It is especially amenable to legal study for a variety of
reasons. The operation was confined in both time and geography.
The units involved were limited in number. UNPROFOR reported on
the operation in a particularly detailed and helpful manner. UN
forces anticipated law of war violations and gathered much
relevant information during the operation. Lastly, it was a
recent event so evidence and witnesses were still available.

On 9 September, at about 6:00 a.m., Croat forces attacked
the Pocket. An artillery, mortar and/or tank fire barrage
preceded an infantry and tank advance. Croats attacked from the
north-east and quickly killed or routed the few Serb defenders.
Overrunning the Serb defences, the Croat forces soon captured
Divoselo (Strunici), Citluk (Licki), Donje Selo, and the
surrounding villages. By 10 September, the Croatian army was in
charge of the area.

The rationale for the Croat attack is impossible to
determine with certainty. Speculation includes: a rehearsal by
the Croats for a larger operation, a test of their forces by the
Croats, retaliation by the Croats for Serb shelling of Gospic, a
desire by the Croats to straighten their front, or simply a Croat
desire to seize territory.

Captain "1" was in command of the Serb forces in the Divo
Selo area. In the face of the Croat attack, he ordered his
soldiers to withdraw. This they did along with many local
civilians. Over the next days, this mixed group made its way by
foot to Serb territory. During the escape, an unidentified Serb
soldier escaping with the group told the Captain that Croat
soldiers had spared him. Indeed, the Croats told the
unidentified soldier to escape when they could easily have killed
or captured him.

"2" was a soldier in the Serb army on 9 September. Upon the
Captain's orders, he withdrew in the face of the Croat attack.
During his escape to Serb territory, he saw the Croats burn
houses and steal livestock. He came across a body. Someone had
either badly mutilated it after death or had tortured the victim
before death. During his escape, he entered Citluk to try to
find food. There he came within 10 to 15 metres of a group of
Croat soldiers. He heard instructions translated into German for
some soldiers. The apparent commander said in Croatian: «Those
houses are Serbian houses and you can do anything you wish.»

"4", a resident of "A", was in the local Serb militia. He
fled the Croat attack and immediately returned to his home.
There he saw his elderly sister-in-law dead. A search of the
scene after UNPROFOR took control of the area revealed only some
clothing. She was wearing this clothing when "4" saw her dead
body. During "4's" escape to Serb territory, he saw Croat
soldiers killing sheep belonging to local civilians and stealing
five or six tractors owned by the local populace.

"5", a resident of "A", was also a member of the Serb
militia. On 9 September, he was on the front line. Upon the
attack he fled, returned to his home, and warned his family to
flee. While he was in hiding, before he reached safety, he saw
his tractor being stolen by the Croats. Croat soldiers wounded
him during his escape.

"6" was a resident of "B". He left his home at the
beginning of the Croat attack. Upon leaving, he saw the victim
and a younger unidentified woman outside her home, from about 200
metres away. About 20 unidentified Croat soldiers came up to the
victim's house and ordered the younger woman away. Then, the
soldiers gunned down the victim. After this, "6" fled to the
forest with relatives, where he eventually joined a mixed group
of Serb military and civilians. They walked to safety.

"8" was a resident of "B". During the early morning of 9
September, he tried to evacuate two wounded Serb soldiers in his
private vehicle. Croat forces ambushed the vehicle, their
gunfire hitting all three vehicle occupants. "8" believed the
gunfire killed both of his passengers. "8" escaped and hid in
bushes approximately 20 metres from the ambush site. Ten to 15
unidentified soldiers approached the vehicle, dragged the two
dead Serb soldiers out, placed the bodies near a building and set
the building on fire. In "8's"; original statement, he said one
of his passengers was alive when taken from the vehicle by the
Croats. He also said that they placed both the wounded soldier
and the body of the other dead soldier in the building before
setting it afire. The correction of the original statement was
not placed in all versions of the various reports compiled by UN
organizations.

"9", a resident of "A", fled the initial attack with her
family. When shortly thereafter she returned to her house to get
shoes, she was shot and wounded by unidentified Croat soldiers.
She heard the soldier's conversation from 300 to 500 metres away.
The conversation showed that the Croats deliberately targeted her
as a civilian. One soldier objected to shooting at her with,
«No, it's a woman»; the other replied, «It does not matter».

