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Insights
from Offsite 2002-1

Nuke Weapons Boss Gets Defensive Over Security

Just Trust Us
Contradictions: Admitting to Deficiencies, Failing to
Fail, and Confusion on Risks.
NNSA Strategy: Deny and Disparage

by Don Moniak
(Aiken, SC, January 25, 2002)

On Wednesday the Department of Energy's (DOE) National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)1
released a one-page statement by NNSA Administrator John
Gordon in which he lambasted critics, admitted to past
nuclear security deficiencies, and overall provided hard
evidence that the NNSA is operating from a bunker
mentality.2

The statement was unexpected, uncharacteristic, and
obviously provoked by the ongoing war of words between
DOE/NNSA and nuclear security critics. The situation
escalated this past week week with updates from the
Government Accountability Project (GAP) and the Project
On Government Oversight (POGO), and peaked Wednesday with
a media conference by Representative Ed Markey
(D-Massachusetts) featuring DOE security whistleblowers.

Until Wednesday the NNSA's media relations featured
self-congratulatory fluff that functioned to bore any
audience. Of the mere 24 press releases issued by NNSA
since June 2000, about one-third of these pertained to
personnel issues, while only two of the 24 contain a
shred of negative publicity about the complex.3

Just Trust Us

The tone of Administrator Gordon's statement suggests an
expectation of respect and credibility based merely on
his title and responsibility:

"As the administrator of the NNSA, I am responsible
to the Secretary of Energy and the American people for
the security of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. I have
assessed the security conditions at our sites many times
and I personally reviewed our posture immediately
following the terrorist attacks in September."

The latter statement referred to Gordon's whirlwind
two-day, post-September 11 tour of six of the ten nuclear
weapons sites housing NNSA field offices.4 The
trip was not only a public relations junket devoid of any
substantive analysis or insights--the NNSA failed to
acknowledge that the ~10 tonnes of plutonium now at Rocky
Flats is not even on its map, the kind of factual
omission that plagues the DOE/NNSA's credibility.5

Since that time criticism has mounted while DOE/NNSA
remained silent and exploited security concerns to shut
down and/or whitewash numerous Department websites. So
after years of DOE folks telling us to "just visit
our web site," the information portals are greatly
diminished or inaccessible.6

The "trust us" approach is credible only when a
bureaucracy has earned some trust by being open and
candid about its problems. Issuing contradictions and
mounting a strategy to deny concerns and to disparage
critics marks a return to Cold War tactics.

Contradictions

Contradictions are the hallmark of Administrator Gordon's
statement.

Admitting to Deficiencies

According to his statement, things were
"riskier" just a few years ago:

"In the mid-1990's, when budgets were severely cut
and security was progressively degraded, there was a
higher level of risk.Now we aggressively
protect our people, facilities, and material, and we
display a formidable security posture to potential
attackers."

We the public were never notified of this higher level of
risk,7 and the notion that aggressive
protection is "now" and "not then" is
not only false but is an unnecessary and hypocritical
potshot at his predecessors. Nor would we be notified of
such a risk today as this would be construed as a threat
to national security.

Overall this tactic is mere DOE tradition, a ploy to
divert concerns upon past practices, and contradicted by
an October 17, 2000 NNSA news release that refers to
security concerns at the weapon labs.8
Security was a problem in 2000, and if it was riskier in
the "mid-1990's" then common sense says the
risk is higher today than anybody is admitting.

Failing to Fail?

On the one hand, Gordon stated:

"Charges that there is a fifty percent failure rate
in our security tests are simply untrue."

Three paragraphs later he stated:

"Our forces are well-trained and well-equipped. They
are tested by outside challengers, often to failure - so
we know where weaknesses are. Then we fix the
problem."

Here is another vague and confusing admission to the
books. How "often" are they tested to failure?
How often do these failure tests fail to produce
failures? If there is a fifty percent failure rate, or a
thirty percent failure rate, are these the results of
being tested to failure?

Confusion on Risks

On the one hand, Administrator Gordon admits risks were
higher back in the last decade, century, and millennium
(leading me to wonder how long it will take for
bureaucrats will point to past mistakes as "20th
Century Mistakes") and also describes critics as
presenting a situation "grossly disproportionate to
the risks to the public."

Three paragraphs later, he dares to state there is no
risk:

"Nuclear material is not at risk at Department of
Energy facilities."

Of course it is at risk. That is why there are guards and
constant monitoring.

NNSA Strategy: Deny and Disparage

Most disturbing is the strategy to deny and disparage:

"As is often the case in 'reports' such as the one
from POGO, the use of outdated data contributes to
misleading conclusions."

"While we welcome serious inquiries into the
Department's security practices, it is unfortunate that
some try to create a climate of fear grossly
disproportionate to the risks to the public. Such
unfounded allegations are a disservice to the communities
that are home to our national defense facilities."

There are some difficulties with the POGO report,9 but
it is a serious inquiry into security practices that
contains very recent data. The fact is that in the area
of safeguards and security, there is no data available to
the public that is not outdated, nor will there be much.
If an agency like the General Accounting Office discovers
grave security risks, we will never know until well after
the fact.

The NNSA approach defies common sense and insults the
public. It is reminiscent of a claim made by the former
Sheriff of Randall County, Texas at a March 1999 public
meeting regarding a new county jail. Sheriff Hooks
claimed that prisons made for safer neighborhoods because
of increased police presence. At the time I happened to
live within shooting distance of the existing county
prison, and was comfortable with its size and location
but had experienced the risks of being that close in May
1997 when a violent offender escaped custody and ended up
on our block. When I cited this this escape as an
objection to the Sheriff's inane logic, he claimed that
the felon had escaped custody, not the jail. There was
laughter in the audience, just as many people will laugh
at Administrator Gordon's pleas to trust the Department
of Energy's security posture because the critics are
concerned with twentieth century practices.

A debate on nuclear security is going to happen and is
happening. The NNSA can stay in its rhetorical foxhole or
it can participate and work towards solutions.

4 http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/map.htm
features a map of the field offices. General Gordon
visited Pantex, Los Alamos, Sandia, Savannah River Site,
Kansas City Plant (which is responsible for non-nuclear
weapon parts), Y-12/Oak Ridge; and did not visit the
Nevada Test Site, Lawrence Livermore, or the Naval
Reactor facilities at Pittsburgh and Schenectady.

7 An inquiry to the NNSA by BREDL as to
whether this was an acceptable risk at the time has yet
to be answered.

8 The news release stated that Secretary of
Energy Bill Richardson "was sharply critical of
their failure to bring the same degree of [scientific]
expertise to the management of security and
operations." See: Secretary Richardson Accepts
Recommendations for Improving Security at Nuclear Weapons
Laboratories October 17, 2000 at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/press.asp

9 http://www.pogo.org/nuclear/security/2001report/reporttext.htm
The report is a compilation of many other reports but
fails to give much credit to other investigators. The
writers also took the unusual approach of citing the
download dates of their Internet citations, most of them
post-September 11th, . a tactic that puts other NGOs on
the spot. For example: http://fas.org/sgp/library/pfiab/
- Downloaded September 13, 2001. POGO also wrote to
Secretary of Energy Abraham to claim that
"sensitive" information and maps were on DOE
websites, a tactic that provided DOE with some measure of
cover for whitewashing its sites. As it turns out, the
information cited as sensitive was common knowledge such
as plutonium stored in Zone 4 at Pantex and in Building
371 at Rocky Flats.