The purpose of this inquiry is to examine the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas
and a select group of exceptionally important theologians—Duns Scotus, Suarez,
Alphonsus Liguori—and representatives of the "Dominican,"
"Jesuit," and "Redemptorist" manualist traditions from the
time of St. Thomas until Vatican Council II on the existence of moral absolutes.
The expression, "moral absolutes," refers to moral norms proscribing
specific sorts of human actions describable in non-evaluative language, for
example, a norm proscribing adultery, understood as genital intercourse between
a married person and someone other than that person's spouse as <always>
wrong, with no exceptions.

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)

St. Thomas teaches that there are certain specifiable sorts of human actions
that are morally wicked of themselves, <secundum se,> and therefore
unworthy of human choice and contrary to precepts of the natural law. Among the
sorts of human acts wicked in this sense and opposed to natural law precepts are
theft1, lying2, fornicating3, committing adultery4, killing the innocent5. This
list is illustrative, not taxative. It thus seems that Aquinas does hold that
there are moral absolutes in the sense in which these are understood here.

Nonetheless, several contemporary theologians, among them Franz Scholz6,
Louis Janssens7, John Milhaven8, and John Dedek9, claim that Aquinas did not
believe in moral absolutes in this sense and that the only unexceptional or
absolute norms he recognized were <formal> norms, i.e., norms proscribing
actions described in morally <evaluative> and not merely
<descriptive> language, for instance, that it is always wrong to kill a
human being <unjustly.> This claim is, however, vigorously repudiated by
many Thomistic scholars, among them Servais Pinckaers10 and Patrick Lee11.

My intent is to set forth Thomas' thought on this matter by examining his
teaching on the natural law and its structure, the absoluteness of the precepts
of the Decalogue, and the difference between the "natural" species of
an act and its "moral" species.

Natural Law and Its Structure

According to Thomas the rule for moral goodness is right reason. The goodness
of the will's acts depends on the goodness of its term or object. Since the will
is a rational appetite, inclining toward objects presented to it by reason, it
follows that "goodness of the will depends on reason, in the same way that
it depends on its object."12 Moreover, Thomas teaches that practical reason
should be measured by its first principles.13 Such principles are the primary
precepts of the natural law, which is the rational creature's unique way of
participating in God's eternal law. God's eternal law is received in or
communicated to human beings through their natural inclinations and their
reason. Rational creatures participate in God's eternal law not simply by being
ruled and measured by it but also by actively measuring and ruling their own
actions in accord with its truth.14 Rational creatures participate in the
eternal law by coming to know the truths of the eternal law and expressing these
as "propositiones" of the practical reason; and there is, Thomas says,
an ordered progression in this active participation in the truths of the eternal
law. For the natural law consists of an ordered series of "precepts"
or propositions of practical reason.

The first set in this ordered series consists of "those common and first
principles,"15 "of which there is no need for any 'publishing', save
insofar as they are written in natural reason itself, as being <per se>
known."16 Among such common and first principles is "good is to be
done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided" and all those precepts that
are based on this ordination of reason.17 Therefore; because good has the
meaning of an end, evil the meaning of its contrary, it follows that all those
things toward which man has a natural inclination natural reason apprehends as
good, and consequently to be pursued by his action, and their contraries as
evils and to be avoided.18

Thomas then lists some of these natural inclinations and the human goods to
which they orient us and which reason naturally apprehends as goods to be
pursued and done: the tendencies to preserve one's life, to bear and raise
children, to live in society with others, and to come to a true knowledge about
God. The list, moreover, is illustrative, not taxative, as Thomas makes clear by
such expressions as "and the like" (<similia>) and "others
of this kind" (<cetera huiusmodi>).19 His point is that the goods to
which these natural inclinations direct us are grasped by practical reason as
fitting objects of the will, the objects that should be pursued and their
contraries avoided. They are goods perfective of human persons, and human
persons are meant to flourish in them. Thus, among the "first and common
principles" of the natural law are the precepts that human life itself, its
handing on in marriage and education, knowledge of the truth about God, life in
fellowship with others and "other goods of this kind" are to be
pursued and their opposites avoided. The human person, through his will and
human acts, must therefore respect these goods. They are indeed the
"ends" toward which we are rightly disposed by the moral virtues.20

St. Thomas also includes, among the primary precepts or principles of natural
law, such precepts as "evil must be done to no one"21 and "you
are to love your God and your neighbor."22 And one loves one's neighbor by
willing that the goods of human existence, of which mention has already been
made, flourish in him. Such non-demonstrable and per se nota principles belong,
Thomas insists, to the "primus gradus" or first set of the natural
law.23

The second "gradus" or set of natural law precepts is that
"which immediately and of itself the natural reason of any man judges are
to be done or not done."24 Such precepts are proximate conclusions from the
first indemonstrable precepts of natural law.25 They can be understood as true,
"immediately, with very little consideration."26 They are "more
determinate" than the primary precepts of natural law, but they can be
easily grasped by the intelligence of the most ordinary individual.27 Such
precepts "are absolutely of the natural law."28 These precepts, it is
true, can become perverted in a few instances because of sin and bad habits, and
it is for this reason that they have a need of a further "edition,"
namely through the divine [positive] law,29 for these precepts are those found
in the Decalogue. Their "absoluteness" will shortly be our principal
concern. But, before examining them more closely, some brief words about the
third set or "gradus" of natural law precepts recognized by St. Thomas
are appropriate.

This third set is made up of those truths about human action that are known
only "by a more subtle consideration of reason."30 They are like
conclusions derived from the second set of natural law precepts,31 and they are
known only to the "wise," i.e., for Aquinas, those in whom the virtue
of prudence is perfected. To know these precepts "much consideration of
different circumstances" is required, and diligently to consider these is
something that pertains to the wise. Those not perfected in virtue need to be
instructed in them by the wise.32

The Absoluteness of the Precepts of the Decalogue

In some texts, in which, it should be noted, the issue formally under
consideration is not that of dispensations from the precepts of the Decalogue,
Thomas says that God can grant dispensations from the precepts of the second
table (the last seven commandments) but not from those of the first (the first
three commandments).33 God cannot grant dispensations from the first three
precepts because they order man in his relationship to God, and man's whole
moral goodness depends on this order. But God can dispense from the last seven,
which order man in his relationship to his neighbors, so long as God through his
own action can, miraculously as it were, preserve man's order to himself. The
question of dispensations from the Decalogue was introduced into these texts by
problems raised by some Old Testament texts, such as God's command to Abraham to
sacrifice Isaac, to the Jews to despoil the Egyptians, and to Hosea to take to
himself a woman of fornication and to have children of fornication. Thomas
responded to such problems in these texts by simply saying that God could grant
dispensations from the relevant precepts (the fifth, seventh, and sixth
commandments respectively).

