The ground upon which a contract entered into under duress can be avoided is because there is no real consent. The apparent consent is unreal because of the imprisonment or force, or of the fear caused by the threats. "Actual violence," it has been said, "is not necessary to constitute duress, * * * because consent is the very essence of a contract; and, if there be compulsion, there is no actual consent; and moral compulsion, such as that produced by threats to take life, or to inflict great bodily harm, as well as that produced by imprisonment, is everywhere regarded as sufficient, in law, to destroy free agency, without which there can be no contract, because in that state of the case there is no consent. 'Duress,' in its more extended sense, means that degree of constraint or danger, either actually inflicted or threatened and impending, which is sufficient, in severity or in apprehension, to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness." 2

The statement of what constitutes duress, made in this and many other cases,8 requires that the violence or threats shall have been sufficient to overcome a mind of "ordinary firmness," or the mind of a person of "ordinary courage." By the great weight of modern authority, however, both in this country and in England, this test has been rejected. The rule now generally prevailing is that violence or threats employed for the purpose of overcoming the mind, and actually having that effect, constitute duress, although the violence or threats employed would not be sufficient to overcome the mind of a person of ordinary firmness.4