October 2012

This week, Ukrainians began voting for a new parliament at a defining phase when trust in the current government is waning. Analysts have described this as an election highly dependent upon the gains of the opposition, but many Ukrainians are still pessimistic. Preliminary election results have already shown President Yanukovych’s ruling Party of Regions in the lead, with over 30% of the vote.

Eight years ago, on November 22, 2004, Ukrainians took to the streets to protest the rigged elections between then Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and opposition leader, Viktor Yushchenko, which ultimately led to seventeen days of protest in the streets of Kiev. The Orange Revolution – as it became known – led to a re-election on December 27th of that same year, in which Yushchenko became Ukraine’s new President. Yushchenko quickly selected his fellow opposition leader, Yulia Tymoshenko, as Prime Minister. But what was described as a momentous event for Ukraine’s democracy spiraled downwards with the presidential victory of Viktor Yanukovych against Yulia Tymoshenko in February 2010, and her subsequent imprisonment. Despite being regarded as unbiased by international observers, many believe the elections were rigged. The election, however, served as a marked reflection on the terrible economic conditions and internal political quarreling that caused the Orange Revolution’s leadership to falter. Kateryna Gaponova, who participated in the Orange Revolution and is currently a graduate student at the UCLA School of Public Health, expressed her disappointment in Yushchenko’s and Tymoshenko’s leadership and commented that many in Ukraine do not like Yanukovych, but are also “afraid of uncertainty which comes [with] electing a new government.”

Yulia Tymoshenko’s arrest is based on vague accusations alleging she abused her position as Prime Minister to make unfair gas deals with Russia, in addition to accusations regarding personal gains in her business in the 1990’s. European Union officials, as well as Russia, are frowning upon the arrest and political situation in Kiev as they express their disdain for President Yanukovych’s insincere political activities.

One year following Tymoshenko’s defeat, in February 2011, the former Prime Minister wrote an editorial addressed to Egyptians and Tunisians to learn from “Ukraine’s lessons” and pointed to the corruption of the judiciary as well as the loss of democratic freedoms that were acquired following the Orange Revolution. Perhaps the most distinguished point made by Tymoshenko is the need to maintain momentum following a revolution and more so, the fact that elections do not always prove that democracy has “prevailed.”

Tymoshenko’s warnings are particularly relevant for Egypt at this juncture. In a country where optimism was in full force following the January 25th uprising, a different path has “prevailed.” Despite the variation in the transition processes, political power struggles and stalemates are paralyzing change in both Ukraine and Egypt. Like Tymoshenko, several of Egypt’s former ministers and businessmen remain imprisoned under pending charges based on vague or unknown allegations. While some would argue that these figures contributed to the demise of political and economic life in Egypt, the legal process has been chaotic, at best, and more so, influenced by popular pressure and the desire for revenge based on former disputes. Regardless of whether or not the arrests are justified, this is not the right path for a healthy democracy. As Tymoshenko has noted, “democracy must be rooted in the rule of law.”

As Ukrainians are electing their new parliament, in Egypt, a constitutional committee made up of predominantly Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers has drawn heavy criticism. Religious clauses aside, the constitution provides the executive branch with significant powers. Naturally also, the process has been drawn out and strenuous, with actors from opposing sides of the political spectrum contending for influence. The potential disbanding of the committee, backed by liberals, is now in the hands of the Supreme Constitutional Court. Ziad Abdel Tawab, from the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, told The Washington Post that there will be a “‘confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Constitutional Court,’” likely to “‘linger.’”

The constitutional drafting process has further highlighted the desire of the Muslim Brotherhood to take over relevant positions of power – including the presidential victory in June 2012 – which has blurred initial optimism and left many Egyptians, feeling similar to Tymoshenko, “betrayed.” The question now is whether Egypt may be headed down a path similar to that of Ukraine, reverting back to a system resembling the old regime, with the Brotherhood as the new dominant force. Simply walking through the streets of Cairo or talking to Egyptians points to the difficulties they are currently facing. “The cost of food has gone up and the situation is worse now than the beginning,” one taxi driver told me last month as he drove through the crowded streets of Giza, “but you have to stay optimistic.” Likewise, a former UCLA student from Ukraine, who preferred to remain anonymous, informed me that citizens are hopeful for change. However, he added that Yanukovych has brought “Ukraine back to that initial stage of development as it was after the collapse of the Soviet Union.”

Regardless of the upcoming results for Ukraine and Egypt, there are some parallels between both countries that point to obvious morals and shared experiences. Perhaps most crucial is the need for democracy to be built upon fundamental values, including a well-functioning judiciary, and for leaders and revolutionaries alike to pay attention to the importance of social welfare and the well being of citizens during a political transition. In both countries, power hungry leaders have emerged, while the declining political and economic conditions have swayed initial optimism and contributed to a drop in morale among citizens.

