During the decade after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, all
the gulf states set out to strengthen their armed forces by converting
to the most modern weapons they could obtain and assimilate. By
1993 each state had at least a modest inventory of tanks and other
armored equipment, air defense missiles, combat aircraft, armed
helicopters, and missile-armed naval craft with which to deter
an intruder. Kuwait is less prepared than the others, not having
recovered from the losses it suffered in personnel and equipment
during the Persian Gulf War. A fundamental constraint for all
the gulf states has been the limited pool of qualified manpower
and, in most countries, the problem of attracting recruits when
better employment opportunities exist in the civilian sector.
The emphasis on advanced weaponry is part of an effort to minimize
the need for personnel. As stated by a senior Kuwaiti officer,
the object is to obtain the best equipment technologically, "easy
to maintain, understand, and operate . . . the greatest firepower
for the smallest human effort." But integrating modern weapons
into the gulf armies and ensuring their effective operation create
other problems. Such problems include the necessity of continued
reliance on foreign officers and foreign maintenance and training
staffs at a time when all gulf states are trying to achieve greater
self-sufficiency. Dependence on foreign personnel, moreover, implies
a degree of loyalty and trustworthiness that may not be forthcoming
in times of crisis.

Although in every case the gulf armies are much larger than the
air forces and navies, the ground forces have traditionally been
oriented toward counterinsurgency actions and the protection of
the ruling families. Most of the armies are organized into one
or more combat brigades; actual fighting strengths are generally
lower than the brigade structure implies. Except for the officers
and men who were briefly exposed to modern military operations
during the Persian Gulf War--and in the late 1960s and first half
of the 1970s during Oman's war with Dhofari guerrillas and their
supporters in the PDRY--most have not faced actual combat situations.

In recognition of the great strategic importance of their air
and sea defenses, the gulf states have all introduced modern combat
aircraft and air defense missile systems, such as the United States
Hawk surface-to-air missile (SAM). Several of the states have
in their inventories or on order attack helicopters to help protect
their oil facilities and oil drilling platforms in the gulf. All
the gulf states have communications, control, and warning systems
for the effective use of their fighter aircraft and antiaircraft
missiles. But each air force is small, and, unless integrated
with others, the overall effectiveness of the GCC in air defense
is marginal. In spite of the attention the problem has received,
there is no common network linking all air defense squadrons and
SAMs to the Saudi Arabian air defense system and to the Saudi
airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. Technical
difficulties, including the incompatibility of national communications
systems and the reluctance to turn control of national air defense
over to a unified command structure, account for this weakness.

Fast-missile attack craft acquired by all of the gulf navies
with small but well-trained crews could inflict damaging blows
to heavier fleets and discourage hostile amphibious operations.
The sixty-two-meter corvettes belonging to Bahrain and the UAE
are the largest vessels among the gulf navies. As the tanker war
demonstrated, the navies lack minesweeping capability, and their
shipboard defense weapons against air attack are also weak. Only
Oman has available larger amphibious transports to convey troops
and vehicles for defending islands or remote coastal areas.

Defense expenditures of the gulf states are among the highest
in the world relative to population. According to an analysis
covering 1989, prepared by the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Qatar recorded the highest per capita military
expenditures of any country in the world, followed by Israel and
the United States. Oman ranked fourth and Kuwait sixth. The UAE
was eleventh highest; Bahrain, listed in twentyseventh place worldwide,
had the lowest outlays relatively of the gulf states. Military
spending as a percentage of central government expenditures also
is high, amounting to more than 40 percent in Oman and the UAE,
for example. In contrast, military spending in Bahrain is 13 percent
of central government expenditure. Military expenditures as a
percentage of the gross national product (GNP--see Glossary) are
more moderate except for Oman, whose military outlays were more
than 20 percent of GNP in 1989. Force ratios are also high in
Oman and the UAE; both countries had about twenty men in uniform
per 1,000 population in 1989. Their respective rankings were eleventh
and twelfth highest in the world. Bahrain and Kuwait had manpower
levels of about ten per 1,000 population, whereas the level for
Qatar was fifteen per 1,000 in 1989.

In spite of the small personnel pools and the desire of all the
gulf governments to train nationals to replace foreigners as quickly
as possible, constraints found in traditional Islamic societies
prevent the widespread recruitment of women to serve in the armed
forces. Oman and Bahrain have allowed a few women to enlist. They
receive combat-style training and learn how to operate small arms.
In Bahrain, however, almost all the women have been assigned to
hospital staffs. In 1990 the UAE introduced a five-month training
course for female recruits with the assistance of a team of female
soldiers from the United States. About 1,200 women applied; only
seventy-four were accepted. Two top members of the first class
were selected to continue with officer training at the Royal Military
Academy at Sandhurst, in Britain. The other graduates of the first
class were assigned as bodyguards of female members of the ruling
families and as specialists in such fields as military intelligence.

Before the Persian Gulf War, some women served in support departments
of the Kuwaiti armed forces, including engineering, military establishments,
moral guidance, and public relations. In July 1991, noting that
a large number of women had volunteered for service in the postwar
military, the minister of defense said that some would be accepted
for a training period of three to six months but would initially
be unsalaried. A role would then be found for them. The minister
cautioned that acceptance by Kuwaiti society was essential for
the government to move ahead with this plan.

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