The Doomsday Clock is an internationally recognized design that conveys how close we are to destroying our civilization with dangerous technologies of our own making. First and foremost among these are nuclear weapons, but the dangers include climate-changing technologies, emerging... Read More

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Theodore A. Postol

A physicist, Postol is professor of science, technology, and national security policy at MIT. His expertise is in ballistic missile defense technologies and ballistic missiles more generally. Prior to coming to MIT, he worked as an analyst at the Office of Technology Assessment and as a science and policy adviser to the chief of naval operations. In 2001, he received the Norbert Wiener Prize from Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility for uncovering numerous false claims about missile defenses.

Close study of photographic and video imagery of Israeli Iron Dome defense inceptors engaging with Hamas rockets—both in the current conflict and in the 2012 hostilities—shows that the Israeli rocket-defense system's success rate has been very low—as low as 5 percent or, perhaps, even less.

A recent National Academy report reaches flawed conclusions based on incorrect assumptions, analytical oversights, and internal inconsistency. It should undergo a comprehensive technical review before it is used in missile defense policy making.

Just a few weeks ago, on September 11, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report titled "Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: an Assessment of Concepts and Systems for US Boost Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives." It is an astonishing document, given that it purports to be the product of a respectable scientific institution. It contains numerous flawed assumptions, analytical oversights, and internal inconsistencies.

The authors show that the United States has the ability to defend itself from long-range nuclear armed ballistic missiles if it builds the right systems—defenses based on stealthy drones that could shoot down ballistic missiles in powered flight after they have been launched from fixed known sit

North Korea tested a launch vehicle called the Unha-2 from its Musudan-ri launch site in North Hamgyong province on April 5 local time (April 4, 10:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time). Using information that has become available since the test and information from previous tests, we have conducted a technical analysis that leads to a compelling description of the Unha-2 launcher. This analysis suggests both challenges and potential opportunities.