ELA-88-1 openssl security update

Juraj Somorovsky, Robert Merget and Nimrod Aviram discovered a padding
oracle attack in OpenSSL.
If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls
SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one)
then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte
record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is
received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently
based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this
amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data.

In order for this to be exploitable “non-stitched” ciphersuites must be in
use. Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain
commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown()
twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do
this but some do anyway). AEAD ciphersuites are not impacted.

For Debian 7 Wheezy, these problems have been fixed in
version 1.0.1t-1+deb7u8.