Now, we
juxtapose the sublime next to the ridiculous.In a previous chapter, the issues of statutory construction that arose
from the terms "includes" and "including" were so complex,
another chapter is required to revisit these terms in greater detail.Much of the debate revolves around an
apparent need to adopt either an expansive or a restrictive
meaning for these terms, and to stay with this choice.The restrictive meaning settles a host of
problems.It confines the meaning of
all defined terms to the list of items which follow the words
"include", "includes" and "including".An official Treasury Decision, T.D. 3980,
and numerous court decisions have reportedly sided with this restrictive school
of ambiguous terminology.The Informer
provides a good illustration of this school of thought by defining
"includes" and "include" very simply as follows:

... [T]o use
"includes" as defined in IRC is restrictive.

[Which One Are You?, page 20]

... [I]n tax
law it is defined as a word of restriction ....

[Which One Are You?, page 131]

In every definition that uses the word
"include", only the words that follow are defining the Term.

[Which One Are You?, page 13]

Author Ralph
Whittington cites Treasury Decision ("T.D.") 3980 as his
justification for joining the restrictive school.According to his reading of this T.D., the Secretary of the
Treasury has adopted a restrictive
meaning by stating that "includes" means to "comprise as a
member", to "confine", to "comprise as the whole a
part".This was the definition as
found in the New Standard Dictionary at the time this T.D. was
published:

"(1)To comprise, comprehend, or embrace as a
component part, item, or member; as, this volume includes all his works, the bill includes his last purchase."

"To comprehend or comprise, as a
genus of the species, the whole a part, an argument or reason the inference; to
take or reckon in; to contain; embrace; as this volume includes the essays to
and including the tenth."

The Century Dictionary defines
"including," thus: "to comprise as a part."

[Treasury Decision 3980, January-December, 1927]

[Vol. 29, page 64, emphasis added]

Authors like
Whittington may have seized upon a partial reading of this T.D., in order to
solve what we now know to be a source of great ambiguity in the IRC and in
other United States Codes.For example,
contrary to the dictionary definitions cited above, page 65 of T.D. 3980 goes
on to say the following:

Perhaps the most lucid statement the books
afford on the subject is in Blanck et
al. v. Pioneer Mining Co. et al.
(Wash.; 159 Pac. 1077, 1079), namely, "the word 'including' is a term of enlargement and not a term of limitation,
and necessarily implies that something is intended to be embraced in the
permitted deductions beyond the general language which precedes.But granting that the word 'including' is a
term of enlargement, it is clear
that it only performs that office by introducing the specific elements
constituting the enlargement.It thus, and thus only, enlarges the otherwise more limited, preceding general
language.***The word 'including' introduces an enlarging definition of the preceding
general words, 'actual cost of the labor,' thus of necessity excluding the idea
of a further enlargement than that
furnished by the enlarging clause to
introduced.When read in its immediate
context, as on all authority it must be read, the word 'including' is obviously
used in the sense of its synonymous 'comprising; comprehending;
embracing.'"

[Treasury Decision 3980, January-December, 1927]

[Vol. 29, page 65, emphasis added]

Now, didn't that settle the matter
once and for all?Yes?No?Treasury Decision 3980 is really not all that decisive, since it obviously
joins the restrictive school on one page,
and then jumps ship to the expansive
school on the very next page.If you
are getting confused already, that's good.At least when it comes to "including", be proud of the fact you are not alone:

This word has received considerable
discussion in opinions of the courts.It has been productive of much controversy.

[Treasury Decision 3980, January-December, 1927]

[Vol. 29, page 64, paragraph 3, emphasis added]

Amen to that!

One of my
goals in this chapter is to demonstrate how the continuing controversy is proof
that terms with a long history of
semantic confusion should never be used in a Congressional statute.Such terms are proof that the statute is
null and void for vagueness.The
confusion we experience is inherent in the language, and no doubt deliberate,
because the controversy has not exactly been a well kept national security
secret.

