One step would be to map out the brain mathematically. This would be equivalent to the complexity a 19th century scientist would find attempting to decipher a cpu it were freshly plonked under his microscope multiplied by 100 or however much more computing power our brains have to a pentium 4. If we could, inside the neo-cortex we might find a complex set of brains which chooses what we think, weighs decisions etc. Or something else.

Nah. The hard problem, as to where the feeling of experience comes from, is constructed so that it is absolutely insoluble by any objective method. Because we don't even know what we mean by experience, nor can we assume we know everything there is to know about the nature of physical law. Technology, and our perceptions extend only to the effects of laws and rules, and going beyond leaves only speculation and belief.

Nah. The hard problem, as to where the feeling of experience comes from, is constructed so that it is absolutely insoluble by any objective method. Because we don't even know what we mean by experience, nor can we assume we know everything there is to know about the nature of physical law. Technology, and our perceptions extend only to the effects of laws and rules, and going beyond leaves only speculation and belief.

Good point. Computers cant do any math without instructions, which comes from humans

Some interesting reading, but my headache got a lot worse.
I think we can get the basic idea if we want to, so I agree with TheTruth in that it's like a computer and we are machines of a biological sort but with so many cogs spinning around that to try and pin down how it all fits together to create what we call "consciousness" and can agree on would probably take awhile, I mean if you really want the detailed and scientifically tested and predictable version of this knowledge which is kind of a hard problem I suppose is what is meant by that.
For instance a child of a certain age will often recognize an ink dot put on it's forehead in a mirror and point to the dot showing that they are aware of their self and something has changed, a monkey sometimes does the same, but does this prove self-awareness or do they just not respond to the dot in the same way?

sleeth, i've read his book. it was rather diffucult to follow what he was saying.i'm not convinced that the hard problem exists. seems like a red herring. what exactly do we mean by qualia or subjective experiance? the question where the vividness of colours come from seem absurd. red is different from green because of its different frequency and wavelength and that difference is detected by our eyes. hence the brain perceives them to be different, what is so 'hard' to explain about that?i just do not get it.

sleeth, i've read his book. it was rather diffucult to follow what he was saying.i'm not convinced that the hard problem exists. seems like a red herring. what exactly do we mean by qualia or subjective experiance? the question where the vividness of colours come from seem absurd. red is different from green because of its different frequency and wavelength and that difference is detected by our eyes. hence the brain perceives them to be different, what is so 'hard' to explain about that?i just do not get it.

It's not hard to look at the optic nerve and deduce that we perceive light along three distinct channels. The hard part comes in when we try to figure out why information processed along those channels looks like anything at all. Why does the color we call red look like this instead of this? If the visual quality of redness and blueness were reversed, we would still meet the criterion of sets of information that are treated distinctly, so that alone is not sufficient to answer the question. The hard problem claims that no combination of relational properties of this sort, no matter how complex, will get us closer to an answer than our initial, humble observation of the three distinct processing channels in the optic nerve.

For that matter, why does information processing in the brain result in qualitative experience at all? Why isn't it that I do not merely detect two distinct light inputs and act upon them without experiencing anything (e.g., as if I were in a deep, dreamless sleep)? If we assume for a moment that computers are not conscious, why is it that I don't just process information like a computer? What accounts for the difference between what my brain does and what the computer does? Assuming we can isolate this causal mechanism, how is it that it somehow 'creates' subjective experience? Those are the types of questions posed by the hard problem. Chalmers argues that the types of causal mechanisms given to us by physics are not sufficient to do the job. I won't go into an extended discussion of the argument here, but you can find some discussion about it in the Metaphysics & Epistemology forum, for instance this thread.

I am reading a piece called "Quining Qualia" by Daniel Dennett at the moment. He seems intent on proving that there "simply are no qualia at all" at least none that fit the definition he has set up (ineffable, intrinsic, private, directly apprehensible properties of experience). If a materialist should somehow be able to prove that qualia do not exist, does that solve the "hard problem"? Or is there more to be challenged?

I am reading a piece called "Quining Qualia" by Daniel Dennett at the moment. He seems intent on proving that there "simply are no qualia at all" at least none that fit the definition he has set up (ineffable, intrinsic, private, directly apprehensible properties of experience). If a materialist should somehow be able to prove that qualia do not exist, does that solve the "hard problem"? Or is there more to be challenged?

Absolutely! And guess what, that is exactly why Dennett wants to find a way to "dismiss" qualia . . . because he can't account for it with physical principles. It's in the way of his functionalist theory, so he'll just pretend it doesn't exist. Amazingly clever little bit of intellectual dishonesty there if you ask me.

That's same thing physicalists have done with life. They've "dismissed" any sort of vital force because they can explain most of the chemistry of life. Of course, they can't explain how all that chemistry got so effectively organized . . . but who cares. Find an excuse to "dismiss" and then you can get around those damn pesky facts which are making your theory come up short.

Thanks, Les. I might have to PM you some questions later. I am almost done with the Dennett reading, but I am moving on to Owen Flanagan now.

To give a nod to humility, I should add that the "dismissing conspiracy theory" is just my opinion. I have been willing, however, to debate anyone who claims to be able to make the case that dismissing vitalism is justified with the evidence we now have. As far as I can tell, physicalist arguments are as "holey" as the creationism story of Genesis. Same with functionalists.

Absolutely! And guess what, that is exactly why Dennett wants to find a way to "dismiss" qualia . . . because he can't account for it with physical principles. It's in the way of his functionalist theory, so he'll just pretend it doesn't exist. Amazingly clever little bit of intellectual dishonesty there if you ask me.

That's same thing physicalists have done with life. They've "dismissed" any sort of vital force because they can explain most of the chemistry of life. Of course, they can't explain how all that chemistry got so effectively organized . . . but who cares. Find an excuse to "dismiss" and then you can get around those damn pesky facts which are making your theory come up short.