The summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war demonstrated that
Israel views the problem of Hezbollah geostrategically, as a proxy military challenge
supported by its long-term enemies Syria and Iran. This view led the government of Israel
to attempt the eradication of Hezbollah through the application of overwhelming military
force, an effort that was flawed in design and failed in execution. Similarly, the United
Nations has viewed the problem as a conflict between two warring military entities, a
problem it has unsuccessfully sought to mitigate since 1978 with the deployment of the
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Colored through the lens of the global
war on terrorism, the United States also views the threat created by Hezbollah
geostrategically, the influence of a top-tier terrorist organization financed by Iran and
supported by Syria.

Together, these
views led to the delayed implementation of a cease-fire in 2006 and the misguided belief
that Israel would be successful in its efforts against Hezbollah. After 34 days of air and
ground engagements the Hezbollah continued to fight, delivering what some have termed a
strategic victory. Meanwhile, the state of Lebanon was once again decimated, with more
than 1,200 civilians killed, 130,000 homes destroyed, and damage to the economy and
infrastructure totaling over $7 billion.1 The post-war
response of the United Nations and the United States continues to focus on the symptom
(Hezbollah), rather than the root cause that allows such an organization to exist; the
weakness of the Lebanese government.

This conflict should
be seen in the context of a series of conflicts that have afflicted Lebanon during its
history. In striking similarity to the current

28/29

crisis in Iraq,
Lebanon has struggled with internal sectarian conflict, the rise of transnational armed
groups, foreign occupation, insurgency, and the use of its territory as both a
battleground and a launching pad for regional conflicts fought by proxy. While outside
actors have played a major role, the weakness of the Lebanese government lies at the
foundation of these problems. The Lebanese government finds itself unable to exercise the
most fundamental elements of state sovereignty: the control of borders and a monopoly on
the use of force. Thus, any international effort to stabilize and reconstruct Lebanon in
the wake of this most recent conflict needs to focus on the political objective of
strengthening the Lebanese government.

The Expanded
UNIFIL

The United Nations
and American-led international response to the summer 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war was the
passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701.2 The
central initiative of UNSCR 1701 was the dramatic expansion of UNIFIL and the simultaneous
deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to South Lebanon. At the tactical level, the
expansion of UNIFIL and the deployment of the LAF enabled Israel to withdraw its forces
from South Lebanon without ceding the terrain to its antagonist, Hezbollah. Strategically,
the LAF deployment serves the critical mission of strengthening the sovereignty of
Lebanons government, demonstrated by placing Lebanese soldiers on the border with
Israel for the first time in decades. Simultaneously, the expanded UNIFIL deployment is
intended to support the LAFs southern deployment and provide political space for the
Lebanese government as it tries to strengthen its institutions.

The UNIFIL mandate
and peacekeeping presence have been in existence in various forms since their inception in
1978. Prior to the 2006 war, UNIFIL consisted of 2,000 lightly armed peacekeepers.3 This force was of insufficient size and capability to
provide any form of credible deterrent to hostile forces on either side of the
Israeli-Lebanese border, commonly referred to as the Blue Line. With the unilateral
withdrawal of Israeli forces in 2000, Hezbollah had extensive freedom of maneuver allowing
them to arm and train local militias and to conduct detailed surveillance of opposing
Israeli

29/30

forces. They were
also able to prepare an extensive series of fighting positions, weapons caches, and
concealed rocket launch sites that proved exceptionally effective during the summer 2006
war.4

UNSCR 1701 expanded
the size of the UN force dramatically and upgraded the forces capabilities, due to
the fact that the primary contributors are top-tier military forces, mostly
from Europe, but also including China and India. UNIFIL is now structured with military
capabilities that are robust by any peacekeeping standard, including armored and
mechanized units, artillery, and even air defense.5 Despite the UNSCR 1701 mandate for up to 15,000 UN troops in
UNIFIL, the organization has deployed just over 12,000 troops, as of late January 2007.6

Perhaps more
significant than the increased size of UNIFIL was its new mandate. UNSCR 1701 specifically
charges UNIFIL to:

Monitor the
cessation of hostilities.