Let us see if
the Restrictive School leads to any absurd results.Reductio ad absurdum to
the rescue again!Notice what results
obtain for the definition of "State" as found in 7701(a), the
"Definitions" section of the Internal Revenue Code:

Step 1:Define "State" as follows:

The term "State" shall be
construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is
necessary to carry out provisions of this title.

[IRC 7701(a)(10)]

Step 2:Define "United States" as follows:

The term "United States" when
used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of
Columbia.

[IRC 7701(a)(9)]

Step 3:Substitute text from one into the other:

The term "United States" when
used in a geographical sense includes only the Districts of Columbia and the
District of Columbia.(Or is it the
District of Columbias?)

This is an
absurd result, no?yes?none of the above?Is the definition of "United States" clarified by
qualifying it with the phrase "when used in a geographical
sense"?yes or no?This qualifier only makes our situation
worse, because the IRC rarely if ever distinguishes Code sections which do use "United States" in a geographical sense, from Code
sections which do not use it in a geographical sense.Nor does the Code tell us which sense to use
as the default, that is, the intended meaning we should use when the Code does not say "in a geographical
sense".Identical problems arise
if we must be specific as to "where such construction is necessary to
carry out provisions of this title", as stated in 7701(a)(10).Where is it not so necessary?What is "this title"?See IRC 7851(a)(6)(A), in chief.

The
Informer's work is a good example of the confusion that reigns in this empire
of verbiage.Having emphatically sided
with the Restrictive School, he then goes on to define the term
"States" to mean Guam, Virgin Islands and "Etc.", as
follows:

The term "States" in 26 USC
7701(a)(9) is referring to the federal states of Guam, Virgin Islands, Etc.,
and NOT the 50 States of the Union.

[Which One Are You?, page 98]

You can't
have it both ways, can you?no?yes?maybe?Let us marshall some help
directly from the IRC itself.Against
the fierce winds of hot air emanating from the Restrictive School of Language
Arts, there is a section of the IRC which does appear to evidence a contrary intent to utilize the expansive sense:

Includes and Including.The terms "includes" and
"including" when used in a definition contained in this title shall
not be deemed to exclude other things
otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.

[IRC 7701(c), emphasis added]

Perhaps we should give this school a
completely different name.How about
the Federal Area of Restrictive Terminology (F-A-R-T)?All in favor, say AYE!(Confusion is a gaseous state.)

Section
7701(c) utilizes the key phrase "other things", which now requires us
to examine the legal meaning of things.(So, what else is new?)Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition, defines "things" as follows:

Things.The objects of dominion or property as contra-distinguished from
"persons."Gayer v. Whelan, 138 P.2d 763, 768.... Such permanent objects, not being persons, as are sensible, or
perceptible through the senses.

[emphasis added]

This definition, in turn, requires us to examine the
legal meaning of "persons" in Black's, as follows:

Person.In general usage, a human being (i.e. natural person), though by statute
term may include labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations,
legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers.

Here, Black's Law Dictionary states that
"person" by statute may include artificial
persons, in addition to natural
persons.How, then, does the IRC define
"person"?

Person. -- The term "person"
shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate,
partnership, association, company or corporation.

[IRC 7701(a)(1)]

Unfortunately, the IRC does not define
the term "individual", so, without resorting to the regulations in
the CFR, we must again utilize a law dictionary like Black's Sixth
Edition:

Individual.As a noun, this term denotes a single person
as distinguished from a group or class, and also, very commonly, a private or natural person as
distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or association ....

[emphasis added]

Therefore, "things" and
"persons" must be distinguished from each other, but the term
"person" is not limited to human beings because it shall be construed
to mean and include an individual, trust, estate, partnership, association,
company or corporation.So, are we
justified in making the inference that individuals, trusts, estates,
partnerships, associations, companies and corporations are excluded from "things" as that term is used in Section
7701(c)?This author says YES.

Notice also the strained grammar that
is found in the phrase "shall be construed to mean and include".Why not use the simpler grammar found in the
phrase "means and includes"?The answer:because the term
"includes" is defined by IRC 7701(c) to be expansive, that's why!But the term "include" is not
mentioned in 7701(c);therefore, it
must berestrictive and is actually used as such in the IRC.Accordingly, no individual, trust, estate,
partnership, association, company or corporation could otherwise fall within the statutory meaning of a termexplicitly defined by the IRC because,
being "persons", none of these is a "thing"!Logically,
then, "includes" and "including" are also restrictive
when they are used in IRC definitions of "persons".Utterly amazing, yes?

