RawFeed: WikiLeaks Casts Old Light on New Problem

WikiLeaks is a curious, multilayered beast. On the surface, the diplomatic cables reveal “secrets.” But perhaps more importantly, they give us context and meaning to government policy and, sometimes, folly.

Such is the case with a recent set of United States diplomatic cables concerning the Colombian government’s attempts to talk peace with right-wing paramilitary groups in early part of the 2000s. These cables demonstrate that the Colombian government’s denial that the new criminal groups (or ‘bandas criminales’ – BACRIMs), who emerged following the talks, were direct descendants of the paramilitaries was simply a means of avoiding an increasingly stark reality: that the peace talks had largely failed.

One cable (reproduced below), sent to Washington from the U.S. Embassy in Bogota in November 2006, discusses a meeting between high-level Colombian government and military officials and the Organization of American States’ Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP). The body presented a report on some 22 “criminal structures associated with former demobilized paramilitaries,” which “have survived military and police operations to dismantle them.” According to the cable the report paid particular attention to gangs formed by former mid-level paramilitaries from the AUC’s so-called Northern Bloc, whose organizations, it says, “remain largely intact.”

The report warns of the rise of groups such as the Aguilas Negras and the Rastrojos, which it describes as “cases of rearmament” involving ex-paramilitaries, and says that many of these emerging groups are led by former mid-level paramilitary commanders.

Even as the cable details government measures to combat these gangs, stationing police officers in “demobilized areas” and carrying out operations against the emerging groups, it demonstrates how the authorities’ refusal to acknowledge the links of heredity between the BACRIM and the paramilitaries goes back to the groups’ founding. According to the cable, Colombian General Mario Montoya “stressed that the last paramilitary group demobilized in August [2006], which means [the paramilitary umbrella group known as the] AUC no longer exists. He characterized the task facing security forces as combating ‘criminal gangs or delinquents at the service of narco-traffickers.’”

In this respect, little has changed. The term ‘BACRIM’ itself was coined by the authorities in 2006 in order to discuss the groups without referring to their paramilitary origins. Following the publication of a Human Rights Watch report in Feb 2010, titled “Paramilitaries’ Heirs: The new face of violence in Colombia,” the Uribe administration responded, “The government has acknowledged that there is a problem with emerging criminal gangs,” before adding, “We do not believe that this is an extension of paramilitarism […] Paramilitarism in Colombia is extinguished and its leaders are in jail.”

More recently, in February 2011, President Santos restated the line that the BACRIM are no more than drug trafficking gangs, who do not have ties to the paramilitaries.

“Criminal gangs are just that: criminal gangs. They are not illegal armed groups,” the president said.

Under Santos the government has heightened its rhetoric, calling the groups Colombia’s number one enemy, and announcing a new strategy known as D6 to combat them. The U.S. has also stepped into the fray, setting up a unit to prosecute the gangs and indicting leaders such as the Rastrojos’ Diego Perez Henao, alias ‘Diego Rastrojo.’

But despite being a fresh president, only six months into his first term, Santos is in no position to challenge the previous government’s position that the BACRIM are an entirely new phenomenon, without links to the paramilitaries. He was a close ally of former President Alvaro Uribe, serving as his defense minister, and so is closely implicated in the failures of the Uribe-managed demobilization project. The former president staked his reputation on the peace deal that he brokered with the paramilitary gangs, which resulted in 31,000 paramilitary fighters disarming and entering into the government’s peace program in exchange for limited prison sentences.

Violence attributed to paramilitary groups dropped following the peace deal, and many of the high-level leaders were jailed. But, as the cable details, as soon as the demobilization had taken place it was clear that the program had failed to fully dismantle the paramilitaries’ organizational, financial and political networks. The cable quotes a Colombian official as noting that it was difficult to eliminate the militias’ power structures because “they are anchored to the region’s illicit economy and their social control over the population persists.”

Human Rights Watch blames this incomplete disarmament process on the government’s failure to attack the AUC’s criminal networks and finances, allowing the groups to “hide assets, recruit new members and continue operating under new guises.”

The program also failed to demobilize many mid-level commanders, who went on to run the BACRIMs. In the power void that followed the peace negotiations with the government, these lower-level leaders stepped forward to take over. Examples include the Paisas‘ Cesar Augusto Torres Lujan, alias ‘Mono Vides,’ and the Aguilas Negras’ Ospina Villarraga Oscar Mauricio, alias ‘Camilo.’

The cable shows that this issue was already evident in 2006. It quotes the MAPP head as saying that jailed paramilitary leaders told him, “They had not been able to control their former mid-level commanders for some time.”

This fracturing of command, which had begun even before demobilization, contributed to the failure of the process, as the AUC leaders were unable to ensure that their entire organization would surrender and disarm.

