Protagoras

Plato

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Table of Contents

Introduction.

The Protagoras, like several of the Dialogues of Plato, is put into the mouth of Socrates, who describes a
conversation which had taken place between himself and the great Sophist at the house of Callias —‘the man who had
spent more upon the Sophists than all the rest of the world’— and in which the learned Hippias and the grammarian
Prodicus had also shared, as well as Alcibiades and Critias, both of whom said a few words — in the presence of a
distinguished company consisting of disciples of Protagoras and of leading Athenians belonging to the Socratic circle.
The dialogue commences with a request on the part of Hippocrates that Socrates would introduce him to the celebrated
teacher. He has come before the dawn had risen — so fervid is his zeal. Socrates moderates his excitement and advises
him to find out ‘what Protagoras will make of him,’ before he becomes his pupil.

They go together to the house of Callias; and Socrates, after explaining the purpose of their visit to Protagoras,
asks the question, ‘What he will make of Hippocrates.’ Protagoras answers, ‘That he will make him a better and a wiser
man.’ ‘But in what will he be better?’— Socrates desires to have a more precise answer. Protagoras replies, ‘That he
will teach him prudence in affairs private and public; in short, the science or knowledge of human life.’

This, as Socrates admits, is a noble profession; but he is or rather would have been doubtful, whether such
knowledge can be taught, if Protagoras had not assured him of the fact, for two reasons: (1) Because the Athenian
people, who recognize in their assemblies the distinction between the skilled and the unskilled in the arts, do not
distinguish between the trained politician and the untrained; (2) Because the wisest and best Athenian citizens do not
teach their sons political virtue. Will Protagoras answer these objections?

Protagoras explains his views in the form of an apologue, in which, after Prometheus had given men the arts, Zeus is
represented as sending Hermes to them, bearing with him Justice and Reverence. These are not, like the arts, to be
imparted to a few only, but all men are to be partakers of them. Therefore the Athenian people are right in
distinguishing between the skilled and unskilled in the arts, and not between skilled and unskilled politicians. (1)
For all men have the political virtues to a certain degree, and are obliged to say that they have them, whether they
have them or not. A man would be thought a madman who professed an art which he did not know; but he would be equally
thought a madman if he did not profess a virtue which he had not. (2) And that the political virtues can be taught and
acquired, in the opinion of the Athenians, is proved by the fact that they punish evil-doers, with a view to
prevention, of course — mere retribution is for beasts, and not for men. (3) Again, would parents who teach her sons
lesser matters leave them ignorant of the common duty of citizens? To the doubt of Socrates the best answer is the
fact, that the education of youth in virtue begins almost as soon as they can speak, and is continued by the state when
they pass out of the parental control. (4) Nor need we wonder that wise and good fathers sometimes have foolish and
worthless sons. Virtue, as we were saying, is not the private possession of any man, but is shared by all, only however
to the extent of which each individual is by nature capable. And, as a matter of fact, even the worst of civilized
mankind will appear virtuous and just, if we compare them with savages. (5) The error of Socrates lies in supposing
that there are no teachers of virtue, whereas all men are teachers in a degree. Some, like Protagoras, are better than
others, and with this result we ought to be satisfied.

Socrates is highly delighted with the explanation of Protagoras. But he has still a doubt lingering in his mind.
Protagoras has spoken of the virtues: are they many, or one? are they parts of a whole, or different names of the same
thing? Protagoras replies that they are parts, like the parts of a face, which have their several functions, and no one
part is like any other part. This admission, which has been somewhat hastily made, is now taken up and cross-examined
by Socrates:—

‘Is justice just, and is holiness holy? And are justice and holiness opposed to one another?’—‘Then justice is
unholy.’ Protagoras would rather say that justice is different from holiness, and yet in a certain point of view nearly
the same. He does not, however, escape in this way from the cunning of Socrates, who inveigles him into an admission
that everything has but one opposite. Folly, for example, is opposed to wisdom; and folly is also opposed to
temperance; and therefore temperance and wisdom are the same. And holiness has been already admitted to be nearly the
same as justice. Temperance, therefore, has now to be compared with justice.

Protagoras, whose temper begins to get a little ruffled at the process to which he has been subjected, is aware that
he will soon be compelled by the dialectics of Socrates to admit that the temperate is the just. He therefore defends
himself with his favourite weapon; that is to say, he makes a long speech not much to the point, which elicits the
applause of the audience.

Here occurs a sort of interlude, which commences with a declaration on the part of Socrates that he cannot follow a
long speech, and therefore he must beg Protagoras to speak shorter. As Protagoras declines to accommodate him, he rises
to depart, but is detained by Callias, who thinks him unreasonable in not allowing Protagoras the liberty which he
takes himself of speaking as he likes. But Alcibiades answers that the two cases are not parallel. For Socrates admits
his inability to speak long; will Protagoras in like manner acknowledge his inability to speak short?

Counsels of moderation are urged first in a few words by Critias, and then by Prodicus in balanced and sententious
language: and Hippias proposes an umpire. But who is to be the umpire? rejoins Socrates; he would rather suggest as a
compromise that Protagoras shall ask and he will answer, and that when Protagoras is tired of asking he himself will
ask and Protagoras shall answer. To this the latter yields a reluctant assent.

Protagoras selects as his thesis a poem of Simonides of Ceos, in which he professes to find a contradiction. First
the poet says,

‘Hard is it to become good,’

and then reproaches Pittacus for having said, ‘Hard is it to be good.’ How is this to be reconciled? Socrates, who
is familiar with the poem, is embarrassed at first, and invokes the aid of Prodicus, the countryman of Simonides, but
apparently only with the intention of flattering him into absurdities. First a distinction is drawn between (Greek) to
be, and (Greek) to become: to become good is difficult; to be good is easy. Then the word difficult or hard is
explained to mean ‘evil’ in the Cean dialect. To all this Prodicus assents; but when Protagoras reclaims, Socrates
slily withdraws Prodicus from the fray, under the pretence that his assent was only intended to test the wits of his
adversary. He then proceeds to give another and more elaborate explanation of the whole passage. The explanation is as
follows:—

The Lacedaemonians are great philosophers (although this is a fact which is not generally known); and the soul of
their philosophy is brevity, which was also the style of primitive antiquity and of the seven sages. Now Pittacus had a
saying, ‘Hard is it to be good:’ and Simonides, who was jealous of the fame of this saying, wrote a poem which was
designed to controvert it. No, says he, Pittacus; not ‘hard to be good,’ but ‘hard to become good.’ Socrates proceeds
to argue in a highly impressive manner that the whole composition is intended as an attack upon Pittacus. This, though
manifestly absurd, is accepted by the company, and meets with the special approval of Hippias, who has however a
favourite interpretation of his own, which he is requested by Alcibiades to defer.

The argument is now resumed, not without some disdainful remarks of Socrates on the practice of introducing the
poets, who ought not to be allowed, any more than flute-girls, to come into good society. Men’s own thoughts should
supply them with the materials for discussion. A few soothing flatteries are addressed to Protagoras by Callias and
Socrates, and then the old question is repeated, ‘Whether the virtues are one or many?’ To which Protagoras is now
disposed to reply, that four out of the five virtues are in some degree similar; but he still contends that the fifth,
courage, is unlike the rest. Socrates proceeds to undermine the last stronghold of the adversary, first obtaining from
him the admission that all virtue is in the highest degree good:—

The courageous are the confident; and the confident are those who know their business or profession: those who have
no such knowledge and are still confident are madmen. This is admitted. Then, says Socrates, courage is knowledge — an
inference which Protagoras evades by drawing a futile distinction between the courageous and the confident in a fluent
speech.

Socrates renews the attack from another side: he would like to know whether pleasure is not the only good, and pain
the only evil? Protagoras seems to doubt the morality or propriety of assenting to this; he would rather say that ‘some
pleasures are good, some pains are evil,’ which is also the opinion of the generality of mankind. What does he think of
knowledge? Does he agree with the common opinion that knowledge is overcome by passion? or does he hold that knowledge
is power? Protagoras agrees that knowledge is certainly a governing power.

This, however, is not the doctrine of men in general, who maintain that many who know what is best, act contrary to
their knowledge under the influence of pleasure. But this opposition of good and evil is really the opposition of a
greater or lesser amount of pleasure. Pleasures are evils because they end in pain, and pains are goods because they
end in pleasures. Thus pleasure is seen to be the only good; and the only evil is the preference of the lesser pleasure
to the greater. But then comes in the illusion of distance. Some art of mensuration is required in order to show us
pleasures and pains in their true proportion. This art of mensuration is a kind of knowledge, and knowledge is thus
proved once more to be the governing principle of human life, and ignorance the origin of all evil: for no one prefers
the less pleasure to the greater, or the greater pain to the less, except from ignorance. The argument is drawn out in
an imaginary ‘dialogue within a dialogue,’ conducted by Socrates and Protagoras on the one part, and the rest of the
world on the other. Hippias and Prodicus, as well as Protagoras, admit the soundness of the conclusion.

Socrates then applies this new conclusion to the case of courage — the only virtue which still holds out against the
assaults of the Socratic dialectic. No one chooses the evil or refuses the good except through ignorance. This explains
why cowards refuse to go to war:— because they form a wrong estimate of good, and honour, and pleasure. And why are the
courageous willing to go to war? — because they form a right estimate of pleasures and pains, of things terrible and
not terrible. Courage then is knowledge, and cowardice is ignorance. And the five virtues, which were originally
maintained to have five different natures, after having been easily reduced to two only, at last coalesce in one. The
assent of Protagoras to this last position is extracted with great difficulty.

Socrates concludes by professing his disinterested love of the truth, and remarks on the singular manner in which he
and his adversary had changed sides. Protagoras began by asserting, and Socrates by denying, the teachableness of
virtue, and now the latter ends by affirming that virtue is knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things, while
Protagoras has been striving to show that virtue is not knowledge, and this is almost equivalent to saying that virtue
cannot be taught. He is not satisfied with the result, and would like to renew the enquiry with the help of Protagoras
in a different order, asking (1) What virtue is, and (2) Whether virtue can be taught. Protagoras declines this offer,
but commends Socrates’ earnestness and his style of discussion.

The Protagoras is often supposed to be full of difficulties. These are partly imaginary and partly real. The
imaginary ones are (1) Chronological — which were pointed out in ancient times by Athenaeus, and are noticed by
Schleiermacher and others, and relate to the impossibility of all the persons in the Dialogue meeting at any one time,
whether in the year 425 B.C., or in any other. But Plato, like all writers of fiction, aims only at the probable, and
shows in many Dialogues (e.g. the Symposium and Republic, and already in the Laches) an extreme disregard of the
historical accuracy which is sometimes demanded of him. (2) The exact place of the Protagoras among the Dialogues, and
the date of composition, have also been much disputed. But there are no criteria which afford any real grounds for
determining the date of composition; and the affinities of the Dialogues, when they are not indicated by Plato himself,
must always to a great extent remain uncertain. (3) There is another class of difficulties, which may be ascribed to
preconceived notions of commentators, who imagine that Protagoras the Sophist ought always to be in the wrong, and his
adversary Socrates in the right; or that in this or that passage — e.g. in the explanation of good as pleasure — Plato
is inconsistent with himself; or that the Dialogue fails in unity, and has not a proper beginning, middle, and ending.
They seem to forget that Plato is a dramatic writer who throws his thoughts into both sides of the argument, and
certainly does not aim at any unity which is inconsistent with freedom, and with a natural or even wild manner of
treating his subject; also that his mode of revealing the truth is by lights and shadows, and far-off and opposing
points of view, and not by dogmatic statements or definite results.

The real difficulties arise out of the extreme subtlety of the work, which, as Socrates says of the poem of
Simonides, is a most perfect piece of art. There are dramatic contrasts and interests, threads of philosophy broken and
resumed, satirical reflections on mankind, veils thrown over truths which are lightly suggested, and all woven together
in a single design, and moving towards one end.

In the introductory scene Plato raises the expectation that a ‘great personage’ is about to appear on the stage;
perhaps with a further view of showing that he is destined to be overthrown by a greater still, who makes no
pretensions. Before introducing Hippocrates to him, Socrates thinks proper to warn the youth against the dangers of
‘influence,’ of which the invidious nature is recognized by Protagoras himself. Hippocrates readily adopts the
suggestion of Socrates that he shall learn of Protagoras only the accomplishments which befit an Athenian gentleman,
and let alone his ‘sophistry.’ There is nothing however in the introduction which leads to the inference that Plato
intended to blacken the character of the Sophists; he only makes a little merry at their expense.

The ‘great personage’ is somewhat ostentatious, but frank and honest. He is introduced on a stage which is worthy of
him — at the house of the rich Callias, in which are congregated the noblest and wisest of the Athenians. He considers
openness to be the best policy, and particularly mentions his own liberal mode of dealing with his pupils, as if in
answer to the favourite accusation of the Sophists that they received pay. He is remarkable for the good temper which
he exhibits throughout the discussion under the trying and often sophistical cross-examination of Socrates. Although
once or twice ruffled, and reluctant to continue the discussion, he parts company on perfectly good terms, and appears
to be, as he says of himself, the ‘least jealous of mankind.’

Nor is there anything in the sentiments of Protagoras which impairs this pleasing impression of the grave and
weighty old man. His real defect is that he is inferior to Socrates in dialectics. The opposition between him and
Socrates is not the opposition of good and bad, true and false, but of the old art of rhetoric and the new science of
interrogation and argument; also of the irony of Socrates and the self-assertion of the Sophists. There is quite as
much truth on the side of Protagoras as of Socrates; but the truth of Protagoras is based on common sense and common
maxims of morality, while that of Socrates is paradoxical or transcendental, and though full of meaning and insight,
hardly intelligible to the rest of mankind. Here as elsewhere is the usual contrast between the Sophists representing
average public opinion and Socrates seeking for increased clearness and unity of ideas. But to a great extent
Protagoras has the best of the argument and represents the better mind of man.

For example: (1) one of the noblest statements to be found in antiquity about the preventive nature of punishment is
put into his mouth; (2) he is clearly right also in maintaining that virtue can be taught (which Socrates himself, at
the end of the Dialogue, is disposed to concede); and also (3) in his explanation of the phenomenon that good fathers
have bad sons; (4) he is right also in observing that the virtues are not like the arts, gifts or attainments of
special individuals, but the common property of all: this, which in all ages has been the strength and weakness of
ethics and politics, is deeply seated in human nature; (5) there is a sort of half- truth in the notion that all
civilized men are teachers of virtue; and more than a half-truth (6) in ascribing to man, who in his outward conditions
is more helpless than the other animals, the power of self-improvement; (7) the religious allegory should be noticed,
in which the arts are said to be given by Prometheus (who stole them), whereas justice and reverence and the political
virtues could only be imparted by Zeus; (8) in the latter part of the Dialogue, when Socrates is arguing that ‘pleasure
is the only good,’ Protagoras deems it more in accordance with his character to maintain that ‘some pleasures only are
good;’ and admits that ‘he, above all other men, is bound to say “that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human
things.”’

