In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and
composed of republican members, the superintending
government ought clearly to possess authority to defend
the system against aristocratic or monarchical innovations.
The more intimate the nature of such a Union may be,
the greater interest have the members in the political institutions
of each other; and the greater right to insist that
the forms of government under which the compact was
entered into, should be substantially maintained. But a right
implies a remedy; and where else could the remedy be deposited,
than where it is deposited by the Constitution?
Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been
found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort, than
those of a kindred nature. "As the confederate republic of
Germany," says Montesquieu, "consists of free cities and
petty states subject to different Princes, experience shews
us that it is more imperfect than that of Holland and
Switzerland." "Greece was undone" he adds, "as soon as
the King of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphyctions."
In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate
force, as well as the monarchical form of the new confederate,
had its share of influence on the events. It may possibly
be asked what need there could be of such a precaution,
and whether it may not become a pretext for
alterations in the state governments, without the concurrence
of the states themselves. These questions admit of
ready answers. If the interposition of the general government
should not be needed, the provision for such an
event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution.
But who can say what experiments may be produced
by the caprice of particular states, by the ambition of enterprizing
leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign
powers? To the second question it may be answered,
that if the general government should interpose by virtue
of this constitutional authority, it will be of course bound
to pursue the authority. But the authority extends no farther
than to a guaranty of a republican form of government,
which supposes a pre-existing government of the
form which is to be guaranteed. As long therefore as the
existing republican forms are continued by the States, they
are guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Whenever the
states may chuse to substitute other republican forms, they
have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty
for the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is,
that they shall not exchange republican for anti-republican
Constitutions; a restriction which it is presumed will hardly
be considered as a grievance.

A protection against invasion is due from every society
to the parts composing it. The latitude of the expression
here used, seems to secure each state not only against foreign
hostility, but against ambitious or vindictive enterprizes
of its more powerful neighbours. The history both
of antient and modern confederacies, proves that the
weaker members of the Union ought not to be insensible
to the policy of this article.

Protection against domestic violence is added with equal
propriety. It has been remarked that even among the
Swiss Cantons, which properly speaking are not under one
government, provision is made for this object; and the history
of that league informs us, that mutual aid is frequently
claimed and afforded; and as well by the most
democratic, as the other Cantons. A recent and well
known event among ourselves, has warned us to be prepared
for emergencies of a like nature.

At first view it might seem not to square with the republican
theory, to suppose either that a majority have not the
right, or that a minority will have the force to subvert a
government; and consequently that the foederal interposition
can never be required but when it would be improper.
But theoretic reasoning in this, as in most other [Volume 4, Page 563]
cases, must be qualified by the lessons of practice. Why
may not illicit combinations for purposes of violence be
formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small
State, as by a majority of a county or a district of the same
State; and if the authority of the State ought in the latter
case to protect the local magistracy, ought not the foederal
authority in the former to support the State authority? Besides,
there are certain parts of the State Constitutions
which are so interwoven with the Foederal Constitution,
that a violent blow cannot be given to the one without
communicating the wound to the other. Insurrections in a
State will rarely induce a foederal interposition, unless the
number concerned in them, bear some proportion to the
friends of government. It will be much better that the violence
in such cases should be repressed by the Superintending
power, than that the majority should be left to
maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest.
The existence of a right to interpose will generally prevent
the necessity of exerting it.

Is it true that force and right are necessarily on the same
side in republican governments? May not the minor party
possess such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military
talents and experience, or of secret succours from foreign
powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal to
the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous position
turn the scale on the same side against a superior
number so situated as to be less capable of a prompt and
collected exertion of its strength? Nothing can be more
chimerical than to imagine that in a trial of actual force,
victory may be calculated by the rules which prevail in a
census of the inhabitants, or which determine the event of
an election! May it not happen in fine that the minority of
CITIZENS may become a majority of PERSONS, by the accession
of alien residents, of a casual concourse of adventurers,
or of those whom the Constitution of the State has not
admitted to the rights of suffrage? I take no notice of an
unhappy species of population abounding in some of the
States, who during the calm of regular government are
sunk below the level of men; but who in the tempestuous
scenes of civil violence may emerge into the human character,
and give a superiority of strength to any party with
which they may associate themselves.

In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice
lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent
factions, flying to arms and tearing a State to pieces, than
the representatives of confederate States not heated by the
local flame? To the impartiality of Judges they would unite
the affection of friends. Happy would it be if such a remedy
for its infirmities, could be enjoyed by all free governments;
if a project equally effectual could be established
for the universal peace of mankind.

Should it be asked what is to be the redress for an insurrection
pervading all the States, and comprizing a superiority
of the entire force, though not a constitutional
right; the answer must be, that such a case, as it would be
without the compass of human remedies, so it is fortunately
not within the compass of human probability; and
that it is a sufficient recommendation of the Foederal Constitution,
that it diminishes the risk of a calamity, for which
no possible constitution can provide a cure.

Among the advantages of a confederate republic enumerated
by Montesquieu, an important one is, "that
should a popular insurrection happen in one of the States,
the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into
one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound."