[Note for Atlantic Free Press readers:Today, a rarity at the
site. Two pieces, officially identified as such and piled atop each
other -- think of them like a double-decker bus -- each focused on a
different aspect of the Iraq situation as Washington imagines it. First
comes a little "political bedtime story" of mine about how Washington
has tried to "fix" everything but reality itself; then, an important
analysis by Michael Schwartz of just why the withdrawal option,
increasingly popular for the American public, is such poison to
Washington's movers and shakers. So dig in. Tom]

"Fixing" the War
By Tom Engelhardt
This is an old tale. Long forgotten. But like all good political bedtime stories, it's well worth telling again.

Once upon a time, there was a retired general named Paul Van Riper. In 1966, as a young Marine officer and American advisor
in Vietnam, he was wounded in action; he later became the first
president of the Marine Corps University, retired from the Corps as a
Lieutenant General, and then took up the task of leading the enemy side
in Pentagon war games.

Over the years, Van Riper had developed into a free-wheeling military thinker, given to quoting Von Clausewitz and
Sun-tzu, and dubious about the ability of the latest technology to
conquer all in its path. If you wanted to wage war, he thought, it
might at least be reasonable to study war seriously (if not go to war
yourself) rather than just fall in love with military power. It seemed
to him that you took a risk any time you dismissed your enemy as
without resources (or a prayer) against your awesome power and imagined
your campaign to come as a sure-fire "cakewalk." As he pointed out,
"Many enemies are not frightened by that overwhelming force. They put
their minds to the problem and think through: how can I adapt and avoid
that overwhelming force and yet do damage against the United States?"

As a result, Van Riper took the task of simulated enemy commander quite
seriously. He also had a few issues with Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld's much vaunted "military transformation," his desire to create
a sleek, high-tech, agile military that would drive everything before
it. He thought the Rumsfeld program added up to just so many "shallow,"
"fundamentally flawed" slogans. ("There's very little intellectual
content to what they say… ‘Information dominance,' ‘network-centric
warfare,' ‘focused logistics' -- you could fill a book with all of
these slogans.")

In July 2002, he got the chance to test that proposition. At the cost
of a quarter-billion dollars, the Pentagon launched the most elaborate
war games in its history, immodestly entitled "Millennium Challenge
02." These involved all four services in "17 simulation locations and
nine live-force training sites." Officially a war against a fictional
country in the Persian Gulf region -- but obviously Iraq -- it was
specifically scripted to prove the efficacy of the Rumsfeld-style
invasion that the Bush administration had already decided to launch.

Lt. Gen. Van Riper commanded the "Red Team" -- the Iraqis of this
simulation -– against the "Blue Team," U.S. forces; and, unfortunately
for Rumsfeld, he promptly stepped out of the script. Knowing that
sometimes the only effective response to high-tech warfare was the
lowest tech warfare imaginable, he employed some of the very techniques
the Iraqi insurgency would begin to use all-too-successfully a year or
two later.

Such simple devices as, according to the Army Times,
using "motorcycle messengers to transmit orders, negating Blue's
high-tech eavesdropping capabilities," and "issuing attack orders via
the morning call to prayer broadcast from the minarets of his country's
mosques." In the process, Van Riper trumped the techies.

"At one point in the game," as Fred Kaplan of Slate
wrote in March 2003, "when Blue's fleet entered the Persian Gulf, he
sank some of the ships with suicide-bombers in speed boats. (At that
point, the managers stopped the game, ‘refloated' the Blue fleet, and
resumed play.)" After three or four days, with the Blue Team in obvious
disarray, the game was halted and the rules rescripted. In a quiet
protest, Van Riper stepped down as enemy commander.

Millennium Challenge 02 was subsequently written up as a vindication of
Rumsfeld's "military transformation." On that basis -- with no one
paying more mind to Van Riper (who, this April, called openly for Rumsfeld's resignation) than to Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki when, in February 2003, he pointed out that hundreds of thousands
of troops would be needed to occupy Iraq, the "transformational"
invasion was launched -- with all the predictably catastrophic results
now so widely known.

The Millennium Challenge 02 war games were already underway when, late
that July, Sir Richard Dearlove, head of MI6 (the British equivalent of
the CIA), returned to London from high-level meetings in Washington to
report to Prime Minister Tony Blair and his top officials. In a secret
meeting, he told them that the decision for war in Iraq had already
been made by the Bush administration and that now, in a memorable
phrase, "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the
policy."

