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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2006:
Catastrophic Disasters:
Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will
Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's Preparedness, Response, and
Recovery System:
GAO-06-618:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-618, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did this Study:
Hurricane Katrina was the largest, most destructive natural disaster in
our nation’s history. The problems experienced in responding to Katrina
resulted in a number of investigations—by congressional committees, the
White House Homeland Security Council, and others--regarding the
preparations for and response to Katrina. GAO assisted the
congressional investigations and, under the Comptroller General’s
authority, initiated a number of Katrina-related reviews. In March 2006
testimony, GAO provided its preliminary observations to Congress.
The purpose of this report is to summarize what went well and why, what
did not go well and why, and what changes are needed to improve the
nation’s readiness to respond to a catastrophic disaster; and to
identify selected issues associated with the Gulf Coast’s recovery.
This report is based on GAO’s prior work on catastrophic disasters,
including Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the over 30 GAO reports completed
to date on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, ongoing GAO work, and other
Hurricane Katrina reviews and lessons learned.
What GAO Found:
Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophic disaster whose scope and
destruction severely tested all levels of governments in the affected
areas and the nation as a whole. It almost immediately overwhelmed
state and local first responders, and the response required outside
action and support from many sources. The heroic efforts by many saved
thousands of lives. The federal government, many states, local
governments, plus nonprofit and private sector organizations provided
substantial personnel and resources to assist in the response, but
these proved insufficient to meet the immediate challenges posed by
Hurricane Katrina’s effects.
The three basic elements in preparing for, responding to and recovering
from any catastrophic disaster are (1) leadership; (2) capabilities;
and (3) accountability. Leadership in the form of legal authorities,
roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of
government must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well
understood in order to facilitate rapid and effective decision making.
DHS has made revisions to the National Response Plan designed to
further clarify federal roles and responsibilities, but their effect
has not yet been tested in an actual disaster.
Developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters should be
part of an overall national effort designed to integrate and define
what needs to be done, where, by whom, and how well. Ensuring needed
capabilities are ready requires effective planning and coordination,
plus robust training and exercises in which the capabilities are
realistically tested, problems identified, and subsequently addressed
in partnership with federal, state, local, and nongovernmental
stakeholders. In addition, integrating an all-hazards risk management
framework into decision making is central to assessing catastrophic
disaster risks and guiding the development of national capabilities to
prevent or mitigate where possible and respond to such risks. DHS has
announced a number of actions to improve readiness and response for
catastrophic disasters, but there is little information available on
the extent to which these changes are operational.
Accountability controls and mechanisms ensure that resources are used
appropriately for valid purposes. Following a catastrophic disaster,
decision-makers face a tension between the demand for rapid response
and recovery assistance—including assistance to victims—and
implementing appropriate controls and accountability mechanisms. Our
work and that of others found, for example, the processes for
confirming disaster victims’ eligibility for assistance were
insufficient and resulted in millions of dollars in questionable
payments to fraudulent claimants. Also, some contracts had insufficient
provisions to ensure that prices were fair and reasonable. DHS has
reported that it has taken steps to address some of the concerns,
including working to complete more contracts for key services in
advance of a disaster and improving its ability to verify individual
claimant eligibility for disaster benefits and assistance.
What GAO Recommends:
This report includes six recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland
Security with which DHS generally agreed, describing actions taken to
implement them. The report also includes a matter for congressional
consideration.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-618].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr.
at (202) 512-8757 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Leadership Is Critical for Preparing for, Responding to, and Recovering
from Catastrophic Disasters:
Enhanced Capabilities for Catastrophic Response and Recovery Are
Needed:
Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring
Accountability to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse:
Long-Term Recovery and Rebuilding Efforts Raise Issues for Congress to
Consider:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments:
GAO Contacts:
Appendix I: Summary of Key Open GAO Recommendations on Catastrophic
Disasters:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: Comments from the Small Business Administration:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Findings in Reports by Congress and the Administration:
Table 2: Implementation of White House Homeland Security Council
Recommendations for the 2006 Hurricane Season: Recommendations Related
to Leadership Issues:
Table 3: Implementation of White House Homeland Security Council
Recommendations for the 2006 Hurricane Season: Recommendations Related
to Regarding Capabilities:
Table 4: Key Open Recommendations Made Prior to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita[A]:
Table 5: Recent Open Recommendations Made in the Aftermath of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita[A]:
Table 6: New GAO Recommendations Formalized in this Report:
Abbreviations:
DCMS: Disaster Credit Management System:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
ESF: Emergency Support Function:
FCO: Federal Coordinating Officer:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
HHS: Health and Human Services:
HSPD: Homeland Security Presidential Directive:
IHP: Individuals and Households Program:
JFO: Joint Field Office:
NDMS: National Disaster Medical System:
NFC: National Finance Center:
NFIP: National Flood Insurance Program:
NIMS: National Incident Management System:
NOAA: National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration:
NRP: National Response Plan:
PFO: Principal Federal Officer:
SBA: Small Business Administration:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 6, 2006:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Chairman:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Chairman:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman:
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Just over 1 year ago, Hurricane Katrina made final landfall in coastal
Louisiana and Mississippi, and its destructive force extended to the
western Alabama coast. Hurricane Katrina was the worst natural disaster
in our nation's history in geographic scope, the extent and severity of
its destruction and damage, and the number of persons displaced from
their homes. Hurricane Katrina and the following Hurricanes Rita and
Wilma--also among the most powerful hurricanes in the nation's history-
-graphically illustrated the limitations at that time of the nation's
readiness and ability to respond effectively to a catastrophic
disaster--that is, a disaster whose effects almost immediately
overwhelm the response capacities of affected state and local first
responders and require outside action and support from the federal
government and other entities. Reports by the House Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina,[Footnote 1] the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee,[Footnote 2] the White House Homeland Security
Council,[Footnote 3] the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Inspector General,[Footnote 4] and DHS and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA)[Footnote 5] have all identified a variety of
failures and some strengths in the preparations for, response to, and
initial recovery from Hurricane Katrina. Collectively, these reports,
along with GAO's various reports and testimonies, have chronicled the
strengths and weaknesses of federal, state, local, and nongovernmental
efforts, and offered a number of specific recommendations for improving
the nation's ability to effectively prepare for and respond to
catastrophic disasters. Legislation to reorganize the federal
government's emergency response responsibilities has been introduced in
both the House and the Senate and the administration has undertaken
several efforts to address disaster management weaknesses identified in
the aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season.
The 2005 hurricane season was particularly active, and the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimated that
there was a 75-percent probability of another active hurricane season
in 2006 (the hurricane season runs from June 1st through November 30th
each year). However, NOAA reminds us that hurricane-spawned
catastrophic disasters can occur even in years with near-normal or
below-normal levels of activity. The nation's second most destructive
hurricane--Andrew in 1992--occurred during a season with otherwise
below normal activity. Moreover, the nation must be prepared to respond
to and recover from a wide range of other disasters that may occur at
any time of year and could be the result of nature or human action,
such as a possible influenza pandemic or terrorist attack.
In a March 2006 testimony,[Footnote 6] we provided our preliminary
observations regarding the preparedness for, response to, and recovery
from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We noted that the key issues were in
many ways very reminiscent of the issues identified in the wake of
Hurricane Andrew in 1992[Footnote 7] and fell into three broad,
interrelated categories: (1) leadership, including clearly defined
roles and responsibilities of all key participants; (2) building and
sustaining effective capabilities through coordinated planning,
training, and exercises; and (3) maintaining accountability for the use
of resources while providing assistance and resources as quickly as
possible. The overall objective of this work was (1) to provide
Congress with a summary of what went well and why, what did not go well
and why, and what specific changes are needed to improve this nation's
emergency preparedness, response, and recovery system; and (2) identify
selected issues associated with the Gulf Coast's recovery. Following
the themes from our prior work, this report discusses the major
findings from our recent and ongoing work on the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina and relevant findings from Congress and the administration with
respect to (1) the actions of government agencies during Hurricane
Katrina that made positive contributions to the response and recovery
and those that were less positive; (2) catastrophic disaster leadership
roles and responsibilities; (3) capabilities to prepare for, respond
to, and recover from catastrophic disasters; (4) recognizing the
tension between the need for timely action and the need for appropriate
controls and accountability mechanisms; and (5) selected longer-term
recovery issues, including the rebuilding effort along the Gulf Coast.
This report is based on our work on Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and our
visits to the areas most affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita--
Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. We interviewed various
officials, including senior federal officials, the governors of
Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, and the mayor of New
Orleans. We also analyzed information from the various involved federal
agencies, such as FEMA and the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
federal audit community; state organizations including state emergency
management agencies; National Guard officials in the states, state
agencies and state auditors; local officials; and representatives from
nongovernmental agencies. We also have studied the findings in reports
issued by Congress, DHS/FEMA, DHS's Office of Inspector General, and
the White House Homeland Security Council.
In addition, we have an extensive body of work on prior catastrophic
disasters. For example, we drew upon several past reviews in 1993,
examining the federal response to Hurricane Andrew. We also conducted
extensive work following the events of September 11, 2001,[Footnote 8]
and on tsunami preparedness and recovery issues.[Footnote 9] Our
reports focused on improving the immediate response to catastrophic
disasters that raise unique challenges, and we made various
recommendations within this context, many of which continue to apply
and help form the basis of our views today, including the issue of
FEMA's future organizational placement. In the months following
Hurricane Katrina, we provided support to congressional investigations
of the preparedness for and response to Hurricane Katrina and have
issued reports on such topics as the military's role in catastrophic
disasters;[Footnote 10] contracting practices for response and recovery
activities;[Footnote 11] the evacuation of hospitals, nursing homes and
other vulnerable populations;[Footnote 12] charitable assistance and
the coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross;[Footnote 13] ensuring
the appropriate use and accountability for international
assistance;[Footnote 14] and issues associated with guarding against
fraud in the provision of expedited assistance to disaster
victims.[Footnote 15] To date we have published over 30 GAO reports and
testimonies on Hurricane Katrina-related matters. We will continue to
focus on ways to improve the nation's readiness and capacity to respond
to catastrophic disasters as well as issues associated with the long-
term recovery of the Gulf Coast region, including housing, health care,
levee reconstruction, and economic recovery.
We conducted our work from September 2005 through August 2006, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
While much of the publicity regarding Hurricane Katrina has focused on
what did not go well in connection with the governments' activities,
there are notable exceptions. For example, the National Weather Service
and the National Hurricane Center provided accurate forecasts of the
time and location of Hurricane Katrina's landfall, accompanied by
warnings of the hurricane's potential destructive force. Dedicated and
heroic efforts by many, including local first responders, hospital
personnel, the U.S. Coast Guard, the National Guard, active duty
military troops, and volunteers saved thousands of lives. Federal
agencies such as the Postal Service, the Social Security
Administration, the National Finance Center, the Forest Service, and
the Internal Revenue Service demonstrated their flexibility and
adaptability, responding to Katrina's challenges. Many states sent
supplies, first responders, National Guard personnel, and other
resources to assist the areas hardest hit by the disasters. Many
charitable, faith-based and private sector organizations supplemented
governmental efforts providing food and shelter for thousands. Despite
these efforts, various reports and our own work on the 2005
catastrophic disasters suggest that the substantial human, financial,
and technological resources and capabilities marshaled by governments
at all levels were inadequate to meet the immediate challenges posed by
the disaster's unprecedented geographic scope, degree of damage, and
the resulting number of hurricane victims who had to be relocated.
In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic
disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines
of authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined,
effectively communicated, and well understood in order to facilitate
rapid and effective decision making. The experience of Hurricane
Katrina showed the need to improve leadership at all levels of
government in order to better respond to a catastrophic disaster. For
example, there were problems experienced with roles and
responsibilities under the National Response Plan (NRP),[Footnote 16]
and ambiguities concerning what constituted an incident of national
significance to trigger the NRP as well as what constituted a
catastrophic incident to trigger the proactive response of the NRP's
Catastrophic Incident Annex. On May 25, 2006, DHS released changes to
the NRP regarding leadership issues, such as which situations require
secretarial leadership; the process for declaring incidents of national
significance; and the scope of the NRP and its Catastrophic Incident
Annex. The revised NRP clearly states that the Secretary of Homeland
Security, who reports directly to the President, is responsible for
declaring and managing incidents of national significance, including
catastrophic incidents. DHS has not yet published the final supplement
to the Catastrophic Incident Annex, which is intended to provide more
detail for implementing the annex. Until the supplement is final and
distributed, agencies that have responsibilities under the supplement
cannot complete the implementation plans and agreements needed to make
the annex and supplement fully operational. The White House Homeland
Security Council report included 44 recommendations that were intended
to be implemented quickly, of which 18 are focused on improving and
clarifying the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines
of authority. DHS has provided limited information on the status of its
implementation of the White House recommendations, although it has
reported actions taken on some issues raised in the White House
Homeland Security Council report and in other critiques. For example,
DHS has designated principal federal officials and federal coordinating
officers for regions and states at-risk of hurricanes and further
described their respective roles in coordinating disaster response--a
source of some confusion in the federal response to Hurricane Katrina.
However, the changes may not have fully resolved the leadership issues
with regard to the roles of the principal federal officer and federal
coordinating officer. While the Secretary of Homeland Security may
avoid conflicts by appointing a single individual to serve in both
positions in non-terrorist incidents, confusion may persist if the
Secretary of Homeland Security does not exercise this discretion to do
so. Furthermore, this discretion does not exist for terrorist
incidents, and the revised NRP does not specifically provide a
rationale for this limitation. Congress also has raised concerns that
FEMA's performance problems exhibited during the hurricane response may
stem from its organizational placement and its budgetary relationship
within DHS. As we stated in our March 8 and May 9, 2006, testimonies,
organizational changes alone, while potentially important, will not be
enough to adequately address the underlying systemic conditions that
resulted in FEMA's performance problems during the last hurricane
season. In our view, a number of other factors may be ultimately more
important to FEMA's success in responding to and recovering from future
disasters, including catastrophic disasters, than its organizational
placement. We have identified several factors that Congress should
consider as it deliberates FEMA's organizational placement: (1) mission
relevancy, (2) similarity of goals and objectives, (3) the ability to
leverage the effectiveness of other agencies, and (4) gains through
consolidation.
As stated earlier, numerous reports and our own work suggest that the
substantial resources and capabilities marshaled by state, local, and
federal governments and nongovernmental organizations were insufficient
to meet the immediate challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of
damage and the resulting number of hurricane victims caused by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Developing the capabilities needed for
catastrophic disasters should be part of an overall national
preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define what needs
to be done, where, based on what standards, how it should be done, and
how well it should be done. The nation's experience with Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita reinforces some of the questions surrounding the
adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic disaster--
particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness;
(2) emergency communications; (3) evacuations; (4) search and rescue;
(5) logistics; and (6) mass care and sheltering. Ensuring that needed
capabilities such as these are available requires effective planning
and coordination, as well as training and exercises in which the
capabilities are realistically tested and problems identified and
subsequently addressed in partnership with other federal, state, and
local stakeholders, as capabilities are built upon the appropriate
combination of people, skills, processes, and assets. In addition,
ongoing work is still needed by DHS to address FEMA's human resource
challenges. Finally, as we stated in our March 2006 testimony, the use
of a risk management methodology--integrating systematic concern for
risk into the normal cycle of agency decision making and
implementation--should be central to assessing the risk for
catastrophic disasters, guiding the development of national
capabilities and the expertise that can be used to respond effectively
to catastrophic disasters.
Although controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that
resources are used appropriately, during a catastrophic disaster
decision-makers struggle with the tension between implementing controls
and accountability mechanisms and the demand for rapid response and
recovery assistance. On one hand, our work found many examples where
quick action could not occur due to procedures that required extensive,
time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital supplies and
other assistance. On the other hand, we also found examples where
FEMA's processes under assistance programs to disaster victims left the
federal government vulnerable to fraud and the abuse of expedited
assistance payments. We estimate that through February 2006, FEMA made
about $600 million to $1.4 billion in improper and potentially
fraudulent payments to applicants who used invalid information to apply
for expedited cash assistance. DHS and FEMA have reported a number of
actions that are to be in effect for the hurricane season so that
federal recovery programs will have more capacity to rapidly handle a
catastrophic incident but also provide accountability. Examples include
significantly increasing the quantity of pre-positioned supplies, such
as food, ice, and water; placing global positioning systems on supply
trucks to track their location and better manage the delivery of
supplies; an enhanced phone system for victim assistance applications
that can handle up to 200,000 calls per day; and improved computer
systems and processes for verifying the eligibility of those applying
for assistance. Effective implementation of these and other planned
improvements will be critical to achieving their intended outcomes.
Finally, catastrophic disasters not only require a different magnitude
of capabilities and resources for effective response, they may also
require more flexible policies and operating procedures. In a
catastrophe, streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making
should quickly replace "business as usual" and the unquestioned
following of long-standing policies and operating procedures used in
normal situations for providing relief to disaster victims. At the same
time, controls and accountability mechanisms must be sufficient to
provide the documentation needed for expense reimbursement and
reasonable assurance that resources have been used legally and for the
purposes intended.
The federal government also will be a major partner in the longer-term
recovery and rebuilding of individuals and communities along the Gulf
Coast. Among the areas requiring federal attention are (1) assessing
the environmental hazards created by the storms; (2) rebuilding and
strengthening the levees; (3) providing assistance to school districts
that have enrolled large numbers of evacuee children; and (4) building
the capacity to address demand in multiple victims assistance programs
such as financial assistance or loans for repair and replacement of
housing and the rebuilding of businesses.
This report summarizes recommendations we have made in our work, some
following Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and others in the aftermath of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We are also updating and formalizing
several recommendations initially presented in our March 8, 2006,
testimony. Specifically, we are recommending that DHS (1) rigorously re-
test, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the roles,
responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of leadership,
implementing changes needed to remedy identified coordination problems;
(2) direct that the NRP base plan and its supporting Catastrophic
Incident Annex be supported by more robust and detailed operational
implementation plans; (3) provide guidance and direction for federal,
state, and local planning, training, and exercises to ensure such
activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery
responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a
lead in monitoring federal agencies' efforts to prepare to meet their
responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness
Goal; (5) use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to
invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic
disaster; and (6) provide guidance on advanced procurement practices
and procedures for those federal agencies with roles and
responsibilities under the NRP so that these agencies can better manage
disaster-related procurement, and establish an assessment process to
monitor agencies' continuous planning efforts for their disaster-
related procurement needs and the maintenance of capabilities. We are
also recommending that Congress give federal agencies explicit
authority to take actions to prepare for all types of catastrophic
disasters when there is warning. We also offer some factors that
Congress may wish to consider as it carries out its oversight and
legislative responsibilities with regard to national preparedness and
the recovery of the Gulf Coast region.
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. On
August 28, 2006, DHS provided official written comments that generally
concurred with our recommendations and described an array of actions it
has taken, has underway, or planned to implement them. The full text of
DHS' comments is included in appendix II. We also provided relevant
sections of the draft report to various federal departments and
agencies including the departments of Agriculture, Education, Health
and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, and State, as
well as the Small Business Administration, Environmental Protection
Agency, and Social Security Administration. All but two either stated
they had no comments or generally agreed with the sections that
addressed their areas of responsibility. The Department of Labor noted
that it had reached agreement with FEMA on coordination for disaster
worker safety issues. SBA's comments basically reiterated its comments
on our July 28, 2006 report on its disaster assistance, to which we
responded in that report.
Background:
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita left more than 1,500 dead, affected over
90,000 square miles, caused more than $80 billion in damage, and forced
mass evacuations from five states along the Gulf Coast, according to
DHS. An estimated 600,000 households were displaced from affected areas
and 50,000 to 100,000 households remained in temporary housing 6 months
later. As a result, 44 states and the District of Columbia received
hundreds of thousands of evacuees, providing them with care and shelter
over an extended period. These events tested the nation's ability to
respond to catastrophic events and demonstrated the importance of
ensuring the effectiveness of federal, state, and local emergency
response plans and the ability to quickly synchronize intergovernmental
efforts. This catastrophic disaster provided a sobering picture of the
overwhelming strains on disaster response and recovery capacities if
there are back-to-back catastrophic disasters in the same area.
Significant local, state, and federal resources were mobilized to
respond to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, along with significant
participation from charitable and private-sector organizations. Among
federal agencies, the National Weather Service and its National
Hurricane Center were proactive and vigilant, accurately predicted and
tracked the size, scale, and path of Hurricane Katrina, and regularly
contacted local, state and federal leaders to apprise them of the
situation. The Coast Guard, National Guard, and state and local
responders acted quickly to implement search and rescue efforts that
saved thousands of stranded and desperate victims. The National Guard
and the active military also played a major role in saving lives,
providing food and shelter, and transporting victims who needed
immediate medical care. Federal agencies such as the Postal Service,
Social Security Administration, National Finance Center, Forest
Service, and Internal Revenue Service demonstrated their flexibility in
performing needed activities and services, and responding in the face
of many challenges. However, the capabilities of several federal,
state, and local agencies were clearly overwhelmed. As events unfolded
in the immediate aftermath and ensuing days after Hurricane Katrina's
final landfall, responders at all levels of government--many victims
themselves--encountered significant breakdowns in vital areas such as
emergency communications as well as obtaining and deploying essential
supplies and equipment.
Stafford Act Is the Principal Federal Statute on Federal Disaster
Assistance to States and Localities:
There are several federal legislative and executive provisions that
support preparation for and response to emergency situations. The
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the
Stafford Act)[Footnote 17] primarily establishes the programs and
processes for the federal government to provide major disaster and
emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations,
individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations. Upon a
governor's request, the President can declare an "emergency" or a
"major disaster" under the Stafford Act, which triggers specific types
of federal relief. The Stafford Act defines an emergency as any
occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President,
federal assistance is needed to supplement state and local efforts and
capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health
and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any
part of the United States. Under an emergency declaration, the federal
government has authority to engage in various emergency response
activities, such as debris removal, temporary housing assistance, and
the distribution of medicine, food, and other consumables. The Stafford
Act places a $5 million limit on federal emergency assistance, but the
President may exceed the limit, followed by a report to Congress.
The Stafford Act defines a "major disaster" as any natural catastrophe
or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of
the United States, which the President determines causes damage of
sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance
under the Stafford Act to supplement the efforts and available
resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief
organizations in alleviating damage, loss, hardship, or suffering.
Under a major disaster declaration, the federal government has the
authority to engage in the same activities authorized under an
emergency declaration, but without the $5 million ceiling. In addition,
major disaster assistance includes a variety of assistance not
available in the context of an emergency declaration. For example, in a
major disaster, the federal government may provide unemployment
assistance, food coupons to low-income households, and repair,
restoration and replacement of certain damaged facilities, among other
things.
For Hurricane Katrina, the President issued emergency declarations
under the Stafford Act for Louisiana on August 27, 2005, and
Mississippi and Alabama on August 28, 2005. The President made major
disaster declarations for Florida on August 28, 2005, and Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama on August 29, 2005, the same day that
Hurricane Katrina made final landfall in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana
at 6:10 a.m. and about 4 hours later at the Louisiana/Mississippi
border.
Federal Disaster Assistance and Relief Is to Be Administered by FEMA
under the Stafford Act:
FEMA, within DHS, has responsibility for administering the provisions
of the Stafford Act, the principal federal statute governing federal
disaster assistance and relief. FEMA was an independent agency from
1979 until 2003 and was a cabinet-level agency from 1996 to 2003. FEMA
became part of the newly formed DHS in March 2003. Prior to FEMA's
creation in 1979, federal disaster response and recovery was managed by
an agency within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
The 1960s and early 1970s brought massive disasters requiring major
federal response and recovery operations by the Federal Disaster
Assistance Administration, the department within HUD responsible at
that time for disaster response and recovery. Hurricane Carla struck in
1962, Hurricane Betsy in 1965, Hurricane Camille in 1969, and Hurricane
Agnes in 1972. A major earthquake hit Alaska in 1964, and the San
Fernando earthquake rocked Southern California in 1971. To respond to
national concern regarding these events, Congress passed the 1974
Disaster Relief Act that established the process of presidential
disaster declarations. However, emergency and disaster activities were
still fragmented. Many parallel programs and policies existed at the
state and local level, compounding the complexity of federal disaster
relief efforts. In 1979, President Carter issued an executive order
that merged many of the separate disaster-related responsibilities into
a new, independent Federal Emergency Management Agency. Among other
agencies, FEMA absorbed the Federal Insurance Administration, the
National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, the National
Weather Service Community Preparedness Program, the Federal
Preparedness Agency of the General Services Administration, and the
Federal Disaster Assistance Administration activities from HUD. Civil
defense responsibilities were also transferred to the new agency from
the Defense Department's Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.
Interstate Disaster Assistance was also Provided through the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact:
In addition to resources provided by the federal government, states
affected by a catastrophic disaster can also turn to other states for
assistance in obtaining needed surge capacity--the ability to draw on
additional resources, such as personnel and equipment, needed to
respond to and recover from the incident. One way of sharing personnel
and equipment across state lines is through the use of an interstate
compact that provides a legal and administrative framework for such
emergency requests. Following the devastation of Hurricane Andrew in
1992, the Southern Governors' Association, along with the Virginia
Department of Emergency Services, formed the Southern Regional
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (SREMAC) in August 1993. In
1995, SREMAC opened membership to any state or territory, becoming the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), approved by Congress in
1996.[Footnote 18] As of September 2005, EMAC included all 50 states,
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands and
has been activated during a variety of emergency events including
hurricanes, floods, wildfires, and the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Administered by the National Emergency Management Association
(NEMA),[Footnote 19] the compact establishes a structure for requesting
and deploying assistance, reimbursing states that provide assistance,
and conferring liability and workers' compensation protection. EMAC was
not designed to supplant federal support nor does it obligate member
states to provide resources to another state.
The deployment of resources through EMAC in response to Hurricanes
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma was by far the largest use of state-to-state
mutual assistance in U.S. history. According to EMAC, as of March 24,
2006, Louisiana and Mississippi had made almost 1,900 requests for
assistance resulting in the deployment of 61,450 civilian and National
Guard personnel.
The Homeland Security Act Requires a Comprehensive Approach to Disaster
Preparation and Response:
The Homeland Security Act of 2002[Footnote 20] required the newly
established DHS to develop a comprehensive National Incident Management
System (NIMS). NIMS is intended to provide a consistent framework for
incident management at all jurisdictional levels regardless of the
cause, size, or complexity of the situation and to define the roles and
responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments, and various
first responder disciplines at each level during an emergency event.
NIMS established the Incident Command System as a standard incident
management organization with five functional areas--command,
operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration--for
management of all major incidents. It also prescribes interoperable
communications systems and preparedness before an incident happens,
including planning, training, and exercises.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also required DHS to consolidate
existing federal government emergency response plans into a single,
integrated and coordinated national response plan. In December 2004,
DHS issued the National Response Plan (NRP), intended to be an all-
discipline, all-hazards plan establishing a single, comprehensive
framework for the management of domestic incidents where federal
involvement is necessary. The NRP does not apply to the majority of
incidents occurring each year that are handled by local jurisdictions
or agencies through established authorities and existing plans under
the planning assumption that incidents are typically managed at the
lowest possible geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional level.
