In "A Child is Missing" we report all Federal Hague Convention Child Abduction Cases. We also provide information to help legal practitioners understand the basic issues, discover what questions to ask and learn where to look for more information when there is a child abduction that crosses country boarders.

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Saturday, August 4, 2012

In Felder v. Ponder, 2012 WL 3128570 (D.Mass.) Petitioner Claudia Felder sought an order for the return of her fourteen year-old daughter ( "K.W."), to Switzerland. Felder claimed the wrongful retention of K.W. under the Hague Convention by Respondent Alexandra Ponder, K.W.'s godmother, Patrick Wetzel, K.W.'s father, and Children's Hospital Corporation where she had been treated. The District Court granted Wetzel’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
K.W. was a citizen of Switzerland. When K.W.'s parents divorced in August 2007, the Uster District Court in Switzerland granted Felder custody of K.W. and her two sisters. Ponder was K.W.'s godmother; she and Felder had known each other for over twenty years. In September 2011, Felder sent K.W. to the United States to study at Central Catholic High School in Lawrence, Massachusetts. Felder agreed to have Ponder, a resident of Haverhill, Massachusetts, care for K.W. while she attended
school in the United States. Although she resided here during the school year, K.W. flew back to Switzerland for approximately one week in December and returned to school on January 3, 2012. At some point, Ponder began complaining about K.W.'s behavior and expressed doubts about her ability to continue caring for K.W. On May 19, 2012, K.W. attempted suicide. This attempt came on the heels of Felder's suggestion that K.W. should return to Switzerland. K.W. was taken to the emergency room at Holy Family Hospital in Methuen, Massachusetts. She was subsequently admitted to the inpatient psychiatric unit at Children's Hospital. Ponder notified Felder of K.W.'s emergency hospitalization and Felder agreed that K.W. should receive immediate medical care to ensure her safety and well-being. Throughout the first three weeks of K.W.'s hospitalization, Felder monitored K.W.'s progress through Ponder and the medical team at the Hospital. After K.W. had been hospitalized for about three weeks, medical staff proposed that K.W. be discharged from the Hospital to McLean Hospital, a psychiatric facility, in Belmont. After consulting with medical professionals in Switzerland, Felder proposed that K.W. be transferred back to Switzerland for further treatment. Felder and K.W.'s physician in Switzerland advised the Hospital staff that they would take responsibility for K.W.'s health and safety and would personally accompany K.W. back to Switzerland. On June 7, 2012, Felder was contacted by a social worker of the Hospital and informed that K.W. could not return to Switzerland. By mid-June, Ponder and Felder's relationship had broken down and Ponder no longer responded to Felder's inquiries about K.W.

.On June 17, 2012, Felder refused to give her consent to Ponder's request for guardianship over K.W., including an order that K.W. remain in the United States, and told Ponder that any prior consent to temporary guardianship had been terminated. On June 20, 2012, Felder traveled to Boston and informed Ponder that she was revoking her temporary role as K.W.'s guardian. On the heels of K.W.'s suicide attempt, K.W.'s father, Wetzel, contacted the City of Lucerne Switzerland, Office of Guardianship Authority concerning his daughter's situation. The Guardianship Authority issued an order by letter dated June 21, 2012 to Felder, stating that the "endangerment of [K.W.] can only be avoided by withdrawing your right to determine the place of residence of [K.W.], or concretely the parental custody right.". The Guardianship Authority issued its precautionary decision withdrawing Felder's parental custody rights, ordering that K.W. continue to be hospitalized for further treatment at Children's Hospital and prohibiting Ponder from removing K.W. from the clinic at that time. Ponder then sought and obtained temporary guardianship over K.W. in Essex County Massachusetts Probate and Family Court on June 25, 2012. On June 27, 2012, Felder requested reconsideration of the Guardianship Authority's June 21, 2012 decision withdrawing her custody rights and requested "its complete repeal."

On July 10, 2012, Felder filed a Hague Convention petition for K.W.'s return to Switzerland, claiming the wrongful retention of K.W. under the Hague Convention by Ponder, Wetzel and Children's Hospital The following day, the Swiss Guardianship Authority issued a letter stating that it "always has jurisdiction over child protection matters" but that "since [K.W.] has resided in America for almost one year, this is a matter of international concern ... the authorities at the place of residence of the child have subject-matter jurisdiction...." The letter further stated that "[b]y the decision of June 25, 2012, the Essex Probate and Family Court ... appointed Alexandra Ponder as the preliminary custodian of [K.W.]. The American authorities thus acknowledged their jurisdiction due to residency and ordered the child protection measures they deemed necessary" and that because of that decision "the basis for the continuation of the child protection proceedings by the Lucerne guardianship office ... ceases to exist" and "the precautionary decision [of June 21, 2012] is to be repealed."

The same day the Swiss Guardianship Authority issued this decision, Felder filed an emergency motion to vacate Ponder's guardianship of K.W. in Probate and Family Court, which was denied. In rendering its decision, the Probate and Family Court reasoned that "the best evidence" before it demonstrated that Felder's "custody rights have been withdrawn" and that the last letter by the Guardianship Authority, does not make clear that those rights "had been reinstated."

On July 12, 2012, the District Court of Lucerne in Switzerland dismissed Felder's complaint against the Guardianship Authority regarding its June 21, 2012 ruling. The Court found that "[w]ith the repeal of the precautionary ruling handed down June 21, 2012, the revocation of the complainant's parental custody ordered by the custodianship authorities of Lucerne becomes obsolete. The complainant no longer has any legally protected interests in continuing the proceedings before the Lucerne District Court. This shall not affect any child protection actions offered by the U.S. authorities."

On July 16, 2012, Ponder filed her verified answer in the Federal District Court, and Wetzel moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court held a hearing on the matter on July 20, 2012.

Felder argued that K.W.'s habitual residence was Switzerland. The Court observed that the determination of a child's habitual residence "begins with the parents' shared intent or settled purpose regarding their child's residence." Nicolson, 605 F.3d at 104 & n. 2. It was undisputed that K.W. was born and raised in Switzerland and that both of her parents still resided there. K.W. also resided in Switzerland until she came to the United States with her mother's permission to attend school. Felder had custody of K.W. since August 2007 and allowed her to come to the United States to attend Central Catholic in Lawrence, Massachusetts, arranging that Ponder would care for K.W. while she studied here. Shortly after purchasing K.W.'s tickets for travel to the United States in August 2011, Felder booked her return flight to Switzerland for July 12, 2012. She also flew back home to Switzerland in late December between the fall and spring semesters. Based on this record, even focusing, as the Court must, on where the child was habitually resident immediately before the alleged wrongful retention in June 2012, Felder's intent and settled purpose was that K.W.'s habitual residence would
remain in Switzerland even as she allowed K.W. to attend school in the United States. Although Ponder and Wetzel claimed that K.W.'s habitual residence was now the United States, the record did not support this contention. Even if the Court credited the Defendants' contention that Felder had acquired a four-year student visa for K.W. to attend school in the United States, such fact did not negate Felder's intent or settled purpose that K.W. would temporarily attend school here but retain a habitual residence in Switzerland. See Poliero v. Centenaro, 373 Fed. Appx. 102, 105-106 (2d Cir.2010) (finding that children's expressed preference for staying in the United States and their schooling for one year in New York did not alter intention that children's habitual residence remain Italy). This was not a case in which "the evidence points unequivocally to the conclusion that the child had become acclimatized to [her] new surroundings and that [her] habitual residence has consequently shifted," Poliero, 373 Fed. Appx. at 105, to the United States. "This is a difficult test to satisfy, and a child's habitual residence will only be found to have shifted due to acclimatization, if the child's relative attachments to the [the two possible habitual residences] have changed to the point where requiring return to the original forum would not be tantamount to taking the child out of the family and social environment in which its life has developed." The evidence here did not not unequivocally demonstrate that K.W.'s acclimatization to the United States had become so complete that returning her to Switzerland would be equivalent to taking her out of a family and social environment in which her life has developed. K.W. returned to Switzerland between the fall and spring semesters to spend time with her Mother and sisters, and there was no suggestion that since returning to the United States for her spring semester, she had not maintained regular contact with her family and friends in Switzerland, despite the allegedly volatile relationship between K.W. and her mother. Thus, it could not be said that K.W.'s habitual residence shifted to the United States.

The Court pointed out that although Felder was granted sole custody of K.W., as part of her divorce decree by the Uster District Court in Switzerland in August 2007, the Swiss Civil Code grants the Guardianship Authority the authority to determine parental custody rights in all matters apart from divorce decrees or modification of same. Under the Swiss Civil Code, the Swiss courts have jurisdiction to amend court orders regarding custody awards and child protection during divorce proceedings, proceeding to alter a divorce decree or in proceedings to modify measures for the protection of the marital union, but "[i]n all other cases jurisdiction lies with the guardianship authorities."Swiss Civil Code, art. 315b. Accordingly, the Guardianship Authority had the power to withdraw parental custody from a parent. Art. 307, 310-312. As of June 21st, the Guardianship Authority took the action that it was empowered to take and revoked Felder's parental custody. However, the Guardianship Authority did take further action after June 21, 2012, but its subsequent rulings did not unequivocally reinstate her custody rights. The Court agreed that the June 21, 2012 decision withdrawing Felder's custody rights over K.W. was a provisional, emergency ruling given the urgent situation involving K.W.'s hospitalization in the United States. The Guardianship Authority's July 11, 2012 letter explained that its previous decision to withdraw Felder's custody rights was based on the information it had at the time that Felder wanted to remove K.W. from the hospital against doctors' recommendations and that at the time of its decision, no Massachusetts court had exercised jurisdiction over the matter to ensure K.W.'s health and safety given the exigency of the situation. The letter explained that because the Probate and Family Court ordered child protection measures for K.W. in appointing Ponder as her temporary guardian on June 25, 2012, after the Guardianship Authority's June 21, 2012 decision, a Massachusetts court had now exercised jurisdiction over the matter, and, as a result, there was no longer a need for the child protection measures the Guardianship Authority had implemented in its June 21, 2012 decision and it repealed that decision. That the Guardianship Authority withdrew its June 21, 2012 order in light of the proceeding in Probate and Family Court, in which Ponder was appointed as a temporary guardian, did not mean that Felder retains her custodial rights. There was no affirmation by the Guardianship Authority of Felder's custody rights even in light of its knowledge of the Probate and Family Court proceedings in which Ponder was appointed as K. W.'s temporary guardian. In the absence of confirmation by the Guardianship Authority that Felder retained her custodial rights, the Court found that Felder failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence, the wrongful retention of K.W. in the United States.

Felder's counsel urged the Court to obtain from Swiss authorities pursuant to Article 15 of the Hague Convention"a decision or other determination that the removal or retention was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, ...." The Court stated that making such a request is at the discretion of the Court and, given both the emergency nature of the Petition and the rulings of the Guardianship Authority in Switzerland, the last of which deferred to Probate and Family Court's ongoing proceedings regarding K.W., the Court declined to make such request.

In Larbie v Larbie, --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL
3089773 (C.A.5 (Tex.) Plaintiff-Appellee Evelyn Larbie filed a petition
under the Hague Convention seeking the return of her son, K.L., to the
United Kingdom. The district court granted Evelyn's petition and ordered
Defendant Derek Larbie to turn K.L. over to Evelyn's care. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that district court's application of the
Convention effectively reversed a custody order entered after lengthy
proceedings, culminating in a final divorce and custody order, in which
neither party objected to the state court's jurisdiction, creating
precisely the type of international custody dispute that
the Convention seeks to avoid. Accordingly, it vacated the district
court's order and rendered judgment in Derek's favor.

