In recent years, major natural gas fields have been found in Israel’s exclusive economic zone. These discoveries have the potential to transform the Israeli energy outlook, enabling the country to diversify its energy sources. Moreover, the discovered volumes of natural gas could theoretically enable regional energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet, it is still uncertain whether these gas finds can effectively benefit Israeli and regional stakeholders. Since the initial discovery of the gas fields, Israel has revised its royalty and energy export policies and continues to debate regulation of the energy market. However, while the length and tenor of this process has been detrimental to investment, he substance of these debates reflects valid concerns, and suggests a need for robust regulation by Israeli authorities.

Israel's complicated relations with nearly all its neighbors render it an "energy island," severely limiting the potential for regional cooperation. As the country contends with its status as an “energy island,” Israeli policymakers are confronted with various challenges related to these new energy discoveries:

Ownership and revenue

The discovery of the Tamar and then the Leviathan fields galvanized social activists and politicians in Israel to call for an overhaul of the energy tax and royalties regime in what has become a heated and politically salient debate.

Energy security and export

The discovery of a vast supply of energy seemed to promise freedom from the threat of an energy shortage. Throughout the country's history, securing the energy supply had been a central concern of Israeli policymakers. The next debate then became whether or not to limit exports, and what effects such limits might have on private investment and on the availability of the gas to the market should investment be limited.

Monopoly and pricing

The rationale of those in favor of export was that Israel should treat its energy market as such—a competitive market—at least partially integrated to the regional and international energy markets. Yet, Israel's energy market remains far from a perfect market; it is, at present, dominated by the partnership of the Delek Group and Noble Energy. Without proper regulation, the monopoly creates a severe problem for the Israeli market, and with one major supplier, the Israel Electric Corporation would have very little leverage when negotiating the price of gas. The resulting price would directly affect both industry and consumers throughout the Israeli economy for decades to come.

Maritime security

In a volatile region, , securing the energy facilities both in the Mediterranean and along the Israeli coast constitute a continued challenge for Israeli policymakers. Of the branches of the Israeli military, Israel’s navy has long been the smallest and least developed. While in recent years its submarine fleet has been upgraded, new platforms are now needed to guard the maritime facilities, along with adaptation of existing systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles, at considerable cost.

Environmental concerns

There is also the environmental risk involved with these new energy discoveries. The environmental aspects of the maritime activity are not currently regulated properly, a a casualty of the speed with which Israel has had to deal with its gas finds and with the introduction of new types of infrastructure deep in the waters of the Mediterranean. While gas leaks tend to be less severe environmentally than oil spills, an accident in—or sabotage to—the offshore facilities could have severe, and potentially long-term, environmental ramifications. Proper regulation is urgently needed.

Conclusion
From the outset, the discovery of large gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean raised the prospect of regional cooperation. Yet, complex and sometimes strained political relations with countries in the region have so far limited effective cooperation. Resolution of the lengthy domestic debates in Israel over natural gas--debates that reflect valid domestic concerns--could in due time also allow for the possibility of regional cooperation on energy. In the long run, however, only a predictable domestic environment will allow Israel, its neighbors, and the United States to overcome the formidable diplomatic challenges of fostering energy cooperation in a volatile region, and allow Israel to cease being an “energy island.”

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Authors

]]>
Thu, 19 Feb 2015 14:00:00 -0500Natan Sachs and Tim Boersma
In recent years, major natural gas fields have been found in Israel's exclusive economic zone. These discoveries have the potential to transform the Israeli energy outlook, enabling the country to diversify its energy sources. Moreover, the discovered volumes of natural gas could theoretically enable regional energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet, it is still uncertain whether these gas finds can effectively benefit Israeli and regional stakeholders. Since the initial discovery of the gas fields, Israel has revised its royalty and energy export policies and continues to debate regulation of the energy market. However, while the length and tenor of this process has been detrimental to investment, he substance of these debates reflects valid concerns, and suggests a need for robust regulation by Israeli authorities.
Israel's complicated relations with nearly all its neighbors render it an "energy island," severely limiting the potential for regional cooperation. As the country contends with its status as an “energy island,” Israeli policymakers are confronted with various challenges related to these new energy discoveries:
Ownership and revenue
The discovery of the Tamar and then the Leviathan fields galvanized social activists and politicians in Israel to call for an overhaul of the energy tax and royalties regime in what has become a heated and politically salient debate.
Energy security and export
The discovery of a vast supply of energy seemed to promise freedom from the threat of an energy shortage. Throughout the country's history, securing the energy supply had been a central concern of Israeli policymakers. The next debate then became whether or not to limit exports, and what effects such limits might have on private investment and on the availability of the gas to the market should investment be limited.
Monopoly and pricing
The rationale of those in favor of export was that Israel should treat its energy market as such—a competitive market—at least partially integrated to the regional and international energy markets. Yet, Israel's energy market remains far from a perfect market; it is, at present, dominated by the partnership of the Delek Group and Noble Energy. Without proper regulation, the monopoly creates a severe problem for the Israeli market, and with one major supplier, the Israel Electric Corporation would have very little leverage when negotiating the price of gas. The resulting price would directly affect both industry and consumers throughout the Israeli economy for decades to come.
Maritime security
In a volatile region, , securing the energy facilities both in the Mediterranean and along the Israeli coast constitute a continued challenge for Israeli policymakers. Of the branches of the Israeli military, Israel's navy has long been the smallest and least developed. While in recent years its submarine fleet has been upgraded, new platforms are now needed to guard the maritime facilities, along with adaptation of existing systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles, at considerable cost.
Environmental concerns
There is also the environmental risk involved with these new energy discoveries. The environmental aspects of the maritime activity are not currently regulated properly, a a casualty of the speed with which Israel has had to deal with its gas finds and with the introduction of new types of infrastructure deep in the waters of the Mediterranean. While gas leaks tend to be less severe environmentally than oil spills, an accident in—or sabotage to—the offshore facilities could have severe, and potentially long-term, environmental ramifications. Proper regulation is urgently needed.________________________________________________________
Conclusion
From the outset, the discovery of large gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean raised the prospect of regional cooperation. Yet, complex and sometimes strained political ... In recent years, major natural gas fields have been found in Israel's exclusive economic zone. These discoveries have the potential to transform the Israeli energy outlook, enabling the country to diversify its energy sources.

In recent years, major natural gas fields have been found in Israel’s exclusive economic zone. These discoveries have the potential to transform the Israeli energy outlook, enabling the country to diversify its energy sources. Moreover, the discovered volumes of natural gas could theoretically enable regional energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet, it is still uncertain whether these gas finds can effectively benefit Israeli and regional stakeholders. Since the initial discovery of the gas fields, Israel has revised its royalty and energy export policies and continues to debate regulation of the energy market. However, while the length and tenor of this process has been detrimental to investment, he substance of these debates reflects valid concerns, and suggests a need for robust regulation by Israeli authorities.

Israel's complicated relations with nearly all its neighbors render it an "energy island," severely limiting the potential for regional cooperation. As the country contends with its status as an “energy island,” Israeli policymakers are confronted with various challenges related to these new energy discoveries:

Ownership and revenue

The discovery of the Tamar and then the Leviathan fields galvanized social activists and politicians in Israel to call for an overhaul of the energy tax and royalties regime in what has become a heated and politically salient debate.

Energy security and export

The discovery of a vast supply of energy seemed to promise freedom from the threat of an energy shortage. Throughout the country's history, securing the energy supply had been a central concern of Israeli policymakers. The next debate then became whether or not to limit exports, and what effects such limits might have on private investment and on the availability of the gas to the market should investment be limited.

Monopoly and pricing

The rationale of those in favor of export was that Israel should treat its energy market as such—a competitive market—at least partially integrated to the regional and international energy markets. Yet, Israel's energy market remains far from a perfect market; it is, at present, dominated by the partnership of the Delek Group and Noble Energy. Without proper regulation, the monopoly creates a severe problem for the Israeli market, and with one major supplier, the Israel Electric Corporation would have very little leverage when negotiating the price of gas. The resulting price would directly affect both industry and consumers throughout the Israeli economy for decades to come.

Maritime security

In a volatile region, , securing the energy facilities both in the Mediterranean and along the Israeli coast constitute a continued challenge for Israeli policymakers. Of the branches of the Israeli military, Israel’s navy has long been the smallest and least developed. While in recent years its submarine fleet has been upgraded, new platforms are now needed to guard the maritime facilities, along with adaptation of existing systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles, at considerable cost.

Environmental concerns

There is also the environmental risk involved with these new energy discoveries. The environmental aspects of the maritime activity are not currently regulated properly, a a casualty of the speed with which Israel has had to deal with its gas finds and with the introduction of new types of infrastructure deep in the waters of the Mediterranean. While gas leaks tend to be less severe environmentally than oil spills, an accident in—or sabotage to—the offshore facilities could have severe, and potentially long-term, environmental ramifications. Proper regulation is urgently needed.

Conclusion
From the outset, the discovery of large gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean raised the prospect of regional cooperation. Yet, complex and sometimes strained political relations with countries in the region have so far limited effective cooperation. Resolution of the lengthy domestic debates in Israel over natural gas--debates that reflect valid domestic concerns--could in due time also allow for the possibility of regional cooperation on energy. In the long run, however, only a predictable domestic environment will allow Israel, its neighbors, and the United States to overcome the formidable diplomatic challenges of fostering energy cooperation in a volatile region, and allow Israel to cease being an “energy island.”

In late September 2000, the very week the Second Intifada began, Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat visited the Gaza Strip to celebrate a natural gas discovery. Arafat proclaimed the Gaza Marine field, located about 22 miles off the coast, to be “a gift from God” to the Palestinian people for generations to come, one which would “provide a solid foundation for our economy, for establishing an independent state with holy Jerusalem as its capital.”

In retrospect, it is easy to conclude that Arafat was overly optimistic about the discovery; the development of the Gaza Marine field has come to a stand-still as tensions between the Palestinian territories and Israel persist.

While the technical and security-related challenges in developing Gaza Marine are considerable, they are solvable. Other advancements to the Palestinian energy market are also achievable and offer avenues for addressing a woefully underdeveloped Palestinian energy system, and Israel has just as much to gain from such development.

For the Palestinians, the benefits of energy cooperation could be transformative. The exploitation of Gaza Marine alone would produce:
• Revenues of between $2.5 to $7 billion;
• A domestic fuel source for electricity generation;
• Sufficient power for water desalination in the Gaza Strip, as well as acceleration of the development of agriculture, a staple of the local economy;
• And the additional revenue and structural change in energy supply could alleviate or eliminate the chronic debt to the Israeli Electrical Corporation and the threat of supply disruptions.

Yet each of these opportunities comes with its own set of challenges:
• While the field is offshore Gaza, the area is prone to conflict;
• Revenues from Gaza Marine heavily depend on the prices charged for natural gas. Natural gas prices, in turn, depend on factors such as regional gas prices, and the willingness of the authorities to do without energy subsidies, a political instrument used widely in the region;
• Israel is concerned that the revenues following natural gas production may benefit Hamas;
• The obstacle still remains over negotiating pricing and securing a buyer for the gas.

Conclusion
The reality is that there are practical solutions for these issues. The direct sale of gas by the BG Group through Israeli infrastructure just north of the Gaza Strip, licensed by the internationally recognized Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, offers a viable route to bring the gas field into production. Security concerns would be alleviated by the underwater piping to safer facilities in Israel. The technicalities, in other words, are solvable, and the economics make sense. All that is lacking now is sufficient political leadership.

See below for a timeline the development of the Gaza Marine field and a download to the full report:

In late September 2000, the very week the Second Intifada began, Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat visited the Gaza Strip to celebrate a natural gas discovery. Arafat proclaimed the Gaza Marine field, located about 22 miles off the coast, to be “a gift from God” to the Palestinian people for generations to come, one which would “provide a solid foundation for our economy, for establishing an independent state with holy Jerusalem as its capital.”

In retrospect, it is easy to conclude that Arafat was overly optimistic about the discovery; the development of the Gaza Marine field has come to a stand-still as tensions between the Palestinian territories and Israel persist.

While the technical and security-related challenges in developing Gaza Marine are considerable, they are solvable. Other advancements to the Palestinian energy market are also achievable and offer avenues for addressing a woefully underdeveloped Palestinian energy system, and Israel has just as much to gain from such development.

For the Palestinians, the benefits of energy cooperation could be transformative. The exploitation of Gaza Marine alone would produce:
• Revenues of between $2.5 to $7 billion;
• A domestic fuel source for electricity generation;
• Sufficient power for water desalination in the Gaza Strip, as well as acceleration of the development of agriculture, a staple of the local economy;
• And the additional revenue and structural change in energy supply could alleviate or eliminate the chronic debt to the Israeli Electrical Corporation and the threat of supply disruptions.

Yet each of these opportunities comes with its own set of challenges:
• While the field is offshore Gaza, the area is prone to conflict;
• Revenues from Gaza Marine heavily depend on the prices charged for natural gas. Natural gas prices, in turn, depend on factors such as regional gas prices, and the willingness of the authorities to do without energy subsidies, a political instrument used widely in the region;
• Israel is concerned that the revenues following natural gas production may benefit Hamas;
• The obstacle still remains over negotiating pricing and securing a buyer for the gas.

Conclusion
The reality is that there are practical solutions for these issues. The direct sale of gas by the BG Group through Israeli infrastructure just north of the Gaza Strip, licensed by the internationally recognized Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, offers a viable route to bring the gas field into production. Security concerns would be alleviated by the underwater piping to safer facilities in Israel. The technicalities, in other words, are solvable, and the economics make sense. All that is lacking now is sufficient political leadership.

See below for a timeline the development of the Gaza Marine field and a download to the full report:

Downloads

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/28-je-suis-gaza-barakat?rssid=palestinian+territories{0C01FE3A-B097-45E7-8E60-4A5561E9A504}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/84368701/0/brookingsrss/topics/palestinianterritories~Je-Suis-Gaza-That%e2%80%99s-What-Europe-Should-Be-SayingJe Suis Gaza: That’s What Europe Should Be Saying

Having failed to protect the civilians of Gaza in July and August last year, the international community seemed poised to make amends by working to rebuild the Strip. But despite pledges of billions of dollars, only $100m in aid had reportedly arrived by the start of this year. That’s just about two per cent of the promised amount.

Hardly any of the 96,000 houses damaged or destroyed during the conflict have been restored, leaving tens of thousands to face one of the harshest winters in years. Little has been done by the international community to put pressure on Israel and Egypt to ease the blockade on Gaza. The Israeli border crossings remain closed to all but a small trickle of aid and the Egyptian authorities’ recent decision to open the Rafah crossing for three days provided only very temporary relief.

Israel enforces “no-go zones” as a security buffer – a 6-kilometre fishing cordon and 1km of farmland along the border fence – and terrible tragedies often happen there with numerous instances of Israeli soldiers firing on fishermen and other civilians in those areas.

As the days and months pass with little or no reconstruction, ordinary Gazans’ frustrations continue to mount. It is all too easy to imagine a spark igniting yet another conflict, leading to yet another humanitarian disaster, an endlessly violent cycle.

The hopelessness and injustices have led many young Muslims in Europe and North America to express their anger and disappointment with the western world’s hypocrisy and double standards on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After the Charlie Hebdo massacre, it is important to remember that among the main reasons for Muslim disaffection and radicalisation in the West is the decades of injustice visited upon the Palestinians in full view of the international media.

Today, in the shadow of ISIL, Al Qaeda and the Taliban, it is fashionable to disassociate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the rise of Islamic radicalism in the West. However, the mere fact that Ahmed Coulibaly – a friend of fellow Frenchmen Said and Cherif Kouachi, who carried out the Charlie Hebdo attacks – chose a kosher supermarket as his target, is a stark reminder of the centrality of this conflict.

The “Je Suis Charlie” message from Europe is not just about freedom of speech, but also about upholding core values that revolve around the universal application of human rights and dignity. While Sweden has taken the courageous step of recognising a Palestinian state, it is time for the rallying cry “Je Suis Gaza” to spur a renewed effort to move the stalled reconstruction process forward. This would send a strong message that Europe does not tolerate the targeting of any civilians in any way, whether it is magazine cartoonists or a siege that is leaving 1.8 million people on the Strip to slowly starve.

It is clear that the reconstruction mechanism proposed by Robert Serry, UN special coordinator for the Middle East peace process, to ease the blockade while ensuring Israel’s security has not worked. Its failure led Oxfam to recently admit that the arrangement “has had little or no positive effect on people’s lives so far”. Oxfam has also described the quantity of construction materials allowed to enter the Strip as no more than “a drop in the bucket”. That is true because the materials currently being allowed in are just four per cent of pre-war levels.

It is time to consider a new approach then, even as we accept that it has to address Israeli security concerns while making Gaza’s critical needs a priority. Reconstruction would be a chance to facilitate Palestinian unity.

Any new approach needs to be based on greater collaboration and transparency about the process, all the better to dispel the notion that security measures are merely a means for Israel to gather intelligence.

Transparency would help end some of the bickering between Hamas and Fatah over control of the reconstruction process. Any new approach would have to allow the Palestinian Authority to take control of the borders to help restore its legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. The idea for a collaborative council for the reconstruction of Gaza – first put forward in a Brookings’ policy briefing, is one such attempt to think outside the box.

Ultimately, of course, there can be no change without the requisite international will. But renewed engagement with the reconstruction of Gaza would not only alleviate much suffering in the Strip, it would uphold basic principles of humanity and justice for all. It would probably do more to pre-empt the radicalisation of some European Muslims than some of the most sophisticated propaganda and intelligence and infiltration campaigns.

Authors

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Wed, 28 Jan 2015 00:00:00 -0500Sultan Barakat
Having failed to protect the civilians of Gaza in July and August last year, the international community seemed poised to make amends by working to rebuild the Strip. But despite pledges of billions of dollars, only $100m in aid had reportedly arrived by the start of this year. That's just about two per cent of the promised amount.
Hardly any of the 96,000 houses damaged or destroyed during the conflict have been restored, leaving tens of thousands to face one of the harshest winters in years. Little has been done by the international community to put pressure on Israel and Egypt to ease the blockade on Gaza. The Israeli border crossings remain closed to all but a small trickle of aid and the Egyptian authorities' recent decision to open the Rafah crossing for three days provided only very temporary relief.
Israel enforces “no-go zones” as a security buffer – a 6-kilometre fishing cordon and 1km of farmland along the border fence – and terrible tragedies often happen there with numerous instances of Israeli soldiers firing on fishermen and other civilians in those areas.
As the days and months pass with little or no reconstruction, ordinary Gazans' frustrations continue to mount. It is all too easy to imagine a spark igniting yet another conflict, leading to yet another humanitarian disaster, an endlessly violent cycle.
The hopelessness and injustices have led many young Muslims in Europe and North America to express their anger and disappointment with the western world's hypocrisy and double standards on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After the Charlie Hebdo massacre, it is important to remember that among the main reasons for Muslim disaffection and radicalisation in the West is the decades of injustice visited upon the Palestinians in full view of the international media.
Today, in the shadow of ISIL, Al Qaeda and the Taliban, it is fashionable to disassociate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the rise of Islamic radicalism in the West. However, the mere fact that Ahmed Coulibaly – a friend of fellow Frenchmen Said and Cherif Kouachi, who carried out the Charlie Hebdo attacks – chose a kosher supermarket as his target, is a stark reminder of the centrality of this conflict.
The “Je Suis Charlie” message from Europe is not just about freedom of speech, but also about upholding core values that revolve around the universal application of human rights and dignity. While Sweden has taken the courageous step of recognising a Palestinian state, it is time for the rallying cry “Je Suis Gaza” to spur a renewed effort to move the stalled reconstruction process forward. This would send a strong message that Europe does not tolerate the targeting of any civilians in any way, whether it is magazine cartoonists or a siege that is leaving 1.8 million people on the Strip to slowly starve.
It is clear that the reconstruction mechanism proposed by Robert Serry, UN special coordinator for the Middle East peace process, to ease the blockade while ensuring Israel's security has not worked. Its failure led Oxfam to recently admit that the arrangement “has had little or no positive effect on people's lives so far”. Oxfam has also described the quantity of construction materials allowed to enter the Strip as no more than “a drop in the bucket”. That is true because the materials currently being allowed in are just four per cent of pre-war levels.
It is time to consider a new approach then, even as we accept that it has to address Israeli security concerns while making Gaza's critical needs a priority. Reconstruction would be a chance to facilitate Palestinian unity.
Any new approach needs to be based on greater collaboration and transparency about the process, all the better to dispel the notion that security measures are merely a means for Israel to gather intelligence.
Transparency would help end some of the bickering between ...
Having failed to protect the civilians of Gaza in July and August last year, the international community seemed poised to make amends by working to rebuild the Strip. But despite pledges of billions of dollars, only $100m in aid had reportedly ...

Having failed to protect the civilians of Gaza in July and August last year, the international community seemed poised to make amends by working to rebuild the Strip. But despite pledges of billions of dollars, only $100m in aid had reportedly arrived by the start of this year. That’s just about two per cent of the promised amount.

Hardly any of the 96,000 houses damaged or destroyed during the conflict have been restored, leaving tens of thousands to face one of the harshest winters in years. Little has been done by the international community to put pressure on Israel and Egypt to ease the blockade on Gaza. The Israeli border crossings remain closed to all but a small trickle of aid and the Egyptian authorities’ recent decision to open the Rafah crossing for three days provided only very temporary relief.

Israel enforces “no-go zones” as a security buffer – a 6-kilometre fishing cordon and 1km of farmland along the border fence – and terrible tragedies often happen there with numerous instances of Israeli soldiers firing on fishermen and other civilians in those areas.

As the days and months pass with little or no reconstruction, ordinary Gazans’ frustrations continue to mount. It is all too easy to imagine a spark igniting yet another conflict, leading to yet another humanitarian disaster, an endlessly violent cycle.

The hopelessness and injustices have led many young Muslims in Europe and North America to express their anger and disappointment with the western world’s hypocrisy and double standards on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After the Charlie Hebdo massacre, it is important to remember that among the main reasons for Muslim disaffection and radicalisation in the West is the decades of injustice visited upon the Palestinians in full view of the international media.

Today, in the shadow of ISIL, Al Qaeda and the Taliban, it is fashionable to disassociate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from the rise of Islamic radicalism in the West. However, the mere fact that Ahmed Coulibaly – a friend of fellow Frenchmen Said and Cherif Kouachi, who carried out the Charlie Hebdo attacks – chose a kosher supermarket as his target, is a stark reminder of the centrality of this conflict.

The “Je Suis Charlie” message from Europe is not just about freedom of speech, but also about upholding core values that revolve around the universal application of human rights and dignity. While Sweden has taken the courageous step of recognising a Palestinian state, it is time for the rallying cry “Je Suis Gaza” to spur a renewed effort to move the stalled reconstruction process forward. This would send a strong message that Europe does not tolerate the targeting of any civilians in any way, whether it is magazine cartoonists or a siege that is leaving 1.8 million people on the Strip to slowly starve.

It is clear that the reconstruction mechanism proposed by Robert Serry, UN special coordinator for the Middle East peace process, to ease the blockade while ensuring Israel’s security has not worked. Its failure led Oxfam to recently admit that the arrangement “has had little or no positive effect on people’s lives so far”. Oxfam has also described the quantity of construction materials allowed to enter the Strip as no more than “a drop in the bucket”. That is true because the materials currently being allowed in are just four per cent of pre-war levels.

It is time to consider a new approach then, even as we accept that it has to address Israeli security concerns while making Gaza’s critical needs a priority. Reconstruction would be a chance to facilitate Palestinian unity.

Any new approach needs to be based on greater collaboration and transparency about the process, all the better to dispel the notion that security measures are merely a means for Israel to gather intelligence.

Transparency would help end some of the bickering between Hamas and Fatah over control of the reconstruction process. Any new approach would have to allow the Palestinian Authority to take control of the borders to help restore its legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. The idea for a collaborative council for the reconstruction of Gaza – first put forward in a Brookings’ policy briefing, is one such attempt to think outside the box.

Ultimately, of course, there can be no change without the requisite international will. But renewed engagement with the reconstruction of Gaza would not only alleviate much suffering in the Strip, it would uphold basic principles of humanity and justice for all. It would probably do more to pre-empt the radicalisation of some European Muslims than some of the most sophisticated propaganda and intelligence and infiltration campaigns.

The bloody war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza this past summer left both Israelis and Palestinians fearing that another war sometime in the not-too-distant future is all but inevitable. Israelis believe they must deter Hamas from conducting additional attacks and keep it weak should a conflict occur. For their part, Hamas leaders remain hostile to Israel and feel politically trapped by the extensive blockade of Gaza—and all the while, Gaza lies in ruins. The combination is explosive.

