Abstract [en]

When a set of players cooperate, they need to decide how the collective cost should be allocated amongst them. Cooperative game theory provides several methods or solution concepts, that can be used as a tool for cost allocation. In this note, we consider a specific solution concept called the Equal Profit Method (EPM). In some cases, a solution to the EPM is any one of infinitely many solutions. That is, it is not always unique. This leads to a lack of clarity in the characterization of the solutions obtained by the EPM. We present a modified version of the EPM, which unlike its precursor ensures a unique solution. In order to illustrate the differences, we present some numerical examples and comparisons between the two concepts.

Abstract [en]

A freight forwarder may consolidate its goods transportations in order to achieve a more efficient operation. When goods transportations are consolidated, they may reduce operational costs, e.g. labor and fuel. This can be further improved if a number of freight forwarders cooperate and consolidate their collective goods transportations, i.e. it is a cooperation between competitors, a coopetition. In order to maintain the cooperation, a suitable business model, in which fair cost allocations plays an important role is essential. The potential by cooperating is not exclusive to freight forwarders, but in fact, any type of goods transportation planning may benefit from cooperation. In this thesis, cooperative game theory is used as an academic tool to study cooperation between stakeholders in different transportation planning applications. Cooperative game theory defines a number of criteria for fair cost allocations.

In Paper 1, the role of the municipality as an enabler of a cooperation between fictitious freight forwarders in an urban area, is studied. In this case, the municipality acts as a stakeholder with unusual characteristics. It is shown that a stable cooperation can be achieved if the municipality is willing to carry some of the cost. This cost is specified and discussed in Paper 1. The results of Paper 2 contribute to game theory by introducing a further development of a cost allocation method. Some small numerical examples are presented in order to illustrate the resulting changes. In Paper 3, the process of establishing a cooperation is studied, where the stakeholders, in this case forest companies, join the cooperation sequentially. Who will join and in what order, is not predetermined. It is shown that a stable cooperation can be achieved despite the uncertainty. This is done by using the cost allocation methods presented.