(August 19, 1962)

This telegram is from the President's Deputy Special
Counsel Feldman after a meeting with Israeli officials, including David
Ben-Gurion, to discuss Hawk missiles and the Johnson Plan. It was
sent exclusively for President Kennedy,
Rusk and Grant.

Have concluded 3-1/2 hour meeting with Prime Minister,
Golda Meir, and Kollek. I began by informing them that the President
had determined that the Hawk missile should be made available to Israel
but cautioned them that this was a long lead time [garble--and] would
have to be worked out in later conversations through other channels.
The Prime Minister asked about terms of payment and I informed him that
this would also have to be determined in follow-up discussions.

I also referred to the fact that Great Britain might
make a competitive offer of the Bloodhound and emphasized that we recognized
Israel's need for a ground-to-air missile system in the absence of arms
limitations but were not deciding for them whether they should seek
United States or British systems.

I also informed Ben-Gurion that we would inform Nasser
of the decision in the hope that we could prevent escalation of weapons
in the Near East. Ben-Gurion replied that he would gladly agree to no
missiles at all if Nasser would agree to arms limitations and controls.
In fact, he said he would like to exclude weapons of every kind from
the area.

2. I then proceeded to discuss the Johnson Plan, reminding
the Prime Minister that he agreed that the solution to the refugee problem
would be worth a try. The initial reaction of the Prime Minister and
his Foreign Minister was negative. Ben-Gurion insisted no area would
dare to accept anything except repatriation. After extended discussions
of the elements in the plan militating against repatriation and particularly
of the authority of Israel to determine when repatriation was in such
large numbers as to threaten her security the Prime Minister said he
would acquiesce in the plan if

(1) Nasser agreed to re-settle those refugees who the
administrator directed should be re-settled in the UAR, and

(2) Nasser agreed not to direct propaganda to the refugees
urging repatriation but permitted them to express their preference without
danger of being considered a traitor.

In deciding what numbers of refugees would threaten
Israel's security the only time a number was mentioned was when I said
it had been estimated that under the Johnson Plan not more than one
refugee in ten would seek repatriation.

3. We discussed briefly the proposed resolution by
African nations calling for direct negotiations between Israel and the
Arab states. The Prime Minister agreed to consult with the US before
taking any further steps but plainly indicated he felt such a resolution
should be offered to the UN.

Have not advised Cairo whether to pursue alternative
1 or alternative 2. If it is felt the first alternative can be amended
to include a request to Nasser not to engage in a propaganda campaign
I would recommend pursuing that course.

I will see Mrs. Meir tomorrow afternoon. Have you any
further suggestions?