Considered and decided by Randall,
Presiding Judge, Schumacher, Judge, and Shumaker, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

RANDALL, Judge

Appellants Sears Home Improvement Products (SHIP) and Eric Thompson challenge the
district court's judgment holding them liable for sexual harassment and hostile
work environment. Appellants challenge
the judgment and the district court's denial of their post trial motion arguing
that (1) the district court erred by failing to make independent findings; (2)
the district court erred by concluding that respondent proved her sexual
harassment and hostile environment claims; (3) the district court erred by
admitting irrelevant, prejudicial, and improper evidence, and the district
court erred by improperly commenting about the case; (4) the district court
erred by upholding the damage award; (5) the district court erred by concluding
that appellants are jointly and severally liable for the damage award; and (6)
the district court erred by imposing a civil penalty on SHIP. Respondent Chantel Devane filed a notice of
review challenging the district court's decision to award attorney fees and
seeks additional attorney fees. We
affirm the district court on all issues.

FACTS

In March of 1999, respondent Chantal
Devane began working as a sales representative for SHIP's predecessor, American
Home Improvement Products, in its Brooklyn Park office. Respondent testified that, at her interview,
Craig Ohren, SHIP's District Sales Manager, asked her several inappropriate
questions, such as whether she was married, had any children, or planned to
have any children. Respondent testified
that while she worked with Ohren he told her that his wife did not satisfy him
sexually, and that his wife did not understand that he has a "wild side." Timothy Divinski, a sales representative at
SHIP, testified that another manager named Greg Davis told him that respondent
was snobby, a "f---ing c--t," and that "it must be that time of the month" or
she must "be on the rag." Divinski also
testified that Davis told him "he would like to let [respondent] have it." In June or July of 1999, Divinski took over
Ohren's position. Divinski testified
that he believed Ohren sexually harassed respondent, but he took no action
because he felt he would lose his job over it.

In January 2000, Eric Thompson
became Sales Manager at SHIP's Brooklyn Park office. Respondent testified that Thompson began to make sexually
inappropriate comments to her almost immediately after he began. She testified that when she bent over
Thompson said, "Ummm" or "Damn."
Respondent also testified that Thompson stood behind her in the hallway
and stated, "Mmmm, mmmm, mmmm, I would like to get me some of that." She stated that she heard Thompson make that
comment on several occasions, although not always directed toward her. Robert Lincoln, project coordinator at SHIP,
testified that he heard Thompson make this comment to respondent. Lincoln also testified that Thompson told
him he "would like to f---" respondent, and that respondent was "a spoiled
c--t," and a "b--ch." By spring 2000,
respondent interacted with Thompson four days a week, typically in the
mornings, and before spring 2000, respondent visited the office twice a
week. Cassandra Knutson, a sales
representative at SHIP, and respondent both testified that Thompson told them
that while having sex with one women at a hotel the night before, he had phone
sex with another woman, and a third women was waiting at the door to have sex
with him. Respondent testified that
Thompson told her that he liked women with "big butts and large breasts." Respondent testified that Thompson told her
that Knutson was "fine," had a "nice booty," and that he slept with her. Respondent also testified that Thompson made
a thrusting motion simulating intercourse while telling stories she was unable
to hear. Lincoln testified that after
Knutson's initial job interview, Thompson told him, he "hit every hole" with
her and that "She was in the same clothes she was in when she left." Lincoln also testified that Thompson told
him that Knutson had a "nice rack."
According to Lincoln, respondent and Knutson would walk down the hall
and Thompson would put his hand on his crotch and say, "Um, I would like to get
me some of that."

Knutson testified that Thompson told her he liked the way her "booty
shakes." Knutson also testified that
when she and Thompson were out for a work appointment Thompson stated, "Don't
you think they want -- they wanted to do me, didn't they[,]" in reference to
two ladies they passed. She also stated
that Thompson told her that on one business outing a lady answered the door in
a robe, and that he "got that sale."
Knutson testified that Thompson treated women in the workplace "like
sexual objects."

