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Tuesday, November 30, 2010

Mr Assange's ego

Many years ago I was in a position where I read all the cables coming into my then Department from Australia's overseas posts. These included some remarkably detailed and frank assessments on people and activities in particular countries. My security clearance also meant that I saw some secret and top secret material, including code word material. This material was distributed by hand. In some cases, our security bloke sat there while I read it.

Not all of the assessments were valid even then. They included gossip and ephemeral material that had relevance, if it had relevance, just at a point in time. However, some of it was pungent and to the point.

A substantial proportion of the workings of an Government depends upon the maintenance of a degree of confidentiality. I used to think that there was too much confidentiality. Now I am coming to think that the opposite holds true. Certainly as a former reasonably senior public servant, I would not have written to my minister in the open way I did if I had thought that my advice might be leaked.

I always knew that my advice would go onto the public record one day for anybody who might want to read it. My concern was simply effectiveness at the time, including the chance to put forward ideas that were not necessarily thought through, did not involve a decision, but were simply part of the process of generating new policy. Because I knew my minister and his sense of humour, sometimes I would put things in such a way as to get a laugh.

To a substantial degree, good public policy depends upon the combination of two things: the capacity to think things though within a confidential space, combined with a proper paper trail so that final accountability is there.

Apart from the immediate damage done by Wikileaks to a variety of people and national interests, the latest imbroglio is likely to continue the erosive process that has been underway for some time, the removal of things from the record.

The role of the Government archivist is in part to preserve critical records so that later generations, and not so much later as all that, can understand and critique Government actions. This is longer term accountability.

But what happens when stuff is no longer recorded or, if recorded, is so sanitised as to be unusable? What happens when material sent is consciously deleted, delete after reading?

As you know, I am a bit of a history nut. As an historian, I deal with official records all the time. As a consultant and contractor dealing with current issues, I actually work with current record systems in private as well as public sectors. I can tell you that many of those systems are a mess and getting worse. They will get worse still if critical stuff is deleted.

I will try to write a proper post on this point so that I just don't seem an old fashioned fuddy-duddy. I have in fact worked within the on-line environment for the best part of thirty years.

For the moment, I just wanted to record my view that Mr Assange has, to my mind, done great damage that works directly against the things that he claims to believe in. It is, I fear, a case of ego rampant.

Postscript

I see from his twitter feed that my old friend Paul Barratt seems to disagree with my position. KVD, a regular commenter, has also taken me to task. I am cooking tea, so can't add more at the moment, but stand by my position.

I will add more, maybe tomorrow.

Postscript 2

I have added quite a long comment in response to KVD. I leave it to you to decide whether or not my concerns are justified.

Jim Belshaw gave a very good summary in a comment on his blog about the ramifications of this from the perspective of governments who wish to retain necessary confidentiality. I hope he frontpages it for future reference.

David, your wish is my command! I wrote:

KDV, we need to disentangle a few issues.

I don't know just what the Guardian means when it says that this type of information is readily available in the normal course to about 3 million Americans.

The US is about twenty times Australia in population. The Australian equivalent would be something over 150,000. There could well be 150,000 Australians including the military who have a security clearance to at least confidential level and who could therefore have at least theoretical access to at least some of the material. However, the number who have actual access is far less because of need to know.

As I see it, there are a cascade of issues in this case.

We start with the question of the extent to which Governments are, or should be, entitled to keep information confidential.

Then, within this boundary, we have the issue of when an employee or someone else with access is entitled in an ethical sense to breach trust or indeed break the law.

Beyond this, there is the question of those who then publish the material. Normally here we are talking about the media who have a general duty to report.

Then we have wikileaks, an organisation whose sole business is the publication of leaked information.

The ethical issues involved with wikileaks are different from those facing the Guardian. I would have thought that once the Guardian was given the material knowing that others would publish it including wikileaks, Guardian publication in some form was inevitable on both practical business grounds and because non-publication could be seen as censorship by the paper.

Surrounding these cascading issues are other sets of issues linked to the impact of the leaks.

If you look at immediate responses here, the commentary is set by individual or organisation frames of reference.

Because I have been so obsessed with the ways that Government systems work or don't work and the reasons for that, my immediate reaction was to ask what it means for the working of Government, rather than either the ethical questions or the impact on foreign policy, individuals and state reputations and relations.

At a general level, I had formed the view that approaches to information were part of the reason why Government systems and policy making were becoming less effective. Again at a general level, since I started blogging I have charted some of the ways in which Government responses to problems including issues with information have compounded problems.

To my mind, the biggest danger created by wikileaks lies in the nature of likely Government responses. I expect these to, among other things, reduce access to information; to increase the risks and penalties for those who do speak out; and to increase the constipation in Government systems that has already reduced effectiveness.

No Government can ignore what has happened. In Australia we have a whole of Government task force addressing the implications of the leaks. The position in the US is more complicated and dangerous.

