A Letter
Concerning Toleration

John Locke

Translated by William Popple

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A Letter Concerning Toleration

Honoured Sir,

Since you are pleased to inquire what are my thoughts about the mutual toleration of Christians in their different
professions of religion, I must needs answer you freely that I esteem that toleration to be the chief characteristic
mark of the true Church. For whatsoever some people boast of the antiquity of places and names, or of the pomp of their
outward worship; others, of the reformation of their discipline; all, of the orthodoxy of their faith — for everyone is
orthodox to himself — these things, and all others of this nature, are much rather marks of men striving for power and
empire over one another than of the Church of Christ. Let anyone have never so true a claim to all these things, yet if
he be destitute of charity, meekness, and good-will in general towards all mankind, even to those that are not
Christians, he is certainly yet short of being a true Christian himself. “The kings of the Gentiles exercise leadership
over them,” said our Saviour to his disciples, “but ye shall not be so.”1 The business of true religion is quite another thing. It is not instituted in order to the erecting
of an external pomp, nor to the obtaining of ecclesiastical dominion, nor to the exercising of compulsive force, but to
the regulating of men’s lives, according to the rules of virtue and piety. Whosoever will list himself under the banner
of Christ, must, in the first place and above all things, make war upon his own lusts and vices. It is in vain for any
man to unsurp the name of Christian, without holiness of life, purity of manners, benignity and meekness of spirit.
“Let everyone that nameth the name of Christ, depart from iniquity.”2
“Thou, when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren,” said our Lord to Peter.3 It would, indeed, be very hard for one that appears careless about his own salvation to persuade me
that he were extremely concerned for mine. For it is impossible that those should sincerely and heartily apply
themselves to make other people Christians, who have not really embraced the Christian religion in their own hearts. If
the Gospel and the apostles may be credited, no man can be a Christian without charity and without that faith which
works, not by force, but by love. Now, I appeal to the consciences of those that persecute, torment, destroy, and kill
other men upon pretence of religion, whether they do it out of friendship and kindness towards them or no? And I shall
then indeed, and not until then, believe they do so, when I shall see those fiery zealots correcting, in the same
manner, their friends and familiar acquaintance for the manifest sins they commit against the precepts of the Gospel;
when I shall see them persecute with fire and sword the members of their own communion that are tainted with enormous
vices and without amendment are in danger of eternal perdition; and when I shall see them thus express their love and
desire of the salvation of their souls by the infliction of torments and exercise of all manner of cruelties. For if it
be out of a principle of charity, as they pretend, and love to men’s souls that they deprive them of their estates,
maim them with corporal punishments, starve and torment them in noisome prisons, and in the end even take away their
lives — I say, if all this be done merely to make men Christians and procure their salvation, why then do they suffer
whoredom, fraud, malice, and such-like enormities, which (according to the apostle)4 manifestly relish of heathenish corruption, to predominate so much and abound amongst their flocks
and people? These, and such-like things, are certainly more contrary to the glory of God, to the purity of the Church,
and to the salvation of souls, than any conscientious dissent from ecclesiastical decisions, or separation from public
worship, whilst accompanied with innocence of life. Why, then, does this burning zeal for God, for the Church, and for
the salvation of souls — burning I say, literally, with fire and faggot — pass by those moral vices and wickednesses,
without any chastisement, which are acknowledged by all men to be diametrically opposite to the profession of
Christianity, and bend all its nerves either to the introducing of ceremonies, or to the establishment of opinions,
which for the most part are about nice and intricate matters, that exceed the capacity of ordinary understandings?
Which of the parties contending about these things is in the right, which of them is guilty of schism or heresy,
whether those that domineer or those that suffer, will then at last be manifest when the causes of their separation
comes to be judged of He, certainly, that follows Christ, embraces His doctrine, and bears His yoke, though he forsake
both father and mother, separate from the public assemblies and ceremonies of his country, or whomsoever or whatsoever
else he relinquishes, will not then be judged a heretic.

Now, though the divisions that are amongst sects should be allowed to be never so obstructive of the salvation of
souls; yet, nevertheless, adultery, fornication, uncleanliness, lasciviousness, idolatry, and such-like things, cannot
be denied to be works of the flesh, concerning which the apostle has expressly declared that “they who do them shall
not inherit the kingdom of God.”5 Whosoever, therefore, is sincerely
solicitous about the kingdom of God and thinks it his duty to endeavour the enlargement of it amongst men, ought to
apply himself with no less care and industry to the rooting out of these immoralities than to the extirpation of sects.
But if anyone do otherwise, and whilst he is cruel and implacable towards those that differ from him in opinion, he be
indulgent to such iniquities and immoralities as are unbecoming the name of a Christian, let such a one talk never so
much of the Church, he plainly demonstrates by his actions that it is another kingdom he aims at and not the
advancement of the kingdom of God.

That any man should think fit to cause another man — whose salvation he heartily desires — to expire in torments,
and that even in an unconverted state, would, I confess, seem very strange to me, and I think, to any other also. But
nobody, surely, will ever believe that such a carriage can proceed from charity, love, or goodwill. If anyone maintain
that men ought to be compelled by fire and sword to profess certain doctrines, and conform to this or that exterior
worship, without any regard had unto their morals; if anyone endeavour to convert those that are erroneous unto the
faith, by forcing them to profess things that they do not believe and allowing them to practise things that the Gospel
does not permit, it cannot be doubted indeed but such a one is desirous to have a numerous assembly joined in the same
profession with himself; but that he principally intends by those means to compose a truly Christian Church is
altogether incredible. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at if those who do not really contend for the advancement
of the true religion, and of the Church of Christ, make use of arms that do not belong to the Christian warfare. If,
like the Captain of our salvation, they sincerely desired the good of souls, they would tread in the steps and follow
the perfect example of that Prince of Peace, who sent out His soldiers to the subduing of nations, and gathering them
into His Church, not armed with the sword, or other instruments of force, but prepared with the Gospel of peace and
with the exemplary holiness of their conversation. This was His method. Though if infidels were to be converted by
force, if those that are either blind or obstinate were to be drawn off from their errors by armed soldiers, we know
very well that it was much more easy for Him to do it with armies of heavenly legions than for any son of the Church,
how potent soever, with all his dragoons.

The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus
Christ, and to the genuine reason of mankind, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive the
necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light. I will not here tax the pride and ambition of some, the passion and
uncharitable zeal of others. These are faults from which human affairs can perhaps scarce ever be perfectly freed; but
yet such as nobody will bear the plain imputation of, without covering them with some specious colour; and so pretend
to commendation, whilst they are carried away by their own irregular passions. But, however, that some may not colour
their spirit of persecution and unchristian cruelty with a pretence of care of the public weal and observation of the
laws; and that others, under pretence of religion, may not seek impunity for their libertinism and licentiousness; in a
word, that none may impose either upon himself or others, by the pretences of loyalty and obedience to the prince, or
of tenderness and sincerity in the worship of God; I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the
business of civil government from that of religion and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the
other. If this be not done, there can be no end put to the controversies that will be always arising between those that
have, or at least pretend to have, on the one side, a concernment for the interest of men’s souls, and, on the other
side, a care of the commonwealth.

The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing
their own civil interests.

Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as
money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.

It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of equal laws, to secure unto all the people in
general and to every one of his subjects in particular the just possession of these things belonging to this life. If
anyone presume to violate the laws of public justice and equity, established for the preservation of those things, his
presumption is to be checked by the fear of punishment, consisting of the deprivation or diminution of those civil
interests, or goods, which otherwise he might and ought to enjoy. But seeing no man does willingly suffer himself to be
punished by the deprivation of any part of his goods, and much less of his liberty or life, therefore, is the
magistrate armed with the force and strength of all his subjects, in order to the punishment of those that violate any
other man’s rights.

Now that the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil concernments, and that all civil
power, right and dominion, is bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things; and that it neither can
nor ought in any manner to be extended to the salvation of souls, these following considerations seem unto me
abundantly to demonstrate.

First, because the care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate, any more than to other men. It is not
committed unto him, I say, by God; because it appears not that God has ever given any such authority to one man over
another as to compel anyone to his religion. Nor can any such power be vested in the magistrate by the consent of the
people, because no man can so far abandon the care of his own salvation as blindly to leave to the choice of any other,
whether prince or subject, to prescribe to him what faith or worship he shall embrace. For no man can, if he would,
conform his faith to the dictates of another. All the life and power of true religion consist in the inward and full
persuasion of the mind; and faith is not faith without believing. Whatever profession we make, to whatever outward
worship we conform, if we are not fully satisfied in our own mind that the one is true and the other well pleasing unto
God, such profession and such practice, far from being any furtherance, are indeed great obstacles to our salvation.
For in this manner, instead of expiating other sins by the exercise of religion, I say, in offering thus unto God
Almighty such a worship as we esteem to be displeasing unto Him, we add unto the number of our other sins those also of
hypocrisy and contempt of His Divine Majesty.

In the second place, the care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in
outward force; but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be
acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything
by outward force. Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any such efficacy as
to make men change the inward judgement that they have framed of things.

It may indeed be alleged that the magistrate may make use of arguments, and, thereby; draw the heterodox into the
way of truth, and procure their salvation. I grant it; but this is common to him with other men. In teaching,
instructing, and redressing the erroneous by reason, he may certainly do what becomes any good man to do. Magistracy
does not oblige him to put off either humanity or Christianity; but it is one thing to persuade, another to command;
one thing to press with arguments, another with penalties. This civil power alone has a right to do; to the other,
goodwill is authority enough. Every man has commission to admonish, exhort, convince another of error, and, by
reasoning, to draw him into truth; but to give laws, receive obedience, and compel with the sword, belongs to none but
the magistrate. And, upon this ground, I affirm that the magistrate’s power extends not to the establishing of any
articles of faith, or forms of worship, by the force of his laws. For laws are of no force at all without penalties,
and penalties in this case are absolutely impertinent, because they are not proper to convince the mind. Neither the
profession of any articles of faith, nor the conformity to any outward form of worship (as has been already said), can
be available to the salvation of souls, unless the truth of the one and the acceptableness of the other unto God be
thoroughly believed by those that so profess and practise. But penalties are no way capable to produce such belief. It
is only light and evidence that can work a change in men’s opinions; which light can in no manner proceed from corporal
sufferings, or any other outward penalties.

