In the overwhelming sea of information, access to timely, insightful and independent open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyses is crucial for maintaining the necessary situational awareness to stay on the top of emerging security threats. This blog covers trends and fads, tactics and strategies, intersecting with third-party research, speculations and real-time CYBERINT assessments, all packed with sarcastic attitude

Let's assess the campaign, expose the malicious infrastructure behind it, list the cybercrime-friendly premium rate SMS numbers, involved in it, as well as related malicious MD5s, known to have participated in the campaign/have utilized the same malicious infrastructure.

Known to have responded to the same IPs (94.242.214.133; 94.242.214.155) are also the following fraudulent domains, participating in a related revenue-sharing affiliate network based type of monetization scheme:hxxp://4books.ruhxxp://annoncer.media-bar.ruhxxp://booksbutton1.comhxxp://film-club.ruhxxp://film-popcorn.ruhxxp://filmbuttons.ruhxxp://filmi-doma.comhxxp://filmonika.ruhxxp://films.909.suhxxp://indiiskie.ruhxxp://kinozond.ruhxxp://media-bar.ruhxxp://playersharks2.comhxxp://playersharks4.comhxxp://pplayer.ruhxxp://sharksplayer2.comhxxp://sharksplayer3.ruhxxp://sharksreader.ruhxxp://tema-info.ruhxxp://toppfilms.ruhxxp://video-movies.comhxxp://video.909.suhxxp://videodomm.ruhxxp://videozzy.comhxxp://videozzzz.ruhxxp://websharks.ruhxxp://yasmotrju.ru

Malicious MD5s known to have phoned back to the same IP (94.242.214.133):
MD5: 9ec8aef6dc0e3db8596ac54318847328
MD5: 895c38ec4fb1fbee47bfb3b6ee3a170b
MD5: c4d88b32b605500b7f86de5569a11e22
MD5: 49861fd4748dd57c192139e8bd5b71e3
MD5: 8b350f8a32ef4b28267995cf8f0ceae1

What's particularly interesting, about this campaign, is the fact, that, the Terms of Service (ToS) presented to gullible and socially engineered end users, refers to a well known Web site (jmobi.net), directly connected with the market leading DIY API-enabled mobile malware generating/monetization platform, extensively profiled in a previously published post.

As cybercriminals continue to achieve a cybercrime-ecosystem wide standardization, we'll continue to observe an increase in fraudulent activity, with the cybercriminals behind it, continuing to innovate, on their way to achieve efficient monetization schemes, and risk-forwarding centered fraudulent models, further contributing to the adaptive innovation to be applied to the current TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures) utilized by them.

Saturday, March 22, 2014

I've recently spotted a malicious, cybercrime-friendly SWF iframe/redirector injecting service, that also exposes a long-run Win32.Nixofro serving malicious infrastructure, currently utilized for the purpose of operating a rogue social media service provider, that's targeting Turkish Facebook users through the ubiquitous social engineering vector, for such type of campaigns, namely, the fake Adobe Flash player.

The managed SWF iframe/redirector service, is a great example of a cybercrime-as-a-service type of underground market proposition, empowering, both, sophisticated and novice cybercriminals with the necessary (malvertising) 'know-how', in an efficient manner, directly intersecting with the commercial availability of sophisticated mass Web site/Web server malicious script embedding platforms.

The managed SWF iframe/redirector injecting service is currently responding to 108.162.197.62 and 108.162.196.62 Known to have responded to the same IPs (108.162.197.62; 108.162.196.62) is also a key part of the malicious infrastructure that I'll expose in this post, namely hizliservis.pw - Email: furkan@cod.com.

Known to have phoned back to the same IP (108.162.197.62) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: 432efe0fa88d2a9e191cb95fa88e7b36
MD5: 720ecb1cf4f28663f4ab25eedf620341
MD5: 02691863e9dfb9e69b68f5fca932e729
MD5: 69ed70a82cb35a454c60c501025415aa
MD5: cc586a176668ceef14891b15e1b412ab
MD5: 74291941bddcec131c8c6d531fcb1886
MD5: 7c27d9ff25fc40119480e4fe2c7ca987
MD5: 72c030db7163a7a7bf2871a449d4ea3c
MD5: 432efe0fa88d2a9e191cb95fa88e7b36

Known to have phoned to the same IP (108.162.196.62) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: eda3f015204e9565c779e0725915864f
MD5: effcfe91beaf7a3ed2f4ac79525c5fc5
MD5: 14acd831691173ced830f4b51a93e1ca
MD5: 7f93b0c611f7020d28f7a545847b51e0
MD5: bcfce3a9bf2c87dab806623154d49f10
MD5: 4c90a89396d4109d8e4e2491c5da4846
MD5: 289c4f925fdec861c7f765a65b7270af

Once executed, the sample phones back to profonixuser.net (141.101.117.218)

Known to have responded to the same IP (141.101.117.218) are also the following malicious MD5s:
MD5: 53360155012d8e5c648aca277cbde587
MD5: a66a1c42cc6fb775254cf32c8db7ad5b
MD5: a051fd83fc8577b00d8d925581af1a3b
MD5: f47784817a8a04284af4b602c7719cb7
MD5: 2e5c75318275844ce0ff7028908e8fb4
MD5: 90205a9740df5825ce80229ca105b9e8

Once executed, the sample phones back to likef.biz (176.53.119.195). The same domain is also known to have responded to the following IPs 141.101.116.165; 141.101.117.165.

Here's comes the interesting part. The fine folks at ExposedBotnets, have already intercepted a malicious Facebook spreading campaign, that's using the already profiled in this post videotr.in.

Having directly connected the cybercrime-friendly SWF iframe/redirector injecting service, with hizliservis.pw as well as the SocialMediaSystem as being part of the same malicious infrastructure, it's time to profile the fraudulent/malicious adversaries behind the campaigns. The cybercriminals behind these campaigns, appear to be operating a rogue social media service, targeting Facebook Inc.

Sample screenshots of the social media distribution platform's Web based interface:

Domain name reconnaissance:
profonixcod.com (profonix-cod.com) - 216.119.143.194 - Email: abazafamily_@hotmail.com (related domains known to have been registered with the same email - warningyoutube.com; likebayi.com)
profonixcod.net

About Me

Cyber Threat Intelligence, Cyber Counter Threat Intelligence, CYBERINT, OSINT and Competitive Intelligence research on demand.
Insightful, unbiased, and client-tailored assessments, neatly communicated in the form of interactive reports - because anticipating the emerging threatscape is what shapes the big picture at the end of the day.