Below, neither plaintiff nor the OLCC disputed the underlying historical
facts. Their dispute lay in whether those facts, taken together, showed sufficient control
over liquor agents' retail operations to make them OLCC employees. Below, and to a
large extent on appeal, the parties have based their arguments on an analysis of statutory
and common-law tests for determining independent contractor and employee status. On
appeal, however, the OLCC has also argued, in support of the trial court's ruling, that the
legislature has conclusively resolved the issue that plaintiff raises on appeal. Relying on
ORS 471.752(1), the OLCC contends that the legislature has determined that liquor
agents are employees only for the purpose of receiving two specified benefits. In so
doing, the OLCC reasons, the legislature has determined that liquor agents are not
employees for the purpose of receiving any other employee benefit. We agree with the
OLCC that ORS 471.752(1) resolves the issue that plaintiff's first assignment of error
presents.

ORS 471.752(1) provides:

"An agent appointed under ORS 471.750 [a liquor agent] may participate in
a health benefit plan available to state employees pursuant to ORS 243.105
to 243.285 at the expense of the agent and may participate in the state
deferred compensation plan established under ORS 243.401 to 243.507.
For such purposes, agents shall be considered eligible state employees."

The text of ORS 471.572(1) makes clear that liquor agents are state employees only for
the purpose of participating in two specific benefits--health benefit plans and deferred
compensation plans. See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industry, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859
P2d 1143 (1993). Put another way, ORS 471.572(1) makes clear that liquor agents are
not OLCC employees for the purpose of receiving any benefit from the state other than
those specified in that subsection. See Roseburg Forest Products v. Wilson, 110 Or App
72, 76, 821 P2d 426 (1991) (explaining that "[t]he inclusion of specific matters in a
statute implies a legislative intent to exclude related matters not mentioned").

Plaintiff raises a second issue. He argues that the trial court erred in ruling
that ORS 471.750(1) does not require the OLCC to bargain over the terms of the
standardized retail sales agreement. Before turning to plaintiff's argument, it is helpful to
put it in perspective. In response to the OLCC's summary judgment motion, plaintiff
submitted an affidavit in which he stated that the OLCC offered a standardized retail sales
agreement to liquor agents but would not negotiate further over the agreement's terms.
According to plaintiff,

"The OLCC dictated the terms of the Retail Sales Agents Agreement, and
required me (and other liquor agents) to either sign the Agreement proposed
by the OLCC, or cease all store operations: the OLCC did not negotiate and
did not engage in a give and take to reach negotiated contract terms."

In plaintiff's view, the OLCC's refusal to bargain over the terms of the standardized retail
sales agreement violates its obligation under ORS 471.750(1).

ORS 471.750(1) provides:

"The Oregon Liquor Control Commission shall establish such stores and
warehouses in such places in the state as in its judgment are required by
public convenience or necessity, for the sale of spirituous liquors, wines and
other alcoholic liquors containing over five percent alcohol by volume, in
sealed containers for consumption off the premises. * * * The commission
shall adopt rules governing advertising by stores operated by the
commission. The commission may appoint agents in the sale of said liquor
under such agreement as the commission may negotiate with said agents or
their representative."

The text of ORS 471.750(1) does not direct the OLCC to bargain over the terms of the
retail sales agreement. Rather, the legislature's use of the word "may" leaves it to the
OLCC to determine in how much negotiation, if any, it is willing to engage. See State ex
rel Cox v. Davidson Ind., 291 Or 839, 851, 635 P2d 630 (1981). Indeed, the dependent
clause--"as the commission may negotiate with said agents or representatives"--merely
modifies the phrase "such agreement." It does not impose an independent duty to bargain
over the individual terms in the agreement. When the legislature wants to impose such a
duty, it knows how to say so. See 243.650(4) (defining "collective bargaining" as the
"mutual obligation of [two parties] to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith *
* * for the purpose of negotiations concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining"). The
trial court correctly ruled that the ORS 471.750(1) does not require the sort of mandatory
bargaining that plaintiff seeks.

Affirmed.

1. Two interrelated claims for relief bear on this issue. In his fourth claim for
relief, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that liquor agents are OLCC employees. In
his fifth claim for relief, plaintiff sought damages "on account of unpaid retirement
benefits, overtime wages, sick pay, vacation pay, fringe benefits, unpaid salary and other
compensation and funds" that he would have received if he were an OLCC employee.

2. In his second claim for relief, plaintiff alleged that the OLCC was acting
ultra vires because it was required, as a matter of statute, to negotiate the terms of the
retails sales agreements with its liquor agents.

3. The OLCC argues that plaintiff's first assignment of error--which is directed
to the trial court's ruling on his declaratory judgment claim--is not justiciable because
plaintiff has not also assigned error to the trial court's ruling on his claim for damages. In
his reply, plaintiff agrees that the two claims are integrally related but responds that his
right to recover damages is contingent on his status as an employee. He contends that, if
we agree that he is an employee for the purpose of receiving employee benefits, then the
trial court can calculate the appropriate damages on remand. We agree with plaintiff that
the failure to assign error to the trial court's ruling on his claim for damages does not
render his first assignment of error nonjusticiable.

4. Additionally, to the extent that the general test set out in ORS 670.600
would otherwise apply to this case, the more specific determination set out in ORS
470.752(1) controls. See Kambury v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.

5. Plaintiff does not argue that we should reverse and remand the trial court's
judgment because it dismissed his declaratory judgment claim instead of entering a
declaration as to his rights. See City of Portland v. Cook, 170 Or App 245, 253, 12 P3d
70 (2000), rev den, 332 Or 56 (2001) (holding that, if the trial court has jurisdiction, it
may not dismiss a declaratory judgment claim but should enter a declaration of the parties'
rights). In the absence of an objection, we conclude that our opinion serves as a sufficient
declaration of plaintiff's right to receive the benefits of state employment. We also note
that plaintiff has not contended, in response to the OLCC's reliance on ORS 471.752(1),
that the OLCC has precluded him from participating in a state health benefit plan or in a
state deferred compensation plan--the two employee benefits that that subsection makes
available to liquor agents.