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Monday, May 7, 2018

IAEA August 2009 Report Islamic Republic of Iran

Originally Published August 28, 2009; Last Updated May 08, 2018; Last Republished May 07, 2018:

"In a mature fast-reactor economy, however, there will be no legitimate reason either to enrich uranium or to use the PUREX-type process that extracts pure, weapons-usable plutonium. Any such effort would be prima facie evidence of an attempt to build nuclear weapons, making it easy to monitor and stop would-be proliferators."--George Stanford--

Congress must hold public joint hearings in response to this paper—our nation has much to learn about deploying force in pursuit of national objectives—so frequently does our nation deploy force one wonders whether it instead of freedom has become our foundation.

Listening to an Iranian negotiator quickly reveals one attribute of force: it freezes any relationship between human beings (and by extension nations) at the point of the last application of force. Stated differently, if ever the relationship resumes it will be at the point of the last application of force, regardless of when the application of force occurred and independent of any definition of "right" or "wrong"!

"Ultimately, a negotiated solution remains the best way to resolve the nuclear crisis with Iran, and increased pressure offers the best hope of convincing Iran to undertake successful negotiations."--Preventing Iran...--

If you are a religious extremist (some might say religious whacko), which is finding it difficult to get along with your neighbors, get a new religion—don't involve us in your whacky crusades!

If you are our unstable, unfit, unwell, and unbalanced "new" alt-white-house et al. who is finding it more difficult to govern, making it necessary to pander to our religious extremists, resign. You can join the whacky crusades of the Middle East after you resignation, impeachment, or otherwise exit our Executive Office of the Presidency of the United States.

...apparently it's not just America's politicos that behave like clownish comedians without constraints...Israeli spies tasked to dig up dirt on supporters of the Iran Six Party JCPOA instead dug up a warehouse of binders and compact discs containing "secret" nuclear research, which Netanyahau presented to the world on national television like a clownish comedian cross between Monty Hall's "Let's Make a Deal" and Geraldo Rivera's "Secrets of Al Capone's Vault"...presumably the binders and compact discs contain more than a stop sign and gin bottle...or maybe Netanyahau plans on continuing has clownish comedy routine by revealing to the world on national television what's behind curtain number three...maybe an agent provocateur...

Our UN representative's castigation of Iran for complying with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not a useful nuclear non-proliferation strategy. Neither is cluelessly chanting "repeal and replace" without a replacement nor is becoming a botheration!

Our "new" alt-white-house's début at the United Nations was a stream of consciousness bombastic harangue distressingly similar to a Hugo Chavez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in equal parts. It's not the JCPOA that is an embarrassment to our nation.

A discussions of "mini-nukes" as deterrents is dangerously incongruous and pointless. Will a hypothetical adversary detonate its "lilliputian nuclear bombs" because my ginormous nuclear bombs is an insufficient deterrent?

It's unclear what our "new" alt-white-house accomplishes by informing Iran that it's playing with fire and that it does not appreciate how kind President Obama was to them, other than to telegraph its ignorance?

ISIS comments on the Associated Press published information about Iran’s enrichment and enrichment R&D, part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiations. Concluding, that a linear scaling of the established Standard Work Units (SWU) at the end of year 13 generates a break-out period of four months.

Kudos Mr. President on your leadership in pursuit of determined, focused and global multilateral diplomacy.

Your detractors' inability to understand that the modern global commons and multilateral diplomacy will often require leading nations to simultaneously participate and enforce sanctions (sometimes harsh) while continuing constructive engagement with all nation is unfortunate, but irrelevant.

"...Baratz, a 42-year-old philosophy lecturer, will be tasked with improving Israel's reputation in the world."--Reuters--

Really!

Perhaps an American Secretary of State functioning at the mental capacity of a 12-year-old is required to convince a continually sulking Israeli prime minister (cum foreign and economic minister) that accusations of Anti-Semitism will not substitute for Palestine peace?

(Those seeking a readable and informative primer on Iran's [six reactor, two uranium mines and cascades of uranium hexafluoride gas centrifuges] nuclear program may find Jeremy Bernstein's short book "Nuclear Iran" helpful?)

