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Thursday, 14 April 2016

Whether private party in criminal case can file appeal before supreme court as per Article 136 of constitution?

Further, this Court in the case of RamakantRai’s case (supra) has held thus:“12. A doubt has been raised about thecompetence of a private party asdistinguished from the State, to invoke thejurisdiction of this Court under Article 136of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short“the Constitution”) against a judgment ofacquittal by the High Court. We do not seeany substance in the doubt. The appellatepower vested in this Court under Article 136of the Constitution is not to be confusedwith the ordinary appellate power exercisedby appellate courts and Appellate Tribunalsunder specific statutes. It is a plenarypower, “exercisable outside the purview ofordinary law” to meet the pressing demands ofjustice (see Durga Shankar Mehta v. RaghurajSingh). Article 136 of the Constitutionneither confers on anyone the right to invokethe jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibitsanyone from invoking the Court’sjurisdiction. The power is vested in thisCourt but the right to invoke the Court’sjurisdiction is vested in no one. Theexercise of the power of this Court is notcircumscribed by any limitation as to who mayinvoke it. Where a judgment of acquittal bythe High Court has led to a seriousmiscarriage of justice, this Court cannotrefrain from doing its duty and abstain frominterfering on the ground that a privateparty and not the State has invoked theCourt’s jurisdiction. We do not haveslightest doubt that we can entertain appealsagainst judgments of acquittal by the HighCourt at the instance of interested privateparties also. The circumstance that theCriminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in short “theCode”) does not provide for an appeal to theHigh Court against an order of acquittal by asubordinate court, at the instance of aprivate party, has no relevance to thequestion of the power of this Court underArticle 136. We may mention that in Mohan Lalv. Ajit Singh this Court interfered with ajudgment of acquittal by the High Court atthe instance of a private party. Anapprehension was expressed that if appealsagainst judgments of acquittal at theinstance of private parties are permittedthere may be a flood of appeals. We do notshare the apprehension. Appeals under Article136 of the Constitution are entertained byspecial leave granted by this Court, whetherit is the State or a private party thatinvokes the jurisdiction of this Court, andspecial leave is not granted as a matter ofcourse but only for good and sufficientreasons, on well-established practice of thisCourt.”In Esher Singh’s case (supra), it has been held bythis Court that Article 136 of the Constitution ofIndia neither confers on anyone the right to invokethe jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibits anyonefrom invoking it. The relevant para 29 of the casereads thus:“29. A doubt has been raised in many casesabout the competence of a private party asdistinguished from the State, to invoke thejurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 ofthe Constitution against a judgment ofacquittal by the High Court. We do not see anysubstance in the doubt. The appellate powervested in this Court under Article 136 of theConstitution is not to be confused withordinary appellate power exercised by appellatecourts and appellate tribunals under specificstatutes. It is a plenary power “exercisableoutside the purview of ordinary law” to meetthe pressing demands of justice. (See DurgaShankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh.) Article 136of the Constitution neither confers on anyonethe right to invoke the jurisdiction of thisCourt nor inhibits anyone from invoking theCourt’s jurisdiction. The power is vested inthis Court but the right to invoke the Court’sjurisdiction is vested in no one. The exerciseof the power of this Court is not circumscribedby any limitation as to who may invoke it.Where a judgment of acquittal by the High Courthas led to a serious miscarriage of justice,this Court cannot refrain from doing its dutyand abstain from interfering on the ground thata private party and not the State has invokedthe Court’s jurisdiction. We do not have theslightest doubt that we can entertain appealsagainst judgments of acquittal by the HighCourt at the instance of interested private parties also. The circumstance that the Codedoes not provide for an appeal to the HighCourt against an order of acquittal by asubordinate court, at the instance of a privateparty, has no relevance to the question of thepower of this Court under Article 136. We maymention that in Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singh thisCourt interfered with a judgment of acquittalby the High Court at the instance of a privateparty. An apprehension was expressed that ifappeals against judgments of acquittal at theinstance of private parties are permitted,there may be a flood of appeals. We do notshare the apprehension. Appeals under Article136 of the Constitution are entertained byspecial leave granted by this Court, whether itis the State or a private party that invokesthe jurisdiction of this Court, and specialleave is not granted as a matter of course butonly for good and sufficient reasons, wellestablished by the practice of this Court.” (emphasis supplied by this Court)Further, in Rama Kant Verma’s case (supra) this Courthas reiterated the aforesaid view that the appellatepower of this Court under Article 136 of theConstitution of India is not just an ordinaryappellate power exercised by appellate courts andappellate tribunals under specific statutes. It is aplenary power which can be exercised outside thepurview of ordinary law to meet the ends of justice.

REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 299 OF 2016(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2866 of 2011)AMANULLAH AND ANR. ………APPELLANTSVs.STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. ……RESPONDENTS

2.This criminal appeal by special leave is directedagainst the impugned judgment and order dated08.12.2010 in Crl. Misc. No. 5777 of 2009 passed bythe High Court of Judicature at Patna whereby itallowed the said criminal miscellaneous petitionfiled by the respondent nos.2 to 9 herein, by settingaside the cognizance order dated 10.11.2008 passed bythe learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rosera,Bihar in Singhia Police Case No.37/2008 and quashedthe criminal prosecution.3.Brief facts of the case are stated hereunder toappreciate the rival legal contentions urged onbehalf of the parties:The case of the prosecution is that on29.03.2008, the informant-Mukhtar went to the houseof his relative at village-Navdega and stayed there.On 30.03.2008, at about 12.00 noon, his uncle Md.Hasim informed him on telephone that his wife’scondition was serious and she was being taken toSinghia for treatment. Mukhtar was asked to reachSinghia. It is alleged by the informant that onreaching Singhia, he neither found his wife nor hisuncle. On enquiry from his uncle, he was informedabout the death of his wife. Thereafter, he reachedhis house and saw the dead body of his wife. Hisuncle disclosed him that his wife-Tamanna Khatoon(since deceased) had gone to maize field wherein shewas found lying with her mouth and nose tied with herdupatta. She was spotted by one Hira Sada (PW-2), whowas returning with her daughter. Upon hearing thenoise made by the deceased she raised alarm and uponhearing the same informant’s uncle-Md. Hasim alongwith others reached the spot and took Tamanna Khatoonto Singhia for treatment. She died on the way toSinghia. On 30.03.2008 FIR was lodged by Mukhtar,husband of the deceased against Md. Raju and Md.Halim @ Mangnu- appellant no.2 herein for theoffences punishable under Sections 302 and 120B readwith Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short“IPC”).4.During investigation, many witnesses deposed beforethe Judicial Magistrate, Rosera under Section 164 ofthe CrPC wherein it has been alleged that Mukhtar,husband of the deceased has killed his wife.5.On 30.09.2008 charge sheet no.111/2008 in respect ofFIR No. 37/2008 was filed in the Court of ChiefJudicial Magistrate (CJM), Rosera by the policeagainst Md. Hasim, Md. Noor Hasan, Md. Safique andJhothi Sada.6.After filing of the charge sheet, Mukhtar startedthreatening the witnesses. With a view to threatenthe appellant no.1 on 17.10.2008, he reached hishouse with pistol and dagger. The appellant no.1raised hue and cry and upon hearing the same, covillagerscaught Mukhtar with arms, after a chase.FIR No. 104/08 was registered against him for theoffence punishable under Sections 25 and 26 of theArms Act, 1959 at Singhia Police Station.7.On 31.10.2008, a supplementary charge sheetno.126/2008, in respect of FIR No. 37/2008 was filedbefore the learned CJM by the police against Md.Mukhtar @ Munna, Md. Nazre Alam and Md. Farukh.8.The learned CJM after considering the material placedbefore him vide order dated 10.11.2008.tookcognizance under Sections 302 and 120B read withSection 34 of the IPC against Mukhtar and otheraccused-persons. 9.Aggrieved by the cognizance order passed by thelearned CJM in PS Case No. 37/2008, respondent nos. 2to 9 approached the High Court of Judicature at Patnaby preferring Crl. Misc. No. 5777/2009 under Section482 of Cr.PC for quashing the order of learned CJMdated 10.11.2008.10. The High Court by its order dated 08.12.2010allowed the said petition by setting aside thecognizance order passed by the learned CJM and alsoquashed the criminal prosecution. Aggrieved by thesaid order, the appellants herein, who are interestedprivate parties, have filed this appeal urgingvarious grounds.11. Mr. Neeraj Shekhar, the learned counsel for theappellants contended that the High Court has failedto appreciate that the FIR and the charge sheetestablish a prima-facie case against the respondentnos. 2-9. He submitted that when the allegations madeagainst the accused person show a prima-facie case,criminal proceedings ought not to have been quashedby the High Court in exercise of its power underSection 482 of Cr.PC.12. It was further contended that the High Court haserred in setting aside the cognizance order passed bythe learned CJM as the extraordinary or inherentpowers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction to actaccording to whim or caprice. He further submittedthat the power of quashing criminal proceedings is tobe exercised sparingly and with circumspection andthat too in rarest of rare cases.13. It was further contended by the learned counselthat at the stage of taking cognizance of the offenceit would not be proper, simply on the basis ofmaterial placed before the court by investigatingagency, to determine whether a conviction issustainable or not. The High Court has erred inappreciating the same by quashing the cognizanceorder passed by the learned CJM. He further submittedthat the inherent power to quash the proceedings canbe exercised only in a case where the material placedbefore the court does not disclose any offence or theallegations made therein are found frivolous,vexatious or oppressive. At this stage there shouldnot be any meticulous analysis of the