Ten Propositions Regarding Space Power

The Dawn of a Space Force

Editorial Abstract: Through an exhaustive historical review of
space, multiple interviews with field professionals, and thorough examination of
pertinent sources, Colonel Harter develops a list of fundamental propositions
and keys to space power. From this discussion, he advocates that the logical
consequence of these propositions for realizing the full potential of military
space power is a separate and distinct space force, replete with its own
doctrine, leadership, organization, and resources.

No one can predict with certainty what the ultimate meaning
will be of mastery of space.

—Pres. John F. Kennedy, 1961

On 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union stunned the world by
successfully launching the first artificial satellite, SputnikI,
into low Earth orbit (LEO). By repeating this feat within a month (Sputnik II),
the Soviets made a bold statement of profound technological, political, and
military significance that ushered in mankind’s race for space—“the final
frontier.” As the Cold War escalated, the United States quickly realized the
global implications and military potential of space assets in the “high ground”
and responded by developing its own space capability, culminating a decade later
in the achievement of President Kennedy’s vision and national goal of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Apollo moon missions.
Since then, space development has proliferated, as dozens of nations now pursue
economic and military benefits from using space systems.

Based on the current demand for both -military and commercial
space operations, it is prudent to contemplate (and act upon) the essential
elements that define the nature and potential of robust space power. What are
the fundamental characteristics of a nation’s potential strategic military space
power? Are there propositions regarding space that can provide guidance on the
questions and issues that shape a nation’s military space-power capability? The
answer is yes.

What fundamental strengths best characterize the potential
of military space power?

What are space power’s
key limitations, and how can they be overcome?

What are the keys to executing successful space power?

What resources and command and control (C2) structure
are required?

How does a nation achieve space-power status?

This article provides a concise, fresh perspective on the
nature and potential of national space power.1 Through a historical
examination of military and commercial space activity, personal interviews with
nearly 100 space professionals, and a review of space-power literature from
more than 50 sources, this research assesses the strategic potential of
robust space power and the fundamental propositions that define it.2 The results
point to a “top 10” list of individual propositions and keys to space power,
ultimately concluding that a nation’s true strategic space power cannot reach
its full potential without a separate, independent space force. In effect, this
work parallels (in a limited respect, based on time and resources) the
thought-provoking research of Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, who published
10 Propositions Regarding Air Power at the School of Advanced Airpower
Studies (SAAS) in 1995, as well as several corollaries produced by other space
professionals since then.3

Space Power:
Historical Background

Space Power will be as decisive in future combat as
airpower is today.

—Hon. E. C. Aldridge Jr.
USAF Space Policy, 1988

There is a familiar correlation between early
twenty-first-century space power and airpower’s infancy in the post–World War I
era. The parallels in the development of airpower and space power are
interesting if not predictable—the space community is currently wrestling with
many of the same issues that plagued early airpower. Similar to post–World War I
airpower, there is no question that today’s space forces provide a wealth of
force enhancement to joint war fighters. Additionally, from a national
perspective, space systems provide essential economic, commercial, and
scientific capabilities resulting in potential centers of gravity (COG).4 Just
as nations protect their land, sea, and air assets for economic, commercial, and
military purposes, the protection of space capabilities is becoming increasingly
important (space control). Like the early airpower advocates wrestling with how
to achieve effective airpower, today’s space community wrestles with very
similar doctrinal, organizational, and operational issues:

Airpower: After World War I

Proven force enhancement
(intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR])
from World War I.
Demonstrated support to ground/naval forces.
Can airpower be both offensive and defensive?
How to develop strategic/tactical airpower?
Best way to integrate airpower into joint operations?
Acquire adequate budget for airpower systems?
Optimized airpower C2?
Develop airpower doctrine, policy, and training.
Does airpower warrant its own separate service?

Space Power: Early Twenty-first Century

Proven force enhancement (ISR, navigation, weather,
communications) from Operations Desert Storm,
Allied Force, Iraqi Freedom/Enduring Freedom.
Demonstrated support to ground, naval, and air forces.
Can space power be both offensive and defensive?
How to develop strategic/tactical space power?
Best way to integrate space power into joint operations?
Acquire adequate budget for space-power systems?
What is the most effective space-power C2 construct?
Develop space-power doctrine, policy, and training.
Does space power warrant its own separate service?

Lessons learned from the history of airpower development
allow national space power to avoid similar mistakes and pain. Recall that
airpower emerged during the post–World War I era as a legitimate military
capability, bringing with it the great airpower theorists William “Billy”
Mitchell, Giulio Douhet, and Hugh Trenchard (to name a few), and leading to an
eventual independent US Air Force. This author suggests that, based on the
parallels with the birth of airpower, the space community is on the brink of
undisputable space power, with the emergence of space-power theorists and the
birth of an independent space force in the next decade.

