PRIME MINISTER WINSTON CHURCHILL REVIEWED THE WAR BEFORE
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

London, England, April 9, 1941 [1]

We are now able, and indeed required, to take a more
general view of the war than when this resolution of thanks
was first conceived.

The loss of Bengazi and the withdrawal imposed upon us by
the German incursion into Cyrenaica are injurious chiefly on
account of the valuable airfields around Bengazi which have
now passed into enemy hands.

Apart from this important aspect we should have been
content, in view of the danger which was growing in the
Balkans, to have halted our original advance at Tobruk.

The rout of the Italians, however, made it possible to
gain a good deal of ground easily and cheaply and it was
thought worthwhile to do this, although in consequence of
other obligations, already beginning to descend upon us, only
comparatively light forces could be employed to hold what we
had won.

The movement of German air forces and armored troops from
Italy and Sicily to Tripoli had begun even before we took
Bengazi and our submarines and aircraft have taken a steady
toll of the transports carrying the German troops and
vehicles.

But that has not prevented, and could not prevent, their
building up a strong armored force on the African shore. With
this force they have made a rapid attack in greater strength
than our commanders expected at so early a date and we have
fallen back upon stronger positions and more defensible
country.

I cannot attempt to forecast what the course of the
fighting in Cyrenaica will be. It is clear, however, that
military considerations alone must guide our generals, and
that these must not in any way be complicated by what are
called prestige values or considerations for public
opinion.

Now that the Germans are using their armored strength in
Cyrenaica we must expect hard and severe fighting, not only
for the defense of Cyrenaica but for the defense of
Egypt.

It is fortunate that the Italian collapse in Eritrea,
Ethiopia and British and Italian Somaliland is liberating
progressively very substantial forces and masses of transport
to reinforce the Army of the Nile.

This sudden darkening of the scene in Cyrenaica in no way
detracts from the merits of the brilliant campaigns which
have destroyed the Italian Empire in North and East Africa.
Nor does it diminish our gratitude to the troops or our
confidence in the commanders who led them. On the contrary,
we shall show that our hearts go out to our armies even more
warmly when they are in hard action than when they are
sailing forward in the flowing tide of success.

A fortnight ago I warned the public that an unbroken
continuance of success could not be hoped for; that reverses
as well as victories must be expected; that we must be ready,
indeed we always are ready, to take the rough with the
smooth.

Since I used this language other notable episodes have
been added to those that had gone before. Cheren was stormed
after hard fighting which cost us about 4,000 casualties.

The main resistance of the Italian army in Eritrea was
overcome. Foremost in all this fighting in Eritrea were our
Indian troops, who at all points and on all occasions
sustained the martial reputation of the sons of
Hindustan.

After the fall of Cheren the army advanced. Asmara has
surrendered, the port of Massawa is in our hands. The Red Sea
has been virtually cleared of enemy warships, which is a
matter of considerable and even far reaching convenience.
Harar has fallen and our troops have entered and taken charge
of Addis Ababa.

The Duke of Aosta's army has retreated into the mountains
where it is being attended upon by the patriot forces of
Ethiopia. The complete destruction or capture of all Italian
forces in Abyssinia [Ethiopia] with corresponding immediate
relief to our operations elsewhere, may be reasonably
expected.

Besides these land operations the Royal Navy under
Admiral Cunningham, splendidly aided by the fleet air arm and
the R.A.F. have gained the important sea battle of Cape
Matapan-decisively breaking Italian naval power in the
Mediterranean.

When we look back upon the forlorn position in which we
were left in the Middle East by the French collapse, and when
we remember that not only were our forces in the Nile Valley
out-numbered by four or five to one by the Italian armies,
that we could not contemplate without anxiety the defense of
Nairobi, of Khartum, of Cairo, Alexandria, Jerusalem and the
Suez Canal, and that this situation has been marvelously
transformed; that we have taken more Italian prisoners than
we had troops in the country, that the British Empire has
fought alone and conquered alone except for the aid of the
gallant Free French and Belgian forces who, although few in
number, have borne their part-when all this is recalled amid
the unrelenting pressure of events, I feel confident that I
can commit this resolution to the House, and that it will be
most heartily and enthusiastically acclaimed.

