OPINION | A Pathway to Peace : New Thinking on a Strategy for Unification of the Korean Peninsula

The continued
status quo and unspoken acceptance of the North Korean regime is no longer
tolerable in the international community. The United States and its allies in
South Korea and Japan must view China as an obstacle rather than the key to
change. This article provides a four-pronged approach for the US-ROK-Japan
alliance to prepare and move towards regime change and unification.

Keywords: North Korea, United States, Japan, South Korea, Unification, Denuclearization

It’s been ten
years since North Korea’s first nuclear launch, and the U.S. failure to bring
the DPRK towards denuclearization has been a dark cloud that has continued to
linger. As we approach the fourth American administration that will have to
deal with this issue, two things are evidently clear: North Korea has no
interest in giving up nuclear weapons—something it sees as its only negotiating
tool in the international arena and key to its survival—and that China can not
be expected to act responsibly in enforcing sanctions or pressuring the regime
to denuclearize. Beijing and Washington view the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK) through two very different lenses, and Washington must face the
sobering reality that a soft-line approach that looks to China to control its
belligerent neighbor is out of touch with reality. China is not and has not
ever been the answer to solving the North Korea problem, but rather a
significant roadblock. Instead, the U.S., along with South Korea and Japan,
must begin their own efforts and preparations for regime change in the North.
This article presents a four-pronged approach: the deployment of a Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); increased US-ROK-Japan joint-military
exercises; sanctions targeting financial institutions and attached to human
rights abuses; and a well-funded and government-led strategy of information
penetration.

The North
Korean regime under Kim Jung-un has evolved into a regime that can no longer be
tolerated by the international community. While the rogue state has been an
issue since the beginning of its nuclear program in the 1990s, recent actions
are evidence of the need for change. So far this year we have witnessed a
hydrogen bomb test, an inter-continental ballistic missile test (ICBM) in the
guise of a satellite launch, progress towards the miniaturization of a nuclear
warhead and an ICBM that could reach the U.S. mainland, and preparations for
terrorist attacks on Seoul. In the past, the international community has
grudgingly accepted the status quo and North Korea’s existence, but this
climate under Kim Jung-un suggests that this status quo is dangerously close to
traversing into what would have been an avoidable disaster.

There are
multiple effective options that the United States and its allies can take to
move towards and plan for regime change. The deployment of THAAD is crucial in
providing missile defense security to USFK forces and the people of South Korea
and Japan. This missile defense system provides the defense necessary to
intercept airborne missiles. The possibility of a hard landing in North Korea
is increasingly likely, and when a regime like the one in North Korea feels
threatened, we should expect it to not go quietly or peacefully.

Planning for a
regime change with a country that has a reported 700,000 active frontline
personnel and an arsenal of ballistic missiles will require extensive military
cooperation. There is already a high amount of bilateral and trilateral
military exercises, but these are mostly defensive in nature. More exercises
are required that are focused on a collapsing North Korea and an interim
occupation period during state building. Additionally, a strategic and
coordinate approach in locating and securing nuclear and non-nuclear weapons is
required. Furthermore, Seoul and Tokyo need to place animosity aside and engage
in more bilateral exercises that include intelligence sharing and wartime
strategy. Their recent reconciliation in December 2015 is a step in the right
direction.

In addition to
military readiness, measures must be taken to weaken the Kim regime. According
to Victor Cha and Robert Gallucci, negotiators during the six-party talks and
the “agreed framework” respectively, there were two times the government in
Pyongyang seemed truly caught off guard: in September 2005 when the U.S.
Treasury Department’s sanctions led to the freezing of Banco Delta Asia’s holdings
of DPRK assets; and in February 2014 when a UN commission called for the
Security Council to refer the regime to the International Criminal Court for
crimes against humanity. Sanctions that target financial institutions known to
engage with the DPRK need to be furthered, including (and especially)
institutions in China. Sanctions tied to human rights need to be put forward as
well, which we do now see occurring. The DPRK relies almost exclusively on
outside sources of funding, and targeted sanctions can effectively cut off this
supply.

The North
Korean regime is incredibly fragile, and its legitimacy and the infallibility
of the Kim dynasty is dependent on information control. Therefore, the effect
of information penetration would greatly assist regime change in the closed
society. Due to heavy government restrictions on what information enters the
country, the average North Korean has a very limited worldview and remains
largely unaware of world affairs. Multiple NGOs work towards getting information
of all types into the closed-off society, from South Korean soup operas to the
latest Hollywood films. This information penetration is incredibly effective in
educating the people on the reality of their situation, but more must be done.
A large-scale South Korean government strategy that is comprehensive and well
funded is needed. There are signs that this information penetration is worth
pursuing. On August 20, 2015 the DPRK military shot at South Korean
loudspeakers that were aimed at the North and playing pop music, resulting in a
North Korean declaration of a “quasi-state of war.” The reaction to the
loudspeakers is understandable. When speaking on the psychology of information
penetration, South Korean President Park Geun-hye noted that it has been the
reason former DPRK soldiers have defected to the South. It is critical that the
North Korean public moves against their government during collapse or regime
change, and information penetration will be a necessary condition in this
effort.

Lastly, the
United States and its allies need to seriously and publicly begin discussions
on preparations for a regime change or collapse in the North, as well as the
resulting unification. This requires a strategy of setting up an interim
government by South Korea that also includes the interests of the North
Koreans, feeding and housing displaced persons, securing the borders, locating
and securing nuclear weapons, missiles and other arms, trauma centers for
psychological care, and medical treatment for the many cases of tuberculosis in
the country.

Planning for a
regime change in North Korea will be a long, expensive, and politically
challenging and sensitive endeavor. The implementation of the four-pronged
approach will give the U.S. and its allies a structured approach for moving
forward. Unification is no longer a question of “if,” but “when,” and this
result is worth realizing. It has been forecasted that South Korea could
benefit economically from accessing the North’s relatively younger labor
market, raw materials, and trade channels to China’s northern provinces. The
security climate will stabilize, with nuclear threats and rogue missile tests a
thing of the past and existing stockpiles placed under the control of the U.S.
and its allies. Furthermore, The United States, South Korea, and Japan will
gain a significant diplomatic victory. But most importantly, 25 million human
beings will be freed from a regime whose physical and mental bonds have
tormented their country for sixty-five years.