The Second Treatise of Civil Government, by John Locke

Chapter VII.

Of Political or Civil Society.

§77. GOD having made man such a creature, that in his
own judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and
inclination to drive him into society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it.
The first society was between man and wife, which gave beginning to that between parents and children; to which, in
time, that between master and servant came to be added: and though all these might, and commonly did meet together, and
make up but one family, wherein the master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a family; each of these,
or all together, came short of political society, as we shall see, if we consider the different ends, ties, and bounds
of each of these.

§78. Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact
between man and woman; and tho’ it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in one another’s bodies as is
necessary to its chief end, procreation; yet it draws with it mutual support and assistance, and a communion of
interests too, as necessary not only to unite their care and affection, but also necessary to their common off-spring,
who have a right to be nourished, and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for themselves.

§79. For the end of conjunction, between male and
female, being not barely procreation, but the continuation of the species; this conjunction betwixt male and female
ought to last, even after procreation, so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones, who
are to be sustained by those that got them, till they are able to shift and provide for themselves. This rule, which
the infinite wise maker hath set to the works of his hands, we find the inferior creatures steadily obey. In those
viviparous animals which feed on grass, the conjunction between male and female lasts no longer than the very act of
copulation; because the teat of the dam being sufficient to nourish the young, till it be able to feed on grass, the
male only begets, but concerns not himself for the female or young, to whose sustenance he can contribute nothing. But
in beasts of prey the conjunction lasts longer: because the dam not being able well to subsist herself, and nourish her
numerous off-spring by her own prey alone, a more laborious, as well as more dangerous way of living, than by feeding
on grass, the assistance of the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common family, which cannot subsist till
they are able to prey for themselves, but by the joint care of male and female. The same is to be observed in all
birds, (except some domestic ones, where plenty of food excuses the cock from feeding, and taking care of the young
brood) whose young needing food in the nest, the cock and hen continue mates, till the young are able to use their
wing, and provide for themselves.

§80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only
reason, why the male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than other creatures, viz. because the
female is capable of conceiving, and de facto is commonly with child again, and brings forth too a new birth, long
before the former is out of a dependency for support on his parents help, and able to shift for himself, and has all
the assistance is due to him from his parents: whereby the father, who is bound to take care for those he hath begot,
is under an obligation to continue in conjugal society with the same woman longer than other creatures, whose young
being able to subsist of themselves, before the time of procreation returns again, the conjugal bond dissolves of
itself, and they are at liberty, till Hymen at his usual anniversary season summons them again to chuse new mates.
Wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the great Creator, who having given to man foresight, and an ability to lay
up for the future, as well as to supply the present necessity, hath made it necessary, that society of man and wife
should be more lasting, than of male and female amongst other creatures; that so their industry might be encouraged,
and their interest better united, to make provision and lay up goods for their common issue, which uncertain mixture,
or easy and frequent solutions of conjugal society would mightily disturb.

§81. But tho’ these are ties upon mankind, which make
the conjugal bonds more firm and lasting in man, than the other species of animals; yet it would give one reason to
enquire, why this compact, where procreation and education are secured, and inheritance taken care for, may not be made
determinable, either by consent, or at a certain time, or upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary
compacts, there being no necessity in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it should always be for
life; I mean, to such as are under no restraint of any positive law, which ordains all such contracts to be
perpetual.

§82. But the husband and wife, though they have but one
common concern, yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it therefore
being necessary that the last determination, i. e. the rule, should be placed somewhere; it naturally falls to the
man’s share, as the abler and the stronger. But this reaching but to the things of their common interest and property,
leaves the wife in the full and free possession of what by contract is her peculiar right, and gives the husband no
more power over her life than she has over his; the power of the husband being so far from that of an absolute monarch,
that the wife has in many cases a liberty to separate from him, where natural right, or their contract allows it;
whether that contract be made by themselves in the state of nature, or by the customs or laws of the country they live
in; and the children upon such separation fall to the father or mother’s lot, as such contract does determine.

§83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained
under politic government, as well as in the state of nature, the civil magistrate cloth not abridge the right or power
of either naturally necessary to those ends, viz. procreation and mutual support and assistance whilst they are
together; but only decides any controversy that may arise between man and wife about them. If it were otherwise, and
that absolute sovereignty and power of life and death naturally belonged to the husband, and were necessary to the
society between man and wife, there could be no matrimony in any of those countries where the husband is allowed no
such absolute authority. But the ends of matrimony requiring no such power in the husband, the condition of conjugal
society put it not in him, it being not at all necessary to that state. Conjugal society could subsist and attain its
ends without it; nay, community of goods, and the power over them, mutual assistance and maintenance, and other things
belonging to conjugal society, might be varied and regulated by that contract which unites man and wife in that
society, as far as may consist with procreation and the bringing up of children till they could shift for themselves;
nothing being necessary to any society, that is not necessary to the ends for which it is made.