To admit that the BACRIMs are direct descendants of the paramilitaries would be to admit these failings in the demobilization program, and call into question the success of the entire Uribe project, which Colombia’s current leaders are still closely linked to.

1. (C) Sergio Caramagna, Director of the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), told us on November 20 that the peace process with the paramilitaries has helped expose the ties between the paramilitaries and politicians. Caramagna was pleased by a recent meeting held with top GOC civilian and military officials on the need to combat new, emerging criminal groups. Defense Minister Santos suggested a monthly meeting to exchange information. Caramagna also said the MAPP/OAS has unofficial GOC approval to extend its mandate for three years. End summary.

2. (C) MAPP/OAS Director Sergio Caramagna told us on November 20 that politician-paramilitary ties would not have become a public issue if not for the peace process with the paramilitaries. He was encouraged by the public exposure of such links and hoped the truth would continue to emerge. He said Colombia's judicial system needed more resources to implement the Justice and Peace law, but stressed that Colombia was the only country in the world with a plan to compensate victims and to punish the main perpetrators of crimes against humanity.

3. (C) Caramagna said when he visited La Ceja two weeks ago, former paramilitary leaders told him they had not been able to control their former mid-level commanders for some time. He noted the former paramilitary leaders were alone and resentful. Even though they are better off in La Ceja than they would be in other prison facilities, what was important was that "they feel imprisoned."

4. (C) Caramagna was pleased with a November 10 meeting convoked by Vice President Francisco Santos to exchange MAPP/OAS and GOC information on rearmament and emerging criminal groups. Caramagna said the purpose was to offer the GOC an opportunity to respond to the MAPP/OAS's VIII Quarterly Report, which focused on the emergence of new criminal groups. GOC officials in attendance included Vice President Santos, Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos, Prosecutor General Mario Iguaran, Peace Commissioner Restrepo, the chiefs of the branches of the Armed Services, National Police Director General Jorge Castro, DIJIN Director General Oscar Naranjo, and Carabineros Director Jorge Gomez.

5. (C) Caramagna said the MAPP/OAS presented its report to the GOC on 22 criminal structures associated with former demobilized paramilitaries (please see paragraphs 12 and 13 for information on the groups). Caramagna noted the 22 criminal structures have survived military and police operations to dismantle them. He gave special attention to former mid-level paramilitaries from the North Bloc, whose organizations remain largely intact and are especially strong in Cesar and southern Magdalena. MAPP/OAS also warned of cooperation in certain regions between these criminal groups and elements of the security forces.

6. (C) Defense Minister Santos said the GOC should meet monthly with the MAPP/OEA to evaluate the situation. Santos said the GOC should receive the MAPP/OAS quarterly reports with gratitude rather than resistance, and use them constructively. Permanent coordination and confidence building should include constructive criticism. He said he

"perceived government willingness to combat these gangs but it has not been enough." The Colombian Army Intelligence motto should not say "God rewards persistence," but rather "God rewards persistence and efficiency." He also suggested the information reward system be expanded, not only to cover leaders such as Vicente Castano and "Los Mellizos," but also to include former mid-level paramilitary leaders. Lastly, he recommended that the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) and the Reinsertion Commissioner's Office attend these meetings.

7. (C) In the November 10 meeting, National Police Director General Castro emphasized the increased police presence in demobilized areas and the number of operations against emerging criminal groups. In 2006, the police inaugurated 54 stations in 18 departments to establish GOC control over areas formerly controlled by the ex-paras. Moreover, the police established 12 additional stations in areas associated with new criminal groups. The police have 2,733 new officers dedicated exclusively to securing areas formerly controlled by the ex-paras. Castro hoped to add 38 additional stations by the end of 2006, with 50 more planned for 2007. He said that in October, the police conducted 15 operations against these groups and captured 90 people.

8. (C) Military Commander General Mario Montoya stressed that the last paramilitary group demobilized in August which means the AUC no longer exists. He characterized the task facing security forces as combating "criminal gangs or delinquents at the service of narcotraffickers." Montoya emphasized the need for the military to occupy strategic areas previously occupied by the paramilitaries. He said mobile brigades have been sent to key areas and joint task forces have been created in the departments of Choco, Cordoba, Meta, Cauca, Narino, Antioquia Risaralda, and areas between Valle and Choco.

9. (C) Peace Commissioner Restrepo agreed with the MAPP/OAS assertion that emerging criminal gangs have been hit. But he noted they had not been eliminated because "they are anchored to the region's illicit economy and their social control over the population persists." Restrepo said the police needed more resources to fight the groups. He stressed that corruption within security forces needed to be addressed. Examples should be made of corrupt officials to show that the government was serious.

