Gordon C. Oehler Testimony 3/27/96

The Continuing Threat From Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Director of Central Intelligence, John Deutch, recently described
a number of troubling developments in the world. He noted that
the increasingly troubled post-Cold War world has, in a curious
way, made us yearn for the dark days of the 1960s and 1970s when
we knew the kind of target we were dealing with and the problems
we were facing. One reason for this is that not only a number
of sovereign states, but now individual groups, have become willing
to buy or sell the technologies necessary to produce weapons that
could have devastating effects on economic or population centers.

Although the threat of a nuclear attack involving hundreds or
perhaps thousands of weapons from the former Soviet Union has
diminished, another threat has arisen: the potential acquisition
of nuclear materials or even nuclear weapons by states hostile
to the United States or by terrorists intent on staging incidents
harmful to US interests. We currently have no evidence that any
terrorist organization has obtained contraband nuclear materials.
However, we are concerned because only a small amount of material
is necessary to terrorize populated areas.

The chilling reality is that nuclear materials and technologies
are more accessible now than at any other time in history--due
primarily to the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the
region's worsening economic conditions. This problem is exacerbated
by the increasing diffusion of modern technology through the growth
of the world market, making it harder to detect illicit diversions
of materials and technologies relevant to a nuclear weapons program.

As you know, many of the technologies associated with WMD programs,
especially chemical and biological technologies, have legitimate
civilian or military applications unrelated to WMD. For example,
chemicals used to make nerve agents are also used to make plastics
and to process foodstuffs; trade in those technologies cannot
be banned. As dual-use technology and expertise continue to spread
internationally, the prospects for chemical and biological terrorism
increase. The relative ease of production increases our concern
that the use of both chemical and biological weapons is attractive
to terrorists. Moreover, the proliferation of WMD to more and
more nations has increased the possibility that one or more of
these states may choose to provide such weapons to terrorists.

At least as worrisome is the likelihood that terrorist groups
or cults can acquire or develop chemical and biological weapons
on their own. The incidents staged in March 1995by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo demonstrate that the
use of WMD is no longer restricted to the battlefield. Japanese
authorities have determined that the Aum was working on developing
the chemical nerve agents sarin and VX. The Aum was able to legitimately
obtain all of the components that it needed to build its massive
chemical and biological infrastructures. However, terrorist groups
and violent sub-national groups need not acquire the massive infrastructure
that the Aum had assembled. Only small quantities of precursors,
available on the open market, are needed to manufacture deadly
chemical or biological weapons for terrorist acts. Extremist groups
worldwide are increasingly learning how to manufacture chemical
and biological agents, and the potential for additional chemical
and biological attacks by such groups continues to grow.

The Intelligence Community is taking all possible measures to
aggressively support US Government efforts to ensure the security
of nuclear materials and technologies. Let me first review why
we are concerned about the security of nuclear materials.

Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union are not
the only potential sources of nuclear weapons or materials. The
reported theft of approximately 130 barrels of enriched uranium
waste from a storage facility in South Africa, which was covered
in the press in August 1994, demonstrates that this problem can
begin in any state where there are nuclear materials, reactors,
or fuel cycle facilities.

A few countries whose interests are inimical to the US are attempting
to acquire nuclear weapons--Iraq and Iran being two or our greatest
concerns. Should one of these countries, or a terrorist group,
acquire one or more nuclear weapons, they could enormously complicate
US political or military activity, threaten or attack deployed
US or allied forces, or possibly conduct an attack against the
US.

Years ago there were two impediments to would-be proliferators:
the technical know-how for building a bomb and the acquisition
of the fissile material. Fissile material is the highly enriched
uranium or plutonium atoms that split apart in a chain reaction
and create the energy of an atomic bomb. Today the major impediment
to a nation committed to acquiring a nuclear capability is the
acquisition of fissile material. While it is by no means easy
to make a nuclear weapons, knowledge of weapons design is sufficiently
widespread that trying to maintain a shroud of secrecy around
this technical knowledge no longer offers adequate protection.

The protection of fissile material in the former Soviet Union
has thus become even more critical at the same time that it has
become more difficult. Many of the institutional mechanisms that
once curtailed the spread of nuclear materials, technology, and
knowledge no longer exist or are present only in a weakened capacity
and effective new methods of control have yet to be fully implemented
for a large portions of the world's nuclear related materials,
technology, and information.

