This matter was certified to the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board by
a Subcommittee of the Fifth District Committee, Section II, and was heard
on June 27, 2003, by a duly convened panel of the Disciplinary Board consisting
of Karen A. Gould, 2nd Vice Chair, Carl Eason, Frank B. Miller,
III, W. Jefferson O’Flaherty, lay member, and Taylor Williams, IV.
The Respondent, William Konan, appeared pro se. Noel Sengel,
Senior Assistant Bar Counsel, appeared as counsel for the Virginia State Bar
(hereinafter “VSB”). The proceedings were transcribed by
Donna T. Chandler of Chandler & Halasz, P.O. Box 9349, Richmond, VA
23227, (804) 730-1222.

All required notices were properly sent by the Clerk of the Disciplinary System.

The Chair polled the panel members to determine whether any member had a personal
or financial interest in this matter that might affect or reasonably be perceived
to affect his or her ability to be impartial in this proceeding. Each
member, including the Chair, responded in the negative.

VSB Exhibits 1 through 90 were admitted without objection during the liability
phase of the hearing and additional Exhibits 91 and 92 were admitted during
the sanctions phase. The Respondent had Exhibits 1 through 89 admitted
without objection during the liability phase and Exhibit 90 admitted during
the sanction phase.

The Bar called Thomas Koerner to testify in Docket Number 01-052-0361 and
James P. Szymkowicz to testify in Docket Number 00-052-3465. Mr. Konan
was the only witness to testify during his case in both matters. During
the sanctions phase of the hearing, after it had been determined that the
Bar had proven by clear and convincing evidence that there were violations
of the disciplinary rules, the Bar called Alexandre Konanykhine to testify
on the impact Mr. Konan’s actions had on him.

Stipulations

The parties stipulated to the following facts:

1.
At all times relevant hereto, Raymond William Konan, Esq. (hereinafter the
Respondent), has been an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth
of Virginia. Mr. Konan received proper notice of this hearing at his
last address of record with the Virginia State Bar.

Virginia
State Bar Docket Number 00-052-3465

2.
In December of 1997, J.P. Szymkowicz, Esquire filed two actions for his client,
Alexandre Konanykhine, Konanykhine v. Izvestia Newspapers, et al., At Law Number 97-1139, and Konanykhine v.
Kommersant Publishing House, et al., At Law Number 97-1206, in the Arlington
County Circuit Court, alleging defamation. Izvestia Newspapers (Izvestia)
was not represented by counsel. Kommersant Publishing (Kommersant) was
represented by Mays &

3.
In June of 1998, the Respondent entered his appearance in the Izvestia case
as counsel for one of the defendants, Vladimir Nadeine, whose article in the
Izvestia newspapers allegedly defamed Mr. Konanykhine. The Respondent
filed an answer to Mr. Konanykhine’s motion for judgment and requests
for admissions.

4.
In November of 1999, Mr. Szymkowicz served requests for discovery on Mr. Nadeine.
Mr. Nadeine’s deposition was scheduled for November 17, 1999, but did
not occur. Mr. Szymkowicz filed a motion to compel Mr. Nadeine’s
response to the discovery requests and on December 3, 1999, the Court granted
the motion. On December 9, 1999, only four days before the trial, the
Respondent filed Mr. Nadeine’s answers to the discovery request.
On December 10, 1999, by agreement between Mr. Symkowicz and the Respondent,
Mr. Nadeine was dismissed without prejudice as a defendant in the Izvestia
case. On December 21, 1999, despite this dismissal and the fact that
the December motion to compel had been issued against Mr. Nadeine, the Respondent’s
own client, the Respondent filed two motions for sanctions against Mr. Konanykhine.
These motions were dismissed.

5.
On December 13, 1999, the jury found in favor of the Plaintiff, Mr. Konanykhine,
in the Izvestia case and awarded him a judgment of $33,500,000.00. Judge
William T. Newman entered the final order in the case on December 16, 1999.
On December 13, 1999, during the trial in the Izvestia case (during which
no counsel appeared on behalf of Izvestia), the Respondent made an oral motion
for amicus curiae involvement, in full
view and hearing of the jury, on behalf of Mr. Nadeine, even though Mr. Nadeine
had been dismissed from the case.

