Justice reinvestment in Oklahoma : analysis and policy framework.

Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 1
Justice Reinvestment
in Oklahoma
Analysis and Policy Framework
Background
IN JANUARY 2011, GOVERNOR MARY FALLIN,
Speaker of the House Kris Steele, Senate Presi-dent
Pro Tempore Brian Bingman, and Supreme
Court Justice James Edmondson expressed interest in
employing a justice reinvestment strategy, which is a
data-driven approach to contain corrections spending
and reinvest a portion of the savings generated in strat-egies
that will increase public safety. These state lead-ers
wrote to the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA),
a division of the U.S. Department of Justice, and the
Pew Center on the States (Pew) seeking intensive tech-nical
assistance, which was approved by BJA and Pew
in May 2011. As a result, the Council of State Govern-ments
Justice Center (CSG Justice Center) —the tech-nical
assistance provider working in partnership with
BJA and Pew —launched a comprehensive analysis of
the state ’s criminal justice system.
To guide the CSG Justice Center ’s work, state lead-ers
established a bipartisan, inter-branch working
group co-chaired by Speaker Kris Steele (R-Shawnee)
and Don Millican, Chairman of the Oklahoma Chris-tian
University Board of Trustees. Other members
of the working group include state lawmakers, state
agency directors, members of the judiciary, district
attorneys, and other stakeholders in the criminal jus-
􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀂽􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁄-
sions between June 2011 and January 2012 to review
data analyses and discuss policy options that would
address the challenges facing the state ’s criminal jus-tice
system.
The CSG Justice Center collected and analyzed vast
amounts of state criminal justice, mental health, and
substance abuse data, drawing on information systems
maintained by the Oklahoma Department of Correc-tions
(OKDOC), the Oklahoma Department of Mental
Health and Substance Abuse Services (ODMHSAS),
the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI),
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀀲􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃���􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇-
eral Bureau of Investigation ’s Uniform Crime Reports.
In total, the Justice Center analyzed over 700,000 indi-vidual
records across these information systems.
In addition to these quantitative analyses, the CSG
Justice Center convened focus groups and meetings
with district attorneys (DAs), the defense bar, behav-ioral
health and substance abuse treatment providers,
faith and community leaders, victim advocates and
􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀏􀀃
law enforcement executives, members of the business
community, and others. Between June 2011 and Janu-ary
2012, the Justice Center convened over 100 in-per-son
meetings with nearly 350 individuals.
This report summarizes the CSG Justice Center ’s
􀂽􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁄����􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁈-
work to address key issues that emerged from the
quantitative and qualitative analyses. Policy options
are organized around three strategies: 1) reducing vio-lent
crime, 2) improving supervision of people on pro-bation,
and 3) containing state spending on prisons.
January 2012
2 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
1. High rate of violent crime;; public safety
resources are stretched beyond their limits
􀂇􀀃 Violent index crime in Oklahoma is higher than
national violent index crime. Three of the four larg-
􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁕􀁅􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀲􀁎􀁏􀁄􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁄􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀂽􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃
increases in homicides and robberies over the past
decade. At the same time, the per capita number of
law enforcement staff in these cities declined.
􀂇􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃
to local governments are stretched further by recent
reductions in mental health services and crisis stabi-lization
beds. Police today spend considerably more
time transporting individuals in mental health crisis
to an appropriate facility than they did just 2 years
ago.
􀂇􀀃 Prosecutor-based victim/witness services are limited
because of scarce resources, impacting the involve-ment
of victims, including victims of violent crime,
in the criminal justice system and the prosecution
of crime.
2. Inadequate supervision and treatment
􀂇􀀃 Fewer and fewer people exiting prison have some
form of post-release supervision.
􀂇􀀃 Risk and need assessments are not used consistently
to inform sentencing and non-OKDOC supervision
decisions.
􀂇􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃
quickly and appropriately when someone violates a
condition of supervision.
􀂇􀀃 Treatment is frequently unavailable to people who
are on supervision and battling addiction, even
though compliance with supervision conditions
often depends on participation in such treatment.
3. Growing prison population
􀂇􀀃 As Oklahoma ’s prison population has increased over
the past 10 years, so has state spending on this bud-get
item; this growth is expected to continue.
􀂇􀀃Many people charged with felony drug possession
are diverted to community-based supervision and
services that are more effective than prison in chang-ing
behavior. But drug possession is still the most
common felony offense among people admitted
to Oklahoma state prisons. When it comes to how
supervision and treatment should be used for people
convicted of low-level drug felonies, state laws are
silent.
Summary of Challenges
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 3
Strategies
1. Fight Crime and
Enhance Public Safety
2. Strengthen
Supervision
3. Contain
Prison Costs
Policies 1(A): Help local law
enforcement prevent violent
crime with state funding for
technology, overtime, crime
analysis, and community
partnerships.
1(B): Prioritize and fund
additional community-­
based psychiatric crisis
stabilization beds
throughout the state.
1(C): Allocate dedicated
􀁙􀁨􀁡􀁗􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁘􀁔􀁖􀁛􀀃􀀷􀀴􀂺􀁦􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃
for the purpose of enhancing
victim/witness services and
securing more convictions.
2(A): Require that every
prison sentence include
a period of post-­release
supervision of no less than 9
months.
2(B): Provide probation
with additional resources to
strengthen supervision.
2(C): Conduct a presentence
risk and need screen on all
people admitted to county
jails who have been charged
with a felony.
2(D): Utilize swift and
certain intermediate
sanctions when people
violate conditions of
supervision.
2(E): Improve access to
treatment for high-­risk/
high-­need people sentenced
to supervision.
3(A): Provide a graduated
approach to sentencing
people convicted of drug
possession based on a
person’s risk of reoffending,
criminal history, and
substance abuse.
3(B): Require people
convicted of the most
serious and violent offenses
to serve 85 percent of their
sentence in prison before
they are able to apply
banked good behavior and/
or achievement credits.
3(C): Permit a longer period
after conviction for judges
to modify sentences.
Justice Reinvestment Policy Framework
4 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
Objectives
Unless policymakers take action, the state ’s high violent
crime rate will likely remain unchanged, thousands of
people will continue being released from prison unsu-pervised
each year, and state spending on prisons will
increase by more than a quarter billion dollars over the
next decade. The policy framework below outlines the
following objectives to avoid this situation:
􀂇􀀃 Target a 10 percent reduction in violent crime by
2016 by providing law enforcement with the tools
and resources necessary to use data-driven strategies
for increasing public safety, making additional crisis
stabilization beds available, and improving victim/
witness services;
􀂇􀀃 Strengthen supervision by requiring a period of
supervision to follow every term of incarceration and
increasing resources available to reduce recidivism
while holding offenders accountable; and,
􀂇􀀃Manage prison growth to contain spending by slow-ing
the population increase currently projected.
Savings
As a package, the policies described in this report
􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀂽􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀲􀁎􀁏􀁄-
homa. By averting growth in the state prison popula-
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀂽􀁖􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁜􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀀋􀀩􀀼􀀌􀀃 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀩􀀼􀀃 􀀕􀀓􀀕􀀔􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
policy framework avoids an estimated $249 million in
additional spending that would otherwise be needed to
accommodate prison population growth.
Reinvestment
To achieve these outcomes and generate the savings
described above, Oklahoma must reinvest $110 mil-lion
in their criminal justice system between FY 2013
and FY 2021. Additional details are listed below.
Projected Impact of Policy Framework
$0
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
$300 Millions
Figure 2: Comparison of spending and proposed
savings/reinvestment (FY 2012–FY 2021)
$259 M
FY2012–FY2021
Increase in spending
associated with
growth in prison
population
$249 M
Total Savings
$110 M
Reinvestment in crime
reduction, victim
services, treatment,
and supervision
to hold offenders
accountable
Current Savings/
Reinvestment
Figure 1: Reinvestment Details
POLICY FY 2013
FY 2014 &
FUTURE
TOTAL
REINVESTMENT:
FY 2013–FY 2021
1(A): Violent Crime
Reduction
$2 M $5 M $42 M
1(C): Victim/
Witness Services
$500 K $1 M $8.5 M
2(B): Probation
Improvement
$1 M $2 M $17 M
2(C): Felony Jail
Screen
$500 K $1 M $8.5 M
2(E): Substance
Abuse Treatment
$2 M $4 M $34 M
TOTAL $6 M $13 M $110 M
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 5
Figure 3: Full Impact of Policies Will Avert Growth of More than 2,000
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021
+2,148
25,011
27,159
+2,561
Baseline Change
2012–2021
Policy Impact
-­2,109
Averted Growth
Fiscal Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Actual 25,011 25,853 26,163 26,667 26,755 27,378 26,692
Model with no
policy changes
27,159 27,569 27,887 28,232 28,534 28,798 29,072 29,266 29,521 29,720
All policy
changes
27,159 26,690 26,102 26,006 26,362 26,694 26,923 27,185 27,409 27,611
Reinvestment $6 M $13 M $13 M $13 M $13 M $13 M $13 M $13 M $13 M
Assumptions
The following analysis projects the policy framework ’s
impact on an offender base of 26,692 —the prison pop-ulation
at the start of FY 2012.1 The model assumes
policy implementation begins in FY 2013 and will be
completely phased in by FY 2015. The base prison pop-ulation
projection demonstrates the accumulation of
the 85 percent offender population (per the effects of
current policy), but holds other admission types and
jail backlogs static. Cost savings and proposed levels of
reinvestment are based on projected savings as calcu-lated
by the CSG Justice Center after consultation with
OKDOC.
1. This number includes people awaiting transfer to OKDOC.
6 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
Violent index crime is high throughout the
state;; homicide and robbery rates increased
in many large urban areas.
􀂇􀀃 The violent crime rate in Oklahoma declined slightly,
less than four percent, between 2000 and 2010; dur-ing
the same period 40 states experienced decreases,
which drove the national violent crime rate down 20
percent.2
􀂇􀀃 In 2010, Oklahoma had the 12th highest rate of vio-lent
crime in the United States, with 480 reported
crimes per 100,000 residents. Oklahoma ranked
higher than Texas, with 450, and Kansas, with 369,
but lower than Arkansas, with 505.3
􀂇􀀃 Oklahoma ’s robbery rate increased 15 percent since
2000; nationally, the robbery rate has decreased 18
percent.4 The 91 percent increase in Tulsa ’s robbery
rate drove the statewide increase.
􀂇􀀃 In 2010, the cities of Tulsa and Oklahoma City
accounted for 56 percent of the state ’s total murders,
yet only 26 percent of the state ’s population. Tulsa ’s
murder rate increased 67 percent between 2000 and
2010, and Oklahoma City ’s increased by 25 percent,
whereas the national rate dropped 13 percent.5
Law enforcement staff per capita declined in
most major Oklahoma cities from 2000 to
2010, while violent crime rose.
􀂇􀀃 􀀲􀁎􀁏􀁄􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁄􀀃 􀀦􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀯􀁄􀁚􀁗􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀂽􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃
increases in their violent crime rates between 2000
and 2010: Lawton ’s violent crime rate increased by
40 percent and Oklahoma City ’s rate increased by
18 percent. Meanwhile, these two cities experienced
considerable declines in the number of sworn law
􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁓􀁌􀁗􀁄􀀑6
2. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Crime in the United States, 2000–2010. Retrieved September 29, 2011 from
www.fbi.gov/about-­us/cjis/ucr/crime-­in-­the-­u.s/2010/crime-­in-­the-­
u.s.-­2010.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Crime in the United States, 2000–2010. Retrieved September 29, 2011 from
www.fbi.gov/about-­us/cjis/ucr/crime-­in-­the-­u.s/2010/crime-­in-­the-­
u.s.-­2010.
Figure 4: 3 out of 4 major cities fought rising
crime with few law enforcement staff8
2000–2010
Percent
Change in:
Violent
Crime Rate
&
Law
Enforcement
Staffing Per
Capita
+
–
Oklahoma
City
17%
11%
Tulsa
2% 8%
Lawton
28%
10%
Norman
43%
18%
􀂇􀀃 Cities in Oklahoma whose number of law enforce-ment
per capita either remained unchanged or
increased did not experience the same spike in
crime. Tulsa ’s violent crime rate decreased by one
percent over the last decade and their law enforce-
􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁓􀁌􀁗􀁄􀀃 􀁉􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃 􀀱􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁓􀁌􀁗􀁄􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃
percent through a citywide bond and saw a 41 per-cent
decrease in the violent crime rate.7
􀂇􀀃 According to police chiefs throughout the state,
budget shortages have diminished the ability of law
enforcement agencies to develop and deploy proac-tive
strategies to reduce and prevent violent crime in
their communities. With the reduction in staff and
resources, most police agencies in Oklahoma focus
Challenge 1: High rate of violent crime;;
public safety resources stretched beyond their limits
Oklahoma’s violent crime rate is high and has remained relatively unchanged since 2000;; during the same period,
􀁩􀁜􀁢􀁟􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁖􀁥􀁜􀁠􀁘􀀃􀁛􀁔􀁦􀀃􀁗􀁘􀁖􀁟􀁜􀁡􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁦􀁜􀁚􀁡􀁜􀃭􀁖􀁔􀁡􀁧􀁟􀁬􀀃􀁡􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀁔􀁟􀁟􀁬􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁜􀁡􀀃􀁠􀁢􀁦􀁧􀀃􀁦􀁧􀁔􀁧􀁘􀁦􀀡
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 7
on responding to 911 calls and providing basic police
services. The deployment of specialized units has
􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀞􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃
reassigned to patrol duty.9
􀂇􀀃 􀀲􀁎􀁏􀁄􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁄􀀃 􀀦􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀀳􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀀋􀀲􀀮􀀦􀀳􀀧􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽-
cials reported that personnel reductions created sig-
􀁑􀁌􀂽􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁆��􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃
presence in their jurisdiction, particularly given the
large area – 621 square miles – that the city spans.10
A 2009 OKCPD manpower study found OKCPD,
with 1.68 sworn staff per square mile, had the lowest
􀁖􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁉􀂽􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃
a group of 10 similar cities. Nashville, Tennessee, fol-lowed
Oklahoma City with 2.63, while Denver, Colo-rado,
had the highest at 10.03 sworn staff per square
mile.11
Targeted violent crime reduction strategies
have demonstrated positive results,
but funding for such strategies is either
intermittent, diminishing, or both.
􀂇􀀃 Despite successes, federal funding for local law
enforcement, such as grants through Byrne Justice
Assistance, Community Oriented Policing Services,
and Weed and Seed, is declining, and Oklahoma has
yet to identify funding streams to replace these pro-grams.
12 In 2000, Oklahoma City received $1,412,262
in local law enforcement grants; in 2011, $445,379.
This is a 68 percent decrease in funding.13
􀂇􀀃 􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀂽􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈-
gies they would like to implement to lower crime in
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀀲􀀮􀀦􀀳􀀧􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃
collect a large amount of crime data that could be
used to pinpoint locations where criminal activity is
most likely to occur, but do not have enough crime
􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁜􀁝􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁄􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃
effectively.14
Since the number of crisis stabilization beds
for people with acute mental health needs
has decreased, law enforcement agencies
have had to dedicate more staff time and
dollars to transport individuals in mental
health crisis to an appropriate facility,
diverting already diminished police resources
from strategies most likely to reduce violent
crime.
􀂇􀀃 Law enforcement executives across the state reported
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃
to the transportation of people with mental illnesses
in crisis to appropriate crisis stabilization facilities.15
When local or regional facilities do not have avail-
􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈����􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
a facility with space, regardless of the geographical
distance from the point of origin. As a result, it is not
􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁖􀀃
multiple law enforcement jurisdictions, which in
turn reduces the availability of staff to perform basic
patrol functions, making the implementation of
􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀑􀀃
􀂇􀀃 Transporting individuals in crisis generates sig-
􀁑􀁌􀂽􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁐􀁅􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈���
departments for mileage, police departments remain
responsible for overtime expenses incurred.16 State
􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁄􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃
for mental health transports increased 45 percent
between FY 2009 and FY 2011.17
9. CSG Justice Center meetings and focus groups with approximately
20 chiefs of police from throughout the state (October, November, and
December 2011).
10. OKCPD Chief of Police Bill Citty, personal communication, August
23, 2011.
11. OKCPD, Management and Manpower Analysis, February 10, 2009.
12. Oklahoma City, in particular, has seen positive outcomes from
federally funded crime reduction strategies. For example, the city
faced a decade-­high 260 drive-­by shootings in 2005, but using federal
funding, OKCPD augmented gang-­intervention efforts, and the
number fell 63 percent to a decade-­low 97 in 2010 (OKCPD, Drive-­By
Comparison Memo 2002–2011).
13. OKCPD Chief of Police Bill Citty, personal communication,
December 2, 2011.
14. OKCPD Chief of Police Bill Citty, personal communication,
November 16, 2011.
15. CSG Justice Center meetings and focus groups with approximately
20 chiefs of police and 13 sheriffs (October, November, and December
2011).
16. Ibid.
17. David Wright (ODMHSAS), personal communication, December 8,
2011.
8 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
In focus groups across the state, law
􀁘􀁡􀁙􀁢􀁥􀁖􀁘􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁘􀁫􀁘􀁖􀁨􀁧􀁜􀁩􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁟􀁜􀁡􀁘􀀠􀁟􀁘􀁩􀁘􀁟􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀃
voiced the need for more state mental health
and addiction treatment facilities and crisis
stabilization beds.
􀂇􀀃 Cuts to the ODMHSAS budget required reductions
in the total number of mental health inpatient and
crisis beds across the state. In 2009, hard caps were
instituted at all crisis centers and hospitals. Prior to
these caps, facilities would accept patients regardless
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀀪􀁕􀁌􀁉􀂽􀁑􀀃 􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
Hospital in Oklahoma City had capacity of just under
150 beds at the start of 2009, yet often had a patient
count of 175 –200 on any given day. In 2008, the hos-pital
was over capacity 283 days out of the year. Since
the caps were instituted, patient admission is contin-gent
upon available bed space. If a facility lacks bed
space, law enforcement must transport an individual
to a facility with an available bed.18
􀂇􀀃 In 2008, a 15-bed treatment facility was closed in
Claremore, and in 2010, 12 beds were closed in Law-ton.
Consequently, these areas have little capacity to
provide crisis stabilization and inpatient treatment to
members of their local community.19
􀂇􀀃 Since 2008, there has been a loss of Medicaid-con-tracted
and private-pay psychiatric beds. The loss of
these beds is particularly noticeable in Tulsa, where
the total number of Medicaid-funded psychiatric
beds is disproportionately low compared to the popu-lation.
Additionally, in Oklahoma City, the University
of Oklahoma Medical Center closed its entire general
adult psychiatric unit.20
Some victims are not receiving services and
supports guaranteed to them under the
state constitution.
􀂇􀀃 The Victims Bill of Rights in Oklahoma ’s State Con-stitution
requires that victims be provided informa-
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂽􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃
return, victim impact statements, and speedy dis-position.
21 Many of these services are supposed to
be delivered or coordinated by victim witness staff
􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀧􀀤􀁖􀂶��􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃
Figure 5: Tulsa Police Department mental health transports22
CIMARRON TEXAS BEAVER HARPER
ELLIS
WOODS
WOODWARD
MAJOR ALFALFA
DEWEY
GRANT
GARFIELD
KINGFISHER
LOGAN
ROGER MILLS
BECKHAM
GREER KIOWA
CUSTER
WASHITA
BLAINE
CADDO
CANADIAN
GRADY HARMON
JACKSON
TILLMAN
COTTON
COMANCHE
STEPHENS
JEFFERSON
CLEVELAND
McCLAIN
OKLAHOMA
LINCOLN
POTTAWATOMIE
GARVIN
CARTER
LOVE
MURRAY
MARSHALL
JOHNSTON
BRYAN
PONTOTOC
SEMINOLE
CHOCTAW
McCURTAIN
ATOKA
PUSHMATAHA
HUGHES
COAL
PITTSBURG
LATIMER LEFLORE
HASKELL
McINTOSH
MUSKOGEE
OKMULGEE
CREEK
OKFUSKEE SEQUOYAH
WAGONER
CHEROKEE0
ADAIR
TULSA
KAY
NOBLE
PAYNE PAWNEE
OSAGE
WASHINGTON
NOWATA
ROGERS
CRAIG OTTAWA
MAYES
DELAWARE
Adult Inpatient/Crisis Stabilization Unit
434 mi
$450/$705 OT
Fort Supply ! 9
384 mi
$400/$650 OT
Clinton ! 10
382 mi
$405/$645 OT
Lawton ! 3
212 mi
$250/$402 OT
OKC ! 82
Tulsa PD
98 mi
$170/$250 OT
Muskogee ! 22
182 mi
$205/$350 OT
McAlester ! 11
250 mi
$300/$450 OT
Norman ! 43
180
Transports from Tulsa to Adult
Inpatient/Crisis Stabilization Units.
