampant nuclear proliferation.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 28 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST
Officials from more than 50 nations have been gathering together in Istanbul to begin planning for the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, which will be the third of its kind that will be focused on preventing nuclear terrorism.

The first summit was convened in April 2010 in Washington D.C. with the participation of the heads of state and government of 47 states and the chiefs of international organizations – the largest of such gatherings since the end of World War II. During the Washington summit, world leaders underlined the importance as well as the urgency of taking swift and effective measures against the threat posed by the possibility of transnational terrorist networks acquiring nuclear materials, namely highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium.

The success of the first summit paved the way for the second summit, which convened in Seoul in March with a record participation of 53 heads of state and government, as well as representatives of the United Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency, European Union and Interpol.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 28 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST
In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama announced “a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years” in an effort to prevent nuclear terrorism.[25] In fact, much of what the administration did in this regard was not new. For example, the U.S. government has operated programs for decades to minimize the civil use of highly enriched uranium (HEU), since HEU can also be used as fissile material for nuclear weapons. In addition, the George W. Bush Administration’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative stepped up spending and focus on these activities after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

But the Obama administration did make one signature step forward: establishing a series of nuclear security summits that brought top-level political focus to efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, a set of issues previously relegated to lower level officials and technical experts. Washington hosted the first nuclear security summit in 2010, which brought together leaders from 47 countries, the largest such gathering since the formation of the United Nations in 1945. An even larger number of countries sent representatives to a second summit hosted by South Korea in Seoul in 2012. And at that summit, governments agreed that the Netherlands would hold another summit in 2014.[26] So far, the summits have been seen as producing mixed results. While the communiqués and official documents from the summits have been cautious in tone, full of caveats and escape clauses, the summit process has been useful in leveraging commitments from individual countries and groups of countries to take concrete actions on nuclear security.

The next administration will need to determine how to approach two overriding issues. First, a growing number of governments have expressed concern that this somewhat technical issue does not merit high level summits every two years, and so it is not clear if the summit process will continue beyond 2014. Indeed, U.S officials have indicated that they would like member states to give the International Atomic Energy Agency a more central role in managing these concerns. Secondly, the administration will have to decide how ambitious an outcome it will push for at the Netherlands Summit. Some NGOs, and governments such as Australia, would like to see the summit commit to a stronger nuclear security regime. These steps, for example, might include instituting binding legal standards for nuclear security, or requirements for some outside review of a country’s nuclear security efforts (e.g., by the IAEA or other countries or organizations).

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 27 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST
As the Congress gathers in Washington for its final session of the year, bipartisan cooperation is going to be needed more than ever to address the urgent issues facing the nation. One of its critical priorities should be approving two treaties that help construct barriers to nuclear terrorism.

Iowa’s Sen. Chuck Grassley, who had previously delayed passage, is now in a unique position to make this happen.

For more than a decade, U.S. defense and security leaders have warned that nuclear terrorism poses a severe threat to American security. The 9/11 Commission report stated, “The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world’s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgSat, 17 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST
In a democracy, there is no greater responsibility than voting for our government representatives. Whether choosing a state legislator, mayor, congressional representative, or president, selecting among candidates and sending them off to formulate and enact laws on our behalf is the single most important duty of a citizen. And many of us Americans exercised that right in last Tuesday's national elections. Many also canvassed communities, talked to neighbors, called strangers, got out the vote, and volunteered at polls on Election Day. Yet it is after all the votes are in and the candidates have either claimed victory or conceded that the real work of democracy begins. Or at least it should.

Too often, however, many of us lucky enough to live in democracies view elections as the only responsibility we have as citizens and leave the policy discussions to the elected and to the experts. There are some good reasons for this, of course. People are busy making a living, finding a job, paying bills, sorting out finances, going to school plays, helping out at the local library, going to church, and caring for children and parents. And, if these were not enough in the way of obstacles, some issues -- like climate change and nuclear security -- seem complicated, contentious, and far removed from our daily lives. Political leaders and policy experts don't always encourage a lot of participation, either; perhaps they believe that citizens are badly informed about issues and that their participation will result in poor decisions. So, the pressures on time and attention, along with the complexity of the issues and lack of encouragement, lead most people to accept the role that policy elites have assigned them -- the ignorant, uninterested public.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 15 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST
ASHINGTON -- Proponents of a legislative effort to bring the United States into line with two international nuclear security agreements appeared skeptical on Tuesday that Congress would be able to complete the task by the end of this year’s lame-duck session.

The bill, which has passed the House but is being held up by an anonymous Republican in the Senate, is meant to ensure the United States meets legal standards required under the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Terrorism. The pact, which entered into force in 2007 and now has 82 state parties, requires member nations to criminalize the possession and use of nuclear weapons and related radioactive material. The deal also sets guidelines for the extradition and prosecution of individuals linked to nuclear terrorism.

The legislation would also bring the United States into line with a 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The change, which has yet to enter into force, would add standards for domestic storage, use and transfer to an agreement that originally focused on protecting international shipments of civilian nuclear material. To date, 59 of 97 countries needed to bring the amendment into force have taken the necessary legislative step.

...

Kingston Reif, nuclear nonproliferation director at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, echoed Ford’s view on the prospects for congressional compromise before lawmakers close up shop for the year.

“It’s not looking great at this point but there is still time in the lame duck and I think it would be very helpful if senators on both sides of aisle who are supportive of robust U.S. leadership on nuclear security continue to have the conversation with Senator Grassley on the importance of this legislation and see what may be able to be worked out,” Reif said. “Even if nothing can be worked out in the lame duck, at least that could be an important down payment on ensuring swift passage in the next Congress.”

What are the major national security threats facing the United States? How is science and
technology connected to national security? What can the next U.S. president do to prepare fora potential disaster?

Only three days after the national election, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) hosteda day-long symposium that featured distinguished speakers who provided recommendations tothe new administration on how to respond to catastrophic threats to national security.

These experts addressed the policy and technological aspects of conventional, nuclear, biological,and chemical weapons; biotechnology; nuclear safety; electricity generation, distribution,and storage; and cyber security. These policy memoranda call for a coordinated national effortto prepare for, prevent, and respond to catastrophic threats to the United States.

Mr. Charles Blair focuses on understanding of terrorists’ ideology and of the command and
control structure of groups who may carry out nuclear and radiological threats. Dr. Sidney
Drell questions whether it’s possible for the United States to escape the nuclear deterence trap,in addition to the current nuclear policy in general. Dr. Richard L. Garwin goes one step furtherand declares that nuclear weapons are more of a threat to developed society than a usefultool. Dr. Garwin lists numerous recommendations to reduce the current threat of nuclearweapons. Mr. Hans Kristensen provides options for nuclear force reduction. Dr. Robert S.Norris writes that fundamental changes to U.S. war planning are a prerequisite to achievingsmall stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 09 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST
The US electorate has spoken, and most of the international diplomats, academics, and others with whom I spoke on the day after our presidential election on 6 November breathed a sigh of relief that the stewardship of the world’s (still) sole superpower will remain in safe hands for another four years. The rest of the world famously backed Barack Obama, so while much of the satisfaction I heard about the Democrat’s re-election pertained particularly to the nuclear-policy matters being addressed in my various meetings, I also found myself, as an American citizen abroad, congratulated more broadly.

The election turned on domestic issues, and even the presidential debate that was supposed to be dedicated to foreign policy pivoted back to the American economy and education system. Nevertheless, the question that I have been asked most is how Obama will use his renewed lease on the White House to address global issues. In my area of specialisation on arms control and non-proliferation, everyone agrees there is much to be done. Unfortunately, there seems little scope for Obama to do it. And, of course, Iran looms large on his agenda.

Obama aimed high in his initial foray into the nuclear subject with his speech in Prague in April 2009. The following year he struck the New START nuclear arms agreement with Russia and corralled global leaders to prioritise efforts to counter nuclear terrorism. After these signal achievements, however, the nuclear agenda stalled.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 08 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST
We need every tool available to prevent nuclear terrorism. Unfortunately, two treaties that have been awaiting Congressional approval for more than half a decade that will enhance our ability to protect nuclear materials and go after terrorists intent on using them are stalled in Congress. This is unacceptable. Now that the election is over, one of the first orders of business when Congress returns should be to get past the bickering and pass these two nonpartisan treaties our military leaders have been pleading for.

Defense and security experts down the line agree that nuclear terrorism is a major threat in the 21st century. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been more than 2000 confirmed cases of illicit or unauthorized trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material. As the 9/11 Commission Report states, “The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world’s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons.” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper noted that inadequately secured stores of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials offer “potential source material” to terrorists.

But while nuclear terrorism is one of the biggest threats to our security, it is also one of the most preventable. Two treaties with very complicated names but very straight-forward goals will equip our security and intelligence communities with tools they need to better prevent attacks. The Convention on the 2005 Amendment to the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the 2005 International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) will increase our ability to confront nuclear terrorism by 1) protecting domestic nuclear material and 2) promoting international cooperation in investigating, extraditing and prosecuting suspected terrorists.

As states in the region work towards establishment of a Zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, they may in the meantime wish to consider cooperative measures in the field of nuclear safety and security that would be valuable in their own right and could help to establish the greater sense of trust that will be necessary for materialization of a “Zone”. With nuclear power having newly arrived in the region and with more reactors on the way, issues of nuclear safety and nuclear security take on vital importance. It will be critical for Middle East states that are pursuing nuclear power to implement effective national policies, to sign up to international instruments and to adhere to global regimes. Mutual encouragement to adopt such national policies and practices in one way that states of the region can join in common purpose. Another way, and at a higher level of political difficulty, Middle East states may find utility in coordination and cooperation on a regional basis. At the higher level of aspiration, states might seek to build a structure for regional collaboration on nuclear and radiological safety and security.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 06 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST
A key White House official on Monday suggested that the changes Russian officials are looking to make to a bilateral agreement that allows the United States to help secure and dismantle Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction are not unreasonable.

The future of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program in Russia was thrown into question last month when officials there said publicly their government was not interested in extending the pact that has enabled the initiative to operate within the country since the early 1990s.

During the past two decades, the United States has used the program to provide Russia with more than $7 billion in funds, equipment and expertise for securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear arms and other unconventional weapons. The U.S. government and its contractors are shielded from virtually all liability from incidents that could occur during the course of CTR work under the enabling umbrella agreement – an issue that has long been contentious in Moscow.

The agreement expires in June. The Obama administration earlier this year proposed extending the deal but received a chilly response from Moscow.

...

Moscow's stance on the CTR agreement is consistent with those it has taken on other international issues since Vladimir Putin reassumed the Russian presidency in May, suggested Andrew Semmel, a consultant to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

“What the president has done now is to alert all of his emissaries around the world to take a tough position on a number of issues and I think [the CTR stance] is one of the manifestations of this,” Semmel said during the panel discussion. “I think this is something that has pervaded in a number of issues including the CTR program.”

