Sixth Circuit Appellate Bloghttps://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com
Fri, 24 May 2019 23:06:30 +0000en-UShourly1https://wordpress.org/?v=4.9.10Subscribe with My Yahoo!Subscribe with NewsGatorSubscribe with My AOLSubscribe with BloglinesSubscribe with NetvibesSubscribe with GoogleSubscribe with PageflakesSubscribe with PlusmoSubscribe with The Free DictionarySubscribe with Bitty BrowserSubscribe with Live.comSubscribe with Excite MIXSubscribe with WebwagSubscribe with Podcast ReadySubscribe with WikioSubscribe with Daily RotationLast Week at the 6th Circuit: Substantive unreasonableness, maiden voyages, and railroaded state lawhttp://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/6thCircuitAppellateBlog/~3/4b88YabJP3M/
https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/case-updates/last-week-at-the-6th-circuit-substantive-unreasonableness-maiden-voyages-and-railroaded-state-law/#respondTue, 21 May 2019 18:03:42 +0000https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/?p=6189Continue Reading]]>No arguments at the court last week, but we received 13 published opinions and 9 unpublished opinions. Plus, as we’ll discuss later this week, one white-hot denial from en banc review that produced four separate opinions. Here’s what you may have missed:

A substantively unreasonable sentence – A divided Sixth Circuit panel vacated the sentence of Davian Warren as substantively unreasonable(!) in United States v. Warren. That doesn’t happen every day. Though Warren, the government, and the Guidelines all agreed that a 51-to-63-month sentence was appropriate, the district court imposed the statutory maximum of 120 months’ imprisonment, relying heavily on Warren’s extensive criminal history.

Chief Judge Guy Cole, joined by Judge Bernice Donald, reasoned in this unpublished opinion that the sentencing guidelines already considered Warren’s criminal history. Effectively double-counting that factor could not “justify such a stark departure from the guidelines. Judge Batchelder dissented, emphasizing Warren’s “stunning eleven felony convictions over nine years,” making the upward departure “necessary to protect the public.”

A not substantively unreasonable sentence – As Warren shows, a sentence can be unreasonably long. But, if a sentence is at the bottom of the proposed Sentencing Guidelines range, it is (presumptively) not unreasonable. As brand-new Judge Chad Readler wrote in United States v. Muchow, only if the district court acted in an “arbitrary manner, considered impermissible factors, or assigned unreasonable weight to a permissible factor” can a sentence be considered unreasonable. Otherwise, a sentence within the Guidelines (such as this child-porn sentence of 21+ years for a single count) is presumptively reasonable. This concise affirmance, joined by Chief Judge Cole and Judge Stranch, serves as Judge Readler’s introduction to the F.3d—his first published opinion.

And who doesn’t love a good railroad case? City councils and subsidiaritans, that’s who.

In 1966, the city of Sebree, Kentucky enacted an ordinance requiring CSX’s predecessor to obtain approval before undertaking maintenance or construction that would change the grade of the city’s railroad crossings. On Tuesday, however, a unanimous panel in CSX Transportation v. Sebree held the ordinance was void and preempted by federal law.

Because the ordinance would force CSX “to utilize a maintenance method that is no longer safe”—removing rather than replacing fouled ballast from underneath the tracks—Judges Cole, Batchelder, and Donald held the law was void as against public policy. The federal Termination Act, moreover, grants the Surface Transportation Board exclusive jurisdiction over the construction and operation of railroads. Because the scope of the Termination Act’s preemption provision broadly applies to any state law “managing or governing rail transportation,” the ordinance fell for this second reason as well.

]]>https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/case-updates/last-week-at-the-6th-circuit-substantive-unreasonableness-maiden-voyages-and-railroaded-state-law/feed/0benjamin.beaton@squirepb.comhttps://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/case-updates/last-week-at-the-6th-circuit-substantive-unreasonableness-maiden-voyages-and-railroaded-state-law/Sixth Circuit Vacates Convictions Due to “Flagrant Misconduct” by Prosecutorhttp://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/6thCircuitAppellateBlog/~3/cBOigBc_v6o/
https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/recent-cases/6184/#respondFri, 17 May 2019 14:04:22 +0000https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/?p=6184Continue Reading]]>On Wednesday, the Sixth Circuit vacated the convictions of two defendants charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Although there was sufficient evidence to support their convictions, the Court held—on plain error review—that certain “remarks made by the prosecutor rose to the level of flagrant misconduct and deprived [defendants] of a fair trial.”

