How to Confront Russia's Anti-American Foreign Policy

About the Author

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.Visiting Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage FoundationDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy

President George
W. Bush's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in
Kennebunkport, Maine, on July 1-2 may be the last opportunity to
improve U.S.-Russian relations before the two leaders leave office
in 2008-2009. In Kennebunkport, President Bush may find out whether
Putin's proposal at the G-8 summit to cooperate on missile defense
with the U.S. is real or a sham. The U.S. should seriously
exam­ine this offer, which includes joint operation of the
Russian-leased radar station in Gabala, Azerbaijan, because it may
indicate a change in Russia's course toward Iran. It may also be a
lever to salvage the frayed relationship between Moscow and
Washington.

U.S.-Russian
relations have deteriorated signifi­cantly since post-9/11
cooperation in 2001-2002, and Russian foreign policy is evolving
fast. While Iraq, Iran, the war on terrorism, and the Middle East
in gen­eral remain top priorities in Washington, the United
States should pay close attention to a resurgent Russia because
Moscow is trying to reorder the post-Cold War global security
architecture, often in ways that are not in America's
interests.

Moscow's
Neo-Soviet Foreign Policy

Before the G-8
summit in Germany, President Putin issued an unprecedented threat
to retarget Russia's nuclear missiles at Europe, returning to the
Soviet strategic posture that existed before efforts by
Ameri­can President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev to end the Cold War. At the St. Petersburg Economic
Summit in June 2007, Putin suddenly called for revising the global
economic architecture, including the World Trade Organiza­tion
(WTO). This unprecedented and dangerous initiative reflects the
current anti-status quo mood in Moscow.

Russia's foreign
strategy is driven by military and security elites who view Russia
as the direct heir to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union and
who cherish its role as America's principal counterbal­ance on
the world stage. Unlike the economic and business elites, the
foreign and defense policy elites barely changed after the collapse
of the Soviet Union.

To a great
degree, contemporary Russian rheto­ric has come full circle and
resembles the Soviet agenda before President Mikhail Gorbachev's
pere­stroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness). In fact,
many foreign policy initiatives undertaken by Gorbachev and Russian
President Boris Yeltsin- such as ending the occupation of Eastern
Europe, signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) arms
control treaty and the Treaty on Con­ventional Forces in Europe
(CFE), recognizing the former Soviet republics as independent
states, and acquiescing to NATO enlargement-are often viewed in
Moscow as treasonous or at least as undermining vital Russian
interests. Current Bush Administration policies, such as democracy
pro­motion, are viewed as part of a sinister plot to undermine
the current Russian government through a series of "orange
revolutions."

Despite the tens
of thousands of Russians that have been killed by Muslim extremists
in Afghani­stan and Chechnya and in terrorist attacks in
Rus­sian cities, Russia remains obsessed with the U.S. as its
"principal adversary." The current elites define Russian strategic
goals in terms of opposition to the United States and its policies
and de facto alliance with China and the Muslim world, particularly
Iran and Syria. The Kremlin is reaching out to anti-sta­tus quo
leaders like Hugo Chávez and views Rus­sians as
culturally distinct from the West.

Russia is also
using the issue of Kosovo's indepen­dence to assert Russian
primacy on the international stage. Kosovo, a province of Serbia,
has been under U.N.-NATO administration since 1999, when a 78-day
NATO-led air campaign stopped the Serbian atrocities against ethnic
Albanians. Russia has sided with the Serbs to oppose any immediate
indepen­dence for Kosovo. Most recently, Russia threatened to
veto and rejected a draft U.N. resolution-sup­ported by the
U.S., the European Union (EU), and ethnic Albanians and opposed by
most Serbs-that would give Kosovo supervised independence and
extensive self-government.[1] Russia threatened to apply the precedent of
Kosovo independence to rec­ognize the independence of
Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia-Moscow-supported
secessionist statelets seeking to undermine the sovereignty of
Moldova and Georgia.

Moscow is using
its full array of modern interna­tional relations and security
tools to achieve its goals: from public diplomacy and weapons sales
to putting foreign political leaders on the petrodollar payroll,
from strategic information operations that depict America as an
out-of-control hyperpower and a threat to the international
community to cod­dling terrorist organizations. In the words of
one incisive observer, Russia has left the West.[2]

To send Russia a
message that they will not be bullied, the United States and its
allies should:

Bolster relations with
pro-Western regimes in the Persian Gulf;

Build bridges to
potential Russian allies and former Soviet republics (e.g.,
Ukraine, Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Armenia) to prevent the
emer­gence of anti-American blocs;

Create a global
coalition of energy consumers to oppose oil and gas cartels and to
apply market principles to the natural gas industry;

Continue dialogue and
cooperation with Russia to demonstrate to Russian elites that the
United States has much to offer Russia; and

Reach out over the heads
of the Russian leader­ship to the Russian people through a
compre­hensive public diplomacy strategy via the Internet,
international broadcasters, visitor pro­grams, and exchanges to
debunk the myth that the U.S. is hostile to Russia.

