[redacted]Citation NR: 9735132
Decision Date: 10/17/97 Archive Date: 10/24/97
DOCKET NO. 96-26 514 ) DATE
)
)
On appeal from the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in No. Little
Rock, Arkansas
THE ISSUES
1. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of a left
leg injury.
2. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of a head
injury.
3. Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to
reopen a claim for service connection for a lumbar spine
disorder with degenerative disc disease (DDD) and
degenerative joint disease (DJD).
REPRESENTATION
Appellant represented by: The American Legion
WITNESS AT HEARINGS ON APPEAL
Appellant
ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD
Michael J. Skaltsounis, Associate Counsel
INTRODUCTION
The veteran had active service from December 1954 to December
1957.
Initially, it is noted that the same issues previously came
before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from
a rating decision of the North Little Rock, Arkansas,
Regional Office (RO), dated in March 1991, whereby the RO
denied service connection for residuals of a left leg injury
and a head injury. The RO also determined that new and
material evidence had not been submitted to reopen a claim
for service connection for a lumbar spine disability. The
veteran appealed that decision to the Board, which also
denied the claims pursuant to a decision in August 1994.
In June 1995, the United States Court of Veterans Appeals
(Court) issued a memorandum decision in the case of [citation redacted]. The Court affirmed that portion of the Board’s decision which determined that new and material evidence had not been
presented to reopen the claim for service connection for a
lumbar spine disability. However, the Court’s order directed
that the Board take further action with respect to the issues
of service connection for residuals of a left leg injury and
head injury.
At the time of the Court’s memorandum decision of June 1995,
if a claimant did not present a claim for which relief could
be granted, there was no claim to adjudicate on the merits
and both the RO and the Board erred if the claim was decided
on the merits. Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93
(1993). In cases where the RO and the Board improperly
adjudicated a claim on the merits, the Court found that the
appropriate remedy on appeal was for the Court to vacate the
Board’s decision and remand the case to the Board with
directions to vacate the underlying RO decision. This was to
ensure that the decisions of the Board and the RO were not
deemed to be final. Id.; see also McGinnis v. Brown, 4 Vet.
App. 239, 244 (1993).
Thus, following the decision of the Court in this case, the
Board’s August 1994 decision was vacated and the matter
remanded in order for the Board to vacate the underlying RO
decision as to the issues of service connection for residuals
of a left leg injury and head injury. In its memorandum
decision of June 1995, the Court held that, as a threshold
matter, these claims for service connection were not well
grounded. Accordingly, the underlying decisions on the
merits issued by the RO and the Board were determined by the
Board to be of no legal effect. Therefore, in accordance
with the Court’s order, the veteran’s prior appeal was
dismissed and the RO was directed to vacate its decision of
March 1991 as these particular issues.
Thereafter, the veteran filed a February 1996 application to
“reopen” his “claim for service connection for injuries to
back, head, and left leg,” and submitted additional evidence
in support of his claim. A rating decision in March 1996
denied the veteran’s claims for service connection for
residuals of a left leg and head injury as not well grounded,
and found that there was no new and material evidence to
reopen the claim for service connection for a back
disability. Following an April 1996 notice of disagreement,
a substantive appeal in May 1996, and additional evidence
submitted by the veteran by way of a lay witness statement
and personal hearing testimony, an October 1996 supplement
statement of the case again determined that the veteran’s
claims for service connection for residuals of a left leg and
head injury were not well grounded, and that new and material
evidence had not been submitted to reopen the veteran’s claim
for service connection for a lumbar spine disorder.
The Board notes that since the decision of the Court in this
matter, subsequent Court decisions such as Edenfield v.
Brown, 8 Vet. App. 384 (1995) (en banc), have held that if
the Board and RO erroneously decided issues on the merits
when the Court was of the opinion that the claims were not
well grounded, the Court could affirm as to those issues
without the necessity of remand. Here, however, in view of
the fact that the Court has already remanded the issues of
service connection for residuals of a left leg and head
injury, the Board will proceed to address those issues
consistent with the Court’s decision of June 1995.
CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT ON APPEAL
In the veteran’s Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Form 1-
9, dated in May 1996, the veteran notes that he is seeking
service connection for a lumbar spine condition, left leg
injury, and a head injury, and that he is requesting further
consideration on his claim. In a subsequent VA Form 1-9,
dated in January 1997, the veteran asserts that he believes
that the injuries to his leg and head are conditions that
happened to him on active military duty in 1957 while
stationed at Fort Ord, California. He further asserts that
he hurt his back at this time which has caused his lumbar
spine disorder. The veteran requests that his personal
hearing testimony be considered in addition to the lay
statement from B. L. D., dated in April 1996.
DECISION OF THE BOARD
The Board, in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A.
§ 7104 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997), has reviewed and considered
all of the evidence and material of record in the veteran's
claims file. Based on its review of the relevant evidence in
this matter, and for the following reasons and bases, it is
the decision of the Board that new and material evidence has
not been submitted to reopen a claim for service connection
for a lumbar spine disorder with DDD and DJD, and that the
veteran has not submitted evidence of well grounded claims
for service connection for residuals of a left leg injury and
a head injury.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. An application to reopen a claim for service connection
for a lumbar spine disorder was received in July 1990, and
was denied by a Board decision in August 1994.
2. The evidence submitted since the August 1994 Board
decision pertinent to the claim for service connection for a
lumbar spine disorder does not create a reasonable
possibility that the outcome of the decision would be changed
if the claim was reopened.
3. Residuals of a left leg injury were not shown in service;
residuals of a left leg injury, first shown years after
service, are not connected by any competent evidence to
service.
4. Residuals of a head injury were not shown in service;
residuals of a head injury are not currently shown.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The August 1994 Board decision which denied the July 1990
application to reopen a claim for service connection for a
lumbar spine disorder was final; new and material evidence
has not been submitted, and the claim is not reopened.
38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997); 38 C.F.R.
§§ 3.104, 3.156 (1996).
2. The claims for service connection for residuals of a left
leg injury and a head injury are not well grounded.
38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991).
REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. A Lumbar Spine Disorder
Background
In Evans v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 273, 285 (1996), the Court
held that “in order to reopen a previously and finally
disallowed claim . . . there must be ‘new and material
evidence presented or secured’ . . . since the time that the
claim was finally disallowed on any basis, not only since the
time that the claim was last disallowed on the merits.”
If new and material evidence has been received with respect
to a claim which has become final, then the claim is reopened
and decided on a de novo basis. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108.
New and material evidence means evidence not previously
submitted to agency decisionmakers which bears directly and
substantially on the specific matter under consideration,
which is neither cumulative nor redundant and which is, by
itself or in combination with other evidence, so significant
that it must be considered in order to fairly decide the
merits of the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a).
New evidence is not that which is merely cumulative
of other evidence on the record. Material evidence
is relevant and probative of the issue at hand.
However, not every piece of new evidence, even if
relevant and probative, will justify a reopening
because some evidence is of limited weight and thus
is insufficient to justify a new hearing. The
'bright line' rule in other federal courts is that
to justify a reopening on the basis of new and
material evidence, there must be a reasonable
possibility that the new evidence, when viewed in
the context of all the evidence, both new and old,
would change the outcome.
Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171, 174 (1991) (citations
omitted).
Service connection may be established for a disability
resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by
active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131 (West 1991 & Supp.
1997). The term “service connected” means, with respect to
disability or death, that such disability was incurred in or
aggravated, or that the death resulted from a disability
incurred or aggravated, in line of duty in the active
military, naval or air service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 101(16) (West
1991 & Supp. 1997). Service connection may also be granted
for certain “chronic diseases.” including arthritis, on a
presumptive incurrence basis if they are manifest to a
compensable degree within one year after separation from
service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137 (West 1991);
38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (1996).
In the June 1995 memorandum decision, the Court held that
since none of the medical evidence submitted since the last
final denial of the appellant’s claim on the merits linked
the appellant’s then-current lumbar spine disorder to
service, or to the one-year presumptive period following
service, the appellant had not submitted new and material
evidence to reopen his claim, and that the Board had
correctly refused to reopen the claim in the Board decision
of August 1994.
Since the August 1994 Board decision, additional pertinent
evidence has been received consisting of service personnel
records, October 1996 personal hearing testimony from the
veteran, and a lay witness statement from B. L. D., dated in
April 1996.
The copies of service records furnished by the veteran
reflect only duty assignments and provide no evidence of
complaints or treatment of a back disability. While these
records do indicate some absence as a result of sickness,
they do not specify any diagnosis, treatments, or complaints
of injury.
At his personal hearing in October 1996, the veteran
testified regarding a witness statement which he was
providing as additional evidence in this matter (transcript
(T.) at p. 1). The veteran indicated that this witness was
his supervisor for several months while he was stationed at
Fort Ord, California (T. at pp. 1-2). The veteran’s accident
apparently occurred outdoors near a truck, at which time the
witness was “back at the office” (T. at p. 3). However, the
veteran maintained that the witness had knowledge of the
incident (T. at p. 3). The veteran then indicated that he
sustained injury to his back and leg in this accident, and
that he sustained injury to his head at the same time when
“that limb fell on me” and cut his head (T. at p. 4). The
incident occurred on a Friday, and the following Monday he
went to the dispensary and was referred to the main hospital
(T. at p. 4). The veteran recalled staying in the hospital
for one night and then returned several times for therapy
treatments (T. at p. 4). He was discharged from service less
than three months after the incident (T. at pp. 4-5). The
veteran did not receive a separation examination before being
discharged from the service (T. at p. 5).
The veteran stated that he went to Dr. P. in Pleasant Hill,
Louisiana, in the early part of 1958, and then went to a
chiropractor in Nacogdoches, Texas in 1959, but did not go to
another doctor until 1985 or 1986 (T. at p. 5). At the time
he got out of the service, the veteran indicated that his
back, leg, and head were still bothering him (T. at p. 6).
A witness statement from B. L. D., received by the RO in
October 1996, indicates that the witness was assigned to the
veteran’s unit in 1956, and that in 1957, the veteran had
some kind of accident on post while delivering milk as part
of his daily duties. The witness further indicated that he
did not remember the details of the incident because he was
living off post at that time, reported for duty in the
morning, and then worked with civilian personnel at the
commissary. The witness noted that he saw the veteran
“limping after the accident on morning information.” He also
noted that he and the veteran were “both guinea pig[s] at the
Plumb Rock atomic exercise at Desert Rock, Nevada.”
Analysis
The Board has considered the evidence and contentions
received since the August 1994 Board decision. Essentially,
the additional testimony from the veteran revealed that the
veteran reported that he received treatment for his back
during service several months before separation, and that his
back was still bothering him after service. As was noted
earlier, the service personnel records provided by the
veteran merely document duty assignments during service, and
the witness statement merely acknowledges that the witness
remembered an accident that involved the veteran and that he
observed the veteran limping after this accident. Thus, the
record still does not contain medical evidence which connects
any current back disorder with DJD and DDD to service.
The critical question has never been whether or not the
veteran had and continues to have back problems, for that has
been shown by the medical evidence of record. The critical
question has been whether the veteran’s back disorder was
incurred in or aggravated by service, or whether the
veteran’s arthritis may be presumed to have been present in
service by virtue of manifestation to a compensable degree
within one year after separation from service. The recently
submitted evidence fails to address these determinative
questions with answers that are favorable to the appellant’s
claim. Therefore, the Board finds that the additional
evidence and material of record received in this case does
not create a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the
decision would be changed if the case were decided on a de
novo basis, that is, considering all of the evidence, both
old and new. See Colvin, 1 Vet. App. at 174.
In regards to the veteran’s testimony that his current back
disorder is related to a back injury sustained in service,
and the lay witness recollection of an incident with a
subsequent observation of the veteran limping, the Court has
held that competent medical evidence is required when the
issue involves medical causation or diagnosis. Grottveit v.
Brown, supra. The veteran’s contention is not considered
competent or probative evidence and, thus, is not material.
Moray v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 211 (1993).
II. Residuals of a Left Leg and Head Injury
Background
Service connection may be established for a disability
resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by
active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131 (West 1991 & Supp.
1997). For the showing of chronic disease in service there
is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to
identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to
establish chronicity at the time. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b)
(1996). If chronicity in service is not established, a
showing of continuity of symptoms after discharge is required
to support the claim. Id. Service connection may be granted
for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all of the
evidence establishes that the disease was incurred in
service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d).
The threshold question that must be resolved with regard to a
claim is whether the veteran has presented evidence that the
claim is well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991);
Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 78, 81 (1990). A well
grounded claim is a plausible claim, that is a claim which is
meritorious on its own or capable of substantiation. Murphy,
1 Vet. App. at 81. Mere allegations in support of a claim
that a disorder should be service-connected are not
sufficient; the veteran must submit evidence in support of
the claim that would “justify a belief by a fair and
impartial individual that the claim is plausible.”
38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a); Tirpak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 609,
611 (1992). The quality and quantity of the evidence
required to meet this statutory burden depends upon the issue
presented by the claim. Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91,
92-93 (1993).
The Court has held that the basic elements of a well grounded
claim for service connection and the type of evidence
required to meet each element are as follows:
(1) Competent evidence of current disability (medical
diagnosis); Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141, 144
(1992); Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992);
(2) Evidence of incurrence or aggravation of disease or
injury in service (lay or medical evidence); Cartwright v.
Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet.
App. 465 (1994); and
(3) Evidence of a nexus between the in-service injury or
disease and the current disability (Medical evidence or
presumption that certain disabilities manifest within certain
periods are related to service); Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet.
App. 91, 93; Lathan v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 359 (1995).
Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995).
The Court has further held that a lay person is not competent
to make a medical diagnosis or to relate a medical disorder
to a specific cause. See Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App.
492, 494 (1992). Therefore, if the issue is one of medical
etiology or a medical diagnosis, competent medical evidence
must be submitted to make the claim well grounded. See
Grottveit at 93.
If the veteran fails to submit a well grounded claim, the VA
is under no duty to assist in any further development of the
claim. Id. Furthermore, a claim that is not well grounded
must be denied.
A March 1987 VA medical examination revealed that the veteran
reported complaints referable to his lower back, which he
stated was injured in 1957 while hauling milk. The veteran
further reported that he was not hospitalized, and that he
was seen on an outpatient basis on several occasions,
receiving medication. Subsequently, he was discharged from
the service in 1957, and had received no treatment from that
time to the present. At the time of this examination, the
veteran complained of pain in his back and left leg. Knee
jerks were noted to be “normoactive” and equal bilaterally.
Although there was a diagnosis at this time of strain of the
lumbar spine by way of history, there was no diagnosis as to
the left leg or head.
VA outpatient medical records from June and July 1987 reflect
that in June 1987, the veteran reported chronic, recurrent
back pain with radiation to the left lower extremity. The
diagnosis was left sacroiliitis. In July 1987, the veteran
again reported back pain with some radiation down the left
leg, and the veteran was to continue his medication.
Lay statements from P. H., dated in November 1987, and from
J. F. and J. S., dated in February 1988, do not specifically
address the veteran’s left leg or head.
At his personal hearing in May 1988, the veteran described an
in-service injury to his back but did not indicate a separate
injury to either his left leg or head (T. at pp. 1-2). He
did note that his then-current complaints included a burning
pain down both legs and dizziness which the veteran thought
was connected to his back problem (T. at p. 3).
VA outpatient and inpatient medical records from December
1989 to March 1990 reflect that the veteran was treated for a
burn injury to the left calf area in December 1989, and that
he continued to receive treatment for this injury for several
months thereafter. A January 1990 VA discharge summary
indicates that the veteran reported a 30+ year history of low
back pain with radiation down the posterior left lower
extremity of the heel after multiple milk cartons fell on
him. The veteran further reported that in December 1989, he
was burned on the left calf posteriorly by some hot pipes.
The summary also notes that the veteran was not currently
having left lower extremity radiation pain, but that he did
have pain exacerbated by walking with leg fatigue. Sensory
examination revealed an extremely decreased pin prick in the
left S1 distribution, and that the veteran also had decreased
pin prick in the left L3-4 and L5 compared to the right.
Reflexes also revealed decreased patellar and ankle type jerk
on the left compared to the right. Straight leg raising was
positive on the left with increased low back pain and left
leg radiation to the knee at 40 degrees, and was positive on
the right with similar distribution down the right leg.
The veteran had been admitted in order to undergo a computer
tomography (CT) myelogram in order to rule out a L5-S1
herniated nucleus pulposus versus neurogenic claudication.
The results of the January 1990 CT myelogram noted that the
veteran complained of left lower extremity pain and revealed
evidence of some severe lumbar canal stenosis with facet
hypertrophy.
A February 1991 VA medical examination indicated that the
veteran reported a history which included an infected leg,
and it was noted that the veteran had a slight limp favoring
the left side. The veteran further reported that he burned
his left leg while burning trash when his trousers caught on
fire. Physical examination at this time revealed that the
head was normal and that the left lower extremity disclosed a
nontender and noninfected burn scar measuring 6 by 5
centimeters over the lateral aspect of the left lower leg.
Examination further revealed some dullness to pin wheel
testing of the entire left leg and no atrophy by measurement.
The diagnosis included a noninfected left leg.
Additional lay witness statements, received by the RO in May
1992, also do not specifically address an injury to the
veteran’s left leg or head.
At his personal hearing in July 1992, the veteran again
testified to the incident in which milk cartons fell on him,
and he stated that these items hit him on the back, head, and
left leg, in 1957, approximately 2 months before his
discharge (T. at pp. 1-2). The veteran indicated that he had
been unable to locate the only person who witnessed the
incident, R. W. (T. at p. 2). With respect to his head
injury, the veteran indicated that he had problems with his
memory and dizziness (T. at p. 4). After the service, he
went to Louisiana where he had trouble maintaining employment
due to his back and legs (T. at p. 4). He continued to have
symptoms, and noted that his left leg would seem to get
tangled with his right leg (T. at p. 8). The veteran was
going to make an effort to obtain additional statements (T.
at p. 9).
Lay statements from Mr. and Mrs. H., received in July 1992,
reflect that these individuals recalled that the veteran had
been involved in an accident while unloading milk cartons,
and Mr. H. indicated that the items fell on his leg, and that
he took the veteran to the hospital at Fort Ord, California
where he received treatment.
Additional lay statements were received in July 1992, and the
statements from F. D. C., D. W. J., D. H., and H. C. F.
identify some familiarity with the veteran’s leg and/or head
problems, and note that the veteran had been suffering from
these problems since service or since the middle to late
1960’s.
As was noted previously, in his personal hearing in October
1996, the veteran testified that he sustained injury to his
back and leg in the milk carton incident, and that he
sustained injury to his head at the same time when “that limb
fell on me” and cut his head (T. at p. 4). At the time he
got out of the service, the veteran indicated that his back,
leg, and head were still bothering him (T. at p. 6).
As was also previously noted, the witness statement from B.
L. D., received by the RO in October 1996, indicates that the
witness did not remember the details of the incident. The
witness did note, however, that he saw the veteran “limping
after the accident on morning information.”
Analysis
The Board has also considered the evidence relevant to these
claims, and with respect to residuals of a head injury, it
shows no current diagnosis of a disability with respect to
the veteran’s head. Thus, one element of a well grounded
claim, competent evidence of current disability (medical
diagnosis), is lacking here. Rabideau v. Derwinski, supra;
Brammer v. Derwinski, supra. Likewise, since there has been
no separate diagnosis of a current disorder of the left leg
other than as related to the veteran’s back disability, the
Board could also find this claim to be not well grounded on
the basis of no current disability. The only evidence
advanced to support the existence of the element of a well
grounded claim involving the existence of injury or disease
in service to either the left leg or head is the appellant
and lay witness evidentiary assertions first advanced several
decades after service. See Caluza v. Brown, supra.
Under the controlling case law, lay evidentiary assertions
must be presumed to be true for the limited purpose of
assessment of whether a well grounded claim has been
presented, and they can establish the existence of an event,
such as an injury, that would be perceptible to a lay party.
But even assuming the appellant’s assertions concerning
injury in service were true, his claims would still be
considered not well grounded due to the absence of evidence
of a nexus between any current disability and the alleged
injury or injuries in service. An evidentiary nexus between
the current disorder and service must also be shown in order
for a claim to be well grounded, and this must be by way of
competent, i.e., medical, evidence. See Espiritu v.
Derwinski, supra. The evidence which has been presented
pertinent to disorders of the left leg and head does not
provide any competent link between these disorders and
service.
The Board recognizes that the veteran has made an effort to
submit evidence that disorders of the left leg and head are
related to symptoms during service in his personal testimony,
by way of medical history contained within medical records
beginning in 1987, and by multiple lay witness statements.
However, the Court has said that claimants unversed in
medicine are not competent to make medical determinations
involving medical diagnosis or causation. In other words,
since the veteran or the lay witnesses have had no medical
training, their assertions that the veteran currently has
disorders of the left leg and head which are related to
certain symptoms he experienced in service, carries no
weight. See Espiritu v. Derwinski, supra. As for the
medical evidence of record, there is no medical evidence
which offers an etiology for any diagnosis of disorders of
the left leg or head. Where the determinative issue involves
medical causation or a medical diagnosis, competent medical
evidence to the effect that a claim is plausible is required
for the claim to be well grounded. See Grottveit v. Brown,
supra.
The Board notes that the Court has also held that, under
certain circumstances, lay evidence of continuity of
symptomatology could provide the element of nexus evidence to
make a claim well grounded. Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet. App.
398 (1995). At this time, however, the Court has taken under
review the whole question of whether lay evidence can provide
the necessary nexus element and, if so, under what
circumstances. See Savage v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 520 (1996)
(Per Curium Order). Accordingly, the Board will also address
the question of whether lay evidence of continuity of
symptoms has been presented sufficient to well ground the
claim. In this case, as in most, the question of whether
continuity of symptoms has been established involves two
components. One is that the same symptomatic manifestations
persist, and the second is that those symptomatic
manifestations are due to the same underlying cause. The
appellant as a lay party is competent to report the presence
of perceptible symptoms such as pain. However, he is not
competent to link those symptoms to a disability that is
itself not a disorder that would be perceptible to a lay
party. In this case, even assuming the appellant’s lay
assertions established continuity of the same symptomatic
manifestations, he is not competent to link them to the
underlying diagnoses shown in the record. Accordingly, he
can not establish a well grounded claim by his lay evidence
of continuity of symptoms.
Finally, the Board notes that if the Court had previously
affirmed the prior decision of the Board which denied service
connection for residuals of a left leg injury and a head
injury on the merits, the additional evidence since the
August 1994 Board decision would also not have been
sufficient to reopen the veteran’s case in that the
additional evidence and material of record received in this
case since August 1994 would not create a reasonable
possibility that the outcome of the decision would be changed
if the case were decided on a de novo basis, that is,
considering all of the evidence, both old and new. See
Colvin, 1 Vet. App. at 174.
ORDER
New and material evidence not having been received to reopen
the claim for service connection for a lumbar spine disorder
with DDD and DJD, the claim remains denied.
The claims for service connection for residuals of a left leg
injury and a head injury are denied as not well grounded.
RICHARD B. FRANK
Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals
NOTICE OF APPELLATE RIGHTS: Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7266 (West
1991 & Supp. 1997), a decision of the Board of Veterans'
Appeals granting less than the complete benefit, or benefits,
sought on appeal is appealable to the United States Court of
Veterans Appeals within 120 days from the date of mailing of
notice of the decision, provided that a Notice of
Disagreement concerning an issue which was before the Board
was filed with the agency of original jurisdiction on or
after November 18, 1988. Veterans' Judicial Review Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 402, 102 Stat. 4105, 4122 (1988). The
date which appears on the face of this decision constitutes
the date of mailing and the copy of this decision which you
have received is your notice of the action taken on your
appeal by the Board of Veterans' Appeals.
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