by Patrick Moore

Developments in the first week of 1997 indicate that Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic is in ever bigger trouble. The opposition has kept up
the pressure with increasingly varied forms of protests, while the Church,
the writers, and the army have made it clear where they stand.

First, at least 200,000 people braved the bitter cold and attended a gala
open-air New Year's Eve party in central Belgrade, international media
reported on 1 January. Leaders of the Zajedno (Together) movement
congratulated their followers and predicted victory over Milosevic, whom
they accuse of having stolen the 17 November local elections. The crowds
were entertained by some of the country's leading rock groups, and the
usually ubiquitous riot police were nowhere to be seen. The next day,
demonstration organizers urged their followers to stay home and make as
much noise as possible with pans, drums, etc. during Serbian television's
main evening newscast at 7:30 pm to protest its biased coverage. On the
balance, the protests showed no sign of losing momentum, and the Zajedno
leadership displayed a new flexibility in tactics in order to sustain
interest. following the ban on protest marches after a clash between
opponents and supporters of Milosevic on 24 December.

On the first days of January the protesters thus made much noise during the
newscast. On 5 January they staged a "protest by traffic jam," in which
drivers of all sorts of vehicles blocked Belgrade streets amid a carnival
atmosphere, international media reported. Protesters said they would extend
the traffic jam tactic throughout Serbia should the government fail to
recognize the results of the local elections within a few days.

In fact, Zajedno rejected the authorities' latest offer to accept part but
not all of those election returns, CNN reported on 4 January. This time the
government proposed to acknowledge opposition victories in Belgrade and two
smaller towns but called for a new vote in Nis. Zajedno said it will keep
up its protests until the government unconditionally respects the 17
November results, even though it is far from clear how long Milosevic will
hold out.

Then, on 6 January, a crowd of at least 200,000 people walked through the
Serbian capital to St. Sava's cathedral to mark Orthodox Christmas Eve. The
protest was typically good-natured and peaceful, except for a reported
small explosion at the headquarters of JUL, the tiny left-wing party led by
Mirjana Markovic, Milosevic's wife, AFP noted on 7 January. Patriarch Pavle
said mass at the cathedral, following which opposition leaders made
speeches outside and presented 5,000 gift boxes for the children of their
supporters. The usually uncommunicative police had earlier assured the
demonstrators that they would not interfere with Christmas processions.

The students had, in fact, appealed to the police not to block their
marches, AFP reported on 6 January. One of their leaders said: "We appeal
to those installing police cordons to withdraw them before January 9, so we
don't have to do it for them." On a more diplomatic note, Zajedno issued a
proclamation to the police as "dear friends," Nasa Borba wrote. The text
stated: "Do not let yourselves be abused by the [Socialist Party of Serbia]
thieves and do not allow yourselves to be pushed into a conflict with the
people, whose lives are as difficult as yours. Think hard before obeying
the orders of the thieves." But the police are one of Milosevic's main
pillars of support and refused to discuss the opposition's appeals.

One of the reasons the Serbian leader has relied on the up to 120,000-
strong police is that his relations with the army (JNA) have never been
particularly good. On 6 January, Chief of Staff Gen. Momcilo Perisic told a
delegation of students that the JNA will not oppose them, AFP reported. A
student spokesman later told reporters: "We expressed hope and our
commitment that the demonstrations would remain peaceful and that what
happened in 1991 would not be replayed. We were given firm assurances that
this would be the case. We are very satisfied with the outcome." Following
those discussions, the army issued a letter saying the military will not
allow themselves to be used in a crackdown against peaceful protesters. The
text stated that problems must be solved by peaceful and constitutional
means, Nasa Borba wrote on 7 January.