At the onset of the Egyptian Revolution, Ukrainians expressed the happiness they felt for Egyptians, but also, the need for them to refer to the experience of the Orange Revolution and its aftermath. In both countries, the coming period will be crucial in determining the success or failure of fundamental elements of the transitions.

Laila Elimam is a first-year MPP student at the UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs. She grew up in the Bay Area and studied and worked in Cairo for eight years before coming to UCLA. She is a co-editor with The Generation.

Fundamentals of Change: Lessons from Ukraine and Egypt was last modified: November 10th, 2012 by thegeneration

Welcome to Spain, home of siestas, fiesta, sangria and paella; please enjoy our nice weather and good food. Why not? Walking throughout the streets of Madrid they appear as lively places full of people and energy. It is awfully surprising how non-obvious the current situation is. Demonstrations, strikes, and riots have been happening every week somewhere within the country, and have been for quite some time. The current state of disbelief, of no hope in our democracy, these are punctual things, a punctual and self-contained discomfort, and one that an outsider may never notice. One could say that it all started with the 2011 Spanish protests of Spain’s economic crisis, also known as the 15M movement.

Throughout 2011, it became obvious that we were living in some sort of police state. If we understand a police state as a place where the law is used to the extent that it becomes repressive – control through fear of the forces of the law – that it limits the freedoms inherited from the transition to the democracy, then that was the state of 2011.

One must come to the understanding that demonstrations in Spain are followed by hundreds of thousands of protesters, by millions in some cities. With only 45 million inhabitants, reaching a million in any city’s demonstration is not a small achievement. The average age in a given demonstration falls around 40 years of age, including families with children or elders. In other words, the demonstrators are not some random punks but are representative of the average population who are simply saying, “We’ve had enough.” Enough.

And by enough, some people refer to the fallacy, the open insult to democracy. The right-wing “People’s Party,” now in the government, is literally doing the opposite of what its agenda campaigned on and promised (protecting or lowering taxes, preserving social aid, etc. during elections – what people voted for. One could take the current state of affairs, fact check each point of what was promised and what has happened, and it literally comes out as the opposite.

By enough, some others refer to the statistics. As Sabino Cuadra, a member of the Congress stated during one of its sessions, between 1994 and 2007, or the “high development” years in Spain, real salaries rose by only 1.9% (without considering inflation), the average pension rose by only 16.3% and unemployment benefits decreased by 16%. Meanwhile, the gross benefit of major companies rose to 50%, shares and other activities rose to 129% and real estate property to 175%. Therefore, the real growth wasn’t applied to the average population. And that money left the country, which takes us to the next point.

By enough, still others may refer to taxes and financial cuts. Spain is the leader in Europe in tax evasion, doubling the average. According to the Association of Technicians of the Spanish Treasury Department, big companies and wealthy families have taken advantage of these loopholes making up 72% of tax evasion, while 80% of tax inspection disproportionately focuses on workers, small companies, and freelancers. The austerity plans affect the general population, elderly, public health, education, VAT, funds for research and small business, all while new laws are being made to protect big wealth.

Enough of it. Enough of the more than 20% unemployment (50% of unemployment for youth), of having a bizarre mockery of what politics and democracy should be, of being ashamed of how it is all being dealt with, of being the average citizen paying for massive bank bankruptcies and massive private investments. The average citizens of Spain have had enough.

Can the big and wealthy continue to wonder why Spain is on the streets? Can the government continue its misrepresentations?

But now, the police state has disappeared. We have reached a point that dates back to September 25th in Madrid, where a subtle change was too obvious to be ignored. Several hundreds of thousands (once again, families and elders joined together) surrounded the Congress with beautiful and neat signs. “No” was the only message, some even with a “Not Like That” as a slogan. Clean and clear.

After 9:30pm, officially 1,800 anti-riots took place (and civilian videos show how hundreds of others were infiltrated between the demonstrators), with their armored vans and rubber bullets, and started shooting—in the streets, inside cafes and bars, in corners. Apart from the exponential increase of police violence, what changed this time was that after everything was “dispersed,” the police kept going for hours. As an example, the images of how they arrived hours after to Atocha (the biggest station in Madrid), which is nearly a mile away, are horrific. The police started randomly shooting rubber bullets and beating pedestrians and passengers as they randomly arrested citizens, all the while breaking journalists’ cameras. Situations like these relate more to a militarized state. The Government does not need to use the law to expand fear – they use force.

A friend of mine told me “I will keep going, it’s my right to demonstrate. Before, I was scared to end up in jail, to wake up in prison for some months… Now sometimes I literally fear for my life.”

But still, welcome to Spain. Enjoy our nice fiestas, sangrias and paellas – because you won’t see the rest; the sweet and sour mixture between desperation and anger is not obvious enough yet, in the day by day, on the streets.

Ferran Masip-Valls is currently living and working in his native Spain. He is a part of the unemployed under 30 crowd, even after having worked on four continents and completed five university degrees. He most recently completed a MA from Teachers College – Columbia University.

