LINKING SCIENCE TO MANNED SPACE FLIGHT

Coordinating Science and Apollo

The question of science on Apollo was far down the list of priorities in
the Office of Manned Space Flight during 1961, behind such overriding
questions as the choice of mission mode and the configuration of the
launch vehicle. Elsewhere, however, stirrings of scientists' interest in
the lunar mission began to appear. The director of MIT's Instrumentation
Laboratory, which was designing the navigation system for Apollo,
proposed that at least one Apollo crewman should be a scientist, since
the major interest in the moon would be scientific. Furthermore, he
said, it would be easier to train a scientist to pilot the spacecraft
than to make a scientist out of a test-pilot astronaut.19 A similar suggestion was made by a group of
scientists working with the Lunar Exploration Committee of OSS, who
asserted that the scientist should be a geologist, or at least a
scientist well versed in geology and geophysics. They further proposed
that NASA begin to recruit astronaut trainees from the ranks of
professional scientists.20

That the Office of Manned Space Flight and the Office of Space Sciences
would have to coordinate their efforts became evident early in 1962.
When Homer Newell appeared before the Space Sciences Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Science and Astronautics to defend NASA's
authorization request, he was pointedly questioned about the support his
office was providing for Apollo.21
This line of questioning evidently perturbed Newell, for he subsequently
wrote a personal letter to the subcommittee chairman explaining that the
specific information needed by Apollo would become available through the
normal course of lunar scientific investigations. Newell acknowledged
the importance of the lunar landing, but could not agree that
concentrating on the immediate needs of Apollo's engineers would best
serve the overall space program. Newell's attitude gave rise to a
feeling, even within OSS, that "space sciences was rather unbending
in not getting scientific data which would assist the manned
program," in the words of a Langley official. Langley had proposed
that future Ranger missions should carry an experiment to measure the
load-bearing capacity of lunar soil intended to assist in the design of
the Apollo lunar landing craft, but the proposal had been rejected in
favor of a purely scientific exercise in lunar seismometry.22

Newell, far from being indifferent to the needs of Apollo or unconscious
of its importance, was simply trying to conduct his programs in the best
interests of space science. Mindful of space scientists' increasing
discontent over Apollo and its effect on NASA's budgets, he was trying
to avoid alienating his major constituency. As nearly as Newell could
make it, the Office of Space Sciences was run along lines that suited
the scientific community. Advice on policy - the general fines that OSS
programs should follow - was provided by the Space Science Board of the
National Academy of Sciences and reflected the best consensus the space
science community could reach. The content of space science projects was
determined (within rather broad limits) by the interests of individual
investigators, evaluated and endorsed by the Space Sciences Steering
Committee and conducted under the direction of the investigator who
proposed it. No one in OSS would have dreamed of telling scientists what
experiments they should conduct with the expectation of having their
instructions followed or their advice appreciated. Indeed, had anyone in
OSS attempted to direct the course of a scientist's experiment, he would
have brought down the wrath of the entire scientific community on the
space science program. The prerogative of individual scientists to
explore problems of their choice, with the endorsement of their
scientific peers, is one of the hallmarks of basic research, and
probably the most jealously guarded.23 While Newell might have been able to find a
way to supply the data Apollo needed, he risked losing the confidence of
the scientists in doing it. At a meeting of OSS field directors in June
1962, Newell's director of Lunar and Planetary Projects reiterated that
"pure science experiments will provide the engineering answers for
Apollo."24

The issue was focused more sharply in mid-June, when Brainerd Holmes
issued a document specifying the information Apollo required: the
radiation environment in cislunar space, the physical properties of
lunar soil, and the topography of the moon, including photos and maps to
permit selection of a landing site. All groups conducting lunar
investigations were asked to give top priority to obtaining the
specified data.25 The curt wording of
the document and its assumption of overriding importance for the lunar
landing project were not calculated to win friends in the space science
programs, where managers had been struggling with the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory over the same issue on Ranger and Surveyor. As events
developed, it was JPL's director, William C. Pickering, who forced the
issue later in the summer by urging Associate Administrator Robert C.
Seamans, Jr., to seek an agreement between the Office of Space Sciences
and the Office of Manned Space Flight that would allow JPL to define
Ranger's objectives more clearly. Pickering's inclination was to support
Holmes, because the science experiments were among Ranger's prime
sources of difficulty.26