In other texts, in which the issue formally under consideration is that of
dispensations from the Decalogue, Thomas says that even God cannot dispense from
any of them, including those of the second table, for if he were to do so he
would be contradicting himself, as he would were he to make a man without a
soul.34 In these texts Thomas holds that all the precepts of the Decalogue
express the intention of God the lawgiver and that consequently no dispensation
from them can be given.

In these texts, in response to the objections that God had commanded the
Israelites to despoil the Egyptians and Hosea to take to himself a wife of
fornication, Aquinas distinguished between the precept and the conditions
required for an act to be against the precept. The precepts that one ought not
to take what belongs to another and that one ought not to fornicate or have
sexual relations with someone who is not "one's own," i.e., one's
spouse, are absolute and admit of no exceptions. But if the item taken belongs,
not to another, but to the one taking or receiving it, then the human act in
question is not the kind of act prohibited by the precept: "God never
commands things to be done contrary to the precepts of the Decalogue insofar as
they belong to the Decalogue. But the prohibition of theft belongs to the
Decalogue <insofar as the thing stolen is alien to him who takes it>
[i.e., is not 'his own']. <Therefore, so long as this condition is kept,>
if that thing should become [the property] of the one who takes it, then it will
not be contrary to the Decalogue."35 Similarly, if the woman with whom a
man has relations is indeed "his own," i.e., his wife, then obviously
he is not fornicating or committing adultery, and this was the case with Hosea:
"Hosea, in approaching the fornicating wife, or the adulterous woman, did
not commit adultery nor did he fornicate, <because he approached her who was
his own [wife]> according to the command of God, who is the author of the
institution of matrimony."36

In his <Scriptum in 3 Sententiarum> (the first of the texts under
consideration here), Aquinas did not explicitly treat of God's command to
Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, noting simply that the Decalogue does not prohibit
killing "simpliciter," but rather the "killing of one who ought
not to suffer death."37 But in the text from the <Summa Theologiae>
(the second of the texts under consideration) he does treat this issue as such.
His point there is that Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son was not a
human act of homicide, because Abraham was acting as the executor of a just
judgment of God, who imposes death on all men, the just and the unjust, as a
penalty for original sin. As Thomas says:

When Abraham consented to kill his son, he did not consent to homicide,
because it was due to him [his son] to be killed through the command of God, who
is the Lord of life and death. For it is He who inflicts the penalty of death on
all men, the just and the unjust, for the sin of our first parents; if a man is
the executor of this sentence by divine authority, he will not be a murderer,
just as God is no murderer.38

Here two things should be noted. First, Thomas is saying that a condition of
Abraham's act was changed so that <what> he did (the object of his will's
act) was no longer the human act prohibited by the fifth commandment, the
killing of an innocent person. God did not dispense Abraham from killing an
innocent person, a kind of act that Thomas elsewhere declares to be
"secundum se malum"39 and the kind of act forbidden by the fifth
commandment. Rather, by his command he changed the object of Abraham's will act
or what Abraham chose to do. The object of Abraham's will act was to carry out
the just sentence of God.

Second, note that Thomas says that Abraham was no more a murderer or a killer
than was God. For St. Thomas, God is absolutely innocent of evil (and thus human
beings, who are God's images, ought, like him, to be innocent of evil). Thus
even in punishing mankind with the evil of death, God does not intend that evil,
though the punishment entails an evil. What God directly intends is the order of
justice. Thus St. Thomas writes:

It is not necessary that the good which is the cause of evil <per
accidens> be a deficient good. For God is the cause of the evil of punishment
in this way; <for in punishing he does not intend the evil of him who is
punished, but he intends to impress upon things the order of justice>, upon
which follows the evil of the one who is punished, just as to the form of fire
follows the privation of the form of water.40 Since Abraham's act was now
specified as an act of carrying out God's just sentence, he was, like God, not
setting his will on evil.

To understand more clearly what this means, it is necessary to examine the
Common Doctor's distinction between the "natural species" of a human
act and its "moral species," and the factors that determine the moral
species of an act. Before doing this, however, I think it pertinent to note St.
Thomas' response to an objection, raised in the article in the <Summa
Theologiae,> that God could indeed dispense from the precepts of the
Decalogue. The objection held that since human lawgivers can dispense from the
laws they make, so too can God. In response Thomas said:

As the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:13), "God remains faithful; he is not able
to deny himself." But he would deny himself if he were to take away the
very order of his justice: since he himself is justice itself. And therefore God
cannot dispense in this, that it be licit for a man not to maintain himself in
an ordinate relation toward God or not to be subject to the order of his
justice, <even in those things according to which men are ordered to each
other>. 41

The "Natural" and the "Moral" Species of Human Acts

"Coition," Thomas writes, "is a certain act commanded by the
will, through the mediation of another power; and therefore, it is only <per
accidens> in the genus of morality. Hence the act of coition can be
considered in two ways: either according to the genus of nature, and then the
marital act and fornication do not differ in species and their natural effects
are the same in species; or these acts can be considered as they relate to the
genus of morality, and then their effects differ in species, as to merit or not
to merit or something of this kind, and in this way they differ
specifically."42 As this text and others43 make clear, Thomas distinguished
sharply between the "natural" or "physical" species of human
actions and their "moral" species. Human acts precisely as human or
moral are constituted in their moral species by "forms" determined by
human reason: "Species moralium actuum constituuntur ex formis, prout sunt
a ratione conceptae."44

Human actions acquire their "forms" from human intelligence, which
places them in their moral species by discerning their "ends,"
"objects," and "circumstances." The end to which the human
act is ordered is a primary, indeed <the> primary source of its moral
species, because it is only for the sake of an end that a human person, as an
intelligent being, acts to begin with.45 The end known by reason and intended by
will is the "object" of the internal act of the will, an internal act
that is an integral element of the whole human act upon which moral judgment
bears.46 In fact, the end intended by the will is the formal reason why the
other essential component of the whole human act, namely, the external act, is
chosen by the will, for this external act is the "means" to the end
intended.47 Thus the end intended by the will is the "forma magis
universalis" of the whole human act in the same way that a genus is said to
be a "forma magis universalis" in respect to its species:
"Insofar as it is more absolute and less constricted . . . and in this way
the genus is the formal cause of the species, and the more common [universal] it
is, the more formal it will be."48 It thus follows that the end intended by
the agent must be known by reason to be good if the whole human act is to be in
the species of a morally good act. An evil end intended by the will vitiates the
entire act.

