Taking risks

In the face of the terrorist threat, Gordon Brown told parliament yesterday, Britain must be "strong in security, robust in our resolve, resilient in response". He detailed the scale of that threat: 15 attempted terrorist plots since 9/11; some 30 more plots known to authorities; 2,000 individuals being monitored. The new prime minister outlined the government strategy for what he called "a generation-long challenge to defeat al-Qaida-inspired terrorist violence". He announced an integrated border force to combat terrorism, a review of the use of intercept evidence in court, and plans to double the current limit for detaining terror suspects without charge, from 28 to 56 days.

Brown's thinking on detention without trial echoes that of Tony Blair, but his approach is markedly different. Gone is the macho idea that liberties are only of concern to Hampstead liberals. "Liberty is the first and founding value of our country," he said yesterday, "and security is the first duty of government." Every measure taken to increase security will be complemented by additional protection against arbitrary treatment of the individual. His proposals, upon which he invites discussion, are that any case for extension beyond 28 days should be hedged with safeguards. For instance, a specific case would have to be made to the director of public prosecutions, reviewed every seven days by a high court judge, and looked at in a regular way by parliament itself.

There will be many who feel that Brown is proposing to trample on civil freedoms, just as Blair did. Is he not, ask detractors, simply playing up to the tabloids by exaggerating the threat posed by terrorism? After all, horrific though they were for those involved, only a few people have died or been injured in the terrorist attacks so far. Many more perished in terrorist attacks when the IRA was active than have been killed in Britain by al-Qaida-style terrorism.

This debate very much hinges upon the assessment of risk. We are faced with a range of risks whose calculation is difficult. Terrorism is one of these, along with the risk of pandemics, or financial meltdown. How seriously we take the risk affects the very nature of that risk. For instance, the threat posed by avian flu to health is very damaging. Recognising its lethal implications, governments and health agencies have mobilised large-scale resources to trying to prevent it. Let's suppose (and hope) they are successful. Many people will then say: "It's just like Sars a few years ago. You were scaring us unnecessarily - look, nothing has happened."

It is the same with international terrorism, which is potentially far more destructive than the local terrorism of the IRA ever was. One should remember that, under the worst-case scenario, 50,000 people could have died in 9/11, rather than the 3,000 who did. At the outer edge of possibility, terrorist groups could acquire nuclear capability. We must mobilise against such risks, and have to strike a new balance between liberty and security to do so. However, if security precautions are successful, there will always be those who will declare that the risks were exaggerated.

Brown's approach is right. It is better than Blair's, because it displays more determination to surround new powers with qualifications. But one thing is missing, and that is precisely considered risk assessment. Alongside the safeguards Brown has suggested, there should be reporting to parliament and to the public about what the risks are at any point in time, backed with informed thinking. Some material will have to be kept confidential; but since so much rests on risk analysis, the reasoning involved should be scrutinised on a continuing basis. It must be well researched - no more dodgy dossiers, thank you.