Derek and Evelyn were Ghanian nationals. Derek obtained naturalized
citizenship in the United States and served as an officer in the United
States Air Force. Evelyn possessed permanent residency in the U.K. They
married in December 2005. They lived in San Antonio, Texas. K.L. was
born in August 2006. Derek had a son from a previous relationship. Derek
sponsored Evelyn for a "green card," which expired on June 27, 2009.
Although Evelyn held a temporary work permit, she stayed home to care
for K.L. In March 2008, Derek filed for divorce in Texas state court.
Shortly thereafter, Derek received orders to report in June for two
months of training in preparation for a deployment to Afghanistan.
Evelyn responded to Derek's divorce petition by answer and counter
petition. In her counter petition she asserted that she had been
domiciled in Texas for at least six months and that she had resided in
San Antonio for at least ninety days before the suit commenced. She also
specified that no other court had jurisdiction over K.L. Given Derek's
impending overseas assignment, the Larbies entered into an agreed
temporary divorce decree on June 11, 2008 which appointed Derek and
Evelyn "Temporary Joint Managing Conservators" of K.L. and entered a
"Standard Possession Order" outlining how the parties would spend time
with him. The Temporary Order also gave Evelyn the authority to
determine K.L.'s residence "without regard to geographic location."
However, it also provided that "[i]n the event that [K.L.] [was] to
travel internationally," Evelyn had to inform Derek of the dates and
location of such travel, the identity of those persons with whom K.L.
was staying, and the telephone numbers at which K.L. could be reached
"while [he was] traveling." The Temporary Order ordered Evelyn to allow
K.L. "weekly" visits with Derek's other son, and provided that various
provisions were operative only so long as the "case [was] pending." On
the same day the parties agreed to the Temporary Order, the Court
granted Derek’s motion to stay the proceedings pursuant to the Service
members Civil Relief Act,"until Sept. 1, 2009 or until such time as [he]
return [ed] to Lackland Air Force Base at the conclusion of [his]
deployment. It granted Derek's motion to stay and entered the Temporary
Order on July 23 and 24, 2008, respectively. The Temporary Order
specified that it was to "continue in force until the signing of the
Final Decree of Divorce or until further order of th[e] Court."

A few weeks after Derek left for training, Evelyn bought a plane ticket
to travel to London on July 12th. Evelyn took only what was "permissible
on the aircraft," leaving behind "substantially all" of her and K.L.'s
"clothing and personal effects" and giving no indication that the trip
was anything other than temporary. She and Derek exchanged e-mails that
indicated her intent to return to San Antonio. Derek deployed to
Afghanistan. Although Evelyn apparently contemplated obtaining a
residence order there , she never sought custody of K.L. in the U.K.
courts. A residence order is the U.K. equivalent of a custody order and
different from he contact order. See Children Act 1989, c. 41, Part II,
s 8(1) ("In this Act-'a contact order' means an order requiring the
person with whom a child lives, or is to live, to allow the child to
visit or stay with the person named in the order, or for that person and
the child otherwise to have contact with each other...."). K.L. had
entered the U.K. on a limited-duration visitor's visa that expired in
early 2009. Without notifying Derek, Evelyn filed an application to
obtain permanent resident status for K.L. in autumn 2008. The U.K.
denied that application on June 23, 2009, in part because Evelyn failed
to show that she was " 'present and settled in the [U.K.] and ... had
sole responsibility for [K.L.'s] upbringing.' " The U.K. official also
reasoned that the Temporary Order " 'impl[ied] that the final decision
regarding [K.L.'s] place of residence and which of [his] parents will
have primary responsibility for [his] upbringing will not be decided
until [his] parents' final decree is signed.' " The official saw "
'nothing to indicate that [Derek had] agreed to [K.L.'s] residing in the
[U.K.] permanently with [his] mother.' "

Days later, Evelyn asked the Texas court to set the divorce for a final
hearing. In her motion, Evelyn stated that she had returned to Texas and
discovered that her immigration paperwork was missing from the marital
residence. These documents were crucial, Evelyn argued, because without
them she could not "retain her current green card status in the United
States." On June 30, 2009, Evelyn, her attorney, and Derek's attorney
attended a hearing in San Antonio. Contending that K.L. could be ejected
from England at any point in time, Evelyn's counsel asked either that
the Texas Court order Derek to give consent for K.L. to have residency
in London or lift the stay to allow the parties to litigate the divorce
issue, because in order for Evelyn to remain in the United States, she's
had to either be divorced or have sponsorship. Evelyn's attorney
represented at least two more times in the relatively brief hearing that
Evelyn hoped to maintain permanent residence in the United States.
Derek's attorney noted that he had been served with "full blown
discovery" shortly before the hearing and argued that Derek's continued
deployment mandated that the stay remain in place. In response to the
judge's questioning, the attorney admitted that he could not think of a
solution to K.L.'s visa problem. He reiterated, however, that Derek
ultimately sought full custody.

The judge then proposed a potential solution: "what if [the parties] did
some kind of an order that said, the Court finds that this temporary
order that was agreed to by the parties signifies [Derek's] consent for
[K.L.] to temporarily reside with [Evelyn] in London, until such time as
the Court hears ... further orders in ... October of 2009 or
something[?]" The attorneys agreed "that might do the trick." The judge
repeatedly made clear that any consent for K.L. to stay overseas was to
temporarily avoid separating him from Evelyn and should not "prejudice
[Derek's] right to come back here and conduct a custody trial in the
future." The judge also warned the parties that if they could not reach
an agreement along the lines she had proposed, she would not rule out
lifting the stay and finalizing the divorce. The attorneys agreed to
work on an agreed order and to come back before another judge in a few
days. The next day, Derek's attorney sent Derek an email about the
"emergency" proceedings. Attached to the email was an affidavit for
Derek's signature giving consent for K.L. to "reside" with Evelyn. In
line with the discussion at the June 30th Hearing, Derek's attorney
suggested that any consent would be valid only through Derek's return to
the United States, noting that they would "have to have a side agreement
between [Evelyn], her lawyer, and [Derek's attorney] that [K.L.'s]
residence in England is not permanent and that he shall be returning to
the U.S. eventually and that this case shall proceed here and only here
in Texas." Derek signed the affidavit on July 6, 2009 . In it, Derek
affirmed that he was K.L.'s biological father, reported that he was
"currently deployed in Afghanistan," and gave his consent for K.L. to
"reside with his mother ... in England," which he considered to be in
K.L.'s "best interest." The same day, Derek emailed the affidavit to his
attorney, writing only that he had "read, signed[,] and attached the
consent form as discussed." On July 2nd-just two days after the June
30th Hearing-Evelyn filed an amended counter petition in the Texas
court. Consistent with her stated desire to maintain permanent residency
in the United States, the counter petition again stated that Evelyn had
been domiciled in Texas for the preceding six months and had been a
resident of Bexar County, in which San Antonio is located, for the
preceding ninety days. Evelyn also sought "the exclusive use and
possession" of the marital residence and an injunction against Derek's
"entering or remaining on the premises." The counter petition further asked the Texas court to
appoint Evelyn as sole managing conservator of K.L. and to enter certain
"temporary" child support and spousal maintenance provisions "until a
final decree [was] signed." The counter petition also disavowed that K.L.
was "under the continuing jurisdiction of any other court" or subject to
any "court-ordered conservatorships, court-ordered guardianships, or
other court-ordered relationships."

