Title. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE I MEF INTELLIGENCE
PERFORMANCE IN THE 1991 PERSIAN GULF WAR

Author. Major Raymond E. Coia, United States Marine Corps

22 May 1995

Problem Question. What was wrong with the I MEF
intelligence apparatus during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and
what is being done to correct it?

Discussion. Prior to Desert Storm, the I MEF theoretical
capability to conduct intelligence operations appeared
considerable. Despite no doctrinal foundation, the newly
established Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group
(SRIG) seemed capable of providing commanders with credible
combat support. By the beginning of Desert Storm, major
CINC imposed restrictions, changes to the MEF operations
plan, and an immaturely developed SRIG severely challenged
MEF intelligence planners. Although the CINC had
significantly relaxed pre-G-Day restrictions by the start of
Desert Storm, some were still in place to hamper MEF
intelligence operations. Also, manpower and systems support
within the MEF G-2 and the CENTCOM J-2 Staff contributed to
a debilitating dissemination bottleneck that existed
throughout the campaign.

Conclusion. I MEF did not have the doctrinal foundation and
existing structure to effectively fulfill the intelligence
needs of a reinforced MEF in a land campaign. Also,
training, manning, systems support and other deficiencies
contributed significantly to the MEF G-2's and the 1st
SRIG's inability to effectively respond to the intelligence
requirements of commanders at all levels. As a result of
post war analysis, the Marine Corps plans to improve its
intelligence apparatus by developing pertinent doctrine,
enhancing educational opportunities, modernizing support
systems and reshaping the manpower structure.

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE. QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS MADE, INCLUDING THE AUTHOR'S NAME, PAPER TITLE, AND THE STATEMENT: "WRITTEN IN FULFILLMENT OF A REQUIREMENT FOR THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE."

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY.

Introduction

Fifty years after the surprise Japanese attack at Pearl
Harbor, the United States lead an international coalition
against an invading Iraqi military that had seized and
occupied the country of Kuwait. Many have described the
resulting coalition victory as one of the greatest in the
Republic's history. Despite such an achievement, wartime
commanders identified significant flaws in the intelligence
apparatus that supported coalition forces. The intelligence
support provided from both national and tactical producers
revealed a system that was unable to adequately support
warfighters throughout all levels of command.

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) also recognized
critical deficiencies in the functional area of intelligence
and began an intensive review of its own system. Commanders
at all levels of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) had
expressed bitter dissatisfaction about the poor intelligence
support they received prior to and during the war. I am one
of those subordinate commanders dissatisfied with the
intelligence support my unit received during Operation
Desert Storm. As an infantry company commander who spent a
prior tour in a signals intelligence assignment in Europe,
the lack of quality intelligence was a major source of
frustration; this was especially true because I was certain
the support capability existed.

As a result of my Desert Storm experience, I am seeking
to answer the question: "What was wrong with the I MEF
intelligence apparatus during the 1991 Persian Gulf War and
what is being done to fix it?" I will explore this question
by critically examining the I MEF intelligence effort in the
1991 Persian Gulf War. I will conduct this analysis by:

(1) identifying the I MEF Intelligence Organization for combat;

(2) discussing the I MEF intelligence planning that preceded the ground operations of Desert
Storm;

(3) detailing and analyzing I MEF intelligence operations during the war; and

(4) highlighting how this debate is reshaping the future of Marine Corps Intelligence.

The end product will bring together the various views on
I MEF intelligence performance and compare them to the near
and long term solutions the Marine Corps as a service is
applying to the intelligence field today. In an attempt to
ensure universal access to this study, I shall incorporate
only unclassified source material into this paper.
Additionally, since I was a part of the I MEF ground combat
element during Desert Storm, I will focus this paper on
ground intelligence operations.

Chapter 1

I MEF ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT: INTELLIGENCE

One of the surest ways of forming good
combinations in war would be to order
movements only after obtaining perfect
information of the enemy's proceedings.
In fact, how can a man say what he
should do himself, if he is ignorant
of what his adversary is about? As it
is unquestionably of the highest im
portance to gain this information, so
it is a thing of the utmost difficulty,
not to say impossibility.(1)

-Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini, The Art of War

What did I MEF bring to the table to begin
"obtaining...information of the enemy's proceedings" in
preparation for the ground offensive? In 1988, the Marine
Corps, under direction of the then Commandant, General
Alfred M. Gray, pooled all MEF level intelligence elements
into a single entity called a Surveillance, Reconnaissance,
Intelligence Group (SRIG). His primary purpose for the
consolidation was to create an "organization where
intelligence assets from throughout the MAGTF [Marine
Air-Ground Task Force] would be formed into a cohesive,
synergetic, vibrant collector, producer, and disseminator of
intelligence." The SRIG's mission was: "to provide
surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence,
counterintelligence, electronic warfare, air/naval gunfire
liaison, tactical deception, and communications support to
the MEF, subordinate MAGTF's, and other commands as
directed."(2)

I MEF formed 1st SRIG in October of 1989 and,
less than one year later, employed it in combat in the
Persian Gulf.

The I MEF SRIG consisted of the following elements (see
figure 1-1): a Headquarters Company, a Radio Battalion, a
Force Reconnaissance Company, a Communications Battalion, a
Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) Company, an Air and Naval
Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), and an Intelligence
Company. By the start of Operation Desert Storm, 2nd SRIG,
II MEF, had substantially reinforced 1st SRIG; this almost
doubled the in-theater capability.

The concept of employment for the SRIG centered around
a cooperative relationship between the SRIG Commander and
the MEF G-2. The MEF G-2 is the staff officer responsible
for the total intelligence support to the MAGTF from the
direction of the intelligence effort to the final
dissemination of finished products. The SRIG commander is
required to properly man, equip and train his subordinate
elements to ensure the rapid and effective completion of the
intelligence cycle as planned for by the MEF G-2.

Figure 1-1: 1st SRIG Organization for Desert Storm

Paramount to understanding the state of affairs of the
SRIG concept rests with doctrine. At the time of the Gulf
War, no existing, sanctioned doctrine existed regarding the
employment of the SRIG. On 12 October 1990, two months
after the beginning of Operation Desert Shield, the
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,
signed the Coordinating Draft of FMFM 3-22 -- SURVEILLANCE,
RECONNAISSANCE, INTELLIGENCE GROUP (SRIG) -- and
subsequently staffed it throughout the Fleet Marine Forces
(FMF) for comments and recommendations. None-the-less, the
reinforced 1st SRIG that went to war in the Persian Gulf
operated under a set of internal and external perceptions
that varied (sometimes widely) between respective MEF
commanders and staff officers due to this doctrinal void.

