Distinguishing Between Metaphysical and Epistemological Randomness

by Johnson, Andrew Michael

Abstract (Summary)

The term 'random' is used both popularly and in science in different senses.
Randomness sometimes refers to our subjective epistemological inability to discern
structure and other times to objective lack of structure in an observed phenomenon. This
thesis argues that the best understanding of 'random' should be as a profitable heuristic,
similar to imaginary numbers and potential infinities, under the rubric of epistemological
randomness (ER). It further argues that positive claims of metaphysical randomness
(MR) must be justified by both internality and indeterminacy. Internality acts as a
criterion that controls for external causal influences in a given phenomenon.
Indeterminacy requires that the expressed observable behavior be considered an absence
of physical law that regulates the behavior. While paradigmatic cases (e.g. gamma
radiation bursts, genetic mutation, gene mutation, and radioactive decay) are assessed as
potential validation of MR, no justification is found for distinguishing quantum internally
indeterminate events from wrongful ascriptions of randomness from internally
determinate entities (e.g. a ‘random number sequence’ from ?). The thesis concludes that
there is no substantive reason to assert metaphysical randomness over and above
epistemological randomness.
Johnson, Andrew (Michael), 2007, UMSL, p. 3