Paul Feyerabend's principle of proliferation

This is a course about the history of Skepticism from the ancient Greeks to today, with special attention to the political ramifications of questioning man's ability to know the world and himself with any certainty. We will discuss the debates raging between Plato and the Sophists, the rise of Christianity in the Roman world, and the so-called 'Skeptical Crisis' of the Renaissance as well as Pierre Bayle's Skepticism and David Hume's. In addition the Natural Law tradition will be explored and the relationship between Skepticism and Conservatism.
In the second part, we will explore the systematic relations between Skepticism and politics. What is skeptical doubt? When is doubt relevant? How does Skepticism relate to tolerance and to freedom of expression? And can it help us to solve political problems not only in a critical, but also in a creative way?

审阅

EC

Very good materials and quality videos. Great teachers. This course made me decide upon Erasmus as the university i want to study at, next year.

JQ

Jun 04, 2017

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Nice Course. Enjoyed the concepts. Thanks, sincerely

从本节课中

The marketplace of ideas: An imaginative argument for freedom of expression

We will consider Mill’s argument from “the marketplace of ideas” for both freedom of opinion and freedom of expression of opinion. If ideas can compete freely, truth will emerge. Just as a free market is self correcting, speech should not be restricted, because in a free and open encounter, the true and sound ideas will survive, and the false and unsound ideas will vanquish. We will identify the Skeptical assumptions of Mill’s argument and we will evaluate it.

教学方

Wiep van Bunge

Prof. dr.

Tim De Mey

Dr.

脚本

To be honest, I don't think Mill's arguments from the Marketplace of Ideas is his best argument for freedom of expression because it depends on an analogy that can be easily doubted. But that powerful image is also the reason why it's his most beautiful argument, and moreover, it keeps on playing a pivotal role in contemporary debates and practices. Although John Stewart Mill's pluralism inspired many philosophers and philosophies of science, notably also Karl Popper's Critical Rationalism. Paul Feyerabend's Epistemological Anarchism can safely be said to owe a great deal to, or perhaps even, to be the true heir of Mill's Marketplace of Ideas. Feyerabend's main idea and drive is that the real hallmark of science and of scientific progress is basically creativity and just as, according to Mill, nobody should ever silence the expression of the differing opinions of the individual according to Feyerabend, nobody should ever interfere in or tamper with the creativity of the individual scientists. One of Feyerabend's main principles is his principle of proliferation. The scientist should proliferate the alternatives. She should make up new theories, propose new ideas. It doesn't matter at all where these ideas come from. Even the ramblings of madmen can be useful inputs into the marketplace of ideas. The scientists can and should explore these alternative theories freely. At the end of the day, the best one will prevail. One of Feyerabend's reasons for adopting and vigorously advocating the principle of proliferation is the problem of theory lateness of observation. All too often, science gets stuck because scientists only work with a single theory. But in order to be successful, in order to make progress, in order to be creative, different views and theories should compete at the same time. Pluralism counterbalances theory lateness and single mindedness, if you wish. Scientific progress is not a matter of progression towards truth. Rather it's a matter of an expanding ocean of alternatives that develops our understanding through a process of competition. Coming from one problem with Feyerabend's approach is that in this process of competition, views and theories can never lose. As Godfrey-Smith argues in his book Theory and Reality, "What is missing in Feyerabend's picture is some rule or mechanism for the rejection and elimination of ideas... There is no way for an idea to be taken off the table." So, perhaps in deeds, the competition between rival ideas works pretty well in science. Pluralism, openness to alternatives, are virtuous attitudes that keep scientists sharp and focused. But this science operates on a truly free market. Isn't science rather, despite Feyerabend's insistence on creativity, are highly regulated, perhaps even over regulated markets? And more importantly for our purposes of evaluating the argument from the marketplace of ideas, aren't it precisely those supplementary regulations rather than the very competition between ideas as such that explain why science seems successful in acquiring or approximating truth? According to Bernard Williams, we shouldn't idealize the operation of the market forces too much. Sure, deliberately confronting and carefully considering alternative fuels will always be beneficial in some sense but it also consumes time without making it necessarily more likely that one will find the truth. Nothing in the open competition between ideas as such guarantees that it leads to truth. As the debate of climate change illustrates, the rival views don't benefit at all from the open competition rather they stick in the mud. Moreover, in the infamous global village, the odd drawing level of noise makes it very unlikely that truth will eventually emerge. As Bernard Williams argues, "Everyone knows that in modern communication, messages compete for attention and cancel each other out. And that they are picked out for reasons that need have nothing to do with their truth. The chances that many of these messages will be true are low and the probability that the system itself will help anyone to pick out the true ones is even lower." Popper and Feyerabends disagree on the correct interpretation of Mill's Marketplace of Ideas in relation to science. Who is, according to you, the true intellectual heir to Mill? Could either or both philosophies of science be reconciled with Mill's phenominalism?