Karl Kautsky

The Lessons of the October Experiment

THE DESPOTISM of the Bolshevik party in Russia appears to be stronger
and less open to attack than ever. Yet already it shows signs of
impending collapse. That has been proved very recently by the Trotsky
case. It may seem at first sight as if its swift and easy settlement
has strengthened the dictatorial regime to the greatest degree, and has
shown that no opposition to this regime is now possible. But it is
precisely the ease with which the opposition was suppressed that has
demonstrated how deep the inner decay of Bolshevism already is. For
this was not an external opposition that faced the present masters of
Russia, but one from within their own ranks, the opposition of a man
who together with Lenin created the dictatorship and justified it both
practically and theoretically, while the majority of Russia's present
ruling elite initially adopted a hesitant and vacillating attitude
towards it – and for very good reasons.

This position taken by Zinoviev and company was demonstrated clearly by Trotsky's recent writings Lenin and 1917 [On Lenin and Lessons of October], and even more clearly by the fact that they do not know how to answer his criticisms except by silencing the critic.

But something else is demonstrated by both of these writings and
particularly by the latter: how even the best minds of Bolshevism have
declined intellectually.

Trotsky speaks with contempt about the "parliamentary cretinism" of
social democracy, by which he understands any interest in parliamentary
proceedings and any involvement in such matters. Engels, who introduced
the expression, understood something different by it: the limited
mentality of some parliamentarians who believe "that the whole world,
its history and future, are governed and determined by a majority of
votes in that particular representative body which has the honour to
count them among its members". (Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany, pp.107-8. Published under Marx's name, but written for the most part by Engels.)[1]

But such an overestimation of one's own sphere of activity is not
found only among members of parliament. In every field of human action
the same conceit can be observed among limited minds.

At the same time that Trotsky engaged in the struggle for power and
then came to power, he also succumbed to cretinism (in the sense
defined here). But not to the parliamentary variety. His is of another
type: it is military
cretinism. Trotsky believes that all the problems of our time can be
solved by means of military force. Eventually he even wanted to revive
the faltering production of Soviet Russia by recklessly militarising
it. And yet it was faltering precisely because an excess of the
militaristic spirit already prevailed within the state administration
and statified industry. Trotsky then also failed miserably with his
militarisation of labour.

He is no wiser for this. He still believes that anything can be
achieved with military force. In his recent book he wants to draw the
"lessons of the revolution", but as far as he is concerned no economic
or social factors are worthy of consideration here, only the military
factor. At one point he even talks in all seriousness about compiling a
"manual of civil war" (p.68 of the German edition, published by E.
Laub, Berlin).[2]

Elsewhere he says: "That is why we require an approach entirely different from the prevailing one
to the questions of civil war in general and of armed insurrection in
particular. Following Lenin, all of us keep repeating time and again Marx’s
words that insurrection is an art. But this idea is transformed into a hollow
phrase, to the extent that Marx’s formula is not supplemented with a study of
the fundamental elements of the art of civil war, on the basis of the vast
accumulated experience of recent years" (p.75).[3]

It is true that Engels (not Marx, in the already quoted book on
revolution and counter-revolution in Germany, p.117) says: "...
insurrection is an art quite as much as war or any other, and subject
to certain rules of proceeding."[4] But these rules
appear to Engels to be very simple. He is not thinking here of drawing
up an official manual for the revolution. These rules, for Engels,
comprise only two: "Firstly, never play with insurrection unless you are fully prepared to face the consequences of your play."[5]
This paragraph from the official manual of revolution should be
urgently taken to heart by every member of the Communist International.

And Engels also says: "Secondly, once the insurrection has begun, act with the greatest determination and seize the offensive."[6] That is today still an indisputable principle which, however, naturally applies only so long as "the insurrection has begun".
But in his book Trotsky does not deal with that at all. For him the
"art of insurrection" is, rather, the art of calling an insurrection
into being. Engels, again, does not deal with this at all. He discusses
the question of how one should proceed in the insurrection, in
connection with the German uprisings of 1849, which arose entirely
spontaneously, out of a situation where the Imperial Constitution and
the National Assembly were threatened by reaction, and thus, as Trotsky
would say, out of "parliamentary cretinism". All the defenders of the
National Assembly acted together at that moment, and Engels joined in
the insurrection of the petty bourgeoisie in Baden and thus became, to
employ Bolshevik phraseology, a "lackey of the bourgeoisie".

By contrast, not only does Trotsky examine the art of staging an
insurrection, but it is also an insurrection of a very particular type
whose arts he develops; not an insurrection against the
counter-revolution, in which all defenders of the revolution work
together, but an insurrection against other revolutionaries, who have to be defeated if they will not allow themselves to be commanded by Lenin and Trotsky.

Engels would have rejected participation in such an insurrection
with indignation – and Marx no less so. After all, they said in
the Communist Manifesto: "The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working class parties."[7]
They were the strongest opponents of sectarianism within the great
workers' party which was their objective. They saw in sectarianism a
sign of the immaturity of the workers' movement.

