Salamanca

The Battle of Salamanca was fought in Spain on 22 July 1812 during the Peninsular War (1808-14). Lieutenant-General Arthur Wellesley, Earl of Wellington, had been seeking an advantageous opportunity to engage the French force of Marshal Marmont. The battle defied Wellington’s reputation as a defensive general and shattered French dominance on the Iberian Peninsula.

The Context

The Peninsular War began with the French and Spanish invasion of Portugal in 1807. In 1808 Napoleon turned on his Spanish ally, placing his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne. An expeditionary force commanded by Arthur Wellesley was despatched to Portugal and enjoyed initial success, defeating the French at Vimeiro in August 1808. By 1812 Wellington had secured Lisbon behind the Lines of Torres Vedras and then driven French troops from Portugal.

The beginning of 1812 saw Wellington take the offensive into Spain. The town of Ciudad Rodrigo was taken on 8 January and, following a costly assault, the formidable fortress of Badajoz fell to the allied force of Britain, Spain and Portugal on 6 April. While there were 230,000 French troops in Spain at this time, they were divided between five armies and Napoleon’s imminent campaign against Russia meant that reinforcements were not available.

Wellington had ensured French forces were held in place by Spanish regular and guerrilla actions that pinned them down throughout the peninsula. Once General Rowland Lord Hill severed communications between Marshal Marmont and Marshal Soult, capturing the Tagus crossing at Almaraz in May, Marmont’s isolation made him Wellington’s prime target.

Wellington marched on Salamanca and entered the city on 17 June. Ten days later he took three of the outlying forts in an attempt to force Marmont into action. With Marmont unwilling to commit, Wellington moved out to manoeuvre against him, probing for an advantage that would allow him to force a battle. Wellington’s intelligence reports, however, warned that Marmont was soon to be reinforced by troops sent by Joseph Bonaparte. Fearing he had lost the initiative, Wellington was forced to consider the abandonment of Salamanca and retreat back to Portugal.

The Armies

Marshal Auguste Marmont (1774-1852) was a skilled artillery officer who had been an aide to Napoleon in his 1796 campaign in Italy. Once Marshal Massena was defeated decisively by Wellington at Fuentes de Onoro (1811), Marmont replaced him as commander of the Army of Portugal. By July 1812 this army consisted of 50,000 men and 78 guns.

Lieutenant-General Arthur Wellesley (1762-1852), Earl of Wellington, had been appointed to command in Portugal on 6 April 1809, following the death of General Sir John Moore. He had made his name in a series of campaigns in India, including significant victories against Tipu Sultan in 1799 and at Assaye in 1803. He had already had success against the French in the peninsula, defeating them at Talavera in July 1809, for which he was given the title Earl of Wellington. At Salamanca, Wellington’s army was 48,000-strong and included contingents of both Portuguese and Spanish troops. He also commanded 60 guns.

The Battle

By 22 July 1812 the two armies were west of Salamanca. Skirmishes broke out around two flat-topped hills that dominated the area, known as the Greater and Lesser Arapiles. The British occupied the Lesser whilst the French had the Greater. As the armies continued to move south-west, with Marshal Marmont attempting to block Wellington’s route to Portugal, Wellington’s forces remained hidden behind ridges north east of the Lesser Arapile.

Marmont believed he knew his enemy. Wellington was a defensive general and would not be attacked on ground not of his own choosing. When Marmont noticed dust clouds created by Wellington’s baggage train, he believed his whole army to be in retreat. He instantly ordered three divisions to sweep quickly westwards to cut off Wellington’s escape.

Wellington immediately seized his opportunity. Realising that Marmont had overstretched his forces, he launched a series of hammer-blows against the French columns. Major-General Edward Pakenham’s 3rd Division surprised Marmont’s left wing, which was shattered. Wellington then unleashed Major-General John Gaspard Le Marchant’s cavalry brigades, causing further havoc amongst French lines and accounting for ‘40,000 Frenchmen in 40 minutes’. Le Marchant himself was killed trying to break a French square.

Early in the battle both Marmont and his second-in-command, General Jean Pierre Bonnet, had been injured. Command passed to General Bertrand Clausel who launched a counter-attack against Wellington’s centre. Against a lesser commander, this might have saved the French army, but Wellington was equal to the task, bringing up reinforcements commanded by Major-General Henry Clinton to shore up his middle. By the end of the day, only General Maximilien Foy’s 1st Division remained intact. Five of the eight French divisions had been devastated.

