1. The case originated in an application (no.
852/02) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Russian nationals, Mrs Zoya
Valeriyanovna Smirnitskaya, Mrs Yelena Fedorovna Stolyarova and Mr Albert
Semenovich Stolyarov (“the applicants”), on 6 July 2001.

2. The applicants were represented by Mr I.V. Novikov,
a lawyer practising in Novosibirsk. The Russian Government (“the Government”)
were represented by Mr P. Laptev, Representative of the Russian Federation
at the European Court of Human Rights.

3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that
the domestic judicial authorities had reconsidered a judgment given
in their favour having improperly used the procedure for reconsidering
judgments on the basis of newly discovered circumstances.

4. By a decision of 17 November 2005 the Court
declared the application partly admissible.

5. The Government, but not the applicants, filed
further written observations (Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber having decided,
after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required
(Rule 59 § 3 in fine), the applicants replied in writing to the Government's
observations.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

6. The first applicant was born in 1925, the second
applicant was born in 1933 and the third applicant was born in 1928.
They live in Novosibirsk.

7. The applicants receive old-age pensions. The
Law of 21 July 1997 on the Calculation and Upgrading of State Pensions
(“the Pensions Act”) introduced, from 1 February 1998 onwards, a
new method for calculating pensions. The idea behind this method, based
on what is known as an “individual pensioner coefficient”, was to
link the pension to the pensioner's previous earnings.

8. The authority in charge of the applicants'
pension, the Pension Fund Agency of the Zheleznodorozhniy District of
Novosibirsk (“the Agency”), fixed the applicants' coefficient at
0.525. The applicants challenged the Agency's decision in the Zheleznodorozhniy
District Court of Novosibirsk. They argued that their coefficient should
be 0.7.

9. On 13 August 1999 the District Court found
for the applicants, considering that the Agency had misinterpreted the
Pensions Act. In particular, it held as follows:

“The opinion of [the Agency] ... is
unfounded because Article 4 [of the 1997 Pensions Act] specifically
indicates that the individual pensioner coefficient ... is fixed at
the rate of 0.7. [The Agency] has no grounds to interpret this provision
of the law arbitrarily or not to enforce it.”

The District Court decided that the Agency was
to recalculate the applicants' pensions using a coefficient of 0.7 from
1 February 1998.

10. The Agency appealed against the judgment.
On 19 October 1999 the Novosibirsk Regional Court upheld the judgment,
which became enforceable on the same day. The judgment was never executed.

11. On 29 December 1999 the Ministry of Labour
and Social Development (“the Ministry”) issued an Instruction on
the “Application of Limitations” established by the Pensions Act
(“the Instruction”). The Instruction clarified how to apply the
Pensions Act.

12. Some time thereafter a group of individuals
challenged the Instruction before the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.
On 24 April 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. It found
that, contrary to what the complainants had suggested, the Ministry
of Labour had not acted ultra vires in issuing the Instruction, and that the Ministry's
interpretation of the Pensions Act had been correct. On 25 May 2000
the Cassation Division of the Supreme Court upheld this judgment on
appeal.

13. From 1 August 2000, following changes to the
pension regulations, the first applicant's pension was calculated based
on a coefficient of 0.7125.

14. On 30 August 2000 the Agency lodged an application
with the District Court for the reconsideration of the applicants' case
owing to newly discovered circumstances.

15. On 7 February 2001 the District Court examined
the Agency's request. It noted that the Instruction had been upheld
by the Supreme Court and held as follows:

“As it can be seen from [the Instruction],
the decision of the RF Supreme Court of 24 April 2000 and the decision
of the Cassation Division of the RF Supreme Court of 25 May 2000, the
limiting coefficient of 0.7, which was established by [the Pensions
Act], ... does not apply to [an 'individual pensioner coefficient'].

The existence of the interpretation [of the Pensions
Act] by the Ministry of Labour constitutes a significant circumstance.

In accordance with ... Article 333 of [the CCivP]
the ground for reconsideration of judgments ... on the basis of newly
discovered circumstances shall be a significant circumstance which was
not and could not have been known to a complainant. ...

