Artigliere and Camicia Nera, Italian destroyers
of the Camicia Nera class, during the battle

The Battle of Calabria, (known to the Italian
Navy as the Battle of Punta Stilo) was a naval battle during
the Battle of the Mediterranean
in World War II.
It was fought between vessels of ItalianRoyal Navy (Regia Marina) on one side and vessels
of the BritishRoyal Navy and the Royal
Australian Navy on the other. The battle occurred thirty miles
to the east of Punta Stilo, the "toe" of Italy (Calabria), on 9 July 1940. It
was one of the few pitched battles of the Mediterranean campaign
during World War
II involving large numbers of ships on both sides. Both sides
claimed victory, but in fact the battle was a draw and everyone
returned to their bases as soon as possible. After the battle a
massive propaganda effort on the part of the Allies tried to convince the
Italian forces that the Allies had won outright; Italian propaganda
also depicted this battle as an Axis victory.

Contents

Origins

When World War
II opened, it was much to the surprise of the Italian forces
who, like many in Europe, did not expect conflict until 1941 at the
earliest. At the time their forces in Libya were ill-equipped for war, and the Italian
fleet was forced to start large supply operations in order to bring
them up to fighting condition.

On 6 July a convoy of four merchant ships left Naples on their way to Bengazi, while attempting
to fool the Allies into thinking they were making for Tripoli. The next day their
escort force joined them from Taranto after being informed that the Allies
had recently left port in Alexandria. A fifth cargo ship also joined
them from Catania. The
escort of the convoy consisted of three groups; directly protecting
the cargo ships were eight destroyers and four torpedo boats, while a second group sailed
35 km to the east and contained six heavy cruisers and another twelve
destroyers. Finally the main battle group contained two battleships (Giulio Cesare
and Conte di
Cavour), eight light cruisers and
another thirteen destroyers.

Meanwhile the Allies were involved in a similar convoy action.
The fleet sailed from Alexandria bound in the direction of Malta where the destroyers would
deliver supplies and a limited number of specialist reinforcements.
Two convoys were arranged to take off fleet stores and civilians
from Malta to Alexandria. Two groups of merchantmen were arranged,
one at 13 knots and another at 9 knots. Protecting them were three
groups of ships, one with five cruisers and a destroyer, Force A,
another, Force B, with the battleship Warspite and five destroyers and
the main battle group, Force C, with the battleships Royal
Sovereign and Malaya, the aircraft
carrierEagle and eleven destroyers
(One, HMS Imperial had to return to Alexandria with a burst steam
pipe on the early hours of 8 July.)

On the night of 8 July, Italian command deciphered Allied radio
signals and told their fleet to prepare for action about 65 miles
south east of Punta Stilo. Some sources suggest that the
Italians had turned to avoid battle as they were moving north when
encountered, but in fact they planned to keep the action close to
Italy and were deliberately moving north in order to draw the
Allies closer to their airbases. During the initial positioning the
Italians suffered technical problems on three destroyers and two
light cruisers, so these ships were formed up with several
additional destroyers and sent to refuel in Sicily. In order to make up for these "losses",
another destroyer group was called for from Taranto. At this point,
the Italian fleet had 16 destroyers.

Meanwhile the Allies were having problems as well. The day
before the battle, land-based bombers of the Italian Royal Air
Force (Regia Aeronautica) from the
mainland had attacked their fleet and hit Gloucester's bridge, killing the
captain and many bridge crew, six officers and eleven ratings. In
addition, three officers and six ratings were wounded. For the rest
of the battle, she would be commanded from the emergency station.
While a serious enough blow, it was perhaps more damaging to the
Italians, who were convinced that their aircraft had inflicted
serious damage to a good deal of the Allied fleet and had reduced
their fighting power considerably. Rome radio claimed several ships
as being struck, some set on fire, and one sunk.

