As I recall, Churchill was widely loathed in liberal circles at various points in his career. Though now mostly remembered for his high points, the architect of the Gallipoli campaign may in some ways be validly compared with Rumsfeld. So maybe this particular award is apropos.

Jeff Weintraub is, incidentally, a representative of the so-called Decent/Sensible Left. Knowing where he’s coming from, his attachment to the notion that arrogant incompetents like Rummy ruined the decents’ Just War is not surprising.

Read for instance his “complexity-themed” posts on Riverbend and Patricia Durkin for a handy summation of what passes for the tenets of the movement these days, like:

– the grotesque misrepresentation of the views of many opponents of the war e.g. the claims that they have idealized Saddam’s tyranny, that they oppose all humanitarian intervention under all circumstances, that they fail to realize that Riverbend’s posts have to be taken with a grain of salt sometimes, etc;

– the pretence, worthy of the best of concern trolls, that in vital matters such as war and peace one can stay above the fray, apportioning blame equally to opponents and supporters of the war, or that by pointing out that the issues at hand are complex one becomes automatically invested with Teh Gravitas;

– the idea that it was ever possible to think of the invasion in generic, ideal terms, without taking into account that it was the Bush administration that was to carry it out;

– the presentation of the neocons as victims of “demonization”, and the reluctance to tackle their many mistakes (to focus instead on the Coalition’s incompetent implementation). I wonder whether any decent has ever admitted, say, that the neocons overestimated the relevance of the stateside Iraqi exiles and misunderstood the motivations of the returnees from Iran (see for instance all those Weekly Standard oldies about Sistani’s “quietism”);

– more generally, a studious ignorance of the geopolitical considerations behind the decision to launch the invasion of Iraq;

– a continued unwillingness to come to terms with the (growing) limitations of American or Western power;

– coupled with the aforementioned misrepresentation of the war opponents’ views on humanitarian intervention, an overly vague formulation of their own. Curiously enough, for a man of Mr. Weintraub’s background, such interventions appear to have to be launched on an ad-hoc basis;

– the highly selective interpretation of opinion polls in Iraq;

– in a similar vein, the consistent depiction of Iraqis as almost purely emotional beings. Durkin’s piece has a priceless passage where she essentially says: “Iraqis made many contradictory demands of the Coalition, but, you know, they were not really loopy, only confused by the dramatic events unfolding about them.” The possibility that at least some Iraqis were actually formulating a set of perfectly rational demands — the Coalition should keep its hands off the oil, should not alter willy-nilly some aspects of the Iraqi system, such as the provision of broad range of services by the state, and it should instead focus on reconstruction — is not considered.

Jeff Weintraub is, incidentally, a representative of the so-called Decent/Sensible Left. Knowing where he’s coming from, his attachment to the notion that arrogant incompetents like Rummy ruined the decents’ Just War is not surprising.

Read for instance his “complexity-themed” posts on Riverbend and Patricia Durkin for a handy summation of what passes for the tenets of the movement these days, like:

1) the grotesque misrepresentation of the views of many opponents of the war e.g. the claims that they have idealized Saddam’s tyranny, that they oppose all humanitarian intervention under all circumstances, that they fail to realize that Riverbend’s posts have to be taken with a grain of salt sometimes, etc;

2) the pretence, worthy of the best of concern trolls, that in vital matters such as war and peace one can stay above the fray, apportioning blame equally to opponents and supporters of the war, or that by pointing out that the issues at hand are complex one becomes automatically invested with Teh Gravitas;

3) the idea that it was ever possible to think of the invasion in generic, ideal terms, without taking into account that it was the Bush administration that was to carry it out;

4) the presentation of the neocons as victims of “demonization”, and the reluctance to tackle their many mistakes (to focus instead on the Coalition’s incompetent implementation). I wonder whether any decent has ever admitted, say, that the neocons overestimated the relevance of the stateside Iraqi exiles and misunderstood the motivations of the returnees from Iran (see for instance all those Weekly Standard oldies about Sistani’s “quietism”);

5) more generally, a studious ignorance of the geopolitical considerations behind the decision to launch the invasion of Iraq;

6) a continued unwillingness to come to terms with the (growing) limitations of American or Western power;

7) coupled with the aforementioned misrepresentation of the war opponents’ views on humanitarian intervention, an overly vague formulation of their own. Curiously enough, for a man of Mr. Weintraub’s background, such interventions appear to have to be launched on an ad-hoc basis;

8) the highly selective interpretation of opinion polls in Iraq;

9) in a similar vein, the consistent depiction of Iraqis as almost purely emotional beings. Durkin’s piece has a priceless passage where she essentially says: “Iraqis made many contradictory demands of the Coalition, but, you know, they were not really loopy, only confused by the dramatic events unfolding about them.” The possibility that at least some Iraqis were actually formulating a set of perfectly rational demands — the Coalition should keep its hands off the oil, should not alter willy-nilly some aspects of the Iraqi system, such as the provision of broad range of services by the state, and it should instead focus on reconstruction — is not considered.