We begin with a discussion of ORS
107.104.� Oregon
case law has long recognized a presumption in favor of enforcing marital
dissolution agreements.� As the Supreme Court explained even before ORS 107.104
was enacted:

"The parties' own resolution of their dispute should be
accorded great weight. �In all cases of dissolution the court exercises full
equity powers. ORS 107.405. �Where parties have foregone their opportunity to
litigate disputes and have chosen instead to enter into an agreement their
reliance on the agreement can be presumed."

McDonnal and McDonnal, 293 Or 772, 779, 652 P2d 1247
(1982).�

The legislature more recently enacted
ORS 107.104 in order to overturn Webber v. Olsen, 330 Or 189, 998 P2d
666 (2000), in which the Supreme Court had declined to enforce as a contract an
agreement embodied in a stipulated judgment of dissolution. �Grossman and
Grossman, 338 Or 99, 107 n 4, 106 P3d 618 (2005).� Accordingly, as the Supreme
Court has recognized, "ORS 107.104(1)(a) announced a state policy of
encouraging settlement of dissolution and similar cases."� Id.�

"(b) �For courts to enforce the terms of
settlements described in subsection (2) of this section to the fullest extent
possible, except when to do so would violate the law or would clearly
contravene public policy.

"(2) �In a suit for marital * * *
dissolution * * * , the court may enforce the terms set forth in a stipulated
judgment signed by the parties, a judgment resulting from a settlement on the
record or a judgment incorporating a marital settlement agreement:

"(a) �As contract terms using contract
remedies;

"(b) �By imposing any remedy available to
enforce a judgment, including but not limited to contempt; or

"(c) �By any combination of the provisions
of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection."

(Emphasis added.)� See also ORS 107.135(15) (granting the
court similar enforcement power for modification of dissolution agreements).

The
question here is whether the parties' stipulated dissolution judgment can be
enforced without violating the law or contravening public policy.� ORS
107.104(1)(b).� Father argues that, insofar as the original
stipulated judgment provides for support after the twins turn 21, it exceeds
the authority of the court to award support under ORS 107.108.� As we will
explain, even assuming that the court's ability to award support under ORS
107.108 is so limited, the question before us is whether the court may enforce
an agreement to do what the court could not otherwise order.� Even if the court
could not award such support in the first instance (a question we do not
decide), such a limitation on the court's authority would not establish that an
agreement to provide such support violates the law or contravenes public
policy.� Because we conclude that an agreement to provide child support after
the child turns 21 neither violates the law nor contravenes public policy, we
reverse the modification order.

We
begin by examining the statutory basis for child support awards.� ORS
107.105(1)(c) provides that, whenever the court enters a judgment of marital
dissolution, it "may provide in the judgment * * * [f]or the support of
the children of the marriage by the parties."��However, "[t]he court is not required
to order support for any minor child who has become self-supporting,
emancipated or married or who has ceased to attend school after becoming 18
years of age."� Id.

Father
contends that ORS 107.108 thus contains the limits of the court's authority to
award child support to a child after the child turns 18.� There are several
problems with that argument.� First, under ORS 107.105, a court "may"
order child support but "is not required" to award support to a child
who is 18 or older "who has ceased to attend school."� Second, ORS
107.108(1) authorizes a court to award support to a "child attending
school" who is under age 21, but does not explicitly prohibit awards of
support in other circumstances.�

In all events, even assuming, although
not deciding, that a court may not award child support to a child older than 18
except as provided under ORS 107.108, the statute neither forbids the parties
from agreeing to such support nor states any public policy against doing so.�
Accordingly, the parties' agreement to do so here is enforceable under ORS
107.104.

The fact that the agreement contains
a definition of a "child attending school" that varies from the
definition in ORS 107.108 does not, by itself, establish that the agreement's
provisions violate the law or clearly contravene public policy.� Even before
the passage of ORS 107.104, we upheld agreements that required less stringent
requirements for change of circumstances sufficient to modify support awards
than that applied in ORS 107.135.�� See, e.g., Eidlin and Eidlin,
140 Or App 479, 483-84, 916 P2d 338 (1996); Hearn and Hearn, 128 Or App
259, 264-66, 875 P2d 508 (1994).� As we explained in Eidlin, "in
the absence of adverse public policy considerations, parties can make it easier
to obtain a modification by agreeing to additional grounds therefor, but their
stipulations cannot remove the court's authority to modify a spousal support
award on the bases that are articulated in ORS 107.135."� By contrast, we
have found that an agreement cannot grant the court a power explicitly
withheld by statute.�See, e.g., Hutchinson and Hutchinson,
187 Or App 733, 744-47, 69 P3d 815 (2003) (holding that an agreement for
spousal support modification could not provide for retroactive modification to
a date before the filing of the husband's motion, where the applicable statute
expressly forbade modification of support that had already accrued).�

ORS 107.108 does not forbid payment of child support beyond
the age of 21; rather the parties agreed here to a more generous support
award.� That agreement is enforceable under ORS 107.104.