The air superiority game is one
which has a lengthy and colourful history, with many successive
generations of airframes, weapons and tactics. What is characteristic
of
paradigm shifts in air superiority is that they are invariably driven
by
one or another technological advance, which providing a decisive
capability advantage in some area, produces corresponding adaptations
in
other areas.

When the only air to air weapon was the gun, development
focussed on better guns, and better airframes and propulsion to bring
the gun to bear on its target. This pattern was well established by the
end of the Great War, but by the fifties, a new weapon emerged, which
would change the game forever. It was the guided missile.

The guided missile was predicted to render fighters obsolete
by the early sixties. This is now proven rubbish, and proponents of
this
idea, such as Duncan Sandys in the UK, well and truly are in immersed
in
egg.

What the guided missile did achieve is the rapid and
continuous evolution of airframes, propulsion, sensors and tactics to
match the evolution of missile performance.

The all weather radar guided Beyond Visual Range (BVR)
missile
is now a mainstay of both air defence and air superiority combat
operations. It spawned large and heavy fighters with powerful air
intercept radars, and together with the Surface-Air Missile (SAM)
provided the impetus for the development of stealth.

The clear sky heatseeking Within Visual Range (WVR) missile
has always been primarily an air superiority weapon, used by fighters
to
kill opposing fighters. It has driven fighter development toward ever
increasing agility, to provide the earliest opportunity to shoot the
opposing aircraft, over an increasingly wide performance envelope.

Until a few years ago, WVR missiles were good, but could be
defeated by aggressive manoeuvre if not launched under optimal
conditions, they could also be successfully decoyed or jammed, and
required excellent instantaneous manoeuvre performance to get an early
firing opportunity. With the deployment of 4th generation missiles such
as the Archer, Python, ASRAAM and AIM-9X, this is no longer true. All
of
these missiles can be cued using helmet mounted sights, all have huge
"no escape" zones, indeed some can engage a pursuing target, all are
difficult to jam, and all have significantly greater range than earlier
WVR weapons, in some instances challenging the performance of older
radar guided BVR missiles.

Radar guided BVR missiles have also evolved dramatically, and
now are becoming extremely difficult to defeat by manoeuvre or jamming.
Moreover we are beginning to see the first air-air anti-radiation
seekers, which will home on an opposing fighter's air intercept radar,
and we are also seeing air breathing BVR weapon proposals. An air
breathing BVR missile will have double or triple the range of a pure
rocket missile of similar size, as it need not carry the oxidising
agent
in its propellant, it sucks it in as it flies.

What we can expect to see in the coming two decades is the
deployment of WVR missiles with further improved speed, agility, range,
jamproof seekers and supporting sensors such as radar homing receivers,
infra-red search and track (IRS&T) equipment, and helmet mounted
sights which may include helmet mounted thermal imagers. Such missiles
will be extremely lethal and virtually impossible to defeat, unless you
swat them out of the sky with a laser beam (the USAF are working on
this, too). The BVR missile of the next two decades will also be
faster,
much longer ranging, more autonomous, and harder to jam or
outmanoeuvre.

We can also expect to see the first generation of hybrid
seekers, combining anti-radiation and or radar homing with heatseeking
guidance. Such missile seekers are virtually impossible to jam as they
will continuously compare the quality of sensor outputs, and select
that
which is providing the best quality signal. If one is jammed, it
switches to the other, and vice-versa, frustrating virtually any
conventional jamming strategy.

With high speed, low smoke motors, low frontal radar
signatures, and passive or low-probability of intercept seeker
techniques, an inbound missile will be hard to detect with sensors or
by
eyeball, and the victim will have little if any warning of impending
impact.

It is fair to say that we live in the decade during which the
air-air missile has finally matured, and is close to reaching its full
potential as an air superiority weapon. It is by no means the end of
the
game plan in air to air weapons. The USAF New World Vistas technology
survey published last year indicates that another weapon is reaching
the
level of development where it can move to deployment in the next two
decades. This weapon is the high power laser cannon, capable of burning
a hole through an aircraft's skin at several miles of range, under
visual clear sky conditions.