In a recent article in The Washington Quarterly, I argue that now is a good time to explore alternatives that would break us out of the cycle of provocation, response, and war. Below I briefly describe Israel’s current approach to Gaza and sketch out some new approaches. As I discuss further in the longer article, each of these options has flaws and limits (some quite deep), and many are difficult or costly to implement – or even unrealistic under current conditions.

The Current Approach: Mowing the Grass

Israel’s current approach is often considered part of a strategy labeled “mowing the grass.” As the label suggests, Israel considers Hamas and other terrorist groups a constant danger, but one that is almost impossible to uproot. The approach, then, is to strike regularly to keep the danger limited (or the grass mowed), recognizing that, on a regular basis, additional strikes will need to be carried out. Israel has successfully kept Hamas from governing Gaza successfully, and its military threat to Israel, while real, is limited.

This approach has many hidden costs. Deterrence works at best fitfully, and Hamas rockets have longer ranges than in the past. The casualties Hamas has inflicted are a high number for a small state, especially one as casualty-sensitive as Israel. In addition, the rocket attacks, and the constant risk of them, impose a psychological burden. Some Israelis living near Gaza are reluctant to return, and rates of trauma are high.

Israel also pays a cost internationally. Mowing the grass also hurts more moderate Palestinians. Whenever Israel attacks Gaza, moderate Palestinians’ cooperation with Israel, and dislike of Hamas, are on full display. The current approach also increases Hamas’s reliance on Iran. Although Syria remains a bone of contention, Iran still needs allies in the anti-Israel struggle, particularly a leading Sunni group like Hamas, and Hamas has few other choices if it wants to maintain its ability to use violence and gain access to external funding. Finally, the current approach puts the conflict in stasis: Hamas is weak and off balance, but politically and militarily still a potent force.

Four Alternatives

Option One: Crush and Occupy

Israel has the military power to reoccupy Gaza and subdue Hamas there, an approach that conservative Israeli leaders like Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Lieberman have suggested. Once in charge, Israel could rule directly or try to install its preferred proxy and, as it did in the West Bank after retaking territory there in 2002, gather the intelligence and develop the security presence necessary to identify and arrest the Hamas cadre. The task would take months, as Hamas has a vast administrative and military infrastructure. However, Israeli intelligence is quite skilled, and over time Israel would crush Hamas and largely end the rocket threat. The timing for such a move in some ways is ideal given Hamas’s international isolation.

Option Two: Bring the PA Back to Gaza

Instead of attempting to impose a government on Gaza, Israel could try to help—or at least not hinder—a return of the PA to Gaza through peaceful means, particularly as part of a unity deal between Hamas and the PA. Under such an arrangement, the PA would assume responsibility for Gaza’s border crossings with Israel and Egypt as well as aspects of the economy and overall administration of the Strip; in reality, though, Hamas would continue to run much of the show. Israel’s extensive cooperation with the PA in the West Bank on security issues would be applied in Gaza to prevent the smuggling of weapons into Gaza (and especially to get Egypt to work with the PA on the Rafah crossing) and to conduct inspections to ensure Hamas is not secretly stockpiling weapons, building tunnels, or otherwise becoming more dangerous militarily. The eventual goal would be for the PA to be strong enough to compel Hamas to disarm, or at least make it hard for the organization to resume violence. In the meantime, for a deal to be struck, Hamas must also gain politically.

Option Three: Exchange Aid for Disarmament

Another option is to combine two extremes: Hamas would make the ultimate sacrifice and disarm, effectively ending its self-styled role as a resistance organization, and in exchange Israel would provide Gazans with a massive aid package that would greatly improve their standard of living. Former Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz proposed an initiative in which, in exchange for the demilitarization of Gaza, Israel would offer a “significant, economic aid package for the Palestinian population that would include a budget of $50 billion over five years for infrastructure, welfare, healthcare, education, and employment,” as well as easing restrictions on border crossings. Other leading Israelis, such as former intelligence chief Yuval Diskin, have proposed less sweeping trades, with a more gradual demilitarization that focuses on particular types of weapons, such as long-range rockets, in exchange for “implementation of an international plan to rebuild the Gaza Strip,” among other concessions.

Option Four: Negotiate a Lasting Ceasefire

Although Hamas is a seemingly implacable opponent of Israel and the PA embraces peace, a limited deal with Hamas over Gaza is in some ways simpler than a comprehensive one with moderate Palestinians. Emotional issues in contention in the West Bank, such as the status of Jerusalem or the fate of Israeli settlements, are not present in Gaza. And Hamas is a stronger organization than the PA: if it makes a deal, it is better able to stick to it.

A limited “like for like” ceasefire, in which Hamas ends rocket attacks and polices the Strip while Israel eases the economic vise on Gaza—but neither side goes much further—is more plausible. Hamas could claim that its long-term goals remain expansive, but that it is accepting a lasting ceasefire due to its current weakness; in fact, Hamas’s current approach has elements of this logic. Israel would have to ensure a modicum of basic economic activity in Gaza, and Egypt would have to allow Gazans some freedom to travel to and from the Strip (admittedly a difficult requirement given Cairo’s hostility to Hamas). Such a ceasefire would also help the people of Gaza, as any deal would involve lifting economic restrictions and otherwise making life easier.

Conclusion

Because of the flaws, limits, or political impossibility of some of these options, the status quo may be the best of a bunch of poor choices. Nevertheless, given the problems with Israel’s current approach and the paucity of good alternatives, some changes are necessary. The analysis suggests the importance of helping moderate Palestinians govern more competently and become politically stronger: currently they are on the path to political irrelevance. In addition, the world should offer pragmatists in Hamas political opportunities, giving them another path to success beyond violence. Finally, options that offer small changes in the status quo deserve consideration. Such steps would, over time, enable Israel to take more risks and allow everyone to move beyond the current stalemate.

Authors

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Fri, 23 Jan 2015 10:46:00 -0500Daniel L. Byman
The bloody war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza this past summer left both Israelis and Palestinians fearing that another war sometime in the not-too-distant future is all but inevitable. Israelis believe they must deter Hamas from conducting additional attacks and keep it weak should a conflict occur. For their part, Hamas leaders remain hostile to Israel and feel politically trapped by the extensive blockade of Gaza—and all the while, Gaza lies in ruins. The combination is explosive.
In a recent article in The Washington Quarterly, I argue that now is a good time to explore alternatives that would break us out of the cycle of provocation, response, and war. Below I briefly describe Israel's current approach to Gaza and sketch out some new approaches. As I discuss further in the longer article, each of these options has flaws and limits (some quite deep), and many are difficult or costly to implement – or even unrealistic under current conditions.
The Current Approach: Mowing the Grass
Israel's current approach is often considered part of a strategy labeled “mowing the grass.” As the label suggests, Israel considers Hamas and other terrorist groups a constant danger, but one that is almost impossible to uproot. The approach, then, is to strike regularly to keep the danger limited (or the grass mowed), recognizing that, on a regular basis, additional strikes will need to be carried out. Israel has successfully kept Hamas from governing Gaza successfully, and its military threat to Israel, while real, is limited.
This approach has many hidden costs. Deterrence works at best fitfully, and Hamas rockets have longer ranges than in the past. The casualties Hamas has inflicted are a high number for a small state, especially one as casualty-sensitive as Israel. In addition, the rocket attacks, and the constant risk of them, impose a psychological burden. Some Israelis living near Gaza are reluctant to return, and rates of trauma are high.
Israel also pays a cost internationally. Mowing the grass also hurts more moderate Palestinians. Whenever Israel attacks Gaza, moderate Palestinians' cooperation with Israel, and dislike of Hamas, are on full display. The current approach also increases Hamas's reliance on Iran. Although Syria remains a bone of contention, Iran still needs allies in the anti-Israel struggle, particularly a leading Sunni group like Hamas, and Hamas has few other choices if it wants to maintain its ability to use violence and gain access to external funding. Finally, the current approach puts the conflict in stasis: Hamas is weak and off balance, but politically and militarily still a potent force.
Four Alternatives
Option One: Crush and Occupy
Israel has the military power to reoccupy Gaza and subdue Hamas there, an approach that conservative Israeli leaders like Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Lieberman have suggested. Once in charge, Israel could rule directly or try to install its preferred proxy and, as it did in the West Bank after retaking territory there in 2002, gather the intelligence and develop the security presence necessary to identify and arrest the Hamas cadre. The task would take months, as Hamas has a vast administrative and military infrastructure. However, Israeli intelligence is quite skilled, and over time Israel would crush Hamas and largely end the rocket threat. The timing for such a move in some ways is ideal given Hamas's international isolation.
Option Two: Bring the PA Back to Gaza
Instead of attempting to impose a government on Gaza, Israel could try to help—or at least not hinder—a return of the PA to Gaza through peaceful means, particularly as part of a unity deal between Hamas and the PA. Under such an arrangement, the PA would assume responsibility for Gaza's border crossings with Israel and Egypt as well as aspects of the economy and overall administration of the Strip; in reality, though, Hamas would continue to run much of ...
The bloody war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza this past summer left both Israelis and Palestinians fearing that another war sometime in the not-too-distant future is all but inevitable. Israelis believe they must deter Hamas from conducting ...

The bloody war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza this past summer left both Israelis and Palestinians fearing that another war sometime in the not-too-distant future is all but inevitable. Israelis believe they must deter Hamas from conducting additional attacks and keep it weak should a conflict occur. For their part, Hamas leaders remain hostile to Israel and feel politically trapped by the extensive blockade of Gaza—and all the while, Gaza lies in ruins. The combination is explosive.

In a recent article in The Washington Quarterly, I argue that now is a good time to explore alternatives that would break us out of the cycle of provocation, response, and war. Below I briefly describe Israel’s current approach to Gaza and sketch out some new approaches. As I discuss further in the longer article, each of these options has flaws and limits (some quite deep), and many are difficult or costly to implement – or even unrealistic under current conditions.

The Current Approach: Mowing the Grass

Israel’s current approach is often considered part of a strategy labeled “mowing the grass.” As the label suggests, Israel considers Hamas and other terrorist groups a constant danger, but one that is almost impossible to uproot. The approach, then, is to strike regularly to keep the danger limited (or the grass mowed), recognizing that, on a regular basis, additional strikes will need to be carried out. Israel has successfully kept Hamas from governing Gaza successfully, and its military threat to Israel, while real, is limited.

This approach has many hidden costs. Deterrence works at best fitfully, and Hamas rockets have longer ranges than in the past. The casualties Hamas has inflicted are a high number for a small state, especially one as casualty-sensitive as Israel. In addition, the rocket attacks, and the constant risk of them, impose a psychological burden. Some Israelis living near Gaza are reluctant to return, and rates of trauma are high.

Israel also pays a cost internationally. Mowing the grass also hurts more moderate Palestinians. Whenever Israel attacks Gaza, moderate Palestinians’ cooperation with Israel, and dislike of Hamas, are on full display. The current approach also increases Hamas’s reliance on Iran. Although Syria remains a bone of contention, Iran still needs allies in the anti-Israel struggle, particularly a leading Sunni group like Hamas, and Hamas has few other choices if it wants to maintain its ability to use violence and gain access to external funding. Finally, the current approach puts the conflict in stasis: Hamas is weak and off balance, but politically and militarily still a potent force.

Four Alternatives

Option One: Crush and Occupy

Israel has the military power to reoccupy Gaza and subdue Hamas there, an approach that conservative Israeli leaders like Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Lieberman have suggested. Once in charge, Israel could rule directly or try to install its preferred proxy and, as it did in the West Bank after retaking territory there in 2002, gather the intelligence and develop the security presence necessary to identify and arrest the Hamas cadre. The task would take months, as Hamas has a vast administrative and military infrastructure. However, Israeli intelligence is quite skilled, and over time Israel would crush Hamas and largely end the rocket threat. The timing for such a move in some ways is ideal given Hamas’s international isolation.

Option Two: Bring the PA Back to Gaza

Instead of attempting to impose a government on Gaza, Israel could try to help—or at least not hinder—a return of the PA to Gaza through peaceful means, particularly as part of a unity deal between Hamas and the PA. Under such an arrangement, the PA would assume responsibility for Gaza’s border crossings with Israel and Egypt as well as aspects of the economy and overall administration of the Strip; in reality, though, Hamas would continue to run much of the show. Israel’s extensive cooperation with the PA in the West Bank on security issues would be applied in Gaza to prevent the smuggling of weapons into Gaza (and especially to get Egypt to work with the PA on the Rafah crossing) and to conduct inspections to ensure Hamas is not secretly stockpiling weapons, building tunnels, or otherwise becoming more dangerous militarily. The eventual goal would be for the PA to be strong enough to compel Hamas to disarm, or at least make it hard for the organization to resume violence. In the meantime, for a deal to be struck, Hamas must also gain politically.

Option Three: Exchange Aid for Disarmament

Another option is to combine two extremes: Hamas would make the ultimate sacrifice and disarm, effectively ending its self-styled role as a resistance organization, and in exchange Israel would provide Gazans with a massive aid package that would greatly improve their standard of living. Former Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz proposed an initiative in which, in exchange for the demilitarization of Gaza, Israel would offer a “significant, economic aid package for the Palestinian population that would include a budget of $50 billion over five years for infrastructure, welfare, healthcare, education, and employment,” as well as easing restrictions on border crossings. Other leading Israelis, such as former intelligence chief Yuval Diskin, have proposed less sweeping trades, with a more gradual demilitarization that focuses on particular types of weapons, such as long-range rockets, in exchange for “implementation of an international plan to rebuild the Gaza Strip,” among other concessions.

Option Four: Negotiate a Lasting Ceasefire

Although Hamas is a seemingly implacable opponent of Israel and the PA embraces peace, a limited deal with Hamas over Gaza is in some ways simpler than a comprehensive one with moderate Palestinians. Emotional issues in contention in the West Bank, such as the status of Jerusalem or the fate of Israeli settlements, are not present in Gaza. And Hamas is a stronger organization than the PA: if it makes a deal, it is better able to stick to it.

A limited “like for like” ceasefire, in which Hamas ends rocket attacks and polices the Strip while Israel eases the economic vise on Gaza—but neither side goes much further—is more plausible. Hamas could claim that its long-term goals remain expansive, but that it is accepting a lasting ceasefire due to its current weakness; in fact, Hamas’s current approach has elements of this logic. Israel would have to ensure a modicum of basic economic activity in Gaza, and Egypt would have to allow Gazans some freedom to travel to and from the Strip (admittedly a difficult requirement given Cairo’s hostility to Hamas). Such a ceasefire would also help the people of Gaza, as any deal would involve lifting economic restrictions and otherwise making life easier.

Conclusion

Because of the flaws, limits, or political impossibility of some of these options, the status quo may be the best of a bunch of poor choices. Nevertheless, given the problems with Israel’s current approach and the paucity of good alternatives, some changes are necessary. The analysis suggests the importance of helping moderate Palestinians govern more competently and become politically stronger: currently they are on the path to political irrelevance. In addition, the world should offer pragmatists in Hamas political opportunities, giving them another path to success beyond violence. Finally, options that offer small changes in the status quo deserve consideration. Such steps would, over time, enable Israel to take more risks and allow everyone to move beyond the current stalemate.

Authors

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http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/01/12-gaza-reconstruction-barakat-shaban?rssid=palestinian+territories{0AACC1D4-6285-4576-893A-0C66985782EA}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/83152895/0/brookingsrss/topics/palestinianterritories~Back-to-Gaza-A-New-Approach-to-ReconstructionBack to Gaza: A New Approach to Reconstruction

The initial drive to rebuild the Gaza Strip following last summer’s destructive war between Israel and Hamas has gradually stalled. Only a tiny percentage of funds pledged at an October donor’s conference have reached Gaza, and thousands remain homeless. What factors have caused these failures in the reconstruction of Gaza? How can the Palestinian leadership and the international community work to avoid past mistakes?

In this Policy Briefing, Sultan Barakat and Omar Shaban draw on their extensive post-war reconstruction expertise to provide policy advice on approaching the daunting task of rebuilding the devastated Gaza Strip. The authors outline a reconstruction strategy that seeks to engage and empower local stakeholders in Gaza, while improving transparency to ensure accountability to the Palestinian people.

Ultimately, the authors propose a collaborative Gaza Reconstruction Council to oversee the reconstruction process, with representatives from Palestinian civil society groups and political parties, international agencies, and key regional countries. This council would oversee a specialized trust fund that would receive and administer donor monies, breaking the cycle of foreign funds failing to effectively contribute to the reconstruction of Gaza.

The initial drive to rebuild the Gaza Strip following last summer’s destructive war between Israel and Hamas has gradually stalled. Only a tiny percentage of funds pledged at an October donor’s conference have reached Gaza, and thousands remain homeless. What factors have caused these failures in the reconstruction of Gaza? How can the Palestinian leadership and the international community work to avoid past mistakes?

In this Policy Briefing, Sultan Barakat and Omar Shaban draw on their extensive post-war reconstruction expertise to provide policy advice on approaching the daunting task of rebuilding the devastated Gaza Strip. The authors outline a reconstruction strategy that seeks to engage and empower local stakeholders in Gaza, while improving transparency to ensure accountability to the Palestinian people.

Ultimately, the authors propose a collaborative Gaza Reconstruction Council to oversee the reconstruction process, with representatives from Palestinian civil society groups and political parties, international agencies, and key regional countries. This council would oversee a specialized trust fund that would receive and administer donor monies, breaking the cycle of foreign funds failing to effectively contribute to the reconstruction of Gaza.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ decision last week to sign the Rome Statute, the treaty governing the International Criminal Court (ICC), has sparked considerable anger and confusion. The move, which had been a “red line” in Israel and Washington, has outraged Israeli leaders and put an end to any residual hopes U.S. officials might have had for restarting the moribund peace talks. The Obama administration condemned the move as “entirely counterproductive” and one that “does nothing to further the aspirations of the Palestinian people for a sovereign and independent state.” The Israeli response was equally predictable, halting tax transfers that account for nearly two-thirds of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) budget, while Congress is said to be reconsidering $400 million in annual U.S. aid to the PA.

Indeed, the move carries additional risks for the Palestinians, since there is no assurance that the ICC will open an investigation into alleged war crimes in Palestinian territory—and even if it did, charges could also be brought against Palestinians and not just Israelis. So why then have the Palestinians chosen a path that promises so much pain and offers so little gain?

While it may seem irrational or even reckless to pursue such a course, the Palestinian decision to join the ICC is both rational and considered. (Whether it will prove successful or effective, however, is of course another matter.) For Israelis, the prospect of having their leaders brought before an international tribunal for war crimes is understandably unnerving. As far as Palestinians are concerned, however, the move is directed as much at Washington as it is at Israel.

Abbas’ decision to join the ICC is part of a broader strategy of internationalizing the conflict in order to increase pressure not only on Israel but on the United States as well. Despite what many believe, the strategy is not designed to bypass or preclude negotiations but to give the Palestinians some badly-needed leverage in a future negotiations process—albeit one that is built on an entirely different framework and structure. As far as Palestinians are concerned, the old peace process dominated exclusively by the United States, and its many domestic political constraints, is no longer tenable—and judging by the growing numberof initiatives to recognize Palestinian statehood, much of the international community seems to agree.

The standard argument in Washington is that even if prospects for a negotiated settlement with Israel look bleak (and they do) they are still the best, if not the only, chance for Palestinians to achieve an independent state. Such arguments, in addition to denying Palestinian agency, overlook the extent to which the “peace process”, as currently constructed and led by the United States for the last two decades, has become a liability for the Palestinians—physically, politically and diplomatically.

Failure has a price, and the Palestinians have thus far borne the brunt of the repeated failures of the peace process. While it may be true, as some argue, that joining the ICC cannot “not alter the reality on the ground,” the same could be said of the U.S.-led peace process. Two decades of “peace processing” have brought Palestinians no closer to an independent state, while leaving them with a divided and dysfunctional polity made up of a war-shattered and besieged Gaza Strip and a West Bank that has been colonized and fragmented beyond recognition.

Whereas ordinary Palestinians have long since given up on the U.S.-sponsored peace process, President Abbas only came to this conclusion belatedly and reluctantly. Abbas has repeatedly made clear his preference for a credible negotiations process and that the decision to turn to the United Nations and the ICC was a last resort. But recent events have forced him to reconsider. The collapse of yet another round of U.S.-brokered peace talks last spring amid a flurry of Israeli settlement announcements—the third such failure during Abbas’s decade-long rule—along with the recent unrest in Jerusalem and last summer’s Gaza war highlighted the Palestinian president’s growing irrelevance and exposed the limits of American mediation.

The Gaza war especially, in which more than 2200 Palestinians were killed, severely damaged Abbas’s standing among Palestinians, as recent polls have shown. Since then, popular and civil society calls for holding Israeli political and military leaders accountable for alleged war crimes have intensified, with an overwhelming majority favoring joining the ICC. With armed Palestinian groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad having publicly already expressed support for the move, despite their own exposure to potential prosecution, it became impossible for Abbas to delay the matter any longer.

The fact that Mahmoud Abbas—perhaps the most accommodating Palestinian leader the U.S. has ever known (or is likely to see again in the future)—would rather face Israeli and congressional sanctions than return to an American-dominated peace process should give American policymakers great pause.

Despite the noise in Washington and Israel, Palestinian accession to the ICC may not be the “nuclear option” some have made it out to be. On the other hand, there are two scenarios that could lead to the sort of “mutually assured destruction” many now fear: ending the PA’s security coordination with Israel and the collapse of the PA, either of which could spell the end of the two-state solution itself. Abbas currently has no interest in either of these scenarios, but may not be able to prevent them should Israel or the Congress carry through with threats to defund or otherwise punish the PA.

While Abbas’ decision to join the ICC may seem “pointless” and “self-defeating” to those in Washington and Israel, it would be equally if not more so to expect the Palestinian leader to ignore his own public opinion let alone two decades of a failed peace process.

Authors

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Wed, 07 Jan 2015 16:26:00 -0500Khaled Elgindy
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' decision last week to sign the Rome Statute, the treaty governing the International Criminal Court (ICC), has sparked considerable anger and confusion. The move, which had been a “red line” in Israel and Washington, has outraged Israeli leaders and put an end to any residual hopes U.S. officials might have had for restarting the moribund peace talks. The Obama administration condemned the move as “entirely counterproductive” and one that “does nothing to further the aspirations of the Palestinian people for a sovereign and independent state.” The Israeli response was equally predictable, halting tax transfers that account for nearly two-thirds of the Palestinian Authority's (PA) budget, while Congress is said to be reconsidering $400 million in annual U.S. aid to the PA.
Indeed, the move carries additional risks for the Palestinians, since there is no assurance that the ICC will open an investigation into alleged war crimes in Palestinian territory—and even if it did, charges could also be brought against Palestinians and not just Israelis. So why then have the Palestinians chosen a path that promises so much pain and offers so little gain?
While it may seem irrational or even reckless to pursue such a course, the Palestinian decision to join the ICC is both rational and considered. (Whether it will prove successful or effective, however, is of course another matter.) For Israelis, the prospect of having their leaders brought before an international tribunal for war crimes is understandably unnerving. As far as Palestinians are concerned, however, the move is directed as much at Washington as it is at Israel.
Abbas' decision to join the ICC is part of a broader strategy of internationalizing the conflict in order to increase pressure not only on Israel but on the United States as well. Despite what many believe, the strategy is not designed to bypass or preclude negotiations but to give the Palestinians some badly-needed leverage in a future negotiations process—albeit one that is built on an entirely different framework and structure. As far as Palestinians are concerned, the old peace process dominated exclusively by the United States, and its many domestic political constraints, is no longer tenable—and judging by the growing number of initiatives to recognize Palestinian statehood, much of the international community seems to agree.
The standard argument in Washington is that even if prospects for a negotiated settlement with Israel look bleak (and they do) they are still the best, if not the only, chance for Palestinians to achieve an independent state. Such arguments, in addition to denying Palestinian agency, overlook the extent to which the “peace process”, as currently constructed and led by the United States for the last two decades, has become a liability for the Palestinians—physically, politically and diplomatically.
Failure has a price, and the Palestinians have thus far borne the brunt of the repeated failures of the peace process. While it may be true, as some argue, that joining the ICC cannot “not alter the reality on the ground,” the same could be said of the U.S.-led peace process. Two decades of “peace processing” have brought Palestinians no closer to an independent state, while leaving them with a divided and dysfunctional polity made up of a war-shattered and besieged Gaza Strip and a West Bank that has been colonized and fragmented beyond recognition.
Whereas ordinary Palestinians have long since given up on the U.S.-sponsored peace process, President Abbas only came to this conclusion belatedly and reluctantly. Abbas has repeatedly made clear his preference for a credible negotiations process and that the decision to turn to the United Nations and the ICC was a last resort. But recent events have forced him to reconsider. The collapse of yet another ...
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' decision last week to sign the Rome Statute, the treaty governing the International Criminal Court (ICC), has sparked considerable anger and confusion. The move, which had been a “

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ decision last week to sign the Rome Statute, the treaty governing the International Criminal Court (ICC), has sparked considerable anger and confusion. The move, which had been a “red line” in Israel and Washington, has outraged Israeli leaders and put an end to any residual hopes U.S. officials might have had for restarting the moribund peace talks. The Obama administration condemned the move as “entirely counterproductive” and one that “does nothing to further the aspirations of the Palestinian people for a sovereign and independent state.” The Israeli response was equally predictable, halting tax transfers that account for nearly two-thirds of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) budget, while Congress is said to be reconsidering $400 million in annual U.S. aid to the PA.