The Intelligence Company provides the key element of
SRIG support to the MEF (see figure 2-1). While the other
elements are primarily information collectors, those who
developed the SRIG concept organized the Intelligence
Company to conduct intelligence collection planning,
all-source fusion, and dissemination of intelligence to all
MEF elements. During the Gulf War, two elements of the
Intelligence Company, the MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center
(MAFC) and the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC)
figured prominently in the support provided to I MEF.

The Marine Corps created the MAFC (see figure 3-1) as a
reaction to lessons learned in Beirut, Lebanon, during the
early 1980's. While Marine Amphibious Units (what Marine
Expeditionary Units were then called) were conducting
peacekeeping operations in Beirut, national and theater
intelligence sources showered them with overwhelming volumes

Figure 2-1: Intelligence Company Organization

Figure 3-1: MAFC Organization

of intelligence data. The MAFC's established purpose was
"...to insure that intel available to the USMC would not
overwhelm its ability to process it."(3) It would be the hub
where analysts turned raw information into intelligence.
Raw data from national, theater, and tactical sources
reflecting all disciplines of the intelligence field would
flow into this central location. From there, MAFC analysts
would process the data and disseminate it to the MEF command
element and its major subordinate elements. The planned
wartime strength of this organization was 117 officers and
Marines. However, on 16 January 1991, the first day of the
air phase of the campaign, the I MEF MAFC operated at less
than 50 percent strength. Like the rest of the SRIG, this
would to be the MAFC's first field test.

The proposed doctrine prescribes that a major
information feed into the MAFC should come from the MEF
SARC. Theoretically, after the MEF G-2 provides approved
essential elements of information and other intelligence
requirements, the SARC formulates a detailed collection plan
and then oversees the associated collection tasking.
Elements from units executing the collection plan (i.e.,
Force Reconnaissance, Radio Battalion, RPV Company, etc.)
man the SARC to oversee mission execution and to forward
incoming information to the MAFC. The SARC concept was not
new at the time of the Persian Gulf War.

Summary

At the start of Desert Shield, the I MEF theoretical
capability to conduct intelligence operations in theater
appeared considerable. Despite no doctrinal foundation, the
Marine Corps had recently created an intelligence based SRIG
organization that appeared capable of providing commanders
with credible combat support. Conceptually, supporting
organizations would no longer overwhelm units with
mountainous volumes of data because the MAFC would fuse the
multi-source incoming information and provide the MAGTF with
relevant intelligence products. However, the commanding
officer of the embryonic 1st SRIG could not have possibly
conceived the sheer magnitude of the task that the MEF
Commander was about to lay before him. All the variables he
was about to face in the joint, combined battlefield of
Kuwait, would make intelligence support planning for Desert
Storm an extremely difficult mountainous task.

Chapter 2

I MEF INTELLIGENCE PLANNING FOR OPERATION
DESERT STORM

Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer, Commanding General
of I MEF, provided clear and unmistakable guidance to his
intelligence planners. He believed the Iraqi indirect fire
weapons, primarily corps level artillery, multiple rocket
launchers and short range missiles, were the greatest threat
to his attacking force. The sheer volume of Iraqi systems
and, specifically, their capability to deliver chemical
fires, concerned General Boomer before the start of the
ground war. He directed the G-2 to develop and implement a
collection plan based on this guidance.(4)

Requirements

The requirements levied upon the I MEF G-2 and the 1st
SRIG were immense. They had to support both their
Commanding General's information requirements and those of
the MEF subordinate elements who were about to conduct the
single largest Marine assault since the Battle of Okinawa in
1945. I MEF (see figure 1-2) consisted of a ground combat
element with two divisions (the 1st and 2nd Marine
Divisions), an aviation combat element (ACE) that included a
reinforced 3d Marine Air Wing which contained the equivalent
of over two wings worth of aircraft, and a combat service
support element that included the Force Service Support
Groups of both I and II MEF.

Figure 1-2: I MEF Organization During Desert Storm

Besides the massive force, the attack plan changed less
than two weeks before G-Day. What initially had been a one
division obstacle belt breech with another following in
trace had, on short notice, turned into a two division
abreast assault.(5)

The need for finding suitable breach
sites had doubled, thus requiring a major refocusing and
shifting of the intelligence effort.

The next higher headquarters' needs, requirements and
capabilities exacerbated the difficult challenge facing the
Marine Intelligence Community in Southwest Asia. The
Central Command (CENTCOM) J-2 Staff was wholly unprepared to
go to war when Iraq invaded Kuwait. When the CENTCOM J-2
Staff deployed into theater, it numbered less than 10
personnel on its rolls (although it grew to over 40 by
Desert Storm). Additionally, this skeleton staff had no
clear pre-planned intelligence architecture to guide the
build up of in-theater collection and information
resources.(6)

This lack of personnel and planning by CENTCOM created
another problem for I MEF. Because of staff shortfalls, the
J-2 tasked the components, including I MEF, as part of the
newly developed Theater intelligence architecture, to
provide "ground truth" reporting on respective areas and
units in Kuwait. For I MEF, this meant conducting theater
level situational analysis reporting on the area controlled
by the Iraqi III Corps. The J-2 Staff, who was obviously
having difficulty just meeting the day-to-day requirements
of the CENTCOM Commander-in-Chief (CINC), had in effect
become areliant consumer from rather than a supporting
producer tothe major subordinate commands.(7)

At the strategic level, the national intelligence
community mobilized to provide CENTCOM with an unprecedented
view of the battlefield. The Director of Central
Intelligence established Watch Condition One during early
August 1990; this directed virtually every national
intelligence collection system to focus on the Kuwait and
Iraqi Theaters of Operation. The assets allocated included
satellites and airborne platforms for gathering imagery and
signals intelligence (SIGINT) against Iraqi targets.(8)

Because of the vast, wide open spaces common in a
desert environment, imagery became the intelligence source
of choice. Every level of command in all the service
components desired imagery to determine the Iraqi order-
of-battle and lay down of forces in their respective zones
of action. SIGINT, which would have normally satisfied a
large number of tactical and theater intelligence
requirements, was relatively ineffective because the Iraqi
defenders in Kuwait communicated primarily through land
lines.(9)

In I MEF, requests for up to date, accurate imagery
were constant and under the circumstances very difficult to
satisfy.

