[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1998, Book II)]
[September 3, 1998]
[Pages 1519-1525]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]
Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With
United Nations Security Council Resolutions
September 3, 1998
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and as part of my effort to keep the
Congress fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts to
obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from June
24 to the present.
Introduction
From June 24 until August 5, Iraq had provided site access to U.N.
weapons inspectors, as required under UNSC resolutions and reaffirmed
under the terms of the February 23 Secretary General/Tariq Aziz MOU and
UNSC Resolution 1154. In June, UNSCOM inspectors presented a work plan
to Iraq to delineate areas of concern and elements that Iraq needed to
disclose. However, in June, UNSCOM revealed that it had found evidence
of Iraqi weaponization of VX nerve agent and in July, Iraq refused to
turn over a document accounting for use of CW during the Iran-Iraq war.
On August 3-4 when Chairman Butler was in Iraq to discuss phase two of
the work plan, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister claimed that Iraq was
fully ``disarmed'' and demanded that this be reported to the Council;
Butler refused, and subsequently departed Baghdad.
On August 5, Iraq declared that it was suspending all cooperation
with UNSCOM and the IAEA, except some limited monitoring activities. On
August 6, the Security Council President issued a press statement which
noted that Iraq's action contravenes the February 23 MOU and relevant
Security Council resolutions. On August 11/12, the IAEA and UNSCOM sent
letters to the Security Council that noted that Iraq's decision to
suspend cooperation with them halted ``all of the disarmament
activities'' of UNSCOM and placed limitations on the inspection and
monitoring activities of both organizations. On August 18, the Council
President replied in writing to UNSCOM and IAEA on the Council's behalf
reiterating full support for the full implementation of their mandates
and underscoring Iraq's obligation to cooperate in the conduct of their
activities, including inspections. Chairman Butler wrote to the Iraqi
regime August 19 expressing his willingness to resume activity, but that
offer was rebuffed.
On August 20, the Security Council met to conduct the periodic
review of Iraq's compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions.
It stated that ``the necessary conditions do not exist for the
modification of the regime established'' in relevant resolutions.
Moreover, the Security Council ``reiterates that the decision by Iraq to
suspend cooperation with UNSCOM and the
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IAEA (on August 5) is totally unacceptable'' and that it ``views with
extreme concern the continuing refusal by the Government of Iraq to
rescind its decision.'' The United States is working with other Security
Council members to suspend subsequent periodic reviews until Iraq
reverses course and resumes cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.
The cornerstone of U.S. policy is to contain Iraq and prevent it
from threatening regional peace and security. To that end, the United
States has supported UNSCOM since its inception and continues to do so,
as an integral part of our policy to contain Iraq and disarm it of its
WMD. We have consistently worked to uphold the principle that UNSCOM
must be able to do its job, free of Iraqi restrictions and impediments.
That includes inspections wherever, whenever, and however the Executive
Chairman of UNSCOM directs. There have been allegations recently that
the United States impeded some kinds of inspections since last fall. In
fact, the international effort to secure full access for UNSCOM and the
IAEA last fall and winter was lead by the United States. Since early
August, the United States has again lead the effort to reverse Iraq's
decision blocking UNSCOM activities. Decisions on how UNSCOM does its
job, including timing, locations and modalities for inspections, are the
Chairman's to make. As Chairman Butler stated on August 14,
``Consultations on policy matters take place regularly between the
Executive Chairman and Council members, but all operational decisions
are taken by the Executive Chairman (of UNSCOM) who has not been given
and would find it invidious were any attempt made to direct his
operational decisions or to micro-manage the day-to-day work of the
Special Commission.''
Iraq's refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM and the IAEA is totally
unacceptable; Iraq must meet its international obligations. In the first
instance, the Council and the Secretary General must respond effectively
to Iraq's flagrant challenge to their authority. We are working with
Council members to ensure that there is a clear, united and forceful
U.N. response to Iraq's actions. If the Council fails to persuade the
Iraqi regime to resume cooperation, all other options are on the table.
