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Discussing cables
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S E C R E T KABUL 003324
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SRAP, S/SCT, EEB, SCA/RA, and SCA/A
DEPT PASS AID/ASIA BUREAU
TREASURY FOR A/S DAVID COHEN and TFFC - BRIAN GRANT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2019
TAGS: EFINEINVKTFNPRELAF
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP REQUEST -- RESOURCING EFFORTS TO DISMANTLE THE NEW
ANSARI HAWALA NETWORK AND OTHER ILLICIT FINANCING THREATS
REF: KABUL 2791
Classified By: CDDEA Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).
¶1. (S) As discussed in reftel, information strongly suggests
Afghanistan's New Ansari hawala network is facilitating bribes and
other wide-scale illicit cash transfers for corrupt Afghan officials
and is providing illicit financial services for narco-traffickers,
insurgents, and criminals through an array of front companies in
Afghanistan and the UAE.
¶2. (S) Headquartered in Kabul, the New Ansari hawala network has
connections to Dubai and other global financial markets. Law
enforcement and other components in Mission Afghanistan and ISAF have
been investigating New Ansari and briefed Washington agencies in a
September 8 SVTC. As noted in ref, moving forward against New Ansari
requires an interagency approach here in country as well as in
Washington. Such efforts will need to include better organizing and
resourcing USG efforts to identify and disrupt financial linkages in
Afghanistan and in key regional financial hubs.
¶3. (S) Embassy would appreciate a response to the requests for
additional resources/support contained in reftel. These include the
need to fully staff the Afghan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) -- the
total number of positions required is 49, but only 22 of those
positions are filled. Moreover, a higher percentage of those slots
should be filled with more senior and experienced interagency
analysts and at least one public corruption prosecutor. The ATFC
also urgently requires access to translators who can accurately and
quickly process an increasing amount of wire intercept information,
including complex technical and financial records. In addition, the
current split in the ATFC between Bagram Airfield and Kabul should be
minimized. To integrate the ATFC better into broader intelligence
analysis efforts, it would be advisable to establish a lead base of
operations in Kabul. The ATFC would continue to forward deploy
liaison staff at each regional command to ensure country-wide
coverage.
¶4. (C) Mission appreciates Washington agencies' consideration and
support of these requests. We look forward to a rapid response.
EIKENBERRY