Respondent testified that Trisha
Clemes, an office manager at SHIP, told her that Thompson would brush up
against her "any chance he g[ot]."
Lincoln testified that Clemes complained to him saying that Thompson
wouldn't leave her alone, continued to make comments, brushed up against her
breasts and buttocks, rubbed her, and that she couldn't take it anymore.

Respondent testified that she told
Thompson he was a "disgusting pig," he had given her "[m]ore information than
she needed," he was inappropriate, and she "[did not] want to hear it." Respondent testified that she complained
three or four times to Lincoln about Thompson.
Lincoln testified that at a meeting Thompson told respondent that she
needed to show her breasts, her legs, and her buttocks in order to increase her
sales. Lincoln testified that he told
Thompson that he could not talk to respondent in that manner. Thompson told Lincoln that he did nothing
wrong and that he was just trying to motivate people.

Respondent also stated that Thompson told her that she should wear a
short skirt and knee-high boots so she could attract more business from male
customers. Respondent, Knutson, and
Lincoln all testified that Thompson created a "skin to win" contest where
whoever dressed "sexy" and showed parts of their body, would receive a 25-inch
color television paid for by Thompson.
Respondent stated that she told Thompson that he was disgusting and that
it would be inappropriate to wear such clothing to work. Respondent, Knutson, and Lincoln testified
that Thompson spent the day calling, "Here, kitty, kitty," to respondent after
she wore a leopard-print cardigan to work one day. Respondent also testified that that same day Thompson called her
cat woman and stated, "Cat woman is looking hot," and then asked her if the
leopard print sweater made her feel "saucy."
On Halloween of 2000, respondent came to work wearing a doctor costume,
and Thompson gestured to her by unbuckling her pants and telling her, "Here
Doctor. It hurts here[,]" while
pointing to his groin.

Respondent also stated that Curtis
Conley, Regional Director of Sales, told sexually explicit jokes in front of
her and others at sales meetings.
Respondent stated that Conley told her that she should try to use her
appearance to persuade male customers to buy from her. Lincoln
testified that Conley told him that Knutson had a "nice rack!"

Respondent testified that Joe Napolitano, a project coordinator manager
from SHIPS's Chicago office, repeatedly asked respondent to go out with him,
assuring her that her husband "wouldn't have to know about it." Respondent testified that when she spoke
with Napolitano on the phone regarding a business matter he told her, "I am
just trying to picture you naked right now trying to bundle up from the
cold." He then told her that he was
fantasizing about how she looked and how he would keep her warm.

Before Lincoln located to Minneapolis from SHIP's St.
Louis Missouri office, Timothy Graham, Conley, and another employee named
"Darko" went out to a business dinner, for the purpose of discussing the
Brooklyn Park office. Lincoln testified
that at dinner, Conley commented that Knutson had a "very nice rack," and that
Thompson had slept with her. Lincoln
testified that Conley told him that respondent was a "spoiled b--ch" and that
she sold well because she had a "nice a--."
After dinner, Conley left, but Graham, SHIP's Regional Director of
Operations, took his subordinates to a topless bar, where they debated whether
respondent shaved her pubic hair or had "a landing strip." Lincoln also stated that Graham commented
that he would like to "bang" respondent, and "get a hold of [Knutson]." Lincoln testified that Graham came to the
office where Lincoln and respondent worked, and invited Lincoln to go to the
topless bars with him and "get some p---y in [his] face." Lincoln felt that if he didn't go he would
be treated differently, and that he was treated differently when he declined
Graham's invitations.

In February 2000, respondent called
SHIP's "Ethics Hotline" and complained about Thompson's management style and
inappropriate conduct. She told the
hotline about Thompson telling inappropriate stories at the office, and
speaking derogatorily toward and about women.
Klinzing testified that on February 29, 2000, he received respondent's
complaint. Klinzing testified that he
called respondent and she expressed dissatisfaction with Thompson's management
style and that he was treating everyone like children. He testified that he received no information
from respondent that she was being sexually harassed. The report did not contain any sexual-harassment
accusations. A day or two later,
respondent received a phone call from Klinzing, responding to her phone
call. Respondent testified that
Klinzing promised to get back to her but never did. In mid-March, Respondent phoned Klinzing again and he told her
that he spoke with Conley, and that there was nothing he could do.

