6 ( ( c. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. This brief is being filed by the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("FACDL") in support of the Petitioner, Gabriel A. Hernandez. FACDL is a statewide organization representing over 2,000 members, all of whom are criminal defense practitioners. The Miami Chapter off ACDL was founded in 1963 and has a membership of over 400 criminal defense lawyers. F ACDL and the Miami Chapter off ACDL (hereinafter collectively referred to as "F ACDL") have an interest in this case because the case concerns an issue that will have an impact on numerous criminal defendants in this state. In the opinion below, the Third District certified the following two questions of great public importance: 1. DOES THE IMMIGRATION WARNING IN FLORIDA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.172(c)(8) BAR IMMIGRATION-BASED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS BASED ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN PADILLA v. KENTUCKY, - U.S. -,130 S. Ct (2010)? 2. IF THE PRECEDING QUESTION IS ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE, SHOULD THE RULING IN PADILLA BE APPLIED RETROACTIVEL Y? Hernandez v. State, 61 So. 3d 1144, (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). FACDL will address the first question in the instant brief. Regarding the second question, F ACDL supports the position taken by the Petitioner in his principal brief. F ACDL contends 1

7 ( that the Court should allow a two-year window for affected defendants to raise Padilla claims - similar to the two-year window that the Court permitted in State v. Green, 944 So. 2d 208, 219 (Fla. 2006) ("Therefore, in the interest of fairness, defendants whose cases are already final will have two years from the date of this I opinion in which to file a motion comporting with the standards adopted today."). 2

8 ( c D. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. FACDL submits that an attorney's misadvice/failure to advise regarding the deportation consequences of a defendant's guilty/no contest plea that renders deportation "practically inevitable" is not cured by a trial court's admonition (based on Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure ( c )(8» that the defendant "may" be deported as a result of the plea. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. -, 130 S. Ct (2010), the United States Supreme Court explained that since 1996, if a noncitizen commits a removable offense, his or her removal is "practically inevitable." The Court further explained that a controlled substance offense is deportable. F ACDL contends that informing a defendant that s/he may be deported is insufficient to meet the requirements of Padilla. There is a substantial difference between informing a defendant that his or her plea may result in deportation versus informing the defendant that his or her plea will result in deportation. Accordingly, F ACDL prays the Court to hold that a trial court's compliance with rule 3.172(c)(8) does not cure defense counsel's misadvice/failure to advise about the deportation consequences of a guilty/no contest plea. 3

9 ( (, E. ARGUMENT AND CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY. An attorney's misadvice/failure to advise regarding the deportation consequences of a defendant's guilty/no contest plea is not cured by a trial court's admonition (based on Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(c)(8)) that the defendant "may" be deported as a result of the plea. In the opinion below, the Third District certified the following question of great public importance: DOES THE IMMIGRATION WARNING IN FLORIDA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.172( c )(8) BARIMMIGRA TION-BASED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS BASED ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN PADILLA v. KENTUCKY, - U.S. -, 130 S. Ct (2010)? Hernandez v. State, 61 So. 3d 1144, (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). For the reasons expressed below, F ACDL requests the Court to answer this question in the negative. 1. Padilla. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. -, 130 S. Ct (2010), defendant Jose Padilla faced deportation proceedings after he entered a guilty plea to transporting a large amount of marijuana in his tractor-trailer in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Mr. Padilla subsequently filed a state postconviction motion asserting that his trial counsel not only failed to advise him of the immigration consequences before he entered his plea, but also told him he '" did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long. '" Padilla, 599 U.S. at-, 130 S. Ct. at The Kentucky Supreme Court denied Mr. Padilla relief, concluding that the right to 4

10 ( ( effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment did not protect a criminal defendant from erroneous advice about immigration consequences that flowed from his guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W. 3d 482, 484 (Ky. 2008). The United States Supreme Court granted Mr. Padilla's petition for writ of certiorari "to decide whether, as a matter of federal law, Padilla's counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he was pleading guilty would result in his removal from this country." Padilla, 599 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at On March 31, 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Padilla. In a 7-2 opinion written by Justice Stevens,! the United States Supreme Court confirmed that the constitutional right to counsel set forth in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that defense counsel give proper advice regarding the deportation consequences of a criminal conviction. See id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at The Court traced the dramatic "changes to our immigration law" over the last half century, id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 1480, concluding that there remains very little discretion in immigration removal statutes today: Under contemporary law, if a noncitizen has committed a removable offense after [1996], his removal is practically inevitable but for the possible exercise of limited remnants of equitable discretion vested in I Justice Alito concurred in a separate opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Thomas. 5