While unintentionally stirring up resentment on one front, the Office of
Manned Space Flight was more cooperatively seeking assistance on
another. In March 1962 the Space Sciences Steering Committee, at OMSF's
request, established an ad hoc working group to recommend scientific
tasks to be performed on the moon by the Apollo crews. Not less
important, the group would recommend a course of scientific instruction
for astronauts in training. Chaired by Charles P. Sonett of the Lunar
and Planetary Programs Office, the working group initially included five
members from the Office of Space Sciences and one from the Office of
Manned Space Flight; membership was later expanded to thirteen and a
roster of some dozen consultants was added.27 The Sonett committee first met on March 27,
1962, to hear William A. Lee, assistant director for systems in OMSF,
explain what his office wanted it to do. As the minutes of the meeting
recorded it, Lee's approach was far from peremptory and demanding;
rather, he explained,

the Office of Manned Space Flight now wants very much to
have on Apollo moon flights experiments which are of fundamental
significance scientifically. They would like the Working Group to
consider these experiments without constraints set in advance by OMSF.
OMSF will attempt to tailor flights and flight equipment to meet these
needs. As examples, it is expected that the duration of stay on the moon
may be largely determined by space science requirements and that if
necessary, one or more members of the crew could be professional
scientists trained as test pilots. . . . They welcome suggestions from the
Group as to astronaut selection procedure with respect to scientific
background; OMSF will handle physiological and psychological factors in
astronaut selection. . . . Unmanned and earth-based scientific
experiments which tie in with or prepare for manned experiments will be
undertaken by OMSF as part of Apollo; suggestions by the Group are
desired.28

At the committee's third meeting on April 17, Lee presented the
engineering guidelines to be considered by the group in proposing
experiments. OMSF expected to fly the first mission "before
1970" and subsequent missions at intervals of about six months. The
mission mode, not yet selected, was not to be considered by the
committee, nor were engineering and operational details of the flights.
Landing sites would be chosen by manned space flight officials, but the
Sonett committee was encouraged to indicate the desirability of
particular areas. OMSF considered it "possible that one of the
flight crew might be a professional scientist trained to perform flight
operations. . . . [But this] would significantly complicate our
selection and training program, and should not be done
unnecessarily." Lee urged the committee to assume no additional
constraints. Even if some experiments required difficult engineering
development, OMSF wanted the committee to list them so that the
requirements could be considered in designing the Apollo spacecraft.29

The guidelines Lee provided stated that the Office of Manned Space
Flight would consider the committee's report "a major factor"
in determining some characteristics of the proposed missions. For
example, the planned number of missions ("more than one but less
than ten") and time to be spent on the lunar surface ("between
4 and 24 hours") might be strongly influenced by scientific
considerations. If enough worthwhile scientific work could be done,
"stays up to 7 days are not impossible." Similarly the planned
payload (100 to 200 pounds, 45 to 90 kilograms) might be increased and
the mobility of the astronauts on the surface might be extended, for
example by providing a motorized vehicle and tailoring the space suit
for increased ease of manipulation, if the increased scientific return
justified the added expense. A soft-landing unmanned supply vehicle
carrying up to 30,000 pounds (13,600 kilograms) of support equipment and
supplies was under active consideration; this vehicle might carry
additional heavy or bulky scientific equipment.30

Lee's presentation indicated that the Office of Manned Space Flight was
willing to be as accommodating as possible in providing for scientific
exploration of the lunar surface. But the qualifiers in Lee's guidelines
suggest that OMSF left itself many escape clauses that could have
important effects on the scientific program.