This effectively rules out the possibility that Milosevic could rely on the
army to crush dissent as he did in March 1991. Army support had been
crucial to him then, during the most direct challenge from the streets to
his rule prior to the current unrest. Perisic last month made noncommittal
statements, in which he simply said that the JNA would "ensure the
stability" of the country. He also rebuffed officers from the Nis-based 63d
Parachute Brigade and other units, who had reportedly issued an open letter
to the Serbian president and to Perisic expressing their support for the
students. (Nasa Borba printed the text of the purported letter on 30
December.) But now some officers seem ready to go even farther. The London
daily The Independent reported on 7 January that at least some units may
be ready to turn on Milosevic if he tries to declare a state of emergency,
AFP wrote. One major said that if Milosevic "tries to use the army, the
army will be used against him."

And even more so than the army, the bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church
have come out against the Socialist-led government. The Holy Synod on 2
January issued a declaration blasting Milosevic for "pitting Serb against
Serb." The text added: "Force has been used by the regime with the
intention of stifling the freely expressed will of the people. The blood of
the innocent [had flowed because the regime was] trying to sow discord and
provoke bloodshed just so it can hang on to power. The Holy Synod condemns
the authorities who have not only ignored the wishes of the electorate,
but... have crushed underfoot our glorious and painful history... [and]
national and moral values. Only the respect of democratic principles and
human rights, the recognition of the 17 November elections, can bring hope
of a better future" to Serbia," AFP and Nasa Borba reported. The bishops
also accused him of betraying the cause of the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs.

The Church has, in fact, openly embraced Serbian nationalism following the
disintegration of the communist system, but many believers and some of the
clergy feel it has been too close to the political authorities both under
the communists and under the ex-communist Milosevic. Such persons identify
more readily with the Bosnian Serb leadership under Radovan Karadzic, who
does not have a communist past. In any event, the Church has now
unambiguously allied itself with Milosevic's opponents, a point Pavle
repeated in a radio broadcast, the BBC noted on 4 January. His appearance
with the demonstrators at the Christmas Eve mass only served to underscore
the point.

And yet another prestigious body, the Serbian Writers' Union, has slammed
the president. Reflecting the same themes as the Synod, the writers told
Milosevic in an open letter that: "By senseless vote stealing, your party
has struck a blow against the state, the constitution and the law, and by
your incomprehensible decisions you have led Serbia to the verge of civil
war. You have deliberately provoked battles in the streets of Belgrade
between peaceful demonstrators and people whom you led astray and brought
here" on 24 December, AFP reported on 3 January. It is difficult to
underestimate the political importance of writers in the Balkans, where
organizations such as the respective Writers Unions and PEN Clubs enjoy
immense prestige.

Still another blow to Milosevic's grip on power came from Montenegro. That
rugged republic's President Momir Bulatovic and the others in power there
are his nominal junior partners, but they know they cannot ignore the
feelings of their voters and have consequently moved to distance themselves
from the increasingly unpopular man in Belgrade. Bulatovic himself called
on Milosevic to explain his position in public, Nasa Borba wrote on 30
December. Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic and Parliament Speaker Svetozar
Marovic, for their parts, have expressed sympathy for the protesters. On 1
January, Marovic urged Serbian authorities to accept the OSCE report
released on 27 December by former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez.
That document that backs the opposition's position that the governing
Socialists stole the local elections in Belgrade and 13 other places.

The Montenegrin parliament, for its part, passed a resolution expressing
concern over the continuing tensions in Serbia, AFP reported on 30
December. The text is weaker than an original opposition proposal but still
reflects the interest of the small republic -- which depends heavily on
shipping and tourism -- in seeing the full return of federal Yugoslavia to
international political and economic life. Zajedno leader Vuk Draskovic,
however, called on Montenegro to go beyond words: "We don't care about your
telegrams and letters. If you want to help us, withdraw your deputies from
the Yugoslav parliament until the recognition of the results of the
November 17 municipal elections, withdraw your representatives from the
Yugoslav government, show that you are for a democratic Serbia."

