Rebecca MacKinnon's postings about work, reading, and ideas from 2004-2011.

November 16, 2011

Last month the U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk sent a letter to the Chinese government requesting information about its censorship practices. The middle kingdom’s response: a polite middle finger. Foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu declared that Chinese censorship follows “international practice.”

Her response is specious given that China operates the world’s most elaborate and opaque system of Internet censorship, as I describe in Chapter 3 of my forthcoming book. Yet Congress has been hard at work to bolster its legitimacy, however inadvertently. The reality is that the PROTECT IP Act now in the Senate, and a new House version called Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), would bring key features of China’s Great Firewall to America. Read my opinion piece in the New York Timesfor more details on how these bills would implement technical and legal solutions that would have the unfortunate result of making the Internet everywhere more like the Chinese Internet.

The House Judiciary Committee will hold a hearing on SOPA at 10am on Wednesday morning (a few hours from now). It will be webcast live on the committee website. The video should also be archived there after the event.

Opposition to SOPA is widespread, bipartisan, and international. The Center for Democracy and Technology is collecting links to blog posts, articles, as well as letters of opposition from human rights groups, Internet engineers, law professors, Internet companies, public interest advocates, consumer rights groups, among others. Allan Friedman at the Brookings Institution has an excellent paper explaining how SOPA and PROTECT IP will make the Internet less secure, sabotaging engineers' long-running efforts to increase the level of security in the global domain name system.

The New America Foundation (where I am a senior fellow) has signed an open letter to the House Judiciary Committee, along with a list of human rights, civil liberties and public interest groups. It argues:

We do not dispute that there are hubs of online infringement. But the definitions of the sites that would be subject to SOPA’s remedies are so broad that they would encompass far more than those bad actors profiting from infringement. By including all sites that may – even inadvertently – “facilitate” infringement, the bill raises serious concerns about overbreadth. Under section 102 of the bill, a nondomestic startup video-sharing site with thousands of innocent users sharing their own noninfringing videos, but a small minority who use the site to criminally infringe, could find its domain blocked by U.S. DNS operators. Countless non-infringing videos from the likes of aspiring artists, proud parents, citizen journalists, and human rights activists would be unduly swept up by such an action. Furthermore, overreach resulting from bill is more likely to impact the operators of smaller websites and services that do not have the legal capacity to fight false claims of infringement.

In Chapter 7 I describe my experience testifying at a March 2010 House Foreign Relations Committee hearing chaired by Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA). Berman happens to be one of SOPA’s key sponsors. While the hearing’s stated purpose was to discuss Google’s decision to halt censorship in China and how the United States can support global Internet freedom, committee members devoted considerable time to chastising a Google executive for failing to sufficiently police uploads to YouTube for infringing content. By their standards, YouTube and other similar user-driven sites clearly fall short of SOPA’s requirements. As I point out in the book, The cognitive dissonance on display at that hearing highlighted an inconvenient reality: politicians throughout the democratic world are pushing for stronger censorship and surveillance by Internet companies to stop the theft of intellectual property. They are doing so in response to aggressive lobbying by powerful corporate constituents without adequate consideration of the consequences for civil liberties, and for democracy more broadly.

The public interest letter details some of those consequences:

Relying on an even broader definition of “site dedicated to theft of US property,” section 103 of SOPA creates a private right of action of breathtaking scope. Any rightsholder could cut off the financial lifeblood of services such as search engines, user-generated content platforms, social media, and cloud-based storage unless those services actively monitor and police user activity to the rightsholder’s satisfaction.

In my op-ed I conclude:

The potential for abuse of power through digital networks — upon which we as citizens now depend for nearly everything, including our politics — is one of the most insidious threats to democracy in the Internet age. We live in a time of tremendous political polarization. Public trust in both government and corporations is low, and deservedly so. This is no time for politicians and industry lobbyists in Washington to be devising new Internet censorship mechanisms, adding new opportunities for abuse of corporate and government power over online speech. While American intellectual property deserves protection, that protection must be won and defended in a manner that does not stifle innovation, erode due process under the law, and weaken the protection of political and civil rights on the Internet.

I am not against copyright or intellectual property protection - I'm about to publish a copyrighted book. I hope that people will buy it. Its quality owes a great deal to the editors and other professionals whose job it was to help me shape and refine my argument, and to improve my prose. But I don't believe that the defense of my copyright should come at the expense of civil liberties. It is a moral imperative for democracies to find new and innovative ways to protect copyright in the Internet age without stifling the ability of citizens around the world to exercise their right to freedom of speech and assembly on the Internet.

October 20, 2011

On Sunday, Tunisia will hold elections for the constituent assembly that will be tasked with re-writing the country's constitution. While much of the news coverage focuses on the question of how well the Islamist parties will do in relation to the more secular political forces, reports are quoting election observers and human rights groups who are optimistic that people are serious about the process of holding a real election. While this first election is only the first step in a long and winding path that may or may not succeed in establishing a vibrant Arab democracy in North Africa, people are full of hope.