I now turn from Cyrenaica and Abyssinia to the formidable
struggle which has followed the German invasion of the Balkan
Peninsula.

We have watched with growing concern the German
absorption of Hungary, the occupation of Rumania and the
seduction and occupation of Bulgaria.

Step by step we have seen this movement of German
military power to the east and southeast of Europe. A
remorseless accumulation of German armored and motorized
divisions and of aircraft has been in progress in all these
countries for months.

And at length we find that the Greeks and the Yugoslavs,
nations and States which never wished to take part in the
war, neither of which was capable of doing the slightest
injury to Germany, must now fight to the death for their
freedom and for the lands of their fathers.

Until Greece was suddenly and treacherously invaded at
the behest of the base Italian dictator, she had observed
meticulous neutrality. It may be that the sentiments of her
people were on our side, but nothing could have been more
correct than the behavior of her government.

We had no contacts or engagements of a military character
with the Greek Government. Although there were islands like
Crete of the highest naval consequence to us, and although we
had given Greece our guarantee against aggression, we
abstained from the slightest intrusion upon her. It was only
when she appealed to us for aid against the Italians that we
gave whatever support in the air and in supplies was
possible.

All this time the Germans continued to give friendly
assistance to Greece and to toy with the idea of a new
commercial treaty. German high officials, both in Athens and
Berlin, expressed disapproval of the Italian invasion.

From the beginning of December the movements of German
forces through Hungary and through Rumania toward Bulgaria
became apparent to all.

More than two months ago, by the traitorous connivance of
the Bulgarian King and government, advance parties of the
German air force in plain clothes gradually took possession
of Bulgarian air fields.

Many thousands of German airmen, soldiers and political
police were ensconced in key positions before the actual
announcement of the accession of Bulgaria to the Axis was
made.

German troops then began to pour into Bulgaria in very
large numbers. One of their objectives was plainly Salonika,
which I may mention they entered at 4 o'clock this
morning.

It has never been our policy nor our interest to see the
war carried into the Balkan Peninsula. At the end of February
we sent Foreign Secretary Eden and General Sir John G. Dill
to the Middle East to see if anything could be done to form a
united defensive front in the Balkans. They went to Athens,
and to Ankara and would have gone to Belgrade but they were
refused permission by Prince Paul's government.

If these three threatened States had stood together they
could have had at their disposal sixty or seventy divisions,
which with a combined plan and prompt united action taken,
might have confronted the Germans with a resistance which
might well have deterred them altogether and must in any case
have delayed them a long time, having regard to the
mountainous and broken character of the country and limits of
communications.

Although we were anxious to promote such a defensive
front, by which alone the peace of the Balkans could be
maintained, we were determined not to urge upon the Greeks,
already at grips with the Italians, any course contrary to
their desires.

The support which we can give to the peoples fighting for
freedom in the Balkans and in Turkey, or ready to fight, is
necessarily limited at present and we did not wish to take
the responsibility of pressing the Greeks to engage in a
conflict.

With the new and terrible foe gathering upon their
borders, however, on the first occasion Eden and Dill met the
Greek King and the Greek Prime Minister. The latter declared
spontaneously on behalf of his government that Greece was
resolved at all costs to defend her freedom and native soil
against any aggressor, and that even if left wholly
unsupported by Great Britain or by Turkey and Yugoslavia,
they would remain faithful to their alliance with Great
Britain, which came into play at the opening of the Italian
invasion, and would fight to the death against both Italy and
Germany.

This being so, our duty was clear. We were bound in honor
to give them all the aid in our power. If they were resolved
to face the might and fury of the Huns, we had no doubts but
that we should share their ordeal, and that the soldiers of
the British Empire must stand in the line with them.

