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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000085
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE AND EUR/ERA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2020
TAGS: PHUMPGOVPRELBKKKSR
SUBJECT: BALKAN POLITICAL DIRECTORS DISCUSS KOSOVO AND
BOSNIA IN BRUSSELS
Classified By: USEU DCM Christopher Murray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Meeting in Brussels on January 11, Quint
Balkans political directors - representing the U.S., Germany,
France, Italy, the UK and EU Council Secretariat - met to
discuss the situation in Kosovo and Bosnia. On Kosovo, the
EU Council Secretariat noted Serb hardening and suggested
that the main tool to counter it was the EU perspective for
both Belgrade and Pristina. There was agreement that Quint
members need to strongly discourage Belgrade from any attempt
to return to the UN General Assembly to press for status
talks. France agreed to circulate draft talking points
linking post-ICJ misbehavior to Serbia's EU perspective.
Concerning parallel structures in the north, the Council
Secretariat reported that Belgrade has appointed 35 judges
and 10 prosecutors to oversee Kosovo - both in the north and
Serb enclaves in the south. The Council Secretariat believes
that a customs protocol is unnecessary and circulated a draft
proposal for the restoration of full customs controls
(e-mailed to EUR/SCE and EUR/ERA separately). On
electricity, the USG was isolated in calling for action to
re-connect KEK line to Valac power station. Others favored
commercial negotiations, but it is not clear they understand
what this means or what Pristina has offered in the past. On
Bosnia, all agreed prospects for agreement are dim but that
they need to remain engaged as part of an election management
strategy, and recognized the need to try to focus the
Bosnians on issues instead of nationalism prior to elections.
The Quint acknowledged U.S. concerns about Bosnian Serb
leader Dodik's lack of compliance with High Representative
decisions, but offered no ideas for fixing the problem beyond
French and Council Secretariat assertions that when the EU
has taken a firm line such as in the case of visa
liberalization, Dodik has backed down. End Summary.
Kosovo
------
¶2. (C) Quint Balkans political directors met in Brussels
January 11 to discuss the situation in Kosovo and Bosnia.
Hosted by outgoing Council Secretariat Director Zoltan
Martinusz and acting director Jonas Jonsson, the meeting was
also attended by EUR DAS Stuart Jones, Daniel Fearn (U.K),
Antje Leendertse (Germany), Roland Galharague (France), and
Luca Franchetti (Italy). Before providing the Council
Secretariat's assessment of the situation in Kosovo,
Martinusz announced his transfer to the cabinet of EU Council
President Herman Van Rompuy where Martinusz will serve as
foreign policy advisor.
¶3. (C) The Council Secretariat opened by providing an
overview of the past year and challenges for the year ahead.
Looking back, Martinusz noted progress on decentralization,
Rule of Law (ROL), practical issues such as reintegration of
Serb police officers in the south, and successful management
of visits. Looking forward, Martinusz reported seeing
parallel structures in the north, ROL, good governance/fight
against corruption, and the ICJ ruling as challenges. He
noted a hardening of the Serbian position on Kosovo and
suggested that the main tool to counter this was the EU
perspective for both Belgrade and Pristina. Martinusz sees
framing issues around this as the key issue moving forward,
noting that technical issues quickly become political ones.
While saying that Brussels must lead on issues, Martinusz
underlined the importance of U.S. assistance, something that
must be mirrored on the ground by cooperation between the
EUSR office and U.S. Embassy.
¶4. (C) Turning to the ICJ, DAS Jones agreed that our best
leverage is the EU perspective and framework. Jones said
that the USG fears that Serbia may plan, after the ICJ issues
its advisory opinion, to return to the General Assembly for a
vote urging status talks. Jones asked if it would be timely
to send a message to Tadic that reviving the issue in the
General Assembly would be seen by key EU Member States as
unhelpful. Jones suggested that Jeremic's fingerprints were
all over this, but that Tadic might overrule him if apprised
of the cost to Serbia's EU perspective. French representative
Galharague agreed that any initiative in the UNGA was for
Serbia and UN precedent generally. He agreed that it would
BRUSSELS 00000085 002 OF 004
be useful to tell Belgrade not to go forward. France
suggested a P5 demarche to Belgrade, with Jones pointing out
that Russia would likely be sympathetic to Belgrade and
unhelpful. The UK and Italy supported the idea of telling
Belgrade this was a bad move, but favored national demarches.
