Thursday, September 29, 2016

China imported $73.2 billion of agricultural products during the first eight months of 2016--but that total was down 7.2 percent from the same period last year. The volumes of some grain and edible oil imports was down 20-to-30 percent, but pork and beef imports continue to surge due to high prices in China.

The Ministry of Agriculture's analysis of the import data shows that grain imports during January-August 2016 totaled 15.9 million metric tons, down 30.8% from the same period in 2015. Imports of rice and wheat rose 18.9%, while imports of corn dropped 32.2%. Imports of corn substitutes dropped even faster: barley was down 59.2%, sorghum was down 29%, DDGS was down 44.1%, and cassava was down 28.7%. Cotton imports continued to shrink by 34.6%. Sugar imports were down 31.2%.

China agricultural imports, January-August 2016

Commodity

Imports

Change from last year

1000 metric tons

Percent

Wheat

2,451

18.9

Rice

2,347

18.9

Corn

2,961

-32.2

Barley

3,027

-59.2

Sorghum

4,982

-29.0

DDGS

2,426

-44.1

Cassava

5,325

-28.7

Cotton

844

-34.6

Sugar

2,115

-31.2

Soybeans

53,993

3.1

Rapeseed

2,764

-11.5

Palm oil

2,601

-30.3

Rapeseed oil

453

-14.8

Sunflower oil

651

44.3

Soy oil

379

-21.5

Pork

1,138

160.0

Swine offal

953

85.3

Beef

400

47.6

Lamb/mutton

173

7.0

Milk powder

627

18.6

Soybean imports were one of the few commodities to post a gain in imports, but the increase was modest, at 3.1%. Sunflower oil imports were up too, as importers ramped up imports from Russia to supplement purchases from Ukraine. Rapeseed imports were down, as were imports of other edible oils. MOA does not mention a four-fold increase in peanuts from the United States and Senegal (430,000 metric tons this year). Nor do they mention 700,000 metric tons of sesame seed imports from Africa (up 19 percent).

China has whipsawed the global market by importing massive volumes and subsequently cutting them off. Cotton was the first commodity where this happened (see chart below). China's imports soared during 2011/12 as imports poured in to replace domestic cotton sucked into State reserves at high support prices. China piled up huge reserves through this process until 2014/15 when they eliminated the cotton price support, allowed the domestic cotton price to plummet and choked off cotton imports by shrinking the import quota.

A similar pattern is underway for corn, with a twist. Corn prices at least double those in the United States created huge incentive to import, but corn imports were tightly controlled by an import quota. Instead, Chinese mills and processors imported substitutes for corn that had no import quota limits--sorghum, barley, cassava, and DDGS. Now Chinese authorities are allowing their domestic corn price to plummet--as they did for cotton prices in 2014/15--and they are force-feeding their corn reserves to domestic producers. Antidumping duties on DDGS are helping to tamp down imports. In 2015, the government canceled the rapeseed support price and has been trying to offload old reserves of rapeseed oil. This month, they have been selling off old soybean reserves which may slow imports in later months. The peanut imports may prove temporary--many localities are targeting increases in peanut plantings as part of the structural adjustment program that will shift land out of corn production to alleviate the country's corn glut.

Wheat and rice prices are still being maintained at high levels--for now. The scarcity of wheat in the Chinese market this spring (because so much wheat is in government reserves) and widespread quality problems with this summer's wheat harvest bumped up this year's wheat imports. The government bought up early rice over the summer and has just launched its price support program for the fall rice crop. The amount of wheat and rice going into government stockpiles this year exceeds the volume imported.

China's imports of livestock products are increasing because domestic prices are high, and most of the world has abundant and cheap meat and dairy products available. Unlike the cotton and grain imports, the meat and milk imports may be a permanent fixture--there are no price supports for meats, there are no massive meat reserves, and China does not have the capacity to ramp up meat and milk production.

