Heg Up – General (1/2)
America’s military power is unprecedented Shapiro 8 (Robert J, Sonecon LLC co-founder, 6/12, http://www.theglobalist.com/storyid.aspx?StoryId=7049)
America’s global military power is so commonplace that it’s easy to overlook how historically unique it is. What’s so unusual and world-changing is not the extent of America’s military, political and economic capacities — but the absence of countries that come anywhere close. America’s historically anomalous position as a sole superpower with no near peer ended the balance-of-power geopolitics that organized much of world affairs for more than a thousand years — and will fundamentally shape a new geopolitics for at least the next generation. Sources of power The United States also derives geopolitical power from its singular capacity to develop new technologies and other valuable intellectual property in large volumes, especially in the software and Internet areas that drive so much economic change and the processes of globalization itself. In 2006, the United States spent about $570 billion on defense, or roughly as much as the rest of the world combined volumes. Other countries now lead in producing and improving the basic manufactures that American companies dominated a few generations ago — steel, consumer electronics, automobiles — and much more. This capacity enhances America’s global position not because it increases the profits that U.S. companies earn on their foreign sales. Much more far-reaching, it subtly aligns the economic paths of other countries with the United States and — whether or not they like it — makes them a little more like America.

America remains the global hegemon International Herald Tribune 8 (5/1, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/05/01/news/30oxan.php)
Instead of describing US 'imperialism' it is more apposite to refer to Washington's position as a hegemonic power in a number of dimensions, such as its dominant position in international political and economic organisations, its cultural reach, and its relative military prowess. Wellsprings of power. US hegemonic power is exercised globally through several key institutions and mechanisms:· Economic power. Following the Second World War, US economic dominance was so great that it was able to help reconstruct post-war Western Europe via the Marshall Plan. Although its relative advantage has since declined, Washington continues to play a key role in global economic affairs; its intervention helped halt the spiralling depreciation of the Mexican peso in 1994. The dollar also remains the world's dominant reserve, or 'numeraire', currency.· Military might. US defence spending continues massively to overshadow the military outlays of other societies. Substantial elements of the US armed forces are still permanently based in many areas abroad. While this overseas basing is, in part, a residue of the old Cold War security apparatus, many areas of the world welcome these troops as the guarantors of stability and the regional balance of power.· Post-1945 legacy. The United States had a major role in structuring post-1945 political and social systems. For example, both the German Basic Law of 1949 and Japan's 1947 constitution reflected significant US input. Both countries were subject to US influence directly through occupation forces, but also intellectually and culturally as their new governments operated under USinfluenced constitutional systems. While such influence is today much diminished, it has not entirely vanished.· International organisations. Washington dominates key international organisations, notably NATO and the UN. NATO, which once had a limited collective security role centred around defending Western Europe from a Soviet attack, is slowly moving towards an expanded 'out of area' mission under US prodding. Despite President George Bush's occasionally confrontational stance towards the UN, the United States remains highly influential there due to the size of its financial contribution and Security Council veto. · Aligning allies. The United States works assiduously to promote its interests by influencing how other states align or realign. For example, it has promoted Turkey's candidacy for EU membership, as a means of promoting political and economic reform. · Ideas and culture. US ideas and popular culture, from jazz to art and cinema, have infectiously spread -- rendering 'Americanisation' among the most significant and disputed phenomena of the contemporary era. Americanisation has its antinomy, 'antiAmericanism', and this cleavage operates globally. 'Globalisation' both overlaps with, and is distinct from, Americanisation, but the two phenomena are often conjoined in political analysis and popular discourse.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

7 Hegemony

Heg Up – General (2/2)
The US has the most power in the world and will continue to do so for decades Haas 8 (Richard, CFR pres., May/June, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html)
In this world, the United States is and will long remain the largest single aggregation of power. It spends more than $500 billion annually on its military -- and more than $700 billion if the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are included -- and boasts land, air, and naval forces that are the world's most capable. Its economy, with a GDP of some $14 trillion, is the world's largest. The United States is also a major source of culture (through films and television), information, and innovation. But the reality of American strength should not mask the relative decline of the United States' position in the world -- and with this relative decline in power an absolute decline in influence and independence. The U.S. share of global imports is already down to 15 percent. Although U.S. GDP accounts for over 25 percent of the world's total, this percentage is sure to decline over time given the actual and projected differential between the United States' growth rate and those of the Asian giants and many other countries, a large number of which are growing at more than two or three times the rate of the United States.

Military bases prove US leadership Topolanek 8 (Mirek, Czech prime minister, 4/14, http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/hl1076.cfm)
Fourteen European countries currently host bases of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force, and the U.S. Navy. This is evidence of American leadership. The American military presence in Europe ensures that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries on both sides of the Atlantic will be equally defended against any conventional threats. This military presence is a result of a strengthened will to provide defense after the two World Wars and the Cold War. That is why it was accepted, and appreciated, as evidenced by the complete absence of referenda, which we are now unfortunately asked to hold in regard to the radar site.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

8 Hegemony

Heg Up – A2: Iraq
Iraq has strengthened the US strategic position and boosted leadership. Australian 8 (4/26, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23599516-7583,00.html)
THE US war in Iraq has strengthened its strategic position, especially in terms of key alliances, and the only way this could be reversed would be if it lost the will to continue the struggle and abandoned Iraq in defeat and disarray. Mike Green holds the Japan chair at Washington’s Centre for Strategic and International Studies and was for several years the Asia director at the National Security Council. He is also one of America’s foremost experts on Japan and northeast Asia generally. His thesis, applied strictly to the US position in Asia, is correct. First, Green states and acknowledges the negatives. He writes: “The Iraq war has had one important, pernicious impact on US interests in Asia: it has consumed US attention.” This has prevented the US from following up in sufficient detail on some positive developments in Asia. Green also acknowledges that the US’s reputation has taken a battering among Muslim populations in Asia. Yet Green’s positive thesis is fascinating. The US’s three most important Asian alliances - with Australia, Japan and South Korea - have in his view been strengthened by the Iraq campaign. Each of these nations sent substantial numbers of troops to help the US in Iraq. They did this because they believed in what the US was doing in Iraq, and also because they wanted to use the Iraq campaign as an opportunity to strengthen their alliances with the US. More generally, in a world supposedly awash in anti-US sentiment, pro-American leaders keep winning elections. Germany’s Angela Merkel is certainly more pro-American than Gerhard Schroeder, whom she replaced. The same is true of France’s Nicolas Sarkozy. More importantly in terms of Green’s analysis, the same is also true of South Korea’s new President. Lee Myung-bak, elected in a landslide in December, is vastly more pro-American than his predecessor, Roh Moo-hyun. Even in majority Islamic societies, their populations allegedly radicalised and polarised by Bush’s campaign in Iraq and the global war on terror more generally, election results don’t show any evidence of these trends. In the most recent local elections in Indonesia, and in national elections in Pakistan, the Islamist parties with anti-American rhetoric fared very poorly. Similarly Kevin Rudd was elected as a very pro-American Labor leader, unlike Mark Latham, with his traces of antiAmericanism, who was heavily defeated. Even with China, the Iraq campaign was not a serious negative for the US. Beijing was far more worried by the earlier US-led NATO intervention into Kosovo because it was based purely on notions of human rights in Kosovo. Such notions could theoretically be used to justify action (not necessarily military action) against China over Taiwan and Tibet. Iraq, on the other hand, was justified on the basis of weapons of mass destruction, a justification with which the Chinese were much more comfortable. More generally, it is American values, or more accurately the universal values of democracy to which the US adheres, that are more popular and receive greater adherence in Asia than before, in the politics and civil societies of Asian nations such as Indonesia, India, Japan and many others.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

9 Hegemony

Heg Up – A2: Multipolar
US continues as superpower; even in transition to multipolar world Sui 8 (Yu, Researcher with the Research Center of Contemporary World, 3/11, http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iissin-the-press/march-2008/us-still-committed-to-unilateralism/) The status of the U.S. as a superpower reached its zenith after the Cold War as it single-mindedly pursued a unilateralist global strategy and there seemed to be only one pole left in the world; while in fact the world was in a relatively long transitional phase from a "bipolar" to "multi-polar" structure. The transition to a multi-polar is continuing. Multi-polarization is a development trend, which does not mean we are already there. There is a relatively lengthy period of transition when a new one is finally established. The basic situation during this transitional period is that the US will enjoy the "sole superpower" edge unchallenged for a rather long time within "a setup featuring one superpower and multiple major powers", but none of the major powers are strong enough to rival the US and therefore have to find solace in statements such as "superpowers" no longer exist. If we see "the sole superpower" the US as one pole,
then we probably should view the "multiple major powers" as a collective "para-pole". It is these "pole" and "para-pole" that form the multi-polar world structure, while the ideas of "unipolar world" and "non-polar world" do not reflect the reality of today's world. The number of "multiple major powers" is growing and the new comers are developing nations or their alliances only, such as certain members of the BRIC nations and VISTA countries and perhaps the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The ongoing accumulation and

Today's America is hurting but remains a superpower nonetheless. The international situation in 2007 showed it was a year when the regional hot spots set on fire by the US sought a way out and achieved
advancement of regional multi-polarization will complement and enrich the multi-polarization of the world. limited success amid malignant escalation. Last year major powers tried to adjust their relations, with the US as the main cause of everything that was wrong, only to further complicate them. Last year the US neo-conservatism was forced to make tactical adjustments with certain strategic implications after serious setbacks and under pressure to win the next presidential election. The growing seriousness and complexity of the world situation last year was, in many ways and to a significant degree, a strong rejection of US unilateralism. With the war in Iraq as a mark, the US has been relegated from hegemonic unilateralism to head-of-the-pack unilateralism. That means it is still committed to unilateralism but cannot do it on its own and has to rely on cooperation by other major powers, including former arch rival Russia, in a "multilateral manner". The embarrassing situation is evident in the war on terror and even more so in the anti-proliferation campaign. However, this situation does not mean the US will give up unilateralism in favor of multilateralism, but rather it has been forced to go along with the latter. The same is true with multi-polarization, which the US would very much not have but cannot get rid of at the moment. Because the gap between the "sole superpower" and "multiple major powers" is narrowing by the day, the idea of the world entering the era of "relative major powers" in the next 30 to 40 years sounds original, but it is far from confirming the word "superpower" is already obsolete. The debate over the question of world structure has been going on since day one, because the international situation has been complicated and changing all the time. Some people say multi-polarization will "cause instability", whereas things are easier to

. American advocates of unipolarism have time and again advertised the US as a "benign hegemony" capable of delivering order to the world community that will keep it mutually beneficial. And the US government has validated this notion repeatedly through its involvement in the Balkans and Middle East wars.
do in a unipolar world with one voice

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

10 Hegemony

Heg Up – Nuclear Primacy
The US has nuclear primacy Judd 8 (Brothers Judd review agency co-founder, 6/17,
http://brothersjuddblog.com/archives/2008/06/when_you_have_superiority_use.html) But little about the emerging nuclear balance between the United States and China should lead anyone to assume a similar stabilizing effect. The United States is pursuing capabilities that are rendering MAD obsolete, and the resulting nuclear imbalance of power could dramatically exacerbate America’s rivalry with China. In the 1990s, with the Cold War receding, nuclear weapons appeared to be relics. Russian and Chinese leaders apparently thought so. Russia allowed its arsenal to decline precipitously, and China showed little interest in modernizing its nuclear weapons. The small strategic force that China built and deployed in the 1970s and early 1980s is essentially the same one it has today. But meanwhile, the United States steadily improved its “counterforce” capabilities—those nuclear weapons most effective at targeting an enemy’s nuclear arsenal. Even as it reduced the number of weapons in its nuclear arsenal, the U.S. made its remaining weapons more lethal and accurate. The result today is a global nuclear imbalance unseen in 50 years. And nowhere is U.S. nuclear primacy clearer—or potentially more important —than in the Sino-U.S. relationship. China has approximately 80 operationally deployed nuclear warheads, but only a few of them—those assigned to single-warhead DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)— can reach the continental United States. (There is no definitive, unclassified count of China’s DF-5 ICBMs, but official U.S. statements have put the number at 18.) China has neither modern nuclear ballistic-missile submarines nor long-range nuclear bombers. Moreover, China’s ICBMs can’t be quickly launched; the warheads are stored separately, and the missiles are kept unfueled. (Unlike the solid fuel used in U.S. missiles, the liquid fuel used to propel Chinese ICBMs is highly corrosive.) Finally, China lacks an advanced early-warning system that would give Beijing reliable notice of an incoming attack. This small arsenal fulfilled China’s strategic requirements in the 20th century, but it is now obsolete. The current Chinese force was designed for a different era:when China was a poor nation with a limited role on the world stage, and when U.S. and Soviet missiles were too inaccurate to carry out a disarming strike—even against Beijing’s small force. But China’s international presence is expanding, and America’s counterforce capabilities have soared. Moreover, one of the biggest constraints that would deter American leaders from contemplating a disarming strike is fading away. In the past, a U.S. preemptive attack would have generated horrific civilian casualties, but that may soon cease to be the case. How the United States achieved nuclear dominance after the Soviet Union collapsed is an open secret. The Navy refitted its entire fleet of nuclear-armed submarines with new, highly accurate Trident II missiles and replaced many of the 100kiloton W76 warheads on these missiles with 455-kiloton W88 warheads. (One kiloton is the explosive energy released by 1,000 tons of TNT.) The result is an unprecedented combination of accuracy and destructive power, essential for an attack on hardened silos. The Navy also recently tested a GPS guidance system that would dramatically boost the accuracy, and thus lethality, of the submarine missile arsenal. For its part, the Air Force has improved the guidance systems of land-based Minuteman III missiles. Many of these missiles are also being “retipped” with more-powerful warheads—and more-accurate reentry vehicles—taken from recently retired MX (“Peacekeeper”) missiles. The Air Force has also upgraded the avionics on B-2 bombers. These nuclear-mission-capable bombers are already “stealthy,” but the upgrades improve the planes’ ability to penetrate enemy airspace secretly, by flying very low and using the terrain to shield them from radar. Perhaps as important, the United States is pursuing a slew of nonnuclear weapons that will provide officials options they may find more palatable if they decide to attack an adversary’s nuclear arsenal. These include precision “bunker buster” conventional bombs, high-speed long-range cruise missiles, and conventionally armed ballistic missiles —each of which could be used to destroy enemy missile silos. Furthermore, Washington is undertaking initiatives—including advances in antisatellite warfare and in wide-area remote sensing, designed to find “relocatable” mobile missile launchers—that will make China’s nuclear forces vulnerable. Even a missile-defense system substantially boosts U.S. offensive counterforce capabilities. Critics of this system are right in claiming that it could not shield America from even a modest nuclear attack (e.g., 25 warheads), because it would be easily overwhelmed by decoy warheads and the “penetration aids” that would accompany an adversary’s missiles. But it could enhance offensive nuclear capabilities, by “mopping up” a small number of incoming warheads that survived a U.S. first strike.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

11 Hegemony

Heg Up – Capabilities Gap (1/2)
The US military is far above all others due to unprecedented military intelligence
Odierno, Brooks, and Mastracchio 8 (Raymond, Nichoel, and Francisco, lt. general, lt. col., and Intelligence Deputy G2 for III Corps, p. 52, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i50.htm) We have seen a significant metamorphosis of intelligence operations in Iraq. Indeed, we still have much to learn, but we are on the right track. The capacity and capability of our intelligence systems have improved greatly in just 3 years. The successes enjoyed by Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) are clearly demonstrated in the ability to leverage the sophistication of intelligence operations ongoing in Iraq today at the lowest levels of command. Employment of ISR, according to the current counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, sets the conditions for the initial success of the surge in Iraq. Decentralization of ISR assets allowed BCT and regimental combat team (RCT) commanders (faced with vastly different problem sets) to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. ISR evolved along with the fight. The robust ISR currently available at the brigade level provides commanders with an unprecedented level of situational awareness. Commanders now have the flexibility to push ISR assets to the lowest tactical echelon, which is one of the most powerful enablers on the battlefield today.

The US navy is unchallengable. King and Berry 8 (Douglas and John, Marine Corps Combat Development Command Director of Operations
and Plans and sr. analyst, p. 45-46, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i50.htm) In recent years, this network of bases has been dramatically reduced, even as the United States is confronted by a variety of strategic challenges and locked in a global struggle for influence. The ability to overcome geographic, political, and military impediments to access has reemerged as a critical necessity for extending U.S. influence and power overseas. Fortunately, the United States possesses an asymmetric advantage in that endeavor: seapower. The American ability to cross wide expanses of ocean and to remain offshore at a time and place and for a duration of its own choosing cannot be contested today to the degree it was in previous eras. Although small in historical terms—and often stretched thin by current operational commitments—the U.S. Navy is, for the foreseeable future, a navy without peer. This asymmetric advantage means that the Navy-Marine team can use the sea as both maneuver space and a secure operating area to overcome impediments to access. This seabased force—particularly its aircraft carriers and amphibious ships with embarked Marines—is capable of projecting influence and power ashore without reliance on ports and airfields in the objective area. It can do so in a selectively discrete or overt manner to conduct a range of operations—from conducting security cooperation activities, to providing humanitarian assistance, to deterring and, when necessary, fighting wars. This significant advantage does not extend to the joint force as a whole, however. The sealift that transports the preponderance of joint force materiel is still dependent upon secure infrastructure in a potential objective area. Just as the amphibious innovations championed by the Navy and Marine Corps during the 1920s and 1930s benefited the entire joint and Allied force in World War II, the seabasing initiatives being pursued by the Navy-Marine\ team today are intended to benefit joint, interagency, and multinational teammates.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

12 Hegemony

Heg Up – Capabilities Gap (2/2)
Capabilities gap reflects hegemony - Air Force proves.
Moseley 8 (T Michael, USAF Chief of Staff, JFQ, p. 14,
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i49.htm) America’s strategic partnerships are more important than ever. Our Air Force will strengthen and broaden coalitions, capitalizing on the global community of like-minded Airmen, while attending to interoperability between allies and partners. Building these relationships not only expands, extends, and strengthens global vigilance, global reach, and global power, but also leverages airpower’s value as an instrument of America’s diplomacy in an increasingly interconnected world. The Air Force is formulating innovative operational concepts to anticipate, adapt to, and overcome challenges. We are transforming our thinking from considering the space and cyber domains as mere enablers of air operations to a holistic approach that factors in their interdependence and leverages their unique characteristics. We must continue to push this conceptual envelope—and expand the boundaries of existing tactics, techniques, and procedures—to fully exploit the synergies of crossdomain dominance. We will accelerate the deployment of evolutionary and disruptive technologies as are address the urgent need to recapitalize and modernize. We must bolster our advantage through continued investment in our own science and technology, as well as outreach and integration with industry, academia, and think tanks. We will reform our procurement and acquisition system to ensure full transparency, open competition, and adherence to operational timelines.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

13 Hegemony

Heg Up – Air Force
Heg Up – Air Force Moseley 8 (T. Michael, USAF Chief of Staff, p. 13, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i49.htm)
Ends: Protect Democracy and Guard Freedom. The Air Force’s nonnegotiable commitment to America’s joint team is to provide forces proficient across the full spectrum of military operations to protect the United States, its interests, values, and allies; deter conflict and prevent surprise; and, should deterrence fail, prevail against any adversary. Airmen deliver global surveillance, global command and control, and the requisite speed, range, precision, persistence, and payload to strike any target, anywhere, anytime, in any domain—and to assess the results. Global vigilance, global reach, and global power grant joint and combined force commanders the ability to safeguard the homeland, assure allies, dissuade opponents, and inflict strategic dislocation and paralysis on adversaries—all while minimizing the loss of life associated with land warfare.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

14 Hegemony

Readiness Up – $ing Up
U.S. military spending is high now Johnson 8 (President and Co-founder of Japan Policy Research Institute, http://mondediplo.com/2008/02/05military
There are three broad aspects to the US debt crisis. First, in the current fiscal year (2008) we are spending insane amounts of money on “defence” projects that bear no relation to the national security of the US. We are also keeping the income tax burdens on the richest segment of the population at strikingly low levels. Second, we continue to believe that we can compensate for the accelerating erosion of our base and our loss of jobs to foreign countries through massive military expenditures — “military Keynesianism” (which I discuss in detail in my book Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic). By that, I mean the mistaken belief that public policies focused on frequent wars, huge expenditures on weapons and munitions, and large standing armies can indefinitely sustain a wealthy capitalist economy. The opposite is actually true.

U.S. military spending is high now Johnson 8 (President and Co-founder of Japan Policy Research Institute, http://mondediplo.com/2008/02/05military
It is virtually impossible to overstate the profligacy of what our government spends on the military. The Department of Defense’s planned expenditures for the fiscal year 2008 are larger than all other nations’ military budgets combined. The supplementary budget to pay for the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, not part of the official defence budget, is itself larger than the combined military budgets of Russia and China. Defence-related spending for fiscal 2008 will exceed $1 trillion for the first time in history. The US has become the largest single seller of arms and munitions to other nations on Earth. Leaving out President Bush’s two on-going wars, defence spending has doubled since the mid-1990s. The defence budget for fiscal 2008 is the largest since the second world war.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

15 Hegemony

Readiness Up – General (A2: Iraq) (1/2)
Readiness high – the US can respond to any challenge despite responsibilities in Iraq. Gates 8 (Robert, US sec. of defense, 5/13, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1240)
But in a world of finite knowledge and limited resources, where we have to make choices and set priorities, it makes sense to lean toward the most likely and lethal scenarios for our military. And it is hard to conceive of any country confronting the United States directly in conventional terms – ship to ship, fighter to fighter, tank to tank – for some time to come. The

record of the past quarter century is clear: the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Israelis in Lebanon, the United States in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Smaller, irregular forces – insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists – will find ways, as they always have, to frustrate and neutralize the advantages of larger, regular militaries. And even nation-states will try to exploit
our perceived vulnerabilities in an asymmetric way, rather than play to our inherent strengths. Overall, the kinds of capabilities we will most likely need in the years ahead will often resemble the kinds of capabilities we need today. The implication, particularly for America’s ground forces, means we must institutionalize the lessons learned and capabilities honed from the ongoing conflicts. Many of these skills and tasks used to be the province of the Special Forces, but now are a core of the Army and Marine Corps as a whole. For example, at West Point last month, I told the cadets that the most important assignment in their careers may not necessarily be commanding U.S. soldiers, but advising or mentoring the troops of other nations. What we must guard against is the kind of backsliding that has occurred in the past, where if nature takes it course, these kinds of capabilities – that is counter-insurgency – tend to wither on the vine. There is a history here. During the 1980s, a Princeton graduate student noted in his dissertation that, about a decade after the fall of Saigon, the Army’s 10month staff college assigned 30 hours – about four days – for what is now called low-intensity conflict. This was about the same as what the Air Force was teaching at the time. That grad student was then-Army Major David Petraeus. Going forward we must find, retain, and promote the right people – at all ranks, whether they wear stripes, bars, or stars – and put them in the right positions to see that the lessons learned in recent combat become rooted in the institutional culture. Similarly, we shouldn’t let personnel policies that were developed in peacetime hurt our wartime performance.

For years to come, the Air Force and the Navy will be America’s main strategic deterrent. We need to These forces provide the strategic flexibility we need to deter, and if necessary, respond to, other competitors. The American people have been generous when it comes to funding their Armed Forces over the past seven years, and they are likely to be supportive in the future. What we should expect, though, is a heightened level
modernize our ageing inventory of aircraft, and build out a fleet of ships that right now is the smallest we’ve had since the late 1930s.

of scrutiny in the Congress, and by the public, for how this money is being spent – particularly when supplemental war funds are no longer available for modernization purposes. Two points on the subject of procurement: First, I believe that any major weapons program, in order to remain viable, will have to show some utility and relevance to the kind of irregular campaigns that, as I mentioned, are most likely to engage America’s military in the coming decades. In Texas, I had an opportunity to see a demonstration of the parts of the Army’s Future Combat Systems that have moved from the drawing board to reality. A program like FCS – whose total cost could exceed $200 billion if completely built out – must continue to demonstrate its value for the types of irregular challenges we will face, as well as for full-spectrum warfare. Second, I would stress that the perennial procurement cycle – going back many decades – of adding layer upon layer of cost and complexity onto fewer and fewer platforms that take longer and longer to build must come to an end. Without a fundamental change in this dynamic, it will be difficult to sustain support for these kinds of weapons programs in the future. A few words about global risk – the threats we face elsewhere in the world while America’s ground forces are concentrated on Iraq. This is an understandable concern. I remember being a Second Lieutenant at Whiteman Air Force base in the late 1960s. There I caught a glimpse of the impact of the Vietnam War on America’s overall strategic strength: White-haired lieutenant colonels were being reassigned to Southeast Asia to make up for our pilot losses there. Some people have made similar comparisons to the impact of Iraq on the Army. Today’s strategic context is completely different. While America’s military was being bled in Vietnam, a superpower with vast fleets of tanks, bombers, fighters, and nuclear weapons was poised to overrun Western Europe – then the central theater in that era’s long twilight struggle. Not so today.

It is true that we would be hard-pressed to launch a major conventional ground operation elsewhere in the world at this time – but where would we sensibly do that? The United States has ample and untapped combat power in our naval and air forces, with the capacity to defeat any – repeat, any – adversary who committed an act of aggression – whether in the Persian Gulf, on the Korean Peninsula, or in the Straits of Taiwan. There is a risk – but a prudent and manageable one. The last point I’d like to address is the strain placed on our ground forces, especially the Army.
Along with Fort Bliss, I’ve visited a number of other military installations over the past year, including Fort Hood and Camp Pendleton – the largest Army and Marine bases respectively. It is a difficult thing to look a family member in the eye whose father or son or daughter is being deployed again – sometimes on a second or third tour. And it’s even harder to do with the families of those who have been killed or wounded. This is the second longest war in American history since our Revolution, and the first to be fought with an all-volunteer force since independence. To be sure the stress is real. There are metrics that need to be watched – such as the number of waivers granted to new recruits, suicides, as well as incidents of divorce and other signs of wear on military families.

Continued on next page…no deletions

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

16 Hegemony

Readiness Up – General (A2: Iraq) (3/4)
Continued from last page…no deletions There are a number of measures underway and trends that should ease the strain on this small sliver of our population who have borne the burden of this conflict: • More and better programs to improve the quality of life for soldiers and their families; • The ground forces are growing by more than 90,000 over the next five years – with a bigger rotational pool of troops and units individual soldiers and Marines will deploy less frequently; and • U.S. force levels in Iraq will decline over time – the debate taking place is mostly over the pacing. As I mentioned before, the discussion about the stress on the Army today is informed by the Vietnam experience – and the terrible shape of the service afterwards, where there was a loss of nearly a generation of NCO leadership and rampant discipline problems. So far, none of those ailments are present today. Overall, our service men and women and their families have shown extraordinary resilience. Morale is high, as is recruiting and retention – particularly among units either in or just returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. Soldier for soldier, unit for unit, the Army is the best trained, best led, and best equipped it has ever been – skilled and experienced in the arduous complexities of irregular warfare.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

17 Hegemony

Readiness Up – General (A2: Iraq) (4/4)
The US military can overcome any military challenge with appropriate resources – surge proves. Kagan 7 (Robert, Carnegie Endowment for Internatoinal Peace sr. associate, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/03/09/AR2007030901839.html?nav=rss_opinion/columns)

Four months later, the once insurmountable political opposition has been surmounted. The nonexistent troops are flowing into Iraq. And though it is still early and horrible acts of violence continue, there is substantial evidence that the new counterinsurgency strategy, backed by the infusion of new forces, is having a significant effect. Some observers are reporting the shift. Iraqi bloggers Mohammed and Omar Fadhil, widely respected for their straight talk, say that "early signs are encouraging." The first impact of the "surge," they write, was psychological. Both friends and foes in Iraq had been convinced, in no small part by the American media, that the United States was preparing to pull out. When the opposite occurred, this alone shifted the dynamic. As the Fadhils report, "Commanders and lieutenants of various militant groups abandoned their positions in Baghdad and in some cases fled the country." The most prominent leader to go into hiding has been Moqtada al-Sadr. His Mahdi Army has been instructed to avoid clashes with American and Iraqi forces, even as coalition forces begin to establish themselves in the once off-limits Sadr City. Before the arrival of Gen. David Petraeus, the Army's leading counterinsurgency strategist, U.S. forces tended to raid insurgent and terrorist strongholds and then pull back and hand over the areas to Iraqi forces, who failed to hold them. The Fadhils report, "One difference between this and earlier -- failed -attempts to secure Baghdad is the willingness of the Iraqi and U.S. governments to commit enough resources for enough time to make it work." In the past, bursts of American activity were followed by withdrawal and a return of the insurgents. Now, the plan to secure Baghdad "is becoming stricter and gaining momentum by the day as more troops pour into the city, allowing for a better implementation of the 'clear and hold' strategy." Baghdadis "always want the 'hold' part to materialize, and feel safe when they go out and find the Army and police maintaining their posts -- the bad guys can't intimidate as long as the troops are staying." A greater sense of confidence produces many benefits. The number of security tips about insurgents that Iraqi civilians provide has jumped sharply. Stores and marketplaces are reopening in Baghdad, increasing the sense of community. People dislocated by sectarian violence are returning to their homes. As a result, "many Baghdadis feel hopeful again about the future, and the fear of civil war is slowly being replaced by optimism that peace might one day return to this city," the Fadhils report. "This change in mood is something huge by itself." Apparently some American journalists see the difference. NBC's Brian Williams recently reported a dramatic change in Ramadi since his previous visit. The city was safer; the airport more secure. The new American strategy of "getting out, decentralizing, going into the neighborhoods, grabbing a toehold, telling the enemy we're here, start talking to the locals -- that is having an obvious and palpable effect." U.S. soldiers forged agreements with local religious leaders and pushed alQaeda back -- a trend other observers have noted in some Sunni-dominated areas. The result, Williams said, is that "the war has changed." It is no coincidence that as the mood and the reality have shifted, political currents have shifted as well. A national agreement on sharing oil revenue appears on its way to approval. The Interior Ministry has been purged of corrupt officials and of many suspected of torture and brutality. And cracks are appearing in the Shiite governing coalition -- a good sign, given that the rock-solid unity was both the product and cause of growing sectarian violence. There is still violence, as Sunni insurgents and alQaeda seek to prove that the surge is not working. However, they are striking at more vulnerable targets in the provinces. Violence is down in Baghdad. As for Sadr and the Mahdi Army, it is possible they may reemerge as a problem later. But trying to wait out the American and Iraqi effort may be hazardous if the public becomes less tolerant of their violence. It could not be comforting to Sadr or al-Qaeda to read in the New York Times that the United States plans to keep higher force levels in Iraq through at least the beginning of 2008. The only good news for them would be if the Bush administration in its infinite wisdom starts to talk again about drawing down forces.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

18 Hegemony

Hard Power Up – Generic (1/2)
American hard power is absolute. Shapiro 8 (Robert J, Sonecon LLC co-founder, 6/12, http://www.theglobalist.com/storyid.aspx?StoryId=7049)
The core business of geopolitics is national security — and the other critical geopolitical fact about U.S. economic dominance is that it will indefinitely finance America’s position as the world’s sole military superpower. America’s historically anomalous position as a sole superpower will fundamentally shape a new geopolitics for at least the next generation superpower. In 2006, the United States spent about $570 billion on defense, or roughly as much as the rest of the world combined. This asymmetry in military spending is also historically unprecedented. In fact, the U.S. military spends more on research and development into new defense systems — some $73 billion in 2007 — than the entire defense budgets of every other country except China. All this spending has bought the United States its remarkable military dominance as the first military superpower in more than a millennium with no near peer in sight. Other nations have armies, air forces and navies capable of protecting their borders from just about anyone else. Projecting worldwide With some considerable lead time, a few of them could send their soldiers, sailors and pilots to fight in other countries in their own regions. But the United States alone has a blue-water navy capable of operating in and across the world’s vast oceans — and a blue-sky air force that with little notice can project forces any where from U.S. bases and those around the world. When they arrive, they wield technologies at least two generations more advanced than anyone else’s, including China, Britain and Russia. Geographical advantage These forces can prevent others from using their own militaries beyond their own borders and — as Saddam Hussein learned — no government can survive for long against their serious assault. Much of the world now embraces the United States' basic approach to organizing economies and doing business serious assault. Geography reinforces America’s awesome military advantages. The United States is the only country with thousands of miles of ocean separating it from anyone else with an army, navy or air force to speak of. And the oceans and the air space above them and above every other country are part of America’s military territory, since only its navy and air force can roam them freely. Most wars begin in conflicts that in some way arise out of geographical proximity — and even today, the proximity of Russia, China and India, for example, will make it harder for them to work together to balance America’s military advantages.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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19 Hegemony

Hard Power Up – Generic (2/2)
American hard power is the greatest in history – surge proves.
There are lessons to be learned from the dazzling success of the surge strategy in Iraq. Lesson one is that just about no mission is impossible for the United States military. A year ago it was widely thought, not just by the new Democratic leaders in Congress but also in many parts of the Pentagon, that containing the violence in Iraq was impossible. Now we have seen it done. We have seen this before in American history. George Washington's forces seemed on the brink of defeat many times in the agonizing years before Yorktown. Abraham Lincoln's generals seemed so unsuccessful in the Civil War that in August 1864 it was widely believed he would be defeated for re-election. But finally Lincoln found the right generals. Sherman took Atlanta and marched to the sea; Grant pressed forward in Virginia. Franklin Roosevelt picked the right generals and admirals from the start in World War II, but the first years of the war were filled with errors and mistakes. Even Vietnam is not necessarily a counterexample. As Lewis Sorley argues persuasively in "A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam," Gen. Creighton Abrams came up with a winning strategy by 1972. South Vietnam fell three years later when the North Vietnamese army attacked en masse, and Congress refused to allow the aid the U.S. had promised. George W. Bush, like Lincoln, took his time finding the right generals. But it's clear now that the forward-moving surge strategy devised by Gens. David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno has succeeded where the stand-aside strategy employed by their predecessors failed. American troops are surely the most capable military force in history. They just need to be given the right orders.

The US has supremacy in hard power – military technology. CAAT 8 (6/20, www.caat.org.uk/publications/economics/MakingArmsExec.php - 30k -)
A hierarchy of production exists, with the United States maintaining clear supremacy in first-tier sophisticated military platforms based on its massive procurement and R&D programmes, including the most advanced fighter aircraft and weapons such as satellite-guided missiles. This ensures its domination of the global arms trade and provides a form of technological leverage with client states to gain support for its over-arching strategic goals. Second-tier suppliers include the UK, France, and Russia offer other large platforms and weapons but with lesser capabilities. However, there are emerging nations including South Africa, South Korea, Brazil and India that have used their role as subcontractors in the international structure to modernise their own manufacturing capacity and now seek to challenge existing second-tier suppliers in their export markets. Below this is a much larger group of countries supplying basic, mass-produced weapons including sub-machine guns and rifles.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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20 Hegemony

US Unilateralism Up
US has no problem acting unilaterally, even in the face of opposition Reuters 8 (6/30, http://uk.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=UKN3042615120080630)
The Bush administration is pressing for U.N. sanctions against Zimbabwe but also may act unilaterally against the government of President Robert Mugabe following his re-election last week in a vote denounced as unfair, the White House said on Monday. "We don't believe that the Mugabe regime is a legitimate government," White House spokeswoman Dana Perino said. "We think that because they ran a sham election last week in which they intimidated every voter who would have voted against Mugabe." Mugabe was re-elected in a vote condemned as violent and unfair by monitors. U.S. President George W. Bush denounced the vote on Saturday and ordered the secretaries of State and Treasury to develop sanctions against Mugabe's government. A sanctions resolution being circulated by the United States at the United Nations on Monday called for an arms embargo against Zimbabwe as well as a freeze on the assets of individuals and firms. "We will press for strong action by the United Nations but we could also act unilaterally," Perino said. "It could come in multiple ways. Obviously, sanctions work best when there are multiple parties working in concert, like we are with the European Union when it comes to getting Iran to halt its uranium enrichment." Asked what the United States hoped to accomplish with sanctions, Perino said: "What we would like is for people first and foremost to feel safe in their own country, to let their voices be heard. I know that down in the area there is conversation about a possible power-sharing agreement." African leaders are pushing Mugabe to open talks with the opposition led by Morgan Tsvangirai on a transitional government.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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21 Hegemony

US Soft Power Up
US soft power high, and will continue with new president Fullilove 8 (Michael, Director of the global issues program at the Lowy Institute, Visiting fellow at the Brookings
Institution, 6/17, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/06/17/opinion/edfullilove.php) In terms of soft power, too - the ability to get others to want what you want - the case for America's decline is easily overstated. America retains its hold on the world's imagination. For most nonAmericans around the world, America's politics are, at some level, our politics as well. Why is the world so interested? America's bulk is only part of the answer. Ultimately, it is not really the size of the U.S. economy that draws our attention. It is not even America's blue-water navy or its new bunkerbusting munitions. Rather, it is the idea of America which continues to fascinate: a superpower that is open, democratic, meritocratic and optimistic; a country that is the cockpit of global culture; a polity in which all candidates for public office, whether or not they are a Clinton, seem to come from a place called Hope. It's worth noting that the declinist canon has emerged at the nadir of the Bush years; America's soft power account will look much healthier the instant the next president is inaugurated.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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22 Hegemony

US Soft Power Up – Asia
US Soft power with Asian countries highest in 10 years Chicago Council on Global Affairs 8 (6/18, http://www.epicos.com/epicos/portal/mediatype/html/user/anon/page/default.psml/js_panename/News+Information+Article+View;jsessionid=9C89C76560E5E 50DC787AA67D8E3A9ED.tomcat5?articleid=106756&showfull=false) The report, which is based on public opinion surveys in five East and Southeast Asian countries and the United States, reveals that perceptions of China's "soft power" - the ability to wield influence by indirect, non-military means - generally trail those of the United States and Japan. These perceptions persist despite China's strong economic relationships in Asia and around the world, and
concerted efforts by Beijing to leverage the Olympic Games to bolster its public image. But, at the same time, sizeable majorities in all the countries surveyed agreed that hosting the games will ultimately increase China's prestige. "The findings of this report clearly illustrate that China is recognized by its neighbors as the undisputed future leader of Asia, but it still has real work to do to win hearts and minds in the region. To enhance its credibility in Asia, China will need to invest more resources in building up its soft power, especially in

The report also reveals that contrary to other polls taken since the United States invaded Iraq which reflected negative views of the United States, a majority of Asians in the surveyed countries still admire the United States on many fronts, including economic, diplomatic, cultural and educational, and see its military presence in Asia as a stabilizing force, notably preventing an arms race between China and Japan. "Considering negative perceptions of the United States elsewhere in the world, it was somewhat surprising to see such strongly positive feelings about the United States among the Asian countries we surveyed," said Christopher Whitney, executive director for studies at The Chicago Council. "It is clear that the United States still has a strong foundation upon which to build in the region." Another unexpected finding of the report focuses on the complex relationship between the United States and China. American feelings towards China have
the diplomatic, social and cultural spheres," said Marshall M. Bouton, president of The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. deteriorated since similar surveys were taken by The Chicago Council in '04 and '06 and a significant number of those questioned expressed general unease about the future of the

Chinese perceptions of the United States have grown noticeably warmer compared to the 2006 survey and Chinese demonstrate consistently positive attitudes towards U.S. influence in Asia. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and EAI conducted more than 6,000 interviews in China, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and the United States in January and February 2008, before the
relationship. In contrast, unrest in Tibet and the Sichuan earthquake placed a spotlight on events inside China. The survey asked between 40 and 60 questions in each country designed to gauge how citizens of these five Asian nations and the United States view each country's popular culture, commercial prowess and brands, intellectual influence and appeal, universities, diplomatic reputations, different political systems, and more. The results were organized to produce indexes of the pillars of soft power: economic, cultural, human capital, diplomatic and political. The five indexes were averaged to produce an overall Soft Power Index. Change was measured on a few key questions that were also asked in a 2006 Chicago Council survey. Among the key findings: On China: -- Majorities or pluralities in every country are at least "somewhat worried" that China could become a military threat to their country in the future (Vietnamese were not asked this question). -- China trails the United States in perceptions of its diplomatic, political, and human capital power in Asia, though perceptions are more positive in Southeast Asia than East Asia. China is also seen as less effective than the United States in promoting its policies to people in Asia by all surveyed publics -- On the question of whether China builds trust and cooperation among Asian countries, it receives low ratings on a 0-10 scale from Americans (3.5), Japanese (4.6) and South Koreans (4.9), ranking China third or fourth among the group -- But when asked whether China will increase its prestige by hosting the 2008 Summer Olympics pluralities or majorities in all

The United States ranks at or near the top of every category in the Soft Power Index. -- Pluralities or majorities in China (44%), Japan (47%), South Korea (42%) and Indonesia (58%) all agree that U.S. influence in Asia has increased over the last 10 years. Majorities in China, Japan, Vietnam and South Korea see overall U.S. influence and
countries surveyed - U.S. (49%), China (86%), Japan (56%), South Korea (82%), Indonesia (65%) and Vietnam (85%) - agree that it would. On the United States: -U.S. cultural influence in Asia as positive. -- The United States is given the highest mean score for importance as a trade and investment partner by South Koreans (8.5 on a 0-10 scale), Japanese (8.0) and Vietnamese (8.0). Chinese give both the United States and the EU the same score (7.6), significantly ahead of Japan (6.7) and South Korea (6.8).

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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23 Hegemony

Soft Power Up – A2: Unilateralism/Bush
Asia proves leadership is high despite Bush policy and credibility loss. Tama 8 (Jordan, Princeton IR prof., 6/24, http://blog.psaonline.org/2008/06/24/declarations-of-american-decline-are-premature/)
The Bush administration’s unilateralism and incompetence, typified by its reckless invasion of Iraq, have damaged perceptions of the United States in much of the world. By many accounts, China has taken advantage of this lapse in U.S. leadership by bolstering its own influence across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. But a new study of perceptions in Asia suggests that favorable opinions of the U.S. will outlast the Bush years and that China still has a long way to go before it can match America’s soft power. This offers grounds for optimism that forecasts of America’s global decline are premature and that a new U.S. president with a more multilateral foreign policy will find many overseas partners who seek and support his leadership. The new study is a survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the East Asia Institute of more than 6,000 people in China, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and the United States. The survey, conducted before this year’s unrest in Tibet and the devastating Sichuan earthquake, asked ordinary citizens questions about how they view each country’s culture, economy, politics, and influence. The findings are striking: majorities in every country except Indonesia see U.S. influence in Asia as positive, and Asians have more positive perceptions of America’s diplomatic, political, and human capital power than they do of China’s. Even Chinese views of America’s soft power are quite favorable: 44% of Chinese would pick the U.S. as their first choice for their children’s higher education. What’s more, pluralities or majorities in most countries state that U.S. influence in Asia has increased over the last 10 years. All of this suggests that, despite the many failings of the Bush administration’s foreign policy, the underpinnings of America’s standing in Asia remain strong.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

24 Hegemony

Soft Power Up – A2: China (1/2)
China has low soft power – 2 reasons: 1) China has hard work to do till it gains soft power 2) The U.S. will always dominate China in soft power US Newswire 8 [Washington, China Lags Behind U.S. in Using Non-Military 'Soft Power' to Gain Influence in Asia,
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS152332+17-Jun-2008+PRN20080617, June 17, 2008]

"The findings of this report clearly illustrate that China is recognized by its neighbors as the undisputed future leader of Asia, but it still has real work to do to win hearts and minds in the region. To enhance its credibility in Asia, China will need to invest more resources in building up its soft power, especially in the diplomatic, social and cultural spheres," said Marshall M. Bouton, president of The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The report also reveals that contrary to other polls taken since the United States invaded Iraq which reflected negative views of the United States, a majority of Asians in the surveyed countries still admire the United States on many fronts, including economic, diplomatic, cultural and educational, and see its military presence in Asia as a stabilizing force, notably preventing an arms race between China and Japan. "Considering negative perceptions of the United States elsewhere in the world, it was somewhat surprising to see such strongly positive feelings about the United States among the Asian countries we surveyed," said Christopher Whitney, executive director for studies at The Chicago Council. "It is clear that the United States still has a strong foundation upon which to build in the region." Another unexpected finding of the report focuses on the complex relationship between the United States and China. American feelings towards China have deteriorated since similar surveys were taken by The Chicago Council in '04 and '06 and a significant number of those questioned expressed general unease about the future of the relationship. In contrast, Chinese perceptions of the United States have grown noticeably warmer compared to the 2006 survey and Chinese demonstrate consistently positive attitudes towards U.S. influence in Asia. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and EAI conducted more than 6,000 interviews in China, Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and the United States in January and February 2008, before the unrest in Tibet and the Sichuan earthquake placed a spotlight on events inside China. The survey asked between 40 and 60 questions in each country designed to gauge how citizens of these five Asian nations and the United States view each country's popular culture, commercial prowess and brands, intellectual influence and appeal, universities, diplomatic reputations, different political systems, and more. The results were organized to produce indexes of the pillars of soft power: economic, cultural, human capital, diplomatic and political. The five indexes were averaged to produce an overall Soft Power Index. Change was measured on a few key questions that were also asked in a 2006 Chicago Council survey. Among the key findings: On China: -- Majorities or pluralities in every country are at least "somewhat worried" that China could become a military threat to their country in the future (Vietnamese were not asked this question). -- China trails the United States in perceptions of its diplomatic, political, and human capital power in Asia, though perceptions are more positive in Southeast Asia than East Asia. China is also seen as less effective than the United States in promoting its policies to people in Asia by all surveyed publics

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

25 Hegemony

Soft Power Up – A2: China (2/2)
China doesn’t have the ability to improve soft power – Its own citizens even admire other countries more Parameswaran 8 [P, Writer for the China Post, China's soft power trails U.S., Japan in Asia,
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/asia/regional%20news/2008/06/18/161478/China's-soft.htm, June 18, 2008] The United States in particular remains highly regarded in all five key areas of soft power addressed in the survey: economics, culture, human capital, diplomacy, and politics, said the report by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the East Asia Institute of South Korea. "China's growing economic and military might have not yet been fully translated into the elements of soft power that help a nation wield indirect influence in its region and the world," said the report based on public opinion surveys in Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, China and the United States. It revealed that perceptions of China's soft power -- the ability to wield influence by indirect, non-military means -- "generally trail those of the United States and Japan." These perceptions persist despite China's strong economic relationships in Asia and around the world, and concerted efforts by Beijing to leverage the upcoming summer Olympic Games to bolster its public image, the report said. "The findings of this report clearly illustrate that China is recognized by its neighbors as the undisputed future leader of Asia, but it still has real work to do to win hearts and minds in the region," said Marshall Bouton, president of The Chicago Council. "To enhance its credibility in Asia, China will need to invest more resources in building up its soft power, especially in the diplomatic, social and cultural spheres," he said. According to the poll, Americans, Chinese, Japanese, and Indonesians all believe that China has the greatest economic influence of any nation in Asia. South Koreans and Vietnamese see it trailing only the United States. More than 6,000 interviews were conducted in January and February 2008 during the survey in the six nations. It was held before the unrest in Tibet and the Sichuan earthquake placed a spotlight on events inside China. The report also said that contrary to other polls taken since the unpopular U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, a majority of Asians in the

surveyed countries still "admire" the United States on many fronts, including economic, diplomatic, cultural and educational. They see U.S. military presence in Asia as a stabilizing force, notably preventing an arms race between
China and Japan, it said. "Considering negative perceptions of the United States elsewhere in the world, it was somewhat surprising to see such strongly positive feelings about the United States among the Asian countries we surveyed," said Christopher Whitney, executive director for studies at The Chicago Council. "It is clear that the United States still has a strong foundation upon which to build in

the region," it said. Another "unexpected" finding showed that American feelings towards China had deteriorated since similar surveys were taken by The Chicago Council in 2004 and 2006.

It is 2016, and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20,000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan, as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar. Afghanistan is stable; Iran is nuclear. China has absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and, from the Pakistani port of Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea. The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa, Russia and the Caspian Sea, as well as substantial nuclear energy. America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline. Why? Weren’t we supposed to reconnect with the United Nations and reaffirm to the world that America can, and should, lead it to collective security and prosperity? Indeed, improvements to America’s image may or may not occur, but either way, they mean little. Condoleezza Rice has said America has no “permanent enemies,” but it has no permanent friends either. Many saw the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a global American imperialism; in fact, they were signs of imperial overstretch. Every expenditure has weakened America’s armed forces, and each assertion of power has awakened resistance in the form of terrorist networks, insurgent groups and “asymmetric” weapons like suicide bombers. America’s unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order. That new global order has arrived, and there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth.

America has lost its hegemony. Khanna 8 (Pagag, American Strategy Program sr. fellow, May,
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/here_comes_second_world_7069)

It is time to stop pretending that the US will stay on top until a clear rival emerges to directly challenge its pre-eminence. Look at its recent foreign policy record: failure in Iraq and Afghanistan, failure to eradicate al Qaeda or to create peace in Palestine, failure to advance global trade talks or to reconcile with Latin America -- the list goes on. The present caution on interventions and democratisation is motivated not by sudden enlightenment, but by the shock of failure. America is waking up to soft power and public diplomacy because hard power has failed and no alternative remains. Getting America's house in order won't happen on a single chilly inauguration day in January 2009. The state department is broken to an extent that outsiders fail to appreciate. And nobody seems to know how to restore American prestige. One would expect hard-headed guidance based on experience, observation and connections, yet instead one hears -- from ex-administration officials from the Clinton or Bush eras -- the platitudes of detached utopians. Grand acronyms for new multilateral institutions are proposed -ignoring the fact that even security council reform has not budged in over a decade. Massive civilian reserve corps are plotted -- while congress cuts the diplomatic budget by 10 per cent. These are proposals suited either to a world that no longer exists, or a country that no longer has the will or power to carry them out.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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28 Hegemony

Heg Low – Middle East
American hegemony is in decline – Middle East proves. CSIS 8 (Center for Strategic & International Studies, 3/17, www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0308_menc.pdf)
But something else has happened as well: regional allies treat the United States government with more circumspection and more wariness. At the same time that fewer hostile governments are trying to outmaneuver the United States in the Middle East, more friendly governments are proving resistant to U.S. requests. We have entered a new world in which we have far fewer enemies, but fewer close friends as well. Some of this was inevitable. For fifty years, countries gravitated to the United States because the United States provided protection from something they feared: British imperialism, Soviet expansion, aggressive neighbors, or some combination. The United States exercised a light hand in the region, preferring to dispatch businessmen rather than viceroys, and averting its eyes from the practice of domestic governance. The U.S. treasury was often full, and it was not hard to like the United States. U.S. standing in the Middle East grew at a time when governments felt their greatest threats came from beyond their borders. U.S. military support helped protect them and was welcomed. Now, the United States is able to offer far fewer protections from the things that governments most fear—internal threats against which a close U.S. relationship is more of a mixed blessing. Governments welcome the tools of U.S. counterterrorism— the communications inter- cepts, the paramilitary training, and the equipment—but they doubt the wisdom of the U.S. prescription of more open politics, respect for human rights, and the like. Many have the sense that the United States is dangerously naïve, no matter how well meaning it may be, with the rise of Hamas being a prime example. There is also fresh doubt about U.S. capabilities, partly stoked by the U.S. performance over five years in Iraq. Equally importantly, however, relatively friendly governments that defied U.S. political demands have survived unscathed. Egypt is an important example of this, although far from the only one. It learned that not only could it say “No” to the United States, but it didn’t even have to smile much when it did so. It is easy to chalk this up to a decline in American primacy. The faltering economy, the weakening dollar, and a military tied down in two wars in Southwest Asia all combine to undermine U.S. influence. Yet to do so would be to ignore how the United States remains a hugely influential force in the world. Its economy remains a towering presence, its military is awesome, and the nation’s productive capacity, innovation, ability to act, and overall mass remain far greater than any other country or collection of countries around the globe. American intellectual products— from science to entertainment—continue to set the pace for change from Mongolia to Chile and everywhere in between. Instead, the problem is that the United States is acting more often like a veteran athlete straining to perform the feats of his or her youth. It is not inevitable that U.S. influence will decline in the Middle East, as newer and more nimble actors—many of them not representing states at all—come to the fore. For all of their newness and nimbleness, few can challenge the United States in a serious way. But to maintain its influence, the United States must refocus its energies in the Middle East to match its capabilities, and that those capabilities must be more closely attuned to the needs, desires and fears of potential partners in the region. The United States no longer leads the Free World, because there is no more Iron Curtain; the age in which the United States could act as if it enjoyed a monopoly on virtue is over. The world is more competitive, and governments have a more diverse set of fears and seek a more diverse set of benefits than ever before. Governments and their citizens have a wider array of relationships to choose from—China, Europe, and even Iran are all carving out their own niches—and those relationships are increasingly complex. In addition, the apparent intimacy of the Information Age projects the United States into people’s lives as never before and sharpens the focus on blemishes and positive attributes alike. Through all of this, the United States remains the standard by which all are measured. Widespread talk of U.S. decline is partly a consequence of Americans not understanding the scale of U.S. influence. Surely, a failure to appreciate what remains beyond the U.S. grasp will diminish U.S. power in the Middle East. At the same time, a failure to appreciate the magnitude of U.S. influence will handicap the United States as well. The twentieth century is over, and gone are its patterns of conflict, bloodshed, allegiance and leadership. The twenty first century has its own challenges. It would be a mistake to miss its opportunities.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

29 Hegemony

Heg Low – Economy
Hegemony low – foreign economic influences prove. CSIS Middle East Program 8 (3/26, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/080326_gulf_roundtable_summary.pdf.)
These concerns play into growing anxiety about the place of the United States in the world. Sharply increasing economic growth in the developing world, combined with slowing growth in the developed world means that U.S. primacy is declining. Although the traditional view is that most economies around the world depend on a healthy U.S. economy to prosper, many economists and businessmen see a possibility that the U.S. and world economy may no longer be so inextricably linked. On a more popular level, concerns that unscrupulous Chinese businessmen are trying to poison Americans while Arabs are trying to use their American dollars to undermine U.S. interests in the Middle East resonate strongly in some quarters.

Increased oil prices have stripped the US of its superpower status Klare 8 (Professor of Peace and World Security studies at Hampshire College, www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2008/05/12/russian_oil/)
Nineteen years ago, the fall of the Berlin Wall effectively eliminated the Soviet Union as the world's other superpower. Yes, the USSR as a political entity stumbled on for another two years, but it was clearly an exsuperpower from the moment it lost control over its satellites in Eastern Europe. Less than a month ago, the United States similarly lost its claim to superpower status when a barrel of crude oil roared past $110 on the international market, gasoline prices crossed the $3.50 threshold at American pumps, and diesel fuel topped $4. As was true of the USSR following the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the USA will no doubt continue to stumble on like the superpower it once was; but as the nation's economy continues to be eviscerated to pay for its daily oil fix, it, too, will be seen by increasing numbers of savvy observers as an ex-superpower in the making.

The self-deluding universalism of the American imperium — that the world inherently needs a single leader and that American liberal ideology must be accepted as the basis of global order — has paradoxically resulted in America quickly becoming an ever-lonelier superpower. Just as there is a geopolitical marketplace, there is a marketplace of models of success for the second world to emulate, not least the Chinese model of economic growth without political liberalization (itself an affront to Western modernization theory). As the historian Arnold Toynbee observed half a century ago, Western imperialism united the globe, but it did not assure that the West would dominate forever — materially or morally. Despite the “mirage of immortality” that afflicts global empires, the only reliable rule of history is its cycles of imperial rise and decline, and as Toynbee also pithily noted, the only direction to go from the apogee of power is down. The web of globalization now has three spiders. What makes America unique in this seemingly value-free contest is not its liberal democratic ideals — which Europe may now represent better than America does — but rather its geography. America is isolated, while Europe and China occupy two ends of the great Eurasian landmass that is the perennial center of gravity of geopolitics. When America dominated NATO and led a rigid Pacific alliance system with Japan, South Korea, Australia and Thailand, it successfully managed the Herculean task of running the world from one side of it. Now its very presence in Eurasia is tenuous; it has been shunned by the E.U. and Turkey, is unwelcome in much of the Middle East and has lost much of East Asia’s confidence. “Accidental empire” or not, America must quickly accept and adjust to this reality. Maintaining America’s empire can only get costlier in both blood and treasure. It isn’t worth it, and history promises the effort will fail. It already has.

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Heg Low – Asia
The US is losing influence in Asia. Overholt 8 (Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy and holds the center’s chair in Asia policy
research. “In Asia, U.S. Still Guards the Fort but Surrenders the Bank”) online: http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/spring2008/disoriented.html Paradoxically, Washington is greatly increasing its military power but sharply degrading its political influence. Throughout Asia, the talk is of declining U.S. influence. No one in Asia doubts that the United States is the world’s biggest military power, the world’s biggest economy, and the world’s greatest cultural influence, but it is seen as declining because it is preoccupied elsewhere, has weakened its relationships with key quasi-allies, has lost its image as a partner in nation-building, has tarnished its moral standing by its actions in Iraq, and has allowed its leverage through regional organizations other than the U.S.-Japan alliance to wither. The United States now finds itself torn between its increasing military reliance on the U.S.-Japan alliance and its increasing political and economic reliance on its relationship with China. The United States copes with the East Asian aspects of the war on terror, North Korea, regional crime, drug and human trafficking, and Southeast Asian instability primarily through a partnership with China. China’s more open economy is much more compatible with U.S. interests in free trade, freedom of investment, and modern agriculture than is Japan’s more closed economy. The tension between military-ideological alignments and politicaleconomic interests is increasingly severe, untenable, and prone to crisis.

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Heg Low – Latin America
American hegemony is over even in Latin America. CFR 8 (May, p. 5-7, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16279/)
For over 150 years, the Monroe Doctrine provided the guiding principles for U.S. policy toward Latin America, asserting U.S. primacy in the foreign affairs of the region. Over the past two decades, those principles have become increasingly obsolete. Washington’s basic policy framework, however, has not changed sufficiently to reflect the new reality. U.S. policy can no longer be based on the assumption that the United States is the most important outside actor in Latin America. If there was an era of U.S. hegemony in Latin America, it is over. In most respects, this shift reflects positive developments within Latin America itself. The region has undergone a historic transformation politically, with militaryauthoritarian rule giving way to vibrant, if imperfect, democracy in almost every nation. Economically, Latin America is now one of the more open market regions in the world and a crucial global provider of energy, minerals, and food. None of this is to say that Latin America has entirely overcome its history of political tumult or done enough to alleviate poverty, improve competitiveness and human capital, or correct extreme inequality. But it does mean that U.S. policymakers must change the way they think about the region. Latin America is not Washington’s to lose; nor is it Washington’s to save. Latin America’s fate is largely in Latin America’s hands. A failure to acknowledge how Latin Americans define their own challenges has created new political strains in recent years. It has also caused U.S. policymakers to overlook the ways in which the United States can meaningfully contribute to Latin America’s progress—furthering the United States’ own interests in the process. By truly beginning to engage Latin America on its own terms, Washington can mark the start of a new era in U.S.-Latin America relations. It is a cliche´ to bemoan Americans’ lack of interest in Latin America. Still, this disinterest remains vexing given the region’s proximity to the United States and the remarkable interconnectedness of U.S. and Latin American economies and societies. In recent years, as Washington’s attention has been focused on crises elsewhere in the world, the connec- tions have only deepened. From 1996 to 2006, total U.S. merchandise trade with Latin America grew by 139 percent, compared to 96 percent for Asia and 95 percent for the European Union (EU).1 In 2006, the United States exported $223 billion worth of goods to Latin American consumers (compared with $55 billion to China).2 Latin America is the United States’ most important external source of oil, accounting for nearly 30 percent of imports (compared with 20 percent from the Middle East), as well as its main source of illegal narcotics. And as a result of both conditions in Latin America and demand for workers in the United States, migration from the region has accelerated. Latinos now account for 15 percent of the U.S. population, nearly 50 percent of recent U.S. population growth, and a growing portion of the elector- ate—allowing Latino voters increasingly to shape the U.S. political agenda. Cross-border community and family ties, as well as the Spanish- language media, mean that Latin America remains part of many Latinos’ daily lives and concerns. For all of these reasons, Latin America’s well- being directly affects the United States. But even with such integration, the opening of Latin American economies and the globalization of Latin American societies means that U.S. policy is now but one of several competing factors capable of influencing the region. Latin American states, especially the larger ones, do not consider their interests to be primarily determined by diplomatic, trade, or security ties with the United States. Brazil has made inroads into groupings such as the South-South Dialogue with South Africa and India and the Group of 20 (G20), while countries such as Chile and Mexico have struck trade and investment agreements with the EU and a number of Asian countries, China most prominently. The economic and political diversification of Latin America is reflected in Latin American attitudes as well. Esteem for U.S. global and hemispheric leadership is at its lowest level in the region in recent memory. In 2002, according to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 82 percent of Venezuelans, 34 percent of Argentineans, and 51 percent of Bolivians had a favorable view of the United States; those numbers had fallen to 56, 16, and 43 percent by 2007. The percentage of Latin Americans who approved of U.S. ideas on democracy decreased from 45 percent in 2002 to 29 percent in 2007.3 This general distrust of the United States has allowed Presidents Hugo Cha´vez of Venezuela, Evo Morales of Bolivia, Rafael Correa of Ecuador, and even Felipe Caldero´ n of Mexico to bolster their domestic popular support by criticizing Washington. Most Latin Americans still prefer a mutually respectful and productive relationship with the United States, but the factors driving

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Latin America’s desire for greater independence are likely to shape the region’s posture toward the United States well into the future.

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Heg Low – Capabilities Gap
U.S. military capacity is at breaking point and growth is key to protecting national and domestic security interests Kagan 8 (Resident Scholar at AEI, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Story?id=3854313&page=2)
As the nation honors its veterans this week, including those who have served in Iraq, troubling questions loom large: Does the current size of the military meet our needs? Is America ready to face future conflicts? Experts say no. Military historian Frederick Kagan argues that while U.S. military superiority is unmatched, capacity is at the breaking point, jeopardizing both domestic and international security. The military needs to grow to ensure the nation is prepared to handle potential crises. "There should be little debate over the proper direction of change: both the Army and Marine Corps must grow, as fast as is practicable, for the foreseeable future," says Kagan. "Facing the dangerous world of the 21st century, the U.S. military is too small to meet current needs or expected contingencies," says defense expert Michael O'Hanlon. "Stretched almost to the breaking point in Iraq, the U.S. military now is patently unable to contemplate another war with anything less than horror." "A collapsed Pakistan ranks very high on the list of military scenarios that would threaten U.S. vital interests," says O'Hanlon. "Regime collapse in Pakistan, or regime change in Iran, easily could require an American commitment of 200,000-300,000 soldiers, as could various scenarios for conflict in Korea."

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Heg Low – Navy
The US Navy is on the brink of collapse. Tastad 8 (Douglas T, Fulbright US Student Fellow, p. 19-20, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i50.htm)
The current state of America’s maritime industry is bleak, and its malaise is negatively impacting the Navy. The lack of American flagged shipping means that the Navy’s core function of keeping sea lines open has lost some of its legitimacy, if not relevance. Worse, America is now reliant on foreign operators to carry military cargo. On the shipbuilding side, our large-scale industry has deteriorated to the point that it is no longer commercially self-sustaining. Even the lucrative Navy contracts, now accounting for the vast majority of the industry’s revenue, may soon fail to convince yard owners and many of the last remaining component suppliers to stay in business. Ship construction, component production, and ship registration have now almost completely moved overseas. Foreign firms are leveraging their dominance at sea and in the shipbuilding arena to assume control of shoreside operations in the United States. Unfortunately, even in the midst of this decline, entrenched American interests in both the shipping and shipbuilding industries seem more concerned with defending their slice of the status quo than seeking the bold initiatives to reverse the trend. The largest U.S. employer of merchant seaman is no longer a U.S. shipping company; it is the Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC). In fact, this command nearly outstrips the next largest employer by an order of magnitude. With precious few American commercial vessels plying the oceans today, those civilian mariners who choose to remain employed at sea are increasingly obliged to work for MSC, with a few maintaining Maritime Administration (MARAD) reserve vessels. MSC operates 115 ships while MARAD holds an additional 49.7 When combined, these figures nearly rival the total privately owned fleet (see table 2).

