AS WITH the winner of Euro 2004, I got one prediction about the new European Union constitution wrong. Writing in The Economist 21 months ago (see article), I suggested that, like the UN Charter or the US constitution, a pocket-sized document would be a signal of its coherence. Well, at 626 grams and 325 pages, you need a poacher's pocket, so it does not quite pass that test. But hang on. Compare what the EU has now with what it will get in the new constitution, and the document passes with flying colours.

First, it is far more coherent than its predecessors. At present, the EU is governed by two sets of overlapping treaties, providing for “three pillars”, several different ways of producing laws and a voting system that lacks a rational basis (Germany, with almost twice Spain's population, has just 7% more votes). There is no clear statement of what the EU is or what it does. Some absolutely fundamental principles, from the primacy of EU law to its exclusive competence over marine conservation, are not mentioned in the treaties. Now, set out in part I of the constitution, is what the EU has needed for years: clarity and coherence about where its powers come from, and how decisions are made. And, at just 59 short articles, this part, which sets the framework for the Union, could easily fit into anyone's pocket.

The constitution dispatches into oblivion any notion that the EU is a federal superstate. It is the member states that confer competences (powers) on the Union “to attain objectives they [ie, the member states] have in common” (article 1). “Conferral”, meaning that the EU's powers derive from member states, is a fundamental principle, requiring the EU to act “within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the member states”. Competences not so conferred remain national. And there is even a streamlined procedure, for the first time, for any member state to withdraw from the EU—proof, if more were needed, that this is an organisation of freely co-operating nations.

The EU's reputation has suffered in the past because the use and transfer of powers has appeared to be a one-way street. Now, there are innovations in the constitution that can make it two-way. Shared competences (or part of them) can be transferred back to member states (article 11). And national parliaments are charged with the duty of ensuring compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.

In its leader of June 26th, The Economist dismissed the procedure for subsidiarity; but it was wrong to do so. At present, there is no obligation on member states or the European Commission even to inform national parliaments about draft EU laws, still less to let them have any power. But under the new provisions all national parliaments must be notified independently of all draft laws, and given six weeks to respond. If a third of them object, the commission must “review” the draft. Yes, in theory, the commission could then re-submit the original proposals unamended, but in practice they would be unlikely to do so, not least because, if a third of national parliaments are against a proposal, so will be their governments, and the commission would be close to losing the qualified majority needed to pass laws.

The Economist also complains that the new treaty “does nothing to provide citizens with any sense of control over the process of European government.” But the new subsidiarity provision is there to be used. It is up to national parliaments, the most effective voices of Europe's citizens, to make it work.

The constitution also shifts power back to member states, and so citizens, in another way: by reform of the presidency system. This sounds a bit arcane. But imagine any complex organisation where the leadership had to switch every six months, and it was only your turn once every twelve-and-a-half years. What would happen is that effective power would shift, automatically, to those with some permanence. And no imagination is needed: this is the EU today. Rotating the presidency made sense when the EU had six members. With 25, and soon to be more, it is now a recipe for member states to lose their grip. A key institutional reform creates a full-time post of president of the European Council (ie, heads of government) to put into effect its decisions on the EU's strategic direction. This was a British proposal. Also, the size of the commission is to be reduced.

A better draft

When the Convention on the Future of Europe published its draft constitution a year ago, The Economist took issue with it. So, in some respects, did we. But it is now much improved. Of 80 separate sets of amendments agreed in the inter-governmental conference, 39 were advocated by Britain. We achieved every one of the goals set in last September's white paper. Even The Economist concedes that decision-making will be easier and a “clear improvement on the previous arrangements”. So too is the voting system, where a simple formula of 55% of member states, comprising 65% of the EU's population, will in almost all cases make up a qualified majority.

Where The Economist's analysis falls down is in its inference that it is the constitution alone that can deliver real progress in Europe. No constitution can do that by itself. This one does, however, provide a better platform for the EU to concentrate on where EU-wide engagement adds value—and to work better.

Here lies a paradox about the EU, and also the root of our collective ambiguity towards it. Were it a superstate, writing its constitution would be easy, and the result short. You would declare that power resided in its parliament, government and supreme court, and leave those institutions to make and enforce the law. It is precisely because the EU is not a superstate that it needs a more complicated rule-book spelling out, policy by policy, the areas of its competence. This is what gives this document its length, so confounding one (but only one) of my predictions. But overall, it is a good constitution, which sets the right framework for a reformed and effective EU, and deserves support.