Although the roots of the
National Velascuista Federation began when its leader, Velasco
Ibarra, first became President of Ecuador in 1934, it did not
become an official party until 1952, when it became the basis of
Velasco Ibarra's support in the election of that year. While
during this time period the party's official name was always the
National Velascuista Federation, it was often referred to as
simply "The Velascuista party."

1.03 organizational
discontinuity

8, AC8

The National Velascuista
Federation underwent a major split in 1961, when Carlos Julio
Arosemena, Velascoís own vice-president, helped engineer
Velascoís ouster as President. There was other evidence of
discontent within the party, e.g., the abstention of 40,351 party
members from the national elections due to a disagreement with the
party directorate. But there was only one split.

1.04 leadership
competition

2, AC7

The National Velasquista
Federation was formed to promote the candidacy of Velasco Ibarra
for the presidency in 1952. Successful in the 1952 election,
Velasco was prohibited by the constitution from succeeding himself
in office. In 1956, the party thus gave its support to Chiriboga
Villagomez, who lost, but it seems that Velasco remained the
leading force within the party which still bore his name. In 1969
Velasco was eligible to run for the presidency himself, and he won
again. In late 1961, he was forced into exile, and the presidency
was assumed by Carlos Julio Arosemena, his vice-president and a
top leader of the Velascuista party. However, this did not appear
to shake Velascoís hold on the party. In 1963, Arosemena
was removed from office by a military coup caused at least in part
by fear that Velasco would return to contest and win the scheduled
1964 election. When elections were finally resumed in 1964 Velasco
did indeed return and win the presidency once more.

l.05 legislative
instability

Instability is .82,
AC8

The high instability score for
the Velasquistas reflects their remarkable fluctuation in seats
held in the chamber during our time period- in 1952, the party
contested the congressional elections along with the presidency.
Then it burst upon the scene with 34 percent of the seats. Its
legislative representation declined to 5 percent in 1958 but
climbed to 48 percent with Velascoís presidential victory
in 1960. When he was forced into exile in 1961, the partyís
fortunes changed, and only 4 percent of the 1962 legislature were
admitted Velasquistas.

1.06 electoral
instability

Instability is .33,
AC7

The three presidential elections
of 1952, 1956, and 1960 were used in calculating the electoral
strength and instability of the FNV. But this presents some
problem, for Velasco himself was a candidate in only the first and
last of these elections. The 1956 candidate was Chiriboga
Villagomez, who was adopted as certain facts. First, the FNV was
never outlawed when it was out of power nor did it outlaw other
parties when in power. Second, although the counting of votes in
Ecuador is not strictly impartial, it appears to be honest enough
to acknowledge changes in party fortunes and alterations in power.
Third, whatever advantages the FNV enjoyed while in power are
likely to have been offset by its handicaps while out of power.
And because the party was in and out of power during each half of
our time period, the ne certain facts. First, the FNV was never
outlawed when it was out of power nor did it outlaw other parties
when in power. Second, although the counting of votes in Ecuador
is not strictly impartial, it appears to be honest enough to
acknowledge changes in party fortunes and alterations in power.
Third, whatever advantages the FNV enjoyed while in power are
likely to have been offset by its handicaps while out of power.
And because the party was in and out of power during each half of
our time period, the net effect is judged to be nil.

Governmental Status Variables,
2.01-2.07

2.01 Government Discrimination

0, AC4

While the literature does not discuss at length incidences of
government discrimination for or against the parties, some fairly
reliable inferences can be drawn from certain facts. First, the
FNV was never outlawed when it was out of power nor did it
outlaw other parties when in power. Second, although the counting
of votes in Ecuador is not strictly impartial, it appears to
be honest enough to acknowledge changes in party fortunes and
alternations in power. Third, whatever advantages the FNV ennjoyed
while in power are likely to be offeset by its handicaps while out
of power, and because the party was in and out of power during
each half of our time period, the net effect is judged to be
nil.

