Over the last decade Nato has constantly found itself behind the curve in planning and executing what they call "influence operations" – a combination of the use of propaganda ("psychological operations") and, importantly, force to deliver its "message". For getting its media message across, it has relied on clunking spokesmen whose pronouncements, particularly on casualties, are automatically assumed by Afghans to be lies. Matters are not assisted by the fact that for much of the time western forces and their Afghan allies do not seem entirely clear on their objectives.

Meanwhile the Taliban (or Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, as they call themselves) are crystal clear as to their desired end-state: foreigners out and a government under Islamic law. Despite the fact that much of their media output is highly inaccurate – their website this morning claimed that they had killed "several dozen foreign invaders and local puppets" – the Taliban are always first off the mark after every incident. This has long been a source of huge frustration to senior officers, but a problem that Nato's media operations bureaucracy seems incapable of putting right.

Tuesday's attacks in Kabul delivered a series of messages from the Taliban (if indeed it was the Taliban who carried them out. Needless to say, they claimed them anyway.) First, they confirm what is already clear to most Afghans: no one is now convinced by Nato's claim that Afghan forces will be able to secure the country within three years. Aside from the inability of the army or police to conduct the smallest operation without foreign help, the desertion rate in the army is extremely high – at one point reaching 35% at the height of harvest time this summer.

The police are even worse: their many checkpoints are regarded, like much of the rest of government, as useless obstructions to everyday life. Afghan security forces' performance during the recent attacks in the capital have not inspired confidence among Kabulis. Matters are not helped by the fact that yesterday's attackers are thought to have entered the city dressed in burqas. Few if any of those police checkpoints have women officers.

Second, the Taliban is pointing up the strategic irrelevance of the current operations in Helmand and the south. The military historian and former US marine corps colonel Bing West describes these desultory battles as "groundhog wars". Despite taking serious losses from what are effectively Nato special forces' death squads, the Taliban is still in business.

In any event, the centre of gravity in this war is not the south, where the enemy is strong and has succeeded in "fixing" US and other Nato forces to their bases and a few hamlets and towns. These forces include British troops in Helmand who cling on to three of the province's 14 districts. The centre of gravity of this war is Kabul itself and what it represents. We have found ourselves involved in national war, which has been exhausting the country for over 30 years since the 1979 Soviet invasion. Both the west and the Taliban are tired now and keen to move toward a resolution.

Which brings us to the key purpose of the attacks. In December, there is to be another try at a political settlement in Bonn. The convenor of the last Bonn conference in 2001, Lakhdar Brahimi, has said that the "original sin" in 2001 was not to give the Taliban a seat at the table. They may yet get it. This week the US approved the opening of a Taliban office in Doha, and it is certain that talks will begin between the US and the Taliban before the end of the year. This is a huge step forward, and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the organisation we call the Taliban, or that part of it under the control of Mullah Omar, is determined to begin them from a position of strength. Their operations in Kabul and elsewhere were intended to establish that position. There is no doubt at all that there will be more like them.