6. Also on December 13, 1999, the Respondent filed a motion for judgment

against
Mr. Konanykhine on behalf of Mr. Nadeine, alleging that Mr. Konanykhine had
induced Mr. Nadeine to publish his article about Mr. Konanykhine, for which
Mr. Konanykhine had always intended to file the defamation suit against Mr.
Nadeine. The motion included claims for

7.
On December 18, 1999, Mr. Szymkowicz wrote to the Respondent, requesting that
he dismiss Mr. Nadeine’s suit against Mr. Konanykhine because, as presented,
the case did not state facts upon which relief could be granted. On
December 21, 1999, and again on December 26, 1999, the Respondent wrote to
Mr. Symkowicz to offer terms of settlement and mutual releases of all claims.

8.
On December 28, 1999, Mr. Szymkowicz, on behalf of Mr. Konanykhine, filed
a demurrer, plea in bar, motion for bill of particulars, counterclaim and
motion for sanctions in Mr. Nadeine’s case against Mr. Konanykhine.

9.
On December 23, 1999, even though his client Mr. Nadeine had been dismissed
from the case, and even though the Respondent had been present for at least
a portion of the trial, the Respondent filed a motion to disclose the identity
of the court reporter who had recorded the Izvestia trial on December 13,
1999. On December 30, 1999, and January 3, 2000, the

Respondent
wrote to Mr. Szymkowicz demanding clarification of “questionable statements”
that Mr. Konanykhine made during the Izvestia trial. On January 4, 2000,
Mr. Szymkowicz wrote to the Respondent that his client would not comment on
the Respondent’s allegations.

10.
On January 5, 2000, the Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Izvestia judgment, supposedly on behalf of Mr. Nadeine, even though Mr. Nadeine
had been dismissed as a defendant in the suit by the Court. The Respondent
also wrote to Mr. Szymkowicz informing him that if Mr. Konanykhine paid Mr.
Nadeine $475,000.00, he and Mr. Nadeine would release both Mr. Konanykhine
and Mr. Szymkowicz from liability, even though Mr. Szymkowicz was not a party
to the suit. The Respondent also stated that he was ninety-five to ninety-nine
percent sure that the Court would grant his motion to revoke the judgment
in favor of Mr. Konanykhine, and possibly would dismiss the suit with prejudice.
On or about January 10, 2000, Mr. Nadeine terminated the Respondent’s
legal services. On January 13, 2000, after the Clerk’s Office
had closed, the Respondent attempted to remove his motions from the Court’s
January 14, 2000 docket, but without success. He also filed a motion
to withdraw as counsel for Mr. Nadeine in Mr. Nadeine’s suit against
Mr. Konanykhine. On January 14, 2000, Mr. Szymkowicz appeared to argue
the motions. The Respondent did not appear. The court sanctioned
the Respondent and his client $1,000.00 for filing the motions. However,
these sanctions were later rescinded.

11.
Also on January 14, 2000, the Respondent filed a notice of appeal on behalf
of Izvestia after receiving a telephone message from Izvestia. On that
same day, Mark MacDougall, Esquire, of the firm Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer
& Field, LLP, called Mr. Szymkowicz and informed him that his firm represented
Izvestia in its appeal of the verdict. At a later time, Mr. Mcdougall
did state the Respondent had been briefly retained by Isvestia, and then replaced
his firm.

12.
Also on January 14, 2000, Mr. Nadeine faxed a letter to Mr. Szymkowicz, informing
him that as of January 10, 2000, he had released the Respondent as his counsel
in his suit against Mr. Konanykhine, and that he would be representing himself
until he found new counsel. Mr. Nadeine stated he would also seek reconsideration
of several motions which the Respondent had filed in the suit against Mr.
Konanykhine. On January 20, 2000, the Court entered the order allowing
the Respondent’s withdrawal as counsel for Mr. Nadeine. By a formal
agreement dated January 26, 2000, Mr. Nadeine rehired the Respondent.
Prior to that date, on January 14, 200, Mr. Nadeine contacted the Respondent
to apologize for terminating his services and began the process of rehiring
him.

13.
On January 19, 2000, the Akin Gump firm filed a notice of appeal of the Izvestia
verdict, without mentioning the notice of appeal previously filed by the Respondent.
Akin Gump filed the notice of appeal one day too late. Subsequently,
the Akin Gump firm relied upon the notice of appeal filed by the Respondent
in pursuing the appeal.

