About Rationally Speaking

Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.

Friday, March 09, 2012

On suicide

by Massimo Pigliucci

Albert Camus famously wrote that “There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide.” It’s more than a slight exaggeration (well, there’s existentialism for ya!), but the phrase came to mind during a recent evening of web surfing, when I found myself reading a brief essay on the ethics of suicide published by a New Zealand site providing “resources for life related issues” (of which self-imposed death clearly is one). There is, of course, a long philosophical tradition of discussions about the ethical permissibility of suicide (Plato and Aristotle: against it; the Roman Stoics: in favor; pretty much everyone in the Christian tradition: against it; pretty much every Enlightenment philosopher: in favor). But what struck me as particularly interesting is the very different takes on suicide of two of the most influential philosophers all of time: David Hume and Immanuel Kant. (For a more comprehensive philosophical look at the issue see the entry in the ever more excellent Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.)

Interestingly, both philosophers approached it from a deontological (duty-based) perspective. For Kant, predictably, the verdict is negative: suicide is not morally permissible on the general grounds that it diminishes the intrinsic worth of a human being to the status of an animal. I’m not sure what to make of this, since I don’t think human beings have any “intrinsic” worth. Whatever worth we have we acquire through our social interactions, and I think I could name a fair number of human beings who are less “intrinsically worthy” than your dog.

Kant considers a common argument in favor of the morality of suicide, that it may be permissible on grounds of personal freedom, since there is no (or relatively little, of an emotional type) harm to third parties. This holds no water with Kant, because he thinks that self-preservation is the highest duty we have to ourselves. Now, it is easy to argue that self-preservation is a biological imperative, but of course this does not at all translate into a duty. The problem with Kant’s general approach is that it is not clear toward whom we have such duties, other than a vague — and metaphysically highly questionable — “universal moral law.” Indeed, a reasonable retort is that a human being ought to have the freedom to decide when pain (physical or psychological) is sufficiently unendurable that one is better off terminating one’s life (let us bracket for a moment the possibility of a mental illness, to which I will return below).

Kant also proposes what appears to be a pragmatic objection to suicide, impugning the moral character of the person who contemplates it: “He who does not respect his life even in principle cannot be restrained from the most dreadful vices.” Needless to say, there is no evidence whatsoever that this is the case, and a pragmatic argument that flies in the face of facts doesn’t represent much of a promising avenue.

Hume, on the contrary, thinks that suicide is morally permissible, also on the grounds of his analysis of duties. He talks about three types of duties: to god, to ourselves, and to others. I will skip the first category, since I don’t think there are any gods toward whom we have any duties.

In terms of duties to others, Hume claims that in committing suicide we do not harm others (again, with the partial exception of the distress we may cause to loved ones). However, we also — by necessity — cease to do any good for society, which may present a problem. Hume’s response here is that our duties to society are in proportion to the benefits we receive from society (a form of pragmatic reciprocal altruism, if you will), and since we do not receive any benefits from society after we die (obviously), it follows that we do not have any duties toward it either. More broadly, in Hume’s words, “I am not obliged to do a small good for society at the expense of a great harm to myself.”

What about duties to ourselves? Hume claims that “we have such a strong natural fear of death, which requires an equally strong motive to overcome that fear,” meaning that we do not contemplate the extreme measure of suicide lightly. And the latter — to decide to terminate our life only under extreme circumstances of duress — is the only duty we may possibly have toward ourselves.

It should be clear that I find Hume’s arguments much more persuasive than Kant’s, but the question remains of the permissibility of intervention to dissuade someone from committing suicide. This is often framed in terms of the rights of autonomous moral agents vs the positive role of a certain degree of “paternalism” (a term that should not carry an automatic negative connotation, as it too often does) on the part of society.

Clearly, if there are signs of mental illness, then intervention by friends, relatives and professionals is warranted. But one can also conceive of plenty of situations — such as chronic and unendurable pain, deep but not pathological psychological distress (for instance by an old person who lost a lifelong companion), and terminal physical illness (particularly of a progressively debilitating type), where one would have to start wondering about the motives of people who allegedly wish to help.