"10" resided in "A". During the 9 September attack, she was
in her home. "10" son fled the house at the start of the
attack. He took his rifle with him. No one has seen him since,
and he is presumed to be dead. An unidentified Croat soldier saw
her through a window then threw a grenade into her house. The
subsequent explosion wounded her. The same soldier entered the
house and fired into the room in which she lay. This gunfire did
not hit her. Wounded but still in her house, "10" observed two
Croat vehicles pull up disguised as UN vehicles (i.e. white with
«UN» lettering). These vehicles carried Croat military forces.
She heard instructions, translated between German and Croatian,
to slaughter everything and leave nothing. She saw Croats
killing her sheep and pigs. During her escape, she also saw
Croats killing domestic animals, burning houses and stealing roof
tiles. She eventually made her way to safety.

"11" lived between "B" and "A". He and his family escaped
to the woods at the beginning of the attack. He fled with his
rifle. From hiding, he returned to his house on 10 September.
There he found all his possessions destroyed, his animals mostly
dead or injured and his house burning. During the several days
it took "11" to reach safety, he was shot at several times and
eventually wounded. A neighbour accompanied "11" during most of
the time.

"12", a resident of "B", also fled during the attack
carrying his rifle. On 10 September, while still in the area,
Croat soldiers discovered him and a friend. The Croats arrested
both and ordered them to turn over their weapons. A Croat
soldier then used his rifle to hit "12". "12" fled with the
Croats trying unsuccessfully to shoot him. His friend apparently
did not escape, not having been seen since. He spent the next
several days hiding in various houses and in the forest in the
area. During this time, he discovered Croats had taken the
furniture and animals from his house. "12" observed the Croats
stealing sheep, cows, and horses belonging to others. He was
shot at by Croats twice and wounded in the leg on the second
occasion.

"14" a resident of "A", escaped from her house on 9
September. During the several days she spent in the woods before
she made her way to safety in Medak, she saw Croat soldiers
burning houses and throwing grenades into houses. Other Croats
fired upon her while she was walking to Medak.

Negotiations took place, and the parties eventually agreed
that the Croats would withdraw to their 8 September positions,
and UN forces would occupy the territory vacated by the Croats.
UN forces consisted of Canbat I, the Canadian battalion of the
Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. It was augmented by
two companies of infantry from two separate French battalions.
The Croat withdrawal and insertion of UN forces started on 15
September and were originally to be completed by 6:00 p.m., 16
September.

As the UN forces began to deploy into the Pocket on 16
September, they could hear tens of explosions and see new smoke
rising from Croat-controlled territory. There were no Serb
forces in those areas nor had there been for many days. Such
explosions and smoke had not been seen before 15 September. They
also heard small arms fire from the same area. There are many
witnesses to this including nearly all Canbat I personnel, UNMOs,
UNCIVPOLs, UN civilian personnel, UN and Canadian Forces public
affairs personnel and news reporters. All suspected that the
Croats were engaged in ethnic cleansing of the Pocket before
turning it over to the UN.

At noon, 16 September, Croat forces prevented Canbat I
soldiers from crossing into the Pocket. This was a violation of
the agreement. UN public affairs video and radio, plus Reuters
news agency, videotaped this delay. Additionally, there were
numerous witnesses to this delay. UN personnel felt the delay
was a deliberate tactic used by the Croats to give them more time
to complete their ethnic cleansing of the Pocket. UNPROFOR
pressed the Croats, and after a delay of about two hours, they
allowed UN forces to enter the Pocket.

As UN forces entered the Pocket, they found every building
burning or demolished. There were hundreds of such buildings in
the several villages and hamlets, none of which were habitable.
Special sweep teams assessed and recorded damage, searched for
survivors and collected bodies. The teams included UNPROFOR
medical officers, UNCIVPOLs, and soldiers.

"17" noted Croat soldiers with the shoulder flashes of the
Ninth Brigade. On 16 September, he saw Croat police of the
Special Police in the Medak area. He witnessed the explosions
and fires that preceded the Croat withdrawal. He also saw the
complete destruction throughout the Medak Pocket.