The second hearing on Evelyn's motion to lift the imposed stay was held
on July 6, 2009-the same day that Derek signed and emailed the Consent
Affidavit. Evelyn's representations differed from those made at the June
30th Hearing in at least two crucial aspects. This time, Evelyn's
counsel reported that U.K. immigration officials had scheduled K.L.'s
deportation for July 9th, just three days away, and that Evelyn "could
never come back over here and live with her child" because her green
card had expired. Both of these claims were questionable. Evelyn's
counsel nonetheless contended that the only way to prevent K.L.'s
deportation was to grant a divorce or to have Derek sign the consent
form. Derek's attorney had not yet heard back from Derek about the
Consent Affidavit and announced "not ready." He argued that any action
without Derek's participation violated the Service members Civil Relief
Act, but attempted to work out some sort of agreement. Based on the
alleged emergency, the judge crafted a compromise. She "order {ed] that
[Derek] sign the consent form to do a status quo. In the event he
fail[ed] to do that, [the judge would] enter a divorce decree." Although
the decree would "grant the divorce and grant custody," it would only be
a temporary arrangement to prevent K.L.'s deportation. After entry of
the decree, the judge proposed that a motion for new trial be filed by
Evelyn's attorney to "prevent it becoming a final order until [Derek
was] able to get back from Afghanistan." The judge noted that she did
not expect Derek's attorney to agree to this solution. In fact, when
Derek's attorney asked for sanctions and attorneys' fees under the
Service members Civil Relief Act, the judge promised to take up those
issues when
"we really do have a final hearing." The judge was explicit that this
arrangement would "not prejudice [Derek] for his custody suit" and that
he was "not in any way precluded from coming back and obtaining
[custody]-and [that] if he want[ed] to come back sooner, [she would]
grant him a new trial." Although Derek emailed the Consent Affidavit to
his attorney on July 6th, there apparently was some objection to Derek's
failure to have it notarized. The Texas court therefore entered a
"final" divorce decree on July 30, 2009, awarding Evelyn sole managing
conservatorship over K.L. but notably omitting the Temporary Order's
"without regard to geographic location" modifier. Evelyn forwarded the
"final" divorce decree to U.K. immigration authorities.

Derek returned from Afghanistan just over two weeks later. He quickly
filed motions for a new trial and to lift the stay. The Texas court
entered an agreed order granting the motion for new trial on August 26,
2009.

A U.K. immigration appeals judge granted K.L. permanent residency in the
U.K. a week later, but not because Evelyn had been granted sole managing
conservatorship. The judge found that it was "quite clear from the
[Texas court] documents that both parents retain[ed] a significant
responsibility for the care of [K.L.]" and that Evelyn's "evidence [was]
far from showing that [she] ha[d] sole responsibility for [him]." The
U.K. judge noted that it was "not in dispute that suitable arrangements
[had] been made for [K.L.'s] care both as a result of the American
divorce proceedings and as a result of [Evelyn's] financial condition."
The judge thus affirmed the rejection of K.L.'s application under the
U.K. law provision relied upon in the original decision. The judge
instead granted the appeal based on a provision allowing permanent
residency in cases where "one parent is present and settled in the
[U.K.] and there are serious and compelling family or other
considerations which make exclusion of the child undesirable."

Derek filed a "Motion for Additional Temporary Orders" on September 16,
2009, seeking extended visitation with K.L. in the U.K. The Texas court
granted the motion on September 30th, and ordered Evelyn to allow Derek
three weeks of "continuous and unrestricted (twenty four (24) hours per
day) visitation with K.L." from October 20th to November 10th. Evelyn
lodged no objections to this order even though she originally opposed
Derek's visitation request.

With Derek's return, the divorce proceedings turned to discovery. The
record suggests that Evelyn refused to comply with several discovery
requests and court orders. Derek filed motions to compel, for sanctions,
and for a continuance. After a December hearing, the Texas court granted
Derek's requests, ordering Evelyn to respond to the discovery requests
and to pay Derek $1538 in sanctions. Trial was continued to March 1,
2010. Evelyn failed to comply with the order, and Derek filed another
motion to compel and other motions. The Texas court granted these
requests by, among other things, giving Derek the exclusive right to
occupy the marital residence, ordering Evelyn to comply with certain
discovery requests, and setting other matters for a hearing. Evelyn was
ordered to bring K.L. to the hearing. On February 4th, the Texas court
issued a multi-part order addressing several pending matters. Among
other things, the order provided that Derek discontinue child and
spousal support payments as a sanction for Evelyn's failure to bring K.L.
to the hearing; that Evelyn comply with the outstanding discovery
requests and finish paying the previously ordered sanction; that Evelyn
was prohibited from raising certain issues in future proceedings; and
that Evelyn pay an additional $1200 in sanctions for her failure to
abide by various orders. The order also imposed heavy sanctions for her
conduct, but allowed her to fully participate in the final divorce
hearing if she complied with all unresolved orders and discovery
requests by March 1, 2010. Evelyn complied with the sanction order, as
well as an order to bring K.L. back to the United States for the trial.
The Texas court heard arguments on March 1 and 2, 2010. Derek and Evelyn
both testified, along with an immigration specialist and an accountant.

The Texas court entered a "Final Decree of Divorce" on May 25, 2010,
finding that it had "jurisdiction of [the] case and of all the parties."
It appointed Derek and Evelyn as joint managing conservators of K.L.,
with Derek as the possessory parent, and found that such an arrangement
was in K.L.'s "best interests." Because the parties "reside[d] in
different and remote countries," the Final Decree imposed a custom
possession order rather than the Texas Standard Possession Order used in
the Temporary Order. In lieu of child support, Evelyn was ordered to pay
"all costs of travel associated with her visitation" rights. Unlike the
Temporary Order, the Final Decree contained a mutual ne exeat provision
that required each party to obtain "written authorization" from the
other to take K.L. "beyond the territorial limits of the United States,"
provided that during her periods of possession, Evelyn had the right to
take K.L. to England, Scotland, and Wales. Before removing K.L. from the
United States, however, the Final Decree obligated Evelyn to post a
$25,000 bond in Derek's favor. The Texas court gave Derek "the exclusive
right to designate the primary residence of [K.L.] without regard to
geographic location," and found "that the United States of America is
the country of habitual residence of [K.L.]"

