CHAPTER II.

OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER.

THE course proposed to
be pursued, is first, to consider the legislative power as it resides in
the senate and house of representatives; to what extent the president
participates in general legislation, and his power in conjunction with the
senate relative to making treaties, with the operation and effect of
treaties; we shall then proceed to those powers of general legislation
which are implied by the Constitution, or expressly enumerated, and
conclude this head with a view of the restraints under which both the
United States and the states severally, are constitutionally placed.

The legislative power is vested in the congress of the United States,
consisting of the senate and house of representatives. The first paragraph
evinces that it is a limited government. The term "all legislative
powers herein granted," remind both the congress and the people, of
the existence of some limitation. The introduction displays the general
objects. The Constitution itself enumerates some of the powers of
congress, and excludes others which might perhaps fall within the general
expressions of the introductory part. These prohibitions are in some
degree auxiliary to a due construction of the Constitution. When a general
power over certain objects is granted, accompanied with certain
exceptions, it may be considered as leaving that general power
undiminished in all those respects which are not thus excepted.

The value and effect of this proposition may be adverted to hereafter.

The legislative body possesses with us a great advantage over that of
those countries where it may be adjourned or dissolved at the pleasure of
the executive authority. It is self-moving and self-dependent. Although it
may be convened by the executive, it cannot be adjourned or dissolved by
it. The time of its assembling is fixed by the Constitution, until which,
unless a law has been passed appointing an earlier day, or the president
on extraordinary occasions has thought proper to convene it, the action of
the legislature cannot commence; but if in their opinion the public good
shall require it, they may continue uninterruptedly in session, until the
termination of the period for which the members of the house of
representatives are elected, and they may fix as early a time for the
meeting of the next congress as they think proper. A similar principle
prevails in all the state constitutions, and it is only where it exists,
that a legislature is truly independent. It is as inconsistent with sound
principles for the executive to suspend, at its pleasure, the action of
the legislature, as for the latter to undertake to deprive the executive
of its constitutional functions.

But without a constitutional limit on its duration, it must be conceded,
that a power in the legislature to protract its own continuance, would be
dangerous. Blackstone attributes the misfortunes of Charles I. to his
having unadvisedly passed an act to continue the parliament, then in
being, till such time as it should please to dissolve itself, and this is
one of the many proofs that the much praised constitution of that country
wants the character of certainty. No act of congress could prolong the
continuance of the legislature beyond the term fixed by the Constitution.