As the United States Army began its rapid expansion in the late
summer of 1940 for the eventuality of war, it had a command
organization far better adapted to the control of peacetime than of
wartime operations. For many years the War Department had foreseen
that this organization would have to be changed whenever a major
war threatened, and it had planned accordingly. The plans for
transforming the command system to a wartime basis were in fact
partially carried out during the year and a half preceding the
formal entry of the United States into World War II and immediately
thereafter. They could not be carried out in full because the
circumstances of American involvement in the war and the problems
of defense during the initial mobilization of forces differed from
those that had been assumed. Instead of beginning its mobilization
on a relatively fixed M-day to deal with a clearly defined war
situation, the Army spread its prewar expansion over many months
during which the war outlook underwent continuous change. Even
without these factors, the earlier plans for wartime organization
would have required some modification because of the changed
character and increasing complexities of warfare and therefore of
the nature of the dangers that war would bring to the United
States.

In planning for the command of active operations, the Army tried
to adhere to certain basic strategic and organizational principles.
It wanted to avoid dispersing its forces in a weak cordon defense
of the frontier, whether of the continental United States or of the
Western Hemisphere. Instead, it planned to group the bulk of Army
ground and air forces in a mobile reserve within the continental
United States. The very large expansion of the Army decided upon in
the summer of 1940 required a tremendous training effort, and it
was the Army's policy to meet current tactical needs with the least
possible interference to the training program. In reorganizing its
command structure, the Army tried to conform to the principle that
the officers responsible for planning operations should also be
responsible for executing them. Finally, the Army theoretically
favored the establishment of unity of

[16]

command both over its own ground and air forces and over Army
and Navy forces in potential or actual theaters of operations,
although in practice not much progress was made in either direction
before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The National Defense Act of 1920 provided the basis for the
establishment of a new command system for the Army after World War
I. The War Department on 1 September 1920 established nine corps
areas with fixed boundaries and gave their commanders full tactical
and administrative control over all Army forces and installations
within their areas except for those specifically exempted. The Army
forces in the Panama Canal Zone, Hawaii, and the Philippines were
organized into departments, identical in character and authority
with die corps areas in the continental United States. Until the
eve of World War II, the few Army troops in Puerto Rico and Alaska
were not separately organized but were attached to the Second and
Ninth Corps Areas, respectively. On 1 July 1939 Puerto Rico became
a separate department, but Alaska remained under the Ninth Corps
Area and successor defense agencies until 2 November 1943.
Theoretically, from 1920 until 1932 Army forces at home and
overseas were divided among three army areas, but these areas never
had more than a nominal existence. Until the fall of 1932, the
tactical control of the ground and air combat forces remained with
the corps area commanders, who in turn were directly responsible to
the Chief of Staff. Under the corps area commanders, the commanders
of five coast artillery districts were responsible for planning and
executing the Army's seacoast defense mission. Corps area
commanders themselves were responsible for defending the Canadian
and Mexican land frontiers and for protecting the nation against
internal disturbances.1

The system of command began to change in the fall of 1932 when
the War Department established four armies without fixed
territorial bounds though located within the limits of specified
corps areas-the First Army within the First, Second, and Third
Corps Areas, for example. The initial "four-army" directives of
1932 seemed to indicate an intention to transfer

[17]

all tactical responsibility except for internal security
measures from the corps area to the army commanders, but
modifications of the four-army plan in 1933 and 1934 restricted the
army commanders to war planning and the direction of field
maneuvers within their areas. Furthermore, until the autumn of 1940
the armies were not given separate commanders and staffs to perform
these functions; the senior corps area commander within an army
area served as the army commander, and used his corps area staff to
conduct the army's business.2 Since
three of the four army headquarters changed location between 1932
and 1940, this last provision meant in practice that much army
staff work had no continuity. Under these circumstances, although
General Staff war plans after 1932 regularly specified that the
armies should work out detailed area defense plans, the armies
could do little effective planning of this sort before the fall of
1939.3

The War Plans Division of the General Staff defined the
peacetime defense responsibilities of the corps area and army
commanders in February 1940 in the following terms:

a. The missions of the several corps areas comprise: Defend as
may be necessary important coastal areas in their respective corps
areas; arrange with appropriate naval district commanders for
cooperation of local naval defense forces in execution of assigned
missions; provide anti-sabotage protection for such installations
and establishments vital to national defense as cannot be
adequately protected by local civil authorities; take necessary
action under the Emergency Plan-WHITE ;
4 and, in certain cases,
receive at detraining points, move to concentration areas, care
for, supply, and move to ports of embarkation units designated for
[overseas] movement.

b. The armies are responsible for coordinating the
defense of the coastal frontiers of the corps areas included in
their respective army area; for exercising general supervision of
the arrangements made by those corps areas with the naval districts
concerned for the cooperation of their local defense forces; and
for effecting any necessary coordination of anti-sabotage measures
along corps area boundaries.5

Irrespective of this definition, or of the wording of current
regulations and directives, the army commanders during late 1939
and 1940 began to play a more active role in war planning and in
the tactical direction of the military forces within their areas.
Their authority was potentially enhanced by an act of 5 August 1939
giving them the rank of lieutenant-general and thus

[18]

GENERAL DRUM

making them superior in rank to the corps area commanders. A
month later, after the outbreak of war in Europe, the War
Department launched a series of immediate action measures to
improve the Army's state of readiness. Thereafter, Lt. Gen. Hugh A.
Drum, commanding the First Army (and Second Corps Area) on the east
coast, and (from December 1939) Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, commanding
the Fourth Army (and Ninth Corps Area) on the west coast, assumed
the increasingly broad responsibility that circumstances required.
Without any immediate change in existing regulations and
directives, the army commanders began to exercise the superior
tactical authority within their areas that had originally been
proposed for them.