Derek took possession of K.L. shortly after the trial ended. Evelyn
appealed and in January 2011 filed a "Motion to Modify and Motion for
Clarification" of the Final Decree which was disposed of.

On February 25, 2011, Evelyn initiated this action. A an evidentiary
hearing, at which both parties testified and presented evidence the
district court granted Evelyn's petition on August 10, 2011, and ordered
that Derek immediately return K.L. to Evelyn's possession. The district
court found that the U.K. was K.L.'s "habitual residence" under the
Convention; that Derek breached Evelyn's U.K. custody rights by
retaining K.L. pursuant to the Final Decree; and that Evelyn was
actually exercising her U.K. custody rights at the time of retention.
Evelyn departed for the U.K. with K.L. in tow. Derek timely appealed.

The Fifth Circuit rejected Evelyn’s argument that the court should adopt
the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Bekier v. Bekier, 248
F.3d 1051 (11th Cir.2001), and hold that the case was moot in light of
K.L.'s return to the U.K. The petitioner in Bekier took his son from the
United States to Israel immediately after the district court resolved
the Convention issue in his favor. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the
respondent's appeal, reasoning that it could provide her "no actual
affirmative relief" because any "potential remedies ... lie in the
Israeli courts." The Fifth Circuit found that Bekier was inconsistent
with the grain of circuit authority. The Third and Fourth Circuits, the
only other circuit courts to rule on the issue, had explicitly rejected
Bekier 's approach. See Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540, 544-46 & n.2
(3d Cir.2004); Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491, 494-97 (4th
Cir.2003). The Court held that Derek's appeal was not moot for basically
the reasons articulated by the Fawcett court. '[C]ompliance [with a
trial court's order] does not [ordinarily] moot an appeal [of that
order] if it remains possible to undo the effects of compliance or if
the order will have a continuing impact on future action.' " The
Convention and U.K. law perhaps best demonstrate that granting Derek
relief can " 'affect the matter in issue.' Both provide a "mechanism for
enforcing a judgment by this court or the district court on remand." It
also was possible that Evelyn could voluntarily respond to an order
requiring K.L.'s return or risk contempt sanctions.

Turning to the merits of Evelyn's case the court concluded that Derek
should prevail. The district court's order had the effect of undoing the
custody arrangement ordered by the Texas court of competent
jurisdiction, before which both parties participated and sought relief,
in favor of relitigating custody before tribunals that, until this
proceeding, Evelyn never argued had authority over the matter. Derek
contended that Evelyn consented to the Texas court's resolution of the
custody issue and "waived" recourse to the Convention by failing to
raise it in the Texas court. The district court, however, held that
Evelyn's "[m]erely participating in the Texas divorce and custody
proceedings [was] not consent to [K.L.'s] removal or retention in
Texas." According to the district court, Evelyn attended the final
divorce proceedings "under compulsion of the Texas court's order,"
belying the voluntariness of her participation. Similarly, the district
court believed that "[t]here was nothing consensual or voluntary in her
surrender of her son."

The Court observed that under Article 13(a), "[t]he consent defense
involves the petitioner's conduct prior to the contested removal or
retention, while acquiescence addresses whether the petitioner
subsequently agreed to or accepted the removal or retention." Baxter v.
Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir.2005). The focus of inquiry is "the
petitioner's subjective intent," , as "evinced by the petitioner's
statements or conduct, which can be rather informal." Nicolson v.
Pappalardo, 605 F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir.2010). "In examining a consent
defense, it is important to consider what the petitioner actually
contemplated and agreed to in allowing the child to travel outside its
home country. The nature and scope of the petitioner's consent, and any
conditions or limitations, should be taken into account." Consent for a
particular tribunal to make a final custody determination, which may be
established by entry of a temporary custody order, suffices to establish
an affirmative defense under the Convention. See Nicolson, 605 F.3d at
106-07 ("The consent order in this case provided only for temporary
custody but, if it were read as agreeing to let the Maine courts
determine final custody..., we would think that this was an acquiescence
or, alternatively, a waiver of Hague Convention rights."; cf. Navani,
496 F.3d at 1132 ("As the English family court retained jurisdiction at
all times over [the child's] custody, and we have never had jurisdiction
over the merits of the English family court's custodial decisions, we
are powerless to alter the current custodial regime forbidding the very
relief that [the appellant-respondent] seeks: return of the child to the
United States.").

Applying these principles left no doubt that Evelyn gave " 'clear and
unequivocal' " consent for the Texas court to make a final custody
determination. Evelyn and Derek agreed to the Temporary Order because
Derek's military service made a final resolution and trial impractical
at the time. Evelyn answered the divorce lawsuit and filed a counter
petition seeking affirmative relief. Evelyn exercised custody, as a
temporary joint managing conservator, under the Temporary Order until
July 30, 2009, when the "final" divorce decree was entered at the
suggestion of a Texas judge and as a compromise to forestall what was
claimed to be K.L.'s imminent deportation. That decree was vacated weeks
later by agreement of the parties. During Evelyn's time in the U.K., she
recognized and obeyed orders entered by the Texas court on multiple
occasions. Although Evelyn was sanctioned for discovery abuses and for
failing to bring K.L. to the United States on one occasion, she
ultimately paid the imposed sanctions and complied with all Texas court
orders. She participated in the divorce trial, appealed the Final
Decree, and later moved that the Texas court modify its terms based on
her consistent obedience to the court's orders and submission to its
jurisdiction. By her own admission, at no time did Evelyn initiate
custody proceedings in the U.K.

The only thing in the record suggesting that Evelyn disagreed with the
Texas court's authority was the filing of this action nine months after
Final Decree was entered and almost a year after the divorce trial
ended. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that Derek proved as a matter
of law that Evelyn agreed to the Texas court's final resolution of the
custody issue.