At Odds
with the West

February 2007
marked a watershed in Russian- American relations. Two key
events-Russian Pres­ident Vladimir Putin's speech at the
Wehrkunde security conference in Germany and his trip to Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, and Jordan-announced that Russia has arrived as an
independent pole of power in the post-Cold War world. For Russian
security elites, this is a happy place where Russia and they have
wanted to be since Yevgeny Primakov success­fully undermined
Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in 1995.[3]

The cold shower
that Putin unleashed on the United States at the international
security confer­ence in Munich on February 1, 2007, should not
have come as a surprise. After all, Putin himself and a host of
other senior spokesmen, including First Deputy Prime Minister and
former Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov (one of the "official" heirs
apparent) and military Chief of Staff General Yuri Baluyevsky, have
said as much in the past. However, the sheer concentration of
vitriol and the high-level forum were new.

Putin's list of
grievances against the United States and the West is long. His main
complaints are that the American "hyperpower" is pursuing its own
unilateral foreign, defense, cultural, and economic policy while
ignoring Russian interests, disregard­ing international law,
and ignoring the U.N., where Russia has a veto on the Security
Council. Former French President Jacques Chirac would be proud, but
Russia takes its opposition much farther than France ever did.

Putin accused the
U.S. of expanding NATO to Russia's borders and deploying "five
thousand bay­onets" each in forward bases in Romania and
Bul­garia. He blasted the plans for U.S. missile defense bases
in Poland and the Czech Republic, mocking the stated goal of
defending against missile launches from Iran or North Korea. Putin
clearly stated that the missile defenses are aimed to neutralize
Russian retaliatory nuclear strike capability, despite the fact
that this is technically impossible.[4]

He further
accused Washington of not meeting its obligations in nuclear
disarmament treaties and attempting to hide hundreds of nuclear
weap­ons in warehouses "under the blanket and under the
pillow."[5]

Adding to the
rhetorical overkill, Putin blamed U.S. foreign policy for the
failure of nuclear non-proliferation, justifying or at least
rationalizing North Korean and Iranian efforts to acquire
weap­ons of mass destruction (WMD).

Putin lambasted
NATO members that refuse to ratify the Treaty on Conventional
Forces in Europe, criticized the Organization for Security and
Cooper­ation in Europe (OSCE) for democracy promotion, warned
against Kosovo's independence, and rejected Western criticisms of
Russia's track record on human rights.

Adding to his
Munich criticisms, Putin obliquely compared U.S. foreign policy to
the Third Reich's foreign policy in his May 9 Victory Day speech
com­memorating the 62nd anniversary of the defeat of Nazi
Germany.[6]

What were Putin's
guiding principles for interna­tional relations? He waxed
nostalgic about the bipo­lar world in which the U.S. and the
Soviet Union checked each other's ambition through a balance of
nuclear terror known as Mutual Assured Destruc­tion (MAD) and
referred to the collapse of the Soviet Union as "the greatest
geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century."[7] Many Russian and
Western experts perceive Putin's speech as further distancing
Russia from the Euro-Atlantic community, if not as a declaration of
a new Cold War.

Putin's
Fulton. The Munich speech has a num­ber of domestic
and international "drivers" that add up to a picture of a Russia
craving strategic parity with the United States and defining its
national identity in opposition to the West.

While Russians
enthusiastically embraced pri­vate business, designer brands,
and Spanish sum­mer vacations, they were slow to internalize
pluralistic values, support freedom of speech and press, and defend
human rights. The rule of law in Russia is a far cry from Western
standards.

Several years of
increasingly loud anti-American and anti-Western propaganda in
pro-government and nationalist media have nurtured a generation of
Russians who are ethnocentric and reject liberal val­ues. In a
recent poll, 60 percent supported the slo­gan "Russia for
Russians."[8]

The "America as
the enemy" construct, pro­moted by Kremlin-funded "political
technologists," bolsters the current regime's legitimacy as the
defender of Mother Russia. It rejects fully integrat­ing Russia
into the global economic and political community.[9]

Putin's visit to
India, where he signed a deal for joint development of a stealth
fighter, and the Middle East tour indicate that Russia is looking
to play the role of a leading power in the Eastern Hemisphere.