Author Otto
Skinner, as we already know from a previous chapter, cites Section 7701(c) of
the IRC as proof that we all belong in the Expansive School of Language
Science.Followers of this school argue
that "includes only" should be used, and is actually used in the IRC, when a restrictive meaning is
intended.In other words,
"includes" and "including" are always expansive.An intent
contrary to the expansive sense is
evidenced by using "includes only" whenever necessary.Fine.All in favor say AYE.All
opposed, jump ship. The debate is finished yes?Not so fast.Cheerleaders, put down your pom‑poms.The operative concepts introduced by 7701(c) are those "things otherwise within the meaning of the
term defined".Now, the 64
million dollar question is this:

How
does something join the class of things that are "within the meaning
of the term defined", if that something
is not enumerated in the definition?

We can obtain some help in answering
this question by referring to an older clarification of "includes"
and "including" that was published in the Code of Federal Regulations
in the year 1961.This clarification
introduces the notion of "same general class".(So, you might be in the right school, but
you may be in the wrong class.Detention after school!)This
clarification reads:

170.59Includes and including.

"Includes" and
"including" shall not be deemed to exclude things other than those
enumerated which are in the same general class.

[26 CFR 170.59, revised as of January 1, 1961]

In an earlier
chapter, a double negative was detected in the "clarification" found
at IRC 7701(c), namely, the terms "not ... exclude" are
equivalent to saying "include"("not-ex" = "in").Two negatives make a positive.Apply this same finding to regulation 170.59 above, and you get the
following:

"Includes" and
"including" shall be deemed to include things other than those
enumerated which are in the same general class.

What are
those things which are "in the same general class", if they have not
been enumerated in the definition?This
is one of the many possible variations of the 64 million dollar question asked
above.Are we any closer to an
answer?yes?no?maybe?(Is this astronomy class, or basket
weaving?)If a person, place or thing
is not enumerated in the statutory definition of a term, is it not a violation
of the rules of statutory construction to join such a person, place or thing to
that definition?One of these rules is
a canon called the "ejusdem generis" rule, defined in Black's Law
Dictionary, Sixth Edition, as follows:

Under "ejusdem generis" canon of
statutory construction, where general words follow the enumeration of
particular classes of things, the general
words will be construed as applying only to things of the same general class
as those enumerated.

[emphasis added]

Here the term "same general
class" is used once again.One of
the major points of this book is to distinguish the 50 States from the federal
zone, by using the principle of territorial heterogeneity.The
50 States are in one class, because of the constitutional restraints under
which Congress must operate inside those 50 States.The areas within the
federal zone are in a different class, because these same constitutional restraints
simply do not limit Congress inside that zone.This may sound totally correct, in theory, but the IRC is totally mum on
this issue of "general class" (because it has none).Yes, this is all the more reason why the IRC
is null and void for vagueness.

This
conclusion is supported by two other rules of statutory construction.The first of these is noscitur a sociis, in Latin.Black's defines this rule as follows:

Noscitur
a sociis.It is known from its
associates.The meaning of a word is or
may be known from the accompanying words.Under the doctrine of "noscitur
a sociis", the meaning of
questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by
reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it.

[emphasis added]

In this context, the 50 States are associated with each other by sharing their membership in the Union
under the Constitution.The land areas
within the federal zone are associated
with each other by sharing their inclusion within the zone over which Congress
has exclusive legislative jurisdiction.The areas inside and outside the zone are therefore dissociated from each other because of this key difference, i.e., the Union, in or out.

The second
rule is inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius, in Latin.Black's
defines this rule as follows:

Inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius.The inclusion of one is the exclusion of
another.The certain designation of one
person is an absolute exclusion of all others. ... This doctrine decrees that
where law expressly describes [a] particular situation to which it shall apply,
an irrefutable inference must be drawn
that what is omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded.

