Sharif’s imprisonment will not end his
political career and will outlast the retirement of generals and colonels who
plotted his downfall.

Nawaz Sharif’s decision to return to Pakistan and go to
prison marks a new phase in the country’s politics. Sharif had been a creature
of the establishment in the first phase of his political life and only a
cautious opponent of the establishment since 1993. He has now become the first
Punjabi politician to defy the predominantly Punjabi establishment in ways
previously associated with leaders of Pakistan’s smaller ethnic groups.

The subject of this article is not Sharif’s
flaws or merits, but the future of Pakistan’s politics. Pakistani politicians
have often allowed the military-led establishment to maintain a façade of
civilian democratic rule while calling most of the shots.

Sharif’s decision to accept prison instead of
staying in exile shocked the establishment, which had assumed that the fear of
prison would be enough to take Sharif out of politics. After all, the old
Sharif had accepted the option of going into exile after being toppled from
power by the 1999 military coup. That decision helped avoid prolonged
confrontation and enabled the survival of General Pervez Musharraf’s military
regime.

Sharif’s return this time forced the
establishment to unleash repression on a large scale, ending the veneer of
benign authoritarianism. Hundreds of Sharif supporters were arrested
pre-emptively. His 85-year-old mother was detained. Traffic into Lahore, the
capital of Punjab, was virtually shut down.

Television coverage of Sharif’s return and the
planned reception was severely censored. Mobile telephone networks were
interfered with to deny people access to social media. And the flight of an
international airline carrying the former prime minister from Abu Dhabi to
Lahore was delayed, amid efforts to divert it, to deny even the slightest
visual contact between Sharif and his supporters.

For millions of Pakistan Muslim League (PML)
voters, Sharif’s conviction on corruption charges is just not credible. But for
many others who were not his supporters before and recognised his flaws, he is
now the symbol of defiance to an arrogant and overbearing establishment.

“Who are the judges and generals to decide who
will represent us? If our elected leaders are corrupt, we want the right to
vote them out” seems to be the dominant sentiment that transcends feelings for
Sharif or his family.

Pakistan’s failure to evolve as a democracy
under the rule of law with strong institutions and its governance by a
civil-military oligarchy creates an air of permanent political crisis that is
likely to be heightened by Sharif’s imprisonment.

Members of the oligarchy jockey for power
through intrigue, rumour and whispering campaigns. Popular politicians are kept
out of the political arena or forced to make compromises that subordinate them
to military officers and civil servants. Almost every Pakistani head of state
and government since independence in 1947 has been imprisoned, assassinated,
executed or removed from power in a military coup or a palace coup backed by
the military.

In the country’s unfortunate history,
governments have sometimes been voted into office but none have been voted out.
The country’s generals and their offspring feel comfortable only with
technocrats and civil servants who have grown up in the Government Officers’
Residences (GOR) and cantonments.

An entire class of Pakistanis resents ‘the
riff-raff’ that votes and believes in ‘the national narrative’ that puts the
army on a pedestal, amid many myths about Pakistan’s origins and place under
the sun.

As early as 1954, General Ayub Khan wrote a
memo titled ‘A short appreciation of present and future problems of Pakistan’,
which laid out a top-down agenda for forging a Pakistani nation through the
leadership of the existing apparatus of the state. While it lays out in detail
the administrative measures necessary for making Pakistan “ a sound, solid and
cohesive nation…able to play its destined role in world history”, it has no
reference whatsoever to the will of the people or to political participation.

Unfortunately for Pakistan, Ayub Khan’s
paradigm of considering the military as the ultimate decision-makers and the
virtual raison d’être of Pakistan has persisted. Every now and then a
politician has gained popularity but the military has been able to use his or
her weaknesses to its advantage. Thus, ‘Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was intolerant of
opposition,’ ‘Benazir Bhutto presided over a corrupt and incompetent
administration,’ and ‘Nawaz Sharif is a creature of the establishment who loves
the comforts of life.’

But after four coups and many more indirect
interventions, Pakistan’s establishment is far from delivering the stability
and progress it seeks to deliver through its machinations. It is unlikely to
succeed this time either.