In the third place, the care of the salvation of men’s souls cannot belong to the magistrate; because, though the
rigour of laws and the force of penalties were capable to convince and change men’s minds, yet would not that help at
all to the salvation of their souls. For there being but one truth, one way to heaven, what hope is there that more men
would be led into it if they had no rule but the religion of the court and were put under the necessity to quit the
light of their own reason, and oppose the dictates of their own consciences, and blindly to resign themselves up to the
will of their governors and to the religion which either ignorance, ambition, or superstition had chanced to establish
in the countries where they were born? In the variety and contradiction of opinions in religion, wherein the princes of
the world are as much divided as in their secular interests, the narrow way would be much straitened; one country alone
would be in the right, and all the rest of the world put under an obligation of following their princes in the ways
that lead to destruction; and that which heightens the absurdity, and very ill suits the notion of a Deity, men would
owe their eternal happiness or misery to the places of their nativity.

These considerations, to omit many others that might have been urged to the same purpose, seem unto me sufficient to
conclude that all the power of civil government relates only to men’s civil interests, is confined to the care of the
things of this world, and hath nothing to do with the world to come.

Let us now consider what a church is. A church, then, I take to be a voluntary society of men, joining themselves
together of their own accord in order to the public worshipping of God in such manner as they judge acceptable to Him,
and effectual to the salvation of their souls.

I say it is a free and voluntary society. Nobody is born a member of any church; otherwise the religion of parents
would descend unto children by the same right of inheritance as their temporal estates, and everyone would hold his
faith by the same tenure he does his lands, than which nothing can be imagined more absurd. Thus, therefore, that
matter stands. No man by nature is bound unto any particular church or sect, but everyone joins himself voluntarily to
that society in which he believes he has found that profession and worship which is truly acceptable to God. The hope
of salvation, as it was the only cause of his entrance into that communion, so it can be the only reason of his stay
there. For if afterwards he discover anything either erroneous in the doctrine or incongruous in the worship of that
society to which he has joined himself, why should it not be as free for him to go out as it was to enter? No member of
a religious society can be tied with any other bonds but what proceed from the certain expectation of eternal life. A
church, then, is a society of members voluntarily uniting to that end.

It follows now that we consider what is the power of this church and unto what laws it is subject.

Forasmuch as no society, how free soever, or upon whatsoever slight occasion instituted, whether of philosophers for
learning, of merchants for commerce, or of men of leisure for mutual conversation and discourse, no church or company,
I say, can in the least subsist and hold together, but will presently dissolve and break in pieces, unless it be
regulated by some laws, and the members all consent to observe some order. Place and time of meeting must be agreed on;
rules for admitting and excluding members must be established; distinction of officers, and putting things into a
regular course, and suchlike, cannot be omitted. But since the joining together of several members into this
church-society, as has already been demonstrated, is absolutely free and spontaneous, it necessarily follows that the
right of making its laws can belong to none but the society itself; or, at least (which is the same thing), to those
whom the society by common consent has authorised thereunto.

Some, perhaps, may object that no such society can be said to be a true church unless it have in it a bishop or
presbyter, with ruling authority derived from the very apostles, and continued down to the present times by an
uninterrupted succession.

To these I answer: In the first place, let them show me the edict by which Christ has imposed that law upon His
Church. And let not any man think me impertinent, if in a thing of this consequence I require that the terms of that
edict be very express and positive; for the promise He has made us,6
that “wheresoever two or three are gathered together” in His name, He will be in the midst of them, seems to imply the
contrary. Whether such an assembly want anything necessary to a true church, pray do you consider. Certain I am that
nothing can be there wanting unto the salvation of souls, which is sufficient to our purpose.

Next, pray observe how great have always been the divisions amongst even those who lay so much stress upon the
Divine institution and continued succession of a certain order of rulers in the Church. Now, their very dissension
unavoidably puts us upon a necessity of deliberating and, consequently, allows a liberty of choosing that which upon
consideration we prefer.

And, in the last place, I consent that these men have a ruler in their church, established by such a long series of
succession as they judge necessary, provided I may have liberty at the same time to join myself to that society in
which I am persuaded those things are to be found which are necessary to the salvation of my soul. In this manner
ecclesiastical liberty will be preserved on all sides, and no man will have a legislator imposed upon him but whom
himself has chosen.

But since men are so solicitous about the true church, I would only ask them here, by the way, if it be not more
agreeable to the Church of Christ to make the conditions of her communion consist in such things, and such things only,
as the Holy Spirit has in the Holy Scriptures declared, in express words, to be necessary to salvation; I ask, I say,
whether this be not more agreeable to the Church of Christ than for men to impose their own inventions and
interpretations upon others as if they were of Divine authority, and to establish by ecclesiastical laws, as absolutely
necessary to the profession of Christianity, such things as the Holy Scriptures do either not mention, or at least not
expressly command? Whosoever requires those things in order to ecclesiastical communion, which Christ does not require
in order to life eternal, he may, perhaps, indeed constitute a society accommodated to his own opinion and his own
advantage; but how that can be called the Church of Christ which is established upon laws that are not His, and which
excludes such persons from its communion as He will one day receive into the Kingdom of Heaven, I understand not. But
this being not a proper place to inquire into the marks of the true church, I will only mind those that contend so
earnestly for the decrees of their own society, and that cry out continually, “The Church! the Church!” with as much
noise, and perhaps upon the same principle, as the Ephesian silversmiths did for their Diana; this, I say, I desire to
mind them of, that the Gospel frequently declares that the true disciples of Christ must suffer persecution; but that
the Church of Christ should persecute others, and force others by fire and sword to embrace her faith and doctrine, I
could never yet find in any of the books of the New Testament.

The end of a religious society (as has already been said) is the public worship of God and, by means thereof, the
acquisition of eternal life. All discipline ought, therefore, to tend to that end, and all ecclesiastical laws to be
thereunto confined. Nothing ought nor can be transacted in this society relating to the possession of civil and worldly
goods. No force is here to be made use of upon any occasion whatsoever. For force belongs wholly to the civil
magistrate, and the possession of all outward goods is subject to his jurisdiction.

But, it may be asked, by what means then shall ecclesiastical laws be established, if they must be thus destitute of
all compulsive power? I answer: They must be established by means suitable to the nature of such things, whereof the
external profession and observation — if not proceeding from a thorough conviction and approbation of the mind — is
altogether useless and unprofitable. The arms by which the members of this society are to be kept within their duty are
exhortations, admonitions, and advices. If by these means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and the erroneous
convinced, there remains nothing further to be done but that such stubborn and obstinate persons, who give no ground to
hope for their reformation, should be cast out and separated from the society. This is the last and utmost force of
ecclesiastical authority. No other punishment can thereby be inflicted than that, the relation ceasing between the body
and the member which is cut off. The person so condemned ceases to be a part of that church.

These things being thus determined, let us inquire, in the next place: How far the duty of toleration extends, and
what is required from everyone by it?

And, first, I hold that no church is bound, by the duty of toleration, to retain any such person in her bosom as,
after admonition, continues obstinately to offend against the laws of the society. For, these being the condition of
communion and the bond of the society, if the breach of them were permitted without any animadversion the society would
immediately be thereby dissolved. But, nevertheless, in all such cases care is to be taken that the sentence of
excommunication, and the execution thereof, carry with it no rough usage of word or action whereby the ejected person
may any wise be damnified in body or estate. For all force (as has often been said) belongs only to the magistrate, nor
ought any private persons at any time to use force, unless it be in self-defence against unjust violence.
Excommunication neither does, nor can, deprive the excommunicated person of any of those civil goods that he formerly
possessed. All those things belong to the civil government and are under the magistrate’s protection. The whole force
of excommunication consists only in this: that, the resolution of the society in that respect being declared, the union
that was between the body and some member comes thereby to be dissolved; and, that relation ceasing, the participation
of some certain things which the society communicated to its members, and unto which no man has any civil right, comes
also to cease. For there is no civil injury done unto the excommunicated person by the church minister’s refusing him
that bread and wine, in the celebration of the Lord’s Supper, which was not bought with his but other men’s money.

Secondly, no private person has any right in any manner to prejudice another person in his civil enjoyments because
he is of another church or religion. All the rights and franchises that belong to him as a man, or as a denizen, are
inviolably to be preserved to him. These are not the business of religion. No violence nor injury is to be offered him,
whether he be Christian or Pagan. Nay, we must not content ourselves with the narrow measures of bare justice; charity,
bounty, and liberality must be added to it. This the Gospel enjoins, this reason directs, and this that natural
fellowship we are born into requires of us. If any man err from the right way, it is his own misfortune, no injury to
thee; nor therefore art thou to punish him in the things of this life because thou supposest he will be miserable in
that which is to come.

What I say concerning the mutual toleration of private persons differing from one another in religion, I understand
also of particular churches which stand, as it were, in the same relation to each other as private persons among
themselves: nor has any one of them any manner of jurisdiction over any other; no, not even when the civil magistrate
(as it sometimes happens) comes to be of this or the other communion. For the civil government can give no new right to
the church, nor the church to the civil government. So that, whether the magistrate join himself to any church, or
separate from it, the church remains always as it was before — a free and voluntary society. It neither requires the
power of the sword by the magistrate’s coming to it, nor does it lose the right of instruction and excommunication by
his going from it. This is the fundamental and immutable right of a spontaneous society — that it has power to remove
any of its members who transgress the rules of its institution; but it cannot, by the accession of any new members,
acquire any right of jurisdiction over those that are not joined with it. And therefore peace, equity, and friendship
are always mutually to be observed by particular churches, in the same manner as by private persons, without any
pretence of superiority or jurisdiction over one another.

That the thing may be made clearer by an example, let us suppose two churches — the one of Arminians, the other of
Calvinists — residing in the city of Constantinople. Will anyone say that either of these churches has right to deprive
the members of the other of their estates and liberty (as we see practised elsewhere) because of their differing from
it in some doctrines and ceremonies, whilst the Turks, in the meanwhile, silently stand by and laugh to see with what
inhuman cruelty Christians thus rage against Christians? But if one of these churches hath this power of treating the
other ill, I ask which of them it is to whom that power belongs, and by what right? It will be answered, undoubtedly,
that it is the orthodox church which has the right of authority over the erroneous or heretical. This is, in great and
specious words, to say just nothing at all. For every church is orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous or heretical.
For whatsoever any church believes, it believes to be true and the contrary unto those things it pronounce; to be
error. So that the controversy between these churches about the truth of their doctrines and the purity of their
worship is on both sides equal; nor is there any judge, either at Constantinople or elsewhere upon earth, by whose
sentence it can be determined. The decision of that question belongs only to the Supreme judge of all men, to whom also
alone belongs the punishment of the erroneous. In the meanwhile, let those men consider how heinously they sin, who,
adding injustice, if not to their error, yet certainly to their pride, do rashly and arrogantly take upon them to
misuse the servants of another master, who are not at all accountable to them.

