Mr. Madison considered an election of one branch at
least of the Legislature by the people immediately, as a
clear principle of free Govt. and that this mode under
proper regulations had the additional advantage of securing
better representatives, as well as of avoiding too great
an agency of the State Governments in the General one.--He
differed from the member from Connecticut (Mr.
Sherman) in thinking the objects mentioned to be all the
principal ones that required a National Govt. Those were
certainly important and necessary objects; but he combined
with them the necessity, of providing more effectually
for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation
of Justice. Interferences with these were evils
which had more perhaps than any thing else, produced
this convention. Was it to be supposed that republican liberty
could long exist under the abuses of it practiced in
some of the States. The gentleman (Mr. Sherman) had admitted
that in a very small State, faction & oppression wd.
prevail. It was to be inferred then that wherever these prevailed
the State was too small. Had they not prevailed in
the largest as well as the smallest tho' less than in the
smallest; and were we not thence admonished to enlarge
the sphere as far as the nature of the Govt. would admit.
This was the only defence agst. the inconveniences of democracy
consistent with the democratic form of Govt. All
civilized Societies would be divided into different Sects,
Factions, & interests, as they happened to consist of rich &
poor, debtors & creditors, the landed the manufacturing,
the commercial interests, the inhabitants of this district, or
that district, the followers of this political leader or that
political leader, the disciples of this religious sect or that
religious sect. In all cases where a majority are united by a
common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are
in danger. What motives are to restrain them? A prudent
regard to the maxim that honesty is the best policy is
found by experience to be as little regarded by bodies of
men as by individuals. Respect for character is always diminished
in proportion to the number among whom the
blame or praise is to be divided. Conscience, the only remaining
tie is known to be inadequate in individuals: In
large numbers, little is to be expected from it. Besides, Religion
itself may become a motive to persecution & oppression.--These
observations are verified by the Histories of
every Country antient & modern. In Greece & Rome the
rich & poor, the creditors & debtors, as well as the patricians
& plebeians alternately oppressed each other with
equal unmercifulness. What a source of oppression was
the relation between the parent Cities of Rome, Athens &
Carthage, & their respective provinces: the former possessing
the power & the latter being sufficiently distinguished
to be separate objects of it? Why was America so
justly apprehensive of Parliamentary injustice? Because G.
Britain had a separate interest real or supposed, & if her
authority had been admitted, could have pursued that interest
at our expense. We have seen the mere distinction
of colour made in the most enlightened period of time, a
ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by
man over man. What has been the source of those unjust
laws complained of among ourselves? Has it not been the
real or supposed interest of the major number? Debtors
have defrauded their creditors. The landed interest has
borne hard on the mercantile interest. The Holders of one
species of property have thrown a disproportion of taxes
on the holders of another species. The lesson we are to
draw from the whole is that where a majority are united
by a common sentiment and have an opportunity, the
rights of the minor party become insecure. In a Republican
Govt. the Majority if united have always an opportunity.
The only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, & thereby
divide the community into so great a number of interests
& parties, that in the 1st. place a majority will not be likely
at the same moment to have a common interest separate
from that of the whole or of the minority; and in the 2d.
place, that in case they shd. have such an interest, they
may not be apt to unite in the pursuit of it. It was incumbent
on us then to try this remedy, and with that view to
frame a republican system on such a scale & in such a
form as will controul all the evils wch. have been experienced.

[1:288; Madison, 18 June]

[Mr. Hamilton.] This view of the subject almost led him
to despair that a Republican Govt. could be established
over so great an extent. He was sensible at the same time
that it would be unwise to propose one of any other form.
In his private opinion he had no scruple in declaring, supported
as he was by the opinions of so many of the wise &
good, that the British Govt. was the best in the world: and
that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would
do in America. He hoped Gentlemen of different opinions
would bear with him in this, and begged them to recollect
the change of opinion on this subject which had taken
place and was still going on. It was once thought that the
power of Congs was amply sufficient to secure the end of
their institution. The error was now seen by every one.
The members most tenacious of republicanism, he observed,
were as loud as any in declaiming agst. the vice of
democracy. This progress of the public mind led him to
anticipate the time, when others as well as himself would
join in the praise bestowed by Mr. Neckar on the British
Constitution, namely, that it is the only Govt. in the world
"which unites public strength with individual security."--
In every community where industry is encouraged, there
will be a division of it into the few & the many. Hence
separate interests will arise There will be debtors & Creditors
&c. Give all power to the many, they will oppress the
few. Give all power to the few they will oppress the many.
Both therefore ought to have power, that each may defend
itself agst. the other. To the want of this check we
owe our paper money--instalment laws &c To the proper
adjustment of it the British owe the excellence of their
Constitution. Their house of Lords is a most noble institution.
Having nothing to hope for by a change, and a
sufficient interest by means of their property, in being
faithful to the National interest, they form a permanent
barrier agst. every pernicious innovation, whether attempted
on the part of the Crown or of the Commons. No
temporary Senate will have firmness en'o' to answer the
purpose. The Senate (of Maryland) which seems to be so
much appealed to, has not yet been sufficiently tried. Had
the people been unanimous & eager, in the late appeal to
them on the subject of a paper emission they would would
have yielded to the torrent. Their acquiescing in such an
appeal is a proof of it.--Gentlemen differ in their opinions
concerning the necessary checks, from the different estimates
they form of the human passions. They suppose
Seven years a sufficient period to give the Senate an adequate
firmness, from not duly considering the amazing violence
& turbulence of the democratic spirit. When a great
object of Govt. is pursued, which seizes the popular passions,
they spread like wild fire, and become irresistable.
He appealed to the gentlemen from the N. England States
whether experience had not there verified the remark. As
to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good
one could be established on Republican principles. Was
not this giving up the merits of the question; for can there
be a good Govt. without a good Executive. The English
model was the only good one on this subject. The Hereditary
interest of the King was so interwoven with that of
the Nation, and his personal emoluments so great, that he
was placed above the danger of being corrupted from
abroad--and at the same time was both sufficiently independent
and sufficiently controuled, to answer the purpose
of the institution at home. one of the weak sides of
Republics was their being liable to foreign influence & corruption.
Men of little character, acquiring great power become
easily the tools of intermedling neibours. Sweeden
was a striking instance. The French & English had each
their parties during the late Revolution which was effected
by the predominant influence of the former. What is the
inference from all these observations? That we ought to
go as far in order to attain stability and permanency, as
republican principles will admit. Let one branch of the
Legislature hold their places for life or at least during
good-behaviour. Let the Executive also be for life. He appealed
to the feelings of the members present whether a
term of seven years, would induce the sacrifices of private
affairs which an acceptance of public trust would require,
so so as to ensure the services of the best Citizens. On this
plan we should have in the Senate a permanent will, a
weighty interest, which would answer essential purposes.
But is this a Republican Govt. it will be asked? Yes, if all
the Magistrates are appointed, and vacancies are filled, by
the people, or a process of election originating with the
people.