Unlike previous pork-price surges in China, record-high pork prices since last year have not prompted a rebound in domestic pork output. Thus, prices remain stubbornly high, creating great opportunities for exporters in Europe and the Americas. Beef prices in China stopped rising when authorities started opening their market to bovine meat several years ago. After removing the ban on Brazilian beef last year, that country has become the leading source of China's beef imports in 2016. China's lamb prices have fallen this year. Lamb imports are not as large as beef imports and grew only 7 percent this year.

The MOA statistics don't mention poultry imports, but other statistics show a 41-percent increase in 2016. China's domestic broiler chicken production is constrained by the ban on imports of U.S. and French birds which deprives their industry of "white-feather" grandparent breeding stock.

The MOA statistics also fail to mention a 25-percent increase in imports of alfalfa hay (to 1.1 million metric tons). This reflects another supply constraint--there aren't enough quality forage crops in the country to support a massive herd of dairy cattle.

Earlier this month Chen Wei, an official with China's Meat Association, described China as big meat-producing country and a big market that accounts for a third of the world's meat, including half of the world's pork. (Statistics from the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization suggest China's share of meat is 27 percent). This share exceeds China's 18-percent share of the world's population, implying that the country's per capita consumption exceeds the world average.

Meat association official speaks in front of Smithfield banner in Beijing.

Mr. Chen expects China's consumption of meat to outpace its production over the next five years. He estimates that China's net imports of meat will grow to about 10 million metric tons by 2020, which will be roughly half of global meat trade.

Chen anticipates some changes in China's meat industry. The proportion of pork--now over 60 percent of meat produced and consumed in China--will fall and the beef and lamb share will increase. The industry will shift away from freshly-slaughtered meat toward more chilled and frozen meat. There will be more cooked and processed meat products. Chen sees more quality differentiation in Chinese meat products, including logos that indicate safety, grades and other attributes, and willingness to pay premium prices for quality.

Mr. Chen expects more western-style meat products to be consumed in China. Chen praised Shuanghui (now known as WH Group in English) for playing a guiding role as an advance guard of chilled meat marketing and offering purely western-style products. He celebrated the completion of a new Shuanghui processing plant in Zhengzhou and expressed hope that other Chinese companies will follow Shuanghui's example.

China's hog-farming sector is also due for a makeover. In April, the Ministry of Agriculture issued a five-year plan for the hog industry that called for "stable growth." The targeted output for 2020 is 57.6 million metric tons, just 1.6-percent more than the output in 2014. This is glacial compared to 4-percent growth rates that were customary since the 1990s and even faster growth during the 1980s. (Pork production fell 3 percent during 2015, but this was not mentioned in the plan). The hog plan calls for a regional shift in production, utilization of hog waste, and a new focus on technology and management to raise productivity.

China hog industry five-year plan objectives

Item

Unit

2014

2020

Pork
output

MMT

56.7

57.6

Slaughter
by "scale" farms
(500 head/yr or more)

Percent

42

52

Slaughtered
by scale enterprises

Percent

68

75

Slaughter
rate

Percent

155

160

Commercial
hogs per sow
(for scale farms)

Head

15

19

Labor
productivity

Hogs/person

650

1000

Feed
conversion

Ratio

2.8:1

2.7:1

Manure
utilization rate

Percent

50

>75

The hog plan delineated regions with differing potential for hog production growth. Regions now producing about three-fourths of pork will have no growth or slow growth. Faster growth will be targeted to fringe regions in the northeast, northwest, and southwest that produce relatively little pork now. The shifting of pork production into the hinterland requires upgrade of the slaughter industry linked with cold-chain marketing and logistics to supply densely-populated cities from a distance.

There will be no growth in pork output in densely-populated cities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and a swathe of southeastern and south-central China criss-crossed by rivers, lakes, and canals (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan Provinces) where pollution is a major concern. This region accounts for 38.6 percent of production now.

1-percent annual growth is targeted for the "key production region" which includes grain-abundant regions of north China (Hebei, Shandong, Henan), less-developed southwestern pork-producing areas (Chongqing, Sichuan) and the far south (Guangxi, Hainan). This region also produces about 38 percent of pork now.