Unlike the dive-bombers favored by the Germans,
Italian bombers operated in formations at high altitudes during the
first stages of the war. The Italian aircraft usually dropped their
bombs together at about twelve-thousand feet. At Calabria, the
Italians carried out the ultimate test of the claims of pre-war
air-power theorist concerning massed bombers being able to sink
modern warships. However, fast-moving ships proved to be a far more
difficult target than anticipated. In addition, ship Captains
waited until the bombers released their sticks of bombs and, in the
remaining seconds, took evasive action. While hundreds of bombs
were dropped by the Italians, the single hit on the
Gloucester represented the outcome of the air attacks.[1]

Cruiser
engagement

At noon on 9 July the two fleets were 90 miles apart. Vice
Admiral Cunningham could not close the distance to engage with the
significantly slower Royal Sovereign and Malaya
(18 knots vs 28 knots) and took Warspite in on its own.
Meanwhile, at 13:15, Eagle launched several sorties by Fairey
Swordfish against the Italian heavy cruisers, with no
success.

The Allied cruiser group was spread out in front of
Warspite and at 15:15 they caught sight of the Italian
main battle force and the two groups opened fire at 21,500 metres.
Italian rangefinding equipment was better than the Allied, and
within three minutes they had found the distance even though they
were firing at extreme range. Although the Allies' rangefinding was
not as good and they had trouble with their rounds falling short,
the Allied gunlaying equipment was better and they were able to
place their rounds in much tighter groups. Generally the gunnery of
the two forces was fairly well matched. After only a few minutes
the range was down to 20,000 metres and the Allied guns became
useful.

However, by 15:22, the Italian fire came dangerously close to
the Allied cruisers and Vice Admiral John Tovey decided to
disengage. At this point splinters from a 6" shell fired by the
cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi hit Neptune, damaging her
catapult and the reconnaissance
aircraft beyond repair. The cruisers continued to open the
range and by 15:30 fire ceased.

Battleship
engagement

One group of Italian light cruisers, mistaken for the very
latest heavy cruiser Zara class, was on the Allied side
of the battle line and was soon within range of the charging
Warspite. Once again the Allied rounds fell short, and
neither of her targets, Alberico da
Barbiano and Alberto di Giussano, received any
damage in the initial salvos. However by this time
Warspite was also out of position, and she circled in
place in order to allow Malaya to catch up (Royal
Sovereign was still well to the rear).

The Italian commander, Vice Admiral Inigo Campioni, decided to
take on Warspite, and started moving his two battleships
into position. At 15:52 Giulio Cesare opened fire at a
range of 26,400 metres. Conte di Cavour did not fire, a
decision many have questioned. Their strategy was to have only one
ship targeted at a time, as it was learned during the Battle of
Jutland that with more than one ship firing at a single target
it became very difficult for the rangefinding parties to tell which
rounds were theirs. Conte di Cavour was responsible for
Malaya and Royal Sovereign, which were further
back and did not enter the engagement.

Warspite, not aware of the Italian firing patterns,
split her guns between the two ships. During the exchange one of
Giulio Cesare's rounds fell long and caused damage to
Warspite's escorting destroyers (Hereward and Decoy) which had formed up on the
far side of the action. At 15:54 Malaya started firing,
well out of range, hoping to cause some confusion on the Italian
ships. Meanwhile the Italian heavy cruisers came into action and
started firing on Warspite at 15:55 but had to break off
as the Allied cruisers returned.

At 15:59 two shells from Giulio Cesare fell very close
to Warspite. Almost immediately after one of
Warspite's 381 mm rounds hit the rear deck of
Giulio Cesare, setting off the stored ammunition for one
of her 37 mm anti-aircraft guns. Two seamen were killed and
several wounded. The fumes from the burning ammunition were sucked
down into the engine room, which had to evacuate and shut down half
of the boilers. Giulio Cesare's speed quickly fell off to
18 knots and Conte di Cavour took over. Giulio
Cesare and Warspite were well over 24,000 metres
(26,000 yards) apart at the time of the hit, setting the record for
naval gunnery against a moving target that stands to this day.

It would appear that Warspite was in an excellent
position to deal some serious blows to the slowing Giulio
Cesare but she once again executed another tight turn to allow
Malaya to catch up. With her guns suddenly silenced during
the turn, the rangefinders on Malaya discovered what the
Italians had been intending to avoid, that her rounds were falling
2,700 yards short of Giulio Cesare and they had been
watching Warspite's rounds.

