Columnist
A H Amin analyses this axis as a focal point of battle between India and
Pakistan.

The
Indian attack on Lahore in particular and Ravi-Sutlej Corridor in general
has remained the subject of too much propaganda and too little analysis.
On Pakistani side the Battle for Lahore was seen as a superhuman effort
while on the Indian side it exposed many glaring weaknesses in the Indian
Army at unit, brigade, divisional and corps level.

On the other hand the total failure of the main
Pakistani attack in Khem Karan was ignored or forgotten in the smoke
screen of glory created by official propagandists who successfully shifted
the entire public attention on laurels of Aziz Bhatti etc. Thus, many
glaring failures like surrender of an entire tank regiment on Pakistani
side in Khem Karan were overlooked. If Niranjan Parshad was sacked on the
Indian side no one realized that the Pakistani GOC 1stArmoured Division survived unceremonious dismissal simply because
he was close to the then army chief.

Unfortunately, instead of dispassionate analysis the
Battle for Lahore or Ravi-Sutlej Corridoras one may call it was overclouded by tales of heroism at
individual and unit level on the Pakistani side.On the Indian side, it led
to various drastic changes in high command and re-thinking about unit
employment. After the war, Indian High Command spent a very large fortune
on increasing terrain friction by construction of spurs, bunds, drains etc
to ensure that something like a tank thrust against their strategic line
of communication to Kashmir and Amritsarmay never again take place. In 1971, thus little activity took
place in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor and the emphasis shifted to area south of
Sutlej.

We will analyse the corps level battle in this
article in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor in 1965 which involved a total force
of some five infantry divisions and one armoured division and an
independent armoured brigade.

Orientation withthe battle area

The Ravi-Sutlej Corridor from the point where the
River Ravi finally enters Pakistan near BRB Syphon north of Lahore till
Kasur measures roughly 160,000 yards in frontage. The main Pakistani town
Lahore, a place which had immense strategic, political as well as
psychological significance for Pakistan was located just 29 kilometres
from the border while the main Indian town Amritsar was about 28
kilometres from the border. Khem-Karan, a small Indian town which made
many headlines in the first four days of the war was located about 60
kilometres south west of Amritsar and 5 kilometres to the border. Ravi,
the river comprising the northern boundary of the corridor was relatively
smaller than Sutlej, the river which formed the southern boundary of the
corridor and entered Pakistan in the Sejhra Bulge, going into India again
for a few miles into Hussainiwala Headworks before re-entering Pakistan
again a few miles south of Kasur, a small Pakistani town 5 kilometres from
the border. Since there was no natural boundary between India or Pakistan
in this corridor, Pakistan had constructed the BRBL (Bambanwalla Ravi
Bedian Link) Canal which the Indians referred to as Ichhogil Canal. The
BRBL canal ran from north to south from Ravi in the north till Sutlej in
the south, after it entered the corridor passing through a siphon on the
Ravi from Sialkot District. The canal was constructed in the 1950s with
the express purpose of serving as a defence obstacleagainst apossible
Indian attack on Lahore. Its western banks were higher than its eastern
banks to provide good fields of fire and observationfor the defender and lined with bunkers. It was approximately five
metres deep and 45 metres wide and was a “complete water obstacle”,
formidable in subcontinental terms where attack across water obstacles was
regarded as a formidable and extremely difficult operation!1 The BRB
running in a nearly ninety degree direction flows 5 to 14 kilometres from
the Indian border. It has various branches which run from east to west
like the Lahore Branch, Kasur Branch. All these branches ran from
northeast to southwestand
thus no cause of any ground friction for any attacker advancing from east
to west. The BRB crossed the GT Road at Dograi a village located on its
east bank. The other obstacles in the corridor were the Hudiara Drain,
Rohi Nala and the Nikasu Nala. The first two could be crossed with minor
engineer effort or recce while the third required greater engineer effort.
Both Ravi and Sutlej were complete water obstacles with width varying from
150 to 350 metres and were in near full flowin the season. The fields of fire in the area were limited from 300
yards to 1200 yards and the area near the canals, their branches and the
nalas were boggy, limiting tank movement and requiring careful
reconnaissance. The main roads in the area were the GT Road linking Lahore
with Amritsar and onwards to Jullundhur and Ludhiana. Lahore-Harike Road
linking Lahore with Ferozepur-LudhianaRoadand the Ferozpur
Road linking Lahore with Ferozpur, after passing through Kasur and
crossing the Sutlej over the Hussainiwala Headworks near Ferozpur. The
major bridges from where the BRB could be crossed were at Dograi on the GT
Road, Bhaini, Malikpur, Bedian, Barki, Kasur etc. In addition, there were
various aquaducts and viaducts on the BRB. The area had thick vegetation
trees etc and various crops specially sugar cane severely limited fields
of observation and fire.

Indian Plan

The Indian war plan was finalized on 9th August
1965.2 The plan envisaged a major attack in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor
employing 11 Corps (4 Mountain Division, 7 Infantry Division and 15
Infantry Division) along three axis i.e 15 Infantry Division on Amritsar-Lahore
axis, 7 Infantry Division on Khalra-Barki-Lahoreaxis and 4 Mountain Division on Khem Karan-Kasur axis. Each
division had two brigades while their third brigade was held by the 11
Corps as reserve or for other tasks. 29 Brigade (ex-7 Division)was directly under corps headquarter and tasked to defend the area
opposite the Dera Baba Nanak Enclave, Dharm Enclave and the Jassar Bridge.
The corps boundary of the 11 Corps extended fromDera Baba Nanak (Included) some 56 Kilometre North of Amritsar in
the north till the north bank of Sutlej River in the south and onwards
till Ganganagar which was defended by 67 Infantry Brigade (three
battalions) supported by 4 Independent Squadron (Sherman-75mm). The 2
Independent Armoured Brigade was the corps reserve of 11 Corps. It
consisted of 3rd Cavalry (Centurions) and 8th Light Cavalry (AMX-13). 15
Infantry Division had 14 Scinde Horse (Shermans-76 mm), and 1st Skinners
Horse (Shermans) an additional regiment which was on move on 6th September
1965 from Benares to the frontline. This unit joined the 15 Division only
on 11th September. The 7th Division’s integral armour unit was the 21
Central India Horse (Sherman-75mm) while the 4th Mountain Division (less
33 Mountain Brigade deployed on Chinese border)had the 9 Deccan Horse (Sherman-76 mm). In addition after 6th
September the 7th Light Cavalry (PT-76) equipped with fully amphibious
PT-76 tanks was moved to the corps area with restrictions placed on the
unit for utilization in only highly sensitive missions because of
conversion and armour vulnerability reasons since the PT-76was newly inducted and had very thin armour plates. This brigade
also had 1 Field Regiment (SP) and 1 Dogra (Lorry borne). In addition the
corps also had a reserve infantry brigade i.e 96 Infantry Brigade (three
infantry units) (ex-15 Division) initially placed at Tarn Taran.

The reader may note that Joginder Singh claims that
at one point General Harbaksh Singh had agreed to transfer 7 Division to 1
Indian Corps involved in Operation Nepal opposite Chawinda but the
decision was changed on Joginder’s remonstrances to the IndianArmy chief. This if done would have left a big gap in between
Indian 15 and 4 Mountain Division.3

Each Indian division had an organic artillery brigade
known as divisional artillery in Pakistan. In addition there was the 21
Independent ArtilleryBrigade
consisting of one medium and one heavy regiment.

In addition the 11 Corps was also given three other
formations which were not in its area of operations on 6th September
1965.These were 41 Mountain Brigade (forced to move to Akhnur after Grand
Slam), 50 Para Brigade which was on move from Agra to 11 Corps area on 6th
September and the 23 Mountain Division which was initially Indian Army
Reserve and did not arrive in the battle area and had no influence on the
conduct of operations till end of the war. The reader may note that this
formation was last ordered to concentrate in area Dera Baba Nanak by 26th
September 19654 while ceasefire took place on night 22/23rd September
1965.

In the strategic sense the prime Indian aim in 11
Corps area was to launch a thrust at Pakistani vital centre of Lahore
which would compel Pakistan to “retain large portion of her reserves in
that Sector”.5

Another major strategic benefit that the Indians
visualised to derive from 11 Corps attack was ensuring defence of Indian
territory in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor by utilising the BRB as a water
obstacle. The Indian planners had assessed that with all territory from
the border till BRBL in Indian hands the Indian territory in Ravi-Sutlej
Corridor was secure against any Pakistani attack. This was so since no
water obstacle like BRB was available with the Indians for the defence of
their side of the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor.

The reader may note that before the war if Joginder
Singh the Chief of Staff Western Command is to be believed some people (Harbaksh
Singh) in the Indian Higher Command regarded the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor as
indefensible and were in favour of taking a defensive position on the Beas
River.6

In classical strategic terms the Indian 11 Corps
attack was a “Thrust” defined by Andre Beaufre as“Reacha vulnerable
point in spite of opposition of the enemy” and aimed at “Depriving the
enemy of his freedom of action by wearing him down”.7

In pure operational order terminology 11 Corps tasks
were:—8

Advance to the Ichogil Canal (BRBL) along the axes GT
Road, Bhikiwind-Khalra and Bhikiwind-Khem Karan to capture Pakistani
territory from opposite Ranian inclusive to its junction with Dipalpur
Canal opposite Hussainiwala inclusive and capture intact:—

a. GT Road Bridge over Ichogil Canal.

b. GT/Jallo Link Road Bridge. Barki Bridge over
Ichogil Canal.

c. Destroy any enemy which may enter the Punjab and
Ganga Nagar Sector in Rajhastan.

d. Simultaneously with point “a” above eliminate
Bridgehead in the areaDera Baba
Nanak, and if possible capture the bridge intact.

e. Finally on completion of task “a”,
be prepared to continue the advance to Lahore.

15 Division Plan

Translated into tangible terminology the above
mentioned objectives were to be acomplished by commencing the advance of
15 Infantry Division in two phases. In Phase One commencing on night 5/6
September with two brigades and one task force. 54 Infantry Brigade (three
battalions) of this divison supported by a tank squadron (14 Scinde Horse)and engineer field company was to advance along GT Road after
crossing the international border at 0400 Hours 6th September and capture
two bridges on BRB at Jallo and Dograi. Simultaneously, a battalion group
task force i.e 1 Jat (ex-38 Infantry Brigade) halftank squadron (14 Scinde Horse), engineer field company,under direct command of HQ 15 Division were to capture road bridge
in area Bhaini-Dhilwal. In the second phase not before six hoursafter 0400 Hours 38 Infantry Brigade was to capture area Bhasin and
Dograich.

7 Division Plan

The 7 Infantry Division was also given a two phase
plan. In Phase one, it was to advance with one infantry brigade (48
Brigade) supported by tank squadron less one troop (21 Central India
Horse) advancing along axis Khalra-Barki capturing Barki and securing the
adjacent bridge over the Ichogil Canal (BRBL) by last light 6th September.
Simultaneously and independent task force directly under 7 Division
Headquarter comprising 17 Rajput and one tank troop (21 Central India
Horse), supported by a regiment strength of artillery and a field company
of engineers was to cross the border at axis Wan-Bedian and secure Bedian
by last light 6th September. In Phase two, 65 Infantry Brigade was to
carry out mopping up operations along BRBL and also destroy all bridges on
BRBL within 7 Division area of responsibility.

4 Mountain Division Plan

4 Mountain Division comprising two infantry brigades
and one tank regiment (9 Deccan Horse) was the southern most division of
the advancing force. It was tasked to secure Pakistani territory upto
Ichhogil Canal which in this area was just about 4 kilometres from the
Indian border, destroying bridge over Ichhogil Canal over road Khem
Karan-Kasur and to occupy a defensive sector to contain possible Pakistani
offensive consisting of an armoured division and two infantry brigades.
This division was also assigned the support of 2 Indian Independent
Armoured Brigade on priority.

The reader may note that initially the Indian
planners had correctly assessed that Pakistani 1st Armoured Division may
be employed in this sector. However, once Pakistan’s 7th Infantry
Division the sister division of the 1st Armoured Division had moved into
Gujrat area the Indian Intelligence equally incompetentlike their Pakistani counterparts had by September assessed that
the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division was inWazirabad area!9

Thus the 11 Corps was in a relaxed mood and had no
clue that the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division was dispersed in Changa
Manga Forest area about to commence an attack which in leading Indian
military analyst Ravi Rikhyes word had the potential to be India’s
Fourth Battle of Panipat.

Pakistani Plan10 Division Plan

The Pakistani plan in this corridor had two different
dimensions. One was the defence of Lahore the prime Pakistani defensive
consideration. The second was the main Pakistani attack originating from
Kasur aimed at severing the entire Indian 11 Corps line of communication.
There were three Pakistani divisions in the corridor. The 10 Division
responsible for defence of Lahore from BRB Syphon till Bedian in the south
a frontage of approximately 60,000 yards.10 The newly raised 11 Division
responsible for defence of the area from Bedian till and including
Hussainiwala Headworks, a total frontage of some100,000 yards11in
gunner terminology!

The 10 Division had three infantry brigades, two of
which were deployed in defensive role and one along with a tank regiment
(23 Cavalry), two infantry battalions, a field artillery regiment in
direct supportand an R &
S Company was designated as theDivision
Strike Force responsible for counterattacks.Before the war this brigade
had been trained to carry out counterattacks to destroy any enemy
penetration west of BRBL. The reader may note that 23 Cavalry had one M-47
Squadron while the remaining two squadrons were equipped with Shermans.12
The TDU regiments were also equipped with Shermans.

114 Brigade was responsible for defence of Ravi
Syphon through Bhaini Bridge till and including the main GT Road at Wagah.
It had three infantry battalions, an R & S Company less one platoon, a
TDU tank squadron (30 TDU) and was directly supported by a field artillery
regiment. The main defensive positions of the brigade were on the BRBL.

103 Brigade was responsible for defence of area
excluding GT Road till Bedian. It had two infantry battalions, a TDU tank
squadron (30 TDU), an R & S Company less a platoon, and a field
artillery regiment in direct support.

The 10 Divisional artillery’s strong point and one
which gave it a marked advantage over the Indians, was in possession of 30
Heavy Regiment consisting of latest USeight 155 mm guns and four 8 inch Howitzers. In addition, the
division had three medium regiments supporting three infantry brigades, a
medium regiment and two locating batteries.

11 Division Plan

The 11 Division was raised in 1965 around May 1965.13
It consisted of three infantry brigades i.e 21 Brigade, (two battalions),
52 Brigade (three battalions) and 106 Brigade

(two battalions). In addition it had two tank
regiments (15 Lancers and 32 TDU). The division had two roles i.e
defending the line of BRB and also providing a bridgehead to the main
Pakistani attack force i.e the 1st Armoured Division. Its artillery
consisted of three field regiments, one mortar troop,one medium regiment,
one heavy regiment (eight8 inch Howitzers and four 115 mm guns) and most valuable a
corps locating regiment.

The dual operational task of the 11 Division was
defence of Kasur, destroy enemy advance on axis Ferozpur-Kasur and Khem
Karan-Kasur, capture Pakistani side of Hussainiwala enclave and destroy
all enemy likely water crossings in the divisional area. Its offensive
role was to be prepared to secure a bridgehead across the Rohi Nala for
the 1st Armoured Division. In this task the division was to secure general
line Patti-Harike inclusive of bridge over Harike and Bhikkiwind on axis
Lahore-Harike. In the Phase two, the division was to get the 5 Armoured
Brigade to capture Jandiala Guru Bridge over the Beas River.14

Conversely, if the GHQ decided to launch the whole of
1st Armoured Division in conjunction with 11 Division, 11 Division was
then to provide a firm base to facilitate operations of 1st Armoured
Division. In this eventuality the 5 Armoured Brigade was to revert to
under command 1st Armoured Division.15

Lately, Major General Naseerullah Babar in an
interview conducted by this scribe for the Defence Journal claimed that
the originator of this offensive plan wasMajor General Altaf Qadir.16

1st Armored Division Plan

As per the initial war plans of the Pakistani GHQHeadquarter, 1 Corps was supposed to control the operations of8 Division, 15 Division, 10 Division, 11 Division and 1st Armoured
Division. Humanly speaking, this was an impossible task and a tribute to
Ayub and Musa’sgrasp of
strategic and organisational depth or lack of it! Even the officially
sponsored historian Shaukat Riza admitted “nothing could be farther away
from intention or capability of HQ 1 Corps” .17

The reader may, note that the 1st Armoured Divisions
prime task was to function as areserve
for the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor along with 7 Infantry Division. However,
later on the 7 Division was diverted to Operation Grand Slam North of
Chenab River.18

The first armoured division as it stood in 1965 was
one of the finest armoured formations that the sub continent had seen till
1965. To be precise in the words ofGul
Hassan the last C-in-C of the Pakistan Army and the then Director Military
Operations in 1965,the 1st
Armoured Division was the “best equipped division that we fielded and
far superior to any armour formation the Indians had”19

In September 1965, the 1st Armoured Division
consisted of three armoured brigades (3rd, 4th and 5th) each with two tank
regiments and one APC borne (Armoured Personnel Carrier) mechanised
infantry battalions. In addition the division had a recce regiment and the
normal divisional artillery component of three self propelled (tracked)
artillery regiments, one medium regiment, one self-propelled (tracked)
Light Anti Aircraft Regiment. In addition there was the usual component of
engineer signal and other supporting arm and service battalions.

On 1st September 1965, Headquarter 1 Corps still in
command of 1st Armoured Division and still retaining some mental
equilibrium which it was soon to lose from 6th September 1965 issued its
grand operational instruction to the 1st Armoured Division:—

“1st Armoured Division on orders from GHQ was
required to debouch from a bridgehead providedby 11 Division and to cut Grand Trunk Road in area Jullundhur”!20

In other words, 1 Corps Headquarter was assigning the
1st Armoured Division an objective some 100 miles inside India and one
which required crossing of one major river !

As per this instruction the 5 Armoured Brigade was
initially placed under command 11 Division for establishment of
bridgehead.21

The initial 1st Armoured Division plan is illustrated
on the adjoining map. It envisaged an advance by 3rd Armoured Brigade
along Sobraon Branch to secure the Beas Bridge, a distance of60 miles, an advance by the 4 Armoured Brigade along Kasur
Branch to Jandiala Guru on Grand Trunk Road east of Amritsar, a distance
of some 50 miles. 5 Armoured Brigade was to revert to command of 1st
Armoured Division in the breakout phase and act as reserve.22

If 1st Armoured Division succeeded in accomplishing
the above mentioned tasks this would have meant that complete Indian 11
Corps was encircled and forced to either surrender or withdraw northwards
towards Pathankot. In the process the Indians would have forced to sue for
ceasefire and would have lost all territory including crucial cities like
Amritsar till the Beas River. This is why Ravi Rikhye called it a possible
fourth battle of Panipat for India.

Conduct of Battle

On4th
September at precisely 2230 Hours the Pakistani GHQ sent a signal to all
formations which asked them to take “necessary defensive measures”
against India. War had not yet broken out but Pakistan had already
launched an infantry division/armoured brigade size attack in Indian Held
Kashmir from 1st September. The signal whose language was described by
Shaukat Riza as “not peremptory”23 read as following:

Pak ArmyDTESept042230E

Latest Intelligence reports indicate Indian
concentration on both East and West Pakistanand such flash announcements on All India Radio as QUOTE Pakistanisattacking Jammu etc. UNQUOTE indicate their aggressive intention,
formations will take necessary defensive measures (.) All Informed

Gul Hassan states that there was no ambiguity in this
signal and that all formations took immediate action on it barring 10
Division in Lahore. This in view of Gul Hassan was a clear case of
complacency.24

10 Division area

All that 10 Division did on receipt of the above
mentioned signal was towarn
forward troops to exercise greater vigilance and ordered troops to move
into defensive positions on night 5th and 6th September.25 Gul’s
assertion is confirmed by Shaukat Riza who states that GOC 10 Division on
4th September brushed aside Commander 114 Brigades suggestion to move into
defences but later relented and ordered move to defensive positions during
night 5/6 September 1965 on the morning of 5th September.26 Shaukat did
not give any reason in his book in which he repeatedly praised Ayub and
Musa as to why the Pakistan Army had so non-military in the language of it
signals while stating that the 10 Division was not in full deployment
because of the GHQ!27 Even the Indian armour historian noted that “for
some unaccountable reason the 114 Brigade was not in its defences when the
Indian attack came on the morning of 6th September “.28

The two forward brigades of the 10 Division were
occupying their positions when the Indian attack commenced at 0400 Hours
6th September 1965. 3 Jat the leading battalion of the 54 Indian Brigade
reached the BRB bridge near Dograi which had been destroyed by the
Pakistani defenders. The Indians claim that two companies of this
battalion crossed the BRB walking over the partially destroyed debris of
the bridge and occupied Batapur for sometime but were forced to withdraw
since the Indian 54 Brigade/15 Division did not reinforce it.29 The reader
may note that in this case the weakest link in the whole affair was not
the Indian soldier or 3 Jat but the Indian 54 Brigade Commander and GOC 15
Division who did not respond to CO 3 Jat’s repeated requests for
reinforcements! The claim of 3 Jat having crossed the BRBL, however, is
denied by Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik who was then defending that
area as Commanding Officer 3rd Baluch.30 In the final analysis 54 Brigade
accomplished little except 3 Jat’s singular accomplishment of contacting
the BRBL opposite Batapur.

1 Jat Group similarly performed miserably. It failed
to reach the BRBL and was
repulsed by the combined effect of artillery fire and left forward
battalion of the 114 Brigade. It panicked and dispersed back to the Indian
side of the border by mid-day.31 It was replaced by 6 Kumaon along with
two tank troops which deployed at Ranian.32

The 38 Infantry Brigade of the 15 Division also
advanced very slowlyat H + 6
and according to Harbaksh’s narrative had just advanced within 2000
yards of the BRBL by 2200 Hours 6th September.33

By 1300 Hours 6th September GOC 15 Indian Division
Niranjan Parshad reported that the situation in his sector was seriouson account of high casualties and no further offensive action was
possible! On hearing this report, Harbaksh Singh accompanied by Commander
11 Corps personally visited 15 Division battle area and found that “the
situation had been grossly exaggeratedand the fighting potential of the formation were in no way impaired
— only the GOC had failed to measure upto certain local reverses,
inevitable in any battle”. Harbakshfound the GOC 15 Division “drained of all will and vision ...his
attitude was passively negative and there was the unmistakable air of the
defeatist about him. He stated his inability to undertake any further
offensive action on the plea that his formation had lost all capacity for
operations”.34

On 7th September afternoon GOC 15 Division while on
the way to visit 38 Brigade towards Bhasin was ambushed35 by 18 Baluch.
The GOC escaped but his jeep was captured and is still retained by 18
Baluch (now 3 Sind) asa war
trophy.

On night 7/8 September 38 Brigade based in Pul Kanjri
area attempted to capture Bhasin but failed. 54 Brigade on Jallo and
Dograi villages with a battalion each also failed on night 7/8 September.

Meanwhile, the Pakistani GOC 10 Division ordered a
counterattack to put 15 Division on the defensive. The Divisional Strike
Force 22 Brigade was given orders to attack Indians east of BRB, something
which they had not practiced in pre-war training manoeuvres. The 22
Brigade crossed the BRB at Maqboolpur Syphon with 23 Cavalry leading,
Brigadier Qayyum Sher37, captured area Bhaini by 0830 Hours 8th September
and had cut the GT Road at Milestone 13 in Dograi area by 1330 Hours. This
audacious counterattack threw the Indian 15 Division into utter confusion.
Harbaksh Singh states that two Indian units 13 Punjab and 15 Dogra in
Dograi area broke the line and abandoned their defences.38 The battalions
were later goaded, rallied and brought back to the defences. This forced
11 Indian Corps to reinforce the area with their reserve brigade i.e 96
Infantry Brigade which was now deployed immediately behind 54 Brigade in
depth in the Hudiara Drain area.

The 22 Brigade Force was too weak to stay in Dograi
area. Therefore, it withdrew back to the west bank of the BRB after
executing their counter-attack.

On 10th September 1965, 1 Jat and 6 Kumaon again
abandoned Ranian area39 in face of alleged heavy artillery, tank and
infantry small arms fire. This produced another crisis in the 11 Corps.
The right flank of the Indian 11 Corps was exposed and Amritsar could be
threatened from this direction. This produced an operational crisis of
magnanimous proportions in the 11 Indian Corps Headquarter. To plug this
gap, 96 Infantry Brigade was rushed forward to Ranian area and its
position at the Hudiara Drain as the reserve brigade was taken over by the
50 Para Brigade.

Meanwhile, the 7 Indian Divisionperformed better. It crossed the international border at0530 Hours 6th Septemberwith
48 Brigade in leadand
secured the Hudiara Drain defended by a company size advanced position by
an outflanking manoeuvre from the left. 65 Brigade commenced the advance
from Hudiara Drain onwards towards Barki and contaced the BRB opposite
Barki which was held in strength by elements ofa unit of 103 Brigade. Barki defended by a company of 17 Punjab and
a company of 12 Punjab was captured by the 7 Division employing one
battalion (4 Sikh) supported by Central India Horse less two squadrons on
night 10th/11th September. Major Aziz Bhatti who was later awarded the
Nishan-I-Haidar was the 17 Punjab Company Commander at Barki and survived
this action. He was killed by enemy shelling on 11th September on the west
bank of the BRBL the next day.40 The Indian Commanding Officer of Central
India Horse Lt Col Joshi who was leading from the front was mortally
wounded once his jeep was blown up by an anti-tank mine and died on 12th
September.41

17 Rajput advanced successfully till the BRBL on 6th
September 1965 but failed to capture the Bedian bridge since the Pakistani
battalion defending the area inundated the area. Nothing significant took
place in this sector till ceasefire.

The last significant event which took place in the 10
Division area was the recapture of Dograi by the Indians. Dograi on the
east bank of the BRBL was defended by the 16 Punjab. It was attacked by
two infantry battalions supported by a squadron plus of tanks and captured
by a multi-directional night attack on night 21/22 September 1965. The
village had little strategic significance specially when compared with the
casualties suffered by both the attackers and defenders who were involved
in the Dograi battle.

11 Division area

4 Mountain Division attacked the 11 Division area on
6th September 1965. The attack was on too wide a front and too diluted to
make any impact. The Indians were overconfident in this sector since they
thought that Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Division was in Wazeirabad as
earlier discussed. Ballanwalla a small village and securing all area upto
the east bank of the BRBL from area opposite Rajoke till opposite Kasur
wasthe main Indian
objective in the area. The Indians had planned a two brigade attack (they
only had two brigades in this division)with 7 Mountain Brigade (two battalions supported by a tank
squadron) going in the north and 62 Mountain Brigade (three battalions and
a company supported by a tank squadron), in the South while 1/9 Gurkha
along with Deccan Horse less two squadrons was the Divisional Reserve.

At mid-day Pakistan’s 52 Brigade mainly 7 Punjab
supported by tanks and well directed artillery firelaunched a determined counterattack on the 62 Brigade. Harbaksh
Singh notes that “the 13 Dogra gave away and broke the line”.42 13
Dograwas the left forward
attacking battalion of the 62 Brigade and its bolting away disoriented the
whole Indian attack. Similarly, the 7 Mountain Brigade opposite
Ballanwalla was thrown back by artillery fire and the small arms fire of
the 106 Brigade units. The Indian Armour historian claims that “Pattons
unexpectedly appeared east of the canal through aviaduct located 500 metres south of the road bridge”43 (Khem
Karan-Kasur on the BRBL). However, Shaukat Riza has made no mention about
this either because of anti-armour bias or because he wanted to unduly
project the 52 Brigade.

K.C Praval notes that 9 Jammu and Kashmir right
forward attacking battalion of the 62 Mountain Brigade became so
demoralized by the combined effect of 52 Brigade attack and artillery/tank
fire that it retreated as far back as Valtoha !

Another significant affair in the 11 Division battle
area was the moverment of the 21 Brigade its reserve brigade. Initially,
on 5th September the brigade was ordered to be ready to move north and
moved north towards Bhimbhar at 0430 Hours 6th September. Laterthe move was countermanded and the brigade reverted to
command 11 Division whose area it reached on around 0200 Hours 7th
September!44

1st Armoured Division/11 Division Attack

Since this article is devoted to the overall battle
in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor the 1st Armoured Division attack will be covered
in brief.

At 1430 Hours 6th September, 2 FF (reserve battalion
of52 Brigade) was ordered by11 Division Headquarter to capture a bridgehead across the Rohi
Nala by first light 7th September. Similarly the 5 Armoured Brigade which
was placedunder command 11
Division on 5th September was ordered on 5th September to secure “line
Bhikkiwind-Patti as soon as possible”.45

The 2 FF launched its attack astride road Khem
Karan-Kasur across the Rohi Nala at 1930 Hours 6th September 1965 and by
2130 Hours secured abridgehead
across the Rohi Nala.466
Lancers the leading regiment of 5 Armoured Brigade was to cross the Rohi
Nala. The bridge over Rohi Nala was completed by 1130 Hours but since its
exit ramp was too steep the first tank of 6 Lancers crossed it at 1300
Hours 7th September.47 After one squadron of 6 Lancers had crossed the
Rohi Nala at 1600 hours one tank got stuck and blocked the Rohi Nala
bridge. At this time there were ten tanks across the Rohi Nala and about a
company strength of 1 FF. Colonel Sahibzad Gul, CO 6 Lancers made some
forward movement putting some Indians in front on the run shooting three
Indian tanks and capturing about 25 prisoners.

1st ArmouredDivision Attack

The 1st Armoured Division was involved in the main
battle from 6th September when 5 Armoured Brigade was placed under command
11 Division. The 5 Armoured Brigade attack was to commence at 0500 Hours
on 7th September, however, it was delayed to 1130 Hours because of delay
in bridge construction on Rohi Nala which was within Pakistani territory.
GulHassan the then DMO later
claimed in his memoirs that a bridge was not required since the Rohi Nala
was fordable but did not explain what he had done as DMO to bring this
point in any pre-war planning discussion ! By evening 1600 Hours only
about a tank squadron strength of the 6 Lancers leading unit of 5 Armoured
Brigade had crossed the Rohi Nala since one of its tanks had got stuck on
the RohiNala Bridge. Thus
7th September was lost with just ten tanks across the Rohi Nala. All this
was happening at a time when the situation in 4 Mountain Division as per
Harbaksh Singh was so serious that ‘out of six battalions two and half
had left the line and the remaining three and half were under severe enemy
pressure”. Harbaksh states that it was under these circumstances that
GOC 4 Mountain Division sought permission from GOC 11 Corps to withdraw
and take a position at Assal Uttar in the rear.48

Harbaksh states that early in the morning of 8th
September he receiveda
handwritten letter from GOC 11 Corps recommending that four infantry units
i.e 18Rajputana, 7
Grenadier, 9 J & K, AND 13Dogra
be disbanded and that another infantry division should replace 4Mountain Division.49

At this stage Harbaksh had no reserves and exhorted
GOC 4 Mountain Division and GOC 11 Corps to be more resolute.

While all this was happening Brig Bashir commander 5
Armoured Brigade was throwing to winds Pakistan’s Armour superiority by
dividing his brigade into two directions with 24 Cavalry to advance along
axis Khem Karan-Bhikiwind and 6 Lancers towards Valtoha Railway Station.
24 Cavalry contacted defences of 4 Mountain Division and tried to develop
the situation from the west but failed because of lack of infantry support
and timely arrival of 3rd Cavalry (Centurions) which reached the 4
Mountain Division area after mid-day. 6 Lancers reached Valtoha Railway
Station but was recalled after last light back to Khem Karan by Brigadier
Bashir to leaguer in line with the old British practice which in this
scenario was not required.50

By 9th September when the Pakistani armour once again
commenced advance the Indian armour was well poistioned with 3rd Cavalry
Centurions plugging flanks which could have enabled 5 Armoured Brigade to
get into rear of 4 MountainDivisioon
8th September. The critical time span was over. The ancient Greeks used to
say that the Goddess of Victory favours those who are bold. Boldness was
sadly missing in 5 Armoured Brigade less Sahibzad Gul the only tank
commander who wanted to lead and fight from the front.

Thus once 5 Armoured Brigade recommenced advance from
its leaguers near Khem Karan, 6 Lancers was greeted by Centurion fire of
3rd Cavalry while 24 Cavalry also made nominal progress. To compound
things further Sahibzad Gul the only man in the whole senior lot was
killed on 9th September near Valtoha.This indomitable man was only given
an SJ since he was not from the more pampered regiments of the then
Pakistan Army!

By 10th September the Indians were well poised to
meet any outflanking attack.They had taken a horse shoe position withabout three tank regiments, one in 4 Mountain Division defences,
another less one squadron in Valtoha area and the third and the most
formidable in technical terms i.e the 3rd Cavalry covering the western
deep flank of the4 Mountain
Division.

Naseer now launched 4 Cavalry into this valley of
death. The result was catastrophic. 4 Cavalry got bogged down and was
forced to surrender. The Indians claimed that they captured all tanks of
the unit, the Commanding Officer and 12 officers including six majors and
several other ranks.51 Shaukat Riza states that “some tank crew of 4
Cavalry trickled into HQ 4 Armoured Brigade.They reported that the
regiment had been taken prisoner...at the end of the day 4 Cavalry
reported 4 Officers and 25 Other Ranks missing and a total of ten killed.
Almost all the tanks had been lost”.52 The layman reader should not get
shocked.In tank warfare such things happen. In WW two an illustrious
British tank unit 8th Hussars along with 4 Armoured Brigade was captured
by the Germans.53 The fault in 4 Cavalry fiasco was not of the unit but
its CO and GOC 1st Armoured Division.

Indian armour historian admits that 4 Cavalry fought
well but ran out of fuel because of poor planning and was caught in a well
laid ambush.

Thus ended an offensive which had the potential to
knock the Indian Army out of the war. The 3rd Armoured Brigade was never
employed and from 11th September the 1st Armoured Division less 5 Armoured
Brigade and 4 Cavalry which was totally written off was despatched to
Chawinda.

The Indians launched some very fool hardy frontal
attacks on 11 Division from 11th September till 22nd September. All were
repulsed since surprise had been lost and defence keeping in view terrain
and relative strength was the superior form of war.

Analysis

Level of strategic success

On the strategic level the Indians failed in their
prime aim i.ein compelling
Pakistan to “retain large portion of her reserves in that Sector” i.e
Ravi-Sutlej Corridor. The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division successfully
disengaged fromKhem Karan
and was redeployed opposite Chawinda. The Pakistanis thus defended Lahore
successfully with existing formations except 5 Armoured Brigade whose one
tank regiment (4 Cavalry) was completely lost, having been captured by
Indians while two (6 Lancers and 24 Cavalry) suffered serious losses. Thus
at ceasefire in strategic terms the Pakistani position opposite Chawinda
was far superior. It is another thing that Ayub and Musa lacked strategic
resolution to launch Operation Wind Up which had the potential of bagging
two Indian Infantry divisions in Chawinda area.

Element of Surprise

Both the sides started with the element of surprise,
the Indians having achieved surprise opposite Lahore and Pakistan having
achieved complete strategic surprise opposite Khem Karan. Ironically the
Intelligence agencies of both sides were a complete negation of the “Two
Nation Theory” in terms ofcomparative
levels of ‘grey matter’, keeping in view the fact that both miserably
failed to detect the location of each other’s armoured division till the
last minute!

Employment of Armour

The conduct of 5 Armoured Brigade on 7th, 8th and 9th
September was the most crucial aspect of the battle. Commander 5 Armoured
Brigade totally failed in his job. His initial orders divided his brigade
into three directions, with 6 Lancers going towards the right and 24
Cavalry going in the centre and left. Had he kept his two tank regiments
concentrated in any one direction with a squadron on the main Khem
Karan-Bhikiwindaxis the
Pakistanis would have outflanked the 4th Mountain Division on the 8th
September. This would have enabled GOC 1st Armoured Division to pump in
the 4th Armoured Brigade to reinforce the success of the 5th Armoured
Brigade with the 4th Armoured Brigadewhile still retaining 3rd Armoured Brigade for the final push to
the Beas River Bridge. By 9th September the Indians were well poised to
defeat any outflanking move and the “critical time span” i.ehad run out for the Pakistanis.

In every battle, campaign and a war there are/is one
or more period/s when one side is greatly exposed to the risk of being
decisively defeated, due to material factors or psychological factors like
perception of the opposing commander that his cause is doomed,with the other side being possibly aware of it or not.54
Superior decision making means the ability or talent to identify the
critical time span and seize it relentlessly! Brigadier Basheer failed in
it on 7th, 8th and 9th September! Alas, the truth in Schillers saying
“what is lost in a moment is lost for eternity”. The current of
history now started moving in the reverse direction and Pakistan Army paid
a very heavy price for the failure at Khem Karan six years later in 1971!

Chances ofStrategic Success

At the strategic level the plan was excellent. It was
in planning and at operational level that it failed. Even Indian military
writers like K.C Praval admitted that the plan was “well
conceived”...”that the advance throughout would be along the grain of
the country and no water obstacles would have to be crossed”...and that
“Pakistani armour had the capability for the thrust but the plan failed
due to inept execution”.55Harbaksh Singh admitted that “it was a simple but foolproof
plan” and that “only the 4 Mountain Division stood in its way”.
Gurcharan Singh Sandhu the tank corps historian also admitted that “The
loss of any bridge over the Beas was expected to pose such a serious
threat to Delhi that the rest of the Indian Army would be forced to
contain it rather than make an attempt to rescue the stranded XI
Corps”.56

In Clausewitzian terms the strategic plan decides
“when, where and with what forces” the battle is to be delivered.57
Again in the light of Clausewitz’s teachings, one of the principal
objects of strategy is “always to be strong, first generally and then at
the decisive point”.58 In this regard, strategy placed at Naseer’s
disposal an initial superiority at the decisive point of about 7 to 1 but
he failed to translate it into success because he and his 5 Armoured
Brigade Commander were incompetent and the men who handpicked them based
on personal likes were worse! After all Naseer was Musa’s handpicked
choice. The fault was not that he was a non-armour officer as Gul Hassan
fallaciously alleges but simply that Naseer was incompetent! After all,
Ibrar who did far better was also an infantry man. Rommel was an infantry
man. Macarthur, Lee and Meade were from Corps of Engineers!

The greatness of the German General Staff as this
scribe stated in an article written in 1994 was not that it produced a
Manstein but that it discovered a Manstein and allowed a Manstein to reach
the highest ranks!59 It was here that the Indo-Pak Armies failed. They are
simply a conspiracy against originality and boldness!

If successful the 1st Armoured Division attack had
great chances of success.Indian GOC Western Command Harbaksh Singh frankly
admitted that“A Blitzkrieg
deep into our territory towards the GT Road or the Beas Bridge would have
found us in a helpless position of a commander paralysed into inaction for
want of readily available reserves while the enemy was inexorably pushing
deep into his vitals.It is a nightmarish feeling even when considered into
retrospect at this stage.”60

The BRB as thekey to the battle

It may sound unheroic and unromantic but the BRBL
proved the English Channel that saved Pakistan’s strategic position in
the crucial Ravi-Sutlej Corridor. This man made obstacle severely
restricted the Indian freedom of manoeuvre and nullified their relative
superiority in infantry. The canal acted as the anvil vis-a-vis Pakistani
artillery fire, tank fire and infantry small arms fire which played the
role of hammer which crushed the Indians inflicting heavy casualties on
them. Without BRB there is no doubt that nothing could have stopped the
indians from entering Lahore on 6th September. Similarly, without BRB the
1st Armoured Division could not have as easily disengaged from the Khem
Karan battle as it did. Conversely, the BRB also slowed down the induction
of the 1st Armoured Division into the bridgehead but this was less because
of the BRB and more due to incompetence in Pakistani planners at GHQ (DMO),
corps and divisional level.

Musa admitted BRBL’s role, once he stated that
Pakistani plan was based on making use of the BRB canal which to a great
extent compensated for disparity in resources and enabled Pakistani
formations in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor to deploy on “very extended
frontages”. 61

Indecision,Vaccillation and Procrastination inthe
GHQ

The Pakistani GHQ particularly the Military
Operations Directorate acted as catalysts towards increased confusion.
Their contradictory orders to a certain extent retarded the pace of
advance of the 1st Armoured Division. Twice the GHQ gave orders which
created great doubt and confusion in the 1st Armoured Division. See the
case of 3rd Armoured Brigade. On 6th September it was told to concentrate
east of Zafarke by first light 7th September. The brigade carried out the
move successfully by 0600 Hours 7th September. The same day at 1400 Hours
it was told to move to Lahore and at 1500 hours on the same day these
orders were cancelled!62 Imagine the state of mind of the brigade
commander and his commanding officers. On the second occasion, the 4
Armoured Brigade was ordered by the DMO to move to Daska in Ravi-Chenab
Corridor at 1300 Hours 7th September. While the brigade was preparing for
the move it was cancelled the same day at 1600 Hours. Naturally, GOC 1st
Armoured Division Naseer could not have ordered these moves on his own.
There were men higher up in the chain of command who were not clear about
many things connected with operationalstrategy and generalship! 63

Lack of initiative atbattalion, brigade and
divisional level

There was a marked lack of initiative at the
battalion, brigade and divisional level. Lieutenant Colonel Ihsan ul Haq
Malik who later rose to the rank of major general and participated in the
Khem Karan operations as the CO of the indomitable 15 SP (it was a
privilege for this scribe to have served in the “Romeo Battery” ofthis fine unit after a disciplinary problem in 11 Cavalry from 9th
August 1984 till 10th October 1984) states that“senior officers were conspicuously absent from the frontline in
war. I saw a command post of one of them in the rear areas. The bunker was
a massive job.Only a direct hit by a5 KT would disturb it!”64

Barring exceptions like Qayyum Sher who as earlier
discussed led from the front. GOC 1st Armoured Division and Commander 5Armoured Brigade preferred staying many miles away from the line of
action! Brigadier Shami the Artillery Commander was killed simply because
in confusion of battle he was disoriented and travelled too forward under
the assumption that he was in territory held by own troops. On the
decisive 8th of September when the 1st Armoured Division could have
achieved a breakthrough no officer of colonel level except SahibzadGul was anywhere within 1000 yards of action! Ina personal conversation with this scribe Brigadier (then captain
Asmat Beg Humayun) then GSO-3 of the 5 Armoured Brigade stated that
Brigadier Bashir had pitched his headquarter in a rest house many miles
behind the actual scene of action.

Triumph of defenceover offence

All battles were triumph of defence over offence. The
attacker was stopped whether it was the Indian opposite BRB or the
Pakistani opposite Assal Uttar or Valtoha. If one Pakistani tank unit
stopped the Indian Armoured Division opposite Gadgor, one Indian tank unit
and later one brigade stopped the Pakistani Armoured Division at Assal
Uttar. If there was a Harbaksh Singh at Assal Uttar prodding 4 Mountain
Division to hold on there was an Abrar at Chawinda reviving the spirits of
the 6 Armoured Division. There were historic reasons for triumph of
defence.The pre-1947 Indian Army was primarily used by the Britisher as ashield rather than a spear. While Indian Infantry dug in, the main
manoeuvres in North Africa were performed by the purely British armoured
divisions. Burma was adifferent
case altogether since in Burma the Indian tank brigades overwhelmed the
Japanese with a ratio of 100 to 10 in qualitative and quantitative terms.
Offensive action required initiative,independent judgement, swiftness in
decision making, all of which were sadly missing in both the armies beyond
tank troop level. Men like Sahibzad Gul or Tarapur were solitary
exceptions and that is why once they were killed in action there was no
one who could replace them. Excellence in decision-making had not been
institutionalised in both the armies and I dare say this is the state till
to date. A convincing proof being the latest Kargil affair!

Role of Artillery

Artillery played a decisive role in breaking many
Indian attacks opposite Lahore and Kasur, however, it lost its
effectiveness when Pakistani armour was distributed in too wide an area on
the 8th ofSeptember. In the
case of 1stArmoured Division
offensive its role was severely mauled due to overemphasis on secrecy.
Ehsan then an artillery CO thus noted “In peace we had not even seen the
maps of this area.Nobody had ever thought that we could be committed in
this area for an ofensive task”.65 Ehsan further noted that such was the
confusion that “another artillery unit in our formation moved by rail.
Understandably, itnever got
to the required place in time”. Artillery was even ignored in award of
gallantry awards.Thus while infantry officers particularly belonging to
Ayub’s Punjab Regiment Group got the Lion’sshare ofgallantry
awards artillery and armour were the underdogs in receipt of gallantry
awards.Thus Shaukat Riza caustically albeit realistically noted “Three
of our observers were killed while bringing fire on the enemy. One captain
stood up in his post to engage enemy tanks with better effect.He was
killed with a bullet in his right eye. After ceasefire we recommended them
for gallantry awards. None of them got anything.” 66

Organisational failures

One of the most serious failures which laid the
foundation of Pakistani 1st Armoured Division’s failure was failure to
have a higher command organisation to control and coordinate the
operations of the Pakistani infantry and armoured divisions. On the Indian
side on the other hand the situation was to a great extent since all
Indian divisions in the corridor were controlled by a corps headquarter.
The responsibility for this failure can be laid squarely on the shoulders
of Ayub and Musa and to some extent on the then CGS and DMO.

Staff and Planning Failures

Ironically while all the blame for failure was heaped
on the shoulders of GOC 1st Armoured Division and Commander 5 Armoured
Brigade, the underlyingand
some more serious failures were ignored. Starting from the top, the prime
culprit in the planning was the Military Operations Directorate. Planning
for attacks which decides the fate of a war at the strategic level cannot
be relegated to divisional headquarters. The Khem Karan Offensive plan was
prepared many years before the war started. Obstacles like Rohi Nala and
the Nikasu Nala were pre-partition obstacles, the Nikasu Nala being so
prominent that it was even prominently marked on the maps of the Radclife
Award Boundary Commission maps. The fault lay not in the fact that the 1st
Armoured Division was launched in bad terrain but in the fact that
adequate preparations in planning were not made to ensure that ground
friction was reduced. Compare this with another similar operation i.e the
Inchon landing. The terrain and amphibious factors at Inchon were
formidable. Macarthur’s own Chief of Staff Major General Almond
described Inchon as the worst possible place to land!67 The reader may
note that the water channel from where the amphibious force of Macarthur
had to approach could be conveniently mined or simply blocked bya sunken or disabled vehicle. Thus, at Inchon terrain did not
favour a landing but the advantage of strategic surprise were far greater
than terrain odds.The important fact which differentiated Inchon and Khem
Karan was that the planners at Inchon took terrain as well as movement
factors into account, thereby reducing terrain friction and the time and
space required to concentrate while at Khem Karan the Pakistani planners
starting from the Military Operations Directorate,1 Corps Headquarter, 1st
Armoured Division Headquarter down till brigade headquarters of the 1st
Armoured Division did not plan meticulously for the move into bridgehead
and for getting out of the gap between Rohi Nala and Nikasu Nala as soon
as they could. The governing element in this whole situation was getting
out of the Nikasu-Rohi bottleneck so as to gain complete freedom of
manoeuvre where Pakistani superiority of nine to three in tank regiments
could be fully exploited. If BRB saved the Pakistani position in this
corridor then the Rohi Nala and the Nikasu Nala to a great extent saved
the Indian position. Nothing in the instructions passed to 1st Armoured
Division indicated that the Pakistani GHQ was even aware of closeness of
two obstacles within Pakistani territory i.e the Rohi Nala and the BRB
which could and did produce traffic jams which severely delayed the
induction of the 1st Armoured Division into the bridgehead and enabled the
Indians to bring their independent armoured brigade into the battle area
before the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division had crossed the crucial
Rohi-Nikasu Corridor which was a serious operational bottleneck. It was
not Nasir or Bashir who failed but the whole staff system inherited from
the British. Nasir andBashir
were just tips of the iceberg! The British staff college at Cambrai in
words of Montgommery’s biographer Nigel Hamilton was an institutionpreoccupied with “hunting and socialising”! 68 A British
officer who rose to considerable height in the British Army in WW Two “
frankly ascribed his selection for staff duty to having played golfregularly with a senior commander”!69

It was a failure of command as well as staff system
where even the staff officers on both sides were too slow for armoured
warfare and worked on yards and furlongs rather than miles. Their
orientation was position oriented rather than mobility oriented and their
idea of a battlefield was a typical linear battlefield. Their Burma or
North African experience where the Japanese and Germans frequently
appeared in their rear had made them extra sensitive about their flanks.
These were men who thought in terms of security rather than speed.
Conformity rather than unorthodox dynamism, having been trained in the
slavish colonial orders oriented. British Indian Army was the cardinal
script of their life. It was this British system in which every senior
commander was more interested in doing the job of those one step junior to
him that led to the lack of dash and initiative at brigade and battalion
level. They were trained that way and their behaviour as far as the
timidity at brigade and divisional level has to be taken in this context.

Analysis of Casualties

Contrary to popular imagination created by the
propaganda that Chawinda was the greatest battle since WW II it was in the
Ravi-Sutlej Corridor that the Indians suffered the maximum casualties.Thus,
while the 1 Indian Corps which fought the Battle of Chawinda suffered a
total of 575 killed casualties, the Indian 15 Division opposite Lahorealone suffered some 486 killed casualties.70 Thus if the
casualties of all three Indian divisions and the independent brigade in 11
Corps area are combined, these far exceed those suffered by the 1 Corps
which fought the Battle of Chawinda.

Influence of Higher Headquarters on lower
headquarters

In the case of Indian 4 Mountain Division the GOC 4
Mountain Division lost the will to carry on as proved by Harbaksh’s
narrative. In this case the situation was restored by Harbaksh’s
personal visit and exhortations to carry on. In the final analysis 4
Mountain Division gradually regained its spirit and functioned effectively
in the defensive role.

Comparative Differences in the two armies

Manyridiculous
myths were propagated in Pakistan about differences in the two armies.
Racially by and large both the armies were of the same stock. The Pakistan
Army bulk of which some 65% to 75% being Punjabis who were converted to
Islam in the period 1000-1600 or Pathans or Ranghars who were of Hindu
Rajput origin. On the other handthe
bulk of theIndian Army wasPunjabi or North Indian again with Sikhs who were converted
to Sikhism in the period from 1500-1800. The remaining larger portion of
the Indian Army was Dogra (Punjabi Hindu Rajput), Punjabi Hindu Jat, and
some Madrasis, Kumaonis and Gurkhas. Racially by and large the armies were
alike. Where a unit did not do well had a deeper connection with poor
leadership at battalion, brigade or divisional level. Units panicked on
both sides, artillery fire had the same effect on both sides and if one
side had better guns it definitely gave it an advantage. Thus, there was
no major differences in both the armies at soldier to soldier level.

This fact was noted by some officers soon after 1965
but the majority were victims of the psychosis of Islamic Martial Military
superiority that overwhelmed the West Pakistani psyche during the period
1966-1971! Brigadier A.R Siddiqi in his book on the Pakistan Army’s
press image thus narrated athought-provoking
incident soon after the war. Siddiqi met Brigadier Qayyum Sher who as just
discussed had distinguished himself as an infantry brigade commander in
the battle opposite Lahore.Qayyum
Sher was unhappy about the unrealistic expectations and myths that were
being created as a result of the official propaganda. Qayyum Sher told
Siddiqi, “Miracles he mused, ‘may indeed have happened, but they
happen only once. Let me tell you that your press chaps are doing a lot of
harm to the soldier psychologically by publishing all those foolish
stories. I wonder what they are really trying to tell the world. That the
Pakistani soldier can fight his war only with the help of his celestial
allies. That he is facing an enemy inferior to him in all respects. I
admit God’s help is of the utmost importance but it’s no substitute
for one’s own performance. It would be quite stupid to forget that the
Indian soldier is as much of a professional as his Pakistani counterpart.
He has been trained in similar military systems and institutions and
fights like hell when he has to. The only reason why the Pakistani soldier
put up a comparatively better performance in this war was that he fought
largely on his own home ground as a defender”. Siddiqi further noted
that “The Pakistani image makers, however, had little use for such
sterile talk. They had their own mental picture of the war and regarded it
as the only correct one. Anybody who dared to speak of the war more
realistically simply betrayed a ‘diffident and defeatist mentality’
...The merest suggestion of the criticism of the military performance
became a taboo”.71Sher
was not alone in entertaining these views. Major General Tajammul Hussain
Malik who very ably commanded the 3rd Baluch opposite Lahore on the BRB
states in his memoirs that the Indian superiority opposite Lahore was not
as overwhelming as later portrayed in the Pakistani official propaganda.
Tajammul thus stated, “We had Patton Tanks whereas Indians had mostly
Sherman Tanks which were comparatively much inferior. Similarly our
artillery guns out ranged the Indian artillery guns. They had an overall
superiority of infantry, perhaps of about 1 to 2 but most of their
divisions were comparatively ill-equipped and untrained and they had to
guard a much bigger frontier”. 72

Conclusion

The battles fought in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor are
fit to be subject of a Shakespearian comedy of errors. On a more serious
note Pakistan Army lost its last chance to force a military solution on
the Indians. It failed not because failure was inevitable but because
seeds of failure were sown once soldiering was mixed with politics, merit
was sidelined and men of limited grey matter were elevated to the highest
ranks. After 1965 the current of history started flowing against Pakistan
and its full results came into light only in December 1971. There was
logic in Bhutto and his hawk’s position that Pakistan had the potential
to knock India out in a swift war like the Israelis did in 1956 and 1967.
Unfortunately, Pakistan failed not because of material reasons but because
of qualitative reasons. The finest steel goes through the hottest fire.
This unfortunately was not the case with the Pakistan Army of 1965 in
terms of higher leadership.

____________________________

1 Gul Hassan the then Pakistani Director Military
Operations (DMO) from 1961 to 1965 stated in his memoirs thatall Pakistani planning was based on the factthat “both sides would refrain from undertaking a crossing over a
major water obstacle at the outset of operations”. See Page-173-Memoirs
of General Gul Hassan Khan-Oxford University Press-Karachi-1993. The
Indians similarly were equally timid and Harbaksh Singh the GOC Western
Command noted that the Indian GHQ was also hesitant in attempting to cross
a major water obstacle even within Indian territory which was close to the
border. See Page-16 & 17-War Despatches-Lieut Gen Harbaksh
Singh-Lancer International-New Delhi-1991. The reason for this was
hesitation in taking any risk and in being unconventional, the cardinal
common trait in both Indian and Pakistan Army’s higher leadership since
the Indians commissioned in the pre-1947 British Indian Army in any case
were not trained to go beyond company or platoon commander level. The WW
II changed everything and speeded up the process of transfer of power!

5Page-15-War Despatches-Op Cit. Harbaksh Singh had
visualised that a major attack in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor with 11 Corps would
force Pakistan to retain a large proportion of her reserves in Lahore
Sector and resultantly minimise the opposition againt the Main Indian
Attack in Ravi-Chenab Corridor opposite Chawinda.

6Page-134-Joginder Singh-Op Cit- The reader is
advised to read Joginder’s book with a pinch of salt. It was published
after publication of Harbaksh’s War Despatches and was more of a
rejoinder than a detached analysis of the war. Joginder was Harbaksh’s
Chief of Staff in the war and it appears that Harbakshwas tough with Joginder. Joginder retired in the same rank soon
after the war while Harbaksh the most deserving candidate for Indian Army
Chief was not promoted since he was a Punjabi Sikh. It is hard to believe
Joginder’s unsubstantiated assertion that Harbaksh a staunch Sikh would
advocate taking position behind the Beas abandoning holy places like the
Sikh Vatican City i.e Amritsar.

16Page-10-” Remembering our Warriors”
series-Interview of Major General Naseerullah Khan Babar (Retired), SJ and
Bar conducted by A.H Amin - Defence Journal-April 2001 Issue-Pathfinder
Fountain -Clifton Karachi-2001. The reader may note that General Babar
avoids self- publicity and propaganda.He agreed to an interview on the
personal request of Mr Ikram Sehgal who had served with him in the Corps
of Aviation in the period 1968-71.

40Page-202-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.Harbaksh claims that
Bhatti was killed on the east bank of BRB (page-96-War Despatches-Op Cit)
but Shaukat states that Bhatti was killed byenemy tanks shooting from across the BRB Canal (Page-202-Shaukat
Riza-Op Cit).

41Page-362-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-Op
Cit.

42 Page-99-War Despatches-Op Cit.

43Page-366-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-Op
Cit.

44Pages-218 and 219-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

45Page-224-Ibid.

46Pages-221 & 222-Ibid.

47Page-227-Ibid.

48Page-100-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.

49Pages-100 & 101-Ibid.

50We shall discuss the leaguer concept which
seriously jeopardised the success of Pakistani armour operations in Khem
Karan. The British, mostly withdrew from the final battle positions in
North Africa because they feared the German 88 Anti-Tank Guns and wanted
to have a peaceful next morning. In any case the operational situation in
North Africa was not area oriented, as in Punjab, but mobility oriented
since any outflanked force could easily move in any direction and regain
its equilibrium. In Punjab where defence was a relatively far more
superior type of warfare than in the desert and holding every inch of
captured territory was important, the operational situation was totally
different from North Africa. Here every locality once captured had to be
held since manoeuvre was far more difficult due to heavy terrain, friction
and large number of artificial and natural obstacles and bottlenecks. This
was a serious doctrinal failing which should have been resolved in the
School of Armour. No one gave it a serious thought since it was thought
that the Pattons were invincible. These pedants failed to realise that the
British repeatedly failed to defeat Rommel despite possessing numerical
and qualitative superiority as was admitted by Captain B.H Liddell Hart.

67Page-24-Hell or High Water-MacArthurs landing at
Inchon-Walt Sheldon-Macmillan and Company-Newyork-1968 and Pages 19 to 23
and Pages-186 & 187-Victory at High Tide-The Inchon Seoul Campaign-Robert.D.Heinl
Junior-J.B Lippincott Co-Philadelphia-1968.

68Page-151-Monty-The Making of a
General-1887-1942-London-Hamilton Books-1981.

69Footnote-25-Page-87-Op Cit-Sidi Rezeg Battles-Op
Cit.

70Page-404,405&409-Major K.C Praval-Op Cit .

71Pages-108 & 109-The Military in Pakistan-Myth
and Reality-Brig A.R Siddiqi-Vanguard-Lahore-1996.