Islamists Are Dreaming of a Caliphate State? Do They Know What They're Talking About?

Timothy R. Furnish holds a PhD in Islamic, African and World history and works as an author, analyst and consultant to the US military. His website is www.mahdiwatch.org and he is on Twitter as @occidentaljihad. This article was first published on MahdiWatch.org.

With the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham annexing large sections of Iraq and Syria, and the
subsequent proclamation of a new caliphate
under Ibrahim al-Badri, or “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi”—ruling as “Caliph
Ibrahim”—the current clash
of civilizations (between Islam and every other one, particularly the
Christian West)
enters a new and
potentially more ominous phase. But while a terrorist-created caliphate is a net negative
for the world (Muslims included), the caliphate per se may yet result in some positives for the modern world—as
per the title of my not-yet-completed book, The Caliphate: Threat or Opportunity?

My once and future
book....

Some history of this primary Islamic political
institution is in order, considering how many misapprehensions exist on the topic. Khalifah
means “successor” to Muhammad as leader of the Muslim community/state, in both a political and religious
sense—as pointed out by Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, in God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First
Centuries of Islam (Cambridge, 1984). In
fact, according to Crone and Hinds, the office of the caliph
even had eschatological
overtones insofar as the occupant thereof was “rightly-guided” by Allah
in the same way
(though perhaps not as
intensely) as the End Times Mahdi would be. Shi`is of
various stripes eventually
eschewed the caliphate as a
usurping Sunni office, opting instead for the Imamate dependent upon
Muhammad’s male descendants
via Ali, Hasan or Husayn,
and their offspring—whether the legitimate line ran through the 5th Imam
(Zaydis), the 7th
(Isma’ilis) or the 12th
(Twelvers). Only one Shi`i group—the Ismai’li Sevener Fatimids,
who ruled Egypt in the
medieval period—really used the term “caliph” for its leaders, perhaps
to curry legitimacy
with the bulk of Egypt’s
population, which always remained staunchly Sunni.

The Fatimid Caliphate-Imamate, in dark green, 970-1171 AD.

The other major caliphates in history were all unambiguously Sunni;
those of: the Rashidun (“rightly-guided”), the first four men to succeed Muhammad; the Umayyads of Damascus
(661-750 AD); the Abbasids of Baghdad—Islam’s “Golden Age”—from 750-1258
AD; and the Ottomans, who ruled for some six centuries until right after World War I. One
other caliphate was
something of an outlier: that of the North African al-Muwahhidun, or
“Almohads,” which was
founded as an overtly
Mahdist state by Ibn Tumart in the 12th century AD but which, after his
death, transformed into a (mere)
caliphate.

Other
lesser, regional caliphal
states have been proclaimed in the past, such as Usman don Fodio’s
Sokoto Caliphate of what
is now northern Nigeria,
and several short-lived ones in the Iberian Peninsula. But
over the last several
centuries, the most
powerful and important caliphate, by far, was that of the Ottomans,
adduced by Abülhamid II (Abd al-Hamid II) in the late 19th/early
20th century as a rallying point for Pan-Islamic unity. With
the Ottoman defeat in World War I and the
onset of the Turkish
Republic, the new secular rulers of Turkey first dissolved the political
power of the House of Osman—the
sultanate—but allowed it to
retain the caliphate as a spiritual authority for Muslims. But in 1924
even this was eradicated, and the last caliph—Abdülmecid (Abd al-Majid)—was exiled to Paris. The
Royal Seal of the House of Osman, c. 1882.
It's festooned with more
weapons, bladed and gunpowder, than a pick-up truck in Texas. Others tried to claim the caliphate, or considered doing do: notably
King Husayn of the Hijaz in
Arabia, who was ultimately defeated by the Sa`udis; and King Fu’ad of
Egypt. Islamic
conferences on the
caliphate met in Mecca in 1926 and Jerusalem in 1931, but could not
agree on the structure and function
of the office, much less on
someone to occupy it. About
the same time Rashid Rida, a
leading Syrian-Egyptian Islamic “modernist,” advocated a caliph as a
preeminent mujtahid,
or exerciser of ijtihad (“updater”
of Islamic law), while both of the Muslim Brotherhood’s major
thinkers--Hasan al-Banna,
its founder, and later Sayyid Qutb, its foremost theorist—endorsed the
caliphate.
Outside the Arab world, the Indo-Pakistani thinker Abu A`la Mawdudi directly pushed for the caliphate’s re-establishment,
stretching from Morocco to Indonesia.