The basic question ought to be, it seems to me, what is the best long term interest of the agent? Most of the time this will be to live as long (and as healthily) as possible. But when this is not the case — as judged by the agent himself, provided that he is capable of sound judgment — then the duty of friends, relatives and professionals switches toward understanding, moral support, and even (at least when allowed by the law) actual material assistance.

Of course, a good number of movies have explored the dimension of assisted suicide, and I particularly remember The Barbarian Invasions, a 2003 French movie set in Montreal, chronicling the last days of a terminally ill man who decides to die on his own terms, surrounded by friends and family. It is hard to imagine a better way to go, and even harder to conceive of a reasonable and compassionate objection to this kind of affirmation of moral autonomy.

23 comments:

Besides just emotional distress caused to loved ones, they are also often left without material/financial support. I think it's immoral to leave a stay-at-home wife with a young child. In a sense, it's like divorce, but without the alimony money.

During a limited and now long-since passed period of my life, I seriously contemplated suicide myself. Recently I have written at length about my own experiences, and on the general philosophical problem. (Unfortunately, my texts are in Swedish. Otherwise I'd be glad to share them with you, for what they're worth.)

I agree with your argument above, up to a point. But I have some reservations regarding your closing paragraphs:

"Clearly, if there are signs of mental illness, then intervention by friends, relatives and professionals is warranted."

Exactly on what grounds?

"...deep but not pathological psychological distress..."

How does one distinguish between pathological and non-pathological distress? And who should make that distinction?

According to your own reasoning, an individual's own judgment of whether life is worthwhile (or bearable) is paramount. Why, then, should it matter how others gauge the (potential) quality of that life, or the individual's capability of making that judgment? Does it even matter if the reasons for suicide seem "sound" at all, in the eyes of others?

"The basic question ought to be, it seems to me, what is the best long term interest of the agent?"

Yes, in the sense that "paternalism" may be warranted if it can be reasonably assumed that an individual's suicidal tendencies are temporary, and that intervention will be appreciated in hindsight. But this is far from clear-cut.

Often, it seems that what most influences such judgments is the intervening party's own interests: In order to protect itself from the terrifying prospect that suicide may be a viable option, society imposes a will to live and a meaning of life on the individual, thus challenging and circumscribing the individual's own judgment and freedom.

"...this will be to live as long (and as healthily) as possible."

Again, according to your own reasoning, it is up to the individual to decide what's in his or her best interest. With no (or negligible) obligations to others or to society, it really doesn't matter what most other people would agree is in their best interest.

"...as judged by the agent himself, provided that he is capable of sound judgment..."

My point, again, is that as soon as we start to talk about "sound" judgments, we open up for an endless variety of external (and more or less arbitrary) delineations of what this entails. And no matter how we draw the line, we deny the individual his or her right to decide, and we invalidate his or her emotions and reasoning.

Wouldn't newborn infants gain worth through their social relationships with their caretaker? If their caretakers want them, that makes them have worth. If *nobody* wants them, what other worth do they have?

Recently, I wrote a grant application to study effectiveness of suicide prevention strategies. In my grant the outcome of "completed suicide" is negative, interventions are of several types, and so are populations of interest. All interventions are either detecting high-risk groups, treating mood/psychiatric disorders or minimizing suicide completions and suicide contagion through other means. It is after submitting the grant I read an article in the "Think" journal and it occurred to me that for many perhaps who complete their suicide, it could be actually a desirable and good outcome. To me that is so out of my universe (yes despite my name :)), yet hardly an investigation probes the universe of suicide risk groups ......why does the thought even come up? It shouldn't.....is it an abnormal psychopathic state or pretty normal reaction given one were to live in that rare universe? If the latter....that universe needs investigation more than investigations of effectiveness of erecting barriers over buildings, media gags, psychological tests etc. etc

As thoroughly as Kant and Hume thought about the issue of suicide, no matter how thorough, or how grounded, I don't think you can make any general statements regarding all suicides. Asking the question if suicide is ethical or not smacks of over simplification. It is a case by case thing (as is murder, I suppose). The Barbarian Invasions depicted a suicide of a man, who lived his life how he wanted, and ended it in a nice way with the blessing and assistance of his family. This is not the same ethical conundrum as a young father ending his life without warning, causing farreaching distress to his children, wife, friends, business partners, fans and work colleagues (and potentially subsequent suicides). Referring to Hume's "duty to society" rationale, here one suicide is done with the blessing of society, the other despite it. Suicides can range from blessings to attacks(even in the absence of violence), and thus from acts of grace to selfishness. Meanwhile, I am out there with Sissyphus smiling when the rock rolls down the hill (obscure Camus reference).

