PHASE I: FROM THE TERRORIST ATTACKS TO
THE OVERTHROW OF THE TALIBAN, 11 SEPTEMBER - 14 NOVEMBER 2001

29. At the end of "Phase I," the Prime
Minister described the progress made. In Afghanistan, the terrorists'
base, Kabul had fallen without serious resistance, the Taliban
were in "total collapse," and "to see women and
children smiling after years under one of the most brutal and
oppressive regimes in the world is finally to understand the true
meaning of the word 'liberation.'"[31]
The critics of the military campaign had been confounded: as the
Foreign Secretary told us on 20 November, "Ten days ago there
were still people writing that the Taliban were an unbreakable
force," yet the regime which had played such an important
role in supporting al Qaeda had disintegrated almost completely.[32]

30. The international coalition against terrorism
had remained remarkably strong throughout the military campaign.
Co-operation to fight terrorism had been stepped up considerably
in the European Union. UN member states' counter-terrorism actions
were being monitored by the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC),
which is chaired by Britain's Permanent Representative to the
UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock. The US approach to the global organization
appeared to have warmed somewhat since 11 September. Crucially,
too, the British Government had emerged as America's closest partner
in the war against terrorism. The Prime Minister had received
a standing ovation in the US Congress. The New York Times
described him as America's "most passionate and steadfast
ally in the fight against terrorism."[33]
The British Government was at the centre of the campaign, and
it appeared to be making progress.

32. The importance of these symbols of support should
not be underestimated. However, it was the actions taken by the
Government which ensured Britain's immediate and deep involvement
in shaping coalition policy.

35. The same objectives were set out in more detail
in the Government's "Campaign Objectives" document,
which was published on 4 October. The "overall objective"
was to "eliminate terrorism as a force in international affairs."
The document described immediate objectives relating to Osama
bin Laden, his network, and the Taliban regime. Wider objectives
were also described: the coalition would "do everything possible
to eliminate the threat posed by international terrorism"
and "deter states from supporting, harbouring or acting complicitly
with international terrorist groups." The coalition would
also aim to reintegrate Afghanistan as a "responsible member
of the international community."[36]
The means for achieving these objectives, both political and military,
were outlined in the document.

36. Another document set out "Responsibility
for the terrorist atrocities." The introduction to the document
states that it "does not purport to provide a prosecutable
case against Usama bin Laden in a court of law... Intelligence
often cannot be used evidentially... But on the basis of all the
information available HMG is confident of its conclusions as expressed
in this document."[37]

37. Both these documents were also posted on the
FCO website in Arabic, and the "Responsibility" document
was also posted in Urdu.

38. The Foreign Secretary told us that the fact that
these were United Kingdom rather than US government documents
"does not suggest there is a disagreement, this must not
be implied because this is to misunderstand the nature of the
relationship... The US, I am certain... were very happy that we
should have published evidence in that way."[38]
Indeed, by division of labour, it probably suited the US for the
British Government to publish the evidence.[39]

39. The Foreign Secretary went on to explain that
the Government had faced "difficult judgements about publishing
that evidence because parts of it were drawn from intelligence
though a great deal of it was historical."[40]
In response to a question about the Government's intention to
publish evidence in advance of possible future military action
against other states, the Foreign Secretary replied that he could
not give "any guarantees one way or the other"the
"good argument in terms of public support" had to be
balanced against the need "to protect intelligence sources,
particularly human intelligence sources."[41]

40. We conclude that the Government was right
to publish the coalition "Campaign Objectives" and the
document outlining "Responsibility for the terrorist atrocities."
These publications went some way towards reassuring Parliament,
the British public and Britain's coalition partners of why military
action against Afghanistan was necessary. Our recommendation
on the need to apply this approach to potential future actions
is made in paragraph 233 below.

42. Between 11 September and the commencement of
military strikes, the Prime Minister met several European leaders
and visited President Bush in the United States. He attended an
emergency meeting of the Council of the European Union in Brussels.
He visited Pakistan and India in early October. The Foreign Secretary
held talks with Iranian, Egyptian and Israeli leaders and the
Arab League.