Nay, further: if it could be manifest which of these two dissenting churches were in the right, there would not
accrue thereby unto the orthodox any right of destroying the other. For churches have neither any jurisdiction in
worldly matters, nor are fire and sword any proper instruments wherewith to convince men’s minds of error, and inform
them of the truth. Let us suppose, nevertheless, that the civil magistrate inclined to favour one of them and to put
his sword into their hands that (by his consent) they might chastise the dissenters as they pleased. Will any man say
that any right can be derived unto a Christian church over its brethren from a Turkish emperor? An infidel, who has
himself no authority to punish Christians for the articles of their faith, cannot confer such an authority upon any
society of Christians, nor give unto them a right which he has not himself. This would be the case at Constantinople;
and the reason of the thing is the same in any Christian kingdom. The civil power is the same in every place. Nor can
that power, in the hands of a Christian prince, confer any greater authority upon the Church than in the hands of a
heathen; which is to say, just none at all.

Nevertheless, it is worthy to be observed and lamented that the most violent of these defenders of the truth, the
opposers of errors, the exclaimers against schism do hardly ever let loose this their zeal for God, with which they are
so warmed and inflamed, unless where they have the civil magistrate on their side. But so soon as ever court favour has
given them the better end of the staff, and they begin to feel themselves the stronger, then presently peace and
charity are to be laid aside. Otherwise they are religiously to be observed. Where they have not the power to carry on
persecution and to become masters, there they desire to live upon fair terms and preach up toleration. When they are
not strengthened with the civil power, then they can bear most patiently and unmovedly the contagion of idolatry,
superstition, and heresy in their neighbourhood; of which on other occasions the interest of religion makes them to be
extremely apprehensive. They do not forwardly attack those errors which are in fashion at court or are countenanced by
the government. Here they can be content to spare their arguments; which yet (with their leave) is the only right
method of propagating truth, which has no such way of prevailing as when strong arguments and good reason are joined
with the softness of civility and good usage.

Nobody, therefore, in fine, neither single persons nor churches, nay, nor even commonwealths, have any just title to
invade the civil rights and worldly goods of each other upon pretence of religion. Those that are of another opinion
would do well to consider with themselves how pernicious a seed of discord and war, how powerful a provocation to
endless hatreds, rapines, and slaughters they thereby furnish unto mankind. No peace and security, no, not so much as
common friendship, can ever be established or preserved amongst men so long as this opinion prevails, that dominion is
founded in grace and that religion is to be propagated by force of arms.

In the third place, let us see what the duty of toleration requires from those who are distinguished from the rest
of mankind (from the laity, as they please to call us) by some ecclesiastical character and office; whether they be
bishops, priests, presbyters, ministers, or however else dignified or distinguished. It is not my business to inquire
here into the original of the power or dignity of the clergy. This only I say, that, whencesoever their authority be
sprung, since it is ecclesiastical, it ought to be confined within the bounds of the Church, nor can it in any manner
be extended to civil affairs, because the Church itself is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the
commonwealth. The boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He jumbles heaven and earth together, the things
most remote and opposite, who mixes these two societies, which are in their original, end, business, and in everything
perfectly distinct and infinitely different from each other. No man, therefore, with whatsoever ecclesiastical office
he be dignified, can deprive another man that is not of his church and faith either of liberty or of any part of his
worldly goods upon the account of that difference between them in religion. For whatsoever is not lawful to the whole
Church cannot by any ecclesiastical right become lawful to any of its members.

But this is not all. It is not enough that ecclesiastical men abstain from violence and rapine and all manner of
persecution. He that pretends to be a successor of the apostles, and takes upon him the office of teaching, is obliged
also to admonish his hearers of the duties of peace and goodwill towards all men, as well towards the erroneous as the
orthodox; towards those that differ from them in faith and worship as well as towards those that agree with them
therein. And he ought industriously to exhort all men, whether private persons or magistrates (if any such there be in
his church), to charity, meekness, and toleration, and diligently endeavour to ally and temper all that heat and
unreasonable averseness of mind which either any man’s fiery zeal for his own sect or the craft of others has kindled
against dissenters. I will not undertake to represent how happy and how great would be the fruit, both in Church and
State, if the pulpits everywhere sounded with this doctrine of peace and toleration, lest I should seem to reflect too
severely upon those men whose dignity I desire not to detract from, nor would have it diminished either by others or
themselves. But this I say, that thus it ought to be. And if anyone that professes himself to be a minister of the Word
of God, a preacher of the gospel of peace, teach otherwise, he either understands not or neglects the business of his
calling and shall one day give account thereof unto the Prince of Peace. If Christians are to be admonished that they
abstain from all manner of revenge, even after repeated provocations and multiplied injuries, how much more ought they
who suffer nothing, who have had no harm done them, forbear violence and abstain from all manner of ill-usage towards
those from whom they have received none! This caution and temper they ought certainly to use towards those. who mind
only their own business and are solicitous for nothing but that (whatever men think of them) they may worship God in
that manner which they are persuaded is acceptable to Him and in which they have the strongest hopes of eternal
salvation. In private domestic affairs, in the management of estates, in the conservation of bodily health, every man
may consider what suits his own convenience and follow what course he likes best. No man complains of the
ill-management of his neighbour’s affairs. No man is angry with another for an error committed in sowing his land or in
marrying his daughter. Nobody corrects a spendthrift for consuming his substance in taverns. Let any man pull down, or
build, or make whatsoever expenses he pleases, nobody murmurs, nobody controls him; he has his liberty. But if any man
do not frequent the church, if he do not there conform his behaviour exactly to the accustomed ceremonies, or if he
brings not his children to be initiated in the sacred mysteries of this or the other congregation, this immediately
causes an uproar. The neighbourhood is filled with noise and clamour. Everyone is ready to be the avenger of so great a
crime, and the zealots hardly have the patience to refrain from violence and rapine so long till the cause be heard and
the poor man be, according to form, condemned to the loss of liberty, goods, or life. Oh, that our ecclesiastical
orators of every sect would apply themselves with all the strength of arguments that they are able to the confounding
of men’s errors! But let them spare their persons. Let them not supply their want of reasons with the instruments of
force, which belong to another jurisdiction and do ill become a Churchman’s hands. Let them not call in the
magistrate’s authority to the aid of their eloquence or learning, lest perhaps, whilst they pretend only love for the
truth, this their intemperate zeal, breathing nothing but fire and sword, betray their ambition and show that what they
desire is temporal dominion. For it will be very difficult to persuade men of sense that he who with dry eyes and
satisfaction of mind can deliver his brother to the executioner to be burnt alive, does sincerely and heartily concern
himself to save that brother from the flames of hell in the world to come.

In the last place, let us now consider what is the magistrate’s duty in the business of toleration, which certainly
is very considerable.

We have already proved that the care of souls does not belong to the magistrate. Not a magisterial care, I mean (if
I may so call it), which consists in prescribing by laws and compelling by punishments. But a charitable care, which
consists in teaching, admonishing, and persuading, cannot be denied unto any man. The care, therefore, of every man’s
soul belongs unto himself and is to be left unto himself. But what if he neglect the care of his soul? I answer: What
if he neglect the care of his health or of his estate, which things are nearlier related to the government of the
magistrate than the other? Will the magistrate provide by an express law that such a one shall not become poor or sick?
Laws provide, as much as is possible, that the goods and health of subjects be not injured by the fraud and violence of
others; they do not guard them from the negligence or ill-husbandry of the possessors themselves. No man can be forced
to be rich or healthful whether he will or no. Nay, God Himself will not save men against their wills. Let us suppose,
however, that some prince were desirous to force his subjects to accumulate riches, or to preserve the health and
strength of their bodies. Shall it be provided by law that they must consult none but Roman physicians, and shall
everyone be bound to live according to their prescriptions? What, shall no potion, no broth, be taken, but what is
prepared either in the Vatican, suppose, or in a Geneva shop? Or, to make these subjects rich, shall they all be
obliged by law to become merchants or musicians? Or, shall everyone turn victualler, or smith, because there are some
that maintain their families plentifully and grow rich in those professions? But, it may be said, there are a thousand
ways to wealth, but one only way to heaven. It is well said, indeed, especially by those that plead for compelling men
into this or the other way. For if there were several ways that led thither, there would not be so much as a pretence
left for compulsion. But now, if I be marching on with my utmost vigour in that way which, according to the sacred
geography, leads straight to Jerusalem, why am I beaten and ill-used by others because, perhaps, I wear not buskins;
because my hair is not of the right cut; because, perhaps, I have not been dipped in the right fashion; because I eat
flesh upon the road, or some other food which agrees with my stomach; because I avoid certain by-ways, which seem unto
me to lead into briars or precipices; because, amongst the several paths that are in the same road, I choose that to
walk in which seems to be the straightest and cleanest; because I avoid to keep company with some travellers that are
less grave and others that are more sour than they ought to be; or, in fine, because I follow a guide that either is,
or is not, clothed in white, or crowned with a mitre? Certainly, if we consider right, we shall find that, for the most
part, they are such frivolous things as these that (without any prejudice to religion or the salvation of souls, if not
accompanied with superstition or hypocrisy) might either be observed or omitted. I say they are such-like things as
these which breed implacable enmities amongst Christian brethren, who are all agreed in the substantial and truly
fundamental part of religion.

But let us grant unto these zealots, who condemn all things that are not of their mode, that from these
circumstances are different ends. What shall we conclude from thence? There is only one of these which is the true way
to eternal happiness: but in this great variety of ways that men follow, it is still doubted which is the right one.
Now, neither the care of the commonwealth, nor the right enacting of laws, does discover this way that leads to heaven
more certainly to the magistrate than every private man’s search and study discovers it unto himself. I have a weak
body, sunk under a languishing disease, for which (I suppose) there is one only remedy, but that unknown. Does it
therefore belong unto the magistrate to prescribe me a remedy, because there is but one, and because it is unknown?
Because there is but one way for me to escape death, will it therefore be safe for me to do whatsoever the magistrate
ordains? Those things that every man ought sincerely to inquire into himself, and by meditation, study, search, and his
own endeavours, attain the knowledge of, cannot be looked upon as the peculiar possession of any sort of men. Princes,
indeed, are born superior unto other men in power, but in nature equal. Neither the right nor the art of ruling does
necessarily carry along with it the certain knowledge of other things, and least of all of true religion. For if it
were so, how could it come to pass that the lords of the earth should differ so vastly as they do in religious matters?
But let us grant that it is probable the way to eternal life may be better known by a prince than by his subjects, or
at least that in this incertitude of things the safest and most commodious way for private persons is to follow his
dictates. You will say: “What then?” If he should bid you follow merchandise for your livelihood, would you decline
that course for fear it should not succeed? I answer: I would turn merchant upon the prince’s command, because, in case
I should have ill-success in trade, he is abundantly able to make up my loss some other way. If it be true, as he
pretends, that he desires I should thrive and grow rich, he can set me up again when unsuccessful voyages have broken
me. But this is not the case in the things that regard the life to come; if there I take a wrong course, if in that
respect I am once undone, it is not in the magistrate’s power to repair my loss, to ease my suffering, nor to restore
me in any measure, much less entirely, to a good estate. What security can be given for the Kingdom of Heaven?