Whilst the first operational laser weapon to deploy (cca
2005)
will be the USAF's YAL-1A anti-ballistic missile weapon, mounted in a
nose turret in a dedicated B-747 airframe, a large weapon with perhaps
300 km or greater range, it is the forerunner of a whole new family of
air combat weapons. It is only a matter of time before the technology
is
well understood, compacted in size, and made robust enough for wider
deployment. Laser beams travel at the speed of light, and cannot be
dodged or evaded.

In the face of a mature missile threat, and the possibility
of
early directed energy weapons cca 2025, conventional air superiority
models begin to break down. Once the opponent has acquired you, he can
shoot you and most likely, kill you. Exchange rates then become a
function either of superior sensors and missiles, used at standoff
ranges, introducing a whole can of worms to do with Rules of
Engagement,
or other measures must be sought to improve survivability. Clearly
throwing expensive fighter assets into a Somme style attrition warfare
meat grinder is not going to win an air war, unless you have twice as
many expendable aeroplanes and pilots as your opponent has. With the
slow production rates typical of modern high tech weapons and expensive
and time consuming training of scarce aircrew (what fraction of any
population has the talent to even get through the training required to
become a fast jet pilot ?), this is a losers' strategy.

The technology however does exist to deal with this problem,
and has existed for almost two decades. It is stealth.

Stealth means suppressing the radar cross section and
infrared
signatures of an aircraft to the point where it cannot be detected
until
it is several miles away, or even closer if we factor in lower
performance in air intercept radars and missile seekers, compared to
large ground based equipment. As a result, a stealthy aircraft can
approach to weapons launch range without its opponent knowing it is
there, launch its weapons and then vanish again.

No matter how good a conventional fighter is, and how good
its
missiles and sensors are, an engagement flown against a stealthy
fighter
aircraft is a no win proposition. The whole engagement can be
summarised
as "Deedle, deedle, deedle, BANG !". Your warning receiver blares away,
you crank your head around to figure out what is happening, and you die
as the inbound missile blows you to little pieces. It is indeed as
simple as that. Situational awareness is everything in the
first-shot-is-the-killing-shot game, and stealth takes away that
situational awareness completely.

This is indeed why the F-22 Raptor is a revolutionary rather
than evolutionary fighter. Certainly its basic high manoeuvrability
aerodynamic design is evolutionary, its supercruise is also arguably
evolutionary, but its use of stealth is clearly revolutionary. The
combination of superior energy manoeuvrability, supersonic cruise and
stealth is an unbeatable combination. Stealth denies the opponent
awareness of the F-22, while the aircraft's superlative
thrust-to-weight
ratio and high speed allow it position itself and close for a kill
before its victim can react.

Given the tremendous tactical advantage that follows from
this, the F-22 can only be defeated by another, better F-22-ski. Since
the Russians are up to two decades behind in stealth materials and
shaping techniques, and do not have the money to catch up in a hurry,
it
is unlikely that we will see a viable competitor to the F-22 for
several
decades to come. Therefore the F-22 is as close to unbeatable as one
can get, in the next few decades.

The curious thing about the F-22 debate is that it has wholly
been focussed upon the aircraft costing cca 35% more than an F-15E.
Political critics of the aircraft in this author's view sound more like
characters from "Alice in Wonderland" ! Indeed, there would be a simple
resolution to this problem. Critics should strap into an F-15 air
combat
simulator and fly against another pilot in a simulated F-22. After they
have "died" in ten or twenty consecutive engagements, then they should
reconsider their position. Deedle, deedle, deedle, BANG !

