3 LORD NEUBERGER: (with whom Lord Kerr and Lord Reed agree) Introductory 1. This is an appeal brought by HM Attorney General against the decision of the Court of Appeal quashing a certificate which he issued on 16 October 2012 pursuant to section 53(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 ( the FOIA 2000 ) and regulation 18(6) of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 ( EIR 2004 ). The underlying question in this appeal is whether communications passing between HRH The Prince of Wales and ministers in various government departments ( the Departments ) between September 2004 and March 2005 (which I shall call the letters ) should be disclosed pursuant to a request made by Rob Evans, a journalist who works on the Guardian newspaper. The effect of the Attorney General s certificate ( the Certificate ) would be to prevent such disclosure, but the effect of the Court of Appeal s decision would be to permit such disclosure. 2. It is worth explaining at the outset of this judgment that, if valid, the effect of the Certificate would be to override a decision of the Upper Tribunal, which is a judicial body and which has the same status as the High Court. The first argument raised by Mr Evans is that the statutory provision giving the Attorney General, a member of the executive, the power to overrule a judicial decision should, as a matter of constitutional principle, be interpreted restrictively, and that the Certificate is therefore invalid. His second argument is that, at least so far as the Certificate applies to environmental information, it is invalid, as the provisions of an EU Directive prevent a decision of a judicial tribunal ordering disclosure of such information being overridden by a member of the executive. The background facts and law The procedural history in summary 3. The procedural history is unusual, but it can be briefly summarised. Mr Evans requested disclosure of the letters from the Departments, pursuant to both the FOIA 2000 and the EIR 2004, in April After initially refusing to state whether or not they had any of the letters, the Departments in due course admitted that they did, but refused to disclose them on the ground that they considered the letters were exempt from disclosure under sections 37, 40 Page 2

4 and/or 41 of the FOIA 2000 and the equivalent provisions of the EIR Mr Evans complained to the Information Commissioner ( the Commissioner ), who upheld the Departments refusal in reasoned determinations promulgated in December Mr Evans then appealed to the tribunal, and the matter was transferred to the Upper Tribunal (Walker J, UT Judge Angel and Ms Cosgrave) ( the UT ), who conducted a full hearing, with six days of evidence and argument. The UT issued their determination on 18 September 2012, and it was to the effect that many of the letters, which they referred to as advocacy correspondence, should be disclosed [2012] UKUT 313 (AAC). 4. The Departments did not appeal against this determination. However, on 16 October 2012, the Attorney General issued the Certificate stating that he had, on reasonable grounds, formed the opinion that the Departments had been entitled to refuse disclosure of the letters, and set out his reasoning. 5. Mr Evans then issued proceedings to quash the Certificate, on two grounds, namely (i) the reasons given by the Attorney General were not capable of constituting reasonable grounds within the meaning of section 53(2) of the FOIA 2000, and/or (ii) because the advocacy correspondence was concerned with environmental issues, the Certificate was incompatible with Council Directive 2003/4/EC ( the 2003 Directive ) and/or article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights ( the EU Charter ). The Divisional Court (Lord Judge CJ, Davis LJ and Globe J) dismissed his claim [2013] EWHC 1960 (Admin), [2014] QB 855. However, the Court of Appeal (Lord Dyson MR and Richards and Pitchford LJJ) allowed his appeal on both grounds ([2014] EWCA Civ 254; [2014] QB 855), and, unusually but rightly, gave the Attorney General permission to appeal to this court. 6. The position in practice is as follows. If the Attorney General s appeal to this court fails on the first ground, then all the advocacy correspondence would have to be disclosed, and the second ground would be moot. If the Attorney General s appeal on the first and second grounds both succeed, then the Certificate would stand and none of the advocacy correspondence would have to be disclosed. If the Attorney General s appeal succeeds on the first ground but fails on the second ground, then to the extent that the advocacy correspondence contains environmental information, it would have to be disclosed, but there is a dispute as to whether that would also apply to the other information in the advocacy correspondence ( the non-environmental information ). There is also an argument as to the extent to which the advocacy correspondence contains environmental information, but that is not before us, and therefore the meaning of environmental information does not have to be considered on this appeal. Page 3