However,
the efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood and Mawdudi notwithstanding, from
the 1950s until recently,
the Pan-Islamic idea of the
caliphate largely took a back seat to either enthnolinguistic-based
unity schemes (Pan-Arabism,
Pan-Turkism) or to
nation-state sovereignty. But in recent decades (certainly
since 1979), the failure
of such agendas has caused
many of the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims to take another look at Islamic
history as a unifying
force for the ummah—which, in Sunni contexts, means chiefly the caliphate. Pro-caliphal
propaganda has been sowed around the world, first and foremost, since 1952 by Hizb al-Tahrir, which openly promoted
the resurrection of the caliphate. (I have attended two of this organization’s yearly meetings in
the US, in 2009 and 2012, and written on the former in the “Washington Times” and on the latter at my website.) Zeal for the caliphate particularly consumes many in Pakistan, where
over a dozen parties espouse it (as per Vernie Liebl, “The Caliphate,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 45,
No. 3, May 2009, pp. 373-391). So ISIS’s new caliphate did not spring ex nihilo from
al-Baghdadi’s
fevered brow; rather, the
groundwork for bringing back such has been being laid almost since the
last Ottoman ruler was deposed.
Many
Muslims—probably a minority, but still tens if not hundreds of
millions—are willing to consider a
renewed caliphate as a
unifier and a point of pride for their faith, the world’s
second-largest. But
most of those probably would not have made the leader of ISIS their first choice.

Home page of the "Party of Liberation's" website. HT has been the John the
Baptist to Caliph Ibrahim's messianic success. How does “Caliph Ibrahim” stack up against historical Islamic standards? According
to Ibn Khaldun, the great
medieval Muslim sociologist and historian, the caliph’s prerequisites
are: 1) knowledge of
Islamic law; 2) honesty and
virtue; 3) ability to lead and wage jihad (yes, holy war);
4) physical health
and lack of bodily defects;
5) Qurayshi origin (descent from Muhammad); and of course 7) maleness
(see The Muqaddimah,
Princeton University, 1981, pp. 158-60). But as Bernard Lewis points out (The Political
Language of Islam, University of Chicago, 1988, p. 99 and passim),
as Islamic history wore on “legitimacy…of
qualifications…was
progressively reduced to the point where, in effect, only two conditions
remained—power and
Islam. As long as the ruler
possessed the necessary armed strength to seize and hold power, and as
long as he was a Muslim,
however minimal and however
nominal, that sufficed.” According to Liebl (pp. 387ff),
that medieval/early
modern concept of the
caliphate was echoed in, and given the stamp of approval by, the 1926
Cairo conference, which mandated
only that the caliph be a
Muslim and a ”free sovereign capable of defending Islam”—of waging
jihad, in other
words. (It was even stated that the caliph could accede to power via conquest.)

“Caliph
Ibrahim” fits a number of Ibn Khaldun’s
requirements: PhD in
Islamic law, demonstrated aptitude for jihad, health, and XY
chromosomes. His followers
probably credit him with probity, as well. He lacks only Muhammadan descent (although don’t be surprised
if a fatwa to that effect from a caliphal-friendly `alim shows up in short order). And
he certainly meets the two
bare bones requirements as laid out by the Cairo Conference. Just as Usama bin
Ladin, a renegade non-cleric, could issue a fatwa of “jihad against Jews and Crusaders”and have it heeded by many, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a renegade leader, can proclaim a caliphate with himself in command.
In fact, the latter
probably has more legitimacy than UBL, since he actually rules
substantial territory, is far more
formally knowledgable about
Islam, and has been in the front ranks fighting against the avowed
enemies of Islam (rather than
having spent the most
recent years plotting from a cave or safe house). Nothing succeeds like success, especially when it comes to the caliphate.

A decade ago the US National Intelligence Council tried to
peer into the palantir and envision geopolitics in 2020. Part of that included the fictional scenario of a new caliphate.
The two most important “lessons learned” from this exercise include the following: 1) “a Caliphate
would not have to be
entirely successful…to present a serious challenge to the international
order”;
and 2) “the proclamation of
a caliphate would not lessen the likelihood of terrorism and, in
fomenting more conflict,
could fuel a new generation
of terrorists.” As the first of these contentions is already being borne
out—with the erasure of the Iraqi-Syrian border, Jordan’s possibly next—and the second almost sure to follow, concern over the new caliphate is more justified than dismissive sang-froid.