It is over twenty years since I had direct contact with the US system and especially the military/defence side. The thing I noticed then was the sheer focus on security, on controls, on risks and rules that seemed to me to verge on paranoia. It was just a bit of a shock.

Reading the US reactions, we have hurt national pride, we have fury, we have demands for responses. While it is difficult to predict how all this will play out, I think that the likely effects will include further controls, a diminution in individual freedoms. God help the next whistle blower.

At a purely practical level, we can expect changes in the way that information is stored, disseminated and managed. I don't expect these to be good, either.

Since I wrote this comment, I have learned some facts that affect the detail but not the thrust of the comment. That's a matter for another post.

12 comments:

Anonymous
said...

Jim

This deserves much thoughtful comment by people much better placed than I am.

That said, my first reaction many weeks/months ago to these leaks was a simple one: it cannot be healthy for any so called democratic government to hold to itself any so called privileged information - unless in time of war.

Embarrassing - yes. Proving the need for some sort of higher secrecy - no. Assange is not my sort of person, but he appears to have given every opportunity to the publishers and the US government to "manage" the release.

The following (long) extract is from the UK Guardian. I would simply note that all released information has been "vetted" by that paper, and its European and US equivalents, and has been discussed with the US government, over a period of many months.

Finally, I think it very telling in the following extract that we are talking about information available in the normal course to no less than 3 million American citizens.

kvd

extract follows...

* guardian.co.uk, Sunday 28 November 2010 18.24 GMT

The articles published today and over coming weeks are drawn from US state department cables which were sent earlier this year to WikiLeaks, an organisation devoted to exposing secrets of all kinds. The Guardian is one of five publications around the world which has had prior access to the material – around 250,000 cables in all – on condition that we observed common deadlines over the timings of release. The others are the New York Times, Le Monde, El País and Der Spiegel.

The leaked material is the third such exercise in which the Guardian and other publications have been involved. The previous two involved military records from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The current release is of leaked dispatches from more than 250 US embassies and consulates worldwide. The documents range from unclassified to "secret". The latter is two rungs below the most confidential ranking of information: more than three million US citizens are cleared to see "secret" material.

WikiLeaks has not revealed the source of its information. It has played no part in the preparation, editing and reporting of the individual papers. Co-operation with WikiLeaks has been restricted to agreeing the dates on which we could cover specific regions. The news organisations have redacted some of the cables in order to protect a number of named sources and so as not to disclose certain details of current special operations. We have shared our redactions with WikiLeaks.

During the course of working on the material over many weeks each publication has formed its own individual judgments about specific stories. There are some cables the Guardian will not be releasing or reporting owing to the nature of sourcing or subject matter. Our domestic libel laws impose a special burden on British publishers.

All the publications involved have given early warning to the US government of our intention to publish. Government officials, who are aware of the general subjects we intend to cover, have not disputed the authenticity of the overall material. They have flagged up some specific, and some general, concerns.

While I understand the mentality behind the need to "keep things secret" I would note that this information was available to no less than 3 million US citizens.

Assange is not my cup of tea, but he appears to have provided his dump in a controlled fashion over many months and to have allowed the chosen newspapers to choose what they will publish, in consultation with the US government.

I think the Guardian editorial is worth a read. An extract is below.

kvd

The documents range from unclassified to "secret". The latter is two rungs below the most confidential ranking of information: more than three million US citizens are cleared to see "secret" material.

WikiLeaks has not revealed the source of its information. It has played no part in the preparation, editing and reporting of the individual papers. Co-operation with WikiLeaks has been restricted to agreeing the dates on which we could cover specific regions. The news organisations have redacted some of the cables in order to protect a number of named sources and so as not to disclose certain details of current special operations. We have shared our redactions with WikiLeaks.

During the course of working on the material over many weeks each publication has formed its own individual judgments about specific stories. There are some cables the Guardian will not be releasing or reporting owing to the nature of sourcing or subject matter. Our domestic libel laws impose a special burden on British publishers.

All the publications involved have given early warning to the US government of our intention to publish. Government officials, who are aware of the general subjects we intend to cover, have not disputed the authenticity of the overall material. They have flagged up some specific, and some general, concerns.

I don't know just what the Guardian means when it says that this type of information is readily available in the normal course to about 3 million Americans.

The US is about twenty times Australia in population. The Australian equivalent would be something over 150,000. There could well be 150,000 Australians including the military who have a security clearance to at least confidential level and who could therefore have at least theoretical access to at least some of the material. However, the number who have actual access is far less because of need to know.

As I see it, there are a cascade of issues in this case.

We start with the question of the extent to which Governments are, or should be, entitled to keep information confidential.

Then, within this boundary, we have the issue of when an employee or someone else with access is entitled in an ethical sense to breach trust or indeed break the law.

Beyond this, there is the question of those who then publish the material. Normally here we are talking about the media who have a general duty to report.

Then we have wikileaks, an organisation whose sole business is the publication of leaked information.

