Hospital Sued By Sacramento Woman For Birth Injuries And Malpractice, Part 2 of 5

It is worth noting that situations similar to those described in this medical malpractice case could just as easily occur at any of the healthcare facilities in the area, such as Kaiser Permanente, UC Davis Medical Center, Mercy, Methodist, or Sutter.

(Please also note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury lawsuit and its proceedings.)

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
SUMMARY OF ISSUE PRESENTED

In this matter, it is likely that the defendant will attempt to offset his obligation for the minor plaintiff’s damages, specifically the need for future medical and other services, by introducing evidence which provides that some future services or benefits may be available to plaintiff from governmental agencies and programs.

Plaintiff objects to the introduction of such evidence on several grounds:

(1) collateral source precludes such evidence;
(2) Civil Code Section 3333.1., which abrogates only part of the collateral source rule in medical negligence actions, does not permit the introduction of such evidence, and

(3) there is no certainty that the minor plaintiff will actually be able to receive, now or in the near or distant future, any such benefits in these troubling economic times with ever-increasing public budget cuts.

THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE PRECLUDES THE INTRODUCTION OF DEFENDANT’S SPECULATIVE EVIDENCE THAT THE MINOR CHILD MAY, IN THE FUTURE, BE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE SOME BENEFITS OR SERVICES FROM THE GOVERNMENT

The collateral source rule provides that if any injured party received some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor. Hrniak v. Graymar, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 725, 729. (Emphasis added). It is not a requirement of the operation of the rule that the claimant have paid for or earned the benefit in question. See Hrniak, supra, 4 Cal.3d at 729-730; Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 920A.

Even if such are truly available to Ellen Choo, the benefits or services which may be provided to the minor child are from a source wholly independent from the tortfeasor. Accordingly, under the traditional application of the collateral source rule, the allegedly available benefits are not admissible in the trial of this matter. (See Part 3 of 5.)