We continue to support the international community's efforts to
provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the
``oil-for-food'' program and other humanitarian efforts. On May 27,
1998, Iraq presented a distribution plan for the implementation of
Resolution 1153, which had been adopted on February 20. Under phase
three of the ``oil-for-food'' program, which ran from December 3, 1997,
through June 2, 1998, $1.1 billion worth of humanitarian goods were
approved for export to Iraq. Under the current phase, phase four, which
began in June, the U.N. Sanctions Committee has approved the purchase of
over $562 million worth of humanitarian goods. United States companies
can participate in the ``oil-for-food'' program, and over $165 million
worth of contracts for U.S. firms have been approved since the program
began.
On June 26, the Secretary of State reported to the Congress on plans
to establish a program to support the democratic opposition in Iraq, as
required by section 10008 of the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and
Rescissions Act (Public Law 105-174). Opposition leaders and their
representatives have been generally receptive to the focus on the
central themes of building a consensus on the transition from
dictatorship to pluralism, conveying to the U.N. opposition views on
Iraqi noncompliance with U.N. resolutions and compiling information to
support the indictment of Iraqi officials for war crimes. The new Radio
Free Iraq service, also funded by that Act, is preparing to broadcast
directly to the Iraqi people under the direction of Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty. These new programs will help us encourage the Iraqi
people to build a pluralistic, peaceful Iraq that observes the
international rule of law and respects basic human rights. Such an Iraq
would have little trouble regaining its rightful place in the region and
in the international community.
The United States maintains a significant military presence in the
region in order to provide the full range of military options necessary
to deter Iraqi aggression, to ensure that UNSC resolutions are enforced,
and to deal with other contingencies that may arise.
U.S. and Coalition Force Levels in the Gulf Region
In view of Saddam's record of aggressive behavior, it is prudent to
retain a significant force presence in the region to deter Iraq and deal
with any threat it might pose to its neighbors. The U.S. and allied
forces now in the region are prepared to deal with all contingencies. We
have the capability to respond rapidly to possible Iraqi aggression. We
have restructured our in-
[[Page 1521]]
theater force levels since my last report. We will continue to maintain
a robust force posture, and moreover, have established a rapid
reinforcement capability to supplement our forces in the Gulf when
needed. Our cruise missile force is twice the pre-October 1997 level, a
number that can be augmented significantly within days. Our contingency
plans allow us the capability for a swift, powerful strike.
The aircraft carrier USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN and accompanying combatant
ships and aircraft are on station in the Gulf today. Our forces in the
region include land and carrier-based aircraft, surface warships, a
Marine expeditionary unit, a Patriot missile battalion, a mechanized
battalion task force and a mix of special operations forces deployed in
support of USCINCCENT operations. To enhance force protection throughout
the region, additional military security personnel are also deployed.
Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch
The United States and coalition partners continue to enforce the no-
fly zones over Iraq under Operation Northern Watch and Operation
Southern Watch. There have been no observed no-fly zone violations.
However, on June 30, U.S. forces responded to an Iraqi ``threat radar''
and subsequently defended the coalition forces by firing an anti-
radiation (HARM) missile. We have made clear to Iraq and to all other
relevant parties that the United States and coalition partners will
continue to enforce both no-fly zones. The no-fly zones remain in
effect.
The Maritime Interception Force
The Maritime Interception Force (MIF), operating under the authority
of UNSC Resolution 665, vigorously enforces U.N. sanctions in the Gulf.
The U.S. Navy is the single largest component of this multinational
force, but it is frequently augmented by ships and aircraft from
Australia, Canada, Belgium, The Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom. Today in the Gulf, ships and aircraft from Canada and the
United Kingdom are operating with us in maritime patrols. Member states
of the Gulf Cooperation Council support the MIF by providing logistical
support and shipriders and by accepting vessels diverted for violating
U.N. sanctions against Iraq.
The MIF continues to intercept vessels involved in illegal smuggling
from Iraq. In late August, we conducted stepped-up operations in the far
northern Gulf in the shallow waters near the major Iraqi waterways.
These operations severely disrupted smuggling operations in the region.
