Introduction

The submarines paid heavily for their successes in World War II. A total of 52
submarines were lost, with 374 officers and 3,131 enlisted men. These personnel
losses represented 16% of the officer and 13% of the enlisted operational
personnel. Of the 52 losses, two submarines, Dorado and R-12, were
lost in the Atlantic, S-26 was sunk in a collision off Panama and
S-28 was an operational loss in training at Pearl Harbor.
The remaining 48 were lost either directly or indirectly as the result of enemy
action, or due to stranding on reefs during combat operations. S-39, S-36,
S-27 and Darter were lost as the result of such
strandings. In all these strandings all personnel were rescued.

In
the cases of the losses due to enemy action, three officers and five men from
Flier and all but four men from Sealion were saved. The remaining submarines
were lost with all hands, though some personnel from Grenadier, Perch, Sculpin,
Tang, two men from S-44 and one from Tullibee were repatriated at the end of
hostilities, having been held as prisoners of war by the enemy. Four men were
said to have survived Robalo's sinking but they were not recovered following
the end of the war, and it is assumed that they perished as prisoners of the
enemy.

The
52 submarines represent approximately 18% of all submarines which saw combat
duty. This loss of 18%, while high in comparison to the losses sustained by
other types of ships of the Allied Forces, is considered remarkably low when
considered in relation to the results achieved, or when compared with the
losses sustained by enemy submarine forces. The Germans, in World War I, lost
178 submarines of a total of 272 submarines in commission during that war, and
in World War II they lost between 700 and 800 submarines. With but meager
results to show for their submarine effort, the Japanese in World War II lost
128 submarines and had but 58 remaining at the end of hostilities, many of the
remaining 58 being nonoperational.

--1--

In analyzing our losses, the following factors are considered as having been
responsible for the low figure as compared to those of our enemies:

Excellent mental and physical condition of our submarine personnel, and their high state
of training.

Superiority of our radar over that of the Japanese.

Weakness of Japanese antisubmarine measures.

Submarine crews, upon their return from a war patrol, were transferred to a Rest and
Recuperation Camp for a period of two weeks while their submarine was being
refitted by a relief crew. During this two week period the regular crew had no
official duties to perform other than to rest and relax and divorce their
minds from all thoughts of war and combat. There were some who criticized this
practice as being in the nature of pampering. The submarine force commanders
vigorously defended it as being not a luxury but a vital part of submarine
warfare. War patrols, normally lasting from 45 to 60 days, introduced a
protracted mental tension unknown to other types of warfare. Without the rest
periods to ease this tension the personnel would soon have cracked up under the
strain. As a result of the rest and recuperation policy submarine crews went to
sea mentally and physically alert and it is considered that this was the
primary factor in keeping our losses to a minimum. Hand in hand with the
excellent mental and physical condition of our personnel was the high state of
training in which they departed on patrol. Prior to a submarine's first patrol
she was given an extensive training period, either on the east coast or at
Panama, followed by advanced training in the Pearl Harbor area. Immediately preceding departure upon subsequent patrols, the
submarine was given an intensive refresher training period, lasting from four
to eight days. Training kept pace with enemy antisubmarine measures, new
training methods being introduced to counter the latest trends in enemy
offensive or defensive measures.

The superiority of
submarine radar, as compared to that of the Japanese antisubmarine forces, was
another factor contributing much to keeping our losses low.

--2--

Submarines started the war without radar, but within a few months all were equipped with
the SD (aircraft warning) radar. The SD, by giving early warning of the
approach of planes, did much to prevent surprise air attacks on surfaced
submarines. The installation of the SJ (surface search) radar a few months
later did the same to prevent the undetected approach of enemy surface craft during
darkness and low visibility. When it became apparent that enemy electronic
science had progressed to the point where they were able to produce efficient
radars, the APR was developed to warn of their presence, and later, the ST and
SV radars, using shorter waves than the SD and SJ, were installed to combat the
enemy's quite successful efforts to detect our own radars.