We were apprised by our generals on the spot, Dill and
Sir Archibald Wavell, and Greek Commander in Chief Alexander
Papagos-both victorious commanders in chief-that a sound
military plan, giving good prospects of success, could be
made.

Of course in all these matters there is hazard. In this
case as any one can see, without particularizing unduly,
there was for us a double hazard.

It remains to be seen how well these opposing risks and
duties have been judged. But of this I am sure, that there is
no less likely way of winning a war than to adhere
pedantically to the maxim of "safety first."

Therefore, early in March we made a military agreement
with the Greeks, and the considerable movement of British and
Imperial troops and supplies began. I cannot enter into
details or, while this widespread battle is going on, attempt
to discuss either the situation or the prospects.

I therefore turn to the story of Yugoslavia. This valiant
steadfast people, whose history for centuries has been a
struggle for life and who owe their survival to their
mountains and to their fighting qualities, made every
endeavor to placate the Nazi monster.

If they had made common cause with the Greeks when the
Greeks hurled back the Italian invaders, the complete
destruction of the Italian armies in Albania could have been
certainly and swiftly achieved long before the German forces
could have reached the theatre of war.

Even in January or February this extraordinary military
opportunity was still open. But Prince Paul's government,
undeterred by the fate of so many small countries, not only
observed the strictest neutrality and refused even to enter
into effective staff conversations with Greece or with Turkey
or with us, but hugged the delusion that they could preserve
their independence by patching up some sort of pact with
Hitler.

Once again we see the odious German poison technique
employed. In this case, however, it was to the government
rather than to the nation that the dose and inoculations were
administered. The process was not hurried. Why should it be?
All the time the German armies and air force were entering
and massing in Bulgaria. From a few handfuls of tourists
admiring the beauties of the Bulgarian landscape in the
wintry weather, the German forces grew to seven, twelve,
twenty and finally to twenty-five divisions. Presently the
weak and unfortunate Prince and afterward his Ministers were
summoned, like others before them, to Hitler's footstool and
a pact was signed which would have given Germany complete
control not over the body but over the soul of the Yugoslav
nation.

Then at last the people of Yugoslavia saw their peril,
and with a universal spasm of revolt swept from power those
who were leading them into a shameful tutelage, and resolved
at the eleventh hour to guard their freedom and their honor
with their lives.

A boa constrictor who had already covered his prey with
his foul saliva and then had it suddenly wrested from his
coils, would be in an amiable mood compared with Hitler,
Goering, Ribbentrop and the rest of the Nazi gang.

A frightful vengeance was vowed against the Southern
Slavs. Rapid, perhaps hurried, redispositions were made of
German forces and German diplomacy. Hungary was offered large
territorial gains to become the accomplice in the assault
upon a friendly neighbor with whom she had just signed a
solemn pact of friendship and non-aggression. Count Teleki,
Hungarian Premier, preferred to take his own life rather than
join in such a deed of shame.

A heavy forward movement of the German armies, already
gathered in Austria, was set in motion through Hungary to the
northern frontier of Yugoslavia. A ferocious howl of hatred
from the supreme miscreant was the signal for the actual
invasion. The open city of Belgrade was laid in ashes and a
tremendous drive by the German armored forces in Bulgaria was
launched westward into Southern Serbia.

When it was no longer deemed worth while to keep up the
farce of love for Greece, other powerful forces rolled
forward into Greece, where they were at once unflinchingly
encountered and have already sustained more than one bloody
repulse at the hands of the heroic Greek Army. The British
and Imperial troops have not up to the present been engaged.
Further than this, I cannot attempt to carry the tale.

I therefore turn for a few moments to the larger aspects
of the war. I must first speak of France and of the French
people, to whom in their sorrows we are united not only by
memories but by living ties.