Writing for the panel, Judge John K. Bush identified nine improper and prejudicial remarks made by the prosecutor. Three of those statements constituted improper vouching or bolstering of government witnesses (e.g., asserting a detective was “a fine young man” who “testified very well, he understood and remembered everything he did”). An additional three statements constituted improper attacks on the credibility of defense witnesses (e.g., asserting a key defense witnesses was “a proven liar” who was “lying” from the stand).

The final three statements were perhaps the most interesting. During a search of defendants’ home, police found “a shrine to a statue of Jesus Malverde,” who is apparently the patron saint of marijuana dealers. The prosecutor repeatedly referenced this statue at trial, describing it as an “idol” worshipped by “drug traffickers” and asking whether defendant “prayed” to the idol for protection from police. The prosecutor also asked the defendant whether he understood, as “a Catholic believer,” “that there is a Commandment that says thou shall not have any god before me.” The prosecutor referenced the same drug “deity” and Commandment during closing argument.

These comments were plainly improper, Judge Bush explained, because they were “utterly irrelevant” to the question of guilt and appeared intended to arouse the passions and prejudices of the jury. The Court could find “no nonprejudicial explanation” for the prosecutor’s references to the Ten Commandments. And to the extent the prosecutor offered such statements to impeach defendant’s credibility, Federal Rule of Evidence 610 specifically prohibited such attacks. (“Evidence of a witness’s religious beliefs or opinions is not admissible to attack or support the witness’s credibility.”)

Defense counsel had not objected to any of the improper remarks at trial, but the Court held they were sufficiently “flagrant” to constitute plain error. Judge Kethledge and Judge White joined Judge Bush’s opinion. In a separate concurrence, Judge White (joined by Judge Kethledge) explained that in her view, “the prosecutor’s questions and argument regarding [defendant’s] religious practices and beliefs necessitate reversal in and of themselves.”

Trial lawyers throughout the Sixth Circuit should be aware of this decision, which (as Judge Bush noted) illustrates the difference between a prosecutor striking “hard blows” and “foul ones.” The case is United States v. Acosta, available here.

]]>https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/recent-cases/6184/feed/0scott.coyle@squirepb.comhttps://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/recent-cases/6184/Squire Patton Boggs’ new appellate co-chairshttp://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/6thCircuitAppellateBlog/~3/-uAKHFeRFTg/
https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis/squire-patton-boggs-new-appellate-co-chairs/#respondThu, 16 May 2019 16:04:38 +0000https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/?p=6182Continue Reading]]>We are pleased to announce that Squire Patton Boggs’ appellate practice group has two new co-chairs: Benjamin Beaton and Lauren Kuley. Lauren and Ben have deep experience with winning big appeals and critical motions in courts around the country. They follow Pierre Bergeron who, our readers know, is now a judge on the Ohio First District Court of Appeals. You can read our official press release after the jump. Thanks for reading the Sixth Circuit Appellate Blog – and please keep in touch!

Squire Patton Boggs is pleased to announce the appointment of partners Benjamin Beaton and Lauren S. Kuley as co-chairs of the firm’s Appellate Practice, effective immediately.

Kuley and Beaton will coordinate a national appellate practice that spans 17 locations in the US. Squire Patton Boggs litigators – including lawyers who have served as US Supreme Court clerks, California’s deputy solicitor general and high-ranking federal officials – have recently notched major victories at the US Supreme Court and several US Courts of Appeals, state supreme courts and regulatory agencies. Kuley and Beaton worked in the appellate group alongside now-Judge Pierre Bergeron, and have practiced extensively before appellate courts nationwide.

Beaton began his legal career as a law clerk for Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg at the US Supreme Court and Judge Raymond Randolph at the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit. Joining from Sidley Austin’s appellate group in 2018, he has litigated in courts across the country, focusing on regulatory challenges, healthcare appeals and complex commercial disputes. Earlier in his career, he served as an aide in the US House of Representatives and at a healthcare regulatory agency. Beaton graduated from Columbia Law School and Centre College.

