The following text, al-Waraqāt fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, is a primer on the fundamentals of Islamic jurisprudence by Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī. The purpose of the text is to introduce students to the source methodology of Muslim scholars in deriving rules from the Quran and Sunnah.

Unavoidable knowledge is what does not result from reflection or inference, such as knowledge of reality by one of the five senses, which are hearing, seeing, smelling, tasting, and touching, or by unanimous reports (al-tawātir).

As for acquired knowledge, it is dependent upon reflection and inference. Reflection is thought upon the situation under reflection. Inference is seeking an indication. An indication guides to what is sought, as it points to it.

وَالظَّن تَجْوِيز أَمريْن أَحدهمَا أظهر من الآخر

Suspicion is the presence of two possibilities, one of which is more likely than the other.

وَالشَّكّ تَجْوِيز أَمريْن لَا مزية لأَحَدهمَا على الآخر

Doubt is the presence of two possibilities, neither of which is more likely than the other.

The topics of the fundamentals of jurisprudence are the types of statements, commands and prohibitions, general and specific, ambiguous and clear, apparent and interpreted, actions of the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, abrogating and abrogated, consensus, reports, analogy, the basis of forbidden and permissible, priority of evidences, characteristics of the legal expert, characteristics of one seeking a verdict, and the rules of independent legal reasoning.

From another point of view, it is divided into literal and figurative speech. Literal speech is that which is used in its ordinary meaning, or it is said that it is used as a specific term known to its audience. Figurative speech is what goes beyond its ordinary meaning.

Its grammatical form is, ‘Do!’ (if’al). It is understood to be in an absolute sense when it has no other mitigating factor to interpret it, unless there is an indication to convey the meaning recommendation or permission. It does not necessitate repetition, according to the correct opinion, unless there is an indication to convey the purpose of repetition. Neither does it necessitate immediacy.

The command to produce an action is a command to do it and whatever is done to complete it, such as the command to pray, as it is also a command to perform purification prior to it. If the action is done, the one commanded is absolved of further responsibility.

The unbelievers are addressed with the branches of the Law and with what is required for its soundness, which is Islam, as in the saying of the Almighty, ‘What caused you to enter fire? They will say: We were not among those who prayed.’ (74:42-43)

وَالْأَمر بالشَّيْء نهي عَن ضِدّه وَالنَّهْي عَن الشَّيْء أَمر بضده

The command to do something is a prohibition of doing its opposite, and a prohibition of something is a command to do its opposite.

Its wordings are four: a single noun with the definite article, plural nouns with the definite article, undefined nouns such as ‘whoever’ for animate beings, ‘whatever’ for inanimate beings, ‘whichever’ for anything, ‘wherever’ for place, ‘whenever’ for time, ‘whatever’ for interrogatives, consequences, and other things, and ‘no’ for indefinite nouns.

An exception is excluding what would otherwise be included in the statement. It is only sound on condition that something remains for which the exception is made and on condition that it is connected to the statement.

That which is restricted to a characteristic is given the same interpretation as if it were unqualified, such as a slave characterized by faith in some places and unqualified in other places. The unqualified is interpreted as though it were qualified by the characteristic.

It is possible for the Book (the Quran) to be specified by the Book, for the Book to be specified by the Sunnah, for the Sunnah to be specified by the Book, for the Sunnah to be specified by the Sunnah, and for statements to be specified by analogy. What we mean by ‘statements’ are the sayings of Allah Almighty and His Messenger, peace and blessings be upon him.

The ambiguous is what lacks clarity. The clear is what turns something vague into something evident. The decisive text (al-naṣṣ) is what cannot be interpreted except with one meaning, or it is said that it is interpreted as it was revealed.

The apparent meaning is what can potentially be interpreted in two ways, one of which is more obvious than the other. The apparent meaning is interpreted differently if there is an indication to do so, which is called ‘apparent by indication.’

It is interpreted as an obligation, according to some of our scholars. Among our scholars are some who said it should be interpreted as a recommendation, and among them are those who suspended judgment.

It is possible for a unanimous report to be abrogated by another unanimous report, and a solitary report (al-āhād) to be abrogated by another solitary or unanimous report. It is not possible for a unanimous report to be abrogated by a solitary report.

If two statements contradict each other, they are inevitably either two general statements, two specific statements, one is general and the other is specific, or each of them is general from one perspective and specific from another perspective.