In addition, the "object" of the external act chosen and commanded
by the will is also a primary source of the moral species of the whole human
act, precisely because this object is the object of a will act. This
"object" is <not> the "materia ex qua" the external
act is composed. That is, it is not the "material" species of the act,
e.g., sexual union. Rather, it is the "materia circa quam" the
external act is concerned and as such "has in some way the meaning of a
form, insofar as it gives the species to the act."49 It is, as it were, the
intelligible proposal that is adopted by choice and executed externally (e.g.,
to have sexual union with "one's own spouse," or to have sexual union
with someone who is not "one's own"). Like the end for whose sake this
object is chosen, it too must be judged good if the whole human act is to be
morally such, for, as St. Thomas insists, "good is caused from an integral
cause, evil from any individual defect."50

The end intended by the will and the object of the external act chosen and
commanded by the will are, then, the primary "forms" intelligently
grasped and placing the whole human act into its moral species. Both the end
intended and the object willed must be judged by reason as morally good if the
whole human act is to be morally good, and it is from these "forms"
that the whole human act receives its species. It receives its more universal
form or genus from the end, which is in this sense the "forma magis
universalis," and it receives its specific difference from the object
essentially ordered to that end: "The specific difference that comes from
the end is more general; and the difference that comes from the object ordered
per se to that end is specific with respect to it."51 If either end or
object is judged evil, then the whole human act is morally bad.

In addition to these essential factors (end and object) that put a human act
into its moral species, the circumstances in which the entire act is willed must
also be taken into account before a final judgment of its moral goodness or
badness can be made. These "circumstances" are like the accidents that
modify a substance, and they too must be good if the whole human act is to be
such.52 Thus marital union, an act morally good by reason of its object and
ordered either to the morally good end of procreation or to the morally good end
of spousal fidelity53 could become morally bad if done in undue circumstances,
e.g., in the public square.

The criteria used by human reason to judge whether the end and objects of the
whole human act are morally good or morally bad are precisely the precepts of
the natural law, whereby human acts are to be ruled and measured. The precepts
of the Decalogue, although divinely revealed and thus pertaining to divine
positive law, are, St. Thomas insists, proximate conclusions of the primary
precepts of the natural law, and hence they pertain to the natural law too. So
proximate are they that they are known by all men save those perverted by sin
and bad habits, as we have seen, "immediately, with little
consideration." These precepts include specific moral norms proscribing
kinds of action describable in non-evaluative language: taking what belongs to
another, having adultery (or sexual relations with some one who is not
"one's own"). These precepts, moreover, are absolutely binding. Not
even God can dispense from them. Apparent exceptions raised by some Old
Testament events are not, in reality, exceptions. For in these cases the
precepts stand, along with the <human acts> proscribed by them. What
occurred was a change in the moral species of the acts commanded by God.

At times some contemporary theologians54 appeal to the texts in which St.
Thomas says that "the natural law . . . with respect to certain proper
precepts, which are conclusions, as it were, of the more common principles, is
the same among all <for the most part. . . . but in some few instances> it
may be defective"55 to show that the Common Doctor did not teach that there
are moral absolutes in the sense understood here. In these texts, the usual
example given by St. Thomas is that of returning something one has borrowed to
its rightful owner. Aquinas notes that one is not obliged, for instance, to
return what one has borrowed if the one seeking its return wants to use it to
attack his country or something of this kind. Appealing to texts of this kind,
some claim that <specific> moral precepts of the natural law (e.g., one
ought not to commit adultery) are "valid for the most part," but, in
particular instances may not be true.

But this claim cannot stand. St. Thomas clearly taught, as the exposition and
analysis of his thought provided here show, that there are some specific moral
precepts that are absolutely and universally true, with no exceptions (e.g., the
precepts of the Decalogue). It is true that not all specific moral precepts are
indispensable or absolute in the sense understood here. It can be right and just
to break a promise or to refuse to return, here and now, what one has borrowed
from one's neighbor. It is right and just to do so because this is what is
required by the "common and first principles" of the natural law from
which such specific norms are derived. We are required to keep our promises and
to return what we have borrowed because of the principle of fairness or the
Golden Rule, which is one of the "common and first principles" of the
natural law. But this same principle can at times require us not to keep our
promises or not, here and now (as in the case used by St. Thomas), to restore
things we have borrowed to their rightful owners. But this principle in no way
justifies <stealing> from others, an action whose malice is seen precisely
in the light of the "common and first principles" of the natural law.
For St. Thomas, the indispensable precepts of the Decalogue (specific moral
precepts, all of them) are absolute, and they follow "immediately, with
little consideration"56 from the first and common precepts of natural law.

Conclusion

Thus, in the thought of St. Thomas, there are natural law precepts
proscribing acts morally bad by reason of their objects. Some of these precepts,
e.g., those of the Decalogue, are absolute, without exceptions, whatever the
circumstances. Accordingly, St. Thomas, on encountering the opinion of the
Anonymous Commentator on Aristotle's <Nicomachean Ethics> that adultery
(sexual relations with a tyrant's wife in this case) is morally permissible when
committed to save a nation from tyranny, did not hesitate to say: "That
Commentator ought not to be supported in this; for one ought not to commit
adultery for any benefit whatsoever."57

In conclusion, St. Thomas teaches, and teaches firmly, that there are moral
absolutes in the sense in which this expression is used here.

Duns Scotus (1266-1308)

Scotus clearly taught that, in one real and significant way, there are moral
absolutes in the sense understood here. He insisted that "all who are
subject to the divine law act inordinately if they do not act in accordance with
it."58 Now the Decalogue, with its precepts that we are not to kill, to
commit adultery, steal, bear false witness, etc. pertains to the divine law.
Scotus maintained that these precepts must be observed in every stage of human
existence, even in the stage of innocence. Thus he wrote: "All were held to
these precepts, which were precepts inwardly [inscribed] in the heart of each
and everyone, or perhaps through some teaching exteriorly given by parents to
their children, although they were not then written in any book."59

Although it is absolutely imperative to obey these precepts, Scotus
nonetheless taught that, in another sense, the moral precepts of the second
table of the Decalogue are <not> absolute insofar as God has the power and
the right to grant true dispensations from them and, in Scotus' opinion, did in
fact grant dispensations from some of them. Properly to understand Scotus'
position it is necessary to know (1) what he meant by a dispensation and (2) why
he thought that God could dispense from the moral precepts of the second table
of the Decalogue.

