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GAO-12-293R:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
February 23, 2012:
Congressional Committees:
Subject: Afghanistan Security: Department of Defense Effort to Train
Afghan Police Relies on Contractor Personnel to Fill Skill and
Resource Gaps:
The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan depends in part on building that
country's capacity to provide for its own security by training and
equipping the Afghan National Security Forces, which includes the
Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police (ANP).[Footnote 1]
Since 2002, the United States has allocated over $43 billion to train,
equip, and sustain the Afghan National Security Forces, which includes
about $14 billion to train, equip, and sustain the ANP. The ANP
training program is intended to create and sustain a professionally-
led police force that is accountable to the Afghan people and is
capable of enforcing laws and maintaining civil order. Currently,
U.S., coalition, and Department of Defense (DOD) civilian contractor
personnel assist the Afghan Ministry of Interior in training the ANP
at 23 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) training sites and in
mentoring ANP units in the field.[Footnote 2]
From 2002 through 2010, the Department of State (State) was involved
in the ANP training program. During this time, State contracted with
DynCorp International (DynCorp) to provide police mentors and trainers
and to develop and execute the ANP training program. DOD became
involved in ANP training in 2004, working in conjunction with State,
DynCorp, and others. In 2009, DOD became the lead U.S. agency for
helping Afghanistan reform the ANP and the Afghan Ministry of
Interior, which oversees the ANP.[Footnote 3] In December 2010, DOD
awarded DynCorp a new contract for ANP training, mentoring,
maintenance, logistics, and security support. The contract has a
potential value over $1 billion, if all options are exercised.
In a June 2010 report, the Senate Committee on Armed Services
expressed concern about problems with the ANP training program,
including lapses in oversight and management of the contract that were
identified by the DOD and State Inspectors General.[Footnote 4] In
January 2011, Congress required that we report on the use of U.S.
government (USG) personnel, rather than contractor personnel, to train
the ANP.[Footnote 5] In response, this report describes (1) the roles
and responsibilities of USG and contractor personnel in the ANP
training program; (2) the extent to which DOD has assessed (a) the
advantages and disadvantages of using USG or contractor personnel for
ANP training and (b) the potential impact of transferring
responsibilities for ANP training from contractor to USG personnel;
and (3) lessons learned from other DOD foreign police training
programs that directly relate to the advantages and disadvantages of
using USG personnel or contractors.
To describe the roles and responsibilities of USG and contractor
personnel, we reviewed DOD and State documents and prior GAO work, as
well as USG audit reports by the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction, the DOD Inspector General, and the State Inspector
General. For the purposes of this report, "USG personnel" refers to
DOD military and civilian personnel supporting the ANP training
program, while "non-USG coalition personnel" refers to personnel from
other coalition countries supporting the ANP training program. We
interviewed DOD and State officials in Washington, D.C.; and Kabul,
Khandahar, and Konduz, Afghanistan; and DynCorp officials in Falls
Church, Virginia; and Khandahar and Konduz, Afghanistan.[Footnote 6]
We also visited three ANP training sites in Afghanistan to further
develop information found in documents and provided via interviews. We
obtained data on the numbers of USG and non-USG coalition trainers and
mentors, DOD contractor personnel operating under the December 2010
contract, and the location of USG and DOD contractor personnel at NATO
ANP training sites. While we assessed the data's reliability and
determined they were sufficient for our purposes, we did not
independently verify this information.
To describe the extent to which DOD assessed (a) the advantages and
disadvantages of using USG or contractor personnel for ANP training
and (b) the potential impact of transferring responsibilities for ANP
training from contractor personnel to USG personnel, we reviewed
relevant contract documents, including DOD's acquisition plan and
strategy, statement of work, and contract performance reports and
obtained information from DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and in
Kabul, Afghanistan.