1-to-2-percent annual growth is targeted for "potential growth regions" in the grain-rich northeastern provinces, Inner Mongolia, and poor southwestern provinces (Yunnan and Guizhou). This region now accounts for 18.6% of pork output.

4-to-6-percent growth is targeted for "appropriate development regions" in northwestern (Shaanxi, Shanxi, Gansu) and far western regions (Ningxia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai). These regions lack water resources and have a weak foundation for pork production (they have large Muslim and pastoral-oriented ethnic groups that do not traditionally eat pork). This region accounts for only 4.8% of production now.

Improvement of the hog breeding industry is a major emphasis for the 2016-2020 plan. The plan aims to break the industry's dependence on continual influx of breeding stock. Instead, the plan foresees localization of breeds by crossing imported stock with local Chinese breeds. A second emphasis is on supporting breeding farms that preserve purebred local Chinese breeds (analogous to a seed bank).

The plan aims for "basic self-sufficiency" in pork, but it raises concerns about rising imports of pork. The writers of the plan attribute surging imports to high unit costs which are 40-percent higher than those in the U.S. The plan emphasizes improvements in technology and management to raise productivity.

The hog development plan emphasizes use of the international market for acquisition of breeding resources. It promises support for a strategy that combines "bringing in" and "going out" by bringing in quality breeding resources and advanced technology from developed countries. "Going out" implies more companies will make overseas acquisitions, with a priority on obtaining swine breeding technology and know-how. Other areas for international cooperation and exchange are research on feed, management and waste treatment to raising general production capacity and improve the industry's international competitiveness.

Saturday, September 24, 2016

Prices are falling as another big corn crop is harvested in China this month. This year there will be no floor under the price to catch it when it falls.

A Futures Daily reporter visited Henan, Hebei, and Shandong Provinces to investigate corn market conditions. The corn crop looks big, the quality is good, and dry weather at harvest time has been favorable for bringing in the crop. Supplies in the market are already plentiful because the government has been auctioning large volumes of corn from reserves over the past two months. The newly-harvested crop will add to the supply pressure.

The Futures Daily reporter learned from a trader in Henan Province's Minquan County that the local price is .76 yuan/500g (1520 yuan/metric ton, 13-15% moisture). He thought the corn price could fall to 0.7 yuan (1400 yuan/mt) as a greater volume of corn comes on the market. A government warehouse manager in Hebei Province told the reporter that some people say the price could fall to 0.65 yuan/500g (1300 yuan/mt), the lowest price in ten years.

Another futures market news report said prices for the first corn coming on the market in the northeastern province of Liaoning are in the range of .65 to .68 yuan/500g (30% moisture, 1300-1360 yuan/mt). Some people think the price for wet corn could fall as low as 900 yuan/mt when large volumes come on the market from the biggest producing provinces in the northeast.

The prices at ports in northeastern China's Liaoning Province for last year's corn (14% moisture) are 1750-1780 yuan/mt. The September 23 Dalian Futures price for corn delivered in November was 1530 yuan/mt, and the price for corn delivered in January or March 2016 was 1420 yuan/mt, confirming that market participants expect prices to decline as new corn comes on the market.

On September 22, China's Grain Bureau released its "Northeastern Corn Purchase Policy" which affirms that the corn price will be determined by supply and demand in 2016. The policy called for diverse operators to go into the market to purchase corn, ordered banks to supply credit, and urged local governments to give loan guarantees to corn purchasers. The document ordered local officials to ensure storage, transport, and marketing channels were available to move grain to other regions, and to make sure farmers have access to drying equipment and facilities to ensure the quality of corn. Local officials were reminded of their responsibility to assure food security.

