Considered and decided by Shumaker,
Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Ross, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

SHUMAKER, Judge

Relator
challenges respondents’ termination of her employment as a chemical-dependency
counselor. Because substantial evidence
supports respondents’ conclusion that relator violated a clear county policy,
we affirm.

FACTS

On
July 19, 2005, the Clay County Board of Commissioners terminated relator Sandra
J. Hanson from her employment by ClayCounty as a
chemical-dependency counselor on grounds that she violated a policy for
handling drugs and drug paraphernalia and that her performance appraisals
showed that she “displayed poor judgment in the areas of safety and application
of departmental policy.”

Hanson
contends that she did not violate any policy applicable to her, that there was
no just cause for her termination, and that substantial evidence does not
support a history of exercising poor judgment.

The
principal incident that resulted in Hanson’s termination occurred on June 2,
2005, the salient facts of which Hanson does not dispute. On that day, a child-protection social worker
notified Hanson that one of Hanson’s clients had tested positive for a
controlled substance. The client’s terms
of probation required that she be admitted to the county detoxification (detox)
unit, and Hanson accompanied her there.
During the intake process at detox, Hanson searched her client, as
required by detox policy, and found a syringe in her purse. The client told Hanson that the syringe
contained methamphetamine.

Under
detox policy, when a person to be admitted to the unit is found to have drugs,
law enforcement is to be notified.
Hanson did not notify law enforcement but rather left the detox unit and
placed the syringe in an unlocked desk drawer in her office. She commented to other employees that her
client did not need any more trouble with the law and that she would notify the
probation officer about the situation.

After
Hanson had left the detox unit, staff members searched the client and found
additional drugs. A staff member
notified Hanson and reminded her that law enforcement had to be called. Hanson then retrieved the syringe, returned
to the detox unit, and eventually surrendered the syringe and other drugs to
law enforcement.

The
county thereafter placed Hanson on administrative leave, conducted an
investigation, and held a “Loudermill hearing,” at which Hanson was present.

On
the basis of the investigation and hearing, the board of commissioners
concluded that Hanson violated county policy by failing to notify law
enforcement of the syringe and the methamphetamine and that “had it not been
for the discovery of the additional drugs by detox, you would not have informed
law enforcement of the syringe of methamphetamine originally taken from your
client.” The board further concluded
that Hanson’s conduct was “a substantial violation of Clay County Policy and
Procedure and significantly affected the rights, interests, and safety of the
public as well as other County employees.”
The board noted that Hanson said that she took the syringe because of
confidentiality concerns, but the board indicated that “[t]his statement was in
contrast to earlier statements you made in which you admitted you took the
methamphetamine to protect your client from any more trouble with the
law.” Finding that Hanson’s actions and
judgment demonstrated her unsuitability for her employment, the board
terminated her from her job. She seeks
certiorari review of this decision.

D E C I S I O N

In
terminating Hanson’s employment, the board of commissioners acted in a
quasi-judicial capacity, and our review of a quasi-judicial decision is limited
to determining whether it was unreasonable, arbitrary, fraudulent, oppressive,
an error of law, or unsupported by substantial evidence. Willis
v. County of Sherburne, 555 N.W.2d 277, 281 n.2 (Minn. 1996).

Hanson
contends that there was no just cause for her termination and that there was no
substantial evidence to support the board’s decision. ClayCounty policy provides
that an employee may be terminated only for just cause. Just cause for termination must relate to and
affect the administration of the employee’s office. Hagen v. State
Civil Serv. Bd., 282 Minn.
296, 299, 164 N.W.2d 629, 631 (1969).
Such cause must be substantial in nature and must directly affect the
public’s rights and interests. Id.at 299, 164 N.W.2d at 632. Furthermore, the cause must affect the
employee’s qualifications or ability to perform the duties of the job and must
show that the employee is not a fit and proper person to hold the job. Id.The
reason for dismissal must be shown by substantial evidence and must relate to
the manner in which the employee performs the duties of the job. Id.“Substantial
evidence” is such that might be accepted by a reasonable mind and adequate to
support a conclusion; is more than a scintilla of evidence; is more than just
some evidence or any evidence; and it is evidence considered in its
entirety. Cable Commc’ns v. Nor-West Cable Commc’ns P’ship, 356 N.W.2d 658,
668 (Minn.
1984).

On
review of an agency decision, the appellate court is to give deference to the
agency’s decision and presume that it is correct. Id.If
the agency engages in reasoned decision-making, the appellate court will affirm
even if it might have reached a contrary decision. Id. at 669.

ClayCounty
had a clear, written policy as to drugs found during the process of admitting a
person to the detox unit. Controlled
substances were to be confiscated and given to law-enforcement personnel but
“individual clients will not be implicated and names will be kept
confidential.” Hanson acknowledged that
she had been informed of the detox policies and procedures before June 2, 2005,
and had received manuals and other writings containing policies, procedures,
and pertinent additional information.

Hanson
argues that she was not a detox employee and was not trained as such and that there
was no specific written policy as to what she as a chemical-dependency
counselor was to do if she found drugs during a detox intake. She admits that she was “generally familiar
with Detox admission procedures.” Her
statement to detox employees that she was taking the syringe because her client
did not need further trouble with the law supports the inference that she was
familiar with the specific policy requiring notification of law enforcement and
that she had decided to ignore that policy to protect her client. She also acknowledged in an interview during
the investigation that she had in the past turned over items “like pipes” to
law enforcement when a client was being admitted to detox. This acknowledgment further supports the
inference that she knew that law enforcement was to be notified.

Hanson
contends that the board improperly based its decision on her failure to
disclose her client’s drug possession. The
board did not suggest that Hanson’s violation was her failure to reveal her
client’s drug possession but rather it was her “intentional and blatant
concealment of the drugs from law enforcement” that became part of the basis of
the board’s action. There is no evidence
that anyone suggested that Hanson had to disclose the identity of the possessor
of the syringe when she gave it to law enforcement. In fact, the policy clearly and expressly
protects the identity of the possessor.

Finally,
Hanson argues that there was no substantial evidence that her conduct
endangered co-workers or the public. But the board could reasonably infer from
undisputed facts that a syringe containing methamphetamine left in an unlocked
desk drawer, even if in Hanson’s own office, posed potential dangers of further
illegal possession, or misuse, or even an accidental puncture. Moreover, there is a general danger to the
public when unauthorized possession of controlled substances occurs. Although Hanson appears to assert a privilege
as a chemical-dependency counselor to control the disposition of a drug found
in a client’s possession, she fails to show that the law gives her the
discretion as to what disposition to make of such a drug. She stated to one of the interviewers that
she was going to report the matter to her client’s probation officer who would
have more leeway than law enforcement as to how to proceed. But county policy did not give her that
discretion.

Substantial
evidence supports the board’s conclusion that Hanson violated clear policy in a
substantial way respecting the disposition of the syringe and
methamphetamine. And, although the board
also based its decision on past performance appraisals, we have not considered
that basis because the board did not identify the particular issues that it had
in mind.