About the Authors

As Russia slowly
begins to withdraw its troops from Georgia, attention now moves to
the question of Russia's future presence in Georgia and in the
secessionist Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Russia rejected a French-drafted U.N. Security Council (UNSC)
resolution calling on Moscow to return to its pre-war position of
August 6. Russia followed this rejection by offering its own
resolution that permitted it to maintain a military presence-in the
form of 2,500 Russian "peacekeeping" troops in "buffer zones"
around Abkhazia and South Ossetia-on Georgian soil
indefinitely.

Although Moscow did
not comply with the original ceasefire negotiated by French
President Nicholas Sarkozy, this draft resolution represents at the
least a violation of the spirit of the agreement. Russia has
clearly indicated that it does not respect the territorial
integrity of Georgia.[1] As
diplomatic efforts intensify at the United Nations (U.N.) to
resolve this international conflict, the United States must
unambiguously define its redlines and veto any proposed resolution
that does not explicitly uphold Georgia's sovereignty and
territorial integrity.

The Ceasefire Agreement: Part of the
Problem, Not the Solution

During an August trip
to Tbilisi and Moscow, Sarkozy negotiated a ceasefire agreement in
which Russia agreed to withdraw its troops from Georgia by August
18. Having missed two deadlines for withdrawal and destroying
Georgian infrastructure in the interim, Russia now appears to be
pulling back. However, under the vague terms of the ceasefire,
Russia has announced that it intends to keep 2,500 heavily armed
soldiers on sovereign Georgian territory beyond the administrative
borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia for an unspecified amount of
time. It has also constructed checkpoints inside Georgia as part of
the additional security measures it deems appropriate under the
terms of the ceasefire agreement. Furthermore, Russia is now
effectively blocking and restricting Georgia's key transportation
routes.[2]

By permitting these
actions, the ceasefire-rather than helping resolve the crisis in
Georgia-has unintentionally contributed to the problem. Tbilisi
signed the ceasefire agreement under international pressure and
assurances by Sarkozy that an eventual peace agreement would ensure
a Russian retreat to at least its pre-war position. However, Moscow
has applied its own interpretation of the ceasefire agreement and
continues to argue in the UNSC that the terms of the agreement
grants it authority to maintain a permanent military presence in
Georgia.

The
United Nations

As a permanent member
of the UNSC, Russia has the ability to veto council resolutions.
Russia has made it abundantly clear that it will use its veto to
block any resolution that would undermine its interpretation of the
ceasefire agreement, force it to withdraw from Georgian territory,
or contain any provision objectionable to Russia. France, Britain,
and the United States must not be tempted into agreeing to a UNSC
resolution simply to say that they have "done something" about the
issue. Russia's demonstrated willingness to take full advantage of
its veto ensures that such an effort will lead to circuitous
negotiations that will result in a progressively weaker
resolution.

Moreover, the U.S.
should resist French entreaties to co-sponsor a resolution, which
would likely lead the U.S. to focus on getting a resolution passed
rather than focus on ensuring that whatever resolution passes is in
the interests of the U.S. and Georgia. Instead, while it is
awaiting France's counterproposal to Russia's unacceptable draft
resolution in the UNSC, the U.S. should publicly announce it will
veto any resolution that fails to meet the three following
redlines:

The territorial
integrity and sovereignty of Georgia must be affirmed;

Russia must be
required to immediately withdraw all of its military personnel in
Georgia proper to their status quo ante positions; and

Russian peacekeepers
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia are replaced with OSCE, EU or U.N.
peacekeepers (excluding both Russian and Georgian citizens) within
a stipulated timeframe.

Such a public
statement would clearly convey the U.S. position to the Russians,
the Europeans, and the Georgians. It would also provide a helpful
counterbalance to the Russians in the UNSC that could aid the
French in their negotiations.

Nonetheless, it is
highly likely that Russia will refuse these conditions and veto
such a resolution. Such an outcome, however, should not be viewed
as a failure of the U.S. position. The above-cited redlines are
entirely reasonable, and Russia will be hard-pressed to explain its
opposition to a U.N. resolution affirming the territorial integrity
of a U.N. member state (it has previously accepted Georgia's
territorial integrity in past resolutions on Georgia) or the
sensible request that parties to a conflict not supply personnel to
a peacekeeping operation designed to serve as a buffer between
combatants.

Russia successfully
manipulated Europe's efforts to resolve this conflict and can not
be allowed to set the agenda in the U.N. The U.S. can bolster
France's effort-and France's resolve now that Paris has taken the
lead role in reconciling the conflict-to draft a counter proposal
by clearly stating the terms for its support of a U.N. Security
Council resolution.

Preconditions for U.S. Support of a U.N. Resolution

A Russian
"peacekeeping" presence beyond Abkhazia and South Ossetia is
immoral, illegal, and a reward to an aggressor. Moreover, Russians
can no longer play an impartial and independent role as a
peacekeeper in either South Ossetia or Abkhazia. These two factors
must be the foremost preconditions for U.S. support for a UNSC
resolution.

While Russia is in a
strong position militarily in Georgia, it is in a far weaker
position internationally. Russia is the clear aggressor and is
seeking to use the UNSC to legitimize its actions and ongoing
presence in Georgia. The U.S. must not let them succeed in that
effort. The U.S. must remind Russia that it too is a veto-wielding
member of the UNSC and that it is equally unafraid to use it. By
setting clear redlines on the resolution, the U.S. would help
maintain the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and
impede Russia's effort to use the U.N. to excuse its actions.

Sally
McNamara is Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs and Brett D.
Schaefer is Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory
Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of
the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.