In late March, respondent called Conley and reiterated her concerns. Conley said that he was aware of her
concerns, had spoken with Thompson, but there was nothing more he could
do. Respondent called Conley again to
report Thompson's specific sexual comments and stories, but Conley told her
that he could not deal with it right now and that he would get back to
her. Respondent testified that Conley
never contacted her.

In May 2000, respondent complained
to Jim Brown, SHIP's vice president of sales, about SHIP's lack of response to
her prior sexual-harassment complaints.
Respondent testified that Brown told her that he would check into the
situation, and he never did. Respondent
stated that she called Brown back, and he told her that he had "no specific
answers."

Respondent and Clemes both talked to
Lincoln about Thompson's harassment.
When Lincoln's attempts to deal directly with Thompson failed, Lincoln
called Graham and told him that he had received several complaints of Thompson
rubbing up against women, and saying inappropriate things. Lincoln testified that he specifically told
Graham that he attended sales meetings where Thompson told respondent to "start
showing some t-ts and a--" to increase sales.
Lincoln stated that Graham told him to keep his mouth shut and keep his
"nose in [his] own business." When
Thompson would not stop his behavior, Lincoln called Graham again, and told him
that Thompson's conduct toward respondent was getting worse. Graham told him to "keep [his] mouth
shut." Graham also told him, "If you
don't like what you hear, close the door and keep the door shut. I told you this before. I am not telling you again."

On May 12, 2000, respondent
resigned. The May 12 resignation does
not mention specific sexual harassment complaints, but mentions her
dissatisfactions with not receiving commissions, and SHIP's failure to resolve
"issues that have evolved in the past few months and have gotten increasingly worse
with time." On May 25, 2000, respondent
sent an email to Brown stating that Thompson acted inappropriately and
disrespectfully toward her and that SHIP failed to take any action to resolve
the situation. Respondent testified
that Brown never responded.

In early July 2000, respondent came back to work after Larry Loftness, a
sales representative, encouraged her to return. Respondent stated, "It was pretty tame the first couple of weeks
but eventually the different comments and the same behavior started happening
again in the office." Respondent
testified that she tried to talk to Conley several times about the same issues,
but that he either did not return her calls, or when she did reach him, he just
listened to her complaints and told her to let him know if anything else came
up.

Respondent testified that when she went back to work in July 2000, the
situation started to affect her emotionally.
Respondent testified that she started to feel nervous about coming into
work, started having panic attacks, and was scared to be around Thompson. She stated that during these panic attacks,
she had chest pains, felt dizzy and nauseous, experienced dry mouth and
migraine headaches, and had such trouble breathing that she feared for her
life. She stated the panic attacks
occurred several times each week and typically lasted 10-15 minutes each.

Respondent also stated that she
experienced changes in her relationships as a result of the harassment. She stated that she withdrew socially and
didn't talk to as many people.
Respondent also testified that the harassment caused marital problems
because she began pushing her husband away.
Respondent testified that the sexual harassment harmed her self-image,
and that she wondered if she was the problem.
Respondent also testified that she tried alternative or holistic
treatments and talked to a psychologist to cope with her emotional
distress.

In June 2001 and April 2002, Dr. Lois Schlutter, a clinical psychologist,
evaluated respondent. Dr. Schlutter
testified that respondent suffered sexual harassment at SHIP and that the
harassment caused psychological pain.
Dr. Schlutter testified respondent was scared to go to work, felt
trapped, felt anxiety, and that she felt even more abused and trapped when SHIP
did nothing about her complaints. She
also testified that respondent suffered heart palpitations, chest discomfort,
shortness of breath, shaking, nausea, fear of losing control, and dizziness. Dr. Schlutter stated that respondent felt
that things were not quite real or "de-realization", and that she could not get
herself to work. She stated that
respondent's panic and anxiety symptoms caused her self-doubt, lack of
self-confidence, and undermined her sense of self. She also stated that respondent experienced insomnia, headaches,
and gastrointestinal problems because of the sexual harassment. Dr. Schlutter testified that respondent
"will need some years of psychotherapy and [possibly] medication, but for
certain psychotherapy."