...

Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security, told Global Security Newswire previously that Russia might raise objections to a Defense Department requirement that it conduct inspections to ensure that any equipment it pays for in Russia has been properly installed. He said Russian officials “balk” at this requirement.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 06 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST
Rarely do major foreign policy initiatives begin on Capitol Hill. But two decades ago, amid the chaos of the Soviet Union’s collapse, two veteran senators persuaded a Cold War Congress to fund a new program that would secure and dismantle the former empire’s vast inventory of nuclear weapons, delivery systems and associated materials. The idea was to prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists or other rogue actors.

In the two decades that it has been operating, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program — known simply as Nunn-Lugar for its Senate authors, Democrat Sam Nunn of Georgia and Republican Richard G. Lugar of Indiana — has helped destroy a huge arsenal of nuclear warheads, missiles, chemical shells and weapons-grade uranium. After Nunn retired in 1997, Lugar continued to champion the program, which — at a cost of $15 billion so far — has proven to be one of the nation’s most effective non-proliferation initiatives.

...

“These are not crazy demands,” says John Isaacs, executive director for the Council for a Livable World, a group that advocates for nuclear non-proliferation. “What the Russians are demanding is perfectly reasonable and should be able to be worked out in negotiations.”

“Progress on one unlocks progress on another,” Isaacs says. “Everything is connected.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgSat, 03 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST
The possibility of radioactive material falling into the hands of criminal organizations or terrorists remains a real and persistent security threat. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that, since 1993, there have been more than 2,000 confirmed incidents of lost regulatory control over potentially dangerous material, including nearly 150 incidents last year. Given the unsettling frequency of reported cases, it may seem surprising that there is no legally binding international convention pertaining to the safety and security of radioactive sources that requires states to take preventive action. However, imposing binding commitments on states to enact stronger regulatory controls -- though potentially useful to some degree -- is not a silver bullet for what will remain a very large and multifaceted security challenge.

Radiological security is commonly associated with the threat of terrorists detonating a "dirty bomb" -- a dispersal device consisting of conventional explosives laced with radioactive material -- as a way of using people’s natural fear of radiation to create chaos that is disproportionate to the actual health risk. However, it is important to remember that there are numerous other ways in which radioactive material could be used to wreak havoc: It could be a surreptitiously placed radiation-emitting device or -- as James Acton, Brooke Rogers, and Peter Zimmerman point out in the journal Survival -- used in an attack that causes people to inhale, ingest, or immerse themselves in a radioactive substance. The dirty bomb scare is only the tip of the iceberg with respect to radiological threats.

Moreover, because these materials are widely used in medicine, industry, and agriculture, there are literally millions of potential sources of radioactive material around the world. Also, small-but-significant amounts of radioactive material remain in thousands of orphaned containers outside regulatory control. Yet all of these radiological materials originate from a relative few supplying countries -- Argentina, Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Russia, South Africa, and the United States -- that produce and export them. Therefore, a top-down approach to security focused primarily on regulatory controls at the state level does have some intuitive appeal.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 02 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST
President Obama and Mitt Romney have staked out diverging paths for nuclear weapons policy, global nonproliferation approaches and arms control, according to a review of their positions and interviews with issue experts.

Romney is generally skeptical of the value of nuclear weapons reductions and other arms control measures, whereas Obama has largely embraced these as policy tools. Obama, for example, wants to seek Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, while the Republican challenger’s advisers do not see that as a possibility during a Romney administration.

The next president might be expected to grapple with Russia’s increasing reluctance to continue Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts, despite a continuing risk of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons proliferation.

The possibility of an Israeli attack against Iranian nuclear facilities could loom early in the next presidential term, as might a decision about whether the United States should use its own military to stop any potential effort by Tehran to build a nuclear weapon.

“That undoubtedly will be a concern of any administration, assuming that force has not been used prior to the new administration taking office,” said William Potter, speaking in his capacity as a professor of nonproliferation studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

...

The threat to drop joint CTR efforts “is a challenge for whoever the next president is,” said Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security. “And it’s not an issue that’s totally within our control.”

“If they bring in all the Bush people, I think that you are going to see the same problems you had in the Bush administration” internationally, Luongo said. “If they bring in more moderate people, they can work with anyone.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 02 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST
Japan’s recently proposed energy strategy is not clear on how to address fundamental policy questions on the country’s approach to spent nuclear fuel, reprocessing, and plutonium use, a Japanese official and a U.S. nuclear expert said in interviews last month.

On Sept. 14, the Japanese government issued an energy strategy document that contemplates the phase-out of nuclear power by about 2040. A cabinet decision five days later made clear that the strategy document did not constitute a binding policy decision, and the strategy could be scrapped entirely if the current Japanese government falls from power in the upcoming elections, which are expected to take place by next summer.

The new energy strategy is part of Japan’s response to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors on March 11, 2011.

For decades, a central part of Japan’s nuclear plans has been what energy and nonproliferation specialists call “closing the fuel cycle.” That involves reprocessing the spent fuel from power reactors to separate plutonium that is then used in making fresh fuel for reactors.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 01 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST
In a potential setback for U.S.-Russian relations, Moscow said in October that it would not sign an agreement drafted by the United States to extend the two countries’ 20-year partnership to dismantle and secure Russian weapons, materials, and delivery systems left over from the Cold War.

The United States, however, hopes to extend the so-called umbrella agreement, which provides the underlying legal framework for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The program is commonly known by the names of the authors of the 1991 legislation that established the effort, Sens. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Sam Nunn (D-Ga.).

If the program, widely viewed as one of the most successful initiatives to control excess Russian weapons of mass destruction, is not renewed, “Russia’s unsecured weapons and materials [would] remain a temptation for terrorists of all varieties to buy or steal for use in future attacks,” The New York Times editorialized Oct. 17.

In comments that many interpreted as an indication the deal was dead, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said Oct. 10 that “[t]he American side knows that we do not want another [Nunn-Lugar] extension,” according to Russia’s Interfax news agency.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 01 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST
Halloween is a time for scary tales and horror movies. It is appropriate, then, that this Halloween falls just after the 50th anniversary of one of the most terrifying real-life horror stories of all time: The Cuban Missile Crisis.

The crisis began on October 16, 1962, when photographs taken by an American U-2 spy plane exposed the secret construction of Soviet nuclear missile sites in Cuba. It was the ultimate trick or treat, with the emphasis on trick.

Upon learning of the secret Soviet deployment, many of President John F. Kennedy’s advisors recommended that he launch an air attack and invasion of Cuba to destroy the missile sites and overthrow Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Fearing the consequences of an attack, Kennedy instead opted for a quarantine of Cuba to allow for a diplomatic solution.

This strategy worked, but just barely. On October 28, 1962, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev agreed to withdraw his arsenal of missiles and nuclear warheads from the island in exchange for Kennedy’s public commitment not to invade Cuba and his secret concession to withdraw US Jupiter missiles from Turkey at a later date. Had the crisis lasted much longer, Kennedy may have given the order to strike.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 31 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST
This book examines the prospects and challenges of a global phase-out of highly enriched uranium and the risks of this material otherwise being used by terrorists to make atom bombs.

Terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, have demonstrated repeatedly that they seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Unbeknownst even to many security specialists, tons of bomb-grade uranium are trafficked legally each year for ostensibly peaceful purposes. If terrorists obtained even a tiny fraction of this bomb-grade uranium they could potentially construct a nuclear weapon like the one dropped on Hiroshima that killed tens of thousands.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 30 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST
A Sunday like today, October 28, but 50 years ago, during the Cold War, the concrete possibility of a nuclear holocaust was left behind, after many days of extreme tension. Only the good judgment of John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev avoided the disaster that they had helped create. Many in both governmental circles promoted the use of nuclear force as the best alternative to define the conflict. A third actor, the Cuban leader Fidel Castro, also pushed the Soviets to carry out a nuclear attack against the United States.

Nevertheless, good judgment prevailed over pressures. Both statesmen were wise but also, they were very lucky…

It is disappointing to say that after 50 years, the nuclear threat is still with us. The expectations of a post Cold War distension in nuclear terms gave way, perhaps too soon, to a hardening of positions, and to more nuclear armed states, from 4 to 9. Moreover, nuclear terrorism, immune to any deterrence and ready to impose its own rules is, appeared in the forefront as perhaps the more dangerous and likely XXI Century threat.

There is no doubt that the world is today more complex and uncertain than during the Cold War. There are still 20,000 nuclear weapons, many on high alert, deployed in 14 countries. Beyond good intentions, at the present time, many of nuclear disarmament commitments are still pending of accomplishment, while virtuous and successful cooperation systems, such as Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement between USA and Russia, popularly known as Nunn-Lugar Agreement, which made possible the dismantlement of more than 7,000 nuclear warheads form the former USSR, run the risk of being deactivated.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgSun, 28 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST
With the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process likely coming to an end after the 2014 summit in the Netherlands, the next eighteen months are crucial for setting an effective long-term agenda for nuclear security and capitalizing on the momentum created by heads-of-state-level political engagement. Integral to crafting this agenda is the consideration of metrics that will allow for not only measuring progress made in securing nuclear material over the span of the three summits, but also for determining the post-summit future of the nuclear security policy discussion.

Although the goal of locking down all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years was agreed to by leaders at the 2010 Washington summit, the goal will not be met by 2014, and even with stepped-up efforts since the first summit, in 2010, a number of nuclear security gaps will remain. Within this context it is important to recognize that improving the nuclear security architecture cannot be confined to or defined by the summit process, but rather the NSS should be seen as a driver of a larger, long-term effort to improve nuclear security worldwide.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 26 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST
China, like all nuclear weapon states, bears a responsibility to provide leadership in nuclear security issues. But China's strategy for securing its nuclear weapons -- and the complex of facilities where fissile material for weapons is fabricated and stored -- has so far remained largely opaque.

What we do know about Chinese nuclear security is encouraging. As in all nations, however, room for improvement surely exists. At the 2012 nuclear security summit in Seoul, Chinese President Hu Jintao said, "In the future, China will [take further] nuclear security measures, make sure [of] the security of its own nuclear materials and facilities, [and] improve … overall nuclear security." But converting Hu's political commitment into practical, sustainable reality will require China to assess its nuclear sector's vulnerabilities along several dimensions, ranging from regulatory arrangements to physical infrastructure to the nation's security culture. Once vulnerabilities have been accurately assessed, the path will be clear to minimize China's nuclear security threats.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 25 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST
Fifty years after the Cuban missile crisis almost led to nuclear war, nuclear weapons still pose enormous risks to U.S. and global security. Today, there still are nearly 20,000 nuclear weapons, and there are nine nuclear-armed states. More countries have access to the technologies needed to produce nuclear bomb material, and the threat of nuclear terrorism is real.