And the Bosnian Serb leadership was even more explicit than the Montenegrin
in its criticism of Milosevic. Aleksa Buha, who succeeded Karadzic as head
of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), issued a Christmas message on 6
January in which called on Milosevic to avoid bloodshed and respect the
election results. Buha added: "It is stupid to stubbornly refuse to
recognize what the laws of civilization dictate," AFP and Nasa Borba
reported. Republika Srpska President Biljana Plavsic repeated her earlier
declaration of support for the students, saying that what is taking place
on the streets of Belgrade now will determine the future democratic course
of Serbia. There has long been little love lost between Milosevic and the
Pale leadership, which feels that the Serbian president has repeatedly
betrayed vital Bosnian Serb interests for his own political purposes.
Milosevic backed opponents of the SDS in last September's Bosnian elections,
and there may well be no small joy in Pale now at the prospect of settling
old political scores.

Meanwhile in Belgrade, the opposition has been encouraged by the Gonzalez
report, despite the reluctance to the authorities to accept it. Federal
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic called the OSCE statement
"balanced" but stressed it was not binding on the Serbian government. The
U.S. has urged the OSCE to condemn the regime if it continues to drag its
feet on accepting the report, Nasa Borba wrote on 6 January. Veteran
Belgrade journalist Hari Stajner told the BBC on 4 January that Milosevic
is becoming increasingly isolated at home and abroad, and that the only
possible foreign source of support for him is Russia.

by Fabian Schmidt

Meanwhile in Serbia's Kosovo province, human rights violations continued
throughout 1996. According to the Council for the Defense of Human Rights
and Freedoms [KMDLNJ], 14 people died as a result of police violence by the
year's end. Also, police raids on homes, arrests and torture did not
diminish. While arbitrary police violence was a daily occurrence in Kosovo
from the abolition of the region's autonomy in 1989, an increase this year
followed the appearance of a shadowy terrorist group calling itself the
"Liberation Army of Kosovo [UCK]." Since 11 February it is believed to have
been responsible for the deaths of at least nine people. It has also caused
injury to many more. The group has so far aimed its attacks primarily at
smaller police stations, police cars or individuals, namely ethnic Serbs.
It has not attacked prominent or well-protected representatives or
institutions of the Serbian administration, which suggests that it is
avoiding waging highly sophisticated terrorist operations. It is not known
when the UCK was set up, how many members it has, who funds it, or who its
leaders are. The leading Albanian party, the Democratic League of Kosovo
[LDK}, has even denied the existence of the group and laid blame for the
attacks on Serbian agents provocateurs.

In October, police arrested 15 suspected members of the group, and after
another attack 30 more. Nonetheless, it is highly doubtful whether the
police actually arrested the real culprits. The UCK's strategy seems to be
to create a climate of fear, to prevent reconciliation between Albanians
and Serbs, to aggravate tensions, and finally to jeopardize the shadow-
state's policy of peaceful protest.

The UCK may nonetheless prove successful given the background of a
continuing constitutional crisis of the Kosovar Albanian shadow-state. In
the four years since it was elected, the shadow state's parliament has
failed to hold its opening session. When its mandate ran out in May,
President Ibrahim Rugova simply prolonged it by a year. Legislators hold
irregular meetings in working groups in which they keep some contact with
local government bodies, but the legislature suffers from an acute lack of
authority under present strained circumstances. Prominent Kosovars are
increasingly calling for an end to the paralysis of the shadow-state's
democratic institutions and are also demanding a more aggressive policy. In
late October, 31 out of 100 legislators sent a letter to Rugova demanding a
constituent meeting of parliament. Elsewhere, exile Prime Minister Bujar
Bukoshi had charged Rugova with sidelining the government and incrementally
abandoning the policy aimed at gaining independence.

Bukoshi said Rugova did not consult its education minister during
negotiations about a 1 September education agreement with Milosevic. The
agreement foresees the return of Albanian pupils and students to school and
university premises, but an education commission made up of three Albanians
and three Serbs has yet to work out any details. The torturing to death of
a teacher by police in December was the latest proof that the approach of
the Serbian authorities towards Albanian-language education has not
fundamentally changed.