Russia has
focused particularly on the Muslim world, which is seething with
anti-American and anti-Western discontent. Russia has provided arms
and leadership in international organizations such as the U.N. This
course of action is bolstered by Russia's observer status in the
Arab League and the Organi­zation of the Islamic Conference.
While it lacks the global reach of Soviet ideology and the Soviet
Union's military muscle, Russian policy nonetheless limits
Washington's freedom to maneuver.

Russia does not
want to fall too far behind mili­tarily. It is planning to
spend $189 billion over the next five years on rapid modernization
of its military. On February 8, 2007, then-Defense Minister Ivanov
announced the modernization program, which includes new nuclear
submarines, aircraft carriers, a fleet of Tu-160 supersonic
strategic bombers, and development of a fifth-generation fighter
jet.[10] Rus­sia is also restarting production
of the Black Shark, a heavily armed attack helicopter.[11]

This military
rearmament program, with its con­ventional and nuclear focus,
is clearly aimed at bal­ancing U.S. military power, not
fighting terrorists in the Caucasus Mountains. It needs the United
States as the glavny protivnik (principal adversary).

Russia is also
trying to corner the market in weapons sales, especially sales to
rogue states and semi-rogue states. Russia is the largest arms
supplier to China and Iran, has signed a $3 billion arms deal with
Hugo Chávez's Venezuela over U.S. objec­tions,[12]
and is courting Middle Eastern buyers.

Russia is happy
to play into the Arab and Muslim street's anti-Americanism to
signal that the U.S. does not exercise exclusive strategic
dominance in the Persian Gulf and in the Middle East. Moscow is
back with a vengeance in the world's most impor­tant energy
region.

Moscow's
Middle East Maneuvers. Russia views the post-Saddam Middle
East as America's Achilles' heel. President Putin's February visit
to the Middle East was exquisitely timed to coincide with
Amer­ica's troubles in the region.

In an interview
with Al-Jazeera, Putin delineated a new Russian Middle Eastern
policy that is at odds with U.S. policy. Putin reiterated Russia's
opposition to the Iraq war and disputed the justice of Saddam
Hussein's execution. He similarly criticized Amer­ica's
democratization efforts in the Middle East, cit­ing as examples
parliamentary elections, which were encouraged by Washington, that
empowered Hamas in the Palestinian territories and Hezbollah in
Lebanon.

At the same time,
using somewhat faulty logic, Putin justified Russia's refusal to
recognize Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations on the
basis of their victory in democratic elections.[13] He
conve­niently failed to spell out deeper reasons for
embrac­ing Hamas and Hezbollah: Russia's burgeoning ties with
Iran, the sponsor of the two organizations; attempts to build ties
with major Islamic states and movements that are supportive of
Hamas; and con­tinuing efforts to keep Islamist support from
reaching Russia's volatile and increasingly Islamist
communi­ties in the Northern Caucasus and beyond.[14]

During his visit
to Riyadh, Putin stunned the world by offering to sell "peaceful"
nuclear reactors to Saudi Arabia. He invited Saudi banks to open
wholly owned subsidiaries in Russia and offered 150 T-90 tanks and
other weapons. Throughout his Middle East tour, Putin indicated
Russia's willing­ness to sell helicopters, build
rocket-propelled gre­nade (RPG) factories, and provide
sophisticated anti-aircraft systems (e.g., the Carapace [Pantsyr],
TOR M1, and Strelets). He topped off the trip by offering the
Saudis expanded satellite launches and an opportunity to join
GLONASS, the Russian sat­ellite navigation system.[15]

While visiting
Qatar, the world's third largest nat­ural gas producer, Putin
also indicated that the Ira­nian offer to form an OPEC-style
cartel of gas producers was "an interesting idea" after his
minis­ter had dismissed it out of hand.

Putin summed up
Russia's new foreign policy and its Middle East policy as
follows:

From the point of
view of stability in this or that region or in the world in
general, the balance of power is the main achievement of these past
decades and indeed of the whole history of humanity, it is one of
the most im­portant conditions for maintaining global stability
and security.…

I do not
understand why some of our partners [i.e., Europe and the
U.S.]…see themselves as cleverer and more civilized and
think that they have the right to impose their standards on others.
The thing to remember is that stan­dards that are imposed from
the outside, in­cluding in the Middle East, rather than being a
product of a society's natural internal devel­opment, lead to
tragic consequences, and the best example of this is Iraq.[16]

This realpolitik
talk was praised in Arab capitals, where the old Soviet
anti-Western and anti-Israel stance is remembered fondly. King
Abdullah I of Saudi Arabia bestowed on Putin the King Faisal Award,
calling him "a statesman, a man of peace, a man of justice."[17]
This is quite an about-face from financing the jihad against the
Soviets 20 years ago during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Mini­timer Shaymiyev, the pro-Kremlin secular ruler of
Tatarstan, accompanied Putin and received the King Faisal award for
his "service to Islam."[18] The Middle East visit was all smiles and
economic ties-pre­dominantly weapons sales-bereft of any
discus­sion of the deep divides between Russia and world of
Islam.