Indeed, the move carries additional risks for the Palestinians, since there is no assurance that the ICC will open an investigation into alleged war crimes in Palestinian territory—and even if it did, charges could also be brought against Palestinians and not just Israelis. So why then have the Palestinians chosen a path that promises so much pain and offers so little gain?

While it may seem irrational or even reckless to pursue such a course, the Palestinian decision to join the ICC is both rational and considered. (Whether it will prove successful or effective, however, is of course another matter.) For Israelis, the prospect of having their leaders brought before an international tribunal for war crimes is understandably unnerving. As far as Palestinians are concerned, however, the move is directed as much at Washington as it is at Israel.

Abbas’ decision to join the ICC is part of a broader strategy of internationalizing the conflict in order to increase pressure not only on Israel but on the United States as well. Despite what many believe, the strategy is not designed to bypass or preclude negotiations but to give the Palestinians some badly-needed leverage in a future negotiations process—albeit one that is built on an entirely different framework and structure. As far as Palestinians are concerned, the old peace process dominated exclusively by the United States, and its many domestic political constraints, is no longer tenable—and judging by the growing numberof initiatives to recognize Palestinian statehood, much of the international community seems to agree.

The standard argument in Washington is that even if prospects for a negotiated settlement with Israel look bleak (and they do) they are still the best, if not the only, chance for Palestinians to achieve an independent state. Such arguments, in addition to denying Palestinian agency, overlook the extent to which the “peace process”, as currently constructed and led by the United States for the last two decades, has become a liability for the Palestinians—physically, politically and diplomatically.

Failure has a price, and the Palestinians have thus far borne the brunt of the repeated failures of the peace process. While it may be true, as some argue, that joining the ICC cannot “not alter the reality on the ground,” the same could be said of the U.S.-led peace process. Two decades of “peace processing” have brought Palestinians no closer to an independent state, while leaving them with a divided and dysfunctional polity made up of a war-shattered and besieged Gaza Strip and a West Bank that has been colonized and fragmented beyond recognition.

Whereas ordinary Palestinians have long since given up on the U.S.-sponsored peace process, President Abbas only came to this conclusion belatedly and reluctantly. Abbas has repeatedly made clear his preference for a credible negotiations process and that the decision to turn to the United Nations and the ICC was a last resort. But recent events have forced him to reconsider. The collapse of yet another round of U.S.-brokered peace talks last spring amid a flurry of Israeli settlement announcements—the third such failure during Abbas’s decade-long rule—along with the recent unrest in Jerusalem and last summer’s Gaza war highlighted the Palestinian president’s growing irrelevance and exposed the limits of American mediation.

The Gaza war especially, in which more than 2200 Palestinians were killed, severely damaged Abbas’s standing among Palestinians, as recent polls have shown. Since then, popular and civil society calls for holding Israeli political and military leaders accountable for alleged war crimes have intensified, with an overwhelming majority favoring joining the ICC. With armed Palestinian groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad having publicly already expressed support for the move, despite their own exposure to potential prosecution, it became impossible for Abbas to delay the matter any longer.

The fact that Mahmoud Abbas—perhaps the most accommodating Palestinian leader the U.S. has ever known (or is likely to see again in the future)—would rather face Israeli and congressional sanctions than return to an American-dominated peace process should give American policymakers great pause.

Despite the noise in Washington and Israel, Palestinian accession to the ICC may not be the “nuclear option” some have made it out to be. On the other hand, there are two scenarios that could lead to the sort of “mutually assured destruction” many now fear: ending the PA’s security coordination with Israel and the collapse of the PA, either of which could spell the end of the two-state solution itself. Abbas currently has no interest in either of these scenarios, but may not be able to prevent them should Israel or the Congress carry through with threats to defund or otherwise punish the PA.

While Abbas’ decision to join the ICC may seem “pointless” and “self-defeating” to those in Washington and Israel, it would be equally if not more so to expect the Palestinian leader to ignore his own public opinion let alone two decades of a failed peace process.

Following the murder of Palestinian Authority Minister Ziad Abu Ein last week, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas threatened that "all options are open." Additionally, Abbas reportedly asked German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to inform Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that he intends to hand over the "keys" to the Palestinian territories to Israel. In other words, Abbas would force Israel, as the occupier of the Palestinian territories, to bear the burden of its obligations to the Palestinians as laid out in international law, including the provision of food, education, healthcare, and security.

This is not the first time that Abbas has spoken of dissolving the Palestinian Authority (PA), of course, and it is unclear when or even if he would implement this threat. Regardless, Netanyahu does not seem too much bothered by the idea. Abbas would be far better off pursuing a comprehensive strategy aimed at ending the occupation rather than submitting to it. Abbas has other options, including what could be called a "diplomatic intifada." Bringing peace to the holy land will require Netanyahu surrendering the keys to the Palestinians , not the other way around.

We define the diplomatic intifada as the phenomenon of an occupied people steadily and confidently pursuing the realization of their right to self-determination, using the countless legal and political means available to them under international law, to end their occupation. For such an intifada to succeed, the Palestinian leadership will need to engage with three primary parties: its own people, the United States, and Europe.

Domestically, Abbas needs to take action to reassure the Palestinians that he is doing enough to address their plight. Palestinians in Jerusalem are suffering from systematic discrimination--what Johan Galtung has termed "structural violence" -- in residency rights, housing, taxes, healthcare, education, and water, as documented by Israeli, Palestinian, and international NGOs. As a result, Jerusalem's Palestinians have been building towards their own intifada for months now; they will not be placated by their leader's calls for calm.

Abbas should not be expected to magically relieve the suffering of the Palestinian, but to preserve his credibility and his standing among the Palestinian people he needs to take action, not just make statements. Abbas has repeatedly threatened to dissolve the PA and join the International Criminal Court (ICC), but at the end of the day, he has not done either. For years now, Palestinians have staged weekly non-violent protests against the separation wall that encroaches on their lands and disrupts their daily lives, and they are tired of Abbas failing to support them in doing so.

Palestinians cannot trust their leadership when they see Europeans boycotting Israeli settlement products while the PA is unable to enforce such measures in its own backyard. For a diplomatic intifada to succeed, Abbas needs to strengthen his internal front and lead from within by sharing in what his people experience daily. Instead of surrendering the keys, the PA needs to do away with all privileges associated with the occupation, starting with VIP cards. The PA has the tremendous potential at its disposal, in the form of universally recognized means of non-violent resistance, but it has not employed civil disobedience or other tactics collectively to this point.

When it comes to the peace process, Abbas needs to be truthful both to his own people and to the United States as well. He must acknowledge that direct negotiations have not worked--and will never work--because they are structurally fatally flawed. Abbas continuing to entertain Washington-sponsored direct negotiations serves only to delude his own people and allow the United States to avoid making tough decisions about pressuring the Netanyahu government or protecting Israel at the Security Council. An effective diplomatic intifada will require Abbas to tell Washington, unequivocally, that the old negotiation paradigm is over once and for all and a new program is emerging that focuses wholly on ending the continued occupation of Palestine.

A diplomatic intifada should, however, aim to isolate and neutralize the United States rather than clashing with it. One of the very few places where a direct confrontation between the United States and the PA could happen is in the Security Council, though for the time being Abbas could avoid this by turning to other venues in the international arena. Washington cannot prevent the PA from joining international organizations, boycotting Israeli products, or practicing civil disobedience. Forms of internationally recognized non-violent resistance may in fact help Washington manage its relationship better with what former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called its "ungrateful ally." At the end of the day, Washington will find it particularly difficult to go after Abbas when his declared strategy is to seek liberation in ways that conform to international norms. Washington will struggle to explain why such behavior should be considered threatening.

While avoiding U.S. opposition will be important for a diplomatic intifada to succeed, engaging Europe is where such a campaign could yield breakthroughs. Historically, Europe has played the role of a "taboo breaker" on Palestinian issues, paving the way for later, substantial changes in American positions. Historically, Europe has proven to be five to ten years ahead of the United States on such issues. For example, Margret Thatcher met with Yasser Arafat five years before the first Bush Administration began its dialogue with the P.L.O. in 1989. Now, Europe is taking the lead on recognizing Palestine as a state with a string of parliamentary votes and state declarations over the past few months. It started with Sweden officially recognizing the State of Palestine and France alluding that a similar recognition is only a matter of time. Meanwhile, parliaments of the UK, Ireland, Portugal, France, and Spain have overwhelmingly recommended that their countries also recognize Palestine. These waves of diplomatic recognitions are sidelining American and Israeli officials and sending an unwavering message to the global community that the status quo is unacceptable.

The difference between the European and American positions on the issue of Palestine is understandable. Europeans are more sensitive and vulnerable to a potential third intifada, the Arab Spring, or any other fundamental changes or upheaval in the Middle East. Europe's vulnerability is, among other reasons, due to its continued reliance upon the region for its energy needs. Equally important for Europe is that Palestinians have already started to emigrate from the shores of Gaza to the shores of Italy, and additional instability in Palestine will only increase the number of migrants. This sensitivity makes Europe more willing to entertain a diplomatic intifada, rather than the risks of a third--and possibly violent -- popular intifada.

The European votes are a clear statement that the Palestinians do not have a reasonable or reliable partner on the Israeli side, and thus Europe is rejecting the American position of investing in the status quo. Europe is instead taking serious steps towards establishing a partnership with the Palestinians. Boycotting Israeli settlement products, recognizing the state of Palestine, and considering sanctions against Israel (as reported by Haaretz last week) are all indicators of a new European position that could give hope to peace in the holy land and eventually push the United States to take a more balanced approach to the conflict.

While Abbas does not have a partner for peace in Israel, he seems to have found one in Europe. A solid and consistent diplomatic intifada that is supported by the Palestinian people and conforms to principles of international law could very well present an alternative to the futility of 20 years of U.S.-led negotiations. International law gives Abbas a huge margin to resist the Israeli occupation and lead the Palestinians towards liberation, one that he has never capitalized on. For a diplomatic intifada to succeed, the Palestinian leadership needs to immediately take a number of measures, including: adopting a comprehensive civil disobedience strategy, boycotting Israeli products, immediately joining the ICC and all United Nations affiliate organizations, ejecting privileges stemming from the occupation such as VIP cards, aligning with the Palestinian people's aspirations and sharing in their hardships, officially adopting the growing and influential BDS (boycott, divestment, and sanctions) movement, and stopping all types of collaboration with the authorities of the Israeli occupation. This includes the long overdue revision of security collaboration with Israel; Abbas's security apparatuses must function in a way to protect the Palestinian people rather than working as "subcontractors of repression" as this New York Times article argues.

Closely cooperating with Europe on the grounds of reaching a just solution to the conflict is an issue of mutual interest and should form a pillar of this strategy. A credible diplomatic intifada of this kind, especially with more European support, would force Netanyahu to surrender Israel's hold over occupied Palestine, rather than Abbas giving up the keys.

Authors

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Thu, 18 Dec 2014 06:04:00 -0500Ghassan Shabaneh and Ibrahim Sharqieh
Following the murder of Palestinian Authority Minister Ziad Abu Ein last week, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas threatened that "all options are open." Additionally, Abbas reportedly asked German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to inform Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that he intends to hand over the "keys" to the Palestinian territories to Israel. In other words, Abbas would force Israel, as the occupier of the Palestinian territories, to bear the burden of its obligations to the Palestinians as laid out in international law, including the provision of food, education, healthcare, and security.
This is not the first time that Abbas has spoken of dissolving the Palestinian Authority (PA), of course, and it is unclear when or even if he would implement this threat. Regardless, Netanyahu does not seem too much bothered by the idea. Abbas would be far better off pursuing a comprehensive strategy aimed at ending the occupation rather than submitting to it. Abbas has other options, including what could be called a "diplomatic intifada." Bringing peace to the holy land will require Netanyahu surrendering the keys to the Palestinians , not the other way around.
We define the diplomatic intifada as the phenomenon of an occupied people steadily and confidently pursuing the realization of their right to self-determination, using the countless legal and political means available to them under international law, to end their occupation. For such an intifada to succeed, the Palestinian leadership will need to engage with three primary parties: its own people, the United States, and Europe.
Domestically, Abbas needs to take action to reassure the Palestinians that he is doing enough to address their plight. Palestinians in Jerusalem are suffering from systematic discrimination--what Johan Galtung has termed "structural violence" -- in residency rights, housing, taxes, healthcare, education, and water, as documented by Israeli, Palestinian, and international NGOs. As a result, Jerusalem's Palestinians have been building towards their own intifada for months now; they will not be placated by their leader's calls for calm.
Abbas should not be expected to magically relieve the suffering of the Palestinian, but to preserve his credibility and his standing among the Palestinian people he needs to take action, not just make statements. Abbas has repeatedly threatened to dissolve the PA and join the International Criminal Court (ICC), but at the end of the day, he has not done either. For years now, Palestinians have staged weekly non-violent protests against the separation wall that encroaches on their lands and disrupts their daily lives, and they are tired of Abbas failing to support them in doing so.
Palestinians cannot trust their leadership when they see Europeans boycotting Israeli settlement products while the PA is unable to enforce such measures in its own backyard. For a diplomatic intifada to succeed, Abbas needs to strengthen his internal front and lead from within by sharing in what his people experience daily. Instead of surrendering the keys, the PA needs to do away with all privileges associated with the occupation, starting with VIP cards. The PA has the tremendous potential at its disposal, in the form of universally recognized means of non-violent resistance, but it has not employed civil disobedience or other tactics collectively to this point.
When it comes to the peace process, Abbas needs to be truthful both to his own people and to the United States as well. He must acknowledge that direct negotiations have not worked--and will never work--because they are structurally fatally flawed. Abbas continuing to entertain Washington-sponsored direct negotiations serves only to delude his own people and allow the United States to avoid making tough decisions about pressuring the Netanyahu government or protecting Israel at the Security Council. An ... Following the murder of Palestinian Authority Minister Ziad Abu Ein last week, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas threatened that "all options are open." Additionally, Abbas reportedly asked German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier ...

Following the murder of Palestinian Authority Minister Ziad Abu Ein last week, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas threatened that "all options are open." Additionally, Abbas reportedly asked German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to inform Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that he intends to hand over the "keys" to the Palestinian territories to Israel. In other words, Abbas would force Israel, as the occupier of the Palestinian territories, to bear the burden of its obligations to the Palestinians as laid out in international law, including the provision of food, education, healthcare, and security.

This is not the first time that Abbas has spoken of dissolving the Palestinian Authority (PA), of course, and it is unclear when or even if he would implement this threat. Regardless, Netanyahu does not seem too much bothered by the idea. Abbas would be far better off pursuing a comprehensive strategy aimed at ending the occupation rather than submitting to it. Abbas has other options, including what could be called a "diplomatic intifada." Bringing peace to the holy land will require Netanyahu surrendering the keys to the Palestinians , not the other way around.

We define the diplomatic intifada as the phenomenon of an occupied people steadily and confidently pursuing the realization of their right to self-determination, using the countless legal and political means available to them under international law, to end their occupation. For such an intifada to succeed, the Palestinian leadership will need to engage with three primary parties: its own people, the United States, and Europe.

Domestically, Abbas needs to take action to reassure the Palestinians that he is doing enough to address their plight. Palestinians in Jerusalem are suffering from systematic discrimination--what Johan Galtung has termed "structural violence" -- in residency rights, housing, taxes, healthcare, education, and water, as documented by Israeli, Palestinian, and international NGOs. As a result, Jerusalem's Palestinians have been building towards their own intifada for months now; they will not be placated by their leader's calls for calm.

Abbas should not be expected to magically relieve the suffering of the Palestinian, but to preserve his credibility and his standing among the Palestinian people he needs to take action, not just make statements. Abbas has repeatedly threatened to dissolve the PA and join the International Criminal Court (ICC), but at the end of the day, he has not done either. For years now, Palestinians have staged weekly non-violent protests against the separation wall that encroaches on their lands and disrupts their daily lives, and they are tired of Abbas failing to support them in doing so.

Palestinians cannot trust their leadership when they see Europeans boycotting Israeli settlement products while the PA is unable to enforce such measures in its own backyard. For a diplomatic intifada to succeed, Abbas needs to strengthen his internal front and lead from within by sharing in what his people experience daily. Instead of surrendering the keys, the PA needs to do away with all privileges associated with the occupation, starting with VIP cards. The PA has the tremendous potential at its disposal, in the form of universally recognized means of non-violent resistance, but it has not employed civil disobedience or other tactics collectively to this point.

When it comes to the peace process, Abbas needs to be truthful both to his own people and to the United States as well. He must acknowledge that direct negotiations have not worked--and will never work--because they are structurally fatally flawed. Abbas continuing to entertain Washington-sponsored direct negotiations serves only to delude his own people and allow the United States to avoid making tough decisions about pressuring the Netanyahu government or protecting Israel at the Security Council. An effective diplomatic intifada will require Abbas to tell Washington, unequivocally, that the old negotiation paradigm is over once and for all and a new program is emerging that focuses wholly on ending the continued occupation of Palestine.

A diplomatic intifada should, however, aim to isolate and neutralize the United States rather than clashing with it. One of the very few places where a direct confrontation between the United States and the PA could happen is in the Security Council, though for the time being Abbas could avoid this by turning to other venues in the international arena. Washington cannot prevent the PA from joining international organizations, boycotting Israeli products, or practicing civil disobedience. Forms of internationally recognized non-violent resistance may in fact help Washington manage its relationship better with what former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called its "ungrateful ally." At the end of the day, Washington will find it particularly difficult to go after Abbas when his declared strategy is to seek liberation in ways that conform to international norms. Washington will struggle to explain why such behavior should be considered threatening.

While avoiding U.S. opposition will be important for a diplomatic intifada to succeed, engaging Europe is where such a campaign could yield breakthroughs. Historically, Europe has played the role of a "taboo breaker" on Palestinian issues, paving the way for later, substantial changes in American positions. Historically, Europe has proven to be five to ten years ahead of the United States on such issues. For example, Margret Thatcher met with Yasser Arafat five years before the first Bush Administration began its dialogue with the P.L.O. in 1989. Now, Europe is taking the lead on recognizing Palestine as a state with a string of parliamentary votes and state declarations over the past few months. It started with Sweden officially recognizing the State of Palestine and France alluding that a similar recognition is only a matter of time. Meanwhile, parliaments of the UK, Ireland, Portugal, France, and Spain have overwhelmingly recommended that their countries also recognize Palestine. These waves of diplomatic recognitions are sidelining American and Israeli officials and sending an unwavering message to the global community that the status quo is unacceptable.

The difference between the European and American positions on the issue of Palestine is understandable. Europeans are more sensitive and vulnerable to a potential third intifada, the Arab Spring, or any other fundamental changes or upheaval in the Middle East. Europe's vulnerability is, among other reasons, due to its continued reliance upon the region for its energy needs. Equally important for Europe is that Palestinians have already started to emigrate from the shores of Gaza to the shores of Italy, and additional instability in Palestine will only increase the number of migrants. This sensitivity makes Europe more willing to entertain a diplomatic intifada, rather than the risks of a third--and possibly violent -- popular intifada.

The European votes are a clear statement that the Palestinians do not have a reasonable or reliable partner on the Israeli side, and thus Europe is rejecting the American position of investing in the status quo. Europe is instead taking serious steps towards establishing a partnership with the Palestinians. Boycotting Israeli settlement products, recognizing the state of Palestine, and considering sanctions against Israel (as reported by Haaretz last week) are all indicators of a new European position that could give hope to peace in the holy land and eventually push the United States to take a more balanced approach to the conflict.

While Abbas does not have a partner for peace in Israel, he seems to have found one in Europe. A solid and consistent diplomatic intifada that is supported by the Palestinian people and conforms to principles of international law could very well present an alternative to the futility of 20 years of U.S.-led negotiations. International law gives Abbas a huge margin to resist the Israeli occupation and lead the Palestinians towards liberation, one that he has never capitalized on. For a diplomatic intifada to succeed, the Palestinian leadership needs to immediately take a number of measures, including: adopting a comprehensive civil disobedience strategy, boycotting Israeli products, immediately joining the ICC and all United Nations affiliate organizations, ejecting privileges stemming from the occupation such as VIP cards, aligning with the Palestinian people's aspirations and sharing in their hardships, officially adopting the growing and influential BDS (boycott, divestment, and sanctions) movement, and stopping all types of collaboration with the authorities of the Israeli occupation. This includes the long overdue revision of security collaboration with Israel; Abbas's security apparatuses must function in a way to protect the Palestinian people rather than working as "subcontractors of repression" as this New York Times article argues.

Closely cooperating with Europe on the grounds of reaching a just solution to the conflict is an issue of mutual interest and should form a pillar of this strategy. A credible diplomatic intifada of this kind, especially with more European support, would force Netanyahu to surrender Israel's hold over occupied Palestine, rather than Abbas giving up the keys.

After the collapse of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations earlier this year and the devastating violence of this summer’s Gaza war, tensions between Israelis and Palestinians are on the rise. Voices on both sides of the conflict question the United States’ traditional role as shepherd of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, and Americans seem increasingly skeptical about their government’s engagements in the Middle East. Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami conducted a survey on American public attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; below are several key findings and a download to the survey's full results.

Survey Methodology

The sample was drawn from a larger standing panel called the KnowledgePanel that is managed by the research company GfK. Though these surveys take place online, this panel is not derived from an “opt-in” by which any online user can volunteer a respondent. Instead, panelists are recruited through a scientific process of selection using two methods: a random selection of residential addresses using the United States Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File. Persons in selected households are then invited by telephone or by mail to participate in GfK’s KnowledgePanel. Those who agree to participate but who do not have Internet access are provided a laptop computer and Internet service. A representative sample is then chosen for a specific survey. Once that sample completes a survey, the demographic breakdown of the sample is compared to the U.S. census. Any variations from the census are adjusted by weighting.

The study was fielded over November 14 to November 19, 2014 with a sample of 1,008 American adults. It has a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percent; with the design effect also taken into account, the margin of error is plus or minus 3.4 percent. Findings were weighted to census data.

Authors

]]>
Fri, 05 Dec 2014 00:00:00 -0500Shibley Telhami
After the collapse of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations earlier this year and the devastating violence of this summer's Gaza war, tensions between Israelis and Palestinians are on the rise. Voices on both sides of the conflict question the United States' traditional role as shepherd of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, and Americans seem increasingly skeptical about their government's engagements in the Middle East. Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami conducted a survey on American public attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; below are several key findings and a download to the survey's full results.
Survey Methodology
The sample was drawn from a larger standing panel called the KnowledgePanel that is managed by the research company GfK. Though these surveys take place online, this panel is not derived from an “opt-in” by which any online user can volunteer a respondent. Instead, panelists are recruited through a scientific process of selection using two methods: a random selection of residential addresses using the United States Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File. Persons in selected households are then invited by telephone or by mail to participate in GfK's KnowledgePanel. Those who agree to participate but who do not have Internet access are provided a laptop computer and Internet service. A representative sample is then chosen for a specific survey. Once that sample completes a survey, the demographic breakdown of the sample is compared to the U.S. census. Any variations from the census are adjusted by weighting.
The study was fielded over November 14 to November 19, 2014 with a sample of 1,008 American adults. It has a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percent; with the design effect also taken into account, the margin of error is plus or minus 3.4 percent. Findings were weighted to census data.
________________________________________________________Graphic Design: Rachel Slattery
Downloads
- American Public Attitudes Toward the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict - Key Findings- American Public Attitudes Toward the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict - Frequencies- American Public Attitudes Toward the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict - Graphic Report- IP Poll Full Frequencies Slideshow
Authors
- Shibley Telhami
After the collapse of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations earlier this year and the devastating violence of this summer's Gaza war, tensions between Israelis and Palestinians are on the rise. Voices on both sides of the conflict question the ...

