@techreport{Boerner2004political,
abstract = {In transition and developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption even if
they have democratic political systems. This is surprising from a political economy
perspective, as the majority of people generally suffers from high corruption levels. Our
model is based on the fact that corrupt offcials have to pay an entry fee to get lucrative
positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that a lack of financial institutions can
lead to more corruption as more voters become part of the corrupt system. Well-functioning
financial institutions, in turn, can increase the political support for anti-corruption measures.},
author = {Kira Boerner and Christa Hainz},
copyright = {http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen},
keywords = {O17; D72; D73; 330; corruption; financial markets; institutions; development; voting; Korruption; Public Choice; Finanzsektor; Theorie},
language = {eng},
number = {1293},
title = {The political economy of corruption and the role of financial institutions},
type = {CESifo working papers},
url = {http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18931},
year = {2004}
}