A country's presence on the Majors List is not necessarily an adverse
reflection of its government's counternarcotics efforts or level of
cooperation with the United States. Consistent with the statutory
definition of a major drug transit or drug- producing country set forth in
section 481(e)(2) and (5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended
(FAA), one of the reasons that major drug transit or illicit drug producing
countries are placed on the list is the combination of geographical,
commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to transit or be produced
despite the concerned government's most assiduous enforcement measures.

Pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, I hereby designate Burma and
Venezuela as countries that have failed demonstrably during the previous 12
months to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics
agreements and take the measures set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the FAA.
Attached to this report (Tab A) are justifications for the determinations
on Burma and Venezuela, as required by section 706(2)(B).

I have also determined, in accordance with provisions of section 706(3)(A)
of the FRAA, that support for programs to aid Venezuela's democratic
institutions, establish selected community development projects, and
strengthen Venezuela's political party system is vital to the national
interests of the United States.

I have removed China and Vietnam from the list of major drug transit or
major illicit drug producing countries because there is insufficient
evidence to suggest that China is a major source zone or transit country
for illicit narcotics that significantly affect the United States. There
is insufficient evidence to
refute claims by the Government of Vietnam that they have virtually
eliminated opium poppy production. Additionally, although cooperation with
United States law enforcement is limited, there are no indications of a
significant Vietnam
based drug threat to the United States.

Despite the Government of Afghanistan's counternarcotics efforts, we remain
concerned about the disturbing magnitude of the drug trade and the prospect
that opium poppy cultivation will likely increase in 2006. We are also
concerned about government corruption, especially at the regional and local
levels, impeding counternarcotics efforts. For these efforts to be
effective, government corruption with respect to the opium economy must be
seriously addressed by both local and central government authorities.

The Government of Canada has made real progress in curbing the diversion
into the United States of pseudoephedrine, which fuels the production of
methamphetamine. There are indications, however, that Canadian based
criminal groups are increasingly involved in the production of MDMA
(Ecstasy) destined for the United States. Large scale cross-border
trafficking of Canadian grown marijuana remains a serious concern. The
United States appreciates the excellent law enforcement cooperation with
Canada in combating these shared threats.

While Haiti made efforts this year to improve its performance, we reiterate
our concerns from last year about the Interim Government of Haiti's
inability to effectively organize Haitian law enforcement resources to
permit sustained counternarcotics efforts. Further, the national criminal
justice system must be significantly strengthened in order to be effective
and gain public confidence.

The Government of The Netherlands has achieved considerable success in
countering the production and flow of MDMA (Ecstasy) to the United States,
and The Netherlands is commended for its
enhanced efforts. In the coming year, the United States would like to
build upon our law enforcement cooperation with the Dutch government
through advancements in mutual legal assistance and direct engagement
between our respective police agencies.

Drug trafficking, money laundering, and other organized criminal activity
in Nigeria remain major sources of concern to the United States. Progress
over the past year on anti money laundering controls is welcome, but much
remains to be done to make such controls effective. Implementing anti
corruption policies must advance more quickly, as corruption at all levels
of government continues to hamper effective narcotics law enforcement. In
addition, measures similar to those taken to improve drug law enforcement
at Nigeria's main airport need to be expanded to, and replicated at,
Nigeria's seaports, where drug trafficking is a growing concern. Finally,
the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and other counternarcotics
institutions should work towards developing the mindset and capacity to
pursue investigations, and prosecutions of major drug traffickers based in
the country.

We remain concerned with the continued involvement by the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in criminal activity, including drug
production and drug trafficking. Given the close relationship between
Japanese and Chinese criminal elements and DPRK drug traffickers in past
smuggling incidents, there is a real possibility of continuing DPRK
involvement in drug trafficking, even when a given incident appears only to
involve ethnic Chinese or other organized Asian criminal groups.

You are hereby authorized and directed to submit this determination to the
Congress and to publish it in the Federal Register.