On May 1st, 2005, notes from this meeting, dubbed "the Downing Street Memo," were leaked to the London Sunday Times.
Thanks to that memo and other documents, it's now commonly accepted
that the Bush administration "fixed" the intelligence around their war
of choice. But Lt. Gen. Van Riper's forgotten story should remind us
that they also "fixed" the war they were planning to fight.

Between then and now, when it came to Iraq, there wasn't much that
wasn't "fixed" in a similar manner. Only recently, James A. Baker's
Iraq Study Group report described
the way levels of violence in Iraq were grossly underreported by U.S.
intelligence officials -- in one case, only 93 "attacks or significant
acts of violence" being officially recorded on a day when the number
was well above 1,000. As the report politely summed up this particular
fix-it-up methodology, "Good policy is difficult to make when
information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its
discrepancy with policy goals."

But here's the thing: The Iraq Study Group, too -- like every other
mainstream gathering of advisors, officials, or pundits -- "fixed" the
intelligence. Think of the ISG as the clean-up-crew version of the Blue
Team of Millennium Challenge 02. Before they even began, Bush family consigliere
Baker and cohorts ensured that, while the ISG would be filled with
notable movers and shakers from numerous previous administrations, no
one on it, nor any expert "team" advising it would represent the one
point of view that a majority of Americans have by now come to support -- actual withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq on a set timeline.

You would not, for instance, find retired Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, the
former Director of the National Security Agency, who has openly called
for the U.S. to "cut and run"
from Iraq, on the panel. Despite the report's harsh descriptions of the
last three years of failed policy and some perfectly sane negotiation
suggestions, it dismissed the idea of such a withdrawal out of hand --
because such a dismissal was simply built into the group's very make
up.

It turns out, of course, that when you control both sides of a war game
or the range of opinion on a panel, you are assured of the results
you're going to get. The problem comes when you only control one side
of a situation; and when, as American commanders learned in the early
days of the Korean War and again in Vietnam, whether due to racism or
imperial blindness, you also discount and disrespect your enemies.

Unfortunately for the Bush administration, it turned out that, while
you could fix the war games and the intelligence, you couldn't be
assured of fixing reality itself, which has a tendency to remain
obdurately, passionately, irascibly unconquerable.
Yes, you could ignore reality for a while. (The President, when being
told a few hard Iraqi truths in 2004 by Col. Derek Harvey, the Defense
Intelligence Agency's senior intelligence officer for Iraq, reportedly
turned to his aides and asked, "Is this guy a Democrat?") But you
couldn't do it forever, not when the Lt. Gen. Van Ripers of Iraq
refused to step aside and you weren't capable of removing them; not
when you couldn't even figure out, most of the time, who they were. It
was then that the fixers first found themselves in a genuine fix, from
which none of Washington's movers and shakers have yet been willing to
extract themselves.

Why Withdrawal Is Unmentionable

Staying the Course with James Baker and the Iraq Study Group
By Michael Schwartz
The report of James A. Baker's Iraq Study Group has already become a
benchmark for Iraq policy, dominating the print and electronic media
for several days after its release, and generating excited commentary
by all manner of leadership types from Washington to London to Baghdad.
Even if most of the commentary continues to be negative,
we can nevertheless look forward to highly publicized policy changes in
the near future that rely for their justification on this report, or on
one of the several others recently released, or on those currently being prepared by the Pentagon, the White House, and the National Security Council.

This is not, however, good news for those of us who want the U.S. to
end its war of conquest in Iraq. Quite the contrary: The ISG report is not an "exit strategy;" it is a new plan for achieving the Bush administration's imperial goals in the Middle East.

The ISG report stands out among the present flurry of re-evaluations as
the sole evaluation of the war by a group not beholden to the
President; as the only report containing an unadorned negative
evaluation of the current situation (vividly captured in the oft-quoted phrase
"dire and deteriorating"); and as the only public document with
unremitting criticism of the Bush administration's conduct of the war.

It is this very negativity that brings into focus the severely
constrained nature of the debate now underway in Washington -- most
importantly, the fact that U.S. withdrawal from Iraq (immediate or
otherwise) is simply not going to be part of the discussion. Besides
explicitly stating that withdrawal is a terrible idea -- "our leaving
would make [the situation] worse" -- the Baker report is built around
the idea that the United States will remain in Iraq for a very long
time.

To put it bluntly, the ISG is not calling on the Bush administration to
abandon its goal of creating a client regime that was supposed to be
the key to establishing the U.S. as the dominant power in the Middle
East. Quite the contrary. As its report states: "We agree with the goal
of U.S. policy in Iraq." If you ignore the text sprinkled with
sugar-coated words like "representative government," the report
essentially demands that the Iraqi government pursue policies shaped to
serve "America's interest and values in the years ahead."