As scientists and engineers with understanding of the physics and technology of nuclear power and of nuclear weapons, we congratulate you and your team on the successful completion of the negotiations in Vienna. We consider that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) the United States and its partners negotiated with Iran will advance the cause of peace and security in the Middle East and can serve as a guidepost for future non-­proliferation agreements."... (Letter to President Obama, 29 Scientists)

Our President deserves praise for pioneering multilateral procedures using multi-national diplomatic solutions to a state's international intransigence. As with all pioneering methods there will be periods of trial and error—including learning to smoothly, routinely, and transparently utilize multiple imposition-relief-imposition sanction cycles5.

Our international community must anticipate such episodes of intransigence by a state et al. and learn to smoothly, routinely, and transparently participate in as many sanction cycles as are necessary to eliminate a state's intransigence or eliminate a state's international economic viability, whichever occurs first.

Secretary of State John Kerry, Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, and Treasury Secretary Jack Lew testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the details of the recently signed nuclear agreement with Iran and its enforcement.
UPDATED 07/18/2015 WH, Weekly Address: A Comprehensive, Long-Term Deal with Iran

Kudos to our President and the international diplomatic teams on concluding a negotiated Iran deal—there's no negotiated deal that cannot be improved, especially by the armchair negotiators on the periphery of negotiations.

Kudos to our President and the long-suffering diplomatic and negotiation teams for successfully concluding an Iran non-proliferation framework.

Our leaders focusing on coercive force should instead focus on convincing nations that nuclear weapons provide only an illusion of security. Just ask Israel, who has reportedly and embarrassingly demanded that the global power nations include an "I love Israel" clause in the recently concluded Iran nuclear non-proliferation framework agreement!

And of course, the soon the global power nations reduce, eliminate and cease pursuing nuclear weapon stockpiles the easier it will be to credibly convince other nations to do the same.

Our newly elected senators should locate the restrooms before attempting to advise foreign governments. In the meantime their more experienced senate colleagues should ensure they don't urinate on themselves, others or the institution, not facilitate a public urination.

A truly bizarre dynamic exists when a nation possessing nuclear weapons for their perceived security publicly criticizes our diplomats' efforts to reduce another nation's propensity to pursue a similar or the same perceived security!

Such criticism is mistaken, unhelpful, hypocritical, and impedes our diplomats' pursuit of incremental nuclear non-proliferation milestones and major objectives.

Kudos to our President for patiently and courageously continuing multilateral diplomacy with Iran, notwithstanding near continuous and caustic criticism from the bomb-now-clowns. A nation's perceived need for a nuclear security blanket will not be reduced or eliminated using bombs or clowns.

Kudos to the diplomats struggling to overcome decades of mistrust in three days—no mean feat with religious-whack-jobs from Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and America et al. shouting a preference for war over diplomacy.

Of course non-signatory nations that lack standing on NPT related issues might have little or no choice but to shout from the sidelines or participate via proxy.

Given that President Obama cannot drop off the radar like a Chinese leader in waiting or declare an Israeli Prime Minister persona non grata and has already publicly lamented that he must deal with Netanyahu, the Prime Minister can be diverted to F-16 flight training complete with his own flight suit and moniker, "Yahoo" or "Yahweh".

He can busy himself conducting "Qom bombings sorties" in the Nevada desert, instead of wasting time bullying our president or others—no red lines or red lights or scooping up the shit after a bombing parade.

Our leadership must resist the frustration of our "force crowd" and continue pursuing patient diplomacy with Iran. Our force crowd is incapable of solutions that do not fundamentally rely on force.

Even those in the "force crowd" that stipulate diplomacy do so with an understanding that "all options are on the table" or that force will be applied elsewhere or that force will ultimately be applied to Iran proper.

The "force crowd" asserts that nobody should or can be taken seriously unless they are fundamentally capable of applying force—of course this is precisely the reasoning that compels Iran (and others) to pursue nuclear weaponry!