Definitions

Proposition—something offered for consideration or
acceptance.5

Space—begins where satellites can maintain orbit (81
miles) and extends to infinity.6

Power—control or authority to influence; the ability to
produce an act or event.7

Space power—a nation’s ability to exploit and control
the space medium to support and achieve national goals.8

This article offers relevant guidance on the questions and
issues that shape a nation’s space-power capability. Military space operators,
strategists, planners, policy developers, and acquisition professionals will
benefit from contemplating these propositions as they develop their
understanding of space power and employ space forces into the next century:

3.
Space power is a force multiplier for every combatant commander and military
service.

4.
Space forces can support all levels of war simultaneously.

5.
Space power leverages a nation’s economic and military centers of gravity.

6.
Space superiority starts with assured access to space.

7.
Controlling space requires eyes, ears, shields, and swords.

8.
Space forces require centralized command and control led by space
professionals.

9.
Space power is a function of a nation’s total space capability (space unity of
effort).

10.
National space power reaches its full potential when a nation commits to a
separate, independent space force.

Ten Propositions
Regarding Space Power

These 10 space-power propositions are grouped in two
categories: space characteristics and space challenges. Propositions one through
five characterize the space medium, revealing the significance, advantages, and
value of space power. Propositions six through 10 frame the challenges in
achieving robust national space power. Arguments are provided for the security,
control, and dominance of the space medium through space superiority (space
lift, counterspace operations, and space-forces C2) and national unity of
effort. The 10th proposition summarizes the key to achieving national space
power—an eventual and necessarily separate, independent space force.

1. Space is the ultimate high ground.

Take the high ground, and hold it!

—Sun Tzu, circa 500 bc

Great military leaders realize the strategic, operational,
and tactical advantages of controlling the high ground. From Sun Tzu’s ancient
Chinese warriors securing a hill, to US Civil War manned balloons, World War I
aeroplane pioneers, World War II aviation heroes, and Cold War high-flying
SR-71s and U-2s, the high ground provides the strategic advantages of security,
situational awareness, reconnaissance, targeting, and offensive force to
dominate the battlespace. The space medium is the ultimate high ground, with
unparalleled speed, range, altitude, and stealth.

High-ground space systems provide a conduit to channel
instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic) to coerce an enemy to capitulate. The twenty-first-century information
age, the global information grid, information technology, and network-centric
warfare all depend on real-time global collection and dissemination of
information, often only possible from space systems. The informational and
military instruments of national power are closely linked. Information
operations, information warfare, and information-in-war likewise depend on
robust space platforms and illustrate that “bullets win battles; information
wins wars.” Space systems are one of the main pipelines for network-centricity,
powering digital networks to distribute information instantly without borders.
Satellite communications (SATCOM) provides real-time, secure, jam-resistant C2
to enable diplomatic actions among nations. Space systems support or disrupt a
nation’s economy by moving large data streams at the speed of light around the
world, reshaping national economies with global connectivity (SATCOM, weather,
navigation, environmental, scientific, etc.). The White House’s national
security strategy of 1998 benchmarked the importance of space.9

Space has emerged as a new global
information utility with extensive political, diplomatic, military, and
economic implications for the United States. Unimpeded access to and use
of space is essential for protecting U.S. national security and
promoting our prosperity.

A National Security Strategy for
a New Century, October 1998.

As the ultimate high ground, the space medium is potentially
the most geopolitical, perhaps more so than any other medium in which the
military operates. Space is global by nature. The space medium holds no
geographic or nation-state boundaries. Satellites traverse in their orbits above
every nation in the world, usually unnoticed and eluding traditional terrestrial
choke points. In space, territorial sovereignty is nonexistent (with the
exception of equatorial geosynchronous Earth orbit [GEO] slots directly above
each country) but still highly geopolitical with numerous complicated space
treaties, international policy, and the laws of armed conflict.10

At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the
central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory. It is fundamental
to sound judgment.

—Gen Curtis E. LeMay, USAF, 1968

Just as ground, naval, and air forces operate in their own
distinct environments (mediums), space forces operate in their own distinct
medium—the vacuum of space. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2, Space
Operations, clearly states, “Space is a medium of warfare like air, land,
and sea.”11 Physical laws constrain, empower, and distinguish each medium. Land
forces are bound by gravity in two dimensions; sea and air forces are
three--dimensional and fully dependent upon Bernoulli’s laws of fluid dynamics;
and space forces function via Kepler’s laws of planetary motion. Accordingly, if
ground, naval, and air forces are governed and optimized by their own
medium-unique theory, doctrine, and policy, it makes sense that space forces
would benefit from their own space-unique theory, doctrine, and policy. Because
of each distinct operating environment, sea-power theory clearly does not
translate to airpower theory; nor would it seem logical for airpower theory to
transfer to space-power theory.12

