The "Middle East and Terrorism" Blog was created in order to supply information about the implication of Arab countries and Iran in terrorism all over the world. Most of the articles in the blog are the result of objective scientific research or articles written by senior journalists.

From the Ethics of the Fathers: "He [Rabbi Tarfon] used to say, it is not incumbent upon you to complete the task, but you are not exempt from undertaking it."

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Monday, May 16, 2016

We’re not Moving from the Golan Part 3: Possible Areas of Compensation - Pazit Rabina

After all, when
faced with the choice between Asad, ISIS or al-Qaeda, Israeli control of the
Golan does not seem like the worst possibility.

Looking back, over the past five years there have been at
least two instances when Netanyahu’s government encountered significant opportunities
to gauge its positions on the Golan Heights. The first opportunity was in 2013
within the framework of the Kerry initiative, which included, among other
things, a plan for gradual withdrawal from the Jordan Valley, leaving IDF
forces in the Valley for ten years.

True, this plan never had a shadow of a chance. Not
politically and not conceptually, from Israel’s point of view and certainly not
from the Palestinians’ side. It was stillborn. The timing was terrible too. The
plan, which was headed by General John Allen, arose while ISIS Toyotas had
already begun racing across the Syrian desert. Had Israelwithdrawn from the Jordan Valley, it would only have been a matter of
time until the armed pick-up trucks stood at the baptismal sites on the Jordan
River.

In short, the plan had no chance at all. But precisely because
it had no chance, Israel had an opportunity to present a fresh idea to her
friends, according to which the security interest on the eastern border would
extend from Aqaba to the Golan Heights instead of ending at the Yarmouk River.
And in contrast to the tendency that prevailed in the past, to separate the
political initiative in the Palestinian front from the political initiative on
the Syrian front, Israel had the opportunity to present another proposal, according
to which, in the changing Middle East, it would be possible to consider an
initiative on the Palestinian front in exchange for a transformation in the
international stance regarding Israel’s remaining in the Golan. After all, when
faced with the choice between Asad, ISIS or al-Qaeda, Israeli control of the
Golan does not seem like the worst possibility. Moreover, between recognition
of Israeli sovereigntyand an
unequivocal demand to leave the Golan, there is a wide range of intermediate
possibilities. And this is even before speaking of the great void in
international law regarding the question of to whom, exactly, the territories
of a dismantled state belong.

By the way, if this is taken to its logical end, regarding
the agreement in Syria, the question must be asked as to not only what the
status of the Golan Heights is, from the point of view of international law,
but also what the status of the Iskenderun Province in Turkey is, which, until
the First World War was part of Syria. The Syrians have claimed this tract of
land over the years, the area of which is 20 times the size of the Golan. But
the Turks were aggressive in their position and knew how to conduct themselves
against the Syrians in these strategic heights. The result: the Syrians have accepted
Turkish control of the Iskenderun district. Anyone who had visited Antika,
capital of the district, before the war, could have seen the train that departed
from Aleppo arrive in Turkish Antika 45 minutes later.

The second opportunity that Israel apparently missed occurred
just before the signing of the Iranian nuclear agreement. Israel’s ability to
influence the agreement was limited from the start, but it also created an effective
opportunity regarding what Hauser and others have called “room for a discussion on compensation”.

“It would be a historic failure if Israel focuses once again
only on the tactical needs of advanced weaponry. The balancing formula in light
of the Iranian achievement (and Assad’s murderous behavior) must include a
maximum reduction in the danger of Iranian nuclearization, along with
containment of Iran’s potential for conventional aggression. This can be done
by creating an international agreement to finally shelve the Shi’ite-Alawite
aspiration to regain control of the Israeli Golan, which constitutes less than
1 percent of the area of what used to be Syria.

The requisite strategic collateral is an “American pledge,”
including with regard to the Golan, with a presidential guarantee and
Congressional legislation to ensure Israeli rule there. In 1975, U.S. President
Gerald Ford made a presidential promise in writing to then-Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin, which included American recognition of Israel’s need to remain
on the Golan Heights, even in peacetime.

Forty years on, in light of Syria’s collapse, the Islamic
State’s takeover of huge areas in the Middle East and the “rotten compromise”
expected with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the achievement that Israel needs
and can attain is to update the international stance, and ratify and upgrade
the U.S. stance on the Golan”.

If such a possibility had existed, relations between the
Obama administration and the Israeli government during the period of the signing
of the nuclear agreement would have allowed Israel to bring the Golan Heights into
the future equation that would restrict Iran and improve Israel’s position. From
various reports it has become known that Netanyahu indeed did hope to present
the matter of the Golan as compensation for the nuclear agreement with Iran,
but he did this some months after the agreement had been passed by Congress. At
that point Obama had no need to act on the matter with Netanyahu, and he simply did not respond. Apparently,
this is also what transpired in the recent meeting with Putin.

Despite Netanyahu’s declarations for the media, in the
discussion with Putin the matter did not come up at all. When Netanyahu was
asked about this in a media debriefing, he responded: “Putin did not express
any position on the subject. The Russian Foreign Affairs Department has an
official position but in practice, our words were heard and, I believe, also understood”.

The bottom line: despite the cold shoulder that Putin and
Obama gave to Israel on the matter of the Golan Heights, Netanyahu’s conduct
hints that the recent steps taken in the Geneva talks force Netanyahu to
continue with delicate tactical understanding regarding Israel’s conduct in
Syria, while in Geneva, matters directly related to Israel are increasingly
being decided – in her absence.