case, beforethe trial, to find out whether the case would end inconviction or acquittal.14. It was further contended that in the instant casethe charge sheet and FIR clearly establish theinvolvement and active participation of the accusedpersonswhich the High Court has failed toappreciate.15. It was further submitted by the learned counselthat the appellants have locus standi to maintainthis appeal for the reason that the appellants haveconnection with matter at hand as appellant no.1 wasthreatened by the informant-Mukhtar and appellantno.2 was falsely implicated by the informant-Mukhtarin the case of murder of his wife. Both theappellants are aggrieved by the impugned order passedby the High Court setting aside the cognizance orderpassed by the Trial Court. In support of theaforesaid he placed reliance upon the ConstitutionBench decision of this Court in the case of P.S.RSadhanantham v. Arunanchalam1. He further placedreliance upon the decisions of this Court in RamakantRai v. Madan Rai & Ors2, Esher Singh v. State ofA.P.3, Ramakant Verma v. State of U.P.4 and AshishChadha v. Asha Kumari & Ors5.16. Per contra, Mr. Shivam Singh, the learned counselappearing on behalf of the respondents contended thatthe answering respondents have not been named in theFIR. The FIR in this case is based on the statementof Mukhtar against two persons, namely Md. Raju andMd. Halim for the murder of his wife and it wasregistered under Sections 302 and 120B read withSection 34 of the IPC. He further submitted that on11.04.2008, the informant-Mukhtar filed a protest1 (1980) 3 SCC 1412 (2003) 12 SCC 3953 (2004) 11 SCC 5854 (2008) 17 SCC 2575 (2012) 1 SCC 680petition before the learned CJM, Rosera. In the saidprotest petition it was brought to the notice of thecourt that originally he had given a writtencomplaint to the police about the murder of his wifeagainst five persons, namely Md. Raju, Md. Halim @Mangnu, Khalid Gulab, Abu Quaiyum and Md. AmidHussain for offences under Sections 376, 302 readwith Section 34 of the IPC. However, the local policein collusion with the accused-persons dropped thenames of three accused persons and also droppedcharge under Section 376 of the IPC against themknowingly and intentionally. The course ofinvestigation was diverted in wrong direction tofalsely implicate the respondent nos. 2-9.17. It was further contended by the learned counselthat the instant case is a unique case as theaccused-persons are made prosecution witnesses andapart from them another set of tutored witnesses havebeen introduced in the case, who are not eyewitnesses to the incident and have in theirdeposition under Section 164 of the CrPC, before theJudicial Magistrate deposed that the informanthusband might have killed his wife. The High Courthas rightly taken a very serious view of the wholematter and after proper scrutiny of the documents andmaterial placed on record has come to an appropriatefinding that the case against the respondent nos.2-9is merely based on suspicion and therefore, it hasrightly quashed the proceedings against them.18. He further submitted that after the incidentManjoor Alam father of the deceased in his statementbefore the police did not blame Mukhtar husband ofthe deceased for the murder of his daughter. As faras other respondents are concerned, apart from theinformant, they all are strangers to the matter andhave been falsely implicated in this case by thelocal police at the behest of the real accusedpersons.19. It was further submitted by the learned counselthat the father and mother of the deceased havegiven their statement on a stamp paper before theNotary Public that their daughter was having acordial matrimonial life with her husband and shewas not being tortured by her husband or his familymembers in connection with any dowry demand.20. By placing reliance upon the decision of thisCourt in J.K. International v. State (Govt. ofDelhi) and Ors6 and HDFC Bank Ltd. & Anr. v. NagpurDistrict Security Guard Board & Anr.7, it wasfurther submitted by the learned counsel that theappellants have failed to disclose their bonafideconnection with the cause of action, to be precisewith the victim and thus, have no locus standi tomaintain this appeal. Therefore, this appealdeserves to be dismissed on this score.21. While concluding his contentions he submittedthat the order passed by the High Court is a wellreasoned order and the same does not suffer fromany ambiguity. The decision of the High Court isalso justified in the light of decision of thisCourt in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan6 (2001) 3 SCC 4627 2008 Cri. L.J. 995Lal8. Therefore, no interference of this Court isrequired in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.22. After considering the rival legal contentionsurged on behalf of both the parties, followingissues would arise for our consideration:1.Whether this appeal is maintainable by theappellants on the ground of the locus standi?2.Whether the High Court, in the instant case,has exceeded its jurisdiction whileexercising its inherent power under Section482 of the CrPC?3.What order? Answer to Point No.123. The term ‘locus standi’ is a latin term, thegeneral meaning of which is ‘place of standing’.The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 10th Edn., at8 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335page 834, defines the term ‘locus standi’ as theright or capacity to bring an action or to appearin a court. The traditional view of ‘locus standi’has been