§134-7 Ownership or possession prohibited,
when; penalty. (a) No person who is a fugitive from justice or is a
person prohibited from possessing firearms or ammunition under federal law
shall own, possess, or control any firearm or ammunition therefor.

(b) No person who is under indictment for, or
has waived indictment for, or has been bound over to the circuit court for, or
has been convicted in this State or elsewhere of having committed a felony, or
any crime of violence, or an illegal sale of any drug shall own, possess, or
control any firearm or ammunition therefor.

(c) No person who:

(1) Is or has been under treatment or counseling for
addiction to, abuse of, or dependence upon any dangerous, harmful, or
detrimental drug, intoxicating compound as defined in section 712-1240, or
intoxicating liquor;

(2) Has been acquitted of a crime on the grounds of
mental disease, disorder, or defect pursuant to section 704-411; or

(3) Is or has been diagnosed as having a significant
behavioral, emotional, or mental disorders as defined by the most current
diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric Association or for treatment for
organic brain syndromes;

shall own, possess, or control any firearm or
ammunition therefor, unless the person has been medically documented to be no
longer adversely affected by the addiction, abuse, dependence, mental disease,
disorder, or defect.

(d) No person who is less than twenty-five
years old and has been adjudicated by the family court to have committed a
felony, two or more crimes of violence, or an illegal sale of any drug shall
own, possess or control any firearm or ammunition therefor.

(e) No minor who:

(1) Is or has been under treatment for addiction to
any dangerous, harmful, or detrimental drug, intoxicating compound as defined
in section 712-1240, or intoxicating liquor;

(2) Is a fugitive from justice; or

(3) Has been determined not to have been responsible
for a criminal act or has been committed to any institution on account of a
mental disease, disorder, or defect;

shall own, possess, or control any firearm or
ammunition therefor, unless the minor has been medically documented to be no
longer adversely affected by the addiction, mental disease, disorder, or
defect.

For the purposes of enforcing this section, and
notwithstanding section 571-84 or any other law to the contrary, any agency
within the State shall make its records relating to family court adjudications
available to law enforcement officials.

(f) No person who has been restrained pursuant
to an order of any court, including an ex parte order as provided in this
subsection, from contacting, threatening, or physically abusing any person,
shall possess, control, or transfer ownership of any firearm or ammunition
therefor, so long as the protective order, restraining order, or any extension
is in effect, unless the order, for good cause shown, specifically permits the
possession of a firearm and ammunition. The restraining order or order of
protection shall specifically include a statement that possession, control, or
transfer of ownership of a firearm or ammunition by the person named in the
order is prohibited. Such person shall relinquish possession and control of
any firearm and ammunition owned by that person to the police department of the
appropriate county for safekeeping for the duration of the order or extension
thereof. In the case of an ex parte order, the affidavit or statement under
oath that forms the basis for the order shall contain a statement of the facts
that support a finding that the person to be restrained owns, intends to obtain
or to transfer ownership of, or possesses a firearm, and that the firearm may
be used to threaten, injure, or abuse any person. The ex parte order shall be
effective upon service pursuant to section 586-6. At the time of service of a
restraining order involving firearms and ammunition issued by any court, the
police officer may take custody of any and all firearms and ammunition in plain
sight, those discovered pursuant to a consensual search, and those firearms
surrendered by the person restrained. If the person restrained is the
registered owner of a firearm and knows the location of the firearm, but
refuses to surrender the firearm or refuses to disclose the location of the
firearm, the person restrained shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. In any case,
when a police officer is unable to locate the firearms and ammunition either
registered under this chapter or known to the person granted protection by the
court, the police officer shall apply to the court for a search warrant
pursuant to chapter 803 for the limited purpose of seizing the firearm and
ammunition.

For the purposes of this subsection, good cause
shall not be based solely upon the consideration that the person subject to
restraint pursuant to an order of any court, including an ex parte order as
provided for in this subsection, is required to possess or carry firearms or
ammunition during the course of the person's employment. Good cause
consideration may include but not be limited to the protection and safety of
the person to whom a restraining order is granted.