If we consider what the F-22 provides against every other
contemporary air superiority fighter, and any evolved variants thereof,
it is quite clear that the F-22 is virtually unbeatable in the next
three decades. If we also consider that the F-22 builds upon the USAF's
unassailable lead in stealth technology, it is clearly a superb long
term investment for any air force which fields it. The pioneering
efforts of Ben Rich's (Lockheed) and John Cashen's (Northrop)
development groups during the late seventies and early eighties have
already yielded some outstanding dividends in the F-117A and B-2A.
These
groups then produced the YF-22 and YF-23. The USAF's production F-22
extends the tremendous potential of stealth into the air superiority
game, with the result that the F-22 is without doubt the most lethal
fighter aircraft ever planned to enter production.

The issue for the ADF to consider here is whether to make a
large long term investment into established fighter technology, which
has reached the end of its technological potential, or to invest in the
technology which will follow it. Committing to established fighter
technology is committing to a paradigm nearing the end of its life.
Committing to stealth is gaining entry into the new model of air
warfare.

It is, in summary, a simple
question: should we as a nation spend our precious defence dollars on
the technology of the past, or the technology of the future ?

The latest generation of
heatseeking dogfight missiles, typified by the Israeli Python
(depicted), the ASRAAM, the AIM-9X and the Archer, have huge no-escape
zones by traditional standards, are virtually impossible to defeat by
manoeuvre, and have highly jam-resistant seekers. Whoever gets the
first
shot away is likely to kill his opponent. We can expect the next
generation of such missiles to provide more range, speed, multi-mode
seekers (anti-radiation, radar, heatseeking), and higher
manoeuvrability, further enhancing lethality against conventional
fighters. The only robust long term defensive measure is therefore
stealth, which denies an opponent the opportunity to shoot first, and
significantly impairs the seeker performance of any missile which is
launched (Rafael).

Despite its
superficial
resemblance to the F-15, the USAF's new F-22A has one fundamental
attribute which places it well above any other existing fighter
aircraft
- STEALTH. Combining an blend of second generation (faceting/planform
alignment) and third generation (blending) stealth shaping techniques,
and modern absorbent materials, the F-22A can be expected to have the
radar signature of a small bird or large insect. It carries an APG-77
low probability of intercept (LPI) radar, which is virtually
undetectable by an opposing fighter aircraft. Unseen on radar and
unheard on a radar warning receiver, the F-22A can stalk its prey
silently and attack with total surprise, firing up to eight internally
carried missiles. It is without doubt the most lethal and survivable
fighter aircraft ever built.

STEALTH AND
AIR COMBAT DOCTRINE

by Carlo Kopp

The emergence of stealth technology in air superiority
fighters fundamentally changes the basic rules of the game.

The conventional model of air combat has traditionally been
based upon the idea of using advantages in fighter manoeuvre, climb and
acceleration performance to get a positional advantage in order to fire
a missile, or at close quarters a gun, to destroy the opposing
aircraft.
With first and second generation heat-seeking and beyond visual range
(BVR) radar guided missiles, which had poor kinematic performance and
turn rates, a fighter needed to typically manoeuvre for several minutes
to position itself for the killing shot. Whilst early radar guided
missiles could be used in head on engagements, their performance
against
turning targets was poor. Early heatseekers had to be shot up the
opponent's tailpipe to lock on to the engine exhaust. Therefore
fighters would have to engage in often complex manoeuvres, until the
opponent was positioned for a shot.

The emergence of all-aspect heatseekers, typically third
generation weapons, as well as more capable radar guided missiles,
expanded the engagement envelope significantly. Whoever got their nose
on the opponent first could get the first shot off and if not win,
certainly force the opponent into a defensive manoeuvre costing
position
and energy, and therefore set the opposing fighter up for another shot,
most likely a lethal one.

With the latest fourth generation heatseekers, such as the
Archer, Python, ASRAAM or AIM-9X, helmet mounted sights allow early
shots even from geometries which would be impossible to exploit with
older weapons. Moreover, modern active radar homing BVR missiles have a
fire and forget capability, once launched and actively homing, they can
be left to fend for themselves. With such weapons the chances of a
"mutual" kill can be quite high, ie two fighters enter an engagement,
fire their missiles, and shoot each other down. This in turn forces
pilots to shoot as early as possible, cutting time for target
identification. Missile speed, target identification capability and
pilot response times become important determinants of success in this
game.