To describe the lessons learned from the execution and oversight of
other DOD foreign police training programs regarding the relative
advantages and disadvantages of using USG or contractor personnel, we
obtained information from DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and in
Afghanistan. We also interviewed two retired USG officials with
expertise in U.S. foreign police training efforts.[Footnote 7] In
addition, we reviewed several reports on recent U.S. foreign police
training efforts published by research organizations based in
Washington, D.C., and by the Center for Army Lessons Learned in Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to February 2012 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
U.S. government (USG), non-USG coalition, and DOD contractor personnel
perform various roles in the ANP training program. These roles
include: (1) serving as advisors and mentors to build ministerial
capacity in areas such as financial and human resource management at
the Afghan Ministry of Interior; (2) serving as mentors and trainers
to develop Afghan commanders' abilities to operate training sites and
provide training to ANP recruits in areas such as criminal
investigation, weapons, survival skills, and physical fitness; and (3)
serving as embedded mentors to help deployed ANP units develop
civilian policing skills. DOD contractor personnel also provide
maintenance, logistics, and security support at training sites. As of
November 2011, about 778 USG, non-USG coalition, and DOD contractor
personnel provided ANP training and mentoring at 23 NATO-managed
sites. Approximately 66 percent of these trainers and mentors were non-
USG coalition personnel, 21 percent were USG personnel, and the
remaining 13 percent were DOD contractor personnel. In addition, about
2,825 DOD contractor personnel provided maintenance, logistics, and
security services at 12 NATO-managed training sites.
After assuming program responsibility from State in 2009, DOD did not
assess the advantages or disadvantages of using USG or contractor
personnel for the ANP training program and has not assessed the
potential impact of transferring responsibilities to USG personnel for
the ANP training program since awarding the contract to DynCorp in
2010. Prior to awarding the DynCorp contract, DOD officials considered
the use of government personnel to perform the mission and found that
the ANP training program did not include any inherently governmental
functions.[Footnote 8] We did not find any additional information in
the contract files underlying their decision. DOD policy officials
told us that DOD had "implicitly" approved State's previous decision
to use contractor personnel when DOD assumed responsibility. DOD
officials told us they did not assess the impact of transferring ANP
training responsibilities from contractors to USG personnel because
USG agencies do not have sufficient personnel with the needed skills
in civilian policing available to provide all the trainers and mentors
needed by the ANP training program. DOD officials in Washington, D.C.,
and Afghanistan agreed that contractor personnel were used to fill
skill and resource gaps. For that reason, these officials informed us,
the ANP training program cannot fulfill its mission without using
contractor personnel.
DOD officials reported that they were not aware of any lessons learned
from other DOD-led foreign police training programs that directly
address the advantages and disadvantages of using USG or contractor
personnel to carry out the ANP training program. While we did not
identify any such lessons, we reported in March 2009 that the United
States lacked sufficient personnel to carry out the ANP training
mission. We also identified several reports that focused on broader
issues concerning the use of contractor personnel in a wartime
environment. For instance, we reported in April 2011 that DOD faces a
number of long-standing and systemic challenges that hinder its
ability to achieve more successful acquisition outcomes. In addition,
the bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan reported on deficiencies in several areas of wartime
contracting, including competition, management, and enforcement.
USG, Non-USG Coalition, and DOD Contractor Personnel Perform Various
Roles in the ANP Training Program:
USG, non-USG coalition, and DOD contractor personnel perform various
roles in the ANP training program. These roles include: (1) serving as
advisors and mentors to build ministerial capacity in areas such as
financial and human resource management at the Afghan Ministry of
Interior and ANP Training General Command Headquarters; (2) serving as
mentors and trainers to develop Afghan commanders' abilities to
operate training sites and provide training to ANP recruits in areas
such as criminal investigation, weapons, survival skills, and physical
fitness; and (3) serving as embedded mentors to help deployed ANP
units develop civilian policing skills. According to NATO, the United
States and 12 other NATO coalition countries provided 325 police
mentoring and liaison teams (consisting of 15 to 20 personnel each) as
of January 2012. In addition, over 3,400 DOD contractor personnel
provided mentoring, training, maintenance, logistics, and security
support to the ANP training program.