At the same time, there is concern that terrorist groups could
obtain and use, or threaten to use, nuclear materials. Nuclear
materials are divided into two categories: 1) fissile materials,
such as plutonium-239 or uranium-235, and 2) other radioactive
materials, such as uranium-238, cesium-137, or cobalt-60. We,
of course, track possible diversions of plutonium and uranium.
But we also are concerned that non-fissile, radioactive materials
could be used in a terrorist device designed to create psychological
or economic trauma or to contaminate buildings, water supplies
or localized areas.

The list of potential proliferators is not limited to states with
nuclear weapons ambitions. There are many non-state actors, such
as separatists and terrorist groups, criminal organizations, and
individual thieves who could choose to further their cause by
using fissile or non-fissile (but radioactive) nuclear materials.
Despite press articles claiming numerous instances of nuclear
trafficking worldwide, we have no evidence that any fissile materials
have been acquired by terrorist organizations. We also have no
indications of state sponsored attempts to arm terrorist organizations
with nuclear material--fissile or non-fissile. Unfortunately,
this does not preclude the possibility that a terrorist group
could acquire enough nuclear material, potentially through illicit
trades, to conduct an operation, especially one specifically designed
to incite panic.

A non-state actor does not necessarily need fissile material--which
is more difficult to acquire--for its purposes. Depending upon
the group's objectives, any radioactive material could suffice,
but the use of non-fissile materials would likely result in very
little physical damage with low levels of contamination. But non-fissile
radioactive materials dispersed by a conventional explosive or
even released accidentally could cause damage to property and
the environment, and cause social, political, and economic disruption.

Examples of non-fissionable, radioactive materials seen in press
reports are cesium-137, strontium-90, and cobalt-60. These cannot
be used in nuclear weapons but could be used to contaminate water
supplies, business centers, government facilities, or transportation
networks. Although it is unlikely they would cause significant
numbers of casualties, they could cause physical disruption, interruption
of economic activity, post-incident clean-up, and psychological
trauma to a workforce and populace. Non-state actors already have
attempted to use radioactive materials in recent operations. For
example:

In November 1995, a Chechen insurgent leader threatened to
turn Moscow into an eternal desert with radioactive waste, according
to press reports. The Chechens directed a Russian news agency
to a small amount of cesium-137 in a shielded container in a Moscow
park which the Chechens claimed to have placed. Government spokesmen
told the press that the material was not a threat, and would have
to have been dispersed by explosives to be dangerous. According
to Department of Defense assessments, there was only a very small
quantity of cesium-137 in the container. If it had been dispersed
with a bomb, an area of the park could have been contaminated
with low levels of radiation. This could have caused disruption
to the populace, but would have posed a minimal health hazard
for anyone outside the immediate blast area.

The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which attacked Japanese civilians
with deadly gas just one year ago (March 20, 1995) also tried
to mine its own uranium in Australia and to buy Russian nuclear
warheads.

Traditional terrorist groups with established sponsors probably
will remain hesitant to use a nuclear weapon, for fear of provoking
a worldwide crackdown and alienating their supporters. In contrast,
a new breed of multinational terrorists, exemplified by the Islamic
extremists involved in the bombing of the World Trade Center,
might be more likely to consider such a weapon if it were available.
These groups are part of a loose association of politically committed,
mixed nationality Islamic militants, apparently motivated by revenge,
religious fervor, and a general hatred for the West.

The danger that a terrorist organization like the Aum Shinrikyo
could again acquire the capability to launch an attack using chemical
or biological weapons continues to grow. Since the November 1995
hearing on the worldwide chemical and biological weapons threat
before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate
Committee on Government Affairs, the Intelligence Community has
been engaged in continuing dialogue with Senator Nunn regarding
the Aum Shinrikyo and information the Senator's staff collected.
We continue to assess and analyze the threat of a terrorist chemical
or biological weapons attack, a threat that remains ever present.

The Aum Shinrikyo attacks in June 1994, in Matsumoto, Japan, which
killed seven and injured 500, and on the subway in Tokyo in March
1995, which killed 12 and injured 5,500, were the first instances
of large-scale terrorist use of chemical agents, but a variety
of incidents and reports over the last two years indicate a growing
terrorist interest in these weapons. These incidents include,
but are not limited to:

In February 1996, German police confiscated from a Neo-Nazi
group a coded diskette that contained information on how to produce
the chemical agent mustard gas. German police have stated that
there are no indications yet of intent or effort to manufacture
the agent.