􀀸􀁔􀁖􀁛􀀃􀁧􀁥􀁔􀁡􀁦􀁣􀁢􀁥􀁧􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁤􀁨􀁜􀁥􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁧􀁪􀁢􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀡
Average:
229 miles round trip
$270–$425 in regular and OT pay
Roundtrip Distance
Regular/Overtime Cost
Location – # of Transports
18. ODMHSAS Commissioner Terri White, personal communication,
December 10, 2011.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Oklahoma Victims Bill of Rights. Retrieved from www.ok.gov/dac/
documents/Victims%20Bill%20of%20Rights.pdf.
22.Tulsa Police Department, personal communication, November 9,
2011. Analysis includes 1 year of data from 11/2010 to 10/2011;;
ODMHSAS, personal communication, November 30, 2011.
KEY
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 9
23. April Doshier, Oklahoma Victim Assistance Academy Needs
Assessment Report, June 30, 2009.
24. CSG Justice Center focus group with 24 victims, survivors, and
advocates, September 7, 2011.
25. Anthony Braga and David Weisburd, Policing Problem Places: Crime Hot
􀁆􀁣􀁢􀁧􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀀸􀃽􀁘􀁖􀁧􀁜􀁩􀁘􀀃􀁃􀁥􀁘􀁩􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀟􀀃2010.
26. 􀁈􀀡􀁆􀀡􀀃􀀷􀁘􀁣􀁔􀁥􀁧􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀟􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁃􀁥􀁢􀁚􀁥􀁔􀁠􀁦􀀟􀀃􀀵􀁨􀁥􀁘􀁔􀁨􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃
Justice Assistance. Intelligence-­Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture,
September 2005.
27. Anthony A. Braga and Christopher Winship, “What Can Cities Do
to Prevent Serious Youth Violence?” Criminal Justice Matters 75.1 (2009):
􀀦􀀨􀂵􀀦􀀪􀀡􀀃􀁈􀀡􀁆􀀡􀀃􀀷􀁘􀁣􀁔􀁥􀁧􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀟􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁃􀁥􀁢􀁚􀁥􀁔􀁠􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁁􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀁔􀁟􀀃
Institute of Justice, Reducing Gun Violence: The Boston Gun Project’s
􀁂􀁣􀁘􀁥􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁔􀁦􀁘􀃭􀁥􀁘􀀟􀀃September 2001.
􀂇􀀃 Less than half of crime victims surveyed in 2009
reported receiving some type of victim services (such
as explanation of court system, referral to victim ser-vices,
safety planning, and court preparation). Of
those, three-fourths of the services they described as
most helpful were those that were provided by vic-tim/
witness professionals.23
􀂇􀀃 Victims, survivors, and advocates who convened for
this project were unanimous in their assessment
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁉􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
demand for support of victims because of mounting
budget cuts over the past several years.24
Strategy 1: Fight crime and
enhance public safety
By 2016, reduce statewide violent index crime at least
10 percent by increasing resources available to law
􀁘􀁡􀁙􀁢􀁥􀁖􀁘􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀡
1(A): Help local law enforcement prevent
violent crime with state funding for
technology, overtime, crime analysis, and
community partnerships.
􀂇􀀃 Create a statewide competitive grant program that
encourages law enforcement agencies to deploy data-driven
strategies to reduce violent crime by at least
10 percent by 2016.
􀂇􀀃 Direct grant funding to activities that include over-time,
targeted policing strategies, the use of tech-nology
for crime prevention and problem solving,
improved crime analysis capabilities, and partner-ships
between law enforcement and community
agencies to reduce violent crime.
rationale: Research has found that targeted polic-ing
strategies such as placed-based “hot spot ” policing
that increase police presence in high crime areas can
help prevent and reduce crime.25􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁗􀁄􀀐􀁇􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈����􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁉􀂽􀁑􀁊􀀃
and resource allocation through crime analysis mod-els
like intelligence-led policing can produce similarly
positive results.26 Additionally, community engage-ment
programs that address the many facets of violent
crime, including youth crime and gang violence, are
making communities safer for citizens, especially chil-dren
and youth.27
1(B): Prioritize and fund additional
community-­based psychiatric crisis
stabilization beds throughout the state.
rationale: The development of additional com-munity-
based crisis stabilization beds throughout the
state of Oklahoma not only will improve outcomes for
people with acute mental health care needs who are
experiencing psychiatric crisis, but will also help law
enforcement agencies focus their limited resources
on those strategies most likely to reduce crime. Trans-porting
individuals who are a danger to themselves or
others is a critical function performed by law enforce-ment,
and as such, law enforcement should have local
resources available to meet this need.
1(C): Allocate dedicated funding to each DA’s
􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁙􀁢􀁥􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁣􀁨􀁥􀁣􀁢􀁦􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁖􀁥􀁘􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀟􀀃􀁘􀁡􀁛􀁔􀁡􀁖􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀟􀀃
or extending victim/witness services and
securing more convictions.
rationale: Dedicated funding is needed to ensure
that crime victims and witnesses receive the protection
accorded them by the state constitution. Support pro-vided
to victims and survivors enables them to navigate
the criminal justice system, serve as effective witnesses
in criminal cases, and access services that can help
them recover from their experiences with crime. Prose-cutors
who can provide victim/witness support are bet-ter
able to secure convictions. Victim/witness support
personnel arrange for witnesses ’ or victims ’ availabil-ity
to prosecutors, coordinate their court appearances,
assist with their preparation, explain court procedures
to them, make sure they understand their role in court
proceedings, and inform them about the status of their
cases.
10 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
No Supervision Probation Parole
3,396
3,060
1,655
4,352
3,440
761
2005 2010
More people in prison are completing their
sentence while incarcerated and returning
to the community without any post-­release
supervision. Many of these are the people
who are most likely to reoffend.
􀂇􀀃 The percentage of people released from prison with-out
supervision has steadily increased from 42 per-cent
in FY 2005 to 51 percent in FY 2010. Only 9
percent of people exiting prison in 2010 were released
to parole supervision. An additional 40 percent of
prison releases subsequently began a period of pro-bationary
supervision to complete a split sentence.28
􀂇􀀃 Thirty-four percent of people in prison eligible for
parole waived their right to a parole hearing in 2010
and opted to complete their sentence in prison
􀀋􀂳􀂾􀁄􀁗􀀐􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀂴􀀌􀀑29 Keenly aware that relatively little time
remains on their sentence, people who waive their
hearings take advantage of time served and cred-its
earned with good behavior and/or participation
programs. Consequently, they get out of prison only
a few weeks or months later than they would had they
received parole. Furthermore, by completing their
sentence in prison, these individuals are not subject
to parole. Accordingly, the narrow time difference
􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀂾􀁄􀁗􀀐􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁈􀁕-
vised release is having the unintended consequence
of people eluding parole.30 In focus groups with peo-ple
who have declined parole, it was clear that these
individuals had done the math; one person bluntly
said, doing time “is faster inside ” than doing time on
parole, since people on parole are not eligible to earn
time off their sentence for good behavior.31
􀂇􀀃 Oklahoma law prohibits probation (and therefore
split sentences) on third or subsequent felony con-victions.
As a result, people with a lengthy criminal
history who are most likely to reoffend are especially
likely to go from prison to the community without
any post-release supervision.
28. OKDOC, Exit Data for FY 2005–FY 2010.
29. OKDOC, personal communication, November 28, 2011.
30. CSG Justice Center focus group with eight offenders at Joseph Harp
Correctional Center, August 24, 2011.
31. Ibid.
32. OKDOC, The State of Corrections in Oklahoma: Fiscal Year 2010.
Retrieved from http://www.doc.state.ok.us/newsroom/
annuals/2010/annualreport2010.pdf.
Figure 6: More people are being released from
prison unsupervised32
51% released unsupervised in 2010
The number of offenders
released to parole
dropped in half
Challenge 2: Inadequate supervision and treatment
Many people exiting prison are released to no supervision, and they do not have access to treatment services
􀁡􀁘􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁞􀁘􀁘􀁣􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀁠􀀃􀁗􀁥􀁨􀁚􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁟􀁖􀁢􀁛􀁢􀁟􀀠􀁙􀁥􀁘􀁘􀀡
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 11
33. 􀁇􀁛􀁥􀁘􀁘􀀃􀁬􀁘􀁔􀁥􀀃􀁥􀁘􀀠􀁔􀁥􀁥􀁘􀁦􀁧􀀃􀁥􀁔􀁧􀁘􀀃􀁕􀁬􀀃􀁥􀁜􀁦􀁞􀀃􀁖􀁔􀁧􀁘􀁚􀁢􀁥􀁜􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁦􀀃􀁗􀁘􀃭􀁡􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁬􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀀿􀁆􀀼􀀠􀁅􀀡􀀃
􀁁􀀰􀀩􀀟􀀨􀀬􀀬􀀃􀀹􀁌􀀥􀀣􀀣􀀪􀀃􀁂􀀾􀀷􀁂􀀶􀀃􀁘􀁫􀁜􀁧􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀡􀀃􀁂􀀾􀀷􀁂􀀶􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁂􀁆􀀵􀀼􀀃􀁥􀁔􀁪􀀃􀁗􀁔􀁧􀁔􀀃􀃭􀁟􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃
2007 Prison Releases
34. OKDOC, Exit Data for FY 2005–FY 2010;; OSBI, Arrest History
for OKDOC FY 2007 Exits. This analysis used a 36-­month rearrest
recidivism rate and only allows each person to be counted once.
OSBI could only provide arrest data, not disposition or charge-­
level information;; therefore, it is unknown if the arrest was at
the misdemeanor or felony level, or if it led to reconviction or
reincarceration.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. CSG Justice Center focus group with 24 victims, survivors, and
advocates, September 7, 2011.
38. Suzanne McClain-­Atwood, email, October 7, 2011.
39. 􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀃􀀴􀁗􀁠􀁜􀁡􀁜􀁦􀁧􀁥􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁩􀁘􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀀶􀁢􀁨􀁥􀁧􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁖􀁔􀁟􀁘􀁡􀁗􀁔􀁥􀀃􀁬􀁘􀁔􀁥􀀃􀀛􀀶􀁌􀀜􀀃
2007–CY 2011 Disposition Data.
40. 3-­year rearrest rate by risk categories.
41.􀀃􀀴􀁗􀁠􀁜􀁡􀁜􀁦􀁧􀁥􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁩􀁘􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀀶􀁢􀁨􀁥􀁧􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀃􀀶􀁢􀁨􀁡􀁧􀁬􀀃􀀶􀁢􀁨􀁥􀁧􀀃
Records, FY2008–FY2011.
􀂇􀀃 Of those people returning to the community from
prison without post-release supervision in 2007, 43
percent were assessed as “high-risk. ” Sixty-three
percent of those high-risk offenders were rearrested
within 36 months of release, compared to 53 per-cent
of moderate-risk and 44 percent of low-risk
offenders.34
􀂇􀀃 In FY 2007, of the 3,677 people who returned to the
community from prison without post-release super-vision,
more than half (54 percent) were rearrested
in the 3-year period following their release.35 People
in this cohort of recidivists were rearrested for one
or more of the following offenses: 480 for statutorily
􀁇􀁈􀂽􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀞􀀃􀀔􀀏􀀓􀀕􀀛􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁘􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
1,890 for property crimes.36
􀂇􀀃 Victims, survivors of crime, and their advocates
expressed concern in focus groups about the increas-ing
number of people leaving prison with no post-release
supervision. They spoke in particular about
situations involving people returning to the com-munity
without post release supervision who are
especially likely to reoffend, predominantly in the
months immediately following their return to the
community.37
44%
Low Risk
Re-­Arrest
Rate
53%
Moderate Risk
Re-­Arrest Rate
63%
High Risk
Re-­Arrest Rate
Figure 7: High-­risk individuals released
from prison are more likely to be
rearrested within 3 years33
Since its inception, the number of people on
DA supervision has increased dramatically;;
in the meantime, the number of people
under probation supervision has decreased
􀁦􀁜􀁚􀁡􀁜􀃭􀁖􀁔􀁡􀁧􀁟􀁬􀀡􀀃
􀂇􀀃 During FY 2011, felony offenders made up 28 per-cent
of the 38,836 offenders on DA supervision.38
􀂇􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀛􀀏􀀃􀂽􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀲􀁎􀁏􀁄􀁋􀁒��􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖-
positions received a sentence of DA supervision, but
by 2011, the number increased to 39 percent of felony
dispositions. This trend contributed to the decrease
in the proportion of felony dispositions receiving a
probation sentence, which fell from 43 to 11 percent
during those 4 years.39
􀂇􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁘􀁏􀁖􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀧􀀤􀂶􀁖􀀃􀀲􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁈􀁏-
ony offenders in 2008: The program started with 46
felony offender admissions and grew rapidly to 1,042
admissions by 2010.40
Figure 8: In Oklahoma County, DA supervision
is replacing probation as the most common
form of supervision for felons41
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
2008 2009 2010 2011
229
2,063
566
1,947
+801%
-71%
DA Supervision
Probation
(DOC & Private)
12 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
42. Oklahoma DAs Council, personal communication, November 17, 2011.
Oklahoma’s Types of Community Supervision
Probation: DAs and judges use probation to sentence felony offenders to community supervision in lieu of prison.
They also use it as part of a split sentence to ensure supervision following release from prison. The state funds all
probation services administered by the OKDOC’s Division of Probation and Parole (P&P). P&P is responsible for the
􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁧􀁜􀃭􀁖􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀟􀀃􀁧􀁥􀁔􀁜􀁡􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀟􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁦􀁨􀁣􀁣􀁢􀁥􀁧􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁔􀁟􀁟􀀃􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁪􀁛􀁢􀀃􀁔􀁥􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁦􀁦􀁜􀁚􀁡􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁦􀁧􀁔􀁧􀁘􀂺􀁦􀀃􀁦􀁜􀁫􀀃􀁃􀀙􀁃􀀃􀁗􀁜􀁦􀁧􀁥􀁜􀁖􀁧􀁦􀀡􀀃
Parole: Release to parole supervision is a discretionary decision made by the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board
to ensure some period of post-­release community supervision before the person’s sentence is complete. The Pardon
􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁃􀁔􀁥􀁢􀁟􀁘􀀃􀀵􀁢􀁔􀁥􀁗􀀃􀁜􀁦􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁣􀁔􀁥􀁧􀀠􀁧􀁜􀁠􀁘􀀟􀀃􀃭􀁩􀁘􀀠􀁠􀁘􀁠􀁕􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁕􀁢􀁗􀁬􀀃􀁖􀁢􀁡􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁧􀁨􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀁔􀁟􀁟􀁬􀀃􀁖􀁛􀁔􀁥􀁚􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁪􀁜􀁧􀁛􀀃􀁠􀁔􀁞􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀃􀁣􀁔􀁥􀁢􀁟􀁘􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁖􀁢􀁠􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁗􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀁦􀀃
􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀀺􀁢􀁩􀁘􀁥􀁡􀁢􀁥􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀟􀀃􀁪􀁛􀁢􀀃􀁛􀁔􀁦􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀃭􀁡􀁔􀁟􀀃􀁦􀁔􀁬􀀃􀁜􀁡􀀃􀁪􀁛􀁘􀁧􀁛􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁣􀁘􀁥􀁦􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁜􀁦􀀃􀁣􀁔􀁥􀁢􀁟􀁘􀁗􀀡􀀃􀁃􀁔􀁥􀁢􀁟􀁘􀀟􀀃􀁟􀁜􀁞􀁘􀀃􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀟􀀃􀁜􀁦􀀃􀁙􀁨􀁡􀁗��􀁗􀀃
by the state and overseen by P&P.
DA Supervision: Instead of sentencing a person to a term of probation supervision administered by P&P, the court
may sentence a person to community supervision overseen by the local district attorney. This form of supervision
was created in 2005 through 22 O.S. § 991(d), although some DAs did not launch the program until some years
later. The extent to which DAs use this supervision program varies from one county to the next. People sentenced to
DA supervision pay fees to offset the costs of this program.
Drug Court: The Oklahoma Drug Court program is a court-­supervised and state-­funded substance abuse treatment
program that offers nonviolent, felony offenders an alternative to prison. People enter the program by pleading
􀁚􀁨􀁜􀁟􀁧􀁬􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁦􀁣􀁘􀁖􀁜􀃭􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁛􀁔􀁥􀁚􀁘􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁔􀁧􀀃􀁖􀁔􀁥􀁥􀁜􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁪􀁜􀁧􀁛􀀃􀁜􀁧􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁦􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁘􀁡���􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁜􀁡􀁖􀁔􀁥􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀡􀀃􀁈􀁣􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁦􀁨􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁦􀁦􀁙􀁨􀁟􀀃􀁖􀁢􀁠􀁣􀁟􀁘􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁧􀁥􀁘􀁔􀁧-­
ment program, the court dismisses the original charge. For repeated noncompliance with the program, however,
the court terminates participation in the program, remanding the person to prison where he or she serves the origi-­
nal sentence.
Community Sentencing: Oklahoma’s Community Sentencing program provides a community sanction as an alter-­
native to prison for felony offenders. According to state statute, an offender is eligible if he/she has been assessed
as moderate or high using a risk assessment and has a felony conviction. Community Sentencing is funded by the
􀁦􀁧􀁔􀁧􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁢􀁩􀁘􀁥􀁡􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁬􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁖􀁢􀁨􀁡􀁖􀁜􀁟􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁘􀁟􀁘􀁖􀁧􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁢􀁨􀁡􀁧��􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁜􀁔􀁟􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁧􀁜􀁭􀁘􀁡􀁦􀀡
Decisions made about whether someone
convicted of a crime is sentenced to
probation, DA supervision, drug court, or
prison are not informed by standardized
assessments, which objectively predict
the likelihood that the person will have
additional contact with the criminal justice
system.
􀂇􀀃 Sentencing decisions are not informed by an objec-tive
risk assessment because most people convicted
of a crime do not receive assessments prior to sen-tencing.
Without such information, people are
prescribed levels of punishment, supervision, and
programming that may not necessarily correspond
to their risk levels. As a result, key opportunities
to change the likelihood of someone committing
another offense are missed.
􀂇􀀃 People placed on OKDOC probation are given an
objective risk assessment within 45 days of sentenc-
􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁐􀁈􀁑���􀀃 􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁓􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀃
determine what strategies are most likely to be suc-cessful,
given the unique needs of the person under
his or her supervision.
􀂇􀀃 People sentenced to DA supervision are not sub-jected
to an objective risk assessment. Furthermore,
conversations with prosecutors indicated that the
􀁐􀁄􀁍􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀧􀀤􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
ensure the same levels of supervision as those pro-
􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀲􀀮􀀧􀀲􀀦􀀃􀀳􀀉􀀳􀀑􀀃
Accordingly, DA supervision may be inadequate for
high- or moderate-risk offenders.42
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 13
43. OKDOC P&P, 2006–2010 Exit Cohorts, Exit Cohort Less Deaths.
44. CSG Justice Center focus group with Central District Probation and
􀁃􀁔􀁥􀁢􀁟􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁁􀁢􀁩􀁘􀁠􀁕􀁘􀁥􀀃􀀤􀀩􀀟􀀃􀀥􀀣􀀤􀀤􀀡
45. Michael D. Spiegler and David C. Guevremont, Contemporary Behavior
Therapy, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2003.
46. OKDOC P&P, 2006–2010 Exit Cohorts. Exit Cohort Less Deaths —
This is a proportion of people who lived to complete probation.
47. CSG Justice Center, The National Summit on Justice Reinvestment and
Public Safety: Addressing Recidivism, Crime, and Corrections Spending, January
2011.
A shift to evidence-­based practices has
increased the effectiveness of OKDOC P&P,
but there remain aspects of P&P operations
that could be improved.
􀂇􀀃 􀀳􀀉􀀳􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀐􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆��􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃
into its supervision model in early 2006. Between
FY 2006 and FY 2010, completion rates for all cat-egories
of probationers increased, with high-risk
offenders completing 14 percent more frequently,
moderate-risk improving by 8 percent, and low-risk
by 2 percent.43
􀂇􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃 􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃
observed that the probation culture has changed
markedly since they adopted new, evidence-based
􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀲􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇-
ing risk and needs, and they are focused on changing
the behaviors of the person they are supervising, as
opposed to an exclusive focus on monitoring the per-son
’s compliance with the conditions of supervision.
