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Re: FOR COMMENT - QUARTERLY - EAST ASIA (China & regional)

Released on 2012-10-19 08:00 GMT

Email-ID

1281886

Date

2010-04-02 02:46:31

From

robert.reinfrank@stratfor.com

To

analysts@stratfor.com

List-Name

analysts@stratfor.com

Lauren Goodrich wrote:

GLOBAL TREND - CHINA vs. US

For 2010, the economic crisis in China will be a major global trend as
it not only dominates one of the largest economies in the world, but it
will also impact the United States. Going into the second quarter of
2010, the stand-off between China and the US will rise to the level of a
global trend.

Over the last two quarters, China and the US have continually to imposed
duties and tariffs on each other's goods in response to ongoing trade
disputes. But the disagreement between Beijing and Washington runs
deeper. For three decades the United States has granted China access to
its consumer markets enabling China to build up massive manufacturing
capacity and export revenues. The Chinese have enhanced competitiveness
in the US market not only by means of their abundance of cheap labor,
but also by pegging their currency, the yuan, to the US dollar. This
policy comes at the expense not only of China's competitors elsewhere
[especially when there is global USD weakness, which drags the yuan down
with it], but also with competing American producers, and has long been
a source of tension that both sides sought to manage so as to maintain
the overall beneficial relationship.

However times have changed [Poor lead]. Emerging from the economic
crisis of 2007-9, China retains massive foreign exchange reserves from
years of trade surpluses [China's stock of FX reserves doesnt really
matter -- they're irrelevant to what's happening now. The mountain of FX
reserves is a legacy of the undervalued yuan, and the undervalued yuan
was politically and economically important during the good times, but
it's really the muted, moribund post-crisis economic environment that is
aggravating the yuan issue] and continues to grow rapidly [Now this is
important. China's GDP grew 8.9% in 2009, while the US economy was still
contracting, and China is set to post over 10 or 11% growth this year.
The growth discrepency is much more relevant to this argument in my
view], while the United States is suffering from prolonged unemployment
at nearly 10 percent and a weakened manufacturing sector [This
hollowing-out has been happening for a long, long time. The principle
reason is that the peg once provided stability and mutual economic
benefit, since China got a stable export market and the US got cheap
shit. The problem is that over time Chinese firms, as they move up the
value chain, begin to benefit disspropotionatley from the peg. Once
those firms move up, they're essentially world-class company but they're
benefitting from a currency fit for low-end, low value-added firms
(which, unsurprisingly, China still has plenty of, and hence the
disagreements over the peg)]. Hence the US has begun to pressure China
both to open its markets to US exports and to remove the fixed currency
advantage [They've been doing this for a while. The US is increasing
pressure now, since now, given the anaemic economic environment, it
really matters, both economically for the US and, by extension, for
Obama politically]. The Chinese resist by claiming that too much
appreciation of the yuan in too short a time will tear a hole in its
already weak [This is a poor and ambiguous word choice. "Weak" in what
sense? Exports not up to pre-crisis levels yet (which would, btw, be an
incredible achievment given the depressed economic environment, and as
such, would therefore be an unrealistically high watermark to benchmark
Chinese exporters' "weakness" against)? "Weak" as in structurally weak,
i.e. razor-thin margins? What about China's recently eclipsing Germany
as the world's #1 exporter? Refine the language.] and risk causing a
destabilizing slowdown that would hurt both countries.
Thus the second quarter is shaping up to be a critical juncture in the
relationship. In addition to using its existing tools to pressure China,
in April the US Treasury Department could formally brand China a
"currency manipulator", a move that would (take) escalate the countries'
disagreement to a new (level) high. Legislators are also calling for
retribution. For its part China is attempting to mitigate US anger by
signaling that it will gradually resume appreciation, as well as
indicating greater willingness to work with the US in other areas, such
as sanctions on Iran or restarting international talks with North Korea.

The countries' leaders have ample opportunities for bilateral meetings
in the second quarter should they seek to avoid a major disruption in
the relationship. But Obama has already shown willingness to play
hardball with China. And approaching the November midterm elections, the
number one priority for voters is jobs -- not to mention the fact that
the US administration could benefit from appearing tough on a major
foreign policy issue. If the United States does not make a bold move
then it will expect Beijing to follow through on promised concessions,
and will retain the option of hitting China harder later in the year.

NEW REGIONAL TREND - JAPAN: PULLING FROM US
A new trend in East Asia for the second quarter is an escalation in the
currently tense relationship between Japan and the US. The Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) was elected in 2009 on the basis that it would
create more independence from the United States, and the first test of
this pledge will take place in the second quarter when the Japan will
make its formal request to the US to relocate its military base on
Okinawa-something the US is firmly against. Washington is not inclined
to renegotiate the deal, but can agree to minor alterations so as to
give the DPJ something to show its domestic audience. The disagreement
will see diplomatic sparks fly, but neither the US nor Japan want make
moves that damage fundamentally the security alliance. But the DPJ will
not want to look as if it is failing on its pledge, especially as it
faces a continued economic crisis in Japan and elections looming in the
third quarter.