Thursday, June 30, 2016

For a federal
unit belonging to a country characterized by a prolonged national movement and the
subsequent Congress dominated scenario, Tamil Nadu has surprisingly escaped the
national electoral trends by and large. Since 1967, the main political parties
operating in Tamil Nadu have been offering an alternative Dravidian ideology in
response to the Hindi-Hindu-Hindustani mobilization of much of the rest of India,
diversifying the political processes of the country to a significant degree. This article attempts to understand the
results of the 2016 Assembly elections in
Tamil Nadu by exploring reasons for the ADMK’s victory, the DMK’s loss, and
some general factors that bring a party to power in the state.

Anti-incumbency
rule takes a hit

The state has been characterized by a constant swing
between All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK/ADMK) and Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) governments since 1989. Exit polls had largely
predicted a DMK victory.[1] Contrary
to the predictions, the ADMK returned to power with 134 seats out of 232 and
the DMK alliance trailed with 98 seats. The ADMK has not come to power with
such low vote share (40.8%) since 1977. Its vote share to power has been over
50% since 1984.

Predictions were made in favour of the DMK owing to the anti-incumbency factor. However,
this was not to happen because of four reasons. Firstly, despite being
criticized as populist, Jayalalithaa’s social welfare schemes provided
household goods and marriage assistance and had ensured the support of women. According
to the CSDS Lokniti survey, female voters cutting across all social and
economic indicators were supportive of the ADMK victory, more so than in
previous elections.[2]
Secondly, the promise of free mobile phones, free 100 units of electricity and
subsidized two wheelers/mopeds have made a difference in the anti-incumbency trend
of Tamil Nadu. The condition of high voter turnouts resulting in
anti-incumbency has been proved wrong; about 3/4th of the electorate
turned up to vote. Thirdly, the anger of the public due to the apparent lack of action and propagandist relief
measures during the November 2015 floods has hardly shown any effect in the
areas not affected by the flood. Moreover, the asset charges against her have
been a seemingly insignificant case compared to the DMK’s 2G scam to the
electorate. Hence, the predictions widely varied from the reality.

The DMK dynasty

Some significant reasons for the DMK’s loss seem to
stem from the party leadership (and ex-leadership). According to news reports, MK Stalin, son of DMK chief
Karunanidhi, had conducted a ‘spirited campaign’ critiquing the inaccessibility
of the incumbent CM Jayalalithaa. He replaced the traditional political attire
of dhoti, white shirt, and a shawl with trousers, t-shirts, and sports shoes.
Almost a year-long public outreach program has led to a positive image of the
party, especially in his constituency of Kolathur.[3] However,
since his name had not been announced for the CM’s post, many have avoided
voting for the DMK. (CSDS Lokniti pre-poll survey) Alagiri, another son of
Karunanidhi, was dismissed from the DMK in 2014 owing to rivalry with Stalin.
He has since then been making statements against the DMK, even claiming
neutrality in the 2016 Assembly elections. His workers have allegedly been
working to make the party loses power in the Madurai belt, a region considered
to be his bastion. Despite performing well in the 2016 elections in the rest of
Tamil Nadu (39.7% vote share), the DMK has suffered in Madurai (35.225%) due to
Alagiri’s ouster.

The dharma of coalitions

A characteristic feature of
victorious parties in the Tamil Nadu assembly elections are coalitions: ADMK’s coalition with Congress, PMK, CPM and CPI in
2001 and DMK’s coalition with the same parties in 2006 had ensured their
respective victories. In 2011, ADMK could form a government without a coalition, and hence it broke off its alliance
with the DMDK (Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam) post elections. In 2016, the
ADMK contested in 227 seats out of 234, distributing the rest of the seats to
allies who contested under the two leaves symbol of the ADMK. The ADMK’s vote
share was 40.8% in 232 constituencies[4]. The
DMK alliance had gained 39.7% of the votes; however, the DMK’s vote share in
the 176 seats that it contested was 41.05%, slightly more than the ADMK’s
performance. Allies have been a significant cause of reducing the DMK
alliance’s vote share – the Congress won only 8 of the 41 seats that it
contested. According to surveys, even traditional Congress supporters did not
vote for the DMK-Congress alliance. DMK allying with other smaller parties
might have resulted in a different electoral outcome. [5]

The
People’s Welfare Front (PWF), a coalition of DMDK (led by actor-politician
Vijayakanth), CPI, CPI (M), and VCK (a Dalit party) aimed to form a strong to the
Dravidian parties. DMDK’s victory in 29 seats out of 41 in 2011 made no effect
in this election as the alliance failed to win even one seat. Lack of funds has
been a leading cause attributed to the
loss; while other contestants spent Rs 5-10 crores in each constituency, the
PWF contestants couldn’t spend more than Rs 40 lakhs.[6] The election commission
does not allow more than Rs 28 lakh to be spent by a candidate for assembly
elections, which brings us to the issue of cash-for-votes.[7]

Cash
for votes

After the resounding DMK win in 2009 by-poll in
Thirumangalam (Madurai district), there were widespread allegations of the
party buying votes for cash. Each voter was supposedly given five thousand
rupees through newspapers and milk delivery systems, forcing many to receive
money. The ‘Thirumangalam model’ of cash for votes has since then gained much
notoriety among the Election Commission. In 2016, more than 100 crores of
unaccounted money was seized, which was
believed to be meant for distribution among the public. In Aravakurichi and
East Thanjavur constituencies alone, the Election Commission seized large sums
of cash a few days before the elections. Hence, elections have not been
conducted in those constituencies as of June 2016.