Since the beginning of the year, over thirty vessels have been detained
for violations of the embargo and sent to ports in the Gulf for
enforcement actions by the GCC. Kuwait and the UAE, two countries
adjacent to the smuggling routes, have also stepped up their enforcement
efforts and have recently intercepted and detained vessels involved in
sanctions violations. Although petroleum products comprise most of the
prohibited traffic, the MIF has recently diverted vessels engaged in
date smuggling as well. Smuggling into Iraq is also a target for MIF
patrols. One additional difficulty remains in our effort to enforce U.N.
sanctions. Ships involved in smuggling have often utilized the
territorial seas of Iran to avoid MIF inspections. We have recently
provided detailed reports of these illegal activities to the U.N.
sanctions Committee in New York.
Chemical Weapons
Despite major progress reported by UNSCOM in accounting for SCUD CBW
warheads during this period, the Iraqis have taken a giant step backward
by continuing to deny the weaponization of VX nerve agent. This denial
is in direct contravention of the finding for UNSCOM by the U.S. Army
Edgewood Arsenal of stabilized VX nerve agent in SCUD missile warhead
fragments recovered by UNSCOM in Iraq. France and Switzerland are now
examining further samples taken in Iraq. They may not report results to
UNSCOM until late September.
However, we, UNSCOM Executive Chairman Butler, and a team of
international experts gathered by Butler are unanimously confident of
the scientific accuracy of the Edgewood results--which Butler has
declared publicly. Iraq is lying today about VX.
While the Iraqis provided new documents to help account for R-400
aerial bombs used for chemical weapons, they have failed to provide the
needed accounting for missing 155mm mustard-filled shells.
On July 22, 1998, UNSCOM reported in a letter to the President of
the Security Council that Iraq had refused to allow an UNSCOM chief
inspector to take, or even copy, a document found in Iraqi air force
headquarters that
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gave an accounting of chemical munitions used during the Iran-Iraq war.
This document would be of great value in helping UNSCOM establish a true
material balance for Iraqi chemical munitions--a mandatory task for
UNSCOM. During Butler's aborted visit to Iraq August 3-4, the Iraqi
Deputy Prime Minister told Ambassador Butler that Iraq would never give
it to the Commission. This evidence directly contradicts the Iraqi claim
that it has given UNSCOM all the information it has.
Biological Weapons
In July 1998, UNSCOM assembled yet another group of international
experts to meet with Iraqi counterparts for review of Iraqi declarations
on the biological weapons program. And again, the Iraqis presented no
new material. The experts thus found, again, that Iraq's declarations
are not adequate for credible verification. This conclusion covered
weapons (SCUD missile BW warheads, R-400 BW bombs, drop-tanks to be
filled with BW, and spray devices for BW), production of BW agents
(botulinum toxin, anthrax, aflatoxin, and wheat cover smut), and BW
agent growth media.
The report of this UNSCOM-250 mission of international experts
recommended to the UNSCOM Executive Chairman that no further
verification of Iraq's declarations be conducted until Iraq commits
itself to provide new and substantive information, stating that any
other approach would be counter-productive.
Long-Range Missiles
UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler reported to the Security
Council on August 5 that UNSCOM and Iraq had made significant progress
in the accounting of both CBW and conventional SCUD warheads, as well as
the material balance of major components for SCUD engine production.
However, no progress was reported in accounting for the unique SCUD
propellant possessed by Iraq, and the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister
refuses to allow further discussion of Iraq's concealment program,
including the hiding of SCUD warheads.
Nuclear Weapons
In an interim report to the UNSC July 29, the IAEA said that Iraq
had provided no new information regarding outstanding issues and
concerns. The IAEA said while it has a ``technically coherent picture''
of Iraq's nuclear program, Iraq has never been fully transparent and its
lack of transparency compounds remaining uncertainties. The IAEA noted
Iraq claims to have no further documentation on such issues as weapons
design engineering drawings, experimental data, and drawings received
from foreign sources in connection with Iraq's centrifuge enrichment
program. The IAEA also reported that Iraq said it was ``unsuccessful''
in its efforts to locate verifiable documentation of the abandonment of
the nuclear program. Iraq has failed to pass the measures required under
UNSC Resolution 715 to implement UNSC Resolutions 687, 707 and other
relevant resolutions, including the penal laws required to enforce them.
