The Trial of German Major War Criminals

Two Hundred and Twelfth Day:
Tuesday, 27th August, 1946(Part 3 of 11)

[DR. GAWLIK continues]

[Page 146]

Therefore, in this trial before the International Military
Tribunal it does not matter whether the SD supported the SS,
the Secret State Police, the Party, or individual persons of
the State leadership, unless the prosecution has brought the
proof of the prerequisites which I have indicated:

(a) Existence of a secret plan for the commission of
crimes according to Article 6 of the Charter and

(b) Knowledge of the members of the SD.

Furthermore, the factual submission of the prosecution
concerning the co-operation of the SD with the SS, the
Secret State Police, or other persons, require correction.

I shall not read Pages 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, or
54. I shall continue on Page 55 in the second paragraph.

Concerning the aims, purposes and methods of the indicted
Amt III, I should like to refer to statements made in
Document SD 70, the handbook of the Supreme Headquarters of
the United Nations of April, 1945. There it says:

"The SD maintained for its purposes a network of
reporters throughout all fields of life in Germany - some
words are missing - who were recruited from all social
strata and professions. The information gained through
reporters was used in the situation reports -

These reports are exceptionally frank and contain a
complete and uncoloured picture of the mood and attitude
in Germany - "

The correctness of this is proven by the 649 affidavits
submitted in my summary and made by former full-time and
honorary workers, Vertrauensmanner (persons entrusted with
special tasks) for the total area of the Reich and for parts
of the Reich.

The aims, purposes and activities of Amt VI are shown by the
Affidavits SD-61, 62 and 66 from Document SD-1.

In regard to Amt VI, I refer particularly to Affidavit SD-
66.

I shall now turn to Section (b): Crimes Against Peace
(Statement of Evidence V of the English Trial Brief against
the Gestapo and SD).

As committing a Crime Against Peace the SD is accused of
having staged so-called border incidents before the outbreak
of the war to give Hitler an excuse for starting the war.
The prosecution, however, referred to only one border
incident in which the SD is alleged to have participated.
That is the alleged attack on the Gleiwitz radio station.

In this connection the prosecution made reference to the
affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, of 20th November, 1945. This
is Document PS-2751. The deponent of Document PS-2751,
Alfred Naujocks, was heard before the Commission. On that
occasion he declared that the execution of the attack on the
Gleiwitz radio station was not included in the aims and
purposes of Amter III and VI (Record of the Commission, Page
147 of the German text).

The witness further testified that no sections of Amter III
and VI were used for the execution of that border incident
in Gleiwitz and that the men who with him attacked the
Gleiwitz station did not belong to the SD, Amt III (Record
of the Commission, Page 150).

The witness also stated that by the term "SD men" in his
affidavit of 20th November, 1945, he did not mean the
members of any definite office of the

[Page 147]

RSHA; but common usage of the term "SD men" referred to RSHA
members of all offices which were subordinate to Heydrich.

The witness further stated that he was charged with the
execution of the border incident at Gleiwitz, not because he
belonged to Amt VI and worked there, but that exclusively
personal reasons made for that decision (Record of the
Commission, Page 150). The witness testified that on the
basis of the conversation he had had with Heydrich he had
gained the impression that Heydrich would have given him
that assignment even if he had not been a member of Amt VI
and the SS. The order for the execution of this assignment
reached the witness Naujocks not through the official
channels of the Chiefs of Amt III or VI. The Chiefs of Amter
III and VI had no knowledge of this action.

The members of the SD, Amter III and VI, had no knowledge
that the attack was carried out by Naujocks, a member of Amt
VI. Particularly the members of the SD Leitabschnitt which
was in charge of Gleiwitz and the output of the SD had no
knowledge of this activity, and they could not have had
because Naujocks had been forbidden to get in touch with any
members of the SD whatsoever in that territory.

The statements of this witness have been reaffirmed by
witness Somman and through the Affidavit SD 11 deposed by
Dr. Marx.

I also submitted 215 affidavits for the office of the RSHA
as well as for all territories of the SD Leitabschnitte and
the SD Abschnitte, particularly for those situated in the
regions of Katowice, Danzig and Saxony. Those affidavits
testify that the members of the SD during the critical time
had no knowledge of the faked border incidents or the
participation of the SD in them.

Page 59 will not be read. I shall turn to Page 60, which
deals with the Einsatzgruppen.

In order to judge whether the SD can be declared criminal on
the grounds of the activities of the Einsatzgruppen, the
following questions must be examined:

1. Did the Einsatzgruppen A, B, C and D, which were assigned
in the East to the army groups, belong to the organization
of Amter III and VI?

2. Were parts of these office organizations used in these
Einsatzgruppen?

3. Did the Amter III, VI or III/VI give orders to the
Einsatzgruppen to commit crimes against the laws of war and
against humanity?