Understanding Risk Assessment47
Risk assessment tools help users sort individuals into low-­, medium-­, and high-­risk groups. They are designed to
gauge the likelihood that an individual will come in contact with the criminal justice system, either through a new
arrest and conviction or re-­incarceration for violating the terms of supervision. They usually consist of 10 to 30
questions designed to ascertain an individual’s history of criminal behavior, attitudes and personality, and life cir-­
cumstances. Risk assessments can be administered at any time during a person’s contact with the criminal justice
􀁦􀁬􀁦􀁧􀁘􀁠􀂶􀁙􀁥􀁢􀁠􀀃􀃭􀁥􀁦􀁧􀀃􀁔􀁣􀁣􀁘􀁔􀁥􀁔􀁡􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁥􀁢􀁨􀁚􀁛􀀃􀁣􀁥􀁘􀁦􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁘􀁡􀁖􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀟􀀃􀁣􀁟􀁔􀁖􀁘􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀟􀀃􀁔􀁗􀁠􀁜􀁦􀁦􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁖􀁢􀁥􀁥����􀁖􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀁔􀁟􀀃􀁙􀁔􀁖􀁜􀁟-­
ity, the period prior to release, and post-­release supervision. They are similar to tools used by an insurance company
to rate risk: they predict the likelihood of future outcomes according to their analysis of past activities (e.g., crimi-­
nal history) and present conditions (such as behavioral health or addiction). Objective risk assessments have been
shown to be generally more reliable than any individual professional’s judgment. Too often, these judgments are no
more than “gut” reactions that vary from expert to expert on the same individual.
Figure 9: Completion Rates for Probation
Increased After OKDOC Implemented
Evidence-­Based Practices46
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Total Low Moderate High
10%
30%
50%
70%
90%
FY2006 February 1, 2006 FY2010
OKDOC began using EBP
+4% +2%
+8%
+14%
􀂇􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
reported that they typically conducted meetings with
high-risk offenders once or twice a month for 15 to
25 minutes per session.44 With as much as weeks
between visits, the response to violations may not be
timely.45
14 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
48. 􀀶􀁆􀀺􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀃􀁃􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁆􀁨􀁥􀁩􀁘􀁬􀀟􀀃􀁂􀁖􀁧􀁢􀁕􀁘􀁥􀀃
2011. The response rate was 58 percent, or 140 out of the 242
􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀃􀁖􀁨􀁥􀁥􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁟􀁬􀀃􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁂􀀾􀀷􀁂􀀶􀀃􀁃􀀙􀁃􀀃􀁣􀁔􀁬􀁥􀁢􀁟􀁟􀀡
49. OKDOC’s policy operation manual states that if jail time is the
recommended sanction, the sentencing judge must approve and sign a
form and the sheriff or jail administrator must stamp a copy. Retrieved
from www.doc.state.ok.us/Offtech/op161002.pdf.
50.􀀃􀀶􀁆􀀺􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀃􀁃􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁆􀁨􀁥􀁩􀁘􀁬􀀟􀀃􀁂􀁖􀁧􀁢􀁕􀁘􀁥􀀃
2011.
51. Ibid.
52. OKDOC’s policy operation manual states that if jail time is the
recommended sanction, the sentencing judge must approve and sign a
form and the sheriff or jail administrator must stamp a copy. Retrieved
from www.doc.state.ok.us/Offtech/op161002.pdf.
􀀴􀁖􀁖􀁢􀁥􀁗􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁦􀁨􀁥􀁩􀁘􀁬􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀃
conducted by the CSG Justice Center in
􀁂􀁖􀁧􀁢􀁕􀁘􀁥􀀃􀀥􀀣􀀤􀀤􀀟􀀃􀁜􀁡􀁦􀁨􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁜􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁦􀁢􀁨􀁥􀁖􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃
��􀁨􀁥􀁗􀁘􀁡􀁦􀁢􀁠􀁘􀀃􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁖􀁘􀁦􀁦􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁠􀁔􀁞􀁘􀀃􀁜􀁧􀀃􀁗􀁜􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁨􀁟􀁧􀀃􀁙􀁢􀁥􀀃
􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁦􀁣􀁢􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁤􀁨􀁜􀁖􀁞􀁟􀁬􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃
appropriately when someone violates a
condition of release.48
􀂇􀀃 􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁕􀁌􀁈􀂾􀁜􀀃
someone who violates a condition of release, this
option appears to be exercised infrequently. Fifty per-
􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁜􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀐
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀏���� 􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁍􀁄􀁌􀁏􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃
to use intermediate sanctions that they feel would be
timely and effective responses to violations of super-vision
conditions.49
􀂇􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃
intermediate sanction of jail in response to 10 per-cent
of supervision violations. Of the 140 respon-dents,
52 percent said they “never ” give jail time as
an intermediate sanction. The Tulsa Probation and
Parole District reported the highest use of jail as an
intermediate sanction: 13 percent of probation vio-lations
in Tulsa resulted in jail time; the Southwest
District responded to 5 percent of violations with jail
time, which was the lowest reported use of the six
􀀳􀀉􀀳􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀑50
􀂇􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀐􀂽􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁜􀁈􀁇􀀃
reported that capacity concerns in their district ’s jails
limited their use of jail time as a sanction. Nine per-cent
reported that this is “sometimes ” a concern and
47 percent reported that it is not a concern.51
Oklahoma has a statewide drug court
system, which was designed to meet national
standards and apply best practices, but as
with any program, there is always room for
improvement.
􀂇􀀃 ODMHSAS coordinates a system of 45 drug courts
that operate in 72 of Oklahoma ’s 77 counties. These
specialty courts promote accountability and recovery
from addiction for people who are convicted of cer-tain
low-level crimes and who have substance abuse
disorders. In FY 2010, Oklahoma drug courts had the
capacity to serve approximately 4,100 participants on
any given day. ODMHSAS spent $17 million in state
dollars to support these drug courts, which amounts
􀀹􀁜􀁚􀁨􀁥􀁘􀀃􀀤􀀣􀀭􀀃􀀴􀀃􀁦􀁨􀁥􀁩􀁘􀁬􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀃􀁜􀁡􀁗􀁜􀁖􀁔􀁧􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁔􀁧􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀁬􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁙􀁥􀁔􀁜􀁡􀀃
from using a sanction of jail due to jail capacity concerns52
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Central Northeast Southeast Northwest Southwest Tulsa
Yes Sometimes No
No
46%
Yes
45%
Sometimes
9%
Department-­wide Region
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 15
53. Ibid. Forty-­six percent of all state substance use treatment dollars
were dedicated to drug courts.
54. David Wright (ODMHSAS), personal communication, November 4,
2011.
55. National Drug Court Institute, Painting the Current Picture: A National
Report on Drug Courts and Other Problem-­Solving Court Programs in the United
􀁆􀁧􀁔􀁧􀁘􀁦􀀡 Retrieved November 18, 2011, from www.ndci.org/sites/
􀁗􀁘􀁙􀁔􀁨􀁟􀁧􀀢􀃭􀁟􀁘􀁦􀀢􀁡􀁔􀁗􀁖􀁣􀀢􀁃􀀶􀁃􀀘􀀥􀀣􀁅􀁘􀁣􀁢􀁥􀁧􀀘􀀥􀀣􀀹􀀼􀁁􀀴􀀿􀀡􀁃􀀷􀀹􀀡􀀃
56. David Wright (ODMHSAS), personal communication, November
30, 2011.
57. David Wright (ODMHSAS), personal communication, November 4,
2011.
58. ODMHSAS;; OSBI 2007 release and rearrest data;; OKDOC 2007
release data.
59. ODMHSAS;; OSBI 2007 releases rearrest data;; and OKDOC 2007
Release Data.
to almost half of all state substance abuse treatment
dollars appropriated in FY 2010 to treat people with
addictions who fall below 200 percent of the poverty
line.53
􀂇􀀃 The state ’s drug court graduation rate is consistent
with drug court graduation rates nationally. In 2008,
59 percent of total participants successfully com-pleted
the program.54 The same year, the average
graduation rate for all drug courts nationally was 57
percent.55
􀂇􀀃 A validated risk assessment tool is not utilized to pri-oritize
drug court resources for those people who are
most likely to reoffend and whose need for treatment
is most acute. The use of such a risk assessment
would ensure that high-risk offenders who would
􀁅􀁈􀁑􀁈􀂽􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁘􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒-
gram have the opportunity to participate.
􀂇􀀃 Currently, decisions about who is admitted to drug
court are based on the number of prior felony con-victions,
which is one of the best indicators of a
high-risk and -need offender. People admitted to
drug courts in Oklahoma in 2010 averaged two prior
felony convictions, but further analysis of this pool of
􀁓􀁄���􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀂾􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀘􀀙􀀜􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀛􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃
prior convictions.56
􀂇􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀛􀀏􀀃􀀲􀁎􀁏􀁄􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁘􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕-
minated, and sent to prison 31 percent of drug court
participants.57 Drug court failures often serve lengthy
terms of incarceration because they must serve the
sentence determined in the original plea agreement
based on the underlying charge.
􀁇􀁛􀁘􀁥􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁥􀁘􀀃􀁜􀁡􀁦􀁨􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁜􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁦􀁨􀁕􀁦􀁧􀁔􀁡􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁕􀁨􀁦􀁘􀀃
treatment resources available to people
under community supervision.
􀂇􀀃 ODMHSAS has limited funds to set aside each year
for substance abuse treatment services for people
in the community under supervision of the crimi-nal
justice system. How these dollars are allocated
among the hundreds of thousands of people on pro-bation,
parole, DA supervision, or some other form
of community corrections depends exclusively on
the person ’s health needs; risk of reoffense is not a
factor.58
Figure 11: People Receiving Treatment After Release From Prison in FY 2007
Were Less Likely to Be Rearrested59
7,196
Released in FY2007
Offenders not receiving treatment following release were 29% more likely to be rearrested
1,195
Treatment
6,001
No Treatment
710
Not
Rearrested
59%
485
Rearrest
41%
2,796
Not Rearrested
47%
3,205
Rearrested
53%
16 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
60. 􀀶􀁆􀀺􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀃􀁃􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁆􀁨􀁥􀁩􀁘􀁬􀀟􀀃􀁂􀁖􀁧􀁢􀁕􀁘􀁥􀀃
2011.
61. ODMHSAS Commissioner Terri White, personal communication,
December 10, 2011.
62. ODMHSAS, personal communication, November 23, 2011. Percent
change is based on rounded whole number percentages (as seen in
Figure 11) and therefore may not be exact.
􀂇􀀃 The availability of substance abuse treatment pro-grams
was rated as poor to fair by 62 percent of pro-
􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀑60
􀂇􀀃 􀀥􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀛􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁗􀁜􀀐􀂽􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅-
stance abuse treatment beds were lost due to bud-get
cuts. When a residential treatment bed is not
available, a person in need is placed on a waiting
list, which on any given day can exceed 600 Okla-homans.
61 While waiting, people under community
supervision may relapse.
􀂇􀀃 Offenders with a treatment need who are able to
access treatment services have a reduced likelihood
of rearrest: for those released from prison in FY
2007, people who did not receive treatment were 29
percent more likely to be rearrested in the 36 months
following release.62
Strategy 2: Strengthen
supervision
􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁨􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁖􀁜􀁗􀁜􀁩􀁜􀁦􀁠􀀃􀁔􀁠􀁢􀁡􀁚􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁢􀁦􀁘􀀃􀁠􀁢􀁦􀁧􀀃􀁟􀁜􀁞􀁘􀁟􀁬􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁢􀃽􀁘􀁡􀁗􀀃
by mandating supervision following prison and
􀁘􀁡􀁦􀁨􀁥􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀃􀁦􀁨􀁣􀁘􀁥􀁩􀁜􀁦􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁦􀁢􀁨􀁥􀁖􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁥􀁘􀀃􀁦􀁨􀃻􀁖􀁜􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁛􀁢􀁟􀁗􀀃
􀁢􀃽􀁘􀁡􀁗􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁖􀁖􀁢􀁨􀁡􀁧􀁔􀁕􀁟􀁘􀀡
2(A): Require that every prison sentence
include a period of post-­release supervision
of no less than 9 months.
rationale: This policy would ensure that people
who are at risk of reoffending, and who currently are
manipulating existing policies to avoid supervision
in the community once they leave prison, have some
form of post-release supervision.
2(B): Provide probation with additional
resources to strengthen supervision.
􀂇􀀃 Increase resources incrementally to ensure addi-
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁜􀀃
to supervise the growing number of people who will
have mandatory supervision terms following their
prison release.
􀂇􀀃 Design and implement a plan to increase the amount
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁒􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃
supervise who are most likely to reoffend.
rationale:􀀃􀀫􀁌􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈����􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃
free up more time for increased contact with people
􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀉􀀳􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
supervision is clearly differentiated based on risk level
and that resources are focused on high-risk offenders
whose behavior is most likely to change with supervi-sion
more intense than is currently provided.
2(C): Conduct a presentence risk and need
screen on all people admitted to county jails
who have been charged with a felony.
􀂇􀀃 Building on already existing screening efforts, con-duct
a screen on people charged with felony offenses
to ensure that objective information about a person ’s
risks and needs informs prosecutorial and sentenc-ing
decisions.
􀂇􀀃 Follow initial screening with an objective and vali-dated
risk assessment for those people who, through
the initial screening, appear to be at high risk of
reoffending.
􀂇􀀃 Provide professional development opportunities
to ensure that judges, DAs, and the defense bar
understand the risk and need assessment and how
it should be used.
rationale: This policy will help ensure DAs and
judges have information about a person ’s risks and
needs, which can guide their recommendations and
decisions about the most appropriate level of punish-ment,
supervision, and treatment. It also will ensure
that the state ’s resources are concentrated on those
people for whom they can make the greatest difference.
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 17
2(D): Utilize swift and certain intermediate
sanctions when people violate conditions of
supervision.
􀂇􀀃 􀀤􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁝􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀀃
court hearing, to certain probation violations with
sanctions that include up to 3 days in jail. Limit the
use of this jail sanction to a maximum of 6 days per
month. Permit probationers to waive their right to a
violation hearing.
􀂇􀀃 Ensure that DA supervision can impose an inter-mediate
sanction of jail on probationers, and trans-
􀁉􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀀲􀀮􀀧􀀲􀀦􀀃 􀀳􀀉􀀳􀀏􀀃 􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁖􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃
revoking their probation and sending them directly
to prison.
􀂇􀀃 Create an intermediate sanction facility (ISF) where
people whose probation is being revoked for the
􀂽􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁘􀁓􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀀙􀀃 􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁋􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃
policy shall apply only to those people who have not
absconded or been convicted of a new crime.
􀂇􀀃 Allow drug court participants to be sanctioned to the
ISF after committing serious violations of the condi-tions
of their program.
rationale: This policy would provide probation
􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀂾􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃
lack to ensure that responses to supervision violations
are swift and certain. Probation departments in both
Georgia and Hawaii have implemented similar poli-cies.
Researchers evaluating these policy changes have
found that the Georgia policy, which enables probation
􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀀃
court hearing, reduced by 70 percent the number of
days that people on probation spent in jail because
they violated a condition of supervision or because they
were awaiting a court hearing.63
2(E): Improve access to treatment for
high-­risk/high-­need people sentenced to
supervision.
􀂇􀀃 Expand substance abuse treatment capacity by creat-ing
a funding stream within ODMHSAS that serves
people on supervision who are determined to be at
high risk of reoffending and who have acute sub-stance
abuse problems.
􀂇􀀃 Support efforts by the ODMHSAS to contract with
􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁌􀂽􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒-
fessionals that provide services and/or employ prac-tices
that research has demonstrated are effective.
􀂇􀀃 Provide funding to train substance abuse treatment
providers in the evidence-based principles of risk,
need, and responsivity.
rationale: Research shows that the greatest reduc-tions
in recidivism can be achieved when treatment
and supervision resources are concentrated on high-risk,
high-need individuals. Furthermore, research
demonstrates that applying the same level of supervi-sion
resources to high- and low-risk offenders is coun-terproductive
and can actually increase recidivism
rates for low-risk offenders.64
63. Jon Speir and Tammy Meredith, An Evaluation of Georgia’s Probation
Options Management Act, Georgia Department of Corrections, 2007.
64. Presentation by Dr. Ed Latessa, “What Works and What Doesn’t in
Reducing Recidivism: Applying the Principles of Effective Intervention
to Offender Reentry.” Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, September 14, 2011.
18 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
As Oklahoma’s prison population has grown,
state spending on corrections has also
increased.
􀂇􀀃 The prison population in Oklahoma grew 17 percent,
from 23,258 to 26,692 people, between FY 2000 and
FY 2011.65 This rate of growth exceeded the rate of
growth of Oklahoma ’s resident population, which
increased almost nine percent, from 3,350,654 to
3,751,351.66
􀂇􀀃 During the same period, the annual appropriation
for the OKDOC increased 30 percent, from $356 mil-lion
in FY 2000 to $462 million in FY 2011.67
Much of the prison population growth stems
from an Oklahoma statute that increased
the percentage of a sentence that people
convicted of various serious or violent crimes
must serve in prison.
􀂇􀀃 Violent offenders are serving longer sentences in
prison than ever before. The 85 percent law, which
became effective in 2000, requires certain offenders
to serve at least 85 percent of their sentence before
becoming eligible for release. Policies intended to
offset the impact of this new law on the prison pop-ulation
were adopted at the time, but subsequently
repealed. As a result, Oklahoma ’s prison population
􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀂽􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀑
􀂇􀀃 In FY 2005, people sentenced to prison under the 85
percent law accounted for 10 percent of the prison
population; by FY 2010, this population increased to
19 percent.68
65. OKDOC’s Evaluation and Analysis, The State of Corrections in Oklahoma:
FY 2010 (retrieved May 1, 2011, from doc.state.ok.us/newsroom/
annuals/2010/annualreport2010.pdf);; Christopher Hyde, personal
communication, August 19, 2011.
66. U.S. Census Bureau. Retrieved December 23, 2011 from
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/40000.html.
67. State of Oklahoma, FY 2011 State Agency Appropriations Summary.
Retrieved May 20, 2010, from http://ftpcontent.worldnow.com/
􀁚􀁥􀁜􀁙􀃭􀁡􀀢􀁁􀀸􀁊􀁆􀁢􀁡􀀩􀀢􀁃􀀷􀀹􀀢􀀤􀀣􀀣􀀨􀀢􀁕􀁨􀁗􀁚􀁘􀁧􀁗􀁘􀁧􀁔􀁜􀁟􀁦􀀡􀁣􀁗􀁙􀀡􀀃􀁇􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀃
Legislature appropriated $503 million to OKDOC in both FY 2009 and
FY 2010. This is a 41 percent increase from FY 2000 and OKDOC’s peak
􀁔􀁣􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁣􀁥􀁜􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁗􀁨􀁥􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁗􀁘􀁖􀁔􀁗􀁘􀀡􀀃􀀵􀁬􀀃􀀹􀁌􀀃􀀥􀀣􀀤􀀤􀀟􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀃭􀁚􀁨􀁥􀁘􀀃􀁗􀁥􀁢􀁣􀁣􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃
$462 million, which is eight percent lower than FY 2010’s apex.
