Subcommittee on Science and SpaceCommittee on Commerce, Science, and TransportationUnited States Senate

Madam Chair and Members of the Subcommittee; thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today to discuss the status and role of the Space
Shuttle in human space flight, our plans for the Shuttle’s retirement,
our progress in minimizing the gap between the retirement of the Space
Shuttle and the introduction of the Crew Exploration Vehicle.

On January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush announced the Vision
for Space Exploration. The President’s directive gave NASA
a new and historic focus and clear objectives. The fundamental goal
of this directive for the Nation’s space exploration program is “…to advance
U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through a robust space
exploration program.” In issuing this directive, the President committed
the Nation to a journey of exploring the solar system and beyond, returning
humans to the Moon, and sending robots and ultimately humans to Mars and
other destinations. NASA embraced this direction and began a long-term
transformation to enable us to achieve this goal.

The first steps in enabling the Vision for Space Exploration are
to return the Space Shuttle fleet to flight, to focus the use of the Space
Shuttle on completing assembly of the International Space Station, to retire
the Space Shuttle by 2010, and to replace it as soon as possible thereafter
with the new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). Given the importance
of ensuring that the Space Shuttle is returned to flight safely, the Space
Shuttle program and, indeed, the whole of NASA has been devoting its available
resources and human capital to ensuring that this first step is executed
to the best of our abilities. Once the two Return to Flight missions
are behind us and we have developed a higher level of confidence in the
knowledge of the Shuttle debris environment, we can focus a greater level
of attention on the important issues surrounding Space Shuttle transition
and the development of the next generation of human spaceflight vehicles.

Space Shuttle Return to Flight

On April 28, 2005, the Space Shuttle program management recommended
that we extend our planning for the first Return to Flight mission, STS-114,
to support the launch window that opens in July 2005. I concurred
with this recommendation. This change was not the result of any single
problem, but instead reflected the need to take additional time to perform
our verification and validation reviews, and to assess the results from
the External Tank (ET) fueling test performed on April 14, 2005.
We knew that there were some open questions going into these reviews and
tests, and we had very detailed plans for developing answers to those questions.
We also understood that the reviews and tests might raise additional questions
before Return to Flight, and that we would have to be prepared to review
our plans and launch opportunities in light of this. That is exactly
what happened. One of the most notable outcomes was our decision
to modify the feed line bellows area with an electrically powered heater
to further reduce or eliminate the ice that naturally forms in the area.

This decision to insert some additional planning time to support a mid-July
launch opportunity was not made lightly. Everyone in the Space Shuttle
program recognizes that we have an extremely important mission to carry
out, and that completing assembly of the International Space Station and
executing the Vision for Space Exploration cannot happen until we
return the Space Shuttle to flight. At the same time, this change
reflects our continuing commitment to remain focused on safety of flight
considerations and prudent engineering decisions. Transporting people
into space remains risky compared to most other human endeavors.
We must make sure that every decision to send people on missions into space
is made with the utmost concern for their safety.

Today, work continues in preparation for
another ET tanking test scheduled for as early as tomorrow, May 19, while
the STS-114 Shuttle stack is still at its launch pad. Engineers and technicians
are adding instrumentation to the tank to help troubleshoot two problems
that were detected during its first tanking test on April 14. The
instrumentation will provide data to further analyze and diagnose the cause
for these two problems: the liquid hydrogen sensors that gave intermittent
readings and the liquid hydrogen pressurization relief valve that cycled
more times than standard during last month's test. Following the
tanking test, technicians will prepare for rolling back Discovery to the
Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) no earlier than May 24. In the VAB,
Discovery will be removed from its ET and lowered into the transfer aisle.

