Dr Hannah Maslen

Deputy Director

Hannah Maslen is the Deputy Director of the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics. She works on a wide range of areas in practical ethics and applied philosophy, from neuroethics to philosophy of punishment. Her current research projects include:

• BrainCom, a European Horizon 2020 project developing neuroprosthetics for speech, on which she is a Principal Investigator leading the work package on ‘Ethics, Implants and Society’;

Previously, Hannah worked as a Research Fellow on the Oxford Martin Programme on Mind and Machine. Here she examined the ethical, legal and social implications of various brain intervention and interface technologies. Technologies covered included non-invasive brain stimulation for enhancement, deep brain stimulation as a treatment for various medical conditions, optogenetics, and virtual reality. She has also worked on philosophy of punishment and sentencing, particularly on the relevance of remorse as a mitigating factor within retributive theories of punishment.
Hannah’s academic background is in philosophy, psychology and law. She is a (non-stipendiary) Junior Research Fellow at New College, and a James Martin Research Fellow at the Oxford Martin School.

Our (2014) model for the regulation of cognitive enhancement devices (CEDs) received a great deal of interest from those involved in European device regulation and from academic commentators. Further, since the publication of our recommendations, the number of manufacturers of brain stimulation devices for non-medical purposes has increased, underscoring the need for a regulatory response. In this paper, we clarify aspects of our original proposal and address additional regulatory issues beyond our original focus on the sale of devices. We begin with theoretical points pertaining to the definition of a CED and the distinction between treatment and enhancement. We then respond to practical challenges raised by the prospect of implementing our regulatory framework. Next, we address some wider societal considerations relating to users and other stakeholders. Finally, we revisit the broader regulatory context within which the various discussions are situated.

Increasing interest in the use of cognitive enhancing pharmaceuticals, such as modafinil, has led to considerable ethical debate about issues around authenticity, fairness and even whether there is a moral obligation to enhance. This latter question has raised questions as to whether there might be a legal obligation to enhance. We have argued elsewhere that the law will not oblige a professional to self-enhance. In this article, we explore a second reason why a claim of negligence for a failure to enhance would be unlikely to succeed: the problem of establishing causation. As the science on enhancers and what they are capable of currently stands, it would be almost invariably impossible to establish a causal link between failure to enhance to redress fatigue, and the harm that allegedly resulted. Even where a link between fatigue and harm can be established, it will be extremely difficult to show that taking an enhancer would have averted the harm. We focus on the most likely context in which such claims might arise--clinical negligence--and on the most efficacious enhancing drug currently available-modafinil.

The Ethics of Deep Brain Stimulation for the Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa.

Maslen, H, Pugh, J, Savulescu, J

2015

|

Journal article

|

Neuroethics

There is preliminary evidence, from case reports and investigational studies, to suggest that Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) could be used to treat some patients with Anorexia Nervosa (AN). Although this research is at an early stage, the invasive nature of the intervention and the vulnerability of the potential patients are such that anticipatory ethical analysis is warranted. In this paper, we first show how different treatment mechanisms raise different philosophical and ethical questions. We distinguish three potential mechanisms alluded to in the neuroscientific literature, relating to desire, control, and emotion, respectively. We explain why the precise nature of the mechanism has important implications for the patient's autonomy and personal identity. In the second part of the paper, we consider practical dimensions of offering DBS to patients with AN in certain cases. We first discuss some limited circumstances where the mere offering of the intervention might be perceived as exerting a degree of coercive pressure that could serve to undermine the validity of the patient's consent. Finally, we consider the implications of potential effects of DBS for the authenticity of the patient's choice to continue using stimulation to ameliorate their condition.

Brain stimulation for treatment and enhancement in children: An ethical analysis

Books and Chapters

Remorse, Penal Theory and Sentencing

Maslen, H

2015

|

Book

Whilst the emphasis here is on theoretical justification, the monograph also offers analysis of how normative conclusions would play out in the broader context of sentencing decisions and the guidance intended to structure them.