14.
The trial in Mr. Konanykhine’s suit against Kommersant Publishing began
on January 19, 2000. That morning, the Respondent entered his appearance
as counsel for Kommersant, having been retained by the company just that morning.
At the trial, the jury found in favor of Mr. Konanykhine and awarded him $3,000,000.00,
less than the $200,000,000.00 requested.

15.
By second facsimile letter, Mr. Nadeine informed Mr. Szymkowicz that the Respondent’s
representation of him had ended in the Izvestia case when Mr. Nadeine was
dismissed from the Izvestia case, noting that the dismissal was without his
knowledge or consent. Mr. Nadeine also requested copies of the motions
that the Respondent had supposedly filed on Mr. Nadeine’s behalf in
the Izvestia case, without Mr. Nadeine’s consent. Later, Mr. Nadeine
contradicted these assertions.

16.
On January 28, 2000, Mr. Szymkowicz filed a motion to strike the notice of
appeal of the Izvestia verdict and the pleadings in the suit against Mr. Konanykhine
filed by the Respondent, but the court denied his motion. On February
10, 2000, the Respondent filed a

motion
to withdraw as counsel for Izvestia, with the Akin Gump firm entering its
appearance as substitute counsel.

17.
On January 31, 2000, the Respondent filed a demurrer in Mr. Nadeine’s
case against Mr. Konanykhine. In this demurrer, he attempted to use
the fact that the statute of limitations had run as a defense to Mr. Konanykhine’s
claims. Under § 8.01-235 of the Code of Virginia, this defense
cannot be established by a demurrer. On February 9, 2000, the Respondent
filed a Response to Mr. Konanykhine’s motion to strike his pleadings,
including an affidavit from Mr. Nadeine confirming and ratifying the pleadings
filed by the Respondent.

18.
On March 2, 2000, on behalf of Mr. Konanykhine, Mr. Szymkowicz served a first
consolidated discovery request on Mr. Nadeine, through the Respondent, in
the suit against Mr. Konanykhine. On March 23, 2000, the Respondent
served his client’s response to the request. In the response,
Mr. Nadeine refused to respond to all eighteen interrogatories propounded.
On March 24, 2000, Mr. Szymkowicz filed a motion to compel Mr. Nadeine’s
responses to discovery. On March 31, 2000, the Court granted the motion
and gave Mr. Nadeine seventeen days to file a proper response. On April
17, 2000, the Respondent filed a second response to interrogatories for Mr.
Nadeine without Mr. Nadeine’s signature under oath as required by Rule
4:8 of the Rules of Virginia Supreme Court. On May 17, 2000,
Mr. Szymkowicz filed a second motion to compel, which was set for hearing
on May 26, 2000. The Respondent failed to appear at that hearing and
the Court sanctioned him $1,050.00.

19.
The Respondent filed a notice of appeal of the Kommersant verdict. Mr.
Szymkowicz filed a motion for a protective order to prevent the filing of
the Kommersant trial transcript. The motion was scheduled for hearing
on March 31, 2000, but the Court did not hear arguments that day. The transcript
was filed on March 31, 2000. The Respondent did not file a petition
for appeal of the Kommersant verdict by the May 12, 2000 deadline. The
Respondent states that he did not do so because the Isvestia judgment was
vacated on March 10, 2000.

20.
On June 13, 2000, the Court dismissed with prejudice Mr. Nadeine’s claims
of fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference
with a contract against Mr. Konanykhine, and the malicious prosecution claim
without prejudice. The Court sanctioned the Respondent and Mr. Nadeine
$5,000.00 for filing the claims.

21.
In a deposition on June 23, 2000, Mr. Nadeine said that he had no knowledge
that his claims against Mr. Konanykhine had been dismissed on June 13, 2000.
Also on June 23, 2000, the Respondent filed a motion for sanctions in Mr.
Nadeine’s suit against Mr. Konanykhine. The Respondent also filed
an amended motion for judgement in the case which contained only the claim
of malicious prosecution. On July 28, 2000, the Court granted Mr. Konanykhine’s
demurrer, dismissed the case, and awarded $22,680.61 in sanctions against
the Respondent. The Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied on August 11, 2000. The Court again sanctioned the Respondent,
in the amount of $2,000.00. On August 31, 2000, the Court found the
Respondent in contempt of court for his failure to pay any of these sanctions.
The Respondent states that the order requiring him to pay sanctions had no
date by which the payments were due.

