A summary of the challenges related to the enterprise goals and decision making processare presented in Figure 6-8.Monitor/ManageFigure 6-8 Summary of challenges related to enterprise goals and decision making process6.7.2 DESIGN PROCESS FOR AIRCRAFT AND CORPORATE CULTUREThe decision making process for technical decisions has increased the difficulty indesigning flexibility in systems. Multiple interviewees described the design process forincluding new technologies in planes as a bottom-up decision making process. Duringthe course of a program, if a new technology is seen as being beneficial to a program, thedecision can then be made to add it into the program. If other programs then find thetechnology of use, it could also find its way into other programs, either new programs orongoing programs. If not, the new technology may not be used for other programs in thefuture. For example, the change to a two-person forward-facing cockpit design was madeon the 767 and 757 programs. Due to the perceived benefits of this layout, otherprograms latter adopted a similar concept of two-person forward-facing cockpits for theirprograms. However, unlike in AI planes where cockpits are shared across families toreduce the training and operating costs for airlines, only the 767 and 757 shared a similarcockpit layout in the BCA families.An example of where technologies may not be adopted across-programs are between the787 and forthcoming 737 programs. While a large investment in composite technologieswere made for the 787 program, its benefit to a new 737 program are not likely to beimmediately realized. This is because many 737 operators are low-cost carriers, such asSouthwest Airlines, who maintain a low-cost business model in part by reducing250

operating and maintenance costs by only operating one type of plane. For thesecustomers who buy in bulk because they only operate a limited number of plane models,a switchover to a new technology such as composites replacing aluminum, createsadditional costs that should be postponed for as long as possible. As a result, pressure isapplied to forgo the use of composites in the plane, despite the large buildup of costsnecessary to build the 787 out of composites.This illustrates a problem with respect to flexibility in the bottom-up design process.While this process creates increased opportunity to innovate at the program level, it cancreate unnecessary duplication and waste between programs. This is because similartechnologies and designs have to be redone to fit other programs, such as the need toredesign the two person cockpit for the 737 program. Without increased top downguidance, it is difficult to make good judgments about what options to include in a plane.In some cases, such as the forward-facing cockpit, the technology was picked up in otherprograms and it would have been worthwhile to have designed a cockpit that could betransferred to other planes without the need for redesign. This would have entailedadditional design costs up-front for the initial plane, but would have reduced overall costsfor design as the cockpit could be used in subsequent planes. In other cases, such as theuse of composites on the 787, with additional top-down direction the large increase in useof composites may not have occurred, as looking out to the next program it could havebeen seen that there was significant customer pushback over such a large switch intechnologies.The culture of the decision making process and goals for programs has not aligned wellwith the constraints posed by real options. Designing real options into a system requiresthat critical uncertainties be identified early in the design process and design solutionsidentified for the system that can be exercised in the future, dependant on the resolutionof the uncertainty. In practice, a range of potential outcomes for the system can berealized, depending on if and when the option is exercised, but this range may beconstrained early in the process. While the presence of options may present futureprogram managers the opportunity to take advantage of previous option purchases, theseoptions can also present a constraint. For a company whose culture is pushing theperformance enveloped to offer the latest technology, the constraint from optionsenvisioned in the past with older technology may present a design constrain that isundesirable. As one interviewee put it, the result is that the option may be purchased, butthen never exercised in the future, as some new technology consistently is available thatmakes the prior option obsolete.A summary of the enterprise architecture and culture challenges are presented in Figure6-9.251