A second major change in the command structure occurred in 1935 with the creation
of the General Headquarters (GHQ Air Force. This organization centralized control
over all tactical air units in the continental United States under one commander.
Until the fall of 1940 air units under the GHQ Air Force were divided among
three wings located adjacent to the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts. The
GHQ Air Force commander was directly responsible to the Chief of Staff until
2 March 1939, when he was placed under the intermediate command of the Chief
of the Air Corps. The removal of air units from the control of armies and corps
areas did not change the responsibility of their commanders for planning the
co-ordinated ground and air defense of their areas, but increasingly the air
organization began to engage in defense planning on its own behalf.6

The proper development and co-ordination of the means for air
defense presented the Army with a new organizational problem late
in 1939. Suc-

[19]

cessful air defense depended upon the integrated action of interceptor
planes, antiaircraft guns, and aircraft warning devices for detecting the
approach of hostile aircraft. Interceptor aircraft were then under GHQ Air Force
command, and most antiaircraft units were controlled by the coast artillery
district commanders. The armies had been specifically charged in 1935 with
planning for the employment of antiaircraft artillery and aircraft warning
devices in air defense. The War Plans Division officer most concerned with the
development of long-range radar equipment urged in November 1939 that corps area
commanders be made responsible for planning its employment. Noting that the
Fourth Army had previously turned over this task to coast defense commanders, he
observed that an air attack on the United States was as likely to strike deep in
the interior as against the coast. Therefore, he contended, only the corps areas
provided a framework that could plan the nationwide employment of aircraft
warning devices. A War Plans Division colleague expressed opposing views and
urged that aircraft warning plans be a responsibility of the army commanders
because they would presumably be called upon to execute these plans in the event
of a real emergency. His views prevailed, and the War Department on 23 May 1940
directed the army commanders to develop plans for the effective use of aircraft
warning devices and to select the sites for the location of detector stations.7

The graver problem of organizing a co-ordinated and effective air defense
system under a united command occupied the attention of an Army Air Defense
Board during the winter of 1939-40 There was general agreement that the War
Department ought to create a new type of command that could exercise control
over the various air defense elements in an emergency. The Air Corps wanted this
new organization to be under the GHQ Air Force. After much discussion General
Marshall decided to create an experimental Air Defense Command in the
northeastern United States and to place it under the First Army. The War
Department specified that its commander, although put under First Army Command,
should be free to co-ordinate details of his work with the GHQ Air Force and
corps area commanders.8

The division of responsibility for war planning and immediate
defense action among corps area, army, Air Defense Command, and GHQ
Air Force commanders did not matter too much so long as the
likelihood of an attack on the continental United States appeared
remote and the size of the Army

[20]

GENERAL DEWITT

was still too small to justify the establishment of the more
elaborate organization planned for wartime. A transition toward
reorganization became mandatory as the actual threat of war loomed
in May and June 1940, and as the Army thereafter began its rapid
expansion and the tremendous task of training the new Army for war
employment if that should become necessary.

In the wartime organization planned under the Defense Act of 1920 the capstone
was to be a General Headquarters (GHQ). Until otherwise directed by the President;
the Chief of Staff in wartime was also to serve as Commanding General of the
Field Forces and to direct both ground and air operations through GHQ. Under
GHQ, there might be one or more active theaters of operations, with commanders
who would exercise full authority over all Army activities within theater boundaries.
Theaters of operations might be established either overseas or in the continental
United States; the remainder of the continental United States not included in
theaters of operations would constitute the zone of the interior.9 The four armies
in the continental United States on M-day (or before, if so directed by the
War Department) would assume full responsibility for the defense of their areas
against external attack; at the same time, they were to be prepared to move
to a theater of operations if so directed. The corps area commanders on M-day
would retain tactical responsibility for internal security only within the zone
of the interior; theater commanders in the continental United States would assume
this as well as all other tactical responsibilities.

The armed services had agreed to coordinate their frontier defense activities
in peace and war in accordance with the provisions of Joint Action of the
Army and the Navy, as revised by the joint Board in 1935 and subsequently
amended. During peace, Joint Action provided for the co-ordination of
local seacoast defense preparations between the Army's corps area com-

[21]

manders (or alternately, through the tatter's subsidiary coast artillery district
and harbor defense commanders) and the corresponding naval district commanders.
Army commanders were responsible in peacetime for planning wartime coastal defense
measures, and on M-day they were to assume responsibility for their execution.
Joint Action provided for the establishment of four coastal frontiers
(North Atlantic, Southern, Pacific, and Great Lakes and for their subdivision
in war into sectors and subsectors. These coastal frontiers were to become active
commands in wartime, at which time the Army's coast artillery districts were
to cease to exist as such and their commanders and staffs were to man the Army's
portion of the wartime coast defense organization and be responsible in turn
to the army commanders.10 The coastal command system prescribed in Joint
Action had two outstanding deficiencies. First, it did not provide an effective
means for establishing unity of command where it was really required. Unity
of command was not established anywhere until the attack on Pearl Harbor illustrated
the disastrous consequences of not doing so. Second, there was no clear delineation
of Army and Navy responsibility for coastal air defense, and thus there was
no agreement as to how an effective air defense of coastal regions should be
organized and controlled.

The critical situation facing the United States in June 1940 furnished the
immediate impetus for the first steps toward the establishment of a wartime
command organization. With Britain's early downfall still considered probable,
and therefore the chance of early American involvement in the war believed
likely, the War Department in July moved to activate GHQ. The order establishing
a nucleus of GHQ specified that GHQ's purpose was to assist the Commanding
General of the Field Forces in the exercise of "jurisdiction similar to that of
Army Commanders" over all mobile ground and air and fixed harbor defense forces
in the continental United States. Army commanders at this time had jurisdiction
over war planning and field maneuvers within their areas, but GHQ's activities
for the time being were expressly confined to the over-all direction and
supervision of combat training.11

The War Department also turned its attention, coincidentally with the establishment
of GHQ, to a reorganization of the field forces in the con-

[22]

tinental United States in order to give better direction to their training
and to improve their readiness for action should the nation become involved
in the war. This reorganization had to be adjusted to the rapid increase in
the Army's strength that followed the induction of the National Guard, approved
by Congress in August 1940, and the passage of selective service legislation
in September. These measures together with an increase in Regular Army strength
were to multiply the Army's numbers more than fivefold by the summer of 1941,
and most of the men and units that were brought into federal service required
intensive training. What the Army needed in 1940 and 1941 was a command system
that would improve the normal peacetime machinery for the planning and direction
of operations without unduly disrupting training.