5 7. Before explaining the legislative and procedural background and then turning to the issues, it is, I think, right to mention that the points which this court has to decide involve determining issues of legal principle. Accordingly, like the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal, we have not seen the letters, and our only knowledge of their contents is based on what the Commissioner and the UT considered it appropriate to reveal in their reasoned determinations (as I have called them in order to avoid any confusion with a decision notice, which is a defined term in the FOIA 2000, as explained below). Unlike us, they had the function of deciding whether the letters should be disclosed on the merits, ie in the light of all the relevant facts and competing public interests for and against disclosure, and that required them to consider the content of the letters. The Freedom of Information Act Part I of the FOIA 2000 is concerned with Access to Information Held by Public Authorities. Section 1(1) states that: Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled (a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him. 9. Section 2 explains that this right is subject to the exemptions set out in Part II, and that some of the exemptions are absolute, which is self-explanatory, while others are qualified, which means that they are subject to the test that in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information. Sections 3-7 are concerned with identifying what is a public authority, and sections 8-17 deal with the procedures (including time limits and fees) for making and answering requests for information. Section 17(1) requires any notice of refusal to specify both the exemption relied on, and (if that would not otherwise be apparent) why the exemption applies. Section 18 creates the post of Information Commissioner. Page 4

6 10. As stated in section 2, Part II deals with Exempt Information. Sections 37, 40 and 41 are directly in point for present purposes. Section 37 provides for an exemption in relation to communications with the Sovereign, other members of the Royal Family or the Royal Household. Until January 2011, this was a qualified exemption, but, as a result of an amendment to the FOIA 2000 by section 46 of, and Schedule 7 to, the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, the exemption in section 37 is now absolute in relation to communications with the Sovereign, the heir to the throne, and the next in line. It is common ground that the original, qualified, version of section 37 is applicable in the present case. 11. Section 40 of the FOIA 2000 ( section 40 ) contains an absolute exemption in relation to personal information, subject to the data protection principles set out in the Data Protection Act Section 41 of the FOIA 2000 ( section 41 ) exempts information which, if disclosed, would constitute an actionable breach of confidence. Although that is an absolute exemption, public interest in disclosure is normally a defence to a claim for breach of confidence, and it appears to be accepted that it could, in principle, operate as an effective answer to reliance on section 41. It is also right to refer to section 35(1), which exempts [i]nformation held by a government department if it relates to certain issues, and they include (a) the formulation or development of government policy or (b) Ministerial communications, which, by section 35(5) would extend to any communications between Ministers of the Crown. 12. Part III of the FOIA 2000 deals with the General Functions of Lord Chancellor and Information Commissioner. The Commissioner s general functions are set out in section 47, and they include promoting, disseminating, teaching, and assessing good practice in connection with the provision of information to the public by public authorities. 13. Part IV of the FOIA 2000 is concerned with Enforcement. It starts with section 50 ( section 50 ), which provides that an applicant, ie a person who has made an application for information under section 1(1), may apply to the Commissioner for a determination whether a request for information made to a public authority has been dealt with in accordance with the requirements of Part I. If that happens, then, by virtue of section 51, the Commissioner can require the public authority to provide him with information by serving an information notice on it. Once the Commissioner has considered a section 50 application and concluded that a public authority has wrongly failed (i) to confirm or deny that it has information as required by section 1(1)(a), (ii) to communicate information, as required by section 1(1)(b), or (iii) to comply with another obligation under Part I of the FOIA 2000, section 50(4) requires him to issue a decision notice specifying what Page 5

7 the authority must do to rectify the failure. Section 50 is stated by subsection (7) to be subject to section In addition to that specific power, section 52 states that, if the Commissioner is satisfied that a public authority has failed to comply with any obligation under Part I of the FOIA 2000, he can serve it with an enforcement notice requiring it to comply. 15. Under subsection (1) of section 57 ( section 57 ), either the applicant or the public authority can appeal to the tribunal against a decision notice, and a public authority is given the right to appeal against an information notice or enforcement notice under section 57(2). Subsection (1) of section 58 ( section 58 ) provides that, if, on an appeal under section 57, the tribunal considers (a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law or (b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, they shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner. Section 58(2) specifically provides that, on such an appeal, the tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based. 16. Such appeals are usually heard by the First-tier Tribunal with a right of appeal to the Upper Tribunal, but only where there is claimed to be an error of law in the determination of the First-tier Tribunal see section 11 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act However, an appeal from the Commissioner under section 57 can be referred direct to the Upper Tribunal, as happened in this case. The Upper Tribunal is an independent court, which is both an expert tribunal and a superior court of record, effectively with the same status as the High Court of Justice see section 3(5) of the 2007 Act. In general, there is a right of appeal on a point of law, subject to permission, from the Upper Tribunal to the Court of Appeal see section 13 of the 2007 Act. 17. Section 53 of the FOIA 2000 ( section 53 ) is of central relevance to the first issue on this appeal. It confers a power on an accountable person to override a decision notice or an enforcement notice served under the FOIA 2000 on, inter alia, any government department. Section 53(2) provides that such a notice: shall cease to have effect if, not later than the twentieth working day following the effective date, the accountable person in relation to that authority gives the Commissioner a Page 6

