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In December 2014, Russia cancelled the South Stream pipeline that was envisaged to deliver natural gas through the Black Sea basin on to Europe and replaced it with a new pipeline through Turkey. The Turkish Stream was a great opportunity for Turkey to turn itself into an energy hub of its region. It had already secured TANAP, a natural gas pipeline to carry Azerbaijani gas to Europe through Turkey. The country's geographical position was one of its crucial assets: to its east lay 70% of the world's natural gas reserves, including Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq, and the eastern Mediterranean basin. To its west was Europe, one of the biggest energy consumers of the world. If the Turkish Stream and TANAP pipeline projects were to go through and connect to other possible energy reserves within the wider region, was it likely that Turkey would eventually become one of Europe's main energy corridors—perhaps even a hub? Was it less risky to remain as a transit country and secure its own energy needs at potentially lower prices? What would be the consequences of being even more dependent on Russian gas through the Turkish Stream? Would Turkey be able to prioritize economic gains and take advantage of the available resources in its south?

Firms increasingly use both mass-media advertising and targeted personal selling to successfully promote products and brands in the marketplace. In this study, we jointly examine the effect of mass-media advertising and personal selling in the context of U.S. presidential elections, where the former is referred to as the "air war" and the latter the "ground game." Specifically, we look at how different types of advertising―candidates' own ads vs. outside ads―and personal selling―in the form of utilizing field offices―affect voter preferences. Further, we ask how these various campaign activities affect the outcome of elections through their diverse effects on various types of people. We find that personal selling has a stronger effect among partisan voters, while candidates' own advertising is better received by non-partisans. We also find that personal selling accounted for the Democratic victories in the 2008 and 2012 elections and that advertising was critical only in a close election, such as the one in 2004. Interestingly, had the Democrats received more outside advertising in 2004, the election would have ended up in a 269–269 tie. Our findings generate insights on how to allocate resources across and within channels.