EU-Global Strategy: After Brexit and the US-Election : a further push for militarization?”

The question that has been dominating the political discourse in the European Union for some time now is what kind of conclusions need to be drawn after two essential occasions: First, the decision of the British population in June 2016 to leave the EU and second, the election of Donald Trump as US-president in November the same year. The answers are unanimous and – from a peace perspective – all problematic. Above all, many voices are stressing that there must be consequences in terms of security policy which include a massive extension of the EU military apparatus. Even though it is seldom sad very clearly, behind these demands is the omnipresent idea that the European Union will only stay in the front row of great powers by means of an extremely powerful military apparatus. Especially since 1999, massive efforts have been made to achieve “improvements” in this area. Indeed the EU militarization project developed slowly; for reasons that might have become obsolete with the two major events described at the beginning. Both the US and Great Britain proved to be considerable blockers for Europe to become a military power. Having this in mind, it seems that the two events suit many policy-makers in Brussels. In any case it did not take long to launch series of essential initiatives. The most important one is the publication of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) adopted by the European Council on the 28th of June 2016, only a few days after the British referendum. With the demand of “highest capacities” for “autonomous warfare” the EUGS set the goal, which seems to be implemented with hasty activity.

1. The EU militarization process and its temporary failure

In 1990 the then Belgian Foreign Minister, Mark Eyskens, already explained the considerable “power-political advantages” of military means referring to the beginning of the Gulf War: “Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm if they do not develop an independent defensive capability.” Hans-Gert Pöttering, former President of the European Parliament and current head of the conservative Konrad-Adenauer foundation put it like this: “In international politics political creative power is invariably bound to military strength. […] The EU should not only be an actor of global relevance in its wishful thinking and its rhetoric. But, the EU must possess the means and act accordingly.” With this in mind, 1999 marked the original beginning of the militarization of the EU: At two council summits, in Cologne and Helsinki, it was decided to set up a rapid reaction force composed of 60.000 soldiers (with rotation around 180.000 soldiers).

In the following year the establishment of the corresponding infrastructure for the EU foreign investments was launched: a Military Committee, a Military Staff and a Political and Security Committee. Furthermore in 2003, the “European Security Strategy” was adopted which provided the conceptual framework for the intervention orientation of the Union. First EU military missions of the now known “Common Security and Defense Policy” (CSDP) took place the same year. Already in that time, the aim was passed off as building autonomous intervention capability. So the capability to be able to carry out greater military operations at least in the extended neighborhood area, without the support (and if necessary without the approval) of the US. Because Washington was at first not in favor to such a process of emancipation, it was trying to torpedo the EU efforts in this phase (in conjunction with Great Britain). However, the next big step for the expansion of the EU military component was the EU constitutional treaty, which was formulated in 2003.

This treaty was stopped by the referendums in France and Netherlands in 2005 and in Ireland in 2008 and could only put into effect as the “Treaty of Lisbon” in 2009 because of tricks. In the same year, Barak Obama took over as the new US president and called on the EU allies to expand their military capacity, which paved the way for the EU-Militarization. As a “litmus test” for the seriousness of the European attempts functioned the war in Libya in 2011: An extensive military mission in the extended EU neighborhood area, which did not took place under the leadership of the US, but under France and Great Britain. Above all, the intervention proved that the EU states were far away from autonomous intervention capabilities. Moreover it showed that France and Great Britain did not have the necessary military capacity for such an operation.

In the middle of the Libyan war in 2011, the US was really furious about the failure of the allies. At that time US-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave an inflammatory speech: “Furthermore, the mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country – yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the U.S., once more, to make up the difference.” For many years, the militarization of the European Union has not progressed as fast as wished. But now there is a new situation. First, the escalation in relation to Russia is working as a mobilizing element and secondly, from 2014 Germany performed a shift towards a much more aggressive foreign and military policy. Furthermore, after the vote of 23rd of June 2016, Great Britain as one of the most vehement opponents of the EU militarization project will leave the Union in near future.

2. Global Strategy and Brexit

It was conspicuous that experienced military politicians such as Elmar Brok (MEP, EVP) did not shed any tears over the forthcoming exit of the British. On the contrary, the then chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the EU Parliament was quoted immediately after the referendum with the following words: “The Brexit also has good points. […] For years, the British have stopped us. Now we are finally moving forward.” The German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen gave a statement going in the same direction: “We had to show consideration for Great Britain for a long time, because Great Britain consistent didn´t want that topic.” Decision makers in Brussels did not lose a lot of time: Only five days after the British referendum, the EU Council adopted a new EU Global Strategy (EUGS) that has replaced the European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003. It is striking that the document written under the aegis of the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini has completely lost the triumphal-optimistic tone of his predecessor.

