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BACKGROUND

America was embroiled in the Cold War and the beginning of the Korean Conflict in April
of 1951 when the Commanding General of the U.S. Army, Caribbean was given the mission
"to keep the art of jungle warfare alive in the Army". Recent worldwide events
demonstrated a need for proficiency in jungle operations. The French were struggling in
the jungles of Indo-China against the Vietminh in hopes of reclaiming part of their pre
Second World War empire. The British were successfully fighting a counterinsurgency war in
the jungles of Malaysia, and the U.S. had recently fought numerous bloody campaigns in the
tropics of the Burma-China-India Theater, and the South Pacific during World War Two
(WWII). Given Americas interests and responsibilities as an emerging superpower, and
our global focus, it was likely the United States would again be called on to wage war in
a jungle environment.

THE BEGINNINGS OF JUNGLE OPERATIONS AND TRAINING IN PANAMA

Until the Second World War, many military experts believed that jungles were
impenetrable and unsuitable for modern military operations. The successful Japanese attack
on the British in Singapore through the Malaysian jungles in 1942 changed conventional
thinking. However, American experiences in conducting training and maneuvers in the jungle
began in 1916 with a cross Panama Isthmus trek by a U.S. Army infantry detachment. The
defense of the Panama Canal required U.S. forces to operate and train in the jungle; thus
elements of the U.S. Army serving in Panama had fairly extensive experience in jungle
survival and movement prior to U.S. participation in WWII. The Japanese defeat of British
forces during the early years of WWII caused an Army-wide examination of its ability to
conduct operations in the jungle.

The Panama Mobile Force (PMF) was the primary Army element with experience in jungle
operations. The PMF aggressively promoted their abilities to the War Department in order
to secure a role in Americas war effort. The PMFs higher headquarters, the
Caribbean Defense Command (CDC) expanded training in jungle operations after being tasked
by the War Department to train 1500 replacements for the Pacific Theater; training camps
were established at Pacora and Rio Hato, Panama. The first sixty-day training cycle was
completed on 15 March 1943. While these sites provided valuable training, the terrain was
not as rugged nor the vegetation as thick as that of most jungle in the Pacific. Another
jungle training site was then established at Camp Pina, just south of Fort Sherman; the
terrain at this site was as challenging as anything in the Pacific Theater. This site was
used until the end of the war.

Coincidentally, the most suitable area to conduct jungle warfare training under U.S.
control at that time was Camp Pina (currently the Pina Range Complex) and Fort Sherman;
the site of coastal artillery and anti-aircraft artillery batteries located on the
Atlantic side of the Panama Canal. The Fort Sherman Military Reservation covered an excess
of fifty square miles of jungle and had an extensive infrastructure that included
logistical and transportation systems. The combination of usable maneuver area and
preexisting base facilities made Fort Sherman an ideal location for a jungle warfare
school.

The areas used throughout the various incarnations of the U.S. Army jungle warfare
school include Fort Sherman and the Pina Range Complex. Fort Sherman Military Reservation
is bordered to the North and North-West by the Caribbean Sea, on the South and South-West
by the Rio Chagres, and East by Limon Bay and Gatun Lake. It consists of 23,000 acres of
single and double canopy jungle, which is cross-compartmentalized with steep rolling
hills, numerous tributaries, mangrove swamps and coastline.The
contonment area includes barracks and mess facilities, cadre headquarters and offices, a
boathouse with docks, classroom and instruction sites, and recreation facilities. Training
areas on the Fort Sherman Military Reservation include the maneuver area with several
fortified or semi-permanent objectives, a jungle land navigation course, and jungle combat
maneuver lanes, helicopter landing zones, a drop zone, and two coastal artillery batteries
that have been converted into small arms ranges and special warfare training sites.

The Pina Range Complex is immediately South of Fort Sherman, across the Rio Chagres.
This complex includes several small arms live fire ranges and maneuver lanes, a mortar
maneuver course, a live fire village, and a demolitions range. White Drop Zone and other
areas of Gatun Lake are used for airborne insertions and small boat operations. The Rio
Chagres is also used for small boat and tactical riverine operationsand
as part of the Sapper (light combat engineer) live demolitions maneuver course.

The coastal artillery batteries and anti-aircraft gun emplacements on Fort Sherman were
obsolete by the mid-1940s; most of the large caliber guns had not been fired in years.
Attack from the air was the major threat, and mobile anti-aircraft guns and missiles, and
motorized ground forces had replaced most of the static defenses of the Canal. This left
Fort Sherman with a caretaker garrison and the primary mission to billet troops stationed
on the Atlantic side of the Panama Canal. The change in mission was another factor that
made Fort Sherman a desirable location for jungle warfare training.