Accompany and
support the Lebanese Armed Forces as they deploy throughout the south, including along the
Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon.

Coordinate
its activities toward a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution with the government
of Lebanon and the government of Israel.

Extend its
assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary
and safe return of displaced persons.

Assist the
Lebanese Armed Forces in taking steps toward the establishment of a demilitarized area
between the Blue Line and the Litani River.

Assist the government of Lebanon, at its request, to secure its
borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms
or related materiel.7

Both the mission
mandate and force authorization in UNSCR 1701 are aggressive by comparison to previous UN
peacekeeping operations in Lebanon, with the implication that this force would be powerful
enough to confront Hezbollah militarily, if required. However, a year into the expanded
mission, it is apparent that neither UNIFIL nor the Lebanese government possesses the will
to directly confront or forcibly disarm Hezbollah. The collective sensitivity against the
implied task of countering Hezbollah is inhibiting forces from completing some explicit
tasks found in the mandate. Specifically, UNIFIL has not executed the accompany and
support mission. From the perspective of military tactics, the directive to
accompany and support requires UNIFIL and the LAF to conduct operations
together, in a physically combined patrol or at the very least within direct observation
and communication of the other force. According to UNIFIL and LAF officers, this is not
happening, with both UNIFIL and the LAF conducting independent patrols and checkpoints

30/31

throughout the zone.8 The February exchange of small-arms fire between Israeli
and Lebanese forces along the Blue Line is a poignant example of the need for UNIFIL
forces to fully execute this mandate.9 UNIFIL needs to be more vigilant in its
close accompaniment of the LAF and its surveillance of activities on the Blue Line if
future conflict is to be avoided.

The Lebanese
armys deployment to the Blue Line is a vital step toward the government of
Lebanons ability to establish control over its territorial borders, a fundamental
element of state sovereignty. UNIFIL has enabled that deployment, providing fuel,
transportation, and significant logistical support to the desperately ill-equipped
Lebanese Armed Forces.10 These military activities in support of the Lebanese army and
government are tremendously important toward achieving the long-term solution
noted in the mandate. It is more valuable for UNIFIL forces to empower and supervise as
the Lebanese army supports the government in asserting its sovereignty, rather than rely
on external powers. Beyond the provision for logistical support, UNIFIL does not have an
explicit mandate to provide military training or assistance, something that could enhance
the capabilities of the Lebanese force.

The structure of
UNIFIL also presents several challenges for the legitimacy of both the UN mission and the
Lebanese government. First, the heavy organization and weaponry of the intervention force
resembles that of a peace enforcement operation, where the intervention units use force or
threat of force to coerce compliance of warring parties.11 This lends credence to Hezbollah suspicions that UNIFIL
plans to attack Hezbollah and disarm it. Second, this heavily armed presence is likely to
generate hostility among the Lebanese population in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL patrols of
heavy tracked vehicles have caused further damage to the already devastated road network
in the south. The image of heavily armored UN peacekeepers is similar to that of forces in
Iraq, widely viewed by the population as an occupation force. Also, UNIFIL
deployed without any organic civil affairs or information operations units, leaving it
without a structured means to interface with local leaders, to craft and disseminate
messages, or to leverage information and influence the population. Information operations
are vital, as locals who perceive that the deployed force is providing them a tangible
benefit are much more likely to inform of possible dangers and plots.12 To their credit, UNIFIL has been able to provide limited
medical and veterinary care to the population of the south, with one Level II hospital
being established by Belgium in Tibneen.13 This effort is extremely popular, as access to western-quality
medicine is extremely rare in South Lebanon. UNIFIL needs to do more along these lines in
an effort to avoid the perception of occupier, whose real mission is the
destruction of Hezbollah. For the Lebanese people in general, and the Shia community in
particular, image of occupation is decidedly negative (built upon Israels previous
occupation of South Lebanon

31/32

and current presence
in Palestinian territory) and generates widespread sympathy for armed resistance.14 No
group has more effectively built upon this sympathy than Hezbollah. Thus, to the extent
that UNIFIL looks and behaves like an occupying force, it emboldens the call for
resistance and legitimizes Hezbollahs justification for retaining its armed
capability.