I welcomed cordially the declaration of Marshal Petain
that France would never act against her former allies or go
to war with her former allies. Such a course, so insensate,
so unnatural and on lower grounds so improvident, might
well-though it is not for me to speak for any government but
our own-such a course might alienate from France for long
years the sympathy and support of the American democracy. I
am sure that the French nation would, with whatever means of
expression are still open to them, repudiate such a shameful
course.

We must, however, realize that the government of Vichy is
in a great measure dependent and, in a great many matters,
though happily not in all, in Hitler's hands, acting daily
through the Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden. Two million
Frenchmen are in German hands. A great part of the food
supply in France has been seized by Germany. Both prisoners
and food can be doled out in return for hostile propaganda or
unfriendly action against Britain. Or again, the cost of the
German occupation of France, for which a cruel and exorbitant
toll is exacted, may be raised still further as a punishment
for any manifestation of sympathy with us.

Admiral Darlan tells us that the Germans have been
generous in the treatment of France. All the information
which we have, both from occupied and unoccupied France,
makes me very doubtful whether the mass of the French people
would endorse that strange and sinister tribute.

But I must make it clear that we must maintain our
blockade against Germany and rights of contraband control at
sea, which have never been disputed or denied to any
belligerent and which a year ago France was exercising with
us.

Some time ago we were ready to open economic negotiations
with the French to mitigate the hardships of their
conditions, but any chance of fruitful negotiations was
nipped in the bud by "the generous Germans" and
imperative orders were given from Wiesbaden to Vichy to break
off all contact with us.

We have allowed very considerable quantities of food to
go into France out of a sincere desire to spare the French
people every hardship in our power. When, however, it comes
to thousands of tons of rubber and other vital war material
which pass, as we know, directly to the German armies, we are
bound, even at the risk of collisions with French warships at
sea, to enforce our rights as recognized by international
law.

There is another action into which Vichy might be led by
the dictation of Germany: namely, sending powerful war
vessels which are unfinished or even damaged from the French
African parts to ports in metropolitan France now under
German control or which may at very short notice fall under
their control.

Such movements of French war vessels from Africa to
France would alter the balance of naval power and would thus
prejudice the interests of the United States as well as our
own. I trust that such incidents will be avoided, or if they
are not avoided, that the consequences which will follow from
them will be understood and fairly judged by the French
nation for whose cause we are contending no less than for our
own.

I am glad to be able to report a continued and marked
improvement in the relative strength of the R.A.F. compared
with that of Germany. Also, I draw attention to the
remarkable increase in its actual strength and in its bombing
capacity and also a marked augmentation in the power and size
of the bombs which we shall be using in even greater
number.

The sorties which we are now accustomed to make upon
German harbors and cities are increasing both in the number
of aircraft employed and in the weight of the discharge with
every month that passes.

In some cases we have already in our raids exceeded in
severity anything which a single town has in a single night
experienced over here. At the same time, there is a sensible
improvement in our means of dealing with German raids upon
this island.

A very great measure of security has been given to this
country in daylight and we are glad that the days are
lengthening; but now the R.A.F. looks forward to the
moonlight periods as opportunities for inflicting severe
losses upon raiders as well as for striking hard at the enemy
in his own territory. The fact that technical advisers
welcome daylight, moonlight and starlight and that we do not
rely for our protection on darkness, clouds and mist, as
would have been the case some time ago, is pregnant with hope
and with meaning. But, of course, all these tendencies are
only in their early stages.

But, after all, everything turns upon the Battle of the
Atlantic which is proceeding with growing intensity on both
sides. Our losses in ships and tonnage are very heavy and,
vast as are the shipping resources we control, these losses
could not continue indefinitely without seriously affecting
our war effort and our means of subsistence.

