In November 2012, soon after the conclusion of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), President Xi Jinping put forward for the first time the idea of the ‘Chinese Dream’. In March 2013, Xi further elaborated on this concept at the closing ceremony of the First Session of the 12th National People’s Congress.

With the US determined not to commit troops, the military defeat of ISIS, at present, is therefore neither feasible nor imminent. Neither the so-called retrained Iraqi Army, nor US air power against this powerful and motivated force will be sufficient.

The US sees the establishment of the AIIB as an attempt by China to pull South- East Asian countries closer to its orbit and a soft-power play that promises economic benefits while refurbishing its image among its Asian neighbours.

Xi Jinping has already recognized the inevitable by stressing that China would adjust to the ‘new normal’ of lower growth and, to ensure stability, he has already cracked down on dissent and strengthened media control measures.

The decision to commit US military power has been camouflaged in suitably humanitarian terms to give the impression that it was an effort designed to ‘protect’ the fleeing Yazidis and other minority groups.

On 3rd July 1914 nearly a hundred years ago at Simla, Tibet and India signed the Simla Convention that gave birth to the McMahon Line separating Tibet from India in the eastern sector. Much is made by some that the Simla Convention was not a legal document but from the time of the Convention till 23rd January 1959, the Chinese government never officially, in any document, ever challenged the McMahon Line.

It is a matter of widespread belief that on assumption of supreme power, Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s overall ambition was to emerge as an iconic figure in the same league as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. At the very outset, Xi realised this would necessitate the elimination of any political challenge and his first step was therefore to consolidate an unassailable position within the Standing Committee of the Party Politburo (PBSC). To achieve this objective, Xi chose to emulate some of the policies and methods of the late Mao Zedong, albeit with modern underpinnings.

The reasons for abstention go far beyond the immediate issue at hand and are enveloped in deep Chinese strategic interests. The Chinese leadership is adamant that there can be no dilution of the concept of the principle of non-violation of the territorial integrity of nation states in the international system.