Spain’s Invisible State of Social Turmoil was last modified: October 28th, 2012 by thegeneration

Despite the anti-austerity protests from thousands of unemployed Spaniards in recent months, Spain is moving towards cutting social programs in its most severe austerity budget plan in history in order to receive bailouts for its banks and government debt. Spain is considering to apply for the Enhanced Conditions Credit Line (ECCL), a euro-zone bailout fund that would grant money to Spain’s government with the condition that it imposes more fiscal austerity. More than $50 billion worth of budget cuts in education, healthcare, welfare, and pensions are expected and unemployment benefits and civil servant wages have already frozen.

However, as long as the labor market in Spain remains uncompetitive, Spain has little hope in recovering from its economic crisis in the long term. Restoration of the labor market, rather than its banks and bond market, is what will ultimately bring Spain out of its suffering. With nearly a 25% unemployment rate, Spain is making a serious mistake in cutting the social programs that are the lifeline of thousands of unemployed people. Moreover, borrowing money from the rest of the world to grant these bailouts to banks does not consider the future of its youth in the job market. According to the Wall Street Journal, “workers ages 16 to 24 face an astronomical 53.3% unemployment rate and for 25- to 34-year-olds, the rate is 27%.”

UCLA Economics Professor Aaron Tornell explains that high unemployment in Spain’s youth is due to a situation of “insiders” and “outsiders.”

“An insider is someone who is ensured a job for life; many insiders are union members,” said Dr. Tornell. “An outsider, particularly a young person, is someone who will not have a job regardless of whether the person is educated or not. The power of unions is protecting the insiders from getting fired. In order to fix unemployment, you have to weaken the power of the unions to make sure companies can hire younger, more productive people.”

Another problem that the Spanish youth faces stems from the housing bubble that burst in 2008. When Spain joined the euro in 1999, low interest rates brought banks to lend an unprecedented number of property loans and the boom years of this period caused wages to rise quickly within the labor market. As a result, Spain has been exporting less of its own, more expensive goods and importing more of cheaper products from its European counterparts. This trend resulted in Spain’s government overspending, but more importantly, Spain’s labor market became highly uncompetitive.

In the long term, giving salvation only to banks with bailouts all the while punishing the Spanish people through austerity measures serves in no interest of the Spanish people, government, or even banks. Nobel Peace Prize Laureate in Economics, Paul Krugman wrote in a New York Timesop-ed article that fiscal austerity in Spain’s current economic state is simply, “just insane.”

“Europe has had several years of experience with harsh austerity programs, and the results are exactly what students of history told you would happen: such programs push depressed economies even deeper into depression,” said Mr. Krugman. “And because investors look at the state of a nation’s economy when assessing its ability to repay debt, austerity programs haven’t even worked as a way to reduce borrowing costs.”

However, the general trend throughout the world, not just in Spain, has been that bailing out banks has preceded the need to support social programs. The banking system has become monopolized so that banks are too large to fail when they are in trouble. Smaller banks around the world have merged together into larger banks in order to increase their assets to a point where defaults in these banks can risk a financial collapse. In addition, the risk of having these banks default could lead to a greater catastrophe of foreign investors pulling out their money from banks and government bonds. No investments cause reserves of banks to shrink, which would in turn increase interest rates and stiffen lending to consumers. Therefore, the banking system has become so essential to capital of the economy that bailouts have become the insurance banks can rely on when their loans are in trouble.

As a prime example, Spain’s government is applying for an ECCL to bring foreign investors, or at least keep the ones it already has, and maintain its credibility to repay debt. Moreover, if there are no foreign investors, there is a risk that Spain will default on its loans to France and Germany, which can spread Spain’s economic crisis into an epidemic throughout Europe. Consequently, further downgrades of Spain’s bonds—which are currently one notch above junk status according to Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s—will not only drive foreign investors further away from its bond market, but also bring other European Union countries down with it.

For these reasons, although banks are responsible for the housing bubble, they will receive the aid that they need even though austerity measures will make taxpayers’ lives harder. Since big banks are nearly guaranteed bailouts, there are no incentives to prevent banks from issuing out risky loans when the economy recovers and interest rates are low again. But for how long can this vicious cycle last? Already there are violent protests of hundreds of thousands all around the world. If governments wish to ensure the future of its citizens, the cries of the poor, young, and unemployed must be heard.

A strong, competitive labor market is what will bring revenue and ultimately restore the economy. Spain can start with not cutting social programs that are the support systems for the thousands of unemployed and struggling citizens. Secondly, laws must be set in place to prevent unions from not hiring the unemployed youth in Spain. Thirdly, although bailouts must be administered, social programs should take priority before banks are given aid. Finally, there must be laws or a set of incentives that will prevent banks from giving out such toxic loans that start such housing bubbles and financial crises. The people of Spain have been hurting long enough and it is time the government supports and invests in the people who can restore the economy for what it once was.