(g) Any person disqualified from ownership,
possession, control, or the right to transfer ownership of firearms and
ammunition under this section shall surrender or dispose of all firearms and
ammunition in compliance with section 134-7.3.

Defendant police chief was entitled to qualified immunity
from plaintiff firearm permit applicant's 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims for monetary
damages for alleged violations of plaintiff's Second Amendment right to bear
arms and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process right because a reasonable
official in defendant's circumstances would not have understood that
defendant's conduct violated a right that was clearly established at the time
of the denial of plaintiff's permit; this section, on which the denial was
based, had not been invalidated by case or legislative action. 869 F. Supp. 2d
1203 (2012).

Plaintiff firearm permit applicant's allegations that
plaintiff was denied a permit and ordered to surrender plaintiff's weapons due
to a conviction of harassment under §711-1106 more than ten years before and
that the conviction was not a crime of violence under subsection (b) or federal
law for the purposes of prohibiting ownership or possession of firearms were
sufficient to state a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim for a violation of plaintiff's
Second Amendment rights. 869 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (2012).

Genuine issue of material fact existed regarding: (1)
whether plaintiff had been under counseling for addiction to, abuse of, or
dependence upon a drug or intoxicating liquor; and (2) whether plaintiff had
been "medically documented to be no longer adversely affected" by
drugs or intoxicating liquor. As a result, plaintiff had not established a
Second Amendment right to possess firearms. 976 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (2013).

Subsection (b) did not disqualify plaintiff from exercising
plaintiff's Second Amendment rights because the court could not conclude that
plaintiff's convictions for harassment constituted a crime of violence. 976 F.
Supp. 2d 1200 (2013).

Where defendants argued that plaintiff was prohibited from
possessing firearms under federal law because of the federal Lautenberg
Amendment, which prohibits firearm ownership by any person who "has been
convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence",
plaintiff's convictions for harassment did not qualify as a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence under federal law. 976 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (2013).

Where defendants asserted that plaintiff lacked standing to
bring a lawsuit because plaintiff was precluded from obtaining firearms under
this section, and, therefore, could not establish a violation of plaintiff's
Second Amendment rights, police department's denial of plaintiff's application
for a firearms permit, order to surrender firearms plaintiff possessed, and
letter affirming the denial of the application constituted an "injury-in-fact"
sufficient to meet the minimum requirements of Article III standing. 49 F.
Supp. 3d 727 (2014).

Where defendant's convictions were premised upon the use of
"any firearm" and language of indictments and trial court's
instructions "to wit, a semiautomatic pistol" did not alter the
statutory elements of §§708-840, 134-6, or this section, trial court's error of
not providing definition of "semiautomatic firearm" did not warrant
reversal of convictions of first degree robbery, carrying or use of firearm in
commission of separate felony, or felon in possession of firearm. 91 H. 33,
979 P.2d 1059.

For the purposes of subsection (b), "possession"
must be analyzed using a two-pronged analysis: (1) the voluntary act of
"possession" of an object "itself" is, by way of §702-202,
satisfied where an individual acts knowingly with respect to his or her
conduct; and (2) the requisite state of mind with respect to the attendant
circumstances--i.e., the particular qualities of the object that make it
illegal to possess it--is, by way of §702-204, satisfied by a reckless state of
mind. 93 H. 87, 997 P.2d 13.

Where one bag containing a gun was found on truck seat next
to defendant and another bag with two guns was found on truck floor where
defendant had been sitting, jury could have inferred from totality of
circumstances that defendant had the state of mind requisite to commit
possession of a firearm and/or ammunition by a person convicted of certain
crimes. 93 H. 87, 997 P.2d 13.

A person commits the offense of attempted prohibited
possession of a firearm, pursuant to §705-500(1)(b) and (3), and subsection
(b), if he or she intentionally engages in conduct that, under the
circumstances as he or she believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step
in a course of conduct intended to culminate in his or her commission of the
offense of prohibited possession of a firearm. 93 H. 199, 998 P.2d 479.