"18" heard the explosions and saw the fires within Croat-
controlled territory on 16 September. He questioned a Croat
liaison officer about these. The Croat officer replied that
maybe the Croats were destroying their own homes in the area.
"18" also observed that the Croat troops within the territory did
not react to the explosions as they would to incoming artillery.
He witnessed the total destruction and devastation throughout the
area. He saw no house undemolished and took photographs of the
damage.

Also on 17 September, during a dispute between UN forces
and the Croatian Army on the exact proper location of their
respective forces, an UNPROFOR officer met a Croatian officer in
the Pocket. The Croatian officer had a map and was plainly in
charge of the Croat forces. The map had been obviously and
crudely altered, and it no longer represented the earlier agreed
upon placement of various forces.

The Medak Pocket area falls within the area of
responsibility of the Croat OZ Gospic. Croat units involved were
largely from OZ Gospic. Some Special Police Forces from OZ Split
were seen during the operation, but their role seemed to be
secondary.

The major Croat unit involved in the attack was the Ninth
Mechanized Brigade (Ninth), which is unofficially called the
«Wolves». It had been designated the 6th Mechanized Brigade
until about July 1993. The Ninth was directly responsible to OZ
Gospic. Graffiti left on the walls of buildings in the Pocket by
Croat forces included the «Ninth» and «Wolves».

UNPROFOR units sweep teams recovered 18 bodies in the
Pocket in the immediate aftermath of the operation. Croat
authorities turned over another 64 bodies they said they
recovered in the Medak Pocket. These bodies were all given to
the Serb authorities. Of all the bodies recovered, 59 (71 per
cent) were probably those of soldiers and 23 (29 per cent) those
of civilians. Among other factors complicating the determination
of military status is that many civilians wear items of military
clothing and many local military wear items of civilian clothing.

Serbian authorities had a doctor conduct an examination of
the bodies turned over to them by the Croats and UNPROFOR. Only
one full autopsy was done. UNCIVPOL describes the rest of the
examinations as «cursory». After this, Serb authorities quickly
turned over the bodies to relatives for burial.

The Serb authorities prepared a postmortem report and gave
it to Major Holland. He passed it on to Dr. Robert Kirschner, an
experienced pathologist
with the independent group, Physicians for Human Rights. Dr.
Kirschner's report states that regarding the bodies recovered by
UNPROFOR, «there is insufficient evidence to document an
execution style slaying». Of those bodies turned over to the
Serbs by the Croats, «I could find no evidence to suggest a
pattern of extra-judicial executions». His opinions regarding
both groups cannot exclude some murders and admit some suspicious
circumstances, but in summary the evidence is ambiguous.

Dr. Kirschner's further verbal opinion was that the
earlier preliminary field examinations and those conducted by a
Serbian doctor are not reliable. This unreliability results from
the necessarily rudimentary conditions of the field examinations,
e.g., the bodies could not be washed, no x-ray equipment was
available, etc. Additionally, the medical personnel involved
understandably lacked forensic experience.

The Croats claimed in an 11 October statement to the UN in
Geneva that they did not violate the laws of war during the Medak
battle. They specifically cited the cases of two elderly but
apparently still feisty women killed during the attack. They
said one was killed while operating anti-aircraft artillery and
another blew herself up with a grenade to avoid capture.

Most Canbat I personnel entering the Pocket witnessed the
total destruction involved. Many buildings were still on fire on
16 September. There may be others with equal experiences. A
Canbat I photographer took 1,400 photographs recording the
destruction and the 18 recovered bodies. Much of this activity
was video recorded by Canbat I personnel.

Besides the destruction of buildings, all witnesses saw
that most livestock was killed and most personal property,
including vehicles and farm equipment, was destroyed. They noted
that haystacks were set on fire, and wells were polluted.
Croatian forces had discarded hundreds of surgical gloves
throughout the area.

The Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team (WCIT) visited
the area from 27 to 31 October and on 10 November 1993. The WCIT
consisted of Major Holland and Master Corporal T. McComb, both of
the Canadian Forces. The team was accompanied by Dr. Kirschner.
The team took video and still photographs, interviewed some
witnesses and gathered further materials and reports. The team
also obtained the 1,400 photographs taken by the Canbat I
photographer and arranged and conducted the videotaped assessment
by Major S. Laplante (a combat engineer in the Canadian Forces
serving as UNPA Sector South Engineer) and Chief Warrant Officer
Bastid (an explosive ordinance disposal expert in the French Army
serving with UNPROFOR HQ Zagreb) of the damage to civilian
buildings.