Censorship is a key subject in the Tunisian political discoure and debates. There have recently been protests by conservatives demanding censorship of all media including TV, film, and Internet and protests by liberals against censorship. After all Internet censorship was lifted when Ben Ali stepped down in January, some censorship of pornographic and incendiary web content returned in May, prompting heated debates over who has the authority to decide what goes on the censorship list and whether that power will inevitably be abused.

ATI (as the Tunisian Internet Agency is known according to its French acronym) was much reviled by activists under Ben Ali and nicknamed "Ammar 404" - the Arabic equivalent of "Joe 404," with "404" referring to the "404 page not found" error message that appears on browsers when a web page has been blocked. Now Mr. Chakchouk says he is trying to turn the agency into a "transparent" and "neutral" Internet exchange point (IXP) that can support a robust public discourse in an evolving new democracy. He wants to put an end to web filtering at the network level and instead provide tools and services for households to filter their home Internet if they so desire, without engaging in blanket censorship for the entire nation. In general, he believes that Tunisia must foster competition and innovation in Internet services. He wants Tunisia adopt global "best practices" in Internet governance.

After a Tunisian court ruled in May that some websites must be blocked, the ATI appealed the ruling twice, but lost both appeals. According to Jillian York it is making a further appeal to the highest court.

Click here for a video of his entire speech in French (perhaps somebody will give it English and Arabic subtitles at some point). Here is a shorter English interview he did immediately afterwards with Tunisia Online:

Whether Mr. Chakchouk will succeed or even keep his job, or whether the ATI will survive as an independent agency, Tunisian activists told me at the conference, will depend in no small part on the outcome of this weekend's elections and the continued political jockeying beyond.

Riadh Guerfali, co-founder of the citizen media platform Nawaat.org which played a key role in spreading protest information and who is now running as an independent candidate from his home town of Bizerte, has made Internet access and online free expression a key goal, as have many other former activists who are now running for office. On the other hand, there are other candidates - on both the left and the right - calling for Internet censorship as part of an effort to attract more conservative religious voters. Who will prevail in the election remains to be seen... and how the constituent assembly will choose to handle the questions of censorship and civil liberties when they write the constitution is even less clear.

"Information infrastructure is politics," writes Philip N. Howard of Washington State University in an excellent Brookings Institution report on authoritarian regimes and Internet controls. Tunisian politics over the coming year are likely to determine the shape of the country's information infrastructure - and decide just how different it will be from the past, or not. The shape of the infrastructure will in turn shape political discourse to the extent that it enables a full range of political viewpoints, debates, and even whistleblowing; or whether it enshrines censorship and surveillance mechanisms that can enable power-holders to subtly (or not so subtly) manipulate information and surveil Internet users.

September 14, 2010

Many companies go on the defensive or go into denial mode, head-in-the-sand mode, and even petulant adolescent mode when confronted by reports like this one in the Sunday New York Times. Not Microsoft. In the face of clear evidence that Microsoft has been used by Russian authorities to crack down on activists under a thinly veiled pretext of intellectual property enforcement, Microsoft reacted in a grown-up, responsible manner. Senior Vice President and General Counsel Brad Smith wrote a long blog post the very next day in which Microsoft accepted full responsibility and accountability for what has happened in Russia, launched an independent investigation, and announced that Microsoft will release a free blanket license for use of Microsoft software by non governmental organizations and take further measures to prevent authorities from raiding NGO offices on vague allegations of using pirated Microsoft software. The NYT follow-up story is here.

We've yet to see the text of the new blanket license. My understanding is that it will not be for global use, but rather is an emergency measure for use in specific countries where the kind of problem described in the NYT story has happened or is seriously likely to happen. Microsoft already has an existing program to donate free and legal software to NGO's which organizations all around the world can avail themselves of.

As a member of the Global Network Initiative (on whose board of directors I currently sit) Microsoft is coordinating closely with several human rights groups to try to ensure that the word gets out about the new blanket license as well as the existing software donation program, and is showing seriousness about making sure that vulnerable groups get the legal information and access to legal advice that they require. Efforts are also being made to make clear to authorities that Microsoft's concerns about piracy should not be used as a tool to crack down on political activism.

While Microsoft has received deserved praise and positive press for its rapid response, it is not escaping criticism. Alan Wexelblat at Copyfight points out correctly that human rights groups have been discussing the over-all problem with Microsoft for some time, but that Microsoft did not act forcefully enough until the bad publicity spurred them into action.

Unfortunately, this is the kind of thing that can happen with a big multinational corporation whose bread and butter depends on the sale of intellectual property. One can easily imagine how the people whose job it is to implement the company's GNI commitments to institutionalize respect and concern for human rights throughout all far-flung branches of Microsoft were not nearly as visible, audible, or powerful in the eyes of Microsoft's local employees and legal counsel compared to those sending a very strong message - with very concrete sets of incentives and disincentives - from headquarters about the need to combat software piracy. Of course, piracy is rampant in Russia and many other countries where human rights violations also happen to be rampant.