For example, the ESS from 2003 was introduced with the following sentence: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.” The EUGS on the other hand sounds way more pessimistic: “We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned.” What the EU’s Global Strategy is altogether missing is any self-criticism and reflection as far as its own policy has contributed to the current predicament. With its neoliberal free trade agreements the European Neighborhood Policy plays a key role in the destabilization of the neighboring countries of the EU. Instead, the EUGS calls for this policy to be intensified: “Many people within the scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) both to the east and to the south wish to build closer relations with the Union.[…] We will support these countries in implementing association agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas.” In general, the EUGS outlines quite clear economic interest which should be “protected”: “A prosperous Union hinges on a strong internal market and an open international economic system. We have an interest in fair and open markets, in shaping global economic and environmental rules, and in sustainable access to the global commons through open sea, land, air and space routes. […] Connected to the EU’s interest in an open and fair economic system is the need for global maritime growth and security, ensuring open and protected ocean and sea routes critical for trade and access to natural resources. The EU will contribute to global maritime security, building on its experience in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, and exploring possibilities in the Gulf of Guinea, the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca.” Although the European ambitions are obviously of a global nature the focus for any military interventions to enforce these interests is clearly the extended neighborhood area: “The EU will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, concentrating our efforts in surrounding regions to the east and south, while considering engagement further afield on a case by case basis.”

As already indicated, the goal is to be able to act militarily in this region without the US: “European security and defense efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO. A more credible European defense is essential also for the sake of a healthy transatlantic partnership with the United States.” In contrary to former times, the US is sympathetic to these efforts. The positive attitude of Washington is described in the EUGS-analysis of the External Policy Section of the EU Council as follows: “[The EUGS] may prove to be a major turning point in EU foreign policy and security thinking. It emphasizes the value of hard power —including via a strong partnership with NATO —along with soft power. […] Some Member States had feared that a stronger and more autonomous EU would harm the North Atlantic Treaty Organization […].These concerns are addressed, as NATO features strongly in the Global Strategy. The Strategy sees no inevitable conflict between the interests of the EU and NATO.”

To what extend this trend will continue under the US-President Donald Trump is unclear. On the one hand, Trump pushes the EU states to pump more money into the armaments sector, like no president before. On the other hand, the disputes among the allies are increasing visibly, that is why it remains to be seen how the transatlantic relationship will evolve. Either way, the claim to “emancipate” military from the US will be pursued determined. In order to achieve this, the EUGS demands to establish the necessary military capacities: “[The] Member States need all major equipment to respond to external crises and keep Europe safe. This means having full-spectrum land, air, space and maritime capabilities, including strategic enablers.” That these “goods” are provided reliable, it is necessary to have a defense industry that is as effective as possible: “A sustainable, innovative and competitive European defense industry is essential for Europe’s strategic autonomy and for a credible CSDP.” In order to achieve this, the EUGS urges a “better” Europeanization of military and armaments policy as well as greater efforts in the armaments financing sector. Precisely, these goals were followed by series of further initiatives.

3. Bratislava-Militarization Agenda

Even one day before the EU’s Global Strategy was adopted by the EU Council, France and Germany made use of the opportune moment and published a paper that had already been worked out for a long time: called “A strong Europe in an uncertain world”. The former Foreign Minister of Germany Frank-Walter Steinmeier and his French colleague Jean-Marc Ayrault announced that they would “take further steps towards a political union in Europe”. In addition to extensive announcements on migration and economic policy, it also presents “A European Security Agency”. They argue that it is now necessary to make the best out of the situation and literally tackle the military rise of Europe into a serious global power, of course under the Franco-German leadership: “In response to this challenge, to beat Germany and France against a European security agenda that includes all security and defense aspects that play a role at European level. […] The Global Strategy of the European Union, the new external relations policy document of the EU, […] is an important step in this direction. But we must go further: In a strongly diverging political interests dominated international environment Germany and France should join together to help develop the EU step by step to an independent and global actor.

