Sec. 4. TO understand
political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what
state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to
order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they
think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or
depending upon the will of any other man.

A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is
reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident,
than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the
same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be
equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord
and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one
above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an
undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.

Sec. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as
so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation
of that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties
they owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice
and charity. His words are,

"The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no
less their duty, to love others than themselves; for seeing those things which
are equal, must needs all have one measure; if I cannot but wish to receive
good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul,
how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself
be careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being
of one and the same nature? To have any thing offered them repugnant to this
desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so that if I do
harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should shew
greater measure of love to me, than they have by me shewed unto them: my desire
therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be,
imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like
affection; from which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are
as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn, for
direction of life, no man is ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1."

Sec. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of
licence: though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of
his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so
much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare
preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern
it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all
mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one
ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men
being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the
servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about
his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last
during his, not one another's pleasure: and being furnished with like
faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any
such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as
if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are
for our's. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his
station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in
competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and
may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the
life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb,
or goods of another.

Sec. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and
from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which
willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of
nature is, in that state, put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a
right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder
its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men
in this world 'be in vain, if there were no body that in the state of nature
had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain
offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any
evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality,
where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another,
what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right
to do.

Sec. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over
another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has
got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless
extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm
reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression,
which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for these two are
the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we
call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares
himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is
that measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and
so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from
injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass
against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the
law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve
mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things
noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed
that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by
his example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon
this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND
BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.

Sec. 9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men:
but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by what right any
prince or state can put to death, or punish an alien, for any crime he commits
in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction they
receive from the promulgated will of the legislative, reach not a stranger:
they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to them. The
legislative authority, by which they are in force over the subjects of that
commonwealth, hath no power over him. Those who have the supreme power of
making laws in England, France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the rest
of the world, men without authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature
every man hath not a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges
the case to require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish
an alien of another country; since, in reference to him, they can have no more
power than what every man naturally may have over another.

Sec. 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and varying
from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and
declares himself to quit the principles of human nature, and to be a noxious
creature, there is commonly injury done to some person or other, and some other
man receives damage by his transgression: in which case he who hath received
any damage, has, besides the right of punishment common to him with other men,
a particular right to seek reparation from him that has done it: and any other
person, who finds it just, may also join with him that is injured, and assist
him in recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the
harm he has suffered.

Sec. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime for
restraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing is in
every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured
party, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate hath the
common right of punishing put into his hands, can often, where the public good
demands not the execution of the law, remit the punishment of criminal offences
by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private
man for the damage he has received. That, he who has suffered the damage has a
right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified person
has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the
offender, by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the
crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving
all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end: and
thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature, has a power to kill a
murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury, which no reparation
can compensate, by the example of the punishment that attends it from every
body, and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal, who having
renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath,
by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war
against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one
of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security:
and upon this is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth man's blood,
by man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that every one
had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder of his brother,
he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so plain was it writ in
the hearts of all mankind.

Sec. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the
lesser breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I answer,
each transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity,
as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to
repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offence, that can be
committed in the state of nature, may in the state of nature be also punished
equally, and as far forth as it may, in a commonwealth: for though it would be
besides my present purpose, to enter here into the particulars of the law of
nature, or its measures of punishment; yet, it is certain there is such a law,
and that too, as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a studier
of that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer; as
much as reason is easier to be understood, than the fancies and intricate
contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words;
for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of countries, which are
only so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are
to be regulated and interpreted.

Sec. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every
one has the executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be
objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that
selflove will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the
other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in
punishing others; and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and
that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the
partiality and violence of men. I easily grant, that civil government is the
proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must
certainly be great, where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy
to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will
scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those who
make this objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but men; and if
government is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily follow from
men's being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is therefore not
to be endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much
better it is than the state of nature, where one man, commanding a
multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to all his
subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question
or controul those who execute his pleasure and in whatsoever he doth, whether
led by reason, mistake or passion, must be submitted to. Much better it is in
the state of nature, wherein men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of
another. And if he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any other case, he
is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.

Sec. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were
there any men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as an answer
at present, that since all princes and rulers of independent governments all
through the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain the world never was,
nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that state. I have named all
governors of independent communities, whether they are, or are not, in league
with others: for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of
nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter
into one community, and make one body politic; other promises, and compacts,
men may make one with another, and yet still be in the state of nature. The
promises and bargains for truck, &c. between the two men in the desert
island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega, in his history of Peru; or between
a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them, though
they are perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one another: for truth
and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of society.

Sec. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of nature,
I will not only oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib.
i. sect. 10, where he says, The laws which have been hitherto mentioned, i.e.
the laws of nature, do bind men absolutely, even as they are men, although they
have never any settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement amongst
themselves what to do, or not to do: but forasmuch as we are not by ourselves
sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things, needful for
such a life as our nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of man;
therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us, as living
single and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and
fellowship with others: this was the cause of men's uniting themselves at first
in politic societies. But I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that
state, and remain so, till by their own consents they make themselves members
of some politic society; and I doubt not in the sequel of this discourse, to
make it very clear.