Figure 1: Roles of USG, Non-USG,A and DOD Contractor Personnel within
the Afghan National Police Training Program:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration with 8 photographs]
Afghan National Police Training Structure:
Afghan Ministry of Interior and ANP Training General Command
Headquarters:
USG, non-USG, and DOD contractor personnel:
Advise and Mentor:
Afghan Ministry of Interior to build Afghan ministerial capacity in
areas such as financial and human resource management.
ANP Training Site:
DOD contractor personnel provide:
* Maintenance;
* Security;
* Logistics.
USG, non-USG, and DOD contractor personnel:
Mentor and Train:
Afghan site commander and staff to develop Afghan capacity to:
1) operate the training sites and;
(2) provide training to ANP recruits in areas such as criminal
investigation, weapons, survival skills, and physical fitness.
Deployed ANP Units:
USG, non-USG, and DOD contractor personnel:
Mentor:
ANP to develop civilian policing skills.
Sources: GAO analysis of DOD data; GAO and NATO (photos).
[A] Non-USG Personnel refers to personnel from coalition countries
other than the United States.
[End of figure]
USG, non-USG, and DOD contractor personnel advise and mentor Afghan
officials at the Ministry of Interior and the ANP Training General
Command Headquarters to build ministerial capacity in areas such as
logistics, financial, and human resources management. According to DOD
and contractor officials, about 166 of these advisors and mentors are
USG personnel and 177 are DOD contractor personnel.
USG and non-USG coalition personnel manage 23 NATO-led ANP training
sites.[Footnote 9] A designated NATO country manages each site and
provides training site mentors for the Afghan training site commander,
who oversees the administrative responsibilities for the training
site.[Footnote 10] The United States manages 8 of the 23 NATO training
sites. Figure 2 shows the sites managed by USG and non-USG coalition
personnel.
Figure 2: Location of USG Personnel and DOD Contractor Personnel at
NATO-Led[A] ANP Training Sites:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map of Afghanistan]
Site: ANP Academy;
NATO training site.
Site: Bamyan;
NATO training site;
United States-led NATO training site;
U.S. military trainers;
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security.
Site: Gardez[B];
NATO training site;
United States-led NATO training site;
U.S. military trainers;
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security.
Site: Ghazni;
NATO training site.
Site: Herat[B];
NATO training site;
U.S. military trainers;
DOD contractor training and mentoring;
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security.
Site: Kabul[D];
NATO training site;
DOD contractor training and mentoring.
Site: Kandahar;
NATO training site;
United States-led NATO training site;
U.S. military trainers;
DOD contractor training and mentoring.
Site: Kandahar[B];
NATO training site;
DOD contractor training and mentoring;
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security.
Site: Khowst;
NATO training site;
United States-led NATO training site;
U.S. military trainers;
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security.
Site: Konduz[B];
NATO training site;
U.S. military trainers;
DOD contractor training and mentoring;
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security.
Site: Laghman[B];
NATO training site;
United States-led NATO training site;
U.S. military trainers.
Site: Lakshar Gah;
NATO training site;
DOD contractor training and mentoring;
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security.
Site: Mazar-E Sharif[B];
NATO training site;
DOD contractor training and mentoring.
Site: Nangarhar[B];
NATO training site;
United States-led NATO training site;
U.S. military trainers;
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security.
Site: Pacheragram;
NATO training site;
United States-led NATO training site;
U.S. military trainers;
DOD contractor training and mentoring.
Site: Paktika;
NATO training site;
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security.
Site: Shaheen;
NATO training site;
U.S. military trainers;
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security.
Site: Sherberghan;
NATO training site;
U.S. military trainers;
DOD contractor training and mentoring;
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security.
Site: Shouz;
NATO training site;
United States-led NATO training site;
U.S. military trainers;
DOD contractor training and mentoring;
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security.
Site: Spin Baldak;
NATO training site;
DOD contractor training and mentoring.
Site: Staff College;
NATO training site.
