The
maritime balance of power in the East Asian littoral is undergoing
slow, but steady change in Beijing’s favor. Numerous
indicators, including the imminent sea-trials of the first
of China’s 2nd-generation nuclear submarines, the first
serial production of its indigenous Song-class diesel
boats, and the ongoing purchase from Russia of eight “Kilo”-class
diesel submarines, all confirm PRC progress in undersea warfare
across a broad front.

Because
of a centuries-long history of neglect, incompetence, and
defeat at sea, there is a strong tendency in Washington to
rate the Chinese as poor mariners. The recent accident and
loss of all hands onboard a Ming-class submarine
in April 2003 only serves to reinforce these stereotypes.
However, besides obvious safety lapses, the incident also
shows that the submarine force of the Peoples Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) is engaged in a vigorous program of realistic
at-sea training, under battle-like conditions. Moreover, despite
this recent mishap, the appointment of Admiral Zhang Dingfa
– a nuclear-trained submariner – to head the PLAN
suggests growing momentum in undersea warfare.

Indeed,
it was the emerging “ASW problem that we have out there
in the Western Pacific,” that moved Pacific Fleet Commander
ADM Walter Doran to call on the U.S. Navy to “rededicate
ourselves to getting back into [the ASW] business.”
With undersea operations a key element of China’s emerging
maritime strategy, the U.S. submarine community must learn
more about this prospective competitor. Since the origins
and development of any large and complex institution over
time will have a strong influence on its future evolution,
this article reviews the known history of the PLAN submarine
force.

200
Submarines for Imperial China

Following
the humiliating Opium War of the mid-19th century, China faced
continual encroachment from Western nations, and total defeat
at the hands of the “upstart” Japanese in 1895.
The occupation of Beijing by an alliance of powers in 1900
only added insult to injury. China’s profound maritime
weakness, however, encouraged surprisingly bold thinking about
emerging technologies for undersea warfare. Over the last
decades of the 19th century, Chinese leaders attempted vainly
to gain the support of foreign powers, particularly Britain
and France, for constructing a modern navy. In 1915, a former
U.S. naval attaché, CDR Irvin Gillis, arranged for
the visit of Vice-Admiral Wei Han and 30 Chinese student officers
to Groton, Connecticut to observe submarine building and operations.
According to one account, Wei Han “delighted [Electric
Boat] officials by announcing that China needed a fleet of
200 submarines.” An initial purchase of 12 vessels was
inked, and plans for training Chinese crews were put into
place. Unfortunately for China’s navy – and for
Electric Boat – these agreements collapsed as the imperial
regime gradually gave way to the so-called warlord era.

Years
of desultory internecine warfare among the warlords were followed
by a period of growing consolidation during the late 1920s
and early 1930s under the leadership of the Chinese nationalist,
Chiang Kai-shek. Submarines continued to be of significant
interest. Chiang attempted to purchase German submarines in
1934 and hired a German naval advisor. Although nothing materialized,
Chiang did succeed in sending a number of young naval officers
to Germany for training on submarine technology. Some of these
officers would later rise to prominence in the PLAN. After
these false starts, China finally received its first two submarines
from the British after World War II, but following the Communist
civil war victory in 1949, China would look to Russia for
submarine assistance.

Soviet-designed
“Romeo”-class conventional attack submarines
were produced in significant quantities by China between
1965 and the early 1980s, and the PLAN eventually had
more than 60 of these boats in service. The “Romeo”s
displaced 1,319 tons surfaced and 1,712 tons submerged
on a length of 252 feet. China continues to produce the
Ming class, which originally was simply a wider
“Romeo”, but has been continuously upgraded
with advanced quieting and weaponry.

The
PLAN’s first nuclear-powered attack submarine –
of the Han class – was laid down in the
mid-1960s but did not enter service until 1974. The first
two of these five ships were troubled with serious propulsion
defects, lacked basic weaponry and electronics, and were
never entirely reliable. The latter members of the class
displaced 5,550 tons submerged on a length of 295 feet,
and in 1985, one of them made a submerged voyage of 84
days.

