A Japanese friend and I met for dinner at the Beijing Normal University campus canteen. The overcrowded campus eateries are operated like well-oiled machines. Inside our oval-shaped canteen, various food stalls surround more than 100 perfectly ordered immovable four-person tables. I managed to find seats at a table beside two locals while my friend inspected the food options. Curious that we were speaking Chinese, one of the locals at our table, politely greeted us and introduced himself as a biology professor at the university. After the usual pleasantries, an awkward silence fell over the table when my friend mentioned his Japanese heritage. A few moments later, the others moved to a table behind us to finish their meals and the professor left for class.

The government in Beijing claims the Japanese acquisition of the Diaoyus infringes on Chinese sovereignty. Others have argued that China’s strong stance over the island is a form of territorial expansionism perhaps for purpose of resource acquisition. However, the Chinese government’s strong position on the Diaoyus is based on neither territory expansionism nor the Chinese government’s interpretation of sovereignty infringement. Rather, internal nationalistic pressure is forcing Beijing to play a stronger hand against Japan.

Let’s be clear: China and Japan’s conflict over the Diaoyus will not result in military action. War, at this point, is simply not an option for the Chinese government.

First, war would have severe and far-reaching implications on the political and economic stability in Asia at a time when China is under pressure to provide stable and reliable growth over the long term. In fact, China must not only maintain its current rate of growth to support a growing population, however, at the same time, it must increase the size of its middle class and move growth away from the manufacturing sector and into the service sector.[1]

Third, the strategic importance of the Diaoyus from the perspective of Beijing is negligible. The island is simply not a crucial component of Chinese national interests nor will it constitute a critical part of China’s overall strategy in Asia in the near future. The emphasis here is on the ‘near future’. The benefit of the islands to resource acquisition in the waters surrounding it is uncertain at best and the strategic importance, military or otherwise, is debatable.

Finally, although the Chinese and Japanese fishing operations have worked together for decades in the surrounding waters, the small island chain has been under Japan’s administration for over a century and has remained uninhabited. In fact, visiting or living on the Diaoyus is illegal, and they are protected by Japan’s regional forces. More importantly, there is no sign that the government in Tokyo will change this arrangement after the islands are nationalized and the federal government has stated that their decision to purchase the Diaoyus was for the purpose of maintaining the status quo.

From a strictly realpolitik perspective, the risks of taking the islands through force substantially outweigh any potential benefits, and it is in the best interests of China and Japan to solve this issue gradually through diplomacy.

China’s growth and new prosperity has been accompanied by a dramatic rise in nationalism. The Chinese economy has improved so rapidly that its citizens identify with both the powerful 21st century China and the isolated and victimized China of most of the 20th Century. As a result the Chinese government is under increasing pressure from its own people to flex its 21st century international muscle.

This pressure is magnified by the government’s constant battle with protecting its legitimacy. Rampant corruption and unapologetic intolerance to political dissent, among other factors, has constantly challenged the CCP’s authority to govern the Chinese people.

Certainly, the seriousness of this territorial dispute is exacerbated by Japan’s role, as it opens fresh wounds of Japanese aggression and territorial occupation. From my conversations with Chinese students and friends, the most common anecdotal theme is that the government’s response to the Diaoyus dispute has been ‘too weak.’ Public sentiment like this places the Beijing government in the precarious position of placating the concerns of its citizens while avoiding military conflict with Japan.

China’s current position toward Japan may have already arrived at a point of ‘no return.’ A few weeks ago China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zhang Zhijun, remarked that “[w]e have the confidence and the ability to uphold the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. No amount of foreign threats or pressure will shake the resolve of the Chinese government and people.” This may be true but the real threat is internal.

China and Japan are on a path of greater economic interdependence where stability is paramount. Both Beijing and Tokyo would rather suspend this disagreement to a later time. Nationalistic pressure, though, has placed the Chinese government in a difficult position. How those in Beijing manage the current conflict will define and shape the future of governance in China.

Further Reading

The federal government in Japan claimed the purchase was necessary to placate nationalist sentiment and prevent deteriorating ties with Beijing.

Extracted quote: “In all levels of contact with the Japanese side, the Chinese side presented China’s stern position and steely resolve to uphold China’s sovereignty. We urge the Japanese side to give up its illusions and correct its mistakes,” he said. [para.10]

Others have argued that China’s strong stance over the island is a form of territorial expansionism perhaps for purpose of resource acquisition or to present a strong face to other countries that may want to challenge China’s resolve.