Sunday, January 24, 2016

Could the Islamic State threat facilitate an India-Pakistan rapprochement?

PMs Sharif and Modi meet in Ufa Russia

Farah Jan, guest contributor, and Ph.D. candidate in the Department of PoliticalScience, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ,contributed this post on the possibility of a warming of relations between India and Pakistan

The rising influence of Islamic
State (Da’ish) in Afghanistan and Bangladesh is threatening India and Pakistan.Could the threat of Islamic State (IS) unite the traditional rivals? Recent
developments and statements from both India and Pakistan appear to be demonstrate serious
concern about the threat posed by the IS and the need to fight the same enemy.

Indian
Prime Minister Nadrindra Modi’s surprise stopover
in Lahore (to wish his counterpart well on his birthday) came at the tail end of his trip
to Russia and Afghanistan. The key points of discussion were cooperation on both economic and security
fronts and serious concerns about the spread of the IS. India had not publicly backed
Vladimir Putin’s militantly intervention in Syria until the recent statements
issued by Indian Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.

These
statements marked Indian support for Russian intervention in Syria. In
Afghanistan, Prime Minister Modi focused on cooperation not just with Kabul,
but also Pakistan, and emphasized on the importance of Pakistan’s cooperation
as a must for Afghanistan’s success. He hoped, Pakistan would become a bridge between South Asia and
Afghanistan.

Birthday Diplomacy:

PMs Modi and Sharif embrace during Modi's visit to Lahore

Prime
Minister Modi’s twitter announcement to meet Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in
Lahore on his way back to Delhi was an unprecedented step. In the history of
the two states, neither an Indian nor a Pakistani head of state has ever
stopped by to wish the other a happy birthday.

Not
to sound pessimistic, these two states are nuclear rivals and any movement on
either side makes the entire international community uncomfortable. Modi’s
visit to Lahore is a 360-degree departure from his hardline position on dealing
with Pakistan. Prime Minister Modi’s visit reminds one of the last time an
Indian prime minister visited Lahore and the events that ensued.

That
visit occurred in 1999 when Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited
Pakistan, and it was followed by the Kargil War between the two nuclear armed
states. It was the only time in history,
after the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the world came to the brink of a nuclear
war. Modi’s Lahore visit was followed by the Pathankot attacks on the Indian military
base.If it turns out that it was
planned in Pakistan that would illustrate once again that the Pakistan army had
not given its blessings to improving relations with India – and most South
Asian analysts know which Sharif (Prime Minister or General) is in the driver seat.

Pakistan Chief-of-Staff, Gen. Raheel Sharif

The
question is, what brought the shift in Indian diplomacy towards Pakistan, for
Modi to visit Pakistan? The BJP government obviously could not have changed its
minds about Pakistan over night! More importantly what has allowed this
re-engagement of dialogue between the two nuclear rivals?

The
primary factor responsible for India’s new Pakistan policy is that the
interests of both states on terrorism have (to some degree) merged. It is too
early to compare Modi’s visit to the historic opening to China and Kissinger-Zhou’s
secret meeting followed by Nixon’s visit in 1972, but it certainly has the
telltale signs of it.During the 1970s,
U.S. and Chinese interests (to some degree) had come into alignment regarding
their mutual adversary – USSR.

Nixon
and Kissinger were interested in taking advantage of the changing relations
between China and the Soviet Union. Similarly, today India and Pakistan are
facing a mutual enemy in the face of ISIS. That said, Pakistan has supported
militant groups in the past which has threatened both India and the Indian
interests in Afghanistan.However, the
current menace of the IS is beyond the reach and control of the Pakistani
government or its intelligence agency, the ISI.The recent support which the IS has garnered in Bangladesh, and the attacks that followed, further confirm
the spread of the influence of extremist groups to South Asia.

Common Interest, Changed
Horizons:

The
opening line of the joint statement issued by the Russian Federation and the
Republic of India was, “Shared Interests, New Horizons.” Indian-Russian relations are
based on mutual trust and a time-tested friendship.Both states have emphasized the convergence of
their foreign policy priorities and
their strategic partnership. In the case of India-Pakistan, however, the
relationship is built on mutual distrust and conflict of interest.

While
Prime Minister Modi’s rendezvous represents a return to the peacemaking initiative,
the road to Lahore was paved in the Russian city of Ufa. Last July, the two leaders met on the sidelines of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization summit in the Russian city of Ufa. The official
statement following the meeting called it “a positive development,” which had a
“positive impact on bilateral relations at regional and international levels.”

The
following day the Indian Foreign Secretary, S. Jaishankar, and his Pakistani
counterpart, issued a joint statement in Ufa elaborating on the meeting. The
key points issued in the official statement emphasized the need for India and Pakistan to take
collective
responsibility for ensuring peace and promoting development. They agreed that
to do achieve these ends, both states were prepared to discuss all outstanding
issues.

The
most important feature of the Ufa communiqué was that both leaders condemned
terrorism in all its forms, and agreed to cooperate with each other to
eliminate it from South Asia. Prime ministers Modi and Sharif both agreed on steps
for the two national security advisors to meet and discuss the issue of
terrorism. Furthermore, both sides agreed to address ways and means to expedite
the Mumbai terror attack trial, including additional information, such as
providing voice samples.

It
is worth noting that Kashmir was not mentioned in this joint statement and that
the emphasis was rather on fighting terrorism. This meeting also created room
for a discussion on dealing with the Mumbai trial. Prior to Ufa, Pakistan was
not ready to acknowledge the problem of terrorism with India and neither was it
willing to discuss ways of facilitating the Mumbai trial.