Kuley previously served in the Ohio Solicitor General’s office and as a law clerk for Judge Karen Nelson Moore of the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. While at Squire Patton Boggs, she has handled appeals in the US Supreme Court and appellate courts nationwide, with a focus on complex commercial, healthcare and white collar appeals. Kuley is also an adjunct professor at the University of Cincinnati College of Law, where she teaches appellate practice and represents indigent individuals. She has served on the Steering Committee for the Federal Bar Association’s Sixth Circuit Appellate Practice Institute. Kuley graduated from Harvard Law School and Harvard College.

“Well-respected litigators and appellate practitioners, Lauren and Ben each brings a unique skill set that will make a dynamic leadership team,” said John A. Burlingame, global co-chair of the Litigation Practice. “Lauren and Ben have demonstrated preeminence in client service, collaboration and work ethic, and we are confident this practice group will continue to succeed under their guidance.”

“Our appellate practice is marrying the Squire Patton Boggs global platform with our local appellate expertise in important courts all across the country, from California to New York to Washington DC to Florida and places in between. No matter where our clients’ needs take us, our talented appellate colleagues are ready to provide sophisticated legal advocacy before, during and after trial,” said Beaton.

“With our skills and experience as appellate advocates, our dynamic team delivers top results – often after things have gone very wrong in another court. And while we have secured reversals of landmark judgments on appeal, we have also worked closely with trial teams to preserve and avoid appellate issues where there is significant exposure,” added Kuley.

]]>https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis/squire-patton-boggs-new-appellate-co-chairs/feed/0colter.paulson@squirepb.com, scott.coyle@squirepb.comhttps://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis/squire-patton-boggs-new-appellate-co-chairs/Last week at the Sixth Circuit: Suspended licenses, (Dis)honor Codes, and Re-redistrictinghttp://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/6thCircuitAppellateBlog/~3/GwW6p6u5kJY/
https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/recent-cases/last-week-at-the-sixth-circuit-suspended-licenses-dishonor-codes-and-re-redistricting/#respondWed, 15 May 2019 18:22:16 +0000https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/?p=6172Continue Reading]]>Showing no signs of a Kentucky Derby hangover (or any follow-on litigation, at least not yet), last week the court wrapped up arguments during the second half of its May sitting. Your quick recap:

A rational basis for suspended licenses – In a blow to con-law professors and indigent drivers, a divided panel held in Fowler v. Benson that Michigan may suspend drivers licenses for unpaid fines. The trial court had granted a class of low-income Michiganders an injunction barring the state from suspending licenses without providing an “ability to pay” hearing and alternative payment plans.

Judge Alice Batchelder’s opinion, joined by Judge Amul Thapar, rejected the notion that state law recognizes a property interest in an indigency hearing. The majority held that Michigan’s policy, by incentivizing payment, survives “rational-basis review” (a notoriously low hurdle) under the Due Process Clause.

Judge Bernice Donald, in full-throated dissent (“I dissent!”), distinguished the “protected property interest in the continued possession of a driver’s license” from the procedures offered to protect that interest. Her opinion also questioned the “likel[ihood] that Michigan will recover [its] costs”—asking how those too poor to pay could drive to work on a suspended license and earn the money they owed.

Largely unmentioned, but hovering over these dueling Due Process opinions, is the Supreme Court’s decision decades ago—in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973)—that wealth is not a suspect classification triggering strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.

Cat’s paw liability under Title IX – On Thursday, a Sixth Circuit panel heard oral argument in Bose v. Bea, a Title IX appeal arising from a Rhodes College student’s expulsion for an honor code violation

The student alleges she declined the sexual advances of a professor, who then retaliated by framing her for cheating on a quiz. The Rhodes College Honor Council expelled the student, and she sued for sex discrimination under Title IX.

On summary judgment, the district court held that respondeat superior and constructive notice could not link a professor’s discriminatory motive to the college’s adverse action. Judges Eugene Siler, Joan Larsen, and John Nalbandian will now decide whether and how the “cat’s paw theory” (and Tennessee’s judicial-privilege rule) apply to private disciplinary proceedings. This marks a return to Title IX for the court, which last year held in a closely watched decision that a right to cross-examination applies in university disciplinary hearings.

Who decides the district lines? The next partisan gerrymandering fight is on its way from the Southern District of Ohio to the Supreme Court. On May 3rd, a three-judge panel unanimously held that Ohio’s congressional district map is an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. The court held that the map—which splits 23 counties and 73 cities—“sacrifices traditional redistricting principles in order to maximize pro-Republican partisan advantage.”

