The Contemporary History of the Western Philosophy
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814)

Life

The Early Period:

Johann Fichte was born as a son of a very poor ribbon weaver in the village called
Rammenau in Sachsen (Saxony in Eastern Germany). When he was a small child, he learned how
to weave ribbon and watch geese and helped his family. Johann was a very unusual child and was
able to retell the sermon as he very carefully listened to the preacher 's talk. One day, a wealthy
farmer from the neighboring village was not able to be to attend the church service on time one
Sunday. So someone told him that he should ask that child who attended the geese. As the wealthy
farmer heard that child recite the sermon back to him exactly without any problem to him, he was
so impressed with his potential that he sponsored this child's education.
Having graduated from the Gymnasium, Johann Fichte studied philosophy, classical
literature and theology at Jena and Leipzig University. When his sponsor died and Fichte's parents
could not provide Johann the financial support to continue his study, Johann Fichte went to Zurich
and became a tutor for the children of a wealthy merchant. During his stay in Zurich, Johann Fichte
had a chance to get acquainted with an extremely intelligent, strong-charactered young lady called
Johanna Rahn and was deeply attracted by her. She later married Johann Fichte and helped him in
various ways to further his philosophy throughout his life. Since the parents of the children he
tutored were rather vulgar and uninteresting people, Johann Fichte left Zurich and went back to
Leipzig in 1790. In order to make his living, he was commissioned to tutor a college student of the
well-to-do family in Kant's philosophy, Johann Fichte for the first time himself studied Kant and
his philosophy intensively for this purpose. This encounter of Fichte with Kant's publications
made a decisive influence on Fichte and came to determine his entire life.
In his letter to his then fiancé and later his wife, Johanna Rahn, Fichte wrote, "I have
finally acquired a most noble morality and instead of concerning myself with the external things, I
am devoting myself to my own inner self. Thus I have been experiencing the peace of mind which
I have never before experienced and am living a very happy life." To one of his friends, Johann
Fichte also wrote, "...it is incredulous how profoundly Kant's philosophy, his moral philosophy
in particular, has influenced the total system of one man's thinking and how decidedly Kant's
philosophy has initiated a revolution in my total philosophical thought. Since I read the Critique of
Practical Reason, I am living in a totally different world. The principles that I hitherto believed to
be absolutely certain have been totally uprooted and destroyed. What I previously thought to be
impossible to explain, for example, absolute Freedom and Moral Obligation are apodeictically
demonstrated. An exhaustible joy fills me. It is incredible how great and overwhelming the
admiration and the strength to humanity this system gives."
Next year, Fichte became acquainted with Kant in person in Königsberg in East Prussia
(today's Karingrad). In the hope that his devotion to Kant's philosophy and his ability in
philosophy be recognized by Kant himself, Johann Fichte wrote Versuch einer Kritik aller
Offenbarung (A Attempt of the Critique of All Revelations) in 1792, in which Kant's philosophical
thought was applied to religious philosophy. Since Kant had not yet published his book on
religious philosophy (his Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft appeared in
1798), Kant read Fichte's work and appreciated his philosophical gift, so much so that Kant found
a job tutoring in Danzig and helped Fichte's work to be published. In 1792 this opus was
published anonymously, i.e., but without the author's name due to some unknown error. Because
the position of the book was so close to Kant's philosophy, the academic world thought that the
author of Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung was Kant. Once it was revealed that the book was
written by Fichte instead, he became instantaneously famous.
Johann Fichte went back to Zurich to marry Johanna and also got acquainted with
Pestalozzi, the famous Swiss pedagogist. During his stay in Zurich, Fichte wrote books on the
French Revolution and on the freedom of the press. During his early period, Fichte was deeply
involved in practical philosophy.
In 1794 Johann Fichte was appointed as the successor to Reinhold, as Reinhold moved to
Kiel University. For five years, till 1799, Johann Fichte was at Jena University devoting himself
to the development of his own philosophical system and also exercised a profound influence on his
students. On first appearance his first opus looks to be a theoretical philosophy: Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre in 1794.

Further, Fichte wanted to make his system more complete and more intelligible, thus he
wrote: Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre
Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre
Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre in 1797.

In 1799 the so-called Der Atheismusstreit (the controversy over atheism) took place in Jena
whereby the bureaucrats accused Fichte of being an atheist. Über den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung in 1798.

Johann Fichte argues that the moral order in the world is the most certain proof for the
existence of God: The very moral order which is fully active and effective in us is no other than the
proof that God exists. We need God solely as the universal moral order and need nothing else in
our religion. Beyond and above this universal moral order, according to Fichte, there exists no
basis to recognize a Special Being as the (mechanical, efficient) Cause of this universe. Anyone
who tries to acknowledge and ascribe Him a certain "consciousness" and "person" in this special
Being is to make God rather a finite being without being aware of what he is doing. The self that
has consciousness is, according to Fichte, a finite, limited, individual ego.
Against Fichte's moral argument for God as the Ground for the moral order of this
universe (which denies Him consciousness and person, too,), the Government of Kursachsen
(Kursaxony), whose capital was Dresden, decided to confiscate Fichte's books and placed an
official complaint to the Government of Weimar that Atheism was taught at the University in Jena,
which was a territory of Weimar Republic. In stead of taking a consoling attitude to this political
uproar, Fichte was being extremely outraged and wrote a second article with a more radical tone: Appellation an ad Publikum in 1799 Gerichtliche Verantwortung gegen die Anklage des Atheismus

The Government of Weimar wanted to settle this diplomatic friction rather quietly without
both antagonizing the Government of Kursachsen and firing Fichte from the University.
Nevertheless, Fichte's personality did not accept such a procedure (Wasn't he childish? Yes,
Indeed he was.) and he wrote a radical complaint to the Government. Everyone concerned in the
Government of Weimar got furious with Fichte and naturally fired him.
In Berlin Fichte wrote books and lectured as a private citizen (he could not get a teaching
position due to that "scandal"). During the Berlin period, Fichte tended to be more religious and
mystical in his philosophical thinking. The officials in Berlin were friendly to Fichte, people were
enthusiastic, and Fichte enjoyed close friendships with such Romantic writers as the brothers
Schlegel, Thiek and Schleiermacher.
Fichte wrote: Die Bestimmung des Menschen
Der geschlossene Handelsstaat in 1800 Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre in 1801 Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters
Über das Wesen des Gelehrten
Die Anweisung zum seeligen Leben oder die Religionslehre in 1806

In 1806 and 1807 Prussia fought against Napoleon and lost the war and Berlin was also
occupied by the French army. Fichte gave a series of lectures appealing to Patriotism for the
Germans: Reden an die deutsche Nation in 1808

In 1810 a new university was founded in Berlin and Fichte became professor there.
In 1818 the so-called Freiheitskrieg (The War of Liberation) broke out, Paris was occupied in
March and Napoleon was sent to St. Helena. Fichte became a victim of this war, for Johanna
Fichte was working as a nurse at the military hospital and contracted an infectious disease from
soldiers who were patients there. Fichte also became fatally infected. Die Tatsachen des Bewußtseins

1. The Objectives
Unfisnished Business of Kant
Completion of Idealism1.-i. The task unfulfilled by Kant's philosophy: Radicalization of Idealism:

According to Fichte, Kant's greatest merit was in his discovery and establishment of
Transcendental Idealism (whereby the emphasis is on Idealism). Fichte contended that what Kant
had accomplished by Transcendental Idealism was to reverse the philosophical "common sense"
orientation such that our thought or understanding (reason) is the source of the universal and
necessary validity of knowledge, and not the knowledge's relatedness to nature (the external
world). In other words, Kant elucidated that the idea determines the object and not that the object
determines the idea (unlike the assumption of the British Empiricism). Our knowledge does not
derive from the external world, but no doubt being related to the external world, our knowledge
possesses the universal and necessary validity (as the criterion of its truth) by means of our reason
(our mind or consciousness).
In other words, Kant "divorced" the pursuit of knowledge (=philosophy) from its
immersion in the external world (nature) and brought philosophy back to the inquiry into the Self
itself or consciousness. This is in a senses a regression to philosophy of self and consciousness.
Nevertheless, Fichte thought that most philosophers misunderstood the spirit of Kant's system and
intention and adhered to the surface, namely the uses of the words. They were absolved in the
thing in itself or the material elements and oversaw that Kant purported the opposite. Kant's
interpreters intended to read their own prejudices into Kant's philosophy so that they took Kant's
objections for Kant's thought. In other words, they merely made Kant's philosophy once again a
dogmatism, while Kant had attempted to destroy dogmatism. For example, Reinhold's
interpretation of Kant is a strange conjecture of a naive dogmatism and a decisive idealism.
According to Fichte, however, that is inconceivable for the originator of such a great philosophy.
Fichte thought that what Kant intended to accomplish in his philosophy was the unfinished
business and Fichte's task was, so he conceived, to radicalize Kant's position and complete his
intention by eliminating the dogmatic elements.

I.-ii. A systematic completion of idealism:

Fichte viewed that the biggest problem of Kant's philosophy consists in a "cleft" in his
system, i.e., the "logical inconsistency" (according to Fichte) in Kant's philosophy. As Fichte saw
it, Kant indeed established the transcendental philosophy to justify the objectivity of our
knowledge of nature, and yet he failed to provide the philosophical foundation for Transcendental
Idealism itself. What was left by Kant therefore, according to Fichte, was to establish the unity and
integration of the system in the transcendental philosophy. The completion of Transcendental
Idealism was to Fichte Die Wissenschaftslehre. According to Johann Fichte, in order to accomplish
this, he must demonstrate that it is possible to logically deduce the entire system of philosophy
from one and the only one principle. This was the subjectivity or "Self." In this sense, despite
Fichte's contention, Fichte did not perfect Kant's philosophy as a mere epigonen (imitator and
follower), but ended up with developing his own, considerably different philosophy.

2. The Details of Completing Transcendental Idealism:

What was the concrete shape and structure of the completion of Transcendental Idealism?
In the theoretical philosophy, Kant for example takes it for granted that the forms of thought may
be applicable to the material elements (objectivity) of knowledge, and yet he did not work out and
clarify the ground for its possibility, namely how our understanding which is totally different from
its object can be applied to the object so that they would produce an a priori synthetic knowledge.
For example, Kant attempted to deduce the category of substance or that of causality from the form
of judgment, but according to Fichte, this actually means that the category of substance or the
category of causality was not founded on the nature of intelligence, but was obtained from the
experience to which Formal Logic applies. In order to authentically understand why reason must
think in accordance with the categories, Fichte maintains, those Tathandlungen (the pure activities
of the Self or I), i.e., the forms of our thought, must be demonstrated indeed to be the rules of our
thinking. In other words, these categories are to be demonstrated as the condition of the possibility
of self consciousness. Not only did Kant fail to do this, but he also failed to justify even space and
time as forms of sensibility.
Even if Kant might have done this, so argues Fichte, then Kant was not able to provide the
ground for and elucidate the origin of the material elements of our knowledge. Unless, before the
eye of the philosophizing spirit, objectivity as a whole is "produced," so argues Fichte, dogmatism
can not be completely eliminated. We cannot leave the thing in itself as something totally
independent of our thought. According to Fichte, the thing in itself is nothing but that which the
subjectivity has to justify and "produce!"
Just as the relation between form and matter of our knowledge has been "modified", the
opposition and differentiation between understanding and senses are to be abolished and to be
reduced to a common principle, namely subjectivity. Sensitivity is to be understood now also by
the Spontaneity of subjectivity that the subjectivity determines itself.
In his practical philosophy (ethics), so insists Fichte, Kant left many questions unsolved.
For example, according to Fichte, the so-called "categorical imperative" is not the ultimate.
Therefore, the categorical imperative also to be philosophically justified. The categorical imperative
is in itself the principle, but is to be deducible from the other, more fundamental principle. The
authentic principle is the imperative of the absolute independence of reason (absolute
Selbstständigkeit der Vernunft).
Furthermore, in order to obtain a substantial moral theory and not just a formal ethics, the
relationship between moral consciousness and natural impulses must be well elaborated and
elucidated.
Thirdly, the relationship between the theoretical philosophy and the practical philosophy in
Kant's thought is untouched by Kant and thus it remained obscure.
What Kant did was that he only distinguished them. This dualism must be overcome.

3. Choice of Philosophical Standpoint (Idealism or Dogmatism?)

Fichte has his own new innovative conception of Idealism apart from Kantian philosophy.
According to Fichte, only two logically consistent systems of philosophy are possible, the one is
dogmatism or realism and the other is idealism. Namely, the former (dogmatism) attempts to
deduce ideas from things, while the former (idealism) endeavors to produce being from thought.
Dogmatism is in error regarding its principle (because no one can produce thought from being!). If
dogmatism were maintained consistently throughout, then it turns out to be like the system of
Spinoza in the sense of materialism.
In this position they cannot escape from causal determinism (and there is no space for
freedom of humanity). For everything is of nature or a product of nature and is governed by
mechanistic causality. Therefore, dogmatism views spirit as an epiphenomenon of natural process
and denies the human spirit the metaphysical and moral autonomy and its immateriality and thus the
dogmatism fails to recognize freedom. In reality, thought cannot be produced or deduced from
matter, therefore materialism or dogmatism must be erroneous in principle. In other words, being
comes from the representation (the idea) while no representation comes from being.
However, Fichte maintains that being can be deduced from the representation, as
consciousness (Bewußtsein) is also being (Sein) and yet consciousness is more than being. For
consciousness (Bewußtsein) is ein bewußtes Sein (a conscious being). Thus it is obvious,
according to Fichte, that consciousness (Bewußtsein) not only contains being but knowledge of
being as its moments as well. Idealism can explain dogmatism, but the latter (dogmatism) can not
explain the former (idealism). The greatest error of dogmatism is dealing with the empty concepts
above and beyond consciousness or self. The concept is empty when it lacks intuitive givenness,
but according to Kant, there cannot be intellectual intuition in epistemology (Kant talks about
intellectual intuition in Critique of Judgement). Fichte went far beyond Kant's assertion and
contended that there is intellectual intuition which Kant failed to recognize in the human mind. The
most pregnant sense of intuition is intellectual intuition which is intuition of the existing self to
immediately grasp its own self. (Intuition is a way of cognition in which the object (that which is to
be known) is known to the subject (the knower) immediately, I.e., without any mediation.)
Philosophy may be able to abstract and must abstract what is given. Thus philosophy must
always behold its object at a higher view-point. However, the correct abstraction is to separate
those which appear as a synthesis in our experience. It analyses our experiential consciousness
because we must re-construct our experiential consciousness out of its essential elements and it
produces the experiential consciousness right "in front of our own eyes." In other words, the
correct abstraction is no other than the actual history of our experiential consciousness. This
abstraction with the aim of genetic observation of the self does not go beyond experience, but
penetrates into the depth of experience. This analysis of abstraction of experience in philosophy is,
therefore, not transcendent, but transcendental, precisely because of the above. Such an
abstraction, maintaining the immediate connection with intuition, provides an actual philosophy
(die wirkliche Philosophie) in contrast with various formal philosophical systems. By means of
remaining within consciousness, i.e., within the self, the significance and advantage of idealism
consists in being capable of the correct abstraction without being involved in those empty concepts.
This is the theoretical strength of idealism.

The law of morality asserts, "Thou shall be independent." (Du sollst selbstständig sein!) In
other words, independence may be understood as freedom and autonomy of the human-being.
Therefore, "You ought to be free and autonomous." As Kant clearly pointed out, if we as humans
ought to be independent, we must be capable of being independent. The ought (Sollen) of being
independent presupposes its can (Können). However, if we are of matter or deducible from matter,
we are not able to be independent. Therefore, idealism, seen from the practical point of view, is the
only philosophical point of view which is consistent with the moral concept of "ought." From a
different way of looking at this, we may say that one who adheres to realism has not yet elevated
himself/herself to being free and autonomous, thus to the domain of morality. For in order to be
able to know that you are free, you must first of all liberate yourself. Idealism can demonstrate that
the idealist is free, and yet to be an idealist it is necessary to liberate oneself as an autonomous
agent, to thereby be able to fulfill the moral obligation. "Those who fulfill the moral obligation, and
who are free, are those who choose idealism for the sake of freedom. What kind of philosophical
position one chooses depends upon what kind of human-beingshe/he is."

[What kind of philosophy one chooses depends upon what kind of human-being
one is. For a philosophical system is not a "dead" utensil which one could reject or
accept as if it were arbitrary. On the contrary, the philosophical system is enlivened
by the human soul that one possesses.]
On the other hand, according to Fichte, it does not repudiate idealism even if the law of
morality demands the reality of the external world and that of other spirits, for idealism does not
deny realism, namely the reality of everyday life. Idealism explains realism not as the ultimate point
of view, but as the necessary viewpoint for our mundane way of life. Contrary to idealism,
dogmatism is an attempt to explain the philosophical viewpoint from the vulgar point of view.
Idealism is related to the philosophical explanation while the mundane consciousness is to
dogmatic realism.
Fichte contends idealism is the only defensible, satisfactory viewpoint both theoretically
and practically. Just like the natural impulse and the moral volition in human action, both realism
and idealism are rooted in Reason. Idealism is the ultimate philosophical position because idealism
is able to explain realism, while dogmatism cannot explain idealism.

4. What is the Science of Knowledge or die Wissenschaftslehre?

What is the nature and aim of the Fichtean Wissenschaftslehre (the doctrine of science =
Science of Knowledge)? Die Wissenschaftslehre is the authentically radicalized idealism and
elevates Kant's philosophy to the level in which the science of knowledge becomes an evident and
intuitive science as the philosophical basis for the transcendental philosophy. This evident science
(Fichte's philosophy) seeks to eliminate the dualism of intuition and thinking on the one hand and
dualism of knowledge and volition on the other so as to attain absolute monism. In other words,
this evident science demonstrates both these dichotomies as deducible from one and the only one
principle, namely the activity of the sole ego (die Tathandlung des einzigen Ichs).

Why this evident science is called dieWissenschaftslehre is because it adequately and
ultimately answers the question,

How is knowledge (Wissen) possible?
and
How is experience possible?

This is not the science about "fact", but the science about "knowledge" (die Wissenschaft
von Wissen). In Kant's terms, it is the transcendental philosophy. This "knowledge" does not
include our everyday practical knowledge and common-sense knowledge, but exclusively deals
with the knowledge of sciences. To Fichte, this knowledge (Wissen) includes not only common
sense but the totality of all the scientific disciplines. Therefore, die Wissenschaftslehre is to
intuitively elucidate the structure of our consciousness functioning both in our mundane life and in
all the special sciences. Die Wissenschaftslehre deals with the necessary ideas or the necessary
actions, while the other special sciences deal with arbitrary (willkürlich) ideas or action
(=behavior). For example, we can arbitrarily represent the idea of triangle or circle, while the idea
of space for instance is necessary and cannot be arbitrarily abstracted. Die Wissenschaftslehre
intends to deal with those necessary ideas (=representations).

Why did intellect come to term with sensitivity?
Why did intellect come to intuitively know space and time?
Why did intellect create such specific categories as substance and causality?

Kant adequately described the activities of the intuitive spirit and the speculative spirit, but
as answers to the above questions, these activities are to be demonstrated as necessary and to be
deducted from the basis of all consciousness, i.e., from the Tathandlung des absoluten Ichs. Die
Tathandlung is contrasted to die Tatsache. Die Tathandlung is also called pure activity. The self is
according to Fichte nothing but this pure activity of the self or ego. Die Wissenschaftslehre
deduces everything systematically from the self as the pure activity (Tathandlung). the highest pure
activity of the self forms three principles.
The Tasks of The Wissenschaftslehre (Science of Knowledge)
(1) the Tasks Kant had left unsolved (viewed from Fichte's viewpoint)
a) Radicalization of idealism
b) Systematization of idealism
both of which is supposed to lead to the completion of idealism

(2) The Details for The Completion of Philosophy of Idealism
Theoretical Philosophy
Form and Matter
Form
The forms of thought (=Categories)
The forms of sensibility (Space and Time)
Matter
That which is affected through senses by Thing itself
`
Understanding and Sensibility

Practical Philosophy
The origin of the affirmative proposition
The relation between the Moral Consciousness and
the Natural Impulse

II. The Three Basic Principles (Die drei Grundsätze)
The highest forms of Tathandlung take three distinct Principles. They are led by the need
for self reflection. In the case of thinking, What does the self necessarily do? It is the fact that in
case of thinking (being conscious of) anything, the I inevitably thinks (is conscious) of one's own
self and that we are not able to abstract this I or self from this activity at all.
That, I think, means either that the I affirms my self or that the I posits my self. Here it
becomes obvious that thereby the affirming I and the affirmed I become apart, the positing I and
the posited I, the thinking I and the I being thought of, distinguish themselves within the I or ego.
This means further that the I or self is the subject and the object at the same time. The nature of self
consciousness consists in the very identity of the representing and the represented. Such pure I or
self is not a fact (Tatsache), but an activity (Tathandlung). this activity (Tathandlung) takes place
unconsciously and it is by intellectual intuition that the self is aware of this unconscious pure
activity. This is the meaning of the First principle. The First Principle says,

That is, "the I or self (=ego) posits itself"(Das Ich setzt sich selbst. [p. 96]), or more
simply, "I am", (Ich bin. [p. 96]). The nature of the self is no other than its activity that the I posits
itself as my own being. The Cartesian "I think, therefore I am", as well as Kant's "synthesis" are
this Tathandlung itself. Logically speaking, from this Tathandlung, the principle of identity ( A=A
) is deduced. In the categories, Kant's category of reality may be deduced from this.
This First Principle is that by which the I thinks of itself, and yet in the fact of our
experiential consciousness, together with the I's positing itself, something other, "something
opposite and foreign" comes to appear. Needless to say, what is something opposite is no other
than opposite to the I itself (for nothing else does exist).
Thus The Second Principle states:

"Against the I the non-I posits itself".

From this Second Principle, the logical Principle of Contradiction is deduced and the
Category of Negation is deducible.
The First Principle and The Second Principle are to be reconciled. Since both the I and the
non-I are opposing each other within the (original) I itself, they are to be posited as mutually
limiting. In other words, they are to be posited as mutually annulling its own portion, i.e., they are
to be posited as being divisible (teilbar).
Thus The Third Principle states:

From this Third Principle the logical Principle of Reason (der Satz des Grundes), for that
principle contains the reason for the synthesis and unity of the I and the non-I. The Category of
Determination (die Kategorie der Bestimmung) is deducible from this.
Simply, the I (without its opposing non-I) as such and the non-I (without its opposing I) as
such alone are indeterminate, infinite. By the Third Principle, they are now determined as the
divisible I and the divisible non-I and being posited as opposite, they are now mutually determinant
and in consequence determined, definite. This is what Kant called the Category of Limitation.
Those three Categories which are deducible from the three Principles belong to The
Categories of Quality (Reality, Negation and Limitation).
The I that is the object of the intellectual intuition is the I which serves as the Ground of all
beings, and is by no means an individual I.
It is the I-ness, the Spirituality as such (die Geistigkeit überhaupt), the Eternal Reason itself
(die ewige Vernunft).
This I as the Eternal Reason is both common to and the one with every I that is. It appears in every
thought and exists in it as its ground. To this absolute I an individual I is merely its accident (die
Akzidenz), its means or its particular expression. this absolute I is pure activity and not a
Substance. The pure I could not be conceived as an entity existing before this pure activity. Being
is the accident and the result of this pure activity. The pure activity of the I is primary, the
substance is secondary. In Goethe's Faust in Studienzimmer Szene (1224-1237), Faust opened
with the beginning of the Gospel according to St. John in the New Testament, and wondered about
the proper translation for the Greek word, "Logos" in the context of "In the beginning was the
Word (Am Anfang war das Wort [Luther's translation]). Instead of "the Word", Faust tried,
"Meaning" (Sinn), then "Power" (Kraft), then finally he settled on the word "Action" (Tat).
According to Fichte, this Tat is no other than his Tathandlung, the pure activity of the absolute I.
The three activities expressed by the above Three Principles are isolated, mutually
independent activities of the I. To the contrary, these three positings (Setzungen) are but one and
encompassing, total activity. It is the beginning of the total system of the unconscious various
activities and the inquiry into these various activities is the task of the Wissenschaftslehre.
In the Wissenschaftslehre the thesis (=the position of the I), the antithesis (=the position of
the non-I), and the synthesis (=the position of the I and the non-Iin mutual limitation) repeatedly
appear to elucidate Fichte's thought and this is the very forerunner of Hegel's dialectic. This may
trace back to what Kant called "eine artige Betrachtung", his Categories. If we may go further
back, we may find it in Jacob Boehme.
Within The Third Principle, there are two propositions included:

1) deals with the cognitive activity of the self, while 2) deals with the practical activity of the self.

III. The theoretical I (the I as cognitive faculty)

One of the two propositions,"the I posits itself as being determined by the non-I" which are
contained in the Third principle purports the cognitive act of the self. Furthermore, this proposition
contains two more propositions:

1) "The non-I determines the I." In other words,, the I is "affected" by the other, namely
"The I suffers(leidet=is acted upon) by the non-I".

2) "The I posits itself", i.e., "the I determines itself", that is,

the I posits by itself its own determination. Namely,
"The I is active (=tätig)".

These two propositions are to be reconciled in such a way that a portion of the I is viewed
as determining, while the other portion of the I is viewed as being determined. Needless to say,
this is based on the Third Principle that reveals that the I is divisible(=teilbar). This "being
divisible" means "being capable of quantity." That one portion of the I is viewed as determining,
while the other portion of the I is viewed as being determined is the same as the I posits in itself the
negation in as much as posits in the non-I the reality, i.e., the same reality that is negated in the I is
to be posited in the non-I. from here the Category of Quantity is derived. Quantitatively viewed,
the being acted upon (=leiden) of the I is no other than the decrease of being active of the I. Being
acted upon (=leiden) is a certain quantity of being active, i.e., that of the I. Unless the I is active, it
is acted upon, or unless the I is active, the non-I is active. In short, the non-I is after all a portion
of the I itself. Fichte tried to demonstrate this relationship of the I and the non-I by means of the
analogy between the light (das Licht) and the darkness (das Finsternis), Reality, Negation and
Limitation. Thus from the Limitation as one of the Categories - the Third Category of Quality, the
Categories of Relation are to be derived.
In the propositions, "The I is acted upon by the non-I" and "The I is active", the
relationship between the I and the non-I are carefully examined, then the Three Categories of
Relation, namely, 1. Mutual Determination, 2. Causality, 3. Substance,

1. The Category of Mutual Determination (Wechselwirkung):
The Reality, once negated in the I, is posited with equal quantity.

As determinatio est negatio is said, between the I and the non-I the determination is
mutually done by negation.

2. The Category of Causality:
The cause of the I's being-acted-upon is the non-I, and as its result,
the I's being-acted-upon (suffering=leiden) is produced.
Thus the Category of Causality is derived.

3. The Category of Substance:
The being-acted upon (leiden=suffering) of the I is the limitation of the I upon itself.
Since the I's being-acted-upon (suffering=leiden) is viewed as an accident at its very
portion, the activity of the I is fundamentally the substance. Thus from this the Category of
Substance is derived. So subsist the necessary relationships among the three Categories of Relation
which are derivable therefrom.

That the I possesses Substantiality, while the non-I possesses Causality, can be viewed
also as these two functions contained the (absolute) I, or this can further construed as the two,
opposite directional powers. This power as a whole is the striving to infinity and it is also said to
be the limitless productive power (Produktionsvermögen).
Compare with Kant's distinction of Imagination;

The production of the productive imagination is prior to our conscious activities and
unconscious activities. Therefore, we believe that objectivity (the external reality) appears to be
discovered. The various representations are the various steps of the unconscious productivity.
Thus, from the pure activity of the I, namely from the productive imagination, the fact of
consciousness in general must be explained. This Fichte called "die Deduktion der Vorstellung".

The Deduction of Representations

1) Feeling (Gefühl) or sensation (Empfindung)

i.e., "In-sich Findung", to find in itself (the I itself). However, The I or self finds (this) as
something other and yet finds in itself. In sensation no distinction between the being
conscious and the being-conscious-of.

2) Intuition (die Anschauung).

When the I reflects upon its own sensation, and posits that which limits the I and looks at
it, this act is Intuition (Anschauung), in which the non-I is intuited, and what is intuited
appears as if it were the product of the non-I.

3) The reproductive imagination (= das Nach-bilden).

Taking into itself the intuition the I reproduces(nach-bilden) the intuition. its product is a
"picture" (das Bild), i.e., das Nachbild to be exact. While this Nachbild is our
representation, its original (das Vorbild) is the thing in itself. Here the thing in itself (das
wirkende Ding) and the picture (das Bild) are distinguished. Thus the I reproduces
(pictures) the Intuition (its own product as the non-I) in itself. In other words, the I
consciously reproduces what the I unconsciously produced. Thus, while the productive
imagination produces reality, the reproductive imagination produces representation.

4) Understanding (der Verstand):

According to Fichte what produces the Categories is also imagination. Understanding
simply makes the categories applicable to the laws. Fichte even argues that Hume was right
in maintaining that Causality is a product of imagination, although Hume erred in failing to
recognize the objective validity of causality.

Kant viewed the Categories as the primary forms of thinking, i.e., that the Categories
originate from Understanding, and he had to elaborate in the Schematism the Categories in
conjunction with productive imagination in order to make the objective application of the
Categories possible. In contrast, according to Fichte, Kant was right in the lawfulness of
the Categories, and yet erred regarding the origin of the Categories. The Categories are not
the products of Understanding, but they arise at the same time as objectivity, (external)
reality and solely on the basis of the productive imagination.

Space and Time, too, according to Fichte, have their origin in imagination. While Kant
discovered Space and Time as the a priori forms of intuition, Fichte attempts to deduce a
priori Space and time. As a result, they are demonstrated as existing in the I.

Understanding solidifies the fluid intuition by means of concepts so that by understanding,
the product of imagination becomes objectivity, the (external) reality.

5) Judgment (die Urtielskraft):

Judgment is the free ability (das freie Vermögen) of reflection. It is the ability whether or
not to direct reflection to a certain object. It freely abstracts a certain object of understanding
and it is an ability to, at will, connect or separate certain characteristics (Merkmale).

6) Reason (die Vernunft):

While understanding is the ability to abstract a certain objectivity, Reason is the ability to
abstract objectivity itself as a whole. Reason is conscious of itself as the ability of
abstraction which does not direct itself to a particular object. it is the I in its absolute, pure
subjectivity. The significance and ability of Reason is Self-Consciousness. The freer
Reason becomes from objectivity, the closer the empirical I comes to pure self
consciousness.

IV. The Practical I (Das Praktische Ich)

The deduction of the various representations reveals the various steps of our cognition:
Sensation
The Sensory Intuition
Reproductive Imagination

Understanding
The Spiritual Judgment
Reason

In the section on theoretical philosophy, Fichte did not explain why the I, hindering itself
from going to the infinity of its own self, goes back to its self. In order that the consciousness or
cognition is formed, it was necessary to "give" or "produce" within itself the first limitation or
hindrance (Anstoß). By so doing, Sensation was produced, and on that basis Understanding
through reflections, the objective world was "built" or produced. Unless, therefore, the I limits its
own infinite activity, there would be no representation, nor objectivity itself.
Why does consciousness, representation, or the world exist at all? "Where did the
primordial non-I come from? Where did the hindrance (Anstoß) come from which hinders the I
from going to infinity and has it return to the I itself?"
As long as we remain within the domain of the theoretical I, we are not able to answer these
questions. For the theoretical I itself was born from encountering that hindrance. This hindrance
(der Anstoß) has to be deduced, which is only possible in the domain of the practical I. The
Primacy of the Practical Reason that Kant emphasized will be able to do so.
To become the theoretical I by limiting itself is, for the I, to become the practical I. There
are the ability of representation and the world of representation in the theoretical world because we,
as the practical Is, provide ourselves with the possibility of fulfilling the moral obligation. Why we
are Intellect is because we may be able to be Will. We exist and, in consequence, recognize (the
world), because we must act, and morally act. (To will and to act, it is necessary to have its object
to "act upon.") To act means to give the form to its matter, to "process" and modify objectivity.
The objective world is but the means to accomplish our moral end. Thus, "the objective world is
the sensory matter for our moral obligation." It is not possible for the practical I to act, unless there
is the objective world to act on. In other words, unless there is a hindrance, unless there is the non
I, the practical I cannot act. Thus, the hindrance (der Anstoß) is deduced.
Moral obligation is the one and the only one in-itself (das An sich) in the phenomenal world
(the moral ought is the form!). That is to say, genuine reality in the phenomenal world is this moral
ought. "The so called Being in itself (das An sich) of the thing is precisely that which we produce
(as its form) from that very thing. Objectivity exists in order to be gradually abandoned, because
objectivity exists to be processed and modified so that the activity of the I may reveal itself.
By means of the same explanation as the necessity of the external world becomes clear, it
becomes apparent that the infinite I diverges itself into many empirical Is' or into individuals. By
the same token we now understand why the infinite I does not immediately actualize its own plan,
but has the finite spirits do so as its means. In his later works, Fichte called this infinite I "the
universal Life" (das allgemeine Leben) or "the Godhead" (die Gottheit). The moral act can only be
performed by the finite, individual I. Without hindrance, i.e., resistance, there is no act, without
war (=moral conflict), there is no morality, according to Fichte. Needless to say, this individuality
must be overcome (and made into an infinite I) by the achievement of the moral act, for the very
reason of which there must exist the individual.

Morality is to overcome both the inner and outer nature.

Now, what does Fichte mean by "nature?" In the practical I, there are to be clarified the
various steps of impulse or drive (Trieb). This Trieb (impulse) is the inner nature. The practical I
constitutes the system of necessary impulses just like the theoretical I did. According to Johann
Fichte, the I is a infinite strife or endeavor (of activity) = ein unendliches Streben. When the
endeavor is posited by the I itself as the inner, subjective one, it is called drive or impulse (der
Trieb). When this Trieb arises solely out of the I, then this drive is related to and directed toward
the I alone. However, the nature of the I consists in reflection, thus the I's drive is the drive for
reflection. The reflection needs its object and its drive is the drive for representation (der
Vorstellungstrieb), whose activity does posit the object. That is, therefore, the drive to produce
reality (der Produktionstrieb).
This drive for reality is called yearning (das Sehnen), it is thus, further, the drive for
satisfaction (der Befriedigungstrieb). This is accomplished when there exists a harmony between
the drive and the act. When not matched, dissatisfaction is felt. Sometimes the act to satisfy a
particular drive itself a drive. That is the endeavor which discovers satisfaction in its own act itself
and not by any consequence. This absolute drive (der absolute Trieb) is der Trieb um des Triebes
willen, i.e., das Streben um des Streben willen. Fichte called this den sittlichen Trieb (=the moral
drive or impulse). This is in itself the practical I itself. thus various drives are derived. Der
kategorische Imperativ means the absolute Law for Law's sake, "Du sollst...!"

The primordial I is the I that is striving for infinity. Thus, the practical I is the bridge, the
mediator,between the theoretical I and the absolute, infinite I. That is, the I who is in itself not
infinite is striving for becoming infinite.
Among obligations, there are universal obligations and mediated particular obligations.

By starting with the immediate, highest principle, the task of the Science of Knowledge is
to overcome the dualism between the intuition and thinking, that between cognition and will. Thus,
once it is accomplished, the Science of Knowledge is completed.

2. Morallity (Sittlichkeit) And Jurisprudence
In Fichte's philosophy, the Non-I possesses a negative significance in that it's role is to
disturb or hinder the activities of the I. In Fichte's system, in this sense, the Non-I or Nature
cannot become a philosophical theme as such.
Therefore, there is no Philosophy of Nature in Fichte's philosophy.
The areas to which the principles of the Science of Knowledge is applicable are such spiritual
aspects of reality as Morality, Jurisprudence, History and Religion.

1) MORALITY.
The principle of morality demands to govern the sensory impulse by means of the pure
impulse, the absolute impulse (=the impulse for the impulse sake, conf. above). Our sensory
impulse, being directed to the fulfillment of pleasure and leisure, makes us dependent on the object
(= the external world, the outer nature, = the Non-I).
Contrary to this, the pure or absolute moral impulse, being directed to the self and the pure
self satisfaction, pursues the industriousness labor and independence (of the outer nature). In our
moral pursuit, the pleasure is not allowed to be the object of our behavior. Morality is the activity
for the sake of activity. Just as Kant held, Fichte, too, maintained that, should our will or action
produce pleasure by chance, such a will or action cannot be called "moral." Our moral will or act
must be pursued only for the sake of the moral ought.Das radikale Böse ist die Trägheit!

Die Trägheit (laziness) is the volition which does not heighten itself to the clear
consciousness of moral duty and freedom beyond the natural impulse of self preservation. For a
truly moral agent, there is no such a thing as leisure (Trägheit) or rest. An moral action will
incessantly arouse the next. The moral imperative would be:

Be Independent, behave autonomously and liberate oneself: Make sure that one
ought to make each action in the series of actions such that such a series of action
will ultimately result in the self's becoming autonomous.

Fichte's view of morality is well represented by Goethe's words in Faust,

The above is the formal, universal moral principle.
Now, needless to say, each individual moral person is given a task peculiar to oneself by the world
order. Each individual person ought to do what only that individual person can and ought to do.
Thus,

Do what is one's own moral task, one's own ethical share!

Going beyond the formality and abstractness of Kantian moral imperative, Fichte attempted
to provide a more concrete imperative peculiar to each individual moral person by establishing the
principle of the individual's self independence.
In order for the self of a concrete moral individual person to attain the freedom, there are 4 stages:

1) At the beginning, freedom exists only in the consciousness of natural impulse. Namely,
freedom comes into being, only if one reflects on various possible alternatives of action,
this freedom is formal.

2) There is a condition (=freedom) in which one is able to escape from the natural impulse
by means of the maxim (self-given law) of one's own happiness.

3) In this higher stage, one becomes excited and in a sense blind such that one is to
heroically sacrifice oneself. It is the condition in which one will act selflessly, i.e., nobly,
out of simple inclination.

4) In this stage of the genuine morality, paying an attention to the moral principles, one will
act out the moral duty out of the duty itself, and must steadily be conscious of morality.

In order for a human being to free oneself from the laziness (Trägheit) as the original sinn
(das radikale Böse), one needs to have an ideal example of moral action. The ideal form of freedom
by a genius individual is necessary to be shown to us.
Such an ideal example may be found among the founders of the great religions (e.g., Christ
or Buddha). The moral conviction of a religious founder is widely circulated by the church, but the
dogmas of the church are to be viewed rather as symbols and not as the doctrines themselves.
Therefore, the church is a kind of convenient and temporal institution for morality and die
Notkriche (this temporally necessary church) should be taken over by the Church of Reason (die
Vernunftkirche) through our moral philosophy.
Fichte established a system of duties or moral obligations.
The end of the moral principles is Reason as such, whereby the purpose of the moral principles is
to have the state or government of Reason appear in the midst of the world of sensibility. The
means to fulfill this end is the particular, finite self or the empirical individual person. The
realization of this purpose depends upon this means' having the right constitution. Thus, the moral
duties must be related both to the end and to the means.

I-i) The universal, conditional moral duty:
This is each individual's moral duty and yet it must be universal.

In order for an individual to live and work as the means for the moral principles, the self
preservation of the individual is necessary as a moral duty.

There is a great difference between the self preservation as the right and the self
preservation as the moral duty. The former consists in the self preservation to attain the
consequences or pleasures of an action, while the latter consists in the self preservation in
order to morally act in accordance with the principles of morality, utterly independent of the
consequences or pleasures of an action.

Therefore, suicide, for example, is against the principles of morality. (System der
Sittenlehre, S. 263-8) According to Fichte, suicide is regarded as unethical (not from the
religious reason).

I-ii) The particular, conditional moral duties:

These are moral duties related to each particular individual. In order to act for the end of
Reason, one ought not to simply act, but act systematically (plannmässig), i.e., one ought
to choose the conditions appropriate to oneself ( in accordance with one's social standing,
e.g. one's vocation and position, circumstances and class), thus in the moral world, it is
one's particular moral duty to choose one's own standing and vocation, and yet it ought not
be chosen by others or by one's inclination, but by oneself out of pure duties.

II-iii) The universal, unconditional moral duty:

The moral duties which are immediately related to the ultimate, moral ends. They are
universal. In the world of sensibility, Reason must govern each individual individually.
They are the duties to others as the humans. Thus,

Behandele den anderen seiner moralischen Bestimmung gemäß!

In other words, this means, "One must not harm others!" For the primary condition of the
morality is freedom, so to treat others as moral entities means to treat them as free beings.
In order to treat others as moral agents, one must consider to not harm others' lives and
properties. This is the universal, unconditional moral duty.

Do not harm others' lives and properties!

II-iv) The particular, unconditional moral duties:

They are the moral duties in regards to the ultimate end and yet they are particular. They are
particular, as long as they are concerned about the social standing, vocation. Fichte
discussed in detail about the duty of the married couple, between parents and children, that
of the scientist (=the service to the science with love of truth, i.e., honesty), of the priest
(=the ideal example of moral actions), of the artist (= not to be an artist, unless you are a
genius, for no moral imperative can command the aesthetic feeling) and of the bureaucrat
(=justice). Fichte distinguished among the vocations, the high and the low vocations,
namely

the lower vocations are those which work on nature such as producers (farmers,
miners, fishermen, hunters), manufacturers (craftsmen) and merchants, while

the higher vocations are scholars, priests, artists and bureaucrats, who work on the
group of Rational beings.

2) JURISPRUDENCE
Regarding his philosophy of law, Fichte held the law of nature quite independent of
morality (Kant held the same position, although Fichte's Grundlage des Naturrechts (The
Foundations of the Natural Law - 1798) appeared before Kant's book on the natural law).
According to Fichte, the jurisprudence cannot be deduced from moral laws. The moral law
can sanction a certain concept of jurisprudence and yet it cannot produce it.
A law is valid quite independently of morality. While a law allows to exercise a certain right
under any circumstance, morality sometimes forbids it. While the moral law under any
circumstances requires good will and would not allow anything else than posited by good will, the
law is valid without good will. Jurisprudence is concerned with expression of freedom in the
sensible world. That is, such an expression is an external behavior, to which the law is related.
The law can coerce, while morality cannot. The law is concerned about the behavior in the
world of senses and is not concerned with "intention" (die Gesinnung) which constitutes the core
of morality (and not the consequence or pleasure that the action will bring about).
For philosophical justification, it is necessary to deduce the law as the necessary behavior of the I,
namely as the condition for the self-consciousness. According to Fichte, the I must posit itself as a
finite Individual, i.e., must posit itself as being related to the finite individuals. By so doing, as a
finite individual, I must set itself in legal relation to the other rational, individual beings. In other
words, I as finite, particular individuals, a finite I and the other finite Is recognize each other's
freedom and accordingly act responsibly.
A finite rational being cannot posit itself, unless it acknowledges its own freedom in the
external sensory world. In order to acknowledge one's own free activities, it is necessary to further
recognize other finite rational beings and other's free activities as well: That means, a finite rational
I is in legal relation to the other rational Is.
Secondly, it means further that a finite I recognizes its material corporeal body to itself and
acknowledges itself as being under the influence of the others.
The community of the finite free individual beings is the condition for the individual self
consciousness, and yet in order that such a community of the free agents may be possible, the
principle of juris.