This is reminiscent of the allegations and circumstances surrounding4 the 1968 election intrigue and sabotage, which resulted in South Vietnam's withdrawal from the Paris Peace Talks based on secret communications they'd get better terms from a Nixon-Kissinger peace negotiation.

Of course history informs us that South Vietnam's trust in any Nixon-Kissinger assurances with respect to better peace negotiation terms was grossly misplaced.

Kudos Mr. President for rejecting the Iran war hyperbole of the "bomb now, ask questions later" crowd following Netanyahu et al.!

The last time an American president followed this crowd they were promising our nation could fighting one war (Afghanistan) and provoke another (Iraq), which they said would cost less than $50 billion dollars. The costs of these war debacles are now in the trillions of dollars, thousands of American troop deaths and tens of thousands of Iraqi and Afghani deaths.

No sooner have we begun scooping up the last piles of shit from a decade of war debacles than the "bomb now, ask questions later" crowd is back! And guess what their message is!?

Yep, they're promising we can fight one war (Afghanistan) and provoke another (Iran), which they have already stated will cost less than we think!

It's an embarrassment to our nation that this crowd can command any national attention, much less the attention of some members of Congress and our President! Decorum and courtesy probably prevents our president from telling this crowd to go to hell, so he politely suggests they consider and articulate the costs of provoking, yet another war. Only one problem Mr. President, they've already demonstrated an inability to understand the costs of war.

The "bomb now, ask questions later" crowd's strategy appears to be to wander in the wilderness of wars in perpetuity—if so, let's not follow them.

Kudos to President Obama for pursuing the diplomatic efforts necessary to economically isolate a high probability nuclear proliferator, specifically Iran's refusal to provide IAEA representatives current, complete and accurate data concerning all its nuclear related activities.

Initially such efforts may only be partially effective as individual nations attempt to avoid participation in orders to protect a perceived self-interest.

Eventually, even mighty nuclear nations such as America, Russia, United States, Britain, France will agree they have a greater self-interest in participating in the international economic system than nuclear proliferation.

Priority can be give to nations that are non-signatories or non-compliant with current non-proliferation regimens such as Iran, Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea. Eventually, applying economic isolation to regimen signatories that refuse to carry out their current obligation to eliminate their nuclear devices.

The bomb now ask questions later logic of the neocon crowd is so yesterday, not to mention ineffective!

Niall Ferguson's terse provocative post on a hypothetical Israeli attack of Iran's nuclear facilities demonstrates little more than that past pedagogy does not predict present perspicuity.

If POTUS were to receive the 11 pm call hypothesized by Ferguson's post POTUS's response should be simple, direct, and unfortunate: "shoot down the Israeli planes" (no doubt loaded with the bunker-buster-bombs quietly transferred to Israel by POTUS).

Notwithstanding Israel's purchase of political influence our nation is not benefiting Israel and may in fact gravely harm it by scripting out some bad version of a Nixonian mad dog tragic-comedy.

Attacking Iran and its nuclear facilities, in addition to being "messy" will ensure that Israel's focus remains on survival for another next half century, plus.

Instead of helping Israel attack its neighbors our nation must insist that Israel pursue immediate peace with its neighbors (yes, we've heard all the arguments against peace, ad nauseam) and focus on building its fragmented nation.

The real tragic-comedy will be an Israel that harms the Jews that it purports to help, with our assistance.

Unfortunately our "transparency President" appears to be reverting to reliance on opaqueness to secretly wage private wars that have become publicly unsustainable.

Secretly (at least initially) providing Israel's Netanyahu government with weaponry to threaten attack or attack Iran's underground nuclear enrichment facilities is unlikely to be helpful to either Israel, our nation, or the region (regardless of weather the weaponry is actually used to attack Iran).

UPDATED 07/24/2011 LAT, Man killed in Iran shooting was student, not nuclear scientist Assassination of academics is not a desirable, useful, or successful methodology for controlling proliferation—no more than burning a book is a desirable, useful, or successful methodology for controlling ideas. Assassination is a nefarious methodology that belies confidence for fear, desperation, and deprivation—producing nothing more than reciprocating retaliation and justification for proliferation.

It seems pretty clear that all nations agree that Iran sanctions are not a cure. Rather an incremental process whereby every nation decides notwithstanding current interests they will begin disentangling and disengaging from a high probability proliferator. It seem beneficial that disentanglement and disengagement does not happen in unison, but rather contiguously and continuously across time and nations. Some nations will disentangle and disengage immediately others will require considerably more time to unwind, substitute, and pursue alternatives. A nation with more entanglements and engagements has a greater opportunity and incentive to influence a high probability proliferator, while simultaneously participating in the disentanglement or disengagement. But refusing to participate or impeding disentanglement and disengagement because sanctions are not a cure is nothing less than facilitating a high probability proliferation. The wonderful Iranian people are pursuing a cure—some are being water and chemically cannoned by riot vehicles provided courtesy of China. (see NYT, U.S. Enriches Companies Defying Its Policy on Iran for our support to Iran nothwithstanding our calls for sanctions.

UPDATED 01/17/2010 UPI, China not to back new sanctions. Simply referring to "room for negotiation" without explanation or active participation risks the appearance of obstructing nonproliferation efforts.

"The fact is, Iran is not dealing straight up,...So they [Iranian leaders] can say whatever they would like. I'm [Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess] an intelligence professional. My job is to verify. And so we continually work on trying to verify what it is the Iranians say. But they are engaged in use of words that is not moving this in a positive direction."

Fortunately for the general Iran is a leaky sieve—unfortunately, Iran’s current leadership are operating with wacky religious beliefs. The general is not just trying to separate and verify data (signal) from wacky religious beliefs, dogma, and rhetoric (noise), but their unique brand of wacky religious beliefs, dogma, and rhetoric (noise)—it's very difficult, even for an experienced professional to get at the signal.

China risks its credibility and projecting a perception that it's a facilitator of nuclear proliferation instead of impeder. Diplomacy must proceed in combination with other continuous cooperative actions related to increasing the probability of nonproliferation and decreasing the probability of proliferation. China must explain its assertion that now is not the time for further action in parallel with diplomacy.

UPDATED 12/22/2009 Brookings, Sanctioning Iran: If Only It Were So Simple. Most do not argue that Iran sanctions are a panacea—most acknowledge the limited usefulness of sanctions—most do not suggest Iran or nuclear proliferation in general are simple matters. Nevertheless, a consensus for the combination of: diplomacy; smart application and administration of sanctions; comprehensive inspections; and the application of targeted United Nations authorized force have been shown useful in curbing proliferation. Ultimately the Iranian people must be the ones to exchange their authoritarian religious leaders for non-authoritarian secular leaders. Leaders who depend on the consensus of the talented Iranian people not on wacky religious dogma and doctrine to govern.

It’s useful to recall that this isn't about Iran, but about how all nations' proliferation efforts will be handled. Patient, persistent diplomacy aimed at continuous closing consensus sanctions—who cares if Iran's wacky religious regime test-launch a missile or two or three a day. It's useful to be mindful, as Zbigniew Brzezinski recently cautioned, that some are seeking to use Iran's irresponsible non-imminent (remote) generalized threats and harmless schoolyard antics and bullying to justify an unlawful preventative attack (as opposed to lawful preemptive attack).

A mostly symbolic IAEA Board of Governors resolution expressing frustration at Iran's delayed disclosure of the Qom nuclear site—Iran made a belated disclosure of the Qom site after a U.S. disclosure—a move unlikely to increase Iran's credibility or trust by the IAEA or community of nations. In an encouraging sign of unity against nuclear proliferation all five major Security Council nations voted in favor of the resolution that requires Iran to cease construction activity of the Qom site, among other items:

Urges Iran to comply fully and without delay with its obligations under the above mentioned resolutions of the Security Council, and to meet the requirements of the Board of Governors, including by suspending immediately construction at Qom;

Urges Iran to engage with the Agency on the resolution of all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme and, to this end, to cooperate fully with the IAEA by providing such access and information that the Agency requests to resolve these issues;

Urges Iran to comply fully and without qualification with its safeguards obligations, to apply the modified Code 3.1 and implement and ratify promptly the Additional Protocol;

Urges Iran specifically to provide the Agency with the requested clarifications regarding the purpose of the enrichment plant at Qom and the chronology of its design and construction;

Calls on Iran to confirm, as requested by the Agency, that Iran has not taken a decision to construct, or authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility which has as yet not been declared to the Agency;

Requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Iran, resolve the outstanding issues which give rise to concerns, and which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, and to implement the relevant provisions of UNSC resolutions;

"Iran's foreign minster [sic Foreign Minister], Manouchehr Mottaki, speaking in Manila, dismissed talk of further sanctions. "Sanction was the literature of the 60s and 70s,' he said. 'I think they are wise enough not to repeat failed experiences.'"--UK Guardian--

Iran's foreign minister is absolutely incorrect with respect to sanctions relating to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or potential proliferation of WMD or a prior opaque pattern with respect to potential proliferation of WMD. The community of nations must continue their impressive work to ensure all state sanctions relating to production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or potential proliferation of WMD or a prior opaque pattern with respect to potential proliferation of WMD continually escalate from trivial to total state isolation until confident conforming compliance with all IAEA guidance is demonstrated by the offending state.

“This would impose further pain on a nation that has already suffered a great deal by its schizophrenic rulers. We are against any kind of sanctions on people.”--Iran Opposition Leader Mir Hussein Moussavi--

Reports, if confirmed, that Iran will obtain 20% enriched fuel2 from the IAEA, via Russia are good news. Iran is apparently amenable to obtaining nuclear fuel from an IAEA fuel bank in lieu of continuing its pursuit of the fuel cycle? Hopefully, Israel, Pakistan, and India will be convinced global security requires all nations to rely on a fuel bank. The major nuclear powers must continue reducing their uranium and plutonium stockpiles so that within a short period EVERY nation has switched to an IAEA run and controlled fuel bank for ALL its fissile material.

UPDATED 09/26/2009 VOA, Iran to Allow IAEA Inspectors into Nuclear Plant. Israel must focus on becoming a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and follow-on Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Leave Iran (an NPT signatory) and its nuclear fuel cycle to the United Nations Security Council and IAEA. Ditto for Pakistan and India.

Iran has informed the IAEA that it has another previously undisclosed enrichment facility. Repeatedly lying to the world when saying it had cooperated fully with the IAEA. A lie repeated again this week by the putative Iranian president at the United Nations. Iran's has decided to come clean after it learned we've been monitoring construction of the secret Iranian facility for years. Better late than never. There is some beauty in Iran's religious regime<sup>1</sup> being hoisting on its own petard.

In an encouraging and remarkable display of unity the major nuclear powers and permanent security council members have encouraged Iran to transparently cooperate with IAEA or face additional consequences.

Article includes a copy of Iran's proposal. UPDATED 09/11/2009 U.S. negotiators find little in the proposal to form a basis for negotiation. Russia has unfortunately indicated its opposition to additional sanctions should Iran continue to be unresponsive to all IAEA requests. Perhaps it can point to hooks upon which to hang negotiations? (see CSM, Iran nuclear proposal rejected as Russia dismisses sanctions and Xinhua, Iran Nuclear Crisis) Surely Russia's stature will significantly diminish if it supports national intransigence to legitimate IAEA requests.

On matters of fissile material and nuclear proliferation nothing but total transparency is acceptable for all nations (i.e. total and unimpeded access to all facilities, scientists, documents, stockpiles, hardware etcetera). All nations' ability to participate in any international system must be inversely related to that nation's opaqueness on matters of fissile material and nuclear proliferation. All nations' ability to participate inany international system must be highly correlated with that nation's total transparency on matters of fissile material and nuclear proliferation. The non-transparent nation's disconnect from all international systems must be immediate, objective, progressive, proportional, public, consistent, and reversible.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) out-going Director General Mohamed ElBaradei tells the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that in many ways the Iran nuclear threat has been hyped. (see below for latest IAEA report on Iran's efforts to master the nuclear fuel cycle.)

1. On 5 June 2009, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2009/35). This report covers relevant developments since that date.

2. On 12 August 2009, Iran was feeding UF6 into Unit A24, and ten cascades of Unit A26, at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz.1 On that day, the eight other cascades of Unit A26 were under vacuum. Iran has continued with the installation of cascades at Unit A28; fourteen cascades have been installed and the installation of another cascade is continuing.2 All machines installed to date are IR-1 centrifuges. Installation work at Units A25 and A27 is also continuing.

3. Iran has estimated that, between 18 November 2008 and 31 July 2009, 7942 kg of UF6 was fed into the cascades and a total of 669 kg of low enriched UF6 was produced.3 The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.

4. As reported earlier, the Agency had informed Iran that, given the increasing number of cascades being installed at FEP and the increased rate of production of low enriched uranium at the facility, improvements to the containment and surveillance measures at FEP were needed for the Agency to continue to fully meet its safeguards objectives for the facility (GOV/2009/35, para. 3). In the course of a series of meetings, Iran and the Agency agreed on the improvements, which were put in place on 12 August 2009. The next physical inventory verification (PIV) at FEP is planned for November 2009. At that time, the Agency will be able to verify the inventory of all nuclear material at the facility and evaluate the nuclear material balance after the cold traps have been cleaned out.

5. Iran and the Agency have also agreed on improvements regarding the provision of accounting and operating records, and on the requirements for timely access for unannounced inspections (GOV/2009/35, para. 5).

6. Between 24 May 2009 and 13 August 2009, a total of approximately 37 kg of UF6 was fed into a 10-machine IR-4 cascade, a 10-machine IR-2m cascade and single IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). The nuclear material at PFEP, as well as the cascade area and the feed and withdrawal stations, remain under Agency containment and surveillance.

7. The results of the environmental samples taken at FEP and PFEP indicate that both plants have been operating as declared (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment).5 Since the last report, the Agency has successfully conducted three unannounced inspections. A total of 29 unannounced inspections have been conducted at FEP since March 2007.

8. The Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility. There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities. While Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related R&D activities in Iran, the Agency can confirm this only with respect to these two facilities, as the measures of the Additional Protocol are not available.

9. On 19 June 2009, the Agency requested Iran to update the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) to reflect the design features of the fuel assembly verified by the Agency during its May 2009 inspection at FMP (GOV/2009/35, para. 9). Under cover of a letter dated 21 August 2009, Iran submitted an updated DIQ for FMP, which the Agency is now reviewing.

10. On 11 August 2009, the Agency conducted both a PIV and design information verification (DIV) at FMP, at which time it was noted that the final quality control equipment had been installed, and the fuel assembly referred to above was undergoing quality control testing. Assessment of the results of the PIV is still pending.

11. On 17 August 2009, Iran, following repeated requests by the Agency, provided the Agency with access to the IR-40 reactor at Arak, at which time the Agency was able to carry out a DIV. The Agency verified that the construction of the facility was ongoing. In particular, the Agency noted that no reactor vessel was yet present. The operator stated that the reactor vessel was still being manufactured, and that it would be installed in 2011. Iran also stated that no hot cell windows or manipulators could be procured from foreign sources and that it was considering producing them domestically. Iran estimated that the civil construction work was about 95% completed and that the plant itself was about 63% completed. The facility at its current stage of construction conforms to the design information provided by Iran as of 24 January 2007. However, Iran still needs to provide updated and more detailed design information, in particular about the nuclear fuel characteristics, fuel handling and transfer equipment and the nuclear material accountancy and control system. The Agency has continued using satellite imagery to monitor the status of the Heavy Water Production Plant, which seems not to have been operating since the last report.

12. The Agency finalized its assessment of the results of the PIV carried out at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in March 2009 (GOV/2009/35, para. 11), and has concluded that the inventory of nuclear material at UCF as declared by Iran is consistent with those results, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with conversion plants of similar throughput. Between 8 March 2009 and 10 August 2009, approximately 11 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6 was produced at UCF. This brings the total amount of uranium in the form of UF6 produced at UCF since March 2004 to approximately 366 tonnes, some of which was transferred to FEP and PFEP, and all of which remains under Agency containment and surveillance. Between March 2009 and 10 August 2009, 159 samples of ammonium diuranate, containing about 2 kg of uranium, were received at UCF from the Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant.

