Kevin Pina gives a swift accounting of recent history in Haiti and the role of the Bush adminstration. He also gives an accounting of Latin American force serving under the UN banner and their motives for participating in yet another "Bush adventure."

Now that we have finally passed through the histrionics where the
American public, by virtue of 9/11, gives the Bush administration the
benefit of the doubt in Iraq, it is perhaps time to re-examine its
other dirty little war, in Haiti. While the Bush administration made
it clear it was willing to take unilateral military action against
Iraq, it took an entirely different approach in 2004 to landing US
marines in Haiti. The official version of events portrays unanimous
international action undertaken to save Haiti from herself, but the
reality was quite different and exposed a political breach in
international opinion that fell mainly along racial lines.

The Bush Administration’s coup in Haiti, neatly sanctioned by the UN
Security Council, gave the appearance of international unanimity while
very little attention has been given to the dissenting voices. Those
dissenting voices came primarily from other black nations in the
Caribbean and Africa while the nations of Latin America, with the sole
exception of Venezuela, either remained silent or gave their overt
support to the operation. The reasons behind this have rarely been
addressed and go far beyond the simplistic explanation of race
solidarity. It can be argued this was a factor but CARICOM and the AU
also made it clear that sanctioning the ouster of the democratically
elected government of Aristide set a bad precedent that might
ultimately come back to haunt them should they not come forward and
condemn it. However, the same can be said for any nation in Latin
America but again, it is a statement of fact that most nations in the
Organization of American States and the Rio Group remained silent or
gave their overt support to Aristide’s ouster.

The truth is that institutional racism has always affected Haiti’s
relationship with the so-called ‘international community’, a term that
is really shorthand for international action undertaken in the
interests of the wealthiest and most developed nations. First among
equals in this lexicon of international diplomacy and expediency
remains the US government.

Since her inception, Haiti was treated as a pariah by an earlier
historical formation of the ‘international community.’ Led by the US
then as now, that version of ‘international community’ punished Haiti
for winning her independence in 1804 as the world’s only successful
slave revolution. The US and its primary allies of the time were
slave-holding nations whose economic development depended upon trade in
human chattel. The US Senate of 1806 reflected this when they called
Haiti, “The greatest threat to US interests at home and abroad.”

This
declaration by the esteemed white gentlemen of the U.S. Senate actually
displayed uncanny foresight as the example of Haiti ultimately would be
cited by the likes of Denmark Vesey, Nat Turner, Gabriel Prosser and
John Brown as inspiration for their like-minded slave revolts on U.S.
territory. Haiti’s existence established an institutional fear in the
halls of power in the U.S. that would lead to a crippling economic
blockade of the country that lasted for more than half a century.

Compounding the effects of the US embargo, in 1825, France demanded
that Haiti repay its former colonizer for the “property” of slave
owners that France lost as a result of the Haitian revolution. This
indemnity payment left Haiti with a staggering debt, which it was still
repaying after the First World War. Haiti was not recognized by the US
until 1862 when Frederic Douglas became the first US Ambassador to
Haiti. [Footnote: He actually resigned protesting “To them[US
businessmen], the welfare of Haiti is nothing; the shedding of human
blood is nothing; the success of free institutions is nothing, and the
ruin of neighboring country is nothing. They are sharks, pirates and
Shylocks, greedy for money, no matter at what cost of life and misery
to mankind.”

In the lead-up to Haiti’s bicentennial in 2004, Haiti’s President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide demanded that France repay the sum the former
slaveholders had wrested from Haiti in 1825--which he calculated
amounted, with inflation and interest, to over 21 billion dollars.
France responded with hostility, leading calls, which were joined by
the US and Canadian governments, for Aristide to leave office.

In February 2004, these three governments supported a coup d’etat
against Haiti’s elected government. The Bush administration and its
allies justified the removal of Aristide as necessary. Aristide made
it clear to the world that he was taken out of Haiti against his will.
US marines showed up at his doorstep the very moment his government was
about to receive a re-supply of weaponry and ammunition, provided by
the government of South Africa at the request of the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM). The timing of his physical removal and relocation
to a former French colony in central Africa ensured that his government
would never have the means to defend itself. This version of events has
since been corroborated by former Haitian prime minister Yvon Neptune
who later spent more than two years in a Haitian jail under the
US-installed government that took power after Aristide’s ouster.

