Trump buys Lithuania, EU cannot stop it

The US President Donald Trump is no doubt a successful businessman who rules his country as if it is a huge enterprise. And this kind of management, to his mind, should lead to success. And very often it really works. As a wise leader he uses different tools to reach his goals. Thus, the most cunning one, which the US exploits in Europe – is indirect influence on the EU countries to gain the desired aim. The EU just becomes a tool in “capable hands” of the US.

Let us give the simple example. Last week the Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania announced that the Lithuanian Air Force Base in Šiauliai would get de-icing equipment for the aircraft. It would be acquired according to an agreement signed by the Ministry of National Defence and the AF Security Assistance and Cooperation Directorate (AFSACD) on behalf of the Government of the United States of America.

It is known that the new equipment is capable of removing ice from aircraft at the necessary height which allows the Šiauliai Air Base to support bigger aircraft of the Alliance, such as C-17 – one of the largest transport aircraft capable of moving a large number of soldiers and large amounts of cargo.

It is said that “the procurement for the Lithuanian Air Force Base will fill a critical capability gap and allow the Base personnel to carry out cold weather operations, as well as support the NATO Air Policing Mission. The equipment will also be used for providing servicing for the aircraft of the NATO enhanced Forward Presence Battalion Battle Group-contributing countries and other NATO allies at the Air Base.”

But according to data, only three C-17s belongs to NATO. The US, in its turn, has 222 C-17s in service as of Jan. 2018. Among EU member states the only country that has C-17A ERs is the United Kingdom with 8 C-17A ERs in use. But The United Kingdom is in the process of leaving the organization. So, it is logical to assume that the most interested country in deploying C-17 in Lithuania is the US, not the EU or even NATO. And of course Lithuania cannot even dream of having such planes.

The second issue which is even more important is the fact that the agreement of approximate value of USD 1.03 million is financed from the European Security Assistance Fund (ESAF). Lithuania is not able to share the burden.

So, nothing depends on Lithuania in this issue. It only gives permission.

In the recent years Lithuania’s procurement from the US has grown significantly. The ministry of National Defence is currently in negotiations with the US department of Defence for procuring JLTV all-terrain vehicles.

Unfortunately, being a member of the EU, Lithuania so hardly depends on the US in military and security spheres that it often mixes up its real needs, responsibilities to the EU with the US interests in the region. Such approach could seriously complicate the relations with neighbouring Russia and Belarus which Lithuania borders. These two countries are interested in Lithuania as an economic partner. But if Lithuania will pose military threat to them, deploying US military equipment, these states could terminate any economic cooperation.

The Economic Roots of Georgia’s “Defection” to the West

An important part of a country’s foreign
policy lies in its economic moves. This is particularly true in the case of
large states seeking a bigger role in the international arena.

For example, China has been implementing
the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI), while the US during the Cold War brought
in the famous Marshall Plan to help Europe restore its shattered financial
strength. Both projects pursue(d) projection of political power through economic
means.

Long gone are the times when it still was
possible to occupy territories solely through military power. Increasingly, as
modernity enabled the rise of self-consciousness and nationalism among small
states and ethnic minorities in large countries, it has become difficult to
rely on repressive measures. A policy of active economic initiatives targeting
one ethnic group inside the country or a separate state has thus gained
additional importance.

Looking at the last 30 years of
Georgian-Russian relations, there has been almost everything one could imagine:
from cordial talks to wars to a full-scale economic embargo. More negative than
positive, but well illustrative of the limits of Russia’s foreign policy.

It is true that Georgia has not been
economically so important to Moscow as, for example, Ukraine, Kazakhstan or
Belarus, but Russia is always interested in influencing Tbilisi. Still, Georgia
is a vital transit corridor between west and east as well as north and south.
Moreover, without Georgia, it will always be difficult for Russia to
effectively control the restive North Caucasus in the long run.

