Williamson v. St. Tammany Parish Protection Fire District No. 12

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

May 7, 2018

THOMAS WILLIAMSONv.ST. TAMMANY PARISH FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT NO. 12

SECTION
A(5)

ORDER AND REASONS

JAY C.
ZAINEY JUDGE

Before
the Court is a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State
a Claim (Rec. Doc. 4) filed by Defendant St. Tammany
Parish Fire Protection District No. 12 (the
“District”). Plaintiff Thomas Williamson
(“Williamson”) opposes the motion (Rec. Doc. 10)
and Defendant has replied. (Rec. Doc. 13). The motion, set
for submission on March 21, 2018, is before the Court on the
briefs without oral argument. Having considered the motion
and memoranda of counsel, the record, and the applicable law,
the Court finds that the Defendant's motion is
DENIED for the reasons set forth below.

I.
Procedural Background

Defendant,
St. Tammany Parish Fire Protection District No. 12, brings
this motion to dismiss the claims brought by Plaintiff Thomas
Williamson. On or about January 16, 2018, Williamson
initially brought this suit in the 22nd Judicial District
Court for the Parish of St. Tammany, State of Louisiana. In
his state court Petition, Williamson alleges the District
infringed upon his Constitutional right to Freedom of Speech
giving rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Williamson further alleges that the District violated
Louisiana's Whistleblower Statute, La. R.S. §
23:967(A).

The
District removed this matter to this Court on February 6,
2018 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 due to
Williamson's allegations that the District is liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Rec. Doc. 1). Because
Williamson's § 1983 action arises under “the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, ”
this Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331-federal question jurisdiction. Additionally, this
Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Williamson's
state court claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367-supplemental jurisdiction.

II.
Factual Background

This
matter arises from a string of events that eventually lead to
Williamson being put on administrative leave from the St.
Tammany Parish Fire District. The following well-pleaded
facts are taken from Williamson's Petition for Damages.
At this 12(b)(6) motion stage, the Court must view the
following facts from Williamson's Petition as true.

Williamson
is a public employee of the District working as a
Firefighter/Operator. According to his Petition, Williamson,
as an employee of the District, came into information that
Fire Chief Stephen Krentel (“Krentel”) and Chief
Michael Haley (“Haley”) violated Louisiana
Revised Statute § 33:2560 and/or the Fire
Department's Policies and SGOs. On or about October 11,
2017, Williamson requested the St. Tammany Parish Civil
Service Board (“CSB”) conduct an investigation
into the unprofessional conduct of Krentel and
Haley.[1] Acting upon Williamson's Request for
Investigation, the CSB found reasonable cause to believe that
Krentel and Haley committed violations as outlined by the
Request for Investigation. By resolution, the CSB passed
Williamson's Request for Investigation to the Board of
Commissioners of Fire District No. 12 for further
investigative action against Krentel and Haley.[2] In conjunction
with the resolution, the CSB issued an Order Regarding
Retaliation that prohibited the District from committing any
retaliatory acts against Williamson in connection with
CSB's investigation.[3] (Rec. Doc. 1-1, p. 7).

On or
about January 4, 2018, Williamson received two Notices of
Investigation issued by the Board of Commissioners of Fire
District No. 12 against Williamson. According to Williamson,
the Notices do not name a complainant, are factually vague,
and lack specificity as to the conduct of Williamson that
allegedly violated policy and gave rise to the
investigations. The Notices also placed Williamson on
administrative leave with pay pending the outcome of the
investigations.[4]The Notices also contain a pre-disciplinary
hearing date set for January 25, 2018.[5] Finally,
Williamson alleges that due to the timing of the
investigations initiated against him and his prior work
performance reviews by the District, it can only be concluded
that this conduct constitutes reprisal, retaliation, and
intimidation. Additionally, Williamson contends that he is
statutorily immune from retaliation, reprisal, disciplinary
action, and/or threats under Louisiana Revised Statute §
23:967(A), Louisiana's Whistleblower Statute. Moreover,
Williamson argues that his accusations against Krentel and
Haley constitute protected activities under the First
Amendment. According to Williamson, the investigation of his
actions and his being placed on administrative leave
constitute prohibited acts of retaliation for exercising his
First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

III.
Legal Standard

Under
well-settled standards governing Rule 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss, a claim may not be dismissed unless it appears
certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that
would entitle him to legal relief. In re Supreme Beef
Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 2006)
(citing Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19 (5th
Cir. 1992)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
the plaintiff must plead enough facts to “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A
claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. A court must accept all
well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S.
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 2009). But
the Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions
couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678.

A
legally sufficient complaint need not contain detailed
factual allegations, but it must go beyond labels, legal
conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a
cause of action. Id. In other words, the face of the
complaint must contain enough factual matter to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
each element of the plaintiff's claim. Lormand,
565 F.3d at 257. If there are insufficient factual
allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculation
level, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint
that there is an insuperable bar to relief, the claim must be
dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

IV.
Law and Analysis

The
District contends that Williamson's First Amendment
freedom of speech retaliation claim should be dismissed for
failing to demonstrate that he suffered from an adverse
employment action. Specifically, the District argues that
being subject to an internal investigation and being placed
on administrative leave with pay do not qualify as adverse
employment actions under Fifth Circuit precedent.
Accordingly, the District argues that Williamson has failed
to plead a prima facie case for First Amendment retaliation
under § 1983 and his claim warrants dismissal at this
stage. In his opposition, Williamson concedes that being
placed on administrative leave alone does not constitute an
adverse employment action cognizable under § 1983.
However, Williamson contends that when viewed collectively,
all of the actions taken against him give rise to an adverse
employment action.

As a
general rule, the First Amendment bars not only direct
limitations on speech, but also adverse government action
against an individual because of his or her exercise of First
Amendment freedoms. Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498,
509 (5th Cir. 1999). To succeed on his First Amendment
freedom of speech retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show
(1) he suffered an adverse employment action; (2) his speech
involved a matter of public concern; (3) his interest in the
speech outweighs the government's interest in the
efficient provision of public service; and (4) the
plaintiff's speech motivated the defendant's actions.
Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 156 (5th
Cir. 2000). Here, the District argues that Williamson failed
to show that he suffered an adverse employment action.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Judge
Barbier recently provided a thorough analysis of the Fifth
Circuit&#39;s precedent concerning what constitutes an
adverse employment action in Dumas v. St. Tammany Parish
Fire District No. 3, No. 17-1025, 2017 WL 1969641, *1
(E.D. La. May 12, 2017). In Dumas, plaintiff James
Dumas worked as a firefighter at St. Tammany Parish Fire
District No. 3. Dumas had Facebook conversations with
community leaders concerning his Fire Chief&#39;s alleged
traits of racism and incompetence. Dumas was thereafter
issued a Notice of Investigation alleging that he was
&ldquo;insubordinate, aired grievances outside the chain of
command, and engaged in communications that had the potential
to bring public reproach to the department.&rdquo;
Id. at *1. Dumas was ultimately suspended for five
shifts without pay. In response, Dumas brought suit against
St. Tammany Fire District No. 3, among other defendants, for
retaliation under the First Amendment for exercising his
First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Id. at
*2. The Court dismissed Dumas&#39;s retaliation claim on
defendant&#39;s 12(b)(6) motion. The Court reasoned that
Dumas&#39;s only allegation of having suffered an adverse
employment action was being subject to an internal
investigation. Id. at *5 ...

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