Rather, the NRP is applicable to incidents that go beyond the state and
local level and require a coordinated federal response. The NRP,
operating within the framework of NIMS, provides the structure and
mechanisms for national-level policy and operational direction for
domestic incident management. The NRP also includes a Catastrophic
Incident Annex, which describes an accelerated, proactive national
response to catastrophic incidents. A draft of a more detailed and
operationally specific Catastrophic Incident Supplement for the NRP's
Catastrophic Incident Annex had not been approved at the time of
Hurricane Katrina, although the NRP's 120-day schedule for implementing
the supplement had passed. Once finalized, the supplement, as supported
by agency-level implementation agreements and plans, is to serve as the
operational framework for implementing the Catastrophic Incident Annex
for all types of catastrophes.
DHS Policies and Plans Have Identified a Strategy for Building and
Sustaining Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Capabilities:
Capabilities--the ability to carry out specific tasks under particular
conditions with desired results--are built upon the appropriate
combination of people, skills, processes, and assets. Catastrophic
disasters place particularly wide-ranging demands on emergency response
capabilities. By their very nature, catastrophic disasters involve
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption that are
likely to immediately overwhelm state and local responders. For non-
catastrophic disasters, the federal government has historically been in
a support and assist role, providing resources and other assistance to
enable state and local governments to carry out their responsibilities.
However, for catastrophic disasters that can overwhelm the ability of
state and local and voluntary agencies to adequately provide victims
with essential services, the federal government generally plays a more
central role--providing selected resources where they are needed or
likely to be needed. As we noted in our 1993 report following Hurricane
Andrew, where there is warning of a catastrophic disaster, federal
agencies need to mobilize resources and deploy personnel before the
disaster strikes so that the federal government is ready and able to
act quickly to assist the affected areas. However, current law--in
particular the Stafford Act--does not explicitly authorize such pre-
declaration activities.
Developing the capabilities needed for large-scale disasters is part of
an overall national preparedness effort that should integrate and
define what needs to be done, where, based on what standards, how it
should be done, and how well it should be done. Along with the NRP and
NIMS, DHS has developed the National Preparedness Goal, as required by
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8). Considered as a
group, these three documents are intended to guide investments in
emergency preparedness and response capabilities. The NRP describes
what needs to be done in response to an emergency incident, the NIMS
describes how to manage what needs to be done, and the National
Preparedness Goal describes how well it should be done.
The interim National Preparedness Goal is particularly important for
determining what capabilities are needed, especially for a catastrophic
disaster. The December 2005 draft National Preparedness Goal defines
both the 37 major capabilities that first responders should possess to
prevent, protect from, respond to, and recover from a wide range of
incidents and the most critical tasks associated with these
capabilities. An inability to effectively perform these critical tasks
would, by definition, have a detrimental impact on effective
protection, prevention, response, and recovery capabilities. Since
September 11, 2001, the federal government has awarded almost $14
billion in grants and assistance to state and local governments to
assist in building emergency management capabilities.
Federal Government Is a Major Partner in Long-Term Recovery:
Because of the widespread physical and economic damage to the Gulf
Coast, there are numerous examples of the federal government playing a
major role in support of state and local recovery efforts. Debris
removal and repairs to the region's public infrastructure and
residential and commercial properties are proceeding, to a significant
extent, from federal funding designated for the area and much remains
to be done. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is reconstructing the New
Orleans levee system to fix those parts of the system that failed
during Hurricane Katrina. The federal role in rebuilding will be
particularly important for transportation and health infrastructures
and federal facilities.
Our prior work has identified state efforts underway to develop long-
term rebuilding strategies. In Louisiana, the governor and the mayor of
New Orleans have charged different groups with guiding various aspects
of the rebuilding efforts. In Mississippi, the Governor's Commission on
Recovery, Rebuilding and Renewal was formed to develop a strategy for
rebuilding the affected areas of Mississippi. On November 1, 2005, the
President issued Executive Order 13390, which directed the creation of
a central figure in the administration's efforts to support the Gulf
Coast recovery and rebuilding phases.[Footnote 21] Specifically, the
President directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish
within the department the position of Coordinator of Federal Support
for the Recovery and Rebuilding of the Gulf Coast region. The federal
coordinator is responsible for developing principles and goals, leading
the development of federal recovery activities, and monitoring the
implementation of designated federal support. The coordinator also
serves as the focal point for managing information flow, requests for
actions, and discussions with Congress, state and local governments,
the private sector, and community leaders.
Congress and the Administration Have Engaged in Numerous Efforts to
Identify and Recommend Improvements to Catastrophic Disaster
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery:
Beginning in February 2006, several reports from Congress and the
administration have explored the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina
and chronicled many weaknesses and some strengths of the preparation
and response efforts, providing observations and recommendations to
improve national preparedness for and response to catastrophic
disasters. Table 1 contains the resulting reports and a brief
description of their findings.
Table 1: Findings in Reports by Congress and the Administration:
Title and author: DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina
in Louisiana (February 13, 2006) Source: FEMA;
Major Findings: Found improvements needed in areas of communications
and interoperability; FEMA staffing; unified command; logistics and
staging; and operating procedures. Recommendations for FEMA include:
work to strengthen emergency management capability at state and local
levels; review emergency management architecture for reponse and
recovery operations; train,equip, and staff reponse teams; improve the
financial management of disasters; improve leadership and management;
establish command authority in the Joint Field Office(JFO); and
continue catastrophic planning with federal, state, and local,
governments.
Title and author: A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate preparation for and Reponse
to Hurricane Katrina (February 15, 2006) Source: House of
Representatives. House Select Bipartisan Committee;
Major Findings: Identifies 14 major findings: critical elements of the
NRP were executed late, ineffectively or not at all; there was massive
communications damage; command and control was impaired at all levels,
delaying relief; and the military played and invaluable role but
coordination was lacking, among others. No recommendations provided.
Title and author: A Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management
Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina (March 31, 2006) Source:
Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General;
Major Findings: Found FEMA adapted to new response plans with
difficulty; FEMA provided record levels of support but needs to improve
delivery structure; and FEMA needs to improve readiness. Identified 38
recommendations.
Title and Author: Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared: Report
of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (May
2006) Source: U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs;
Major Findings: Found differing roles at different levels of government
affected the reponse; long-term and short-term warnings went unheeded;
preparation provided insufficient; reponse at all levels of government
was unacceptable; long-term factors contributed to poor response; and
waste, fraud, and abuses were identified. Report identified seven
foundational recommendations based on identified systematic weaknesses
and challenges.
Source: GAO analysis of executive branch and congressional reports.
[End of Table]
Leadership Is Critical for Preparing for, Responding to, and Recovering
from Catastrophic Disasters:
Our March 2006 testimony, along with the House, Senate, White House
Homeland Security Council, and DHS reports on the preparation for and
response to Hurricane Katrina discussed the vital importance of
federal, state, and local leadership, including clearly defined and
well understood roles and responsibilities. All the various critiques
of Hurricane Katrina concluded that leadership at all levels of
government should be improved. In preparing for, responding to, and
recovering from any catastrophic disaster, the legal authorities, roles
and responsibilities, and lines of authority for the preparation and
response at all levels of government must be clearly defined,
effectively communicated, and well understood in order to facilitate
rapid and effective decision making. For example, during Hurricane
Katrina, separate roles specified in the NRP and in the Stafford Act
resulted in leadership uncertainty and may have slowed the response,
and some of the NRP's provisions were unclear and may have hindered the
federal government's ability to guide a more proactive response. DHS
has reported taking a number of actions to address leadership issues
raised in the various Hurricane Katrina reports, particularly making
revisions to the NRP to clarify roles, responsibilities, and lines of
authority. Another leadership issue raised in the aftermath of the
disaster was whether the organizational placement of FEMA is
appropriate for its mission.
Communicating and Clearly Defining Leadership Roles, Responsibilities,
and Lines of Authority in Advance of Catastrophic Disasters Is
Essential to Effective Response:
Our March 2006 testimony, and other reports issued on the preparation
for and response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, have all identified
the importance of improved leadership and clearly defined and well
understood roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority at all
levels of government, especially in times of a catastrophe. In the
response to Hurricane Katrina there was confusion regarding roles and
responsibilities under the NRP. This included uncertainty concerning
the roles of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Principal Federal
Officer (PFO), and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), under the
NRP.
At the time of Hurricane Katrina, there were three key roles in the
management of a catastrophic disaster. First, with the passage and
subsequent implementation of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the
Secretary of Homeland Security became the cabinet-level focal point for
response to natural and man-made crises (such as major disasters and
terrorist incidents) requiring a coordinated response and developing a
single, coordinated national response plan for such crises and
incidents. We view this as a strategic role to coordinate federal
activities and policy from a national standpoint and be directly
responsible and accountable to the President, which is consistent with
recommendations we made in 1993. The revised NRP clearly states that
the Secretary of Homeland Security, who reports directly to the
President, is responsible for declaring and managing incidents of
national significance, including catastrophic incidents.
The response to Hurricane Katrina identified unresolved issues
regarding lines of authority with respect to the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the FEMA Director, as well as the key officials reporting
to them, the PFO to the secretary and the FCO to the FEMA Director. For
example, in response to Katrina, the Secretary of Homeland Security
initially designated the head of FEMA as the PFO, who appointed
separate FCOs for Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. It was not,
however, clear who was responsible for coordinating the overall federal
effort at a strategic level. Our fieldwork indicated that the lack of
clarity in leadership roles and responsibilities resulted in disjointed
efforts of many federal agencies involved in the response, a myriad of
approaches and processes for requesting and providing assistance, and
confusion about who should be advised of requests and what resources
would be provided within specific time frames. The House Select
Committee also found difficulties with roles and responsibilities,
including federal officials' unfamiliarity with their roles and
responsibilities under the NRP and NIMS. Likewise, the White House
Homeland Security Council made numerous recommendations, including
giving the PFO the same authority as an FCO to execute responsibilities
and coordinate federal response assets. According to the White House
Homeland Security Council report, giving the PFO this authority could
be accomplished without a change to the Stafford Act by simply
designating the PFO as an FCO.
In our March 8, 2006, testimony, we recommended that DHS clarify and
communicate the roles of the secretary, the PFO, and the FCO,
consistent with the provisions of the Homeland Security Act and the
Stafford Act. In May 2006, DHS revised the NRP to state that the
Secretary of Homeland Security may choose to combine the roles of the
PFO and FCO in a single individual to help ensure synchronized federal
coordination for incidents other than terrorist incidents.[Footnote 22]
In instances where a single PFO/FCO has been appointed, the revised NRP
states that deputy FCOs will be designated for the affected states to
support the PFO/FCO. In addition, DHS has pre-designated regional
officials who will be PFOs and FCOs in the event of an incident of
national significance.
The NRP revisions may not fully resolve the leadership issues with
respect to the PFO and FCO roles. While the secretary may avoid
conflicts by appointing a single individual to serve as PFO and FCO in
non-terrorist incidents, confusion may persist if the secretary does
not exercise this discretion. Furthermore, this discretion does not
exist for terrorist incidents that may result in a Stafford Act
declaration. In a terrorist-caused incident, the PFO and FCO roles
cannot be combined in a single individual, as might be the case in a
natural disaster. The revised NRP does not specifically provide a
rationale for this limitation, although a terrorist incident would
involve law enforcement and criminal investigation activities that the
PFO must coordinate with the Attorney General's representative, the FBI
Special Agent-in-Charge. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether, and to
what extent, the PFO's roles and responsibilities might conflict with
those of the FCO in a terrorist incident resulting in a Stafford Act
declaration. Given the persistent confusion about the NRP regarding key
federal leadership roles and responsibilities in a catastrophic
disaster, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security
rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the
roles, responsibilities, and the lines of authority for all levels of
leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified
coordination problems.
New GAO recommendation to DHS to re-test, train, and exercise its
recent clarification of leadership roles:
DHS should rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent
clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority
for all levels of leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy
identified coordination problems. For more detailed information about
our recommendations, see appendix I.
Provisions of the NRP Regarding Incidents of National Significance Were
Not Clear at the Time of Hurricane Katrina, and Revisions Potentially
Raise New Issues:
We identified an ambiguity in the NRP's triggering mechanisms that
existed at the time Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast--i.e., what
actions were necessary to activate the NRP. The NRP distinguished
between incidents that required DHS coordination and those that did
not. Only those requiring DHS coordination, termed "incidents of
national significance," triggered activation of the NRP. However, it
was not clear whether the Secretary of Homeland Security needed to make
a formal declaration of such an incident to trigger the NRP or whether
such an incident was automatically triggered by one of four criteria
contained in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-
5).[Footnote 23] In our March 2006 testimony, we recommended that DHS
clarify in the NRP whether the Secretary of Homeland Security must
formally declare an incident of national significance to activate the
NRP and, if not, whether the secretary must take any specific actions
when the President, in effect, activates the NRP by declaring a
Stafford Act emergency or major disaster.
The May 25, 2006, revisions to the NRP make clear that the Secretary of
Homeland Security must formally declare an incident of national
significance.[Footnote 24] The four factors stated in HSPD-5 continue
to be primary criteria for such a declaration, but the revised NRP
states that the Secretary of Homeland Security is not limited to these
criteria and may consider other factors in deciding whether to declare
an incident of national significance. According to the revisions, the
key is whether the incident is of such severity, magnitude, or
complexity that it requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to
manage the federal response.
While clarifying the declarations process for incidents of national
significance, the revised NRP potentially raises new implementation
issues. First, the May 2006 revisions of the NRP state that the NRP is
"always in effect," but it is not clear what this means operationally.
Previously, the NRP only applied to incidents of national significance,
which were defined as those incidents requiring DHS coordination. Under
the revised NRP, incidents of national significance are not simply
those incidents requiring DHS coordination, but those that must be
managed directly by the Secretary of Homeland Security. While the
revised NRP makes clear that incidents of national significance must be
declared by and managed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
revised NRP also applies to incidents of lesser severity that may
nevertheless require some federal involvement. According to the revised
NRP, such incidents are to be managed by the federal department or
agency with jurisdictional authority based on a scaled and flexible
implementation of the NRP. There is no declarations process for
incidents of lesser severity and there are no specific plans detailing
how agencies are to address such incidents. In the absence of any
implementation plans or a specific declaration or designation process,
leadership issues may arise in responding to issues of lesser severity.
Proactive Response Provisions of the NRP's Catastrophic Incident Annex
Were Unclear at the Time of Hurricane Katrina, and Implementation
Issues Remain:
The NRP's Catastrophic Incident Annex also was a source of considerable
criticism after Hurricane Katrina. Under the NRP, a catastrophic
incident is any natural or manmade incident (including terrorism) that
results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or
disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure,
environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A
catastrophic incident could result in sustained national impacts over a
prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally
available to state, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in
the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations
and emergency services to such an extent that national security could
be threatened. The annex describes an accelerated, proactive national
response to catastrophic incidents and establishes protocols to pre-
identify and rapidly deploy essential resources expected to be urgently
needed. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, a draft supplement to the
annex would have limited the annex's scope to no-notice or short-notice
catastrophic incidents, not incidents that may evolve or mature to
catastrophic magnitude, which could be the case with strengthening
hurricanes. Importantly, and consistent with a prior GAO
recommendation, the revised NRP does not include this limitation. While
stating that the catastrophic incident annex is primarily designed to
address no-notice or short-notice catastrophic incidents that defy
advance planning and resource pre-positioning, the revised NRP states
that projected catastrophic incidents (e.g., hurricanes) are also
covered by the annex. In the event there is time to assess the
requirements and plan for a catastrophic event, the proactive federal
response and pre-positioning of assets is to be tailored to address the
specific situation.
A proactive approach to catastrophic disasters when there is warning is
consistent with recommendations we made in 1993 following Hurricane
Andrew.[Footnote 25]FEMA generally agreed with our findings and
recommendations and had begun taking actions to address them. We noted
that some of the improvements necessary in the overall federal response
were outside of FEMA's control, such as Presidential action to
strengthen leadership for the federal response by designating a key
White House or cabinet-level official to oversee the federal
government's overall preparedness and response activities for
catastrophic disasters. In 1996, FEMA became a cabinet agency whose
director reported directly to the President, consistent with our 1993
recommendation to the President.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 made FEMA a part of DHS in March
2003, with its director reporting to the Secretary of Homeland
Security. As a result of the new national response framework brought
about by the Homeland Security Act, HSPD-5 and the NRP, the Secretary
of Homeland Security became the cabinet-level focal point for emergency
preparedness and response, and the principal Federal official for
domestic incident management. The role assigned to the secretary
through this framework is consistent with our 1993 recommendation.
However, the experience of Katrina revealed some of the same problems
that led to our 1993 recommendation, including a lack of clarity with
regard to federal leadership roles and responsibilities for the
response. For example, the secretary promptly designated the Director
of FEMA as PFO under the NRP, whose responsibilities included serving
as the secretary's personal representative on the scene, providing
situational awareness, and coordinating the federal response. However,
as noted in subsequent testimony and congressional reports, problems
arose with regard to the FEMA Director's reporting relationship with
the secretary and the White House during the response, and it was
unclear who was directly accountable to the President for the overall
federal strategic coordination and management of the incident. The
Secretary of Homeland Security did not perform this role, and the
Director of FEMA was not in a position to effectively perform this
role. As noted above, the revised NRP addresses this issue with respect
to incidents of national significance, by requiring the Secretary of
Homeland Security to declare such incidents, including those deemed
catastrophic, and to manage the federal response following such a
declaration. Maintaining at the secretary level the strategic role,
described earlier, of coordinating federal activities and policy from a
national standpoint, and being directly responsible and accountable to
the President, is critical to ensuring an efficient federal response
and vital presidential leadership during a catastrophic disaster. These
responsibilities should be performed by the secretary and not delegated
to the PFO or FCO in such circumstances.
We continue to believe that our other 1993 recommendations still apply
in terms of improving the nation's response to catastrophic disasters.
For example, the NRP's catastrophic incident annex needs to be
supported with more robust and detailed operational implementation
plans. In addition, we are renewing our recommendation that Congress
should consider giving federal agencies explicit authority to take
actions to prepare for catastrophic disasters when there is warning. In
1993 we found that federal response time could be reduced by
encouraging agencies to do as much advance preparation as possible
prior to a disaster declaration. When there is early warning, as there
is for hurricanes, DOD and other federal agencies need to mobilize
resources and deploy personnel before the catastrophe strikes. However,
current law--in particular, the Stafford Act--does not explicitly
authorize such pre-declaration activities. Therefore, federal agencies
may fail to undertake advance preparation, because of uncertainty over
whether FEMA will request their assistance and whether costs incurred
before a disaster declaration will ultimately be reimbursed by FEMA.
New GAO matter for congressional consideration:
Congress should give federal agencies explicit authority to take
actions to prepare for catastrophic disasters when there is warning.
For more detailed information about our recommendations, see appendix
I.
Our review of the NRP and its catastrophic incident annex--as well as
lessons from Hurricane Katrina--demonstrate the need for DHS and other
federal agencies to develop robust and detailed operational plans to
implement the catastrophic incident annex and its supplement in
preparation for and response to future catastrophic disasters. DHS has
not yet released the supplement to the catastrophic incident annex,
more than a year after Katrina and its original target date. The
catastrophic incident supplement is intended as the more operationally
specific companion to the catastrophic incident annex. For example, the
September 2005 draft supplement includes operations to be carried out
by local, state, and federal responders; detailed execution schedules
and implementation strategies; functional capability overviews (such as
coverage for transportation support); and key responsibilities of
federal departments and agencies. Until DHS finalizes and distributes
the supplement, neither DHS nor other federal agencies that have
responsibilities under the supplement can finalize the detailed
implementation plans required to make the NRP fully operational for
catastrophic disasters. Therefore, as noted in our March testimony, we
are recommending that DHS direct that the NRP base plan and its
Catastrophic Incident Annex be supported by more robust and detailed
operational implementation plans, particularly the Catastrophic
Incident Supplement to the NRP. Such operational plans should, for
example, further define and leverage those military capabilities that
might be needed in a catastrophic disaster.[Footnote 26]
New GAO recommendation to DHS for detailed and robust implementation
plans for the NRP:
DHS should direct that the NRP base plan and its Catastrophic Incident
Annex be supported by more robust and detailed operational
implementation plans, particularly the Catastrophic Incident
Supplemental to the NRP. Such operational plans should, for example
further define and leverage those military capabilities that might be
needed in a catastrophic disaster. For more information about our
recommendations, see appendix I.
Federal Coordination Issues with the NRP Have Not Been Fully Addressed
by Recent Revisions:
Our ongoing Hurricane Katrina-related work has identified other
examples of possible implementation issues within the NRP related to
coordination within and across federal government entities. These
involve coordination issues for search and rescue, the military
response, worker safety and the role and responsibilities of the Red
Cross. First, the NRP did not fully address search and rescue missions.
While tens of thousands of people were rescued through the efforts of
the military, civilian government, and private rescuers, the lack of
clarity in search and rescue plans led to operations that, according to
aviation officials, were not as efficient as they should have been.
Under the National Search and Rescue Plan[Footnote 27] the Coast Guard
ordinarily had responsibility for providing or arranging maritime
search and rescue services, and the Air Force ordinarily had
responsibility for providing or arranging non-maritime search and
rescue. The plan also called on DOD to support civil search and rescue,
and it stated that DOD and Coast Guard commands should provide their
facilities for civil search and rescue to the fullest extent
practicable. While the NRP acknowledged the existence of the National
Search and Rescue Plan, the NRP did not specifically address how the
Coast Guard and the Air Force organizational responsibilities in the
National Search and Rescue Plan coincided with the NRP's urban search
and rescue annex. In addition, the National Search and Rescue Plan had
not been updated to reflect the NRP. As a result of the lack of clear
search and rescue guidance, the aviation portion of military search and
rescue operations was not fully integrated with the helicopter search
and rescue operations of the Coast Guard and other rescuers. Moreover,
no one had the total picture of the missions that had been resourced
and the missions that still needed to be performed during the response
to Hurricane Katrina.
Second, the military mounted a massive response to Hurricane Katrina
that saved many lives and greatly assisted recovery efforts. However,
the NRP made little distinction between the military response to
smaller, regional disasters and the military response to large-scale,
catastrophic natural disasters even though past disasters had shown
that the military tends to play a much larger role in catastrophes. We
found a lack of understanding within the military and among federal,
state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and
capabilities that DOD might provide in the event of a catastrophe--for
example, timely damage assessments or communications capabilities--the
timing of this assistance, and the respective contributions of the
active-duty and National Guard forces. For example, neither the NRP,
DHS, nor DOD had fully identified the military's extensive
reconnaissance assets or communications capabilities that could be
brought to bear in a catastrophe. In the absence of this planning, some
of the military's available assets were never requested or proactively
deployed.
To improve the military response to catastrophic disasters, we have
recommended that the Secretary of Defense (1) provide proposed
revisions of the NRP to DHS that addresses the proactive functions the
military is expected to make during a catastrophic incident, and (2)
establish milestones and expedite the development of detailed plans and
exercises to fully account for the unique capabilities and support that
the military is likely to provide to civil authorities in response to
the full range of domestic disasters, including catastrophic disasters.
Furthermore, the plans and exercises should specifically address the
use of reconnaissance, communications, and search and rescue
capabilities; integration of active component and National Guard and
Reserve forces; and the role the military might be expected to play in
logistics.[Footnote 28] DOD should direct the National Guard Bureau to
work with state governors to develop and maintain a list of the types
of capabilities the National Guard will likely provide in response to
domestic natural disasters. DOD commented on our recommendations,
partially concurring with each of them: DOD said that proactive
military functions can be identified in all 15 major disaster scenarios
and said it is working with the Department of Homeland Security to
revise the NRP. While DOD stated that the long-term focus of the U.S.
government should be to develop more robust domestic disaster
capabilities within the Department of Homeland Security, it
acknowledged that DOD will need to assume a more robust response role
in the interim period, when other responders lack the resources and
expertise to handle a particular disaster. DOD also listed a number of
steps it is taking to improve its disaster response planning and
exercises. It also said that consistent with its Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Civil Support the active component should complement, but
not duplicate, the National Guard's likely role as an early responder.
DOD said that logistics planning and execution are the clear
responsibility of FEMA and individual states, and DOD would remain
ready in a supporting role. However, we continue to believe that DOD
should plan and prepare to assume additional emergency support function
responsibilities during catastrophic disasters when other responders
may be overwhelmed.
Third, our ongoing work examining worker safety issues has found that
the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) and FEMA officials disagreed about which agency was responsible
for ensuring the safety and health of response and recovery workers.
OSHA and FEMA disagreed over who had the leadership role as the Safety
and Health Coordinator at the Joint Field Office in each state and in
the field. This lack of clarity about each other's roles and procedures
resulted in delayed implementation of the NRP's Worker Safety and
Health Support Annex. Following a review of the draft of this report,
OSHA reported that their agency and FEMA have worked together to
develop procedures for role of the Safety and Health Coordinator in the
Joint Field Office and for the NRP's Worker Safety and Health Support
Annex.
Lastly, the Red Cross and FEMA also had differing views about their
roles and responsibilities under Emergency Support Function-6 (ESF-6)
of the NRP, which hampered efforts to coordinate federal mass care
assistance. The two organizations differed in their understanding of
the role of the ESF-6 coordinator, according to a key FEMA official
tasked with providing strategic vision and leading efforts to
coordinate federal mass care, housing, and human services assistance.
This difference in expectations about the role of the ESF-6 coordinator
created tension between FEMA and the Red Cross and affected the
organizations' working relationship. Additionally, Red Cross staffing
policies, which directed staff and volunteers to rotate every 2 to 3
weeks and the absence of a comprehensive FEMA system to track Red Cross
requests for assistance also hindered the Red Cross and FEMA's working
relationship during hurricane relief efforts. Red Cross and FEMA
officials have stated they are working to clarify future roles and
responsibilities.
To clarify roles and responsibilities within ESF-6 for the 2006
hurricane season, and to help ensure that FEMA's resource tracking
system will meet the needs of those requesting FEMA assistance, we have
recommended that the Secretary of DHS should direct FEMA to work with
the Red Cross as soon as possible to reach agreement on the operating
procedures that they will both use in the event of an incident of
national significance and ensure that FEMA obtains input from the Red
Cross as it develops a resource tracking system. DHS did not provide a
response to our recommendations, noting that FEMA was actively
preparing for the hurricane season. We have also recommended that the
Chief Executive Officer of the Red Cross implement ESF-6 staffing
strategies that better facilitate the development of working
relationships and retain institutional knowledge.[Footnote 29]
The Red Cross endorsed and is taking actions, as applicable, to
address, two of our recommendations. For example, the Red Cross said it
has been working closely with FEMA in recent months to develop and
finalize a memorandum of understanding that outlines areas of mutual
support and cooperation with respect to response and recovery in
presidentially-declared disasters and emergencies. Overall, the Red
Cross agreed with our conclusion that coordination between FEMA and the
Red Cross could be improved for the 2006 hurricane season. With respect
to our recommendation about staffing strategies, the Red Cross said
that it is in the process of hiring ESF-6 reservists who will be
deployed for extended periods of time to perform Red Cross ESF-6 mass
care functions at the federal level.