Therefore there are grounds for reconsideration
of the judgment of the district court of 13 August 1999 owing to newly
discovered circumstances.”

The court noted that the Agency's application
was not time barred.

16. In a decision of 7 February 2001 the District
Court granted the Agency's application, under Article 337 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, and quashed the judgment of 13 August 1999, as upheld
on 19 October 1999.

17. As a result of the fresh examination of the
case the District Court delivered a judgment of 27 February 2001 in
which it relied on the Instruction and rejected the applicants' claims
in full. The applicants appealed against the judgment.

18. From 1 May 2001, following further changes
to the pension regulations, the applicants' coefficients were fixed
at 0.9, 0.786 and 0.852 respectively.

19. On 21 June 2001 the Novosibirsk Regional Court
dismissed the applicants' appeal and upheld the judgment of 27 February
2001.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

20. The Code of Civil Procedure of 1964 (“CCivP”),
in force at the material time, provided as follows:

Article 333. Grounds for reconsideration

“[Judgments] which have come into force may
be reconsidered on the basis of newly discovered circumstances. The
grounds for reconsideration ... shall be as follows:

1. significant circumstances which were not and
could not have been known to the party who applies for reconsideration;
...

4. cancellation of a court [judgment] or of another
authority's decision which served as legal basis for the [judgment]
in question.”

Article 334. Lodging of application

“... [An application for reconsideration of
a [judgment] owing to newly discovered circumstances] shall be lodged
within three months after the discovery of the circumstances.”

Article 337. Court decision on reconsideration
of a case

“After examination of an application for reconsideration
of a [judgment] owing to newly discovered circumstances, the court may
either grant the application and quash the [judgment], or dismiss the
application.

The court decision by which an application for
reconsideration of a [judgment] owing to newly discovered circumstances
is granted shall not be subject to appeal. ...”

21. On 2 February 1996 the Constitutional Court
of the Russian Federation adopted a ruling concerning certain provisions
of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCrP”). In that ruling the Constitutional
Court decided that Article 384 of the CCrP (“Grounds for reconsideration
of a [criminal] case on the basis of newly discovered circumstances”,
which was in many respects similar to Article 333 of the CCivP) was
unconstitutional in that it limited the grounds for the reopening of
a criminal case to situations of “newly discovered circumstances”.
In that ruling the Constitutional Court suggested that this provision
of the CCrP prevented rectification of judicial errors and miscarriages
of justice. In its ruling of 3 February 1998 the Constitutional Court
came to the conclusion that Article 192 § 2 of the Code of Commercial
Procedure was unconstitutional in so far as it had served as a basis
for the dismissal of applications for reconsideration of judgments of
the Presidium of the Supreme Commercial Court, where the judgment had
been delivered as a result of a judicial error which had not been and
could not have been established earlier.

22. The Instruction of the Ministry of Labour
and Social Development of 29 December 1999 on the “Application of
Limitations” established by the Pensions Act was registered by the
Ministry of Justice on 31 December 1999 and became binding in February
2000, ten days after its official publication.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6
§ 1 AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1

23. The applicants complained that the State had
reconsidered a final judgment in their favour. The Court will examine
this complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1
of Protocol No. 1.

Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, as far as relevant,
reads as follows:

“In the determination
of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ...
hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...”

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 reads as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled
to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived
of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international
law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however,
in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties.”

A. The parties' submissions

1. The Government

24. The Government submitted that the complaint
was incompatible with the Convention ratione materiae, as it did not concern “civil rights and
obligations” or “property” or, alternatively, that there had been
no breach of Article 6 § 1 or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account
of the reconsideration of the case concerning the applicants' pension.

(a) Applicability of Article 6 § 1

25. The Government stressed that the judgment
of 13 August 1999 had not determined any definite amount due to the
applicants, but had rather established how the pensions should be calculated.
In their words, “the subject-matter of the dispute was not the applicants'
claim to award [them] monetary sums, but the matter of lawfulness ...
of application of the Instruction”. According to the Government, the
dispute at issue was not a civil one because “the determination of
the order of calculation of pensions belongs to the realm of public
law”. They referred to Schouten and Meldrum v. the Netherlands (judgment of 9 December
1994, Series A no. 304, § 50), Pančenko v. Latvia, ((dec.), no. 40772/98, 28 October 1999)
and Kiryanov
v. Russia ((dec.), no. 42212/02, 9 December 2004).

