PB iet
T1 One for all – all for one: unifying standard differential power analysis attacks
JN IET Information Security
VO 5
IS 2
SP 100
OP 110
AB In this study, the authors examine the relationship between and the efficiency of different approaches to standard (univariate) differential power analysis (DPA) attacks. The authors first show that, when fed with the same assumptions about the target device (i.e. with the same leakage model), the most popular approaches such as using a distance-of-means test, correlation analysis and Bayes attacks are essentially equivalent in this setting. Differences observed in practice are not because of differences in the statistical tests but because of statistical artefacts. Then, the authors establish a link between the correlation coefficient and the conditional entropy in side-channel attacks. In a first-order attack scenario, this relationship allows linking currently used metrics to evaluate standard DPA attacks (such as the number of power traces needed to perform a key recovery) with an information theoretic metric (the mutual information). The authors results show that in the practical scenario defined formally in this study, both measures are equally suitable to compare devices with respect to their susceptibility to DPA attacks. Together with observations regarding key and algorithm independence the authors consequently extend theoretical strategies for the sound evaluation of leaking devices towards the practice of side-channel attacks.
K1 information theoretic metric
K1 side-channel attack
K1 cryptography
K1 statistical testing
K1 first-order attack scenario
K1 distance-of-means test
K1 conditional entropy
K1 statistical artefact
K1 correlation analysis
K1 Bayes attacks
K1 standard differential power analysis attack
DO https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs.2010.0096
UL https://digital-library.theiet.org/;jsessionid=3997kio7u6lkq.x-iet-live-01content/journals/10.1049/iet-ifs.2010.0096
LA English
SN 1751-8709
YR 2011
OL EN