Tina Kim is a second year Communications major and Public Policy and Urban Planning double minor. She is a co-editor and writer for The Generation.

Spain’s Labor Markets: The Disregarded Solution of Economic Recovery was last modified: October 23rd, 2012 by thegeneration

The New York Times reported on Saturday that the U.S. andIran have agreed to one-on-one negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. According to Obama administration officials, this is “setting the stage for what could be a last-ditch diplomatic effort to avert a military strike on Iran.”

This is encouraging as we are approaching a U.S. Presidential election that pits two candidates against each other who have vastly differing opinions on foreign policy. These negotiations fit in nicely with the policy suggestions put forth below. This article is meant to offer an objective dissection of the issues that face the United States and the world with regards to the issue of a nuclear Iran.

The ideas are based upon a policy memo created in June 2012 by UCLA Master in Public Policy candidates Chloe Cornuejols, Nobuko Goto, Masaaki Kishi, Celeste Miller, Brad Rowe and Isla Yao for their Methods in Policy course. In addition to conducting thorough research that went into the creation of the memo, these students conducted interviews with high-level policy and security experts who elaborated upon some of the concepts and findings.

* * * * *

Iran may be enriching uranium to levels that would be useful for developing a nuclear weapon. If they acquire a weapon of this type, it presents several potential concerns. There are a multitude of possible even probable dangers from this scenario. One is that Iran would use the weapon on the U.S. or elsewhere. Others come simply from their possession of the bomb: it could set off a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, it could provoke a military response from Israel, or an Iranian nuclear WMD could end up in the hands of terrorists.

It would serve the negotiating parties to embrace the fact that, at this point, we cannot prove they are not enriching uranium to weapons grade levels, but we most certainly cannot prove that they are either. Dealing with the argument that ‘you cannot prove the absence’ of something is akin to me saying that you cannot prove that I don’t have a nuclear device somewhere in my house. Indeed you would have to tear apart every square inch of my house to prove this.

The current U.S. course of sanctions, diplomatic negotiation, military threats, and cyber attacks seems like a prudent path for the time being. For now, the IAEA has been accommodated by Iran for unfettered access to existing nuclear power development facilities. If reliable information emerges signaling a shift to weapons enrichment efforts, we should consider alternate options.

In light of the unlikely but hugely consequential possibility that Iran is working toward acquiring ‘doomsday’ technology, it is critical to keep the full menu of strategy options available as actionable scenarios and as tools of negotiation.

Before Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon, the options are: do nothing; diplomatic intervention (which seems currently viable); economic sanctions and incentives; cyber attacks; military threat; and finally land, air, and sea attacks. These are not exclusive options and can be used in combination.

After Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon, the options would be: do nothing; diplomatic intervention; reduce US dependency on oil from the Middle East; regional defense system; secure Iran’s nuclear weapons system; regime destabilization; cyber attacks; military threat; and finally land, air, and sea attacks. Again, these are not exclusive options either and can be used in combination.

Policy Options

Let’s look at the policy options in two ways.

First, BEFORE acquisition: Should the United States dissuade Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons and if so, how? The top options in this scenario would be:

Cyber attacks to slow or prevent any nuclear weapon development

Diplomatic Intervention

Economic intervention: sanctions and incentives

Second, AFTER acquisition: If Iran did acquire nuclear weapons, how could the United States best minimize bad outcomes? The top options in this scenario would be:

Regional Defense System

Reduce US dependency on Middle East oil

Secure Iran’s nuclear weapons system

U.S. Priorities and Concerns

For the UNITED STATES: The major priorities and concerns relating to Iranian nuclear weapons acquiring activity are the international distrust and disbelief that Iran is developing its nuclear capabilities for peaceful uses only. Furthermore there is concern that Israel will act unilaterally against Iran via military efforts if Iran continues to grow its nuclear capacity overall and/or if Iran specifically develops nuclear weapons. This could have dire circumstances if Israeli leadership is less than rational.

We also need to give weight to the potential growth in and power of threats to U.S. interests posed by Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan. As Colin H. Kahl stated in September’s Foreign Affairs article ‘Iran and the Bomb’: “Iran’s government currently sponsors terrorist groups and supports militants throughout the Middle East, in part to demonstrate a capability to retaliate against the United States, Israel, and other states should they attack Iran or undermine its interests.”

This threat is leveraged by Iran’s ability to destabilize world economy and oil markets through controlling their own oil exports and threats to free passage of Middle East oil through the Straits of Hormuz.

What no one wants is further proliferation resulting in a nuclear arms race in the Middle East especially among Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

There are homegrown concerns as well. U.S. leadership, such as House Speaker John Boehner, is very mercurial and has displayed hawkish tendencies recently.