§84. The society betwixt parents and children, and the
distinct rights and powers belonging respectively to them, I have treated of so largely, in the foregoing chapter, that
I shall not here need to say any thing of it. And I think it is plain, that it is far different from a politic
society.

§85. Master and servant are names as old as history, but
given to those of far different condition; for a freeman makes himself a servant to another, by selling him, for a
certain time, the service he undertakes to do, in exchange for wages he is to receive: and though this commonly puts
him into the family of his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof; yet it gives the master but a temporary
power over him, and no greater than what is contained in the contract between them. But there is another sort of
servants, which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who being captives taken in a just war, are by the right of nature
subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. These men having, as I say, forfeited their
lives, and with it their liberties, and lost their estates; and being in the state of slavery, not capable of any
property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society; the chief end whereof is the preservation of
property.

§86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family with
all these subordinate relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves, united under the domestic rule of a family;
which, what resemblance soever it may have in its order, offices, and number too, with a little common-wealth, yet is
very far from it, both in its constitution, power and end: or if it must be thought a monarchy, and the paterfamilias
the absolute monarch in it, absolute monarchy will have but a very shattered and short power, when it is plain, by what
has been said before, that the master of the family has a very distinct and differently limited power, both as to time
and extent, over those several persons that are in it; for excepting the slave (and the family is as much a family, and
his power as paterfamilias as great, whether there be any slaves in his family or no) he has no legislative power of
life and death over any of them, and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he. And he certainly
can have no absolute power over the whole family, who has but a very limited one over every individual in it. But how a
family, or any other society of men, differ from that which is properly political society, we shall best see, by
considering wherein political society itself consists.

§87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to
perfect freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any
other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life,
liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that
law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the
fact, in his opinion, requires it. But because no political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the
power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society; there, and
there only is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into
the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by
it. And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by
settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for
the execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society
concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society, with
such penalties as the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and who are not, in political
society together. Those who are united into one body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to,
with authority to decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another: but
those who have no such common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being, where there is no
other, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before shewed it, the perfect state of nature.

§88. And thus the common-wealth comes by a power to set
down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it, committed amongst the
members of that society, (which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto
any of its members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the power of war and peace;) and all this for the
preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far as is possible. But though every man who has
entered into civil society, and is become a member of any commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to punish
offences, against the law of nature, in prosecution of his own private judgment, yet with the judgment of offences,
which he has given up to the legislative in all cases, where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a right to
the common-wealth to employ his force, for the execution of the judgments of the common-wealth, whenever he shall be
called to it; which indeed are his own judgments, they being made by himself, or his representative. And herein we have
the original of the legislative and executive power of civil society, which is to judge by standing laws, how far
offences are to be punished, when committed within the common-wealth; and also to determine, by occasional judgments
founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both these
to employ all the force of all the members, when there shall be need.

§89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so
united into one society, as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public,
there and there only is a political, or civil society. And this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the state of
nature, enter into society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme government; or else when any one
joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he authorizes the society, or which is
all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the society shall require; to the
execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into
that of a common-wealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controversies, and redress
the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates
appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to
appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature.

§90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which
by some men is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no
form of civil-government at all: for the end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the
state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man’s being judge in his own case, by setting up a known
authority, to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise, and
which every one of the* society ought to obey; where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to appeal to,
for the decision of any difference between them, there those persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every
absolute prince, in respect of those who are under his dominion.

(*The public power of all society is above every soul contained in the same society; and the principal
use of that power is, to give laws unto all that are under it, which laws in such cases we must obey, unless there be
reason shewed which may necessarily inforce, that the law of reason, or of God, doth enjoin the contrary, Hook. Eccl.
Pol. l. i. sect. 16.)

§91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative
and executive power in himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly,
and indifferently, and with authority decide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any injury
or inconviency, that may be suffered from the prince, or by his order: so that such a man, however intitled, Czar, or
Grand Seignior, or how you please, is as much in the state of nature, with all under his dominion, as he is with
therest of mankind: for where-ever any two men are, who have no standing rule, and common judge to appeal to on earth,
for the determination of controversies of right betwixt them, there they are still in the state of* nature, and under
all the inconveniencies of it, with only this woful difference to the subject, or rather slave of an absolute prince:
that whereas, in the ordinary state of nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and according to the best of his
power, to maintain it; now, whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no
appeal, as those in society ought to have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of rational creatures, is
denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and so is exposed to all the misery and inconveniencies, that a
man can fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state of nature, is yet corrupted with flattery, and armed with
power.