Limitations/Restrictions

Once the I MEF Staff and the SRIG began to operate in
support of Operation Desert Shield, the effects of a lack of
doctrine immediately became apparent. The parties concerned
had to settle how the SRIG fit into I MEF's command, staff,
and intelligence architecture. Unfortunately, the MEF staff
and the SRIG leadership were unable to mutually define the
association. As a member of the MEF staff recalled: the
SRIG Commanding Officer wanted to be an operational
commander who worked directly for Lieutenant General Boomer.
The MEF staff saw the SRIG as more of an asset pool that
supported the G-2's intelligence plan.(10)

Ultimately, the
SRIG became a non-entity in the operational aspects of
offensive ground warfare planning. The MEF staff simply
reverted to the old way of doing business by ignoring the
SRIG organizational chain-of-command altogether. Before the
establishment of the SRIG, MEF intelligence agencies
planned, trained, and operated within their respective
specialties as independent functional entities with their
operational tasking coming directly from the MEF G-2. This
was generally how MEF intelligence units operated during
Desert Storm.(11)

Circumstances in theater forced components to fulfill
the vast majority of their intelligence requirements prior
to Desert Storm primarily through the national architecture.
This situation existed because General H. Norman
Schwartzkopf, the CINC of CENTCOM (CINCENT), had established
specific rules of engagement (ROE) in theater. These ROE
restricted all cross boundary incursions into occupied
Kuwait until after 16 January 1991, the beginning of
Operation Desert Storm (i.e., the air phase of the
campaign). This restriction nullified the use of virtually
all available in-theater imagery and ground surveillance
assets prior to the first offensive action. Tasking the national collection assets became
another major problem for I MEF. To access national assets,
the I MEF G-2 had to have all requests for national support
validated by the CENTCOM J-2 Staff. The J-2 had to balance
the requests of each major command against the CINC's
current focus of effort. These circumstances placed all
service commands in fierce competition for the thin pool of
support. Initially, the air phase of the campaign had top
priority. Until the beginning of the ground phase of the
war, I MEF's ground combat concerns were at the bottom of
the priority listing. Unlike the other services, I MEF had
no other avenue through the service chain to obtain national
support.(12)

There was an equally intense internal competition for
the MEF's focus of support. The MEF was directing most of
its intelligence effort to promoting targeting for the
prosecution of its own in-zone battlefield preparation by
the ACE. So focused was the MEF on attriting the Iraqi III
Corps prior to G-Day, that RPV's never flew in support of
the 1st or 2nd Marine Divisions until seven days before
starting ground operations (G-Day minus 7).

The MEF G-2 organized the SARC, the entity established
to support intelligence collection for the ground war, after
Desert Storm had actually commenced (16 Jan 91).
Previously, little thought had gone into who would man and
lead it, and how it would function. In the SRIG concept
(FMFM 3-22 coordinating draft), the SARC is a pre-
established, functioning organization that the SRIG
commander has trained and prepared for war. As a result of
this late beginning, no coherent concept of employment was
developed that efficiently and effectively made use of the
existing organization. As a by-product, most of the
intelligence asset employment occurred in a piecemeal manner
with tasking coming directly from the G-3 (Operations and
Plans) vice the G-2.(13)

In the MAFC, which was working directly for the MEF
G-2, an information bottleneck evolved as the air phase of
the campaign began. The Analysis and Production (A&P)
Section received an average of 3000 individual reports a day
from national, theater and MEF intelligence support
agencies. A&P was, in theory, supposed to analyze the
multi-source incoming information and produce a fused
all-source intelligence product on the enemy situation for
the MEF Command Element and its subordinates. With A&P
manned with somewhere between 20-24 personnel (less than 50
percent as proposed in FMFM 3-22 coordinating draft), the
section became little more than a "repository" of incoming
information. The analysis function never really existed as
analysts focused their efforts on "bean counting" and
plotting enemy positions on maps.(14)

A&P did what it could
to simply sort through and plot the incoming bits of
information. Thus, the MEF staff acquired a fairly good
picture of the enemy situation, but provided very little
information to its subordinate commands.(15)

As noted previously, the CINC, by his overflight and
ground reconnaissance ban, fully restricted I MEF from
exploiting the potential of organic and theater intelligence
resources. In addition, at the request of Special
Operations Command (SOCCENT), the CINC established a
restrictive zone between the Kuwait Border and I MEF which
denied I MEF access to Iraqi deserters and Kuwaiti
expatriates who were streaming across the border. Even
after SOCCENT captured the deserters and put them into enemy
prisoner of war (EPW) camps, the CINC still denied I MEF
access until late December 1990.(16)

Seven months prior to Operation Desert Storm, the MEF
G-2 could have tasked VMFP-3, the Corps' sole tactical
reconnaissance squadron, to provide timely, hard copy, wide
area coverage imagery on specified targets. However, this
was no longer an option: because of end of service
limitations associated with the RF-4 airframe, the Marine
Corps deactivated VMFP-3 two weeks before the beginning of
Operation Desert Shield! Therefore, the MEF Commander could
acquire suitable tactical, wide area coverage imagery only
if the CINC directed some of the theater assets away from
supporting pre-G-Day air operations.

Summary

The intelligence planning considerations were extensive
for the MEF G-2. Those in Marine intelligence were
extremely challenged to meet the support requirements
emanating from all command levels because of the immaturely
developed SRIG organization and considerable in-theater
limitations and restrictions. As the date for ground
operations approached, Lieutenant General Boomer, his staff,
and the MEF major subordinate commanders sought to mitigate
the existing limitations and restrictions to increase
intelligence collection and dissemination. Although the MEF
G-2 was beginning to satisfy some intelligence requirements
by the start of the air phase of Desert Storm, significant
obstacles still existed as intelligence operations reached
their peak during the ground phase of the campaign.

Chapter 3

I MEF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DURING DESERT STORM

Once Operation Desert Storm commenced on 16 January
1991, the potential existed for increasing the intake of
quality intelligence support to the MEF. Theoretically,
unrestricted intelligence operations appeared probable;
however, significant restrictions still existed. Nonethe-
less, as the air phase continued, the enemy situation on the
ground became progressively clearer for some within I MEF.