The examinations of the buildings by Major Laplante and
Chief Warrant Officer Bastid reveal that the buildings were
either set on fire and/or demolished by charges set inside the
buildings. Artillery did not cause the damage nor did tank fire,
mortar shells, rocket propelled grenades, nor aerial bombardment.
Canbat I personnel believed that antitank mines were used to
demolish those buildings not burned. However, neither of the
above witnesses could be that certain of the type of explosives
used.

Croat authorities say that the widespread destruction in
the Medak Pocket was necessitated by the Serbs using the civilian
homes for barracks and the storage of ammunition. What evidence
there is of military use of the civilian accommodation is
ambiguous or point to its military use by Croat forces. The type
of garbage (Croat cigarettes, newspapers, etc.) and the direction
the builders pointed the defensive positions (towards Serb
controlled areas, etc.) support usage by Croat forces.

Wanton destruction (»extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly«--Article 2(d), »wanton
destruction of . . . villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity«--Article 3(b)); and

Plunder (»plunder of . . . private property«--Article
3(e)).

The war crimes have been analysed in a pragmatic narrow
legal fashion. The analysis will seek to decide who
specifically, if anyone, can be held criminally responsible for
any given crime. Dealing with a war crime, no matter how
horrendous or how clear, is in this analysis a fruitless exercise
if specific legal responsibility cannot be attributed.

Such an analysis will deal with those directly responsible
«who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided
and abetted» the crime (Article 7(1)). Also dealt with will be
indirect (command) responsibility, as referred to in Article
7(3), of a superior «if he knew or had reason to know that the
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.»

The analysis of direct criminal responsibility for any of
the disclosed war crimes is very simple. At present, there is no
evidence implicating any specific identifiable individual in the
direct planning, instigation, ordering, commission, aiding or
abetting of any of these crimes. Therefore, this analysis will
concentrate on indirect, i.e., command responsibility.

Proof of command responsibility for war crimes will often
be largely circumstantial. Absent capturing or obtaining written
orders by the suspects or having the testimony of witnesses to
the issuing of these orders, such responsibility can usually only
be inferred. Inferences of such orders of a sufficiently
reliable nature to satisfy a criminal tribunal can only be
derived from clear and convincing patterns. Under the first head
of criminal command responsibility, the patterns must be so
strong that the only reasonable inference is that the suspect
ordered the commission of the crimes. Under the second head of
criminal command responsibility, the pattern must be so strong
that the only reasonable inference is that the suspect knew of
the crimes and failed to control or punish his offending
subordinates or that the suspect criminally abandoned his
command.

As mentioned, there is no evidence identifying any
specific individuals with any crimes, including any of the
murders. The only first-hand evidence of a murder is in the
murder of the 83 year-old blind woman. However, even here,
neither of the witnesses identified the responsible individuals
beyond being «Croat soldiers». In any event, there are serious
discrepancies between the two witnesses. "6" describes 20
soldiers, "7" describes 10. Furthermore, "6" describes a second
woman with the victim, but "7" omits this.

There is no convincing general pattern in the deaths
occurring in the Pocket. It is suspicious that UN troops found
virtually no survivors. It may also be suspicious that there
were more head wounds and close-range injuries than might be
expected. However, the majority (71%) of the located dead were
military. Although not strictly comparable, this was a higher
percentage of military casualties than the global figures in
WWII, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

Despite the importance of the presence of surgical gloves
stressed in the Canbat I report and elsewhere, their presence is
ambiguous. The sinister explanation is a possible one. However,
surgical gloves may have simply been ordinary precautions by the
Croats to deal with the legitimate dead and wounded anticipated
in any attack. The photographs of Canbat I personnel show them
also using surgical gloves.