The problem for current space forces is that, since the
inception of the US Air Force in 1947 until the 1990s, airpower has overshadowed
space-power development, as both were governed under the umbrella of Air Force
theory, doctrine, and policy. The USAF claimed in 1958 that the air and space
vertical domain (aerospace) was “indivisible.”13 This unfortunately resulted in
both airpower and space power being developed simultaneously in an
airpower-centric service. Limited resources (budget and manpower) existed during
the Cold War to develop both airpower and space power equally; airpower took
priority, and space power—viewed as a subset of airpower—suffered.14 Two major
events in the 1990s reversed this 40-year trend and significantly improved
space-power development: (1) the end of the Cold War freed up resources for
space-power development, and (2) the Persian Gulf War proved to be a “watershed
event in military space applications,” quickly driving space investments
throughout the Department of Defense (DOD).15 Since then, space-power doctrine
at both the service and joint levels has made significant progress, but there is
still a long way to go.16

3. Space power is a force multiplier for every combatant commander and
military service.

As proved during Desert Storm, and again during the Balkans
air campaign, space is an integral part of everything we do to accomplish our
[military] mission.

—Gen Lester P. Lyles, USAF, 2001

Any discussion of Desert Storm cannot ignore the immense
contribution made by our space forces. Even less will we be able to ignore
space contributions in the future.

—Gen Charles A. “Chuck” Horner, USAF, 1999

Space power provides military leaders, operators, and
planners with enormous force-enhancement effects that multiply joint combat
effectiveness in prosecuting theater campaigns. Space systems significantly
improve friendly forces’ ability to strike at the enemy’s heart or COGs,
paralyzing an adversary to allow land, sea, and air forces to achieve rapid
dominance of the battlespace. Space assets reduce the Clausewitzian “fog of war”
by providing synergistic, effects-based operations to terrestrial forces,
producing effects that achieve campaign objectives in ways that air, land, and
sea forces alone cannot (fig. 1). The emergence of military space following the
Vietnam War produced monumental combat advances using 24 hours a day/seven days
a week (24/7) space assets such as global precision navigation/targeting;
global-reach SATCOM; strategic and theater missile warning; global weather data;
phenomenal intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and highly
integrated combat search and rescue. In addition to being a huge force
multiplier, space power is joint by nature; its effects to earthbound land, sea,
and air combat operations can be direct or indirect, immediate or delayed.
Integration of space into the joint force commander’s (JFC) theater campaign
plan, as well as deliberate and crisis-action planning, has come a long way
since Operation Desert Storm, providing even more lethal and rapid dominance of
the battlespace.17 Simply put, terrestrial forces combined with effects-based
space operations produce unparalled synergistic combat capability: 1 + 1 = 3!

4. Space forces can support all levels of war simultaneously.

Space is already inextricably linked to military operations
on land, at sea, and in the air.

Likewise, because of its unique high-ground medium, space
power delivers information critical to planning and execution of military
operations in all levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical
(fig. 2). While terrestrial forces generally fight sequential tactical battles
before they can move on to operational or strategic objectives, space forces
(and to a limited extent, air forces) have the ability to engage in separate,
parallel campaigns at all levels of war.18 For example, the Defense Support
Program constellation detects, identifies, tracks, and warns of strategic
missile launches (intercontinental ballistic missiles), while also providing
tactical theater missile warning from short-range enemy missiles.

Figure 2. Space-power umbrella

Finally, space systems provide information across the
spectrum of conflict, including conventional warfare, unconventional warfare
(nuclear), asymmetric warfare (global war on terrorism), and military operations
other than war, which include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,
peacekeeping operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, and so forth. As
the US military’s operations tempo continues to increase in quantity and
duration (fig. 3), often at austere global locations that have limited or no
existing infrastructure, military forces increasingly depend upon immediate
space-based capabilities.19 Space systems are usually first in-theater by virtue
of their high-ground, ubiquitous orbits, ready to provide 24/7 navigation,
weather, SATCOM, and ISR from the start of a conflict.

Figure 3. USAF operations tempo, 1947–2000

The key for space power to support all levels of war
simultaneously and across the spectrum of conflict is to ensure that space
systems have global access to the entire depth and breadth of an adversary or a
regional conflict. However, if space assets are limited in number, capability,
or constellation size, they quickly become very scarce, high-demand, low-density
(HD/LD) assets that military leaders compete for in priority and support,
ultimately reducing their ability to support all levels of war simultaneously.