With the CINC and the I MEF Commanding General
concentrating most of their attention on conducting air
operations, both focused most of their in-theater
intelligence collection assets on that end. General
Schwartzkopf directed most of his attention to reducing the
Iraqi center of gravity, Saddam Hussein's highly centralized
system of command and control.(17)

Lieutenant General Boomer
concentrated his intelligence activities on supporting the
ACE's efforts on reducing the Iraqi III Corps artillery,
missiles, and nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC)
threats. Not until five to seven days before the start of
the ground phase of the campaign did the focus shift for
both generals. Because of the scant intelligence support
that had been flowing to ground commanders prior to then,
this late shift in focus would be a key source of friction
between the MEF staff and the maneuver divisions throughout
the operation.

Collection

With the national and theater collection assets focused
on the CINC's priorities, the MEF commander had to maximize
the collection capabilities of his organic assets. There
was information flowing into the MAFC from national sources,
but nearly all of it focused on Iraq and not in I MEF's
sector of the Kuwait theater of operation, i.e., the Iraqi
III Corps area.(18)

Imagery. Hard copy, up to date imagery was in short
supply throughout both Deserts Shield and Storm. During
this period, a significant volume of imagery flowed into the
theater from national sources both before and after 16
January 1991, but very little of it was of value to MEF
decision makers. Most of the national imagery that reached
the MEF and its subordinate elements was "not current enough
to satisfy most operators."(19)

As a 1st Marine Division G-2,
Analysis Section Officer stated: "We received a multitude of
imagery products...a few were useful and many were of no
assistance." Most imagery products came to the 1st Marine
Division G-2 unevaluated. They often lacked reference grid
locations, north arrows, photo interpreters' analytical
annotations, and image dates.(20)

The MEF G-2 believed hard copy, high resolution imagery
focused on the Iraqi III Corps was available from national
sources but the CINC's J-2 and his Staff were not
consistently distributing the products. In a desperate
move, the MEF G-2 sent two officers back to Washington, D.C.
to search for any current and available imagery on the Iraqi
III Corps. They located a large volume of imagery from
national level sources focused on the MEF's zone and
personally brought it back to the MEF for use and
dissemination.(21)

Once Desert Storm began, I MEF used the RPV very
effectively to support the information needs for pre-G-Day
battlefield shaping operations. This meant, however, that
Pioneer RPV's did not fly in direct support of the Marine
division commanders until just prior to the start of the
ground phase of the war. Still, when the MEF sent the RPV's
to support the divisions, the respective staffs put them to
very productive use both for last minute planning and for
supporting ground operations after G-Day.(22)

Although both the MEF and the divisions extensively
employed the RPV's, the system could not fill the hard-copy
imagery void. The RPV's collected "narrow field of view"
video images onto cassette tapes. The ground station
operators could copy the tapes, but the RPV Companies
maintained only a limited capability to do so. In addition,
once a unit had a tape, they would have to possess a
compatible video tape player (VHS) to view it, but such VHS
players were in very limited supply in the Persian Gulf.
Even if tape players were available, the raw video was of
little value without a trained ground station operator to
interpret the running mission data (location, direction,
etc.), however they were not normally available at the
division level and below.(23)

HUMINT. Because of the ROE restrictions and the lack
of access to enemy deserters, I MEF was not able to maximize
HUMINT assets to support planning for G-Day operations. But
a change occurred in late December when I MEF took over the
SOCCENT zone along the border from Central to Eastern
Kuwait. SRIG Marines from 1st Force Reconnaissance Company
and Interrogator-Translator and Counter-Intelligence Teams
relieved the Special Operations Forces in the border
observation posts (OP's) immediately after the boundary
change. These OP's provided the most current and accurate
pre-G-Day information available on the Iraqi units opposite
I MEF. Deserting enemy soldiers provided the first
indications that the Iraqi obstacle belts were not as
formidable as expected. The EPW reports coming from the
OP's also provided invaluable insight as to the
effectiveness of deception operations and to the state of
Iraqi front-line morale.(24)

Although the CINC lifted most ground associated cross
border restrictions immediately after the beginning of the
air phase of Desert Storm, he still prohibited cross border
ground reconnaissance operations until just immediately
(nearly three days) before G-Day. When the CINC lifted the
last prohibition, the only intelligence collection elements
to conduct cross boundary operations were Division
Reconnaissance Teams (which crossed the border at G-Day
minus 3). The actions of these teams, coupled with imagery
that was now trickling down from the MEF, verified the poor
state of Iraqi defenses in the first obstacle belt.(25)

SIGINT. Although the Iraqi III Corps radio
communications were relatively low key for several months,
there was a small increase in enemy tactical communications
immediately after the start of Desert Storm. Through 1st
Radio Battalion's Mobile Electronic Warfare Support Systems
(MEWSS) which were well forward, they were able to make a
limited intelligence contribution through communications
intercept.(26)

The MEWSS were deficient, though, in their
ability to conduct direction finding (DF). Their outdated
DF equipment was of such poor accuracy that the MEF was
unable to use the locations provided for targeting.(27)

The ACE. With the ACE's loss of VMFP-3, its ability to
contribute to the ground intelligence collection effort was
limited. Traditional pilot debriefings during the air phase
were of some positive value to ground commanders. The MEF
G-2 did attempt to have the ACE air drop ground motion
sensors along the Kuwait Coastal Highway during the air
phase. However, the CINC's restrictions on U.S. aircraft
flying under 10,000 feet due to the surface-to-air missile
and anti-aircraft artillery threat precluded the ACE from
providing the support. Fortunately, Kuwaiti pilots were not
under the same restriction. The MEF G-2 coordinated with
them and they deployed the sensors at altitudes under 3000
feet. One major success from this should be noted: these
sensors were the first system to detect the Iraqi withdrawal
out of Kuwait City after the ground war began.(28)

Processing

The Analysis and Processing Section of the MAFC had a
limited ability to process the staggering number of incoming
pieces of datum. During ground phase of the war, the volume
of incoming traffic jumped from a pre-G-Day average of 3000
messages per day to upwards of 6000 to 8000 per day after
G-Day.(29)

The MEF needed a significant number of analysts
and capable data processing systems to adequately process
such a large number of reports. Compounding an already
existing problem, on 14 February 1991, the I MEF Command
Post (CP) split into two sections: a forward and a main CP,
with 180 kilometers between both elements!(30)

With this
relocation, the A&P section experienced a commensurate split
of its limited assets. Now, the A&P section had to support
two separate command posts with half the personnel at each
location and double the incoming information.(31)