A number of
factors drive Putin's recent rhetoric and actions in the Middle
East.

First,
by embracing Middle Eastern monarchies and Islamist
authoritarianism in Iran, he signals Russia's continued divergence
from Western norms of internal political behavior. This has
important implications, as 2007 and 2008 are election years in
Russia.

Second,
Russia is following the Soviet model of opposing first the British
and then the American presence in the Middle East by playing to
anti-West­ern sentiment in the "street" and among the elites.
This is something that both Wilhelmine Germany and, later, Nazi
Germany tried to do as well. Putin's Munich speech, Al-Jazeera
interview, and press con­ferences in Jordan and Qatar
solidified the Kremlin's public diplomacy message, amplifying its
differ­ences with Washington.

Third,
the Russian leadership is concerned about high Muslim birthrates in
Russia, especially with the declining Slavic Orthodox population.
Russia is facing an increasingly radicalized Mus­lim population
along its southern "soft under­belly," particularly in the
North Caucasus, where the two wars in Chechnya (1994 and 1999),
even though the rebels were effectively crushed, led to the spread
of Salafi Islam.

Many young
Muslims in Russia view themselves more as members of the global
Islamic ummah (com­munity) than as Russian citizens. Keeping
Muslim powers such as Saudi Arabia and Iran at bay, pre­venting
them from supporting insurgencies in Eur­asia, and toning down
Islamic radicalization in Russia through Islamist education and
propaganda are important policy items on the Kremlin's agenda.

Finally,
Russia is a high-cost oil producer that benefits disproportionately
from high oil prices. As the largest oil and gas producer in the
world and the largest oil exporter outside of OPEC, Russia is
inter­ested in maintaining a high energy price
environ­ment, which is caused by tensions and conflicts in the
Middle East among other things.

Russia is
perfectly willing to sell weapons to both sides of the growing
Sunni-Shia divide. This was evidenced when Putin offered the same
"peaceful" nuclear reactors and anti-aircraft systems to both Iran
and the Arab Gulf states. As one Russian observer put it, weapons
sales create allies.[19] Russia is using weapons and nuclear
reactor sales today the way that imperial Germany used railroads
before World War I-to attract allies, bolster influence, and
undermine the dominant power in the Middle East.

Syrian
Weapons Sales. The Middle East is not a new market for
Russian weapons. The Soviet Union armed the region for decades,
serving as a major arms supplier to Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya,
Syria, and Yemen, often in exchange for mere promises of future
payment. It was this unpaid debt that led to a halt of weapons
sales to Syria after the Soviet Union collapsed. Yet 1998-1999
marked the resumption of sales of weapons, such as the AT-14
Kornet-E anti-tank guided missile.[20]

Although
re-establishment of ties between Rus­sia and Syria began in
1998, Syrian President Bashar Assad's January 2005 visit to Moscow
proved to be a turning point, as Russia made a decision to write
off 73 percent ($10 billion) of Syria's total debt of $13.4
billion. A sale of the Strelets air defense missile sys­tem was
concluded the same year despite protests from Israel and the United
States. At the time of the sale, Putin denied Syria's request for
more robust air defense missiles, such as S-300 and Igla, and for
the short-range ballistic missile Iskander-E, which some analysts
interpreted as a demonstration of sensitiv­ity to Israeli
security concerns.[21]

In the meantime,
Syria was supplying Hezbollah with Russian weapons. In 2006,
Israeli forces found evidence of Russian-made Kornet-E and Metis-M
anti-tank systems in Hezbollah's possession in southern Lebanon.[22] In
February 2007, Russia responded to accusations of arming terrorist
groups by announcing inspections of Syrian weapons stor­age
facilities with the goal of preventing the weap­ons from
reaching unintended customers.[23]

For several
years, Russia has been attempting to engage in military cooperation
with both Israel and Syria. However, the levels of cooperation with
the two states are inversely related, and escalating arms sales to
Syria can only damage the relationship with Israel. Russian-Syrian
military cooperation went through numerous stages, from high levels
of coop­eration during the Soviet era to virtually no
cooper­ation after the Cold War, until 2005 when Russia began
to attempt to balance its relationships with Israel and Syria.
However, Russia's recent return to the Middle East might indicate
that Moscow is pre­pared to enter a new stage of military
cooperation with Syria, even to the detriment of its relationship
with Israel.