that the person who is aggrieved oraffected has the standing before the court, i.e.,to say he only has a right to move the court forseeking justice. Later, this Court, with justice orientedapproach, relaxed the strict rule withregard to ‘locus standi’, allowing any person fromthe society not related to the cause of action toapproach the court seeking justice for those whocould not approach themselves. Now turning ourattention towards the criminal trial, which isconducted, largely, by following the procedure laiddown in the CrPC. Since, offence is considered tobe a wrong committed against the society, theprosecution against the accused person is launchedby the State. It is the duty of the State to getthe culprit booked for the offence committed byhim. The focal point, here, is that if the Statefails in this regard and the party having bonafideconnection with the cause of action, who isaggrieved by the order of the court cannot be leftat the mercy of the State and without any option toapproach the appellate court for seeking justice.In this regard, the Constitution Bench of thisCourt in the case of P.S.R. Sadhanantham’s case(supra) has elaborately dealt with the aforesaidfact situation. The relevant paras 13, 14 and 25 ofwhich read thus:“13. It is true that the strictestvigilance over abuse of the process of thecourt, especially at the expensivelyexalted level of the Supreme Court, shouldbe maintained and ordinarily meddlesomebystanders should not be granted “visa”. Itis also true that in the criminaljurisdiction this strictness applies afortiori since an adverse verdict from thisCourt may result in irretrievable injury tolife or liberty.14. Having said this, we must emphasisethat we are living in times when manysocietal pollutants create new problems ofunredressed grievance when the Statebecomes the sole repository for initiationof criminal action. Sometimes, pachydermicindifference of bureaucratic officials, atother times politicisation of higherfunctionaries may result in refusal to takea case to this Court under Article 136 eventhough the justice of the lis may welljustify it. While “the criminal law shouldnot be used as a weapon in personalvendettas between private individuals”, asLord Shawcross once wrote, in the absenceof an independent prosecution authorityeasily accessible to every citizen, a widerconnotation of the expression “standing” isnecessary for Article 136 to further itsmission. There are jurisdictions in whichprivate individuals — not the State alone —may it statute criminal proceedings. TheLaw Reforms Commission (Australia) in itsDiscussion Paper No. 4 on “Access to Courts— I Standing: Public Interest Suits” wrote:“The general rule, at the presenttime, is that anyone may commenceproceedings and prosecute in theMagistrate court. The argument forretention of that right arises ateither end of the spectrum — thegreat cases and the frequent pettycases. The great cases are thosetouching Government itself — aWatergate or a Poulson. Howeverindependent they may legally be anypublic official, police orprosecuting authority, must besubject to some governmentsupervision and be dependent onGovernment funds; its officers willinevitably have personal links withgovernment. They will be part of the‘establishment’. There may be caseswhere a decision not to prosecute acase having political ramificationswill be seen, rightly or wrongly, aspolitically motivated. Accepting thepossibility of occasional abuse theCommission sees merit in retainingsome right of a citizen to ventilatesuch a matter in the courts.”Even the English System, as pointed by theDiscussion Paper permits a private citizento file an indictment. In our view thenarrow limits set in vintage English Law,into the concept of person aggrieved and“standing” needs liberalisation in ourdemocratic situation. In Dabholkar casethis Court imparted such a wider meaning.The American Supreme Court relaxed therestrictive attitude towards “standing” inthe famous case of Baker v. Carr. LordDenning, in the notable case of theAttorney-General of the Gambia v. PierraSarr N’jie, spoke thus:“... the words “person aggrieved”are of wide import and should not besubjected to a restrictiveinterpretation. They do not include,of course, a mere busybody who isinterfering in things which do notconcern him;”Prof. S.A. de Smith takes the same view:“All developed legal systems havehad to face the problem of adjustingconflicts between two aspects of thepublic interest — the desirabilityof encouraging individual citizensto participate actively in theenforcement of the law, and theundesirability of encouraging theprofessional litigant and themeddlesome interloper to invoke thejurisdiction of the courts inmatters that do not concern him.”Prof. H.W.R. Wade strikes a similar note:“In other words, certiorari is notconfined by a narrow conception oflocus standi. It contains an elementof the actio popularis. This isbecause it looks beyond the personalrights of the applicant; it isdesigned to keep the machinery ofjustice in proper working order bypreventing inferior tribunals andpublic authorities from abusingtheir powers.”In Dabholkar case, one of us wrote in hisseparate opinion: “ The possible apprehension thatwidening legal standing with apublic connotation may unloose aflood of litigation which mayoverwhelm the Judges is misplacedbecause public resort to court tosuppress public mischief is atribute to the justice system.”This view is echoed by the Australian LawReforms Commission.