Intellectual property law professor Michael Geist discusses the broader problem of messaging and priorities not only by American multinationals but also by the U.S. government, whose trade policies are shaped by heavy lobbying by U.S. companies who are pushing for stronger global IP protections:

While the Microsoft response is a good one, it must be noted the abuse of IP enforcement is surely connected to efforts by the U.S. government and copyright lobby groups to actively encourage Russia to increase its IP enforcement. The US has regularly cited Russia in its Special 301 report, this year including it on the Priority Watch list. The IIPA, the industry lobby group that includes software associations,pushed the U.S. to target Russia, saying that is imperative that prosecutors bring more IPR cases. In fact, the IIPA complained that Russian authorities do not seize enough computers when conducting raids. On top of all this is the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, which will provide Russia with a template to follow on IP enforcement, including new seizure powers with less court oversight.

It has often been pointed out that the ACTA/Special 301 report approach seeks to export tougher enforcement measures - often to countries where free speech is not a given - without including the exceptions, due process, and balancing provisions. The recent Russian case highlights why this is such a dangerous and misguided approach that is apt to cause more problems than it solves.

Denise Howell at ZDNet adds her two cents about the controversial international treaty for intellectual property rights enforcement that the U.S. is negotiating with a select group of countries behind closed doors:

This story seems particularly timely given that finalization of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is imminent. Even without ACTA, a government in search of a pretext has all the tools it needs to ransack or seize computers in the name of protecting foreign copyright holders. ACTA promises to provide a whole new legal infrastructure and justification for such tactics, in addition to the myriad concerns it raises simply if enforced in a non-corrupt, as-intended manner

If the U.S. government's rhetoric about "Internet freedom" is sincere (and there are plenty of cynics who doubt it), it's time to stop sending contradictory, hypocritical messages about policy priorities - saying one thing and then acting in ways that send a rather different kind of message. Otherwise situations like the Microsoft Russia fiasco are just the beginning. It is essential that in the course of protecting intellectual property rights, due process, rule of law, and respect for free expression and privacy must be strengthened instead of eroded. Corporations and the trade negotiators who do their bidding need to understand that eroding democracy abroad and weakening it at home is an unacceptable price to pay for the protection of intellectual property. There has got to be a better and more balanced way forward. Policymakers are going to have to be much more innovative in their approaches to make sure that one policy isn't negating another. Companies need to adapt their business models and business practices not only to the irreversible realities of the Internet age, but also to a global business environment where markets are expanding fastest in places where corruption, thuggery and human rights violations are often the rule instead of the exception. That means taking a much more difficult, uncharted path forward. But the alternative is simply unacceptable.

If the copyright lobby gets their way with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) or ifgovernments continue to act on the claim that "piracy" demands sweeping changes to Internet privacy and freedom, then we can generalize the New York Times headline — "Russia Uses Microsoft to Suppress Dissent" — into something we'll surely see more often: "Regime Uses Copyright Violations to Curtail Freedoms."

This episode should remind legislators and policymakers worldwide of the real risk that powers enacted in the name of copyright enforcement can to be used to do real harm. Ensuring balance in copyright law is not just good copyright policy — it's necessary to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms worldwide.

It appears that quite a lot of people in China watched the live video stream. The links to the text, video, and an ad-hoc Chinese translation - published through Google Docs, no less - are also circulating widely.

Beijing is 12 hours ahead of Washignton and people are just getting up over there. Once more people have had time to read, watch and react, it will be interesting indeed to see what they have to say - and to what extent people's reactions get censored on Chinese domestic blog-hosting platforms, Baidu, etc.

On Twitter, blogger Lianyue offered his prediction for how the Chinese Foreign Ministry will respond: "1. The Chinese Internet is the freest of all. 2. Opinions not in agreement with #1 have violated Chinese national conditions and do not respect Chinese law, so we have the right to shut them down."

it’s encouraging to see Clinton and the State Department unambiguously on the right side of these issues. It’s hard to know whether there’s any concrete implications to these words today beyond a worthy set of aspirations. Here’s hoping the next step is a conversation about how we would move from the right intentions to real-world outcomes, not just on censorship, but on the provocative idea of the “freedom to connect” and the vision of a “new nervous system for the planet.”

It’s thrilling that a Secretary of State would claim “freedom to connect” as a basic human right. That’s a very bit [I think he meant "big"-RM] stake in the ground. Likewise, it’s sort of amazing that the State Department is funding the development of tools to help users circumvent government restrictions on access. On the negative side, it’s distressing (but not surprising) that the Secretary of State should be come against anonymity so we can track down copyright infringers. Of course, in response to a question she said that we have to strike a balance so that the anonymity of dissenters is protected even as the anonymity of file sharers is betrayed. I just don’t know how you do that.

