Month: January 2018

I learned today from an Independent piece (27 January 2018) that “an “expletive” originally meant any unnecessary word or phrase used to fill out a sentence. It comes from the Latin ex-, out, and plere, fill, and came to mean a swear word only in the 19th century.”
This coincides with what I was going to cover in this blog post, namely the need for more precise drafting of policy, particularly in relation to the NPPF, and particularly if the courts continue with their present approach to policy interpretation disputes.

When the Commons CLG Select Committee reported in 2011 on its inquiry into the draft of what became the current NPPF, its conclusions included this passage:
“Brevity and simplicity are to be applauded in any document. However, we consider that the NPPF does not achieve clarity by its brevity; critical wording has been lost and what remains is often unhelpfully vague. If the NPPF is to be a document that assists with practical decision-making, rather than a lawyers’ charter or an easy-to-read guide to the planning system, its drafting must be more precise and consistent, and sufficiently detailed to enable local authorities to write their own Local Plans. The Government should carefully consider the alternative drafts, submitted by many organisations as part of DCLG’s consultation, in order to produce a tighter, clearer document, and should not make a fetish of how many pages it is. Examples of such words and phrases needing tighter definitions in the NPPF include: ‘significant weight’; ‘great weight’; ‘substantial weight’; ‘considerable weight’; ‘significant flexibility’; ‘a high degree of certainty’; ‘sustainable economic growth’; ‘absent’; ‘silent’; ‘indeterminate’; ‘out-of-date’; ‘certificate of conformity’, ‘where practical’; and ‘where reasonable‘.”
Whilst changes were made in the final 2012 document, too much was left loose. In retrospect, there was an obvious reason: the one document was trying to provide at least three separate things:
– political advocacy as to policy outcomes sought by the Government

– a precise framework for local authority policy making and decision taking

– a significantly condensed version of numerous previous policy documents

It may be fine and convenient to use loose, sometimes emotive (“the golden thread”) or purely exhorting language for a document with solely that first role, but certainly not the second or third, where precise words matter.
It is also a mistake to imagine that, in order to be more precise, a document has to be longer. In fact there are far too many adjectives and adverbs in the current NPPF and I would be red-pen brutal. Is each necessary? For instance, what is the difference between “evidence” and “compelling evidence” (para 48), “positively seek” vs “seek” (para 14) or “significantly and demonstrably outweigh” vs “significantly outweigh” (also para 14)?
If the word is necessary, is its meaning sufficiently defined or calibrated? By this I mean, what precisely is meant by, for instance, “substantial” (used 11 times), or “significant”/”significantly” (used 27 times) or “exceptional” (used 9 times)? If the answer is that this is for the LPA to determine, say that. However, I am not sure that this is often what is meant and the participants descend into trying to weigh the indeterminate presumption in favour of the plan in section 38(6) of the 2004 as against various matters which are either given an uncertain degree of additional weight by national policy or by statute (for instance the unhelpfully differing terminology in relation to specific duties on decision makers in relation to listed buildings, conservation areas and AONBs in sections 66(1) – “special regard” – and 72(1) – “special attention” – of the Listed Buildings Act 1990 and section 85(1) – “regard” – of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 respectively).
Apples with pears perhaps but contrast the analysis of proposals as against policy with the more methodical and internally consistent categorisation of effects in the environmental impact assessment process. Through the good work of IEMA and others, standardised terms have recognised meanings. We need to work towards that in relation to for example judging harm to designated heritage assets for the purposes of paragraphs 132 to 134 of the current NPPF – practical consequences flow from whether there is likely to be “harm” and whether any harm is likely to be “substantial” or “less than substantial”, with practitioners recognising different degrees of harm within those policy categories.
This doesn’t just matter to lawyers. Jonathan Edis and Elizabeth Stephen in A Consultant’s view of the NPPF (Papers from the Institute of Archaeology, 2013):