Care must be taken in relying upon local witnesses. They
tend to be unreliable due to their extremely emotional attachment
to their own community's cause and their demonization of the
enemy. Witness "9" has given several versions of her
experiences. While her versions are not inconsistent, they do
not cover the same material, some of which it is surprising not
to hear in all versions. Her testimony should be confirmed and
carefully considered before presentation.

Many civilians were fleeing in the company of retreating
Serb soldiers, armed Serb civilians or were themselves armed.
Thus, the actions of many Croat soldiers were possibly lawful
and, at least, ambiguous. Much of the firing was at night. They
may have believed they were firing on retreating non-surrendering
enemy forces, which remain lawful targets. The law of war does
not impose a standard of perfection on soldiers. It accepts that
unfortunately civilians near military objectives may be
incidentally killed without necessarily breaching the law of war.
The inherent ambiguities surrounding this aspect of the Medak
Pocket Operation make building a prosecution for unlawful
targeting of civilians difficult. The evidence is not
sufficiently reliable or clear to obtain a conviction.

There is even a hint of contradictory evidence. The
sparing of the Serb soldier, as related to "1" is some, albeit
second hand, evidence that either there was no express policy to
kill everyone, or at least any such policy was not strictly
observed. Additionally, the witnesses naturally would not be
aware of the possibly many times they were not fired upon by
Croat forces.

All this being said, some dead were probably murdered.
However, no individual can be proved to be directly responsible.
Further, there is no strong unambiguous pattern of willful
killing emerging from the evidence available to this point.
Without such a pattern, it is impossible to affix criminal
responsibility upon the Croat commanders.

«Clearly, assignment to command military troops is
accompanied by broad authority and heavy responsibility.
This has been true of all armies throughout recorded
history. It is absurd, however, to consider a commander a
murderer or rapist because one of his soldiers commits a
murder or a rape.» *2

What is required is something «extensive and widespread». No
such pattern emerges from the evidence. Many commentators have
criticized the General Yamashita prosecution, which was, at
least, an aggressive use of the doctrine of command
responsibility. Even at that, the prosecutors of General
Yamashita could point to tens of thousands, if not hundreds of
thousands, of victims with 286 witnesses and 423 exhibits.

Unlike the deaths arising from the Medak Pocket Operation,
there is a clear, obvious and overwhelming pattern of wanton
destruction. Hundreds of homes were destroyed, virtually
hundreds of other buildings were destroyed, most animals were
killed or taken, virtually all personal property was destroyed or
taken, all vehicles and farm equipment were destroyed or taken,
haystacks were fired, and many wells were polluted. Devastation
was total.

The timing of the destruction is inconsistent with any
legitimate military conduct or of military necessity. The bulk
of this destruction occurred on 16 September, according to the
many eyewitnesses. The sounds of the explosions, the rising of
the smoke from fires, and the fact many buildings were still on
fire as UN personnel entered the Pocket establish this.

The destruction occurred well after all Serb resistance
had ended. There was no Serb resistance in the areas from which
the explosions were heard and the rising smoke seen. All
effective Serb forces had fled the area at the time of the bulk
of the destruction. The devastation was wrought in an unopposed
withdrawal, not a contested advance or retreat. Even the Croat
liaison officer was forced to use an excuse not involving
legitimate combat activity by the opposing forces. The scattered
nature of the buildings, with the brief and desultory original
Serb defence, does not explain this level of destruction.

The widespread destruction by demolition and fire is also
generally inconsistent with legitimate military operations. If
buildings are contested, then demolition charges cannot usually
be placed inside them. Similarly, absent incendiary weapons, of
which there is no evidence, being able to set fire to buildings
implies an ability to approach and control them. That is
inconsistent with enemy forces being present in them.

The Canbat I report states that any antitank mines used in
demolitions would have been centrally controlled. This indicates
that their use to destroy civilian objects would have required
high level approval. Such control is usual in a regular well-run
military. However, there is evidence that this is not always the
case with the forces involved in this conflict. Some minefields
in Sector South have overlapped, indicating a lack of such
central control. Additionally, all the forces display large
measures of ill-discipline, lack of control, and disorganization.

