By
a doctrinal philosophy we mean in the following a system of statements,
which – without scientific basis – raises a claim
on general validity. Doctrinal philosophies can develop into dogmas if they regard their claim to truth
as irrefutable. Doctrinal philosophizing is a proclaiming of
truth and not – like the Socratic philosophizing – a search for truth.

Because
the concept of truth is an object of investigation in philosophy itself,
it can take different meanings depending on the field of knowledge:

-In the social sciences and the humanities the
concept of truth is heterogeneous and the subjective influence of the recognizing
person cannot be completely eliminated. The task of the theory here is often to
clarify the concepts, which are used in the assertions [O'Grady, 225].

-In art (literature, film) it is mostly about
insights from the inner perspective, which however have an inter-subjective
validity. Art observes, compares and describes. As a rule, it makes no claims.

The
project of a philosophical theory of truth embracing all fields of knowledge
is correspondingly disputed.

Since Socrates, philosophy has also
been post-doctrinal (...). Socratic-type (critical) philosophy attempts to
prevent, that people from becoming unfree by religious, political, economic or
scientific dogmatism [Information Philosophy, 35].

Michael Hampe attempts to
criticize the doctrinal philosophy without falling into a doctrinal mode
himself [Hampe 13.31]. In order to make this intention distinct, we will speak
of theses in the following:

2. Philosophy as Demarcation

Thesis: The doctrinal philosophy goes on
distance to the everyday language, the individual sciences and the arts. Such a
demarcation, however, makes no sense. Philosophy is characterized by its
motivation and by the nature of its questions and not by the nature of the
languages used. The expansion of knowledge is not a reason for demarcation; it
is rather a reason for integration. Philosophy could exercise an important
integrative function which no individual science is capable to achieve [Hampe,
26-27].

Not only philosophy but also science is interested in answering
philosophical questions. If someone is studying physics to know what
"holds the world together at heart" he/she is a physicist, but also a
philosopher (e.g. Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr with their interpretations of quantum mechanics ). Likewise, if someone is studying biology to understand how life
originated, or if someone is studying computer science to better understand
thought processes.

In antiquity philosophy had an interpretative and explanatory
function. Aristotle was a philosopher and a physicist. Probably he even
overlooked the entire knowledge of his time. Nowadays this is no longer
possible, but that does not mean that one has to separate philosophy from
science.

▪ There are philosophical questions which can only be answered by an
individual science (e.g. the question of the origin of life)

▪ Other questions require interdisciplinary work (e.g. the question of
free will)

Although empirical knowledge is growing rapidly, many of
today's philosophers do not acknowledge this progress at all, or fight a
rearguard battle with science, similar to the orthodox theologians.

Insight,
however, cannot only be gained in science, but also by experiences in everyday life
or the description of such experiences in art:

-Writers often report on processes of self-awareness
which have inter-subjective validity. In this sense Sophocles and
Proust are philosophers as well [Hampe].

-Others
develop the ability to find thought patterns that can be found in
geographically and culturally different environments.In this sense, the Egyptian
Nobel Nagib Mahfuzis alsoa philosopher.

“To declare the activities in which truth is sought as theories of
truth and confront them with each other, does not help to satisfy the human
need for truth" [Hampe, 195].

3. Philosophy
as Self-Entertainment

The doctrinal philosophy is essentially a self-entertainment program
for philosophers. A large part of the energy is invested in winning supporters
for claims. The sciences and arts are hardly concerned any more about this kind
of philosophy [Hampe, 34-36]

▪ Epistemology competes with psychology, informatics and brain
research (with regard to the internal perspective it competes with literature).

▪ The theory of science competes with the history of science and with
the practice of the individual sciences

▪ The philosophy of language competes with linguistics

Metaphysics
and ontology are avoided by the natural sciences, because they concern
empirically non-examinable aspects of reality.

In
practical philosophy one can
distinguish between ethics, legal philosophy, political philosophy, and philosophy
of economics. Normative ethics is one of the few disciplines that have
been challenged only to a small degree by other sciences so far. The derivation
of ethical norms from scientific facts is regarded as a naturalistic fallacy.

If
normative ethics does not lose itself in subtleties [Hampe, 49] and does not
develop unrealistic mathematical models, it is directly confronted with the
practice of life. In contrast, many areas of doctrinal philosophy are – after
the departure of the sciences – confronted with themselves only. Similar developments of lacking practical
relevance are also known in the history of theology (scholasticism) and in the history
of welfare economics .

The
self-employment thesis may seem provocative, but it is still harmless in
comparison to Wittgenstein’s diagnosis, according to which some philosophers produce pseudo-problems. The pupils of
these philosophers are, after years of study, trapped in a language confusion [Gunnarsson].

4. Philosophy
as Standardization

Thesis: Doctrinal philosophers have a
tendency to standardize different languages and ways of thinking. But the
description of the world in a single system of thought and a single language is
not necessarily conducive to seeking truth. It is often the variety of
perspectives and forms of expression that improves understanding [Hampe, 34].

Some philosophers are dissatisfied with the inaccuracy of the ordinary language and with the
variety of professional languages. They
examine the question whether it would be possible – for philosophical purposes
– to replace the ordinary language as well as the professional jargons by means
of an ideal language rule. A related question
is whether it would be possible to reduce the individual sciences to a single basic science
to create a unified view of reality. The probably most
radical design of such standardization originates from Albert North Whitehead. In process and reality, he argued indeed
that language is never an adequate representation of the real world, but that
it is possible to improve the imaging quality of existing languages.

2. In process and reality the investigation
(of mathematical truths) was extended to all truths. All scientific
questions should be captured in a uniform conceptual system. The conceptual
systems of individual sciences would then be specializations within this more
general conceptual system.

Whitehead died in 1947 and therefore missed the upswing of computer science. Otherwise, he
would have come to the conclusion that his language concept has an affinity to object-oriented programming and
that it has come a step closer to realization. Basically, however, Whitehead's
vision is more of a theoretical than a practical interest. It is namely
questionable, if the description of the world in a planned language would create
more clarity. A varied phenomenon like the freedom of will or happiness, for example, can better
be understood by looking at the specific concepts of science and literature than
by describing it in a highly sophisticated philosophical language.

5. Philosophy as
Economic Competition

Thesis: Economic competition is
increasingly determining the way people live [Hampe, 40]. The doctrinal philosophy
subordinates itself – more or less unreflecting – to this dictation.

Charles Sanders Peirce pointed to the danger that people interpret themselves as competing
selfish maximizers of profit, and then produce a social reality that
corresponds to this interpretation [Hampe, 40]. It seems that this development
also does not stop with respect to philosophy and that it transforms contemplative people into
aspiring career planners.

If
theoretical philosophy – which is closely linked to the sciences – adopts
economic competition, then this is still fairly comprehensible. An essential part
of practical philosophy (especially ethics), by contrast, is threatened
in its heart. It can perhaps still describe alternative ways of thinking and alternative
ways of living, but it can no longer represent it credibly:

a) If a philosophy focuses on the letting go of desires and devaluates the
power-oriented accumulation of knowledge, then it is badly suited for the
accumulation of graduate credits – at least if
one not only writes about philosophy but also lives it. How should we imagine a
competition in meditation? Competition is becoming an obstacle here.

b) In existential philosophies, which
weigh subjective experience higher than books read, it may be difficult to
measure and compare achievements.

c) Skeptical philosophies, which do
not trust any knowledge, are also skeptical with regard to better-knowing.

d) Finally, anarchist philosophies are – so to say by definition – not
suitable for the award of academic titles.

In
order to illustrate the nonsense of a general competition, one only has to imagine
that the Buddha, Socrates and Epicurus are assessed by a business school
(keyword university ranking) and that
they distribute graduate credits to their interlocutors.

One
may regret it or not, the fact is that certain forms of philosophizing fall
through the academic evaluation grid and are lost, at least for public education
institutes.

The ancient philosophers, Chinese, Hindu, Persian, and Greek, were a
class than which none has been poorer in outward riches, none so rich in inward
(…). There are nowadays professors of philosophy, but not philosophers (…). To
be a philosopher is not merely to have subtle thoughts, nor even to found a
school, but so to love wisdom as to live according to its dictates, a life of
simplicity, independence, magnanimity, and trust. It is to solve some of the
problems of life, not only theoretically, but practically [Thoreau, 15-16].

6.
Philosophy as Disorientation

Thesis: At present, cultural
disorientation is the most important ethical experience. Someone who – fighting
a losing battle – is looking for orientation is perceived as a pretentious moralist
and as a naive "good mind" [Hampe, 334]. The human sciences have lost
their guideline function [Hampe, 335]. There is a cynical relativism among the
humanities [Hampe, 337]. The doctrinal philosophy contributes to this
disorientation with its contradictory assertions and its often detached
technical jargon.

Philosophy
could well be a source of orientation, if it were not taught by doctrinal
speech acrobats. To convey ethical orientation does not mean to spread an
unfailing doctrine, but to explain competing ethics. Descriptive ethics,
which reveals the influence of historical situations, social interests, and
life stories on ethical concepts and norms, does not necessarily lead to
cynicism and ethical relativism. A deeper understanding of the contexts is
either the basis for societal improvements (1) or the basis for a
retreat-oriented philosophy (2):

1. Societal Improvements [Arendt]:

Anti-doctrinal philosophy promotes tolerance and therefore has an
affinity for the freedom of expression, media diversity, multi-party systems and the protection of minorities. The Enlighteners are assuming that the most
reasonable concepts will be established over time. The anti-doctrinal thinking,
however, begins (or ends) in school already. Pupils,
who read a lot and extensively learn by heart, have hardly time left to think themselves.
The educational result is people who copy political thoughts instead of
developing them on their own. Philosophy lessons in the form of Socratic discussions could, in comparison,
promote the growing up of active and critical citizens.

2. Retreat-oriented philosophy:

Cultural pessimists assume that the triumph of reason (predicted by the philosophers
of the Enlightenment) is a utopia. The “reasonable way of living" then
rather becomes a rare leisure activity than a political program. The fact that
philosophical-verbal criticism is (until now) but little effective [Hampe, 351]
however, does not have to cause resignation. Also an island of reason in
a sea of addiction, violence and irrationality is worth being explored and
described. For some shipwrecked people, it can mean orientation and rescue.

3.Gunnarsson Logi (2010), The Philosopher as Pathogenic Agent,
Patient, and Therapist: The Case of William James, in Philosophy as Therapeia, Royal Institute of Philosophy
Supplements, Vol.66: 165-186, Cambridge University Press, UK

4.O’Grady Paul (2013), Philosophy
and Gestalt Psychotherapy, in Philosophy as a Way of
Life, Essays in Honor of Pierre Hadot, pp.223-240, Wiley Blackwell, UK