ORIGINS OF A FORMAL JUNGLE SCHOOL

The U.S. Army, Caribbean (USARCARIB) was still conducting limited jungle warfare and
survival training for its forces, when they received the formal mission from the
Department of the Army of "keeping the art of jungle warfare alive in the Army"
in April of 1951. In compliance with this directive, USARCARIB issued Training Memorandum
Number 9, which established a Jungle Warfare Training Board (JWTB). The JWTB was a study
group "responsible for continued research and study, analysis, and reporting of final
findings and recommendations on changes or additions to established U.S. Army doctrine and
techniques of jungle warfare and equipment designed for jungle operations." Standards
of individual and unit jungle training were also established. One major result of the
JWTBs study was the establishment of a provisional headquarters to plan, organize,
and evaluate a 2,000 man, field training exercise. BRUSH BAY was conducted on Fort Sherman
from 4 May to 4 June 1953. Elements of the 33rd Infantry, the 370th Engineer Amphibious
Support Regiment, and the 45th Reconnaissance Battalion stationed in Panama were joined by
nearly 1,000 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division, organized in a Battalion Combat
Team. The provisional HQ was replaced by the 7437th Army Unit, Jungle Warfare Training
Center (JWTC) on 15 June 1953; this was the origin of the Jungle Operations Training
Center (JOTC).

In November of 1953 the JWTC was attached to the 33rd Infantry; its focus was to train
Panama based soldiers in jungle warfare and survival. Improvements were made to Fort
Sherman facilities, and formal training of the 33rd Infantry was begun in the Spring of
1954; the objective was to make the entire regiment proficient in jungle operations. In
May of 1956 the 33rd Infantry was inactivated, and was replaced by the 20th Infantry
Regiment, which inherited the JWTC and the mission of the 33rd Infantry.

The majority of soldiers trained by the JWTC were from the Panama area, though CONUS
based units were also being trained. An example of this was Exercise JUNGLE JIM, where a
1,200 man reinforced battalion combat team (2/188 AIR, 11th Airborne Division) received a
month long (9 May to 7 June 1955) program of instruction (POI) and maneuvers very similar
in scope of the POI used by the JOTC in the 1990s. In December of 1957, the JWTC began
regular cyclic training of units from outside of the Panama area as part of the recently
reorganized 1st Battle Group, 20th Infantry; this established the Jungle Operations
Course.

The JWTC normally ran ten, three week long, cycles annually. Specialized cycles (some
were taught completely in Spanish for instance) and support of training exercises also
occurred in addition to the ten regular cycles. A normal cycle conducted training on three
levels, individual soldier skills, small unit, and company. The bulk of the instruction
was conducted for the infantry rifle company, but specialized training for a heavy weapons
company, a heavy mortar company, a headquarters company, a combat engineer (Sapper)
platoon, and a medical platoon was also available. Individual training included jungle
survival, camouflage, navigation, mines and boobytraps, and jungle plants and living. Upon
completion of the "core" classes, the training focus shifted to small unit
patrolling, attack, and ambush tactics and techniques. Once the small unit was proficient
in jungle operations, training moved to company and occasionally battalion level offensive
field training exercises. By 1960 the JWTC had trained eleven infantry battalions, one
artillery battalion, nine infantry companies, one mortar battery, three provisional
non-commissioned officer groups, and three provisional officer groups from the Continental
United States (CONUS). Concurrent with these cycles, numerous soldiers from the USARCARIB,
LA Guardia National (Panamanian Police), numerous soldiers from Latin American countries,
and American Special Warfare Units received jungle-specific training.

On 1 July 1963 the mission and functions of the JWTC were assumed by the Jungle
Operations Committee (JOC) of the School of the Americas, based at Fort Gulick, Canal
Zone, Panama (the JOC continued to operate at Fort Sherman). Fort Gulick was located
approximately ten kilometers east of Fort Sherman, adjacent to the city of Colon. The JOC
extended the course to five weeks in duration, with the emphasis in jungle survival
skills, and less focus on tactics. The reduction in tactical operations was mainly due to
a shortage of resources and trained cadre available from the School of the Americas.
Fortunately, an influx of Special Forces qualified instructors and increased supervision
from the 8th Special Forces Group, in late 1965, brought fundamental changes to the
program of instruction. The course was shortened to two weeks in length, most of which was
spent in the jungle, and the training focus returned to combat tactics, techniques, and
procedures.