Dual-Use Imports
Resolution 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to monitor
Iraq's imports of allowed dual-use items. Iraq must notify the unit
before it imports specific items which can be used in both weapons of
mass destruction and civilian applications. Similarly, U.N. members must
provide timely notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items.
We continue to be concerned that Iraq's land borders are extremely
porous. Iraq continues substantial trade with its neighbors. There is
significant potential for evasion of sanctions by land routes, giving
additional weight to our position that UNSCOM must have full
unconditional access to all locations, and be allowed to inspect and
monitor Iraqi compliance over time.
Iraq's Concealment Mechanisms
In June, UNSCOM Chairman Butler presented Iraq with a proposed work
plan which, had Iraq cooperated, could have moved the process of
verifying the disarmament forward. However, when Butler made a return
visit August 3-4, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister denounced UNSCOM and
demanded that UNSCOM report to the Council that Iraq was ``disarmed in
all areas.'' On August 5, Iraq announced it was suspending cooperation
with UNSCOM and the IAEA. The following day, the Security Council
President issued a press statement declaring the Iraqi decision
``totally unacceptable,'' noting that it ``contravened'' relevant
Security Council resolutions.
On August 11, 1998, IAEA Director-General El Baradei wrote to the
President of the Security Council that Iraq's August 5 decision to
suspend its cooperation with UNSCOM and the
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IAEA ``makes it impossible for the IAEA . . . to investigate . . .
remaining questions and concerns . . .,'' and that Iraq's decision will
allow only ``limited implementation'' of monitoring that will ``fall
short of full implementation of the OMV plan and result in a
significantly reduced level of assurance'' that Iraq is not renewing its
programs for weapons of mass destruction.
On August 12, 1998, UNSCOM Executive Chairman Butler sent the
President of the Security Council a letter similar to the August 11
letter of the IAEA noted above, saying that ``Iraq's actions bring to a
halt all of the disarmament activities of the Commission and place
limitations on the rights of the Commission to conduct its monitoring
operations.''
On August 18, the Council President replied to UNSCOM and the IAEA
on behalf of the Council, reiterating the full support of the Council
for IAEA and UNSCOM to fully implement their mandates and noting that
Iraq is obliged to cooperate with them in their activities, including
inspections. On August 19, Chairman Butler wrote to the Iraqi government
seeking a resumption of the dialogue between UNSCOM and the regime and
of all substantive UNSCOM work. That request was immediately rebuffed.
On August 20, the Security Council conducted its periodic review of
Iraq's compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions. The
Council stated that ``the Sanctions Review showed that the necessary
conditions do not exist for the modification of the regime'' and
reiterated that ``the decision by Iraq to suspend cooperation with
UNSCOM and the IAEA is totally unacceptable.'' Further, ``they view with
extreme concern the continuing refusal by the Government of Iraq to
rescind its decision.''
We continue to work with the Council in its effort to bring about
full Iraqi cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. We are now seeking a
Council resolution that would suspend further periodic reviews until
Iraq reverses course and resumes cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.
Iraq's refusal to cooperate is a challenge to the authority of the
Security Council and to the credibility of all international weapons
nonproliferation efforts, since UNSCOM and the IAEA are responsible to
the Security Council for the most thorough arms control regime on earth.
The U.N.'s ``Oil-for-Food'' Program
We continue to support the international community's efforts to
provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the
``oil-for-food'' program and other humanitarian efforts. Under the last
phase of the ``oil-for-food'' program, which ran from December 3, 1997,
through June 2, 1998, $1.1 billion worth of humanitarian goods were
approved for export to Iraq. United States companies can participate in
``oil-for-food'' and over $165 million worth of contracts for U.S. firms
have been approved.
Under the current phase of ``oil-for-food'' Iraq is authorized to
sell up to $5.2 billion worth of oil every 180 days, up from $2.0
billion in previous phases. Although the UNSC resolution outlining this
program, Resolution 1153, was adopted on February 20, Iraq did not
present an acceptable distribution plan for the implementation of
Resolution 1153 until May 27, 1998; it was accepted by the U.N.