The removal of the northeastern corn price floor this year benefits processors by lowering their cost of raw materials. Earlier in September, one commentator said there is a rumor that the government is preparing to give a subsidy to starch processors in Jilin and Heilongjiang Provinces to encourage more corn use. The rumored subsidy would be 100-130 yuan from the central government and 200-260 yuan/mt from local governments for each metric ton of corn used. The commentator estimates that corn use by these processors would rise to 20.4 mmt this year from last year's 18.3 mmt. He also anticipates that the removal of the price floor will benefit starch producers in the northeast by lowering their raw material cost vis-a-vis their competitors in Shandong, Hebei, and Henan Provinces.

With prices expected to fall, traders are "standing on the sidelines," and processors are only buying as they need corn. The Futures Daily reporter was told that farmers eager to return to their off-farm jobs may be eager to sell their corn as soon as possible.

Tuesday, September 20, 2016

China's agricultural sector was relatively weak during August 2016, according a monthly report on rural economic conditions by the Ministry of Agriculture. Agricultural prices are generally weak, livestock numbers are stagnant or declining, and growth in rural migrant wages is slowing. The MOA report warns that pressure from slowing economic growth and pressure on businesses dims the outlook for the rural economy.

China's agricultural prices rebounded in August from July, but they were still lower than a year ago. The index of wholesale prices for agricultural prices was down 4.3 percent from the same period last year, and the "market basket" price index (vegetables, fruit, meat, milk) was down 4.9 percent from a year ago. The two indexes increased 2.5 percent and 3 percent, respectively, from July to August.

The MOA report warns of further downward pressure on farm prices as the fall harvest approaches. The early rice crop harvested this summer was estimated by the National Bureau of Statistics at 32.775 million metric tons, down 2.7 percent from last year due to lower planted area. The fall grain harvest conditions are overall favorable, despite some effects of flooding and isolated drought conditions in some areas. The pest situation is overall stable. MOA warns that corn and rice prices could both decline under pressure from big harvests this fall.

Livestock prices are generally weak in China. Beef prices were down 5 percent from the same period last year, lamb prices were down 6 percent, and milk prices were down 4.8 percent from a year ago. Pork prices peaked in June and are still at an historically high level, but they are now declining. The average live hog price peaked at 20.8 yuan/kg in June, and fell 10 percent by the last week in August. The pork price fell 5.1 percent over two months. Hog producers are enjoying high net returns, but they are cautious about expanding, according to the MOA report. The sow inventory is down 3.5 percent from last year. MOA's monitoring shows the number of hogs being slaughtered is still low. Dairy cattle inventories are down 10.2% from a year ago, which MOA attributes to low milk prices and pressure from imported milk powder. Egg prices rebounded after a string of five monthly declines. Returns to laying hens rebounded and farmers are expanding flocks again.

Agricultural imports were down and exports were up, narrowing China's agricultural trade deficit during August. The volume of cereal grain imports during January-July plummeted 30 percent from the same period last year. Imports of corn and corn substitutes were down 40 percent. Cotton imports for January-July were down 38 percent and sugar imports were down 37 percent. Soybean imports totaled 46.3 mmt for January-July, up 3.7 percent from the same period last year.

China's imports of meat and milk were up, prompted by cheaper prices of imports. The volume of pork imports more than doubled, and beef imports were up 50.8 percent, and milk powder imports were up 30 percent for January-July versus a year ago. China's exports of vegetable, fruit, and fish were up in value terms.

Monday, September 19, 2016

The Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC) agreed to bankroll the Ministry of Agriculture's five-year rural policy blitz by committing to provide no less than 3 trillion yuan ($450 billion) in loans for agricultural modernization during 2016-2020. The funds were committed in a "strategic agreement" signed with the Ministry of Agriculture September 18, 2016.

Few specifics were announced. The two parties agreed to deepen rural reform, push forward stronger policies that benefit farmers and agriculture, upgrade agriculture, raise the efficiency and sustainability of agricultural development, in order to effectively accelerate agricultural modernization. Priorities were as follows:

maintain national food security

construct high-standard fields

improve in agricultural structure

promote innovation in agricultural science and technology and modernize the seed industry

foster new-type farm operators

push forward sustainable agricultural development

accelerate agricultural “going global”

promote rural industry integration

advance antipoverty projects

advance reforms of the state farm "reclamation" system

The ADBC's lending has already been going through the roof. The bank has not released an annual report for 2015 (normally the report is released in April, so it is now five months late).