DHS Reported Taking Some Actions to Improve Leadership in Response to
Findings in Congress' and the Administration's Reviews:
In addition to changes to the NRP, DHS has reported taking other
actions to improve DHS leadership during major disasters. In July 2006,
Secretary of Homeland Security Chertoff sent letters to the governors
of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi identifying the PFO and FCO for
their respective states with the purpose of permitting coordinated,
collaborative federal, state, pre-disaster planning and communications.
Each of these letters differed somewhat in content, but generally
summarized the agreements on DHS's assistance for each state, including
pre-positioned supplies and equipment and identified key federal and
state roles and responsibilities in the event of a catastrophic event.
Each letter also emphasized that evacuation "is fundamentally a state
and local responsibility." Similar letters were also sent to the chief
executive of all the states and territories, according to DHS.
DHS has also reported taking other actions to improve DHS leadership
during major disasters through communications such as press releases,
speeches by top officials, and congressional testimonies by the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Undersecretary for Preparedness,
the recently confirmed Undersecretary for Federal Emergency Management
(who is also the FEMA Director), and FEMA's Director of Operations.
These reported actions include improvements to national preparedness
and integrating the use of the military's capabilities. Table 2 lists
the White House Homeland Security Council recommendations regarding
leadership, with the White House Homeland Security Council report's
"critical action" recommendations. According to DHS officials, they
were to have implemented 11 recommendations that the White House
Homeland Security Council said were essential for the 2006 hurricane
season. However, DHS has not provided us with the documentation needed
to verify these actions. DHS officials have stated that they have put a
more experienced senior leadership team in place at FEMA and created a
National Operations Center to improve coordination and situational
awareness.
Table 2: Implementation of White House Homeland Security Council
Recommendations for the 2006 Hurricane Season: Recommendations Related
to Leadership Issues:
Recommendations related to leadership: Critical action recommendation:
Ensure co-location of relevant federal, state, and local decision-
makers, including leaders of state National Guards, to enhance unity of
effort;
Primary agency(ies) responsible for implementation: Department of
Homeland Security;
Supporting agency(ies) responsible for implementation: All federal
agencies.
Recommendations related to leadership: Critical action recommendation:
For events preceded by warning, ensure preparations to pre-position a
fully resourced and integrated interagency Federal Joint Field Office
(JFO) to coordinate and, if necessary, direct federal support to the
disaster;
Primary agency(ies) responsible for implementation: Department of
Homeland Security;
Supporting agency(ies) responsible for implementation: Office of
Management and Budget, Department of Defense.
Recommendations related to leadership: Critical Action Recommendation:
Co-locate a single Department of Defense point of contact at the JFO
and current FEMA regional offices to enhance coordination of military
resources supporting the response;
Primary agency(ies) responsible for implementation: Department of
Defense, Department of Homeland Security;
Supporting agency(ies) responsible for implementation: N/A.
Recommendations related to leadership: Critical Action Recommendation:
Identify and develop rosters of federal, state, and local government
personnel who are prepared to assist in disaster relief;
Primary agency(ies) responsible for implementation: Department od
Homeland Security;
Supporting agency(ies) responsible for implementation: All federal
agencies.
Recommendations related to leadership: Critical Action Recommendation:
Enhance ongoing review of state evacuation plans and incorporate
planning for continuity-of-government to ensure continuation of
essential and emergency services;
Primary agency(ies) responsible for implementation: Department of
Homeland Security;
Supporting agency(ies) responsible for implementation: Homeland
Security Council.
Recommendations related to leadership: Establish an interagency team of
senior planners with appropriate emergency management experience to
conduct a comprehensive, 90-day review of the NRP and the NIMS;
Primary agency(ies) responsible for implementation: Department of
Homeland Security;
Supporting agency(ies) responsible for implementation: All federal
agencies.
Recommendations related to leadership: Revise the NRP to address
situations that render state and local governments incapable of an
effective response;
Primary agency(ies) responsible for implementation: Department of
Homeland Security;
Supporting agency(ies) responsible for implementation: All federal
agencies.
Recommendations related to leadership: PFO should have the authority to
execute responsibilities and coordinate federal response assets;
Primary agency(ies) responsible for implementation: Department of
Homeland Security;
Supporting agency(ies) responsible for implementation: N/A.
Recommendations related to leadership: Establish national information
requirements and a national information reporting chain;
Primary agency(ies) responsible for implementation: Department of
Homeland Security;
Supporting agency(ies) responsible for implementation: All federal
agencies.
Recommendations related to leadership: Establish the Disaster Response
Group;
Primary agency(ies) responsible for implementation: Homeland Security
Council;
Supporting agency(ies) responsible for implementation: Members of the
Homeland Security Council.
Recommendations related to leadership: Develop recommendations for
revision of the NRP to delineate the circumstances, objectives, and
limitations of when DOD might temporarily assume the lead for the
Federal response to a catastrophic incident;
Primary agency(ies) responsible for implementation: Department of
Homeland Security, Department of Defense;
Supporting agency(ies) responsible for implementation: N/A.
Recommendations related to leadership: Revise the Immediate Response
Authority (IRA) policy to allow commanders, in appropriate
circumstances, to exercise IRA even without a request from local
authorities;
Primary agency(ies) responsible for implementation: Department of
Defense;
Supporting agency(ies) responsible for implementation: N/A.
Recommendations related to leadership: Establish standards for
“pushing” the pre-positioning of federal assets to states and locals,
in the case of an imminent catastrophe;
Primary agency(ies) responsible for implementation: Department of
Homeland Security;
Supporting agency(ies) responsible for implementation: All federal
agencies.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS and Homeland Security Council data:
Note: N/A = not applicable:
[End of Table]
As a Result of FEMA's Performance during Hurricane Katrina, Questions
Have Been Raised about Its Organizational Placement:
FEMA's performance problems in responding to Hurricane Katrina have
been well documented in the several reports. In addition to the
problems related to roles and responsibilities and lines of authority
previously discussed, the House Select Committee noted that (1) senior
officials were ill prepared due to their lack of experience and
knowledge of the required roles and responsibilities prescribed by the
NRP; (2) having lost a number of top disaster specialists, senior
leaders, and other experienced personnel since 2002, DHS and FEMA
lacked adequately trained and experienced staff for the Katrina
response; and (3) FEMA's logistics systems were unable to support large-
scale logistical challenges. There is concern among members of Congress
that the causes of FEMA's response and recovery problems may stem from
FEMA's organizational placement and its budgetary relationship within
DHS.
Different approaches have been suggested for addressing FEMA's
performance problems in responding to Hurricane Katrina. The White
House Homeland Security Council report's recommendations covered areas
such as improving DHS expertise and experience, development of a
national crisis communications system, and development of DHS regions
that are fully staffed, trained, and equipped to manage and coordinate
all preparedness activities and any emergency that may require a
substantial federal response. There are some proposals in Congress that
would keep FEMA within DHS, but statutorily reorganize the agency's
responsibilities and lines of authority. Other proposals would remove
FEMA from DHS and reconstitute it as an independent agency, much as it
was prior to the creation of DHS. As we stated in our March 8 and May
9, 2006, testimonies, organizational changes alone, while potentially
important, are not enough to adequately address the underlying systemic
conditions that resulted in FEMA's performance problems. In our view, a
number of factors may be ultimately more important to FEMA's success in
responding to and recovering from future disasters than its
organizational placement. Conditions underlying FEMA's performance
during Hurricane Katrina involved the experience and training of DHS or
FEMA leadership; the clarity of FEMA's mission and related
responsibilities and authorities to achieve mission performance
expectations; the adequacy of its human, financial, and technological
resources; and the effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related
partnerships. These issues must be addressed whether or not FEMA
remains in DHS. For example, we believe that the position of FEMA
Director and other key FEMA leadership and managerial positions could
benefit from having statutory professional qualifications requirements.
In addition, Congress should consider a term appointment for the FEMA
Director and other selected positions.
If an organizational change remains under consideration, our past work
could be helpful. Before the formation of DHS in 2003, we testified
before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security that
reorganizations of government agencies frequently encounter start-up
problems and unanticipated consequences, are unlikely to fully overcome
obstacles and challenges, and may require additional modifications in
the future.[Footnote 30] Some considerations from our prior work that
are relevant to FEMA's organizational placement include.
* Mission Relevancy: Is homeland security a major part of the agency or
program mission? Is it the primary mission of the agency or program?
* Similar Goal and Objectives: Does the agency or program being
considered share primary goals and objectives with the other components
and programs in the department as a whole?
* Leverage Effectiveness: Does the agency or program under
consideration create synergy and help to leverage the effectiveness of
other agencies and programs within the department as a whole?
* Gains through Consolidation: Does the agency or program being
considered improve the efficiency and effectiveness of homeland
security missions through eliminating duplications and overlaps,
closing gaps, and aligning or merging common roles and
responsibilities?
In addition, the dispersion of responsibility for preparedness and
response across more than one federal agency was a problem we
identified during the formation of DHS. When Congress created DHS, it
separated FEMA's responsibilities for preparedness and response
activities into two DHS directorates. Responsibility for preparedness
for terrorism disasters was placed in the department's Border and
Transportation Security Directorate, which included FEMA's Office of
National Preparedness. Other types of FEMA disaster preparedness and
response efforts were transferred to the department's Emergency
Preparedness and Response Directorate, which included FEMA. In January
2003, we observed that this organizational arrangement would challenge
FEMA in ensuring the effective coordination of preparedness and
response efforts and enhancing the provision and management of disaster
assistance for efficient and effective response. A division of
responsibility remains under the recent DHS reorganization resulting
from Secretary Chertoff's Second Stage Review. Preparedness efforts--
including planning, training, exercising, and funding--are consolidated
into a Preparedness Directorate, while FEMA maintains responsibility
for response and recovery missions and reports directly to the
Secretary of Homeland Security.[Footnote 31] Secretary Chertoff has
stated that the reorganization would refocus FEMA on its historic
mission of response and recovery. Legislation has been introduced in
both the House and Senate that would reorganize the emergency
management structure of the federal government. Two of the bills, for
example, would amend the Homeland Security Act to create a new
emergency management organization within DHS that would combine FEMA
and the Preparedness Directorate.[Footnote 32]
Enhanced Capabilities for Catastrophic Response and Recovery Are
Needed:
Developing the capabilities needed for large-scale disasters is part of
an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate
and define what needs to be done, where, based on what standards, how
it should be done, and how well it should be done. The nation's
experience with Hurricane Katrina reinforces some of the concerns
surrounding the adequacy of the nation's capabilities in the context of
a catastrophic disaster--particularly for capabilities such as the
assessment of the disaster's effects, communications, logistics of
supplies and services, and mass care and sheltering of victims.
Ensuring that needed capabilities are available requires effective
planning and coordination and training and exercises whereby
capabilities are realistically tested, and problems are identified and
subsequently addressed across all stakeholders. DHS has reported taking
some actions to improve capabilities in response to findings in
Congress' and the administration's reviews. However, ongoing work is
still needed by DHS to address FEMA's significant human resource
challenges (e.g., a large number of open positions, skill gaps, and
succession planning challenges). Finally, risk management principles
can be applied as part of the development of capabilities to guide
federal, state, and local decision making by thinking about risk
systematically within the normal cycle of development and
implementation at all levels.
Capabilities Were Not Adequate for a Catastrophic Disaster:
The various reports and our own work on FEMA's performance before,
during, and after Hurricane Katrina suggest that FEMA's human,
financial, and technological resources and capabilities were
insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the unprecedented degree
of damage and the resulting number of hurricane victims. For example,
the Senate's report concluded that FEMA did not have the resources to
fulfill the mission and respond effectively in a catastrophic event and
recommended that DHS develop the national capabilities--especially
adequate surge capacity--it needs to respond to catastrophic disasters,
ensuring it has sufficient full-time staff, response teams, contracting
personnel, and adequately trained and sufficiently staffed reserve
corps to ramp up capabilities, when needed. The Senate report also
identified the need for DHS to complete and/or adopt technology and
information management systems to effectively manage catastrophic
disaster-related activities. The report concluded that resources are
needed for staffing and preparation of regional strike teams, better
development of a trained cadre of reservists, and the development of
new logistics capabilities. FEMA's assessment of its initial response
concluded that the agency needed to lead an audit of current staffing
capability and workforce demands for staff in a severe or catastrophic
event and determine the number of personnel available to serve in each
position or unit for such an event. Their assessment also concluded
that FEMA needs to develop a communications suite that operates
independently of normal communications infrastructure and is able to be
moved into disaster locations. Similarly, the White House Homeland
Security Council report identified the need for each homeland security
region to have access to the resources, equipment, and personnel needed
to establish a self-sufficient, temporary Joint Field Office to direct
response and recovery efforts anywhere within the region.
In developing its lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, the White
House Homeland Security Council has recommended that future
preparedness of the federal, state, and local authorities should be
based on the risk, capabilities, and needs structure of the National
Preparedness Goal. More specifically, the White House Homeland Security
Council recommended that the National Preparedness Goal and its target
capabilities list should be used, for example, in (1) defining required
capabilities and what levels of those capabilities are needed,
including those within the purview of the federal government; (2)
developing mutual aid agreements and compacts informed by the National
Preparedness Goal's requirements; and (3) developing strategies to meet
required levels of capabilities that prioritize investments on the
basis of risk.
Developing the capabilities needed for large-scale disasters is part of
an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate
and define what needs to be done, where, based on what standards, how
it should be done, and how well it should be done. The NRP defines
"preparedness" as the "range of deliberate, critical tasks and
activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational
capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from
domestic incidents. Preparedness is a continuous process involving
efforts at all levels of government and between government and private-
sector and nongovernmental organizations to identify threats, determine
vulnerabilities, and identify required resources." In our earlier work
on the National Preparedness Goal, we observed that if properly planned
and executed, the goal and its related products, such as program
implementation plans and requirements, may help guide the development
of realistic budget and resource plans for an all-hazards national
preparedness program.[Footnote 33] However, questions remain regarding
what should be expected in terms of the expanded capabilities and
mutual aid needed from other jurisdictions to meet the demands of a
catastrophic disaster. The nation's experience with Hurricane Katrina
reinforces some of the questions surrounding the adequacy of
capabilities in the context of a catastrophic disaster--particularly in
the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency
communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics,
and (6) mass care and sheltering.
Situational Assessment and Awareness:
Situational assessment and awareness activities are a critical
capability common across all phases of an incident (i.e., preparedness,
response, and recovery), to immediately estimate services needed by
communities and disaster victims. The NRP notes that following a
disaster, state and local governments are responsible for conducting
initial damage assessments, but it also notes that state and local
officials could be overwhelmed in a catastrophe. Our prior work has
pointed out that the NRP does not specify the proactive means or
capabilities the federal government should use to conduct damage
assessments and gain situational awareness when the responsible state
and local officials are overwhelmed. For example, the military has
significant assets to provide situational assessment and awareness, and
although some of its capabilities were employed during Hurricane
Katrina, there had been no advance planning among federal, state, and
local responders as to how DOD might support this capability in the
event of a catastrophic disaster. As a result, response efforts were
hampered by the federal government's failure to fully use its available
assets to conduct timely, comprehensive damage assessments in Louisiana
and Mississippi. In 1993, we also identified the failure to quickly
assess damage and gain situational awareness as a problem during
Hurricane Andrew in 1992.[Footnote 34] We recommended then that FEMA
improve its catastrophic disaster response capability by using existing
authority to aggressively respond to catastrophic disasters, assessing
the extent of damage, and then advising state and local officials of
identified needs and the federal resources available to address them.
Our analysis shows that neither the NRP nor DOD's functional plan
specifically called for the proactive use of the military's extensive
reconnaissance assets as part of a proactive response to catastrophic
incidents. About 4 days after Katrina's landfall the military began
providing imagery data from some of its reconnaissance assets to its
forces and civilian agencies, although some information was classified
due to its source and could not be shared directly with civilian
agencies. Also, some agencies were not able to access some of the
available information because the data files were too large to
download. A National Guard Hurricane Katrina after-action review
reported that the adjutants general in Mississippi and Louisiana
required real-time imagery that the military community should have been
able to provide, but did not. Because state and local officials were
overwhelmed and the military's extensive reconnaissance capabilities
were not effectively leveraged, responders began organizing and
deploying without fully understanding the extent of the damage or the
required assistance. In contrast, DOD officials told us that almost
immediately after Hurricane Rita struck Louisiana and Texas in
September 2005, considerable assets were made available to assess
damage, primarily because of lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina.
To improve the military response to catastrophic disasters, we have
recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish milestones and
expedite the development of detailed plans and exercises to fully
account for the unique capabilities and support that the military is
likely to provide to civil authorities in response to the full range of
domestic disasters, including catastrophes; and that the plans and
exercises should specifically address the use of reconnaissance
capabilities.[Footnote 35] In May 2006, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense testified that U.S. Northern Command was
developing a reconnaissance annex to its Defense Support to Civil
Authorities Contingency Plan and had tested the annex's concepts during
an 11-day exercise in May 2006.
Emergency Communications:
Emergency communications is a critical capability common across all
phases of an incident. Agencies communications systems during a
catastrophic disaster must first be operable, with sufficient
communications to meet everyday internal and emergency communication
requirements. Once operable, they then should have communications
interoperability whereby public safety agencies (e.g., police, fire,
emergency medical services, etc.) and service agencies (e.g., public
works, transportation, and hospitals) can communicate within and across
agencies and jurisdictions in real time as needed. Hurricane Katrina
caused significant damage to the communication infrastructure in
Louisiana and Mississippi, which further contributed to a lack of
situational awareness for military and civilian officials. Hurricane
Katrina destroyed or severely degraded many commercial landline and
cellular telephone systems. In addition, emergency radio systems usage
exceeded their capacity, making it difficult to establish necessary
connections between officials and responders at the local, state, and
federal levels, and to implement other capabilities. For example, even
when local officials were able to conduct damage assessments, the lack
of communications assets caused delays in transmitting the results of
the assessments. As a result, it was difficult for officials to share
situational awareness.
The military, other government agencies, and public companies all have
extensive communications assets and capabilities, but DHS has
responsibility for coordinating communications for disaster response
operations under the NRP. Our work has found, however, that neither DHS
nor DOD fully identified the extensive military communication
capabilities that could be leveraged as part of a proactive federal
response to catastrophic disasters.[Footnote 36] For example, although
DOD's emergency response plan addressed internal military
communications requirements, DOD did not address the communication
requirements of communities affected by a catastrophic natural
disaster, and it did not address coordination with civilian responders.
As previously noted, we have made recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense to develop detailed plans and exercises regarding the unique
capabilities and support, such as communications capabilities, that the
military is likely to provide to civil authorities.[Footnote 37] In May
2006, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense testified
that DOD had taken a number of steps to increase communications
capabilities in regions affected by disasters. These include
authorizing the Command of U.S. Northern Command to deploy
communications capabilities and develop pre-scripted requests for
assistance for deployable communications options.
Our prior work on interoperable communications identified problem
definition, performance goals and standards, and defining the roles of
federal, state, local government and other entities as the three
principal challenges to achieving effective interoperable
communications for first responders. The single greatest barrier to
addressing the decades-old problems of interoperable communications has
been the lack of effective, collaborative, interdisciplinary, and
intergovernmental planning. Our 2004 recommendations called for DHS to:
(1) work with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to develop a
nationwide database of interoperable communications frequencies and a
common nomenclature so that first responders from different disciplines
and jurisdictions can quickly identify shared frequencies when arriving
at the scene of an incident; (2) establish interoperability
requirements whose achievement can be measured; and (3) encourage
states through DHS grants to establish statewide bodies that will
develop a comprehensive statewide interoperable communications plan and
condition the purchase of new equipment on the adoption of such a
plan.[Footnote 38] DHS responded that it was developing a nationwide
database of interoperable public safety communications frequencies and
also said it planned to work on a common nomenclature across public
safety disciplines and jurisdictions. DHS also said it is developing a
methodology to establish a national baseline of public safety
communication and interoperability capabilities with input from the
public safety community. On June 16, 2006, the FCC published a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking to address and implement the recommendations of
an independent panel that reviewed the impact of Hurricane Katrina on
communications networks. The FCC identified 18 actions that the
Commission can take in conjunction with the private sector and state
and local governments, and other federal departments, to promote
heightened readiness and preparedness, and effective and efficient
response and recovery efforts.[Footnote 39]
Evacuations:
By definition, a catastrophic disaster like Hurricane Katrina will
impact a large geographic area, necessitating the evacuation of people-
-including vulnerable populations, such as hospital patients, nursing
home residents, and transportation-disadvantaged populations who were
not in such facilities. Although state and local governments can order
evacuations, health care facilities can be exempt from these orders.
Hospital and nursing home administrators often face challenges related
to evacuations caused by hurricanes, including deciding whether to
evacuate and obtaining transportation. Nursing home administrators must
locate receiving facilities that can accommodate residents who may need
a place to live for a long period of time. If a hospital or nursing
home does decide to evacuate, contractors providing transportation for
hospitals and nursing homes could be unable to provide enough vehicles
during a major disaster because local demand for transportation could
exceed supply.
We have conducted work related to the evacuation of special needs
populations in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The National
Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is the primary federal program that
supports the evacuation of patients in need of hospital care during
disasters such as hurricanes. We found that the program has two
limitations in its design that constrain its assistance to state and
local governments with patient evacuation. The first limitation is that
NDMS evacuation efforts begin at a mobilization center, such as an
airport, and do not include short-distance transportation assets, such
as ambulances or helicopters, to move patients out of health care
facilities to mobilization centers. Even during a catastrophe when
state and local government capabilities are almost immediately
overwhelmed, short-distance transportation remains a state and local
responsibility.[Footnote 40] The second limitation is that NDMS
supports the evacuation of patients needing hospital care; the program
was not designed nor is it currently configured to move people who do
not require hospitalization, such as nursing home residents, which
remains a state and local responsibility.
NDMS supplemented state and local emergency response capabilities with
federal resources and services and helped evacuate about 2,900 people
during recent hurricanes, including Hurricane Katrina. According to
program officials the program was actually designed to evacuate and
transport hospital patients starting from a federally-designated
mobilization center, although NDMS supported evacuation efforts during
Hurricane Katrina that included nursing home residents. NDMS officials
explained that the program does not have agreements with nursing homes
that could receive evacuated nursing home residents or appropriate
transportation such as special buses that could transport them.
To address limitations in how the federal government provides
assistance with the evacuation of health care facilities, we have
recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security clearly delineate
how the federal government will assist state and local governments with
the movement of patients and residents out of hospitals and nursing
homes to a mobilization center where NDMS transportation begins; and in
consultation with the other NDMS federal partners--the Secretaries of
Defense, Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs--clearly
delineate how to address the needs of nursing home residents during
evacuations, including the arrangements necessary to relocate these
residents.[Footnote 41] DHS said it would take the recommendation under
advisement as it reviews the National Response Plan, confirming that
the federal government becomes involved in evacuations only when the
capabilities of state and local governments are overwhelmed.
We conducted work examining the nation's efforts to protect children
after the Gulf Coast hurricanes and identified evacuation challenges
for this population.[Footnote 42] Thousands of children were reported
missing to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children,
which utilized its trained investigators to help locate missing
children after the evacuation.[Footnote 43] Officials from this center
stated that both the American Red Cross and FEMA had some information
on the location of children in their databases; however, they said it
was difficult to obtain this information because of privacy concerns.
These officials told us that standing agreements for data sharing among
organizations tracking missing children, the Red Cross, and FEMA could
help locate missing persons more quickly. Regarding foster children,
Louisiana child welfare officials told us it was difficult to contact
foster parents who had evacuated because the emergency contact
information for them was limited and located in case records that was
inaccessible for weeks following the storm. They said updated emergency
contact information for foster parents and automated case file systems
could help locate and serve foster children more quickly. Also, child
welfare officials told us that having an adequate number of trained
staff present during large-scale evacuations can help ensure that
families stay together.
Search and Rescue:
Search and rescue is the capability to coordinate and conduct urban
search and rescue response efforts for all hazards. Urban search and
rescue response efforts require a seamless transition from finding
stranded people, rescuing them, and transporting them to safe shelter,
which may call on the additional skills and resources of responders,
along with support from other emergency support functions such as
public safety. Capabilities also can include accessing, medically
stabilizing, and extricating victims trapped in damaged or collapsed
structures. The U. S. Coast Guard, state and local agencies, and
military assets rescued thousands in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina. Almost 6,000 Coast Guard personnel from throughout the country
conducted one of the largest search and rescue missions in its history
as part of an even larger multi-agency, multi-level search and rescue
effort, according to the White House Homeland Security Council report.
The Coast Guard retrieved more than 33,000 people along the Gulf Coast,
including more than 12,000 by air, and 11,000 by surface, plus 9,403
evacuated from hospitals. Almost one-third of the Coast Guard's entire
fleet was dedicated to rescue efforts, according to the White House
Homeland Security Council report.
Search and rescue capabilities must also include ensuring the safety of
first responders. For example, following Hurricane Katrina's landfall,
Coast Guard rescue swimmers involved in the helicopter-based rescues
told us that safety and security became a concern as time passed and
individuals became frustrated because they had no food or water. In
some instances, tensions among survivors became heated when rescue
swimmers prioritized the rescues of children, women, and the elderly
over able-bodied men. For boat operations, officials explained that
they dealt with security challenges by deploying Coast Guard security
teams with the rescue personnel to provide armed security coverage for
both Coast Guard personnel and FEMA urban search and rescue teams.
In addition, although tens of thousands of people were rescued after
Hurricane Katrina through the efforts of military, civil government,
and private rescuers, the lack of clarity in search and rescue plans
led to operations that were not as efficient as they should have been.
As we noted in our discussion of leadership, the NRP at that time
addressed only part of the search and rescue mission, and the National
Search and Rescue Plan had not been updated to reflect the NRP.