(b) Applicability of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1

26. The Government contested that the pension
awarded to the applicants by virtue of the judgment of 13 August 1999
constituted their “possession”. They noted that in the case of Pravednaya v.
Russia (no. 69529/01, 18 November 2004) the Court had regarded
a judicial award of that type as the applicant's “possession”. In
that case the Court had ordered the restoration of the initial judgment
in the applicant's favour and the payment of the pension in the amount
established by that judgment. However, in the Government's view, such
an approach created confusion. If the sum awarded by a court was a pensioner's
“possession”, it should not be affected by any subsequent increase
in pension rates. Therefore, in Pravednaya the applicant would have had to return the money
“excessively” paid to her by virtue of the later changes in the
legislation on State pensions. They concluded that in order to avoid
such situations the Court should not regard the pension amounts awarded
by the domestic courts as the claimants' “possessions” within the
meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

(c) Merits of the complaint

27. The Government submitted that it was the Supreme
Court's decision upholding the Instruction which had constituted a newly
discovered circumstance and warranted the reopening of the case within
the meaning of Article 333 of the CCivP. This was a major difference
with the Pravednaya case (cited above). The Government explained that
to consider the Supreme Court's decision as a newly discovered circumstance
was in line with the position of the Constitutional Court set out in
its decisions of 2 February 1996 and 3 February 1998. In another decision
of 14 January 1999 the Constitutional Court had held that court judgments
might be reconsidered if relevant provisions of law had been found unconstitutional.

28. The Government further submitted that the
Instruction had been issued after the initial judgment had become final,
so the Agency could not have relied on it in the appeal proceedings.
This was another difference with the Pravednaya case, where the Instruction had been adopted while
the proceedings were still pending. Therefore, the Agency's request
to reopen the case had not been an “appeal in disguise” but a conscientious
effort to make good a miscarriage of justice.

29. The Government observed that the reopening
of the case had been lawful and complied with the procedure prescribed
by law, the request having been lodged within the statutory three-month
time-limit.

30. The Government concluded that the reopening
of the case had not infringed the principle of legal certainty as guaranteed
by Article 6 § 1 nor had it interfered with the applicants' property
rights as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

2. The applicants

31. The applicants disagreed with the Government's
arguments. They pointed out that the Instruction had not existed at
the time when their case had been examined in court and when the judgment
of 13 August 1999 had been delivered. Therefore, neither the Instruction
nor the subsequent Supreme Court decision, which addressed the lawfulness
of the Instruction, could be considered a newly discovered circumstance
within the meaning of Article 333 of the CCivP. The Instruction had had
no retrospective effect and could not have applied to situations which
had arisen before its adoption. Furthermore, the Agency had missed the
time-limit for reopening a case: it had applied to the court eight months
after the Instruction had been issued, instead of three months as required
by the civil procedure. Therefore, the applicants' case had been reopened
in breach of the domestic law. The Government's reference to the Constitutional
Court's decision of 14 January 1999 was irrelevant because the Pensions
Act had never been declared unconstitutional.

32. The applicants further noted that it was clearly
established by the European Court that Article 6 applied to court proceedings
concerning the right to a State pension. They referred to a number of
judgments and decisions including Francesco Lombardo v. Italy (judgment of 26 November 1992, Series A
no. 249-B), Androsov v. Russia (no. 63973/00, 6 October 2005), Vasilyev v. Russia ((dec.), no. 66543/01, 1 April 2004), and Pravednaya v. Russia
((dec.), no. 69529/01, 25 September 2003). They pointed out that in Pravednaya
the dispute had concerned the application of a specific pension law
to the applicant's case, and not the general system of pension calculation.

