Tag Archives: M&A gambling

The last time I posted on Paddy Power Betfair (PPB.L) in March, I highlighted the rich valuation and cautioned better value may be had on future dips, ending with the comment that “the game of speculation is all about getting the best odds”. Well, PPB.L has been on quite a ride in recent months. First the prospect of disappointing operating results put the stock under pressure and last week the bombshell that the golden boy CEO, Breon Corcoran, wants to do something more meaningful with his time. The result, as can be seen below, is PPB.L down 15% since the start of the year and 20% since this time last year.

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The revenue for the latest quarter, even after adjusting for the lack of the Euro soccer tournament in 2016, disappointed analysts who are fretting about whether reduced net revenue margins are part of a trend.

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Despite the firm putting reduced net revenue margins primarily down to unfavourable sports results (increased promotion costs also contributed, doing things like paying out on Hilary Clinton prior to the actual election results doesn’t help!), the worry is that competitive pressures rather than bad luck are resulting in reduced net revenue and gross win margins. [Net revenues are gross wins less VAT and fair-value adjustments for free bets, promotions and bonuses]. Care needs to be taken when comparing gross win margins (i.e. gross win divided by amounts staked) and net revenue margins across firms as the make-up of the underlying portfolio is important (e.g. gross wins varies by sport type such as football, horses, tennis, etc and by geography) and firms may account for certain items differently. Also, the absence of the largest online player, the privately owned Bet365, makes industry analysis difficult for amateurs like me.

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Of course, this sector is haunted by regulatory risk. The predicted restrictions of the highly addictive gaming machines by the UK Government is expected to impact PPB’s high street competitors much more that PPB.L. For example, PPB.L only derives 6% of its revenue from gaming machines compared to 30% for William Hill. The reaction of PPB’s competitors to compensate for restrictions on gaming machine revenue is likely to have a bigger potential impact on PPB.L’s future results.

For me, the biggest disappointment in the Q2 results wasn’t the revenue line but the operating margins. The full year 2017 EBITDA projection was nearly 10% shy of my estimates. The firm acknowledged that the platform integration has been taking longer than planned and took up over 70% of internal technology resources in Q2. This is projected to reduce to 60% and 30% in Q3 and Q4 respectively before been completed by year end. Releasing these resources will allow a refocus on product development and on fixing other problem areas such as their online gaming offerings. As a result of the Q2 results, I have taken a knife to my earnings estimates (my revenue estimates only required minor adjustment) for 2017 and 2018, as the graphic below shows.

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My 2017 and 2018 EPS estimates have reduced to £3.72 and £4.01 respectively, down 10% and 12% from my previous estimates. That puts PPB.L’s current market cap at a PE of approximately 20 and 18 for 2017 and 2018. That’s not bad for a firm with EPS growth of 13% and 8% for 2017 and 2018 respectively although, if these figures turn out to be accurate, the share price is likely to have gone lower that it currently is on worries about reducing operating metrics in a fiercely competitive market.

These estimates are conservative in my view, possibly overtly so. They reflect a sense that Breon Corcoran’s reason to go off into the tech sunset now is really due to concerns about the medium-to-long term prospects for the sector. Corcoran obviously has put a different explanation forward, one which is suspiciously unconvincing given the amount left undone at PPB.L, although he still does have about £40 million of share options in PPB.L. No firm is simply about the CEO and at the end of the conference call an indication was given of ensuring more exposure to the full management team in future investor engagements. That should help investors get more comfortable with management depth at the firm. I know nothing about the new CEO, Peter Jackson, so he has a real challenge in gaining investor’s confidence. He has big boots to fill as far as investors are concerned.

So, yet again, I suggest the best course of action is to wait, both for existing and new shareholders, and see how 2017 develops for PPB.L. There can be little doubt that recent events mean that the odds on PPB.L have lengthened.

PS- PPB have already paid out on Floyd Mayweather prior to his 26th of August fight with Conor McGregor. In the unlikely event that the Irishman does achieve the impossible PPB’s Q3 net revenue margins will suffer……

The last time I posted on Paddy Power Betfair (PPB.L), I highlighted it was looking pricey in the mid-to high 90s. It has since traded down to the eighties and recently dipped below £83 after the full year results. Although it has now quickly recovered up around £88, the initial disappointment over the online revenue in Q4 sent the stock down 6%.

The graph below shows quarterly revenues, which met expectations largely due to the favourable A$ rate with Australia revenue up 34% in sterling but only 18% in the underlying currency. Management make a point of stating that “approximately 70% of our profits are sterling denominated, and accordingly, we are not exposed to FX translation fluctuation”. Events such as the summer 2016 Euros contribute to the revenue spike in Q2 2016.

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They exceeded my expectations on the bottom line with an operating profit of £182 million for H2 over my expectation of £160 million, with the merger expense and intangible write-off impacts of £300 million for the full year stripped out. The EPS of £3.30 for 2016 on average 80 million shares was impressive. I messed up on the average share count (again!) in my previous EPS estimate.