According to Louisiana National Guard officials, they worked with the
Coast Guard to coordinate aviation operations, but the aviation search
and rescue efforts that were being directed from two different command
sites were not integrated. For example, some military aircraft received
their direction from a military task force at the Superdome, while
others received their direction from the Coast Guard or the Joint Task
Force that was in command of the active troops on the ground. According
to military officials, better integration of search and rescue efforts
could reduce duplications of effort for search and rescue aircraft. As
previously noted, GAO has made recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense to improve planning for the search and rescue support that the
military is likely to provide to civil authorities.[Footnote 44]
Logistics:
Our work and that of others indicates that logistics systems--the
capability to identify, dispatch, mobilize, and demobilize and to
accurately track and record available critical resources throughout all
incident management phases---were often totally overwhelmed by
Hurricane Katrina. Critical resources apparently were not available,
properly distributed, or provided in a timely manner. The result was
duplication of deliveries, lost supplies, or supplies never being
ordered. Reviews of acquisition efforts indicated that while these
efforts were noteworthy given the scope of Hurricane Katrina, agencies
needed additional capabilities to (1) adequately anticipate
requirements for needed goods and services; (2) clearly communicate
responsibilities across agencies and jurisdictions; and (3) deploy
sufficient numbers of personnel to provide contractor oversight. For
example, a factor that affected the military response was the large and
unanticipated logistics role it was asked to assume. Under the NRP,
FEMA is responsible for coordinating logistics during disaster response
efforts, but during Hurricane Katrina, FEMA quickly became overwhelmed,
in part because it lacked the people, processes, and technology to
maintain visibility--from order through final delivery--of the supplies
and commodities it had ordered. As a result of FEMA's lack of
visibility over the meals that were in transit, DOD had to airlift 1.7
million meals to Mississippi to respond to a request from the Adjutant
General of Mississippi, who was concerned that food supplies were
nearly exhausted.
Similarly, our work examining the coordination between FEMA and the Red
Cross to provide relief to disaster victims found that FEMA did not
have a comprehensive system to track requests for assistance it
received from the Red Cross on behalf of voluntary organizations and
state and local governments for items such as water, food, and cots.
The absence of such a system created more work for the Red Cross and
slowed the delivery of relief services. The Red Cross was only able to
follow up on these requests informally--a process that took time and
was often ineffective. FEMA officials were often unable to provide the
Red Cross with accurate information regarding FEMA's ability to fulfill
a request or when expected items would be delivered, causing many
requests to go unfilled or be filled too late to be of use. The
unreliability of FEMA's supply systems required the Red Cross to try to
follow up on requests through other informal channels--a process the
Red Cross reported as being inefficient and only marginally effective.
Other voluntary organizations also told us that in many cases the
unreliability of FEMA's supply systems hindered their attempts to
provide mass care services, and, as a result, they had to scale back on
their service provision.
In contrast, response efforts benefited from the logistical support of
the U.S. Forest Service. As the White House Homeland Security Council
reported in February 2006, about 3,000 members of the Forest Service
also deployed to the region to support response efforts. Forest Service
personnel in Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, and Alabama established
support camps, provided aviation assistance, and transported needed
supplies to relief workers. The base camps they established were
capable of supporting 1,000 emergency responders at each site.
According to the Forest Service, nearly 2,760 Forest Service employees
nationwide were called upon to provide assistance by using their
incident management abilities to help manage evacuation centers and
base camps, provide logistical support, clear roadways, and operate
mobilization centers and trailer staging areas. They also helped
navigate the federal procurement system and successfully obtained
needed emergency response supplies, the White House Homeland Security
Council noted. Forest Services' incident management teams helped to
supply more than 600,000 people with 2.7 million meals, 4 million
gallons of water, and 40 million pounds of ice. One Forest Service
region sent nearly 470 people, including various types of interagency
responder teams, buying teams, and other services in the relief effort,
according to the Forest Service.
Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services:
This emergency support function includes the non-medical mass care,
housing, and human services needs of individuals and families. Mass
care is the capability to provide immediate shelter, feeding centers,
basic first aid, and bulk distribution of needed items and related
services to affected persons. Charities and government agencies that
provide human services, supported by federal resources, helped meet the
mass care needs of the hundreds of thousands of evacuees.
Recognizing the historically large role of charities in responding to
disasters, DHS collaborated with the American Red Cross in the
development of the NRP and gave it considerable responsibilities. In
addition, the NRP establishes a separate support annex that defines the
capability to effectively manage and deploy volunteers and unsolicited
donations. Federal and charitable organization officials we spoke to
indicated that because of the catastrophic nature of the storms, in
some cases volunteers and donations were not well integrated into
response and recovery activities.
Charities have taken steps to improve coordination of relief efforts
since September 11, 2001. These efforts have included sharing
information about relief services through daily conference calls and
the use of electronic databases. Additionally, charities coordinated
service delivery to meet the needs of evacuees. For example, the Red
Cross did not work in areas that might become flooded or in structures
that could be compromised by strong winds. During our visits to the
Gulf Coast region in October 2005, we observed that in areas where the
Red Cross did not provide services, the Salvation Army and smaller
organizations--often local churches--were able to meet many of the
charitable needs of hard-to-reach communities. Despite these efforts,
charities faced some challenges in coordinating service delivery. For
example, some charities reported that the electronic database created
to share information about services provided to evacuees was still in
its developmental stage and, therefore, not ready to be activated on
such a large scale. Some concerns were also raised about smaller
charities' abilities to provide adequate disaster relief services.
Additionally, some Gulf Coast areas did not have sufficient shelter
facilities, in part because the Red Cross had in effect "shelter
protection policies" to promote evacuation of low-lying areas, which
prohibited the placement of shelters in areas prone to high winds,
storm surge, and flooding--causing some of the most severely affected
areas to be without sheltering facilities. In addition, some shelters
were accessible to the general population only during limited daylight
hours.
In addition to immediate food and shelter, individuals may need help
replacing Social Security checks, obtaining food stamps or other basic
federal support benefits and services. Our preliminary work indicated
that a number of federal and state programs provided assistance and
services to eligible individuals and families before the catastrophic
disaster. Significant ongoing assistance after the catastrophic
disaster has also been required. Such basic federal support programs as
food stamps, social security, unemployment insurance, and income
assistance played an important role in the immediate response to those
displaced or otherwise affected by Hurricane Katrina. To ensure
delivery of benefits, and in some cases, to address the sharp rise in
new applications, these programs set up operations in shelters,
disaster recovery centers, other sites, and some programs served an
unprecedented number of people in their offices that serve the public.
For example, Hurricane Katrina disrupted mail delivery of monthly
social security checks, leaving many social security recipients without
key income support. However, the Social Security Administration had
procedures in place to provide emergency payments and, with about 1,300
offices nationwide, had the capability to quickly deploy staff and
equipment from other offices to address the increased workload.
Individuals affected by Hurricane Katrina also overwhelmed the state of
Louisiana's food stamp, welfare, and unemployment offices. State and
local officials we visited said they struggled to find equipment and
supplies to handle the increase and to obtain other help such as
security for crowd control. Louisiana--overwhelmed in its efforts to
issue unemployment checks to evacuees without stable addresses--rushed
to implement a debit card payment system and encountered some
challenges doing so. The debit card payment systems the states of
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi had in place for income assistance
and food stamps allowed them to continue benefit payments that were
uninterrupted when beneficiaries relocated. In addition, over 2 million
families received food assistance through the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's Disaster Food Stamp Program.
Effective Capabilities Development Requires Adequate Planning,
Coordination, Training, and Exercises:
Capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of people,
skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed capabilities are
available requires effective planning and coordination and training and
exercises in which the capabilities are realistically tested, problems
identified and lessons learned, and subsequently addressed in
partnership with other federal, state, and local stakeholders.
Planning and Coordination:
As we identified in our March 2006 testimony, the ability of the nation
to prepare for, respond to, and recover from catastrophic disasters can
be enhanced through strong advance planning, both within and among
responder organizations. By their very nature, catastrophic disasters
involve extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption
that likely will immediately overwhelm state and local responders,
circumstances that make sound planning for catastrophic events all the
more crucial. Identifying, obtaining, and pre-positioning adequate
quantities of key supplies, such as food, ice, water, and blankets, and
delivering those supplies quickly when and where needed is an important
component of planning. Another example is the previously discussed
planning challenges states and localities face in preparing for and
carrying out the evacuation of transportation-disadvantaged
populations, such as the elderly or persons with disabilities, during a
disaster. Our work in this area has noted challenges in identifying
these populations, determining their needs, and providing for and
coordinating their transportation. Some emergency management officials
told us they did not yet have a good understanding of the size,
location, and composition of the transportation-disadvantaged in their
communities. However, we have also observed efforts in some locations
to address the evacuation needs of the transportation-disadvantaged by
encouraging citizens to voluntarily register with their local emergency
management agency, integrating social service providers into emergency
planning, and other measures.
Examples of Good Planning:
In some cases, sound advance planning contributed to a more effective
response during Hurricane Katrina. For example:
* U. S. Coast Guard-The Coast Guard was able to mitigate some of the
communication shortfalls it experienced, in part because of its
planning assumption that "communications systems could be heavily
damaged or destroyed" during a natural disaster. This assumption
prompted Coast Guard officials to build into their contingency plans
approaches that were not reliant on communication systems and that
allowed personnel to act independently or with limited guidance from
commanding officers. As a result of the contingency plan, personnel in
charge of the assets knew their mission prior to the storm and did not
need to communicate any further with district command to fulfill their
operation. In addition, as planned, the Coast Guard pre-placed
communication equipment before the storm. Members of the Coast Guard
Auxiliary were notified prior to the hurricane's landfall and provided
communication capabilities after the storm passed, which according to
Coast Guard officials, was critical to conducting search and rescue
operations.
* National Finance Center--Planning for continuity of operations
enabled the National Finance Center (NFC) in New Orleans paid more than
half a million federal workers on time while Hurricane Katrina was
bearing down, then made subsequent payrolls--NFC's largest ever--
without any delays. According to officials, NFC had gone through
various diverse scenarios in disaster recovery planning and exercises
as part of its preparedness for just such an event. There was a
structured timeline for reviewing the continuity of operations plan
every year, beginning with continuity of operations plan requirements
and business impact analysis at the unit level. A NFC official said
that key NFC staff members worked the weekend before landfall at the
New Orleans facility to complete payroll processing for federal
employees, then shut down operations and deployed to backup locations
before the hurricane hit New Orleans. NFC backup data was trucked out
of the New Orleans facility. When Hurricane Katrina made landfall in
Louisiana shortly after 6 a.m. on Monday, August 29, 2005 NFC had
already sent an advance deployment team to its backup sites in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Grand Prairie, Texas. That same night,
the trucks arrived at an alternate processing facility outside
Philadelphia. The backup tapes also enabled the New Orleans NFC staff
restore many operations within 2 days of the devastation. Within a 50-
hour period, NFC had the data center recovered and began catch-up
processing to bring applications up to current state.
* Social Security Administration---The Social Security Administration
had enhanced planning and pre-established procedures in place to
provide immediate emergency payments to the significant number of
beneficiaries who evacuated and did not receive their monthly checks.
With these procedures in place, the Social Security Administration had
the capability to deploy staff and equipment from its 1,300 offices
across the nation to address the increased workload.
* Department of Defense--The White House Homeland Security Council's
report also identified DOD's preparedness efforts for the 2005
hurricane season. DOD approved a standing order to prepare and organize
for severe weather disaster operations, which was based on prior
assistance for hurricane recovery operations. This order expedited the
pre-positioning of senior military representatives known as Defense
Coordinating Officers, to act as liaisons with other governmental
organizations in the projected disaster area prior to an event. The
order also authorized the use of DOD installations as logistical
staging areas for FEMA. The military also took steps to proactively
respond as Katrina strengthened in the Gulf of Mexico, and it published
warning and planning orders and was positioned to respond with both
National Guard and federal forces by the time Katrina made landfall on
August 29, 2005.
* U.S. Postal Service--The Postal Service was relatively well-prepared
for the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. While the hurricane damaged
some 500 post offices, the Postal Service was able to establish limited
services just days after the disaster. As early as August 26, 2005,
USPS was anticipating a landfall in the Gulf Coast and was diverting
some mail from processing plants in that region to minimize the effects
of potential disruption to its processing capabilities. By the time the
storm passed on August 30, some 500 postal facilities in Alabama,
Mississippi, and Louisiana had been damaged and were incapable of
providing delivery service. On September 1, 2005, the Postal Service
set up temporary centers for the pickup of checks in Mississippi,
Louisiana, and Alabama. In New Orleans proper, two post offices were
designated as Social Security check pickup points for a short period of
time. Reconstituting regular mail delivery in the areas affected by
Hurricane Katrina was a priority. For those now displaced from their
homes, the Postal Service says that it can provide relatively efficient
delivery service if customers submit a change of address form in
person, by toll-free telephone, or on the Internet. The Postal Service
now has the capability, through innovations in sorting technology, to
intercept mail at its original sorting point that is addressed to an
address that has changed, and re-route the mail to a new address. Thus,
it can avoid the cost and delay of physically transporting mail to the
former delivery post office for flagging and forwarding under a local
change of address request.
² Internal Revenue Service--The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) worked
in coordination with FEMA to address the human services needs of
individuals and families. The IRS began staffing Disaster Assistance
Centers in more than a dozen states. The IRS assigned nearly 5,000
employees to augment the FEMA hurricane victim registration effort and
established its own dedicated toll-free disaster number and a special
section of their internet web site, according to the Treasury
Department. IRS employees were taking calls seven days a week over two
shifts to help people with the process of registering with FEMA to
obtain benefits, answering approximately 950,000 registration calls for
FEMA and filling orders for over 291,000 Disaster Relief Kits. Through
February 2, 2006, they answered more than 100,000 calls on the special
IRS toll-free line for affected taxpayers. In addition, the IRS issued
filing and payment relief guidelines, launched a special toll-free
disaster hotline, and created a Hurricane Katrina disaster link at
www.irs.gov web site to expedite the processing of transcript and tax
return requests.
Examples Where Planning and Coordination Should Be Improved:
* DHS Nationwide Plan Review: State and Local Catastrophic Disaster
Planning--In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, DHS has responded to
the need to ascertain the status of the nation's emergency preparedness
planning, as identified both by Congress and the President. On
September 15, 2005, the President ordered DHS to undertake an immediate
review, in cooperation with local counterparts, of emergency plans in
every major city in America. In addition, the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users
required the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of Homeland
Security to jointly review and assess federal and state evacuation
plans for catastrophic hurricanes impacting the Gulf Coast
Region.[Footnote 45] Finally, in the conference report to the
Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2006 Appropriations Act,
the conferees directed DHS to report on the status of catastrophic
planning, including mass evacuation planning, in all 50 states and the
75 largest urban areas.[Footnote 46] In response, DHS developed the
Nationwide Plan Review in coordination with the Department of
Transportation and support from the Department of Defense.
The Nationwide Plan Review included two phases. In Phase 1, released in
February 2006, all states and urban areas submitted self-assessments of
their emergency operations plans, focusing on their adequacy and
feasibility to manage the consequences of a catastrophic
event.[Footnote 47] In Phase 2, released in June 2006, DHS employed
peer review teams to visit states and urban areas, where these teams
reviewed and validated the self-assessments, and helped determine
requirements for federal planning assistance. At the conclusion of each
visit, the peer review team completed a comprehensive report and
submitted it to DHS.
The June 2006, DHS Phase 2 report found that current catastrophic
planning is unsystematic, not linked within a national planning system,
and the status of plans and planning gives grounds for significant
national concern. The report found a systemic problem of outmoded
planning processes, products, and tools, which all contribute to
inadequate catastrophic planning. DHS found that emergency operations
rely on plans that are created in isolation, insufficiently detailed,
and not subject to adequate review. The report identified 15 findings
specific to state and urban area planning, and 24 findings specific to
the federal government's role and efforts to support catastrophic
disaster planning. DHS concluded that the result of these systemic
planning problems translates to uneven performance and repeated and
costly operational miscues, and critical response time lost to correct
the misperceptions of federal, state, and local responders about their
roles, responsibilities, and actions.
DHS's findings call for a fundamental modernization of the nation's
planning processes. According to its report, planning modernization
must be managed as a single program with established funding. Further,
according to DHS, the goal of the modernization program must be to
establish a networked, collaborative national planning system that
satisfies planners' information needs; provides procedures and tools to
accomplish pre-incident plan synchronization; allows faster development
or revision of existing plans; and provides flexible options that
accommodate the diverse hazards and threats. However, DHS states that
the next phase that needs to be addressed is the development of an
implementation strategy to begin to address the 40 findings in the
White House Homeland Security Council report in a rational way. Such an
implementation strategy can prioritize remedial actions based on a risk
management model that considers threats, vulnerabilities, and
consequences.
* Department of Defense--Our recent report on DOD and the National
Guard's planning for and response to Hurricane Katrina illustrates an
example of the need for coordinated planning in advance of a disaster.
While multiple agencies support each "Emergency Support Function" in
the NRP, DOD does not have the primary responsibility for any emergency
support function, as DOD's role is primarily that of a support agency.
We found that pre-Katrina plans involving the military were inadequate
in several ways. Neither the NRP nor DOD's disaster plans incorporate
lessons learned from past catastrophes to fully delineate the military
capabilities needed to respond to a catastrophic disaster.[Footnote 48]
DOD is aware of disaster response problems described in this report and
is beginning to take actions to address the lessons learned from
Hurricane Katrina and to prepare for the next catastrophic event. DOD
has been conducting its own reviews and is also examining the lessons
and recommendations in reports from a White House review panel,
congressional oversight committees, and other sources. We noted that
DOD is taking some actions to address catastrophic disaster response
problems. For example, DOD officials stated that it is currently
updating its emergency response plan and intends to use a contingency
plan rather than a less detailed functional plan to guide its military
support to civil authority missions. DOD also has an organizational
realignment underway that gives a single Army organization that is
responsible for domestic disaster response and will be capable of
deploying within 18 hours as joint task forces for catastrophes
anywhere in the United States.
* FEMA--Enhancing planning and coordination efforts may also benefit
other federal agencies' efforts to provide response and recovery
services. For example, our observations of the Individuals and
Households Program (IHP), which provides housing and other financial
assistance to disaster victims, suggest that FEMA's program planning
was reactive and ad hoc, with IHP procedures differing from disaster
area to disaster area. Our work examining the IHP program indicated
that FEMA lacked final plans, policies, and procedures that
specifically addressed the types of unique challenges the agency could
expect to face in catastrophic circumstances. In commenting on a draft
of our report, FEMA officials said they had previously identified the
need to develop plans to expand its disaster registration intake and
applicant assistance process and to temporarily relocate victims to
outside the area after a catastrophic disaster. However, they said the
$20 million to address these requirements and others that were
requested and provided in the FY 2005 Disaster Supplemental
appropriation were not available for commitment until days before
Katrina made landfall. They also said that their planning efforts were
significantly slowed by staff commitments to the 2004 and 2005
hurricane seasons. One of the consequences of this lack of planning for
catastrophic disasters was that FEMA's systems and processes for
verifying applicant eligibility for IHP assistance were overwhelmed,
resulting in payments made to thousands of ineligible
applicants.[Footnote 49] FEMA officials said that these problems more
directly reflected a failure of system capacity that could not be
overcome by any amount of planning. Nonetheless, if FEMA had developed
and implemented a plan for an expandable disaster registration intake
and applicant assistance process after identifying the need for such a
plan, systems and processes for verifying applicant eligibility for IHP
assistance would have been better prepared to manage the unprecedented
volume of requests and reduce the number of payments made to ineligible
applicants.
In addition, FEMA did not have sufficient pre-positioned supplies,
equipment, and services (e.g., debris removal) contracts in place prior
to Katrina to meet the demand during the response, particularly for
needs such as temporary housing and public buildings. The experience of
Katrina highlighted the need for better logistics planning and the need
for contracts to be in place prior to the disaster that could be
activated to lean forward and provide surge capacity for critical
supplies and services. For example, because FEMA had not planned for a
catastrophic disaster such as Katrina, FEMA spent funds for temporary
housing that were hardly used. In addition, because FEMA did not inform
the Corps of Engineers prior to Katrina that the Corps would be
responsible for acquiring portable classrooms, the Corps lacked
sufficient knowledge of the market for this commodity to obtain the
best deal for the government. In these and other instances, better
planning could have avoided some unnecessary costs.
* Small Business Administration--In another example, SBA needs enhanced
strategic planning to ensure its ability to provide timely loans, as
our ongoing work in this area indicates. As the primary federal lender
to disaster victims SBA's disaster loan program provides loans to
businesses, homeowners, and renters to rebuild and replace uninsured or
underinsured property damaged by a disaster. However, as more fully
described in our recently issued report, several factors affected SBA's
ability to provide timely disaster assistance to victims of the Gulf
Coast hurricanes, including the large volume of applications that SBA
processed.[Footnote 50]For example, SBA planned the maximum user
capacity for its new Disaster Credit Management System (DCMS) based
solely on its experience during the 1994 Northridge earthquake--the
single largest disaster SBA had previously faced--and other historical
data. SBA did not consider information available from catastrophe risk
models and disaster simulations, such as the likelihood and severity of
damages from potential natural disasters, to help predict the volume of
applications that might be expected from such events. SBA's limited
planning contributed to insufficient DCMS user capacity, thus
restricting the number of staff that could access DCMS and process
applications in a timely manner. SBA also did not completely stress
test DCMS before implementation and received the incorrect computer
hardware from its contractor, which reduced user capacity and
contributed to the system instability, outages, and slow response times
initially experienced by SBA staff. As a result of these and other
factors, SBA faced significant delays and backlogs in processing loan
applications.
Going forward, SBA may be able to process disaster loans more
efficiently by implementing an Internet-based application feature. In
order to provide more timely disaster assistance in the future, we
recommended that the Administrator of SBA direct the Office of Disaster
Assistance to take the following four actions: (1) reassess DCMS's
maximum user capacity and related loan processing resource needs based
on such things as lessons learned from the Gulf Coast hurricanes, a
review of information available from catastrophe risk modeling firms
and disaster simulations, and related cost considerations; (2) conduct
complete stress testing to ensure that DCMS can function as planned for
maximum user capacity levels; (3) improve management controls over
assessing contractor performance through inspections of all equipment
purchased or leased to support DCMS; and (4) expedite plans to resume
business processing reengineering efforts to analyze the disaster loan
process and identify ways to more efficiently process loan
applications, including an evaluation of the feasibility of
implementing a secure Internet-based application feature for home loan
applicants. SBA disagreed with some of our findings but generally
agreed with these recommendations.
In addition our preliminary analysis from an ongoing review indicates
that SBA's overall planning efforts for providing timely recovery
assistance in response to large scaled disasters appears to be
insufficient and may have contributed to the delays in providing
affordable disaster assistance to victims in the Gulf Coast Region. For
example, at the time of the Gulf Coast hurricanes, SBA lacked a
comprehensive, documented plan for providing timely disaster recovery
assistance. Disaster recovery experts have told us that such a plan
would address various aspects of SBA's response including staffing
capacity, telecommunication needs and other logistical support, as well
as coordination with federal, state, and local entities in providing
appropriate disaster recovery assistance. In addition, SBA did not have
any full-time staff responsible for planning its disaster recovery
activities. Rather, SBA relied extensively on the experience and
knowledge of its field office staff to determine its response needs and
carry out SBA's role. SBA officials stated that it recently started
developing a response plan; however, it was unclear when this plan
would be completed and implemented. We plan to complete our review of
these issues and issue a report later this year.
* Child Welfare--Findings from our recent work and from other agency
"after action" reports point to the need to improve current plans and
strengthen related agreements and understandings of expectations
between governments and other organizations that will be responders in
the event of a future catastrophe. Our work has identified areas where
prior to an incident, obstacles can be identified and agreements to
address them reached between agencies, levels of governments, and
private and nongovernmental organizations. Our recent work examining
Louisiana's child welfare system's response to the disaster and
education system identified lessons learned by the state's child
welfare officials, including the need for state disaster plans to
include evacuation information and instructions for social workers and
their foster parents. In a recent national survey, child welfare
officials in 20 states and the District of Columbia reported that they
had a written child welfare disaster plan.[Footnote 51] Of these, 13
states reported that their plan addressed identifying children under
state care who may be dispersed after a disaster, and 14 reported that
their plan addressed continuing services for children under state care
who may be dispersed. Child welfare agencies could also benefit from
standing data-sharing agreements that would speed efforts to locate
displaced children in the event of the type of evacuation witnessed
prior to and after Katrina's landfall.[Footnote 52] Louisiana child
welfare officials told us that, during the response to Hurricane
Katrina, they had to sign a memorandum of understanding for sharing
information with the American Red Cross, but by the time the memorandum
was finalized and approved the demand had abated, and the Red Cross had
closed its shelters.
To better assist states in developing child welfare disaster plans, we
recommended to the Secretary of Health and Human Services that child
welfare disaster planning guidance should address the dispersion of
children and families within and across state lines. This guidance
should include information on (1) preserving child welfare records, (2)
identifying children who may be dispersed, (3) identifying new child
welfare cases and providing services, (4) coordinating services and
sharing information with other states, and (5) placing children from
other states. We also recommended that the secretary develop and
provide training on child welfare disaster planning to all states. HHS
responded by stating that it has taken action to update the guidance
and provide training to states and will encourage them to develop and
submit disaster plans for review. Finally, to ensure continuity of
services within or across state lines for the children under state
care, we have recommended that Congress should consider requiring that
states develop and submit child welfare disaster plans for HHS review.
Training and Exercises:
Clear roles and coordinated planning are necessary, but not sufficient
by themselves to ensure effective disaster management. It is important
to test the plans and participants' operational understanding of their
roles and responsibilities through robust training and exercise
programs. Training and exercising are designed to test emergency
management plans and increase the level of understanding of those roles
and responsibilities on the part of officials, contrasting catastrophic
versus non-catastrophic disasters. Involving key federal, state, and
local leaders--including elected leaders--in robust training and
exercise programs can better familiarize and prepare leaders with their
roles in a catastrophic disaster. DHS has taken the lead to establish
and maintain a comprehensive training and exercise program and
standards to meet the national preparedness goal, as required by
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8). For example, the
15 national planning scenarios developed by DHS and the Homeland
Security Council provide the basis for disaster exercises throughout
the nation.
In our previous work on Hurricanes Andrew and Hugo,[Footnote 53] we
identified the need for the federal government to upgrade training and
exercises for state and local governments specifically geared towards
catastrophic disaster response. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the
potential benefits of applying lessons learned from training exercises
and experiences with actual hurricanes, as well as the dangers of
ignoring them. During our fieldwork, we found examples of how an
incomplete understanding of NRP and NIMS roles and responsibilities
could lead to misunderstandings, problems, and delays. In Louisiana,
for example, some city officials were unclear about federal roles. In
Mississippi, we were told that county and city officials were not
implementing NIMS because they did not understand its provisions.
Our recent review of DOD's preparedness and response to Hurricane
Katrina reported that inadequate exercises prior to Hurricane Katrina
created a lack of understanding within the military and among federal,
state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and
capabilities, the timing of assistance, and the contributions that the
military might provide. We noted that DOD is likely to contribute
substantial support to state and local authorities, including search
and rescue assets, evacuation assistance, provision of supplies, damage
assessment assets, and possibly helping to ensure public safety.
