Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act grants this court the authority to review a final decision of the Secretary, including the power to affirm, modify, or reverse such decision with or without remand to the Secretary for a rehearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Our scope of review, however, is narrow, for "The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." Id. Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (1971)). Specifically, substantial evidence is something "more than a mere scintilla," Cass v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 1993), but may be "something less than the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence." Young v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 957 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir. 1992). Additionally, this court will also review decisions of the Secretary for errors of law. "When the Secretary commits an error of law, reversal is, of course, warranted irrespective of the volume of evidence supporting the factual findings." Schmoll v. Harris, 636 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1980).

Both the magistrate judge and the Plaintiff cited to Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1993), as delineating the proper criteria that a reviewing court must consider when determining whether a claimant suffers from a disabling pain under the Act. Pope requires a court to consider the medical evidence presented, evidence of the claimant's daily activities, the Plaintiff's own claims of pain and the ALJ's own observations to determine whether there is substantial evidence supporting an ALJ's decision. Pope, 998 F.2d at 485. Although a reviewing court "cannot discredit a complaint of pain simply because objective medical evidence was not introduced to support the extent of the pain, neither [is it] required to give full credit to every statement of pain, and require a finding of disabled every time a claimant states that she feels unable to work." Pope, 998 F.2d at 486.

Despite misstating the legal standard, the magistrate judge nonetheless properly evaluated the Plaintiff's claim of pain against the Pope criteria required by this Circuit. In reaching her finding, the magistrate judge considered the X-Ray and medical examinations, Plaintiff's own claims, the evidence of Plaintiff's daily activities, as well as the ALJ's credibility findings. (Report and Recommendation at 14-15). The magistrate judge agreed with the ALJ that the record does not support with substantial evidence Plaintiff's claims of disabling pain. We also agree. The magistrate judge was correct not to disturb the ALJ's credibility finding on this issue because the ALJ's decision was not patently wrong in view of the cold record. SeeId.

Furthermore, we find no merit to Plaintiff's additional objection regarding proof of the degree of pain Plaintiff must exhibit in order to qualify as disabled. Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge incorrectly required Plaintiff to prove her pain to the degree alleged. (Plaintiff's Objections at 4). The magistrate judge did not search for evidence of severe pain as the Plaintiff alleged. In fact, the magistrate judge stated that "the regulations do not require her to establish that her pain is severe." (Report and Recommendation at 13).

This court agrees that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision that the Plaintiff did not suffer from a history of pain.

B. Limitation of Motion

The report and recommendation reviewed the ALJ's finding that the Plaintiff suffered no limitation of motion. The magistrate judge analyzed the reports of two doctors who examined the Plaintiff and determined whether Plaintiff's obesity limited the range of motion in her knees. Dr. Jordan Trafimow found that Plaintiff had limitation of motion in her knees due to her obesity. (R. at 355.) Dr. Robert Moscoso, however, reported that Plaintiff's range of motion was "normal" in her knees. (R. at 165). The magistrate judge correctly noted that when there exists a difference of medical opinions, "it is the Secretary, not the courts, who must resolve conflicts in the medical evidence." Strunk v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 1357 (7th Cir. 1984). The magistrate judge reasoned that the ALJ was charged with resolving the factual dispute and that he did so reasonably by concluding that the Plaintiff had no limitation of motion in her knees.

As trier of the facts, the administrative law judge is not bound by the medical judgment of a designated physician regarding medical equivalency. However, the judgment of a designated physician on the same evidence before the administrative law judge must be received into the record as expert evidence and given appropriate weight. Fox, 776. F.2d at 740.

The Fox court ruled in favor of the Secretary on this issue. The record in Fox revealed a "Form SSA-831-U5" signed by a reviewing physician which stated that the severity of the individual's impairments did not meet or equal that of any listed impairment. Id. The existence of this form, signed by a physician, proved that the ALJ in Fox complied with SSR 83-19. This Circuit also held in Pope that the presence of a signed "SSA-831-U5" form in the record was considered proof that a physician designated by the Secretary had considered the equivalency question. 988 F.2d at 480. see also Steward v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1988). (Record contained two opinions by consulting physician's that claimant's impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment).

We find that two cases which the magistrate judge relied on, Stuckey v. Sullivan, 881 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1989) and Nelson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1988), do not require this court to rule otherwise. Nelson involved an appeal of the Secretary's decision that the Plaintiff had the capacity to perform a limited range of light work therefore he was not disabled. The case was remanded on the grounds that the Appeals Council had erroneously ruled that additional medical evidence submitted by the Plaintiff was immaterial. The court in Nelson never reached the issue of whether a physician must provide an opinion concerning equivalency before an ALJ may decide if the claimant is disabled. Nelson, 855 F.2d at 508.

Stuckey also does not address the question whether a medical opinion is required for an equivalency determination. Stuckey involved a Plaintiff who claimed that the combination of a variety of impairments rendered him disabled. The court held that the medical evidence reviewed by the ALJ did not support Plaintiff's claims. The Seventh Circuit in Stuckey did not address, nor did the parties raise the question of whether the medical reports contained physicians' opinions on medical equivalency. Stuckey, 881 F.2d at 508.

We believe that Fox, Pope and Steward provide the relevant precedent on this issue. Our review of the entire record in this case and the relevant case law convince us that the ALJ erred by not eliciting a specific medical opinion on the question of whether Plaintiff's combined impairments equal the Listing for obesity.

This court's ruling is also in line with the Seventh Circuits's general admonition to courts and ALJ's not to overstep their bounds and make medical determinations rather than legal conclusions. This Circuit held that "the medical expertise of the Social Security Administration is reflected in the regulations; it is not the birthright of the lawyers who apply them. Common sense can mislead; lay intuitions about medical phenomena are often wrong." Schmidt v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 117, 118 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 901, 116 L. Ed. 2d 230, 112 S. Ct. 278 (1991). See also Bauzo v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 917, 926 (7th Cir. 1986). We believe that the ALJ improperly succumbed to the temptation to "play doctor" when he failed to obtain a physician's opinion on whether the effects of Plaintiff's combined ailments equaled a listed impairment under the Act.

On remand, we direct the ALJ to elicit and consider a medical judgment concerning the medical equivalence of claimant's combined impairments. In so doing, the physician should consider all the medical evidence that has been made part of the record. Furthermore, we urge the ALJ to articulate, at least minimally, his justification for accepting or rejecting Plaintiff's claim that the combination of her impairments equals the Listing for obesity. We accept and adopt the remainder of the magistrate judge's report and recommendation.

CONCLUSION

We remand this matter to the Secretary in accordance with this opinion. The Social Security Act, as amended in 1990, provides for remand of cases in several instances, none of which clearly apply in this case. The language of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) states that a court may remand a case either upon motion of the Secretary for good cause shown or upon a demonstration of new, material evidence and a good reason for the claimant's failure to include that evidence in the record. The Seventh Circuit has held that remand is also appropriate "when the findings of the Secretary are not supported by substantial evidence but do not provide sufficient evidence to support a reversal and a finding that the claimant is disabled." Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 610 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Bauzo, 803 F.2d at 926. The circumstances described by the Seventh Circuit apply here in Fenn, so this court remands this case to the Secretary pursuant to this opinion.

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