The Courts conclusion that consent was given defeated Evelyn's claim of
"wrongful retention." Even if this analysis was incorrect, however, the
Court concluded that Evelyn failed to satisfy her burden on the elements
necessary to establish wrongful retention. Because wrongful-retention
analysis depends on first determining
K.L.'s country of "habitual residence," it began there. The Fifth
Circuit joined the majority of circuits that "have adopted an approach
that begins with the parents' shared intent or settled purpose regarding
their child's residence." Nicolson, 605 F.3d at 104 & n.2 (collecting
cases). This approach does not ignore the child's experience, but rather
gives greater weight to the parents' subjective intentions relative to
the child's age. For example, parents ' intentions should be dispositive
where, as here, the child is so young that "he or she cannot possibly
decide the issue of residency." Whiting, 391 F.3d at 548-49. In such
cases, the threshold test is whether both parents intended for the child
to "abandon the [habitual residence] left behind." Mozes, 239 F.3d at
1075; see also Whiting, 391 F.3d at 549-50. Absent shared intent, "prior
habitual residence should be deemed supplanted only where 'the objective
facts point unequivocally' to this conclusion." Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1082.
Notably, when "the child's initial move from an established habitual
residence was clearly intended to be for a specific, limited duration
[,] ... most courts will find no change in habitual residence." Mere
retention in another country and "private reservations" or intentions
that are made "manifest and definitive" only after the child has left
its country of origin are generally insufficient to establish intent to
change a child's habitual residence.

The district court concluded that the U.K. was K.L.'s habitual residence
in March 2010 based on K.L.'s acclimation to the U.K. and Derek's intent
that K.L. reside there with Evelyn during Derek's deployment. The
district court relied primarily on Derek's agreeing to the Temporary
Order provision giving Evelyn the right to determine K.L.'s residence
without geographic restrictions and on his executing the Consent
Affidavit allowing K.L. to reside in the U.K. The district court found
that Evelyn and Derek's "last shared agreement ... was that [K.L.]
reside in the U.K. with his mother." The Fifth Circuit disagreed.

As an initial matter, the district court's order did not consider
several components of the habitual-residence inquiry. The order never
analyzed the threshold question of whether Derek and Evelyn shared an
intention that K.L. abandon the United States, which was indisputably
his habitual residence before his arrival in the U.K.. Nor did the order
address the fact that Evelyn never claimed before filing her petition
that she intended for K.L. to permanently remain in the U.K. Derek, for
his part, never intended for K.L. to "abandon" the United States for any
amount of time and, at most, agreed for K.L. to stay in the U.K. through
resolution of the divorce proceedings. Thus, although Derek agreed that
K.L. could remain in the U.K. for some time, no objective facts
"unequivocally" show that the U.K. should "supplant[ ]" the United
States as K.L.'s habitual residence. Regardless of the ties that K.L.
unavoidably developed in the U.K., his young age required Derek and
Evelyn's
shared intentions be the primary focus in the habitual residence inquiry
here. The Court opted against following the Sixth Circuit's exclusively
child-centered approach. To focus on a young child's experience
encourages future "would-be abductor[s] to seek unilateral custody over
a child in another country" or to delay returning to the child's
original habitual residence as long as possible.

The record established that K.L.'s presence in the U.K. was to last for
a limited duration; that Derek never agreed to any other arrangement;
and that no special circumstances justified departing from courts'
general practice of finding no change in habitual residence in such
cases. See Whiting, 391 F.3d at 549-50. It concluded that Evelyn's
sojourn did not alter K.L.'s habitual residence. As a result, it did not
need to analyze any other element of the "wrongful-retention" analysis.

It held that the appeal was not moot; that Derek satisfied his
affirmative defense burden under the Convention to show that Evelyn consented
and acquiesced to the Texas court's authority to make a final custody
adjudication; and found that K.L.'s habitual residence at the time of the
alleged retention remained the United States.

In White v White, 2012 WL 3041660 (S.D.N.Y.) pro se
Plaintiff Keith White brought an action against his ex-wife Gabriela White under
the Hague Convention, seeking the return of the parties' son S. to Keith and
repayment of monies that Keith paid to Gabriela since 2005.

According to the complaint, on January 27, 2005, Gabriela "abducted" S.,
who was then three years old, from S.'s residence in New York City and
transported S. to Germany without Keith's consent. While in Germany, Gabriela
"said to the Competent Agency for Youth Services that she 'was not willing to
return w[i]th the child to the United States.' " In an effort to bring about the
return of his son to the United States, Keith filed Hague Convention proceedings
in Germany through the United States Department of State. The German Local Court
Koblenz assumed jurisdiction over Keith's case and set a trial date for May 24,
2005. Two days before trial was scheduled to begin, Gabriela "vanished [with S.]
and eventually resurfaced in New Jersey," where she and S. resided since. In
April 2006, in light of Gabriela's voluntary return with S. to the United
States, the German Court issued an order terminating the Hague Convention
proceedings because "[b]oth parties in agreement declared the lawsuit finished"
and assessing Keith's costs of adjudicating the proceedings on Gabriela. In
explaining its imposition of costs, the German Court noted that, prior to the
date set for trial, several efforts had been made to "force [Gabriela] to return
to the United States with the child and to there clarify the issue of the
child's custody " but that, only under the pressure of trial, did Gabriela
"change[ ] her mind to fly back to New York and ... stand trial at divorce and
child custody proceedings." The German Court concluded that, had Gabriela not
"returned voluntarily with the child to the United States, an order would have
been enacted to effect the surrender of the child... for the immediate return
purpose of the child to New York, NY, United States." Therefore, because it was
"indisputable that a sentence of repatriation would have been [issued]," the
German Court determined that Keith's costs of litigating the Hague Convention
proceedings should be imposed on Gabriela.

Upon Gabriela's return to the United States in 2005, the parties each
filed divorce actions in Supreme Court, New York County, asserting divorce,
custody, and support claims. These suits were consolidated into a single action.
On April 17, 2008, after trial, Supreme Court (Lobis,J.) issued an order
granting joint custody of S. to both parents, primary residential custody to
Gabriela, weekly and holiday visitation to Keith, and shared decision-making
authority over S. In awarding Gabriela primary residential custody, Justice
Lobis acknowledged that "[t]here is no dispute over the fact that [Gabriela]
removed S. from New York [to] ... Germany for approximately four months without
[Keith]'s permission" . On March 11, 2010, the Appellate Division affirmed the
Custody Order. In so holding, the Appellate Division stated: We note, contrary
to plaintiff's assertions, that the German court to which he applied for return
of the child did not declare defendant a kidnapper or "child abductor." Rather,
the record shows that the Hague Convention proceedings initiated by plaintiff
were dismissed, upon agreement of the parties, without any such finding having
been made.