33. The Court notes that the dispute as to the
increase of the applicants' old-age pension entitlement was one of a
pecuniary nature and undeniably concerned a civil right within the meaning
of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, judgment of 24 June 1993, Series
A no. 263, p. 17, § 46; Massa v. Italy, judgment of 24 August 1993, Series A no. 265-B,
p. 20, § 26; Süßmann v. Germany, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, p. 1170, § 42;
and, as a recent authority, Tričković v. Slovenia, no. 39914/98, § 40, 12 June 2001).

34. It reiterates that Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 does not guarantee, as such, the right to an old-age pension or to
any social benefit in a particular amount (see, for example, Aunola v. Finland (dec.), no. 30517/96, 15 March 2001). However
a “claim” – even concerning a pension – can constitute a “possession”
within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 if it is sufficiently
established to be enforceable (see Stran Greek Refineries v. Greece, judgment of 9 December 1994,
Series A no. 301, § 59). The judgment of the Zheleznodorozhniy District
Court of 13 August 1999, which became final after it had been upheld
on appeal by the Novosibirsk Regional Court on 19 October 1999, provided
the applicants with an enforceable claim to receive an increased pension
based on a coefficient of 0.7.

35. The Court notes that the objections and arguments
put forward by the Government were rejected in the earlier similar case
of Bulgakova
v. Russia (no. 69524/01, §§ 27-32, 18 January 2007) and sees no
reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case.

36. Accordingly, the Court considers that in the
present case the applicants' dispute concerned a civil right within
the meaning of Article 6, and that the applicants had a “possession”
within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

2. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1

37. The Court reiterates that the right to a fair
hearing before a tribunal as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
must be interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the Convention,
which, in its relevant part, declares the rule of law to be part of
the common heritage of the Contracting States. One of the fundamental
aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty, which
requires, among other things, that where the courts have finally determined
an issue, their ruling should not be called into question (see Brumărescu
v. Romania, judgment of 28 October 1999, Reports 1999-VII, § 61). This principle underlines that no
party is entitled to seek a review of a final and binding judgment merely
for the purpose of obtaining a rehearing and a fresh determination of
the case. Review by higher courts should not be treated as an appeal
in disguise, and the mere possibility of there being two views on the
subject is not a ground for re-examination. A departure from that principle
is justified only when made necessary by circumstances of a substantial
and compelling character (see Ryabykh v. Russia, no. 52854/99, § 52, ECHR 2003-IX).

38. The Court examined the quashing of a final
judgment on the ground of newly discovered circumstances in Pravednaya (cited above), a case with a similar set of facts,
where it held:

“27. The procedure for quashing of a final judgment
presupposes that there is evidence not previously available through
the exercise of due diligence that would lead to a different outcome
of the proceedings. The person applying for rescission should show that
there was no opportunity to present the item of evidence at the final
hearing and that the evidence is decisive. Such a procedure is defined
in Article 333 of the CCivP and is common to the legal systems of many
member States.

28. This procedure does not by itself contradict
the principle of legal certainty in so far as it is used to correct
miscarriages of justice. ...”

39. In the case of Pravednaya the Instruction of the Ministry of Labour had been
issued between the first-instance and appeal judgments. The relevant
pension agency had not relied on the Instruction in the appeal proceedings
but had only done so later, in their request for the judgment, then
final, to be set aside owing to “newly discovered circumstances”.
The Court considered that the agency's request had been an “appeal
in disguise” and found that by granting it the court had infringed
the principle of legal certainty and the applicant's “right to a court”
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Pravednaya, cited above, §§ 29-34).

40. The present case differs from Pravednaya in that the Instruction of the Ministry of Labour
was issued after the first-instance judgment had been upheld on appeal.
The Court's task is to determine whether, on the facts of the present
case, the quashing of the judgment was exercised in a manner compatible
with Article 6. To do so it will examine the reasons adduced by the
Zheleznodorozhniy District Court for the quashing of the judgment (see
paragraph 15 above).

41. The Zheleznodorozhniy District Court held
that the interpretation of the Pensions Act by the Ministry of Labour,
which had been upheld by the Supreme Court, was a “newly discovered
circumstance”. Therefore, the District Court decided that the Agency's
request should be granted and the judgment be quashed.