Tajik opposition members lacing champagne with cyanide at
a New Years celebration in January 1995, killing six Russian soldiers
and the wife of another, and sickening other revelers.

Press reports of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party, a guerrilla
group that opposes the Turkish Government) in southeast Turkey
poisoning Turkish water supplies with cyanide.

Such examples reflect an increased interest in and a capability
to produce chemical and biological agents. Open source literature--including
access to the Internet--provides instructions on how to make some
chemical agents.

Terrorist interest in chemical and biological weapons is not surprising,
given the relative ease with which some of these weapons can be
produced in simple laboratories, the large number of casualties
they can cause, and the residual disruption of infrastructure.
Although popular fiction and national attention have focused on
terrorist use of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons
are more likely choices for such groups.

In contrast to the fabrication of nuclear weapons, the production
of biological weapons requires only a small quantity of equipment.

Even very small amounts of biological and chemical weapons can
cause massive casualties. The fact that only 12 Japanese died
in the Tokyo subway attack de-emphasizes the significance of the
5,500 people who required treatment in hospital emergency rooms.
Such a massive influx of injured--many critically--has the potential
to overwhelm emergency medical facilities, even in a large metropolitan
area.

Terrorist use of these weapons also makes them weapons of
mass disruption because of the necessity to decontaminate affected
areas before the public will be able to begin feeling safe.

Although the Aum Shinrikyo case demonstrates that terrorists can
produce CW, they also may be able to directly acquire these weapons
via other means:

Theft of agents from research labs;

Acquisition of commercially available poisons;

Theft of chemical munitions held by the military;

Black market activity;

Receipt of ready-made chemical weapons from a state sponsor.

The continued willingness of such states as Iran, Libya and Syria
to support terrorism highlights the danger of state sponsorship
of a terrorist's chemical or biological weapons program. Although
we have no evidence of state sponsors providing chemical or biological
weapons or the technologies to produce them to terrorist groups,
recent revelations about Iraq's well hidden chemical and biological
programs highlight the difficulty in detecting national programs
to develop such weapons and disperse them to terrorist entities.

The investigation of Aum leader Shoko Asahara has resulted in
a number of revelations about the cult's activities. Press reports
allege that:

Asahara ordered the capability to produce sarin beginning
in 1993; a large agent production complex was not operational
until March 1994.

Some evidence suggests that the group may have tested sarin
on sheep in Australia. Press reports claim that examination of
some 30 sheep carcasses at an abandoned Aum site in Australia
revealed the presence of sarin and other pesticides of similar
structures.

Aum planned to produce enough agent to annihilate a large
Japanese city by spraying it from a helicopter. Aum possessed
a Russian helicopter and two drone airplanes that, with modifications,
could have been capable of delivering chemical and biological
weapons. A high-ranking Aum member reportedly obtained a helicopter
pilot's license in the US. Press reports also allege that Aum
was considering chemical attacks using remote-controlled aircraft.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Aum expanded its activities
in Russia, claiming some 30,000 followers there in addition to
the 10,000 in Japan.

Video news footage indicates that a Russian-made GSP-11 toxic
gas detector was found at the Aum compound in Japan. Designed
to be used on the battlefield, the Russian detector can also be
used in a nerve agent production/handling facility.

Asahara intended the simultaneous chemical strike on 10 locations
in the Tokyo subway to be a massive mystery attack that would
divert attention from the cult.

In February 1996, The Thai police were informed by the Japanese
embassy that members of Aum Shinrikyo had arrived in Thailand
possibly to carry out terrorist activities. One individual was
arrested and later identified as an Aum member; however, there
is no information indicating that terrorist activity was planned
or conducted in Thailand.

This country study examines the magnitude of Iraq's chemical and
biological warfare programs and underscores the complexity faced
by international efforts to curb the spread of these weapons.
Details about the breadth of Iraq's chemical and biological warfare
programs are presented to demonstrate the broad range of weapons
that a state sponsor of terrorism has available and could provide
to terrorists if it so chooses.