8 certificate signed by him stating that he has on reasonable grounds formed the opinion that, in respect of the request or requests concerned, there was no failure [to comply with section l(l)(a) or (b)]. 18. The effective date is defined in section 53(4) as the day on which (a) the notice was given to a public authority or (b) an appeal under section 57 is determined or withdrawn. The accountable person is defined in section 53(8), and, for present purposes, it is a Cabinet Minister or the Attorney General. Under section 53(6), the reasonable grounds have to be communicated to the applicant, not necessarily at the same time as the certificate, but as soon as reasonably practicable, and the communication does not have to include exempt information section 53(7). Any section 53 notice has to be laid before Parliament as soon as practicable [after it is issued], by virtue of section 53(3). 19. Two points are worth making about the section 53 power to certify (or veto, as it is sometimes referred to). Both points are mentioned in the Ministry of Justice s publication Statement of HMG Policy: Use of the executive override under the [FOIA 2000] in relation to ministerial communications. Although the Statement of HMG Policy is therefore concerned with the section 35 exemption rather than the section 37 exemption (see paras 10 and 11 above), it is of relevance in relation to the Certificate in the present case. 20. First, as was acknowledged in the Certificate, the Government s view is that the veto should only be used in exceptional circumstances and only following a collective decision of the Cabinet. This reflects a ministerial assurance given to the House of Commons during the passage of the Bill which became the FOIA Secondly, it is appropriate to identify the reason for the inclusion of the Attorney General in section 53(8), and indeed the reason that the Certificate was issued by the Attorney General in this case. Normally, a section 53 certificate would be issued by the Secretary of State for the relevant Department. However, where (as here) the information concerned is contained in documents which were created or sent under a previous administration, there is a well-established convention that on papers of a previous administration only the Attorney General will have access to the information being considered (to quote from the Statement of HMG Policy). So in this case, before he issued the Certificate, the Attorney General saw the letters and discussed them with those who were the relevant ministers at the time. Page 7

9 Council Directive 2003/4/EC 21. According to recital (5), the purpose of the 2003 Directive is to provide public access to environmental information and to ensure that provisions of Community law are consistent with the UN Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters ( the Aarhus Convention ). 22. The Aarhus Convention, through article 4(1), requires each signatory state to ensure that public authorities are obliged to comply with any request for environmental information by mak[ing] such information available to the public, within the framework of national legislation. Article 9(1) of the Aarhus Convention requires that a person who considers that a request has not been dealt with in accordance with article 4 should be able to invoke a review procedure before a court of law or other independent and impartial body, and that [f]inal decisions of that body should be binding on the public authority holding the information. 23. Article 3 of the 2003 Directive provides that member states shall ensure that public authorities are required to make available environmental information held by them. Article 3.1 is in these terms: Member States shall ensure that public authorities are required, in accordance with the provisions of this Directive, to make available environmental information held by or for them to any applicant at his request and without his having to state an interest. 24. Article 4 provides that member states may provide for a request to be refused in specified cases. It states that the grounds for refusal shall be interpreted in a restrictive way, taking into account for the particular case the public interest served by disclosure. In every particular case, the public interest served by disclosure shall be weighed against the interest served by the refusal. Article 5 is concerned with charges. 25. Article 6 of the 2003 Directive ( article 6 ) is of central importance to the second issue on this appeal. So far as material, it provides: 1. Member States shall ensure that any applicant who considers that his request for information has been ignored, wrongfully refused (whether in full or in part), inadequately Page 8

