Myanmar has always been given scant, almost negligible, mention
in the field of study on naval modernisation in Asia. The first reason
for this is the paucity of reliable information available. The second
reason is that, based on what is being known about the Myanmar
Navy’s modernization attempts, quantitatively and qualitatively they
were deemed to be insignificant compared to the phenomenal growth
in capabilities of Myanmar’s neighbors in the region. The underresearched
state of affairs for the Myanmar Navy could have been
justifiable a few decades back and possibly up till as recent as the early
2000s, since all along Myanmar has been considered a relatively small
player in the region’s geopolitics and naval arena, and its national
security focus has been inward-centric premised on consolidation
of the regime’s political legitimacy in the face of significant internal
dissent and insurgencies.

However, in the light of new political developments in Myanmar
which could potentially herald the beginning of a country reborn,
certainly in no insignificant manner. In so far the naval arena, for
decades a much neglected dimension, is concerned the future of
Myanmar’s naval development necessitates a revisit. In this editorial,
the ongoing political reform and changes brought to Myanmar’s
economic and security dimensions are examined, using a wide variety
of carefully considered open sources-a necessary measure in view of
the paucity of official publications on the Myanmar Navy. It argues
that these new developments will bring about potential room for
growth of the country’s naval power which deserves greater attention
in the foreseeable future. First, the economic, political and security
developments taking place in Myanmar will be discussed.

Thereafter, the editorial looks at the contemporary evolution of
the Myanmar Navy to date in order to postulate the future trajectory
of Myanmar’s naval power.

Political Reform in Myanmar

The first crucial development is the current political reform
taking place in Myanmar. Having had run the country with an
iron-fisted military rule for decades, the ruling State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC) has begun moving the country on a
graduated path of democratization since the late 2011. Opportunities
are ripe for eventual socioeconomic benefits to be reaped by a newly-reborn Myanmar assuming the path of political reform carries on
unimpeded and irreversibly as its political leaders has assured. The
political reform will first allow the country to gain wider diplomatic
acceptance beyond the region. An encouraging sign has been the
decision by Australia and the European Union to lift sanctions on
the country while the United States of America has also made a series
of notable moves to enhance its diplomatic relations with Myanmar.
Following which, international financial institutions will be allowed
to provide much needed funds to assist Myanmar’s socioeconomic
development. In fact, to this end, Japan has made a noteworthy
move of forgiving Myanmar’s external debts and on top of which,
offer funding assistance for the latter’s socioeconomic development
projects. The eventual end-result will be an open Myanmar which
is integrated within the international community after decades of
isolation.

A New Dawn for Economic Growth

The second crucial development, which is linked to the first, is the
essential opening of the economic sphere and this is where Myanmar
will benefit the most. With the concrete steps undertaken since the
conduct of its first parliamentary elections in decades, Myanmar has
attracted a swarm of foreign investors keen on getting their share
of the potential economic pie in a country that is blessed with vast
natural resources and abundant room for development, as well as
a new market in itself. For decades, the crown jewel of Myanmar’s
economy has been the oil and gas (O&G) sector that has seen China
for instance having owned a significant slice of the pie. With the
opening up of Myanmar’s political and economic dimensions, more
opportunities will become available to foreign O&G companies. Much
interest has been placed in expanding Myanmar’s offshore marine
O&G development. Two countries are primarily interested in this
prospect: Bangladesh and Thailand. These two countries are in search
of new sources of natural gas in particular to make up for anticipated
shortfalls in their national power needs. To date, it would appear that
Bangkok has been the most successful in pushing for its projects in
Myanmar-owned offshore O&G blocks in the Bay of Bengal. However,
Dhaka may have been disappointed when Yangon announced that it
has no plans to export its new gas finds. Nonetheless, the potential
for Myanmar’s offshore O&G development remains significant, even
more so than the onshore sector. The other notable area of interest is
Myanmar’s drive towards gradual industrialization, with the Dawei
deep-sea port and special economic zone (SEZ) project being the
centerpiece of this endeavor. The geostrategic position of Myanmar
makes it an attractive new destination for international shippers,
assuming the Dawei port SEZ project takes off and turns into fruition.