There is no reason to suppose that in all this Plato is depicting an imaginary Protagoras; he seems to be showing us
the teaching of the Sophists under the milder aspect under which he once regarded them. Nor is there any reason to
doubt that Socrates is equally an historical character, paradoxical, ironical, tiresome, but seeking for the unity of
virtue and knowledge as for a precious treasure; willing to rest this even on a calculation of pleasure, and
irresistible here, as everywhere in Plato, in his intellectual superiority.

The aim of Socrates, and of the Dialogue, is to show the unity of virtue. In the determination of this question the
identity of virtue and knowledge is found to be involved. But if virtue and knowledge are one, then virtue can be
taught; the end of the Dialogue returns to the beginning. Had Protagoras been allowed by Plato to make the Aristotelian
distinction, and say that virtue is not knowledge, but is accompanied with knowledge; or to point out with Aristotle
that the same quality may have more than one opposite; or with Plato himself in the Phaedo to deny that good is a mere
exchange of a greater pleasure for a less — the unity of virtue and the identity of virtue and knowledge would have
required to be proved by other arguments.

The victory of Socrates over Protagoras is in every way complete when their minds are fairly brought together.
Protagoras falls before him after two or three blows. Socrates partially gains his object in the first part of the
Dialogue, and completely in the second. Nor does he appear at any disadvantage when subjected to ‘the question’ by
Protagoras. He succeeds in making his two ‘friends,’ Prodicus and Hippias, ludicrous by the way; he also makes a long
speech in defence of the poem of Simonides, after the manner of the Sophists, showing, as Alcibiades says, that he is
only pretending to have a bad memory, and that he and not Protagoras is really a master in the two styles of speaking;
and that he can undertake, not one side of the argument only, but both, when Protagoras begins to break down. Against
the authority of the poets with whom Protagoras has ingeniously identified himself at the commencement of the Dialogue,
Socrates sets up the proverbial philosophers and those masters of brevity the Lacedaemonians. The poets, the
Laconizers, and Protagoras are satirized at the same time.

Not having the whole of this poem before us, it is impossible for us to answer certainly the question of Protagoras,
how the two passages of Simonides are to be reconciled. We can only follow the indications given by Plato himself. But
it seems likely that the reconcilement offered by Socrates is a caricature of the methods of interpretation which were
practised by the Sophists — for the following reasons: (1) The transparent irony of the previous interpretations given
by Socrates. (2) The ludicrous opening of the speech in which the Lacedaemonians are described as the true
philosophers, and Laconic brevity as the true form of philosophy, evidently with an allusion to Protagoras’ long
speeches. (3) The manifest futility and absurdity of the explanation of (Greek), which is hardly consistent with the
rational interpretation of the rest of the poem. The opposition of (Greek) and (Greek) seems also intended to express
the rival doctrines of Socrates and Protagoras, and is a facetious commentary on their differences. (4) The general
treatment in Plato both of the Poets and the Sophists, who are their interpreters, and whom he delights to identify
with them. (5) The depreciating spirit in which Socrates speaks of the introduction of the poets as a substitute for
original conversation, which is intended to contrast with Protagoras’ exaltation of the study of them — this again is
hardly consistent with the serious defence of Simonides. (6) the marked approval of Hippias, who is supposed at once to
catch the familiar sound, just as in the previous conversation Prodicus is represented as ready to accept any
distinctions of language however absurd. At the same time Hippias is desirous of substituting a new interpretation of
his own; as if the words might really be made to mean anything, and were only to be regarded as affording a field for
the ingenuity of the interpreter.

This curious passage is, therefore, to be regarded as Plato’s satire on the tedious and hypercritical arts of
interpretation which prevailed in his own day, and may be compared with his condemnation of the same arts when applied
to mythology in the Phaedrus, and with his other parodies, e.g. with the two first speeches in the Phaedrus and with
the Menexenus. Several lesser touches of satire may be observed, such as the claim of philosophy advanced for the
Lacedaemonians, which is a parody of the claims advanced for the Poets by Protagoras; the mistake of the Laconizing set
in supposing that the Lacedaemonians are a great nation because they bruise their ears; the far-fetched notion, which
is ‘really too bad,’ that Simonides uses the Lesbian (?) word, (Greek), because he is addressing a Lesbian. The whole
may also be considered as a satire on those who spin pompous theories out of nothing. As in the arguments of the
Euthydemus and of the Cratylus, the veil of irony is never withdrawn; and we are left in doubt at last how far in this
interpretation of Simonides Socrates is ‘fooling,’ how far he is in earnest.

All the interests and contrasts of character in a great dramatic work like the Protagoras are not easily exhausted.
The impressiveness of the scene should not be lost upon us, or the gradual substitution of Socrates in the second part
for Protagoras in the first. The characters to whom we are introduced at the beginning of the Dialogue all play a part
more or less conspicuous towards the end. There is Alcibiades, who is compelled by the necessity of his nature to be a
partisan, lending effectual aid to Socrates; there is Critias assuming the tone of impartiality; Callias, here as
always inclining to the Sophists, but eager for any intellectual repast; Prodicus, who finds an opportunity for
displaying his distinctions of language, which are valueless and pedantic, because they are not based on dialectic;
Hippias, who has previously exhibited his superficial knowledge of natural philosophy, to which, as in both the
Dialogues called by his name, he now adds the profession of an interpreter of the Poets. The two latter personages have
been already damaged by the mock heroic description of them in the introduction. It may be remarked that Protagoras is
consistently presented to us throughout as the teacher of moral and political virtue; there is no allusion to the
theories of sensation which are attributed to him in the Theaetetus and elsewhere, or to his denial of the existence of
the gods in a well-known fragment ascribed to him; he is the religious rather than the irreligious teacher in this
Dialogue. Also it may be observed that Socrates shows him as much respect as is consistent with his own ironical
character; he admits that the dialectic which has overthrown Protagoras has carried himself round to a conclusion
opposed to his first thesis. The force of argument, therefore, and not Socrates or Protagoras, has won the day.

But is Socrates serious in maintaining (1) that virtue cannot be taught; (2) that the virtues are one; (3) that
virtue is the knowledge of pleasures and pains present and future? These propositions to us have an appearance of
paradox — they are really moments or aspects of the truth by the help of which we pass from the old conventional
morality to a higher conception of virtue and knowledge. That virtue cannot be taught is a paradox of the same sort as
the profession of Socrates that he knew nothing. Plato means to say that virtue is not brought to a man, but must be
drawn out of him; and cannot be taught by rhetorical discourses or citations from the poets. The second question,
whether the virtues are one or many, though at first sight distinct, is really a part of the same subject; for if the
virtues are to be taught, they must be reducible to a common principle; and this common principle is found to be
knowledge. Here, as Aristotle remarks, Socrates and Plato outstep the truth — they make a part of virtue into the
whole. Further, the nature of this knowledge, which is assumed to be a knowledge of pleasures and pains, appears to us
too superficial and at variance with the spirit of Plato himself. Yet, in this, Plato is only following the historical
Socrates as he is depicted to us in Xenophon’s Memorabilia. Like Socrates, he finds on the surface of human life one
common bond by which the virtues are united — their tendency to produce happiness — though such a principle is
afterwards repudiated by him.

It remains to be considered in what relation the Protagoras stands to the other Dialogues of Plato. That it is one
of the earlier or purely Socratic works — perhaps the last, as it is certainly the greatest of them — is indicated by
the absence of any allusion to the doctrine of reminiscence; and also by the different attitude assumed towards the
teaching and persons of the Sophists in some of the later Dialogues. The Charmides, Laches, Lysis, all touch on the
question of the relation of knowledge to virtue, and may be regarded, if not as preliminary studies or sketches of the
more important work, at any rate as closely connected with it. The Io and the lesser Hippias contain discussions of the
Poets, which offer a parallel to the ironical criticism of Simonides, and are conceived in a similar spirit. The
affinity of the Protagoras to the Meno is more doubtful. For there, although the same question is discussed, ‘whether
virtue can be taught,’ and the relation of Meno to the Sophists is much the same as that of Hippocrates, the answer to
the question is supplied out of the doctrine of ideas; the real Socrates is already passing into the Platonic one. At a
later stage of the Platonic philosophy we shall find that both the paradox and the solution of it appear to have been
retracted. The Phaedo, the Gorgias, and the Philebus offer further corrections of the teaching of the Protagoras; in
all of them the doctrine that virtue is pleasure, or that pleasure is the chief or only good, is distinctly
renounced.

Thus after many preparations and oppositions, both of the characters of men and aspects of the truth, especially of
the popular and philosophical aspect; and after many interruptions and detentions by the way, which, as Theodorus says
in the Theaetetus, are quite as agreeable as the argument, we arrive at the great Socratic thesis that virtue is
knowledge. This is an aspect of the truth which was lost almost as soon as it was found; and yet has to be recovered by
every one for himself who would pass the limits of proverbial and popular philosophy. The moral and intellectual are
always dividing, yet they must be reunited, and in the highest conception of them are inseparable. The thesis of
Socrates is not merely a hasty assumption, but may be also deemed an anticipation of some ‘metaphysic of the future,’
in which the divided elements of human nature are reconciled.

Protagoras

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, who is the narrator of the Dialogue to his Companion. Hippocrates, Alcibiades and
Critias. Protagoras, Hippias and Prodicus (Sophists). Callias, a wealthy Athenian.

SCENE: The House of Callias.

COMPANION: Where do you come from, Socrates? And yet I need hardly ask the question, for I know that you have been
in chase of the fair Alcibiades. I saw him the day before yesterday; and he had got a beard like a man — and he is a
man, as I may tell you in your ear. But I thought that he was still very charming.

SOCRATES: What of his beard? Are you not of Homer’s opinion, who says

‘Youth is most charming when the beard first appears’?

And that is now the charm of Alcibiades.

COMPANION: Well, and how do matters proceed? Have you been visiting him, and was he gracious to you?

SOCRATES: Yes, I thought that he was very gracious; and especially to-day, for I have just come from him, and he has
been helping me in an argument. But shall I tell you a strange thing? I paid no attention to him, and several times I
quite forgot that he was present.

COMPANION: What is the meaning of this? Has anything happened between you and him? For surely you cannot have
discovered a fairer love than he is; certainly not in this city of Athens.

SOCRATES: Yes, much fairer.

COMPANION: What do you mean — a citizen or a foreigner?

SOCRATES: A foreigner.

COMPANION: Of what country?

SOCRATES: Of Abdera.

COMPANION: And is this stranger really in your opinion a fairer love than the son of Cleinias?

SOCRATES: And is not the wiser always the fairer, sweet friend?

COMPANION: But have you really met, Socrates, with some wise one?

SOCRATES: Say rather, with the wisest of all living men, if you are willing to accord that title to Protagoras.

COMPANION: What! Is Protagoras in Athens?

SOCRATES: Yes; he has been here two days.

COMPANION: And do you just come from an interview with him?

SOCRATES: Yes; and I have heard and said many things.

COMPANION: Then, if you have no engagement, suppose that you sit down and tell me what passed, and my attendant here
shall give up his place to you.

SOCRATES: To be sure; and I shall be grateful to you for listening.

COMPANION: Thank you, too, for telling us.

SOCRATES: That is thank you twice over. Listen then:—

Last night, or rather very early this morning, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and the brother of Phason, gave a
tremendous thump with his staff at my door; some one opened to him, and he came rushing in and bawled out: Socrates,
are you awake or asleep?

I knew his voice, and said: Hippocrates, is that you? and do you bring any news?

Good news, he said; nothing but good.

Delightful, I said; but what is the news? and why have you come hither at this unearthly hour?

He drew nearer to me and said: Protagoras is come.

Yes, I replied; he came two days ago: have you only just heard of his arrival?

Yes, by the gods, he said; but not until yesterday evening.

At the same time he felt for the truckle-bed, and sat down at my feet, and then he said: Yesterday quite late in the
evening, on my return from Oenoe whither I had gone in pursuit of my runaway slave Satyrus, as I meant to have told
you, if some other matter had not come in the way; — on my return, when we had done supper and were about to retire to
rest, my brother said to me: Protagoras is come. I was going to you at once, and then I thought that the night was far
spent. But the moment sleep left me after my fatigue, I got up and came hither direct.

I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said: What is the matter? Has Protagoras robbed you of
anything?

He replied, laughing: Yes, indeed he has, Socrates, of the wisdom which he keeps from me.

But, surely, I said, if you give him money, and make friends with him, he will make you as wise as he is
himself.

Would to heaven, he replied, that this were the case! He might take all that I have, and all that my friends have,
if he pleased. But that is why I have come to you now, in order that you may speak to him on my behalf; for I am young,
and also I have never seen nor heard him; (when he visited Athens before I was but a child;) and all men praise him,
Socrates; he is reputed to be the most accomplished of speakers. There is no reason why we should not go to him at
once, and then we shall find him at home. He lodges, as I hear, with Callias the son of Hipponicus: let us start.

I replied: Not yet, my good friend; the hour is too early. But let us rise and take a turn in the court and wait
about there until day-break; when the day breaks, then we will go. For Protagoras is generally at home, and we shall be
sure to find him; never fear.

Upon this we got up and walked about in the court, and I thought that I would make trial of the strength of his
resolution. So I examined him and put questions to him. Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, as you are going to Protagoras,
and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom you are going? and what will he make of you? If, for example,
you had thought of going to Hippocrates of Cos, the Asclepiad, and were about to give him your money, and some one had
said to you: You are paying money to your namesake Hippocrates, O Hippocrates; tell me, what is he that you give him
money? how would you have answered?

I should say, he replied, that I gave money to him as a physician.

And what will he make of you?

A physician, he said.

And if you were resolved to go to Polycleitus the Argive, or Pheidias the Athenian, and were intending to give them
money, and some one had asked you: What are Polycleitus and Pheidias? and why do you give them this money? — how would
you have answered?

I should have answered, that they were statuaries.

And what will they make of you?

A statuary, of course.

Well now, I said, you and I are going to Protagoras, and we are ready to pay him money on your behalf. If our own
means are sufficient, and we can gain him with these, we shall be only too glad; but if not, then we are to spend the
money of your friends as well. Now suppose, that while we are thus enthusiastically pursuing our object some one were
to say to us: Tell me, Socrates, and you Hippocrates, what is Protagoras, and why are you going to pay him money — how
should we answer? I know that Pheidias is a sculptor, and that Homer is a poet; but what appellation is given to
Protagoras? how is he designated?