The systems support was equally as vexing as the
manpower issue. There were four data-base management
systems brought into theater to support the G-2, I MEF.
Both the Intelligence Analysis System (IAS) and the
Intelligence Analysis Center (IAC) never worked and
consequently MAFC analysts never used them. IAS was still
in the developmental phase at the time of the Gulf War and
MAFC personnel were relatively untrained in its operation.
IAC was an outdated system that had out lived its
usefulness. Analysts used the Swifthawk System only as a
Top Secret/Special Compartmented Information word processor.
The only system serving as a functioning data base was the
Intelligence Database Management System, an old, obsolete
design that provided the best order of battle data available
to the MEF. While this system was functional, the
subordinate element G/S-2's could not access its data, and
it was not compatible nor linked with other theater or
national data base systems.(32)

Although little time existed for analysts of the A&P

Section to do anything but read messages and plot enemy
situational details on maps, they did manage to provide a
daily intelligence summary to all MEF major subordinate
elements. However, this product was of limited value to
many who received it. Division intelligence personnel
described these reports as consistently containing a
multitude of glaring inaccuracies, to include incorrect grid
coordinates, mis-identification of units, and misdated
information.(33)

Reporting

Intelligence dissemination was a constant difficulty
for I MEF throughout the war. Officers of the I MEF G-2
blamed the dissemination problem primarily on the physical
separation between the MEF command post and it's major
subordinate units. Also, they implicated the inferior and
unreliable communications architecture supporting the G-2's
dissemination process. Regarding the physical separation,
the G-2, I MEF, possessed only 25 percent of its allocated
vehicle support. Due to this vehicle shortage, several
individuals involved with I MEF intelligence stated they
were unable to push out hard copy imagery to the major
subordinate elements with any acceptable regularity.(34)

It
seems logical, though, that the divisions and the Force
Service Support Group, all of which had fleets of vehicles
available, would have eagerly picked up any available
intelligence products from the MEF G-2.

Regarding the communications support, the MEF
maintained a Local Area Network (LAN) that kept them
connected with their major subordinate elements. This
system was slow and very prone to being backed up when the
message load increased. This limitation ultimately led
analysts to deem it unreliable during the high volume
information periods during the ground war. LAN by default
was used primarily to pass intelligence summaries back and
forth every twelve hours.(35)

To pass time sensitive,
perishable information, the MAFC had to rely on single
channel high frequency (HF) radio. Intelligence officers
labeled the HF as unreliable as well as slow.(36)

Operators
would have to pass individual messages over encrypted radio
nets and the individual receiving the traffic would record
each word by hand on message pads. Radio operators would
have to repeat this process down each level of command.
This "Stovepipe" method of dissemination through every level
of command was extremely slow and very inefficient.(37)

Summary

Although the CINC significantly relaxed pre-G-Day
restrictions by the start of Desert Storm, many obstacles
still existed to hamper intelligence support within the MEF.
CINC imposed cross border restrictions remained a reality
until the actual beginning of ground combat operations.
Additionally, manpower and systems support issues within
both the MAFC and the CENTCOM J-2 greatly contributed to the
dissemination bottleneck hampering the entire in-theater MEF
intelligence effort. Despite the higher headquarters'
somewhat debilitating impact upon the MEF G-2's ability to
provide support, the genesis of most problems were a product
of self inflicted, internal problems that were years in the
making.

Chapter 4

I MEF INTELLIGENCE PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

The Marine Corps did not prepare its intelligence
apparatus to support the MEF as a separate element in a
joint, combined land campaign. Almost all the existing
Marine Corps doctrine dealing with intelligence operations
(FMFM 3-20 -- Commanders Guide to Intelligence, FMFM 2-1 --
Intelligence, etc.), focused primarily on the MAGTF fighting
as an element of a Naval force. Fighting as part of a
Navy-Marine Team, the MAGTF would have direct access to the
national as well as theater intelligence architectures
through the Navy. In addition, a naval task force provides
an enhanced communications capability that is only available
to Marine intelligence personnel when working out of a
command and control configured ship's Joint Intelligence
Center.

The SRIG in theory was to provide the MEF Commander,
through enhanced organization and training, proficient and
properly equipped analysts to ensure rapid completion of the
intelligence cycle.(38)

Two years after fielding the first
SRIG, the vision of General Gray had not come to fruition.
The major single point of failure was the MAFC. The SRIG
had improperly equipped, minimally manned and poorly trained
the MAFC. Although MAFC personnel did the best they could
with the tools provided, it was not ready to support such a
large scale operation as Desert Storm.

After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, some intelligence
officers implicated their commanders (primarily at the
regimental level and below) and other staff officers for not
understanding how the G/S-2 really did their jobs. Most of
this type of criticism came from intelligence officers who
felt operators wrongly attacked them for their performance
in the Persian Gulf, or from those who felt commanders were
a major part of the problem.(39)

Whatever the case, the
maneuver tactics preached in FMFM-1, Warfighting, can only
be a reality if commanders are extremely competent in every
aspect of employing their organizations in combat. Those
that are only skilled in maneuver will eventually fail
because they will disregard the concerns of such critical
areas as intelligence and logistics, the results of which
will cause them to fight blindly and without endurance.

The post-war performance analysis from Lieutenant
General Boomer and from Major Generals J.M. Myatt and
William Keys, the Commanding Generals of 1st and 2nd Marine
Divisions, were equally critical of I MEF intelligence
support. General Boomer stated that [the MEF staff] led
subordinate commanders to believe that they were "...going
to get some marvelous stuff..." from national satellite
imagery sources, but what the MEF provided never measured up
to their expectations. Hence, they wanted to know why.(40)

Both Major Generals Myatt and Keys believed the
intelligence community erroneously depicted the Iraqi's as
being "ten feet tall" or "monsters" when they really were
just the opposite -- demoralized and neglected individual
foot soldiers. Major General Keys believed this inaccurate
depiction made his forces "more gun-shy" going into the
battle than they should have been. He also stated he did
not receive [from I MEF] enough "front-line battle
intelligence" to support his combat operations.(41)

Although Major General Myatt recognized the inaccurate
depiction of the Iraqi's, he didn't believe this view was
all bad. In an interview with Naval Institute Proceedings
after the war, Myatt stated because they believed the
Iraqi's to be ten feet tall the 1st Marine Division prepared
to fight someone ten feet tall. He was more critical of the
volume and quality of imagery reaching the division, which
he believed was poor. Most of the imagery, when it did
reach the division analysts, appeared to be "third and
fourth generation copies" that were very difficult to read
and analyze. He also stated during a debrief with the Marine
Corps Battlefield Assessment Team that too many intelligence
officers were enamored with national systems, yet did not
understand how to employ [collection] assets organic to the
MAGTF.(42)

Summary

I MEF did not have the doctrinal foundation and
existing structure in place to effectively fulfill the
intelligence needs of a two division MEF engaged in a land
campaign. Although they did the best they could, the MEF
G-2 and the 1st SRIG could not adequately adapt and respond
to meet commander's needs throughout all levels within the
MEF. With sharp criticism coming from both the I MEF
commanders and from the intelligence community, the Marine
Corps needed to conduct a penetrating examination of the I
MEF intelligence apparatus and resident service level
structure to correct the deficiencies that existed during
the 1991 Gulf War, and this is what the Corps proceeded to
do.