The goal is to more effectively implement our findings and our instruments in civil and military in real politics. France and Germany will therefore support an integrated EU foreign and security policy, which brings together all EU policy instruments.” The EUGS should be used as stepping stone for a further militarization of the EU. This was done in a similar form in a second German-French paper released on the 12th of September 2016. This time the German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen and French Defense Minister Yves Le Drian presented an initiative called “Renewal of the CSDP”. Shortly after, EU Commissioner Jean-Claude Junker gave his “State of the Union” speech on the 14th of September 2016. In doing so, the military sound which he used attracted attention: “Soft power is not enough in our increasingly dangerous neighborhood. […] Europe needs to toughen up. Nowhere is this truer than in our defense policy. Europe can no longer afford to piggy-back on the military might of others or let France alone defend its honor in Mali. We have to take responsibility for protecting our interests and the European way of life.” One of the most important concrete demands of Junker, which could also be found in the two German-French proposals, is the establishment of an EU headquarter in order to be “better” and faster for military interventions in the future.

The so-called “permanent structured cooperation”, a core-Europe, which would annul the principles of the unanimous vote and to transfer important parts of the EU military policy to individual states; the procurement of EU´s own military capabilities and an important step towards an EU army; and the most far-reaching demand, the establishment of a kind of an EU armaments budget: “For European defense to be strong, the European defense industry needs to innovate. That is why we will propose before the end of the year a European Defense Fund, to turbo boost research and innovation.” Of course the time chosen by Leyen, Le Drian and Juncker was not arbitrary. Shortly afterwards, the heads of state and government met on their informal, because Britain was not invited, EU Council meeting on the 16th of September 2016 in the capital of Slovakia. They agreed, with the so-called Bratislava agenda, to elaborate the proposals until the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome in March 2017.

4. Defense Action Plan: billions of EU funds for armaments

That the EU budget is used for military-relevant interests, as required by the Defense Action Plan, is anything but self-evident. This is due to the civilian financing reserve in Article 41 (2) of the EU Treaty, which says: “Operating expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter [Common Foreign and Security Policy] gives rise shall also be charged to the Union budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defense implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise.” For a long time, this passage was interpreted, not least on the insistence of the United Kingdom, in such a way that on this basis no military-relevant expenditure from the EU budget can be spent.

Over the years a complex network at the EU level has emerged for the financing of military measures in order to circumvent this limitation at least in parts. For this, a considerable creativity was shown. For example, about 10% of the costs of EU military deployments are financed through a so-called ATHENA-funded shadow budget, in which all Member States pay in. Regardless of whether they are involved in a particular operation or not. It is also common practice to declare military operations as “civil” because they can be financed through the budget of the “Common Foreign and Security Policy” (CFSP). The EU space programmes Galileo and Copernicus are two incredible cases. Although they are clearly serving military purposes to a negligible extent, they are financed from the EU budget. For Galileo the multiannual financial framework from 2014 until 2020 is about EUR 7 billion and Copernicus receives around 4.3 billion. Cheeky is also the “African Peace Facility” – since 2004, EUR 1.9 billion have been removed mainly for the development of African intervention groups and for the financing of African Union military deployments. Although these are financial means from the “European Development Fund”.

So “successful” it was to use money from different departments so laborious it is for those who want to pump as many funds as possible into the armaments sector. In this respect, it has long been attempted to undermine the financing reserve of Article 41 (2). The Commission’s Defense Action Plan of 30 November 2016 could prove a decisive step towards this direction. The Commission states at the beginning of the “European Defence Action Plan” that there is an urgent need for Europeans to “support the entire cycle of defence capabilities development”. For this purpose, as already announced by Juncker a “European Defense Fund” should be set up with two components: a “research window” and a “capability window”. As far as the “research window” is concerned, a 16-person strong high-level group (Group of Personalities, GoP) on the subject of an EU armaments research budget was convened by EU Industrial Commissioner El¿bieta Bieñkowska in March 2015. It consisted mainly of representatives of the armaments industry and therefore unsurprisingly they came to the conclusion that the EU had to set up a budget of EUR 3.5 billion in the next budget (2021-2027). In the final report of the group it is stated: “The European Union is a global player with global interests and responsibilities. Being an effective player, however, requires capabilities in critical military areas and an appropriate level of strategic autonomy, freedom of action and security of supply.”

The request for “strategic autonomy” runs like a thread through the document and emerges no less than 24 times. The target armaments industry, as powerful as possible, is in need of a massive support on the export markets otherwise it is doomed, so the further argumentation: “Export growth significantly contributes to sustaining the critical mass of European defense companies.[…]Without exports, many European companies would now be struggling to survive the deep cuts in their national defense expenditure.” The GoP demands were copied one-on-one in the Defense Action Plan of the European Commission. By a “preparative” amounting to a total of EUR 90 million between 2017 and 2019 should pave the way for the “research window” to take the form of a European defence research programme within the next multiannual financial framework post 2020. Even at the exact extent, the GoP proposals were adopted: “Given the importance of defence research investment, the scale of existing national defence research budgets and the high costs of developing cutting-edge defence technologies, such a “window” may need an estimated annual budget of EUR 500 million in order to make a substantial difference.”