The Meaning of Dispensation

Scotus is very clear what he means by "dispensation." "To
dispense," he wrote, "is not to make it lawful to do what is contrary
to the precept while the precept is still in force; but to dispense is to revoke
the precept or to declare how it ought to be understood. For there is a twofold
kind of dispensation, namely, the revoking of a law and the declaration of a
law."60 Dispensation of the first kind is an unconditional dispensation.
Thus, for example, to ask whether God can grant a dispensation for an act of
killing is to ask:

Whether, with all the circumstances staying the same in the act of killing a
man, with only the circumstance of prohibition and non-prohibition changing,
could God make that act, which is prohibited at one time with such other
circumstances, be licit and not prohibited on another occasion? If so, he can
dispense absolutely.61

In other words, a dispensation in the true sense is given when the human act
in question (act as morally specified and not as considered in its
"natural" species) remains the same, with the only condition changed
being the fact that in one instance it is prohibited and illicit, in the other
instance not prohibited and licit, for instance, an act of killing (<occisio
hominis>). Scotus believes that God did in fact dispense from the precept
against killing the innocent when he commanded Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. He
clearly recognized the difference between dispensing in a true and unconditional
sense and changing a condition of the human act in question so that it is no
longer the kind of act prohibited by the precept. He clearly understood this
difference because he explicitly said, in speaking of the spoliation of the
Egyptians by the Israelites, that "it can be said that . . . [God] did not
dispense against that law or that precept, 'thou shalt not steal', because they
did not take what belonged to another . . . because God was the superior Lord
and could transfer dominion to them, even if the lesser lords were
unwilling."62 In this instance God <could> have dispensed the
Israelites from the precept against stealing, but in fact did not do so but
rather changed the moral object of their act of choice. God so changed things
that the Israelites were not taking what belonged to others but rather were
receiving what was rightfully theirs. Nonetheless, God could have dispensed from
the precept not to steal. But why?

Natural Law, Practical Truth, and God's Will

God can dispense from some precepts of the Decalogue and not from others
because different precepts relate differently to the natural law, which is the
expression, in the rational creature, of God's will. According to Scotus,
"some things can be said to be of the natural law in two ways." First,
some things pertain to it "as the first practical principles, known from
their terms, or the conclusions necessarily following from them, and these are
said to be of the natural law in the most strict sense . . . and in such there
can not be any dispensation."63 But what are these first principles and
what conclusions necessarily follow from them? Scotus says that the precepts of
the first table of the Decalogue "immediately receive God for their
object." And of these the first two [the third poses special problems
because it specifies the day on which God is to be worshipped, and hence Scotus
has some doubts about its precise status] "are of the natural law when this
law is taken in a strict sense, because it follows necessarily that, 'if God
exists, then God alone must be loved'. Likewise, it follows that nothing else is
to be worshiped as God, nor is irreverence to be done to God. And consequently,
in these [precepts] God could not dispense, that someone might do what is
opposed to them."64

In other words, the first principle of the natural law is that God is to be
loved above everything. This is the one practical principle that is necessarily
true, because it is based on the nature of reality itself, prior to any will act
that might command it. Here it should be noted that Scotus regarded the act of
commanding or ordering to pertain to the will, not to the intellect (as did St.
Thomas). Hence law, <precisely as law>, i.e., as a command of the ruler
imposed on subjects and directing them to the common good, pertains to the will,
not to the intellect.65 Natural law, which has God as its author, has its
obligatory force from God's will, although it is made known to men by the
intellect and in them consists in judgments in conformity with right reason,
that is, reason rectified by the rule of justice or the "affectio
iustitiae" (on this, see below).

The point is that the practical principle, <God is to be loved>, is a
necessary truth that even God's will must command. As Scotus says:

If there should be some law prior to the determination of his own [God's]
will, to which law and in this legislator, as it were to another, his own will
ought rightly conform; and indeed this is that law, <God must be loved>.
But if this ought not to be called a law or a practical principle of law, it is
at least a practical truth preceding every determination of the divine will.66

Thus this first principle or precept and any precepts that are necessarily
drawn from it express practical truths whose observance must be willed, even by
God himself. Such precepts, and such alone, pertain strictly and essentially to
the natural law, and from them no one, not even God, can dispense.

Scotus acknowledges that in another way "some things are said to be of
natural law because they are very consonant with that law, although they do not
necessarily follow from first practical principles." It is in this way that
"all the precepts of the second table are of natural law, because their
rectitude is very consonant with the first practical principles necessarily
known." Thus all these precepts "are of natural law, speaking in a
broad sense."67

The "Affectio Iustitiae" and the Rule of Justice For Scotus the
moral goodness of human actions consists in their conformity with right
reason.68 Reason is made "right" when it conforms to the rule of
justice or the "affectio iustitiae." What does this mean? Scotus
distinguishes, following Anselm, two "affections" or
"inclinations" in the will. One is its natural inclination or
"affectio commodi" toward its own perfection and fulfillment and
includes a love for God as something that is good for itself. The other is the
will's inclination to love something for its own intrinsic merits, which
includes love for God as a being infinitely lovable. The latter must regulate
and rectify the former:

One [the <affectio commodi>] naturally and most intensely inclines the
will toward the advantageous, but the other [<affectio iustitiae>]
restricts it, so that in eliciting its act is not necessary to follow its
inclination. These affections are nothing other than the will itself, insofar as
it is a naked intellective appetite, and insofar as above this it is free. For .
. . insofar as it is merely an intellective appetite it would be most intensely
actually inclined toward the best intelligible, just as sight is toward the best
visible; but insofar as it is free, it can restrain itself in eliciting an act,
so as not to follow this inclination . . . to which the potency is naturally
inclined.69

Thus the "first" goodness of the will that pertains to it beyond
its ontological goodness as an "ens positivum" is the goodness it has
insofar as "passes over to the object suitable for its act according to the
dictate of reason and not only because it is naturally suitable for an act of
that kind."70 Reason ruled by this justice is "right reason,"
i.e., reason as rectified by the rule of justice or the "affectio
iustitiae." Its judgment is that we are to will to an object what its
intrinsic character merits.