22.
The Respondent filed a notice of appeal of the dismissal of the case against
Mr. Konanykhine. He filed his statement of facts for appeal on September
25, 2000, after the statutory due date had passed. By order entered
October 13, 2000, the Court ruled that the

Respondent’s
statement of facts for appeal, in addition to being untimely filed, was incomplete,
and struck it from the record.

23.
By order entered November 9, 2000, Judge Newman found the Respondent in contempt
of court.

24.
On November 27, 2000, the Respondent filed a motion to vacate the November
9, 2000 order of contempt. By opinion dated September 25, 2001, the
Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the contempt order of November 9,
2000. The Respondent then attempted to appeal the Virginia Court of
Appeals ruling to the Virginia Supreme Court. His petition for appeal
was denied certiorari. The Respondent then filed a petition for
rehearing which was denied by order entered June 7, 2002.

Virginia
State Bar Docket Number 01-052-0361

25.
In 1996, the Complainant, Thomas F. Koerner, Jr., Esq., filed a libel action
on behalf of his client, Zahid Hameedi, against a publication, the Urdu
Times, in the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Hameedi
v. Urdu Times, Inc., et al., At Law 96-765. On or about June 18,

1999,
the Respondent, counsel for the defendants, filed a motion to have the case
dismissed, with the consent of Mr. Hameedi. The agreed consent order
reserved the issue of attorney’s fees for later consideration.

26.
On June 25, 1999, Judge William T. Newman, Jr. heard arguments by counsel
on the Respondent’s motion for attorney’s fees and then denied
the motion. However, the judge did not direct either counsel to prepare
an order, and did not enter an order of his own.

27.
On August 12, 1999, Judge Benjamin Kendrick entered the consent order, signed
by both parties, dismissing the case, and reserving the the issue of attorneys
fees for later consideration. On August 17, 1999, Judge Kendrick entered
another order, prepared by the Respondent and filed by the Respondent with
the original motion, which order dismissed the case but granted the Respondent’s
motion for attorneys’s fee for his client in the amount of $1,870.00.
The Complainant had not signed that order. On September 30, 1999, the
Respondent faxed the Complainant a letter regarding the attorney’s fees
ordered by Judge Kendrick. After nearly a year had passed without any action
by opposing counsel, on August 10, 2000, the Respondent faxed the Complainant
another letter demanding payment of the attorney’s fees. On September
22, 2000, the Complainant filed a motion to vacate Judge Kendrick’s
order of August 17, 1999 and enter Judge Newman’s original ruling of
June 25, 1999, on the basis of a clerical error.

28.
On October 6, 2000, the Complainant’s motion was heard. Judge
Kendrick vacated and set aside his order of August 17, 1999.

29.
The Respondent appealed the order of October 6, 2000 to the Virginia Supreme
Court, claiming that Judge Kendrick lacked jurisdiction to set aside the order
he entered on August 17, 1999 granting attorney’s fees. During
oral argument, a Supreme Court justice asked the Respondent if he had had
an obligation to be honest and candid with Judge Kendrick. The Supreme
Court determined that Judge Kendrick did have jurisdiction to set aside the
order granting attorney’s fees because of a clerical error. The
Court affirmed Judge Kendrick’s vacation of his August 17, 1999 order
on the basis of a clerical error only. The Court noted that it was troubled
by the position the Respondent took before Judge Kendrick.

Charges
Certified to the Disciplinary Board

The Subcommittee
Certification charged the Respondent with the following ethical violations
from the Disciplinary Rules and analogous Rules of Professional Conduct for
the conduct that occurred in 2000 and thereafter:

DR 1‑102. Misconduct.

(A)
A lawyer shall not:

(3)
Commit a crime or other deliberately wrongful act that reflects adversely
on the lawyer's fitness to practice law.

(4)
Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation
which reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness to practice law.

DR 6‑101. Competence
and Promptness.

(A)
A lawyer shall undertake representation only in matters in which:

(1)
The lawyer can act with competence and demonstrate the specific legal knowledge,
skill, efficiency, and thoroughness in preparation employed in acceptable
practice by lawyers undertaking similar matters, or

(2)
The lawyer has associated with another lawyer who is competent in those matters.

(B)
A lawyer shall attend promptly to matters undertaken for a client until completed
or until the lawyer has properly and completely withdrawn from representing
the client.

(C)
A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about matters in which the
lawyer's services are being rendered.

(D)
A lawyer shall inform his client of facts pertinent to the matter and of communications
from another party that may significantly affect settlement or resolution
of the matter.

DR 7‑102. Representing
a Client Within the Bounds of the Law.

(A)
In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:

(1)
File a suit, initiate criminal charges, assert a position, conduct a defense,
delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows
or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously
injure another.

(2)
Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law,
except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law.

(3)
Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to
reveal.

(a)
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
a client.

(b)
A lawyer shall not intentionally fail to carry out a contract of employment
entered into with a client for professional services, but may withdraw as
permitted under Rule 1.16.

(c)
A lawyer shall not intentionally prejudice or damage a client during the course
of the professional relationship, except as required or permitted under Rule
1.6 and Rule 3.3.

RULE 1.4 Communication

(a)
A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter
and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.

(b)
A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

(c)
A lawyer shall inform the client of facts pertinent to the matter and of communications
from another party that may significantly affect settlement or resolution
of the matter.

RULE 3.1 Meritorious
Claims And Contentions

A lawyer shall not bring or defend
a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument
for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the
defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that
could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as
to require that every element of the case be established.

RULE 3.4 Fairness To
Opposing Party And Counsel

A lawyer shall not:

(i)
File a suit, initiate criminal charges, assert a position, conduct a defense,
delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of the client when the lawyer
knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass
or maliciously injure another.

RULE 8.4 Misconduct

It is professional misconduct for
a lawyer to:

(b)
commit a criminal or deliberately wrongful act that reflects adversely on
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer;

Disciplinary Rule Findings

After hearing the testimony present, the arguments of the Bar and the Respondent,
and having considered the stipulations entered into by the parties and the
documentary evidence presented, as well as the Rules of Court, statutes and
calendars of which the Board took judicial notice, the Board makes the following
findings:

VSB
Docket No. 01-052-0361 (aka “the Koerner matter”)

In VSB Docket No. 01-052-0361 (aka “the Koerner matter”), the
Board finds that the Bar failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that Mr. Konan had violated DR 7-102(A)(1) and Rule 3.4. The Board further
finds, however, that the Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that
Mr. Konan violated DR 1-102(A)(3) and (4) prior to 1999 and analogous Rule
8.4 for the period when the Rules of Professional Conduct were effective in
2000.

While basing its decision upon all the evidence adduced in this matter at
the hearing, as well as the documentary evidence, the Board was particularly
influenced in the Koerner matter by the fact that the Respondent pursued collection
of the attorneys’ fees supposedly awarded by Judge Newman when he knew
or should have known that the Order awarding the attorneys’ fees had
been entered in error. His client’s motion for attorneys’
fees had previously been denied by one judge. (Stipulation ¶ 26.)
The case had already been dismissed, yet the order granting the attorneys’
fees referred again to dismissal of the action. (VSB Exhibits 81 and
82.) In addition, Mr. Konan had done nothing to bring on for hearing
the issue of the attorneys’ fees such as a motion for reconsideration.
There were no endorsement of the sketch order by plaintiff’s counsel,
nor was there a recitation in the order that the court was dispensing with
endorsement as was required by the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
(VSB Exhibit 82.)

Mr. Konan
tried to excuse his actions in pursing collection of the $1870 by saying that
his initial fax to the plaintiff’s counsel simply asked him how he or
his client plans to “handle this.” (VSB Exhibit 83.)
This disingenuous explanation is belied, however, by the testimony of Mr.
Koerner in which he described their subsequent telephone conversation as involving
a demand by Mr. Konan to pay the attorneys’ fees. It is also belied
by the subsequent written communication from Mr. Konan in which he stated
that “I wrote to you about this needed payment last year, but we still
have not received any payment or payment plan….” (VSB Exhibit
84.)

After
plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion to vacate the order awarding attorneys’
fees, Mr. Konan further engaged in unethical conduct by failing to disclose
in his response the salient fact that one judge had already denied the request
for attorneys’ fees. (VSB Exhibit 87.) After the order was
vacated (VSB Exhibit 85), Mr. Konan pursued the matter by appealing the decision
to the Virginia Supreme Court. When asked by one of the justices of
the Supreme Court whether he owed a duty of candor to the circuit court judge
regarding the denial of the request of attorneys’ fees (having failed
to mention it in his argument), Mr. Konan responded that his duty was to his
client. This evidence was presented through the testimony of Mr. Koerner
and was unrebutted by Mr. Konan. The Supreme Court commented in its
order that it was “troubled by the position taken by counsel before
that court.” (VSB Exhibit 90.)

The Board
felt that the conduct proven by the Bar in connection with the Koerner matter
was egregious and was a violation of DR 6-102(A)(3) and (4) in that it was
a deliberately wrongful act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness
to practice law, as well as being deceitful.

VSB
Docket No. 00-052-3465 (aka “the Szymkowicz matter”

or
“Russian newspaper cases”)

In VSB Docket No. 00-052-3465 (aka “the Szymkowicz matter” or
“Russian newspaper cases”), the Board finds that the Bar failed
to prove violations of DR 7-102(A)(1) and Rule 3.4, but finds that the Bar
proved violations of the following rules by clear and convincing evidence:
DR 1-102(A)(3) and (4) and analogous Rule 8.4 covering the conduct occurring
subsequent to adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct; DR 6-101 and
analogous Rules 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4; and DR 7-102(A)(2), (3), and (5), and analogous
Rule 3.1.

While basing its decision upon all the evidence adduced in this matter at
the hearing, as well as the documentary evidence, the Board was persuaded
that Mr. Konan had engaged in violations of these disciplinary rules by his
pattern and practice of forging ahead with positions that were not well based
in law or fact. For instance, after his client, Mr. Nadeine had been
dismissed from a lawsuit brought by Alexandre Konanykhine against Izvestia
Newspapers and Mr. Nadeine (hereinafter the “Izvestia
lawsuit”), Mr. Konan appeared in court during the trial and asked the
court to permit him to participate as an amicus curiae.
His brief filed in support of that motion (VSB Exhibit 14) referred to Rule
5:30 of the Rules of the Supreme Court as the predicate for this action.
Even at the time of the Disciplinary Board hearing, Mr. Konan testified that
Supreme Court Rule 5:30 was the basis for filing an amicus curiae brief
in circuit court. When it was pointed out to him that Rule 5:30 dealt
with procedure for amicus curiae in
the Supreme Court, Mr. Konan then resorted to arguing that there was no authority
that established he could not request the trial court’s permission to
appear as an amicus curiae.

Another example of Mr. Konan’s ill founded and vexatious actions was
his filing a motion for sanctions in the Izvestia lawsuit, again after
his client had been dismissed, seeking an award of attorneys’ fees and
expenses incurred in defense of that matter amounting to $6,315. (VSB
Exhibit 18.) One of the bases of the motion for sanctions was that Mr.
Konanykhine was in contempt of court for refusing to sit for deposition as
ordered by the court. (Id.) There was no order requiring
Mr. Konanykhine to sit for deposition. There was no order finding that
Mr. Konanykhine was in contempt of court. There was an order that required
Mr. Konan’s client, Mr. Nadeine, to sit for depositions, “when
both Plaintiff and Defendant Nadeine can be present, no later than Friday,
December 10, 1999.” (VSB Exhibit 12.)

Mr. Konan
also filed a motion to disclose the identity of the court reporter who transcribed
the Izvestia trial (VSB Exhibit 19) after his client had been dismissed
from the case. The motion for sanctions and the motion to disclose the
identity of the court reporter, as well as two other motions filed by Mr.
Konan seeking to overturn the Izvestia judgment (VSB Exhibit 25), although
he was not representing any party in the litigation at that time, were denied
by the court. (VSB Exhibit 30.)

Mr. Konan’s
services were terminated by his client, Mr. Nadeine in January of 1999.
(VSB Exhibit 14.) Mr. Szymkowicz, Mr. Konanykhine’s attorney,
received a fax from Mr. Nadeine on January 14, 2000, notifying him of this
fact. (VSB Exhibit 28.) In this fax, Mr. Nadeine stated that he
would seek reconsideration of several recent legal motions, “launched
by my former attorney without my knowledge and approval.” Mr.
Konan pointed to an affidavit attached to his answer to the Symkowicz complaint
as being proof that Mr. Nadeine was lying when he made the statement that
he (Mr. Konan) had acted without authorization. Upon further questioning
of Mr. Konan by the Board, it was clear that the affidavit in the Disciplinary
Board’s file attached to the answer was not executed by Mr. Nadeine,
although Mr. Konan indicated that an executed copy of the affidavit was included
in the materials as an exhibit. Later in the hearing, Mr. Nadeine pointed
to VSB Exhibit 44 as being the same affidavit. However, that affidavit,
while similar in content is dated February 8, 2000, as opposed to the affidavit
attached to the answer, which is dated February 4, 2000. Mr. Konan frankly
admitted that he drafted the affidavit, which the Board felt was a self-serving
document. The Board is of the opinion that the earlier fax by Mr. Nadeine
was a more reliable indicator of what had actually transpired at the time.
This conclusion is bolstered by another memorandum from Mr. Nadeine, albeit
undated, in which he states “his duty to represent me was terminated
after he agreed to my dismissal from the hearing KONANYKHINE v. IZVESTIA without
my knowledge and approval.” (VSB Exhibit 34.) Mr. Nadeine
further stated, “As for this time, Mr. Konanykhine failed to provide
me with documents pertaining to all the Motions made upon my name after December
15, 1999.” Mr. Symkowicz testified that he believed Mr. Nadeine
had mistakenly referred to Mr. Konanykhine in this sentence, when he meant
to refer to Mr. Konan, because Mr. Konanykhine, Mr. Symkowicz’s client,
had never provided Mr. Nadeine with any documents.

Mr. Konan also filed a motion for judgment against Mr. Konanykhine on behalf
of Mr. Nadeine for “Fraud, Malicious Lawsuit, Interference with Contract
Business and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.” (VSB
Exhibit 15.) Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Szymkowicz, wrote
to Mr. Konan and asked that the lawsuit be dismissed as not properly founded
in law or fact. (VSB Exhibit 16.) Mr. Konan’s response to
this letter was to write and demand $725,000 from Mr. Konanykhine (VSB Exhibit
17), which demand was later reduced to $475000. (VSB Exhibit 25.)
Mr. Szymkowicz testified that he felt these letters were basically extortion
attempts on the part of Mr. Konan, in that the lawsuit filed on Mr. Nadeine’s
behalf was not well based in fact or law and the letters referred to dismissal
of Mr. Konan’s claims against he and his client, when there were no
such claims pending or asserted.

Another example of Mr. Konan engaging in wrongful conduct by playing fast
and loose with the truth is demonstrated by an order entered by the Arlington
County Circuit Court on March 13, 2000, granting Mr. Konanykhine’s motion
to strike statements which falsely claimed that he had violated a court order.
(VSB Exhibit 47.) The statements were made by Mr. Konan in pleadings
filed on behalf of Mr. Nadeine, the plaintiff in that lawsuit.

After
filing the lawsuit against Mr. Konanykhine on behalf of Mr. Nadeine, Mr. Konan
failed to follow through in answering discovery propounded by the defendant.
Because of this, the defendant was forced to file a motion to compel.
That motion was granted on March 31, 2000. (VSB Exhibit 48.) Mr.
Konan then failed to comply with the court’s order of March 31, 2000,
which resulted in the court entering a further order on May 26, 2000, granting
a second motion to compel and sanctioning Mr. Konan and his client $1,050.
(VSB Exhibit 49.) No testimony or explanation was provided by Mr. Konan
at the hearing before the Disciplinary Board explaining why the failure to
comply with the first order granting the motion to compel was anything but
the result of incompetence on his part.

Meanwhile,
Mr. Konanykhine had filed responsive pleadings to the Nadeine lawsuit, seeking
to have it dismissed for failure to state a claim and other reasons.
(VSB Exhibit 21.) The Nadeine lawsuit against Mr. Konanykhine was dismissed
by the court on June 13, 2000, although Mr. Konan was permitted to amend the
“Malicious Lawsuit” count if he could plead sufficient facts to
state a claim. (VSB Exhibit 51.) The court awarded $5,000 to Mr.
Konanykhine for attorneys’ fees against Mr. Konan and his client for
having to defend against a motion for judgment which had been filed without
any basis in fact or law. (Id.) Mr. Konan did file an Amended
Motion for Judgment, but it was also dismissed, and the court awarded $22,680.61
against Mr. Konan alone for filing pleadings “which were not well grounded
in fact or warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law in violation of Va. Code § 8.01-271.1.”
(VSB Exhibit 55.) After Mr. Konan filed a motion for reconsideration
of the issue of the sanctions awarded (VSB Exhibit 56), the court denied
the motion and awarded Mr. Konanykhine an additional $2,000 in sanctions from
Mr. Konan, finding that the motion for reconsideration was also in violation
of Va. Code § 8.01-271.1.

Mr. Konan
failed to pay the sanctions awarded against him to Mr. Konanykhine in a timely
fashion. After a hearing in which it was found that he had failed to
establish an inability to pay the sanctions, Mr. Konan was found to be in
contempt of court. (VSB Exhibit 62.) After Mr. Konan promised
to post bond to appeal the sanctions awards, but failed to do so, he was then
found to have willfully attempted to mislead the court in a filing in connection
with an appeal of the award of sanctions, and the contempt and sanctions awards
were reinstated. (VSB Exhibit 68.) Appeals of the court’s
orders resulted in the orders being affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court.
(VSB Exhibits 70-76.)

Mr. Konan
defended his actions in the Nadeine v. Konanykhine case, including
the actions that resulted in the five orders assessing sanctions against him
and being held in contempt of court, as justified and appropriate, on the
basis that they were undertaken in defense of his clients. He expressed
no remorse for his conduct during the liability phase of the hearing for his
actions.

Another
defamation lawsuit brought by Mr. Konanykhine against Kommersant Publishing
was defended by Mr. Konan, who was hired at the last moment before trial.
A 3 million dollar judgment resulted, which Mr. Konan was supposed to appeal.
The appeal was dismissed because the transcript was not timely filed.
Mr. Konan claimed that he did not file the transcript because his client had
decided not to pursue the appeal, but this argument simply does not make sense
because the transcript was filed, albeit late.

The facts
discussed above are examples of the conduct engaged in by Mr. Konan.
There was additional testimony and documentary evidence of similar behavior.
It was the totality of the evidence, as established by the testimony and the
documentary evidence, that persuaded the Board that Mr. Konan had engaged
in a pattern and practice of ill founded and vexatious litigation, and that
he did not consider himself bound by any duty of truthfulness. He played
fast and loose with the truth in his factual representations to the court,
as well as in his legal pleadings, irrespective of whether they were well
based in law or fact.

After
the Board made its finding that Mr. Konan had violated the disciplinary rules
set forth above, it learned of his disciplinary record. Upon finding
that Mr. Konan had been found guilty of similar behavior in another matter
and received a public reprimand (in addition to a private reprimand in another
matter) and after hearing Mr. Konanykhine testify of the impact Mr. Konan’s
actions had upon him, as well as Mr. Konan’s testimony during the sanctions
phase, the Board voted to revoke Mr. Konan’s license to practice law,
feeling that he was a danger to the integrity of the legal system in Virginia.

ACCORDINGLY
IT IS ORDERED that the license of Raymond William Konan be, and the same is
hereby REVOKED effective June 27, 2003. It is further ORDERED that,
as directed in the Board’s June 27, 2003, Summary Order in this matter,
Respondent must comply with the requirements of Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph
13.M, of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. All issues concerning
the adequacy of the notice and arrangements required by the Summary Order
shall be determined by the Board.

It is
further ORDERED that costs shall be assessed against the Respondent in accordance
with the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph
13.B.8.c, and the Respondent shall comply therewith.

It is
FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Disciplinary System forward a copy of
this order to the Respondent, by certified mail, at his address of record
with the Virginia State Bar, and to Noel Sengel, Senior Assistant Bar Counsel,
100 N. Pitt St., Suite 310, Alexandria, VA 22314.