However, we found that few exercises led by DHS or DOD focused on
catastrophic natural disasters and none called for a major deployment
of DOD capabilities.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, we have made several
recommendations designed to build the capabilities to respond to and
recover from catastrophic disasters. To ensure that agencies are
adequately prepared to continue performing essential functions
following an emergency, we recommended to DHS that it improve the
assessment and oversight of agency continuity planning and develop
guidance on telework in such planning.[Footnote 54] DHS partially
agreed and stated that FEMA will be conducting assessments in
conjunction with its upcoming interagency exercise. To improve the
military response to catastrophic disasters, as previously noted, we
recently called for improving military plans and exercises and
resolving response problems associated with damage assessment,
communication, search and rescue, and logistics issues.[Footnote 55] We
noted that DOD is taking steps to improve its future response,
including expanding its training programs to accommodate planners from
other agencies and to improve its disaster response planning and
exercises. Also as first noted in our March 8, 2006, testimony, we are
recommending that documents such as the NRP and the catastrophic
incident annex be supported and supplemented by more detailed and
robust operational implementation plans. Such operational plans should,
for example, further define and leverage any military capabilities as
might be needed in a catastrophic disaster.
Finally, as initially presented in our March 8, 2006, testimony, we are
recommending that DHS should provide guidance and direction for
federal, state, and local planning, training, and exercises to ensure
such activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery
responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis. This should
also include the application of lessons learned from actual
catastrophes and other disasters.
In addition, we observed in our earlier work on the National
Preparedness Goal that if properly planned and executed, the goal and
its related products, such as program implementation plans and
requirements, may help guide the development of realistic budget and
resource plans for an all-hazards national preparedness
program.[Footnote 56] However, questions remain regarding what should
be expected in terms of basic capabilities for most disasters compared
to the expanded capabilities and mutual aid needed from other
jurisdictions to meet the demands of a catastrophic disaster.
Consequently, we recommend that DHS take the lead in monitoring federal
agencies' efforts to meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the
interim National Preparedness Goal, including the development, testing,
and exercising of agency operational plans to implement their
responsibilities under the NRP, NIMS, and the National Preparedness
Goal.
DHS Reported Taking Some Actions to Improve Capabilities in Response to
Findings in Congress' and the Administration's Reviews:
DHS and the administration have engaged in an effort to respond to the
White House Homeland Security Council's study of lessons learned about
capabilities from Hurricane Katrina. The White House Homeland Security
Council's report originally identified 125 recommendations to improve
future disaster preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities. As
table 3 shows, 27 recommendations that were to be implemented prior to
June 1, 2006, are focused on improving capabilities. However, DHS has
not provided information to support the actions it has reported taking
to implement these 27 recommendations, including which actions have
resulted in changes in operational readiness and capabilities.
Table 3: Implementation of White House Homeland Security Council
Recommendations for the 2006 Hurricane Season: Recommendations Related
to Regarding Capabilities:
[See PDF for Table. Table did not compute properly]
Source: GAO analysis of DHS and Homeland Security Council data.
Note: N/A = not applicable.
[End of Table]
Additional Work Is Needed to Address FEMA's Human Resource Challenges:
The various reports and our own work on FEMA's performance before,
during, and after Hurricane Katrina suggest that FEMA's human resources
were insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the unprecedented
degree of damage and the resulting number of hurricane victims. The
Senate's report concluded that FEMA did not have the resources
necessary to fulfill the mission and respond effectively in a
catastrophic event and recommended that DHS develop the national
capabilities--especially surge capacity--it needs to respond to
catastrophic disasters, ensuring it has sufficient full-time staff and
the support, such as contracting personnel and adequately trained and
sufficiently staffed reserve corps, to ramp up capabilities, as needed.
FEMA's initial response assessment concluded that the agency needed to
lead an audit of current staffing capability and workforce demands for
staff in a severe or catastrophic event and determine the number of
personnel available to serve in each position or unit for such an
event.
As stated during the March 8, 2006 hearing, strategic national
leadership is provided by the Secretary of Homeland Security, who is to
act as a focal point for natural and manmade crises and emergency
planning under the provisions of the Homeland Security Act. We stated
our belief that other strategic national leadership positions such as
the Undersecretary for Federal Emergency Management (who is also the
Director of FEMA) and other key leadership and managerial positions
within FEMA and DHS could benefit from having statutory, professional
qualifications requirements. In addition, Congress could consider a
term appointment for the Undersecretary for Federal Emergency
Management and selected other positions within DHS.
To improve the staffing level of its permanent full-time employees, on
February 22, 2006, FEMA announced a hiring initiative to fill
identified vacancies and attain a 95 percent staffing level in 95 days.
The identified vacancies are based on the positions FEMA had already
allocated but not staffed; however, the current allocation of positions
has not been validated in a strategic workforce planning process. This
staffing effort was to be completed before the hurricane season that
began on June 1. However, the hiring initiative did not meet this
target. Although FEMA was able to increase its staffing level from 76.5
percent to 81.6 percent between February 22 and May 29, the agency did
not reach a staffing level of 95 percent. In June, a FEMA Human
Resources official told us that while Human Resources was working
toward reaching the 95 percent staffing goal in August, the agency has
not established a "hard" deadline because of the priority FEMA gives to
life-saving and life-sustaining operations in emergencies that could
significantly slow or suspend other operations. Although not part of
the 95-percent staffing effort, a related effort to fill Senior
Executive Service vacancies has not made similar progress, decreasing
from 74 percent to 61 percent between February 22 and May 29. According
to FEMA officials, they expected that the time required to fill Senior
Executive Service positions would be greater than the time required to
fill other positions. In addition, the number of FEMA Senior Executive
Service positions has increased since February 22, thus FEMA's level of
Senior Executive Service staffing on May 29 was less than at the
beginning of the period. Finally, as of May 29, FEMA had six Senior
Executive Service positions that, although not vacant, had incumbents
who were in an "acting" capacity.
Building Capabilities for Catastrophic Disasters Calls for a Risk
Management Approach:
In earlier work that included an examination of the draft National
Preparedness Goal, we observed that if properly planned and executed,
the goal and its related products, such as program implementation plans
and requirements, may help guide the development of realistic budget
and resource plans for an all-hazards national preparedness program.
However, questions remain regarding what should be expected in terms of
basic capabilities for most disasters compared to the expanded
capabilities and mutual aid needed from other jurisdictions to meet the
demands of a catastrophic disaster.[Footnote 57]
Risk management can be central to assessing needs and resources in the
event of future catastrophic disasters. A decision-making process using
risk-management principles can guide the development of federal
capabilities and the expertise that can be used to respond effectively
to catastrophic disasters. The goal of risk management is to integrate
systematic concern for risk into the normal cycle of agency decision
making and implementation. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, we
identified the need for a risk management decision-making approach to
develop the nation's capabilities and expertise to respond to a
catastrophic disaster. Given the likely costs, Congress may wish to
consider the use of a risk-management framework as it carries out its
oversight and legislative responsibilities with regard to national
preparedness and the recovery.
Our risk management framework calls for risk assessment based on three
components of risk--threat, vulnerability, and criticality (i.e., the
severity of the consequences of an incident). Using the information
gathered through risk assessment, agencies can then: (1) assess the
likelihood that an adverse event will occur whether caused by nature or
man; (2) identify and select among alternatives to reduce the
vulnerability to such an event; and (3) take actions that might reduce
the consequences of one or more potential adverse events should they
occur. This is a continuous process and should consider all hazards.
Our risk management framework calls for links between risk-mitigation
strategies, strategic goals, and plans and budgets. The framework also
calls for an assessment of the value and risks of various courses of
action as a tool for setting priorities and allocating resources, and
the use of performance measures to assess outcomes and adjust future
actions as needed.
Building and sustaining needed capabilities should be based on a risk
assessment that would identify the vulnerabilities of communities or
regions to potential disasters of various magnitudes and causes and how
they should be addressed within available resources and with
contingency planning. Periodic assessments of all hazards should
determine if plans remain viable, actual capabilities match planned
capabilities, and the contingency plans are appropriate. Because
different states and areas face different risks, not every state or
area should be expected to have the same capability to prepare for a
catastrophic disaster. In our previous work examining the draft
National Preparedness Goal, we observed that DHS's assessment and
reporting implementation plan, intended to accurately identify the
status of capabilities at the state, regional, and local levels, is
vital for establishing a baseline and providing an ongoing feedback
loop upon which preparedness decisions at multiple levels of government
can be based. Assessment of catastrophic disaster planning and
capability needs will be a critical piece. As a result, we recommend
that DHS use an all-hazards, risk management approach in deciding
whether and how to invest federal resources in specific capabilities
for a catastrophic disaster.
Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring
Accountability to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse:
Effective controls and accountability mechanisms for the use of
resources during a catastrophic disaster are essential to ensure that
resources are used appropriately, but there is a tension between normal
controls and accountability procedures and the need to deliver
assistance expeditiously. As we stated in February 2006, the inspectors
general of the various federal departments have been conducting much of
the detailed Hurricane Katrina-related work on fraud, waste, and abuse
in individual federal programs.[Footnote 58] In the wake of Hurricane
Katrina, contracts were let quickly with little competition, funds were
spent for temporary housing that was never used, and hundreds of
millions of dollars might have been provided to ineligible persons for
cash assistance because of an inability to verify their social security
numbers or other information. Our work, and that of the DHS Inspector
General and others across the audit community, have identified a number
of problems that have resulted in inadequate accountability for the use
of resources during and after Hurricane Katrina, including (1)
contracting problems; (2) accounting for and managing international
assistance that was offered; (3) tracking and managing food, water, and
ice deliveries; and (4) screening fraudulent applications for
assistance. These problems might have been avoided if there had been
better planning for delivering assistance during catastrophic
disasters.
Catastrophic Disaster Controls and Accountability Mechanisms Should Be
Flexible to Address the Urgent Need for Delivery of Assistance:
Ensuring accountability during a catastrophic disaster requires the
appropriate people, processes, and technology to, among other things,
qualify benefit applicants; report and account for contracts awarded
(in advance of or after the event) for such things as debris removal,
temporary shelter, feeding, and medical care for disaster victims; and
documenting reimbursable expenses, such as first responder overtime. Of
necessity, initial response efforts focus on the immediate, urgent
tasks of search and rescue and services such as medical care and food
and shelter for those displaced by the disaster. In any major disaster
there is the difficult task of putting in place controls and
accountability mechanisms that reduce the potential for waste, fraud,
and abuse but are flexible enough to provide assistance and resources
quickly.
To date, Congress has appropriated approximately $88 billion of federal
support through emergency supplemental appropriations to federal
agencies for hurricane disaster relief and recovery efforts related to
the 2005 hurricanes. [Footnote 59] For Stafford Act activities,
Congress makes appropriations to the Disaster Relief Fund, which FEMA
administers. The Stafford Act, the principal federal disaster
assistance statute, authorizes three general types of major disaster
assistance: (1) public assistance grants to state and local governments
and certain private nonprofit organizations, (2) hazard mitigation
grant programs, and (3) individual assistance programs. For example, in
the individual assistance area, FEMA may provide direct assistance
(temporary housing units) and financial assistance (grant funding for
temporary housing and other disaster-related needs) to disaster victims
through IHP. FEMA had provided about $5.6 billon in IHP benefits as of
April 2006.
As we stated in our March 8, 2006, testimony, catastrophic disasters
not only require a different magnitude of capabilities and resources
for effective response, but they may also require more flexible
policies and operating procedures. In a catastrophe, streamlining,
simplifying, and expediting decision making should quickly replace
"business as usual" and the unquestioned following of long-standing
policies and operating procedures used in normal situations for
providing relief to disaster victims. When there is a catastrophic
disaster, temporarily suspending certain rules and regulations may be
necessary in order to expedite relief and recovery of the affected
area, even if such a suspension requires legislation. The key is to
recognize when flexibility is needed to meet response and recovery
needs in a catastrophic disaster. Across our work we have discovered
many examples where quick action could not occur as agencies followed
procedures that required extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying
the delivery of vital supplies and other assistance. In other cases,
urgent need was used to bypass standard procedures without better
outcomes. Processes and controls must be sufficient to provide the
documentation needed for expense reimbursement and reasonable assurance
that resources have been used legally and for the purposes intended.
As we saw in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the lack of internal
controls and other accountability mechanisms established prior to the
disaster can result in delay, uncertainty, and wasted or misdirected
resources. The aftermath of a catastrophic disaster is not the time to
determine what rules and procedures to suspend or streamline. It is
important that essential accountability mechanisms be designed and
ready to implement prior to the event, just as an incident management
structure should be understood and ready to implement prior to an
event. Decentralization of responsibilities enhances the challenge of
assuring that controls and accountability mechanisms are being
followed.
Hurricane Katrina Highlighted Several Contracting Deficiencies:
The government's response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita depended
heavily on contractors to deliver ice, water, and food supplies; patch
rooftops; and provide housing to displaced residents and temporary
facilities to local government agencies. Audits by the inspectors
general at several agencies, along with the major Hurricane Katrina
"after action" reports, identified deficiencies in the award and
execution of many of the individual contracts. From a broader
perspective, our past work has shown that, to ensure successful
acquisition outcomes in any environment, certain critical success
factors must be in place: sound acquisition planning, good business
arrangements, and effective contract monitoring and oversight. To do
so, decision makers and acquisition personnel need sufficient knowledge
and clearly defined and communicated roles and responsibilities. We
identified deficiencies under each of the critical success factors.
Acquisition planning:
Our work on contracting issues following Hurricane Katrina indicates
that some key federal agencies involved in responding to the disaster
did not have adequate acquisition plans for carrying out their assigned
responsibilities. For example, while contracts for some items were in
place prior to the storm, FEMA did not adequately anticipate needs for
such services as providing temporary housing and public buildings.
Better planning for requirements could have avoided some costs, such as
the $3 million FEMA spent for 4,000 base camp beds that were never
used. Another example was the government's approach to acquiring
refrigerated truck services. During the 2005 hurricane season, the U.
S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of Transportation,
and FEMA had contracts with three separate contractors for refrigerated
truck services.[Footnote 60] We did not find a coordinated plan for
obtaining these services. By not taking a coordinated approach, the
agencies may have missed opportunities to make the most cost-effective
use of their contracts. For example, the government obtained selected
refrigerated truck services using an existing contract with Department
of Transportation at an average price over 60 percent higher than the
price FEMA paid for similar services.
Business arrangements:
Having good business arrangements requires that agencies have
sufficient knowledge about the goods and services available in the
market to satisfy their requirements, as well as the ability to
translate that knowledge into sound business decisions in using their
contracts. We found instances where insufficient knowledge of the
market or unsound ordering practices led to excessive or wasteful
expenditures.
In one case, FEMA tasked the Corps with acquiring temporary classrooms
for Mississippi within a very short time frame. To meet the
requirement, the Corps placed a non-competitive order for the
classrooms under an existing agreement for portable buildings. Because
the Corps had not been formally assigned this task prior to Katrina's
landfall, contracting officials lacked sufficient knowledge of the
industry and information about suppliers, inventories, and prices that
would have been useful in negotiating a good deal.[Footnote 61] The
business arrangement the Corps used involved layers of subcontractors:
the Corps purchased 45 portable buildings from a contractor, who in
turn purchased the 45 buildings from a distributor, who in turn
purchased them from another distributor, who had purchased the 45
buildings from the manufacturer. Each subcontractor added an additional
fee, resulting in the Corps agreeing to a price that was 63 percent
higher than the manufacturer's price.
Another example involved the process for ordering and delivering ice.
According to Corps officials, FEMA ordered at least double the amount
of ice required, resulting in an oversupply of ice and a lack of
distribution sites available to handle the volume ordered. One FEMA
official working at the local level told us that to ensure that he
would receive an adequate amount of ice for first few days, he doubled
his initial orders. He said that he kept ordering more ice because
headquarters did not provide timely notification of when his shipments
would arrive. At the end of hurricane season 2005, FEMA had over 2,000
truckloads of excess ice, which costs the government over $500,000 per
month for storage and additional transportation costs. The Senate
report on Katrina noted that when Hurricane Katrina hit, and FEMA
realized the scope of the temporary housing needs, the agency began
buying all of the travel trailers it could find. Unfortunately, FEMA
purchased approximately $900 million worth of manufactured homes and
modular homes that could not be used because FEMA's own regulations do
not allow for these types of homes to be placed in flood plains.
Further, some of the homes purchased did not fit FEMA's size standards.
However, FEMA seemingly had no plans for how the homes would be used
when the purchases were made.
Contract Monitoring and Oversight:
Effective monitoring--to ensure that goods and services are delivered
in accordance with the agreed upon schedule, cost, quality, and
quantity provisions in the contract--relies on having sufficient
numbers of trained and properly-deployed personnel to oversee
contractor performance. Our work indicated that the number of
monitoring staff available was not always sufficient, nor were they
effectively deployed to provide sufficient oversight. For example, on
FEMA's contracts for installing temporary housing in four states, only
17 of the 27 technical monitors necessary to oversee contractor
performance had been assigned at the time of our review. In another
case, Corps officials told us that progress in the temporary roof
program was slowed due to the lack of sufficient monitors.
Deployment practices did not always provide for appropriate
notification of responsibilities or overlap of rotating contracting
personnel, thus making knowledge transfer and continuity of contract
management operations difficult. For example, for four of the contracts
we reviewed, officials were either unaware or not notified by FEMA of
their oversight responsibilities. The lack of overlap between oversight
personnel for a large temporary housing contract left the most recent
contract administrator with no knowledge or documentation of who had
authorized the contractor to perform certain activities or why the
activities were being performed.
Practices to Help Ensure Successful Acquisition Outcomes:
We identified a number of emergency response practices in the public
and private sectors that provide insight into how the federal
government can better manage its disaster-related procurements. These
practices include:
* developing knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices by
identifying available commodities and services and establishing vendor
relationships before they are needed,
* establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust the level of
capacity required to effectively respond to the need,
* formally assigning and communicating disaster-related
responsibilities, with joint training for government and contractor
personnel, and:
* providing sufficient numbers of field-level contracting staff with
the authority needed to meet mission requirements.
We found a positive example of acquisition practices used during the
response to Katrina in our recent review of the Coast Guard's response
and recovery missions.[Footnote 62] Under the NRP, the Coast Guard is
the co-lead agency along with the Environmental Protection Agency for
Emergency Support Function 10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
along coastal areas. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard had
basic ordering agreements with fixed prices and other pre-established
terms and conditions with private companies to facilitate a rapid
response. These agreements were be used to respond to oil spills, for
acquiring the use of equipment for vessel salvage and for the use of
helicopters. According to Coast Guard officials, they have used basic
ordering agreements for this particular mission since the early 1990s,
and have extensive knowledge of the market for these particular goods
and services. Although we have not conducted a thorough evaluation of
the Coast Guard's Marine Environmental Protection clean-up efforts,
these agreements contributed to the successful cost control of the
marine environmental pollution response after Hurricane Katrina,
according to Coast Guard officials.
To help ensure successful acquisition outcomes, we recommend that DHS
provide guidance on advance procurement practices and procedures for
those federal agencies with roles and responsibilities under the NRP,
so that these agencies can better manage disaster-related procurements.
These practices should be in advance of disasters, ongoing and
continuous, and include (1) developing knowledge of contractor
capabilities, and available commodities, services, and prices, as well
as developing pre-established vendor relationships, on a competitive
basis whenever feasible; (2) establishing scalable operations plans to
adjust the level of capacity needed to respond; (3) formally assigning
and communicating disaster-related responsibilities and, where
feasible, incorporating necessary training; and (4) providing
sufficient numbers of field-level contracting staff to meet mission
requirements. DHS should also establish an assessment process to
monitor agencies' continuous planning efforts for their disaster-
related procurement needs and the maintenance of capabilities.
Lack of Controls Limited Accountability in the Receipt and Distribution
of International Assistance:
Federal agencies involved in managing international assistance were not
prepared to coordinate, receive, distribute, or account for the
assistance. The NRP establishes the Department of State as the
coordinator of all offers of international assistance. As part of its
Stafford Act responsibilities, FEMA has authority to accept the
assistance and coordinate its distribution.[Footnote 63] Agency
officials involved in the cash and in-kind assistance during Hurricane
Katrina told us the agencies were not prepared to accept international
assistance for use in the United States, because the U.S. government
had not received such substantial amounts of international disaster
assistance before. Therefore, they told us that they developed ad hoc
processes to accept, receive, and distribute the cash and in-kind
assistance. Understandably, not all of these ad hoc processes contained
controls to support full accountability. For example, we recently
reported that no agency tracked and confirmed that the assistance
arrived at its destinations.[Footnote 64] Also, we found that lack of
procedures, inadequate information up front about the donations, and
insufficient coordination resulted in the U.S. government agreeing to
receive food and medical items that were unsuitable for use in the
United States and entailed storage costs of about $80,000. DOD's lack
of internal guidance regarding the State Department's coordinating
process resulted in some foreign military donations that arrived
without State Department, FEMA, or DOD oversight.
In the aftermath of Katrina, we recommended that DHS and DOD, in
consultation with the Department of State, establish within the NRP--or
other appropriate plans--clearly delineated policies and procedures for
the acceptance, receipt, and distribution of international assistance
to improve the policies, procedures, planning, and oversight of
international cash and in-kind donations to the U.S. government in
response to disasters. DOD and DHS generally agreed with our
recommendations. DHS noted that, in some cases, actions were already
underway to address the recommendations.
Control Weaknesses in Individual Assistance Payments Resulted in Fraud
and Abuse:
When responding to the needs of the victims of a catastrophic disaster,
FEMA must balance controls and accountability mechanisms with the
immediate need to deliver resources and assistance in an environment
where the agency's initial response efforts must focus on life-saving
and life-sustaining tasks. Nonetheless, our work has identified flaws
in the programs designed to assist disaster victims, which would leave
the federal government vulnerable to fraud and abuse of individual
assistance payments.
As mentioned earlier, FEMA provides direct assistance--such as
temporary housing units--and financial assistance--such as grant
funding for temporary housing and other disaster-related expenses--to
disaster victims through IHP. Under IHP, FEMA may provide disaster
assistance to individuals and households who have uninsured (or
underinsured) needs that cannot be met through other means. IHP
assistance is limited to 18 months.[Footnote 65] The maximum amount of
financial assistance available is adjusted annually for inflation and
was capped at $27,200 in 2006. IHP provides assistance to cover certain
expenses not covered by insurance or which individuals or households
cannot cover with their own resources. Because IHP benefits are
statutorily capped, the program may not cover all losses to damaged
property or restore such property to its condition before the
disaster.[Footnote 66] To receive assistance, applicants must qualify
for benefits through a process implemented primarily by FEMA
contractors and temporary disaster employees in a network of permanent
and temporary field offices. The benefits provided to disaster victims
of hurricanes in 2005 far surpassed the number of registrants,
beneficiaries, and the dollar value amount of benefits provided under
the program for named hurricane disasters in 2003 and 2004 combined.
Under the IHP, disaster victims in declared counties must first
register and apply for assistance with FEMA, by phone, in person at a
disaster recovery center, or over the Internet. FEMA does not provide
monetary assistance to any individual without first receiving an
application from and taking steps to validate the eligibility of that
individual based on the application. For some IHP benefits, applicants
above a certain income threshold must first apply to the SBA for
disaster loan assistance.[Footnote 67]
Many of the challenges FEMA faced after Hurricane Katrina stemmed from
the magnitude of the disaster, including the number of victims who were
displaced from their homes, and related issues in planning, trained
staff, and limitations for implementation of the program. As we have
reported, FEMA's processes for validating eligibility in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina were partially successful. Our work, however, has
identified significant flaws in the process for disaster victim
applications that leave the federal government vulnerable to fraud and
abuse of individual assistance payments.[Footnote 68]
We estimate that through February 2006, FEMA made about 16 percent, or
$1 billion, in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to
applicants who used invalid information to apply for disaster
assistance. Based on our statistical sample, we are 95-percent
confident that the range of improper and potentially fraudulent
payments is from $600 million to $1.4 billion. In our assessment of
whether a payment was improper and potentially fraudulent, we did not
test for other evidence of impropriety or potential fraud, such as
insurance fraud and bogus damage claims. This means our review
potentially understates the magnitude of improper payments made.
Examples of fraud and abuse include payments to applicants who used
post office boxes, United Parcel Service stores, and cemeteries as
their damaged property addresses. In one case, FEMA paid nearly $6,000
to our applicant who submitted a vacant lot as a damaged
address.[Footnote 69]
For Internet applications, limited automated controls were in place to
verify an applicant's identity. However, we found no independent
verification of the identity of applicants who applied for disaster
assistance over the telephone. To demonstrate the vulnerability
inherent in the call-in applications, we used falsified identities,
bogus addresses, and fabricated disaster stories to register for IHP
and found that we were able to obtain $2,000 expedited assistance
checks from FEMA through these means.[Footnote 70] As we previously
testified, FEMA continued to provide our undercover operations with
additional disaster-related assistance payments even after FEMA
received indications from various sources that our applications may
have been bogus.[Footnote 71] Other control weaknesses included the
lack of any validation of damaged property addresses for both Internet
and telephone registrations. Our work in this area revealed that
thousands of applicants misused social security numbers--i.e., used
social security numbers that were never issued or belonged to deceased
or other individuals. Our case study investigations of several hundred
applications also revealed the use of bogus damaged property addresses.
For example, our visits to over 200 of the case study damaged
properties in Texas and Louisiana showed that at least 80 of these
properties were bogus--including vacant lots and nonexistent
apartments. We found that FEMA also made duplicate expedited assistance
payments to about 5,000 of the nearly 11,000 debit card recipients--
once through the distribution of debit cards and again by check or
electronic funds transfer. We found that although debit cards were used
predominantly to obtain cash, food, clothing, and personal necessities,
a small number were used for adult entertainment, bail bond services,
and weapons purchase, which do not appear to be items or services that
are essential to satisfy disaster-related needs.
To reduce waste, fraud and abuse in expedited assistance for disaster
victims, we have recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security
direct the Undersecretary for Federal Emergency Management to take six
actions to address the weaknesses we identified in the administration
of IHP: (1) establish an identity verification process for IHP
registrants applying via both the Internet and telephone; (2) develop
procedures to improve the existing review process of duplicate
registrations containing the exact same social security number (SSN);
(3) establish an address verification process for IHP registrants
applying via both the Internet and telephone; (4) explore entering into
an agreement with other agencies to periodically authenticate
information contained in IHP registrations; (5) establish procedures to
collect duplicate expedited assistance payments or to offset these
amounts against future payments; and (6) ensure that any future
distribution of IHP debit cards includes instructions on their proper
use.[Footnote 72]
DHS and FEMA concurred fully with four of our six recommendations, and
partially concurred with the remaining two recommendations. FEMA and
DHS stated that they have already taken actions to address some of
these recommendations. These actions include instituting an Internet
application process that will prevent all duplicate applications from
the Internet, and conducting data sharing tests with the Social
Security Administration. In addition, DHS and FEMA stated that,
starting in June 2006, all registration addresses (including those
provided through phone-in applications) will be subjected to an online
verification during the application process. While these are steps in
the right direction, we will follow up on whether the actions taken
fully address our recommendations. Going forward it will be important
for FEMA to establish effective controls to prevent fraudulent and
improper payments before they occur, because fraud prevention is a far
more effective control than detecting improper and potentially
fraudulent payments after they are made. Our experience with
organizations that rely on a process that attempts to detect improper
and potentially fraudulent payments after they are made is that the
organization recovers only a fraction of the payments that should not
have been made.