They call him a Sophist, Socrates, he replied.

Then we are going to pay our money to him in the character of a Sophist?

Certainly.

But suppose a person were to ask this further question: And how about yourself? What will Protagoras make of you, if
you go to see him?

He answered, with a blush upon his face (for the day was just beginning to dawn, so that I could see him): Unless
this differs in some way from the former instances, I suppose that he will make a Sophist of me.

By the gods, I said, and are you not ashamed at having to appear before the Hellenes in the character of a
Sophist?

Indeed, Socrates, to confess the truth, I am.

But you should not assume, Hippocrates, that the instruction of Protagoras is of this nature: may you not learn of
him in the same way that you learned the arts of the grammarian, or musician, or trainer, not with the view of making
any of them a profession, but only as a part of education, and because a private gentleman and freeman ought to know
them?

Just so, he said; and that, in my opinion, is a far truer account of the teaching of Protagoras.

I said: I wonder whether you know what you are doing?

And what am I doing?

You are going to commit your soul to the care of a man whom you call a Sophist. And yet I hardly think that you know
what a Sophist is; and if not, then you do not even know to whom you are committing your soul and whether the thing to
which you commit yourself be good or evil.

I certainly think that I do know, he replied.

Then tell me, what do you imagine that he is?

I take him to be one who knows wise things, he replied, as his name implies.

And might you not, I said, affirm this of the painter and of the carpenter also: Do not they, too, know wise things?
But suppose a person were to ask us: In what are the painters wise? We should answer: In what relates to the making of
likenesses, and similarly of other things. And if he were further to ask: What is the wisdom of the Sophist, and what
is the manufacture over which he presides? — how should we answer him?

How should we answer him, Socrates? What other answer could there be but that he presides over the art which makes
men eloquent?

Yes, I replied, that is very likely true, but not enough; for in the answer a further question is involved: Of what
does the Sophist make a man talk eloquently? The player on the lyre may be supposed to make a man talk eloquently about
that which he makes him understand, that is about playing the lyre. Is not that true?

Yes.

Then about what does the Sophist make him eloquent? Must not he make him eloquent in that which he understands?

Yes, that may be assumed.

And what is that which the Sophist knows and makes his disciple know?

Indeed, he said, I cannot tell.

Then I proceeded to say: Well, but are you aware of the danger which you are incurring? If you were going to commit
your body to some one, who might do good or harm to it, would you not carefully consider and ask the opinion of your
friends and kindred, and deliberate many days as to whether you should give him the care of your body? But when the
soul is in question, which you hold to be of far more value than the body, and upon the good or evil of which depends
the well-being of your all — about this you never consulted either with your father or with your brother or with any
one of us who are your companions. But no sooner does this foreigner appear, than you instantly commit your soul to his
keeping. In the evening, as you say, you hear of him, and in the morning you go to him, never deliberating or taking
the opinion of any one as to whether you ought to intrust yourself to him or not; — you have quite made up your mind
that you will at all hazards be a pupil of Protagoras, and are prepared to expend all the property of yourself and of
your friends in carrying out at any price this determination, although, as you admit, you do not know him, and have
never spoken with him: and you call him a Sophist, but are manifestly ignorant of what a Sophist is; and yet you are
going to commit yourself to his keeping.

When he heard me say this, he replied: No other inference, Socrates, can be drawn from your words.

I proceeded: Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or retail in the food of the soul? To me that
appears to be his nature.

And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul?

Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul; and we must take care, my friend, that the Sophist does not
deceive us when he praises what he sells, like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food of the body; for they
praise indiscriminately all their goods, without knowing what are really beneficial or hurtful: neither do their
customers know, with the exception of any trainer or physician who may happen to buy of them. In like manner those who
carry about the wares of knowledge, and make the round of the cities, and sell or retail them to any customer who is in
want of them, praise them all alike; though I should not wonder, O my friend, if many of them were really ignorant of
their effect upon the soul; and their customers equally ignorant, unless he who buys of them happens to be a physician
of the soul. If, therefore, you have understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely buy knowledge of Protagoras
or of any one; but if not, then, O my friend, pause, and do not hazard your dearest interests at a game of chance. For
there is far greater peril in buying knowledge than in buying meat and drink: the one you purchase of the wholesale or
retail dealer, and carry them away in other vessels, and before you receive them into the body as food, you may deposit
them at home and call in any experienced friend who knows what is good to be eaten or drunken, and what not, and how
much, and when; and then the danger of purchasing them is not so great. But you cannot buy the wares of knowledge and
carry them away in another vessel; when you have paid for them you must receive them into the soul and go your way,
either greatly harmed or greatly benefited; and therefore we should deliberate and take counsel with our elders; for we
are still young — too young to determine such a matter. And now let us go, as we were intending, and hear Protagoras;
and when we have heard what he has to say, we may take counsel of others; for not only is Protagoras at the house of
Callias, but there is Hippias of Elis, and, if I am not mistaken, Prodicus of Ceos, and several other wise men.

To this we agreed, and proceeded on our way until we reached the vestibule of the house; and there we stopped in
order to conclude a discussion which had arisen between us as we were going along; and we stood talking in the
vestibule until we had finished and come to an understanding. And I think that the door-keeper, who was a eunuch, and
who was probably annoyed at the great inroad of the Sophists, must have heard us talking. At any rate, when we knocked
at the door, and he opened and saw us, he grumbled: They are Sophists — he is not at home; and instantly gave the door
a hearty bang with both his hands. Again we knocked, and he answered without opening: Did you not hear me say that he
is not at home, fellows? But, my friend, I said, you need not be alarmed; for we are not Sophists, and we are not come
to see Callias, but we want to see Protagoras; and I must request you to announce us. At last, after a good deal of
difficulty, the man was persuaded to open the door.

When we entered, we found Protagoras taking a walk in the cloister; and next to him, on one side, were walking
Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and Paralus, the son of Pericles, who, by the mother’s side, is his half- brother, and
Charmides, the son of Glaucon. On the other side of him were Xanthippus, the other son of Pericles, Philippides, the
son of Philomelus; also Antimoerus of Mende, who of all the disciples of Protagoras is the most famous, and intends to
make sophistry his profession. A train of listeners followed him; the greater part of them appeared to be foreigners,
whom Protagoras had brought with him out of the various cities visited by him in his journeys, he, like Orpheus,
attracting them his voice, and they following (Compare Rep.). I should mention also that there were some Athenians in
the company. Nothing delighted me more than the precision of their movements: they never got into his way at all; but
when he and those who were with him turned back, then the band of listeners parted regularly on either side; he was
always in front, and they wheeled round and took their places behind him in perfect order.

After him, as Homer says (Od.), ‘I lifted up my eyes and saw’ Hippias the Elean sitting in the opposite cloister on
a chair of state, and around him were seated on benches Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus, and Phaedrus the
Myrrhinusian, and Andron the son of Androtion, and there were strangers whom he had brought with him from his native
city of Elis, and some others: they were putting to Hippias certain physical and astronomical questions, and he, ex
cathedra, was determining their several questions to them, and discoursing of them.

Also, ‘my eyes beheld Tantalus (Od.);’ for Prodicus the Cean was at Athens: he had been lodged in a room which, in
the days of Hipponicus, was a storehouse; but, as the house was full, Callias had cleared this out and made the room
into a guest-chamber. Now Prodicus was still in bed, wrapped up in sheepskins and bedclothes, of which there seemed to
be a great heap; and there was sitting by him on the couches near, Pausanias of the deme of Cerameis, and with
Pausanias was a youth quite young, who is certainly remarkable for his good looks, and, if I am not mistaken, is also
of a fair and gentle nature. I thought that I heard him called Agathon, and my suspicion is that he is the beloved of
Pausanias. There was this youth, and also there were the two Adeimantuses, one the son of Cepis, and the other of
Leucolophides, and some others. I was very anxious to hear what Prodicus was saying, for he seems to me to be an
all-wise and inspired man; but I was not able to get into the inner circle, and his fine deep voice made an echo in the
room which rendered his words inaudible.

No sooner had we entered than there followed us Alcibiades the beautiful, as you say, and I believe you; and also
Critias the son of Callaeschrus.

On entering we stopped a little, in order to look about us, and then walked up to Protagoras, and I said:
Protagoras, my friend Hippocrates and I have come to see you.

Do you wish, he said, to speak with me alone, or in the presence of the company?

Whichever you please, I said; you shall determine when you have heard the purpose of our visit.

And what is your purpose? he said.

I must explain, I said, that my friend Hippocrates is a native Athenian; he is the son of Apollodorus, and of a
great and prosperous house, and he is himself in natural ability quite a match for anybody of his own age. I believe
that he aspires to political eminence; and this he thinks that conversation with you is most likely to procure for him.
And now you can determine whether you would wish to speak to him of your teaching alone or in the presence of the
company.

Thank you, Socrates, for your consideration of me. For certainly a stranger finding his way into great cities, and
persuading the flower of the youth in them to leave company of their kinsmen or any other acquaintances, old or young,
and live with him, under the idea that they will be improved by his conversation, ought to be very cautious; great
jealousies are aroused by his proceedings, and he is the subject of many enmities and conspiracies. Now the art of the
Sophist is, as I believe, of great antiquity; but in ancient times those who practised it, fearing this odium, veiled
and disguised themselves under various names, some under that of poets, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, some, of
hierophants and prophets, as Orpheus and Musaeus, and some, as I observe, even under the name of gymnastic-masters,
like Iccus of Tarentum, or the more recently celebrated Herodicus, now of Selymbria and formerly of Megara, who is a
first-rate Sophist. Your own Agathocles pretended to be a musician, but was really an eminent Sophist; also
Pythocleides the Cean; and there were many others; and all of them, as I was saying, adopted these arts as veils or
disguises because they were afraid of the odium which they would incur. But that is not my way, for I do not believe
that they effected their purpose, which was to deceive the government, who were not blinded by them; and as to the
people, they have no understanding, and only repeat what their rulers are pleased to tell them. Now to run away, and to
be caught in running away, is the very height of folly, and also greatly increases the exasperation of mankind; for
they regard him who runs away as a rogue, in addition to any other objections which they have to him; and therefore I
take an entirely opposite course, and acknowledge myself to be a Sophist and instructor of mankind; such an open
acknowledgement appears to me to be a better sort of caution than concealment. Nor do I neglect other precautions, and
therefore I hope, as I may say, by the favour of heaven that no harm will come of the acknowledgment that I am a
Sophist. And I have been now many years in the profession — for all my years when added up are many: there is no one
here present of whom I might not be the father. Wherefore I should much prefer conversing with you, if you want to
speak with me, in the presence of the company.

As I suspected that he would like to have a little display and glorification in the presence of Prodicus and
Hippias, and would gladly show us to them in the light of his admirers, I said: But why should we not summon Prodicus
and Hippias and their friends to hear us?

Very good, he said.

Suppose, said Callias, that we hold a council in which you may sit and discuss. — This was agreed upon, and great
delight was felt at the prospect of hearing wise men talk; we ourselves took the chairs and benches, and arranged them
by Hippias, where the other benches had been already placed. Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades got Prodicus out of bed
and brought in him and his companions.

When we were all seated, Protagoras said: Now that the company are assembled, Socrates, tell me about the young man
of whom you were just now speaking.

I replied: I will begin again at the same point, Protagoras, and tell you once more the purport of my visit: this is
my friend Hippocrates, who is desirous of making your acquaintance; he would like to know what will happen to him if he
associates with you. I have no more to say.

Protagoras answered: Young man, if you associate with me, on the very first day you will return home a better man
than you came, and better on the second day than on the first, and better every day than you were on the day
before.

When I heard this, I said: Protagoras, I do not at all wonder at hearing you say this; even at your age, and with
all your wisdom, if any one were to teach you what you did not know before, you would become better no doubt: but
please to answer in a different way — I will explain how by an example. Let me suppose that Hippocrates, instead of
desiring your acquaintance, wished to become acquainted with the young man Zeuxippus of Heraclea, who has lately been
in Athens, and he had come to him as he has come to you, and had heard him say, as he has heard you say, that every day
he would grow and become better if he associated with him: and then suppose that he were to ask him, ‘In what shall I
become better, and in what shall I grow?’— Zeuxippus would answer, ‘In painting.’ And suppose that he went to
Orthagoras the Theban, and heard him say the same thing, and asked him, ‘In what shall I become better day by day?’ he
would reply, ‘In flute-playing.’ Now I want you to make the same sort of answer to this young man and to me, who am
asking questions on his account. When you say that on the first day on which he associates with you he will return home
a better man, and on every day will grow in like manner — in what, Protagoras, will he be better? and about what?

When Protagoras heard me say this, he replied: You ask questions fairly, and I like to answer a question which is
fairly put. If Hippocrates comes to me he will not experience the sort of drudgery with which other Sophists are in the
habit of insulting their pupils; who, when they have just escaped from the arts, are taken and driven back into them by
these teachers, and made to learn calculation, and astronomy, and geometry, and music (he gave a look at Hippias as he
said this); but if he comes to me, he will learn that which he comes to learn. And this is prudence in affairs private
as well as public; he will learn to order his own house in the best manner, and he will be able to speak and act for
the best in the affairs of the state.

Do I understand you, I said; and is your meaning that you teach the art of politics, and that you promise to make
men good citizens?

That, Socrates, is exactly the profession which I make.

Then, I said, you do indeed possess a noble art, if there is no mistake about this; for I will freely confess to
you, Protagoras, that I have a doubt whether this art is capable of being taught, and yet I know not how to disbelieve
your assertion. And I ought to tell you why I am of opinion that this art cannot be taught or communicated by man to
man. I say that the Athenians are an understanding people, and indeed they are esteemed to be such by the other
Hellenes. Now I observe that when we are met together in the assembly, and the matter in hand relates to building, the
builders are summoned as advisers; when the question is one of ship-building, then the ship-wrights; and the like of
other arts which they think capable of being taught and learned. And if some person offers to give them advice who is
not supposed by them to have any skill in the art, even though he be good-looking, and rich, and noble, they will not
listen to him, but laugh and hoot at him, until either he is clamoured down and retires of himself; or if he persist,
he is dragged away or put out by the constables at the command of the prytanes. This is their way of behaving about
professors of the arts. But when the question is an affair of state, then everybody is free to have a say — carpenter,
tinker, cobbler, sailor, passenger; rich and poor, high and low — any one who likes gets up, and no one reproaches him,
as in the former case, with not having learned, and having no teacher, and yet giving advice; evidently because they
are under the impression that this sort of knowledge cannot be taught. And not only is this true of the state, but of
individuals; the best and wisest of our citizens are unable to impart their political wisdom to others: as for example,
Pericles, the father of these young men, who gave them excellent instruction in all that could be learned from masters,
in his own department of politics neither taught them, nor gave them teachers; but they were allowed to wander at their
own free will in a sort of hope that they would light upon virtue of their own accord. Or take another example: there
was Cleinias the younger brother of our friend Alcibiades, of whom this very same Pericles was the guardian; and he
being in fact under the apprehension that Cleinias would be corrupted by Alcibiades, took him away, and placed him in
the house of Ariphron to be educated; but before six months had elapsed, Ariphron sent him back, not knowing what to do
with him. And I could mention numberless other instances of persons who were good themselves, and never yet made any
one else good, whether friend or stranger. Now I, Protagoras, having these examples before me, am inclined to think
that virtue cannot be taught. But then again, when I listen to your words, I waver; and am disposed to think that there
must be something in what you say, because I know that you have great experience, and learning, and invention. And I
wish that you would, if possible, show me a little more clearly that virtue can be taught. Will you be so good?