4. Did the members of the Inland Information Service (Amt
III) or of the Foreign Information Service (Amt VI) have any
knowledge of activities of the Einsatzgruppen which are
crimes in the sense of the Charter?

First I must rectify an error. In this Trial and before the
Commission the Einsatzgruppen have repeatedly been
designated as Einsatzgruppen of the SD, up to a short time
ago. As an example, I refer in particular to the records of
Keitel, Dr. Best, Hauser and von Manstein. (These are in the
Record at Pages 72/46/47, 14442, 14706, 15003-4, 15007,
15010-11, and 15041.)

This designation is wrong.

The four Einsatzgruppen employed in the East were designated
by A, B, C and D. They had under them the Einsatzkommandos,
which were designated by the numbers 1 to 12. Thus the word
"SD" is mentioned neither in the designation of the
Einsatzgruppen nor of the Einsatzkommandos. Furthermore,
there was no reason for that, since, according to the
evidence submitted by the prosecution, only 3 per cent of
their members were part of the SD Amter III or VI. The
members of the SD were in the eighth place, as far as
membership was concerned. I refer you to the statistics
found in Document L-180 submitted by the prosecution.
(Repeated in the Record at Page 1676 of the German text.)

The designation of the Einsatzgruppen is also shown by the
distribution list of prosecution Document D-569. This shows
the various relationships. The Einsatzkommandos 1-a, 1-b, 2
and 3 were under Einsatzgruppe A. The Einsatzkommandos 7-a,
7-b, 8, 9, Moscow, were under Einsatzgruppe B; 4-a, 4-b, 5

[Page 148]

and 6 were under Einsatzgruppe C; 10-a, 10-b, 11-a, 11-b
and 12 were under Einsatzgruppe D.

The setting up of the Einsatzgruppen was not ordered by Amt
III, VI, or VII, but by Himmler on the basis of an agreement
with the OKH. I refer you to the testimony of Dr. Best,
Schellenberg and Ohlendorf, to Exhibit USA 1557 and
Affidavits SD Nos- 41 and 46. The evidence has shown further
that the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos were not under
the orders of Amts III, VI and VII. (I refer again to
Exhibit USA 557, Affidavits SD Nos- 41, 44 and 46, to the
record on Pages 1812-14, and 1850-51, to prosecution
Document L-180, Pages 2 and 3, to the record at Pages 10906-
08 and Document PS-2620.)

If one considers in particular the constitution of the
Einsatzgruppen which is set forth on Page 1676 of the record
in German, one will have to admit, as has been deposed by
the witness Hoeppner and confirmed by the witness Bendt in
Affidavit SD 41, that this concerns an affiliation of a
special kind of persons who did not belong to the
organizations of Amter III, VI or VII.

The evidence has further shown that no parts of the
organizations of Amter III, VI or VII were employed in the
Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos, and that the Amter III,
VI and VII did not issue any orders for the mass destruction
carried out by the Einsatzgruppen. I refer to Affidavit SD
61, the record of the Commission at Pages 2181 and 2217,
Affidavit SD 41, and particularly the answers to questions 6
and 9, and to Affidavit SD 44, Nos- 4 and 5.

The Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos are special
units which deviated in their composition entirely from the
structure of the Security Police and SD in the Reich itself.
I refer in this connection to the statements of Ohlendorf
and Hoeppner and to the Affidavits SD 41 and SD 46. The
witness Best testified (on Page 14431 of the record):

"They were Security Police Units of a special kind."

It is of decisive significance for the question whether the
organization can be declared criminal that no parts of the
SD, Amter III, VI or VII, were employed in the
Einsatzgruppen, but only individual members were assigned to
these Einsatzgruppen as a result of legal regulations. In
this connection Hoettl's affidavit of 10th April, 1946,
seems especially important to me. I emphasize that this is a
prosecution document. Hoettl declared in the affidavit
mentioned that the membership of the people in the SD was
inactive during their affiliation with the Einsatzgruppen.
(Pages 14504-5 of the German record.)

In so far as members of Amter III, VI and VII were assigned
by legal order to the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos in
the East, I refer for their tasks and activities to the
testimony of Dr. Ehlich, and von Manstein, and to Affidavit
SD 69.

The selection of the members of the Security Service for the
Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos was not on the basis of
their position and duties in the home offices. For that
point I refer to the testimony of Ohlendorf and Affidavits
SD 41 and SD 45.

Thus I come to the conclusion:

(1) Einsatzgruppen A, B, C and D did not belong to the
Domestic Intelligence Service, Amt III, to the Foreign
Intelligence Service, Amt VI, or to Amt VII.

(2) No parts of this organization were used for this
purpose, but individual members were assigned to the
Einsatzgruppen.

(3) The legal position of these persons was the same as,
for, example, that of persons who had been called up for
military service. Their affiliation with Amter III, VI, or
VII was inactive. They were no longer subject to
instructions from their home offices.

