Anchoring as Grounding: On Epstein's The Ant Trap draft of 6/9/18, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming)Synopsis: Critical discussion of Epstein's book, focusing on his distinction between anchoring and groundingTopics: Grounding, Social ontology

Cognitive Science and Metaphysics: Partners in DebunkingAlvin Goldman and his Critics, eds. Kornblith and McLaughlin (2016), 337-65: Wiley-Blackwell (to be reprinted in Metaphysics and Cognitive Science, eds. Goldman and McLaughlin: Oxford; also Tsingua Studies in Western Philosophy 3 (2017), 434-72)Synopsis: Discussion of the relevance of cognitive science to metaphysics, and the roles that both need to play in debunking intuitionsTopics: Methodology, Meta-metaphysics

What Not to Multiply without NecessityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2015), 644-64Synopsis: Argument that it is only fundamental entities that are not to be multiplied without necessityTopics: Meta-Metaphysics, Fundamentality

The Action of the WholeProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 (2013), 67-87Synopsis: Argument that the cosmos is the one and only fundamental thing, since it is the one and only thing that evolves by the fundamental lawsTopics: Monism, Substance

Necessitarian PropositionsSynthese 189 (2012), 119-62Synopsis: Is there any good reason to think that propositions are eternal (time-specific), which does not provide parallel reason to think that propositions are necessary (world-specific)?Topics: Semantics, Propositions

Contrastive Causation in the LawLegal Theory 16 (2010), 259-97Synopsis: Application of the contrastive view of causation to causation in the law (with a focus on liability in common law)Topics: Contrastive causation, Causation in the law

On What Grounds WhatMetametaphysics, eds. Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman (2009), 347-83: Oxford (selected as one of the ten best articles published in philosophy in 2009 and reprinted by Philosopher’s Annual 29, eds. Grim, Charlow, Gallow, and Herold; also reprinted in Metaphysics: An Anthology, 2nd edition, eds. Kim, Korman, and Sosa (2011), 73-96: Blackwell.)Synopsis: Conception of metaphysics as primarily concerned with questions of grounding rather than existenceTopics: Meta-metaphysics, Grounding

Review of Hüttemann's What's Wrong with Microphysicalism?British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59.2 (2008), 253-7Synopsis: Review of Hüttemann's book, arguing that the main arguments support monism (macrophysicalism) rather than Hüttemann's own egalitarian viewTopics: Physicalism, Monism

MonismStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007, last revised 2014)Synopsis: Overview of metaphysical monisms, and discussions of existence monism (exactly one thing exists) and priority monism (exactly one thing is fundamental)Topics: Monism

Causation and Laws of Nature: ReductionismContemporary Debates in Metaphysics, eds. Hawthorne, Sider, and Zimmerman (2007), 82-107: BlackwellSynopsis: Undergraduate level review of some main arguments for and against treating causation and laws as fundamentalTopics: Causation, Lawhood, Humeanism

Contrastive CausationPhilosophical Review 114.3 (2005), 327-58Synopsis: Defense of a (doubly) contrastive view of causation, on which causal relations have the form: c rather than C* causes e rather than E*Topics: Contrastive causation

Contrastive KnowledgeOxford Studies in Epistemology1, eds. Gendler and Hawthorne (2005), 235-71: Oxford (reprinted in The Concept of Knowledge, ed. Tolksdorf (2012), 357-94: De Gruyter)Synopsis: Defense of, a contrastive view of knowledge, on which the knowledge relation has the form: s knows that p rather than qTopics: Contrastive knowledge

What Shifts? Thresholds, Standards, or Alternatives?Contextualism in Philosophy, eds. Preyer and Peter (2005), 115-30: OxfordSynopsis: Arguments that contextualists should work with relevant alternatives rather than thresholds for justification (Cohen) or distance of tracking (DeRose)Topics: Contextualism

Quiddistic KnowledgePhilosophical Studies 123.1-2 (2005), 1-32 (reprinted in Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis,eds. Jackson and Priest (2004), 210-30: Oxford)Synopsis: Is the relation between properties and powers contingent or necessary, and if contingent how can we know what the properties are?Topics: Properties, Knowledge

The Problem of Free Mass: Must Properties Cluster?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66.1 (2003), 125-38Synopsis: Can a thing have mass but no other property? The question of whether there are necessary connections between propertiesTopics: Properties

Principled ChancesBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54.2 (2003), 27-41Synopsis: Account of chance that is Humean, while avoiding undermining and allowing non-zero chances to be realizable (but is not quite the quantity found in the laws, and is not stable across duplicate trials)Topics: Chance, Humeanism