A January 2016 article revealed numbers for ADBC's 2015 lending boom learned from "knowledgeable people." ADBC issued loans valued at 1.69 trillion yuan during 2015. Its outstanding balance of loans at the end of 2015 was 3.44 trillion yuan, up 21.5% from the previous year.

Traditionally, the biggest chunk of ADBC's lending was for procurement of grain, oils, and cotton for government reserves. That lending has ballooned as the government's floor price programs soared out of control. During 2015, ADBC lent 667.8 billion yuan ($100 billion) to finance procurement of 270 million metric tons of grain, representing a record 43% of grain financed by the government. The ADBC financed 2.36 million metric tons of cotton for government reserves, but that was half the volume financed in 2013 when the floor price for cotton was still in effect. Authorities have been selling their reserves at a loss--it is unclear who is paying for the losses and the interest on the loans. ADBC claimed to have a nonperforming loan rate of 0.81% at the end of 2015.

ADBC already ramped up lending by diversifying its lending to include various rural development initiatives during 2015:

"Bridge loans" for State water projects totaled 35 billion yuan,

medium-long-term loans for water projects totaled 150 billion yuan during 2015 according to "knowledgeable people." The water infrastructure loans more than tripled in value.

The corn producer subsidy will be paid to farmers in the provinces Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Inner Mongolia. The subsidy will be based on the area of land they plant in corn.

The central government has allocated funds to the four provinces. The provinces then divide up the funds among prefectures and then to counties. The payment in each county will vary depending on the ratio of funds to area planted in corn. Liaoning's Agriculture Department estimates that the subsidy payment will vary from 120 to 180 yuan per mu ($109-$163 per acre), with an average of 150 yuan per mu ($137 per acre).

Farmers submit an application for the subsidy to their village committee who should verify the farmer's eligibility. The applications are compiled and passed up to the township government and then the county and prefecture agriculture departments. The township and county authorities must verify the area planted in corn in 2016 by September 30 (the deadline will be June 30 in 2017 and 2018). They must issue payments to farmers through electronic bank accounts by October 31 (the deadline will be September 30 in 2017 and 2018). Officials are not allowed to withhold, deduct, or misappropriate the funds.

Rural families, family farms, farmer cooperatives, and agricultural enterprises who grow corn are eligible for the subsidy. Corn has to be planted on approved cultivated land. Land retired through "grain for green" (退耕土地), land that has not been approved for reclamation, and land requisitioned by the government with compensation is not eligible for the corn subsidy.

The article revealed that Liaoning Province is also giving a nearly-equal 150 yuan-per-mu subsidy to farmers who stopped growing corn this year. This subsidy payment reportedly will be issued at the same time as the corn producers' subsidy. This subsidy is part of a provincial structural adjustment plan announced in March that aims to reduce corn area by 2 million mu and shift cropping patterns in the various regions of the province. Liaoning will install "infrastructure agriculture" in its drought-prone northwest; expand small grains and peanuts in hilly parts of the northwestern region; focus on flower, medicinal crops, and berries in cold mountainous areas; expand "scale" livestock farming in central and western regions, guiding farmers to plant corn for silage and forage crops; rice and soybeans will be promoted in river valleys.

As of today, Chinese netizens had posted 17 uniformly caustic comments about American intentions in response to a brief article reporting the U.S. action on the web site of Global Times, a nationalist-leaning newspaper published by the Chinese government.

Here are the unvarnished opinions of Chinese observers and propagandists:

"Grain is the most basic need. American dogs can control China by controlling its grain more easily than by using force."

"China's farmers are in the weakest position. America's complaint about the State's protection price policy is disgusting in the extreme."

"America is like a rabid dog biting China's trade."