The unprecedented inspections conducted in Iraq by the UN have
revealed much about Iraqi WMD programs. In the wake of the August
1995 defection of two high-level Iraqis, the Baghdad government
turned over to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a large cache
of WMD-related documents and have revealed even more information
in extensive discussions with both UN organizations. The sudden
revelation of new information underscored the long-standing judgment
that the Iraqis had made efforts to deceive UNSCOM and the IAEA.
Such behavior resulted in UNSCOM Chairman Ekeus's delivery of
a strongly worded report to the UN Security Council that was critical
of Iraq's progress in fulfilling its obligations under the UN
Resolutions imposed following the Gulf War. Despite the UN resolutions,
Iraq successfully concealed developments in both its chemical
and biological warfare programs.

These revelations demonstrated the ability of countries to hide
capabilities in the face of intrusive international inspection
regimes and included:

The Iraqi program to develop the nerve agent VX actually began
as early as May 1985 and continued until December 1990 without
interruption; Iraq claimed previously that its program spanned
only the period April 1987 to September 1988.

Iraq produced 65 tons of chlorine, intended for the production
of VX, and had more than 200 tons each of the precursor chemicals
phosphorous pentasulfide and diisopropylamine. Together, these
three precursors would have been sufficient to produce almost
500 tons of VX.

Iraq developed a true binary sarin-filled artillery shell,
122-mm rockets, and aerial bombs in quantities beyond prototype
level. An Al Husayn missile with a chemical warhead was flight-tested
in April 1990.

Following the August 1995 defections, Iraq
revealed substantial information about its extensive biological
warfare program. The Iraqi Government adopted a policy to acquire
biological weapons in 1974. Research and development began in
1975, but went into hiatus in 1978. In 1985, Iraq restarted biological
weapons research and development. Initial work focused on literature
studies, until bacterial strains were received from overseas in
April 1986. Additionally, Iraq's revelations to the UN included
the following information on the production and weaponization
of its biological agents:

A total of 6,000 liters of concentrated botulinum toxin and
8,425 liters of anthrax were produced at Al Hakam during 1990.
An additional 5,400 liters of concentrated botulinum toxin were
produced at the Daura Foot and Mouth Disease Institute during
the period November 1990 to January 15, 1991; 400 liters of concentrated
botulinum toxin was produced at Taji; and 150 liters of concentrated
anthrax were produced at Salman Pak.

Production of clostridium perfringens (a biological agent
that causes gas gangrene and, when aerosolized, can cause severe
gastric effects) began in August 1990. A total of 340 liters of
concentrated agent was produced.

Static field trials of anthrax simulant and botulinum toxin
were conducted using aerial bombs as early as March 1988. Effects
were observed on test animals. Additional weaponization tests
took place in November 1989, with 122-mm rockets. Live firings
of 122-mm rockets filled with agents were conducted in May 1990.

Large-scale weaponization of BW agents began in December 1990.
Iraq filled more than 150 bombs and 50 warheads with agent. All
these weapons were dispersed to forward storage locations.

Iraq worked to adapt a modified aircraft drop tank for biological
agent spray operations beginning in December 1990. The tank could
be attached either to a piloted fighter or to an unmanned aircraft
that would be guided to the target by a piloted aircraft. The
tank was designed to spray up to 2,000 liters of anthrax on a
target. Iraq claims the test was a failure, but three additional
drop tanks were modified and stored, ready for use.

International regimes continue to be expanded to slow the proliferation
of WMD. Since the 1960s, when the US sponsored the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), this country has recognized
that proliferation is a global problem and that combating it requires
high levels of international cooperation. The United States has,
at times, exerted unilateral influence, successfully in several
cases, to discourage proliferation, but remains committed to supporting
multilateral efforts to stem proliferation. To that end, the US
successfully pursued the permanent extension of the NPT to prevent
the spread of nuclear technologies to countries and entities attempting
to acquire such weapons.

With regard to the former Soviet Union, the Russians have accepted
US assistance in upgrading equipment, training, and procedures,
in order to address deficiencies in their security programs. Joint
US-Russian cooperation on improving material protection, control,
and accountability (MPC&A) has been ongoing since the signing
of an agreement between MINATOM--the Russian Ministry of Atomic
Energy--and the US Department of Defense in September 1992. The
Intelligence Community has monitored the safety and security practices
at Russian non-Ministry of Defense fissile materials facilities
for some time. A comprehensive examination revealed that none
of these facilities in Russia or other newly independent states
had adequate safeguards or security measures by international
standards for weapons-useable materials. The Intelligence Community
has assisted the policy community in identifying the most critical
Russian civilian sites handling weapons-useable material that
could benefit from US efforts. This provided a starting point
for US and Russian agreement on which facilities to concentrate
initial MPC&A improvement efforts. This cooperation has been
steadily expanding and currently involves over a dozen MINATOM
facilities and a comparable number of facilities outside of Russia.

