This
study uses a very simple experimental design to explore how children (ages 3
through 5) use ownership in their explanations about why it is acceptable or unacceptable
for a person to use an object. They do three experiments.

In the first two experiments, ownership is not mentioned to
children, and researchers test whether children bring up ownership
spontaneously in their explanations.

In Experiment 1, researchers
focused on the “right of use”, that is, whether it is acceptable for a certain
character to use a certain object.

Experiment 2 is
similar to experiment 1, but it focuses on the “right of exclusion” (someone
shouldn’t use something because it belongs to someone else).

Experiment 3 provides
children with explicit information about ownership before asking about
acceptability and unacceptability of use.

The conclusions are that, as children grow older, they become
more likely to use ownership to explain why it acceptable or unacceptable to
use an object. 3-year-olds rarely referenced ownership, while 5-year-olds
referenced ownership in almost half of their explanations. 5-year-olds gave
ownership explanations more than any other particular kind of explanation (and
this is not the case in younger children).

4- and 5-year-olds gave ownership explanations at similar
rates regardless of whether ownership was mentioned. However, whether ownership
was mentioned (experiment 3) did influence 3-year-olds: When 3-year-old explained
why it was unacceptable to use an object, they referenced ownership more often
when it was mentioned than when it was not mentioned. 3-year-olds gave more
ownership explanations in the unacceptability-of-use condition.

We should emphasize that it all hangs in the narrative
context. Children might reference ownership more if asked about why a person is
allowed to modify an object; but they might reference ownership less if asked
about gender typed objects or objects that are potentially dangerous, as other
explanatory factors might be more compelling for such items (i.e., gender
norms; safety concerns).

I’m interested in this topic because I think that ownership
plays an important role in the development of reasoning. Rather thank
considering reasoning as a cognitive, cold faculty that is applied to the
domain of ownership, I believe that reasoning develops in the context of the rhetorical
fight for object possession (competition, sharing, adjudication of ownership,
etc.) Children feel authorized to give
permission, forbid, and reason about objects in general in so far as they can
appropriate those objects and feel that they are their own. The fact that ownership
appears spontaneously in children’s reasoning is therefore relevant for my
research interests.

This is another great article by Ori Friedman’s team. They did three experiments to find out whether children see owned objects as fungible (i.e., as replaceable or interchangeable). In Experiment 1, children considered an agent who takes one of two identical objects and leaves the other for a peer. When considering a scenario where a boy took one of two identical objects home, and left the other for a girl, preschoolers viewed his behavior as more acceptable when he took his own item, rather than the girl’s.

In Experiment 2, children considered scenarios where one agent took property from another. When considering a scenario where a boy deprived a girl of her balloon, preschoolers judged it acceptable for the girl to take back her own balloon; but they judged it unacceptable for her to take the boy’s balloon, even though it was the only balloon available to compensate her.

Finally, in Experiment 3A and 3B, children considered scenarios where a teacher could give a child either of two objects to play with—an object that the child had recently played with, or another object that looked the same. When considering a scenario where a teacher could give a boy one of two identical-looking balls to play with, preschoolers were more likely to say she should return the ball that the boy had previously played with when it belonged to him, compared with when it was her own.

These findings indicate that children see property as non-fungible.

Previous studies showed that children at these ages show concern for owners’ rights to an object. McEwan et al.’s findings extend knowledge by showing that these concerns persist even when an identical replacement is available to the other. The fact that children at these ages already show intuitions of non-fungibility indicates that such intuitions are an early development, and perhaps foundational in people’s reasoning about ownership. People view ownership as granting people rights to particular objects (i.e., rather than to objects of a certain type).

These are all very relevant and important findings that add detail to current knowledge about the development of ownership.

One conceptual doubt. The fact that children say that it’s not ok to take the perpetrator’s object may not mean that children literally see identical objects as interchangeable. In my opinion, this last statement presupposes a “physicalist” view of the world, understood as a collection of free floating objects with certain physical characteristics that make them different or identical, and placed in certain positions within a 3D space. An alternative view is that children, when they respond to the interviewer, are judging the actions and intentions of the characters, in the context of a social situation that includes objects. And, as Gelman says, objects have histories. So children may think something like “it’s not ok to take someone else’s property even if they took yours first”. It is also more likely that they think in terms of particular objects, not in terms of classes or categories of objects. So the concepts of “identical” or “interchangeable” may not play a role in children’s reasoning. Also, the difference between responses to the balloon situation and the cookie situation might be due to the fact that children take into account the actions of the perpetrators, and perhaps her intentions. It’s not the same popping a balloon accidentally than eating a cookie purposefully.