On May 2, 2001, respondent sued SHIP
for sexual harassment and reprisal under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA),
and for unpaid commissions. Respondent
also sued Thompson for aiding and abetting sexual harassment. The case was tried before an advisory jury,
and the trial began on May 14, 2002. On
June 4, 2002, the advisory jury returned a special verdict. The advisory jury found in SHIP's favor
regarding respondent's reprisal claim, but found in respondent's favor
regarding her sexual harassment claim against SHIP, and her aiding-and-abetting
claim against Thompson. The jury denied
respondent any past economic damages and the court directed a verdict against
her for any future lost income. The
advisory jury awarded respondent $500,000 for mental anguish up until trial, and
$250,000 for future mental anguish.

On July 2, 2002, the district court
adopted the jury's verdict, and issued Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and
Order for Judgment. Based on those
findings, the district court concluded that SHIP was liable for sexual
harassment, Thompson was liable for aiding and abetting sexual harassment, and
respondent was entitled to compensatory damages totaling $750,000 (exactly the
amount of the advisory jury special verdict).
The court also awarded respondent $8,500 in punitive damages. Finally, the district court held that
respondent was entitled to reasonable attorney fees. Subsequently, respondent submitted a petition for an award of reasonable
costs and attorney fees.

On December 17, 2002, the district
court issued subsequent findings and entered judgment rejecting in part
respondent's fee petition and finding that "the 40% (contingency fee) provided
for attorneys' fees in Mr. Laurie's contract with the [respondent was]
reasonable, sufficient, and fully compensat[ed] Mr. Laurie for his professional
services." Laurie had applied for an
additional $349,000 over and above his 40% of $750,000. The court then granted attorney fees in the
amount of $2,798.10 for services performed on respondent's behalf by Rider, Bennett,
Egan & Arundel. The court also
ordered SHIP to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 to the state of
Minnesota. Subsequently, on January 6,
2003, the district court denied appellants' motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict and Amended Findings, or New trial or Remittitur. On January 17, 2003, the July 2, 2002 order
for judgment was entered. This appeal
follows.

D
E C I S I O N

1. Independent Findings

Appellants
argue that the district court "refused" to make its own independent findings
because it adopted the advisory jury's findings of fact and verdict. We disagree. MHRA claims "shall be heard and determined by a judge sitting
without a jury." Minn. Stat. § 363.14,
subd. 2 (2002). But it is beyond
dispute that the district court may try a case with an advisory jury. Minn. R. Civ. P. 39.02. When a jury acts in an advisory capacity,
the district court is free to accept or reject the verdict. Agner v. Bourn, 281 Minn. 385, 400,
161 N.W.2d 813, 823 (1968). The
district court is not required to adopt the advisory jury's findings and is
required to make its own independent findings.
Doan v. Medtronic, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 100, 105 (Minn. App. 1997), review
denied (Minn. May 14, 1997); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01
(stating that it is necessary that trial courts find facts
and state conclusions clearly and specifically).

The
district court adopted the jury's verdict and findings of fact. As in this case, district courts are
entitled to empanel advisory juries.
District courts are free to accept or reject the advisory jury's
verdict. The district court is required
to make independent findings to show it independently arrived at its legal
conclusions, but it is always possible that an advisory jury's recommendations
reflect the district court's view of the case.
In its July 2, 2002 order, the district court adopted the
advisory jury's findings of fact and issued eleven separate findings of facts
in support of the verdict. The district
court did enough to show that it independently reviewed the advisory jury's
findings of fact. Even though the
district court adopted the advisory jury's verdict and findings of fact, it did
not fail to make reasoned independent findings.