This
minor shift in the official statements issued in Ufa was the result of the two
states’ interests merging with regards to terrorism. In international relations,
states have both general interests and particular interests. General interests,
as defined by Glenn Snyder, concern the general configuration of power in the
system, while particular interests represent a state’s interests in a
particular conflict.

Fighting
terrorism is of particular interest to both Pakistan and India. Pakistan has
suffered 60,000 civilian casualties and an estimated $100 billion in
economic losses in its fight against terrorism. The casualty figures in India
are not the same as Pakistan, but the 2001-02 Twin Peaks crises and the Mumbai
terrorist attacks are tragic, and they point to the threat of terrorism which emanates
from Pakistani soil.

What
is different at this point in time is the global spread of terrorism in the
shape of the IS. Prior to the spread of the IS in Afghanistan and South Asia, Pakistan had to cope with non-state proxies
such as Lashkar-e-Taib, which was responsible for the Mumbai bombing, Jaish-e-Mohammed
which attacked the Indian parliament in 2001, and of course the good and the
bad Talibans.

With
the IS pushing for greater influence
in Afghanistan
and Bangladesh, it further threatens both Pakistan and India. Although the IS
is yet to become a serious rival to the Taliban in Afghanistan, the threat still
looms large.With Taliban fighters
switching sides, it certainly suggests that the threat may materialize further.
The rise of the Islamic State in Afghanistan constitutes a critical juncture
which has produced a convergence of interests of the two long-time rivals. Fighting
the menace of terrorism has mostly plagued Pakistan, but now threatens India as
well.

Moving
forward, Ufa was followed by a meeting of the India and Pakistan National
Security Advisors in Bangkok this past December 6. Once again the location and
the language of the joint statement are key indicators of the direction in which
India-Pakistani relations are heading. It
signaled a step forward towards bilateral cooperation on the issue of terrorism,
(this time Kashmir was mentioned) and insuring stability along the traditional Line
of Conflict between the two states.

Pakistani
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was criticized by the local media, as well as
the opposition parties, over the absence of a more comprehensive statement on
Kashmir in the joint communique. In this
regard, two considerations should be taken
into account about the Bangkok NSA
meeting. First, because it was held on the soil of a third party, the question
of bringing the Kashmiri groups to the table was not on the agenda.Second, the Pakistani national security
advisor was retired Lt. Gen Naseer Khan Janjua, thus keeping the military
leadership involved and engaged in the process.

The
NSA meeting was followed by the Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj’s visit
to Pakistan, where once again the emphasis was on terrorism. After her meeting
with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, she issued the following statement, “We said
we can talk so that terrorism comes to an end. So talks [between the two NSAs]
took place in Bangkok where we discussed terrorism. But one meeting will not
bring a solution to all the problems. So
we will continue the dialogue.”

On
her return to India, Ms. Swaraj was asked about India’s unilateral option
against Pakistani based terror groups – similar to the one carried out by the United
States to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden. Her response was a shift from the saber-rattling
BJP Party stance and instead indicating that, “her
government was talking to Pakistan
on the terror camps and war is not an option with Pakistan… we have decided
that through talks we will resolve the issue of terrorism as talks is the way
forward so that the shadow of terror is removed.”

Looking Ahead Under The Shadow of
Terror:

Could
Pakistan and India really be moving towards improved relations? The Stimson Center’s Sameer Lalwani has analyzed the strategic
shift in Pakistan’s national security policies based on the following
assessment: a reduction in Pakistan’s belligerent behavior towards India; a
strategic reorientation which involves a focus on domestic threats rather than its
competition with India; and an evolution in Pakistani strategic culture – a
significant self-examination. I would
argue that time would be the best judge of the last characterization of this
change. However, I do agree with Lalwani that Pakistan’s behavior is changing
but I still feel it is too early to be assured that it a significant shift.

In
conclusion, we should not expect a breakthrough in India-Pakistani relations following
Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Pakistan.However, the visit did chip away the ice that has frozen the relations
between the two states for the last decade. The Modi-Sharif Lahore meeting is
mere symbolism, but symbolism which is essential for concrete steps towards change
in the two states’ relations in the future.

The
shift in India-Pakistani relations is taking place under the shadow of terror,
not the terror of nuclear war, but the terror of radical extremism. A shadowy enemy that is difficult to contain
is thus bringing two traditional foes to increase cooperative policies based on
enhancing their respective national security. One of the most remarkable and
least expected outcomes of the spread of terrorism has been the ability of
former rivals – India and Pakistan - to put aside their differences and cooperate
on a serious threat to their economies, cultures and, most importantly, stability.

About Me

Eric Davis is Executive Director, MA Program in Political Science - Concentration in United Nations and Global Policy Studies, Professor of Political Science and the former director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA. He is author of CHALLENGING COLONIALISM: BANK MISR AND EGYPTIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1920-1941 (Princeton University Press, 1983; Institute for Arab Development, Beirut, 1986, and Dar al-Sharook, Cairo, 2009); STATECRAFT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: OIL, HISTORICAL MEMORY AND POPULAR CULTURE (University Presses of Florida, 1993); MEMORIES OF STATE: POLITICS, HISTORY AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN MODERN IRAQ (University of California Press, 2005; Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 2008; and the forthcoming, TAKING DEMOCRACY SERIOUSLY IN IRAQ (Cambridge University Press). Currently, he is writing a book on the Islamic State and the changing modalities of terrorism in the Middle East. He can be contacted at davis@polisci.rutgers.edu and @NewMidEast