Defining and
Dealing with Hezbollah

Inspired by the
Iranian Revolution of 1979, Hezbollah emerged in 1982 in response to Israels
occupation of southern Lebanon.15
Professor Augustus Richard Norton recently stated that if Iran was the mother of
Hezbollah, Israel was its stepfather because Israels two-decade-long occupation
fostered and honed Hezbollah.16
Trained and funded by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah began as an
exceptionally violent and ideological organization that eschewed politics and extensively
employed terror (most notably kidnappings, assassinations, and suicide bombings) to weaken
its opponents. As President George W. Bush pointed out in his 2007 State of the Union
Address, Hezbollah is only second to al Qaeda in the number of Americans killed by
terrorism.17 Yet since its murderous beginnings in the
1980s, Hezbollah has grown in both size and complexity.This growth has changed its tactics
and goals. Beginning in 1992, Hezbollah made a strategic decision to participate in
parliamentary elections. Thus, the organization was (partially) resorting to a peaceful
political process to obtain its goals, which were becoming increasingly national and less
ideological in nature.18

Despite its foray
into politics, Hezbollah maintained its emphasis on armed resistance. Benefiting from
support of Iran and Syria, as well as years of combat operations against Israeli forces in
southern Lebanon, Hezbollahs military wing became increasingly professional and
capable. Simultaneously, Hezbollah developed a popular base by providing social services
to the neglected and impoverished Shia community, as well as creating a world-class
television and Internet operation, Al-Manar.19 Hezbollah now is a classic nationalist insurgency, not unlike the
Irish Republican Army with its political wing Sinn Fein. Even after Israel unilaterally
withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, Israels retention of the disputed Shabaa Farms
area and the Lebanese governments inability to control South Lebanon enabled
Hezbollah to resist Israel by exercising a strategy based on border skirmishes, rocket
attacks, and the preparation of defensive positions. Hezbollahs defense-in-depth
proved formidable during the July 2006 war and contributed to Israels inability to
destroy its forces.20 Israels strategy appeared to be
aimed at inflicting pain on the Lebanese people as a whole, with the expectation they
would turn on Hezbollah. Yet, Israels over-reaction and seemingly wanton destruction
only consolidated popular sup-

32/33

port for the
resistance in both the Shia community and among Lebanese who had traditionally opposed
Hezbollah. The war was viewed as an Israeli defeat by many Israelis and Lebanese.21
Thus, the war gave Hezbollah greater legitimacy and political clout; a non-state actor
repelled the invader and had defeated Israel on the field of battle by merely surviving.

With the cessation
of hostilities and the UNs expansion of UNIFIL, Hezbollah has shifted its efforts to
gaining additional political power. Allied with the Christian party of Michel Aoun, its
boycott of the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and subsequent demonstrations
are challenging the Lebanese governments ability to retain power. The Hezbollah-Aoun
alliance vehemently opposes the Siniora governments pro-western agenda, most notably
the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute the killers of former Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri. Emanating from the UNs investigation conducted by Serge
Brammertz, a criminal tribunal has the potential to implicate Syria, Hezbollahs
local sponsor.22 Since the walkout of five Shia ministers
and a Christian cabinet minister in November 2006, the alliance has used public
demonstrations and an extensive media campaign to pressure the government into meeting
their demands. Specifically, the alliance is seeking early parliamentary elections and the
formation of a national unity government, in which their political bloc would have at
least one-third plus one seat, guaranteeing them the ability to block objectionable
legislation (such as acceptance of the Hariri tribunal).23