Haass ‘8 (President of Council of Foreign Relations) online: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/683c4bb6-0b4c-11dd8ccf-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1 The unipolar era, a time of unprecedented American dominion, is over. It lasted some two decades, little more than a moment in historical terms. Why did it end? One explanation is history. States get better at generating and piecing together the human, financial and technological resources that lead to productivity and prosperity. The same holds for companies and other organisations. The rise of new powers cannot be stopped. The result is an ever larger number of actors able to exert influence regionally or globally. It is not that the US has grown weaker, but that many other entities have grown much stronger. A second reason unipolarity has ended is US policy. By both what it has done and what it has failed to do, the US has accelerated the emergence of new power centres and has weakened its own position relative to them.

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Heg Low – Iraq
Failed War in Iraq has drastically decreased U.S. heg Haass ‘8 (President of Council of Foreign Relations) online: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/683c4bb6-0b4c-11dd8ccf-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1 US economic policy has played a role as well. President George W. Bush has fought costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, allowed discretionary spending to increase by 8 per cent a year and cut taxes. The US fiscal position declined from a surplus of more than $100bn in 2001 to an estimated deficit of about $250bn in 2007. The ballooning current account deficit is now more than 6 per cent of gross domestic product. This places downward pressure on the dollar, stimulates inflation and contributes to the accumulation of wealth and power elsewhere in the world. Poor regulation of the US mortgage market and the credit crisis it spawned have exacerbated these problems. Iraq has also contributed to the dilution of American primacy. The conflict has proved to be an expensive war of choice - militarily, economically and diplomatically, as well as in human terms. Years ago, the historian Paul Kennedy outlined his thesis about "imperial overstretch", which posited that the US would eventually decline by overreaching, just as other great powers had. Prof Kennedy's theory turned out to apply most immediately to the Soviet Union, but the US - for all its corrective mechanisms and dynamism - has not proved to be immune.

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Hard Power Low
American hard power is insufficient. Herrly 8 (Peter, retired army col., 2/11, www.supportscoursenligne.sciences-po.fr/2007_2008/scpo_lse/plan.pdf -)
Since September 11th 2001, this military has been engaged in a conflict which the Americans call the Global War on Terrorism. This conflict had already stretched thin the American military – much of which had evolved to deter the Soviet Union. The conflict in Iraq since March 2003 has brought American military power into sharp focus and deep controversy. A high-technology force seemingly unrivaled in its ability to project conventional force has (like many other powers before it) encountered enormous difficulties in facing insurgent warfare. The viability of the U.S. Armed Forces, so painstakingly rebuilt after the Vietnam War, is at great risk. By any measure, an astounding turnaround, from toppling the statue of Saddam Hussein to the grim news from Iraq, and even Afghanistan. Though these issues are by no means decided, they beg a careful and considered analysis. Besides considering the crucial questions of why and how the current situations in Iraq and Afghanistan have evolved – with special consideration as to the causes and impact of the current “Surge” -- the questions which ought to be at the center of an inquiry into the nature and prospects of the U.S. Armed Forces are numerous. What are the sources of America’s military power? What drives its budgetary size and constraints? In what direction is the so-called Transformation of this military moving, and what are the prospects for success? What of the reported abuses concerning the treatment of prisoners, as symbolized by the images from the Abu Ghraib prison – are they symptom of the stresses of a war longer and harder than expected with its strains on leadership and reserve forces thrust into roles for which they were not prepared? Or do they reflect a systemic corruption of American values and are harbingers of a military increasingly too powerful and dominant?

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Readiness Low – Iraq/Afghanistan
Iraq, Afghanistan have devastated readiness. Huffington Post 8 (2/8, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/02/08/war-demands-strain-us-mil_n_85797.html)
WASHINGTON — A classified Pentagon assessment concludes that long battlefield tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with persistent terrorist activity and other threats, have prevented the U.S. military from improving its ability to respond to any new crisis, The Associated Press has learned. Despite security gains in Iraq, there is still a "significant" risk that the strained U.S. military cannot quickly and fully respond to another outbreak elsewhere in the world, according to the report. Last year the Pentagon raised that threat risk from "moderate" to "significant." This year, the report will maintain that "significant" risk level _ pointing to the U.S. military's ongoing struggle against a stubborn insurgency in Iraq and its lead role in the NATO-led war in Afghanistan. The Pentagon, however, will say that efforts to increase the size of the military, replace equipment and bolster partnerships overseas will help lower the risk over time, defense officials said Friday. They spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the classified report. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has completed the risk assessment, and it is expected to be delivered to Capitol Hill this month. Because he has concluded the risk is significant, his report will include a letter from Defense Secretary Robert Gates outlining steps the Pentagon is taking to reduce it. The risk level was raised to significant last year by Mullen's predecessor, Marine Gen. Peter Pace. On Capitol Hill this week, Mullen provided a glimpse into his thinking on the review. And Pentagon officials Friday confirmed that the assessment is finished and acknowledged some of the factors Gates will cite in his letter. "The risk has basically stayed consistent, stayed steady," Mullen told the House Armed Services Committee. "It is significant." He said the 15-month tours in Iraq and Afghanistan are too long and must be reduced to 12 months, with longer rest periods at home. "We continue to build risk with respect to that," he said. Other key national security challenges include threats from countries that possess weapons of mass destruction, as well as the need to replace equipment worn out and destroyed during more than six years of war.

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Readiness Low – Overstretch
U.S. military is overstretched now making inadequate to face current demands O’Halon 7 (Director of Research, 21st Century Defense Initiative. Director, “Opportunity 08: Independent Ideas
for Our Next President”) online: http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/0228defense_kagan_Opp08.asp Facing the dangerous world of the 21st century, the U.S. military is too small to meet current needs or expected contingencies. After opposing force increases for many years, the Administration, through the new Secretary of Defense, proposed in January 2007 a combined increase in active-duty soldiers and Marines of some 65,000 above current levels. Even greater increases in the size of the ground forces may be prudent. Highly plausible scenarios involving Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other large countries (such as Indonesia, Congo, and Nigeria) illustrate the need to provide the next President with the capacity to muster large new forces without delay. This growth should occur without a return to a military draft, which would be impractical in terms of numbers and counterproductive in terms of maintaining personnel quality. Additionally, investments in technologies are needed, in order to replace outmoded systems and to maintain our military’s edge. Some savings can be achieved, but, in general, overall requirements portend a substantial increase in the defense budget over several years. Context There is a rational need to worry about America’s security in a fiery world. Today, war is common and ongoing; tomorrow, additional conflicts are quite possible. Consider, for example, the Iranian government’s repeated rejection of international demands to stop enriching uranium. What will happen if a U.S. or Israeli government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? One need not consider the military option the best or most likely instrument of American policy in this setting to recognize the possibility that it may be used—and that the plausible capacity to threaten its use may be critical for achieving a viable policy outcome. North Korea, of course, has crossed the nuclear threshold already, creating significant regional ripples. Although in the background for now, Sino-Taiwanese tensions remain serious, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Venezuela and the United States, and others. Key countries like Pakistan and Indonesia also continue to struggle with possible challenges to their internal cohesion.

U.S. military is currently overstretched and lacks capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan O’Hanlon 7 (Director of Research, 21st Century Defense Initiative. Director, “Opportunity 08: Independent Ideas
for Our Next President”) online: http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/0228defense_kagan_Opp08.aspx The U.S. military now suffers from the greatest strain it has encountered since conscription ended in 1973. Soldiers and Marines are deploying for their third tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, and historical evidence suggests that the third tour seriously erodes morale and reenlistment rates. We must anticipate the possibility that our remarkable men and women in uniform at some point will begin to crack, despite the resilience and dedication they have shown to date. Many analysts believe that even multiple redeployments are not providing enough boots on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, in neither country have U.S. forces been able to provide security to the citizenry, an essential precondition for successful counter-insurgency operations. The new “surge strategy” that one of the authors (Kagan) has advocated (and the other has supported, at least on a provisional basis) will strain the force further.

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US Soft Power Low (1/2)
US Soft power has been in decline since 1995 Nye and Armitage 7 (CSIS Commission on Smarter Power, Joseph, PhD in political science from Harvard,
Richard, President Armitage International, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf) Recent U.S. administrations have struggled to get public diplomacy right. More than public relations, effective public diplomacy moves both people and information and helps provide insight into the policies and values of the United States. It also improves Americans’ awareness and understanding of the world beyond our shores. Despite past successes during the Cold War, many U.S. decision makers dismiss public diplomacy as ineffective or as mere propaganda. Although a number of independent commissions have criticized the U.S. government for problems implementing public diplomacy, it remains a critical part of U.S. smart power. Much of the current debate over revitalizing public diplomacy efforts has centered on institutional arrangements and resource levels. It is a well-known story by now that during the Cold War, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) undertook public diplomacy and helped to shape public opinion behind the Iron Curtain. In the Cold War’s aftermath, however, the United States essentially demobilized its public diplomacy efforts as part of a budget-cutting “peace dividend.” Beginning in 1995, Congress drastically cut funding for the activities of the USIA, which the Clinton administration eventually merged into the State Department in 1999.

US soft power falling rapidly, with European countries taking over Hockenos 8 (Paul, 6/19, http://www.alternet.org/story/87828/)
In Europe, as in nearly everywhere else in the world, the image of the United States has taken a severe battering during the Bush years. Survey after survey shows that negative feelings toward America and U.S. policies have soared. Only 36 percent of Europeans, for example, view U.S. leadership in world affairs as desirable, according to a 2007 German Marshall Fund poll. Markedly lower is their approval of the Bush administration: a dismal 17 percent. In Harris polls since 2003, the majority of Europeans have even cited the United States as the greatest threat to international security -- more so than Iran, North Korea or Russia. But distinguishing between an all-encompassing animus toward the country and its people, and legitimate criticism of U.S. government policies, has proven extremely difficult. Only the former is anti-Americanism -- an irrational, deeply embedded cultural aversion to a presumed American “national character.” A standard distinction between America-bashing and rational critique is between disapproval of what America is and what America does. Yet they inevitably blur into one another: After all, what one is informs what one does, and vice versa. The Bush administration attributed the opposition of France and Germany to the Iraq War as a blunt expression of anti-Americanism. Even some left-of-center intellectuals, such as University of Michigan political scientist Andrei Markovits, claim that a virulent anti-Americanism is currently sweeping Europe -- worse even than that during the Vietnam War or during the 1980s, when the United States deployed nuclear missiles in Western Europe. However, the range of European issues with the United States is not wanton America-trashing but conflicting visions of how to organize society and conduct relations in the wider world. In the European Union (E.U.), citizens are voicing a preference for a greater European role in global affairs, with Germans (87 percent) and Spaniards (81 percent) at the top. As Jeremy Rifkin put it in his 2004 book, The European Dream, Europe’s vision for the future has replaced that of the American dream.

Events such as the abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have undermined the attractiveness of American values, since that is based in part on international perceptions of the US as a humane and law- abiding nation. The leading candidates in the US presidential elections well realise that. The strongly pro-American William Hague MP, the Conservative spokesman on foreign affairs, told the Daily Telegraph on 23 February: 'Certainly America does need to restore its moral authority in the world and be a great advert for democracy. An Obama-McCain campaign will be that'. While the US continues to rely on hard power, other nations have suc- cessfully used soft power to improve their global position. Polls taken in 2005 report that a large majority of nations believe Europe and China play more positive roles in the world than does America, indicating America's declining popularity. For example, a 2005 poll by the Lowy Institute reported that just over half of Australians polled had a positive view of the US, but, paradoxically, that around the same number saw the foreign policies of the US as a potential threat equivalent to the same number of Australians who worried about the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. It should be remembered that Australia assisted the US with troops in Iraq. Even in the UK, the US's closest ally, there has been a growing popular sentiment against the hard power of the Bush Administration. Polls taken in other nations suggest similar anti-American sentiment. A poll by the Pew Charitable Trust reported that the attractiveness of the US decreased significantly between 2001 and 2003 in 19 of 27 countries sampled.'^' Gallup International polls report that, for the majority of people in 29 countries, US policies have had a negative impact on their opinion of the US.i'°

US is not exercising soft power Coulthart 8 (Stephen, Graduate student studying diplomacy and international affairs at the Whitehead School of
Diplomacy, 6/28, http://dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=14663)
The event comes as a reminder of the limits of American military might, or "hard power". Indeed, the US easily toppled the Iraqi regime in days but it failed to win the peace after the

it is clear that the US must place greater emphasis on soft power than ever before. But what is soft power? The term can be traced back to Joseph Nye who defines it as a country's "power of attraction" and influence "that is associated with [it's] ideas,
conventional conflict ended. As a result, cultures, and policies". Many point to soft power as the main reason the US outlasted the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Certainly this historical event was accompanied in part by

Today, soft power proponents are saying we can take these historic lessons and apply them to the challenge of violent religious extremism. Unfortunately however, the US government has done very little to utilize the soft power dynamic, relegating the model to the domain of NGOs and non-profit organizations. Further, there are several indicators that the US is missing out on key soft power opportunities; Americans are going abroad less and the rules governing foreign student visas are elastic and frequently change, making it difficult for them to enter the US. These students act as goodwill ambassadors between countries, and this decline suggests that Americans are paying less attention to the world and becoming disengaged. Ultimately this leads to a lack of communication and encourages policymakers to fall back on hard power measures. But what can be done? In the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami in Asia we saw an example of how the US government can use
hard power: the US built up a formidable defensive shield to counter the Soviets, but ultimately it was not violent combat that led to the current detente. its existing infrastructure, personnel and equipment to provide humanitarian aid, an example of soft power. So successful was the aid mission in the Indian Ocean that Robert Kaplan stated," [the US disaster relief forces] probably did more to improve America's image in Asia than any conventional training deployment". The US needs to look outside of the "military might" box when it comes to foreign engagement. Warfare is no longer the straightforward task of prior ages but a delicate affair that should only be used in the direst circumstances. Interestingly, some of the backers of this idea are coming from the most unlikely of places: the military. Former NATO general Rupert Smith has stated the war has moved from the battlefields to amongst the people. Indeed civilians now suffer more than ever before in war: in World War I approximately 10% of all deaths were civilian while in

Now that the battle is moving amongst the people, the US government must take an active lead in developing soft power approaches to mitigate conflict.
modern conflicts, such as in Iraq, civilian causalities account for 90% of all fatalities.

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US Unilateralism Low
Bush’s unilateralism falling now Cyr 8 (Arthur I, 6/30,
http://www.zwire.com/site/printerFriendly.cfm?brd=1697&dept_id=662724&newsid=19816224) The confident cowboy unilateralism of his first few years in the White House, including declarations that other nations were 'either for us or against us', has disappeared. The White House foreign policy message now is that relations with European nations have improved considerably, indicating by implication that alliances matter after all. This White House shift has significance reaching well beyond Europe. South Korean President Kim Dae Jung made a special effort to ensure he was the first foreign head of government to visit the newly inaugurated American president early in 2001. For his trouble, he
was publicly scolded by Bush for being too accommodating to North Korea. By contrast, the Bush administration now actively encourages diplomatic initiatives regarding limitation of North Korea's nuclear capacity, and the preferred means has been the six-party talks that include China, Japan and Russia along with the U.S. and South Korea. Iran and North

Bush has chosen to give priority to collective diplomacy over unilateral military action. Emphasis on acting with allies spreads the burdens and costs involved, and provides a useful practical test of the advisability of proposed actions. This point applies very directly to our European allies in the context of NATO. Refusal of the alliance as a whole to join the United States in the 2003 invasion of Iraq
Korea represent particularly dangerous nuclear flash points on the globe. Whatever the specific differences between these two cases, in each was an early warning that the Bush administration was cavalierly underestimating the task.

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Heg Up – A2: Asia checks US Heg
Asia is not countering US leadership Twining 7 (Transatlantic Fellow based in Oxford and New Delhi and concurrently the Fulbright/Oxford Scholar
at the University of Oxford. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Washington Quarterly. “America’s Grand Design in Asia”) U.S. policy seeks to build and bind together friendly centers of power in Asia to help maintain a regional balance that preserves U.S. interests and values as China rises. “We want to encourage the rise of friendly, independent Asian powers, but we also want to bind their interests to ours,” says former National Security Council official Michael Green. The United States is trying to build strength in its Asian partners, not subordinate or contain them in Cold War– type alliance structures in which the United States institutionalizes its own dominance. This policy is attractive to Asian leaders who want to build national capabilities and increase their respective country’s room to maneuver in the emerging Asian order and who recognize that cooperation with the United States to strengthen their economic and military capabilities will accelerate this process, enhance their autonomy, and countervail growing Chinese influence. Yet, U.S. policy rekindles traditional wariness in India, Indonesia, and Vietnam about perceived U.S. hegemonic designs. Ironically, although U.S. leaders welcome these countries’ determination to protect their autonomy as China rises, thereby helping to preserve a pluralistic Asian security order, their very independence also means that they are wary of U.S. dominance. Nonetheless, the United States values its key Asian partners for their growing strength. As former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran notes, “If there is a greater focus today on India in the [United States], it is not because India is weak but because India is strong. We are being recognized as a country which has [an] array of capabilities and has the potential to emerge as a very important power in the future.” Former Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi controversially maintained that building Japanese strength within the U.S. alliance would actually improve Tokyo’s relations with Beijing. Washington’s policy of building new centers of power in Asia is premised on a congruence of interests with states such as India and Japan in strengthening their national capabilities and expanding their security horizons to shape the emerging order of the new century. The United States is not pursuing this design to contain China but to shape its geopolitical options as a country at a “strategic crossroads.” Washington is limiting China’s potential strategic choices by strengthening and cultivating friendly Asian powers along its periphery that will constrain and constructively channel Beijing’s regional and international ambitions. “It is very useful to remind China,” says one U.S. official, “that there are other emerging powerful countries, such as India, who are setting standards we agree with. This is very different from containment; it is more about encouraging or shaping China’s view of the international system in a constructive way.”

Rising Asian influence doesn’t constrain the US Twining 7 (Transatlantic Fellow based in Oxford and New Delhi and concurrently the Fulbright/Oxford Scholar
at the University of Oxford. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Washington Quarterly. “America’s Grand Design in Asia”) Accelerating the rise of friendly, independent centers of power in Asia may allow the United States to maintain its privileged position within an “asymmetrically multipolar” Asian security order characterized by multiple power centers—China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and ASEAN—that makes it naturally resistant to Chinese domination. Nonetheless, the implications for the United States of trends in Asia are inescapable. Relative U.S. power will wane as China and India rise. “It’s not possible to pretend that [China] is just another player,” said Singapore’s former prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, in 1993. “This is the biggest player in the history of man. … The size of China’s displacement of the world balance is such that the world must find a new balance” within a few decades. The United States is pursuing a grand design to shape that new balance in ways that preserve its interests in a pluralistic security order that is dominated by no one regional power and that aligns it increasingly closely with democratic and like-minded centers of strength is a rising Asia.

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Anti-Americanism High
Anti-Americanism is very high. Nye 8 (Joseph S, Harvard IR prof., p. 7, http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/616/1/94)
Soft power is an important reality. Those self-styled realists who deny the importance of soft power are like people who do not understand the power of seduction. They succumb to the “concrete fallacy” that espouses that something is not a power resource unless you can drop it on a city or on your foot.2During a meeting with President John F. Kennedy, senior statesman John J. McCloy exploded in anger about paying attention to popularity and attraction in world politics: “ ‘world opinion?’ I don’t believe in world opinion. The only thing that matters is power.” But as Arthur Schlesinger noted, “like Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, Kennedy understood that the ability to attract others and move opinion was an element of power” (McCloy and Schlesinger, as quoted in Haefele 2001, 66). The German editor Josef Joffe once argued that America’s soft power was even larger than its economic and military assets. “U.S. culture, low- brow or high, radiates outward with an intensity last seen in the days of the Roman Empire—but with a novel twist. Rome’s and Soviet Russia’s cultural sway stopped exactly at their military borders. America’s soft power, though, rules over an empire on which the sun never sets” (Joffe 2001, 43). But cultural soft power can be undercut by policies that are seen as illegitimate. In recent years, particularly after the invasion of Iraq, American soft power has declined. For example, a 2007 BBC opinion poll reported that across twenty-five countries, half of those polled said the United States played a mainly negative role in the world (New York Times2007)

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China Soft Power Up
China is expanding soft power to guarantee energy resources YOSHIHARA AND HOLMES ‘8 (IFPA Senior Research Fellow. Professor in the Strategy and Policy
Department at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Senior research associate at the University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security and teaches international relations. China’s Energy-Driven ‘Soft Power’) Few would dispute that China’s naval priorities remain locked on Taiwan. The potential range of vexing military contingencies surrounding Taiwan has been the primary driver behind China’s ongoing and rapid naval modernization. Indeed, advances in the Chinese navy are being tailored specifically to meet the challenges that the nautical environment separating the island from the mainland poses to Beijing. However, there is growing evidence that Beijing is already considering and preparing for broader regional and perhaps extra-regional missions that beckon far beyond the Taiwan Strait. The reason for this outwardlooking posture? Energy. As China’s energy dependence accelerates, influential voices within the Chinese strategic community have forcefully called upon Beijing to develop the military means to protect its vulnerable sea lines of communication, which stretch from the Bohai Sea to the Persian Gulf. As one study asserts, ‘‘Many PRC energy security analysts from the neo-mercantilist school perceive the global oil system to be controlled by the United States. They therefore advocate acquiring the naval wherewithal to defend China’s growing dependence on secure seaborne oil imports.’’ Consider also China’s most recent Defense White Paper, issued in December 2006. For the first time, the document identifies access to raw materials and the various mediums upon which economic development depends as a major national security concern. It observes that ‘‘Security issues related to energy, resources, finance, information, and international shipping routes [emphasis added] are mounting.’’

China’s soft power is rising as U.S. soft power declines YOSHIHARA AND HOLMES ‘8 (IFPA Senior Research Fellow. Professor in the Strategy and Policy
Department at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Senior research associate at the University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security and teaches international relations. China’s Energy-Driven ‘Soft Power’) The concept has regularly been misinterpreted or dismissed as too vague to be of value to foreign-policy practitioners. But if Nye is correct, then soft power creates real, tangible strategic opportunities denied to states that rely too heavily on military coercion or economic inducements. If Nye’s analyses since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 are accurate, for example, then the United States is seeing its own soft power deteriorate amid widespread anti-Americanism. In consequence, the United States could see its ability to organize future multinational initiatives suffer. Yet while Nye claims that the United States is losing soft power, this is not the case among its rivals and competitors, in particular China. Despite oft- voiced European and North American concerns over human rights and military modernization in China, Beijing’s economic success and diplomatic prominence since the Deng Xiaoping reforms of the late 1970s have garnered acclaim in virtually every part of the world. This has furthered China’s soft power.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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47 Hegemony

***Heg Sustainable***

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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48 Hegemony

Heg Sustainable
Hegemony is sustainable – this card assumes all their arguments. Drezner 8 (Daniel W, associate IR prof. @ Tufts U, 2/20, http://www.newsweek.com/id/114011/page/2)
If it's Tuesday then it's time to bemoan the waning of American hegemony yet again. This topic has been a growth industry among the commentariat in recent weeks—and for good reason. Using standard metrics of power, the United States is in a relative decline. Militarily, this is the last year of a deeply unpopular administration that has exhausted U.S. armed forces in the Middle East. Economically, the United States seems headed for a recession—or worse. The collapse of the subprime mortgage market in the United States has constipated other financial markets and contributed to the fall in the dollar. Last month the Federal Reserve sprang into action to avert a panic—but not before U.S. financial institutions were forced to rely on bailouts from sovereign wealth funds to retain their solvency. In a recent cover story in the New York Times Magazine titled "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony," the author, Parag Khanna, asserted that rising powers like Venezuela and India would be playing the United States, the European Union and China off each other to advance their aims. As if on cue, Venezuela's Hugo Chávez announced last week that his country was contemplating a cutoff of oil sales to the United States. America's decline is matched with growing buzz over the rise of the BRICs—Brazil, Russia, India and China. Are we already living in a multipolar world? Not so fast. There is a difference between forming expectations about future trends and believing that the future is now. If anything, recent events reaffirm the primacy of American power. American consumer and capital markets are still the primary engine of global economic growth. In the recent rash of health and safety scares revolving around products made in China, Beijing blustered in a way that suggested it held the upper hand. Six months later, however, China announced plans to overhaul health and safety inspections of Chinese exports, including improving its information database on all exports. Chinese diplomats demonstrated greater contrition in private negotiations with Western officials. Publicly officials began opening up more factories to inspection by Western journalists. In December of last year China signed two bilateral agreements with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services widening access to Chinese factories. One Chinese academic concluded that the agreements represented "a very big response to U.S. demands." Contrary to popular perception, China's productive power remains less salient on the world stage than the market power of the United States. The effect of uncertainty in America's mortgage market had ripple effects across the globe. These market jitters revealed two facts. First, for all the talk about waning American power, markets stabilized only when Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke announced an emergency interest rate cut. Second, an underlying cause behind the worldwide financial hiccup is that producers across the globe rely on the American consumer to purchase their wares. This even applies to sovereign wealth funds. To be sure, the United States needs the money to finance its large current account deficit. However, most other asset markets are neither big enough nor open enough to cater to large-scale sovereign wealth investments. Indeed, the very countries ginning up sovereign wealth funds at the moment are the most protectionist when it comes to foreign direct investment. The ability of rising states to play the United States off Europe and China is also open to question. Consider Venezuela again. This past Sunday Chávez backed down from his threat, saying, "We don't have plans to stop sending oil to the United States." Clearly Chávez wishes he could carry out the threat—but the only refineries that can process Venezuelan oil into a useful commodity are based in the United States. Chávez has been in power for close to a decade, and the United States remains Venezuela's largest export market. ongtime observers of international relations will have a sense of déjà vu in reading about America's decline. Two decades ago international-relations scholars were enmeshed in a debate about American decline. Replace China with Japan, and the current gnashing of teeth sounds like a replay of debates from the 1980s. Over the long term, however, the demographic and economic vitality of the American economy is difficult to dispute compared with possible peer competitors. For decades to come, the United States will be first among equals. So don't believe the hype. By most measures, the United States is still the hegemon. This does not mean, of course, that the declinists don't have a point. Power is a relative measure, and the robust growth of the BRIC nations guarantees that U.S. influence will decline in the future. The really important question for America—and the world—is how Americans will manage this adjustment.

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49 Hegemony

Heg Sustainable – Economy
Hegemony is sustainable – other countries are forced to adopt US economics and identify with US economic and social philosophies. Shapiro 8 (Robert J, Sonecon LLC co-founder, 6/12, http://www.theglobalist.com/storyid.aspx?StoryId=7049)
The Internet’s software infrastructure developed in a typically American way — by entrepreneurs working in areas largely untouched by government regulation — into a radically open and decentralized system. As a result, the Internet has become essentially “American” wherever it is, and not just because U.S. companies dominate its development and content. Free flow of ideas Much more than that, it creates American-style opportunities wherever it reaches, disseminating information without restriction and spurring the development of new services and products by newly formed companies in new ways. There are no credible alternatives anywhere in the world to America’s basic take on the limits of the government’s role in the economy and how businesses should run. services and products by newly formed companies operating in new ways. That can produce geopolitical benefits for America, as tens or hundreds of thousands of newly successful people around the world associate their success with its continuing technological achievements. The heart of the geopolitical clout that America derives from its economic preeminence, however, is that so much of the world now embraces its basic approach to organizing their economies and doing business. In less than a generation, the alternative models that much of the world had followed for decades have been discredited — and largely discarded. The American alternative This reaches past the epochal collapse of Soviet collectivism and China’s startling conversion to capitalism. The appeal of the more mixed models of a private economy with heavy government direction also has waned, after Asia’s bumper economies melted down or stagnated and Europe’s entered a decade of disappointing growth. Some leaders in Europe and Japan may deny it, but for the first time there are no credible, grand alternatives anywhere in the world to America’s basic take on the limits of the government’s role in the economy and how businesses should run. In sync with current demands This doesn’t make the American economic approach “right” in an objective sense, like the composition of the atom. Rather, it’s What’s so unusual and world-changing is not the extent of America’s military, political and economic capacities — but the absence of countries that come anywhere close. very broadly preferred right now, because it’s in sync with the current demands of globalization. For a long time, the European and Japanese approaches — not to mention what passed for an economic model in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China — produced more equality and economic security for individuals than American-style capitalism. But for nearly a generation, globalization has crippled the capacity of those approaches to generate strong, sustained growth — and greater equality and security are less appealing when people also face a prospect of growing poorer. International systems This simply is a time when growth in both advanced and developing economies depends on governments not only stepping up to invest in education, health and modern infrastructure, but also stepping back from protections and regulations that slow or muck up the era’s massive transfers of technologies, capital and expertise. Almost every country also now supports the international institutions that enforce American-style rules of globalization, especially the World Trade Organization and World Intellectual Property Organization — but also the older International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Paris Club (which deals with sovereign debt default issues among countries).

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50 Hegemony

Heg Sustainable – Innovation
America’s matrix of innovation ensures sustainability. AAU 8 (association of American universities, March, p. 3, http://www.aau.edu/reports/SAAS_08.pdf)
The next President will make decisions that determine our nation’s place in the 21st century. We remain the world’s military and economic superpower, yet at home and abroad we face economic and national security challenges to our leadership with serious consequences for future generations of Americans. During the 2008 presidential campaign, Americans will judge candidates on their ability to lead the nation in addressing these challenges. As each candidate considers the resources on which his or her administration might draw for ideas and talent, few are as valuable as the people and organizations that comprise America’s matrix of innovation. The elements of this matrix—universities, businesses, nonprofit organizations, government agencies, and individual innovators—are seeking and creating real solutions for the challenges we face. It is this innovation matrix— decentralized, networked, crossdisciplinary, and sparked by the intellectual genius of Americans and people from around the world— that can ensure America’s national and economic security and world leadership in the 21st century. At the core of this great national innovation matrix is our system of higher education and research. This system sets the standard for the world, in part because of the autonomy and extraordinary diversity of its 4,000 institutions. Our colleges and universities educate the men and women who, in turn, create the ideas that spark innovation. Among these institutions, America’s research universities serve particularly as drivers of innovation because they fully integrate research with education. With strong government support, these institutions have made America the world’s leading incubator of innovators and innovation.

Hegemony is sustainable – American innovation allow sus to continuously recreate our leadership. Martino 7 (foreign policy research institute, www.fpri.org/orbis/5102/martino.innovationamericanleadership.pdf)
The United States of course faced great challenges to its security and economy in the past, most obviously from Germany and Japan in the first half of the twentieth century and from the Soviet Union in the second half. Crucial to America’s ability to prevail over these past challenges was our technological and industrial leadership, and especially our ability to continuously recreate it. Indeed, the United States has been unique among great powers in its ability to keep on creating and recreating new technologies and new industries, generation after generation. Perpetual innovation and technological leadership might even be said to be the American way of maintaining primacy in world affairs. They are almost certainly what America will have to pursue in order to prevail over the contemporary challenges involving economic competitiveness and energy dependence.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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51 Hegemony

AT: Realism Proves Unipolarity Unsustainable
( ) The unipolar system does not follow realist predictions. We must look to other theories William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World."
Today's distribution of power is unprecedented, however, and power-centric theories naturally expect politics among nations to be different than in past systems. In contrast to the past, the existing distribution of capabilities generates incentives for cooperation. The absence of hegemonic rivalry, security competition, and balancing is not necessarily the result of ideational or institutional change. This is not to assert that realism provides the best explanation for the absence of security and prestige competition. Rather, the conclusion is that it offers an explanation that may compete with or complement those of other theoretical traditions. As a result, evaluating the merits of contending theories for understanding the international politics of unipolarity presents greater empirical challenges than many scholars have acknowledged.

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52 Hegemony

AT: Counter-Alliances Undermine Unipolarity
( ) Alliances cannot counterbalance as they are not as strong as the members acting individually William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World."
Alliances are not structural. Because alliances are far less effective than states in producing and deploying power internationally, most scholars follow Waltz in making a distinction between the distribution of capabilities among states and the alliances states may form.46 A unipolar system is one in which a counterbalance is impossible. When a counterbalance becomes possible, the system is not unipolar. The point at which this structural shift can happen is determined in part by how efficiently alliances can aggregate the power of individual states. Alliances aggregate power only to the extent that they are reliably binding and permit the merging of armed forces, defense industries, R&D infrastructures, and strategic decisionmaking. A glance at international history shows how difficult it is to coordinate counterhegemonic alliances. States are tempted to free ride, pass the buck, or bandwagon in search of favors from the aspiring hegemon. States have to worry about being abandoned by alliance partners when the chips are down or being dragged into conflicts of others' making.47 The aspiring hegemon, meanwhile, has only to make sure its domestic house is in order. In short, a single state gets more bang for the buck than several states in an alliance. To the extent that alliances are inefficient at pooling power, the sole pole obtains greater power per unit of aggregate capabilities than any alliance that might take shape against it. Right away, the odds are skewed in favor of the unipolar power.

( ) Even if alliances have counterbalanced in the past, the position of the US, separate from Eurasia, makes it invulnerable William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World."
The key, however, is that the countercoalitions of the past-on which most of our empirical knowledge of alliance politics is based-formed against centrally located land powers (France, Germany, and the Soviet Union) that constituted relatively unambiguous security threats to their neighbors. Coordinating a counterbalance against an offshore state that has already achieved unipolar status will be much more difficult.48 Even a declining offshore unipolar state will have unusually wide opportunities to play divide and rule. Any secondtier state seeking to counterbalance has to contend with the existing pro-U.S. bandwagon. If things go poorly, the aspiring counterbalancer will have to confront not just the capabilities of the unipolar state, but also those of its other great power allies. All of the aspiring poles face a problem the United States does not: great power neighbors that could become crucial U.S. allies the moment an unambiguous challenge to Washington's preeminence emerges. In addition, in each region there are smaller "pivotal states" that make natural U.S. allies against an aspiring regional power.49 Indeed, the United States' first move in any counterbalancing game of this sort could be to try to promote such pivotal states to great power status, as it did with China against the Soviet Union in the latter days of the Cold War.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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53 Hegemony

***Heg Unsustainable***

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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54 Hegemony

Heg Unsustainable (1/2)
Hegemony is not sustainable – current trends show decline in all facets of US power. Haas 8 (Richard, CFR pres., May/June, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html)
In this world, the United States is and will long remain the largest single aggregation of power. It spends more than $500 billion annually on its military -- and more than $700 billion if the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are included -- and boasts land, air, and naval forces that are the world's most capable. Its economy, with a GDP of some $14 trillion, is the world's largest. The United States is also a major source of culture (through films and television), information, and innovation. But the reality of American strength should not mask the relative decline of the United States' position in the world -- and with this relative decline in power an absolute decline in influence and independence. The U.S. share of global imports is already down to 15 percent. Although U.S. GDP accounts for over 25 percent of the world's total, this percentage is sure to decline over time given the actual and projected differential between the United States' growth rate and those of the Asian giants and many other countries, a large number of which are growing at more than two or three times the rate of the United States. GDP growth is hardly the only indication of a move away from U.S. economic dominance. The rise of sovereign wealth funds -- in countries such as China, Kuwait, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates -- is another. These government-controlled pools of wealth, mostly the result of oil and gas exports, now total some $3 trillion. They are growing at a projected rate of $1 trillion a year and are an increasingly important source of liquidity for U.S. firms. High energy prices, fueled mostly by the surge in Chinese and Indian demand, are here to stay for some time, meaning that the size and significance of these funds will continue to grow. Alternative stock exchanges are springing up and drawing away companies from the U.S. exchanges and even launching initial public offerings (IPOs). London, in particular, is competing with New York as the world's financial center and has already surpassed it in terms of the number of IPOs it hosts. The dollar has weakened against the euro and the British pound, and it is likely to decline in value relative to Asian currencies as well. A majority of the world's foreign exchange holdings are now in currencies other than the dollar, and a move to denominate oil in euros or a basket of currencies is possible, a step that would only leave the U.S. economy more vulnerable to inflation as well as currency crises. U.S. primacy is also being challenged in other realms, such as military effectiveness and diplomacy. Measures of military spending are not the same as measures of military capacity. September 11 showed how a small investment by terrorists could cause extraordinary levels of human and physical damage. Many of the most costly pieces of modern weaponry are not particularly useful in modern conflicts in which traditional battlefields are replaced by urban combat zones. In such environments, large numbers of lightly armed soldiers can prove to be more than a match for smaller numbers of highly trained and better-armed U.S. troops. Power and influence are less and less linked in an era of nonpolarity. U.S. calls for others to reform will tend to fall on deaf ears, U.S. assistance programs will buy less, and U.S.-led sanctions will accomplish less. After all, China proved to be the country best able to influence North Korea's nuclear program. Washington's ability to pressure Tehran has been strengthened by the participation of several western European countries -- and weakened by the reluctance of China and Russia to sanction Iran. Both Beijing and Moscow have diluted international efforts to pressure the government in Sudan to end its war in Darfur. Pakistan, meanwhile, has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to resist U.S. entreaties, as have Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. The trend also extends to the worlds of culture and information. Bollywood produces more films every year than Hollywood. Alternatives to U.S.-produced and disseminated television are multiplying. Web sites and blogs from other countries provide further competition for U.S.-produced news and commentary. The proliferation of information is as much a cause of nonpolarity as is the proliferation of weaponry.

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55 Hegemony

Heg Unsustainable (2/2)
Heg is unsustainable due to improving competition, economic decline, overstretch, and globalization. Haas 8 (Richard, CFR pres., May/June, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html)
But even if great-power rivals have not emerged, unipolarity has ended. Three explanations for its demise stand out. The first is historical. States develop; they get better at generating and piecing together the human, financial, and technological resources that lead to productivity and prosperity. The same holds for corporations and other organizations. The rise of these new powers cannot be stopped. The result is an ever larger number of actors able to exert influence regionally or globally. A second cause is U.S. policy. To paraphrase Walt Kelly's Pogo, the post-World War II comic hero, we have met the explanation and it is us. By both what it has done and what it has failed to do, the United States has accelerated the emergence of alternative power centers in the world and has weakened its own position relative to them. U.S. energy policy (or the lack thereof) is a driving force behind the end of unipolarity. Since the first oil shocks of the 1970s, U.S. consumption of oil has grown by approximately 20 percent, and, more important, U.S. imports of petroleum products have more than doubled in volume and nearly doubled as a percentage of consumption. This growth in demand for foreign oil has helped drive up the world price of oil from just over $20 a barrel to over $100 a barrel in less than a decade. The result is an enormous transfer of wealth and leverage to those states with energy reserves. In short, U.S. energy policy has helped bring about the emergence of oil and gas producers as major power centers. U.S. economic policy has played a role as well. President Lyndon Johnson was widely criticized for simultaneously fighting a war in Vietnam and increasing domestic spending. President Bush has fought costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, allowed discretionary spending to increase by an annual rate of eight percent, and cut taxes. As a result, the United States' fiscal position declined from a surplus of over $100 billion in 2001 to an estimated deficit of approximately $250 billion in 2007. Perhaps more relevant is the ballooning current account deficit, which is now more than six percent of GDP. This places downward pressure on the dollar, stimulates inflation, and contributes to the accumulation of wealth and power elsewhere in the world. Poor regulation of the U.S. mortgage market and and the credit crisis it has spawned have exacerbated these problems. The war in Iraq has also contributed to the dilution of the United States' position in the world. The war in Iraq has proved to be an expensive war of choice -- militarily, economically, and diplomatically as well as in human terms. Years ago, the historian Paul Kennedy outlined his thesis about "imperial overstretch," which posited that the United States would eventually decline by overreaching, just as other great powers had in the past. Kennedy's theory turned out to apply most immediately to the Soviet Union, but the United States -- for all its corrective mechanisms and dynamism -- has not proved to be immune. It is not simply that the U.S. military will take a generation to recover from Iraq; it is also that the United States lacks sufficient military assets to continue doing what it is doing in Iraq, much less assume new burdens of any scale elsewhere. Finally, today's nonpolar world is not simply a result of the rise of other states and organizations or of the failures and follies of U.S. policy. It is also an inevitable consequence of globalization. Globalization has increased the volume, velocity, and importance of cross-border flows of just about everything, from drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases, manufactured goods, and people to television and radio signals, viruses (virtual and real), and weapons. Globalization reinforces nonpolarity in two fundamental ways. First, many cross-border flows take place outside the control of governments and without their knowledge. As a result, globalization dilutes the influence of the major powers. Second, these same flows often strengthen the capacities of nonstate actors, such as energy exporters (who are experiencing a dramatic increase in wealth owing to transfers from importers), terrorists (who use the Internet to recruit and train, the international banking system to move resources, and the global transport system to move people), rogue states (who can exploit black and gray markets), and Fortune 500 firms (who quickly move personnel and investments). It is increasingly apparent that being the strongest state no longer means having a near monopoly on power. It is easier than ever before for individuals and groups to accumulate and project substantial power.

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Heg Unsustainable – Isolationism
Hegemony is unsustainable – isolationism. CSM 8 (3/20, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0320/p01s04-ussc.html)
Washington - The Iraq war has been perhaps America's bitterest lesson since Vietnam in the realities of war and geopolitics – profoundly altering ordinary citizens' sense of their country, its essential abilities, and the overall role it plays in the world. Poll after poll shows that Americans are worried about US troops. They're distressed at the war's rising human and financial cost and are fully aware of the globe's rising tide of anti-Americanism. Most of all, they may be confused – unsure of how the United States got here, uncertain about what to do next, and in doubt about how, and when, the conflict will end. "It's just become a mess, and I don't think there's an easy end to it, so we're going to end up in a quagmire," says Ben Lem, a Boston-area cafe owner. The bottom line may be that today many in the US view the Iraq invasion as a mistake they don't want to see repeated. Troubles in Iraq appear to have fed a desire on the part of some ordinary Americans for disengagement with the world. "We are in a period of rising isolationism, just as we saw a bump in isolationism after the war in Vietnam in the '70s," said Andrew Kohut, president of the Pew Research Center, at a Center for Strategic and International Studies seminar in Washington on March 12. Five years ago, America – as well as Iraq – was a different place. Virtually every major poll showed US majorities in support of military action. For instance, in a March 2003 Gallup survey, 64 percent of respondents said they were in favor of a US ground invasion of Iraq to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

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57 Hegemony

***No Balancing***

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58 Hegemony

No Balancing – Benign Heg
No counterbalancing – benign hegemony means other nations don’t perceive a threat. Haas 8 (Richard, CFR pres., May/June, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html)
The fact that classic great-power rivalry has not come to pass and is unlikely to arise anytime soon is also partly a result of the United States' behavior, which has not stimulated such a response. This is not to say that the United States under the leadership of George W. Bush has not alienated other nations; it surely has. But it has not, for the most part, acted in a manner that has led other states to conclude that the United States constitutes a threat to their vital national interests. Doubts about the wisdom and legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy are pervasive, but this has tended to lead more to denunciations (and an absence of cooperation) than outright resistance.

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No Balancing – Capabilities Gap
No balancing – disparities in power between the US and other states are too great. Haas 8 (Richard, CFR pres., May/June, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html)
But this has not happened. Although anti-Americanism is widespread, no great-power rival or set of rivals has emerged to challenge the United States. In part, this is because the disparity between the power of the United States and that of any potential rivals is too great. Over time, countries such as China may come to possess GDPs comparable to that of the United States. But in the case of China, much of that wealth will necessarily be absorbed by providing for the country's enormous population (much of which remains poor) and will not be available to fund military development or external undertakings. Maintaining political stability during a period of such dynamic but uneven growth will be no easy feat. India faces many of the same demographic challenges and is further hampered by too much bureaucracy and too little infrastructure. The EU's GDP is now greater than that of the United States, but the EU does not act in the unified fashion of a nation-state, nor is it able or inclined to act in the assertive fashion of historic great powers. Japan, for its part, has a shrinking and aging population and lacks the political culture to play the role of a great power. Russia may be more inclined, but it still has a largely cash-crop economy and is saddled by a declining population and internal challenges to its cohesion.

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No Balancing – Interdependence
No balancing – interdependence makes the cost of disrupting geopolitical order too great. Haas 8 (Richard, CFR pres., May/June, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html)
A further constraint on the emergence of great-power rivals is that many of the other major powers are dependent on the international system for their economic welfare and political stability. They do not, accordingly, want to disrupt an order that serves their national interests. Those interests are closely tied to cross-border flows of goods, services, people, energy, investment, and technology -- flows in which the United States plays a critical role. Integration into the modern world dampens great-power competition and conflict.

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No Balancing – China

It is important to emphasize that Chinese power has not taken the aggressive military form that simplistic scaremongers like to stoke. China’s armed forces remain second-tier in quality, the report says, primarily defensive in their posture. What’s more, Beijing’s military spending is still relatively low even if the highest American estimate—$137 billion in 2007—is accepted. By comparison, the U.S. spent $450 billion on defense in the same fiscal year, not including another $120 billion spent on Iraq and Afghanistan.

In exploring just a small sample of the second world, we should start perhaps with the hardest case: Russia. Apparently stabilized and resurgent under the Kremlin-Gazprom oligarchy, why is Russia not a superpower but rather the ultimate second-world swing state? For all its muscle flexing, Russia is also disappearing. Its population decline is a staggering half million citizens per year or more, meaning it will be not much larger than Turkey by 2025 or so — spread across a land so vast that it no longer even makes sense as a country. Travel across Russia today, and you’ll find, as during Soviet times, city after city of crumbling, heatless apartment blocks and neglected elderly citizens whose value to the state diminishes with distance from Moscow. The forced Siberian migrations of the Soviet era are being voluntarily reversed as children move west to more tolerable and modern climes. Filling the vacuum they have left behind are hundreds of thousands of Chinese, literally gobbling up, plundering, outright buying and more or less annexing Russia’s Far East for its timber and other natural resources. Already during the cold war it was joked that there were “no disturbances on the Sino-Finnish border,” a prophecy that seems ever closer to fulfillment. Russia lost its western satellites almost two decades ago, and Europe, while appearing to be bullied by Russia’s oil-dependent diplomacy, is staging a long-term buyout of Russia, whose economy remains roughly the size of France’s. The more Europe gets its gas from North Africa and oil from Azerbaijan, the less it will rely on Russia, all the while holding the lever of being by far Russia’s largest investor. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development provides the kinds of loans that help build an alternative, less corrupt private sector from below, while London and Berlin welcome Russia’s billionaires, allowing the likes of Boris Berezovsky to openly campaign against Putin. The E.U. and U.S. also finance and train a pugnacious second-world block of Baltic and Balkan nations, whose activists agitate from Belarus to Uzbekistan. Privately, some E.U. officials say that annexing Russia is perfectly doable; it’s just a matter of time. In the coming decades, far from restoring its Soviet-era might, Russia will have to decide whether it wishes to exist peacefully as an asset to Europe or the alternative — becoming a petro-vassal of China.

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No Balancing – Russia/China
China and Russia lack cohesion to balance the US. CNN 8 (5/23, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/05/23/china.russia.ap/index.html)
China and Russia have built a relationship intended to serve as a counterweight to U.S. dominance, but continued friction remains -- especially over oil and gas -- in Central Asia. Medvedev's trip to Kazakhstan was apparently intended to send a message to both Beijing and the West that Moscow continues to see the former Soviet Central Asia as its home turf. "Russia is worried by China's quiet expansion in Central Asia," said Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs magazine. "Moscow has grown accustomed to viewing Central Asia as its backyard, but China doesn't share this view." China already has won a cut of the region's riches, reaching an oil pipeline deal with Kazakhstan and negotiating a gas agreement with Turkmenistan. "China has been actively seeking to secure energy supplies from Central Asia and they have gone quite far," said Alexander Konovalov, head of the Moscowbased Institute for Strategic Assessment. There is also rich symbolism in Medvedev's choice of China as the main destination of his first foreign trip. When his predecessor, Vladimir Putin, went abroad for the first time as president in 2000, he traveled to London -- via Belarus -- with a message Russia wanted closer ties to the West. In recent years, China and Russia have made highly symbolic political overtures to one another, holding joint military maneuvers and engaging in high-level talks on creating a "multi-polar world." They have taken a coordinated stance on several global issues, sharing opposition to Kosovo's independence and U.S. missile defense plans, and taking a similar approach to the Iran nuclear issue. Putin greatly strengthened relations with China, reaching a long-delayed agreement on demarcation of the 2,700 mile border. However, economic ties have lagged behind. Bilateral trade rose by about one-third last year to some $48 billion, but still accounts for only 2 percent of China's global trade. China does more than eight times as much business with the United States

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No Balancing – EU
The EU won’t counterbalance the US – France proves. Newsweek 8 (6/30, http://www.newsweek.com/id/142565)
The spectacle of Sarkozy's grandstanding as he gets ready for the big parade may be reminiscent of many a French president who struggled to show that he and his country were still relevant players. But unlike his predecessors, Sarkozy has put a lot of new pieces on the board, he's moving them all at once, and he's breaking precedents the French thought were immutable. What they are witnessing may not be a revolution on a par with the storming of the Bastille, but it is about as radical a change in foreign-policy and nationalsecurity doctrine as they've seen in decades. Gone is the geopolitical posturing of French presidents who wanted to act as a counterbalance to American power. Instead, speaking the week after the Irish voted down the Treaty of Lisbon, Sarkozy promised that France would remain "a great military power," and presented collective defense as the key to greater unity. The clearest outline of Sarkozy's foreign-policy and defense ambitions came in the speech he delivered to the French military elite last week, in which he shifted priorities away from resisting invasion, which ceased to be a threat 15 years ago, and emphasized flexibility in an uncertain world where dangers have become "diverse and ever-changing." By slashing the number of soldiers to 225,000 over the next half-dozen years and focusing on a smaller, lighter military, he hopes to be able to finance better intelligence gathering that anticipates threats, whether from terrorists, failed states, nuclear proliferators, cyberwarriors or climate change. Rather than manning garrisons left over from colonial days in Francophone Africa, France will prepare for action in what Defense Minister Hervé Morin has called "an arc of crisis going from Mauritania to Afghanistan." And with more modern equipment, Sarkozy wants to be able to deploy 30,000 combat forces quickly and efficiently to the far corners of the world while dealing effectively with catastrophic events at home. "The French are realizing that not even they are able to go it alone, and he is putting the French military back in the business of dealing with threats that really matter," says Tomas Valasek of the Centre for European Reform.Sarkozy has also made it clear that next year France will rejoin NATO's integrated command structure for the first time since President Charles De Gaulle pulled out of it in 1966. As part of his plan for greater EU defense cooperation both inside and outside NATO, Sarkozy proposed a complete restructuring and unification of Europe's defense industries, a vast exchange program for officer training, perhaps even a European military college and unified headquarters. Sarkozy telegraphed his contempt for geopolitical game-playing in the style of his predecessors well before his election last year. He has praised the United States unabashedly, and embraced Israel enthusiastically, unlike previous French presidents who tended to worry about the sensibilities of rich Arab tyrants. "All democracies are accountable for Israel's security, which is nonnegotiable," Sarkozy wrote in 2006, and since he took office, relations with Jerusalem have looked like a love-in. "You are a great and positive gush of wind in French politics," Israeli President Shimon Peres told him on a visit in March.

The basic problem is that the current boom doesn’t touch on the basic structural fallacies in India. Of these fallacies, there are two, which is most devastating. The first is the deplorable elementary school system in India. The second is that the boom has not triggered any major grow of a low-skilled labour intensive industry in India, which are strongly needed if the huge unskilled masses in India shall find appropriate employment. Generally, India is characterized by low labour-elasticity vis-a-vis its growth rate, which means that India is a very “jobless” economy. However, in a country, where approximately 13 million is added to the workforce every year, this is a problem of the highest cardinal importance. The relative few jobs, which are created during the current boom, are generally job for higher educated professionals or higher skilled workers. In other words the job-pattern of the current boom has nothing or little to offer the majority of Indian workers, including the wave of the coming generation of lowskilled workers, which multiply every year in alarming numbers. The problem is that there is nothing, which really indicates that India seriously is trying to deal with these two cardinal problems. The much talk about India’s becoming urbanization ignores the fact that the jobs, which should facilitate this process of urbanization is simply not there. It is true that the new financial budget is allocating more money to the elementary school level but the problem of the elementary school system is entangled in cultural attitudes, caste-habits, teacher-privileges and fundamental institutional weaknesses and its solutions is not simply a matter of financing. So before India begin to dream of racing with China, it will be well advised to start solving those basic structural problems, which India so far have ignored for the last 60 years. India will not be able to establish any sustainable growth before it has solved these fundamental problems. Naturally, the current boom in India is “real” in the sense that a few Indian states and some segments of the population experience real growth. (It is not the growth, which is in question but the issue regarding its institutional and structural functions). But the function of this growth will not be an answer for India as a whole and will increasing split India into two radically separated worlds, which have little other than the noun “India” in common. Do not believe in the hype of India’s as the next economic superpower; it is a play on empty rhetoric. The current appearance of progress is misleading. The reality is that India cannot find jobs to its rapid growing masses and the majority of these masses is – and will remain – low-skilled and to a large degree illiterates. The number of main workers out of the total Indian population is constantly falling although the Indian population become younger and younger. Since more and more Indian factories are increasingly automating, then it is clear that the solution to the problem hardly comes from the established industry. Indeed, Stephen Roach of the Morgan Stanley, once, wondered how India would create jobs, when its factories are “more heavily populated by robots than human workers.” Indeed, from 19912001, the fraction of Indians in the actual workforce is supposed to have fallen from approximately 34 to 30% (so much for the “demographic dividend”). Especially, the number of women in the workforce in India is record low. Jobless India is also a tale of an increased gender-bias, which again is reflected in the relative few women who take a higher education in India. India is increasingly squeezed between its growing masses of unemployed (and underemployed) and its inability to produce the necessary low-skilled labour intensive industries. In other words, India is marching down the path of major social conflicts, and the lack of a sufficient elementary school-system has make sure that there is no end to the supply of this misery.

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No Balancing – Asia Generic
Asia is not countering US leadership Twining 7 (Transatlantic Fellow based in Oxford and New Delhi and concurrently the Fulbright/Oxford Scholar
at the University of Oxford. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Washington Quarterly. “America’s Grand Design in Asia”) U.S. policy seeks to build and bind together friendly centers of power in Asia to help maintain a regional balance that preserves U.S. interests and values as China rises. “We want to encourage the rise of friendly, independent Asian powers, but we also want to bind their interests to ours,” says former National Security Council official Michael Green. The United States is trying to build strength in its Asian partners, not subordinate or contain them in Cold War– type alliance structures in which the United States institutionalizes its own dominance. This policy is attractive to Asian leaders who want to build national capabilities and increase their respective country’s room to maneuver in the emerging Asian order and who recognize that cooperation with the United States to strengthen their economic and military capabilities will accelerate this process, enhance their autonomy, and countervail growing Chinese influence. Yet, U.S. policy rekindles traditional wariness in India, Indonesia, and Vietnam about perceived U.S. hegemonic designs. Ironically, although U.S. leaders welcome these countries’ determination to protect their autonomy as China rises, thereby helping to preserve a pluralistic Asian security order, their very independence also means that they are wary of U.S. dominance. Nonetheless, the United States values its key Asian partners for their growing strength. As former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran notes, “If there is a greater focus today on India in the [United States], it is not because India is weak but because India is strong. We are being recognized as a country which has [an] array of capabilities and has the potential to emerge as a very important power in the future.” Former Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi controversially maintained that building Japanese strength within the U.S. alliance would actually improve Tokyo’s relations with Beijing. Washington’s policy of building new centers of power in Asia is premised on a congruence of interests with states such as India and Japan in strengthening their national capabilities and expanding their security horizons to shape the emerging order of the new century. The United States is not pursuing this design to contain China but to shape its geopolitical options as a country at a “strategic crossroads.” Washington is limiting China’s potential strategic choices by strengthening and cultivating friendly Asian powers along its periphery that will constrain and constructively channel Beijing’s regional and international ambitions. “It is very useful to remind China,” says one U.S. official, “that there are other emerging powerful countries, such as India, who are setting standards we agree with. This is very different from containment; it is more about encouraging or shaping China’s view of the international system in a constructive way.”

Rising Asian influence doesn’t constrain the US Twining 7 (Transatlantic Fellow based in Oxford and New Delhi and concurrently the Fulbright/Oxford Scholar
at the University of Oxford. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Washington Quarterly. “America’s Grand Design in Asia”) Accelerating the rise of friendly, independent centers of power in Asia may allow the United States to maintain its privileged position within an “asymmetrically multipolar” Asian security order characterized by multiple power centers—China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and ASEAN—that makes it naturally resistant to Chinese domination. Nonetheless, the implications for the United States of trends in Asia are inescapable. Relative U.S. power will wane as China and India rise. “It’s not possible to pretend that [China] is just another player,” said Singapore’s former prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, in 1993. “This is the biggest player in the history of man. … The size of China’s displacement of the world balance is such that the world must find a new balance” within a few decades. The United States is pursuing a grand design to shape that new balance in ways that preserve its interests in a pluralistic security order that is dominated by no one regional power and that aligns it increasingly closely with democratic and like-minded centers of strength is a rising Asia.

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AT: Transition Now Better – First Line
Arguments about transitioning early and showing restraint now are wrong – the US would never do it, and it shouldn’t anyways. Best to maximize power’s benefits while we have it. Schweller 2K1
(Randall Assoc. Professor Political Science at Ohio State, “The Problem of International Order Revisted”, International Security, Summer, p. lexis) First, although hegemonic decline may be inevitable, it is not self-evident that a policy of strategic restraint better serves the hegemon's longrun interests than simply taking advantage of its power position to grab immediate gains. Indeed there is no a priori reason to conclude that instant postwar benefits (e.g., increases in the size of the new hegemon's territorial boundaries, spheres of influence, colonial possessions, etc.) will not continue to accrue significant future gains and thereby better serve to arrest the pace of hegemonic decline than Ikenberry's alternative of a constitutional peace settlement. Because one can make an equally impressive logical case to support either position, theoretical arguments alone will not tell us whether the choice to transform is more likely to benefit the hegemon over the long run than is the decision to dominate. It is ultimately an empirical question.In practice, there has been a strong relationship between the growth in power of a state and its desire to extend its territorial control, political influence, and domination of the international economy.[25] Great powers have tended to expand when they can. They have done so not necessarily to satisfy an innate lust for power, prestige, and glory—though history is replete with such cases—but rather because anarchy compels states to enhance their security and influence over others and their environment whenever it is possible and pragmatic for them to do SO.[26] Hegemonic postwar junctures are precisely when great powers, especially the leading state, can be expected to expand, not bind, their power. Because nature and politics abhor a vacuum, the victors will move quickly to fill the political vacuums left behind by the defeated great powers. This is predictable behavior because, when presented with such an extraordinary opportunity to expand the state's territory and influence, political leaders “can be said to act under external compulsion rather than in accordance with their preferences”:[27] That is, their actions are driven by irresistible temptation.Second, even if decisionmakers believe that hegemonic decline is inevitable, there are plenty of reasons why they would not and should not act on that belief. First, leaders have few if any domestic incentives to abandon policies of autonomy and unilateralism in favor of multilateralism and self-restraint. The incentive structure of elites, even foreign policy ones, is primarily a function of domestic, not international, politics. No matter how much internationalists may champion multilateral solutions, elected officials must answer to a domestic audience, and unelected bureaucrats must serve and promote the autonomy and interests of the bureaucratic organization to which they belong. Second, Ikenberry's claim rests on an unrealistic assumption about the time horizons of democratic leaders. Even if we concede the point that the creation of a constitutional order is a wise long-term investment for the new hegemonic state, history records few decisionmakers who acted in such a farsighted manner. This is particularly true for leaders of democratic states, because the primary goal for most elected officials is to ensure reelection. Why, then, should we expect democratically elected policymakers of a newly hegemonic state to forgo immediate gains for long-run payoffs that may or may not be reaped decades later—long after they have left office? Finally, the deliberate choice to restrain the exercise of power now because of the possibility (but not certainty) of exerting relatively less power later is like committing suicide for fear of death. The key question for postwar leaders is not whether but when decline will come and how much deterioration can be expected. Had American policymakers, for example, been persuaded by the chorus of scholars in the 1970s to late 1980s proclaiming that U.S. power was in terminal decline, the Cold War might have continued for decades longer; and it surely would noth ave ended in total victory for the West. Thankfully, instead of constraining American power and preparing for inevitable decline, the Reagan administration began ramping up U.S. power capabilities in the 1980s, arresting America's relative decline through bold policy choices.[28] Consequently, as Ikenberry himself acknowledges, “American power in the 1990s is without historical precedent” (p. 270).It is worth pointing out that even in the late 1980s, few if any foreign policy experts forecasted America's current supremacy in a unipolar world. This predictive failure, however, is not proof of the impoverishment of international relations theories, as many have claimed.[29] The (painful for some) truth is that the future power position of the United States or any other country is simply beyond prediction. This is

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because the power trajectories of nations, especially powerful ones, are not structurally determined; they are the result of wise or imprudent policy choices.

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AT: Transition Now Better – Second Line
Transition would be slow – reigning in the US would spread instability. Kupchan 2K2
(Charles, Professor of International Relations @ Georgetown, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21st Century, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, lexis) America’s diminishing internationalism is not the product of political decay. Nor does it mark the return of the dark and illusory brand of isolationism that so sorely misguided the nation in the past. It is the logical consequence of the times, of America’s location, and of a strategic environment in which terror attacks against the homeland, not hegemonic wars in Europe or Asia, represent the most immediate threat to the country’s well-being. The nation’s politics are in the process of catching up with geopolitical realities. At the same time, a waning internationalism does have the potential to turn into a dangerous isolationism. Especially because of the natural security afforded by America’s location, the allure of preserving that security by pulling back from commitments that may compromise it, and the isolationist strains that have influenced U.S. foreign policy since the founding of the republic, a reduction of the country’s global role does have the potential to go too far. A reining in of America’s overseas commitments is one thing. It is inevitable and can be done gradually and with adequate preparation so as to minimize the attendant risks. An American withdrawal from global affairs is another matter altogether. It would have dire consequences precisely because global stability is at present so dependent on American power and purpose. [P. 65]

And, Drawing out early leads to massive instability in the gulf and the Balkans Kupchan 2K2
(Charles, Professor of International Relations @ Georgetown, The End of the American Era: US Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21st Century, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, lexis) If America’s politics soon come to rein in its foreign policy; the United States might well bow out before others are prepared to fill the void. With no one around to mind the store, incremental threats of the sort that recently emerged in the Middle East and the Balkans would go unchecked. No other country has the combination of military capability and political clout needed to put together a campaign of the size that drove Iraqi troops from Kuwait or the Yugoslav army from Kosovo. Had the United States chosen not to contain Saddam Hussein in the early i99os, Iraq today could well be in control of not just Kuwait, but also of Saudi Arabia and its massive oil reserves. And the Balkan Peninsula could be in turmoil, doing irreversible damage to southeastern Europe and calling into question the relevance and legitimacy of NATO and the EU. [P. 205-206]

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***Yes Balancing***

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Multipolarity Now
The world is now multipolar. Khanna 8 (Parag, America Strategy Program sr. fellow, 1/27, p. 1, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27worldt.html?_r=1&oref=slogin)

At best, America’s unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s, but that was also a decade adrift. The post-cold-war “peace dividend” was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership. So now, rather than bestriding the globe, we are competing — and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world’s other superpowers: the European Union and China. This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. Not Russia, an increasingly depopulated expanse run by Gazprom.gov; not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars; and not India, lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite. The Big Three make the rules — their own rules — without any one of them dominating. And the others are left to choose their suitors in this postAmerican world. The more we appreciate the differences among the American, European and Chinese worldviews, the more we will see the planetary stakes of the new global game. Previous eras of balance of power have been among European powers sharing a common culture. The cold war, too, was not truly an “East-West” struggle; it remained essentially a contest over Europe. What we have today, for the first time in history, is a global, multicivilizational, multipolar battle. In Europe’s capital, Brussels, technocrats, strategists and legislators increasingly see their role as being the global balancer between America and China. Jorgo Chatzimarkakis, a German member of the European Parliament, calls it “European patriotism.” The Europeans play both sides, and if they do it well, they profit handsomely. It’s a trend that will outlast both President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, the self-described “friend of America,” and Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, regardless of her visiting the Crawford ranch. It may comfort American conservatives to point out that Europe still lacks a common army; the only problem is that it doesn’t really need one. Europeans use intelligence and the police to apprehend radical Islamists, social policy to try to integrate restive Muslim populations and economic strength to incorporate the former Soviet Union and gradually subdue Russia. Each year European investment in Turkey grows as well, binding it closer to the E.U. even if it never becomes a member. And each year a new pipeline route opens transporting oil and gas from Libya, Algeria or Azerbaijan to Europe. What other superpower grows by an average of one country per year, with others waiting in line and begging to join? Robert Kagan famously said that America hails from Mars and Europe from Venus, but in reality, Europe is more like Mercury — carrying a big wallet. The E.U.’s market is the world’s largest, European technologies more and more set the global standard and European countries give the most development assistance. And if America and China fight, the world’s money will be safely invested in European banks. Many Americans scoffed at the introduction of the euro, claiming it was an overreach that would bring the collapse of the European project. Yet today, Persian Gulf oil exporters are diversifying their currency holdings into euros, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran has proposed that OPEC no longer price its oil in “worthless” dollars. President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela went on to suggest euros. It doesn’t help that Congress revealed its true protectionist colors by essentially blocking the Dubai ports deal in 2006. With London taking over (again) as the world’s financial capital for stock listing, it’s no surprise that China’s new state investment fund intends to locate its main Western offices there instead of New York. Meanwhile, America’s share of global exchange reserves has dropped to 65 percent. Gisele Bündchen demands to be paid in euros, while Jay-Z drowns in 500 euro notes in a recent video. American soft power seems on the wane even at home. And Europe’s influence grows at America’s expense. While America fumbles at nation-building, Europe spends its money and political capital on locking peripheral countries into its orbit. Many poor regions of the world have realized that they want the European dream, not the American dream. Africa wants a real African Union like the E.U.; we offer no equivalent. Activists in the Middle East want parliamentary democracy like Europe’s, not American-style presidential strongman rule. Many of the foreign students we shunned after 9/11 are now in London and Berlin: twice as many Chinese study in Europe as in the U.S. We didn’t educate them, so we have no claims on their brains or loyalties as we have in decades past. More broadly, America controls legacy institutions few seem to want — like the International Monetary Fund — while Europe excels at building new and sophisticated ones modeled on itself. The U.S. has a hard time getting its way even when it dominates summit meetings — consider the ill-fated Free Trade Area of the Americas — let Continued on next page – no text deleted.