5. Space power leverages a nation’s economic and military centers of gravity.

Conducted properly, space power leverages military and
economic COGs, providing an avenue for all instruments of national power to more
effectively respond to global situations. Space is emerging as a military and
economic COG for nations that conduct information--dependent military and
economic operations.20 The global increase of government, military, and
commercial space activity is significant despite a brief economic hiccup in the
late 1990s. For example, US space-industry expenditures (military, civil, and
industry) are valued in excess of $80 billion per year; the space -industry
involves over 500,000 jobs in the United States alone; and since 1959 the total
US government national space investment is nearly $1.3 trillion.21 The late
1990s marked the first time commercial space-investment activities actually
exceeded government activity in areas such as number of launches,
satellite-manufacturing revenue, and launch revenue.22 Most recently, during
Operation Iraqi Freedom, commercial satellites provided 80 percent of all SATCOM
used by the US military.23 From a global perspective, space contributions will
account for an estimated $209 billion in the 2006 global economy.24

A COG is a source of power from which a nation-state derives
its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.25 The United States
is more space dependent than any other nation, yielding an asymmetric advantage
(and potential vulnerability).26 Collectively, US space assets are already a
COG, and dominance of the space medium is key to sustained national health,
security, and prosperity. In the current information age, economies are built
and wars waged increasingly with information (electrons); space is rapidly
becoming the primary medium for information transfer. Like any other military or
national COG, a nation’s space COG must be secure. Consider the strategic
implications and vulnerability of both military and economic COGs should space
systems become unavailable. Space-based communication, navigation, imagery, and
weather are now essential for global situational awareness, the transportation
industry, and financial markets.

Space is a lucrative COG for other nations as well; it is no
longer a “sanctuary” for the United States alone to enjoy. Other nations are
rapidly getting into the space race. Currently, 58 nations have satellites on
orbit for military or economic purposes; 15 nations have their own indigenous
space-lift capability; and there are five international-consortium space-launch
providers to launch satellites for those who cannot do so themselves.27 While
space growth occurs predominantly among technologically advanced nations, sales
of commercial space products to all nations are on a dramatic rise. Dozens of
international space-consortium SATCOM and imagery providers offer their services
in open global markets.28 The existence of these commercial and international
space organizations means that a nation does not have to be a technologically
advanced superpower to acquire space power—space imagery, weather, and SATCOM
are available and can be purchased over the Internet with a credit card. Space
commercialism makes all nation-states potential space players, blurring the line
between hostile (red), friendly (blue), and neutral (gray) space forces.

6. Space superiority starts with assured access to space.

Whoever has the capability to control space will likewise
possess the capability to control the surface of the earth.

—Gen Thomas D. White
USAF Chief of Staff, 1958

The first principle that should guide our air and space
professionals is the imperative to control the high ground.

—Hon. Peter B. Teets
Undersecretary of the
Air Force, 2002

The purpose of a nation-state’s space power is to support and
achieve national objectives. To accomplish this, a nation needs to be able to
secure its space assets, control the space medium, and deter potential space
adversaries. Space superiority—ensuring freedom of action in space by protecting
space assets and, if necessary, denying an adversary’s space capabilities—is
fundamental to national space power and is currently Air Force Space Command’s
top priority.29 The author suggests that space superiority is best represented
as a pyramid consisting of three critical components: responsive space lift
(getting to space), counterspace operations (space control), and a space-focused
C2 structure (fig. 4).30 Eliminate any of these three elements, and a nation’s
space power quickly deteriorates.

Figure 4. Space-superiority pyramid

Position is strategic. Position is vital. Position is the key
to success in most aspects of life, whether sports, business, or politics—and
especially military combat operations. To get the ultimate position in
space, a nation needs assured access to space—it is the foundation on which
space superiority operates. Space lift provides access to strategic, vital
positions for on-orbit assets to achieve national objectives integrated with
military campaigns. To ensure security and dominance of the space medium (space
superiority), a space-power nation needs responsive, affordable space lift to
deploy, sustain, augment, and operate space systems on orbit when required.
Reliable, responsive, affordable space lift is the door to true national space
power.

This research indicates that space lift (assured
access to space) is without question the leading limitation to effective,
sustained, robust space power. National space lift must be integrated among the
military, civil, commercial, and international space-lift communities—sharing
synergistic technology, common-core launch vehicles, and ground/range
infrastructure is essential to national space-lift capability (see proposition
no. 9). Replacing expendable launch vehicles with reusable launch-vehicles (RLV),
single-stage-to-orbit systems, and air-breathing hypersonic propulsion systems
(ramjets, scramjets) is overdue.31 A spacefaring nation requires indigenous
space-launch capability for national defense operations but should also take
advantage of international space-lift opportunities for non-DOD missions such as
commercial, scientific, and civil space activities. National space power
requires multiple spaceports from which to achieve orbit to eliminate ground
choke points in time of crisis or increased launch activity.32 Without these
elements of space lift, a nation cannot execute efficient space power.

7. Controlling space requires eyes, ears, shields, and swords.

U.S. space policy is to promote development of the full
range of space-based capabilities in a manner that protects our vital security
interests. We will deter threats to our interests, and if deterrence fails,
defeat hostile efforts against U.S. access to and use of space.

—National Security Strategy, 1998

The goal is not to bring war to space, but rather to defend
against those who would.

—Donald H. Rumsfeld
US Secretary of Defense, 2004

For a nation to achieve decisive space power in support of
national objectives and goals, it must have the means to control the space
medium. Space control, or counterspace operations, is the second element
of the space-superiority triad. Ensuring and denying the use of the space medium
require a robust counterspace architecture: space situational awareness (SSA)
with corresponding defensive/offensive counterspace (DCS/OCS) means to protect
space interests (fig. 5).33

Figure 5. Counterspace operations

SSA forms the basis for national space control, mapping the
battlespace by providing the “eyes and ears” of friendly, neutral, and
potentially hostile global space activity. Without SSA, a nation is blind and
deaf to space activity, rendering DCS/OCS capabilities useless and jeopardizing
national security. Robust SSA allows a nation to understand adverse
environmental conditions (e.g., space weather), know where space adversaries
are, predict nefarious foreign space operations, and determine courses of
action. SSA includes finding and tracking space objects, identifying links and
nodes, and characterizing the signals of red, blue, and gray forces. The goal is
rapid, accurate, and meaningful space intelligence preparation of the
battle-space with a single integrated space picture.

DCS operations are the “shields” for a nation’s space power,
deterring and defending space systems from enemy attack with active or passive
means. As advanced nations depend on their space capabilities and develop
military/economic COGs, this space dependence also represents a potential
vulnerability for an adversary to exploit. A nation’s robust DCS operations
reduce this threat with hardened satellite systems, antijam components, kinetic
attacks against ground jammers, frequency-hopping and spread-spectrum signals,
on-orbit maneuvers to evade hostility, and rapid reconstitution of on-orbit
systems.34

OCS operations provide the “swords” for national space power
by negating an adversary’s space capability (ground segment, satellite, or
signal). Just as land, sea, and air forces all eventually employed offensive
weapons, so will space forces; it is only a matter of time.35 While the weaponization of space is highly controversial, it is not explicitly prohibited
by international law and treaty.36 OCS forces should be suited for effects-based
operations; AFDD 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations, identifies five levels
of desired OCS effects: deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and
destruction. These effects are achieved through a variety of OCS resources,
including aircraft, missiles, special operations forces, antisatellite weapons,
directed-energy weapons, network-warfare operations, jamming systems, and
surface forces.37 Flexible, effects-based OCS is key to decisive, dominant
national space power; together with SSA and DCS, they form the foundational
architecture for operational space superiority.

8. Space forces require centralized command and control led by space
professionals.

Future warfare depends on the rapidity of collecting
information and making decisions.

—Gen Chuck Horner, USAF, 1998

The final piece of the space-superiority puzzle is effective
command and control of space forces (C2 of both people and systems) (fig.
6). Unlike air, land, and sea power, space power is unique in that space systems
have simultaneous impacts on and contributions to multiple theaters (proposition
no. 4); this makes space-power C2 especially challenging. Just as experienced
soldiers, sailors, and airmen control land, sea, and air forces, so are
experienced military space professionals the best choice to centrally control
space forces. Perhaps Douhet stated it best when he advocated that “only
airmen can fully appreciate airpower’s intricacies: therefore, only airmen
should command air forces” (emphasis in original).38 So is it with control of
space forces—it needs to be done by space experts. The most straightforward and
effective solution for space-force C2 employment (both global and theater) is to
fuse today’s service- and agency-fragmented US space forces into an independent
space force led by space professionals.

Figure 6. Space superiority: C2 brings it together

The current devolution of C2 of joint operational US military
space forces is complicated and different for global and theater operations
(described in AFDDs 2-2 and 2-2.1). To plan and execute global operations, US
Strategic Command operates joint military space forces through its space and
global-strike functional component (Eighth Air Force) via the joint space
operations center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg AFB, California.39 C2 of theater space
forces gets more complicated. There is no question that space forces need to be
integrated into the JFC’s theater-campaign battle rhythm. The issue becomes how
and by whom space forces are best controlled in-theater.

Currently, the joint force air component commander (JFACC) is
normally responsible for air and space operations to accomplish the JFC’s
objectives; the JFACC is assisted by a newly created director of space forces.40
As space forces become more “taskable” and lethal in theater operations, the
author suggests taking C2 of space forces one step further by transitioning C2
of theater space forces from an already multitasked JFACC to the dedicated space
leadership of a joint force space component commander (JFSCC) (fig. 7). The
result would be a space professional leading and integrating theater space
operations at a level equivalent with the other services (mediums), focusing on
space power (not air and space power, as current JFACCs do).

9. Space power is a function of a nation’s total space capability (space
unity of effort).

Space power is the total strength of a nation’s capability
to conduct and influence activities to, in, through, and from space to achieve
its objectives.

—Joint Publication (JP) 1-02,Department of Defense Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms,
12 April 2001 (as amended
through 31 August 2005); and
JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space
Operations, 9 August 2002

Current joint doctrine reflects the significance of a
national space-power effort by its very definition. Space power is a
nationwide endeavor. However, the 2001 report of the Space Commission identified
a main problem with current US space capability: the US space community is
fragmented and lacks unity of effort. This is primarily due to decades of
stovepiped, agency-focused projects and security barriers between military and
non-DOD space sectors.

The solution is cooperative efforts among military,
government, civil, scientific, commercial, and, to a certain extent, even allied
international space organizations (fig. 8). Clearly, because of the incredible
technology and limited available resources to pursue space systems, space power
must be a cooperative, synergistic endeavor. Even more so than airpower, space
power and technology are integrally and synergistically related.41 One way to
overcome technological complexities and tremendous space-related costs is to
encourage (and reward) the leveraging of technology and shared resources
(infrastructure, ranges, etc.) among industry, the DOD, the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, NASA,
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and academia. The Pentagon’s
newly created [May 2004] National Security Space Office (NSSO) is a good first
step to building a cooperative space culture.42 The NSSO charter is to identify
both military and national-intelligence space activities, develop architectures
and implement programs that bridge both communities, and improve the integration
of space capabilities into joint war-fighting and intelligence operations.
Synchronizing and integrating the NRO and the DOD space communities increase
efficiency by reducing redundancy and space-system costs.

Figure 8. Space power: a function of national teamwork

A cooperative space culture would most benefit the number-one
space limitation today—space lift—due to its limited infrastructure, complex
technology, and high operations cost. The co-use of HD/LD space-lift
infrastructure assets and codevelopment of RLVs, advanced materials, and
propulsion technologies would pay huge dividends to the national space effort by
improving assured access to space. Government incentives and rewards for private
industry to develop new space-lift capabilities, technologies, and approaches
result in a win-win situation for a nation’s total space capability.43

10. National space power reaches its full potential when a nation commits to
a separate, independent space force.

So long as the budget for the development of aircraft is
prepared by the Army, Navy, or other agency of the Government, aviation will
be considered as an auxiliary and the requisite amount of money, as compared
with the other services, will be subject to the final decision of personnel
whose main duty is not aviation.

The greatest deterrent to development which air forces
combat in every country is the fact that they have had to be tied up to armies
and navies where senior officers, unused to air work, were placed in the
superior positions.

—Gen William “Billy” Mitchell
US Army Air Service, 1925

True national space power cannot reach its full potential
until a nation commits itself to a separate, independent space force. War
fighters would do well to recall the prophetic words of arguably the most ardent
forefather of a separate, independent US Air Force, Gen Billy Mitchell.44 Plug
in the word “space” for “air,” and it is a close fit to the current
twenty-first-century status of space-power development. It was right for the
Army to nurture and shelter airpower in the Army construct until airpower
demonstrated decisively that it warranted its own separate military service.
Once the Air Force became an independent service, airpower rapidly grew into a
global, strategic instrument of national power. Likewise, it was right for the USAF to shelter and nurture the vertical dimension of space—it has been the best
place to foster space power since its inception 50 years ago. However, as
airpower was constrained during the post–World War I era, US space power was
constrained during the Cold War and morphed to airpower doctrine, policy, and
theory. In spite of this restraint, military space power has grown to be a
pervasive influence on nearly every facet of military operations. The United
States holds a decisive asymmetric space-power advantage—clearly it is too
critical to be considered a subset of airpower. An independent space-force
organization would fully unleash the true potential of space power, allowing
freedom to explore, develop, and refine space theory, doctrine, and policy
without undue influence from other service cultures.

US Space Force:
No Longer a Question
of “If” but “When”

This may be an unpopular statement, but it is irrefutable,
based on the historical precedent of the creation of separate and distinct land,
sea, and air services. Nearly half of the surveys conducted in this research
indicated that a separate space force was the eventual and necessary path
of US space power. This does not mean that space power cannot positively
influence joint military operations while under the umbrella of the USAF—it can
and has proven so, as discussed throughout this article. The issue becomes
availability of resources (e.g., budget, manpower, and equipment), for which
both airpower and space power compete in the USAF. In today’s realistic
environment of finite resources, space systems have historically received lower
priority than terrestrial weapon systems. Today US space power has grown to the
point where either a bigger USAF umbrella is needed (more resources to pursue
space power) or an entirely separate umbrella is created (an independent space
force).

From a joint perspective, there is also cause for a separate
space force. Land and sea services are heavily dependent on USAF-controlled
space assets. As the designated executive agent for space, the USAF controls
approximately 86 percent of the DOD’s $11 billion space budget.45 With space
assets competing within the USAF against airpower programs (e.g., the F-22A),
the other DOD services are concerned that the USAF may not be pursuing adequate
space capability (in a timely manner) to support joint land and sea combat
needs. A separate, independent space force would provide more equitable
representation among the services for space-power budget and combat-support
capability as well as reduce or eliminate confusion and redundancy among the
three services’ own space efforts (AFSPACE, ARSPACE, and NAVSPACECOM).

While such a reorganization of space forces into a separate,
independent space force is understandably delayed due to the current global war
on terrorism, it no doubt needs to be addressed sooner rather than later. Some
say that a separate space force is not justified until there is a serious space
peer competitor that challenges US space superiority. The response to that
argument is that although the United States holds a healthy asymmetric
space-power advantage today, it would be foolish to wait for national space
forces to be threatened or allow a potential “space Pearl Harbor” to occur when
the opportunity exists now to organize space forces to prevent that very
threat.46 An independent space force will foster a space-force culture, reduce
competition for resources, and allow space-power theory and resulting combat
capability to develop more effectively to counter future space threats.

Summary and Conclusions

These 10 propositions illustrate the necessity and challenges
of national space power:

Characteristics

High Ground

Distinct Medium/Doctrine

Joint Force Multiplier

Simultaneity and Versatility

Center of Gravity

Challenges

Responsive Space Lift

Counterspace Operations

Space-Forces C2

Space Unity of Effort

Independent Space Force

The strength of space contributions in strategic military, commercial, and
economic operations is undeniable. Space power is not just a continuation of
airpower; space is a unique, distinct, war-fighting medium. Continuing to
restrain US space power from developing its own identity, culture, theory, and
doctrine is to confine a powerful dimension of war fighting available only
through the fourth medium of space. Undisputed combat space power is drawing
near, and the United States may be on the brink of unleashing decisive military
space operations, ushering in the era of a separate space force. The reality is
that, as in the evolution of airpower, the true potential of a nation’s military
space power will come to fruition only when a separate space force is created,
complete with its own space-competent leadership, organization, doctrine,
theory, policy, and resources.

1. All research was conducted at the unclassified,
public-release level.

2. Perhaps the most revealing aspect of this research was the
prolific response received from a survey of nearly 100 space professionals
across the nation, including military space operators, acquirers, industry, and
academia. The demographics and combined space experience alone of these survey
participants are staggering, totaling more than 1,500 years of collective space
background from the backbone of today’s space cadre. Survey participants include
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine personnel, along with participants from key
national space organizations including NASA, the NRO, Air Force Space Command,
and the US Strategic Command. To ignore such a pool of knowledge would be
foolish, and in fact their jewels of wisdom are woven into the fabric of this
research. Additionally, the author visited more than a dozen key components of
the space community to collect information and build the basis of this research.

8. Definition is consistent with current
joint-operations definitions of space power as defined in Joint
Publications (JP) 1-02 and 3-14, and similar to Lt Col David Lupton’s definition
of the term in his book On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine (Maxwell
AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1988).

9. The White House, A National Security Strategy
for a New Century (Washington, DC: The White House, October 1998), 25–26.

10. The GEO belt slots (22,300 miles above a country’s
equatorial longitude) are governed by the International Telecommunications Union
and are becoming a highly sought after commodity since the GEO belt is getting
crowded. Demand for geosynchronous slots and frequency allocations is
intensifying to a geopolitical battlespace, resulting in recent political and
international disputes.

13. Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Gen Charles
A. Gabriel stated, “From battlefield to highest orbit, airpower provides
deterrence,” implying that space was a subset of airpower. Air Force Manual (AFM)
1-6, Military Space Doctrine, 15 October 1982. An earlier CSAF, Gen
Thomas D. White, set the “aerospace” tone in 1958 by declaring, “There is no
division . . . between air and space. Air and space are an indivisible field of
operations.” Air Force, March 1958, 40–41.

15. Gen Thomas S. Moorman, USAF, former vice CSAF and
commander, Air Force Space Command, stated, “Desert Storm . . . was a watershed
event in military space applications because for the first time, space systems
were both integral to the conflict and critical to the outcome of the war.” AFDD
4, Space Operations Doctrine, 10 July 1996, http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usaf/afdd4.htm.
“During the 1991 Persian Gulf War . . . over 60 military satellites and others
from the commercial and civil sectors were employed.”George W. Bradley
III, “A Brief History of the Air Force in Space,” High Frontier: The Journal
for Space and Missile Professionals 2, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 7.

16. Between 1995 and 2005, over 75 Air University
research papers, articles, and books were produced dealing with space issues,
and significant DOD service doctrine has been approved, including AFDD 2-2,
Space Operations; AFDD 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations; AFDD 4,
Space Operations Doctrine; JP 3-14, Space Operations; Army Field
Manual (FM) 100-18, Space Support to Army Operations; and National
Security Space (NSS) Acquisition Policy 03-01.

17. This is clearly evidenced in Operations Allied
Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, and military operations other than
war, including humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) activities.

18. Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Airpower,
35. “Parallel Operations occur when different campaigns, against different
targets, and at different levels of war, are conducted simultaneously.”

19. The trend indicates that the DOD operations tempo
is growing and increasingly involved in small-scale contingencies and military
operations other than war, such as humanitarian relief, noncombatant evacuation
operations, and peacekeeping/peace-enforcement operations. Data collected from
the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL.

25. Ibid., 50. The great Prussian military strategist
Carl von Clausewitz defined a COG as “the hub of all power and movement, on
which everything depends.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans.
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1976), 595–96.

26. Report of the Commission to Assess United
States National Security Space Management and Organization (Washington, DC:
Space Commission, 2001), 18, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.pdf.

27. “Rest of World Space Launch,” Air University
Space Primer, chap. 20 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, July 2003),
http://space.au.af.mil/primer/rest_of_world_launch.pdf.

31. The United States needs to develop and employ RLVs,
which will provide significant improvements in military responsiveness and
life-cycle costs. Recent attempts (e.g., evolved expendable launch vehicles [EELV])
have made progress in standardizing the “family of systems,” but US space lift
remains largely unresponsive (months to launch), expensive (on the order of
50–200 million dollars per launch), and unpredictable (significant integration
and launch infra-structure delays). Foreign launch services are becoming highly
competitive and challenge US space-lift capability.

32. The two main US spaceports (30th Space Wing,
Vandenberg AFB, CA, and 45th Space Wing, Patrick AFB, FL) represent two choke
points for polar and GEO space launches. Elimination of either range would
cripple US access to space due to lack of alternate sites and facilities. Range
infrastructure needs an overhaul to improve cost and responsiveness
(payload/booster processing, launch-facility maintenance, etc.).

33. SSA, DCS, and OCS are the three components of
counterspace operations as defined by AFDD 2-2, Space Operations, and
AFDD 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations.

34. AFDD 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations, 25–29.

35. “We know from history that every medium—air, land
and sea has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different.”
Report of the Commission.

36. Maj Elizabeth Waldrop, USAF, “Weaponization of
Outer Space: US National Policy,” High Frontier: The Journal for Space and
Missile Professionals 1, no. 3 (Winter 2005): 35–46. International space law
does not prohibit conventional force-application weapons in space,
antisatellite weapons, or protection of space assets, but there are some
limitations. The 1963 United Nations (UN) Limited Test Ban Treaty bans
nuclear-weapon tests in outer space. The 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty declares
that outer space and all celestial bodies are free for exploration by all states
and are to remain free of military bases; it bans Earth-orbiting weapons of mass
destruction. The 1972 US-USSR Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty prohibits the
development, testing, or deployment of space-based ABM systems (the United
States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002).

37. AFDD 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations, 31–34.

38. Rhoades, “Bernoulians versus Keplerians,” 9.

39. The Unified Command Plan assigns US Strategic
Command as the functional unified command with overall responsibility and
combatant command for space operations. The JSpOC provides day-to-day
operational command of joint space forces by issuing daily and weekly space
tasking orders to space units, which mirror the air tasking orders produced by
an air operations center. The JSpOC fuses and analyzes space information into a
single integrated space picture, determines courses of action, and serves as the
reach-back interface for theater space support.

40. The JFACC is also usually assigned the role of
space coordinating authority, the single authority in-theater to coordinate
joint theater space operations and integrate space capabilities and effects. A
newly created director of space forces assists the JFACC in planning, executing,
and assessing space operations for the JFC’s campaign plan.

41. Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Airpower.
This is a space-power corollary to Meilinger’s proposition regarding the
synergism between airpower and technology. Similarly, and in parallel with
airpower technology and development, Gen Billy Mitchell also recognized early on
the symbiotic relationship between civil and military airpower. Rhoades,
“Bernoulians versus Keplerians,” 13.

42. The capstone directive for this effort is NSS
03-01, the result of a recommendation from the Space Commission report.

43. Similar to the recent $10 million space prize won
by Burt Rutan’s Scaled Composites Spaceship One endeavor.

44. Gen William “Billy” Mitchell, USA, Winged
Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power—Economic and
Military (1925: repr., New York: Dover Publications, 1988), 160, 248–49.

Lt Col Mark Harter (BS, University of Minnesota; MA, Webster University;
MMOAS, Air Command and Staff College) is the division chief, Space Control
Testing, Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, Detachment 4,
Peterson AFB, Colorado. He has served in a variety of space and missile
operations, joint/national operations, testing, and acquisition positions. His
operational experience includes serving as the first space warfare officer for
Pacific Air Forces at Andersen AFB, Guam; chief, Global Positioning Systems
Operations and Tactics, Schriever AFB, Colorado; director of Inter-continental
Ballistic Missile Operations, 320th Missile Squadron, F. E. Warren AFB, Wyoming;
National Military Command Center operations officer on the National Airborne
Operations Center E-4B; and crew commander at the Space Control Center, Cheyenne
Mountain AFS, Colorado. He also served assignments at Headquarters Air Force
Space Command’s Directorate of Requirements and as an astronautical engineer for
the X-30 national aerospace plane at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Colonel Harter
is a distinguished graduate of Undergraduate Space Training and Squadron Officer
School and a graduate of Space Weapons and Tactics School, Air Command and Staff
College, and Air War College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the
author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air
University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government,
Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University