Is God Necessary For Morality?

That was the topic of a debate between philosophers William Lane Craig and Shelly Kagan (via Andrew Moon). It’s an important question that goes to the heart of both religion and morality. But, as R. Aharon Lichtenstein remarked in a related context, “this particular query is a studded minefield, every key term an ill-defined booby trap.” The Craig-Kagan debate, particularly Kagan’s closing argument, helped me put my finger on a key point I didn’t fully appreciate before.
Andrew summarizes the intuition underlying Craig’s position, as “[i]f there is no God or afterlife, then life loses its significance.” Craig writes, in Reasonable Faith, as Andrew excerpts, if there’s no God, “Mankind is a doomed race in a dying universe.”

Mankind is thus no more significant than a swarm of mosquitoes or a barnyard of pigs, for their end is all the same. The same blind cosmic process that coughed them up in the first place will eventually swallow them all again.

And if life is insignificant, the argument continues, then my actions are similarly insignificant. Kagan’s response, nicely articulated in his closing, is this:

It seems to me that one essential point of disagreement between Craig and me is something that I asked about several times. It’s . . . the move from the thought that, without theism, then our actions don’t have eternal cosmic significance, to the conclusion that, therefore, without theism our actions don’t have significance – objective, moral significance. That just seems to me to be a mistake. It seems to me that if I love somebody, the reality of that loving relationship is valuable, of real value, of genuine objective value, and it’s not in any way threatened by the fact that I will die, my wife will die, my children will die, and eventually the universe will come to an end. The fact that billions and billions of years from now, it’s all going to be the same doesn’t mean it’s all the same now.

Andrew puts his finger on Kagan’s key objection. Kagan challenges the proposition that “If x does not have eternal, cosmic moral significance, then x does not have objective, moral significance.” Craig’s argument can be fairly paraphrased as follows:

(1) Morality only makes sense where our actions have eternal, cosmic significance;
(2) Only theism can provide such significance; therefore
(3) Theism is necessary for morality.

Kagan, along with many atheists, rejects (1). The problem is that (1) is far more robust than it initially appears and ultimately assumes, rather than proves, the conclusion here. The assertion that morality is inextricably tied to cosmic significance assumes a very specific notion of morality. It’s a morality that views our lives as a crucial part of an unfolding narrative, beginning with Creation and culminating with Redemption, in which we were placed in this world to seek out our Creator, to obey Him, imitate Him, and cleave to Him. I’m sympathetic to this view of morality, as I’ve discussed before. But it’s a deeply religious view, not a neutral premise by which one can prove the relationship between theism and morality. It incorporates God into what it means to be good.

In its place, Kagan and atheists generally are free to adopt one of a variety of conceptions of morality. Is God necessary for morality? No, not if by “necessary,” you mean that the atheist can’t account for rightness and goodness some other way; of course, he can. He can ground virtue in empathy, or maximizing utility, or duty. But here’s the point I appreciate more fully after listening to Kagan. The atheist’s morality won’t include cleaving to God among its virtues, and that renders it a radically different kind of morality.

What’s so frustrating about the Craig-Kagan debate, and the dozens of iterations occurring every day on blogs, in college dorms, and in philosophy seminars, is that, at some level, each side uses the same term to mean something very different. Is God necessary for morality? I think morality is independent of the divine command, as Plato argued in The Euthyphro but I also think that morality, at its core, is about imitating and cleaving to God. So, yes, God is necessary for morality. What that really means, though, is that God is necessary for a religious conception of morality, a point which would be obvious if it weren’t so often obscured by imprecise language.

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11 Responses

But, as R. Aharon Lichtenstein remarked in a related context, “this particular query is a studded minefield, every key term an ill-defined booby trap.”