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alone when it’s not even invited, as with the new East Asian Community, the region’s answer to America’s Apec. The East Asian Community is but one example of how China is also too busy restoring its place as the world’s “Middle Kingdom” to be distracted by the Middle Eastern disturbances that so preoccupy the United States. In America’s own hemisphere, from Canada to Cuba to Chávez’s Venezuela, China is cutting massive resource and investment deals. Across the globe, it is deploying tens of thousands of its own engineers, aid workers, dam-builders and covert military personnel. In Africa, China is not only securing energy supplies; it is also making major strategic investments in the financial sector. The whole world is abetting China’s spectacular rise as evidenced by the ballooning share of trade in its gross domestic product — and China is exporting weapons at a rate reminiscent of the Soviet Union during the cold war, pinning America down while filling whatever power vacuums it can find. Every country in the world currently considered a rogue state by the U.S. now enjoys a diplomatic, economic or strategic lifeline from China, Iran being the most prominent example. Without firing a shot, China is doing on its southern and western peripheries what Europe is achieving to its east and south. Aided by a 35 million-strong ethnic Chinese diaspora well placed around East Asia’s rising economies, a Greater Chinese Co-Prosperity Sphere has emerged. Like Europeans, Asians are insulating themselves from America’s economic uncertainties. Under Japanese sponsorship, they plan to launch their own regional monetary fund, while China has slashed tariffs and increased loans to its Southeast Asian neighbors. Trade within the India-Japan-Australia triangle — of which China sits at the center — has surpassed trade across the Pacific. At the same time, a set of Asian security and diplomatic institutions is being built from the inside out, resulting in America’s grip on the Pacific Rim being loosened one finger at a time. From Thailand to Indonesia to Korea, no country — friend of America’s or not — wants political tension to upset economic growth. To the Western eye, it is a bizarre phenomenon: small Asian nationstates should be balancing against the rising China, but increasingly they rally toward it out of Asian cultural pride and an understanding of the historical-cultural reality of Chinese dominance. And in the former Soviet Central Asian countries — the so-called Stans — China is the new heavyweight player, its manifest destiny pushing its Han pioneers westward while pulling defunct microstates like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as oil-rich Kazakhstan, into its orbit. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization gathers these Central Asian strongmen together with China and Russia and may eventually become the “NATO of the East.”

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Nonpolarity Now
The world is nonpolar. Haas 8 (Richard, CFR pres., May/June, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html)
The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is turning out to be nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. This represents a tectonic shift from the past. The twentieth century started out distinctly multipolar. But after almost 50 years, two world wars, and many smaller conflicts, a bipolar system emerged. Then, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, bipolarity gave way to unipolarity -- an international system dominated by one power, in this case the United States. But today power is diffuse, and the onset of nonpolarity raises a number of important questions. How does nonpolarity differ from other forms of international order? How and why did it materialize? What are its likely consequences? And how should the United States respond? NEWER WORLD ORDER In contrast to multipolarity -- which involves several distinct poles or concentrations of power -- a nonpolar international system is characterized by numerous centers with meaningful power. In a multipolar system, no power dominates, or the system will become unipolar. Nor do concentrations of power revolve around two positions, or the system will become bipolar. Multipolar systems can be cooperative, even assuming the form of a concert of powers, in which a few major powers work together on setting the rules of the game and disciplining those who violate them. They can also be more competitive, revolving around a balance of power, or conflictual, when the balance breaks down. At first glance, the world today may appear to be multipolar. The major powers -- China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan, Russia, and the United States -- contain just over half the world's people and account for 75 percent of global GDP and 80 percent of global defense spending. Appearances, however, can be deceiving. Today's world differs in a fundamental way from one of classic multipolarity: there are many more power centers, and quite a few of these poles are not nation-states. Indeed, one of the cardinal features of the contemporary international system is that nation-states have lost their monopoly on power and in some domains their preeminence as well. States are being challenged from above, by regional and global organizations; from below, by militias; and from the side, by a variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations. Power is now found in many hands and in many places. In addition to the six major world powers, there are numerous regional powers: Brazil and, arguably, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin America; Nigeria and South Africa in Africa; Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; Pakistan in South Asia; Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea in East Asia and Oceania. A good many organizations would be on the list of power centers, including those that are global (the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the World Bank), those that are regional (the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the EU, the Organization of American States, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and those that are functional (the International Energy Agency, OPEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the World Health Organization). So, too, would states within nation-states, such as California and India's Uttar Pradesh, and cities, such as New York, São Paulo, and Shanghai. Then there are the large global companies, including those that dominate the worlds of energy, finance, and manufacturing. Other entities deserving inclusion would be global media outlets (al Jazeera, the BBC, CNN), militias (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Mahdi Army, the Taliban), political parties, religious institutions and movements, terrorist organizations (al Qaeda), drug cartels, and NGOs of a more benign sort (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Doctors Without Borders, Greenpeace). Today's world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than concentrated, power.

Without firing a shot, China is doing on its southern and western peripheries what Europe is achieving to its east and south. Aided by a 35 million-strong ethnic Chinese diaspora well placed around East Asia’s rising economies, a Greater Chinese Co-Prosperity Sphere has emerged. Like Europeans, Asians are insulating themselves from America’s economic uncertainties. Under Japanese sponsorship, they plan to launch their own regional monetary fund, while China has slashed tariffs and increased loans to its Southeast Asian neighbors. Trade within the India-Japan-Australia triangle — of which China sits at the center — has surpassed trade across the Pacific. At the same time, a set of Asian security and diplomatic institutions is being built from the inside out, resulting in America’s grip on the Pacific Rim being loosened one finger at a time. From Thailand to Indonesia to Korea, no country — friend of America’s or not — wants political tension to upset economic growth. To the Western eye, it is a bizarre phenomenon: small Asian nation-states should be balancing against the rising China, but increasingly they rally toward it out of Asian cultural pride and an understanding of the historical-cultural reality of Chinese dominance. And in the former Soviet Central Asian countries — the so-called Stans — China is the new heavyweight player, its manifest destiny pushing its Han pioneers westward while pulling defunct microstates like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as oil-rich Kazakhstan, into its orbit. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization gathers these Central Asian strongmen together with China and Russia and may eventually become the “NATO of the East.”

China can counterbalance the US – ASATs and espionage. TIME 8 (2/13, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1712812,00.html)
But there may be more at stake than national honor. Some analysts say that China's attempts to access American space technology are less about boosting its space program than upgrading its military. China is already focusing on space as a potential battlefield. A recent Pentagon estimate of China's military capabilities said that China is investing heavily in anti-satellite weaponry. In January 2007, China demonstrated that it was able to destroy orbiting satellites when it brought down one of its own weather satellites with a missile. China clearly recognizes the significance of this capability. In 2005, a Chinese military officer wrote in the book Joint Space War Campaigns, put out by the National Defense University, that a "shock and awe strike" on satellites "will shake the structure of the opponent's operations system of organization and will create huge psychological impact on the opponent's policymakers." Such a strike could hypothetically allow China to counterbalance technologically superior U.S. forces, which rely heavily on satellites for battlefield data. China is still decades away from challenging the U.S. in space. But U.S. officials worry espionage may be bringing China a little closer to doing so here on Earth.

While denouncing India for the 1998 Pokhran II nuclear tests, Malaysia became a willing participant in Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear trade and commerce. Mr. Abdullah Badawi’s own son was allegedly frontrunning a shadow company for the benefit of AQ Khan’s international nuclear Wal-Mart that benefited Pakistan and smuggled nuclear weapon components to North Korea, Libya, Syria and Iran. Details of these transactions are carefully documented by Adrian Levy and Catherine Clark-Scott in their best seller entitled “Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons”. Also not widely known is the fact that Kuala Lumpur was the active planning and meeting ground for the Islamic terrorists who brought down the Twin Towers during the 9/11 attacks. It appears that after Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Malaysia has turned out to be the incubator of Jihadi terrorism in Asia. In the Asian geopolitical theatre, a de-facto China-Pakistan-Malaysia axis has emerged with its strong anti-India underpinnings. Malaysia, like Pakistan is an artificially contrived product of British Colonialism. The British colonial territory of Peninsular Malaya was merged with Sabah and Sarawak states that constitute East Malaysia. Analogous to Pakistan, it has pre-Islamic Indic and Hindu heritage that Malay Muslim civil society vehemently refuses to accept and acknowledge unlike their Indonesian cousins. Both countries are part of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and tend to view international policies through the prism of Islamic Ummah. Both countries lack true democracy and have authoritarian, anti-minority constitutional provisions that have brought about ethnic cleansing of Hindu minority since independence from colonial Britain. This has reflected in demographic pattern of both these countries with declining Hindu minority population since the time of Independence from colonial power Britain. Meanwhile, China, in order to counter-balance US in the Islamic world, has gone out of the way to aggressively cultivate Islamic countries, including Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, Albania, Libya and Malaysia etc. It is no secret that China has cultivated Pakistan over the last four decades to contain India. With their similar hostile anti-India and anti-Hindu national mindsets, both Pakistan and Malaysia have become Chinese pawns in the international chessboard.

In Europe’s capital, Brussels, technocrats, strategists and legislators increasingly see their role as being the global balancer between America and China. Jorgo Chatzimarkakis, a German member of the European Parliament, calls it “European patriotism.” The Europeans play both sides, and if they do it well, they profit handsomely. It’s a trend that will outlast both President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, the selfdescribed “friend of America,” and Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, regardless of her visiting the Crawford ranch. It may comfort American conservatives to point out that Europe still lacks a common army; the only problem is that it doesn’t really need one. Europeans use intelligence and the police to apprehend radical Islamists, social policy to try to integrate restive Muslim populations and economic strength to incorporate the former Soviet Union and gradually subdue Russia. Each year European investment in Turkey grows as well, binding it closer to the E.U. even if it never becomes a member. And each year a new pipeline route opens transporting oil and gas from Libya, Algeria or Azerbaijan to Europe. What other superpower grows by an average of one country per year, with others waiting in line and begging to join? Robert Kagan famously said that America hails from Mars and Europe from Venus, but in reality, Europe is more like Mercury — carrying a big wallet. The E.U.’s market is the world’s largest, European technologies more and more set the global standard and European countries give the most development assistance. And if America and China fight, the world’s money will be safely invested in European banks. Many Americans scoffed at the introduction of the euro, claiming it was an overreach that would bring the collapse of the European project. Yet today, Persian Gulf oil exporters are diversifying their currency holdings into euros, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran has proposed that OPEC no longer price its oil in “worthless” dollars. President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela went on to suggest euros. It doesn’t help that Congress revealed its true protectionist colors by essentially blocking the Dubai ports deal in 2006. With London taking over (again) as the world’s financial capital for stock listing, it’s no surprise that China’s new state investment fund intends to locate its main Western offices there instead of New York. Meanwhile, America’s share of global exchange reserves has dropped to 65 percent. Gisele Bündchen demands to be paid in euros, while Jay-Z drowns in 500 euro notes in a recent video. American soft power seems on the wane even at home. And Europe’s influence grows at America’s expense. While America fumbles at nation-building, Europe spends its money and political capital on locking peripheral countries into its orbit. Many poor regions of the world have realized that they want the European dream, not the American dream. Africa wants a real African Union like the E.U.; we offer no equivalent. Activists in the Middle East want parliamentary democracy like Europe’s, not American-style presidential strongman rule. Many of the foreign students we shunned after 9/11 are now in London and Berlin: twice as many Chinese study in Europe as in the U.S. We didn’t educate them, so we have no claims on their brains or loyalties as we have in decades past. More broadly, America controls legacy institutions few seem to want — like the International Monetary Fund — while Europe excels at building new and sophisticated ones modeled on itself. The U.S. has a hard time getting its way even when it dominates summit meetings — consider the ill-fated Free Trade Area of the Americas — let alone when it’s not even invited, as with the new East Asian Community, the region’s answer to America’s Apec.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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77 Hegemony

Yes Balancing – EU (2/2)
The EU is counterbalancing US influence. Al-Ahram 8 (6/4, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/899/re1.htm)
France, which will assume presidency of the European Union next month, Youssef pointed out, wants to create a counter- balance to the American role, which attempts to monopolise influence on developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict. He stressed that through its communications with European officials, Hamas is trying to make them aware of the reality of the Palestinian cause and limit the effect of Israeli propaganda as much as possible. He said that Hamas wants to break the isolation forced on it by Israel and America since it won the last elections and to try to open up more doors. He holds that the greatest problem facing the European position is its dependency on American politics and its unwillingness to cross lines set by Washington. Youssef reported a number of European officials he has met in Gaza and several European capitals as saying that they currently cannot overstep US policy, though they are convinced that placing Hamas on the list of terrorist organisations is a "mistake and lacks good judgement and balance". They say this because the isolation the world has imposed on Hamas has brought results opposite to those desired -- in addition to being unethical and unjust. Youssef holds that the EU will continue to place Hamas on the list of terrorist organisations until the current US administration completes its term.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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78 Hegemony

Yes Balancing – Russia/China/India
China, Russia, and India don’t have the political will to balance the US. Berman
But is such a construct possible? Many observers remain deeply skeptical. Earlier this year, Moscow’s Nezavisimaya Gazeta ridiculed the idea. “China, Russia and India are not forming and will not be able to form such a conglomerate,” the opposition paper insisted in a January editorial, stressing the historically-rocky ties between Beijing and New Delhi and Moscow’s wariness over China’s expanding energy ambitions. Some Chinese scholars are likewise incredulous, citing competing priorities between China and India and the long-standing premium placed by the PRC on independent foreign policy decision-making.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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79 Hegemony

Yes Balancing – Russia/China
Russia and China are counterbalancing the US. CNN 8 (5/23, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/05/23/china.russia.ap/index.html)
BEIJING, China (AP) -- The presidents of China and Russia have condemned U.S. plans for a global missile defense system. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev meeting with Chinese journalists on the eve of his visit to Beijing. In a joint statement signed with Chinese President Hu Jintao, the leaders said a U.S. plan for a global missile defense system "does not help to maintain strategic balance and stability or strengthen international efforts to control nonproliferation." Moscow and Beijing have formed closer ties in recent years as part of their efforts to counterbalance Washington's global dominance. The agreement came after new Russian President Dmitry Medvedev arrived Friday in Beijing on his first overseas trip since his inauguration earlier this month -- a further sign of improving ties between the one-time Cold War rivals. The official Xinhua News Agency said Medvedev's two-day visit will include talks with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. His arrival in Beijing was to come after a stop in neighboring Kazakhstan on Thursday, where he was seeking to preserve his country's clout in the energy-rich Central Asian region. China and Russia have built a relationship intended to serve as a counterweight to U.S. dominance, but continued friction remains -- especially over oil and gas -- in Central Asia.

Sino-Russian relations are high, allowing them to counterbalance the US. MSN News 8 (5/23, http://news.in.msn.com/international/article.aspx?cp-documentid=1414630)
Beijing: Chinese President Hu Jintao thanked Russia's new president Dmitry Medvedev, who is visiting China for offering speedy aid after last week's powerful earthquake, as the two began meetings Friday to bolster their partnership with expanded nuclear cooperation. The trip is Dmitry Medvedev's first since his inauguration earlier this month as the hand-picked successor to Vladimir Putin, underscoring the importance the two countries place on a relationship that both see as a counterbalance to U.S. dominance. But continued friction between the neighboring giants remains _ especially over oil and gas in Central Asia. At the start of their talks, Hu thanked both Medvedev and Putin _ now prime minister _ for assistance offered after the May 12 quake that struck central China. Russia sent rescue crews and a mobile hospital to the disaster area in central Sichuan province. ''Your visit to China is very important and will allow us to not only preserve but to advance all the good undertakings we have had,'' Hu said. ''We are sure that it will give a powerful impulse to the development of strategic partnership and cooperation.'' Medvedev offered his condolences to quake victims and relatives of more than 55,000 dead. "Russia is ready to provide all the necessary assistance and aid to our Chinese friends," he said."You must have no doubt that we will do everything necessary." The two leaders' talks were to conclude later Friday with a series of agreements including a US$1 billion (?630 million) deal on Russian help building a uranium enrichment facility for electricity generation and regular shipments of low-enriched uranium to China. ''We are ready to conduct general dialogue on all aspects of our strategic partnership,'' Medvedev said. Medvedev came to China from a stop in neighboring Kazakhstan, where he was seeking to preserve his country's clout in energy-rich central Asia and send a message to both Beijing and the West that Moscow continues to see the region as its home turf. China already has won a cut of the region's riches, reaching an oil pipeline deal with Kazakhstan and negotiating a gas agreement with Turkmenistan. There is also rich symbolism in Medvedev's choice of China as the main destination of his first foreign trip. When his predecessor Putin went abroad for the first time as president in 2000, he traveled to London _ via Belarus _ with a message Russia wanted closer ties to the West. In recent years, China and Russia have made highly symbolic political overtures to one another, holding joint military maneuvers and engaging in highlevel talks on creating a "multi-polar world". They have taken a coordinated stance on several global issues, sharing opposition to Kosovo's independence and U.S. missile defense plans, and taking a similar approach to the Iran nuclear issue. Putin greatly strengthened relations with China, reaching a long-delayed agreement on demarcation of the 2,700 mile (4,300-kilometer) border.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

80 Hegemony

Yes Soft Balancing
Nations are engaging in soft balancing with the US. Bergfeldt 8 (Henrik, Lund U poli-sci dept., http://www.essays.se/essay/dc887e7a72/)
One of the biggest puzzles deriving from this debate is whether the balance of power theory vanished with the Cold War. The balance of power theory envisages that second-tier major powers1 such as Russia and China should start to assembleforces based on arms buildups and countervailing alliances in order to keep the power of the U.S. in check. Today, the absence of overt counter balancing at the systemic level has made scholars question the relevance of the balance of power theory and its ability to explain state behavior in the post-Cold War world. In the last couple of years however, potential explanations to this irregularity have started to occur. Today, scholars believe that second-tier states, at least until recently, have refrained from balancing the power of the United States since they do not regard the country as a threat. This new turn, in connection with a growing literature on American aggressive unilateralism after 9/11, has made scholars foresee a new kind of state behavior. Even though second-tier states do not want to challenge the U.S. directly, they are increasingly using non-military tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies. The most prominent examples of this behavior are: SinoRussian rapprochement, the Russian-Iran alliance, the defense cooperation of European Union, and the anti-American coalition before the Iraq war. As a result, the conventional wisdom started to change and “soft balancing” became a way of describing this kind of state behavior. The soft balancing argument rests on the same assumptions as neo-realism’s balance of power theory and is not only seen as a subtler form of this behavior but also as a precursor to “hard” power balancing. In other words, states that chose to soft balance can, at any time, change their minds and start balancing the U.S. in the more traditional sense.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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81 Hegemony

AT: Benign Hegemony
( ) The US is not perceived as benign—unilateralist polices are menacing to other powers. Christopher Layne, Associate Professor of Bush School of Government and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, 2006 (“The Unipolar Illusion Revisted: The Coming of the United States’Unipolar Moment”, International Security
31.2, 7-41, Project Muse) Precisely because unipolarity means that other states must worry primarily [End Page 21] about the hegemon's capabilities rather than its intentions, the ability of the United States to reassure others is limited by its formidable—and unchecked—capabilities, which always are at least a latent threat to other states. 55 This is not to say that the United States is powerless to shape others' perceptions of whether it is a threat. But doing so is difficult because in a unipolar world, the burden of proof is on the hegemon to demonstrate to others that its power is not threatening. 56 Even in a unipolar world, not all of the other major powers will believe themselves to be threatened (or to be equally threatened) by the hegemon. Eventually, however, some are bound to regard the hegemon's power as menacing. For example, although primacists assert that U.S. hegemony is nonthreatening because U.S. power is "offshore," this manifestly is not the case. On the contrary, in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East, American power is both onshore (or lurking just over the horizon in the case of East Asia) and in the faces of Russia, China, and the Islamic world. Far from being an offshore balancer that is "stopped by water" from dominating regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, the United States has acquired the means to project massive military power into, and around, Eurasia, and thereby to establish extraregional hegemony in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. 57

( ) There is no such thing as a benevolent hegemon. Christopher Layne, Associate Professor of Bush School of Government and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, 2006 (“The Unipolar Illusion Revisted: The Coming of the United States’Unipolar Moment”, International Security
31.2, 7-41, Project Muse) In international politics there are no benevolent hegemons. In today's world, other states dread both the overconcentration of geopolitical influence in the United States' favor and the purposes for which it may be used. As Paul Sharp writes, "No great power has a monopoly on virtue and, although some may have a great deal more virtue than others, virtue imposed on others is not seen as such by them. All great powers are capable of exercising a measure of self-restraint, but they are tempted not to and the choice to practice restraint is made easier by the existence of countervailing power and the possibility of it [End Page 27] being exercised." 74 While Washington's self-proclaimed benevolence is inherently ephemeral, the hard fist of U.S. power is tangible.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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82 Hegemony

AT: Benign Hegemony (Democracy)
( ) US democracy doesn’t make heg benevolent—democracy doesn’t decrease international fear of US hegemonic power Christopher Layne, Associate Professor of Bush School of Government and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, 2006 (“The Unipolar Illusion Revisted: The Coming of the United States’Unipolar Moment”, International Security
31.2, 7-41, Project Muse) Many primacists believe that the United States can be a successful, benevolent hegemon because it is a liberal democracy. This argument rests on wobbly reasoning. Certainly, there is a considerable literature purporting to show that the quality of international politics among democracies differs from that between democracies and nondemocracies; that is, democracies cooperate with each other, constitute a "pluralistic security community," accord each other respect, and conduct their affairs based on shared values and norms (transparency, give-and-take, live and let live, compromise, and peaceful dispute resolution). These ideas comport with the Wilsonian ideology that drives U.S. grand strategic behavior, but there is powerful evidence demonstrating that democracies do not behave better toward each other than toward nondemocracies. The mere fact that the United States is a democracy does not negate the possibility that other states will fear its hegemonic power. First, theories that posit a special democratic (or liberal) peace are contradicted by the historical record. When important geopolitical interests are at stake, realpolitik—not regime type —determines great power policies. 69 Contrary to liberal theory, democracies (and liberal states) have threatened to use military force against each other to resolve diplomatic crises and have even gone to the brink of war. Indeed, democracies have not just teetered on the brink; they have gone over it. The most notable example of a war among democracies occurred in 1914 when democratic Britain and France went to war against democratic Germany. 70 Today, the gross imbalance of U.S. power means that whenever the United States believes its interests are threatened, it will act like other hegemons typically have acted, notwithstanding that it is a democracy. 71 [End Page 26] Second, the term "democracy" itself is subjective; democracy has many different—contested—meanings. 72 To say that two states are democracies may conceal more than it reveals.

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83 Hegemony

AT: Soft Balancing Won’t Work
( ) Soft balancing decreases hegemony. Robert A. Pape, professor of political science at the U of Chicago, 2005 (“Soft Balancing against the United
States”, International Security 30.1, 7-45, Project Muse) States can also seek to equalize the odds through soft balancing. Balancing can involve the utilization of tools to make a superior state's military forces harder to use without directly confronting that state's power with one's own forces. Although soft balancing relies on nonmilitary tools, it aims to have a real, if indirect, effect on the military prospects of a superior state. Mechanisms of soft balancing include territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signaling of resolve to participate in a balancing coalition. All of these steps can weaken the military power that the superior state can bring to bear in battle.59

( ) Soft balancing decreases hegemony—weakens the military power that the superior states can bring to battle. Robert A. Pape, professor of political science at the U of Chicago, 2005 (“Soft Balancing against the United
States”, International Security 30.1, 7-45, Project Muse) How Soft Balancing Works States can also seek to equalize the odds through soft balancing. Balancing can involve the
utilization of tools to make a superior state's military forces harder to use without directly confronting that state's power with one's own forces. Although soft balancing relies on nonmilitary tools, it aims to have a real, if indirect, effect on the military prospects of a superior state. Mechanisms of soft balancing include territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening, and signaling of resolve to participate in a balancing coalition. All of these steps can weaken the military power that the superior state can bring to bear in battle.59

Territorial Denial. Superior states often benefit from access to the territory of third parties as staging areas for ground forces or as transit for air and naval forces. Denying access to this territory can reduce the superior state's prospects for victory, such as by increasing the logistical problems for the superior state or
compelling it to fight with air or sea power alone, constraints that effectively reduce the overall force that a stronger state can bring to bear against a weaker one. Entangling Diplomacy. Even strong states do not have complete freedom to ignore either the rules and procedures of important international organizations or accepted diplomatic practices without losing substantial support for their objectives. Accordingly, states may use international institutions and ad hoc diplomatic maneuvers to delay

a superior state's plan for war and so reduce the element of surprise and give the weaker side more time to prepare; delay may even make the issue irrelevant. Especially if the superior state is [End Page 36] also a
democracy, entangling diplomacy works not only by affecting the balance of military capabilities that can be brought to bear in the dispute but also by strengthening domestic opposition to possible adventures within the superior state. Economic Strengthening.

Militarily strong, threatening states that are the targets of balancing efforts usually derive their military superiority from possession of great economic strength. One way of balancing effectively, at least in the
long run, would be to shift relative economic power in favor of the weaker side. The most obvious way of doing this is through regional trading blocs that increase trade and economic growth for members while directing trade away from nonmembers. If the superior

state can be excluded from the most important such blocs, its overall trade and growth rates may suffer over time. Signals of Resolve to Balance. Second-ranked powers seeking to act collectively against a sole superpower confront intense concern that the needed collective action will not materialize. Soft balancing, in addition to its direct usefulness in restraining aggression by a unipolar leader, may also address this problem by helping to coordinate expectations of mutual balancing behavior. If multiple states can cooperate, repeatedly, in some of the types of measures listed above, they may gradually increase their trust in each other's willingness to cooperate against the unipolar leader's ambitions. Thus, a core purpose of soft balancing is not to coerce or even to impede the superior state's current actions, but to demonstrate resolve in a manner that signals a commitment to resist the superpower's future ambitions. Accordingly, the measure of success for soft balancing is not limited to whether the sole superpower abandons specific policies, but also includes whether more states join a soft-balancing coalition against the unipolar leader.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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84 Hegemony

AT: Soft Balancing Empirically Denied
( ) Soft balancing works—the US and Germany prove. Robert A. Pape, professor of political science at the U of Chicago, 2005 (“Soft Balancing against the United
States”, International Security 30.1, 7-45, Project Muse) Soft balancing is most conducive to the politics of unipolar systems, but examples of it can be found in history. Today, the U.S. strategy of containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War is thought of as a military strategy, but this is not how it started out. The crucial first step was the Marshall Plan, a massive program of U.S. economic aid to rebuild the shattered industries, agricultural areas, and cities of Europe and Japan in the aftermath of World War II. This economic instrument helped desperate states resist the temptations of communist doctrines of class struggle and revolution; it also integrated Western Europe and Japan into a North Atlantic trading network. Although the Marshall Plan did not create military forces or commit states to use force against the Soviet Union, it was the crucial long-term bond that ensured that the world's key [End Page 37] industrial centers would be in the Western camp and that the Soviet Union would remain permanently inferior to it.60 A second example is Bismarckian Germany. After Germany's victory in the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, France remained Bismarck's immediate problem, both because it retained the most latent power of any state on the continent and because it might have tried to avenge its loss. A comprehensive German-led alliance against the French, however, was not possible. Austria, Russia, and Britain were worried about France, but they were also worried about a newly unified Germany, and so could be tempted into an alliance with Paris. Bismarck's solution was to set up a series of crosscutting alliances and contradictory international commitments that, at its peak, included half of Europe but excluded France. This system was largely useless in case of war, but that was not the point. As Josef Joffe has written, "Bismarck did not construct his system in order to aggregate power but to devalue it —balancing and stalemating à la Britain, but in totally un-British ways."61 In other words, this new web of international cooperation isolated and balanced against a potentially superior power not through addition (amassing military forces in opposition) but through dilution (removing capabilities available to the opponent) and without confronting the power of the opponent directly.

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AT: Multilateralism Insulates from Balancing
( ) Multilateralism cannot inoculate the US from counterbalancing, especially after Iraq Christopher Layne, Associate Professor of Bush School of Government and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, 2006 (“The Unipolar Illusion Revisted: The Coming of the United States’Unipolar Moment”, International Security
31.2, 7-41, Project Muse) The argument that U.S. hegemony can be long-lasting if the United States acts multilaterally is doubtful. Its proponents assert that by acting multilaterally, [End Page 23] the United States can establish its credentials as a benevolent hegemon and insulate itself from counterbalancing. The very hallmarks of international politics, however—anarchy, self-help, and competition—mean that, in the realm of security, unilateral strategies are always the default option of great powers. As John Mearsheimer writes, "States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international community. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world." 60 Smart policymakers in other states know this and understand the implications with respect to U.S. behavior. Prophylatic multilateralism cannot inoculate the United States from counterhegemonic balancing. The reality of the United States' enormous power cannot be hidden by the veil of multilateralism. Moreover, what the feisty Brooklyn Dodgers' manager Leo Duroucher said about baseball is also true in international politics: nice guys finish last. The United States did not attain hegemony by being nice, but rather by assertively—and, occasionally, aggressively—using its power. Although the United States may profess its regard for others' interests and its commitment to multilateralism, it can use its power unilaterally to others' detriment whenever it chooses. 61 If other states did not understand this before (though many of them did), the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq dispelled any illusion. For much of the world, the invasion shattered one of the most important foundations upon which the notion of benevolent U.S. hegemony is based: the perception that the United States is a status quo power. Since the Cold War's end, notes Walt, "The United States has not acted as a 'status quo' power: rather, it has used its position of primacy to increase its influence, to enhance its position vis-à-vis potential rivals, and to deal with specific security threats." 62

( ) US multilateralism is a myth—the US will inevitably default to unilateralism most of the time Christopher Layne, Associate Professor of Bush School of Government and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, 2006 (“The Unipolar Illusion Revisted: The Coming of the United States’Unipolar Moment”, International Security
31.2, 7-41, Project Muse) Indeed, the idea that the United States—until the George W. Bush administration—preferred to act multilaterally is more myth than fact. Although this administration has been more inept diplomatically than many of its predecessors, the substance of its policy has been the same: the United States acts multilaterally when it can (i.e., when others support U.S. policies), and unilaterally [End Page 24] when it decides that it must, which is much of the time. 63 Following World War II, the United States created a web of security and economic institutions to solidify its hegemony in the non-Soviet world and promote its grand strategic ambitions. In doing so, it availed itself of its allies' strategic resources (and kept them from drifting into the Soviet sphere), but it never intended to be constrained by its allies—and seldom was. 64 All post-1945 U.S. administrations "have believed that the only way" the United States could attain its most critical grand strategic goals "was to keep others from having too much influence" on its policies. 65 In the Suez, Berlin, and Cuban missile crises, and during the Vietnam War, the United States acted unilaterally. Similarly, according to Stephen Sestanovich, it also did so during the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s and during the negotiations on German reunification. 66 And although the U.S.-led NATO interventions in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 may have appeared to be—and certainly were depicted by Washington as—multilateral actions, they were not. As Walt observes, "America's European allies complained during both episodes, but could do little to stop the United States from imposing its preferences upon them." 67 In truth, when they felt [End Page 25] that U.S. interests required doing so, preceding administrations acted no less unilaterally than did the Bush administration in deciding (foolishly) to invade Iraq in March 2003. 68

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

86 Hegemony

AT We Solve Bad Parts of Heg (Multilateralism)
Multilateralism is a sham—realism dictates that so long as the US is so preponderant, it will act unilaterally. One instance will not negate the larger trend Layne 2K2
(Christopher & Ben Schwarz, Assoc. Prof Political Science at the University of Miami “A New Grand Strategy”, Atlantic Monthly, Jan 2002, vol. 289, no. 1, p. Proquest) Many American foreign policy analysts have concluded that the Iraq crisis has demonstrated the folly of a unilateralist American grand strategy. To heal the transatlantic breach, they say, the lesson from the Iraq crisis is of the imperative need for the United States to work multilaterally in concert with Europe. The debate about whether the U.S. should act multilaterally or unilaterally rests on a false dichotomy, however. In international politics, great powers always put their self-interest first. And they must do so; international politics is an especially competitive realm. In the jargon of international relations scholars, international politics is an “anarchic” system because there is no central authority able to make and enforce laws and maintain order. Consequently, international politics is a “self-help” system in which each actor must rely primarily on its own efforts to ensure its survival and security, and in which each can employ the means of its choice—including force—to advance its interests. As University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer says: “States operating in a self help world almost always act according to their own selfinterest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international community. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world.”49 The nature of international politics impels great powers to think of themselves first— thus, their natural inclination is to act unilaterally. If Iraq posed a serious and imminent threat to the United States, then Washington need not be constrained by the opposition of NATO Europe (or at least its hard core, centered on France and Germany). The best argument against the Bush administration’s Iraq policy was not that the United States needed to placate Paris, Berlin, or London, but rather that there were—and despite the battlefield success, there remain—serious questions about the wisdom of the administration’s policy. First, as the leading realist scholars John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt recently have pointed out, containment was an effective strategy for dealing with Saddam Hussein.50 Second, the administration’s policy toward Iraq is—in the memorable phrase of German chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg in July 1914—a leap into the dark. Although the ultimate success of American forces on the battlefield never was in doubt, wars are fought to attain political objectives. And it is far from clear that the United States is going to be more secure now that Saddam Hussein is removed from power. At best, as the early months of the postwar occupation suggest, the United States faces the prospect of a lengthy and costly period of pacifying and reconstructing Iraq. And if recent acts of violence against American military personnel are indicative, it is far from clear that the people of Iraq are prepared to acquiesce either to the U.S. military occupation or to accept an Americanimposed government. At worst, there still is a risk that Iraq will come apart at the seams. What does seem apparent is that the unsettled political situation in Iraq following the war is likely to have crucial ramifications for regional stability. These considerations, not the failure to defer to Paris and Berlin, are the real defects in U.S. policy.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

87 Hegemony

***Energy Leadership High***

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

88 Hegemony

Energy Leadership High (1/2)
The US is assuming energy leadership – research and economic trends prove. Lugar 8 (Richard, US senator, Jan., http://lugarenergycenter.iupui.edu/forum.html)
Already, faculty and student researchers affiliated with the Center are accomplishing world-class research in areas such as fuel cells, biofuels, batteries, and solar energy. One of the guiding principles of their work is to develop technologies that will be capable of widespread usage. American consumers and industries demand energy that is reliable, safe, and cost-effective. No new technology will be successful without meeting those basic criteria. An energy revolution is occurring that will transform the world economy, and Indiana can be at the center of it. Throughout Indiana, we have ground-breaking researchers at our universities, and we have a history of innovation in automobiles and manufacturing. In October 2006, I traveled across Indiana in a flex-fuel car using E85 ethanol. On that trip, I visited with many entrepreneurial Hoosiers doing exciting research and production in new energy technologies. It is thus fortuitous that the Lugar Center for Renewable Energy is based right here at the crossroads of it all in Indianapolis.

US energy leadership is emerging. Lugar 8 (Richard, US senator, Jan., http://lugarenergycenter.iupui.edu/forum.html)
Public awareness of our energy dilemma is improving. Politicians understand that Americans care about energy security, the environmental and balance of payments impact of oil dependence, and the cost of energy. For almost two years now, I have been asserting that the “balance of realism” in the U.S. energy debate has shifted from proponents of a fossil fuel-based, laissez faire approach relying on market evolution to advocates of energy alternatives who recognize the urgency of achieving a major reorientation in the way the United States obtains and uses energy. The new energy “realist” asks: how can we shape our energy future before it shapes us in calamitous ways? Yet, despite this new energy realism in American politics, the United States has not committed itself to the policy steps required to achieve a promising alternative future. In fact, advancements in American energy security have been painfully slow, and political leadership has been defensive, rather than pro-active. One can point with appreciation to some positive trends and initiatives. For example, the energy bill passed last month by Congress and signed into law by the President included a substantial increase in the renewable fuels standard. It took Senators Daschle, Harkin, and me five years to pass a Renewable Fuels Standard that was less than a quarter of the 36 billion gallons now agreed upon. But compared to our acute energy vulnerability, progress in most areas of energy policy has not been sufficient.

The US is spearheading alternative energy in Hawaii, building energy leadership. Cox News 8 (1/29, http://www.ajc.com/green/content/shared/green/stories/2008/CLIMATE_HAWAII30_COX.html)
It may be known for surf and sunshine, but Hawaii is also quickly earning a name for itself as a national hot spot for alternative energy. The island state's pioneering push for alternative energy is one of the reasons the White House picked Honolulu for a meeting of world economic leaders Wednesday and Thursday to discuss climate change and energy security. Diplomats from the world's 15 biggest economies, along with the United Nations and the European Union, are expected to attend. It's also why the U.S. Department of Energy this week announced an unprecedented project to make Hawaii produce 70 percent of its energy from renewable sources by 2030. Through state and federal investments, tax credits and new energy policies, the Energy Department and Hawaii hope to attract billions of dollars in new clean energy development to Hawaii and turn the state into a national test bed for renewable energy. "We need to be able to go to a place where people can look and feel and touch and see the integration of these things in society as commonplace," Assistant Energy Secretary Andy Karsner said in an interview here. "That's what Hawaii can give us." Of course, some of Hawaii's green-energy projects are inexorably tied to its unique resources. But some innovative projects in the works could eventually make their way to mainland states.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

89 Hegemony

Energy Leadership High (2/2)
US Companies paving the way for alternative energy Romm and Curtis 96 (Joseph, Charles, April, http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/96apr/oil/oil.htm)
Predicting our energy future beyond 2010 is chancy, but here we have an opportunity to rely on perhaps the most successful predictor in the energy business: Royal Dutch/Shell Group. According to The Economist, "The only oil company to anticipate both 1973's oil-price boom and 1986's bust was Royal Dutch/Shell." Anticipating the oil
shocks of the 1970s helped Shell to move from being the weakest of the seven largest oil companies in 1970 to being one of the two strongest only ten years later. Anticipating the oil bust was apparently even more lucrative. According to Fortune's ranking of the 500 largest corporations, Royal Dutch/Shell is now not only the most profitable oil company in the world but the most

When such a company envisions a fundamental transition in power generation from fossil fuels to renewable energy beginning in two decades, a transition that will have a significant impact on every aspect of our lives, the prediction is worth examining in some detail. Chris Fay, the chairman and CEO of Shell UK Ltd., said in a speech in Scotland last year, "There is clearly a limit to fossil fuel. . . . Shell analysis suggests that resources and supplies are likely to peak around 2030 before declining slowly. . . . But what about the growing gap between demand and fossil fuel supplies? Some will obviously be filled by hydro-electric and nuclear power. Far more important will be the contribution of alternative renewable energy supplies." Fay presented a detailed analysis of future trends in energy supply and demand, noting that the fossil-fuel peak in 2030
profitable corporation of any kind. would occur at a usage level half again as high as today's. Shell's analysis does not rely exclusively on supply limits--after all, for decades people have been worried about such limits, and the supply has continued to expand--but also incorporates a recognition of the tremendous advances that have been made in renewable-energy technologies over the past two decades and that are expected to be made over the next two decades. Although these advances in renewables have received very little media attention, they have persuaded Shell planners that renewables may make up a third of the supply of new electricity within three decades even if electricity from fossil fuels continues to decline in cost. An "Energy in Transition" scenario that they have prepared does not assume price increases in fossil fuels--also, as we have seen, a plausible hypothesis. Nor does Shell assume any attempt by governments to incorporate environmental costs into the price of energy, even though every single independent analysis has found that fossil-fuel generation has much higher environmental costs than non-fossil-fuel generation has. According to Shell's

"The Energy in Transition future can claim to be a genuine 'Business as Usual' scenario, since its energy demand is a continuation of a long historical trend, and the energy is supplied in a way which continues the pattern." Indeed, in the past fifteen years the Department of Energy, working with the private sector, has reduced the costs of electricity from biomass (such as crops and crop waste) and wind, bringing them into the current range of wholesale costs for coal and other traditional sources of electricity: three to five cents per kilowatt-hour. A quiet revolution has already brought the United States almost eight gigawatts of biomass electrical capacity. Gasifying biomass and using advanced turbines could bring biomass power to 4.5 cents per kilowatt-hour within a decade, according to the DOE's National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Shell projects that by 2010 commercial energy from biomass could provide five percent of the world's power; using
strategic-planning group, Shell's projections, we estimate that the value of that power generation could exceed $20 billion. Over the past fifteen years electricity from wind power has declined in cost by 10 percent a year. The problems of the windmills that were rushed to market in the 1970s, such as noise and TV interference, have largely been solved. With the DOE's help the old wind-turbine blades, borrowed almost directly from aircraft-propeller design, have been replaced with sophisticated blades designed to capture wind energy efficiently over a broad range of wind speeds and direction. Utilities are already receiving long-term bids for electricity from wind at 4.5 cents per kilowatt-hour in the best wind sites in the country. With a continued public-private partnership in technology advancement, wind could hit three cents per kilowatt-hour by 2020, and soon after that wind-power plants' annual sales could reach $50 billion. Photovoltaic (PV) cells, which convert sunlight

. Shell expects that PVs, along with fuel cells and small gas-fired power plants, will permit the growth of distributed-power systems. In developing nations distributed sources can obviate the need for huge power lines and other costly elements of an enormous electric-power grid (much as personal computers replace large mainframe computers). PV
into electricity, now cost one tenth what they did in 1975. The DOE has invested heavily in new thin-film PV panels, which take advantage of U.S. expertise in semiconductor fabrication modules sold worldwide totaled less than four megawatts in 1980 and now exceed 80 megawatts a year; sales continue to grow. The Energy in Transition scenario predicts that photovoltaics and other direct conversions of sunlight will be the most rapidly growing form of commercial energy after 2030. Sales could quickly exceed $100 billion. Shell itself has bought two photovoltaics

This scenario, a highly credible one given Shell's reputation, is tantalizing, because it holds out the possibility that the world could within a few decades begin to realize the dream of nearly pollution-free energy. Consider also that the United States, which is now the leader in most areas of renewables technology, could simultaneously reduce its dependence on foreign energy supplies, reverse the trend toward an ever-increasing energy trade deficit, and capture a large share of what promises to be perhaps the largest new job-creating sector of the international economy.
companies.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

90 Hegemony

Energy Leadership High – Innovation
US making long term plans for leadership Romm and Curtis 96 (Joseph, Charles, April, http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/96apr/oil/oil.htm)
the DOE is that it has had big, expensive failures, such as the synthetic-fuels program, but few successes. The department has learned from experience, however, and its R&D portfolio is diverse, emphasizing small-scale technologies that have in fact been remarkably successful in the past. The recently concluded independent review of the department's energy-research
Another criticism often leveled at portfolio cited dozens of examples of such technologies, among them a $3 million investment in energy-efficient windows made in the late 1970s, which has already saved U.S. taxpayers more than $1 billion in lower energy bills; a polycrystalline diamond drill bit that has reduced the cost of drilling for oil by $1 million per well; and many of the advances

Diversity is a key element of DOE policy today: diversify the world's oil supply, and diversify America's domestic supply and end-use options. Because no one can predict the future with certainty, or know the outcome of R&D in advance, the DOE must invest in many options. The sharp
described above, including photovoltaics. cuts that Congress is pursuing narrow the country's options and leave us far less flexibility to respond to future crises and opportunities. Finally, some argue that government

the DOE has formed partnerships with the private sector to develop leapfrog technologies--such as the fuel cell, solar energy, and clean industrial, building, and transportation technologies--that will benefit many segments of our society. Americans today have a duty to eliminate the deficit, rooted in their obligation to future generations, but the country also needs to acknowledge that public investment in R&D, far from being corporate welfare, is an investment in America's own future. As the Yergin task force wrote, Americans have an obligation to "assure for future generations that our Nation's capacity to shape the future through scientific research and technological innovation is continually being renewed."
investments are "corporate welfare," a term implying a giveaway with no societal benefits. But

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

91 Hegemony

Energy Leadership High – Perception
Perceptions of US energy leadership are unprecedented Science Daily 8 (6/20, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/07/070719140134.htm)
(NSF) report finds the number of U.S. science and engineering (S&E) articles in major peer-reviewed journals flattened in the 1990s, after more than two decades of growth, but U.S. influence in world science and technology remains strong. The report, Changing U.S. Output of Scientific Articles: 1988 - 2003, finds changes occurred despite continued increases in funding and personnel for research and development. Flattening occurred in nearly all U.S. research disciplines and types of institutions. In contrast, emerging Asian nations had large increases in publication
A new National Science Foundation numbers, reflecting their growing expertise in science and technology. European Union totals also went up. Numbers of articles published and their citation in S&E journals is a widely accepted indicator of research capability. When paired with trends in patenting, licensing, research and development expenditures and advanced training of personnel, publication trends may be viewed as a factor affecting a nation's ability to spur technological innovation. Despite the

researchers emphasize other evidence that indicates U.S. science and technology capability remains strong. They say the change in U.S. share of the world's S&E articles is not a surprise in view of growing S&E research capability around the world, nor do they view it as a cause for concern. "In addition to numbers published, one should look at another very
leveling of articles published, important indicator -- article quality," said Derek Hill, senior analyst and a coauthor of the report. "The more often an article is cited by other publications, the higher quality it's

the United States remains a major force in world S&E. However its overall share of published articles has declined while other nations produce more.
believed to have. While citation is not a perfect indicator, U.S. publications are more highly cited than those from other countries." In raw numbers, continues to publish far more articles than any other country and

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

92 Hegemony

***Energy Leadership Low***

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

93 Hegemony

Energy Leadership Low (1/4)
Energy leadership is low – current progress towards energy security is insufficient. Lugar 8 (Richard, US senator, Jan., http://lugarenergycenter.iupui.edu/forum.html)
Public awareness of our energy dilemma is improving. Politicians understand that Americans care about energy security, the environmental and balance of payments impact of oil dependence, and the cost of energy. For almost two years now, I have been asserting that the “balance of realism” in the U.S. energy debate has shifted from proponents of a fossil fuel-based, laissez faire approach relying on market evolution to advocates of energy alternatives who recognize the urgency of achieving a major reorientation in the way the United States obtains and uses energy. The new energy “realist” asks: how can we shape our energy future before it shapes us in calamitous ways? Yet, despite this new energy realism in American politics, the United States has not committed itself to the policy steps required to achieve a promising alternative future. In fact, advancements in American energy security have been painfully slow, and political leadership has been defensive, rather than pro-active. One can point with appreciation to some positive trends and initiatives. For example, the energy bill passed last month by Congress and signed into law by the President included a substantial increase in the renewable fuels standard. It took Senators Daschle, Harkin, and me five years to pass a Renewable Fuels Standard that was less than a quarter of the 36 billion gallons now agreed upon. But compared to our acute energy vulnerability, progress in most areas of energy policy has not been sufficient. If we have to endure an oil embargo, if terrorists succeed in disrupting our oil lifeline, if we slide into a military conflict because oil wealth has emboldened anti-American regimes, if climate change is accelerated by unrestrained growth in carbon emissions, or if eventual scarcity sends energy prices to unthinkable heights, it will not matter that before disaster struck, the American public and its leaders gained a new sense of realism about our vulnerability. It will not matter that we were producing marginally more ethanol than before or that consumers are more willing to consider hybrids and other alternative vehicles. Achieving a positive trend line is almost inevitable as long as energy costs remain high, because these costs will lead to some improvements in investment and conservation. We need to have the discipline to understand that a modestly positive trend line is not enough.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

94 Hegemony

Energy Leadership Low (2/4)
The US lacks energy leadership. Huffington Post 8 (6/16, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/clint-wilder/as-the-world-watches-wash_b_107344.html)
No challenge is more global than climate change, and the contrast between international 'Obamania' and the U.S. Senate's latest failure on carbon emissions legislation - the same week that Obama clinched his nomination -- couldn't have been more striking. Pulled from the Senate floor after less than four days of debate, the Warner-Lieberman cap-and-trade bill was an all-too-familiar reminder of America's 71⁄2 years of failed leadership on climate action. It's not the demise of Warner-Lieberman that I lament - it was a flawed bill on many levels. It was the pathetic nature of the debate itself. The New York Times editorialized that Republicans "behaved like babies" and forced a full reading of the 492-page bill. Leading Republican senators presented the same tired, outdated arguments we've heard for at least 20 years, that we have to choose between the environment and the economy. And now there's the convenient debating cudgel of high gas prices. Let's think through the logic of that - we can't 'afford' to take action on global warming because we're paying too much for the hydrocarbons (coal and natural gas costs are way up, as well) that are causing the problem. Seems like bizarre reasoning to me. (By the way, that U.S. economy of ours, safely protected from those big bad ruinous carbon limits - how's it been performing lately?) Many in Congress, at least those among the 41 senators with the power to block anything in the all-filibuster-allthe-time scenario of the past two years, clearly want nothing to do with carbon legislation. To make matters worse, the Senate failed yet again last week to extend the critical investment and production tax credits for wind, solar, and other clean energy sources that will expire at year's end. Meanwhile, the climate and economic effects of our fossil-fueled world - deadly heat waves, wildfires, record floods and droughts - are on the front page daily. Even China (and India to a lesser extent), as reported by The Economist, are getting into action - Chinese provincial leaders now have "save energy, cut emissions" targets as criteria for promotions. And on June 10, scientific academies in five developing countries -Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa -- joined those in the G-8 nations in calling for much more aggressive action on global carbon reduction. We in the U.S. can do so much better than our Congress (and our president, with his threatened veto of cap-and-trade legislation) have shown. Whatever happened to global leadership, cutting-edge thinking and problem-solving, technology and financial innovation, and good ol' Yankee ingenuity? I rarely agree with words spoken by GOP Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, but he said he opposed the Warner-Lieberman bill because it would result in "the largest restructuring of the American economy since the New Deal." He might be right. I think we should get started on it as soon as possible.

With oil pushing past $130 per barrel, Congress is swinging into action with a series of boneheaded measures designed to generate crowd-pleasing sound bytes vs. actually addressing the issue. In typical fashion, Washington's approach to the problem is to take symbolic measures like last week's vote to stop filling to SPR, or this week's House bill allowing the U.S. to sue OPEC (good luck with that) and Joe Lieberman's proposal to regulate commodity trading, as if surging crude prices are entirely a function of evil speculators. Today brought another dog and pony show with a Senate hearing "Exploring the Skyrocketing Price of Oil." Predictably, the hearing brought a lot of heated rhetoric but few solutions, as Congress overlooks the critical point that major oil companies don't really control much of the world's oil, much less its price. "We cannot change the world market," Robert Malone, chairman and president of BP America said at the hearing. "Today's high prices are linked to the failure both here and abroad to increase supplies, renewables and conservation." As Malone suggests, the sad truth is that Congress has failed miserably to produce any serious energy policy, and politicians of both parties ignored the Hirsch Report on peak oil. Bottom line: The politicians didn't like the report's conclusions and so ignored them. Speaking of which, Congress' failure is matched, if not exceeded, by that of the Bush Administration, which may very well be the worst in history. Beyond the horrific miscalculations in Iraq, the Bush administration has actually discouraged conservation and gave people tax breaks for driving SUVs. Bush has also overseen a huge increase in the deficit, which has undermined the value of the dollar. Given all that (and more), maybe we should be thankful oil and gas prices aren't higher.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

96 Hegemony

Energy Leadership Low (4/4)
The US has set itself up for a loss of leadership in the energy market Romm and Curtis 96 (Joseph, Charles, April, http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/96apr/oil/oil.htm)
Imagine a world in which the Persian Gulf controlled two thirds of the world's oil for export, with $200 billion a year in oil revenues streaming into that unstable and politically troubled region, and America was importing nearly 60 percent of its oil, resulting in a $100-billion-a-year outflow that undermined efforts to reduce our trade deficit. 8That's a scenario out of the 1970s which can never happen again, right? No, that's the "reference case" projection for ten years from now from the federal Energy Information Administration.

Imagine another world in which fossil-fuel use had begun a slow, steady decline; more than a third of the market for new electricity generation was supplied from renewable sources; the renewables industry had annual sales of $150 billion; and the fastest-growing new source of power was solar energy. An environmentalist's fantasy, right? No, that's one of two planning scenarios for three to four decades from now, developed by Royal Dutch/Shell Group, the world's most profitable oil company, which is widely viewed as a bench mark for strategic planning. A decade's worth of little-heralded technological advances funded by the Department of Energy have helped to bring such a renewables revolution within our grasp. Yet budget cuts already proposed by Congress would ensure that when renewable energy becomes a source of hundreds of thousands--if not millions--of new high-wage jobs in the next century, America will have lost its leadership in the relevant technologies and will once again be importing products originally developed by U.S. scientists. Moreover, Congress's present and planned cuts in advanced transportation and fossil-fuel research and development impede efforts to maximize the nation's conventional-energy resource base. Although little can be done to change the first scenario, Congress's actions all but guarantee that if an oil crisis comes, our national response will be reactive, uninformed, and unduly burdensome. Having abandoned the technological means to minimize the crisis, the nation will be left in the next century with little more than its usual responses to energy crises: price controls or other rigid regulations, or unplanned, ineffective attempts to deal with the effects of sharp price or supply fluctuations.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

97 Hegemony

***Environmental Leadership High***

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

98 Hegemony

Enviro Leadership High
US environmental leadership is high. Cunningham 7 (James, US consul gen. in Hong Kong, 2/7,
http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/cg_jc2007020801.html) The United States recognised several years ago the challenge posed by climate change, and has been taking steps to address it. Since 2001, we have set aside US$29 billion on activities related to climate change. We committed an additional US$6.5 billion this year. President George W. Bush recently announced new, concrete measures to address the serious issues of climate change, energy security and sustainable development both at home and abroad. This comprehensive plan will reduce petrol usage in the US by 20 per cent over the next decade, stop the projected growth of carbon dioxide emissions from US cars and sports utility vehicles, and reduce America's dependence on oil. The plan focuses on road transport - one of the largest sources of US greenhouse-gas emissions - and rapidly accelerates the use of renewable fuels. The US is already the global leader in the production of biofuels. The new plan requires the use of 132.5 billion litres of renewable and alternative fuels by 2017, five times more than current targets. Sources include ethanol from corn, plant waste and wood chips, as well as biodiesel, methanol and other alternative fuels. This will have a real impact, and will displace as much as 15 per cent of the projected annual petrol use. To further reduce the use of fossil fuel, we are increasing fuelefficiency standards. We expect to cut petrol use by an additional 5 per cent, or 32 billion litres. How will the plan affect the environment? Increasing the use of renewable fuels and mandating tougher standards could cut annual carbon dioxide emissions by 10 per cent by 2017. This is like taking 26 million cars off the road. Mr Bush's plan builds on a long record of American action on global climate change that all too often goes overlooked. In 2002, the US set an ambitious goal to reduce the ratio of US greenhouse-gas emissions to our economic output by 18 per cent by 2012. We have introduced new technologies and implemented a wide variety of policies, including many mandatory, incentive-based and voluntary programmes that allow for both environmental stewardship and economic growth. Our emissions performance since 2000 has been among the best in the developed world. In addition to taking action at home, the United States is collaborating with countries around the world to address climate change. Last year, the US started the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) to bring together Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and the US to tackle complementary energy, economic and environmental goals. These countries account for about half of the world's economic output, energy use and greenhouse-gas emissions. In each nation, the governments and private sectors have formed partnerships to develop and deploy clean, efficient energy technologies. Emissions from developing countries - notably China and India - will likely surpass those from developed countries by 2010. The APP thus includes China and India as equal partners and participants in co-operative projects for addressing climate change, while promoting economic development. The APP is one of many such international partnerships we have initiated since 2002 to promote development and the use of new, cleaner technologies. These include partnerships to collect and reuse methane, a powerful greenhouse gas; to capture and safely store carbon dioxide; and to develop cost-effective hydrogen and fuel-cell technologies.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

99 Hegemony

Enviro Leadership High – US/EU Co-op
Environmental leadership high – US drives action with EU. State Dept. 8 (Spring, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/newsletter/105169.htm)
The U.S. and Europe both recognize climate change as a serious challenge and share a common goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Both are committed to negotiating a new post-2012 climate change framework under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change by the end of 2009 and working with all international partners, including the major economies, to reach agreement on this post-2012 framework. During the April 2007 U.S.- EU Summit in Washington, the leaders agreed to a series of commitments to ensure secure, affordable, and clean supplies of energy, while tackling climate change. Starting in 2006 a series of working groups on biofuels and energy efficiency have been held to help advance work on common biofuel standards and efficiency measures like Energy Star. The U.S. and EU are also engaging bilaterally on nearly every policy level; centerpieces are the U.S.-EU Strategic Energy Review and the High-Level Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development, which met most recently on March 3 and March 7, 2008, respectively. U.S.–EU: Multilateral Partnership The U.S. and EU work together multilaterally as well. The President launched the Major Economies Process, in which the EU and several European countries have participated, in May 2007, as a way to support and accelerate the UN process. When 17 economies, representing 80 percent of the world’s economy and 80 percent of the world’s emissions gather together, they can make a significant contribution to the UN talks. Another example of productive multilateral cooperation is the Methane-to-Markets partnership – an international effort to promote methane recovery and its use as a clean source of energy. European countries played an important role at the Washington International Renewable Energy Conference (WIREC) which brought together over 6,000 government officials, private sector representatives and NGOs from around the world to advance development of renewable energy technologies.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

100 Hegemony

Enviro Leadership High – Bali/MEM
The US has restored its environmental leadership with Bali and MEM. Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 27-28, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change process remains the main international forum for addressing climate change. At the annual meeting of its parties in December 2007, governments, including the United States, committed to an agenda for negotiating a new agreement that would follow theKyoto Protocol when it expires in 2012. That so-called Bali road map establishes four negotiating tracks— mitigation, technology, finance, and adaptation—toward an agreement that the parties aim to conclude by the end of 2009.24 The Bali road map has been noted in particular for an agreement by the developing countries to ‘‘commitments’’ and by developed countries to ‘‘actions’’ that in both cases would be ‘‘measurable, reportable and verifiable.’’ The Bali meeting also yielded notable but still nascent initiatives on avoiding deforestation and on helping vulnerable countries adapt to climate change. Until Bali, the Bush administration had chosen not to engage actively in theUNprocess. Its policy long rejected binding country-by-country limits on greenhouse gas emissions, focusing instead on a long list of voluntary bilateral and regional initiatives, of which the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) has been the most prominent.25 These activities have produced some additional focus on technological opportunities to control emissions, but they consist mainly of meetings and have mobilized only very small sums of money and technological resources. More recently, the Bush administration’s series of Major Economies Meetings on Energy Security and Climate Change has taken center stage in U.S. foreign policy on climate change.26 The Major Economies Meetings (MEM), which held its first meeting in September 2007, brings together sixteen countries responsible for roughly four-fifths of global emissions, as well as representatives of the European Union, European Commission, UNFCCC, and United Nations, with the stated goal of agreeing, by the end of 2008, on emissions reduction targets, and, by the end of 2009, on a new international framework and strategy for meeting those targets. The effort is intended to feed directly into the UNFCCC process. The Bush administration has also recently expressed a new openness to binding country-by-country limits on greenhouse gas emissions, so long as all major economies are included.27 As part of that effort, it has announced a willingness to commit the United States to stop its emissions growth by 2025 and stop the growth of power plant emissions within ten to fifteen years.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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101 Hegemony

Enviro Leadership High – R&D
US has environmental leadership – it’s the biggest investor in climate science and alternative energy technology development and distribution. Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 29-30, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
Consistent with that philosophy, the Bush administration has pursued a domestic climate change policy that emphasizes the continuing study of climate science, research and development on potential breakthrough technologies, and incentives for deployment of specific lowcarbonsources of energy,mostnotably nucleargenerationandbiofuels.31 In fact, the U.S. government is the largest single funder of climate science. The United States also played a leading role in the formation of the IPCC in 1988, the main international body for assessment of climate science. The administration has endorsed the findings of the most recent round of IPCC assessments, which include statements warning of the large dangers from unchecked climate change. The federal government also invests heavily in development of climate-friendly technologies, although it is difficult to measure the exact level of investment, as the effort is spread across government. That public investment is supplemented by steadily increasing private investment in relevant technologies—much of it driven by the anticipation of a binding federal climate policy in the near future and by the reality that some states are already imposing limits on the emission of greenhouse gases

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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102 Hegemony

Enviro Leadership High – Congress
Environmental leadership is high – Congress action and presidential candidates prove. Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 30, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
Recent years have also seen significant movement in Congress, particularly in the Senate. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 contains measures that will lower greenhouse gas emissions from what would otherwise have been their course. Most strikingly, a succession of proposed legislation envisions deepmandatory reductions in U.S. greenhouse gas emissionsby2020 and 2050. Creatively designed, they have attracted increasing bipartisan support in Congress. While each proposal has also found critics among those calling for either stronger or weaker action, the proposals are widely regarded as having been unthinkable a few years ago. The presidential candidates have either introduced or cosponsored far-ranging legislation—and have included ambitious climate change plans as parts of their campaign platforms.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

103 Hegemony

Enviro Leadership High – A2: Kyoto Hurts Lead
Kyoto isn’t critical to leadership Iritani 5 (Evelyn, 12/19, http://www.stopglobalwarming.org/sgw_read.asp?id=3001612192005)
The United States has not joined the Kyoto Protocol to cut greenhouse gases, but the pact nevertheless is boosting sales for American companies that market "clean" energy technologies. The spread of renewableenergy standards — particularly in Europe — propelled by the treaty, along with a surge in oil and gas prices, has triggered a boom in business for solar and wind energy companies. When Solar Integrated Technologies Inc. opened an office in Germany last
spring, for example, the salespeople were allocated enough solar roofing material to provide one megawatt of power. In six weeks, they were sold out. Within a month, they had orders for 16 megawatts more. "It's a no-brainer to do business in solar in Europe," said Jon Slangerup, chief executive of Solar Integrated, whose 120 employees are producing about one mile of solar roofing panels a week at a plant in South Los Angeles. "The only question is: How much can you allocate and how fast can you install it?" In Germany, the world's leading solar energy market, farmers are replacing crops with fields of solar panels, thanks to a government buyback program for renewable energy that spurred 150% growth in solar installations in 2004.Britain, France and Spain also have introduced aggressive plans to reduce their production of carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping gases over the next decade. “Every available [solar] module is going to Germany," said Rhone Resch, president of the Solar Energy Industries Assn. in Washington. "It's Google-like growth.” A world leader in renewable energy less than a decade ago, the United States is now viewed as a laggard. At the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Montreal this month, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin accused the U.S. of lacking a "global conscience" for

a spokesman for the U.S. Department of Energy, said the Bush administration recognized that climate change was a "serious longterm issue."But he said the best way to address that concern was by developing cleaner, more environmentally friendly forms of fossil-fuel-generated energy and nuclear power.Stevens said renewable energy would also be an "important part" of the nation's energy mix, which was why the government was planning to invest $391 million next year in solar, wind, hydroelectric and geothermal energy projects. State and local governments don't think the Bush administration is moving fast enough. Twenty states, including California, have established standards to guarantee that a certain portion of the energy they use comes from renewable-energy sources.
refusing to sign the Kyoto treaty, which requires developed countries to slash their greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels by 2012.Craig Stevens,

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

104 Hegemony

***Environmental Leadership Low***

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

105 Hegemony

Enviro Leadership Low (1/3)
The US lacks environmental leadership – this can only be reversed in the next year. Becker 8 (Bill, Presidential Climate Action Project exec. director, May, p. 2, http://www.aicgs.org/documents/facet/becker.facet08.pdf)
U.S. President George W. Bush delivered a speech in April acknowledging the challenges presented by climate change, but he offered no policies for addressing the problem. He called for America “to stop the growth of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 2025,” leaving the world to assume that U.S. emissions would continue to grow unabated for 17 years with no regulations to ensure that action is taken even then. For many across the United States, it was a disappointment. But while Washington seems paralyzed on this issue, pressure is growing for aggressive climate action at other levels across the country. In the same week that President Bush delivered his climate address, a bipartisan group of governors of 20 states met at Yale University to sign the “Governors’ Declaration on Climate Change.” They called for the federal government to join states in developing cost-effective programs to drastically reduce greenhouse-gas emissions nationwide.They also encouraged Congress and the President to develop regulations to move thecountry forward quickly toward a new energy economy. Meanwhile, mayors in more than 800 U.S. cities have signed the “Mayors’ Climate Protection Agreement,” which endorses the goals of the Kyoto Protocols. Industry calls for mandatory action In the private sector, representatives from some of the biggest corporations in theUnited States have issued “A Call for Action,” urging the federal government to confront climate change. The United States Climate Action Partnership, which includes Alcoa, General Motors Corp., Caterpillar Inc., Ford Motor Co., General Electric, BP America Inc., Duke Energy, ConocoPhillips, PepsiCo, Siemens Corp., Xerox, Johnson & Johnson, DuPont, Deere & Co., Dow Chemical and other major corporations, has issued recommendations for a cap-and-trade program, mandatory emissions reduction targets, incentives for improved energy efficiency across the economy, and subsidies for rapid development of new technologies. Still, despite the drumbeat of support for climate action, little is expected from Congress or the White House in 2008. Washington is too preoccupied with election- year politics. That means in 2009 the new president and Congress will need to act quickly. With this in mind, a national non-partisan organization, the Presidential Climate Action Project, is amassing the best research on climate science and public policy, and developing a full slate of recommendations for action by the next president. The U.S. lags behind in an enormous challenge The challenges are enormous. More than half of America’s power is generated yb burning coal, which produces about 40 percent of the carbon dioxide emissions nationwide. By some estimates, buildings in the United States are 30 percent less energy efficient than their European counterparts. American cars also are less efficient than those in Europe, and a third of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions come from transportation. More than 10 percent of the world’s oil is going into America’s gas tanks. Per capita energy use and greenhouse gas emissions are twice as high in the United States as they are in the European Union.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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106 Hegemony

Enviro Leadership Low (2/3)
US environmental leadership is low – other nations perceive our action as insufficient. Reuters 8 (4/17, http://www.climateactionprogramme.org/news/article/bush_climate_plan_criticized_for_lacking_urgency/)
The world needs tougher action to combat global warming than a plan by President George W. Bush to halt a rise in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions only by 2025, delegates at a climate conference in Paris said on Thursday. South Africa, one of 17 nations at the two-day global warming talks that started on Thursday, called Bush's proposals "disappointing" and unambitious when many other industrialized economies are already cutting emissions. "There is no way whatever that we can agree to what the U.S. is proposing," South African Environmental Affairs Minister Marthinus van Schalkwyk said in a statement. Developing nations such as China and India also want the rich, led by the United States, to cut now. The United Nations and France noted that studies by the U.N. Climate Panel say that world emissions will have to peak within 10 to 15 years and then fall sharply to avert the worst of floods, droughts, and rising seas.