I too thought Clinton's speech was a very welcome - even exciting - commitment by the Obama administration to advance and protect a single, free and open Internet. But like David I agree the most difficult part going forward won't be supporting circumvention tools for dissidents in obviously un-free nations. As I've been saying in numerous articles, blog posts, interviews, and panels over the past week, I think the toughest work will be in coordinating U.S. domestic and foreign policies so that you don't have some policies advancing Internet freedom while other policies - especially on copyright, child protection, crime, and terror - end up sending a very different kind of message about American priorities. It's easy to criticize Iran and China for censorship but much trickier to work with Italy, France, and a wide range of other U.S. allies and close trade partners to ensure that policies and laws surrounding Internet regulation and governance don't end up being counterproductive, despite being well-intentioned in the short term.

January 19, 2010

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton plans to give a big speech about Internet freedom on Thursday. People are calling on her to speak loudly against Chinese censorship and stand firm for free speech on the Chinese Internet - and elsewhere like Iran. I've been invited to attend and I'm also going to be on a post-game analysis panel. But before the fun and games begin, I might as well add my two cents to the suggestion pile.

The wrong message for Clinton to give on Thursday would be something to the effect of: "Never fear, netizens of China, America is here to free you!"

My dream speech would be about how the Internet poses a challenge to all governments and most companies (except those companies like Google whose business is built around that challenge). I would call on all governments to work together with citizens, companies and each other to build a globally interconnected, free and open network that enhances the lives of everybody on the planet, enables commerce and innovation by big and small players alike, makes everybody richer and freer, and improves all governments' relations with their citizens by making government more transparent, efficient, and thus more credible and legitimate.

I would quote Benjamin Franklin, who wrote in 1759: “Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.”

The speech would remind us all that all power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely, and that American democracy was built on this assumption. The Internet empowers governments and law enforcement agencies as well as citizens, upstart candidates, and dissidents. I would emphasize that the great challenge of our generation - as far as freedom is concerned - is to rediscover the right balance in the Internet age between society's need for security on the one hand, and the imperative of human rights and free expression on the other. Authoritarian nations obviously don't have the balance right which is why we consider them repressive. No democracy ever stops arguing internally about where the balance should be. But I would be honest about the fact that right now the world's democracies are arguing fiercely within and sometimes amongst themselves about where the right balance point should be in the Internet age. Wouldn't it be just so wonderful if the United States could take the lead in being honest rather than acting like the Lone Ranger on a white horse, much to the derision and cynicism of all my friends back in Asia, including the ones who hate their own governments?

The problem of censorship and surveillance is obviously many magnitudes worse when these things happen without a democratic political system, independent courts, and a free press. But as I've written here and here, I'm concerned that in the name of protecting children, fighting terror and preserving the intellectual property and pre-Internet business models of companies with deep pockets and powerful lobbies, Western democracies are going too far in enabling censorship and surveillance, in a way that in turn empowers and justifies what the Chinese and other authoritarian governments are doing. A few years ago China used to deny censoring because it wasn't something a government wanted to admit in polite company. Now they proudly respond to questions about their Internet policies along the lines of: "We're merely exercising our sovereign right just like everybody else. F-off."

The U.S. congress is getting energized again to make it illegal for U.S. companies to cooperate with surveillance in "internet-restricting countries" (an ever-growing list which - depending on how you define "internet-restricting" which one could argue over endlessly - includes a growing number of democracies and close U.S. trade partners). Yesterday Glenn Greenwald brought up a chillingly ironic fact about corporate collaboration with surveillance in America:

all of the sponsors of the pending bill to ban American companies from collaborating with domestic Internet spying in foreign countries -- the inspirationally-named Global Online Freedom Act of 2009 -- voted in favor of the 2008 bill to legalize what had been the illegal warrantless interception of emails and to immunize telecoms which helped our own government break the law in how it spied on Americans.

I will leave it there, and cross my fingers for Thursday. Meanwhile if you want a warm-up, I'll be speaking on a panel with Evgeny Morozov, Jim Fallows, Tim Wu and Sec. Clinton's special adviser Alec Ross at the New America Foundation tomorrow morning at 9:30am Eastern. The live webcast will be here.

January 27, 2009

Welcome to U.S.-China relations! You didn't even mention China in your inaugural address, but the Chinese censors still took it personally. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner's remarks in his confirmation hearing about currency manipulation have got everyone in a tizzy. We're off to a rollicking start!

People in China are watching closely -- and starting to debate -- whether your administration's pursuit of America's economic interests will help or hurt their own.

China is obviously not a democracy. Even so, if you really want to take U.S.-China relations to a new strategic level that rises above the day-to-day issues, you need to find new ways to engage the Chinese people themselves -- not just their government.

Normalization of U.S.-China relations in 1979, combined with economic reforms and opening, transformed the Chinese people's lives. Chinese of our generation understand this. But their children take their opportunities and comforts for granted. They don't necessarily see the U.S. as a symbol of hope or a target of aspirations the way their parents did.