This backgrounder provides some key facts concerning nuclear weapons issues that will shape the national security choices of the next U.S. president over the next four years:

Iran's Nuclear Capabilities and "Red Lines"
A central issue in 2013 will be how to handle Iran's nuclear program, which could be used as the basis for building nuclear weapons in the years to come.

President Obama has said repeatedly that he will not allow Iran to possess nuclear weapons. Governor Romney has also said he will not allow a "nuclear-armed" Iran. However, in October 8 speech he said: "I will put the leaders of Iran on notice that the United States and our friends and allies will prevent them from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability."

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 22 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST
Fifty years after the Cuban missile crisis brought the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust, the threats posed by the bomb have changed but still hang over us all. Today, there are still nearly 20,000 nuclear weapons and nine nuclear-armed states. More countries have access to the technologies needed to produce nuclear bomb material and the risk of nuclear terrorism is real.

The massive nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia – the most dangerous legacy of the cold war – have been reduced through successive arms control agreements. However, deployed US and Russian nuclear forces still exceed 1,500 strategic warheads each – far more than necessary to deter nuclear attack.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 19 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST
Last week, alarm bells rang as the first headlines ran about Moscow's "bombshell" decision not to renew the 1992 Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Agreement underpinning efforts to improve nuclear security. Perhaps it was the context of chilling relations with Putin's Russia, including the crackdown on nongovernmental organizations and the eviction of the U.S. Agency for International Development, that evoked such angst. The claim that U.S.-Russian nuclear security cooperation is dead, however, is greatly exaggerated.

The CTR Agreement was conceived and implemented in a very different time. The Soviet Union had disintegrated and Russia was financially supine. U.S. assistance was necessary to keep body and soul together for Russian nuclear weapons scientists, and to remove the temptation for them to sell their knowledge and wares to other nations or terrorists. In the absence of Soviet oppression, the Russian nuclear archipelago was a security nightmare, with fallen fences, crumbling buildings, poor procedures, and a demoralized (and all too often drunken) guard force. Championed by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, and signed by President George H. W. Bush, the Cooperative Threat Reduction legislation created programs to detect, secure, and dispose of dangerous nuclear material in Russia and the former Soviet Union, as well as to facilitate the destruction of missiles and chemical weapons.

Today, Russia is more prosperous and its nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities are much more secure. Work under the Bratislava Initiative, agreed to by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in 2005, essentially completed physical security upgrades at nuclear weapons facilities in Russia. Fissile material production reactors at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk were shut down and replaced with coal-fired plants. Hundreds of Russian ports, airports, and border crossings are now equipped with nuclear detection equipment. Over 400 metric tons of Russian highly enriched uranium has been down-blended to fuel reactors that now provide 10 percent of American electricity. Nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus have been removed to Russia, and the former Soviet nuclear test site at Degelen Mountain in Kazakhstan has been secured from scavengers. Moscow and Washington, among others, should be proud of these signal achievements.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 19 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST
Even in an age of intense partisanship some issues rise above the fray. Preventing nuclear terrorism is one of them and for good reason.

The prospect of nuclear terrorism is at once one of the biggest threats to American security and one of the most preventable. But, like many foreign policy issues in 2012, nuclear terrorism has been overlooked. That is both unfortunate and unacceptable. Now, as focus turns to foreign policy issues, President Obama and Gov. Romney owe it to the American people to clearly articulate their vision to prevent these materials from falling into the wrong hands.

There is a clear consensus on the severity of the need to secure nuclear materials. The bipartisan 9/11 Commission that I chaired noted, “The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world’s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons.”

Speaking in London, Yukiya Amano of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said groups' efforts to build a dirty bomb were becoming "more professional".

It was particularly worrying, he said, that smuggling networks had hold of technology to evade sophisticated monitoring equipment designed to prevent proliferation of radioactive material.

"Terrorists having access to nuclear material is a real threat," he said. "They have developed a particular container to put enriched uranium in as samples. The groups repeat [deliveries] to defeat the preventive measures. This is a real threat."

Patricia Lewis, the head of the international security at Chatham House, said Mr Amano's comments appeared to confirm suspicions that groups had got their hands on devices used by scientists to prevent radioactive emissions in transit.

"It is worrying because these containers can get past detectors," she said. "We use these devices for security to block isotopes and you can certainly hide Highly Enriched Uranium in them. They can certainly get through the detectors."

...

Miss Lewis said the number of incidents published by the IAEA did not represent the full scale of the threat.

"Not all of these were reported as missing. Is that because the organisation that lost the material didn't know or didn't want to say," she said. "There is no real sense of how big this is. Is the figure fairly accurate or the tip of the iceberg. Nobody knows."

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 17 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST
Russia announced this week that it would no longer work to disarm nuclear and chemical weapons under the U.S. program known as Nunn Lugar. This was a very successful program that reduced Russia's stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction over the past 20 years. U.S. money and expertise drove the program, but now the Russians believe they have plenty of both to continue the job on their own. NPR's Mike Shuster reports.

...

DARYL KIMBALL, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION: This has been one of the most successful security programs in history. And it has been a vital part of really ending the Cold War.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgSun, 14 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST
Obama administration officials on Thursday said that a bilateral effort to help secure weapons of mass destruction in Russia is not dead, despite Moscow’s announcement a day earlier that it is unwilling to extend an enabling agreement with the United States.

“We are still in talks,” State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said during a press briefing when asked about the future of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program in Russia.

Since the early 1990s, the United States has provided Russia with more than $7 billion in funds, equipment and expertise for securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear arms and other unconventional weapons through the CTR initiative. The program is enabled by an umbrella agreement that, among other things, shields the U.S. government and its contractors from virtually all liability stemming from incidents that might occur in the course of CTR work.

...

Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security, told GSN earlier this week that Russia could raise objections to other aspects of the program, such as a Defense Department requirement that it conduct inspections to ensure that any equipment it pays for in Russia has been properly installed. He said the Russians “balk” at this demand.

Luongo and other observers suggested it is still possible to negotiate a revised agreement, however, and the Obama administration is now also making that case.

WASHINGTON, D.C. - The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), a coalition of domestic and international experts dedicated to preventing nuclear terrorism, urged the United States and Russia to reach an agreement to continue key threat reduction work under the so-called Nunn-Lugar program.

Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Sergey Ryabkov, indicated on Wednesday that Russia would not seek an extension of the current agreement authorizing vital security cooperation on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) between the two countries. Senator Richard Lugar and others have indicated that Russia may be open to an amended agreement, although it is unclear what Russia’s preferred changes are or if they would undercut the effectiveness of the program if instituted.

Ken Luongo, FMWG co-chair and President of the Partnership for Global Security said “It would be a huge blow to allow the critical threat reduction work of the Nunn-Lugar program to lapse. Enhancing protections against WMD terrorism has been one of the most important areas of cooperation between the United States and Russia, and that partnership has been mutually beneficial and greatly enhanced global security.”

Over the past 20 years, the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has enabled substantial improvements in defenses against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism in the states of the former Soviet Union. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, control of the vast Soviet WMD complex began to unravel. The Nunn-Lugar program, launched in 1991, enabled the United States to assist Russia in safely dismantling and destroying WMD and enhancing security of key sites. The bipartisan program’s many accomplishments include the removal of nuclear weapons from three former Soviet states, the deactivation of 7,610 strategic nuclear warheads, destruction of 25,000 tons of chemical agents, and enhanced security at 24 nuclear weapons storage sites. Without a further agreement between the United States and Russia, this critical work will end in the spring of 2013.

“The decision to move forward on this agreement is one for the Russians to make, but the implications and consequences of that choice are global,” Luongo continued. “If the agreement is terminated, then it sends one of the worst signals to the international community about the importance of cooperation to enhance protections against WMD terrorism, precisely when more bilateral and multilateral action and transparency are urgently needed.”

“There is still time for the United States and Russia to find common ground and reach an agreement that will ensure that this pivotal work continues,” said Dr. Paul Walker, director of the Environmental Security and Sustainability Program of Green Cross International. “If the two sides could put aside their Cold War animosity twenty years ago, then surely a mutually beneficial agreement could be reached today.”

The FMWG, a coalition of U.S. and international experts, was formed to improve fissile material security through the development of actionable policy proposals and advocacy for government adoption and implementation of improved policies. For more information, visit www.fmwg.org.

###

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 11 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CSTThe announcement by Russia’s foreign ministry yesterday – mostly by leaks to domestic media – that it will not renew the decades-old bilateral Nunn-Lugar program to dismantle Soviet-era nuclear and chemical weapons has left the American architects of the program scratching their heads.Charles Digges, 11/10-2012

Later announcements by the Foreign Ministry said it did not want the program unless there were major changes made to it, but did not specify what those changes it desired might be.

What is clear is that 24 hours after the initial media reports hit the airwaves is that the Russian Foreign Ministry seems to have no unified opinion about the future of the program – except for making it tougher – while the US side seems to be reading in the tea leaves that the program is not ending so much as being demanded to change.

...

“In my view, the end of the [Nunn Lugar] program […] would be a serious mistake for both sides and for the global community," Kenneth Luongo, President of the Washington-based Partnership for Global Security, one of the America’s most authoritative nonproliferation think tanks, told Bellona.

“There is little that binds the US and Russia together at this time and mutual cooperation to ensure that [weapons of mass destruction] are secured and not vulnerable to theft or proliferation is one of the strongest common links between the two countries,” he said.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 11 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST
The Pakistani security establishment is capable of protecting the country's nuclear facilities against potential new attacks mounted by local extremist groups, Arms Control Today this month quoted ex-Pakistani and U.S. officials as saying.

The nuclear-armed South Asian nation's atomic sites are "very well protected" and protections at installations such as the Dera Ghazi Khan site are "adequate" for responding to terrorist dangers, ex-Pakistani Nuclear Command Authority arms control and disarmament chief Naeem Salik wrote in a mid-September e-mail message.

There were reports early last month of a Pakistani Taliban plot to attack the large nuclear complex, which houses a number of uranium fuel cycle operations. Security around the Dera Ghazi Khan complex was said to have been significantly bolstered following discovery of the reported plot, but no attack emerged.

...

Salik also maintained the Dera Ghazi Khan site holds "no fissile materials or weapons related facilities." Had the Taliban actually attempted to assault the complex, the result would have been "more of an embarrassment than any real damage" as the nuclear work at the isolated site is not military-related, he insisted.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 03 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST
In a recent letter to the editor, Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Vermont Democrat and the chairman of the SenateJudiciary Committee, incorrectly wrote that “an anonymous Republican hold” had prevented swift passage of legislation implementing two treaties, one on nuclear and radiological terrorism and another on preventing nuclear proliferation (“Nuclear terrorism bill delay unwarranted,” Sept. 20).