The Russian political establishment failed
to see that a major reason in Georgia’s shift to the West in the early 2000s
was a shattered post-Soviet economy and no help from Moscow. Russia was not
perceived as an enemy when the Rose Revolution was about to happen in 2003:
there were simply no concerted efforts from the Russian side to lure Georgia
economically.

Russia was also experiencing turbulent times
and was self-absorbed with internal problems when Vladimir Putin came to power
in 1999. Even when Russia became financially stable in the late 2000s, no
viable long-term economic vision was offered to the former Soviet countries.
The announcement of the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) did not
produce the expected results nor did it stop Ukraine drifting from Russia in
2014.

Again, Russian political thought failed to
recognize that Kyiv’s choice to move closer to the European Union was based on
the latter’s economic attractiveness. As no brotherly relations with Russians
could stop Ukrainians’ drift to the western economic space, much less
surprising is Georgia’s eagerness to join the European market.

Simply put, Russia has not been attractive
enough. Even those countries which are economically close to Russia are so
because they have no alternative. Take for example Armenia, the large
population of which is not inclined to Russia but is close to the Russian
economy because there is no other option. The same goes for the Central Asian
states, which still prefer the Russian economy to the Chinese market (however
even this trend based on Central Asia’s cultural and historical closeness with
Russia has been shifting and the region’s economic relations with China now
thrive).

When it comes to choosing between Western
and Russian economic spaces even countries culturally closest to Russia still
choose the West. The roots of this problem for Russia are its inability to
build powerful state institutions and a thriving economic space with
opportunities for peaceful development across the former Soviet territories.

What is troubling is Russia’s failure to
understand the source of that weakness – the need for a rapid restructuring of
the economy to yield higher industrial and technological results. When
high-level politicians openly discuss this, it often ends with no specific
results.

It can be argued that for the last 30
years, Russia has not pursued a consistent economic policy towards Georgia.
Investments were occasional, while other political decisions only further
hampered bilateral relations. The case of Georgia’s “defection” to
the West well reflects how less attention is paid nowadays in Russia to
economic components in the country’s foreign policy. There are even hints that
Moscow now prefers military moves to economic ones.

Even from a strategic point, one can say
that Russia simply has not had a foreign policy towards Georgia, except for
militarily preventing the country from joining NATO and the EU. No long-term
approach of economic, cultural and other components was ever formulated. As a
result, by 2003 it was already too late to reverse the existing trend in
Georgia, while a similar process is now being seen in Ukraine.

Related

Lost Independence of the Baltic States

In 1991 the
Baltic States gained independence. They started to develop their new way. This
choice was highly appreciated by the residents of the Baltic countries, as well
as by people all over the world.

People
craved independence then, and they still crave it now. They understand
independence as “freedom from the control, influence, support, aid, or the
like, of others.”

Today some
political decisions reduce the significance of achieved results. Thus, NATO
personnel deployed in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia is so numerous that it is
hard to speak about the independence of these countries. In other words they
are not free from the NATO’s control, influence, support, aid, or the like.

Around 700
NATO personnel based in Estonia are took part in a major training exercise in
Latvia on September, 3, Baltic News Service reports.

Exercise
Furious Hawk takes place at the training area at Ādaži, NATO’s Canadian-led
Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battlegroup base in Latvia, and brings the
Estonian-based troops from the British-led Estonian battlegroup based at Tapa.

The
exercise means military convoys, directed by Military Police units, are already
moving along routes between Tapa, southwards via Paide, Pärnu and Ikla, as they
make their way to the Latvian border.

It is not
even about the presence of foreign troops on the territory. The matter is
locals are limited in their freedom of movement’s right. It was announced that
the convoys will include heavy military equipment, which could slow down
traffic in that direction. The Papiniidu bridge in Pärnu is likely to be closed
to the public during the period.

So, foreign
troops move freely across countries, while locals are restricted in their
rights. Hey NATO, who are you in the Baltic States? Are you a guest or a host?