VIETNAM AND JUNGLE WARFARE TRAINING

Although highly beneficial to the survival and combat effectiveness of U.S. troops in
Southeast Asia, the Jungle Operations Committee remained fairly low profile throughout the
early 1960s. However as American involvement in Southeast Asia increased, so did the
importance and utilization of the JOC. An example of this increase is number of students
who graduated from the course. In FY 1961, about 1700 students graduated from the course;
9145 students graduated in FY 1967. One of the major reasons for this increase was the
participation of 60 officers and non-commissioned officers from the 1st Cavalry Division
(Airmobile) in July of 1966. Extensive positive feedback about the value of instruction
was quickly brought to the attention of LTG Creighton Abrams, the U.S. Army Vice Chief of
Staff. Soon the Department of the Army (DA) increased the quota of trainees for the JOC,
and agreed to increase instructors and funds late in 1967. A rapid increase in class size
and number of two week cycles occurred before additional funds and manpower was provided
by DA; one of the JOCs higher headquarters, U.S. Army South (USARSO) was tasked to provide
additional resources in the interim.

The Jungle Operations Committee continually took measures to improve the quality of
instruction. In addition to conducting course after action reviews, the JOC sent
questionnaires to officers and NCOs that deployed to Vietnam about 90 days after they had
been in country; this questionnaire asked for a reappraisal of course curriculum based on
their experiences (see Appendix C). The commentary received was very positive overall, but
valuable suggestions were made that led to modifications in the course. In October 1965 a
team from the USARSO G3 visited a jungle operations course being taught in Hawaii. The POI
was similar to the Panama jungle operations course, but the Hawaii course included a
cordon and search of a mock Vietnamese village; this was added to the Panamanian course.
This program of cadre/instructor self-critique and rotational unit after-action reviews
(with the goal of constantly refining the Jungle Operations Course) continued until the
school was closed in 1999.

JUNGLE OPERATIONS TRAINING CENTER DEVELOPMENT

The Jungle Operations Committee, of the School of the Americas was separated by the
Department of the Army on 1 July 1968, and became the Jungle Operations Training Center
(JOTC). The JOTC was placed under operational control of the 8th Special Forces Group on 1
July 1970. In July of 1975 the JOTC became an independent major subordinate command within
the 193rd Infantry Brigade. These were primarily administrative moves, with little impact
on the content of the Jungle Operations Course. The school did receive other
responsibilities in addition to running the JOC; a USARSO RECONDO course was established
in March of 1969, and operation of the USARSO NCO academy was given to the JOTC in October
1971.

The Jungle Operations Course was three weeks long throughout the early 1970s with
minor alterations in the POI; most of these were caused by technological improvements in
night vision optics and heliborne mobility. Slots to the JOTC were given primarily to
CONUS based light and airborne battalions. Slots were still allocated to individual
soldiers in a manner similar to Airborne School. Organic units such as a squad from 1-504
Parachute Infantry Regiment did not attend the course. Soldiers from throughout the Army
came to JOTC and were assigned to a provisional squad / platoon for the duration of the
course. The jungle warfare skills learned and the opportunity for NCOs to test their
leadership was undoubtedly very valuable, but a major change initiated in the mid-1970s
vastly improved the benefits gained from attendance.

The Jungle Operations Training Center was reorganized in Fiscal Year 1976 to train
battalion sized units. The basic POI was still taught, but
soldiers now attended all training with members of their organic teams, squads, and
platoons. This did much to improve unit teambuilding and to enhance leadership skills of
junior NCOs and officers. After core week training, platoons went through situational
training exercises (STX) where squad and platoon leaders were placed in difficult tactical
situations. These exercises, in addition to live fire ambushes and react to contact
maneuver courses, honed the warfighting skills and esprit of the small unit. The third
week added company and battalion level operations during a battalion led field training
exercise (FTX). The FTX exercised the battalion command group, the battalion staff, and
company leadership. Units experienced the challenges of command, control and logistics in
the jungle. The overall benefits of a rotation to the JOTC were now battalion wide and
covered almost all of the Battle Operating Systems. Rotations were sought after throughout
the Army light infantry community and the Marine Corps. Additionally, many Special
Operations units received training from JOTC instructors or used JOTC facilities while
conducting internal training events.

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

The unit that operated the Jungle Operations Training Center was redesignated the
Jungle Operations Training Battalion (JOTB) during the invasion of Panama in December
1989. The battalion was notified of possible contingency operations as tensions between
the American and Panamanian governments increased, and prepared and trained accordingly.
The JOTB was augmented with additional combat and combat support assets and as JUST CAUSE
began, was designated Task Force Sherman. The task force served with the 3rd Brigade, 7th
Infantry Division (Light) as part of Task Force Atlantic.

