John Adams and Religious Liberty: What Our Second President Can Teach Us About Constitutional Compromise

John Adams’ name is in the news again. And once again he is being misrepresented. As in life, so too in death. In the past few month, then noted historian Rosemarie Zigarri wrote in the Washington Post that (in the Post’s words) “John Adams believed that the state should provide support for ministers.” In a much discussed essay on Ricochet, the distinguished historian Paul Rahe recently made the same claim.

Everyone knows that Adams wrote the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, and everyone knows that Article III of the Constitution’s Declaration of Rights created a church establishment. QED, it would appear. The trouble is that Adams did not write Article III of the Massachusetts Constitution. Indeed, he refused to write it because, in his words, “I found I could not sketch [it], consistent with my own sentiments of perfect religious freedom, with any hope of its being adopted by the Convention, so I left it to be battled out in the whole body.” In that refusal lies an important story of democratic statesmanship.
Throughout his life, Adams believed in religious liberty. As a young man, he decided not to become a minister because he could not follow that career path in good conscience: “the Reason of my quitting Divinity was my Opinion concerning some disputed Points.”

He wrote at the time that “men ought, (after they have examined with unbiased Judgments, every System of Religion, and chosen one System on their own Authority, for themselves) to avow their Opinions and defend them with boldness.” Such intense study and robust debate can only exist where there is religious liberty. Late in life he told Jefferson that Massachusetts’ law against blasphemy was “a great embarrassment,” lamenting that it presented “great obstructions to the improvement of the human mind.”

Given these beliefs, drafting the Massachusetts constitution posed Adams with a problem. He thought it was important to show that republican constitutionalism could work. The Massachusetts constitution was drafted by a special convention which would, in turn, submit its work to the people for their approval. As of 1780, no other state had tried that experiment. Adams recognized that it was the best way to embody, in law, the principle that republican government was built upon the consent of the governed. If it succeeded, it would be imitated.

Completing that process, however, entailed creating a constitution with a major flaw, for the people wanted an establishment. To be sure the establishment the constitution created was peculiar, and far less severe than other establishments–the people of each town, in their town meeting, were to decide which denomination or denominations in the town were to receive their tax money. But it was still an establishment.

Facing that dilemma, Adams punted. He drafted Article II of the Declaration of Rights which declared “no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshiping GOD in the manner most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious profession or sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious worship.”

And he let others draft Article III. When the state convened a convention to revise the constitution in 1820, the 85-year-old Adams attended. He wanted them to repeal Article III, but it was not yet time.

There’s an important lesson here in democratic politics. Democratic politics, even constitutional politics, entails compromise. One cannot claim “here the people rule,” and, at the same time, deny that the people have the right to put their preferences into law. To be sure, our republic seeks to restrain and refine the will of the people with constitutional guarantees and with checks and balances. But it is also important to keep public opinion, and the consent of the governed, in a prominent place. A democratic republic cannot simply dismiss the wishes of the majority, however problematic those wishes sometimes are.

And why did the establishment in Massachusetts die? Adams had placed a time bomb in the state constitution. Article II, the guarantee of religious liberty, allowed religious pluralism to flourish in Massachusetts. As a result, the town-by-town establishment broke down. There were simply too many different churches, within and among the towns, for it to work. In 1832, the people of the choose to end the establishment.

Helping the people to embrace religious liberty by choice, rather than by force, is not a bad achievement for a democratic statesman. In a democratic republic, the people will have their say. Constitutional politics takes time, but, as Adams realized, constitutional change is best secured when it is chosen, rather than forced upon the people.

Comments

Stating a preference is not much of a hazard for Christians. It is more so for those who state no preference. To not consider any religion, one is shunned and more. A label is applied for not choosing a label.

While we have no established religion, the Pledge of Allegiance was required in grade school, and still opens government meetings. To some, the Pledge is a an establishment of a religion, for it is done with a emptiness of consideration between the theory and the practice of our “National” government.

Trackbacks

[…] John Adams, second U.S. President The following link also contains some interesting insights re: John Adams and Religious Liberty: What Our Second President Can Teach Us About Constitutional Compro… Again, thanks & respect for your consideration of these ideas, I appreciate. If love is […]

Recent Posts

The judiciary should strike down only laws that clearly violate the meaning of Constitution. For this reason, Jack Balkin’s project of Living Originalism is fundamentally flawed at least as to the judiciary, because he believes that judges have substantial discretion to construct the Constitution, even when the semantic meaning is not clear. But it doesRead Moreby John O. McGinnis

Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 44:10 — 40.5MB) FDR observed that “The process of collective bargaining . . . cannot be transplanted into the public service.” What does it mean for taxpayers if government workers organize into unions and engage in collective bargaining arrangements? What actually checks and balances their desires forRead Moreby Daniel DiSalvo

In my last several posts (see here for links), I have written about the possibility of constraining the executive branch and regulation through statutory reforms. I have focused on reforms that might be desirable and that might actually be passed by a Republican Congress with a Republican President. Of course, if one wanted to departRead Moreby Mike Rappaport

Over the past few years, state attorneys general have brought dozens of lawsuits challenging the Obama Administration’s regulatory initiatives. In addition to leading constitutional challenges to the Affordable Care Act, AGs have sued to block new environmental regulations, implementation of the Dodd-Frank financial law, and a host of other federal policies. For those concerned aboutRead Moreby Paul Nolette

Yale law professor Heather K. Gerken is among the country’s most prolific and creative federalism scholars. In cooperation with two co-authors (Ari Holtzblatt and James T. Dawson—hereinafter, “Gerken & Co”) she has embarked on a project to develop a theory of “The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism.” Michael S. Greve Michael S. Greve is aRead Moreby Michael S. Greve

Archives

About

The Online Library of Law and Liberty’s focus is on the content, status, and development of law in the context of republican and limited government and the ways that liberty and law and law and liberty mutually reinforce the other. This site brings together serious debate, commentary, essays, book reviews, interviews, and educational material in a commitment to the first principles of law in a free society. Law and Liberty considers a range of foundational and contemporary legal issues, legal philosophy, and pedagogy.