The more
so, damage to public road transport infrastructure made by heavy military
equipment is considerable. Repairing damage requires large budgetary funds,
which could be spent on social needs.

The
officials of the Baltic States declare openly that the Baltic countries cannot
defend themselves. This means that NATO supports, aids and controls the
military and security spheres. NATO also influences and controls the decisions
made by the Baltic States authorities in these fields. NATO hereby discards
results of Baltic States’ fight for independence.

Related

Did Russia Really Win in the 2008 August War?

Eleven years have passed since the short Georgian-Russian war started on
August 7-8 in 2008. As every discussion on who started the war generally is,
the Georgian-Russian one too is about finding moral grounds for military
actions which both sides took at the time.

Morality in geopolitics, and the Georgian-Russian conflict is indeed
caused by pure geopolitical calculations, is at most times a superfluous thing.
All these years the Russians have been trying to convince the world and the
public inside the country that the Russian military moves actions and
subsequent recognition of the independence of the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions
were the only possible and correct actions to be taken. The Georgians also have
their dilemmas: some marginal political figures still believe that it was the
Georgian government that was most to blame for the catastrophe of 2008. Though
close geographically, these diverging narratives and the constant need to prove
one’s own truth says a lot about how far apart Georgia and Russia have grown in
the past decade.

11 years since the war and it is still unclear what Russia has gained
from its military and diplomatic actions since 2008. True, military build-up in
Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region limited Tbilisi’s ability to become an EU/NATO
member state. Moreover, Russian intervention into Georgia in 2008 also showed
the West how far Moscow can go if a strategic decision is made to draw Georgia
into the alliances. At the time (August-September 2008) those seemed to be
long-term (strategic) victories for Moscow. In international relations and
geopolitical calculations, you can stop a country from attaining the aims
harmful to you, but in the long run you will be unable to reverse the process
by forceful actions alone: you have to provide a counter-policy to turn an
unfriendly state into an amenable neighbor.

Put all of this into the Russian case. More than a decade has passed
since 2008, only a few not-so-important states recognized Georgia’s territories
as independent entities. The Georgian public is overwhelmingly anti-Russian,
the last hopes of a grand geopolitical bargain – the return of the territories
in exchange for reversing EU/NATO aspirations – have disappeared among the
Georgian public, and support for western institutions so far has only
increased.

In the end, though Moscow waged a reasonably costly war in 2008, took
and still experiences a diplomatic burden for its moves against the West, and
has yet to attain its grand geopolitical goal of reversing Georgia’s
pro-western course. Politicians in Moscow, at least strategists behind the
scenes, all understand that Georgia’s persistence, which seems naive today,
might turn into serious business if Russia’s geopolitical positions worsen
elsewhere in Eurasia.

Indeed, there are signs that Russian influence is set to diminish
further in the former Soviet space as the country’s economy is unlikely to be
attractive to the neighboring states. Imagine a scenario where Russian internal
problems (Putin’s upcoming succession, economic downturns, China’s rise,
stronger Ukraine, etc.) weigh ever stronger upon the Russian decision-makers in
the 2020s, then Georgia’s western aspirations might become more concrete – it
will be easier for the West to make a strategic decision to draw Tbilisi into
EU/NATO.

Overall, Russia definitely gained significant results in 2008, but in
the long run it did not change the strategic picture in the South Caucasus,
though it did produce a grand design for geopolitical domination in north
Eurasia: years after the war, Moscow initiated its Eurasian Economic Union
(EEU) to draw its neighbors into one economic space – a prerequisite for
building a world power. Ideally, it should have attracted Russia’s major
neighbors and it would have served the people of the former Soviet space
economically. But Moscow failed to get Ukraine and other states involved:
without Kiev, the EEU, if not dead, is at least a marginal project. This means
that Russian policies towards Georgia and the wider South Caucasus remain the
same as before 2008 – keeping foreign powers out of the region, while failing
to provide an alternative vision for Tbilisi.