The support claims and other financial matters were tried before a referee
in December 2008. On June 30, 2010, New York Supreme Court Justice Saralee
Evans, to whom the case had been reassigned, issued a Decision/Order adopting in
part and modifying in part the referee's recommendation as it related to child
support, maintenance, distribution of marital property, and counsel fees.
Justice Evans characterized as undisputed "the fact that [Gabriela] removed S.
from New York, traveled to see her family, and stayed in Germany for
approximately four months without [Keith's] permission." Justice Evans also
acknowledged Keith's "conten[tion] that vacatur of the referee's report was
warranted because defendant ' kidnapped' the parties' son in 2005, when she took
him to Germany against plaintiff's wishes, and remained there for four months,
until plaintiff brought an action under the Hague Convention" and Keith's "object[ion]
that this constituted egregious fault, barring [Gabriela] from receiving
maintenance." Justice Evans found the referee's recommendation to be
"substantially supported by the record" and made financial awards. Justice Evans
recognized that the German Court had imposed the costs of the Hague Convention
proceedings on Gabriela after ruling "that the transport of the parties' son to
Germany by defendant was illegal," and found that, "[w]hile these facts do not
warrant vacatur of the Referee's report, it appears to the court that the German
court's determination of [Gabriela's] liability under the Hague Convention for
wrongful retention of the parties' son in Germany should be afforded full faith
and credit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. s 11603(g) and ... [Keith] is therefore
entitled ... to payment by [Gabriela] of his demonstrated expenses in that
action." Consequently, Justice Evans reduced Keith's aggregate financial
obligations to Gabriela by his costs of adjudicating the Hague Convention
action, which she calculated at "the sum of $6,247.13 plus the value of 3,874.98
euros."

On December 15, 2010, Justice Evans issued a Judgment of Divorce that
incorporated the Custody and Support Orders and reaffirmed that Keith's
financial obligations to Gabriela were to "be reduced by [Keith's Hague
Convention] legal and court costs, in the sum of $6,247.13 plus the value of
3,874.98. On January 5, 2012, the Appellate Division summarily dismissed Keith's
appeal from the Divorce Judgment.

On January 11, 2012, proceeding pro se, Keith filed a complaint under the
Hague Convention and ICARA. The complaint alleged that, by returning to New
Jersey voluntarily in May 2005, Gabriela "frustrated the German Court in its
efforts to issue 'a sentence of repatriation to the state of habitual residence
... [of] New York' " and that "[d]espite New York State Civil Supreme Court
extending full faith and credit to the German Court's decision and order [,] ...
[t]o date a return order incorporating the German Court's definition ... of the
state of habitual residence has not been issued." The complaint also alleged
that Gabriela had "refused to comply with the German Court's decision and order"
and "essentially extort[ed] monies from [Keith], forcing [him] to in essence,
pay for the ongoing abduction of their son." Keith asked the Court to "honor the
definition of the state of habitual residence established for this case by the
German Court and issue an order for the immediate return of S. to the plaintiff
in New York, NY, United States" and "to require [Gabriela to] repay all monies
paid to her by [Keith] since January 27, 2005."

On January 18, 2012, Judge Daniels of the District Court referred the case
to the Magistrate for general pretrial purposes and to issue a report and
recommendation regarding any dispositive motions. On February 16, 2012, Gabriela
filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the Hague Convention did not apply to
domestic custody disputes and that the only possible relief to which Plaintiff
could be entitled under the Hague Convention, transfer of the parties' son to
the United States for custody proceedings in New York, occurred seven years ago,
when Gabriela voluntarily returned to the United States with S. Keith filed an
opposition in which he did not assert that Gabriela had wrongfully removed S.
from the United States since 2005, but rather that Gabriela's continued
residential custody of S. pursuant to the New York State Supreme Court's Custody
Order violated the German Court order. ("[T]he Hague case has already been
adjudicated by the [German] Court. Plaintiff is not asking for the case to be
reopened or litigated again. He is asking that the status quo that existed prior
to the wrongful retention of the parties' child, which was the intention of the
[German] Court's order, be enforced."). Keith's opposition papers further
clarified that he brought his claim, under ICARA's full faith and credit
provision, 42 U.S.C. 11603(g), which requires a district court to enforce a
Hague Convention order that has issued elsewhere.

The Magistrate observed that though courts in this Circuit have previously
applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine coextensively with claim and issue
preclusion, the Supreme Court recently clarified that the doctrine does not "supersed[e]
the ordinary application of preclusion law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1738." Instead,
it occupies a "narrow ground" and "is confined to cases of the kind from which
the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining
of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments." Green, 585 F.3d at 101 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284). The
Second Circuit interpreted this language to impose four conditions, each of
which must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar a district court from
hearing the case: "(1) the party raising the claim must have lost in state
court; (2) that party's injuries must be caused by the state court judgment; (3)
that party's claims must invite the district court to review and reject the
state court judgment; and (4) the state court judgment must have been rendered
prior to the commencement of the federal court proceedings."

