Author Archive

Last week, our colleague Dr. Istvan Aranyosi posted a discussion focusing on a comment made by Dr. Rachel McKinnon on a thread over at Daily Nous. Dr. Aranyosi’ post was not moderated in any way by any of the administrators of this blog. Whilst we, Dr. Sandrine Berges, and Dr. Serife Tekin, the authors of the present statement, believe in the benefits of some moderating in philosophy blogs, we also think that the political climate in Turkey is such that any attempt at moderating may come across as a form of censorship – a perception that we want to avoid. Nonetheless, as two of the four co-founders and administrators of this blog, we want to disassociate ourselves from the contents of Dr. Aranyosi’s post. It by no means reflects our position.

We invite the submission of extended abstracts by early career scholars (graduate students, post-docs, and untenured faculty) for individual paper presentations (limit 30 minutes). Submissions should include a 1,000 word abstract, a 1-2 page CV, and should be in .doc/.docx or .pdf format via email.Deadline: May 5, 2014

Summary: The goal of this conference is to address the crisis in psychiatric research and treatment by exploring the ways in which the mind-brain dualism can be overcome in contemporary psychiatry.

CFP:
Psychiatry’s aspirations as a branch of medicine are often in conflict with its aspirations as a branch of science. As a branch of medicine, it aims to clinically address the complaints of individuals with mental disorders, including the subjective, mental, and first- person aspects of psychopathology (such as feelings of worthlessness and hallucinations). As a branch of science, on the other hand, it targets the objective, embodied, and third-person correlates of mental distress (such as atypical brain mechanisms and behavioral anomalies). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the psychiatric taxonomy used in the US and increasingly around the world, has traditionally been employed to identify both the scientific and medical targets of psychiatry, as well as in the service of sociological, pedagogical, and forensic projects. In attempting to be everything for psychiatry, however, the manual has succeeded in fully pleasing no one. The virtually universal dissatisfaction with contemporary nosology has led to a tension between critics who argue the way forward is focusing on the needs of the clinic and those who believe psychiatry should work harder to resemble the sciences.

We believe that the resolution of this dilemma is hindered by a contemporary form of dualism, in which psychiatric disorders are seen as either disembodied problems in living or as subtypes of somatic disease. There is a tendency to perceive the etiology of psychiatric disorders as either brain-based (organic or biological), to be investigated by the biomedical sciences, or mind-based (functional or psychological), to be investigated by behavior-based schemas such as the DSM or patient-centered approaches that take a more holistic approach to disorder. There is also a tendency to divide psychiatric treatments into those that directly target the brain, e.g., antidepressants, and those that purportedly target the mind, e.g., cognitive behavior therapy, — often to the detriment of the latter. While significant work has been done to overcome the dualistic conception of persons in the contemporary philosophy of cognitive science and in the philosophy of neuroscience, the results of these debates have not been fully transferred to the domain of psychiatry.

The goal of this conference is to address the crisis in psychiatric research and treatment by exploring the ways in which the mind-brain dualism can be overcome in contemporary psychiatry through an integration of approaches from philosophy of mind, philosophy of science (including philosophy of cognitive science and neuroscience) and philosophy of medicine. One goal of such re-evaluation is to reconcile the claim that psychopathology needs to be scientific with the claim that it needs to keep the experience of the sufferer at its core.

Format of Conference: The conference will take place over two days. Eight papers by early career scholars (graduate students, postdocs, and untenured faculty) will be commented on by senior philosophers who have expertise in philosophy of science, philosophy of neuroscience, or philosophy of medicine.

By matching each junior presenter with a senior commentator, our aim is to give junior scholars an opportunity to receive thoughtful and targeted feedback on their work and to facilitate lively discussions. Further, this format will initiate junior-mentor relationships that will help strengthen the philosophy of psychiatry community.

Each presenter will be given 25 minutes for his or her paper, followed by 15 minutes for commentary and 15 minutes for discussion.

If you are a senior scholar and would like to participate in the conference as a speaker or commentator, please contact Serife Tekin, at serife.tekin@daemen.edu.

I want to let you now about a new internship opportunity for international undergraduate students (especially students from Turkey, India, China, Brazil, Mexico,and Vietnam) at Novel Tech Ethics, Dalhousie University, Canada.

As a Novel Tech Ethics alumnus, I highly encourage interested undergraduate students in Turkey to apply for this resourceful opportunity to work with a dynamic group of researchers in Bioethics.

The internship is sponsored by Mitacs Globalink, a not-for-profit research organization, offering training programs in partnership with companies, government and academia. Mitacs provides funding for accepted students to come to Canada for 12 weeks, matches them with a relevant research project, and assists in coordinating local arrangements including campus housing.

Undergraduates from the following countries are eligible for the 2014 program: India, China, Brazil, Mexico,Turkey and Vietnam.

Novel Tech Ethics has a project accepted with Mitacs for a research assistant within a bioethics research project on the use of human reproductive tissues for science. The student will be an active member of the Novel Tech Ethics grant team, and will be involved with collecting and compiling information provided by IVF clinics. More information about this project is available on the website, here.

Applications for the position open in September 2013, for a limited time. Interested students must apply directly through Mitacs Globalink. More information on the program and instructions on how to apply are available here.

Ulric Neisser, an American psychologist and one of the founders of cognitive psychology died last month. Neisser’s life, including his major contributions to the revolution of the study of the human cognition is well documented; see for instance, the NY Times obituary and the Mind Hacks blog. My intention is not to replicate what has appeared elsewhere but to add to it by focusing on Neisser’s later work in ecological psychology, more specifically, his interdisciplinary research on the self which has guided the content and methodology of my own work. I take this as an opportunity to remember him, with the added hope of sparking the interest of those less familiar with his later work.

Behaviourism dominated the scientific study of the mind in the first half of the 20th century. Behaviourists declared that psychology should not attempt to address internal mental events and mechanisms but should focus on the observable markers of cognition, such as stimuli, responses, and the consequences of these responses. Despite its contribution to the development of rigorous experimental techniques and to the domain of learning, behaviourism was limited in explaining many interesting dimensions of human cognition, such as the development of language.

The Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is the official classification manual developed for use in clinical, educational, and research settings; it is published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and is regularly revised. The fifth edition (DSM-5) is expected to appear in May 2013. In the DSM’s current edition (DSM-IV), feelings of sadness and associated symptoms (e.g., insomnia, poor appetite, and weight loss), following the death of a loved one are excluded from the criteria for a Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), but a cautionary clause states that if these symptoms continue beyond two months and impair the individual’s psychological, social and occupational functioning, she may be given an MDD diagnosis.

The DSM-5 Working Group for the Mood Disorders has recently proposed the removal of the bereavement exclusion from the diagnostic criteria for a Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), arguing that the available evidence does not support distinguishing bereavement from other stressors that underlie MDD.

This proposal has led to a controversial debate on the advantages and disadvantages of distinguishing between the cases that involve individuals who develop major depression in response to bereavement and those who develop depression following other severe stressors. For instance, Allen Frances, the lead editor of DSM-IV, is concerned that removing the bereavement exclusion will result in over-diagnosing and over-treating non-pathological grief by labelling it MDD.