DHS has also reported taking a number of other actions and initiatives
designed to improve timeliness and accountability in providing goods
and services to the affected areas and their victims. However, because
DHS did not provide us documentation to verify these actions and
initiatives, we could not determine their status, including the extent
to which they are operational. According to DHS, their current efforts
are designed to enhance the debris removal guidance, processes and
policies to, in part, ensure consistent cost-sharing for federal
contracting (through the Corps) and local government contracting. FEMA
has also announced a number of customer service improvement efforts so
federal recovery programs will have the capacity to handle a
catastrophic incident. These include (1) doubling FEMA's registration
capacity to 200,000 per day; (2) instituting a pilot project for
deployable Mobile Registration Intake Centers; (3) enhancing identity
verification during registration; (4) increasing the daily home
inspection capacity of FEMA contracted firms from 7,000 per day to
20,000; and (5) updating its policies to improve and quicken
determination of applicant eligibility for FEMA's IHP program along
with determining eligibility for any expedited assistance available
under the program.
Long-Term Recovery and Rebuilding Efforts Raise Issues for Congress to
Consider:
The federal government will be a major partner in the longer-term
rebuilding of the Gulf Coast because of the widespread damage and
economic impact. Rebuilding raises issues concerning the need for
consensus on what rebuilding should be done, where and based on what
standards, who will pay for what, and what oversight is needed to
ensure federal funds are spent for their intended purposes. In
addition, federal programs will face financial difficulties in
responding to the long-term needs, and there is uncertainty concerning
the impact of catastrophic disasters on the availability and
affordability of insurance. Among the issues that will require federal
attention include (1) assessing the environmental hazards created by
the storms; (2) rebuilding and strengthening the levees; (3) providing
assistance to school districts that have enrolled large numbers of
evacuee children; (4) continuing to provide assistance for temporary
housing, and (5) assuring the financial soundness of the National Flood
Insurance Program. Finally, our March 2006 testimony identified
guidelines that may enhance federal financial assistance's performance
in the restoration of the Gulf Coast.
Long-Term Recovery Is a Shared Responsibility and a Number of Federal
Agencies Will Play a Role in Addressing Multiple Recovery-Related
Issues:
State and local officials will have the lead on determining the future
needs of the Gulf Coast. However, a number of federal agencies have
responsibilities related to the long-term recovery. The recovery should
be guided by careful planning that balances the need for speedy
economic recovery with actions that reduce the impact of future storms,
such as elevating structures located in areas at highest risk of damage
from future flooding. In Louisiana and Mississippi, several efforts are
underway to implement long-term rebuilding strategies. The actions of
state, local, and federal governments, individuals, and nongovernmental
entities will affect the speed and nature of the region's recovery.
Our March 2006 testimony identified a number of issues that will
require the attention of the Administration and Congress. Among those
issues include the rebuilding the region's transportation, health
infrastructures and federal facilities, and the availability and
affordability of insurance coverage. We also have ongoing work
examining other issues that will require federal attention, including
(1) assessing the environmental hazards created by the storms; (2)
rebuilding and strengthening the levees; (3) providing assistance to
school districts that have enrolled large numbers of evacuee children;
(4) continuing to provide assistance for temporary housing; and (5)
assuring the financial soundness of the National Flood Insurance
Program.
Assessing Environmental Hazards Involves the Environmental Protection
Agency:
Immediately following Katrina, areas along the Gulf Coast faced a
number of environmental challenges associated with oil and hazardous
material releases resulting from the storm. EPA and federal and state
partners continue to monitor air, water, and sediment for potential
chemicals of concern such as heavy metals including lead and arsenic;
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons; pesticides; and diesel and oil range
organics and have jointly issued public reports with CDC that provide
recommendations on steps individuals can take to limit potential
exposure. EPA is also continuing to provide support to Louisiana and
Mississippi in assessing drinking water and wastewater infrastructure.
Following initial assessments of drinking water and wastewater impacts
in Louisiana and Mississippi at the request of the states, FEMA, and
the Corps, Louisiana requested additional EPA assistance in conducting
needs assessments of repairs at drinking water systems in the state.
These facilities are now largely operational, but distribution systems
are still being repaired, leaving some areas without service. Through
its Office of Recovery and Removal, Mississippi is reviewing wastewater
and drinking water needs, and EPA has offered to assist, if needed.
While EPA has largely completed its response to hazardous material
releases, which has included responding to spills at industrial
facilities and collecting orphaned chemical drums and tanks, the agency
continues to oversee cleanup of a million-gallon oil spill at a Murphy
oil facility in St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana. Finally, EPA continues
to assist in hazardous debris removal by coordinating recycling efforts
for damaged refrigerators and electronic goods, removing and safely
disposing of thousands of household hazardous waste containers such as
paint cans and propane tanks, and working with the Army Corps of
Engineers and local agencies to remove CFCs and other refrigerants from
abandoned appliances that are harmful to the environment.
Areas along the Gulf Coast are also facing environmental challenges as
they begin long-term rebuilding efforts. Large-scale demolition efforts
now underway along the Gulf Coast create the potential for release of
asbestos and other hazardous pollutants. EPA has noted that the number
of houses requiring demolition, the sheer volume of debris, and limited
landfill space available to accept contaminated debris raise a number
of environmental concerns. In addition to EPA's continued role in
assisting the Corps and local agencies with the removal of hazardous
household waste and appliances, EPA also has a role in ensuring that
debris containing asbestos and other pollutants is removed and disposed
of appropriately. At the request of the Louisiana and Mississippi
Departments of Environmental Quality, EPA has provided some flexibility
regarding regulated asbestos materials from homes to facilitate
demolition activities in the state of Louisiana and in six counties in
Mississippi. This flexibility still requires appropriate practices to
ensure protection of public health and the environment. Efforts to
reduce the volume of debris by grinding and burning certain types of
debris also present environmental challenges, as these activities have
the potential to release hazardous air pollutants. EPA continues to
work with Louisiana to determine if these practices are appropriate.
Continued monitoring will be necessary to minimize the environmental
risks associated with demolition and debris removal activities. We are
evaluating environmental challenges facing the Gulf Coast, including
EPA's oversight of federal asbestos requirements, in an ongoing review
of the agency's role in hurricane response.
Rebuilding and Strengthening the Levees Involves the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers:
We also examined and monitored the Corps plans to repair 169 miles of
levees and floodwalls damaged by Hurricane Katrina to pre-storm
conditions. Completion of these repairs was planned for June 1, 2006,
the start of the 2006 hurricane season. On June 1, 2006, the Corps
announced that 100 percent of pre-hurricane levels of protection had
been restored although some construction contracts were not yet
completed. In instances where the Corps could not complete permanent
repairs by June 1, 2006, it made interim repairs and developed
emergency procedures to protect against flooding in the event of a
hurricane.
After completing these repairs, the Corps planned to (1) repair all
pumps, motors and pumping stations by about March 2007; (2) restore
sections of existing hurricane protection projects that have settled
over time to their original design elevations; and (3) complete
construction of incomplete portions of five previously authorized
hurricane and flood control projects by September 2007. The Corps also
planned to undertake further work to restore, construct, and enhance
hurricane protection for southeastern Louisiana by 2010. For example,
in April 2006, FEMA released advisory flood elevations for New Orleans
and the surrounding area based on a one percent annual chance of
flooding, also called a 100-year flood. In response, the Corps is
revising its plans and cost estimates to raise the height of levees and
floodwalls to provide the area with a 100-year level of protection.
Since September 2005, the Congress has appropriated more than $7
billion to the Corps for portions of this work and additional
appropriations are expected. Our ongoing work indicates, however, that
the Corps does not have a comprehensive strategy and implementation
plan to integrate and manage this work and is currently revising its
cost estimates for most system enhancements. Instead, the Corps appears
to be following a piecemeal approach, similar to its past practice of
building projects without giving sufficient attention to the
interrelationships between projects or fully considering whether they
will provide an integrated level of hurricane protection for the
region. We plan to continue our examination of the Corps' plans and
efforts, and to issue a report on this work later this year.
Despite Federal Assistance, States and School Districts Face Continuing
Challenges Regarding Funding and Displaced Students:
State and local education officials faced challenges in restarting
schools and educating displaced students. Hundreds of thousands of
students, from kindergarten to the 12th grade, were displaced by the
hurricanes. In addition, Louisiana officials said that 29 schools were
destroyed and about half of the state's schools were damaged, and
Mississippi officials said that 16 schools were destroyed and over half
of the state's districts reported some damage. Districts in areas
directly affected by the storms and those that enrolled displaced
students faced financial challenges. For example, local property tax
revenue--a key funding source for schools--may be undercut in areas
with property damage, and state funding for schools may also be
undercut from the effects of the storms. The large number of displaced
students in some districts led to a strain on classroom space, books,
teachers, school buses and drivers, and counseling services. Congress
initially appropriated a total of approximately $1.4 billion under the
Restart and Emergency Impact Aid programs to help reopen elementary and
secondary schools and serve displaced students;[Footnote 73] Congress
subsequently appropriated an additional $235 million under the
Emergency Impact Aid program for serving displaced students.[Footnote
74] Federal assistance for displaced students must be obligated by
September 30, 2006, and must be used only for expenses incurred during
the 2005-2006 school year; yet, state officials reported that a large
number of displaced students are likely to remain in their new
districts for longer than a year.
In addition, state and district officials expressed the need for
flexibility in meeting the requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act
of 2001. Upon request of the affected states, the U.S. Department of
Education quickly granted some flexibility regarding certain No Child
Left Behind Act requirements. State officials were also concerned about
the effect of displaced students on their No Child Left Behind Act
academic accountability results. As of June 1, 2006, Education had
granted several states flexibility with regard to how schools are
accountable for the academic achievement of displaced students for the
2005-2006 school year. Although some states received flexibility in how
schools are accountable for academic achievement, schools were still
responsible for ensuring that displaced students participated in 2005-
2006 academic assessments. State and local school officials could
promote continuity of operations after large-scale emergencies by
developing plans that include locating displaced employees and working
closely with other local officials to focus resources on reopening
schools. The reopening of schools is vital for community recovery.
Also, federal regulatory flexibility in reporting and other
requirements can allow states and districts to focus on rebuilding.
Duration of Housing Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita Will Require Federal Attention:
Our ongoing work on the recovery of the Gulf Coast has identified
several issues regarding temporary housing that will require federal
attention. These issues generally relate to the question of how long
the federal government should provide disaster housing assistance to
victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita under FEMA and HUD administered
programs. Typically, FEMA's IHP provides temporary housing.[Footnote
75] IHP requires an assessment of eligibility before it can provide
housing assistance.[Footnote 76] According to FEMA officials, in order
to house the large number of displaced residents quickly, FEMA used its
authority under Section 403 of the Stafford Act to allow states to
provide temporary housing for evacuees of Hurricane Katrina. Section
403 of the Stafford Act authorizes the agency to provide assistance
essential to meeting immediate threats to life and property resulting
from a major disaster, including emergency shelter. By using this
authority, FEMA allowed states to house evacuees without assessing
eligibility. According to FEMA, approximately 60,000 households
received temporary housing under this authority. In early 2006, FEMA
began determining the eligibility of those it is assisting under
Section 403 to transition to IHP. In March 2006, FEMA announced that it
would no longer provide temporary housing benefits under Section 403 as
of May 31, 2006.[Footnote 77] Households deemed ineligible because they
do not meet the IHP eligibility criteria will no longer receive housing
assistance from FEMA, potentially leaving thousands of people without
housing if they are unable to obtain other housing assistance. For
example, FEMA officials estimate that approximately 20 percent of the
45,000 households in Texas receiving assistance under Section 403
authority will be ineligible for assistance under IHP.
Victims who receive assistance under FEMA's IHP are eligible to receive
temporary housing assistance generally up to 18 months after the date
of the disaster declaration. FEMA reported that as of April 2006, it
had approved temporary housing assistance for more than 825,000
households displaced by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Although some FEMA
officials told us that many victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita will
require housing assistance beyond this limit, it is unclear who will
provide it. According to a FEMA official assigned to Louisiana, state
and local governments are not currently capable of providing housing
assistance after the FEMA assistance ends. FEMA may extend this
assistance beyond the 18 month period if it determines that due to
extraordinary circumstances an extension would be in the public
interest.
For victims of Hurricane Katrina who resided in public or other HUD-
assisted housing units damaged or destroyed by the storm, HUD initially
provided assistance through its Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance
Program. According to HUD, it assisted approximately 15,000 families
through this program. In December 2005, Congress appropriated $390
million for temporary rental voucher assistance for victims of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.[Footnote 78] Subsequently, HUD established
a new program--the Disaster Voucher Program--and in February 2006 began
transitioning those from the previous program to the new program. Under
the Disaster Voucher Program, households received a housing voucher
that covers 100 percent of the rent for up to 18 months. According to
HUD guidance, a family is eligible to reoccupy its previously-occupied
public or assisted housing unit if and when it becomes available.
However, HUD has not yet issued guidance on what housing assistance
will be available to displaced residents whose units are not going to
be available by the time the assistance ends or those with permanently
damaged units[Footnote 79]. Moreover, as a result of the hurricanes,
the housing shortage is even more acute in the affected areas,
including public and assisted housing. For example, some residents
resided in public housing units that the storms damaged or destroyed.
HUD plans to demolish some of its severely damaged public housing stock
in New Orleans and other areas affected by the hurricanes.
In response to the hurricanes, HUD's Federal Housing Administration
also issued a 90-day moratorium on foreclosures for all FHA-insured
loans on properties located in areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita. HUD subsequently extended the moratorium on foreclosures twice
for areas eligible for FEMA's Individual Assistance, because it found
that due to magnitude of the storm damage, lenders and borrowers may
still need additional time to develop and finalize plans for home
repair and resumption of mortgage payments. According to HUD, the last
moratorium on foreclosures was extended to August 31, 2006. In addition
to the moratoriums, HUD issued guidance instructing lenders servicing
FHA-insured mortgage loans not to report hurricane related
delinquencies to credit bureaus, not to charge late fees, and to expand
their efforts to contact displaced borrowers. Furthermore, HUD offered
special mortgage assistance to borrowers in eligible areas who could
not maintain mortgage payments due to hurricane related property
damage, curtailment of income or increased living expenses. Under this
initiative, HUD may make payments to lenders on behalf of borrowers for
up to 12 months worth of mortgage payments (principal, interest, taxes,
and insurance). This special mortgage assistance is available to
eligible borrowers through May 31, 2007. Borrowers are not required to
repay HUD until the FHA-insured first mortgage is paid in full. It is
unclear, however, what additional assistance lenders and servicers of
FHA-insured single-family mortgages may provide and what impact this
may have on borrowers and FHA as the guarantor of these mortgages.
We plan to continue our examination of the federal role in providing
housing assistance in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and to
issue a report on this work by the end of this year.
Questions Raised about FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program
Structure and Long-Term Solvency:
Although homeowner insurance policies typically cover damage and losses
from fire or theft and often from wind-driven rain, they do not cover
flood damage because private insurance companies are largely unwilling
to bear the economic risks associated with the potentially catastrophic
impact of flooding, including damage from storm surges. To provide some
insurance protection for flood victims, as well as incentives for
communities to adopt and enforce floodplain management regulations to
reduce future flood damage, Congress established the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP) in 1968.[Footnote 80] Homeowners with
mortgages from federally regulated lenders on property in communities
identified to be in special high-risk flood hazard areas are required
to purchase flood insurance on their dwellings for, at minimum, the
amount of the outstanding mortgage. Optional, lower-cost coverage is
also available under the NFIP to protect homes in areas of low to
moderate risk. The NFIP provides insurance protection of up to $250,000
for homes and up to $100,000 for personal property.[Footnote 81] As of
December 2005, the NFIP had about 4.8 million policies in force. About
3 million (62 percent) of the policies were for properties in the five
states impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita--Alabama, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
The NFIP was created in part to reduce taxpayer funded payments to
owners of flood-damaged properties by having payments for such damage
paid through flood insurance policyholder premiums. The claims from
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita required unprecedented borrowing from the
Treasury of $18.5 billion at the time of our January 2006 testimony,
raising anew questions about its structure and long-term
solvency.[Footnote 82] The program's financial resources are
insufficient to meet future expected losses, in part because policy
subsidies and repetitive loss properties have contributed to continuing
losses to the program. Specifically, the program is not actuarially
sound because a high proportion of insurance properties are subsidized-
-about 26 percent at the time of FEMA's 2004 review. Policy holders for
these properties, built before flood plain regulations were established
in their communities, pay premiums that represent about 35 to 40
percent of the true risk premium. In January 2006, FEMA estimated the
program had a shortfall of $750 million in annual premium income
because of policy subsidies.
The portion of subsidized polices that most adversely impact the
program's financial solvency are about 49,000 repetitive loss
properties (as of March 2004) for which two or more claims of $1,000 or
more have been paid in a 10-year period. Although these properties make
up only about 1 percent of the properties insured under the NFIP, they
account for 25 to 30 percent of all claims losses. As of March 2004,
nearly half of all nationwide repetitive loss property insurance
payments had been made in Louisiana, Texas, and Florida. These
properties accounted for about $4.6 billion in claims payments from
1978 to March 2004. A significant number of repetitive loss properties
were affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and a FEMA management
official predicted that the inventory of repetitive loss properties
would increase as a result of damage from the two storms.
As part of its flood plain management strategy, NFIP policies encourage
states and local communities to elevate or remove damaged properties
from the flood plain. In addition to paying claims for flood damage,
NFIP policies pay up to $30,000 for the cost of complying with
mitigation actions required under state or local floodplain management
laws or ordinances, such as elevating, moving, or demolishing the
damaged structures. This increased cost of compliance (ICC) coverage is
available under the NFIP's standard flood insurance policy for
properties that suffer substantial damage, including repetitive loss
properties.[Footnote 83] In an upcoming revision to the standard flood
insurance policy, FEMA plans to make permanent the increase in time to
complete work and receive an ICC payment. It is too early in the
recovery process to determine the impact of the mitigation actions on
the national inventory of repetitive loss properties.
For all these reasons, and others described in our March 2006
testimony, we have placed the NFIP on our list of high-risk government
programs. In 2004 we made recommendations to FEMA on strategies to
better ensure that FEMA's map modernization achieves the intended
benefits of improved flood mitigation, increased flood insurance
participation, and improved multi-hazard mitigation and risk management
capabilities.[Footnote 84] DHS and FEMA generally agreed with our
recommendations. FEMA said that it planned to refine existing
standards, in coordination with stakeholders, to ensure consistent data
collection and analysis for all communities commensurate with their
flood risk; that it would continue to collaborate with stakeholder
groups to develop an effective strategy to include states and
communities with varying levels of capabilities and resources; and that
it planned to refine performance measures for this map modernization
objective to make them more useful and quantifiable. In 2005, we
recommended that FEMA use a statistically valid method to select claims
for quality review because its existing sampling and internal controls
did not provide management with the information needed to have
reasonable assurance that program objectives are being achieved. We
also recommended that FEMA set target dates for implementing the
provisions of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004.[Footnote 85] FEMA
said its existing sampling method was sufficient for the purposes for
which it was used and that it was working diligently to implement the
requirements of the 2004 reform act.[Footnote 86]
A Framework to Enhance Federal Financial Assistance's Performance in
the Restoration of the Gulf Coast:
Finally, in our March 8 testimony, we identified an accountability and
performance framework from relevant GAO past work that may be
considered regarding the provision of federal financial assistance for
the restoration of the Gulf Coast:[Footnote 87]
* Identify the scope of the problem. For example, does the problem
reflect broader industry wide or regional economic conditions? For the
Gulf Coast, this would involve financial and economic analyses, perhaps
utilizing current studies of prior conditions and the ongoing progress
of recovery and rebuilding.
* Clearly establish the effect of the problem on the national interest-
-such as whether federal involvement is needed because the problem
presents potentially large economy wide or regional consequences. For
example, in the Gulf Coast, Congress should consider whether the
proposed rebuilding plans are reasonable and the involvement of state
and local governments and the private sector will not, on their own,
provide necessary capital.
* Establish clear, concise, and consistent legislative goals and
objectives associated with the response. For example, in the Gulf
Coast, building on the President's decision to appoint a Coordinator of
Federal Support for the Recovery and Rebuilding of the Gulf Coast
region, Congress should ensure that the goals of all aspects of federal
involvement are clear, measurable, and agreed-upon by all participants.
* Protect the government's financial interest. In the Gulf Coast, for
example, controls might be put in place so there is review of the most
important financial and operating plans that rely on federal
investments.
In terms of protecting the government's financial interest, our ongoing
work in this area found that there is no one agency or central
collection point that exists to compile and report on how the emergency
supplemental appropriations funds provided to 23 different federal
agencies are being spent. Without a framework and mechanisms in place
to collect and consolidate information from these agencies on a
periodic basis, it will be difficult for decision makers to determine
how much federal funding has been spent and by whom, whether more may
be needed, or whether too much has been provided. The ability to
separately track and report on these funds is important to help ensure
better accountability and clearly identify the status of funding
provided in direct response to these hurricanes at both the individual
federal agency level as well as the government wide level. Also, it is
important to provide transparency so that hurricane victims, affected
states, as well as American taxpayers, know how these funds are being
spent. We will issue a report later this year that addresses the
federal government's ability to track and report on the hurricane
relief funds received.
Conclusions:
Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has awarded billions
of dollars in grants and assistance to state and local governments to
assist in strengthening emergency management capabilities. DHS has
developed several key policy documents, including the NRP, NIMS, and
the interim National Preparedness Goal to guide federal, state, and
local efforts. The aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season resulted in a
reassessment of the federal role in preparing for and responding to
catastrophic events. The studies and reports of the past year--by
Congress, the White House Homeland Security Council, the DHS-IG, DHS
and FEMA, GAO, and others--have provided a number of insights into the
strengths and limitations of the nation's capacity to respond to
catastrophic disasters and resulted in a number of recommendations for
strengthening that capacity. Collectively, these studies and reports
paint a complex mosaic of the challenges that the nation--federal,
state, local, and tribal governments, nongovernmental entities, the
private sector, and individual citizens--faces in preparing for,
responding to, and recovering from catastrophic disasters. In addition
to the reports issued to date, there are numerous ongoing analyses of
various facets of the nation's preparedness and response efforts before
and after Hurricane Katrina.
Improving the nation's ability to prepare, respond, and recover from
catastrophic disasters will take three critical inputs: (1) leaders and
professionals with the right knowledge, skills, and experience; (2)
plans and guidance that detail what needs to be done, by whom, how, and
how well; and finally (3) clear criteria and expectations that are
clearly communicated, well understood, and result in appropriate,
coordinated actions from all levels of government, their emergency
planners and responders, and the nonprofit and private-sector
organizations that will be providing support. This requires the
development of thoughtful strategic planning and assessment, along with
developing and sustaining needed skills and assets. Effective training
and exercises based on realistic scenarios is a key component of
building and maintaining needed skills and capabilities. As we noted in
past GAO work, overall federal assistance has not been guided by a
clear, risk-based strategic plan that would provide a basis for
realistic budgeting and resource planning.[Footnote 88] Ultimately, the
federal government must determine how much it will cost to develop and
maintain these needed capabilities and what the federal government can
afford to pay. Other levels of government face a similar challenge. DHS
and its partners and stakeholders--governmental and nongovernmental,
public and private--face the challenge of working together to
coordinate preparedness activities and formulate realistic budgets and
resource plans to share these costs and support and sustain
implementation of an efficient and effective all-hazards national
preparedness program.
Catastrophic disasters are unique in their scope and the magnitude of
their effects. In preparing for any disaster, but particularly
catastrophic disasters, it is essential to have in place through
contracts, prepositioning of key supplies, and other means the needed
surge capacity to respond quickly and effectively to the destruction
and dislocation that results from the catastrophe. In moving forward,
one critical challenge will be determining if the initial and long-term
efforts to implement specific initiatives will truly close the
identified gaps in the nation's capacity to prepare for, respond to,
and recover from catastrophic disasters. Sound recommendations and
initiatives must be effectively implemented to achieve the intended
improvements. Currently, there is little available information on the
operational readiness of many of the reforms and actions DHS has
announced in recent months. The first real test of these actions will
come with the next major hurricane or other major disaster. DHS has
conducted some exercises in recent weeks, but there is little available
information on the results of those exercises. In addition, some of the
reforms, such as revisions to the NRP, may have clarified some issues,
such as the role of the Secretary of Homeland Security in declaring
incidents of national significance, while potentially raising new
issues, such as how the NRP, which DHS now states is in effect at all
times, would be operationalized in incidents of lesser severity. While
the scope of the NRP has broadened, DHS and other federal agencies may
be without a road map for dealing with incidents of lesser severity
until they supplement the NRP with detailed, scalable operational
plans. Likewise, DHS and other federal agencies may be without a road
map in responding to catastrophic incidents until they supplement the
NRP's catastrophic incident annex with the detailed operational plans
envisioned by the NRP. To be effective, the NRP must be supported by
robust operational plans for implementing its provisions.
Appropriate controls and accountability mechanisms for the use of
resources during a catastrophic disaster are essential to ensure that
the resources are used appropriately, but there is always a tension
between normal controls and accountability mechanisms and the need to
deliver assistance expeditiously, especially when responders and
governments are providing life-saving and life-sustaining services in a
time-critical environment. DHS and state and local governments all face
a significant challenge in ensuring that relief payments and services
are only sent to valid registrants while also distributing those relief
payments and services as fast as possible. Thus, all levels of
governments must further develop and strengthen controls to ensure
accountability, because--as FEMA has learned from prior experience--
pursuing collection activities after disaster relief payments have been
made is costly, time-consuming, and ineffective. Upfront controls are
all the more crucial given the estimated billions of dollars in
erroneous or excessive payments related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Finally, given the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina's devastation of the
physical and economic infrastructure in the Gulf Coast--both public and
private sector--rebuilding is likely to take years, if not decades, to
complete. As a result, all levels of government will have a critical
role in the effort, not just the federal government and not solely or
even primarily through FEMA's post-disaster recovery and mitigation
funding. Some communities were so totally devastated that they almost
face rebuilding their communities from the ground up. These long-term
recovery and rebuilding efforts offer an opportunity to mitigate the
potential impact of future hurricanes, and employ both direct
governmental funding and forms of fiscal and monetary support from the
banking and insurance industries. In light of how long this effort may
take, GAO will continue to examine current recovery issues and long-
term rebuilding activities.
Recommendations:
In this report we are making several new recommendations updating and
formalizing several recommendations first posed in our March 8, 2006,
testimony on preliminary observations regarding preparedness, response,
and recovery; and one new recommendation on advance procurement
practices and procedures:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
* Rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent clarification of
the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of
leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified
coordination problems.
* Direct that the NRP base plan and its Catastrophic Incident Annex be
supported by more robust and detailed operational implementation plans,
particularly the Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the NRP. Such
operational plans should, for example, further define and leverage
those military capabilities that might be needed in a catastrophic
disaster.
* Provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local
planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully
support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a
jurisdictional and regional basis. This should also include the
application of lessons learned from actual catastrophic and other
disasters.
* Take the lead in monitoring federal agencies' efforts to meet their
responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness
Goal, including the development, testing, and exercising of agency
operational plans to implement their responsibilities under the NRP,
NIMS, and the interim National Preparedness Goal.
* Given that resources are finite, apply an all-hazards, risk
management approach in deciding whether and how to invest in specific
capabilities for a catastrophic disaster.
* Provide guidance on advance procurement practices and procedures for
those federal agencies with roles and responsibilities under the NRP,
so that these agencies can better manage disaster-related procurements,
such as food, shelter, and debris removal. These practices should be in
advance of disasters, ongoing and continuous, and include (1)
developing knowledge of contractor capabilities and available
commodities, services and prices as well as developing pre-established
vendor relationships, on a competitive basis whenever feasible; (2)
establishing scalable operations plans to adjust the level of capacity
needed to respond; (3) formally assigning and communicating disaster-
related responsibilities and, where feasible, incorporating necessary
training; and (4) providing sufficient numbers of field-level
contracting staff to meet mission requirements. DHS should also
establish an assessment process to monitor agencies' continuous
planning efforts for their disaster-related procurement needs and the
maintenance of capabilities.
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Reaffirming a recommendation we made following Hurricane Andrew, we
recommend that Congress:
* Give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions to prepare
for catastrophic disasters when there is warning.
We also offer some analytical frameworks and factors that Congress may
wish to consider in carrying out its oversight and legislative
responsibilities with regard to national preparedness and the recovery
of the Gulf Coast region:
* Use a risk management framework to assist in its oversight and
legislative decision-making regarding the nation's capacity to respond
to catastrophic disasters.
* If Congress is considering a change in FEMA's organizational
placement, it should consider (1) whether factors such as the
qualifications, experience, and training of the leadership and the
adequacy of resources led to its performance difficulties; (2) criteria
such as mission relevancy, similar goals, and objectives (present and
future); (3) leveraging the effectiveness of other agencies and
programs or the new department as a whole; and (4) gains in efficiency
and effectiveness through eliminating duplications and overlaps.
² If Congress is considering a change in the qualifications of the
Undersecretary for Federal Emergency Management, it should consider
establishing statutory professional qualifications for the
Undersecretary and other selected key positions within DHS and term
appointments for the Undersecretary and selected other positions.
* Consider the four conditions that we suggested in 1984, as a
framework of ideas about how to structure future financial assistance
programs and what program requirements to include to achieve
Congressional goals and objectives while minimizing the risk of
financial loss to the government. These guidelines are a useful
framework for developing assistance programs for the Gulf Coast
restoration:
* The scope of the problem should be identified, such as if the problem
reflects broader industry wide or regional economic conditions. For the
Gulf Coast, this would involve financial and economic analyses, perhaps
utilizing current studies of prior conditions and the ongoing progress
of recovery and rebuilding.
* The effect of the problem on the national interest should be clearly
established, for example, whether the problem presents potentially
large economy wide or regional consequences. For example, in the Gulf
Coast, Congress should consider the costs of municipal and corporate
collapse and the challenges associated with providing assistance.
* The legislative goals and objectives associated with the response
should be clear, concise, and consistent. For example, in the Gulf
Coast, goals and objectives for rebuilding should be clearly stated,
working with the state and local groups already tasked with recovery
planning and with the Administration's Coordinator of Federal Support
for the Recovery and Rebuilding of the Gulf Coast region.
* Lastly, the government's financial interest should be protected. In
the Gulf Coast, controls might be put in place so that the most
important financial and operating plans will be reviewed.
This report also identifies the major findings, conclusions, and 74
recommendations and matters for congressional consideration from our
prior and ongoing work on catastrophic disasters. Appendix I summarizes
24 key GAO recommendations identified in work prior to Hurricane
Katrina. These 24 prior recommendations were not adopted or in effect
when Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast and remain listed by GAO as
open recommendations, that is, recommendations not fully implemented.
We continue to believe that, for the most part, these recommendations
are still viable. In addition, appendix I lists 43 GAO recommendations
from GAO reports in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and 7
new recommendations formalized in this report.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment, and
also provided relevant sections of the draft report to various federal
departments and agencies including the departments of Agriculture,
Education, HHS, HUD, Labor, and State, as well as SBA, EPA and Social
Security Administration. The Departments of State and HHS said they had
no comments on our draft. The Department of Agriculture's Food and
Nutrition Service, the Department of Education, EPA, HUD, and the
Social Security Administration provided additional technical comments
that we incorporated, and the Social Security Administration also
stated that they were pleased to be included in the report as an
example of good planning.
DHS provided written comments on August 28, 2006, signed by the
Undersecretary for Federal Emergency Management and the Undersecretary
for Preparedness. DHS's comments are reproduced in full in appendix II.
DHS also provided technical comments that we incorporated as
appropriate. DHS generally concurred with the six new recommendations
in our draft report and described an array of actions it has taken, has
underway, or planned to implement those recommendations. DHS also
described actions it has taken to address the expansion of search and
rescue capabilities; the supply pre-positioning and tracking of
emergency supplies, such as food, ice, and water; FEMA staffing; and
the acceptance and management of international donations for disaster
response and relief.
If effectively implemented, the actions that DHS described should
basically address the problems that we described in the draft report.
However, as we noted in our report, the NRP revisions may not fully
resolve the leadership issues with respect to the PFO and FCO roles and
questions remain with regard to how the NRP, which now states it is in
effect at all times would be operationalized in incidents of severity
less than the incidents of national significance that are to be managed
by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Because we did not have time to
evaluate DHS' actions completed to date, we cannot reach any
conclusions regarding the extent to which those actions are fully
operational and have improved disaster preparedness and response
capabilities.
In commenting on our recommendations, DHS stated that planning for
patient evacuation out of hospitals and nursing homes is being
coordinated by HHS, as Coordinating Agency for the NRP's Emergency
Support Function 8. We understand that responding to our recent
recommendation of planning for patient evacuation out of hospitals and
nursing homes will involve coordination among various agencies,
including HHS, and addressed our recommendations to DHS because it is
responsible for the NRP, the Catastrophic Incident Annex and its
Supplement, and the activation of NDMS.[Footnote 89]
On August 14, 2006, we received written comments from the Department of
Labor who stated that our report correctly points out that OSHA and
FEMA had experienced difficulties in agreeing on roles and procedures.
OSHA has reported that their agency and FEMA have worked together to
develop procedures for role of the Safety and Health Coordinator in the
Joint Field Office and for the NRP's Worker Safety and Health Support
Annex.
SBA's Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance provided written
comments on August 14, 2006, on a draft of the SBA segment of this
report. SBA's comments basically reiterate the comments it made on our
earlier report[Footnote 90] and are reproduced in full in appendix III.
SBA stated that more emphasis should have been given to its improvement
efforts and the benefits of DCMS compared with its previous system and
stated its concerns regarding the use of catastrophe risk model data in
determining the user requirements of DCMS. It was not within the scope
of our work to conduct a comparative analysis of DCMS and SBA's
previous system, but we recognized some of the benefits the agency
realized by adopting DCMS. We continue to believe that catastrophe risk
modeling firms provide critical information, such as the likelihood and
severity of damages from potential catastrophes. Combined with other
elements of a comprehensive planning process, such information would
have been useful in planning the maximum user capacity of DCMS. If SBA
had considered this information, it may have expanded the maximum user
requirement for DCMS and been better prepared to reduce the backlog of
loan applications.
GAO Contacts:
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Director, Office of
Management and Budget; and other interested parties. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. For further
information about this report, please contact William Jenkins, Jr,
Director, GAO Homeland Security and Justice Issues Team, at (202)-512-
8757 or at jenkinswo@gao.gov. GAO staff who were major contributors to
this report are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
David M. Walker:
Comptroller General of the United States:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Summary of Key Open GAO Recommendations on Catastrophic
Disasters:
The following three tables show GAO's recommendations on dealing with
catastrophic disasters made before Hurricane Katrina, in the aftermath
of Katrina, and new recommendations formalized in this report. The
tables also show the agency response to each recommendation.
Recommendations are given in chronological order in each table, with
the most recent recommendations listed first.
Table 4: Key Open Recommendations Made Prior to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita[A]:
[See PDF for Table. Table would not compute]
Source: GAO analysis:
[A] An open recommendation is one that the agency has not fully
implemented.
[End of table]
Table 5: Recent Open Recommendations Made in the Aftermath of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita[A]:
[See PDF for Table. Table would not compute]
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] An open recommendation is one that the agency has not fully
implemented.
[End of Table]
Table 6: New GAO Recommendations Formalized in this Report:
We are making several additional recommendations regarding
preparedness, response, and recovery:
Recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security:
The Secretary should,
* Direct that the NRP base plan and its supporting catastrophic
incident annex be supported and supplemented by more robust and
detailed operational implementation plans. Such operational plans
should, for example, further define and leverage those military
capabilities that might be needed in a catastrophic disaster.
* Given the persistent confusion about the NRP regarding key federal
leadership roles and responsibilities in a catastrophic disaster, as
observed in both the TOPOFF 3 exercise and Hurricane Katrina,
rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent clarification of
these roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of
leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified
performance problems.
* Take the lead in monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to meet their
responsibilities under the NRP and the draft National Preparedness
Goal, including the development, testing, and exercising of agency
operational plans to implement their responsibilities under the NRP,
NIMS, and the National Preparedness Goal.
* Provide oversight of federal, state, and local planning, training,
and exercises to ensure such activities fully support preparedness,
response, and recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and
regional basis. This should also include the application of lessons
learned from actual catastrophic and other disasters.
* Given that resources are finite, apply an all-hazards risk management
approach in deciding whether and how to invest in specific capabilities
for a catastrophic disaster.
* Provide guidance on advance procurement practices and procedures for
those federal agencies with roles and responsibilities under the NRP,
so that these agencies can better manage disaster-related procurements.
These practices should be in advance of disasters, ongoing and
continuous, and include (1) developing knowledge of contractor
capabilities, and available commodities, services and prices as well as
developing pre-established vendor relationships, on a competitive basis
whenever feasible; (2) establishing scalable operations plans to adjust
the level of capacity needed to respond; (3) formally assigning and
communicating disaster-related responsibilities and, where feasible,
incorporating necessary training; and (4) providing sufficient numbers
of field-level contracting staff to meet mission requirements. DHS
should also establish an assessment process to monitor agencies'
continuous planning efforts for their disaster related procurement
needs and the maintenance of capabilities.
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
We again recommend, as we did in 1993 in the aftermath of Hurricane
Andrew, that Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take
actions to prepare for catastrophic disasters when there is warning.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 2052:
August 28, 2006:
Mr. Norman Rabkin:
Managing Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues Team:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Re: Draft Report GAO-06-618, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced
Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Tools Can Improve the
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery.
Dear Mr. Rabkin:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the Government Accountability
Office's draft report. As you know, in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has received
oversight and review in the form of nearly 100 Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and DHS Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) audits, as well as House and Senate reports, and a review by the
Homeland Security Council (HSC). We have received hundreds of
recommendations from the individual GAO, OIG and congressional reports,
38 recommendations from the OIG capping report, 125 recommendations
from the HSC report, as well as the six additional recommendations in
this GAO capping report. We are taking all of these recommendations
under advisement as we move forward to improve the full realm of
Department and National preparedness.
The following comments outline efforts DHS has taken to implement the
six new recommendations contained in this report. In addition, we take
the opportunity to highlight some further steps DHS has taken to
enhance our readiness for all hazards that this Nation faces.
We want to emphasize several critical issues. The lessons of Katrina
will be incorporated into our broader national preparedness focus. The
combined lessons of events of the past quarter century have underscored
the need for: an all hazards risk management approach; emphasis on the
full continuum of prevention, protection, response and recovery to be
integrated and synchronized; and finally, that Federal action alone
will not be enough. The changes we are making because of Katrina are
being accomplished as part of, and not in exclusion to, the
Department's overall mission to ready for a full spectrum of scenarios
and engaging all levels of government, the private sector, and our
citizens. A strategic national approach to preparedness - not simply a
Federal approach - is key to being ready for the full range of threats
and hazards that define America's risk.
GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1. Direct that the NRP base plan and its supporting
catastrophic incident annex be supported and supplemented by more
robust and detailed operational implementation plans, particularly the
Supplement to the Catastrophic Incident Annex which is more than a year
overdue. Such operational plans should, for example, further define and
leverage those military capabilities that might be needed in a
catastrophic disaster.
We have taken the following steps toward implementing this
recommendation:
DHS completed a revised National Response Plan (NRP) Catastrophic
Incident Supplement (CIS). The purpose of the CIS is to establish a
coordinated strategy for accelerating the delivery and application of
Federal and Federally accessible resources and capabilities in support
of a jurisdictional response to a catastrophic mass victim/mass
evacuation incident. The CIS provides the operational strategy
summarized in the National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Annex,
and is critical to facilitating the Federal Government's rapid response
to a catastrophic incident. DHS/FEMA is currently reviewing the
Distribution Plan to implement the CIS with our State, local and tribal
stakeholders. To further support the NRP base plan, DHS will undertake
a comprehensive stakeholder review of the NRP in the fall of 2006 which
may result in additional modifications.
In addition, a National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) Standard
Operating Procedure (SOP) and an NRCC Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
have been completed. The 2006 Hurricane CONOPS is also complete and
being briefed/reviewed by the Regional Interagency Steering Committees
(RISC). The RISC is critical to the implementation of Federal, State
and local response plans and the coordination of those plans and
activities with DHS/FEMA Regional functions. To maintain visibility on
complementary Regional planning activities, the FEMA Operations Branch,
Response Division is continuing to participate in scheduled RISC
meetings.
Twelve Emergency Support Functions (ESF) SOPS have also been completed,
and three SOPS are being revised to incorporate additional comments.
Regular and ongoing ESF meetings have verified the utility of the 2006
Hurricane CONOPS. We will continue to refine and validate the majority
of ESFs and their SOPs and practices based on situation-specific
information obtained immediately before the incident or during the
initial post-incident damage and need assessment periods. There are
also plans to meet quarterly on ESFs as an integral part of the
comprehensive review and revision of the NRP.
These activities will ensure that the NRP is effectively supported
through effective leadership and management at all levels.
Recommendation 2. Given the persistent confusion about the NRP
regarding key federal leadership roles and responsibilities in a
catastrophic disaster, as observed in both the TOPOFF 3 EXERCISE AND
Hurricane Katrina, rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent
clarification of these roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority
for all levels of leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy
identified coordination problems.
We have taken the following steps toward implementing this
recommendation:
DHS has provided substantial training and conducted numerous exercises
to prepare the pre-designated PFOs and other JFO leadership and staff
for the 2006 Hurricane season. These training and exercise activities
include:
* PFO/FCO training completed clarifying the relationship and
responsibilities between PFOs and FCOs.
* Federal Incident Response Support Team (FIRST) and ERT-N training
completed, which exercised the leadership roles with FEMA's first
responders.
* A series of hurricane preparedness exercises for the Gulf and
Atlantic coastal states completed, which exercised the leadership roles
between different levels of government.
* 2006 Hurricane CONOPS Synchronization training event and Tabletop
Exercise for the ESF Leader Group, FCOs, Regional staff, and FEMA
leadership completed enhancing effective coordination between senior
leadership.
* JFO SOP exercise completed testing operations within the JFO.
* FCO meeting to discuss the 2006 Hurricane CONOPS held in July 2006.
* Advanced PFO Training completed promoting effective senior leadership
for catastrophic events.
* Regional Directors' meeting to discuss 2006 Hurricane CONOPS and
other response plans and procedures in August 2006.
Exercises and training will continue to prepare Federal leadership and
staff to execute the functions of the JFO when needed.
Recommendation 3. Take the lead in monitoring federal agencies' efforts
to meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the draft National
Preparedness Goal, including the development, testing, and exercising
of agency operational plans to implement their responsibilities under
the NRP, NIMS, and the National Preparedness Goal.
We have taken the following steps toward implementing this
recommendation:
The NRP applies to all Federal Departments and Agencies that may be
requested to provide assistance or conduct operations during actual or
potential incidents. The FY 2006 Emergency Supplemental for FEMA
included $3 million for FEMA "to immediately review and revise the NRP
and the NIMS." DHS will lead an interagency review to assess the
effectiveness of the NRP, identify improvements, and recommend NRP
modifications and re-issuance as required by the implementation
guidance for the NRP and in accordance with the Homeland Security
Council (HSC) report, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:
Lessons Learned.
DHS/FEMA will lead an interagency review and assessment of the NRP in
coordination with the DHS Preparedness Directorate. The NRP review
process will begin in September 2006 and conclude by April 2007. This
completion date will allow time for training on the concepts as well as
development and refinement of related SOPs prior to the 2007 Hurricane
Season. The review of the NRP will require input from a variety of
stakeholders including internal DHS components and other Federal,
State, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental and private sector
partners.
The NIMS Integration Center (NIC) has initiated a review of the NIMS
document. The NIMS review will be administered in parallel with the NRP
review, with both documents becoming available in their new form in
early 2007. The ESF Leadership Group will provide interagency input and
guidance as required. The NIC will lead the effort to coordinate a
robust education and awareness program to ensure that the Nation's
emergency management network is ready and capable of supporting all-
hazards incident management and recovery in accordance with an upgraded
NIMS and revised NRP.
In addition to the programmatic review and revision of the NRP and
NIMS, the NIC has been conducting individual coordination meetings with
Federal agencies. The meetings began in earnest in the beginning of FY
2006 and resulted in a summit meeting on May 29 through June 2, 2006.
The summit, which was held at the FEMA Emergency Management Institute,
included representatives from 27 Federal agencies, including the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Coast Guard and the
Department of Defense. The summit also included a presentation from DHS
on the National Preparedness Goal.
The summit meeting focused on training and planning, and considered
Homeland Security Council lessons learned from Katrina, Rita and Wilma.
The participants agreed to continue meeting quarterly in order to
develop a Peer Review Compliance program for Federal compliance to the
NRP and NIMS, with the NIC responsible for coordination.
Recommendation 4. Provide guidance and direction for federal, state,
and local planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities
fully support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at
a jurisdictional and regional basis. This should also include the
application of lessons learned from actual catastrophic and other
disasters.
We have taken the following steps toward implementing this
recommendation:
A draft of the National Exercise Program that defines a standardized
methodology for Federal, State and local efforts to plan, organize,
conduct, evaluate, report on, and track corrective actions from
exercise activities has been promulgated. The NEP is currently in
Interagency staffing. Portions of the NEP have already been circulated
and are being utilized across the United States. Future revisions of
the NEP will expand on the development of the Federal Preparedness
Coordinators, which will provide for a structured approach to exercise
and training coordination at the regional level. A central theme of the
NEP is to synchronize exercise activities so as to maximize available
resources, while limiting the overall number of exercise activities to
a more supportable number of events. Another key aspect of the NEP is a
standardized "corrective action program" that incorporates the "Lessons
Learned, Information Sharing" (LLIS) system. This provides
participating jurisdictions and agencies with the tools to more
effectively analyze, task and track issues identified in exercise (and
operations) to a successful resolution.
DHS/FEMA's Response Division established strategic Response Program
priorities for its major program elements. The strategic priorities
include improving response team capabilities, improving logistics
capabilities, catastrophic disaster planning, and improving disaster
workforce management. In one specific focus area, DHS/FEMA embarked on
a catastrophic planning initiative as a strategic priority because we
recognized that Federal disaster response capabilities were not robust
enough to successfully address the anticipated effects of a
catastrophic disaster. This initiative is designed to ensure that
Federal, state and local partners are well prepared to affect a timely
and efficient response to such a catastrophic disaster, thereby
fulfilling DHS/FEMA's legislative and executive responsibilities.
DHS/FEMA is working directly with high-risk jurisdictions to fully
explore and characterize their catastrophic planning gaps and
capabilities and jointly develop robust, comprehensive response
strategies and plans. Included in these activities are combinations of
Federal, state and local conferences, planning, training, and exercise
events. The Response Division has focused such efforts on Southeastern
Louisiana Parishes, the states along the New Madrid Seismic Zone in the
Midwest and southern Florida (catastrophic hurricane) thus far. As part
of this initiative, response and recovery-related catastrophic planning
topics are reviewed to enhance the capability to respond and recover
from a catastrophic disaster.
In addition, the NRP-CIS is primarily designed to address both notice
and no-notice disaster incidents of catastrophic magnitude, where the
need for Federal assistance is crucial. The NRP-CIS outlines an
aggressive concept of operations, establishes an execution schedule and
implementation strategy, and in the supporting appendices, provides
functional capability overviews and outlines key responsibilities of
interagency partners.
DHS/Preparedness has conducted hurricane specific training for the pre-
designated PFO teams. Two training sessions have been held. The initial
training was in early May 2006. The advanced team training was
conducted in early August 2006. The advanced team training included the
pre-designated PFO teams as well as the PFO staff support personnel.
The training included briefings from the pre-designated PFO Teams,
United States Coast Guard, FEMA, National Operations Center (NOC),
Department of Justice and the National Preparedness Task Force. The
advanced training in August 2006 also included a PFO team exercise, as
noted in response to Recommendation 2.
Recommendation 5. Given that resources are finite, apply an all-
hazards, risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest
in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster.
We have taken the following steps toward implementing this
recommendation:
In the broadest sense, preparedness addresses the full range of
capabilities to prevent, protect against, and respond to acts of terror
or other disasters. Since resources are finite, as a Nation, tough
choices must be made about how to allocate the human and financial
resources available to attain the optimal state of preparedness.
Because of this, it is important to focus preparedness on objective
measures of risk and performance. Risk analysis is based on three
variables: threat, vulnerability, and consequences. These variables are
not equal. For example, some infrastructure is quite vulnerable, but
the consequences of an attack are relatively small; other
infrastructure may be much less vulnerable, but the consequences of a
successful attack are very high, even catastrophic. DHS will
concentrate first and foremost on addressing threats that pose
catastrophic consequences.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) establishes the
Secretary of Homeland Security as "the principal Federal official for
coordinating the implementation of all-hazards preparedness in the
United States" and requires establishment of a National Preparedness
Goal. "To help ensure the preparedness of the Nation to prevent,
respond to, and recover from threatened and actual domestic terrorist
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, the Secretary, in
coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments
and agencies and in consultation with State and local governments shall
develop a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal." HSPD-8
further states that the National Preparedness Goal will establish
"measurable readiness targets . that appropriately balance the
potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters,
and other emergencies with the resources required to prevent, respond
to, and recover from them." Risk-based target levels of capability will
meet that requirement. The intent is to establish capability baselines
for operational missions and track resource allocation against them.
The National Preparedness Goal engages Federal, State, local, and
tribal entities, their private and nongovernmental partners, and the
general public in a continuous cycle of activity to achieve and sustain
risk-based target levels of capability to prevent, protect against,
respond to, and recover from major events that require a coordinated
national effort in order to minimize the impact on lives, property, and
the economy.
Furthermore, the National Strategy for Homeland Security attaches
special emphasis to preparing for catastrophic threats with "the
greatest risk of mass casualties, massive property loss, and immense
social disruption." To prepare for such threats, National Planning
Scenarios were developed to illustrate the potential scope, magnitude,
and complexity of a plausible range of major events, including
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The
scenarios are intended to illustrate a broad range of potential
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies and their
related impacts. These scenarios were selected since they generally
require capabilities for which the Nation is currently the least
prepared. Scenarios provide the foundation for a risk-based approach to
minimize the impact on lives, property, and the economy.
For FY 2007, DHS's focus will broaden to address other critical risk-
based priorities. States and Urban Areas will be required to revise
their Homeland Security Preparedness Strategies and submit the fully
updated strategies pursuant to the National Preparedness Goal in order
to receive further Federal preparedness assistance.
In FY 2006, the Preparedness Directorate's Office of Grants and
Training incorporated a risk management approach to Homeland Security
Grant Program (HSGP) allocations. For FY 2006, HSGP funding allocations
are based primarily on two factors: (1) analysis of relative risk to
assets as well as risk to populations and geographic areas; and (2) the
anticipated effectiveness of State and Urban Area grant proposals in
addressing their identified homeland security needs.
These factors were used to determine allocation amounts for the
following programs under HSGP:
* The State Homeland Security Program (SHSP);
* The Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI); and:
* The Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP).
In addition to risk and effectiveness, a base allocation was awarded
under SHSP and LETPP according to the USA PATRIOT Act formula. All UASI
funding was allocated based on risk and effectiveness. DHS's new
funding criteria (based on risk and effectiveness of proposed solutions
to identified needs) align federal resources with the National
Priorities established by the National Preparedness Goal.
DHS also applied a risk management approach in pre-designating PFO,
Deputy PFO, FCO and Infrastructure Liaison teams for the hurricane
prone regions of the country to coordinate the Federal government's
response to hurricanes in support of State and local governments. The
geographic areas determined to have the highest potential for hurricane
activity are:
* Northeast (New York, New Jersey, New England):
* Mid-Atlantic (Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia,
Washington, DC, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania):
* Florida:
* Gulf Coast (Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana) * Texas:
* Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands:
Recommendation 6. Provide guidance on advanced procurement practices
and procedures for those federal agencies with roles and
responsibilities under the NRP, so that these agencies can better
manage disaster-related procurement. These practices should be in
advance of disasters, ongoing and continuous and include (1) developing
pre-established vendor relationships and knowledge of contractor
capabilities, available commodities, services and prices (2)
establishing scalable operations plans to adjust the level capacity,
(3) formally assigning and communicating disaster-related
responsibilities and incorporating joint training, and (4) providing
sufficient numbers of field-level contracting staff to meet mission
requirements. DHS, should also establish an assessment process to
monitor agencies' continuous planning efforts for their disaster-
related procurement needs and the maintenance of capabilities.
We have taken the following steps toward implementing this
recommendation:
DHS/FEMA has entered numerous contracts supporting disaster recovery
and response. These competitively bid contracts make available a wide
range of products and services, including an Individual Assistance and
Public Assistance Technical Assistance Contract, housing inspectors,
mobile disaster response center equipment, and tents. These contracts
permit a surge capacity that ensures DHS/FEMA has the capability to
respond appropriately given the magnitude of the disaster.
To provide guidance on advanced procurement policies and procedures for
other Federal agencies, a government-wide working group, which is
sponsored by the Federal Chief Acquisition Council and chaired by the
DHS Chief Procurement Officer and GSA Chief Acquisition Officer,
developed a knowledge management portal that will serve as a
clearinghouse for current information related to emergency response and
recovery as well as an emergency response contracting officer training
and certification program. This portal, which is jointly sponsored by
the Federal Acquisition Institute and the Department of Defense
University, provides government agencies with information related to
emergency incidents, polices and procedures, the availability of
Interagency Agreements, training resources, and human resources.
