A 30-year old male student worker (victim), performing the
functions of a laborer, died after the metal combination street
light and traffic signal standard (support pole and attachments) he
was positioning contacted an overhead high voltage power line. The
standard was suspended from a truck-mounted crane and he was
attempting to position it over a foundation so it could be secured
in place. As he was positioning the standard, it twisted and the
street light mast arm contacted the overhead power line. His
co-worker, who was helping him position the standard, was seriously
burned. The CA/FACE investigator concluded that, in order to
prevent future occurrences, employers should:

Always contact the local power company when working in close
proximity to energized high voltage power lines.

Assure the "10-foot" rule is observed when working near
energized high voltage power lines.

Allow the standard to become stable before being handled by
employees.

Use non-conductive pole positioning devices to handle
standards when working near energized power lines.

Ground the pole or bond the pole to an effective ground.

INTRODUCTION

On February 16, 1996 at 1102 hours a 26-year old male student
worker, performing laborer duties, was positioning a metal
combination street light and traffic signal standard (support pole
and attachments) when the street light mast arm contacted an
overhead high voltage power line, and he was electrocuted.

The CA/FACE investigator learned of this fatality on February
21, 1996 through the local Cal/OSHA district office. The CA/FACE
investigator inspected the site of the incident on February 26,
1996 to take photographs of the scene. Two CA/FACE investigators
traveled to the company's main yard on February 27, 1996 to meet
with two representatives of the safety office, a chief electrical
supervisor, and two additional crew members who were present at the
time of the incident. Copies of the Cal/OSHA form 36, coroner's
report, death certificate, and police report were obtained by the
CA/FACE investigator.

The company, a governmental agency, has been in business for
more than 50 years, but was reorganized in 1987 to consolidate
several departments into one. The four-person crew had been
working at the site only on the day of the incident. The decedent
had been working for the agency for six years in this job capacity.
The crew supervisor has been doing this type of work for 14 years.
The agency employs 3,700 people. There are seven employees in
the unit with the same job title who do work corresponding to that
of the decedent. There is a safety officer, who devotes all work
time to safety, assigned to the employees in the major work group.
The safety officer was not at the site at the time of the incident.
Although there was no specific written safety rule or procedure for
the particular task being performed at the time of the incident,
there were safety rules and procedures in place. Training was done
mostly on the job. Manuals were provided and video training was
also included as part of the training program. General safety
meetings were held every two weeks. The decedent had attended six
of the forty-two training sessions. None of the six sessions he
attended dealt with electrical safety. No crew safety meeting
(tailgate, e.g.) was held prior to the start of the job on the day
of the incident since it was considered a routine operation.

INVESTIGATION

The CA/FACE investigator made an unescorted visit to the site
of the incident to photograph the layout. The site is the
intersection of a six-lane, high speed north/south street with that
of a four-lane street which dead ends into it from the east. The
actual work site is a triangular island which separates northbound
traffic from traffic turning right (eastbound). The island is
concrete curbing around the perimeter with asphalt fill up to the
level of the curbing. The west side of the triangle, which runs
the same direction as the north bound lanes, is 42 feet long and is
the area where the truck-mounted crane was parked during the
incident. All of the work was done on the island itself, the apex
of which was pointing east.

There were a number of power lines above the northern side of
the triangle. There was a 120/240 volt AC power line 12-feet,
8-inches above the level of the island. Directly above that, at a
height of 32-feet, 6-inches was a 34,500 volt, three phase, AC
power line. At approximately the same level, was a guy wire which
ran from a wooden power pole located on the west side of the
six-lane street to a wooden pole approximately 75 feet east of the apex
of the triangle. All of the above wires and lines ran in an east
and west direction. At a greater height, 54-feet, 6-inches, a
300,000 volt AC line ran north and south.

There was a combination street light and traffic signal
standard and a temporary street light standard located on the
island. Both were located along the west side of the triangle, the
temporary street light standard on the northern end and the
combination standard on the southern end. They were 33 feet apart.

After an initial meeting at the main yard the following day,
the CA/FACE investigators were accompanied by two representatives
of the agency's safety department, the chief electrician
supervisor, and the electrical supervisor who was present during
the incident to the area where the truck-mounted crane, equipment
and materials were impounded. The CA/FACE investigators examined
all of the equipment and materials related to the incident and took
photographs.

About a month before the incident, the two original poles
located on the triangular island were noted by a district
supervisor to have been hit and bent by traffic on previous
occasions. The district supervisor issued a report through normal
channels to the traffic signal construction crew that these two
poles needed to be replaced. The supervisor for the crew which was
subsequently assigned the replacement job did a site survey. He
later assigned the job to a four-person crew which consisted of a
journeyman electrician, acting as the supervisor, a technician and
two laborers.