That I will, Socrates, and gladly. But what would you like? Shall I, as an elder, speak to you as younger men in an
apologue or myth, or shall I argue out the question?

To this several of the company answered that he should choose for himself.

Well, then, he said, I think that the myth will be more interesting.

Once upon a time there were gods only, and no mortal creatures. But when the time came that these also should be
created, the gods fashioned them out of earth and fire and various mixtures of both elements in the interior of the
earth; and when they were about to bring them into the light of day, they ordered Prometheus and Epimetheus to equip
them, and to distribute to them severally their proper qualities. Epimetheus said to Prometheus: ‘Let me distribute,
and do you inspect.’ This was agreed, and Epimetheus made the distribution. There were some to whom he gave strength
without swiftness, while he equipped the weaker with swiftness; some he armed, and others he left unarmed; and devised
for the latter some other means of preservation, making some large, and having their size as a protection, and others
small, whose nature was to fly in the air or burrow in the ground; this was to be their way of escape. Thus did he
compensate them with the view of preventing any race from becoming extinct. And when he had provided against their
destruction by one another, he contrived also a means of protecting them against the seasons of heaven; clothing them
with close hair and thick skins sufficient to defend them against the winter cold and able to resist the summer heat,
so that they might have a natural bed of their own when they wanted to rest; also he furnished them with hoofs and hair
and hard and callous skins under their feet. Then he gave them varieties of food — herb of the soil to some, to others
fruits of trees, and to others roots, and to some again he gave other animals as food. And some he made to have few
young ones, while those who were their prey were very prolific; and in this manner the race was preserved. Thus did
Epimetheus, who, not being very wise, forgot that he had distributed among the brute animals all the qualities which he
had to give — and when he came to man, who was still unprovided, he was terribly perplexed. Now while he was in this
perplexity, Prometheus came to inspect the distribution, and he found that the other animals were suitably furnished,
but that man alone was naked and shoeless, and had neither bed nor arms of defence. The appointed hour was approaching
when man in his turn was to go forth into the light of day; and Prometheus, not knowing how he could devise his
salvation, stole the mechanical arts of Hephaestus and Athene, and fire with them (they could neither have been
acquired nor used without fire), and gave them to man. Thus man had the wisdom necessary to the support of life, but
political wisdom he had not; for that was in the keeping of Zeus, and the power of Prometheus did not extend to
entering into the citadel of heaven, where Zeus dwelt, who moreover had terrible sentinels; but he did enter by stealth
into the common workshop of Athene and Hephaestus, in which they used to practise their favourite arts, and carried off
Hephaestus’ art of working by fire, and also the art of Athene, and gave them to man. And in this way man was supplied
with the means of life. But Prometheus is said to have been afterwards prosecuted for theft, owing to the blunder of
Epimetheus.

Now man, having a share of the divine attributes, was at first the only one of the animals who had any gods, because
he alone was of their kindred; and he would raise altars and images of them. He was not long in inventing articulate
speech and names; and he also constructed houses and clothes and shoes and beds, and drew sustenance from the earth.
Thus provided, mankind at first lived dispersed, and there were no cities. But the consequence was that they were
destroyed by the wild beasts, for they were utterly weak in comparison of them, and their art was only sufficient to
provide them with the means of life, and did not enable them to carry on war against the animals: food they had, but
not as yet the art of government, of which the art of war is a part. After a while the desire of self-preservation
gathered them into cities; but when they were gathered together, having no art of government, they evil intreated one
another, and were again in process of dispersion and destruction. Zeus feared that the entire race would be
exterminated, and so he sent Hermes to them, bearing reverence and justice to be the ordering principles of cities and
the bonds of friendship and conciliation. Hermes asked Zeus how he should impart justice and reverence among men:—
Should he distribute them as the arts are distributed; that is to say, to a favoured few only, one skilled individual
having enough of medicine or of any other art for many unskilled ones? ‘Shall this be the manner in which I am to
distribute justice and reverence among men, or shall I give them to all?’ ‘To all,’ said Zeus; ‘I should like them all
to have a share; for cities cannot exist, if a few only share in the virtues, as in the arts. And further, make a law
by my order, that he who has no part in reverence and justice shall be put to death, for he is a plague of the
state.’

And this is the reason, Socrates, why the Athenians and mankind in general, when the question relates to
carpentering or any other mechanical art, allow but a few to share in their deliberations; and when any one else
interferes, then, as you say, they object, if he be not of the favoured few; which, as I reply, is very natural. But
when they meet to deliberate about political virtue, which proceeds only by way of justice and wisdom, they are patient
enough of any man who speaks of them, as is also natural, because they think that every man ought to share in this sort
of virtue, and that states could not exist if this were otherwise. I have explained to you, Socrates, the reason of
this phenomenon.

And that you may not suppose yourself to be deceived in thinking that all men regard every man as having a share of
justice or honesty and of every other political virtue, let me give you a further proof, which is this. In other cases,
as you are aware, if a man says that he is a good flute- player, or skilful in any other art in which he has no skill,
people either laugh at him or are angry with him, and his relations think that he is mad and go and admonish him; but
when honesty is in question, or some other political virtue, even if they know that he is dishonest, yet, if the man
comes publicly forward and tells the truth about his dishonesty, then, what in the other case was held by them to be
good sense, they now deem to be madness. They say that all men ought to profess honesty whether they are honest or not,
and that a man is out of his mind who says anything else. Their notion is, that a man must have some degree of honesty;
and that if he has none at all he ought not to be in the world.

I have been showing that they are right in admitting every man as a counsellor about this sort of virtue, as they
are of opinion that every man is a partaker of it. And I will now endeavour to show further that they do not conceive
this virtue to be given by nature, or to grow spontaneously, but to be a thing which may be taught; and which comes to
a man by taking pains. No one would instruct, no one would rebuke, or be angry with those whose calamities they suppose
to be due to nature or chance; they do not try to punish or to prevent them from being what they are; they do but pity
them. Who is so foolish as to chastise or instruct the ugly, or the diminutive, or the feeble? And for this reason.
Because he knows that good and evil of this kind is the work of nature and of chance; whereas if a man is wanting in
those good qualities which are attained by study and exercise and teaching, and has only the contrary evil qualities,
other men are angry with him, and punish and reprove him — of these evil qualities one is impiety, another injustice,
and they may be described generally as the very opposite of political virtue. In such cases any man will be angry with
another, and reprimand him — clearly because he thinks that by study and learning, the virtue in which the other is
deficient may be acquired. If you will think, Socrates, of the nature of punishment, you will see at once that in the
opinion of mankind virtue may be acquired; no one punishes the evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he
has done wrong, — only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But he who desires to inflict rational
punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous
that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for the
sake of prevention, thereby clearly implying that virtue is capable of being taught. This is the notion of all who
retaliate upon others either privately or publicly. And the Athenians, too, your own citizens, like other men, punish
and take vengeance on all whom they regard as evil doers; and hence, we may infer them to be of the number of those who
think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Thus far, Socrates, I have shown you clearly enough, if I am not
mistaken, that your countrymen are right in admitting the tinker and the cobbler to advise about politics, and also
that they deem virtue to be capable of being taught and acquired.

There yet remains one difficulty which has been raised by you about the sons of good men. What is the reason why
good men teach their sons the knowledge which is gained from teachers, and make them wise in that, but do nothing
towards improving them in the virtues which distinguish themselves? And here, Socrates, I will leave the apologue and
resume the argument. Please to consider: Is there or is there not some one quality of which all the citizens must be
partakers, if there is to be a city at all? In the answer to this question is contained the only solution of your
difficulty; there is no other. For if there be any such quality, and this quality or unity is not the art of the
carpenter, or the smith, or the potter, but justice and temperance and holiness and, in a word, manly virtue — if this
is the quality of which all men must be partakers, and which is the very condition of their learning or doing anything
else, and if he who is wanting in this, whether he be a child only or a grown-up man or woman, must be taught and
punished, until by punishment he becomes better, and he who rebels against instruction and punishment is either exiled
or condemned to death under the idea that he is incurable — if what I am saying be true, good men have their sons
taught other things and not this, do consider how extraordinary their conduct would appear to be. For we have shown
that they think virtue capable of being taught and cultivated both in private and public; and, notwithstanding, they
have their sons taught lesser matters, ignorance of which does not involve the punishment of death: but greater things,
of which the ignorance may cause death and exile to those who have no training or knowledge of them — aye, and
confiscation as well as death, and, in a word, may be the ruin of families — those things, I say, they are supposed not
to teach them — not to take the utmost care that they should learn. How improbable is this, Socrates!

Education and admonition commence in the first years of childhood, and last to the very end of life. Mother and
nurse and father and tutor are vying with one another about the improvement of the child as soon as ever he is able to
understand what is being said to him: he cannot say or do anything without their setting forth to him that this is just
and that is unjust; this is honourable, that is dishonourable; this is holy, that is unholy; do this and abstain from
that. And if he obeys, well and good; if not, he is straightened by threats and blows, like a piece of bent or warped
wood. At a later stage they send him to teachers, and enjoin them to see to his manners even more than to his reading
and music; and the teachers do as they are desired. And when the boy has learned his letters and is beginning to
understand what is written, as before he understood only what was spoken, they put into his hands the works of great
poets, which he reads sitting on a bench at school; in these are contained many admonitions, and many tales, and
praises, and encomia of ancient famous men, which he is required to learn by heart, in order that he may imitate or
emulate them and desire to become like them. Then, again, the teachers of the lyre take similar care that their young
disciple is temperate and gets into no mischief; and when they have taught him the use of the lyre, they introduce him
to the poems of other excellent poets, who are the lyric poets; and these they set to music, and make their harmonies
and rhythms quite familiar to the children’s souls, in order that they may learn to be more gentle, and harmonious, and
rhythmical, and so more fitted for speech and action; for the life of man in every part has need of harmony and rhythm.
Then they send them to the master of gymnastic, in order that their bodies may better minister to the virtuous mind,
and that they may not be compelled through bodily weakness to play the coward in war or on any other occasion. This is
what is done by those who have the means, and those who have the means are the rich; their children begin to go to
school soonest and leave off latest. When they have done with masters, the state again compels them to learn the laws,
and live after the pattern which they furnish, and not after their own fancies; and just as in learning to write, the
writing-master first draws lines with a style for the use of the young beginner, and gives him the tablet and makes him
follow the lines, so the city draws the laws, which were the invention of good lawgivers living in the olden time;
these are given to the young man, in order to guide him in his conduct whether he is commanding or obeying; and he who
transgresses them is to be corrected, or, in other words, called to account, which is a term used not only in your
country, but also in many others, seeing that justice calls men to account. Now when there is all this care about
virtue private and public, why, Socrates, do you still wonder and doubt whether virtue can be taught? Cease to wonder,
for the opposite would be far more surprising.

But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill? There is nothing very wonderful in this; for, as I have
been saying, the existence of a state implies that virtue is not any man’s private possession. If so — and nothing can
be truer — then I will further ask you to imagine, as an illustration, some other pursuit or branch of knowledge which
may be assumed equally to be the condition of the existence of a state. Suppose that there could be no state unless we
were all flute-players, as far as each had the capacity, and everybody was freely teaching everybody the art, both in
private and public, and reproving the bad player as freely and openly as every man now teaches justice and the laws,
not concealing them as he would conceal the other arts, but imparting them — for all of us have a mutual interest in
the justice and virtue of one another, and this is the reason why every one is so ready to teach justice and the laws;
— suppose, I say, that there were the same readiness and liberality among us in teaching one another flute-playing, do
you imagine, Socrates, that the sons of good flute-players would be more likely to be good than the sons of bad ones? I
think not. Would not their sons grow up to be distinguished or undistinguished according to their own natural
capacities as flute-players, and the son of a good player would often turn out to be a bad one, and the son of a bad
player to be a good one, all flute-players would be good enough in comparison of those who were ignorant and
unacquainted with the art of flute-playing? In like manner I would have you consider that he who appears to you to be
the worst of those who have been brought up in laws and humanities, would appear to be a just man and a master of
justice if he were to be compared with men who had no education, or courts of justice, or laws, or any restraints upon
them which compelled them to practise virtue — with the savages, for example, whom the poet Pherecrates exhibited on
the stage at the last year’s Lenaean festival. If you were living among men such as the man-haters in his Chorus, you
would be only too glad to meet with Eurybates and Phrynondas, and you would sorrowfully long to revisit the rascality
of this part of the world. You, Socrates, are discontented, and why? Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one
according to his ability; and you say Where are the teachers? You might as well ask, Who teaches Greek? For of that too
there will not be any teachers found. Or you might ask, Who is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art which
they have learned of their fathers? He and his fellow-workmen have taught them to the best of their ability — but who
will carry them further in their arts? And you would certainly have a difficulty, Socrates, in finding a teacher of
them; but there would be no difficulty in finding a teacher of those who are wholly ignorant. And this is true of
virtue or of anything else; if a man is better able than we are to promote virtue ever so little, we must be content
with the result. A teacher of this sort I believe myself to be, and above all other men to have the knowledge which
makes a man noble and good; and I give my pupils their money’s-worth, and even more, as they themselves confess. And
therefore I have introduced the following mode of payment:— When a man has been my pupil, if he likes he pays my price,
but there is no compulsion; and if he does not like, he has only to go into a temple and take an oath of the value of
the instructions, and he pays no more than he declares to be their value.

Such is my Apologue, Socrates, and such is the argument by which I endeavour to show that virtue may be taught, and
that this is the opinion of the Athenians. And I have also attempted to show that you are not to wonder at good fathers
having bad sons, or at good sons having bad fathers, of which the sons of Polycleitus afford an example, who are the
companions of our friends here, Paralus and Xanthippus, but are nothing in comparison with their father; and this is
true of the sons of many other artists. As yet I ought not to say the same of Paralus and Xanthippus themselves, for
they are young and there is still hope of them.