It is this young generation born after 1980 who were most vocal on the Chinese Internet last year, lashing out against Western critics and Western media coverage of their government's crackdown in Tibet. In response to international pressure, the Chinese government negotiated with the Dalai Lama, but it didn't feel the need to concede anything meaningful. In maintaining a hard line, the Chinese leadership could feel doubly secure in the fact that, not only did they have the strength of the People's Liberation Army and the People's Armed Police on their side; China's majority Han-Chinese public had no sympathy for the idea of Tibetan autonomy.

Chinese leaders listen selectively to public opinion, and sometimes those opinions actually give them an extra excuse to tell the U.S. where to shove it. While Americans tend to think of the Internet as the medium that will inevitably free the Chinese people of authoritarian rule, Chinese leaders have -- for many years now -- been going there for proof that the public wants them to be tougher with the U.S. Back in 2001 a U.S. spyplane made an emergency landing on Hainan island after a collision with a Chinese fighter jet which crashed into the sea. If people in the Chinese Internet chatrooms had gotten their way, the U.S. crew would be in a Chinese jail today. In a recent interview with The Atlantic's James Fallows, the President of the China Investment Corporation Gao Xiqing pointed out that his P.R. department is inundated with public comments calling for him to sell U.S. dollar assets.

The point is that while these people are not citizens of a democracy, they are by no means an undifferentiated mass of brainwashed drones. Despite often crude censorship of the Internet and state-run media, despite manipulation, intimidation of dissidents and political astro-turfing of the blogosphere by paid commentators, there is no unity of thought in China today. Civic minded citizens manage to hold wide-ranging debates on the Chinese Internet, in living rooms, dormitories, office break rooms, and classrooms about many public issues. Reading the Chinese blogs I've found all kinds of views about you and your new administration. Many are inspired by your personal story and the idea of truly equal opportunity that you represent. Others hope that you will be more forthright and principled on human rights issues than the Bush administration was. Others are very concerned that you will be protectionist in order to help the American people in the short run, and that this will hurt the Chinese people economically. Others lament cynically that no matter what happens, the rich and powerful in both countries will be the relationship's main beneficiaries.

The Chinese government will have greater incentive to work with you on creative solutions to complex problems if your diplomats can do a better job of reassuring ordinary Chinese that you do actually care whether U.S.-China policy outcomes will benefit them -- not just China's commercial and political elites. Right now, frankly, they're not convinced. One-way monologues through the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia don't have much street cred with China's Internet generation, to be honest. It's time to upgrade your public diplomacy strategy for the 21st Century.

Just as you have used new technology to engage with the American electorate, your China policy can be greatly strengthened if you conduct a real conversation with the Chinese people. Listen as much as you talk; provide a much-needed platform for open discussion. The U.S. embassy in Beijing should build a Chinese-language website modeled after change.gov, focused not just on U.S.-China relations, but on the range of concerns and interests - from environment, to food safety, to factory safety standards, to education and real estate law -- shared by ordinary Chinese and Americans. Some linguistically talented State Department employees should start blogging in Chinese. Open up the comments sections, see how the Chinese blogosphere responds, then respond to them in turn. Translate some of the Chinese conversation into English for Americans to read and react, then translate it back. Sure there will be censorship problems on the Chinese side, but if enough Chinese find the conversation important and relevant to their lives, the censors ultimately won't be able to stop it. Nor should they want to if they're wise - because the resulting conversation would help both governments build a more stable and rational relationship that would truly benefit the people of both countries.

January 20, 2009

When China's first Premier Zhou Enlai was asked in the mid-20th century for his opinion on the historical significance of the 1789 French Revolution, he is said to have replied: "It's too soon to tell." I've started to give the same answer when people ask me about Charter 08. It's way too soon. It could be completely forgotten a year from now. Or it may be viewed by future historians as one of many arguments - some theoretical, some concrete, some practical - that helped advance and shape the Chinese people's emergent debate about their future. Some hope that this "principled blueprint for change may yet inspire other Chinese to see the hollowness of the party's promises of wealth over the universal promise of freedom." We'll see. If forced to bet this week on one of those three, my money goes for scenario number two.

On December 18th, President Hu Jintao delivered the CCP's first rebuttal to Charter 08 and its call for multi-party democracy. He insisted that China will never copy Western political institutions, and echoed Deng Xiaoping's assertion that "only development makes hard sense." His point was that only the economic pragmatism and political stability brought by the Communist Party's rule would enable the Chinese people to achieve prosperity and fulfill their dreams. On Sunday the party's second rebuttal to Charter 08 (full Chinese text here) came from China's number-four leader Jia Qinglin, in the form of a long essay in the Communist Party's main ideological journal, Qiushi ["Seeking Truth"]. The essay takes Hu's speech a step further. Hu said that China' won't copy Western multiparty democracy; Jia's article seems like a call to start digging trenches for an upcoming fight. According to Reuters' translation of one passage, the Party must "build a line of defence to resist Western two-party and multi-party systems, bicameral legislature, the separation of powers and other kinds of erroneous ideological interferences," and "consciously abide by the Party's political discipline and resolutely safeguard the Party's centralised unity."