Gas OPEC:
A New Foreign Policy Tool

Russia has been
using its position as the world's leading natural gas producer to
boost its role in the Middle East and beyond. Steadily and
stealthfully, a new gas cartel-the Gas Exporting Countries' Forum
(GECF)-is emerging.[24] The cartel is inspired by those that
would benefit most from its future geopolitical muscle: Russia and
Iran, specifi­cally President Putin and Iran's Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Speaking to the
Russian National Security Coun­cil Secretary Igor Ivanov on
January 29, Khamenei called for the creation of an OPEC-like gas
cooper­ation organization. The GECF took a step toward its
unannounced emergence at an April 9 meeting in Doha, Qatar, despite
the opposition of Azerbaijan, Canada, the Netherlands, and
Norway.

Russia's
Global Gas Strategy. Moscow is play­ing a complex and
sophisticated game that will likely maximize its advantages as the
leading gas producer with the largest reserves on the planet.

First,
Russia's approach is gradualist. Moscow has never been openly
enthusiastic about a gas cartel but has waited for an opportunity
to launch one. The message in most of the Russian media after the
summit was that "no 'gas OPEC' agreements have been signed."[25]
This is exactly what Gazprom, the Russian state-owned gas monopoly,
wants everyone to believe. However, a careful examination of the
official announcement and media reports reveals that there is
reason for concern.

Second,
Russia's approach is stealthy. Instead of prematurely proclaiming
the cartel and alarming consumer countries, it is quietly putting
the compo­nent parts into place. In Doha, Russia initiated the
creation of a high-level group to "research" the pric­ing of
gas and to develop methodologies toward commonly accepted gas
pricing models. Conve­niently, Russia will staff this
group.

Third,
Russia looks reasonable. The immediate price-regulating function of
the emerging cartel is supported by those Latin American countries
(Ven­ezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina) that want to dis­pense
with market principles in gas trade. With Iran and Venezuela
(supported by Bolivia and Argentina) applying their OPEC-honed
instincts to gas and demanding price regulation, Russia can afford
to stand aside and let others do the talking. Neverthe­less, an
unnamed "high ranking member of the Rus­sian delegation" to
Doha told RIA Novosti that "as the gas market undergoes
globalization, certainly such an organization (a gas cartel) will
appear and is necessary."[26]

Fourth,
and most important, a cartel by any other name is still a cartel.
Members of the GECF agreed to discuss dividing up the consumer
markets among them, particularly in Europe, where Russia and
Algeria are major players. For example, if Rus­sia agrees not
to challenge Algeria's position in Spain, Algeria will stay clear
of Germany. This will clearly challenge the EU's energy
liberalization and gas deregulation policy, which is scheduled to
take effect on July 1, 2007.

The group's
members plan to "reach strategic understandings" on export volumes,
delivery schedules, and the construction of new pipelines. They
also plan to explore and develop gas fields jointly and to
coordinate startups and production schedules. To continue their
work, members will gather for their next annual meeting in Moscow
and plan to develop a permanent secretariat. Despite protestations
to the contrary, this sounds like a car­tel in the making.

Not
Tomorrow. Oil is a global commodity, while natural gas is
not-or at least not while it is piped and its prices are defined up
to 15-20 years in advance through long-term contracts. However,
liq­uid natural gas (LNG) is rapidly becoming a com­modity
that is shipped worldwide.

By 2010, the LNG
share of the world's total gas consumption will double. Thus, price
gouging through manipulation of production quotas may come faster
than many experts think if the GECF becomes a new OPEC and if the
consumer nations do not unite and flex their muscle. Moreover,
Russia and Iran are interested in increasing their
geopoliti­cal leverage against the EU in areas that often have
little to do with energy.

The Bush
Administration barely reacted to the Doha meeting. Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Rank­ing Member of the House Foreign
Affairs Commit­tee, wrote to the Secretary of State that the
establishment of a gas OPEC would be a "major and long-term threat
to the world energy supply" that the U.S. should "vigorously
oppose."[27] Privately, officials express grave
concern.

As the case of
OPEC demonstrates, closing mar­kets to competition, promoting
national oil compa­nies, and limiting production through a
quota system results in limited supply and higher prices. In the
long run, gas will be no different.