XX XX XX25. In India also, the criminal law envisagesthe State as a prosecutor. Under the Code ofCriminal Procedure, the machinery of theState is set in motion on informationreceived by the police or on a complaintfiled by a private person before aMagistrate. If the case proceeds to trial andthe accused is acquitted, the right to appealagainst the acquittal is closelycircumscribed. Under the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1898, the State was entitled toappeal to the High Court, and the complainantcould do so only if granted special leave toappeal by the High Court. The right of appealwas not given to other interested persons.Under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973,the right of appeal vested in the States hasnow been made subject to leave being grantedto the State by the High Court. Thecomplainant continues to be subject to theprerequisite condition that he must obtainspecial leave to appeal. The fetters soimposed on the right to appeal are promptedby the reluctance to expose a person, who hasbeen acquitted by a competent court of acriminal charge, to the anxiety and tensionof a further examination of the case, eventhough it is held by a superior court. TheLaw Commission of India gave anxious thoughtto this matter, and while noting that theCode recognised a few exceptions by way ofpermitting a person aggrieved to initiateproceedings in certain cases and permittingthe complainant to appeal against anacquittal with special leave of the HighCourt, expressed itself against the generaldesirability to encourage appeals againstacquittal. It referred to the common lawjurisprudence obtaining in England and othercountries where a limited right of appealagainst acquittal was vested in the State andwhere the emphasis rested on the need todecide a point of law of general importancein the interests of the generaladministration and proper development of thecriminal law. But simultaneously the LawCommission also noted that if the right toappeal against acquittal was retained andextended to a complainant the law shouldlogically cover also cases not instituted oncomplaint. It observed:“Extreme cases of manifestinjustice, where the Governmentfails to act, and the partyaggrieved has a strong feeling thatthe matter requires furtherconsideration, should not, in ourview, be left to the mercy of theGovernment. To inspire and maintainconfidence in the administration ofjustice, the limited right of appealwith leave given to a private partyshould be retained, and shouldembrace cases initiated on privatecomplaint or otherwise at theinstance of an aggrieved person.”However, when the Criminal Procedure Code,1973 was enacted the statute, as we haveseen, confined the right to appeal, in thecase of private parties to a complainant.This is, as it were, a material indication ofthe policy of the law.” (emphasis supplied by this Court)24. Further, this Court in the case of RamakantRai’s case (supra) has held thus:“12. A doubt has been raised about thecompetence of a private party asdistinguished from the State, to invoke thejurisdiction of this Court under Article 136of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short“the Constitution”) against a judgment ofacquittal by the High Court. We do not seeany substance in the doubt. The appellatepower vested in this Court under Article 136of the Constitution is not to be confusedwith the ordinary appellate power exercisedby appellate courts and Appellate Tribunalsunder specific statutes. It is a plenarypower, “exercisable outside the purview ofordinary law” to meet the pressing demands ofjustice (see Durga Shankar Mehta v. RaghurajSingh). Article 136 of the Constitutionneither confers on anyone the right to invokethe jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibitsanyone from invoking the Court’sjurisdiction. The power is vested in thisCourt but the right to invoke the Court’sjurisdiction is vested in no one. Theexercise of the power of this Court is notcircumscribed by any limitation as to who mayinvoke it. Where a judgment of acquittal bythe High Court has led to a seriousmiscarriage of justice, this Court cannotrefrain from doing its duty and abstain frominterfering on the ground that a privateparty and not the State has invoked theCourt’s jurisdiction. We do not haveslightest doubt that we can entertain appealsagainst judgments of acquittal by the HighCourt at the instance of interested privateparties also. The circumstance that theCriminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in short “theCode”) does not provide for an appeal to theHigh Court against an order of acquittal by asubordinate court, at the instance of aprivate party, has no relevance to thequestion of the power of this Court underArticle 136. We may mention that in Mohan Lalv. Ajit Singh this Court interfered with ajudgment of acquittal by the High Court atthe instance of a private party. Anapprehension was expressed that if appealsagainst judgments of acquittal at theinstance of private parties are permittedthere may be a flood of appeals. We do notshare the apprehension. Appeals under Article136 of the Constitution are entertained byspecial leave granted by this Court, whetherit is the State or a private party thatinvokes the jurisdiction of this Court, andspecial leave is not granted as a matter ofcourse but only for good and sufficientreasons, on well-established practice of thisCourt.”

