Third cycle

Here the researchers read again through
the document extracting and tabulating everything that could be construed
as environmental facts. The definition of an environmental fact used when
this table was constructed was ‘any thing or context that would have
influence on an actor when making their decisions or any thing or context
that would force a decision to be made’. An example of this part of the analysis
is provided in Table 6.2, “Environments (extract)”.

The result of this cycle enabled the
researchers to develop the table of environmental factors that could be
identified. It became abundantly clear that social, political and economic
factors played an enormous part in this project.

Because of the detailed examination of
the document, a number of hitherto seemingly insignificant factors
emerged. For example, because of the hub nature of the old Stapleton
Airport, a local storm could congest all air traffic across the United
States since predictions about increases in travel demand for the local
area appear to have been wrong. Moreover, this was a public works program
and the local laws stated that there must be 30% of minority owned firms
and 6% of firms owned by women participating in the project. And,
curiously, the authors gave a detailed history of BAE, appearing to
emphasise its list of failures (e.g. the San Francisco Airport baggage
handling system) while still describing them as the pre-eminent baggage
handling system developers.

During the creation of this second
derivative text document we found ourselves constantly referring back to
the first document as a reference. A feeling emerged that the environment
in which this project was living was quite delicately balanced with
considerable demands being made on the project by a variety of key
stakeholders. What was becoming evident was that it appeared that each
environmental factor was quite fixed and immovable.

Table 6.2. Environments (extract)

Env35

1992

The
City did not get the airlines together to ask them what they
wanted or what they needed to operate. The approach was more along
the lines of ‘we will build the apartment building, and then you
come in and rent a set of rooms’.

Gene Di Fonso

Env36

1992

The
direct relationship with BAE was delegated to Working Area 4,
which also had responsiblity for building design efforts such as
the people mover, airside concourse, passenger bridge, parking
garage, etc.

Env37

1992

BAE
had to change its working structures to conform to DIA’s project
management structure

Gene Di Fonso

Env38

1992

At
the time of BAE commencing work, substantial construction work had
already been done necessitating in some instances to have the
already completed work demolished.

Env39

1992/05

Head of the DIA project team
resigns.

Walter Slinger

Env40

1992/10

Chief engineer Walter Slinger
dies.

Gail Edmond

Env41

1992/10

Gail Edmond takes over the job of chief
engineer

Env42

1992/10

City Council did not give Gail Edmond the same
autonomy and power as Walter Slinger – they tied her hands and
everybody knew it.

Env43

1992/10

Just after Slinger’s death, BAE
employees’ site-wide access deteriorated as their access was
ignored or restricted.

Env44

1992

City of Denver had denied BAE’s original
contract because it did not comply with minority employment
requirements. BAE engaged outside contractors instead of their own
employees.

Env45

1992

The
City of Denver was unable to supply clean power to the airport
baggage handling system

Env46

1992

The
management team had no prior baggage handling competence or
experience. They treated the baggage handling system as a public
works project – like pouring concrete. Access was difficult with
contractors out on their own – almost anarchy.

Gene Di Fonso

Env47

1992

BAE
simply did not respond to the obvious incredible workload that
they had. Their inexperience and project management vastly
underestimated their task. Their work ethic was
deplorable.

‘Project Manager’ from Stone and Webster,
consultants to PMT.

The local laws about the desired mix of
minority owned and female owned firms involved in public works contracts
was flagged as being very inflexible given that BAE was forced to change
its working structures to conform.

In addition, the researchers noted that
the airport Chief Engineer, Walter Slinger, seemed to be something of a
champion of the project and the one who was convinced by BAE that it was
indeed possible. It seems that Slinger was also instrumental in making the
actual construction work of the project operate – ‘He had a lot of
autonomy and could get things done’. The researchers have interpreted this
statement as meaning that Slinger was able to make substantial decisions
directly related to the project alone and without reference to higher
authorities. This was changed when Slinger died and his job was taken over
by Gail Edmond who was stripped of that autonomy by the Denver City
Council and forced to validate all her decisions with them.

By this stage of the hermeneutic cycle,
the researchers had created two new texts and were evaluating their
contributions to the understanding of this case. It was becoming evident
that the next text, to be developed during the fourth cycle, would reveal
even more, and enable an even deeper understanding, of the whole from its
component parts.

As a reflection it was at this point of
the investigation, during the creation of this second derived text, that
the first researcher suddenly realised how important Walter Slinger was to
the whole project. The fact of his death, previously overlooked, now had a
profound impact from this point onwards on the investigation. What was now
becoming clearer was that Slinger’s autonomy and flexibility died with him
because Edmonds did not inherit these managerial freedoms.