“The problem is that we know there is harm, but we are not given the words to describe it and convert it into a form where it can be put into the planning balance consistently. We know from recent appeal decisions that less than substantial harm can include levels of impact that are also described as significant and considerable, which concentrates a disconcerting number of similar adjectives in a small conceptual space. Lower down the scale we also know that less than substantial harm can accommodate effects which are described as minor, which is easier to swallow. However, the NPPF provides no framework within which to rank these terms, and there is no indication of how to describe the lowest level of harm to be considered under paragraph 134 of the NPPF”

Definition doesn’t necessarily mean greater length or making the document less readable. The existing glossary could be expanded, or there could be a clearer read-through to the relevant passages in the Planning Practice Guidance (with hyper-text links in the NPPF to all defined terms). But in some instances, the policy wording in the NPPF could itself be made more specific. Indeed this is what the Government has consulted upon in relation to the relevant test for amending green belt boundaries: the guidance in paragraph 83 that “Green Belt boundaries should only be altered in exceptional circumstances, through the preparation or review of the Local Plan” is proposed (see paragraph 1.39 of the Government’s February 2017 Housing White Paper) to be replaced with specific criteria that are to be applied.
The problems arising from loose wording are evident from the extent of litigation that has revolved around specific words and phrases of the NPPF, litigation which has obvious costs, both direct (for the participants) and indirect (for society and the economy).
In Suffolk Coastal (see my 5 May 2017 blog post NPPF Paras 49 & 14: So What Is The Supreme Court Really Saying?), Lord Carnwath described the NPPF as “a simplification of national policy guidance, designed for the lay-reader“, but it can’t just be that. (Indeed for the lay-reader I suspect it is hopelessly confusing and raises all sorts of unjustified expectations). It does need to have some legal precision if it is intended to have practical effects. Lord Reed in Tesco Stores Limited v Dundee City Council states that “policy statements should be interpreted objectively in accordance with the language used, read as always in its proper context“. This is an interpretative role that the courts cannot step back from, although being careful to recognise that, as stated by Lord Carnwath in Suffolk Coastal, “the judges are entitled to look to applicants, seeking to rely on matters of planning policy in applications to quash planning decisions (at local or appellate level), to distinguish clearly between issues of interpretation of policy, appropriate for judicial analysis, and issues of judgement in the application of that policy; and not to elide the two.”

Does Government analyse the extent to which litigation could have been reduced by clearer policy wording? Why for instance was the Suffolk Coastal saga not stopped well before the Supreme Court by a ministerial clarification of how paragraphs 14 and 49 are intended to work?

The courts are also placed in a bind. They are rightly turned to for resolution of disputes as to what the words actually mean, but they strain against overlaying their own interpretation upon the words themselves and from interfering with the application, as opposed to interpretation, of policy. Challenges are routinely being knocked back on the basis of “excessive legalism” but the disputes arising are often not in truth “legalistic”, they are (in line with the Tesco case) disputes as to what the policy in question actually means, which surely matters. Is it acceptable (from the perspective of fairness and predictability) or sensible (from the perspective of the Government achieving its desired policy outcomes and reducing delays caused by appeals) to have vague statements in policy that can be read in different ways (and which the courts will refrain from defining)?
The distinction between policy interpretation and policy application can be difficult to make. It often flows only from a decision by the court as to whether the decision-maker’s interpretation was correct, for which the applicant first has to litigate. For instance, this week the Court of Appeal in Jelson Limited v Secretary of State (19 January 2018) declined to quash an inspector’s decision on the basis of an alleged incorrect approach to arriving at a figure for objectively assessed housing needs in the relevant area. Christopher Lockhart-Mummery QC on behalf of Jelson pointed to various alleged mistakes in the inspector’s approach as against the requirements of the NPPF.

“As a result, Mr Lockhart-Mummery submitted, the inspector failed to approach her assessment of the “full need” for affordable housing as she should have done, and failed to identify, with “clarity and precision”, a robust figure for the “full, objectively assessed needs” for housing in the council’s area.

