Herman J. Sena, appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability
(COA) to appeal the district court's order dismissing his petition for writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We deny his request for a COA.(1)

In 1985, Sena was convicted by a jury in a New Mexico district court of
first degree murder, aggravated burglary, and tampering with evidence, and he
was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1987, the New Mexico Supreme Court
affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. In March 2001, Sena filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus in the state district court. The state district court
dismissed the petition, and the New Mexico Supreme Court denied Sena's petition
for writ of certiorari in January 2002.

In February 2002, Sena filed his § 2254 petition in the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico, claiming that his federal due
process rights had been violated because the state district court's "Judgment,
Sentence and Commitment" order (sentencing order), see R., Doc. 2, Ex. A, did
not reflect the court's "ruling"(2) at his sentencing hearing that "with total good
time defendant could be eligible for parole in as little as fifteen years," id.,
Doc. 1
at 2. Sena further alleged that, as a result of this omission in the sentencing
order, the New Mexico Corrections Department has refused to allow him to use
earned good time credits to reduce the mandatory thirty-year sentence he is
required to serve under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-10(A) before becoming eligible
for parole. As a remedy, Sena requested that the federal district court: (1) "order
that his [sentencing order] be amended"; and (2) "order his good time to be
deducted from the end of his thirty (30) year life term." Id. at 9.

The magistrate judge recommended that Sena's § 2254 petition be
dismissed on the grounds that it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations
in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and
dismissed Sena's petition. This appeal followed.

Issuance of a COA is jurisdictional. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029,
1039 (2003). A COA can issue only "if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a
district court has dismissed a habeas petition on procedural grounds, a prisoner
must also show that "jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district
court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000). After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court's
procedural ruling as to the untimeliness of Sena's petition would not be debatable
among jurists of reason.

Sena's convictions became final before the April 24, 1996 effective date of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Consequently,
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), Sena was required to file his § 2254 petition on or
before April 24, 1997. See Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir.
2001) (holding that "[w]here a conviction became final before AEDPA took
effect, . . . the one year limitation period for a federal habeas petition starts on
AEDPA's effective date"), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1034 (2002); United
States v.
Hurst, 322 F.3d 1256, 1261 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that "a [habeas petition]
presented to the court on the anniversary date of a triggering event is within the
'1-year period of limitation' set out in . . . § 2244(d)(1)"). Further, the one-year
limitations period cannot be tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for the time Sena spent in
state post-conviction proceedings because his state-court habeas petition was "not
filed until after April 24, 1997, the end of the limitations period for convictions,
like [Sena's], which became final before the effective date of AEDPA." Fisher,
262 F.3d at 1143.

In the proceedings before the magistrate judge, Sena did not argue that the
one-year limitations period should be extended beyond April 24, 1997 based on
any of the grounds set forth in § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D). Likewise, he did not argue
that the limitations period should be tolled on equitable grounds. Instead, Sena
argued that his due process claim was not "mature" until he had actually earned
enough good time credits to become eligible for a release from prison, and he
claimed that this had not occurred until the year preceding the filing of his
petition. See R., Doc. 16 at 3-4.

We disagree. In his § 2254 petition, Sena challenged the validity of the
state district court's sentencing order, and he alleged that the due process
violation occurred in 1985 when the allegedly invalid sentencing order was
entered. Id., Doc. 1 at 2-3. Similarly, in his answer to respondents' answer to his
§ 2254 petition, Sena claimed that his incarceration was unlawful because he had
been imprisoned "pursuant to an invalid [sentencing] order."
Id., Doc. 16 at 1.
Accordingly, Sena's due process claim was ripe in 1985 when the state district
court entered the sentencing order. Thus, we conclude that jurists of reason
would not debate the correctness of the magistrate judge's determination that
Sena's § 2254 petition is time barred because he failed to file it on or before April
24, 1997.

In his objections to the magistrate judge's proposed findings and
recommended disposition and in his opening brief in this appeal, Sena claims that
his § 2254 petition was timely filed because: (1) the Corrections Department has
been awarding him good time credits since 1985; and (2) he did not discover that
the Corrections Department was going to refuse to apply his good time credits to
reduce his mandatory thirty-year sentence under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-10(A)
until February or March 2001 when he first learned of this fact from his prison
case manager. Id., Doc. 18 at 3-4; Aplt. Br. at II, X-XI. Even if we give Sena the
benefit of these allegations and construe his habeas petition to be a timely
challenge to the execution of his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Sena has failed
to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

At the time of his sentencing in 1985, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-10(A)
provided that "[a]n inmate of an institution who was sentenced to life
imprisonment as the result of the commission of a capital felony becomes eligible
for a parole hearing after he has served thirty years of his sentence." N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 31-21-10(A) (1985 Cum. Supp.). Notably, § 31-21-10(A) did not address
whether an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment could earn good time credits
and have the credits applied to reduce the mandatory thirty-year sentence. This
omission was significant because a separate statute provided that "[a]ny inmate
confined in the penitentiary of New Mexico . . . may be awarded a deduction
of not more than ten days' meritorious good time per month based on good
conduct . . . ." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-2-34(A) (1985 Cum. Supp.).

In 1989, the New Mexico Supreme Court issued an opinion making it clear
that § 31-21-10(A) takes precedence over § 33-2-34(A), and that an inmate
sentenced to life imprisonment is not entitled to have the mandatory thirty-year
sentence reduced based on good time credits. See Martinez v. New Mexico, 772
P.2d 1305, 1305-06 (N.M. 1989);(3)accord New Mexico v. Garcia, 837 P.2d 862,
865 n.5 (N.M. 1992). We therefore agree with the magistrate judge that Sena has
no basis for asserting a federal due process claim based on the refusal of the
Corrections Department to release him before the end of the thirty-year period,
and this is the case regardless of whether the Corrections Department previously
had a practice of misapplying § 31-21-10(A). Cf. Stephens v. Thomas, 19
F.3d
498, 500-01 (10th Cir. 1994) (construing prior New Mexico statute enacted in
1955 that required inmates sentenced to life imprisonment to serve a mandatory
ten-year sentence before becoming eligible for parole, and holding that
"revocation of good time credits from a life term prisoner who has served less
than ten years of his sentence . . . does not implicate the Due Process Clause,"
regardless of the Corrections Department's "previous practice of misapplying the
law").

FOOTNOTESClick footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.

1. We previously entered an order directing
Sena to show cause why this
appeal should not be dismissed on the ground that his notice of appeal was filed
more than thirty days after the entry of judgment by the district court. Having
considered Sena's response to the show cause order, we conclude that the letter
the district court received from Sena on July 1, 2002 provided the notice required
by Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1). Because the letter was filed within the time period
specified by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), the letter was effective as a timely notice of
appeal. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1992).

2. The record does not support Sena's claim
that the state district court made a
"ruling" at the sentencing hearing regarding good time credits. However, even if
we assume that the court made the ruling alleged by Sena, there are still no
grounds for granting him a COA.

3. In Martinez, 772 P.2d at
1305-06, the New Mexico Supreme Court was
addressing the 1987 versions of §§ 31-21-10(A) and 33-2-34(A). See
N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§ 31-21-10(A) and 33-2-34(A) (1987 Repl. Pamp.). However, for purposes
of this case, the 1985 and 1987 versions of the statues are identical.