AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

This is the third in a Series on how American Politics
always involves vertical interactions between several “levels”:
national, supranational, and subnational. This time we report an
important recent critique of American federalism: it may work OK
for the USA, but it is NOT a good model for other countries,
particularly for accommodating demands of nationalities for greater
autonomy.

This Post reports some elements of an important recent book
in comparative politics, about “multinational democracy” (cited
above). Overall, the book is a critique of the dominance – both in
actual world politics and in academic comparative politics – of the
idea of the NATION-STATE: one territory, one central state, one
“nationality” (politically mobilized ethnic
group).

The authors propose one alternative, the STATE-NATION,
particularly one that uses a particular form of FEDERACY. Most
people associate “federalism” with the USA version. In contrast,
the authors argue that the USA version not only is NOT the ONLY
version, but also that it is POOR version for accommodating
politically mobilized nationalities (last
chapter).

This Post outlines the authors’ overall argument,
concluding with their critique of American federalism (last section
of the Post: “A warning”). We omit the authors’ long discussion of
India (which they regard as a very successful example of a
“state-nation”) and their short discussion of the Ukraine (whose
current difficulties they insightfully anticipate).

NATION-STATE

“Nation-state” is the ideal that emerged out of Western
European political history. Through centuries of
“nation-building,” countries such as England and France became
examples of that ideal. Then other nationalities too each wanted
their own state, particularly after World War I destroyed the
German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires.

After World War I, pursuing the nation-state ideal, the
victorious Allies forced Germany, Austria, and Hungary to give up
much territory. They redrew state boundaries to coincide with
nationalities (e.g. in Poland, Czechoslavakia and among the
southern Slavs). The Ottoman empire yielded modern Turkey and
(eventually) the modern Arab states.

After World War II, the eventual disintegration of the
British and French empires posed new challenges to the ideal of the
nation-state. European colonies did NOT correspond to indigenous
nationalities, so decolonization produced mostly states without
“natural” nations. Nevertheless, many former colonies aspired to
become nation-states.

Meanwhile, in academia, “nationalism” became an implicit
ideal. One author famously explained how diverse nationalities
could “imagine” a nation (Benedict Anderson 1983/1991 Imagined
communities). Another argued that successive different
European nationalisms provided different paths to modernity and
democracy (Liah Greenfeld 1992
Nationalism).

In Crafting state-nations, Stepan, Linz and Yadav
question the assumption that all “countries” tend to become, CAN
become, or should WANT to become “nation-states.” For countries
that are “robustly multinational,”* often that is simply
impossible. There, trying to “build” a nation-state can create
unnecessary disaster for the country, for the nationalities, and
for individuals.

* “Robustly multinational”: All states contain diverse
nationalities that express themselves in politics – usually in
support of, not opposition to, an overall national identity.
However, some states have MORE THAN ONE culturally distinctive
nationality that is highly concentrated territorially, with leaders
who consider themselves a nation and advance claims for
independence.

STATE-NATION

Early in the book, the authors outline what they call “the
nested policy grammar of state-nations” (17-18). By “grammar” they
mean that these policies articulate with each other to facilitate a
state-nation. By“nested” they mean that each policy is more likely
to work if the previous policy is already in place. The desired
characteristics are [my explanations in
brackets]:

1. An asymmetrical federal state BUT NOT a
symmetrical federal state or a unitary state. [“Asymmetrical” means
that different subnational units can be defined and treated
differently. “Symmetrical” means they must all be the same. That
makes it difficult to make different accommodations for different
nationalities, tailored to their needs and demands.]

2. Individual rights AND collective
recognition. [A democracy must guarantee individual rights. But
that does not automatically guarantee the rights of groups, such as
nationalities. A state-nation should guarantee BOTH kinds of rights
– even though individualistic liberal political traditions find it
hard to justify group rights.]

3. A parliamentary INSTEAD OF a presidential or
semi-presidential system. [A parliamentary system provides more
ways in which nationalities can be represented in government, at
the same time. Presidential or semi-presidential systems tend to
install one group at a time, which can make a winning nationality
overbearing and make losing nationalities insecure and
fearful.]