Environmental leadership is low – the US refuses to assume it. Washington Post 8 (“Climate Action in the Senate; Sadly, even having a debate is proress”, 6/2, ln)
The world has clamored for U.S. leadership on climate change. Yet for seven years the Bush administration denied and dithered while the planet warmed. Initially, it questioned the science underpinning the warnings about climate change. Today, President Bush believes global warming is real, but he has resisted concrete actions to address it. Chief among them is putting a price on carbon, as would be required by the climate bill sponsored by Sens. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.), Joseph I. Lieberman (I-Conn.) and John W. Warner (R-Va.)

Environmental leadership is low – the Kyoto Protocol ruins the US image. Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 25-26, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the treaty, which has been the focal point of climate change diplomacy for the last decade, attempted to address the lack of specifics. Under the protocol, participating developed countries collectively committed to reduce their average annual greenhouse gas emissions between the years 2008 and 2012 to 5.2 percent below their 1990 levels. This was divided up through negotiations that assigned targets to individual countries. (The European Union pooled its targets and, through its own internal negotiations, reallocated its collective target to each EU nation individually.) Most countries have ratified Kyoto; while the United States participated vigorously in all stages of the negotiations, it has chosen not to ratify the protocol. The Senate indicated that this would be the case early on with its 95–0 vote in 1997 in favor of the so-called Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which signaled that the United States would reject any international climate agreement that did not include ‘‘specific scheduled commitments’’ from developing countries. (That resolution has in some ways been superseded by the bipartisan 2005 BingamanSpecter resolution, which called on the United States to lead at home with mandatory emissions reductions, even while it chose not to ratify Kyoto.) This outcome— and the way that the United States withdrew, for several years, from follow-on negotiations—has antagonized U.S. allies. Even those advanced industrialized countries that sympathize with some arguments against Kyoto have argued that the treaty is an important experiment in climate policy that can provide useful lessons for crafting future approaches.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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107 Hegemony

Enviro Leadership Low (3/3)
Environmental leadership low – the US lags behind in policy. Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 43, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
The rest of the advanced industrial world has, for the most part, adopted more aggressive policies than the United States toward avoiding dangerous climate change, though with uneven results on the ground. While those countries will need to continually intensify their efforts at home, U.S. foreign policy strategy is unlikely to determine whether that happens there. The European Union, in particular, has already promised, alone, to achieve a substantial (20 percent) cut in emissions by 2020, and offered to make an even deeper cut (30 percent) if other countries make major efforts.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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108 Hegemony

Enviro Leadership Low – AT: Congress
Congressional movements toward environmental leadership are insignificant – they can’t pass key international action. Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 31, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
Still, the recent shifts, while large, should not be overestimated. In particular, increasing willingness in Congress to approve aggressive domestic limits on greenhouse gas emissions should not be confused with a similar appetite for new international treaties. The relative difficulty of having Congress approve a traditional treaty—which requires sixty seven votes in the Senate—compared with the challenges involved in passing domestic legislation must be kept in mind as a climate strategy is designed.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

109 Hegemony

***Technological Leadership High***

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

110 Hegemony

Tech Leadership High (1/3)
US technological leadership is high and sustainable. Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., June, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
The United States still leads the world in science and technology. The United States accounts for 40 percent of total world R&D spending, 38 percent of industrialized nations’ (OECD countries) triadic patents, and employs 37 percent of OECD researchers (1.3 million FTE). It produces 35 percent, 49 percent, and 63 percent of world publications, citations, and highly cited publications, employs 70 percent of the world’s Nobel Prize winners, 66 percent of its most cited individuals, and is home to 75 percent of the world’s top 20 and top 40 universities and 58 percent of its top 100. R&D spending is rapidly increasing in developing nations such as China and Korea. But despite this rapid growth, the U.S. share of world R&D spending (dollars at PPP) fell only by 1.5 percent to 36.1 percent between 1993 and 2003, while the EU-15 and Japan lost signiﬁcant ground. In absolute terms, the United States increased its R&D spending by $126.3 billion (nominal value at PPP), from $166.1 billion in 1993 to $292.4 billion in 2003. This increase is more than in any other region: Over the same period, the EU-15 added $76.6 billion, Japan added $38.3 billion, and China added $60.8 billion. S&T employment is not growing more rapidly in other nations/ regions than in the United States, though China showed remarkable growth. The United States added a large number of researchers (299,000) between 1995 and 2003, suggesting a vibrant R&D sector. At the same time, China added nearly as many (289,000), the EU-15 added 220,000, and Japan added 95,000. Both the EU-15 and China graduated more scientists and engineers than the United States. While developing nations (China and India in particular) are starting to account for a signiﬁcant portion of the world’s S&T inputs and activities (R&D funding in dollars at PPP, research jobs, S&T education, etc.) and are showing rapid growth in outputs and out- comes, they still account for a very small share of triadic patents, S&T publications, and citations. Innovation and scientiﬁc discovery are still led by the United States, EU 15, and Japan. The United States did lose 3 percentage points in its world share in publications, citations, and top 1 percent highly cited publications between 1993–1997 and graduated more scientists and engineers than the United States. But on measures such as additions to the S&T workforce and patented innovations, U.S. growth in S&T was in line with or above average world trends. By comparison, Japan grew more slowly in additions to the S&T workforce, and both the EU-15 and Japan had slower growth in patented innovations

US is not losing edge in alternative energy production or technology Science Daily 8 (6/13, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/06/080612070406.htm)
the United States remains the dominant leader in science and technology worldwide, according to a new RAND Corporation study. The United States accounts for 40 percent of the total world's spending on scientific research and development, employs 70 percent of the world's Nobel Prize winners and is home to three-quarters of the world's top 40 universities. An inflow
Despite perceptions that the nation is losing its competitive edge, of foreign students in the sciences -- as well as scientists and engineers from overseas -- has helped the United States build and maintain its worldwide lead, even as many other

Continuing this flow of foreign-born talent is critical to helping the United States maintain its lead, according to the study. "Much of the concern about the United States losing its edge as the world's leader in science and technology appears to be unfounded," said Titus Galama, co-author of the report and a management scientist at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. "But the United States cannot afford to be complacent. Effort is needed to make sure the nation maintains or even extends its standing. "U.S. investments in research and development have not lagged in recent years, but instead have grown at rates similar to what has occurred elsewhere in the world -- growing even faster than what has been seen in Europe and Japan. While China is
nations increase their spending on research and development. investing heavily in research and development, it does not yet account for a large share of world innovation and scientific output, which continues to be dominated by the United States, Europe and Japan, according to RAND researchers. However, other nations are rapidly educating their populations in science and technology. For instance, the European

. Policymakers often receive advice from ad hoc sources. Although their viewpoints are valuable, they should be balanced by more complete and critical assessments of U.S. science and technology, said report co-author James Hosek, a RAND senior economist. The absence of a balanced assessment can feed a public misperception that U.S. science and technology is failing when in fact it remains strong, even preeminent. "There is a pressing need for ongoing, objective analyses of science and
Union and China each are graduating more university-educated scientists and engineers every year than the United States technology performance and the science and technology workforce. We need this information to ensure that decision makers have a rigorous understanding of the issues," Hosek said.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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111 Hegemony

Tech Leadership High (2/3)
Technological leadership is high despite growing capabilities in other nations. CSIS 4 (5/25, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/040521_globalization_impacts.pdf)
U.S. leadership springs from our values and culture and from our strength in technology. Continued international influence will rest on both the ability to advance these values and to protect our technological lead. Technological leadership gives the U.S. an advantage internationally. Despite growing foreign strength in technology, the U.S. can maintain leadership with continued support for universities and basic research and with improved abilities in DOD and the intelligence community to identify and take advantage of commercial technological innovation (whether from U.S. or foreign sources).U.S. leadership springs from our values and culture and from our strength in technology. Continued international influence will rest on both the ability to advance these values and to protect our technological lead. Technological leadership gives the U.S. an advantage internationally. Despite growing foreign strength in technology, the U.S. can maintain leadership with continued support for universities and basic research and with improved abilities in DOD and the intelligence community to identify and take advantage of commercial technological innovation (whether from U.S. or foreign sources).

Technological leadership is strong – universities, entrepeneurs, and private support. Lewis 4 (James A, CSIS Tech & Public Policy Program, Dec., www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/globalization_natl_security_execsum.pdf)
Innovative new technologies come from several sources, but one source is particularly important because it provides the U.S. with comparative advantage. A combination of university research programs, entrepreneurs, and financial support (from venture capital, corporations, or governments) provides an increasingly strong source for innovation. The small, new firms this creates are a strong source of innovation. The U.S. can take advantage of this to increase the pace of innovation. Examples of this ‘system’ include the research triangle in North Carolina, Silicon Valley and the area around MIT. This blend of science and engineering expertise with entrepreneurial skills and capital is a leading source of innovation in the US. One sign of its success is the effort by many countries to create similar centers around their own universities.

Technological leadership is high due to unique advantages in innovation and spending. Lewis 7 (James A., CSIS technology and public policy program, 3/14, p. 1,
http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTCtech031407/Lewis_Testimony031407.pdf)

The key to technological leadership is innovation. Continued technological leadership depends on the U.S. capacity to innovate. Innovation is the ability to use knowledge to create new or better goods and services. The U.S. innovation system, with its mix of university research, entrepreneurship and venture capital is crucial for a steady flow of ideas that benefits both the commercial market and a military that often relies on commercial technology. The U.S. has been one of the world leaders in innovation, and our political and social makeup may provide America with something of an advantage over other nations when it comes to the ability to innovate. The question is whether this comparative advantage is, by itself, enough in an era of heightened global competition. The first thing to note, perhaps, is that there is a strange anomaly in these concerns over the potential loss of technological leadership. That anomaly is that the U.S. spends more than any other nation on science and on research and development. The U.S. spends more that the next five nations combined. It is reasonable to ask how there can be a problem when we are spending so much more than other nations

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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112 Hegemony

Tech Leadership High (3/3)
US technological leadership is absolute and sustainable. RAND 8 (policy think tank, 6/12, http://www.rand.org/news/press/2008/06/12/index.html)
Despite perceptions that the nation is losing its competitive edge, the United States remains the dominant leader in science and technology worldwide, according to a RAND Corporation study issued today. The United States accounts for 40 percent of the total world’s spending on scientific research and development, employs 70 percent of the world’s Nobel Prize winners and is home to three-quarters of the world’s top 40 universities. An inflow of foreign students in the sciences -- as well as scientists and engineers from overseas -- has helped the United States build and maintain its worldwide lead, even as many other nations increase their spending on research and development. Continuing this flow of foreign-born talent is critical to helping the United States maintain its lead, according to the study. “Much of the concern about the United States losing its edge as the world’s leader in science and technology appears to be unfounded,” said Titus Galama, co-author of the report and a management scientist at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. “But the United States cannot afford to be complacent. Effort is needed to make sure the nation maintains or even extends its standing.” U.S. investments in research and development have not lagged in recent years, but instead have grown at rates similar to what has occurred elsewhere in the world -- growing even faster than what has been seen in Europe and Japan. While China is investing heavily in research and development, it does not yet account for a large share of world innovation and scientific output, which continues to be dominated by the United States, Europe and Japan, according to RAND researchers.

US Technological leadership is far beyond that of any other nation. Committee on Civilian Industrial Technology 96 (Technology in the National Interest, p. 16,
http://books.google.com/books?id=jEqFQv1P_UYC&pg=PA16&lpg=PA16&dq=%22U.S.%22,+%22technological+leadership%22&source=web &ots=vcGAU8wGCf&sig=U9TJUhy9ta4D9-4GS8hFTRoYofk&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=5&ct=result#PPA16,M1)

With the increasing importance of technology to our prosperity, national security, and quality of life, America stands poised to lead the world into an exciting new era filled with opportunity. This new era – the “Golden Age” – is tailor-made for Americans. The vision, commitment, and investment of those who have come before us have provided the United States with the most powerful economic engine in the world – an unparalleled R&D enterprise that spans industry, academia, and government; a worldclass cadre of scientists and engineers, the world’s most diverse and productive manufacturing base; a broad and technologically sophisticated service sector; the world’s most productive work force; and a climate and culture that encourages competition, risk-taking, and entrepreneurship. These assets provide America with a competitive advantage in today’s global economy.

The US maintains technological leadership. Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., June, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
High growth in R&D expenditures, patents, and S&E employment, combined with continuing low unemployment of S&E workers, suggest that U.S. S&E has remained vibrant. These signs do not support the notion that jobs are being lost at substantial rates as a result of the outsourcing and oﬀshoring of S&T. U.S. gains in S&T occur against a backdrop in which R&D expenditures, S&E employment, and patents are also increasing in the EU-15, Japan, China, Korea, and many other nations/regions. Studies of the oﬀshoring of high-skill work suggest that it does not result in job losses in the originating country, as it is increasingly driven by the need to access scarce talent, but rather that the overall number of jobs is increasing.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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113 Hegemony

Tech Leadership High – Wages/Employment
Wages and unemployment prove technological leadership isn’t declining. Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 25, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
Wage and unemployment trends do not show the traditional signs of a shortage of scientists and engineers. Unemployment has not been decreasing but has been steadily low, as is typical in professional occupations. Also, wages have not been increasingly rapidly relative to trend. Nevertheless, low unemployment, the relatively steady wage growth in S&E, and claims of shortages can plausibly be reconciled by oﬀ shoring and outsourcing. If ﬁrms cannot ﬁll their S&E positions in the United States, they may decide to oﬀshore or outsource R&D to take advantage of foreign S&E labor pools. In addition, ﬁrms may prefer to set up foreign production and research activities as part of a strategy of gaining entry to foreign markets. Moving operations to foreign countries and drawing on their S&E workers may be less costly and strategically more advantageous than bidding up S&E wages in the United States in an eﬀort to hire S&E workers. Thus, oﬀshoring and outsourcing are options that can slow wage increases and remove shortages. That is, shortages in the United States have not materializedor have been mitigated, by these means. Under this explanation, it also follows that reducing the inﬂow of foreign high-skilled S&E workers (e.g., by reducing the H1-B visa cap) will likely increase oﬀshoring and outsourcing. It may not even induce suﬃcient numbers of U.S. citizens to join the S&E workforce, as wage growth will still be slowed by the decision to oﬀshore or outsource the work. Increasing the inﬂow of foreign high skill S&E workers may, in contrast, increase investment and employment at home as well as provide local spillover beneﬁts.

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114 Hegemony

AT: Tech Leadership Low – Empirics
Their arguments are empirically disproven – no crisis is coming. Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 44, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
Despite the rhetoric and the intensive action on the Hill, some voices called for restraint. The reports and testimony making a case for or arguing against an S&T crisis are part of an ongoing policy debate. One line of counterargument is that such warnings are far from unprecedented and have never resulted in the crisis anticipated. The author of a Washington Watch article noted that “similar fears of a STEM6 workforce crisis in the 1980s were ultimately unfounded” (Andres, 2006). Neal McCluskey, a policy analyst from the Cato Institute, noted that similar alarm bells were sounded decades earlier (and in his view, have had underlying political agendas): Using the threat of international economic competition to bolster federal control of education is nothing new. It happened in 1983, after the federally commissioned report A Nation at Risk admonished that ‘our once unchallenged preeminence in com- merce, industry, science, and technological innovation is being overtaken by competitors throughout the world,’ as well as the early 1990s, when George Bush the elder called for national aca- demic standards and tests in order to better compete with Japan. (McCluskey, 2006) Roger Pielke of the University of Colorado observed that such issues as poor student performance have an even longer history, with no negative outcomes. Arguments that “certain other countries produce a greater proportion of scientist and engineering students or that those students fare better on tests of achievement . . . have been made for almost 50 years,” he stated, “yet over that time frame the U.S. economy has done quite well” (Pielke, 2006).

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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115 Hegemony

***Technological Leadership Low***

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

116 Hegemony

Tech Leadership Low (1/3)
Technological leadership is declining due to globalization and economic change. Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 37, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
First is that the eﬀects of globalization—including the growing strength of other nations in S&T—will make it much more diﬃcult in the future for the United States to maintain a leadership position in S&T. Advocates of this viewpoint cite the quickly rising S&T capacity of rival powers, the heightened competition presented by white-collar workers in S&T in lower-wage countries, the ability for new technolo- gies and information to be rapidly transmitted around the globe, and changes in the nature of innovation, which is increasingly driven by private investment and international clusters of emerging tech ﬁrms, capital markets, and research universities (e.g., Segal, 2004), rather than by large corporate laboratories—such as Bell, GE, and IBM—4 U.S. Competitiveness in Science and Technology located in the United States and by U.S. scientists supported by U.S. government funds. Second, it is argued that the domestic building blocks of S&T leadership are eroding. For a nation to be a strong performer in S&T, certain elements must be in place: Infrastructure: This includes physical infrastructure—such as laboratories, equipment, and user facilities such as national and industrial laboratories—as well as substantial investment in research and development (R&D) and laws, policies, and regu- lations to support that investment (e.g., tax policies, intellectual property rights, eﬃcient labor markets, etc.). Today, those laws would include favorable immigration policies for foreign S&T talent. Education: The education system should be able to provide highquality instruction in the sciences, engineering, and mathematics. This includes both K–12 and higher education. Also, students should have the counseling, support, and ﬁnancial aid to help them make wellinformed decisions and to ﬁnance their education. Workforce: S&T capability depends on having a welltrained, well-prepared, and sizeable S&T workforce, and this depends in part on the challenges, incentives, and rewards, both monetary and nonmonetary, found in S&T careers. Advocates contend that the United States has for decades invested too little in sustaining its S&T leadership, and that is particularly so given the increased pressures on the United States resulting from globalization.

The answer is also relatively simple. We are not spending enough to maintain our lead, and we are not spending enough on the things needed for military technology. While our spending levels are flat, spending in other nations is increasing. If these trends continue without change, the long term result will be that the U.S. will no longer have the lead in important technologies.

In a few key areas of research, scientists in other nations are publishing more than their American counterparts. The number of U.S. authored papers increasing by only 13% between 1988 and 2001 while the number of papers authored by Europeans increased by 60% (and Europe overtook the U.S.) while the number of papers authored by Asians more than doubled, increasing by 120%. Even more worrisome is that half of the U.S. publications were in the life sciences, whereas other nations were concentrated in the physical sciences. The age of our technological workforce in some key areas, like aerospace, is another troubling trend. Many scientists and engineers will retire in the next few years and will not be replaced. From an economic standpoint, this may not be bad – we do not want to train engineers only to find that there is no work for them – but from a national security perspective these are warning signs that suggest that the U.S. may want to consider whether if it is paying enough attention to the connection between science, technology and security.

Part of this challenge is the result of what we call globalization - the increasing integration of national economies into a single market. Globalization tends to diffuse technology around the world. Globalization has eroded the national character of science, as research is increasingly carried out by multinational teams, but it has not changed the need for nations to draw upon science for their security. Part of the challenge also comes from the rise of strategic competitors, national like China or India, and perhaps Brazil or even Europe in the distant future. These strategic challengers have seen how important science has been to U.S. military leadership and they seek to copy what we have done

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Tech Leadership Low (3/3)
Low numbers of skilled engineers and scientists in the US kill technological leadership. Freeman 6 (Richard B, Harvard U econ prof., 6/8, http://www.smarteconomist.com/interview/7)
Not that these statements are scientific, but why do you think so many technology executives decry what they call a lack of skilled engineers and scientists in the US when the unemployment rate for engineers is not lower than (perhaps higher than) most other professions? (Samuel Pavel, Brooklyn, NY, USA) The quick economics answer is that they want to be able to hire US skilled engineers and scientists easily at as low a wage as they can. So the more there are, the better it is for them and their firms. But I think these execs are also concerned about a deeper issue - the fear that the US will lose its edge in these high tech areas and that their children or grandchildren will not get the quality of jobs they would like them to have. The hope is that with more skilled S&E workers, the US can remain the hub of the global technology and business world. But it is a bit schizophrenic. IBM Intel, Microsoft shift more high tech to low wage countries which is good for the company and good for the world, but not for US S&E workers. More and cheaper US skilled S&Es will benefit the company and the country… but you are not going to increase US supplies if wages are below MBA wages and unemployment is no better or worse than in the professions. It is an interesting mix of self-interest and social concern.

Globalization is reducing US technological leadership. CSIS 4 (5/25, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/040521_globalization_impacts.pdf)
Globalization is reshaping employment, technological leadership and U.S. security. The underlying concern is that globalization will erode America’s strength, as jobs, manufacturing and technological leadership appear to flow from the United States in response to the demands of the international market. The U.S. is not the only country affected by international economic integration. European countries have reacted with government bailouts of ailing firms and a call to build “European champions.” Globalization has cost China (in sheer numbers) more manufacturing jobs than the U.S., as its once-protected state industries face international competition. Foreign firms, facing the same pressures and opportunities as American companies, have outsourced millions of jobs to the United States. Global economic integration will continue to increase. First, technological change in communications and transportation has created unprecedented mobility for goods, money, people, and ideas. Technological change reinforces economic integration. More importantly, globalization is the result of long-standing U.S. policies – policies to promote free trade, open markets and the rule of law as the basis for a stable international order. The U.S. and its allies created international institutions (the UN, IMF, OECD and WTO) that reduce risks for international economic activity. Success for these policies has been gradual and iterative, but they have created strong integrative forces in the global economy.

China and India are challenging US technological leadership and hegemony. CSIS 4 (5/25, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/040521_globalization_impacts.pdf)
China and India power the current wave of globalization. They will become leading sources of new technologies and, if they chose, formidable military powers. The U.S. has successfully adjusted to the entry of China into world markets and American companies have benefited by inserting China into their production chains. Now the U.S. economy is adjusting to India’s entry. The political implications that result from economic growth – greater assertiveness and influence for China and India –are still reverberating through U.S. foreign policy and in the two countries’ internal politics. In the short term, economic interdependence makes managing the political relationship with these countries more complex as we lack the mechanisms for cooperation developed in our longer-standing relations with Europe or Japan.

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Tech Leadership Low – Globalization
Globalization is destroying technological leadership and innovation, threatening hegemony. Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 37, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
Those who warn that the United States faces an imminent S&T crisis point to globalization as one of two primary causes. Their concern lies in the belief that various eﬀects of globalization are beginning to impede the ability of the United States to compete in S&T. “Today, Americans are feeling the gradual and subtle eﬀects of globalization that challenge the economic and strategic leadership that the United States has enjoyed since World War II,” opens the National Academies of Sciences (2006) report Rising Above the Gathering Storm. Similarly, “We face complex changes in the increasingly globalized economy that put signiﬁcant stress on [our innovation ecosystem]” (President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 2004) so that “the United States can no longer take its supremacy [in scientiﬁc discovery and innovation] for granted” (Task Force on the Future of American Innovation, 2005). If America’s leadership economically and strategi- cally depends on its ability to dominate in S&T, any threat to its strong S&T performance is also a threat to its leadership in those spheres. Reports that take up the globalization theme focus on four eﬀects of globalization that they contend will endanger America’s ability to retain its S&T leadership: the growing strength of other nations in S&T, heightened competition from high-skill workers in low-wage countries that may lead toward oﬀshoring of American S&T jobs, the changing nature of innovation, and the increased global diﬀusion of technology

Globalization destroys technological leadership. Lewis 4 (James A, CSIS Tech & Public Policy Program, Dec., www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/globalization_natl_security_execsum.pdf)
Second and more importantly, the U.S. relative share of innovation will fall, potentially affecting technological leadership. Globalization's most significant effect on U.S. interests is the leveling of technological leadership. The increased international mobility of highly skilled labor and the diffusion of technological know-how means that many countries now can compete with the U.S. in producing cutting edge research and innovation. U.S. policy and regulation reinforces globalization’s technological leveling. The U.S. may damage its ability to create new technologies because of funding decisions for research, new homeland security policies and if it fails to compensate for decreased manufacturing activity. Federal investment in physical sciences and engineering has fallen by half since 1970 as a percentage of GDP. Corporate R&D spending has changed significantly and focuses on development of new products, in reaction to competitive pressures and the need to show near-term gains to financial markets. The result is that the U.S. has seriously underfunded key research sectors. Homeland security initiatives accelerate the loss of technological and economic leadership. In addressing legitimate security concerns, we have inadvertently made the U.S. a less attractive destination for investors, students, and researchers. The result is the erosion of a major source of economic and technological advantage. The most important element of this is the damage to University research, which is a fundamental component of U.S. strength, and it is likely that this damage outweighs any gains to security. While much of the concern over the shift in the U.S. economy from manufacturing to services is misplaced, the relationship between manufacturing and innovation is an area of risk. Innovation can come from ‘breakthrough technologies,’ but also from incremental improvements to existing products. Those who make the product are more likely to be able to improve it or develop the next generation. As the U.S. increasingly depends on foreign manufacturing, it could lose the boost to innovation provided by hands-on experience and will need mechanisms to compensate.

Federal funding for basic research in engineering and physical sciences has experienced little or no growth in the last thirty years. As a percentage of GDP, funding for physical science research has been in a thirtyyear decline and has fallen by about half. Total federal funding for R&D was essentially flat from 1988 to 2001. Spending on mathematics research was roughly $190 million in 1985 and $200 million in 2004; spending on physics was flat between 1985 and 2001 and there were only slight increases in funding for chemistry. Funding for engineering research increased from approximately $6 billion to $9 billion between 1988 and 2001, but funding for some key research areas, such as electrical engineering, remained essentially flat. The effect on security of underinvestment is acute and damaging in specific research areas. These include physics, aeronautics, mathematics, computer sciences, and engineering. There are three reasons for emphasizing the dangers of underinvesting in these areas. First, research in these areas provides the basis for improved military performance. Second, in relative terms, these areas have been the most seriously underfunded. Third, advances in these research areas enable other areas of scientific research – by providing better sensors and measuring tools or improved computing power. The problem of underfunding is compounded by changes in research and development in the Department of Defense and in the private sector. In the past, about three percent of DOD spending on procurement ultimately went to R&D. However, the decline in procurement of new equipment has reduced the amount of funds for technological innovation for the military. In addition, government and private defense R&D investments are skewed - understandably - toward near-term priorities (e.g., upgrades or replacements for existing systems) rather than fundamentally new capabilities. Additionally, some research problems are too expensive for any company to undertake. The combination of changing research priorities in DOD and the private sector means that some key research areas are not adequately funded.

Underfunding and lack of national focus has undermined US technological leadership. Casey 4 (Charles P, American Chemical Society pres., 8/23, http://pubs.acs.org/cen/editor/8234edit.html)
As President Bush and Sen. Kerry turn up the heat on their debate over economic policy, it's easy to forget that basic research plays a central role in sustaining U.S. leadership in science and in creating high-wage jobs. The formula is as certain as it gets in economics: Research investments spark innovation, which fosters productivity and job growth, which drive the economy. Yet budget pressures and the lack of a national science and technology strategy are driving down federal investments in research. This is a dangerous gamble at a time when the stakes could not be higher. U.S. leadership in science and technology used to be a foregone conclusion. No longer. The European Union, China, Japan, India, Russia, and other nations are rapidly building scientific capabilities that rival ours--as evidenced by more U.S. companies moving science and engineering jobs and facilities offshore and by fewer international students applying for U.S. graduate programs in science and engineering. Is our technological leadership slipping? If so, how will that affect our ability to generate future breakthroughs and high-wage jobs? These questions are not being asked often enough in Washington, D.C. Instead, the President's budget request cuts basic research at the Departments of Energy and of Defense, and the House of Representatives recently slashed National Science Foundation research. Because these agencies dominate federal investments in nonmedical research, our elected leaders are running a very risky national experiment at a pivotal time in U.S. history.

Another set of U.S. policies also threatens technological leadership. These are changes in immigration policy. It is useful to remember that U.S. national security and military power was strengthened in the 20th century by an influx of foreign scientists fleeing unstable conditions in Europe. The universities and institutions that received these scientists became global leaders in research, a role which they continue to play. Having these leading universities benefits the U.S., as leading students from other nations come to the U.S. to study and contribute to research. However, several factors have made the U.S. a less attractive destination for scientific talent than it once was. Measures imposed in the attacks of September 11 have the unintended consequence of deterring some researchers from coming to the U.S. Other changes prevent researchers form staying here once they complete their educations. This is particularly damaging - when a foreign student has completed their training and is ready to begin work, U.S. policy is to have them and work in another country. At the same time, other nations have recognized the economic and military advantages provided by scientific leadership and have attempted, with some success, to capture a greater share of scientific talent and to duplicate the success of research centers found in the U.S. This means that the U.S. faces new competition for scientific talent at the same moment that it policy is to discourage needs to compensate as foreign supplies of scientists and engineers shrink in the face of increased demand from other countries

U.S. restrictions on technology transfer also works against maintaining technological leadership. In some areas, there are restrictions that prevent scientists from exchanging unclassified information or working together on research projects. In other areas, restrictions on U.S. exports have encouraged other nations to invest in their own research and technologies. The unintended effect of these restrictions, and the restrictions on immigration, has been to create incentives for people to move research outside of the United States. The unintentional effect of some U.S. policies is to create new competitors.

Immigration restrictions and competition are undermining technological leadership. RAND 8 (policy think tank, 6/12, http://www.rand.org/news/press/2008/06/12/index.html)
The inflow of foreign students, scientists and engineers has been a key factor that has enabled the U.S. science and engineering workforce to grow faster than the U.S. is graduating native-born scientists and engineers, according to the report. Researchers found that foreign-born scientists and engineers are paid the same as native born, suggesting their quality is on par. But a recent reduction in the cap on skilled immigrant visas (H1-B) has the potential to reduce the inflow of foreign science and engineering workers, and the report argues that curtailing the supply of these scientists and engineers can lead U.S. firms to outsource more research and development to foreign countries and locate new facilities overseas. Rather than protecting jobs, this could lead to reduced investment and employment at home. Among potential weaknesses faced by the United States are the persistent underperformance of older, native-born K-12 students in math and science and the heavy focus of federal research funding on the life sciences versus physical sciences. Another unknown is whether an increasing U.S. reliance on foreignborn workers in science and engineering makes the U.S. vulnerable. In recent years, about 70 percent of the foreign scientists and engineers who receive PhDs from U.S. universities choose to remain here, but the stay rate could fall as research conditions and salaries improve abroad.

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Tech Leadership Low – Other Nations
Technological leadership is low – India, China, and the EU are catching up. Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 37, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
An oﬃcial statement from the National Summit on Competi- tiveness calls attention to “the resources that other countries are pour- ing into building their science and technology enterprises” (National Summit on Competitiveness, 2005). China and India are the most notorious examples of nations on the rise: “The major development since the mid-1990s was the rapid emergence of Asian economies out- side of Japan as increasingly strong players in the world’s S&T system.. . . China is growing at the most rapid pace. . . . Fragmentary data on India suggest that it is also seeking rapid technological development” (National Science Board, 2006a). According to economist Richard Freeman, this does not bode well for the United States: “[A]s China and India grow and join Europe, Japan and other high-tech competitors, the U.S. scientiﬁc advantage ‘is going down pretty rapidly and it’s going to continue to fall’” (Farrell, 2006). Other nations/regions certainly have ambitions to strengthen their competitiveness as knowledgebased economies. China and the Euro- pean Union (EU) are two examples. In January 2006, China initiated a 15-year “Medium- to Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology.” China aims to become an “innovation-oriented society” by 2020 and a world leader in science and technology by 2050, develop indigenous innovation capabilities, leap-frog1 into leading positions in new science-based industries, increase R&D expenditures to 2.5 percent of GDP by 2020 (from 1.34 percent in 2005), increase the contribution to economic growth from technological advances to 60 percent, limit dependence on imported technology to 30 percent, and become one of the top ﬁve countries in the world in the number of patents granted (Cao, Suttmeier, and Simon, 2006). In March 2000, the EU heads of states and governments agreed to make the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” by 2010—the so-called Lisbon Strategy (Eurac- tiv, 2004a). Two years later, the EU set a goal to increase its average research investment level from 1.9 percent to 3 percent of GDP by 2010, of which two-thirds should be funded by the private sector as compared with 56 percent at the time. Concern that the reform process was not going fast enough led to a relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy in March 2005 (Euractiv, 2004b). Some of the initiatives under way include

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***Alternate Causes to US Leadership***

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Down – Weak Military
Insufficient military resources and funding are destroying US leadership. Holmes 8 (Kim R, pH.D. specializing in national security studies, 3/14, http://www.heritage.org/research/worldwidefreedom/hl1069.cfm)
As for "getting a bigger stick," we must regain our military strength. Our military power is simply inadequate to our claims of global leadership: Our forces are underfunded; they are underresourced; and they are wearing out. We need a renewed com–mitment to restoring American military strength if we are to reclaim that mantle of world leadership. This means modernizing our forces; it means better integration of the National Guard and reserves; and it means funding them, which we estimate costs at least 4 percent of gross domestic product. It also means building a comprehensive ballistic missile defense system. This renewed military power is necessary to defend liberty itself, but it also is necessary as an insurance policy against a resurgent Russia and a ris–ing China. I argue in this book that our policies toward these two countries are terribly muddled. We desperately want to be friends with them, and yet they don't seem to want to return the favor--at least on terms that we understand. They do not behave in ways that are consistent with our understanding of freedom and international responsibility. It's best, frankly, that we admit this and under–stand this. We don't have to make them into ene–mies as a result of this misunderstanding, but neither should we be pretending that they are our friends and that they have the same stake that we do in freedom and international stability. They do not share that with us. They are not our enemies, but they are also not like us, and we should not make the mistake of concluding that they are

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Down – Foreign Media/Domestic Dissent
Foreign media agencies and US politicians will spin any policy so that it erodes US leadership. Holmes 8 (Kim R, pH.D. specializing in national security studies, 3/14, http://www.heritage.org/research/worldwidefreedom/hl1069.cfm)
But there is a deeper, more homegrown chal–lenge to American leadership. Some Americans no longer believe that America has the moral stature to be a world leader. Their doubts about traditional American values lead them to be skeptical about the assertion of American power abroad. In other words, they have doubts about us as a nation, mak–ing them reluctant to support an assertive foreign policy abroad. They fall back into a mindset like that of our European friends; they want to constrain and tame American power--to make us atone for our alleged sins and to create a nation not unlike what you may find in the European Union. This brings me to why I wrote this book: This is not the America I believe in. I know that many peo– ple are going to draw the wrong conclusions about how we got into our current predicament and, more important, how to get out of it. Some are going to say, "Yes, Holmes, you are right; we are in a mess, and Bush is to blame for all of it." Well, Bush is not to blame for all of it--per–haps some of it, but not all of it or even most of it. He's not responsible for the anti-American excesses of the foreign media or the efforts by some of our allies to undermine American influence. Nor is he responsible for the less than honorable Members of Congress who voted for the Iraq War and then turned against it.

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Down – Latin America
US leadership is down due to Iraq and disillusionment with US economic policy – Latin America proves. Panama News 7 (4/7, http://www.thepanamanews.com/pn/v_13/issue_06/editorial.html)
The silly presentation of George W. Bush’s week-long visit to Latin America at the same time that Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez was visiting or hosting other regional leaders as some sort of political duel had the one saving grace of putting US influence in the region into some rough approximation of perspective. Relatively weak and little countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua are thumbing their noses at American pretences that they are part of the US “back yard,” and the bigger countries of the region may be a bit more polite to the president of the United States but they are certainly not taking any orders. The only places where Bush was warmly embraced by his hosts were Colombia and Guatemala, both of which have governments dominated by far-right politicians with historic links to death squads. The Iraq War has both distracted US attention and diverted its economic, diplomatic and military resources from this hemisphere and proven most unpopular throughout the Americas. Even in Panama, the one place in the region where Bush gets mostly positive public opinion ratings, people overwhelmingly oppose the Iraq War. Bush’s economic message of privatizations and cutbacks in public services, one-sided opening of markets to US-based corporations and international economic integration models bereft of democratic features has not been well received. Why should it be? Those policies have been tried and they have failed, causing misery and political instability throughout the region. Even in Panama, where we depend on international trade more than any other Latin American country does, the proposed free trade agreement with the United States splits public opinion right down the middle.

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Down – Suicidal Statecraft
America’s overzealous use of power has created a suicidal statecraft that kills US leadership. Ben-Ami 7 (Shlomo, former Israeli foreign minister, 7/4, http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/America's_Suicidal_Statecraft)

Even so, America remains by far the world’s most powerful country; its decline has more to do with its incompetent use of power than with the emergence of competitors. It is American leaders’ “suicidal statecraft,” to use Arnold Toynbee’s pithy phrase for what he considered the ultimate cause of imperial collapse, that is to blame for America’s plight. Consider the Middle East. Nothing reveals the decline of the United States in the region better than the contrast between America’s sober use of power in the first Gulf War in 1991 and the hubris and deceit of today’s Iraq war. In 1991, America forged the most formidable international coalition since World War II, and led it in a fully legitimate war aimed at restoring regional balance after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. In 2003, America went to war without its trans-Atlantic allies after manipulating false assertions. In doing so, the US embarked on a preposterous grand strategy that aimed no less at simultaneously dismantling Iraq’s tyrannical regime, restructuring the entire Middle East, destroying al-Qaeda, and helping democracy to take root throughout the Arab world. The result has been utter failure: military defeat and a severe degradation of America’s moral standing. Rather than undermining radical Islam, the US has legitimized it, in Iraq and beyond. Indeed, what will now shape the future of the region is not democracy, but the violent divide between Shiites and Sunnis that the Iraq war precipitated. It is this Muslim civil war that is allowing al-Qaeda to gain a larger pool of recruits.

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***Energy Leadership K Heg***

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Energy Leadership K Heg (1/4)
Energy leadership is uniquely key to maintain hegemony. Lugar 8 (Richard, US senator, Jan., http://lugarenergycenter.iupui.edu/forum.html)
Third, energy is the underlying condition that exacerbates almost every major foreign policy issue. We pressure Sudan to stop genocide in Darfur, but we find that the Sudanese government is insulated by oil revenue and oil supply relationships. We pressure Iran to stop its uranium enrichment activities, yet key nations are hesitant to endanger their access to Iran’s oil and natural gas. We try to foster global respect for civil society and human rights, yet oil revenues flowing to authoritarian governments are often diverted to corrupt or repressive purposes. We fight terrorism, yet some of the hundreds of billions of dollars we spend each year on oil imports are diverted to terrorists. We give foreign assistance to lift people out of poverty, yet energy-poor countries are further impoverished by expensive energy import bills. We seek options that would allow for military disengagement in Iraq and the wider Middle East, yet our way of life depends on a steady stream of oil from that region. American national security will be at risk as long as we are heavily dependent on imported energy. Vigorous energy diplomacy of the type that only a committed President can ensure is required around the world. Even as we seek to reduce our foreign oil dependence, the United States will remain part of the global energy system and our foreign policy priorities will be affected by the production and consumption decisions of other nations. A top priority in our relations with China and India should be helping them avoid replicating U.S. dependence on oil and coal and guiding them to cleaner power generation technologies. Countries from Indonesia to Egypt to Chile are considering new nuclear power programs, creating risks for proliferation of enrichment technology. Management of energy relations with Russia will remain difficult for our NATO allies. And any strategy for resolving the situations in Iraq and Iran must include a plan for stability of Persian Gulf oil supplies. Making progress in Central Asia and the Caucasus is another case in point. Recently President Putin of Russia sought to secure agreements with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to ship their energy north through Russia, rather than through alternative routes that would not be dominated by the Kremlin. Next week, I will travel to the region to demonstrate American interest in strengthening relations with these countries. An East-West energy corridor would help reduce Russia’s stranglehold on gas shipments to Europe. Diplomatic support for the Baku-TbilisiCeyhan and South Caucasus pipelines that have led development of the corridor was a bold initiative with tremendous strategic importance. Already we have seen benefits for stability in the region and closer relationships with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Those benefits can also be reaped in Central Asia.

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Energy Leadership K Heg (2/4)
Leadership in alternative energy is key to hegemony. Lugar 8 (Richard, US senator, Jan., http://lugarenergycenter.iupui.edu/forum.html)
We can debate the margin of error in any of these international energy projections, but the picture they paint is a bleak one for global stability and U.S. influence. Rapid industrialization in China, India, and other nations is rendering obsolete many well-intentioned approaches to energy security, climate change, and global economic policy. Technological breakthroughs that expand energy supplies for billions of people worldwide will be necessary for sustained economic growth. If concerns over climate change are factored into policies, the challenge becomes even greater, because serious efforts to limit carbon could constrain energy options – particularly the use of coal. In the absence of revolutionary changes in energy policy, we will be risking multiple hazards for our country that could constrain living standards, undermine our foreign policy goals, and leave us highly vulnerable to economic and political disasters with an almost existential impact.

US leadership on alternative energy solves warming and hegemony. Biriwasha 8 (Masimba, 6/26, http://ecoworldly.com/2008/06/26/should-us-be-held-to-higher-environmentalstandards/) Unlike the US however, many of the developing nations have approved international climate agreements, a critical first step in addressing the problem. However, developing nations lack the werewithal to produce the requisite greneer techonlogies as well as the political and economic might to influence a global response. On the contrary, the US has all this in abundance but seriously lacks the moral aptitude because of its stance on the global climate agreement. With its financial and technological might, the US is well positioned to build a low-emissions environment, and therefore set an example to the rest of the world. It is a paradoxic sham that the US assumes a claim to higher moral standards in protecting democracy worldwide yet refuses due to self-interest to commit to global agreements against what scientists have described as the “greatest threat facing humanity” in our time. The proposition that the US can go it alone is hurtful to global efforts because it makes other countries, chiefly China, to engage in finger pointing without addressing the problem. As the world’s leading power, the US needs to show farsighted leadership in efforts to respond to threats posed by climate change. “By committing to higher environmental standards, the US can make it a priority to develop and prove the effectiveness of alternative forms of energy, and use this as a basis to lobby and mobilize less-developed nations,” states US in the World, an initiative to get Americans involved in worldly matters. “By acting first, the U.S. and other rich countries that are most responsible for global warming - because they burn the most oil, gas, and coal - can set a powerful example for others to follow. By committing themselves to developing alternative energy sources, technologically advanced countries like the United States can create new jobs and industries at home while jump-starting the international effort to slow global warming and influencing the energy choices of less advanced countries that are on the brink of making big new energy investments,” adds US in the World. Given that the US is world’s super-power, it needs to lead by example, and rally the world toward a better management of the environment.

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Energy Leadership K Heg (3/4)
Energy leadership is key to maintaining hegemony. Lugar 8 (Richard, US senator, Jan., http://lugarenergycenter.iupui.edu/forum.html)
We find ourselves in a situation that should be intolerable for a superpower and for a nation with such high economic expectations. We maintain a massive military presence overseas, partly to preserve our oil lifeline. One conservative estimate puts U.S. oil-dedicated military expenditures in the Middle East at $50 billion per year. But there is no guarantee that even our unrivaled military forces can prevent an energy disaster. We have lost leverage on the international stage and are daily exacerbating the problem by participating in an enormous wealth transfer to authoritarian nations that happen to possess the commodity that our economy can least do without. October 2007 trade figures show that our nonpetroleum trade deficit shrank by 2.9 percent that month, but because of our oil import bill, the overall U.S. trade deficit rose 1.2 percent to $57.8 billion. Our energy vulnerability is intensified by the increasing percentage of U.S. public debt – now 44 percent – held by foreign entities and the dimming luster of the dollar. A very significant recession could be triggered by economic or geopolitical forces over which we have little control. I do not believe these challenges are insurmountable, but it is unlikely that we can address them within the prevailing political mindset that has proven to be incapable of more than incremental action on energy security.

Furthermore, financiers are projecting significant growth in demand for renewable energy technologies and energy efficient products. Mandatory climate policy will spur U.S. leadership in environmental and energy technology innovation, assuring U.S. competitiveness in the booming global market for climate-friendly technology.

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Energy Leadership K Heg (4/4)
Energy leadership is key to hegemony and the economy. Romm and Curtis 96 (Joseph, Charles, April, http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/96apr/oil/oil.htm)
Because of the close connection between energy production and consumption on the one hand and pollution on the other, the Department of Energy provides a substantial majority--70 percent--of all federally funded pollution-prevention R&D. Pollution-prevention technologies take a variety of forms. Renewable energy prevents pollution in the production of electricity. Fuel cells offer the hope of preventing pollution in the transportation sector. Many other sectors of the economy have equally great prevention opportunities. As Yergin's task force noted, in the past two decades a DOE investment totaling about $1.1 billion in energy-efficient
industrial technologies has yielded "approximately $2.5 billion in documented energy savings and net productivity gains, and the accumulation of these savings continues to grow at increasing rates." By 2000 these investments will be generating savings of about $10 billion a year. Very few other federal investments produce as great a societal return on taxpayers' dollars. One technology, a process for dezincing (removing the galvanized coating from) scrap steel, provided the breakthrough that industry needed in order to recycle up to 10 million tons of scrap metal annually. By 2005 electrochemical dezincing could reduce raw-materials costs by $150 million a year, saving 50 trillion BTUs in the process, and reduce the need to import at least 70,000 tons of zinc, for further savings of at least $70 million annually. Another government-funded technology, vacuum-pressure swing adsorption, which is now used in manufacturing 15 percent of the glass made in the United States, reduces glassmaking emissions of nitrogen oxide by 90 percent and cuts furnace energy use by 25

most industrial pollution in the United States comes from the country's seven most energy-intensive industries: steel, aluminum, petroleum refining, chemicals, pulp and paper products, glass, and metal casting. These industries account for about 80 percent of the energy consumed in U.S. manufacturing and for more than 90 percent of the hazardous waste. They represent the greatest opportunities for increasing energy and resource efficiency while reducing pollution. That's why the DOE has been forming partnerships with these industries to develop clean technologies.
percent. Something that is not widely understood is that Funding for pollution prevention is the best way for the nation to avoid the need for costly environmental regulations. The government has a role in encouraging pollution prevention for several reasons. First, pollution-prevention technologies often benefit each of many companies only a little bit, so no one company has an incentive to spend the necessary money by itself. Second, prevention has many societal benefits: it reduces energy and other resource consumption and improves the environment, among other advantages. Third, and most important, pollution prevention and resource efficiency help companies to shift money from consuming energy and resources to investing in technology and capital equipment, thus

a shift from consumption to investment may be the single most important transformation the U.S. economy must undergo if we are to remain prosperous in the next century.
creating jobs and economic growth. Indeed, A 1993 analysis for the DOE attempted to quantify the macroeconomic benefits of pollution prevention. The study found that a 1020 percent reduction in waste by American industry would generate a cumulative increase of $1.94 trillion in the gross domestic product from 1996 to 2010. By 2010 the improvements would be generating two million new jobs, or roughly 1.5 percent of employment in that year. According to the study, this is "a relatively large impact considering that the investments driving it were assumed to be made for purposes other than increasing employment." Moreover, this analysis does not include the jobs to be gained from capturing the large and growing export market for clean technologies

Resource inefficiency and environmental degradation are very real limitations on the attempts of developing nations to raise the living standards of their people, especially since most of those nations do not have the abundance of resources with which America is endowed. The World Bank estimates that by 2000 the countries
and processes. of Asia alone will need to spend about $40 billion a year on clean technologies. By then the global market for environmental services and technologies is expected to exceed $400

The resource, environmental, and capital constraints on the developing world guarantee a rich export market for the nation that leads the world in developing clean technologies.
billion.

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AE = Soft Power
U.S. can use scientific and technological innovations in context of developing alternative energies to increase soft power Foust ‘7 (Aerospace analyst, journalist and publisher) online: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/855/1
In the early 21st century, the United States can exert soft power influence in science and technology areas beyond human spaceflight, and perhaps more effectively. One example is the growing global concern about climate change, for which the evidence mounts that human activity is either the primary cause or a critical exacerbating factor. Imagine if the US decided to take the leading role in combating climate change, through the development of alternative energy sources (particularly those that have the desirable side effect of reducing US reliance on energy imported from unstable regions of the globe) and other mitigating technologies. How much soft power would the US accrue, particularly in counterpoint to China, whose economic expansion has been powered primarily by coal and oil? And, of course, space technologies—although not necessarily human spaceflight—would have a role to play here as well.

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AE = US Economy
Alternative energy key to US Economy Alliance 8 (Apollo, Ella Baker Center's Green Collar Jobs Campaign,
http://www.cleantechamerica.com/GreenDevelopment/) The brightest star in the U.S. economy is the emerging multi-billion dollar green sector. It promises new opportunities in clean renewable power, energy efficient construction, clean technology, and urban agriculture. More to the point, green offers jobs. According to a 2004 UC Berkeley study updated in 2006, Putting Renewables to Work: How Many Jobs Can the Clean Energy Industry Generate? - the renewable industry has consistently produced more jobs per megawatt of electricity generated than the fossil fuel industries in construction, manufacturing, installation, operations, management, and fuel processing. With a 20 percent national renewable energy standard, UC Berkeley predicts more than 188,000 jobs would be created by 2020. The Apollo Alliance's Jobs Report details how 3.3 million new green collar jobs could be added to the economy over a 10-year period that would stimulate $1.4 trillion in new gross domestic product.

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Oil Dependence Hurts Heg
Dependence on fossil fuels is the most important issue undermining US leadership. Haas 8 (Richard, CFR pres., May/June, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html)
The United States can and should take steps to reduce the chances that a nonpolar world will become a cauldron of instability. This is not a call for unilateralism; it is a call for the United States to get its own house in order. Unipolarity is a thing of the past, but the United States still retains more capacity than any other actor to improve the quality of the international system. The question is whether it will continue to possess such capacity. Energy is the most important issue. Current levels of U.S. consumption and imports (in addition to their adverse impact on the global climate) fuel nonpolarity by funneling vast financial resources to oil and gas producers. Reducing consumption would lessen the pressure on world prices, decrease U.S. vulnerability to market manipulation by oil suppliers, and slow the pace of climate change. The good news is that this can be done without hurting the U.S. economy.

Fossil fuel dependence ends hegemony – creates new centers of power. Haas 8 (Richard, CFR pres., May/June, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html)
A second cause is U.S. policy. To paraphrase Walt Kelly's Pogo, the post-World War II comic hero, we have met the explanation and it is us. By both what it has done and what it has failed to do, the United States has accelerated the emergence of alternative power centers in the world and has weakened its own position relative to them. U.S. energy policy (or the lack thereof) is a driving force behind the end of unipolarity. Since the first oil shocks of the 1970s, U.S. consumption of oil has grown by approximately 20 percent, and, more important, U.S. imports of petroleum products have more than doubled in volume and nearly doubled as a percentage of consumption. This growth in demand for foreign oil has helped drive up the world price of oil from just over $20 a barrel to over $100 a barrel in less than a decade. The result is an enormous transfer of wealth and leverage to those states with energy reserves. In short, U.S. energy policy has helped bring about the emergence of oil and gas producers as major power centers.

U.S. must kick oil dependency to maintain global leadership and national security National Security Task Force on Energy ‘6 (“Energy Security in the 21st Century: A New National
Strategy”) online: http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/energy_security_report.pdf President Bush has declared that America is addicted to oil and dangerously dependent on unstable or hostile states for its energy supply. But while there is a consensus across the political spectrum

that the current energy strategy is failing, Democrats and Republicans fundamentally disagree about what should be done to address the threats posed by America’s dependence on foreign oil and the potentially catastrophic environmental damage caused by carbon emissions from the use of fossil fuels. The Bush administration has demonstrated a willingness to
acknowledge the existence of such energy security challenges, but it has failed to implement a plan to meet them. In this report, leading energy and national security experts present a new, comprehensive energy security strategy that will put the United States on a path toward energy independence while enhancing our national, economic, and environmental security.

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Oil Dependence Alienates Allies
Oil dependence alienates allies Bromley 98 (Simon, Open U International Political Economy sr. lecturer, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013404)
A shift from a zero-sum direct control (where the powers of the United States and its corporate contractors were exercised at the expense of local states, ruling classes and people), to an indirect, positive-sum arrangement mutually beneficial to the parties involved is precisely the achievement of US hegemony as distinct from empire. Nevertheless, larger questions relating to the changing nature of US hegemony and the role of oil politics within it remain. It is in this context that one must locate power and influence in the contemporary international political economy of oil. For there is now a very real challenge to US hegemony and the US role as guardian of the West's oil, although it does not lie primarily in the sands of Arabia. The key geopolitical shift has been the resolution and after-effects of the Cold War.6 Four implications are especially pertinent: First, it has freed the hand of the US to deploy military power while undermining the domestic and international rationale for doing so; second, it has weakened the position of some Arab states (including important OPEC members, most notably Iraq) opposed to US strategy in the region; third, it has undercut the last remaining material and ideological bases for planned, statist models of development, including those based directly or indirectly on oil rents; and fourth, it has shifted the competition between the United States and its capitalist allies into more strictly "economic" channels, thus complicating US efforts to devise general strategies of geopolitical and economic leadership. The US's elevation to sole military superpower status and the enfeeblement of "radical" Arab regimes has certainly allowed the US to deploy military power in the region on an unparalleled scale. Equally, the ascendance of the market and private property is working its way across the Middle East now that the protection afforded to statist models by petroleum rents is falling, which can only be welcomed in Washington. Against these favorable shifts, one has to balance the absence of a clear rationale for intervention and the growing unease of the advanced capitalist allies about US regional strategy. Although it is still too early to judge how far the Cold War magnified the influence of the United States over its capitalist allies in the North and its regional partners in the South, the fall-out so far has been considerable.'

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***AT: Energy Leadership K Heg***

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Energy Leadership Causes Russian Backlash
US energy leadership conflicts with Russian interests DOE 7 (Carnegie Moscow Center, 3/14, http://www.doe.gov/news/4876.htm)
The United States and Russia will naturally have different perspectives on exactly what this plan means. That is not surprising…the U.S. is the world’s largest net consumer of energy and Russia is the world’s largest net producer. So, we won’t always agree. But I think I understand why Russia agreed to these principles. Russia wants to advance its dominant role as an energy supplier to the world. Russia wants to mature its energy sector to take full potential from its incredible natural wealth. And further, I believe Russia wants to increase the share value of its energy companies, and desires the benefits that will accrue from collaboration with privately-owned international companies. I would cite, as a great example the collaboration that exists with ConocoPhillips and Lukoil. New development in the oil and gas sector in Russia will require new technology, foreign capital, and the experience and best practices of the world’s leading energy companies. And the greatest success in this area will require a transparent marketplace, a certain investment climate, and fair and predictable regulatory regimes.

For much of the past two decades, the United States has been relatively successful at imposing neoliberal reforms on oil-rich nations of the South in order to open up their economies and resources to multinational energy com- panies. In countries where neo-liberal reforms were not possible, or proved insufficient, such as in Iraq, US military intervention occurred in conjunction with economic intervention. Under President George W. Bush, the historic links between US energy policy and US foreign policy became even more pronounced, and it should be noted that the United States has been steadily expanding its control of overseas territories since the turn of the twentieth century, though most Americans do not think of their government as an'empire'. Now, with over 700 military bases worldwide, the US holds sway over an area that dwarfs the great empires of history. Only last month there was a heated debate in Parliament about the use of the US base on Diego Garcia which is on that small Britishowned island. British officials admitted that the US had used the base in at least two cases for 'rendition' flights carrying terrorist suspects

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***Enviro K US Leadership***

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Enviro Leadership K Heg (1/2)
Environmental leadership, achievable only through new domestic efforts to cut emissions, is key to hegemony. Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 21-22, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
Without deep U.S. emissions cuts, it will be impossible to achieve a global reduction in emissions to half of 1990 levels by 2050. An ambitious U.S. effort is essential since U.S. emissions are such a large share of the world total, and because visible U.S. leadership is essential to getting other nations, especially the rapidly growing developing countries, to make significant efforts. As of 2005, the United States accounted for approximately 15 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, more than anyother country aside fromChina—andmost analysts believe that China’s emissions surpassed the U.S. level in 2007.35 Those emissions— most of which were CO2 from electricity and heat production and from transportation— were 20 percent higher than U.S. emissions in 1990.36 The IEA projects that, without new policies, U.S. carbon dioxide emissions will increase by 10 percent by 2015 and by 20 percent by 2030. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) projects that non-CO2 emissions will increase by 20 percent by 2020.37 A wide range of scientific, business, and environmental groups have supported a path in which the United States, along with the other advanced industrial countries, begins reducing its emissions immediately and ultimately reduces them to roughly 60 percent to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050, a trajectory reflected in several bipartisan bills currently before Congress. These are extremely ambitious goals, but they are ones the Task Force has previously identified as having the strong potential to be economically reasonable, assuming flexible and carefully designed policy, particularly given the gravity of the climate challenge. If developing countries control their emissions so that they are roughly the same in 2050 as today, that would be consistent with a global goal of halving emissions from 1990 levels by 2050. In addition to the immediate quantitative need to reduce the U.S. contribution to global emissions, there is also a broader case for aggressive U.S. action and leadership. Without it, the United States will have far less leverage in moving the rest of the world toward emissions cuts in a way that is most attractive to the United States. Moreover, by not taking early action, the United States will give up opportunities to rebuild critical alliances, to create jobs in new industries, and to bolster support for near-term measures that could strengthen energy security. Indeed, it could endure real economic harm if, retaliating for a lack of U.S. action, other countries imposed tariffs on emissions-intensiveU.S. exports, as some in Europe have threatened to do. To be certain, precipitous action and inflexible policy would entail dangerous economic risks—but, as the Task Force has already found, efficient, equitable, and adaptable climate policy would make those risks far smaller. The Task Force finds that aggressive and mandatory domestic efforts to cut U.S. greenhouse gas emissions are a prerequisite to effective U.S. engagement and leadership internationally on climate change policy. A policy that begins reducing U.S. emissions now and that is initially aimed at a goal of cuts as deep as 60 percent to 80 percent below 1990 levels in 2050 at reasonable cost is appropriate.38 The Task Force finds that with emissions rising, current policies are nowhere near the level of effort required to stop and then reverse growth in greenhouse gas emissions, let alone reach these targets.

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Enviro Leadership K Heg (2/2)
Failure to take action on warming undermines US influence. NYT 0 (12/3, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A00E1D9163CF930A35751C1A9669C8B63)
The collapse of the United Nations conference on climate change (front page, Nov. 26) undermines the United States' leadership position in the rest of the world. The United States wants to attribute the failure of the conference to the European Union's unwillingness to be ''reasonable'' and compromise in order to reach agreement. But the United States' position reduced an already severely diluted Kyoto agreement to the point where no meaningful reduction in greenhouse gases would have been accomplished at all. This is despite the fact that the United States is by far the world's biggest polluter and has done nothing to address the problem. This cynical disregard of a global danger and the cavalier dismissal of the rest of the world's effort to try to come to grips with this problem is a national disgrace.