Stealth changes the tactical environment in fundamental ways.
The first result of stealth is that the opponent cannot see the
stealthy
fighter on radar, or detect its radar on a warning receiver. Therefore,
the stealthy fighter can locate, identify and stalk its opponent
without
being detected. A stealthy fighter can therefore exploit von
Richtoven's fundamental axiom, approach its victim undetected and shoot
from six o'clock before the opposing fighter even knows it is there.

To fully exploit its technological advantage, the stealthy
fighter will therefore need to adopt hit-and-run ambush tactics and
avoid being drawn into a "turn-and-burn" knife-fight-in-a-phone-booth.
At ranges inside 3 miles, a stealthy fighter loses its basic advantage
of undetectability, as it may be tracked visually, and an opposing
fighter's radar and missiles can detect it and track it.

Therefore a stealthy fighter will maximise its survivability
and lethality by staying outside its opponent's visual engagement
envelope, positioning itself for a shot and then shooting a
fire-and-forget missile.

Because the conventional fighter will have no idea of where
the stealthy fighter is, it will not have the option of choosing an
advantageous opening geometry in an engagement. It may detect the
stealthy fighter at ranges similar to eyeball detection range. A
stealthy fighter can therefore choose the opening geometry to its
advantage, for instance by approaching from the aft quarter.

In basic defensive counter-air scenarios, where a fighter CAP
is being vectored to engage known inbound hostiles in a BVR
head-to-head
high-noon shootout, the stealthy fighter can shoot multiple rounds at
multiple hostiles before it is detected by the hostiles.

In offensive fighter sweeps into hostile airspace, the
stealthy fighter can ambush defending CAPs or GCI controlled
interceptors in whatever engagement geometry is most favourable. Where
rules of engagement mandate visual ID of a target before firing,
stealth
still provides an advantage as the stealthy fighter can approach from a
six o'clock low position undetected. Because tail warning radars and
aft
facing fire control radars, such as those on advanced Flanker variants,
have much inferior detection range performance to forward facing fire
control radars, the stealthy fighter will in most situations not be
detected until it is too late.

A conventional air superiority fighter with equal or better
aerodynamic performance against a stealthy fighter is unlikely to get
an
opportunity to exploit that performance to its advantage. Performance
can only be made use of where the opponent is seen and can therefore be
manoeuvred against. An opponent unseen cannot be engaged.

Statistics from previous air wars suggest that most aircraft
lost in combat did not see the SAM or fighter that attacked them.
Caught
by surprise, the pilot either did not or could not react appropriately
and was in turn hit.

With a stealthy air superiority fighter, an opponent faces
this fundamental problem in every engagement. He is disadvantaged in
reaction time in every situation, and if the pilot of the stealthy
fighter exploits his advantage systematically, the conventional fighter
will lose almost every time.

There is no historical parallel for this. Therefore, the
established doctrine for air combat tactics is largely obsoleted. Only
should the pilot of the stealthy fighter choose to be drawn into a
turn-and-burn dogfight, or do so by poor choice of engagement geometry,
does the conventional fighter have a chance of success in the
engagement.

Therefore, trivial comparisons of manoeuvre performance
between conventional and stealthy air superiority fighters are quite
meaningless. Capability can only be measured in the context of a
suitable air combat doctrine for the stealthy fighter. Should this
doctrine be designed to exploit stealth to its fullest, then the
conventional fighter will suffer overwhelming losses in almost any
scenario.

A US observer commented some years ago that stealth was a
"zero-sum game". There is only one winner in an air battle between a
force of stealthy fighters and a force of conventional fighters.
Stealth
will rule the air battle.

Fifty three years ago, Maj. Tommy
McGuire, number two ranking USAAF Pacific fighter ace in WW 2, noted
"It
is always the one you don't see that gets you". With stealth, this is
the fundamental truth.