In 2001 Sound Transit (ST) admitted their initial
cost estimates were wrong and shortened the line to 14 miles, from Westlake
Mall in downtown Seattle to the boundary of Tukwila and SeaTac, about two
miles by bus north of SeaTac Airport..However ST still hopes eventually to build over
125 miles of light rail and is taking administrative steps toward doing so.

Sound Transit has continually justified its choice of
light rail technology on an alternatives analysis done in 1993 by Sound Transits
predecessor agency, the Regional Transit Project (RTP).This particular study compared a 125-mile rapid rail system costing
$11.5 billion against an express bus alternative costing $4.7 billion. I went back to give this study some
additional attention it badly needs, since ST is still referring to it as
valid a decade after it was issued.

During the course of that study RTP
predicted year 2020 ridership for both the bus and rail alternatives, and then evaluated their capacity to
handle the predicted ridership.In looking at
bus system capacity through downtown Seattle, the RTP assumed the existing
Downtown Seattle Transit Tunnel -- the bus tunnel under Pine Street and
Third Avenue -- could only
carry 100 buses per hour in each direction, even though six previous studies had concluded
its capacity was significantly higher than that.

At this point the RTP had a choice.Either it could verify that 100 buses
per hour was the correct
value, and if so, apply one of the remedies that staff had already identified.Or it could penalize the bus alternative.It chose the latter course of action, and
then proceeded to reduce
predicted ridership for the bus alternative. RTP claimed it did not have enough capacity
to meet the regions needs.In addition,
because the bus alternative now had lower ridership, the RTA also down-rated it on all
other ridership related benefits, such as its ability to improve mobility and support land
use goals.

In short, the RTP compared a robust, grade-separated
rapid rail alternative against a deliberately hobbled bus alternative and used the results
to rule out bus technology for the regions main transit spine along I-5.In its Draft Long-Range Plan
released December 2004, Sound Transit still relies on that corrupted 1993
alternatives analysis to justify proceeding
with light rail.

Fortunately, I was able to take steps to
estimate what would have happened if RTP had elected to remedy the alleged capacity
problem rather than penalize the bus alternative.
To compare apples to apples it is necessary to have two alternatives that are either
equal in benefit or equal in cost. I elected to modify the bus alternative so it would attract the same ridership as
the rail alternative, and then compare costs.

The
first step was to remove the alleged capacity bottleneck using -- to be conservative --
the most expensive remedy identified by RTP staff, namely, building a second parallel bus
tunnel costing $600 million.This allowed the
bus alternative to carry its originally predicted ridership, which was 93% of what the
rail system was predicted to carry.To get
that last 7% I used an RTP estimate for the cost of attracting extra riders.

The result is that a modified bus
alternative would be $400 million per year less expensive (in 1991 dollars) than the rapid rail
system chosen by RTP.This is the picture
that the RTP could have produced using information available at that time.However, RTP chose not to do so because officials
wanted rail to win.

Today there is every indication Sound
Transits Board wants to build at least 125 miles of light rail, some
of which, unlike rapid rail, is to be at-grade with places for cars and
trucks to cross the tracks.There has never been an apples-to-apples
comparison between bus rapid transit (BRT) and any of the different-sized light rail
networks that Sound Transit is contemplating, much less a 125-mile system.

However; it is possible to make an approximation.

First, we can assume that 125 miles
of Link light rail would attract as many riders as 125 miles of rapid rail.Clearly, it would not do this, because Link
is
slower, but this is the conservative approach.Then
we have to estimate the cost of a 125-mile version of Link and compare that
with an all-bus or BRT alternative. The
1993 cost comparison can be reused, but only after adjusting it for the facts that Sound
Transits early rail cost estimates were 44% too low and that many of the HOV lanes
needed for the bus alternative have now been completed.

The results show that a 125-mile light rail system would cost about $900
million per year more (in 2002 dollars) than a comparable BRT system.This cost differential would continue over
the 30-year period needed to repay the construction bonds.

Its also likely that BRT could replace the 14-mile Initial Segment or
the 21-mile Central Link system for less than half their costs.

This information about a potential
$900 million per year savings opportunity is new, and it needs to be published widely so
taxpayers can decide whether it makes better sense to abandon Sound Transits light
rail strategy and switch to an equally effective BRT alternative.

Itís unfortunate that knowledge of the BRT opportunity
developed in 1993 has been suppressed.The
best explanation may be the major disconnect that exists between what most citizens of
this region want (reduced traffic congestion at the lowest possible cost) versus what the
members of the Sound Transit Board want -- light rail regardless the cost and despite the
fact it wont reduce congestion.

To paper over the gap, Sound Transit
has systematically and continually resorted to disseminating biased, misleading, and even
false information about the merits of Link light rail in order to bolster public support
and justify Federal funding.One result is
deterioration in the publics trust in government to spend scarce tax dollars wisely.Its also evidence that the current
transportation planning process in Puget Sound is broken.The process is not providing the through and objective information officials
and voters need to make multi-billion dollar decisions.

This report finds that the very
foundation of Sound Transits Draft Long-Range Plan of 2005 is invalid because it
is
based on one corrupted and obsolete study done in 1993.It recommends that Link be placed on hold until and unless a proper, honest
alternatives analysis demonstrates that it is superior to BRT and other alternatives.This report further recommends that federal and
local officials take steps to fix the process.