10 answered or otherwise not dealt with in accordance with the provisions of articles 3, 4 or 5, has access to a procedure in which the acts or omissions of the public authority concerned can be reconsidered by that or another public authority or reviewed administratively by an independent and impartial body established by law In addition to the review procedure referred to in paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that an applicant has access to a review procedure before a court of law or another independent and impartial body established by law, in which the acts or omissions of the public authority concerned can be reviewed and whose decisions may become final Final decisions under paragraph 2 shall be binding on the public authority holding the information. Reasons shall be stated in writing, at least where access is refused under this Article. The Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/3391) 26. The EIR 2004 are intended to give effect to the United Kingdom s obligation to implement the 2003 Directive. Regulation 5 of the EIR 2004 provides that a public authority that holds environmental information shall make it available on request. Regulations 12 and 13 of the EIR 2004 contain exceptions to this general duty which correspond with article 4 of the Directive, and which for present purposes can be treated as closely mirroring the exceptions in sections 37, 40 and Regulation 18 of the EIR 2004 provides that, with certain modifications, including enforcement and appeals, the provisions of the FOIA 2000 shall apply for the purposes of the EIR In particular, regulation 18(6) provides that section 53 applies to a decision notice or enforcement notice served under Part IV of the FOIA as applied to the EIR 2004 on any of the public authorities referred to in section 53(1)(a). Regulation 18 also provides that in section 53(7) for the reference to exempt information there should be substituted a reference to information which may be refused under these Regulations. Page 9

11 The EU Charter 28. Turning now to the EU Charter, article 47 provides: Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law Article 52(3) provides: In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection. The determination of the Commissioner 30. The proceedings before the Commissioner were protracted, and, after exchanges of written submissions and evidence, he issued his determinations in December The determination concerning the letters held by the Cabinet Office ran to 192 paragraphs plus annexes, and Davis LJ in the Divisional Court rightly described it as thorough and carefully reasoned. As an initial point, the Commissioner decided that some of the contents of the letters constituted environmental information within the meaning of the 2003 Directive and the EIR 2004 (and, as explained above, that is not in dispute). 31. He next addressed the arguments as to whether or not he should direct the Departments to disclose any or all of the letters under the FOIA He first decided that, in so far as the letters included confidential information, disclosure should not be ordered because a public interest defence would, in his view, not be available if the confidential information was published. In considering this aspect, he effectively took sections 40 and 41 together, and reached his conclusion partly because of the weighty public interest in maintaining confidences, and partly because of the specific arguments Page 10

12 relevant in this case in relation to the Prince of Wales, which he went on to consider in relation to the section 37 exemption. 32. The Commissioner then turned to the arguments relating to section 37, and said at para 129 that he considered that there were four reasons justifying non-disclosure, namely (i) protecting the tripartite convention, namely the ability of the Sovereign to exercise her right to consult, to encourage and to warn her Government, (ii) protecting the education convention that the Heir to the Throne should be instructed in the business of government in preparation for when he is King, (iii) preserving the political neutrality of the Royal Family, and (iv) protecting the privacy and dignity of the Royal Family. He noted that the Prince of Wales had approved the release of some communications with Government Ministers already. 33. The Commissioner concluded that the four factors which he had identified in para 129 meant that, under the FOIA 2000, in so far as the information falls within the scope of the [education] convention the public interest in maintaining the exemption is very strong and justified non-disclosure. However, in so far as any information fell outside the [education] convention, the position was, he said, more finely balanced, but, even there the public interest favours maintaining the exemption. Finally, he held that the same conclusion applied to the environmental information essentially for the same reasons as he had given in relation to the FOIA The determination of the Upper Tribunal 34. Mr Evans exercised his right to appeal under section 57, and his appeal was referred to the Upper Tribunal, which heard the appeal over six days. Again, the proceedings were rather protracted. The issues were the same as before the Commissioner, but there was substantially more evidence, and much of it was subject to cross-examination. The UT s determination ran to 65 pages and 251 paragraphs, and there were appended to it substantial annexes (both open and closed). Open Annex 3 ran to 109 pages and 297 paragraphs. As Lord Dyson said in the Court of Appeal, the determination is a most impressive piece of work. 35. The UT decided that Mr Evans was entitled to disclosure of the advocacy correspondence, which, as they explained, meant correspondence in which The Prince of Wales advocated certain causes which were of particular interest to him. These included causes which related to the environment. The UT said this near the start of their determination: Page 11