Politics is often described as the art of the
possible and governance is considered a function of politics. Good governance
means the art of administering the state successfully within the parameters of
attainable and realistic objectives. Anyone trying to set everything right at
the same time might be pursuing a dream. Such pursuits can neither be termed as
practical politics nor can they be the basis of good governance.

Moreover, military officers are used to
dealing with regimented minds. The troops under their command ask no questions
while obeying orders. When called upon to command civilians, military men find
it difficult to deal with constant debates and disagreements as well as the
numerous options put forward with equal eloquence. The diversity of civilian
issues is the most important characteristic of running a government. Pakistan’s
soldier-rulers and their civilian dependents refuse to learn the lesson
that the profession of soldiering provides insufficient training for the task
of governance.

This time, the script for ‘saving Pakistan’
differed little from previous such efforts. It was expected that once the
Supreme Court disqualified Sharif, his support would evaporate and his party
would desert him. Then the establishment’s favorites, including former
cricketer Imran Khan (who is described since his Oxford University days as ‘Im
the Dim’) were expected to win an election widely seen as free and fair.
Pakistan was to live the happily ever after.

But Sharif’s party did not desert him and the
few locally influential leaders who did had to be coerced in manners that could
not be concealed. The army and the ISI decided to deal with the media in a
heavy-handed way, with specific instructions about whom to favour and whom to
oppose in the election campaign. This, too, could not remain secret.

Other exertions of the military-intelligence
combine on behalf of its preferred candidates included calling up candidates
with vote-banks to leave the PML, Altaf Hussain’s Muttahida Qaumi Movement
(MQM), or the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and join the PTI or other smaller
pro-establishment factions. Insolent politicians faced corruption charges and
some were even disqualified while the obedient ones were protected and promised
rewards.

In cantonment life, an adverse order from a
superior officer ends or diminishes careers but in politics repression and
persecution only engenders sympathy. Through its ham-fisted approach, the
Pakistani establishment has made the public forget their complaints against Nawaz
Sharif and his daughter, Maryam. Instead, the father and daughter will now be
seen as symbols of defiance in an establishment that has consistently
undermined Pakistan’s evolution as a democracy.

Even if the military succeeds in installing a
selected prime minister into office after the votes are cast on July 25, it
will not succeed in its core objective of creating a credible, effective,
civilian façade. Sharif’s imprisonment will not end his (or his daughter’s)
political careers long after the retirement of the generals and colonels who
plotted his downfall. Soldiers should remain soldiers. Politics is more
difficult than locating and liquidating enemies.

Husain Haqqani,
director for South and Central Asia at the Hudson Institute in Washington D.C.,
was Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States from 2008-11. His latest book is
‘Reimagining Pakistan.

About Me

Dr Shabir Choudhry has done extensive research on the issue of Kashmir and Indo Pakistan relations. He passed BA Honours in Politics and History, and Mphil in International Relations (title of the thesis, ‘Kashmir and Partition of India’); and title of his PhD thesis is ‘Kashmir- An issue of a nation not a dispute of a land’.

Apart from this Dr Shabir Choudhry passed Post Graduates Certificates in Education, and NVQ Assessor’s qualifications; and taught English in London.

Political Achievements

Founder member of JKLF (Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front established in 1977) and got elected as a Press Secretary in 1984.

Became its Secretary General in 1985, and resigned from this post in 1996.

Got elected President of JKLF and Europe in May 1999, and decided not to contest in elections of July 2001.

Said good - bye to the JKLF as it is in many groups and is largely seen as advancing a Pakistani agenda on Kashmir dispute, and set up a new party Kashmir National Party in May 2008.

.

At present, he is:

·Spokesman Kashmir National Party and Director Diplomatic Committee;

·Spokesman for International KashmirAlliance;

·Founder member and Director Institute of Kashmir Affairs;

Previously

·A founder Member and Trustee/ Director of London based registered charity, Kashmir Foundation International and resigned from this position in August 2001.

·Regularly take part in the Sessions of the UN Human Rights (Commission) now Council in Geneva; and address various conferences and seminars to oppose violence and highlight the Kashmir cause.

