In chapter one I argue that determinism is not fatalistic. This implies that free will is compatible with determinism.Chapter two begins with what I believe is a sound argument for logical determinism, after which I argue that Arthur Prior is unsuccessful in his attempt to refute determinism by resting indeterminism on the principle of bivalence.In Chapter three we examine a revision of Richard Taylor's argument for fatalism which turns the argument into one supporting logical determinism, but which is not fatalistic, and which withstands all of many arguments against it.Chapter four is devoted to an examination of Jan Lukasiewicz's effort to support indeterministic free will. His aim is to show that it is not irrational to believe both in trivalent indeterminism as a basis for free will and in the universality of cause and effect. However, his argument implies that the notion of the universality of cause and effect cannot in its entirety be accommodated within his system. Therefore Lukasiewicz's argument is unsound.The arguments in this essay, in my judgment, lend credence both to determinism's truth and to its compatibility with free will.