Rugova, meanwhile, continued his policy of seeking the diplomatic
"internationalization" of the conflict, but has been unable to adjust his
strategy to the dramatic developments in Serbia. The Kosovars, as in
previous years, boycotted the Yugoslav and Serbian elections, underscoring
their position that they are an independent state. Also, they failed to
quickly address the growing opposition protests against Milosevic's regime.
The only official reaction came on 12 December, almost three weeks after
the beginning of the protests. The shadow-state government then issued a
statement which in principle welcomed the demonstrations, but at the same
time stated that they were an internal Serbian affair.

Thus the Kosovars made clear that a common animosity towards Milosevic was
not sufficient to reconcile the Serbian opposition and the Albanians.
Instead the shadow state said that much of the Serbian opposition actually
was "anti-Albanian" and that the Kosovars would only support those Serbs,
who "are ready to accept... that the Albanians will refuse to remain under
Serbian jurisdiction."

While the shadow state establishment thus looked the other way, some
Kosovar politicians realized that the events provided them with an
opportunity. The head of the KMDLNJ, Adem Demaci, joined the Parliamentary
Party of Kosovo and was elected its chairman on the first weekend of 1997.
He had earlier said he would run for President after Rugova's term runs out
in May. Demaci had on the one hand called for open but peaceful protests
and demonstrations against the Serbian regime, similar to those in
Belgrade; and on the other, he indicated that a solution may be found
through a new federal Yugoslav constitution which would give Kosovo and
probably Sandzak and Vojvodina -- with their large non-Serbian populations -
- an equal constitutional status to that of Serbia and Montenegro. Whether
new presidential and parliamentary elections of the shadow state will take
place remains, however, in doubt.

by Stefan Krause

And in Bulgaria, too, the holiday season provided little respite from
politics. President Zhelyu Zhelev on 30 December asked the Bulgarian
Socialist Party (BSP) to form a new government to succeed that of Zhan
Videnov, who resigned as premier and party leader the previous week. While
it is certain that the BSP will be able to form a new cabinet by mid-
January, it is clear that the recent BSP congress and Videnov's resignation
have not solved the party's and the country's basic problems.

Videnov resigned on 21 December, at the beginning of a three-day
extraordinary party congress. Parliament dismissed his government on 28
December by a near unanimous vote. Announcing his resignation, Videnov
cited a lack of trust within the BSP and within society as a whole as the
main reason. He said he will not again seek any top post in the government,
the party, or in parliament. Videnov's decision came as a surprise to both
his allies and his critics, since he had repeatedly said that he would not
give up power voluntarily and because many delegates to the congress were
known to be on his side. Obviously, pressure from within the party had
become unbearable for Videnov, especially after 19 top BSP politicians
representing all factions from orthodox Marxists to social-democratic
reformers had called in early November for his ouster.

The BSP congress elected Georgi Parvanov as Videnov's successor at the
party's helm. Parvanov, a 39-year-old historian, had been one of Videnov's
deputies. He handily defeated three other candidates, including former
Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski and former BSP Deputy Chairman Yanaki
Stoilov, both of whom belong to the party's reformist wing. Parvanov's
election is seen as a compromise between the hard-liners and reformers. In
another compromise, both Videnov supporters and reformers alike were
elected to the new Supreme Council.

Parvanov's election for the time being muted the crisis within the party,
but the BSP's woes are hardly over. One can argue that Parvanov's choice is
a compromise that did not solve but only postponed a solution to the BSP's
problems. Although the congress was scheduled to discuss and decide on
basic policy changes, it dealt mostly with leadership issues. Once again,
the decision was put off as to whether the BSP wants to be a reformist
party in the social democratic tradition, an orthodox leftist party, or a
conglomerate of diverse groups and platforms.

The reformists, moreover, were dealt several blows. Not only did Pirinski
and Stoilov fare badly in the vote for party leader; the delegates also
voted against several reformist proposals. And there was yet another
incident implying that democracy has yet to take root in the BSP. On 22
December, a package of seven resolutions proposed by reformists was at
first adopted by the congress. But when Videnov -- who at that point had
already resigned -- insisted that the congress vote on them again, the
delegates followed him in voting against them.

If the reformists fared badly at the congress, then worse was still to
come. On 3 January, the BSP Supreme Council gathered to elect a new
Executive Bureau, the highest decision-making body between party
congresses. Parvanov had originally proposed that it comprise 20 members in
order to accommodate representatives of all factions, but the Supreme
Council voted to opt for 15 members instead. Parvanov proposed a list of
candidates, of whom five failed to get elected. They include Pirinski,
Stoilov, and the head of the parliamentary foreign relations commission,
Nikolay Kamov. Observers saw the vote not only as a crushing defeat for the
reformists: it also was a defeat for Parvanov less than two weeks after his
election. By the same token, the vote was a victory for Videnov since his
most prominent opponents failed to get elected. Videnov himself refused to
run for the Executive Bureau, saying former party leaders should not be on
it. But the vote seems to underscore than even without holding formal
office, Videnov continues to play an important role within the BSP.

On 7 January, the newly-elected BSP Executive Bureau nominated Interior
Minister Nikolay Dobrev as prime minister. Dobrev was at first unwilling to
take on that responsibility, but on 6 January agreed. Other names
originally aired included Pirinski and parliamentary speaker Blagovest
Sendov. Parvanov said he would not seek the premiership himself, saying he
will concentrate "on the party alone." Dobrev, who emerged as an outspoken
Videnov critic at the recent BSP congress, has support within the party but
also within the population for his fight against corruption and organized
crime, but critics of his nomination pointed out that he lacks experience
in economics or finance. In any event, the new government's scope of action
will be limited by outside factors such as the need to comply with IMF
recommendations. The new cabinet will not have much leeway in solving the
country's problems.

Thus, in addition to the myriad structural problems facing the country, the
BSP might prove to be another obstacle to much-needed change. If Parvanov
does not get the BSP onto a new track, Videnov's replacement might well go
unnoticed in terms of real -- rather than symbolic -- politics. The
elections to the Executive Bureau cast doubts on Parvanov's ability to
control the party apparatus.

The Serbian president, for his part, made a New Year's speech on television
but did not directly refer to the protests, VOA noted. Instead, he made a
passing remark about internal and external attempts to destabilize the
country. He also promised a new economic program that would "change the
face of Serbia." Such grandiose rhetoric has long been typical of his
political style, but it is doubtful whether his promises will meet with the
eager popular approval they did in the late 1980s. His regime is
increasingly regarded as corrupt, as responsible for continuing and
widespread poverty, and as interested only in power. -- Patrick Moore

Meanwhile in Bucharest, the fast-moving Serbian developments have provided
the newly elected authorities with an additional opportunity to show how
their policies differ from those of their predecessors. A statement
released by the government on 25 December "condemns the violence" of the
authorities in Belgrade, adding that the Romanian executive "deplores the
situation" and hopes a fast settlement using "democratic means" will be
found, Radio Bucharest reported. In a separate statement, President Emil
Constantinescu said he had "learned with consternation" about the conflict
between the Serbian government and the opposition, "which now has reached a
dangerous phase." He called on the authorities in Belgrade to "show wisdom
and not resort to force."

Then in a statement released on 30 December, the Romanian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs said the present crisis in "the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia" represents a "threat to stability" in the region and expressed
"concern" in view of the "increasing confrontation." The statement said the
Gonzalez report "may considerably contribute to solving the crisis" and
expressed hope that the government in Belgrade will implement the OSCE's
recommendations. The Romanian declaration added that "using force against
peaceful demonstrators can only lead to isolation", whereas peacefully
solving the crisis via dialogue will contribute to "Yugoslavia's
reintegration into the international community." -- Michael Shafir

Back in Bosnia, the Republika Srpska parliament on 28 December approved a
bill on the creation of a professional army, international agencies
reported, citing Pale radio. Under the new law, "the professional armed
forces are responsible for defending the territorial integrity and
constitutional order of the Republika Srpska," AFP reported. There is also
a clause aimed at Serbs in Serbia-Montenegro that stipulates that people
without Republika Srpska citizenship can volunteer to join the army in case
of conflict. -- Daria Sito Sucic

Meanwhile, President Alija Izetbegovic's Party of Democratic Action (SDA)
has confirmed that it received $500,000 from Iran in mid-1996,
Oslobodjenje reported on 4 January. It added, however, that the money was
used for scholarships and not for the party's election campaign. The Los
Angeles Times had reported that Iran gave Izetbegovic that sum for use in
the run-up to the September elections. The newspaper said the story was
based on classified documents it had obtained. Meanwhile, the CIA has
provided congressional committees with a classified report on Iranian
activities in Bosnia. An unclassified version is expected to follow soon.
State Department spokesman John Dinger said Izetbegovic recognizes that his
relationship with the U.S. is more important than that with Iran. As a
result, the U.S. will go ahead with a plan to train and equip the Bosnian
Federation forces with military gear, Dinger added. -- Daria Sito Sucic

But SFOR said on 2 January it will confiscate tank ammunition donated to
the Bosnian army through that program because the munitions were not
properly registered, Reuters reported. NATO spokesman Maj. Tony White said
SFOR strictly insists on rules requiring armies to fully document all
weapons or ammunition stored at designated depots. SFOR troops have now
confiscated 474 unregistered tank rounds out of a total of 11,000 shipped
to the Bosnian federation under the aid program. In other news, NATO
announced the same day that at least a dozen houses formerly inhabited by
Bosnian Muslims and Serbs were destroyed over the past week in a Croat-held
area near Mostar. The attacks are aimed at discouraging non-Croatian
refugees from returning to the region, Reuters reported. -- Daria Sito
Sucic

And on the purely civilian front, Bosnia's new government convened for the
first time on 3 January in Serb-held Lukavica, near Sarajevo, international
media reported. Earlier the same day, deputies in the lower house of the
Bosnian parliament approved the government and the nomination of the two
joint prime ministers: Boro Bosic, a Serb, and Haris Silajdzic, a Muslim.
Silajdzic said the cabinet discussed who should take part in the delegation
to a conference in Brussels on 9-10 January aimed at raising funds for the
reconstruction of Bosnia. Meanwhile, Momcilo Krajisnik, the Serbian member
of Bosnia's three-man presidency, said he wants to see "the reconciliation
and acceptance of the characteristics of all the peoples" in Bosnia, AFP
reported. -- Daria Sito Sucic

But that road will obviously be long and rocky. The European Union's
mandate in Mostar expired on 31 December, but the city remained as divided
as it was 17 months ago when the EU arrived. Mostar is still split between
Muslims in the eastern half and Croats in the west. EU spokesman Dragan
Gasic, striking an optimistic note, said that a lot has been done toward
reconstruction and that peace has been politically restored. Croats,
however, continued throughout 1996 to expel Muslims from their part of the
city. But Mostar Mayor Ivan Prskalo, a Croat, criticized only Muslim
"terrorist acts" following an incident on 29 December in which two Croats
were robbed, stripped naked, and beaten up in the Muslim half of the city.
The EU administration in Mostar will be replaced by the Office of the High
Representative Carl Bildt. Former EU envoy Sir Martin Garrod will stay on
in Mostar to head the mission. He knows the area well and speaks Serbo-
Croatian. -- Daria Sito Sucic

Edited by Patrick Moore

This material was reprinted with permission of the Open Media
Research Institute, a nonprofit organization with research offices in
Prague, Czech Republic.
For more information on OMRI publications please write to info@omri.cz.