13 4. For reasons which we explain below, we conclude that under relevant legislative provisions Mr Evans will, in the circumstances of the present case, generally be entitled to disclosure of advocacy correspondence falling within his requests. The essential reason is that it will generally be in the overall public interest for there to be transparency as to how and when Prince Charles seeks to influence government. The Departments have urged that it is important that Prince Charles should not be inhibited in encouraging or warning government as to what to do. We have not found it necessary to make a value judgment as to the desirability of Prince Charles encouraging or warning government as to what to do, for even assuming this to have the value claimed by the Departments we do not think the adverse consequences of disclosure will be as great as the Departments fear. In broad terms our ruling is that although there are cogent arguments for non-disclosure, the public interest benefits of disclosure of advocacy correspondence falling within Mr Evans's requests will generally outweigh the public interest benefits of nondisclosure. 5. It is important to understand the limits of this ruling. It does not entitle Mr Evans to disclosure of purely social or personal correspondence passing between Prince Charles and government ministers. It does not entitle Mr Evans to correspondence within the established constitutional convention that the heir to the throne is to be instructed in the business of government. Nor does it involve ruling on matters which do not arise in the present case. Thus, for example, it is conceivable that there may be correspondence which, although outside the established constitutional convention, can properly be described as preparation for kingship. Or it may be that correspondence concerns an aspect of policy which is fresh and time needs to be allowed for a protected space before disclosure would be in the public interest. While they do not in our view arise in the present case it is possible that for these or other reasons correspondence sought in other cases may arguably not be disclosable. 36. The UT then proceeded to explain why they had reached this conclusion. They considered in some considerable detail the evidence and arguments relating to the effect and relevance of the three constitutional conventions, the cardinal convention (whereby the monarch is normally expected to act in accordance with ministerial advice), the tripartite convention and the Page 12

14 education convention. They pointed out that the Prince of Wales had strongly held views on a number of matters, including politically controversial issues and proposed legislation, that his communication of those views to government ministers was well known (not least because he, ministers and others had mentioned this publicly), that he had a selfperceived role which was representational and involved expressing views in danger of not being heard, that some of the letters had been published, and that a high degree of publicity had not stopped his education about government or his correspondence with ministers. They then referred to the expert evidence on the three constitutional conventions. Contrary to the view of the Commissioner, they considered that, in the light of the expert evidence and argument, the education convention did not extend to charitable or personal matters. 37. The UT then summarised the competing arguments in para 123 as follows (ignoring some numbering): Factors in favour of disclosure Governmental accountability and transparency; The increased understanding of the interaction between government and monarchy; A public understanding of the influence, if any, of Prince Charles on matters of public policy; A particular significance in the light of media stories focusing on Prince Charles's alleged inappropriate interference/lobbying; Furthering the public debate regarding the constitutional role of the monarchy and, in particular, the heir to the throne; and Informing the broader debate surrounding constitutional reform. Factors against disclosure Page 13

15 Potential to undermine the operation of the education convention; An inherent and weighty public interest in the maintenance of confidences; Potential to undermine Prince Charles's perceived political neutrality; Interference with Prince Charles's right to respect for private life under article 8; and A resultant chilling effect on the frankness of communication between Prince Charles and government ministers. 38. The UT recorded that the parties differed as to the weight to be accorded to these factors, and then went on to discuss them in some detail. They observed that the Commissioner had given insufficient weight to the public interest, and had overestimated the extent to which disclosure would undermine the [education] convention. The UT expressed the view that the education convention would actually be assisted by recognition that advocacy communications will generally be disclosable if requested. The UT then carefully assessed and weighed the various factors which they had identified in para 123, and reached the conclusion that the advocacy correspondence should be disclosed. In very summary terms, the UT s conclusion was that, in relation to section 37 the public interest outweighed the argument for the exemption, in relation to section 40 this meant that para 6(1) of Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act applied, and in relation to section 41 the public interest prevented the disclosure being a breach of confidence. Further details of the UT s reasoning is set out in Lord Mance s judgment. 39. In the course of the discussion the UT considered the date at which the position must be tested, and discussed this at paras of their determination. At para 58, they stated that the reference date cannot be later than 28 February 2006, which was the latest date by which any of the Departments ought to have concluded their internal review of the decision to refuse Mr Evans s request. However, the UT added that later-occurring matters could be taken into account if they cast light on the circumstances at the reference date. Page 14

