Poles and Jews: The Quest For Self-Determination 1919-1934

By Feigue Cieplinski

Poland became an independent nation against all odds in the interwar period and retained
her sovereignty from 1919 to 1939; hence the concept “interwar Poland.” The vicissitudes
of her existence earned her the name of “God’s Playground.” [1] The Jews within her borders shared her history since 1240 C.E. Their freedoms
during this period, unequaled in other places of Western Europe, earned Poland the
Biblical allusion of “New Canaan.” [2] In contrast, some scholars have described Poland’s Jewry in the interwar Republic
as being “On the Edge Of Destruction.” [3] That Polish Jewry was in distress is attested by the urgent visit of Mr. Neville
Laski, a member of the British Joint Foreign Committee closely associated with the
American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the Joint Distribution Committee, in 1934. [4] His August visit fell between two historical events framing Polish Jewry’s status:
seven months before, in January of that year, Poland and Germany signed a bilateral
non-aggression declaration and in September Colonel Josef Beck, as Foreign Minister,
announced in Geneva, his country’s unilateral abrogation of the Minorities Treaty
in force since 1919. The scholars listed below have studied separately either the
birth of Poland and the imposition of the Minorities Protection Treaty, the rapprochement
between Poland and Germany, or the situation of the Jews in Poland. However, they
have paid scant attention to the nexus between the rise of Hitler, the rapprochement
between Poland and Germany, the demise of the Minorities Protection Treaty, and the
consequent worsening situation of Polish Jewry. [5]

The Polish government reluctantly accepted the signing of the Minorities Protection
Treaty concurrently with the Peace Treaty in Paris on May 28, 1919, complaining that
it was an intrusion in its internal affairs and sovereignty. Colonel Beck’s unilateral
abrogation sixteen years later was therefore a confirmation of this long held stance.
While the Polish government could not reject the Minorities Protection Treaty in 1919,
it chose to do so unilaterally in 1934 because of its new political circumstances.
The Polish-German rapprochement of that year restored in Poland’s eyes its own standing
as an independent political agent that could act without consultation with its staunchest
ally, France. In addition, the Polish government felt that it could protect itself
against the threat of German aggression on its own while at the same time project
itself to be in the same league as other great powers such as Britain, Russia, or
France. By abrogating the Treaty unilaterally the government sent a clear message
that it was a master of its own house.

However, that house was not in complete order as there were intractable political
and social problems. In addition, the Polish government’s treatment of its varied
minorities deteriorated. Exploring in detail these international events and tying
them up to the internal political, social, and economic situation in Poland, makes
the task of assessing Polish Jewry’s situation easier. It was indubitably threatened
by both the internal situation in Poland and international political shifts of power,
but most certainly not “on the edge of destruction.” It is important to study the
interwar period without taking into account Jewish annihilation during the Second
World War. To do so casts a shadow that obscures actual events the record and produces
a partisan historiography. [6] It behooves all historians working in this sensitive period to heed Michael Ignatieff’s
advice: “in no field of history does one wish more fervently that historians could
write blind into the future.” [7]

The purpose of this study is to explore the Jewish situation in Poland during the
years when the Minorities Protection Treaty was accepted. This will be done by framing
in the context of both the domestic and international events affecting the country
in the same period. Such a study will make it clear that the September 1934 abrogation
of the Minority Treaty was intimately connected to Poland’s new relationship with
Germany. The Polish government could ignore the treaty’s stipulations as it had done
all along without the need to denounce it in the international arena. Hitler’s contempt
toward for the League of Nations bolstered by the rapprochement served as a model
for Poland to follow suit. Finally, Mr. Laski’s visit anchors the political maneuvering
that led the Polish government to renounce the Minority Treaty. The latter had been
imposed by the Allies at the prodding of British and American Jews as insurance for
the Polish Jews to be treated fairly. Sixteen year later, Mr. Laski, as a member of
the same group, albeit not an original contributor to the Treaty’s stipulations, was
now a witness to its demise.

* * *

The year 1934 opened with a coup of Polish diplomacy. War minister Josef Pilsudski,
Foreign minister Colonel Josef Beck, and the newly appointed Envoy to Germany, Josef
Lipski, engineered a careful rapprochement with Poland’s erstwhile foe. Soon after
Hitler walked out of both the disarmament conference in Geneva and the League of Nations,
Pilsudski, Lipski, and Beck, conferring in Warsaw, agreed it was worthwhile to approach
the Chancellor. Pilsudski directed his Envoy to convey the following communiqué:

Reflecting upon the present situation, the Marshal [meaning Pilsudski] declares Poland’s security to be based directly upon these two elements namely: upon direct relationship with other states (in this instance, on Polish - German relations), and upon the collaboration of states within the frame of the League of Nations. The Marshal describes this second element as a sort of reinsurance, ensuing from the fact that the states, as members of the League of Nations, are bound by obligations under the pact of the League of Nations, especially in the case of conflict. Therefore, the last decision of the Reich’s government, resulting in [its] withdrawal from the League of Nations, deprives Poland of this second element of security. [8]

The Berlin- Warsaw diplomatic exchanges, surprisingly smooth and swift, culminated
with the signing of a bilateral non- aggression pact. During his audience with the
Chancellor on November 15, 1933, Lipski transmitted Pilsudski’s measured words to
both Hitler and Baron Constantin von Neurath. Within two weeks, on November 27, 1933,
he was handed a draft of their new commitments. Simultaneously, Germany’s Envoy, Hans
von Moltke, presented the identical text to Pilsudski in Warsaw. Meanwhile, Col. Beck
appeased the French ambassador. [9] The non-aggression pact was signed on January 26, 1934. [10] The most important paragraphs state:

Both governments announce to reach direct understanding on questions of any mutual nature whatsoever concerning their mutual relations. Should any disputes arise out of these agreements [and] not be solved by direct negotiations, they will in each particular case, on the basis of mutual agreement, seek a solution by other peaceful means without prejudice to the possibility of applying if necessary, such modes of procedure as are provided for such cases by other agreements in force between them. In no circumstances, however, will they proceed to use force in order to settle such dispute.” [11]

The present declaration is to remain in force until its denouncement by one of the Contacting Parties, but this may not be done prior to expiration of ten years. [12]

Poland and Germany’s respective parliaments ratified this declaration soon thereafter,
and their representatives were raised to the rank of ambassadors within a few months. [13] The western powers reacted in a stunned, subdued manner because the pact eased
fears of renewed hostilities. Meanwhile, to cement the rapprochement, Hitler sent
Josef Goebbels to Warsaw in June 1934. Ostensibly invited to speak at the Association
of Intellectual Cooperation on “National Socialism as a factor of European Peace,”
he met afterwards with Beck and von Moltke in a non- official reception. [14]

In the interim, on June 7, 1934, a group of four Rabbis (Kanal, Perelman, Langleben,
and Fajner) visited Cardinal Kakowski in Warsaw with a petition. They wanted him to
use his moral authority to stop “youthful outbursts,” and protect unfortunate Jews
from suffering more violence. Their petition is worth quoting in full:

