Why `Tv Marti` Might Backfire

February 22, 1990|By Gillian Gunn.

The United States is about to enter an electronic conflict with Cuba that could produce the inverse of the intended results. The U.S. Information Agency`s ``Television Marti`` project, designed to beam U.S. programming into Cuban airspace and scheduled for testing in February, has little chance of fulfilling its goal: to provide the Cuban population with an alternative information source. Instead, it may provoke retaliatory Cuban disruption of radio broadcasts in the southern United States, banning of commercial overflight of Cuban airspace and jamming of the existing USIA Radio Marti broadcasts to Cuba. Therefore, other ways of circumventing Cuba`s information wall should be vigorously explored.

Television Marti has little chance of fulfilling its goal because it can be blocked inexpensively by the Cuban authorities. U.S. engineers were aware of this danger, and Cuban tests carried out in December apparently confirmed their fears. Television Marti suffers from the same flaw that afflicts the Strategic Defense Initiative. The price of mounting the program is high; the cost of combating it is low.

The Cuban ability and will to disrupt U.S. radio broadcasts in retaliation is also evident. In mid-December three Cuban AM stations mysteriously shifted one kilohertz, causing an ``annoying whistle`` on three U.S. AM stations. An official of the Federal Communications Commission remarked, ``It would be quite unusual for all three (Cuban stations) to change simultaneously by accident.`` A very strong Cuban signal has also been heard occasionally at night. According to recent visitors to Cuba, the Castro regime now has transmitting facilities 30 times stronger than those the FCC permits in the United States. These developments suggest Cuba is preparing a major retaliatory radio interference effort.

The potential ban on U.S. commercial aircraft overflying Cuban airspace would also be problematic, for it would disrupt three major air routes used by U.S. carriers. The path around Cuba would take longer, use more fuel and so cost more.

Neither of these potential problems has influenced TV Marti`s most avid supporters in the Cuban-American community, for the retaliatory measures do not directly affect their interests. That community, however, should be concerned about the Cuban threat to jam Radio Marti broadcasts. If Radio Marti has indeed broadened the political horizons of the Cuban population as its supporters claim, and if the attempt to broadcast Television Marti will produce Cuban government jamming of both the television and the radio signals, then the Cuban-American community might wish to reconsider its position.

The Cuban population no doubt would benefit greatly from freer access to information. As Television Marti is unlikely to achieve that goal, thought should be given to other techniques. One alternative would be a television news program exchange. Washington could propose that Cuban television run a number of normal U.S. programs, not specially prepared for Cuban consumption. In return, the U.S. could adjust the Cuban embargo legislation to let U.S. television networks broadcast Cuban programs.

The U.S. would risk little, for few networks would express interest in the Cuban programs, and the U.S. public is sufficiently sohpisticated not to be taken in by Cuban propaganda. The Cuban government might well accept the proposal, even though it would be more advantageous to the U.S., because Havana is anxious to improve its image in the United States.

Another alternative would be to facilitate computer and fax links between American and Cuban groups. Initially, the links might have to be with state-sanctioned organizations, such as Cuban universities, to obtain Castro`s agreement, but such communication could have an important long-term political impact. For example, a U.S. academic could fax to his Cuban colleague the wire agency coverage of the recent arrest of four Havana University students who called for greater democracy. Because there is a concrete benefit to the scheme for Cuba, greater communication with U.S. academics, Havana might go along with the idea.

In sum, Washington should concentrate on effective ways of broadening the Cuban population`s access to information not controlled by the Cuban state, rather than pursue a project that appears technically impossible, may decrease that information access and will damage the U.S. broadcast and airline industries. And if Washington believes in the superiority of U.S.-style democracy over Castro-style regimentation, it should not shrink from offering the enticement of two-way information exchange to convince Havana to open a crack in the information wall.