NOW with audio: Listen to Federico Fuentes' assessment after just returning from Bolivia. Morales seems to
have outmanouevred the ultra-right's attempts to unseat him and
to have made his position stronger, while his enemies are in
disarray. He is so confident of his support in the popular social
movements now that he is holding another referendum next month. Thanks to Left Click.

La Paz, Bolivia -- October 28, 2008 -- After three months of intense class struggle, there can be no
doubt that the US-backed right-wing opposition to the government of
President Evo Morales has suffered three important defeats. The right’s
offensive to topple Morales, which climaxed with the September 11-12
“civic coup” attempt, has been decisively rolled back by the combined
action of the government and social movements.

The government secured a historic vote in
its favour with more than 67% endorsing Morales’ mandate in a
referendum in August that also revoked the mandate of two opposition
prefects. Another opposition prefect was arrested for his role in the
coup. And now Morales has secured a referendum for the new draft constitution to “refound Bolivia” on the basis of justice for the
indigenous majority.

More importantly, a strengthened Morales
government now counts on an unprecedented alliance of indigenous,
peasants’ and workers’ organisations determined to defend their
government and the Morales-led “democratic and cultural revolution”.

Third wave of struggle

With the turn of the century, Bolivia’s
social movements — united behind Bolivia’s powerful indigenous peasant
movement — began to rise up in opposition to neoliberalism and
indigenous oppression, overthrowing two presidents and paving the way
for the victory of the Morales-led Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) in
early general elections in 2005.

On assuming the presidency, Morales moved
to nationalise Bolivia’s gas reserves and convoke a constituent
assembly to draft a new constitution — the two central demands of the
mass movement.

A concerted campaign led by reactionary
forces grouped around the prefects of the “half moon” — the eastern
departments (or provinces) of Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz and Tarija — to wear down
government support in order to pave the way for Morales’ downfall,
succeeded in stopping the advance of this process for most of 2007.

Mistakes by the government and a relative demobilisation of the movements also contributed.

With their ability to mobilise an
important social base against the government in the east around defence
of “regional autonomy” and to stall the constituent assembly around the
demand for a two-thirds majority vote on the new constitution, these
forces spread their support outside of the half moon to the central
departments of Cochabamba, where violent clashes occurred in January
2007, and then Chuquisaca.

Racist attacks against indigenous people
and the assembly delegates in Chiquisaca’s capital Sucre forced the
assembly to reconvene, first in a military barrack and afterwards in a
different state — without the opposition — to approve the final text.

Bolivia appeared to be approaching the abyss, as regional and ethnic tensions deeply divided the country.

Victory at the ballot box

Believing that the time was right to move
to get rid of Morales, the right-wing Podemos party (which controls the
Senate) approved a law for recall referendums on Morales and the
prefects.

This was also partly an attempt by Podemos
to seize the initiative within the opposition from the half moon
opposition prefects.

The opposition prefects, now grouped
together in the National Democratic Coalition (CONALDE), initially
opposed the referendums. However, following a series of meetings with
US ambassador Phillip Goldberg, they agreed to accept the challenge.

A June by-election resulted in an anti-MAS
prefect replacing the MAS predecessor in Chuquisaca, further lifting
the right’s hopes.

But the results of the August 10 vote
demonstrated a totally different reality. Morales’ mandate was endorsed
with an historic 67.4% of the vote.

Morales also won in Pando, tied in Tarija
and got more than 40% in Beni and Santa Cruz, with the opposition’s support
base isolated to the main cities, encircled by MAS-aligned rural areas.

In the majority of rural electorates
Morales scored over 90%, while in poor urban areas like El Alto in the
west and Plan 3000 in Santa Cruz his support was above 80%.

Opposition prefects were also recalled in Cochabamba and La Paz.

Together with social programs that had
begun to change the lives of millions, the deep connection felt with a
president “just like us” that exists among the indigenous and poor
urban sectors helps explain this result.

A coup by any other name

Fearing the government would use this
victory to push ahead with a referendum on the draft Constitution, the
right wing went to Plan B.