16 The Attorney General s certificate 40. A few weeks later, the Attorney General issued the Certificate stating that he had on reasonable grounds formed the opinion that the Departments had been entitled to refuse the requests for disclosure. The effect of the Certificate was that any decision notice of the UT requiring the Departments to disclose the advocacy correspondence ceased to have effect. As the Court of Appeal pointed out, it may be that the Attorney General issued the Certificate prematurely (unsurprisingly in the light of the strict time limit in section 53(2)), because the UT had not formally issued a decision notice, although they had published their final determination. However, nothing hangs on that. 41. The Certificate summarised the background and then, over more than five pages, explained why the Attorney General had decided to exercise his power under section 53(2). After accurately encapsulating the UT s reasoning and conclusions, he set out the arguments for and against disclosure as he saw them. 42. Against disclosure, he thought, was the important basis for the section 37 exemption, namely the three constitutional conventions and their particular significance in the context of the letters. The Attorney General explained that it was important that the Prince of Wales should be able to engage in correspondence and engage in dialogue with Ministers about matters falling within the business of their departments as such correspondence and dialogue will assist him in fulfilling his duties under the tripartite convention as King. He went on to explain that [d]iscussing matters of policy with Ministers, and urging views upon them, falls within the ambit of advising or warning about the Government s actions. He then said that if such correspondence is to take place at all, it must be under conditions of confidentiality. He added that the advocacy correspondence deserved protection from disclosure given that it was clearly conducted on a confidential basis. The Attorney General thought that the recent nature of the letters, and the fact that they revealed deeply held personal views which were often particularly frank, but not at all improper, militated against disclosure. 43. He then turned to the argument for disclosure, which included governmental accountability and transparency, improving public understanding of government, and furthering public debate about the role of the monarch and the heir to the throne. However, he made it clear that, while these were good generic arguments, they could only succeed in the present instance at the expense of the strong public interest arguments against disclosure, and that Page 15

17 he disagreed with the UT s view that the Prince of Wales was in no different position from any other lobbyist. 44. The Attorney General then said that in his view the public interests in nondisclosure of the disputed information in this case substantially outweigh the public interests in its disclosure. He then went on to say that the same conclusion applied to the environmental information as well as to the nonenvironmental information. He also took the view that there would be a breach of the Prince of Wales s data protection rights if the advocacy correspondence was made public. 45. The Attorney General then acknowledged that the section 53 power should be exercised only in exceptional cases, but said that he was satisfied that this is such an exceptional case, for reasons which he summarised as being the following: The fact that the information in question consisted of private and confidential letters between The Prince of Wales and Ministers. The fact that the request in this case was for recent correspondence. The fact that the letters in this case formed part of The Prince of Wales s preparation for kingship. The potential damage that disclosure would do to the principle of The Prince of Wales s political neutrality, which could seriously undermine the Prince s ability to fulfil his duties when he becomes King. The ability of the Monarch to engage with the Government of the day whatever its political colour, and maintain political neutrality as a cornerstone of the UK s constitutional framework. Further details of the contents of the Certificate are set out in Lord Mance s judgment. Page 16

18 The instant judicial review proceedings 46. Mr Evans sought judicial review of the Certificate, arguing that it was invalid on two grounds. First, in domestic law, he contended that section 53 did not permit a certificate to be issued simply because, on the same facts and arguments, the accountable person took a different view of the public interest from the Upper Tribunal when it came to the issue of disclosure. Secondly, in EU law, because the advocacy correspondence included environmental information, he contended that, once the UT had issued its determination, it was contrary to the provisions of article 6, supported by the EU Charter, for anyone, especially a member of the executive, to overrule that determination. 47. The Divisional Court rejected both lines of argument in a judgment given by Davis LJ, with which Lord Judge CJ (who delivered a short concurring judgment) and Globe J agreed. They held that reasonable grounds in section 53(2) simply meant grounds which, when viewed on their own, were cogent, and there was no reason to constrain the expression to exclude the accountable person from forming his own view simply because it differed from that of a court or tribunal. As to the EU law argument, the Divisional Court rejected the contention that invoking section 53 fell foul of the 2003 Directive or the EU Charter in a case where a court or tribunal had ruled that the information concerned should be disclosed. Mr Evans appealed to the Court of Appeal, and in a judgment given by Lord Dyson MR (with which Richards and Pitchford LJJ agreed) they allowed his appeal on both points. They also gave the Attorney General permission to appeal to this court. 48. I turn then to the two arguments which are said on behalf of Mr Evans, and were held by the Court of Appeal, to undermine the Certificate. The Certificate s validity under the FOIA 2000 Validity under the FOIA 2000: introductory 49. The argument for the Attorney General under the FOIA 2000 proceeds as follows. First, section 53 clearly envisages that an accountable person, ie the Attorney General or a Cabinet Minister, can override a decision notice ordering disclosure; secondly, it is clear, especially in the light of section 53(4)(b) (referring as it does to the power being exercised after any appeal has been determined) and section 58(1) (which enables the tribunal to confirm or issue a decision notice), that the power can be exercised even after a tribunal or any court has ordered disclosure; and, thirdly, while reasonable Page 17

