Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/397

Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round PRESENT

Joo Yeon Cho

Abstract: PRESENT is a hardware-oriented block cipher suitable for resource
constrained environment. In this paper we analyze PRESENT by the
multidimensional linear cryptanalysis method.
We claim that our attack can recover the 80-bit secret key of PRESENT up to 25 rounds
out of 31 rounds with around $2^{62.4}$ data complexity.
Furthermore, we showed that the 26-round version of PRESENT can be attacked
faster than key exhaustive search with the $2^{64}$ data complexity
by an advanced key search technique.
Our results are superior to all the previous attacks.
We demonstrate our result by performing the
linear attacks on reduced variants of PRESENT.
Our results exemplify that
the performance of the multidimensional linear attack is superior compared
to the classical linear attack.