68. CSG Justice Center analysis based on OKDOC admissions data.
Challenge 3: Growing prison population
If current policies remain unchanged, the prison population will continue to grow, and the state will need to
􀁘􀁫􀁣􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁣􀁥􀁜􀁦􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁖􀁔􀁣􀁔􀁖􀁜􀁧􀁬􀀃􀁔􀁧􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁦􀁜􀁚􀁡􀁜􀃭􀁖􀁔􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁖􀁢􀁦􀁧􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁧􀁔􀁫􀁣􀁔􀁬􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀡
Explanation of the 85% Law
Persons convicted of an 85 percent offense are required to serve no less than 85 percent of the court-­imposed sen-­
tence of imprisonment prior to becoming eligible for parole consideration. Persons convicted of these offenses are
not eligible to earn credits reducing their length of stay until 85 percent of their sentence has been served. The 85
􀁣􀁘􀁥􀁖􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁟􀁔􀁪􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁖􀁔􀁠􀁘􀀃􀁘􀁙􀁙􀁘􀁖􀁧􀁜􀁩􀁘􀀃􀁜􀁡􀀃􀀥􀀣􀀣􀀣􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁥􀁜􀁚􀁜􀁡􀁔􀁟􀀃􀁟􀁔􀁪􀀃􀁜􀁗􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁜􀃭􀁘􀁗􀀃􀀤􀀤􀀃􀁢􀁙􀁙􀁘􀁡􀁦􀁘􀁦􀀮􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁙􀁢􀁟􀁟􀁢􀁪􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀃􀁬􀁘􀁔􀁥􀀟􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁟􀁘􀁚􀁜􀁦􀁟􀁔􀁧􀁨􀁥􀁘􀀃
added ten more crimes to this list. One year later, and again in 2007 and 2011, the legislature added an additional
􀁢􀁙􀁙􀁘􀁡􀁦􀁘􀀡􀀃􀀴􀁦􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀥􀀣􀀤􀀤􀀟􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀁥􀁘􀀃􀁪􀁘􀁥􀁘􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁧􀁢􀁧􀁔􀁟􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀥􀀨􀀃􀁢􀁙􀁙􀁘􀁡􀁦􀁘􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁪􀁛􀁜􀁖􀁛􀀃􀁜􀁡􀁖􀁟􀁨􀁗􀁘􀀃􀁦􀁘􀁥􀁜􀁢􀁨􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁛􀁘􀁜􀁡􀁢􀁨��􀀃􀁖􀁥􀁜􀁠􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁦􀁨􀁖􀁛􀀃􀁔􀁦􀀃􀃭􀁥􀁦􀁧􀀃􀁗􀁘􀁚􀁥􀁘􀁘􀀃
murder, rape, robbery, arson, child pornography, and assault with intent to kill.
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 19
􀂇􀀃 In practice, the 85 percent offenders serve approxi-mately
92.5 percent of their sentences.69 There are
two reasons for this phenomenon. First, state stat-ute
is not interpreted in a way that allows 85 percent
offenders to earn programmatic or good behavior
credits until they have completed 85 percent of their
sentence.70 Second, many people sentenced under
the 85 percent law choose to waive the parole process
when they become eligible for parole after serving 85
percent of their sentence. They elect to do so because
they want to avoid post-release supervision. Only one
percent of the 761 parolees in FY 2010 also had an 85
percent conviction.71
Oklahoma’s prison population growth is
expected to continue.
􀂇􀀃 According to a CSG Justice Center propagation
model, the prison population will continue to grow
over the next decade, largely because of an increase
in the number of people sentenced under the 85
percent law.72 That number is projected to rise from
6,137 in FY 2012 to 8,698 in FY 2021, an increase
of 3,028 or 42 percent.73 The CSG Justice Center, in
consultation with OKDOC, projects the cumulative
additional cost to the state to house these offend-ers
between FY 2013 and FY 2021 will be $259
million, on top of what the state already spends on
corrections.74
􀂇􀀃 The propagation model assumed a 1 percent annual
increase in the number of admissions for people
sentenced under the 85 percent law, which is consis-tent
with past annual trends. It is not the number of
admissions that simply drives the prison population
upward; it is also the certainty that the number of
people in prison who will serve at least 85 percent of
their sentence is steadily accumulating.
􀂇􀀃 The propagation model is a static estimate; it assumes
that the annual population of offenders convicted for
non-85 percent offenses remains constant at the FY
2011 level. That share of the population may increase
or decrease depending on changes in admissions
and/or length of stay.
69. CSG Justice Center analysis based on OKDOC exit data.
70.􀀃􀁀􀁜􀁞􀁘􀀃􀁂􀁔􀁞􀁟􀁘􀁬􀀃􀀛􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀃􀀴􀁧􀁧􀁢􀁥􀁡􀁘􀁬􀀃􀀺􀁘􀁡􀁘􀁥􀁔􀁟􀀜􀀟􀀃􀁣􀁘􀁥􀁦􀁢􀁡􀁔􀁟􀀃
memorandum to OKDOC Director Justin Jones, October 12, 2011. The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has also issued various opinions
related to the intent of the statute. One of the most noteworthy is
the unpublished Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals case of 􀁆􀁢􀁢􀁧􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁩􀀡􀀃
Oklahoma Department of Corrections, REC-­2008-­442.
71. Ibid.
72. A propagation model analyzes past patterns to estimate future
patterns for a discrete component in a system. In contrast, a simulation
model includes all data elements and can makes dynamic predictions
across multiple attributes.
73. CSG Justice Center analysis based on OKDOC data. A propagation
model analyzes past patterns to estimate future patterns.
74. Tom James (OKDOC), personal communication, December 29,
2011. Full calculation completed by CSG Justice Center.
75. OKDOC, Entry and Exits, FY2005 to FY2011.
Figure 12: Estimate of Growth in Prison Population (Driven by Stacking of the
85% Offenders)75
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
Propagation Model
+3,110
85% Population
Assumes 1% increase in annual admissions for 85% crimes,
but population growth is driven by stacking as offenders
serve much longer than they have historically.
Non-­85% Population
Assumes the annual population of offenders incarcerated
for non-­85% offenses remains the constant at 2011 levels.
This is not a projection of the non-­85% population, but
rather a static estimate. This share of the population
may increase or decrease depending on any chance in
admissions or length of stay of this population.
Jail Back-­up
20 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
Drug possession is the most common
nonviolent felony in Oklahoma, yet state law
is ambiguous about the appropriate sentence
for people convicted of this crime, so use
of prison and probation for this population
varies considerably across the state.
􀂇􀀃 Drug possession cases make up approximately 30
percent of court dispositions in Oklahoma and Tulsa
Counties.76 The options available to DAs and judges
when sentencing individuals convicted of felony
drug possession in these two counties – and most
other counties in the state – include DA supervision,
probation, community sentencing, drug court, and
prison.
􀂇􀀃 In practice, DAs and judges use their discretion
to divert most people charged with drug posses-sion
from prison into other forms of punishment,
supervision, and treatment. Analysis of 2010 Tulsa
County data found that, of those people convicted of
felony drug possession, 24 percent were sentenced
to prison, 39 percent were sentenced to DA super-vision,
22 percent to probation, 10 percent to drug
court, and 6 percent to community sentencing.77
􀂇􀀃 Despite extensive use of diversions from prison
for drug possession felonies, analyses suggest that
for people convicted of this crime, prison is used
inconsistently, the level of community supervision
provided does not correspond to the likelihood of
whether someone will reoffend, and treatment is not
delivered in a manner that maximizes its impact.
􀂇􀀃 An analysis of a sample from the 7,056 people admit-ted
to prison between FY 2005 and FY 2010 for a drug
possession offense found that 10 percent had no
prior felony convictions, nor any prior misdemeanor
drug convictions. An additional 17 percent had one
prior drug conviction or one nonviolent felony.78
􀂇􀀃 In FY2010, the 1,070 offenders admitted to prison
for drug possession received an average sentence of
5.3 years, with sentence lengths ranging from 1.3
years to 12.7 years.79
76.􀀃􀀴􀁗􀁠􀁜􀁡􀁜􀁦􀁧􀁥􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁩􀁘􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀀶􀁢􀁨􀁥􀁧􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁨􀁟􀁦􀁔􀀃􀀶􀁢􀁨􀁡􀁧􀁬􀀃
Court Data
77. David Wright, personal communication, November 23, 2011
(Tulsa County DA probation data: CY 2010 receptions;; OKDOC FY 2010
probation data: FY 2010 community sentencing and prison receptions).
78. OSBI rap sheets for sample of drug possession receptions, retrieved
December 5, 2011. An offender can have a misdemeanor drug charge
and a non-­drug felony charge and fall in this category.
79. CSG Justice Center analysis based on OKDOC entry data.
80. OSBI Rap Sheets for sample of Drug Possession Receptions
Figure 13: Analysis of Drug Possession Offenders Admitted to
Prison between 2005 and 201080
26%
10%
17%
11% 12%
23% No History or
Only Non-Drug
Misdemeanors
1 Felony or
1 Prior Drug
Offense
2 Felonies or
2 Prior Drug
Offenses or
1 Violent Felony
3 Felonies or
3 Prior Drug
Offenses or
2 Violent
Felonies
4+ Felonies or
4+ Drug Priors or
3+ Violent Felonies
Unaffected by
Policy Change
Safety Concern
2+ Prior Felonies or
2+ Prior Drug Offenses or
1+ Violent Felony
Repeat User
Only 1 Prior Felony or
1 Prior Drug Offense
Wake Up Call
No Prior Convictions
or Only Non-Drug
Misdemeanors
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 21
􀂇􀀃 The drug possession statute provides just two sen-
􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀝􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀂽􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀐􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑-
victions (2 –10 years) and another for second or
subsequent possession convictions (4 –20 years).81
The vague guidance provided in statute for judges
sentencing people convicted of a drug possession
􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀂽􀁆􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒-
vided for judges sentencing people convicted of Driv-
􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀂾􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀀋􀀧􀀸􀀬􀀌􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁖􀀃
out punishment, supervision, and treatment accord-ing
to criminal history, risk of reoffense, and need
for treatment.82
Judges do not have a long enough window of
time in which to modify a sentence.
􀂇􀀃 State statute provides judges with only a 365-day
window, starting the day of conviction, to modify
sentences.83
􀂇􀀃Many of the interventions ordered by a judge require
either more than 1 year for successful completion or
take so long to enter into that the offender is unable to
show successful compliance by the time the judge ’s
ability to exercise discretion has lapsed.
􀂇􀀃 In focus group meetings with judges from across the
state, participants noted that they are unable to fully
􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁝􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁒􀁇􀁌􀂽􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃
the timeline for doing so is too short.84
Strategy 3: Contain prison
costs
Manage growth in the prison population while
􀁘􀁡􀁦􀁨􀁥􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁠􀁢􀁦􀁧􀀃􀁦􀁘􀁥􀁜􀁢􀁨􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁩􀁜􀁢􀁟􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁢􀃽􀁘􀁡􀁗􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀃􀁦􀁘􀁥􀁩􀁘􀀃
lengthier sentences that are required by the state’s 85
􀁣􀁘􀁥􀁖􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁟􀁔􀁪􀀡
3(A): Provide a graduated approach to
sentencing people convicted of drug
possession based on a person’s risk of
reoffending, criminal history, and substance
abuse.
rationale: State law should provide a graduated
approach that can be applied systematically for sen-tencing
individuals convicted of drug possession. Such
an approach would ensure that sentencing decisions
are made according to the likelihood that a person will
reoffend, past criminal history, and need for treatment,
and, as a result, increase public safety, reduce recidi-vism
and associated costs, and increase accountability
among people convicted of drug possession.
3(B): Require people convicted of the most
serious and violent offenses to serve 85
percent of their sentence in prison before
they are able to apply banked good behavior
and/or achievement credits.
􀂇􀀃 Clarify the intent of the 85 percent law by modify-ing
it to indicate that, starting in FY 2012, individuals
incarcerated for 85-percent crimes may be autho-rized
to start earning credits toward sentence reduc-tion
from 100 to 85 percent, while ensuring that they
will not be released before serving a full 85 percent of
their court-imposed sentence.
81. Schedule I or II, excluding marijuana possession.
82. Oklahoma Statutes, Title 63: Public Health and Safety, 63-­2-­
402, and Title 47: Motor Vehicles, 47-­11-­902 (retrieved from www.
oklegislature.gov/osstatuestitle.html);; Oklahoma Driver’s Manual,
November 2010 (retrieved from www.dps.state.ok.us/dls/pub/ODM.
pdf).
83. 22 O.S.§􀀃􀀬􀀫􀀥􀁔􀀡􀁇􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁟􀁟􀁢􀁪􀁔􀁕􀁟􀁘􀀃􀁪􀁜􀁡􀁗􀁢􀁪􀀃􀁙􀁢􀁥􀀃􀁦􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁘􀁡􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁠􀁢􀁗􀁜􀃭􀁖􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃
was previously 120 days. The statute was changed to 365 days on July
1, 1999.
84. CSG Justice Center meetings and focus groups with approximately
20 judges from across the state (August, September, and October
2011).
22 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
􀂇􀀃 The credits will be applied when the person com-pletes
85 percent of the sentence. Unless the offender
is engaged in misconduct during incarceration that
result in credit reductions, being convicted of an
85-percent crime will mean that the offender will
serve approximately 85 percent of the sentence.
rationale: This policy change would clarify the
statute regarding the inability of 85 percent offenders
to earn and bank credits for good behavior/participa-tion
in programs and subsequently apply them once
they have served 85 percent of their sentence. This
change would align the law with the understanding
that most people in Oklahoma ’s criminal justice sys-tem
had about the intent of the 85 percent law when it
was enacted. This change would also encourage 85 per-cent
offenders to exhibit good behavior and participate
in rehabilitation and educational programming before
serving 85 percent of their sentence. They currently
have no incentive to do either.
3(C): Permit a longer period after conviction
for judges to modify a sentence.
rationale: The ability to modify a sentence after
a period of time allows judges the option to recom-mend
that an offender undertake treatment, program-ming,
or other intervention and, upon completion of
recommended activities, that the sentence be altered
in response to the offender ’s compliance and demon-strated
behavior change.
To learn more about the justice reinvestment strategy
in Oklahoma and other states, please visit:
www.justicereinvestment.org
􀁇􀁛􀁘􀀃􀀶􀁢􀁨􀁡􀁖􀁜􀁟􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁆􀁧􀁔􀁧􀁘􀀃􀀺􀁢􀁩􀁘􀁥􀁡􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁦􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁜􀁦􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁡􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀁔􀁟􀀃􀁡􀁢􀁡􀁣􀁥􀁢􀃭􀁧􀀃􀁢􀁥􀁚􀁔􀁡􀁜􀁭􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁔􀁧􀀃􀁦􀁘􀁥􀁩􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁣􀁢􀁟􀁜􀁖􀁬􀁠􀁔􀁞􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁧􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁟􀁢􀁖􀁔􀁟􀀟􀀃􀁦􀁧􀁔􀁧􀁘􀀟􀀃
and federal levels from all branches of government. The Justice Center provides practical, nonpartisan advice and consensus-­driven
strategies, informed by available evidence, to increase public safety and strengthen communities.
This project was supported by Grant No. 2010-­RR-­
BX-­K071 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance.
The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the
􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁃􀁥􀁢􀁚􀁥􀁔􀁠􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁪􀁛􀁜􀁖􀁛􀀃􀁔􀁟􀁦􀁢􀀃􀁜􀁡􀁖􀁟􀁨􀁗􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃
Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of
􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀟􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁩􀁘􀁡􀁜􀁟􀁘􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀀷􀁘􀁟􀁜􀁡􀁤􀁨􀁘􀁡􀁖􀁬􀀃
􀁃􀁥􀁘􀁩􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀟􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁙􀁢􀁥􀀃􀁉􀁜􀁖􀁧􀁜􀁠􀁦􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀶􀁥􀁜􀁠􀁘􀀡􀀃􀁃􀁢􀁜􀁡􀁧􀁦􀀃
of view or opinions in this document are those of the
􀁔􀁨􀁧􀁛􀁢����􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁢􀀃􀁡􀁢􀁧􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁣􀁥􀁘􀁦􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁜􀁔􀁟􀀃􀁣􀁢􀁦􀁜􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁢􀁥􀀃
policies of the United State Department of Justice.
To learn more about the Bureau of Justice Assistance,
please visit: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/.
Research and analysis described in this report has been
funded in part by the Public Safety Performance Project
of The Pew Charitable Trusts’ Center on the States.
Launched in 2006 as a project of the Pew Center on the
States, the Public Safety Performance Project seeks to
􀁛􀁘􀁟􀁣􀀃􀁦􀁧􀁔􀁧􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁗􀁩􀁔􀁡􀁖􀁘􀀃􀃭􀁦􀁖􀁔􀁟􀁟􀁬􀀃􀁦􀁢􀁨􀁡􀁗􀀟􀀃􀁗􀁔􀁧􀁔􀀠􀁗􀁥􀁜􀁩􀁘􀁡􀀃􀁣􀁢􀁟􀁜􀁖􀁜􀁘􀁦􀀃
and practices in sentencing and corrections that protect
public safety, hold offenders accountable, and control
corrections costs.
To learn more about the Public Safety Performance
Project, please visit: http://www.pewpublicsafety.org/.
􀁃􀁢􀁜􀁡􀁧􀁦􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁩􀁜􀁘􀁪􀀟􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁖􀁢􀁠􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁗􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁢􀁥􀀃􀃭􀁡􀁗􀁜􀁡􀁚􀁦􀀃􀁦􀁧􀁔􀁧􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁜􀁡􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁜􀁦􀀃􀁗􀁢􀁖􀁨􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁔􀁥􀁘􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁢􀁦􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁨􀁧􀁛􀁢􀁥􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁢􀀃􀁡􀁢􀁧􀀃􀁡􀁘􀁖􀁘􀁦􀁦􀁔􀁥􀁜􀁟􀁬􀀃􀁥􀁘􀃮􀁘􀁖􀁧􀀃
􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁜􀁔􀁟􀀃􀁣􀁢􀁦􀁜􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁢􀁥􀀃􀁣􀁢􀁟􀁜􀁖􀁜􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀀵􀁨􀁥􀁘􀁔􀁨􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀀴􀁦􀁦􀁜􀁦􀁧􀁔􀁡􀁖􀁘􀀟􀀃􀁈􀀡􀁆􀀡􀀃􀀷􀁘􀁣􀁔􀁥􀁧􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀟􀀃􀁇􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁃􀁘􀁪􀀃􀀶􀁛􀁔􀁥􀁜􀁧􀁔􀁕􀁟���􀀃􀁇􀁥􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁦􀀟􀀃􀀶􀁢􀁨􀁡􀁖􀁜􀁟􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃
State Governments Justice Center, or the Council of State Governments’ members.
Suggested citation: Council of State Governments Justice Center, Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma: Analysis and Policy Framework
(New York: Council of State Governments Justice Center, 2012).
Bureau of Justice Assistance
U.S. Department of Justice
Council of State Governments
Justice Center
New York, NY
Bethesda, MD
Austin, TX
Seattle, WA
project contact:
Anne Bettesworth
Policy Analyst
abettesworth@csg.org
www.justicecenter.csg.org

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Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 1
Justice Reinvestment
in Oklahoma
Analysis and Policy Framework
Background
IN JANUARY 2011, GOVERNOR MARY FALLIN,
Speaker of the House Kris Steele, Senate Presi-dent
Pro Tempore Brian Bingman, and Supreme
Court Justice James Edmondson expressed interest in
employing a justice reinvestment strategy, which is a
data-driven approach to contain corrections spending
and reinvest a portion of the savings generated in strat-egies
that will increase public safety. These state lead-ers
wrote to the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA),
a division of the U.S. Department of Justice, and the
Pew Center on the States (Pew) seeking intensive tech-nical
assistance, which was approved by BJA and Pew
in May 2011. As a result, the Council of State Govern-ments
Justice Center (CSG Justice Center) —the tech-nical
assistance provider working in partnership with
BJA and Pew —launched a comprehensive analysis of
the state ’s criminal justice system.
To guide the CSG Justice Center ’s work, state lead-ers
established a bipartisan, inter-branch working
group co-chaired by Speaker Kris Steele (R-Shawnee)
and Don Millican, Chairman of the Oklahoma Chris-tian
University Board of Trustees. Other members
of the working group include state lawmakers, state
agency directors, members of the judiciary, district
attorneys, and other stakeholders in the criminal jus-
􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁐􀀑􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁉􀁘􀁏􀁏􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁑􀀃􀂽􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁆􀁆􀁄-
sions between June 2011 and January 2012 to review
data analyses and discuss policy options that would
address the challenges facing the state ’s criminal jus-tice
system.
The CSG Justice Center collected and analyzed vast
amounts of state criminal justice, mental health, and
substance abuse data, drawing on information systems
maintained by the Oklahoma Department of Correc-tions
(OKDOC), the Oklahoma Department of Mental
Health and Substance Abuse Services (ODMHSAS),
the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI),
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀀲􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃���􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀩􀁈􀁇-
eral Bureau of Investigation ’s Uniform Crime Reports.
In total, the Justice Center analyzed over 700,000 indi-vidual
records across these information systems.
In addition to these quantitative analyses, the CSG
Justice Center convened focus groups and meetings
with district attorneys (DAs), the defense bar, behav-ioral
health and substance abuse treatment providers,
faith and community leaders, victim advocates and
􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁙􀁒􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁍􀁘􀁇􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀏􀀃
law enforcement executives, members of the business
community, and others. Between June 2011 and Janu-ary
2012, the Justice Center convened over 100 in-per-son
meetings with nearly 350 individuals.