On the day of the incident, the crew arrived at the site and
proceeded to cone off the right hand lane of the northbound street.
The recently certified 13.45-ton truck-mounted hydraulic crane was
parked along the curb of the island, pointing north, in the coned-off
lane. The truck's outriggers were fully extended to about one-foot
out and two-feet down. The first job was to replace the bent
pole on the south side of the island. The pole was removed and the
street light mast arm and luminaire detached. The bent pole was
loaded on to the truck, and the new pole laid out on the island.
The existing mast arm and luminaire, as well as several traffic
signs, were attached to the new pole. It was raised into place and
secured with four bolts and nuts.

The second pole was located near the north end of the island.
At 1000 hours, the bent pole was rigged, unbolted from its
foundation, lifted by the journeyman electrician at the crane's
turret controls, and placed on the island. The traffic signal
head, street light mast arm and luminaire were disconnected and
laid aside. The bent pole was lifted onto the truck and the new
pole laid out on the island along a north/south direction. The
crew reattached the street light mast arm, luminaire and the
traffic signal head to the new pole as it laid on the ground. The
new pole was then rigged with an 18-foot long wire rope sling
having a hook on one end and an eye on the other. A continuous,
padded 3-foot synthetic sling was placed through the eye of the
wire rope sling in a double basket configuration. The padded sling
was then placed around the new pole at about an 18-foot level from
the base. The load hook of the truck-mounted crane was then
attached to the padded sling.

The hook at the other end of the wire rope sling was inserted
into the hand hole which was about one foot above the base of the
pole. The hand hole is an opening in the pole approximately 8-inches
by 6-inches. The sling was made taut by two of the crew members.

While the uninjured laborer was holding the luminaire off the
ground, the 28-foot, 6-inch pole was lifted off the ground by the
journeyman electrician at the truck-mounted crane's turret
controls. The mast arm was pointing along an east/west direction.
The boom was pointing northeast and the base of the pole had to be
moved north and slightly west to mate with the existing foundation.
The uninjured laborer proceeded to the area near the pole
foundation to straighten up the wiring and prepare the attaching
hardware. When the pole began to clear the ground, the second
laborer (the decedent) and the technician began to push it into
position by grabbing the pole near the base. As they were pushing
it, the pole began to twist. The street light mast arm swung
around in a northerly direction and contacted the "C" phase of the
high voltage power line located at the 32-foot, 6-inch height. The
time was reported as 1102 hours by the power company's dispatcher.
There was what was described as a tremendous flash and both
workers burst into flames. The decedent fell to his back and his
co-worker fell onto his side toward the truck, both still in
contact with the pole. A bystander who was stopped at a red light
ran over to help. He quickly slapped the hand of the technician
and received a jolt which blew holes in his socks. Before the
bystander began his next move, the journeyman electrician who was
protected from shock by the crane's non-conducting, synthetic load
line, lowered the pole away from the power line by lowering the
boom and the load line simultaneously from the turret controls.
According to some witnesses, the street light mast arm apparently
got hung up on the lower guy wire. Fortunately, the pole had been
removed from contact with the high voltage power line before the
bystander made his next move which was to grab the injured co-worker
by both hands and pull him free. No rescue attempt of the
decedent was made because it was apparent to the rescuers that he
was fatally injured.

The high voltage power line apparently was never de-energized
because of the contact. Although the line relayed (opened a
circuit breaker) on the high side, the low side circuit breaker did
not relay because of the high resistance fault (circuit failure
which prevents current flow along intended path). The line would
have remained energized by backfeeding through the other high
voltage lines connected to the buss (a common connection for
multiple electrical circuits). The high side circuit breaker, as
is normal, reclosed in 5 seconds and remained closed.

The two crew members who were not injured were somewhat unsure
of what actions took place after the high voltage contact. After
collecting his wits, the uninjured laborer remembers going under
the pole over to the injured and attempting to put out the fire on
the clothes of the injured. The journeyman electrician went to his
phone to call in a "code three" to his dispatcher, who, in turn,
called emergency services.

Paramedics were dispatched at 11:05 a.m. and arrived at 11:08
a.m. They found the decedent to have no pulse or spontaneous
respiration and pronounced him dead at 11:12 a.m. The decedent had
burn marks on both hands, more pronounced on his left hand, with a
large hole in his left heel. There also was a large hole in the
asphalt where the current had exited his left heel. The co-worker
who was helping position the pole had current enter his left
hand and exit his right foot. He was seriously burned. Also
evident on the asphalt were burn marks from the bodies of both men.

CAUSE OF DEATH

The coroner's report stated the cause of death to be high
voltage electrocution.

RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION

Recommendation #1: Always contact the local power company when
working in close proximity to energized high voltage power lines.