I cannot accept those submissions. They collide with the most basic principle in the court’s jurisdiction to review planning decisions, which is that matters of planning judgment are not for the court, but for the decision-maker – here an inspector appointed by the Secretary of State – and that the decision-maker’s exercise of planning judgment will not be overturned except on clearly demonstrated public law grounds.”
The court held that the inspector had not misunderstood the approach to be taken and that her conclusions were therefore beyond challenge.
Paragraphs 23 and 24 of Lindblom LJ’s judgment are important:“As this court has emphasized in Oadby and Wigston Borough Council, against the background of its earlier decisions in Hunston Properties Ltd.and Gallagher Estates Ltd., national policy and guidance does not dictate, for decision-making on applications for planning permission and appeals, exactly how a decision-maker is to go about identifying a realistic and reliable figure for housing need against which to test the relevant supply (see paragraphs 35 and 36 of my judgment). In this respect, government policy, though elaborated at length in the guidance in the PPG, is not prescriptive. Where the Government wanted to be more specific in the parameters it set for decision-makers considering whether a local planning authority could demonstrate the required five-year supply of housing land, it was – in laying down the approach to calculating the supply of deliverable housing sites in paragraphs 47 and 49 of the NPPF, and, in particular, in carefully defining the concept of a “deliverable” site (see my judgment in St Modwen Developments Ltd. v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2017] EWCA Civ 1643, at paragraph 36).

Responsibility for the assessment of housing need lies with the decision-maker, and is no part of the court’s role in reviewing the decision. Although the decision-maker is clearly expected to establish, at least to a reasonable level of accuracy and reliability, a level of housing need that represents the “full, objectively assessed needs” as a basis for determining whether a five-year supply exists, this is not an “exact science” (the expression used in paragraph 2a-014-20140306 of the PPG). It is an evaluation that involves the decision-maker’s exercise of planning judgment on the available material, which may not be perfect or complete (see the judgment of Lang J. in Shropshire Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2016] EWHC 2733 (Admin), at paragraph 27). The scope for a reasonable and lawful planning judgment here is broad (see the judgment of Hickinbottom J. in Stratford-on-Avon District Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2013] EWHC 2074 (Admin), at paragraph 43). Often there may be no single correct figure representing the “full, objectively assessed needs” for housing in the relevant area. More than one figure may be reasonable to use. It may well be sensible to adopt a range, rather than trying to identify a single figure. Unless relevant policy in the NPPF or guidance in the PPG has plainly been misunderstood or misapplied, the crucial question will always be whether planning judgment has been exercised lawfully, on the relevant material, in assessing housing need in the relevant area (see paragraphs 32 to 38 of my judgment in Oadby and Wigston Borough Council). A legalistic approach is more likely to obscure the answer to this question than reveal it (see paragraph 50 of my judgment in Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council).”

“The Planning Court – and this court too – must always be vigilant against excessive legalism infecting the planning system. A planning decision is not akin to an adjudication made by a court (see paragraph 50 of my judgment in Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council). The courts must keep in mind that the function of planning decision-making has been assigned by Parliament, not to judges, but – at local level – to elected councillors with the benefit of advice given to them by planning officers, most of whom are professional planners, and – on appeal – to the Secretary of State and his inspectors. They should remember too that the making of planning policy is not an end in itself, but a means to achieving reasonably predictable decision-making, consistent with the aims of the policy-maker. Though the interpretation of planning policy is, ultimately, a matter for the court, planning policies do not normally require intricate discussion of their meaning. A particular policy, or even a particular phrase or word in a policy, will sometimes provide planning lawyers with a “doctrinal controversy”. But even when the higher courts disagree as to the meaning of the words in dispute, and even when the policy-maker’s own understanding of the policy has not been accepted, the debate in which lawyers have engaged may turn out to have been in vain – because, when a planning decision has to be made, the effect of the relevant policies, taken together, may be exactly the same whichever construction is right (see paragraph 22 of my judgment in Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council). That of course may not always be so. One thing, however, is certain, and ought to be stressed. Planning officers and inspectors are entitled to expect that both national and local planning policy is as simply and clearly stated as it can be, and also – however well or badly a policy is expressed – that the court’s interpretation of it will be straightforward, without undue or elaborate exposition. Equally, they are entitled to expect – in every case – good sense and fairness in the court’s review of a planning decision, not the hypercritical approach the court is often urged to adopt.”

