24. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger)
to President Nixon1

Washington, September 15,
1969.

SUBJECT

Talking Points for Your Use with Senator Fulbright at the
Leadership Meeting, September 152

At the Leadership Meeting on September 15 it is possible that Senator
Fulbright will want to speak to you about the US role in Thailand. Although he has said that his
differences with Secretary Laird over release of the Project Taksin plan
(a contingency plan covering joint US-Thai operations to defend Thailand against aggression under
the more general provisions of the SEATO Treaty) have now been eliminated, he may still wish
to have a copy of this document turned over to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. He may also reiterate the line which he has taken
publicly to the effect that Project Taksin is in effect an automatic
commitment by the US to use its forces to
fight in Thailand.

Your Recommended Position

—The US commitment to Thailand
exists wholly in the context of the SEATO Treaty, which in the event of aggression by an
armed attack on any of its parties calls on them to act to meet the
common danger in accordance with their constitutional procedures. In
the case of subversion, all that the parties undertake to do is to
consult. The Rusk–Thanat
Declaration of 1962 adds that our obligations are individual as well
as collective but we regard this as simply a valid restatement of
the responsibilities set forth in the SEATO Treaty.

—Project Taksin represents nothing more than a contingency plan
undertaken within the framework of the SEATO Treaty. This type of contingency planning is a
normal military function. The plan cannot be put into effect without
the specific approval of both the Thai and US Governments, and emphatically does not automatically
commit US troops to fight in
Thailand.

—The USSEATO commitment to Thailand is a
firm one, however, and affects the entire political relationship
between our two countries. You have said, and you wish to reiterate,
that the US will live up to
commitments of this nature.

—You have also stated that our commitment does not extend to using
US forces to help fight internal
subversion. Our role is limited to providing military equipment and
economic assistance where needed. The Thai understand this, and have
publicly said that they do not want US troops to assist them in dealing with their
insurgency.

—Demonstrating the Thai attitude toward the presence of US troops in Thailand, the Thai
Government has encouraged US to
reduce the level of US forces in
Thailand if not needed for Vietnam. It understands that these troops
are present in connection with the Vietnam war, and can be withdrawn
as their need diminishes.

—You consider that the Thai deserve a great deal of credit for
their staunchness as a US ally.
Despite their tradition of not becoming identified with any great
power, they joined with US as long
ago as 1950 to help resist aggression in Korea, they have cooperated
with us fully in regional and world affairs, and they have sent
troops to fight in Vietnam in recognition of the issues involved
there. But they are a very sensitive Asian people, and feel that
somehow their contributions are overlooked or misunderstood. You
personally believe that it is important to reassure them on this
score.

—(If asked) Concerning release of the
Project Taksin plan, you understand that arrangements have been
worked out whereby the document is available at the Department of
Defense for scrutiny by members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.3 You
hope that this arrangement is satisfactory. To do more would of
course raise a Constitutional question over executive privilege and
separation of powers, and you believe that this issue deserves
further study.

Holdridge indicated in a September 15 memorandum to Kissinger that he had drafted
the talking points for the President “in the event that Senator
Fulbright uses the Leadership Meeting” to bring up his
“reservations about the US role
in Thailand.”↩

A notation next to this
sentence in Nixon’s
handwriting reads: “H.K. Does this make
sense? I question revealing any
contingency plan. 9–15–69”↩