Secretary General on May 29.
Under the current phase of the ``oil-for-food'' program, 235
contracts for the purchase of humanitarian goods for the Iraqi people
have been presented for approval; of these, 162 contracts worth over
$562 million have been approved and 13 are on hold pending clarification
of questions about the proposed contracts. With regard to oil sales, 50
contracts with a total value of $955 million have been approved so far
during this phase.
The United States has supported the repair of the Iraqi oil
infrastructure in order to allow sufficient oil to be exported to fund
the level of humanitarian purchases the Security Council approved in
UNSC Resolution 1153. Treasury is in the process of amending its
regulations to allow U.S. companies to bid on oil infrastructure repair
contracts just as they are permitted both to purchase Iraqi oil and sell
humanitarian goods under the U.N. ``oil-for-food'' program.
Resolution 1153 maintains the separate program for northern Iraq,
administered directly by the U.N. in consultation with the local
population. This program, which the United States strongly supports,
receives 13 to 15 percent of the funds generated under the ``oil-for-
food'' program. The separate northern program was established because of
the Baghdad regime's proven disregard for the humanitarian condition of
the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkomen minorities of northern Iraq and its
readiness to apply
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the most brutal forms of repression against them. The well-documented
series of chemical weapons attacks a decade ago by the government
against civilians in the north is only one example of this brutality. In
northern Iraq, where Baghdad does not exercise control, the ``oil-for-
food'' program has been able to operate relatively effectively. The
Kurdish factions are seeking to set aside their differences to work
together so that the UNSC Resolution 1153 is implemented as efficiently
as possible.
The U.N. must carefully monitor implementation of Resolution 1153.
As the current phase anticipates a doubling of goods flowing into Iraq,
including equipment for infrastructure repairs in areas such as oil
export capacity, generation of electricity, and water purification, the
U.N. faces increasing challenges in monitoring. The Iraqi government
continues to insist on the need for rapid lifting of the sanctions
regime, despite its clear record of non-compliance with its obligations
under relevant U.N. resolutions--a record which was unanimously
acknowledged during the Security Council's 39th sanctions review on June
24. We will continue to work with the U.N. Secretariat, the Security
Council, and others in the international community to ensure that the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people are met while denying any
political or economic benefits to the Baghdad regime.
The Human Rights Situation in Iraq
The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be a cause
for grave concern. Particularly troubling are the assassinations of two
distinguished Shia clerics--Ayatollah Borujerdi on April 22 and Grand
Ayatollah Mirza Ali Gharavi on June 18. These killings have been widely
attributed to the Baghdad regime and were followed by an increased
security presence in the predominantly Shia cities of south and central
Iraq, such as Najaf and Karbala. These events expose a callous disregard
for human life and the free exercise of religion. Summary, arbitrary,
and extra-judicial executions also remain a primary concern. Baghdad
still refuses to allow independent inspections of Iraqi prisons despite
the conclusion of U.N. Special Rapporteur for Iraq, Max Van der Stoel,
that ``there is strong evidence that hundreds of prisoners (were)
executed in Abu Graraib and Radwaniyah prisons'' late last year. As
noted in my last report, based on these reports of summary executions
and other ongoing humans rights violations, the U.N. Human Rights
Commission in April issued a strong condemnation of the ``all-pervasive
repression and oppression'' of the Iraqi government. Nevertheless,
sources inside Iraq report another wave of executions in June, with
about sixty people summarily killed.
In southern Iraq, the government continues to repress the Shia
population, destroying the Marsh Arabs' way of life and the unique
ecology of the southern marshes. In the north, outside the Kurdish-
controlled areas, the government continues the forced expulsion of tens
of thousands of ethnic Kurds and Turkomen from Kirkuk and other cities.
The government continues to stall and obfuscate attempts to account for
more than 600 Kuwaitis and third-country nationals who disappeared at
the hands of Iraqi authorities during or after the occupation of Kuwait.
The Government of Iraq shows no sign of complying with UNSC Resolution
688, which demands that Iraq cease the repression of its own people.