[emphasis added]

Are we, or are we not, therefore, justified in drawing
the following irrefutable inferences?

Places omitted from the statutory
definitions of "State", "States" and "United
States" were intended to be
omitted (like California, Maine, Florida and Oregon).

"Include" is omitted from the
definition of "includes" and "including" because the latter
terms were intended to be expansive,
while the former was intended to be
restrictive.

Let's dive back into the Code in order to find any help
we can get on this issue.In Subtitle
F, the Code contains a formal definition of "other terms" as follows:

Other terms. -- Any term used in this
subtitle with respect to the application of, or in connection with, the
provisions of any other subtitle of this title shall have the same meaning as
in such provisions.

[IRC 7701(a)(28)]

Let's use the rules of grammar to decompose this
definition of "other terms" into two separate definitions, as
follows:

Any term used in Subtitle F with respect to
the application of the provisions of any other subtitle shall have the same
meaning as in such provisions.

-or-

Any term used in Subtitle F in connection
with the provisions of any other subtitle shall have the same meaning as in
such provisions.

Now, therefore, does IRC 7701(a)(28) clarify
anything?For example, if there is a different definition of
"State" in the provisions of some other subtitle, do we now know
enough to decide whether or not:

(1)that different
definition should be expanded with things that are within the meaning as
defined at 7701(a)(10)?Yes or No?

(2)the definition at 7701(a)(10) should be
expanded with things that are within the meaning of that different definition?Yes
or No?

(3)all of the above are correct?

(4)none of the above is correct?

If you are having difficulty answering
these questions, don't blame yourself.With all this evidence staring you in the face, it is not difficult to
argue that the confusion which you are experiencing is inherent in the statute
and therefore deliberate.

To confuse
our separate cheering squads even more,
the word "shall" means "may".Squad leaders, let's see those pom-poms.Since this may be most difficult for many of
you to swallow without convincing proof, the following court decisions leave no
doubt about the legal meaning of "shall".In the decision of Cairo & Fulton R.R. Co. v. Hecht,
95 U.S. 170, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:

As against the government the word
"shall" when used in statutes, is to be construed as "may,"
unless a contrary intention is manifest.

[emphasis added]

Does the IRC manifest a contrary intent?In the decision of George Williams
College v. Village of Williams Bay, 7 N.W.2d 891, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin stated:

"Shall" in a statute may be
construed to mean "may" in order to avoid constitutional doubt.

If necessary to avoid unconstitutionality
of a statute, "shall" will be deemed equivalent to "may"
....

Maybe we can
shed some light on the overall situation by treating the terms
"State" and "States" as completely different words.After all, the definition of "United
States" uses the plural form twice, and there is no definition of
"States" as such.Note
carefully the following:

The term "State" shall be construed to include the District of Columbia,
where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this title.

[IRC 7701(a)(10)]

The term "United States" when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.

[IRC 7701(a)(9)]

So, can we
assume that the singular form of words necessarily has a meaning that is different from the plural form of
words?This might help us to
distinguish the two terms "include" and "includes", since
one is the singular form of the verb, while the other can be the plural form of
the verb.For example, the sentence
"It includes ..." has a singular subject and a singular
predicate.The sentence "They
include ..." has a plural subject and a plural predicate, but the
sentence "I include ..." has a singular subject and predicate.What if "include" is used as an
infinitive, rather than a predicate?

Recall that the
"clarification" at IRC 7701(c) contains explicit references to
"includes" and "including", but not to
the word "include".Does this
provide us with a definitive reason for deciding the term "include"
is restrictive, while the terms "includes" and "including"
are expansive?Some people, including this author, are completely
satisfied that it does (but not all people are so satisfied).What if these latter terms are used in the
restrictive sense of "includes only" or "including only"?Are you getting even more confused now?Welcome to the state of confusion (surely a
gaseous state).Recall once again the
definition of "State" at 7701(a)(10):

The term "State" shall be
construed to include the District of
Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of this
title.

[IRC 7701(a)(10)]

Now recall the definition of "United States"
at 7701(a)(9):

The term "United States" when
used in a geographical sense includes
only the States and the District of Columbia.