And relating directly to the November elections, there is U.S. executive unpredictability. Presidential candidate Mitt Romney has surrounded himself with several neo-con military advisors from the George W. Bush era. Among them are a group born from the post 9-11 neo-con think tank Project for a New American Century (PNAC), now renamed the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI). One of the most prominent hawkish foreign policy advisors to Romney is John Bolton who has publicly equated diplomacy with weakness and indecisiveness. This could spell for contentious or non-existent future negotiations with Iran.

Iran’s Key Drivers

Key among Iran’s drivers and positions concerning its potential status as a nuclear power with weapons capability are the current regime survival and increased nationalism/support of the population for the government. They are looking out for their national security and protection, including from external threats, such as the U.S. and other members of the international community. They are also not without ambition and are looking at expansion of Iranian regional influence as well as of the country’s global stature – overall and as a trading partner.

The current status of Iran’s nuclear efforts and situation includes sustained vows by Iran that their nuclear activities remain for peaceful civilian purposes only. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s (and other clerics’) repeated condemnation of nuclear weapons as being contrary to Islamic Law (he has expressed support for the development and use of nuclear resources for peaceful use but issued a fatwa in 2010 – and later reaffirmed it – on banning production and use of weapons of mass destruction).

As an international cooperator, Iran continues as a signatory to The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It should be noted that Iran is currently in compliance. Most importantly: there is no evidence – either from the limited International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) observations, under General Director Yukiya Amano, or other monitoring or intelligence sources – that Iran has diverted any nuclear resources from civilian to military uses. To bolster Iran’s case here, there was an announcement on May 22, 2012 by the director general of IAEA, that he has reached an agreement with Iran granting nuclear inspectors wider access to Iranian atomic facilities.

To be noted however: Iran’s current ability to produce low enrichment uranium means that 90% of the necessary resources and effort to generate highly enriched uranium already have been brought together by Iran. This means simple nuclear weapons could at that time be delivered to a target in a small vehicle or boat; however it would still take several years of work and testing, for any weapon to be delivered by missile. Such undertakings – especially testing – would be hard to keep under wraps.

To understand the progress they have made, consider that having enriched to 20% means they are 90% they way to enriching to 90% weapons grade Uranium. This is on account of front loaded program building and the similarly front loaded Separative Work Units, or SWUs, needed to separate the Uranium isotope 235 from zero to 5% energy-producing levels.

A few points to highlight for further research are:

Recently uranium enriched above the 20% used for power was found, though the 27% enrichment number could have been attributed to equipment error.

In a 2005 speech, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad commented that he wished the State of Israel would collapse. (The translation of his “Wiped off the Map” comment has been widely disputed) Whether or not his statement was a declaration of military intent or simply a lament, it has resulted in an agitated condition for nuclear-armed Israel.

Based on review of existing research, analysis, and information on this situation as well as our own expert interviews[1],we also acknowledge that the highest objective of the Iranian government is to remain in power. Within the Iranian national dynamic, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei wants power over Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and vises versus.

Let us not underestimate the power of the masses however. Iran could become a fully representative democratic republic. Per our U.S. security and international diplomacy source, people of Iran currently appear favor or to have neutral feelings about America now, but would likely be swayed the other way by overly aggressive U.S. intervention. Extreme external pressure or military aggression will only increase Iranian nationalism and support of its citizens for the existing government there.

Regionally? Iran has scarce close regional allies on account that it feels ethnically and religiously isolated and has a sense of cultural and historical “exceptionalism.” While U.S. and international economic sanctions may have no direct effect on the progress of Iran’s nuclear efforts, they are causing enough pain to the government and country overall to potentially allow for more openness in discussions on the part of Iran as an example, both sides (Iran and US/P5+1) have dropped some prior intractable conditions for negotiation and Iran has agreed to grant wider access to IAEA inspectors.

Any military intervention would raise Iranian incentive for expansion of nuclear capabilities into weapons of mass destruction, while at the same time ensuring Iran’s expulsion of any IAEA observers and possible Iranian withdrawal from the NPT. Along these lines, we feel the Iranian government will act rationally. Iran is aware of and we all should be as well that U.S. future standing with the Middle East, Russia and Iran itself are critical considerations when weighing these policy options.

There is an important note regarding horizon type strategy relevance here. This long-term strategy is a valid exercise as Iran acquiring a nuclear device is still possible, even though they would have to violate the non-proliferation treaty and jump through several logistical and technical hurdles to get there. We also want to consider the possibility that Iran getting the bomb could potentially be a stable scenario *(i.e. Pakistan).

Finally, there is a special worst-case situation that needs sober consideration. While military intervention was not one of the more robust strategies when all criteria were considered, there is one situation in which experts believe it should be fully considered as a top option. That is when it is absolutely obvious that a missile attack by Israel on Iran is imminent and the U.S. and/or UN are unable to dissuade them. Under such circumstances, according to some security experts, the U.S. should then undertake any bombing attacks.

