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VIETNAM NEWSLETTER
Pam
757
Number
Published by Graduate Students
of Stanford University
July 28, 1965
Why I Will Not Go to the United States
The Nation April 19, 1965 Jean-Paul Sartre
On learning that Jean-Paul Sartre
had cancelled his lectures at Cornell
University, The Nation cabled him for
an explanation of his action. In response, M. Sartre authorized us to
publish in America the following statement (with interview interpolations)
which he had already prepared for
Le Nouvel Observateur. The English
translation is by Lionel Abel.
Paris
Let's not kid ourselves. We are in
danger of being caught in one of
the prettiest snares ever invented
by propagandists. What do the
Americans say? That they are intensifying the war in Vietnam, that
they are bombing the north and using gas in the south, in order to be
in a better position to negotiate.
Considering the horror, this sounds
encouraging. But what do the American claims amount to? Obviously,
one always makes war in order to
make peace. In order to arrive at
some kind of peace. The kind of
peace one desires. In order to arrive at some kind of negotiation.
The kind one wants to impose. Here
is the problem: Is a solution being
sought which can be accepted by
the enemy, or is the enemy's destruction being sought, so that his successors will accept capitulation?
Washington declares that it is waiting for some sign of good will on
the part of North Vietnam. Translated, this means: We are waiting
for North Vietnam to concede defeat, to beg us to stop bombarding
it and to promise to give no further
aid to the Vietcong. Clearly this
means the Americans are for extending the war. So let's understand
them. That is of first importance.
And having understood them, we
must take a stand ourselves. That
is just what I have done.
To be sure, there are Americans
who have understood and condemned this policy, and who have
even demonstrated against it. It is
these Americans who reproach me
lor having called off the series of
lectures I was to give next month
in the United States. I had been
invited a ye.ir ago by Cornell University, where 1 count not a lew
friends. I have in mind those on
the Cornell staff who recently sent
President Johnson an open letter,
denouncing his policy on Vietnam,
and who organized a protest march
in Ithaca. I had accepted Cornell's
invitation, first of all, because of
the quality of this university, and
then because I had noted the development in the United States of an
active minority, whose views I sympathized with, which has been participating side by side with Negroes
in the struggle against racial discrimination. At Cornell I would not
have felt out of place.
It is true that at the time America was already at war with Vietnam. But the war had not yet reached the proportions it took on just
a month ago. When the United
States, after the defeat of the
French in 1954, decided to support
the Diem government, its purpose
evidently was to insure its own
strategic position in the Far East.
But one could think that at that
particular moment it had been
caught in a trap; one was not
obliged to think that it- wanted' to
support a dictatorship. Since then
the trap has slowly closed. The situation has become worse, year after
year, and the Americans have found
themselves squeezed. One would
even have been able to sympathize
with them if they had tried to get
out of the trap by seeking a solution which a democratically elected
South Vietnamese government could
have found acceptable.
Instead of which, when it became
evident that the successive shocks
to this dictatorship were due entirely to personal rivalries within a
decadent ruling clique, and when
it became clear, too, that the regime
was detested by the people of Vietnam as a whole, the Americans refused to draw reasonable conclusions and turned to what I would
call an attitude of 'diversion": Held
in check by the Vietcong in the
south, they decided to strike out
against the neighbor in the north.
Militarily, this made no sense, for
these actions do not help them toward victory in the south. The
American high command itself has
estimated that only 10 to '20 per
cent of the arms and munitions of
the Vietcong come from North Vietnam. Let's suppose that an impenetrable wall could be set up, separating the north from the south. Would
the fighting strength of the Vietcong be diminished? Hardly. The
Vietcong would merely change its
tactics and intensify its efforts to
arm itself from the same source
that has already served it, namely,
the depots of the South Vietnamese
army.
Aggression against the north is
the expression of an ignominious
policy, one which has modified the
very character of the war.
it is a quantitative difference.
Operations are addressed to other
targets and are carried out by other
means, but the objectives remain
the same.
On the contrary. After a certain
point, as everybody knows, quantity
changes into quality. The bombardments of the north have given the
war the Americans are waging there
a new aspect. These bombings indicate an irreversible qualitative
leap, insofar as they make brutally
evident that American society as
such has an imperialist base.
Until the bombings, the situation in Vietnam had a politcally and
morally positive aspect, insofar as
the Vietcong was moving toward
victory, while the American position was becoming more and more
untenable. It would have been possible for me to go to the United
States at that time, because I had
the definite impression that a period of imperialist recession had begun and that the Americans were
about ready to judge their policy
absurd.
The bombings have changed all
this. After they began. I realized
that the Americans had understood ;
nothing and that there was no common language between them and
us. They tell me: Come and argue
with us. But discussion is possible
only with those who are read» to
put in question the whole American
imperialist policy—not only in Vietnam but in South America, in Korea.
(continued next page)

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Copyright belongs to the individuals who created them or the organizations for which they worked. We share them here strictly for non-profit educational purposes. If you believe that you possess copyright to material included here, please contact us at asklibrary@wisconsinhistory.org. Under the fair use provisions of the U.S. copyright law, teachers and students are free to reproduce any document for nonprofit classroom use. Commercial use of copyright-protected material is generally prohibited.