The panel, which included Circuit Judge Karen Nelson Moore and District Judges Black and Watson, ordered the Ohio General Assembly to draw a new map by June 14th. But Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost has filed a direct appeal (not a cert petition; Supreme Court review is mandatory) with the U.S. Supreme Court. Ohio’s request to stay the redistricting deadline is awaiting a response.

Earlier this term, the Supreme Court heard argument in related gerrymandering cases from North Carolina and Maryland. The Supreme Court should render a decision in these cases before July. Though just last year it managed to back away—twice—from Justice Frankfurter’s “political thicket,” by avoiding a substantive decision in two argued cases challenging Wisconsin and Maryland maps.

Before Justice Kavanaugh’s arrival, his former boss had written “[t]hat a workable standard for measuring a gerrymander’s burden on representational rights has not yet emerged does not mean that none will emerge in the future.” Rather oracular, and totally vexing for those drawing map lines and practicing political law. Ohio and the plaintiffs soon should (might?) learn whether partisan-gerrymandering claims are justiciable. And if so—which is a very big “if”—how partisan is too partisan under the Constitution.

]]>https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/recent-cases/last-week-at-the-sixth-circuit-suspended-licenses-dishonor-codes-and-re-redistricting/feed/0benjamin.beaton@squirepb.com, lauren.kuley@squirepb.comhttps://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/recent-cases/last-week-at-the-sixth-circuit-suspended-licenses-dishonor-codes-and-re-redistricting/Trends in the Sixth Circuit – Time to a Decisionhttp://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/6thCircuitAppellateBlog/~3/dCx_h-13kDQ/
https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis/trends-in-the-sixth-circuit-time-to-a-decision/#respondWed, 08 May 2019 03:53:16 +0000https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/?p=6158Continue Reading]]>“How long will my appeal take?” A question clients always ask and lawyers often resist (and which always depend heavily on the individual facts of the case). But the data also shows that the average has continued to decline in the Sixth Circuit. In 2011, the average Sixth Circuit appeal took 15.5 months from the notice of appeal to the final decision. Under the leadership of Sixth Circuit Clerk Deborah Hunt and Chief Judges Batchelder and Cole, the Circuit made a concertedeffort to reduce the time it takes to decide an appeal. The circuit now decides the average case in just 7.4 months—less than half the time it took in 2011. Here’s a chart showing the changes over time:

For many years, the circuit was tied with the Ninth Circuit as the slowest circuit to move cases along and render its decisions. Every circuit has made changes to improve the speed of their decisions over the past ten years—the circuits have, on average, sped up decisions about three months. But while the current laggard is the First Circuit, at 13.4 months, the Sixth Circuit at 7.4 months has dramatically improved its position and is now the third-fastest circuit.

This increase in speed is undoubtedly a positive development. Individuals who seek relief or repose, businesses that depend on certainty, prisoners waiting to hear their fate or freedom—everyone benefits when the wheels of justice grind a little faster. That’s especially so when (as our experience suggests is the case in the Sixth Circuit) courts manage to increase speed without sacrificing accuracy and while increasing transparency. Statistics we discussed recently on this blog suggest that the circuit’s faster pace has not diminished the number of written decisions or rate of reversal.

]]>https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis/trends-in-the-sixth-circuit-time-to-a-decision/feed/0colter.paulson@squirepb.com, benjamin.beaton@squirepb.comhttps://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis/trends-in-the-sixth-circuit-time-to-a-decision/Sixth Circuit Issues Interesting Decision on Use of Representative Evidence in FLSA Collective Actionshttp://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/6thCircuitAppellateBlog/~3/ftSbdPmbmOI/
https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/recent-cases/sixth-circuit-issues-interesting-decision-on-use-of-representative-evidence-in-flsa-collective-actions/#respondFri, 03 May 2019 14:05:01 +0000https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/?p=6155Continue Reading]]>Earlier this week, the Sixth Circuit released an interesting opinion addressing the use of representative evidence in “collective actions” brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act. As discussed below, the Court held that uniform testimony from dozens of individual employees can establish liability without the need for statistical evidence. At the same time, the decision yields some important questions regarding the use of statistical sampling in future cases.