Discussion: The employer did not contact the power company
prior to beginning work, specifically hoisting metal poles, near
energized, high voltage power lines. Title 8 of the California
Code of Regulations, Section, 2948 states: "When any operations
are to be performed, tools or materials handled, or equipment is to
be moved or operated within the specified clearances of any
energized high-voltage lines, the person or persons responsible for
the work to be done shall promptly notify the operator of the
high-voltage line of the work to be performed and shall be responsible
for the completion of the safety measures as required by Section
2946(b) before proceeding with any work which would impair the
aforesaid clearance."

The local power company, if contacted, could have dispatched
a line crew to either protect or de-energize the high voltage power
lines. Had the power company performed this service, the fatality
and serious injury most likely would not have occurred.

Recommendation #2: Assure the "10-foot" rule is adhered to, using
an observer, when working near energized high voltage power lines.

Discussion: When working near energized, overhead high-
voltage power lines rated 50,000 volts (50KV) or below, any part of
the crane or its load must maintain a distance of at least 10 feet
at all times. Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations,
Section, 2946(b)(2) states: "The operation, erection, handling, or
transportation of tools, machinery, materials, structures,
scaffolds, or the moving of any house or other building, or any
other activity where any parts of the above or any part of an
employee's body will come closer than the minimum clearances from
energized overhead lines as set forth in Table 1 shall be
prohibited. Operation of boom-type equipment shall conform to the
minimum clearances set forth in Table 2 ...." Since the voltage
involved in this incident was 34,500 and boom-type equipment was
being used, Table 2 applies. Table 2 specifies that a distance of
10 feet must be maintained when exposed to voltages between 600 and
50,000. An observer, qualified to give signals, should have been
watching the lifting and positioning operation to assure the
truck-mounted crane operator that he was maintaining the specified
10-foot distance. Had an observer done this, and a distance of
10-feet from the energized, overhead power lines was maintained at all
times, this incident would most likely not have happened.

Recommendation #3: Allow the standard to become stable before
being handled by employees.

Discussion: The combination street light and traffic signal
standard had not been lifted vertically to a point of maximum
stability before the workers began to try to manually position it
over the existing foundation. With the traffic signal head
attached about the middle of the new pole and the street light mast
arm and luminaire attached to the top, the pole was inherently
unstable. The highest degree of stability would have been when the
pole was most vertical. The workers did not wait for this to occur
and when they tried to position the new pole in the still unstable
state, it twisted and contacted the overhead high-voltage power
line.

If the rigging had been placed higher on the pole, the
standard would have been more stable. The use of an 18 foot sling
limited how high the rigging could be placed on the pole. An
alternate method of rigging could have been used involving a
synthetic sling with eyes on both ends. It could be adjusted to
any position on the pole depending on the pole height, weight,
attachments and any other factors that dictate stability during a
lift. After it is determined where the sling is best placed on the
pole, the end of the sling nearest the bottom of the pole could
have been wrapped around the pole in a choke manner. The sling
would then be stretched toward the top of the pole and the other
end of the sling also wrapped around the pole in a choke fashion.
To keep tension on the sling so it does not slip, a small line
could be tied to the eye of the sling nearest the bottom of the
pole and then secured at the bottom. The lift then could be made
by placing the load hook in the eye of the sling nearest the top of
the pole.

Additionally, the luminaire could have been installed on the
mast arm after the pole had been set in place. The removal of the
weight of the luminaire would have added to the stability.

Recommendation #4: Use non-conductive pole positioning devices to
handle standards when working near energized power lines.

Discussion: Non-conductive tag lines or other non-conductive
pole positioning devices could have been used to handle the combination street
light and traffic signal standard instead of positioning it by use of bare hands.
The truck-mounted crane's operators manual refers to electrocution hazards when
handling poles and states: "Contact with vehicle and other equipment attached
or connected to the vehicle shall be avoided by personnel standing on the ground."
It also states, as does Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations, Section,
2940.8(d) that tag lines used near energized conductors shall be of a non-conductive
type. Rubber protective gloves and leather keepers could have been used during
this operation as an additional protective measure. Because of the voltage involved,
they would only have been used as secondary protection. The operators manual
states: "All personnel shall wear suitable insulating gloves, sleeves,
and hard hats. Personnel shall not allow any un-insulated part of their body
to come in contact with pole, vehicle or other equipment." Had the workers
handling the pole used non-conductive pole positioning devices and, as secondary
protection, rubber protective gloves, the fatality and serious injury most likely
would not have occurred.

Recommendation #5: Ground the pole or bond the pole to an
effective ground.

Discussion: The pole itself could have been grounded or
bonded to a suitable ground. Such a suitable ground would be a
ground rod. If the pole was grounded directly, or if it was bonded
to an effective ground, an alternate pathway for current would have
been established. Had this been done, the fatality and serious
injury most likely would not have occurred.

REFERENCES

Barclays Official California Code of Regulations, Vol. 9, Title 8,
Industrial Relations, South San Francisco, 1990.