Moving towards National Reconciliation

The third crucial development is the gradual move by Yangon
towards national reconciliation, with its stated goal of achieving a
permanent peace pact with major ethnic rebel groups in three to four
years time. For decades, the military regime has been engaged in hard
fighting with the array of ethnic insurgent groups in the northern and
north-eastern part of the country. This overarching focus on internal
security for the purpose of maintaining regime survival in the face of
resistance from the ethnic rebel armies and potential dissent within the broader Myanmar population has for decades entrenched the
country’s security outlook in an inward orientation. This could have
been justifiable back then because the primary national security threat
perceived by the military regime is internal in nature. External threats
come largely in the form of foreign subversion, especially by Western
powers in collusion with dissenting segments in the populace, but not
a major foreign armed aggression. In any case, Myanmar has carefully
cultivated cordial and warm ties with China – its primary patron and
an indirect provider of its security against potential external foes –
and with India. Its membership in the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) provides another layer of security under which
the regime could feel free to pursue its internal interest of pacifying
the restive north and north-eastern parts of the country. In the wake
of political reforms, Yangon has begun to negotiate for peace with
the ethnic rebels, with greatest inroads made to date with major
ethnic rebel group the Karen National Union (KNU). There is huge
potential for eventual national reconciliation, assuming both Yangon
and the ethnic rebel groups continue to show interest in this process.
The end-result will be a change in security outlook from inward to an
outward orientation.

Changing Security Outlook for Myanmar

The fourth crucial development is linked to the second and third
developments and it concerns the impetus for a change in Myanmar’s
security outlook. Potential for growth in Myanmar’s economy will
essentially increase its reliance on the seas. In fact, Yangon has long
been interested in developing its maritime sector even before the
recent political reform. Achievements attained to date in the political
reform process will catalyze the growth of its maritime sector, be
it international shipping with the Dawei port and SEZ project or
the expansion of its offshore marine O&G sector. This increased
emphasis on the maritime sector necessitates an outward, not inward,
security conception. Credible naval power will have to be available to
protect these maritime interests. In the case of Myanmar, the need
for maritime resource protection is therefore essential given its long
coastline and vast maritime zone under its jurisdiction. The resolution
of maritime boundary dispute with Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal
in April 2012 by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS) not only provided the basis for Myanmar’s offshore marine
resource development but also stressed upon the need for the country
to safeguard its maritime interests. The ITLOS ruling is in favor of
Dhaka and this development would not have been well received by
many within Myanmar’s political-military leadership circle. In any
case, the long neglect of the maritime boundaries due to decades
of overwhelming focus on internal security deep in Myanmar’s
terrestrial hinterland has somewhat contributed to Yangon’s
‘defeat’ in the ITLOS ruling. In addition, the acute need to focus on
safeguarding Myanmar’s maritime interests was further sharpened in
the wake of the May 2008 Cyclone Nargis when American, British
and French warships stood poised near the shores of Myanmar to
deliver humanitarian aid to the affected population-a move which
was perceived as a threat to Myanmar’s national security. The French
and the Dutch governments were even prepared during that time
to push for United Nations Security Council resolution to compel
Yangon ‘by all means necessary’ to accept international aid in the
name of humanitarian rationale. This move could only be interpreted
by Yangon as a potential threat of seaward invasion by external naval
powers and puts greater emphasis on a maritime-focused, outwardoriented
security conception.

Implications for the Myanmar Navy

The above discussed developments could only logically mean that
Myanmar’s national security conception will become increasingly
outward-looking and essentially predicated on its growing maritime
interests and hence room for growth of Myanmar’s naval power as
a tool to insure these interests. It was not as if Myanmar is oblivious
to the need for a credible naval capability. All these while, the
Myanmar Navy has been ranked the last in the army-dominated
Tatmadaw (Myanmar Defence Services) and had been mainly
relegated to supporting the Army and Air Force in the country’s fight
with the ethnic insurgents, other than policing the coastline against
encroachment by foreign fishermen. It was only after the November
2008 standoff with the Bangladesh Navy - during which the Myanmar
Navy was said to have made a poor showing - which the regime
started to recognize the deficiencies in its naval capabilities. This was
complemented also by complaints and resignations by a number of
Myanmar Navy officers who lamented the navy’s sorry state of affairs.
The reported inability of the Myanmar Navy to assert its stance in the
Bay of Bengal against the assembled aid-carrying Western warships
in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis further amplified the fact that the
fleet has been grossly neglected and incapable of performing its basic
role of safeguarding national maritime interests within the immediate
200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone even if the Myanmar
Navy is not expected to be a bluewater force in any measure. Since
2008, some attempts had been made to enhance the Myanmar Navy.
However, political isolation and continued troubles in the restive
rebel-occupied zones ensured that Yangon found its hands tied in its
attempt to bolster its naval capabilities. The recent political reform
thus brings forth new opportunities yet at the same time also new
imperatives for the expansion of Myanmar’s naval capabilities.