I agree with Mr. Leahy that swift implementation of those treaties is important to national security. However, the legislation passed by the House of Representatives and fast-tracked by the Senate Democratic leadership is flawed. It not only includes a drafting error that requires an amendment to ensure proper implementation, but it fails to include important provisions that were in President Obama’s proposal for implementing the treaties.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 02 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST
Fifty years after the Cuban missile crisis brought the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust, the threats posed by the bomb have changed, but still hang over us all. Today, there still are nearly 20,000 nuclear weapons, and there are nine nuclear-armed states. More countries have access to the technologies needed to produce nuclear bomb material, and the risk of nuclear terrorism is real.

The massive nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia—the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War—have been reduced through successive arms control agreements. Yet, deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces still exceed 1,500 strategic warheads each, far more than necessary to deter nuclear attack.

Five decades ago, President John Kennedy warned of the possibility of dozens of nuclear-armed nations. Since then, world leaders have built up an extensive nonproliferation regime that has slowed the spread and reduced the salience of nuclear weapons.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 01 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST
Efforts to negotiate a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), which would require states to cease production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, have been at an impasse for 17 years in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD). Almost no substantive discussion has taken place on a treaty, which is a crucial step toward halting the manufacture of nuclear weapons worldwide.

As argued by Mari Amano, the Japanese ambassador to the CD, an FMCT would be an essential complement to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Once it enters into force, the test ban will act as a “quality cap” on global nuclear weapons programs while the FMCT would be a “quantity cap.” Yet problematically for those keen on advancing an FMCT, various countries, most recently Pakistan, have blocked the CD’s work by taking advantage of the body’s requirement for consensus.

The resulting frustration has fueled a growing movement to start formal FMCT negotiations in another forum. Most recently, Canada in 2011 convinced the UN General Assembly to pass Resolution 66/44, requiring the assembly to “consider options for the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices at its sixty-seventh session.” As expected, none of the draft programs of work proposed to the CD in 2012 was able to muster consensus support. The 67th session of the General Assembly thus opened in late September with the debate over parallel negotiating forums on its agenda.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 01 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST
The 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) have established global fissile material security as a top-level international objective and led many to consider whether today's nuclear material security regime is adequately adapted to the twenty-first century's globalized threat environment. While the regime has improved over the last decade, its developement still lags behind other nuclear regimes for safety, safeguards, and arms control. The current nuclear security regime relies almost entirely on the national protection and control systems of countries that possess nuclear and radiological materials and facilities to portect the public from unintended releases of radiation. However, there is a growing appreciation of the limitations of this approach and recognition that a more global, integrated, and comprehensive response is needed.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgSun, 30 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST
Talks between South Korea and the United States on renewing their 1974 nuclear cooperation agreement appear stalled, with the main sticking point the countries’ differences over Seoul’s pursuit of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Many observers say they do not expect to see significant progress until next year, after the U.S. presidential election this November and South Korea’s in December.

A key point of contention is pyroprocessing, a spent fuel treatment process that South Korea is developing and says is significantly more proliferation resistant than conventional reprocessing. A U.S. official has publicly disagreed with that claim, saying that pyroprocessing is reprocessing.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgSun, 30 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST
An Aug. 16 attack on a Pakistani military base by militants has raised concerns about the security of the country’s nuclear weapons, although Pakistani officials denied that nuclear weapons are stored at the base.

Located northwest of Islamabad in Kamra, the Minhas air base includes facilities for manufacturing various weapons systems, including the assembly plant for the Mirage and JF-17 fighter jets. According to U.S. experts, the Mirage may be nuclear capable, and nuclear weapons might be stored at the facility.

A spokesperson for Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said Aug. 16 that the country’s “strategic assets are safe” and that “all measures” are in place to ensure the “safety and security of our nuclear assets.” U.S. Defense Department Spokesman George Little said during a press conference the same day that there was no indication that the attack had “endangered the Pakistani nuclear stockpile.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgSat, 29 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST
In June 2005, the congressionally mandated bipartisan Task Force on the United Nations concluded that the UN Security Council, in adopting Resolution 1540, “created a potentially powerful tool for countering the nonstate proliferation threat.”[1] The task force thought that the effectiveness of the resolution, which obliges all states to take measures to combat the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery to nonstate actors, would depend heavily on the committee it established to carry out its directives.

In particular, the task force wondered what standards the 1540 Committee, as it is known, would use to evaluate how well states were implementing the resolution; how much the committee would press states to comply with the legally binding obligations of the resolution; and whether the work could be done with only seven committee experts. By 2012, the answers to those questions are none, very little, and no, respectively.

The committee does not evaluate states; it uses the lightest of touches to encourage them to comply with the resolution, and it has far too few resources to do the work envisioned by the task force. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that states have taken many actions meant to meet their obligations and that Resolution 1540 and the 1540 Committee have become linchpins in the global nonproliferation regime.[2]

Now, in an unexpected twist — just before the Senate recessed for the fall elections — Republicans tried to change anti-nuclear terrorism legislation the House embraced in June and which has the approval of the White House and former Bush administration officials.

...

In a Sept. 13 op-ed in The Washington Times, Andy Semmel, a former Bush administration official, wondered what the holdup was.

“Congress hasn’t given its best effort to prevent nuclear terrorism,” he wrote. “Senate approval of the pending implementing legislation remains the last hurdle.”

Leahy fired back in a letter to the editor, saying Senate Republicans were responsible for the setback.

Iowa Sen. Chuck Grassley, the ranking Republican on the committee, did not like how the bill was moving forward — with no opportunity to add amendments.

“Given the seriousness of the topic and the differences between the House-passed bill and what the president proposed, Sen. Grassley asked for the bill to either be referred to committee, where members can offer amendments, or allow for a fair amendment process on the floor to reconcile the differences,” a Senate source said.

One of his main objections was the death penalty provision, which had been stripped from the House bill with the White House’s approval.

...

“It is vital that the Senate pass the implementing legislation, which has already been approved by the GOP-led House, in this session of Congress,” said Kingston Reif, director of nuclear non-proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. “Swift congressional approval is important not only to ensure U.S. laws are sufficient but also to help prod other countries into action.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 27 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST
A congressional attempt to bring the United States into line with two nuclear security agreements appeared to stall late last week as a Republican senator sought changes to a compliance bill cleared this summer by the House of Representatives.

The proposed updates might prove unacceptable to House lawmakers, preventing approval of the legislation before the current Congress adjourns in January. Meanwhile, a secret GOP hold has prevented the House-approved language from advancing through the Senate, according to a key Democratic lawmaker in that chamber.

The amended version of the bill -- put forward on Friday by Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) -- would eliminate several alterations House lawmakers made to an earlier Obama administration draft of the legislation. Among other changes, the senator would reinstate language to the House proposal that might allow for the execution of a person convicted of an “act of nuclear terrorism” if it results in death, according to Beth Levine, Grassley’s Judiciary panel spokeswoman.

...

White House intervention might be necessary to break the deadlock, said Andrew Semmel, an advocate for U.S. ratification of the nuclear security agreements and a retired veteran staffer for Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.).

“It could very well be any number of reasons why they’re dragging their feet on this,” according to Semmel, who also served under the Bush administration as deputy assistant secretary of State for nuclear nonproliferation policy and negotiations. “Oftentimes … if you follow the Senate and the House, the issue is not really the issue. It’s something else,” he told Global Security Newswire in an interview.

Washington’s formal endorsement of the 2005 nuclear materials amendment could hasten the measure’s entry into force by encouraging its ratification by other countries, a number of arms control advocates and former high-level U.S. officials have argued.

“Diplomats in both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have made a point of urging ratification of these two treaties in meetings with their counterparts,” Semmel stated in a Washington Times commentary published earlier this month.

“There is little doubt that other countries look to the U.S. for leadership to help make it easier for them to ratify the treaties and contribute their part in the global fight against nuclear terrorism,” Semmel wrote. “The immediate fate of the implementing legislation that is needed to enact and complete ratification of these two treaties rests with the Senate Judiciary Committee and the full Senate.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 27 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST
With time running out before the expiration of the US-South Korea nuclear cooperation agreement PDF that has governed the two countries' nuclear trade since 1972, negotiators remain far apart on the terms of a new pact. Failure to reach a deal would threaten billions of dollars in nuclear commerce between the two countries. It would also threaten Seoul's $20 billion contract to supply reactors to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), since those reactors contain parts and design information imported to South Korea from the United States under the current nuclear cooperation agreement. Surprisingly, however, the main sticking point in negotiations seems unlikely to be South Korea's desire to pursue a commercially untested form of reprocessing called pyroprocessing. Rather, the snag appears to be South Korea's interest in the other end of the fuel cycle -- uranium enrichment.

South Korean officials are interested in developing an enrichment capacity for reasons both economic and political. The political concerns that surround enrichment in South Korea can be eased by diplomats working out appropriate language. The economic issues, meanwhile, can be addressed through measures like arranging South Korean investment in US enrichment facilities -- which would provide Seoul much of what it wants from a domestic enrichment capacity without creating new proliferation risks.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 25 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST
At the dawn of the civilian nuclear age in the 1950s, one of the pressing questions was how to find enough fuel for reactors and bombs. The government and the private sector seized on a man-made substitute for natural uranium, producing about 3,400 pounds of an exotic and expensive material called uranium 233.

Today, the problem is how to safely get rid of it.

“We do consider this to be waste,” said David G. Huizenga, the senior administrator for environmental management at the Energy Department. “There’s no further need for it.”

Uranium 233 looked attractive because it could be made in a reactor from thorium, a cheap and abundant radioactive metal, and, almost magically, the reactor would produce more fuel than it consumed. Utilities manufactured some of it at the Indian Point I reactor in Westchester County, N.Y., which is now retired, and at reactors in Colorado, Illinois and Pennsylvania.

...

“Nuclear physicists weren’t geologists and didn’t understand the supply of uranium,” said Frank N. Von Hippel, a physicist and public policy specialist at Princeton. “It turned out there was more uranium than people thought and less nuclear power than people thought there would be.”

...

Because the uranium 233 is mixed in with dangerously radioactive materials, it is “self-protecting” to an extent, said Charles D. Ferguson, the president of the Federation of American Scientists and an expert on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Over time, he said, the radiation will diminish, and some of it has died away because the uranium 233 is 50 to 60 years old.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgSun, 23 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST
This article explores interpretations of the concepts of strategic stability and nuclear deterrence with a focus on distinguishing those factors that have a real destabilizing impact on cornerstones of strategic stability from those that are only perceived to be doing so.

Cold War Years

The joint USSR-US Statement on the future negotiations on nuclear and space arms – that the two nations’ leaders signed - gave a most general definition of what constituted strategic stability during the Cold War. According to the June 1990 statement, strategic stability should be understood as such a balance of strategic forces of the two countries where there were no incentives for a first strike. That definition effectively replaced an earlier principle of “equality and equal security” which was amorphous and non-binding.

