Philip E. Pinnell, Asst. U.S. Attorney, Kevin C. Danielson, Office
of the United States Attorney, Carmon Danny Clem, United States
Attorney, Tulsa, OK, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Frederick L. Dunn, III, Tulsa, OK, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before KELLY, O'BRIEN, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
[FN**]

FN**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.

ORDER
AND JUDGMENT
[FN*]

FN*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless,
an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th
Cir. R. 36.3.

PAUL J. KELLY, JR., Circuit Judge.

*1 Defendant-Appellant Johannas Green was convicted on a conditional plea
of guilty of possession of a firearm and ammunition after former conviction
of a felony. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). He was
sentenced to 64 months imprisonment followed by three years supervised
release and was fined $3,000.
He now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence based upon
an unlawful arrest and/or an unlawful search and seizure of his vehicle.
We affirm.

Background

About 4:30 a.m. on January 4, 2004, Mr. Green drove
to the Creek Nation Tulsa Casino, parked his vehicle, and
went into the casino. A sign at the entrance of
the casino parking lot warns that all persons and vehicles
are subject to search, and that it is unlawful to
carry firearms on casino property. A security guard in the
parking lot observed that the wing window on the driver's
side of Mr. Green's vehicle was broken. Suspecting a stolen
vehicle, she requested assistance. While shining a flashlight into the
passenger side of the vehicle to see if the steering
wheel had been "popped," the guard observed a gun in
the middle of the front floorboard.

Meanwhile, Mr. Green emerged
from the casino. Apparently noticing the officers near his vehicle, he
went back in only to emerge a few seconds later. He asked the officers
about their presence near the vehicle. Mr. Green was asked for identification;
he responded that his identification was in the vehicle. A tribal police
officer (but one that was not cross-deputized) requested Mr. Green's keys
several times. When the keys were not forthcoming, the officer told him
that he would be arrested for disobeying a police officer and for having
a firearm when it was prohibited by tribal law. Mr. Green then fled the
scene.

Thereafter, another tribal police officer, one cross-deputized by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, arrived on the scene and was briefed
about Mr. Green and his vehicle. The cross-deputized officer recalled
an encounter with Mr. Green less than a month previously.
During that encounter, the cross-deputized officer learned that Mr. Green
was residing in a halfway house for recently released inmates.
He also recalled that Mr. Green had broken the vehicle's
window in order to retrieve keys.

The cross-deputized officer personally observed the gun in Mr. Green's
vehicle, and then had the vehicle impounded and inventoried after
deciding that it had been abandoned. In response to a
variety of theories urged by Mr. Green for suppression of
the evidence, the district court held that (1) the law
enforcement personnel acted on reasonable suspicion in investigating Mr. Green's
vehicle as a possible stolen vehicle, (2) though the non
cross-deputized law enforcement personnel may have lacked the authority to
arrest Mr. Green in connection with a federal offense, they
certainly had the authority to detain and refer him to
the proper authorities, (3) Mr. Green voluntarily abandoned the vehicle
upon his flight. In the alternative, the district court held
that (4) the cross-deputized tribal officer had probable cause to
search and inventory the vehicle based upon his suspicion that
Mr. Green was a convicted felon and his observation of
the gun in the vehicle.

*2
On appeal, Mr. Green argues that the search and seizure by the tribal
police was unlawful. He contends that the district court erred in finding
that (a) Mr. Green voluntarily abandoned his vehicle, (b) the tribal police
had probable cause to arrest Mr. Green or authority to impound and inventory
his vehicle with a search warrant. The predicate of Mr. Green's claims
is that tribal law cannot be enforced against non-Indians and consequently,
the events that led to Mr. Green's flight were improper. Mr. Green argues
that the search and seizure is based upon probable cause developed after
it occurred, and that a search warrant was required. He argues that the
tribal police lacked a search warrant, probable cause, consent from Mr.
Green, or exigent circumstances.

Discussion

When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to
suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government, accepting the district court's factual findings unless
clearly erroneous. United
States v. Cantu,
405 F.3d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir.2005). Fourth amendment reasonableness is
reviewed de novo. Id.

The district court did not err
in denying the motion to suppress. Tribal criminal jurisdiction may extend
to both member and non-member Indians. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2);
United States v. Lara,
541 U.S. 193, 209 (2004). It does not extend to non-Indians. Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). That said, tribal officers do have the authority
to investigate violations
of law on tribal land, and detain persons, including non-Indians, suspected
of violating the law. Duro
v. Reina, 495 U.S.
676, 696-97 (1990) ( "Tribal law enforcement authorities have the
power to restrain those who disturb public order on the reservation, and
if necessary, to eject them. Where jurisdiction to try and punish an offender
rests outside the tribe, tribal officers may exercise their power to detain
the offender and transport him to the proper authorities."); United
States v. Terry, 400
F.3d 575, 579-80 (8th Cir.2005). Moreover, tribal authorities may investigate
unauthorized possession of firearms on gaming premises which is proscribed
by tribal law. See
Muscogee (Creek) Nation Code Ann., tit. 21., § 5-116(C).

An officer may seize evidence of a crime if it
is in plain view, its incriminating character is immediately apparent,
and the officer has a lawful right of access to
the item. Horton
v. California,
496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990). The security guard certainly could
investigate whether Mr. Green's vehicle was in fact stolen. We
have suggested that incriminating evidence that may be seen through
the window of a vehicle may be in plain view.
United
States v. Sparks,
291 F.3d 683, 692 (10th Cir.2002). This view may be
assisted by a flashlight without any infringement of Fourth Amendment
rights. Texas
v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (plurality opinion); United
States v. Ortiz,
63 F.3d 952, 954 (10th Cir.1995).

*3
Having personally observed the gun and knowing Mr. Green's background
as a felon, we have no
doubt that the cross-deputized officer had probable cause to conclude
that the gun was evidence of a crime. Thus, no warrant was required for
law enforcement to seize the gun. See
Soldal v. Cook County, Ill.,
506 U.S. 56, 68 (1992) (seizure of property in plain view without a warrant
is authorized only when probable cause exists to associate property with
criminal activity); Sparks,
291 F.3d at 690-91; United
States v. Hatten, 68
F.3d 257, 261 (8th Cir.1995). Given our holding, it is unnecessary to
address whether Mr. Green abandoned the vehicle thereby justifying the
inventory search and whether Mr. Green gave implied consent to search
his vehicle by entering the casino property.