Environmental leadership boosts competitiveness. LA Times 7 (8/31, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-dustup31aug31,0,7642681,full.story?coll=la-promo-opinion)
Yes, we should demand national legislation - and global treaties - to ensure that California's environmental leadership doesn't undermine our global competitiveness. In fact, by encouraging innovative approaches to meeting the 2020 targets, we can promote California as a world leader in green industry and green building

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Enviro Leadership K Heg – Relations
Environmental leadership is key to global leadership – restores relations and builds new partnerships. Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 21-22, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
Climate change policy also provides an opportunity to mend U.S. relations with other countries. Among the advanced industrialized nations, the United States is viewed as the country that has been slowest to develop a credible climate policy. The shape of U.S. policy has many origins. The United States found it especially difficult to meet the emissions targets set forth in the Kyoto Protocol primarily because its own emissions rose rapidly during the economic boom of the late 1990s and because it chose not to require emissions reductions; the European Union, by contrast, has seen its emissions rise much less sharply for a variety of reasons linked to its slower population growth, generally less robust economic expansion, fortuitous changes in its energy systems, and its active policies to cut emissions.20 The perceived lack of a sufficiently aggressive U.S. policy, along with the United States’ failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol at a time when many in the world view climate change as a paramount danger for the planet, has undercut U.S. credibility in addressing global challenges. To be certain, the United States has adopted a variety of policies that will lead emissions to be lower than they otherwise would be, something discussed in more detail in the next chapter. But combined with an array of other policy differences, the U.S. approach to the climate problem has harmed the transatlantic alliance, long a bedrock of U.S. foreign policy. With climate change a top priority for most major U.S. allies in Europe, engaging in a way that is seen as serious and constructive has the potential to rebuild weakened relationships and accrue goodwill that would be useful across the U.S. foreign policy agenda. At the same time, climate change diplomacy, which will involve every major country in the world, also provides the United States anopportunity to build and intensify relationships that will be important well beyond the climate arena. U.S. leadership on climate changewould also help steer any global approach in a direction that the United States finds to be in its interests. The Task Force finds that engaging on climate change can help repair U.S. relationships with historical allies and provide an avenue for strengthening relations with others.

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Enviro Leadership K Heg – Energy Dependence
Environmental leadership on climate change solves hegemony – eliminates dependence on oil from dangerous states on a global scale. Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 23, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
Energy security has risen alongside climate change to the top tier of the foreign policy agenda—in much of the United States it outstrips climate change in the priority assigned by the public. In the United States, energy security concerns focus primarily on dependence on imported oil, which accounts for 65 percent of total U.S. oil consumption. In the coming decades it will also link to gas (already the focus of European worries), which the United States imports in small quantities today but is likely to rely on more heavily in the future.21 Imported oil and gas distorts the behavior of friends, allies, and competitors alike in ways that are inimical to U.S. interests, exposes the U.S. economy to sharp shifts in resource prices, and constrains U.S. options in dealing with oil- and gas-rich states, all while abetting corruption and antidemocratic forces.22 Shaping global action to limit the emissions that cause climate change offers the United States opportunities to advance its energy security agenda. For example, cutting emissions around the world by making far more efficient use of energy would also lessen global dependence on oil and gas, in turn depressing the revenues that flow to dangerous oil- and gas-rich states such as Iran and Venezuela. Over the longer term, it is also plausible that large quantities of oil currently used in transportation could be displaced by shifting to electricity for transportation. If future power plants are built in ways that reduce greenhouse gas emissions—such as with advanced coal plants that sequester their CO2 deep underground, large-scale deployment of wind turbines, fuller use of nuclear power,or any of a host of other technologies—electrifying the transport sector would yield major climate benefits at the same time

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Enviro Leadership K Heg – Competitiveness
Environmental leadership on climate change can uniquely boost US economic competitiveness, solving hegemony. Maybee 8 (Sean C, US Navy commander, p. 99, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i49.htm)
Climate policy is far from only about confronting challenges. It also presents opportunities to strengthen important parts of the economy and create jobs, to rebuild U.S. partnerships and alliances, and to bolster energy security. Large long-term reductions in greenhouse gas emissions at relatively low costs will require developing new low-carbon technologies and deploying them on a massive scale.16 (Throughout this report, lowcarbon technologies should be understood to include not only those that generate lower emissions, but also those that improve energy efficiency and thus reduce demand, those that help absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and those that reduce emissions of other greenhouse gases.) This technological and economic revolution will require society to invest large amounts of resources. If done wisely, however, it will also yield dividends that include jobs and value in science, engineering, and skilled trades. Private investment in emerging and transforming industries has the potential, as in past technological revolutions, to deliver substantial returns for the economy and workforce, with particular benefits to the United States if it can harness its traditional ingenuity. Past experience with high-technology industries strongly suggests that those countries thatmove first in developing new technologies and training an appropriately skilledworkforce gain a substantial advantage in the global marketplace. Examples include the Internet boom, which finds its epicenter in the United States and is partly the result of wise early investments to push clusters of information networking technologies that are now the backbone for those industries. Similarly, a vast industry to design and build low-pollution power plants has arisen over the last four decades, much of it also centered in the countries that moved first to control air pollution—the United States, as well as Japan.

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Enviro Leadership K Heg – Empirics
Empirically proven – environmental leadership boosts hegemony. Levi 8 (Michael, CFR Energy and Environment sr. fellow, p. 93, June, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16362/)
The report provides important insights and recommendations at a critical time both for U.S. political leadership and in the global treaty negotiations. I particularly endorse the Task Force’s recognition that climate change cooperation strengthens our international relationships: collaboration on clean energy and climate change with the LatinAmerican governments in the 1990s built trust through shared mutual challenges and opportunities, benefited their development objectives, and opened up new markets for U.S. firms. It also diversified U.S. foreign policy relationships beyond long-standing difficult issues like the illegal drug trade and immigration.

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Climate Change Kills Heg
Climate change would devastate US leadership and security. Maybee 8 (Sean C, US Navy commander, p. 99, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i49.htm)
Resiliency has always been a national security concern and is embedded in military planning and operations due to the uncertainty of warfare and conflict. That being said, the potentialities of GCC may require a fresh look at the resiliency of the U.S. military. One obvious concern is the vulnerability of military installations to sea level rise or increased storm activity. More subtly, how will equipment and personnel be affected by changed environmental conditions? Even more intangibly, how will unintended economic and social ripple effects impact the ability to build, maintain, and deploy the military? As the national debate unfolds, the resiliency of national systems (energy, food, economic, military) should be considered. The interdependency of world systems and ripple effects point toward a greater concern regarding the resiliency of other regions of the world. The instability that may result could become a threat to national security. The resilience of a government and its capacity to respond will depend on the challenges it faces, but some governments will no doubt be more successful than others. The other fundamental question is what happens in nations where the government fails to meet the challenges of climate change. No one knows, but when government X fails, there will be some form of internal strife as competing groups vie for control. The ensuing conflict may further decrease any subsequent government’s ability to deal with GCC impacts while amplifying the effects, a cycle that is difficult to break.

Climate change’s erosion of US primacy is on par with great power war or terrorism. Nye 8 (Joseph S, Harvard IR prof., 3/7, p. 1353, http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/51/9/1351)
The final major challenge to our security is somewhat more novel—ecological breakdowns such as pandemics and negative climate change. Some deny that these are security issues, but if security means protection against threats to vital interests, then they fit the term. These challenges can do damage on a scale represented by a terrorist use of a weapon of mass destruction. It is worth remembering that Avian influenza killed more people at the end of World War I than died in the war and that a greater-than-expected melting of the Antarctic ice cap could deprive us of thou- sands of miles of our territory. These types of security threats will require prudent energy policies and a new regime for global climate change,as well as greater coop- eration through international institutions such as the World Health Organization.

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Enviro Leadership Solves China/India
US environmental leadership creates initiative for under developed countries to follow, specifically China and India Biriwasha 8 (Masimba, 6/26, http://ecoworldly.com/2008/06/26/should-us-be-held-to-higher-environmentalstandards/) The US has in the past shown great moral strength, courage and sacrifice to respond to global crises but no so with the imminent threat of global climate change. Yet, in order to accelerate global efforts to protect the environment, the US must not only be held to a higher environmental standard than the rest of the world, it must also show greater commitment to a coordinated worldly response. The statistics speak for themselves - the US produces a total of 5,410 million
metric tonnes of carbon dioxide per year, almost a quarter of the global emissions, according to researchers. This makes the US the world’s leading polluter, making it imperative to hold the country to a higher environmental standard. The impact of US emissions go far beyond its borders, changing climatic patterns in many parts of the world, and disrupting people’s lives. The apparent lack of US enthusiasm to make the world greener is in a word detrimental to the agenda of protecting the global environment. Since the Kyoto treaty was established in 1997 to collaborate a global response to environmental destruction, in particular global warming, the US government has dilly-dallied and exhibited a consistent reluctance to ratify the agreement thereby dealing a body blow to the global campaign to protect the environment. Incumbent US President George W. Bush has insisted that making global commitments to climate change would harm his country’s economic prospects. Since President Bush entered the White House, his administration has muzzled the country’s

“The United States performance indicates that the next administration must not ignore the ecosystem impacts of environmental as well as agricultural, energy and water management policies,” said Gus Speth, Dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies at the launch of the 2008 Environmental Performance Index (EPI). “The EPI’s climate change metrics ranking the United States alongside India and China near the bottom of the world’s table are a national disgrace.” The fact of the matter is that, in order to produce a real global outcome on climate change, the US must step out of its shell of self-interest and show leadership as the world’s greatest power through ratifying and implementing international global climate agreements. Though the US cites protecting
responsibility to significantly contribute to environmental solutions, including pulling the US out of the Kyoto climate change agreement. its economy as the reason for its reluctance to make a global commitment, the long term impact of little action against climate change will undoubtedly unravel current, short-term

. If the US can commit to higher environmental standards - mainly because it is the main polluter anyway, it will significantly make it easier for the world to engage other major polluters such as China and India in the global climate response. China and India, like many developing nations accuse the US and other developed nations of having done damage to the environment for longer periods to time.
concerns

US leadership key to Chinese and Indian action on warming. Pew Center on Global Climate Change 8 (3/26,
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/1114_BusinessFinal.pdf) Many of the businesses making the case for government action also see a pressing need for U.S. leadership in the international arena. Multinational firms in particular want to know that policies around the world will be as predictable, integrated and consistent as possible. They are operating in many countries that have signed the Kyoto Protocol and that will be requiring real reductions in emissions. For these companies, it makes sense to implement company-wide strategies for managing their emissions, rather than working under one set of rules in the United States or Australia, and another set of rules everywhere else. Companies also want to be sure that their competitors in developing countries, especially China and India, are soon subject to carbon constraints. Those with the most experience on the climate issue realize that the most important first step for getting China and India to move toward climate commitments is for the United States to adopt its own mandatory limits on emissions and to reengage in the international effort to address climate change.

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***AT: Environmental Leadership***

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Enviro Leadership Kills Competitiveness (1/2)
Environmental leadership undermines competitiveness and increases environmental damage. Financial Times 6 (11/23, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/77516e6a-7b2e-11db-bf9b-0000779e2340.html?nclick_check=1)
Europe is damaging its competitiveness by moving faster than the rest of the world to tackle climate change, the European Union’s industry commissioner has warned. In a letter seen by the Financial Times, Günter Verheugen says: “We have to recognise that ... our environmental leadership could significantly undermine the international competitiveness of part of Europe’s energy-intensive industries and worsen global environmental performance by redirecting production to parts of the world with lower environmental standards.” His comments are understood to be aimed in particular at the economic threat from China, India and other Asian nations. The industry commissioner wrote to José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, calling for special exemptions for such sectors to state aid rules and backing the introduction of a levy on imports from developed countries that have yet to implement the Kyoto treaty, which has been floated in Brussels. However, he also believes that European business could benefit if the market-friendly emissions trading scheme is extended to cars and airlines by encouraging it to invest in new technology and reducing emissions in the developing world. His distress call reflects the increasing priority Mr Barroso is putting on green issues since the publication of the Stern report by the UK and the US debate sparked by Al Gore, the former vice-president. Brussels is set next week to reject several of its members’ emissions trading plans for the 2008-12 period as too weak.

Environmental leadership undermines economic competitiveness and worsens climate change. Kogan 6 (Lawrence A, international business atty., http://www.itssd.org/pdf/REACH-TradeBarrier_Global-Governance.pdf.)
The EU Parliament decided to adopt REACH despite the repeated opposition voiced by European and foreign industries since at least 2003. In fact, exasperated European industry groups, including the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC), the European Association of Non-Ferrous Metals (Eurometaux), and the European engineering association Orgalime had just last week held a Brussels press conference in a last ditch effort to persuade the Parliament to abandon REACH’s very costly and onerous substitution, dossier preparation and burden of proof rules, which will “send[] the wrong signal to business communities in terms of investment and innovation.” 3 Even EU Industry Commissioner Günter Verheugen made a passing reference to the REACH regulation when he stated this past November that, “ “We have to recognise that ... our environmental leadership could significantly undermine the international competitiveness of part of Europe’s energy-intensive industries and worsen global environmental performance by redirecting production to parts of the world with lower environmental standards.” 4 Apparently, the Parliament ignored them, and acted in response to the favorable support that the compromise document had received from some European socialist party Parliamentarians 5and the public disparagement it had attracted from certain transatlantic environment extremist groups.

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Enviro Leadership Kills Competitiveness (2/2)
Environmental leadership devastates economic competitiveness. Financial Times 6 (12/6, http://www.wbcsd.org/plugins/DocSearch/details.asp?type=DocDet&ObjectId=MjIwMjA)
Japan refused to hurry moves to commit to reductions in emissions beyond 2012, when the current provisions of the Kyoto protocol expire, because of fears that it would hand China a competitive advantage in manufacturing industries. Canada faced a similar dilemma, resisting pressure to push for greater emissions cuts as the US was refusing to take on reduction targets. The US and Australia have already rejected the protocol, which obliges developed countries to cut their emissions by an average of 5 per cent compared with 1990 levels by 2012. More worrying for proponents of the treaty, however, are rifts on the issue that are beginning to become apparent within Europe. The European Union has long been the most steadfast supporter of the Kyoto protocol, in the face of backsliding from Canada and Japan. The EU was credited with enticing Russia to agree to the protocol two years ago, which was the decisive factor in ensuring the long-delayed agreement finally came into effect. The EU's greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme is the only mandatory scheme in the world to impose constraints on business emissions of carbon dioxide and to allow companies to trade their emissions allowances with one another in order to reduce carbon output at the lowest possible price. But the dilemma over competitiveness and environmental action has split the European Commission. Günter Verheugen, industry commissioner, late last month warned that “our environmental leadership could significantly undermine the international competitiveness of part of Europe's energy-intensive industries”. In a letter to José Manuel Barroso, president of the Commission, Mr Verheugen called for special exemptions to state aid rules for energyintensive sectors and backed the introduction of a levy on imports from developed countries that have yet to implement the Kyoto treaty. He said that going it alone on emissions could “worsen global environmental performance by redirecting production to parts of the world with lower environmental standards”.

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Enviro Leadership Kills Econ
Assuming environmental leadership would lead to mandatory emissions cuts that kill the US economy. Idso and Idso 1 (Craig and Keith, Center for the Study of CO2 and Climate Change pres. & VP, Aug.,
http://www.co2science.org/articles/V4/N32/EDIT.php)

It has become the mantra of nearly everyone worried about potential global warming: leadership. Just last Thursday (2 August 2001), the most recent worthies to decry what they view as a lack of this virtue in the Bush White House issued a call for U.S. power plants and industries to reduce their emissions of carbon dioxide. Said Arizona's Sen. John McCain, as quoted in the next day's Washington Post, "the United states has a responsibility to cut its emissions of greenhouse gases," adding that "the current situation demands leadership." Likewise, saying he had been "extremely troubled by the failure of our government to engage on this crucial issue," Connecticut's Sen. Joseph Lieberman claimed "this failure abdicates the United States' position as a leader in environmental affairs." Nothing could be further from the truth. In leveling these derogatory charges against the president and his administration, the two senators substitute a form of namecalling for the more substantive discussion one would have hoped to receive from them. If President Bush had allowed U.S. negotiators in Bonn to join with the rest of the world in seeking ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, he would have been hailed as a great leader and more: he would have been heralded as an environmental savior. So, it's not lack of White House leadership the senators decry, it's the direction that leadership might possibly take the nation that disturbs them; and, hence, their claims that the U.S. administration is not leading on the issue are an affront to reason and sensibility alike. When the situation is more objectively considered, in fact, an even better case can be made for the proposition that the two senators are the ones who are lacking in leadership on the global change front. Particularly in the case of Sen. McCain is this fact evident. During his unsuccessful challenge of Bush in the 2000 Republican presidential primaries, McCain was pretty much lukewarm to the idea of global warming. Only over the past few months has there been what the Washington Post describes as "a dramatic evolution in his thinking" on the subject, most likely fueled by the senator's realization there is much to be gained by "greening up." In this transformation it seems clear he is only following what his nose tells him are greener political pastures on campaign trails to come. Ditto for Lieberman. To wax slightly more philosophical on this point, it is pertinent to note that great leaders do not use coercive tactics to force the masses to go where they want them to go; they use reason to encourage them to go where they truly believe they should be. Education, not legislation, is thus the key to real leadership. Yet what do we have from the media-knighted leaders of today? Scientificallyunfounded and economically-unsound proposals for treaties and laws that would bind, obligate and enforce us to abide by a host of rules and regulations designed to reduce anthropogenic CO2 emissions in a massive global program for which many scientists believe there is no compelling rationale. This abdication of one of the most basic principles of leadership cuts across all party lines. The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example, recently voted 19 to 0 to urge the administration to go to the next international climate change conference in Morocco in November with a plan for ensuring U.S. participation in "a revised Kyoto Protocol or other future binding climate change agreements." Note that word binding. It's the primary characteristic of what is being sought; and that is why the nations of the earth -- except for the freedom-loving United States -- were willing to accept such a watered-down Kyoto Protocol in Bonn: it's binding ... and it's a foot in the door to future egregious binding. It's also the chief ingredient of the plan of Senators McCain and Lieberman, who intend to introduce legislation later this year to set an economy-wide cap on U.S. CO2 emissions. And that's exactly what it will do: put a nationwide cap on our economy.

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Enviro Leadership Causes Backlash
Environmental leadership would pressure China and India to cut emissions, causing them to backlash and counterbalance the US. Telegraph 7 (9/6, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1554055/China-and-India-reject-climate-changedeal.html) China and India yesterday poured cold water on the climate change deal reached at the G8. They both rejected attempts by America to make environmental targets dependent on their willingness to follow suit. China gave a studied, neutral response to the deal in Germany to move towards cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. India reiterated that it had not changed its attitude that it was up to the developed world to take the initiative. In theory, both should have been pleased that there was no attempt to set specific targets for their own greenhouse gas emissions, which they have refused to consider. But G8 leaders implied that when negotiations on specific details began, they would have to involving developing countries, including China and India. In an ominous response, state media in China stressed the growing closeness of the two rising economic giants of Asia on the issue. "China, India agree to work more closely," said the headline in China Daily, the international voice of the ruling Communist Party.

China perceives environmental leadership as an effort at domination in step with military containment. Drifte 5 (Reinhard, emeritus prof. of Japanese politics,
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/asiaResearchCentre/pdf/WorkingPaper/ARCWP12ReinhardDRIFTE2003.pdf)

The political, economic and social diversity of East Asia is a major obstacle for regional approaches to cope with environmental degradation. Bilateral relations are burdenend with issues of the past (JapanChina), territorial disputes (Japan-China, Korea-China, Japan-Korea) and, as we have seen, even naming of geographic area. Japan and China are increasingly becoming political and economic rivals in East Asia. The rivalry for regional leadership works against Japan being supported by China in taking environmental leadership in East Asia, a natural role for a country which is the biggest economic power and ODA donor in the region. Instead China is inclined to perceive Japan‘s environmental leadership as yet another indication for Japan trying (again) to dominate the region, putting it next to Tokyo‘s reinforced military relationship with the US, its increaslingly realist security policy and its quest for a permanent UN Security Council seat. Japan, on the other hand, sees its environmental leadership role as a means to create a politically and economically stable regional environment, to respond in a nonmilitary way to calls for international contribution, to complete its engagement policy towards China, and to promote the interests of its export industry.

Part of the challenge also comes from changes in the ways societies create wealth. The most important of these changes is the transition to an information economy. An easy way to understand this transition is to look at earlier examples. In the 1800s, we saw a transition from agriculture to industry and manufacturing. This transition meant that the best way to generate wealth lay in industry, not farming. Now we are seeing an economic transition from manufacturing to information. This means that the best way to generate wealth will be in the creation of new knowledge, not in industrial production. However, while this transition away from manufacturing may be good for the U.S. our economy, it does have implications for U.S. leadership in military technology. The cumulative effect of these changes is to put U.S technological leadership under some pressure. Combined with problematic U.S. policies, they create a new kind of risk for national security. The best way to describe this risk is that the vigorous research and technological base that has given the U.S. a military advantage for decades is in danger of being eroded. The U.S. and other nations realized in World War II that sustained scientific research provided military advantage. The United States created institutions in the 1940s and 1950s to support scientific research for national security, including DARPA, the service labs, the National Science Foundation and others. These Federal institutions build upon and are closely intertwined with America’s strong University system, and the graduate research programs found at these universities. The U.S. system of innovation, with its mix of university and federal research, entrepreneurship and venture capital, provides a steady flow of ideas that benefits both the commercial market and a military and it is the envy of the world.

Technological leadership is critical to military and industrial dominance – renewable energy can rejuvenate it.. Casey 4 (Charles P, American Chemical Society pres., 8/23, http://pubs.acs.org/cen/editor/8234edit.html)
Like a thoroughbred in a race without a finish line, science runs nonstop for the American people. Our military supremacy, industrial strength, and quality of life depend heavily on it. However, if we leave critical areas unexplored, we will fall back in science and create a void other nations are certain to fill. To keep pace, we must make sustained and smart investments in basic research. The trend toward flat research budgets is troubling because basic research supported by NSF and other agencies ensures a steady stream of scientific discoveries that can transform entire industries and even create new ones. While the nation's sluggish job growth is gaining much attention, too little attention is being paid to America's longstanding reliance on innovative new industries to create high-wage jobs. No one knows which next big innovation will produce a wave of new jobs, although biotechnology, nanotechnology, and renewable energy are strong contenders. But we do know that major job-producing innovations stem from strong basic research investments.

“Security and competitiveness go hand in hand,” Engler said. “A strong, innovative industrial base not only helps us maintain the best military in the world but also keeps our economy growing and supports U.S. global leadership. The international marketplace is changing rapidly with new competitors emerging in both developed and transitioning economies. We need a modern export control system that recognizes this new environment and enables U.S. companies to compete and continue their technological leadership.” AIA President and CEO John Douglass said modernizing the export control system will boost U.S. national security and enhance our diplomacy. “Making these improvements will increase our ability to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with our allies and friends around the world,” Douglass said. “Past experience has made it clear that multilateral operations enhance success, and military interoperability is vital to this endeavor. Improved defense trade and technology cooperation also helps ensure our brave men and women in uniform have the best weapons and equipment available to do their job. It is hard to overstate how important this is to our nation.” EIA Interim President and CEO Charlie Robinson said the regulatory process must catch up with industrial advances. “We measure modern technology in nanoseconds, but it often takes two months or more to complete this regulatory process,” Robinson said. “Federal officials are making strides to bridge that gap, but we must do better. We need an export control policy that puts security first, while helping our allies abroad win and our companies at home compete. These changes can make America a more secure, prosperous nation.” National Foreign Trade Council President Bill Reinsch said a more efficient and transparent process would make the country more secure and more competitive. “The Coalition’s reform program will create a system fit for the 21st century – one that is more efficient and transparent for business and one which is focused on controlling the things that really affect our security,” Reinsch said. “If the Administration adopts our reforms, the country will be safer and our high tech industries healthier, which, in turn, will enable us to continue to run faster than our competitors.” Information Technology Industry Council President Rhett Dawson said the Coalition’s proposed modernization reforms would increase U.S. companies’ competitiveness. “The technological leadership of U.S. companies underpins the economic and military strength of America,” Dawson said. “We need to improve our export control system to reflect the global nature of innovation and security and to enable American businesses to remain competitive in the world economy. The modernization initiatives proposed by the coalition are a much-needed step in the right direction.”

US technological leadership is key to US influence. CSIS 4 (5/25, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/040521_globalization_impacts.pdf)
U.S. leadership springs from our values and culture and from our strength in technology. Continued international influence will rest on both the ability to advance these values and to protect our technological lead. Technological leadership gives the U.S. an advantage internationally. Despite growing foreign strength in technology, the U.S. can maintain leadership with continued support for universities and basic research and with improved abilities in DOD and the intelligence community to identify and take advantage of commercial technological innovation (whether from U.S. or foreign sources).U.S. leadership springs from our values and culture and from our strength in technology. Continued international influence will rest on both the ability to advance these values and to protect our technological lead. Technological leadership gives the U.S. an advantage internationally. Despite growing foreign strength in technology, the U.S. can maintain leadership with continued support for universities and basic research and with improved abilities in DOD and the intelligence community to identify and take advantage of commercial technological innovation (whether from U.S. or foreign sources).

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Tech Leadership K Heg (3/4)
Other nations are challenging US technological leadership – maintaining it is key to hegemony. HENAAC 7 (10/12, http://www.henaac.org/publications/files/HENAACSTEMImperative.pdf)
First, U.S. technological leadership has been called into question by a surge of worldwide investment in technical talent. China, India, Korea, Tai wan, and others have al l moved boldly to expand their human resource base i n STEM. Thei r obj ecti ve i s to match, i f not surpass, U.S. competitiveness in high-value products and services. Now more than ever, American prosperity and national security will hinge on Americaʼs ability to develop and ex- pand its own human capital to remain at the cutti ng edge of worl d-wi de i nnovati on and technology.

US technological superiority is declining, killing global leadership. CSIS 4 (5/25, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/040521_globalization_impacts.pdf)
Preserving our ability to innovate is more important than keeping manufacturing or call-center jobs. Innovation of new ideas, goods and services is the key to economic growth and crucial for military strength. In relative terms, other nations will increase their share of innovation compared to the U.S. Additionally, financial, pressures, government policies and the shift from manufacturing may result in an absolute decline in the pace and scope of innovation in the U.S. Technological superiority is crucial to the U.S. global position and we cannot contemplate its loss lightly.

US technological superiority is key to hegemony. CSIS 4 (5/25, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/040521_globalization_impacts.pdf)
The U.S. still has the lead in crucial defense integration skills. Retaining this leadership in the ability to innovate and integrate innovation into complex weapons systems is crucial for continued military strength. Our lead will be challenged as other countries improve their ability to innovate. Globalization will produce this challenge even if the U.S. tries to block technology transfer. A fifteen-year effort to block the Chinese semiconductor industry has failed in the face of economic pressures. The old problem was how to keep defense technology from flowing out of the U.S. The new problem will be how to ensure that the technologies needed for defense can flow in.

Lack of technological leadership destroys hegemony by increasing opportunity for asymmetric warfare and sabotage. Lewis 4 (James A, CSIS Tech & Public Policy Program, Dec., www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/globalization_natl_security_execsum.pdf)
Finally, technological leveling and interdependence give opponents new opportunities to seek asymmetric advantage. The emphasis is to avoid direct engagement with military forces. Civilian and economic infrastructures are soft targets that are more vulnerable to asymmetric attack. Nations and groups will exploit commercial technologies and services to mimic advanced military capabilities and take advantage of unexpected vulnerabilities to gain asymmetric advantages. Globalization, by giving opponents increased access to U.S. critical infrastructure, creates a new set of risks, particularly in information technologies. Intelligence agencies are opportunistic and foreign production of hardware and software gives them an opportunity to gain access to information or to disrupt critical infrastructures. A potential opponent could take advantage of the access afforded by globalization to intentionally introduce malicious flaws. A few hundred lines of code hidden in programs with hundreds of thousands of lines may be enough to provide an advantage, while being very difficult to detect. Foreign intelligence agencies could exploit opportunities provided by economic integration to insert or recruit personnel with access to critical functions in the U.S.

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Tech Leadership K Heg (4/4)
Technological leadership is increasingly key to hegemony. Wilson 8 (Ernest J, government and politics prof., p. 112-113, http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/616/1/110) But the current thirst for smart power is not driven only by the good or bad choices of individual leaders. Even if the U.S. administration had not displayed so many weaknesses of its own making, there are some longer-term secular trends that would have provoked a demand for a new way to conceive of and exercise

state power. In a nutshell, the G-8 nations are accelerating their trans- formation from industrial to postindustrial economies, where power increasingly rests on a nation’s capacity to create and manipulate knowledge and information. A country’s capacity for creativity and innovation can trump its possession of armored divisions or aircraft carriers, and new hi-tech tools can greatly enhance the reach of military and nonmilitary influence. Armies and militaries remain important, but their relative role has changed radically, in terms both of how the military conducts warfare and in the mix of military to nonmilitary assets. The world of warfare has become more digital, networked, and flexible, and nonmilitary assets like communications have risen in the mix of instruments of state power (Arguilla and Ronfeldt 1999). Sophisticated nations have everything from smart bombs to smart phones to smart blogs. And as states get smarter, so too do nonstate actors like Al Qaeda in their use of the media across multiple platforms (Brachman 2006; Thomas 2003). Any actor that aspires to enhance its position on the world stage has to build strategies around these new fundamentals of “smartness.”

Technological leadership is key to hegemony – supplies the basis of economic and military power. Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 41, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
Thus, capability to innovate and adopt new technologies, including those invented elsewhere, is crucial to the employment, sales, and proﬁtability of U.S. ﬁrms and hence to the U.S. economy and standard of living. Science and technology have historically contributed signiﬁcantly not only to economic growth but also to well-being (improved public health, longer life expectancy, better diagnoses and treatments of many illnesses, etc.), standard of living (refrigerators, cars, iPods, etc.), and national security (atomic bomb, radar, sonar, etc.). The strength of the U.S. economy and military provide it with the foundation for its global leadership. If claims of diminishing U.S. leadership in S&T are true and its future ability to compete globally is in question, the prognosis is indeed serious. S&T is directly linked not only to economic strength but also to its global strategic leadership.

Loss of US technological leadership cuts hegemony. Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 48-49, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
Invention and Innovation: While nations may increase productivity and standard of living through usage of technology invented abroad, countries receive royalties on usage abroad of inventions they make, piracy aside, while they pay royalties on usage of inventions made abroad. Further, nations compete with one another on the basis of comparative advantage,14 and international leadership in science and technology gives the United States its comparative advantage in the global economy. Loss of comparative advantage could hurt the United States, as it may have to reallocate resources, reduce wages, and forgo market-leader rents from new products or innovations.

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Tech Leadership K Energy Leadership
US still leads R&D for alternative energy Romm and Curtis 96 (Joseph, Charles, April, http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/96apr/oil/oil.htm)
What is the appropriate national response to the re-emerging energy-security threat? Abroad the Department of Energy has
been working hard to expand sources of oil outside the Persian Gulf region--in the former Soviet Union, for example--and to encourage the privatization of the oil companies in Mexico and other

the DOE is encouraging greater production by providing royalty relief in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico and similar incentives, so that the industry can drill wells that otherwise would not be cost-effective. The DOE is working to reduce the cost for the industry to comply with federal regulations. Finally, the department is spending tens of millions of dollars a year to develop new technologies that will lower the cost of finding and extracting oil--for example, using advanced computing
Latin American countries. At home to model oil fields. Still, few expect to reverse the decade-long decline in U.S. oil production. Some would open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to drilling, a plan the Clinton Administration has opposed on environmental grounds, but not even that would change our forecasted oil dependency much. This is true even using earlier, more optimistic estimates that the refuge could provide 300,000 barrels of oil a day for thirty years. The EIA projects that within ten to fifteen years the United States will probably be importing thirty times as much--some 10 million barrels of crude oil a day, even if the decline in other domestic production levels off in the next few years. Increasing domestic supply, although it may help to slow the rising tide of imports, cannot itself reverse the major trend. And reversing the nation's ever-increasing demand for oil would be difficult. The country is in no mood to enact higher energy taxes in order to bring our energy markets into better balance. To most people, an increase in gasoline taxes of even a few cents a gallon--let alone the amount needed to have a noticeable impact on consumption--is anathema. Similarly,

That leaves one solution for reducing consumption: the technological approach, which draws on America's traditional leadership in research and development. Here tremendous progress has been made. Given the uncertain nature of long-term, high-risk R&D in leapfrog technologies, the prudent approach is to explore a number of possibilities. The DOE has invested in the development of
Congress is in no mood for a regulatory approach, such as mandating increased fuel efficiency for cars. cars and trucks that are highly fuel-efficient, along with cars that run on electricity, on liquid biofuels from crops, crop waste, and municipal solid waste, or on natural gas.

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Research and Development K Heg
American Competitiveness Initiative ensures continued U.S. leadership Bush ‘6 (President of the United States) online: http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/aci/
One of the great engines of our growing economy is our Nation’s capacity to innovate. Through America’s investments in science and technology, we have revolutionized our economy and changed the world for the better. Groundbreaking ideas generated by innovative minds in the private and public sectors have paid enormous dividends—improving the lives and livelihoods of generations of Americans. To build on our successes and remain a leader in science and technology, I am pleased to announce the American Competitiveness Initiative. The American Competitiveness Initiative commits $5.9 billion in FY 2007 to increase investments in research and development, strengthen education, and encourage entrepreneurship. Over 10 years, the Initiative commits $50 billion to increase funding for research and $86 billion for research and development tax incentives. Federal investment in research and development has proved critical to keeping America’s economy strong by generating knowledge and tools upon which new technologies are developed. My 2007 Budget requests $137 billion for Federal research and development, an increase of more than 50 percent over 2001 levels. Much of this increased Federal funding has gone toward biomedical research and advanced security technologies, enabling us to improve the health of our citizens and enhance national security. We know that as other countries build their economies and become more technologically advanced, America will face a new set of challenges. To ensure our continued leadership in the world, I am committed to building on our record of results with new investments— especially in the fields of physical sciences and engineering. Advances in these areas will generate scientific and technological discoveries for decades to come.

U.S. research and development initiatives ensure future global leadership Domestic Policy Option ‘6 (Office of Science and Technology Policy) online: http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/aci/aci06-booklet.pdf
During the past five years, the U.S. economy has shown remarkable vitality and resilience. The current economic expansion is steady and strong, with GDP growing at an annual rate of over 3.5 percent for three years. After-tax incomes are rising, household net worth is at an all-time high, and the unemployment rate is low. Meanwhile, inflation remains in check, and we have had extraordinary and sustained productivity growth—averaging a 3.4 percent annual rate for the past half-decade. The American economy today is the envy of the world. Our prosperity is no accident. It is the product of risk-takers, innovators, and visionaries. We owe our global leadership in large measure to our willingness to build an economy and culture that welcomes and encourages innovation and flexible, open markets. By increasing U.S. innovation capacity through the bolstering of our world-class R&D enterprise and through investments in our education and information infrastructure, we have achieved new discoveries and breakthroughs that drive productivity, grow the economy, and solve important societal problems. Research pays off for our economy. It leads to breakthroughs that inspire new products and have spawned entire industries. In fact, economists estimate that as much as half of post-World War II economic growth is due to R&D-fueled technological progress. Today’s revolutionary technologies and many of our most popular consumer products have roots deep in basic and applied research. Long before there were computers or the Internet, scientists were unlocking the secrets of lasers, semiconductors, and magnetic materials upon which today’s advanced applications were built. This enterprise was fueled in large part by Federal investment in basic research that was necessary but not necessarily profitable for the private sector to undertake over the long term.

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***AT: Technological Leadership K Heg***

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AT: Tech Leadership K Heg (1/3)
Increased technological competition fuels hegemony more than US technological dominance – it allows the US to implement innovation in a way that other nations can’t. Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 10-11, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
High growth in R&D expenditures, employment of scientists and engineers, and patents suggests that U.S. S&T has remained vigorous. These U.S. developments occur at a time when increases (though at diﬀerent rates) in each of these measures are also seen in the EU-15, Japan, China, Korea, and many other nations/regions. In other words, strong growth of R&D activity, S&E employment, and innovation in many countries suggests a future of signiﬁcant innovation activity, and, because of the greater diﬀusion of technology in a globalized world, the promise of economic growth for those nations that are capable of absorbing (making economic use of) the new technology. Scientiﬁcally advanced nations and regions such as the United States, the EU, and Japan are highly capable of implementing new technology and will beneﬁt from it. Developing nations such as China and India have par- tial capability, but are well ahead of Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. Though, as we will discuss in more detail later, develop- ing nations can continue to grow their economies rapidly by absorbing existing technology in addition to new technology.

Technological leadership isn’t key – what matters is how the US implements technology and innovation, not how it’s created. Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 10-11, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
Another opposing view suggests that fears of a looming S&T crisis may result from a misunderstanding of concepts driving the issue. The July 2006 Economist noted the “wide range of potential remedies” being suggested to the purported S&T problem, which include “getting more Americans to study science and engineering, bigger tax breaks for research and development, and trade protection to prevent the innovative hordes from China and India from storming America’s gates” (The Economist, 2006). The piece continues by citing a new paper by Amar Bhidé, of Columbia University’s business school, who argues that these supposed remedies, and the worries that lie behind them, are based on a misconception of how innovation works and of how it contributes to economic growth. . . .This consists, ﬁrst, of paying too much attention to the upstream development of new inventions and technologies by scientists and engineers, and too little to the downstream process of turn- ing these inventions into products that tempt people to part with their money, and, second, of the belief that national leadership in upstream activities is the same thing as leadership in generat- ing economic value from innovation. . . . Mr Bhidé argues that this downstream innovation . . . is the most valuable kind and what America is best at . . . that most of the value of innovations accrues to their users not their creators—and stays in the coun-Introduction 11 try where the innovation is consumed. So if China and India do more invention, so much the better for American consumers. (The Economist, 2006)

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AT: Tech Leadership K Heg (2/3)
Economic models show increased diffusion and spread of technological research will bring research activity back to the US, reinforcing technological leadership. Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 157, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
Nations trade with one another on the basis of comparative advantage, and international leadership in science and technology gives the United States its comparative advantage in the global economy. Loss of comparative advantage could hurt the United States, as it would have to reallocate resources, reduce wages, and forego market-leader rents from new products or innovations. As more centers of scientiﬁc excel- lence develop abroad, R&D will become more globalized, but it is not clear that the United States is fated to lose as this occurs. Eaton and Kortum’s (2006) model of innovation, technology diﬀusion, and trade suggests that as long as trade barriers are not too high, faster diﬀusion shifts research activity toward the country that does it better (which in many ﬁelds is the United States). This shift in research activity raises the relative wage there. It can even mean that, with more diﬀusion, the country better at research eventually obtains a larger share of tech- nologies in its exclusive domain. Increased trade and faster diﬀusion of technology will probably not aﬀect all sectors alike, however, and a loss of leadership in some areas may be accompanied by a gain of leadership in others. Freeman (2006, 2007) argues that populous, low-income countries such as China and India have a cost advantage and may be able to compete with the United States in high tech by focusing in a speciﬁc area and by having many S&E workers, even though they are only a small fraction of their workforces.

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AT: Tech Leadership K Heg (3/3)
Technological progress isn’t zero-sum – we benefit from other countries’ advancements and economic competition is obsolete. Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 41, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
In work published over a decade ago, economist Paul Krugman questions whether the notion of competition in S&T is even relevant. He argues that the idea that nations “compete” is incorrect; countries are not like corporations and “are [not] to any important degree in economic competition with each other” (Krugman, 1994). Major industrial nations sell products that compete with each other, yet these nations are also each other’s main export markets and each other’s main suppliers of useful imports. More broadly, international trade is not a zero-sum game. For example, if the European economy does well, this helps the United States by providing it with larger markets and goods of superior quality at lower prices. Further, he argues that the growth rate of U.S. living standards essentially equals the growth rate of domestic productivity, not U.S. productivity relative to competitors; and enhancing domestic productivity is in the hands of Americans, not foreigners. Part of the reason for this, Krugman argues, is that the world is not as interdependent as one would think: 90 percent of the U.S. economy consists of goods and services produced for domestic use, i.e., produced by Americans, for Americans. But this is not to deny the importance of technological progress, and beneath it, science and technology, as a determinant of economic progress and improvement in the standard of living.

International trade and technological development are not zero sum – no need to fear competition in technological leadership. Galama and Hosek 8 (Titus and James, physical scientist and econ pH.D., p. 54, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674/)
Given the complexity of the problem, economists and policymakers do not know what the “right” amount of eﬀort and investment in S&T is for a nation; at a minimum, we can compare the United States with other nations to learn how much they have chosen to invest and with what results, and reﬂect on that in considering how much the United States should invest. The comparison with other countries is made from this perspective and not from the viewpoint of competition between nations in S&T, which is the more common motivation for such comparisons. As we discussed earlier, the notion of competition can be mis- leading when applied to a comparison of countries. Neither international trade nor S&T progress is a zero-sum game, and improvement in one country does not necessarily imply a loss for another country.

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***General Links***

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Competitiveness K Heg
Economic competitiveness is key to hegemony. Khalilzad 95 (Zalmay, US ambassador to UN, Washington Quarterly, 3/24, LN)
The United States is unlikely to preserve its military and technological dominance if the U.S. economy declines seriously. In such an environment, the domestic economic and political base for global leadership would diminish and the United States would probably incrementally withdraw from the world, become inward-looking, and abandon more and more of its external interests. As the United States weakened, others would try to fill the Vacuum. To sustain and improve its economic strength, the United States must maintain its technological lead in the economic realm. Its success will depend on the choices it makes. In the past, developments such as the agricultural and industrial revolutions produced fundamental changes positively affecting the relative position of those who were able to take advantage of them and negatively affecting those who did not. Some argue that the world may be at the beginning of another such transformation, which will shift the sources of wealth and the relative position of classes and nations. If the United States fails to recognize the change and adapt its institutions, its relative position will necessarily worsen. To remain the preponderant world power, U.S. economic strength must be enhanced by further improvements in productivity, thus increasing real per capita income; by strengthening education and training; and by generating and using superior science and technology. In the long run the economic future of the United States will also be affected by two other factors. One is the imbalance between government revenues and government expenditure. As a society the United States has to decide what part of the GNP it wishes the government to control and adjust expenditures and taxation accordingly. The second, which is even more important to U.S. economic wall-being over the long run, may be the overall rate of investment. Although their government cannot endow Americans with a Japanese-style propensity to save, it can use tax policy to raise the savings rate.

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Multilateralism K Heg
Working within coalitions and with other governments and NGOs is key to preserve US heg. Zalmay Khalilzad, US Ambassador to the United Nations. “Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War.” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2. pg. 84 Spring 1995
Overextension is a mistake that some of the big powers have made in the past. Such a development can occur if the United States is not judicious in its use of force and gets involved in protracted conflicts in non-critical regions, thereby sapping its energies and undermining support for its global role. And when the United States uses force in critical regions, its preference should be to have its allies and friends contribute their fair share. Having the capability to protect U.S. vital interests unilaterally if necessary can facilitate getting friends and allies of the United States to participate -- especially on terms more to its liking. It is quite possible that if the United States cannot protect its interests without significant participation by allies, it might not be able to protect them at all. For example, in the run-up to the Gulf war, several allies did not favor the use of force to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. If the military participation of these allies had been indispensable for military success against Iraq, Saddam Hussein's forces might still be in Kuwait and Iraq might now possess nuclear weapons. When it comes to lesser interests the United States should rely on nonmilitary options, especially if the stakes involved do not warrant the military costs. It has many options: arming and training the victims of aggression; providing technical assistance and logistic support for peacekeeping by the United Nations, regional organizations, or other powers; and economic instruments such as sanctions and positive incentives. The effectiveness of these non-military options can be enhanced by skillful diplomacy.

While Multilateralism is effective, the US must be involved Serfaty 03 ("Studies Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership" Simon Serfaty director of European Studies CSIS
May http://www.nato.int/docu/conf/2003/030718_bxl/serfati-transatlpart.pdf) Whatever its inspiration, multilateralism served the United States and its allies well. Indifference to the postwar world was no longer an option for either side of the Atlantic. In most European countries, the imperative of U.S. support for reconstruction, protection, and reconciliation limited any debate on their fading role in the world. Whatever doubts some of these countries harbored were overcome by U.S. policies that were all the more effective as they showed enough flexibility to respond to and alleviate these doubts.

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Multilateralism Hurts Heg
( ) Multilateralism only drags down US hegemony Krauthammer 2004 (Charles, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, "Democratic
Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World" – American Enterprise Institute) But that, you see, is the whole point of the multilateral enterprise: To reduce American freedom of action by making it subservient to, dependent on, constricted by the will—and interests—of other nations. To tie down Gulliver with a thousand strings. To domesticate the most undomesticated, most outsized, national interest on the planet—ours

( ) Multilateralism only drags America down Krauthammer 2004 (Charles, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, "Democratic
Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World" – American Enterprise Institute) Historically, multilateralism is a way for weak countries to multiply their power by attaching themselves to stronger ones. But multilateralism imposed on Great Powers, and particularly on a unipolar power, is intended to restrain that power. Which is precisely why France is an ardent multilateralist. But why should America be? Why, in the end, does liberal internationalism want to tie down Gulliver, to blunt the pursuit of American national interests by making them subordinate to a myriad of other interests? In the immediate post-Vietnam era, this aversion to national interest might have been attributed to self-doubt and self-loathing. I don’t know. What I do know is that today it is a mistake to see liberal foreign policy as deriving from anti-Americanism or lack of patriotism or a late efflorescence of 1960s radicalism.

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Unilateralism K Multilateralism
Unilateralism inevitably leads to multilateralism Krauthammer 2004 (Charles, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, "Democratic
Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World" – American Enterprise Institute) Moreover, unilateralism is often the very road to multilateralism. As we learned from the Gulf War, it is the leadership of the United States—indeed, its willingness to act unilaterally if necessary—that galvanized the Gulf War coalition into existence. Without the president of the United States declaring “This will not stand” about the invasion of Kuwait—and making it clear that America would go it alone if it had to—there never would have been the great wall-to-wall coalition that is now so retroactively applauded and held up as a model of multilateralism.

US unipolarity encourages states to help the US solve global issues rather than start them William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World."
Neither the Beijing-Moscow "strategic partnership" nor the "European troika" of Russia, Germany, and France entailed any costly commitments or serious risks of confrontation with Washington. For many states, the optimal policy is ambiguity: to work closely with the United States on the issues most important to Washington while talking about creating a counterpoise. Such policies generate a paper trail suggesting strong dissatisfaction with the US.- led world order and a legacy of actual behavior that amounts to bandwagoning. These states are seeking the best bargains for themselves given the distribution of power. That process necessitates a degree of politicking that may remind people faintly of the power politics of bygone eras. But until the distribution of power changes substantially, this bargaining will resemble real-politik in form but not content.

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Hard Power K Heg
( ) Hardpower is critical to maintaining US hegemony Lind 07 (Michael, New America Foundation, Beyond American Hegemony,
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381) Finally, the global hegemony strategy insists that America’s safety depends not on the absence of a hostile hegemon in Europe, Asia and the Middle East -- the traditional American approach -- but on the permanent presence of the United States itself as the military hegemon of Europe, the military hegemon of Asia and the military hegemon of the Middle East. In each of these areas, the regional powers would consent to perpetual U.S. domination either voluntarily, because the United States assumed their defense burdens (reassurance), or involuntarily, because the superior U.S. military intimidated them into acquiescence (dissuasion). American military hegemony in Europe, Asia and the Middle East depends on the ability of the U.S. military to threaten and, if necessary, to use military force to defeat any regional challengebut at a relatively low cost. This is because the American public is not prepared to pay the costs necessary if the United States is to be a "hyperpower."

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Consultation K Heg
Consultation is Key to US leadership Ross 02 (Christopher, special coordinator for public diplomacy and public affairs at the Department of State.
Washington Quarterly, Spring, 2002. "Public Diplomacy Comes of Age." www.twq.com/02spring/ross.pdf) In today’s world, the United States is more likely to meet with success if it structures activities in ways that encourage dialogue. Although the wording of recriminations varies—ranging from hegemony to multilateralism to cultural imperialism—the United States, as the world’s dominant power, will inevitably be accused of heavy-handedness and arrogance. It will inform and influence public opinion effectively only if it changes the paradigm of the past and establishes a two-way approach that builds credible dialogue. To arrive there, the United States should experiment and take a few chances, developing programs that encourage two-way engagement with the people it seeks to influence. Some efforts may fail, but others will succeed; the U.S. government can use those successes to shape a sustained future effort.

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Consultation Hurts Heg

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Consultation Hurts Heg – Bandwagoning (1/2)
Unilateralism produces better coalitions through bandwagoning – solves all of your offense and creates better and more unified policy Krauthammer 01 (Charles, Washington Post columnist, Dec. 17,
http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:Knd3RQ1QQ1YJ:https://www.townhall.com/opinion/columns/charleskrautha mmer/2001/12/17/161907.html) WASHINGTON--Last month's Putin-Bush summit at Crawford was deemed an arms control failure because the rumored deal--Russia agrees to let us partially test, but not deploy, defenses that violate the 1972 AntiBallistic Missile Treaty--never came off. In fact, it was a triumph. Like Reagan at the famous 1986 Reykjavik summit, at which he would not give up the Strategic Defense Initiative to Gorbachev, Bush was not about to allow Putin to lock the United States into any deal that would prevent us from building ABM defenses. Bush proved that on Thursday when he dropped the bombshell and unilaterally withdrew the United States from the treaty, and thus from all its absurd restrictions on ABM technology. This is deeply significant, not just because it marks a return to strategic sanity, formally recognizing that the ballistic missile will be to the 21st century what the tank and the bomber were to the 20th, but because it unashamedly reasserts the major theme of the Bush foreign policy: unilateralism. After Sept. 11, the critics (the usual troika: liberal media, foreign policy establishment, Democratic ex-officials) were clucking about how the Bush administration has beaten a hasty retreat from reckless unilateralism. President Bush ``is strongly supported by the American people,'' explained former Senate leader George Mitchell, ``in part because he has simply discarded almost everything he said on foreign policy prior to Sept. 11.'' Bush had wanted to go it alone in the world, said the critics. But he dare not. ``It's hard to see the president restoring the unilateralist tinge that colored so many of his early foreign policy choices,'' wrote columnist E.J. Dionne just two months ago. ``Winning the battle against terror required an end to unilateralism.'' We need friends, they said. We need allies. We need coalition partners. We cannot alienate them again and again. We cannot have a president who kills the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gases, summarily rejects the ``enforcement provisions'' of the bioweapons treaty, trashes the ABM Treaty--and expect to build the coalition we need to fight the war on terrorism. We cannot? We did. Three months is all it took to make nonsense of these multilateralist protests. Coalition? The whole idea that the Afghan war is being fought by a ``coalition'' is comical. What exactly has Egypt contributed? France sent troops into Mazar-e Sharif after the fighting had stopped, noted that renowned military analyst Jay Leno. (``Their mission?'' asked Leno. ``To teach the Taliban how to surrender.'') There is a coalition office somewhere in Islamabad. Can anyone even name the coalition spokesman who makes announcements about the war? The ``coalition'' consists of little more than U.S. aircraft, U.S. special forces, and Afghan friends-of-the-moment on the ground. Like the Gulf War, the Afghan war is unilateralism dressed up as multilateralism. We made it plain that even if no one followed us, we would go it alone. Surprise: Others followed. A unilateralist does not object to people joining our fight. He only objects when the multilateralists, like Clinton in Kosovo, give 18 countries veto power over bombing targets. The Afghan war is not a war run by committee. We made tough bilateral deals with useful neighbors: Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia. The Brits and the Australians added a sprinkling of guys on the ground risking their lives, and we will always be grateful for their solidarity. But everyone knows whose war it is. The result? The Taliban are destroyed. Al Qaeda is on the run. Pakistan has made a historic pro-American strategic pivot, as have the former Soviet republics, even Russia itself. The Europeans are cooperating on prosecutions. Even the Arab states have muted their anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric, with the Egyptian foreign minister traveling to Jerusalem for the first time in three years. Not because they love us. Not because we have embraced multilateralism. But because we have demonstrated astonishing military power and the will to defend vital American interests, unilaterally if necessary. Where is the great Bush retreat from unilateralism? The ABM Treaty is dead. Kyoto is dead. The new provisions of the totally useless biological weapons treaty are even deader: Just six days before pulling out of the ABM Treaty, the administration broke up six years of absurd word-mongering over a bio treaty so worthless that Iraq is a signatory in good standing. And the world has not risen up against us--no more than did the ``Arab street'' (over the Afghan war), as another set of foreign policy experts were warning just weeks ago. The essence of unilateralism is that we do not allow others, no matter how well-meaning, to deter us from pursuing the fundamental security interests of the United States and the free world. It is the driving motif of the Bush foreign policy. And that is the reason it has been so successful

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Consultation Hurts Heg – Bandwagoning (2/2)
And bandwagoning solves best – ensures cooperation Krauthammer 02 (Charles, “Fictional Rift,” Sept. 17,
http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/krauthammer091702.asp) That leaves Colin Powell, supposedly the epicenter of internal opposition to the hard line on Iraq. Well, this is Powell last Sunday on national television: "It's been the policy of this government to insist that Iraq be disarmed. . . . And we believe the best way to do that is with a regime change." Moreover, he added, we are prepared "to act unilaterally to defend ourselves." When Powell, the most committed multilateralist in the administration, deliberately invokes the incendiary U-word to describe the American position, we have ourselves a consensus.It turns out that the disagreement among Republicans was less about going to Iraq than about going to the United Nations. It was a vastly overblown disagreement, because even the most committed unilateralist would rather not go it alone if possible. Of course you want allies. You just don't want to be held hostage to their veto. And as the first President Bush demonstrated when he declared that the United States would liberate Kuwait unilaterally if necessary, the best way to get allies is to let others know you are prepared to go it alone and let them ponder the cost of missing the train.

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Consultation Hurts Heg – A2: Unilat Bad
Unilateral action solves all of your offense with the velvet glove – ABM treaty proves
Krauthammer 2k1 (Charles Krauthammer, won the Pulitzer Prize for distinguished commentary in 1987, Washington Post, June 18 2001) Ask yourself: If you really wanted to reassert American unilateralism, to get rid of the cobwebs of the bipolar era and the myriad Clinton-era treaty strings tying Gulliver down, what would you do? No need for in-your-face arrogance. No need to humiliate. No need to proclaim that you will ignore nattering allies and nervous ex-enemies. Journalists can talk like that because the truth is clarifying. Governments cannot talk like that because the truth is scary. The trick to unilateralism -- doing what you think is right, regardless of what others think -- is to pretend you are not acting unilaterally at all. Thus if you really want to junk the ABM Treaty, and the Europeans and Russians and Chinese start screaming bloody murder, the trick is to send Colin Powell to smooth and soothe and schmooze every foreign leader in sight, have Condoleezza Rice talk about how much we value allied input, have President Bush in Europe stress how missile defense will help the security of everybody. And then go ahead and junk the ABM Treaty regardless. Make nice, then carry on. Or, say, you want to kill the Kyoto protocol (which the Senate rejected 95-0 and which not a single EU country has ratified) and the Europeans hypocritically complain. The trick is to have the president go to Europe to stress, both sincerely and correctly, that the United States wants to be in the forefront of using science and technology to attack the problem -- but make absolutely clear that you'll accept no mandatory cuts and tolerate no treaty that penalizes the United States and lets China, India and the Third World off the hook. Be nice, but be undeterred. The best unilateralism is velvet-glove unilateralism. At the end of the day, for all the rhetorical bows to Russian, European and liberal sensibilities, look at how Bush returns from Europe: Kyoto is dead. The ABM Treaty is history. Missile defense is on. NATO expansion is relaunched. And just to italicize the new turn in American foreign policy, the number of those annual, vaporous U.S.-EU summits has been cut from two to one.

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Economy K Heg
Only by preserving productivity, can the US retain its economic strength, and therefore its global heg. Zalmay Khalilzad, US Ambassador to the United Nations. “Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War.” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2. pg. 84 Spring 1995
The United States is unlikely to preserve its military and technological dominance if the U.S. economy declines seriously. In such an environment, the domestic economic and political base for global leadership would diminish and the United States would probably incrementally withdraw from the world, become inward-looking, and abandon more and more of its external interests. As the United States weakened, others would try to fill the Vacuum. To sustain and improve its economic strength, the United States must maintain its technological lead in the economic realm. Its success will depend on the choices it makes. In the past, developments such as the agricultural and industrial revolutions produced fundamental changes positively affecting the relative position of those who were able to take advantage of them and negatively affecting those who did not. Some argue that the world may be at the beginning of another such transformation, which will shift the sources of wealth and the relative position of classes and nations. If the United States fails to recognize the change and adapt its institutions, its relative position will necessarily worsen. To remain the preponderant world power, U.S. economic strength must be enhanced by further improvements in productivity, thus increasing real per capita income; by strengthening education and training; and by generating and using superior science and technology. In the long run the economic future of the United States will also be affected by two other factors. One is the imbalance between government revenues and government expenditure. As a society the United States has to decide what part of the GNP it wishes the government to control and adjust expenditures and taxation accordingly. The second, which is even more important to U.S. economic wall-being over the long run, may be the overall rate of investment. Although their government cannot endow Americans with a Japanese-style propensity to save, it can use tax policy to raise the savings rate.

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Reverse Flawed Policies K Heg
Reversing flawed policies most important step forward for leadership Sewell 8 (Sarah, John F. Kennedy School of Government - Harvard University, May,
http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP08-028/$File/rwp_08_028_sewall.pdf.) This paper focuses on two new complementary components of U.S. grand strategy: strategic flexibility and an indirect method. Strategic flexibility encompasses a host of policies designed to allow the United States to maintain its power and to shape the emerging security environment. The policies that enable strategic flexibility reflect a long-overdue update of the political, economic, and security assumptions that once buttressed U.S. foreign policy. The world is no longer divided into two ideological camps frozen by the threat of mutual assured destruction. Yet, American assumptions about the world and how to protect U.S. interests have barely changed since the height of the Cold War. America’s unipolar moment is already en route to being eclipsed by an increasingly diverse cast of global characters with the capacity to degrade or enhance U.S. security. The United States retains predominance in many arenas, but longer-term demographic and economic trends in key states and the diffusion of power from states to other entities suggest an emerging, if still largely invisible, shift of global power. The United States must revisit deeply engrained habits in order to obtain greater freedom of action to protect its interests. If strategic flexibility is required to adapt to changing global constellations of power, the indirect approach
reflects realism about the relationship of U.S. power to the demands of a conservation strategy that preserves the power of states and the international system. The indirect approach means working predominantly through, with, and by other actors to achieve U.S. strategic goals. This tactic is essential to share the burden and achieve U.S. ends. Even if the United States knew precisely how to do so, it lacks the resources to strengthen all states and would hardly be a welcome interlocutor in all cases. Furthermore, the United States alone cannot provide sufficient legitimacy and strength to a revised social compact among states and possibly other global actors. That legitimacy and strength must come from the collective, with consent and support from other players. Thus, a strategy of conservation directly confronts U.S. foreign policy traditions and its strong national preference for self-reliance.

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***Soft Power Good***

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Soft Power Solves – Misc (1/3)
Soft power is key to solve warming, disease, terrorism, and organized crime. Nye 4 (Joseph S, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 264)
Because of its leading edge in the information revolution and its past investment in military power, the United States will likely remain the world's single most powerful country well into the twenty-first century. French dreams of a multipolar mihtary world are unlikely to be realized anytime soon, and the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, has explicitly eschewed such a goal.^^ But not all the important types of power come out of the barrel of a gun. Hard power is relevant to getting the outcomes we want on all three chessboards, but many of the transnational issues, such as climate change, the spread of infec- tious diseases, international crime, and terrorism, cannot be resolved by mili- tary force alone. Representing the dark side of globalization, these issues are inherently multilateral and require cooperation for their solution. Soft power is particularly important in dealing with the issues that arise from the bottom chessboard of transnational relations. To describe such a world as an American empire fails to capture the real nature of the foreign policy tasks that we face.

Soft power is key to solve climate change and terrorism. Khanna 8 (Director of the Global Governance Initiative and Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy
Program at the New America Foundation. Council on Foreign Relations: “The United States and Shifting Global Power Dynamics”) online: http://www.cfr.org/publication/16002/united_states_and_shifting_global_power_dynamics.html To the extent that our grand strategy will involve elements of promoting good governance and democracy, we will have to become far more irresistible as a political partner, offering incentives greater than those of other powers who do not attach any strings to their relationships. Even if you are agnostic on this issue, we are all aware that this is a perennial plank of American diplomacy and if we want to be even remotely effective at it, we have to up our ante in this arena of rising powers. This I believe is part of what you would call “non-military spending on national security,” a course of action I strongly advocate for the Middle East and Central Asia. An equally important component of grand strategy will have to be a realistic division of labor with these rising powers, something both of us clearly emphasize. Whether the issue is climate change, public health, poverty reduction, post-conflict reconstruction, or counterterrorism, we do not have the capacity to solve these problems alone—nor can any other power. I argue that we need serious issue-based summit diplomacy among concerned powers (and other actors such as corporations and NGOs) to get moving quickly on these questions rather than (or in parallel to) allowing things to drag through their course in cumbersome multilateral fora. This last point is crucial: the missing ingredient to a globalized grand strategy is the U.S. foreign policy community cleverly leveraging the strengths, activities, and global footprint of the U.S. private sector and NGO communities into what I call a diplomatic-industrial complex. It is in changing our foreign policy process, as much as some of the goals, that our success lies.

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Soft Power Solves – Misc (2/3)
Soft power is key to sustain hegemony and solve terrorism. Nye 4 (Joseph S, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 257)
But it would be a mistake to dismiss the recent decline in our attractiveness so lightly. It is true that the United States has recovered from unpopular poli- cies in the past, but that was against the backdrop of the Cold War, in which other countries still feared the Soviet Union as the greater evil. Moreover, while America's size and association with disruptive modernity are real and un- avoidable, wise policies can soften the sharp edges of that reality and reduce the resentments that they engender. That is what the United States did after World War II. We used our soft power resources and co-opted others into a set of alliances and institutions that lasted for sixty years. We won the Cold War against the Soviet Union with a strategy of containment that used our soft power as well as our hard power. It is true that the new threat of transnational terrorism increased American vulnerability, and some of our unilateralism after September 11 was driven by fear. But the United States cannot meet the new threat identified in the national security strategy without the cooperation of other countries. They will cooper- ate, up to a point, out of mere self-interest, but their degree of cooperation is also affected by the attractiveness of the United States. Take Pakistan for ex- ample. President Pervez Musharraf faces a complex game of cooperating with the United States on terrorism while managing a large anti-American constitu- ency at home. He winds up balancing concessions and retractions. If the United States were more attractive to the Pakistani populace, we would see more con- cessions in the mix. It is not smart to discount soft power as just a question of image, public re- lations, and ephemeral popularity. As I argued earlier, it is a form of power—a means of obtaining desired outcomes. When we discount the importance of our attractiveness to other countries, we pay a price. Most important, if the United States is so unpopular in a country that being pro-American is a kiss of death in their domestic politics, political leaders are unlikely to make concessions to help us. Turkey, Mexico, and Chile were prime examples in the run-up to the Iraq war in March 2003. When American policies lose their legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of others, attitudes of distrust tend to fester and further reduce our leverage. For example, after September 11, there was an outpouring of sympathy from Germans for the United States, and Germany joined a mili- tary campaign against the al Qaeda network. But as the United States geared up for the unpopular Iraq war, Germans expressed widespread disbelief about the reasons the United States gave for going to war, such as the alleged connec- tion of Iraq to al Qaeda and the imminence of the threat of weapons of mass destruction. German suspicions were reinforced by what they saw as biased American media coverage during the war and by the failure to find weapons or prove the connection to al Qaeda right after the war. The combination fos- tered a climate in which conspiracy theories flourished. By July 2003, one-third of Germans under the age of thirty said that they thought the American govern- ment might even have staged the original September 11 attacks."

Soft power solves terrorism and democracy promotion. Nye 4 (Joseph S, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 257)
According to the National Security Strategy, the greatest threats the American people face are transnational terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and particularly their combination. Yet, meeting the challenge posed by trans- national military organizations that could acquire weapons of mass destruction requires the cooperation of other countries—and cooperation is strengthened by soft power. Similarly, efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and elsewhere will require the help of others. Reconstruction in Iraq and peacekeeping in failed states are far more likely to succeed and to be less costly if shared with others rather than appearing as American imperial occupation. The fact that the United States squandered its soft power in the way that it went to war meant that the aftermath turned out to be much more costly than it need have been.

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Soft Power Solves – Misc (3/3)
A “smart power” combination of hard and soft power is key to hegemony, the war on terror, and solving warming and disease. Nye 8 (Joseph S, Harvard IR prof., 3/7, p. 1353, http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/51/9/1351)
Etzioni is correct that a successful policy of security first will require the combi- nation of hard and soft power. Combining the two instruments so that they reinforce rather than undercut each other is crucial to success. Power is the ability to get the outcomes one wants. In the past,it was assumed that military power dominated most issues, but in today’s world, the contexts of power differ greatly on military, economic, and transnational issues. These latter problems, including everything from climate change to pandemics to transnational terrorism, pose some of the greatest challenges we face today, and yet few are susceptible to purely military solutions. The only way to grapple with these problems is through cooperation with others, and that requires smart power —a strategy that combines the soft power of attraction with the hard power of coercion. For example,American and British intelligence agen- cies report that our use of hard power in Iraq without sufficient attention to soft power has increased rather than reduced the number of Islamist terrorists throughout the past 5 years. The soft power of attraction will not win over the hard core terrorists but it is essential in winning the hearts and minds of mainstream Muslims,without whose sup- port success will be impossible in the long term. Yet all the polling evidence suggests that American soft power has declined dramatically in the Muslim world. There is no simple military solution that will produce the outcomes we want. Etzioni is clear on this and highly critical of the failure to develop a smart power strategy in Iraq. One wishes, however, that he had spent a few more pages developing one for Iran.

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Soft Power Solves Heg (1/2)
Soft power is key to sustain hegemony due to alliances and information sharing. Nye 4 (Joseph S, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 261)
In the global information age, the attractiveness of the United States will be crucial to our ability to achieve the outcomes we want. Rather than having to put together pick-up coalitions of the willing for each new game, we will benefit if we are able to attract others into institutional alliances and eschew weak- ening those we have already created. NATO, for example, not only aggregates the capabilities of advanced nations, but its interminable committees, procedures, and exercises also allow these nations to train together and quickly be- come interoperable when a crisis occurs. As for alliances, if the United States is an attractive source of security and reassurance, other countries will set their expectations in directions that are conducive to our interests. Initially, for ex- ample, the U.S.-Japan security treaty was not very popular in Japan, but polls show that over the decades, it became more attractive to the Japanese public. Once that happened, Japanese politicians began to build it into their approaches to foreign policy. The United States benefits when it is regarded as a constant and trusted source of attraction so that other countries are not obliged continually to re-examine their options in an atmosphere of uncertain coalitions. In the Japan case, broad acceptance of the United States by the Japanese public "contributed to the maintenance of US hegemony" and "served as politi cal constraints compelling the ruling elites to continue cooperation with the United States.'"^ Popularity can contribute to stability. Finally, as the RAND Corporation's John Arquila and David Ronfeldt ar- gue, power in an information age will come not only from strong defenses but also from strong sharing. A traditional realpolitik mind-set makes it difficult to share with others. But in an information age, such sharing not only enhances the ability of others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so.'' As we share intelligence and capabilities with others, we develop common outlooks and approaches that improve our ability to deal with the new challenges. Power fiows from that attraction. Dismissing the importance of at- traction as merely ephemeral popularity ignores key insights from new theories of leadership as well as the new realities of the information age. We cannot afford that.

Soft power is key to hegemony – avoids backlash and provides staying power. Nye 4 (Joseph S, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 261)
Ironically, however, the only way to achieve the type of transformation that the neoconservatives seek is by working with others and avoiding the backlash that arises when the United States appears on the world stage as an imperial power acting unilaterally. What is more, because democracy cannot be imposed by force and requires a considerable time to take root, the most likely way to obtain staying power from the American public is through developing interna- tional legitimacy and burden sharing with allies and institutions. For Jacksoni- ans like Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, this may not matter. They would pre- fer to punish the dictator and come home rather than engage in tedious nation building. For example, in September 2003, Rumsfeld said of Iraq, "I don't be- heve it's our job to reconstruct the country."^' But for serious neoconservatives, like Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, their impatience with institutions and allies may undercut their own objectives. They understand the importance of soft power but fail to appreciate all its dimensions and dynamics.

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Soft Power Solves Heg (2/2)
Soft power is key to US leadership. Nye 8 (Joseph S, Harvard IR prof., p. 7, http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/616/1/94)
Promoting positive images of one’s country is not new, but the conditions for projecting soft power have transformed dramatically in recent years. For one thing, nearly half the countries in the world are now democracies. The competi- tive cold war model has become less relevant as a guide for public diplomacy. While there is still a need to provide accurate information to populations in coun- tries like Burma or Syria, where the government controls information, there is a new need to garner favorable public opinion in countries like Mexico and Turkey, where parliaments can now affect decision making. For example, when the United States sought support for the Iraq war, such as Mexico’s vote in the UN or Turkey’s permission for American troops to cross its territory, the decline of American soft power created a disabling rather than an enabling environment for its policies. Shaping public opinion becomes even more important where author- itarian governments have been replaced. Public support was not so important when the United States successfully sought the use of bases in authoritarian countries, but it turned out to be crucial under the new democratic conditions in Mexico and Turkey. Even when foreign leaders are friendly, their leeway may be limited if their publics and parliaments have a negative image of the United States. In such circumstances, diplomacy aimed at public opinion can become as important to outcomes as the traditional classified diplomatic communications among leaders.

However, it would be in the interests of the United States to create internal mechanisms for a more consistent and stable foreign policy, one that is consis- tent with the long-term policy goals of the State Department. Inconsistent uni- lateral actions, using hard power, by the United States both caused distrust by allies and increased suspicions by many nations who believe that the United States masks evil goals behind the rhetoric of idealism. On May 3, 2007, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated in Washington that in this tumultuous period, America's leadership and purpose has become more critical than ever. I cannot help but fully endorse the sentiments of Prime Minister Lee. There is an urgent need for the US to evolve and develop an overall foreign policy which has coherent principles and acknowledges the merits of soft power.In contrast to hard power that rests on coercion and is derived from military and economic might, soft power rests, not on coercion, but on the ability of a nation to co-opt others to follow its will through the attractiveness of its culture, values, ideas and institutions. When a state can persuade and influ- ence others to aspire to share such values, it can lead by example and foster cooperation. Soft power includes propaganda, but is considerably broader. It is much more than 'image, public relations and ephemeral popularity'. It contains very real power - an ability to gain objectives.

Soft power has always been an important element of leadership. For example, the Cold War was won with a strategy of containment that used soft power along with hard power. However, in the global information age, we are seeing the increase in the importance of soft power. Communication technology is shrinking the world and creating ideal conditions for projecting soft power through the control of information.

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Soft Power Solves Terrorism
Soft power is key to solve terrorism - hard power is insufficient. Nye 4 (Joseph S, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 257)
Look again at Afghanistan. Precision bombing and Special Forces defeated the Taliban government, but U.S. forces in Afghanistan wrapped up less than a quarter of al Qaeda, a transnational network with cells in sixty countries. The United States cannot bomb al Qaeda cells in Hamburg, Kuala Lumpur, or De- troit. Success against them depends on close civilian cooperation, whether shar- ing intelligence, coordinating police work across borders, or tracing global fi- nancial flows. America's partners cooperate partly out of self-interest, but the inherent attractiveness of U.S. pohcies can and does influence the degree of co- operation. Equally important, the current struggle against Islamist terrorism is not a clash of civilizations but a contest whose outcome is closely tied to a civil war between moderates and extremists within Islamic civilization. The United States and other advanced democracies will win only if moderate Muslims win, and the ability to attract the moderates is critical to victory. We need to adopt policies that appeal to moderates and to use public diplomacy more effectively to explain our common interests. We need a better strategy for wielding our soft power. We will have to learn better how to combine hard and soft power if we wish to meet the new challenges.

Soft power is key to solve terrorism. Cristo 5 (Danna A, Pace U,
Although worthwhile, the strategy assessment of the US's use of soft power is not a new or novel idea. The management and psychology literature has long touted the benefits of using referent power (soft power) over coercive power (hard power). In their classic article, "The Bases of Social Power," Raven and French (1959), describe the five bases of power: reward, coercive, legitimate, referent, and expert. Referent power is based on identification and attraction, and yields the greatest influence in relation to the other bases along as this strong attraction exists. The authors point out that referent power has the broadest range of power. The most negative power is coercion, which decreases attraction, and thus referent power. In relation to the rest of the world, there are some and individuals that are attracted to the US and its culture and others that are not. This is especially true of Islamic fundamentalists who believe that the US's secular culture is evil and corrupt. Moreover, many European countries have long shared feelings that their cultures are far superior to that of the US. The major failure of the Bush administration in gaining broad support for the war against Iraq may in fact be a failure in assessing the strength of the referent power of the US, which had been eroding for many years prior to the administration. Although it would have been best to move ahead with broad support using soft power, the US could not use what they did not have. The fault of the Bush administration could lie in their immediate use of coercive power without the exploration of the other bases of power before declaring war. But it is important to note that France, Germany, and Russia had their own self-interest in mind when they opposed the war against Iraq. These countries had a long history of trying to weaken the containment of Iraq to ensure that they could have good trading relations with it.

It is argued that both hard and soft power are important in US foreign policy and in the fight against terrorism. The suppression of terrorism, and the achievement of a variety of other objectives including efforts to promote democracy overseas, require the willing assistance of other nations and peo- ples. There are places where the US cannot go in search of terrorist leaders. It needs broad cooperation for intelligence gathering and the restriction of ter- rorist finances. The hard power of military and economic strength is, of course, essential, but the use of 'carrot and stick' alone cannot achieve these objectives. America's neglect of soft power is undermining its ability to persuade and influence others.

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Soft Power Solves Democracy
Soft power is key to democracy. Nye 8 (Joseph S, Harvard IR prof., p. 7, http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/616/1/94)
In addition, there are times when cooperation, including enhancement of the public image of multilateral institutions like NATO or the UN, can make it easier for governments to use such instruments to handle difficult tasks like peacekeeping, promoting democracy, or countering terrorism. For example, during the cold war, American public diplomacy in Czechoslovakia was reinforced by the association of the United States with international conventions that fostered human rights. In 1975, the multilateral Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) legitimized discussion of human rights behind the Iron Curtain and had consequences that were unforeseen by those who signed its Final Act. As former CIA director Robert Gates concluded, despite initial American resistance, “the Soviets desperately wanted the CSCE, they got it, and it laid the foundations for the end of their empire” (as quoted in Thomas 2003, 257).

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Soft Power Solves China
China is taking advantage of low US soft power to remove US primacy in its region. Shuja 8 (Sharif, Monash U Global Terrorism Research Unit Honorary Research Associate, “Why America Can Not Ignore Soft Power”,
3/22, p. 21)

With its declining soft power capabilities America is losing its persuasive power. In its attempt to persuade North Korea to give up its weapons of mass destruction, the US has had to let China play a major role. As its economy has rapidly grown over the last decade, China has sought to develop its soft power capabilities. It has sought to influence other countries using regional aid, pub- lic diplomacy, interaction with multilateral institutions and the embracing of free trade. Its appeal threatens to outstrip that of the United States and cast it as the primary regional power, presenting a potential danger to US influence and interests in the region. China is actually copying Nye's soft power concept: building authority through persuasion rather than coercion. China's Office of the Chinese Lan- guage Council International has opened 135 Confucius Institutes worldwide, aiming to teach Chinese. The Office is, actually, part of a broad campaign involving investment and diplomacy as well as cultural outreach, all aimed at hastening China's progress toward great-power status. The campaign, com- bined with China's economic growth and military modernisation, forms a challenge that some US politicians, including Democratic presidential candi- date John Edwards, are taking note of. 'China is capitalizing on the United States' current unpopularity to project its own soft power In the coming years, China's influence and importance will only continue to grow', he wrote in the September/October issue of Foreign Affairs

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***Soft Power Bad***

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Soft Power Causes Resentment
Soft power breeds resentment – our culture is intrinsically offensive to other peoples. Huffington Post 6 (6/20, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-gardels/hollywood-in-the-world-a_b_23412.html)
This vast influence of American culture in the world is what Harvard professor Joseph Nye has called "soft power." Now, however, we are witnessing a mounting resistance, particularly from Asia and the Muslim world, to the American medium's libertarian and secular messages. There is also resistance to the mere fact of America's overwhelming cultural dominance. Josef Joffe, the publisher-editor of the German weekly Die Zeit has put it directly: "Between Vietnam and Iraq, America's cultural presence has expanded into ubiquity, and so has resentment of America. Soft power does not necessarily increase the world's love for America. It is still power, and it still makes enemies. If, as Nye has said, politics in the information age is about whose story wins, America's story, which has won for so long, is losing its universal appeal. Fewer and fewer are buying into the American narrative. Needless to say, that has big implications for America's storyteller -- Hollywood -- as well. America's soft power is losing its luster for several reasons. Though projected through movies and music, that power has been based fundamentally on ideals more or less realized in practice -- individual freedom, the rule of law, social and economic opportunity. In foreign policy it has meant the defense of human rights, the just use of force against fascism and the containment of Soviet power. Certainly the unilateral invasion and occupation of Iraq has fueled intense anger at America, eroding the natural sympathy after 9/11. But perhaps more disturbing to those who once held up America as a model has been not only Guantanamo, the Abu Ghraib prison abuse and the Haditha massacre but the White House defense of torture, its dismissal of the key aspects of the Geneva protocols on treatment of prisoners of war and the government wiretapping of its own citizens. The Katrina catastrophe in New Orleans not only exposed anew unsolved racial issues but revealed to a shocked world the burgeoning inequality that has crept back into American society as the welfare state has withered. The rise of the Christian right has made many, in Europe in particular, doubt whether a majority still shares America's founding commitment to the secular principles of the Enlightenment. Seized by the marketing machine, Hollywood entertainment has, with ever fewer exceptions, hewn to the blockbuster formula of action, violence, sex and special effects. A masterful drama like Orson Welles' "Citizen Kane" would be impossible to make in Hollywood today. In a recent Gallup Poll of 8,000 women in Muslim countries, the overwhelming majority cited "attachment to spiritual and moral values" as the best aspect of their own societies, while the most common answer to the question about what they admired least in the West was "moral decay, promiscuity and pornography" that pollsters called "the Hollywood image."

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Soft Power Causes Prolif, Genocide
Soft power allows proliferation and is complicit with genocide. New York Post 3 (12/8, http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/750)
The Oslo Accords, the most praised fruit of soft power, led to years of intensified conflict in which more Palestinians and Israelis have died than in the whole of the preceding 50 years. (As discussed yesterday, the so-called Geneva Accord can only have similar effect.) Bill Clinton's soft-power approach to North Korea gave Kim Jong-il four years in which to develop his nuclear arsenal and continue to thumb his nose at the world. And will not the compromise negotiated by the European Union with Tehran persuade the mullahs to speed up their plans to develop nuclear weapons? Whenever I hear the term "soft power," I am reminded of one particular scene. It is 1995 Srebrenica, a Bosnian city under U.N. protection. The ethnic Serb army arrives in the mainly Muslim town and begins to round up all Muslim males aged above 12. In four days, some 8,000 men and boys are forced into a makeshift camp held by the Serbs. On the fifth day, the Serbs start killing the captives. It takes them five days to kill everyone. All that time the U.N. protection force, a contingent of Dutch blue berets, is cantoned in its quarters just a mile away, doing nothing. Well, not quite: Some of the Dutch soldiers turned up their radios and cassette players to the maximum to drown the cries of Muslims being massacred by the Serbs. The Dutch blue berets were there on a soft-power mission. When their commander asked the U.N. headquarters in New York what he was supposed to do, the answer was chilling: Observe and report.

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Soft Power DN Solve War
Soft power and multilateralism can’t stop war. Kagan 2 (Robert, Carnegie Endowment sr. associate, 9/13, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1065)
If you're the kind of person who worries about American unilateralism, here's what should really keep you up at night: Even most American multilateralists are unilateralists at the core. Consider what passes these days for a "multilateralist" view on Iraq: Before taking any action against Iraq, the United States should seek the approval of the U.N. Security Council. Then, if the Security Council refuses, the United States can invade anyway. As Secretary of State Colin Powell said on Sunday, the Bush administration will bring the Iraq case to the United Nations, but that doesn't mean "we lose our option to do what we might think is appropriate to do." Or, as James Baker put it, "even if the administration fails in the Security Council, it is still free" to make its own decision.

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Soft Power DN Solve Heg, Democracy, Prolif
Soft power fails to solve hegemony, proliferation or democracy while causing backlash. Philadelphia Inquirer 98 (“Political Power is not Susceptible to the Charms of a Big Mac Attack”, 6/17, LN)
But what also struck me, as I munched fries in Yogya, was the gap between America's power to shape global culture and its power to influence global affairs. Our domination of the airwaves, soundwaves and Web sites won't bring democracy to Jakarta. Throughout Indonesia's recent political upheavals, America's influence has been almost zilch. This disconnection is important to ponder. After the Cold War ended, many analysts believed the nature of power had changed. "In an age of information-based economies and transnational interdependence, power is becoming ... less tangible and less coercive," wrote Harvard professor Joseph Nye Jr., who held key diplomatic and intelligence posts in the first Clinton administration. The kind of power that matters now, Nye argued - in a phrase that became a buzzword - is "soft power." Soft power means that a country's ideas (democracy, free trade, consumerism) are so attractive that others will imitate them. America's culture (and the hold it has on the global imagination) are supposed to be an important source of soft power. Nye and others thought the importance of soft power would continue to grow relative to that of "hard power" - typified by military strength. Soft power was supposed to be an essential tool of the "world's sole remaining superpower." It was supposed to make "them" want to be like "us." But as I watched events unfold in Indonesia, soft power seemed irrelevant. It hardly served to bolster democracy. What young Indonesians see as the essence of America is consumer goods and media images of sex and violence. They know almost nothing about America's democratic values. Only those Indonesians with deeper knowledge of the United States (from studies abroad or professors) know that America is defined by both consumerism and democracy. Nor does the McWorld syndrome make leaders in other countries saturated by U.S. cultural exports toe the U.S. line. Soft power won't soften up Chinese leaders. McWorld won't make those leaders desist from exporting missile technology; that requires the hardpower technique of sanctions, which the Clinton team has found difficult to apply. The same holds for Japan, where a McDonald's sprouts in every neighborhood and an Elvis look-alike cult dances on Sundays in a downtown park. The veneer of U.S./global culture, despite its omnipresence, does not penetrate the foundation of Japanese-ness. Thus, American pleas for Japan to deregulate its economy and bail out its failing banks so Tokyo can power a new Asian growth spurt fall on deaf ears. Japanese leaders are willing to let the yen's value plummet, even though that drags all Asian economies down with it, because they think cheap exports will get their country out of its recession. No hard-power tools are easily at hand for Washington to pry open the Tokyo mindset. And all the McDonald's in Asia won't change Japanese thinking. Soft power is even less effective in countries that have resisted U.S. consumer products. McDonald's is in India (although it doesn't serve beef, since cows are sacred). But in a country long closed to Western exports and deluged with its own, home-produced movies, the Ameri-global culture has yet to take hold. But even if it had, that wouldn't have stopped India's government from exploding the bomb. The blasts were about hard power. Perhaps therein lies the clue to the relevance of soft power, or its lack. Since the Cold War's end, using hard power is tougher, because the objectives are less clear. A lot of wishful thinking has emerged about the impact of America's global empire of burgers and bytes on the projection of U.S. power. McWorld is great for exports (and for convincing foreign youths that their countries should go, and stay, capitalist). But in real power terms, it is still hard power that matters. The only punch delivered by a burger in Yogya is the bite of the hot chili sauce.

The hegemonists are right about one thing: hard power is necessary to break the back of radical Islamic groups and to force the Islamic world into fundamental change. Bin Laden said it well himself: "When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature they will like a strong horse." The United States must be seen as the strong horse. The reluctant U.S. interventionism of the 1990s made no headway against this implacable enemy. Clinton's policy of offering his and NATO's credibility to save Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo won Washington little goodwill in the Islamic world.

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***Heg Good***

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Heg Good – Classic Khalilzad
( ) Hegemony prevents prolif and global nuclear war. Zalmay Khalilzad, US Ambassador to the United Nations. “Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War.” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2. pg. 84 Spring 1995
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system. Precluding the rise of a hostile global rival is a good guide for defining what interests the United States should regard as vital and for which of them it should be ready to use force and put American lives at risk. It is a good prism for identifying threats, setting priorities for U.S. policy toward various regions and states, and assessing needs for military capabilities and modernization.

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Heg Good – Long Khalilzad (1/2)
( ) A withdrawal of US hegemony would cause multiple scenarios for war that could become global, destroy US economic viability, and lead to widespread WMD proliferation. Zalmay Khalilzad, US Ambassador to the United Nations. “Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War.” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2. pg. 84 Spring 1995
Realistically and over the longer term, however, a neo-isolationist approach might well increase the danger of major conflict, require a greater U.S. defense effort, threaten world peace, and eventually undermine U.S. prosperity. By withdrawing from Europe and Asia, the United States would deliberately risk weakening the
institutions and solidarity of the world's community of democratic powers and so establishing favorable conditions for the spread of disorder and a possible return to conditions similar to those of the first half of the twentieth century. In the 1920s and 1930s,

U.S. isolationism had disastrous consequences for world peace. At that time, the United States was but one of several major powers. Now that the United States is the world's preponderant power, the shock of a U.S. withdrawal could be even greater. What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward? Without the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than cooperating with each other, the West European nations might compete with each other for domination of East-Central Europe and the Middle East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany -- especially since unification -would be the natural leading power. Either in cooperation or competition with Russia, Germany might seek influence over the territories located between them. German efforts are likely to be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the region, and precluding its domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development. Given the strength of democracy in Germany and its preoccupation with absorbing the former East Germany, European concerns about Germany appear exaggerated. But it would be a mistake to assume that U.S. withdrawal could not, in the long run, result in the renationalization of Germany's security policy. The same is also true of Japan.

Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security and build up its military capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S. protection, Japan is likely to increase its military capability dramatically -- to balance the growing Chinese forces and still-significant Russian forces. This could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear weapons. Given Japanese technological prowess, to say nothing of the
plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier task forces. With the shifting

balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united Korea could come significant risks of preventive or proeruptive war. Similarly, European competition for regional dominance could lead to major wars in Europe or East Asia. If the United States stayed out of such a war -- an unlikely prospect -- Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten U.S. interests. A power that achieved such dominance would seek to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests-economic and political -- in the region. Besides, with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a power might seek global hegemony and the United States would face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more catastrophic than the last. In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. Iran and Iraq have, in the past, both sought
regional hegemony. Without U.S. protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would be unlikely to retain their independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world supply of oil, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Any country that gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its

disposal that could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other oil importing nations. Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis. The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living. Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports and jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. Given that total imports and exports are equal to a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product, the cost of necessary adjustments might be high. The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their delivery. Already several

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rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. That danger would only increase if the United States withdrew from the world. The result would be a much more dangerous world in which many states possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would increase accordingly. If this happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the United States, would be harmed.

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Heg Good – War (General)
( ) US primacy prevents the outbreak of global hegemonic war. Stephen Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. "American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls." Naval War College Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2. pg. 9 (20 pages) Spring 2002.
Proquest A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power rivalry and a higher level of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those who argue that primacy is no longer important, because the danger of war is slight, overlook the fact that the extent of American primacy is one of the main reasons why the risk of great-power war is as low as it is. For most of the past four centuries, relations among the major powers have been intensely competitive, often punctuated by major wars and occasionally by all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for example, great-power wars killed over eighty million people. Today, however, the dominant position of the United States places significant limits on the possibility of great-power competition, for at least two reasons. One reason is that because the United States is currently so far ahead, other major powers are not inclined to challenge its dominant position. Not only is there no possibility of a "hegemonic war" (because there is no potential hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war via miscalculation is reduced by the overwhelming gap between the United States and the other major powers. Miscalculation is more likely to lead to war when the balance of power is fairly even, because in this situation both sides can convince themselves that they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed, however, the leading state does not need to go to war and weaker states dare not try.8 The second reason is that the continued deployment of roughly two hundred thousand troops in Europe and in Asia provides a further barrier to conflict in each region. So long as U.S. troops are committed abroad, regional powers know that launching a war is likely to lead to a confrontation with the United States. Thus, states within these regions do not worry as much about each other, because the U.S. presence effectively prevents regional conflicts from breaking out. What Joseph Joffe has termed the "American pacifier" is not the only barrier to conflict in Europe and Asia, but it is an important one. This tranquilizing effect is not lost on America's allies in Europe and Asia. They resent U.S. dominance and dislike playing host to American troops, but they also do not want "Uncle Sam" to leave.9 Thus, U.S. primacy is of benefit to the United States, and to other countries as well, because it dampens the overall level of international insecurity. World politics might be more interesting if the United States were weaker and if other states were forced to compete with each other more actively, but a more exciting world is not necessarily a better one. A comparatively boring era may provide few opportunities for genuine heroism, but it is probably a good deal more pleasant to live in than "interesting" decades like the 1930s or 1940s.

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Heg Good – Laundry List
Heg is necessary to prevent WMD prolif, promote human rights, and promote democracy. Stephen Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. "American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls." Naval War College Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2. pg. 9 (20 pages) Spring 2002.
Proquest Thus, anyone who thinks that the United States should try to discourage the spread of weapons of mass destruction, promote human rights, advance the cause of democracy, or pursue any other positive political goal should recognize that the nation's ability to do so rests primarily upon its power. The United States would accomplish far less if it were weaker, and it would discover that other states were setting the agenda of world politics if its own power were to decline. As Harry Truman put it over fifty years ago, "Peace must be built upon power, as well as upon good will and good deeds."17 The bottom line is clear. Even in a world with nuclear weapons, extensive economic ties, rapid communications, an increasingly vocal chorus of nongovernmental organizations, and other such novel features, power still matters, and primacy is still preferable. People running for president do not declare that their main goal as commander in chief would be to move the United States into the number-two position. They understand, as do most Americans, that being number one is a luxury they should try very hard to keep.

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Heg Good – Peace/Stability
( ) Unipolarity promotes peace and stability – others want to follow US leadership Wohlforth '99. William, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 1999. "The Stability of a Unipolar World" Second, the current unipolarity is prone to peace. The raw power advantage of the United States means that an important source of conflict in previous systems is absent: hegemonic rivalry over leadership of the international system. No other major power is in a position to follow any policy that depends for its success on prevailing against the United States in a war or an extended rivalry. None is likely to take any step that might invite the focused enmity of the United States. At the same time, unipolarity minimizes security competition among the other great powers. As the system leader, the United States has the means and motive to maintain key security institutions in order to ease local security conflicts and limit expensive competition among the other major powers. For their part, the second-tier states face incentives to bandwagon with the unipolar power as long as the expected costs of balancing remain prohibitive.

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Heg Good – Warming
US military power and leadership is key to solve climate change. Maybee 8 (Sean C, US Navy commander, p. 98, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i49.htm)
For the purpose of this essay, national security is defined as the need to maintain the safety, prosperity, and survival of the nation-state through the use of instruments of national power: diplomatic, military, economic, and informational power will be the drivers of GCC responses as they provide the needed resources ideas and technology. It will be through invoking military and diplomatic power that resources are used and new ideas are implemented to overcome any GCC challenges. In addition to fighting and winning the nation’s wars, the US military has a long history of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, but the potential impacts of GCC should lead national security policymakers to consider how environmental security will play a role in the future.

US leadership is key to solve warming. Maybee 8 (Sean C, US Navy commander, p. 98, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i49.htm)
The national security implications of GCC pose unique challenges for the United States in part because it is best suited to lead counter-GCC efforts. The Nation has the economic and informational power to develop and resource effective methods and the international status to foster global cooperation and implementation. The U.S. military already has a robust capacity to respond and could continue to develop and use it to help other nations to build that capacity. In addition, by addressing environmental security, the United States may foster trust and cooperation while beginning to anticipate some GCC effects.

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Heg Key to South China Sea – First Line
First, forward military presence in the pacific deters China and leads to stabilization allowing a political solution to be brokered. Odgaard 2K1
(Liselotte, Asst Prof, of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark, “Deterrence and Co-operation in the South China Sea”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Aug 1, lexis) The South China Sea constitutes a first line of defence for the littoral states of Southeast Asia. As a consequence, they cannot afford to ignore the worst-case scenario of conflict involving China. The majority of the Southeast Asian states have embarked on a modernization of their naval capabilities, aimed at developing a deterrent force as well as a force capable of engaging in military operations at sea. However, the financial crisis of the late 1990s delayed some of these efforts, making the Southeast Asian states more reliant on bilateral defence arrangements, in particular with the United States. The main countries in the U.S. network of military co-operation agreements are Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. In substitution of the permanent base arrangements during the Cold War, U.S. troops have resumed joint exercises with the Philippines from 2000. In general, the military agreements facilitate training, exercises, and interoperability, permitting the United States to be seen to be engaged in Southeast Asia as a flexible regional balancer. The United States shares the widespread perception within Southeast Asia that China's moves in the South China Sea indicate that it might have expansionist intentions. Thus, the United States has maintained its strategy of forward deployment.
However, China is a power of second rank compared with the United States, and as such, is no immediate threat to the latter. Therefore, Washington prefers that the regional states settle their disputes without its involvement as long as these do not pose a threat to U.S. interests. Although the United States looks at China's Spratly policy as an indication of its possible bid for regional hegemony, it is not prepared to play an active part in the Spratly dispute unless freedom of navigation through Southeast Asian waters is threatened. At the same time, the United States maintains its support for the ASEAN position on the non-use of force concerning dispute settlement in the South China Sea. Thus, the U.S. policy on the Spratlys may be characterized as guarded non-involvement. American reservations about direct involvement in the Spratly dispute do not imply that cordial relations between the United States and China are on the agenda. On the contrary, since 1999, the relationship between the two powers has suffered a downturn because of Chinese opposition to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strikes in Yugoslavia, the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and accusations of Chinese military espionage in the United States. The Administration of George W. Bush is unlikely to call for a revival of the idea of a strategic partnership with China. Bush describes China as a strategic competitor. [4] In line with this hardening of U.S. policy towards China, Bush has voiced strong support for a theatre missile defence (TMD) system covering Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Technological constraints are likely to force Bush to moderate his position on such defence plans. However, U.S. reassurances that research and development on the TMD will continue only leaves China with the option of proceeding with military modernization to build up its deterrence capabilities. This geostrategic picture suggests that co-operation on managing the

regional balance of power is not on the cards. Instead, a structure of deterrence appears to be in the making. Deterrence is directed at the intentions of opponents: if the existence of deterrent forces are seen to prevent the opponent from achieving gains through aggression, the opponent will refrain from attack. Thus, the power-projection capabilities of the various states are constrained by a mutual display of force between the United States and the Southeast Asian states on the one hand, and China on the other. A structure of deterrence does not operate on the basis of cooperation between opposing powers. Nor can deterrence be equated with violence and volatility. On the contrary, the consolidation of a structure of deterrence in the South China Sea may provide Southeast Asia with the level of military security and reassurance necessary to allow for the development of stronger co-operative ties with China.

Second, conflict in the SCS culminated into a global nuclear war. Strait Times 1995
(staff, “Choose Your Own Style of Democracy”, May 21, p. proquest) In his speech, Dr Mahathir also painted three scenarios for Asia. In the first -the worst possible scenario -Asian countries would go to war against each other, he said. It might start with clashes between Asian countries over the Spratly Islands because of China's insistence that the South China Sea belonged to it along with all the islands, reefs and seabed minerals. In this scenario, the United States would offer to help and would be welcomed by Asean, he said. The Pacific Fleet begins to patrol the South China Sea. Clashes occur between the Chinese navy and the US Navy. China declares war on the US and a fullscale war breaks out with both sides resorting to nuclear weapons.

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Heg Key to South China Sea
( ) American military hegemony balanced with dialogue leads to a peace solution to the South China Sea in the Squo. Odgaard 2K1
(Liselotte, Asst Prof, of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark, “Deterrence and Co-operation in the South China Sea”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Aug 1, lexis) This article has analysed the impact of the Spratly dispute on the security policies emerging between China and Southeast Asia in the South China Sea after the Cold War. The analysis suggests three principal conclusions. First, the emergence of challenges to old security policies in the dispute suggests that it is not merely a peripheral dispute reflecting security relations between China and Southeast Asia after the Cold War, but a central dispute in the sense that it affects these relations. Secondly, the fact that the challenges are founded in different security practices between China and Southeast Asia implies that the threats towards regional security arising in the Spratly dispute are not caused by the malevolent intentions of one state or entity. Instead, the challenges are the result of interaction in an environment where the states have not yet established concrete mechanisms of order. Thirdly, the efforts at managing the challenges coming to the fore in the Spratly dispute suggest that the seeds of a new order are emerging, going beyond the rudimentary level. Within the confines of a structure of deterrence, mechanisms of consultation and limited co-operation are emerging as a focal point in the approaches to diplomacy and international law of the littoral states of the South China Sea. What are the prospects that an order combining deterrence and cooperation are consolidated as a stable security practice in the South China Sea? From the preceding analysis, three preconditions must be fulfilled. First, the United States must maintain its military presence in the region. Secondly, China and Southeast Asia must compromise on their different approaches to diplomacy. Finally, China and Southeast Asia must establish a code of conduct defining their rights and obligations in the South China Sea. If the United States limits its role to maintaining a stable balance, the emerging structure of deterrence can provide the Southeast Asian states with the military security necessary for them to develop a partnership with China in the South China Sea.

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Heg Key to East Asian Stability – First Line
First, US withdrawal from Asia sparks Japan into rapid nuclear armament, attack on Taiwan and North Korean proliferation. Dao 2K3
(James, staff , “Why Keep US Troops?”, The New York Times, Jan. 5, p. l lexis) Deciding if now is the time depends on how well the United States is able to project power across the Pacific, as well as on its responsibilities as the globe's presumptive supercop. Withdrawing forces in Korea would reverberate powerfully in Tokyo, Beijing, Taipei and beyond, raising questions in an already jittery region about Washington's willingness to maintain stability in Asia. "In the present mood, the Japanese reaction could be quite strong," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser to Jimmy Carter. "And under those circumstances, it's hard to say how the Chinese might respond." In the 1970's, Mr. Brzezinski took part in the last major debate over reducing American forces in Korea, when President Carter, motivated by post-Vietnam doubts about American power, proposed withdrawing ground forces from the peninsula. He faced resistance from the South Korean government, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency. The arguments against withdrawal then still apply today, Mr. Brzezinski says. A secure Korea makes Japan more confident, he contends. An American withdrawal from Korea could raise questions about the United States' commitment to the 40,000 troops it has in Japan. And that could drive anxious Japanese leaders into a military buildup that could include nuclear weapons, he argues. "If we did it, we would stampede the Japanese into going nuclear," he said. Other Asian leaders would be likely to interpret a troop withdrawal as a reduction of American power, no matter how much the United States asserts its commitment to the region. China might take the opportunity to flex its military muscle in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea. North Korea could feel emboldened to continue its efforts to build nuclear arms. "Any movement of American forces would almost certainly involve countries and individuals taking the wrong message," said Kurt Campbell, a deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Clinton administration. "The main one would be this: receding American commitment, backing down in the face of irresponsible North Korean behavior. And frankly, the ultimate beneficiary of this would be China in the long term." "Mind-sets in Asia are profoundly traditional," he said. "They calculate political will by the numbers of soldiers, ships and airplanes that they see in the region."

Second, increasing Asian nuclearization runs the risk of wild-fire proliferation and armsracing, leading to miscalculation and nuclear war. Friedburg 1994
(Aaron, Professor of International Relations at Princeton University International Security, Winter, p. 8, p. lexis) Assuming, for the moment that an Asia with more nuclear powers would be more stable than one with fewer, there would still be serious difficulties involved in negotiating the transition to such a world. As in other regions, small, nascent nuclear forces will be especially vulnerable to preemption. In Japan the prevailing “nuclear allergy” could lead first to delays in acquiring deterrent forces and then to a desperate and dangerous scramble for nuclear weapons. In Asia, the prospects for a peaceful transition may be further complicated by the fact that the present and potential nuclear powers are both numerous and strategically intertwined. The nuclearization of Korea (North, South or, whether through reunification or competitive arms programs, both together) could lead to a similar development in Japan, which might cause China to accelerate and expand its nuclear programs, which could then have an impact on the defense policies of Taiwan, India (and through it, Pakistan) and Russia (which would also be affected by events in Japan and Korea). All of this would influence the behavior of the United States. Similar shockwaves could also travel through the system in different directions (for example, from India to China to Japan to Korea). A rapid, multifaceted expansion in nuclear capabilities could increase the dangers of misperception, miscalculation, and war.

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Heg Key to Caspian Stability – First Line (1/2)
First, American leadership in the Caspian key to stability: boosts American hegemony, contains Russia and is key to checking terrorism and smuggling Kalicki 2K1
(Jan, Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Caspian Energy at the CrossRoads”, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct, p. lexis) The countries surrounding the Caspian Sea -- Russia to the north, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to the east, Iran to the south, and Azerbaijan to the west -- hold some of the largest oil and gas reserves in the world. And together with neighboring Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, they represent important economic, political, and strategic interests for the United States. To advance those interests, Washington should strengthen its policy toward the Caspian by giving the highest level of support to the cooperative development of regional energy reserves and pipelines. In particular, it should encourage the construction of multiple pipelines to ensure diverse and reliable transportation of Caspian energy to regional and international markets.Although the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries will continue to dominate the global energy market for decades to come, oil and gas development in the Caspian basin could help diversify, secure, and stabilize world energy supplies in the future, as resources from the North Sea have done in the past. The proven and possible energy reserves in or adjacent to the Caspian region -- including at least 115 billion barrels of oil -- are in fact many times greater than those of the North Sea and should increase significantly with continuing exploration. Such plentiful resources could generate huge returns for U.S. companies and their shareholders. American firms have already acquired 75 percent of Kazakhstan's mammoth Tengiz oil field, which is now valued at more than $10 billion. Over time, as the capital generated from Caspian energy development spreads to other sectors, U.S. firms in other industries -- from infrastructure to telecommunications to transportation and other services -- could also benefit. In addition to these energy-related and commercial interests, the United States has important political and strategic stakes in the Caspian region -- including a NATO ally in Turkey, a former adversary in Russia, a currently turbulent regime in Iran, and several fragile new states. Located at the crossroads of western Europe, eastern Asia, and the Middle East, the Caspian serves as a trafficking area for weapons of mass destruction, terrorists, and narcotics -- a role enhanced by the weakness of the region's governments. With few exceptions, the fledgling Caspian republics are plagued with pervasive corruption, political repression, and the virtual absence of the rule of law. Even if they can muster the political will to attempt reform themselves, the attempt will fail so long as they lack the resources to build strong economic and political institutions. And until they build close, substantive relations with the West, they will remain vulnerable to Russia's hegemonic impulses. The cooperative development of regional energy reserves and pipelines -- independent of their huge neighbors to the north and the south -- thus represents not only a boon for the United States and the world at large, but also the surest way to provide for the Caspian nations' own security and prosperity.

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Heg Key to Caspian Stability – First Line (2/2)
Second Failure to contain Russian would destabilize all of Eurasia, spark nuclear wars and put a stranglehold on the west. Cohen 1996
(Ariel, PhD, Heritage Foundation, “The New Great Game: Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia”, Backgrounder, no. 1065, p. lexis) Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russia’s transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $6 billion to date (equal to Russia’s IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world stability, and security. As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia’s neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neoimperialist Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.15 Domination of the Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East. Russian imperialists, such as radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, have resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm port on the Indian Ocean. If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south, the threat to Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, and Afganistan will increase. The independence of pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan already has been undermined by pressures from the Russian armed forces and covert actions by the intelligence and security services, in addition to which Russian hegemony would make Western political and economic efforts to stave off Islamic militancy more difficult. Eurasian oil resources are pivotal to economic development in the early 21st century. The supply of Middle Eastern oil would become precarious if Saudi Arabia became unstable, or if Iran or Iraq provoked another military conflict in the area. Eurasian oil is also key to the economic development of the southern NIS. Only with oil revenues can these countries sever their dependence on Moscow and develop modern market economies and free societies. Moreover, if these vast oil reserves were tapped and developed, tens of thousands of U.S. and Western jobs would be created. The U.S. should ensure free access to these reserves for the benefit of both Western and local economies.

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Caspian Module – AT: No Military Deployments in Caspian
United States maintains substantial military presence in the Caspian region, including military aid and training Blank 2K3
(Stephen, MacArthur Professor of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute “A Violent Theater: Central Asia’s Militarization”, The World and I, Feb. 1, p. lexis) Finally, there is the American military presence in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. This presence, ratified by bilateral agreements, extends to all of the area except for Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Washington now can render military assistance to Armenia, and discussions to provide it with genuine assistance began several years ago. The U.S. presence comprises air bases, landing rights, and troops to defend those bases. Regular training and advising for the host countries' troops also take place, whether through bilateral agreements, multilateral venues like the Partnership for Peace exercises, or exercises with the Central Asian Battalion. U.S. commanders have stated that these exercises and the mutual relationships forged through them were vital in winning local governments' speedy agreement to host U.S. military bases and personnel after September 11. Those forces will remain abroad at least through 2003 to complete the mission of extirpating terrorism in Afghanistan and securing that country for the future. Of course, they do not even begin to address in public the strategic issues connected with the possibility of using Central Asian or Transcaucasian bases and U.S. military assets there against Iraq. While American officials profess no interest in long-term bases in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, Washington's commitment to consolidating long-term security relationships with those states has undoubtedly intensified. The final parameters of our relationship with local regimes remain to be determined, but the United States can be expected to upgrade and extend its overall presence. Bilateral and multilateral venues of military training, assistance, and cooperation will continue, along with local governments' quest for something in the way of security guarantees against threats to their security. Uzbekistan, for example, quite openly wants a U.S. guarantee of its security. We can also expect, therefore, that the sale of U.S. weapons and technologies will soon figure in these states' military profile, since those systems obviously go with American training and organization. Unsurprisingly, the motives of those arms sellers will resemble those of the other states cited here, a quest for revenues and markets to keep their firms going, as well as a political quest for influence over the security institutions and policies of the recipient states.

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Caspian Module – AT: No Risk Of Russian Hegemony
Lack of American involvement in the Caspian allows Russia’s reemergence as an imperial power. Cohen 1996
(Ariel, PhD, Heritage Foundation, “The New Great Game: Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia”, Backgrounder, no. 1065, p. lexis) The main threat to the equitable development of Eurasian oil is the Russian attempt to dominate the region in a de facto alliance with the radical Islamic regime in Tehran.8 Russia benefits from instability in the Caucasus, where wars and conflicts undermine independence and economic development while hindering the export of oil from the region’s states.9 Moscow has gone beyond words to establish its power in the Caucasus. The Russians are setting up military bases in the region in order to gain exclusive control over all future pipelines. Georgia now has four Russian bases and Armenia has three, while Azerbaijan is still holding out under severe pressure from Moscow. In addition, members of the Commonwealth of Independent States are required to police their borders jointly with Russian border guards, and thus are denied effective control over their own territory. Attempts to Reintegrate the South. The struggle to reestablish a Russian sphere of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia started in early 1992. While not a full-scale war, this struggle employs a broad spectrum of military, covert, diplomatic, and economic measures. The southern tier of the former Soviet Union is a zone of feverish Russian activity aimed at tightening Moscow’s grip in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. The entire southern rim of Russia is a turbulent frontier, a highly unstable environment in which metropolitan civilian and military elites, local players, and mid-level officers and bureaucrats drive the process of reintegration.10 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, President Boris Yeltsin called for a re-examination of Russia’s borders to the detriment of her neighbors, especially Ukraine and Kazakhstan. For example, upon his return from a state visit to the U.S. in September 1994, Yeltsin reiterated Russia’s “right” to conduct “peacemaking” in the “near abroad,” to protect Russian speakers and to exercise freedom of action in its sphere of influence.11 These statements were echoed on numerous occasions by former Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and other key policymakers in Moscow. In his September 1995 Decree “On Approval of the Strategic Policy of the Russian Federation Toward CIS Member States,”12 Yeltsin outlined plans to create a CIS military and economic union. Some observers have termed this design an informal empire “on the cheap,” a “sustainable empire” which is less centralized than the old Soviet Union.13 The aim of such an arrangement would be to ensure Russia’s control of the oil and gas reserves in Eurasia. Competing political interests inside Russia’s neighbors often prompt local elites to challenge the faction in power and to seek Moscow’s support. For example, Russian oil chieftains in Kazakhstan and military commanders who are still in place in Moldova and Georgia naturally maintain close links with Moscow. Where it lacks troops on the ground, Moscow supports the most proRussian faction in the conflict, such as Trans-Dniestrian ethnic Russians in Moldova, the separatist Abkhazs in Georgia, warlords and former communist leaders in Azerbaijan, and pro-communist clans in Tajikistan. This is a classic scenario for imperial expansion. What is common to these conflicts is that without Russian support, the pro-Moscow factions (regardless of their ethnicity) could not have dominated their respective regions, and would be forced to seek negotiated and peaceful solutions. In each case, appeals by the legitimate governments of the Newly Independent States to restore their territorial integrity were ignored by Moscow. Russian political elites have not overcome the imperialist ideology that inspired both pre-1917 and Soviet expansionism. For today’s Moscow bureaucrats and generals, as for their predecessors in St. Petersburg prior to 1917, the turbulent southern periphery is a potential source of political fortunes, promotions, and careers. For Russian politicians in search of a grand cause, re-establishing the empire and paying for it with Eurasian oil revenues is a winning proposition, especially in the murky environment in the aftermath of imperial collapse.

Heg Key to Prevent Japanese Rearm
First, assurance of American hegemony is critical to prevent a resurgent nuclear Japan that would spark arms races and war

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab Khalilzad & Lesser 1998

212 Hegemony

(Rand analyst & permanent UN ambassador & Vice President and director of studies at the Pacific Council on International Policy, Zalmay & Ian, editors, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, RAND Books, p. 13 lexis) The third vital interest is to ensure the survival of American allies— critical for a number of reasons. The first and most obvious reason is that the United States has treaty obligations to two important Asian states, Japan and South Korea. While meeting these obligations is necessary to maintain the credibility of the United States in the international arena, it is consequential for directly substantive reasons as well. In both instances, the assurance of U.S. protection has resulted in implicit bargains that are indispensable to the American conception of stable international order. Thanks to American security guarantees, South Korea and Japan have both enjoyed the luxury of eschewing nuclear weapons as guarantors of security. Should American protective pledges be seen as weakening, the temptation on the part of both states to resurrect the nuclear option will increase—to the consequent detriment of America’s global antiproliferation policy. Equally significant, however, is that Japan, and possibly South Korea as well, would of necessity have to embark on a significant conventional build-up, especially of maritime and air forces. The resulting force posture would in practice be indistinguishable from a longrange powerprojection capability possessing offensive orientation. Even if such forces are developed primarily for defensive purposes, they will certainly give rise to new security dilemmas regionwide that in turn would lead to intensive arms-racing, growing suspicions, and possibly war. .

Second, the instability from re-arms fuels wildfire proliferation, a series of wars and eventual emergence of hostile Asian rival to the US Khalilzad & Lesser 1998
(Rand analyst & permanent UN ambassador & Vice President and director of studies at the Pacific Council on International Policy, Zalmay & Ian, editors, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, RAND Books, p. 13 lexis) China in world III eschews democratization and normalization for an accelerated program of military modernization, especially air and naval power-projection capabilities (Tellis et al., 1996). Japan might choose to go in one of several directions in the face of China’s drive for regional superiority. Tokyo might decide to ally itself with Beijing; it might seek U.S. support in balancing China; or it might compete with China for Asian leadership. In the worst case—our world III—Japan loses faith in U.S. security guarantees and chooses the latter path. Tokyo begins converting its economic power into military strength and deploys a small nuclear arsenal to defend itself and its interests against what it perceives as malign Chinese designs. In the rest of Asia, the second-tier powers jockey for position alongside one or another of the competitors within a complex context of border and resource disputes. In this world, NBC proliferation proceeds at a rapid clip, as actors see nuclear weapons in particular as insurance policies against the dangers around them. Power relations are fluid to the point of instability as small countries seek protectors and larger powers recruit clients. And in this world, it seems likely that a global competitor to the United States could emerge, perhaps as a result of an alliance of convenience between one of the Asian competitors and Russia.

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Japan Module – AT: Heg Doesn’t Solve Rearm
Collapse of US leadership in East Asia causes rapid Japanese renuclearization and a SinoJapanese alliance against the US.
Joseph S. Nye, Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. “U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq.” Foreign Affairs. Council on Foreign Relations. July/August 2003. Lexis Could a revived Japan, a decade or two hence, become a global challenger to the United States, economically or militarily, as was predicted a decade ago? It seems unlikely. Roughly the size of California, Japan will never have the geographical or population scale of the United States. Its record of economic success and its popular culture provide Japan with soft power, but the nation’s ethnocentric attitudes and policies undercut that. Japan does show some ambition to improve its status as a world power. It seeks a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and polls show that many younger Japanese are interested in becoming a more “normal country” in terms of defense. Some politicians have started a movement to revise Article 9 of the country’s constitution, which restricts Japan’s forces to self-defense. If the United States were to drop its alliance with Japan and follow the advice of those who want us to stay “offshore” and shift our allegiance back and forth to balance China and Japan, we could produce the sense of insecurity that might lead Japan to decide it had to develop its own nuclear capacity. Alternatively, if Japan were to ally with China, the combined resources of the two countries would make a potent coalition. While not impossible, such an alliance seems unlikely unless the United States makes a serious diplomatic or military blunder. Not only have the wounds of the 193os failed to heal completely, but China and Japan have conflicting visions of Japan’s proper place in Asia and in the world. China would want to constrain Japan, but Japan might not want to play second fiddle. In the highly unlikely prospect that the United States were to withdraw from the East Asian region, Japan might join a Chinese bandwagon. But given Japanese concerns about the rise of Chinese power, continued alliance with the United States is the most likely outcome. An allied East Asia is not a plausible candidate to be the challenger that displaces the United States. [P. 24-25]

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214 Hegemony

Heg Key to Stop German and Japan Rearm
( ) US hegemony is critical to preventing a German or Japanese rearmament Lind 07 (Michael, New America Foundation, Beyond American Hegemony,
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381) High levels of defense expenditures are not merely to overawe potential challengers. (In outlining possible competitors, Krauthammer noted, "Only China grew in strength, but coming from so far behind it will be decades before it can challenge American primacy -- and that assumes that its current growth continues unabated.") To again quote from the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, "we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order." Reassurance, the second prong of the hegemonic strategy, entails convincing major powers not to build up their military capabilities, allowing the United States to assume the burdens of ensuring their security instead. In other words, while outspending allies like Germany and Japan on defense, the United States should be prepared to fight wars on behalf of Germany and Japan, sparing them the necessity of re-arming -- for fear that these countries, having "renationalized" their defense policies and rearmed, might become hostile to the United States at some future date. For example, even though the threats emanating from the spillover of the Balkan conflicts affected Germany and its neighbors far more than a geographically farremoved United States, Washington took the lead in waging the 1999 Kosovo war -- in part to forestall the emergence of a Germany prepared to act independently. And the Persian Gulf War was, among other things, a reassurance war on behalf of Japan -- far more dependent on Persian Gulf oil than the United States -- confirmed by the fact that Japan paid a substantial portion of the United States’ costs in that conflict. Today, the great question is whether or not two other Asian giants -- India and China -- will eschew the development of true blue-water navies and continue to allow the United States to take responsibility for keeping the Gulf open.

Sustained American hegemony prevents Japan from both rearming and nuclearizing Lind 07 (Michael, New America Foundation, Beyond American Hegemony,
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381) In the case of North Korea, for example, U.S. policy is motivated largely, although not solely, by the fear that if Japan loses confidence in America’s willingness to protect it, Japan may obtain its own nuclear deterrent and renationalize its foreign policy, emerging from the status of a semi-sovereign U.S. protectorate to that of an independent military great power once again. But no president can tell the American public that the United States must be willing to lose 50,000 or more American lives in a war with North Korea for fear that Japan will get nuclear weapons to defend itself. Therefore the public is told instead that North Korea might give nuclear weapons to non-state actors to use to destroy New York, Washington and other American cities, or that North Korean missiles can strike targets in North America.

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Heg Key to Global Economy – First Line
First, Hegemony is key to trade and interdependence—stability opens conditions necessary for growth. WALT 2K2
(Stephen, JFKSchool of Government Professor at Harvard Univiversity Naval War College Review, Spring, www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2002/spring/art1-sp2.htm) By facilitating the development of a more open and liberal world economy, American primacy also fosters global prosperity. Economic interdependence is often said to be a cause of world peace, but it is more accurate to say that peace encourages interdependence-by making it easier for states to accept the potential vulnerabilities of extensive international intercourse. Investors are more willing to send money abroad when the danger of war is remote, and states worry less about being dependent on others when they are not concerned that these connections might be severed. When states are relatively secure, they will also be less fixated on how the gains from cooperation are distributed. In particular, they are less likely to worry that extensive cooperation will benefit others more and thereby place them at a relative disadvantage over time. By providing a tranquil international environment, in short, U.S. primacy has created political conditions that are conducive to expanding global trade and investment. Indeed, American primacy was a prerequisite for the creation and gradual expansion of the European Union, which is often touted as a triumph of economic self-interest over historical rivalries. Because the United States was there to protect the Europeans from the Soviet Union and from each other, they could safely ignore the balance of power within Western Europe and concentrate on expanding their overall level of economic integration. The expansion of world trade has been a major source of increased global prosperity, and U.S. primacy is one of the central pillars upon which that system rests. The United States also played a leading role in establishing the various institutions that regulate and manage the world economy. As a number of commentators have noted, the current era of “globalization” is itself partly an artifact of American power. As Thomas Friedman puts it, “Without America on duty, there will be no America Online.”

( ) Second, A global economic collapse would escalate to full scale conflict and rapid extinction Bearden 2K
(Thomas, “The Unnecessary Energy Crisis”, Free Republic, June 24, lexis) History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate Chinawhose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

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Heg Key to Global Economy
The tranquility caused by US primacy is key to the health of the global economy. Stephen Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. "American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls." Naval War College Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2. pg. 9 (20 pages) Spring 2002.
Proquest By facilitating the development of a more open and liberal world economy, American primacy also fosters global prosperity. Economic interdependence is often said to be a cause of world peace, but it is more accurate to say that peace encourages interdependence-by making it easier for states to accept the potential vulnerabilities of extensive international intercourse.10 Investors are more willing to send money abroad when the danger of war is remote, and states worry less about being dependent on others when they are not concerned that these connections might be severed. When states are relatively secure, they will also be less fixated on how the gains from cooperation are distributed. In particular, they are less likely to worry that extensive cooperation will benefit others more and thereby place them at a relative disadvantage over time.11 By providing a tranquil international environment, in short, U.S. primacy has created political conditions that are conducive to expanding global trade and investment. Indeed, American primacy was a prerequisite for the creation and gradual expansion of the European Union, which is often touted as a triumph of economic self-interest over historical rivalries. Because the United States was there to protect the Europeans from the Soviet Union and from each other, they could safely ignore the balance of power within Western Europe and concentrate on expanding their overall level of economic integration. The expansion of world trade has been a major source of increased global prosperity, and U.S. primacy is one of the central pillars upon which that system rests.12 The United States also played a leading role in establishing the various institutions that regulate and manage the world economy. As a number of commentators have noted, the current era of "globalization" is itself partly an artifact of American power. As Thomas Friedman puts it, "Without America on duty, there will be no America Online."13

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Heg Key to Democracy – First Line
First, leadership is critical to democratization effects. Albright 97
(Madeleine, Secretary of State, “Building a framework for American leadership in the 21st Century - U.S. Secretary of State” Statement before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC. http://findarticles.co m/p/articles/mi_m1584/is_n2_v8/ai_19538680/pg_9) Mr. Chairman, more than seven years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall and five years since the demise of the Soviet Union. Today, America is secure, our economy vibrant, and our ideals ascendant. Across the globe, the movement towards open societies and open markets is wider and deeper than ever before. Democracy's triumph is neither accidental nor irreversible; it is the result of sustained American leadership. It would not have been possible without the power of our example, the strength of our military, or the constancy and creativity of our diplomacy. That is the central lesson of the twentieth century -- and this lesson must continue to guide us if we are to safeguard our interests as we enter the twenty-first. Make no mistake: the interests served by American foreign policy are not the abstract inventions of State Department planners; they are the concrete real, ties of our daily lives. Think about it. Would the American people be as secure if weapons of mass destruction, instead of being controlled, fell into the wrong hands? That is precisely what would have happened if the Administration and Congress had not acted to ensure the dismantling of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, the freezing of North Korea's, and the securing of Russia's.

Second, democratic consolidation is key to preventing nuclear war. CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT 1995
(staff, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990’s”, Oct, p. online: http://www.carnegie.org/sub/pubs/deadly/dia95_01.html lexis) This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

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218 Hegemony

Heg Key Prevent War with China
( ) Absent increased influence, Chinese leadership will collide with US hegemony. Romero 2K6,
(Julius, author – Journal Online. “US-China rivalry turning serious,” June 20th 2006, http://www.journal.com.ph/index.php?page=news&id=4836&sid=1&urldate=2006-06-20) WASHINGTON -- Rivalry between the United States and China is turning serious with the former tightening global security control and the latter pushing bold groundwork for economic power. With a recent survey indicating that it is statistically feasible to upstage the U.S. as a world power over the next decade and a half via economic domination, China is seen in a fast forward roll. Fifty-five percent of 10,250 people polled worldwide saw China emerging as a formidable rival to the U.S. while 57 percent believed American supremacy could hang on. What should disturb Washington in the survey commissioned by Germany’s Bertelsmann Foundation is a question of blunder and fallback poked at why American influence is decreasing. The 57 percent is a somersault from the 81 percent who currently see the U.S. as a powerful international leader while the 55 percent on China as aspirant to lead the world in 2020 is a sharp increment from the 45 percent who believe it has already attained that status. The same poll considered economic power and potential for growth as the most important quality for a global leader -- and China has stepped up the challenge with loud action. Top Beijing officials burned the economic front by expanding trade alliance and investment network for supremacy, a feat China already enjoyed in 1421 when Great Britain was still contemplating to colonize the U.S. and more than 300 years before American independence. That explains how Chinese civilization greatly influenced the world, making it empirically possible for China to lead anew an enlarged socio-economic concordat with different political persuasions. Its new leadership creates regional synergy and collides head-on with U.S. hegemony. That also allows China to dominate an expanding world economy with widening imbalances. Since 1978 when Beijing launched a major economic reform program, phenomenal growth became a fixture of modern China that created a spectacle of how communism compatibly operates with market economy. Data shows the Chinese economy closed out the first quarter with 10.3 percent growth and 2006 GDP is projected to hit $2.23 trillion. China has contributed an average of 13 percent to the world economy, accounting for $500 billion worth of commodities from the time it became a member of the World Trade Organization in 2001.

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219 Hegemony

Heg Key to Deter Rogue States – First Line (1/2)
First, Strong Hegemony and force projection is the only way to deal with rogue states. HENRIKSON 1999
(Thomas, Sr. Fellow at Hoover Institute, “Using Power and Diplomacy to Deal with Rogue States”, p. online: http://www.hoover.stanford.edu/publications/epp/94/94a.html //wyo-tjc) In today's globally interconnected world, events on one side of the planet can influence actions on the other side, meaning that how the United States responds to a regional rogue has worldwide implications. Rogue leaders draw conclusions from weak responses to aggression. That Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein, escaped unpunished for his invasion of Kuwait no doubt emboldened the Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, in his campaign to extirpate Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina in pursuit of a greater Serbia. Deterring security threats is a valuable mechanism to maintain peace, as witnessed by the cold war, and it may afford the only realistic option available. But in dealing with rogue states deterrence and containment may not be enough. Before NATO intervened in the Bosnia imbroglio in 1995, to take one example, the ethno-nationalist conflict raised the specter of a wider war, drawing in the neighboring countries of Greece, Turkey, and Russia. Political inaction creates vacuums, which can suck in states to fill the void. Although the United States does not want to be the world's sheriff, living in a world without law and order is not an auspicious prospect. This said, it must be emphasized that the United States ought not intervene militarily in every conflict or humanitarian crisis. Indeed, it should pick its interventions with great care. Offering Washington's good offices to mediate disputes in distant corners is one thing; dispatching armed forces to far-flung deserts, jungles, or mountains is quite another. A global doctrine setting forth all-inclusive guidelines is difficult to cast in stone. Containment, the doctrine articulated in response to Soviet global ambitions, offered a realistic guideline for policymakers. A similar response to rogue states cannot be easily cloned for each contingency but may require the United States to corral allies or partners into a unified policy, as circumstances dictate. But watching rogue behavior with complacency or relying on the United Nations courts disaster in the age of weapons of mass destruction. Most incidents of civil turmoil need not engage U.S. military forces. Regrettable as the bloody civil war in Sri Lanka is, it demands no American intervention, for the ethnic conflict between the secessionist Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority is largely an internal affair. Political turmoil in Cambodia is largely a domestic problem. Even the civil war in the Congo, which has drawn in small military forces from Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, and Zimbabwe, is a Central African affair. Aside from international prodding, the simmering Congolese fighting is better left to Africans to resolve than to outsiders. In the case of the decades-long slaughter in southern Sudan, the United States can serve a humanitarian cause by calling international attention to Khartoum's genocide of Christian and animist peoples. These types of conflicts, however, do not endanger U.S. strategic interests, undermine regional order, threaten global commercial relationships, or, realistically, call for direct humanitarian intervention. No weapons of mass destruction menace surrounding peoples or allies. Thus, there is no compelling reason for U.S. military deployment. Terrorist rogue states, in contrast, must be confronted with robust measures, or the world will go down the same path as it did in the 1930s, when Europe and the United States allowed Nazi Germany to propagate its ideology across half a dozen states, to rearm for a war of conquest, and to intimidate the democracies into appeasement. Rogue states push the world toward anarchy and away from stability. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security adviser to President Carter, cited preventing global anarchy as one of the two goals of "America's global engagement, namely, that of forging an enduring framework of global geopolitical cooperation." The other key goal is "impeding the emergence of a power rival."(4)

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Heg Key to Deter Rogue States – First Line (2/2)
Second, Failure to deter Rogues sparks a nuclear crises and war Boot 2K4
(Max Boot, Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, “Neocons. (Think Again),” FOREIGN POLICY, January/February 2004, n. 140 p. 20 lexis) True. The greatest danger to the United States today is the possibility that some rogue state will develop nuclear weapons and then share them with terrorist groups. Iran and North Korea are the two likeliest culprits. Neither would be willing to negotiate away its nuclear arsenal; no treaty would be any trustworthier than the 1994 Agreed Framework that North Korea violated. Neocons think the only way to ensure U.S. security is to topple the tyrannical regimes in Pyongyang and Tehran. This objective does not mean, however, that neocons are agitating for preemptive war. They do not rule out force if necessary. But their preferred solution is to use political, diplomatic, economic, and military pressure, short of actual war, to bring down these dictators--the same strategy the United States followed with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Iranian and North Korean peoples want to be free; the United States should help them by every means possible, while doing nothing to provide support for their oppressors. Regime change may seem like a radical policy but it is actually the best way to prevent a nuclear crisis that could lead to war. Endless negotiating with these governments--the preferred strategy of self-described pragmatists and moderates--is likely to bring about the very crisis it is meant to avert.