While these
machinations should be seen as yet another phase of an ongoing insurgency and effort to
gain political power, it is extremely important to note that Hezbollah has not used their
military capabilities to realize their goals. Having demonstrated its lethality against a
well-trained and equipped Israeli force, Hezbollahs military capabilities are
superior to those of the Lebanese army. But rather than pursuing a violent overthrow in an
effort to establish an Islamic state, Hezbollahs leadership is attempting to work
within the current government framework. It is also instructive to note that they are
willing to ally themselves politically with a Christian party in their effort to attain
power. This is not the same group that called for the establishment of a Shia Islamic
theocracy in the 1980s. While they have retained their armed wing as a hedge, their
political faction seeks increased representation commensurate with the growing Shia
population in Lebanon.

Once Hezbollah is
recognized as both a military and political insurgency, then any strategy designed to
contain or end the insurgency needs to be based on accepted counterinsurgency principles.
One of the most widely recognized of these principles is the fact that counterinsurgency
operations should focus on developing effective governance and enhancing the
governments legitimacy in the eyes of the population.24

33/34

Strengthening
the Lebanese Government

If good governance
and enhancing governmental legitimacy are key to defeating an insurgency, then the
long-term solution to the cycle of violence in Lebanon requires more than military action;
such as economic development, social reconciliation, and the enhancement of government
capacity. A senior diplomat in Beirut explained, The government of Lebanon governs
Beirut, but doesnt govern in the south, the north, or in the Bekaa
Valley.25 The governments inability to fully
exercise its writ and provide services outside the capital creates essentially ungoverned
spaces that permit organizations such as Hezbollah to exist. While Hezbollah is the
strongest non-state actor, it is not alone in challenging the states monopoly of
force; sectarian militias, armed Palestinian groups, and new Sunni extremist groups
inspired by al Qaeda all have established a presence in the rural regions of Lebanon.26 Many of these rural areas receive little or no essential
services from the government. Particularly in southern Lebanon, where whole villages were
obliterated by the July war, there is a great need for the government to step in and make
a difference.27 Despite the widely publicized Hezbollah
payments (funded by Iran) to those who lost their homes, that money has not put all the
villagers back to work or restored their livelihood.28

Unfortunately, the
Lebanese government and its international partners have been slow to mobilize
reconstruction efforts, allowing Hezbollah to lead in the race for hearts and minds. The
governments failure to quickly respond is perceived as apathy and disregard for the
Shias welfare, and it continues to ignite the long-held grievances of a marginalized
population.29 Indeed, much of the initial United
Nations Development Programs reconstruction effort and funding have gone to
rebuilding infrastructure in greater Beirut, with comparatively little going to the
devastated south.30 The January 2007 Economic Reform Program
submitted to international donors by the Siniora government states an intention to offset
expenditures by closing the Fund for the Displaced and the Council of the
South, created as the governments vehicle to reconstruct South Lebanon.31 If
the Siniora government and the international community want to separate the insurgency
from the population, they need to be able to compete with Hezbollah in terms of resources
and services.

The slow and
disjointed nature of the ongoing stabilization and reconstruction effort is symptomatic of
a fundamental lack of unity. On the political front with regard to the United
Nations effort, there are a number of high-level UN envoys to Lebanon, none of which
has clear authority to oversee or coordinate the actions of the many UN organizations
working in the