2. Sexual Harassment and Hostile Work
Environment

Appellants argue that respondent failed to prove the existence of sexual
harassment and hostile work environment.
We disagree. A district court's
"findings should not be disturbed on appeal if they are reasonably supported by
the evidence as a whole." Johnson v.
Ramsey County, 424 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 24, 1988). A district
court's "decision will be reversed only if the result is clearly
erroneous." Id. Findings are not
clearly erroneous if reasonably supported by the evidence in the record as a
whole, with due regard given to the trial court's opportunity to judge the
credibility of the witnesses. Minn. R.
Civ. P. 52.01; see also Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 386 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. 1986) ("Employment
discrimination cases often involve intricate factual issues in which only the
trial court, with its opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand, can
meaningfully assess the weight and credibility of the evidence.").

Under the MHRA, sexual harassment includes "unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, sexually motivated physical contact or other verbal
or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature," which
has the effect of "substantially interfering with an individual's
employment." Minn. Stat. § 363.01,
subd. 41 (2002). To establish a prima
facie case of sexual harassment based on hostile work environment, a claimant
must show: (1) that the conduct was unwelcome; (2) that the harassment was
based on sex; (3) that the conduct was pervasive enough to create an abusive
working environment; and (4) that there is some basis for imputing knowledge or
liability to the employer. Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd., 585 N.W.2d 853, 861 (Minn. App. 1998). If
discriminatory harassment is present, such conduct is not actionable unless it
is "so severe or pervasive" as to " alter the conditions of the [plaintiffs']
employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717,
725 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted). Whether harassment is
sufficiently severe to constitute discrimination must be determined based on
the totality of the circumstances, including examination of the "nature,
frequency, intensity, location, context, duration, and object or target" of the
conduct. Klink
v. Ramsey County by Zacharias, 397 N.W.2d 894, 901 (Minn. App. 1986) (addressing sexual harassment), review
denied (Minn. Feb. 13, 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Cummings v.
Koehnen, 568 N.W.2d 418, 420 n. 2
(Minn. 1997).

Because the evidence showed that appellants
subjected respondent to repeated
unwelcome sexually offensive conduct, respondent proved her sexual-harassment
and hostile-work-environment claims. Not
only did respondent testify to several instances of sexual harassment that
began with her initial employment interview, several witnesses confirmed her
testimony. Divinski corroborated the
testimony respondent gave about Ohren, and Lincoln corroborated respondent's
testimony about Thompson and Conley.
Because respondent saw Thompson four days a week, and later, twice a
week at sales meetings, respondent frequently endured Thompson's sexually
inappropriate behavior. On several
occasions, respondent and other SHIP employees complained to various SHIP personnel,
but SHIP did nothing. Respondent testified
that SHIP personnel repeatedly failed to follow up on her claims, and Lincoln
testified that he was told to keep his mouth shout. The district court considered this testimony and found the
witnesses credible. Given the totality
of the circumstances, the record supports the district court's conclusion that
respondent established a prima facie case of sexual harassment and hostile work
environment.

3. Evidence

Next,
appellant argues that the district judge erred by admitting
irrelevant, prejudicial and improper evidence, and the district court erred by
improperly commenting about the case. We disagree. A district court's evidentiary ruling "will
not be disturbed unless it is based on an erroneous view of the law or
constitutes an abuse of discretion." Kroning
v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42, 45-46 (Minn. 1997) (quotation
omitted). Even if an evidentiary ruling is erroneous, it
will not be reversed unless it resulted in prejudice. Id. at 46. An evidentiary error is prejudicial if it
might reasonably be said to have changed the result of the trial. See
State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 198 (Minn. 1995) (providing that an error
in admitting evidence is prejudicial "if there is a reasonable possibility
that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the
evidence had not been admitted").

A. Former SHIP employee testimony

Appellants argue that the
district court abused its discretion by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial
testimony that had nothing to do with respondent. Specifically, appellants contend that Lincoln's testimony about
the dinner and strip club he attended with SHIP supervisors was irrelevant
because it was not directed at respondent.