43. Soon after the commencement of military operations,
on 11 October, the Prime Minister visited Egypt. Between 30 October
and 1 November, he also visited Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel
and the Palestinian Authority. The FCO, in its 19 November memorandum,
states that these visits were in part an effort to "reinvigorate
the search for peace" in the Middle East, though they also
contributed to the sense that Britain was engaging with its allies
in the Islamic world during the campaign against Afghanistan.[43]

44. Between mid-October and mid-November, the Prime
Minister also appointed Paul Bergne, a diplomat with experience
in Central Asia, to be his "personal representative on Afghan
affairs."[44] Robert
Cooper, another diplomat, was appointed to represent Britain in
negotiations towards the future of Afghanistan in the UN and elsewhere.[45]

45. Philip Stephens told us of other diplomatic initiatives
which have been pushed forward by the Government since 11 September.
He told us that both "the Prime Minister and the foreign
secretary took an active part in encouraging Russia's Vladimir
Putin to see the aftermath of September as an opportunity to join
the mainstream of western policymaking. Elsewhere, the US administration
was initially reluctant to involve the Group of Eight in the international
counter-terrorism effort but at the UK's instigation it has broadened
the remit of its Financial Action Task Force to include action
to halt the flow of terrorist funding."[46]

46. We conclude that the Prime Minister and the
Foreign Secretary were right to invest substantial time and effort
overseas in helping the United States to mobilise the international
coalition against terrorism.

"If it is determined that this attack was directed
from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as
an action covered by Article V of the Washington Treaty, which
states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies
in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against
them all."[48]

This was the first time in NATO's history that its
members had invoked Article V.

48. The FCO told us that Britain had "played
an active role in promoting ... the NATO decision"[49]
to invoke Article V. The FCO also "pushed forward the deployment
of joint NATO assets such as the Standing Force in the Mediterranean
and the NATO AWACS [Allied Airborne Early Warning and Control
aircraft]."[50]
NATO AWACS aircraft were sent to patrol US airspace on 9 October
in an operation code named "Eagle Assist."[51]

49. We conclude that NATO was entirely right to
invoke Article V, and commend the Secretary General on his initiative
in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks.

50. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, Russian
President Vladimir Putin sought stronger links with NATO. The
Prime Minister responded to this by asking the FCO to produce
a paper setting out options for a new relationship with Russia,
"encouraging," as Philip Stephens told us, "Russia's
Vladimir Putin to see the aftermath of September as an opportunity
to join the mainstream of western policymaking."[52]
This paper proposed an overhaul of the relationship between NATO
and Russia, including the creation of a new body, in which twenty
governments (19 NATO members plus Russia) would discuss some security
issues as equals. The new body would replace the Permanent Joint
Council, and would reflect the "changing political atmosphere
since 11 September attacks in America."[53]
The paper was sent to other NATO members on 17 November, and the
NATO Secretary General went to Russia on 21 November 2001 to discuss
the proposals with the Russian President.

51. On 14 May 2002, agreement was reached on the
establishment of a NATO-Russia Council (NRC) to replace the existing
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. This will allow NATO members
and Russia to work "as equal partners in areas of common
interest while preserving NATO's prerogative to act independently."[54]
The agreement was adopted and signed at the NATO-Russia summit
in Rome on 28 May 2002.

52. NATO did not play a significant role in the Afghanistan
campaign, although established methods of joint operations and
inter-operability of forces must have considerably facilitated
the work of ISAF. There were press reports only two days after
the attacks suggesting that NATO was "drawing up an emergency
plan for a massive attack on Afghanistan if proof emerges that
Osama bin Laden, the wanted Saudi-born terrorist sheltered by
Afghanistan, was responsible for the attacks. Under contingency
plans being prepared, an assault would involve tens of thousands
of ground troops, equivalent to the scale of the force deployed
in Kosovo."[55]
Though military action did not ultimately involve NATO command
structures, Britain was "active in encouraging a positive
US response to the offer by allies, especially our European partners,"
of military support.[56]
Such offers came from Britain's EU partners, India, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand and Turkey. Russia permitted US overflights of its
territory, shared intelligence, and offered combat search and
rescue support; it also assented to American proposals to use
former Soviet military facilities in some of the Central Asian
republics.