Site: Tarin Kowt;
NATO training site;
U.S. military trainers.
Site: Wardak[C];
NATO training site;
DOD contractor training and mentoring.
Sources: GAO based on DOD data; Map Resources (map).
[A] NATO training sites include sites operated by NATO coalition
partners, including Sweden and Australia.
[B] Regional training site.
[C] National training site.
[D] Central training site.
[End of figure]
At the 23 NATO-led ANP training sites, USG, non-USG coalition, and DOD
contractor personnel serve as trainers and mentors. These trainers and
mentors work with the Afghan site commanders and staff to develop
their ability to (1) operate the training sites and (2) provide
training to ANP recruits in areas such as criminal investigation,
weapons, survival skills, and physical fitness. As of November 2011,
USG personnel comprised about 21 percent of the 778 trainers and
mentors at these training sites, non-USG coalition personnel comprised
approximately 66 percent, and DOD contractor personnel comprised about
13 percent (see figure 3). Of the 267 total USG and DOD contractor
personnel involved in training and mentoring at the NATO-led sites,
about 61 percent (163) were USG personnel, and about 39 percent (104)
were DOD contractor personnel. USG personnel, DOD contractor
personnel, or both provided training and mentoring at 19 of the 23
NATO-led sites (see enclosure I for more details).[Footnote 11]
Figure 3: USG, Non-USG Coalition,[A] and DOD Contractor Personnel
Trainers and Mentors at 23 NATO ANP Training Sites:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Non-USG coalition personnel: 511 (66%);
USG personnel: 163 (21%);
DOD contractor personnel: 104 (13%).
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] Non-USG coalition Personnel refers to personnel from coalition
countries other than the United States.
[End of figure]
Also at the training sites, approximately 2,825 DOD contractor
personnel provided support services. These services included
maintenance, logistics, and security. As a result, most DOD contractor
personnel at the training sites--more than 80 percent--were not
directly involved in the training and mentoring of ANP personnel. As
of November 2011, DOD contractor personnel provided these support
services at 12 of the 23 sites, according to DOD documents (see figure
2 and enclosure I for locations).
USG, non-USG, and DOD contract personnel serve as embedded mentors to
deployed ANP units. According to DOD and contractor officials, 319 USG
personnel and 329 DOD contractor personnel serve as embedded mentors
that work directly with deployed ANP units to help develop civilian
policing skills (see figure 4).
Figure 4: DOD Contractor Personnel Employed, by Type of Service
Performed (as of November 2011):
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Personnel providing maintenance, logistics, and security: 2,825; 81.8%;
Embedded field mentors: 329; 9.5%;
Embedded mentors within the Afghan Ministry of Interior and ANP Training
General Command Headquarters: 177; 5.1%;
NATO-led site trainers and mentors: 104; 3.0%;
Non-NATO site trainers and mentors: 17; 0.5%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: The figure's percentages do not add to 100 percent due to
rounding.
[End of figure]
DOD Did Not Assess the Advantages or Disadvantages of Using Contractor
Personnel or the Impact of Transferring Responsibilities to USG
Personnel for the ANP Training Program:
DOD did not assess the advantages or disadvantages of using USG
personnel rather than contractor personnel for the ANP training
program after assuming responsibility for the program from State in
2009. DOD policy officials informed us that DOD had "implicitly"
approved State's previous decision to use contractor personnel when
DOD assumed responsibility for the contract. In reviewing the contract
file, we found that DOD officials in Afghanistan had considered the
use of USG instead of contractor personnel in June 2010 but decided
that the requirements for the contractor did not include inherently
governmental functions.[Footnote 12] Our review of the contract files
and our discussions with DOD officials in Afghanistan did not provide
any additional information or support for the decision. We also found
that Army contracting officials had noted concerns in the acquisition
strategy regarding the wartime environment in Afghanistan (including
the regular rotations of USG personnel in and out of the country) in
justifying the need for contractor personnel to train the ANP.