Not only have Lenin and Trotsky adopted this sign of the immaturity
of the movement as their most important principle and made Bolshevism
the most intolerant of all sects, but they have gone further than even
the most immature of socialist sects have ever gone before: they have
propagandised for and carried out the armed insurrection of their sect
against other workers' parties – as Trotsky shows, initially in
opposition to a substantial section of their own supporters, who
rightly held doubts about such a type of civil war, at least so long as
they had not themselves tasted the attractions of power. Whoever
practises the art of this insurrection may in no way appeal to Engels
or Marx. Such an uprising could never emerge out of the spontaneous
action of the masses, and, as Trotsky himself shows, an essential
condition for its success was the deception of the masses regarding the
aim of the action and the lulling of other socialists, with whom a part
of the Bolsheviks engaged in friendly negotiations while at the same
time the other part brought up machine guns against them. Trotsky takes
it upon himself to sneer at the Mensheviks because they trusted in the
honesty of the Bolsheviks.[8]

What took place in October 1917 in St Petersburg was precisely not a
spontaneous uprising of the masses, like that in February of the same
year, but a coup d'état,
which Lenin and Trotsky themselves staged, entirely in the old Russian
manner. It is the art of such coup d'états that Trotsky is
thinking of, and he understands them better than anyone else. His
success does not prove that this is the way to socialism which the
proletariat has to follow everywhere, but only that in many things
Russia is still no further advanced than it was under Catherine II.

It is evidence of Trotsky's military cretinism that he imagines that
you need only to know the manual for such insurrections to be able to
produce them as you like, anywhere and at any time. If the world
revolution has still not happened, this is evidently due to the fact
that the manual is not ready yet.

He does not see that the success of the coup d'état
in 1917 was due to conditions of a quite specific type which existed
only in Russia at that time and which do not exist today in any country
in the world, least of all in the capitalist world. It shows an
incredible narrowness of vision to think that any lessons for the
international proletariat can be gained from the arts of the October
putsch of 1917.

Up to today, it still has not registered in Trotsky's consciousness
what the real lessons to be drawn from this coup are. He thinks: "...
for the study of the laws and methods of proletarian revolution there
is, up to the present time, no more important and profound a source
than our October experience" (p.14).[9] However, for him the proletarian revolution is identical with the "armed seizure of power".

Seizure of power by whom? By the proletariat? Trotsky himself holds
that the Russian proletariat is incapable of maintaining state power.
He speaks only of the "organisation of the proletarian vanguard"
for the armed insurrection. By that he means the Communist Party. But
this was itself split in October, as Trotsky shows. At that time, apart
from Lenin and Trotsky, almost all the leaders of Bolshevism harboured
doubts about the insurrection. So in the end the "proletarian
revolution" is reduced to the seizure of power by the commanders of the
vanguard: Lenin and Trotsky.

Was that why all the thinkers and fighters of Russian socialism from
Chernyshevsky to Plekhanov struggled, and why all its countless martyrs
shed their blood, in order to provide Lenin and Trotsky with absolute
power? No, they wanted to free Russia and to establish the conditions
there which would make it possible for the proletariat to develop the
strength and maturity that would enable it to free itself.

In October 1917 the majority of the Bolsheviks themselves still knew
that this was the task of the proletarian revolution, and for that
reason they were against the seizure of power that Lenin and Trotsky
planned; not because they were in general against the seizure of power
by the proletariat, which would be a nonsense, but because they were
against the type of seizure of power planned by those two men, since
they foresaw that only evil could arise from this for Russia and for
its proletariat, as is proved by statements quoted by Trotsky from
Zinoviev, Lozovsky and others, the "experienced revolutionists, Old
Bolsheviks" whom Trotsky accuses of having adopted an essentially
social democratic position in this "most critical period" (p.76).[10]

It was the position that the entire socialist and revolutionary
movement had adopted up until then. Only when they got their hands on
power did those vacillating Bolsheviks forget, like so many victorious
revolutionaries before them who became intoxicated with power, their
own past and all knowledge of what inspired them when they themselves
had to conduct difficult struggles against the existing power.

For Lenin and Trotsky, during the October days, it was basically a
question only of personal power, not the seizure of power by the
proletariat.

Trotsky repeatedly points out that Lenin at that time rightly said: Now or never.
And, in point of fact, he may have been right in this if the aim was
only to capture all power for Lenin. For that, the conditions were
perhaps present only in the chaos of October 1917. Once this critical
moment had passed, it would perhaps not have been possible again for
Lenin to capture absolute power for himself. But from the standpoint of
the seizure of power by the proletariat
in October it would be ridiculous to say: "Now or never!" In all
industrialised countries the proletariat must, along with the
development of industry itself, inexorably gain in strength and
maturity, and its eventual victory is assured. And this victory, which
will arise from the struggles of countless millions, cannot depend on
whether or not any single individual has caught the right moment for
it.

Incidentally, what a contradiction it is, on the one hand, to say
that in Russia there was only one special situation, a single moment,
which would never be repeated, for the the insurrection that would
capture power for the Communists, whereas, on the other hand, the right
moment for the world revolution recurs constantly!

In 1917, on the basis of his utopianism, which it now turns out was
as primitive as it was extreme, Lenin could still think that if only he
conquered power everything would be won for the proletariat. He could
just knock together the new society with a few heavy hammer blows.

