Seminars in Moral Philosophy Week 3 HT12

Talk by Alison Hills (Oxford) 'Cognitivism about moral judgement' to be held in the Lecture Room at the Philosophy Centre, 10 Merton Street.

Abstract

What is it to make a moral judgement? There are two standard views, cognitivist and non-cognitivist, plus hybrid options according to which moral judgements have cognitivist and non-cognitivist components. In this context, cognitivism is typically defined as the following theory: “moral judgments are beliefs”. ). I will be arguing that this is a mistake. In section 2, I set out an objection to cognitivism which I call the “testimony” argument. The remainder of the paper attempts to answer this argument on behalf of a cognitivist, by arguing that moral judgements may be belief-like mental states without being beliefs. In sections 3 and 4, I introduce a moral “ulief”, a belief-like state which is related to exercised moral understanding as a moral belief is related to moral knowledge. Section 5 addresses some objections to the idea of a moral ulief. In the final section I set out new definitions of cognitivism and non-cognitivism and draw some further implications of the argument.

All philosophers are welcome to attend, and also to join the speaker for drinks after the talk, and later for dinner.