March 28, 2014

A Crimean Crisis for Delhi

The following article originally appeared in the Economic Times on March 28, 2014.

Russia's virtually bloodless annexation of Crimea has shaken Europe. At
the Brussels Forum, organised last weekend by the German Marshall Fund, leaders
and diplomats — including from Ukraine, Russia and Eastern Europe —
raised the worrying prospect of a new Cold War.

Many highlighted the need to enhance their military preparedness after two
decades of relative neglect. For its part, India has adopted a more careful
position on the Crimean crisis than the headlines have often projected.

While NSA Shivshankar Menon noted that there were "legitimate Russian and
other interests involved" in Crimea, PM Manmohan Singh — according to a
released statement — emphasised "issues of unity and territorial
integrity" and the hope of "long term peace and stability in
Europe" in a phone conversation with Russian President Vladimir
Putin.

The Crimean crisis has clearly presented India with a dilemma. On the one hand,
Indian commentators are mindful of New Delhi's longstanding ties with Moscow,
which manifest themselves primarily in defence sales and cooperation in
international organisations. While the defence ties have come under strain,
positive sentiments based on Russia's willingness to support India in less
promising times still find resonance.

There is also an implicit understanding about realms of influence among great
powers, which India finds relevant in its own neighbourhood, given its concerns
about Chinese involvement in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The Indian
leadership is also wary of China being the prime beneficiary of the
deteriorating relationship between Russia, on the one hand, and Europe and the
US, on the other.

New Delhi, it is felt, must keep pace by ensuring as little daylight as
possible between its position on Crimea and that of Beijing. But there are
other aspects of this situation that complicate India's stance, and the balance
to strike. The first is that this is not simply a case of India maintaining
equidistance between Russia and the West. Russia's annexation of Crimea has
engendered fears among its neighbours — including Kazakhstan and Belarus,
hardly pro-Western states — that feel that they can no longer treat Moscow's
assurances with any degree of seriousness, particularly when, like Ukraine,
they are home to large Russian speaking minorities.

Crimea's annexation by Russia, in other words, sets a dangerous precedent by
undermining the principle of pluralism, a value that is central to the idea of
India, and one that it upheld at significant cost during the Balkan conflicts
of the 1990s and 2000s.

There is also the small matter of sovereignty. While NATO enlargement has been
employed by some commentators to justify Russia's annexation of Crimea, new
NATO members — whether the Baltic states or most former Warsaw Pact members —
joined the US-led alliance of their own accord. This is often forgotten, even
by many American commentators, such as The New York Times' Thomas Friedman, who
place the blame for Russia's aggression squarely on NATO's doorstep.

The principle of sovereignty also extends to territorial claims based on
arbitrary points of history, such as Moscow's 1954 transfer of Crimea to
Ukraine. Not only are some of India's territorial claims undermined by such
justifications for revisionism, but so is any respect for treaties meant to
guarantee the territorial status quo.

After all, by signing the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Russia agreed to respect
Ukraine's sovereignty and "existing borders" (which included Crimea)
and to refrain from threatening or using force against Ukraine.

Like any decision which requires compromise between the logic of realpolitik
and a defence of principles, Russia's annexation of Crimea presents India with
an uncomfortable dilemma. Fortunately, India will not play a determinative role
in the outcome of the Crimean crisis. But in its words and deeds, it will have
to maintain a delicate balance between interests and values as relations
between Russia and the West deteriorate.