Tracing the Evolution of the Myanmar Navy

The old Myanmar Navy after the Second World War was
essentially a hodgepodge of former American, European and
Yugoslavian coastal and inshore patrol forces in the main. The navy
then was adequate in supporting ground operations against the
ethnic rebel armies through the provision of gunfire support and
troop transports in the numerous inland waterways of Myanmar.
The fleet was barely capable, however, of effectively policing the long
coastline of the country, much less to project credible naval force
beyond the country’s territorial waters. In the 1990s, possibly linked
to an agreement to allow the Chinese to establish listening posts in
strategic naval stations in Myanmar, the Myanmar Navy received a
number of new Chinese-built patrol craft, most notably the Houxin
class fast patrol craft, whose Chinese-made, 22 nautical mile-range
C-801 anti-ship missile for the first time gave the fleet a greatly
enhanced long-range striking power since prior to the arrival of such
a craft, the fleet was made up of only gun-armed craft that could prove
invaluable in providing gunfire support for the Myanmar Army but
certainly close to obsolete in modern naval warfare. The arrival of the
Hainan class large patrol craft gave the Myanmar Navy a revitalized
coastal anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability since it is armed
with Soviet-origin RBU-1200 5-barrelled ASW mortars and Chinesemade
BMB-2 depth charge projectors-all optimized only for shallowwater
ASW operations. Nonetheless, compared to the rest of the fleet,
the Hainan and Houxin classes marked a significant addition to the
Myanmar Navy.

Chinese assistance continued apace for the Myanmar Navy, not
just confined to the supply of warships and crew training, but also in building up the indigenous naval shipbuilding capacity of the country.
With the Western-imposed sanctions in place, Myanmar has limited
options but to either procure Chinese equipment or build its own. In
a move towards self-reliance, in the 1990s the Myanmar state-owned
shipbuilders began to churn out a number of new local makes for
the fleet. The first was a simple coastal fast patrol craft known as the
Myanmar class, which was apparently successful since this class was
placed into series production – a general patrol, gun-armed variant as
well as a strike variant equipped with Chinese-supplied C-802 missiles
that have a 65 nautical mile range, giving the fleet an enhanced
surface striking power. The gradual induction of the Myanmar class
into service allowed the fleet to retire the ageing force of post-war
Western craft. Near the end of the 1990s, the Sinmalaik Shipyard
located in Rangoon managed to build a 77m-long and 1105-ton
displacement warship-a corvette that gave the Myanmar Navy for the
first time a helicopter deck-equipped vessel and an overall ship design
that looked poised to take the fleet beyond the territorial waters into
the country’s EEZ. Initially designated the Sinmalaik class, by virtue
of its shipbuilder, the corvette was actually a larger hull equipped
with a helicopter deck but no hangar facilities but the remaining
combat systems did not represent a significant leap beyond what the
Myanmar Navy already possessed in its inventory. Later designated
the Anawrahta class, the ship was armed with a 76 mm dual-purpose
gun of Italian OTO Breda design-a huge step beyond the inventory
of mainly manually-operated and lower-calibre gun armaments-and
OTO Breda 40 mm close-in weapon system (CIWS). For surface
strike, the C-802 anti-ship missile found on board the Myanmar
class is standard fit while for ASW, it is equipped with the standard
RBU-1200 found on board the Hainan class. The arrival of the class at
least allowed the fleet to finally retire the pair of ex-American, Second
World War vintage light frigates. The Myanmar Navy has no organic
naval aviation, hence the Anawrahta class is likely able to embark
a small air force helicopter for short periods of time but certainly
incapable of locking it down under inclement weather conditions far
out from shore. Therefore for the most part, the corvette might have
been able to conduct offshore patrols in the EEZ but not for sustained
periods of time. This deficiency was possibly exposed during the naval
standoff with Bangladesh in November 2008, during the aftermath
of which there was reported internal criticisms that the Myanmar
Navy was unable to hold its own in asserting national claims to
the overlapping zone due to the availability of merely small craft as
compared to the larger warships of the Bangladesh Navy. Prior to
that, the inability of the Myanmar Navy to mobilize sufficient forces
to ‘show flag’ in the waters close to the high seas, where the Western
warships were awaiting permission to deliver cyclone aid in May
2008 highlighted the acute need for platforms capable of sustained
presence at sea.