The response of the other fourteen nations of CARICOM was swift: they
expelled Haiti from the organisation and refused to recognise the
US-installed regime of Gerard Latortue. They were joined by the
fifty-one member states of the African Union (AU) in refusing to extend
diplomatic recognition and demanding an immediate and thorough
investigation into the circumstances surrounding Aristide’s removal.
The only Latin American nation to join them in this diplomatic action
was Venezuela, the government of which was nearly decapitated in a
similar Bush stratagem in 2002.

The US marines, Canadian Special Forces and the French Foreign Legion
were on the ground even before the 29 February 2004 ouster of Aristide.
Immediately following the coup, under a UN banner called the
Multinational Interim Force (MIF), these foreign armies waged a
lightning campaign to pacify the country. In the days that followed,
the US marines, who controlled the capital, allowed paramilitary death
squads who had invaded Haiti weeks previous from the Dominican
Republic, to enter poor neighborhoods resisting Aristide’s ouster. The
MIF had imposed dusk to dawn curfew that was not applied to these
paramilitary forces that took advantage of their exception to
indiscriminately strafe those neighborhoods with automatic weapons. The
US marines launched a major military operation on 12 March 2004 against
the poor neighborhood of Bel Air, whose residents had begun to
demonstrate for Aristide’s return and against what they saw as another
coup. According to video interviews I took with survivors the next day,
the blood ran so thick in the streets that fire trucks arrived to hose
them down before dawn. These survivors also reported the corpses of
those killed were placed into black body bags by US marines and hauled
away for disposal. Having lived in Haiti for five years prior to the
coup, I was on the ground during this period. Most of the US marines I
saw during this time were Caucasian, conjuring the collective memories
of Haitians in poor neighborhoods of the capital of the US military
invasion of their country in 1915.

On 1 June 2004, the MIF was replaced by a UN military operation.
Combined, both military initiatives resulted in the murder, torture,
rape and false imprisonment of thousands of Haitians.
The current UN operations, since they replaced the MIF, have been
carried out under the command and leadership of the armies of Brazil,
Argentina and Chile. Responsibility for command and control of the
operation was given to the Brazilian commanders.

This raises a few very important questions. Why was it that the bulk of
international outcry and resistance to the ouster of Haiti’s
constitutional government came from CARICOM and the AU? Why did
regional Latin American organisations such as the Organization of
American States (OAS) and the Rio Group (RG) support the Bush
administration’s position justifying Aristide’s ouster? Was it merely a
question of race solidarity and the fact that those nations opposing
the Haiti intervention were African or descendants of African slaves?
The OAS and the RG would ultimately move beyond mere tacit support for
Bush’s Haiti policy by agreeing to a US initiative in the United
Nations for them to take the leadership of yet another military
occupation of Haiti. The “others” would move to isolate the regime that
replaced Aristide and demand an explanation of the circumstances of his
removal from office.

Beyond the well-known machinations of the self-professed leaders of the
free world in the North, Haiti has never been embraced as the symbol of
freedom and liberty she can rightfully claim in Latin America. Eduardo
Galeano, whom I deeply admire, best sums up the perception of Haiti in
a famous poem:
In the French Caribbean islands, history books present Napoleon as the
most admirable warrior of the West. In these islands, Napoleon restored
slavery in 1802. With fire and sword, he forced the free blacks back
into slavery on the plantations. Of this, the texts make no mention.
The blacks are Napoleon’s grandchildren.
We must believe Galeano knew that the great Haitian General
Jean-Jacques Dessalines lined up French officers and urinated in their
faces before sending them to the gallows! ‘Koupe tet! Boule Kay’ (cut
off their heads and burn their houses) was his Kreyol battle cry and
most Haitians today would identify more with that sentiment than any
offers of returning to slavery. The Haitians today are the children of
Dessalines, not the grandchildren of Napoleon – he would have to run
for his life to survive their ire. Also remember that Dessaline was not
racist, his commander in charge of his artillery units was the defected
white French officer Lieutenant Tesroit. Latin American brothers and
sisters wanting to understand Haiti should be concerned with its
history and context. The Haitian people earned their true spirit and
reputation from Dessalines as a symbol of liberty and freedom in the
world. Bolivar understood this after Haitians offered him arms and
assistance to liberate Latin America from the yoke of Spanish
colonialism.