[1:421; Madison, 26 June]

Mr. Madison. In order to judge of the form to be given
to this institution [the second branch of the legislature], it
will be proper to take a view of the ends to be served by
it. These were first to protect the people agst. their rulers:
secondly to protect the people agst. the transient impressions
into which they themselves might be led. A people
deliberating in a temperate moment, and with the experience
of other nations before them, on the plan of Govt.
most likely to secure their happiness, would first be aware,
that those chargd. with the public happiness, might betray
their trust. An obvious precaution agst. this danger wd. be
to divide the trust between different bodies of men, who
might watch & check each other. In this they wd. be governed
by the same prudence which has prevailed in organizing
the subordinate departments of Govt. where all
business liable to abuses is made to pass thro' separate
hands, the one being a check on the other. It wd. next
occur to such a people, that they themselves were liable to
temporary errors, thro' want of information as to their
true interest, and that men chosen for a short term, & employed
but a small portion of that in public affairs, might
err from the same cause. This reflection wd. naturally suggest
that the Govt. be so constituted, as that one of its
branches might have an oppy. of acquiring a competent
knowledge of the public interests. Another reflection
equally becoming a people on such an occasion, wd. be
that they themselves, as well as a numerous body of Representatives,
were liable to err also, from fickleness and
passion. A necessary fence agst. this danger would be to
select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited
number, and firmness might seasonably interpose agst. impetuous
counsels. It ought finally to occur to a people deliberating
on a Govt. for themselves, that as different interests
necessarily result from the liberty meant to be
secured, the major interest might under sudden impulses
be tempted to commit injustice on the minority. In all civilized
Countries the people fall into different classes havg.
a real or supposed difference of interests. There will be
creditors & debtors, farmers, merchts. & manufacturers.
There will be particularly the distinction of rich & poor. It
was true as had been observed. (by Mr Pinkney) we had
not among us those hereditary distinctions, of rank which
were a great source of the contests in the ancient Govts. as
well as the modern States of Europe, nor those extremes
of wealth or poverty which characterize the latter. We cannot
however be regarded even at this time, as one homogeneous
mass, in which every thing that affects a part will
affect in the same manner the whole. In framing a system
which we wish to last for ages, we shd. not lose sight of the
changes which ages will produce. An increase of population
will of necessity increase the proportion of those who
will labour under all the hardships of life, & secretly sigh
for a more equal distribution of its blessings. These may
in time outnumber those who are placed above the feelings
of indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage,
the power will slide into the hands of the former. No
agrarian attempts have yet been made in this Country, but
symptoms of a leveling spirit, as we have understood, have
sufficiently appeared in a certain quarters to give notice of
the future danger. How is this danger to be guarded agst.
on republican principles? How is the danger in all cases of
interested co-alitions to oppress the minority to be
guarded agst.? Among other means by the establishment
of a body in the Govt. sufficiently respectable for its wisdom
& virtue, to aid on such emergencies, the preponderance
of justice by throwing its weight into that scale. Such
being the objects of the second branch in the proposed
Govt. he thought a considerable duration ought to be
given to it. He did not conceive that the term of nine years
could threaten any real danger; but in pursuing his particular
ideas on the subject, he should require that the long
term allowed to the 2d. branch should not commence till
such a period of life as would render a perpetual disqualification
to be re-elected little inconvenient either in a public
or private view. He observed that as it was more than
probable we were now digesting a plan which in its operation
wd. decide forever the fate of Republican Govt we
ought not only to provide every guard to liberty that its
preservation cd. require, but be equally careful to supply
the defects which our own experience had particularly
pointed out.