After 2008, it appears that the Myanmar Navy has gained greater
traction in demanding more attention from the land-oriented
military junta in order to bolster the fleet’s capacity to handle offshore
operations for longer periods of time, partly but significantly also to
exorcise the ghosts of humiliation suffered in May and November
2008 in the face of what was deemed to be more superior foreign
naval forces that witnessed the Myanmar Navy being outclassed. Not
only naval training was intensified, the Myanmar Navy began to look
into capabilities to better allow it to sustain naval presence farther
out in the EEZ. The end result was apparently the new Aung Zeya
class frigate, which appears a larger ship derived from the Anawrahta
class, built locally with Chinese assistance. It was said to have been
laid down in 2006 and commissioned in 2010, with a second ship still under construction. A total of 3 ships of the class was said to be
planned for service. The frigate was shrouded in secrecy compared
to the preceding Anawrahta class and not much information is
available. However, what was known was that the Aung Zeya class
possesses an enhanced striking power compared to the Anawrahta
class in the form of Chinese-supplied C-602 anti-ship missile with a
151 nautical mile range-more than double of that of the C-802. The
OTO Breda 76 mm gun appears to have become the new standard
medium-calibre gun in Myanmar Navy service. However, the frigate
is armed with Russian-supplied AK-630 6-barrelled Gatling-type 30
mm CIWS. According to Jane’s Fighting Ships, the ship is equipped
with a helicopter deck but no hangar facilities like the Anawrahta. For
ASW, again the standard RBU-1200 mortars are observed fitted on
board the frigate but no torpedoes seen. On the whole, the Aung Zeya
probably provides the fleet an enhanced sustained offshore patrol
capacity with much improved surface striking power. However, air
defence at sea remains confined to short-range non-missile systems
while ASW capabilities remain restricted to only shallow-water
operations and incapable of dealing with modern submarines armed
with long-range torpedo and anti-ship missile armaments. The haste to
acquire offshore naval capabilities is witnessed in the recent induction
of a pair of former Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy Jianghu
I class frigates that had seen service since the early 1970s. The ageing
vessels probably represent a stopgap prior to the possible induction
of two more Aung Zeya class frigates because these two old frigates
are armed with weapons, for instance the obsolete C-201 (itself a
Chinese copy of the old Soviet SS-N-2 Styx) and hand-operated guns,
that represented a step backward of what the Myanmar Navy’s most
modern fleet units are equipped with. Named the Mahar Bandoola
class, the frigates made their first maiden appearance as the newest
additions to the Myanmar Navy when they docked in Vietnam’s Tien
Sa Port in March 2012 for a visit on their way from China back to
Myanmar.