In Pierce v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., a group of over 150 sales employees at four Wyndham resorts in Tennessee alleged the company failed to compensate them for overtime. Plaintiffs fell into three different groups: “front-line” salespeople who sold ownership interests in Wyndham timeshares to new customers; “in-house” salespeople who sold upgraded interests to existing owners; and “discovery” salespeople who sold “trial packages” to prospective owners. All three groups received commissions and a minimum-wage draw (deducted from any commissions paid). Plaintiffs, however, alleged the company systematically required salespeople to underreport their hours and altered timesheets to avoid paying any overtime.

In an opinion by Judge Sutton, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to allow two types of sales employees (front-line and in-house salespeople) to proceed as a collective action, and to use “representative evidence” to prove their claims against Wyndham. Although they sold to different customers, the Court held that collective treatment was appropriate because they performed “identical tasks.” Both groups arrived at the same time each morning to attend a mandatory sales meeting, and participated in the same types of sales activities (tours, party weekends, etc.). And Wyndham subjected both groups to a “common policy of not paying them overtime, even when they worked over 40 hours per week.”

With respect to the third type of sales employees (discovery salespeople), however, the Sixth Circuit held that the trial court erred by including them in the collective action. Although discovery salespeople were subject to the same illegal overtime policy, they were not similarly situated to the other two groups because their hours were not necessarily the same – they sold different products to different customers via different sales activities. As the panel majority explained:

A common policy cannot overcome the factual differences between the discovery employees and the other salespeople (what they sold and when they started work), which goes to determining the heart of the claim (the total hours worked each week).

Because the district court included the discovery employees in its collective damages calculation, the panel majority reversed in part and remanded for a recalculation of damages. In a separate opinion, Judge White explained her position that the discovery salespeople were similarly situated to the others.

The Court’s discussion of the “common policy” necessary to sustain a collective action under the FLSA is worth a read, as it illustrates the type of evidence required to demonstrate that employees are similarly situated. Plaintiffs presented a wealth of evidence regarding the roles and responsibilities of front-line and in-house salespeople, but only one discovery salesperson testified at trial (and his testimony failed to establish that discovery salespeople performed the same tasks as the other two groups).

What caught our eye, however, was the Court’s discussion of plaintiffs’ use of “representative evidence” to establish liability and damages – an issue we recently had the opportunity to brief in the class action context (although the Court ultimately did not have to reach that issue). From that perspective, a few things from the Court’s opinion in Pierce are worth noting:

The Court relied on consistent testimony from dozens of witnesses regarding an “across-the-board” policy to establish liability.

As its name suggests, “representative evidence” allows a group of plaintiffs to establish liability and damages for testifying and non-testifying employees alike through the testimony of individual plaintiffs, who testify as “representatives.” The Supreme Court approved the use of such evidence in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016), holding that plaintiffs may rely on representative evidence to establish class-wide liability when “the evidence is reliable in proving or disproving the elements of the relevant cause of action.” The Sixth Circuit followed suit in Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC, 860 F.3d 389, 408 (2017), holding that “representative testimony” may be used to “establish a pattern of violations that include similarly situated employees who did not testify.”

Importantly, however, neither Tyson Foods nor Monroe establish a bright-line rule permitting the use of representative testimony in every collective action. Rather, the question arising from those cases is whether the evidence offered by plaintiffs is “reliable” and “representative” of the group as a whole, so that it can be fairly extrapolated to non-testifying group members.

To make this showing, plaintiffs often rely on statistical evidence. In Tyson Foods, for example, plaintiffs relied on an expert study examining the average amount of (uncompensated) time required for various types of employees to put on and remove protective equipment (“donning and doffing”). The parties debated the statistical validity of the expert’s conclusions, and whether they established a common injury.

In Pierce, however, the Sixth Circuit relied on something far more straight-forward: unanimous testimony from dozens of employees that Wyndham subjected all salespeople to a common, across-the-board policy of underreporting hours and altering timesheets to avoid paying overtime. The panel noted that 43 of the 145 sales employees properly included in the action testified at trial, and that those witnesses “consistently said that Wyndham required them to underreport their time or altered their recorded time.”

The absence of any countervailing evidence eliminated the need to rely on statistical evidence. As the Court explained, “the collective-action framework presumes that similarly situated employees are representative of each other and have the ability to proceed to trial collectively” (quoting Monroe). Wyndham failed to rebut this presumption with any evidence that individual salespeople were treated differently. Uncontested testimony regarding a common policy was thus sufficient to establish liability.