It has taken an extraordinary effort to return the Space Shuttle fleet
to flight readiness status. 116 individual hardware modifications
(41 of which were directly related to the 15 Return to Flight recommendations
of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board [CAIB]) and over 3.5
million work-hours have gone into Return to Flight, raising the bar, and
launch processing activities on Space Shuttle Discovery alone.
Our Return to Flight effort has been focused on identifying hazards, re-designing
current systems to eliminate or control those hazards, providing means
for warning that hazards might have occurred during flight, and emplacing
standardized special procedures to counter any hazardous conditions that
might arise. We have eliminated the External Tank bipod foam which
was the proximate cause of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident on
February 1, 2003. The crews on board Discovery and the International
Space Station will now be able to detect critical damage to the Space Shuttle’s
thermal protection system during the first two development test flights
and, in the unexpected event of severe damage, to take shelter in the International
Space Station until a rescue mission can be launched. We have gone
well beyond the recommendations of the CAIB to reduce risks and provide
additional safety measures through added hardware improvements and procedural
changes.

Return to Flight has been a massive effort, focusing the energies of
every technical discipline across all the NASACenters and Space Shuttle
contractors on a very specific objective. It has been, in short,
an example of NASA at its finest. I am very proud of this Space Shuttle
team and this Agency for their hard work, their diligence, and their incomparable
expertise and professionalism during these difficult times.

But returning the Space Shuttle fleet to flight status is only the first
step in the Nation’s Vision for Space Exploration. Over the
next few years, the Space Shuttle fleet will resume executing some of the
most complex missions ever attempted in space. The return to Space
Shuttle operations means that NASA can once again return to assembly of
the International Space Station. The first two Space Shuttle Return
to Flight missions, STS-114 and STS-121, are development test and logistics
missions which will focus on carrying cargo to the Station and thoroughly
exercising the extensive hardware and process changes made during the past
twenty-seven months. Following those two flights, the crew of STS-115
will resume the assembly of the International Space Station. We will
complete assembly of the International Space Station using the minimum
number of Space Shuttle flights necessary.

Space Shuttle Transition - Scope

As the Space Shuttle resumes its mission, NASA will begin tackling an
equally challenging assignment – ensuring a safe and orderly retirement
of the Space Shuttle system by 2010 and a graceful transition of the Space
Shuttle knowledge, workforce, and assets to future exploration missions.
We need to maintain a robust program that is capable of safely executing
the remaining Space Shuttle missions while, at the same time, not displacing
the orderly pursuit of necessary transition activities.

This effort could very well be one of the largest single planned transitions
NASA (or any federal agency) has ever undertaken. The Space Shuttle
program occupies 640 facilities, utilizes over 900,000 equipment line items,
and directly employs over 2,000 civil servants and more than 15,000 work-year-equivalent
prime contractors, with an additional 3,000 people working indirectly on
Space Shuttle activities at all NASA Centers. Thousands more are
employed at the subcontractor level in 43 states across the country.
The total equipment value held by the Program is over $12 billion.
The total facilities value held by the Program is approximately $5.7 billion
(approximately one-third of the value of NASA’s entire facility inventory),
mostly at the field centers. There are also approximately 1,500 active
suppliers and 3,000 – 4,000 qualified suppliers that directly support the
Space Shuttle program.

Of all these assets, the most important are, of course, the people.
Space Shuttle transition will have an unavoidable impact on NASA’s workforce.
The early transition of workforce elements, the need to retain segments
of that workforce, and the transition of program knowledge to future programs
must all be addressed. We will ensure that this transition treats
these dedicated people with the respect they deserve, and that their knowledge
and experience will be captured or converted as we begin the next phase
of exploration. There will be challenges, but we will ensure
that critical skills are retained for safe mission execution through the
operational life of the program.

NASA and the Space Shuttle program will also face significant challenges
in terms of balancing different technical and programmatic requirements:
(1) maintaining access to the necessary equipment, facilities, and vendors
needed through Space Shuttle flyout; (2) identifying and maintaining those
capabilities that may be needed for next-generation exploration systems
activities, and; (3) retiring unneeded capabilities to free resources that
will support future exploration. For example, because the amount
of flight hardware accumulated (including spares) will be sufficient to
meet the current mission manifest through 2010, several key Space Shuttle
hardware vendors and sub-tier suppliers will be ending their relationship
with the program prior to 2010. Draw-down decisions need to be made
with regard to equipment and facilities which currently support (and are
supported by) the Space Shuttle program. These resources will need
to be characterized and dispositioned in such a way that either supports
exploration goals or removes them from NASA’s books.

