This autumn’s
sentiments are a special cause for concern in Russia. Both citizens and
authorities are worried. Following the earlier outburst of protests and the
reaction of authorities, the situation in the country is in for some scrutiny.
This is happening on three levels: on the level of the political class, the
middle class and the working class.

Experts are sure that the government’s
summer initiatives – the increase in housing and utilities prices, the
establishment of libel as a crime – will change the attitudes in one of the
social groups and, ultimately, the behavior of the whole society.

Second, there are the growing alarmist sentiments among
many experts and analysts who feel that, in spite of the illusion that the
situation is under control, the slightest change that occurs by accident or
design may bring fateful changes to the whole social situation (see Olga
Kryshtanovskaya’s opinion on next page).

Political
scientists offer two explanations. Some think that all this is being done with
the future in mind – just in case. Others believe that the authorities, as one
scholar has suggested, are pursuing “an intelligent reactionary policy,” the
main aim of which is to scare the urban middle class. That is why “patently
ill-designed laws” are being passed.

The aim has been
achieved and the protest movement has lost momentum. As one of the opposition
members put it, “the wave is subsiding and is not being reproduced in new
formats.” The summer brought some creative ideas, such as the “protest walk” of
writers and Occupy Abai.

By autumn, however, things had been reduced to
unreliable and ineffectual street rallies. Its most creative element – the
angry urban dweller – has run out of steam and returned to day-to-day life. The
remaining elements are either not dangerous or are committed to “actions,” which
makes them easy to suppress.

Perhaps the
members of the protest movement have sensed this. Everyone noticed the leftward
shift in the agenda and the speeches at the latest rally. This signals an
attempt to broaden the protest circles by bringing in more marginal, and
certainly left-leaning, sections of society.

Status quo
is not an option

There are some
other, equally important circumstances. The urban dweller is scared, but he
does not fear being arrested; he is afraid that the situation may get out of
control and lead to uncontrollable consequences. The fear of revolution
outweighs the thirst for change, both in the elite and in the middle class.

“According to game theory,” one prominent economist explains, “when the future
is uncertain, the least damaging option – that is, the preservation of the
status quo – is always preferred.”

The ruling class
might interpret this choice as a victory over the rebellious citizens who had
been led astray by extremists and “enemy agents.” That would be a mistake.

Even
philosophically-minded observers are convinced that the seeds for a
re-evaluation of reality have been planted. They compare the situation with the
1960s, when the moral foundations of a whole generation
were established.

Another parallel is France during the Revolution, which was
then followed by the Restoration. It took the loss of human lives, political
reaction and Thermidor to gradually build the institutions that protect human
rights and property and maintain a flexible political system.

Another
possibility is the marginalization of the protest movement. Many of the
administration’s initiatives have broad voter support; but the interests of the
people are not always identical to the opinion of the majority.

Alexander
Hamilton, as a proponent of strong government and strong federal power, warned
against looking to what the people want, rather than to what will benefit them.
For him, such a government could only lead to the search for means, “error,
confusion and instability.”

“The search for
means” has already begun. Everyone understands that, should a second wave of
the crisis strike, it will have dire consequences for Russia. Everyone will be
affected, including the powers that be. This is one reason why political forces
of various stripes have chosen to stand together, shoulder to shoulder.

The third problem
– one that sooner or later will require actions as well as words – is that
there can be no question of any post-industrial development for the country
without a class of “urban modernists” who are successful, mobile and
well-educated.

The authorities and the urbanites will have to make a deal. They
would be pushed in that direction by the global crisis, since there would be no
guarantee that everybody who wished to leave Russia in the coming years would
find a job in Europe and the United States. Far from it. Indeed, some of those
who have left may come back, creating more tensions in their demands for a
decent life and a decent place in life.

So far, lacking
the opportunity, desire or the means to come to an agreement, each social
stratum is again trying to withdraw into its shell. Power wants to remain in
power, the citizen is concerned about providing the bare necessities for
himself and his family, and the average man seeks to survive and preserve what
he has. But the traditional system of coordinates has already shifted.

“We are
once again at loggerheads,” a leading sociologist believes. In his opinion,
there are two options: to continue tightening the screws without “loosening
any” and proceed from expediency in combating somebody or something, or, to
move from one strategy to another, keeping in mind the new circumstances and
social sentiments.