Protagoras ended, and in my ear

‘So charming left his voice, that I the while Thought him still speaking; still stood fixed to hear (Borrowed by
Milton, “Paradise Lost”.).’

At length, when the truth dawned upon me, that he had really finished, not without difficulty I began to collect
myself, and looking at Hippocrates, I said to him: O son of Apollodorus, how deeply grateful I am to you for having
brought me hither; I would not have missed the speech of Protagoras for a great deal. For I used to imagine that no
human care could make men good; but I know better now. Yet I have still one very small difficulty which I am sure that
Protagoras will easily explain, as he has already explained so much. If a man were to go and consult Pericles or any of
our great speakers about these matters, he might perhaps hear as fine a discourse; but then when one has a question to
ask of any of them, like books, they can neither answer nor ask; and if any one challenges the least particular of
their speech, they go ringing on in a long harangue, like brazen pots, which when they are struck continue to sound
unless some one puts his hand upon them; whereas our friend Protagoras can not only make a good speech, as he has
already shown, but when he is asked a question he can answer briefly; and when he asks he will wait and hear the
answer; and this is a very rare gift. Now I, Protagoras, want to ask of you a little question, which if you will only
answer, I shall be quite satisfied. You were saying that virtue can be taught; — that I will take upon your authority,
and there is no one to whom I am more ready to trust. But I marvel at one thing about which I should like to have my
mind set at rest. You were speaking of Zeus sending justice and reverence to men; and several times while you were
speaking, justice, and temperance, and holiness, and all these qualities, were described by you as if together they
made up virtue. Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole, of which justice and temperance and
holiness are parts; or whether all these are only the names of one and the same thing: that is the doubt which still
lingers in my mind.

There is no difficulty, Socrates, in answering that the qualities of which you are speaking are the parts of virtue
which is one.

And are they parts, I said, in the same sense in which mouth, nose, and eyes, and ears, are the parts of a face; or
are they like the parts of gold, which differ from the whole and from one another only in being larger or smaller?

I should say that they differed, Socrates, in the first way; they are related to one another as the parts of a face
are related to the whole face.

And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue? Or if a man has one part, must he also have all the
others?

By no means, he said; for many a man is brave and not just, or just and not wise.

You would not deny, then, that courage and wisdom are also parts of virtue?

Most undoubtedly they are, he answered; and wisdom is the noblest of the parts.

And they are all different from one another? I said.

Yes.

And has each of them a distinct function like the parts of the face; — the eye, for example, is not like the ear,
and has not the same functions; and the other parts are none of them like one another, either in their functions, or in
any other way? I want to know whether the comparison holds concerning the parts of virtue. Do they also differ from one
another in themselves and in their functions? For that is clearly what the simile would imply.

Yes, Socrates, you are right in supposing that they differ.

Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or
like holiness?

No, he answered.

Well then, I said, suppose that you and I enquire into their natures. And first, you would agree with me that
justice is of the nature of a thing, would you not? That is my opinion: would it not be yours also?

Mine also, he said.

And suppose that some one were to ask us, saying, ‘O Protagoras, and you, Socrates, what about this thing which you
were calling justice, is it just or unjust?’— and I were to answer, just: would you vote with me or against me?

With you, he said.

Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of the nature of the just: would not you?

Yes, he said.

And suppose that he went on to say: ‘Well now, is there also such a thing as holiness?’— we should answer, ‘Yes,’ if
I am not mistaken?

Yes, he said.

Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing — should we not say so?

He assented.

‘And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy, or of the nature of the unholy?’ I should be angry
at his putting such a question, and should say, ‘Peace, man; nothing can be holy if holiness is not holy.’ What would
you say? Would you not answer in the same way?

Certainly, he said.

And then after this suppose that he came and asked us, ‘What were you saying just now? Perhaps I may not have heard
you rightly, but you seemed to me to be saying that the parts of virtue were not the same as one another.’ I should
reply, ‘You certainly heard that said, but not, as you imagine, by me; for I only asked the question; Protagoras gave
the answer.’ And suppose that he turned to you and said, ‘Is this true, Protagoras? and do you maintain that one part
of virtue is unlike another, and is this your position?’— how would you answer him?

I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said, Socrates.

Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this; and now supposing that he proceeded to say further, ‘Then holiness is
not of the nature of justice, nor justice of the nature of holiness, but of the nature of unholiness; and holiness is
of the nature of the not just, and therefore of the unjust, and the unjust is the unholy’: how shall we answer him? I
should certainly answer him on my own behalf that justice is holy, and that holiness is just; and I would say in like
manner on your behalf also, if you would allow me, that justice is either the same with holiness, or very nearly the
same; and above all I would assert that justice is like holiness and holiness is like justice; and I wish that you
would tell me whether I may be permitted to give this answer on your behalf, and whether you would agree with me.

He replied, I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposition that justice is holy and that holiness is just, for
there appears to me to be a difference between them. But what matter? if you please I please; and let us assume, if you
will I, that justice is holy, and that holiness is just.

Pardon me, I replied; I do not want this ‘if you wish’ or ‘if you will’ sort of conclusion to be proven, but I want
you and me to be proven: I mean to say that the conclusion will be best proven if there be no ‘if.’

Well, he said, I admit that justice bears a resemblance to holiness, for there is always some point of view in which
everything is like every other thing; white is in a certain way like black, and hard is like soft, and the most extreme
opposites have some qualities in common; even the parts of the face which, as we were saying before, are distinct and
have different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar, and one of them is like another of them. And
you may prove that they are like one another on the same principle that all things are like one another; and yet things
which are like in some particular ought not to be called alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular, however
slight, unlike.

And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and holiness have but a small degree of likeness?

Certainly not; any more than I agree with what I understand to be your view.

Well, I said, as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take another of the examples which you mentioned
instead. Do you admit the existence of folly?

I do.

And is not wisdom the very opposite of folly?

That is true, he said.

And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be temperate?

Yes, he said.

And temperance makes them temperate?

Certainly.

And they who do not act rightly act foolishly, and in acting thus are not temperate?

I agree, he said.

Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately?

He assented.

And foolish actions are done by folly, and temperate actions by temperance?

He agreed.

And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and that which is weakly done, by weakness?

He assented.

And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly, and that which is done with slowness, slowly?

He assented again.

And that which is done in the same manner, is done by the same; and that which is done in an opposite manner by the
opposite?

He agreed.

Once more, I said, is there anything beautiful?

Yes.

To which the only opposite is the ugly?

There is no other.

And is there anything good?

There is.

To which the only opposite is the evil?

There is no other.

And there is the acute in sound?

True.

To which the only opposite is the grave?

There is no other, he said, but that.

Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more?

He assented.

Then now, I said, let us recapitulate our admissions. First of all we admitted that everything has one opposite and
not more than one?

We did so.

And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by opposites?

Yes.

And that which was done foolishly, as we further admitted, was done in the opposite way to that which was done
temperately?

Yes.

And that which was done temperately was done by temperance, and that which was done foolishly by folly?

He agreed.

And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites?

Yes.

And one thing is done by temperance, and quite another thing by folly?

Yes.

And in opposite ways?

Certainly.

And therefore by opposites:— then folly is the opposite of temperance?

Clearly.

And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be the opposite of wisdom?

He assented.

And we said that everything has only one opposite?

Yes.

Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce? One says that everything has but one opposite; the
other that wisdom is distinct from temperance, and that both of them are parts of virtue; and that they are not only
distinct, but dissimilar, both in themselves and in their functions, like the parts of a face. Which of these two
assertions shall we renounce? For both of them together are certainly not in harmony; they do not accord or agree: for
how can they be said to agree if everything is assumed to have only one opposite and not more than one, and yet folly,
which is one, has clearly the two opposites — wisdom and temperance? Is not that true, Protagoras? What else would you
say?

He assented, but with great reluctance.

Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same. And
now, Protagoras, I said, we must finish the enquiry, and not faint. Do you think that an unjust man can be temperate in
his injustice?

I should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to acknowledge this, which nevertheless many may be found to assert.

And shall I argue with them or with you? I replied.

I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many first, if you will.

Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you are of their opinion or not. My object is to
test the validity of the argument; and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who answer may both be put on our
trial.

Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the argument was not encouraging; at length, he
consented to answer.

Now then, I said, begin at the beginning and answer me. You think that some men are temperate, and yet unjust?

Yes, he said; let that be admitted.

And temperance is good sense?

Yes.

And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice?

Granted.

If they succeed, I said, or if they do not succeed?

If they succeed.

And you would admit the existence of goods?

Yes.

And is the good that which is expedient for man?

Yes, indeed, he said: and there are some things which may be inexpedient, and yet I call them good.

I thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited; he seemed to be setting himself in an attitude of war.
Seeing this, I minded my business, and gently said:—

When you say, Protagoras, that things inexpedient are good, do you mean inexpedient for man only, or inexpedient
altogether? and do you call the latter good?

Certainly not the last, he replied; for I know of many things — meats, drinks, medicines, and ten thousand other
things, which are inexpedient for man, and some which are expedient; and some which are neither expedient nor
inexpedient for man, but only for horses; and some for oxen only, and some for dogs; and some for no animals, but only
for trees; and some for the roots of trees and not for their branches, as for example, manure, which is a good thing
when laid about the roots of a tree, but utterly destructive if thrown upon the shoots and young branches; or I may
instance olive oil, which is mischievous to all plants, and generally most injurious to the hair of every animal with
the exception of man, but beneficial to human hair and to the human body generally; and even in this application (so
various and changeable is the nature of the benefit), that which is the greatest good to the outward parts of a man, is
a very great evil to his inward parts: and for this reason physicians always forbid their patients the use of oil in
their food, except in very small quantities, just enough to extinguish the disagreeable sensation of smell in meats and
sauces.

When he had given this answer, the company cheered him. And I said: Protagoras, I have a wretched memory, and when
any one makes a long speech to me I never remember what he is talking about. As then, if I had been deaf, and you were
going to converse with me, you would have had to raise your voice; so now, having such a bad memory, I will ask you to
cut your answers shorter, if you would take me with you.

What do you mean? he said: how am I to shorten my answers? shall I make them too short?

Certainly not, I said.

But short enough?

Yes, I said.

Shall I answer what appears to me to be short enough, or what appears to you to be short enough?

I have heard, I said, that you can speak and teach others to speak about the same things at such length that words
never seemed to fail, or with such brevity that no one could use fewer of them. Please therefore, if you talk with me,
to adopt the latter or more compendious method.

Socrates, he replied, many a battle of words have I fought, and if I had followed the method of disputation which my
adversaries desired, as you want me to do, I should have been no better than another, and the name of Protagoras would
have been nowhere.

I saw that he was not satisfied with his previous answers, and that he would not play the part of answerer any more
if he could help; and I considered that there was no call upon me to continue the conversation; so I said: Protagoras,
I do not wish to force the conversation upon you if you had rather not, but when you are willing to argue with me in
such a way that I can follow you, then I will argue with you. Now you, as is said of you by others and as you say of
yourself, are able to have discussions in shorter forms of speech as well as in longer, for you are a master of wisdom;
but I cannot manage these long speeches: I only wish that I could. You, on the other hand, who are capable of either,
ought to speak shorter as I beg you, and then we might converse. But I see that you are disinclined, and as I have an
engagement which will prevent my staying to hear you at greater length (for I have to be in another place), I will
depart; although I should have liked to have heard you.

Thus I spoke, and was rising from my seat, when Callias seized me by the right hand, and in his left hand caught
hold of this old cloak of mine. He said: We cannot let you go, Socrates, for if you leave us there will be an end of
our discussions: I must therefore beg you to remain, as there is nothing in the world that I should like better than to
hear you and Protagoras discourse. Do not deny the company this pleasure.

Now I had got up, and was in the act of departure. Son of Hipponicus, I replied, I have always admired, and do now
heartily applaud and love your philosophical spirit, and I would gladly comply with your request, if I could. But the
truth is that I cannot. And what you ask is as great an impossibility to me, as if you bade me run a race with Crison
of Himera, when in his prime, or with some one of the long or day course runners. To such a request I should reply that
I would fain ask the same of my own legs; but they refuse to comply. And therefore if you want to see Crison and me in
the same stadium, you must bid him slacken his speed to mine, for I cannot run quickly, and he can run slowly. And in
like manner if you want to hear me and Protagoras discoursing, you must ask him to shorten his answers, and keep to the
point, as he did at first; if not, how can there be any discussion? For discussion is one thing, and making an oration
is quite another, in my humble opinion.

But you see, Socrates, said Callias, that Protagoras may fairly claim to speak in his own way, just as you claim to
speak in yours.

Here Alcibiades interposed, and said: That, Callias, is not a true statement of the case. For our friend Socrates
admits that he cannot make a speech — in this he yields the palm to Protagoras: but I should be greatly surprised if he
yielded to any living man in the power of holding and apprehending an argument. Now if Protagoras will make a similar
admission, and confess that he is inferior to Socrates in argumentative skill, that is enough for Socrates; but if he
claims a superiority in argument as well, let him ask and answer — not, when a question is asked, slipping away from
the point, and instead of answering, making a speech at such length that most of his hearers forget the question at
issue (not that Socrates is likely to forget — I will be bound for that, although he may pretend in fun that he has a
bad memory). And Socrates appears to me to be more in the right than Protagoras; that is my view, and every man ought
to say what he thinks.

When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one — Critias, I believe — went on to say: O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias
appears to me to be a partisan of Protagoras: and this led Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take the other side.
But we should not be partisans either of Socrates or of Protagoras; let us rather unite in entreating both of them not
to break up the discussion.

Prodicus added: That, Critias, seems to me to be well said, for those who are present at such discussions ought to
be impartial hearers of both the speakers; remembering, however, that impartiality is not the same as equality, for
both sides should be impartially heard, and yet an equal meed should not be assigned to both of them; but to the wiser
a higher meed should be given, and a lower to the less wise. And I as well as Critias would beg you, Protagoras and
Socrates, to grant our request, which is, that you will argue with one another and not wrangle; for friends argue with
friends out of good-will, but only adversaries and enemies wrangle. And then our meeting will be delightful; for in
this way you, who are the speakers, will be most likely to win esteem, and not praise only, among us who are your
audience; for esteem is a sincere conviction of the hearers’ souls, but praise is often an insincere expression of men
uttering falsehoods contrary to their conviction. And thus we who are the hearers will be gratified and not pleased;
for gratification is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of the body when eating or
experiencing some other bodily delight. Thus spoke Prodicus, and many of the company applauded his words.

Hippias the sage spoke next. He said: All of you who are here present I reckon to be kinsmen and friends and
fellow-citizens, by nature and not by law; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant of mankind,
and often compels us to do many things which are against nature. How great would be the disgrace then, if we, who know
the nature of things, and are the wisest of the Hellenes, and as such are met together in this city, which is the
metropolis of wisdom, and in the greatest and most glorious house of this city, should have nothing to show worthy of
this height of dignity, but should only quarrel with one another like the meanest of mankind! I do pray and advise you,
Protagoras, and you, Socrates, to agree upon a compromise. Let us be your peacemakers. And do not you, Socrates, aim at
this precise and extreme brevity in discourse, if Protagoras objects, but loosen and let go the reins of speech, that
your words may be grander and more becoming to you. Neither do you, Protagoras, go forth on the gale with every sail
set out of sight of land into an ocean of words, but let there be a mean observed by both of you. Do as I say. And let
me also persuade you to choose an arbiter or overseer or president; he will keep watch over your words and will
prescribe their proper length.

This proposal was received by the company with universal approval; Callias said that he would not let me off, and
they begged me to choose an arbiter. But I said that to choose an umpire of discourse would be unseemly; for if the
person chosen was inferior, then the inferior or worse ought not to preside over the better; or if he was equal,
neither would that be well; for he who is our equal will do as we do, and what will be the use of choosing him? And if
you say, ‘Let us have a better then,’— to that I answer that you cannot have any one who is wiser than Protagoras. And
if you choose another who is not really better, and whom you only say is better, to put another over him as though he
were an inferior person would be an unworthy reflection on him; not that, as far as I am concerned, any reflection is
of much consequence to me. Let me tell you then what I will do in order that the conversation and discussion may go on
as you desire. If Protagoras is not disposed to answer, let him ask and I will answer; and I will endeavour to show at
the same time how, as I maintain, he ought to answer: and when I have answered as many questions as he likes to ask,
let him in like manner answer me; and if he seems to be not very ready at answering the precise question asked of him,
you and I will unite in entreating him, as you entreated me, not to spoil the discussion. And this will require no
special arbiter — all of you shall be arbiters.

This was generally approved, and Protagoras, though very much against his will, was obliged to agree that he would
ask questions; and when he had put a sufficient number of them, that he would answer in his turn those which he was
asked in short replies. He began to put his questions as follows:—

I am of opinion, Socrates, he said, that skill in poetry is the principal part of education; and this I conceive to
be the power of knowing what compositions of the poets are correct, and what are not, and how they are to be
distinguished, and of explaining when asked the reason of the difference. And I propose to transfer the question which
you and I have been discussing to the domain of poetry; we will speak as before of virtue, but in reference to a
passage of a poet. Now Simonides says to Scopas the son of Creon the Thessalian:

‘Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good, built four-square in hands and feet and mind, a work without a
flaw.’

Do you know the poem? or shall I repeat the whole?

There is no need, I said; for I am perfectly well acquainted with the ode, — I have made a careful study of it.

Very well, he said. And do you think that the ode is a good composition, and true?

Yes, I said, both good and true.

But if there is a contradiction, can the composition be good or true?

No, not in that case, I replied.

And is there not a contradiction? he asked. Reflect.

Well, my friend, I have reflected.

And does not the poet proceed to say, ‘I do not agree with the word of Pittacus, albeit the utterance of a wise man:
Hardly can a man be good’? Now you will observe that this is said by the same poet.

I know it.

And do you think, he said, that the two sayings are consistent?

Yes, I said, I think so (at the same time I could not help fearing that there might be something in what he said).
And you think otherwise?

Why, he said, how can he be consistent in both? First of all, premising as his own thought, ‘Hardly can a man become
truly good’; and then a little further on in the poem, forgetting, and blaming Pittacus and refusing to agree with him,
when he says, ‘Hardly can a man be good,’ which is the very same thing. And yet when he blames him who says the same
with himself, he blames himself; so that he must be wrong either in his first or his second assertion.

Many of the audience cheered and applauded this. And I felt at first giddy and faint, as if I had received a blow
from the hand of an expert boxer, when I heard his words and the sound of the cheering; and to confess the truth, I
wanted to get time to think what the meaning of the poet really was. So I turned to Prodicus and called him. Prodicus,
I said, Simonides is a countryman of yours, and you ought to come to his aid. I must appeal to you, like the river
Scamander in Homer, who, when beleaguered by Achilles, summons the Simois to aid him, saying:

‘Brother dear, let us both together stay the force of the hero (Il.).’

And I summon you, for I am afraid that Protagoras will make an end of Simonides. Now is the time to rehabilitate
Simonides, by the application of your philosophy of synonyms, which enables you to distinguish ‘will’ and ‘wish,’ and
make other charming distinctions like those which you drew just now. And I should like to know whether you would agree
with me; for I am of opinion that there is no contradiction in the words of Simonides. And first of all I wish that you
would say whether, in your opinion, Prodicus, ‘being’ is the same as ‘becoming.’

Not the same, certainly, replied Prodicus.

Did not Simonides first set forth, as his own view, that ‘Hardly can a man become truly good’?

Quite right, said Prodicus.

And then he blames Pittacus, not, as Protagoras imagines, for repeating that which he says himself, but for saying
something different from himself. Pittacus does not say as Simonides says, that hardly can a man become good, but
hardly can a man be good: and our friend Prodicus would maintain that being, Protagoras, is not the same as becoming;
and if they are not the same, then Simonides is not inconsistent with himself. I dare say that Prodicus and many others
would say, as Hesiod says,

‘On the one hand, hardly can a man become good, For the gods have made virtue the reward of toil, But on the other
hand, when you have climbed the height, Then, to retain virtue, however difficult the acquisition, is easy (Works and
Days).’

Prodicus heard and approved; but Protagoras said: Your correction, Socrates, involves a greater error than is
contained in the sentence which you are correcting.

Alas! I said, Protagoras; then I am a sorry physician, and do but aggravate a disorder which I am seeking to
cure.

Such is the fact, he said.

How so? I asked.

The poet, he replied, could never have made such a mistake as to say that virtue, which in the opinion of all men is
the hardest of all things, can be easily retained.

Well, I said, and how fortunate are we in having Prodicus among us, at the right moment; for he has a wisdom,
Protagoras, which, as I imagine, is more than human and of very ancient date, and may be as old as Simonides or even
older. Learned as you are in many things, you appear to know nothing of this; but I know, for I am a disciple of his.
And now, if I am not mistaken, you do not understand the word ‘hard’ (chalepon) in the sense which Simonides intended;
and I must correct you, as Prodicus corrects me when I use the word ‘awful’ (deinon) as a term of praise. If I say that
Protagoras or any one else is an ‘awfully’ wise man, he asks me if I am not ashamed of calling that which is good
‘awful’; and then he explains to me that the term ‘awful’ is always taken in a bad sense, and that no one speaks of
being ‘awfully’ healthy or wealthy, or of ‘awful’ peace, but of ‘awful’ disease, ‘awful’ war, ‘awful’ poverty, meaning
by the term ‘awful,’ evil. And I think that Simonides and his countrymen the Ceans, when they spoke of ‘hard’ meant
‘evil,’ or something which you do not understand. Let us ask Prodicus, for he ought to be able to answer questions
about the dialect of Simonides. What did he mean, Prodicus, by the term ‘hard’?

Evil, said Prodicus.

And therefore, I said, Prodicus, he blames Pittacus for saying, ‘Hard is the good,’ just as if that were equivalent
to saying, Evil is the good.

Yes, he said, that was certainly his meaning; and he is twitting Pittacus with ignorance of the use of terms, which
in a Lesbian, who has been accustomed to speak a barbarous language, is natural.

Do you hear, Protagoras, I asked, what our friend Prodicus is saying? And have you an answer for him?

You are entirely mistaken, Prodicus, said Protagoras; and I know very well that Simonides in using the word ‘hard’
meant what all of us mean, not evil, but that which is not easy — that which takes a great deal of trouble: of this I
am positive.

I said: I also incline to believe, Protagoras, that this was the meaning of Simonides, of which our friend Prodicus
was very well aware, but he thought that he would make fun, and try if you could maintain your thesis; for that
Simonides could never have meant the other is clearly proved by the context, in which he says that God only has this
gift. Now he cannot surely mean to say that to be good is evil, when he afterwards proceeds to say that God only has
this gift, and that this is the attribute of him and of no other. For if this be his meaning, Prodicus would impute to
Simonides a character of recklessness which is very unlike his countrymen. And I should like to tell you, I said, what
I imagine to be the real meaning of Simonides in this poem, if you will test what, in your way of speaking, would be
called my skill in poetry; or if you would rather, I will be the listener.

To this proposal Protagoras replied: As you please; — and Hippias, Prodicus, and the others told me by all means to
do as I proposed.

Then now, I said, I will endeavour to explain to you my opinion about this poem of Simonides. There is a very
ancient philosophy which is more cultivated in Crete and Lacedaemon than in any other part of Hellas, and there are
more philosophers in those countries than anywhere else in the world. This, however, is a secret which the
Lacedaemonians deny; and they pretend to be ignorant, just because they do not wish to have it thought that they rule
the world by wisdom, like the Sophists of whom Protagoras was speaking, and not by valour of arms; considering that if
the reason of their superiority were disclosed, all men would be practising their wisdom. And this secret of theirs has
never been discovered by the imitators of Lacedaemonian fashions in other cities, who go about with their ears bruised
in imitation of them, and have the caestus bound on their arms, and are always in training, and wear short cloaks; for
they imagine that these are the practices which have enabled the Lacedaemonians to conquer the other Hellenes. Now when
the Lacedaemonians want to unbend and hold free conversation with their wise men, and are no longer satisfied with mere
secret intercourse, they drive out all these laconizers, and any other foreigners who may happen to be in their
country, and they hold a philosophical seance unknown to strangers; and they themselves forbid their young men to go
out into other cities — in this they are like the Cretans — in order that they may not unlearn the lessons which they
have taught them. And in Lacedaemon and Crete not only men but also women have a pride in their high cultivation. And
hereby you may know that I am right in attributing to the Lacedaemonians this excellence in philosophy and speculation:
If a man converses with the most ordinary Lacedaemonian, he will find him seldom good for much in general conversation,
but at any point in the discourse he will be darting out some notable saying, terse and full of meaning, with unerring
aim; and the person with whom he is talking seems to be like a child in his hands. And many of our own age and of
former ages have noted that the true Lacedaemonian type of character has the love of philosophy even stronger than the
love of gymnastics; they are conscious that only a perfectly educated man is capable of uttering such expressions. Such
were Thales of Miletus, and Pittacus of Mitylene, and Bias of Priene, and our own Solon, and Cleobulus the Lindian, and
Myson the Chenian; and seventh in the catalogue of wise men was the Lacedaemonian Chilo. All these were lovers and
emulators and disciples of the culture of the Lacedaemonians, and any one may perceive that their wisdom was of this
character; consisting of short memorable sentences, which they severally uttered. And they met together and dedicated
in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, as the first-fruits of their wisdom, the far-famed inscriptions, which are in all
men’s mouths —‘Know thyself,’ and ‘Nothing too much.’

Why do I say all this? I am explaining that this Lacedaemonian brevity was the style of primitive philosophy. Now
there was a saying of Pittacus which was privately circulated and received the approbation of the wise, ‘Hard is it to
be good.’ And Simonides, who was ambitious of the fame of wisdom, was aware that if he could overthrow this saying,
then, as if he had won a victory over some famous athlete, he would carry off the palm among his contemporaries. And if
I am not mistaken, he composed the entire poem with the secret intention of damaging Pittacus and his saying.

Let us all unite in examining his words, and see whether I am speaking the truth. Simonides must have been a
lunatic, if, in the very first words of the poem, wanting to say only that to become good is hard, he inserted (Greek)
‘on the one hand’ (‘on the one hand to become good is hard’); there would be no reason for the introduction of (Greek),
unless you suppose him to speak with a hostile reference to the words of Pittacus. Pittacus is saying ‘Hard is it to be
good,’ and he, in refutation of this thesis, rejoins that the truly hard thing, Pittacus, is to become good, not
joining ‘truly’ with ‘good,’ but with ‘hard.’ Not, that the hard thing is to be truly good, as though there were some
truly good men, and there were others who were good but not truly good (this would be a very simple observation, and
quite unworthy of Simonides); but you must suppose him to make a trajection of the word ‘truly’ (Greek), construing the
saying of Pittacus thus (and let us imagine Pittacus to be speaking and Simonides answering him): ‘O my friends,’ says
Pittacus, ‘hard is it to be good,’ and Simonides answers, ‘In that, Pittacus, you are mistaken; the difficulty is not
to be good, but on the one hand, to become good, four-square in hands and feet and mind, without a flaw — that is hard
truly.’ This way of reading the passage accounts for the insertion of (Greek) ‘on the one hand,’ and for the position
at the end of the clause of the word ‘truly,’ and all that follows shows this to be the meaning. A great deal might be
said in praise of the details of the poem, which is a charming piece of workmanship, and very finished, but such
minutiae would be tedious. I should like, however, to point out the general intention of the poem, which is certainly
designed in every part to be a refutation of the saying of Pittacus. For he speaks in what follows a little further on
as if he meant to argue that although there is a difficulty in becoming good, yet this is possible for a time, and only
for a time. But having become good, to remain in a good state and be good, as you, Pittacus, affirm, is not possible,
and is not granted to man; God only has this blessing; ‘but man cannot help being bad when the force of circumstances
overpowers him.’ Now whom does the force of circumstance overpower in the command of a vessel? — not the private
individual, for he is always overpowered; and as one who is already prostrate cannot be overthrown, and only he who is
standing upright but not he who is prostrate can be laid prostrate, so the force of circumstances can only overpower
him who, at some time or other, has resources, and not him who is at all times helpless. The descent of a great storm
may make the pilot helpless, or the severity of the season the husbandman or the physician; for the good may become
bad, as another poet witnesses:—

‘The good are sometimes good and sometimes bad.’

But the bad does not become bad; he is always bad. So that when the force of circumstances overpowers the man of
resources and skill and virtue, then he cannot help being bad. And you, Pittacus, are saying, ‘Hard is it to be good.’
Now there is a difficulty in becoming good; and yet this is possible: but to be good is an impossibility —

‘For he who does well is the good man, and he who does ill is the bad.’