I shall omit the next pages, 64, 65, 66, 67. Pages 68 to 71
refer to the Einsatzkommandos in prisoner-of-war camps
(Statement of evidence).

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gawlik, the Tribunal understands that the
SS, the Gestapo and the SD all disclaim responsibility for
the Einsatzgruppen. Could you tell the Tribunal who is
responsible for the Einsatzgruppen?

[Page 149]

DR. GAWLIK: The Einsatzgruppen were subordinated to - the
responsibility may be seen from my statement on Page 61. I
should like to refer you to the testimony of Dr. Best,
Schellenberg, Ohlendorf, and document -

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gawlik, the Tribunal would like to know
who you say was responsible for the Einsatzgruppen. They do
not want to be referred to a crowd of documents and a crowd
of witnesses. They want to know what your contention is.

DR. GAWLIK: The Einsatzgruppen, in my opinion, were
organizations of a special kind which were directly under
Himmler, and for the rest, the testimony of the witnesses
differs as to how far they were subordinate to the
commanders-in-chief.

Some of the witnesses have stated that they were subordinate
to the commanders-in-chief, and some disputed this. As far
as this question is concerned, I cannot define my attitude.

THE PRESIDENT: Was it possible, according to your
contention, for Himmler to control these Einsatzgruppen
without any organization, and if it was not, what
organization controlled it?

DR. GAWLIK: The Einsatzgruppen had their own head, as may be
seen from prosecution Document 180-L, the Stahlecker report.
Stahlecker was the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe A, and this
man probably sent this report, which was found, directly to
Himmler, and from that I may assume that the heads of the
Einsatzgruppen were directly under Himmler. It was a
subordinate organization along with the RSHA for occupied
countries. Your Lordship, may I -

THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell the Tribunal who were the
individual men who composed the Einsatzgruppen? Did they
consist of SS or SA or SD or the Wehrmacht?

DR. GAWLIK: Your Lordship, the composition may be seen on
Page 1676 of the German transcript. I do not remember them
exactly, your Lordship, but I do know that they contained
Waffen SS, Criminal Police, State Police, SD -

THE PRESIDENT: You are too fast. Waffen SS?

DR. GAWLIK: Waffen SS, Criminal Police, State Police, SD,
and on this page, as far as I can recall, NSKK [N.B.
Kraftfahrer (German Text).] is mentioned, and I believe
interpreters, but I cannot tell you that for certain. The
various groups are stated exactly on this page, your
Lordship, which is Page 17 -

THE PRESIDENT: The last that I have down is NSKK. What did
you say after that?

DR. GAWLIK: Your Lordship, there is a mistake. NSKK is not
participating, here.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything else? Any Gestapo?

DR. GAWLIK: Yes, Gestapo, of course. Your Lordship, State
Police and Gestapo are identical. Interpreters are
enumerated in this document. I believe these were the main
groups, but at the moment I cannot tell you for certain, but
only as I remember it.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

DR. GAWLIK: I beg your pardon, did your Lordship wish to
know the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen or the members?

THE PRESIDENT: I mean the memberships.

DR. GAWLIK: Yes, that is quite correct. Your Lordship, I
wanted to add that altogether there were a thousand to
twelve hundred men in these four Einsatzgruppen.

THE PRESIDENT: How many did you say?

DR. GAWLIK: One thousand men to approximately twelve hundred
men, and from the SD there were three per cent. That may be
seen from the document:

It is Document 180-L. The set-up is shown there.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for a recess.

(A recess was taken.)

DR. GAWLIK: Your Lordship, I shall have to correct my
statement regarding the Einsatzgruppen on one point. I
procured Document 180-L during the recess, and the total
strength of Einsatzgruppen A was 990 men. It was composed as
follows: Waffen SS, 34 per cent; drivers (Kraftfahrer) 17
per cent; administration, 1.8 per cent; SD, 3.5 per cent;
criminal police (Kripo), 4.1 per cent; State police (Stapo),
9 per cent; auxiliary police, 8.8 per cent - those, your
Lordship, were apparently the policemen of the occupied
territories - regular police, 13.4 per cent; female
employees, 1.3 per cent; interpreters, 5.1 per cent;
teleprinter operators, 3 per cent; wireless operators, 8 per
cent.

That is Einsatzgruppe A, as far as I know; no documents are
available for Einsatzgruppen B, C, and D, but the witnesses
have testified that B, C, and D had about the same ratio.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the extent is nearly four times as large
as you said?

DR. GAWLIK: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Can you give a date for the constitution of
Group A? What date was it?

DR. GAWLIK: The Einsatzgruppen were formed before the
beginning of campaign, before June, 1941.

THE PRESIDENT: When you get down to 3 per cent, that must
have been at a certain time. It could not have remained 3
per cent all the time, could it, or is that an
establishment?

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