If they are two general statements that can be reconciled, they are reconciled. If they cannot be reconciled, judgment is suspended if their historical order is not known. If the historical order is known, the previous statement is abrogated by the later statement. It is the same if they are two specific statements.

If one of them is a general statement and the other is a specific statement, the general statement is restricted by the specific statement. If one of them is general from a perspective and specific from another perspective, the generality of each is restricted by the specification of the other.

The consensus of this nation is a proof in itself, due to his saying, peace and blessings be upon him, ‘My nation will not gather together upon misguidance.’ The law has related the immunity of this nation from error (in consensus).

If we say that the passing of the first generation is a condition, the opinion of one would be considered who was born in their lifetimes, acquired legal knowledge, and became a legal expert, that they may retract this ruling.

Consensus is valid by their statements and actions, or the widespread statements and actions of some of them while the remaining jurists are silent. The statement of a single companion is not a binding proof over others, according to the new school of al-Shāfi’ī.

Unanimous reports necessarily result in accurate knowledge. They are reported by groups who could not have conspired upon a lie, from those similar to them up to the end of transmission, and being what was originally witnessed or heard, not from independent reasoning.

If unattributed reports are from those besides the companions, they are not a binding proof unless they are the reports of Sa’īd ibn al-Musayyib, as they have been investigated and found to be attributable to the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him.

والعنعنة تدخل على الْأَسَانِيد

Reports with imprecise transmission terminology (saying ‘from’ or ‘an) are included in attributed reports.

If the Shaykh reads a report, it is permissible for the narrator to say ‘he narrated to me,’ (ḥaddathanī) or ‘he informed me,’ (akhbaranī). If the narrator reads a report to the Shaykh, he says ‘he informed me’ and he does not say ‘he narrated to me.’ If the Shaykh grants him license without reading, he says ‘he granted me license’ or ‘he informed me by license.’

As for analogy, it is referring a derived case back to the original case through an effective cause (‘illah) that connects them in the ruling. It is divided into three categories: analogy by effective cause, analogy by indication, and analogy by similarity.

فَقِيَاس الْعلَّة مَا كَانَت الْعلَّة فِيهِ مُوجبَة للْحكم

Analogy by effective cause contains an effective cause that necessitates the ruling.

Among the conditions of the derived case is that it be suitable to the original case. Among the conditions of the original case is that it be established by evidence and agreed upon by conflicting parties.

وَمن شَرط الْعلَّة أَن تطرد فِي معلولاتها فَلَا تنتفض لفظا وَلَا معنى

Among the conditions of the effective cause is that it be continuous in its effects, such that it does not alter its wording or meaning.

Among the conditions of the ruling is that it be similar to the effective cause in negation or affirmation, that is, in its existence or non-existence. If the effective cause is found, the ruling is found. The effective cause is what results in the ruling.

As for forbidden and permissible, among people are those who say that things are forbidden except if the law permits them. If no indication is found in the law to permit them, the default position is adhered to, which is that it is forbidden.

Among the conditions of the legal expert are that he is knowledgeable in jurisprudence, its roots, its branches, its disagreements, and its doctrines, that he is completely aware of the indications of independent legal reasoning, recognizing what is needed to derive rulings, the exegesis of verses related to the rulings, and the reports related to them.

Among the conditions of one seeking a verdict is that he is among those incapable of independent legal reasoning, so he conforms to the legal expert in his verdict. It is not for the scholar to conform to others. Legal conformity (al-taqlīd) is to accept the opinion of someone without knowing its proof.

فعلى هَذَا قبُول قَول النَّبِي صلى الله عَلَيْهِ وَسلم يُسمى تقليدا

Based on this, accepting the statement of the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, is called conformity.

As for independent legal reasoning (al-ijtihād), it is to expend the sum of one’s efforts in achieving the objective. If the expert jurist has mastery over the mechanisms of legal reasoning in secondary issues and his verdict is correct, he will have two rewards. If he reasons to a verdict and is mistaken, he will have one reward.

It is not possible that every expert jurist is correct in foundational theological issues, for that would lead to declaring the people of misguidance to be correct, such as pagans, unbelievers, and heretics.

The evidence of those who say that not every expert jurist is correct in secondary issues is his saying, peace and blessings be upon him, “Whoever strives in his reasoning and is correct, he will have two rewards. Whoever strives in his reasoning and is mistaken, he will have one reward.”