But what sort of doing is good in letters? and what sort of doing makes a man good in letters? Clearly the knowing
of them. And what sort of well- doing makes a man a good physician? Clearly the knowledge of the art of healing the
sick. ‘But he who does ill is the bad.’ Now who becomes a bad physician? Clearly he who is in the first place a
physician, and in the second place a good physician; for he may become a bad one also: but none of us unskilled
individuals can by any amount of doing ill become physicians, any more than we can become carpenters or anything of
that sort; and he who by doing ill cannot become a physician at all, clearly cannot become a bad physician. In like
manner the good may become deteriorated by time, or toil, or disease, or other accident (the only real doing ill is to
be deprived of knowledge), but the bad man will never become bad, for he is always bad; and if he were to become bad,
he must previously have been good. Thus the words of the poem tend to show that on the one hand a man cannot be
continuously good, but that he may become good and may also become bad; and again that

‘They are the best for the longest time whom the gods love.’

All this relates to Pittacus, as is further proved by the sequel. For he adds:—

‘Therefore I will not throw away my span of life to no purpose in searching after the impossible, hoping in vain to
find a perfectly faultless man among those who partake of the fruit of the broad-bosomed earth: if I find him, I will
send you word.’

(this is the vehement way in which he pursues his attack upon Pittacus throughout the whole poem):

‘But him who does no evil, voluntarily I praise and love; — not even the gods war against necessity.’

All this has a similar drift, for Simonides was not so ignorant as to say that he praised those who did no evil
voluntarily, as though there were some who did evil voluntarily. For no wise man, as I believe, will allow that any
human being errs voluntarily, or voluntarily does evil and dishonourable actions; but they are very well aware that all
who do evil and dishonourable things do them against their will. And Simonides never says that he praises him who does
no evil voluntarily; the word ‘voluntarily’ applies to himself. For he was under the impression that a good man might
often compel himself to love and praise another, and to be the friend and approver of another; and that there might be
an involuntary love, such as a man might feel to an unnatural father or mother, or country, or the like. Now bad men,
when their parents or country have any defects, look on them with malignant joy, and find fault with them and expose
and denounce them to others, under the idea that the rest of mankind will be less likely to take themselves to task and
accuse them of neglect; and they blame their defects far more than they deserve, in order that the odium which is
necessarily incurred by them may be increased: but the good man dissembles his feelings, and constrains himself to
praise them; and if they have wronged him and he is angry, he pacifies his anger and is reconciled, and compels himself
to love and praise his own flesh and blood. And Simonides, as is probable, considered that he himself had often had to
praise and magnify a tyrant or the like, much against his will, and he also wishes to imply to Pittacus that he does
not censure him because he is censorious.

‘For I am satisfied’ he says, ‘when a man is neither bad nor very stupid; and when he knows justice (which is the
health of states), and is of sound mind, I will find no fault with him, for I am not given to finding fault, and there
are innumerable fools’

(implying that if he delighted in censure he might have abundant opportunity of finding fault).

‘All things are good with which evil is unmingled.’

In these latter words he does not mean to say that all things are good which have no evil in them, as you might say
‘All things are white which have no black in them,’ for that would be ridiculous; but he means to say that he accepts
and finds no fault with the moderate or intermediate state.

(‘I do not hope’ he says, ‘to find a perfectly blameless man among those who partake of the fruits of the
broad-bosomed earth (if I find him, I will send you word); in this sense I praise no man. But he who is moderately
good, and does no evil, is good enough for me, who love and approve every one’)

(and here observe that he uses a Lesbian word, epainemi (approve), because he is addressing Pittacus,

‘Who love and APPROVE every one VOLUNTARILY, who does no evil:’

and that the stop should be put after ‘voluntarily’); ‘but there are some whom I involuntarily praise and love. And
you, Pittacus, I would never have blamed, if you had spoken what was moderately good and true; but I do blame you
because, putting on the appearance of truth, you are speaking falsely about the highest matters.’— And this, I said,
Prodicus and Protagoras, I take to be the meaning of Simonides in this poem.

Hippias said: I think, Socrates, that you have given a very good explanation of the poem; but I have also an
excellent interpretation of my own which I will propound to you, if you will allow me.

Nay, Hippias, said Alcibiades; not now, but at some other time. At present we must abide by the compact which was
made between Socrates and Protagoras, to the effect that as long as Protagoras is willing to ask, Socrates should
answer; or that if he would rather answer, then that Socrates should ask.

I said: I wish Protagoras either to ask or answer as he is inclined; but I would rather have done with poems and
odes, if he does not object, and come back to the question about which I was asking you at first, Protagoras, and by
your help make an end of that. The talk about the poets seems to me like a commonplace entertainment to which a vulgar
company have recourse; who, because they are not able to converse or amuse one another, while they are drinking, with
the sound of their own voices and conversation, by reason of their stupidity, raise the price of flute-girls in the
market, hiring for a great sum the voice of a flute instead of their own breath, to be the medium of intercourse among
them: but where the company are real gentlemen and men of education, you will see no flute-girls, nor dancing- girls,
nor harp-girls; and they have no nonsense or games, but are contented with one another’s conversation, of which their
own voices are the medium, and which they carry on by turns and in an orderly manner, even though they are very liberal
in their potations. And a company like this of ours, and men such as we profess to be, do not require the help of
another’s voice, or of the poets whom you cannot interrogate about the meaning of what they are saying; people who cite
them declaring, some that the poet has one meaning, and others that he has another, and the point which is in dispute
can never be decided. This sort of entertainment they decline, and prefer to talk with one another, and put one another
to the proof in conversation. And these are the models which I desire that you and I should imitate. Leaving the poets,
and keeping to ourselves, let us try the mettle of one another and make proof of the truth in conversation. If you have
a mind to ask, I am ready to answer; or if you would rather, do you answer, and give me the opportunity of resuming and
completing our unfinished argument.

I made these and some similar observations; but Protagoras would not distinctly say which he would do. Thereupon
Alcibiades turned to Callias, and said:— Do you think, Callias, that Protagoras is fair in refusing to say whether he
will or will not answer? for I certainly think that he is unfair; he ought either to proceed with the argument, or
distinctly refuse to proceed, that we may know his intention; and then Socrates will be able to discourse with some one
else, and the rest of the company will be free to talk with one another.

I think that Protagoras was really made ashamed by these words of Alcibiades, and when the prayers of Callias and
the company were superadded, he was at last induced to argue, and said that I might ask and he would answer.

So I said: Do not imagine, Protagoras, that I have any other interest in asking questions of you but that of
clearing up my own difficulties. For I think that Homer was very right in saying that

‘When two go together, one sees before the other (Il.),’

for all men who have a companion are readier in deed, word, or thought; but if a man

‘Sees a thing when he is alone,’

he goes about straightway seeking until he finds some one to whom he may show his discoveries, and who may confirm
him in them. And I would rather hold discourse with you than with any one, because I think that no man has a better
understanding of most things which a good man may be expected to understand, and in particular of virtue. For who is
there, but you? — who not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for many are this, and yet have not the power of
making others good — whereas you are not only good yourself, but also the cause of goodness in others. Moreover such
confidence have you in yourself, that although other Sophists conceal their profession, you proclaim in the face of
Hellas that you are a Sophist or teacher of virtue and education, and are the first who demanded pay in return. How
then can I do otherwise than invite you to the examination of these subjects, and ask questions and consult with you? I
must, indeed. And I should like once more to have my memory refreshed by you about the questions which I was asking you
at first, and also to have your help in considering them. If I am not mistaken the question was this: Are wisdom and
temperance and courage and justice and holiness five names of the same thing? or has each of the names a separate
underlying essence and corresponding thing having a peculiar function, no one of them being like any other of them? And
you replied that the five names were not the names of the same thing, but that each of them had a separate object, and
that all these objects were parts of virtue, not in the same way that the parts of gold are like each other and the
whole of which they are parts, but as the parts of the face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one
another, and have each of them a distinct function. I should like to know whether this is still your opinion; or if
not, I will ask you to define your meaning, and I shall not take you to task if you now make a different statement. For
I dare say that you may have said what you did only in order to make trial of me.

I answer, Socrates, he said, that all these qualities are parts of virtue, and that four out of the five are to some
extent similar, and that the fifth of them, which is courage, is very different from the other four, as I prove in this
way: You may observe that many men are utterly unrighteous, unholy, intemperate, ignorant, who are nevertheless
remarkable for their courage.

Stop, I said; I should like to think about that. When you speak of brave men, do you mean the confident, or another
sort of nature?

Yes, he said; I mean the impetuous, ready to go at that which others are afraid to approach.

In the next place, you would affirm virtue to be a good thing, of which good thing you assert yourself to be a
teacher.

Yes, he said; I should say the best of all things, if I am in my right mind.

And is it partly good and partly bad, I said, or wholly good?

Wholly good, and in the highest degree.

Tell me then; who are they who have confidence when diving into a well?

I should say, the divers.

And the reason of this is that they have knowledge?

Yes, that is the reason.

And who have confidence when fighting on horseback — the skilled horseman or the unskilled?

The skilled.

And who when fighting with light shields — the peltasts or the nonpeltasts?

The peltasts. And that is true of all other things, he said, if that is your point: those who have knowledge are
more confident than those who have no knowledge, and they are more confident after they have learned than before.

And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant, I said, of these things, and yet confident about them?

Yes, he said, I have seen such persons far too confident.

And are not these confident persons also courageous?

In that case, he replied, courage would be a base thing, for the men of whom we are speaking are surely madmen.

Then who are the courageous? Are they not the confident?

Yes, he said; to that statement I adhere.

And those, I said, who are thus confident without knowledge are really not courageous, but mad; and in that case the
wisest are also the most confident, and being the most confident are also the bravest, and upon that view again wisdom
will be courage.

Nay, Socrates, he replied, you are mistaken in your remembrance of what was said by me. When you asked me, I
certainly did say that the courageous are the confident; but I was never asked whether the confident are the
courageous; if you had asked me, I should have answered ‘Not all of them’: and what I did answer you have not proved to
be false, although you proceeded to show that those who have knowledge are more courageous than they were before they
had knowledge, and more courageous than others who have no knowledge, and were then led on to think that courage is the
same as wisdom. But in this way of arguing you might come to imagine that strength is wisdom. You might begin by asking
whether the strong are able, and I should say ‘Yes’; and then whether those who know how to wrestle are not more able
to wrestle than those who do not know how to wrestle, and more able after than before they had learned, and I should
assent. And when I had admitted this, you might use my admissions in such a way as to prove that upon my view wisdom is
strength; whereas in that case I should not have admitted, any more than in the other, that the able are strong,
although I have admitted that the strong are able. For there is a difference between ability and strength; the former
is given by knowledge as well as by madness or rage, but strength comes from nature and a healthy state of the body.
And in like manner I say of confidence and courage, that they are not the same; and I argue that the courageous are
confident, but not all the confident courageous. For confidence may be given to men by art, and also, like ability, by
madness and rage; but courage comes to them from nature and the healthy state of the soul.

I said: You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live well and others ill?

He assented.

And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief?

He does not.

But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life, will he not in that case have lived well?

He will.

Then to live pleasantly is a good, and to live unpleasantly an evil?

Yes, he said, if the pleasure be good and honourable.

And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some pleasant things evil and some painful things good? —
for I am rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant, if they have no consequences of
another sort, and in as far as they are painful they are bad.

I do not know, Socrates, he said, whether I can venture to assert in that unqualified manner that the pleasant is
the good and the painful the evil. Having regard not only to my present answer, but also to the whole of my life, I
shall be safer, if I am not mistaken, in saying that there are some pleasant things which are not good, and that there
are some painful things which are good, and some which are not good, and that there are some which are neither good nor
evil.

And you would call pleasant, I said, the things which participate in pleasure or create pleasure?

Certainly, he said.

Then my meaning is, that in as far as they are pleasant they are good; and my question would imply that pleasure is
a good in itself.

According to your favourite mode of speech, Socrates, ‘Let us reflect about this,’ he said; and if the reflection is
to the point, and the result proves that pleasure and good are really the same, then we will agree; but if not, then we
will argue.

And would you wish to begin the enquiry? I said; or shall I begin?

You ought to take the lead, he said; for you are the author of the discussion.

May I employ an illustration? I said. Suppose some one who is enquiring into the health or some other bodily quality
of another:— he looks at his face and at the tips of his fingers, and then he says, Uncover your chest and back to me
that I may have a better view:— that is the sort of thing which I desire in this speculation. Having seen what your
opinion is about good and pleasure, I am minded to say to you: Uncover your mind to me, Protagoras, and reveal your
opinion about knowledge, that I may know whether you agree with the rest of the world. Now the rest of the world are of
opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength, or of rule, or of command: their notion is that a man may have
knowledge, and yet that the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger, or pleasure, or pain, or love, or
perhaps by fear — just as if knowledge were a slave, and might be dragged about anyhow. Now is that your view? or do
you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which cannot be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he
only knows the difference of good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have
strength to help him?

I agree with you, Socrates, said Protagoras; and not only so, but I, above all other men, am bound to say that
wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human things.

Good, I said, and true. But are you aware that the majority of the world are of another mind; and that men are
commonly supposed to know the things which are best, and not to do them when they might? And most persons whom I have
asked the reason of this have said that when men act contrary to knowledge they are overcome by pain, or pleasure, or
some of those affections which I was just now mentioning.

Yes, Socrates, he replied; and that is not the only point about which mankind are in error.

Suppose, then, that you and I endeavour to instruct and inform them what is the nature of this affection which they
call ‘being overcome by pleasure,’ and which they affirm to be the reason why they do not always do what is best. When
we say to them: Friends, you are mistaken, and are saying what is not true, they would probably reply: Socrates and
Protagoras, if this affection of the soul is not to be called ‘being overcome by pleasure,’ pray, what is it, and by
what name would you describe it?

But why, Socrates, should we trouble ourselves about the opinion of the many, who just say anything that happens to
occur to them?

I believe, I said, that they may be of use in helping us to discover how courage is related to the other parts of
virtue. If you are disposed to abide by our agreement, that I should show the way in which, as I think, our recent
difficulty is most likely to be cleared up, do you follow; but if not, never mind.

You are quite right, he said; and I would have you proceed as you have begun.

Well then, I said, let me suppose that they repeat their question, What account do you give of that which, in our
way of speaking, is termed being overcome by pleasure? I should answer thus: Listen, and Protagoras and I will
endeavour to show you. When men are overcome by eating and drinking and other sensual desires which are pleasant, and
they, knowing them to be evil, nevertheless indulge in them, would you not say that they were overcome by pleasure?
They will not deny this. And suppose that you and I were to go on and ask them again: ‘In what way do you say that they
are evil — in that they are pleasant and give pleasure at the moment, or because they cause disease and poverty and
other like evils in the future? Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil consequences, simply because
they give the consciousness of pleasure of whatever nature?’— Would they not answer that they are not evil on account
of the pleasure which is immediately given by them, but on account of the after consequences — diseases and the
like?

I believe, said Protagoras, that the world in general would answer as you do.