"It is well known that America's subsidies are the highest in the world. Protection price procurement of grain is the nation's main policy for maintaining grain production. America wants to shake the country's foundation."

"Ha, ha. America laughs at the misery of Chinese common people while not letting the Chiense government help them. Ha, ha. America is really too shameless."

"The American government has nothing better to do than continually looking for an excuse to suppress China. Afraid of being surpassed by China, its most insidious threat. Of course, I believe China can deal with the problem."

"Can't a thorough investigation of GMOs be done?"

"China has never had a surplus of grain production. America has always dumped wheat, corn, and soybeans. China should assess anti-dumping duties on the Americans."

"'No stability without an army, no security without grain.' In the struggle against
American imperialism we should take up the secret weapon of our forefather Mao
Zedong. With this cruel trick the Americans plan to shake our nation’s grain as
the foundation of security."

"America is the country that stirs up the [poop] in the world!!!"

"Good people being bullied. Adding to
crimes."

"American tactics are: First, use
market rules to undermine the competitiveness of China’s agricultural
production and allow low-priced American grain to enter the Chinese market. This takes the
initiative away from China’s grain and forces China’s government to give in.
Second, American grain companies seize the top position in China’s market and
raise the grain price, creating social turmoil in China within 10 to 20
years, then forcing the Chinese government to obey the commands of the Americans. Third,
how can we deal with the American devils’ conspiracy to change the bad
situation? Already 40% of our grain seed industry market has been monopolized
by American companies when we were not paying attention. Hope building a brick
house is not a bad idea."

"Our country’s Ministry of
Agriculture has a problem, American transgenic food entered China, creating low-price
pressure on incentives to produce grain, shaking the foundation of the country,
while transgenic grain also affects the health of Chinese people; China’s
Ministry of Agriculture has been defeated by the Americans."

"Please don’t interfere with China’s
internal affairs. Do you have time to pay attention to your Hillary’s health?"

"Can China slap antidumping duties
on American apples? American dogs have no shame."

"Americans are too @#$% shameless,
saying that China’s agricultural subsidies are more than America’s; they are
conspirators."

"Does China have any actual strength?
Westerners previously set up cannons on the shore to plunder Asian countries.
Now without killing a single person, without firing a gun or a cannon, they
make China into their source for low-price industrial raw materials and
laborers, dumping high value added products here...is this what we want China
to be?"

"To what
degree do we have to patiently appease them before we speak boldly? Who is the
protectionist here? A government that can’t preserve the interests of its
people must step down."

Three comments use variants of the phrase "shake the foundation of the country," which also appeared in the Ministry of Commerce's statement. This is apparently the party line. A google search for the Chinese phrase "shake the foundation of the country" (动摇国本) indicates that it previously was used mainly to comment on the effects of corruption in China. Now there is an external threat to divert attention from internal systemic weakness.

Monday, September 12, 2016

In its September "China Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates" China's Ministry of Agriculture reduced its estimates of the country's corn production and imports for the coming year, but an excess supply of over 8 million metric tons is still expected for the 2016/17 market year. Soybean imports were revised downward to 84 mmt for 2016/17 as sales of government stocks displace some imports and tepid livestock industry growth slows soybean meal demand growth. Corn prices in production regions are expected to fall to 1500-to-1650 yuan/mt during 2016/17, down from 1850-1880 yuan during 2015/16.

China
corn balance sheet (China Ministry of Ag, Sept 2016)