Your Eminence! In the name of the rabbinate of the Polish Republic we turn to you in the following powerful matter. In Germany in the land of the of the Teutonic knights, from time immemorial Poland’s enemy, a horde of barbarous pagans has recently come to power warring against all the laws of God, trampling upon all the important principles of the Christian faith, persecuting all adversaries with cruelty unknown in human history, especially to the descendants of the land of Israel. The whole civilized world, and the princes of the Catholic Church, has condemned the monstrous actions of the Nazis in Germany. Unfortunately in Poland the land with the greatest number of God – fearing Catholic Christians, a certain faction, especially youth, is troubling us. Shamefully, calling themselves Polish nationalists, they modeled themselves after the example of the pagan Nazis. They attack defenseless people walking on the streets of Poland’s cities because they look Jewish. Without pity they bully, beat and injure them. Sometimes these ruffians encounter resistance from their innocent victims and they react with even more fury bringing shame to Poland’s old reputation for tolerance and God. We are convinced, Cardinal, that no true Polish Catholic can be utterly corrupt, that these youth have been momentarily deluded by the slogans of foreign enemies. At an appeal by their senses and certainly cease the persecution of the Jewish people which defames Poland’s good name. In the name of the Rabbis and Jews of this illustrious Republic, we entreat you, Cardinal, to issue a pastoral appeal about this to all Poland Catholics. Then peace and order will reign again in the land beloved by us all. May grace flow upon it.

Amen. [15]

The Rabbis were referring to the violence generated by the students’ “Green League”
formed in 1931. Their platform called for all those belonging to the League not to
buy from Jews, not to patronize their businesses in any way, not in commerce and not
in law, and certainly not as social peers. They also called for the government to
reinforce the numerus clausus restricting the entry of Jewsin the universities they attended. [16] In addition, they distributed antisemitic pamphlets, posters and cartoons and
the number of violent incidents increased during their school holidays. They attacked
Jews in Warsaw, Vilna, and Lemberg (See map Appendix 1). The police dispersed them,
but within a few days they attacked again. [17]

These anti-Jewish riots were outright imitations of Nazi violence. [18] They spread like wildfire to other universities and by 1934 they had become
a threat to the Jewish community as a whole. Indeed, anti-Jewish violence inspired
non-radicalized youth to join the Green League and harass shopkeepers everywhere.
These attacks escalated to Jewish homes under the excuse that the Jews “affronted”
a Christian procession in Warsaw. The intensification of violence was triggered by
the Goebbels’ visit to Poland. [19] While Polish Jews have suffered similar pogroms prior to the re-establishment
of interwar Poland, the ferocity of these attacks during a peaceful period was unprecedented.
Undoubtedly, these youths were imitating their counterparts in Germany. Hence the
Rabbis’ pressing appeal to stop the terror.

However, the Cardinal did nothing of that sort and his response to the Rabbis’ plea
is an important indicator of the role religion played in the complex interaction between
Jews and Poles in this period. Whereas the 1921 Constitution guaranteed equal rights
to all religions, article 114 declared the Roman Catholic faith to be in “a chief
position among the enfranchised religions of the state.” [20] Most significantly, Cardinal Kakowski was one of the signatories of the Concordat
with the Holy See in 1925. [21] His close relationship with Pious XI was implicit in his response to the Rabbis:
he regretted the violence but railed at the same time against Jewish newspapers “infecting
public culture with atheism.” [22] That allusion -meant for Jews directly tied to Communism- tainted also anyone
politically active left of center. [23] Undoubtedly, his denunciation was devoid of a racist tenor; nonetheless it depicted
Jews as an inimical force to Christianity and by extension the Polish state. The Cardinal’s
response implied that Jewish behavior provoked Polish youth to use Nazi methods. Yes,
he ruefully added it was “regrettable,” but apparently eminently necessary.

The Rabbis’ appeal also offers clues to the Polish-Jewish relationship. Their plea
was typical of Jewish petitions since medieval times. Prior to emancipation, Rabbis
or wealthy individuals served as intermediaries requesting protection or the rescission
of a law that affected all the community. Political enfranchisement made intercession,
or Shtadlanut, obsolete. Elected Jewish representatives to the Parliament, or Sejm, could effectively
argue that the recent violence was in complete violation of both the clauses of the
Minorities Protection Treaty and Poland’s own 1921 Constitution.

Mr. Laski’s June 1934 visit was therefore geared to assess the impact of these violations.
He arrived in Poland after visiting the Jews in Austria, and was received by a young
man named Cang who served as his guide. This young Jewish-Polish journalist wrote
for the Manchester Guardian, the Jewish Chronicle and the Central News. He obviously spoke English and was well versed on the current events and situation. [24] After walking through the streets of Warsaw and speaking with diverse members
of the Jewish community, Laski was granted an audience with Colonel Josef Beck.

Actually, Mr. Laski had two important conversations that August morning. While waiting
to be received by Colonel Beck, he was able to strike up a conversation with Beck’s
principal secretary Mr. Gwiazdowski. The secretary, a converted Jew, suggested that
the solution to the pressing Jewish situation was emigration. Mr. Laski challenged
him to be practical: “Where was the land, the money, the technical means and the will
of the Polish Jews to leave Poland?” Gwiazdowski’s silence spoke volumes. Mr. Laski
then berated him by adding that the Jews of Poland had citizenship rights. Moreover,
they were under the protection of the Minorities Treaty and there was absolutely no
point in arguing about the validity of the Treaty. Undoubtedly, the Polish state had
to abide by it. Moreover, the Jews of Western Europe were ready to compel the Polish
state to comply. Gwiazdowski retorted that there was less antisemitism in Poland than
in Germany. Upset at Gwiazdowski’s disingenuousness, Mr. Laski compelled him to answer:
“Do two blacks make a white?” Does the fact that Germany is [blatantly] antisemitic
justify a similar penchant [for it] in Poland?” However, Mr. Laski elicited neither
an answer nor any emotions from the Secretary. He essentially continued taking notes
about the conversation. [25] As a converted Jew, Gwiazdowski no longer retained a staunch commitment to his
coreligionists or their fate.

Apparently Mr. Laski’s interview with Colonel Beck had a more subdued and formal tone.
Prince Lubormski, served as a translator. Lubormiski greeted Laski in a most pleasant
manner, informing him of his acquaintance with his brother Harold. [26] At the very outset of the conversation, Mr. Laski was assured that the Jews
of Poland were treated fairly and that concerns about antisemitism were exaggerated.
To this “well worn cliché,” related Mr. Laski, “ I answered with another well worn
cliché: that the proof of the pudding was in the eating.” He then praised the Pilsudski’s
government as more benign, but argued that nothing practical was truly being done
to ameliorate the Jewish situation. Indeed, Mr. Laski remarked, “nobody could visit
the Warsaw’s Jewish quarters and argue that the Jewish community was not in distress.”
[27] Interestingly, Mr. Laski did not say anything to Col. Beck about the Minorities
Treaty.

Finally, Mr. Laski spent another hour that afternoon speaking with the acting Prime
Minister, Mr. Zawadski. The conversation covered the same ground, but Laski felt that
he had better rapport with Zawadski than with Col. Beck: “…whether it was pre-agreement
of courtesy or not, at any rate, I found that we were moving very much along the same
line at the close of the interview.” [28] Quite possible this was so because they were both able to speak privately in
French with no intermediary.

The most remarkable conversation was with the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Zydram-
Koscialkowski. He acknowledged that the poverty in the Jewish quarter was striking,
but appealed to Mr. Laski to consider, too, the undeniable fact that Poland’s poverty
contributed to Jewish pauperization. As for antisemitism, he acknowledged its irrefutable
incidence as: “common in Poland and probably ineradicable and most parties used it
for election purposes.” [Indeed] “Any party that favored the Jews would find itself
in a precarious position, and added “un grand nombre de Juifs sont communiste, mais ce n’est pas la politique, cest la
misere.” Delighted to hear his own perceptions validated, Mr. Laski politely encouraged him
to take the next step: “could this be said in a public platform?” Zydram Koscialkowski
did not take the hint. Actually, he warned against such a move: “no one would have
the courage to say so publicly, even though it was absolutely true.” In the final
moments of this interview, they deliberated about possible solutions to the present
Jewish quandary; depressingly none emerged: Zydram Koscialkowski averred that emigration
was impossible and that Zionism was a palliative. [29] Mr. Laski offered some clues to this gentleman’s exquisite frankness: He was
married to a Jewess and had been governor of a province for four years. During his
regime, Jews and non- Jews lived side by side in harmony. [30]

Mr. Zydram- Koscialkowski’s remarks about the party system were accurate. The Parliament,
or Sejm, despite its diverse parties was totally dominated by the Nationalist Party,
or Endecja. Its heady patriotism, imbued with a strong Catholic ethos, encouraged
ethnic uniformity, barely tolerating the participation of other political groups. [31] Its preference for the Hassidic Agudath Israel Party hinged on this group’s
narrow claims: religious protection as granted by article 110 in Section V of the
1921 Polish Constitution. Other Jewish parties were snubbed because they aimed at
a broader range of political co-determination based also on the Constitution:

Article 95:

The Republic of Poland guarantees on its territory, to all, without distinction of extraction, nationality, language, race, or religion, full protection of life, liberty, and property.

Article 107:

Citizens have the right of presenting individual or collective petitions to all state and self-government representative bodies and public authorities.

Article 110:

Polish citizens belonging to national, religious, or linguistic minorities have the same rights as other citizens of funding, supervision and administering at their own expense, charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational institutions, and of using freely therein their language, and observing the rules of their religion. [32]

Importantly, as the Jewish leadership stressed, these articles were backed by the
stipulations of the Minorities Protection Treaty of 1919. These articles were incorporated
almost verbatim in the Constitution with stipulations insuring civil, political, and
religious rights to all the minorities in reconstituted Poland. [33]

However, Jewish leaders did not speak with one voice. Jewish parties were splintered
in a multiplicity of political currents and lines of conflict. There were four Zionist
parties: Orthodox Zionists, or Mizrachi (Conservative agenda combined with Modern
Zionism), General Zionists (Democratic-liberalism geared to the Middle class and neutral
to the issue of religion), Labor Zionists (with a socialist agenda) and Revisionists
(fiercely Zionists with a Palestinian emigration agenda). In contrast, the Bund party
was anti-Zionist and anti-Communist, anchoring itself on national territorial claims
and the right to use the Yiddish language. Finally, there was an insignificant group
of mostly former assimilated Austrian-Jews who advocated Polonization. [34] Unable to jettison these parties’ insistent claims, the Sejm retaliated instead
by not allocating money for their school budgets and not offering their students free
rides on the trams. [35] Needless to say, Agudath’s students did not confront such petty slights.

In an attempt to counteract the constant snubs and distinctive harassment in the Sejm,
the General Zionists led by Yitzhak Gruenbaum banded with other non- Jewish minorities
(Germans and some Slavs) to form a Minorities Bloc in 1922, as a response to the government’s
re-arrangement of political districts favoring the Nationalist Party, or Endejca. [36] The animosity between the Minorities Bloc and the Nationalist Party peaked with
the election of the first President of the Republic. The ballots awarded this post
to Gabriel Narutowicz, a socialist, chosen as candidate by the Minorities Block as
well as the Left and Center. Endecja acrimoniously decried this legal victory: “Look
what the Jews are imposing on us.” [37] The ensuing diatribe, published in several newspapers, cost the fifty-seven
years old President his life. He was assassinated while talking to the British Ambassador
during the opening of the Zacheta Art Gallery. While Eligiuz Niewamdowski allegedly
acted alone, there is no question that Endecja bears the brunt of the responsibility
for fostering this rancorous climate. [38]

This enduring visceral hostility between Endecja and the Jews is most immediately
linked to the tensions surrounding the Fourth Duma elections of 1912 when the Jews
did not support the party’s candidate, Mr. Kurazewski. In retaliation, Roman Dmowski,
Endejca’s founder, called for an economic boycott which was later incorporated as
a party-platform in interwar Poland. In addition, Dmowski envisioned an ethnically
homogeneous and intensely Catholic Poland. He therefore supported the signing of the
Concordat with the Holy See. [39] The boycott was a tool to achieve his twofold aims: to rally most Poles behind
Endejca, and to make Jews so uncomfortable they would “voluntarily” decide to emigrate
from Poland. Dmowski’s antisemitic rhetoric is evident in his 1916 speech:

Why is there such dislike for the Jews in Poland? The Jews are the salt of the earth. It is necessary to court them. I will not go into whether they are the salt of the earth or not. Salt is a good condiment and if added to soup in measured amounts it brings out taste. But if too much is poured nobody can finish the soup. [40]

Elite books and popular newsletters carried Dmowski’s message across the land. Arthur
Gruszecki‘s novel Prezebudzenie (1916) picked up the theme by accusing Jews of lacking patriotism by wanting to dominate
the land at the expense of Poles and Polishness. [41] Similarly, the newsletter Gazetta Polska carried as its masthead the rhyming logo “Swoj do Swego po Swoje” encouraging Poles to patronize only “their own.” [42]

This “ cold pogrom” channeled as an economic strangulation, albeit ambivalently applied,
impoverished the most vulnerable members of the Jewish community, but drove away very
few Jews. Many saw no reason to leave since they were citizens of Poland. Furthermore,
they and their ancestors had shown loyalty by fighting alongside Polish forces in
their attempts at liberation. But even those who heard the expulsion clarion there
was no place to go. Most governments around the world closed their frontiers to new
emigration throughout the interwar period. [43]

Mr. Laski’s visit confirmed both the abject poverty of the majority in the Jewish
community and the wishes to emigrate. His wandering around Warsaw’s Jewish district
permitted him to observe the wretchedness of its inhabitants: “Nothing that I have
seen or heard [before] in any degree can picture what I saw with my own eyes.” He
interviewed, for example, a man about forty years old who eked a living as a sign-painter.
He lived and worked out of one room shared with his wife and four children. His total
earnings were 30 zlotys which only covered the rent. Mr. Laski observed a child sleeping
on the doorstep because there was no room for him to sleep inside. Most of the district’s
homes were in disrepair and the hygienic conditions appalling. Finally, disheveled
children wandered everywhere in these tenements. [44]