The template for US repression in Latin America had been established in
Haiti nearly fifteen years before the gringos kidnapped and
assassinated Sandino in Nicaragua and hunted down Farabundo Marti in El
Salvador. White US marines (usually speaking with a southern drawl)
kidnapped and assassinated Haitian resistance leader Charlemagne
Peralte and killed more than 10,000 Haitians before they preyed upon
the rest of the region. Beginning in 1915, the US marines committed a
scorched earth policy and massacres in Haiti meant to set an example
for the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean in the decades that
followed. We must never forget the common history Latin America shares
with these former black slaves of Haiti.

Despite this history, the OAS and the RG would uncritically support the
Bush administration in ousting Aristide in 2004 while CARICOM would
lead a movement to isolate the US-installed regime that followed. What
is undeniable is that most of CARICOM’s members are former slave
colonies while most Latin American nations are not. However, there is
more to the story than differences of race, historical origin and
development.

What is rarely mentioned these days is that CARICOM had reached the end
of its patience with the Bush administration in the months proceeding
29 February 2004. They had worked closely with the constitutional
government in Haiti to give the so-called opposition something they
could never earn at the ballot box, namely, power sharing.

Aristide’s government argued that the so-called opposition was really
window dressing for an initiative largely funded by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA) and France, through the
European Union (EU). They specifically pointed the finger at USAID and
the Democracy Enhancement Project financed by the US government. The
Aristide administration also gave evidence of the role of these
countries’ embassies in supporting opposition demonstrations demanding
the president’s resignation. Despite this evidence, CARICOM convinced
Aristide to agree to a power sharing agreement that would give the
opposition control of the prime minister’s office and all the positions
of the cabinet. Again, this was a position of power in Haitian politics
that the opposition, nurtured by foreign largesse against Aristide,
could never have won at the ballot box.

The governments of the US, France and Canada worked behind the scenes
to sabotage CARICOM’s initiatives. They succeeded in scuttling these
efforts but it was clear that their surrogates could not sustain the
momentum to force Aristide out. Opposition demonstrations demanding
Aristide’s resignation had dwindled to a few hundred raucous voices in
the streets of the capital in early February 2004. A massive
demonstration on 7 February, demanding Aristide fulfill his five-year
mandate, swelled to several hundred thousand in the capital, dwarfing
any previous opposition rallies by comparison.

Suddenly, the door to compromise was closed forever as paramilitary
forces attacked Haiti from the Dominican Republic. CARICOM diplomats
and Haiti-watchers knew that these forces enjoyed the tacit and overt
support of the US and Dominican militaries. It would have been
impossible for these paramilitaries to use Dominican territory for
their training camps and to procure the large weaponry they were using
against the Haitian police without the consent of the US and Dominican
authorities. An editorial in the Jamaica Gleaner on 4 March 2004 summed
it up best:
It is curious that rather than placing pressure on the opposition to
respect the tenets of democracy, Messrs. [Colin] Powell, [Dominique] de
Villepin, and [Bill] Graham, quickly acquiesced. But worse, they turned
the screws on Aristide. Noticeably, too, the insurgency, led by former
death-squad leaders and coup planners, erupted after Aristide declared
– for the second time – that he would embrace the power-sharing
agreement.

So, in the end, CARICOM expended a large investment of political
capital to aid the constitutional government to broker a settlement
with what was arguably a foreign-funded and foreign-backed opposition
in Haiti. The fact that the triumvirate of the US, France and Canada
never had any intention of allowing their Haitian surrogates to end the
crisis was not lost on CARICOM. It was for this reason that they felt
justified in expelling Haiti from the organisation and leading the
effort to diplomatically isolate the US-installed government that
followed.