The absence of countervailing evidence allowed the Court to sidestep some interesting issues regarding the use of statistical evidence.

Although Wyndham did not present testimony that individual salespeople were treated differently from one another, it did challenge the “sample” of testifying salespeople offered by plaintiffs at trial. The Court’s response to this challenge is worth unpacking, as it sheds some light on potential issues that may arise in future cases in which a defendant does successfully rebut the presumption that the individual experiences of testifying class members were “representative” of the entire group.

First and most importantly, the Court held that a valid statistical study is not required in every case. As the Court explained, “Tyson did not discuss expert statistical studies because they are the only way a plaintiff may prove’ his claim by representative evidence under the Act.” Rather, a statistical study is merely one means of demonstrating that evidence can be reliably extrapolated to all members of the group. (As Pierce demonstrates, unanimous testimony from a large group of individual employees will also do the trick.)

Second, if Wyndham had successfully rebutted the presumption of similar treatment, this case would have presented some interesting issues regarding sample size and, specifically, the reliability of sampling relatively small plaintiff classes. The district court heard testimony from 43 of the 145 salespeople properly included in the collective action – a percentage (29.66%), the Court noted, that compared favorably to the “sample” accepted in Monroe (17 of 293, or 5.8%).

But the raw percentage of class members included in a “sample” is not a valid proxy for statistical reliability. Rather, the size of the sample needed to achieve statistical significance is a function of the size of the population under study – not the raw percentage sampled. Because the margin of error depends inversely on the square root of the sample size, large populations (such as that of the United States) are often represented by a sample size of 1,000 – representing far less than 1% of the population.

To reliably assess smaller populations (like the total number of Wyndham salespeople in this case), however, a much larger percentage of the population must be sampled. A population of 500, for example, may require a sample of 218 members (44% of the population) to arrive at statistically reliable results (at the conventional 95% confidence level). The size of an appropriate sample also depends on the degree of variability or differences that exist in the population under study. Several organizations provide helpful, easy-to-usecalculators and tablesonline that allow one to determine whether a particular sample is within the realm of reason.

As explained above, the size of the sample was not determinative in this case. (And, admittedly, there is some questionable precedent out there that appears to accept comparing raw percentages of class members “sampled” as a measure of reliability. See Monroe, 860 F.3d at 410 (collecting cases).) But the Court’s discussion of sample size highlights an issue that could arise in future cases.

Third, Wyndham also challenged the “randomness” of plaintiffs’ sample. After an expert pulled a random sample of Wyndham sales employees, plaintiffs supplemented that sample with the testimony of six additional salespeople who were not part of the random sample. Wyndham argued the addition of these “hand-picked” employees undermined the reliability of plaintiffs’ sample.

Ordinarily, selectively adding members to a purportedly “random” sample would undermine the reliability of the evidence, introducing potential bias. But the Court’s response to Wyndham’s argument demonstrates exactly why these types of statistical issues did not trouble the Court in this case.

As the Court explained, Wyndham deposed all six newly-added salespeople, as well as every other salesperson included in the sample. If any salesperson in the original (or supplemented) sample experienced different treatment, Wyndham “could have called [them] to rebut the testifying employees.” But it “failed to do so,” leaving the Court with “no warrant to doubt the reliability of the witnesses.”

The Court’s response makes clear that it based its decision on the uniform testimony of dozens of sales employees who were subject to the same policy and experienced the same injury – not the statistical validity of plaintiffs’ sampling methods. Nonetheless, the Court’s discussion of representative evidence raises some important questions for future cases. If the defendant had effectively rebutted the allegation that all front-line and in-house salespeople were treated the same way, how would the Court determine whether the testimony of individual plaintiffs was truly representative of the group as a whole? What role should statistical evidence play in that inquiry? And in future cases, how will the Court address criticism of sampling methods, and the “conclusions” drawn from questionable samples?

Congress created the Tennessee Valley Authority, a government-owned corporation, to promote economic development during the Great Depression. TVA exercises both “traditionally governmental functions” (like making arrests and condemning property) and “commercial ones” (like producing and selling electricity). The TVA Act explicitly allows it to “sue and be sued in its corporate name.” But the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits—borrowing from the Federal Tort Claims Act—have long held that TVA is “exempt from liability” for discretionary actions when it exercises “wholly governmental functions.”