42. The Court first notes that the Instruction
and the Supreme Court's decision upholding it did not exist during the
examination of the applicants' case. They were adopted after the judgment
had been upheld on appeal. In the Court's view, the above-mentioned
Instruction and decision were new legal acts and did not constitute
newly discovered circumstances as considered by the District Court (see
Article 333 of CCivP, paragraph 20 above).

43. Further, the judgment of 13 August 1999 was
a result of the District Court's interpretation and application of the
Pensions Act to the applicants' case. As it transpires from the decision
of 7 February 2001, the fact that the Ministry's interpretation of that
Act in an Instruction, a subordinate legal instrument, differed from
the court's findings, with the effect that it would have led to a different
outcome of the proceedings, was considered by the District Court a sufficient
reason to quash the judgment and reconsider the case. The Court finds
that this reason as such could not justify the reopening of the case
after a final and binding judgment.

44. The Court notes the Government's argument
that the reopening was necessary to make good a miscarriage of justice.
However, other than referring to the Ministry's interpretation of the
law as a reason for the reopening, the District Court said nothing in
its decision to explain why its original findings were to be considered
a “miscarriage of justice” such as to justify the reopening.

45. The Court finds that by granting the Agency's
request to reconsider the applicants' case and setting aside the final
judgment of 13 August 1999, as upheld on 19 October 1999, the domestic
authorities infringed the principle of legal certainty and the applicants'
“right to a court” under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

46. There has accordingly been a violation of
that Article.

3. Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1

47. The Court notes that
the “possession” in this case was the applicants' claim to a pension
based on a coefficient of 0.7 from 1 February 1998, in accordance with
the judgment of the Zheleznodorozhniy District Court of 13 August 1999,
upheld on 19 October 1999.

48. The District Court did not determine the date
until which this method of calculation should have been maintained.
When delivering its judgment it applied the statutory pension regulations
which were in force at the time. Those regulations, however, “are
liable to change and a judicial decision cannot be relied on as a guarantee
against such changes in the future” (see Sukhobokov v. Russia, no. 75470/01, § 26, 13 April 2006). Thus
the Court observes that, as a result of such changes, the coefficient
for the calculation of the first applicant's pension changed to 0.7125
from 1 August 2000 and again to 0.9 from 1 May 2001. The coefficient
of the other two applicants changed to 0.786 and 0.852 respectively
from 1 May 2001.

49. The Court notes that the applicants' concern
under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was the loss of their entitlement
to a pension based on a coefficient of 0.7 for the period between 1
February 1998 and 1 August 2000 for the first applicant and for the period
between 1 February 1998 and 1 May 2001 for the other two applicants, as
opposed to the pension calculated and actually paid. However, the Court
further notes that before those periods ended on 1 August 2000 or 1
May 2001, the Instruction had removed the ambiguity of the Pensions
Act with the effect that the applicants' dispute over the coefficient
had been resolved, at the level of the statutory regulations, in favour
of the Agency. The Court considers that it was until the moment when
the Instruction became binding in February 2000, and apparently changed
the legislative framework relevant to the applicants' dispute, that
the applicants' claim – and “possession” under Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 – had been secured by the judgment.

50. The effect produced by the decision of the
Zheleznodorozhniy District Court of 7 February 2001, by which the application
for reconsideration was granted, was that the applicants became deprived,
retrospectively in respect of the above-mentioned period from February
1998 to February 2000, of the right to receive the pension in the amount
initially determined by the court or, in other words, deprived of their
possessions within the meaning of the second sentence of the first paragraph
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The taking of property, in the light
of this rule, can only be justified if it is shown, inter alia, to be “in the public interest” and “subject
to the conditions provided for by law” (see Pravednaya, cited above, §§ 39-40).

51. While assuming that it was in the public interest
to ensure a uniform application of the Pensions Act, the compliance
of the reconsideration of the applicants' case with the “lawfulness”
requirement is questionable (see paragraph 42 above). Even assuming
that the court's interpretation of the domestic procedural law was not
arbitrary (see the Government's argument concerning the Constitutional
Court's decisions and the relevant domestic law in paragraphs 27 and
21 above), it still remains to be established whether the interference
was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

52. In this connection the Court reiterates its
finding in Pravednaya that “the State's possible interest in ensuring
a uniform application of the Pensions Law should not have brought about
the retrospective recalculation of the judicial award already made”
(Pravednaya,
cited above, § 41). Having regard to the fact that the reconsideration
of the case resulted in the full dismissal of the applicants' claim
that had been granted in the initial judgment, the Court finds no reason
to depart from that conclusion in the present case.