Does this imply that Party unity is a little shaky lately? Or is it just a preemptive warning in case anybody was getting any wrong ideas about the Party's tolerance levels for political reform debates? I'm not enough of an insider to know.

Meanwhile, very far outside the Party, Charter 08 supporters are derisive. Chengdu-based intellectual Ruan Yunfei pulled no punches in his Monday-morning reaction to Jia, going so far as to write: 凡是反对公正公开公平竞争者，都是民众利益之敌. "Anybody who opposes just, open, and fair competition is the enemy of the people's interests." He wonders rightly how a government that claims with such certitude to be the best thing for the Chinese people can be so afraid of competition.

It has not been possible for the Chinese people to debate China's political future fully and openly. As Uln at the Chinayouren blog points out, China's net nannies are doing their best to scrub mentions of Charter 08 from the parts of the Internet they have some control over. Still, debates are happening. In spite of censorship, many people have managed to find their way to the document and many have managed to blog about why they did or didn't sign Charter 08. Xujun Eberlein has a good summary of the wide gamut of opinions about the Charter that can be found around the Chinese-language internet. Even some people who agreed with the charter and were brave enough to sign it sometimes felt the need to qualify their support. One example is the Beijing-based blogger who goes by the pen name Doubleaf:

In summary, he warns that the last time China's intellectuals got swept up in an idealistic belief that changing the political system would solve China's problems was in 1949, when the Communist revolution happened. He argues that changing China's political system won't on its own be enough to solve China's urgent problems of education, environment, and poverty.

Roland Soong at ESWN has a detailed analysis of why "there is no groundswell of popular support flowing from inside China." He argues that the "class of enlightened intellectuals" who form the main drafters and supporters of the Charter are only one of nine different socio-political categories of people in China today. Among the points he makes: the majority of China's population is made of peasant farmers who, while having the "lowest social status" in China are less likely to be attracted by liberal political theory and "most easily attracted by the leftists to engage in a new revolution to "re-distribute the land/wealth." If social change is to occur through the combined efforts of the laborers and peasants, China will repeat its history from the late 1940's." He also argues that Charter 08 does not sufficiently appeal to China's materialistic middle-class:

They are amendable to reforming the political systems, provided that their present situations won't be negatively affected as a result. What guarantees does Charter 08 offer them? Oh, let's get rid of the Communists, we'll have an American democratic system, we'll only elections based upon universal suffrage and then corruption will be gone and we will all be even more prosperous? Hmmm ... Instead of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, we can elect our own presidents and premiers just like they do in USA and Taiwan. Hmmm ... Do you really think that George W. Bush and Chen Shui-bian will be better for China?

In Washington, many foreign policy thought-leaders like political scientist Daniel Drezner seem to think that Charter 08 could be the rallying cry for revolution in short order, and that it has direct parallels with Czechoslovakia's Charter 77. Roland agrees with Dave at Mutant Palm (who lives and works in Quanzhou and doesn't see people there getting worked up about Charter 08) that "Charter ‘08 arguably has had a more significant impact on readers of the New York Review of Books than it has on China." Roland translated this very useful analysis published on an overseas-Chinese website comparing Charter 08 and Charter 77. The author's conclusion is worth quoting at length:

Czechoslovakia had a long tradition of freedom, democracy and human rights. This tradition was suppressed by the Communist authorities, but it continued to exist underneath the surface. Once triggered, it became a raging river. The situation in Czechoslovakia back then is somewhat similar to China when the Cultural Revolution ended and the reforms were beginning. At the time, the intellectuals thought that the western world was paradise. Thirty years later, the Chinese people no longer believe in the much self-ballyhooed western ideology. There have been too many examples of third-wave transitions to democracy that failed, of which Taiwan is one.

The eastern European countries also resented deeply the hegemonic Russian empire. Charter 77 seemed to be directed against the Czechoslovak Communist Party but it was actually aimed at the Soviet Russian masters behind the scene. But there are no puppet masters behind the Chinese Communists. On the contrary, the Chinese people who signed Charter 08 are getting the most encouragement and praises from the western world, and this will naturally lead to nationalistic resentment.

In summary, Chinese society is highly complex with many diverse interests being involved. This is unlike the relatively closed societies in eastern European back then, where the classes are clearly defined, the culturati and intelligentsia are prominent and draw huge public attention with their speeches.

On a recent trip to Beijing and Shanghai, I asked a lot of Chinese friends about Charter 08. While Charter 08 may have been modeled after Charter 77, none of the people I spoke with who considered themselves sympathetic or supportive of Charter 08, and who knew something about Cold War era Eastern Europe, actually believed that the conditions surrounding Charter 77 and the conditions surrounding Charter 08 are remotely similar. Despite being run by a party that dubiously calls itself "communist" and which falls in to the general category of "authoritarian" (which encompasses a wide variety of relationships between people and their non-democratically elected governments), China has few similarities to Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe. What's more, thanks to the Internet, there is a great deal more political discourse and deliberation going on in China today than there was in Czechoslovakia of 1977. Democracy, it's certainly not. But China's political culture is not the same as Eastern Europe's during the cold war.