That is a problem, according to the Supreme Court, because the FTCA expressly excludes TVA from its scope. The TVA Act, meanwhile, contains no discretionary-function exception of its own. And separation-of-powers principles, Justice Kagan explained, don’t prevent Congress from allowing TVA to “sued or be sued.”

The Government …. asks us to let the FTCA in through the back door, when Congress has locked the front one.

So: when TVA raises a downed power line, across a river, protected by TVA police boats, during a fishing tournament, is it liable for negligence like a private power company? Or immune like a government agency? That is a vexing fact pattern for a law-school exam. Here, tragically, the question is not hypothetical: a collision on the water killed one fisherman and injured another.

We won’t learn the answer until a remand back to the Eleventh Circuit. Going forward, lower courts including the Sixth Circuit will determine whether TVA’s activities were “commercial”—and therefore not immune—or “governmental”—and therefore immune only if exposure to suit would clearly cause “grave interference” with a governmental function. “That,” the Court emphasized, “is a high bar.”

Pre-Thacker, the Sixth Circuit’s TVA jurisprudence tracked the FTCA. But now the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits (which include the vast majority of TVA territory) will apply a newly-narrowed immunity to the TVA—and potentially many other government corporations that may “sued and be sued.” At least sometimes.

]]>https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/supreme-court/supreme-court-rejects-sixth-and-eleventh-circuits-discretionary-function-immunity-for-tva/feed/0larisa.vaysman@squirepb.com, benjamin.beaton@squirepb.comhttps://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/supreme-court/supreme-court-rejects-sixth-and-eleventh-circuits-discretionary-function-immunity-for-tva/Trail-Blazing Sixth Circuit Judge Damon Keith Dies at 96http://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/6thCircuitAppellateBlog/~3/amqwvYVbGIA/
https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis/trail-blazing-sixth-circuit-judge-damon-keith-dies-at-96/#respondTue, 30 Apr 2019 20:46:23 +0000https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/?p=6144Continue Reading]]>Sixth Circuit Judge Damon J. Keith died this weekend at the age of 96. He served on the Sixth Circuit for over 40 years. A civil rights icon, he issued notable opinions addressing racial desegregation in public education, warrantless Nixon-era wiretaps, and blanket secrecy for deportation hearings of terrorism suspects after 9/11. In remembrance, the Sixth Circuit has posted this biographical video, including Judge Keith’s own words about his experiences with segregation and the mentorship he received from US Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall. The Eastern District of Michigan has posted this reflection on his life, including in particular his impact in Michigan. News outlets and civil rights groups around the country are noting his passing — including the New York Times, the Detroit Free Press, and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.

A lifelong Detroit resident, Judge Keith was nominated to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan by President Lyndon Johnson in 1967. President Jimmy Carter later appointed him to the Sixth Circuit in 1977. Although he took senior status in 1995, he continued to sit for cases (and in fact, he was on the panel in decisions issued just last week).

Among his well-known rulings: In Davis v. School District of Pontiac, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Judge Keith’s findings that the school board perpetuated racial segregation within the city by lining up schools and school-boundaries with segregated housing patterns. To remedy these Fourteenth Amendment violations, Judge Keith ordered that the schools be integrated, including by city-wide busing. In United States v. Sinclair, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed Judge Keith’s ruling that the Nixon administration’s warrantless wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment. In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, writing for a unanimous Sixth Circuit panel, Judge Keith held that the government’s categorical assertion of national security as grounds for conducting all deportation hearings of terrorism suspects in secret did not pass muster under the First Amendment.

Details on the public visitation and simulcast services can be found here.

]]>https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis/trail-blazing-sixth-circuit-judge-damon-keith-dies-at-96/feed/0lauren.kuley@squirepb.comhttps://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/news-and-analysis/trail-blazing-sixth-circuit-judge-damon-keith-dies-at-96/Sixth Circuit Amends “Chalking” Decision to Clarify Scopehttp://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/6thCircuitAppellateBlog/~3/9usgTfuxhk4/
https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/case-updates/sixth-circuit-amends-chalking-decision-to-clarify-scope/#respondFri, 26 Apr 2019 18:30:50 +0000https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/?p=6141Continue Reading]]>Earlier this week, the Sixth Circuit issued a decision addressing a constitutional challenge to the practice of “chalking” the tires of parked cars for parking enforcement purposes. As we noted, that decision garnered a lot of attention from the national media.

