ARBITRATION - TROY HEALTH AND REHABILITATION CENTER V. MCFARLAND

Troy Health and Rehabilitation Center v. McFarland [Ms. 1140090, Aug. 28, 2015], So.3d (Ala. 2015). The Supreme Court, in
a plurality opinion, reverses the Pike Circuit Court's denial of a
nursing home's motion to compel arbitration in a wrongful death case.
The Court concluded the decedent's personal representative failed
to prove that the decedent was not mentally competent when he executed
a durable power of attorney in favor of his attorney-in-fact who, in turn,
while acting as the attorney-in-fact executed an arbitration agreement
with the nursing home providing that all claims or causes of action for
medical negligence would be subject to arbitration.

"The presumption is that every person is sane, until the contrary
is proven." Ms. at 19, quoting
Thomas v. Neal, 600 So.2d 1000, 1001 (Ala. 1992). "'... [P]roof of insanity
at intervals or of a temporary character would create no presumption that
it continued up to the execution of the instrument, and the burden would
be upon the attacking party to show insanity at the very time of the transaction.'"
Id., quoting
Wilson v. Wehunt, 631 So.2d 991, 996 (Ala. 1994) (underlined emphasis in original). The
burden of proof rests with the opponent to enforcement of the arbitration
provision following
Yates v. Rathbun, 984 So.2d 1189, 1195 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007):

[T]he standard for determining whether a person is competent to execute
a power of attorney is whether that person is able to understand and comprehend
his or her actions.
Queen v. Belcher, 888 So.3d 472, 477 (Ala. 2003). The burden initially falls on the party
claiming that the person who executed the power of attorney was incompetent
when he or she executed the power of attorney. Id. If, however, it is
proven that the person who executed the power of attorney was habitually
or permanently incompetent before executing the power of attorney, the
burden shifts to the other party to show that the power of attorney was
executed during a lucid interval. Id.

Ms. at 18, quoting
Yates v. Rathbun, supra. Because there were "no facts demonstrating [the decedent]
was not mentally competent 'at the very time' he executed the
... power of attorney" in question, and were instead facts in the
record indicating he was indeed competent at the time of such execution,
the arbitration agreement executed by the decedent's attorney-in-fact
was enforceable pursuant to the powers granted in the durable power of
attorney. Consequently, the Pike Circuit Court's order denying arbitration
was due to be reversed.

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