Asymmetric Response

Russia has been
the leader in developing ballistic missile defenses and is the only
country that oper­ates such a system around its capital.
Russian oppo­sition to U.S.-led missile defense and Moscow's
support for Iran's unyielding pursuit of long-range missiles
capable of delivering nuclear warheads have rekindled Soviet-era
tensions between the United States and Russia over the deployment
of missile defense systems in Europe and elsewhere.

U.S.
Missile Defense Deployment in Europe. The United States
has announced its intention to deploy 10 long-range ground-based
missile inter­ceptors in Poland and a mid-course tracking radar
in the Czech Republic. This system is designed to protect the
United States from "nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons
delivered by ballistic missiles," specifically from the rogue
regimes of North Korea and Iran, clearly poses no threat to Russian
security, and has no offensive capability.[28]

Russia's current
arsenal of 503 deployed inter­continental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) could easily overwhelm such defenses. Additionally,
missiles launched at the United States from Russian territory would
pass over the Arctic region, not over Europe, making interception
by the proposed Poland- Czech system almost impossible.[29]

Russian
Opposition. Yet Russia has opposed U.S. plans for missile
defense in Europe. After meet­ing with U.S. Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates on April 19, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly
Ser­dyukov said, "We believe that the strategic missile defense
system is a serious destabilizing factor capa­ble of having a
considerable impact on regional and global security."[30]

Russians have
come to recognize that such a small deployment cannot counter the
Russian ICBM arsenal. Strategically, however, Russia sees the
ballistic missile defense issue as the most recent evi­dence of
American and NATO efforts to chip away at its sphere of influence-a
sphere that has been diminishing since the collapse of the Soviet
empire.

Russian
Asymmetric Responses. Russia's re­sponse is both
military and diplomatic. On May 7, Russia announced the deployment
of an upgraded Topol-1 ICBM missile system in the next two or three
years. This would raise the number of Russian silo-based systems
from 44 to 48 by late 2007.[31] Russian Air Force
Commander General Vladimir Mikhailov declared that Russian
warplanes would, if necessary, destroy any American ballistic
missile defense system stationed in the Caucasus.[32] Finally, Russia
is developing its own anti-ballistic missile air-defense system
that, according to General Mikhailov, will be a considerable
improvement over the current S-400 missiles.[33]

Over the years,
top Russian officials have warned that Russia may renounce the INF
Treaty and restart production of intermediate-range ballis­tic
missiles. However, others point out that reopen­ing production
lines to build new generations of intermediate-range ballistic
missiles might be too costly for Russia.[34]

Russia's position
represents an about-face since the U.S. withdrawal from the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Before the United States quit
the ABM Treaty in December 2001, Russians were intimating possible
cooperation on a European ballistic missile shield. In February
2001, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev proposed a European
ballistic missile defense program to NATO Secretary General Lord
George Robertson.[35] After continuous rejection of U.S.
missile defense cooperation offers, Putin has suggested using
Russia-leased, Soviet-era early warning radar in Gabala,
Azerbaijan, for an ABM joint venture with the U.S.

Russian
Response I: Withdrawal from the INF. On the diplomatic
front, Russia has begun to chip away at two crucial building blocks
of the post-Soviet balance of power: the INF and CFE treaties.

The
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed by the United
States and the Soviet Union on December 8, 1987, banned the
deployment of nuclear and conventional ground-launched missiles
with ranges between 500 kilometers (310 miles) and 5,500 kilometers
(3,410 miles) and related sup­port equipment.[36] The treaty
remains in force.

On February 15,
2007, Army General Yury Bal­uyevsky, chief of the Russian
General Staff, said that "It is possible for a party to abandon the
[INF] treaty (unilaterally) if it provides convincing evidence that
is necessary to do so. We currently have such evi­dence,"
referring to U.S. missile defense plans in Eastern Europe. The next
day, Russian Foreign Min­ister Sergei Lavrov moderated but did
not contra­dict Baluyevsky's comments: "We are not speaking
about a decision that has already been made. We are just stating
the situation."[37] General Nikolai Solovtsov, commander of
Russian Strategic Missile Forces, said on February 19: "If a
political decision is taken to quit the treaty, the Strategic
Missile Forces are ready to carry out this task."[38] Thus, Rus­sia
stands determined to destabilize the status quo.