The problem of fitting the Army's air arm into an effective reorganization
of command was complicated by additional factors. Air Corps officers wanted
a greater degree of autonomy in planning and directing the employment of air
power, and they tended to resist the adoption of any organizational scheme that
would place air planning and operations under ground commanders. The airmen
had good reason for maintaining their position, since the problem of continental
and hemisphere defense seemed increasingly to be primarily one of air defense.
The technological improvement of aircraft also tended to render obsolete the
older plans for coastal defense organization. The greater range and mobility
of the new combat planes made it undesirable to set up any organization that
would require the attachment of air units to relatively small territorial commands
and restrict their employment to the confines of these commands. The scarcity
of combat aircraft added emphasis to the other arguments against territorial
attachment. In June 1940 the Army had adopted an ambitious program for organizing
and equipping fifty-four air combat groups, but national policy after September
dictated the diversion of an increasingly large proportion of American combat
aircraft production to Great Britain and the other nations fighting the Axis
Powers. During late 1940 and most of 1941, therefore, almost all of the combat
airplanes available to the Army within the continental United States had to
be used in training. There was virtually no "GHQ Reserve" of combat
planes and units, and units in training had to be designated for current defense
employment if that became necessary. The effective training of the rapidly expanding
air forces required that in the meantime these units remain under air command.

With the easing of the critical Atlantic situation from
September 1940 onward, the Army was able to concentrate more
attention on training its

[23]

rapidly growing forces for future operations. Accordingly, the
next moves toward a tactical reorganization were associated more
with training than with the planning and direction of operations. A
proposal of the G-3 Division of the General Staff in July 1940 that
the corps areas be provided with additional tactical headquarters
to facilitate training grew into a War Department directive of 3
October 1940 ordering the separation of the field armies and the
corps areas. This directive and supplementary War Department orders
provided the armies with separate commanders and staffs, and
contemplated also a complete segregation of army and corps area
headquarters and functions. The armies were given command of the
ground combat forces, which had hitherto been under corps area
control except during maneuvers, and the armies now assumed full
responsibility for planning and directing the employment of these
troops in the defense of the continental United States against
external attack. Though the corps area commanders retained their
responsibility for internal security measures, the corps areas
thereafter became essentially supply and administrative agencies.12

The War Department similarly initiated a reorganization of the combat air
forces in the summer of 1940, after the adoption of the fifty-four group
program. In August the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, directed the
establishment of four air districts to replace the existing three-wing
subordinate organization of the GHQ Air Force. These air districts were intended
primarily to facilitate the supervision of training. Under the four air
districts, GHQ Air Force units were to be organized initially into seventeen
wings and forty groups. The existing Air Defense Command, operating in the
northeast United States under the direction of the First Army commander, was to
serve as a model for a nationwide air defense command system. This air
reorganization was only partially carried through in 1940; the air districts
were not activated until 15 January 1941, and the expansion of the air defense
command system was not approved until March 1941. In the meantime, the War
Department on 19 November 1940 removed the GHQ Air Force from the control of the
Chief of the Air Corps and placed it under GHQ. The appointment, shortly before
this change, of Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, the Chief of the Air Corps, to the
additional post of Deputy Chief of Staff made it possible for him to continue to
exert a measure of control over the operations of the GHQ Air Force.13

[24]

The organizational changes of late 1940 left a confused and unsatisfactory
definition of responsibility for the planning and direction of current and future
defense tasks in the continental United States. The confusion was such that
subordinate ground and air commanders had to be reminded in December that GHQ
still had no functions except those associated with training.14 The four armies had acquired responsibility for planning and controlling
operations, but the armies were not territorial organizations and in theory
were subject to transfer from their areas to overseas theaters of operations.
The situation seemed to call for a new type of fixed territorial defense organization.
In October 1940 the GHQ staff, noting that neither the armies nor the planned
coastal frontier organization met existing requirements, proposed that four
territorial defense commands be organized, with bounds approximating those of
the armies. Maj. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, the GHQ Chief of Staff, personally objected
to the term "defense commands" and wanted the new organizations called
"theaters." Whatever they were called, these defense areas in peacetime
were to engage only in planning and were to be commanded by army commanders
assisted by a small separate staff, but they were to be so organized that in
time of war they could be transformed into a theater of operations type of organization
which would operate under GHQ and command the ground and air forces assigned
for the execution of continental defense missions.15

The War Plans Division incorporated the GHQ proposal for the creation of defense
commands into a study on continental defense organization prepared by Col. Jonathan
W. Anderson in late 1940 and presented to the Chief of Staff in mid-January
1941. It appeared to Colonel Anderson that the wartime defense organization
prescribed by Joint Action of the Army and the Navy was archaic, since
Joint Action provided for a narrow coastal frontier defense only, whereas
the possibilities of air attack now required a defense in depth well into the
interior of the country. Furthermore, political considerations demanded at least
an outline defense organization for the

[25]

whole continental area. General McNair, in discussing these matters with
Colonel Anderson, emphasized the desirability of holding to a minimum the forces
tactically assigned to the First, Third, and Fourth Armies guarding the seacoast
frontiers, and of keeping as many combat units as possible with the Second Army
in the interior. General McNair's thought was: "If we give to the First Army
three corps, regardless of their needs .... they will plan the employment and
distribution of three corps, and . . . it may be difficult at a critical time to
pry these troops loose." The First Army, on the other hand, naturally and
strongly advocated a defense organization that would give it wartime control
over all ground and air forces within its area, peacetime control of a nucleus
of bombardment as well as pursuit aviation, and full air defense responsibility.
It also wanted to extend the boundaries of the North Atlantic Coastal Frontier
to include all United States garrisons established in the North Atlantic area.
In principle, War Plans and GHQ agreed on the necessity of holding the ground
and air forces assigned to defense missions to a minimum, and of retaining all
possible forces in GHQ ground and air reserves from which they could be
allocated to active theaters as necessary. General McNair wanted to place the
air defense commands in peacetime under GHQ Air Force control in order to
facilitate their training; War Plans wanted them under the defense commands in
order to establish unity of command in peacetime over all Army defense elements
that would be under the defense (or theater) commander in time of war.16

The issue of where to put the air defense commands in the new continental defense
organization had deeper implications. Giving the GHQ Air Force control over
all air defense means would be another big step toward air autonomy. In November
1940, before War Plans circulated its continental defense proposal for comment,
G-3 had taken the initiative in suggesting that the existing Air Defense Command
and new commands modeled after it be put under the air districts, and that the
air districts, under the GHQ Air Force, be given a very different function from
that approved for them by General Marshall the preceding August. They would
become tactical as well as training and administrative organizations. Each air
district would have a bombardment-fighter force for offensive air operations
and an air defense command for defensive purposes. This scheme would centralize
air defense control for the whole United States in one