In desperation, many Jews asked Mr. Laski for certificates of emigration to Palestine.
One young man thought that he would be permitted to emigrate from Poland if he had
a wife. Could Mr. Laski provide him one? [45] He could not promise anything of that sort because the British restricted emigration
to Palestine following a dispute between Arabs and Jews about access to the Western
Wall in 1931. [46] Furthermore, the majority of Polish Jews barely eked out a living from their
labors and few could afford travel expenses. In 1934, only 19,026 Polish- Jews managed
to leave the country. [47]

The poverty of most Polish Jews stemmed from their concentration in the less modern
sectors of the economy, but there was also an important middle class contingent ignored
in Mr. Laski’s report. According to the 1931 census there were about 3,113,933 million
Jews, or 9.8% percent of the total population of Poland. [48] By 1934 it had grown to approximately 3,200,000. [49] The upper strata, mostly urban, were involved in commerce, trade and insurance.
Jews also formed a large part of the intelligentsia: forty to fifty percent were lawyers
and forty percent were doctors. They were also involved in the cultural life of both
the Jewish and the Polish community. While there were a handful of industrialists,
most Jews fell into the category of master craftsmen with small shops employing a
few people, or self employed as petty traders: tailoring, leatherwork, book -binders,
and bakers. [50] These craftsmen lived dispersed in small villages, or shtetls. Finally, in an unusual move, a handful of Galician Jews used their newly won legal
right to buy land in these villages becoming landowners and peasants. [51] (See map Appendix 2).

According to Mr. Laski, bureaucratic discrimination exacerbated the pauperization
of the Jews in the shtetls. Dealing with these corrupt officials was like running an obstacle course. A clear
example was the discrimination against the approximately 30,000 Jewish bakers. Compelled
by the government to modernize their machinery, many lost their businesses through
their inability to obtain the necessary loans. In one case, a lucky baker obtained
both a loan and a letter because he had been a baker in the army. A new impediment
was soon invented however: he was told his bakery would have to function near a body
of water. That meant a considerable physical dislocation and further expenses. Needless
to say this baker joined the ranks of the impoverished. Laski recorded a similar harassment
deriving from the payment of taxes. While the law permitted flexibility and discretion
for those lagging behind, local officials resorted to bribery and extortion with impunity.
Finally, while the government encouraged the formation of trade guilds, local guilds
barred Jews from joining them. [52]

Another factor implicated in this impoverishment was the Jews’ adherence to the strictures
of Orthodox life. Mr. Laski’s visit to schools and Yeshivot (religious academies)
confirmed this fact: committed to just study Torah and Talmud, they could not supplement
their income except as teachers or rabbis. The facilities and living arrangements
in these institutions were coarse and primitive. Many of these students slept on the
floors of the schools. Mr. Laski justly perceived this lifestyle as injurious, but
his own ambivalence is apparent. On one hand, he enjoyed his visit with these young
men, and judged them to be “remarkably intelligent,” but on the other, he also depicted
them as “odd” and their occupation as a “ blind alley.” [53]

Undoubtedly, Jewish impoverishment was part and parcel of Poland’s own economic situation.
Since its independence, the government had a difficult time establishing one currency
system and stabilizing it. In addition, Poland’s population growth during this period
was one of the highest in Europe. However, this instability was intimately tied to
political atomization and its ensuing corruption. [54] As of 1925, of 92 registered political parties, thirty-two gained representation
in the Sejm. Political stability, a leading indicator of an orderly society, appeared
to be unattainable. In the first seven years the government formed 14 different cabinets.
These parties’ representatives were educated prior to the reconstitution of Poland.
As members of the either Russian, Polish and Austrian Parliaments their modus operandi had been always reactive to their governments oppressive policies. While this policy
was appropriate then, it was obsolete as members of their own government. They spent
more time bickering with one another than attending to the affairs of state. Their
animosity and mindset were still entrenched in fighting pre-independence struggles
with each other. [55] It was in this milieu that Jewish parties tried to enforce their minority rights
to no avail.

The Sejm’s ineffectiveness led to Josef Pilsudski’s re-emergence and the subsequent
coup of 1926. [56] He justified his new involvement in politics under the apt name of “sanajca” (literally meaning purification.) [57] The majority of Jews preferred a Pilsudski-dominated government because, unlike
Endejca, it did not promote overt antisemitism. Indeed, their situation improved under
the cabinet of Pilsudski’s appointee Kazimierz Bartel. He had a friendlier attitude
toward all minorities. [58] During his government, steps were taken to revive Jewish trade, prohibit university
quotas at the universities, and rescind the still extant Russian anti- Jewish laws.
However, the cold pogrom was not dismantled. [59] Unfortunately, two factor undermined these positive developments. First, the
Sejm, still dominated by Endecja, remained recalcitrant and made a mockery of purification.
For example, encouraged by the new benign climate, the minorities published a newspaper
called Nation in 1927. Within a few days Yitzhak Gruenbaum was mysteriously beaten
in front of his house in Warsaw, and the German editor, a teacher by the name of Augusta
Utta, was soon transferred to a forsaken province. [60] Secondly, the stock market crash of 1929, and the consequent world wide Depression,
expunged the rest of the Bartelian promises.

Mr. Laski was able to talk with one of the members of the Sejm: Mr. Wislicki. He was
an extremely prosperous merchant not touched by the Depression. He reiterated the
distressed economic condition of the Jewish population. Apparently Mr. Laski associated
the problem of discrimination with the subject of the Minorities Protection Treaty.
Mr. Wislicki sidestepped the issue by remarking emphatically, “the Treaty would soon
be liquidated by the Polish government, Poland would not be deterred from denouncing
the Minorities Treaty merely because of her minorities [living] outside, or because
of the Treaty of Versailles.” [61]

Mr. Wislicki’s casual forewarning of such an important political shift to a mere member
of a NGO is at first surprising. Yet, prince Lubormiski’s allusion to Laski’s brother
Harold offers an interesting clue. Since both Neville and Harold Laski worked in the
highest echelons of government as barristers, this delicate message was meant to reach
not only Mr. Laski’s Jewish audience, but also the British government itself. Quite
possibly, it was a deft attempt to blunt its response to Poland’s challenge at Geneva.

As Mr. Wislicki predicted, Poland stunned the world again: Colonel Beck, on September,
13, 1934, announced his country’s stance on the Minorities Protection Treaty with
a succinctly short statement:

My government is compelled to refuse as of today all cooperation in the matter of supervision of the application by Poland of the system of minorities protection, pending the implementation of a uniform system for protection of minorities. [62]

The key words in this defiant statement are “pending the implementation of a uniform
system.” In other words, unless all countries across the world embraced similar Minorities
Protection Treaties, Poland would no longer obey its statutes. The lack of universality
touched the issue of fairness already debated by the Allies in 1919. However, weary
about their own colonial concerns, the seemingly lucid argument failed to persuade
the Allies. This crucial understanding of particularity versus universality haunted
the authors of the Minorities Protection Treaty. Finally, as a way out of their quandary,
they conjured a compromise: old states had a legacy of stability, but new states lacked
it. Therefore, only “new” states would be required to incorporate a Minorities Protection
Treaty. [63]

Poland protested this new interpretation. Indeed, interim Polish President Ignazy
Paderweski had pleaded not to make them sign such a document since it infringed upon
his country’s sovereignty. He also stalled on the eve of signing the Peace accords,
to no avail. The French Premier, Clemenceau, tersely warned Paderewski of the dire
consequences of procrastinating: the Allies won the war and it was up to them to define
the conditions of the Polish miracle. [64] Roman Dmowski, keenly aware of the inexorable quid pro quo, had advised Paderewski
to sign first and worry later about the implications of compliance to the Minorities
Treaty. [65] Furthermore, despite ratification, the Polish government had not published the
text of this treaty in its official Gazzete until December 6, 1920. [66] This passive- aggressive behavior was a clear indication not only of hurt pride,
but also of the government’s unwillingness to meet its terms in the future.

In addition, the 1919 activism of Jewish groups formulating and lobbying for the enforcement
of a Minority Protections Treaty affronted Polish sensibilities. [67] Although American and British Jews had no direct access to the Peace conference,
except through President Wilson and his counsel, Col. House, they had introduced their
own minorities-protection document. They took into account the following factors:
extreme nationalism, antisemitism, the ongoing boycott, and the past history of Polish
pogroms that were recurring. [68]

These new pogroms began because the Allies had not define Poland’s borders with Russia.
A Polish- Russian war, lasting until 1921, defined the new frontiers. The Polish Army,
dressed proudly in blue uniforms, also dubbed “Hallerczy Boys” because of the name
of its captain, fought valiantly and enlarged Polish territory. Josef Haller, an Austrian
by birth and trained in France, had been allowed to form there the Polish army in
exile and transfer it to Poland. However, Haller had also augmented his troops along
the way with badly trained volunteers. Either by design or accident of war, the “Hallerczy
Boys” had killed Jews not involved in the direct hostilities during these maneuvers;
their neutrality was to no avail as many were accused of having sided with either
the Russian or the Ukrainians. [69]

In the midst of the hostilities it was difficult to fathom how many Jews had been
killed, but these cold-blooded murders were in the pattern of old pogroms and dubbed
as such. The total tally of Jews killed was disputed by the parties involved in conformity
with their own aim: Pilsudski minimized the incidents and the number of Jews killed,
but a journalist by the name of Israel Cohen confirmed the events and characterized
them as a pogrom. [70] The Allies, bent in preserving Poland’s rebirth as a “cordon sanitaire” against
Bolshevist ideology and Russian old-age imperialism, also toned down the nature of
these incidents. [71] Pressed by American Jews to send a fact-finding commission, President Wilson
assigned Henry Morgenthau to the task. [72] His return report had been tone down for the press. At any rate, Jewish organizations
then used these recent pogroms as evidence that the Poles needed to be restrained.
(See map Appendix 3). Actually, some individual Jews had even argued that Poland did
not deserve its independence. This acrimonious debate over the extent of the pogroms
and Jewish involvement in the Minorities Treaty continues to strain Polish-Jewish
relationship up to this day. [73]

Nonetheless, these incidents had convinced the Allies of a categorical need for protection
of minorities in all successor-states. [74] The League of Nations would assume responsibility for reinforcing the treaties.
However, a remarkable hurdle needed to be surmounted: this proviso was decided before
the League of Nations became a reality! It was not even clear if the members of the
League’s Council would accept to oversee such a minefield of future disputes. Indeed,
Lord Balfour had predicted the obstacle to such an endeavor. [75] A softening criterion to make the task more palatable was agreed upon: any minority,
which required the League of Nations’ attention, would only address the League under
the doctrine of “clean hands.” In other words, this group could solve practical issues
to enhance its socio/political welfare, but could not have an irredentist ulterior
agenda. [76] However, it was also noted that resisting assimilation should not be construed
as irredentist. [77] This fear of potential political conflagrations had watered down the sanctions
of the League of Nations against wayward states. Furthermore, the Council’s purposeful
destruction of its own papers and records make it difficult to evaluate their performance
adequately. [78]

The Minorities Protection Treaty and the League of Nations, despite the above iniquities,
were both bold and courageous new designs in international law. Yet, many in-built
setbacks had undermined their effectiveness. Chief among them was the United States’
withdrawal from its initial commitment to help form a new order in Europe. The Senate’s
vote had not ratified either the Treaty or the United States’ entrance into the League
of Nations, robbing the latter of a chance to grow roots as a truly international
system. [79] Championing at first Poland’s rebirth, the United States had unceremoniously
abandoned it and permitted it to become again, in Norman Davies’s apt phrase, “God’s
Playground.”

One example of this iniquity will suffice: the Germans’ case in Polish Upper Silesia.
Its German residents became, overnight and against their will, a minority. While many
moved to Germany immediately, the German government had entreated many others to stay.
The German government had argued that there was no point in uprooting themselves from
their homes and the environment they knew so well. However, the hidden agenda is more
convincing: they should stay there in the hope that one-day this land would return
to its “rightful owners.” Moreover, once Germany entered the League of Nations in
1926, it used this minority issue to browbeat Poland with a myriad of complaints.
While many grievances- such as language and educational issues- were indeed accurate,
others were intended to keep the issue of Germany’s minorities alive. In this manner,
Gustaf Stresemann became their advocate at the expense of Polish dignity. [80] On the other hand, even with this constant harassment, Poland learned too well
to wait out these complaints until they lost their relevancy. Furthermore, Poland
imputed any and all grievances to acts of disloyalty. [81]

Polish-Jews, acutely aware of the disloyalty card, understood that winning a case
against the government in the League’s Council was often a Pyrrhic victory with consequent
reprisals back home. [82] Even if they won, the Polish government always found new legal maneuvers at
the federal and local level to camouflage or nullify their non-compliance with the
Minorities Protect Treaty. For example, the licenses of many thousands of shoemakers
and tailors were taken away from them in 1927, due to a new prerequisite requiring
a test on Polish history, geography and language. [83]

The situation of the German minority also deteriorated as a result of the Polish-German
non-aggression pact in 1934. While Hitler allowed, the Stresemann’s monetary compensation,
albeit in a more reduce level, he was not their guardian anymore. Unrestrained, the
Polish government also harassed them with impunity. [84] Indeed, the League of Nations did not receive any complaints from the German
government and the grievance Council ceased its activities after 1934. [85] This paralysis perfectly captures the ineffectiveness of the whole system.

Meanwhile, Russia’s imminent integration into the League of Nations system, also in
1934, raised Poland’s fears that its small but sizable Russian minority, quiescent
up to now, would soon acquire a champion. The Polish government envisioned the German
humiliation nightmare repeating itself again: indeed, some historians argue that Russian
admission to the League was the main trigger for Poland’s unilateral abrogation of
the Minorities Protection Treaty. [86]

However, Soviet Russia’s entry into the League of Nations was clearly not the primary
instigating factor in the abrogation. It is a well-known fact that Stresemann’s unrelenting
defense of the German minority forced Beck’s predecessor, Foreign Minister A. Zaleski,
to resign from his post in 1932. [87] It seems reasonable to assert that under those circumstances Poland would have
more important reasons to withdraw. Instead, it endured the indignities and even acquiesced
to solve some of its own blatant transgressions as a result of the League’s arbitration.
Therefore, a more plausible explanation for the unilateral abrogation is Poland’s
new relationship with Germany: emboldened by Hitler’s own withdrawal from the League,
Poland dared to defy it too. It purportedly proclaimed to regain its absolute sovereignty
while shielding itself of further public indignities at the international level.

Nonetheless, Poland was vaguely aware that this new international position, albeit
temporarily tenable, was extremely uncertain in the long run. Pilsudski’s relief after
the signing of the non- aggression pact purportedly “buying” ten years security confirms
this assertion. Interestingly, Pilsudski also assumed an independent relationship
with Russia. He sent Colonel Beck to Russia with reassurances that Poland intended
to respect their 1932 bilateral agreements despite its new pact with Germany. Colonel
Beck successfully managed to extend the Russian pact for other ten years. [88]

Both Pilsudski and Colonel Beck were extremely proud of their brinkmanship. Without
the help of France they had single-handedly wrestled their country from the starker
political designs of both Germany and Soviet Russia. They hoped that the pacts they
signed with each of these countries would prove to be a true détente. They were pleased
to think that as of 1934 Poland was in charge of its own destiny. Barring omniscience,
there was no way to detect later tectonic political shocks. Similarly, the Jewish
minority, despite Poland’s insidious political antisemitism, could not predict the
future implications of this double-tracked international venture. Under the best of
circumstances their situation would not deteriorate further, and at worst, they might
suffer other pogroms; but they would nonetheless survive them.

Meanwhile, in a volatile era of competing nationalisms, Polish-Jewish discourse on
self-determination remained embroiled in the antithetical quarrels about its criteria
and significance. On one hand, it is important to remember that the Polish people
once they were independent in 1919 resented any new interference with the way they
wanted to handle their political and domestic affairs. Understandably, they looked
forward to reconstitute themselves as a Catholic Polish country and the presence of
Jews and other minorities appeared to be an insurmountable hindrance. At this moment
in time, they had not taken into consideration that Jews dwelled with them for five
centuries. On the other hand, the latter also considered Poland their own country
and had no irredentist agenda. They hoped to be granted the same respect and self-determination
the Poles wanted for themselves. The wanted they civic rights that the 1921 Constitution
assured them they will have, but also respect and dignity as a diverse minority. This
is what they understood by self- determination. Had the Jews felt there was no hope
of improvement, they would not have had participated in neither the government’s elections
nor the Parliament.

However, the Poles did not care for the Jews’ presence or their religion, and their
rapprochement with the Holy See complicated the political tensions. Poles understood
self -determination as uniformity: one ethnicity, one religion, and one political
outlook. They were not alone; Hitler was advocating similar nationalistic notions.
Granted, Poland’s antisemitism was not the same level as Hitler’s maniacal obsession.
Yet, the Polish government allowed itself to be seduced by the use of similar violent
tactics- in addition to an economic strangulation- fervently hoping Jews would emigrate.
It is at this junction that both political antisemitism and racial antisemitism entwine.
Witness, the word “pollution” in the Cardinal’s speech: it was meant as an obvious
attack against Jews’ sympathies for Communism or Socialism, but it was also a borrowed
term from racial notions. Furthermore, Jews, as victims of either cold or hot pogroms,
did not stop to make this fine distinction between the two; although, of course there
are important differences between the two. Historians that read the tragic story of
interwar Poland as linked with the Holocaust are conflating both antisemitic discourses
and drawing what appear to be logical conclusions. Yet, it is prudent, as disciplined
historians, to keep these two periods separate and not read the events backward: coercive
emigration measures no matter how violent are not a ”Final Solution,” despite the
intense hatred against Jews and Judaism that inspired them.

Mr. Laski’s report highlighted these complex issues and put into perspective the mistreatment
of the Jews and the reasons for it. Undeniably, Polish Catholic antisemitism and Nationalism
- as expressed by the Endejca Party- were part of this explosive mixture. If in addition,
the government permitted the racial discourse in Germany to filter in by allowing
its youth to act like Nazi thugs, any hope of a Polish Jewish dialogue was lost. Mr.
Laski’s arrival coincided with these events, as the last shreds of compromise between
Poles and Jews began to unravel. The abrogation of the Minority Protection Treaty
proved to be a watershed.

[2] Iwo Cyprian Pogonowski,Jews In Poland: A documentary History (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1993), p. 14. Poland was the only land to accept massive
influx of Jews escaping from the Christian Crusades. In that period of peace and freedom
they grew and cultivated a unique culture in a rare co-existence not evinced anywhere
in Europe at that time. This religious toleration made Poland attractive to Jews for
more than 500 years.

[3] Celia Heller, On the Edge of Destruction New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

[4] Encyclopedia Judaica, “AJC. ” The American Jewish Committee is the oldest Jewish defense organization
in the United States. It was established in 1906 to prevent the infraction of the
civil and religious right of Jews in any part of the world- including the United States.
The men who worked on behalf of their co-religionists were prominent American- Jews
of German extraction who formed this organization in the wake of the Russian pogroms
of 1904. By 1931 the AJC counted 350 such volunteers under a small executive in New
York. The Joint Distribution Committee was founded in 1914. As its name indicates
it united several Jewish relief organizations belonging to the spectrum of religious
denominations and labor. The main aim of the JDC was to help Jews in the country they
inhabited: “The Jew Must be helped where he is.” See, JDC Archive Berhnard statement
of November 11, 1931. See also, H.H. Fisher, America and the New Poland (New York: Macmillan, 1928), p. 189. The JDC also helped non- Jews in 42 countries
including interwar Poland.

[6] On the Jewish camp: see Celia Heller, “On the Edge.” See also, Isaiah Trunk,”
Der Economischer Antisimitismus in Poiln” in Studies on Polish Jewry Joshua Fishman ed. (New York: Yivo Instititute for Jewish Research, 1974), pp. 1-98.
(Yiddish). See also, David Cymet “Polish State Antisemitism as a major factor leading
to the Holocaust” in Journal of Genocide Research, 1999 1(20), pp. 169-212. Finally see, Pawel Korzec, “Antisemitism in Poland as an Intellectual
Social and Political Movement,” in Studies on Polish Jewry Joshua Fishman ed. (New York: Yivo Institute for Social Research, 1974), pp.12-104.
On the Polish camp: see, Norman Davies, op. cit., Andrezej Korbonski “Poland Between
the Wars” in The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University Press), p.234. In addition, it is important to contrast
these two authors: Ezra Mendelsohn’s fairer appraisal against Peter Stachura’s ad-hominem
attacks: Ezra Mendelsohn’s “Interwar Poland: Good for the Jews-Bad for the Jews,”
in Chimen Abramsky, Maciej Jachimzyk and Antony Polonski ed. New York; Basil Blackwell,
1986), pp. 136-139. Peter Stachura’s Poland Between the Wars New York: St Martin Press, 1988, and Poland in the Twentieth Century New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. As a closure see, Pogonowski’s op. cit. straightforward
historical account. His work is a provocative bridge between all the above- mentioned
authors. His exhaustive documentation supports some of the above authors’ assertions
while exposing others as extremely partisan.

[9] Debicki, “Foreign Policy,” p. 74. The Foreign Office at the Quai d’Orsay criticized
Poland for not advising them about these diplomatic negotiations before they happened.
However, the French, having just changed their own cabinet, had their own political
internal problems. They were not in a strong position to argue or restrain the Poles
in this issue.

[16] Segal, “New Poland,” p. 197-198. “Numerous clausus” refers to the regulation
to accept student at the university only in the proportions of people living in the
country. Yet, these radicals would have been more content by achieving a numerous
nullus so that no Jews should take any class seats at all. The Polish government argued
that the universities were autonomous bodies and that it could do nothing to prevent
this type of policy. Yet, the government exercised a similar pressure against Jewish
students independently of the universities. For example, twenty nine percent of Jewish
students forced to study abroad in 1927 the government did not recognize their diploma
once they returned and had to wait five years to take their examinations. In the interim
they had no choice but to be idle or return abroad. See also, Heller,” On the Edge,”
p. 104. It was important to have this license because without it, there was no chance
to employ apprentices, or helpers. Finally see, Watt,” Bitter Glory,” p. 360. The
exams were given only in Polish thereby excluding Yiddish speaking students who wanted
to train in artisan schools.

[21] Modras, “Catholic Church,” p. 37. Pope Pious XI signed the Concordat. As Archbishop
Achilles Ratti he arrived in Poland in 1918 at the behest of Pope Benedict XV. At
a later date Archbishop Kakowski elevated him to Nuncio, and Kakowski became a Cardinal.
Ratti returned to Milan and was then elected Pope. He never lost interest Polish affairs
and worked closely with the Church of Poland to preserve Polish Catholicism.

[22] Modras, “Catholic Church,” p. 350.

[23] Modras, “Catholic Church,” p. 352.

[24] Laski’s file number 788, Poland. Center for Jewish History, New York City, New
York. (hereafter referred to as AJDC Laski), p. 6

[25] AJDC Laski, p. 11.

[26] Encyclopedia Judaica, “Harold Laski.” Mr. H. Laski, a Fabian socialist, was well placed in British politics.
He later became the leader of the Labour Party.

[27] AJDC Laski, p. 12.

[28] AJDC Laski, p. 12.

[29] AJDCLaski, pp.12-13.

[30] AJDC Laski, p. 13. Mr. Laski does not mention the name of the mayor’s town.

[36] Polonski, "Politics,” p. 44. The Jews, a 9.8% of the total population, lived
throughout the land. In contrast, the Germans (2.3%) lived in concentrated areas such
as Upper Silesia and were skilled industrial workers. The Ukrainians (4%), mostly
peasants, lived in concentrated areas such as Lwow,Tarnopol,, and Lublin. While the
Germans and Jews decided to cooperate with the government, the Ukrainians declined
because they wanted independence and wanted to avoid a message of accommodation. There
were other minorities such as Lithuanians (0.3%), Russians (0.2%), and Czechs (0.1%).
There were even Polish speaking Moslems descendants of Tatar and Turkish prisoners
of war, and Karaites, a schismatic group once part of Judaism.

[36] Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, The Jew In The Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) pp.444 -445. See also Bela Vago “The attitude
toward the Jews as a criterion of the Left- Right Concept” in Jews and Non- Jews in Eastern Europe (New Brunswick: Transaction Books), p. 48 n.50.

[38] Stachura, “National identity,” pp. 75-76. This author perceives the actions
of the Minorities Block as “calculated antagonism to ethnic harmony.” Is this not
part of the give and take of a democratic system? Also, depicting Gruenbaum in unsympathetic
terms and accusing him of kowtowing to the German leader Erwin Hasbach who later became
a Nazi is unfair. How could Gruenbaum divine future allegiances? Stachura is bent
in protecting Polish honor and therefore misses the opportunity to examine these complex
issues in a balanced manner.

[46] Robert Seltzer, Jewish People-Jewish Thought (New York: Macmillan, 1980), p. 658, and p.650. The underlying fear of many countries
closing their frontiers was the importation of Bolshevism. Many prominent Jews were
involved in the movement: Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev. See also, William Rubinstein,
The Myths of Rescue (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 26. During and after the First World War, Britain enacted
the Aliens Restriction Act which in effect abolished the notion of a refugee altogether.
See also, p. 33. As in Britain, the USA’s immigration legislation of 1924 ended America
as an automatic place of refuge for any would be immigrant, not only Jewish ones.
Finally see, p. 40. .Rubinstein argues that these measures were not only as a protection
for the countries that closed their frontiers, but also for those oppressed populations
in successor states. Had there been a open door policy it would have encouraged those
government to be more brutal to achieve that coveted goal of expulsing “undesirables.”

[47] Heller, "On the Edge,” p. 285. It is not clear in which countries did these
Jews found a haven.

[48] Heller, “On the Edge,” p. 71.

[49] AJDC Laski, p. 7.

[50] Leslie, “History-Poland,” p. 144.

[51] Leslie, “History-Poland,” p. 145.

[52] AJDC Laski,, p. 7.

[53] AJDC Laski, p. 9. See also p. 10. Indeed, on his interview with Mr. Mazur, head
of the Warsaw community and a member of Agudath Israel, Mr Laski tried to convince
him of the positive economic prospects if these yeshiva students trained as artisans.
Mr. Mazur was not enthused. Laski, as an assimilated Jew, could not grasp the religious
devotion of these Hasidim. No secular pursuit could take its place or interfere with
Jewish learning. Frustrated, Laski’s described Mr. Mazur’s lack of enthusiasm for
his scheme: “ I felt as if I was talking to a stone.” While Mr. Laski’s advice seemed
logical, Mr. Mazur’s response was so steeled because he perceived this intervention
as disrespectful.

[56] Leslie, “History-Poland,” p. 158. The coup was accomplished in three days of
fighting. About 500 people were killed and a 1,000 were wounded. See also Marian Mushkat,
Philosemitic and Atisemitic attitudes in Post Holocaust Poland (Levinston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), P. 15. All national minorities supported the
coup, as did the socialists, the liberals, and the democrats.

[57] Leslie, “History-Poland,” p. 160. See also, Watt, “Bitter Glory,” pp. 207-209.
A month prior to Pilsudski’s coup there were food riots in Warsaw. Watt intimates
that Pilsudski’s semi-retirement was a result of Narutowicz’s assassination. He is
alleged to have said: “Serving under these people (meaning the nationalists) never!”
Quite possible he was afraid of being assassinated too.

[58] Korzec, "Antisemitism,” p. 65. n. 66. Bartel was associated with Klub Pracy. The latter adopted the following slogan as its banner: “Truly free is only he who
is able to respect the freedom of others.” See also, Modras, “ Catholic Church,” p.
58. Bartel was a Freemason.

[59] Leslie, History Poland,” p. 162. See also, Watt, “Bitter Glory,” p. 360. Finally
see, Korzcec, “Antisemitism,” p. 63. In 1925 there had been a similar attempt under
the Wladislaw Grabski cabinet in 1925-26. He agreed to help the Jews to bolster the
precariousness of his cabinet. This agreement was called Ugoda. Grabski even acceded to let the Jews work on Sundays. However, nothing came out
of these meetings because the agreement made with the Jews was not published in its
totality in the official Gazette. Indeed, his cabinet fell the following year and
Pilsudski took over. The latter never accepted the presidency, but retained the Army
and War portfolio. The Ugoda was another example of shtadlanut - similar to the one attempted by the rabbis with Cardinal Kakowski in 1934. See also,
Korzec, “Antisemitism,” p. 63. Yitzhak Gruenbaum could not convince religious Jews
that private arrangements by one section of the Jewish population with the government
were not the proper way anymore. Actually, he left the country for a while as a protest.
In turn, sectors of the Jewish community criticized him for the failure of the Minorities
bloc. Encyclopedia Judaica “Yitzhak Gruenbaum” The Minorities Bloc folded in 1930, but Gruenbaum continued in
the Sejm until 1932.

[60] Blanke, “Orphans,” pp. 92-93.

[61] AJCD, Laski, .p. 14.

[62] Watt, “Bitter Glory,” p. 329. Poland’s non- compliance was just that: a message,
The Polish government did not withdraw from the League of Nations, as Hitler had done.
See also, Polonski, “ Politics,” p. 378. Polish public opinion seconded this abrogation.
For example, the Gazetta Warsawska reacted by saying that Poland had not gone far enough. The next step should complete
the process by depriving the Jews of their civil rights. While they would be allowed
to continue living in the country, they would be severed from the political life of
the country. See also, Modras, “ Catholic,” p. 176. The Catholic press seconded this
opinion in newspapers like Pro- Christo, reminding its readers that “ Jews after all were the engineers of the Minorities Treaty.”

[68] Von Frentz, “Lesson,” pp. 53, 66. The Allies did not accept all the articles
recommended by the Jewish delegation. According to the British, some of these demands
in protection of the Jews meant to institute “a state within a state.” Their rationale
was based on the assumption that Jews in Poland would acculturate themselves successfully
as they had done in America and Britain. However, this was a mistake because the majority
of Polish- Jews observed their religion in the Hassidic tradition and they spoke only
Yiddish. Mr.. Laski’s observation of the Gerer Rebbe and Agudath’s behavior with the
government confirms that British predictions were not appropriate for the Central
European milieu. See also, Blanke, “ Orphans,” p.18. Polish diplomats were aware of
the international damage of Dmowski’s antisemitic stance. They asked him to tone it
down but he never relented.

[70] Janowski, “Jews-Minority” pp. 277-327. Cohen’s account continues to be contested.
In addition, the Jewish leadership was enormously divided over the scope and limits
of protection.

[71] David Ryan, US Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 86. This was also true of President Wilson. He was
extremely worried about Trotsky’s pronouncement and ideology.

[72] Lundgren-Nielsen, “Polish Problem,” pp. 346, and 372-373. See the interesting
debate of American Jews’ misgivings on sending Morgenthau in this fact- finding mission.
Morgenthau himself resisted this appointment.. See Cymet, “Polish State Antisemitism,”
p.117. Morgenthau’s visit to Pinsk.

[73] Stachura, “Poland,” p. 74. This author calls these incidents “apocryphal” and
Jews “hysterical.” Furthermore, he insists, Jews were “disloyal” because they argued
that maybe Poland should not be given independence. The charge of Communist ties and
hence support for the Russians in the ongoing border disputes, is part of Stachura’s
polemic. While there were indeed Communist Jews, they were a tiny minority and not
very influential. What's more, the number of Jews killed in these pogroms is much
higher than the number of existing communists. On the other hand, see Cymet, “ Polish
State- Antisemitism,” pp.176-179. He cites personal diaries and related documents
confirming the accuracy of these events. See also, Norman Davies, “ Gods’s Playground,”
p. 262. This author takes a middle of the road position: while there were indeed casualties,
they were less than the Jews claimed them to be. Finally see, Pogonowski, “Jews,”
p. 305. He denies both Stachura’s and Davies assertions of exaggerations by citing
the higher figure of 70,000 killed and more than 50,000 wounded in hundreds of pogroms
in different cities.

[74] Lundgren-Nielesen, “Polish Problem,” p. 343. See also, Wagner, “Minderheit”
p. 208. There were several types of Minorities Protection Treaties: Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia and Greece. Others were signed with Austria Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey.
The governments of Finland, Albania, Eastland, Letland and Lithuanians had to hand
explanation about their treatment of minorities as a requirement to be accepted on
the League of Nations. Other separate closed agreements were signed between single
states. The most significant was the Polish Treaty, because it served as a model for
the treaties signed subsequently.

[75] Robinson, “Minorities,” pp. 78-79. The League had no choice but to accept the
challenge. The Tittoni Commission researched the legal implications of this issue.
It concluded that the League of Nations was indeed liable because these legal transactions
fell under the category of international agreements.

[76] Robinson, “Minorities,” p. 96.

[77] Robinson, "Minorities,” p. 102.

[78] Robinson, “Minorities,” pp. 110, 133. The Minorities committee had three period
of peak activity: 1921-1923, 1929, and 1934. It folded soon thereafter.

[79] See George Creel, The War, The World and Wilson ( New York: Harper and Row, 1920), pp 32-346. The Senate killed on March 19, 1919.
The Republicans were bent on discrediting President’s Wilson’s record and prevent
his re-election the following year.

[80] von Frentz, “Lesson,” p.102. Stresemann used this issue to divert public opinion
at home, but there is no denying either that the Poles were intent in Polonizing the
area and make those German leave.

[81] Blanke, “Orphans,” pp. 132-136,195.

[82] Robinson, “Minorities,” p. 248. Yet, it also important to stress that The Jewish
situation in Poland, despite the antisemitism and the economic boycott, enjoyed its
bright spots. Touring the same Warsaw, perhaps on the other side of these dismal streets
there was a small but powerfully cultured middle class. Mr. Laski would have observed
successful educational activities, a Jewish national press, like the newspaper Haynt, teacher- training institutes, and theater performances, and Zionist schools. The
scope of these activities is beyond the scope of this brief paper, but mentioning
them balances Mr. Laski’s bleak portrayal.

[84] Blanke, “Orphans,” pp. 163, 195. See also, von Frentz, “Lesson,” p.246. The
German minority became in Hitler’s eyes a bargaining chip for greater further political
advantages.

[85] Robinson, “Minorities,” p. 133.

[86] See Zanowski, “Le System,” pp. 24-24.

[87] Fink, “Stresemann,” p. 410. The A. Zaleski- Stresemann confrontation of 1928
is an example of Zaleski’s ongoing frustrations. In that meeting he argued that most
of the German complaints were of a trivial nature. In addition, Zaleski denounced
the support given to the Deutscher Volksbund in Silesia. Stresemann interrupted him and contemptuously derided his interferences with the “sacrosant Minorities Treaty.” A. Briand, the French Foreign
Minister, privately chided Zaleski for allowing Stresemann to vent. All members knew
of Stresemann’s need to appear strong for domestic consumption. See also, Debicki,
“Foreign Policy,” p.67.