Chapter 5

WHERE DOES THE MARINE CORPS GO FROM HERE?

Immediately after the end of the Gulf War, the Marine
Corps embarked upon a two pronged examination of its
intelligence apparatus. The first set of analysis were
internal examinations spearheaded by career intelligence
officers. These studies examined the effectiveness of
intelligence support within I MEF. They focused primarily
on the functioning of the intelligence cycle and how it
supported MEF staff planning. They began one day after the
28 February 1991 Desert Storm cease fire! They then
continued after forces returned to CONUS. Input for these
internal evaluations came primarily from intelligence
officers at the MEF headquarters and down to the battalion
level, and from division and regimental commanders and their
respective operations officers.(43)

The basic conclusions were:

(1) Intelligence support to I MEF during Desert Storm adequately supported the MEF staff but did not fulfill the needs of tactical units
(division and below) in a timely manner.

(2) Imagery support was inadequate.

(3) Processing and dissemination of combat information and all source intelligence of immediate tactical value were
inadequate.

The predominant factors contributing to these shortfalls
were insufficient personnel and physical resources, and
constraints imposed by operating in a joint environment.(44)

The Department of the Defense, Inspector General (IG)
conducted the second leg of this examination. At the
request of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the IG
evaluated the Marine Corps in relation to the other services
and intelligence agencies so as to acquire an external,
higher level perspective.

This report, provided to the Commandant of the Marine
Corps on 24 September 1993, identified the following six
deficiencies in Marine Corps intelligence:

In March 1994 as a result of these examinations of Gulf
War intelligence, the Marine Corps approved and
subsequently began to implementing a series of changes and
improvements to its intelligence structure. The Corps'
leadership developed a plan seeking to 'revitalize and
professionalize' the intelligence community and service
architecture as a whole.(46)

Doctrine

In "The Plan" (as it will be referred to in this
chapter), the Corps' leadership recognized that the lack of
a doctrinal framework contributed to the problem; hence,
developing an appropriate doctrine was fundamental to
rebuilding the Marine Corps intelligence infrastructure.(47)

The doctrine developed must address the multi-faceted role
Marine forces could play in both amphibious operations and
sustained operations ashore as part of a naval task force or
separate from it, in both a joint and combined environment.
In addition, this doctrine must be interchangeable with
joint intelligence doctrine because all future combat
operations will undoubtedly be multi-service.

Organization

The Plan discusses specific increases to existing
structure. For instance, the numbers of personnel assigned
to infantry battalions and regiments will be increased to
"process and integrate...intelligence products received"
from the MAFC. Also, it creates a new structure in the form
of direct support teams who will act as an interface between
major subordinate elements and the MAFC.(48)

For all the
changes, there is no mention about repairing the SRIG. The
SRIG idea is generally sound in theory. The U.S. Army has
employed a similar concept with great success in its
Military Intelligence units. The Marine Corps needs to
focus significant emphasis on developing an effective, well-
trained intelligence support organization for the MEF.

There is much discussion in The Plan about
organizations that conduct business with the MAFC, but
little dialogue concerning its structure. By inference, the
plan calls for the MAFC to continue to be the hub of
intelligence processing and dissemination for the MEF. If
that is the case, then the organizational structure requires
significant refinement. The Army's Military Intelligence
Brigade (which supports a corps) allocates 82 personnel to
the analysis function alone as compared to the MAFC's A&P
Section table of organization of 48.(49)

For operating Marine forces (i.e., those under the
operational control of a theater CINC), there still is no
existing service or FMF level organization that can provide
a direct pipeline to the national intelligence apparatus.
Headquarters Marine Corps fielded a Marine Corps
Intelligence Activity (MCIA) in 1993 at the National
Maritime Intelligence Center in Suitland, Maryland.(50)

Although the MCIA has direct access to the entire national
intelligence system, it is not organized and manned nor
permitted by charter to directly assist operational units.
It can provide direct, pre-planned exercise support, but to
provide operational support, requirements must be validated
through the respective CINC's chain of command.(51) As a
result, the problem still exists.

Manpower

Besides issues concerning increasing the existing
structure, The Plan calls for reshaping the intelligence
officer military occupational specialties (MOS'). The field
used to rely primarily on officers to laterally moved from a
combat arms MOS into the intelligence field. This process
sent inadequately trained and experienced intelligence
officers to operational units who often performed (or were
perceived to perform) unsatisfactorily. Manpower at
Headquarters Marine Corps will now assign officers to the
intelligence specialty straight out of The Basic School.
These officers will enter an entry level operational and
training track to produce a more professional and competent
individual who will be assigned to positions commensurate
with their skills.(52)

Training and Education

To develop the skills of intelligence officers, The
Plan establishes a new training regimen stressing a
multi-disciplined, phased approach. This educational track,
which will be in addition to career level professional
military education, targets the intelligence officer at
specific periods to receive formal training throughout his
professional development.(53)

While The Plan has addressed the educational needs, it
has ignored the real world professional development the
intelligence officer misses when not employed in the Fleet
Marine Forces. As is done in the Navy (and similarly in the
other services), when not assigned to ships or battle
groups, intelligence officers are employed in theater level
Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facilities (FOSIFs).
The Navy has these organizations stationed throughout the
world and tasks them to provide direct support to forward
deployed fleet commanders.