That’s exactly it. Even when everyone is arguing or disagreeing in good faith, no two people mean exactly the same thing when they say “morality” or even “God.” At the same time, I think believers rarely make this argument in good faith, anyway. It’s usually an attack on atheism rather than an attempt to understand it. It’s the difference between musing, “Hmm, that atheist is a moral person, I wonder how he does it?” and simply insisting that atheists cannot have morals, all evidence to the contrary.

JA, you’re talking about something different. The Craig-Kagan debate (btw, you should watch it; it’s very good) isn’t about whether morality requires belief in God, but whether it requires the existence of God.

And let’s not slander “believers”. There’s plenty of bad faith to go around (there are several good puns to be made here but it’s Friday afternoon and I’m tired).

JA, you’re talking about something different. The Craig-Kagan debate (btw, you should watch it; it’s very good) isn’t about whether morality requires belief in God, but whether it requires the existence of God.

Yeah, but it doesn’t really pass the laugh test, does it? It’s a word game, like the ontological argument.

And let’s not slander “believers”. There’s plenty of bad faith to go around (there are several good puns to be made here but it’s Friday afternoon and I’m tired).

I meant specifically w/r/t the atheism-moralism discussion, not in general. However, I also don’t want to imply that “good faith” is evenly distributed. I don’t believe that.

Hi David,
I guess I don’t see why this comes down to differences in the definition of morality. It seems that their views are plain enough–if I asked whether there was good reason for me to make sacrifices for others in a godless universe, Kagan would say that there is and Craig would say that there isn’t. Craig’s job was to show that there’s no sense to be made of any moral notions in a godless universe and showing that some moral notions don’t make sense without god (e.g., eternal significance) couldn’t possibly accomplish that.

On its face, the proposition that sentient creatures would not be moral patients in a godless universe and merit some non-instrumental concern is outrageous. The proposition that no rational creature should care about moral patients in a godless universe seems equally so.

Clayton, Craig and Kagan have very different reasons for, say “mak[ing] sacrifices for others” in the first place. For theists, morality is inextricably tied to imitatio dei or similar doctrines. On that view, of course moral notions don’t make sense in a godless universe (I’d go further and argue that nothing would make sense in a godless universe, but that’s a topic for another post).

Suppose, for example, that you’re a Singer-style utilitarian. Does morality make sense in a world devoid of any suffering?Well no, not really, at least for you. But, in my example, it’s not morality per se that no longer makes sense, but rather your view of it. I know the analogy isn’t perfect but my sense is that something similar is going on here.

I agree that there are theists that think what you’ve suggested (all seems a stretch, perhaps), but I don’t see why this matters. Look, Kantians think that the truth of true moral claims has to do with the categorical imperative and consequentialists think that the truth of true moral claims has to do with the maximization of utility. That they disagree about what makes moral claims true does not mean that the meaning they attach to “ought” differed. If it did, Kantians and consequentialists couldn’t even so much as disagree when they argued about how animals ought to be treated. Intuitively, they do disagree.

If this disagreement about what makes moral claims true does not generate a situation in which two parties mean different things by “ought” and talk past one another, I guess I don’t see why the disagreement between Kagan and Craig would generate a situation in which “each side uses the same term to mean something very different”.

Suppose you ask Kagan and Craig “Would you have a categorical reason to assist a small child in a godless universe?” If Kagan says “Yes” and Craig says “No”, it certainly seems like they disagree in spite of their differing conceptions of what gives us reasons to act. And, I might add, anyone who says “No” here seems badly confused.

Clayton,
You’re obviously right that Kagan and Craig disagree about more than semantics. But I still don’t think their disagreement is strictly about whether God is necessary for morality, at least not as the question has been understood in this context. Or rather, the specific disagreement stems from a more general (and fundamental) disagreement about what morality is.

Let’s reframe the question. Can one fully account for all moral data without reference to God? No theist can answer “yes” insofar as theism presumably attaches a moral component to religious beliefs and acts. In other words, theism entails that obedience to God is intrinsically good. Do you think that’s the same question Craig and Kagan debated? I don’t think so but I’m still working out my thoughts on this.