Soviet Union-Stalin's Legacy POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

MONGABAY.COM
Mongabay.com seeks to raise interest in and appreciation of wild lands and wildlife, while examining the impact of emerging trends in climate, technology, economics, and finance on conservation and development (more)

In the 1980s, the basic structure and operation of Soviet
agriculture retained many of the features of the system that became
entrenched during Stalin's regime. Under Stalin agriculture was
socialized, and a massive bureaucracy was created to administer
policy. This bureaucracy was highly resistant to subsequent reform
efforts.

Stalin's campaign of forced collectivization, begun in the
autumn of 1929, confiscated the land, machinery, livestock, and
grain stores of the peasantry. By 1937 approximately 99 percent of
the countryside had been collectivized. Precise figures are
lacking, but probably 1 million
kulak (see Glossary) households
with nearly 5 million members were deported and were never heard
from again. About 7 million starved to death as the government
confiscated grain stores. In defiance, peasants slaughtered their
livestock rather than surrender it to the collectives. As a result,
within five years the number of horses, cattle, and hogs in the
country was halved, and the number of sheep and goats was reduced
by two-thirds.

Aside from the immediate devastation wrought by forced
collectivization, the experience left an enduring legacy of mutual
distrust and hostility between the rural population and the Soviet
authorities. The bureaucracy that evolved to administer agriculture
was motivated more by political than by economic considerations.
Its objectives were to industrialize agriculture, create a rural
proletariat, and destroy peasant resistance to communist rule. Once
entrenched, the bureaucracy relished its power, dictating policy
from the top down with little regard for the opinions of individual
farmers and even farm managers, who better understood local
conditions. Such policies resulted in abysmally low labor
productivity and massive waste of resources. This situation
persisted into the 1980s, when the Soviet farmer was on average
about one-tenth as productive as his American counterpart.

During Stalin's regime, virtually all farmland was assigned to
the two basic agricultural production entities that still
predominated in the 1980s--state farms and collective farms. The
state farm (sovetskoe khoziaistvo--sovkhoz) was conceived in
1918 as the ideal model for socialist agriculture. It was to be a
large, modern enterprise, directed and financed by the government,
with a work force receiving wages and social benefits comparable to
those enjoyed by industrial workers. By contrast, the collective
farm (kollektivnoe khoziaistvo--kolkhoz) was a self-financed
producer cooperative, which farmed land granted to it rent free by
the state and which paid its members according to their
contribution of work. Although in theory the kolkhoz was
self-directed, electing its own managing committee and chairman, in
reality it remained under the firm control of state planning and
procurement agencies. Chairmen who did not meet ideological purity
requirements were removed. Sovkhozy operated much like any other
production
enterprise (see Glossary) in the Soviet command economy,
with production targets and operating budgets determined by distant
planning organs. The entire output of sovskhozy was delivered to
state procurement agencies. Kolkhozy also received procurement
quotas, but they were free to sell excess production in collective
farm markets, where prices were determined by supply and demand.
Because kolkhozy were self-financed, they received somewhat higher
prices for their products. Nevertheless, the income of the kolkhoz
resident was usually lower than that of the sovkhoz resident. In
general, labor productivity on the sovkhoz was higher, probably
because of its access to better machinery, chemicals, and seed and
because it could specialize in the crops best suited to its region.
The kolkhoz was constrained to produce a variety of crops and
livestock, which decreased efficiency.

Several watershed decisions by Stalin's successors reduced the
differences between the two types of farms. Among these decisions
were the 1958 elimination of state-operated machine tractor
stations, which had given the party leverage over the kolkhoz by
controlling its access to heavy farm machinery; the establishment
in 1965 of a minimum wage, pension, and other benefits for kolkhoz
workers; and the 1967 decision to make the sovkhoz a self-financed
entity, which in theory the kolkhoz had been from the start. Not
only was there a trend toward convergence of the features of the
two types of farms, but there was also a pattern of official
conversion of smaller, less solvent kolkhozy to sovkhozy. As a
result, in 1973 the total sown area of sovkhozy surpassed that of
kolkhozy for the first time. The total number of kolkhozy decreased
from 235,500 in 1940 to 26,300 in 1986. But after the March 1989
Agricultural Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU), it appeared likely that the
proliferation of sovkhozy would cease. Even one of the most
conservative Politburo members, Egor K. Ligachev, who was named
chairman of the party's Agrarian Policy Commission in September
1988, recommended gradually converting sovkhozy into cooperatives
and leasing collectives.

A third production entity that survived from Stalin's era was
the private plot, known in Soviet jargon as the "personal auxiliary
holding." These plots were ideologically unpalatable to the
bureaucrats, but they were tolerated as a means for farmers to
produce their own food and supplement their incomes. The plots were
small (roughly half a hectare) and were assigned one to a
household. Peasants were allowed to consume whatever was grown on
the plot and sell any surplus--either at the collective farm
markets or to state or cooperative marketing agencies. The
contribution of private plots to the nation's food supply far
exceeded their size. With only 3 percent of total sown area in the
1980s, they produced over a quarter of gross agricultural output,
including about 30 percent of meat and milk, 66 percent of
potatoes, and 40 percent of fruits, vegetables, and eggs.

Data as of May 1989

Stalin's Legacy

In the 1980s, the basic structure and operation of Soviet
agriculture retained many of the features of the system that became
entrenched during Stalin's regime. Under Stalin agriculture was
socialized, and a massive bureaucracy was created to administer
policy. This bureaucracy was highly resistant to subsequent reform
efforts.

Stalin's campaign of forced collectivization, begun in the
autumn of 1929, confiscated the land, machinery, livestock, and
grain stores of the peasantry. By 1937 approximately 99 percent of
the countryside had been collectivized. Precise figures are
lacking, but probably 1 million
kulak (see Glossary) households
with nearly 5 million members were deported and were never heard
from again. About 7 million starved to death as the government
confiscated grain stores. In defiance, peasants slaughtered their
livestock rather than surrender it to the collectives. As a result,
within five years the number of horses, cattle, and hogs in the
country was halved, and the number of sheep and goats was reduced
by two-thirds.

Aside from the immediate devastation wrought by forced
collectivization, the experience left an enduring legacy of mutual
distrust and hostility between the rural population and the Soviet
authorities. The bureaucracy that evolved to administer agriculture
was motivated more by political than by economic considerations.
Its objectives were to industrialize agriculture, create a rural
proletariat, and destroy peasant resistance to communist rule. Once
entrenched, the bureaucracy relished its power, dictating policy
from the top down with little regard for the opinions of individual
farmers and even farm managers, who better understood local
conditions. Such policies resulted in abysmally low labor
productivity and massive waste of resources. This situation
persisted into the 1980s, when the Soviet farmer was on average
about one-tenth as productive as his American counterpart.

During Stalin's regime, virtually all farmland was assigned to
the two basic agricultural production entities that still
predominated in the 1980s--state farms and collective farms. The
state farm (sovetskoe khoziaistvo--sovkhoz) was conceived in
1918 as the ideal model for socialist agriculture. It was to be a
large, modern enterprise, directed and financed by the government,
with a work force receiving wages and social benefits comparable to
those enjoyed by industrial workers. By contrast, the collective
farm (kollektivnoe khoziaistvo--kolkhoz) was a self-financed
producer cooperative, which farmed land granted to it rent free by
the state and which paid its members according to their
contribution of work. Although in theory the kolkhoz was
self-directed, electing its own managing committee and chairman, in
reality it remained under the firm control of state planning and
procurement agencies. Chairmen who did not meet ideological purity
requirements were removed. Sovkhozy operated much like any other
production
enterprise (see Glossary) in the Soviet command economy,
with production targets and operating budgets determined by distant
planning organs. The entire output of sovskhozy was delivered to
state procurement agencies. Kolkhozy also received procurement
quotas, but they were free to sell excess production in collective
farm markets, where prices were determined by supply and demand.
Because kolkhozy were self-financed, they received somewhat higher
prices for their products. Nevertheless, the income of the kolkhoz
resident was usually lower than that of the sovkhoz resident. In
general, labor productivity on the sovkhoz was higher, probably
because of its access to better machinery, chemicals, and seed and
because it could specialize in the crops best suited to its region.
The kolkhoz was constrained to produce a variety of crops and
livestock, which decreased efficiency.

Several watershed decisions by Stalin's successors reduced the
differences between the two types of farms. Among these decisions
were the 1958 elimination of state-operated machine tractor
stations, which had given the party leverage over the kolkhoz by
controlling its access to heavy farm machinery; the establishment
in 1965 of a minimum wage, pension, and other benefits for kolkhoz
workers; and the 1967 decision to make the sovkhoz a self-financed
entity, which in theory the kolkhoz had been from the start. Not
only was there a trend toward convergence of the features of the
two types of farms, but there was also a pattern of official
conversion of smaller, less solvent kolkhozy to sovkhozy. As a
result, in 1973 the total sown area of sovkhozy surpassed that of
kolkhozy for the first time. The total number of kolkhozy decreased
from 235,500 in 1940 to 26,300 in 1986. But after the March 1989
Agricultural Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU), it appeared likely that the
proliferation of sovkhozy would cease. Even one of the most
conservative Politburo members, Egor K. Ligachev, who was named
chairman of the party's Agrarian Policy Commission in September
1988, recommended gradually converting sovkhozy into cooperatives
and leasing collectives.

A third production entity that survived from Stalin's era was
the private plot, known in Soviet jargon as the "personal auxiliary
holding." These plots were ideologically unpalatable to the
bureaucrats, but they were tolerated as a means for farmers to
produce their own food and supplement their incomes. The plots were
small (roughly half a hectare) and were assigned one to a
household. Peasants were allowed to consume whatever was grown on
the plot and sell any surplus--either at the collective farm
markets or to state or cooperative marketing agencies. The
contribution of private plots to the nation's food supply far
exceeded their size. With only 3 percent of total sown area in the
1980s, they produced over a quarter of gross agricultural output,
including about 30 percent of meat and milk, 66 percent of
potatoes, and 40 percent of fruits, vegetables, and eggs.