Evidence is relevant if it has
"any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Minn. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its
prejudicial effect will substantially outweigh its probative value. Minn. R. Evid. 403. But evidence of discrimination not directed
at the plaintiff is relevant to show the employer's sexist, racist, ageist, or
otherwise corporate culture. See, e.g., Hamblin v. Alliant Techsystems,
636 N.W.2d 150, 154 (Minn. App. 2001) (evidence of discriminatory corporate
culture is relevant to show discriminatory intent).

The court allowed several former SHIP employees to testify about
several alleged acts of sexual harassment committed by male managementlevel
personnel. Appellants are particularly
concerned with Lincoln's testimony about the conversations that took place when
Lincoln attended dinner and a strip club with SHIP supervisors. The testimony consisted of sexually explicit
statements made by both SHIP supervisors about SHIP employees. Although some of the testimony by Lincoln
and other former SHIP employees extended to the outer limits of what is
relevant, the district court had wide discretion in determining which evidence
was relevant. See State v. Boitnott, 443 N.W.2d 527, 534 (Minn. 1989) (concluding
that district courts have "wide discretion in determining relevance and the
probative value of evidence"). The
court allowed this testimony because it was relevant to respondent's burden of
showing a hostile environment.
Appellants were free to cross-examine and/or deny any part of this
testimony. We conclude the district
court did not abuse its discretion by allowing former SHIP employees to testify
about the comments made by SHIP supervisors.

B. Agency

An admission is not
hearsay and is admissible if offered against a party and made by the party's
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment. Minn. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(D); see also Minn. R.
Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) 1989 comm. cmt. (stating that rule 801(d)(2)(D) "rejects
the strict agency theory in determining whether or not the statement is
admissible" and "requires only that the statement be made concerning a matter
within the scope of the agency"). Appellants argue that the district court's
decision to admit the testimony made by former SHIP employees was improper
because the statements were made outside the scope of employment. This argument is of limited
value. No company would ever admit that
its employees committed sexual harassment "within the scope of their
employment." Further, illegal acts are
not allowed whether an employee is acting within the scope of employment or
not. Thus, we find that the district
court did not err by admitting this testimony.

C. Judge's comment

Appellants further argue that
the court erred by commenting about the case.
Following the court's ruling that Lincoln's testimony would not be
stricken, the judge commented that "[Lincoln's testimony] goes to the hostile
environment that was apparently rampant . . . at SHIP[.]" After hearing testimony from several
witnesses about the instances of sexual harassment at SHIP, the judge's comment
was not inappropriate. See In re Estate of Lange, 398 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Minn. App. 1986) ("Bias
or prejudice, to be disqualifying, must stem from an extrajudicial source and
result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge
learned from his participation in the case").

D. Expert
testimony

A qualified
witness may give expert testimony "[i]f scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue." Minn.
R. Evid. 702. The opinions of experts
are admitted when "the subject matter of the inquiry is such that inexperienced
persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it
without such assistance." Wyatt v.
Wyett, 200 Minn. 106, 110, 273 N.W. 600, 601-02 (1937). The standard of review of expert-testimony
admissibility is two-pronged. Goeb
v. Thoraldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 815 (Minn. 2000). The first prong, general acceptance in the relevant scientific
field, is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. Under the
second prong, expert-witness qualifications and helpfulness are reviewed under
an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id.

Appellants argue that the district court abused its
discretion by allowing Dr. Schlutter to testify that respondent was sexually
harassed, which was consistent with Dr. Schlutter's understanding of the
term. When respondent's counsel asked
Dr. Schlutter whether she had reached an opinion with a reasonable degree of
psychological certainty that respondent was sexually harassed, appellants
objected, and the district court sustained the objection. The judge ruled that Dr. Schlutter could
give her opinion within the context of her own definition of sexual harassment
but not the legal definition.
Respondent's counsel then changed his question and asked, "In accordance
with the definition that you just gave of sexual harassment, do you have an
opinion with a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that [respondent]
suffered sexual harassment at [SHIP]?"
Dr. Schlutter responded, "My opinion is that [respondent] did suffer
sexual harassment at [SHIP]." The court
properly sustained appellants' first objection and any indication that Dr. Schlutter
was giving improper expert testimony was corrected or was harmless error. Under the circumstances of this case, it was
not a surprise to the advisory jury, the judge, or defense counsel that
respondent's expert thought respondent was sexually harassed. Even assuming that it was error in the way
it came in, it did not substantially change the outcome of the case or
materially prejudice appellant. See State v. Nunn, 561 N.W.2d 902, 907
(Minn. 1997) (stating that "[r]eversal is warranted only when the
error substantially influences the jury's decision").

