The attacks in Chhattisgarh have triggered a
raging debate in security establishments on whether anti-Naxal offensives have
been a massive failure. And whether a combined force of state police and
Central paramilitary is in a position to tackle the insurgents, operating in 76
districts across 10 states.

Facts & Figure!!

The government data in the past decade (2005-2015)
throws horrific figures about the state of India’s anti-Naxal operations:4,510 people—1,753 jawans and 2,757
civilians—were killed by Naxalites.

During the same period, however, security forces killed
2,193 Naxalites.

This means that on an average, theNaxalites killed about two persons for every one
they lost in the battlefield.

They also snatched away 536 sophisticated weapons from
the security forces.

Killing of Police informers

According to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), in the
first three months of 2015, around 19 informers, responsible for gathering
and disseminating human intelligence (HUMINT), were killed.

Between 2010 and 2014, the figure was 879.

Reason for this worrisome scenario ?

A senior IPS officer in his book notes:

“We are fighting the war on their (Naxalites) terms, not
our terms.”

Pointing out the reasons for anti-Naxal operations not
producing any worthwhile results in spite of huge investments and heavy
deployment, he says -->

“The tragedy is that vast resources have been placed at
the disposal of those who aresimply not fit to command—who do not have
slightest idea of combat.”

Anti-Naxal operations deployment.

Deployment of forces has increased but
effectiveness is not satisfactory !!!

The police performance can be judged by the areas that
the forces recapture and continue dominating.

But, if we see the statistics of the last four-five
years, there is no change on the ground.

Despite increase in the boots on the ground, the
Maoist-dominated areas we are supposed to recapture remain elusive.

Naxalites have been on the back foot for the last six
months to one year because of loss of their senior leaders and mass
desertion of their cadres.

Violation of Standard Operating Procedures !!

Misconception about the setback to Naxalites as
threat of attack on security forces has always been there !!!

Sometimes there is no attack but it is not because of
security forces proactive measures.

It is due to Maoists’ design. They keep changing the
tactics which sometimes are misinterpreted by the forces.

So the notion of sudden spurt in attacks is wrong.

If no incidents are happening, it is not because of
security force's heroism but because of the Naxalites’ tactical
counter-offensive.

Incidents of turf war between the state police
and Central para forces.

An SOP was prepared in 2005 on coordinated operation for
Central and state police which states that the police will lead the
operation while the Central paramilitary forces will assist them, but the
role was reversed and now major operations are launched by the Central
forces, and police personnel accompany the unit in jungle.

In 2008, Chhattisgarh Police filed an FIR against a CRPF
jawan when a civilian got killed in a Naxalite encounter. This led to a
massive showdown and the CRPF argued that even the state police inspector
was part of the encounter team and how can he be spared?

FLOW OF FUNDS

The
Central government in the last many years has spent huge money towards Security
Related Expenditure, Special Infrastructure Scheme, raising India Reserve
(IR) Battalions and setting up of counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist
training institutions in the affected states.

The
government disbursed Rs 303 crore in 2014-15 to make state policing more
effective. In the last four years, it spent Rs 1,617 crore for creating
special infrastructure for police and strengthening the police
station.

This
is just the Central grant on training, fortification etc. If we take into
account the money spent on ammunition as well as modernisation, the figure
would be manifold.

A conservative estimate on government spending, based on
the killing of 63 Naxalites by the security forces and state police in
2014, leads us to the fact that each killing has cost the exchequer Rs
78-80 crore.

Issues faced by security forces !

The Central paramilitary personnel not only lose their
lives to the blood-thirsty Naxalites, their deaths due to diseases in
inhabitable jungles too is a matter of concern.

Also, the CRPF is threatened by attrition. Around 16,523
personnel quit the force during 2009-2012.

On March 4, the MHA said the CRPF lost 323 jawans since
2009 in anti-Naxal operations while 978 lost their lives due to
diseases.

In fact, more CRPF jawans lost their lives to heart
attacks (642 deaths) than killed in action.

As many as 228 personnel in the last five years
committed suicide while 108 died due to malaria.

MHA attributed causes like

personal enmity,

mental illness,

marital discord,

work-related stress to such a high number of men taking
their own lives.

What did the new Government do ?

The Centre decided to work on several aspects to make
the force effective.

Besides raising its own intelligence unit, the CRPF is
also focusing on welfare of the jawans.

There is plan to provide enough rest to those posted in
hard areas before they are transferred again to the Naxal-hit areas.

Earlier, the government had taken measures to implement
a transparent, rational and fair leave policy.

There will be more interaction between jawans and
officers as well as reforms in the grievance redressal machinery.

EXTORTION RACKET of NaXalites !!!

According to MHA, Naxalites raise money through a variety of
sources, including extortion from
contractors, businessmen, industries, government servants etc. They are also involved in confiscation of properties of the
rich land owners.

The ministry says many cases of extortion are not reported for
fear of violent reprisal from the ultras.

The most comprehensive analysis was prepared by security forces in
a secret note in August 2013, listing 14 sources for Maoist-funding, ranging
from individuals to industries.

The note said PWD works have been a successful method of gaining
funds for Naxalites in red corridors, and they are also targeting educational
institutions, liquor business, tendu leaf contractors, mines and government
servants as well as politicians.

The note said usually an over-ground
member of the outfit or an NGO is deputed to collect the fixed extortion amount
from these sources.

It also said Maoists issued guidelines through ‘Our
Financial Policy’, a written document for proper expenditure. It said
they are collecting every year approximately Rs 140 crore from business
houses.

The
amount to be collected each year is decided by the central committee of
Maoists.

Each
level of ultras maintains a detailed statement of money collected.

A
consolidated expenditure is prepared by the commander and submitted to the
higher committee at regular meetings.

But are the sources drying up due to government’s two-pronged strategy of development and security
operations?

Maoist
literatures seized by security forces suggest so. People’s March admitted that
reform measures have been speeded up, remote tribal villages are now
witnessing regular visit by government officials, roads are being built,
houses being repaired and rations being granted to neutralise the Maoists
propaganda.

Official
data says 140 Naxalites surrendered in the last three months, with the
maximum 70 in Andhra Pradesh followed by 38 in Chhattisgarh.

Last
year, 387 Naxalites laid down their arms in Chhattisgarh, followed by
Andhra (130) and Odisha (94). The police in Jharkhand claimed to have
arrested 230 Naxalites in 2014.

A total of 656 Naxalites surrendered last year while 1,689
were arrested in the country.

Surrender
at best could be used as Psy-War against Naxalites, but forces cannot lower the
guard by interpreting the numbers.