DOD officials also stated that they had not assessed the impact of
transferring contractor responsibilities for the ANP program to USG
personnel after DOD awarded the contract in 2010. DOD officials
informed us that transferring contractor ANP training responsibilities
is not feasible because the U.S. government does not have sufficient
personnel with the right skills available to fulfill the multiple
requirements of the mission.[Footnote 13] DOD officials in Washington,
D.C., and Afghanistan agreed that contractor personnel are used to
fill skill and resource gaps. According to these officials, DOD needs
contractor personnel to provide training and mentoring in civilian
policing skills, as well as in more advanced areas of expertise such
as criminal investigation, interrogation, and forensic crime scene
analysis. DOD officials stated that the U.S. government lacks
available personnel to train the ANP and perform all the support roles
that DOD contractor personnel fill.[Footnote 14]
None of the Lessons Learned from DOD Police Training Efforts Directly
Address the Use of Contractor Personnel Instead of USG Personnel to
Train ANP:
DOD officials reported that they were not aware of any lessons learned
from other DOD-led foreign police training programs that directly
address the advantages and disadvantages of using USG or contractor
personnel to implement the ANP training program. Additionally, we
spoke with former USG officials with considerable foreign police
training experience, specifically a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant
General who was in charge of the police training mission in Iraq and a
former Department of Justice official who led the department's
international police training efforts. These retired officials also
indicated that they were unaware of any specific lessons from Iraq or
other DOD foreign police training missions that directly address the
relative advantages and disadvantages of using USG or contractor
personnel for the ANP training program.
While we did not identify any lessons learned that directly address
the advantages and disadvantages of using USG rather than contractor
personnel for the ANP training program, we reported in March 2009 that
the United States lacked sufficient personnel to carry out the ANP
training mission.[Footnote 15] We recommended that DOD and State
provide more personnel to support the ANP training program, and the
President responded by authorizing an additional 4,000 troops. Also,
an August 2011 joint audit by the Inspectors General of DOD and State
reported that additional personnel were needed for program management
and contract oversight for the ANP training program.[Footnote 16]
Other reports have focused on broader issues concerning the use of
contractor personnel in a wartime environment. For instance, in
February 2010, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
issued a report on applying lessons learned from Iraq that included a
section on contract and acquisition management.[Footnote 17] We
reported in April 2011 that DOD faces a number of long-standing and
systemic challenges that hinder its ability to achieve more successful
acquisition outcomes in contingency operations like Iraq and
Afghanistan.[Footnote 18] DOD generally agreed with our
recommendations and has taken steps to implement them (see enclosure
II for a list of other related GAO reports). In August 2011, the
bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
reported that (1) U.S. government agencies have not institutionalized
acquisition as a core function for operations such as Afghanistan
police training and that (2) contract competition, management, and
enforcement are ineffective.[Footnote 19]
We are not making any recommendations in this report.
We provided the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice,
and State a draft of this report. DOD and State provided technical
comments on our draft, which we have incorporated as appropriate. The
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security had no comments. We
provided DynCorp with portions of the draft report describing the
roles of DOD contractor personnel. DynCorp had no comments on these
portions.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees and the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice,
and State. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff members have questions concerning this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this
report are listed in enclosure III.
Signed by:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Enclosures - 3:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John Kerry:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Chairman:
The Honorable Lindsey Graham:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Darrell Issa:
Chairman:
The Honorable Elijah Cummings:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Chairman:
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Kay Granger:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure I:
Roles of USG Personnel and DOD Contractor Personnel at 23 NATO ANP
Training Sites:
Table 1 identifies the lead NATO coalition country that serves at each
of NATO's 23 ANP training sites. It also shows where USG and DOD
contractor personnel serve as trainers and mentors and where DOD
contractor personnel provide maintenance, logistics, and security.
Table 1: Roles of USG Personnel and DOD Contractor Personnel at 23
NATO ANP Training Sites:
Training site name (alphabetical): ANP Academy;
Lead NATO coalition country: Germany;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Empty].
Training site name (alphabetical): Bamyan;
Lead NATO coalition country: United States;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Check].