Still, I'm not ready to dismiss Charter 08 as meaningless. As daughter of a professor of modern Chinese history, I found much food for thought in a blog post by historian-blogger Jeremiah Jenne: Cai Yuanpei and Charter 08. A turn-of-the-century Chinese intellectual, Cai was a catalyst for much intellectual and political ferment in his day, though the majority of Chinese at the time never heard of him nor gave a toss. His actions in the short term had no direct relevance or appeal for the majority of Chinese at the time. Eventually however the elite intellectual activities he facilitated contributed to the May Fourth Movement and a major watershed in Chinese history. Jeremiah concludes:

But to dismiss the importance of Charter 08 because it is the product of a single class (or sub-group within that class) is to miss a lesson of history. With a nod to Margaret Mead, I might suggest that modern Chinese history has had its own share of small groups of committed individuals whose ideas did not receive their due when first published or spoken but whom we now look back upon as transformational figures: Wang Tao, Yan Fu, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Sun Yat-sen, Li Dazhao, even Mao Zedong. This is not to say that the authors of Charter 08 are destined to enter such a hallowed pantheon, only that history warns us not to immediately dismiss their ideas because “only” 2000 intellectuals signed the document.

Of the Chinese friends I've spoken with about Charter 08, only those who fall into Roland's category of "enlightened intellectuals" had either heard of the Charter or thought about it very much. As signatory Dai Qing points out, Charter 08 is fairly moderate in that, while it calls for multi-party democracy, it's not a call for immediate revolution. (Note that the Falun Gong have decided not to support it.) That is likely also a reason why only one person involved with Charter 08, Liu Xiaobo, has been arrested despite thousands of signatories - though arresting even one person over such a non-violent and moderate document is unacceptable.

Even among people who agreed with most or all of the Charter's content, many said they felt its impact would be limited because it has no practical component. As one 20-something person who works in publishing put it: "It's performance art. There is no practical strategy for how its goals can be achieved." China is now at Point A. Charter 08 envisions Point B. But how do you get from here to there? There is no proposed plan and no consensus. Most of the people I spoke with who would like China to become a multiparty democracy with independent judiciary some day felt that a sudden overthrow of the current government would not be conducive to greater human rights protections and informed democratic discourse in the long run. (Most Chinese who admit to wanting rapid regime change don't live in China.) Right now, while the current system is corrupt and is failing many of its citizens in the rural areas especially, many pro-democracy intellectuals are concerned that no alternative groups have the governance and leadership capacity, because they've not been able to build that capacity. Plus, a critical mass of business and cultural elites have benefitted materially from their relationships with the current regime, they're proud of the fact that China's economic strength brings them respect around the world, and things would have to get one heck of a lot worse before they'd be interested in facing off against the powers that be.

"It's like we're passengers on a plane that was hijacked in 1949," said one friend. "But if we kill the hijackers, we crash the plane because we don't know how to fly it ourselves. So we have to slowly negotiate." The passengers know that the hijackers don't want to die so that gives some negotiating leverage. Now the passengers have to convince the hijackers that its in their interest to land the plane safely at their desired destination. The problem is, the hijackers won't allow the passengers to vote on the desired destination and some of the people who have emerged as passenger advocates and leaders wonder if it really makes sense to have everybody on the plane vote on their desired destination at this point.

Most people I've spoken with are not particularly optimistic that China will attain the goals outlined in Charter 08 any time soon, and some were skeptical that China ever will. Many felt that the first step is to build platforms that enable the Chinese people to engage in an informed discourse about their future so that concrete solutions and strategies for getting from A to B - or perhaps to some other Point C - can eventually emerge. The Internet is already facilitating a great deal of discourse, despite all the censorship, propaganda, nationalism, manipulation, and cyber-mob behavior. A more constructive discourse would be possible, many argue, if a law could be passed upholding the right of journalists to do their jobs. Thus some people are focusing on building professionalism and improving the quality of Chinese journalism, and trying to push for more media freedoms. Another step, which I heard from many people, was the need to build a stronger sense of citizenship throughout Chinese society: people need to take responsibility for the problems they see around them, and get in the habit of doing what they can to help improve whatever is in their power to improve, however small. Not to change the whole country right away, but to make small changes in their own communities. Efforts by Zhang Shihe aka "Tiger Temple" to raise money to help petitioners and vagrants in Beijing is one small example. Another better known example is the spontaneous relief effort that rose up around the Sichuan earthquake. Finally, there is the heroic work being done by China's growing group of rights-defense lawyers such as Xu Zhiyong, Teng Biao, and Liu Xiaoyuan who are doing what they can to educate the public about the rights they are already supposed to have under China's existing laws and constitution, and who are trying to advocate for the upholding of those rights. As Dai Qing told me: "Everybody needs to take responsibility as a citizen, and use their own unique strengths and professional skills to help improve the country in whatever small way we can... We can slowly build the road stone by stone."