Perhaps some will say that they do not suppose this infallible judgement, that all men are bound to follow in the
affairs of religion, to be in the civil magistrate, but in the Church. What the Church has determined, that the civil
magistrate orders to be observed; and he provides by his authority that nobody shall either act or believe in the
business of religion otherwise than the Church teaches. So that the judgement of those things is in the Church; the
magistrate himself yields obedience thereunto and requires the like obedience from others. I answer: Who sees not how
frequently the name of the Church, which was venerable in time of the apostles, has been made use of to throw dust in
the people’s eyes in the following ages? But, however, in the present case it helps us not. The one only narrow way
which leads to heaven is not better known to the magistrate than to private persons, and therefore I cannot safely take
him for my guide, who may probably be as ignorant of the way as myself, and who certainly is less concerned for my
salvation than I myself am. Amongst so many kings of the Jews, how many of them were there whom any Israelite, thus
blindly following, had not fallen into idolatry and thereby into destruction? Yet, nevertheless, you bid me be of good
courage and tell me that all is now safe and secure, because the magistrate does not now enjoin the observance of his
own decrees in matters of religion, but only the decrees of the Church. Of what Church, I beseech you? of that,
certainly, which likes him best. As if he that compels me by laws and penalties to enter into this or the other Church,
did not interpose his own judgement in the matter. What difference is there whether he lead me himself, or deliver me
over to be led by others? I depend both ways upon his will, and it is he that determines both ways of my eternal state.
Would an Israelite that had worshipped Baal upon the command of his king have been in any better condition because
somebody had told him that the king ordered nothing in religion upon his own head, nor commanded anything to be done by
his subjects in divine worship but what was approved by the counsel of priests, and declared to be of divine right by
the doctors of their Church? If the religion of any Church become, therefore, true and saving, because the head of that
sect, the prelates and priests, and those of that tribe, do all of them, with all their might, extol and praise it,
what religion can ever be accounted erroneous, false, and destructive? I am doubtful concerning the doctrine of the
Socinians, I am suspicious of the way of worship practised by the Papists, or Lutherans; will it be ever a jot safer
for me to join either unto the one or the other of those Churches, upon the magistrate’s command, because he commands
nothing in religion but by the authority and counsel of the doctors of that Church?

But, to speak the truth, we must acknowledge that the Church (if a convention of clergymen, making canons, must be
called by that name) is for the most part more apt to be influenced by the Court than the Court by the Church. How the
Church was under the vicissitude of orthodox and Arian emperors is very well known. Or if those things be too remote,
our modern English history affords us fresh examples in the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth, how
easily and smoothly the clergy changed their decrees, their articles of faith, their form of worship, everything
according to the inclination of those kings and queens. Yet were those kings and queens of such different minds in
point of religion, and enjoined thereupon such different things, that no man in his wits (I had almost said none but an
atheist) will presume to say that any sincere and upright worshipper of God could, with a safe conscience, obey their
several decrees. To conclude, it is the same thing whether a king that prescribes laws to another man’s religion
pretend to do it by his own judgement, or by the ecclesiastical authority and advice of others. The decisions of
churchmen, whose differences and disputes are sufficiently known, cannot be any sounder or safer than his; nor can all
their suffrages joined together add a new strength to the civil power. Though this also must be taken notice of — that
princes seldom have any regard to the suffrages of ecclesiastics that are not favourers of their own faith and way of
worship.

But, after all, the principal consideration, and which absolutely determines this controversy, is this: Although the
magistrate’s opinion in religion be sound, and the way that he appoints be truly Evangelical, yet, if I be not
thoroughly persuaded thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety for me in following it. No way whatsoever that I
shall walk in against the dictates of my conscience will ever bring me to the mansions of the blessed. I may grow rich
by an art that I take not delight in; I may be cured of some disease by remedies that I have not faith in; but I cannot
be saved by a religion that I distrust and by a worship that I abhor. It is in vain for an unbeliever to take up the
outward show of another man’s profession. Faith only and inward sincerity are the things that procure acceptance with
God. The most likely and most approved remedy can have no effect upon the patient, if his stomach reject it as soon as
taken; and you will in vain cram a medicine down a sick man’s throat, which his particular constitution will be sure to
turn into poison. In a word, whatsoever may be doubtful in religion, yet this at least is certain, that no religion
which I believe not to be true can be either true or profitable unto me. In vain, therefore, do princes compel their
subjects to come into their Church communion, under pretence of saving their souls. If they believe, they will come of
their own accord, if they believe not, their coming will nothing avail them. How great soever, in fine, may be the
pretence of good-will and charity, and concern for the salvation of men’s souls, men cannot be forced to be saved
whether they will or no. And therefore, when all is done, they must be left to their own consciences.

Having thus at length freed men from all dominion over one another in matters of religion, let us now consider what
they are to do. All men know and acknowledge that God ought to be publicly worshipped; why otherwise do they compel one
another unto the public assemblies? Men, therefore, constituted in this liberty are to enter into some religious
society, that they meet together, not only for mutual edification, but to own to the world that they worship God and
offer unto His Divine Majesty such service as they themselves are not ashamed of and such as they think not unworthy of
Him, nor unacceptable to Him; and, finally, that by the purity of doctrine, holiness of life, and decent form of
worship, they may draw others unto the love of the true religion, and perform such other things in religion as cannot
be done by each private man apart.

These religious societies I call Churches; and these, I say, the magistrate ought to tolerate, for the business of
these assemblies of the people is nothing but what is lawful for every man in particular to take care of — I mean the
salvation of their souls; nor in this case is there any difference between the National Church and other separated
congregations.

But as in every Church there are two things especially to be considered — the outward form and rites of worship, and
the doctrines and articles of things must be handled each distinctly that so the whole matter of toleration may the
more clearly be understood.

Concerning outward worship, I say, in the first place, that the magistrate has no power to enforce by law, either in
his own Church, or much less in another, the use of any rites or ceremonies whatsoever in the worship of God. And this,
not only because these Churches are free societies, but because whatsoever is practised in the worship of God is only
so far justifiable as it is believed by those that practise it to be acceptable unto Him. Whatsoever is not done with
that assurance of faith is neither well in itself, nor can it be acceptable to God. To impose such things, therefore,
upon any people, contrary to their own judgment, is in effect to command them to offend God, which, considering that
the end of all religion is to please Him, and that liberty is essentially necessary to that end, appears to be absurd
beyond expression.

But perhaps it may be concluded from hence that I deny unto the magistrate all manner of power about indifferent
things, which, if it be not granted, the whole subject-matter of law-making is taken away. No, I readily grant that
indifferent things, and perhaps none but such, are subjected to the legislative power. But it does not therefore follow
that the magistrate may ordain whatsoever he pleases concerning anything that is indifferent. The public good is the
rule and measure of all law-making. If a thing be not useful to the commonwealth, though it be never so indifferent, it
may not presently be established by law.

And further, things never so indifferent in their own nature, when they are brought into the Church and worship of
God, are removed out of the reach of the magistrate’s jurisdiction, because in that use they have no connection at all
with civil affairs. The only business of the Church is the salvation of souls, and it no way concerns the commonwealth,
or any member of it, that this or the other ceremony be there made use of. Neither the use nor the omission of any
ceremonies in those religious assemblies does either advantage or prejudice the life, liberty, or estate of any man.
For example, let it be granted that the washing of an infant with water is in itself an indifferent thing, let it be
granted also that the magistrate understand such washing to be profitable to the curing or preventing of any disease
the children are subject unto, and esteem the matter weighty enough to be taken care of by a law. In that case he may
order it to be done. But will any one therefore say that a magistrate has the same right to ordain by law that all
children shall be baptised by priests in the sacred font in order to the purification of their souls? The extreme
difference of these two cases is visible to every one at first sight. Or let us apply the last case to the child of a
Jew, and the thing speaks itself. For what hinders but a Christian magistrate may have subjects that are Jews? Now, if
we acknowledge that such an injury may not be done unto a Jew as to compel him, against his own opinion, to practise in
his religion a thing that is in its nature indifferent, how can we maintain that anything of this kind may be done to a
Christian?

Again, things in their own nature indifferent cannot, by any human authority, be made any part of the worship of God
— for this very reason: because they are indifferent. For, since indifferent things are not capable, by any virtue of
their own, to propitiate the Deity, no human power or authority can confer on them so much dignity and excellency as to
enable them to do it. In the common affairs of life that use of indifferent things which God has not forbidden is free
and lawful, and therefore in those things human authority has place. But it is not so in matters of religion. Things
indifferent are not otherwise lawful in the worship of God than as they are instituted by God Himself and as He, by
some positive command, has ordained them to be made a part of that worship which He will vouchsafe to accept at the
hands of poor sinful men. Nor, when an incensed Deity shall ask us, “Who has required these, or such-like things at
your hands?” will it be enough to answer Him that the magistrate commanded them. If civil jurisdiction extend thus far,
what might not lawfully be introduced into religion? What hodgepodge of ceremonies, what superstitious inventions,
built upon the magistrate’s authority, might not (against conscience) be imposed upon the worshippers of God? For the
greatest part of these ceremonies and superstitions consists in the religious use of such things as are in their own
nature indifferent; nor are they sinful upon any other account than because God is not the author of them. The
sprinkling of water and the use of bread and wine are both in their own nature and in the ordinary occasions of life
altogether indifferent. Will any man, therefore, say that these things could have been introduced into religion and
made a part of divine worship if not by divine institution? If any human authority or civil power could have done this,
why might it not also enjoin the eating of fish and drinking of ale in the holy banquet as a part of divine worship?
Why not the sprinkling of the blood of beasts in churches, and expiations by water or fire, and abundance more of this
kind? But these things, how indifferent soever they be in common uses, when they come to be annexed unto divine
worship, without divine authority, they are as abominable to God as the sacrifice of a dog. And why is a dog so
abominable? What difference is there between a dog and a goat, in respect of the divine nature, equally and infinitely
distant from all affinity with matter, unless it be that God required the use of one in His worship and not of the
other? We see, therefore, that indifferent things, how much soever they be under the power of the civil magistrate, yet
cannot, upon that pretence, be introduced into religion and imposed upon religious assemblies, because, in the worship
of God, they wholly cease to be indifferent. He that worships God does it with design to please Him and procure His
favour. But that cannot be done by him who, upon the command of another, offers unto God that which he knows will be
displeasing to Him, because not commanded by Himself. This is not to please God, or appease his wrath, but willingly
and knowingly to provoke Him by a manifest contempt, which is a thing absolutely repugnant to the nature and end of
worship.