But “excessive legalism” is in itself a value-laden term. What is an acceptable level of “legalism”? What is the difference between correct legal interpretation and unacceptable legalism? Is legalism sometimes excessive even if it is based on a correct legal interpretation?
We have seen a similar approach by the courts in the retail planning area, where there is still much genuine uncertainty as to the proper application of the sequential test and specifically as to the flexibility required of the applicant in looking for potentially more central locations (NPPF, paragraph 24). I referred in my blog post Town Centres First? Two Recent Decisions (22 December 2017) to words of caution by Ouseley J, in refusing permission in relation to the Tollgate Colchester challenge) as to the dangers of relying too heavily on judicial interpretation of policy. We have now obtained a transcript of his judgment (contact me if you would like a copy). It includes this passage:

“I simply make this word of warning in the light of the decision I have come to, which I will shortly reveal, that what I said in Aldergate Properties also comes with a warning I gave in Aldergate Properties, that the language that the court uses to explain what a policy means in a particular context is not a substitute for the words of the policy itself, which fall to be construed and then applied in relation to the particular circumstances at issue. The words of para.24 are very simple but are intended, however, for application in a wide variety of circumstances, and no one phrase is necessarily apt for application, still less as a substitute, in all the circumstances. I had also intended by the use of the word “broad” and “approximate” something a little more flexible than the word “closely similar” as a substitute might have indicated.”

That may sound sensible, but the words of the policy allow for differing interpretations. How does one determine the appropriate interpretation for the specific circumstances and is the applicant and local community alike in the hands largely of the decision-maker? Is that the latitude the Government intended to give?
Whatever emerges as the draft revised NPPF really needs to be stress-tested and amended accordingly. Which are the words and phrases over which we will all inevitably fall out and how to lance those disputes now by a bit more clarity, rather than in court or at planning appeal? What is the Government willing to leave to authorities and inspectors to work out? I am not necessarily suggesting a longer document but certainly delineation between supporting explanatory test and policy; a more rigorous approach to defined terms, and an adjectival haircut.
Simon Ricketts, 27 January 2018
Personal views, et cetera

A.140 The National Planning Policy Framework, supported by planning guidance, already incorporates elements of the ‘agent of change’ principle (this provides that the person or business responsible for the change should be responsible for managing the impact of that change) in relation to noise, by being clear that existing businesses wanting to grow should not have unreasonable restrictions put on them because of changes in nearby land uses since they were established.

A.141 We propose to amend the Framework to emphasise that planning policies and decisions should take account of existing businesses and other organisations, such as churches, community pubs, music venues and sports clubs, when locating new development nearby and, where necessary, to mitigate the impact of noise and other potential nuisances arising from existing development. This will help mitigate the risk of restrictions or possible closure of existing businesses and other organisations due to noise and other complaints from occupiers of new developments. ”

The latest statement takes this further forward not one jot. I was blogging about the agent of change principle back in October 2016 in my post Noise Annoys.

The prod for the 18 January announcement was the introduction into the House of Commons on 10 January 2018 of a private members’ bill, the Planning (Agent of Change) Bill, by Labour MP John Spellar. Following the debate on 10 January, the Bill (which has not actually been published at this stage, as is often the case with private members’ bills of this nature which are largely intended just intended to draw attention to an issue) was due to receive a second reading on 19 January but this has now been postponed until 16 March. Presumably the intention of the bill was simply to keep the Government focused on what it had already indicated to do. If this is how politicians have to spend their time but it all seems odd to this outsider.
The agent of change concept really now does have momentum, with a strong campaign run by the Music Venue Trust and supported by the Local Government Association. It is frustrating that even such an apparently simple change to policy (oversold in Javid’s statement as a new “rule”) takes so long to introduce.
The Welsh Assembly was able to move rather faster, introducing an equivalent policy change by its letter letter Supporting the Night Time Economy and the Agent of Change Principle (26 May 2017):
“Existing policy in Planning Policy Wales already says new uses should not be introduced into an area without considering the nature of existing uses. Under the agent of change principle, if new developments or uses are to be introduced near a pre-existing business, such as a live music venue, it is the responsibility of the developer to ensure solutions to address and mitigate noise are put forward as part of proposals and are capable of being implemented.