The reason for this is two-fold. First, Israel does not have the military capability and weaponry to launch an effective attack, which would ensure the elimination of the nuclear targets. The U.S. has the needed firepower and expertise to do so. Second, even if Israel acted unilaterally, both Iran and most of the international community would assume the U.S. was complicit. Therefore, if the U.S. will be facing the ramifications of such global opinion post-Israeli strike, then it would be prudent for the U.S. to ensure a surgical and fully efficient missile strike.

This is, of course very tricky as Israel cannot know that US will intervene on their behalf. This could cause them to act recklessly. Israel would be burning the ally bridge with US in either case. This is a difficult hand to play for sure.

It will be of great importance and interesting to see how the Iran negotiations play out. Hopefully cooler minds will prevail and the safety of the next generations will be more secure than they were before hand.

Brad Rowe is a second year Masters In Public Policy candidate at UCLA focusing in Education, Crime and International Affairs. Rowe is also a Rosenfield Fellow working on Educational Policy and Programs for the United Way of Greater Los Angeles.

On Thursday, October 11th, the Burkle Center for International Relations invited prominent figures of academia to the UCLA School of Law, to discuss the current Crisis in Syria. Asli Bâli of UCLA Law, Dalia Dassa Kaye of the RAND Corporation, and Daniel Treisman of the UCLA Political Science Department gave us their perspectives on the likelihood of a halt to violence, while the somber tones of pessimism and urgency filled the room. This increasingly turbulent region of the Middle East has attracted much attention from the international sphere since the breakout of civil war in March of 2011, which pitted rebel forces against the Bashar al-Assad regime. Unfortunately, it seems that not much has been effectively carried out since then, in the direction of peace.

Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan named the crisis a “humanitarian tragedy” in his critique of the U.N.’s failure to act. But the dichotomy inherent within any sort of solution is quite complex, and it is not as black and white as “status quo vs. intervention.” Our panelists analyzed the roles that the U.S., Turkey, Russia, Iran and other stakeholders would have in reaching a coherent diplomatic solution, and whether this option is still on the table. They weighed the pros and cons of multilateral intervention, as moderator Kal Raustiala of the Burkle Center posed some very critical questions. Raustiala asked the panelists to analyze the various reasons why a tenable diplomatic solution has not yet been achieved, and whether democracy awaits in the aftermath of bloodshed. In the end, our panelists agreed that any real solution must begin with an end to the flow of arms to the opposing sides. But while this critical international discourse took place, the death toll of innocent, civilian lives continued to rise and to remind us of the urgency of now.

The fastest way to peace now is containment, and our panelists were in agreement. Kaye expanded on the infeasibility of intervention by underscoring the very real possibility that the conflict may escalate into regional war. “The key is to figure out how to address the humanitarian problem, while keeping radicalization of separatist groups from occurring,” she said. But did this imply that we had ruled out any chance of a diplomatic solution?

From the offset, Treisman claimed, Russia has viewed the option of conflict resolution by diplomacy as being naive in the case of Syria. Perhaps to maintain its own interests, by refusing to sign on to any western remedy such as the Security Council resolutions, Russia has bold-facedly sabotaged any forced change-in-regime that may have ensued. With arms contracts of a $700 million per year to defend, as well as commercial interests, a military base and social ties that link the two regions historically, the supplier of weapons and long-time ally to Syria is unlikely to bend with any international pressures to enforce economic sanctions for Assad to step down. Moreover, there is no guarantee, from Russia’s perspective, that the region will be more stable if Assad is forced out without a credible plan.

And yet, Bâli argued, sustaining the status quo for much longer is equally unlikely. It might not be too late to bring Russia, Iran and the U.S. to the table once more. The outcome of such a meeting, however, will not necessarily be an ideal one for the U.S.. “Russia has interests, as does Iran, to maintain allies in this region,” Bâli said. “If the goal is to prevent escalation or civilian death,” she added, “[the people of Syria] might want a pro-Russian, pro-Iranian entity to remain in power.” In pushing for a western solution, we must be aware of what we are committing ourselves to in the long run. “The future that we would prefer is going to come at a large cost,” Bâli cautioned.

While some rebel forces, including the Free Syrian Army and other unarmed opposition groups, are able to operate their headquarters from Turkish soil, Turkey’s support is limited to financial and non-lethal assistance. Bâli frowned upon the Turkish government’s recent act of forcing down civilian planes and limiting its airspace. With these “foolish” acts that put pressure on Syria and Russia, she added, Turkey is risking escalation and the possibility of bringing in Russia or the NATO powers, in unfavorable ways. Turkey has most recently invoked Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, which calls for a consultation among NATO members. In the meeting this month, Turkey presented plans for a no-fly zone. The government of Turkey has also set up a de-facto buffer zone by making it clear to Syria that if it operates near the border with any artillery shells from either side, it will face Turkish fire.