The analysts stationed at a FOSIF receive the constant
experience of fighting the intelligence war and working
within the national, theater and fleet architectures despite
not being deployed. The benefit to the Navy's fleet units
is accurate, timely intelligence support tailored to their
operating needs. The Marine Corps does involve its SIGINT
personnel in a similar arrangement with the Navy as part of
the Naval Security Group Command. Although the new plan
will seek to feed officers into similar joint billets, the
Marine Corps has wasted the potential of the MCIA. A CONUS
based MCIA in the FOSIF model could provide both Marine
operating forces and intelligence personnel with the same
added benefits.(54)

Commander and Staff Training

The plan acknowledges the requirement to increase the
commander's direct participation in the intelligence
process. The general corrective action seeks to use career
level schools, such as the Amphibious Warfare School or the
Command and Staff College, as the forum for increased
intelligence training, primarily for combat arms officers.(55)

Although this tactic will have an affect on the small
percentage of Marine Corps officers attending career level
schools, it is inadequate. Commanders must be as proficient
in employing their intelligence assets as they are in
employing supporting arms. There is no training available
in the Fleet Marine Force to teach officers how to organize
and plan intelligence operations (similar to the training
officers receive at FMF schools on fire support
coordination). Until the Marine Corps trains "operators" on
how to conduct intelligence operations, their warfighting
skills will be incomplete.

Systems

Although The Plan doesn't directly address systems,
since the Persian Gulf War the Marine Corps has taken
several major steps in providing more capable processing and
dissemination capabilities. FMF units have begun to receive
the first improved Intelligence Analysis Systems (IAS).
Unlike data base systems employed by the MAFC in 1991, the
IAS will link subordinate and adjacent units of the MEF
(down to battalion level). This system will provide
participating units with the ability to rapidly exchange
data and digitized imagery. It also is compatible with the
Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) which
will be resident in the MAFC. JDISS provides the CINC or
JTF Commander direct access to the Joint Intelligence Center
and other intelligence agencies in the continental United
States.(56)

Summary

The Desert Storm experience has resulted in numerous
innovative and productive enhancements to the Marine Corps
intelligence architecture. Commitments to improvements in
doctrine, increases in manning structure, enhanced
educational concepts and modernized systems should all have
a profound affect on future Marine Corps combat operations.
Although these new concepts appear to be a great step
forward, the self examination needs to continue

to ensure the intelligence field can keep step with an
ever-changing battlefield and intelligence environment.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Operation Desert Storm was a low point for Marine Corps
intelligence. It revealed an antiquated architecture that
was unresponsive to the needs of the I MEF Commanders, his
Staff and the major subordinate elements. The 1989 addition
of 1st SRIG, whose concept was still in an evolutionary
phase, had not matured to the level that would allow it to
be a relative factor in the campaign. Aside from the issues
of insufficient manning, training and systems, the Marine
Corps fielded the SRIG without a sufficient doctrinal
foundation. As stated in FMFM-1, Warfighting, "...doctrine
provides the basis for harmonious actions and mutual
understanding." This doctrinal foundation did not exist for
the I MEF and SRIG commanders and their staffs.(57)

The problems associated with I MEF intelligence were
exacerbated by a series of CINC imposed cross border
restrictions and by J-2 staff limitations. With a staff
that was under manned and trained, the J-2 focused on
providing support to the CINC and not on assisting the major
subordinate commands. As a result, this lack of downward
focus created clogs in the dissemination process. An almost
identical situation occurred at the MEF level as the G-2 and
the MAFC struggled to meet the day-to-day requirements of
its own headquarters.

The period also exposed a generation of "operators" who
were out of touch with and lacked an understanding of the
intelligence discipline. Many commanders for too long were
leaving the unit's intelligence activities entirely to the
specialists, and thus were not providing necessary guidance
and direction to the effort. This command and staff
breakdown diminished the effectiveness of intelligence
operations within I MEF.

The new Marine Corps emphasis on correcting the
problems recognized during Operation Desert Storm has many
ambitious aspects that will undoubtedly provide a basis for
great improvement. To be productive, it must be a concerted
effort over the long term and must survive the constant
turnover of service leadership. In addition, during the
current era of downsizing, it will be a significant
challenge to maintain and grow the necessary structure to
support a credible intelligence apparatus when all elements
of the Marine Corps are being constantly cut, piece by
piece, due to fiscal constraints.

The Marine Corps' intelligence problems are far from
over. The problems identified during Operation Desert Storm
need to serve as a watershed for future Marines to improve
upon. As recent examples in Somalia and Haiti have shown,
the battlefield of tomorrow will be more complex and as
lethal as the one that I MEF fought for in 1991.(58) The
intelligence community and those whom it will support, need
to continue to refine the discipline from all angles.
Future generations of Marines do not need to relearn the
lessons of Operation Desert Storm.

APPENDIX A

ACRONYMS

ACE -- Air Combat Element

A&P -- Analysis and Production Center,

ANGLICO -- Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

CENTCOM -- Central Command

CINC -- Commander-in-Chief

CINCENT -- Commander-in-Chief, Central Command

CONUS -- Continental United States

CP -- Command Post

DF -- Direction Finding

EPW -- Enemy Prisoner of War

FOSIF -- Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility

HF -- High Frequency

HUMINT -- Human Resources Intelligence

IAC -- Intelligence Analysis Center

IAS -- Intelligence Analysis System

IG -- Inspector General

JDISS -- Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System

LAN -- Local Area Network

MAFC -- MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center

MAGTF -- Marine Air Ground Task Force

MCIA -- Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

MEF -- Marine Expeditionary Force

MEWSS -- Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System

MOS -- Military Occupational Specialty

NBC -- Nuclear, Chemical, Biological

OP -- Observation Post

ROE -- Rules of Engagement

RPV -- Remotely Piloted Vehicle

SARC -- Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center

SIGINT -- Signals Intelligence

SOCCENT -- Special Operations Command, Central Command

SRIG -- Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group

USMC -- United States Marine Corps

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY

ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE FUSION -- Analysis that uses all
available intelligence from tactical, theater and national
sources, and from multiple disciplines (SIGINT, HUMINT,
IMINT etc.) to form a single intelligence picture on a
specified target.

CENTER OF GRAVITY -- An aspect of a force that, if
destroyed, will cause it to lose its will to fight.
(Schwartzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero)

COMBINED -- Two or more forces or agencies of two or more
countries. (Joint Pub 1-02)

DOCTRINE -- (NATO) Fundamental principles by which the
military forces guide their actions in support of
objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in
application. (Joint Pub 1-02)

G-DAY -- Non-doctrinal term used during Operation Desert
Storm designating the day offensive ground operations will
begin. G minus or plus a number designates the number of
days before or after G-Day, respectively.

REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLES (RPV) -- An unmanned vehicle
capable of being controlled from a distant location through
a communications link. It is normally designed to be
recoverable. (Joint Pub 1-02) Note: the RPV's discussed in
the paper are the aerial version.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) -- Directives issued by competent
military authority which delineate the circumstances and
limitations under which United States forces will initiate
and/or continue combat engagement with other forces
encountered. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Cureton, Charles, LtCol, USMC. U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1993.