The ethical issues involved with wikileaks are different from those facing the Guardian. I would have thought that once the Guardian was given the material knowing that others would publish it including wikileaks, Guardian publication in some form was inevitable on both practical business grounds and because non-publication could be seen as censorship by the paper.

Surrounding these cascading issues are other sets of issues linked to the impact of the leaks.

If you look at immediate responses here, the commentary is set by individual or organisation frames of reference.

Because I have been so obsessed with the ways that Government systems work or don't work and the reasons for that, my immediate reaction was to ask what it means for the working of Government, rather than either the ethical questions or the impact on foreign policy, individals and state reputations and relations.

At a general level, I had formed the view that approaches to information were part of the reason why Government systems and policy making were becoming less effective. Again at a general level, since I started blogging I have charted some of the ways in which Government responses to problems including issues with information have compounded problems.

To my mind, the biggest danger created by wikileaks lies in the nature of likely Government responses. I expect these to, among other things, reduce access to information; to increase the risks and penalties for those who do speak out; and to increase the constipation in Government systems that has already reduced effectiveness.

No Government can ignore what has happened. In Australia we have a whole of Government task force addressing the implications of the leaks. The position in the US is more complicated and dangerous.

It is over twenty years since I had direct contact with the US system and especially the military/defence side. The thing I noticed then was the sheer focus on security, on controls, on risks and rules that seemed to me to verge on paranoia. It was just a bit of a shock.

Reading the US reactions, we have hurt national pride, we have fury, we have demands for responses. While it is difficult to predict how all this will play out, I think that the likely effects will include further controls, a diminution in individual freedoms. God help the next whistle blower.

At a purely practical level, we can expect changes in the way that information is stored, disseminated and managed. I don't expect these to be good, either.

I may make further comment later - my own computer has been off air for some hours - but I would just like to note a couple of things:

1) my initial then retried posting was more in response to your putting this down as some sort of ego trip by Assange. I think it is a lot more complex than that, as are the responses.2) in attempting to get a reply that would actually "stick" I foreshortened my response, and probably thereby lost the sense I wished to pursue. Apologies3) your now linked newspaper article immediately brings to mind several other recent Australian citizens and their treatment (or lack thereof) by our government. We really are moving in an unhealthy direction I believe, when some elected official can choose or not to support or destroy an Australian citizen because he is temporarily on the wrong side of our political class.

All of the above aside, I really do appreciate your comments re the need for appropriate confidentiality in the affairs of government. However I would point out that the same dangers lurk here as are apparent in the quite vocal opposition to internet censorship.

While I wait for my earlier comment to appear, I repeat - I have no argument with your analysis of the consequences, just the reaction and the target of the reaction..First, we have a government (the US) storing thousands of absolute dross-level messages, classifying them as “secret”, but failing to secure them.

We then have a thief, or possibly several thieves; and “a messenger” – Assange; and then the press – quite considered in their release if you accept the Guardian editorial.

The solution? Accuse the messenger of r-pe with, apparently, the full cooperation of the messenger’s own government.

I used the word ego deliberately because that was the way I saw it. In terms of Government responses in my reply to your comment, Mr Hick et al were in the back of my mind. Or, for that matter, the war on terrorism.

I will try to write something on the confidentiality issue because I don't actually think that journalists or the public have an automatic right to know. Further, some diseases are worse than the cure because of the side-effects.

Jim:I don't know just what the Guardian means when it says that this type of information is readily available in the normal course to about 3 million Americans. That is the number(+/-) of U.S. citizens with security clearance of the level to have access to such documents as being released.Leaves a bit of a problem with security,don't you think?. Anyhow, am slightly on the side of WikiLeaks, I hope our Assange comes to no harm.

Hi Anon. I think that your are right on the security question, that was part of my point. What I did not know when I wrote was the nature of the very centralised information systems introduced by the US following 9/11. This allowed what some one has called an industrial scale leak.

I too hopre that he comes to no harm. The difficulty is that if you poke a brown snake with a large enough stick you get bitten.

Jim,As I'm on the 'land' so to type,I always take into account that Brown Snakes or Foxes are like most of us, just trying to make a living, it may well be that they hold morals (full belly,sex,a life of aware, whatever it takes) and fear of higher threat than they hold that they find repulsive.In short, a murder of Crows is apt, and applies, perhaps the the one eye left is Assange, hump, more I think the more I'm with the fellow.Bye the way, you can be more 'forceful' in you occasional thoughts in the Armidale Express, we are mostly aware of what is going on, one hopes that a standard does not apply via Rural Press and yourself. Rupert may well lay in his bed and smile, when if you consider that he may well be a cause of much of the WikiLeaks, one hopes he finds the bed as an irksome as he looks at his life, he wont, he cant. Rarely I find distaste in people, give me numerous Assange's and no Ruperts.

Hi again, anon. Maybe I was being unfair on brown snakes! A murder of crows is certainly more colourful! Interesting comment on the Express column. I might respond to that via a comment in this morning's post.

Keep Belshaw writing!

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