·Participated in a Round Table Conference on Kashmir, organised by Socialist Group of European Parliament in Brussels in 1993.

·Addressed as a Chief Guest in a seminar on issue of Mangla Dam during the UN Sub Commission’s proceedings in August 2003.

·Addressed as a key - note speaker in a seminar on the issue of Gilgit and Baltistan, organised by Association of British Kashmiris.

·Addressed as a keynote speaker on human rights conference in Paris in 1991.

·Addressed at CambridgeUniversity as a Chief Guest in a conference on Kashmir in 1990.

·Addressed as a keynote speaker at New Delhi conference on Kashmir, which was part of Track Two diplomacy in November 2000.

·In September 2008, addressed a Conference arranged by Interfaith International in Geneva, topic of which was:“Kashmir Issue, Terrorism and Human Rights”.

·Addressed as a speaker in a NGO Conference on Self - Determination in Geneva in August 2000.

·Addressed as a keynote speaker in a fringe meeting of Liberal Democrats at their Annual Conference in Brighton in 1995.

·Participated in World Human Rights Conference in Vienna in 1993.

·Before President Clinton's visit to India and Pakistan in 2000, lead a JKLF delegation to the State Department to discuss Kashmir dispute and situation in South Asia.

·Also had two rounds of meetings with senior State Department officials before President Musharraf’s meeting to Washington in June 2003.

·Apart from that had meetings with senior officials including Ministers of different countries, and also held many meetings with the State Department and Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials on number of occasions.

·Played important role in advancing a Kashmiri perspective on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir; and also helped Baroness Emma Nicholson with her report ‘Kashmir: present situation and future prospects’, which was adopted by the European Parliament in May 2007.

·Won first prize in an essay competition in Urdu in 1976. It was organised by High Commission of Pakistan in London, and title of the essay was 'Qaaid-e- Azam's role in Islamic History'.

·Apart from that have addressed conferences in Brussels, Geneva, Toronto, Islamabad, Delhi, and

Publications

·Got first Urdu novel ‘Fareena’ published at the age of eighteen.

·Second Urdu novel ‘Bay-Khataa’ which was about the problems of Asian youths living in UK published in 1983.

·Third Urdu book ‘Pakistan and Kashmiri struggle for independence’ published in 1990.

·Fourth Urdu book is also on Kashmiri struggle, 'Is an independent Kashmir a conspiracy?'

·Apart from that has twenty books and booklets published in English on various aspects of the Kashmiri struggle.

·Recent publications are: Kashmir dispute as I see it

·Different perspective on Kashmir

·JKLF visit to Pakistan Administered Kashmir

·Kashmir Needs Change of Heart

·If not self - determination then what?

·Emma Nicholson report- who has won?

·Struggle for independence, Jihad or proxy war (Introduction by Baroness Emma Nicholson)

·

Future publications

Following books were completed some time ago and shall be published in near future:

In Search of Freedom - My visit to Srinagar and Islamabad

Kashmir and Partition of India

A brief background

Dr Shabir Choudhry was born in a small village called Nakker Shimali (near Panjeri) in District Bhimber, Azad Kashmir. He went to UK in 1966, and like other people from the region, holds a dual nationality. He left secondary school in 1970 with no qualifications and began his life as a textile worker.

In 1975 he started part time studies and passed Matriculation from Government High School Panjeri, passed ‘O’ and ‘A’ levels from UK, and resumed full time degree course in 1981, and passed BA (Hons) in Politics and History in 1984.

He continued full time and part time jobs until he got his Mphil. He passed his PGCE (Post Graduates Certificate in Education) in 1990, and then started full time job as a Lecturer. Due to health problems he resigned from teaching in 1999. At present he is self - employed, provides private tuition, translation and interpretation and consultancy.

Through out his adult life he has actively worked for the cause of Kashmir, and even during long illness he effectively carried out his responsibilities as a leader of the JKLF, a ‘prolific writer’ and consistent campaigner of Rights Movement and peace in Jammu and Kashmir and South Asia.