PPB stated that they “expect to complete the integration of our European online platforms by the end of 2017” and “until then, new product releases on the Paddy Power brand will be relatively limited, but on completion customers will see immediate benefits”. Despite their market beating margins on their dominant online segment, they caution that “a lot of the sportsbook operators acknowledge that gaming got harder in the second half of last year” and they always emphasis that they operate in a very very competitive market. It looks to me like PPB management are trying to carefully manage expectations for 2017 and are likely nervous that large competitors like William Hill and Ladbrokes could possibly recover from recent online slumps and (just maybe) finally get their act together online.

There is an ongoing regulatory headwind in this business and 2016 bought items such as the online gaming point of consumption tax, the statutory Horserace Betting Levy, and the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) investigation into UK online gambling (update due in April) to the fore. In addition, South Australia announced a 15% consumption tax effective from July 2017. The UK Government’s Review of Gaming Machines is a much bigger deal for PPB’s larger competitors as it only makes up 6% of their revenue.

PPB have substantially completed the integration of risk and trading functions which means that Paddy Power proprietary pricing and risk management tools are now used for over 85% of the bets on the Betfair sportsbook across 19 sports. They stated that “operating two individual brands on an integrated shared function is also proving to be beneficial for efficiency” and that the “pooling of analytics data has improved our econometric modelling, giving us greater insight into the effectiveness of marketing activity and leading to improved optimisation of spend”. These are critical factors in why PPB is differentiating itself operationally from its peers and are important to the success of the business model envisaged by the merger.

So, although I have likely got the share count wrong again (I am assuming an average of 85 million this time across 2017 and 2018), my new projections are below. I estimate growth of 5% and 11% for revenue in 2017 and 2018 respectively and EPS growth of 14% and 20% respectively. I factored in a degree of topline and bottom line upside in 2018 from the soccer world cup in Russia (assuming politics hasn’t messed up the world order by then!). That represents a PE multiple of 19.4 on an 2018 EPS estimate at a share price of £88 (2017 PE of 23.3). Not bargain basement cheap but not crazy mad either. With a targeted payout rate of 50%, my estimates could mean a dividend yield of 2% and 3.5% for 2017 and 2018 (again at a £88 share price).

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That looks like a better dynamic that the one at a share price in the mid to high 90’s, as per my post in August. If only I wasn’t so negative about overall valuations across the market, I would have added to my PPB position on the dip after the results last week. [Customary caution: PPB is not for the faint hearted, it is the gambling business after all!]. My instinct tells me markets will be bumpy in the coming months, valuation wise (e.g. rising interest rates, politics!). That may prove an opportune time to get more of PPB at a good price. After all, the game of speculation it is all about getting the best odds!

It has been about 10 months since I posted on the potential for the Paddy Power and Betfair merger and a lot has happened since. Brexit and the resulting sterling volatility are obvious events of significance. In the betting sector, consolidation has continued with the Ladbrokes and Gala Coral merger having been announced and approved. The audacious proposed tie up by Rank and 888 on William Hill floundered with recent press reports suggesting Rank and 888 could get together. The consolidation in this rapidly changing sector is far from over.

The initial optimism on the future prospects for the two high achieving entities, Paddy Power and Betfair, resulted in the share price trading above the £100 level earlier in the year. Following Brexit, it traded as low as £80. The merged firm reported their H1 figures earlier this week which showed the full extent of the merger costs and provided an increased cost synergies figure for 2017 of £65 million. With 75% of EBITDA being sterling based, the currency impact was not as material as their multi-jurisdictional operations would suggest.

Top-line results for H1 do however indicate that 2016 revenue growth will likely not be as high as the 17% I had expected in November. The reality of issues in this regulated and highly competitive sector also served as a reminder that the path may not be as smooth as initially hoped for. Regulatory headwinds in Australia were an example. As a result, I revised my revenue estimates in November from £1.64 billion to £1.51 billion. The graph below shows the breakdown of my revenue estimates for the next few years with a comparison to overall average analyst estimates.

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Also, I have revised my previous earnings estimates with an operating profit margin of 20% for 2016, growing to 22% in 2017 and 23% in 2018. Based upon a share count of 86 million as at end June 2016 (which includes 2 million treasury shares), I estimate the H2 EPS at £1.55 which when added to the H1 EPS of £1.45 gives a full year 2016 EPS of £3.02.[ This 2016 estimate does represent an operating EPS of £3.79 which compares to my November estimate of £3.85 albeit that the November estimate was based upon suspect figures like the share count!!]. At today’s share price of £95.65, the PE multiple for 2016 is a hefty 31.6. The graph below shows the multiple based on my EPS estimates for 2016, 2017 and 2018 compared to those using the average analyst estimates.

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In conclusion, I remain optimistic about the business model of Paddy Power Betfair particularly given the proven quality of the management team and their history of execution. However, quality doesn’t come cheap and the current valuation is priced for perfection. For new investors, it may be prudent to wait for a better entry point.

Disclaimer

This blog represents my personal views and is not reflective of the views or opinions held by any company or employer I work for currently or have worked for in the past. The views expressed herein are based solely upon publicly available data. No views expressed herein should be taken as an endorsement to take any particular course of action in the markets. The basis of this blog is that different views should be expressed and readers make up their own minds on the what they believe and act accordingly.