The statement essentially declared that future agreements should ensure strategic stability through stabilizing reductions of strategic offensive arms as well as through implementing the concept of the corresponding interrelation between strategic offensive and defensive weapons. Reductions in concentration of warheads on strategic delivery systems and preference for weapons with increased survivability were at that time identified as principles of stabilizing reductions.

However, this was not sufficient for implementation of the declared provisions. The sides needed to formalize the provisions, to reinforce them with quantitative correlations that would be both justified and illustrative.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 21 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST
I read with interest the recent contribution by Andy Semmel, former deputy assistant secretary of state for nuclear nonproliferation in the George W. Bush administration (“Nuclear terrorism treaties still incomplete,” Commentary, Friday). In the piece Mr. Semmel advocates the swift passage of legislation to implement two critical anti-terrorism treaties.

Mr. Semmel asserts that “the immediate fate of the implementing legislation that is needed to enact and complete ratification of these two treaties rests with the SenateJudiciary Committee and the full Senate.” I share Mr. Semmel’s sense of urgency, and he must have been unaware that as chairman of the SenateJudiciary Committee, I requested this legislation be discharged from the Judiciary Committee on Sept. 12 in order to expedite its passage by the full Senate. The bill, the Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act of 2012, has now been cleared by all Senate Democrats. Unfortunately an anonymous Republican hold has been placed on the bill.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 19 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST
A South Korean think tank affiliated with the government on Monday urged the United States to permit Seoul to expand its range of permitted atomic energy production activities to include uranium enrichment and the recycling of used fuel, the Yonhap News Agency reported.

A soon-to-expire bilateral nuclear cooperation deal bars South Korea from recycling used atomic fuel or refining uranium -- activities that have both peaceful and nuclear-weapon applications. The two nations are negotiating a replacement accord that the South hopes will include the right to use developmental pyroprocessing technology, which does not remove separated plutonium from other atomic elements.

...

"Given the fact that South Korea has been actively working to strengthen a global nonproliferation regime, the U.S. needs to fully change its policy on nuclear cooperation with South Korea," report author Jun Bong-geun wrote.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 18 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST
South Korea called for the United States to approve it undertaking "peaceful" enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, a government think tank said Monday, as little progress has been made in bilateral negotiations to revise the countries' nuclear accord.

Under a 1974 accord with the U.S., South Korea is banned from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. The allies have held five rounds of formal negotiations since 2010 to rewrite the bilateral nuclear cooperation treaty, which expires in 2014.

South Korea, a major nuclear energy developer, wants the U.S. to allow it to adopt a proliferation-resistant technology for enriching uranium and reprocessing spent atomic fuel from its 22 nuclear power plants, but Washington has been reluctant to do so.

...

The U.S. nuclear cooperation policy towards restricting South Korea's peaceful enrichment and reprocessing is contradictory to the bilateral partnership built on mutual respect under the Korea-U.S. strategic alliance," said Jun Bong-geun, a senior professor at the Korean Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, in a report.

"Given the fact that South Korea has been actively working to strengthen a global non-proliferation regime, the U.S. needs to fully change its policy on nuclear cooperation with South Korea," Jun said in the report. The institute is affiliated with Seoul's foreign ministry.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 17 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CSTCongress hasn’t given its best effort to prevent nuclear terrorism. Despite broad bipartisan recognition that nuclear terror is one of the biggest threats of our time, two common-sense anti-terrorism treaties have been on the “to-do” list for more than half a decade. The Senate has the opportunity to pass those treaties in the weeks ahead and should do so for one simple reason: They would make America more secure.

There is a long and commendable record of U.S. bipartisan support for policies and practices that prevent nuclear terrorism and impede nuclear proliferation. Successive administrations and both political parties have broadly agreed that combating nuclear terrorism ranks at the top of our foreign policy and national security agenda. The 9/11 Commission warned, “The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world’s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates noted, “Every senior leader, when you’re asked what keeps you awake at night, it’s the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.”

Despite these and other meritorious actions, including the elimination of Osama bin Laden, the threat of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation is not going away. We need more tools and more legal cooperation with other states to fill gaps that enable terrorists and other rogue elements to exploit weaknesses in the international system, weaknesses that jeopardize our security and the security of our friends and allies. The 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) build upon past U.S. international initiatives to strengthen our hand against terrorism.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 13 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST
The unanimous adoption of UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1977 (2011) did not just extend the timeframe of the 1540 Committee, but made a significant step toward institutionalizing the 1540 process—a process designed to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) while keeping these deadly weapons out of the hands of sub-state actors. Its provisions encourage all states to prepare national implementation action plans and to promote the sharing of experience, lessons learned, and effective practices in areas covered by UNSCR 1540. Hence, one of the major tasks to keep this emerging institution on track is to identify a common foundation for threat perceptions and compliance motivation among all those who are supposed to organize, promote, and implement this process in the evolving threat environment.

Why CBRN Security Culture?

A practical tool to achieve this goal is to develop a comprehensive vision of security culture that is applicable to the expanding, very long-term mission of UNSCR 1540. That security culture enhances and supports the security regime was unambiguously recognized by the 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits. Held in Seoul, the 2012 summit adopted not just a summit communiqué but several statements about individual components of nuclear security. These documents specifically cite the human element as key to achieving such goals as physical protection, transport, and IT security. There are at least four reasons why a common paradigm of security culture—a paradigm that applies to the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear fields alike—is becoming a necessity.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 12 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST
Conventional wisdom holds that technical fixes can close loopholes in the emerging nuclear security regime. According to this approach, a large budget and enough capacity building resources will allow most issues to be addressed quickly and effectively.

Accordingly, many experts argue that the Nuclear Security Summit process, which began with an April 2010 meeting hosted by U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington and continued with a second summit that took place in Seoul this past spring, urgently needs to set higher expectations and pursue more ambitious goals. For instance, Joan Rohlfing, president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, argues that “we need to develop a comprehensive, universal, and ultimately enforceable [nuclear] materials control system.”

Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security and co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group, calls for a framework agreement to unite currently disparate and loosely-defined nuclear security conventions, rules, and standards.2 Akin to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, such an agreement would be universal, but it would permit a comprehensive system to be developed over time. It would promote recognition of nuclear security as a priority and require its parties to take specific steps to gradually achieve its objectives.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 10 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST
An Obama administration plan to change to the Medicare payment system for radiological isotopes used in diagnostic procedures would not give health care providers enough incentive to end their reliance on bomb-grade uranium, industry officials say.

The Health and Human Services Department in July proposed to pay providers more if they conduct diagnostic procedures on their Medicare patients using isotopes derived from low-enriched uranium. The plan – part of a wide-ranging proposed rule that would make numerous adjustments to the Medicare system -- is the latest attempt by Washington to wean the United States off medical isotopes produced with highly enriched uranium.

...

The disagreement over proper compensation “underlines the need to pass appropriate legislation that would provide additional incentives for LEU-based production,” Miles Pomper, a senior research associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, told Global Security Newswire on Thursday.

The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) is pleased to announce Miles Pomper, Senior Research Associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, as its new co-chair, joining Kenneth Luongo the President of the Partnership for Global Security. Pomper replaces Alexandra Toma, Executive Director of the Connect U.S. Fund, who served as co-chair for more than three years. Toma will remain active within the FMWG as a member of the Steering Committee.

Luongo said, “I, and all the members of the FMWG, sincerely thank Alex for her vision in encouraging expert collaboration on the vital international issue of securing nuclear materials worldwide. Her years of dedicated service to the Fissile Materials Working Group raised awareness of the threat of nuclear terrorism among policymakers, the general public, and the media. In addition, her guidance has facilitated the growth of the FMWG into a vital contributor to ongoing efforts to strengthen international nuclear security and the coalition is situated to continue its success for years to come.”

Luongo continued, “I look forward to partnering with Miles in leading the coalition during its next phase and continuing to serve as co-chair through the next Nuclear Security Summit in 2014 in the Netherlands.”

Pomper brings years of experience working on nuclear security and broader nonproliferation issues. Prior to his current role at CNS, he served as Editor-in-Chief of Arms Control Today from 2003-2009. He also served as the lead foreign policy reporter for CQ Weekly and Legi-Slate News Service, where he covered national security issues before Congress, and as a Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. Information Agency. He has been widely quoted on nuclear security issues by publications including Bloomberg, USA Today, and the BBC, and has published his work in Foreign Service Journal, Survival, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, World Politics Review, Nuclear Engineering International, and the Centre for International Governance Innovation. He holds a master's degree in international affairs from Columbia University and a master's degree in journalism from Northwestern University.

“The past four years have seen some significant achievements in international efforts to enhance nuclear security, but substantial challenges remain. Nuclear terrorism is still one of the greatest threats to global security,” Pomper stated. “I look forward to working with my colleagues in the FMWG to ensure that additional steps are taken to better address this threat.”

The FMWG, founded in 2009, is a coalition of more than 65 U.S. and international non-governmental organizations dedicated to promoting actionable policy proposals to prevent nuclear terrorism. For more on the FMWG, please visit: http://www.fmwg.org.

# # #

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 06 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST
The Asia-Pacific region epitomizes the type of proliferation challenges the international community faces. Globalization turned the region into one of the most important international trade hubs, the home to leading dual-use companies, and the anticipated site of the world’s most significant growth in nuclear energy. While those trends are beneficial, they also create new sources of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation.

Several existing initiatives laid the groundwork for regional cooperation on WMD nonproliferation. But there are still a number of steps that governments in the Asia-Pacific region can take to promote greater regulation and transparency:

Engage the private sector. Economy-focused organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) could reach out to companies to raise awareness of proliferation risks and help them to adopt internal practices that are in compliance with governments’ export control regulations. Regional incentives for cooperation could also be established.

Establish a clearing house for regional expertise sharing and assistance. Regional security will suffer if countries lack the resources and expertise to implement proliferation controls consistently. A regional forum could collect region-specific information so countries can benefit from each other’s expertise.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 30 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST
The prevention of nuclear terrorism, one of the foremost international security threats that we face today, relies on separate national regulations with little oversight. There are few international checks and balances on the physical protection of the treacherous material, which could be used to create nuclear devices by terrorists, aside from bilateral agreements and individual treaties formed at the will of individual states. This lack of binding guidelines and international oversight of nuclear security is inadequate for today's nuclear risks. Rhetoric from the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul is laden with expressions of hope that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will assume a larger role in nuclear security. With the summit process likely ending after 2014, there is an opportunity for the IAEA to take over as the key driver of improvements to international nuclear security. Optimistic expressions of hope and even opportunity aside, the future of the IAEA heavily depends on political dynamics, questions of funding, and member states' initiative.