53. Philip Stephens told us that "Washington
was initially reluctant to accept military contributions, albeit
token, from other European nations and some in the Pentagon are
said to have opposed even a UK contribution."[57]
Maintaining the multilateral nature of the coalition is extremely
important, and the military aspects of the war against terrorism
are no exception to this. We commend the Government's efforts
to include other countries' military contributions in the war
against terrorism, and recommend that it continue to press for
similar coalitions where appropriate in any future military operations.

54. NATO has played a limited military role in the
war against terrorism. This may suggest a shift in the US approach
to the Alliance. There are voices in the Administration who no
longer perceive NATO as being as central to US security as it
was only two or three years ago, but perhaps as more of a political
organisation. We note, however, that the US Administration is
considering the possibility of NATO setting up a number of highly
mobile "mini task-forces" for deployment to troublespots.[58]

55. It is clear that the international coalition
against terrorism has a great attraction to the US as an international
vehicle for prosecuting US defence and foreign policy. The coalition
is made up exclusively of US bilateral relationships. By working
through the coalition, the US is not dependent on any international
decision-making process. The command structure of the coalition
is entirely US-led. It is unclear where this leaves NATO. We
recommend that the FCO clarify how it sees the role of NATO in
the conduct of US-led military operations against terrorists or
the states that sponsor them. We further recommend that the FCO
clarify NATO's role in providing and co-ordinating intelligence
in the war against

56. The European Union took action after 11 September
with what the International Crisis Group described as "a
pace of response almost unprecedented within the EU."[59]
To ensure co-ordinated responses to the attacks, an emergency
meeting of foreign ministers was convened in Brussels on 12 September.
EU heads of state met on 21 September, and agreed to the introduction
of a counter-terrorism Plan of Action. This included a proposal
for a European arrest warrant and the adoption of an EU-wide definition
of terrorism; a Framework Agreement on freezing assets and evidence;
increased co-operation between services responsible for fighting
terrorism; the early ratification by all member states of the
UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;
implementation by member states of UN Security Council resolutions
on countering terrorism; the review of relations with third countries
in the light of their performance in combating terrorism; and
the approval by the Commission of improvements to air transport
security.[60] Overall,
the Plan defined over sixty discrete objectives to fight terrorism,
covering foreign policy, home affairs, judicial co-operation,
financial and economic

policy.

57. We discussed the impact of the terrorist attacks
on the EU agenda when we visited Brussels in October 2001. We
were told that many of the issues that were addressed with increased
urgency after the attacks, such as the common arrest warrant,
had been on the EU's Justice and Home Affairs agenda for some
time but had become bogged down in minor disagreements among member
states. The crisis had given EU-wide legislation in these areas
a huge a boost: EU member states pledged to address policies on
counter-terrorism, asylum and immigration, and mutual recognition
of judicial procedures before the Laeken summit at the end of
2001.

58. The crisis was seen by some as a test of the
EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. In the first stages of
the campaign, there were few if any significant differences between
EU member states on how to tackle the terrorist crisis, and the
consensus was that they had acted cohesively and rapidly in response
to the threat. We heard during our visit to Washington in early
November 2001 that the EU response to the crisis had impressed
those in the Administration who have a sceptical view of Europe,
many of whom, until that point, had not realised that European
co-operation existed in so many areas. By November, however, the
Foreign Secretary reported to us that some EU countries were not
"on target" in implementing anti-terrorism measures:
"There are some abstruse arguments taking place among Member
States about particular aspects of the measures."[61]

59. The immediate EU response to the 11 September
attacks was impressive, but progress became bogged down in the
following months. Nonetheless, the habits of intergovernmental
co-operation created through the EU proved valuable in this crisis.
Some of the subsequent problems in reaching agreement over the
action plan have been resolved under the Spanish Presidency of
the EU. On 14 February 2002, the Spanish Presidency announced
that political agreement had been reached on the establishment
of the European arrest warrant and that all the difficulties involved
in the establishment of Eurojust, an EU-wide judicial co-operation
unit, had been resolved.[62]
Efforts within the EU are also being made to strengthen judicial
co-operation with the United States to fight terrorism.