In Esher Singh’s case (supra), it has been held bythis Court that Article 136 of the Constitution ofIndia neither confers on anyone the right to invokethe jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibits anyonefrom invoking it. The relevant para 29 of the casereads thus:“29. A doubt has been raised in many casesabout the competence of a private party asdistinguished from the State, to invoke thejurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 ofthe Constitution against a judgment ofacquittal by the High Court. We do not see anysubstance in the doubt. The appellate powervested in this Court under Article 136 of theConstitution is not to be confused withordinary appellate power exercised by appellatecourts and appellate tribunals under specificstatutes. It is a plenary power “exercisableoutside the purview of ordinary law” to meetthe pressing demands of justice. (See DurgaShankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh.) Article 136of the Constitution neither confers on anyonethe right to invoke the jurisdiction of thisCourt nor inhibits anyone from invoking theCourt’s jurisdiction. The power is vested inthis Court but the right to invoke the Court’sjurisdiction is vested in no one. The exerciseof the power of this Court is not circumscribedby any limitation as to who may invoke it.Where a judgment of acquittal by the High Courthas led to a serious miscarriage of justice,this Court cannot refrain from doing its dutyand abstain from interfering on the ground thata private party and not the State has invokedthe Court’s jurisdiction. We do not have theslightest doubt that we can entertain appealsagainst judgments of acquittal by the HighCourt at the instance of interested privateparties also. The circumstance that the Codedoes not provide for an appeal to the HighCourt against an order of acquittal by asubordinate court, at the instance of a privateparty, has no relevance to the question of thepower of this Court under Article 136. We maymention that in Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singh thisCourt interfered with a judgment of acquittalby the High Court at the instance of a privateparty. An apprehension was expressed that ifappeals against judgments of acquittal at theinstance of private parties are permitted,there may be a flood of appeals. We do notshare the apprehension. Appeals under Article136 of the Constitution are entertained byspecial leave granted by this Court, whether itis the State or a private party that invokesthe jurisdiction of this Court, and specialleave is not granted as a matter of course butonly for good and sufficient reasons, wellestablished by the practice of this Court.” (emphasis supplied by this Court)Further, in Rama Kant Verma’s case (supra) this Courthas reiterated the aforesaid view that the appellatepower of this Court under Article 136 of theConstitution of India is not just an ordinaryappellate power exercised by appellate courts andappellate tribunals under specific statutes. It is aplenary power which can be exercised outside thepurview of ordinary law to meet the ends of justice.The relevant para 16 of the case reads thus:“16. In Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai it wasinter alia observed as follows: (SCC p. 402,para 12)“12. A doubt has been raised about thecompetence of a private party asdistinguished from the State, to invokethe jurisdiction of this Court underArticle 136 of the Constitution ofIndia, 1950 (in short ‘theConstitution’) against a judgment ofacquittal by the High Court. We do notsee any substance in the doubt. Theappellate power vested in this Courtunder Article 136 of the Constitution isnot to be confused with the ordinaryappellate power exercised by appellatecourts and Appellate Tribunals underspecific statutes. It is a plenarypower, ‘exercisable outside the purviewof ordinary law’ to meet the pressing demands of justice (see Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh ). Article136 of the Constitution neither conferson anyone the right to invoke thejurisdiction of this Court nor inhibitsanyone from invoking the Court’sjurisdiction. The power is vested inthis Court but the right to invoke theCourt’s jurisdiction is vested in noone. The exercise of the power of thisCourt is not circumscribed by anylimitation as to who may invoke it.Where a judgment of acquittal by theHigh Court has led to a seriousmiscarriage of justice, this Courtcannot refrain from doing its duty andabstain from interfering on the groundthat a private party and not the Statehas invoked the Court’s jurisdiction. Wedo not have slightest doubt that we canentertain appeals against judgments ofacquittal by the High Court at theinstance of interested private partiesalso. The circumstance that the CriminalProcedure Code, 1973 (in short ‘theCode’) does not provide for an appeal tothe High Court against an order ofacquittal by a subordinate court, at theinstance of a private party, has norelevance to the question of the powerof this Court under Article 136. We maymention that in Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singhthis Court interfered with a judgment ofacquittal by the High Court at theinstance of a private party. Anapprehension was expressed that ifappeals against judgments of acquittalat the instance of private parties arepermitted there may be a flood ofappeals. We do not share theapprehension. Appeals under Article 136of the Constitution are entertained byspecial leave granted by this Court,whether it is the State or a privateparty that invokes the jurisdiction ofthis Court, and special leave is notgranted as a matter of course but onlyfor good and sufficient reasons, onwell-established practice of thisCourt.”” (emphasis supplied by this Court)25. After considering the case law relied upon bythe learned counsel for