13. On 21 July 2009 and 10 August 2009, the Agency conducted design information verification at UCF. The Agency was able to confirm that the facility conforms to the design information provided by Iran.

14. Iran has not yet resumed the implementation of the revised Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part on the early provision of design information (GOV/2008/59, para. 9; GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14). Iran is the only State with significant nuclear activities which has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force but is not implementing the provisions of the revised Code 3.1. The absence of such information results in late notification to the Agency of the construction of new facilities and changes to the design of existing facilities.

15. The Agency has not yet received the requested preliminary design information for the nuclear power plant that is to be built in Darkhovin (GOV/2008/38, para. 11).

16. In view of the anticipated loading of fuel into the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (GOV/2009/35, para. 15), now expected to take place in October/November 2009, the Agency installed a containment and surveillance system at that facility on 22–25 August 2009.

17. In a letter dated 12 July 2009, Iran informed the Agency that it had transferred all nuclear material out of the Uranium Chemical Laboratory at Esfahan and that it did not plan any other nuclear activities in this location and requested the Agency to consider this facility as a decommissioned facility. The Agency has scheduled an inspection to confirm the decommissioned status of this facility.

18. As referred to in the Director General’s previous reports to the Board (most recently in GOV/2009/35, para. 17), there remain a number of outstanding issues which give rise to concerns, and which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. As indicated in those reports, it is essential that Iran re-engage with the Agency to clarify and bring to a closure questions related to the alleged studies, the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document, and the procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related as well as the production of nuclear related equipment and components by companies belonging to defence industries.

19. It should be noted that, although the Agency has limited means to authenticate independently the documentation that forms the basis of the alleged studies, the information is being critically assessed, in accordance with the Agency’s practices, by corroborating it, inter alia, with other information available to the Agency from other sources and from its own findings. A description of all of the documentation available to the Agency about the alleged studies which the Agency has been authorized to share with Iran and which has been sufficiently vetted by the Agency was provided in the Director General’s report of May 2008 (GOV/2008/15, Annex A). It should be noted, however, that the constraints placed by some Member States on the availability of information to Iran are making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran on this matter. Notwithstanding, as the Director General has repeatedly emphasized, the information contained in that documentation appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, appears to be generally consistent, and is sufficiently comprehensive and detailed that it needs to be addressed by Iran with a view to removing the doubts which naturally arise, in light of all of the outstanding issues, about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

20. In connection with the outstanding issues, Iran has provided to the Agency: (a) its overall assessment of the documentation related to the alleged studies (GOV/2008/15, Annex A), and (b) partial replies and a document, in response to specific questions presented by the Agency (GOV/2008/15, Annex B). Iran has indicated further that it has information which could shed more light on the nature of the alleged studies, but has not yet provided it to the Agency (GOV/2008/15, para. 23). In the meantime, the Agency has studied the information provided by Iran thus far, but has not yet been given the opportunity by Iran to discuss its findings in detail owing to Iran’s insistence that it had already provided its final responses. In the view of the Agency, however, there are still matters which need to be discussed based on the documents and information provided by Iran itself or which relate to information which the Agency has independently corroborated. Examples of information included in the documentation that Iran has not disputed as being factually accurate7 are provided below.

21. Although Iran has challenged the allegation that it has engaged in nuclear related high explosives testing studies, Iran has told the Agency that it has experimented with the civil application of simultaneously functioning multiple detonators (GOV/2008/15, para. 20), and was asked by the Agency to provide it with information which would prove that such work had been for civil and nonnuclear military purposes (GOV/2008/38, para. 17(c)). Iran has not yet shared that information with the Agency. The Agency would also like to discuss with Iran the possible role that a foreign national with explosives expertise (GOV/2008/38, para. 17(d)), whose visit to Iran has been confirmed by the Agency, played in explosives development work.

22. With respect to the letter with handwritten annotations which was part of the documentation related to the alleged green salt project (GOV/2008/15, Annex A.1, Doc. 2), Iran has confirmed the existence of the underlying letter, has shown the original to the Agency and has provided the Agency with a copy of it. The existence of this original demonstrates a direct link between the relevant documentation and Iran. As already requested of Iran, the Agency needs to see further related correspondence and to have access to the individuals named in the letter.

23. In respect to the alleged missile re-entry vehicle studies, the Agency still wishes to visit the civilian workshops which Iran has indicated to the Agency exist and which are identified in the documentation as having been involved in the production of model prototypes of a new payload chamber for a missile (GOV/2008/38, para. 17(e)). In addition, while asserting that the documentation on the alleged missile re-entry vehicle was forged and fabricated, Iran informed the Agency that it was well known that Iran was working on the Shahab-3 missile. In light of that, the Agency has reiterated the need to hold discussions with Iran on the engineering and modelling studies associated with the re-design of the payload chamber referred to in the alleged studies documentation to exclude the possibility that they were for a nuclear payload.

24. In light of the above, the Agency has repeatedly informed Iran that it does not consider that Iran has adequately addressed the substance of the issues, having focused instead on the style and form of presentation of the written documents relevant to the alleged studies and providing limited answers or simple denials in response to other questions. The Agency has therefore requested Iran to provide more substantive responses and to provide the Agency with the opportunity to have detailed discussions with a view to moving forward on these issues, including granting the Agency access to persons, information and locations identified in the documents in order for the Agency to be able to confirm Iran’s assertion that these documents are false and fabricated. The Agency has reiterated its willingness to discuss modalities that could enable Iran to demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in the documentation are not nuclear related, as Iran asserts, while protecting sensitive information related to its conventional military activities.

25. For the Agency to be in a position to progress in its verification of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, it is essential that Iran take the necessary steps to enable the Agency to clarify and bring to a closure the outstanding issues and implement its Additional Protocol.

26. The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has cooperated with the Agency in improving safeguards measures at FEP and in providing the Agency with access to the IR-40 reactor for purposes of design information verification. Iran has not, however, implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, on the early provision of design information.

27. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related projects as required by the Security Council.

28. Contrary to the requests of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues of concern which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. Regrettably, the Agency has not been able to engage Iran in any substantive discussions about these outstanding issues for over a year. The Agency believes that it has provided Iran with sufficient access to documentation in its possession to enable Iran to respond substantively to the questions raised by the Agency. However, the Director General urges Member States which have provided documentation to the Agency to work out new modalities with the Agency so that it could share further documentation with Iran, as appropriate, since the Agency’s inability to do so is rendering it difficult for the Agency to progress further in its verification process.

29. It is critical for Iran to implement the Additional Protocol and clarify the outstanding issues in order for the Agency to be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

30. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

The above items from the report do not include Heading or Footnotes—a pdf of the report can be viewed or downloaded at Scribd (see below above link).

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1. All religious regimes and regimens, like nuclear weapons have out lived their usefulness.

2. It appears Iran is requesting fuel based on definitional criteria as opposed to technical. Fuel less than 20% is considered low enriched uranium (LEU).

3. Aftenposten is also reporting that between 2007 and 2009 the Swedish company ÅF Colenco secretly helped Iran design a 360 MW light water reactor. This activity may have violated UN sanctions. The design and support help has since stopped. According to Aftenposten companies from Russia, Pakistan, Syria, France, Italy, Macedonia, Armenia and the Emirates may have engaged in activity that violated UN sanction, too.

4. Intercepts of Anna Chennault's conversation with South Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem (assumed Thieu was talking to his ambassador) form the basis of the allegations attributing the intrigue and sabotage of the Paris Peace Talks to the Nixon campaign.

5. Many states are participants in a multi-national international sanctions framework by day while continuing to do business with a sanctioned state by night. Therefore the pioneering sanctions framework must smoothly, routinely, and transparently sanction states that violate imposed sanctions regimen.