At 16:01 the Italian destroyers generated smoke and the
battleships got under cover. There is some debate about this point
today, the Allied position being that the battleships were leaving
battle, the Italian that they were attempting to make a torpedo attack with their
destroyers from within the smoke.

Final
actions

The Italian heavy
cruisers were a serious threat and could have evened the battle
between the main battleships, but with Warspite in the
battle the Allied cruisers returned and the Italians turned to
restart their initial fight with them.

At 15:58 Fiume re-opened fire on
her counterpart in the Allied line, Liverpool and soon two
groups of Italian cruisers were in combat with the main Allied
cruiser battle group. Firing continued as both groups attempted to
form up and at 16:07 the Italian cruiser Bolzano was hit three
times, temporarily locking her rudder and suffering two fatalities.
A near miss on the destroyer Vittorio Alfieri caused minor
damage.

Meanwhile the mechanics on Giulio Cesare were able to
repair two of the four damaged boilers, allowing the battleship to
reach 22 knots. Admiral Campioni, considering the possibilities of
his remaining battleship, Conte di Cavour against three
enemy battleships and an aircraft carrier, decided to withdraw the
battleships towards Messina.

Over the next hour both fleets attempted to make torpedo runs with their
destroyer groups without success. At 14:40, the Italian air force
made an attack with 126 aircraft, reporting damage on
Eagle, Warspite and Malaya; because of
some misunderstanding, 50 of the Italian aircraft attacked the
Italian ships, without damage. The battle ended at 16:55 with both
sides withdrawing.

One final victim was the destroyer Leone Pancaldo, sent
to Augusta in Sicily, which
was hit by a torpedo launched from a Swordfish at 09:40 the next
day.

Result

After the battle both fleets turned for home. This allowed the
Italians to claim a victory of sorts, as their cargo ships were
already past the action by this time and sailed safely for Libya.
Meanwhile, the Allied ships also reached Alexandria along with
their escort. However, Allied gunnery proved superior and while the
damage to Giulio Cesare was light and repaired within a
month, the Allies claimed that they had suffered no damage at all
and eventually it seems the Italians came to believe them. While
the battle was a draw, it was an Allied win from the propaganda
point of view.

One question is why the Italians did not send their two
remaining battleships at Taranto, both ready for action and only a few
hours from the scene. The answer appears to be that they were
afraid to send them out without the destroyer escort, which had
been sent out earlier to make up for "losses" in the main fleet.
These two ships would have tipped the balance of fire well onto the
Italian side.

Even without these ships the fleets were fairly even. The
Italian superiority in aircraft due to the nearby land-based
aircraft of the Italian Royal Air Force (Regia
Aeronautica) should have been overwhelming. In fact they
played almost no part at all, with the exception of the damage to
Gloucester, yet their battle reports were inflated to the
point of claiming damage to half of the Allied fleet.

Order of
battle

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Allies

Force A was made up of the 7th Cruiser squadron and HMAS
Stuart under Admiral Tovey; Force B commanded by Vice
Admiral Andrew
Cunningham who was the Commander in Chief of the entire
Mediterranean Fleet; and Force C commanded by Vice-Admiral H. A.
Pridham-Wippel.

The destroyer HMS Escort was sunk in the Western
Mediterranean where Force H was providing a feint and demonstration
against Sardinia to distract the Italian fleet from the sailing of
the Allied convoys. HMS Escort was torpedoed on 11 July by
the Italian submarine Marconi during Force H's
return passage.[6]

and Camicia Nera, Italian destroyers of the Camicia Nera class, during the battle]]

The Battle of Calabria, (known to the Italian Navy as the Battle of Punta Stilo) was a naval battle during the Battle of the Mediterranean in World War II. It was fought between the ItalianRoyal Navy (Regia Marina) and the BritishRoyal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy. The battle occurred 30 miles to the east of Punta Stilo, the "toe" of Italy (Calabria), on 9 July 1940. It was one of the few pitched battles of the Mediterranean campaign during World War II involving large numbers of ships on both sides. Both sides claimed victory, but in fact the battle was a draw and everyone returned to their bases as soon as possible. After the battle the Allies claimed to have achieved some sort of "moral ascendancy" over the Italian Navy; conversely, the Italian propaganda depicted the clash as a victory of their own.