And in causing diseases do they not cause pain? and in causing poverty do they not cause pain; — they would agree to
that also, if I am not mistaken?

Protagoras assented.

Then I should say to them, in my name and yours: Do you think them evil for any other reason, except because they
end in pain and rob us of other pleasures:— there again they would agree?

We both of us thought that they would.

And then I should take the question from the opposite point of view, and say: ‘Friends, when you speak of goods
being painful, do you not mean remedial goods, such as gymnastic exercises, and military service, and the physician’s
use of burning, cutting, drugging, and starving? Are these the things which are good but painful?’— they would assent
to me?

He agreed.

‘And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest immediate suffering and pain; or because, afterwards,
they bring health and improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of states and power over others and
wealth?’— they would agree to the latter alternative, if I am not mistaken?

He assented.

‘Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain? Are you
looking to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?’— they would acknowledge that they were
not?

I think so, said Protagoras.

‘And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an evil?’

He assented.

‘Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good: and even pleasure you deem an evil, when it robs you of
greater pleasures than it gives, or causes pains greater than the pleasure. If, however, you call pleasure an evil in
relation to some other end or standard, you will be able to show us that standard. But you have none to show.’

I do not think that they have, said Protagoras.

‘And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain? You call pain a good when it takes away greater pains than
those which it has, or gives pleasures greater than the pains: then if you have some standard other than pleasure and
pain to which you refer when you call actual pain a good, you can show what that is. But you cannot.’

True, said Protagoras.

Suppose again, I said, that the world says to me: ‘Why do you spend many words and speak in many ways on this
subject?’ Excuse me, friends, I should reply; but in the first place there is a difficulty in explaining the meaning of
the expression ‘overcome by pleasure’; and the whole argument turns upon this. And even now, if you see any possible
way in which evil can be explained as other than pain, or good as other than pleasure, you may still retract. Are you
satisfied, then, at having a life of pleasure which is without pain? If you are, and if you are unable to show any good
or evil which does not end in pleasure and pain, hear the consequences:— If what you say is true, then the argument is
absurd which affirms that a man often does evil knowingly, when he might abstain, because he is seduced and overpowered
by pleasure; or again, when you say that a man knowingly refuses to do what is good because he is overcome at the
moment by pleasure. And that this is ridiculous will be evident if only we give up the use of various names, such as
pleasant and painful, and good and evil. As there are two things, let us call them by two names — first, good and evil,
and then pleasant and painful. Assuming this, let us go on to say that a man does evil knowing that he does evil. But
some one will ask, Why? Because he is overcome, is the first answer. And by what is he overcome? the enquirer will
proceed to ask. And we shall not be able to reply ‘By pleasure,’ for the name of pleasure has been exchanged for that
of good. In our answer, then, we shall only say that he is overcome. ‘By what?’ he will reiterate. By the good, we
shall have to reply; indeed we shall. Nay, but our questioner will rejoin with a laugh, if he be one of the swaggering
sort, ‘That is too ridiculous, that a man should do what he knows to be evil when he ought not, because he is overcome
by good. Is that, he will ask, because the good was worthy or not worthy of conquering the evil’? And in answer to that
we shall clearly reply, Because it was not worthy; for if it had been worthy, then he who, as we say, was overcome by
pleasure, would not have been wrong. ‘But how,’ he will reply, ‘can the good be unworthy of the evil, or the evil of
the good’? Is not the real explanation that they are out of proportion to one another, either as greater and smaller,
or more and fewer? This we cannot deny. And when you speak of being overcome —‘what do you mean,’ he will say, ‘but
that you choose the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good?’ Admitted. And now substitute the names of pleasure
and pain for good and evil, and say, not as before, that a man does what is evil knowingly, but that he does what is
painful knowingly, and because he is overcome by pleasure, which is unworthy to overcome. What measure is there of the
relations of pleasure to pain other than excess and defect, which means that they become greater and smaller, and more
and fewer, and differ in degree? For if any one says: ‘Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs widely from future
pleasure and pain’— To that I should reply: And do they differ in anything but in pleasure and pain? There can be no
other measure of them. And do you, like a skilful weigher, put into the balance the pleasures and the pains, and their
nearness and distance, and weigh them, and then say which outweighs the other. If you weigh pleasures against
pleasures, you of course take the more and greater; or if you weigh pains against pains, you take the fewer and the
less; or if pleasures against pains, then you choose that course of action in which the painful is exceeded by the
pleasant, whether the distant by the near or the near by the distant; and you avoid that course of action in which the
pleasant is exceeded by the painful. Would you not admit, my friends, that this is true? I am confident that they
cannot deny this.

He agreed with me.

Well then, I shall say, if you agree so far, be so good as to answer me a question: Do not the same magnitudes
appear larger to your sight when near, and smaller when at a distance? They will acknowledge that. And the same holds
of thickness and number; also sounds, which are in themselves equal, are greater when near, and lesser when at a
distance. They will grant that also. Now suppose happiness to consist in doing or choosing the greater, and in not
doing or in avoiding the less, what would be the saving principle of human life? Would not the art of measuring be the
saving principle; or would the power of appearance? Is not the latter that deceiving art which makes us wander up and
down and take the things at one time of which we repent at another, both in our actions and in our choice of things
great and small? But the art of measurement would do away with the effect of appearances, and, showing the truth, would
fain teach the soul at last to find rest in the truth, and would thus save our life. Would not mankind generally
acknowledge that the art which accomplishes this result is the art of measurement?

Yes, he said, the art of measurement.

Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend on the choice of odd and even, and on the knowledge of when a
man ought to choose the greater or less, either in reference to themselves or to each other, and whether near or at a
distance; what would be the saving principle of our lives? Would not knowledge? — a knowledge of measuring, when the
question is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, when the question is of odd and even? The world will
assent, will they not?

Protagoras himself thought that they would.

Well then, my friends, I say to them; seeing that the salvation of human life has been found to consist in the right
choice of pleasures and pains, — in the choice of the more and the fewer, and the greater and the less, and the nearer
and remoter, must not this measuring be a consideration of their excess and defect and equality in relation to each
other?

This is undeniably true.

And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art and science?

They will agree, he said.

The nature of that art or science will be a matter of future consideration; but the existence of such a science
furnishes a demonstrative answer to the question which you asked of me and Protagoras. At the time when you asked the
question, if you remember, both of us were agreeing that there was nothing mightier than knowledge, and that knowledge,
in whatever existing, must have the advantage over pleasure and all other things; and then you said that pleasure often
got the advantage even over a man who has knowledge; and we refused to allow this, and you rejoined: O Protagoras and
Socrates, what is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure if not this? — tell us what you call such a state:— if we
had immediately and at the time answered ‘Ignorance,’ you would have laughed at us. But now, in laughing at us, you
will be laughing at yourselves: for you also admitted that men err in their choice of pleasures and pains; that is, in
their choice of good and evil, from defect of knowledge; and you admitted further, that they err, not only from defect
of knowledge in general, but of that particular knowledge which is called measuring. And you are also aware that the
erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This, therefore, is the meaning of being overcome by
pleasure; — ignorance, and that the greatest. And our friends Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias declare that they are
the physicians of ignorance; but you, who are under the mistaken impression that ignorance is not the cause, and that
the art of which I am speaking cannot be taught, neither go yourselves, nor send your children, to the Sophists, who
are the teachers of these things — you take care of your money and give them none; and the result is, that you are the
worse off both in public and private life:— Let us suppose this to be our answer to the world in general: And now I
should like to ask you, Hippias, and you, Prodicus, as well as Protagoras (for the argument is to be yours as well as
ours), whether you think that I am speaking the truth or not?

They all thought that what I said was entirely true.

Then you agree, I said, that the pleasant is the good, and the painful evil. And here I would beg my friend Prodicus
not to introduce his distinction of names, whether he is disposed to say pleasurable, delightful, joyful. However, by
whatever name he prefers to call them, I will ask you, most excellent Prodicus, to answer in my sense of the words.

Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the others.

Then, my friends, what do you say to this? Are not all actions honourable and useful, of which the tendency is to
make life painless and pleasant? The honourable work is also useful and good?

This was admitted.

Then, I said, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under the idea or conviction that some other thing
would be better and is also attainable, when he might do the better. And this inferiority of a man to himself is merely
ignorance, as the superiority of a man to himself is wisdom.

They all assented.

And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived about important matters?

To this also they unanimously assented.

Then, I said, no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in
human nature; and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when he may have
the less.

All of us agreed to every word of this.

Well, I said, there is a certain thing called fear or terror; and here, Prodicus, I should particularly like to know
whether you would agree with me in defining this fear or terror as expectation of evil.

Protagoras and Hippias agreed, but Prodicus said that this was fear and not terror.

Never mind, Prodicus, I said; but let me ask whether, if our former assertions are true, a man will pursue that
which he fears when he is not compelled? Would not this be in flat contradiction to the admission which has been
already made, that he thinks the things which he fears to be evil; and no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that
which he thinks to be evil?

That also was universally admitted.

Then, I said, these, Hippias and Prodicus, are our premisses; and I would beg Protagoras to explain to us how he can
be right in what he said at first. I do not mean in what he said quite at first, for his first statement, as you may
remember, was that whereas there were five parts of virtue none of them was like any other of them; each of them had a
separate function. To this, however, I am not referring, but to the assertion which he afterwards made that of the five
virtues four were nearly akin to each other, but that the fifth, which was courage, differed greatly from the others.
And of this he gave me the following proof. He said: You will find, Socrates, that some of the most impious, and
unrighteous, and intemperate, and ignorant of men are among the most courageous; which proves that courage is very
different from the other parts of virtue. I was surprised at his saying this at the time, and I am still more surprised
now that I have discussed the matter with you. So I asked him whether by the brave he meant the confident. Yes, he
replied, and the impetuous or goers. (You may remember, Protagoras, that this was your answer.)

He assented.

Well then, I said, tell us against what are the courageous ready to go — against the same dangers as the
cowards?

No, he answered.

Then against something different?

Yes, he said.

Then do cowards go where there is safety, and the courageous where there is danger?

Yes, Socrates, so men say.

Very true, I said. But I want to know against what do you say that the courageous are ready to go — against dangers,
believing them to be dangers, or not against dangers?

No, said he; the former case has been proved by you in the previous argument to be impossible.

That, again, I replied, is quite true. And if this has been rightly proven, then no one goes to meet what he thinks
to be dangers, since the want of self-control, which makes men rush into dangers, has been shown to be ignorance.

He assented.

And yet the courageous man and the coward alike go to meet that about which they are confident; so that, in this
point of view, the cowardly and the courageous go to meet the same things.

And yet, Socrates, said Protagoras, that to which the coward goes is the opposite of that to which the courageous
goes; the one, for example, is ready to go to battle, and the other is not ready.

And is going to battle honourable or disgraceful? I said.

Honourable, he replied.

And if honourable, then already admitted by us to be good; for all honourable actions we have admitted to be
good.

That is true; and to that opinion I shall always adhere.

True, I said. But which of the two are they who, as you say, are unwilling to go to war, which is a good and
honourable thing?

The cowards, he replied.

And what is good and honourable, I said, is also pleasant?

It has certainly been acknowledged to be so, he replied.

And do the cowards knowingly refuse to go to the nobler, and pleasanter, and better?

The admission of that, he replied, would belie our former admissions.

But does not the courageous man also go to meet the better, and pleasanter, and nobler?

That must be admitted.

And the courageous man has no base fear or base confidence?

True, he replied.

And if not base, then honourable?

He admitted this.

And if honourable, then good?

Yes.

But the fear and confidence of the coward or foolhardy or madman, on the contrary, are base?

He assented.

And these base fears and confidences originate in ignorance and uninstructedness?

True, he said.

Then as to the motive from which the cowards act, do you call it cowardice or courage?

I should say cowardice, he replied.

And have they not been shown to be cowards through their ignorance of dangers?

Assuredly, he said.

And because of that ignorance they are cowards?

He assented.

And the reason why they are cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice?

He again assented.

Then the ignorance of what is and is not dangerous is cowardice?

He nodded assent.

But surely courage, I said, is opposed to cowardice?

Yes.

Then the wisdom which knows what are and are not dangers is opposed to the ignorance of them?

To that again he nodded assent.

And the ignorance of them is cowardice?

To that he very reluctantly nodded assent.

And the knowledge of that which is and is not dangerous is courage, and is opposed to the ignorance of these
things?

At this point he would no longer nod assent, but was silent.

And why, I said, do you neither assent nor dissent, Protagoras?

Finish the argument by yourself, he said.

I only want to ask one more question, I said. I want to know whether you still think that there are men who are most
ignorant and yet most courageous?

You seem to have a great ambition to make me answer, Socrates, and therefore I will gratify you, and say, that this
appears to me to be impossible consistently with the argument.

My only object, I said, in continuing the discussion, has been the desire to ascertain the nature and relations of
virtue; for if this were clear, I am very sure that the other controversy which has been carried on at great length by
both of us — you affirming and I denying that virtue can be taught — would also become clear. The result of our
discussion appears to me to be singular. For if the argument had a human voice, that voice would be heard laughing at
us and saying: ‘Protagoras and Socrates, you are strange beings; there are you, Socrates, who were saying that virtue
cannot be taught, contradicting yourself now by your attempt to prove that all things are knowledge, including justice,
and temperance, and courage — which tends to show that virtue can certainly be taught; for if virtue were other than
knowledge, as Protagoras attempted to prove, then clearly virtue cannot be taught; but if virtue is entirely knowledge,
as you are seeking to show, then I cannot but suppose that virtue is capable of being taught. Protagoras, on the other
hand, who started by saying that it might be taught, is now eager to prove it to be anything rather than knowledge; and
if this is true, it must be quite incapable of being taught.’ Now I, Protagoras, perceiving this terrible confusion of
our ideas, have a great desire that they should be cleared up. And I should like to carry on the discussion until we
ascertain what virtue is, whether capable of being taught or not, lest haply Epimetheus should trip us up and deceive
us in the argument, as he forgot us in the story; I prefer your Prometheus to your Epimetheus, for of him I make use,
whenever I am busy about these questions, in Promethean care of my own life. And if you have no objection, as I said at
first, I should like to have your help in the enquiry.

Protagoras replied: Socrates, I am not of a base nature, and I am the last man in the world to be envious. I cannot
but applaud your energy and your conduct of an argument. As I have often said, I admire you above all men whom I know,
and far above all men of your age; and I believe that you will become very eminent in philosophy. Let us come back to
the subject at some future time; at present we had better turn to something else.

By all means, I said, if that is your wish; for I too ought long since to have kept the engagement of which I spoke
before, and only tarried because I could not refuse the request of the noble Callias. So the conversation ended, and we
went our way.

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