34/35

country. Geir
Pedersen, formerly the Envoy for South Lebanon, was named Special Coordinator for Lebanon
in February 2007. While his new title is encouraging, what is really required is a mandate
that delineates lines of authority and provides adequate staffing if he is to successfully
fill the political void. Terje Roed-Larsen remains the Special Envoy for the
Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, a resolution with the sole
requirement to disarm militias.32 In
perhaps the most politically visible UN initiative, Serge Brammertz serves as Commissioner
of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission into the assassination of
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. While there are many areas of overlap in the
political portfolios of these UN leaders, none has clear authority to orchestrate the
actions of UNIFIL or the myriad of other UN agencies.33 Each of these entities reports to its home office at United
Nations headquarters in New York, including the UNIFIL Military Commander, who reports to
a Strategic Military Cell in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.34 The existing structure squanders resources that could be
directed at reconstruction, but are instead spent on multiple layers of bureaucracy. In
other post-conflict interventions, the United Nations has named a Special Representative
to the Secretary General with the mandate to coordinate all UN activities (including
military operations) in an integrated mission. Unfortunately, the UN has not provided this
type of leadership or a headquarters structure for the Lebanon effort.35 The
compartmentalized nature of the UN structure reflects a view that the UNIFIL mission is
separate from and unrelated to the missions of providing humanitarian aid or investigating
the Hariri murder. In fact, these missions are all facets of a single nation-building
mission in the midst of an insurgency.

The US effort to
bolster the Lebanese government suffers from a similar problem of focus, exacerbated by an
inability to deliver timely aid. Seeing the Lebanon-Hezbollah-Israel problem through the
prism of the global war on terrorism, the US response has been to channel aid to military
security and humanitarian relief programs, while providing limited resources to strengthen
the Lebanese governments non-security institutions. In August 2006, President Bush
pledged $230 million in assistance to Lebanon, and the United States did an admirable job
of providing immediate humanitarian relief. However, as of January 2007, only $120 million
of the initial $230 million pledged had been delivered. The remaining funds are awaiting
the completion of the fiscal year 2007 budget and fulfillment of long-lead-time equipment
orders. At the height of the Siniora governments political crisis in January 2007,
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced an additional $770 million in assistance at
the Paris III conference.36 While Congress appropriated the funds in
the fiscal year 2007 emergency supplemental bill, it

35/36

will take more time
to program and apportion these funds.37 In the
most optimistic scenario, these funds will not be released until later this year.38

Even for the funds
already allocated to Lebanon, the United States has been challenged to quickly turn those
funds into deliverables, actual items or programs on the ground. The US
Foreign Military Financing program was not designed as a rapid-response system, and the
arcane process from apportionment of funding to the actual delivery of an item can take 18
to 24 months, dependent on technology transfer approval, availability, production
schedules, and transportation.39 Making matters more difficult is the
ongoing effort to equip the Lebanese Armed Forces. This program has suffered from
competition for resources with US forces that are equipping and reorganizing for combat in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of the most immediate needs of the LAF have been trucks and
ammunition, both items that are in tight supply.40 For example, in January 2007, the US was only able to make a
symbolic delivery of 20 of the 285 trucks promised to the LAF. The remainder must await
production and shipping.41

The majority of
pledged US funds for Lebanese post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction are targeted
against military or security requirements. A close examination of the fiscal year 2008
international affairs budget request shows that 60 percent of the $770 million in new US
assistance will go to fund the military and police initiatives, while only 40 percent is
allocated to humanitarian, economic, and social programs. If the Lebanese
governments inability to provide essential services is the driving force of popular
support for its political opposition, then a primary focus of the strategy to empower the
government needs to be the expansion of its capacity to govern and serve. The proponents
for heavy military assistance point to the need to stabilize the security situation first,
but the requirement for jobs and services has proven to be an equally essential part of
the security equation in post-conflict interventions.42

The impact of
targeted security assistance on internal Lebanese politics needs to be factored into the
equation. During the opposition-led Beirut demonstrations in January 2007, most local
observers regarded the Internal Security Forces (ISF) as dominated by Sunni groups and
partial to the 14 March ruling coalition.43 The recent US delivery of riot-control gear and vehicles to the
ISF may be viewed as empowering the Sunnis to take on the Shia, thereby exacerbating the
sectarian aspect of the conflict.44 The
Lebanese army, on the other hand, is widely viewed as an impartial, cross-confessional,
national institution (despite a high number of Christians in the senior officer ranks).
The LAF commander, Lieutenant General Michel Suleiman, is a protégé of pro-Syrian
Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, yet has urged the army to exercise restraint and
neutrality in the face of protests.45 This restraint

36/37

and neutrality is critical to the Lebanese
governments efforts to gain legitimacy against sectarian challengers.