Contents

Origins

When Italy entered WWII, their forces in Libya were ill-equipped for offensive operations, and the Italian fleet was forced to start large supply convoys in order to bring them up to fighting condition.[1]

On 6 July a convoy of four merchant ships left Naples on their way to Bengazi, while attempting to fool the Allies into thinking they were making for Tripoli. That evening two torpedo-boats from Catania and another freighter met them off Messina and the next day their escort force joined the convoy from Taranto after being informed that the Allies had recently left port in Alexandria. The transports carried 2190 troops, 72 M11 tanks, 232 vehicles, 10,445 tons of supplies and 5720 tons of fuel. The convoy's escort consisted of three groups; eight destroyers and four torpedo boats directly protecting the cargo ships, a second group sailed 35 miles to the east consisting of six heavy cruisers and another four destroyers. Finally, the main battle group consisted of two battleships (Giulio Cesare and Conte di Cavour), eight light cruisers and another 16 destroyers.[2] A substantial number of the Italian destroyers didn't take part in the battle due to mechanical problems and the need to refuel.[3]

Meanwhile, the Allies were involved in a similar convoy action. The fleet sailed from Alexandria bound towards Malta where the destroyers would deliver supplies and a limited number of specialist reinforcements. Two convoys were arranged to take off fleet stores and civilians from Malta to Alexandria. Two groups of merchantmen sailed, a fast convoy at 13 knots and slow one at 9 knots. Protecting them were three groups of ships, one with five cruisers and a destroyer, Force A, another, Force B, with the battleship Warspite and five destroyers and the main battle group, Force C, with the battleships Royal Sovereign and Malaya, the aircraft carrierEagle and eleven destroyers.[4] One of them, HMS Imperial, had to return to Alexandria with a burst steam pipe on the early hours of 8 July.[5]

At 14:40 on 8 July two Italian Cant Z.506 from Tobruk spotted the British fleet and shadowed it for nearly four hours. Admiral Campioni ordered his fleet to defend the convoy by turning eastward and preparing for action. The Italian Supreme Command, however, was reluctant to risk its warships in a night time encounter, and they ordered the fleet to avoid contact.[6] During the initial positioning the Italians suffered technical problems on three destroyers and two light cruisers, so these ships, with several additional destroyers, were detached to refuel in Sicily. In order to make up for these "losses", another destroyer group was summoned from Taranto. At this point, the Italian fleet had 16 destroyers.[3][7]

Meanwhile the Allies were having problems as well. From 10:00 to 18.40, 72 land-based bombers of the Italian Royal Air Force (Regia Aeronautica) from the mainland had attacked their fleet and struck HMS Gloucester's bridge, killing the captain, six officers and eleven ratings. In addition, three officers and six ratings were wounded. The forward fire control and the steering equipment was destroyed, and for the rest of the battle, she would be commanded from the emergency station.[6][8] The damage to Gloucester, while serious and necessitating her withdrawal from the frontline, was the only damage to allied ships by two series of substantial Italian air attacks[9]

Unlike the dive-bombers favored by the Germans, Italian bombers operated in formations at high altitudes during the first stages of the war. The Italian aircraft usually dropped their bombs together at about twelve-thousand feet. At Calabria, the Italians carried out the ultimate test of the claims of pre-war air-power theorist concerning massed bombers being able to sink modern warships. However, fast-moving ships proved to be a far more difficult target than anticipated. In addition, ship Captains waited until the bombers released their sticks of bombs and, in the remaining seconds, took evasive action. While scores of bombs were dropped by the Italians, the single hit on the Gloucester represented the outcome of the air attacks.[10]