This report summarizes the CSG Justice Center ’s
􀂽􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁄����􀁇􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁏􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁈-
work to address key issues that emerged from the
quantitative and qualitative analyses. Policy options
are organized around three strategies: 1) reducing vio-lent
crime, 2) improving supervision of people on pro-bation,
and 3) containing state spending on prisons.
January 2012
2 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
1. High rate of violent crime;; public safety
resources are stretched beyond their limits
􀂇􀀃 Violent index crime in Oklahoma is higher than
national violent index crime. Three of the four larg-
􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁘􀁕􀁅􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀲􀁎􀁏􀁄􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁄􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀂽􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃
increases in homicides and robberies over the past
decade. At the same time, the per capita number of
law enforcement staff in these cities declined.
􀂇􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃
to local governments are stretched further by recent
reductions in mental health services and crisis stabi-lization
beds. Police today spend considerably more
time transporting individuals in mental health crisis
to an appropriate facility than they did just 2 years
ago.
􀂇􀀃 Prosecutor-based victim/witness services are limited
because of scarce resources, impacting the involve-ment
of victims, including victims of violent crime,
in the criminal justice system and the prosecution
of crime.
2. Inadequate supervision and treatment
􀂇􀀃 Fewer and fewer people exiting prison have some
form of post-release supervision.
􀂇􀀃 Risk and need assessments are not used consistently
to inform sentencing and non-OKDOC supervision
decisions.
􀂇􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁅􀁘􀁕􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁒􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃
􀁐􀁄􀁎􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁇􀁌􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃
quickly and appropriately when someone violates a
condition of supervision.
􀂇􀀃 Treatment is frequently unavailable to people who
are on supervision and battling addiction, even
though compliance with supervision conditions
often depends on participation in such treatment.
3. Growing prison population
􀂇􀀃 As Oklahoma ’s prison population has increased over
the past 10 years, so has state spending on this bud-get
item; this growth is expected to continue.
􀂇􀀃Many people charged with felony drug possession
are diverted to community-based supervision and
services that are more effective than prison in chang-ing
behavior. But drug possession is still the most
common felony offense among people admitted
to Oklahoma state prisons. When it comes to how
supervision and treatment should be used for people
convicted of low-level drug felonies, state laws are
silent.
Summary of Challenges
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 3
Strategies
1. Fight Crime and
Enhance Public Safety
2. Strengthen
Supervision
3. Contain
Prison Costs
Policies 1(A): Help local law
enforcement prevent violent
crime with state funding for
technology, overtime, crime
analysis, and community
partnerships.
1(B): Prioritize and fund
additional community-­
based psychiatric crisis
stabilization beds
throughout the state.
1(C): Allocate dedicated
􀁙􀁨􀁡􀁗􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁘􀁔􀁖􀁛􀀃􀀷􀀴􀂺􀁦􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃
for the purpose of enhancing
victim/witness services and
securing more convictions.
2(A): Require that every
prison sentence include
a period of post-­release
supervision of no less than 9
months.
2(B): Provide probation
with additional resources to
strengthen supervision.
2(C): Conduct a presentence
risk and need screen on all
people admitted to county
jails who have been charged
with a felony.
2(D): Utilize swift and
certain intermediate
sanctions when people
violate conditions of
supervision.
2(E): Improve access to
treatment for high-­risk/
high-­need people sentenced
to supervision.
3(A): Provide a graduated
approach to sentencing
people convicted of drug
possession based on a
person’s risk of reoffending,
criminal history, and
substance abuse.
3(B): Require people
convicted of the most
serious and violent offenses
to serve 85 percent of their
sentence in prison before
they are able to apply
banked good behavior and/
or achievement credits.
3(C): Permit a longer period
after conviction for judges
to modify sentences.
Justice Reinvestment Policy Framework
4 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
Objectives
Unless policymakers take action, the state ’s high violent
crime rate will likely remain unchanged, thousands of
people will continue being released from prison unsu-pervised
each year, and state spending on prisons will
increase by more than a quarter billion dollars over the
next decade. The policy framework below outlines the
following objectives to avoid this situation:
􀂇􀀃 Target a 10 percent reduction in violent crime by
2016 by providing law enforcement with the tools
and resources necessary to use data-driven strategies
for increasing public safety, making additional crisis
stabilization beds available, and improving victim/
witness services;
􀂇􀀃 Strengthen supervision by requiring a period of
supervision to follow every term of incarceration and
increasing resources available to reduce recidivism
while holding offenders accountable; and,
􀂇􀀃Manage prison growth to contain spending by slow-ing
the population increase currently projected.
Savings
As a package, the policies described in this report
􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁊􀁈􀁑􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀂽􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁄􀁙􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀲􀁎􀁏􀁄-
homa. By averting growth in the state prison popula-
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀂽􀁖􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁜􀁈􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀀋􀀩􀀼􀀌􀀃 􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀖􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀩􀀼􀀃 􀀕􀀓􀀕􀀔􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
policy framework avoids an estimated $249 million in
additional spending that would otherwise be needed to
accommodate prison population growth.
Reinvestment
To achieve these outcomes and generate the savings
described above, Oklahoma must reinvest $110 mil-lion
in their criminal justice system between FY 2013
and FY 2021. Additional details are listed below.
Projected Impact of Policy Framework
$0
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
$300 Millions
Figure 2: Comparison of spending and proposed
savings/reinvestment (FY 2012–FY 2021)
$259 M
FY2012–FY2021
Increase in spending
associated with
growth in prison
population
$249 M
Total Savings
$110 M
Reinvestment in crime
reduction, victim
services, treatment,
and supervision
to hold offenders
accountable
Current Savings/
Reinvestment
Figure 1: Reinvestment Details
POLICY FY 2013
FY 2014 &
FUTURE
TOTAL
REINVESTMENT:
FY 2013–FY 2021
1(A): Violent Crime
Reduction
$2 M $5 M $42 M
1(C): Victim/
Witness Services
$500 K $1 M $8.5 M
2(B): Probation
Improvement
$1 M $2 M $17 M
2(C): Felony Jail
Screen
$500 K $1 M $8.5 M
2(E): Substance
Abuse Treatment
$2 M $4 M $34 M
TOTAL $6 M $13 M $110 M
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 5
Figure 3: Full Impact of Policies Will Avert Growth of More than 2,000
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021
+2,148
25,011
27,159
+2,561
Baseline Change
2012–2021
Policy Impact
-­2,109
Averted Growth
Fiscal Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Actual 25,011 25,853 26,163 26,667 26,755 27,378 26,692
Model with no
policy changes
27,159 27,569 27,887 28,232 28,534 28,798 29,072 29,266 29,521 29,720
All policy
changes
27,159 26,690 26,102 26,006 26,362 26,694 26,923 27,185 27,409 27,611
Reinvestment $6 M $13 M $13 M $13 M $13 M $13 M $13 M $13 M $13 M
Assumptions
The following analysis projects the policy framework ’s
impact on an offender base of 26,692 —the prison pop-ulation
at the start of FY 2012.1 The model assumes
policy implementation begins in FY 2013 and will be
completely phased in by FY 2015. The base prison pop-ulation
projection demonstrates the accumulation of
the 85 percent offender population (per the effects of
current policy), but holds other admission types and
jail backlogs static. Cost savings and proposed levels of
reinvestment are based on projected savings as calcu-lated
by the CSG Justice Center after consultation with
OKDOC.
1. This number includes people awaiting transfer to OKDOC.
6 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
Violent index crime is high throughout the
state;; homicide and robbery rates increased
in many large urban areas.
􀂇􀀃 The violent crime rate in Oklahoma declined slightly,
less than four percent, between 2000 and 2010; dur-ing
the same period 40 states experienced decreases,
which drove the national violent crime rate down 20
percent.2
􀂇􀀃 In 2010, Oklahoma had the 12th highest rate of vio-lent
crime in the United States, with 480 reported
crimes per 100,000 residents. Oklahoma ranked
higher than Texas, with 450, and Kansas, with 369,
but lower than Arkansas, with 505.3
􀂇􀀃 Oklahoma ’s robbery rate increased 15 percent since
2000; nationally, the robbery rate has decreased 18
percent.4 The 91 percent increase in Tulsa ’s robbery
rate drove the statewide increase.
􀂇􀀃 In 2010, the cities of Tulsa and Oklahoma City
accounted for 56 percent of the state ’s total murders,
yet only 26 percent of the state ’s population. Tulsa ’s
murder rate increased 67 percent between 2000 and
2010, and Oklahoma City ’s increased by 25 percent,
whereas the national rate dropped 13 percent.5
Law enforcement staff per capita declined in
most major Oklahoma cities from 2000 to
2010, while violent crime rose.
􀂇􀀃 􀀲􀁎􀁏􀁄􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁄􀀃 􀀦􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀀯􀁄􀁚􀁗􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀂽􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃
increases in their violent crime rates between 2000
and 2010: Lawton ’s violent crime rate increased by
40 percent and Oklahoma City ’s rate increased by
18 percent. Meanwhile, these two cities experienced
considerable declines in the number of sworn law
􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁓􀁌􀁗􀁄􀀑6
2. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Crime in the United States, 2000–2010. Retrieved September 29, 2011 from
www.fbi.gov/about-­us/cjis/ucr/crime-­in-­the-­u.s/2010/crime-­in-­the-­
u.s.-­2010.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Crime in the United States, 2000–2010. Retrieved September 29, 2011 from
www.fbi.gov/about-­us/cjis/ucr/crime-­in-­the-­u.s/2010/crime-­in-­the-­
u.s.-­2010.
Figure 4: 3 out of 4 major cities fought rising
crime with few law enforcement staff8
2000–2010
Percent
Change in:
Violent
Crime Rate
&
Law
Enforcement
Staffing Per
Capita
+
–
Oklahoma
City
17%
11%
Tulsa
2% 8%
Lawton
28%
10%
Norman
43%
18%
􀂇􀀃 Cities in Oklahoma whose number of law enforce-ment
per capita either remained unchanged or
increased did not experience the same spike in
crime. Tulsa ’s violent crime rate decreased by one
percent over the last decade and their law enforce-
􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁓􀁌􀁗􀁄􀀃 􀁉􀁈􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁈􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀑􀀃 􀀱􀁒􀁕􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁚􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁆􀁄􀁓􀁌􀁗􀁄􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀀔􀀛􀀃
percent through a citywide bond and saw a 41 per-cent
decrease in the violent crime rate.7
􀂇􀀃 According to police chiefs throughout the state,
budget shortages have diminished the ability of law
enforcement agencies to develop and deploy proac-tive
strategies to reduce and prevent violent crime in
their communities. With the reduction in staff and
resources, most police agencies in Oklahoma focus
Challenge 1: High rate of violent crime;;
public safety resources stretched beyond their limits
Oklahoma’s violent crime rate is high and has remained relatively unchanged since 2000;; during the same period,
􀁩􀁜􀁢􀁟􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁖􀁥􀁜􀁠􀁘􀀃􀁛􀁔􀁦􀀃􀁗􀁘􀁖􀁟􀁜􀁡􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁦􀁜􀁚􀁡􀁜􀃭􀁖􀁔􀁡􀁧􀁟􀁬􀀃􀁡􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀁔􀁟􀁟􀁬􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁜􀁡􀀃􀁠􀁢􀁦􀁧􀀃􀁦􀁧􀁔􀁧􀁘􀁦􀀡
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 7
on responding to 911 calls and providing basic police
services. The deployment of specialized units has
􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁗􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀞􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃
reassigned to patrol duty.9
􀂇􀀃 􀀲􀁎􀁏􀁄􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁄􀀃 􀀦􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀀳􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀀧􀁈􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀀋􀀲􀀮􀀦􀀳􀀧􀀌􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽-
cials reported that personnel reductions created sig-
􀁑􀁌􀂽􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁆��􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁈􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃
presence in their jurisdiction, particularly given the
large area – 621 square miles – that the city spans.10
A 2009 OKCPD manpower study found OKCPD,
with 1.68 sworn staff per square mile, had the lowest
􀁖􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁉􀂽􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁖􀁔􀁘􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁚􀁋􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃
a group of 10 similar cities. Nashville, Tennessee, fol-lowed
Oklahoma City with 2.63, while Denver, Colo-rado,
had the highest at 10.03 sworn staff per square
mile.11
Targeted violent crime reduction strategies
have demonstrated positive results,
but funding for such strategies is either
intermittent, diminishing, or both.
􀂇􀀃 Despite successes, federal funding for local law
enforcement, such as grants through Byrne Justice
Assistance, Community Oriented Policing Services,
and Weed and Seed, is declining, and Oklahoma has
yet to identify funding streams to replace these pro-grams.
12 In 2000, Oklahoma City received $1,412,262
in local law enforcement grants; in 2011, $445,379.
This is a 68 percent decrease in funding.13
􀂇􀀃 􀀯􀁄􀁚􀀃 􀁈􀁑􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀂽􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈-
gies they would like to implement to lower crime in
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁘􀁑􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀀲􀀮􀀦􀀳􀀧􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃
collect a large amount of crime data that could be
used to pinpoint locations where criminal activity is
most likely to occur, but do not have enough crime
􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁜􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁄􀁏􀁜􀁝􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁄􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁇􀁈􀁓􀁏􀁒􀁜􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃
effectively.14
Since the number of crisis stabilization beds
for people with acute mental health needs
has decreased, law enforcement agencies
have had to dedicate more staff time and
dollars to transport individuals in mental
health crisis to an appropriate facility,
diverting already diminished police resources
from strategies most likely to reduce violent
crime.
􀂇􀀃 Law enforcement executives across the state reported
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁌􀁗􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃
to the transportation of people with mental illnesses
in crisis to appropriate crisis stabilization facilities.15
When local or regional facilities do not have avail-
􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁈􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈����􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁘􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
a facility with space, regardless of the geographical
distance from the point of origin. As a result, it is not
􀁘􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁐􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁆􀁕􀁒􀁖􀁖􀀃
multiple law enforcement jurisdictions, which in
turn reduces the availability of staff to perform basic
patrol functions, making the implementation of
􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁌􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁘􀁏􀁗􀀑􀀃
􀂇􀀃 Transporting individuals in crisis generates sig-
􀁑􀁌􀂽􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀑􀀃􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁌􀁐􀁅􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈���
departments for mileage, police departments remain
responsible for overtime expenses incurred.16 State
􀁇􀁄􀁗􀁄􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁈􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁈􀁖􀀃 􀁇􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁜􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃
for mental health transports increased 45 percent
between FY 2009 and FY 2011.17
9. CSG Justice Center meetings and focus groups with approximately
20 chiefs of police from throughout the state (October, November, and
December 2011).
10. OKCPD Chief of Police Bill Citty, personal communication, August
23, 2011.
11. OKCPD, Management and Manpower Analysis, February 10, 2009.
12. Oklahoma City, in particular, has seen positive outcomes from
federally funded crime reduction strategies. For example, the city
faced a decade-­high 260 drive-­by shootings in 2005, but using federal
funding, OKCPD augmented gang-­intervention efforts, and the
number fell 63 percent to a decade-­low 97 in 2010 (OKCPD, Drive-­By
Comparison Memo 2002–2011).
13. OKCPD Chief of Police Bill Citty, personal communication,
December 2, 2011.
14. OKCPD Chief of Police Bill Citty, personal communication,
November 16, 2011.
15. CSG Justice Center meetings and focus groups with approximately
20 chiefs of police and 13 sheriffs (October, November, and December
2011).
16. Ibid.
17. David Wright (ODMHSAS), personal communication, December 8,
2011.
8 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
In focus groups across the state, law
􀁘􀁡􀁙􀁢􀁥􀁖􀁘􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁘􀁫􀁘􀁖􀁨􀁧􀁜􀁩􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁟􀁜􀁡􀁘􀀠􀁟􀁘􀁩􀁘􀁟􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀃
voiced the need for more state mental health
and addiction treatment facilities and crisis
stabilization beds.
􀂇􀀃 Cuts to the ODMHSAS budget required reductions
in the total number of mental health inpatient and
crisis beds across the state. In 2009, hard caps were
instituted at all crisis centers and hospitals. Prior to
these caps, facilities would accept patients regardless
􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁙􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁈􀁛􀁄􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀏􀀃 􀀪􀁕􀁌􀁉􀂽􀁑􀀃 􀀰􀁈􀁐􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃
Hospital in Oklahoma City had capacity of just under
150 beds at the start of 2009, yet often had a patient
count of 175 –200 on any given day. In 2008, the hos-pital
was over capacity 283 days out of the year. Since
the caps were instituted, patient admission is contin-gent
upon available bed space. If a facility lacks bed
space, law enforcement must transport an individual
to a facility with an available bed.18
􀂇􀀃 In 2008, a 15-bed treatment facility was closed in
Claremore, and in 2010, 12 beds were closed in Law-ton.
Consequently, these areas have little capacity to
provide crisis stabilization and inpatient treatment to
members of their local community.19
􀂇􀀃 Since 2008, there has been a loss of Medicaid-con-tracted
and private-pay psychiatric beds. The loss of
these beds is particularly noticeable in Tulsa, where
the total number of Medicaid-funded psychiatric
beds is disproportionately low compared to the popu-lation.
Additionally, in Oklahoma City, the University
of Oklahoma Medical Center closed its entire general
adult psychiatric unit.20
Some victims are not receiving services and
supports guaranteed to them under the
state constitution.
􀂇􀀃 The Victims Bill of Rights in Oklahoma ’s State Con-stitution
requires that victims be provided informa-
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁌􀂽􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁗􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀃
return, victim impact statements, and speedy dis-position.
21 Many of these services are supposed to
be delivered or coordinated by victim witness staff
􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀧􀀤􀁖􀂶��􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃
Figure 5: Tulsa Police Department mental health transports22
CIMARRON TEXAS BEAVER HARPER
ELLIS
WOODS
WOODWARD
MAJOR ALFALFA
DEWEY
GRANT
GARFIELD
KINGFISHER
LOGAN
ROGER MILLS
BECKHAM
GREER KIOWA
CUSTER
WASHITA
BLAINE
CADDO
CANADIAN
GRADY HARMON
JACKSON
TILLMAN
COTTON
COMANCHE
STEPHENS
JEFFERSON
CLEVELAND
McCLAIN
OKLAHOMA
LINCOLN
POTTAWATOMIE
GARVIN
CARTER
LOVE
MURRAY
MARSHALL
JOHNSTON
BRYAN
PONTOTOC
SEMINOLE
CHOCTAW
McCURTAIN
ATOKA
PUSHMATAHA
HUGHES
COAL
PITTSBURG
LATIMER LEFLORE
HASKELL
McINTOSH
MUSKOGEE
OKMULGEE
CREEK
OKFUSKEE SEQUOYAH
WAGONER
CHEROKEE0
ADAIR
TULSA
KAY
NOBLE
PAYNE PAWNEE
OSAGE
WASHINGTON
NOWATA
ROGERS
CRAIG OTTAWA
MAYES
DELAWARE
Adult Inpatient/Crisis Stabilization Unit
434 mi
$450/$705 OT
Fort Supply ! 9
384 mi
$400/$650 OT
Clinton ! 10
382 mi
$405/$645 OT
Lawton ! 3
212 mi
$250/$402 OT
OKC ! 82
Tulsa PD
98 mi
$170/$250 OT
Muskogee ! 22
182 mi
$205/$350 OT
McAlester ! 11
250 mi
$300/$450 OT
Norman ! 43
180
Transports from Tulsa to Adult
Inpatient/Crisis Stabilization Units.
􀀸􀁔􀁖􀁛􀀃􀁧􀁥􀁔􀁡􀁦􀁣􀁢􀁥􀁧􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁤􀁨􀁜􀁥􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁧􀁪􀁢􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀡
Average:
229 miles round trip
$270–$425 in regular and OT pay
Roundtrip Distance
Regular/Overtime Cost
Location – # of Transports
18. ODMHSAS Commissioner Terri White, personal communication,
December 10, 2011.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Oklahoma Victims Bill of Rights. Retrieved from www.ok.gov/dac/
documents/Victims%20Bill%20of%20Rights.pdf.
22.Tulsa Police Department, personal communication, November 9,
2011. Analysis includes 1 year of data from 11/2010 to 10/2011;;
ODMHSAS, personal communication, November 30, 2011.
KEY
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 9
23. April Doshier, Oklahoma Victim Assistance Academy Needs
Assessment Report, June 30, 2009.