After the collapse of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations earlier this year and the devastating violence of this summer’s Gaza war, tensions between Israelis and Palestinians are on the rise. Voices on both sides of the conflict question the United States’ traditional role as shepherd of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, and Americans seem increasingly skeptical about their government’s engagements in the Middle East. Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami conducted a survey on American public attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; below are several key findings and a download to the survey's full results.

Survey Methodology

The sample was drawn from a larger standing panel called the KnowledgePanel that is managed by the research company GfK. Though these surveys take place online, this panel is not derived from an “opt-in” by which any online user can volunteer a respondent. Instead, panelists are recruited through a scientific process of selection using two methods: a random selection of residential addresses using the United States Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File. Persons in selected households are then invited by telephone or by mail to participate in GfK’s KnowledgePanel. Those who agree to participate but who do not have Internet access are provided a laptop computer and Internet service. A representative sample is then chosen for a specific survey. Once that sample completes a survey, the demographic breakdown of the sample is compared to the U.S. census. Any variations from the census are adjusted by weighting.

The study was fielded over November 14 to November 19, 2014 with a sample of 1,008 American adults. It has a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percent; with the design effect also taken into account, the margin of error is plus or minus 3.4 percent. Findings were weighted to census data.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2014/12/05-american-opinion-poll-israeli-palestinian-conflict?rssid=palestinian+territories{5FB92379-7C79-4199-AAE4-65EA1B32BFAA}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/80464956/0/brookingsrss/topics/palestinianterritories~American-Views-of-US-Foreign-Policy-Public-Opinion-on-the-IsraeliPalestinian-ConflictAmerican Views of U.S. Foreign Policy: Public Opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Event Information

After the collapse of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations earlier this year and the devastating violence of this summer’s Gaza war, tensions between Israelis and Palestinians are on the rise. Voices on both sides of the conflict question the United States’ traditional role as shepherd of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, and Americans seem increasingly skeptical about their government’s engagements in the Middle East.

It’s crucial to look beyond this skepticism to specifics. How much importance do Americans attach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and to reaching a resolution? How do different communities in the United States—Democrats, Republicans, minorities, youth, older Americans—vary in their attitudes toward Israelis and Palestinians? Beyond the question of who is more “at fault” in the conflict, what kind of future for Israel and the Palestinians do Americans think the United States should support?

On December 5, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at Brookings and the 2014 Saban Forum hosted Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami for the launch of a new public opinion poll, focusing on Americans’ attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the United States involvement in the region. Telhami was joined in discussion by Brookings Senior Fellow Bill Galston. Tamara Cofman Wittes, senior fellow and director of the Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the panel.

This event launched the Center for Middle East Policy’s 11th annual Saban Forum, entitled “Stormy Seas: the United States and Israel in a Tumultuous Middle East.”

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

]]>
Fri, 05 Dec 2014 10:00:00 -0500http://7515766d70db9af98b83-7a8dffca7ab41e0acde077bdb93c9343.r43.cf1.rackcdn.com/141205_IsraelPalestine_64K_itunes.mp3
Event Information
December 5, 2014
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC Register for the Event
After the collapse of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations earlier this year and the devastating violence of this summer's Gaza war, tensions between Israelis and Palestinians are on the rise. Voices on both sides of the conflict question the United States' traditional role as shepherd of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, and Americans seem increasingly skeptical about their government's engagements in the Middle East.
It's crucial to look beyond this skepticism to specifics. How much importance do Americans attach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and to reaching a resolution? How do different communities in the United States—Democrats, Republicans, minorities, youth, older Americans—vary in their attitudes toward Israelis and Palestinians? Beyond the question of who is more “at fault” in the conflict, what kind of future for Israel and the Palestinians do Americans think the United States should support?
On December 5, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at Brookings and the 2014 Saban Forum hosted Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami for the launch of a new public opinion poll, focusing on Americans' attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the United States involvement in the region. Telhami was joined in discussion by Brookings Senior Fellow Bill Galston. Tamara Cofman Wittes, senior fellow and director of the Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the panel.
This event launched the Center for Middle East Policy's 11th annual Saban Forum, entitled “Stormy Seas: the United States and Israel in a Tumultuous Middle East.”
Join the conversation on Twitter using #Saban14
Audio
- American Views of U.S. Foreign Policy: Public Opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Transcript
- Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)
Event Materials
- 20141205_us_public_opinion_transcript
Event Information
December 5, 2014
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC Register for the Event
After the collapse of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations earlier ...

Event Information

After the collapse of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations earlier this year and the devastating violence of this summer’s Gaza war, tensions between Israelis and Palestinians are on the rise. Voices on both sides of the conflict question the United States’ traditional role as shepherd of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, and Americans seem increasingly skeptical about their government’s engagements in the Middle East.

It’s crucial to look beyond this skepticism to specifics. How much importance do Americans attach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and to reaching a resolution? How do different communities in the United States—Democrats, Republicans, minorities, youth, older Americans—vary in their attitudes toward Israelis and Palestinians? Beyond the question of who is more “at fault” in the conflict, what kind of future for Israel and the Palestinians do Americans think the United States should support?

On December 5, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at Brookings and the 2014 Saban Forum hosted Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami for the launch of a new public opinion poll, focusing on Americans’ attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the United States involvement in the region. Telhami was joined in discussion by Brookings Senior Fellow Bill Galston. Tamara Cofman Wittes, senior fellow and director of the Center for Middle East Policy, provided introductory remarks and moderated the panel.

This event launched the Center for Middle East Policy’s 11th annual Saban Forum, entitled “Stormy Seas: the United States and Israel in a Tumultuous Middle East.”

The horrific attack on a Jerusalem synagogue last month has generated heated discussion about the causes of violence. The latest villain — an old one, really — is inflammatory Palestinian rhetoric. But it’s the wrong explanation for a much deeper problem. Incitement can make matters worse, but it is rarely a primary cause of violence and often is its outcome.

We have been here before. From 1998 to 2000, I served on the American side of the Trilateral U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian Anti-Incitement Committee, which came out of the Wye River agreements. Benjamin Netanyahu was in his first stint as Israeli prime minister and, having opposed the Oslo agreements, he had been pressured into the talks by President Bill Clinton. Netanyahu stressed Palestinian “incitement” as the cause of the failure of peace negotiations, and the committee was established to appease him.

From the outset, Israelis and Palestinians could not agree how to define incitement. Israelis would present, for instance, a statement by a Muslim religious figure against Israel, and Palestinians would respond by citing settlement construction or episodes of Palestinian humiliation. And so it went — with each side downplaying the examples of the other or simply rejecting them.

This debate about what was worse — Israel using its dominant power to alter Palestinian lives or troubling Palestinian rhetoric — was never settled, and indeed it could not be settled without a real prospect for peace. In the end, little progress emerged.

Incitement is sometimes employed by those seeking to prevent reconciliation, to be sure, but its resonance in society is broader. This is especially true when there’s pervasive pessimism about the prospects for peace and people are preparing themselves emotionally for conflict — something that is made easier when the enemy is demonized.

We see this among both Israelis and Arabs. Research I conducted for my book “The World Through Arab Eyes” showed that majorities of each side initially reacted to the other’s civilian casualties not with empathy but a sense that the other side “brought it upon itself.” This is not purely a function of hate: Most Palestinians rejected terrorism against Israelis in the 1990s when there was genuine hope for peace, while the overwhelming majority of Israelis rejected expelling Palestinians from their homes. Attitudes changed after negotiations collapsed.

Fighting provocation and incitement in conflicts is difficult because they often serve strategic aims. Just as empathy with the enemy is discouraged because it might diminish the will to fight, so a weaker party will often use incitement to muster the will to sustain the fight. By contrast, provocation is often the tool of the stronger party, as it pushes for an earlier fight while it has the upper hand.

My research shows that countering incitement with information that might humanize the other side often gets the opposite result. When Arabs hear stories of the Holocaust, or Israelis confront reports of historical Palestinian suffering, their reactions are similar: They resent the accounts as instruments intended to elicit sympathy or weaken their will.

Both Arab and Israeli leaders have been guilty of incitement and provocation, but the degree to which their words have effect is itself debatable. After almost five decades of occupation, Palestinians are no closer to freedom, and Israelis are no closer to peace; most have given up hope on the very possibility of two states. This reality is far more powerful than the utterances of any individual.

In the face of angry public sentiments, leaders’ words have limited impact. Jordan’s government, for example, condemned the synagogue attack. But Jordan’s parliament, mindful more of public rage than King Abdullah’s desires, moved to honor the killers.

Highlighting incitement is partly a political decision. After Ehud Barak replaced Netanyahu as prime minister in 1999, the full Anti-Incitement Committee never met again. Barak, who aimed for a comprehensive political deal, didn’t take the issue seriously. Had the negotiations succeeded in shaping a durable Israeli-Palestinian peace, some incitement would probably still occur, but few would pay attention. Conversely, the collapse of negotiations in 2000 and the advent of more violence would have negated any anti-incitement deal. As it was, even the limited steps on media and education that seemed acceptable to both sides were forgotten as soon as casualties started to mount.

So it will be with the current state of affairs. If an agreement appealing to majorities on both sides is reached, incitement will be widely ignored. If the efforts fail, no media or public relations efforts will stop mounting provocation and incitement campaigns — or the violence that will erupt with or without these campaigns.

Authors

]]>
Fri, 05 Dec 2014 00:00:00 -0500Shibley Telhami
The horrific attack on a Jerusalem synagogue last month has generated heated discussion about the causes of violence. The latest villain — an old one, really — is inflammatory Palestinian rhetoric. But it's the wrong explanation for a much deeper problem. Incitement can make matters worse, but it is rarely a primary cause of violence and often is its outcome.
We have been here before. From 1998 to 2000, I served on the American side of the Trilateral U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian Anti-Incitement Committee, which came out of the Wye River agreements. Benjamin Netanyahu was in his first stint as Israeli prime minister and, having opposed the Oslo agreements, he had been pressured into the talks by President Bill Clinton. Netanyahu stressed Palestinian “incitement” as the cause of the failure of peace negotiations, and the committee was established to appease him.
From the outset, Israelis and Palestinians could not agree how to define incitement. Israelis would present, for instance, a statement by a Muslim religious figure against Israel, and Palestinians would respond by citing settlement construction or episodes of Palestinian humiliation. And so it went — with each side downplaying the examples of the other or simply rejecting them.
This debate about what was worse — Israel using its dominant power to alter Palestinian lives or troubling Palestinian rhetoric — was never settled, and indeed it could not be settled without a real prospect for peace. In the end, little progress emerged.
Incitement is sometimes employed by those seeking to prevent reconciliation, to be sure, but its resonance in society is broader. This is especially true when there's pervasive pessimism about the prospects for peace and people are preparing themselves emotionally for conflict — something that is made easier when the enemy is demonized.
We see this among both Israelis and Arabs. Research I conducted for my book “The World Through Arab Eyes” showed that majorities of each side initially reacted to the other's civilian casualties not with empathy but a sense that the other side “brought it upon itself.” This is not purely a function of hate: Most Palestinians rejected terrorism against Israelis in the 1990s when there was genuine hope for peace, while the overwhelming majority of Israelis rejected expelling Palestinians from their homes. Attitudes changed after negotiations collapsed.
Fighting provocation and incitement in conflicts is difficult because they often serve strategic aims. Just as empathy with the enemy is discouraged because it might diminish the will to fight, so a weaker party will often use incitement to muster the will to sustain the fight. By contrast, provocation is often the tool of the stronger party, as it pushes for an earlier fight while it has the upper hand.
My research shows that countering incitement with information that might humanize the other side often gets the opposite result. When Arabs hear stories of the Holocaust, or Israelis confront reports of historical Palestinian suffering, their reactions are similar: They resent the accounts as instruments intended to elicit sympathy or weaken their will.
Both Arab and Israeli leaders have been guilty of incitement and provocation, but the degree to which their words have effect is itself debatable. After almost five decades of occupation, Palestinians are no closer to freedom, and Israelis are no closer to peace; most have given up hope on the very possibility of two states. This reality is far more powerful than the utterances of any individual.
In the face of angry public sentiments, leaders' words have limited impact. Jordan's government, for example, condemned the synagogue attack. But Jordan's parliament, mindful more of public rage than King Abdullah's desires, moved to honor the killers.
Highlighting incitement is partly a political decision. After Ehud Barak replaced ...
The horrific attack on a Jerusalem synagogue last month has generated heated discussion about the causes of violence. The latest villain — an old one, really — is inflammatory Palestinian rhetoric. But it's the wrong explanation for ...

The horrific attack on a Jerusalem synagogue last month has generated heated discussion about the causes of violence. The latest villain — an old one, really — is inflammatory Palestinian rhetoric. But it’s the wrong explanation for a much deeper problem. Incitement can make matters worse, but it is rarely a primary cause of violence and often is its outcome.

We have been here before. From 1998 to 2000, I served on the American side of the Trilateral U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian Anti-Incitement Committee, which came out of the Wye River agreements. Benjamin Netanyahu was in his first stint as Israeli prime minister and, having opposed the Oslo agreements, he had been pressured into the talks by President Bill Clinton. Netanyahu stressed Palestinian “incitement” as the cause of the failure of peace negotiations, and the committee was established to appease him.

From the outset, Israelis and Palestinians could not agree how to define incitement. Israelis would present, for instance, a statement by a Muslim religious figure against Israel, and Palestinians would respond by citing settlement construction or episodes of Palestinian humiliation. And so it went — with each side downplaying the examples of the other or simply rejecting them.

This debate about what was worse — Israel using its dominant power to alter Palestinian lives or troubling Palestinian rhetoric — was never settled, and indeed it could not be settled without a real prospect for peace. In the end, little progress emerged.

Incitement is sometimes employed by those seeking to prevent reconciliation, to be sure, but its resonance in society is broader. This is especially true when there’s pervasive pessimism about the prospects for peace and people are preparing themselves emotionally for conflict — something that is made easier when the enemy is demonized.

We see this among both Israelis and Arabs. Research I conducted for my book “The World Through Arab Eyes” showed that majorities of each side initially reacted to the other’s civilian casualties not with empathy but a sense that the other side “brought it upon itself.” This is not purely a function of hate: Most Palestinians rejected terrorism against Israelis in the 1990s when there was genuine hope for peace, while the overwhelming majority of Israelis rejected expelling Palestinians from their homes. Attitudes changed after negotiations collapsed.

Fighting provocation and incitement in conflicts is difficult because they often serve strategic aims. Just as empathy with the enemy is discouraged because it might diminish the will to fight, so a weaker party will often use incitement to muster the will to sustain the fight. By contrast, provocation is often the tool of the stronger party, as it pushes for an earlier fight while it has the upper hand.

My research shows that countering incitement with information that might humanize the other side often gets the opposite result. When Arabs hear stories of the Holocaust, or Israelis confront reports of historical Palestinian suffering, their reactions are similar: They resent the accounts as instruments intended to elicit sympathy or weaken their will.

Both Arab and Israeli leaders have been guilty of incitement and provocation, but the degree to which their words have effect is itself debatable. After almost five decades of occupation, Palestinians are no closer to freedom, and Israelis are no closer to peace; most have given up hope on the very possibility of two states. This reality is far more powerful than the utterances of any individual.

In the face of angry public sentiments, leaders’ words have limited impact. Jordan’s government, for example, condemned the synagogue attack. But Jordan’s parliament, mindful more of public rage than King Abdullah’s desires, moved to honor the killers.

Highlighting incitement is partly a political decision. After Ehud Barak replaced Netanyahu as prime minister in 1999, the full Anti-Incitement Committee never met again. Barak, who aimed for a comprehensive political deal, didn’t take the issue seriously. Had the negotiations succeeded in shaping a durable Israeli-Palestinian peace, some incitement would probably still occur, but few would pay attention. Conversely, the collapse of negotiations in 2000 and the advent of more violence would have negated any anti-incitement deal. As it was, even the limited steps on media and education that seemed acceptable to both sides were forgotten as soon as casualties started to mount.

So it will be with the current state of affairs. If an agreement appealing to majorities on both sides is reached, incitement will be widely ignored. If the efforts fail, no media or public relations efforts will stop mounting provocation and incitement campaigns — or the violence that will erupt with or without these campaigns.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2014/11/21-violence-in-jerusalem-and-the-future-of-the-two-state-solution?rssid=palestinian+territories{124C0DC3-5443-465B-8EBF-99EDE6670C5F}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/80464958/0/brookingsrss/topics/palestinianterritories~Violence-in-Jerusalem-and-the-Future-of-the-TwoState-SolutionViolence in Jerusalem and the Future of the Two-State Solution

In the wake of escalating violence in Jerusalem, the Brookings Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy held a panel discussion examining the causes behind the troubling spate of violence, and exploring the future of the two-state solution. This discussion also considered ongoing settlement activity, particularly in and around Jerusalem, and the renewed Palestinian push for international recognition.

The discussion began with an account of the attack on worshipers at a Jerusalem synagogue, an attack that occurred amid escalating tensions since the kidnappings and murders that occurred in early summer. Sachs and Elgindy explained the perceptions in the region of Israeli efforts to change the status quo on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif.

Sachs noted the irony in that the community targeted that morning is among those most vociferously opposed to Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount, yet such acts of violence are likely to galvanize and unite the public, further inflaming tensions. Elgindy described the context that has generated Palestinian anger in Jerusalem and concerns about the erosion of the status quo as being rooted in a history of discriminatory Israeli policies toward Palestinian Jerusalemites and the increasingly illiberal nature of Israeli political discourse.

Both Sachs and Elgindy touched on the current regional turmoil and its impact on efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Elgindy noted that the internal crises facing Arab states deny them the bandwidth to deal with another challenge, much less to engage in creative diplomacy, put forth a constructive plan and devote the requisite resources toward resolving this conflict.

Sachs argued that from the Israeli standpoint, regional chaos, particularly as it encroaches on Israel’s borders, plays directly into fears regarding the consequences of further territorial concessions. The Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip after Israel’s withdrawal in 2005 continues to resonate among the Israeli public. Thus, Sachs predicted, for the foreseeable future, Israeli leaders will likely strive to minimize risk.

The conversation also explored a future American role in efforts to mediate and ultimately resolve this conflict. The collapse of the U.S.-brokered peace talks in April, calls on both sides for unilateralism, and the recent escalation in violence, prompted general agreement among the panelists that the framework for negotiations based on the “Oslo model” — bilateral negotiations mediated by the U.S. — has been exhausted.

Sachs noted that, in the current climate, some Israeli politicians see political gains in publicly criticizing the United States. Still, he said, the U.S.-Israel relationship remains a core pillar of Israel’s national security, and Israelis remain very keen on maintaining it. To the degree that there is still a “process,” Israel will continue to strongly prefer bilateral negotiations with U.S. backing.

Elgindy said that Palestinians increasingly express support for efforts to seek international recognition and engage international institutions, as a means of enhancing their leverage vis-à-vis Israel. However, the Palestinian leadership, despite past disappointments, remains wedded to a U.S.-led peace process.

Yet the speakers noted possibilities for developing new avenues of diplomacy. Wittes said that there was a moment of opportunity last summer, in the wake of the Gaza conflict, to use the alignment of interests between Israel and a number of Arab states as a platform for developing something similar to the Madrid peace talks — a regional framework that would support U.S.-led bilateral negotiations. Elgindy advocated for developing mechanisms that would instill accountability and prevent both sides from harming one another during any future negotiations. Sachs cautioned that blunt mechanisms designed solely to pressure Israel would likely backfire.

The panelists agreed that, for the foreseeable future, there is no substitute for the U.S. role as guarantor of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. As Sachs noted, the potential for the parties to conclude an agreement remains, although perhaps only under different leaders.

Authors

Lauren Mellinger

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Tue, 25 Nov 2014 20:45:00 -0500Lauren Mellinger
In the wake of escalating violence in Jerusalem, the Brookings Institution's Center for Middle East Policy held a panel discussion examining the causes behind the troubling spate of violence, and exploring the future of the two-state solution. This discussion also considered ongoing settlement activity, particularly in and around Jerusalem, and the renewed Palestinian push for international recognition.
The event was moderated by Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, and featured a conversation with Khaled Elgindy and Natan Sachs, both fellows at the Center for Middle East Policy.
The discussion began with an account of the attack on worshipers at a Jerusalem synagogue, an attack that occurred amid escalating tensions since the kidnappings and murders that occurred in early summer. Sachs and Elgindy explained the perceptions in the region of Israeli efforts to change the status quo on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif.
Sachs noted the irony in that the community targeted that morning is among those most vociferously opposed to Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount, yet such acts of violence are likely to galvanize and unite the public, further inflaming tensions. Elgindy described the context that has generated Palestinian anger in Jerusalem and concerns about the erosion of the status quo as being rooted in a history of discriminatory Israeli policies toward Palestinian Jerusalemites and the increasingly illiberal nature of Israeli political discourse.
Both Sachs and Elgindy touched on the current regional turmoil and its impact on efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Elgindy noted that the internal crises facing Arab states deny them the bandwidth to deal with another challenge, much less to engage in creative diplomacy, put forth a constructive plan and devote the requisite resources toward resolving this conflict.
Sachs argued that from the Israeli standpoint, regional chaos, particularly as it encroaches on Israel's borders, plays directly into fears regarding the consequences of further territorial concessions. The Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip after Israel's withdrawal in 2005 continues to resonate among the Israeli public. Thus, Sachs predicted, for the foreseeable future, Israeli leaders will likely strive to minimize risk.
The conversation also explored a future American role in efforts to mediate and ultimately resolve this conflict. The collapse of the U.S.-brokered peace talks in April, calls on both sides for unilateralism, and the recent escalation in violence, prompted general agreement among the panelists that the framework for negotiations based on the “Oslo model” — bilateral negotiations mediated by the U.S. — has been exhausted.
Sachs noted that, in the current climate, some Israeli politicians see political gains in publicly criticizing the United States. Still, he said, the U.S.-Israel relationship remains a core pillar of Israel's national security, and Israelis remain very keen on maintaining it. To the degree that there is still a “process,” Israel will continue to strongly prefer bilateral negotiations with U.S. backing.
Elgindy said that Palestinians increasingly express support for efforts to seek international recognition and engage international institutions, as a means of enhancing their leverage vis-à-vis Israel. However, the Palestinian leadership, despite past disappointments, remains wedded to a U.S.-led peace process.
Yet the speakers noted possibilities for developing new avenues of diplomacy. Wittes said that there was a moment of opportunity last summer, in the wake of the Gaza conflict, to use the alignment of interests between Israel and a number of Arab states as a platform for developing something similar to the Madrid peace talks — a regional framework that would support U.S.-led bilateral negotiations. Elgindy advocated for developing mechanisms ...
In the wake of escalating violence in Jerusalem, the Brookings Institution's Center for Middle East Policy held a panel discussion examining the causes behind the troubling spate of violence, and exploring the future of the two-state solution.

In the wake of escalating violence in Jerusalem, the Brookings Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy held a panel discussion examining the causes behind the troubling spate of violence, and exploring the future of the two-state solution. This discussion also considered ongoing settlement activity, particularly in and around Jerusalem, and the renewed Palestinian push for international recognition.

The discussion began with an account of the attack on worshipers at a Jerusalem synagogue, an attack that occurred amid escalating tensions since the kidnappings and murders that occurred in early summer. Sachs and Elgindy explained the perceptions in the region of Israeli efforts to change the status quo on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif.

Sachs noted the irony in that the community targeted that morning is among those most vociferously opposed to Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount, yet such acts of violence are likely to galvanize and unite the public, further inflaming tensions. Elgindy described the context that has generated Palestinian anger in Jerusalem and concerns about the erosion of the status quo as being rooted in a history of discriminatory Israeli policies toward Palestinian Jerusalemites and the increasingly illiberal nature of Israeli political discourse.

Both Sachs and Elgindy touched on the current regional turmoil and its impact on efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Elgindy noted that the internal crises facing Arab states deny them the bandwidth to deal with another challenge, much less to engage in creative diplomacy, put forth a constructive plan and devote the requisite resources toward resolving this conflict.

Sachs argued that from the Israeli standpoint, regional chaos, particularly as it encroaches on Israel’s borders, plays directly into fears regarding the consequences of further territorial concessions. The Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip after Israel’s withdrawal in 2005 continues to resonate among the Israeli public. Thus, Sachs predicted, for the foreseeable future, Israeli leaders will likely strive to minimize risk.

The conversation also explored a future American role in efforts to mediate and ultimately resolve this conflict. The collapse of the U.S.-brokered peace talks in April, calls on both sides for unilateralism, and the recent escalation in violence, prompted general agreement among the panelists that the framework for negotiations based on the “Oslo model” — bilateral negotiations mediated by the U.S. — has been exhausted.