Russian
Response II: Withdrawal from the CFE. Russian rejection of
the Treaty on Conven­tional Forces in Europe has been similar
to its mis­sile defense rhetoric, despite General Baluyevsky's
insistence that "those who think that the Russian position on the
U.S. missile defense and [its posi­tion on] the CFE are tied
are mistaken."[39]

The CFE Treaty,
signed in 1990, imposed limits on the numbers of tanks, artillery,
armored vehicles, combat helicopters, and warplanes that could be
deployed in Europe by the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.[40]
Russia nevertheless repeatedly violated its flank quotas when it
deployed weapons to the North Caucasus region during the 1994
Chechen War.

The United States
revised the CFE Treaty at an OSCE summit in Istanbul in 1999 to
legalize Rus­sia's arms concentration in the Caucasus. In
return, President Boris Yeltsin promised to remove all Rus­sian
troops from Georgia and Transnistria, a break­away region of
Moldova, by 2004. Nevertheless, Russia has not yet withdrawn troops
from those regions. In turn, NATO member states have refused to
ratify the revised CFE Treaty, making the treaty functionally
ineffective.

During their
April 23 discussions about the pro­posed U.S. missile shield in
Eastern Europe, Rus­sian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov
told U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates that the CFE Treaty was
"increasingly ineffective." President Putin solid­ified this
position in his annual address to the Duma on April 26, when he
announced a "moratorium on Russia's implementation of the CFE
Treaty until all NATO countries ratify it and start to strictly
adhere to it, as Russia does today."[41]

Finally, while
speaking to NATO representatives at Oslo the following day, Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said, "No one in NATO is complying
with CFE Treaty and we do not want too," to which NATO Secretary
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer re­plied that "first Russia must
honor its Istanbul com­mitments," referring to Yeltin's promise
to remove Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova.[42]

Together, the INF
and CFE treaties are the linch­pins of European security.
Russia's withdrawal from one of them raises concerns about the
regime's intentions. Withdrawing from both would create a dangerous
potential of re-establishing Europe as a battleground between two
competing, albeit cur­rently unequal, military powers. Russia's
possible withdrawal from these treaties must be taken
seri­ously, as it threatens to derail the very purpose of the
U.S. missile defense initiative-enhancing Euro­pean and
American security.

Looking
to the Future

From Washington's
perspective, the timing of Putin's Munich speech and the steps that
followed could not be worse. With Iraq in limbo and Iran remaining
truculent, the chances for Russian coop­eration in taming
Tehran's nuclear ambitions are in doubt. Russia was recalcitrant in
applying the nec­essary pressure to Iran during the December
2006 negotiations on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 and may
refuse to do so again.

Moreover, Putin
has been signaling that Russia is willing to be the vanguard of the
anti-American camp in Europe and the Middle East and from
Car­acas to Beijing.

Clearly, the new
Middle East, where U.S. power and prestige are threatened in Iraq
and where Mos­cow is challenging America's superpower status,
is becoming a more competitive and challenging envi­ronment.
Today's Middle East needs to be viewed with the realism and
toughness that its history and cultures require.

What
Washington Should Do

The image of a
new Cold War may be too sim­plistic to describe the emerging
relationship with Russia. In fact, Russian foreign policy has a
distinc­tive late 19th century czarist, post-Bismarckian tinge:
muscular, arrogant, overestimating its own power, and
underestimating the American adver­sary that it is busily
trying to recreate. This policy is likely to become a
self-fulfilling prophecy with dan­gerous consequences and a
high price in treasure and ultimately in blood.

Clearly, the
post-communist honeymoon is over. A realistic reassessment of the
relationship is in order.

The United States
does not need a new Cold War. The U.S. is engaged in two regional
conflicts-in Iraq and Afghanistan-and in the global war on
ter­rorism. On the horizon, relations with China may one day
become more complicated. With that in mind, U.S. policymakers would
do well to remem­ber that Moscow values certainty in relations
and respects power and action. Deeds, not words, are needed to send
a message to the Kremlin that the U.S. and its allies will not be
bullied.

Specifically, as
the status quo power in the Mid­dle East, the U.S. should:

Seriously examine Russian
proposals for a joint missile defense radar station in
Azer­baijan. If possible, the U.S. should use missile
defense cooperation to salvage and improve the strategic
relationship between Moscow and Washington. Russia should be
enticed to change its stance toward Iran, cooperate in the U.N.
Security Council to tighten economic sanctions, stop its weapons
sales, and participate in other measures to terminate the Iranian
nuclear pro­gram. This would be a major change in the
Rus­sian position and beneficial for the United States.