President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa was closely watching events in
Haiti throughout this period. He had his own experiences with the
so-called opposition in Haiti when he attended the country’s
bicentennial celebrations in January 2004. Mbeki clearly saw that the
opposition forces were being led by Haiti’s economic elites, who owned
most of the radio, television and print media in the country. He and
his staff were aghast as they watched, heard and read the most
outlandish statements and rumours broadcast and written about his
visit. Mbeki was overheard, during an official state dinner, saying to
one of his diplomats: ‘Opposition? These people can only be described
as crazy and unreasonable.’

After the bloodthirsty paramilitaries crossed into Haiti from the
Dominican Republic and began attacking police stations and taking over
townships, CARICOM requested that the government of South Africa
provide assistance to the Haitian police. Mbeki responded by
dispatching a cargo plane of weapons and ammunition to Haiti on 27
February 2004. At the very moment the plane was refueling in Kingston,
Jamaica, US marines, led by CIA station chief Luis Moreno, entered
Aristide’s residence and gave him an ultimatum. He could get on a
plane to leave Haiti or they would clear the way for the paramilitaries
to enter the capital. He was told the bloodletting would be on his
hands and that he would most likely be killed.

President Aristide had already seen the writing on the wall. Two of the
final telephone calls he reportedly made before Moreno showed up on his
doorstep were to Jamaican President P. J. Patterson and President
Mbeki. He told them that the Bush administration was urging him to
resign and that the US embassy had made it plain that the South African
shipment for the police would never be allowed to leave Jamaica. He
also said his conversations with US representatives had included a
veiled threat of violence.

As soon as it became clear that Aristide was being taken out, Patterson
and Mbeki mobilised to ensure that CARICOM and the AU would speak with
one clear voice and position. Whatever government the US used to
replace Aristide would not receive diplomatic recognition from their
member states and an investigation into the circumstances of Aristide’s
ouster would be demanded.

The OAS was already bought off and predisposed to accept the Bush
administration’s claim that Aristide had left Haiti of his own
volition. The regional group had already allowed itself to rubber
stamp an earlier smear campaign to taint the Aristide government’s
reputation in 2000–2003, under the leadership and influence of US
diplomatic hit-men like Otto Reich, Luigi Einaudi, Lino Gutierrez and
Roger Noriega. The most scandalous example of this was the OAS laying
the blame for an attempted coup on 17 December 2001 on the victim.
After a military assault-force failed to take over Haiti’s national
palace, a frightened and angry population went on a rampage and
attacked the opposition, who claimed that Aristide had orchestrated the
whole affair. The OAS agreed and, adding insult to injury, forced the
cash-strapped government of Haiti to pay reparations to the opposition.
By any objective accounting of the evidence that has surfaced since,
including public admissions by paramilitary commander Guy Philippe, the
opposition was complicit in the attack. As recently as May 2007,
Philippe has publicly confirmed long--held suspicions that leading
opposition figures Evans Paul and Andre Apaid had provided funds and
logistical support to his paramilitary organization. The so-called
“peaceful” opposition to Aristide had actually worked in concert with
the paramilitaries in the Dominican Republic to oust Aristide.

To better understand the role and position of the OAS we should never
forget the amount of aid its member states and their respective
militaries receive through Pentagon funding, via International Military
Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF).
According to Frida Berrigan and Jonathan Wingo, writing for the World
Policy Institute, military aid to Latin America has increased to $122
million, more than thirty-four times its year 2000 levels. Beyond
military aid there is annual Foreign Aid and Assistance programmes of
nearly a billion dollars. Add to this the thousands of non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) funded through the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) who are involved in every facet of
political, social and economic ‘development’ in the region. Certainly
this lesson is not lost on President Chavez who is the latest object of
US ire by actively pursuing a policy of using Venezuela’s petro-dollars
to offset US influence in the region.

Now we find the armies of Brazil, Chile and Argentina leading a
military force that occupies Haiti under the banner of the United
Nations. Isn’t it miraculous how these three countries, with
historically the most heinous records of human rights abuses in the
western hemisphere, are transformed into ‘peacekeepers’ by virtue of a
United Nations Security Council resolution, sponsored by the Bush
administration? The truth is that a strong case can be made that
historically these militaries have been more beholden to the Pentagon
than to their own civilian leadership. Research how much money these
militaries still receive in arms and training from the US and study
their participation in the inter-regional military exercises called
“Fuerzas Commando” led by the Pentagon to combat terrorism
(http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/exOps.php). The chain of command
leads to the Southern Command of the Pentagon (USSOUTHCOM) not to Rio
de Janeiro, Santiago, Buenos Aires or any other capital in the region.

