line-of-battle ships possessed by now about equals our own, if we o the block-ships, whick are not ' shipä of the line, but adapted

to be used as additional defences to val ports or other harbours, if attack apprehended. No doubt wc can [y and speedily regain the numerical riority in vessels of this class which recently possessed; but tho process entail groat cost, a cost ti Lieh the

will not shrink from, the successful application of the to men of war our sailing line-of :Íe ships have become obsolete, and t of them as are unfit for conversion it be considered as erased from our list

jrviceable vessels. From that point itarted somewhere upon an equality

our neighbours in the creation of a

and steam-propelled fleet;

extraordinary anti un- ited activity having been exercised in r dockyards, the present result is that j have nearly as ninny ships of the line "or service as wo have. In seven years it

.ra that they have increased their war ers of all classes from 111 to. 230. ;e facts will prove that our Admiralty o simply done their duty in completing nany first and second rate screw ships ihey have done and in laying down BO

ty new ones. The inconsiderate and

objectors who fancied that iron-sided and steam rams were going to make an alteration in naval warfaro as to linc-of-battlo ships altogether hors ¡combat will now see that the Admiralty re' not heedlessly squandering the ionnl resources in building theso ships. "". they been less active in this dircc we should have been numerically iu ior to the French; and the discovery of it fact would have aroused the indig

ion of the whole country. . A short e ago it w as proposed to begin cutting rn our magnificent screw liners and iting their sides with iron making them _it-proof at the expense of their sailing, «¿id, to some extent, of their fighting Ijiaíitics. The fortunato invention of the ^armstrong gun has, however, given the %k<p de grace to the suggestion. It is sftry liltely-nay,. almost certain-that Üsie-of-battlo ships will not in Ifcturo naval wars play such an

ifiportant part U3 of yoro; but wo

.ajsmnot overlook the fact of the great iu ká»íease vi hich, in the French navy, has been pude in that class of ships. Tho most äsWcess.iry thing now to be done in our jfMvy is to arm our wholo fleet with tho ïîiijrraordinary powerful weapon which tho

_ ireiilion of Mr. Armstrong has placed at Hu* disposal. By means of this gun, as the '*rpcrimeiits at Shoeburyness havo coin

letely demonstrated, an enemy's ship may

easily sunk at the distance of two miles least-the inventor says three-and a iOt has been propelled Irom it a distance '¡five miles. The most closely accurate jim may be taken by it, at even.the long Spnge, and from it snell as well* as solid gjhot may be fired. The shell fired from

"r. Armstrong's gun is more destructive an any hitherto used, as it does'not ixplode until aftor striking its object, md it will pnss through a ship's sido and ixplode between its decks, scattering do itructiou among all around. As to the

?on-plttte vessels, their sides aro quite as nlnerablo ns wooden planks to shots rom the Armstrong gun, and the sides of ;ho Trusty, one of the supposed shot iroof floating batteries, used ns a target in the late experiments, were pierced ' rough and through. Let, thon, a por

jn at least of the armament of every in henceforward fitted for soa consist if Armstrong's guns. We shall have to re lace tho whole of our naval artillery, and groat oost will thoroby be occasioned, but »9 we hold this invaluable invention in our own hands, it will be enough to make the change gradually. Only some of the guns, »oro or less according to the rating of the pbtp, should be placed on board every ono pf our shins in commission as speedily as they can be manufactured and supplied. AU that we need b» very anxious about is the power of holding our own at the first outbreak of ¡my future war. We posBCss almost limitless resources for increasing our navy in caso of need, and they would be freely forthcoming «hen others would be feeling exhaustion. Tho rapidity with which our numerous fleet of gunboats was created during tho late Russian war, in the midst of othor most

extensive operations, wa3 a proof of this 'fact. Hitherto our weak point has boen

the slowness with which wo have mnnued ,ous ships ; and ns impressment, whatever IrfOrd Hardwicke may think, will never be permitted by this nation to be again ! resorted to, wo havo to find sotno other

?means of promptly manning a largo fleet in case of emergency. No suggestion -with this view appears to us to bo. equally ¡¿feasible with that of. Sir Charles Napier. Unless the commission now sitting can devise a better plan, mid we doubt if they can, wo hope the Admiralty will adopt the gallant admiral's recommendation, and 'put only half the usual number of marines I on board the line ships of the Channel ifleet intime of peace, dispensing altogether iwith ordinary seamen, landsmen and boys, aud filling up tho complement with A.B.'s. Then another fleet of an equal number of ships could be at any time provided with .crews, by draughting off half tho able

seamen, and replacing thom with the marines, ordinaries, landsmen, and boys,

who can always bo got hold of ; while, for able seamen, unless wo have them

ready provided, we must wail. It is an excellent suggestion, and may bo carried «mt without ni|ich additional expense. The adoption of this plan,' and keeping always a fleet of eight or ten ships of the line on the home station, lo servo as a Channel squadron, would wo fully believe be quite sufficient to secure our coasts against the possibility of invasion. For the rest, our Admiralty must bo always on the alert to tnko advnntigo " of real improvements, such as that of the ' Arm- strong gun, and wo may then have no fear for the permanence of England's naval supremacy.-Observer. > , ,,, /