4. Polity-wide AND “centric-regional” parties
and careers. [There should be political parties and political
careers at BOTH the national and subnational levels. However,
regional parties and careers should be oriented toward
participation in the central government, not toward extreme
regional autonomy or political secession.]

5. Politically integrated BUT NOT culturally
assimilated populations. [All nationalities should be integrated
into the national political system, with equal rights and respect.
However, such political integration should NOT require cultural
assimilation – giving up nationalities’ own old culture, to be
replaced by a new national culture.]

6. Cultural nationalists VERSUS secessionist
nationalists. [In a state-nation, it is OK for nationalities
to remain proud of their cultural identity. What is NOT OK is for
them to advocate secession from the state-nation in order to set up
a separate independent nation-state that exclusively
expresses that cultural identity.]

7. A pattern of multiple BUT complementary
identities. [In a state-nation, individuals may have many
different identities, but these need not conflict, creating
personal “identity crises” or group ethnic politics. Different
identities can be appropriate to different circumstances. Thus they
can complement each other, adding up to a “multinational” country
as a whole.]

THE PROBLEM: UNITARY STATE, LOCALIZED
MINORITY

Later the authors further define the problem they are
trying to solve: the incompatibility of a unitary state with a
culturally distinctive, territorially concentrated minority. Each
of the characteristics listed below create and aggravate that
problem. These characteristics are self-explanatory, so I don’t add
comments (except the labels Security, Economy, Identity).

1. Physical separation or great distance of the
minority from the unitary state. [Security]

2. Linguistic or religious difference.
[Identity]

3. A previous, self-governing tradition that the
minority wants to restore or expand. [Security]

4. A geopolitical or cultural sense that the minority was,
and should be, part of a neighboring state with which it
identifies. [Security, Identity]

5. A radically different economy that the minority
believes needs special laws to help preserve its own livelihood and
way of life. [Economy]

6 A history of warfare with, or coercive repression
by, the unitary state within which the minority is located.
[Security]

A SOLUTION: FEDERACY

As noted, the authors want to find a DEMOCRATIC solution to
the problem of how a UNITARY STATE can accommodate a MINORITY
NATIONALITY that wants more autonomy: cultural, economic, or –
particularly – political. They propose that the unitary state
should add a FEDERACY – a sort of “partial state within the unitary
state.”

The authors present Federacy as an “ideal type”: a list of
desirable characteristics that define what, ideally, a Federacy
would include. Of course, in particular actual situations, it might
or might not be possible to implement all of these characteristic,
or to implement all of them fully. The authors begin with a
DEFINITION: [italics and dashes added]

A FEDERACY is a political-administrative unit in an
independent unitary state with exclusive power in certain
areas, including some legislative power – constitutionally or
quasi-constitutionally embedded, that cannot be changed
unilaterally – and whose inhabitants have full citizenship rights
in the otherwise unitary state. (204)

The authors then outline a Federacy’s five DEFINING
CHARACTERISTICS (D), then add two FACILITATING CHARACTERISTICS (F,
204-207). Note the “state within a state” aspect: The
national state has to be willing to cooperate and negotiate
with the subnational Federacy as though it were
independent. Supranational involvement can also be
helpful.

D1. Federal-like division of functions between state
and federacy.

D2. Quasi-constitutionally embedded political
autonomy of the federacy.

D3. Existence of dispute resolution
procedures.

D4. Reciprocal representation between the unitary
state and the federacy.

D5. The federacy is part of an internationally
recognized independent state.

F1. Role of international guarantors in the founding
of the federacy.

F2. Role of the federacy in international treaties
signed by the center.

[In order to further clarify exactly what they do and don’t
mean by “federacy,” the authors then discuss “federacy’s conceptual
distinctiveness from ‘unitary states,’ ‘asymmetrical federations.’
‘Confederations,’ and ‘associated states’ ” (207-210). This Post
can’t summarize that interesting analysis; please read the
book!]

A WARNING: DON’T COPY AMERICAN
FEDERALISM!

Stepan, Linz and Yadav want to warn other countries NOT to
copy USA federalism. Again, not only is the USA version not the
ONLY possible version of federalism, but also it is a very POOR
version for accommodating minority nationalities. (Chapter Eight:
“The US federal model and multinational societies: Some problems
for democratic theory and practice,” 257-275.)