The US also has played a significant role in Kazakstan. After
several months of sensitive negotiations, the United States purchased
from Kazakstan and brought to the US Department of Energy's facility
at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for storage, 600 kilograms of highly
enriched uranium. As a result, that material is unavailable to
nuclear traffickers and proliferation states.

The Australia Group (AG) -- Formed in 1984 as a result of
the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, the AG is an
informal forum of states whose goal is to discourage and impede
proliferation by harmonizing national export controls on CW precursor
chemicals and manufacturing equipment, sharing information on
target countries, and seeking other ways to curb the use of chemical
weapons. It has since been expanded to include biological weapons.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) -- Opened for signature
in 1993 and subsequently signed by 160 countries, the CWC bans
the use, development, production and storage of chemical warfare
agents and munitions and requires the destruction of all existing
stocks and facilities for their production. The CWC will enter
into force 180 days after the 65th country deposits instruments
of ratification (to date 47 countries have ratified the CWC).
International negotiations the bring the CWC into force are under
way.

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) -- Ratified by 137
countries, the BWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling
or transfer of biological agents and weapons and mandates the
destruction of all existing stocks.

While these international nonproliferation
efforts were not designed to prevent terrorism, they do include
nonproliferation provisions that will enhance our efforts to fight
attempts by rogue states and by terrorists to acquire, to transfer,
and to use chemical weapons and their precursors. For example,
the CWC will require States Parties to cease transfers of certain
CW agents and CW precursor chemicals to non-States Parties and
to restrict such transfers to other parties. Additionally,
at a BWC Special Conference held in Geneva in September 1994,
the US, in order to help deter violations of and enhance compliance
with the BWC, promoted the development of a legally binding instrument
that increased transparency of activities and facilities that
could have biological weapons applications.

Though they include provisions that should
aid in preventing the acquisition of WMD by terrorist entities,
treaties such as the NPT, CWC and BWC will likely be of limited
effectiveness in halting the acquisition of WMD technologies by
groups determined to possess them. Even if the CWC had been in
effect at the time Aum Shinrikyo began its CW program, Aum was
purchasing only Schedule 3 chemicals--including phosphorous trichloride--which
it claimed were for the production of chemical pesticides for
use on its agricultural holdings. In addition, the Aum was in
the process of establishing its own university and would have
been able to purchase laboratory stocks of the same chemicals
in Japan without attracting attention.

An effective program to combat terrorist use
of WMD will require vigorous efforts by police and intelligence
agencies, from local police through international law enforcement
and intelligence organizations, to detect and intercept possible
terrorist attacks.

The mission of the US Intelligence Community in the counterproliferation
arena is to support those who make and execute all four aspects
of US counterproliferation policy: preventing acquisition; capping
or rolling back existing programs; deterring use of WMD; and ensuring
US forces' ability to operate against proliferated weapons.

To achieve these ends, the Intelligence Community focuses its
efforts on providing accurate, comprehensive, timely, and actionable
foreign intelligence. The Community has also searched for new
ways and opportunities to add substantial value to counterproliferation
policy decisions and activities. This has included:

Support to those policy makers responsible for implementation
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons wherein
the US and other signatories have expressed their nonproliferation
commitments;

Support to those implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
wherein the US and other signatories have expressed their commitments
to end nuclear testing; and

Examining the entire Russian nuclear weapons cycle to identify
areas where transparency measures would be most effective.

Maintaining a surge capability to quickly deploy specialists
outside the United States to the scene of a terrorist nuclear
or radiological threat to provide the US Mission and host government
advice and guidance on dealing with the threat. During such an
event, the specialists would coordinate fully with appropriate
United States Government Agencies, keeping them informed and drawing
upon their expertise if follow-up action is required.