Appellants also argue that Dr. Schlutter was not a
qualified witness, her testimony failed to assist the fact-finder, and the
testimony was prejudicial because respondent's notice to appellants that Dr.
Schlutter would possibly testify was untimely.
We find no merit to these arguments.
There is nothing to indicate that Dr. Schlutter was not qualified to
testify as an expert witness.
Respondent's counsel properly laid foundation to establish her qualifications
as an expert, and the district court was in the best position to determine if
Dr. Schlutter was qualified and if Dr. Schlutter's testimony was helpful to her
and members of the advisory jury.
Respondent notified appellants of Dr. Schlutter's potential for being a
witness one month and as long as one year before trial. Appellants
failed to explain why this amount of prior notice was prejudicial, and we find
respondent's notice timely. We
conclude the district court did not err by admitting Dr. Schlutter's
testimony.

4. Damage Award

Appellants argue that
the district court
erred by upholding the damage award because there is no causal
connection between respondent's alleged injuries and the damage award, and the
damage award is excessive when compared with other compensatory damage
awards. The discretion to grant a new
trial on the ground of excessive damages rests with the trial court, whose
determination will only be overturned for abuse of that discretion. Advanced Training Sys. v. Caswell Equip.
Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984).
"The trial judge has large discretion' in determining if damages are
excessive and whether the cure is a [remittitur] or a new trial." Hanson v. Chicago, Rock Island &
Pac. R.R. Co., 345 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 1984). Appellate courts have stated that a verdict should be set aside
if it "shocks the conscience." Verhel v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 709,
359 N.W.2d 579, 591 (Minn. 1984).

Here, the psychologist's
testimony and respondent's evidence, including but not limited to heart
palpitations, chest discomfort, shortness of breath, shaking, nausea, fear of
losing control, and dizziness combined with evidence of her insomnia,
headaches, and gastrointestinal problems are sufficient to support the verdict. The evidence supports the verdict, and the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a new
trial or remittitur on grounds the damage award was excessive.

5. Jointly and Severally Liable

Appellants argue that the district court erred by concluding that SHIP
and Thompson are jointly and severally liable.
We disagree. The MHRA prohibits
employers from discrimination on the basis of gender in places of their
respective employment. Minn. Stat. §
363.03, subd. 1(2)(c) (2002). The MHRA
also provides that any person unfairly discriminates when they "intentionally
aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce a person to engage in any of the practices
forbidden" under the statute. Id., subd. 6(1) (2002) (emphasis
added). Under the "single divisible
rule," apportionment is not required where two defendants caused harm to
plaintiff through closely related wrongful acts. Canada v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496, 507 (Minn. 1997). Where the
harm is indivisible, each actor is liable for the entire harm. Id. The defendant must prove that any damages
caused by other factors were divisible, and if so, what portions of damages the
defendant caused. Id.

Appellants argue that Thompson could not have aided and abetted SHIP
because the MHRA statute attaches liability to any person who aids and abets a person to commit unlawful acts under
the statute, not employers. But
appellants fail to cite any authority for this assertion. See
Ganguli v. Univ. of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n. 1 (Minn. App. 1994) (declining
to address allegations unsupported by legal analysis or citation). Consequently, we decline to address this
argument. Given that appellants failed
to prove that their acts were divisible or specify which party caused any
particular portion of the damages, the district court did not error by
concluding that SHIP and Thompson are jointly and severally liable for the
damage award in this case.