Scotus teaches that the "moral goodness of an act is its fittingness,
judged according to the right reason of the agent himself," and the first,
generic moral specification of the act derives from its object, i.e., the
intelligible subject matter with which it is concerned.71 But, and this is
crucially important, for Scotus the only act morally good by reason of its
object in such wise that it can <never> be made bad by reason of the
circumstances surrounding it (among which Scotus includes the end72) is the act
of loving God. According to the <Doctor Subtilis:>

But no act is good of its kind from its object alone save the act of loving
God, which love is the love of an object of itself willable and infinitely good.
This act cannot be morally bad, because no one can love him too excessively with
a love of friendship and for his own sake; and the only act evil of its kind is
the act opposite to that act and with respect to the same object, that is, to
hate God; this act can in no way be so circumstanced that it should become good;
therefore every other act which is in respect of any other object is
indifferent, and can be so circumstanced that it is either good or bad.73

It thus follows that every eligible human act other than that of loving God
can be so "circumstanced" that no matter what its object it can be
made morally good or bad. Thus the act of hating one's neighbor can, according
to Scotus' understanding of the "affectio iustitiae" and of the
natural law rooted in this, be so circumstanced that it can be a morally good
act. All actions having good objects other than God himself can, in other words,
be so "circumstanced" that they can become morally wicked acts; and
all actions having evil objects other than hatred of God can be so circumstanced
that they can become morally good acts.

Scotus admits that we ought to love our neighbor and to will to our neighbor
the goods of life and health, knowledge and justice, etc. according to God's
<ordained power>, inasmuch as God has, in fact, willed that we do so.74 In
fact, as noted already, the precepts of the second table of the Decalogue are
inscribed in our hearts and "very much in accord" with the first and
necessary precepts of the natural law. Thus we are morally obliged to abide by
them. Nonetheless, by his <absolute power> God can will whatever does not
contain in itself a contradiction.75 But, as we have seen, the only practical
principle that can never be contradicted is the principle that God is to be
loved. Therefore, it is within God's absolute power to command that we hate our
neighbors and hate ourselves. He can thus dispense us from precepts ordering us
in our relationship toward our neighbors, and in Scotus' opinion this is
precisely what God did do in ordering Abraham to sacrifice Isaac.

It is for these reasons that Scotus denies that there are, in the very strict
sense, moral absolutes as understood here. Still, it must be kept in mind that
he taught that all men are strictly obligated to rule their lives by the moral
precepts of the Decalogue, for God by his ordained power wills that they do so,
and only God can dispense from them.

Francis Suarez (1548-1617)

Suarez clearly taught that there are moral absolutes and that there are
certain kinds of actions, described in terms of their moral objects, that human
beings ought never choose to do. His position on this subject can be seen by
examining his teaching on the natural law and on intrinsically evil actions
proscribed by the natural law.

Law, Eternal Law, and Natural Law

Unlike St. Thomas and like Scotus, Suarez believes that "imperium"
is an act, not of the intellect, but of the will. He thus holds that law, in its
most proper sense as existing in the mind of the legislator, "is an act of
a just and right will, whereby a superior wills to oblige an inferior to do this
or that."76 This will act is not arbitrary and presupposes an act of the
intellect judging that the law is just and conducive to a good end.77 Thus the
eternal law can be said to be "a free decree of God's will establishing an
order that must be kept . . . especially . . . by intellectual creatures with
respect to their own free acts."78

Natural law, however, is law not as existing in the mind of the legislator
but as found in the intellectual creatures subject to the eternal law. Suarez
rejects the view that the rational creature's nature is itself the natural law,
although he acknowledges that this nature is the foundation of natural law
"inasmuch as it is as it were the foundation of the agreement or
non-agreement of human actions to itself."79 More precisely, natural law is
a "certain power of that nature, which it has for discriminating between
actions agreeing or not agreeing with that nature, which [power] we call natural
reason . . . which prescribes or prohibits to the human will what is to be done
in accord with natural law."80 In its most precise sense the natural law is
a <judgment> or <set of judgments> of the human intellect about what
is or is not in conformity with human nature and therefore to be done or
avoided: "I do not doubt that natural law exists most properly in the
actual judgment of the mind."81

Judgments of the human intellect about what is or is not in conformity with
human nature are not merely <indicative> of the natural law; they are
truly <preceptive,> i.e., obligatory. Suarez puts the matter thus:
"Natural law is not only indicative of bad and good, but also contains its
own proper prohibition of bad and prescription of good."82 It is
preceptive, i.e., obligatory and not merely indicative precisely because
"God, as the author of this nature, prescribes to do or to avoid what
reason declares is to be done or avoided," and because "whatever
happens contrary to right reason displeases God and its contrary pleases him,
because, since God's will is supremely just, what is base cannot please him, nor
can what is noble not please him, because the will of God cannot be
irrational."83 Therefore, Suarez concludes, "Natural reason, which
indicates what is of itself bad or good for man, consequently indicates that it
is in harmony with the divine will that the one be done and the other
avoided."84

The Intrinsic Meaning of Human Acts

God's prohibiting or prescribing of an act is not the whole reason for its
malice or goodness. Rather, God's will "supposes necessary in these actions
a certain goodness or wickedness and joins to them a special obligation of the
divine law."85 To prove this Suarez first appeals to authorities such as
St. Thomas and St. Augustine, attributing to the latter the source of the maxim
that "some evils are forbidden because they are evil."86 He then
argues that this truth is rooted in the metaphysical principle "that the
natures of things are immutable with respect to their essential being, and
consequently also with respect to the agreement or non-agreement of their
natural properties."87 He continues by saying that "in a human act
there is some goodness or badness from the force of the object precisely
considered, inasmuch as it is fitting or not fitting to right reason and can be
denominated by it as evil and sin and culpable in those respects, even leaving
out of account its relationship to its own proper law."88 He next affirms
that God "cannot not prohibit through some law those things that are
intrinsically evil."89 God cannot not prohibit those actions judged
intrinsically evil by reason of their objects because:

If we suppose that there was the will of creating a rational nature with
sufficient knowledge for doing good and evil and with sufficient concourse on
the part of God to both, God could not have willed to prohibit for such a
creature acts intrinsically wicked or not to have willed to prescribe noble and
necessary acts. Because, just as God cannot lie, so he cannot govern unwisely or
unjustly. Providence would have been quite alien to divine wisdom and goodness
had it not prohibited or prescribed for those subject to it suchlike things.90

The natural law has God as its author, but it exists in the rational creature
as a judgment or set of judgments about actions that are intrinsically good,
i.e., in conformity with human nature, the foundation of the natural law, and of
judgments about actions that are intrinsically evil, i.e., not in conformity
with this nature. Thus, "the natural law prohibits those things that are
intrinsically evil (<secundum se mala>) inasmuch as they are such; and
therefore it supposes in their very objects or acts something intrinsically
undue, so that they may not be loved or done; and on the contrary it prescribes
those things that are good inasmuch as they have an intrinsic connection and
necessity with a rational nature."91 This intrinsic character of human acts
as being either good or in conformity with human nature or evil or in
disconformity with it exists antecedently, in an ontological or metaphysical
way, to the acts being either prohibited or commanded by some law extrinsic to
them. Their moral character "is intrinsically presupposed in things
themselves before every extrinsic law; and therefore, as long as these things
remain themselves, [this moral character] cannot be taken away, because it does
not depend on an extrinsic will, nor is it some distinct thing, but is as it
were an entirely intrinsic mode or relationship that cannot be impeded, given
its foundation and term."92

In other words, the intrinsic goodness or badness of human acts consists in
their conformity with or disconformity from human nature, their foundation and
term. Thus, so long as human nature exists, actions in conformity with it will
be judged to be good and actions not in conformity with it will be judged to be
bad. Since God is the author of this nature, it necessarily follows that
whatever will be judged contrary to human nature will be displeasing to him, and
whatever will be judged to be in conformity with it will be pleasing to his
will. His will, therefore, is that human beings act in accord with the judgments
of natural reason, and it is for this reason that these judgments constitute the
natural law, whose author is God and whose obligating force comes from his will.

Thus God cannot dispense from the precepts of the Decalogue, including such
precepts as those forbidding adultery or intercourse with someone who is not
one's spouse, theft, and the like,93 because to dispense from such precepts,
which contain the very order of justice that God wills, would be a
self-contradiction. Suarez thus firmly rejects Scotus' position94 and concurs in
the judgment of St. Thomas that even God cannot dispense from the precepts of
the Decalogue.95 He insists that "as often as . . . God makes licit an act
which <seemed> prohibited by natural law, he never makes this as a pure
legislator, but by using another power."96 By "using another
power," Suarez means that God changes, by his power, the <nature> of
the act that he commands, i.e., the subject matter or "object" of the
human will. He makes the act in question to be a different sort of human act by
changing its object or essential conditions. Thus, Suarez writes, "it must
be said that, properly speaking, God does not dispense in any natural precept,
but rather that he changes its matter or the circumstances without which the
natural precept itself is not obligatory of itself."97 Indeed, "since
the goodness or malice arise from the conformity or nonconformity of the act to
rational nature, it is not possible that the same act with the same conditions
be of itself (<per se>) dissonant and consonant, because opposite
relationships do not result from the same foundation."98

Although Suarez's understanding of natural law is quite different from that
of St. Thomas, he too affirms unequivocally the existence of moral absolutes.

St. Alphonsus Liguori (1696-1787)

St. Alphonsus, as will be seen, clearly affirms the existence of moral
absolutes. His work is quite different from that of the theologians already
considered. It is intended as a practical guide for priest confessors, and not,
as in Thomas, Scotus, and Suarez, as a systematic presentation of a moral
theory. Book One of his <Theologia Moralis> begins with a long treatise on
conscience and the proper way to resolve doubts of conscience. This is followed
by a treatise on laws, in which he briefly notes the difference between natural
and positive law, discourses at length on papal infallibility, reflects on the
subjects of laws and their duties (in particular, travelers from one legal
jurisdiction to another), discusses the way in which legal precepts are to be
observed, takes up factors excusing one from transgressing a precept, offers an
analysis of legal privileges, and concludes with a section on the censoring of
books. In the part devoted to factors excusing from the transgression of a
precept he discusses ignorance of the law, fear, inability to act, and
dispensations; but he does not discuss the possibility of dispensations from the
Decalogue.

In the second book consideration is given to the precepts connected to the
theological virtues. Book Three is concerned with the precepts of the Decalogue
and of the Church. Book Five contains a preliminary treatise on human acts.
Matter relevant to moral absolutes is found in his treatise on law, in the
various treatises concerned with the precepts of the Decalogue, and in the
treatise on human acts.

Alphonsus says that a <natural> precept is one of the natural law. Such
a precept "is a dictate or judgment of our reason, whereby through the
light impressed upon us by the author of nature we establish what must be done
and what must be avoided; which [dictate of reason] is this: good is to be done,
evil is to be avoided."99 He continues by saying that from this general
precept, "particular precepts, e.g., that God is to be worshipped, that
injury is to be done to no one, <indeed, all the precepts of the
Decalogue> (with exception being made of the circumstance of the Sabbath) and
many others are derived."100 Obviously he regards the precepts of the
Decalogue as conclusions from the first precept of the natural law. He further
insists that one cannot be invincibly ignorant of the principles of natural law
and of the precepts of the Decalogue:

When talk is about natural law, it is evident that there can be no invincible
ignorance of its very first principles; and by agreement these are: <God must
be worshiped, what you do not want done to yourself, you are not to do to
others>. Thus we say also that neither the <immediate conclusions>
derived from these principles, or conclusions proximately connected to and
cohering with these aforesaid principles can be invincibly ignored; and
certainly these [immediate conclusions] are the precepts of the Decalogue.101

These texts show that Alphonsus considered the precepts of the Decalogue
proscribing killing, adultery, theft, etc. as immediate conclusions from the
first principles of natural law.

In discussing specific precepts of the Decalogue Alphonsus insists that it is
always wrong to kill oneself (suicide) or an innocent person. With respect both
to killing oneself102 and killing the innocent,103 however, he says that such
killing is permissible with God's authority. In speaking of suicide he says:
"Without divine authority it is not licit directly and intentionally
(<ex intentione>) to kill oneself. The reason is that this is contrary to
love of oneself, and it does an injury to the republic and to God, who is alone
the direct and absolute Lord of human life."104 Speaking of killing the
innocent, he says, "this is never lawful knowingly and by direct intent,
unless God, the Lord of all life, grants it."105 Whether he would interpret
this as a divine dispensation from the precept against killing or as an instance
in which the very nature of the human act chosen and willed is changed because
of a change in the matter of the act is not clear. Still, he obviously regards
the precept against killing the innocent to be absolute so far as human beings
are concerned. He certainly holds this as an absolute precept: human beings are
not to kill innocent human beings without the explicit authorization of God
himself.

