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ff. 15 ὧδεδὲκρῖνεκτλ. The following
sentences are among the most perplexing in the whole of the Republic, or
indeed in the whole of Plato's writings. That the reading of the MSS is corrupt has been
admitted by the majority of critics, and will be proved in App. VI, to which I must
refer for a full discussion on the text and interpretation of this difficult passage.
Here it is possible only to set down what seems to me, after a review of all the
conditions of the problem, the least unsatisfactory solution. The emendation in the
text, which I printed in my Text of the Republic, has been approved by a
critic in Hermathena XXIV p. 252. We have to discover whether food, drink
etc. participate in pure Being more than true opinion, knowledge etc.; and the answer is
arrived at by the following steps. (1) Which is
more—that which is connected with the ever-like, the immortal and Truth, and
which is itself of this nature, and found in something of this nature; or that which is
connected with the never-like and mortal, and which is itself of this nature (never-like
etc.) and found in something of this nature? That which is connected with the ever-like,
says Glauco, is more. (2) Then does the Being of the never-like (ἀεὶἀνομοίου= μηδέποτεὁμοίου）
participate in Being at all more than the Being of Knowledge does? Certainly not
(οὖν is strictly illative: if it is true that what
is connected with the ever-like is more than what is connected
with the never-like, then the Being of the never-like cannot be
more than Knowledge is—for Knowledge of course ἔχεταιτοῦἀεὶὁμοίου. Knowledge is in short taken as a type of that which
ἔχεταιτοῦἀεὶὁμοίου). (3) Or has the Being of
the never-like more part in Truth than Knowledge has? To this also the
answer is no: [for that which is connected with the ever-like—and Knowledge is
so—is connected also with Truth: see above τὸτοῦἀεὶὁμοίουἐχόμενον—καὶἀληθείας]. (4) And if it has less part in truth [as it has], it must also have less part in
Being. [This deduces from step (3) the conclusion already implied in (2), and also paves
the way for οὐκοῦνὅλως—μετέχει]. (5)
Thus—since what is true of Knowledge is true of all the
spiritual γένη, [and since food etc. are of course only
particular examples of the ἀεὶἀνόμοιον or
never-like], universally (ὅλως) those γένη which are concerned with the care of the body have less
part in Being and Truth than those which are concerned with the care of the soul. For a
further discussion of this passage and other suggested solutions and emendations see
App. VI.

τὸτοῦἀεὶὁμοίουκτλ. The whole of
this passage presupposes, as Grimmelt shews (de reip. Pl. comp. et
unit. pp. 74 ff.), the metaphysical theory of V—VII. With τοῦἀεὶὁμοίου cf. V 479 A and VI 500 C: with ἀθανάτου VI 485 B (ἐκείνηςτῆςοὐσίαςτῆςἀεὶοὔσης): and with καὶἀληθείας VI 508 D. The last two words are rejected by Madvig and Baiter on
the grounds that (1) we should expect an adjective, (2) καὶἀληθείας has no antithesis expressed, whereas ἀεὶὁμοίου and ἀθανάτου have: (3) the words
unduly anticipate τίδ̓; ἀληθείας; below. As I
understand the passage, the mention of Truth is necessary— see
above—just in view of τίδ̓; ἀληθείας; and
there is little weight in Madvig's first two arguments.

καὶαὐτὸκτλ. Is καί here and in καὶαὐτό again below
‘and’ (Schneider) or ‘both’? The first view is
perhaps more likely: for it is more in keeping with the somewhat loose structure of the
argument throughout this passage, and καί in D below
(καὶαὐτό) is most probably
‘and.’

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