The Nuclear Jihadist

The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World's Most Dangerous Secrets ... and How We Could Have Stopped Him

TWELVE BOOKS; 413 PAGES; $25

Upon hearing mention of people who have caused death and destruction in our world, such as Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin, most decent people will react negatively. While Dr. Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan may not elicit the same reaction, it's high time to include him on that list.

Khan played a major role in constructing Pakistan's nuclear program, bringing atomic bombs to the Islamic world and to various rogue states. He's regarded as a hero by some in his native country, and a national disgrace by others. Time magazine dubbed him the "Merchant of Menace" in February 2005. And his controversial actions mark him as a real threat to liberty, freedom and democracy.

Two prominent reporters, the husband-and-wife team of Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, spent four years examining Khan's life, views and possible reasons for selling nuclear secrets. Their efforts have yielded "The Nuclear Jihadist," which details Khan's rise in terror circles and points fingers at various sources, including U.S. government officials, for not stopping him earlier.

Khan was born in 1936 in India, where he was raised. His father, fearing there was no future for Muslims in their native country, sent him to Pakistan at 16. He was trained as a metallurgist, worked in Germany and Holland, and eventually married a Rhodesian-born woman, Henny Reterink, in Amsterdam.

Frantz and Collins believe the Pakistani army's failed attempt to liberate the country from Indian rule in 1965 "struck a chord deep within Khan, dredging up his old hatred of India and foreshadowing events in his own life." The metallurgist felt like an outsider in Europe in much the same way many Pakistanis felt about India. His frustration therefore mirrored Pakistan's frustration, and he wanted to help change Pakistan's political and geographic destiny. As Khan's biographers wrote, his ultimate goal "was to make Pakistan so strong that it would never have to face such a trauma again."

The timing of Khan's departure from Holland back to Pakistan unfortunately coincided with India's push for a nuclear presence. Once India went nuclear, there would surely be "no chance to stop Pakistan from matching its neighbor, bomb for bomb." But when Khan arrived in Pakistan, his country's budding nuclear program was a mess. Canada had cut off supplying parts for a nuclear reactor in Karachi, and France faced international pressure to back out of an agreement to sell Pakistan a reprocessing plant. It was the opening that Khan needed to advance Pakistan's interests and make him a hero in the process.

"The Nuclear Jihadist" details Khan's rise to prominence in Pakistan's scientific and intelligence circles. Frantz and Collins point out that Khan "thought of himself as a great scientist and a leader," and he set out to prove this. The book depicts in great detail the intense rivalry he had with Munir Khan, who is also regarded as one of the chief architects of the country's nuclear push. He also forced his way into President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's good graces, and eventually gained the respect of many politicians and military leaders.

Yet there was a deeper undercurrent to Khan's interest in nuclear weapons - especially in the area of nuclear trafficking. His ideological hatred for Western democracies such as the United States, Britain and Israel had gradually intensified, and he evidently wanted Pakistan to establish stronger links with like-minded nations. As the book describes, Khan created a black market network that was selling nuclear secrets and technology to countries such as Iran, Libya and North Korea for vast sums of money. This led Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to directly call Khan the "chairman of the board" of this network, which had become a one-stop shopping center, or a kind of "nuclear Wal-Mart."

The book's biggest revelation is Frantz and Collins' claim that Clinton and Bush officials knew about Khan's nuclear plans, and that the CIA had infiltrated his network with agent Urs Tinner. If that's the case, why didn't someone stop Khan? As the authors explain, the CIA and Bush administration "were employing the same passive response implemented in 1975 - watch and wait."

There were other threats to national security that were perceived to be more important, including the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. This decision allowed Khan to continue his ideological mission to build weapons for his beloved Pakistan - and keep selling nuclear secrets to enemies of the West.

It's fair to say "The Nuclear Jihadist" has the potential to shake the foundations of the U.S. government and its intelligence operations. Many U.S. readers will be understandably frustrated by their country's failure to bring down Khan, because all threats to our safety and security must be dealt with in a timely fashion. In the war on terrorism, we should demand nothing less.