Casting the vote or voting the caste?

Parties like Puthiya
Tamizhagam (PT), Viduthalai
Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK) (both are SC welfare parties) and the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK – an OBC-Vanniyar[8]
interest based party) failed to win a single seat in 2016. Voters appear to
have avoided caste-based parties openly
and instead opted for the Dravidian parties (ADMK and DMK) which express a
pan-Tamil identity. However, the Dravidian parties are not caste-neutral – candidates fielded in a
constituency mostly belong to the dominant caste of that region, thereby
splitting the votes of the caste. Moreover, many important positions in the DMK
and ADMK are filled by dominant OBC castes (including Vanniyars); some token
positions are given for Dalits.[9] Violence
against Dalits is continually silenced to keep the OBC vote banks intact.[10] Hence,
the Dravidian parties themselves work under caste influence. Ironically, they brand
the PMK (accused of inciting violence against Dalits), PT and VCK (Dalit
parties) together as playing caste-based
politics. The caste factor in Tamil Nadu’s politics is rarely brought to the
limelight because of the assumption that an anti-Brahmin movement before
independence has driven caste identities
underground. However, this is not the reality.

Conclusion

It is true that Tamil Nadu has largely bucked the
national trend in terms of the party
system. However, what binds the political processes of Tamil Nadu to the Indian
state’s processes is the concealed but important role of caste and community in
elections. Additionally, large scale cash distribution takes place during
campaigns. The cash and caste model of
mobilization have resulted in the
hegemony of the Dravidian parties. Hence, stable subaltern formations or even
alternative governments have become a remote possibility in the state.

*Sambhavi Ganesh is a intern at CPPR. The views expressed by the author is personal.

Friday, June 24, 2016

With the city
population growing there is an increasing pressure on the existing
infrastructure like housing, health, transportation etc. which fails to cater
to the demand, demanding an increase in the infrastructural capacity of the
city. Along with these infrastructural deficiencies, the growing cities face
much more serious problems in terms of waste management and sanitation
facilities. In India, the onus of waste management lies with the local bodies
as per the 73rd and 74th Constitutional amendments. In spite of coming up with
various waste management plans, the local bodies are not able to address the
problem efficiently; two of the reasons being: lack of citizens' participation
and a centralised waste management plan by the urban local bodies.

The 73rd and 74th
amendment are meant to facilitate a decentralised governance structure
empowering the local bodies to improve service delivery and programme
implementation at the local level. It is necessary that the local governments
understand the objective of this transfer of powers and adopt to further
decentralisation and participatory approach by involving the citizens to
address various concerns like waste management and making them accountable for
the waste they generate, in order to meet the desired results.

Waste generators
should be made to own the responsibility of managing the waste they produce,
this is the only way to minimise the waste to be taken out of the city and at
the same time making the citizens realise and minimise the amount of waste they
produce. An effective system of decentralised processing of waste needs to be
set up in the cities under the guidance of waste management experts keeping in
mind the geographical and climatic condition of the city. The existing
governance structure can be used optimally with the Councillor playing a major
role by initiating this participatory process with the help of Resident
Associations in his/her ward for monitoring and for ensuring that the guidelines
issued are adhered to by the citizens.

The Municipalities
and Municipal Corporations are to play a major role in incentivizing the
individual property owners, housing societies and commercial complexes to
process their waste at the source by incorporating bio-methanation or
vermicomposting at the site, by making provisions like giving them rebate in
their property tax as few other local bodies have done. Also, the urban local
bodies can explore the possibilities of decentralised waste-to-energy plants within
the city limits and use the energy generated from the same for street lighting.
Cities like Pune and Solapur have been able to set up waste-to-energy plants which
produce electricity using bio-methanation technology, with slurry being used to
make organic compost and sold as a fertilizer. Countries like Sweden have less
than one percent of their waste in landfills, almost fifty percent is recycled
and the rest fifty percent converted to energy(Plante). Indian cities
should aim for a similar situation while stressing on decentralized processing
plants. Also, a push by the urban local bodies under the context of Smart City
Mission, for similar ‘green’ waste management techniques would open
opportunities for entrepreneurs to invest in the Research and Development and
explore the area of ‘waste management’ as a ‘business opportunity’.

With the
increasing urban-rural continuum and migration, it is the need of the hour that
the elected representatives of the urban local bodies initiate a citizen-led
participatory process to address the waste management issue, with the urban
local bodies focusing on capacity building and coming out with clear guidelines
with respect to penalties and its collection mechanism in case of violation and
incentives for decentralised processing. Citizens should be viewed as starting
point in the waste management systems as they are the waste generators. Unless
until citizens adopt the philosophy of minimum generation, reuse, recycle and
then process whatever possible at source before sending to landfill, a stark
change in the present scenario would be difficult. Large scale impactful
awareness programmes are important in order to impart this philosophy and boot active
citizens’ participation. Clean Chennai an initiative by Corporation of Chennai
has used videos and social media effectively in their awareness drive along
with a website giving status of waste management in city like detailing the
vermicomposting units, bio-methanation plants etc. in the city, enlightening
the citizens about the issue and integrating them in the process.

Till citizens
remain external to the waste management system, it would be difficult for them
to understand the gravity of the problem. Only their involvement, active
participation and making them accountable would help in dealing with the solid
waste management issue; with technology and best practices around the world
reengineered according to the needs of different Indian cities.

*Mugdha Ghaisas is a intern at CPPR. The views expressed by the author is personal.