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221 Hegemony

Heg Key to Middle East Stability – First Line (1/2)
US leadership is key to prevent Middle Eastern stability and prevent escalation. Frontiers of Freedom, 7/9/07 (“Democrats and Some Republicans Ignore Reality in Iraq”,
http://www.opinioneditorials.com/guestcontributors/jbell_20070709.html) It not only seems contradictory, it is contradictory - indeed, it is delusional - to believe that a reliance on international cooperation and foreign aid will soothe the ire of Iran, al Qaeda in Iraq and their ideological supporters and pave the way for political and social progress. Absent active and engaged U.S. leadership Iraq will become a long-term failed state and a terrorist sanctuary. With respect to Iraq, the
Democrats have always preferred to plow the easy field of political expediency instead of laboring in the difficult field of policy. Now the party of the donkey is being joined by some Republicans who are prepared to ignore reality in favor of mythical rhetoric. On July 5, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid wrote, “As evidence mounts that the ‘surge’ is failing to make Iraq more secure, we cannot wait until the Administration’s September report before we change course. President Bush and the Iraqis must move now to finally accept a measure of accountability for this war … transition the mission for our combat troops and start bringing them home from an intractable civil war.” First, Reid and his political brethren have spent far too much time trying to make the case that what is transpiring in Iraq is a civil war. However one defines the conflict it is a key battleground and the aftermath of the fighting will dictate what forces sink their roots deep into the Middle East’s future. Second, despite Reid’s hyperventilating, there is no “evidence” that the surge is failing. In fact,

U.S. commanders on the ground report the opposite. On July 6, the day after Reid’s misguided missive, Army Major General Rick Lynch, commander of Multinational Division Center and the 3rd Army Division said U.S. and Iraqi forces are making “significant progress” in destroying insurgent sanctuaries. General Lynch said the “surge forces are giving us the capability we have now to take the fight to the enemy. The enemy only responds to force and we now have that force.” Lynch explained, “We can conduct detailed kinetic strikes, we can do cordon and searches, and we can deny the enemy sanctuaries. If those surge forces go away that capability goes away and the Iraqi security forces aren’t ready yet to do that (mission).” The general said if U.S. forces begin an untimely departure, “You’d find the enemy regaining ground, reestablishing sanctuaries, building more IEDs (and) carrying those IEDs to Baghdad, and the violence would escalate.”

Middle Eastern instability sky rockets oil prices, causing economic collapse. Islam Online.Net, March 21, 2006 (“Frequently Asked Questions About Iraq”,
http://www.islamonline.net/english/In_Depth/Iraq_Aftermath/topic_15.shtml) Oil is the lifeblood of the global economy. The Middle East has about 65% of the world’s total oil resources. With this in mind, it becomes clear that any instability in the Middle East would threaten the global oil trade. If the global oil trade were disrupted, it would cause a shortage in supply which would cause oil prices to skyrocket. Skyrocketing oil prices hamper global economic growth and threaten the world’s economies. At worst, it could cause a recession in many of the world’s oil dependent countries.

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222 Hegemony

Heg Key to Middle East Stability – First Line (2/2)
( ) Economic collapse causes global nuclear war and extinction. Bearden, 2000 (Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army, 2000, The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How We Can Solve
It, 2000, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Big-Medicine/message/642) (PDAF0842) Bluntly, we foresee these factors - and others { } not covered - converging to a catastrophic collapse of the world economy in about eight years. As the collapse of the Western economies nears, one may expect catastrophic stress on the 160 developing nations as the developed nations are forced to dramatically curtail orders. International Strategic Threat Aspects History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China - whose long range nuclear missiles can reach the United States - attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is his side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all, is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs, with a great percent of the WMD arsenals being unleashed . The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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223 Hegemony

Heg Key to Middle East Stability
( ) US primacy prevents Middle East instability Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Rene Belfer Professor of International Affairs, March 22, 2002 (“American Primacy:
Its Prospects and Pitfalls. (Prominence of United States in Economic, International Affairs”, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-1555909/American-primacy-its-prospects-and.html) Primacy Provides Security Perhaps the most obvious reason why states seek primacy--and why the United States benefits from
its current position--is that international politics is a dangerous business. Being wealthier and stronger than other states does not guarantee that a state will survive, of course, and it cannot insulate a state from all outside pressures. But the strongest state

is more likely to escape serious harm than weaker ones are, and it will be better equipped to resist the pressures that arise. Because the United States is so powerful, and because its society is so wealthy, it has ample resources to devote to whatever problems it may face in the future. At the beginning of the Cold War, for example, its power enabled the United States to help rebuild Europe and Japan, to assist them in developing stable democratic orders, and to subsidize the emergence of an open international economic order. (7) The United States was also able to deploy powerful armed forces in Europe and Asia as effective deterrents to Soviet expansion. When the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf increased in the late 1970s, the United States created its Rapid Deployment Force in order to deter threats to the West's oil supplies; in 1990-91 it used these capabilities to liberate Kuwait. Also, when the United States was attacked by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network in September 2001, it had the wherewithal to oust the network's Taliban hosts and to compel broad international support for its campaign to eradicate Al-Qaeda itself. It would have been much harder to do any of these things if the United States had been weaker.

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224 Hegemony

Heg Key to Iraq Stability (1/2)
( ) US hegemony in Iraq prevents Iraqi collapse Washington Post, April 30, 2007 (“IF Leave, Regional War and ‘Shiastan’”,
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/leon_krauze/2007/04/keep_foot_on_or_chaos_and_shia.html) For a while now, there have been only two possible outcomes in Iraq: the bad and the worse. Which is the latter and how to avoid it? The worst outcome for Iraq would be a full-scale civil war that ends in the country’s partition. There is little question that, once the American forces leave, the country will become a far bloodier and more lawless battleground than it is now. Once that happens, I see no reason why Moqtada al-Sadr and other Shiite strongmen would seek any kind of compromise with Sunni leaders in a pluralist government. Outright Shia domination of Iraq should never be allowed. Given the recent history of both the Middle East and Islam, secularity is a precious asset. In fact, Saddam’s pragmatic view of religion was perhaps the man’s only virtue. It wasn’t an insignificant attribute, especially given the aggressive expansionist theocracy next door. America (and the world) should make sure that Iraq remains a diverse multicultural federation rather than become three isolated and weak enclaves. So the bad but not the worst is a state more like India than the former Yugoslavia. But is this even possible? Can this be achieved without a violent, revolutionary period? The stakes are too high to wait and find out. The consequences of an enormous “Shiastan” right in the heart of the Middle East could prove to be disastrous. Saudi Arabia, Israel and Syria would stretch out their own claws soon enough. Regional conflict would be, literally, around the corner.

( ) Iraqi instablity spills over and causes terrorism. The National Interest, May-June 2007 (“Keeping the Lid On”, Lexisnexis)
THE COLLAPSE of Iraq into all-out civil war would mean more than just a humanitarian tragedy that could easily claim hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives and produce millions of refugees. Such a conflict is unlikely to contain itself. In other similar cases of all-out civil war the resulting spillover has fostered terrorism, created refugee flows that can destabilize the entire neighborhood, radicalized the populations of surrounding states and even sparked civil wars in other, neighboring states or transformed domestic strife into regional war. Terrorists frequently find a home in states in civil war, as Al-Qaeda did in Afghanistan. However, civil wars just as often breed new terrorist groups-Hizballah, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat of Algeria, and the Tamil Tigers were all born of civil wars. Many such groups start by focusing on local targets but then shift to international attacks-starting with those they believe are aiding their enemies in the civil war.

( ) Terrorism risks extinction Kirkus Reviews, 1999 (Book Review on “The New Terrorism: Fanatiscism and the Arms of Mass Destruction”,
http://www.amazon.com/New-Terrorism-Fanaticism-Arms-Destruction/dp/product-description/0195118162) Today two things have changed that together transform terrorism from a ``nuisance'' to ``one of the gravest dangers facing mankind.'' First terroristsbe they Islamic extremists in the Middle East, ultranationalists in the US, or any number of other possible permutationsseem to have changed from organized groups with clear ideological motives to small clusters of the paranoid and hateful bent on vengeance and destruction for their own sake. There are no longer any moral limitations on what terrorists are willing to do, who and how many they are willing to kill. Second, these unhinged collectivities now have ready access to weapons of mass destruction. The technological skills are not that complex and the resources needed not too rare for terrorists to employ nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons where and when they wish. The consequences of such weapons in the hands of ruthless, rootless fanatics are not difficult to imagine. In addition to the destruction of countless lives, panic can grip any targeted society, unleashing retaliatory action which in turn can lead to conflagrations perhaps on a world scale. To combat such terrorist activities, states may come to rely more and more on dictatorial and authoritarian measures. In short, terrorism in the future may threaten the very foundations of modern civilizations.

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Heg Key to Iraq Stability (2/2)
( ) US presence in Iraq is key to stability. The Straits Times, June 3, 2006 (“Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s Address at the Asia Security
Conference”, Singapore Press Holdings Limited, Lexisnexis) The security situation in Iraq has not improved. After the attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra in February, fears grew that the country is sliding into civil war. The recent appointment of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his new government after months of deadlock has brought fresh hope of stabilising the situation, but enforcing basic order and security remains a difficult challenge. If the United States leaves Iraq under conditions that can be portrayed as defeat, its enemies everywhere will be emboldened, and we will all be at greater risk. There is no choice but for the US and its coalition partners to stay the course and complete the work in Iraq.

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Heg Key to Asian Arms Control
( ) US heg is key to nuclear arms control in Asia. Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategy, April and May 2000 (“Smoke, Fire, and What to do in Asia”,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3492121.html) I believe that the commitment to U.S. regional preeminence remains the best solution to our multiple national security interests in Asia. The relative merits of pursuing the maintenance of preeminence as a grand strategy — as opposed to settling for a local multipolar balance of power or slowly disengaging from the region — can be best demonstrated by testing the consequences of each of these alternatives against the multiple goals pursued by the United States in Asia. The United States has, arguably, several critical interests in Asia. The list here is in decreasing order of importance: The first critical interest consists of preventing, deterring, and reducing the threat of attack on the continental United States and its extended territorial possessions. In the simplest sense, this interest has two components. The first and most important involves preserving the continental United States (conus) and its possessions from threats posed by weapons of mass destruction in Asia. These weapons are important because of the extensive damage they can inflict in relatively compressed time frames. Equally important, as Bracken points out, are the challenges posed by sophisticated delivery systems, like ballistic and cruise missiles and advanced attack aircraft, currently deployed by the wmd-capable states as well as prospective delivery systems that may be acquired by other Asian states over time. This includes both spin-off technologies emerging from space and commercial aviation programs as well as other kinds of nontraditional, covert delivery systems. The other component of this national objective involves protecting the conus and its possessions from conventional attack. Because of the vast distances involved in the AsiaPacific region, the critical variables here are battlespace denial and power-projection capabilities — both seaand air-based — that may be acquired by one or more Asian states. Given the changes in technology, these capabilities must be expanded to include other, newer, approaches to conventional war-fighting like strategic information warfare and the technologies and operational practices associated with the "revolution in military affairs." In all instances, U.S. interests suggest the following preference ordering: preventing potential adversaries from acquiring such capabilities; if prevention is impossible, deterring their use becomes the next logical objective; and, if even deterrence is unsuccessful, attenuating their worst effects through either extended counterforce options or effective defensive measures finally becomes necessary.

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Heg Key to Chinese Containment – First Line
First, strong American capabilities and the containment of China is critical to prevent aggression and war over Taiwan. Zalmay Khalilzad, US Ambassador to the United Nations. “Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War.” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2. pg. 84 Spring 1995
Third, the United States should seek to strengthen its own relative capabilities and those of its friends in East Asia to deter possible Chinese aggression and deal effectively with a more powerful, potentially hostile China. China's military leaders are considering the possibility of a conflict with the United States. They recognize the overall superiority of the U.S. military but believe there are weaknesses that could be exploited while preventing the United States from bringing its full power to bear in case of a conflict over Taiwan. According to the Chinese, U.S. weaknesses include vulnerability of U.S. bases to missile attacks, heavy U.S. reliance on space, America's need to rapidly reinforce the region in times of conflict, susceptibility of U.S. cities to being held hostage, and America's sensitivity to casualties. According to the emerging Chinese doctrine, the local balance of power in the region will be decisive because in this new era wars are short and intense. In a possible Taiwan conflict China would seek to create a fait accompli, forcing the United States to risk major escalation and high levels of violence to reinstate the status quo ante. China might gamble that these risks would constrain the U.S. response. Such an approach by China would be extremely risky and could lead to a major war. Dealing with such possible challenges from China both in the near and long term requires many steps. Burden-sharing and enhanced ties with states in East and Southeast Asia will be important. New formal alliance relationships--which would be the central element of a containment strategy--are neither necessary nor practical at this time, but it would be prudent to take some preparatory steps to facilitate the formation of a new alliance or the establishment of new military bases should that become necessary. They would signal to China that any attempt on their part to seek regional hegemony would be costly. The steps we should take now in the region must include enhancing military-to-military relations between Japan and South Korea, encouraging increased political- military cooperation among the ASEAN states and resolving overlapping claims to the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea; fostering a Japanese-Russian rapprochement, including a settlement of the dispute over the "northern territories;" and enhancing military-to-military cooperation between the United States and the ASEAN states. These steps are important in themselves for deterrence and regional stability but they can also assist in shifting to a much tougher policy toward China should that become necessary. Because of the potential for conflict between the United States and China over issues such as Taiwan, the U.S. military posture in general should take this possibility into account. Measures should be taken to correct the Chinese belief that they can confront the world with a fait accompli in Taiwan. The United States needs expanded joint exercises with states in the region. Ensuring access to key facilities in countries such as the Philippines, pre-positioning stocks in the region, and increasing Taiwan's ability to defend itself would also be prudent. The large distances of the East Asian region also suggest that a future U.S. forcemix must emphasize longer-range systems and stand-off weapons. The United States must develop increased capabilities to protect friendly countries and U.S. forces in the region against possible missile attacks.

Second, failure to deter an invasion sparks a global nuclear war. Chicago Tribune 1996
(staff, “China Prepares New Show of Strength”, Feb. 6, p. lexis) While a peaceful solution remains a priority, both the politburo and the Peoples Liberation Army have pledged to use force if necessary to regain the island on which the Nationalists settled after losing the civil war to Mao Tse-tung in 1949.A PLA analysis--leaked to Western media--suggests that in the event of war with Taiwan, the U.S. would not intervene because U.S. commercial interests in China would be damaged and any intervention could lead to a new Sino-Russian alliance.The document, circulated among officers, concludes that even if the U.S. intervened, Washington could only retard--but not reverse--the defeat of Taiwan, and a Sino-U.S. conflict might lead to a global nuclear holocaust.

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Heg Key to Chinese Containment
American military presence is key to deter Chinese aggression. Ross 2K2
(Robert, Professor of Political Science, Boston College, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait”, International Security, Fall, lexis) The United States can continue to deter China from initiating war in the Taiwan Strait for many decades. In the absence of a Taiwan declaration of independence, China prefers to maintain the status quo and an international environment conducive to economic and military modernization. Moreover, Chinese analysts understand that China is vastly inferior to the United States in nearly all facets of international power and that it will remain so for a long time. One analyst estimated that Chinese military technology is fifteen to twenty years behind that of the United States. n90 More important, Chinese analyses of "comprehensive national power," which takes into account the military, technological, educational, and economic bases of national strength, estimated in 2000 that China would catch up to the United States in 2043 if Chinese comprehensive national power grew at a rate of 6 percent per year and U.S. comprehensive national power grew at 3 percent per year.n91 During the Cold War, the most pessimistic U.S. civilian and government analysts insisted that only if the United States possessed war-winning capabilities and/or escalation dominance could it deter the Soviet use of force in Europe. n92 In the twenty-first century, the United States possesses escalation dominance in the Taiwan Strait. At every level of escalation, from conventional to nuclear warfare, the United States can engage and defeat Chinese forces. Moreover, it can do so with minimal casualties and rapid deployment, undermining any Chinese confidence in the utility of asymmetric and fait accompli strategies. Chinese military and civilian leaders have acknowledged both U.S. resolve and its superior war-winning capabilities. Confidence in its deterrence capabilities enables the United States to protect Taiwan while developing cooperative relations with China. This was post-Cold War U.S. policy toward China in both the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations. Maintaining this policy is both possible and necessary. On the one hand, the United States should continue to develop its capabilities in long-range precision-guided weaponry and in its command-and-control facilities. It should also continue to develop and forward deploy not only aircraft carriers but also Trident SSGNs and UAVs, platforms that enable the United States to deliver precision-guided weaponry and carry out surveillance with minimal risk of casualties, thus further reducing PRC expectations that asymmetric capabilities or a fait accompli strategy could deter U.S. defense of Taiwan.

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Heg Key to Space Dominance – First Line
First, it is crucial that the United States maintain leadership in Space to deter conflicts and prevent other count Dolman, Everett C. "Strategy Lost: Taking the Middle Road to Nowhere." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1 Winter, 2K5
Common to all hedging strategy proponents is the fear that placing weapons in space will spur a new arms race. Unfortunately, such a strategy increases the likelihood of a space arms race if and when space weapons are ultimately deployed, as the only plausible response by the US would be to at least match the opposing capabilities. This dithering approach blatantly ignores the current real world situation. At present, the US has no peer competitors in space. For the US to refrain from weaponizing until another state proves the capacity to challenge it allows for potential enemies to catch up to American capabilities. At a minimum, there is no risk for potential peer competitors to try. On the other hand, should the US reject the hedging strategy and unilaterally deploy weapons in space, other states may rationally decide not to compete. The cost of entry will simply be too great; the probability of failure palpable. In other words, the fear of an arms race in space, the most powerful argument in favor of the hedging plan, is most likely if the US follows its counsel.

Second, this leads to global nuclear war. Hitchens 2K3
(Theresa, Editor of Defense News, Director of Center for Defense Information, Former director of British American Security Information Council -think tank based in Washington and London. October 2. http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1745) The negative consequences of a space arms race are hard to exaggerate, given the inherent offensedominant nature of space warfare. Space weapons, like anything else on orbit, are inherently vulnerable and, therefore, best exploited as first-strike weapons. Thus, as Michael Krepon and Chris Clary argue in their monograph, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance,” the hair-trigger postures of the nuclear competition between the United States and Russia during the Cold War would be elevated to the “ultimate high ground” of space. Furthermore, any conflict involving ASAT use is likely to highly escalatory, in particular among nuclear weapons states, as the objective of an attacker would be to eliminate the other side’s capabilities to respond either in kind or on the ground by taking out satellites providing surveillance, communications and targeting. Indeed, U.S. Air Force officials participating in space wargames have discovered that war in space rapidly deteriorates into all-out nuclear war, precisely because it quickly becomes impossible to know if the other side has gone nuclear. Aviation Week and Space Technology quoted one gamer as saying simply: “[If] I don’t know what’s going on, I have no choice but to hit everything, using everything I have.” This should not be surprising to anyone – the United States and the Soviet Union found this out very early in the Cold War, and thus took measures to ensure transparency, such as placing emphasis on early warning radars, developing the “hotline” and pledging to noninterference with national technical means of verification under arms control treaties.

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U.S. Space Dominance Key to Prevent Conflicts
( ) US Space leadership is essential to deter conflicts and satisfy regional interests Klotz, Frank G. , Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colonel, Council on
Foreign Relations, “Guiding U.S. Goal should be to Preserve its Leadership in Outer Space” Space, Commerce, and National Security January 1999 In this environment of mounting political and economic pressures, a principal objective of the United States should be to maintain a leadership role in all aspects of human activity in space. One way or another, rules of the road for national activities in space will evolve to account for the phenomenal growth in its importance for both the military and commerce. For much of the space age, the United States and the Soviet Union wrote these rules-first by actual practice, and then by leading the process of codifying them into treaties and international agreements. Other nations have, as has been shown, achieved modest success in influencing international practice and law on space, particularly in the allocation of geosynchronous orbital slots and radio frequencies. But the failure of the Moon treaty and other efforts to circumscribe the activities of the major space powers shows the importance of a major and continuous U.S. presence in space to writing the rules in such a way as to promote (or at least not hinder) American interests there. Thus, the most important order of business for the United States in the years immediately ahead is to maintain and build upon its status as the leading spacefaring nation. This not a new aspiration. As John Logsdon has pointed out, "the quest for leadership has been a central feature of U.S. space policy from the very beginning." However, the objective is changing. During the Cold War, leadership in space was perceived by senior American leaders to be an important element in a multifaceted competition with the Soviet Union for the hearts and minds of the rest of the world. Demonstrated accomplishment in space was thought to confer prestige that translated into international influence writ large. Today, leadership in space assumes a different, more focused dimension as the best means of influencing the evolution of the international regime in space in response to clearly emerging political, economic, and military challenges.

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Leadership Key to Solve Global Problems (1/2)
( ) US primacy grants security to the country and its dominance—if it were weakened, challenges against the US would be likely. Stephen Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. "American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls." Naval War College Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2. pg. 9 (20 pages) Spring 2002.
Proquest Perhaps the most obvious reason why states seek primary-and why the United States benefits from its current position-is that international politics is a dangerous business. Being wealthier and stronger than other states does not guarantee that a state will survive, of course, and it cannot insulate a state from all outside pressures. But the strongest state is more likely to escape serious harm than weaker ones are, and it will be better equipped to resist the pressures that arise. Because the United States is so powerful, and because its society is so wealthy, it has ample resources devote to whatever problems it may face in the future. At the beginning of the Cold War, for example, its power enabled the United States to help rebuild Europe and Japan, to assist them in developing stable democratic orders, and to subsidize the emergence of an open international economic order.7 The United States was also able to deploy powerful armed forces in Europe and Asia as effective deterrents to Soviet expansion. When the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf increased in the late 1970s, the United States created its Rapid Deployment Force in order to deter threats to the West's oil supplies; in 1990-91 it used these capabilities to liberate Kuwait. Also, when the United States was attacked by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network in September 2001, it had the wherewithal to oust the network's Taliban hosts and to compel broad international support for its campaign to eradicate Al-Qaeda itself. It would have been much harder to do any of these things if the United States had been weaker. Today, U.S. primacy helps deter potential challenges to American interests in virtually every part of the world. Few countries or nonstate groups want to invite the "focused enmity" of the United States (to use William Wohlforth's apt phrase), and countries and groups that have done so (such as Libya, Iraq, Serbia, or the Taliban) have paid a considerable price. As discussed below, U.S. dominance does provoke opposition in a number of places, but anti-American elements are forced to rely on covert or indirect strategies (such as terrorist bombings) that do not seriously threaten America's dominant position. Were American power to decline significantly, however, groups opposed to U.S. interests would probably be emboldened and overt challenges would be more likely. This does not mean that the United States can act with impunity, nor does it guarantee that the United States will achieve every one of its major foreign policy objectives. It does mean that the United States has a margin of security that weaker states do not possess. This margin of safety is a luxury, perhaps, but it is also a luxury that few Americans would want to live without.

( ) US Leadership is critical to solving global problems Kagan 98
(Robert, Senior Associate at Carnegie, Foreign Policy Magazine, Summer, the Benevolent Empire, www.foreignpolicy.com/Ning/archive/archive/111/empire.pdf) Temporarily interrupting their steady grumbling about American arrogance and hegemonic pretensions, Asian, European, and Middle Eastern editorial pages paused to contemplate the consequences of a crippled American presidency. The liberal German newspaper Frankfurter Run& schau, which a few months earlier had been accusing Americans of arrogant zealotry and a "camouflaged neocolonialism," suddenly fretted that the "problems in the Middle East, in the Balkans or in Asia" will not be solved "without U.S. assistance and a president who enjoys respect" and demanded that, in the interests of the entire world, the president's accusers quickly produce the goods or shut up. In Hong Kong, the South China Morning Post warned that the "humbling" of an American president had "implications of great gravity" for international affairs; in Saudi Arabia, the Arab News declared that this was "not the time that America or the world needs an inward-looking or wounded president. It needs one unencumbered by private concerns who can make tough decisions."

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Leadership Key to Solve Global Problems (2/2)
( ) Leadership is crucial to solving civil conflicts and global problems. Serfaty 03 ("Studies Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership" Simon Serfaty director of European Studies CSIS
May http://www.nato.int/docu/conf/2003/030718_bxl/serfati-transatlpart.pdf) Thus, after three global wars and a near infinite number of regional and civil conflicts fought increasingly at the expense of civil populations, the twentieth century has given birth to a new generation of “wretched” people who inhabit the territorial corpses left behind by these wars—wars of territorial expansion, wars of national liberation, and even wars of ideological redemption. In most cases, these were wars that the United States did not fight— and in many cases, wars that long predate the American Republic— but they are nonetheless wars that U.S. power must now end. The war in Iraq is one of them: coming with the war in Afghanistan, it is not the only such war, nor alas, is it likely to be the last among them, notwithstanding the truly awesome and intimidating ways in which the war was waged and won. For there will be more such wars—as if August 1914 had started only with a bilateral clash in and over Serbia to settle the unresolved territorial issues inherited from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the unraveling of the Habsburg Empire, while escaping the world war that we now know erupted in the absence of their resolution.

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Unipolarity Key to Solve War (1/3)
Unipolarity prevents power balancing wars William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World."
Unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers and comparatively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: the leading state's power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics, and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance-ofpower politics among the major states. This argument is based on two well-known realist theories: hegemonic theory and balance-of-power theory. Each is controversial, and the relationship between the two is complex.35 For the purposes of this analysis, however, the key point is that both theories predict that a unipolar system will be peaceful.

Unipolarity deters nations from attempting to balance power through wars William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World."
Until the underlying distribution of power changes, second-tier states face structural incentives similar to those of lesser states in a region dominated by one power, such as North America. The low incidence of wars in those systems is consistent with the expectations of standard, balance-of-power thinking. Otto von Bismarck earned a reputation for strategic genius by creating and managing a complex alliance system that staved off war while working disproportionately to his advantage in a multipolar setting. It does not take a Bismarck to run a Bismarckian alliance system under unipolarity. No one credits the United States with strategic genius for managing security dilemmas among American states. Such an alliance system is a structurally favored and hence less remarkable and more durable outcome in a unipolar system.

Unipolarity, by design, avoids conflict William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World."
To appreciate the sources of conflict that unipolarity avoids, consider the two periods already discussed in which leading states scored very highly on aggregate measures of power: the Pax Britannica and the Cold War. Because those concentrations of power were not unipolar, both periods witnessed security competition and hegemonic rivalry. The Crimean War is a case in point. The war unfolded in a system in which two states shared leadership and three states were plausibly capable of bidding for hegemony.41 Partly as a result, neither the statesmen of the time nor historians over the last century and a half have been able to settle the debate over the origins of the conflict. The problem is that even those who agree that the war arose from a threat to the European balance of power cannot agree on whether the threat emanated from France, Russia, or Britain. Determining which state really did threaten the equilib- rium-or indeed whether any of them did-is less important than the fact that the power gap among them was small enough to make all three threats seem plausible at the time and in retrospect. No such uncertainty-and hence no such conflict-is remotely possible in a unipolar system.

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Unipolarity Key to Solve War (2/3)
( ) Unipolarity solves the roots of the worlds issues, security and competition William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World."
Third, we should not exaggerate the costs. The clearer the underlying distribution of power is, the less likely it is that states will need to test it in arms races or crises. Because the current concentration of power in the United States is unprecedentedly clear and comprehensive, states are likely to share the expectation that counterbalancing would be a costly and probably doomed venture. As a result, they face incentives to keep their military budgets under control until they observe fundamental changes in the capability of the United States to fulfill its role. The whole system can thus be run at comparatively low costs to both the sole pole and the other major powers. Unipolarity can be made to seem expensive and dangerous if it is equated with a global empire demanding U.S. involvement in all issues everywhere. In reality, unipolarity is a distribution of capabilities among the world's great powers. It does not solve all the world's problems. Rather, it minimizes two major problems- security and prestige competition-that confronted the great powers of the past. Maintaining unipolarity does not require limitless commitments. It involves managing the central security regimes in Europe and Asia, and maintaining the expectation on the part of other states that any geopolitical challenge to the United States is futile. As long as that is the expectation, states will likely refrain from trying, and the system can be maintained at little extra cost.

( ) Under a unipolar system, hegemonic counterbalancing and security concerns do not turn into conflicts William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World."
Both hegemonic rivalry and security competition among great powers are unlikely under unipolarity. Because the current leading state is by far the world's most formidable military power, the chances of leadership conflict are more remote than at any time over the last two centuries. Unlike past international systems, efforts by any second-tier state to enhance its relative position can be managed in a unipolar system without raising the specter of a power transition and a struggle for primacy. And because the major powers face incentives to shape their policies with a view toward the power and preferences of the system leader, the likelihood of security competition among them is lower than in previous systems.

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Unipolarity Key to Solve War (3/3)
( ) Unipolarity is critical to solving regional conflicts and will prevent global counterbalancing William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World."
Second, the current unipolarity is prone to peace. The raw power advantage of the United States means that an important source of conflict in previous systems is absent: hegemonic rivalry over leadership of the international system. No other major power is in a position to follow any policy that depends for its success on prevailing against the United States in a war or ail extended rivalry. None is likely to take ally step that might invite the focused enmity of the United States. At the same time, unipolarity minimizes security competition among the other great powers. As the system leader, the United States has the means and motive to maintain key security institutions in order to ease local security conflicts and limit expensive competition among the other major powers. For their part, the second-tier states face incentives to bandwagon with the unipolar power as long as the expected costs of balancing remain prohibitive.

( ) Unipolarity is both stable and effective at conflict prevention and resolution
William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World." The scholarly conventional wisdom holds that unipolarity is dynamically unstable and that any slight overstep by Washington will spark a dangerous backlash.12 I find the opposite to be true: unipolarity is durable and peaceful, and the chief threat is U.S. failure to do enough.13 Possessing an undisputed preponderance of power, the United States is freer than most states to disregard the international system and its incentives. But because the system is built around U.S. power, it creates demands for American engagement. The more efficiently Washington responds to these incentives and provides order, the more long-lived and peaceful the system. To be sure, policy choices are likely to affect the differential growth of power only at the margins. But given that unipolarity is safer and cheaper than bipolarity or multipolarity, it pays to invest in its prolongation. In short, the intellectual thrust (if not the details) of the Pentagon's 1992 draft defense guidance plan was right.

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Heg K Asian Stability, Democracy
Hegemony is key to Asian stability and democracy. Buruma 8 (Henry Luce professor at Bard College. After America) online:
http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2008/04/21/080421crat_atlarge_buruma?currentPage=2 The one nation whose presence still guarantees a measure of stability in Asia is the very one whose influence commentators are so quick to write off: the United States of America. The Chinese may not like the fact that the United States has so many bases in Japan and South Korea, but they still prefer it to a nuclear-armed Japan. Cases of American G.I.s molesting local girls enrage the populations of South Korea and Japan, but they still feel safer with a U.S. military presence than without it. Aside from the disaster in Vietnam, the United States has been a reasonably good Asian cop. But how long can it continue to play that role? The longer this postwar arrangement goes on, the longer it will take the East Asian powers to manage their own security responsibly. The same can be said of the Europeans, as became painfully clear in the Balkan conflicts. Kagan is right when he says that "the world's democracies need to show solidarity for one another, and they need to support those trying to pry open a democratic space where it has been closing." But this task would be made a lot easier if the United States were to depart from what Kagan believes to be its national destiny of "expansive, even aggressive, global policy," and amplify its influence by fully engaging with international institutions, instead of seeing them as threats to its national sovereignty. Democracy would be a far more persuasive model than Chinese or Russian autocracy if some of its main proponents were less eager to believe that the open society comes out of the barrel of a gun.

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AT: Heg  China War – Cooperation (1/2)
US and China will cooperate. Hachigian 8 (Senior Vice President and Director for the California office at American Progress. Council on
Foreign Relations: “The United States and Shifting Global Power Dynamics”) online: http://www.cfr.org/publication/16002/united_states_and_shifting_global_power_dynamics.html More interesting is a difference we might have in what constitutes security. We define direct threats to American security as outside agents that can harm our citizens. The only two forces that could take American lives on a large scale soon are terrorists, especially armed with a nuclear device, and a deadly pathogen like influenza. Thus when you say, "I of course agree that we need to work with others wherever possible," that considerably understates the urgency of the matter. Our very lives depend on collaboration. British police officers and Chinese health officials, for better or worse, hold our fates in their hands. Further, we will not avoid a climate crisis—the potential security implications of which seem to get worse by the hour—unless every large emitter acts. We have to prioritize, and these direct threats are more important than whether China or others are empowering some of the despicable regimes you list, much as that troubles us. Moreover, Beijing has shown it will act constructively under certain conditions—it has played a critical role in efforts to rollback North Korea's nuclear weapons program. On Iran, America is the country being isolated. Instead of worrying that we cannot get our way, America has to lead the world community toward a pragmatic solution that others accept. We do think American leadership remains an important ingredient to solving many of the world's problems. It is easiest to see the need where we have not acted—such as on global warming. We are not advocating the kind of leadership America has exercised recently, though. Instead, we have to build consensus and motivate other powers to take responsibility. We do not advocate that America seek specifically to retain its "dominance." The cooperation we need is undermined by a pursuit of primacy. Unlike you, however, we do not think that the question of American dominance is all that determinative. Of course, by pure logic, if other countries are getting stronger, then America is getting relatively weaker. The more important question is: So what? Will that negatively impact American lives? After an exhaustive survey, we conclude that it will not—if America finds a new way to lead, harnessing the power of others, and invests in fixing some of its core problems at home.

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AT: Heg  China War – Cooperation (2/2)
US-China relations aren’t zero-sum – the US and China will cooperate. Hachigian 8 (Senior Vice President and Director for the California office at American Progress. Council on
Foreign Relations: “The United States and Shifting Global Power Dynamics”) online: http://www.cfr.org/publication/16002/united_states_and_shifting_global_power_dynamics.html In our book, Mona Sutphen and I lay out a new paradigm for thinking about what we call the “pivotal powers,” China, India, Russia, the EU and Japan. America need not fear their strength. In fact, in order to keep Americans safe and prosperous, we need to work with these powers as never before. If America leads abroad and tackles its problems at home, we will continue to thrive in a more crowded world. Importantly, pivotal powers now want what we want—a stable world with open markets. None are true ideological adversaries. Though hot spots remain, no intractable disputes divide us. Nation states seeking order are on the same side against the forces of chaos—terrorists, climate change, disease, and proliferation. Only together can they defeat these rotten fruit of globalization. For instance, China allows American agents into China’s ports to help screen outbound shipping containers for smuggled radioactive devices. A climate crisis will come unless all the big emitters act. Nevertheless, near panic dominates the debate about emerging powers, especially inside the Beltway—they are taking our jobs, luring away R&D, giving solace to enemies and reducing democracy’s appeal. There is truth in some of these claims. But remedies to these problems, more often than not, begin with domestic policy. For example, more innovation in China and India benefits America, as long as innovation continues here. That requires investments in math and science education. Thinking of big powers principally as competing rivals is not the right paradigm. Companies compete for profits. Countries do not. Nor is there a vast zero-sum head-to-head battle for influence. Policymakers need to shed the “us against them” Cold-War mindset. We advocate “strategic collaboration” with the pivotal powers. The biggest challenge America faces is not their growing strength. It is convincing them to contribute to the world order—regimes and institutions that will tackle shared challenges like economic stability and nuclear proliferation. America still has to lead, but in a new way that encourages others to take responsibility. Of course, we have to be prepared in case a hostile hegemon ever emerges. But we’ve been notoriously bad at predicting which powers will rise and which will fall, and we have little control over their trajectories. We should strengthen the country we do control—our own—and seek the cooperation that will keep Americans safe and prosperous.

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AT: Heg  China War – Heg K Check China
Preserving hegemony in Asia is key to check Chinese expansion. Overholt 8 (Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy and holds the center’s chair in Asia policy
research. “In Asia, U.S. Still Guards the Fort but Surrenders the Bank”) online: http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/spring2008/disoriented.html Much of the current national-security establishment in Washington expresses fear of being forced out of Asia by China. China has indeed made disproportionate gains in recent years. But this is not because it has forced the United States out. It is because Washington has deliberately stepped back from Asian regional institutions that include the United States, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and created a vacuum into which China has stepped with institutions that exclude the United States, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the East Asia Summit, and others. Likewise, South Korea and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have distanced themselves from U.S. policy and cultivated a relationship with China that is much warmer than it was before. China’s disproportionate success in both Asia and Africa has come from adopting policies that had been the core U.S. strategies in winning the Cold War. The United States had a patent on those strategies but ceded the intellectual-property rights to China. There is a real risk that future historians will conclude that the most influential foreign-policy decisions of this era concerned not Iraq, not the war on terror, but rather the re-ignition and acceleration of Sino- Japanese rivalry. Washington can still reestablish the old balances between military and economic priorities and between China and Japan. Future U.S. administrations would do well to revive an Asia policy that emphasizes diplomacy with all Asian countries, promotes economic liberalization throughout the region, and abates rather than fosters hostility among regional neighbors.

Chinese rise risks US-China war. Overholt 8 (Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy and holds the center’s chair in Asia policy
research. “In Asia, U.S. Still Guards the Fort but Surrenders the Bank”) online: http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/spring2008/disoriented.html China’s emergence triggered a reaction in the United States and Japan. China had joined all the major economic institutions nurtured by the West in the Cold War, opened its economy far more than Japan did, resolved most of its border disputes to the satisfaction of its neighbors, and engaged in a very successful campaign for good diplomatic relations with most of its neighbors. All these seemed to support U.S. and Japanese interests, particularly in comparison with an earlier era when China had been systematically attempting to destabilize its neighbors and to spread communism globally. Nonetheless, China’s success evoked various theories that rising powers are inherently destabilizing, that undemocratic regimes are inherently aggressive, and that, since China is perhaps the only power that could conceivably challenge the United States, American military planning should focus on China. Tensions over Taiwan became a particular focus for the U.S. military, and thus, too, did the risk of Sino-American war. That focus was greatly intensified by various U.S. interest groups that had much to gain from building new weaponry for war against China or from hampering trade with China.

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AT: Heg Bad – AT: Imperialism
The US is not an empire. Nye 4 (Joseph S, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 255-256)
In many ways, the metaphor of empire is seductive. The American military has a global reach, with bases around the world, and its regional commanders sometimes act like proconsuls. English is a lingua franca, like Latin. The Ameri- can economy is the largest in the world, and American culture serves as a mag- net. But it is a mistake to confuse the politics of primacy with the politics of empire. Although unequal relationships certainly exist between the United States and weaker powers and can be conducive to exploitation, absent formal political control, the term "imperial" can be misleading. Its acceptance would be a disastrous guide for American foreign policy because it fails to take into account how the world has changed. The United States is certainly not an em- pire in the way we think of the European overseas empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because the core feature of such imperialism was direct political control.^"* The United States has more power resources, compared to other countries, than Britain had at its imperial peak. On the other hand, the United States has less power, in the sense of control over the behavior that occurs inside other countries, than Britain did when it ruled a quarter of the globe. For example, Kenya's schools, taxes, laws, and elections—not to men- tion external relations—were controlled by British officials. Even where Brit- ain used indirect rule through local potentates, as in Uganda, it exercised far more control than the United States does today. Others try to rescue the meta- phor by referring to "informal empire" or the "imperialism of free trade," but this simply obscures important differences in degrees of control suggested by comparisons with real historical empires. Yes, the Americans have widespread influence, but in 2003, the United States could not even get Mexico and Chile to vote for a second resolution on Iraq in the UN Security Council. The British empire did not have that kind of problem with Kenya or India.

US Military too overstretched for empire Economist 8 (3/29, Power and Peril, 00130613, 3/29/2008, Vol. 386, Issue 8573)
These days the word "imperial" is usually followed by "overstretch". The bookshops Nobody doubts America's unparalleled ability to project its military power into every corner of the world, but blowing things up is not the same as establishing an "imperium". Enthusiasm for empire has been replaced by worries about exhaustion and vulnerability. Americans are concerned that the army has been stretched to breaking point, and that their country remains a terrorist target. If George Bush wanted to "fight them over there" so that Americans do not have to "fight them over here", his successor will have to face the possibility that, in fighting them over there, America has overstrained its army while leaving the home front vulnerable.
What a difference a bungled war makes. are full of titles cautioning against the folly of empire (Cullen Murphey's "Are We Rome?", Amy Chua's "Day of Empire").

Because of its enormous hard power capabilities, US policy-makers have been conscious of the fact that the United States potentially can, if it chooses, significantly influence its external environment. And possession of this power often has given rise to the desire to use it.'^^^ Garry Leach, the editor of Columbia Journal, observes: The Bush Administration's unilateralist and militaristic foreign policy has made evi- dent the cracks in the new world order. In fact, in the face of a growing global resistance to the US-driven neo-liberal project, the Bush Administration's military and economic policies have contributed to a new world disorder. US military interventions have further destabilized already embattled nations, while the Bush White House's support for authoritarian regimes and its insistence on promoting free market reforms have spurred civil unrest among peoples of the South adamantly opposed to such policies.'*' Since the end of the Cold War, the US has found herself fighting in the former Yugoslavia, followed by the war in Afghanistan, and then again the ongoing occupation of Iraq. And what has China been up to in the meantime?

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Unilateralism Bad for HIV/AIDS
( ) Unites States is currently using unilateralism which violates human rights only a shift to multilateralism will solve the HIV/AIDS epidemic. David P. Fidler, Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow at Indiana University School of Law,
Fighting the Axis of Illness: HIV/AIDS, Human Rights, and U.S. Foreign Policy”, Harvard Human Rights Journal,

2K4
The attention focused on Bush Administration policy on HIV/AIDS reflects the importance of engaging U.S. power in the global fight against HIV/AIDS and other infectious disease threats.[191] U.S. hegemonic power creates a dilemma for efforts to increase the role of international human rights law, including the right to health, in the HIV/AIDS battle. The global HIV/AIDS endeavor has no choice other than persuading or confronting the United States in order to get the hegemon more involved. Hegemony means, however, that the United States enjoys immense freedom of action in its foreign policy because of its unmatched power.[192] This context is an unattractive envi- ronment in which to effect significant change in U.S. foreign policy on HIV/AIDS with respect to international human rights law. Those who want to increase the role of such law have to appeal to a hegemon that does not need such law to have influence. The hegemony dilemma does not mean that getting the United States to pay more attention to the global HIV/AIDS problem is impossible. After all, the importance of HIV/AIDS as a U.S. foreign policy issue increased in the post-Cold War period in which the United States emerged as hegemon. Both the Clinton and Bush Administrations approached HIV/AIDS as a serious foreign policy problem. The dominant feature of the increased U.S. foreign policy interest in HIV/AIDS has, however, been conceptualizing the problem as a threat to material U.S. political, security, and economic interests. The Clinton Administration framed the HIV/AIDS pandemic as a threat to U.S. national security, and the Bush Administration continued this approach. Human rights concepts and international human rights law have not driven the hegemon’s growing concern about the HIV/AIDS problem. The hegemony dilemma also does not mean that U.S. foreign policy on HIV/AIDS is immutable because of the hegemonic status of the United States. Developing countries and NGOs forced the United States to acknowledge the primacy of public health over intellectual property rights in the battle concerning TRIPS and access to antiretroviral drugs.[193] The difficulty of achieving this outcome reflects, however, the hegemonic power of the United States.

( ) US hegemony fails with health assitance and leads to human rights abuses. David P. Fidler, Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow at Indiana University School of Law,
Fighting the Axis of Illness: HIV/AIDS, Human Rights, and U.S. Foreign Policy”, Harvard Human Rights Journal,

2K4
Policymakers seeking to increase the role of international human rights law in U.S. foreign policy on HIV/AIDS must also face the human rights dilemma. This dilemma begins with the point made above: HIV/AIDS only became a prominent U.S. foreign policy issue after the pandemic reached disturbing proportions in the developing world. U.S. foreign policy on global health, from Carter to Bush, combined Westphalian and post-Westphalian elements. No administration has approached the axis of illness only on post-Westphalian terms. The human rights element in U.S. foreign policy on health appears to depend on the existence of disease threats serious enough to trouble material U.S. power and interests. The stronger the link-age between Westphalian and post-Westphalian elements in U.S. foreign policy on HIV/AIDS, the worse the human rights situation concerning HIV/AIDS seems to be. But disease problems serious enough to trouble the United States typically involve a failure of national or international collective action against deteriorating social determinants of health exacerbated by accelerating human mobility and globalization. The public health turn toward international human rights law, evident from the preamble to the WHO Constitution and the strategy of UNAIDS, was designed to prevent significant infectious disease crises through respect for civil and political rights and fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural rights. The Westphalian conceptualization of HIV/AIDS as a national security threat to the United States demonstrates that the human rights prevention strategy failed on a global basis because the pandemic has raged to the point of threatening the economic and demographic stability of many developing nations.

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Unilateralism Bad – Democracy/Backlash
( ) Bush’s unilateralism kills democracy and causes backlash Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, Director of Philosophy and Literature Graduate, and a member of the Women’s Studies Committee at Perdue U, Fall 2006 (“The Dangers of
Unilateralism”, NWSA Journal, Issue 18.3, pp. 20-32, Project Muse) Refusing to consult other nations individually, or the United Nations generally, places a bellicose country outside the democratic safeguards of consensual rule.1 It signals a flagrant disregard for the democratic ethos of cooperation, the free exchange of ideas, and the peaceful resolution of differences. The consent of other nations does not of itself justify war. But going to war in the absence of such support violates the commitment to democratic process. It is also foolhardy: it makes of one a clear aggressor and likely target of retaliation, and liable to bear the full brunt of paying for the operation, both in personnel and money. Additionally, in today's complex and interconnected world, it is more than likely that actions that [End Page 20] profoundly disturb or outright destroy the civil infrastructures of a nation have ramifications that are beyond the ability of any single country to rectify. Jane Addams expressed this insight when she criticized President Wilson's abandonment of peaceful means to resolve the conflicts that led to the First World War. She said "[i]t seemed to me quite obvious that the processes of war would destroy more democratic institutions than he could ever rebuild however much he might declare the purpose of war to be the extension of democracy" (Addams 1922/2002, 39).

( ) Current unilateralism is anti-democratic and oppressive—Iraq proves. Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, Director of Philosophy and Literature Graduate, and a member of the Women’s Studies Committee at Perdue U, Fall 2006 (“The Dangers of
Unilateralism”, NWSA Journal, Issue 18.3, pp. 20-32, Project Muse) Addams distinguishes between autonomous decision making and consensual decision making to demonstrate the fallacy of assuming that morality is best served through a model of individualistic autonomy. She defines autonomous decision making as one based on the dictates of one's own conscience and following one's own ideals (Addams 1902/2002, 68). But, as has been shown, the United States has not even followed its own ideals of democracy. Instead, it has appealed to an intended democratic outcome to justify its one-sided, hierarchical decision-making and oppressive action. Addams's understanding of consensual decision making is the antithesis of unilateralism. It entails the give and take of compromise and a willingness to develop goals that are inevitably challenged and modified in the process (Seigfried 2006/in press). But in compensation for the clarity and certainty lost in such a process, the goals eventually arrived at will [End Page 29] more likely be sustained because they are upheld by the sentiments and aspirations of many others besides oneself. As the war in Iraq drags on in the guise of a troubled peace, it becomes daily more evident that the United States has neither met its goal of establishing democracy nor realized any lasting peace. Until and unless the public recognizes the betrayal of democracy that unilateralism represents, it is unlikely that any other outcome can be expected.4

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Unilateralism Bad – Backlash
( ) Unilateralism invites hostility towards the administration and the US. Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, “The End of the Bush Revolution”, July/ August 2K6 SECTION: Pg. 75 Vol. 85 No. 4, lexis
Needless to say, everything has not turned out as planned. Far from producing the rapid liberation, stabilization, and democratization of Iraq, the U.S. invasion has led to a protracted insurgency, significant Iraqi civilian and U.S. military casualties, and a high risk of civil war. At the time of the fall of Baghdad, in the spring of 2003, polls showed that more than 70 percent of Americans supported the war; by early 2006, polls indicated that a majority had concluded that the war was a mistake. The allied support that success was supposed to bring also failed to materialize. The absence of the WMD that had provided the official pretext for the war -- and the widespread impression that the administration had exaggerated the threat in order to sell the war and had violated international law by waging it -- raised serious questions about the legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy in Iraq and elsewhere. The consequences of the war in Iraq -- and of other U.S. policies on issues ranging from the Middle East to climate change, prisoner treatment, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) -- have taken their toll on the United States' popularity in the world and thus on its ability to win over allies. Far from producing the expected "bandwagoning," the exercise of unilateral U.S. power has led to widespread hostility toward the Bush administration and, in many cases, the United States itself. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, between 2002 and 2005 the percentage of people with a "favorable opinion" of the United States fell from 72 percent to 59 percent in Canada, 63 percent to 43 percent in France, 61 percent to 41 percent in Germany, 61 percent to 38 percent in Indonesia, 25 percent to 21 percent in Jordan, 79 percent to 62 percent in Poland, 61 percent to 52 percent in Russia, 30 percent to 23 percent in Turkey, and 75 percent to 55 percent in the United Kingdom. According to the same polls, the percentage of those who believed that the United States took their country's interests into account was 19 percent in Canada, 18 percent in France, 38 percent in Germany, 59 percent in Indonesia, 17 percent in Jordan, 20 percent in the Netherlands, 13 percent in Poland, 21 percent in Russia, 19 percent in Spain, 14 percent in Turkey, and 32 percent in the United Kingdom. Global support for U.S. policies has never been a prerequisite for U.S. activism, but it sure does not hurt.

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Unilateralism Bad – Democracy
( ) Bush’s unilateralism is grounded in religious intolerance that disregards truly democratic principles. Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, Director of Philosophy and Literature Graduate, and a member of the Women’s Studies Committee at Perdue U, Fall 2006 (“The Dangers of
Unilateralism”, NWSA Journal, Issue 18.3, pp. 20-32, Project Muse) Unilateralism is underpinned by a naive belief in one's goodness and a reflexive chauvinism, both of which are raised to intolerable heights of self-righteousness when backed by religious fervor. In another Newsweek article, Fareed Zakaria castigates General William Boykin, a much-decorated Special Operations veteran and the top intelligence official at the Pentagon, for telling Christian groups that "I knew that my God was bigger than his God. I knew that my God was a real God and his was an idol" (2003, 30). He had originally said that this riposte was motivated by a Somali warlord who bragged that he couldn't be captured because Allah would protect him. Zakaria continues that Boykin "has also repeatedly explained that America's enemy was 'a spiritual enemy . . . called Satan.' The enemy will only be defeated, he added, 'if we come against them in the name of Jesus'" (2003, 41). Boykin is not alone in his demonization of Muslims; there's also Franklin Graham, Pat Robertson, and Jerry Falwell, but, unlike them, he is a member of Bush's administration. As deputy undersecretary for intelligence, his holy war crusading rhetoric is the public face of United States policy and his attitude cannot but infect his interactions with Pakistanis, Egyptians, Afghans, Indonesians, and other Muslims from around the world. General Boykin is not an aberration in the Bush administration. According to Elisabeth Bumiller, "Administration officials and members of Congress say the religious coalition has had an unusual influence on one of the most religious White Houses in American history." She gives as an example the fact that
"[t]hey were instrumental in making sure that the president included extensive remarks on sex trafficking in his speech [End Page 27] to the United Nations General Assembly in September" (Bumiller 2003, 1). The problem is not that using morality as defined by some religious denominations as the basis for political decision making is always going to lead to democratically suspect decisions, but that

it is corrosive of a democratic form of life that values and even requires for its continuation sympathetic understanding, reciprocity, protection of the dignity of persons, and the well-being of minorities. As Bumiller continues: "The human rights issues offer a politically safe way for the president to appeal to his base of
white evangelicals, who leading scholars and pollsters define by their membership in historically white evangelical denominations, like Southern Baptists and Assemblies of God. Evangelical churches believe that the Bible is truth, that members have an imperative to proselytize and convert and that Jesus Christ is the only way to salvation" (2003, 4). Half a world away Rajiha al-Amidi, one of the women protesting the swearing-in ceremony for Nidal Nasser Hussein, appeals to the Christian fundamentalist underpinnings of the U.S.'s unilateral decisions to explain her resistence: "We refuse the appointment of a woman judge because it

contradicts Islamic law. . . . This is what the Americans wanted to achieve in the first place with their invasion, to undermine Islam" (MacFarquhar 2003, A2). And as the occupation continues, U.S. forces are reaping the consequences of America's religious and cultural myopia and consequent lack of respect for ordinary Iraqis. "Like so many other parents," Abdul Razak al-Muamy, a 32–year-old laborer in Falluja said, "American soldiers had humiliated him in front of his children. 'They searched my house,' he said. 'They kicked my Koran. They speak to me so poorly in front of my children. It's not that I encourage my son to hate Americans. It's not that I make him want to join the resistance. Americans do that for me'" (Gentleman 2004, 11).

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Unilateralism Bad – Colonialism
( ) The US imposition in Iraq is an example of unilateralism’s colonialist tendencies and disregard for democracy. Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, Director of Philosophy and Literature Graduate, and a member of the Women’s Studies Committee at Perdue U, Fall 2006 (“The Dangers of
Unilateralism”, NWSA Journal, Issue 18.3, pp. 20-32, Project Muse) The determination of the U.S. government to dictate the core principles of the interim Iraqi constitution is a classic case of top-down, nondemocratic procedures. Addams argues that such nonparticipatory one-way decisions cannot outlast the use of power to enforce them (1902/2002). To illustrate the incongruity between democratic means and ends in Iraq, John F. Burns reports that despite the fact that "nothing like this has been tried in Iraq before," Americans who run democracy training classes in Hilla "are betting . . . that past nightmares will draw Iraqis on a path of entrenched individual and group rights, of a firewall separation between church and state, of independence for the executive, legislative and judicial branches, and above all, of tolerance for minorities. In other words, the core of a civil society as understood in the West." The interpreter in one of the classes, who was "otherwise fluent in English, was stumped by the concept of divided government, and made several false starts in attempts to convey the idea before giving up." Several men in the audience responded to the absurd unilateralist colonialist expectation of instant understanding and acceptance of the one right model of democracy by saying that the lecturer "had said nothing new to Iraqis, because it was all written in the Koran anyway" (Burns 2003, 1, 12). A similar disconnect is apparent with regard to the issue of women's rights. Iraqi women Al-Souhail and al-Damluji claim that their proposal for "a formal quota system for female representation in government . . . has been met with indifference from male Iraqi politicians and outright opposition from the U.S. government. Al-Damluji says the British government had proposed a 25 percent mandatory female ratio in government, but that the U.S. did not support the idea. CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority, headed by Paul Bremer] officials have said in press reports that a female quota is not in their plans, but have reiterated their general commitment to women's rights" (Khalil 2004). The commitment apparently consists in telling Iraqi women what rights the United States thinks they should have and does not extend to implementing the rights that Iraqi women themselves have asked for.

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Unilateralism Bad – Middle Eastern Instability
( ) Unilateralism doesn’t solve middle east instability—multilateralism is key. Yale Global, June 29, 2004 (“Gulf Security in a Globalizing World: Going Beyond US Hegemony”,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4154) War and domestic political uncertainty have reigned in the Middle East during the past three decades. But one strategic reality has steadfastly evolved: the rise of the United States as an external guarantor of Gulf security. The continued presence of 138,000 US troops in Iraq after the formal handover of sovereignty is the latest reminder. However, while US military dominance may be unquestioned, writes security expert Michael Kraig, the downward spiral of the Iraq occupation and increasing terrorist activity in Saudi Arabia are creating an unprecedented legitimacy crisis within the region and raising fundamental questions about the future of Gulf security. US leaders have consistently failed to recognize the importance of domestic factors in Gulf leaders’ threat perceptions. "Because of the pressures of globalization and the vast increase in open media sources within Gulf societies," Kraig writes, "the greatest danger in the Gulf is not a nuclear Iran or a traditional threat of conventional invasion, but rather, internal socioeconomic and political changes that might be increasingly hard for leaders to direct or control." Past policies based on strong bilateral military ties are therefore unlikely to effectively stabilize today’s Persian Gulf, he concludes. It is time to craft a genuinely new strategy of "principled multilateralism" to provide longterm security and prosperity in the Gulf region. Resorting to the tried-and-untrue strategies of the past would have predictably negative results.

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Unilateralism Bad – Terrorism
( ) Bush’s unilateralism favors the international threats of terrorism and proliferation. Robert A. Pape, professor of political science at the U of Chicago, 2005 (“Soft Balancing against the United
States”, International Security 30.1, 7-45, Project Muse) For other major powers, the main threat to their security stems not from the risk that the United States will eventually pose a direct threat to attack their homelands, but that the U.S. policy of preventive war is likely to unleash violence that the United States cannot fully control and that poses an indirect threat to their security. As a result, even though the United States means them no harm, other major states must still contend with the spillover effects of U.S. unilateral uses of force. These indirect effects are especially pronounced for U.S. military adventures in the Middle East, which could stimulate a general rise in the level of global terrorism targeted at European and other major states. As the French foreign policy adviser Bruno Tertrais explains: "The implementation of the U.S. strategy [of preventive war] tends to favor, rather than reduce, the development of the principal threats to which it is addressed: terrorism and proliferation. . . . The Al Qaeda organization . . . has now reached the shores of Europe, as shown by the [terrorist attacks] in Turkey (December [End Page 29] 2003) and Spain (March 2004). The campaign conducted by the United States has strengthened the Islamists' sense of being totally at war against the rest of the world."44

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Unilateralism Bad – Russia Relations – First Line (1/2)
US unilateralism collapses US-Russia relations Canadian Content, May 16, 2007 (“Rebuilding the U.S.-Russia Relationship Discussion”,
http://forums.canadiancontent.net/us-american-politics/62475-rebuilding-u-s-russia-relationship.html) Toward that end, Russian President Vladimir Putin has consistently spoken out on those issues. On May 8, 2001, he declared that “claims to world domination…still are the cause of many wars” and that “these sorts of claims still linger on today and this is very dangerous.” A day later, he added, “Our entire postwar [post-World War II] history teaches us that no country can build a safer world for itself alone, and even more so, cannot build its security to the detriment of others.” Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a wholly Neoconservative approach to foreign policy blossomed in the U.S. Unilateralism became arguably the major means by which the U.S. conducted its relations with the international community. “Regime Change” replaced “Containment” and “proactive war” replaced “pre-emption.” In June 2002, the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty. In March 2003, it invaded Iraq in the face of strong Russian opposition and in the absence of a United Nations Security Council resolution. Currently, it is pursuing plans to place 10 missile interceptors in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic to construct a limited missile defense shield against countries such as Iran. Russian alarm grew. On February 10, 2007, President Putin made a seminal speech that detailed his objections to the Neoconservatives’ “Unipolar” vision and U.S. uniltateralism. Excerpts from Putin’s speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy detail his views and follow: The history of humanity certainly has gone through unipolar periods and seen aspirations to world supremacy. And what hasn’t happened in world history? However, what is a unipolar world? …It is [a] world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within… I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today’s—and precisely in today’s—world, then the military, political and economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilization. Along with this, what is happening in today’s world…is a tentative to introduce precisely this concept into international affairs, the concept of a unipolar world. And with which results? Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. Moreover they have caused new human tragedies and created new centers of tension. Judge for yourselves: wars as well as local and regional conflicts have not diminished… Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force—military force—in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible. Putin explicitly blamed the United States for such developments. “One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way,” he charged, “This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations.” A fullfledged rupture in U.S.-Russia relations is still avoidable. In fact, the relationship can still be repaired fairly easily, as unilateralism, and not a clash of critical interests between the two nations, is at the root of the worsening relationship. A pragmatic, interest-driven U.S. foreign policy that restores primacy to diplomacy, eliminates idealistic “Regime Change,” and returns emphasis to relations between allies and great powers can overturn the unilateralism that is currently harming the relationship.

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251 Hegemony

Unilateralism Bad – Russia Relations – First Line (2/2)
Collapse of US-Russia relations leads to global diaster, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Yale Global, February 28, 2005 (“US-Russia Relations Saved for Now”,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5348) For the United States, a declining agenda with Russia will sooner or later result in overextension of US resources and global disaster. Short- and middle-term reasons for engaging Russia lie in policy toward North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and China, and the long-term - in the broader Middle East. Russia, with its imperial history, vast experience, and readiness to invest in security, is the only US ally capable of collaborating to bring about Mideast stability- a rather imperial, but necessary mission. Neither Europe nor the southern CIS have the resources to accomplish the task. Despite an EU presence in Afghanistan and some contribution to Iraq, Europe's political culture and growing Muslim populations do not allow for serious investments in missions like occupation and state-building. Ultimately, Washington and Moscow must work together, despite all the difficulties and prejudices. They should strengthen those elements of agenda - creating the NATO-Russia Council and Russian participation in the G8 - that may still facilitate cooperation and joint action. The US-Russia foreign policy priority should be stabilization and governance promotion in the broader Middle East. Radical Islamic terrorism and nuclear proliferation are facets of one single problem: degradation of this region.

Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East leads to nuclear terrorism Giuseppe Nardulli, Union of Scientists for Disarmarment-USPID Italy, 1998 (“Nuclear Weapons in the Middle
East”, http://oldserver.ba.infn.it/~nardulli/nuke_mo.html) The presence of nuclear weapons in an Islamic state may have an impact on the Middle East and on the security of Israel. In principle the reasons for the Indian-Pakistani nuclear arms race are strictly regional and are unrelated to the Middle East. From the viewpoint of Pakistan, it is indeed clear that the Indian threat represents the main security policy problem. Historically, its entering into the regional arms race always followed the Indian actions [27]: for example the Pakistan's interest for nuclear weapons was triggered by the abovementioned indian nuclear test of 1974; also the May 1998 Pakistan's tests followed the Indian ones. On the other hand there is no guarantee that the nuclear arms race can be confined to the South Asia, though dangerous this perspective might be. Other states in the region may be led to enter into the arms race to guarantee their own security. An example is given by Iran, whose rivalry with Pakistan is enhanced by their recent support to different fighting factions in Afghanistan. Or, to give another example, Iraq which might be induced to resume its nuclear programme interrupted by the Gulf War. It is clear that in the long run the nuclear arms race can spread to the Middle East and have a disastrous impact on the Middle East stability. Last, but not least, one should take into account the possibility of nuclear terrorism of both India and Pakistan. To quote an article of a decade ago, which seems today even more relevant, some Pakistani official might seek to emulate the exploits of fellow countrymen involved in nuclear smuggling and be tempted to sell nuclear technology to political extremists within their own country or to agents of an Arab country that they perceive as friendly[...] In the hands of political extremists or a maverick state, an atomic device or weapons usable material could become a power intrument of nuclear blackmail and terror in a holy Jihad against enemies.[28]

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252 Hegemony

Heg Bad – Nuclear Terrorism
Hegemony increases the risk of nuclear terrorism which will lead to extinction. Dietrich Fischer, Academic Director of The European University Center for Peace Studies, July 10, 2005 (“The
Real Threat is Nuclear Terrorism”, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/07/10_fischer_real-threat-nuclearterrorism.htm) As long as the big powers insist on maintaining nuclear weapons, claiming they need them to protect their security, they cannot expect to prevent other countries and terrorist organizations from acquiring such weapons--and using them. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima killed over 200,000 people. Today's nuclear bombs are vastly more powerful. If even one nuclear device had been detonated in a parked car or a sailboat on the Thames, the Center of London would be strewn with smoking, radioactive rubble and over a million people might have been killed outright, and scores more would die slowly from radiation disease.
The double standard, "Nuclear weapons are good for us, but bad for you", is stupid and unconvincing. Believing that nuclear weapons technology can be kept secret forever is naive. Those who still believe in the fairy-tale of "deterrence theory" better wake up to the age of suicide bombers. Anyone convinced to go straight to heaven if blown up cannot be "deterred" by the threat of horrendous retaliation. Governments that order tons of bombs to be rained on Iraq and Afghanistan should not be surprised if they plant ideas in the minds of eager imitators. Osama bin Laden once benefitted from support and training financed by the CIA. Richard Falk, long a Professor of International Law at Princeton University, rightly pointed out: "The greatest utopians are those who call themselves 'realists,' because they falsely believe that we can survive the nuclear age with politics as usual. The true realists are those who recognize the need for change." What changes

must we make if we want humanity to survive? [1] We must stop believing that problems can be solved by applying offensive military force. That only encourages others to pay back in kind. Policing to stop criminals and defense against a foreign attack are justified, but not military interventions abroad. [2] Thirtyseven years after signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is time for the nuclear powers to fulfill their commitment to nuclear disarmament. We also need a vastly more open world, where all nuclear weapons are verifiably
destroyed, and the manufacturing of new ones cannot be hidden. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can now inspect only sites that member countries voluntarily place under its supervision. If a suspected weapons smuggler could tell a border guard, "You may check under my seat, but don't open the trunk," such an "inspection" would be meaningless. The IAEA must have the power to inspect any suspected nuclear facilities, anywhere in the world, without advance warning, otherwise it is impossible to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The governments that now possess nuclear weapons object to such intrusive inspections as a "violation of their sovereignty." Yet many airline passengers also protested at first against having their luggage searched for guns or explosives, when such searches were introduced after a series of fatal hijackings. Today, passengers realize that such inspections protect their own security. Those who have nothing to hide have nothing to fear. Sooner or later, governments will reach the same conclusion. The question is only whether

this will happen before or after the first terrorist nuclear bomb explodes. [3] We need to address the root causes of terrorism: long festering unresolved conflicts. Peaceful conflict transformation is a skill that can be taught and learned. Johan Galtung, widely regarded as founder of the field of peace research, was able to help end a longstanding
border conflict between Ecuador and Peru over which they had fought four wars by suggesting to make the disputed territory into a "binational zone with a natural park", jointly administered. This peaceful intervention cost nearly nothing compared with a military peacekeeping operation. We need a UN Organization for Mediation, with several hundred trained mediators who can help prevent conflicts from erupting into violence. This is a very inexpensive, worthwhile investment in human survival, compared with the trillion dollars the world spends each year to arm millions of troops, which only make the world collectively less secure. If we cling to obsolete ways

of thinking--that threatening others will make us safe--we face extinction as a human species, like other species that failed to adapt to new conditions.