At 15:10 on 8 July, Cunningham's fleet steamed toward Taranto, in order to cut Italian's return route. At dusk, Cunningham changed course from 310º to 260º and slowed the fleet speed. During the first hours of 9 July, they took a 305º course, to avoid the Italian air recce while keeping their fleet between the Italian squadron and the Gulf of Taranto.[11] By 12:30, the Italian Supreme Command was clueless about the situation of the British fleet. Campioni told his fleet to scramble by 14:00 about 60 miles south east of Cape Spartivento in search of the enemy. Campioni eventually received reports of the British position at 13:30, and six Ro.43 flying boats launched shortly after by the Italian cruisers spotted the British warships 30 miles closer than supposed.[7]

Cruiser engagement

At noon on 9 July the two fleets were 90 miles apart. Vice Admiral Cunningham could not close the distance to engage with the significantly slower Royal Sovereign and Malaya (18 knots vs 28 knots) and took Warspite in on its own. Meanwhile, at 13:15, Eagle launched several unsuccessful sorties by Fairey Swordfish against the Italian heavy cruisers, which they took for battleships.[7] At 13:10, the Italian Supreme Command had instructed Campioni to engage one of the two enemy forces facing him, but in fact they had planned to keep the action close to Italy and were deliberately moving north in order to draw the Allies closer to their airbases. By 14:00, however, Cunningham plans to cut off the Italian fleet from Taranto had succeeded.[3]

The Allied cruiser group was spread out in front of Warspite and at 15:15 they caught sight of the Italian main battle force and the two groups opened fire at 21,500 metres. Italian rangefinding was better than the Allied, and within three minutes they had found the distance even though they were firing at extreme range. Although the Allies' rangefinding was not as good and they had trouble with their rounds falling short, the Allied gunlaying was better and they were able to place their rounds in much tighter groups. Generally the gunnery of the two forces was fairly well matched. After only a few minutes the range was down to 20,000 metres and the Allied guns became useful. However, by 15:22, the Italian fire came dangerously close to the Allied cruisers and Vice Admiral John Tovey decided to disengage.[12] At this point splinters from a 6" shell fired by the cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi hit HMS Neptune, damaging her catapult and the reconnaissance aircraft beyond repair.[13] The cruisers continued to open the range and by 15:30 fire ceased.[12]

Battleship engagement

One group of Italian light cruisers, mistaken for the very latest heavy cruiser Zara class, was on the Allied side of the battle line and was soon within range of the charging Warspite. Once again the Allied rounds fell short, and neither of her targets, Alberico da Barbiano and Alberto di Giussano, received any damage in the initial salvos. However by this time Warspite was also out of position, and she circled in place in order to allow Malaya to catch up. Meanwhile, Royal Sovereign was still well to the rear.

The Italian commander, Vice Admiral Inigo Campioni, decided to take on Warspite, and started moving his two battleships into position. At 15:52 Giulio Cesare opened fire at a range of 26,400 metres. Conte di Cavour did not fire, a decision many have questioned. Their strategy was to have only one ship targeted at a time, as it was learned during the Battle of Jutland that with more than one ship firing at a single target it became very difficult for the rangefinding parties to tell which rounds were theirs. Conte di Cavour was responsible for Malaya and Royal Sovereign, which were further back and did not enter the engagement.[14]

Warspite, not aware of the Italian firing patterns, split her guns between the two ships. During the exchange one of Giulio Cesare's rounds fell long and caused damage to Warspite's escorting destroyers (Hereward and Decoy) which had formed up on the far side of the action.[15] At 15:54 Malaya started firing, well out of range, hoping to cause some confusion on the Italian ships. Meanwhile the Italian heavy cruisers came into action and started firing on Warspite at 15:55 but had to break off as the Allied cruisers returned.