As previously
mentioned, the deployment of the LAF to the Blue Line is a critical step to enhancing the
legitimacy of the government. However, the LAF needs to not only be able to take control
of the nations borders, but its training and equipment must also improve
qualitatively if it is to be seen as a capable replacement for Hezbollah as the
defenders of Lebanon. For example, a ubiquitous reminder of Lebanese
vulnerability to its Israeli neighbor is the overflight of southern Lebanon and Beirut by
Israeli warplanes. These overflights reduce the legitimacy of both the Lebanese government
and the LAF, and make UNIFIL appear ineffective in its enforcement of UNSCR 1701. The
ability of the Israeli air force to overfly Lebanon with impunity is a direct result of
the fact that the LAF has virtually no organized air defense capability.46 While the United States has agreed to provide the LAF
with a wide range of military systems for defensive purposes, America has not yet approved
the transfer of such technology as air defense weapons or anti-tank missiles, weaponry
that could potentially alter the tactical balance of power in the region. Meanwhile,
Hezbollah demonstrated impressive anti-tank missile capability during the July war and is
now reported to be acquiring advanced man-portable surface-to-air missiles from Iran.47/48 If the strategy to minimize or eliminate
Hezbollah influence is to empower the LAF and the central government, then it needs to
demonstrate a military capability that might be considered threatening to Israel.

A major
consideration for the United States in providing economic aid and humanitarian assistance
should be how such assistance promotes and strengthens the Lebanese government. To its
credit, the United States did a great deal in the aftermath of the July war in providing
immediate humanitarian relief. Additional support has come in the areas of food aid,
de-mining funds, and funding for water, sanitation, and health projects. However, 90
percent of $108 million that the United States obligated in fiscal year 2006-2007 for
humanitarian assistance was disbursed to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as
Mercy Corps, World Vision, and Catholic Relief Services, as well as to various UN relief
agencies. Only 10 percent went directly to aid to the government of Lebanon or for
administrative costs.49 While NGOs may be the most expeditious and cost-effective way to
dispense relief in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, the almost exclusive reliance
on western aid organizations does little to enhance the Lebanese governments
capacity or its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. In the context of the larger
strategic problem of empowering the Lebanese government, future assistance should serve
the dual purposes of providing services while increasing the role of the government of
Lebanon in distributing those services.

37/38

Recommendations

United Nations

Unity of effort is
essential to the successful stabilization and reconstruction of Lebanon. The best means to
create this unity is for the United Nations to appoint a Special Representative of the
Secretary General with a mandate to establish an integrated mission that would directly
coordinate all UN activities in Lebanon, to include UNIFIL. If the UN goal is the
territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, then
a more holistic and integrated approach that addresses all aspects of stabilization and
reconstruction is required.50

Second, UNIFIL needs
to coordinate more closely with the Lebanese army, specifically by ensuring that all
operations are combined (UNIFIL and LAF) operations. This change will meet the
requirements of UNSCR 1701 to accompany and support, and minimize the
likelihood of accidental engagements between the Lebanese army and the Israeli Defense
Forces along the Blue Line. UNIFIL should also bolster its ability to advise, train, and
assist the Lebanese army within its sector. In addition to traditional military training,
any assistance should empower and encourage the Lebanese army in its effort to assist the
population in South Lebanon. The LAF and UNIFIL need to work side-by-side in operating
field hospitals, providing medical and dental services, conducting civil engineering
projects, and rendering other assistance that will benefit both the LAF and the local
population. Over time, a coordinated effort to train and equip the Lebanese army will
serve two strategic goals. It will empower the army to capably replace both UNIFIL and
Hezbollah. It is imperative that this increased capability allows the LAF to demonstrate
that it is fully capable of defending the territorial integrity of Lebanon.
Simultaneously, these actions will demonstrate the Lebanese governments commitment
to the welfare of the impoverished south, enhancing the legitimacy of the Lebanese
government, and diminishing the populations reliance on Hezbollah.

