The Roman Catholic teaching on peace and war, as found in the documents of the universal church and of the American bishops, is found to be consistent with traditional Catholic approaches to ethical theory, eschatology, and ecclesiology. Mediation in ethical theory recognizes that the gospel is mediated through reason and the sciences to particular conclusions and insists on the importance of structures and institutions. An eschatology recognizing the tension between the now and the not yet argues against both pacifism and (...) a noncritical acceptance of the status quo. Catholic ecclesiology has traditionally accepted a pluralism of specific approaches in social ethics and understands the prophetic role of the church within such a "big" ecclesiology. (shrink)

This article analyzes six ethical principles at work in the Pastoral Letter of the Roman Catholic Bishops on the United States economy. The first three principles derive from the Thomistic tradition with its attempt to avoid the extremes of collectivism and individualism. Human beings are by nature social and called to live in political society. The principle of subsidiarity guides the role of the state. Distributive and social justice furnish the criteria for a just distribution of human goods. The fourth (...) ethical principle which is a later development in the Catholic tradition recognizes human rights including economic rights. In keeping with recent emphases in Catholic teaching the fifth principle insists that the goods of creation exist to serve all and stresses the social aspect of property. The sixth principle enunciates a preferential option for the poor and has come to the fore in the light of recent liberation theology. (shrink)

There is general agreement about the very broad outlines of a just tax structure in the Roman Catholic tradition, and these are sketched in part I. There has been, however, no sustained, systematic, in-depth treatment of the question. Part II develops those aspects of the Roman Catholic ethical tradition which ground a just tax structure-the role of the state in working for the common good, distributive justice with its proportional equality, the universal destiny of the goods of creation to serve (...) the needs of all. In addition, some attention is given to the historical practice of tithing, the state's obligation to care for the poor, and the moral obligation to pay just taxes. Part III proposes the goals which should govern a just tax structure in the Roman Catholic perspective and defends these goals against other possible interpretations. (shrink)

Scholars agree that Aristotle held a view that has been called "Aristotelian Essentialism" , but disagree about what this thesis entails. I reconstruct as the view that there are certain individuals, namely substances, that have essences, and that essences are to be understood as "explanatorily basic" features of an individual--features of an individual substance that serve as part of a scientific explanation of the presence of other features of that individual, but are not themselves explained in this way. When Aristotle's (...) view is understood in this way, interesting differences and parallels between him and contemporary essentialists emerge. For one, so-called "properties of origin" such as "being born to George and Barbara Bush" are not essential to the individual that has them, on Aristotle's view. Furthermore, understanding Aristotle's view in this way explains why essences are not, as it has often been maintained, merely "career attributes"--properties that an individual has necessarily and at each moment at which it exists. I argue that for Aristotle, essences belong to an individual in virtue of the species to which it belongs, and that Aristotle subscribes to the "species-form" view of essence. I examine and respond to arguments to the contrary that, in both the Metaphysics and the Generation of Animals, Aristotle holds that the essence of an individual substance is an "individual form" unique to that thing, and not shared by any other individual. Aristotle's account of family resemblances, in particular, has been thought by many to present problems for understanding Aristotle's essentialism. In that text it looks like Aristotle gives up on the view that only certain features--the ones that define the species--are essential to an individual when he attempts to explain the phenomena of family resemblance. I conclude with a sketch of a reading of this text that shows Aristotle holding an account of family resemblances that is consistent with the view that only certain features--the explanatorily basic ones--are part of the essences of individual substances. (shrink)