The defendant is charged [in count __]
with threatening in the second degree. The statute defining this offense reads
in pertinent part as follows:

a person is guilty of threatening
in the second degree when <insert appropriate subsection:>

§ 53a-62 (a)
(1): that person, by physical threat, intentionally places or attempts to
place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury.

§ 53a-62 (a)
(2): that person threatens to commit any crime of violence with the intent
to terrorize another person.

§ 53a-62 (a)
(3): that person threatens to commit any crime of violence in reckless
disregard of the risk of terrorizing another person.

For you to find the defendant guilty
of this charge, the state must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable
doubt:

Element 1 - Made a threatThe first element is that the
defendant <insert as appropriate:>

§ 53a-62 (a)
(1): made a physical threat to another person. A threat is the expression
of an intention to injure another person. A physical threat is a threat
accompanied by some action, such as words accompanied by a threatening gesture.
A physical threat may also occur if the defendant expresses the threat in the
person's presence and has the apparent ability to carry out (his/her) threat.
Mere words are insufficient to constitute a physical threat; the defendant must
also indicate by (his/her) actions an intent or an ability physically to carry
out that threat. The conduct of a person, even without words, may be sufficient
to cause fear in another person.

§ 53a-62 (a) (2)
or § 53a-62 (a) (3): threatened to commit a crime of violence. A crime of violence is one in which physical
force is exerted for the purpose of violating, injuring, damaging, or abusing
another person. The state must prove that the defendant behaved in a manner
that indicated (his/her) intent to commit such a crime.

A threat can
only be punishable when it is a true threat, that is, a threat that a reasonable
person would understand as a serious expression of an intent to harm or assault,
and not as mere puffery, bluster, jest or hyperbole. In determining whether the
threat is a true threat, consider the particular factual context in which the
allegedly threatening conduct occurred which could include the reaction of the
person allegedly being threatened and the defendant's conduct before and after
the allegedly threatening conduct.1

Element 2 - IntentThe second element is that
the defendant <insert as appropriate:>

§ 53a-62 (a)
(1): intended by (his/her) conduct to put that person in fear of imminent
serious physical injury. A person acts "intentionally"
with respect to a result when (his/her) conscious objective is to cause such
result. <See
Intent: Specific, Instruction 2.3-1.> "Serious
physical injury" means physical injury that creates a substantial risk of
death, or that causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or
serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ. ''Imminent''
means impending or likely to occur immediately. It is not the danger or risk of
injury, but the person's perception that is essential to this crime. The state
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to place the
other person in fear of imminent and serious physical injury.

§ 53a-62 (a)
(2): intended to terrorize another person. To terrorize means
to cause intense fear or apprehension.2A person acts "intentionally"
with respect to a result when (his/her) conscious objective is to cause such
result. <See
Intent: Specific, Instruction 2.3-1.>

§ 53a-62 (a)
(3): acted in reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror to another
person. A person acts "recklessly"
with respect to a result or circumstances when (he/she) is aware of and
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result
will occur or that such circumstances exist. <See
Recklessness, Instruction 2.3-4.>

Conclusion

In summary, the state must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) the defendant threatened (another person / to
commit any crime of violence), and 2) the defendant (intended to put <insert
name of person> in fear of imminent serious physical injury / intended to
terrorize <insert name of person> / acted in reckless disregard of the
risk of causing terror to <insert name of person>).

If you unanimously find that the state
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the crime of
threatening in the second degree, then you shall find the defendant guilty. On
the other hand, if you unanimously find that the state has failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt any of the elements, you shall then find the defendant
not guilty.
_______________________________________________________

"[T]hreatening . . . requires the
state to show that the defendant, by physical threat, intentionally placed or
attempted to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury.
It is not the danger or risk of injury, but the victim's perception, which is
essential to the . . . crime." State v. Gibson, 75 Conn. App. 103,
122-23 (2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 270 Conn. 55
(2004).

"A threat does not require
immediate menace of violence or acts showing a present ability and will to
execute the threat. . . . A threat imports the expectation of bodily harm,
thereby inducing fear and apprehension in the person threatened. A threat,
unlike an assault, is not limited by time or distance." (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 123-24. It is the defendant's present ability to harm the
victim that amounts to "imminent." "A threat is always an indication of
probable evil to come, whether at once or at some uncertain time in the
future." State v. Snead, 41 Conn. App. 584, 593-94 (1996).

Threatening is not a lesser
included offense of attempted murder. State v. Jacobiwitz, 182 Conn.
585, 592-93 (1981), overruled on other grounds, State v. Welch, 224 Conn.
1 (1992); State v. Palmer, 8 Conn. App. 496, cert. denied, 201 Conn. 808
(1986). "It is not the danger or risk of injury, but the victim's perception,
which is essential to [the crime of threatening]. . . . [A]ttempted murder does
not require placing in fear, and it is possible to imagine an attempted murder,
such as a shot from ambush, in which there has been no prior threatening act."
State v. Jacobiwitz, supra, 182 Conn. 592-93.