This paper proposes a new, stronger version of the cluster theory of proper names. It introduces a meta-identifying rule that can establish a cluster's main descriptions and explain how they must be satisfied in order to allow the application of a proper name. At the same time, it preserves some main insights of the causal-historical view. With the resulting rule we can not only give a more detailed reply to the counter-examples to descriptivism, but also explain the informative contents of (...) proper names and why they are rigid designators in contrast with descriptions.1. (shrink)

In this paper an improved formulation of the classical tripartite view of knowledge is proposed and defended. This formulation solves Gettier's problem by making explicit what is concealed by the symbolic version of the tripartite definition, namely, the perspectival context in which concrete knowledge claims are evaluated.

In this paper the relevance of so-called "propositional knowledge" is at first compared witho ther forms of knowledge. Secondly,the traditional and standard definition of propositional knowledge as justified true belief is discussed and defended against its most relevant objections. The third and main focus of this paper is a discussion of Gettier's objection to the tradicional definition and some answers to it,with the purpose of developing a more elaborate version of the traditional definition, one which makes it immune to counter-examples, (...) such as those of the Gettier type. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false PT-BR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabela normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-language:EN-US;} Freud explains not only the neurotic symptoms and dreams as products of the primary process; works of art are also products of it. Althought being the product of a primary process can’t be a sufficient condition for the identification of an (...) artwork, it can be conceived as a necessary condition of it; a condition that works as well in the creation of artworks as in its correct apprehension by us. (shrink)

In this paper is developed a reconstructive analysis of the conditions for both utterances constative and performative. These conditions were not presented by Austin (in that way), but we must deal with them, if we want that the distinction works. Under the light of this analysis is shown -against Austin -no compelling ground for the rejection of the distinction.

The following paper contains a new refutation of the skeptical argument concerning our knowledge of the external world. The central idea is that the argument fails because it presupposes ambiguous attributions of reality. Once these ambiguities are identified, they make the argument either trivial or equivocal. Differently from others, this refutation does not lead us to undesired results.

Este artigo trata do problema da epistemologia do mental. Co-mo é possível nosso conhecimento de nossos conteúdos fenomenais, como é possível nosso conhecimento dos conteúdos fenomenais de ou-tras mentes? A resposta consiste no regresso a velhas idéias, como a do conhecimento de outras mentes por analogia e de nosso conhecimento por introspecção de nossas próprias mentes, embora colocando-os den-tro de um referencial teórico e crítico mais sofisticado.This paper deals with the epistemological problem of the knowledge of the mental. How is (...) it possible our knowledge of the phe-nomenal contents of other minds? The answer is to regress to old ideas, like that of the knowledge of other minds by analogy and our knowledge by introspection concerning our own minds, although setting them within a more sophisticated theoretic and critical background. (shrink)

Scholars working in the field of Graeco-Arabic Neoplatonism often discuss the role Porphyry, the editor of Plotinus, must be credited with in the formation of the Arabic Plotinian corpus. A note in this corpus apparently suggests that Porphyry provided a commentary to the so-called Theology of Aristotle, i.e., parts of some treatises of Enneads IV-VI. Consequently, Porphyry has been considered as responsible for the (sometimes relevant) doctrinal shifts which affect the Arabic Plotinian paraphrase with respect to the original text. This (...) article aims at submitting this hypothesis to trial on a specific doctrinal point where Porphyry parts company with Plotinus: the relationship between the Demiurgic Intellect and World Soul. The ancient doxographical sources testify that Porphyry, in his conviction to be in agreement with Plotinus, in fact parted company with him in so far as he merged the World Soul into the Demiurgic Intellect, while Plotinus always kept them apart. There are in the Enneads some baffling passages where the role of Intellect as the Demiurge of the sensible world is not clearly distinguishable from the role of World Soul. Notwithstanding that, these passages in the Arabic paraphrase do not bear any trace of the characteristically Porphyrian merging of World Soul into Intellect. The Arabic paraphrase of Plotinus text and its Arabic tradition. (shrink)