Sachs noted that, in the current climate, some Israeli politicians see political gains in publicly criticizing the United States. Still, he said, the U.S.-Israel relationship remains a core pillar of Israel’s national security, and Israelis remain very keen on maintaining it. To the degree that there is still a “process,” Israel will continue to strongly prefer bilateral negotiations with U.S. backing.

Elgindy said that Palestinians increasingly express support for efforts to seek international recognition and engage international institutions, as a means of enhancing their leverage vis-à-vis Israel. However, the Palestinian leadership, despite past disappointments, remains wedded to a U.S.-led peace process.

Yet the speakers noted possibilities for developing new avenues of diplomacy. Wittes said that there was a moment of opportunity last summer, in the wake of the Gaza conflict, to use the alignment of interests between Israel and a number of Arab states as a platform for developing something similar to the Madrid peace talks — a regional framework that would support U.S.-led bilateral negotiations. Elgindy advocated for developing mechanisms that would instill accountability and prevent both sides from harming one another during any future negotiations. Sachs cautioned that blunt mechanisms designed solely to pressure Israel would likely backfire.

The panelists agreed that, for the foreseeable future, there is no substitute for the U.S. role as guarantor of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. As Sachs noted, the potential for the parties to conclude an agreement remains, although perhaps only under different leaders.

Authors

Lauren Mellinger

]]>

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http://www.brookings.edu/events/2014/11/18-violence-in-jerusalem-two-state-solution?rssid=palestinian+territories{E2613F47-605F-47C8-86A1-DD88831309AB}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/80464960/0/brookingsrss/topics/palestinianterritories~Violence-in-Jerusalem-and-the-Future-of-the-TwoState-SolutionViolence in Jerusalem and the Future of the Two-State Solution

Event Information

After the collapse of peace negotiations and the devastating armed conflict that followed, tensions between Israelis and Palestinians are again on the rise. The growing frequency of attacks by Palestinians and the subsequent heavy response by Israeli security forces portend a slide toward deeper violence. The violence is also occurring against the backdrop of high-profile settlement activity, especially in sensitive areas in and around Jerusalem, and a renewed push by Palestinians for international recognition at the United Nations. These moves, and growing calls for unilateralism, suggest that the two-state solution is facing unprecedented and perhaps insurmountable challenges.

On Tuesday, November 18, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a panel discussion examining the troubling spate of violence in Jerusalem and explored the future of the two-state solution. Fellows Natan Sachs and Khaled Elgindy shared their observations and insights. Tamara Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy, chaired the discussion.

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

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Tue, 18 Nov 2014 10:00:00 -0500http://7515766d70db9af98b83-7a8dffca7ab41e0acde077bdb93c9343.r43.cf1.rackcdn.com/141118_TwoStateSolution_64K_itunes.mp3
Event Information
November 18, 2014
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST
Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036 Register for the Event
After the collapse of peace negotiations and the devastating armed conflict that followed, tensions between Israelis and Palestinians are again on the rise. The growing frequency of attacks by Palestinians and the subsequent heavy response by Israeli security forces portend a slide toward deeper violence. The violence is also occurring against the backdrop of high-profile settlement activity, especially in sensitive areas in and around Jerusalem, and a renewed push by Palestinians for international recognition at the United Nations. These moves, and growing calls for unilateralism, suggest that the two-state solution is facing unprecedented and perhaps insurmountable challenges.
On Tuesday, November 18, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a panel discussion examining the troubling spate of violence in Jerusalem and explored the future of the two-state solution. Fellows Natan Sachs and Khaled Elgindy shared their observations and insights. Tamara Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy, chaired the discussion.
Audio
- Violence in Jerusalem and the Future of the Two-State Solution
Transcript
- Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)
Event Materials
- 20141118_jerusalem_violence_transcript
Event Information
November 18, 2014
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST
Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036 Register for the Event
After the collapse of peace negotiations and the devastating armed ...

Event Information

After the collapse of peace negotiations and the devastating armed conflict that followed, tensions between Israelis and Palestinians are again on the rise. The growing frequency of attacks by Palestinians and the subsequent heavy response by Israeli security forces portend a slide toward deeper violence. The violence is also occurring against the backdrop of high-profile settlement activity, especially in sensitive areas in and around Jerusalem, and a renewed push by Palestinians for international recognition at the United Nations. These moves, and growing calls for unilateralism, suggest that the two-state solution is facing unprecedented and perhaps insurmountable challenges.

On Tuesday, November 18, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted a panel discussion examining the troubling spate of violence in Jerusalem and explored the future of the two-state solution. Fellows Natan Sachs and Khaled Elgindy shared their observations and insights. Tamara Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy, chaired the discussion.

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/10/12-gaza-reconstruction-barakat-shaban?rssid=palestinian+territories{D73EB5D3-27F5-4613-BB1C-E954B081E319}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/80464962/0/brookingsrss/topics/palestinianterritories~The-Case-for-a-Collaborative-Council-for-Gazas-ReconstructionThe Case for a Collaborative Council for Gaza's Reconstruction

Editor's note: This paper has been updated since its release on Oct 12, 2014. The most recent version can be found here.

As the fragile August 26th ceasefire between Israel and Hamas struggles to hold, attention has shifted to the reconstruction of Gaza. The PA appealed for urgent international assistance to the Gaza Strip, a territory that has been facing extremely difficult humanitarian, economic and social conditions even prior to Israel’s most recent “Operation Protective Edge”.

As in the aftermath of previous wars in Gaza, a special donors’ conference is taking place today in Cairo (12 October 2014), under the join auspices of Norway and Egypt, where the PA will seek to raise $4 billion in reconstruction aid. However, this time, the purpose of the conference is not only to raise the specified amount of aid required to rebuild what has been destroyed in the Strip, but also to agree on the mechanisms through which this aid will be distributed and used.

In the past seven years Gaza has been going through a protracted process of destruction, which has had a high human cost and wasted huge amounts of national and international resources allocated by donors. This cyclical process is in part due to the lack of international political will to change the over-arching strategy towards Gaza to something more in line with the reality of the political situation on the ground. Such a strategy would require efforts that seek to create a local capacity in Gaza capable of leading and sustaining its own reconstruction and development in a transparent way while elevating the public good above narrow political and economic interests.

As Donors meet in Cairo, there is a critical need to objectively analyze the previous attempts to reconstruct in Gaza and to reflect on mistakes made so that the reconstruction this time may proceed in a much more effective way easing civilian suffering, compacting extremism and hopefully contributing to a lasting truce between Hamas and Israel.

Based on the authors’ extensive experience in post-war reconstruction both in Gaza and elsewhere, this paper aims to provide policy advice to the Palestinian and the international community on how to approach the daunting task of rebuilding the Gaza Strip while avoiding the mistakes of past experiences. It starts by highlighting some of the most relevant contextual facts before exploring the current challenges facing the reconstruction of Gaza, and suggesting an alternative, collaborative approach.

Editor's note: This paper has been updated since its release on Oct 12, 2014. The most recent version can be found here.

As the fragile August 26th ceasefire between Israel and Hamas struggles to hold, attention has shifted to the reconstruction of Gaza. The PA appealed for urgent international assistance to the Gaza Strip, a territory that has been facing extremely difficult humanitarian, economic and social conditions even prior to Israel’s most recent “Operation Protective Edge”.

As in the aftermath of previous wars in Gaza, a special donors’ conference is taking place today in Cairo (12 October 2014), under the join auspices of Norway and Egypt, where the PA will seek to raise $4 billion in reconstruction aid. However, this time, the purpose of the conference is not only to raise the specified amount of aid required to rebuild what has been destroyed in the Strip, but also to agree on the mechanisms through which this aid will be distributed and used.

In the past seven years Gaza has been going through a protracted process of destruction, which has had a high human cost and wasted huge amounts of national and international resources allocated by donors. This cyclical process is in part due to the lack of international political will to change the over-arching strategy towards Gaza to something more in line with the reality of the political situation on the ground. Such a strategy would require efforts that seek to create a local capacity in Gaza capable of leading and sustaining its own reconstruction and development in a transparent way while elevating the public good above narrow political and economic interests.

As Donors meet in Cairo, there is a critical need to objectively analyze the previous attempts to reconstruct in Gaza and to reflect on mistakes made so that the reconstruction this time may proceed in a much more effective way easing civilian suffering, compacting extremism and hopefully contributing to a lasting truce between Hamas and Israel.

Based on the authors’ extensive experience in post-war reconstruction both in Gaza and elsewhere, this paper aims to provide policy advice to the Palestinian and the international community on how to approach the daunting task of rebuilding the Gaza Strip while avoiding the mistakes of past experiences. It starts by highlighting some of the most relevant contextual facts before exploring the current challenges facing the reconstruction of Gaza, and suggesting an alternative, collaborative approach.

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Authors

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2014/09/30-netanyahu-united-nations-speech-peace-process-abbas?rssid=palestinian+territories{AA655346-7136-478C-9F50-112856C21BBC}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/80464964/0/brookingsrss/topics/palestinianterritories~Netanyahu-in-New-York-and-WashingtonNetanyahu in New York and Washington

Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on September 29, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu laid out his worldview of a single threat of militant Islam, from Shia Islamist Iran to Salafi ISIS to the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Hamas. Netanyahu comes to Washington to meet with President Obama on October 1 with an agenda focused on this unified threat.

Netanyahu and Abbas Spar at the UN

At the best of times, Israeli and Arab leaders know how to speak to each other's audiences, assuaging some of the fears and suspicions on the other side, as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat did when coming to Jerusalem in 1977 to call for peace.

These are not the best of times.

In a speech that was vintage Netanyahu, the prime minister's first mission, he said, was "to expose the brazen lies spoken from this podium." Netanyahu was alluding to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's bellicose speech at the same venue last Friday, in which the Palestinian President catered to his own, outraged, domestic audience. Abbas began his speech with the accusation that "Israel has chosen to make [this year] a year of a new war of genocide perpetrated against the Palestinian people." In Abbas's accounting, Israel alone chose the war this summer, as if Hamas was a passive recipient of Israeli malice (I wrote on this issue at the start of the war, here). He made no mention of how the West Bank, which he rules, avoided Gaza's fate, or of his own previous question to Hamas: "What are you trying to achieve by sending rockets?"

True to form, Netanyahu tied Abbas's accusations to the reemergence of anti-Semitism in Europe and, never shy to invoke the Holocaust, to Abbas's demand that no Jews remain in a new Palestinian state, which Netanyahu labeled a policy of "Judenrein," the Nazi term for an area "free of Jews."

Voicing grievances most Israelis share about a judgmental world opinion, Netanyahu called the UN Human Rights Council an "oxymoron" for its manifest fixation with Israel but indifference toward its adversaries—including blatant human rights violator Hamas — or, in comparison to Israel, toward any other country in the world. It is a "Terrorists' Rights Council," he concluded.

Throughout, Netanyahu spoke not to Palestinians but to world opinion, which to Netanyahu means, first and foremost, Americans. He mentioned retiring New York Yankee Derek Jeter, a mostly anonymous figure outside the United States (Israelis and Palestinians could not care less about baseball.) He pointed out that the distance between the June 1967 border and the outskirts of Tel Aviv (the outermost outskirts, in truth) is about the distance between the UN building and another New York landmark, Times Square.

The Single Threat of Militant Islam

More broadly, Netanyahu laid out a stark vision of a single, common threat engulfing the Middle East and threatening the world — militant Islam. "The Nazis believed in a master race. The militant Islamists believe in a master faith."

Though it comes in many shades, for Netanyahu the threat is fundamentally one. In his own words: “[W]hen it comes to their ultimate goals, Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas”. (It is worth remembering that Netanyahu is negotiating, indirectly, with Hamas, something he would presumably not advise with regard to ISIS.) And alluding to Iran, he queried, "Would you let ISIS enrich uranium?"

It's this long-held worldview that underlies his agenda with the president as well.

Netanyahu Meets Obama

As was the case in the Obama-Netanyahu meetings of 2012, 2013 and in March of this year, Netanyahu will focus above all else on Iran’s nuclear program. With a November deadline for discussions between the P5+1 and Iran fast approaching, Netanyahu will hope to hear that the United States will stand firm in its demands on Iran's enrichment capabilities. At the UN, Netanyahu warned again about Iran's "charm offensive," quoting otherwise amiable Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif's writing: "We have a fundamental problem with the West, and especially with America. This is because we are heirs to a global mission, which is tied to our raison d'etre…."

In particular, Netanyahu will seek assurance that the U.S. effort against ISIS, one in which Iran has a common interest, will not weaken U.S. resolve on the Iranian nuclear issue, a hope shared across the Israeli political sphere. (Israeli Opposition Leader Isaac Herzog spoke on the matter at Brookings a few weeks ago, and heard similar assurances on the matter at the White House.)

In the Palestinian arena, with the militant-Islamist threat in mind and the fresh memory of the Gaza conflict, Netanyahu now again emphasizes security above all. The peace process is moribund; both leaders have turned away from negotiations with Abbas now outlining a vision for internationalizing the conflict. Netanyahu will hope that President Obama directs the U.S. mission to veto any Palestinian move in the UN Security Council, as it has done in the past.

For Netanyahu, the Palestinian UN track appears as an outright threat, but any other track must be subsumed to the growing need for security guarantees. Making no mention of a Palestinian state at the UN, Netanyahu made clear that he wants peace, "but it must be a genuine peace, one that is anchored in mutual recognition and enduring security arrangements, rock solid security arrangements on the ground." He went on to stress that: "Israel's withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza created two militant Islamic enclaves on our borders from which tens of thousands of rockets have been fired at Israel."

The rather limited silver lining in Netanyahu’s account, and one he may well stress with the president, was of a "new Middle East" (a far grimmer version of the phrase coined by Shimon Peres in the 1990s). "It presents new dangers, but also new opportunities." Netanyahu now sees an alliance of interests between Israel and several Sunni states — Saudi Arabia and Egypt chief among them — that virulently oppose both the Muslim Brotherhood (and to a degree Hamas) and Iran.

This new alliance is certainly meaningful — it shaped much of the recent Gaza conflict — but it is also inherently limited. The new Arab partners Netanyahu identifies remain beholden to Arab public opinion, for which the Palestinian issue remains a powerful emotive force. After all, the Arab Peace Initiative — the formal proposal of the Arab League which adopted the Saudi proposal — offered Israel normalization with the entire Arab world, once peace is signed with the Palestinians.

Given where the Palestinian and Israeli leaders and publics are today — evident in the leaders’ speeches at the UN — that peace is not on the horizon.

Authors

]]>
Tue, 30 Sep 2014 23:15:00 -0400Natan Sachs
Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on September 29, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu laid out his worldview of a single threat of militant Islam, from Shia Islamist Iran to Salafi ISIS to the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Hamas. Netanyahu comes to Washington to meet with President Obama on October 1 with an agenda focused on this unified threat.
Netanyahu and Abbas Spar at the UN
At the best of times, Israeli and Arab leaders know how to speak to each other's audiences, assuaging some of the fears and suspicions on the other side, as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat did when coming to Jerusalem in 1977 to call for peace.
These are not the best of times.
In a speech that was vintage Netanyahu, the prime minister's first mission, he said, was "to expose the brazen lies spoken from this podium." Netanyahu was alluding to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's bellicose speech at the same venue last Friday, in which the Palestinian President catered to his own, outraged, domestic audience. Abbas began his speech with the accusation that "Israel has chosen to make [this year] a year of a new war of genocide perpetrated against the Palestinian people." In Abbas's accounting, Israel alone chose the war this summer, as if Hamas was a passive recipient of Israeli malice (I wrote on this issue at the start of the war, here). He made no mention of how the West Bank, which he rules, avoided Gaza's fate, or of his own previous question to Hamas: "What are you trying to achieve by sending rockets?"
More appalling, Abbas repeated his previous claim of "genocide," which both belittles actual genocide and defies any reasonable assessment of the — terrible — human suffering in Gaza or its context.
True to form, Netanyahu tied Abbas's accusations to the reemergence of anti-Semitism in Europe and, never shy to invoke the Holocaust, to Abbas's demand that no Jews remain in a new Palestinian state, which Netanyahu labeled a policy of "Judenrein," the Nazi term for an area "free of Jews."
Voicing grievances most Israelis share about a judgmental world opinion, Netanyahu called the UN Human Rights Council an "oxymoron" for its manifest fixation with Israel but indifference toward its adversaries—including blatant human rights violator Hamas — or, in comparison to Israel, toward any other country in the world. It is a "Terrorists' Rights Council," he concluded.
Throughout, Netanyahu spoke not to Palestinians but to world opinion, which to Netanyahu means, first and foremost, Americans. He mentioned retiring New York Yankee Derek Jeter, a mostly anonymous figure outside the United States (Israelis and Palestinians could not care less about baseball.) He pointed out that the distance between the June 1967 border and the outskirts of Tel Aviv (the outermost outskirts, in truth) is about the distance between the UN building and another New York landmark, Times Square.
The Single Threat of Militant Islam
More broadly, Netanyahu laid out a stark vision of a single, common threat engulfing the Middle East and threatening the world — militant Islam. "The Nazis believed in a master race. The militant Islamists believe in a master faith."
Though it comes in many shades, for Netanyahu the threat is fundamentally one. In his own words: “[W]hen it comes to their ultimate goals, Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas”. (It is worth remembering that Netanyahu is negotiating, indirectly, with Hamas, something he would presumably not advise with regard to ISIS.) And alluding to Iran, he queried, "Would you let ISIS enrich uranium?"
It's this long-held worldview that underlies his agenda with the president as well.
Netanyahu Meets Obama
As was the case in the Obama-Netanyahu meetings of 2012, 2013 and in March of this year, Netanyahu will focus above all else on Iran's nuclear ...
Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on September 29, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu laid out his worldview of a single threat of militant Islam, from Shia Islamist Iran to Salafi ISIS to the Muslim ...

Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on September 29, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu laid out his worldview of a single threat of militant Islam, from Shia Islamist Iran to Salafi ISIS to the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Hamas. Netanyahu comes to Washington to meet with President Obama on October 1 with an agenda focused on this unified threat.

Netanyahu and Abbas Spar at the UN

At the best of times, Israeli and Arab leaders know how to speak to each other's audiences, assuaging some of the fears and suspicions on the other side, as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat did when coming to Jerusalem in 1977 to call for peace.

These are not the best of times.

In a speech that was vintage Netanyahu, the prime minister's first mission, he said, was "to expose the brazen lies spoken from this podium." Netanyahu was alluding to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's bellicose speech at the same venue last Friday, in which the Palestinian President catered to his own, outraged, domestic audience. Abbas began his speech with the accusation that "Israel has chosen to make [this year] a year of a new war of genocide perpetrated against the Palestinian people." In Abbas's accounting, Israel alone chose the war this summer, as if Hamas was a passive recipient of Israeli malice (I wrote on this issue at the start of the war, here). He made no mention of how the West Bank, which he rules, avoided Gaza's fate, or of his own previous question to Hamas: "What are you trying to achieve by sending rockets?"

True to form, Netanyahu tied Abbas's accusations to the reemergence of anti-Semitism in Europe and, never shy to invoke the Holocaust, to Abbas's demand that no Jews remain in a new Palestinian state, which Netanyahu labeled a policy of "Judenrein," the Nazi term for an area "free of Jews."

Voicing grievances most Israelis share about a judgmental world opinion, Netanyahu called the UN Human Rights Council an "oxymoron" for its manifest fixation with Israel but indifference toward its adversaries—including blatant human rights violator Hamas — or, in comparison to Israel, toward any other country in the world. It is a "Terrorists' Rights Council," he concluded.

Throughout, Netanyahu spoke not to Palestinians but to world opinion, which to Netanyahu means, first and foremost, Americans. He mentioned retiring New York Yankee Derek Jeter, a mostly anonymous figure outside the United States (Israelis and Palestinians could not care less about baseball.) He pointed out that the distance between the June 1967 border and the outskirts of Tel Aviv (the outermost outskirts, in truth) is about the distance between the UN building and another New York landmark, Times Square.

The Single Threat of Militant Islam

More broadly, Netanyahu laid out a stark vision of a single, common threat engulfing the Middle East and threatening the world — militant Islam. "The Nazis believed in a master race. The militant Islamists believe in a master faith."

Though it comes in many shades, for Netanyahu the threat is fundamentally one. In his own words: “[W]hen it comes to their ultimate goals, Hamas is ISIS and ISIS is Hamas”. (It is worth remembering that Netanyahu is negotiating, indirectly, with Hamas, something he would presumably not advise with regard to ISIS.) And alluding to Iran, he queried, "Would you let ISIS enrich uranium?"

It's this long-held worldview that underlies his agenda with the president as well.

Netanyahu Meets Obama

As was the case in the Obama-Netanyahu meetings of 2012, 2013 and in March of this year, Netanyahu will focus above all else on Iran’s nuclear program. With a November deadline for discussions between the P5+1 and Iran fast approaching, Netanyahu will hope to hear that the United States will stand firm in its demands on Iran's enrichment capabilities. At the UN, Netanyahu warned again about Iran's "charm offensive," quoting otherwise amiable Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif's writing: "We have a fundamental problem with the West, and especially with America. This is because we are heirs to a global mission, which is tied to our raison d'etre…."

In particular, Netanyahu will seek assurance that the U.S. effort against ISIS, one in which Iran has a common interest, will not weaken U.S. resolve on the Iranian nuclear issue, a hope shared across the Israeli political sphere. (Israeli Opposition Leader Isaac Herzog spoke on the matter at Brookings a few weeks ago, and heard similar assurances on the matter at the White House.)

In the Palestinian arena, with the militant-Islamist threat in mind and the fresh memory of the Gaza conflict, Netanyahu now again emphasizes security above all. The peace process is moribund; both leaders have turned away from negotiations with Abbas now outlining a vision for internationalizing the conflict. Netanyahu will hope that President Obama directs the U.S. mission to veto any Palestinian move in the UN Security Council, as it has done in the past.

For Netanyahu, the Palestinian UN track appears as an outright threat, but any other track must be subsumed to the growing need for security guarantees. Making no mention of a Palestinian state at the UN, Netanyahu made clear that he wants peace, "but it must be a genuine peace, one that is anchored in mutual recognition and enduring security arrangements, rock solid security arrangements on the ground." He went on to stress that: "Israel's withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza created two militant Islamic enclaves on our borders from which tens of thousands of rockets have been fired at Israel."

The rather limited silver lining in Netanyahu’s account, and one he may well stress with the president, was of a "new Middle East" (a far grimmer version of the phrase coined by Shimon Peres in the 1990s). "It presents new dangers, but also new opportunities." Netanyahu now sees an alliance of interests between Israel and several Sunni states — Saudi Arabia and Egypt chief among them — that virulently oppose both the Muslim Brotherhood (and to a degree Hamas) and Iran.

This new alliance is certainly meaningful — it shaped much of the recent Gaza conflict — but it is also inherently limited. The new Arab partners Netanyahu identifies remain beholden to Arab public opinion, for which the Palestinian issue remains a powerful emotive force. After all, the Arab Peace Initiative — the formal proposal of the Arab League which adopted the Saudi proposal — offered Israel normalization with the entire Arab world, once peace is signed with the Palestinians.

Given where the Palestinian and Israeli leaders and publics are today — evident in the leaders’ speeches at the UN — that peace is not on the horizon.

Authors

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2014/09/10-herzog-israel-security-in-a-volatile-middle-east?rssid=palestinian+territories{9904F3B3-C9FB-4F69-8797-6CDD4E455B8D}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/80464966/0/brookingsrss/topics/palestinianterritories~After-the-Truce-Israel%e2%80%99s-Security-in-a-Volatile-Middle-EastAfter the Truce: Israel’s Security in a Volatile Middle East

Although Israel and Hamas have recently agreed to a cease-fire, the debate within Israel over how to prevent future eruptions of violence and preserve Israeli security and the viability of the two-state solution has only just begun. On September 9, 2014, the Center for Middle East Policy hosted Isaac Herzog, member of the Knesset, chairman of Israel’s Labor Party, and leader of the opposition, to discuss Israeli politics and society and the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations. CMEP Director Tamara Cofman Wittes welcomed Herzog and moderated the conversation.

Herzog explained that the recent conflict with Hamas has left Israel in a "post-traumatic state." He noted that Israeli public opinion has shifted to the right in the conflict's wake, adding that while he may not welcome such a political shift, he recognizes that it is "totally provisional, logical, and to be expected" given the "long period of national pain" Israel has recently endured.

Herzog spoke about the "unique" phenomena he observed during the Gaza operation: the emergence of a clear Israeli consensus on the military objectives; rising public demands to protect Israelis living near the southern border; and the massive public attendance at the funeral of a U.S.-born Israeli soldier killed in the fighting. He argued that Israelis were developing a "new reality" — a growing understanding that Israel can work with regional partners such as Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority in addressing common concerns.