Here, the question automatically came up how the unambiguous financing reserve from Article 41 (2) could be circumvented. Meanwhile a line of argumentation was agreed according to which the prohibition is exclusively concerned with the financing of “operations” as a military intervention, since they are talking about “operational measures”. As a result, other aspects are not affected. This is also what the scientific service of the German Bundestag stated: “The wording ‘operational measure‘does not yet include research in general language usage.” This is a decisive step in order to get rid of the exasperating financial reserve. It was not without reason that, in connection with these plans, the German Newspaper Handelsblatt spoke of a “milestone for Europe’s defense policy” and the “impulse for a change of time”. Although the assessment is likely to be true, the “second” window that the Commission plans has even more far-reaching consequences. The “capability window” actually goes a step beyond research by starting with the procurement of armaments at EU level.

The corresponding passage of the Defense Action Plan proves that this involves considerable amounts: “It [the capability window] would secure joint financing of the development and procurement of strategic capability priorities. […] This “window” would focus on the post-R&T phases, including prototypes as well as the development and procurement of products and technologies. As a first estimate, a reference amount of EUR 5 billion per year could serve as an objective. This would correspond to 2.5% of total national spending on defence within the EU and to 14% of national spending on defence capabilities.”The exact modalities of how this fund should be filled and “played” has yet to be worked out. According to the Commission paper, the individual states as well as the EU budget should contribute to it. The Commission leaves no doubts about its determination to put the militarization of the European Union on a whole new level: “Europe has to take responsibility for protecting its interests, values and the European way of life. […]The Commission is ready to engage at an unprecedented level in defence to support Member States. It will exploit the EU instruments, including EU funding, and the full potential of the Treaties, towards building a Defence Union.”

6. Europe as a global power?

As can be seen from the chronological description of the most important current EU militarization initiatives, these are by no means entirely new plans which have been developed only in response to Brexit and Trump’s election. On the contrary: The EUGS was also already spelled out before the British referendum was taking place, as was presumably the first Franco-German militarization paper. They only used the Brexit as collateral use and justification for long targeted projects. This is also true for the election of Donald Trump as US-president. Having in mind that the “State of the Union” speech by EU-Commission president Juncker was held nearly two months before the election of the US President, in which almost all major initiatives were sketched. With the reference to Trumps unrestricted demands for more EU armaments efforts, they are presented as a practical constraint even though they have long been on the agenda anyway. Thus, Juncker reported directly after Trumps election: “Europe […] owes a great debt of thanks to America, but they will not ensure our security in the long term. We have to do that for ourselves, and that is why we need to take a new approach to the European Defence Union, including the long-term goal of establishing a European army.”

The EU High Representative Federica Mogherini made an even more ambitious appearance shortly after the US election when she said: “In the months and years ahead, actually I can say, in the hours we are living, there is, there will be, an increasing “demand of Europe” from our neighbours and from our partners worldwide. There is and there will be a growing request for a principled global security provider. For a super-power that believes in multilateralism and in cooperation.” Similarly, the EU parliamentarians expressed their opinion on the “Implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy”, which was adopted the 14th of December 2016: “The European Parliament […] emphasises that the EU must strengthen its security and defence capabilities, as it can only use its full potential as a global power if it combines its unrivalled soft power with hard power, as part of the EU’s comprehensive approach.” After the heads of states and governments already agreed on the establishment of an EU- headquarter in the beginning of March 2017, called “Military Planning and Conduct Capability”, it was signed on the 25th of March 2017.

On the emblematic 60th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, together with representatives of the member states and EU-Commission, the “Rome Declaration” was adopted. It emphasized once again the determination that the EU has the “capacity of playing a key role in the world”. For a “stronger Europe on the global scene” a Union is needed that is willing “to take more responsibilities and to assist in creating a more competitive and integrated defence industry; a Union committed to strengthening its common security and defence, also in cooperation and complementarity with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.” The real tragedy is that the Brexit and the election of Donald Trump are expressions of a deep and viciously comprehensible dissatisfaction with the political establishment on both sides of the Atlantic. It is a bitter irony that the most important conclusion for the EU – after these events – is to act out global power fantasies and to push on costly militarization initiatives instead of finally listening to the real worries and needs of the people. In addition, it appears to be the cement of a project that started to slowly fall apart. Spiegel Online gets to the heart of how grotesque this project is: “The European Union started as a peace project after the Second World War and now Europe – of all things – should find unity through the military.”