Owner

Wisconsin Historical Society

Full text

VIETNAM NEWSLETTER
Pam
757
Number
Published by Graduate Students
of Stanford University
July 28, 1965
Why I Will Not Go to the United States
The Nation April 19, 1965 Jean-Paul Sartre
On learning that Jean-Paul Sartre
had cancelled his lectures at Cornell
University, The Nation cabled him for
an explanation of his action. In response, M. Sartre authorized us to
publish in America the following statement (with interview interpolations)
which he had already prepared for
Le Nouvel Observateur. The English
translation is by Lionel Abel.
Paris
Let's not kid ourselves. We are in
danger of being caught in one of
the prettiest snares ever invented
by propagandists. What do the
Americans say? That they are intensifying the war in Vietnam, that
they are bombing the north and using gas in the south, in order to be
in a better position to negotiate.
Considering the horror, this sounds
encouraging. But what do the American claims amount to? Obviously,
one always makes war in order to
make peace. In order to arrive at
some kind of peace. The kind of
peace one desires. In order to arrive at some kind of negotiation.
The kind one wants to impose. Here
is the problem: Is a solution being
sought which can be accepted by
the enemy, or is the enemy's destruction being sought, so that his successors will accept capitulation?
Washington declares that it is waiting for some sign of good will on
the part of North Vietnam. Translated, this means: We are waiting
for North Vietnam to concede defeat, to beg us to stop bombarding
it and to promise to give no further
aid to the Vietcong. Clearly this
means the Americans are for extending the war. So let's understand
them. That is of first importance.
And having understood them, we
must take a stand ourselves. That
is just what I have done.
To be sure, there are Americans
who have understood and condemned this policy, and who have
even demonstrated against it. It is
these Americans who reproach me
lor having called off the series of
lectures I was to give next month
in the United States. I had been
invited a ye.ir ago by Cornell University, where 1 count not a lew
friends. I have in mind those on
the Cornell staff who recently sent
President Johnson an open letter,
denouncing his policy on Vietnam,
and who organized a protest march
in Ithaca. I had accepted Cornell's
invitation, first of all, because of
the quality of this university, and
then because I had noted the development in the United States of an
active minority, whose views I sympathized with, which has been participating side by side with Negroes
in the struggle against racial discrimination. At Cornell I would not
have felt out of place.
It is true that at the time America was already at war with Vietnam. But the war had not yet reached the proportions it took on just
a month ago. When the United
States, after the defeat of the
French in 1954, decided to support
the Diem government, its purpose
evidently was to insure its own
strategic position in the Far East.
But one could think that at that
particular moment it had been
caught in a trap; one was not
obliged to think that it- wanted' to
support a dictatorship. Since then
the trap has slowly closed. The situation has become worse, year after
year, and the Americans have found
themselves squeezed. One would
even have been able to sympathize
with them if they had tried to get
out of the trap by seeking a solution which a democratically elected
South Vietnamese government could
have found acceptable.
Instead of which, when it became
evident that the successive shocks
to this dictatorship were due entirely to personal rivalries within a
decadent ruling clique, and when
it became clear, too, that the regime
was detested by the people of Vietnam as a whole, the Americans refused to draw reasonable conclusions and turned to what I would
call an attitude of 'diversion": Held
in check by the Vietcong in the
south, they decided to strike out
against the neighbor in the north.
Militarily, this made no sense, for
these actions do not help them toward victory in the south. The
American high command itself has
estimated that only 10 to '20 per
cent of the arms and munitions of
the Vietcong come from North Vietnam. Let's suppose that an impenetrable wall could be set up, separating the north from the south. Would
the fighting strength of the Vietcong be diminished? Hardly. The
Vietcong would merely change its
tactics and intensify its efforts to
arm itself from the same source
that has already served it, namely,
the depots of the South Vietnamese
army.
Aggression against the north is
the expression of an ignominious
policy, one which has modified the
very character of the war.
it is a quantitative difference.
Operations are addressed to other
targets and are carried out by other
means, but the objectives remain
the same.
On the contrary. After a certain
point, as everybody knows, quantity
changes into quality. The bombardments of the north have given the
war the Americans are waging there
a new aspect. These bombings indicate an irreversible qualitative
leap, insofar as they make brutally
evident that American society as
such has an imperialist base.
Until the bombings, the situation in Vietnam had a politcally and
morally positive aspect, insofar as
the Vietcong was moving toward
victory, while the American position was becoming more and more
untenable. It would have been possible for me to go to the United
States at that time, because I had
the definite impression that a period of imperialist recession had begun and that the Americans were
about ready to judge their policy
absurd.
The bombings have changed all
this. After they began. I realized
that the Americans had understood ;
nothing and that there was no common language between them and
us. They tell me: Come and argue
with us. But discussion is possible
only with those who are read» to
put in question the whole American
imperialist policy—not only in Vietnam but in South America, in Korea.
(continued next page)