¶5. (C) Martinusz added that while Serbia had applied for EU
membership, its application has yet to be referred to the
European Commission for its opinion. He said that Serbia
wants its application to be referred before the ICJ ruling,
Germany reported its government would not support referring
the application before the ICJ ruling. France said that we
are nearing a point at which Serbia's chance of moving
forward on the EU is jeopardized by its attitude towards
Kosovo, adding that France had not yet decided when or how to
link the issues. According to France, Serbia is considering
only two options for approaching negotiations with the
Kosovars, the first being an outright partition of the north,
the other an "Inter German" model. France said the latter
would only be provisional and that we would have to make it
clear to Serbia that it can not come into the EU without
recognizing Kosovo. The UK suggested that it would be key to
build conditionality into the EU accession process early on.
¶6. (C) Jones said that he was encouraged by the discussion
and voiced support for the idea of a coordinated approach and
clear understanding of what we want from Serbia and Kosovo in
the near and longer term. In response to Jones' question as
to what Pristina should be doing, France said that mutual
recognition was the goal and that we should advise the GoK to
enter talks with the understanding that this is the goal.
Saying "we don't want a repeat of Cyprus," France asked if we
wanted to make an opinion (on Serbia's EU candidacy
application) contingent upon mutual recognition. France then
offered to draw up and circulate points that would tell
Belgrade that it would not be helpful to go to the General
Assembly and, in general terms, express the harm this could
do to Serbia's EU candidacy. Jones voiced his support for
delivering this message early and often, with the UK adding
that approaching Belgrade separately with a common scripts
was the way to go.
¶7. (C) Concerning the judiciary, Jonsson reported that
Belgrade had appointed new judges and prosecutors
Serbia-wide, including Kosovo. He noted that while the
Council Secretariat was aware of the Serbian law requiring
the appointments, it had been surprised by how swiftly
Belgrade had moved, especially in light of the Serbian
holidays. Jonsson reported that the European Commission and
Venice Commission found fault with the underlying Serb
legislation. Since it was not yet universally implemented,
there was still time for a message to be sent to Belgrade.
According to Jonsson, Belgrade appointed 35 judges and 10
prosecutors for the north, with the North Mitrovica
courthouse serving as the primary court for Kosovo, with
branches in enclaves including Strpce. He reported that
EULEX wants Belgrade's appointments to be frozen and that
EULEX and EUSR reps would be traveling to Brussels for a
brainstorming session next week. Kosovars were very
concerned about the move and Sejdiu had called in EULEX Head
of Mission de Kermabon and ICR deputy Burton on January 5.
Jonsson suggested that given the Commission's unhappiness,
this could be noted in the progress report if Member States
approached the Commission and suggested that they consider
it. Concerning the UN report in January, Jones suggested
that while it was too late to influence the report,
objections could be raised in the Council.
¶8. (C) On customs, Jonsson reported that Belgrade has been
signaling that it wants a customs protocol, adding that EULEX
does not believe one is necessary. The UK agreed, saying
that a protocol provided no gain, only an opportunity for
Belgrade to seek a repeat of the police protocol. Jonsson
said that money distribution remained the main hurdle to an
understanding on customs. The Council Secretariat circulated
its paper and requested feedback (Note: paper e-mailed to
EUR/SCE separately). After receiving Quint feedback, the
plan would be to discuss the proposal with the Kosovars and
then with Belgrade. After asking for clarification of the
language in the draft proposal, Jones said he needed to study
BRUSSELS 00000085 003 OF 004
it further, but stressed the U.S. could not support less than
was in the plan, adding that customs revenues must go into
the Kosovo consolidated budget. Jonsson added that
¶9. (C) Turctiontegr`lishing a political presence in the north via the
standing up of an "EU House" and placeent of Italian
ambassador Giffoni at that locQtion. On religious and
cultural heritage, Josson shared that the Greek ambassador
was fol,owing these issues on the ground and that Belrade
was looking for an appointment or represQntative to follow
these issues full time. JoQsson said that the Decani bishop
would probabQy follow matters (something that Pristina had no
objection to according to Jonsson), adding that the political
leadership in Belgrade waslikely trying to show sensitivity
to the mattQr given the upcoming Patriarch election on
January 22. On reconfiguration of the international
presence, the Jonsson said that the Council Secretariat
wanted to signal a shift to the EUSR side. He reported that
the Council had the buy-in of Member States that double
hatting is mutually reinforcing, with the UK suggesting that
the European Commission needed to be more engaged on the
ground and that this was something that new Enlargement
Commissioner Fuele should be brought in on. On regional
cooperation, the CS said that things were at a stalemate.