Herzog advocated that Gaza "open its gates" and bring back civilian management by Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority. He argued that Abbas should seek international financing to rebuild Gaza, suggesting that this would weaken Hamas’s hold in Gaza and move it toward greater political responsibility.

One of Herzog's key themes was the need for Israeli political leaders to be proactive and seize the opportunity to create a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace. He criticized Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for failing to show "vision" for Israel's next steps.

Herzog also emphasized Israel's identity as a diverse, multicultural, multi-faceted society. He acknowledged the recent controversy over remarks by Knesset member Hanin Zoabi, who suggested that the kidnappers of three Israeli teenagers in June 2014 were not terrorists. Herzog declared that "there is no limitation of free speech in Israel" and asserted that Israeli leaders must protect the right of all Israeli voices to be heard, as long as they do not violate the law. He also argued that Jewish-Arab relations in Israel are not as conflictual as commonly portrayed.

Much of the discussion focused on the U.S.-Israel relationship and Israeli efforts to strengthen economic ties with Russia, China, and India. Herzog insisted that there "cannot and will not" be any change in the centrality and uniqueness of the U.S.-Israel relationship and reaffirmed Israel's gratitude for American support. Nevertheless, Herzog explained that Israel has interests in expanding its export markets and building strong commercial ties to Asia. He reiterated that these new commercial partnerships will not change Israel's relationship with the United States, with which Israel has "intimate shared values."

On Iran, Herzog stated that the nuclear issue remains very important, and while Israel recognizes the need to address more immediate issues such as the "Genghis Khans coming from the East, beheading people" on the world stage (a reference to the group known as the Islamic State, or ISIS), the Iranian nuclear issue is a "stand-alone issue" that must be dealt with.

On the issue of the recent land appropriation announcement, Herzog criticized the move but raised the question of why it did not provoke more vocal criticism within Israel. His explanation was that "legally and technically," the move was not a step toward settlement construction. Speaking about politics, he explained that "[the opposition’s] role is to replace the government. That is what we do." He said he would like to lead a coalition of centrist parties that is both "serious enough" to protect Israeli security and proactive on promoting peace and social justice.

Authors

Jennifer R. Williams

Image Source: Ralph Alswang

]]>

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Wed, 10 Sep 2014 22:32:00 -0400Jennifer R. Williams
Although Israel and Hamas have recently agreed to a cease-fire, the debate within Israel over how to prevent future eruptions of violence and preserve Israeli security and the viability of the two-state solution has only just begun. On September 9, 2014, the Center for Middle East Policy hosted Isaac Herzog, member of the Knesset, chairman of Israel's Labor Party, and leader of the opposition, to discuss Israeli politics and society and the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations. CMEP Director Tamara Cofman Wittes welcomed Herzog and moderated the conversation.
Herzog explained that the recent conflict with Hamas has left Israel in a "post-traumatic state." He noted that Israeli public opinion has shifted to the right in the conflict's wake, adding that while he may not welcome such a political shift, he recognizes that it is "totally provisional, logical, and to be expected" given the "long period of national pain" Israel has recently endured.
Herzog spoke about the "unique" phenomena he observed during the Gaza operation: the emergence of a clear Israeli consensus on the military objectives; rising public demands to protect Israelis living near the southern border; and the massive public attendance at the funeral of a U.S.-born Israeli soldier killed in the fighting. He argued that Israelis were developing a "new reality" — a growing understanding that Israel can work with regional partners such as Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority in addressing common concerns.
Herzog advocated that Gaza "open its gates" and bring back civilian management by Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority. He argued that Abbas should seek international financing to rebuild Gaza, suggesting that this would weaken Hamas's hold in Gaza and move it toward greater political responsibility.
One of Herzog's key themes was the need for Israeli political leaders to be proactive and seize the opportunity to create a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace. He criticized Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for failing to show "vision" for Israel's next steps.
Herzog also emphasized Israel's identity as a diverse, multicultural, multi-faceted society. He acknowledged the recent controversy over remarks by Knesset member Hanin Zoabi, who suggested that the kidnappers of three Israeli teenagers in June 2014 were not terrorists. Herzog declared that "there is no limitation of free speech in Israel" and asserted that Israeli leaders must protect the right of all Israeli voices to be heard, as long as they do not violate the law. He also argued that Jewish-Arab relations in Israel are not as conflictual as commonly portrayed.
Much of the discussion focused on the U.S.-Israel relationship and Israeli efforts to strengthen economic ties with Russia, China, and India. Herzog insisted that there "cannot and will not" be any change in the centrality and uniqueness of the U.S.-Israel relationship and reaffirmed Israel's gratitude for American support. Nevertheless, Herzog explained that Israel has interests in expanding its export markets and building strong commercial ties to Asia. He reiterated that these new commercial partnerships will not change Israel's relationship with the United States, with which Israel has "intimate shared values."
On Iran, Herzog stated that the nuclear issue remains very important, and while Israel recognizes the need to address more immediate issues such as the "Genghis Khans coming from the East, beheading people" on the world stage (a reference to the group known as the Islamic State, or ISIS), the Iranian nuclear issue is a "stand-alone issue" that must be dealt with.
On the issue of the recent land appropriation announcement, Herzog criticized the move but raised the question of why it did not provoke more vocal criticism within Israel. His explanation was that "legally ...
Although Israel and Hamas have recently agreed to a cease-fire, the debate within Israel over how to prevent future eruptions of violence and preserve Israeli security and the viability of the two-state solution has only just begun.

Although Israel and Hamas have recently agreed to a cease-fire, the debate within Israel over how to prevent future eruptions of violence and preserve Israeli security and the viability of the two-state solution has only just begun. On September 9, 2014, the Center for Middle East Policy hosted Isaac Herzog, member of the Knesset, chairman of Israel’s Labor Party, and leader of the opposition, to discuss Israeli politics and society and the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations. CMEP Director Tamara Cofman Wittes welcomed Herzog and moderated the conversation.

Herzog explained that the recent conflict with Hamas has left Israel in a "post-traumatic state." He noted that Israeli public opinion has shifted to the right in the conflict's wake, adding that while he may not welcome such a political shift, he recognizes that it is "totally provisional, logical, and to be expected" given the "long period of national pain" Israel has recently endured.

Herzog spoke about the "unique" phenomena he observed during the Gaza operation: the emergence of a clear Israeli consensus on the military objectives; rising public demands to protect Israelis living near the southern border; and the massive public attendance at the funeral of a U.S.-born Israeli soldier killed in the fighting. He argued that Israelis were developing a "new reality" — a growing understanding that Israel can work with regional partners such as Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority in addressing common concerns.

Herzog advocated that Gaza "open its gates" and bring back civilian management by Mahmoud Abbas's Palestinian Authority. He argued that Abbas should seek international financing to rebuild Gaza, suggesting that this would weaken Hamas’s hold in Gaza and move it toward greater political responsibility.

One of Herzog's key themes was the need for Israeli political leaders to be proactive and seize the opportunity to create a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace. He criticized Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for failing to show "vision" for Israel's next steps.

Herzog also emphasized Israel's identity as a diverse, multicultural, multi-faceted society. He acknowledged the recent controversy over remarks by Knesset member Hanin Zoabi, who suggested that the kidnappers of three Israeli teenagers in June 2014 were not terrorists. Herzog declared that "there is no limitation of free speech in Israel" and asserted that Israeli leaders must protect the right of all Israeli voices to be heard, as long as they do not violate the law. He also argued that Jewish-Arab relations in Israel are not as conflictual as commonly portrayed.

Much of the discussion focused on the U.S.-Israel relationship and Israeli efforts to strengthen economic ties with Russia, China, and India. Herzog insisted that there "cannot and will not" be any change in the centrality and uniqueness of the U.S.-Israel relationship and reaffirmed Israel's gratitude for American support. Nevertheless, Herzog explained that Israel has interests in expanding its export markets and building strong commercial ties to Asia. He reiterated that these new commercial partnerships will not change Israel's relationship with the United States, with which Israel has "intimate shared values."

On Iran, Herzog stated that the nuclear issue remains very important, and while Israel recognizes the need to address more immediate issues such as the "Genghis Khans coming from the East, beheading people" on the world stage (a reference to the group known as the Islamic State, or ISIS), the Iranian nuclear issue is a "stand-alone issue" that must be dealt with.

On the issue of the recent land appropriation announcement, Herzog criticized the move but raised the question of why it did not provoke more vocal criticism within Israel. His explanation was that "legally and technically," the move was not a step toward settlement construction. Speaking about politics, he explained that "[the opposition’s] role is to replace the government. That is what we do." He said he would like to lead a coalition of centrist parties that is both "serious enough" to protect Israeli security and proactive on promoting peace and social justice.

Authors

Jennifer R. Williams

Image Source: Ralph Alswang

]]>

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http://www.brookings.edu/events/2014/09/09-israel-security-isaac-herzog?rssid=palestinian+territories{A6927A9D-EF8E-4622-9721-0D9B9063E13E}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/80464968/0/brookingsrss/topics/palestinianterritories~After-the-Truce-Israel%e2%80%99s-Security-in-a-Volatile-Middle-EastAfter the Truce: Israel’s Security in a Volatile Middle East

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Register for the EventAn Address by Isaac Herzog, Chairman of Israel&rsquo;s Labor Party and Leader of the Opposition

After nearly two months of intense fighting at great human cost, Israel and Hamas agreed to a cease-fire. But Israelis and Palestinians now face the even bigger questions of what comes next and how to prevent another round of violence. Can the current truce provide a path towards a more permanent peace and a two-state solution? How will Israel’s internal political dynamics shape its national security policy in the aftermath of the war?

On September 9, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted His Excellency Isaac Herzog, member of Knesset (MK), Israeli chairman of the Labor Party and leader of the opposition, for an address on the future of Israeli security. Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, provided welcoming remarks and moderated a question and answer session with MK Herzog.

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Tue, 09 Sep 2014 15:00:00 -0400http://7515766d70db9af98b83-7a8dffca7ab41e0acde077bdb93c9343.r43.cf1.rackcdn.com/140909_IsraelSecurity_64K_itunes.mp3
Event Information
September 9, 2014
3:00 PM - 4:00 PM EDT
Root Room
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC Register for the Event
An Address by Isaac Herzog, Chairman of Israel&rsquo;s Labor Party and Leader of the Opposition
After nearly two months of intense fighting at great human cost, Israel and Hamas agreed to a cease-fire. But Israelis and Palestinians now face the even bigger questions of what comes next and how to prevent another round of violence. Can the current truce provide a path towards a more permanent peace and a two-state solution? How will Israel's internal political dynamics shape its national security policy in the aftermath of the war?
On September 9, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted His Excellency Isaac Herzog, member of Knesset (MK), Israeli chairman of the Labor Party and leader of the opposition, for an address on the future of Israeli security. Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, provided welcoming remarks and moderated a question and answer session with MK Herzog.
Join the conversation on Twitter using #IsraelatBrookings
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- After the Truce: Israel’s Security in a Volatile Middle East
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- After the Truce: Israel’s Security in a Volatile Middle East
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Event Information
September 9, 2014
3:00 PM - 4:00 PM EDT
Root Room
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC Register for the Event
An Address by Isaac Herzog, Chairman of Israel&

Event Information

Register for the EventAn Address by Isaac Herzog, Chairman of Israel&rsquo;s Labor Party and Leader of the Opposition

After nearly two months of intense fighting at great human cost, Israel and Hamas agreed to a cease-fire. But Israelis and Palestinians now face the even bigger questions of what comes next and how to prevent another round of violence. Can the current truce provide a path towards a more permanent peace and a two-state solution? How will Israel’s internal political dynamics shape its national security policy in the aftermath of the war?

On September 9, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings hosted His Excellency Isaac Herzog, member of Knesset (MK), Israeli chairman of the Labor Party and leader of the opposition, for an address on the future of Israeli security. Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, provided welcoming remarks and moderated a question and answer session with MK Herzog.

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

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http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2014/08/26-us-israel-relationship-indyk-rothkopf?rssid=palestinian+territories{4F7DA315-10BF-4E3E-8FEF-73438B835E54}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/80464970/0/brookingsrss/topics/palestinianterritories~The-USIsrael-Relationship-Arrives-at-a-Moment-of-ReckoningThe U.S.-Israel Relationship Arrives at a Moment of Reckoning

When it comes to U.S. Mideast policy, Martin Indyk is something like a human seismograph. Having spent three and a half decades at the leading edge of U.S. policy in the region, the English-born, Australian-raised Indyk has grown acutely sensitive to the shifts, tremors, and upheavals that have signaled change across the Middle East. Indyk has twice served as America's ambassador to Israel, is a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, and most recently has played the role of U.S. special envoy for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. He remains an advisor to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on these issues.

Earlier this summer, Indyk stepped down from his negotiator's role when U.S. President Barack Obama decided it was time to declare at least a momentary halt to the spluttering peace process. Given his recent role at the very center of these often fractious exchanges between the Israelis, Palestinians, their neighbors, and Secretary of State John Kerry and the U.S. team, Indyk is as well placed as anyone to identify what's new, what's truly broken, and what still remains possible in the conflict-torn region.

Indyk believes that much has changed but that Israel's leaders and their Palestinian counterparts may be the last to recognize it. He sees a rising generation of Palestinians who simply don't believe a two-state solution is possible and are turning their focus toward winning full rights as Israeli citizens. He sees Israeli leaders who won't acknowledge the irreversible generational shift that is altering U.S.-Israeli relations. Israel, in his view, is also becoming gradually less dependent on the United States and is cultivating a new set of global alliances that may have significant consequences for how it behaves in the years ahead. And there is a growing likelihood that Israel's battle with Hamas may tie its immediate fate more to a once-unimaginable de facto alliance with Arab neighbors seeking to quash militant extremists than to the kind of negotiations, deals, and alliances with which the world is accustomed.

In short, recent events may amount to nothing less than a strategic earthquake. ­FP Group CEO and Editor David Rothkopf talks to Indyk to get an informed perspective few others can offer.

David Rothkopf: How has what happened in Gaza altered the dynamics of the peace process?

Martin Indyk: I think it's made it a lot more difficult -- as if it wasn't difficult enough already -- because it has deepened the antipathy between the two sides. The Israelis look at Gaza and what's happened there and understandably say, "We cannot allow such a thing to happen in the West Bank." And therefore, today there's a lot more credibility to the argument that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have to stay in the West Bank, otherwise Israelis fear there will be tunnels into Tel Aviv and there will be rockets on Ben Gurion Airport, and Hamas will take over and they'll face a disaster in the "belly" of Israel.

There are security answers to all of that, but I just think the Israeli public attitude is going to be far more concerned about any kind of Israeli military withdrawal from the West Bank. At the same time, the Palestinian attitude will be even stronger that there has to be an end to the occupation, which means a complete Israeli military withdrawal from the West Bank. And the process of negotiating peace does not have any credibility with them unless they have a date certain for when the occupation is going to end, and basically the Israeli attitude will likely be that the occupation is not going to end if that means a complete withdrawal of the IDF.

So beyond all of the antagonism that conflict generates this Gaza war may have put another nail in the coffin of the two-state solution.

On the positive side, I think that Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas], the Palestinian leader, has gained some credibility in some quarters in Israel by the way in which he had his security forces cooperate with Israeli security forces during the Gaza crisis and the way in which he prevented a third intifada from breaking out in the West Bank. But whatever he may have gained on the Israeli side, I fear he's lost on the Palestinian side because they see Hamas resisting Israel and they see ISIS [the Islamic State] using violence to establish its Islamic State over in Iraq, and all Abu Mazen has to offer is negotiations as the way to achieve Palestinian statehood. And negotiations don't have any credibility anymore, 20 years after Oslo and with over 300,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and settlement growth continuing and the collapse of the latest effort. So I think that too has also made it more difficult. And now Abu Mazen is responding to his need for "street cred" by threatening to go the international route to unilateral recognition of Palestinian statehood, which will generate an Israeli counter-reaction.

And once the dust settles, we may have a politically weakened [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu as well. There was already the problem of distrust between the people and the leadership -- I'm afraid that's just going to be compounded by what's happened [in Gaza].

DR: Give me the scenario under which Netanyahu weakens -- given that recent polls showed considerable support for him and his Gaza policy.

MI: The poll that showed strong support -- 82 percent support -- was conducted before the ground operation. But the sentiment in Israel, the popular sentiment, was to go all the way, to topple Hamas, to take over Gaza, and then somehow hand it over to the Palestinian Authority. People wanted a victory, and "quiet for quiet" is not a victory and probably isn't going to be attainable. If [Israelis] end up with a war of attrition, and every time rockets are fired they have to go into the air raid shelters, I'm afraid that they're going to blame their leadership for not achieving their preferred outcome. [An Israeli TV poll revealed Monday of this week that Netanyahu's support had seen a "dramatic decline," falling to 38 percent, bearing out Indyk's prognostication of a few days earlier.]

The fact that such an outcome was not achievable at any reasonable price, and that Netanyahu acted responsibly in the circumstances, may not be convincing to an Israeli public that's left feeling unsatisfied.

That may be compounded by the declining growth in the Israeli economy, to the point that there's now talk about an Israeli recession. Bear in mind that Israel rode out the 2008 Great Recession without any pain, thanks to very good economic management by Netanyahu and [former Israeli central bank governor] Stanley Fisher. And life has been very good for most Israelis since then -- very little terrorism or violence because of security cooperation with Abu Mazen, despite being surrounded by regional turmoil. Life has been "a beach." But the indications of a slowdown in the economy were already starting before the Gaza War and now might be compounded by the drastic reduction in tourism and other negative factors that slow the economy. So that may create a very different circumstance than has been the case for much of Netanyahu's time in office over the last four years. The combination might lead to disaffection.

DR: That's interesting. So effectively, by having a lingering crisis with periodic rocket attacks and periodic responses from the Israelis, Hamas is actually able to in effect impose economic sanctions on Israel. Is that what you're saying?

MI: It might be. It's too soon to tell but if the chronic violence succeeds in significantly reducing tourism to Israel and foreign investment in Israel, you could be right. Israel has ridden out these kinds of crises in the past and bounced back. It's not at all clear whether Hamas is capable of sustaining a war of attrition, but the trend line is negative.

DR: What do you see as the impact of the Gaza conflict on the U.S.-Israel relationship?

MI: It's had a very negative impact. There's a lot of strain in the relationship now. The personal relationship between the president and the prime minister has been fraught for some time and it's become more complicated by recent events.

What people like to say about the American economy is also true of the U.S.-Israel relationship: The fundamentals are strong. Certainly, congressional support is strong and bipartisan. And in the security relationship and the intelligence relationship, those ties have developed over the years to the point that they are now deep and wide. But there are things happening in the relationship that should give people who care about the relationship -- as I do -- anxiety. There was a Pew poll that showed a generational shift, with younger people being less supportive of Israel. It also showed a political shift, with Democrats being less supportive of Israel, [and] Republicans staying the same in terms of their strong support.

If those trends continue -- and I think they are likely to have been exacerbated by the Gaza crisis, with all the ethical questions that has raised -- then over time Israel may find itself in a very different situation than it's gotten used to. If Israel becomes a partisan issue in American politics, the U.S.-Israel relationship will then be weaker as a result. And if the next generation is less supportive than the current generation -- and I fear that that will be true amongst younger American Jews as well as more broadly -- then that will erode the fundamentals of the relationship over time.

So I think there's a warning bell ringing that people need to pay attention to.

DR: The more this happens, the more it seems the reaction of the Israeli government is to be defiant, to stick its thumb in the eye of the relationship -- the attacks on Kerry; the release of phone call transcripts; the harsh language. The message is sent by Israeli leaders periodically that says, we'll go around the White House, and we'll go to the Congress. I've even had some conversations with Israelis where they say, "Americans don't understand the reality; they're naïve." But we do understand the reality. In fact, it's many Israeli leaders who seem to be shrugging off what you're talking about -- a generational, historical shift that could change the very nature of the most important sort of foundation of Israel's support in the world. How do you account for the apparent disparity?

MI: I think that something's changing on the Israeli side too that all the things that you mentioned reflect, which is that Israel is not anymore the weak and small and dependent state that for so long characterized its position in its relationship with the United States. Now it has a strong army. It has a strong economy. And it has developed relations with world powers that it didn't have before.

Few people noticed that the Indian government came out in support of Israel in this war; social media in China was pro-Israel. It has developed strategic relations with both countries, and with Russia as well, that led Israel to absent itself from the vote of the U.N. General Assembly condemning Russia's annexation of Crimea. I think there's a sense in Israel, particularly on the right, that they can afford to be defiant of the United States. Israelis also sense a potential for a new alignment with Gulf Arab states that didn't exist before that is generated by their common interest in curbing Iran's nuclear program and countering Iran's efforts to dominate the region, opposing if not overthrowing Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and combating Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood, with its stepchild Hamas in Gaza. Israel shares this array of enemies with the Sunni Arab monarchs and the Abdel Fattah al-Sisi regime in Egypt. You can see it in this Gaza crisis quite clearly, where the Saudis and the Egyptians in particular wanted Israel to take down Hamas.

So the combination of all of that leads Israelis to feel more independent of the United States, especially in the context of their sense that the United States is withdrawing from the region and therefore may be less reliable for Israel. These Arab states are also concerned about what they see as an American withdrawal and feel a greater need to cooperate under the table with Israel to help deal with the chaos and threats around them.

So I think that the framing for Israel is different now. Now some politicians on the right feel that standing up to the United States is a cheap way to assert their independence and patriotism. I don't remember a situation before where right-wing Israeli politicians could disparage the United States' leadership and yet gain popularity. And maybe it's because they don't seem to pay any price for it. But I suspect that it's something deeper. There's a sense that Israel has become a power in its own right, and it doesn't need the United States as much. It's a kind of hubris.

I saw this once before, before the 1973 war, when Israelis felt they were the superpower in the region and so didn't have to worry about support from the United States. And it turned on a dime once Egypt and Syria attacked Israel by surprise on Yom Kippur in 1973, and suddenly Israel found itself totally dependent on the United States. So it may be that the bubble of illusion will burst here too and Israeli politicians on the right will come to understand that for all their bravado, the United States is not just Israel's most important friend but in a real crunch its only reliable friend.

DR: Do you feel that the White House was trying to send a message about Gaza? Do you feel the White House is trying to exert more pressure on the Israelis than the Israelis are used to?

MI: No, I don't think so. I think it was in a very specific context of the president being concerned by the loss of civilian life in Gaza, and making that clear both privately and then in public. The statements out of the White House and the State Department were a reaction to the bombing of U.N. compounds and the loss of innocent lives, particularly of children.

President Obama has been very clear from the beginning of his administration -- something for which he gets practically no credit in Israel or amongst Israel's supporters in the United States -- he's been absolutely clear that whatever the differences he may have with the Israeli prime minister, he's not going to touch the security relationship. And he's been very strongly supportive of Israel's security requirements, notwithstanding the real tension in the personal relationship.

So I don't believe that the White House intended now to withhold weapons or missiles in order to get Israel to stop firing. The fact of the matter is the Israelis wanted to stop the firing. It was a question of how to get Hamas to stop firing the rockets.

DR: To what do you attribute the remarkable outbursts against the secretary of state, who's clearly been devoting himself towards advancing a peace process which, at least in theory, is in the interests of the Israelis?

MI: Well, it started with Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon attacking [Kerry] publicly during the peace process, which I attribute to two things. One, the defense minister had a very clear sense of what Israel's security needs are and they do not include withdrawing the Israeli army from the Jordan River, which would have to be addressed in the peace negotiations if there was to be a deal. So I think there was a substantive disagreement, but the lack of respect was truly disturbing, specifically given the importance of American security assistance for the well-being of Israel's defense, for which the defense minister is responsible.

But it got completely out of control during the Gaza crisis, where the secretary was assailed for supposedly betraying Israel because he was trying to work with the prime minister on a cease-fire, and he engaged with Qatar and Turkey to test whether they could influence Hamas to stop firing the rockets. And that criticism came not just from the right but from pundits on the left as well -- Haaretz published three articles by their journalists attacking Kerry. I think that's a product of a particular circumstance in which Israelis felt very much isolated, on their own -- that the world didn't understand them. In that defensive crouch, I think they were waiting for a betrayal by the United States even though the secretary and the president repeatedly supported their right to defend themselves. So they interpreted the secretary's actions as being designed to undermine Israel in favor of Hamas and undermine its burgeoning alignment with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

In fact, nothing could have been further from the truth but that was the perception and, unfortunately, it was a line fed by some unnamed Israeli officials, one of whom described Kerry as launching "a strategic terror attack." That was just outrageous and it enraged the president.