But it will be here asked: “If nothing belonging to divine worship be left to human discretion, how is it then that
Churches themselves have the power of ordering anything about the time and place of worship and the like?” To this I
answer that in religious worship we must distinguish between what is part of the worship itself and what is but a
circumstance. That is a part of the worship which is believed to be appointed by God and to be well-pleasing to Him,
and therefore that is necessary. Circumstances are such things which, though in general they cannot be separated from
worship, yet the particular instances or modifications of them are not determined, and therefore they are indifferent.
Of this sort are the time and place of worship, habit and posture of him that worships. These are circumstances, and
perfectly indifferent, where God has not given any express command about them. For example: amongst the Jews the time
and place of their worship and the habits of those that officiated in it were not mere circumstances, but a part of the
worship itself, in which, if anything were defective, or different from the institution, they could not hope that it
would be accepted by God. But these, to Christians under the liberty of the Gospel, are mere circumstances of worship,
which the prudence of every Church may bring into such use as shall be judged most subservient to the end of order,
decency, and edification. But, even under the Gospel, those who believe the first or the seventh day to be set apart by
God, and consecrated still to His worship, to them that portion of time is not a simple circumstance, but a real part
of Divine worship, which can neither be changed nor neglected.

In the next place: As the magistrate has no power to impose by his laws the use of any rites and ceremonies in any
Church, so neither has he any power to forbid the use of such rites and ceremonies as are already received, approved,
and practised by any Church; because, if he did so, he would destroy the Church itself: the end of whose institution is
only to worship God with freedom after its own manner.

You will say, by this rule, if some congregations should have a mind to sacrifice infants, or (as the primitive
Christians were falsely accused) lustfully pollute themselves in promiscuous uncleanness, or practise any other such
heinous enormities, is the magistrate obliged to tolerate them, because they are committed in a religious assembly? I
answer: No. These things are not lawful in the ordinary course of life, nor in any private house; and therefore neither
are they so in the worship of God, or in any religious meeting. But, indeed, if any people congregated upon account of
religion should be desirous to sacrifice a calf, I deny that that ought to be prohibited by a law. Meliboeus, whose
calf it is, may lawfully kill his calf at home, and burn any part of it that he thinks fit. For no injury is thereby
done to any one, no prejudice to another man’s goods. And for the same reason he may kill his calf also in a religious
meeting. Whether the doing so be well-pleasing to God or no, it is their part to consider that do it. The part of the
magistrate is only to take care that the commonwealth receive no prejudice, and that there be no injury done to any
man, either in life or estate. And thus what may be spent on a feast may be spent on a sacrifice. But if peradventure
such were the state of things that the interest of the commonwealth required all slaughter of beasts should be forborne
for some while, in order to the increasing of the stock of cattle that had been destroyed by some extraordinary
murrain, who sees not that the magistrate, in such a case, may forbid all his subjects to kill any calves for any use
whatsoever? Only it is to be observed that, in this case, the law is not made about a religious, but a political
matter; nor is the sacrifice, but the slaughter of calves, thereby prohibited.

By this we see what difference there is between the Church and the Commonwealth. Whatsoever is lawful in the
Commonwealth cannot be prohibited by the magistrate in the Church. Whatsoever is permitted unto any of his subjects for
their ordinary use, neither can nor ought to be forbidden by him to any sect of people for their religious uses. If any
man may lawfully take bread or wine, either sitting or kneeling in his own house, the law ought not to abridge him of
the same liberty in his religious worship; though in the Church the use of bread and wine be very different and be
there applied to the mysteries of faith and rites of Divine worship. But those things that are prejudicial to the
commonweal of a people in their ordinary use and are, therefore, forbidden by laws, those things ought not to be
permitted to Churches in their sacred rites. Only the magistrate ought always to be very careful that he do not misuse
his authority to the oppression of any Church, under pretence of public good.

It may be said: “What if a Church be idolatrous, is that also to be tolerated by the magistrate?” I answer: What
power can be given to the magistrate for the suppression of an idolatrous Church, which may not in time and place be
made use of to the ruin of an orthodox one? For it must be remembered that the civil power is the same everywhere, and
the religion of every prince is orthodox to himself. If, therefore, such a power be granted unto the civil magistrate
in spirituals as that at Geneva, for example, he may extirpate, by violence and blood, the religion which is there
reputed idolatrous, by the same rule another magistrate, in some neighbouring country, may oppress the reformed
religion and, in India, the Christian. The civil power can either change everything in religion, according to the
prince’s pleasure, or it can change nothing. If it be once permitted to introduce anything into religion by the means
of laws and penalties, there can be no bounds put to it; but it will in the same manner be lawful to alter everything,
according to that rule of truth which the magistrate has framed unto himself. No man whatsoever ought, therefore, to be
deprived of his terrestrial enjoyments upon account of his religion. Not even Americans, subjected unto a Christian
prince, are to be punished either in body or goods for not embracing our faith and worship. If they are persuaded that
they please God in observing the rites of their own country and that they shall obtain happiness by that means, they
are to be left unto God and themselves. Let us trace this matter to the bottom. Thus it is: An inconsiderable and weak
number of Christians, destitute of everything, arrive in a Pagan country; these foreigners beseech the inhabitants, by
the bowels of humanity, that they would succour them with the necessaries of life; those necessaries are given them,
habitations are granted, and they all join together, and grow up into one body of people. The Christian religion by
this means takes root in that country and spreads itself, but does not suddenly grow the strongest. While things are in
this condition peace, friendship, faith, and equal justice are preserved amongst them. At length the magistrate becomes
a Christian, and by that means their party becomes the most powerful. Then immediately all compacts are to be broken,
all civil rights to be violated, that idolatry may be extirpated; and unless these innocent Pagans, strict observers of
the rules of equity and the law of Nature and no ways offending against the laws of the society, I say, unless they
will forsake their ancient religion and embrace a new and strange one, they are to be turned out of the lands and
possessions of their forefathers and perhaps deprived of life itself. Then, at last, it appears what zeal for the
Church, joined with the desire of dominion, is capable to produce, and how easily the pretence of religion, and of the
care of souls, serves for a cloak to covetousness, rapine, and ambition.

Now whosoever maintains that idolatry is to be rooted out of any place by laws, punishments, fire, and sword, may
apply this story to himself. For the reason of the thing is equal, both in America and Europe. And neither Pagans
there, nor any dissenting Christians here, can, with any right, be deprived of their worldly goods by the predominating
faction of a court-church; nor are any civil rights to be either changed or violated upon account of religion in one
place more than another.

But idolatry, say some, is a sin and therefore not to be tolerated. If they said it were therefore to be avoided,
the inference were good. But it does not follow that because it is a sin it ought therefore to be punished by the
magistrate. For it does not belong unto the magistrate to make use of his sword in punishing everything, indifferently,
that he takes to be a sin against God. Covetousness, uncharitableness, idleness, and many other things are sins by the
consent of men, which yet no man ever said were to be punished by the magistrate. The reason is because they are not
prejudicial to other men’s rights, nor do they break the public peace of societies. Nay, even the sins of lying and
perjury are nowhere punishable by laws; unless, in certain cases, in which the real turpitude of the thing and the
offence against God are not considered, but only the injury done unto men’s neighbours and to the commonwealth. And
what if in another country, to a Mahometan or a Pagan prince, the Christian religion seem false and offensive to God;
may not the Christians for the same reason, and after the same manner, be extirpated there?

But it may be urged farther that, by the law of Moses, idolaters were to be rooted out. True, indeed, by the law of
Moses; but that is not obligatory to us Christians. Nobody pretends that everything generally enjoined by the law of
Moses ought to be practised by Christians; but there is nothing more frivolous than that common distinction of moral,
judicial, and ceremonial law, which men ordinarily make use of. For no positive law whatsoever can oblige any people
but those to whom it is given. “Hear, O Israel,” sufficiently restrains the obligations of the law of Moses only to
that people. And this consideration alone is answer enough unto those that urge the authority of the law of Moses for
the inflicting of capital punishment upon idolaters. But, however, I will examine this argument a little more
particularly.

The case of idolaters, in respect of the Jewish commonwealth, falls under a double consideration. The first is of
those who, being initiated in the Mosaical rites, and made citizens of that commonwealth, did afterwards apostatise
from the worship of the God of Israel. These were proceeded against as traitors and rebels, guilty of no less than high
treason. For the commonwealth of the Jews, different in that from all others, was an absolute theocracy; nor was there,
or could there be, any difference between that commonwealth and the Church. The laws established there concerning the
worship of One Invisible Deity were the civil laws of that people and a part of their political government, in which
God Himself was the legislator. Now, if any one can shew me where there is a commonwealth at this time, constituted
upon that foundation, I will acknowledge that the ecclesiastical laws do there unavoidably become a part of the civil,
and that the subjects of that government both may and ought to be kept in strict conformity with that Church by the
civil power. But there is absolutely no such thing under the Gospel as a Christian commonwealth. There are, indeed,
many cities and kingdoms that have embraced the faith of Christ, but they have retained their ancient form of
government, with which the law of Christ hath not at all meddled. He, indeed, hath taught men how, by faith and good
works, they may obtain eternal life; but He instituted no commonwealth. He prescribed unto His followers no new and
peculiar form of government, nor put He the sword into any magistrate’s hand, with commission to make use of it in
forcing men to forsake their former religion and receive His.