Item

Unit

2014/15

2015/16

2016/17

Change from last month

Sown area

1000 HA

37,123

38,117

36,026

Yield

KG/HA

5,809

5,892

5,983

-27.00

Production

Mil MT

215.70

224.58

215.43

-1.08

Imports

Mil MT

5.52

4.60

2.00

-0.40

Consumption

Mil MT

183.39

193.35

208.97

0.80

--food

Mil MT

7.52

7.65

7.72

--feed

Mil MT

112.56

120.61

132.68

--industrial

Mil MT

52.57

53.97

56.35

--seed

Mil MT

1.69

1.66

1.61

--waste and other

Mil MT

9.05

9.56

9.81

Exports

Mil MT

0.01

0.03

0.20

Inventory change

Mil MT

37.82

34.02

8.06

After big surpluses of 37.8 mmt in 2014/15 and 34 mmt in 2015/16, MOA projects a smaller surplus of 8 mmt for 2016/17. Production is expected to be down in 2016/17 on a 2-million-hectare reduction in area and hot, dry weather in parts of northeastern China that prompted a 27-kg downward revision of yield. Recovery of feed consumption (up 12 mmt) is the biggest change in the 2016/17 balance sheet. This apparently comes from a shift from imported corn substitutes back to corn (the soybean meal outlook presumes weak growth in feed demand). MOA expects only a 800,000-mt bump in industrial consumption from the VAT-rebate for starch and alcohol exports. Corn imports for 2016/17 were revised downward by 400,000 metric tons to 2 mmt as lower corn prices in China reduce imports of corn substitutes.

MOA reduced its 2015/16 soybean imports to 81.4 mmt as sales of domestic reserves slowed imports during the final month of the market year. The change in soybean inventory for 2015/16 is estimated at -1.84 mmt, reflecting the sale of government stocks.

China
soybean balance sheet (China Ministry of Ag, Sept 2016)

Item

Unit

2014/15

2015/16

2016/17

Change from last month

Harvested area

1000 HA

6,800

6,590

7,150

-6

Yield

KG/HA

1,787

1,762

1,753

-44.00

Production

Mil MT

12.15

11.61

12.53

-0.33

Imports

Mil MT

78.35

81.42

83.50

Consumption

Mil MT

89.83

94.76

98.20

--crushing

Mil MT

77.34

81.00

84.00

--food

Mil MT

9.15

10.35

11.18

--seed

Mil MT

0.50

0.54

0.56

--loss & other

Mil MT

2.84

2.87

2.46

Exports

Mil MT

0.14

0.13

0.20

Inventory change

Mil MT

0.53

-1.84

-2.37

-0.35

The only changes in the 2016/17 soybean balance sheet is a downward revision in production due to dry weather in the northeast. Yield was revised downward, and MOA expects 6000 hectares to go unharvested. Soybean imports for 2016/17 are forecast at 83.5 mmt. MOA expects crush of soybeans to increase only 3 mmt duirng 2016/17. MOA expects a weak bounce in soybean production to 12.5 mmt in 2016/17.

Cotton production is expected to fall again during 2016/17, mostly due to poor weather in Xinjiang: colder than normal temperatures in northern Xinjiang and heavy rain in the southern part of the region. Cotton inventories continue their slow decline to 9.3 mmt at the end of 2016/17, still 124% of forecast consumption. MOA expects 950,000 metric tons of cotton imports during 2016/17, slightly less than 2015/16 imports.

The subsidy appears to be part of two Chinese initiatives. First is the overhaul of grain subsidies which combines three separate subsidies into a single payment and makes payments to both small-scale landholders and new-style farms that rent in land. Second is a structural adjustment initiative which hopes to address the surplus of corn and deficit of soybeans by inducing farmers to shift land from corn to soybeans. A related initiative seeks to break the continuous mono-cropping of corn that has become predominant in northeastern China and degrades soil fertility.

The document announcing the subsidy offers no concrete details about how authorities will verify that farmers planted soybeans this year on plots where they planted corn last year. Local statistics bureaus are supposed to measure and verify the area subsidized, but this is impossible. Statisticians have had difficulty verifying the area planted in soybeans, so measuring area planted in corn in one year and soybeans in the next where there are no accurate records is an impossible task. According to the document, the subsidy will cover 6.5 million mu (over 1 million acres) in Heilongjiang. That would be about a fifth of soybeans planted in Heilongjiang.