19 grounds for the certificate have to be given, it cannot be said that the Attorney General s grounds were unreasonable in this case, as (a) they reflected the views of the Commissioner, and (b) the UT acknowledged that there were cogent arguments for non-disclosure. 50. The only point of dispute to which this argument gives rise is at the third stage. Ms Rose QC, on behalf of Mr Evans, contends that, construed in its context (as of course it must be) the expression reasonable grounds does not permit the accountable person to issue a certificate simply because, on the basis of the same facts and issues as were before a judicial tribunal (particularly a court of record), he takes a different view from that which was taken by the UT in its determination. On this basis, she contends, once a judicial tribunal, or at any rate a court of record, has ruled on the question, there has to be something more than a mere different assessment on the part of the accountable person of where the balance falls before a certificate can be justified. Validity under the FOIA 2000: the constitutional aspect 51. When one considers the implications of section 53(2) in the context of a situation where a court, or indeed any judicial tribunal, has determined that information should be released, it is at once apparent that this argument has considerable force. A statutory provision which entitles a member of the executive (whether a Government Minister or the Attorney General) to overrule a decision of the judiciary merely because he does not agree with it would not merely be unique in the laws of the United Kingdom. It would cut across two constitutional principles which are also fundamental components of the rule of law. 52. First, subject to being overruled by a higher court or (given Parliamentary supremacy) a statute, it is a basic principle that a decision of a court is binding as between the parties, and cannot be ignored or set aside by anyone, including (indeed it may fairly be said, least of all) the executive. Secondly, it is also fundamental to the rule of law that decisions and actions of the executive are, subject to necessary well established exceptions (such as declarations of war), and jealously scrutinised statutory exceptions, reviewable by the court at the suit of an interested citizen. Section 53, as interpreted by the Attorney General s argument in this case, flouts the first principle and stands the second principle on its head. It involves saying that a final decision of a court can be set aside by a member of the executive (normally the minister in charge of the very department against whom the decision has been given) because he does not agree with it. And the fact that the member of the executive can put forward cogent and/or strongly held Page 18

20 reasons for disagreeing with the court is, in this context, nothing to the point: many court decisions are on points of controversy where opinions (even individual judicial opinions) may reasonably differ, but that does not affect the applicability of these principles. 53. In M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377, 395, Lord Templeman in characteristically colourful language criticised the proposition that the executive obey the law as a matter of grace and not as a matter of necessity [as] a proposition which would reverse the result of the Civil War. The proposition that a member of the executive can actually overrule a decision of the judiciary because he does not agree with that decision is equally remarkable, even if one allows for the fact that the executive s overruling can be judicially reviewed. Indeed, the notion of judicial review in such circumstances is a little quaint, as it can be said with some force that the rule of law would require a judge, almost as a matter of course, to quash the executive decision. 54. The constitutional importance of the principle that a decision of the executive should be reviewable by the judiciary lay behind the majority judgments in the famous case, Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147, where the House of Lords held that a statutory provision, which provided that any determination by the commission in question shall not be called in question in any court of law, did not prevent the court from deciding whether a purported decision of the commission was a nullity, on the ground that the commission had misconstrued a provision defining their jurisdiction. Lord Reid said at p 170D that if it had been intended to prevent any inquiry [in all circumstances] I would have expected to find something much more specific than the bald statement that a determination shall not be called in question in any court of law. And see per Lord Diplock in In re Racal Communications Ltd [1981] AC 374, 383, where he held that there is a presumption that Parliament did not intend an administrative body to be the final arbiter on questions of law. 55. This is scarcely a recent development. In R v Cheltenham Commissioners (1841) 1 QB 467, a statute provided that any decision of the Quarter Sessions as to the levying of certain rates was to be final, binding, and conclusive to all intents and purposes whatsoever, and that no order made in that connection shall be removed or removable by certiorari, or any other writ or process whatsoever, ; any law or statute to the contrary thereof in anywise notwithstanding. Despite this, Lord Denman CJ robustly stated at p 474 that Page 19

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