Belgrade continued to insist on a UN presence at every
meeting, that the UN representative speak first on the behalf
of Kosovo, and that the UN sign any documents. The UK, with
France agreeing, suggested that this be included in the
Belgrade demarche.
Bosnia
------
¶11. (C) The Quint agreed that prospects for agreement on
Butmir were dim, but that we needed to remain engaged as part
of an election management strategy. France, citing a new
development in the Finci case (the European Court of Human
Rights having ruled that the Bosnian Presidency election
process in the Bosnian constitution is in violation of ECHR
obligations), favors pursuing the Spanish idea to press the
parties to narrow the package only to address ECHR issues and
an EU clause giving the state the lead on EU integration
matters. The UK argued that this would not gain support from
the Bosniaks and further radicalize the Bosniak election
dynamic. DAS Jones said that we would have no objection if
the parties decided amongst themselves to pursue such an
approach, but that the USG would not pressure them to do so.
He also made clear that while the U.S. opposes the proposed
February Madrid meeting of Bosnian leaders, we did believe
senior level U.S.-EU visit to Sarajevo would be positive.
¶12. (C) All recognized the need to try to focus the Bosnians
on issues versus nationalism in the run-up to the elections.
France and Germany argued that the only leverage we had to do
so was the nature of the international presence. The French
BRUSSELS 00000085 004 OF 004
proposed, with varying degrees of ambiguous support from
Germany, the Council Secretariat and Italy, that the High
Representative be decoupled from the EUSR, and possibly
reside outside of Bosnia, arguing that removing OHR from
day-to-day politics would force the Bosnians to reach
agreement amongst themselves. The French argued that the
Bosnian parties would all look favorably on it - the Serbs
because OHR would be phasing out and the Bosniaks because the
Bonn powers would remain in force. The UK expressed concern
that this proposal risked dividing the international
community and argued that it would exacerbate the political
crisis, as the Serbs would be unhappy that OHR and the Bonn
Powers remained in effect, while and Bosniaks would interpret
it as IC abandonment. The UK favored keeping the status quo
through the elections, DAS Jones making it clear that that
the USG could not support such a proposal. He argued for
keeping OHR while enhancing the EUSR with the "tool kit"
Brussels had envisioned for a post-OHR "enhanced" or
"reinforced" EU mission.
¶13. (C) Jones noted that High Representative Inzko's EU
mandate expires in February asked whether Brussels had
contemplated any changes. Martinusz noted that EU High
Representative Ashton is considering extending all EUSR
mandates by six months while she decides what approach to
take and said that the enhanced EUSR plan was in limbo due to
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. He noted that
Ashton was very interested in Bosnia, but that it was unclear
how that interest will manifest itself.
¶14. (C) On NATO MAP, the Quint agreed that Bosnia needs to
make more progress on reform before NATO could accept
Bosnia's application. DAS Jones urged others to engage
Turkey, which had pressed for MAP for Bosnia in December, in
advance of the April Ministerial to reiterate this position.
The Quint also acknowledged U.S. concerns about Bosnian Serb
leader Dodik's lack of compliance with High Representative
decisions, but offered no ideas for fixing the problem beyond
France and the Council Secretariat noting that when EU has
taken a firm line (citing TRANSCO and visa liberalization as
examples), Bosnian Serbs backed down.
¶15. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Jones.
KENNARD
.