Task Force Sherman successfully maintained the security and defense of Fort Sherman and
the Gatun Locks complex, including numerous key communications and transportation
facilities, the Gatun Locks, dam, spillway bridge, and hydroelectric plant. The Task Force
also cleared and 27 towns and villages, and 140 kilometers of coastline. They conducted 19
air assaults and Civilian Military Operations in four villages. Patrols from Task Force
Sherman eliminated all Hunter Platoons south of the Rio Chagres, captured numerous
prisoners of war, weapons, and large amounts of ammunition and equipment. They cleared the
town of Portobello, Isla Grande and other villages located north of Colon during a joint
operation with Navy SEALs and Special Operations Aviation. Patrols continued until 12
January 1990, when Task Force Sherman became the reserve for Task Force Atlantic. The
Jungle Operations Training Battalion was awarded a battle streamer for its actions during
Operation JUST CAUSE, making it the only TDA unit in the U.S. Army to receive this
distinction.

THE JOTB IN THE 1990s

The JOTB returned to its primary mission of training light infantry units in the art of
jungle warfare after Operation JUST CAUSE. By 1992, twelve light infantry jungle warfare
courses, four engineer jungle warfare courses, and four aircrew survival courses were
taught annually. In addition to these standard rotations, the JOTB provided support to
numerous Special Operations units, U.S. Government, and law enforcement agencies.

The JOTB fulfilled a critical role in the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and USARSO
military-to-military exchange programs (which included small unit exchanges, and guest
instructor programs) that enhanced relations and aided our efforts to influence the
further democratization of the Americas. Countries that participated in these programs
included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Guyana, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

The Jungle Warfare Course (JWC) was three weeks in duration and trained light
infantry battalion task forces in jungle operations. The first week (core week) of
training consisted of individual soldier skills and squad collective tasks that would be
performed in a jungle environment. These tasks included: jungle plants and living, land
navigation, mines and boobytraps, jungle combat techniques, waterborne operations, and
squad react to contact live fire lanes. Scout, mortar, and combat engineer (Sapper)
platoons received additional specialized training during core week. The second week
consisted of situational training exercises (STX) which included platoon deliberate
attacks, raids, ambushes, a company cordon and search, and Sapper, riverine demolition
missions. A battalion field training exercise (FTX) was conducted during the third and
final week of the JWC. This FTX was normally a four-day long, free-play exercise that
pitted the training battalion against a company-sized opposition force (OPFOR). JOTB
observer/controllers provided both the training battalion and the OPFOR company with
continuous feedback through comprehensive after action reviews.

The Engineer Jungle Warfare Course (EJWC) was similar in nature to the JWC, with
additional focus on demolitions and mobility operations. The core week instruction was the
same as the JWC, with the second week consisting of a four day FTX that required Sapper
platoons to conduct numerous combat patrols, engineer reconnaissance missions, and route
clearance missions on the Chagres River and jungle trails using live demolitions to reduce
obstacles. The Sapper company would perform construction missions during the third and
fourth weeks. These missions included basic masonry, carpentry, and pioneer tasks. The
repair or replacement of foot bridges in the jungle, repair of boat docks, and
construction of training sites are examples of some EJWC projects.

The Air Crew Survival Course (ACS) was approximately two weeks in duration, and
trained Army and Air Force aircrew personnel, U.S. Government, and law enforcement
agencies in basic survival, escape and evasion techniques. Subjects included crossing
water obstacles, improvised tools, weapons, traps, and snares, food procurement and
preparation, and jungle navigation. The course culminated in a four day survival, escape,
and evasion exercise designed to test the students ability to survive alone or in
small groups, while in hostile territory.

Due to the Army drawing down after Operation DESERT STORM, there were only two light
infantry divisions, one air assault division, and one airborne division left on active
duty. Numerous low-intensity conflicts and sustainment and stability operations in
Somalia, Haiti and the Balkans showed the need for skilled light fighters. Many of the
battalions that participated in these operations had gone through a JOTC rotation. The
environmental experience from the conduct of jungle operations was not the only benefit
gained from training at the JOTC. Teambuilding, the focus on small unit combat operations
and numerous live fire exercises, honed the critical combat skills of many battalions that
participated in these operations.

The value of a JOTC rotation was recognized by all echelons of the "light
fighter" community, from division commanders to team leaders. Infantry and Combat
Engineer units from all CONUS based active Army, light, airborne, and air assault
divisions, the 75th Ranger Regiment, and the United States Marine Corps continued to
compete for course rotations to the JOTB until its inactivation in 1999.