24. CSG Justice Center focus group with 24 victims, survivors, and
advocates, September 7, 2011.
25. Anthony Braga and David Weisburd, Policing Problem Places: Crime Hot
􀁆􀁣􀁢􀁧􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀀸􀃽􀁘􀁖􀁧􀁜􀁩􀁘􀀃􀁃􀁥􀁘􀁩􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀟􀀃2010.
26. 􀁈􀀡􀁆􀀡􀀃􀀷􀁘􀁣􀁔􀁥􀁧􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀟􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁃􀁥􀁢􀁚􀁥􀁔􀁠􀁦􀀟􀀃􀀵􀁨􀁥􀁘􀁔􀁨􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃
Justice Assistance. Intelligence-­Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture,
September 2005.
27. Anthony A. Braga and Christopher Winship, “What Can Cities Do
to Prevent Serious Youth Violence?” Criminal Justice Matters 75.1 (2009):
􀀦􀀨􀂵􀀦􀀪􀀡􀀃􀁈􀀡􀁆􀀡􀀃􀀷􀁘􀁣􀁔􀁥􀁧􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀟􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁃􀁥􀁢􀁚􀁥􀁔􀁠􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁁􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀁔􀁟􀀃
Institute of Justice, Reducing Gun Violence: The Boston Gun Project’s
􀁂􀁣􀁘􀁥􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁔􀁦􀁘􀃭􀁥􀁘􀀟􀀃September 2001.
􀂇􀀃 Less than half of crime victims surveyed in 2009
reported receiving some type of victim services (such
as explanation of court system, referral to victim ser-vices,
safety planning, and court preparation). Of
those, three-fourths of the services they described as
most helpful were those that were provided by vic-tim/
witness professionals.23
􀂇􀀃 Victims, survivors, and advocates who convened for
this project were unanimous in their assessment
􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁉􀁉􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁈􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃
demand for support of victims because of mounting
budget cuts over the past several years.24
Strategy 1: Fight crime and
enhance public safety
By 2016, reduce statewide violent index crime at least
10 percent by increasing resources available to law
􀁘􀁡􀁙􀁢􀁥􀁖􀁘􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀡
1(A): Help local law enforcement prevent
violent crime with state funding for
technology, overtime, crime analysis, and
community partnerships.
􀂇􀀃 Create a statewide competitive grant program that
encourages law enforcement agencies to deploy data-driven
strategies to reduce violent crime by at least
10 percent by 2016.
􀂇􀀃 Direct grant funding to activities that include over-time,
targeted policing strategies, the use of tech-nology
for crime prevention and problem solving,
improved crime analysis capabilities, and partner-ships
between law enforcement and community
agencies to reduce violent crime.
rationale: Research has found that targeted polic-ing
strategies such as placed-based “hot spot ” policing
that increase police presence in high crime areas can
help prevent and reduce crime.25􀀃􀀧􀁄􀁗􀁄􀀐􀁇􀁕􀁌􀁙􀁈����􀀃􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁉􀂽􀁑􀁊􀀃
and resource allocation through crime analysis mod-els
like intelligence-led policing can produce similarly
positive results.26 Additionally, community engage-ment
programs that address the many facets of violent
crime, including youth crime and gang violence, are
making communities safer for citizens, especially chil-dren
and youth.27
1(B): Prioritize and fund additional
community-­based psychiatric crisis
stabilization beds throughout the state.
rationale: The development of additional com-munity-
based crisis stabilization beds throughout the
state of Oklahoma not only will improve outcomes for
people with acute mental health care needs who are
experiencing psychiatric crisis, but will also help law
enforcement agencies focus their limited resources
on those strategies most likely to reduce crime. Trans-porting
individuals who are a danger to themselves or
others is a critical function performed by law enforce-ment,
and as such, law enforcement should have local
resources available to meet this need.
1(C): Allocate dedicated funding to each DA’s
􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁙􀁢􀁥􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁣􀁨􀁥􀁣􀁢􀁦􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁖􀁥􀁘􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀟􀀃􀁘􀁡􀁛􀁔􀁡􀁖􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀟􀀃
or extending victim/witness services and
securing more convictions.
rationale: Dedicated funding is needed to ensure
that crime victims and witnesses receive the protection
accorded them by the state constitution. Support pro-vided
to victims and survivors enables them to navigate
the criminal justice system, serve as effective witnesses
in criminal cases, and access services that can help
them recover from their experiences with crime. Prose-cutors
who can provide victim/witness support are bet-ter
able to secure convictions. Victim/witness support
personnel arrange for witnesses ’ or victims ’ availabil-ity
to prosecutors, coordinate their court appearances,
assist with their preparation, explain court procedures
to them, make sure they understand their role in court
proceedings, and inform them about the status of their
cases.
10 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
No Supervision Probation Parole
3,396
3,060
1,655
4,352
3,440
761
2005 2010
More people in prison are completing their
sentence while incarcerated and returning
to the community without any post-­release
supervision. Many of these are the people
who are most likely to reoffend.
􀂇􀀃 The percentage of people released from prison with-out
supervision has steadily increased from 42 per-cent
in FY 2005 to 51 percent in FY 2010. Only 9
percent of people exiting prison in 2010 were released
to parole supervision. An additional 40 percent of
prison releases subsequently began a period of pro-bationary
supervision to complete a split sentence.28
􀂇􀀃 Thirty-four percent of people in prison eligible for
parole waived their right to a parole hearing in 2010
and opted to complete their sentence in prison
􀀋􀂳􀂾􀁄􀁗􀀐􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀂴􀀌􀀑29 Keenly aware that relatively little time
remains on their sentence, people who waive their
hearings take advantage of time served and cred-its
earned with good behavior and/or participation
programs. Consequently, they get out of prison only
a few weeks or months later than they would had they
received parole. Furthermore, by completing their
sentence in prison, these individuals are not subject
to parole. Accordingly, the narrow time difference
􀁅􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁒􀁏􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀂾􀁄􀁗􀀐􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁈􀁕-
vised release is having the unintended consequence
of people eluding parole.30 In focus groups with peo-ple
who have declined parole, it was clear that these
individuals had done the math; one person bluntly
said, doing time “is faster inside ” than doing time on
parole, since people on parole are not eligible to earn
time off their sentence for good behavior.31
􀂇􀀃 Oklahoma law prohibits probation (and therefore
split sentences) on third or subsequent felony con-victions.
As a result, people with a lengthy criminal
history who are most likely to reoffend are especially
likely to go from prison to the community without
any post-release supervision.
28. OKDOC, Exit Data for FY 2005–FY 2010.
29. OKDOC, personal communication, November 28, 2011.
30. CSG Justice Center focus group with eight offenders at Joseph Harp
Correctional Center, August 24, 2011.
31. Ibid.
32. OKDOC, The State of Corrections in Oklahoma: Fiscal Year 2010.
Retrieved from http://www.doc.state.ok.us/newsroom/
annuals/2010/annualreport2010.pdf.
Figure 6: More people are being released from
prison unsupervised32
51% released unsupervised in 2010
The number of offenders
released to parole
dropped in half
Challenge 2: Inadequate supervision and treatment
Many people exiting prison are released to no supervision, and they do not have access to treatment services
􀁡􀁘􀁘􀁗􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁞􀁘􀁘􀁣􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀁠􀀃􀁗􀁥􀁨􀁚􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁔􀁟􀁖􀁢􀁛􀁢􀁟􀀠􀁙􀁥􀁘􀁘􀀡
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 11
33. 􀁇􀁛􀁥􀁘􀁘􀀃􀁬􀁘􀁔􀁥􀀃􀁥􀁘􀀠􀁔􀁥􀁥􀁘􀁦􀁧􀀃􀁥􀁔􀁧􀁘􀀃􀁕􀁬􀀃􀁥􀁜􀁦􀁞􀀃􀁖􀁔􀁧􀁘􀁚􀁢􀁥􀁜􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁦􀀃􀁗􀁘􀃭􀁡􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁬􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀀿􀁆􀀼􀀠􀁅􀀡􀀃
􀁁􀀰􀀩􀀟􀀨􀀬􀀬􀀃􀀹􀁌􀀥􀀣􀀣􀀪􀀃􀁂􀀾􀀷􀁂􀀶􀀃􀁘􀁫􀁜􀁧􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀡􀀃􀁂􀀾􀀷􀁂􀀶􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁂􀁆􀀵􀀼􀀃􀁥􀁔􀁪􀀃􀁗􀁔􀁧􀁔􀀃􀃭􀁟􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃
2007 Prison Releases
34. OKDOC, Exit Data for FY 2005–FY 2010;; OSBI, Arrest History
for OKDOC FY 2007 Exits. This analysis used a 36-­month rearrest
recidivism rate and only allows each person to be counted once.
OSBI could only provide arrest data, not disposition or charge-­
level information;; therefore, it is unknown if the arrest was at
the misdemeanor or felony level, or if it led to reconviction or
reincarceration.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. CSG Justice Center focus group with 24 victims, survivors, and
advocates, September 7, 2011.
38. Suzanne McClain-­Atwood, email, October 7, 2011.
39. 􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀃􀀴􀁗􀁠􀁜􀁡􀁜􀁦􀁧􀁥􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁩􀁘􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀀶􀁢􀁨􀁥􀁧􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁖􀁔􀁟􀁘􀁡􀁗􀁔􀁥􀀃􀁬􀁘􀁔􀁥􀀃􀀛􀀶􀁌􀀜􀀃
2007–CY 2011 Disposition Data.
40. 3-­year rearrest rate by risk categories.
41.􀀃􀀴􀁗􀁠􀁜􀁡􀁜􀁦􀁧􀁥􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁩􀁘􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀀶􀁢􀁨􀁥􀁧􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀃􀀶􀁢􀁨􀁡􀁧􀁬􀀃􀀶􀁢􀁨􀁥􀁧􀀃
Records, FY2008–FY2011.
􀂇􀀃 Of those people returning to the community from
prison without post-release supervision in 2007, 43
percent were assessed as “high-risk. ” Sixty-three
percent of those high-risk offenders were rearrested
within 36 months of release, compared to 53 per-cent
of moderate-risk and 44 percent of low-risk
offenders.34
􀂇􀀃 In FY 2007, of the 3,677 people who returned to the
community from prison without post-release super-vision,
more than half (54 percent) were rearrested
in the 3-year period following their release.35 People
in this cohort of recidivists were rearrested for one
or more of the following offenses: 480 for statutorily
􀁇􀁈􀂽􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁙􀁌􀁒􀁏􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁆􀁕􀁌􀁐􀁈􀁖􀀞􀀃􀀔􀀏􀀓􀀕􀀛􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁘􀁊􀀃􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀞􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
1,890 for property crimes.36
􀂇􀀃 Victims, survivors of crime, and their advocates
expressed concern in focus groups about the increas-ing
number of people leaving prison with no post-release
supervision. They spoke in particular about
situations involving people returning to the com-munity
without post release supervision who are
especially likely to reoffend, predominantly in the
months immediately following their return to the
community.37
44%
Low Risk
Re-­Arrest
Rate
53%
Moderate Risk
Re-­Arrest Rate
63%
High Risk
Re-­Arrest Rate
Figure 7: High-­risk individuals released
from prison are more likely to be
rearrested within 3 years33
Since its inception, the number of people on
DA supervision has increased dramatically;;
in the meantime, the number of people
under probation supervision has decreased
􀁦􀁜􀁚􀁡􀁜􀃭􀁖􀁔􀁡􀁧􀁟􀁬􀀡􀀃
􀂇􀀃 During FY 2011, felony offenders made up 28 per-cent
of the 38,836 offenders on DA supervision.38
􀂇􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀛􀀏􀀃􀂽􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀲􀁎􀁏􀁄􀁋􀁒��􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁉􀁈􀁏􀁒􀁑􀁜􀀃􀁇􀁌􀁖-
positions received a sentence of DA supervision, but
by 2011, the number increased to 39 percent of felony
dispositions. This trend contributed to the decrease
in the proportion of felony dispositions receiving a
probation sentence, which fell from 43 to 11 percent
during those 4 years.39
􀂇􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁈􀀃􀀷􀁘􀁏􀁖􀁄􀀃􀀦􀁒􀁘􀁑􀁗􀁜􀀃􀀧􀀤􀂶􀁖􀀃􀀲􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁈􀁏-
ony offenders in 2008: The program started with 46
felony offender admissions and grew rapidly to 1,042
admissions by 2010.40
Figure 8: In Oklahoma County, DA supervision
is replacing probation as the most common
form of supervision for felons41
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
2008 2009 2010 2011
229
2,063
566
1,947
+801%
-71%
DA Supervision
Probation
(DOC & Private)
12 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
42. Oklahoma DAs Council, personal communication, November 17, 2011.
Oklahoma’s Types of Community Supervision
Probation: DAs and judges use probation to sentence felony offenders to community supervision in lieu of prison.
They also use it as part of a split sentence to ensure supervision following release from prison. The state funds all
probation services administered by the OKDOC’s Division of Probation and Parole (P&P). P&P is responsible for the
􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁧􀁜􀃭􀁖􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀟􀀃􀁧􀁥􀁔􀁜􀁡􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀟􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁦􀁨􀁣􀁣􀁢􀁥􀁧􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁔􀁟􀁟􀀃􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁪􀁛􀁢􀀃􀁔􀁥􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁦􀁦􀁜􀁚􀁡􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁦􀁧􀁔􀁧􀁘􀂺􀁦􀀃􀁦􀁜􀁫􀀃􀁃􀀙􀁃􀀃􀁗􀁜􀁦􀁧􀁥􀁜􀁖􀁧􀁦􀀡􀀃
Parole: Release to parole supervision is a discretionary decision made by the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board
to ensure some period of post-­release community supervision before the person’s sentence is complete. The Pardon
􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁃􀁔􀁥􀁢􀁟􀁘􀀃􀀵􀁢􀁔􀁥􀁗􀀃􀁜􀁦􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁣􀁔􀁥􀁧􀀠􀁧􀁜􀁠􀁘􀀟􀀃􀃭􀁩􀁘􀀠􀁠􀁘􀁠􀁕􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁕􀁢􀁗􀁬􀀃􀁖􀁢􀁡􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁧􀁨􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀁔􀁟􀁟􀁬􀀃􀁖􀁛􀁔􀁥􀁚􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁪􀁜􀁧􀁛􀀃􀁠􀁔􀁞􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀃􀁣􀁔􀁥􀁢􀁟􀁘􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁖􀁢􀁠􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁗􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀁦􀀃
􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀀺􀁢􀁩􀁘􀁥􀁡􀁢􀁥􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀟􀀃􀁪􀁛􀁢􀀃􀁛􀁔􀁦􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀃭􀁡􀁔􀁟􀀃􀁦􀁔􀁬􀀃􀁜􀁡􀀃􀁪􀁛􀁘􀁧􀁛􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁣􀁘􀁥􀁦􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁜􀁦􀀃􀁣􀁔􀁥􀁢􀁟􀁘􀁗􀀡􀀃􀁃􀁔􀁥􀁢􀁟􀁘􀀟􀀃􀁟􀁜􀁞􀁘􀀃􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀟􀀃􀁜􀁦􀀃􀁙􀁨􀁡􀁗��􀁗􀀃
by the state and overseen by P&P.
DA Supervision: Instead of sentencing a person to a term of probation supervision administered by P&P, the court
may sentence a person to community supervision overseen by the local district attorney. This form of supervision
was created in 2005 through 22 O.S. § 991(d), although some DAs did not launch the program until some years
later. The extent to which DAs use this supervision program varies from one county to the next. People sentenced to
DA supervision pay fees to offset the costs of this program.
Drug Court: The Oklahoma Drug Court program is a court-­supervised and state-­funded substance abuse treatment
program that offers nonviolent, felony offenders an alternative to prison. People enter the program by pleading
􀁚􀁨􀁜􀁟􀁧􀁬􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁦􀁣􀁘􀁖􀁜􀃭􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁛􀁔􀁥􀁚􀁘􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁔􀁧􀀃􀁖􀁔􀁥􀁥􀁜􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁪􀁜􀁧􀁛􀀃􀁜􀁧􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁦􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁘􀁡���􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁜􀁡􀁖􀁔􀁥􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀡􀀃􀁈􀁣􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁦􀁨􀁖􀁖􀁘􀁦􀁦􀁙􀁨􀁟􀀃􀁖􀁢􀁠􀁣􀁟􀁘􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁧􀁥􀁘􀁔􀁧-­
ment program, the court dismisses the original charge. For repeated noncompliance with the program, however,
the court terminates participation in the program, remanding the person to prison where he or she serves the origi-­
nal sentence.
Community Sentencing: Oklahoma’s Community Sentencing program provides a community sanction as an alter-­
native to prison for felony offenders. According to state statute, an offender is eligible if he/she has been assessed
as moderate or high using a risk assessment and has a felony conviction. Community Sentencing is funded by the
􀁦􀁧􀁔􀁧􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁢􀁩􀁘􀁥􀁡􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁕􀁬􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁖􀁢􀁨􀁡􀁖􀁜􀁟􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁘􀁟􀁘􀁖􀁧􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁢􀁨􀁡􀁧��􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁜􀁔􀁟􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁖􀁜􀁧􀁜􀁭􀁘􀁡􀁦􀀡
Decisions made about whether someone
convicted of a crime is sentenced to
probation, DA supervision, drug court, or
prison are not informed by standardized
assessments, which objectively predict
the likelihood that the person will have
additional contact with the criminal justice
system.
􀂇􀀃 Sentencing decisions are not informed by an objec-tive
risk assessment because most people convicted
of a crime do not receive assessments prior to sen-tencing.
Without such information, people are
prescribed levels of punishment, supervision, and
programming that may not necessarily correspond
to their risk levels. As a result, key opportunities
to change the likelihood of someone committing
another offense are missed.
􀂇􀀃 People placed on OKDOC probation are given an
objective risk assessment within 45 days of sentenc-
􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁐􀁈􀁑���􀀃 􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁓􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀃
determine what strategies are most likely to be suc-cessful,
given the unique needs of the person under
his or her supervision.
􀂇􀀃 People sentenced to DA supervision are not sub-jected
to an objective risk assessment. Furthermore,
conversations with prosecutors indicated that the
􀁐􀁄􀁍􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀧􀀤􀁖􀂶􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁇􀁒􀀃􀁑􀁒􀁗􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃
ensure the same levels of supervision as those pro-
􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁜􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁚􀁒􀁕􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀲􀀮􀀧􀀲􀀦􀀃􀀳􀀉􀀳􀀑􀀃
Accordingly, DA supervision may be inadequate for
high- or moderate-risk offenders.42
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 13
43. OKDOC P&P, 2006–2010 Exit Cohorts, Exit Cohort Less Deaths.
44. CSG Justice Center focus group with Central District Probation and
􀁃􀁔􀁥􀁢􀁟􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁁􀁢􀁩􀁘􀁠􀁕􀁘􀁥􀀃􀀤􀀩􀀟􀀃􀀥􀀣􀀤􀀤􀀡
45. Michael D. Spiegler and David C. Guevremont, Contemporary Behavior
Therapy, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 2003.
46. OKDOC P&P, 2006–2010 Exit Cohorts. Exit Cohort Less Deaths —
This is a proportion of people who lived to complete probation.
47. CSG Justice Center, The National Summit on Justice Reinvestment and
Public Safety: Addressing Recidivism, Crime, and Corrections Spending, January
2011.
A shift to evidence-­based practices has
increased the effectiveness of OKDOC P&P,
but there remain aspects of P&P operations
that could be improved.
􀂇􀀃 􀀳􀀉􀀳􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁈􀁙􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀐􀁅􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆��􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀃
into its supervision model in early 2006. Between
FY 2006 and FY 2010, completion rates for all cat-egories
of probationers increased, with high-risk
offenders completing 14 percent more frequently,
moderate-risk improving by 8 percent, and low-risk
by 2 percent.43
􀂇􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃 􀁙􀁄􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁏􀁒􀁆􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃
observed that the probation culture has changed
markedly since they adopted new, evidence-based
􀁓􀁕􀁄􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀲􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁄􀁓􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁋􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁊􀁄􀁕􀁇-
ing risk and needs, and they are focused on changing
the behaviors of the person they are supervising, as
opposed to an exclusive focus on monitoring the per-son
’s compliance with the conditions of supervision.