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253 Hegemony

Heg  China War (2/2)
Hegemony causes US-China war. Gries 7 (Harold J. & Ruth Newman Chair in U.S.-China Issues and Director of the Institute for U.S.-China Issues
at the University of Oklahoma. Director of the Sino-American Security Dialogue (SASD) “Harmony, Hegemony, and US – China Relations”) And this is what strikes me as new, and potentially dangerous, about Chinese Occidentalism today. The dialectic of similarity to and difference from the U.S. has swung decidedly in favor of difference. Unlike China’s earlier “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development” discourse, which clearly had a status quo orientation, focusing on China’s development within the existing world system, the new discourse of “civilization modes” and “harmonious worlds” appears more revisionist, pointing to a distinctly Chinese and different regional order. It evokes a hierarchical, China-at-the-center vision of East Asian politics. Furthermore, the new Chinese Occidentalism depicts Americans as an aggressive, militaristic, and threatening people. It certainly does not help that the current Bush administration’s embrace of military and unilateral means to resolve international disputes in Iraq and elsewhere has provided ample fodder for Chinese nationalist arguments. The danger is that heightened Chinese perceptions of U.S. threat could promote the emergence of an acute “security dilemma” in U.S.-China relations. Feeling threatened by a “hegemonic” U.S., Chinese could decide to step up their military modernization for defensive reasons. Americans would likely respond to increased Chinese arms acquisitions with heightened threat perception of their own, leading the U.S. to embrace its own defensive arms buildup. The unintended result: a possible U.S.-China arms race in East Asia. Absent feelings of mutual trust, and given the deep animosities that have led to the recent deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations and the always volatile situation in the Taiwan Strait, there is a real possibility that the United States will get drawn into yet another conflict with China in the first decades of the twenty-first century. What can be done? While American and Chinese nationalists produce Orientalist and Occidentalist discourses based on similar epistemologies of difference, other Americans and Chinese can construct discourses of similarity. At its best, American and Chinese cultural products, like the special section on contemporary Chinese literature in this issue of World Literature Today, celebrate our common humanity. Translation and cultural exchange can reveal our shared challenges: modernization, globalization—indeed, the human condition. In the end, cultural products that raise awareness of our common humanity can serve as a vital counterweight to the discourses of difference and threat that undermine U.S.-China relations.

A hostile international environment causes Chinese nationalism that increases risk of war. Esteban 2005 (Mario Esteban, Autonomous University of Madrid, “Nationalism and
prospects for political change in China”, Working Papers Online Series, http://www.uam.es/centros/derecho/cpolitica/investigacion/papers/38_2005.pdf) On the contrary, a hostile international environment could boost the leverage of assertive and even aggressive nationalism, which demand a tougher international policy and a pattern of economic development less dependent on foreign trade, investment, and technology. In this respect, a hypothetical declaration of the independence of Taiwan, the aggravation of the separatist conflict in Tibet or Xinjiang, or a Japanese rearmament, could have a particularly intense influence in the mobilization of a political movement along the lines of these nationalist discourses. That potential nationalist movement would be articulated at both the popular and the elite level. The popular dimension would express itself through massive demonstrations, probably headed by students, and would have an enormous symbolic power and a wideranging mobilization capacity. The elitist dimension would embrace the conservative wing of the CCP and the army, who most likely would be favored by this situation in their struggle for winning the upper hand within the regime, since they are the most willing and qualified to implement the politic line advocated by assertive and aggressive nationalism.

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254 Hegemony

Heg  China War (2/2)
US and Chinese influence are zero-sum. Glain 2004 (Stephen Glain, Newsweek International Writer, “Yet Another Game,”
12/20/04, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Oil_watch/GreatGame_China_US_Oil.html) While the United States appears to have conceded Sudan to China, it is active elsewhere in Africa. U.S. President George W. Bush has made a point of meeting with leaders of such countries as Chad and Congo, which in the past barely registered on Washington's foreign-policy map. The African Oil Policy Initiative Group, a confederation of oil executives, members of Congress, White House officials and consultants, has recommended that the United States work openly with Nigeria to secure Africa's oilrich areas and enhance the prospects for foreign investment. It has also urged the Pentagon to build a naval base at the oil-rich islands of Sao Tome and Principe, and to permanently deploy a large force of U.S. troops there. Some analysts even suspect that the deliberate way in which the United States lifted sanctions on Libya earlier this year was a move to check China's growing influence in Africa. If China sees energy security as a zero-sum game, so, it appears, does its American rival.

Declining US interest is key to PRC soft power. Businessweek 5 (4/12, www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/apr2005/nf20050412_9145.htm)
UNSAVORY ALLIANCES. Latin America and Africa are two areas of opportunity for the Chinese, and the new web of interests coincides with a diminished U.S. presence in these regions. Seeking oil, China has successfully cozied up to Venezuela. (During a December visit to China, President Hugo Chávez unveiled a statue of Simon Bolívar and even ventured some historical revisionism by calling his conservative founder a kindred spirit of Marxist revolutionary Mao Zedong.) Eager for access to raw materials, Chinese President Hu Jintao toured Argentina, Brazil, and Chile last November. He signed agreements worth some $30 billion, including big-time investments in infrastructure, which, of course, will help transport those materials out of the country. China is just as active in Africa. According to South Africa's Business Day, two-way trade between China and Africa hit about $29.5 billion last year, a 59% increase over 2003. In Nigeria, where there's oil aplenty, the Chinese are building roads and railways. Across the continent, the Chinese are buying timber companies, exploring for gas, and buying up mines. The alliances can sometimes be unsavory: Beijing is investing heavily in Sudan's oil sector, despite the barbaric attacks by pro-government militia against civilians. Chinese laborers "work under the vigilant gaze of Sudanese government troops armed largely with Chinese-made weapons -- a partnership of the world's fastest growing oil consumer with a pariah state accused of fostering genocide in its western Darfur region," reports The Washington Post. Strongman Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe is another of Beijing's favorites.

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255 Hegemony

Heg  China War – At: Cooperation
China won’t cooperate with the US. Thompson 4
(Drew Thompson is the Director of China Studies and Starr Senior Fellow at The Nixon Center in Washington, DC. He was formerly the National Director of the China-MSD HIV/AIDS Partnership in Beijing, “ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOFT POWER: CHINA'S AFRICA STRATEGY”, Jamestown China Brief, December 07, 2004, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=395&issue_id=3170&article_id=2368982) China's interests in Africa represent an opportunity for the United States and the international

community. China maintains friendly relations with most African nations, particularly nations that the U.S. has limited contact or diplomatic leverage over, such as Libya and Sudan. If President Bush seeks to address U.S. national security interests around the world, promoting social, political and economic development in Africa will have to become a significant priority for the administration. China can potentially be a strong ally in this effort. But, as the U.S. and China seek to further their interests in Africa, whether they work together or at cross-purposes remains an open question. The U.S. could see China as a competitor, and become increasingly concerned about its growing spheres of influence, while China could see U.S. efforts to promote stability and democracy in Africa as an effort to cut off their access to raw materials and further contain China's professed "peaceful rise." Of course, China is always cautious of U.S. intentions, which might lead to suspicion of any overtures made to them to cooperate on issues, particularly involving other nations' internal affairs. China is likely to be initially reluctant to work with the U.S. on any efforts to coerce African countries to conform to a Western-centric global strategy. Concerns about the subjugation of their own interests, as well as any precedent such cooperation would set regarding a code of conduct for nations that China enjoys close relationships with, are sure to dominate Beijing's thinking on these issues. The Chinese remain wary that their cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue might encourage Washington to seek to use their leverage on Sudan, Libya, Syria and Iran, without tangible benefits on the table for Beijing. U.S. assertions that China's effort to defuse the North Korean crisis is in their best interest might not translate as easily to problems in Africa.

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256 Hegemony

Heg Bad – Blowback (1/3)
( ) 9/11 Validates blow-back—it was a direct result of intervention in Afghanistan. Johnson 2K4
(Chalmers, President of Japan Policy Research Institute, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 2K4, p. xvi-xvii, lexis) The attacks of September 11 descend in a direct line from events in 1979, the year in which the CIA, with full presidential authority, began carrying out its largest ever clandestine operation—the secret arming of Afghan freedom fighters (mujabideen) to wage a proxy war against the Soviet Union, which involved the recruitment and training of militants from all over the Islamic world. Various members of the current Bush cabinet were complicit in generating the blowback of 9/11. Former general Cohn Powell certainly knows why “they” might hate us. He was Ronald Reagan’s last national security adviser and then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the George H. W. Bush administration. Others include former secretary of defense Dick Cheney, former National Security Council staff official Condoleezza Rice, former Reagan confidant and emissary to Saddam Hussein Donald Rumsfeld, former Pentagon official in both the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations Paul Wolfowitz, and many more. Throughout the 1980s, these officials designed and implemented the secret war in Afghanistan and then, after the Soviet Unions withdrawal, made the decision to abandon America’s Islamic agents.

( ) Hegemony reinforces a cycle of terror and retaliation spurring proliferation to neutralize leadership. Johnson 2K4
(Chalmers, President of Japan Policy Research Institute, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 2K4, p. xvi-xvii, lexis) A second strategic objective of revolutionary terrorism is to provoke ruling elites into a disastrous overreaction, thereby creating widespread resentment against them. This is a classic strategy, and when it works, the impact can be devastating. As explained by Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian guerrilla leader whose writings influenced political terrorists in the 1960s and 1970s, if a government can be provoked into a purely military response to terrorism, its overreaction will alienate the masses, causng them to “revolt against the army and the police and blame them for this state of things.” The second Palestinian Intifada of 2000— 03 illustrates the dynamic: terrorist attacks elicited powerful and disproportionate Israeli military reactions that led to an escalating cycle of more attacks and more retaliation, completely militarizing relations between the two peoples. In our globahizing world, the masses alienated by such overreactions may be anything but domestic. The bombing of Afghanistan that the United States launched on October 7, 2001, inflicted great misery on many innocent civilians, a pattern repeated in Iraq, where the death toll of civilians as of August 2003 stood at well over 3,000, a figure that informed observers think may go as high as 10,000 as more evidence is collected. Altogether, instead of acting to resolve the post 9/11 crisis, the United States exacerbated it with massive military assaults on Afghanistan and Iraq, two illadvised and unnecessary wars that inflamed passions throughout the Islamic world and repelled huge majorities in every democratic country on earth. Afghanistan and Iraq The two wars that the United States launched preemptively were the pet projects of special interest groups that used the attacks of 9/li as a cover to hijack American foreign policy and implement their private agendas. These interest groups include the military-industrial complex and the professional armed forces, close American supporters of and advisers to the Likud Party in Israel, and neoconservative enthusiasts for the creation of an American empire. This latter group, concentrated in right-wing foundations and think tanks in Washington D.C., is composed of “chicken-hawk” war lovers (that is, soi-disant military strategists with no experience of either the armed forces or war) who seized on the national sense of bewilderment after 9/11 to push the Bush administration into conflicts that were neither relevant to nor successful in destroying alQaeda. Instead, the wars accelerated the recruitment of more suicidal terrorists and promoted nuclear proliferation in countries hoping to deter similar preemptive attacks by the United States. Two years after 9/i 1, America is unquestionably in greater danger of serious terrorist threats than it has ever been before.

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Heg Bad – Blowback (2/3)
( ) Hegemony will destroy itself through terrorist attacks and undermining economic vitality of the US Johnson 2K4
(Chalmers, President of Japan Policy Research Institute, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 2K4, p. xvi-xvii, lexis) "Blowback" is shorthand for saying that a nation reaps what it sows, even if it does not fully know or understand what it has sown. Given its wealth and power, the United States will be a prime recipient in the fore- seeable future of all of the more expectable forms of blowback, particularly terrorist attacks against Americans in and out of the armed forces anywhere on earth, including within the United States. But it is blow- back in its larger aspect-the tangible costs of empire-that truly threatens it. Empires are costly operations, and they become more costly by the year. The hollowing out of American industry, for instance, is a form of blowback-an unintended negative consequence of American policy- even though it is seldom recognized as such. The growth of militarism in a once democratic society is another example of blowback. Empire is the problem. Even though the United States has a strong sense of invulner- ability and substantial military and economic tools to make such a feel- ing credible, the fact of its imperial pretensions means that a crisis is inevitable. More imperialist projects simply generate more blowback.

( ) Hegemony breeds blowback in the form of catastrophic terrorism and economic meltdowns. Johnson 2K4
(Chalmers, President of Japan Policy Research Institute, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 2K4, p. xvi-xvii, lexis) I believe the profligate waste of our resources on irrelevant weapons systems and the Asian economic meltdown, as well as the continuous trail of military "accidents" and of terrorist attacks on American instal- lations and embassies, are all portents of a twenty-first-century crisis in America's informal empire, an empire based on the projection of mili- tary power to every corner of the world and on the use of American capi- tal and markets to force global economic integration on our terms, at whatever costs to others. To predict the future is an undertaking no thoughtful person would rush to embrace. What form our imperial crisis is likely to take years or even decades from now is, of course, impossible to know. But history indicates that, sooner or later, empires do reach such moments, and it seems reasonable to assume that we will not miracu- lously escape that fate.

( ) Hegemonic strategies undermine the US by directing violence and social decay at it Johnson 2K4
(Chalmers, President of Japan Policy Research Institute, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 2K4, p. xvi-xvii, lexis) The term "blowback," which officials of the Central Intelligence Agency first invented for their own internal use, is starting to circulate among students of international relations. It refers to the unintended consequences of policies that were kept secret from the American peo- ple. What the daily press reports as the malign acts of "terrorists" or "drug lords" or "rogue states" or "illegal arms merchants" often turn out to be blowback from earlier American operations. It is now widely recognized, for example, that the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, which resulted in the deaths of 259 passengers and 11 people on the ground, was retaliation for a 1986 Reagan administration aerial raid on Libya that killed President Muammar Khadaffi's stepdaughter. Some in the United States have sus- pected that other events can also be explained as blowback from impe- rial acts. For example, the epidemic of cocaine and heroin use that has afflicted American cities during the past two decades was probably fueled in part by Central and South American military officers or corrupt politi- cians whom the CIA or the Pentagon once trained or supported and then installed in key government positions. For example, in Nicaragua in the 1980s, the U.S. government organized a massive campaign against the socialist-oriented Sandinista government. American agents then looked the other way when the Contras, the military insurgents they had trained, made deals to sell cocaine in American cities in order to buy arms and supplies.

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258 Hegemony

Heg Bad – Blowback (3/3)
( ) The link between hegemony and terrorism is air-tight. Johnson 2K4
(Chalmers, President of Japan Policy Research Institute, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 2K4, p. xvi-xvii, lexis) If drug blowback is hard to trace to its source, bomb attacks, whether on U.S. embassies in Africa, the World Trade Center in New York City, or an apartment complex in Saudi Arabia that housed U.S. servicemen, are another matter. One man's terrorist is, of course, another man's free- dom fighter, and what U.S. officials denounce as unprovoked terrorist attacks on its innocent citizens are often meant as retaliation for previ- ous American imperial actions. Terrorists attack innocent and unde- fended American targets precisely because American soldiers and sailors firing cruise missiles from ships at sea or sitting in B52 bombers at extremely high altitudes or supporting brutal and repressive regimes from Washington seem invulnerable. As members of the Defense Science Board wrote in a 1997 report to the undersecretary of defense for acqui- sition and technology, "Historical data show a strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States. In addition, the military asymmetry that denies nation states the ability to engage in overt attacks against the United States drives the use of transnational actors [that is, terrorists from one country attacking in another."

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259 Hegemony

Heg Bad – Preemptive Wars
( ) Hegemony leads to preemptive wars because of proliferation of WMDs Lind 07 (Michael, New America Foundation, Beyond American Hegemony,
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381) Given this premise, the obsession with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) makes perfect sense. WMD are defensive weapons that offer poor states a possible defensive shield against the sword of unexcelled U.S. conventional military superiority. The success of the United States in using superior conventional force to defeat Serbia and Iraq (twice) may have accelerated the efforts of India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran to obtain nuclear deterrents. As an Indian admiral observed after the Gulf War, "The lesson is that you should not go to war with the United States unless you have nuclear weapons." Moreover, it is clear that the United States treats countries that possess WMD quite differently from those that do not. So proliferation undermines American regional hegemony in two ways. First, it forces the U.S. military to adopt costly and awkward strategies in wartime. Second, it discourages intimidated neighbors of the nuclear state from allowing American bases and military build-ups on its soil. With this in mind, proponents of the hegemony strategy often advocate a policy of preventive war to keep countries deemed to be hostile to the United States from obtaining nuclear weapons or WMD. Preventive war (as distinguished from pre-emptive attack to avert an impending strike) is not only a violation of international law but also a repudiation of America’s own traditions. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson all ruled out preventive wars against the Soviet Union and China to cripple or destroy their nuclear programs, and President Ronald Reagan, along with Britain’s Margaret Thatcher, denounced Israel’s 1981 attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak. Yet, by 2002, a bipartisan majority in the Congress authorized President George W. Bush to wage the first -- and to date the only -- preventive war in American history against Iraq. Although it turned out to be a disaster, it was perfectly consistent with the radical neoconservative variant of U.S. global hegemony strategy.

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260 Hegemony

Heg Bad – Middle East Prolif
First, US hegemony in the Middle East is would encourage the development of nuclear weapons in the region undermining Yale Global, June 29, 2004 (“Gulf Security in a Globalizing World: Going Beyond US Hegemony”,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4154) Under a hegemonic approach, Gulf relations would be exclusionary, with US “friends and allies” on one side, and US enemies such as Iran on the other. The United States would make a decision on who is excluded, and this decision would be based on factors such as internal regime structure, support of terrorism, and WMD aspirations. Confidence-building measures in the military realm (such as arms limitations, cooperative military exercises, or transparency on arms buildups) would only apply to friends and allies. The ultimate goal would be to target those “rogue” states outside the established order, isolate them, and bring about a “regime conversion” or regime change. WMD would not be viewed as “bad” in and of themselves; rather, the character of the state obtaining WMD would be the primary criterion for counter-proliferation efforts. Implicitly, Israel, Pakistan, and India would not be pressured to moderate their nuclear behavior, despite the potentially negative effects of their nuclear activities on Gulf states’ security. Arab friends and allies would not base security on their own indigenous capabilities but rather on continued bilateral dependence on the United States as an outside power. Finally, the United States would probably treat Iraq as a base for US economic, diplomatic, and military power projection throughout the region, including against Syria and Iran.

Second, Nuclear weapons in the Middle East would lead to regional nuclear war. Military Review, November 1, 2K6 (“Military Planning for a Middle East Stockpiled With Nuclear Weapons”,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-155824168.html) The bad news is that these experts probably are dead wrong. The theory is appealing, but theory rarely, if ever, conforms to reality. States armed with nuclear weapons in the Middle East might well wage war against one another under a variety of strategic circumstances. Iran might undertake conventional military operations against neighboring states calculating that its nuclear deterrent would prevent a retaliatory American or Arab Gulf state response. Saudi Arabia, in turn, fearing its conventional forces are inferior, could resort to the tactical use of nuclear weapons to blunt Iranian conventional assaults in the Gulf, much as NATO had planned to do against Warsaw Pact forces in cold-war Europe. Egypt had no nuclear weapons in
1973, but this did not stop it from attacking Israeli forces in the Sinai. Along with other Arab states, Egypt could use conventional forces in saber rattling against Israel, and conventional clashes could erupt into a general war. Right now, American forces cannot deter a Syria without nuclear weapons from sponsoring jihadist operations against U.S. forces in Iraq. A Syria armed with a nuclear

deterrent might be emboldened to undertake even more aggressive sponsorship of guerrilla war against U.S. and Israeli forces, and this could tip a crisis into open warfare. Sitting on hair triggers in the narrow geographic confines of the Middle East, states armed with nuclear weapons would be under strong incentives to use them or lose them and to fire nuclear ballistic missiles in a crisis. At the height of a regional crisis, Iran, for example, might launch huge salvos of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons against Israel in order to overwhelm Israeli ballistic missile defenses, decapitate the Israeli civilian and
military leadership, and reduce the chances of Israeli nuclear retaliation. During the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union had about 30 minutes of breathing time from the launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles to their impact. That was 30 potential minutes of precious time to determine whether warnings of launches were real. In the Middle East, there would be only a handful of such warning minutes, and regimes would feel even more vulnerable than the United States and the Soviet Union did during the cold war. Many nation-states in the Middle East resemble city-states more than industrialized nations; they have much less time to hide their leaders from enemy attack and fewer places to hide them. Nuclear-armed states in the Middle East could also transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist groups. Iran is the top concern on this score. Over the past two decades, Tehran has nurtured Hezbollah with arms, training, logistics, ideological support, and money to enable it to serve as an appendage of Iranian foreign policy. Iranian support helped Hezbollah destroy the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in the early 1980s and kill about 250 Marines. (4) According to a former director of the FBI, senior Iranian government officials ordered Saudi Hezbollah to bomb Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996. (5) The explosion killed 19 U.S. airmen. Iran has used Hezbollah to do its dirty work and maintained "plausible deniability" to reduce the chances of American retaliatory actions. The strategy worked because the United States has yet to retaliate militarily against Iran. Calculating that its nuclear weapons would deter conventional retaliation against it, a nuclear-

armed Iran would be emboldened to sponsor even more aggressive and devastating attacks to push American forces out of the Middle East.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

261 Hegemony

Heg Bad – Iraq Instability
( ) US hegemony causes Iraqi Instability Mark Selden, coordinator of Japan Focus, an electronic journal and archive on Japan and the Asia-Pacific, June 30, 2004 (“Discusson of ‘Notes From Ground Zero’: Power equity and Postwar Construction in Two Eras”,
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/SeldonDiscussion.html) What policies make sense with respect to Iraq following the transfer of certain formal powers to the handpicked Iraq administration? What is most striking in my view is the continuity of the effort to sustain American domination of Iraq through the permanent stationing of 138,000 US troops supplemented by allied troops and US mercenaries, and the farflung base structure designed to support US primacy in the region. This, together with the dismantling of much of the previous Iraq administrative structure, the tieing of the hands of the present administration by a series of neoliberal policies that deny fiscal authority to the government, and the transfer of many of the most lucrative sectors of the Iraq economy to American firms, has created a situation that ties the hands of any Iraq administration. Policies that sharply reduced US domination of Iraq, including the systematic withdrawal of US forces and elimination of US bases, coupled with a stronger international presence, including the United Nations and European nations, both governments and NGOs, might create more hopeful conditions for relief, reconstruction and reform agendas that will be essential for the reconstruction of Iraq and a reduction of international tensions in a region that is super charged. It seems certain that if that multinational presence is predominantly military, the needs of the Iraqi people and society are unlikely to be met. Whatever the changes, we should not of course expect peace and development to reign any time soon. What can be said with confidence is that the US has embarked on a course that has brought disaster to Iraq and the region and disgrace to the United States. The Bush administration's attempt to hide the fact that fundamental elements of its flawed policies remain in place seems certain to add fuel to the fire.

( ) Iraqi instablity spills over and causes terrorism. The National Interest, May-June 2007 (“Keeping the Lid On”, Lexisnexis)
THE COLLAPSE of Iraq into all-out civil war would mean more than just a humanitarian tragedy that could easily claim hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives and produce millions of refugees. Such a conflict is unlikely to contain itself. In other similar cases of all-out civil war the resulting spillover has fostered terrorism, created refugee flows that can destabilize the entire neighborhood, radicalized the populations of surrounding states and even sparked civil wars in other, neighboring states or transformed domestic strife into regional war. Terrorists frequently find a home in states in civil war, as Al-Qaeda did in Afghanistan. However, civil wars just as often breed new terrorist groups-Hizballah, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat of Algeria, and the Tamil Tigers were all born of civil wars. Many such groups start by focusing on local targets but then shift to international attacks-starting with those they believe are aiding their enemies in the civil war.

( ) Terrorism risks extinction Kirkus Reviews, 1999 (Book Review on “The New Terrorism: Fanatiscism and the Arms of Mass Destruction”,
http://www.amazon.com/New-Terrorism-Fanaticism-Arms-Destruction/dp/product-description/0195118162) Today two things have changed that together transform terrorism from a ``nuisance'' to ``one of the gravest dangers facing mankind.'' First terroristsbe they Islamic extremists in the Middle East, ultranationalists in the US, or any number of other possible permutationsseem to have changed from organized groups with clear ideological motives to small clusters of the paranoid and hateful bent on vengeance and destruction for their own sake. There are no longer any moral limitations on what terrorists are willing to do, who and how many they are willing to kill. Second, these unhinged collectivities now have ready access to weapons of mass destruction. The technological skills are not that complex and the resources needed not too rare for terrorists to employ nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons where and when they wish. The consequences of such weapons in the hands of ruthless, rootless fanatics are not difficult to imagine. In addition to the destruction of countless lives, panic can grip any targeted society, unleashing retaliatory action which in turn can lead to conflagrations perhaps on a world scale. To combat such terrorist activities, states may come to rely more and more on dictatorial and authoritarian measures. In short, terrorism in the future may threaten the very foundations of modern civilizations

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

262 Hegemony

Heg Bad – Terrorism
First, US hegemony fuels terrorism
Tehran Times, Jult 20, 2005 (“Iranian Daily Says Al-Qu’aidah Angered by US ‘Hegemony’ Not Western ‘democracy”, Lexisnexis) While Al-Qa'idah and its allies (if this is the network that is guilty of 7/7) may be opposed to various aspects of Western civilization, it is apparent from their strategies and their pronouncements that what has angered and incensed them is not Western democracy or Western freedoms as such, but Washington's hegemony, reinforced by its close allies, and its adverse impact upon the Arab and Muslim world. Even before the 9/11 episode, Al-Qa'idah's bombings in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in 1996; in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; and in Yemen in 2000 were all targeted against US interests. Indeed, it was the establishment of US military bases in Saudi Arabia in 1991- the most tangible manifestation of hegemonic power - which prompted Al-Qa'idah leader Usamah Bin-Laden to create his own shadowy network. Since 9/11, Usamah has highlighted other long-standing grievances to justify his operations. He has cited the colonial dismemberment of the Arab nation in the early part of the twentieth century and the Western imposition of Zionist Israel upon the Arab heartland a few decades later as traumatic events which have resulted in the humiliation and subjugation of his people. It is in this context that he has also chosen to defend the rights of the oppressed Palestinian people: the cause celebrate of the Arab and Muslim world. The hegemonic control that Washington exercises over Arab oil through what Al-Qa'idah regards as US client states is yet another issue which the network focuses upon. It is an issue which resonates with the masses. And since the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq beginning in March 2003, the truncated sovereignty of both states has become an important item in the Usamah agenda. Besides, the death and destruction that occupation has wreaked upon Iraq in particular has galvanized Arab and Muslim sentiment right across the globe.

Second, Terrorism leads to nuclear war John Thompson, President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism, March 8, 2004 (“More Reasons to Fear the Bomb”, http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2004/terror030204.htm)
Sometime, possibly very soon, some terrorist group is going to use a nuclear bomb. When that day comes, there will be much more to worry about than merely the damage of the attack; fear that inevitable day for three reasons. Making a nuke is no great trick - the Americans constructed the first weapons sixty years ago, and the science isn’t complicated. Making a big hydrogen bomb rather than an atomic bomb is somewhat trickier, and shrinking the whole package down to a manageable size requires really expensive engineering and really costly machinery; but North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran are showing that bomb building 101 isn’t too difficult. Between these three of states, and some of the more blurred records for the old Soviet inventory, a nuclear weapon will someday trickle down into the hands of some non-state actor who is prepared to use them. Al Qaeda will probably be the first to use an atomic weapon in an act of terrorism, and it need not be complicated or large. The emerging nuclear states know that fissionable materials are too expensive to let too much out of their hands, and a 20 kiloton package would be adequate for terrorism anyway.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

263 Hegemony

Heg Bad – South China Sea
First, the desire for leadership is the root cause of conflict in the South China Sea Vuving 2K5. Alexander, research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard.
"Vietnam's Geopolitical Resources." The Saigon Times Weekly (15 October 2005) http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?program=CORE&ctype=article&item_id=1300 China’s expansion of its control in the South China Sea and its influence in Southeast Asia occurs in the context of its rise to the status of world power and regional leader. All this has led the United States, Japan, and India to direct attention toward Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, and seek measures to cope with this new development. With its desire for “world leadership,” the United States regards the rise of China as a threat at the grand strategic level. Although Japan and India have no global ambition, the two do want to become Asia’s regional powers. Naturally, they would not tolerate China’s ascent to regional leadership. Japan has opted for a strategic alliance with the United States, thus taking shelter under America’s global hegemony in order to oppose China’s regional leadership. India has sought a “freer” position, but basically it is also a strategic alignment with the United States. A conflict over regional leadership has emerged in Asia between China on one side and the United States, Japan, and India on the other. This constellation has made Southeast Asia and the South China Sea a strategic theater in the playing field of great power rivalry. The South China Sea is of vital interest for both China and Japan. 90 per cent of oil supplies for Japan, 80 per cent of oil supplies for China, and most of the goods exchanged between the two countries and the Middle East and Europe flow through the Sea. Although the South China Sea is not that important to the United States, Washington has strategic interests in it. Control of the Sea means control of the major sea lane of communication between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and a lifeline of East Asian economy.

Second, conflict in the SCS culminated into a global nuclear war. Strait Times 1995
(staff, “Choose Your Own Style of Democracy”, May 21, p. proquest) In his speech, Dr Mahathir also painted three scenarios for Asia. In the first -the worst possible scenario -Asian countries would go to war against each other, he said. It might start with clashes between Asian countries over the Spratly Islands because of China's insistence that the South China Sea belonged to it along with all the islands, reefs and seabed minerals. In this scenario, the United States would offer to help and would be welcomed by Asean, he said. The Pacific Fleet begins to patrol the South China Sea. Clashes occur between the Chinese navy and the US Navy. China declares war on the US and a fullscale war breaks out with both sides resorting to nuclear weapons.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

264 Hegemony

Heg Doesn’t Solve Caspian Instability
( ) US Influence cannot prevent conflict over the Caspian Sea Aras 2K (BÜLENT, Professor Political Science Faith University Istanbul, www.bulentaras.com/files/caspian.pdf)
The patterns of development pursued by the Caspian states seem to follow an analogous line. The reliance on the prospective fruits of natural resources, rather than on socio-political reform and institution-building, recalls the historical experiences of the Middle Eastern countries, further confirming the fateful alignment of these two regions in strategic thinking. Most of the countries in the Middle East acquired their statehood following the colonial period, a fact evidenced by the artificial boundaries separating them. Their state-building experiences were driven largely by their oil-centered socio-economic structure. The recurring instabilities in the region stem from this over-dependence on oil revenues without a genuine industrial production base and from the lack of a firm legacy of state tradition. Similar processes might be experienced in the Caspian region, though in no worse conditions. The Caspian states emerged from the formal disintegration of the Soviet empire in a manner analogous to the end of colonial rule in the Middle East. In dealing with the state-building problems, the Caspian states are also oriented more toward the promises of natural riches than toward institutionalized reform. Given the diminishing returns of a volatile oil market and the declining oil prices predicted for the following decades, this kind of attitude and policy can easily result in chronic internal tensions within the Caspian states as well as in the Gulf. Furthermore, neither these indigenous countries nor the United States, which is the prime security manager in the region, are prepared for these growing internal instabilities. In handling inter-state clashes in these regions the United States proved itself well, but as the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the bloody conflicts in the Balkans—especially in Bosnia—indicate, U.S. initiative cannot resolve mature internal instabilities easily.18 In this sense, the Caspian’s wealth in natural resources may turn into a self-destructive possession.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

265 Hegemony

Heg Bad – Caspian Sea Stability (1/2)
( ) Increased US power would be directed towards the Caspian Sea in order to secure both oil and strategic placement near Iran, which would anger the Russians even more. Riemer 04 (Mathew, power and interest news, jan 12, caspian region likely to remain critical for foreseeable
future, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/oil/2004/0112caspian.htm) It is these countries that the United States and Russia will attempt to woo and intimidate over the coming decade in their competition for political influence in the region that will lead to long-term energy security. Beginning in the west, the two flashpoints at the moment are Georgia's and Russia's own never ending -- at least so far -- "war on terrorism" in Chechnya and other neighboring republics. The Caucasus are perhaps the region in which unbridled U.S. influence most irks Moscow. Within the Soviet realm, this area of the country was closer to home so to speak, being nearer to Moscow and St. Petersburg and more culturally similar than many of the frontier territories to the far east. Because of this, Moscow has always attempted to keep a tight hand on the reigns of power here; during the Second World War, Joseph Stalin -- himself a Georgian -- deported hundreds of thousands of Chechens to Kazakhstan because he believed they were Nazi sympathizers. Boris Yeltsin commenced the bombing of Grozny, Chechnya a mere three years after the break-up of the Soviet Union and launched a decade-long war just because a tiny, mountainous republic on the border of Georgia wanted its independence. As much as Moscow is truly offended by U.S. presence in the area, Washington wants to be there. Neighboring Azerbaijan is the point of departure for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline -- one of the most prominent, new energy projects in the entirety of Asia, and one in which Western interests are heavily invested. Azerbaijan also borders Iran, which has the possibility of becoming a flashpoint in the coming year because of questions concerning Tehran's nuclear weapons program. At this point, Moscow must understand that the U.S. has no intention of limiting or even leveling its presence in the region and will no doubt be reacting to this inevitability.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

266 Hegemony

Heg Bad – Caspian Sea Stability (2/2)
( ) US Russian relations are on the brink. Russia doesn’t like our unilateralist policies because it sees them as destabilizing. We can still salvage relations, but only through multilateral action, a failure to do so will result in counterbalancing wars Sutherland 07 (Well published author on geopolitics and international relations, rebuilding the u.s.-russia
relationship, http://ezinearticles.com/?Rebuilding-the-U.S.-Russia-Relationship&id=568610) Russia was humiliated. At the same time, it was constrained by its major weakness. Emboldened by the march of world events, Neoconservative thinkers believed that the new “Unipolar” world made U.S. consideration of the major interests of the world’s other great powers relatively less important than in it was past. Under such an assumption, they advocated an increasingly assertive unilateral approach to U.S. foreign policy toward creating a safer world. In stark contrast, Russia saw unilateralism as hazardous to international peace and security. Today, Russia continues to believe that single-power hegemony and a unilateralist approach to foreign policy are dangerous and destabilizing. Consequently, it views U.S. unilateralism as posing a threat to its critical interests and wellbeing. Toward that end, Russian President Vladimir Putin has consistently spoken out on those issues. On May 8, 2001, he declared that “claims to world domination…still are the cause of many wars” and that “these sorts of claims still linger on today and this is very dangerous.” A day later, he added, “Our entire post-war [postWorld War II] history teaches us that no country can build a safer world for itself alone, and even more so, cannot build its security to the detriment of others.” Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a wholly Neoconservative
approach to foreign policy blossomed in the U.S. Unilateralism became arguably the major means by which the U.S. conducted its relations with the international community. “Regime Change” replaced “Containment” and “proactive war” replaced “pre-emption.” In

June 2002, the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty. In March 2003, it invaded Iraq in the face of strong Russian opposition and in the absence of a United Nations Security Council resolution. Currently, it is
pursuing plans to place 10 missile interceptors in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic to construct a limited missile defense shield against countries such as Iran. Russian alarm grew. On February 10, 2007, President Putin made a seminal

speech that detailed his objections to the Neoconservatives’ “Unipolar” vision and U.S. uniltateralism. Excerpts from Putin’s speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy detail his views and follow: The history of humanity certainly has gone through unipolar periods and seen aspirations to world supremacy. And what hasn’t happened in world history? However, what is a unipolar world? …It is [a] world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within… I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today’s—and precisely in today’s—world, then the military, political and economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilization. Along with this, what is happening in today’s world…is a tentative to introduce precisely this concept into international affairs, the concept of a unipolar world. And with which results? Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. Moreover they have caused new human tragedies and created new centers of tension. Judge for yourselves: wars as well as local and regional conflicts have not diminished… Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force—military force—in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible. Putin explicitly blamed the United States for such developments. “One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way,” he charged, “This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations.” A full-fledged rupture in U.S.-Russia relations is still avoidable. In fact, the relationship can still be repaired fairly easily, as unilateralism, and not a clash of critical interests between the two nations, is at the root of the worsening relationship. A pragmatic, interest-driven U.S. foreign policy that restores primacy to diplomacy, eliminates idealistic “Regime Change,” and returns emphasis to relations between allies and great powers can overturn the unilateralism that is currently harming the relationship.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

267 Hegemony

Heg Bad – China Relations
US hegemony in East Asia hurts US-China relations Wu Xinbo, Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, September 2000 (“U.S. Security Policy in
Asia: Implications for China-U.S. Relations”, http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/2000_wu.htm) Three major factors have constantly troubled Sino-U.S. relations in the post-Cold War era: human rights, trade, and security. With the de-linking of China's human rights record from its MFN treatment in 1994 and the closing of Beijing-Washington marathon negotiations on China's WTO membership in 1999, human rights and trade may subside as major sources of tension on the bilateral agenda. Security issues, emerging in the mid-1990s, now appear to be the most important factor affecting bilateral relations. Due primarily to differences in their worldviews, historical experiences and capabilities, China and the U.S. have diverging conceptions of security, which in turn has led to their different security practices. Chinese and U.S. security interests in Asia both converge and diverge, and as the U.S. begins to contemplate China as a latent adversary, such divergence will become even more conspicuous. While both sides will continue to pursue their own security interests in Asia, each country also has to adapt itself to the changing political, economic and security landscape in this region. To enable durable, peaceful coexistence, both sides will have to make certain shifts in their current security policies. To address these questions more directly, this paper first considers some of the U.S. misperceptions about China's policy objectives in the Asia-Pacific and certain important conceptual differences on security practices between Beijing and Washington. Then, the study explores how China perceives the U.S. impact on its security interests. Finally, the paper concludes with a few policy recommendations as to how China and the United States could manage the bilateral relationship more effectively. Misperceptions and Conceptual Differences One popular perception in the U.S. about China's long-term policy objectives in Asia is that Beijing aspires to be the regional hegemon and would like to restore a Sino-centric order in this part of the world. This observation is wrong. First, Beijing believes in the trend of multipolarization rather than unipolarization at both global and regional levels, and predicts that with continued economic development and growing intra-regional political consultation in Asia, influence on regional affairs will be more diversified and more evenly distributed. Secondly, even though China expects some relative increase in its influence in Asia, it understands that because of the limits of its hard power and especially its soft power, China can never achieve a position comparable to its role in the ancient past or to the U.S. role in the region at present. Another misperception is that in the long run China will endeavor to drive the U.S. out of East Asia. Again this is not a correct assumption. From Beijing's perspective, the United States is an AsiaPacific power, although not an Asian power, and its political, economic and security interests in the region are deep-rooted, as are its commitments to regional stability and prosperity. In fact, Beijing has always welcomed a constructive U.S. role in regional affairs. At the same time however, Beijing also feels uneasy with certain aspects of U.S. policy. As a superpower, the United States has been too dominant and intrusive in managing regional affairs. It fails to pay due respect to the voices of other regional players, and sometimes gets too involved in the internal affairs of other states, lacking an understanding of their culture, history and values. While there is no danger of the U.S. being driven out of East Asia, its current policy may result in the U.S. wearing out its welcome in the region, thus undermining its contributions to stability and prosperity. In addition to the above misperceptions about China's regional intentions, the United States and China also hold diverging conceptions of national and regional security. Hegemonic stability vs. security cooperation In the post-Cold War era, Washington has been advocating an Asia-Pacific security structure with the U.S. as the sole leader and with U.S.-led bilateral alliances as the backbone. This is in essence hegemonic stability. Beijing believes, however, that regional security rests on the cooperation of regional members and a blend of various useful approaches (unilateral, bilateral and multilateral, institutional and non-institutional, track I and track II, etc.), not just on one single country and a set of bilateral security alliances.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

268 Hegemony

Heg Bad – Prolif
Fear of US hegemony leads to nuclear proliferation Wilson Center, March 4, 2005 (“The Global Response to U.S. Primacy: Implications for Nonproliferation,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?event_id=110376&fuseaction=events.event_summary) Professor Walt discussed the main themes of his forthcoming book, Taming America: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (Norton, 2005). He focused, in particular, on how American global preeminence affects the proliferation choices of other countries. Walt argued that the adverse perception of American power reflected in opinion polls (e.g., the Pew Global Attitudes Project) stems from three sources: first, the sheer magnitude of American power relative to other states; second, opposition to specific U.S. policies (such as the preventive war in Iraq), and third, Washington’s perceived double standard (e.g., tolerating nuclear proliferation in Israel while opposing it in Iran). Walt stated that states are either accommodating or resisting American power in this so-called era of unipolarity. The strategies of accommodation include: (1) “bandwagoning,” or deflecting U.S. power through appeasement or acquiescence; (2) enlisting the United States to address regional security problems (e.g., Qatar); and (3) “bonding” or aligning with the United States to shape U.S. policy and gain concessions or prestige (e.g., British Prime Tony Blair’s approach toward both the Clinton and Bush administrations). The strategies of resistance include: (1) balancing (as pursued diplomatically by the French, German and Russian governments in the United Nations during the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War); (2) asymmetric responses – such as the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction by “rogue states” in an effort to level the playing field with the United States; (3) “blackmail” (as North Korea is trying to do with its nuclear weapons program); (4) “balking” – just saying no (e.g., Russia’s continuing nuclear relationship with Iran despite U.S. objections); and (5) delegitimation – attempting to portray U.S. actions as self-interested and illegitimate. Walt concluded that international concerns about U.S. power are undermining Washington’s nonproliferation efforts.

Nuclear proliferation leads to nuclear war—someone will pull the trigger Larry Seaquist, former US Navy warship captain, has been the custodian of nuclear weapons at sea and a contributor to nuclear deterrence strategy in the Pentagon, April 3, 2003 (“Listen to the Nuclear Chatter”,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0403/p11s02-coop.html) The pattern of nuclear proliferation is shifting, and with it the dynamics of deterrence. Formerly we worried about countries like Iraq and Iran making their weapons from scratch. But in the future, we'll deal also with shadowy networks of terrorists who buy their weapons on the underground market. Where does a superpower fly a squadron of bombers if it wants to grab the attention of a covert terrorist organization like Al Qaeda, with scattered cells all over the globe? At heart, nuclear signaling is much more than just writing diplomatic notes on a warhead. By threatening catastrophe, each party hopes to extract a measure of safety from the mutual standoff. That's the theory. But instead of calming the situation, nuclear threats ricocheting among today's players may lead one of the smaller, inexperienced parties to panic and shoot. Regardless of who pulls the trigger or why, a nuclear detonation would be a disaster. A mushroom cloud rising over the dead in any city could thrust civilization into an era of unlimited violence just when bio-weapons are creeping into our mass-killing capabilities. Clearly, humankind must steer in the other direction, toward managing disagreements with less deadly methods.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

269 Hegemony

AT: Heg Solves Prolif
( ) The wars and deterrance that are inherent with US hegemony would limit our response time, which would destroy our ability to stop proliferation of WMDs Corr 03 (Anders, department of government harvard "american primacy and offensive posture:a reply to stephen
walt." belfer center for science and international affairs, November) In order to ease international fear of American military primacy, Stephen Walt (2002) prescribes decreasing US military mobility (an offensive capability) in favor of localized defensive forces -- ground troops and tactical aircraft (primarily defensive capabilities). "United States ground troops and tactical aircraft could be deployed overseas to defend key allies, as they currently do in Japan, Germany, and South Korea," writes Walt. "By eschewing large offensive capabilities (such as long-range bombers), the United States would appear less threatening to others and would be less likely to provoke defensive reactions" (1489). While such a defensive position is entirely appropriate for a lesser power concerned primarily with providing security to itself, it is not effective for the provision of security to an international system. Such a decrease in mobility would damage the US ability to respond in a timely manner to surprise violations of the international order by rogue states such as Iraq or even large powers such as China. Decreasing the mobility of troops would decrease the deterrent of what limited stationary troops are located with close allies such as South Korea or Taiwan. Defending these allies requires that forces quickly move to the theater of conflict. The forces currently in place are too thin to defend those theaters without rapid reinforcements from distant locations. Military intervention in humanitarian crises and civil wars must often be rapid to gain effect. A slow US response to civil war or genocide may be no response at all. Most importantly, a defensive posture would deny the US the ability to fight wars of prevention against surprise weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. If intelligence is received that a state is quickly developing a WMD capability that can strike the West and its allies, the US military necessarily requires speed in eradicating the threat and upholding international treaties of nonproliferation. A defensive conventional posture would protect the US in the short-term, but it would not give the US the ability to deter WMD proliferation that threatens the international system and long-term US national security.

( ) US primacy fails to protect against the proliferation of WMDs Krepon 02 (Michael, Founding President Henry L. Stimson Center, arms control and asymmetric warfare,
disarmament.un.org/rcpd/pdf/5cnfkrepon.pdf) This is not a good time to adhere to Cold War formulations for and against arms control. The incoming Bush administration took office with fixed views about the efficacy of treaties, nuclear weapons, and missile defenses – and with many questions about the efficacy of CTR programs. The administration’s reassessment has wisely led to a reaffirmation of the value of these programs, but its approach remains unbalanced in significant respects. US primacy is insufficient to reduce the dangers associated with proliferation, asymmetric warfare, and terrorism. When primacy is accompanied by the unraveling of treaty regimes, security is weakened.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
Scholars Lab

270 Hegemony

Heg Bad – Terrorism
US hegemony causes backlash and terrorism Christopher Layne, Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, Spring 2002 (“The Washington Quarterly 25.2, pp 233-248, http://www.twq.com/02spring/layne.pdf)
U.S. role in the Gulf has rendered it vulnerable to a hegemonic backlash on several levels. First, some important states in the region (including Iran and Iraq) aligned against the United States because they resented its intrusion into regional affairs. Second, in the Gulf and the Middle East, the self-perception among both elites and the general public that the region has Offshore Balancing Revisited l long been a victim of “Western imperialism” is widespread. In this vein, the United States is viewed as just the latest extraregional power whose imperial aspirations weigh on the region, which brings a third factor into play. Because of its interest in oil, the United States is supporting regimes—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf emirates—whose domestic political legitimacy is contested. Whatever strategic considerations dictate that Washington prop up these regimes, that it does so makes the United States a lightning rod for those within these countries who are politically disaffected. Moreover, these regimes are not blind to the domestic challenges to their grip on power. Because they are concerned about inflaming public opinion (the much talked about “street”), both their loyalty and utility as U.S. allies are, to put it charitably, suspect. Finally, although U.S. hegemony is manifested primarily in its overwhelming economic and military muscle, the cultural dimension to U.S. preeminence is also important. The events of September 11 have brought into sharp focus the enormous cultural clash, which inescapably has overtones of a “clash of civilizations,” between Islamic fundamentalism and U.S. liberal ideology. The terrorism of Osama bin Laden results in part from this cultural chasm, as well as from more traditional geopolitical grievances. In a real sense, bin Laden’s brand of terrorism—the most dramatic illustration of U.S. vulnerability to the kind of “asymmetric warfare” of which some defense experts have warned—is the counterhegemonic balancing of the very weak. For all of these reasons, the hegemonic role that the strategy of preponderance assigns to the United States as the Gulf’s stabilizer was bound to provoke a multilayered backlash against U.S. predominance in the region. Indeed, as Richard K. Betts, an acknowledged expert on strategy, presciently observed several years ago, “It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam.”15 (Betts was referring to the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center.)

US hegemony provoked the social context for radical Muslims to embrace fundamentalism vented in terrorism. Glen M. Segell, Director of the Institute of Security Policy, Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, March 2005
(“Wahabism/Hegemony and Agenic Man/Heroic Masculinity”, Strategic Insights, Issue 4.3, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Mar/segellMar05.asp#author) Explicitly the decline of Islamic hegemony and the rise of Western hegemony provoked the socialhistorical context for an Islamic minority to embrace fundamentalism vented in terrorism. A Senate Judiciary subcommittee on terrorism has taken evidence that the 9/11 attacks were an expression of anger and rage expressing sentiments that embraced martyrdom rooted in an especially strict austere minority Islamism traced back to the fanatical Puritanism of the Bedouin zealots known as the Wahabis.[5] This article takes Wahabism through hegemony showing it as the systemic context key to unlocking 9/11 as acceptance by the perpetrators that the ultimate sacrifice of a soldier is to give his life for a cause. The cause was perceived to have been fueled by Wahabi fundamentalist sentiments, where jihad or holy war, became a compensatory, default position. The Al-Quaeda terrorist network found this tolerable given the historical Islamic suicide wars of AfIt. This gave substance to justify terrorism as a means where a warrior legacy of “heroic masculinity” was resurrected within a framework of an anti-modern and anti-Western holy war. The choice of America as the target is indicative of its hegemonic role expressing military asymmetry—small players can harm the powerful easily.[6]

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Heg Bad – Blowback
Hegemony causes international backlash Charles William Maynes, President of the Eurasia Foundation, Summer 1998 (“The Perils of (and for) an Imperial
America”, Foreign Policy Issue: 111, Questia.com) Suppose, despite all of these obstacles, a quest for world hegemony could succeed. We still should not want it. As Henry Adams warned in his autobiography, the effect of power on all men is "the aggravation of self, a sort of tumor that ends by killing the victim's sympathies." Already the surplus of power that America enjoys is beginning to metastasize into an arrogance toward others that is bound to backfire. Since 1993, the United States has imposed new unilateral economic sanctions, or threatened legislation that would allow it do so, 60 times on 35 countries that represent over 40 percent of the world's population. Increasingly, in its relations even with friends, the United States, as a result of the interplay between administration and Congress, has begun to command more and listen less. It demands to have its way in one international forum after another. It imperiously imposes trade sanctions that violate international understandings; presumptuously demands national legal protection for its citizens, diplomats, and soldiers who are subject to criminal prosecution, while insisting other states forego that right; and unilaterally dictates its view on UN reforms or the selection of a new secretary general. To date, the United States has been able to get away with these tactics. Nevertheless, the patience of others is shortening. The difficulty the United States had in rounding up support, even from its allies, in the recent confrontation with Iraqi president Saddam Hussein was an early sign of the growing pique of others with America's new preemptive arrogance. So was the manner in which the entire membership of the European Union immediately rallied behind the French in the controversy over a possible French, Malaysian, and Russian joint investment in the Iranian oil industry that would violate America's unilaterally announced sanctions policy against Iran. In March 1998, while reflecting on President Bill Clinton's visit to South Africa, President Nelson Mandela strongly rejected a trade agreement with the United States that would limit transactions with any third country, declaring that "we resist any attempt by any country to impose conditions on our freedom of trade."

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272 Hegemony

Heg Bad – Economy (1/2)
US hegemony destroys the economy Eland 02 (Ivan, Director of defense policy studies Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 459- The Empire Strikes
Out: The New Imperialism and Its Fatal Flaws, November 26, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf) Most of all, the strategy of empire is likely to overstretch and bleed America’s economy and its military and federal budgets, and the overextension could hasten the decline of the United States as a superpower, as it did the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The strategy could also have the opposite effect from what its proponents claim it would have; that is, it would alarm other nations and peoples and thus provoke counterbalancing behavior and create incentives for other nations to acquire weapons of mass destruction as an insurance policy against American military might.

US spending to maintain hegemonic power is huge Eland 02 (Ivan, Director of defense policy studies Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 459- The Empire Strikes
Out: The New Imperialism and Its Fatal Flaws, November 26, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf) The United States accounts for about 40 percent of total worldwide defense spending, up from 28 percent in the mid-1980s, the height of the Reagan military buildup. That’s two and a half times the combined spending of all its potential rivals.79 But, as an indication of its overextension, the United States accounts for only 29 percent of the world’s GDP. Another comparison indicates that U.S. allies are free riding: although the U.S. economy is larger than the next three largest economies on the planet— those of Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom—U.S. defense spending is larger than that of the next 15 highest defense spending nations, most of which are rich U.S. allies.

US spending on security is increasing Eland 02 (Ivan, Director of defense policy studies Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 459- The Empire Strikes
Out: The New Imperialism and Its Fatal Flaws, November 26, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf) With the war on terrorism, the Bush administration has already requested an additional $45.5 billion for 2003, bringing the total to $396 billion, an increase of 13 percent. In all, the administration plans to spend $2.1 trillion on the military over the next five years, which will raise annual U.S defense spending 15 percent above the Cold War average. How much more the strategy of empire will cost is unclear. Also, foreign aid, nation building, and other activities related to the strategy are not free. The Bush administration recently pledged to substantially increase America’s core development assistance by 50 percent. And American efforts at nation building in tiny Bosnia and Kosovo have cost U.S. taxpayers an estimated $21 billion so far. The more dependents and protectorates Washington takes on, the greater the burden on the U.S. economy will be.

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273 Hegemony

Heg Bad – Economy (2/2)
US hegemony is very expensive Eland 02 (Ivan, Director of defense policy studies Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 459- The Empire Strikes
Out: The New Imperialism and Its Fatal Flaws, November 26, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf) Certainly, the United States currently has the world’s most powerful military, and it spends much more on its defense than all its rivals combined. But it costs far more for the United States—a relatively secure nation separated from most of the world by two vast oceans—to project its power across the seas than it does for states located on other landmasses to project their power regionally. In other words,

proximity matters, which raises what John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago has called the “stopping power of water,” the belief that “the presence of oceans on much of the earth’s surface makes it impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony.”

US hegemony will crash the economy Ferguson 03 (Niall, Professor of History at Harvard, “The True Cost of Hegemony: Huge Debt”, The New York
Times, April 20, http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/crisis/2003/0420hyper.htm) But today, as America overthrows "rogue regimes," first in Afghanistan and now in Iraq, it is the world's biggest debtor. This could make for a fragile Pax Americana if foreign investors decide to reduce their stakes in the American economy, possibly trading their dollars for the increasingly vigorous euro. Foreign investors now have claims on the United States amounting to about $8 trillion of its financial assets. That's the result of the ever-larger American balance-of-payments deficits -

totaling nearly $3 trillion - since 1982. Last year, the balance-of-payments deficit, the gap between the amount of money that flows into the country and the amount that flows out, was about 5 percent of gross national product. This year it may be larger still.

Hegemony will bankrupt the US Hoke 06 (Zlatica, Voice Of America News, June 8, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/200606/AmericasRole2006-06-08-voa60.cfm?CFID=31442881&CFTOKEN=75492258) But U.S. services to the rest of the world are not cheap. According to the Congressional Research Service, for example, the U.S. cost of war and reconstruction in Iraq is approaching 200 billion dollars.

The United States gave more than 16 billion dollars in aid to developing countries in 2003, almost twice as much as the next biggest donor, Japan. And in 2004, the U.S. budget deficit exceeded 400 billion dollars, reaching an all-time high. So the question for many observers is whether America can continue to afford its leadership role in world affairs. Robert Guest, Washington Bureau Chief for The Economist magazine, suspects it may not. "There is nothing unforeseen about this whatsoever. When empires run out of money, they either run out of the will to fight or they tend to retreat into themselves. And the looming gap that you see with the retirement of the 'baby boomers' [i.e., Americans born between 1946 and 1964], bringing Medicare, Social Security and, to a lesser degree, Medicaid fairly rapidly into bankruptcy is the single greatest threat to American global hegemony," says Guest.

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274 Hegemony

Heg Bad – Space
( ) US space dominance leads to proliferation of weapons in space. Katz-Hyman, Michael and Michael Krepon. Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003.
The likely consequences of a dynamic, but uneven, space warfare competition are not hard to envision. Potential adversaries are likely to perceive American initiatives to weaponize space as adjuncts to a U.S. military doctrine of preemption and preventive war. Depending on the scope and nature of U.S. space warfare preparations, they could also add to Chinese and Russian concerns over the viability of their nuclear deterrents. U.S. initiatives to extend military dominance into space are therefore likely to raise tensions and impact negatively on U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations at a time when bilateral relations have some promising, but tenuous, elements. Cooperative relations with both countries will be needed to successfully combat proliferation, but Moscow and Beijing are unlikely to tender such cooperation if they perceive that U.S. strategic objectives include the negation of their deterrents. Under these circumstances, proliferation of weapons in space would be accompanied by terrestrial proliferation.

( ) US space weaponization leads to WWIII Reynolds, Glenn Harlan. Outer Space: Problems of Law and Policy. New York, NY: Westview Press, 1989.
Not only does the proliferation of space debris pose a threat to space activities, but it could pose an even greater threat to those of us on earth. The United States and the Soviet Union (together with, increasingly, other powers) depend greatly on space resources to support military intelligence, early-warning, communications, and other functions. If, in a crisis, a key satellite were to be accidentally lost, that loss could be blamed on an adversary and could lead to a potentially disastrous response. As space analyst Daniel Deudney has said, "The Archduke Francis Ferdinand of World War III may well be a critical U.S. or Soviet reconnaissance satellite hit by a piece of space junk during time of crisis."

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275 Hegemony

AT: Heg Solves Terrorism
First, their claim that direct US leadership will solve terrorism is wrong multilateralism must be used to rid the world of Islamic extremism. Michael Krepon, Co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Prior to co-founding the Stimson Center, Krepon worked at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Carter administration, and in the US House of Representatives “Is Dominance Enough? Countering Terrorism and WMD”, Henry L. Stimson Center, 2K4, http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=185 Just as a "combined arms" approach increases the likelihood of success on the battlefield, a "combined efforts" approach is needed to rid the world of Islamic extremism and the most deadly, indiscriminate weapons. The strategic concept of military dominance can produce successes, but it constitutes a severely skewed approach to a multifaceted problem. The use of force is not widely applicable to proliferation threats, and the pursuit of unfettered dominance corrodes rather than builds international cooperation. The application of power projection may be required, but if employed unwisely, it generates more terrorist threats than it foils. It also risks heavy casualties, and places great burdens on the societies liberated from tyrants. The more the strategic concept of dominance is actually demonstrated, the more it exhausts or alienates the countries waging, receiving, and observing its effects.

Second, the threat of Islamic extremism the greatest to the whole world only a shift to multipolarity can prevent the wars that come from Islamic extremism. Abraham H. Foxman, National Director of the Anti-Defamation League, “The Threat of Islamic Extremism”, To the ADL National Commission Meeting, October 2K6
Today I want to speak about another, greater threat to us – to democracy, to America, to the State of Israel and Jewish people, indeed to the world – the threat of Islamic extremism. History will record the 20th century as one of triumph and tragedy…of miracles and massacres…of hope to make life better through inventions and technology and mostly, of the horrors of the Holocaust that destroyed the life of 6 million Jews and a war that destroyed millions of others. This 21st century is starting out with a clash of cultures, a clash of faiths -- Islamists against Western and Judeo-Christian values. This looms ominously as the greatest threat to the safety of the world – to the safety of world Jewry and world peace. Radical Islamists are arming their faithful with hate and rage, with a goal toward dismantling democracy and creating a world ruled by Islamic law. This threat must be confronted with the same resolve that brought triumph for democracy and freedom over fascism and Communism. This threat is especially dangerous because its roots are in religion, thus there is no way to reason with it, as we, the Jewish people, know too well from our history. Al Qaeda's chief in Iraq made our blood run cold when he said "killing the infidels is our religion, slaughtering them is our religion, until they convert to Islam or pay us tribute." How do you reason with these thoughts? How do you debate? How do you argue? How do you dialogue?

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276 Hegemony

Unipolarity Bad – War
( ) The US’ attempt to hold on to its unipolarity will cause wars Christopher Layne, Associate Professor of Bush School of Government and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, 2006 (“The Unipolar Illusion Revisted: The Coming of the United States’Unipolar Moment”, International Security
31.2, 7-41, Project Muse) If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States, thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America's next grand strategy.

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277 Hegemony

Hard Power Ineffective
( ) Hard power is ineffective in modern warfare Anderson 04 (Donald J, naval war college joint military operations dept, May,
http://stinet.dtic.mil/stinet/jsp/advanced-tr.jsp) Threats today are different. They’re non-traditional; they’re ones we haven’t experienced before. “The application of the military isn’t as direct as we would like, and our theory and doctrine prevent dealing with reality, which is overlaid and mixed with politics and economics, as well as humanitarian and cultural issues.”31 The indirect approach is becoming more important, and to make it effective a cultural base of knowledge is essential

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Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008
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279 Hegemony

AT: Power Vacuum
The idea that the world will suddenly collapse without American hegemony is delusional— US hegemony can only go down, and attempting to sustain it only breeds backlash. Khanna 08 (Parag, expert on geopolitics and global governance, Director of the Global Governance Initiative and Senior Research Fellow
in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony". http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604, January 27)

The self-deluding universalism of the American imperium -- that the world inherently needs a single leader and that American liberal ideology must be accepted as the basis of global order -- has paradoxically resulted in America quickly becoming an ever-lonelier superpower. Just as there is a geopolitical marketplace, there is a marketplace of models of success for the second world to emulate, not least the Chinese model of economic growth without political liberalization (itself an affront to Western modernization theory). As the historian Arnold Toynbee observed half a century ago, Western imperialism united the globe, but it did not assure that the West would dominate forever -- materially or morally. Despite the "mirage of immortality" that afflicts global empires, the only reliable rule of history is its cycles of imperial rise and decline, and as Toynbee also pithily noted, the only direction to go from the apogee of power is down.

EU, china, and US will balance each other in the event of declined US supremacy Khanna 08 (Parag, expert on geopolitics and global governance, Director of the Global Governance Initiative and Senior Research Fellow
in the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony". http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604, January 27)

Would the world not be more stable if America could be reaccepted as its organizing principle and leader? It's very much too late to be asking, because the answer is unfolding before our eyes. Neither China nor the E.U. will replace the U.S. as the world's sole leader; rather all three will constantly struggle to gain influence on their own and balance one another. Europe will promote its supranational integration model as a path to resolving Mideast disputes and organizing Africa, while China will push a Beijing consensus based on respect for sovereignty and mutual economic benefit. America must make itself irresistible to stay in the game.

Vacuum after US falls will be filled by multipolarity Haass 8 (Richard N, 4/16, President of Council on Foreign Relations, Financial Times.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16026/what_follows_american_dominion.html) All of this raises a critical question: if unipolarity is gone, what will take its place? Some predict a return to the bipolarity that characterised international relations during the cold war. This is unlikely. China’s military strength does not approximate that of the US; more important, its focus will remain on economic growth, a choice that leads it to seek economic integration and avoid conflict. Russia may be more inclined towards re-creating a bipolar world, but it too has a stake in cooperation and, in any event, lacks the capacity to challenge the US. Still others predict the emergence of a modern multipolar world, one in which China, Europe, India, Japan and Russia join the US as dominant influences. This view ignores how the world has changed. There are literally dozens of meaningful power centres, including regional powers, international organisations, companies, media outlets, religious movements, terrorist organisations, drug cartels and non-governmental organisations. Today’s world is
increasingly one of distributed, rather than concentrated, power. The successor to unipolarity is neither bipolarity or multipolarity. It is non-polarity. Those who welcome America’s comeuppance and unipolarity’s replacement by non-polarity should hold their applause. Forging collective responses to global problems and making institutions work will be more

Relationships will be more difficult to build and sustain. The US will no longer have the luxury of a “You’re either with us or against us” foreign policy. But neither will anyone else. Only diplomacy that is more focused, creative and collective will prevent a non-polar world from becoming more disorderly and—dangerous.
difficult. Threats will multiply.