PPW also encourages local planning authorities to consider the compatibility of uses in areas and afford appropriate protection where they consider it necessary, as part of their development plans. The revisions to PPW will add to this and allow for the designation of areas of cultural significance for music through development plans.”

The letter advises Welsh planning authorities that they “should begin to apply this principle, where it is a relevant consideration, with immediate effect.” Javid could have taken this approach with his 18 January announcement and it is a disappointment that he did not.
The Mayor of London has also of course introduced a policy into the draft London plan.

There has also been coverage this week of the supposed news of further slippage in the publication of the draft NPPF, which would cause further delay to the final document. Senior MCHLG servant Melanie Dawes was reported in Planning magazine as saying to the CLG Commons Select Committee that it would be “ready for consultation in the next few months – I hope just before Easter or thereabouts”, meaning that we should assume it may be at the end of March (“or thereabouts”!). But again, this wasn’t news, given that Government chief planner Steve Quartermain’s 21 December 2017 letter to local authorities had promised the draft “early” in 2018. The letter states that the final version of the revised NPPF would be “before the end of the summer“. In my view this is careful wording: we should not necessarily assume that we will see it this side of the Parliamentary recess (which starts on 20 July). Which of course has an immediate influence on those authorities who had either been rushing to submit their local plans by the end of March 2018 or waiting until after that deadline, depending on their tactical judgment as to how they would be affected by the proposed standardised methodology for assessing housing needs – that end of March deadline is now a late summer deadline.

Honestly, it would be enough to make one scream, if it wasn’t for the neighbours.
Simon Ricketts, 19.1.18
Personal views, et cetera

Spare a thought for Dominic Raab, who was appointed minister for housing on 9 January 2018. (Is he also minister for planning as his predecessors were? Who knows?). Linklaters-trained lawyer, he may have thought that the EU was byzantine in its tiers of policy making but that is surely as nothing compared to the English planning system.
I do hope that Mr Raab sits down to read Dove J’s judgment in Richborough Estates Limited (and 24 other co-claimants) v Secretary of State (12 January 2018). This is of course the challenge by various land promoters and house-builders to the written ministerial statement made on 12 December 2016 (without prior consultation) by Mr Raab’s predecessor but one, Gavin Barwell. I blogged about the WMS at the time (That Written Ministerial Statement, 29 December 2016).
For me the case illustrates the unnecessary policy complexities arising from unclear statements, ad hoc glosses to previous policies and the unclear inter-relationship between the NPPF, PPG and written ministerial statements. It also evidences the obvious tension between on the one hand the Government’s desire to increase housing land supply by ensuring that failure by authorities to provide adequately has real consequences and on the other hand the Government’s desperation to retain public confidence in neighbourhood planning. If that wasn’t enough, you have within it the attempt by policy makers to take into account the implications of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Suffolk Coastal – that one should also definitely be on Mr Raab’s reading list.
You will recall that, despite the policy in paragraph 49 of the NPPF that relevant policies for the supply of housing should not be considered up-to-date if the local planning authority cannot demonstrate a five-year supply of deliverable housing sites (triggering the presumption in favour of sustainable development in paragraph 14), the WMS provided that relevant policies for the supply of housing in a neighbourhood plan should not be deemed to be ‘out-of-date’ where the WMS is less than two years old or the neighbourhood plan has been part of the development plan for two years or less; the neighbourhood plan allocates sites for housing; and the local planning authority can demonstrate a three-year supply of deliverable housing sites.
Effectively the five year housing land supply target was being significantly watered down, to a three year target, where an up to date neighbourhood plan, allocating sites for housing (however few) was in place. The policies in that plan would still have full effect. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Suffolk Coastal, which clarified the operation of paragraphs 14 and 49, the Government changed its PPG but policies in neighbourhood plans which met the criteria in the WMS were still to be given ‘significant weight’ notwithstanding there not being a five years’ housing supply.