At 15:59 two shells from Giulio Cesare fell very close to Warspite. Almost immediately after one of Warspite's 15-inch (381 mm) rounds hit the rear deck of Giulio Cesare, setting off the stored ammunition for one of her 37 mm anti-aircraft guns. Two seamen were killed and several wounded. The fumes from the burning ammunition were sucked down into the engine room, which had to evacuate and shut down half of the boilers. Giulio Cesare's speed quickly fell off to 18 knots and Conte di Cavour took over. Giulio Cesare and Warspite were well over 24,000 metres (26,000 yards) apart at the time of the hit, which was one of the longest-range naval artillery hits in history.[Note 1]

It would appear that Warspite was in an excellent position to deal some serious blows to the slowing Giulio Cesare but she once again executed another tight turn to allow Malaya to catch up. With her guns suddenly silenced during the turn, the rangefinders on Malaya discovered what the Italians had been intending to avoid, that her rounds were falling 2,700 yards short of Giulio Cesare and they had been watching Warspite's rounds.

At 16:01 the Italian destroyers generated smoke and the battleships got under cover. There is some debate about this point today, the Allied position being that the battleships were leaving battle, the Italian that they were attempting to make a torpedo attack with their destroyers from within the smoke.[16]

Final actions

At 15:58 Fiume re-opened fire on her counterpart in the Allied line, Liverpool and soon two groups of Italian cruisers were in combat with the main Allied cruiser battle group. Firing continued as both groups attempted to form up and at 16:07 the Italian cruiser Bolzano was hit three times by 6" shells from HMS Neptune, temporarily locking her rudder and suffering two fatalities at the torpedo room. A near miss on the destroyer Vittorio Alfieri caused minor damage.[17]

Meanwhile the mechanics on Giulio Cesare were able to repair two of the four damaged boilers, allowing the battleship to reach 22 knots.[18] Admiral Campioni, considering the possibilities of his remaining battleship, Conte di Cavour against three enemy battleships and an aircraft carrier, decided to withdraw the battleships towards Messina.[19]Cesare was out of action for 30 days.[17]

Over the next hour both fleets attempted to make long-range torpedo runs with their destroyer groups without success.[20] At 16:40, the Italian air force made an attack with 126 aircraft, reporting damage on Eagle, Warspite and Malaya; because of some misunderstanding, 50 of the Italian aircraft also attacked the Italian ships, without damage. The battle ended at 16:50 with both sides withdrawing.[21]

One final victim was the destroyer Leone Pancaldo, sent to Augusta in Sicily, which was hit by a torpedo launched from a Swordfish at 09:40 the next day and sank in shallow water.[9][17] (She was refloated and returned to service in December 1941.[22])

Result

After the battle both fleets turned for home. This allowed the Italians to claim a victory of sorts, as their cargo ships were already past the action by this time and sailed safely for Libya.[23] Meanwhile, the Allied ships also reached Alexandria along with their escort. However, Allied gunnery proved superior and while the damage to Giulio Cesare was light and repaired within a month, while the Italian salvoes were too widely dispersed due to technical reasons, not to be overcome until the end of the conflict.[24] Although the battle was indecisive, Allied sources claimed that the Royal Navy asserted an important "moral ascendancy" over their Italian counterpart.[25]
One question is why the Italians did not send their two remaining battleships of the Vittorio Veneto class at Taranto, both almost ready for action and only a few hours from the scene. Both capital ships were still undergoing trials, and the Littorio had suffered an electrical mishap on one of her main turrets. Littorio and Vittorio Veneto would have tipped the balance of fire well onto the Italian side.[26]

Even without these ships the fleets were fairly even. The Italian superiority in aircraft due to the nearby land-based aircraft of the Italian Royal Air Force (Regia Aeronautica) was ineffective. In fact they played almost no part at all, with the exception of the damage to Gloucester,[6] yet their battle reports were inflated to the point of claiming damage to half of the Allied fleet.[27]

Order of battle

Allies

Force A was made up of the 7th Cruiser squadron and HMAS Stuart under Admiral Tovey; Force B commanded by Vice Admiral Andrew Cunningham who was the Commander in Chief of the entire Mediterranean Fleet; and Force C commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Pridham-Wippell.

The destroyer HMS Escort was sunk in the Western Mediterranean where Force H was providing a feint and demonstration against Sardinia to distract the Italian fleet from the sailing of the Allied convoys. She was torpedoed on 11 July by the Italian submarine Marconi during Force H's return passage.[32]