Recent Tendencies in Ethics eBook

In his own life, so far as it is a moral life, each
individual seeks system or unity. And this unity
is realised on three different levels—­as
we may call them—­which may be distinguished
for clearness’ sake, though it is not possible
actually to separate them. On each level morality
is realised through system, and system is brought about
by the rule of the morally higher and the submission
of the morally lower: in this goodness lies,
in the opposite evil. If we isolate the individual
and consider him apart, he may be said to attain goodness
by the due ordering and control of his sensuous and
passional nature by rational or spiritual ends.
The result may be described, negatively, as the suppression
of sensualism. But the positive description remains
imperfect until we can say what the rational or spiritual
principle is which is to weld all man’s ’particular
impulses’ into an organic whole.

And this cannot be done so long as we contemplate
the mere individual in isolation. We cannot remain
at the level of bare individuality. Personality
itself is not a merely individual product: neither
the knowledge nor the activity of the individual can
be explained without reference to his position as
a member of society; his inheritance is a social inheritance.
Nor can the individual establish a claim to deal with
his own personality as a merely individual end.
It is a factor in social life; and, in systematising
his own life, he must have regard to the social factor.
In this respect he attains goodness only when his
individual life seeks a unity higher than that of his
own individuality, and not centred in his selfish
interests. From this point of view we may say,
again negatively, that goodness consists in the suppression
of selfishness. But once again there is a difficulty
about the positive description. Many moralists,
undoubtedly, are content to rest with the social aspect:
to regard the ‘health’ or ‘vitality’
of society as the final expression of morality.
But a life which is simply absorbed by society cannot
be said to be a perfect unity. Society itself
is a process; and its changes are determined in large
measure by the moral ideals of its members. For
its unity we must look to an end—­an ideal—­of
which its actual forms can offer indications only.
Both man and society are factors in a universal order;
and their perfection cannot be independent of the purpose
of this order. When the consciousness of it fills
man’s life, morality is merged in religion.