Who is Harald?

2 June 2008

One of the key figures in the negotiations on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – which met again in Bangkok in April – is Harald Dovland. He’s the appointed chair of the (now take a deep breath...) Ad-Hoc-Working-Group-on-Further-Commitments-for-Annex-I-Parties-under-the-Kyoto-Protocol, otherwise known as the AWG.

For 12 years, Mr Dovland headed up Norway's climate negotiations team. Nowadays he works in the private sector, for international consulting and engineering firm, Poyry plc. His branch publishes the Global Carbon Report which helps ‘market observers, analysts, policy makers and carbon market professionals in finance, energy and carbon-intensive industries’ understand and exploit ‘carbon markets’. And just to be clear about their orientation, an article on their website about the outcomes of last year’s Bali climate change conference draws the controversial conclusion that ‘carbon trading is instrumental to achieve sufficient [greenhouse gas] reduction’.

Others see carbon trading quite differently, as a way for corporations to continue their harmful business as usual. In the words of research and activist group Carbon Trade Watch, the growing international carbon market is ‘polluters successfully turning the potential threat of climate change into an opportunity for profit’.

Mr Dovland is clearly highly appreciated by his AWG colleagues, but it does seem rather strange that one of the most important negotiating forums on climate change is under the gavel of an employee of a firm which makes money out of promoting carbon trading.

Climate Talks in Bangkok

3 April 2008

BANGKOK, 2 April, 2008:
This week, climate negotiators are in Bangkok hammering out a workplan
which will allow them to reach a new set of agreements by the end of
2009. Contrary to some reports, the Kyoto Protocol does not end in 2012
– it is simply the end of the first commitment period and all so-called
Annex 1 (mainly industrialized) countries are legally required to
commit to new binding emission reductions targets.

At this
early stage, the meetings are low key, but the subterranean current
seems to be a continuation of Bali – the rich countries are trying to
avoid their responsibilities, while the developing countries are
desperately trying to get them to meet their existing commitments on
mitigation, finance and technology.

The seemingly arcane
discussion about the order of the workplan is key: the EU and the US
want to start with a decision on global targets while the G77 and China
wants to lead with decisions on finance and technology. Clearly the
Annex 1 countries are keen to see some of the major emitters from the
South take on ambitious, albeit voluntary, targets as part of a global
package, while developing countries want to see the money and the
technology on the table before they commit to anything. Given the
history of international negotiations, the G77's scepticism is
justified.

Away from the UN conference centre, at a panel
discussion on climate justice, Witoon Permpongsacharoen – a longtime
energy and anti-dam activist from Thailand – highlighted the bizarre
disjuncture between the facts of the global warming and Thailand's
ambitious 15 year energy plan.The Thai government projects that energy
demand in the next 15 years will rise exponentially, with an average
increase in peak demand of 1844 MW a year for 2007-2021, despite the
fact that the average increase in peak demand in the past 15 years has
been only 914 MW a year (and with an actual decline in demand in the
financial-crisis years of 1998 and 1999).The plan includes nuclear,
more coal and gas-fired power plants, and a huge expansion in
'biofuels' (most of which would be grown outside of Thailand in
neighbouring, and much poorer, Laos, Burma and Cambodia).

Inexplicably,
renewables, such as biomass, solar and small hydro, are capped at
unnecessarily low levels. Witoon projects that under this extravagant
energy plan, Thailand's carbon dioxide emissions would double from 2007
levels of just over 80 million tonnes to almost 160 million tonnes by
2021.Underlying this is the assumption that Thailand's economy must
continue to grow, and that that growth must be fed by energy. There is
no strategy to increase efficiency, reduce demand, manage supply, or
maximize the potential of renewables; much less a discussion about the
broader social objectives or environmental impacts of endless economic
growth. There appears to be no basis for the energy plan, other than
the obsession with growth, the megalomania of policy makers, and the
greed of the energy industry.

Of course Thailand is not the only
country where energy policy is totally out of sync with the imperatives
of climate change, but the tragedy is that it need not be so. There are
so many viable energy alternatives. It seems that even the reality of
longer droughts, hotter summers and heavier floods does not concentrate
the minds of Thailand's policy makers, but they are not alone judging
from the meagre outcomes of the Bangkok climate change talks. Maybe by
Friday there will be some good news.

The big tree catches wind

1 September 2004

In scenes reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution – or a motivation session for sales reps – thousands of young Beijingers wearing matching sky blue tracksuits sit in row after orderly row repeating with frightening enthusiasm the words of their evangelical English teacher, a well-dressed 30-something Chinese with an American accent: ‘I want to be somebody some day.’ ‘We will occupy the US, we will occupy Europe, we will occupy Japan. The three markets!!!’ ‘Make... money... internationally!’

For these privileged urbanites, the slogans of capitalism have long replaced the wisdom of Chairman Mao, and individual achievement – rather than collective endeavour – is the new path to reclaiming China’s lost glory.

Though it is now an economic powerhouse, China is also a political powder keg. In the vast rural hinterland – home to 800 million – the peasants and workers, too, have discarded their blue Mao jackets in favour of tracksuits. But the rural classes who symbolized the Chinese Revolution are suffering (see (http://www.newint.org/issue371/prairie-fire.htm)[A single spark]). In the past five years, annual growth has exceeded nine per cent, but there are signs that the economy is ‘slowing’ and the Government has warned of a ‘breakdown in public order’ if growth falls below seven per cent. Modern-day China is teetering on the edge of a social cataclysm as the Communist Party attempts to balance its warm embrace of capitalism and private property rights with the cold facts of rural poverty, mass unemployment and growing discontent in its own backyard. The Chinese Government knows this and so does the rest of the world.

China’s official aspirations are peace, prosperity, democracy and unity. It rejects ‘one value’ or being ‘led by one country’ and claims to base its foreign relations on mutual respect, sovereignty and co-operation between states: an emphasis clearly directed against the role assumed by the US as global leader.

Two-faced reflections Even though these elements are clearly visible in China’s international relations stance, the way that it is expressing itself both inside and outside the country is more schizophrenic. Partly, this is a realistic response to where the country finds itself. Within its borders, the developing and developed worlds live side by side. The US is pushing for China to have closer relations with the G8: the élite grouping of major industrial powers comprising the US, France, Canada, Japan, the UK, Germany, Russia and Italy. Yet China is also a leading member of the G20: the emerging coalition of developing countries within the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is an economic dynamo of capitalism – able to out-price and out-produce all competitors. Yet the Communist Party leadership explains that this free-for-all capitalism is a necessary step on the road to true socialism. Balancing these tensions – while advancing its own interests – are the hallmarks of China’s engagement in international affairs.

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In 1997, Jiang Zemin – who was then the President and chair of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – announced that China would take a more active role in the world by ‘opening up in all directions... developing an open economy, enhancing our international competitiveness, optimizing our economic structure and improving the quality of our national economy’. This was the official signal that China was open for business.

It is now so integrated into the global economy that its economic health is a matter for global concern. With an economy the size of China’s, national interests can easily become international concerns. China now accounts for 48 per cent of Japanese exports – spurring Japan’s recovery after 10 years of recession. Any sign of a slow-down in China sends shivers through Tokyo’s financial markets. In March this year, the People’s Bank of China had a foreign exchange reserve of $439.8 billion: almost as much as the US foreign debt. In the past two decades, China has opened its doors to some $600 billion of foreign investment and almost 65 per cent of its exports are from ‘foreign-invested enterprises’ – Chinese subsidiaries of global transnational companies.

The transition to a market economy – which started in the late 1970s – culminated in 2001 when China joined the WTO after almost 15 years of negotiations. For the Chinese leadership, joining the WTO was a matter of pride: a sign that the country was ready to run with the ‘big boys’. Many developing countries welcomed its arrival in the WTO, hoping that it would stand up for the interests of the global South. China has joined with India and Malaysia in opposing the kind of far-reaching investment agreement the developed nations want. What’s more – in the WTO and elsewhere – China offers an important ‘demonstration effect’ for other developing countries because it vigorously defends its own interests. Last year, after the US accused China of dumping, it slapped duties on several Chinese products. China’s diplomatic retaliation was immediate: it cancelled a high-level mission to the US to sign orders for agricultural products.