Understanding Risk Assessment47
Risk assessment tools help users sort individuals into low-­, medium-­, and high-­risk groups. They are designed to
gauge the likelihood that an individual will come in contact with the criminal justice system, either through a new
arrest and conviction or re-­incarceration for violating the terms of supervision. They usually consist of 10 to 30
questions designed to ascertain an individual’s history of criminal behavior, attitudes and personality, and life cir-­
cumstances. Risk assessments can be administered at any time during a person’s contact with the criminal justice
􀁦􀁬􀁦􀁧􀁘􀁠􀂶􀁙􀁥􀁢􀁠􀀃􀃭􀁥􀁦􀁧􀀃􀁔􀁣􀁣􀁘􀁔􀁥􀁔􀁡􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁥􀁢􀁨􀁚􀁛􀀃􀁣􀁥􀁘􀁦􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁘􀁡􀁖􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀟􀀃􀁣􀁟􀁔􀁖􀁘􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀟􀀃􀁔􀁗􀁠􀁜􀁦􀁦􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁖􀁢􀁥􀁥����􀁖􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀁔􀁟􀀃􀁙􀁔􀁖􀁜􀁟-­
ity, the period prior to release, and post-­release supervision. They are similar to tools used by an insurance company
to rate risk: they predict the likelihood of future outcomes according to their analysis of past activities (e.g., crimi-­
nal history) and present conditions (such as behavioral health or addiction). Objective risk assessments have been
shown to be generally more reliable than any individual professional’s judgment. Too often, these judgments are no
more than “gut” reactions that vary from expert to expert on the same individual.
Figure 9: Completion Rates for Probation
Increased After OKDOC Implemented
Evidence-­Based Practices46
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Total Low Moderate High
10%
30%
50%
70%
90%
FY2006 February 1, 2006 FY2010
OKDOC began using EBP
+4% +2%
+8%
+14%
􀂇􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁆􀁘􀁖􀀃 􀁊􀁕􀁒􀁘􀁓􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃
reported that they typically conducted meetings with
high-risk offenders once or twice a month for 15 to
25 minutes per session.44 With as much as weeks
between visits, the response to violations may not be
timely.45
14 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
48. 􀀶􀁆􀀺􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀃􀁃􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁆􀁨􀁥􀁩􀁘􀁬􀀟􀀃􀁂􀁖􀁧􀁢􀁕􀁘􀁥􀀃
2011. The response rate was 58 percent, or 140 out of the 242
􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀃􀁖􀁨􀁥􀁥􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁟􀁬􀀃􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁂􀀾􀀷􀁂􀀶􀀃􀁃􀀙􀁃􀀃􀁣􀁔􀁬􀁥􀁢􀁟􀁟􀀡
49. OKDOC’s policy operation manual states that if jail time is the
recommended sanction, the sentencing judge must approve and sign a
form and the sheriff or jail administrator must stamp a copy. Retrieved
from www.doc.state.ok.us/Offtech/op161002.pdf.
50.􀀃􀀶􀁆􀀺􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀃􀁃􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁆􀁨􀁥􀁩􀁘􀁬􀀟􀀃􀁂􀁖􀁧􀁢􀁕􀁘􀁥􀀃
2011.
51. Ibid.
52. OKDOC’s policy operation manual states that if jail time is the
recommended sanction, the sentencing judge must approve and sign a
form and the sheriff or jail administrator must stamp a copy. Retrieved
from www.doc.state.ok.us/Offtech/op161002.pdf.
􀀴􀁖􀁖􀁢􀁥􀁗􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁦􀁨􀁥􀁩􀁘􀁬􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀃
conducted by the CSG Justice Center in
􀁂􀁖􀁧􀁢􀁕􀁘􀁥􀀃􀀥􀀣􀀤􀀤􀀟􀀃􀁜􀁡􀁦􀁨􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁜􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁦􀁢􀁨􀁥􀁖􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃
��􀁨􀁥􀁗􀁘􀁡􀁦􀁢􀁠􀁘􀀃􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁖􀁘􀁦􀁦􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁠􀁔􀁞􀁘􀀃􀁜􀁧􀀃􀁗􀁜􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁨􀁟􀁧􀀃􀁙􀁢􀁥􀀃
􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁦􀁣􀁢􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁤􀁨􀁜􀁖􀁞􀁟􀁬􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃
appropriately when someone violates a
condition of release.48
􀂇􀀃 􀀤􀁏􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁊􀁋􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁜􀀃􀁅􀁕􀁌􀁈􀂾􀁜􀀃
someone who violates a condition of release, this
option appears to be exercised infrequently. Fifty per-
􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁜􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁏􀁌􀁊􀁋􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀐
􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀏���� 􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁆􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀀏􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃
􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁌􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁍􀁄􀁌􀁏􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁓􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁄􀁅􀁏􀁈􀀃
to use intermediate sanctions that they feel would be
timely and effective responses to violations of super-vision
conditions.49
􀂇􀀃 􀀳􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃 􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀀃
intermediate sanction of jail in response to 10 per-cent
of supervision violations. Of the 140 respon-dents,
52 percent said they “never ” give jail time as
an intermediate sanction. The Tulsa Probation and
Parole District reported the highest use of jail as an
intermediate sanction: 13 percent of probation vio-lations
in Tulsa resulted in jail time; the Southwest
District responded to 5 percent of violations with jail
time, which was the lowest reported use of the six
􀀳􀀉􀀳􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁕􀁌􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀑50
􀂇􀀃 􀀩􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁜􀀐􀂽􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁙􀁈􀁜􀁈􀁇􀀃
reported that capacity concerns in their district ’s jails
limited their use of jail time as a sanction. Nine per-cent
reported that this is “sometimes ” a concern and
47 percent reported that it is not a concern.51
Oklahoma has a statewide drug court
system, which was designed to meet national
standards and apply best practices, but as
with any program, there is always room for
improvement.
􀂇􀀃 ODMHSAS coordinates a system of 45 drug courts
that operate in 72 of Oklahoma ’s 77 counties. These
specialty courts promote accountability and recovery
from addiction for people who are convicted of cer-tain
low-level crimes and who have substance abuse
disorders. In FY 2010, Oklahoma drug courts had the
capacity to serve approximately 4,100 participants on
any given day. ODMHSAS spent $17 million in state
dollars to support these drug courts, which amounts
􀀹􀁜􀁚􀁨􀁥􀁘􀀃􀀤􀀣􀀭􀀃􀀴􀀃􀁦􀁨􀁥􀁩􀁘􀁬􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀃􀁜􀁡􀁗􀁜􀁖􀁔􀁧􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁔􀁧􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀁬􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁙􀁥􀁔􀁜􀁡􀀃
from using a sanction of jail due to jail capacity concerns52
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Central Northeast Southeast Northwest Southwest Tulsa
Yes Sometimes No
No
46%
Yes
45%
Sometimes
9%
Department-­wide Region
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 15
53. Ibid. Forty-­six percent of all state substance use treatment dollars
were dedicated to drug courts.
54. David Wright (ODMHSAS), personal communication, November 4,
2011.
55. National Drug Court Institute, Painting the Current Picture: A National
Report on Drug Courts and Other Problem-­Solving Court Programs in the United
􀁆􀁧􀁔􀁧􀁘􀁦􀀡 Retrieved November 18, 2011, from www.ndci.org/sites/
􀁗􀁘􀁙􀁔􀁨􀁟􀁧􀀢􀃭􀁟􀁘􀁦􀀢􀁡􀁔􀁗􀁖􀁣􀀢􀁃􀀶􀁃􀀘􀀥􀀣􀁅􀁘􀁣􀁢􀁥􀁧􀀘􀀥􀀣􀀹􀀼􀁁􀀴􀀿􀀡􀁃􀀷􀀹􀀡􀀃
56. David Wright (ODMHSAS), personal communication, November
30, 2011.
57. David Wright (ODMHSAS), personal communication, November 4,
2011.
58. ODMHSAS;; OSBI 2007 release and rearrest data;; OKDOC 2007
release data.
59. ODMHSAS;; OSBI 2007 releases rearrest data;; and OKDOC 2007
Release Data.
to almost half of all state substance abuse treatment
dollars appropriated in FY 2010 to treat people with
addictions who fall below 200 percent of the poverty
line.53
􀂇􀀃 The state ’s drug court graduation rate is consistent
with drug court graduation rates nationally. In 2008,
59 percent of total participants successfully com-pleted
the program.54 The same year, the average
graduation rate for all drug courts nationally was 57
percent.55
􀂇􀀃 A validated risk assessment tool is not utilized to pri-oritize
drug court resources for those people who are
most likely to reoffend and whose need for treatment
is most acute. The use of such a risk assessment
would ensure that high-risk offenders who would
􀁅􀁈􀁑􀁈􀂽􀁗􀀃􀁐􀁒􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁘􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒-
gram have the opportunity to participate.
􀂇􀀃 Currently, decisions about who is admitted to drug
court are based on the number of prior felony con-victions,
which is one of the best indicators of a
high-risk and -need offender. People admitted to
drug courts in Oklahoma in 2010 averaged two prior
felony convictions, but further analysis of this pool of
􀁓􀁄���􀁗􀁌􀁆􀁌􀁓􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀂾􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀘􀀙􀀜􀀏􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀀕􀀛􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀏􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁇􀀃􀁑􀁒􀀃
prior convictions.56
􀂇􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀛􀀏􀀃􀀲􀁎􀁏􀁄􀁋􀁒􀁐􀁄􀀃􀁇􀁕􀁘􀁊􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁌􀁄􀁏􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁙􀁒􀁎􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁈􀁕-
minated, and sent to prison 31 percent of drug court
participants.57 Drug court failures often serve lengthy
terms of incarceration because they must serve the
sentence determined in the original plea agreement
based on the underlying charge.
􀁇􀁛􀁘􀁥􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁥􀁘􀀃􀁜􀁡􀁦􀁨􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁜􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁦􀁨􀁕􀁦􀁧􀁔􀁡􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁕􀁨􀁦􀁘􀀃
treatment resources available to people
under community supervision.
􀂇􀀃 ODMHSAS has limited funds to set aside each year
for substance abuse treatment services for people
in the community under supervision of the crimi-nal
justice system. How these dollars are allocated
among the hundreds of thousands of people on pro-bation,
parole, DA supervision, or some other form
of community corrections depends exclusively on
the person ’s health needs; risk of reoffense is not a
factor.58
Figure 11: People Receiving Treatment After Release From Prison in FY 2007
Were Less Likely to Be Rearrested59
7,196
Released in FY2007
Offenders not receiving treatment following release were 29% more likely to be rearrested
1,195
Treatment
6,001
No Treatment
710
Not
Rearrested
59%
485
Rearrest
41%
2,796
Not Rearrested
47%
3,205
Rearrested
53%
16 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
60. 􀀶􀁆􀀺􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀃􀁃􀁥􀁢􀁕􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁆􀁨􀁥􀁩􀁘􀁬􀀟􀀃􀁂􀁖􀁧􀁢􀁕􀁘􀁥􀀃
2011.
61. ODMHSAS Commissioner Terri White, personal communication,
December 10, 2011.
62. ODMHSAS, personal communication, November 23, 2011. Percent
change is based on rounded whole number percentages (as seen in
Figure 11) and therefore may not be exact.
􀂇􀀃 The availability of substance abuse treatment pro-grams
was rated as poor to fair by 62 percent of pro-
􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀑60
􀂇􀀃 􀀥􀁈􀁗􀁚􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀓􀀛􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀕􀀓􀀔􀀔􀀏􀀃􀁑􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁗􀁜􀀐􀂽􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁌􀁇􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁌􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅-
stance abuse treatment beds were lost due to bud-get
cuts. When a residential treatment bed is not
available, a person in need is placed on a waiting
list, which on any given day can exceed 600 Okla-homans.
61 While waiting, people under community
supervision may relapse.
􀂇􀀃 Offenders with a treatment need who are able to
access treatment services have a reduced likelihood
of rearrest: for those released from prison in FY
2007, people who did not receive treatment were 29
percent more likely to be rearrested in the 36 months
following release.62
Strategy 2: Strengthen
supervision
􀁅􀁘􀁗􀁨􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁖􀁜􀁗􀁜􀁩􀁜􀁦􀁠􀀃􀁔􀁠􀁢􀁡􀁚􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁢􀁦􀁘􀀃􀁠􀁢􀁦􀁧􀀃􀁟􀁜􀁞􀁘􀁟􀁬􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁢􀃽􀁘􀁡􀁗􀀃
by mandating supervision following prison and
􀁘􀁡􀁦􀁨􀁥􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀃􀁦􀁨􀁣􀁘􀁥􀁩􀁜􀁦􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁦􀁢􀁨􀁥􀁖􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁥􀁘􀀃􀁦􀁨􀃻􀁖􀁜􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁛􀁢􀁟􀁗􀀃
􀁢􀃽􀁘􀁡􀁗􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁖􀁖􀁢􀁨􀁡􀁧􀁔􀁕􀁟􀁘􀀡
2(A): Require that every prison sentence
include a period of post-­release supervision
of no less than 9 months.
rationale: This policy would ensure that people
who are at risk of reoffending, and who currently are
manipulating existing policies to avoid supervision
in the community once they leave prison, have some
form of post-release supervision.
2(B): Provide probation with additional
resources to strengthen supervision.
􀂇􀀃 Increase resources incrementally to ensure addi-
􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁄􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁋􀁌􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁌􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀏􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁇􀁜􀀃
to supervise the growing number of people who will
have mandatory supervision terms following their
prison release.
􀂇􀀃 Design and implement a plan to increase the amount
􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁈􀁒􀁓􀁏􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃
supervise who are most likely to reoffend.
rationale:􀀃􀀫􀁌􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁄􀁇􀁇􀁌􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈����􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃
free up more time for increased contact with people
􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁙􀁌􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀑􀀃􀀳􀀉􀀳􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁏􀁇􀀃􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃
supervision is clearly differentiated based on risk level
and that resources are focused on high-risk offenders
whose behavior is most likely to change with supervi-sion
more intense than is currently provided.
2(C): Conduct a presentence risk and need
screen on all people admitted to county jails
who have been charged with a felony.
􀂇􀀃 Building on already existing screening efforts, con-duct
a screen on people charged with felony offenses
to ensure that objective information about a person ’s
risks and needs informs prosecutorial and sentenc-ing
decisions.
􀂇􀀃 Follow initial screening with an objective and vali-dated
risk assessment for those people who, through
the initial screening, appear to be at high risk of
reoffending.
􀂇􀀃 Provide professional development opportunities
to ensure that judges, DAs, and the defense bar
understand the risk and need assessment and how
it should be used.
rationale: This policy will help ensure DAs and
judges have information about a person ’s risks and
needs, which can guide their recommendations and
decisions about the most appropriate level of punish-ment,
supervision, and treatment. It also will ensure
that the state ’s resources are concentrated on those
people for whom they can make the greatest difference.
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 17
2(D): Utilize swift and certain intermediate
sanctions when people violate conditions of
supervision.
􀂇􀀃 􀀤􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁝􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁅􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀏􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀀃
court hearing, to certain probation violations with
sanctions that include up to 3 days in jail. Limit the
use of this jail sanction to a maximum of 6 days per
month. Permit probationers to waive their right to a
violation hearing.
􀂇􀀃 Ensure that DA supervision can impose an inter-mediate
sanction of jail on probationers, and trans-
􀁉􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁐􀀃 􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀀲􀀮􀀧􀀲􀀦􀀃 􀀳􀀉􀀳􀀏􀀃 􀁕􀁄􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁖􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁜􀀃
revoking their probation and sending them directly
to prison.
􀂇􀀃 Create an intermediate sanction facility (ISF) where
people whose probation is being revoked for the
􀂽􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁋􀁈􀁏􀁇􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁘􀁓􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀀙􀀃 􀁐􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁋􀁖􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃
policy shall apply only to those people who have not
absconded or been convicted of a new crime.
􀂇􀀃 Allow drug court participants to be sanctioned to the
ISF after committing serious violations of the condi-tions
of their program.
rationale: This policy would provide probation
􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁘􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀂾􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁅􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃
lack to ensure that responses to supervision violations
are swift and certain. Probation departments in both
Georgia and Hawaii have implemented similar poli-cies.
Researchers evaluating these policy changes have
found that the Georgia policy, which enables probation
􀁒􀁉􀂽􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁈􀁎􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁄􀀃
court hearing, reduced by 70 percent the number of
days that people on probation spent in jail because
they violated a condition of supervision or because they
were awaiting a court hearing.63
2(E): Improve access to treatment for
high-­risk/high-­need people sentenced to
supervision.
􀂇􀀃 Expand substance abuse treatment capacity by creat-ing
a funding stream within ODMHSAS that serves
people on supervision who are determined to be at
high risk of reoffending and who have acute sub-stance
abuse problems.
􀂇􀀃 Support efforts by the ODMHSAS to contract with
􀁆􀁈􀁕􀁗􀁌􀂽􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁘􀁅􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁅􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁗􀁐􀁈􀁑􀁗􀀃􀁓􀁕􀁒-
fessionals that provide services and/or employ prac-tices
that research has demonstrated are effective.
􀂇􀀃 Provide funding to train substance abuse treatment
providers in the evidence-based principles of risk,
need, and responsivity.
rationale: Research shows that the greatest reduc-tions
in recidivism can be achieved when treatment
and supervision resources are concentrated on high-risk,
high-need individuals. Furthermore, research
demonstrates that applying the same level of supervi-sion
resources to high- and low-risk offenders is coun-terproductive
and can actually increase recidivism
rates for low-risk offenders.64
63. Jon Speir and Tammy Meredith, An Evaluation of Georgia’s Probation
Options Management Act, Georgia Department of Corrections, 2007.
64. Presentation by Dr. Ed Latessa, “What Works and What Doesn’t in
Reducing Recidivism: Applying the Principles of Effective Intervention
to Offender Reentry.” Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, September 14, 2011.
18 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
As Oklahoma’s prison population has grown,
state spending on corrections has also
increased.
􀂇􀀃 The prison population in Oklahoma grew 17 percent,
from 23,258 to 26,692 people, between FY 2000 and
FY 2011.65 This rate of growth exceeded the rate of
growth of Oklahoma ’s resident population, which
increased almost nine percent, from 3,350,654 to
3,751,351.66
􀂇􀀃 During the same period, the annual appropriation
for the OKDOC increased 30 percent, from $356 mil-lion
in FY 2000 to $462 million in FY 2011.67
Much of the prison population growth stems
from an Oklahoma statute that increased
the percentage of a sentence that people
convicted of various serious or violent crimes
must serve in prison.
􀂇􀀃 Violent offenders are serving longer sentences in
prison than ever before. The 85 percent law, which
became effective in 2000, requires certain offenders
to serve at least 85 percent of their sentence before
becoming eligible for release. Policies intended to
offset the impact of this new law on the prison pop-ulation
were adopted at the time, but subsequently
repealed. As a result, Oklahoma ’s prison population
􀁋􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁖􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁌􀂽􀁆􀁄􀁑􀁗􀁏􀁜􀀃􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁖􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁇􀁈􀀑
􀂇􀀃 In FY 2005, people sentenced to prison under the 85
percent law accounted for 10 percent of the prison
population; by FY 2010, this population increased to
19 percent.68
65. OKDOC’s Evaluation and Analysis, The State of Corrections in Oklahoma:
FY 2010 (retrieved May 1, 2011, from doc.state.ok.us/newsroom/
annuals/2010/annualreport2010.pdf);; Christopher Hyde, personal
communication, August 19, 2011.
66. U.S. Census Bureau. Retrieved December 23, 2011 from
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/40000.html.
67. State of Oklahoma, FY 2011 State Agency Appropriations Summary.
Retrieved May 20, 2010, from http://ftpcontent.worldnow.com/
􀁚􀁥􀁜􀁙􀃭􀁡􀀢􀁁􀀸􀁊􀁆􀁢􀁡􀀩􀀢􀁃􀀷􀀹􀀢􀀤􀀣􀀣􀀨􀀢􀁕􀁨􀁗􀁚􀁘􀁧􀁗􀁘􀁧􀁔􀁜􀁟􀁦􀀡􀁣􀁗􀁙􀀡􀀃􀁇􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀃
Legislature appropriated $503 million to OKDOC in both FY 2009 and
FY 2010. This is a 41 percent increase from FY 2000 and OKDOC’s peak
􀁔􀁣􀁣􀁥􀁢􀁣􀁥􀁜􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁗􀁨􀁥􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁗􀁘􀁖􀁔􀁗􀁘􀀡􀀃􀀵􀁬􀀃􀀹􀁌􀀃􀀥􀀣􀀤􀀤􀀟􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀃭􀁚􀁨􀁥􀁘􀀃􀁗􀁥􀁢􀁣􀁣􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃
$462 million, which is eight percent lower than FY 2010’s apex.