Yesterday, the Court issued an amended opinion clarifying the scope of its ruling. The amended opinion contains the following new paragraph in its conclusion:

Taking the allegations in Taylor’s complaint as true, we hold that chalking is a search under the Fourth Amendment, specifically under the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones. This does not mean, however, that chalking violates the Fourth Amendment. Rather, we hold, based on the pleading stage of this litigation, that two exceptions to the warrant requirement—the “community caretaking” exception and the motor-vehicle exception—do not apply here. Our holding extends no further than this. When the record in this case moves beyond the pleadings stage, the City is, of course, free to argue anew that one or both of those exceptions do apply, or that some other exception to the warrant requirement might apply.

While the Sixth Circuit has thus held that chalking constitutes a “search” under Jones, the amended opinion stops short of declaring that such “searches” will always be unreasonable (or never fall under an exception to the warrant requirement).

The amended opinion thus tees up a debate over the “reasonableness” of the search on remand. Long story short: Ms. Taylor has survived the motion-to-dismiss-stage, but she has not yet evaded the parking authorities.

]]>https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/case-updates/sixth-circuit-amends-chalking-decision-to-clarify-scope/feed/0scott.coyle@squirepb.com, lauren.kuley@squirepb.comhttps://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/case-updates/sixth-circuit-amends-chalking-decision-to-clarify-scope/Sixth Circuit Erases Chalking of Parked Carshttp://feeds.lexblog.com/~r/6thCircuitAppellateBlog/~3/eZZkK_Sh6Ik/
https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/recent-cases/sixth-circuit-erases-chalking-of-parked-cars/#respondWed, 24 Apr 2019 18:00:54 +0000https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/?p=6134Continue Reading]]>It’s not often that a dispute over parking tickets ends up in federal court. But that’s exactly what happened this week in Taylor v. City of Saginaw – a case that has already drawn the attention of the national media.

Taylor involved a challenge to “a common parking enforcement practice known as ‘chalking,’ whereby City parking enforcement officers use chalk to mark the tires of parked vehicles to track how long they have been parked.” This practice can be surprisingly effective (as certain blog authors unfortunately can attest). But it is apparently very effective in Saginaw – according to Judge Donald’s decision, one particular parking enforcement officer managed to chalk (and then ticket) Ms. Taylor fifteen separate times between 2014 and 2017.

Armed with a slew of parking tickets, Ms. Taylor filed suit in federal court, alleging that the City violated the Fourth Amendment by chalking her tires without her consent or a valid warrant. The Sixth Circuit agreed, relying upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), to hold that chalking constitutes an unreasonable trespass upon a constitutionally-protected area (your car).

At first blush, chalking a car’s tires may not seem like the type of “search” typically raising Fourth Amendment concerns. But as Judge Donald explained, Jones signaled a rebirth of “the seldom used ‘property-based’ approach to the Fourth Amendment search inquiry,” which focuses on physical intrusion to one’s property:

Under Jones, when governmental invasions are accompanied by physical intrusions, a search occurs when the government: (1) trespasses upon a constitutionally protected area, (2) to obtain information.

In the Court’s view, chalking satisfied both of these requirements: the officer came into contact with Ms. Taylor’s car, in an attempt to obtain information about her (whether she remained in her parking spot too long).

The Court proceeded to hold that the search was unreasonable because the car was parked legally when chalked, and the officer lacked any reasonable suspicion (let alone probable cause) that a crime had been committed. The Court also specifically rejected the City’s assertion of the “community caretaker” exception, explaining that “the purpose of chalking is to raise revenue, and not to mitigate [a] public hazard.”

Taylor is the latest in a series of interesting Fourth Amendment cases playing out on our public roadways. The Sixth Circuit’s decision relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, which addressed the constitutionality of electronically monitoring an individual’s location by affixing a GPS device to his car.

And the Supreme Court heard argument yesterday in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, which asks whether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist suspected of driving under the influence provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Squire Patton Boggs filed an amicus brief in that case (along with the State and Local Legal Center) on behalf of the National Conference of State Legislatures and other organizations that represent the interests of local governments and prosecutors.

UPDATE: The Sixth Circuit issued an amended opinion narrowing the scope of its ruling. See our update here.