[26]

headquarters, to be located in Washington. Subject to the over-all control
of GHQ, the GHQ Air Force would collaborate directly with the Navy in fending
off sea and air invaders until an actual land invasion of the continental United
States occurred; only then would unity of command over all ground and air forces
be established. Adhering to these views, G-3 refused to concur in the War Plans
study. In the meantime, and after he had heard "disturbing rumors,"
the commanding general of the GHQ Air Force urged General Marshall to put all
air defense elements under the air districts and thus under his force. When
General Marshall found time in mid-January to study and discuss the War Plans,
G-3, and GHQ Air Force proposals, he noted that he was "considerably impressed"
with the G3 argument. This argument was further fortified shortly thereafter
by Lt. Col. William K. Harrison, Jr., of the War Plans Division who, after observing
the Air Defense Command's exercises at Mitchel Field, likewise recommended
that the air defense commands be put under the air districts.17

An intensive and month-long round of discussions with respect to the
peacetime continental defense system followed. Those who favored placing the air
defense commands under the four territorial commands argued that there must be
unity and continuity of command in peace and war over all defense elements. This
argument undoubtedly would have carried more weight if the United States had
been closer to war and its continental area more imminently threatened. Everyone
agreed that in time of war each theater commander should have control over all
air and ground forces within his area. But, as General Arnold pointed out, under
existing circumstances it was impossible to foresee where real theaters of
operations might be required, and thus it was impossible to delimit them in
peacetime. General Arnold believed that the greatest immediate need was for air
defense commands overseas in Hawaii and Panama, and that the GHQ Air Force was
the proper agency for training mobile air defense commands within the United
States that could be sent overseas where needed. He argued therefore that "the
United States should be considered basically as a Zone of the Interior," in
which "all elements of the Field Forces must be prepared for overseas operations
primarily, and the defense of the United States secondarily."18

[27]

Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney, commanding the existing Air Defense Command,
joined in urging the Chief of Staff to put air defense under the GHQ Air Force.19 Finally,
after extended discussion, General Marshall decided to put the air defense
system under the direction of the GHQ Air Force in time of peace and then
directed the War Plans Division to work out a continental defense organization
on this basis.20

Accordingly the War Department on 17 March 1941 directed that the continental
United States be divided into four strategic areas (Northeast, Central, Southern,
and Western) to be known as defense commands. It defined a defense command as
"a territorial agency with appropriate staff designed to coordinate or
prepare to initiate the execution of all plans for the employment of Army Forces
and installations against enemy action in that portion of the United States
lying within the command boundaries."
21 The new commands were to operate under the direction of GHQ,
but not until the War Department enlarged the GHQ staff so that it could undertake
this additional responsibility.22

The defense commands were made responsible during peacetime for
planning the defense of their areas against ground and air attack,
the corps area commanders retaining their responsibility for
internal security plans and measures. Other features of the new
command system were described in some remarks of Colonel Anderson:

The four Army Commanders, in addition to their responsibilities
as Army Commanders, are designated as Commanding Generals, Defense
Commands. The responsibility of the Commanding General, Defense
Command, includes all planning for the defense of the area, the
coordination of these plans with the Navy, and the execution of
them in war until such time as the War Department directs to the
contrary. The Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, is given the
responsibility for the peacetime organization and training for air
operations and air defense throughout the entire continental United
States. He exercises this responsibility through four Air Forces,
each of these Air Forces replacing one of the existing Air
Districts. In addition, he is responsible for the aviation and air
defense portions of the defense plans for Defense

[28]

Commands. Each Air Force is organized as a bomber command and an interceptor
command, the latter replacing the currently named Air Defense Command. The above
organization centralizes under the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, full
control and responsibility for the peacetime development and training of
aviation and means and methods of air defense. It decentralizes to the
Commanding Generals, Defense Commands, responsibility for peacetime planning for
coordination with the Navy and for execution of defense in war. It provides for
unity of command in all elements employed in each Defense Command.23

The new organization in effect was designed to free the armies
from defense responsibilities and thereby permit them to give their
full attention to training ground combat units. Though the new
defense commands, when activated in June and July, actually
consisted of only a few headquarters staff officers engaged in
regional planning, the defense command promised to provide a
suitable means of transition toward a wartime theater organization,
should that become necessary.

The March 1941 reorganization marked a further step toward air
autonomy, but the Air Corps had plans for a new and more sweeping
air reorganization. Nor was the Air Corps alone in questioning the
adequacy of the March reorganization. Before the month was over
General Marshall had given his approval to a virtually independent
handling of air matters within the War Department.24In April
Secretary of War Stimson noted that the defense system established
in March struck him as a "dangerous arrangement" pregnant with
"possibilities for misunderstanding and trouble."
25 Mr. Stimson
had previously indicated his approval of a unified command system
for the Army's air forces, and in his own office he had elevated
Robert A. Lovett to the long-vacant post of Assistant Secretary of
War for Air. With encouragement such as this, the Air Corps
continued between April and June to work out the details of its
planned reorganization.

In the air reorganization approved and instituted in June the
GHQ Air Force disappeared. The new air establishment was an
integral part of the War Department placed directly under the Chief
of Staff. Its Chief, General Arnold, continued to occupy the
position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Air as well. The Army Air
Forces had two components, the Air Corps to handle service
functions, and the Air Force Combat Command to control combat
training, planning, and operations. The charter of the Army Air
Forces -Army Regulations 95-5 issued on 20 June 1941- in effect gave
it complete

[29]

authority over air defense planning and operations within the
continental United States, at least until theaters of operations
were established there. The Chief of the Army Air Forces delegated
his specific responsibility for air defense planning to the Air
Force Combat Command, which in turn called upon the commanders of
the four regional air forces for local defense plans.

The War Department gave the Army Air Forces authority over air
defense planning and operations within the United States without
revoking any of the responsibility allocated in March to the
defense commanders for all defense planning-air as well as
ground-within their areas. To add to the confusion, their area
defense plans were to be subject to the review and approval not of
the Army Air Forces but of GHQ as soon as it was activated as an
operational headquarters, as it was about to be.26 The following
statement, agreed on by the Army Air Forces and the War Plans
Division, represented an early effort to clarify the situation:

The Chief of the Army Air Forces, pursuant to policies,
directions and instructions from the Secretary of War, has been
made responsible for the organization, planning, training, and
execution of active air defense measures, for continental United
States. Active operations will be controlled by G.H.Q. These
operations will be directed by appropriate commanders, either
ground or air, as may be dictated by the situation.27

Subsequently, General Arnold agreed that neither the Army Air
Forces nor its component Air Force Combat Command had any official
authority to conduct or control air combat operations within a
theater of operations established either overseas or within the
continental United States.28

These interpretations failed to meet the basic objections
leveled by the War Plans Division against the new air organization
on the eve of its establishment. The War Plans staff then noted
that "the essentials of proper organization require that
responsibility and authority be centered in a single agency, and
that where this authority and responsibility lie be clearly and
definitely stated," and also that "no organization should be set up
which requires material change to pass from a peace to a war
basis." According to the War Plans Division, the new air
organization failed in two vital points when tested by these
principles. Noting that Assistant Secretary Lovett in

[30]

presenting the air organization for approval had agreed that GHQ
should be ultimately responsible for the planning and conduct of
operations, War Plans nevertheless held that the air organization
as proposed failed "to grant the Commanding General of the Field
Forces at GHQ command authority over all the means." The proposed
organization also failed "to prescribe a rapid and certain means of
coordinated employment of ground and air forces."
29 All of which
meant that while the air reorganization of June 1941 brought order
within the Army's air arm, it had not eliminated the "possibilities
for misunderstandings and trouble" that Secretary Stimson had
foreseen after the March 1941 reorganization.

In the meantime the passage of the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941
followed by President Roosevelt's decision to extend the scope of
American naval operations in the North Atlantic had again presented
the prospect of active if limited American involvement in the war.
It appeared by May that the Army might be ordered on short notice
to arrange the dispatch of expeditionary forces from the United
States to sundry strategic points along the Atlantic front. Such an
order was actually issued on 22 May when the President directed
that the Army and Navy prepare an expeditionary force ready to sail
to the Azores within one month's time. The preparation and dispatch
of a force of this sort required a type of detailed theater
planning and executive supervision that no War Department agency
was then prepared to perform.

General Marshall met this need by establishing an operations
section in GHQ. The directive for this new agency, which he
approved on 24 June, stated that GHQ should also prepare to divest
itself of its training functions, thus indicating the intention of
translating GHQ into the type of operational headquarters
contemplated in prewar planning. GHQ was granted broad powers to
plan and to control military operations, but only when it was
authorized by the War Department to do so for specified commands
and areas. When GHQ assumed its new operational functions on 3 July
1941, it also had instructions to take over the responsibility for
defense planning in the continental United States as soon as its
operational staff was ready to handle the work.30

As things worked out, before Pearl Harbor GHQ was not given the
authority to command the new continental defense organization
established in March and June 1941, and it had only limited
authority over continental

[31]

defense planning. The terms of the new GHQ directive and a statement in the
War Department RAINBOW 5 plan distributed in July together were interpreted
by the War Plans Division and GHQ as giving the latter the responsibility for
supervising the preparation of plans by the defense commands in the continental
United States. Subsequently the War Department specifically authorized GHQ to
supervise the preparation of continental as well as overseas regional defense
plans and to consult with appropriate representatives of the Army Air Forces,
the defense commands, and overseas organizations in the execution of this responsibility.31 Neither GHQ nor the defense commands were given the authority to
approve or disapprove continental air defense plans; they could only coordinate
the air defense portion of over-all plans with the plans of the Army Air Forces.

The operational mission of GHQ was further complicated by a
fundamental difference of opinion as to how best to organize for
continental and overseas defense. The method prescribed in March
1941 contemplated the segregation of continental defense forces
from those of overseas areas and bases. Generals Drum and DeWitt,
commanding the armies and defense commands on the Atlantic and
Pacific coasts, favored the linking of continental and overseas
forces as the best way of permitting the projection of Army power
in the direction of a hostile threat. General DeWitt wanted to keep
Alaska under his command, and General Drum's Northeast Defense
Command headquarters in August 1941 assumed that even Army bases
established in Great Britain would come under its authority.32 The
Army Air Forces wanted to establish northeastern and northwestern
air theaters that would tie in overseas areas and bases with the
air forces stationed along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the
United States.33 Under this plan the air strength of outlying bases
could be kept at a bare minimum, since reinforcements could be
readily shuttled from the continental United States without
violating command boundaries.

But a system under which the continental air forces would
provide overseas reinforcements on call was incompatible with a
defense organization segregating continental and overseas Army
forces. With the armies in theory also movable organizations, a
similar incompatibility existed in the Army-continental defense
command relationship at the time of Pearl Harbor.

When the United States went to war on 7 December 1941, the
Army's responsibility for defending the nation's continental area
rested with the four armies and four air forces rather than with
the defense commands that had been activated earlier in the year.
The first step toward translating these continental defense
commands into something more than planning agencies was taken the
day before the Japanese struck in the Pacific. As a result of a
suggestion first put forward by the War Plans Division in August
1941, the War Department on 6 December directed that the command of
harbor and coast defense units should pass from army to defense
commanders not later than 1 January 1942.34 The outbreak of war
precipitated more far-reaching changes. After conferring with his
principal subordinates on 11 December, General Marshall decided to
designate the Western Defense Command (including Alaska as a
theater of operations. Instructions to this effect were immediately
dispatched to General DeWitt, who took command of the new theater
before midnight the same day.35 Also on the 11th, General Drum, the
commander of the First Army, arranged an informal system for
coordinating Army and Navy defense forces in the northeastern
United States that lasted until the establishment of the Eastern
Theater of Operations a fortnight later.36 On both coasts the
commanders proceeded to organize the defense system long
contemplated in Army and Navy planning, coastal frontier sectors
and subsectors replacing the peacetime coast artillery district and
local harbor defense organizations.

The Western Defense Command as a theater commanded the Fourth
Army, the Second and Fourth Air Forces, and the Ninth Corps Area.
General DeWitt retained personal command of the now subordinate
Fourth Army and exercised control through a combined theater and
army headquarters. As a theater commander, General DeWitt
controlled all Army troops and installations within the bounds of
the Western Defense Command (which comprised California, Oregon,
Washington, Nevada, Idaho, Arizona, Utah, Montana, and Alaska),
except those specifically exempted by War Department instructions.
These instructions imposed three important categories of
limitations on his authority: those associated with the
organization and movement of air units within his theater; those
connected with the move-

[33]

ment of ground and air units and supplies through his theater to
overseas destinations; and those pertaining to nontactical
functions and installations that were kept under direct War
Department control. The first group of limitations was designed to
prevent any undue infringement of the autonomy of the air
organization, its training of air units, and their availability for
quick transfer to other theaters. The second and third groups were
essential to the establishment of any theater of operations within
the continental United States. These limitations did not seriously
restrict General DeWitt's freedom to use the means available within
his theater for defending it against both external and internal
attacks.37

On the east coast General Drum by conference had arranged an
interim working organization for the Northeast Defense Command and
a method of coastal defense collaboration between Army and Navy
commanders. The First Army established a central headquarters to
control all antiaircraft artillery units in the Northeast Defense
Command. The Army and Navy commands set up a Joint Operations
Office in New York that served as a model for joint operations
centers which the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations
asked other commands to establish. General Drum nevertheless
believed that the informal arrangements made were inadequate, and
he recommended the activation of the Northeast Defense Command as
the supreme Army authority in the northeastern United States.38

The War Department appreciated the desirability of centralizing
the Army's command authority on the east coast, but it also
recognized that the situation there differed fundamentally from
that on the Pacific coast since there was no likelihood of any
sizable land or air attack along the Atlantic front. Furthermore,
the existing defense organization could not be readily translated
into a theater of operations; the east coast was divided between
two defense commands, the Northeast and the Southern, and each
extended far into the interior of the continent. Air defense forces
had to be organized so that they could be concentrated anywhere
along the Atlantic coast, both in the continental United States and
seaward to Newfoundland in the north and to the Caribbean in the
south.39 With nothing more than minor air or naval attacks
foreseeable, there seemed to be no justification for a theater

[34]

organization of forces extending any great distance into the
interior. Therefore, instead of activating the Northeast Defense
Command, the Army established a new Eastern Theater of Operations
under General Drum's command. The Eastern theater included
Newfoundland and the continental coast from Maine to the Gulf of
Mexico at the Florida-Alabama line, and extended inland to a line
drawn about four hundred miles from the Atlantic coast. The theater
forces consisted initially of the First Army, the First and Third
Air Forces, units assigned or attached to the First, Second, and
Third Corps Areas, the forces of the
Newfoundland Base Command, and "all other units now stationed in
the Eastern Theater of Operations." Units of these forces currently
located outside the theater's boundaries were also put at the
disposal of its commanding general. The limitations imposed on the
theater commander's authority were virtually the same as those
prescribed for the Western Defense Command. The new theater became
active at noon on 24 December 1941.40

The War Department placed GHQ in command of the continental
theaters established in December 1941, but did not extend its
authority to include the Central and Southern Defense Commands.41 These commands, occupying about 55 percent of the continental
United States, changed in area, but their authority and means for
carrying out defense measures remained poorly defined until March
1942. As long as the Eastern and Western theaters lasted as such,
the zone of the interior was restricted, in theory, to the areas of
the Central and Southern Defense Commands. In accordance with
prewar plans the corps areas' responsibility for internal security
measures had passed to the theater commanders, but it remained with
the corps areas in the zone of the interior. In both theaters the
commanders began to organize a theater-type supply system and in
doing so made further inroads on the functions of the corps areas.

The greatest anomaly in the December reorganization, and the one
that called for immediate remedy, was the air defense situation.
The War Department's theater directives placed the four existing
continental air forces under

[35]

theater command, over the strong protest of the Army Air Forces,
but left the Air Force Combat Command responsible for air defense
measures in the Central and Southern Defense Commands. Early in
January the Second and Third Air Forces were moved inland from the
theaters and again came under Air Force Combat Command control, a
move that did not satisfy the Army Air Forces, which wanted either
to regain responsibility for all air defense means and measures in
the continental United States or to be excused from any such
responsibility altogether. General Arnold, as Chief of the Army Air
Forces, protested to the War Department in late January that he was
unable to discharge his assigned responsibilities for continental
air defense; but as Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, General Arnold
directed that no action be taken on this protest, except to use it
as an additional argument for War Department reorganization.42

The garrisons of the two continental theaters at the beginning
of 1942 contained the bulk of the trained or partly trained combat
ground and air units of the Army in the continental United States.
Their forces included nineteen of the thirty-four divisions, most
of the antiaircraft regiments, and more than two-thirds of the
available combat air units. A good many of the ground combat troops
were being used to guard vital installations-a task for which Army
field force units were neither designed nor trained. Despite
instructions directing the theater commanders to continue the
maximum degree of training compatible with tactical assignments,
the existing deployment of ground and air forces was bound to
interfere seriously with training, and furthermore it was
threatening to freeze the bulk of the Army's forces in a perimeter
defense of the continental United States. Only the imminent threat
of large-scale invasion could have justified a continued deployment
of this sort. Since it was soon evident that no such threat was in
the offing on either coast, GHQ had begun to study ways and means
of reducing the theater areas and garrisons even before the
activation of the Eastern theater on 24 December.43

To correct the situation, GHQ proposed that the Eastern and
Western theaters be reduced to coastal frontier areas approximately
one hundred miles wide, with Newfoundland separated from the
Eastern theater. Instead of com-

[36]

manding the bulk of the field forces, the theaters were to be
considered as task forces and would contain the air, antiaircraft,
harbor defense, and troop guard units actually needed for defending
the coasts against minor attacks. The First and Fourth Armies were
to be separated from the theaters, or at least partially segregated
from them, so that all of the armies could concentrate on training
larger field units. The corps areas would also be removed from
theater control and would assume all supply functions. The basic
idea of the GHQ plan was to "reduce theater forces to the minimum
required fox defense of the coastal frontier, based on the present
situation, and to return the maximum number of field forces to a
training status."
44 The War Plans Division agreed with the premises
underlying GHQ's proposals but disagreed with the remedies
suggested. War Plans wanted to maintain the existing theater
boundaries but to restrict interference with training by
large-scale exemption of units and installations from theater
control. It wanted to keep Newfoundland in the Eastern theater in
order to permit its ready air reinforcement. Pending the training
of military police battalions that could replace the field units
currently on internal guard duty, War Plans wanted to keep internal
security responsibility under the theaters in order to avoid
confusion and duplication in the assignment of troops to guard
duty.45

To resolve the conflicting recommendations of GHQ and the War
Plans Division on continental organization, General Marshall
decided to send Brig. Gen. Mark W. Clark, Deputy Chief of Staff of
GHQ, to make a survey of conditions on the west coast. Before
General Clark's departure, the Chief of Staff apparently also
decided that Generals Drum and DeWitt must be retained as
commanders of the First and Fourth Armies, thus disposing of GHQ's
recommendation that the armies and theaters be separated. After
conferences with General DeWitt and other Army officials, General
Clark recommended to General Marshall the abolition of theater
status but the retention of the existing bounds of the Western and
Eastern commands-the latter to be designated the Eastern Defense
Command. The principal mobile ground force units to be assigned to
the Eastern and Western commands would be approximately five and
six regimental combat teams, respectively. He also proposed to
divorce the corps areas and their functions from the defense
commands, and to allot all internal security responsibility to the
corps area commanders as soon as military police or other special
types of guard units became available to replace field force units
in guarding installations. The

[37]

only exception would be the retention by the Western Defense
Command of responsibility for guarding certain vital aircraft
factories on the west coast. These proposals would have placed the
four continental defense commands on a common plane, except that
the Eastern and Western commands would have retained control of
defensive air units and responsibility for air defense measures and
also, of course, would have had the great bulk of the forces
assigned to defense missions.46

There was general agreement on the major purpose of the new GHQ
recommendations-a sharp reduction in field forces currently
assigned to the theater commands. General DeWitt vigorously
disagreed with the proposal to remove the Ninth Corps Area and
particularly its control of antisabotage measures from his
jurisdiction.47 General
DeWitt's position was supported wholly or in part in the War
Department by the Provost Marshal General, by the War Plans
Division, by G-1, and by G-3. All agreed that internal security in
the Western Defense Command should remain a defense command
responsibility. War Plans wanted both Eastern and Western commands
to retain it, and also wanted to keep the theater designations.48

Before any action could be taken on the GHQ recommendations and
the objections raised thereto, a new element entered the picture.
The decision made in February for a sweeping reorganization of the
Army high command required a further modification of the
continental defense organization, since the reorganization
contemplated placing the corps areas under a new service command.
General Marshall therefore approved General Clark's GHQ plan in
principle, but he directed that it be revised to conform to the
proposed general reorganization of the Army and modified in other
minor particulars.49

The general reorganization of 9 March 1942 reduced the War
Department to two parts, the civilian offices of the Secretary of
War and his assistants, and the military staff headed by the Chief
of Staff and consisting of the War Department General and Special
Staff divisions. Under the Chief of Staff,

[38]

three major commands-the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air
Forces, and the Services of Supply (redesignated Army Service
Forces a year later)- absorbed many of the old War Department bureaus
and assumed- control of all nondefense functions of the Army within
the continental United States. GHQ was abolished, its training
functions being absorbed by the Army Ground Forces, and its
operating functions by the War Plans Division. This division (soon
renamed the Operations Division) became the Chief of Staff's
command post for directing operations. Thus the. continental
theaters and commands came under the command direction of the War
Plans Division, while the corps areas (presently renamed service
commands) were placed under the intermediate control of the
Services of Supply.50

On the same day that the Army published the general
reorganization plan, General McNair, who was about to take command
of the new Army Ground Forces, proposed to General Marshall a
scheme for shifting most of the larger field force units from
continental theater to Army Ground Forces control. He also proposed
that the First and Fourth Armies remain under the Eastern and
Western commands but that they be virtually divorced from the
training of large units (corps and divisions), most of which would
be put under the Second and Third Armies.51His recommendations were
followed generally in the continental reorganization that became
effective on 20 March. (Map 1)

In this reorganization the Eastern Theater of Operations was
abolished and the Eastern Defense Command was established within
the same area.52 Newfoundland remained under the administrative
control of the Eastern Defense Command, and a month later the
Bermuda Base Command was similarly attached to it. The Western
Defense Command kept its bounds, including Alaska, and its theater
status, but at this time the War Department intended that it too
would cease to be a theater of operations as soon as the movement
of the bulk of the Japanese population into the interior had been
completed. All but one of the divisions were taken away from
(though not necessarily taken out of) the Eastern Defense Command;
the Western Defense Command kept direct control of two divisions,
and the other major units within its bounds were placed under a
joint control with the Army Ground Forces. The Eastern and Western
Defense commanders might never-

theless use any troops within their bounds in an emergency.
Under the initial directive, the Western Defense Command continued
to command the Ninth Corps Area, including its supply and internal
security functions; in the rest of the United States the corps
areas and all their functions passed to the control of the Services
of Supply. A fortnight later the War Department also removed the
Ninth Corps Area from Western Defense Command control, but the
defense commander retained responsibility for Japanese and enemy
alien evacuation and for guarding installations, as well as control
over troops assigned to carry out these activities. The commanding
generals of the Second and Third Armies continued to command the
Central and Southern Defense Commands, which were now clearly
charged with all Army responsibilities for repelling external
surface and air attacks on their areas. Since this directive
specifically exempted the air forces within the Central and
Southern Defense Commands from defensive missions, the interior
defense commands could get air support only by calling upon air
units assigned to the Eastern and Western Defense Commands. The
First and Fourth Air Forces remained with the Eastern and Western
commands, which were also directed to centralize control over all
antiaircraft units under the Air Forces' interceptor commands.53

Soon after this reorganization, confusion developed over the
control of internal security measures. The War Department on 22
April rectified the situation by authorizing the defense commanders
to establish military areas within their commands. Within the
military areas, the defense functions of the corps area commanders
were to be put under the "direction and supervisory control" of the
defense commanders, and otherwise the defense commanders were made
"responsible for the planning and execution of all defense
measures."
54 Shortly thereafter, and with War Department approval,
Generals Drum and DeWitt created military areas coextensive with
the boundaries of their commands, and the Southern Defense Command
established a military area along the entire Gulf coast. Thus in a
wide belt along the coastal frontiers of the continental United
States the Army continued to maintain unity of command and
centralized control over all means assigned to defense.

The Army Air Forces challenged this unity and centralized
control in June 1942 by raising anew the question of responsibility
for continental air

[40]

defense, and specifically by asking that the First and Fourth
Air Forces be returned to its control. The Air Forces also proposed
to reorganize the four fighter commands directly responsible for
active air defense measures along geographic lines very different
from those of the defense commands. The fighter commands would also
be given control of blackouts, dimouts, and radio broadcasts. The
War Department passed these proposals on to the defense commanders
and to Army Ground Forces for comment.55

Army Ground Forces' single comment on the proposals was,
"Centralizing air defense would disrupt unity of command in the
defense commands .... Since unity of command is deemed vital, the
proposals are not favored."
56 This was the main reason for the War
Department's rejection of the Air Forces' requests. Though
recognizing that Air control would at least in theory permit a more
uniform and better integrated continental air defense system, the
War Department held that "the principle of unity of command within
the geographical subdivisions is of paramount importance in order
that the local defense effort may be coordinated under one
commander located at the scene of action."
57 Besides, as General
Drum pointed out, by midsummer of 1942 the existing continental
defense organization was beginning to function in as efficient a
manner as the limited means of the defense commanders permitted. He
added a comment worthy of inclusion in any study of organization:

The success or failure of any organization depends as much on
its being thoroughly understood by all concerned and competently
administered by all echelons as on its original form. The present
organization includes all elements essential to an effective
defense grouped under a single responsible commander, has been
developed for and is particularly well-suited to the assigned
mission, and has the advantage of months of trial and error.58

General DeWitt considered that the proposed changes were
"dangerously unsound and academic," that they would cripple the
entire structure of west coast and Alaskan defense, and that in any
event it was absurd to centralize control of west coast air defense
in Washington, three thousand or more miles from the scene of
action.59 The views of the defense commanders prevailed, and for
the time being both the responsibility and the control of air
defense

[41]

means remained with the Eastern and Western Defense Commands.
The Southern and Central Defense Commands kept the responsibility
but never did get independent control of active air defense elements.

Before Pearl Harbor no one raised the issue of Army-Navy unity
of command over continental United States defense forces.
Immediately thereafter, the Chief of the Army Air Forces proposed
that he be given command of all Army, Navy, and Marine Corps air
operations launched from continental bases. General Arnold pointed
out that in accordance with the RAINBOW
g plan the Army Air Forces was
responsible for the active air defense of the continental United
States, and that the very limited number of combat and patrol
aircraft available to both services seemed to require centralized
control of those at hand. The War Plans Division recommended to
General Marshall the establishment of air unity of command only on
the more exposed west coast.
60 The creation of continental theaters
of operations during December and the allocation to them of active
air defense responsibility changed one premise underlying
General Arnold's proposal; and for the time being General Marshall
withheld action on it.

The devastating submarine offensive that developed along the
Atlantic coast from January 1942 onward, and the continued threat
of carrier-based air attack on the west coast, required as much
offshore air reconnaissance as the Army and Navy could provide, as
well as bombardment aviation ready to strike at submarine and
surface vessels. The conduct of air reconnaissance and bombardment
operations against ships (unless they comprised a hostile invasion
force was a Navy mission, and the theoretical argument for Navy
unity of command over such operations was sound enough. But in
early 1942 the Navy had very few shore-based planes available for
such work, and the Army had to provide the bulk of the planes so
employed on both coasts. The Army's air arm in early 1942 was
itself too short of trained bombardment units to assign any of them
permanently to reconnaissance, which from the Air Forces' point of
view was distinctly a secondary mission. Besides, by the end of
January both continental theater commanders had worked out
satisfactory arrangements with the Navy for co-ordination of air
operations over the sea. At General Marshall's request, General
Clark of GHQ had also investigated this problem on the west coast
in late January. He joined with the local commanders in
recommending against any attempt to establish air unity of command
there. The Navy had so few planes that almost all of the
reconnaissance was being done by the Army anyway, and the
co-ordination of

[42]

Army and Navy air operations was as good as could be expected
under the circumstances.
61

The Navy rather than the Army was the first to propose a system
of command unity for continental frontiers. This development came
about in connection with a reorganization and redesignation of
naval coastal defense forces. "Sea frontiers" were replacing "naval
coastal frontiers"; and these sea frontiers, which were to contain
almost all of the Navy's coastal combat forces (ships and planes,
were being put under fleet command. The Navy's fleet commander,
Admiral Ernest J. King, proposed that the sea frontiers also
command all Army air units allocated to overwater operations.
General Marshall countered with the proposal "that full unity of
command in all continental coastal frontiers and Alaska be vested
in the Army over all naval forces which do not normally accompany
the fleet."
62

Informal discussion between General Marshall and Admiral King in
mid-February produced a tentative agreement on continental unity of
command. This arrangement would have placed the Navy's sea frontier
commanders under Army command except during fleet operations off
the coast. It would have put Army harbor defense forces except
antiaircraft units, and all other Army units engaged in operations
"involving missions in or over sea areas," under the Navy sea
frontier commanders. Thus Army overwater air operations would have
been under intermediate Navy command, but the Army theater or
defense commander would have retained authority to allot, withhold,
or rotate air units for this purpose as he desired. During adjacent
fleet operations, the normally allotted sea frontier forces (Army
and Navy would have been under fleet command, but this command
would not have extended to other Army continental defense forces.
Details of the arrangement were still unsettled when General
Marshall and Admiral King transmitted an interim joint directive on
25 March vesting the Navy sea frontier commanders immediately with
unity of command "over all Army air units allocated by defense
commanders for operations over the sea for the protection of
shipping and for antisubmarine and other operations against enemy
seaborne activities."
63

[43]

Instead of the agreement contemplated during February and March,
the Army and Navy in April agreed on a different plan for
continental coastal command-the essential difference being that in
a "state of non-invasion" unity of command would not extend beyond
the scope of the 25 March directive. If invasion threatened, the
Army and Navy chiefs were to declare either a "state of
fleet-opposed invasion" or a "state of Army-opposed invasion." In
the first case, the only change in the normal command relationship
would be to put under Army command such local naval defense forces
as were exempt from sea frontier command. In the second case, the
Army would command all coastal defense forces, including those of
the Navy's sea frontiers. Admiral King and General Marshall on 18
April declared a "state of non-invasion" to exist, and within the
continental defense commands (except in Alaska) this condition
remained unchanged throughout the war. Unity of command in the
continental United States during World War II was therefore
confined to Navy command of Army air units allocated to the Navy's
sea frontier commands for overwater missions.64

After mid-1942 the need for continental defense activity
progressively declined, but it was not until September 1943 that
the First and Fourth Armies were separated from the Eastern and
Western Defense Commands, and the First and Fourth Air Forces taken
away from them and restored to the Army Air Forces. Thereafter the
theory of Army unity of command was maintained by prescribing that,
with War Department approval, the commanding generals of the
Eastern and Western Defense Commands might assume command of any
air units within their territorial jurisdiction to meet a serious
hostile threat.65 On 27 October 1943 the War Department terminated
the Western Defense Command's theater status, detached Alaska from
it, and designated the latter a separate theater of operations
effective 1 November 1943. The Eastern Defense Command absorbed the
functions and area of the Central Defense Command at the beginning
of 1944, and a year later similarly absorbed the Southern Defense
Command. Thus the Army's continental defense structure remaining in
1945 was a mere shell of that created in December 1942, but
organizationally it still reflected the principles advocated in
prewar planning of wartime unified command responsibility and
over-all territorial coverage.