Caliph Ibrahim & former Ottoman Caliph Mehmet V. Both proclaimed jihad; one is
just a snazzier dresser with more bling.

But while the self-styled caliphal “Islamic State” is quite problematic, it’s perhaps
not the geopolitical disaster that some would have it. First, al-Badri’s
caliphate may yet be
rejected by the non-Arab-jihadist Muslim population, on the grounds of
his lacking Qurayshi bona
fides and/or his deficiency of ties to the last Ottoman caliph. Second, more
reputable
organizations like the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation or al-Azhar University/Mosque—Sunni
Islam’s highest
authority (founded,
ironically, by the aforementioned Shi`i Fatimids)—will almost inevitably
condemn and illegitimize
the “Islamic State” [IS]. Third, claimants with far more plausible claims to the caliphate--such
as descendants of the Ottoman royal line, King Abd Allah II of Jordan or, perhaps most credibly, the family of Barkat Ali Khan Mukarram Jah Asaf Jah VIII, with ties to the Ottoman and Mughal rulers (see Liebl, pp. 384ff.)—might dispute
the pretensions of “Caliph Ibrahim.” So too might the Saudis, who have never asserted
such but whose rulership of
Mecca and Medina makes their claim more religiously, if less
militantly, convincing.

Some argue that the new caliphate’s brutal
practices of beheading and crucifixion will inevitably make it unpopular and lead to its demise. Perhaps.
But there’s a
problem with that thesis: both beheading and crucifixion are enjoined in
the Qur’an for,
respectively, battlefield
opponents and those who “war against Allah (and Muhammad)” and/or cause
“immorality.”
(Here is my analysis of Islamic decapitation; an excellent break-down of the Qur’anic passage backstopping crucifixion can be found here.) IS[IS]
may be violent, but it’s not thereby unIslamic;
in fact, the caliphate can
claim, quite plausibly, to be hewing closer to the Qur’an than the Sunni
leaders in Amman
or Riyadh—never mind the murtaddun, “apostates,” ruling in Damascus and Baghdad—as it hews
through infidel necks.

As
for the alleged threat
IS[IS] poses to the West in general and the US in particular: in the near term,
such is doubtful—hyperbolic claims about conquering Rome notwithstanding—but
on a long(er) time frame,
“Caliph Ibrahim,” if he and
his devotees stay in power, is indeed a clear and present danger to our
allies and
interests in the Middle
East proper. Not just Jordan and northern Saudi Arabia are in the caliph’s crosshairs; much more ominously, IS[IS]
almost certainly plans on attacking Israel in order to “liberate” al-Quds, Jerusalem. This
is all the more true to the
extent that the new caliphate is motivated by eschatological fervor (as
per my previous post). Al-Badri’s hubris is so great that he may even begin
to think of himself in Mahdist terms—if his followers are not already doing so.

How on earth is any of this positive?
A number of ways come to mind. First, a caliph that enjoins beheadings and
crucifixions and simultaneously adduces his strict adherence to the Qur’an and the example of Muhammad might,
just might, cause some Muslims to start questioning slavish adherence to same. Second,
this caliphate is
inexorably exposing the
fact that Iraq and Syria (and likely Jordan) possess only the thinnest
gauze of legitimacy, and that
the ethnic and sectarian
realities on the ground would likely be better served by a reversion to
the Ottoman realities; certainly
the Kurds would benefit
thereby. Third, a caliph and state dedicated to jihad
against not just non-Muslims,
but Shi`is, would (further)
draw Jordan, Sa`udi Arabia and Egypt—and likely even Turkey—into closer
cooperation
with the US and Israel. Relatedly,
perhaps even the world’s foremost state sponsor of terror—the
Islamic Republic of
Iran—might realize that the Dajjal in their midst is worse than the
Great Satan over the horizon.
Fourth, with a Qur’anic literalist caliphate subjugating tens of thousands of Christians to dhimmi
status,
and raping and killing
those who object, perhaps at long last the majority-Christian countries
of the world—led by the
largest one, the US—will
stand up for their co-religionists in the Middle East.

The Sack of Rome by Muslim Arabs (846 AD) as depicted on a $6 US of Islam bill. Sheer
genius from moneyartstore.com

And who knows? If the US, or at least this
administration, is too craven to protect Christians from such a horrific caliphate, then an El Cid may emerge from a more worthy venue--one that is not ashamed to stand up for his, and its, civilizational, and yes, religious,
heritage.