Secondly, foreigners and such as were strangers to the commonwealth of Israel were not compelled by force to observe
the rites of the Mosaical law; but, on the contrary, in the very same place where it is ordered that an Israelite that
was an idolater should be put to death,7 there it is provided that
strangers should not be vexed nor oppressed. I confess that the seven nations that possessed the land which was
promised to the Israelites were utterly to be cut off; but this was not singly because they were idolaters. For if that
had been the reason, why were the Moabites and other nations to be spared? No: the reason is this. God being in a
peculiar manner the King of the Jews, He could not suffer the adoration of any other deity (which was properly an act
of high treason against Himself) in the land of Canaan, which was His kingdom. For such a manifest revolt could no ways
consist with His dominion, which was perfectly political in that country. All idolatry was, therefore, to be rooted out
of the bounds of His kingdom because it was an acknowledgment of another god, that is say, another king, against the
laws of Empire. The inhabitants were also to be driven out, that the entire possession of the land might be given to
the Israelites. And for the like reason the Emims and the Horims were driven out of their countries by the children of
Esau and Lot; and their lands, upon the same grounds, given by God to the invaders.8 But, though all idolatry was thus rooted out of the land of Canaan, yet every idolater was not
brought to execution. The whole family of Rahab, the whole nation of the Gibeonites, articled with Joshua, and were
allowed by treaty; and there were many captives amongst the Jews who were idolaters. David and Solomon subdued many
countries without the confines of the Land of Promise and carried their conquests as far as Euphrates. Amongst so many
captives taken, so many nations reduced under their obedience, we find not one man forced into the Jewish religion and
the worship of the true God and punished for idolatry, though all of them were certainly guilty of it. If any one,
indeed, becoming a proselyte, desired to be made a denizen of their commonwealth, he was obliged to submit to their
laws; that is, to embrace their religion. But this he did willingly, on his own accord, not by constraint. He did not
unwillingly submit, to show his obedience, but he sought and solicited for it as a privilege. And, as soon as he was
admitted, he became subject to the laws of the commonwealth, by which all idolatry was forbidden within the borders of
the land of Canaan. But that law (as I have said) did not reach to any of those regions, however subjected unto the
Jews, that were situated without those bounds.

The articles of religion are some of them practical and some speculative. Now, though both sorts consist in the
knowledge of truth, yet these terminate simply in the understanding, those influence the will and manners. Speculative
opinions, therefore, and articles of faith (as they are called) which are required only to be believed, cannot be
imposed on any Church by the law of the land. For it is absurd that things should be enjoined by laws which are not in
men’s power to perform. And to believe this or that to be true does not depend upon our will. But of this enough has
been said already. “But.” will some say; “let men at least profess that they believe.” A sweet religion, indeed, that
obliges men to dissemble and tell lies, both to God and man, for the salvation of their souls! If the magistrate thinks
to save men thus, he seems to understand little of the way of salvation. And if he does it not in order to save them,
why is he so solicitous about the articles of faith as to enact them by a law?

Further, the magistrate ought not to forbid the preaching or professing of any speculative opinions in any Church
because they have no manner of relation to the civil rights of the subjects. If a Roman Catholic believe that to be
really the body of Christ which another man calls bread, he does no injury thereby to his neighbour. If a Jew do not
believe the New Testament to be the Word of God, he does not thereby alter anything in men’s civil rights. If a heathen
doubt of both Testaments, he is not therefore to be punished as a pernicious citizen. The power of the magistrate and
the estates of the people may be equally secure whether any man believe these things or no. I readily grant that these
opinions are false and absurd. But the business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety
and security of the commonwealth and of every particular man’s goods and person. And so it ought to be. For the truth
certainly would do well enough if she were once left to shift for herself. She seldom has received and, I fear, never
will receive much assistance from the power of great men, to whom she is but rarely known and more rarely welcome. She
is not taught by laws, nor has she any need of force to procure her entrance into the minds of men. Errors, indeed,
prevail by the assistance of foreign and borrowed succours. But if Truth makes not her way into the understanding by
her own light, she will be but the weaker for any borrowed force violence can add to her. Thus much for speculative
opinions. Let us now proceed to practical ones.

A good life, in which consist not the least part of religion and true piety, concerns also the civil government; and
in it lies the safety both of men’s souls and of the commonwealth. Moral actions belong, therefore, to the jurisdiction
both of the outward and inward court; both of the civil and domestic governor; I mean both of the magistrate and
conscience. Here, therefore, is great danger, lest one of these jurisdictions intrench upon the other, and discord
arise between the keeper of the public peace and the overseers of souls. But if what has been already said concerning
the limits of both these governments be rightly considered, it will easily remove all difficulty in this matter.

Every man has an immortal soul, capable of eternal happiness or misery; whose happiness depending upon his believing
and doing those things in this life which are necessary to the obtaining of God’s favour, and are prescribed by God to
that end. It follows from thence, first, that the observance of these things is the highest obligation that lies upon
mankind and that our utmost care, application, and diligence ought to be exercised in the search and performance of
them; because there is nothing in this world that is of any consideration in comparison with eternity. Secondly, that
seeing one man does not violate the right of another by his erroneous opinions and undue manner of worship, nor is his
perdition any prejudice to another man’s affairs, therefore, the care of each man’s salvation belongs only to himself.
But I would not have this understood as if I meant hereby to condemn all charitable admonitions and affectionate
endeavours to reduce men from errors, which are indeed the greatest duty of a Christian. Any one may employ as many
exhortations and arguments as he pleases, towards the promoting of another man’s salvation. But all force and
compulsion are to be forborne. Nothing is to be done imperiously. Nobody is obliged in that matter to yield obedience
unto the admonitions or injunctions of another, further than he himself is persuaded. Every man in that has the supreme
and absolute authority of judging for himself. And the reason is because nobody else is concerned in it, nor can
receive any prejudice from his conduct therein.

But besides their souls, which are immortal, men have also their temporal lives here upon earth; the state whereof
being frail and fleeting, and the duration uncertain, they have need of several outward conveniences to the support
thereof, which are to be procured or preserved by pains and industry. For those things that are necessary to the
comfortable support of our lives are not the spontaneous products of nature, nor do offer themselves fit and prepared
for our use. This part, therefore, draws on another care and necessarily gives another employment. But the pravity of
mankind being such that they had rather injuriously prey upon the fruits of other men’s labours than take pains to
provide for themselves, the necessity of preserving men in the possession of what honest industry has already acquired
and also of preserving their liberty and strength, whereby they may acquire what they farther want, obliges men to
enter into society with one another, that by mutual assistance and joint force they may secure unto each other their
properties, in the things that contribute to the comfort and happiness of this life, leaving in the meanwhile to every
man the care of his own eternal happiness, the attainment whereof can neither be facilitated by another man’s industry,
nor can the loss of it turn to another man’s prejudice, nor the hope of it be forced from him by any external violence.
But, forasmuch as men thus entering into societies, grounded upon their mutual compacts of assistance for the defence
of their temporal goods, may, nevertheless, be deprived of them, either by the rapine and fraud of their fellow
citizens, or by the hostile violence of foreigners, the remedy of this evil consists in arms, riches, and multitude of
citizens; the remedy of the other in laws; and the care of all things relating both to one and the other is committed
by the society to the civil magistrate. This is the original, this is the use, and these are the bounds of the
legislative (which is the supreme) power in every commonwealth. I mean that provision may be made for the security of
each man’s private possessions; for the peace, riches, and public commodities of the whole people; and, as much as
possible, for the increase of their inward strength against foreign invasions.

These things being thus explained, it is easy to understand to what end the legislative power ought to be directed
and by what measures regulated; and that is the temporal good and outward prosperity of the society; which is the sole
reason of men’s entering into society, and the only thing they seek and aim at in it. And it is also evident what
liberty remains to men in reference to their eternal salvation, and that is that every one should do what he in his
conscience is persuaded to be acceptable to the Almighty, on whose good pleasure and acceptance depends their eternal
happiness. For obedience is due, in the first place, to God and, afterwards to the laws.

But some may ask: “What if the magistrate should enjoin anything by his authority that appears unlawful to the
conscience of a private person?” I answer that, if government be faithfully administered and the counsels of the
magistrates be indeed directed to the public good, this will seldom happen. But if, perhaps, it do so fall out, I say,
that such a private person is to abstain from the action that he judges unlawful, and he is to undergo the punishment
which it is not unlawful for him to bear. For the private judgement of any person concerning a law enacted in political
matters, for the public good, does not take away the obligation of that law, nor deserve a dispensation. But if the
law, indeed, be concerning things that lie not within the verge of the magistrate’s authority (as, for example, that
the people, or any party amongst them, should be compelled to embrace a strange religion, and join in the worship and
ceremonies of another Church), men are not in these cases obliged by that law, against their consciences. For the
political society is instituted for no other end, but only to secure every man’s possession of the things of this life.
The care of each man’s soul and of the things of heaven, which neither does belong to the commonwealth nor can be
subjected to it, is left entirely to every man’s self. Thus the safeguard of men’s lives and of the things that belong
unto this life is the business of the commonwealth; and the preserving of those things unto their owners is the duty of
the magistrate. And therefore the magistrate cannot take away these worldly things from this man or party and give them
to that; nor change propriety amongst fellow subjects (no not even by a law), for a cause that has no relation to the
end of civil government, I mean for their religion, which whether it be true or false does no prejudice to the worldly
concerns of their fellow subjects, which are the things that only belong unto the care of the commonwealth.

But what if the magistrate believe such a law as this to be for the public good? I answer: As the private judgement
of any particular person, if erroneous, does not exempt him from the obligation of law, so the private judgement (as I
may call it) of the magistrate does not give him any new right of imposing laws upon his subjects, which neither was in
the constitution of the government granted him, nor ever was in the power of the people to grant, much less if he make
it his business to enrich and advance his followers and fellow-sectaries with the spoils of others. But what if the
magistrate believe that he has a right to make such laws and that they are for the public good, and his subjects
believe the contrary? Who shall be judge between them? I answer: God alone. For there is no judge upon earth between
the supreme magistrate and the people. God, I say, is the only judge in this case, who will retribute unto every one at
the last day according to his deserts; that is, according to his sincerity and uprightness in endeavouring to promote
piety, and the public weal, and peace of mankind. But What shall be done in the meanwhile? I answer: The principal and
chief care of every one ought to be of his own soul first, and, in the next place, of the public peace; though yet
there are very few will think it is peace there, where they see all laid waste.

There are two sorts of contests amongst men, the one managed by law, the other by force; and these are of that
nature that where the one ends, the other always begins. But it is not my business to inquire into the power of the
magistrate in the different constitutions of nations. I only know what usually happens where controversies arise
without a judge to determine them. You will say, then, the magistrate being the stronger will have his will and carry
his point. Without doubt; but the question is not here concerning the doubtfulness of the event, but the rule of
right.