It is no answer to say that we have inflicted upon the
Germans and Italians a far higher proportion of losses,
compared with the size of their merchant fleet, and that our
world-wide traffic is maintained. We have in fact sunk,
captured or seen scuttled over 2,300,000 tons of German and
Italian shipping. We have lost nearly 4,000,000 tons of
British tonnage. Against that we have brought under the
British flag over 3,000,000 tons of foreign or newly
constructed tonnage, not counting considerable Allied tonnage
under our control. Therefore, at the moment our enormous
fleets sail the seas without any serious or obvious
diminution so far as numbers of ships is concerned.

But what is to happen in the future if losses continue at
the present rate? Where are we to find another 3,000,000 or
4,000,000 tons to fill the gaps which are being created and
to carry us on through 1942?

We are building merchant ships upon a very considerable
scale and to the utmost of our ability. We are also making a
most strenuous effort to repair the large number of vessels
damaged by the enemy and the still larger number damaged by
Winter gales. We are doing our utmost to accelerate the
turnaround of our ships, remembering that even ten days'
saving on turnaround of our immense fleet is equal to a
reinforcement of 5,000,000 tons of imports in a single
year.

All the energy and contrivance of which we are capable
have been and will be devoted to these purposes and we are
already conscious of substantial results.

But when all is said and done, the only way in which we
can get through the year 1942 without a very sensible
contraction of our war efforts is by another gigantic
building of merchant ships in the United States similar to
that prodigy of output accomplished by the Americans in
1918.

All this has been in train in the United States for many
months past. There has now been a very large extension of the
program and we have assurance that several millions of tons
of American newly-built shipping will be available for the
common struggle during the course of the next year.

Here, then, is the assurance upon which we may count for
the staying power without which it will not be possible to
save the world from the criminals who assail its future.

But the Battle of the Atlantic must be won not only in
the factories and shipyards but upon the blue water. I am
confident that we shall succeed in coping with the air
attacks which are made upon the shipping in our western and
northwestern approaches.

I hope eventually the inhabitants of the sister isle
[Ireland] may realize that it is as much in their interests
as it is in ours that their ports and airfields should be
available for naval and air forces which must operate ever
further into the Atlantic.

But while I am hopeful we shall gain mastery over the air
attacks upon our shipping, the U-boats and the surface
raiders range ever farther to the westward, ever nearer to
the shores of the United States, and constitute a menace
which must be overcome if the life of Britain is not to be
endangered and if the purposes to which the Government and
peoples of the United States have devoted themselves are not
to be frustrated. We shall, of course, make every effort in
our power.

The defeat of the U-boats and of surface raiders has been
proved to be entirely a question of adequate escorts for our
convoys.

It will indeed be disastrous if the great masses of
weapons, munitions and instruments of war of all kinds made
with the toil and skill of American hands at the cost of the
United States and loans to us under the Aid to Britain Bill
were to sink into the depths of the ocean and never reach the
hard-pressed fighting line.

That would be lamentable to us and I cannot believe it
would be found acceptable to the proud and resolute people of
the United States.

Indeed, I am authorized to say that ten United States
Revenue cutters, fast vessels of about 2,000 tons
displacement with a fine armament and a wide range of
endurance, have already been placed at our disposal by the
American Government and will soon be in action. These
vessels, originally designed to enforce prohibition, will now
serve an even higher purpose.

It is, of course, very hazardous to try to forecast in
what direction or directions Hitler will employ his military
machine in the present year. He may at any time attempt the
invasion of this island. That is an ordeal from which we
shall not shrink.

At the present moment he is driving fast through the
Balkans and at any moment he may turn upon Turkey. But there
are many signs which point to an attempt to secure the
granary of the Ukraine [both in Russia] and the oil-fields of
the Caucasus as a German means of gaining the resources
wherewith to wear down the English-speaking world.

All this is speculation, but I will say one thing more:
Once we have gained the Battle of the Atlantic and are sure
of the constant flow of American supplies which are being
prepared for us, then, however far Hitler may go or whatever
new millions and scores of millions he may lap in misery, we
who are armed with the sword of retributive justice shall be
on his track.