Don't be fooled by this often quoted passage from the Report: "By the
first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the
security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq." The ebullient interpretations of this statement by the media have been misleading in three different ways. First, the combat brigades mentioned in this passage represent far less
than half of all the troops in Iraq. The military police, the air
force, the troops that move the equipment, those assigned to the Green
Zone, the soldiers that order, store, and move supplies, medical
personnel, intelligence personnel, and so on, are not combat personnel;
and they add up to considerably more than 70,000 of the approximately
140,000 troops in Iraq at the moment. They will all have to stay -- as
well as actual combat forces to protect them and to protect the new
American advisors who are going to flood into the Iraqi army -- because
the Iraqi army has none of these units and isn't going to develop them
for several years, if ever.

Second, the ISG wants those "withdrawn" American troops "redeployed,"
either inside or outside Iraq. In all likelihood, this will mean that
at least some of them will be stationed in the five permanent bases
inside Iraq that the Bush administration has already spent billions
constructing, and which are small American towns, replete with fast
food restaurants, bus lines, and recreation facilities. There is no
other place to put these redeployed troops in the region, except bases
in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, none of which are
really suited to, or perhaps eager to, host a large influx of American
troops (guaranteed to be locally unpopular and a magnet for terrorist
attacks).

Third, it's important not to ignore those two modest passages: "subject
to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground" and
"not necessary for force protection." In other words, if the Iraqi
troops meant to replace the redeployed American ones are failures, then
some or all of the troops might never be redeployed. In addition, even
if Iraqi troops did perform well, Americans might still be deemed
necessary to protect the remaining (non-combat) troops from attack by
insurgents and other forces. Given that American troops have not been
able to subdue the Sunni rebellion, which is still on a growth curve,
it is highly unlikely that their Iraqi substitutes will do any better.
In other words, even if the "withdrawal" parts of the Baker report were
accepted by the President, which looks increasingly unlikely, its plan
has more holes and qualifications than Swiss cheese.

Put another way, no proposal at present on the table in Washington is
likely to result in significant reductions even in the portion of
American troops defined as "combat brigades." That is why this
statement says that the combat troops "could be out of Iraq," not "will be out of Iraq" in the first quarter of 2008.

So, the ISG report contemplates -- best case scenario -- "a
considerable military presence in the region, with our still
significant [at least 70,000 strong] force in Iraq, and with our
powerful air, ground, and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and
Qatar…" Given a less-than-optimum scenario, the American presence in
Iraq would assumedly remain much higher, perhaps even approaching
current levels. As if this isn't bad news enough, the report is laced
with qualifiers indicating that the ISG members fear their new strategy
might not work, that "there is no magic formula to solve the problems
of Iraq" -- a theme that will certainly be picked up this week as the right-wing of the Republican Party and angry neocons continue to blast at the report.

Danger to Empire

Why was the Iraq Study Group so reluctant to advocate the withdrawal of
American troops and the abandonment of the Bush administration's goal
of pacifying Iraq? The likely explanation is: Its all-establishment
membership (and the teams of experts that gave it advice) understood
that withdrawing from Iraq would be an imperially momentous decision.
It would, in fact, mean the abandonment of over two decades of American
foreign policy in the Middle East. To grasp this, it's helpful to
compare the way most Americans look at the war in Iraq to the way those
in power view it.

Most Americans initially believed that the U.S. went into Iraq to shut
down Saddam Hussein's WMD programs and/or simply to topple a dangerous
dictator (or even a dictator somehow connected to the 9/11 attacks). Of
course, had that really been the case, the Bush administration should
have withdrawn almost immediately. Even today, it could, at least
theoretically, withdraw and declare victory the day after Saddam
Hussein is executed, since the WMDs and the 9/11 connection were
evanescent. In this scenario, the dismal post-invasion military failure
would represent nothing but the defeat of Bush's personal crusade --
articulated only after the Hussein regime was toppled -- to bring
American-style democracy to a benighted land.

Because of this, most people, whether supporters or opponents of the
war, expect each new round of policy debates to at least consider the
option of withdrawal; and many hold out the hope that Bush will finally
decide to give up his democratization pipe dream. Even if Bush is
incapable of reading the handwriting on the Iraqi wall, this analysis
encourages us to hope that outside advisers like the ISG will be
"pragmatic" enough to bring the message home to him, before the war
severely undermines our country economically and in terms of how people
around the world think about us.