Therein may lay one of the answers to why the nations of Latin America
provided cover and troops for the Bush administration’s policy in
Haiti. It helps to explain why a number of so-called Latin American
progressive governments have provided troops to the UN occupation
forces in Haiti. They must appease their militaries and, by extension,
the Pentagon or the same machine of destabilisation might be aimed
against them. It is a reality all leaders of Latin America and the
Caribbean have had to face since the Monroe Doctrine and very little
has changed. There is also the added benefit of transferring the most
reactionary troublemakers in their own militaries to Haiti instead of
them remaining in their own countries where they might cause problems.
For example, remember the historical roles of the Brazilian,
Argentinean and Chilean armed forces remain highly controversial in
their own countries to this day. Transferring them to UN “peacekeeping”
operations in Haiti has been a convenient safety valve to temper
internal debate over their previous undemocratic roles in their
respective countries.

The Brazilian military has responsibility for leadership of the UN
military forces in Haiti and they have been authorized to use deadly
force. They are at the top of the command structure and their influence
on the overall mission should not be understated. It is important to
note that I have seen with my own eyes the differences between black
soldiers and brown soldiers in the Brazilian military in Haiti. The
upper echelon is almost exclusively lighter skin color while the
darkest faces are almost always found among the soldiers on the street.
A case can be made that what has been identified as racism in Brazilian
society is mirrored in the composition of the high command of the
Brazilian armed forces. Simply go to their website to see what I mean
(www.exercito.gov.br/NE/2004/12/10189/capa189.htm).

More importantly, there is a direct parallel between Brazilian military
tactics utilized by UN forces in Haiti and similar military operations
in their own country. These are the same commanders who also order
Afro-Brazilian soldiers to open fire in the slums of Sao Paolo and Rio
de Janeiro called favelas. This was highlighted in an Amnesty
International report “Brazil: 'They come in Shooting': Policing
socially excluded communities” released on December 2, 2005. The report
stated,

“The violence was highlighted by an incident in March, in which 29
people were shot dead by a ‘death squad’ -- believed to consist of
members of Rio de Janeiro's military police force -- in the Baixada
Fluminense District of the city; it was the worst massacre in the
city's history, but not a new or isolated phenomenon.”

It should be noted that the favelas in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paolo are
around 70% black and the rich in all the main cities are predominantly
light-skinned (in Haiti this racial divide is more pronounced). The
same Amnesty report continued,

“When [military] police do intervene in favelas, it is often by
mounting ‘invasions’ -- violent mass raids using no warrants or, on
rare occasions, collective warrants that label the entire community as
criminal. The majority of the victims of police violence are poor,
black or mixed-race youths.”

These are the same tactics authorized by the Brazilian generals in
Haiti. It has resulted in several high-profile massacres committed in
the poor slum of Cite Soleil where protestors challenged the UN’s
authority by continuing to launch massive demonstrations demanding the
return of President Aristide. In each instance, the entire community
was demonized by the UN and the elite-run Haitian press as being
criminals and gangsters and/or collaborators of criminals and
gangsters. While it is true that armed gangs operated in the
neighborhood and a few claimed they were aligned with Aristide’s
Lavalas movement, these military raids had a clear correlation to the
ongoing demonstrations.

Cite Soleil was terrorized on July 6, 2005 when Brazilian commanders
authorized a raid by UN forces with the stated aim of routing gangs in
the area (http://www.haitiaction.net/News/HIP/7_12_5.html). For
supporters of the ousted president, the raid was viewed as a preemptive
strike by the UN to dampen the impact of protests on Aristide's
birthday, planned to take place only nine days later on July 15. By
the time UN guns stopped firing, countless unarmed civilians lay dead
with the majority having been killed by a single high-powered rifle
shot to the head.