Together with India, Brazil and South Africa, China is a leading member of the G20 – the group of Southern countries that built a common position on agriculture and stood up against the European Union (EU) and the US at last year’s ministerial meeting of the WTO in Cancun. With China on board, the G20 represents 60 per cent of the world’s farmers, giving it a powerful legitimacy in agricultural negotiations. China’s economic weight and enormous internal market also ensures that the US and the EU take the G20 seriously. Most importantly, though, China’s support for India in the G20 has been a critical factor in holding the group together, not because other developing countries disagree with India’s positions, but because many were politically too weak to withstand the combined pressures of the US and EU.

One Chinese analyst, Xu Weizhong, has predicted that ‘the spirit of unity demonstrated by the developing countries during the WTO talks will impact on the entirety of North-South relations.’

Mao Zedong, November 1964

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Globalization’s embrace

Most developing countries try to defend their agricultural sector. However, few have the political weight to succeed. Historically, India has carried the torch for agriculture in the South, with some support from Kenya and the Philippines. With China on their side – even if its specific interests may differ – developing countries now have a better chance of holding their ground. What’s more, China has 70 staff in their Geneva mission working on trade issues alone and this provides a level of technical and negotiating expertise that even many Western countries would envy.

But China (like all nations) will stand up for the interests of the developing world only when these coincide with its own interests. In 2003, Thailand signed an agreement with China to eliminate trade barriers in fruit and vegetables. Six months into the agreement, Thai farmers were complaining that they couldn’t compete with Chinese produce: Thai longans (fruit similar to lychees) cost 35 baht (85 cents) a kilo, while Chinese longans reach the Thai market at 20 baht (49 cents) a kilo. The story is the same for other fruits, onions and garlic. Thais complain that China is creating obstacles – such as delays at the border and food safety checks – which make it impossible for their products to enter the Chinese market. In this respect, China’s approach to trade is no different from the US or the EU, both of which use WTO rules to maximize their own gains and back this with hefty economic weight.

Diplomacy rules

No-one is willing to put pressure on China to make trade or financial concessions that could jeopardize its continued growth. At the same time, the pressure on China to open up its trade even further will be a permanent feature of its WTO negotiations. For some Chinese critics, membership of the WTO is a disaster in the making. Predictions of a rural crisis and the decimation of Chinese industry (which have proved to be well-founded) have found their way into mainstream debates. Nevertheless the Government has continued its single-minded pursuit of international legitimacy.

Although China competes economically with many countries in East and Southeast Asia, it is showing leadership in trade, security and strategic affairs. Furthermore, Asian countries feel comfortable dealing with China, knowing that they are unlikely to be lectured about shortcomings in civil and political rights.

Unlike Japan, which even at the height of its economic power refused to assume political leadership, China has repeatedly responded to emerging situations in a way that guarantees it is now accorded the level of respect usually reserved for the US. For example, China has backed the ‘ASEAN+3’: an Asian regional trade agreement. This is a long-term strategy to build a regional trade block that could one day counter the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the EU.

China is also playing an important diplomatic role in the ‘Six party talks’ on South Korea and mediating between its traditional rival India and its traditional ally Pakistan. No doubt, China’s present assessment is that regional stability – rather than ideological point scoring – serves its interests best.

Its ‘engagement’ in international relations now goes beyond the obvious spheres of the Security Council, the WTO and the UN, as it seeks to influence other international debates. This could be viewed as a strategy of China defining its own problems in the international arena rather than leaving the field open to its competitors and critics.

In April this year, China applied to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group and attended for the first time a meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime: two groups it previously dismissed as US-dominated cartels controlling access to nuclear technology. By joining these small clubs, China is strengthening its relations with the US, Europe and Japan, and at the same time guaranteeing access to state of the art nuclear energy technology.

China also lobbied hard for a vice-presidency in the International Labour Organization – a move derided by labour rights activists who suspect its motive is to control the debate on international labour standards while at the same time deflecting criticism from its own labour conditions.

Officially, China denies any hegemonic or global leadership ambitions; yet economically and politically, it is positioning itself to be the rising power of the 21st century. So far, China’s only voice on the international stage is the official voice of the Government. However, it is obvious that the impacts of rapid economic transformation are creating social divisions and dissent. Clearly, important things are happening in China that are not being reported either by the Communist Party or by the business press. While the ‘conditions’ may not be right for the growth of a democratic movement inside China, in the new era of the internationalization of the anti-war and anti-globalization movements, Chinese workers and peasants are the missing voices that still need to be heard.

Nicola Bullard works with Focus on the Global South, an activist research NGO based in Bangkok, Thailand.