Quilter, Charles, Col., USMCR. U.S. Marines in the Persian
Gulf, 1990-1991: With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Washington, D.C.:
History and Museums Division, Headquarters, United
States Marine Corps, 1993.

5. For more background information regarding the CG, I MEF's decision to change from a
one to a two Division breach see: LtGen Walter Boomer, "Special Trust and Confidence Among
Trailbreakers," Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1991, 47-50.

6. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, 103d Congress, Intelligence
Successes and Failures inOperations Desert Shield/Storm, 16 August 1993, Committee Print,
5-6; Majs F.D. Houston and P.J. Nagy, "Intelligence," unpublished research paper sponsored by the
USMC Battlefield Assessment Team (Quantico, VA.: MCCDC), July 1991, 4. Note: A source
assigned to the CENTCOM J-2 staff a year prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War indicated that the
J-2's staff was over 100 while he was stationed there. Evidently, only a small portion of the J-2 staff
deployed to Saudi Arabia while the rest provided CONUS based support.

10. The source of these views spoke in an environment that allowed him non-attribution for his
comments. Therefore, I shall only identify him as a member of the I MEF Staff and the location and
time of his comments will not be identified.

12. During the Persian Gulf War, all services, less the Marine Corps, had a direct link back
to intelligence centers that were plugged into the national intelligence apparatus. This connectivity
allowed the components direct access to information that otherwise may have been unavailable to
them in the competition for support within CENTCOM.

15. I attributed my conclusion that the MEF staff acquired a good picture of the Iraqi Defenses
in sector to a key I MEF staff member who spoke in a non-attribution environment. His
comments centered around the clear picture of the enemy situation that he felt MEF intelligence
provided him prior to the ground war. I have also interviewed several key officers from the 1st
Marine Division Staff whose opinion was the exact opposite of the MEF Staffer. This opposing
conclusion was also common throughout source material on the topic.

16. Houston and Nagy, 6. The reasoning for this loss of access is unclear. I assume that
SOCCENT felt there was a threat to operational security and convinced the CINC accordingly.

21. LtCol Michael Ennis, "Perception Versus Reality: Intelligence in the Persian Gulf,"
unpublished paper prepared for the USMC Battlefield Assessment Team (Washington, D.C.), 25
June 1991, 6. The volume and type of national level imagery are a hotly contested point between
those within the Marine Corps intelligence community who supported I MEF. One source, who was
directly responsible for providing national level imagery directly to the I MEF G-2 during the war,
stated that his element provided over 5000 hard copy photos to I MEF during the course of Desert
Shield and Desert Storm. This source directly blamed the poor dissemination structure within the
MEF for not distributing the photos to subordinate elements. That General Boomer sent a liaison
team back to CONUS for current, accurate imagery lends credence to the argument that the imagery
support provided in theater was not what he needed.

22. For more information on the contributions of RPV's, see: MajGen J.M. Myatt, "The First
Marine Division in the Attack," Naval Institute Proceedings, November, 1991, 71-75.

23. This information comes from direct experience during the Gulf War. My unit, the 1st
Battalion, 5th Marines, Task Force Ripper, 1st Marine Division, was desperate to get any type of
imagery available on our perspective zone of attack. Our higher headquarters made an RPV tape
available to us for a very limited period of time (about an hour). Because someone to interpret the
mission data was not available, the video meant very little.

33. Sullivan, 6. Although this piece served as the basis for this topic, the articles by LtCol Ennis
and Maj's Houston and Nagy echo the same sentiment on the overall MEF analyst capability.

34. Since attending the Command and Staff College, I have heard no less than three
separate speakers, all in the intelligence community, refer to these two topics. Since the College
provides the speakers with an environment of non-attribution, I can not disclose their names. Also
refer to: Ennis, "Perception Versus Reality," 8.

37. Peterson, 19. Note: To quote Major Peterson on "stovepipe" dissemination -- "As with a
wood-burning stove's exhaust vent that takes smoke directly up and out from the furnace without
letting any of it escape along the way, much intelligence dissemination goes straight by the chain of command and must be readdressed, if not re-written, before it goes to all users. This can
cause fatal delays."

46. Van Riper, 1-2. MajGen Van Riper is the Assistant Chief of Staff for Command, Control,
Communications, Computers and Intelligence, at Headquarters Marine Corps. Immediately after
the Gulf War he was a central figure in criticizing the Intelligence Community for its performance in
combat (ref: BGen P.K. Van Riper, "Observations During Operation Desert Storm," Marine Corps
Gazette, June 1991, 58).

49. Houston and Nagy, 3-4. Note: The A&R table of organization varies depending what source
used. The coordinating draft of FMFM 3-22 uses the number of 48 whereas as the Nagy and
Houston article uses the total of 33 with a barely readable administrative message from MCCDC as
a reference.

51. The Director, MCIA provided this information through a briefing at which I was present on
6 march 1995. As an example: Doug Schultz, analyst at the Office of Naval Intelligence,
interviewed by the author, 14 April 1995. Mr. Schultz is a former Navy Lieutenant Commander
and intelligence officer who was stationed last year on CINC, Europe's J-2 staff. His current
position at the Office of Naval Intelligence places him in regular contact with Fleet Ocean
Surveillance Information Facility (FOSIF) Rota, Spain which provides tailored, all-source
intelligence support to the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. He stated that Navy task forces operating
either independently or as part of a Joint Task Force, can, as a matter of routine, request direct
intelligence support from a FOSIF strictly through Navy channels without going through the CINC's
chain of command.

58. Marines learned several new intelligence related lessons during Operation Restore Hope
when I MEF served as the nucleus of and lead a Joint Task Force in Somalia. Major issues
centered around problems with joint interoperability of multi-service systems and personnel
operating within a fully integrated Joint Intelligence Center. Additionally, fulfilling the support
needs of the U.N. civil/military command greatly increased the complexity of the in-theater
intelligence apparatus. The unique environment associated with operations in and around third
world urban areas revealed the necessity for a more robust HUMINT capability within the FMF
operating forces. For more information see: Capt David A. Rababy, "Intelligence Support During a
Humanitarian Mission," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1995, 40-42, and; Major David L.
Shelton, "Intelligence Lessons Known and Revealed During Operation RESTORE HOPE Somalia,"
Marine Corps Gazette, February 1995, 37-40.