60. We recommend that in its response to this
Report the Foreign and Commonwealth Office provide a full statement
on EU-wide co-operation and progress in countering terrorism.

62. On 11 September, Britain and France together
drafted a Security Council resolution condemning "in the
strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks." The resolution
affirmed the "inherent right of individual and collective
self-defence" in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations, and stated that the Security Council regarded
the terrorist acts as "a threat to international peace and
security." It called on all states to "work together
urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organisers and
sponsors of these terrorist attacks," and expressed "readiness
to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks...
and to combat all forms of terrorism." This Security Council
Resolution, 1368 (2001), was passed unanimously on 12 September
2001.[64]

63. By characterising the attacks as "a threat
to international peace and security" and by implying that
the Security Council was acting under Article 51 of the UN Charter,
Resolution 1368 also gave immediate legal authorisation for military
action by the United States and its allies, provided that such
action was demonstrably one of self-defence against "armed
attack," and provided that the action was immediately reported
to the Security Council.[65]
[66]

64. The United States subsequently drafted a second
Resolution, number 1373, which was passed on 28 September 2001.[67]
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 declared explicitly
that the Security Council was acting under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter,[68] implying
that the steps proposed in the Resolution imposed obligations
on Member States which were binding in international law. UNSCR
1373 specified that states must prevent all financing of terrorist
organisations, refrain from assisting such organisations, and
find ways of enhancing counter-terrorist activity, both at a national
level and through international co-operation. UNSCR 1373 also
established the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), "a
Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members
of the Council, to monitor implementation of this resolution."[69]

65. We were told during our visits to New York that
UNSCR 1373 was exceptional because, although it was drawn up and
passed by the fifteen-member Security Council, it obliges all
member states to take action. It is, therefore, equivalent to
a binding treaty which no state has had the opportunity to negotiate.
For this reason, it is extremely important for the success of
the UN's activities against terrorism to ensure that member states
regard the CTC as legitimate, important, and serving their own
interests.

66. Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the United Kingdom's Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, was elected by the Security
Council as Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. As the
Foreign Secretary told us, this was a "very great personal
compliment to him," because it is "very unusual... for
any Permanent Member of the Security Council to have their Permanent
Representative made Chairman of a Security Council Committee."[70]

67. As Chairman, Sir Jeremy Greenstock moved quickly
towards setting out a work plan for the Counter-Terrorism Committee.
On 8 October, he outlined the steps that the CTC would take in
encouraging, monitoring and advising States on their implementation
of UNSCR 1373. The CTC would "assess States' implementation
in so far as it would identify problem areas and examine whether
there was scope for assistance to Member States to help them improve
their implementation." Sir Jeremy Greenstock was clear that
the "Security Council, not the CTC, would tackle any political
questions on the implementation of resolution 1373."[71]
The question of defining terrorism would also be avoided by the
CTC: Sir Jeremy Greenstock explained in a press briefing on 19
October that "It is not the primary purpose of the Counter-Terrorism
Committee to get into the politics of what is happening in the
short-term. It is not the intention of the Counter-Terrorism Committee
to try and solve problems that are for the General Assembly. Or
to try and define terrorism, or otherwise solve some of the sensitive
political issues that are directly, or indirectly attached to
the fight against terrorism."[72]

68. Each member state was required to provide a report
of measures towards implementation of UNSCR 1373, which would
be delivered to the CTC by 27 December 2001. To assist member
states in this task, in October the CTC produced written guidance
for states on the information the CTC expected to be included
in the reports. Member states were asked to identify counter-terrorism
"contact points" in missions to the UN and in capitals.
The CTC discussed the need for expert advice to assist it in analysing
reports from states, and to guide the Committee on technical assistance
for states.

69. We congratulate Sir Jeremy Greenstock on his
appointment as Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. We
conclude that the Government was right to push for a prominent
UN role in the war against terrorism, and commend its work towards
this end in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September attacks.
We assess the work of the CTC in paragraphs 118 to 130 below.

72. On 7 October 2001, British and American armed
forces began a series of air and cruise missile attacks in Afghanistan.
The attacks were launched against the terrorist camps of Osama
bin Laden and the military installations of the Taliban regime.
By this stage, international legal grounds for such an attack
had been established through Security Council Resolutions 1368
and 1373.

73. On 8 October, Parliament was recalled for the
third time since 11 September. The Prime Minister pointed out
in his speech to the House that the Government and the United
States had decided to delay any military action for almost four
weeks after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
The Prime Minister paid "tribute to President Bush's statesmanship
in having the patience to wait," and explained that action
had been delayed for three reasons: "First, we had to establish
who was responsible. Once it was clear that the al Qaeda network
planned and perpetrated the attacks we then wanted to give the
Taliban regime time to decide their own position: would they shield
bin Laden or would they yield him up? ... thirdly, we wanted time
to make sure that the targets for any action, minimised the possibility
of civilian casualties."[74]

74. Without trying the diplomatic route before military
action, and without the clear and public articulation of coalition
objectives and of responsibility for the terrorist attacks, global
support for the operation would have been much harder to establish.
We were reassured to hear from Mr Paul Bergne, the Prime Minister's
envoy to the United Front (also known as the Northern Alliance)
during October and November 2001, that, in his view, during this
four week period all diplomatic alternatives to military action
had been exhausted.[75]
The British and American governments, together with the government
of Pakistan, expended "considerable thought" and diplomatic
effort between 11 September and the beginning of October in examining
"what alternative forms of pressure [to military force] there
might be" to persuade the Taliban to extradite Osama bin
Laden. The Pakistani government sent two delegations to Kandahar
to try to persuade the Taliban to give him up, but without success.

75. We commend the efforts of British diplomats
to persuade the Taliban to surrender Osama bin Laden after 11
September. We conclude that this was the right course of action,
which helped to hold together the international coalition during
the subsequent military campaign in Afghanistan.

76. Military action was taken with a remarkably high
level of international endorsement. Islamic countries at the Asia-Pacific
Economic Co-operation forum in October were generally supportive
of the US-led campaign. The Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxhuan
referred to the anti-terrorism campaign as a "fight between
justice and evil,"[76]
and Russia issued strong statements of support, encouraged Central
Asian states to offer the US use of military bases, and reportedly
co-operated with the US on intelligence to aid the campaign in
Afghanistan.[77]

77. The campaign in Afghanistan began with cruise
missile attacks on al Qaeda and Taliban air defences, command
and control facilities, air bases and training camps. Military
vehicles were also attacked, and US aircraft destroyed defences
around major cities in Afghanistan such as Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar
and Mazar-e-Sharif. Taliban and al Qaeda troop concentrations
were targeted later in the campaign. The US-led military campaign
was made in alliance with the Northern Alliance, which had been
fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan throughout the late 1990s.
Small numbers of special forces were used to liaise with the Northern
Alliance and to help with missile guidance.

78. From the beginning, concerns were raised about
the campaign in Afghanistan. Military analysts pointed to the
dangers inherent in such a campaign. Afghanistan, it was noted,
had in the past been a graveyard for invading armies, not least
the British in the nineteenth century and the Soviet Russian army
in the twentieth. The US and its allies would surely become bogged
down in a fruitless campaign there for years. The Chief of the
Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, warned that "we
must expect [military action] to go through the winter and into
next summer at the very least."[78]
Professor Sir Michael Howard warned in late October that trying
to defeat al Qaeda through the continued bombardment of Afghanistan
was like "trying to eradicate cancer cells with a blow torch."[79]

79. There was also widespread concern during October
about the consequences of the campaign for the civilian population
of Afghanistan. The UN, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International
called on the US-led coalition to strengthen measures to ensure
that civilians were not killed as a result of military action,
and expressed particular concern about the use of cluster bombs.[80]
In late October, some humanitarian organisations also called for
an break in the bombing campaign to ensure assistance was delivered
to vulnerable communities in Afghanistan.[81]

80. By 9 November, Alliance forces had captured the
northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif. Six provinces across Northern
Afghanistan fell quickly after this, as Taliban troops retreated
to the east and west of the country. During the night of 12-13
November, Taliban forces evacuated the capital, Kabul.

81. We conclude that the British and American
governments were vindicated in their judgments that the Taliban
could be removed speedily, and with loss of life that appears
to have been far lower than was predicted early in the military
campaign.

83. However, British liaison with its Afghan allies
appears to have been difficult on some occasions. Paul Bergne
told us that, during his assignment in Afghanistan, he was able
"to play a significant role in de-fusing the fury of the
Northern Alliance leaders when the United Kingdom landed troops
at Bagram [air base] without seeking their agreement."[83]
Mr Bergne told us that he did not know why the British Government
had not sought agreement before landing the Special Boat Service
troops at Bagram; he had never received a satisfactory explanation
from the FCO. Mr Bergne himself had only been informed of the
troops' arrival in Afghanistan half an hour before the first aeroplane
flew in, by the Northern Alliance 'foreign minister' (now Afghan
foreign minister) Dr Abdullah Abdullah, who was "extremely
angry."[84] The
Northern Alliance were threatening to open fire on the British
troops. Bergne was able to persuade Dr Abdullah to send instructions
to prevent such an attack, though the British Commanding Officer
at Bagram told Bergne later that the Afghans at Bagram had been
"sorely tempted" to open fire on this occasion.

84. We recommend that the Government investigate
the circumstances which led to the dangerous misunderstanding
with Britain's allies at Bagram. We trust that measures will be
taken to ensure that British personnel will not be endangered
unnecessarily through such misunderstandings in future operations.

85. We also recommend that the Government investigate
the extent to which the confusion and blurred lines of communication
arose from the fact that Mr Bergne was appointed by the Prime
Minister rather than by the FCO. Lessons need to be learned about
relations between the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister's
personal appointees in such circumstances.

87. The evidence suggests that the defeat of the
Taliban did achieve its major objective, which was to destroy
al Qaeda's support base in Afghanistan and significantly to weaken
the organization. As far as is known, Osama bin Laden was not
captured or killed during the campaign. There were reports as
Kabul fell to Northern Alliance and international forces that
many Taliban and al Qaeda leaders were fleeing to northern Pakistan.
While this area is somewhat lawless, Paul Bergne told us that
he did not see "any chance at all, with the present political
situation in Pakistan and, indeed, in the ... former Soviet republics,
of al Qaeda succeeding in building up the sort of arrangements
it had in Afghanistan" in these areas.[86]

88. The fall of the Taliban was also, in Mr Bergne's
judgement, a "severe blow" to terrorist organizations
operating in the Ferghana Valley, to the terrorist Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan, although such organizations would not be destroyed
by the changes in Afghanistan. They would continue to have large
numbers of sympathizers, because governments in many of the Central
Asian republics are seen by political Islamists as "oppressive,
inefficient, corrupt and anti-Islamic" and the region is
"fertile ground for that version of political Islam."[87]
Bergne warned us that the governments of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
were both vulnerable to Islamic revolution, in part because of
the widespread poverty of these countries, the failure of their
governments to deal with economic problems, and the oppression
of legitimate forms of dissent.

89. The stability of Central Asia is of crucial importance
to the success of the campaign against terrorism. The Government
explained to us that it would focus on poverty reduction to help
remove "the conditions which enable terrorists to recruit
and win support," through "greater co-ordination with
EU, US, international financial institutions and other partners"
and "more collaboration between the multilateral organisations."[88]
Mr Stephen Wright, Director of Security Policy, FCO, also told
us on 5 December that the FCO "before the 11 September had
an intention to open an Embassy in Bishkek [the capital of the
Kyrgyz Republic] and we are pressing ahead with that plan. Since
11 September we are looking again at the question of whether we
should open a small Embassy in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, where up
to now we have not had one, principally for security reasons."[89]
We welcome the Government's decision to increase diplomatic representation
in Central Asia, as recommended by our predecessor Committee in
its Report on the South Caucasus and Central Asia in July 1999.[90]
We also welcome the opportunities the Government has recognised
since 11 September for closer co-operation with Russia to increase
security in the region.

91. We commend the Government for the speed with
which it deployed a sizeable contingent of UK personnel to CENTCOM,
and conclude that this deployment made an important contribution
to close co-operation with the United States in the campaign in
Afghanistan.

93. On 5 December, the Foreign Secretary told us
that Britain took a "leading role in the Security Council"
on the question of post-Taliban Afghanistan.[93]
The United Kingdom drafted UNSCR 1378, which was passed as the
Taliban was expelled from Kabul on 14 November 2002. UNSCR 1378
called for the establishment of a new transitional administration
which should be "broad-based, multi-ethnic and fully representative
of all Afghan people." The resolution also affirmed the "central
role" of the United Nations in supporting the Afghan people
in establishing this administration, and called member states
to provide support to Afghanistan to ensure security was re-established
and to provide humanitarian and economic assistance to the country.

94. Earlier, Britain had "done a great deal
of work behind the scenes, first of all much earlier in proposing
that the Secretary General should appoint a special representative."
In the event, Lakhdar Brahimi was appointed as the Secretary General's
Special Representative for Afghanistan on 3 October 2001. The
Foreign Secretary also pointed out that Britain was also the "first
country to identify and appoint a senior diplomat to assist in
the reconstruction process, in our case Robert Cooper."[94]

95. We commend the Government for realising, early
in the Afghanistan campaign, the necessity to look beyond its
military aspects. We conclude that the Government's planning in
this area contributed to the rapid and successful establishment
of an interim authority after the fall of the Taliban.

97. What appear to have established Britain as America's
most trusted ally in the war against terrorism were the actions
taken by the Government to draw together and define a international
coalition against terrorism, publicly and through multilateral
fora. These actions ensured that, by the end of September, Britain
had "a seat at the table" in Washington and ensured
that "the views of the Blair Government are taken seriously".[99]
The Government's articulation of campaign objectives also appears
to have shaped coalition policy, seizing the moment of maximum
support for counter-terrorist action to ensure that global action
was taken to defeat the threat.

98. We believe that the Government's support of the
UN's role in the war against terrorism was particularly important
in these early stages. Without the British initiatives we mention
here, the UN may not have been so central to the war against terrorism.
We are convinced that this war can only be won through sustained
global co-operation. The UN is the only global organisation with
a mandate appropriate to this task. The CTC is an important initiative
and its success so far depends to a great extent on British leadership.

99. We also commend the Government's work towards
establishing international legal grounds, through the United Nations
Security Council, before responding militarily against the threat
of international terrorism. We believe that this focus on establishing
a legal basis for action helped to ensure widespread international
support for the subsequent military action in Afghanistan, and
this holds lessons for future military actions.

100. Britain's leadership in the UN role early in
the campaign may have influenced, at least for a time, the US
Administration's view of the Organisation. On 10 November, President
Bush opened the UN 56th General Assembly debate with a speech
which appeared to show that the Administration saw the value of
the UN in fighting terrorism. The UN, President Bush argued, had
already defined the "most basic obligations in this new conflict,"
in UNSCR 1373.[100]
Though the most important decisions in the conduct of the war
against terrorism continue to be taken in Washington, not New
York, the role of the UN in the global campaign against terrorism
is now clearly established.