10. (C) Caramagna said the GOC has unofficially approved an extension of the MAPP/OAS mandate for an additional three years. He talked to Minister of Foreign Affairs Maria Consuelo Araujo and Peace Commissioner Restrepo, and both agreed with extending the Mission's mandate beyond its current January 2007 deadline. The MAPP/OAS is also working on a new action plan which it plans to present to the Group of Friends on November 28.

11. (C) The new action plan includes two strategies: consolidate the work with the AUC, and expand support for any similar process with the ELN or FARC. The first strategy includes post-demobilization and reinsertion verification; Justice and Peace Law monitoring; support for the Reparations and Reconciliation Commission; and support for local and civil society initiatives. The second strategy consists of improving MAPP/OAS's analytical capacity on the armed conflict and scenarios for a political negotiation; confidence building efforts; geographical presence in key territories; and technical support for any future peace processes. Caramagna said the only international group prepared to assist in a future peace process with the ELN or

the FARC was the OAS. He said both the European Union and the United Nations would face political and technical difficulties in playing such a role.

12. (C) The MAPP/OAS identified 22 cases of rearmament of former demobilized paramilitaries. It had verified the existence of fourteen groups in ten departments and was examining reports regarding eight more groups. It estimated there were a total of 3,000 criminal group members, among them common criminals, narcotraffickers, paramilitaries who never demobilized, and former demobilized paramilitaries. The percentage of the former demobilized paramilitaries participating was still small, but this could change. The following are the 14 cases of rearmament:

- Guajira Department: three groups called "Aguilas Negras," "Aguilas de la Sierra," and "AUC," composed of 160 members, led by former mid-level paramilitary leaders. The modus operandi was control of illicit economy -- narcotrafficking and hydrocarbons contraband.

- Atlantico Department: a 60-member group led by former mid-level paramilitary leaders; they continue to call themselves AUC. The modus operandi is control of illicit and licit economy -- education and healthcare sectors.

- Cesar Department: three groups composed of 400 members led by former mid-level paramilitary leaders; one group's name is "Aguilas Negras." The modus operandi is control of illicit and licit economy -- public works projects.

- North Santander Department: a 300-400 member group led by former mid-level paramilitary leaders; they continue to call themselves "Aguilas Negras." The modus operandi is control of illicit economy -- narcotrafficking, arms trafficking, and hydrocarbons contraband.

- Bolivar Department: a 50-member group led by former mid-level paramilitary leaders; their group name is unknown. The modus operandi is control of coca production, kidnapping, and selective killings.

- Cordoba Department: a 50-member group led by a former mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is "Los Traquetos." The modus operandi is control of coca production and control over the population.

- Tolima Department: a 20-member group; the group name is "Bloque Pijao." The leader is undetermined. The modus operandi is extortion and kidnapping.

- Casanare Department: a 200-member group led by a former mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is undetermined. The modus operandi is extortion. Military operations, however, have forced its displacement.

- Caqueta Department: a 50-member group led by a former mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is not determined. The modus operandi is extortion and control over the population. Military operations on October 21 led to the death of two members, one of which was the principal commander.

- Narino Department: a 250-300-member group led by a former mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is "Nueva Generacion Colombia" or "Mano Negra." The modus operandi is control of extortion and control over the population. In September and October the FARC's 29th Front confronted the group. These combats led to the displacement of residents in several administrative units or "corregimientos."

13. The following are eight groups still being identified:

- Cesar Department: a 70-member group led by former mid-level paramilitary leaders; the group name is not determined. The modus operandi is extortion and control over the population.

- Magdalena Department: a 150-member group led by former mid-level paramilitary leaders; the group name is "Mano Negra and/or Power Rangers." The modus operandi is extortion and control over the population.

- Sucre Department: a 20-member group led by a former mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is "Cartel Verde" or "Aguilas Negras." The modus operandi is economic and political control over the population.

- Antioquia Department: a 60-member group led by former mid-level paramilitary leaders; the group name is not determined. The modus operandi is control over the population and the illicit economy.

- Santander Department: a 25-member group led by a former mid-level paramilitary leaders; the group name is not determined. The modus operandi is extortion and illicit economy.

- Meta Department: a 200-member group led by a former mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is not determined. The modus operandi illicit crops and narcotrafficking.

- Narino Department: a 100-member group; group's leader has not been determined; the group has several names "Nueva Generacion Colombia," "Mano Negra," "Los Traquetos, and "Los Rastrojos." The modus operandi is narcotrafficking.

- Putumayo Department: a 350-member group; the group's leader has not been determined; the group has several names "Rastrojos," "Cruzados," or "a faction of Sur Putumayo Front that never demobilized." The modus operandi is narcotrafficking. WOOD

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