But to believe today, after the experience of the last seven years,
that the central problem of socialism consists only in the question of
how one conquers power, without any consideration of the methods, the
aims and the conditions of this conquest – to speak today of the
lessons of the "October experiment" and only discuss the question of
the military victory of one's own sect, or rather its high command,
without the slightest reference to the economic and social conditions
of that time, is to demonstrate an almost frightening military
cretinism. The military are concerned only with defeating the enemy,
destroying its resources and imposing on their own army the blind
obedience of all subordinates. They are not concerned with anything
more.

And that is exactly how Trotsky thinks today. It does not occur to
him that it is necessary to examine whether those within his own ranks
whom he accuses of being "social democrats", "Mensheviks" and
"accomplices of the bourgeoisie" were perhaps fundamentally correct
when they saw, in a coup d'état against fraternal socialist
parties, a danger to the progress of Russia and its proletariat, even
if today they are ashamed of the good sense they showed at that time.
Perhaps today the facts speak a language which cannot be misunderstood
and which clearly shows what a "blind alley", to use Veresaev's words,[11] Russia and its working classes have been led into by the "October experiment".

The present holders of power there still do not understand any of
this. While they resort to contradictory methods, seeking to win the
trust and confidence of capitalists and governments abroad in order to
get hold of loans, and at the same time making propaganda for the
overthrow of these governments and capitalists through the world
revolution, they get ever deeper into the swamp.

Anyone who looks at things from an economic standpoint will find
that the "October experiment" has by no means been a success.
Militarily, however, it has succeeded. Every opponent inside Russia has
been defeated, and the blind obedience of subordinates has been fully
imposed, not only among the general population but also in the Red Army
and the Communist Party itself.

And today Trotsky will nevertheless no longer think quite so
favourably of the "October experiment" as he did a few months ago, when
he wrote his latest works. And he may perhaps discover some lessons in
this experiment which have hitherto eluded him.

For him, the central problem during the October days was the seizure of power, of personal
power. It appears to have been a complete success: Lenin and Trotsky
became autocrats to whom everyone submitted. Trotsky himself made the
greatest contribution to the construction of that terrible apparatus of
domination whose machinery crushes anyone that is prepared to defy the
ruling elite. But lo and behold! Because of purely personal
differences, or so it would seem, the worshipper of power comes into
conflict with his colleagues who, after Lenin's withdrawal from the
affairs of government, have made themselves at home at the head of the
state, and he himself is then seized by this merciless machinery. To
such perfect working order has he brought it. What a success! What was
for him the means to total power has condemned him to complete
powerlessness. His "arts" have thus brought power to those whom he
himself criticises as "Mensheviks" and "opportunists". And therefore
also as robbers and murderers!

Perhaps Trotsky will now begin to think a little less contemptuously of democracy.

That a man like Trotsky, who for all his weaknesses nevertheless
stands head and shoulders above his Bolshevik opponents and who has
done so much for their state apparatus, should be disposed of so
rapidly and so easily is most surprising. That Patroclus and even
Achilles should fall and Thersites return has of course often occurred
in history; and it has not infrequently happened that in a duel between
Thersites and Achilles the former has won by some dirty trick.[12]
But that Achilles should challenge Thersites to a duel and at the first
sign of resistance lay down his arms without a fight – that has
hardly any precedent in history. And just as rarely has it occurred
that, if Achilles is banished, the whole army of his comrades who have
fought beside him lines up almost unanimously behind Thersites and
enthusiastically agrees. This phenomenon is a serious symptom of the
inner weakness of Bolshevism. It appears so serious because it is
perhaps the most prominent example, but it is in no way the only one of
its kind. In a social structure as decayed as Soviet Russia, conflicts
between members of the ruling caste are inevitable. But until now every
attempt by a former champion of the Communist Party to raise criticisms
of the government has ended with the critic being transferred to some
sinecure and condemned to silence. And each of them has quietly
accepted this.

That shows that not only has the Medusa's head of the Terror and the
Cheka petrified the mass of the population but it also seems to have
killed off all independent life among those who hold it in their hands.
It has transformed the champions of the ruling party itself into slaves
and subservient creatures.

That is very convenient for the existing rulers, as long as
everything goes smoothly. But so much the worse for the regime if it
enters into a crisis that threatens its existence. Then it will look
around in vain for defenders. Does anyone imagine that those who allow
a Trotsky to fall without a word of opposition will risk their lives,
if one day it should come to that, in order to save a Zinoviev?

The ease of Trotsky's suppression shows that the
regiment of Bolshevism has very few men with backbone in its ranks. It
is a colossus with feet of clay which can no longer survive any serious
crisis, and which is moreover incapable of any regeneration from
within. The first deep-going crisis that it meets must end in
catastrophe for it.

Editorial notes

[1] Marx-Engels, Collected Works, Vol.11, p.79.

[2] Trotsky, The Lessons of October, in The Challenge of the Left Opposition, 1923-25, 1975, p.247.

[3] Ibid., p.253. [Transcriber's Note: This quote was shortened in the original English translation].