This portal will create immediate access to a variety of detailed
information to help DHS/FEMA personnel and contracting professionals
from across the Federal government who may be involved in emergency
response and preparedness. The Portal will provide immediate access to
the types of information needed for informed contracting decisions. It
serves as the on-demand "go-kit" for contracting officers from FEMA,
DHS, and across the government when called upon to deploy in support of
a disaster. The emergency response contracting officer training and
certification program contains mandatory training requirements for
contracting officers desiring/requiring a supplemental certification in
contingency contracting. After completing the certification program,
those contracting officers are placed in a database and available for
deployment to support contingency operations of any Federal agency.
In addition to the knowledge management portal, DHS/FEMA published a
field guide that prepares everyone involved in the supply chain so that
role and responsibilities are clearly understood.
Additional Comments On GAO Findings:
In addition to the six new recommendations, the capping report made
findings regarding a number of other DHS activities. We are pleased to
share the Department's latest accomplishments on these matters:
Evacuation of Hospital and Nursing Home Patients:
DHS/FEMA is providing significant assistance to the Gulf Coast region
in addressing evacuation and sheltering issues. This requires close
cooperation with HHS, which bears primary responsibility for planning
and coordinating the evacuation of patients from hospitals and nursing
homes under ESF-8 of the NRP.
Expansion of Search and Rescue Capabilities:
The DHS/FEMA Response Division broadened the scope of search and rescue
in ESF-9 to include water search and rescue operations. The ESF-9 Annex
to the NRP is under revision and will be incorporated into the next
iteration of the NRP.
The Operations Branch and Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Section
conducted meetings recently with representatives from the USCG and
Department of Interior (DOI), as well as with subordinate agencies
(National Park Services and Fish & Wildlife), as part of the effort to
broaden the US&R scope to include water search and rescue; the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
U.S. Forest Service as support agencies in this effort. US&R is also
working with NORTHCOM, DOD, to identify ways to work together in
complex search and rescue operations.
Supply Pre-Positioning Efforts:
DHS/FEMA has created a network of logistics centers strategically
located throughout the country. DHS/FEMA is continuing to evaluate
these locations and may upgrade current facilities as well as add
additional locations in future years. In addition to commodities and
supplies currently stored at Logistics Centers, FEMA is working to
strategically position pharmacy caches in its Logistics Centers.
DHS/FEMA uses storage facilities, both commercial and through other
Federal agencies, and has pre-positioned sites for the 2006 Hurricane
Season. DHS/FEMA also maintains a list of potential Mobilization
Centers (MOB Centers) and/or Federal Operational Staging Areas (FOSAs)
for possible usage. This list is periodically updated and is currently
being reviewed. At this time, over 70 possible Mobilization Centers
and/or Federal Operational Staging Areas have been identified to
include all 10 FEMA Regions.
In coordination with the Hurricane prone states, FEMA developed a
National Pre-Positioning Plan where initial commodities are pre-
positioned to reduce the initial response time during disasters. The
plan has been executed in the continental United States and is
anticipated to be completed in Puerto Rico, in August 2006.
Asset Visibility:
The Total Asset Visibility (TAV) Phase I initiative provides FEMA with
the ability to manage its inventory of certain commodities and track
the location of trailers carrying commodities distributed from the FEMA
Logistics Centers in Region IV and Region VI. These commodities include
water, ice, emergency meals, plastic sheeting, tarps, generators, cots,
blankets, living kits, Joint Field Office kits, material handling
equipment, and some travel trailers. There are two software packages
encompassed in this initiative: a Warehouse Management (WM) module, and
a Trading Partners Management (TPM) module. The WM module is currently
available at the Atlanta, GA Logistics Center and the Fort Worth, TX
Logistics Center and provides FEMA with the ability to inventory
commodities upon arrival, place the commodities in storage and track
these items while in the warehouse. A contract is in place that will
sustain FEMA's ability to operate, support and maintain the TAV Phase I
initiative through June 1, 2007.
Currently, FEMA is researching the required steps for TAY Phase II. The
nationwide TAV solution must be capable of providing improved inventory
management and real-time asset/commodity location tracking. The intent
is to have this capability for a variety of disasters that may occur in
different parts of the United States and outside the continental United
States where the response and recovery missions may be operating
simultaneously for substantial periods of time.
Moreover, FEMA has developed an Operations Matrix Tool (OMT). The OMT
was developed as an activity/task tracking tool in response to a need
identified during the 2004 Hurricane season. The purpose of the OMT is
to provide FEMA the capability to better coordinate and track
activities/tasks and objectives during the response to a disaster or in
preparation for an impending disaster. The OMT is an easy-to-use
software application that is accessible on FEMA's Intranet.
OMT major goals are to:
* Support the planning and accurate tracking of tasks, assignments, and
status for a wide spectrum of responders from multiple agencies (i.e.
ESF briefings, coordination of activities from headquarters to the
local NO levels, etc.)
* Provide the capability to coordinate activities across a wide
spectrum of responders from multiple agencies.
* Provide a consistent, common view of all information to responders at
the headquarters, regional, and local levels, i.e. NRCC, the Regional
Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs), and JFO.
* Provide up to the minute status updates of tasks and assignments
(i.e. the information is available to everyone as soon as it is entered
into the system).
* Create a historical record of the response and recovery activities
performed for any given response and recovery event for use in future
disaster response planning.
Staffing:
The DHS/FEMA Human Resources Division has been involved in a number of
initiatives in preparation for the upcoming hurricane season to
solidify agency leadership and staffing. These initiatives were
necessary to improve and empower FEMA to act with efficiency and
urgency when fulfilling the agency's critical missions of response,
recovery and mitigation from both natural and man-made disasters - thus
maximizing the agency's performance regardless of disaster size or
complexity.
In a concerted effort to meet staffing objectives, leadership positions
were identified as the top priority, followed by non-supervisory/non-
managerial senior positions, journeyman level positions, and then
support positions in FEMA's hiring efforts and staffing priorities.
Recent Schedule C appointments and selections have heeded the DHS
imperative to fill critical FEMA positions with individuals who have
strong emergency management and specialty expertise and credibility.
FEMA has also promoted from within, recognizing the talent and
potential of current employees for their capabilities and experience as
well as the quality of service and commitment. FEMA has also used the
re-employed annuitant waiver authority, granted by the Office of
Personnel Management, to staff positions identified as critical and
those that the Agency has found difficult to fill.
FEMA staffing has been augmented by the broadened use of Disaster
Assistance Employees (DAEs), the hiring of contractors, and the
establishment of an Inter-Agency Agreement which enhanced Human
Resources Division operations and allowed for Division staff to work
directly with program staff so they may accelerate recruitment and
selection in the hiring process.
FEMA has also used a variety of innovative advertising and recruitment
approaches. Announcements have included radio advertisements, newspaper
ads in major metropolitan areas and trade journals that market to
specialized positions. Creative recruitment approaches have included
recruitment and relocation bonuses, retention allowances as well as
referral bonuses for personal outreach, and open continuous
announcements for tough to fill positions. As a result, vacancy
announcements post daily and FEMA brings new talent on board each pay
period.
International Donations:
Since January 2006, DHS, DHS/FEMA, the Department of State, DOD, the
U.S. Agency for International Development, the American Red Cross, the
Food and Drug Administration, DHS Customs and Border Protection, the
U.S. Department of agriculture and other departments and agencies have
closely worked together to develop an International Assistance System
(IAS).
IAS is the concept of operations for how the U.S. Government (USG) will
accept international assistance during domestic disasters. IAS outlines
policies and procedures for managing international offers of
assistance, taking into account both operational needs and foreign
policy priorities. It also specifies roles and responsibilities of
participating agencies, provides standard operating procedures for
managing offers of foreign assistance, outlines procedures for managing
domestic requests for foreign resources, and defines the process for
receiving and distributing international assistance accepted by the
USG. IAS also accounts for formal oversight of in-kind assets and
proper coordination with regulatory agencies.
DHS/FEMA, the State Department, the Office of Management and Budget,
and the Treasury Department have also reached consensus on the
procedures for accepting foreign cash donations. An interagency
mechanism has been created to manage the receipt, distribution, and
auditing of foreign cash donations made during a domestic disaster.
We thank you again for the opportunity to review this most important
report and provide comments updating findings in the report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
George W. Foresman:
Under Secretary for Preparedness:
Signed by:
R. David Paulison:
Under Secretary for Federal Emergency Management:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Small Business Administration:
U.S. Small Business Administration:
Washington, D.C. 20416:
AUG 15 2006:
William B. Shear:
Director:
Financial Markets and Community Investment:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Shear:
We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on your draft report
entitled Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership Capabilities and
Accountability Can Improve the Nation's Preparedness. Response and
Recovery.
In the summer and fall of 2005, Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma
destroyed significant portions of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
Florida and Texas. These hurricanes wrecked devastation on home and
business owners and collectively represent the worst natural disasters
in American history. The declared disaster area was approximately
90,000 square miles, covering an area equivalent to that of Great
Britain. External factors, such as the devastation of critical
infrastructure, damage to roads and bridges, loss of basic utilities
(i.e., electrical, gas, water), limited communications ability,
inability to gain access to parts of the disaster area in order to
perform damage inspections, etc. also adversely affected the. speed at
which SBA was able to deliver its Disaster Loan Program.
The magnitude of these disasters caused over 420,000 home and business
owners to apply for SBA assistance. To date, SBA has approved over
156,000 disaster loans for over $10.4 billion to victims of these
horrific storms. Put in context, 20 percent of all the dollars approved
in the 53-year history of SBA occurred this past disaster season. The
Gulf Coast hurricanes represent the largest collection of disasters the
Agency has ever faced, vastly surpassing our previous largest disaster,
the Northridge earthquake in 1994, where we received approximately
250,000 applications and approved about $4.3 billion in disaster loans.
To build from lessons learned, and in preparation for the 2006
hurricane season, SBA convened an Agency-wide Disaster Oversight
Council comprised of senior Agency leadership to better leverage the
resources of the Agency as a whole, and incorporate new ideas and best
practices from SBA program areas into our disaster preparedness
capability. To preposition the Agency, SBA has completed a series of
process improvements and reengineering initiatives to improve service
delivery, which include the following:
* Upgraded System Capacity. The Disaster Credit Management System
(DCMS) has been tested and verified to support a minimum of 8,000
concurrent users.
* Enhanced Disaster Workforce. SBA has selected over 1,000 employees in
the expansion of the Disaster reserve corps.
* Partnered with Private Sector. SBA created the Disaster Loan Partners
Initiative and awarded three private sector firms contracts to assist
with SBA loan processing and loan closing activities.
* Leveraged SBA's Nationwide Infrastructure. During the 2005 hurricane
season, the Agency utilized SBA's already-existing nationwide District
Office infrastructure to handle increased disaster activity.
* Expanded Agency Footprint. In addition to the 182,000 sq. ft. of
permanent space, the Agency has secured over 200,000 sq. ft. of
temporary space for the Disaster Loan Program.
* Bolstered Forecasting Ability and Risk Monitoring Procedures. The
Agency has enhanced its capability to immediately forecast application
volumes when a disaster strikes. This new model - which includes a
flexible tool for forecasting purposes - provides a more robust
methodology for predicting application volume based on assets at risk
and disaster characteristics.
* Developed Disaster Scalability Preparedness Tool. The Agency
possesses the capability to determine resource needs - financial, human
capital (by function), and logistics - required to maximize SBA's
response against a number of different application volume scenarios.
Concurrent action plans that support the requirement outlined in each
scenario continue to be refined.
* Enhanced Communications. SBA is focused on a two-pronged
communications strategy for the current hurricane season-emphasizing
disaster preparedness, and outreach to the public and the media once a
disaster is declared.
While catastrophe risk model data may be useful in estimating the
likelihood that losses from natural disasters in the coming year (or
future years) will exceed certain levels, it is also important to note
the inherent uncertainties in estimating of the probability of an event
occurring and the magnitude of dollar losses. From all indications the
actual losses from Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan and Jeanne in 2004
and Katrina (and the extensive flooding caused by the levee break) in
2005 will exceed any estimates that may have been generated by
catastrophic risk modeling.
The report is unclear on how SBA could use such modeling to determine
the system requirements and what level of catastrophe should be set as
the benchmark. Should SBA set the standard at a level to respond to
worst case scenarios? Rather than rely solely on catastrophe risk
modeling data that estimates the probability of disasters occurring and
corresponding losses, the Agency has taken steps to develop a
comprehensive and scalable plan that addresses staffing and logistical
support required to respond to various levels of disaster losses.
In addition, the report should emphasize our successful completion of a
DCMS and user capacity upgrade. It is also important to note the
significant improvements of DCMS over the legacy system that it
replaced, such as:
* Electronic case files versus paper case files.
* Automated workflow within DCMS eliminates hundreds of staff who
performed file control processes.
* Automated credit report pull for every application eliminates manual
process.
* Loss verification assignments are sent and completed inspections
returned through data sync via secure internet connection that
eliminates file shipping costs and time associated with loss verifier
deployment.
* Loss verification process automated with pre-defined data and
formulas to eliminate manual steps.
* Scanning component integrates into the electronic data file to
provide access to multiple users without need to physically transport
paper records.
* Automated loan closing checklist eliminates manual creation of
document for each case.
* New interface with FEMA for automated Duplication of Benefits
retrieval eliminates manual access and printing of multiple pages of
data.
* New interface with SBA loan accounting system for automated queries
on previous loan history of loan applicants eliminates manual search
and printing of records.
* New interface to update SBA co-borrower and guarantor data eliminates
manual data entry.
* Implemented certain achievable process improvements such as
reengineered application screening process, pre-processing decline and
referral process, auto-decline process, and an expedited approval
process.
We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments to the report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Herbert L. Mitchell:
Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Norman Rabkin, Managing Director, GAO Homeland Security and Justice
Issues Team, (202)-512-8777 (rabkinn@gao.gov):
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above the following individuals from
GAO's Homeland Security and Justice Team also made contributions to
this report: William O. Jenkins Jr., Director; Sharon Caudle, Assistant
Director; John Vocino, Analyst-In-Charge; Daniel Rodriguez; Kathryn
Godfrey; and Christine Davis, GAO Office of General Counsel.
[End of section]
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FOOTNOTES
[1] A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House Select
Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for And Response to
Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006).
[2] Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May
2006).
[3] The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).
[4] A Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in
Response to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31,
2006).
[5] DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana,
DR-1603-LA (Baton Rouge, La.: Feb. 13, 2006).
[6] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 8, 2006).
[7] GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to
Catastrophic Disasters, GAO/RCED-93-186 (Washington, D.C.: July 23,
1993).
[8] GAO, Disaster Assistance: Information on FEMA's Post 9/11 Public
Assistance to the New York City Area, GAO-03-926 (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 29, 2003); and GAO, September 11: Overview of Federal Disaster
Assistance to the New York City Area, GAO-04-72 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
31, 2003).
[9] GAO, U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal and State Partners
Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but
Significant Challenges Remain, GAO-06-519 (Washington, D.C.: June 5,
2006); and Foreign Assistance: USAID Has Begun Tsunami Reconstruction
in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, but Key Projects May Exceed Initial Cost
and Schedule Estimates, GAO-06-488 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2006).
[10] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide
the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).
[11] See GAO, Agency Management of Contractors Responding to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, GAO-06-461R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2006);
Hurricane Katrina: Planning for and Management of Federal Disaster
Recovery Contracts, GAO-06-622T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2006); and
Hurricane Katrina: Improving Federal Contracting Practices in Disaster
Recovery Operations, GAO-06-714T (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2006).
[12] See GAO, Disaster Preparedness: Preliminary Observations on the
Evacuation of Hospitals and Nursing Homes Due to Hurricanes, GAO-06-
443R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 2006); and Disaster Preparedness:
Preliminary Observations on the Evacuation of Vulnerable Populations
due to Hurricanes and Other Disasters, GAO-790T (Washington, D.C.: May
18, 2006); Disaster Preparedness: Limitations in Federal Evacuation
Assistance for Health Facilities Should be Addressed, GAO-06-826
(Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2006).
[13] See GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable
Assistance, GAO-06-297T (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 2005); and
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita : Coordination between FEMA and Red Cross
Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season, GAO-06-712
(Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006).
[14] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Procedures Are Needed to
Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International
Assistance, GAO-06-460 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006).
[15] GAO, Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita: FEMA's Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant
Fraud and Abuse, GAO-06-655 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006).
[16] The National Response Plan is the basis for how federal
departments and agencies are to work together with state, local, and
tribal governments and the private sector in managing domestic
incidents.
[17] 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206.
[18] Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 (1996).
[19] The National Emergency Management Association is a non-partisan,
non-profit 501(c)(3) association affiliated with The Council of State
Governments.
[20] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
[21] "Establishment of a Coordinator of Federal Support for the
Recovery and Rebuilding of the Gulf Coast Region," Exec. Order No.
13390, 70 Fed. Reg. 67327 (2005).
[22] The NRP revisions include a Quick Reference Guide that provides a
condensed, 23-page overview of the NRP as modified.
[23] The HSPD-5 criteria are: (1) a federal department or agency acting
under its own authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary
of Homeland Security; (2) the resources of state and local authorities
are overwhelmed and federal assistance has been requested by the
appropriate state and local authorities, for example, under the
Stafford Act; (3) more than one federal department or agency has become
substantially involved in responding to an incident; or (4) the
Secretary of Homeland Security has been directed by the President to
assume responsibility for managing a domestic incident.
[24] According to the Catastrophic Incident Annex, all catastrophic
incidents are Incidents of National Significance. Implementation of the
annex requires a separate catastrophic incident designation by the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
[25] See GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to
Catastrophic Disasters, GAO/RCED-93-186 (Washington, D.C.: July 23,
1993); and Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need
to Improve the Nation's Response Strategy, GAO/T-RCED-93-46
(Washington, D.C.: May 25, 1993).
[26] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 8, 2006).
[27] The National Search and Rescue Plan (1999) provides an overall
plan for coordination of search and rescue operations, the effective
use of all available resources, mutual assistance, and efforts to
improve such cooperation and services. The goal of the plan is to
integrate available resources that can be used for search and rescue
into a cooperative network for greater protection of life and property
and to ensure greater efficiency and economy.
[28] GAO-06-643.
[29] GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and
the Red Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season, GAO-06-
712 (Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006).
[30] GAO, Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues
GAO-02-957T (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002).
[31] As a result of the Secretary's Second Stage Review, the Director
of FEMA also became the Undersecretary of Emergency Management.
[32] See United States Emergency Management Authority Act of 2006, S.
3595, 109th Cong. § 504 (2006); National Emergency Management Reform
and Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5351, 109th Cong. § 502(b) (2006).
[33] GAO, Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders'
All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-652 (Washington,
D.C.: July 11, 2005).
[34] See GAO, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to
Catastrophic Disasters, GAO-93-186 (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1993);
and Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to
Improve the Nation's Response Strategy, GAO-93-46 (Washington, D.C.:
May 25, 1993).
[35] GAO-06-643.
[36] GAO-06-643.
[37] Typically, military equipment cannot communicate with civilian
police, fire, and emergency medical systems unless it is augmented with
specialized equipment. During Hurricane Katrina, the military and
civilian agencies deployed mobile communication vans that were able to
connect different communications systems that are normally
incompatible.
[38] GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental
Cooperation Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable
Communications, GAO-04-740 (Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004).
[39] Federal Communications Commission, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
FCC-06-83 (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2006).
[40] The September 2005 draft Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the
NRP is intended to be used with the Catastrophic Incident Annex when a
catastrophic incident almost immediately overwhelms the capabilities of
state and local governments. The draft supplement does not describe
what, if any, role the federal government is to play in coordinating
with state and local authorities for this kind of transportation.
[41] GAO, Disaster Evacuations: Limitation in Federal Assistance to
Health Facilities for Transportation Should Be Addressed, GAO-06-826
(Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2006).
[42] GAO, Lessons Learned for Protecting and Educating Children after
the Gulf Coast Hurricanes, GAO-06-680R (Washington, D.C.: May 11,
2006).
[43] We observed that while the reasons children were separated from
their families are not fully understood, in many cases children were
evacuated separately from parents and sent to different shelters. All
of the instances of children reported missing to the National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children were resolved by March 2006. All of
the children reported missing were not necessarily unaccompanied or in
harm's way; some who were safe were probably reported as missing
because non-guardians (such as neighbors) could report a child as
missing.
[44] GAO-06-643.
[45] Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144, 1934 (2005).
[46] H.R. Rep. No. 109-241, at 68 (2006).
[47] As used in the Nationwide Review Plan, the term "state" refers to
any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa,
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any possession of
the United States. The term "urban areas" refers to the 55 Fiscal Year
2005 Urban Areas Security Initiative program grantees; and the 20 major
cities selected for the Nationwide Plan Review by DHS were based on a
DHS analysis of 2004 population, risk, and need.
[48] GAO-06-643.
[49] GAO-06-403T.
[50] GAO, Small Business Administration: Actions Needed to Provide More
Timely Disaster Assistance, GAO-06-860 (Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2006).
[51] We surveyed 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico;
20 states and the District of Columbia reported that they had a written
plan, 17 states and Puerto Rico reported they did not have a written
plan, and 11 states did not respond to the disaster planning questions
in our survey.
[52] GAO, Federal Action Needed to Ensure States Have Plans to
Safeguard Children in the Child Welfare System Displaced by Disasters.
GAO-06-944 (Washington, DC.: July 28, 2006).
[53] See GAO, Disaster Assistance: DOD's Support for Hurricanes Andrew
and Iniki and Typhoon Omar, GAO/NSIAD-93-180 (Washington, D.C.: June
18, 1993); and Disaster Assistance: Federal, State, and Local Responses
to Natural Disasters Need Improvement, GAO/RCED-91-43 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 6, 1991).
[54] GAO, Continuity of Operations: Selected Agencies Could Improve
Planning for Use of Alternate Facilities and Telework during
Disruptions, GAO-06-713 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2006).
[55] GAO-06-643.
[56] GAO-05-652.
[57] GAO, Homeland Security: DHS's Efforts to Enhance First Responders'
All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-652 (Washington,
D.C.: July 11, 2005).
[58] GAO, Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, GAO-06-365R. (Washington: D.C.: Feb. 1,
2006).
[59] Four emergency supplemental appropriations acts account for the
approximately $88 billion in hurricane relief. See Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate Needs Arising From
the Consequences of Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-61, 119
Stat. 1988 (2005); Second Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to
Meet Immediate Needs Arising From the Consequences of Hurricane
Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-62, 119 Stat. 1990 (2005); Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of
Mexico, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. B, title I, 119 Stat. 2680, 2745
(2005); and Further Hurricane Disaster Relief and Recovery, Pub. L. No.
109-234, title II, 120 Stat. 418, 443 (2006).
[60] One contractor provided ice production and transport services,
another provided cold storage and transport services, and a third
contractor provided a variety of transportation services, including
refrigerated trucks.
[61] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Army Corps of Engineers Contract for
Mississippi Classrooms, GAO-06-454 (Washington D.C.: May 1, 2006).
[62] GAO, Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and
Recovery Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina, GAO-06-903 (Washington
D.C.: July 31, 2006).
[63] 42 U.S.C. § 5201(b).
[64] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are
Needed to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for
International Assistance, GAO-06-460 (Washington D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006).
[65] FEMA may extend this 18-month limit if it determines that, due to
extraordinary circumstances, an extension would be in the public
interest. 44 C.F.R. § 206.110(e).
[66] The maximum of IHP assistance is statutorily capped at $25,000,
adjusted annually to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index. 42
U.S.C § 5174(h). In 2005, the maximum was $26,200.
[67] Loans from the Small Business Administration are considered to be
the primary means of disaster assistance for disaster victims who have
the financial ability to repay such loans.
[68] GAO, Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita: FEMA's Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant
Fraud and Abuse, GAO-06-403T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2006).
[69] GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Improper and Potentially
Fraudulent Individual Assistance Payments Estimated to Be between $600
Million and $1.4 Billion, GAO-06-844T (Washington, D.C.: June 14,
2006).
[70] Expedited Assistance--a component of the IHP program during
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita--took the form of $2,000 payments to
disaster victims to help with the immediate, emergency needs for food,
shelter, clothing, and personal necessities.
[71] GAO-06-844T.
[72] GAO, Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita: FEMA's Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant
Fraud and Abuse, GAO-06-655 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006).
[73] Pub. L. No. 109-148.
[74] Pub. L. No. 109-234.
[75] Section 408 of the Stafford Act.
[76] Eligibility requirements for receiving assistance under IHP
include demonstrating that an applicant's pre-disaster residence is
located in the declared disaster area; that damage to the property was
not covered by insurance; and that the applicant is unable to return to
their pre-disaster home due to damage caused by the disaster.
[77] FEMA announced certain exceptions to the May 31 deadline. In
particular, FEMA stated that it planned to make every effort to notify
states of the IHP eligibility status of evacuees before April 15. If
this notification occurred after April 15, states could request
additional time to provide eligible and ineligible evacuees with a 30-
day lease termination notice. Specifically, states could receive up to
15 additional days for eligible evacuees, and up to 30 additional days
for ineligible evacuees. Also, for ineligible evacuees, the state would
be reimbursed for contractual lease termination costs associated with
leases that require greater than 30 days notice. FEMA subsequently
extended the May 31 deadline to June 30 for 11 jurisdictions. FEMA
further extended the deadline for one of these jurisdictions--Houston,
Texas--until September 30TH.
[78] The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-148).
[79] Under the Disaster Voucher Program, funding must be obligated by
September 30, 2007. Unless expressly renewed or extended by law,
assistance may not continue beyond the time the obligated funds are
expended.
[80] The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968. The act, as amended, is
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001 to 4129.
[81] NFIP coverage is also available for other structures such as
apartment buildings, schools, churches, businesses and condominium
associations, but the coverage terms differ in various respects from
homeowners' coverage.
[82] GAO, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges for the
National Flood Insurance Program, GAO-06-335T (Washington, D.C.: Jan.
25, 2006).
[83] The NFIP standard flood insurance policy considers a property
substantially damaged if the cost of repairing it exceeds 50 percent of
its market value at the time of the flood.
[84] GAO, Flood Map Modernization: Program Strategy Shows Promise, but
Challenges Remain, GAO-04-417 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004).
[85] GAO, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Improvements Needed to
Enhance Oversight and Management of the National Flood Insurance
Program, GAO-06-119 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 18, 2005).
[86] In response to the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004, FEMA
recently published an interim final rule establishing a regulatory
appeals process for flood insurance claimants. National Flood Insurance
Program; Appeal of Decisions Relating to Flood Insurance Claims, 71
Fed. Reg. 30294 (2006).
[87] GAO, Guidelines for Rescuing Large Failing Firms and
Municipalities, GAO/GGD-84-34 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 1984).
[88] GAO, Homeland Security: DHS' Effort to Enhance First Responders'
All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-04-652 (Washington,
D.C.: July 11, 2005).
[89] GAO, Limitations in Federal Evacuation Assistance for Health
Facilities Should be Addressed, GAO-06-826 (Washington, D.C.: July 20,
2006).
[90] GAO, Small Business Administration: Actions Needed to Provide More
Timely Assistance, GAO-06-860 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006)
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