Richborough and the other claimants sought to quash the WMS on various grounds. They argued:

– the WMS was inconsistent with paragraphs 14 and 49 of the NPPF and in having the effect of amending paragraph 49 without explicitly doing so represented an approach which was irrational and unlawful;

– the Government had made errors of fact in the research that was relied upon in formulating the policy;

– the WMS was invalid for uncertainty and confused given a lack of clarity as to how the three years’ supply was to be calculated;

– irrationality in the face of the stated intention of the NPPF to “boost significantly the supply of housing“;

– breach of legitimate expectation that there would be public consultation before planning policy for housing was changed by the WMS.

Dove J found for the Government on all grounds. He found that the Government has a very wide discretion in the way that it brings forward planning policy:
“Provided […] that the policy produced does not frustrate the operation of planning legislation, or introduce matters which are not properly planning considerations at all, and is not irrational, the matters which the defendant regards as material or immaterial to the determination of the policy being issued is [sic] a matter entirely for the defendant“.
The policy was capable of “sensible interpretation“: three years’ housing land supply was to be calculated using the same methodology as for calculating five years’ supply.
The judge did not interpret the WMS, with the subsequent addition of the guidance in the PPG, as amending paragraph 49 or 14 of the NPPF, albeit that it did “change national policy in relation to housing applications in areas with a recently made [neighbourhood plan]“. I am still struggling with this one – undoubtedly the WMS has changed the application of the NPPF in areas with a neighbourhood plan that meets the NPPF criteria. Even if this is not unlawful, surely this approach to policy making is to be discouraged – the NPPF does not now mean what it says.
The judge found that there was an adequate evidential basis for the WMS and errors of fact had not been made. The bar was low given that the WMS had only stated that ‘recent analysis suggests…“.
As regards the suggestion of irrationality in the face of the stated intention of the NPPF to “boost significantly the supply of housing“, the judge noted that this “is not an objective which exists on its own and isolated from the other interests addressed by the Framework…Amongst the other concerns for which the Framework has specific policies is, of course, Neighbourhood Planning...”
The judge set out the circumstances in which a legitimate expectation to consultation arises and found that such an expectation did not arise because a limited number of other policy announcements in relation to housing and planning matters had not been preceded by consultation. I understand that the claimants are likely to seek permission to appeal on this last ground.
So, there is disappointment for those of us who saw Gavin Barwell’s WMS as an inappropriate attempt to rewrite (without the consultation which would have been so helpful in arriving at a workable policy) a key protection that is within the NPPF against authorities that fail properly to plan for housing. The disappointment is reduced since the Suffolk Coastal ruling and the change to the PPG which followed (no doubt largely because the Government was faced with this litigation) where the Government sought to clarify that the WMS did not change the operation of paragraph 49, although “significant weight” should be given to the neighbourhood plan.
But, stepping back, the planning system has become as tangled again as it was at the time of the great bonfire of the previous planning policy statements and circulars in 2012 – we are having to pick uncertainly through unclear passages in the NPPF, the PPG and the WMS, reliant on regular revelations from the courts as to what the documents actually mean; decision-makers are having to ascertain the relative weight to be applied to various, often inconsistent, policies at national, local and neighbourhood level, and in the meantime the Government apparently has carte blanche to change its policies without prior consultation (policies were meant to be just in the NPPF, guidance in the PPG if you remember…).
There is a heavy burden on the shoulders of those drafting the new NPPF, that’s for sure! And a massive and important job to do for our new housing minister.
Simon Ricketts, 12 January 2018
Personal views, et cetera

I last blogged about the new brownfield land regime back in April 2017. Back then, the deadline of 31 December 2017 had been set for local planning authorities to publish their first registers. We were also waiting for the final set of regulations that would set out the procedure by which, if your land is listed in part 1 of the register, you can apply for “permission in principle” (if your land is in part 2 of the register it is automatic).
This blog post takes a quick look at some of the registers that have been published to see the approaches that authorities are taking – after all, whilst authorities had the 31 December deadline for publishing their registers, there was no minimum number of sites to be included, whether on part 1 or part 2 and no procedure for appeal or independent scrutiny if a land owner considers that their land has been wrongly overlooked.
In the longer term, I hope that something will be done about authorities that only pay lip service to the process, although it is difficult to see what, without a more prescriptive system, or other sticks and carrots being applied. DCLG’s planning update newsletter published on 21 December 2017 stated:“DCLG will assess progress in January, and it will be important that published registers contain up-to- date information on brownfield land suitable for housing.

