But we don't typically expect that things will last forever - to the contrary, we merely expect them to last for some estimated time and when they are things we like we fear their impermanence. Because of that, we often are very careful with objects we like and try to protect them lest they should fall into ruin and keep us from enjoying them any longer.

If the "seeming" is not the "self-liberated" there is not unblurred unimpaired vision=freedom from all reference points=the perfect nirvāṇa by nature

The Karmapa quote for it:

(The Feast; p.321) The notion of “inherent arising” refers to an arisingof the very characteristics of phenomena themselves, an arising that existsindependent of the conceptual mind. There is no such arising in either ofthe truths.

2.2.2.1.1.6.2.3.1.1.1.2.1.2.2.2.2.2. We do not contradictscripture

Therefore the Teacher said that all phenomenaAre primordially peace, free of arising,And perfect nirvāṇa by nature.Therefore never is there any arising. (6.112)

In other words, defining inherent existence is the problem itself. What was not in the first place means primordial. In buddhahood there is no need to catch anything (e.g. wisdom) because everything already the "self-liberated", perfect and beyond the seeming (obscurations to liberation and to omniscience)

Pema Rigdzin wrote:But we don't typically expect that things will last forever - to the contrary, we merely expect them to last for some estimated time and when they are things we like we fear their impermanence. Because of that, we often are very careful with objects we like and try to protect them lest they should fall into ruin and keep us from enjoying them any longer.

That's an interesting take on it. It's true, when I buy a chocolate bar I don't expect it to last forever, but then I"m not shocked when it is gone either. When I buy a pen, I expect it to last until the ink is gone at best. On the other hand, when I was 18 and had a new girlfriend, I really did expect it to last forever, and was very upset when it didn't. Today, when I buy new things, I still have to make a conscious effort to remind myself, "this thing is impermanent and will decay and cease ."

So perhaps a more accurate way to put it would be, "To the degree to which we expect things to last forever, we are upset when they don't"

Namdrol wrote:The suffering of chasing mirages never ends. The only way to end it is simply to stop.The suffering of accepting and rejecting never ends.The only way to end it is simply to stop.

I can agree with these.

Namdrol wrote:..likewise, the suffering of intellectual pursuits never ends. The only way to end it is simply to stop. ..likewise, the suffering of proof and rebuttal never ends. The only way to end it is simply to stop.

I have a problem with these. Why? I cannot leave contradictions and paradoxes unresolved as they eat away at my faith/belief in the Dhamma/Dharma and disturb my mental peace. That's just me I guess.

Namdrol wrote:The suffering of chasing mirages never ends. The only way to end it is simply to stop.The suffering of accepting and rejecting never ends.The only way to end it is simply to stop.

I can agree with these.

Namdrol wrote:..likewise, the suffering of intellectual pursuits never ends. The only way to end it is simply to stop. ..likewise, the suffering of proof and rebuttal never ends. The only way to end it is simply to stop.

I have a problem with these. Why? I cannot leave contradictions and paradoxes unresolved as they eat away at my faith/belief in the Dhamma/Dharma and disturb my mental peace. That's just me I guess.

intellectual pursuits are like mirages, always promising satiation and just creating more doubt.

Namdrol wrote:The suffering of chasing mirages never ends. The only way to end it is simply to stop.The suffering of accepting and rejecting never ends.The only way to end it is simply to stop.

I can agree with these.

Namdrol wrote:..likewise, the suffering of intellectual pursuits never ends. The only way to end it is simply to stop. ..likewise, the suffering of proof and rebuttal never ends. The only way to end it is simply to stop.

I have a problem with these. Why? I cannot leave contradictions and paradoxes unresolved as they eat away at my faith/belief in the Dhamma/Dharma and disturb my mental peace. That's just me I guess.

intellectual pursuits are like mirages, always promising satiation and just creating more doubt.

Proof and rebuttal is merely intellectual accepting and rejecting.

N

I guess we have to agree to disagree on this as it is my basis for deciding between different religions. It is also my basis for deciding from among the various Buddhist traditions, which one I would follow. Thus far, it has served me quite well. To each his own, I'd say.

Mind can never transcend itself. This is why intellectualism is useless.

N

I know. But until such time when the mind is transcended, I have to rely on my intellect for making my decisions.

But it does not contradict. I quoted the seeming is "not totally faulty":

The Karmapa wrote: Chandrakīrti identifies the relative truth of theworld of no analysis as the method, and the ultimate truth, the realizationof the way things are, as what arises from relating to that method skillfully.

Santideva explains this collapse of useful analysis using intellect until Nirvana!:If what has been analyzedIs analyzed through further analysis,There is no end to it,Because that analysis would be analyzed too.

Once what had to be analyzed has been analyzed,The analysis has no basis left.Since there is no basis, it does not continue.This is expressed as nirvana.

Kamalasila's Stages of meditations describes how it is done and He quotes “The dharani of entering nonconceptuality”:Through mental nonengagement, the characteristics of form and so on are relinquised".

