Michelle Hennick, a former food distributor
employee, claimed that her employer failed to hire, train
or promote her to a route manager’s job — and made
her working conditions so intolerable that she was
effectively discharged, according to BNA Daily Labor
Reporter.

In Hennick v. Schwans Sales Enterprises, Judge Mark W.
Bennett of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Iowa refused Schwans Sales Enterprises’ request
for summary judgment on several claims brought by Hennick,
who sued for wage discrimination under the Equal Pay Act
and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Behavioral Qualities?

Schwans argued that Hennick’s claims were founded
on her preference for the position of route manager over
another position, that of new account specialist. The
employer claimed that it exercised business judgment, not
discrimination, in refusing to place Hennick in the route
manager’s job, claiming she lacked the “necessary
behavioral qualities” to be a successful route
manager.

Additionally, Schwans argued that the route
manager’s job was a lateral move, not a promotion —
and that it gave her a raise and better hours shortly
before she left.

However, the court disagreed, noting that Hennick
raised genuine issues of material fact that the job was not
a purely lateral transfer.
Further, the court found that a jury might
reasonably find that the particular circumstances gave rise
to the claim, including statements by Hennick’s manager and
the absence of any female route managers.

Apparent Conflicts

Judge Bennett cited apparently conflicting rulings of
Eighth Circuit panels in similar cases. He noted that in
Sowell v. Alumina Ceramics Inc., a panel ruled that an
employee could not state a prima facie case
– one that is evident on the face of it – of wage
discrimination because she was paid the same as, or more
than, at least some comparable male employees.

On the other hand, the judge found that in Hutchins v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, another Eighth
Circuit panel “apparently applied a different rule.”
That court found that an employee could state a prima facie
case by showing that “she was paid less than at least some
male comparators for equal work, even if she was paid the
same as other male comparators.”

In support of his ruling, Bennett also noted that in
EEOC v. White & Son Enterprises, the Eleventh Circuit
held that a prima facie case of wage discrimination “need
only show discrimination in pay against an employee
vis-à-vis one employee of the opposite sex.”
Bennett believed that approach was more in keeping with the
purposes of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII — and
that the approach was not expressly overruled by the
decisions in the Eighth Circuit.