Training site name (alphabetical): Gardez (Regional);
Lead NATO coalition country: United States;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Check].
Training site name (alphabetical): Ghazni;
Lead NATO coalition country: Poland;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Empty].
Training site name (alphabetical): Herat (Regional);
Lead NATO coalition country: Italy;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Check].
Training site name (alphabetical): Kabul (Central);
Lead NATO coalition country: Italy;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Empty].
Training site name (alphabetical): Kandahar;
Lead NATO coalition country: United States;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Empty].
Training site name (alphabetical): Kandahar (Regional);
Lead NATO coalition country: Romania;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Check].
Training site name (alphabetical): Khowst;
Lead NATO coalition country: United States;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Check].
Training site name (alphabetical): Konduz (Regional);
Lead NATO coalition country: Germany;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Check].
Training site name (alphabetical): Laghman (Regional);
Lead NATO coalition country: United States;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Empty].
Training site name (alphabetical): Lashkar Gah;
Lead NATO coalition country: United Kingdom;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Check].
Training site name (alphabetical): Mazar-e-Sharif (Regional);
Lead NATO coalition country: France;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Check].
Training site name (alphabetical): Nangarhar (Regional);
Lead NATO coalition country: United States;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Check].
Training site name (alphabetical): Pacheragram;
Lead NATO coalition country: United States;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Empty].
Training site name (alphabetical): Paktika;
Lead NATO coalition country: Poland;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Check].
Training site name (alphabetical): Shaheen;
Lead NATO coalition country: Sweden[A];
USG military trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Empty].
Training site name (alphabetical): Sherberghan;
Lead NATO coalition country: Turkey;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Check].
Training site name (alphabetical): Shouz;
Lead NATO coalition country: United States;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Check].
Training site name (alphabetical): Spin Baldak;
Lead NATO coalition country: Romania;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Empty].
Training site name (alphabetical): Staff College;
Lead NATO coalition country: Germany;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Empty].
Training site name (alphabetical): Tarin Kowt;
Lead NATO coalition country: Australia[A];
USG military trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Empty].
Training site name (alphabetical): Wardak (National);
Lead NATO coalition country: France;
USG military trainers and mentors: [Empty];
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: [Check];
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: [Empty].
Training site: Total;
USG military trainers and mentors: 12 sites;
DOD contractor trainers and mentors: 12 sites;
DOD contractor maintenance, logistics, and security: 12 sites.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[A] Sweden and Australia are not NATO countries, but serve in the NATO-
led coalition in Afghanistan. For the purposes of this report, the 23
ANP training sites led by NATO include those led by Sweden and
Australia.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Enclosure II:
Related GAO Products:
Afghanistan Governance: Performance-Data Gaps Hinder Overall
Assessment of U.S. Efforts to Build Financial Management Capacity.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-907]. Washington, D.C.:
September 20, 2011.
Afghanistan: Actions Need to Improve Accountability of U.S. Assistance
to Afghanistan Government. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-710]. Washington, D.C.: July 20,
2011.
Multiple U.S. Agencies Provided Billions of Dollars to Train and Equip
Foreign Police Forces. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-402R]. Washington, D.C.: April 27,
2011.
Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers
Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-66]. Washington, D.C.: January 27,
2011.
The Strategic Framework for U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-655R]. Washington, D.C.: June 15,
2010.
Afghanistan's Security Environment. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-613R]. Washington, D.C.: May 5,
2010.
Afghanistan's Security Environment. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-178R]. Washington, D.C.: November
5, 2009.
Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but
Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts
Needed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-291].
Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2010.
Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-473SP]. Washington, D.C.: April 21,
2009.
Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of
Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel
and Afghan Cooperation. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-280]. Washington, D.C.: March 9,
2009.
Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police
Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help
Ensure Accountability. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-883T]. Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2008.
Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to
Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable
Afghan National Security Forces. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661]. Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2008.
Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-801SP]. Washington, D.C.: May 24,
2007.
Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made
Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-575]. Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2005.