United States

The most important
step the United States can take to support the Lebanese government is to expedite the
delivery of promised funds and assistance. Rather than relying on wartime supplemental
funding legislation to fund aid projects, the President and the Congress should reconsider
the size of the foreign operations budget and the annual timeliness of its passage. While
the Department of Defense (DOD) has been given limited authority to reprogram funds to
meet emerging regional requirements, the Department of State (DOS) has no such authority.51 In
the case of both DOD and DOS, the severe lag in delivery of funds and equipment has placed
the Lebanese government at risk.

38/39

While the effort to
train and equip the Lebanese Armed Forces is strategically important, the United States
should weight future assistance in favor of economic and social aid versus military
assistance. The ratio of security assistance to economic support funds should be 1:2 (a
reversal of the current ratio). This ratio is required if the current government is to
address the dire conditions impacting the Lebanese economy. An increase in economic
funding will provide tangible benefits to the population and ameliorate many of the
conditions that permit the insurgency to thrive. More importantly, the bulk of the
economic aid provided by the United States should be administered by the government of
Lebanon rather than western NGOs. Regimens and conditionality can be emplaced to inhibit
corruption, but it is imperative that the United States use its assistance to empower
Lebanon in its efforts to build governmental capacity and serve its people.

While US funds and
equipment are vitally important to improving the capabilities of the Lebanese army, the
United States is caught in the unfortunate dilemma that any effort to provide training
within Lebanon by American personnel would raise their public profile. A more viable
approach would be to financially support a UNIFIL-led training assistance mission. As the
effort to train and equip the LAF matures, the United States might consider modifying arms
transfer policies to permit the LAF to field a defensive capability (e.g., air defense and
anti-tank missiles) providing a credible deterrent to aggression. A credible deterrent is
key to the LAFs ability to replace Hezbollah as defender of the Lebanese people.

Finally, there is no
doubt that Lebanons neighbors must play a strategic role in the international
communitys effort to stabilize and reconstruct Lebanon, particularly Syria and Iran.
Both the United Nations and the United States need to make a concerted effort to engage
Syria and Iran on the subject of Lebanon within the context of Middle East peace. Recent
American initiatives to talk directly with North Korea and to participate in direct talks
with Syria and Iran on the subject of Iraq provide promising precedents. While the
problems of Lebanon will not be resolved outside of Lebanon, recent history has shown that
outside influence can either exacerbate or mitigate many of these challenges.

Conclusion

The provision for
more and better-armed peacekeepers and a significant increase in the security forces of
the Lebanese government are not the answers to a lasting peace in Lebanon. To be
successful, the United Nations intervention must change from a force separation mission to
a holistic nation-building effort. The strategy underpinning this effort needs to
recognize the insurgency within Lebanon and develop a campaign to address the conditions
which give rise to that insurgency. First and foremost, this integrated cam-

39/40

paign should
increase the capacity of the Lebanese government in its efforts to provide good governance
and services. Adapting the current US aid program to support a UN-led integrated effort
would be the most effective use of funding. Additionally, it will provide a positive
example of the carrots that the United States offers to accompany the many
sticks it wields in its war on terrorism. Without this holistic approach,
Lebanon will certainly return to the cycle of violence that it has suffered for the past
30 years.