However, a more realistic look at the original goals of the invasion
makes clear why withdrawal cannot be so easily embraced by anyone loyal
to the grandiose foreign policy goals adopted by the U.S. right after
the fall of the Soviet Union. The real goals of the war in Iraq add up
to an extreme version of this larger vision of a "unipolar world"
orbiting around the United States.

The invasion of 2003 reflected the Bush administration's ambition to
establish Iraq as the hub of American imperial dominance in the oil
heartlands of the planet. Unsurprisingly, then, the U.S. military
entered Iraq with plans already in hand to construct and settle into at least four
massive military bases that would become nerve centers for our military
presence in the "arc of instability" extending from Central Asia all
the way into Africa -- an "arc" that just happened to contain the bulk
of the world's exportable oil.

The original plan included wresting control of Iraqi oil
from Saddam's hostile Baathist government and delivering it into the
hands of the large oil companies through the privatization of new oil
fields and various other special agreements. It was hoped that
privatized Iraqi oil might then break OPEC's hold on the global oil
spigot. In the Iraq of the Bush administration's dreams, the U.S. would
be the key player in determining both the amount of oil pumped and the
favored destinations for it. (This ambition was implicitly seconded
by the Baker Commission when it recommended that the U.S. "should
assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize the national oil industry as a
commercial enterprise")

All of this, of course, was contingent upon establishing an Iraqi
government that would be a junior partner in American Middle Eastern
policy; that, under the rule of an Ahmed Chalabi or Iyad Allawi, would,
for instance, be guaranteed to support administration campaigns against
Iran and Syria. Bush administration officials have repeatedly
underscored this urge, even in the present circumstances, by
attempting, however ineffectively, to limit the ties of the present Shia-dominated Iraqi government to Iran.

Withdrawal from Iraq would signal the ruin of all these hopes. Without
a powerful American presence, permanent bases would not be welcomed by
any regime that might emerge from the current cauldron in Baghdad;
every faction except the Kurds is adamantly against them. U.S. oil
ambitions would prove similarly unviable. Though J. Paul Bremer, John
Negroponte and Zalmay Khalilzad, our three ambassador-viceroys in
Baghdad, have all pushed through legislation mandating
the privatization of oil (even embedding this policy in the new
constitution), only a handful of top Iraqi politicians have actually
embraced the idea. The religious leaders who control the Sunni militias
oppose it, as do the Sadrists, who are now the dominant faction in the
Shia areas. The current Iraqi government is already making economic
treaties with Iran and even sought to sign a military alliance with that country that the Americans aborted.

Still Staying the Course

Added to all this, from Lebanon to Pakistan, the administration's
political agenda for the "arc of instability" is now visibly in a state
of collapse. This agenda, of course, predated Bush, going back to the
moment in 1991 when the Soviet Union simply evaporated, leaving an
impoverished Russia and a set of wobbly independent states in its
place. While the elder George Bush and Bill Clinton did not embrace the
use of the military as the primary instrument of foreign policy, they
fully supported the goal of American preeminence in the Middle East and
worked very hard to achieve it -- through the isolation of Iran,
sanctions against Iraq, various unpublicized military actions against
Saddam's forces, and a ratcheting upward of permanent basing policies
throughout the Gulf region and Central Asia.

This is the context for the peculiar stance taken by the Iraq Study
Group towards the administration's disaster in Iraq. Coverage has
focused on the way the report labeled the situation as "grave and
deteriorating" and on its call for negotiations with the previously
pariah states of Iran and Syria. In itself, the negotiation proposal is
perfectly reasonable and has the side effect of lessening the
possibility that the Bush administration will launch an attack on
Iranian nuclear facilities in the near future.

But no one should imagine that the "new" military strategy proposed by
Baker and his colleagues includes dismissing the original goals of the
war. In their letter of transmittal, ISG co-chairs James Baker and Lee
Hamilton declared:

"All options have not been exhausted. We believe it is
still possible to pursue different policies that can give Iraq an
opportunity for a better future, combat terrorism, stabilize a critical
region of the world and protect America's credibility, interests and
values."

This statement, couched in typical Washington-speak, reiterates those
original ambitious goals and commits the ISG to a continuing effort to
achieve them. The corpus of the report does nothing to dispel that
assertion. Its military strategy calls for a (certainly quixotic)
effort to use Iraqi troops to bring about the military victory American
troops have failed for three years to achieve. The diplomatic
initiatives call for a (certainly quixotic) effort to enlist the aid of
Syria and Iran, as well as Saudi Arabia and other neighbors, in
defeating the insurgency. And the centerpiece of the economic
initiatives seeks to accelerate
the process of privatizing oil, the clearest sign of all that Baker and
Hamilton -- like Bush and his circle -- remain committed to the grand
scheme of maintaining the United States as the dominant force in the
region.