DR: In theory...

MI: The fact of the matter is what Secretary Kerry had produced in terms of the proposal that he had worked on with Prime Minister Netanyahu was actually better than [what] the Egyptian initiative -- which has just now collapsed in Gaza -- produced. Unfortunately, people don't look at the facts in an emotional situation, and turning on the secretary of state was egregious. I don't think I've ever seen anything like it in my over three decades of involvement in the U.S.-Israel relationship.

DR: And yet it seems that the Israelis can do whatever they want with impunity because the security relationship is off the table for the president. So the defense minister, heavily dependent on U.S. defense assistance, can say whatever he wants about the United States and there's no consequence, to speak of. Or is that -- or are they just testing the boundaries of the relationship and we haven't seen the limit?

MI: You know, I think there's a great deal of tolerance and patience in Washington that comes from a basic commitment to the relationship. I think John Kerry has a perfect voting record on Israel -- 30 years in the Senate, 100 percent support -- that comes not because AIPAC told him to do it but because he has a fundamental understanding of the importance of Israel and the U.S.-Israel relationship.

So, you know, there's a tolerance for this kind of static in verbal exchanges because Secretary Kerry knows it's not true. But somebody likened the United States to a dinosaur -- we're so big and so strong that these kinds of slights don't really make much of a difference, until one day the dinosaur awakes wakes up, and it lifts up its tail, and brings it down again, and whomp! So just because there don't seem to be consequences for this, I think it's very unwise for Israeli right-wing politicians to assume that there will never be a consequence because, when push comes to shove, as much as they may think that the United States needs Israel, the bottom line is: Israel needs the United States more. And that is going to be even more the case going forward than it is today. It's not a good idea to leave the reservoir of goodwill empty.

DR: What does all this mean in terms of the future of the peace process? There are several ways you can interpret what you said. One is, for the near term, given the situation in Gaza, given the composition of the Israeli government, given the composition of the U.S. government, progress seems extremely unlikely, particularly if the Palestinian authority and Abu Mazen are at all weakened -- and Hamas is at all strengthened -- by this.

Another way is to say that perhaps the nature of the interaction will change in some fundamental way. Some other issue will supplant the discussion we've been having, you know, over the course of the past couple of decades regarding the peace process. And I can think of two. One is that the Palestinians proceed with statehood on an independent path and the world supports it -- they set up a country and they say, "We'll deal with these other issues as an independent state."

Or, alternatively, the coalescing alliance among the Israelis, the Egyptians, the Gulf states, the Jordanians, the Russians, the Indians, and others -- even the Chinese -- against the spread of militant Islam takes precedence because of the Islamic State and other things, and that it's that alliance that ends up supporting, pushing back on Hamas, and that we focus for the next couple of years on this issue of militant extremism, and just table the other issues until we get there. And in so doing, if there is some success in this, it could end up strengthening a more moderate series of Sunni voices throughout the region, including the Palestinian Authority.

But maybe there's another still. Are we at a phase shift in all of this?

MI: It's obviously very difficult to tell. I'm impressed in my experience over 35 years of close observation of the U.S.-Israeli relationship of its ability to constantly reinvent itself. Think back to the pre-1973 war situation, the height of Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East, and Israel is on the front line shooting down Soviet pilots in Egyptian MiGs over the Suez Canal. Israel becomes an ally in [the] defense of freedom during the Cold War.

After the '73 war, the United States and Israel became allies in the effort to promote peace and American dominance in the region. And since then they have become our ally in the defense of the West against terrorism. And in each case, the relationship has grown deeper and broader on a strategic level.

And now, as you suggest, there may be a new justification for the relationship, in which the United States, as it withdraws from the Middle East, looks to adopt an offshore balancing approach in which Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia become the pillars of an attempt to construct a new order in the region out of the chaos that's engulfing it. At the moment that doesn't seem to be the way it's developing, because the United States seems to be on the other side of this alignment when it comes to the negotiations with Iran or our tension with Egypt or our reluctance to act in Syria. But I think over time it's probable that that realignment will be something that the United States ends up getting behind and that will provide a new justification for the U.S.-Israel relationship.

And so one can, in a sense, look at the long arc of the relationship and say everything's going to be all right. But where it won't be all right is for Israel itself, because as nice as it is to have strategic alignments, none of that solves Israel's existential problem: What is it going to do about the 2.6 million Palestinians it has responsibility for now? And if it doesn't find a way to resolve that issue, that existential dilemma, if Israel continues to control 2.6 million Palestinians in the West Bank, it's going to have to decide sooner rather than later whether it's a democracy or a Jewish state, but it won't be able to be both.

I witnessed it during these negotiations. The younger generation of Palestinians who have grown up knowing nothing but Israeli occupation don't believe in a two-state solution, don't believe there will ever be an independent Palestinian state. They want equal rights in Israel. And that's where this is heading. And then Israel will find itself in a really serious dilemma. It's only a matter of time. And no matter how strong the relationship is between the United States and Israel, it's not going to help solve that dilemma unless Israelis decide that they want to resolve it.

The United States will do fine without a resolution of this particular conflict. As time goes on and other issues come to dominate our agenda and our interests shift, really the only reason we have left to pursue a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is because of our concern about Israel's future.

It's very hard to make the argument that America now has a strategic interest in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It's just one of many conflicts and it's not the most important and it's not the most difficult. We could leave Israel alone to deal with it as best it can, but that's not what a true friend does. So when the Israeli public decides that they have to find a way to confront their dilemma, then the United States will be there to help, and the U.S.-Israeli relationship will be critically important in terms of giving them a safety net to enable them to make the difficult, gut-wrenching compromises necessary to resolve this dilemma.

DR: But it sounds like what you're saying is that this timeout is necessary because it's time for Israel to do some soul-searching about why it's doing this, what its objectives are, what solutions it wants to pursue. But that's complicated by the fact that it doesn't sound like the Israelis have much of an appetite for soul-searching. We could be in a period of sort of protracted stasis on this front, dealing with other issues until this one ripens.

MI: Well, the president certainly felt it necessary to have a timeout. That was driven by the reality that despite a major investment of time and energy by his secretary of state, mobilization of Pentagon resources to try to address Israel's security concerns in the context of the peace agreement, and a major diplomatic effort by the United States to try to achieve a breakthrough, we weren't able to do it. I think it was Einstein who said the definition of insanity is repeating the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. With so many other priorities for the secretary of state and the president in a world that is presenting huge challenges for American interests, it doesn't make sense at this point to try again unless something has changed in a way that leads us to believe that success becomes possible.

I think that the change will have to come from Israelis and Palestinians knocking on the president's door and saying, "We're ready, we want to resolve this now," rather than the United States knocking again on their door and insisting that they have to do it.

Authors

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Tue, 26 Aug 2014 00:00:00 -0400Martin S. Indyk and David Rothkopf
When it comes to U.S. Mideast policy, Martin Indyk is something like a human seismograph. Having spent three and a half decades at the leading edge of U.S. policy in the region, the English-born, Australian-raised Indyk has grown acutely sensitive to the shifts, tremors, and upheavals that have signaled change across the Middle East. Indyk has twice served as America's ambassador to Israel, is a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, and most recently has played the role of U.S. special envoy for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. He remains an advisor to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on these issues.
Earlier this summer, Indyk stepped down from his negotiator's role when U.S. President Barack Obama decided it was time to declare at least a momentary halt to the spluttering peace process. Given his recent role at the very center of these often fractious exchanges between the Israelis, Palestinians, their neighbors, and Secretary of State John Kerry and the U.S. team, Indyk is as well placed as anyone to identify what's new, what's truly broken, and what still remains possible in the conflict-torn region.
Indyk believes that much has changed but that Israel's leaders and their Palestinian counterparts may be the last to recognize it. He sees a rising generation of Palestinians who simply don't believe a two-state solution is possible and are turning their focus toward winning full rights as Israeli citizens. He sees Israeli leaders who won't acknowledge the irreversible generational shift that is altering U.S.-Israeli relations. Israel, in his view, is also becoming gradually less dependent on the United States and is cultivating a new set of global alliances that may have significant consequences for how it behaves in the years ahead. And there is a growing likelihood that Israel's battle with Hamas may tie its immediate fate more to a once-unimaginable de facto alliance with Arab neighbors seeking to quash militant extremists than to the kind of negotiations, deals, and alliances with which the world is accustomed.
In short, recent events may amount to nothing less than a strategic earthquake. ­FP Group CEO and Editor David Rothkopf talks to Indyk to get an informed perspective few others can offer.
David Rothkopf: How has what happened in Gaza altered the dynamics of the peace process?
Martin Indyk: I think it's made it a lot more difficult -- as if it wasn't difficult enough already -- because it has deepened the antipathy between the two sides. The Israelis look at Gaza and what's happened there and understandably say, "We cannot allow such a thing to happen in the West Bank." And therefore, today there's a lot more credibility to the argument that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have to stay in the West Bank, otherwise Israelis fear there will be tunnels into Tel Aviv and there will be rockets on Ben Gurion Airport, and Hamas will take over and they'll face a disaster in the "belly" of Israel.
There are security answers to all of that, but I just think the Israeli public attitude is going to be far more concerned about any kind of Israeli military withdrawal from the West Bank. At the same time, the Palestinian attitude will be even stronger that there has to be an end to the occupation, which means a complete Israeli military withdrawal from the West Bank. And the process of negotiating peace does not have any credibility with them unless they have a date certain for when the occupation is going to end, and basically the Israeli attitude will likely be that the occupation is not going to end if that means a complete withdrawal of the IDF.
So beyond all of the antagonism that conflict generates this Gaza war may have put another nail in the coffin of the two-state solution.
On the positive side, I think that Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas], the Palestinian leader, has gained some credibility in some quarters in Israel by the way in which he had his security ...
When it comes to U.S. Mideast policy, Martin Indyk is something like a human seismograph. Having spent three and a half decades at the leading edge of U.S. policy in the region, the English-born, Australian-raised Indyk has grown acutely ...

When it comes to U.S. Mideast policy, Martin Indyk is something like a human seismograph. Having spent three and a half decades at the leading edge of U.S. policy in the region, the English-born, Australian-raised Indyk has grown acutely sensitive to the shifts, tremors, and upheavals that have signaled change across the Middle East. Indyk has twice served as America's ambassador to Israel, is a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, and most recently has played the role of U.S. special envoy for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. He remains an advisor to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on these issues.

Earlier this summer, Indyk stepped down from his negotiator's role when U.S. President Barack Obama decided it was time to declare at least a momentary halt to the spluttering peace process. Given his recent role at the very center of these often fractious exchanges between the Israelis, Palestinians, their neighbors, and Secretary of State John Kerry and the U.S. team, Indyk is as well placed as anyone to identify what's new, what's truly broken, and what still remains possible in the conflict-torn region.

Indyk believes that much has changed but that Israel's leaders and their Palestinian counterparts may be the last to recognize it. He sees a rising generation of Palestinians who simply don't believe a two-state solution is possible and are turning their focus toward winning full rights as Israeli citizens. He sees Israeli leaders who won't acknowledge the irreversible generational shift that is altering U.S.-Israeli relations. Israel, in his view, is also becoming gradually less dependent on the United States and is cultivating a new set of global alliances that may have significant consequences for how it behaves in the years ahead. And there is a growing likelihood that Israel's battle with Hamas may tie its immediate fate more to a once-unimaginable de facto alliance with Arab neighbors seeking to quash militant extremists than to the kind of negotiations, deals, and alliances with which the world is accustomed.

In short, recent events may amount to nothing less than a strategic earthquake. ­FP Group CEO and Editor David Rothkopf talks to Indyk to get an informed perspective few others can offer.

David Rothkopf: How has what happened in Gaza altered the dynamics of the peace process?

Martin Indyk: I think it's made it a lot more difficult -- as if it wasn't difficult enough already -- because it has deepened the antipathy between the two sides. The Israelis look at Gaza and what's happened there and understandably say, "We cannot allow such a thing to happen in the West Bank." And therefore, today there's a lot more credibility to the argument that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have to stay in the West Bank, otherwise Israelis fear there will be tunnels into Tel Aviv and there will be rockets on Ben Gurion Airport, and Hamas will take over and they'll face a disaster in the "belly" of Israel.

There are security answers to all of that, but I just think the Israeli public attitude is going to be far more concerned about any kind of Israeli military withdrawal from the West Bank. At the same time, the Palestinian attitude will be even stronger that there has to be an end to the occupation, which means a complete Israeli military withdrawal from the West Bank. And the process of negotiating peace does not have any credibility with them unless they have a date certain for when the occupation is going to end, and basically the Israeli attitude will likely be that the occupation is not going to end if that means a complete withdrawal of the IDF.

So beyond all of the antagonism that conflict generates this Gaza war may have put another nail in the coffin of the two-state solution.

On the positive side, I think that Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas], the Palestinian leader, has gained some credibility in some quarters in Israel by the way in which he had his security forces cooperate with Israeli security forces during the Gaza crisis and the way in which he prevented a third intifada from breaking out in the West Bank. But whatever he may have gained on the Israeli side, I fear he's lost on the Palestinian side because they see Hamas resisting Israel and they see ISIS [the Islamic State] using violence to establish its Islamic State over in Iraq, and all Abu Mazen has to offer is negotiations as the way to achieve Palestinian statehood. And negotiations don't have any credibility anymore, 20 years after Oslo and with over 300,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and settlement growth continuing and the collapse of the latest effort. So I think that too has also made it more difficult. And now Abu Mazen is responding to his need for "street cred" by threatening to go the international route to unilateral recognition of Palestinian statehood, which will generate an Israeli counter-reaction.

And once the dust settles, we may have a politically weakened [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu as well. There was already the problem of distrust between the people and the leadership -- I'm afraid that's just going to be compounded by what's happened [in Gaza].

DR: Give me the scenario under which Netanyahu weakens -- given that recent polls showed considerable support for him and his Gaza policy.

MI: The poll that showed strong support -- 82 percent support -- was conducted before the ground operation. But the sentiment in Israel, the popular sentiment, was to go all the way, to topple Hamas, to take over Gaza, and then somehow hand it over to the Palestinian Authority. People wanted a victory, and "quiet for quiet" is not a victory and probably isn't going to be attainable. If [Israelis] end up with a war of attrition, and every time rockets are fired they have to go into the air raid shelters, I'm afraid that they're going to blame their leadership for not achieving their preferred outcome. [An Israeli TV poll revealed Monday of this week that Netanyahu's support had seen a "dramatic decline," falling to 38 percent, bearing out Indyk's prognostication of a few days earlier.]

The fact that such an outcome was not achievable at any reasonable price, and that Netanyahu acted responsibly in the circumstances, may not be convincing to an Israeli public that's left feeling unsatisfied.

That may be compounded by the declining growth in the Israeli economy, to the point that there's now talk about an Israeli recession. Bear in mind that Israel rode out the 2008 Great Recession without any pain, thanks to very good economic management by Netanyahu and [former Israeli central bank governor] Stanley Fisher. And life has been very good for most Israelis since then -- very little terrorism or violence because of security cooperation with Abu Mazen, despite being surrounded by regional turmoil. Life has been "a beach." But the indications of a slowdown in the economy were already starting before the Gaza War and now might be compounded by the drastic reduction in tourism and other negative factors that slow the economy. So that may create a very different circumstance than has been the case for much of Netanyahu's time in office over the last four years. The combination might lead to disaffection.

DR: That's interesting. So effectively, by having a lingering crisis with periodic rocket attacks and periodic responses from the Israelis, Hamas is actually able to in effect impose economic sanctions on Israel. Is that what you're saying?

MI: It might be. It's too soon to tell but if the chronic violence succeeds in significantly reducing tourism to Israel and foreign investment in Israel, you could be right. Israel has ridden out these kinds of crises in the past and bounced back. It's not at all clear whether Hamas is capable of sustaining a war of attrition, but the trend line is negative.

DR: What do you see as the impact of the Gaza conflict on the U.S.-Israel relationship?

MI: It's had a very negative impact. There's a lot of strain in the relationship now. The personal relationship between the president and the prime minister has been fraught for some time and it's become more complicated by recent events.

What people like to say about the American economy is also true of the U.S.-Israel relationship: The fundamentals are strong. Certainly, congressional support is strong and bipartisan. And in the security relationship and the intelligence relationship, those ties have developed over the years to the point that they are now deep and wide. But there are things happening in the relationship that should give people who care about the relationship -- as I do -- anxiety. There was a Pew poll that showed a generational shift, with younger people being less supportive of Israel. It also showed a political shift, with Democrats being less supportive of Israel, [and] Republicans staying the same in terms of their strong support.

If those trends continue -- and I think they are likely to have been exacerbated by the Gaza crisis, with all the ethical questions that has raised -- then over time Israel may find itself in a very different situation than it's gotten used to. If Israel becomes a partisan issue in American politics, the U.S.-Israel relationship will then be weaker as a result. And if the next generation is less supportive than the current generation -- and I fear that that will be true amongst younger American Jews as well as more broadly -- then that will erode the fundamentals of the relationship over time.

So I think there's a warning bell ringing that people need to pay attention to.

DR: The more this happens, the more it seems the reaction of the Israeli government is to be defiant, to stick its thumb in the eye of the relationship -- the attacks on Kerry; the release of phone call transcripts; the harsh language. The message is sent by Israeli leaders periodically that says, we'll go around the White House, and we'll go to the Congress. I've even had some conversations with Israelis where they say, "Americans don't understand the reality; they're naïve." But we do understand the reality. In fact, it's many Israeli leaders who seem to be shrugging off what you're talking about -- a generational, historical shift that could change the very nature of the most important sort of foundation of Israel's support in the world. How do you account for the apparent disparity?

MI: I think that something's changing on the Israeli side too that all the things that you mentioned reflect, which is that Israel is not anymore the weak and small and dependent state that for so long characterized its position in its relationship with the United States. Now it has a strong army. It has a strong economy. And it has developed relations with world powers that it didn't have before.

Few people noticed that the Indian government came out in support of Israel in this war; social media in China was pro-Israel. It has developed strategic relations with both countries, and with Russia as well, that led Israel to absent itself from the vote of the U.N. General Assembly condemning Russia's annexation of Crimea. I think there's a sense in Israel, particularly on the right, that they can afford to be defiant of the United States. Israelis also sense a potential for a new alignment with Gulf Arab states that didn't exist before that is generated by their common interest in curbing Iran's nuclear program and countering Iran's efforts to dominate the region, opposing if not overthrowing Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and combating Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood, with its stepchild Hamas in Gaza. Israel shares this array of enemies with the Sunni Arab monarchs and the Abdel Fattah al-Sisi regime in Egypt. You can see it in this Gaza crisis quite clearly, where the Saudis and the Egyptians in particular wanted Israel to take down Hamas.

So the combination of all of that leads Israelis to feel more independent of the United States, especially in the context of their sense that the United States is withdrawing from the region and therefore may be less reliable for Israel. These Arab states are also concerned about what they see as an American withdrawal and feel a greater need to cooperate under the table with Israel to help deal with the chaos and threats around them.

So I think that the framing for Israel is different now. Now some politicians on the right feel that standing up to the United States is a cheap way to assert their independence and patriotism. I don't remember a situation before where right-wing Israeli politicians could disparage the United States' leadership and yet gain popularity. And maybe it's because they don't seem to pay any price for it. But I suspect that it's something deeper. There's a sense that Israel has become a power in its own right, and it doesn't need the United States as much. It's a kind of hubris.

I saw this once before, before the 1973 war, when Israelis felt they were the superpower in the region and so didn't have to worry about support from the United States. And it turned on a dime once Egypt and Syria attacked Israel by surprise on Yom Kippur in 1973, and suddenly Israel found itself totally dependent on the United States. So it may be that the bubble of illusion will burst here too and Israeli politicians on the right will come to understand that for all their bravado, the United States is not just Israel's most important friend but in a real crunch its only reliable friend.

DR: Do you feel that the White House was trying to send a message about Gaza? Do you feel the White House is trying to exert more pressure on the Israelis than the Israelis are used to?

MI: No, I don't think so. I think it was in a very specific context of the president being concerned by the loss of civilian life in Gaza, and making that clear both privately and then in public. The statements out of the White House and the State Department were a reaction to the bombing of U.N. compounds and the loss of innocent lives, particularly of children.

President Obama has been very clear from the beginning of his administration -- something for which he gets practically no credit in Israel or amongst Israel's supporters in the United States -- he's been absolutely clear that whatever the differences he may have with the Israeli prime minister, he's not going to touch the security relationship. And he's been very strongly supportive of Israel's security requirements, notwithstanding the real tension in the personal relationship.

So I don't believe that the White House intended now to withhold weapons or missiles in order to get Israel to stop firing. The fact of the matter is the Israelis wanted to stop the firing. It was a question of how to get Hamas to stop firing the rockets.

DR: To what do you attribute the remarkable outbursts against the secretary of state, who's clearly been devoting himself towards advancing a peace process which, at least in theory, is in the interests of the Israelis?

MI: Well, it started with Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon attacking [Kerry] publicly during the peace process, which I attribute to two things. One, the defense minister had a very clear sense of what Israel's security needs are and they do not include withdrawing the Israeli army from the Jordan River, which would have to be addressed in the peace negotiations if there was to be a deal. So I think there was a substantive disagreement, but the lack of respect was truly disturbing, specifically given the importance of American security assistance for the well-being of Israel's defense, for which the defense minister is responsible.

But it got completely out of control during the Gaza crisis, where the secretary was assailed for supposedly betraying Israel because he was trying to work with the prime minister on a cease-fire, and he engaged with Qatar and Turkey to test whether they could influence Hamas to stop firing the rockets. And that criticism came not just from the right but from pundits on the left as well -- Haaretz published three articles by their journalists attacking Kerry. I think that's a product of a particular circumstance in which Israelis felt very much isolated, on their own -- that the world didn't understand them. In that defensive crouch, I think they were waiting for a betrayal by the United States even though the secretary and the president repeatedly supported their right to defend themselves. So they interpreted the secretary's actions as being designed to undermine Israel in favor of Hamas and undermine its burgeoning alignment with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

In fact, nothing could have been further from the truth but that was the perception and, unfortunately, it was a line fed by some unnamed Israeli officials, one of whom described Kerry as launching "a strategic terror attack." That was just outrageous and it enraged the president.

DR: In theory...

MI: The fact of the matter is what Secretary Kerry had produced in terms of the proposal that he had worked on with Prime Minister Netanyahu was actually better than [what] the Egyptian initiative -- which has just now collapsed in Gaza -- produced. Unfortunately, people don't look at the facts in an emotional situation, and turning on the secretary of state was egregious. I don't think I've ever seen anything like it in my over three decades of involvement in the U.S.-Israel relationship.

DR: And yet it seems that the Israelis can do whatever they want with impunity because the security relationship is off the table for the president. So the defense minister, heavily dependent on U.S. defense assistance, can say whatever he wants about the United States and there's no consequence, to speak of. Or is that -- or are they just testing the boundaries of the relationship and we haven't seen the limit?

MI: You know, I think there's a great deal of tolerance and patience in Washington that comes from a basic commitment to the relationship. I think John Kerry has a perfect voting record on Israel -- 30 years in the Senate, 100 percent support -- that comes not because AIPAC told him to do it but because he has a fundamental understanding of the importance of Israel and the U.S.-Israel relationship.

So, you know, there's a tolerance for this kind of static in verbal exchanges because Secretary Kerry knows it's not true. But somebody likened the United States to a dinosaur -- we're so big and so strong that these kinds of slights don't really make much of a difference, until one day the dinosaur awakes wakes up, and it lifts up its tail, and brings it down again, and whomp! So just because there don't seem to be consequences for this, I think it's very unwise for Israeli right-wing politicians to assume that there will never be a consequence because, when push comes to shove, as much as they may think that the United States needs Israel, the bottom line is: Israel needs the United States more. And that is going to be even more the case going forward than it is today. It's not a good idea to leave the reservoir of goodwill empty.

DR: What does all this mean in terms of the future of the peace process? There are several ways you can interpret what you said. One is, for the near term, given the situation in Gaza, given the composition of the Israeli government, given the composition of the U.S. government, progress seems extremely unlikely, particularly if the Palestinian authority and Abu Mazen are at all weakened -- and Hamas is at all strengthened -- by this.

Another way is to say that perhaps the nature of the interaction will change in some fundamental way. Some other issue will supplant the discussion we've been having, you know, over the course of the past couple of decades regarding the peace process. And I can think of two. One is that the Palestinians proceed with statehood on an independent path and the world supports it -- they set up a country and they say, "We'll deal with these other issues as an independent state."