Many of these decisions depend upon the role that Space Shuttle knowledge,
workforce, hardware, and infrastructure will play in follow-on launch vehicles.
NASA is continuing to analyze next-generation crew and heavy-lift launch
requirements in support of the Vision for Space Exploration, including
the degree to which those requirements could be met by boosters derived
from existing Space Shuttle propulsion components and systems. Flight-proven
Space Shuttle propulsion elements (including the Space Shuttle Main Engines,
the Solid Rocket Boosters, and the External Tank, as well as some of the
existing Space Shuttle infrastructure and workforce) will be carefully
evaluated, as their use may enable more rapid development of crew and heavy
lift capability than other alternatives like Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicles (Delta IV and Atlas V). A decision to use Space Shuttle
propulsion elements as part of our next-generation space transportation
architecture would have a significant impact on Space Shuttle transition
planning. However, since these launch vehicle requirements are not
yet fully defined, current Space Shuttle transition planning must take
into account the risks of prematurely terminating Space Shuttle vendors
and retiring equipment and facilities that could possibly be needed to
fulfill these requirements.

Space Shuttle transition will also be affected by the number and pacing
of flights needed to complete assembly of the International Space Station.
NASA is also currently examining alternative configurations for the Space
Station that meet the goals of the Vision and the needs of our international
partners, while requiring as few Shuttle flights as possible to complete
assembly. This effort will be a factor in the formulation of NASA’s
FY 2007 budget, and we will keep Congressional Committees informed as the
study effort progresses.

I believe that Space Shuttle transition will be one of the largest,
most complex, and most emotionally-charged tasks facing NASA during the
initial phases of the Vision. It cannot be started too soon.

Space Shuttle Transition - Processes

The single most important requirement in Space Shuttle transition is
to maintain the highest level of flight and ground safety through the life
of the Program. The last flight of the Space Shuttle must be just
as safe as the upcoming Return to Flight missions. The success
of Space Shuttle transition will also depend upon serving the goals of
the Vision for Space Exploration in such a way that takes maximum
advantage of existing programs and personnel, minimizes the negative impacts
of transition on Space Shuttle team morale and performance, and ensures
full compliance with all relevant federal, state, and local laws and standards.

Our transition planning began soon after the release of the Vision
for Space Exploration a year ago. While our efforts over the
past two years have been dedicated to Return to Flight, NASA has also concluded
the exploratory phase of its Space Shuttle transition activities and has
begun to set out the next steps in transition planning. We have benchmarked
phaseouts in other high-technology, systems-intense programs, including
the ongoing retirement of the Titan IV program, which just had its final
launch out of Cape Canaveral on April 29, 2005. The Space Shuttle
program has also asked the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA)
to assist us in our transition activities, particularly in the development
of strategies and plans for the transition from the Space Shuttle program
to the programs that will implement the Vision for Space Exploration.

Through the recent Integrated Space Operations Summit this past March,
NASA engaged a broad community on a number of issues affecting both the
Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs. For this
past year’s annual Summit, NASA chartered one panel specifically to study
Space Shuttle transition. That panel considered several programs,
including the Titan IV, and developed recommendations intended to lay the
foundation for managing Space Shuttle transition activities. In accordance
with these recommendations, the Space Operations Mission Directorate will
establish the position of Space Transportation System Transition Manager.
The initial efforts of this manager will be to develop the planning as
recommended by the Transition Panel and to look for candidate areas for
transition from the Space Shuttle program. We will select an individual
to fill this position shortly.

The Space Shuttle program recognizes the importance of maintaining an
experienced workforce to safely execute the Space Shuttle’s mission through
the end of the decade. The NASA Workforce Flexibility Act of 2004
provides the Agency with vital tools, such as the authority to provide
workforce retention bonuses in critical skill areas, that will help retain
the necessary human capital needed during mission execution. NASA
has nine panels and teams looking at workforce issues across the Agency,
in addition to the Integrated Space Operations Summit Transition Panel’s
workforce assessment. We have also invited human capital experts
from government and private industry to advise us on best practices during
Space Shuttle program phaseout.

Many of our contractor partners have begun taking steps (such as defining
critical skill requirements and bringing in human capital consulting firms)
to counter the impact of transition on mission execution. Provisions
in the follow-on to the Space Flight Operations Contract (which runs through
September 2006) will require the prime Space Shuttle operations contractor,
United Space Alliance, to prepare for sustaining its required workforce,
including submitting a critical skills retention plan.

Accelerating the Crew Exploration Vehicle

A cornerstone of the Vision for Space
Exploration is a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and its associated
launch system. The CEV will be developed in the latter part of this
decade and deployed operationally as soon as possible. The primary
mission of the CEV will be the exploration of the Moon and other destinations,
but initially it will conduct missions in Earth orbit, including missions
to the International Space Station.

Our earlier plans called for operational
deployment of the CEV not later than 2014. As I testified during
my confirmation hearing, I believe that the CEV development must be accelerated
in order to minimize the gap between the 2010 Space Shuttle retirement
and the first operational flight of the CEV. NASA has embarked upon
a rigorous review of the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) architecture to
determine opportunities to accelerate the availability of the CEV. This
assessment is a part of the "Exploration Systems Architecture Study" (ESAS),
which I chartered on April 29, 2005. The product of this analysis
is anticipated by mid-July 2005. Acceleration of the CEV program
will be facilitated by down-selecting to a single contractor sooner than
originally planned, and by deferring other elements of the exploration
systems research and technology plan, like demonstration of nuclear electric
propulsion, not required for the CEV or for the early phases of human return
to the Moon.

The CEV will conduct missions in Earth orbit, including missions to
the ISS, but its primary mission will be to support exploration of the
Moon and other destinations. In addition, NASA's Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate will be responsible for developing and acquiring crew
and cargo services to support the International Space Station, and funds
have been transferred to that Directorate, as reflected in the May update
to the FY 2005 Operating Plan.

NASA needs to communicate our view of the
CEV launch architecture and our requirements, and we will keep Congressional
Committees informed as the ESAS study effort progresses. Going forward,
the Agency will need a launch system for the CEV, one which does not at
present exist. Two obvious possibilities exist by which we might
obtain such a vehicle. The first is to develop a launch system derived
from Shuttle components, specifically the SRB with a new upper stage.
The second option is to upgrade the proposed heavy-lift versions of EELV,
again in all likelihood with a new upper stage. As NASA Administrator,
I must be a responsible steward of our funds, and a key aspect of the Agency’s
analysis of alternatives will be to capitalize on existing technical and
workforce assets in a cost-effective and efficient way. NASA’s goal
is to develop a CEV capable of operating safely soon after the retirement
of the Space Shuttle.

Summary

Space Shuttle transition represents an enormous challenge for NASA and
for the Nation as a whole. While we have benchmarked other programs
that are similar in scope to the Space Shuttle, the Shuttle is one of the
largest single programs for which an orderly transition to disposal has
ever been required. I do not want, and we should not want, to repeat
the mistakes made in the aftermath of the Apollo program, where many unique
capabilities were shut down abruptly and irretrievably. We must transition
the Space Shuttle in a way that ensures continued safety in our ongoing
operations, maximizes the efficiency with which we utilize our resources,
respects the Space Shuttle workforce, and protects critical national capabilities
that will be needed to support the Vision for Space Exploration.
There will be hard decisions to be made over the next five years.
It is vital, however, that we remain focused on the worthy and ambitious
goals laid out by the President on January 14, 2004.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look forward to
responding to any questions you may have.