The
petitioner, Cynthia Marie Clark, appeals an order of the
Circuit Court (Quigley, J.) dismissing her petition
to adopt the four-year-old child, A.D. We affirm.

The
following facts were found by the trial court, relate the
contents of documents submitted as part of the appellate
record, or are undisputed. The petitioner and the child are
not related. In November 2014, when the child was
approximately two months old, the New Hampshire Division for
Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) removed her from the
custody of her mother. The child was placed with the
petitioner to provide foster care. DCYF filed a neglect
petition against the child's biological parents, and,
according to the petitioner and apparently not disputed by
DCYF, in December 2014, the parents were adjudicated to have
neglected the child. Legal custody of the child was awarded
to DCYF.

In
April 2016, the child was reunited with her mother with whom
she resided until December 2016. During that time, the
petitioner sometimes babysat the child. Pursuant to court
orders, the child's father was allowed to have only
supervised visitation with the child; those visits were to be
arranged through, and supervised by, a parent aide. However,
unbeknownst to DCYF, while babysitting the child, the
petitioner allowed the child's father to visit and stay
overnight.

In
September, the child's father informed the petitioner
that he believed that the child was not safe with the mother
and that he wanted to be reunited with the child. Although
the petitioner, as a social worker, was a mandatory reporter,
she did not contact DCYF about the father's safety
concerns. Rather, unbeknownst to DCYF, she began a personal
relationship with the father who, at the time, was 19 while
the petitioner was 47 years old. Text messages between the
petitioner and the child's father indicate that he was a
regular visitor to the petitioner's home and that he was
involved in her personal life. In one message, the
child's father told the petitioner that he "want[ed]
. . . a future" with her, that he loved her, and that he
planned to "have a baby and get married" to her.

In
December, the child was removed from her mother's care
and was again placed with the petitioner for foster care. A
permanency hearing in the parents' ongoing neglect case
was scheduled to take place in March 2017. Shortly before it
took place, DCYF learned of the relationship between the
petitioner and the child's father. DCYF informed the
court, and the court ordered that the child be removed from
the petitioner's care and placed with another foster
family. The child was placed with another foster family that
day.

In June
2017, approximately three months after the child was removed
from her care and before the parental rights of the
child's parents had been terminated, the petitioner filed
a petition to adopt the child. Her petition was held in
abeyance pending the termination of the parental rights of
the child's parents, which occurred in December 2017.
After the parents' parental rights were terminated, DCYF
became the child's legal guardian. See RSA
170-C:11, II (2014).

In
January 2018, the court ordered a home study to be submitted,
as required by RSA 170-B:18 (Supp. 2018). DCYF objected,
asserting that the petitioner lacks "standing to file
for adoption" because she is not related to the child
and because, as of January 2018, it had been approximately
ten and one-half months since the child had resided with her.
DCYF further asserted that the petitioner had "failed to
obtain the surrenders required by RSA 170-B:5," and that
DCYF did "not agree to surrender its legal rights as the
legal guardian over [the child] and [would] not be executing
a surrender." DCYF contended that the petitioner's
adoption of the child would not be in the child's best
interest. In response, the petitioner filed a copy of a home
study that had been conducted in 2014, when she was first
seeking to become a foster parent.

The
court held two hearings. At the first hearing in June 2018,
it heard arguments on standing. Thereafter, it allowed the
parties to file memoranda on that issue. At the second
hearing in September 2018, the court informed the parties
that it would allow them to argue the standing issue, and
then, if it deferred that issue or ruled that the petitioner
had standing, it would allow them to present evidence on
whether the petitioner's adoption of the child was in the
child's best interest. Although the petitioner's
counsel stated that she thought the hearing had been noticed
"for the issue of standing," she acknowledged that
she had brought witnesses and was "ready to argue . . .
everything." She further acknowledged that she had
brought to the hearing "five copies" of all of her
exhibits. Following argument, the court deferred ruling on
the standing issue and allowed the parties to present their
evidence regarding whether the adoption was in the
child's best interest.

In
November, the trial court dismissed the petitioner's
petition to adopt the child on the ground that the petitioner
lacks standing. The court observed that the child had never
been placed with the petitioner "for the purposes of
adoption," that she had been removed from the
petitioner's care "for cause," and that the
child had not been in the petitioner's care and custody
"for a year and a half." The petitioner
unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. Thereafter, the
petitioner asked the court to stay any adoption of the child.
In granting the stay, the court observed that "[t]here
is another petition to adopt [the child] that has been filed
by prospective adoptive parents with the consent of
DCYF," and that DCYF "intends to surrender any
legal rights it has prior to the petition being
considered." This appeal followed.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;On
appeal, the petitioner first argues that the trial court
erred by dismissing her adoption petition on the ground that
she lacks standing. When, as in this case, a motion to
dismiss does not contest the sufficiency of the
petitioner&#39;s legal claim, but instead challenges the
petitioner&#39;s standing to sue, the trial court must look
beyond the allegations and determine, based upon the facts,
whether the petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated a right
to claim relief. In the Matter of Chrestensen &
Pearson, 172 N.H. ___, ___ (decided March 8, 2019) (slip
...

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