Even as the group called on the President to declare that the U.S.
"does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq" once the country is
secure, it immediately hedged this intention by pointing out that we
"could consider" temporary bases, "if the Iraqi government were to
request it." Of course, if the Bush administration were somehow to
succeed in stabilizing a compliant client regime, such a regime would
surely request that American troops remain in their "temporary" bases
on a more-or-less permanent basis, since its survival would depend on
them.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the ISG report is its embrace of
the Bush administration's imperial attitude toward the Iraqi
government. Although the report repeatedly calls for American "respect"
for Iraqi "sovereignty" (an implicit criticism of the last three years
of Iraq policy), it also offers a series of what are essentially
non-negotiable demands that would take an already weak and
less-than-sovereign government and strip it of control over anything
that makes governments into governments.

As a start, the "Iraqi" military would be flooded with 10,000-20,000
new American "advisors," ensuring that it would continue to be an
American-controlled military, even if a desperately poor and
recalcitrant one, into the distant future. In addition, the ISG offered
a detailed program for how oil should be extracted (and the profits
distributed) as well as specific prescriptions for handling a number of
pressing problems, including fiscal policy, militias, the city of
Kirkuk, sectarianism, de-Baathification, and a host of other issues
that normally would be decisions for an Iraqi government, not an
American advisory panel in Washington. It is hardly surprising, then,
that Iraqi leaders almost immediately began complaining that the
report, for all its bows to "respect," completely lacked it.

Most striking is the report's twenty-first (of seventy-nine)
recommendations, aimed at describing what the United States should do
if the Iraqis fail to satisfactorily fulfill the many tasks that the
ISG has set for them.

"If the Iraqi government does not make substantial
progress toward the achievement of milestones on national
reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should
reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi
government."

This could be interpreted as a threat that the United States will withdraw -- and the mainstream media
has chosen to interpret it just that way. But why then did Baker and
his colleagues not word this statement differently? ("… the United
States should reduce, and ultimately withdraw, its forces from Iraq.")
The phrase "reduce its political, military, or economic support for the
Iraqi government" is probably better interpreted literally: that if
that government fails to satisfy ISG demands, the U.S. should transfer
its "political, military, or economic support" to a new leadership
within Iraq that it feels would be more capable of making "substantial
progress toward" the milestones it has set. In other words, this
passage is more likely a threat of a coup d'état
than a withdrawal strategy -- a threat that the façade of democracy
would be stripped away and a "strong man" (or a government of "national
salvation") installed, one that the Bush administration or the ISG
believes could bring the Sunni rebellion to heel.

Here is the unfortunate thing. Evidently, the "grave and deteriorating"
situation in Iraq has not yet deteriorated enough to convince even
establishment American policymakers, who have been on the outside these
last years, to follow the lead of the public (as reflected in the latest opinion polls)
and abandon their soaring ambitions of Middle East domination. If they
haven't done so, imagine where George W. Bush and Dick Cheney are in
policy terms. So far, it seems everyone of power or influence in
Washington remains committed to "staying the course."

Michael Schwartz, Professor of Sociology and Faculty Director of the
Undergraduate College of Global Studies at Stony Brook University, has
written extensively on popular protest and insurgency, as well as on
American business and government dynamics. His work on Iraq has
appeared on numerous Internet websites, including Tomdispatch.com, Asia
Times, Mother Jones.com, and ZNet; and in print in Contexts, Against
the Current, and Z Magazine. His books include Radical Protest and Social Structure, and Social Policy and the Conservative Agenda (edited, with Clarence Lo). His email address is Ms42@optonline.net.

...
I read these excellent post earlier at Juan Cole. I keep the 'faith' in humankind after articles like this. It's up to 'us.' We can't expect some foggy-nebulous notion something Bigger/Better or dumb/smarter will get the job done. Expell them fron Congress/White House now...or...we asked for it? The bus driver is loco-looney. Wrestle the wheel away from them or we better buckle-up...Crash-Sites ain't pretty.

There's gotta be more to it than that.
Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, all exist in the shadow of Russia and China. Any analysis of U.S. intent and involvement there that makes no mention of either Russia or China is incomplete at best. Think if Russia invaded El Salvador on a pretext and failed in the planning to factor in the interests and probable reaction of the United States to such an event.

Clearly that's unrealistic. The United States WOULD be involved whether the Russians planned on that or not. And Russian journalists who made no mention and took no account of American interests would be mistaken at best. . . .