The precepts included under the sixth commandment are, for Alphonsus,
absolutely binding. He includes far more than adultery among the human acts
proscribed by this commandment. He notes that "although under this precept,
<thou shalt not commit adultery,> adultery only is expressed . . .
nonetheless, every venereal act outside of marriage is forbidden by the same
precept." He continues by saying, "for although fornication is less
evil than is adultery, nonetheless, because <carnal copulation is, by the
natural law, ordained only toward marriage, through which progeny is not only to
be born but also able to be well educated,> therefore in this precept God
prohibited all coition outside of marriage, and likewise every venereal act
which is ordered to generation."106 In treating the issues raised by the
sixth commandment he makes it clear that fornication, or genital sex between
persons who are not married, "semper est intrinsice mala,"107 even if
the persons are engaged to marry.108 He also makes it clear that adultery, which
is <always> immoral, is intercourse with someone who is not one's spouse,
even with the consent of one's spouse.109 In other words, he does not define
adultery <formally> or tautologically as immoral sex with the wrong
person. He defines it as intercourse with someone who is not one's spouse, and
he brands it as always and intrinsically immoral.110

Alphonsus calls those human acts good that are "consonant with right
reason" and <bad> those acts that are "disconsonant."111 He
lists three sources or principles of an act's moral character, namely, the
object, end and circumstances (placing the end among the circumstances, but as
the principal circumstance). He teaches that "<the object> from which
the act receives its essential and primary morality, is that about which the
moral act is concerned, and is primarily and <per se> attained by the act
itself: thus the 'property of another' (<res aliena>) is the object of
theft. . . . Such an object can not be considered physically and according to
its entitativeness . . . but is considered morally, insofar as it is in
agreement or not in agreement with right reason."112 The object, he holds,
gives the act its essential moral goodness or badness.113 Thus, the moral object
of the act, if bad, makes the whole act bad. In addition, he insists that the
end and circumstances must also be good if the whole human act is to be good.
"In order that an act be called good from its integral cause," he
writes, "it must be in agreement with law and right reason both <by
reason of its object,> and <by reason of the extrinsic end> of the
agent, and also <by reason of its circumstances.>"114

From all this it is clear that St. Alphonsus affirms the existence of moral
absolutes.

Moralists Representative of the Manualist Traditions

In this part of this inquiry the views of theologians representing the
Jesuit, Redemptorist, and Dominican "schools" regarding moral
absolutes will be given. I have chosen <Compendium Theologiae Moralis> by
John Gury, S.J. (first published in 1852), as revised by Antonio Ballerini,
S.J., put into briefer form for the use of seminarians by Aloysius Sabetti,
S.J., and further revised by Timothy Barrett, S.J. (<editio vicesima
quarta>, 1942) as an example of the Jesuit school; for the Redemptorist
school I have chosen the widely used manual of J. Aertnys, C.Ss.R.,
<Theologia Moralis secundum doctrinam S. Alfonsi de Ligorio> (first
published in 1906) and revised by C.A. Damen, C.Ss.R. (editio 14, 1944); for the
Dominican tradition I have chosen M. Prümmer's <Manuale Theologiae Moralis
secundum principia S. Thomae Aquinatis> (first published in 1914; the
<editio quarta et quinta> of 1928). Prümmer's work is influenced greatly,
as notes throughout indicate, by the interpretation given Aquinas by Ch.
Billuart, O.P. (d. 1757).

Gury/Ballerini/Sabetti/Barrett: The "Jesuit" School

According to these authors the essence of morality consists primarily in the
relationship between human acts and the eternal law, "which is the divine
reason or will of God commanding that the natural order be conserved and
forbidding that it be disturbed."115 Secondarily it consists in the
relationship of human acts to right reason, which is "a certain
participation and consequently something manifesting the divine reason."116

The "fontes" of an act's morality are its object, end, and
circumstances. Moreover, "the first and essential morality of a human act
is derived from the object morally considered,"117 whereas the end of the
agent and the circumstances are other determinants of moral goodness or
badness.118 These authors distinguish three types of acts intrinsically evil by
reason of their objects, of which the first two types are of relevance to this
inquiry. "Some things are such [intrinsically evil]," they write:
<absolutely>, and independently of every circumstance because of
themselves they involve a repugnance with the right order that is absolutely
necessary, such as hatred of God, blasphemy, etc. . . . Others are
<intrinsically> evil, not precisely in themselves, but by reason of
something adjoined or some condition, which depends upon the dominative power of
God or of man: such are the taking of what belongs to another, the wounding of
body or reputation, and other like things which at times can become licit.119

A "taking away of another's thing," the authors make clear in their
discussion of theft, can be morally right if the thing taken <no longer
belongs to the person from whom it is taken> because <ownership of it>
has been given to the one who takes it, either by God, the Lord of all, or by
competent human authority.120 In such an instance, the subject matter of the
human act or its moral object has been changed. Thus, for these authors the
precept proscribing theft or the taking of what belongs to another remains true
and absolute.

These authors regard the directly intended killing of the innocent as
<never> licit: "it is never lawful directly to kill the innocent,
whether by private or public authority. The reason is both that the killing of
the innocent is an action harmful to the rights of God, who alone has supreme
lordship over life—and therefore this action is <intrinsically evil>—and
that it is an action harmful to the right of the innocent to life, and that it
is positively forbidden by God himself, for it is said (Ex. 23:7), 'the innocent
and the just thou shalt not kill'."121 They likewise condemn as absolutely
forbidden by natural law both fornication and adultery.122 Such acts seem to
fall into the category of acts intrinsically evil "absolutely, and
independently of every circumstance because of themselves they entail a
repugnance with the right order that is absolutely necessary."

They regard God as "the author of the natural law . . . ; its subject is
the rational creature; its herald is the light of reason; its object inasmuch as
the law is prohibiting are actions intrinsically bad . . . inasmuch as the law
is commanding its object are actions intrinsically good."123

This team of Jesuit moralists clearly affirms moral absolutes.