There are at least two defences to this charge offered or
available to the responsible Croat authorities. A Croat press
release said that the level of destruction in the Pocket was
required by the Serbs' use of civilian buildings as barracks and
for ammunition storage. This is clearly an inept excuse. The
timing of the destruction, being after Serb resistance ended,
argues against it. The extent of the destruction also argues
against this excuse. If every destroyed building had contained
Serb soldiers and ammunition, the Croats would never have
captured the Pocket. Destruction by fire and demolition, as
opposed to conventional military assault, also suggests this
Croat excuse is invalid.

Although not yet raised by the Croats, the second possible
excuse is that this destruction was a legitimate use of a
«scorched earth» policy. However, pointing out that this excuse
was not what the Croats themselves have claimed demolishes it.
They chose to rely on the use of these buildings for military
purposes by the Serbs.

Lastly, as a party to the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions, Croatia is bound by Part IV, Section I of Protocol
I. That treaty prohibits this tactic even if the Croats could
otherwise claim they were entitled to lay waste to their own
territory as a legitimate defensive tactic.

It is not practical to prosecute anyone for any torture
committed during the Medak Pocket Operation. First, it is not
clear anyone was tortured. In each instance of suspected
torture, it is possible the body was subjected to post-death
mutilation and not pre-death torture. However, mutilation of
bodies is itself a conventional war crime. It is not
specifically covered in Article 3, but it is perhaps within its
general ambit. The determination of this question turns on
whether mutilation of corpses is a «serious violation of
international humanitarian law» (Article 1).

Second, as with the suspected murders, no specific
individual can be identified as involved in any torture or
mutilation. Again, assuming torture or mutilation could be
proved, the few cases do not form any convincing pattern that
could then be attributed to commanders.

The thoroughness of the destruction, the open nature of
the methods used (the explosions could be heard and the smoke
seen by all), the orders overheard by civilian survivors, the
inherent control a commander must or should have, and the express
concerns raised by all overwhelmingly point to his
responsibility. He, by his actions and by attending at various
meetings, was clearly the responsible OZ Commander.

Widespread use of roadblocks by all parties in the
conflict, particularly near front lines, means that the
responsible commanders would or should know about any large-scale
movements of personnel or goods entering or leaving an area of
operations. Therefore, the commanders either did know or should
have known about demolition or incendiary materials entering the
Pocket and plundered goods leaving.

Can responsibility be found above that officer? Another
officer was clearly in charge of the withdrawal of the Croat
forces. However, he was only sent from the Zagreb general staff
on about 15 September to oversee the withdrawal. The Croats saw
the withdrawal as extremely sensitive, requiring a high level of
supervision. His responsibility is therefore problematic due to
his limited time in the area.

There is no direct evidence of the commander of the
Ninth's role in the wanton destruction. However, based solely on
the orbat information, a prima facie case can be made. As the
commander of the major unit involved, he is responsible for the
destruction inflicted in the Pocket, which must have involved his
unit. Graffiti in some of the destroyed buildings implicate the
Ninth.

The OZ Commander was replaced shortly after this battle.
This, plus his reported Albanian ethnic background, suggests that
the Croatian authorities are perhaps more likely to turn him over
to the International Criminal Tribunal than another officer of
Croat background and in more political favour.

A grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, being the extensive destruction and appropriation of
property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva
Convention, such destruction and appropriation not being
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly contrary to Article 2(d);

A violation of the laws or customs of war, being the
wanton destruction of villages or devastation not justified by
military necessity contrary to Article 3(b); and

A violation of the laws or customs of war, being plunder
of private property contrary to Article 3(e).

The charges involve the wanton destruction and plunder which
occurred during the Medak Pocket Operation. While the case
against one officer is stronger than that against the other, it
is believed that there is also a prima facie case against the
second officer.

It is also recommended that no one be charged with any
murder (murder, killing, unlawful targeting of civilians or
genocide related deaths), torture or mutilation occurring during
the operation. No one has been identified as being directly
responsible for such crimes. There are some suspicious
circumstances and even some probable murders. However, no
convincing pattern can be proved such that a commander can be
held indirectly criminally responsible using the doctrine of
command responsibility.

NOTES

*1 From the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
(Statute) Article 1. All further references to articles are to
those in the Statute, unless stated otherwise. It is interesting
that virtually all these provisions are echoed in the Yugoslav
constitution.

*2 «Trial of General Yamashita», 4 Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals 35.