After a series of meetings between the US
ambassador, US congresspeople and the half moon prefects, it was agreed
to enact a plan to destabilise the east, stirring up violence to the
point where either the military would be forced to react, causing
deaths and Morales’ resignation, or creating the justification for some
kind of United Nations intervention to “restore stability”.

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Small groups of balaclava-wearing thugs
took over airports to create an image of a president that could not set
foot in half the country, while the prefects openly talked about
regional independence.

With violent attacks on indigenous people
escalating, fascist youths began to target police officers and
soldiers. The aim was to stir up discontent within these institutions.

The plan was ratcheted up as
paramilitaries began to appear openly together with armed youths and to
take over and loot state institutions, stating that they would now come
under the jurisdiction of the prefectures.

Uncertain as to the potential reaction from the people and soldiers, the government wavered on whether to send in troops.

At the same time, the right began to seek
out support among high-ranking military officials. On September 5, a
meeting was held between US embassy representatives and military
figures, including the Santa Cruz-based commander of the army’s eighth
division, General Marcos Bracamonte.

Bracamonte agreed to not act against the coup plot.

The government finally decided to order
the top commander of the armed forces Luis Trigo, known to have links
with the Santa Cruz oligarchy, to move into Pando to take control of
the situation. He responded that he would do nothing until a
presidential decree had been signed to ensure that full responsibility
for any blood spilt lay with Morales.

Once in Pando, he ordered troops to remain
in their barracks and turned off his phone. According to sources in the
government, Morales could not communicate with Trigo for four days.
Others in the military high command did the same.

An emergency meeting of social movements
was held in Cochabamba on September 10 where they resolved to march on
Santa Cruz and crush the coup-plotting offensive.

Pando massacre

In order to distract the attention of the
social movements focused on Santa Cruz, the coup plotters agreed to
create a crisis in Pando.

Paramilitaries ambushed and fired upon
unarmed peasants travelling to a meeting of their departmental union
federation. At least 20 men, women and children were massacred, with
more than 60 still missing.

A wave of revulsion spread throughout
society, including among middle-class sectors in the east that the
opposition had hoped to mobilise.

The social movements stepped up plans to
encircle Santa Cruz. Peasants in the rural areas of Santa Cruz cut off
all access to the city.

Amidst generalised revulsion against the
actions of the right, and with the social movements on the march,
Morales — and the entire ministerial cabinet according to one source —
signed the decree to implement martial law in Pando.

Desire for action also swept through the
military, as soldiers demanded to be allowed to go and defend their
indigenous brothers. Under direct orders from Morales, new troops were
sent to Pando.

After fighting off armed paramilitaries in the airport, they moved in to restore order in the capital Cobija.

Three days later, at an emergency summit
of the Union of South American Nations (Unasur), nine countries in the
region came out strongly in defence of the Morales government and
against any attempt to break up Bolivia.

Lacking international support, and with
their plan unravelling, the prefects quickly called for a return to
dialogue. The right-wing gangs began to lift their roadblocks and the
government regained control of public buildings.

Although many of the social movement
marchers wanted to continue until they reached the central plaza of
Santa Cruz, on September 23 a decision was taken to end the protest and
avoid a potential confrontation and bloodbath, as there were no
guarantees for the security of protesters and snipers were rumoured to
be present.

Dialogue

The government stated that the dialogue
would focus on two controversial issues: regional autonomy and the
level of funding to the departments from the direct tax on hydrocarbons.

Meanwhile, the government stepped up its
campaign to hunt down those responsible for the Pando massacre and the
destruction of state property. Pando prefect Leopoldo Fernandez,
accused of ordering the massacre, had gone into hiding. He was found
and arrested.

Numerous opposition “civic leaders” find themselves in the same situation.

With no overall agreement reached,
dialogue shifted to Congress. Even with the votes of the other two
opposition parties, MAS did not have the numbers without support from
at least some Podemos deputies to achieve the required two-thirds vote
of approval for a referendum on the Constitution.

The National Coalition for Change
(CONCALCAM), which unites more than 30 peasant, indigenous, workers' and
social organisations, together with the Bolivian Workers Central (COB) in a
historic unity pact, decided to organise a march on Congress to ensure
the approval of the law.

