The articles and essays in this blog range from the short to the long. Many of the posts are also introductory (i.e., educational) in nature; though, even when introductory, they still include additional commentary. Older material (dating back mainly to 2005) is being added to this blog over time.

Sunday, 31 May 2015

Wittgenstein on Doubt

Wittgenstein’s
case against scepticism (or at least against global scepticism) is
simple. We can't doubt without exempting some things from doubt. As
Wittgenstein himself puts it:

“The
questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on
which those [doubts] turn.

“That
is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations
that certain things are in deed not doubted…

“My
life consists in my being content to accept many things.”(On Certainty, ##341-4.)

To
put this at its simplest. Say that you're doubting a person’s
thesis in geology. You wouldn't, thereby, doubt the meanings of your
own words or the words of the person who's offering the geological
thesis. That would be semantic doubt; not geological doubt.

Similarly,
you wouldn't doubt that the geologist were a person rather than a
zombie or a machine. That would be a doubt about other minds; not a
doubt about, again, geology.

Even
if the other doubts aren't philosophical, they still needn't be
geological doubts. For example, you may doubt the geologist’s
honesty or why he's saying what he's saying. (You may doubt that you
put your underpants on. If you did, then perhaps you couldn't pay
attention.) Thus these doubts must be "properly ignored" (as
David Lewis put it).

What's
at the heart of these ‘exemptions’ is the ‘context’ in which
the doubt (or the exemption of doubt) takes place. As Wittgenstein
again puts it:

“Without
that context, the doubt itself makes no sense: ‘The game of
doubting itself presupposes certainty’; ‘A doubt without an end
is not even a doubt.’”(76, On Certainty, #115;
#625.)

If
one doubts everything, then there's no sense in doubting anything.
Doubt occurs in the context of non-doubt. For example, one thing one
can't doubt, according to Descartes, is that one is doubting. (Or one
can't doubt the meanings of one’s words or that one’s words mean
the same today as they did yesterday.) Even just psychologically
speaking one needs a context for one’s doubt.

The
Things We Cannot Doubt

The
important point to make about Wittgenstein’s position is not that
“there is some special class of privileged propositions that we
simply can’t doubt” (Timothy Chappell,
76). It isn’t a Cartesian or foundationalist position. The
propositions we mustn't doubt could be of (just about) any kind. The
point is, generally, there just has to be some propositions (of
whatever kind) that we mustn't doubt in order to get the ball rolling
(at it were). We can't start ex nihilo, as Descartes
ostensibly did. We must bounce off certain propositions which we
don't doubt. We can't, then, doubt literally everything (again, as
Descartes supposedly did).

What
we choose not to doubt (indeed what we choose to doubt) will depend
on our context. That will determine the nature of our doubts (or our
lack of doubt vis-à-vis particular propositions or possibilities).
Timothy Chappell gives some very basic, and non-philosophical,
examples of this. He writes:

“…
in each context,
there is a very great deal that is not in doubt: the existence of the
chessboard, the reliability of the atlas, the possibility of
generally getting shopping sums right. This background makes it
possible to have doubts, and possible (in principle) to resolve them.
Where there is no such background, says Wittgenstein, the doubt
itself makes no sense.” (77)

We
can create a table of what we can't doubt: (a); and what we can
doubt: (b):

1a)
The existence of the chessboard. 1b) The sincerity of our chess
opponent’s naivety.

2a)
The (general) reliability of the atlas. 2b) Whether or not the atlas
is up to date.

To
put the above another way. One couldn't doubt the sincerity of our
chess opponent’s naivety if before that we actually doubted the
existence of the chessboard. We wouldn't doubt whether or not our
atlas was up to date if we had already doubted its general
reliability. We wouldn't doubt our arithmetical skills during a
hangover if we had already doubted our skills in all contexts.

Not
only that: we can only resolve our lesser doubts if we simply
disregard the more global (or extreme) doubts which might have
proceeded them. That is, I can go ahead and win my chess opponent
only if I simply disregard the possibility of the chessboard simply
not existing in the first place.

Wittgenstein
also seems to say that total (or global) doubt simply “makes no
sense” because there needs to be a reason to doubt. If one doubts
everything, then there can be no reason to doubt – unless the act
of doubting (everything) is itself the reason (to doubt)! Perhaps the
sceptic would concede that senseless (according to Wittgenstein)
position!

Descartes’
Fallacy?

Chappell
offers us a logical argument against Descartes’ global or total
doubt. He argues that it rests on a fallacious argument. He writes:

“Descartes
– you could say – begins his philosophy by arguing that since any
of our beliefs might be false, therefore all of our beliefs might be
false. But this is a fallacious argument. (Compare: ‘Any of these
strangers might be the Scarlet Pimpernel; therefore every one of
these strangers might be the Scarlet Pimpernel.’) What is true of
any belief is not necessarily true of every belief. So – the claim
would be – Descartes’ system rests on a fallacy (the ‘any/all
fallacy’, as it is sometimes called.)” (77)

In
fact Chappell's argument does seem to follow. That is, “if any of
our beliefs might be false, therefore all of our beliefs might be
false” (77). It isn't saying that they are false if one is false;
but that all of them might be if one is (found to be) false. However,
perhaps that doesn’t follow logically. In that case, how does it
follow?