11 ( ( the Attorney General to cancel removal for noncitizens convicted of particular classes of offenses. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (emphasis added). Applying the facts of Mr. Padilla's case, the Court then proceeded to explain that a defendant convicted of a controlled substance offense is deportable. See id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (citing 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) ("Any alien who at anytime after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance..., other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.")). Put another way, the Court concluded that removal is "specifically command[ ed]... for all controlled substances convictions except for the most trivial of marijuana possession offenses." Id. Because Padilla pled to a controlled substance offense under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the Court held, defense counsel had a duty to accurately advise him of this consequence. See id. The Court added: When the law is not succinct and straightforward (as it is in many of the scenarios posited by Justice ALITO), a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 6

12 ( ( 2. Flores, rule 3.172( c )(8), and "may" versus "shall" In Flores v. State, 57 So. 3d 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), the Fourth District held that an attorney's misadvice regarding the deportation consequences of a defendant's guilty/no contest plea is cured by a trial court's admonition (based on Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172( c )(8)) that the defendant "may" be deported. See Flores, 57 So. 3d at ("The court's warning that Flores may be deported based on his plea cured any prejudice that might have flowed from counsel's alleged misadvice. "). In Hernandez, the Third District rejected the Fourth District's holding in Flores:... Flores holds that the trial court's warning to Flores that he may be deported based on his plea "cured any prejudice that might have flowed from counsel's alleged misadvice." 57 So. 3d at While this may have been an accurate statement of federal and Florida law before Padilla, we respectfully conclude that it is no longer accurate. As noted, the record in Padilla did not even include a "may subject you" warning as part of the plea colloquy. But the holding in that case does not depend on a distinction between defense counsel's mere failure to warn versus his or her affirmative misadvice. Instead, Padilla goes to the very heart of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel when the defendant is entering a plea to a criminal charge as to which the plea and sentence, as here, will subject the defendant to deportation (and with no basis to apply for discretionary relief from that result). The majority opinion in Padilla focuses on counsel's duty, not on the "fair notice" warning that such a plea might (and therefore, inferentially, might not) result in deportation: There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain. The duty of the private practitioner in such cases is more limited. When the law is 7

13 ( ( not succinct and straightforward (as it is in many of the scenarios posted by Justice Alito), a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (footnote omitted; emphasis provided). The majority opinion thus differentiated between those cases involving a mere "risk of adverse immigration consequences," and those with a "truly clear" deportation consequence. The concurring opinion by Justice Alito in Padilla, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, recognized the consequence of such a distinction in the many cases in which deportability is clear but only the "risk of adverse immigration consequences" warning is given. The concurring opinion argued that defense counsel must only "( 1) refrain from unreasonably providing incorrect advice and (2) advise the defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences and that, ifthe alien wants advice on this issue, the alien should consult an immigration attorney." Id. at We are obligated to follow and apply the majority's distinction and holding in Padilla. Applying this new Sixth Amendment analysis to the present case, neither the plea colloquy nor Hernandez's counsel's advice (accepting the sworn allegation of Hernandez, s motion as true for this purpose) conveyed the warning that deportability was a non-discretionary and "truly clear" consequence of his plea. The Supreme Court also explained in Padilla why this seemingly simple distinction between a "will subject you" warning versus a "may subject you" warning has a constitutional dimension: We too have previously recognized that '" [p ]reserving the client's right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.'" [ INS v.] St. Cyr, 533 U.S. [289,] 323 [(2001)] (quoting 3 Criminal Defense Techniques 60A.01, 60A.02[2] (1999)). Likewise, we have recognized that "preserving 8

14 ( the possibility of' discretionary relief from deportation under 212(c) of the 1952 INA, 66 Stat. 187, repealed by Congress in 1996, "would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial." St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at In Flores, the Fourth District further noted that Padilla's plea resulted in a conviction for an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), while Flores' conviction did not. The opinion reported, however, that Flores nonetheless became deportable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B). Under our reading of Padilla, constitutionally effective defense counsel is required under either scenario to furnish a "will subject you," not a "may subject you" warning to his or her client. Hernandez, 61 So. 3d at (footnotes omitted). FACDL requests the Court to approve the Third District's holding in Hernandez on this point. "A criminal defendant who faces almost certain deportation is entitled to know more than that it is possible that a guilty plea could lead to removal; he is entitled to know that it is a virtual certainty." United States v. Bonilla, 637 F.3d 980,984 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Padilla, 599 U.S. at-, 130 S. Ct. at 1483) (emphasis in original). In support of its argument, F ACDL notes that a similar issue was recently litigated in a federal case in Tallahassee (misadvice as to whether the defendant would be deported as a result of a plea). See United States v. Choi, case number 4:08cr5-RH-WCS (N.D. Fla.). At the postconviction hearing in Choi, the prosecutor 9

15 ( ( argued that there was no misadvice because the defendant had been informed that his plea could result in deportation. The judge (the Honorable Robert L. Hinkle) rej ected this argument, noting when a plea makes deportation "presumptively mandatory," there is a substantial difference between telling a defendant that a plea could result in deportation versus telling the defendant that a plea will result in deportation. Judge Hinkle then used the analogy of flying on an airplane: MS. NeSMITH: But, Your Honor, I still believe that, just him knowing that he could face, that he could be deported, is adequate - that's adequate knowledge for him to know and understand the consequences of his plea. THE COURT: Well, I know every time that I get on an airplane, that it could crash, but if you tell me it's going to crash, I'm not getting on. (Doc 96 - Pg 52) (available on PACER). See also Scales v. Miss. State Parole Bd., 831 F.2d 565,566 (5th Cir. 1987) ("The distinction between whether a prisoner shall or may be given parole critically differentiates his expectation of release... "). F ACDL further notes that courts in other jurisdictions have rejected the argument that a trial court's warning during a plea colloquy that a defendant may be deported is sufficient to cure defense counsel's affirmative misadvice on the matter. F or example, in In re Resendiz, 19 P.3 d 1171, (Cal. 2001), the California Supreme Court held that compliance with a statutory advisement that informs a defendant that a guilty/no contest plea "may have the consequences of deportation" 10

16 ( ( did not cure counsel's misadvice: The Attorney General argues, as does Justice Brown in her concurring and dissenting opinion, that a trial court's having provided a [Cal. Penal Code ] advisement "should shield pleas from collateral attack" (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.,post, atp. 453,19 P.3d at p. 1192) based on immigration consequences. We disagree. That defendants have a right to counsel when they undertake the plea evaluation and negotiation specifically provided for in section , subdivisions (b) and (d) is not disputed. And that right to counsel "is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. " We recognize that it is the attorney, not the client, who is particularly qualified to make an informed evaluation of a proffered plea bargain. Thus, whether or not the court faithfully delivers section 's mandated advisements, the defendant can be expected to rely on counsel's independent evaluation of the charges, applicable law, and evidence, and of the risks and probable outcome of trial. Under the Sixth Amendment, defendants are entitled so to rely and to expect representation within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. The existence of a state statute requiring courts to deliver a specified immigration advisement cannot deprive defendants ofthese federal constitutional rights. Efforts to mine section ' s history for hints the Legislature meant that statute to foreclose some kinds of ineffectiveness claims are misplaced. What constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel is a question of constitutional law, not of legislative intent. Thus, that a defendant may have received valid section advisements from the court does not entail that he has received effective assistance of counsel in evaluating or responding to such advisements. The Attorney General's suggestion that we construe section as a categorical bar to immigration-based ineffective assistance claims would deny defendants who prove incompetence and prejudice a remedy for the specific constitutional deprivation suffered, viz., the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. Any construction that might engender such constitutional infirmity is to be avoided. Nothing, moreover, suggests that the drafters of section intended either to narrow defendants' relationships with their attorneys 11

17 ( (, or to shield incompetent legal advisers. If anything, the statutory scheme contemplates an enhanced, not a diminished, role for counsel. F or the foregoing reasons, section does not bar petitioner's claim. (Citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).2 See also Ex parte Tanklevskaya, No CR, 2011 WL at *11 (Tex. App. May 26,2011) ("[W]ehold that, under these facts, the trial court's statutory admonishment [i.e., that the plea 'may' result in deportation] prior to accepting applicant's guilty plea does not cure the prejudice arising from plea counsel's failure to inform applicant that, upon pleading guilty, she would be presumptively inadmissible."); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S. 2d 398, 407 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) ("I hold that where, as here, defendant is found in fact to have been misled by bad advice from a so-called retained specialist and by a lack of advice from his defense attorney, the Court's general warning will not automatically cure counsel's failure nor erase the consequent prejudice.") (footnote omitted); State v. Creary, 2004 WL (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a trial court's warning during a plea colloquy that the conviction "could" result 2 The California Supreme Court added that "the Legislature cannot have intended, when enacting section , to burden pleading defendants (on pain of waiving subsequent Sixth Amendment claims) with an obligation to raise before the judge at the plea proceeding any concerns they might have about advice they receive from counsel regarding the court's section advisement." Resendiz, 19 P.3d at 1178 na. 12

18 ( ( in deportation did not cure defense counsel's alleged misadvice ). 3 3 Similarly, other courts in this country have concluded that an attorney's advice that deportation is a "possibility" is insufficient under Padilla if the correct advice is that deportation is mandatory. In particular, in Ex Parte Romero, 351 S.W.3d 127, 131 (Tex. App. 2011), the Texas appellate court stated: Based on trial counsel's affidavit, the trial court could have found that trial counsel reviewed the written immigration admonition with Romero including the "possible" immigration consequences; however, reviewing the written admonition did not satisfy trial counsel's duty under these circumstances. Because the deportation consequence was truly clear, trial counsel had a duty to inform Romero of the specific consequences of his plea. In his affidavit, Romero stated that trial counsel never advised him that he would be deported. Because trial counsel only informed Romero about "possible" immigration consequences where the law made deportation a virtual certainty, counsel's performance was deficient. (Emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Simonovich v. State, No. AII-821, 2011 WL (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2011) (holding that counsel was ineffective for merely telling defendant that he "might" be deported as a result of his plea, when the correct advice was that deportation was presumptively mandatory); Ex Parte Carpio-Cruz, No CR, 2011 WL at *7 (Tex. App. Nov. 9, 2011) ("Counsel testified that she was aware of and understood all of these statutes, yet she only advised Carpio that his guilty plea 'could' result in removal and he 'could' face immigration consequences. Because Carpio's deportation was 'practically inevitable,' this advice was deficient.") (citations omitted); Salazar v. State, No CR, 2011 WL at *3 (Tex. App. Aug. 31, 2011) {"[T]he trial court inferentially found that Salazar failed to establish the first prong of Strickland because his counsel told him that there was a likelihood he would be deported. The trial court characterized that the attorney did not make an inaccurate representation. As we have previously noted, Salazar's trial counsel also admonished him that there was a possibility that he would be deported. In any event, the correct advice, which was that the plea of guilty would result in certain deportation, was not given. Both the terms 'likelihood' and 'possibility' leave open the hope that deportation might not occur. Consequently, these admonishments were inaccurate 13

19 ,. ( (I Finally, F ACDL submits that the fact that a state requires court advisals regarding potential immigration consequences of a guilty/no contest plea does not obviate the need for defense counsel to investigate and advise the defendant. See Immigrant Defense Project, "Duty of Criminal Defense Counsel Representing An Immigrant Defendant after Padilla V. Kentucky," April 6, The American Bar Association's ("ABA") commentary to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Pleas of Guilty states that the court's "inquiry is not, of course, any substitute for advice by counsel" because: The court's warning comes just before the plea is taken, and may not afford time for mature reflection. The defendant cannot, without risk of making damaging admissions, discuss candidly with the court the questions he or she may have. Moreover, there are relevant considerations which will not be covered by the judge in his or her admonition. A defendant needs to know, for example, the probability of conviction in the event of trial. Because this requires a careful evaluation of problems of proof and of possible defenses, few defendants can make this appraisal without the aid of counsel. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Pleas of Guilty, cmt. to Standard at 118 (3d. ed. 1999). See also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Pleas of Guilty, cmt. to Standard (f) at 126 ("[O]nly defense counsel is in a position to ensure that the defendant is aware of the full range of consequences that may apply in his or her and did not convey to Salazar the certainty that the guilty plea would lead to his deportation."). 14

20 ( case.,,).4 Consistent with these standards and commentary, FACDL requests the Court to reject the Fourth District's holding in Flores. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, FACDL submits that a trial court's compliance with rule 3.172(c)(8) does not cure the prejudice caused by counsel's 4 The ABA recommends that "[d]efense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function, Standard 4-4.1(a) (3d. ed. 1993). "Effective investigation by the lawyer has an important bearing on competent representation at trial, for without adequate investigation the lawyer is not in a position... to conduct plea discussions effectively." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function, cmt. to Standard at 183. A judge, however, is prohibited from independent investigation. Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct states that a "judge must not independently investigate facts in a case and must consider only the evidence presented." Fla. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3. "What makes a system adversarial rather than inquisitorial is not the presence of counsel, much less the presence of counsel where the defendant has not requested it; but rather, the presence of a judge who does not (as an inquisitor does) conduct the factual and legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties." McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991). The stark contrast between a defense lawyer's duty to investigate and a judicial prohibition against investigation further underscores the duties of a defense counsel when compared to the responsibilities of a judge. Additionally, "[t]he key to plea bargaining is not the plea colloquy, but the bargaining and advice that precede it[; p ]articularly because judges are absent from that bargaining, defense lawyers must actively negotiate and competently advise their clients on whether a bargain is substantively desirable." Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 1117, 1142 (2011). Any additional warning deemed to "cure" counsel's ineffectiveness eliminates the requirement of defense counsel to advise of the immigration penalties and prevents the lawyer from competently advising her client on the desirability of a plea bargain. 15

21 ,, misadvice/failure to advise regarding deportation consequences. When a plea renders deportation "practically inevitable," it is insufficient to merely inform a defendant that s/he may be deported. 16

22 r' (I F. CONCLUSION. F or all of the foregoing reasons, F ACDL requests the Court to (l) answer the first certified question in the negative and (2) approve the Third District's holding in Hernandez on this point. 17

A NEW OBLIGATION FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS A practicing attorney for over 17 years, Jorge G. Aristotelidis is board certified in criminal law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, and is a former

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff and Respondent, F065134 v. Kern County Superior Court ARMANDO ALVAREZQUINTERO, No. BF132212A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA STATE OF FLORIDA, Petitioner, v. CASE NO. SC07-95 GLENN KELLY, Respondent. / AMICUS BRIEF OF THE FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

No. 05-10-01016-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT DALLAS FRED ANDERSON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 5 of Dallas County,

IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent, v. AARON REGINALD CHAMBERS, Petitioner. No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0392-PR Filed March 4, 2015 THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT

CHARLES EDWARD DAVIS, Applicant-Appellant, vs. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 14-0420 Filed May 20, 2015 STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County,

Case 1:03-cr-00422-LEK Document 24 Filed 05/02/06 Page 1 of 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK PATRICK GILBERT, Petitioner, -against- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1:05-CV-0325 (LEK)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED. v. CASE NO.: 1D05-4610

NOTICE This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e(1. 2015 IL App (4th 130903-U NO. 4-13-0903

COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED August 28, 2008 David R. Schanker Clerk of Court of Appeals NOTICE This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in

PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: THE NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURT SYSTEM, ONE YEAR LATER A Report of the Criminal Courts and Criminal Justice Operations Committees of the New York City Bar Association I. Introduction

Offering Defense Witnesses to New York Grand Juries By: Mark M. Baker 1 Your client has just been held for the action of the Grand Jury. Although you have a valid defense, you do not want your client to

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO Opinion Number: Filing Date: June 19, 2014 Docket No. 33,604 MARTIN RAMIREZ, a/k/a RICHARD G. SANCHEZ, JR., v. Petitioner-Respondent, STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Assigned on Briefs November 04, 2014 WILLIAM NEWSON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County No. C13358 Roy B. Morgan,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA ERIC EDENFIELD, v. Petitioner, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED CASE NO. 1D09-6554

IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS WESTERN DISTRICT STATE OF MISSOURI, v. ROBERT E. WHEELER, Respondent, Appellant. WD76448 OPINION FILED: August 19, 2014 Appeal from the Circuit Court of Caldwell County,

LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY By Peter L. Ostermiller Occasionally, a defendant, while incarcerated and apparently having nothing better to do, will file a Motion under RCr. 11.42,

-rev & rem-slz 2014 S.D. 89 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, v. BRANDON M. WOLF, Plaintiff and Appellant, Defendant and Appellee. MARTY J. JACKLEY Attorney General

Civil Action No. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO COLORADO CRIMINAL DEFENSE BAR, a Colorado non-profit corporation; COLORADO CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM COALITION, a Colorado

NO. 05-11-00657-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT DALLAS 5th Court of Appeals FILED: 03/23/2012 14:00 Lisa Matz, Clerk GLEN FRAZIER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

1. No. 108,809 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. SHANE RAIKES, Appellant. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT Generally, issues not raised before the district court, even constitutional

Nos. 05-11-01575-CR and 05-11-01576-CR The State Waives Oral Argument 5th Court of Appeals FILED: 06/04/2012 14:00 Lisa Matz, Clerk IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT DALLAS MARK

U.S. Department of Justice United States Attorney Southern District of New York The Silvio J. Mollo Building One Saint Andrew s Plaza New York, New York 10007 By Hand Michael Pancer, Esq. 105 West F Street

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Criminal Case Number 8:08-cr-126-EAK-TBM-1 Civil Case Number 8:12-cv-630-T-17TBM

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE EDWIN SCARBOROUGH, Defendant Below- Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below- Appellee. No. 38, 2014 Court Below Superior Court of the State of Delaware,

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE May 16, 2001 Session STEVE EDWARD HOUSTON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Giles County No. 9082 Robert L. Jones,

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT MICHELLE BOWERS, Petitioner, v. Case No. 2D08-3251 STATE OF FLORIDA,

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE March 11, 2015 Session STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DUSTY ROSS BINKLEY Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County No. 2009-I-833 Steve R. Dozier,

2014 IL App (1st) 120762-U No. 1-12-0762 FIFTH DIVISION February 28, 2014 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2013-CP-00221-COA FREDDIE LEE MARTIN A/K/A FREDDIE L. MARTIN APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/08/2013 TRIAL JUDGE:

NO. 05-10-01117-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS, TEXAS COREY TERRELL GARDNER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County,

NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION

AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed June 23, 2015. S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-14-01390-CR LUIS ANTONIO RIQUIAC QUEUNAY, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. 480A.08, subd. 3 (2010). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A10-1742 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Nicholas

IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TULSA COUNTY STATE OF OKLAHOMA STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Plaintiff, v. Case No. CF-2008-1601 Judge William Kellough RODNEY EUGENE DORSEY, Defendant. BRIEF CONCERNING REQUEST FOR

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit No. 13-3229 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANTHONY BAILEY, v. Plaintiff-Appellee. Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA QUENTIN SULLIVAN, v. Appellant, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED CASE NO. 1D06-4634

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION ONE STATE OF ARIZONA, ex rel. No. 1 CA-SA 12-0201 WILLIAM G. MONTGOMERY, Maricopa County Attorney, DEPARTMENT A Petitioner, Maricopa County Superior Court

130 Nev., Advance Opinion 7 IN THE THE STATE SERGIO AMEZCUA, Petitioner, vs. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT THE STATE, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE ROB BARE, DISTRICT JUDGE, Respondents,

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELIZABETH RODRIGUEZ- VEGA, Defendant-Appellant. No. 13-56415 D.C. Nos. 3:12-cv-01996-WVG

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA CRIMINAL SPECIALIST INVESTIGATIONS, INC., v. Petitioner, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF

Filed 2/19/10 Vince v. City of Orange CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified

COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNCTION OF A.G. O P I N I O N No. 08-12-00174-CV Appeal from 171st District Court of El Paso County, Texas (TC # 2012-DVC02875)

A GUIDE* FOR NEW YORK STATE CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS: HOW MELLOULI V. LYNCH IMPACTS CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 1 CASES FOR YOUR IMMIGRANT 2 CLIENTS Introduction On June 1, 2015, the United States Supreme Court

Filed 9/19/13 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE LAS VEGAS LAND AND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLC et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

IN THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT STATE OF FLORIDA, Petitioner, vs. Case No. 74,251 ROBERT L. JOHNSON, Respondent. I DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL SECOND DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA KRISTINA R. DOBSON, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE CRANE MCCLENNEN, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Respondent

Case 1:07-cv-00039-PGC Document 12 Filed 07/20/07 Page 1 of 13 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION JOE R. ALVARADO, Petitioner, ORDER DENYING MOTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

Case 1:11-cr-00326-SCJ-JFK Document 119-1 Filed 01/20/12 Page 1 of 16 GUILTY PLEA and PLEA AGREEMENT United States Attorney Northern District of Georgia UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A14-0553 State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Darrell

USCA Case #07-3021 Document #1160520 Filed: 01/23/2009 Page 1 of 14 United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued September 4, 2008 Decided January 23, 2009 No. 07-3021 UNITED

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-15-00223-CV In re The State of Texas ex rel. Jennifer A. Tharp ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM COMAL COUNTY M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N In this original

Case 1:12-cv-00547-CWD Document 38 Filed 12/30/13 Page 1 of 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO ALBERT MOORE, v. Petitioner, Case No. 1:12-cv-00547-CWD MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

Immigration Assistance for Indigent Defenders Sejal Zota and John Rubin October 2010 All expressions of opinion are those of the author or authors. The American Constitution Society (ACS) takes no position