As for the position of the Syrian population, this is divided as well. There remain factions of Islamic extremists, and there is no telling whether there will be any democratic union even if Assad leaves. “Russia maintains that there may be further anarchy and war on the basis of religion,” Treisman said. The biological and chemical weapons of the Assad regime are at least being protected; if the regime falls, this may no longer hold true. “The Alawites will still be there,” he added, referring to the historically oppressed Syrian minority religious group. Russia sees no good choices here, and she is reluctant to sign on as cheerleader to the U.S. pattern of repeated intervention to change regimes and overthrow leaders using military force, under the veil of multilateral humanitarian intervention, as she feels was the case with Libya, Treisman said. He concluded, however, that Iran, as a supplier of arms to Syria, and Saudi Arabia, as a supplier to extremist fighters, hold more significant roles in this crisis than does Russia.

Through the panelists’ well-informed and logical analysis, it became clear that a diplomatic solution is not promising, insofar as regional sponsors on both sides do not feel tremendous pressure for a negotiated solution. Moreover, opposition groups have inflated expectations. According to Bâli, “Syrian parties are their first source of frustration, and second comes the international community’s inability to come together.” Does International Law even provide justification for a potential intervention in this region? Bâli concluded that “where the scale of humanitarian crisis on the ground is large, this is sufficient grounds for intervention.”

Kaye’s prescribed plan of containment seems most feasible after all. We must indeed first stop the flow of arms on both sides, regain focus on the many thousands of lives lost, increase funding for refugees, find more sustainable ways of humanitarian support, try to change sectarianism, provide an off-ramp for the Alawite, the Christians and other minorities, and offer some hope that the people’s welfare will be protected. To the extent that we can create a solution that underscores these points, we will have somewhat succeeded.

When asked by an audience member about the likelihood that Syria will end up democratic, Treisman listed such determining factors as the country’s level of modernization, sophistication and higher media; he said the extreme sectarian divides would be the largest obstacle to overcome. If that is the Syrians’ intended outcome, then perhaps the only way the Syrian civil war will produce an orderly democratic outcome is by burning out. Raustiala closed the panel with this uncomfortable quasi-truth. Our panelists likened the crisis in Syria to the civil war of Lebanon, it being perhaps the closest regional model; but my colleague Rujuta Gandhi suggests this dire situation actually resembles the Rwandan genocide from a distance.

Will Syria Become the Next Rwandan Genocide?

by Rujuta Gandhi

Crisis in Syria Panel hosted by the Burkle Center for International Relations. Photo by Emily Moon

There lies an irony in the effect of media – it creates a small world, yet non-physical distances remain a discomforting reality. While Syrian diasporic societies and the global community alike receive news of the perpetuating fatalities in Syria, a row of digits is not prompting an adequate response – marking the beginning of a timeline that could foreseeably mirror the Rwandan genocide. However, the panelists compared the crisis in Syria to the Lebanese civil war. Both conflicts are abundant in political and sectarian conflict, which affects neighboring countries. In Lebanon, the Christian Maronite government fought against Muslim organizations. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, one of the Muslim organizations, was charged with attacking Israel and prompting their intervention. Similarly in Syria, President Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite government fights against the Sunni Muslim majority. Recently, Syria shelled Turkish border towns, inviting a warranted response.

Current events parallel the length and chronology of the Syrian conflict to the roughly sixteen year Lebanese civil war, but future occurrences may set the crisis in par with the Rwandan genocide. Syria’s death toll has surpassed 33,000 since fighting began last year. Although starkly different from the 800,000 killed in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the future may hold the same fate for Syria. Recent reports expose Syria’s use of cluster bombs, indiscriminately maiming the population. The coming winter and ongoing food shortage will also quickly inflate the figure. Furthermore, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon announced that 2.5 million Syrians require assistance. Without intervention, violence in Syria will ensue until the factions tire of a net stalemate, causing thousands more in fatalities, or worse, a genocide may occur, resulting in hundreds of thousands of lives lost.

Syria and Rwanda have comparable sociopolitical tensions. Hutu-Tutsi discrimination existed since Belgium’s colonial rule and detonated with assassination of Hutu President Juvénal Habayarimana. The Tutsi minority served as a scapegoat until investigation revealed that Hutu extremists shot down the plane as a pretext for genocide. As a former French colony, Syria is equally affected. France bestowed subsidies, legal rights, and lower taxes for Alawites while permitting subjugation of Sunni Muslims. A potential assassination of President Assad or another leader may trigger a response proportional to that in Rwanda. If such a response occurs, Bâli agrees that the Alawite population will be in danger.

Furthermore, according to Genocide Watch, Rwanda met the eight stages of genocide: classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, extermination, denial. The organization has already declared a genocide emergency, and Syria is arguably at the seventh stage: extermination. President Assad also denies mass killings.

The international community is wholly aware of the daily atrocities in Syria but hasn’t addressed the humanitarian situation within the nation. Instead, the diplomatic and political aspects are seemingly more important both globally and locally.