(*To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs, i.e. such as attend men in the state of
nature, there was no way but only by growing into composition and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some kind
of govemment public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and
govem, by them the peace, tranquillity and happy estate of the rest might be procured. Men always knew that where force
and injury was offered, they might be defenders of themselves; they knew that however men may seek their own commodity,
yet if this were done with injury unto others, it was not to be suffered, but by all men, and all good means to be
withstood. Finally, they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own right, and according to
his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every man is towards himself, and them whom he
greatly affects, partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would be endless, except they gave their common
consent, all to be ordered by some, whom they should agree upon, without which consent there would be no reason that
one man should take upon him to be lord or judge over another, Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)

§92. For he that thinks absolute power purifies men’s
blood, and corrects the baseness of human nature, need read but the history of this, or any other age, to be convinced
of the contrary. He that would have been insolent and injurious in the woods of America, would not probably be much
better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion shall be found out to justify all that he shall do to his
subjects, and the sword presently silence all those that dare question it: for what the protection of absolute monarchy
is, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be and to what a degree of happiness and security it
carries civil society, where this sort of government is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late relation
of Ceylon, may easily see.

§93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other
governments of the world, the subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any controversies, and restrain
any violence that may happen betwixt the subjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks necessary, and
believes he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society and mankind, who should go about to take it away. But
whether this be from a true love of mankind and society, and such a charity as we owe all one to another, there is
reason to doubt: for this is no more than what every man, who loves his own power, profit, or greatness, may and
naturally must do, keep those animals from hurting, or destroying one another, who labour and drudge only for his
pleasure and advantage; and so are taken care of, not out of any love the master has for them, but love of himself, and
the profit they bring him: for if it be asked, what security, what fence is there, in such a state, against the
violence and oppression of this absolute ruler? the very question can scarce be borne. They are ready to tell you, that
it deserves death only to ask after safety. Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant, there must be measures, laws
and judges, for their mutual peace and security: but as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all such
circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right when he does it. To ask how you may be
guarded from harm, or injury, on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the voice of faction and
rebellion: as if when men quitting the state of nature entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one,
should be under the restraint of laws, but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state of nature,
increased with power, and made licentious by impunity. This is to think, that men are so foolish, that they take care
to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured
by lions.

§94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people’s
understandings, it hinders not men from feeling; and when they perceive, that any man, in what station soever, is out
of the bounds of the civil society which they are of, and that they have no appeal on earth against any harm, they may
receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of nature, in respect of him whom they find to be so;
and to take care, as soon as they can, to have that safety and security in civil society, for which it was first
instituted, and for which only they entered into it. And therefore, though perhaps at first, (as shall be shewed more
at large hereafter in the following part of this discourse) some one good and excellent man having got a pre -eminency
amongst the rest, had this deference paid to his goodness and virtue, as to a kind of natural authority, that the chief
rule, with arbitration of their differences, by a tacit consent devolved into his hands, without any other caution, but
the assurance they had of his uprightness and wisdom; yet when time, giving authority, and (as some men would persuade
us) sacredness of customs, which the negligent, and unforeseeing innocence of the first ages began, had brought in
successors of another stamp, the people finding their properties not secure under the government, as then it was,
(whereas government has no other end but the preservation of * property) could never be safe nor at rest, nor think
themselves in civil society, till the legislature was placed in collective bodies of men, call them senate, parliament,
or what you please. By which means every single person became subject, equally with other the meanest men, to those
laws, which he himself, as part of the legislative, had established; nor could any one, by his own authority; avoid the
force of the law, when once made; nor by any pretence of superiority plead exemption, thereby to license his own, or
the miscarriages of any of his dependents.** No man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it: for if any
man may do what he thinks fit, and there be no appeal on earth, for redress or security against any harm he shall do; I
ask, whether he be not perfectly still in the state of nature, and so can be no part or member of that civil society;
unless any one will say, the state of nature and civil society are one and the same thing, which I have never yet found
any one so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm.

(*At the first, when some certain kind of regiment was once appointed, it may be that nothing was then
farther thought upon for the manner of goveming, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion, which were to
rule, till by experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a
remedy, did indeed but increase the sore, which it should have cured. They saw, that to live by one man’s will, became
the cause of all men’s misery. This constrained them to come unto laws, wherein all men might see their duty
beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing them. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)

(**Civil law being the act of the whole body politic, cloth therefore over-rule each several part of
the same body. Hooker, ibid.)