Russia’s
brewing social unrest may foretell a system collapse

Olga Kryshtanovskaya, the head of the RAS Sociology Institute’s Center for the Study of Elites, Professor Emeritus at Glasgow University, Doctor of Sciences (Sociology) and author of Anatomy of the Russian Elite. Source: RIA Novosti

Svetlana
Babayeva: Your recent statements have been distinctly alarmist. Why do you
think that the situation in Russia is explosive?

Olga Kryshtanovskaya:
Think of the collapse of the Soviet Union. There was nothing to foreshadow an
early collapse. The system seemed weakened, but still strong. The same is true
of other revolutions: they brew a long time, but the collapse is quick. A
domino effect sets in and, before you know it, disintegration cannot be
stopped. The question is what triggers it.

S.B.: It
is impossible to foresee things in an unstable situation.

O.K.: Not exactly. The
pretext may be accidental, but the potential triggers are known. First, there
are elections. All recent revolutions have been connected with elections. This
was the case in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and in the Arab world.

The second
type is man-made catastrophes – especially if they are on a large scale or
occur in rapid succession and the opposition succeeds in convincing the people
that the authorities are to blame. Natural disasters that put the population
under stress can also act as a trigger. Think of the theories discussed during
the Krymsk disaster (link). The fourth factor is economic upheaval. The fifth –
arbitrary acts of the judicial system.

S.B.:
Catastrophes happen and give rise to stormy discussions and outbursts of wrath,
but do not bring about radical change. All the social strata prefer the status
quo.

O.K.: Protest is like a
pyramid. At the top are those who seek to gain power – the
politician-revolutionaries. Further down are the fanatics and the reckless
youth. Even further down are the activists and, below them, the sympathizers,
which are made up mainly of the intelligentsia and students. At the base of the
pyramid are the broad socially disadvantaged masses which have yet to be drawn
into protests.

Why do opposition leaders call these actions “marches of
millions?” Because their target is a million people.

S.B.: What
could make such a huge crowd take to the streets?

O.K.: So far, not much.
But this does not mean that the protesters cannot stir up those at the bottom
of the social heap. That could happen under certain circumstances. Then things would
really get dangerous. The mob is irrational and spontaneous, but spontaneity
can be controlled.

The crowd has its ideological leaders, the reckless youth
who have yet to realize that they have something to lose. Radical actions
require structure, combat units, money, communications and networks. All of
this is already there, in varying degrees. All that is missing is a trigger.

S.B.: If
someone decides to act, the authorities have much more powerful resources to
stop all of this.

O.K.: The authorities
always have superior strength and resources. Nevertheless, revolutions do
happen. Cracks appear in the establishment, grow deeper under the influence on
the streets, and eventually blow up the situation. In reality, there are
cracks. I see signs of the power structure becoming unwieldy and the
fragmentation of the elites.

S.B.: What
causes fragmentation?

Related:

O.K.: During his
presidency, Dmitry Medvedev started rejuvenating the elite. Although the
average age of Putin’s elite is quite normal by world standards (54),
Medvedev’s appointees in the civil service are about 15 years younger than
their predecessors. The younger generation is breathing down the necks of those
whose positions they covet. This can’t help but irritate part of the political
class. A generation gap has emerged.

The second cause of fragmentation is the
creation of two power centers. Cracks have appeared within the administration.
Furthermore, there is the political reform for the return of gubernatorial
elections. The system can no longer guarantee victory for the loyalists. If
this is so, the contract changes within the elite – loyalty in exchange for
guarantees. This means that tectonic shifts in our political system have begun.

S.B.: So
far, most of the moves have been aimed at “suppressing and preventing.”

O.K.: It is necessary to
calm people down, presumably by strengthening the government and its leader. A
strong leader will restore the confidence of the elite by punishing some,
backing others and helping yet others. Some people will return from the streets
to their homes. A minority will become radicalized. Law enforcers know how to
combat radical elements.

But the question remains, what next? The problems that
have prompted the protests did not go away. The system must be modernized
quickly, to make it flexible and capable of reacting to challenges. Time is
running short. Otherwise there will be a social explosion.

Olga
Kryshtanovskaya is the head of the RAS Sociology Institute’s Center for the
Study of Elites, Professor Emeritus at Glasgow University, Doctor of Sciences
(Sociology) and author of Anatomy of the Russian
Elite.