There are examples of "self-liberation" in Madhyamaka: Like two wood-sticks touching each other create fire. Like fire consumates more fire by itself. Like cutting a branch of tree you are sitting on, until all will collapse.The term "self-liberation" is nothing new. For example is also in Dzogchen where "cutting through until primordial purity", or "the all is the play of Mahamudra" from the tradition IX Karmapa is.

Mariusz wrote:The term "self-liberation" is nothing new. For example is also in Dzogchen where "cutting through until primordial purity", or "the all is the play of Mahamudra" from the tradition IX Karmapa is.

The difference of course is introduction. There is no introduction in sutra, hence, no introduction for Madhyamaka.

Madhyamaka is not equivalent with Dzogchen and Mahamudra. As both Longchen pa and Jigme Lingpa points out, while the intellectual structure of the view of Prasanga and Dzogchen are identical i.e. free from all extremes, the former is based on an intellectual analysis whereas the latter is based on a personal experience.

In Dzogchen and Mahamudra meditation is based on an example wisdom. This is not the case with Madhyamaka.

Since meditation in Vajrayāna systems is based on an example wisdom gained during the introduction of the third and fourth empowerments, Gorampa points out in a treatise refuting some on Tsongkhapa's interperations of the Guhyasmaja sadhana that it does matter very much what your intellectual view might be; whether cittamatra or madhyamaka, since your meditation is not based on an intellectual analysis, but rather a path wisdom derived from the introduction of third and fourth empowerment.

Therefore, I feel personally that all of this scholastic nit picking about Tibetan scholar's disagreements about what they think Indian scholars think is pretty much just an empty diversion. Hence the reason I lack patience with it, and and not very interested in defending Gorampa or criticizing Dolbupa, or Tsongkhapa, etc. I simply think that it is a waste of time.

If people want to spend their time reading books about Madhayamaka, I have no problem with that, but silly thread titles like "Gorampa untenable according to Karmapa" for me are meaningless. Honestly, who cares? (well obviously mariusz does). Also Ganden Chophel faults Gorampa for this and that point -- and there is no doubt the eighth Karmapa can be faulted for this and that point. It is all just meaningless dancing on books to me, something scholars do when they have a bit a free time for fun. The whole history of Tibetan Buddhist scholastics is scholars faulting each other for this and that point.

That is why I recommend going back to the basics: If you want read Madhyamaka, read the originals. If you have to learn Tibetan or Sanskrit to do so, great. But honestly, all this "Tsongkhapa is wrong!" "Gorampa is wrong!" "Karmapa is wrong!" Dolbupa is wrong" is really nonsensical and just perpetuates a sectarian intellectual culture that we should leave behind.

Mariusz wrote:The term "self-liberation" is nothing new. For example is also in Dzogchen where "cutting through until primordial purity", or "the all is the play of Mahamudra" from the tradition IX Karmapa is.

The difference of course is introduction. There is no introduction in sutra, hence, no introduction for Madhyamaka.

Madhyamaka is not equivalent with Dzogchen and Mahamudra. As both Longchen pa and Jigme Lingpa points out, while the intellectual structure of the view of Prasanga and Dzogchen are identical i.e. free from all extremes, the former is based on an intellectual analysis whereas the latter is based on a personal experience.

In Dzogchen and Mahamudra meditation is based on an example wisdom. This is not the case with Madhyamaka.

Since meditation in Vajrayāna systems is based on an example wisdom gained during the introduction of the third and fourth empowerments, Gorampa points out in a treatise refuting some on Tsongkhapa's interperations of the Guhyasmaja sadhana that it does matter very much what your intellectual view might be; whether cittamatra or madhyamaka, since your meditation is not based on an intellectual analysis, but rather a path wisdom derived from the introduction of third and fourth empowerment.

Therefore, I feel personally that all of this scholastic nit picking about Tibetan scholar's disagreements about what they think Indian scholars think is pretty much just an empty diversion. Hence the reason I lack patience with it, and and not very interested in defending Gorampa or criticizing Dolbupa, or Tsongkhapa, etc. I simply think that it is a waste of time.

If people want to spend their time reading books about Madhayamaka, I have no problem with that, but silly thread titles like "Gorampa untenable according to Karmapa" for me are meaningless. Honestly, who cares? (well obviously mariusz does). Also Ganden Chophel faults Gorampa for this and that point -- and there is no doubt the eighth Karmapa can be faulted for this and that point. It is all just meaningless dancing on books to me, something scholars do when they have a bit a free time for fun. The whole history of Tibetan Buddhist scholastics is scholars faulting each other for this and that point.

That is why I recommend going back to the basics: If you want read Madhyamaka, read the originals. If you have to learn Tibetan or Sanskrit to do so, great. But honestly, all this "Tsongkhapa is wrong!" "Gorampa is wrong!" "Karmapa is wrong!" Dolbupa is wrong" is really nonsensical and just perpetuates a sectarian intellectual culture that we should leave behind.

N

Each school has produced enlightened beings so who really cares anyway ?