The authors list “seven key features of US federalism in
comparative perspective” (259-262). Overall, one upshot is too
much power concentrated in particular national institutions that
can VETO proposals to change from the status quo (favoring the
majority nationality) to new arrangements (accommodating minority
nationalities).

1. The upper chamber is extremely malapportioned.
[Different states’ senators can represent very different numbers of
citizens, violating the democratic principle of “one person, one
vote.” The 1787 Constitution specifies that this undemocratic
provision CANNOT be changed. Robust minority nationalities will
resent such an arrangement, when it disadvantages
them.]

2. The upper chamber has major and unique constitutional
powers. [The undemocratically-elected Senate can veto ANY
legislation (Article 1, Section 7). It – NOT the very well
apportioned House – can veto important presidential nominations
and international treaties. Moreover, the Senate alone tries
impeachment of the president. Again, great power without true
democratic accountability.]

3. US federalism is symmetrical, not asymmetrical.
[Again, all USA states have the same political rights and
obligations and must be treated exactly the same. Again, on
particular matters, this prevents national leaders from making
different accommodations on particular matters to different
nationalities in different states.]

4. “Residual powers” go NOT to the Union but instead
to the individual states. [The 1787 Constitution says that any
powers that it does not explicitly grant to the national government
should remain entirely with the states. This limits the national
government’s authority to accommodate the demands of nationalities,
and allows state governments to ignore such demands with
impunity.]

5. Senate and states must both vote approvals of any
amendment by supermajority. [This makes it difficult to
change the old Constitution. In the USA, the result has been
adaptation through “extra-constitutional” processes and
institutions. But that requires national consensus so, elsewhere,
might not work for accommodating the political demands of robust
nationalities.]

6. A supreme court with strong and extensive judicial
review capacity. [Rather undemocratically, the Supreme Court
can declare unconstitutional even legislation approved by both
congress and president. Again the problem is too much power given
to a national institution that is not accountable to the public,
including to minority nationalities.]

7. The USA president is a directly elected, “unsharable”
executive with a fixed term and strong veto powers. [Again a
national institution with strong powers, not accountable to the
public, except once every four years. There is only one president,
so executive powers cannot be shared among several
nationalities.]

Finally, the authors spell out “the implications of these
seven features for democracy in a robust multinational society”
(262-275). Overall – at least in robustly multinational societies –
these features are NOT conducive to goals of “democracy, reasonably
inclusive social welfare policies, and relative political
tranquility” (257). Problems include:

1. The inability to use “asymmetrical” federal
formulas. [One cannot treat different states differently, in order
to accommodate the different demands of different nationalities.
This is done by ALL democratic polities that are robustly
multinational: Spain, Belgium, Canada, and
India.]

2. The weakness of coalitional incentives in the US
presidential system. [The US presidency cannot be shared between
nationalities, exacerbating conflict between them. In contrast, a
parliamentary system can enable a minority nationality to
participate in national coalition governments.]

3. The potentially severe political problem of every full
federal unit having the same number of seats (regardless of
population) in the upper chamber. [Different nationalities could
receive drastically and unfairly different representation,
inhibiting transition to democracy.]

4. A high number of electorally based veto players
and their constraining impact on inequality-reducing legislation.
[There are lots of institutional positions whose incumbents can say
“no!” to proposals to reduce inequalities – political, economic, or
cultural – between nationalities.]

总访问量：博主简介

韦爱德Edwin A. Winckler (韦爱德) is an American political scientist (Harvard BA, MA, and PhD) who has taught mostly in the sociology departments at Columbia and Harvard. He has been researching China for a half century, publishing books about Taiwan’s political economy (Sharpe, 1988), China’s post-Mao reforms (Rienner, 1999), and China’s population policy (Stanford, 2005, with Susan Greenhalgh). Recently he has begun also explaining American politics to Chinese. So the purpose of this Blog is to call attention to the best American media commentary on current American politics and to relate that to the best recent American academic scholarship on American politics. Winckler’s long-term institutional base remains the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University in New York City. However he and his research have now retreated to picturesque rural Central New York.