The Impact

Marshal Marmont’s army lost at least 14,000 men and 20 guns, while allied losses were around half as many. The French defeat would have been even more disastrous had the Spanish garrison not abandoned the river crossing at Alba de Tormes. Much to Wellington’s annoyance, the French were allowed to escape to safety.

Salamanca proved that Wellington had the ability to manoeuvre and attack in the open field. His reputation for being mainly a defensive general was destroyed. The outstanding victory gave the British and their allies a psychological superiority over the French that would last throughout the remainder of the war.

Following the victory at Salamanca, Wellington was able to liberate Madrid. Joseph Bonaparte’s authority in Spain was undermined and Spanish guerrillas were encouraged to increase their operations against the weakened French garrisons. The victory persuaded the British government that the war was worth pursuing, and the subsequent Battle of Vitoria in June 1813 showed the Russians, Prussians and Austrians that Napoleon could be defeated. When Wellington entered France in October 1813, Napoleon was soon forced to abdicate. Salamanca had been one of the key turning points.

The Legacy

As a visual and very personal response to the events in the peninsula, the Spanish artist Francisco Goya created a set of horrific etchings entitled ‘The Disasters of War’ (1810-20). Although not printed until 1863, the prints detail the horrors of war and show episodes such as the Battle of Salamanca without the traditional view of glory and honour. Goya also painted Wellington (National Gallery, London) who sat for him following the liberation of Madrid in 1812. Salamanca features in several novels including Leo Tolstoy’s ‘War and Peace’ (1869) and Bernard Cornwall’s ‘Sharpe’s Sword’ (1983).

Tours to Peninsular War sites like Salamanca are very popular today. As part of the 200th anniversary celebrations in July 2012 a group of serving and retired soldiers from The Rifles took part in a visit to the battlefield and city of Salamanca. The battle honour ‘Salamanca’ is shared by all the forming regiments of this unit. There they joined other British regiments in a parade with their Spanish army counterparts. The Mayor of Salamanca bestowed the Freedom of the City on The Rifles, only the second time in its history that Salamanca has presented this honour (the first being to Pope John Paul II in 1982).

The field of Salamanca itself is largely unchanged from the time of the battle, although there is a commemorative monument located there. In nearby Arapiles there is also a museum describing the battle through dioramas, relief maps, video presentations and items recovered from the battlefield.

If the "Fighting" 3rd Division´s main attack was sometime after 4pm then the French were certainly not defeated and in rout after 50 mins. Ah! the English will have it so....certainly not Wellington in his offical dispatch.....July nightfall in Spain comes many hours after 4pm when fighting was still going on.

Why do we not resepect/remember the Mayor of the village of Pollo on the Duero River who rode a hell of a way to let Lord W to tell him that almost 2,000 French cavalry had just arrived and that they would, by the 23rd, be with Marmont thus putting the balance of power in favour of the enemy? Lord W knew it was the 22nd or off towards Portugal that night & catch up with his army´s baggage.

As General Foy commanding the French 1st Division at Salamanca (Arapiles to both Spanish & French even today) before this battle said "We considered Wellington the best defensive of enemy generals against us. Afterwards, the best attacking enemy general!".

As for him munching on a chicken leg in the village of Arapiles when advised the French were extending their left.... the debate will go on & on...I don´t support that....sure it was cold cuts!

A masterclass in generalship giving significant strategic benefit. Wellington was in his prime and Salamanca showed his capabilities as a daring manoeuvrist. His anticipatory manoeuvres at Salamanca to counter Clausel’s central counter attack after the collapse of the French left wing were particularly admirable. Rather in the way that the Second Battle of El Alamein in 1942 was considered by many to be a turning point in World War Two, the Battle of Salamanca allowed Wellington, as with Montgomery later, to demonstrate the capabilities which gave them the political and military credit to continue their respective campaigns to the end.

If you consider Wellington's strategy in keeping part of the French army engaged on the east coast of Spain while he waged battle against Marmont on the other side of the country, you have to judge the Battle of Salamanca as brilliant both in concept and execution.

This has to be regarded as the turning point of the Peninsula war.
Wellington's attack was an inspired grasping of opportunity, and finally removed his reputation as a purely defensive minded leader on a European battlefield.
Whilst not the famous finale of Waterloo, nor a recent entry to the British psyche, this battle showed the benefits of Wellingtons holistic approach.
The Spanish were constructive allies, the Portuguese army had been totally restructured, and the stage had been brutally set at Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo.
All evidence of inspired generalship beyond a few seconds of decisiveness whilst eating a chicken lunch.

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