But to come to particulars. I say, first, no opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral rules which are
necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate. But of these, indeed, examples
in any Church are rare. For no sect can easily arrive to such a degree of madness as that it should think fit to teach,
for doctrines of religion, such things as manifestly undermine the foundations of society and are, therefore, condemned
by the judgement of all mankind; because their own interest, peace, reputation, everything would be thereby
endangered.

Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is when men arrogate to themselves, and to those
of their own sect, some peculiar prerogative covered over with a specious show of deceitful words, but in effect
opposite to the civil right of the community. For example: we cannot find any sect that teaches, expressly and openly,
that men are not obliged to keep their promise; that princes may be dethroned by those that differ from them in
religion; or that the dominion of all things belongs only to themselves. For these things, proposed thus nakedly and
plainly, would soon draw on them the eye and hand of the magistrate and awaken all the care of the commonwealth to a
watchfulness against the spreading of so dangerous an evil. But, nevertheless, we find those that say the same things
in other words. What else do they mean who teach that faith is not to be kept with heretics? Their meaning, forsooth,
is that the privilege of breaking faith belongs unto themselves; for they declare all that are not of their communion
to be heretics, or at least may declare them so whensoever they think fit. What can be the meaning of their asserting
that kings excommunicated forfeit their crowns and kingdoms? It is evident that they thereby arrogate unto themselves
the power of deposing kings, because they challenge the power of excommunication, as the peculiar right of their
hierarchy. That dominion is founded in grace is also an assertion by which those that maintain it do plainly lay claim
to the possession of all things. For they are not so wanting to themselves as not to believe, or at least as not to
profess themselves to be the truly pious and faithful. These, therefore, and the like, who attribute unto the faithful,
religious, and orthodox, that is, in plain terms, unto themselves, any peculiar privilege or power above other mortals,
in civil concernments; or who upon pretence of religion do challenge any manner of authority over such as are not
associated with them in their ecclesiastical communion, I say these have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate; as
neither those that will not own and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere religion. For what do all
these and the like doctrines signify, but that they may and are ready upon any occasion to seize the Government and
possess themselves of the estates and fortunes of their fellow subjects; and that they only ask leave to be tolerated
by the magistrate so long until they find themselves strong enough to effect it?

Again: That Church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is constituted upon such a bottom that
all those who enter into it do thereby ipso facto deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another
prince. For by this means the magistrate would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country
and suffer his own people to be listed, as it were, for soldiers against his own Government. Nor does the frivolous and
fallacious distinction between the Court and the Church afford any remedy to this inconvenience; especially when both
the one and the other are equally subject to the absolute authority of the same person, who has not only power to
persuade the members of his Church to whatsoever he lists, either as purely religious, or in order thereunto, but can
also enjoin it them on pain of eternal fire. It is ridiculous for any one to profess himself to be a Mahometan only in
his religion, but in everything else a faithful subject to a Christian magistrate, whilst at the same time he
acknowledges himself bound to yield blind obedience to the Mufti of Constantinople, who himself is entirely obedient to
the Ottoman Emperor and frames the feigned oracles of that religion according to his pleasure. But this Mahometan
living amongst Christians would yet more apparently renounce their government if he acknowledged the same person to be
head of his Church who is the supreme magistrate in the state.

Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are
the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought,
dissolves all; besides also, those that by their atheism undermine and destroy all religion, can have no pretence of
religion whereupon to challenge the privilege of a toleration. As for other practical opinions, though not absolutely
free from all error, if they do not tend to establish domination over others, or civil impunity to the Church in which
they are taught, there can be no reason why they should not be tolerated.

It remains that I say something concerning those assemblies which, being vulgarly called and perhaps having
sometimes been conventicles and nurseries of factions and seditions, are thought to afford against this doctrine of
toleration. But this has not happened by anything peculiar unto the genius of such assemblies, but by the unhappy
circumstances of an oppressed or ill-settled liberty. These accusations would soon cease if the law of toleration were
once so settled that all Churches were obliged to lay down toleration as the foundation of their own liberty, and teach
that liberty of conscience is every man’s natural right, equally belonging to dissenters as to themselves; and that
nobody ought to be compelled in matters of religion either by law or force. The establishment of this one thing would
take away all ground of complaints and tumults upon account of conscience; and these causes of discontents and
animosities being once removed, there would remain nothing in these assemblies that were not more peaceable and less
apt to produce disturbance of state than in any other meetings whatsoever. But let us examine particularly the heads of
these accusations.

You will say that assemblies and meetings endanger the public peace and threaten the commonwealth. I answer: If this
be so, why are there daily such numerous meetings in markets and Courts of Judicature? Why are crowds upon the Exchange
and a concourse of people in cities suffered? You will reply: “Those are civil assemblies, but these we object against
are ecclesiastical.” I answer: It is a likely thing, indeed, that such assemblies as are altogether remote from civil
affairs should be most apt to embroil them. Oh, but civil assemblies are composed of men that differ from one another
in matters of religion, but these ecclesiastical meetings are of persons that are all of one opinion. As if an
agreement in matters of religion were in effect a conspiracy against the commonwealth; or as if men would not be so
much the more warmly unanimous in religion the less liberty they had of assembling. But it will be urged still that
civil assemblies are open and free for any one to enter into, whereas religious conventicles are more private and
thereby give opportunity to clandestine machinations. I answer that this is not strictly true, for many civil
assemblies are not open to everyone. And if some religious meetings be private, who are they (I beseech you) that are
to be blamed for it, those that desire, or those that forbid their being public! Again, you will say that religious
communion does exceedingly unite men’s minds and affections to one another and is therefore the more dangerous. But if
this be so, why is not the magistrate afraid of his own Church; and why does he not forbid their assemblies as things
dangerous to his Government? You will say because he himself is a part and even the head of them. As if he were not
also a part of the commonwealth, and the head of the whole people!

Let us therefore deal plainly. The magistrate is afraid of other Churches, but not of his own, because he is kind
and favourable to the one, but severe and cruel to the other. These he treats like children, and indulges them even to
wantonness. Those he uses as slaves and, how blamelessly soever they demean themselves, recompenses them no otherwise
than by galleys, prisons, confiscations, and death. These he cherishes and defends; those he continually scourges and
oppresses. Let him turn the tables. Or let those dissenters enjoy but the same privileges in civils as his other
subjects, and he will quickly find that these religious meetings will be no longer dangerous. For if men enter into
seditious conspiracies, it is not religion inspires them to it in their meetings, but their sufferings and oppressions
that make them willing to ease themselves. Just and moderate governments are everywhere quiet, everywhere safe; but
oppression raises ferments and makes men struggle to cast off an uneasy and tyrannical yoke. I know that seditions are
very frequently raised upon pretence of religion, but it is as true that for religion subjects are frequently ill
treated and live miserably. Believe me, the stirs that are made proceed not from any peculiar temper of this or that
Church or religious society, but from the common disposition of all mankind, who when they groan under any heavy
burthen endeavour naturally to shake off the yoke that galls their necks. Suppose this business of religion were let
alone, and that there were some other distinction made between men and men upon account of their different complexions,
shapes, and features, so that those who have black hair (for example) or grey eyes should not enjoy the same privileges
as other citizens; that they should not be permitted either to buy or sell, or live by their callings; that parents
should not have the government and education of their own children; that all should either be excluded from the benefit
of the laws, or meet with partial judges; can it be doubted but these persons, thus distinguished from others by the
colour of their hair and eyes, and united together by one common persecution, would be as dangerous to the magistrate
as any others that had associated themselves merely upon the account of religion? Some enter into company for trade and
profit, others for want of business have their clubs for claret. Neighbourhood joins some and religion others. But
there is only one thing which gathers people into seditious commotions, and that is oppression.

You will say “What, will you have people to meet at divine service against the magistrate’s will?” I answer: Why, I
pray, against his will? Is it not both lawful and necessary that they should meet? Against his will, do you say? That
is what I complain of; that is the very root of all the mischief. Why are assemblies less sufferable in a church than
in a theatre or market? Those that meet there are not either more vicious or more turbulent than those that meet
elsewhere. The business in that is that they are ill used, and therefore they are not to be suffered. Take away the
partiality that is used towards them in matters of common right; change the laws, take away the penalties unto which
they are subjected, and all things will immediately become safe and peaceable; nay, those that are averse to the
religion of the magistrate will think themselves so much the more bound to maintain the peace of the commonwealth as
their condition is better in that place than elsewhere; and all the several separate congregations, like so many
guardians of the public peace, will watch one another, that nothing may be innovated or changed in the form of the
government, because they can hope for nothing better than what they already enjoy — that is, an equal condition with
their fellow-subjects under a just and moderate government. Now if that Church which agrees in religion with the prince
be esteemed the chief support of any civil government, and that for no other reason (as has already been shown) than
because the prince is kind and the laws are favourable to it, how much greater will be the security of government where
all good subjects, of whatsoever Church they be, without any distinction upon account of religion, enjoying the same
favour of the prince and the same benefit of the laws, shall become the common support and guard of it, and where none
will have any occasion to fear the severity of the laws but those that do injuries to their neighbours and offend
against the civil peace?

That we may draw towards a conclusion. The sum of all we drive at is that every man may enjoy the same rights that
are granted to others. Is it permitted to worship God in the Roman manner? Let it be permitted to do it in the Geneva
form also. Is it permitted to speak Latin in the market-place? Let those that have a mind to it be permitted to do it
also in the Church. Is it lawful for any man in his own house to kneel, stand, sit, or use any other posture; and to
clothe himself in white or black, in short or in long garments? Let it not be made unlawful to eat bread, drink wine,
or wash with water in the church. In a word, whatsoever things are left free by law in the common occasions of life,
let them remain free unto every Church in divine worship. Let no man’s life, or body, or house, or estate, suffer any
manner of prejudice upon these accounts. Can you allow of the Presbyterian discipline? Why should not the Episcopal
also have what they like? Ecclesiastical authority, whether it be administered by the hands of a single person or many,
is everywhere the same; and neither has any jurisdiction in things civil, nor any manner of power of compulsion, nor
anything at all to do with riches and revenues.