Bolster relations with
pro-Western regimes in the Gulf. While some weapons sales
and busi­ness projects will inevitably take place, only by
maintaining a security umbrella in the Persian Gulf can the U.S.
have greater influence than Russia in the region. The Department of
Defense should expand relations with the Gulf Coopera­tion
Council by providing military and security assurances to Gulf
countries against Iranian encroachment-assurances that Russia is
inca­pable of giving-and expand cooperation in the fight
against terrorism, which threatens Amer­ica's Middle Eastern
allies.

Build bridges to potential
Russian allies to prevent the emergence of anti-American
blocs, especially to the former Soviet republics of Ukraine,
Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Armenia. The State Department and the
Department of Energy should also appeal to America's traditional
allies in Europe and elsewhere to recognize the chang­ing
geostrategic balance in the Eastern Hemi­sphere, to boost
mutual defenses, to coordinate energy policy, and to cooperate on
energy secu­rity among the consumer states.

In addition to EU members, the U.S. should expand relations with
key emerging markets into which Russia is attempting to encroach
(e.g., Turkey, India, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa). For
example, the U.S. should encourage Latin American leaders to
recognize the threat posed by Hugo Chávez's cooperation with
Mos­cow, especially his massive weapons purchases from
Russia.

Create a global coalition of
energy consumers to oppose oil and gas cartels and to apply
mar­ket principles to the natural gas industry. The Bush
Administration needs to develop a clear global policy to limit
cartelization of the gas mar­kets and to oppose the OPEC policy
of produc­ing too little oil too late. Without buyer solidarity
translated into action, energy consumers and economic growth will
suffer worldwide. The National Security Council and National
Eco­nomic Council should take the lead in develop­ing this
policy.

Specifically, the U.S. should work with EU member states, Japan,
China, India, and other countries to prevent the cartelization of
the gas sector along OPEC lines. This can be accom­plished
through cooperation in the International Energy Agency and by
applying anti-trust legis­lation worldwide against companies
that are actively involved in cartel-like behavior in the energy
markets. Finally, the U.S. should liberal­ize its own
regulations to allow exploration in the Arctic, in the Rocky
Mountains, and along the Pacific and Atlantic Continental
shelves.

Continue dialogue and
cooperation with Rus­sia on matters of mutual concern.
This is nec­essary to demonstrate to Russian elites that the
United States has much to offer Russia. Fields of cooperation may
include energy (especially nuclear energy), non-proliferation of
WMD, and space exploration. Specifically, cooperation on
interdicting drug trafficking from Afghanistan and Central Asia,
anti-terrorism cooperation related to the North Caucasus, and WMD
disar­mament programs under Nunn-Lugar funding should be
continued.

Reach out to the people of
Russia through a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy via
the Internet, international broadcasters, visitor programs, and
exchanges to debunk the myth that the U.S. is hostile to Russia.
Congress should increase funding for such programs from $40 million
in fiscal year (FY) 2007 to $100 million for FY 2008. The
Department of Commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative, and the
business community should reach out to the Russian business
community, which may be interested in improving international
economic and business cooperation, particularly through WTO
acces­sion and repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amend­ment (at
least in relation to Russia).

Conclusion

After a 20-year
hiatus, Russia is forcing its way back onto the global stage as an
adversarial actor. It is flush with cash, bolstered by a market
economy, and expects respect, recognition, and influence.

Washington
decision-makers can no longer afford to take Moscow for granted and
must design better strategies to cope with this renewed
geopolit­ical challenge in Eurasia. The Kennebunkport
sum­mit may be the last chance for the two leaders to reverse
the downward spiral that has characterized U.S.-Russian relations
since 2003.

Ariel
Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and
Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the Douglas
and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of
the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Michael Belinsky, an intern at
The Heritage Foundation, contributed to the preparation of this
study.

About the Author

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.Visiting Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage FoundationDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy

[18] The King Faisal Award was given to Shaymiyev "in recognition of his role in the service of the noble Islamic values." Saudi Press Agency, "King, Putin Grace King Faisal Award Function for Shimiyev," February 12, 2007, at www.spa.gov.sa/English/details.php?id=424841 (March 5, 2007).

[21] Mark N. Katz, "Putin's Foreign Policy Toward Syria," Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006), p. 59, at /static/reportimages/2528F2CEA59760BEAE00FF4909AC1786.pdf (June 25, 2007). Iskander E is the export version of the Kolomna-designed 9M72 short-range missile currently in service with the Russian armed forces. Iskander-E has a range of 280 kilo­meters, which is 120 kilometers less than its Russian Army analog but still sufficient to reach Haifa and Tel Aviv.

[36] Black, "Russia and the Future of the INF," and Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed December 8, 1987, at www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/inf2.html (June 26, 2007).