2.02 governmental
leadership

5 out of 7 for 1950-56,
AC9

2 out of 6 for 1957-62,
AC5

Velasco Ibarra, leader of the
National Velascuista Federation, was President of Ecuador from
1952 to 1956, and from 1960 to 1961, when he was ousted by the
military forces in his country. However, Carlos Julio Arosemena,
his vice president and a leader of the FNV, was then elected to
the presidency by the congress. And the party still had
representation in the congress. Thus one might argue that the
party continued to claim the governmental leader. But in the 1962
elections for congress, 6 deputies were elected as arosemenistas
and 4 as Velasquistas, suggesting a split from the
FNV.

2.03 cabinet
participation

5 out of 7 for 1950-56,
AC8

2 out of 6 for 1957-62,
AC7

Velasquistas were members of the
president's cabinet from 1952-1956 and from 1960-1961. This was
under the leadership of Velasco Ibarra. It was not evident from
the literature whether or not Velasquistas were cabinet members
during the rule of parties other than their own. The cabinet was
changed completely when Arosemena was declared elected in
November, 1961, and it appears that none of the ministries went to
Velasquistas.

2.04 national
participation

4 for 1950-56, AC9

5 for 1957-62, AC9

The FNV was decidedly more
regional in its appeal in 1952 than in 1960. In 1952, it drew 56
percent of its vote from the coastal region which accounted for
only 38 percent of the total vote. In 1960, it again ran stronger
in the coastal region, claiming 53 percent of its vote there, but
by then the region climbed in population and cast 46 percent of
the total vote.

2.05 legislative
strength

Strength is .21 for 1950-56, AC8,
and .20 for 1957-62, AC8

The high instability score for
the Velasquistas reflects their remarkable fluctuation in seats
held in the chamber during our time period- in 1952, the party
contested the congressional elections along with the presidency.
Then it burst upon the scene with 34 percent of the seats. Its
legislative representation declined to 5 percent in 1958 but
climbed to 48 percent with Velascoís presidential victory
in 1960. When he was forced into exile in 1961, the partyís
fortunes changed, and only 4 percent of the 1962 legislature were
admitted Velasquistas.

2.06 electoral
strength

Strength is .30 for 1950-56, AC8,
and .48 for 1957-62, AC7

The three presidential elections
of 1952, 1956, and 1960 were used in calculating the electoral
strength and instability of the FNV. But this presents some
problem, for Velasco himself was a candidate in only the first and
last of these elections. The 1956 candidate was Chiriboga
Villagomez, who was adopted as certain facts. First, the FNV was
never outlawed when it was out of power nor did it outlaw other
parties when in power. Second, although the counting of votes in
Ecuador is not strictly impartial, it appears to be honest enough
to acknowledge changes in party fortunes and alterations in power.
Third, whatever advantages the FNV enjoyed while in power are
likely to have been offset by its handicaps while out of power.
And because the party was in and out of power during each half of
our time period, the ne certain facts. First, the FNV was never
outlawed when it was out of power nor did it outlaw other parties
when in power. Second, although the counting of votes in Ecuador
is not strictly impartial, it appears to be honest enough to
acknowledge changes in party fortunes and alterations in power.
Third, whatever advantages the FNV enjoyed while in power are
likely to have been offset by its handicaps while out of power.
And because the party was in and out of power during each half of
our time period, the net effect is judged to be nil.

2.07 outside origin

7, AC9
The National Velascuista Federation was founded by Velasco Ibarra
who had been president of Ecuador two times before the party's
founding in 1952. Before, Velasco had run as an independent, but
in 1952, this party formed the basis of his support.

Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15

5.01 ownership of means of
production

1, AC5

While the Velascuista government
financed certain basic industries in Ecuador and while it
advocated government regulation, it was not found to support
ownership of the means of production in its country.

5.02 government role in economic
planning

3, AC9

The government of Velasco Ibarra
strongly favored taking an active part in the development of its
countryís economy. It subsidized certain regions in the
building of roads, brought about an expansion in agricultural
production, and instituted various tax reforms.