With these guidelines in mind, the Sonett committee began to collect
suggestions for lunar surface experiments. Their criteria, established
early, were simple: experiments must be scientifically feasible and
important, capable of being performed only on the moon, significantly
improved by having a human aboard, and likely to lead to additional
scientific and technological progress. Three basic types of experiments
were suggested: measurements and qualitative observations to be made by
the astronauts on the lunar surface; experiments to be performed on
samples selected and brought back by the crews; and instruments to be
emplaced by the astronauts and left on the moon to transmit data to
earth.31

A point that seriously concerned the Sonett committee was the background
and training of the lunar explorers. As a basic requirement, the group
suggested sufficient scientific judgment and maturity to recognize and
act appropriately upon unexpected phenomena. They noted that
scientist-astronauts might be caught in a serious conflict between
acquiring proficiency in spacecraft operation and maintaining their
skills in research32 - a question
that was to complicate relations between the science community and
NASA's operations experts for the next 10 years.

Sonett's committee submitted a draft report in early July 1962; its
recommendations, considered in the following weeks by the first of
NASA's Summer Studies and endorsed by the external scientific community,
would form the basis for the initial planning of Apollo's lunar
exploration program. Meanwhile, the committee's work, together with the
controversy over the content of the Ranger missions, emphasized the
desirability of continuous contact between the offices of Space Sciences
and Manned Space Flight on scientific matters. The experience in
developing the scientific exercises carried out by the Mercury
astronauts showed that overlapping responsibilities requiring close
supervision would develop when science went aboard manned spacecraft,
and some kind of formal liaison needed to be established.

Homer Newell moved to provide coordination in September 1962 when he
proposed to establish a Joint Working Group to replace the ad hoc
arrangements that were proving cumbersome. The basic tasks of this group
would be to recommend to manned space flight planners a detailed program
of scientific exploration, and to suggest to the Office of Space
Sciences a program of data acquisition to ensure that Apollo's needs
were met. It would also keep the field centers and outside scientists
informed of the science programs planned for manned space flight. In
carrying out its functions, the group would have the implicit
responsibility of assuring that NASA's interface with the scientific
community remained where it belonged - within the Office of Space
Sciences - and to assure that each program office's projects were
maximally responsive to the interests of the other. The group's chairman
was to be assigned to OSS for administrative purposes but functionally
would be a member of both offices, reporting to the Lunar and Planetary
Programs Office in OSS and the Office of Systems Studies in OMSF.33 Newell would later remark that this
official "had two bosses to try to satisfy, which is universally
recognized as unsatisfactory"34; but no
better alternative seemed available.

To chair this Working Group, Newell appointed Eugene M. Shoemaker, a
geologist from the U.S. Geological Survey who had recently been assigned
for a one-year stint to NASA from the Survey's Astrogeology Branch.
Shoemaker had received his doctorate from Princeton under Harry H. Hess,
chairman of the Space Science Board from 1962 to 1968 and an
enthusiastic promoter of space science.35 Since October 1961 Shoemaker had been a
co-investigator for the television experiment on Ranger.36 Having been a space enthusiast since
pre-Sputnik days, he had consciously fashioned his professional career
with an eye to becoming a scientist-astronaut.37 Although he never realized that ambition,
for seven years starting in 1962 he would contribute to the design of
Apollo's lunar surface activities and help to train the men who would be
his surrogates on the moon.

For the first several months Shoemaker's new job took him into a tangle
of uncharted responsibilities and unclear jurisdictions. At
Headquarters, Newell's Office of Space Sciences had asserted its
responsibility for all of NASA's science, manned or unmanned; in the
opinion of many scientists in OSS, neither the Office of Manned Space
Flight nor the Manned Spacecraft Center had a staff qualified to manage
scientific experiments, but both were considering adding their own
science people.38 Newell and his
staff expected to plan and develop the manned science program and to
help select and train the astronauts. The Office of Manned Space Flight,
foreseeing the many complex interactions that such divided
responsibility would require, felt that it was simply not feasible to
allow anything - even the science - to be managed by another office.39 When scientists showed interest in
the Mercury project, the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) had quickly
moved to establish a Mercury Scientific Experiments Panel to screen
proposed scientific observations and prevent any interference with the
program's primary purposes.40