Current operations. Before the 2002 establishment of the Office of Nuclear Security, the IAEA had minimal tools for addressing nuclear security. Trevor Findlay, a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Canada, details current advances in hisreport, including the inaugural nuclear security plan, which was the agency's first comprehensive program to combat nuclear terrorism. In addition, the IAEA puts out its own guidelines PDF, which are useful for creating a common global norm, but are nonbinding. Many nations have also signed up for and received International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions, in which IAEA experts review security measures at selected sites. Further, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material -- which compels participating states to disclose the safe transport of nuclear material -- requires members to designate a national point of contact to the IAEA in the event of a breach. In addition, more security progress was made in 2005 with an amendment to the convention that binds signatories to the protection of nuclear materials in domestic use, storage, and transport. Unfortunately, many key states, including the United States and China, still have not signed on.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 30 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST
For nearly four decades, antinuclear activists have called for limits on the use of highly installations around the world. Although Iran and North Korea might be among the obvious targets of that movement, so too has been the National Research Universal (NRU) reactor in Chalk River, Ontario, which produces medical isotopes using the potential bomb-making material.

Yet, so vital has the output of the reactor been that Canada was able to earn a special exemption from a 1992 American law that compelled foreign reactors to commit to convert to low-enriched uranium (LEU) as expeditiously as possible if they wanted to access HEU fuel from the United States to use in their reactors. To that end, the US established a Reduced Enrichment for Research Test Reactors program to develop LEU for foreign reactors, which ultimately morphed into the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which has targeted 200 reactors in the US and around the world for conversion or shutdown by 2020. To date, 72 have converted or closed their doors.

...

The proposed American move toward preferential procurement of isotopes made with LEU is expected to further alter the economics of production. It eliminates the prospect that a new pricing regime could be undercut by high-volume, lower-cost producers using HEU, says Alan Kuperman, associate professor of public affairs with the University of Texas at Austin. Moreover, most producers are well on their way to converting their facilities to run on LEU, he says, adding that the remainder are primarily found in Russia.

...

But he also questions the wisdom of such a slow timeline for LEU conversion, in light of America’s apparent intention to slam its doors to the use of isotopes produced through the use of HEU. “To invest now a lot of money into producing isotopes with HEU is likely to be a huge waste —something Nordion shouldn’t want to do, and Nordion shareholders should-n’t want to do,” he argues. “And for the record, Canada’s government really shouldn’t be happy about Nordion encouraging increased civilian commerce in HEU. That’s counter to what the Canadian government subscribed to at the Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, a policy of HEU minimization and eventually total phase-out.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 27 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST
The Obama administration has drafted a proposal that would extend a key weapons security agreement between the United States and Russia but it is uncertain whether Moscow will approve draft deal, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) said on Thursday.

The so-called umbrella agreement, which allows the United States to conduct Cooperative Threat Reduction operations in Russia, is due to expire in June 2013.

The program established two decades ago by Lugar and then-Senator Sam Nunn aims to secure or deactivate nuclear and other unconventional weapons systems left over from the Soviet Union. It has provided U.S. funds and personnel support to Russia and other nations toward that end. To date, the Russian component of the program has eliminated more than 7,000 strategic nuclear warheads and over 900 ballistic missiles, among other accomplishments.

...

The liability provisions in the umbrella agreement and other such pacts were “negotiated essentially when the Soviet Union had just collapsed and Russia’s lawyers weren’t really paying attention yet,” Matthew Bunn, an associate professor at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government who served as a nuclear security adviser to the Clinton administration, previously told Global Security Newswire.

As Russia’s position in the world strengthens the likelihood that it will hold up renewal agreements over such issues increases, Bunn and other observers have said.

While many of the large-scale construction projects administered and funded by the Cooperative Threat program are mainly complete, the United States continues to administer a broad array of initiatives in Russia that could suffer a blow if umbrella agreement dissolves, Bunn warned.

In addition to maintaining the Mayak fissile material storage facility, the United States is also involved with facility security upgrades and efforts to strengthen nuclear protective regulations in Russia, Bunn said.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 23 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST
There are two main obstacles that will affect medical grade isotope production: the aging nuclear reactors that produce the isotopes and the U.S. government's stance on foreign producers utilizing HEU (highly enriched uranium) used to produce medical isotopes. Earlier this year, a coalition of U.S. public health, medical, and nuclear nonproliferation experts urged Congress to restrict the use of imported Russian medical isotopes produced with HEU, which is bomb-grade uranium, and to block them completely within about five years:

We write to urge you to amend S. 99, the American Medical Isotopes Production Act of 2011, which was passed by the U.S. Senate on 17 November 2011. The amendment is necessary to achieve the bill's two stated objectives: (1) minimizing global commerce in bomb-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU) to reduce risks of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation; and (2) ensuring a reliable supply of medical radio-isotopes derived from molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) -- which account for 80 percent of our country's 20-million nuclear diagnostic procedures annually -- by fostering domestic production without HEU.

The coalition criticized Russia for expanding its use of HEU to produce medical isotopes so that it can dominate that particular sector of the U.S. health-care market. Their concerns were that, if successful, the Russian initiative would undermine Washington's efforts to promote domestic production of medical isotopes without HEU and to phase-out global commerce in such uranium.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 22 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST
WASHINGTON – The International Atomic Energy Agency’s top nuclear security official said his operation must have more money and people if it is to meet nations’ growing demand for help in ensuring their atomic facilities are protected against terrorism.

As it stands, governments in some cases could wait for years to receive expert guidance in preparing a comprehensive protection program, according to Khammar Mrabit, head of the U.N. branch’s Nuclear Security Office.

“The risk is that there will be gaps in nuclear security in some countries, in some areas, that is not acceptable,” he told Global Security Newswire. “This is the risk and we would like to speed up the process of establishing and strengthening nuclear security in these countries. … The sooner the better.”

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 20 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST
Wyatt, the Y-12 spokesman, said after the plant ended its stand-down that the main security force operated by WSI Oak Ridge, formerly Wackenhut, has been downgraded to a subcontractor in response to the incident. Other improvements also were made, but he declined to provide specifics because the information is considered sensitive.

After the breach, the president and general manager of the Babcock & Wilcox division that runs Y-12, Darrel Kohlhorst, retired from his job. He told The Knoxville News Sentinel that the company would emerge stronger because of the incident.

"Well, I think it did show us we had some weaknesses. We had some deficiencies," Kohlhorst told the newspaper. "The team has really attacked those things and corrected them, and I think we're actually going to be a lot stronger coming out of this thing."

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgSat, 18 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST
Officials like to refer to the Y-12 National Security Complex as the Fort Knox for highly enriched uranium, which is why an unprecedented incursion by an 82-year-old nun and two fellow protesters has critics mocking the notion that the weapons plant is secure.

Operations resumed last week after being shut down over the embarrassing incident 18 days earlier. The Department of Energy has called on the contractor that runs the sensitive facility just west of Knoxville to explain why it shouldn't be replaced.

...

Matthew Bunn, an associate professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, said his own tour of the facility leads him to agree that penetrating the interior of the building would be a difficult proposition.

...

"We were lucky in that regard that it was the nun and her cohorts, rather than a serious terrorist outfit," Stockton said. POGO, a Washington-based independent watchdog known for exposing overpriced military parts and other government shortcomings, has been a frequent critic of security lapses at the facility.

Stockton called the July 28 intrusion the "only serious penetration of a plant" that he's aware of since becoming involved in nuclear security issues in the mid-1970s.

The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) has experts available to comment on today’s militant attack on a Pakistani air base which is rumored to house a portion of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Approximately eight militants were killed after climbing a perimeter wall at Kamra Air Force Base and engaging in a two-hour firefight with the base’s security forces.

To speak to an FMWG expert about the attack, nuclear security in Pakistan, or the status of ongoing efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, please contact Ryan Costello at rcostello@connectusfund.org or +1-703-963-1901. The FMWG is an international coalition of more than 65 non-governmental organizations dedicated to preventing nuclear terrorism.

The FMWG, a coalition of U.S. and international experts, was formed to improve fissile material security through the development of actionable policy proposals and advocacy for government adoption and implementation of improved policies. For more information, visit www.fmwg.org.

###

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 16 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST
As the saying goes, “The fish rots from the head down.” This is certainly the case at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tenn., where an 82-year-old nun and two accomplices recently broke in, raising serious questions about the Department of Energy’s (DOE) security strategy.

Energy Secretary Steven Chu said in a statement provided to the Knoxville News Sentinel on Monday: “The department has no tolerance for security breaches at any of our sites, and I am committed to ensure that those responsible will be held accountable.” But there is no denying that Y-12 was a giant failure of federal oversight. Now the people being axed are lower-level employees rather than those who have allowed the security standards to fall far below acceptable levels, such as Secretary Chu, himself.

Secretary Chu should be the first on the chopping block. He has been preaching for years that government overseers should get off the back of the contractors and everything will be fine. Then, of course, he is shocked when Y-12 is successfully attacked by an 82-year-old nun.

WASHINGTON — An 82-year-old nun and two fellow pacifists who penetrated the defenses of one of the nation’s most important nuclear weapons facilities last week are due in federal court in Knoxville, Tenn., on Thursday to face charges of trespassing and spray-painting antiwar slogans on a building that houses nuclear bomb fuel. But the incident has also put the Department of Energy’s security system on trial.

The security breach, at Oak Ridge in Tennessee, has prompted the Department of Energy to reappraise security measures across its nuclear weapons program and private experts to criticize the agency’s safeguarding of nuclear stockpiles.

The activists, who got past fences and security sensors before dawn on July 28, apparently spent several hours in the Y-12 National Security Complex before they were stopped — by a lone guard, they told friends — as they used a Bible and candles in a Christian peace ritual. In a telephone interview, Sister Megan Gillespie Rice, of Las Vegas, said she was not sure exactly how long they were there. “It was dark; we couldn’t see our watches,” she said.

On July 25 the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee held a hearing on the appropriate size of the US nuclear weapons stockpile to maintain a credible deterrent. Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright headlined the witness panel, which also included former US Ambassador to Russia Tom Pickering and NoH favorite Keith Payne.

Cartwright and Pickering briefed the findings and proposals of the Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission, on which they both served. The Commission's recent report (titled “Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Forces and Posture for the 21st Century”) calls for significant changes to nuclear strategy and posture, headlined by an illustrative recommendation to reduce the size of the US arsenal to 900 total nuclear weapons by 2022, 450 of which would be deployed on an ICBM-less dyad of submarines and bombers. Cartwright and Pickering clarified that 900 total nuclear weapons should be the aim of the next round of arms control negotiations with the Russians, though they did not rule out unilateral steps or parallel reciprocal steps to help jumpstart the process.

See here for our initial summary of the Commission’s report. And check out John's excellent summary of the hearing over at the Chain Reaction.