As the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a
firearm under this section does not include a result-of-conduct element and
§705-500(2) does not therefore apply, trial court instruction erroneously
defined the state of mind necessary to prove the offense of attempted
prohibited possession of a firearm as something less than intentional, as
required by §705-500(1)(b). 93 H. 199, 998 P.2d 479.

Pursuant to §§701-109(4)(b), 705-500(1)(b) and (3), and
subsection (b), attempted prohibited possession of a firearm is an included
offense of prohibited possession of a firearm. 93 H. 199, 998 P.2d 479.

Where defendant failed to carry defendant's burden of establishing
that defendant's conduct--of possessing ammunition in violation of subsection
(b), a class B felony involving conduct that had the potential for serious
public safety consequences--was de minimis within the meaning of §702-236,
appellate court's dismissal of trial court's granting of motion to dismiss
charges as a de minimis infraction under §702-236 affirmed. 123 H. 329, 235
P.3d 325.

Requisite state of mind for a violation of subsection (b) is
that of acting intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly; failure to instruct
jury on state of mind element, as required by §701-114(1)(b), was prejudicial
and not harmless error. 78 H. 422 (App.), 895 P.2d 173.

Where the State's evidence only went so far as to show
defendant's ownership and presence in the vehicle and defendant's proximity to
the firearm and ammunition, absent evidence of intent, the circuit court
correctly granted defendant's renewed motion of judgment of acquittal; the
appeals court thus erred in vacating circuit court's judgment by concluding
that there was sufficient evidence of intent for jury to infer that defendant
constructively possessed the subject rifle and ammunition in violation of
subsection (b). 128 H. 18, 282 P.3d 560 (2012).

Where State failed to establish defendant's prior felony
conviction and no lesser included offense of a felon in possession of a firearm
or ammunition in chapter 134, defendant's convictions of being a felon in
possession of a firearm and firearm ammunition under subsection (b) reversed.
82 H. 517 (App.), 923 P.2d 934.

Under subsection (b), multiple punishments are not authorized
for violating the prohibition against possession of "any firearm or
ammunition therefor"; thus, where defendant was already convicted of
possessing a firearm, defendant could not be convicted for possession of
ammunition loaded into that firearm. 89 H. 59 (App.), 968 P.2d 1070.

Although evidence that defendant had previously been
convicted of a felony was relevant for purposes of this section, evidence that
defendant may have received ineffective assistance of counsel during that prior
felony trial would not have any bearing on the validity of that felony
conviction; thus, trial court did not err in precluding evidence that defendant
may have received ineffective assistance during prior trial. 90 H. 489 (App.),
979 P.2d 85.

Unless expressly permitted by the court, subsection (f)
unqualifiedly prohibits a person subject to a chapter 586 order from possession
and control of a firearm during the pendency of that order; this prohibition is
effective irrespective of whether the respondent owned the firearms involved.
91 H. 438 (App.), 984 P.2d 1264.

Trial court erred in sentencing defendant to ten years of
incarceration with a mandatory minimum term of ten years under §706-660.1(3)(c)
as convicting defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm pursuant to
subsection (b) and sentencing defendant to a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment pursuant to §706-660.1(3)(c) essentially punished defendant twice
for a single possession of a firearm; a rational interpretation of §706-660.1
is that the legislature did not intend its application for felonies where the
entirety of the felonious conduct is the use or possession of a firearm. 107
H. 273 (App.), 112 P.3d 759.

In a prosecution of a felon under subsection (b) for
possession of firearm ammunition, the State must prove, whether by direct or
circumstantial evidence, that the ammunition was "actually loaded";
given detective's authoritative identification of the bullets as ammunition,
and in the absence of evidence that the ammunition was not loaded or otherwise
incapable of being fired, was substantial evidence that the ammunition was
actually loaded. 108 H. 124 (App.), 117 P.3d 856.