The Armed Forces

The armed forces constitute an essentially autonomous power within
the Chilean state. An entire chapter of the constitution (Chapter 10) is
devoted specifically to the armed forces, granting them a status
comparable to that of Congress and the courts. Although the opposition
felt that it had reduced the tutelary role of the armed forces with the
constitutional reforms of 1989 by softening the language dealing with
Cosena's powers, the military continued to have a constitutionally
sanctioned right to discuss politics and policy and make its views known
to the democratically elected authorities.

Whether or not the commanders of the services "represent"
their views "or make them known," the political fact remains
that the armed forces are defined by the constitution as the
"guarantors of the institutional order of the Republic." Thus,
their leadership exercises tutelage over the conduct of the elected
government and other state bodies. This privilege is given only to the
commanding officers. The 1980 constitution lays down strict rules
requiring lower-ranking officers to refrain from any political activity
or expression and to conform strictly to the orders of their superiors.

The 1989 reforms did not change the provisions that insulate the
commanders in chief of the armed services and the National Police from
democratically elected leaders. Although the military commanders and the
head of Chile's paramilitary police, the Carabineros, are chosen by the
president from among those officers having the most seniority in their
respective services, the appointment is for four years, during which
time the commanders cannot be removed except by Cosena under exceptional
circumstances.

The constitution also specifies that entry into the armed services
can only be through the established military academies and schools that
are governed exclusively by the services without outside interference.
The Organic Constitutional Law on the Armed Forces (Law 18,948 of
February 1990) governs in detail military education, hierarchy,
promotion, health, welfare, and retirement. It also provides the armed
forces with a specific minimum budget that cannot be reduced. Other
legislation provides the military with a set percentage from the
worldwide sales of the state-run copper companies.

Despite seventeen years of military rule, the armed forces are
remarkably uncontaminated by factionalism or partisan politics. No major
divisions within the services are apparent. However, because the
military enjoyed privileged treatment during Pinochet's rule, any
attempt to tamper with military prerogatives was likely to be strongly
resisted.

Pinochet's insistence on retaining his position as commander in chief
of the army displeased the Aylwin government. As commander of the army,
the general affirmed the military's determination to resist prosecution
for human rights violations. Yet the army's credibility was badly
damaged by allegations of financial wrongdoing by Pinochet's son, the
discovery of mass graves containing corpses of individuals who died
while in military hands, and the illegal export of arms to Croatia. The
report of the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, known as
the Rettig Commission, confirmed many of the allegations of military
abuses.

The Aylwin government contended that the full consolidation of
democracy could not be accomplished without a fundamental change in the
relationship between civil and military authority. Members of the CPD
asserted that presidential control of the armed forces existed in all
modern democracies and since 1822 had been an essential element in
Chile's constitutional tradition.

A proposal for reform of the Organic Constitutional Law on the Armed
Forces was signed by President Aylwin on March 29, 1992, and sent to
Congress. Aylwin's initiative dealt specifically with Article 7 and
Article 53 of the organic laws of the armed forces and police, which
limit presidential prerogatives in relation to the hiring, firing, and
promotion of members of the military. Among the suggested reforms was a
provision providing the president with the right to choose commanders of
the armed forces from among the ten most senior officers, instead of the
top five. These proposals were opposed, however, by both parties of the
right, making it impossible to envision any constitutional reform on
this matter in the foreseeable future.

The opposition contended that the tenure of the commanders had
contributed to the stability and moderation of the Chilean transition.
It argued that these reforms would result in the politicization of the
armed forces by undermining the hierarchy, discipline, and
professionalism of military institutions. The rightist parties also
contended that the reform proposals, if successful, would upset the
counterweights on presidential power and would disturb the institutional
balance existing between the president, the Constitutional Tribunal,
Congress, and Cosena. This balance, they argued, helped guarantee the
success of the Chilean transition by insulating the armed forces from
overt political pressures.