4. For a review of
Hezbollahs tactical performance, see Andrew Exum, Hizballah at War: A Military
Assessment, Policy Focus #63 (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, December 2006),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=260.

5. From a UNIFIL
briefing given to the author during a January 2007 visit to Lebanon.

11. US Department of
Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint
Publication 1-02, 12 April 2001, as amended through 31 August 2005; and Air Land Sea
Application Center, Peace Operations: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for Conducting Peace Operations, Field Manual 3-07.31, 26 October 2003.

12. For an excellent
illustration of the relationship between the provision of basic services for the local
population and force protection for the deployed force, see Peter Chiarelli and Patrick
Michaelis, Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations, Military
Review, 85 (July/August 2005), 4.

13. Per a UNIFIL
briefing the author received in January 2007 in Lebanon. In medical terminology, a Level
II hospital is one capable of providing initial definitive trauma care, but may lack the
array of specialty care available at a full hospital.

30. For details, see
Government of Lebanon and United Nations Development Program, Lebanon: Quick
Delivery - High Impact Projects for the Immediate Post-Ceasefire Period,
http://www.undp.org.lb/lebanon/Quick_Delivery_High_Impact_Projects_for_Lebanon.pdf.

31. Lebanese
Republic, Recovery, Reconstruction, and Reform, International Conference for
Support to Lebanon, 2 January 2007.

33. For more
information on UN agencies in Lebanon, see http://www.un.org.lb/un/template.asp?id=182.

34. A new
organization created to oversee the expanded UNIFIL, the Strategic Military Cell is headed
by Italian Lieutenant General Giovanni Ridino, who in turn reports to the Under Secretary
General for Peacekeeping Operations. See UN Secretary General, Secretary-General
Appoints Lieutenant General Giovanni Ridino of Italy as Director of New Strategic Military
Cell for United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, News Release, 21 September 2006,
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sga1020.doc.htm.

35. For more
discussion on the role of the SRSG in post-conflict interventions, see Robert Orr, ed., Winning
the Peace, An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Washington: Center
for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 22.

36. US Department of
State, United States Supports the Recovery of Lebanon, Fact Sheet, 25 January
2007, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/79396.htm.

37. US Department of
State, Summary and Highlights: International Affairs Function 150 Fiscal Year 2008
Budget Request, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/80151.pdf; and United
States Agency for International Development, United States Assistance to
Lebanon, 26 January 2007,
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/YSAR-6XTTKS?OpenDocument.

39. The author has
extensive experience with the process, having managed a $750 million Foreign Military
Financing portfolio while serving with the Military Assistance Program Office at the US
Embassy in Amman, Jordan, from 2000-2002.

40. From an
unclassified review of the Lebanese Armed Forces conducted by a team led by US Central
Command in September 2006.

41. Embassy of the
United States, Beirut, Lebanon, U.S. Delivers First of 285 Humvees to Lebanese Armed
Forces; A Component of $39 Million in Military Assistance to Lebanon in 2006, News
Release, 19 January 2007, http://lebanon.usembassy.gov/lebanon/PR_HUMVEES011907.html; and
from interviews with US officials involved in the effort.

49. United States
Agency for International Development, U.S. Government Situation Report #10: Lebanon
Humanitarian Emergency, 29 December 2006.

50. UNSCR 1701,
para. 5.

51. Specifically,
sections 1206 and 1207 of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act allow the Department
of Defense to transfer limited funds and training to foreign countries to build partner
capacity for the global war on terrorism. In US government circles, these funds have
become known as 1206 funds and 1207 funds.

Lieutenant Colonel William K.
Mooney, Jr., serves on the Joint Staff in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate
(J-5). He has served in both command and staff positions as a US Army aviator and Middle
East Foreign Area Officer. Lieutenant Colonel Mooney is a graduate of Norwich University,
Boston University, and the Arabic language program at the Defense Language Institute. He
recently completed a Senior Service College Fellowship at Georgetown University.