[IRC 7701(a)(9)]

Title 1 and the Code of Federal Regulations come to the
rescue.Plural forms and singular forms
are interchangeable:

170.60Inclusive language.

Words in the plural form shall include the
singular and vice versa, and words in the masculine gender shall include the
feminine as well as trusts, estates, partnerships, associations, companies, and
corporations.

[26 CFR 170.60, revised as of January 1, 1961]

Now, doesn't
that really clarify everything?If
"includes" is singular and "include" is plural, using the
above rule for "inclusive language", the term "include"
includes "includes".Wait,
didn't we already make this remarkable discovery in a previous chapter?Answer:No, in that chapter, we discovered that "includes" includes
"include".But, now we have conflicting results.Didn't we just prove that one is restrictive
and the other is expansive?What
gives?Remember, also, that
"shall" means "may".Therefore, our rule for "inclusive language" from the CFR can
now be rewritten to say that "words in the plural form MAY include the
singular" (and may NOT, depending on whether it is a week from
Tuesday).If this is Tuesday, then we
must be in Belgium.At least one major
mystery is now solved, maybe!(MAYbe?)

Does the Code
of Federal Regulations clarify any of the definitions found in section 7701 of
the Internal Revenue Code?The
following table lists the headings of corresponding sections from the CFR,
beginning at 26 CFR 301.7701-1:

Definitions

301.7701-1Classification of
organizations for federal tax purposes

301.7701-2Business entities; definitions

301.7701-3Clarification of certain business entities

301.7701-4Trusts

301.7701-5Domestic, foreign, resident, and nonresident
persons

301.7701-6Definitions;person, fiduciary

301.7701-8Military or naval forces and Armed Forces of the United States

301.7701-9Secretary or his delegate

301.7701-10 District director

301.7701-11 Social security number

301.7701-12 Employer
identification number

301.7701-13 Pre-1970 domestic building and loan association

301.7701-13A Post-1969 domestic building and loan
association

301.7701-14 Cooperative bank

301.7701-15 Income tax return preparer

301.7701-16 Other terms

301.7701-17T Collective-bargaining plans and agreements

[26 CFR 301.7701-1 thru 7701-17T]

This list contains such essential
topics as trusts, associations, cooperative banks, and pre-1970 and post-1969
domestic building and loan associations.In fact, there are numerous
pages dedicated to these building and loan associations.However, the reader reaches the end of the
list without finding any reference to
"State" or "United States".Instead, the following regulation is found near the end of the
list:

301.7701-16Other terms.

For a definition of the term
"withholding agent" see section 1.1441-7(a).Any
other terms that are defined in section 7701 and that are not defined in sections 301.7701-1 to 301.7701-15, inclusive,
shall, when used in this chapter, have
the meanings assigned to them in section 7701.

[26 CFR 301.7701-16]

Like it or not, we are right back
where we started, in IRC Section 7701, the "definitions" section of
that Code, where "other terms" are defined differently.You may pass
"GO" again, but do not
collect 200 dollars.You must pay the
bank instead!(Try changing that
rule the next time you play Monopoly.The Monopoly bank will, of course, end up owning everything in
sight.)You are also free to search
some 10,000 pages of additional regulations to determine if the fluctuating
definitions of the terms "State" and "United States" are
clarified anywhere else in the Code of Federal Regulations.Happy hunting!

The only way
out of this swamp is to rely on something other
than the murky gyrations of conflicting, mutually destructive semantic
mishmash.That something is The
Fundamental Law:Congress can only tax
the Citizens of foreign States under special and limited
circumstances.Congress can only levy a
direct tax on Citizens of the 50 States if that tax is duly
apportioned.Congress can only levy an
indirect tax on Citizens of the 50 States if that tax is uniform.These are the chains of the
Constitution.Read Thomas Jefferson.

The
historical record documents undeniable proof that the confusion, ambiguity and
jurisdictional deceptions now built into the IRC were deliberate.This historical
record provides the "smoking gun" that proves the real intent was
deception.The first Internal Revenue
Code was Title 35 of the Revised Statutes of June 22, 1874.On December 5, 1898, Mr. Justice Cox of the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia delivered an address before the
Columbia Historical Society.In this
address, he discussed the history of the District of Columbia as follows:

In June 1866, an act was passed
authorizing the President to appoint three commissioners to revise and bring
together all the statutes ....[T]he act does not seem, in terms, to
allude to the District of Columbia, or even to embrace it ....Without having any express authority to
do so, they made a separate revision and collection of the acts of Congress
relating to the District, besides the collection of general statutes relating
to the whole United States.Each
collection was reported to Congress, to be approved and enacted into law
....[T]he whole is enacted into law as
the body of the statute law of the United States, under the title of Revised
Statutes as of 22 June 1874. ...

[T]he general collection might
perhaps be considered, in a limited sense as a code for the United States, as
it embraced all the laws affecting the whole United States within the
constitutional legislative jurisdiction of Congress, but there could be no complete code for the entire United States, because the
subjects which would be proper to be regulated by a code in the States are
entirely outside the legislative authority of Congress.

[District of Columbia Code, Historical Section]

[emphasis added]

More than
half a century later, the deliberate confusion and ambiguity were problems that
not only persisted; they were getting worse by the minute. In the year 1944,
during Roosevelt's administration, Senator Barkley made a speech from the floor
of the U.S. Senate in which he complained:

Congress is to blame for these
complexities to the extent, and only to the extent, to which it has accepted
the advice, the recommendations, and the language of the Treasury Department,
through its so-called experts who have sat in on the passage of every tax
measure since I can remember.

Every member of
the House Ways and Means Committee and every member of the Senate Finance
Committee knows that every time we have undertaken to write a new tax bill in
the last 10 years we have started out
with the universal desire to simplify the tax laws and the forms through which
taxes are collected.We have attempted
to adopt policies which would simplify them.

When we have
agreed upon a policy,we have submitted
that policy to the Treasury Department to write the appropriate language to
carry out that policy;and frequentlythe Treasury Department, through its experts, has brought back language
so complicated and circumambient that neither Solomon nor all the wise men of
the East could understand it or interpret it.

[Congressional Record, 78th
Congress, 2nd Session]

[Vol. 90, Part 2, February 23, 1944,
pages 1964-5]

[emphasis added]

You have, no
doubt, heard that ignorance of the law is no excuse for violating the law.This principle is explicitly stated in the
case law which defines the legal force and effect of administrative
regulations.But, ambiguity and
deception in the law are an excuse,
and the ambiguity in the IRC is a major cause of our ignorance.

Moreover, this principle applies as
well to ambiguity and deception in the case law.Lack of specificity leads to uncertainty, which leads in turn to
court decisions which are also void for vagueness.The 6th Amendment guarantees our right to ignore vague and
ambiguous laws, and this must be extended to vague and ambiguous case law.In light of their enormous influence in laying the foundations
for territorial heterogeneity and a legislative democracy for the federal zone,
The Insular Cases have been justly criticized, by peers, for lacking the minimum
judicial precision required in such cases:

The Absence of Judicial Precision.
-- Whether the decisions in the Insular Cases are considered correct or
incorrect, it seems generally admitted that the opinions rendered are deficient in clearness and in precision,
elements most essential in cases of such importance.Elaborate discussions and irreconcilable differences upon
general principles, and upon fascinating and fundamental problems suggested by
equally indiscriminating dicta in
other cases, complicate, where they do not hide, the points at issue.It is
extremely difficult to determine exactly what has been decided;the position of the court in similar cases
arising in the future, or still pending, is entirely a matter of conjecture....

It is still more to be regretted
that the defects in the decision under discussion are by no means
exceptional.From our system of
allowing judges to express opinion upon general principles and of following
judicial precedent, two evils almost inevitably result:our books are overcrowded with dicta, while dictum is frequently taken for decision.Since the questions involved are both fundamental and political,
in constitutional cases more than in any others thetemptation to digress, necessarily strong, is seldom
resisted;at the same time it is
strikingly difficult, in these cases, to distinguish between decision, ratio decidendi, and dictum.Yet because the questions involved are both extensive and political, and
because the evils of a dictum or of
an ill-considered decision are of corresponding importance, a precise analysis, with a thorough
consideration of the questions raised, and of those questions only, is
imperative.The continued absence of
judicial precision may possibly become a matter of political importance;for opinions such as those rendered
cannot be allowed a permanent place in our system of government.

