Lastly, while al Qaeda may be degrading globally, the West should not mistakenly believe that jihadi violence will necessarily decrease. On the contrary, competing al Qaeda affiliates may actually increase their attack tempo in an effort to assert themselves as the new leader post-Zawahiri and al Qaeda Central. More successful attacks will likely lead to more media attention, more recruits and more resources. As I noted last year in “What if there is no al Qaeda?”, the U.S. may now be encountering many different regional terror groups. Some will require direct engagement and elimination. Some indirect engagement and disruption. And others may only require monitoring and little to no engagement. Ultimately, in a post-al Qaeda-era (much like the post-Soviet-era), analysis, planning and decision-making will in many ways become more difficult rather than less difficult.

SelectedWisdom All parts of my "Smarter Counterterrorism" series is now available. Continue reading → The post “Smarter Counterterrorism” – The Complete Series appeared first on %%www.selectedwisdom.com%%.

SelectedWisdom My thoughts at the AEI debate on the state of al Qaeda. Continue reading → The post AEI Discussion Panel – My Take On Countering al Qaeda & Other Jihadis appeared first on %%www.selectedwisdom.com%%.