Shoemaker spent much of 1962 devising a structure for the working group
and soliciting support from the centers.41 Toward the end of the year he recommended to
Newell that the group should comprise an executive board and two panels:
one on data requirements generated by OMSF, the other on scientific
missions recommended by OSS for manned space flight. The executive board
would recommend projects to the respective directors (Holmes and
Newell).42 It would, however, neither
initiate nor manage specific scientific projects.43

In the first months of 1963 Homer Newell moved steadily to bring manned
space science under his office's direction. He also began a campaign to
persuade the Manned Spacecraft Center that science was something more
than a means of acquiring the data required to design their
spacecraft.44 Shoemaker, who had been
urging MSC to start training astronauts in geology, had found a few
receptive minds at the Houston center - among them Max Faget, director
of engineering and development - who understood that "it wouldn't
look very good if we went to the moon and didn't have something to do
when we got there."45 In late
March, Faget drafted a letter for MSC Director Robert R. Gilruth's
signature, formally requesting the U.S. Geological Survey to assign six
of its scientists to the Houston center. Newell had paved the way for
this cooperation in informal discussions with the Survey's director, who
agreed to Gilruth's request.46 Newell
saw no need to establish a geological competence in NASA, and both he
and Shoemaker preferred to have the Geological Survey staff the Apollo
science program rather than geologists hired by MSC.

Meanwhile Newell and Holmes, anticipating a need for increased
cooperation as Project Gemini progressed, were negotiating a formal
division of responsibility for manned science projects between their
offices. Newell insisted that the Office of Space Sciences had the
responsibility to solicit, select, and approve all of NASA's scientific
experiments; Holmes similarly asserted the Office of Manned Space
Flight's responsibility to approve any hardware that went into a manned
spacecraft and any procedure that affected the flight plan. Between the
selection of an experiment and its execution on a flight was a large
area where responsibility for funding and management of design,
fabrication, and integration into the spacecraft of the scientific
instruments had to be worked out.

After considerable negotiation, deputies for Newell and Holmes signed a
memorandum of agreement on July 25, 1963, spelling out the
responsibilities of their two offices. Planning and development of all
manned space science projects was assigned to the Office of Space
Sciences, as well as any research and development necessary to support
them. This meant that OSS would select the experiments and principal
investigators and undertake preliminary development of the necessary
instruments, in consultation with the Office of Manned Space Flight and
the appropriate field center. OMSF agreed to develop and integrate
flight hardware and work the scientific objectives into mission plans,
usually acting through the Manned Spacecraft Center. OSS took on the job
of formulating a science training program for the astronauts, which OMSF
would conduct. Newell's office would also establish the scientific
qualifications for scientist-astronauts (though none had yet been
selected) and would participate in selection of scientists for astronaut
training. Each office would budget the funds for its part of experiment
development. Fabrication, testing, and installation of the flight
instruments would be supervised by the same team that monitored its
design and early development.47 This
agreement proved to be about as workable an arrangement as possible,
given the division of responsibility inherent in the Headquarters
organization. With minor changes, it governed OSS-OMSF relations in
manned space science throughout the Apollo program.

While the new agreement was being worked out, Newell reorganized
Shoemaker's working group as the Manned Space Science Division on July
30, 1963. The new division reported to both program offices as before,
but at a higher level, and it would be the focus of OSS's management of
manned science experiments. Shoemaker, however, did not stay to direct
the lunar science program from this position. When his tour of duty with
NASA ended in November 1963 he returned to the Geological Survey to
continue his work with Ranger and Surveyor. He was succeeded by Willis
B. Foster, who had served in the Pentagon as Deputy Assistant Director
for Research in the Directorate of Defense Research and Engineering.48

40. Swenson, Grimwood, and Alexander,
This New Ocean, pp. 414, 419, 443-44; W. David Compton and
Charles D. Benson, Living and Working in Space: A History of
Skylab, NASA SP-4208 (Washington, 1983), pp. 59-60.

41. Shoemaker to Dir, Lunar and
Planetary Programs and Dir., Systems Studies, "Report for Week of
November 12," "Report for Week of November 19," and
"Report for Week of November 26," all dated Dec. 13, 1962.