6. Civil Penalty

SHIP
claims that the $50,000 civil penalty assessed by the district court is
excessive and unsupported by the evidence.
We disagree. The district court
has the discretion to determine the amount of a civil penalty, and that
decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Gillson v. State DNR, 492 N.W.2d 835,
843 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 1993). The judge shall order any party found to be
in violation of any provision of section 363.03 to pay a civil penalty to the
state. Minn. Stat. § 363.071, subd. 2
(1992). The "judge shall determine the
amount of the civil penalty to be paid, taking into account the seriousness and
extent of the violation, the public harm occasioned by the violation, whether
the violation was intentional, and the financial resources of the
[party]." Id. A civil penalty is intended to supplement
compensatory and punitive damages. Bradley
v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 471 N.W.2d 670, 678 (Minn. App. 1991), review
denied (Minn. Aug. 2, 1991).

Because we conclude that the
evidence supports the verdict, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by imposing a $50,000 civil penalty on SHIP. SHIP's apparent inability to follow through on
complaints of sexual harassment could have perpetuated the inappropriate
behavior of
Thompson and other employees, and the total climate at work regarding gender
issues. The district court was in the
best position to assess the seriousness of the offense and other factors.

7. Attorney Fees

Respondent and amicus curiae, the National Employment Lawyers Association
(NELA), claim
that the district court erred by only giving respondent's attorney his 40
percent contingency fee and not awarding another substantial amount over and
above the contingent fee. We are not
persuaded that this district court improperly assessed attorney fees.

"On
review, this court will not reverse a trial court's award or denial of attorney
fees absent an abuse of discretion." Becker
v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng'g Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 1987). The reasonable value of counsel's work is a
question of fact and this court must uphold the district court's findings on
that issue unless they are clearly erroneous.
Amerman v. Lakeland Dev. Corp., 295 Minn. 536, 537, 203 N.W.2d 400, 400-01 (1973). Under the relevant
language of the MHRA, "reasonable attorney's fees" may be awarded. Minn. Stat. § 363.071, subd. 2. Appellants argue that the district court
failed to calculate attorney fees in accordance with the lodestar method that
multiplies the reasonable hourly rate times the reasonable number of hours expended. Shepard v. City of St. Paul, 380 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Minn. App. 1985). A
reasonable rate is based on prevailing market rates in the community. Id.

The
district court concluded that:

[respondent]
entered into an Agreement with her attorney's firm, Laurie & Laurie, P.A.
that provides for the payment of "40% of any total amount recovered either by
way of suit or settlement" plus costs.
In support of his application for attorney fees beyond the amount set
forth in the Agreement, [respondent's] attorney avers that, based upon the
hours involved in this case and the value of his professional expertise, his
reasonable fees (above the Agreement) would be an additional $349,605.75. This includes a 50% enhancement of the
actual hourly fees incurred, and would give Mr. Laurie's firm more tha[n] twice
the fee he agreed to accept in his 40% contingency fee contract. The Agreement between the [respondent] and
her attorney provides that 40% of the $750,000 judgment previously issued by
this Court will be paid to Laurie and Laurie, P.A. in attorneys' fees and
totals $300,000. This Court finds that
to be a reasonable total fee and will not grant any additional fees to
[respondent's] attorney or his firm above that amount. This Court finds that $2,798.10 for attorney
fees [respondent] incurred with Rider Bennett Egan & Arundel prior to the
Laurie firm's acceptance of [respondent's] case reasonable and will grant
Judgment in that amount to Rider Bennett Egan & Arundel, to be paid by the
Defendants in addition to the judgment for $750,000.00

We
recognize respondent's point that a contingency fee contract is not the
determinative legal test. But that does
not mean that the amount the contingency fee engenders cannot be examined to
consider what is reasonable compensation.
We cannot find that the district court's conclusion that $300,000 to
respondent's attorney was reasonable was an abuse of discretion. The court properly considered the reasonable
hours devoted to this case, the result, and other relevant factors. Respondent and NELA failed to show how the
district court abused its discretion on the issue of reasonable attorney
fees.