Northern Iraq: Deepening Engagement
In northern Iraq, the cease-fire between the Kurdish parties,
established in November 1997 as the result of U.S. efforts, continues to
hold. It is strengthened by growing and effective cooperation between
the parties on humanitarian matters, particularly those related to the
U.N.'s ``oil-for-food'' program. Working with the U.N., the Kurds have
been able to resolve nutrition and medical problems and look forward to
rebuilding their infrastructure as U.N. programs expand. David Welch,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs,
led a U.S. delegation to the north, July 17-20. He encouraged the Kurds'
efforts towards peace; underscored U.S. support for their human rights,
physical welfare and safety; and renewed our decades-long engagement
with them. During the visit, Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP), and Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), made positive, forward-looking statements on
political reconciliation, and they accepted separate invitations to
visit the United States later this year.
The United States firmly supports the territorial integrity of Iraq.
Supporting the rights and welfare of Iraqi Kurds within Iraq in no way
contradicts that support. The United States is committed to ensuring
that international aid continues to get through to the north, that the
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human rights of the Kurds and northern Iraq minority groups, such as the
Turkomen, Assyrians, Yezedis and others are respected, and that the no-
fly zone enforced by Operation Northern Watch is observed.
We will continue our efforts to reach a permanent reconciliation
through mediation in order to help the people of northern Iraq find the
permanent, stable settlement they deserve, and to minimize the influence
of either Baghdad or Tehran. Baghdad continues to pressure the two
groups to enter into negotiations.
The Iraqi Opposition
It is the policy of the U.S. Government to support the Iraqi
opposition by establishing unifying programs on which all of the
opposition can agree. Section 10008 of the 1998 Supplemental
Appropriations and Rescissions Act (P.L. 105-174), earmarks $5 million
in FY 98 Economic Support Funds for these programs. These programs are
designed to encourage and assist political opposition groups,
nonpartisan opposition groups, and unaffiliated Iraqis concerned about
their nation's future in peacefully espousing democracy, pluralism,
human rights, and the rule of law for their country. Based on extensive
consultations with opposition leaders and representatives, we have found
a deep resonance on several central themes. These are: building a
consensus on the transition from dictatorship to pluralism, conveying to
the U.N. opposition views on Iraqi noncompliance with U.N. resolutions
and compiling information to support indictment of Iraqi officials for
war crimes.
Iraq is a diverse country--ethnically, religiously, and culturally.
The Iraqi opposition reflects this diversity. We emphasize themes and
programs, rather than individuals and groups, in order to encourage
unity and discourage the rivalries which have divided the opposition in
the past. Many opposition political groups that formerly coordinated
their efforts decided several years ago to work independently. We are
interested in working with them towards greater unity on their own
terms, not enforcing the issue by declaring that any one group must take
the lead. We firmly believe they can succeed in this effort.
We anticipate that there will be a need for additional funding for
these programs as the opposition becomes more active and as it grows.
The funds will be administered by the Department of State working
through established NGOs, Federal institutions, and comparable private
organizations. To ensure transparency and accountability and to avoid
creating potential rivalries among opposition groups, none of these
funds will go directly to any opposition group.
The United Nations Compensation Commission
The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), established
pursuant to UNSC Resolutions 687 and 692, continues to resolve claims
against Iraq arising from Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of
Kuwait. The UNCC has issued over 1.3 million awards worth approximately
$7 billion. Thirty percent of the proceeds from the oil sales permitted
by UNSC Resolution 986, 1111, 1143, and 1153 have been allocated to the
Compensation Fund to pay awards and to finance operations of the UNCC.
To the extent that money is available in the Compensation Fund, initial
payments to each claimant are authorized for awards in the order in
which the UNCC has approved them, in installments of $2,500. To date,
809 U.S. claimants have received an initial installment payment, and
payment is still in process for another 25 U.S. claimants.
Conclusion
Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I
remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all of its obligations
under UNSC resolutions. The United States looks forward to the day when
Iraq rejoins the family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding
member.
I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts and shall
continue to keep the Congress informed about this important issue.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton
Note: Identical letters were sent to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House
of Representatives, and Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the
Senate.