Under this framework, the Magistrate determined that Keith was a
"state-court loser." In terms of the issues before the Court, whether
enforcement of the German Court order required that Gabriela "return" S. to
Keith in New York and reimburse Keith for more than $100,000 paid to her since
2005 (presumably pursuant to either the Support Order or an earlier interim
order of the Supreme Court), Keith plainly "lost" in state court. On these
issues, Keith asserted virtually identical arguments to the Supreme Court that
he now made, namely that "extend[ing] full faith and credit to [the German
Court] order ... [required Justice Evans to] vacate the [referee's] findings
against [Keith]", and that Keith should be given primary custody of S. because
"the crime of kidnapping should not be rewarded with custody and should not be
rewarded in general." The Supreme Court considered these arguments, including
the degree to which the German Court order affected Gabriela's entitlement to
child support and maintenance , and held that the German Court order's only
legal effect was in its imposition of Keith's Hague Convention costs on
Gabriela. In so holding, the Supreme Court necessarily rejected Keith's
arguments that the German Court order had any further import for its custody and
financial determinations. The Appellate Division also addressed and rejected
Keith's argument that enforcement of the German Court order required a different
disposition of custody. Since Keith urged a view of the German Court order that
was presented to and rejected by the Supreme Court and Appellate Division, he
"lost" on those issues in state court. Thus, the first element of the test was
met. The second issue was whether Keith's injuries were "caused" by the state
court judgment. The complaint described Keith's injuries as Gabriela's "refus[al]
to comply with the German Court's decision and order by returning S. to New
York, Ny"; Gabriela's "obstruct[ion][of] access" between S. and Keith; and
Gabriela's collection from Keith of "in excess of $100,000 ... during the
ongoing abduction of S." Though Keith attributed these injuries to Gabriela, the
Supreme Court's Custody and Support Orders created Gabriela's legal entitlement
to retain primary custody of S. and receive support payments from Keith. Thus,
that the state court orders "caused" the custody and support arrangement of
which Keith now complained. The third element of Rooker-Feldman was also met
because Keith asked the Court to overturn the state court's Custody and Support
Orders by mandating the "immediate return of S. to [Keith] in New York, NY" and
requiring Gabriela to "repay all monies paid to her by [Keith] since January 27,
2005." Keith's opposition papers further explained that "this Court has
authority to supersede any ruling issued by the New York state courts" and ask
the Court to "immediately return" S. to Keith "regardless of any standing
custody orders...." . Moreover, Keith's opposition papers did not challenge
Gabriela's assertion that "she has the permission of the state courts" to live
with S. in New Jersey, but merely argued that "State Court decisions did not
render moot, replace or supersede a Hague recovery process." Keith's complaint
and opposition papers therefore constituted invitations to "review and reject
the state court judgment." Williams, 2012 WL 691832, at *4. Finally, because the
Divorce Judgment incorporating the Custody and Support Orders was rendered in
2010, and this action was not filed under January 11, 2012, the fourth element
of Rooker-Feldman, that the state court judgment was rendered prior to
commencement of the federal court proceedings, was also met.

Though Keith did not specifically request review of the state court
judgment, claiming instead that he sought merely to enforce the German Court
order under the full faith and credit provision of ICARA, analysis of the four
elements made clear that his federal lawsuit would require the Court to review
and reject the Supreme Court's Custody and Support Orders after Keith has lost
on appeal to the Appellate Division. The Court was therefore divested of subject
matter jurisdiction over Keith's claims and could not hear them.

The Magistrate found that Keith's Claims were also barred by the doctrine
of res judicata, or claim preclusion, and by the doctrine of collateral estoppel
(or issue preclusion) The Magistrate also found that even if Keith's claims were
not precluded by the state court action, Keith failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Keith did not state a case of wrongful retention
(or removal) under 42 U.S.C. 11603(b) because he acknowledged that S. did not
remain in Germany but was returned to the United States in 2005. Instead,
Keith's theory of relief was premised on enforcement of the German Court's order
under 42 U.S.C. 11603(g). However, that provision required only that "[f]ull
faith and credit shall be accorded by the courts of the States and the courts of
the United States to the judgment of any other such court ordering or denying
the return of a child, pursuant to the Convention...."42 U.S.C. 11603(g) . The
German Court did not order or deny S.'s return to the United States. It declared
that it "would have" ordered S.'s return to New York, but that it was
unnecessary to do so because Gabriela voluntarily returned with S. to the United
States. Keith sought only to have this Court "honor the definition of the state
of habitual residence established for this case by the German Court." However,
ICARA does not provide for the enforcement of a "definition" and, even if it
did, at most, that definition would determine where custody proceedings should
take place and not what the outcome of those proceedings should be. Keith
misconstrued the Convention in seeking to use the German Court's order, not to
protect New York's jurisdiction as home-state arbiter of custody (as the
Convention seeks to do), but instead to override New York's custody
determination. There was simply no authority under the Hague Convention for such
an outcome; it was fundamentally inconsistent with the treaty's purpose and
plain language and expressly excluded from ICARA's limited grant of
jurisdiction. See Hague Convention, art. 19 ("A decision under this Convention
concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on
the merits of any custody issue."); 42 U.S.C. 11601(b)(4). Thus, the Convention
not only does not authorize-it prohibits-the Court from using the Convention as
a basis to alter New York's custody determination. Nor did 42 U.S.C. 11607-or
any other provision of the Convention or ICARA-authorize the Court to order
Gabriela to "repay all monies paid to her by [Keith] since January 27, 2005."
Section 11607 merely provides that "[a]ny court ordering the return of a child
pursuant to an action brought under [ 42 U.S.C. s 11603(b) ] shall order the
respondent to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the
petitioner...."42 U.S .C. 11607(3). Because no return order ever issued, it was
not clear that Keith was entitled to recover such expenses at all under section
11607(3). Nevertheless, to the extent the German Court ordered that Keith should
recover his costs, and the state court found that its determination should be
given full faith and credit, that relief had already been incorporated into the
Support Order. Accordingly, the Court found that even if Keith's claims were not
foreclosed under the doctrines of Rooker-Feldman, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel, Keith failed to state claim on which relief could be granted, and
recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted and that the complaint be
dismissed with prejudice.

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This blog is published by Joel R. Brandes Consulting Services, Inc.
Joel R. Brandes is the author of the "Law and the Family New York 2d", and "Law and the Family New York Forms" (Thomson-West). He is not a lawyer.
Joel R. Brandes Consulting Services, Inc. is not a law firm, or a lawyer and does not give legal advice.
Notice: The information on this site pertains to New York and Federal law only and is offered as a public service. It is not intended to give legal advice about a specific legal problem, nor does it create an attorney-client relationship. Due to the importance of the individual facts of every case, the generalizations we make may not necessarily be applicable to any particular case. Changes in the law could at any time make parts of this web site obsolete. This information is provided with the understanding that if legal advice is required the services of a competent attorney should be sought.

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What this Blog is About

This blog is dedicated to all of those parents, relatives and friends of persons whose children are missing and have been abducted by a parent, to another country. The Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, commonly referred to as the Hague Convention, established procedures to enable parents to obtain the prompt return, to their country of habitual residence, of children who have been unlawfully removed or retained in another country. In this blog we will focus on providing information with regard to what to do where there is a child abduction that crosses country boarders.

This Blog is written by Joel R. Brandes, the author of Law and the Family New York, Second Edition Revised, and Law and the Family New York Forms (Thomson-West), Bari Brandes Corbin, of the New York Bar, and co-author of Law and the Family New York, Second Edition, Revised, Volumes 5 & 6 (Thomson-West), and Evan B. Brandes, of the New York and Massachusetts Bars, and a Solicitor in New South Wales, Australia. The authors write the annual supplements to Law and the Family New York, Second Edition Revised, and Law and the Family New York Forms