68. CSG Justice Center analysis based on OKDOC admissions data.
Challenge 3: Growing prison population
If current policies remain unchanged, the prison population will continue to grow, and the state will need to
􀁘􀁫􀁣􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁣􀁥􀁜􀁦􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁖􀁔􀁣􀁔􀁖􀁜􀁧􀁬􀀃􀁔􀁧􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁦􀁜􀁚􀁡􀁜􀃭􀁖􀁔􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁖􀁢􀁦􀁧􀀃􀁧􀁢􀀃􀁧􀁔􀁫􀁣􀁔􀁬􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀡
Explanation of the 85% Law
Persons convicted of an 85 percent offense are required to serve no less than 85 percent of the court-­imposed sen-­
tence of imprisonment prior to becoming eligible for parole consideration. Persons convicted of these offenses are
not eligible to earn credits reducing their length of stay until 85 percent of their sentence has been served. The 85
􀁣􀁘􀁥􀁖􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁟􀁔􀁪􀀃􀁕􀁘􀁖􀁔􀁠􀁘􀀃􀁘􀁙􀁙􀁘􀁖􀁧􀁜􀁩􀁘􀀃􀁜􀁡􀀃􀀥􀀣􀀣􀀣􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁥􀁜􀁚􀁜􀁡􀁔􀁟􀀃􀁟􀁔􀁪􀀃􀁜􀁗􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁜􀃭􀁘􀁗􀀃􀀤􀀤􀀃􀁢􀁙􀁙􀁘􀁡􀁦􀁘􀁦􀀮􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁙􀁢􀁟􀁟􀁢􀁪􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀃􀁬􀁘􀁔􀁥􀀟􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁟􀁘􀁚􀁜􀁦􀁟􀁔􀁧􀁨􀁥􀁘􀀃
added ten more crimes to this list. One year later, and again in 2007 and 2011, the legislature added an additional
􀁢􀁙􀁙􀁘􀁡􀁦􀁘􀀡􀀃􀀴􀁦􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀥􀀣􀀤􀀤􀀟􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀁥􀁘􀀃􀁪􀁘􀁥􀁘􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁧􀁢􀁧􀁔􀁟􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀥􀀨􀀃􀁢􀁙􀁙􀁘􀁡􀁦􀁘􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁪􀁛􀁜􀁖􀁛􀀃􀁜􀁡􀁖􀁟􀁨􀁗􀁘􀀃􀁦􀁘􀁥􀁜􀁢􀁨􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁛􀁘􀁜􀁡􀁢􀁨��􀀃􀁖􀁥􀁜􀁠􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁦􀁨􀁖􀁛􀀃􀁔􀁦􀀃􀃭􀁥􀁦􀁧􀀃􀁗􀁘􀁚􀁥􀁘􀁘􀀃
murder, rape, robbery, arson, child pornography, and assault with intent to kill.
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 19
􀂇􀀃 In practice, the 85 percent offenders serve approxi-mately
92.5 percent of their sentences.69 There are
two reasons for this phenomenon. First, state stat-ute
is not interpreted in a way that allows 85 percent
offenders to earn programmatic or good behavior
credits until they have completed 85 percent of their
sentence.70 Second, many people sentenced under
the 85 percent law choose to waive the parole process
when they become eligible for parole after serving 85
percent of their sentence. They elect to do so because
they want to avoid post-release supervision. Only one
percent of the 761 parolees in FY 2010 also had an 85
percent conviction.71
Oklahoma’s prison population growth is
expected to continue.
􀂇􀀃 According to a CSG Justice Center propagation
model, the prison population will continue to grow
over the next decade, largely because of an increase
in the number of people sentenced under the 85
percent law.72 That number is projected to rise from
6,137 in FY 2012 to 8,698 in FY 2021, an increase
of 3,028 or 42 percent.73 The CSG Justice Center, in
consultation with OKDOC, projects the cumulative
additional cost to the state to house these offend-ers
between FY 2013 and FY 2021 will be $259
million, on top of what the state already spends on
corrections.74
􀂇􀀃 The propagation model assumed a 1 percent annual
increase in the number of admissions for people
sentenced under the 85 percent law, which is consis-tent
with past annual trends. It is not the number of
admissions that simply drives the prison population
upward; it is also the certainty that the number of
people in prison who will serve at least 85 percent of
their sentence is steadily accumulating.
􀂇􀀃 The propagation model is a static estimate; it assumes
that the annual population of offenders convicted for
non-85 percent offenses remains constant at the FY
2011 level. That share of the population may increase
or decrease depending on changes in admissions
and/or length of stay.
69. CSG Justice Center analysis based on OKDOC exit data.
70.􀀃􀁀􀁜􀁞􀁘􀀃􀁂􀁔􀁞􀁟􀁘􀁬􀀃􀀛􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀃􀀴􀁧􀁧􀁢􀁥􀁡􀁘􀁬􀀃􀀺􀁘􀁡􀁘􀁥􀁔􀁟􀀜􀀟􀀃􀁣􀁘􀁥􀁦􀁢􀁡􀁔􀁟􀀃
memorandum to OKDOC Director Justin Jones, October 12, 2011. The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has also issued various opinions
related to the intent of the statute. One of the most noteworthy is
the unpublished Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals case of 􀁆􀁢􀁢􀁧􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁩􀀡􀀃
Oklahoma Department of Corrections, REC-­2008-­442.
71. Ibid.
72. A propagation model analyzes past patterns to estimate future
patterns for a discrete component in a system. In contrast, a simulation
model includes all data elements and can makes dynamic predictions
across multiple attributes.
73. CSG Justice Center analysis based on OKDOC data. A propagation
model analyzes past patterns to estimate future patterns.
74. Tom James (OKDOC), personal communication, December 29,
2011. Full calculation completed by CSG Justice Center.
75. OKDOC, Entry and Exits, FY2005 to FY2011.
Figure 12: Estimate of Growth in Prison Population (Driven by Stacking of the
85% Offenders)75
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
Propagation Model
+3,110
85% Population
Assumes 1% increase in annual admissions for 85% crimes,
but population growth is driven by stacking as offenders
serve much longer than they have historically.
Non-­85% Population
Assumes the annual population of offenders incarcerated
for non-­85% offenses remains the constant at 2011 levels.
This is not a projection of the non-­85% population, but
rather a static estimate. This share of the population
may increase or decrease depending on any chance in
admissions or length of stay of this population.
Jail Back-­up
20 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
Drug possession is the most common
nonviolent felony in Oklahoma, yet state law
is ambiguous about the appropriate sentence
for people convicted of this crime, so use
of prison and probation for this population
varies considerably across the state.
􀂇􀀃 Drug possession cases make up approximately 30
percent of court dispositions in Oklahoma and Tulsa
Counties.76 The options available to DAs and judges
when sentencing individuals convicted of felony
drug possession in these two counties – and most
other counties in the state – include DA supervision,
probation, community sentencing, drug court, and
prison.
􀂇􀀃 In practice, DAs and judges use their discretion
to divert most people charged with drug posses-sion
from prison into other forms of punishment,
supervision, and treatment. Analysis of 2010 Tulsa
County data found that, of those people convicted of
felony drug possession, 24 percent were sentenced
to prison, 39 percent were sentenced to DA super-vision,
22 percent to probation, 10 percent to drug
court, and 6 percent to community sentencing.77
􀂇􀀃 Despite extensive use of diversions from prison
for drug possession felonies, analyses suggest that
for people convicted of this crime, prison is used
inconsistently, the level of community supervision
provided does not correspond to the likelihood of
whether someone will reoffend, and treatment is not
delivered in a manner that maximizes its impact.
􀂇􀀃 An analysis of a sample from the 7,056 people admit-ted
to prison between FY 2005 and FY 2010 for a drug
possession offense found that 10 percent had no
prior felony convictions, nor any prior misdemeanor
drug convictions. An additional 17 percent had one
prior drug conviction or one nonviolent felony.78
􀂇􀀃 In FY2010, the 1,070 offenders admitted to prison
for drug possession received an average sentence of
5.3 years, with sentence lengths ranging from 1.3
years to 12.7 years.79
76.􀀃􀀴􀁗􀁠􀁜􀁡􀁜􀁦􀁧􀁥􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁩􀁘􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀀶􀁢􀁨􀁥􀁧􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁂􀁞􀁟􀁔􀁛􀁢􀁠􀁔􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁇􀁨􀁟􀁦􀁔􀀃􀀶􀁢􀁨􀁡􀁧􀁬􀀃
Court Data
77. David Wright, personal communication, November 23, 2011
(Tulsa County DA probation data: CY 2010 receptions;; OKDOC FY 2010
probation data: FY 2010 community sentencing and prison receptions).
78. OSBI rap sheets for sample of drug possession receptions, retrieved
December 5, 2011. An offender can have a misdemeanor drug charge
and a non-­drug felony charge and fall in this category.
79. CSG Justice Center analysis based on OKDOC entry data.
80. OSBI Rap Sheets for sample of Drug Possession Receptions
Figure 13: Analysis of Drug Possession Offenders Admitted to
Prison between 2005 and 201080
26%
10%
17%
11% 12%
23% No History or
Only Non-Drug
Misdemeanors
1 Felony or
1 Prior Drug
Offense
2 Felonies or
2 Prior Drug
Offenses or
1 Violent Felony
3 Felonies or
3 Prior Drug
Offenses or
2 Violent
Felonies
4+ Felonies or
4+ Drug Priors or
3+ Violent Felonies
Unaffected by
Policy Change
Safety Concern
2+ Prior Felonies or
2+ Prior Drug Offenses or
1+ Violent Felony
Repeat User
Only 1 Prior Felony or
1 Prior Drug Offense
Wake Up Call
No Prior Convictions
or Only Non-Drug
Misdemeanors
Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma 21
􀂇􀀃 The drug possession statute provides just two sen-
􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁕􀁄􀁑􀁊􀁈􀁖􀀝􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀂽􀁕􀁖􀁗􀀐􀁗􀁌􀁐􀁈􀀃 􀁓􀁒􀁖􀁖􀁈􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑-
victions (2 –10 years) and another for second or
subsequent possession convictions (4 –20 years).81
The vague guidance provided in statute for judges
sentencing people convicted of a drug possession
􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁑􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁗􀁕􀁄􀁖􀁗􀁖􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁌􀂽􀁆􀀃 􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁐􀁈􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁖􀀃 􀁓􀁕􀁒-
vided for judges sentencing people convicted of Driv-
􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀀸􀁑􀁇􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀬􀁑􀂾􀁘􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀀋􀀧􀀸􀀬􀀌􀀑􀀃 􀀷􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁏􀁏􀁖􀀃
out punishment, supervision, and treatment accord-ing
to criminal history, risk of reoffense, and need
for treatment.82
Judges do not have a long enough window of
time in which to modify a sentence.
􀂇􀀃 State statute provides judges with only a 365-day
window, starting the day of conviction, to modify
sentences.83
􀂇􀀃Many of the interventions ordered by a judge require
either more than 1 year for successful completion or
take so long to enter into that the offender is unable to
show successful compliance by the time the judge ’s
ability to exercise discretion has lapsed.
􀂇􀀃 In focus group meetings with judges from across the
state, participants noted that they are unable to fully
􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁝􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁓􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁑􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁒􀁇􀁌􀂽􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁄􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃
the timeline for doing so is too short.84
Strategy 3: Contain prison
costs
Manage growth in the prison population while
􀁘􀁡􀁦􀁨􀁥􀁜􀁡􀁚􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁠􀁢􀁦􀁧􀀃􀁦􀁘􀁥􀁜􀁢􀁨􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁩􀁜􀁢􀁟􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁢􀃽􀁘􀁡􀁗􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀃􀁦􀁘􀁥􀁩􀁘􀀃
lengthier sentences that are required by the state’s 85
􀁣􀁘􀁥􀁖􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁟􀁔􀁪􀀡
3(A): Provide a graduated approach to
sentencing people convicted of drug
possession based on a person’s risk of
reoffending, criminal history, and substance
abuse.
rationale: State law should provide a graduated
approach that can be applied systematically for sen-tencing
individuals convicted of drug possession. Such
an approach would ensure that sentencing decisions
are made according to the likelihood that a person will
reoffend, past criminal history, and need for treatment,
and, as a result, increase public safety, reduce recidi-vism
and associated costs, and increase accountability
among people convicted of drug possession.
3(B): Require people convicted of the most
serious and violent offenses to serve 85
percent of their sentence in prison before
they are able to apply banked good behavior
and/or achievement credits.
􀂇􀀃 Clarify the intent of the 85 percent law by modify-ing
it to indicate that, starting in FY 2012, individuals
incarcerated for 85-percent crimes may be autho-rized
to start earning credits toward sentence reduc-tion
from 100 to 85 percent, while ensuring that they
will not be released before serving a full 85 percent of
their court-imposed sentence.
81. Schedule I or II, excluding marijuana possession.
82. Oklahoma Statutes, Title 63: Public Health and Safety, 63-­2-­
402, and Title 47: Motor Vehicles, 47-­11-­902 (retrieved from www.
oklegislature.gov/osstatuestitle.html);; Oklahoma Driver’s Manual,
November 2010 (retrieved from www.dps.state.ok.us/dls/pub/ODM.
pdf).
83. 22 O.S.§􀀃􀀬􀀫􀀥􀁔􀀡􀁇􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁟􀁟􀁢􀁪􀁔􀁕􀁟􀁘􀀃􀁪􀁜􀁡􀁗􀁢􀁪􀀃􀁙􀁢􀁥􀀃􀁦􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁘􀁡􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁠􀁢􀁗􀁜􀃭􀁖􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃
was previously 120 days. The statute was changed to 365 days on July
1, 1999.
84. CSG Justice Center meetings and focus groups with approximately
20 judges from across the state (August, September, and October
2011).
22 Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma
􀂇􀀃 The credits will be applied when the person com-pletes
85 percent of the sentence. Unless the offender
is engaged in misconduct during incarceration that
result in credit reductions, being convicted of an
85-percent crime will mean that the offender will
serve approximately 85 percent of the sentence.
rationale: This policy change would clarify the
statute regarding the inability of 85 percent offenders
to earn and bank credits for good behavior/participa-tion
in programs and subsequently apply them once
they have served 85 percent of their sentence. This
change would align the law with the understanding
that most people in Oklahoma ’s criminal justice sys-tem
had about the intent of the 85 percent law when it
was enacted. This change would also encourage 85 per-cent
offenders to exhibit good behavior and participate
in rehabilitation and educational programming before
serving 85 percent of their sentence. They currently
have no incentive to do either.
3(C): Permit a longer period after conviction
for judges to modify a sentence.
rationale: The ability to modify a sentence after
a period of time allows judges the option to recom-mend
that an offender undertake treatment, program-ming,
or other intervention and, upon completion of
recommended activities, that the sentence be altered
in response to the offender ’s compliance and demon-strated
behavior change.
To learn more about the justice reinvestment strategy
in Oklahoma and other states, please visit:
www.justicereinvestment.org
􀁇􀁛􀁘􀀃􀀶􀁢􀁨􀁡􀁖􀁜􀁟􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁆􀁧􀁔􀁧􀁘􀀃􀀺􀁢􀁩􀁘􀁥􀁡􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁦􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁘􀁥􀀃􀁜􀁦􀀃􀁔􀀃􀁡􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀁔􀁟􀀃􀁡􀁢􀁡􀁣􀁥􀁢􀃭􀁧􀀃􀁢􀁥􀁚􀁔􀁡􀁜􀁭􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁔􀁧􀀃􀁦􀁘􀁥􀁩􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁣􀁢􀁟􀁜􀁖􀁬􀁠􀁔􀁞􀁘􀁥􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁧􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁟􀁢􀁖􀁔􀁟􀀟􀀃􀁦􀁧􀁔􀁧􀁘􀀟􀀃
and federal levels from all branches of government. The Justice Center provides practical, nonpartisan advice and consensus-­driven
strategies, informed by available evidence, to increase public safety and strengthen communities.
This project was supported by Grant No. 2010-­RR-­
BX-­K071 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance.
The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the
􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁃􀁥􀁢􀁚􀁥􀁔􀁠􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁪􀁛􀁜􀁖􀁛􀀃􀁔􀁟􀁦􀁢􀀃􀁜􀁡􀁖􀁟􀁨􀁗􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃
Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of
􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀟􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁩􀁘􀁡􀁜􀁟􀁘􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀀷􀁘􀁟􀁜􀁡􀁤􀁨􀁘􀁡􀁖􀁬􀀃
􀁃􀁥􀁘􀁩􀁘􀁡􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀟􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁂􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁘􀀃􀁙􀁢􀁥􀀃􀁉􀁜􀁖􀁧􀁜􀁠􀁦􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀶􀁥􀁜􀁠􀁘􀀡􀀃􀁃􀁢􀁜􀁡􀁧􀁦􀀃
of view or opinions in this document are those of the
􀁔􀁨􀁧􀁛􀁢����􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁢􀀃􀁡􀁢􀁧􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁣􀁥􀁘􀁦􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁜􀁔􀁟􀀃􀁣􀁢􀁦􀁜􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁢􀁥􀀃
policies of the United State Department of Justice.
To learn more about the Bureau of Justice Assistance,
please visit: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/.
Research and analysis described in this report has been
funded in part by the Public Safety Performance Project
of The Pew Charitable Trusts’ Center on the States.
Launched in 2006 as a project of the Pew Center on the
States, the Public Safety Performance Project seeks to
􀁛􀁘􀁟􀁣􀀃􀁦􀁧􀁔􀁧􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁗􀁩􀁔􀁡􀁖􀁘􀀃􀃭􀁦􀁖􀁔􀁟􀁟􀁬􀀃􀁦􀁢􀁨􀁡􀁗􀀟􀀃􀁗􀁔􀁧􀁔􀀠􀁗􀁥􀁜􀁩􀁘􀁡􀀃􀁣􀁢􀁟􀁜􀁖􀁜􀁘􀁦􀀃
and practices in sentencing and corrections that protect
public safety, hold offenders accountable, and control
corrections costs.
To learn more about the Public Safety Performance
Project, please visit: http://www.pewpublicsafety.org/.
􀁃􀁢􀁜􀁡􀁧􀁦􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁩􀁜􀁘􀁪􀀟􀀃􀁥􀁘􀁖􀁢􀁠􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁗􀁔􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀁦􀀟􀀃􀁢􀁥􀀃􀃭􀁡􀁗􀁜􀁡􀁚􀁦􀀃􀁦􀁧􀁔􀁧􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁜􀁡􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁜􀁦􀀃􀁗􀁢􀁖􀁨􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁔􀁥􀁘􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁢􀁦􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁔􀁨􀁧􀁛􀁢􀁥􀁦􀀃􀁔􀁡􀁗􀀃􀁗􀁢􀀃􀁡􀁢􀁧􀀃􀁡􀁘􀁖􀁘􀁦􀁦􀁔􀁥􀁜􀁟􀁬􀀃􀁥􀁘􀃮􀁘􀁖􀁧􀀃
􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁢􀁙􀃭􀁖􀁜􀁔􀁟􀀃􀁣􀁢􀁦􀁜􀁧􀁜􀁢􀁡􀀃􀁢􀁥􀀃􀁣􀁢􀁟􀁜􀁖􀁜􀁘􀁦􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀁧􀁛􀁘􀀃􀀵􀁨􀁥􀁘􀁔􀁨􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀃􀀴􀁦􀁦􀁜􀁦􀁧􀁔􀁡􀁖􀁘􀀟􀀃􀁈􀀡􀁆􀀡􀀃􀀷􀁘􀁣􀁔􀁥􀁧􀁠􀁘􀁡􀁧􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃􀀽􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁜􀁖􀁘􀀟􀀃􀁇􀁛􀁘􀀃􀁃􀁘􀁪􀀃􀀶􀁛􀁔􀁥􀁜􀁧􀁔􀁕􀁟���􀀃􀁇􀁥􀁨􀁦􀁧􀁦􀀟􀀃􀀶􀁢􀁨􀁡􀁖􀁜􀁟􀀃􀁢􀁙􀀃
State Governments Justice Center, or the Council of State Governments’ members.
Suggested citation: Council of State Governments Justice Center, Justice Reinvestment in Oklahoma: Analysis and Policy Framework
(New York: Council of State Governments Justice Center, 2012).
Bureau of Justice Assistance
U.S. Department of Justice
Council of State Governments
Justice Center
New York, NY
Bethesda, MD
Austin, TX
Seattle, WA
project contact:
Anne Bettesworth
Policy Analyst
abettesworth@csg.org
www.justicecenter.csg.org