53. Based on the above considerations, the Court
finds that by depriving the applicants of the right to benefit from
the pension in the amount secured in a final judgment, the State upset
the fair balance between the interests at stake.

54. There has, accordingly, been a violation of
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF
THE CONVENTION

55. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation
of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law
of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation
to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”

A. Damage

1. Pecuniary damage

56. As regards pecuniary damage, Mrs Smirnitskaya
claimed 610 euros (EUR), Mrs Stolyarova claimed EUR 724.12 and Mr Stolyarov
claimed EUR 532.59. These amounts represented the underpayment of their
pensions between 1 February 1998 and 1 August 2000 in Mrs Smirnitskaya's
case and between 1 February 1998 and 1 May 2001 in Mrs Stolyarova's and
Mr Stolyarov's case, and the relevant inflation-related losses. The
difference in pension was based on an “individual pensioner coefficient”
of 0.7 and a coefficient linked to the region of the applicants' residence.

57. The Government submitted that no just satisfaction
should be awarded to the applicants because there had been no violation
of their rights under the Convention. Alternatively, the finding of
a violation in itself would constitute sufficient just satisfaction.
As regards the claim in respect of pecuniary damage, it should be rejected
because it was open to the applicants to request a re-trial, which would
be the most appropriate form of redress in this case. The Government
further asserted that, as regards the period from February 1998 to December
2001, the difference between the pensions calculated with a coefficient
of 0.7 and the pensions actually paid would be 942.27 roubles (RUR)
in respect of Mrs Smirnitskaya, RUR 1,219.66 in respect of Mrs Stolyarova
and RUR 1,152.28 in respect of Mr Stolyarov.

58. The Court considers it appropriate to award
the applicants, in respect of the violation of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1, the sums they would have received had the reduction of the pensions
as a result of the reconsideration of the case not been backdated (see, mutatis mutandis, Vasilyev v.
Russia, no. 66543/01, § 47, 13 October 2005). The Court notes
that the sums calculated by the applicants were based on official certificates
which confirm the amounts of the pensions actually paid and the rates
of inflation. However, the sums to be awarded by the Court should not
take account of the coefficient linked to the region of the applicants'
residence, as that claim was not secured by the judgment of 13 August
1999, upheld on 19 October 1999, having been rejected by the second-instance
court (see the facts in the Smirnitskaya and Others v. Russia admissibility decision of 17 November 2005). Nor should
it cover the whole periods taken by the applicants. The period relevant
to the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is indicated in paragraph
49 above. Those adjustments being made, the Court awards EUR 199 to
Mrs Smirnitskaya, EUR 247 to Mrs Stolyarova and EUR 78 to Mr Stolyarov
in respect of pecuniary damage.

2. Non-pecuniary damage

59. Each applicant further claimed EUR 5,000 in
respect of non-pecuniary damage. They submitted that the pension was
their only means of subsistence. Because of the underpayment of her
pension, according to Mrs Smirnitskaya, she could not afford to buy basic
foodstuffs or clothing or to repair her flat. The applicants further
submitted that the violation of their rights by the domestic judicial
authorities had caused them psychological suffering and deterioration
of their health.

60. The Government submitted that the claim was
“wholly ill-founded, unsubstantiated and unreasonable”.

61. The Court considers that the applicants have
sustained non-pecuniary damage as a result of the violations found and
that this cannot be made good merely by the Court's finding of a violation.
Making its assessment on an equitable basis, as required by Article
41 of the Convention, the Court awards each applicant EUR 2,000.

B. Costs and expenses

62. The applicants did not make any claims for
the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.

63. Accordingly, the Court does not award anything
under this head.

C. Default interest

64. The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 to the Convention;

3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay
the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the
following amounts, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement:

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the
above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing
on 5 July 2007, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.