In July we published planning guidance, a data standard, and a template , to support local planning authorities in preparing and publishing their registers, and to ensure registers are published in a consistent and open format which can be aggregated by users of the data.”
From a quick google, it seems to me that authorities have met the deadline. However:
– the sites included do not appear to go beyond sites which were already in play by virtue of either having permission, an allocation or having featured in the authority’s strategic housing land availability assessment
– sites have not yet been included in part 2

– whilst the government’s data standard and template have been followed, the supporting information is pretty sparse.

These are three authorities that I chose to look at, by way of a random selection:
Elmbridge Borough Council’s register only contains sites that already have planning permission.
Milton Keynes Council has decided not to include any sites on part 2 of its register. Its part 1 sites all come from its SHLAA as well as unimplemented planning permissions.
The notes to Islington Council’s register set out uncertainties as to the required methodology:“The Regulations and PPG are not clear about whether the 5 dwelling threshold for inclusion on the BLR refers to net or gross dwellings. Regulation 4 of the Regulations merely requires sites to be included if they have an area of at least 0.25 hectares or is capable of supporting at least 5 dwellings. This suggests the threshold is a gross figure.

However, Schedule 2 of the Regulations requires sites on the BLR to set out the minimum net number of dwellings which, in the authority’s opinion, the land is capable of supporting.

This is an important distinction as there are several sites – all extant permissions – which are less than 0.25 hectares, and permit 5 or more dwellings gross but less than 5 dwellings net. Hence the decision to enter these sites onto the BLR hinges on whether we assume the 5 dwelling threshold is net or gross.

Islington have assumed that the Regulations refer to the gross figure in terms of assessing capability under Regulation 4, although a site’s net figure is used for the ‘MinNetDwellings’ column. The council will monitor changes to guidance and other boroughs BLRs for best practice, and may revert to a net figure in future in terms of assessing sites against the Regulations.”

Islington identifies all of the sites on its register as in unknown ownership:
“The BLR identifies all sites as unknown ownership, which reflects the lack of access to up-to-date Land Registry records for these sites. Islington will aim to secure ownership data for sites on future iterations of the BLR.”
These approaches are not untypical and it is underwhelming. DCLG will need to turn the thumbscrews in time for the first annual update of the registers if this process is going to do anything other than round up the usual suspect sites.
The formatting does at least allow for some useful data gathering, such as this map of London brownfield sites.
Barton Willmore have carried out some interesting analysis as to the numbers of homes identified by the Manchester authorities in their register.

Of course one of the benefits of finding your land within part 1 of the register is the idea that you will be able to apply for “permission in principle” as a supposedly quick route to planning approval. However this is only relevant if the site is very small, given that the cap is nine dwellings – and given that the minimum size for inclusion on the register is five dwellings this is all pretty niche. Be that as it may, the Town and Country Planning (Permission in Principle) (Amendment) Order 2017 was laid before Parliament on 21 December 2017 and will come into force on 1 June 2018. The order sets out the procedure for applying for PiPs. Lichfields’ 2 January 2018 blog post Take a chance on me: what we know about permission in principle on application is a good summary, also covering the fee rates for applications.

On reading my April 2017 blog post again, I was surprisingly optimistic about the brownfield land registers. Nine months on, I suppose at least we now have the initial registers in place but surely now we need to see:
– greater engagement between land owners and LPAs so as to begin to use the process to unlock sites which are not already in play.

– consultation in relation to moving appropriate sites onto part 2 so that they secure automatic permission in principle (and without the nine units cap there is in relation to part 1, although they must be below the threshold for EIA).

– a real incentive for development of sites on the register, including supportive policies in the forthcoming revised NPPF.