Works by Paul Tomassi

In a recent paper on Truth, Knowability and Neutrality Timothy Kenyon sets out to defend the coherence of a putative anti-realist truth-predicate, superassertibility, due to Wright (1992, 1999), against a number of Wright’s critics. By his own admission, the success of Kenyon’s defensive strategies turns out to hinge upon a realist conception of absolute warrant which conflicts with the anti-realist character of the original proposal, based, as it was, on a notion of defeasible warrant. Kenyon’s potential success in resisting Wright’s (...) critics brings a pyrrhic victory: either way, realism wins. Here I argue that the link between superassertibility and defeasible warrant can be restored in a way which clarifies the consistency of the pair, provided that the notion of inference to superassertibility is properly understood in logical terms. As one might expect, the requisite notion is not classical in character. As one might not expect, the notion cannot be properly construed in intuitionist terms either. Hence, I propose an alternative logical framework which, I believe, is at least formally adequate to the representation of superassertibility on the basis of defeasible warrant. The price to be paid for rejecting the ‘third way’ proposed here in favour of either of the two more traditional logical options is precisely that indicated by Kenyon’s discussion. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's later rejection of the externalist Tractarian picture of logic according to which all rationally analysable discourse is properly understood as truth-functional rules out any conception of logic as the study of universal features of discourse. Given later references to 'the logic of our language', some conception of logic appears to survive even on Wittgenstein's later view. However, given his rejection of any conception of philosophical theory as explanatory or hypothetical, Wittgenstein seems to be forced into descriptivism. Despite these constraints, (...) I attempt to show that a valuable account of logic consistent with Wittgenstein's critique can be identified. That possibility raises the question: can any conception of formal logic as valuable modulo natural language survive Wittgenstein's later change of heart? Taking Wittgenstein's rejection of Tractarian conceptions seriously, logic is relativised to language-games in general and, perhaps, localised to particular language-games. Looking at logic in this way opens up the possibility of uncovering inferential structures distinct from those which form the traditional logical-epistemological dichotomy. Here I outline a formal logical framework consistent with all of the foregoing points in terms of which analogues of inferential structures (traditional and non-traditional) can be constructed. Taking third-person ascriptions of psychological predicates as a testcase, I try to show that the formal framework (a system of formal dialogue) has a flexibility which augurs well for future logical investigations into linguistic practices without presupposing knowledge of the kinds of inferential structures which such investigations might reveal. Hence, my claim that the system in question represents logic after (the later) Wittgenstein. (shrink)

In the first instance, the paper proposes a response to W.V.O. Quine's infamous attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction which attempts to carve out a core notion of analyticity by strictly delimiting the extension of that concept. The resulting position -- epistemic conservatism -- provides a platform for a significant epistemic challenge to essentialist positions of the kind proposed by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam: under exactly which kinds of circumstance are we warranted in asserting that we have grasped the truth (...) of an identity-statement of the requisite kind? In the absence of a clear and complete response to that epistemic challenge, the paper concludes that the Kripke-Putnam case remains not proven. (shrink)

Current understanding of the nature of language owes much to two authors: Noam Chomsky and the later Wittgenstein. What is interesting is that the conceptions of language proposed by each appear to conflict. The key question is: what is it to understand a language? In these terms, the internalist/individualist view of linguistic understanding which Chomsky has consistently advocated throughout his career appears to flatly contradict the later Wittgenstein's externalist account of linguistic understanding . In short, the relation between these two (...) conceptions is not well-understood. 2 The aim of this paper is to establish some rapprochement along the following lines: philosophy of language may be the richer for what it can learn from empirical linguistics but that area of philosophy remains the context within which empirical linguistics derives its significance. (shrink)

Logic brings elementary logic out of the academic darkness into the light of day. Paul Tomassi makes logic fully accessible for anyone trying to come to grips with the complexities of this challenging subject. This book is written in a patient and user-friendly way which makes both the nature and value of formal logic crystal clear. This textbook proceeds from a frank, informal introduction to fundamental logical notions to a system of formal logic rooted in the best of our natural (...) deductive reasoning in daily life. The book includes plenty of exercise to put the students' reading to test, summay boxes of key points, a glossary and many illustrations. This book will be useful to any student who needs a patient and comprehensible introduction to what otherwise can be a daunting subject. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;The thesis focusses on the question of the coherence of the notion of a "criterion" which has enjoyed considerable currency in the contemporary Philosophy of Language and Mind. The text is divided into three parts, each of which deals with a particular aspect of the notion of a criterion, or of theories of criteria. Part One consists of Chapters 1, 2 and 3 and explores the question of the (...) origins of the notion and of theories concerning it. Wittgenstein's later work is widely recognized as the notion's point of origin and for that reason I examine Wittgenstein's use of the term "criterion" and the philosophy of language which is the proper context of the notion as employed by that author. I then present my own account of the significance of the notion to Wittgenstein, and the role of the notion in his later thought. Part Two consists of Chapters 4 and 5 which examine the place of the notion in the contemporary Philosophy of Language and offer a critical account of much recent work in that field. Finally, in Part Three, I concentrate on the question of the coherence of the notion. The sixth Chapter deals mainly with epistemological issues of relevance but also involves some formal work together with some discussion of the ramifications of the notion, correctly understood, in the Philosophy of Mind. Chapter Seven suggests a formal, logical framework in which criterial reasoning patterns can be usefully mapped and also attempts to demonstrate an inherent flexibility of format which might allow for contrastive comparisons with other modes of reasoning. (shrink)

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