One
belief (or “any” belief) being false doesn't entail every belief
being false; or even their possibly being false. Though doesn’t it leave
open that possibility? The analogy with the Scarlet Pimpernel doesn't
work because, by definition, only one person can be him.
There's nothing strange about saying that every (or all) our beliefs
might be false - or even that they are false. Not all our beliefs
need to be numerically identical; though there can only be one other
person who is numerically identical with the Scarlet Pimpernel. So
“any of these strangers might be the Scarlet Pimpernel; therefore
every one of these strangers might be the Scarlet Pimpernel” isn't
the same as the Cartesian example at all! Two beliefs may both be
false; though they needn't be identical beliefs. However, if there
were two people who were the Scarlet Pimpernel, they would need to be
identical – indeed numerically identical.

The
Language Game of Scepticism

Wittgenstein
brings in his notion of language games to make sense of doubt (or
global doubt). Again, his argument against doubt is simple. That
argument is that philosophical or sceptical doubts simply doesn't
arise in any of our language games (outside philosophy!); therefore
we should ignore them! Chappell writes:

“The
trouble with crazy sceptical hypotheses, according to Wittgenstein,
is that they don’t crop up in any of the various language games
that make up the texture of ordinary life in the world. That is why
it doesn’t make sense to discuss them.”(78)

That
is, “crazy sceptical hypotheses” don’t have any context. If
they have no context (outside philosophy!), then “it doesn’t make
sense to discuss them” (78). However, the septic (or philosopher)
may just say:

So
what! I don’t care if scepticism has no ‘context’ or of there's
no sceptical ‘language game’. What I'm saying may still be
legitimate and even true! Why can’t scepticism (or philosophy
generally) be a language game itself?

After
all, philosophy is a language game (if we insist on using
Wittgenstein's words) which has been played for over two
thousand years. And scepticism itself has been an important and
influential language game in our culture generally. What better
example of a language game could you have?

In
any case, does scepticism only exist in the language game of
philosophy? What about the many conspiracy theories that are so much
a part of culture in the U.K and the U.S? These theories can be deemed
to be sceptical in nature – after all, they distrust the truths of
the “Establishment” or the “status quo”; just as the
philosophical sceptics did (in part).

In
addition, shouldn’t a Wittgensteinian say that the very fact that
that “crazy sceptical hypotheses” have been discussed at all
means that they must have been so in one (or various) language games?
Every discourse, crazy or sane, needs its own language game. Wasn’t
that part of Wittgenstein’s point about language games?

Despite
saying all that, Chappell writes that “the sceptic isn’t playing
any legitimate language game in his discourse, and so is talking
nonsense” (78). Who says he isn’t playing a language game? Who
says that if he is, that his language game isn't ‘legitimate’? Is
it because it's not the language game (or language) of the ordinary
man speaking ‘ordinary language’? The sceptic may again say:

So
what! Why should I care about ordinary language or the ordinary man?

So
I’m not sure why - or how - Wittgenstein excluded scepticism from all
language games or denied that it is a legitimate language game.
Chappell too appears to agree with this position against
Wittgenstein’s chauvinism against the sceptical language game.
He writes:

“…
since the
sceptic’s discourse makes sense, it must be part of a
Wittgensteinian language game – a particular form of human
linguistic activity with its own rules – called the ‘scepticism
game’.”(78)

Perhaps
Wittgenstein might have replied:

But
that’s where you're wrong! The sceptic’s discourse doesn't make
sense. It's metaphysical and therefore meaningless. It's meaningless
precisely because it's not ordinary language. (It doesn't use
accepted terms in the way that we use them in everyday life.)
Therefore the sceptic’s discourse, again, doesn't make sense. It's
nonsense.

It's
certainly true that sceptical “linguistic activity” does indeed
have “its own rules”. Indeed it can hardly not do. And because it
does, it must also be a bona fide language game. However, it
just happened to be a language game that Wittgenstein didn't like.
(Just as William P. Alston –
in his paper 'Yes,
Virginia, There Is a Real World' - likes religious language
games; though he doesn't like the language games of 'relativism' or
‘scientism’.) If we truly believe in Wittgensteinian language
games (that is, in their existence and autonomy), then we simply
can't pick and choose which ones we accept and which ones we reject.
If it's a “human linguistic activity with its own rules” (78),
then it's a language game (whether or not we like it or agree with
its beliefs or theories). Indeed, according to the theory of language
games, it's irrelevant if you or I (who belong to other language
games) agree or disagree with language games (to which we don’t
belong). After all, all language games - almost by definition - are
autonomous and thus beyond the criticisms of other language games.
That is the truly relativistic aspect of Wittgensteinian languages
games; despite the fact that Wittgenstein himself and many others
mightn't have liked the relativist language game itself.