Aertnys/Damen: The "Redemptorist" School

These authors affirm that the moral goodness or badness of human acts
consists in their "agreement or disagreement . . . with the proper rule of
human acts as such or with the rule of morality." This rule ultimately is
God's eternal law.124 More proximately and intrinsically it is human reason, but
human reason only insofar as "it participates in the eternal law and is
subject to it, or the dictate of reason which is a participation in the eternal
law. Therefore it is reason, not in itself, but as informed by the principles of
the natural law and their conclusions and by the precepts of positive law,
divine and human, and by the particular principles of prudence, or reason as
perfect and formed by synderesis, moral science, divine and human precepts, and
the particular precepts of prudence."125

With other theologians considered here, they consider the sources of an act's
moral goodness or badness to be its object and circumstances, of which the
principal circumstance is the end intended by the agent.126 As examples of moral
objects, which give to an act its essential morality, they give "what
belongs to another" as the object of theft and "killing one's
neighbor" as the object of homicide.127 They hold that some acts are
intrinsically evil by reason of their objects. Acts "intrinsically evil are
said to be prohibited because they are evil." Acts <absolutely>
"evil intrinsically" are those that are per se repugnant to the order
of things metaphysically considered and rooted in the very essences of
things.128 This language seems very Suarezian. Other actions are
"hypothetically" intrinsically evil, i.e., so long as the conditions
under which they are contrary to right reason remain the same; but these
conditions can be changed either by God, the supreme Lord of all, or at times,
by men. As examples of acts intrinsically evil in this way they include the
"taking away of another's thing" and "murder."129 It would
seem from this that, in those instances when "killing" and the
"taking of what is another's" are licit the very conditions of the
acts have been changed so that the human acts in question are no longer ones of
killing or of theft; this, however, is not explicitly brought out by the
authors.

They maintain that the direct killing of the innocent can never be made licit
by any human authority, giving the same reasons why it cannot as do
Gury/Ballerini/Sabetti/Barrett.130 They also teach that fornication and adultery
can never be made right.131

Whether God can dispense from the precept not to kill the innocent or whether
his command makes the act in question to be a different kind of human act is not
clear from their text. Yet they nonetheless regard the killing of the innocent
as a norm absolutely binding on human beings and unjustifiable by any human
authority, public or private.

It is clear that these authors affirm the existence of moral absolutes.

Prümmer: The "Dominican" School

In common with the other manualist, Prümmer holds that the morality of human
actions is determined by their objects, ends, and circumstances. He considers
the object as the primary factor giving an act its intrinsic goodness or
badness. With Billuart, he regards the end intended by the agent to be extrinsic
to the act [whereas, as we have seen, Thomas himself considered both object and
end to be intrinsic constituents of an act's morality].132 All three of these
sources must, of course, be good if the whole human act is to be good.133

Prümmer holds that acts are wicked by their objects alone if they are
contrary to the rules according to which human acts are to be measured, i.e.,
God's eternal law and the natural law. He instances fornication as an act
morally wicked for this reason; it is objectively wrong by its very nature, even
if the one engaging in it may erroneously think this act to be good.134 He also
affirms that "adultery, by the very fact that it is approaching the wife of
another, is understood first of all and essentially to be wicked, prescinding
from its order to other circumstances; it cannot be conceived without this
wickedness."135

Although I realize that this is a very brief account of Prümmer's work, it
suffices to show that he, like the other authors of moral manuals considered
here, affirms the existence of moral absolutes.

Conclusion

In his Apostolic Exhortation, <Reconciliatio et Poenitentia>, Pope John
Paul II spoke of a "doctrine, based on the Decalogue and on the preaching
of the Old Testament, and assimilated into the kerygma of the Apostles and
belonging to the earliest teaching of the Church; and constantly reaffirmed by
her up to this day." The doctrine in question is that "there exist
acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always
seriously wrong by reason of their object." Correspondingly, as the Holy
Father noted in his "Discourse to the International Congress of Moral
Theology" on April 10, 1986, "there are moral norms that have a
precise content which is immutable and unconditioned . . . for example, the norm
. . . which forbids the direct killing of an innocent person."

I believe that the material set forth in this essay shows that the Holy
Father is absolutely correct in his articulation of the constant teaching of the
Church. Although some theologians, for instance, Scotus, held that <God, and
God alone>, could dispense from the precepts of the Decalogue and make the
human act of killing an innocent person to be morally good, the Common Doctor of
the Church, St. Thomas Aquinas, more correctly taught that even God could not
make an act of this kind morally right; to do so would be to deny his own being.
But even Scotus was absolutely clear in teaching that no human authority could
possibly justify the actions proscribed in the Decalogue. Unfortunately, several
influential contemporary theologians contend that there are no actions,
describable in morally neutral terms, that are intrinsically evil and that no
specific moral norms, including those found in the Decalogue, are absolute,
i.e., without exceptions. These theologians claim to be faithful to the Catholic
theological tradition. I believe that the material presented here shows that
their claim is spurious and that their moral teaching is utterly incompatible
with the theological tradition from St. Thomas to the eve of Vatican Council II.
and surely nothing that the Council Fathers taught contradicts this tradition.
Instead, it confirms it. for the Council taught, among other things, that all
actions against human life, such as suicide, abortion, mercy killing and
infanticide, dishonor the Creator, poison human society, and do more harm to
their perpetrators than those harmed by them (cf. <Gaudium et Spes>, n.
27).

11 Patrick Lee, "Permanence of The Ten Commandments: St. Thomas and His
Commentators," <Theological Studies> 42 (1981) 422-433. Since this
article was first written, an exceptionally important study of moral absolutes
in the Catholic theological tradition has appeared, namely, John Finnis,
<Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth> (Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 1991). See also my own <Moral
Absolutes: Catholic Tradition, Current Trends, and the Truth,> the Pere
Marquette Theology Lecture for 1989 (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press,
1989).

William E. May holds his Ph.D. in philosophy from Marquette University. He is
currently professor of Moral Theology at the John Paul II Institute in
Washington DC. Dr. May is the author of several books including <Sex and the
Sanctity of Human Life> (available from Christendom Press: 1-800-877-5456).

This article was taken from the Summer 1992 issue of "Faith &
Reason". Subscriptions available from Christendom Press, 2101 Shenandoah
Shores Road, Ft. Royal, VA 22630, 703-636-2900, Fax 703-636-1655. Published
quarterly at $20.00 per year.