This subsidy is a companion to Heilongjiang's grain subsidy for small-scale farmers announced in July. That subsidy is supposedly meant to compensate farmers for land fertility improvements, but there was no mechanism to verify that any improvements were made. Both subsidy payments appear to be general subsidies for grain producers dressed up as environmentally-friendly payments. By classifying the subsidies this way, officials may hope to claim the payments are exempt from limits on subsidies imposed by the World Trade Organization.

Heilongjiang farmers apparently will be eligible for a basic subsidy plus a corn or soybean subsidy, depending on which crop they grow on their land. The basic subsidy is a 71.45 yuan/mu "land fertility subsidy" for small-scale farmers or the 150 yuan/mu corn-soybean rotation payment for large scale farmers who rent land. Those who plant soybeans will also be eligible for a 130.87 yuan/mu "target price subsidy", and those who plant corn will get a "corn producers subsidy" of a similar amount. Rice producers will get the basic subsidy plus the assurance that the price will be supported by a minimum purchase price policy.

How low will China's corn price go after new corn comes on the market? While the national "temporary reserve" policy for corn has been eliminated, there may be a flurry of micro-interventions to support corn prices and stockpile corn in other ways. Nevertheless, market players in China are expecting a sharp decline in prices after new corn comes on the market.

An article circulating on Chinese web sites this week calls on local officials, state-owned enterprises, private companies, and individual brokers to make a coordinated effort to ensure that farmers are able to sell their corn this fall to ensure national food security and "harmonious stability."

The article from something called "Farmer's Home" anticipates that China's corn market will have difficulty adjusting to the first year of "marketized" corn purchase because the cancellation of the floor price was announced too late for farmers to adjust their planting decisions. Farmers have become accustomed to planting corn year after year under the floor price policy, and the government relied on strong corn prices to boost rural incomes, according to "Farmer's Home." Another glut of corn is expected in China this year.

This year there will be no formal floor price program for corn prices, but the "Farmer's Home" author urges local officials to intervene to prevent prices from plummeting too far. The author reminds provincial and local officials of their responsibility for maintaining national food security under the "provincial governor's responsibility system" and urges them to take a leading role in coordinating purchases of corn. They should "plan ahead," fully mobilize state-owned enterprises to purchase grain, and guide diverse players to buy grain--"whoever has storage, whoever has people, whoever has money should buy grain."

Specifically, the article recommends cutting taxes for grain enterprises to encourage them to buy more corn, and it calls for a one-time subsidy to encourage enterprises to sell off old corn inventories to make room for new grain in their silos and warehouses. The article highlights the importance of "coordinating" financial organizations to ensure that credit is available to buy grain, which suggests banks will be pressured to make loans to buy grain that is likely to plummet in price. The "Farmer's Home" author tells officials to utilize news media to publicize policies and create an atmosphere of good public opinion.

The "Farmers Home" author singles out state-owned grain enterprises as key players who should play their role in maintaining national food security. The author chastises state-owned enterprises for not having a high degree of market-orientation, but he also charges them with responsibility for buying up unwanted old reserves of grain from auctions being held now ahead of the harvest. He encourages the state-owned enterprises to maintain their reliance on the IV-drip of government for funds supplied by the Agricultural Development Bank. The author urges private companies and individual grain merchants to fulfill their responsibilities to buy up grain and prevent prices from crashing.

The article endorses the objective of moving toward a
market-driven corn
market, and the writer insists that these are only temporary measures needed to make the transition without forcing farmers to bear the losses. However,
the recommendations imply a fundamental distrust of the market
mechanism that can only be corrected by a tangle of "invisible handshakes" between government officials, public and private companies and banks to guide the
market.
Trading in corn futures contracts on China's Dalian Futures Exchange suggests that market players expect a significant decline in Chinese corn prices this fall, despite such local policy measures. Today's price for the January 2017 contract closed at 1425 yuan per metric ton--23 percent lower than the 1850 yuan price for September contracts. The January contract accounted for nearly all of the corn futures trading on the exchange, suggesting that many traders are speculating on a crash in prices after this fall's northeastern corn comes on the market in large volumes during November and December.