5.03 redistribution of
wealth

0, AC5

Having the typical Latin American
maldistribution of wealth, Ecuador found itself with a few large
landowners paying almost no taxation, and a great mass of poor
Indians unable to attain land. Velasco Ibarra promised to change
the situation by bringing reform to the poor and landless people.
But, even though he introduced various new tax measures, they
proved only to increase the cost of living and put an additional
burden on middle and low income consumers. Eventually, this issue
led to Velasco's ouster in 1961.

5.04 social welfare

3, AC8

In advocating social reforms for
the people of Ecuador, Velasco Ibarra promised and succeeded in
launching an ambitious program. It included advances in education,
literacy, public works. And low cost housing, along with
colonization and agrarian reform.

5.05 secularization of
society

1, AC5

Our consultant reports that
Velasco was critical of clericalism in politics.

5.06 support of the
military

3, AC9

While he himself had many
problems with the armed forces in his country, Velasco Ibarra
generally supported the military establishment in Ecuador. He
believed in the necessity of the armed forces and used them to
fight terrorism in his country in 1953. In 1961, Velasco's
government raised taxes in order to give more money to the
military.

5.07 alignment with east-west
blocs

5, AC9

Throughout his terms of office,
Velasco Ibarra spoke out against communism. Communist countries
represented an extreme threat to him in his last term as president
in 1960. Moreover, since 1947 when he was president of Ecuador for
the second time, Velasco entered into many mutual assistance pacts
with the United States, often looking to the United States for
economic aid as well.

5.08 anti-colonialism
-

3, AC7

The United States gave both
financial and technical assistance to Ecuador throughout the time
period, including the administrations of Velasco Ibarra. This
assistance was actively sought by Velasco who realized the
importance of the United States aid to his country.

5.09 supranational
integration

0, AC3

While in 1960 Velasco demanded a
larger share in the economic benefits of international trade,
there was no other information to enable sufficient recognition,
in terms of actual economic and political practice, of
Velascoís attitudes on supranational
integration

5.10 national
integration

3, AC6

Velasco Ibarra was known to be an
extreme nationalist, with a desire to break down the barriers
between people in his country and bring them together. The Indians
of Ecuador were one cultural sector which Velasco desired td
incorporate into the rest of society.

5.11 electoral
participation

1, AC8

Velasco was in favor of free
elections in Ecuador--in the ability to vote without coercion.
During his term of office, voting was compulsory for all literate
male citizens. Still, since 40 percent of all men could not read
or write, they were excluded from voting. The effect of the
literacy requirement was to deny the franchise to
Indians.

5.12 protection of civil
rights

3, AC6

In 1960, the Velasco government
instituted laws to protect the Indians and incorporate them into
society. This was in answer to the discrimination felt by the
Indians from other sectors found within Ecuador.

5.13 interference with civil
liberties

AC1

No information.

5.14 / 5.15 US--Soviet experts
left-right ratings

US says 2, center

Soviets say 2, the party is
composed of various classes of the population, believing in
Velasco personally. During periods of mass uprisings, he made
demagogic statements promising to satisfy the needs of laborers.
During his periods of presidency, he suppressed by force the
demands of the workers and peasants.

Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55

6.00 open competition in the
electoral process

4, AC8

Velasco Ibarra and the National
Velascuista Federation relied upon open competition in the
electoral process. No fraudulent behavior was practiced when
Velasco ran for president in 1952, and in 1956, due to this
assurance, the elections of that year were conducted in an
extremely orderly fashion.

6.10 restricting party
competition

0, AC8

Both times during our time period
when Velasco was president of Ecuador, he relied upon open
competition among political parties. Voters were given full
freedom in voting for the party of their choice, without being
coerced by the Velascuista government.

6.20 subverting the political
system

0, AC8

While the literature did not
expressly say that the National Velascuista Federation did not
subvert the political process, there was enough evidence to the
contrary to imply that it did not.

6.30 propagandizing ideas and
program

AC1

No information.

6.40 allying with other
parties

AC1

No information

6.50 providing for welfare of
party members

AC1

No information.

Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05

7.01 Sources of Funds

1 (sector 01), AC8

It is impossible to accurately determine
the proportion of Social Democratic Party funds received from the
trade union federation and the Danish labor unions. However, the
federation and the ions support the daily Social Democratic paper
in Copenhagen, contribute over one half of the party's electoral
campaign funds, and provide other direct
contributions.

7.02 source of members

5 (sector 01), AC9

Although most trade union members support
the Social Democratic Party and the party has structural and
representational links with The unions, the party's membership is
entirely voluntary.

7.03 Sources of Leaders

2 (sectors 01, 03), AC9

Before 1957 all Social Democratic prime
ministers had labor backgrounds. However, other lesser leaders
were civil servants with academic backgrounds. Two of these became
prime minister between 1957-1962, as did one leader with a labor
background.

7.04 Relations With Domestic
Parties

5 for 1st half, AC9

4 for 2nd half, AC9

For the periods 1947-50 and 1953-57 the
Social Democrats headed minority governments whose existence were
dependent on the parliamentary voting support of the Radical Party
(which refused cabinet responsibility). From 1957-62 the Social
Democrats also headed governments but with the Radicals as part of
a governing coalition.

7.05 Relations With Foreign
Organizations

3, AC9

Although the Danish Social Democratic Party
is a member of the Socialist International, its membership in that
organization does not seem to affect its national policy
orientation. It operates mostly for the purpose of exchanging
information and ideas.

Organizational Complexity Variables,
8.01-8.07

8.01 structural
articulation

2, AC3

The FNV appears to have some sort
of central directorate, although only one mention of it was found
(in relation to a party disagreement). This variable has not been
assigned a stronger adequacy confidence code, because 'party
directorate' is not defined as an institutionalized organ in the
literature- it could be an ad-hoc group, or it could only mean
Velasco.

8.02 intensiveness of
organization

AC1

No information

8.03 extensiveness of
organization

AC1

There is no information on the
extensiveness of the organization of the FNV, although it does
have support and leadership in various parts of the
country.

8.04 frequency of local
meetings

AC1

No information

8.05 frequency of national
meetings

AC1

No information

8.06 maintaining
records

AC5

There is no evidence of party
records.

8.07 pervasiveness of
organization

0, AC3

The FNV may have been supported
at various times by political or socioeconomic sectors (E. G.,
Peasants, urban proletariats) in Ecuador. But it does not appear
that the party organized these persons or utilized their support
through pre-existing institutions.

Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08

9.01 nationalization of
structure

AC1

There is no direct evidence for
national or local organizations.

9.02 selecting the national
leader

8, AC9

Velasco Ibarra has consistently
named himself national leader and candidate, even when there was
discontent in the party, stating 'the Velasquismo of Velasco
Ibarra has the people's support.' the only exception to this was
in the 1961 coup against him by his vice-president, Arosemena, and
by Araujo. It is not clear if this had any vital effect on the
FNV. But it appears that Arosemena did not replace Velasco as
leader of the FNV.

9.03 selecting parliamentary
candidates

AC1

No information

9.04 allocating funds

AC1

No information

9.05 formulating
policy

7, AC3

From the data that we have, one
cannot distinguish between party policy (if there is any) and
Velascoís own public policy.

9.06 controlling
communications

AC1

No information

9.07 administering
discipline

AC1

For the 1st half 4 for the 2nd
half, AC5

We can consider the withholding
of votes by Guayaquil's FNV in 1960 and Arosemena's threats and
subsequent coup as punitive discipline against Velasco and his
immediate followers) governmental officials of the more rightist
inclination). Velasco's discipline against Arosemena was an
indirect threat that those who disagreed with the Velasquismo of
Velasco should leave the FNV. It thus appears that disciplinary
action (or threats) is made at all levels of the party, but always
by leaders, and generally by those on a national level or of
nationally recognized importance.

9.08 leadership
concentration

6, AC9

Velasco, the personalist leader,
exercises power by virtue of his popular support. This is revealed
most characteristically during the left wing split led by
Arosemena and Araujo in 1961. This succeeded in a temporary
transfer of governmental power to Arosemena, but Velasco was once
again supported for the FNV candidacy in 1964.

Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06

10.01 legislative
cohesion

AC1

There is no information about
legislative cohesiveness per se. The only information relating to
this concept discusses intra-party dissension but gives no further
data about how this was reflected in the legislature.

10.02 ideological
factionalism

1 for 1st half, AC3

3 for 2nd half, AC5

During the first half of our time
period, Velasco did not appear to have any ideological factions
developing within his party. The FNV, because his own ideology
(thus the ideology of the party) was totally unstructured--it
vacillated between right and left wing interpretations of events
as he consolidated power. Thus ideology would be considered a
matter of public debate in the party, but without any factional
tendency. In the discussion of the second half of our time period,
the mention of 'left wing' and 'leftist' in the literature was
equated with ideology. Sometime during the late 1950'5, or very
early 1960's, a left-right schism developed in the party which
culminated in the coup d'etat of 1961. The leftist oriented wing
is regarded as a small faction of the FNV because most of the
party members are followers of Velasco, rather than of am
ideology. And do not view the party as a vehicle for attaining
ideological goals. There is no evidence of any formal organization
of this leftist faction.

10.03 issue
factionalism

1 for 1st half, AC3

3 for 2nd half, AC5

The same general discussion
applied to variable 10.02 describes this variable. Factionalism
was issue oriented as well as ideologically oriented, because the
left wing of the FNV did demand certain actions of Velasco, i. e.,
recognition of Castroís Cuba and closer relations with the
communist nations.

10.04 leadership
factionalism

0 for 1st half, AC3

2 for 2nd half, AC6

During the first part of our time
period, the FNV was generally considered to be a representation of
Velasco's whims. There is no evidence in our data collection of
any leadership competition. During the second half of our time
period, we find an ambitious party member becoming vice-president
in 1960, and beginning to make political contacts and indeed
developing a base for support in an effort to gain power.
Arosemena is seen as a symbol of popular opposition to Velasco and
eventually leads a coup d'etat against him.

10.05 strategic or tactical
factionalism

0, AC3

There is no discussion of
different strategies within the FNV, and this aspect does not
appear to be a source of party factionalism.

10.06 party purges

0, AC5

There was a temporary ouster of
the leader in 1961, but this did not constitute a purge by our
definition.

Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06

11.01 membership
requirements

AC1

No information

11.02 membership
participation

AC2

There is not really enough
information about party members to determine the pervasiveness of
party participation. There is evidence of transitory support due
to Velasco's charisma, and yet there is also a statement about
40,351 active party members in the city of Guayaquil.

11.03 material
incentives

AC1

The one statement relating to
this variable speaks of the members of Velasco's administration as
'hand-picked mediocrity,' thus they feel indebted to Velasco for
their jobs. I do not know if we can equate the administration with
the FNV militants because of the prevalence of governmental
coalitions in Ecuadorian society. I do not therefore feel it
possible to code this variable with the information
given.

11.04 purposive
incentives

0 for 1st half, AC3

1 for 2nd half, AC3

Because of Velasco's lack of
structured ideology for the FNV, many people joined for many
different reasons. During the second half of our time period, a
faction of the FNV, a group of what I believe to be party
militants, were motivated to change the party orientation to a
more left wing philosophy, or at least to use the party as a
vehicle for their purposes.

11.05 doctrinism

0, AC8

In the case of the FNV, the party
doctrine is the variable utterances of the eloquent
Velasco.

11.06 personalism

4 for 1st half AC3

3 for 2nd half, AC3

Again, the problem in coding this
variable is in defining 'militants.' During the first half of our
time period, with the development of Velasquismo into an
Ecuadorian institution, I would have to believe that almost all of
the militants were motivated by Velasco and his vacillating
doctrine (probably joining the FNV for many different reasons).
During the 1961 split and coup, there was a decrease in total
support due to his failure to instrument social change. In both of
these observations, I had to rely on general trends within the
party during the time periods, in lieu of better data.