President Barack Obama has been on the front lines of this fight, launching the first in a series of international nuclear security summits in 2010 to provide a global forum to support efforts to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years, strengthen global nuclear materials security, and prevent nuclear terrorism. Since April 2009, when the Obama administration began implementing the four-year goal, the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), home to the key programs tasked with securing and eliminating nuclear material at an accelerated rate, has removed more than 1,200 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and plutonium -- including all the highly enriched uranium from eight countries, most recently Mexico and Ukraine this year. In addition, the agency has completed security upgrades at 32 Russian buildings containing weapons-usable materials and downblended 2.9 metric tons of Russia's highly enriched uranium so that it could no longer be used in nuclear weapons or reactors. This is a remarkable return on a relatively limited investment.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 02 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST
Today, there are approximately 1,440 tons of HEU in the world, some of it poorly secured. Because this material an ideal target for terrorists seeking to build a nuclear weapon, efforts are underway to reduce, secure, and consolidate stocks of HEU. But simply minimizing the use of HEU is no longer sufficient to combat the risk of nuclear terrorism. The international community’s efforts must now turn to elimination, with an initial focus on enhanced transparency and developing stronger international standards for the management of existing HEU inventories.

Low-enriched uranium (LEU) has proved acceptable for virtually all civilian applications, and there are few remaining technical barriers to the elimination of HEU use in civil and military applications. Important technical and political progress has been made through initiatives like the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program, the 1993 Megatons-to-Megawatts agreement between the United States and Russia and the Nuclear Security Summit process. The authors note that since 1978, “62 HEU-fueled research reactors have been converted to use LEU fuel and 17 reactors have been shut down in 36 countries.” Progress has also been made in the medical-isotope industry, where most producers have pledged to convert their reactors and targets to use LEU by 2016.

The United States’ Global Threat Reduction Initiative, in particular, has had significant impact on HEU minimization efforts, offering incentives such as new fuel, new facilities and technical upgrades to countries concerned that conversion to LEU might have negative economic consequences.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 02 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST
The Asia-Pacific region epitomizes the type of proliferation challenges the international community faces. Globalization turned the region into one of the most important international trade hubs, the home to leading dual-use companies, and the anticipated site of the world’s most significant growth in nuclear energy. While those trends are beneficial, they also create new sources of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 01 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST
Situations routinely considered in defensive drills at the Y-12 National Security Complex appeared to have little in common with details from Saturday's infiltration of the Tennessee nuclear arms site by three antiwar advocates, the Knoxville News Sentinel reported on Tuesday (see GSN, July 30).

The facility's perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system at about 4:30 a.m. indicated a breach of the nuclear-weapon handling area, prompting a reaction by security personnel.

Experts Available to Comment on Missed Nuclear Terror Prevention Deadline

The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) has experts available to comment on the Obama administration's failure to meet a deadline this month to scan all shipping containers for radioactive material before they reach the United States. In response to the 9/11 Commission report, Congress passed a 2007 law that mandated all cargo entering the U.S. from foreign ports be scanned with radiation detection equipment by July 2012 to strengthen seaport security and prevent terrorist smuggling.

To speak to an FMWG expert about the failure to meet the deadline, the threat of nuclear terrorism, or the status of ongoing efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, please contact Ryan Costello at rcostello@connectusfund.org or +1-703-963-1901. The FMWG is an international coalition of more than 65 non-governmental organizations dedicated to preventing nuclear terrorism.

The following experts are currently available:

• Kingston Reif, Director of Non-Proliferation, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation;

The FMWG, a coalition of U.S. and international experts, was formed to improve fissile material security through the development of actionable policy proposals and advocacy for government adoption and implementation of improved policies. For more information, visit www.fmwg.org.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 16 Jul 2012 00:00:00 CST
Legislation necessary to ratify two international treaties that improve nuclear security and strengthen measures to prevent nuclear terrorism finally passed the House of Representatives on June 28 after multiple failed attempts to bring U.S. federal code in line with these important treaties.

Once the bill makes its way through the Senate, and is signed into law by the President, the U.S. federal code will finally comply with provisions in the treaties allowing the U.S. to deposit its ratifications of the nuclear security pacts.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgFri, 13 Jul 2012 00:00:00 CST
A severe money shortage stands to restrict the International Atomic Energy Agency's capacity to detect clandestine nuclear efforts with potential arms-related aspects, a one-time Australian arms control envoy said in an assessment made public on Wednesday (see GSN, Nov. 30, 2010).

The U.N. nuclear watchdog is a "veritable bargain for international peace and security" but "is significantly underfunded, considering its responsibilities and the expectations increasingly being placed on it," wrote Trevor Findlay, now a scholar with Carleton University in Canada.

"What will make a focus on nuclear security a permanent feature of what we do?" asked Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit held in Seoul in late March. Experts agree that the 2014 summit must go further in securing nuclear materials from disasters and, most important, terrorist threats -- but agreement on precisely how to do this is harder to come by. In this regard, Australia has much to offer.

Though much of the world may not realize it, Australia has a superlative record in nuclear security. A recent international report by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the NTI Nuclear Materials Index, placed Australia first in nuclear security and control out of 32 states with weapons-usable nuclear materials. In addition, the country fulfilled key promises it made at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit -- such as passing the Nuclear Terrorism Amendment Act of 2011, which allows Canberra to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

It reveals that, though South Africa has completed substantial security upgrades at its Pelindaba nuclear facility, and implemented regulations requiring the protection of nuclear sites against threats, these have yet to be formally enforced.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 12 Jul 2012 00:00:00 CST
Contractors at several government nuclear facilities have routinely mishandled explosives, unnecessarily endangering the lives of employees and the public, according to an inspector general's report released today.

The Department of Energy inspector general reported that the contractors that operate four sites that handle nuclear materials did not fully comply with the department’s explosives safety manual -– a nearly 500-page guide to handling and storing explosives. The sites in question are Los Alamos and Sandia national laboratories, which perform nuclear weapons missions; Idaho National Laboratory, home to nuclear energy programs, among other science missions; and the Savannah River Site, which performs nuclear waste repurposing and cleanup.

The report said that management at the sites “took immediate action” in response to the inspector general recommendations, resolving many of the issues the report details. Among these issues were incorrect signage that misrepresented explosive hazards and the storage of combustible material in explosives bunkers.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 12 Jul 2012 00:00:00 CST
The House of Representatives on June 28 passed legislation required to bring the United States into compliance with two international treaties that improve nuclear material security and enhance measures to prevent nuclear terrorism.

Efforts to implement the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism began in 2008, but stalled in Congress. President Barack Obama submitted a similar draft proposal in 2010 and again in 2011 to implement the nuclear security agreements following his commitment to complete U.S. ratification at the 2010 nuclear security summit in Washington. (See ACT, May 2010.)

The updated legislation submitted to Congress would bring U.S. law into line with provisions in the treaties. Congressional passage of the bill is the last substantive hurdle to U.S. ratification of the pacts.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 09 Jul 2012 00:00:00 CST(Reuters) - Iran's announcement that it plans to build its first nuclear-powered submarine is stoking speculation it could serve as a pretext for the Islamic state to produce highly enriched uranium and move closer to potential atom bomb material.

Western experts doubt that Iran - which is under a U.N. arms embargo - has the capability any time soon to make the kind of sophisticated underwater vessel that only the world's most powerful states currently have.

RAY SUAREZ: The Fukushima nuclear accident is often seen as a consequence of a rare natural disaster. But a tough new report from Japan concludes that the accident was manmade in more ways than one.

The traditional narrative of what went wrong in Japan in early 2011 had gone like this. After withstanding a powerful 9.0-magnitude earthquake on March 11, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant lost all power to three of its six units when a tsunami destroyed its emergency generators and cooling pumps. With those offline and severe flood damage to structures and equipment, meltdowns soon followed and seemed unavoidable. But a new report released today says otherwise.

KENZO OSHIMA, Fukushima Nuclear Accident Commission (through translator): In this report, we have concluded that the Fukushima nuclear accident is a manmade disaster. In our process of investigating the background of the accident, we found that there were organizational problems, systemic problems, and human-related problems, as well as crisis management and governance problems.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 05 Jul 2012 00:00:00 CST
A growing consensus is emerging in the Obama administration that the size of the U.S. launch-ready nuclear arsenal should be between 1,000 and 1,100 weapons, the Associated Press reported on Monday following interviews with former and current officials (see GSN, June 20).

Officials think an announcement on the matter could be declared as soon as July.

However, in light of strong GOP opposition to further reductions in the nation's atomic stockpile and the revving up of the presidential race, the Obama administration could also choose to delay any announcement of new arms cuts until the November elections are over, according to officials.

House Passes Anti-Nuclear Terror Legislation

Experts Call on Senate for Prompt Approval

WASHINGTON, DC – A non-partisan coalition of 65 leading national security experts is commending the House of Representatives for passing legislation that strengthens U.S. efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. The Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act of 2012 passed today by a vote of (XX-XX).

The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), a coalition of experts dedicated to preventing nuclear terrorism, commended the House of Representatives for passing bipartisan legislation that would expand and strengthen U.S. efforts to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism by implementing key requirements of the 2005 International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the essential 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

“Yesterday, the House of Representatives took a key step to ensure that a nuclear terrorist attack does not become a reality,” said Miles Pomper, Senior Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and FMWG Steering Committee Member. “I hope that the Senate will act swiftly to pass this critical legislation.”

Ratification would fulfill critical commitments that the United States made at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) and accelerate international efforts to bring the treaties into force.

Despite long-standing bipartisan support, the treaties failed to gain sufficient traction over the past several years. The George W. Bush administration submitted the treaties to the Senate in September 2007 and the Senate overwhelmingly approved them in September 2008. However, prior to U.S. ratification, the agreements require the United States to pass legislation to criminalize certain offenses, such as the possession of radioactive material other than nuclear material.

The legislation passed by the House today would implement certain requirements of the 2005 International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the essential 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). The Amendment to the CPPNM requires parties to protect nuclear facilities and material that is stored and used domestically. ICSANT would establish an international framework to strengthen cooperation among countries in combating nuclear terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In 2010 and again last year, the Obama administration submitted draft implementing legislation for the two treaties to Congress. But concerns held by some Members of Congress regarding potential application of the death penalty and unnecessary use of wiretap authority held up the measure for over two years. The bipartisan legislation introduced today is the product of months of negotiations between the House Judiciary Committee leaders and administration officials.

“Preventing nuclear terrorism has been a rare area of agreement among Republicans and Democrats,” said Kingston Reif, Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. “However, our nation’s failure to show leadership on this legislation has contributed to international inertia in addressing the threat.”

Quick congressional approval is important not only to ensure U.S. laws are sufficient but to prod other countries into action. At the Nuclear Security Summit held in Seoul in March 2012, more than 50 countries pledged to seek the entry into force of the CPPNM Amendment by the next summit in 2014.

Reaching this goal will require a major effort as the Amendment will only enter into force after it has been ratified by two-thirds of the parties to the Convention. As of April, only 56 out of 145 states had approved the Amendment; 98 are required to do so before entry into force. Many other countries have indicated that they are waiting for the United States to complete ratification of the two treaties before moving ahead with their own ratification processes.