Artist Ai Weiwei, who told me he wants to devote all his time to political activity from now on, is one of the few who was optimistic that major change is possible in the near term. (Since he didn't mind speaking completely on the record, I'll be posting longer excerpts from my conversation with him soon.) When I asked him about Charter 08's lack of practical strategy, he replied:

Society needs different people to voice opinions, to voice strategy, to have technical ideas... Its just like in a war, some people blow horns, some shoot the guns, other build the roads. People have different roles. Right? Thomas Jefferson in 1776, when he wrote the Declaration of Independence did he know how to build the road? He had no idea. He simply said that all men are created equal, we need to throw off the shackles of occupation, we need freedom of speech, and that citizens have the right to form their own government. At the time nobody had any idea how to make it happen.

I'm not ready to equate Charter 08 with the Declaration of Independence. Like Charter 77, much of its momentum and appeal had to do with resistance against a foreign colonial force or hegemon. Foreign occupation is no longer one of China's problems - a fact from which the Communist Party derives a lot of its legitimacy. The CCP claims to have played a starring role in solving that one. Few people who went through China's education system are inclined to dispute or question that claim, whatever they think about China's current problems and the reasons for them.

Which brings me back to history, and Jeremiah's blog. His last post marked the 80th anniversary of the death of another historical figure, reformer Liang Qichao. He concludes:

It’s hard to say if the PRC would have met with [Liang's] approval. The founding in 1949 at least fulfilled one of two conditions of political consciousness about which Liang was so optimistic twenty years earlier, “That all who are not Chinese lack the right to control Chinese affairs,” even as the CCP failed (and continues to fail) to fulfill the second, “All Chinese have a right to control Chinese affairs.”

Will the Chinese people accomplish this second condition in the 21st Century? It's possible. How will they do it? Will China will be governed as Charter 08 recommends? Or in some other way that might truly represent the will of the people? Hard to say.

One thing Charter 08 has going for it is that it sets out a clear set of goals. Other than getting rich and having a strong country respected by the world, the CCP has not drawn up a clear alternative narrative for what China's future should look like - beyond more of the same which equals more money at least for those who "get rich first" as Deng liked put it. The CCP has not provided a convincing rebuttal to critics who say that economic development is not sufficient to solve human rights problems, corruption, and growing social inequality, and that the current trajectory is in the long run unsustainable. The leadership effectively asks that the Chinese people continue to have faith in them because there's no alternative. That argument will likely tide things over for while, maybe quite a while still, assisted by censorship, surveillance, and the People's Armed Police. But in the longer run, will they figure out how to evolve in order to fit the Chinese people's growing needs? Or will the CCP eventually be shed like a skin that gets unbearably tight?

Deng saved the CCP from one possible skin-shedding in 1978 by making a major adjustment to the Party's whole basis of legitimacy. It's unclear whether the current crowd has what it takes to pull off the same feat. Meanwhile the skin is getting tighter. Charter 08 is perhaps one of many symptoms. But there are many other symptoms, many of which are better known to ordinary Chinese beyond the "awakened intellectual" class. They include massive groundswell of public sympathy around the case of Yang Jia, who was recently executed for killing six police, and whose mother was spirited away to a mental institution during his appeal. Other symptoms include very specific things like anger about Chinese New Year train ticket management. Another is the Sanlu melaminepoisoned milk scandal, in which thousands of babies could have been spared from deadly kidney problems if investigative journalists had been allowed to do their jobs last Spring. The regime is taking bigger hits to its legitimacy from those things than from Charter 08 right now. These are the kinds of things most likely to inspire people to take specific actions... whether those actions will take China in the direction of Charter 08's goals or some other direction, who knows. It's too soon to tell.

June 29, 2008

The public part of the Global Voices Summit is over, and the blog posts about it are piling up around the web. But the meeting continues for GV project participants, website contributors, editors, and others who are actively involved with our growing citizen media community. We're nearing Day 1 of two days of internal planning and brainstorming meetings in which we try to figure out where to take the project in the future. Ethan has a great post about the techniques David Sasaki, Georgia Popplewell and Solana Larsen have devised to unearth ideas and foster discussion amongst this multi-cultural, multi-lingual group.

I was almost brought to tears yesterday during the first panel, devoted to work by members of the Rising Voices project. Led by David Sasaki, Rising Voices is funded by a grant from the Knight Foundation. It gives micro-grants to promote blogging among groups of people who are - for various reasons, cultural, economic, linguistic, gender - not taking advantage of the opportunity to express themselves online. After Global Voices was created, there has always been concern by many people in our community that blogospheres in most countries are dominated by wired elites - and that unless we conduct more active outreach, Global Voices is really "Global Elite Voices." Rising voices it our first stab at addressing that problem. Ethan writes that he is "blown away" by the work being done by Rising Voices grantees. Click here for summaries of all the projects and here to watch videos of all the projects. Also see the RV Introduction to Global Citizen Media. But before you click on any of those links, watch this video: