What it really takes for a US-Iran deal

Pepe Escobar is an independent geopolitical analyst. He writes for RT, Sputnik and TomDispatch, and is a frequent contributor to websites and radio and TV shows ranging from the US to East Asia. He is the former roving correspondent for Asia Times Online. Born in Brazil, he's been a foreign correspondent since 1985, and has lived in London, Paris, Milan, Los Angeles, Washington, Bangkok and Hong Kong. Even before 9/11 he specialized in covering the arc from the Middle East to Central and East Asia, with an emphasis on Big Power geopolitics and energy wars. He is the author of "Globalistan" (2007), "Red Zone Blues" (2007), "Obama does Globalistan" (2009) and "Empire of Chaos" (2014), all published by Nimble Books. His latest book is "2030", also by Nimble Books, out in December 2015.

U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman (L-3rd L) meet with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (2nd R) at a hotel in Vienna, Austria June 28, 2015 (Reuters / Carlos Barria) / Reuters

Forget the mad spinning. Here it is, in a nutshell, what it really takes for Iran and the P5+1 to clinch a game-changing nuclear deal before the new July 7 deadline.

Iran and the P5+1 agreed in Lausanne on a “comprehensive plan
of action,” taking into account delicate constitutional
considerations in both the US and Iran. A crucial part of the
plan is the mechanism to get rid of sanctions. Lausanne – and now
Vienna – is not a treaty; it’s an action plan. There will be a
declaration when a deal is reached. But there won’t be a signing
ceremony.

The next important step is what happens at the UN Security
Council (UNSC). All the concerned parties at the UNSC will
endorse a declaration, and a resolution - which is still being
negotiated – will render null and void all previous sanctions
resolutions.

As it stands, all the parties – except the US government – want
to go to the UNSC as soon as possible. Washington remains, at
best, reticent.

Iranian negotiators have made it very clear at the table that
Tehran will start implementing its nuclear restriction
commitments - removal of a number of centrifuges, removal of the
core of Arak’s reactor, disposal of uranium stock, etc. -
immediately. The IAEA will be constantly checking Iran has
complied with an extensive list.

But it has to be a parallel process; the US and the EU must for
their part and “take physical action”, tackling the complex
mechanism of lifting all economic sanctions. Once again; a UNSC
signature instantly erases all previous sanctions.

And here is something crucial; all of this has been agreed in
Lausanne. The work must be simultaneous, as stressed, in tandem,
by Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and EU
representative Federica Mogherini.

Those fateful parameters

Meanwhile, we have the media centrifuges spinning like mad, as I
described here. On the negotiating table, there are
still skirmishes related to the US desire in trying to “prove a
negative” – as in the “possible military dimensions” (PMD) of
Iran’s nuclear program.Logically, you don't need to be a
neo-Wittgenstein to see that’s impossible.

The deadline extension from June 30 to July 7 is mostly about
finding – rather, finding again - a “reasonable common narrative”
inbuilt in the Lausanne framework, and even before.

This means Washington should make the political decision to tone
down repeated attempts to introduce new demands. Iranian
officials admit, “we may have had disagreements on how we do
simultaneous work,” but that’s part of Lausanne. New demands are
not.

In Lausanne, US Secretary of State John Kerry and Foreign
Minister Zarif agreed on a “set of parameters” – after
excruciating nine hours of debate.They also agreed, crucially,
that both sides would refrain from humiliating one another
publicly.

The recent record shows that’s been the case – as far as
negotiators and diplomats are concerned. On the other hand, US
corporate media predictably has been wreaking the proverbial
havoc.

Which brings us to the clincher; Iranian negotiators have yet to
detect a readiness of the US government to really change the
“culture of sanctions” in the UNSC. And here a diplomatic
consensus emerges, involving, very significantly, Russia and
Germany; this agreement will be made - or broken - on one crucial
point; whether the Obama administration wants to lift the
sanctions or keep them.

Watch the BRICS front

The least one can say about what’s really happening in the Palais
Coburg since this past weekend is that the Obama administration’s
position is oscillating wildly. There seems to be – finally –
some movement on the American side in the sense they feel a
strategic interest in changing the situation.

That will depend, of course, on the Obama administration’s
evaluation of all factions operating in the Beltway
establishment. Diplomats in Vienna agree Kerry is personally
involved in trying to change the equation. So this means the ball
is really in the US court.

But all’s still murky; even oscillating wildly; the Americans
continue to entertain what an Iranian official described to me as
“buyer’s remorse” regarding what they agreed on Lausanne in the
first place.

Serious, key sticking points remain. The duration of the
sanctions; confidentiality issues – as in the US, especially,
respecting terms of access to Iranian military installations; and
what’s defined as “managed access” under certain conditions.

Also very crucial is the BRICS front at the P5+1. Neither China
nor Russia wants to see any exacerbation of tensions, in
Southwest Asia and beyond, because a deal is not clinched. The
bottom line; with their eye in the Big Picture – as in Eurasia
integration - both are committed to facilitate a deal.

Until next Tuesday, all remains in play. Obama has been spinning
he doesn’t want a “bad deal”. That’s not the issue. The issue is
Obama himself making the fateful political decision of abandoning
the weapon of choice of US foreign policy; sanctions. Has he got
what it takes to pull it off?

The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.