the appellants as well as therespondents, in the light of the material placed onrecord, we are of the view that the appellants havelocus standi to maintain this appeal. From thematerial placed on record, it is clear that theappellants have precise connection with the matter athand and thus, have locus to maintain this appeal.The learned counsel for the appellants has rightlyplaced reliance upon the Constitution Bench judgmentof this Court, namely, P.S.R Sadhanantham (supra) andother decisions of this Court in Ramakant Rai, EsherSingh, Ramakant Verma (supra). Further, it ispertinent here to observe that it may not be possibleto strictly enumerate as to who all will have locusto maintain an appeal before this Court invokingArticle 136 of the Constitution of India, it dependsupon the factual matrix of each case, as each casehas its unique set of facts. It is clear from theaforementioned case law that the Court should beliberal in allowing any third party, having bonafideconnection with the matter, to maintain the appealwith a view to advance substantial justice. However,this power of allowing a third party to maintain anappeal should be exercised with due care and caution.Persons, unconnected with the matter underconsideration or having personal grievance againstthe accused should be checked. A strict vigilance isrequired to be maintained in this regard.Answer to Point No.226. A careful reading of the material placed onrecord reveals that the learned CJM took cognizanceof the offences alleged against the accused-personsafter a perusal of case diary, chargesheet and othermaterial placed before the court. The cognizance wastaken, as a prima facie case was made out against theaccused-persons. It is well settled that at the stageof taking cognizance, the court should not get intothe merits of the case made out by the police, in thechargesheet filed by them, with a view to calculatethe success rate of prosecution in that particularcase. At this stage, the court’s duty is limited tothe extent of finding out whether from the materialplaced before it, offence alleged therein against theaccused is made out or not with a view to proceedfurther with the case. The proposition of lawrelating to Section 482 of the CrPC has beenelaborately dealt with by this Court in Bhajan Lal’scase (supra). The relevant paras 102 and 103 of whichread thus:“102. In the backdrop of the interpretationof the various relevant provisions of theCode under Chapter XIV and of the principlesof law enunciated by this Court in a seriesof decisions relating to the exercise of theextraordinary power under Article 226 or theinherent powers under Section 482 of the Codewhich we have extracted and reproduced above,we give the following categories of cases byway of illustration wherein such power couldbe exercised either to prevent abuse of theprocess of any court or otherwise to securethe ends of justice, though it may not bepossible to lay down any precise, clearlydefined and sufficiently channelised andinflexible guidelines or rigid formulae andto give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds ofcases wherein such power should be exercised.(1) Where the allegations made in thefirst information report or the complaint,even if they are taken at their face valueand accepted in their entirety do notprima facie constitute any offence or makeout a case against the accused.(2) Where the allegations in the firstinformation report and other materials, ifany, accompanying the FIR do not disclosea cognizable offence, justifying anPage 27Crl.A.@ SLP(Crl.)No.2866 of 2011 27investigation by police officers underSection 156(1) of the Code except under anorder of a Magistrate within the purviewof Section 155(2) of the Code.(3) Where the uncontroverted allegationsmade in the FIR or complaint and theevidence collected in support of the samedo not disclose the commission of anyoffence and make out a case against theaccused.(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR donot constitute a cognizable offence butconstitute only a non-cognizable offence,no investigation is permitted by a policeofficer without an order of a Magistrateas contemplated under Section 155(2) ofthe Code.(5) Where the allegations made in the FIRor complaint are so absurd and inherentlyimprobable on the basis of which noprudent person can ever reach a justconclusion that there is sufficient groundfor proceeding against the accused.(6) Where there is an express legal barengrafted in any of the provisions of theCode or the concerned Act (under which acriminal proceeding is instituted) to theinstitution and continuance of theproceedings and/or where there is aspecific provision in the Code or theconcerned Act, providing efficaciousredress for the grievance of the aggrievedparty.(7) Where a criminal proceeding ismanifestly attended with mala fide and/orwhere the proceeding is maliciouslyinstituted with an ulterior motive forwreaking vengeance on the accused and witha view to spite him due to private andpersonal grudge.103. We also give a note of caution to theeffect that the power of quashing a criminalproceeding should be exercised very sparinglyPage 28Crl.A.