As a result of negotiations, the
mobilisation of the social movements and the overwhelming public
support for the law’s approval, Congress voted on October 20 to hold a
referendum in January.

As well as agreeing to minor modifications
to around 100 of the 411 articles in the draft, the government agreed
to take Morales’ current presidential term into account under the new constitution. This means Morales will not be able to stand for
re-election in 2014 if he wins the proposed December 2009 presidential
elections.

The new constitution will limit presidents to a maximum of two terms in office.

A separate referendum will be held to determine whether large landholdings will be limited to 5000 or 10,000 hectares.

The land reform proposed in the constitution will not be retroactive, but continued ownership of land
will depend on landowners using the land productively.

The CONALCAM supported the decisions,
arguing that they demonstrated the willingness of the government to
negotiate, and announced that it will immediately begin to campaign for
a “yes” vote.

On the other hand, while the parliamentary
right have stated they will also campaign in favour of the new constitution that until recently they described as approved by a
“constituent assembly stained in blood”, the opposition prefects have
announced they will campaign for a “no” vote.

An important political space has opened up
in the east, where broad parts of society that until now have not felt
part of MAS’s project, now openly reject the right-wing prefects who
hoped to drag them into a civil war.

How MAS can reach out to these sections
and consolidate its national hegemony is a crucial question in the next
period. MAS is attempting to use the issue of regional autonomy,
previously used by the right, to win these sections over to an autonomy
based on solidarity and national unity.

Importantly, the Morales government now
also counts on the revitalised social movements, which, together with
their government, successfully neutralised the fascist coup attempt.

‘The people will decide’

By Federico Fuentes

La Paz, Bolivia -- “For the social movements and the Bolivian
people, the approval of the new constitution is key to reversing the
centuries of discrimination”, Julio Salazar, executive secretary of the
Six Federations of Coca Growers from the Tropics of Cochabamba, told Green Left Weekly.

Sitting in his office, the walls covered
with posters of Bolivian President Evo Morales, who also presides over
the six federations, Salazar explained that “no matter what happens, no
matter what they say, no matter what it costs, the new constitution has
to be approved”.

“The social movements are going to mobilise in order to ensure this happens.”

Together with a busload of cocaleros, we
arrived in Caracollo on October 13 to begin the 200-kilometre march on
Congress to force that body to agree to a referendum on the new
constitution that was drafted by an elected constituent assembly.

At 2 am in the morning of October 21,
Morales signed the historic law of convocation for the referendum,
while more than 100,000 protesters — with whom he had spent the last
11 hours awaiting Congress’s decision — cheered and shouted for
joy.

Bolivians will now go to the polls on
January 25 to vote on the draft constitution — demanded since the
peasant mobilisations of the early 1990s — that will dramatically
increase the rights of the historically excluded indigenous majority,
expand state control over natural resources and land, and give a
measure of autonomy to departments, municipalities and indigenous
peoples within the framework of a united plurinational state.

Once approved, new elections will be held in December 2009 for president, vice-president, the Congress and departmental prefects.

Conversing at the start of the march,
Salazar pointed to the crowd and explained: “Before they used to say it's just the peasants, the cocaleros, that are marching. This time,
other sectors are uniting with us: health workers, teachers, university
students, neighbourhood committees, professionals are all participating
in the march.”

Pedro Montes, head of the Bolivian Workers
Central (COB), which joined forces with the National Coalition for
Change (CONALCAM) to organise the march, told Green Left Weekly that the protest was
a demonstration of the type of unity that was required to ensure “the
refounding of Bolivia”.

“Our recent national gathering voted to be
part of this march. All our regional centrals and affiliated unions
will be participating”.

Asked what would happen if some union
leaders decided not to participate, Montes replied that “the rank and
file will go over the top of them”.

“The people have wakened up”, said
Leonilda Zurita, leader of the National Federation of Peasant Women of
Bolivia–Bartolina Sisa (FNMCB-BS).

“Today, our president comes from the
people, a people that have become the government. With or without Evo,
this process will continue.

“It is the people that will decide, at the
ballot box and not with arms as the oligarchs wanted… The choice is
clear: continue the process of change or return to neoliberalism.”