Little
Brother

In fact,
close cooperation with Soviet submariners predated the Communist
victory in China. Stalin’s Red Army had entered northern
China during the final weeks of the war against Japan in mid-1945.
By 1948, a significant force of 14 Soviet submarines patrolled
the Yellow Sea, operating out of Lushun at the tip of the
Liaodong Peninsula. In the fall of 1948, Chiang
Kai-Shek’s Kuo-Min Tang (KMT) faction, fielding a number
of surface combatants, attempted to blockade Manchuria and
insulate central China from Communist infiltration. This effort
failed, probably because of intelligence on the KMT patrols
from Soviet submarines, and when the Peolples Iberation Army
(PLA) also succeeded in landing large contingents of Communist
organizers on the nearby Shandong Peninsula, Chiang’s
armies were soon defeated in central China.

The Communist
Party approved the preliminary formation of a Chinese submarine
force in June 1949, four months before the official founding
of the PRC.

Mao Zedong’s
focus on submarines reflected both his determination to end
the “Chinese nation’s total failure to create
maritime defenses” and the strong influence of the Soviet
“New School” approach to maritime strategy. The
doctrine was encapsulated in a three-character phrase to guide
the PRC’s new navy: “Qian, Kong, Kuai” –
“Submarines, [Land-Based] Aircraft, and Fast [Attack
Patrol Boats].” In 1951, several hundred officers were
selected from the ground forces to form the nucleus of the
new submarine corps. Many were sent to study with the Soviet
Pacific Fleet and trained aboard Soviet submarines. However,
a year later, the submarine force suffered its first major
institutional setback when the extraordinary demands of the
stalemated Korean conflict forced the PLA to divert funds
from shipbuilding to aircraft production.

Nonetheless,
step-by-step progress under Soviet tutelage continued during
the 1950s. Over the course of the decade, 275 Chinese students
traveled to the USSR to study submarine building and operations.
In 1953, the PLAN received its first submarines, (one M-class,
and three S 1-class) from the USSR and founded the submarine
academy at Qingdao. The following June, the PLAN declared
its first, four-ship submarine squadron operational, although
some authorities believe that submarines operating in the
Yellow Sea before 1954 may well have had joint Sino-Soviet
crews. On the whole, China’s initial submarine efforts
were concentrated in the North Sea Fleet, probably to counter
U.S. forces based in Japan. Mao’s recognition of the
importance of the developing submarine force was underscored
by his January 1956 visit to the Jiangnan shipyard in Shanghai,
where the PRC’s very first submarine was being built
from a Soviet kit. China would eventually build 21 of these
Soviet “Whiskey”-class boats.

As early
as 1956, even before China had produced its first diesel boat,
nuclear propulsion for submarines was adopted as a national
priority by Mao himself. The daunting challenge that this
entailed only became fully clear after Moscow refused Beijing’s
explicit request to share nuclear propulsion technology, on
the grounds that it would be premature for the PLAN. Foreshadowing
the imminent souring of Sino-Soviet relations, Mao reacted
indignantly: “We will have to build nuclear submarines
even if it takes us 10,000 years.” In July 1958, the
Politburo approved an ambitious plan to develop nuclear propulsion
and an SLBM simultaneously.

Problematic
Adolescence

By 1957,
the year that culminated a “golden age” of relatively
rational governance and steady development under the Communists,
the Chinese had established a strong foundation for their
submarine force. However, this period was followed by the
gravely-destructive Great Leap Forward (GLF) in 1958 and later
by the Great Cultural Revolution (GCR) of 1966-69. These periods
of tumult had lasting, deleterious effects on the PLAN submarine
force.

Mao’s
GLF was an attempt to accelerate China’s modernization
process by turning away from the Soviet model of development
in favor of an effort to harness the ideological will of the
Chinese people. Accordingly, Mao rejected Khrushchev’s
offer to create a joint Sino-Soviet fleet in exchange for
a renewed Soviet naval presence in Chinese waters. As a result,
Russia was prevented from locating submarine broadcast transmitters
on the Liaodong peninsula, and China lost a unique opportunity
to augment the strength and operational capabilities of the
PLAN undersea force.