The opinion of the court was delivered by: A. Richard Caputo, United States District Judge.

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiffs brought the present § 1983 action on July 9, 1999,
alleging that Defendants deprived them of their constitutionally
protected rights by conspiring to terminate Plaintiffs' lease of a parking
garage owned by the City of Scranton ("the city"). The second amended
complaint contains substantive and procedural due process claims, an
equal protection claim, and a claim for breach of contract under
Pennsylvania law. (Doc. 45.) On December 7, 1999, this court denied the
motion to dismiss of Defendant Boyd Hughes, holding that Plaintiffs had
properly alleged that Hughes had participated in the wrongdoing and that
he had acted under color of state law. (Memorandum and Order, Doc. 33.)
Hughes subsequently moved for summary judgment on all four of Plaintiffs'
claims, a motion which the other defendants then incorporated into their
own motion for summary judgment. (Docs. 51, 57.)*fn1 Because the court
concludes that Defendants' termination of the lease was not a breach of
contract and thus not a violation of due process, and because Plaintiffs
have failed to produce sufficient evidence of arbitrarily disparate
treatment by the governmental defendants, Defendants' motion for summary
judgment will be granted.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiff Anthony Rinaldi is the sole shareholder of Scranton Life
Realty Company ("Scranton Life"), which has offices in Scranton,
Pennsylvania. (Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, Doc. 64 ¶
2.) On September 11, 1989, Scranton Life sold certain properties to the
city in lieu of condemnation, namely, a multi-story commercial and
parking garage building located on Adams Avenue and a three story
commercial building located on Lackawanna Avenue. (See Agreement of
Sale, Document 69, Exhibit J ¶ 1.) Paragraph four of the sale
agreement states that "[t]he purchase price is $1,350,000 (the `Purchase
Price')." (Id. ¶ 4.) The following paragraph of the agreement
requires the city, upon purchasing the property, to lease the parking
garage building to Adams Parking, Inc., an entity wholly owned by
Rinaldi, "for a term of five (5) years with five (5) five (5) year
options, at first year rent [sic] $3,850.00 per month, on the condition
that [the building] continue to be operated as a public parking garage."
(Id. ¶ 5.) Rent increases were tied to increases in the consumer
price index. (Id.)

Adams Parking challenged the condemnation in state court. The Court of
Common Pleas of Lackawanna County upheld the condemnation, rejecting
Plaintiffs' contention that the SRA's determination of blight was made
arbitrarily and capriciously and in bad faith. (Opinion and Order of
June 22, 1999, Doc. 53, Exhibit D at 19.) On appeal, the Commonwealth
Court affirmed the trial court, stating:

A review of the record as a whole including the
extensive testimony decribing the blight determination
and the Garage's condition, supports the finding that
the Authority acted in conformance with the law and
not in bad faith or in an arbitrary and capricious
manner. The Court notes also that the lease between
the City and Appellant contained a termination
clause, which became operative once the Authority
acquired title to the condemned property.

(December 15, 1999 Memorandum Opinion, Doc. 53, Exhibit E at 6.)

The instant suit was filed by Plaintiffs in July of 1999, after the
decision of the Court of Common Pleas but prior to the Commonwealth
Court's affirmance. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conspired to
deprive them of their property interests in the parking garage for
various personal, political and economic reasons. (See Doc. 45 ¶¶
26-45.) For example, Plaintiffs' claim that the personal animosity of
SRA attorney Boyd Hughes was revealed when he allegedly said "F___ Tony
Rinaldi" to Defendant Parnell Joyce, Director of the Scranton Office of
Economic and Community Development. (See Rinaldi Aff., Doc. 69 ¶
23.)

For their part, Defendants acknowledged in oral argument that they
acted in concert with respect to the parking garage. (Tr. of Oral
Argument, Doc. 80 at 33.) However, they deny that such action constitutes
a "conspiracy" motivated by improper personal or political ends. (See,
e.g., Answer of All Defendants Except Boyd Hughes, Doc. 47 ¶ 29;
Answer of Hughes, Doc. 46 ¶ 29.) Rather, Defendants aver that the
parking garage matter was simply part of a redevelopment project which,
like many such projects, is a joint venture by state, local and private
entities. (See generally Doc. 80 at 16-20.)

II. Analysis

Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits,
if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Where there is no material fact in dispute, the moving
party need only establish that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Where, however, there is a disputed issue of material fact, summary
judgment will lie only if the factual dispute is not a genuine one, that
is, if the evidence adduced by the parties is such that no reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party under the governing
evidentiary standard. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248-53, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

With regard to the standing issue, the court concludes that Anthony
Rinaldi does not have standing to bring any of the claims in this case.
He is not a party to the city's sale agreement with Scranton Life, nor to
its lease agreement with Adams Parking. His interest is that of a
shareholder in both corporations, and as such he has no standing to
advance the claims of either one. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. V. Alcan
Aluminium Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 336, 110 S.Ct. 661, 665, 107 L.Ed.2d 696
(1990) (the shareholder standing rule prohibits shareholders from
initiating actions ...

Our website includes the first part of the main text of the court's opinion.
To read the entire case, you must purchase the decision for download. With purchase,
you also receive any available docket numbers, case citations or footnotes, dissents
and concurrences that accompany the decision.
Docket numbers and/or citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a
legal proceeding. Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision. If the document contains a simple affirmation or denial without discussion,
there may not be additional text.

Buy This Entire Record For
$7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.