The FMWG is a coalition of more than 65 leading experts and non-governmental organizations in nuclear security. It was formed to support and help implement the goal of promptly securing all vulnerable fissile materials. For more information, visit www.fmwg.org and follow us on twitter @FMWG.

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]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 28 Jun 2012 00:00:00 CST
In case you missed it amidst a rather eventful news day, the House this evening passed by voice vote H.R. 5889, the Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act of 2012.

This bipartisan legislation would expand and strengthen U.S. efforts to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism by implementing key requirements of the 2005 International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ISCANT) and the essential 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). The House Judiciary Committee favorably reported the legislation on a voice vote to the full House on June 6.

The George W. Bush administration submitted the treaties to the Senate in September 2007 and the Senate overwhelmingly approved them in September 2008. However, prior to U.S. ratification, the agreements require the United States to pass legislation to criminalize specific offenses. There is substantial overlap between existing US anti-terrorism laws (including those implementing anti-terrorism treaties) and the crimes covered by the legislation, but some crimes are not prohibited by existing law. H.R. 5889 criminalizes certain acts relating to the possession and use of radioactive material and radiological dispersal devices and damage to nuclear facilities.

The radiological isotope molybdenum 99 through the decay process generates technetium 99, which is used widely in medical diagnostic procedures. Historically, molybdeneum 99 has been produced using bomb-grade highly enriched uranium – of which the United States is a key supplier -- but NNSA initiatives in recent years have supported U.S. efforts to develop technology that would allow a switch to proliferation-resistant low-enriched uranium.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 26 Jun 2012 00:00:00 CSTrcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 20 Jun 2012 00:00:00 CSTWASHINGTON – The renewal of a key weapons security agreement between the United States and Russia is not a sure thing despite preliminary assurances from an Obama administration official, issue experts warn.

Madelyn Creedon, assistant Defense secretary for global strategic affairs, told a Senate panel last week that the United States is looking to extend the so-called umbrella agreement that allows the United States to do work under the Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative in Russia. The agreement, which has authorized the Russian component of a program that has eliminated 7,619 strategic nuclear warheads and 902 ballistic missiles, among other accomplishments, is due to expire in June of 2013.

Global Consensus Forming on Needed Steps

A network of former prime ministers and leading policymakers from the Asia-Pacific has called for stronger action to prevent the threat of nuclear terrorism. The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network’s (A-PLN) recommendations, which would fill systemic gaps in global defenses against nuclear terrorism, are strongly endorsed by the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), an international coalition of more than 65 non-governmental organizations dedicated to preventing nuclear terrorism.

“It is clear that there is a convergence of expert and political opinion on the need for stronger, more harmonized, and transparent requirements for global nuclear security,” said Kenneth Luongo, co-chair of the FMWG and President of the Partnership for Global Security. “Some may consider this objective to be too difficult to attain because of sovereignty concerns. But, leadership by even a few committed governments can lead to the achievement of these goals and the significant improvement in the protection against nuclear terrorism they will provide.”

The A-PLN, a coalition of thirty former senior political, diplomatic and military leaders from thirteen countries around the region, called on world leaders to bring critical nuclear security treaties into force, establish binding nuclear security standards and mechanisms for transparency, and to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) role in nuclear security. The A-PLN called on world leaders to advance these recommendations through preparations for the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands, and for the Asia-Pacific to consider a regional approach that could serve as a model for others. The A-PLN is convened by Gareth Evans, former Foreign Minister of Australia, and includes former Prime Ministers from Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

The threat of nuclear terrorism is real. Around the world there is enough fissile material for at least 100,000 additional nuclear weapons. If a competent terrorist group acquired a grapefruit-sized amount of this dangerous material, they would be capable of constructing a crude nuclear device.

Additionally, current global measures to protect against nuclear terrorism are inadequate. There are no binding standards of protection for weapons-grade nuclear materials that states must follow. Similarly, there are no mechanisms to ensure that states are following best practices in safeguarding their nuclear material. Critical treaties that would strengthen protections against nuclear terrorism, including the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Material, have not yet entered in to force. Further, the IAEA needs regularized and substantially increased funding for its nuclear security functions.

The recommendations of A-PLN reflect Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s address at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea, where she called on world leaders to develop an “accountability framework” on nuclear security that enables enhanced transparency and peer review. Miles Pomper, senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and FMWG Steering Committee member, indicated that “current international governance in nuclear security is weak. It’s good to see that some countries – such as Australia and South Korea –recognize this fact and are committed to bold action to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism.”

The FMWG aims to provide action-oriented and innovative policy solutions to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism. For more information, visit www.fmwg.org.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgMon, 11 Jun 2012 00:00:00 CSTThe U.S. House Judiciary Committee on Wednesday passed without objection a bill to bring the United States into compliance with four international counterterrorism treaties, including two nuclear security agreements that arms control advocates have long urged the country to ratify (see GSN, March 12).

...

"Speedy congressional consideration is essential to helping better protect the United States and the rest of the world from nuclear terrorism," Miles Pomper, a senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said in the Fissile Materials Working Group press release. "I hope other members of Congress will show the same bipartisan leadership as the House Judiciary Committee and help the United States to ratify these treaties."

"Republicans and Democrats agree that nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security, and have a long history of bipartisan cooperation on efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism," Kingston Reif, nuclear nonproliferation head for the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, added in the document. "However, the inability of the United States to ratify these two essential treaties has been counterproductive and self-defeating."

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgWed, 06 Jun 2012 00:00:00 CSTThe Seoul Nuclear Security Summit held in March 2012 was a watershed event for South Korea. It marked by far the largest gathering of world leaders on South Korean soil. The summit also further cemented the already remarkably close ties between the current U.S. and ROK governments, and offered a showcase for the country’s burgeoning and increasingly export-oriented nuclear industry.

The summit’s ultimate impact is unclear, however. Despite the summit’s incremental steps forward on nuclear security, it seems clear that participants will fall far short of their ultimate goal of securing all vulnerable fissile materials when a four-year push initiated by the United States ends next year. That has led the United States and South Korea to chart out different paths for the future of the summit process, with Seoul advocating a more ambitious course and Washington a more conservative one. And while the summit polished South Korea’s global nuclear reputation, it remains to be seen how much the effort will further Seoul’s goals to win new contracts overseas and obtain concessions in bilateral nuclear negotiations with the United States.

At the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, a number of countries announced they were establishing centers of excellence to provide technical, scientific, and educational support to assist in developing a robust “nuclear security culture,” both nationally and internationally. A number of other centers had also been established prior to the summit, including those associated with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

An assessment of the existing and planned centers indicates that much closer coordination and collaboration among the centers is needed in order to optimize their full potential and to ensure their long-term sustainability.

In this policy analysis brief, Dr. Alan Heyes, a senior visiting research fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, makes recommendations to realize these goals.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 15 May 2012 00:00:00 CSTFor more than 30 years, Kodak Park was home to a little-known underground labyrinth containing a small nuclear research reactor, one of the few of its kind in the world.

It wasn’t a power plant, and carried no risk of explosion. Nothing ever leaked. Eastman Kodak Co. officials say the research device was perfectly safe.

The last two years have delivered substantial progress in bolstering global defenses against nuclear terrorism.This is in large part due to the successes of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington, D.C. and last month’s NSS in Seoul, South Korea.In particular, the Summit process has accelerated efforts to remove and consolidate stockpiles of fissile material around the globe and has succeeded in increasing awareness of a serious global security concern that has long suffered from inattention and inertia.

Nevertheless, nuclear terrorism is still a threat that is out of sight and out of mind for the public, the media, and many governments around the globe.This fundamental lack of attention and understanding is a major obstacle to continued progress on preventing nuclear terrorism.As a result, it is vital that the international expert community continue to educate others on the global dangers of nuclear terrorism and push world leaders to take steps to counter this dire threat.

The Seoul Summit highlighted the fact that media attention on efforts to enhance nuclear security is sorely lacking.In the United States, two major storylines came out of the Seoul Summit, neither of which had to do with the steps that world leaders took to strengthen global nuclear security.First, journalists focused on North Korea’s plans to launch a rocket, abrogating a tentative deal cut with the United States.Second, journalists picked up on an exchange between President Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, wherein the U.S. President indicated that he would have more flexibility to negotiate an agreement on Europe’s missile defense system after the election.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgThu, 03 May 2012 00:00:00 CSTAs a presidential candidate, Barack Obama asserted that the most immediate and extreme threat to national security was that posed by a terrorist organization acquiring a nuclear weapon. As president, he pledged to mitigate that potentiality by securing all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. Simultaneously, Obama pursued a high-profile nonproliferation and arms control strategy that, despite an intensive investment of political capital, has enjoyed only halting progress. Nuclear reduction negotiations with Russia have stalled. Prospects for multilateral treaties governing nuclear tests and the production of nuclear bomb fuel are distant possibilities at best. Meanwhile, Iran and North Korea march steadily forward with their own enrichment and, in the case of Pyongyang, nuclear testing programs, creating associated proliferation risks. Meanwhile, on Obama’s all important four-year goal, initial ebullience has given way to skepticism and plodding progress, most recently illustrated last month by the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea.

In Seoul, heads of state from more than 50 countries came together to take action against the illicit proliferation of materials and technology that can be used to build nuclear weapons or radiological "dirty bombs." The gathering yielded a series of sporadic new attempts to address the lengthening proliferation supply chain around the globe, building on progress made at the inaugural 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, which resulted in bolstered efforts to secure fissile material, primarily in post-Soviet countries.

]]>rcostello@connectusfund.orgTue, 01 May 2012 00:00:00 CSTThe basic aims of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are fairly straightforward: to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; to provide assurances, through international safeguards, that peaceful nuclear activities will not lead to the production of nuclear weapons; to promote, to the maximum extent consistent with the treaty's other provisions, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and eventually to make progress toward nuclear disarmament.

But enforcement of the treaty's provisions has long been a major challenge -- in part because the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is empowered to enforce the Safeguards Agreements that it establishes with individual nations, is not empowered to enforce the treaty as a whole. That is, the agency has no executive force. In any case, its role as an international promoter of "Atoms for Peace" is as important as its safeguards function.

Limits on the IAEA's authority, particularly in the field of nuclear security, amount to a set of serious deficiencies in the nonproliferation regime. For example, the agency cannot require states to establish systems for nuclear security. It has no authority to verify that nuclear materials within states are accorded appropriate physical protection. Even guidance on these issues is provided by the agency only on request, and though the IAEA regularly publishes recommendations PDF on these topics, following the recommendations is not mandatory. No nuclear security mandate requires that states adequately protect their nuclear materials.

In fact, the agency lacks the authority to take action or even comment on the measures that states enact regarding physical protection of nuclear materials unless states request that the agency carry out a specific mission to do so. And even if safeguards inspectors were to note inadequacies in nuclear security, they would not have legal authority to report them.