While Kaye acknowledged both humanitarian and geopolitical interests in the Syrian crisis, the former was denied attention for the bulk of the conversation. Kaye, Bâli, and Treisman geared the conversation toward future and potential Turkish, Russian, U.S., and Iranian diplomatic and military involvement.

Reactions to murders in Rwanda were knowingly set aside, while nations and institutions negotiated solutions. Today, there is an atmosphere of regret for their lack of humanitarian intervention. Remorse will emerge again if leaders do not provide medical and dietary support to victims of the Syrian crisis. Although a diplomatic solution may be safe, it does not mean that leaders will not be sorry.

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Do you think the international community is doing enough?

More on intervention:

The Brookings Institution’s Michael Doran and The Council on Foreign Relations’ Max Boot list five reasons to intervene now; The Stimson Center’s Mona Yacoubian suggests a different kind of shift in paradigm in this Foreign Policy piece.

January 3, 2009: “I had a terrible dream yesterday with military helicopters and the Taleban […]I went off to school. I was afraid going to school because the Taleban had issued an edict banning all girls from attending schools […] Before the launch of the military operation we all used to go to Marghazar […] for picnics on Sundays. But now the situation is such that we have not been out on picnic for over a year and a half.” –Malala Yousafzai in her “Diary of a Pakistani schoolgirl” for BBC.

Two days ago, a fourteen year old girl by the name of Malala Yousafzai was on her way home from school when a man with a gun approached a young girl waiting to leave school and asked her which one of them was Malala. One of the girls pointed to Malala, but when Malala denied it, the man shot both of the girls. This is not some random psychotic-snap shooting—the man is a member of the Taliban occupying the Swat Valley region of Pakistan and the girl is an activist for girls’ education and recipient of the National Peace Award. The young girl is a symbol of equality and courage and the Taliban’s gunman is a symbol of cowardice and humanity’s darkest hole of unenlightenment, insecurity and violence.

Although both girls survived, Malala remains in critical condition in a hospital in Peshawar after being shot in the head and neck. Malala Yousafzai garnered public attention in 2009, at the age of 11, when she began blogging for BBC (under the pseudonym Gul Makai) about living under the occupation of the Taliban. When the Taliban arrived in Swat Valley, so did a harsher set of rules for its people: men forced to grow beards; women restricted from attending the bazaar; the whipping of women deemed immoral; the beheading of opponents; and most crucial for Malala, an edict banning girls from attending school.

Hence, the Taliban’s staunch opposition to Malala’s public advocacy for girls’ education materializes into a repulsive assassination attempt and a shamefully boastful announcement of responsibility for shooting her:

Taliban spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan commented on her shooting via telephone, “She has become a symbol of Western culture in the area; she was openly propagating it. This was a new chapter of obscenity, and we have to finish this chapter. Let this be a lesson.”

Public outrage now amplifies at the shameless proposal by the Taliban to attack the young girl again.

Malala attended school despite the edict, wore her favorite pink dress in place of the uniform, and voiced a message of liberation through education in the face of death threats. Clearly, her message was so strong and so threatening that the fundamentalist Muslim militia felt the need to silence her. In attacking this young girl, the Taliban has done nothing but legitimize her claims for girls’ education. Clearly, the future of an educated female population is so threatening to the fundamental control-tactics of the Taliban’s occupation that they feel the need to assassinate a child.

Words that come to mind include pathetic and disturbing but more significantly, symbolic—symbolic of a powerful oppressed population of citizens that are becoming so threatening for the Middle East that not only have Pakistan and Afghanistan issued edicts banning girls’ education, but even Iran has now banned women from 77 majors at 36 universities. The forbidden majors are of course heavily mathematics and science oriented, aimed at preemptively limiting the amount of independence women in the Middle East can acquire through higher paying jobs. Just as the extremist Iranian government is back-lashing against the 2009 Green Revolution with banning women from universities, the Taliban is fighting off the threat of Malala’s plea for a fundamental basis of empowerment though education by attempting to stifle her and incite fear in other advocates.

Let the rage of Pakistan be a “lesson” to Swat Valley’s occupiers: attacking a 14 year-old school girl solidifies the powerful threat she and her message represent for unbinding a bound population of young girls. The attempt to stifle her amplifies her voice, emboldens the Taliban’s opposition to rebel, and solidifies her message.

Although many may think twice now before allowing their children to advocate for their rights, Malala’s own father, a teacher and girls’ education advocate, told BBC, “Of course, it was a risk [to let her write the blog], but I think that not talking was a greater risk than that because then ultimately we would have given in to the slavery and the subjugation of ruthless terrorism and extremism.”

Facts and figures from Aljazeera and BBC.

Shadee Ashtari is a senior at UCLA majoring in Communications with a minor in Political Science. She is a co-editor with The Generation.

The Shooting of a 14-Year-Old Pakistani School Girl: A Solidification of the Female Threat to the Middle East was last modified: August 26th, 2017 by thegeneration