Just for the sake of controversy: If you value an individual's choice and respect an individual's decision to kill himself, would this not require to respect an insane individual's decision to kill himself as well - after all - who is going to decide whether the insane one is more likely to appreciate being prevented from dying than the sound one? Kant's universal moral law?

I watched someone jump to his death from an upper floor of a building in Montreal. Though this person was a stranger to me and I know nothing about him or his reasons for killing himself, this event left me bummed out for several days afterwards. We are not simply autonomous disconnected individuals, but our actions affect other people, even strangers. If this person's death affected me, how much more did it affect the police officers who spent over an our trying to dissuade him from his act as well as those who had to retrieve his battered body from the ventilation shaft that he landed in. There may be instances where suicide is a rational act as depicted in "Les invasions barbares", but I think that too often, it is done without considering all of the implications because the person is not in a rational state of mind.

"My point, again, is that as soon as we start to talk about "sound" judgments, we open up for an endless variety of external (and more or less arbitrary) delineations of what this entails. And no matter how we draw the line, we deny the individual his or her right to decide, and we invalidate his or her emotions and reasoning."

This looks like the continuum fallacy to me. Lets not argue that because there is a vagueness to the judgements that have to be made, that there are no differences at the extremes. Yes, there will have to be some arbitrariness and gray areas with judging a person's state of mind, but that seems to come with the territory.

I would hope that if I were attempting to take my life in distraught and extreme emotional state that someone could think clearly for me, at least temporarily. Sure that would be denying me "the right to decide" (as you say) at that moment, but I think that is a minor consideration since that intervention is temporary. It does not prevent me from committing suicide at a later time, but does have a role in preventing a rash decision that is not thought through.

>I’m not sure what to make of this, since I don’t think human beings have any “intrinsic” worth. Whatever worth we have we acquire through our social interactions...

I have to admit this surprised me. I agree that "intrinsic" is a problematic term, but the notion that we acquire worth ONLY through social interactions seems obviously wrong.

Even were I the last person alive in the universe, I might still wish to live, and if so, I would hold my life to be worth something.

Moreover, your statement would seem to imply that people whose social interactions are, on balance, a detriment to society have... no worth? This doesn't seem plausible. Even a serial murderer's life is surely worth something; one might have to take it away on some utilitarian imperative, but that would still be doing something *bad* for the sake of something good. It wouldn't be a straightforward positive with no drawbacks!

well, I don't see any other way around this. To say that the concept of intrinsic value is problematic is an understatement: there doesn't seem to be any way to really make sense of it.

If you were the only person alive in the universe you would certainly care about yourself, but in what sense would you have value in any broader context?

As for your example of taking a life, I'm generally against the death penalty for a number of reasons, but are you seriously suggesting that we lose anything at all when, say, a genocidal maniac dies? I seriously doubt it.

What I am reacting to is the implication that putting a criminal in jail or killing them (whether via capital punishment or not) could ever possibly be a positive thing in and of itself. It may work out to be better for society, or even the individual, and therefore entirely justified, but it still belongs in the 'costs' column of the moral ledger. It violates their preferences, and quite possibly those of their loved ones.

yes, but I still don't see it. Violating a genocidal maniac's personal preferences seems to me not to detract anything from the morality of our decisions. Those preferences are simply irrelevant in my mind, he forfeited any right in that area by engaging in genocide.

I think the point of talking about humans having "intrinsic worth" is to express moral values such as you have in saying that "hopefully" people will choose to help those in need. Could this be a language issue?