Serious Deficiencies in Naval Capacity

The Myanmar Navy has certainly made notable strides since
the 1990s by progressively enhancing its capabilities, moving from
‘brown-water’ to ‘green-water’ naval platforms with the immediate
objective of safeguarding the country’s maritime interests within
the 200-nautical mile EEZ in the Indian Ocean. All these while, the
Myanmar Navy has been heavily focused on enhancing its surface
strike capabilities, which it has done admirably well so far. Clearly
however, serious deficiencies remain. The Myanmar Navy remains
weak in anti-air warfare (AAW) and ASW. Until the Myanmar Navy
acquires a basic point defence AAW missile system, AAW for the
fleet will continue to be restricted to very short-range gun armaments
that may only be marginal against modern sea-skimming anti-ship
missile threats. Furthermore, the Myanmar Navy will continue to be
reliant upon the Myanmar Air Force for land-based air support. It is
not clear whether the Myanmar Air Force has over-water maritime
support capabilities even though theoretically, its existing inventory
of Chinese-built A-5C Fantan and the newer Russian-built MiG-
29SE Fulcrum-C fighters can at least muster some basic surface
attack capabilities. Shallow-water ASW remains the primary focus
of the Myanmar Navy but in the deeper waters of the EEZ, where
hostile submarines enjoy greater room for manoeuvre and deeper
spots to hide, the existing capabilities are deemed obsolete until the
fleet acquires a respectable ASW capability in the form of lightweight
ASW torpedoes and possibly, a shipborne ASW helicopter capability.
Since the immediate concerns of the Myanmar Navy are likely local, there may not be a need for at-sea replenishment capabilities. For a
country which has an extensive coastline and maritime zone to police,
Myanmar possesses weak maritime surveillance capabilities even
though India transferred a pair of retired BN-2 Islander maritime
patrol aircraft from its naval aviation service to Myanmar in 2006,
followed by a second pair in 2007 notwithstanding British protests.
These complemented the existing three Fokker F-27 Friendship
utility transports acquired in the early 1990s and were employed
by the Myanmar Air Force in the secondary role of visual coastal
surveillance. Finally, the Myanmar Navy has no mine warfare
capability even though it may acquire a basic mine countermeasure
capacity in the near term considering the rising importance of its
reliance on sea trade routes to facilitate its industrialization process.

Possible New Naval Developments in the Offing?

In general at present, the Myanmar Navy has a strong surface
strike capability, marginal in ASW and weak in AAW. The paucity of
information emanating from Myanmar means that the picture of its
naval development process is incomplete at best, peppered with discrete
information from unofficial sources such as Myanmar dissidents
based in Thailand, through The Irrawaddy online publication for
instance, and also an interesting blog maintained on the Tatmadaw,
called mmmilitary.blogspot.com which posted rather authentic
pictures of the Tatmadaw in action and the equipment it possesses.
The same blog in May 2012 published some pictures of what seemed
to be new warships being in the process of induction into Myanmar
Navy. The two new warships-one a frigate or corvette-sized vessel and
the other a fast attack or patrol craft-exact specifications unknown
and unpublicized, appear to incorporate stealth design features. If
they indeed are new warships being incorporated into Myanmar
Navy service, again likely with Chinese (or even Indian and Russian)
technical assistance, these might represent another significant leap in
capabilities for the fleet. The third dimension of naval warfare the subsurface is an area that the Myanmar Navy appears to have made some
quiet steps. It was reported in Thai press that the Myanmar Navy has
already begun to send personnel to China for submarine training and
is currently in the process of acquiring at least three ex-PLA Navy
submarines. If these developments were verified to have indeed taken
place, it will imply significant enhancements of the overall capacity
of the Myanmar Navy to sustain its power projection into the EEZ
waters.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding the recent ongoing sectarian violence between
the Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims, the political reform
is well underway and has already been termed as an ‘irreversible’
process by top Myanmar political leadership. Assuming this process
continues unabated, the political and economic gains for the new
Myanmar Government can be significant. The revival of diplomatic
ties with erstwhile foes in the West, buttressed by its membership
in ASEAN, will lead to renewed foreign investments and aid from
international financial institutions flowing into the country to
resuscitate its ailing economy. In this respect, the ASEAN (primarily
Singapore), China, India and Japan may spearhead industrialization
of Myanmar. The consequent effect of this development will be an
outward focus of Yangon’s national security interests, facilitated
by ongoing national reconciliation with ethnic rebel groups. This
outward security orientation will necessarily be maritime-focused
in nature-an area which has been much neglected by the Myanmar
Government at least until 2008. To safeguard its national maritime
interests, such as the offshore marine O&G sector that remains the
crown jewel of Myanmar’s economy in the foreseeable future and a
source of revenue to propel its industrialization process in conjunction
with foreign direct investments, the Myanmar Navy looks poised to
emerge from the shadows to become a significant force that is worth
a close watch in the coming future.