US Intelligence has instituted a corporate strategic planning
and evaluation process for support to counter proliferation. This
process contributes to the Intelligence Community's National Needs
Process and the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP),
the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and the Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) program and Planning
Guidance. A major benefit of this effort has been the establishment
of a significant Department of Defense (DoD) representation within
the DCI's Nonproliferation Center. This has helped integrate Intelligence
support to DoD counterproliferation needs and actions. The Intelligence
Community also has expanded its relations with the law enforcement
community and is sharing information and resources in support
of the law enforcement community's counterproliferation efforts.

The Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on Nonproliferation
and Export Controls, related PDDs, Congressional Language, reports
from government committees engaged in counterproliferation, and
policy statements of several government agencies have shaped the
Intelligence Community's counterproliferation strategic planning
process and have helped determine a list of priority customer
information requirements. These requirements are addressed in
various Intelligence Community action programs such as the Annual
Strategic Intelligence Review, the WMD Integrated Collection Strategy,
the Countering WMD Strategic Plan, and the NSC-directed country
studies.

As the threat of proliferation has increased, US Intelligence
capabilities to support counterproliferation efforts have been
redirected or expanded and now include:

Supporting diplomatic, law enforcement, and military efforts
to counter proliferation;

Providing direct support for multilateral initiatives and
security regimes; and

Overcoming denial and deception practices set up by proliferators
to conceal their programs.

US Intelligence has taken or participated in actions to address
the overall challenges facing US counterproliferation efforts,
including:

Formation of the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology
Working Group (NPAC/TWG) to enhance the coordination of R&D
efforts among intelligence, operational, policy and other elements
of the US Government;

Fostering the development of new technologies with the potential
to improve our ability to detect WMD activities at significantly
longer ranges than possible today. For example, the Central Intelligence
Agency has explored the efficacy of high risk, high payoff counterproliferation-related
Research and Development initiatives;

Establishing a relationship to enhance cooperation between
CIA and R&D components;

Redirecting and reorganizing intelligence activities to increase
and sharpen the focus of counterproliferation-related efforts--both
analytically and operationally; and

Redirecting resources and activities toward assisting Federal
Bureau of Investigation and US Customs Service efforts to identify,
target, and apprehend individuals engaged in the trafficking and
smuggling of nuclear materials worldwide.

Additionally, the creation of JMIP to coordinate joint, DoD-wide
initiatives, activities and programs, will provide intelligence
information and support to multiple DoD customers and should significantly
enhance US Intelligence support to DoD's counterproliferation
program.

US efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
have enjoyed some successes over the past several years. Director
Deutch observed last week, I think a tremendous amount of progress
has been done...to build a serious, post-Cold War, nonproliferation
intelligence capability. For obvious reasons, we cannot describe
in this forum many of our successes. Some that we can include:

Supporting Department of State efforts to provide actionable
intelligence to the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspection
and monitoring effort in Iraq.

Developing a list of collection indicators to alert collectors
and analysts prior to use of chemical and biological weapons.
Similar initiatives are also underway to provide early warning
for the possible diversion of nuclear materials.

Establishing a southern Tier Study Group designed to focus
on all WMD-related proliferation issues in the southern tier of
the Former Soviet Union.

Providing Congressional Committees with a report that reviewed
and evaluated nonproliferation programs in the NFIP fiscal year
1996 budget submission.

But even if we could list all of our accomplishments, we would
be the first to say there is more to do. Over the next year, the
Community will seek to:

Strengthen and focus our integrated collection strategy;

Work to enhance the Community's information processing capabilities;

Implement unified and standardized information systems, to
include shared access by intelligence and consumer organizations;

Strengthen and broaden foreign language training and support
tools;

continue to review and evaluate new methodologies and technologies;

And, as part of the DCI and Secretary of Defense joint program
and budget reviews, continue to evaluate intelligence resources
and capabilities for optimal support for actions to counter proliferation.

In closing, I would note that intelligence is essential to countering
the proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction.
The recent anniversary of the poison gas attack in the Tokyo subway
reminded all of the devastating consequences of such an attack.
The US is not invulnerable. While we will continue to provide
intelligence support to those who would have to respond to such
an event, we must do all that we can to eliminate or at least
minimize such a possibility. Of course we will continue efforts
to impede and prevent the spread and acquisition of such weapons
and technology. That, however, is not enough. Efforts to terminate
developmental program and to deter weapons use must be enhanced.