Or, alternatively, the coalescing alliance among the Israelis, the Egyptians, the Gulf states, the Jordanians, the Russians, the Indians, and others -- even the Chinese -- against the spread of militant Islam takes precedence because of the Islamic State and other things, and that it's that alliance that ends up supporting, pushing back on Hamas, and that we focus for the next couple of years on this issue of militant extremism, and just table the other issues until we get there. And in so doing, if there is some success in this, it could end up strengthening a more moderate series of Sunni voices throughout the region, including the Palestinian Authority.

But maybe there's another still. Are we at a phase shift in all of this?

MI: It's obviously very difficult to tell. I'm impressed in my experience over 35 years of close observation of the U.S.-Israeli relationship of its ability to constantly reinvent itself. Think back to the pre-1973 war situation, the height of Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East, and Israel is on the front line shooting down Soviet pilots in Egyptian MiGs over the Suez Canal. Israel becomes an ally in [the] defense of freedom during the Cold War.

After the '73 war, the United States and Israel became allies in the effort to promote peace and American dominance in the region. And since then they have become our ally in the defense of the West against terrorism. And in each case, the relationship has grown deeper and broader on a strategic level.

And now, as you suggest, there may be a new justification for the relationship, in which the United States, as it withdraws from the Middle East, looks to adopt an offshore balancing approach in which Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia become the pillars of an attempt to construct a new order in the region out of the chaos that's engulfing it. At the moment that doesn't seem to be the way it's developing, because the United States seems to be on the other side of this alignment when it comes to the negotiations with Iran or our tension with Egypt or our reluctance to act in Syria. But I think over time it's probable that that realignment will be something that the United States ends up getting behind and that will provide a new justification for the U.S.-Israel relationship.

And so one can, in a sense, look at the long arc of the relationship and say everything's going to be all right. But where it won't be all right is for Israel itself, because as nice as it is to have strategic alignments, none of that solves Israel's existential problem: What is it going to do about the 2.6 million Palestinians it has responsibility for now? And if it doesn't find a way to resolve that issue, that existential dilemma, if Israel continues to control 2.6 million Palestinians in the West Bank, it's going to have to decide sooner rather than later whether it's a democracy or a Jewish state, but it won't be able to be both.

I witnessed it during these negotiations. The younger generation of Palestinians who have grown up knowing nothing but Israeli occupation don't believe in a two-state solution, don't believe there will ever be an independent Palestinian state. They want equal rights in Israel. And that's where this is heading. And then Israel will find itself in a really serious dilemma. It's only a matter of time. And no matter how strong the relationship is between the United States and Israel, it's not going to help solve that dilemma unless Israelis decide that they want to resolve it.

The United States will do fine without a resolution of this particular conflict. As time goes on and other issues come to dominate our agenda and our interests shift, really the only reason we have left to pursue a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is because of our concern about Israel's future.

It's very hard to make the argument that America now has a strategic interest in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It's just one of many conflicts and it's not the most important and it's not the most difficult. We could leave Israel alone to deal with it as best it can, but that's not what a true friend does. So when the Israeli public decides that they have to find a way to confront their dilemma, then the United States will be there to help, and the U.S.-Israeli relationship will be critically important in terms of giving them a safety net to enable them to make the difficult, gut-wrenching compromises necessary to resolve this dilemma.

DR: But it sounds like what you're saying is that this timeout is necessary because it's time for Israel to do some soul-searching about why it's doing this, what its objectives are, what solutions it wants to pursue. But that's complicated by the fact that it doesn't sound like the Israelis have much of an appetite for soul-searching. We could be in a period of sort of protracted stasis on this front, dealing with other issues until this one ripens.

MI: Well, the president certainly felt it necessary to have a timeout. That was driven by the reality that despite a major investment of time and energy by his secretary of state, mobilization of Pentagon resources to try to address Israel's security concerns in the context of the peace agreement, and a major diplomatic effort by the United States to try to achieve a breakthrough, we weren't able to do it. I think it was Einstein who said the definition of insanity is repeating the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. With so many other priorities for the secretary of state and the president in a world that is presenting huge challenges for American interests, it doesn't make sense at this point to try again unless something has changed in a way that leads us to believe that success becomes possible.

I think that the change will have to come from Israelis and Palestinians knocking on the president's door and saying, "We're ready, we want to resolve this now," rather than the United States knocking again on their door and insisting that they have to do it.

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http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2014/08/5-points-from-a-brookings-event-on-israel-hamas-conflict-in-gaza?rssid=palestinian+territories{33604A22-8396-4984-8633-DE3D7480E662}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/80464972/0/brookingsrss/topics/palestinianterritories~Five-Points-from-a-Brookings-Event-on-the-IsraelHamas-Conflict-in-GazaFive Points from a Brookings Event on the Israel-Hamas Conflict in Gaza

“We saw how the conflict exploded and yet even though the status quo is obviously unsustainable, we are headed back to the status quo, and that is the pathology of this conflict, the chronic nature of it that makes this whole situation even more depressing,” explained Martin Indyk, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, at an event earlier this week on the policy options and regional implications of the recent round of violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.

The event was introduced by Tamara Coffman Wittes, senior fellow and director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, who stressed that the “primary obstacles to a peace agreement lie in the domestic politics of the two sides.” In looking at the future implications of the current round of violence, she suggested that “we’re at a moment where I think we can hope that each of the parties involved in this conflict and interested in this conflict will engage in some self-criticism and some internal reflection.”

Effect of the Conflict on U.S.-Israel Relations

Indyk, who recently returned to Brookings after serving as the U.S. special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, commented on whether there has been a structural shift in U.S.-Israeli relations due to this conflict. “On the one hand,” he said, there is “[the critical] language used by both sides”:

The United States [is] on the record criticizing Israel in language that we have not heard before that I can remember; and [senior Israeli officials] backgrounding the Israeli press with vitriolic language about the efforts of the United States to achieve a cease fire that also I think were unprecedented …

So that’s on the one side. On the other side … the president signs a bill for $225 million more in security assistance to pay for additional Iron Dome capabilities for Israel. And both the prime minister on the one side and the secretary of state and the president on the other singing each other’s praises as we come out of this conflict.

“So, take your pick,” Indyk said. Reflecting on the way the U.S.-Israel relationship rebounded after the Israeli war in Lebanon in 1982, he added, “We’ve seen this movie before.”

Somehow each time the relationships survives, moves on, and that’s partly because it has deep roots and there’s this strong, popular support for Israel that I’m sure has been damaged to some extent but probably will rebound. So in a sense, it’s plus ça change, plus seule la même chose.

However, Indyk said, “there’s something else going on here that I also felt in the negotiating room. And that is that Israel today is a different country to what it was, say, back in 1982, and for most of its history.” In addition to being stronger economically and militarily, Indyk noted that Israelis feel “more independent of the United States than they have in the past” as Israel has developed strong relationships with other powers around the world beyond the U.S., including in the Arab world.

Unfortunately, he noted, that seems to have been accompanied by a level of disrespect for the United States by some on the right wing in Israel even though the United States remains Israel’s best friend.

On Treating Gaza and the West Bank Separately

“One of the key assumptions of U.S. policy and Israeli policy … that has been a real failure the last eight years,” Elgindy said, is “this policy of separating Gaza from the West Bank, keeping Palestinians divided.”

“This is not what diplomacy is made of,” Elgindy said. Continuing:

Frankly this is how colonialism operates. It’s not how diplomacy works; it’s not how peacemaking works. ... The notion that we could make peace with one group of Palestinians and support war against other Palestinians was never going to work. And that’s now played itself out. It was either going to drive Hamas into the peace camp or drive Mahmoud Abbas to adopt Hamas’s positions.

What is happening, Elgindy explained, is that the conflict is causing the various Palestinian factions and power centers—Fatah, the PLO, the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian leadership, and Hamas—to unify even more. “I think,” he said, “there’s a real sense among Palestinians that Hamas’s way, painful as it is, produces results.” Speaking of the recent reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas, Elgindy observed that “I think Hamas went into this reconciliation agreement very much the junior partner and they came out of this [current conflict] very much as an equal partner at least … Hamas needs Fatah as much as Fatah needs Hamas at this point.”

On Israel’s Difficult Choices

“The Israeli position going in from the start was very clearly to avoid this conflict,” Sachs said. He argued that “Israel, in a sense, was dragged along by Hamas that kept insisting on having this battle until its conditions were met … notwithstanding the human suffering in Gaza [for] which Hamas shares at least some blame.” He considered the “difficult dilemma Israel faces” as it considers what to “do with this territory which is very close to the center of Israel and governed by an organization that makes no qualms about its position.” Sachs emphasized that “Hamas has been the central spoiler of the peace process since the 90s.”

Sachs explained that in Hamas, “you have a quasi-political, quasi-military organization effectively ruling a state or a region and waging war from it” which could only produce “three very bad options” for Israel:

Take over the territory completely

Let Hamas rearm, lift all the restrictions, and hope for the best

Accept a very grim, unsatisfactory status quo

As far as the public goes, Israel is “split down the middle on whether [its ground operation] was a success or not.” While the “support for Netanyahu’s conduct is quite high, the flip side of that is that, Israel going in had no clear goal.” What the Israelis did learn “is that if you let Hamas into the Gaza Strip, it’s not going to build shelters for the civilian population, certainly not hospitals and schools, it’s going to build tunnels.”

On Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution

Elgindy drew a distinction between conflict management and conflict resolution. While not mutually exclusive, he charged that the George W. Bush administration focused too much on conflict management, while the Obama administration focuses on conflict resolution “to the total neglect of any sense conflict management.”

“Any real viable peace process has to have both,” Elgindy said, characterizing this as “another fundamental failure in U.S. policy” because “If we come out of this with anything, other than why it’s important to avoid these kinds of violent conflagrations in the first place, when they do start, I think there have to be rules to the game.”

Indyk offered his perspective when he stated that the policy of the Obama administration to resolve the conflict “came out of a belief that you needed to find a way to break out of the chronic nature of this conflict. You needed to try to resolve it.“ He continued:

To say that it would have been better off engaging in conflict management is essentially to say that we’re not going to be able to resolve this conflict so we should just manage it and try to keep it contained. But there was a fundamental decision made by the secretary and the president that that was only going to lead to more conflicts like the things we’ve seen here.

When asked if the U.S., Israeli and Palestinian negotiating delegations thought they could push resolution of Gaza issues down the road (i.e., conflict management), Indyk replied, “No.”

We didn’t have a choice. Why? Because Hamas controls Gaza and Hamas is not interested in peace with Israel. It’s an inconvenient truth. But Hamas is not interested in peace with Israel and therefore you cannot construct a peace negotiation with Hamas. Now maybe as a result of this it becomes possible that the Palestinian leadership under Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas] will somehow convince Hamas that it should go along with a two-state solution, and acceptance of Israel, but there is no indication that Hamas is actually prepared to do that.

So it’s fine to say we should have conflict management but it doesn’t treat the problem. It just ensures that we’re going to have outbreaks of conflict from time to time. There’s nothing that we could do to prevent that from happening other than to try to resolve the conflict.

In response, Elgindy reiterated that it’s not an either/or proposition, “but that we conduct the two together.”

That’s what a peace process ought to do, so that there is a safety net for when the negotiations collapse rather than simply sort of drifting toward the abyss as we often do when negotiations collapse. So there needs to be some thought put into conflict management when negotiations are not happening or possible.

On Israel’s Use of Force and Proportionality

In terms of conflict management, Elgindy offered a critical view of Israel’s prosecution of the conflict as disproportionate to the threat. “The notion that Israel’s military doctrine of overwhelming disproportionate force is somehow acceptable,” he said, should be reconsidered.

I don’t think this is a legitimate way to conduct a military operation by deliberately inflicting as much pain on the other side. After all, that is the essential tenet of the Dahiya Doctrine, is to be disproportionate. There is a reason that proportionality is a basic principle in international humanitarian law. So when you have something that flies in the face of that and you see the kind of death and destruction that you have in the Gaza Strip, out of all proportion to any threat that Hamas may have, this has real consequences. It has human consequences, it has moral consequences, it has political consequences.

Calling the deaths of 400 children, destruction of 10,000 homes and displacement of 400,000 people in Gaza “simply outrageous,” Elgindy asserted that “We need to think about how to prevent these conflicts in the first place,” Elgindy argued, “and when they do happen to make sure that there is a degree of reasonableness to how they’re conducted; otherwise we’ve completely destroyed, in addition to I think losing our humanity, … our credibility.”

Indyk responded to Elgindy’s point on proportionality by asking that we put it into context:

I understand very well Khaled’s criticism and his passionate conviction on this matter, and I share his view that it’s unacceptable that over 400 children could be killed in this conflict. But we do have to put it in context. The context is one in which Hamas was targeting Israeli civilians, and the only reason that the casualty rate wasn’t higher on the Israeli side was because they had a means of protecting their civilians. Whereas Hamas does not have a means of protecting their civilians and never paid any attention to protecting their civilians, whatsoever. It’s not as if they built air raid shelters for them. Instead they were firing rockets from civilian areas. Now we all know that, but I think you can’t just condemn the Israelis on this side without putting into context the circumstances that they faced.

During the event, the panelists also spoke about regional actors’ role in resolving the conflict, how political factions on both sides play out in their respective strategies, and whether Israel would ever withdraw from the West Bank.

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Thu, 07 Aug 2014 09:14:00 -0400Fred Dews and Elina Saxena
“We saw how the conflict exploded and yet even though the status quo is obviously unsustainable, we are headed back to the status quo, and that is the pathology of this conflict, the chronic nature of it that makes this whole situation even more depressing,” explained Martin Indyk, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, at an event earlier this week on the policy options and regional implications of the recent round of violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.
The event was introduced by Tamara Coffman Wittes, senior fellow and director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, who stressed that the “primary obstacles to a peace agreement lie in the domestic politics of the two sides.” In looking at the future implications of the current round of violence, she suggested that “we're at a moment where I think we can hope that each of the parties involved in this conflict and interested in this conflict will engage in some self-criticism and some internal reflection.”
In addition to Indyk and Wittes, the event included Fellows Khaled Elgindy and Natan Sachs. During the event, the panelists offered their insight on a variety of topics related to the conflict. Visit the event's web page to get full video and audio of the discussion or watch below.
________________________________________________________
A few highlights appear below.
Effect of the Conflict on U.S.-Israel Relations
Indyk, who recently returned to Brookings after serving as the U.S. special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, commented on whether there has been a structural shift in U.S.-Israeli relations due to this conflict. “On the one hand,” he said, there is “[the critical] language used by both sides”: The United States [is] on the record criticizing Israel in language that we have not heard before that I can remember; and [senior Israeli officials] backgrounding the Israeli press with vitriolic language about the efforts of the United States to achieve a cease fire that also I think were unprecedented …
So that's on the one side. On the other side … the president signs a bill for $225 million more in security assistance to pay for additional Iron Dome capabilities for Israel. And both the prime minister on the one side and the secretary of state and the president on the other singing each other's praises as we come out of this conflict.
“So, take your pick,” Indyk said. Reflecting on the way the U.S.-Israel relationship rebounded after the Israeli war in Lebanon in 1982, he added, “We've seen this movie before.” Somehow each time the relationships survives, moves on, and that's partly because it has deep roots and there's this strong, popular support for Israel that I'm sure has been damaged to some extent but probably will rebound. So in a sense, it's plus ça change, plus seule la même chose.
However, Indyk said, “there's something else going on here that I also felt in the negotiating room. And that is that Israel today is a different country to what it was, say, back in 1982, and for most of its history.” In addition to being stronger economically and militarily, Indyk noted that Israelis feel “more independent of the United States than they have in the past” as Israel has developed strong relationships with other powers around the world beyond the U.S., including in the Arab world.
Unfortunately, he noted, that seems to have been accompanied by a level of disrespect for the United States by some on the right wing in Israel even though the United States remains Israel's best friend.
On Treating Gaza and the West Bank Separately
“One of the key assumptions of U.S. policy and Israeli policy … that has been a real failure the last eight years,” Elgindy said, is “this policy of separating Gaza from the West Bank, keeping Palestinians ... “We saw how the conflict exploded and yet even though the status quo is obviously unsustainable, we are headed back to the status quo, and that is the pathology of this conflict, the chronic nature of it that makes this whole situation even ...

“We saw how the conflict exploded and yet even though the status quo is obviously unsustainable, we are headed back to the status quo, and that is the pathology of this conflict, the chronic nature of it that makes this whole situation even more depressing,” explained Martin Indyk, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, at an event earlier this week on the policy options and regional implications of the recent round of violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.

The event was introduced by Tamara Coffman Wittes, senior fellow and director of the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, who stressed that the “primary obstacles to a peace agreement lie in the domestic politics of the two sides.” In looking at the future implications of the current round of violence, she suggested that “we’re at a moment where I think we can hope that each of the parties involved in this conflict and interested in this conflict will engage in some self-criticism and some internal reflection.”

Effect of the Conflict on U.S.-Israel Relations

Indyk, who recently returned to Brookings after serving as the U.S. special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, commented on whether there has been a structural shift in U.S.-Israeli relations due to this conflict. “On the one hand,” he said, there is “[the critical] language used by both sides”:

The United States [is] on the record criticizing Israel in language that we have not heard before that I can remember; and [senior Israeli officials] backgrounding the Israeli press with vitriolic language about the efforts of the United States to achieve a cease fire that also I think were unprecedented …

So that’s on the one side. On the other side … the president signs a bill for $225 million more in security assistance to pay for additional Iron Dome capabilities for Israel. And both the prime minister on the one side and the secretary of state and the president on the other singing each other’s praises as we come out of this conflict.

“So, take your pick,” Indyk said. Reflecting on the way the U.S.-Israel relationship rebounded after the Israeli war in Lebanon in 1982, he added, “We’ve seen this movie before.”

Somehow each time the relationships survives, moves on, and that’s partly because it has deep roots and there’s this strong, popular support for Israel that I’m sure has been damaged to some extent but probably will rebound. So in a sense, it’s plus ça change, plus seule la même chose.

However, Indyk said, “there’s something else going on here that I also felt in the negotiating room. And that is that Israel today is a different country to what it was, say, back in 1982, and for most of its history.” In addition to being stronger economically and militarily, Indyk noted that Israelis feel “more independent of the United States than they have in the past” as Israel has developed strong relationships with other powers around the world beyond the U.S., including in the Arab world.

Unfortunately, he noted, that seems to have been accompanied by a level of disrespect for the United States by some on the right wing in Israel even though the United States remains Israel’s best friend.

On Treating Gaza and the West Bank Separately

“One of the key assumptions of U.S. policy and Israeli policy … that has been a real failure the last eight years,” Elgindy said, is “this policy of separating Gaza from the West Bank, keeping Palestinians divided.”

“This is not what diplomacy is made of,” Elgindy said. Continuing:

Frankly this is how colonialism operates. It’s not how diplomacy works; it’s not how peacemaking works. ... The notion that we could make peace with one group of Palestinians and support war against other Palestinians was never going to work. And that’s now played itself out. It was either going to drive Hamas into the peace camp or drive Mahmoud Abbas to adopt Hamas’s positions.

What is happening, Elgindy explained, is that the conflict is causing the various Palestinian factions and power centers—Fatah, the PLO, the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian leadership, and Hamas—to unify even more. “I think,” he said, “there’s a real sense among Palestinians that Hamas’s way, painful as it is, produces results.” Speaking of the recent reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas, Elgindy observed that “I think Hamas went into this reconciliation agreement very much the junior partner and they came out of this [current conflict] very much as an equal partner at least … Hamas needs Fatah as much as Fatah needs Hamas at this point.”

On Israel’s Difficult Choices

“The Israeli position going in from the start was very clearly to avoid this conflict,” Sachs said. He argued that “Israel, in a sense, was dragged along by Hamas that kept insisting on having this battle until its conditions were met … notwithstanding the human suffering in Gaza [for] which Hamas shares at least some blame.” He considered the “difficult dilemma Israel faces” as it considers what to “do with this territory which is very close to the center of Israel and governed by an organization that makes no qualms about its position.” Sachs emphasized that “Hamas has been the central spoiler of the peace process since the 90s.”

Sachs explained that in Hamas, “you have a quasi-political, quasi-military organization effectively ruling a state or a region and waging war from it” which could only produce “three very bad options” for Israel:

Take over the territory completely

Let Hamas rearm, lift all the restrictions, and hope for the best

Accept a very grim, unsatisfactory status quo

As far as the public goes, Israel is “split down the middle on whether [its ground operation] was a success or not.” While the “support for Netanyahu’s conduct is quite high, the flip side of that is that, Israel going in had no clear goal.” What the Israelis did learn “is that if you let Hamas into the Gaza Strip, it’s not going to build shelters for the civilian population, certainly not hospitals and schools, it’s going to build tunnels.”

On Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution

Elgindy drew a distinction between conflict management and conflict resolution. While not mutually exclusive, he charged that the George W. Bush administration focused too much on conflict management, while the Obama administration focuses on conflict resolution “to the total neglect of any sense conflict management.”

“Any real viable peace process has to have both,” Elgindy said, characterizing this as “another fundamental failure in U.S. policy” because “If we come out of this with anything, other than why it’s important to avoid these kinds of violent conflagrations in the first place, when they do start, I think there have to be rules to the game.”

Indyk offered his perspective when he stated that the policy of the Obama administration to resolve the conflict “came out of a belief that you needed to find a way to break out of the chronic nature of this conflict. You needed to try to resolve it.“ He continued:

To say that it would have been better off engaging in conflict management is essentially to say that we’re not going to be able to resolve this conflict so we should just manage it and try to keep it contained. But there was a fundamental decision made by the secretary and the president that that was only going to lead to more conflicts like the things we’ve seen here.

When asked if the U.S., Israeli and Palestinian negotiating delegations thought they could push resolution of Gaza issues down the road (i.e., conflict management), Indyk replied, “No.”

We didn’t have a choice. Why? Because Hamas controls Gaza and Hamas is not interested in peace with Israel. It’s an inconvenient truth. But Hamas is not interested in peace with Israel and therefore you cannot construct a peace negotiation with Hamas. Now maybe as a result of this it becomes possible that the Palestinian leadership under Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas] will somehow convince Hamas that it should go along with a two-state solution, and acceptance of Israel, but there is no indication that Hamas is actually prepared to do that.

So it’s fine to say we should have conflict management but it doesn’t treat the problem. It just ensures that we’re going to have outbreaks of conflict from time to time. There’s nothing that we could do to prevent that from happening other than to try to resolve the conflict.

In response, Elgindy reiterated that it’s not an either/or proposition, “but that we conduct the two together.”

That’s what a peace process ought to do, so that there is a safety net for when the negotiations collapse rather than simply sort of drifting toward the abyss as we often do when negotiations collapse. So there needs to be some thought put into conflict management when negotiations are not happening or possible.

On Israel’s Use of Force and Proportionality

In terms of conflict management, Elgindy offered a critical view of Israel’s prosecution of the conflict as disproportionate to the threat. “The notion that Israel’s military doctrine of overwhelming disproportionate force is somehow acceptable,” he said, should be reconsidered.

I don’t think this is a legitimate way to conduct a military operation by deliberately inflicting as much pain on the other side. After all, that is the essential tenet of the Dahiya Doctrine, is to be disproportionate. There is a reason that proportionality is a basic principle in international humanitarian law. So when you have something that flies in the face of that and you see the kind of death and destruction that you have in the Gaza Strip, out of all proportion to any threat that Hamas may have, this has real consequences. It has human consequences, it has moral consequences, it has political consequences.

Calling the deaths of 400 children, destruction of 10,000 homes and displacement of 400,000 people in Gaza “simply outrageous,” Elgindy asserted that “We need to think about how to prevent these conflicts in the first place,” Elgindy argued, “and when they do happen to make sure that there is a degree of reasonableness to how they’re conducted; otherwise we’ve completely destroyed, in addition to I think losing our humanity, … our credibility.”

Indyk responded to Elgindy’s point on proportionality by asking that we put it into context:

I understand very well Khaled’s criticism and his passionate conviction on this matter, and I share his view that it’s unacceptable that over 400 children could be killed in this conflict. But we do have to put it in context. The context is one in which Hamas was targeting Israeli civilians, and the only reason that the casualty rate wasn’t higher on the Israeli side was because they had a means of protecting their civilians. Whereas Hamas does not have a means of protecting their civilians and never paid any attention to protecting their civilians, whatsoever. It’s not as if they built air raid shelters for them. Instead they were firing rockets from civilian areas. Now we all know that, but I think you can’t just condemn the Israelis on this side without putting into context the circumstances that they faced.

During the event, the panelists also spoke about regional actors’ role in resolving the conflict, how political factions on both sides play out in their respective strategies, and whether Israel would ever withdraw from the West Bank.