@ SLP(Crl.)No.2866 of 2011 28and with circumspection and that too in therarest of rare cases; that the court will notbe justified in embarking upon an enquiry asto the reliability or genuineness orotherwise of the allegations made in the FIRor the complaint and that the extraordinaryor inherent powers do not confer an arbitraryjurisdiction on the court to act according toits whim or caprice.”Further, this Court in the case of Rajiv Thapar v.Madan Lal Kapoor9 has laid down certain parameters tobe followed by the High Court while exercising itsinherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC, in thefollowing manner:“29. The issue being examined in the instantcase is the jurisdiction of the High Court underSection 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash theinitiation of the prosecution against an accusedat the stage of issuing process, or at the stageof committal, or even at the stage of framing ofcharges. These are all stages before thecommencement of the actual trial. The sameparameters would naturally be available forlater stages as well. The power vested in theHigh Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stagesreferred to hereinabove, would have far-reachingconsequences inasmuch as it would negate theprosecution’s/complainant’s case withoutallowing the prosecution/complainant to leadevidence. Such a determination must always berendered with caution, care and circumspection.To invoke its inherent jurisdiction underSection 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fullysatisfied that the material produced by the9 (2013) 3 SCC 330accused is such that would lead to theconclusion that his/their defence is based onsound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; thematerial produced is such as would rule out anddisplace the assertions contained in the chargeslevelled against the accused; and the materialproduced is such as would clearly reject andoverrule the veracity of the allegationscontained in the accusations levelled by theprosecution/complainant. It should be sufficientto rule out, reject and discard the accusationslevelled by the prosecution/complainant, withoutthe necessity of recording any evidence. Forthis the material relied upon by the defenceshould not have been refuted, or alternatively,cannot be justifiably refuted, being material ofsterling and impeccable quality. The materialrelied upon by the accused should be such aswould persuade a reasonable person to dismissand condemn the actual basis of the accusationsas false. In such a situation, the judicialconscience of the High Court would persuade itto exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC toquash such criminal proceedings, for that wouldprevent abuse of process of the court, andsecure the ends of justice.30. Based on the factors canvassed in theforegoing paragraphs, we would delineate thefollowing steps to determine the veracity of aprayer for quashment raised by an accused byinvoking the power vested in the High Courtunder Section 482 CrPC: 30.1. Step one : whether the materialrelied upon by the accused is sound,reasonable, and indubitable i.e. thematerial is of sterling and impeccablequality? 30.2. Step two : whether the materialrelied upon by the accused would ruleout the assertions contained in thecharges levelled against the accusedi.e. the material is sufficient toreject and overrule the factualassertions contained in the complainti.e. the material is such as wouldpersuade a reasonable person to dismissand condemn the factual basis of theaccusations as false? 30.3. Step three : whether the materialrelied upon by the accused has not beenrefuted by the prosecution/complainant;and/or the material is such that itcannot be justifiably refuted by theprosecution/complainant? 30.4. Step four : whether proceeding withthe trial would result in an abuse ofprocess of the court, and would notserve the ends of justice?30.5. If the answer to all the steps isin the affirmative, the judicialconscience of the High Court shouldpersuade it to quash such criminalproceedings in exercise of power vestedin it under Section 482 CrPC. Suchexercise of power, besides doing justiceto the accused, would save preciouscourt time, which would otherwise bewasted in holding such a trial (as wellas proceedings arising therefrom)specially when it is clear that the samewould not conclude in the conviction ofthe accused.” (emphasis supplied by this Court)27. After considering the rival legal contentionsurged by both the parties, case law referred to supraand the material placed on record, we are of the viewthat the High Court has exceeded its jurisdictionunder Section 482 of the CrPC. It has erred inquashing the cognizance order passed by the learnedCJM without appreciating the material placed beforeit in correct perspective. The High Court has ignoredcertain important facts, namely, that on 17.10.2008,the appellant no.1 was allegedly threatened by theaccused-Mukhtar for which FIR No. 104/08 wasregistered against him for offences punishable underSections 25 and 26 of the Arms Act, 1959. Further,there are statements of various witnesses made underSection 164 of the CrPC, before a judicialmagistrate, to the effect that the deceased has beenmurdered by none other than her husband-Mukhtar. Theevidence collected by the I.O. by recording thestatement of prosecution witnesses, filed alongwiththe chargesheet was duly considered by the learnedCJM before taking cognizance and therefore, the sameshould not have been interfered with by the HighCourt in exercise of its inherent power under Section482 of the CrPC.28. Further, the High Court has failed to take intoconsideration another important aspect that the caseat hand relates to the grave offence of murder andthat the criminal proceedings related thereto shouldnot lightly be interfered with, which is a wellsettled proposition of law.Answer to Point No.329. Thus, for the aforesaid reasons, this Court isof the view that the High Court in the instant casehas failed to appreciate the material placed beforeit in the light of law laid down by this Court inBhajan Lal’s case (supra) and has exceeded itsjurisdiction while exercising its power under Section482 of the CrPC. Therefore, the impugned judgment andorder passed by the High Court is liable to be setaside by this Court.30. The impugned judgment and order of the High Courtis set aside and the matter is remitted to thelearned CJM for proceeding further in accordance withlaw. The appeal is allowed.