MEMORANDUM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to
the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), and (j). We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331,
337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). The principal condition that led to the adjudication was
respondent?s failure to protect her children from sexual abuse. Respondent stipulated to the
factual basis for termination of parental rights.
Further, the evidence failed to show that termination of respondent?s parental rights was
clearly not in the children?s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-
357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Testimony at trial demonstrated that the children and an older
sibling had suffered sexual abuse by respondent?s live-in boyfriend and that respondent had been
aware of the abuse of the older sibling and had not prevented further occurrences. The
uncertainty over their own placement was affecting the children?s mental and emotional well-
being. Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating respondent?s parental rights to the children.
Moreover, because the FIA requested termination of respondent?s parental rights at the
initial adjudication, respondent was not entitled to a parent-agency agreement because there was
never a plan to return the children to respondent. Therefore, the FIA did not err in failing to give
respondent an agreement or provide her with services, and respondent?s argument in this regard
is without merit. While respondent alleges the trial court compared Casandra?s foster home to
that of respondent, a review of the record demonstrates that no comparison was made.