[End of section]
Enclosure III:
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr. at 202-512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual above, Pierre Toureille, Assistant
Director; Timothy J. DiNapoli; Hynek Kalkus; Rhonda M. Horried;
Christopher Mulkins; Angie Nichols-Friedman; David Schneider; Jennifer
Zakarian; Ashley Alley; Melissa Hermes; David Dayton; Cindy Gilbert;
and Etana Finkler made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] For more information on the Afghan National Army, see GAO,
Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers
Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-66] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 27,
2011).
[2] The United States is a member of an international coalition that
conducts security operations in Afghanistan. The coalition is led by
NATO. The coalition includes non-NATO member countries, such as Sweden
and Australia.
[3] DOD manages the ANP training program through the NATO Training
Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
(NTM-A/CSTC-A). NTM-A/CSTC-A is an integrated NATO and U.S. command,
currently led by a U.S. Army Lieutenant General, with the mission of
generating and developing the Afghan National Security Forces.
[4] S. Rep. 111-201, at p. 210, June 4, 2010.
[5] Pub. L. No. 111-383, §1235(b), Jan. 7, 2011.
[6] We also spoke with officials from the Departments of Homeland
Security and Justice to obtain information on their roles and
responsibilities in the ANP training program. These departments
provide mentoring and training in counternarcotics, customs and border
issues, weapons, procedures, crime scene protocols, investigations,
crime scene management, and financial crime.
[7] We contacted these individuals based on our prior police training
work. We used their views to assess the statements of current DOD
officials. These officials may not be the only individuals with
relevant information to offer.
[8] Activities are considered to be inherently governmental when they
are so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate
performance by federal government employees. 31 U.S.C. § 501 note. See
48 C.F.R. § 7.503(c) for examples of functions considered to be
inherently governmental.
[9] According to DOD documents, as of October 2011, 37 training sites
in Afghanistan provided police training. NATO coalition personnel
operated 23 of these 37 sites. The Afghan Ministries of Interior and
Justice and their bilateral partners, such as Germany and the Czech
Republic, operated the remaining sites. Since these other sites are
not NATO-led, we did not include them within the scope of our review.
[10] Sweden and Australia are not NATO countries, but they are part of
the NATO-led coalition in Afghanistan. For the purposes of this
report, the 23 ANP training sites led by NATO include those led by
Sweden and Australia. Sweden serves as the lead for the Shaheen
training site and Australia is the lead for the Tarin Kowt training
site. See enclosure I for more information.
[11] DOD documents show that DOD contractor personnel were also
involved in providing training and mentoring services at two
additional non-NATO ANP training sites managed by the Ministry of
Interior.
[12] The officials were required to prepare a request for services
contract approval form under Army Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement Subpart 5107.503. The regulation does not require the
officials who signed the form to include an assessment or analysis to
support the request for contract services.
[13] In 2009, GAO reported that the lack of personnel to serve on
police mentor teams constrained expansion of the ANP training program.
For additional information, see GAO, Afghanistan Security: U.S.
Programs to Further Reform the Ministry of Interior and National
Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan
Cooperation, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-280]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2009).
[14] Similarly, DynCorp was contracted by State to provide police
advisors and logistical support in Iraq. See Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction, Long-Standing Weakness in Department of State
Oversight of DynCorp Contract for Support of the Iraqi Police Training
Program (Arlington, VA: January 2010).
[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-280].
[16] Inspectors General of the Department of State and Department of
Defense, Afghan National Police Training Program: Lessons Learned
During the Transition of Contract Administration, Department of
Defense Report No. D-2011-095, DOS Report No. AUD/CG-11-42
(Washington, D.C., and Arlington, VA: Aug. 15, 2011).
[17] Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Applying
Iraq's Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction
Operations (Arlington, VA: February 2010).
[18] GAO, Contingency Contracting: Observations on Actions Needed to
Address Systemic Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-580] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25,
2011).
[19] Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,
Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks
(Washington, D.C.: August 2011).
[End of section]
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