Abandoning Dharma is, in the final analysis, disparaging the Hinayana because of the Mahayana; favoring the Hinayana on account of the Mahayana; playing off sutra against tantra; playing off the four classes of the tantras against each other; favoring one of the Tibetan schools—the Sakya, Gelug, Kagyu, or Nyingma—and disparaging the rest; and so on. In other words, we abandon Dharma any time we favor our own tenets and disparage the rest.

Very excuse me. Madhyamaka is not meaningless. So is also compatible even with Dzogchen and Mahamudra as I quoted. I thought I quoted only for people "who care" here? Who can investigated, no matter from what "sects" they are. Because I was presented here some contradictions I was interested also what Gorampa's quotes proof them

I agree with Namdrol's points....but this is an internet discussion forum, eh? I mean, aside from banging concepts around, there's not much else a discussion is going to do for any of us....and I'm sure Namdrol would agree that intellectual understanding is helpful, to a point. First, though, we have to remember that all this intellectual activity is mentation, conceptual activity, and will never liberate us, on it's own. Take concepts for what they're worth, ultimately, eh? Second, if one becomes too "attached" to defending one's favorite theory, such attachment is just another fetter. The purpose isn't to build an airtight ontological template--we often forget that.

Now, off on a tangent, perhaps--in 3rd Karmapa's Mahamudra Monlam, he explicitly equates Dzokchen, Mahamudra, and Madhyamika--or, at least the "states" or "resulting minds" of these methods, not the paths themselves. Dzokchen and Mahamudra are Tantric, and do depend on this "example wisdom" Namdrol speaks of....but Madhyamika, as it's presented, is an analytical system that relies on conceptual activity. However, it's explained that, in terms of Meditation practice, Madhyamika analysis leads to a "not finding," and the meditation practice is to "rest in that not-finding." At least, that's the way it's been presented to me, as a meditative method--and I'm wondering if that's the way it's taught in Geluk practice, where it is stressed? And, if this is the correct understanding of the method, then does the "resulting mind" equate with the "resulting mind" or state attained by Dzokchen and Mahamudra practice? Does anyone know what Karmapa says about this? Or, for that matter, what Gorampa or Tsong Khapa say?

May any merit generated by on-line discussionBe dedicated to the Ultimate Benefit of All Sentient Beings.

I did not say Madhyamaka was meaningless, I said that worrying about Tibetan scholastic nit picking this or that point was meaningless.

If that is really what you want to spend your life doing, then the only fair way to do it it to select the scholars from all four schools: present what each and everyone of them says about each passage in the Madhyamaka avatara for example with their refutations of each other's POV and leave it like that.

Otherwise, this cherry picking just leads to confusion and a very incomplete understanding and causes people to criticize amazing scholars we could not even withstand for five seconds in debate.

I am quite sure that if you read Tsongkhapa with a open mind, at the end of the day, you will be completely sure he is correct and perfect. But then, I am quite sure that if you read Gorampa with a open mind, at the end of the day, you will be completely sure he is correct and perfect. Then, I am quite sure that if you read Dolbupa with a open mind, at the end of the day, you will be completely sure he is correct and perfect. Next, I am quite sure that if you read Mipham with a open mind, at the end of the day, you will be completely sure he is correct and perfect.

And it just goes on and on.

Why? Because there is no end to intellectul analysis.

If you want to know Candrakirti's own point of view on this passage in the Madhyamaka -avatara from his autocommentary, however, well, here it is:

It might be if you were really talking about what Candrakirti and Nagarjuna said, but you are not -- you are arguing about what Tibetans say about categories of Madhyamaka invented wholly by Tibetans.

Can I ask personal question to Namdrol? Why did you not protest when questions to Tsongkhapa, but protest when questions to Gorampa?

You have forgotten that I spent several weeks defending Tsongkhapa from what I considered to erroneous crticisms of his view on e-Sangha.

You have also forgotten that when someone opined that one could not realize the meaning of Dzogchen if they held Tsongkhapa's point of view about "Prasangika" [Prasangika being a Tibetan invention, a term coined at Sangphu by Batsab Nyima Drag in the 12th century] I swiftly reminded them that both Jigme Lingpa and Shabkar upheld Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Prasangika.

"If it is asked, 'how is can there be a memory such as in the thought "It was seen by me" if cognitions are momentary but there is no reflexive cognition [rang rig, svasamvedana]?'

The reply to that is: 'This also is the standard of worldly convention.'

Since there is no opportunity to analyze the conventions of the worldly, however it seems in the world, it is necessary to accept it as such. Therefore, as the worldly also maintain there is no reflexive cognition [rang rig, svasamvedana], since the convention of the thought ''it was seen' was generated, there is clinging to the cognitions of the experience [nyams su myong ba' shes pa dag] as being the same, thus there is no fault."

Therefore we can infer from this that since Candrakirti rejects reflexive cognitions based on world convention, in order to be consistent he must accept outer objects since those too are accepted based on worldly convention.