[15 Harvard Law Review 220, anonymous]

The average
American cannot be expected to have the skill required to navigate the journey we
just took through the verbal swamp that is the Internal Revenue Code, nor does
the average American have the time required to make such a journey.Chicanery does not make good law.The rules of statutory construction fully
support this unavoidable conclusion:

... [I]f it is intended that regulations
will be of a specific and definitive nature then it will be clear that the only safe method of interpretation will
be one that "shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and
to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief
...."

[Statutes and Statutory Construction, by J. G.
Sutherland]

[3rd Edition, Volume 2, Section 4007, page 280 (1943)]

The U.S. Supreme Court has also agreed, in no uncertain
terms, as follows:

... [K]eeping in mind the well settled
rule that the citizen is exempt from taxation unless the same is imposed by
clear and unequivocal language, and that where the construction of a tax law is
doubtful, the doubt is to be resolved in
favor of those upon whom the tax is sought to be laid.

[Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v. McLain]

[192 U.S. 397 (1903), emphasis added]

In the interpretation of statutes levying
taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by
implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their
operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out.In
case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the Government, and in
favor of the citizen.

[United States v. Wigglesworth]

[2 Story 369, emphasis added]

On what
basis, then, should the Internal Revenue Service be allowed to extend the
provisions of the IRC beyond the clear
import of the language used?

On what basis can the IRS act when that language has no clear import?

On what basis is the IRS justified in
enlarging their operations so as to
embrace matters not specifically pointed out?The answer is tyranny.The "golden" retriever has broken his leash and is now tearing
up the neighborhood to fetch the gold.What a service!

Consider for
a moment the sheer size of the class of people now affected by the fraudulent
16th Amendment.First of all, take into
account all those Americans who have passed away, but who paid taxes into the
Treasury after the year 1913.How many of those correctly understood all the rules, when people like Frank
R. Brushaber were confused as early as 1914?

Add to that number all those Americans
who are still alive today and who have paid taxes to the IRS because they thought
there was a law, and they thought that law was the 16th Amendment.After all, they were told as much by
numerous federal officials and possibly also their parents, friends, relatives,
school teachers, scout masters and colleagues.Don't high school civics classes now spend a lot of time teaching
students how to complete IRS 1040 forms and schedules, instead of teaching the
Constitution?

Donald C.
Alexander, when he was Commissioner of Internal Revenue, published an official
statement in the Federal Register that the 16th Amendment was the
federal government's general authority to tax the incomes of individuals and
corporations (see Chapter 1 and Appendix J).Sorry, Donald, you were wrong.At this point in time, it is impossible for us to determine whether you
were lying, or whether you too were a victim of the fraud.

Just how many people are in the same general class of those affected by
the fraudulent 16th Amendment?Is it
200 million?Is it 300 million?Whatever it is, it just boggles the
imagination.It certainly does involve
a very large number of federal employees who went to work for Uncle Sam in good faith.

It is clear,
there is a huge difference between the area covered by the federal zone, and
the area covered by the 50 States.Money is a powerful motivation for all of us.Congress had literally trillions of dollars to gain by convincing
most Americans they were inside its
revenue base when, in fact, most Americans were outside its revenue base, and remain outside even today.

This is deception on a grand scale,
and the proof of this deception is found in the Code itself.It is no wonder why public relations
"officials" of the IRS cringe
in fear when dedicated Patriots like Godfrey Lehman admit, out loud and in
person, that they have read the law.

It is quite stunning how the carefully
crafted definitions of "United States" do appear to unlock a Code
that is horribly complex and deliberately so.As fate would have it, these carefully crafted definitions also expose
perhaps the greatest fiscal fraud that has ever been perpetrated upon any
people at any time in the history of the world.