December 16, 2006 saw another large demonstration for Aristide that
began in Cite Soleil and only six days later Brazilian commanders would
authorize a second deadly raid by UN forces that residents and human
rights groups say resulted in the wholesale slaughter of innocent
victims (http://haitiaction.net/News/HIP/1_21_7/1_21_7.html). The
unspoken parallel of Brazil’s role in leading the UN’s military
strategy in Haiti is the fact that terror tactics such as these have
been their modus operandi in their own country.

Unfortunately, the governments of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and
Uruguay, among many others, continue to pretend that they are acting in
the best interests of the Haitian people as they dutifully fulfill
Bush’s policy under the guise of a baby-blue banner. Can they really
believe that their civilian leadership will have more control over
their own militaries once they return home from Bush’s misadventures in
Haiti? When their troops finally do return home it is more likely these
Latin American nations will find their military commanders even more
dependent upon and partial to the dictates of USSOUTHCOM rather than
less. US military commanders, even in UN peacekeeping operations in
Haiti, remain at the top of the food chain.

Historically, the power of the US military has always trumped national
dignity and sovereignty in Latin America and the Caribbbean. US
foreign policymakers have traditionally relied upon local economic
elites and the militaries they created and trained to serve as proxies
for their interests in the region. When that didn’t work, by virtue of
popular resistance from the target population, the US military would
then intervene directly. Haiti has been among the nations who have
suffered the most at the hands of US policymakers in the region exactly
because of their level of historical resistance to foreign domination.
Today’s efforts at subjugating Haiti by US foreign policymakers may be
under a different guise and under a different banner, but the goal
remains the same as it ever was. Whether it was slaveholding nations,
led by the US following Haitian independence, or Latin American
“peacekeepers” sanctioned by a UN Security Council resolution, the goal
remains to subjugate the independent will and resistance of Haiti’s
poor majority, by force if necessary. It is a denigration of the memory
of Haiti’s aid and assistance to the great Simon Bolivar that Latin
American support for this project continues uncritically.

Brasil military/police - clearing up some confusion
I would like to clear up some confusion about the difference between the Brazilian military and police forces.

The Policia Militar in Brasil, which has been criticized by groups such as Amnesty International among others, despite its somewhat confusing name, has absolutely nothing to do with the Brazilian military. They are part of the civilian police force. The Brazilian military (army) presence in Haiti is in no way connected with the Policia Militar that is involved in the favelas in Rio de Janeiro or Sao Paulo. The Policia Militar in Brasil are controlled by the respective states they operate in (every state has its own force) not by the nation's Ministry of Defense, unlike the army. They are totally separate entities.

With very few exceptions, such as in 2003 and again in 2006, since Brazil's return to democracy in 1985, the government of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has been very careful not to give the military any sort of formalized law enforcement role in Brazil. In fact, members of Lula's Partido dos Trabalhadores have often been among those calling for increased accountability and transparency in the law-enforcement regime currently in place in Brasil.

Having spent time in the favelas of Rio de Janiero, I can say that, much as it has been in Haiti, the situation in the favelas is often one in which heavily-armed gang members are squaring off against an often-equally brutal police force with thousands of civilians helplessly caught in the middle.

Distiguishing between the Brazilian military and police
You are correct and I did not mean to say they are the same institutions...the only congruous institution is the Brazilian state and the same "law enforcement" tactics used in in the favelas are the same tactics being utilized by Brazilian generals in Haiti. It is the tactics of the two that beg comparison. That is where the twain meets.

Brazilian military police is part of the militar
There is no big difference between the military police in Brazil and the Army. Their historical role has been the same: to keep in place the dangerous classes (mostly blacks). The military police is formally part of the armed forces, their iternal structure is military, and their highest rank is "coronel", never general. Thay are formally a support and reserve force of the Army, and subordinated to the Army, their officials must obey orders from Army commanders.

The role of the Brazilian armed forces in internal affairs has been enshrined in the 1988 constitution. Lula has been keen in using the Army for internal affairs, for example in the events last year in São Paulo, when police stations were attacked by so-called organized crime: Lula put at the disposition of São Paulo State governor 10 thousand military.