7 June has shaken Turkey‘s politcal landscape. On election night, many
left and Kurdish activists felt like they had felt at the time of the
Gezi Park movement in the summer of 2013.The ruling right-wing and
conservative Islamist AKP suffered a bigger blow than most polls
predicted, losing 2.6 million votes and 69 MPs, compared to the last
legislative elections in 2011. The left, pro-Kurdish "Democratic Party
of the People" (HDP) has won 13% of the votes, more than the 10%
threshold needed to enter Parliament. This threshold is an extremely
anti-democratic measure which was implemented in the wake of the
military coup in 1980, precisely to prevent Kurdish parties to get any
Parliamentary representation.

Especially in the Kurdish regions of the South East, spontaneous rallies
and celebrations took place to welcome the HDP’s electoral breakthrough
–for the first time in Turkish history, a pro-Kurdish party had made it
into the Parliament. Also, the entry of many female HDP activists into
the Assembly, of many representatives of social and political movements,
and different kinds of minorities has a high symbolic value in the
context of the Turkish political system, traditionally dominated by old,
right-wing men. Many of the 80 new HDP members of Parliament belong
indeed to ethnic, social or religious minorities. Their presence in the
Turkish parliament is a blow to the nationalist reactionary elite, as
was the presence of the first openly gay parliamentary candidate in the
history of the Turkish Republic.

The election was also marked by rising polarisation, with an increase in
votes for the far-right nationalists of the MHP, whose vote-share rose
from 13% to over 16%. The electoral campaign was notably shaken by
outbursts of violence, especially against the HDP, with dozens of
physical attacks on HDP offices and activists reported across the
country.

The MHP whipped up Turkish nationalism, especially by blaming the AKP as
“traitors” because of the peace process between the AKP government and
the Kurdish movement. But the MHP played also a social populist card.
Along with nationalism, they argued for the rise of the minimum wage, to
reduce taxes on fuel and to stop the sackings in the state sector. This
is another small indication that social issues have become more
important, because of the problems in the Turkish economy and the fear
of job losses.

AKP counts its losses

The prevailing social and economic situation played a crucial role in
this election. Many Turkish people held the personal feeling that their
living standards had improved during the years of the AKP goverment.
That is one of the main reasons why a segment of the Turkish poor,
especially those targeted by the AKP’s campaigns of charity patronage
has continued to vote for this party over the years.

However, this has started to change, with a deteriorating economic
situation over the last two years, a rise in unemployment and inflation,
and growing difficulties for millions of working class families. This,
coupled with the general sharpening of attacks on democratic rights and
a reinforcement of the regime‘s autocratic tendencies (extension of
police powers, attacks on trade union rights, imprisonment of
journalists and activists critical of the regime, muzzling ocial media
etc.) has alienated a whole layer of long-standing AKP voters and
supporters.

Illustrating this, President Erdogan‘s attempt at securing an absolute
(two-thirds) parliamentary majority in order to change the Constitution
in favour of stronger powers for himself totally backfired, to the point
that the AKP lost even its simple parliamentary majority, getting only
41% of the vote. This opens a period of political instability and
uncertainty when it comes to the formation of the next government.

HDP’s victory

For the left, and for all those yearning and fighting for a better
society, the HDP’s remarkable electoral success opens a window of
political opportunities Since the election, HDP is the talk of the town.

The HDP is a coalition between left groups, parties and left
individuals, whose core originated from the Kurdish national movement.
In the last few months, the party leadership has managed to engage many
activists from different social and political movements, such as the
LGBT movement, and environmental campaigners, among others.The Kurdish
BDP (the political arm of the banned PKK) remains the dominating force
inside the party. But the latter has also started to attract an
increasing number of Turkish voters who have drawn the conclusion that
the Erdogan-led AKP and the main opposition party, the CHP, do not
provide a favourable alternative. The vast majority of HDP voters are
workers, pensioners, small farmers and young people, many of whom have
been radicalised by the important struggles of workers and youth in the
last few years to demand better working conditions, against precarious
work, for democratic rights etc. Many HDP activists see themselves as
socialists, or communists.

The HDP stands for a better healthcare system, a stronger
state-supported education system, a rise of the minimum wage to 1,800
Turkish Lira per month, and the shortening of the working week to 35
hours without loss of pay, among other important demands. All other
parties were demanding much less, but the very fact that the HDP was
bringing these social issues into the public debate --even though these
did not dominate the party’s propaganda--- forced the other parties to
position themselves on those questions.

Overall HDP leaders put more emphasis on vague ideas such as “democratic
breakthrough“, “radical democracy“, “great humanity“ –as well as
campaigning for the rights of national minorities, of LGBT people etc.
They also tried to surf on the religious feelings of a layer of the
population. Figen Yüksegdag, co-leader of the HDP, in one of her final
campaign speeches spoke about the corruption of AKP‘s leaders, and
argued that corruption is an “insult to Islam“.

Looking at the HDP leadership, it is not clear what they actually want,
and this is understandable from the fact that the social and political
composition of the party is far from homogeneous. Can the HDP become a
new workers‘ party, or will it turn into a vaguely leftist liberal
party, like, for example the Greens in most of Europe?

Worldwide, the crisis of capitalism is getting worse, and Turkey is not
an exception. Workers and youth face hard times. To defend democratic
rights and fight for social improvements, a militant party rooted in the
working class will be needed. A party that has strong links with trade
unions and social movements. A party where MPs use their position in the
Parliament as a platform for defending workers’ struggles.

If the MPs of the HDP use the first parliamentary session as a launchpad
to start a bold campaign for securing their social and political demands
(rise of the minimum wage, 35-hour week, getting rid of the anti-strike
laws, etc) they could gain a lot of traction and respect from many
workers and youth all around the country. It would also contribute to
expose the traditional “Kemalist” CHP as well as the far right MHP, who
had the rise of the minimum wage in their electoral program but are not
ready to put up a fight for it.

A new left workers‘ party that stands for workers‘ rights and has strong
social demands would have a great opportunity to grow in Turkey. Ten of
thousands of workers and youth have big hopes in the HDP to fulfill this
role. It is possible that many new people will now move towards joining
it.

Yet many Turkish workers are still hostile towards the HDP. Some of them
see the HDP as a maneuver by the PKK, a party which is dominated by old
PKK cadres and where the important decisions are made between the
imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the HDP leaders. This is an
important reason why the HDP needs democratic and transparent
structures. It is especially important that workers and youth can see
how decisions are made, and that there is no “hidden PKK-agenda”.

In the election, the HDP leadership got lot of support from Turkish
people, but the big majority of these supporters and voters belong to
liberal middle classes. Building a bridge between Kurdish and Turkish
workers is a key task for the future of the workers’ movement in Turkey.
The HDP, taking into account its election success, can make important
steps in that direction. By picking up every social issue, every little
strike or other workers’ resistance and using their position in the
media and in the Parliament, the HDP could become a “sounding-board” of
the whole working class.

It is certainly positive that the HDP has ruled out any coalition with
the AKP from the beginning. But they should also unequivocally exclude
any coalition with or support for forces other than the AKP, which they
have not made clear. Any new government, whatever it is, will be a
government of social cuts and rightwing policies. Hence rather than
calling all parties to be “responsible” and to contribute to political
stability, and giving priority to coalition talks with pro-capitalist
forces, the HDP leadership should prepare for the coming resistance. It
could, for example, use the momentum of its successful campaign and its
newly acquired position to call for mass meetings, inviting workers,
young people, social campaigners etc to discuss together how to build
the next stages of the struggle.

The experience with many left parties around the world shows that after
initial electoral successes, there is a real danger that such parties
swing to the right. To prevent this from happening, a cohesive political
programme, democratic structures at all levels and a mass active
membership needs to be developped. Defending a genuine socialist
orientation for the HDP, based on support for mass working class action,
and for the nationalisation of the banks and big industries, will be a
key task of activists in the coming period. Developing organic
connections with the grassroots of the social and trade union movements
will also be crucial to make sure that this formation does not end up in
a mire of political compromises, coalitions with pro-capitalist forces,
and cuts.