Maladminstration in the provision of welfare support did not infringe the right to private life under Article 8 unless the public authority in question was particularly culpable and even then damages should not necessarily be awarded

Public law schemes involving a two-tier decision-making process would usually engage the citizen's private law civil rights engaging Article 6 of the Convention, but the statutory scheme designed by Parliament, coupled with the availability of judicial review would usually be sufficient to satisfy the Article 6 standard.

Where a mother was unlawfully present in the United Kingdom the decision of a local authority to cease providing her and her two children with accommodation had not been unlawful, perverse or irrational, nor had it been in breach of Article 8.

For property transactions such as the transfer of housing under the Housing Act from one registered landlord to another, the appropriate test of proportionality under Article 1 Protocol 1 required a decision which was justified on the basis of a compelling case in the public interest and as being reasonably necessary but not obligatorily the least intrusive of Convention rights.

In providing care and accommmodation for residents placed within it by a local authoirty, a privately owned care home was not performing public functions so as to attract liability under the Human Rights Act 1998

Once a local authority and a contractual and proprietary right to possession of a property, an Article 8 defence could only apply in exceptional cases. Lower courts must follow binding domestic precedent and not apparently inconsistent authority from the European Court of Human Rights

Article 8 of the Convention would not be infringed by the making of an order for possession in favour of a local authority that was simply seeking to enforce its right to possession of its own freehold property against a person who no longer had any right under domestic law to remain in possession.

The statutory mechanism under the Housing Act 1996 that allowed local authorities to obtain possession of their housing on the grounds of domestic violence by a tenant, did not of itself render unlawful other methods of achieving the same result, nor was it incompatible with Article 8.

Section 185(4) of the Housing Act 1996 was held to be incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The provision breached Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 when it required a dependent child of a British citizen who was subject to immigration control to be disregarded when determining whether the citizen had a priority need for accommodation.

Where a tenant occupied a residence after the expiry of their tenancy that occupation still qualified as a "home" under Article 8 but possession proceedings by a public authority landlord after a notice to quit had terminated the tenancy did not violate that Article.

To complain of discrimination in breach of Article 14, it is necessary to have “other status” within the meaning of Article 14 jurisprudence. Being homeless or a "rough sleeper" was not a "personal characteristic" and therefore did not qualify as “other status”.

“Domestic violence” in section 177(1) of the Housing Act 1996 has been extended to include threatening or intimidating behaviour and any other form of abuse which, directly or indirectly, may give rise to the risk of harm.