Ecclesiastical assemblies and sermons are justified by daily experience and public allowance. These are allowed to
people of some one persuasion; why not to all? If anything pass in a religious meeting seditiously and contrary to the
public peace, it is to be punished in the same manner and no otherwise than as if it had happened in a fair or market.
These meetings ought not to be sanctuaries for factious and flagitious fellows. Nor ought it to be less lawful for men
to meet in churches than in halls; nor are one part of the subjects to be esteemed more blamable for their meeting
together than others. Every one is to be accountable for his own actions, and no man is to be laid under a suspicion or
odium for the fault of another. Those that are seditious, murderers, thieves, robbers, adulterers, slanderers, etc., of
whatsoever Church, whether national or not, ought to be punished and suppressed. But those whose doctrine is peaceable
and whose manners are pure and blameless ought to be upon equal terms with their fellow-subjects. Thus if solemn
assemblies, observations of festivals, public worship be permitted to any one sort of professors, all these things
ought to be permitted to the Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists, Arminians, Quakers, and others, with the same
liberty. Nay, if we may openly speak the truth, and as becomes one man to another, neither Pagan nor Mahometan, nor
Jew, ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth because of his religion. The Gospel commands no
such thing. The Church which “judgeth not those that are without”9
wants it not. And the commonwealth, which embraces indifferently all men that are honest, peaceable, and industrious,
requires it not. Shall we suffer a Pagan to deal and trade with us, and shall we not suffer him to pray unto and
worship God? If we allow the Jews to have private houses and dwellings amongst us, why should we not allow them to have
synagogues? Is their doctrine more false, their worship more abominable, or is the civil peace more endangered by their
meeting in public than in their private houses? But if these things may be granted to Jews and Pagans, surely the
condition of any Christians ought not to be worse than theirs in a Christian commonwealth.

You will say, perhaps: “Yes, it ought to be; because they are more inclinable to factions, tumults, and civil wars.”
I answer: Is this the fault of the Christian religion? If it be so, truly the Christian religion is the worst of all
religions and ought neither to be embraced by any particular person, nor tolerated by any commonwealth. For if this be
the genius, this the nature of the Christian religion, to be turbulent and destructive to the civil peace, that Church
itself which the magistrate indulges will not always be innocent. But far be it from us to say any such thing of that
religion which carries the greatest opposition to covetousness, ambition, discord, contention, and all manner of
inordinate desires, and is the most modest and peaceable religion that ever was. We must, therefore, seek another cause
of those evils that are charged upon religion. And, if we consider right, we shall find it to consist wholly in the
subject that I am treating of. It is not the diversity of opinions (which cannot be avoided), but the refusal of
toleration to those that are of different opinions (which might have been granted), that has produced all the bustles
and wars that have been in the Christian world upon account of religion. The heads and leaders of the Church, moved by
avarice and insatiable desire of dominion, making use of the immoderate ambition of magistrates and the credulous
superstition of the giddy multitude, have incensed and animated them against those that dissent from themselves, by
preaching unto them, contrary to the laws of the Gospel and to the precepts of charity, that schismatics and heretics
are to be outed of their possessions and destroyed. And thus have they mixed together and confounded two things that
are in themselves most different, the Church and the commonwealth. Now as it is very difficult for men patiently to
suffer themselves to be stripped of the goods which they have got by their honest industry, and, contrary to all the
laws of equity, both human and divine, to be delivered up for a prey to other men’s violence and rapine; especially
when they are otherwise altogether blameless; and that the occasion for which they are thus treated does not at all
belong to the jurisdiction of the magistrate, but entirely to the conscience of every particular man for the conduct of
which he is accountable to God only; what else can be expected but that these men, growing weary of the evils under
which they labour, should in the end think it lawful for them to resist force with force, and to defend their natural
rights (which are not forfeitable upon account of religion) with arms as well as they can? That this has been hitherto
the ordinary course of things is abundantly evident in history, and that it will continue to be so hereafter is but too
apparent in reason. It cannot indeed, be otherwise so long as the principle of persecution for religion shall prevail,
as it has done hitherto, with magistrate and people, and so long as those that ought to be the preachers of peace and
concord shall continue with all their art and strength to excite men to arms and sound the trumpet of war. But that
magistrates should thus suffer these incendiaries and disturbers of the public peace might justly be wondered at if it
did not appear that they have been invited by them unto a participation of the spoil, and have therefore thought fit to
make use of their covetousness and pride as means whereby to increase their own power. For who does not see that these
good men are, indeed, more ministers of the government than ministers of the Gospel and that, by flattering the
ambition and favouring the dominion of princes and men in authority, they endeavour with all their might to promote
that tyranny in the commonwealth which otherwise they should not be able to establish in the Church? This is the
unhappy agreement that we see between the Church and State. Whereas if each of them would contain itself within its own
boundsthe one attending to the worldly welfare of the commonwealth, the other to the salvation of souls — it is
impossible that any discord should ever have happened between them. Sed pudet hoec opprobria. etc. God Almighty grant,
I beseech Him, that the gospel of peace may at length be preached, and that civil magistrates, growing more careful to
conform their own consciences to the law of God and less solicitous about the binding of other men’s consciences by
human laws, may, like fathers of their country, direct all their counsels and endeavours to promote universally the
civil welfare of all their children, except only of such as are arrogant, ungovernable, and injurious to their
brethren; and that all ecclesiastical men, who boast themselves to be the successors of the Apostles, walking peaceably
and modestly in the Apostles’ steps, without intermeddling with State Affairs, may apply themselves wholly to promote
the salvation of souls.

Farewell.

Perhaps it may not be amiss to add a few things concerning heresy and schism. A Turk is not, nor can be,
either heretic or schismatic to a Christian; and if any man fall off from the Christian faith to Mahometism, he does
not thereby become a heretic or schismatic, but an apostate and an infidel. This nobody doubts of; and by this it
appears that men of different religions cannot be heretics or schismatics to one another.

We are to inquire, therefore, what men are of the same religion. Concerning which it is manifest that those who have
one and the same rule of faith and worship are of the same religion; and those who have not the same rule of faith and
worship are of different religions. For since all things that belong unto that religion are contained in that rule, it
follows necessarily that those who agree in one rule are of one and the same religion, and vice versa. Thus Turks and
Christians are of different religions, because these take the Holy Scriptures to be the rule of their religion, and
those the Alcoran. And for the same reason there may be different religions also even amongst Christians. The Papists
and Lutherans, though both of them profess faith in Christ and are therefore called Christians, yet are not both of the
same religion, because these acknowledge nothing but the Holy Scriptures to be the rule and foundation of their
religion, those take in also traditions and the decrees of Popes and of these together make the rule of their religion;
and thus the Christians of St. John (as they are called) and the Christians of Geneva are of different religions,
because these also take only the Scriptures, and those I know not what traditions, for the rule of their religion.

This being settled, it follows, first, that heresy is a separation made in ecclesiastical communion between men of
the same religion for some opinions no way contained in the rule itself; and, secondly, that amongst those who
acknowledge nothing but the Holy Scriptures to be their rule of faith, heresy is a separation made in their Christian
communion for opinions not contained in the express words of Scripture. Now this separation may be made in a twofold
manner:

1. When the greater part, or by the magistrate’s patronage the stronger part, of the Church separates itself from
others by excluding them out of her communion because they will not profess their belief of certain opinions which are
not the express words of the Scripture. For it is not the paucity of those that are separated, nor the authority of the
magistrate, that can make any man guilty of heresy, but he only is a heretic who divides the Church into parts,
introduces names and marks of distinction, and voluntarily makes a separation because of such opinions.

2. When any one separates himself from the communion of a Church because that Church does not publicly profess some
certain opinions which the Holy Scriptures do not expressly teach.

Both these are heretics because they err in fundamentals, and they err obstinately against knowledge; for when they
have determined the Holy Scriptures to be the only foundation of faith, they nevertheless lay down certain propositions
as fundamental which are not in the Scripture, and because others will not acknowledge these additional opinions of
theirs, nor build upon them as if they were necessary and fundamental, they therefore make a separation in the Church,
either by withdrawing themselves from others, or expelling the others from them. Nor does it signify anything for them
to say that their confessions and symbols are agreeable to Scripture and to the analogy of faith; for if they be
conceived in the express words of Scripture, there can be no question about them, because those things are acknowledged
by all Christians to be of divine inspiration and therefore fundamental. But if they say that the articles which they
require to be professed are consequences deduced from the Scripture, it is undoubtedly well done of them who believe
and profess such things as seem unto them so agreeable to the rule of faith. But it would be very ill done to obtrude
those things upon others unto whom they do not seem to be the indubitable doctrines of the Scripture; and to make a
separation for such things as these, which neither are nor can be fundamental, is to become heretics; for I do not
think there is any man arrived to that degree of madness as that he dare give out his consequences and interpretations
of Scripture as divine inspirations and compare the articles of faith that he has framed according to his own fancy
with the authority of Scripture. I know there are some propositions so evidently agreeable to Scripture that nobody can
deny them to be drawn from thence, but about those, therefore, there can be no difference. This only I say — that
however clearly we may think this or the other doctrine to be deduced from Scripture, we ought not therefore to impose
it upon others as a necessary article of faith because we believe it to be agreeable to the rule of faith, unless we
would be content also that other doctrines should be imposed upon us in the same manner, and that we should be
compelled to receive and profess all the different and contradictory opinions of Lutherans, Calvinists, Remonstrants,
Anabaptists, and other sects which the contrivers of symbols, systems, and confessions are accustomed to deliver to
their followers as genuine and necessary deductions from the Holy Scripture. I cannot but wonder at the extravagant
arrogance of those men who think that they themselves can explain things necessary to salvation more clearly than the
Holy Ghost, the eternal and infinite wisdom of God.

Thus much concerning heresy, which word in common use is applied only to the doctrinal part of religion. Let us now
consider schism, which is a crime near akin to it; for both these words seem unto me to signify an ill-grounded
separation in ecclesiastical communion made about things not necessary. But since use, which is the supreme law in
matter of language, has determined that heresy relates to errors in faith, and schism to those in worship or
discipline, we must consider them under that distinction.

Schism, then, for the same reasons that have already been alleged, is nothing else but a separation made in the
communion of the Church upon account of something in divine worship or ecclesiastical discipline that is not any
necessary part of it. Now, nothing in worship or discipline can be necessary to Christian communion but what Christ our
legislator, or the Apostles by inspiration of the Holy Spirit, have commanded in express words.

In a word, he that denies not anything that the Holy Scriptures teach in express words, nor makes a separation upon
occasion of anything that is not manifestly contained in the sacred text — however he may be nicknamed by any sect of
Christians and declared by some or all of them to be utterly void of true Christianity — yet in deed and in truth this
man cannot be either a heretic or schismatic.

These things might have been explained more largely and more advantageously, but it is enough to have hinted at them
thus briefly to a person of your parts.