At
the start of the war, enemy antisubmarine materiel was comparable with our own;
their listening and echo ranging gear were practically duplications of that
installed in our own antisubmarine vessels. The Japanese in certain fields have
been notoriously poor inventors but great copyists, and with their espionage
services cut off during the war, they rapidly fell behind in the development of
antisubmarine measures. And although their original equipment was good, their
technique of employing it was faulty. They seemed to have little trouble in
locating a submarine with their listening gear following a torpedo attack, but
having located her, they failed miserably in the solution of the mathematical
problem of where to drop their depth charges. Their attacks were characterized
by a consistent lack of persistence. They were prone to accept the most
nebulous evidence as positive proof of a sinking, and being sure of a kill,
they were off about their business, letting the submarine surface and thank God
for the Japanese superiority complex. While only 48 submarines were lost in
combat operations--and of these not more than 41 directly due to enemy action--the
Japanese, at the end of hostilities, furnished us with information which
showed a total of 468 positive sinkings of our submarines. The U.S. Navy, by a
wise policy of total censorship of submarine operations, encouraged the enemy
in their belief in their antisubmarine successes. When we failed to announce
the successful attacks of our submarines, the enemy naturally assumed they
never got home to report them.

--3--

The chart on the following page shows the known or estimated positions of all
submarine losses in the Pacific. The estimated positions must be accepted with
caution--at best they are only fair guesses. In several cases submarines
departed from their bases for patrol and were never heard from again. In such
cases the estimated position is given as inside the area to which the submarine
was assigned but the loss might have occurred anywhere between that area and
the base. In general, solid dots have been placed on the chart where the
position of the loss is known with reasonable certainty to have occurred within
the area covered by the dot. Open dots have been used where positions are not
certain, due to circumstances explained in the text.

Assuming these estimations are correct, a study of the chart will reveal
some amazing facts, as for example:

Not a single submarine was lost in Central Pacific waters until the loss of Pickerel in April 1943, sixteen months
after the start of the war.

The area south of Honshu, at the entrance to Tokyo Bay, and at the Kii Suido
and Bungo Suido entrances to the Inland Sea, would normally be
considered the areas where enemy antisubmarine measures would be most
intensive. Yet, although these areas were constantly and heavily patrolled
during the entire war, not a single submarine was ever lost along the southern
coast of Honshu.

Next to the southern Honshu areas, the most intense enemy antisubmarine
measures could be expected at his strongest outposts-Truk and Palau. Yet the war was two
years old before the first of two submarines was lost near Truk, and information
indicates that the only loss near Palau--Tullibee
in March 1944--was caused by a circular run of one of her own torpedoes.

The shallow waters of the Yellow Sea made submarine evasive tactics difficult, and
permitted extensive defensive mining by the enemy, yet only two submarines were
lost in that area, and none during the last ten months of the war when the
greater part of all submarine offensive patrols were concentrated therein.

--4--

POSITIONS OF SUBMARINE LOSSES

Indicates Know Position

Indicates Estimated Position

1.

Sealion

12-10-41

2.

S-3

1-20-42

3.

S-26

1-24-42

4.

Shark I

2-11,12-42

5.

Perch

3-3-42

6.

S-27

6-19-42

7.

Grunion

7-30, 8-6-42

8.

S-39

8-13,14-42

9.

Argonaut

1-10-43

10.

Amberjack

2-16-43

11.

Grampus

3-5,6-43

12.

Triton

3-15-43

13.

Pickerel

4-3-43

14.

Grenadier

4-22-43

15.

Runner

5-28, 7-4-43

16.

R-12

6-12-43

17.

Grayling

9-12-43

18.

Pompano

8-29, 9-27-43

19.

Cisco

9-28-43

20.

S-44

10-7-43

21.

Dorado

10-12-43

22.

Wajpp

10-11-43

23.

Corvina

11-16-43

24.

Sculpin

11-19-43

25.

Capelin

12-9-43

26.

Scorpion

1-5, 2-24-44

27.

Grayback

2-26-44

28.

Trout

2-29-44

29.

Tullibee

3-26,27-44

30.

Gudgeon

4-7, 5-11-44

31.

Herring

6-1-44

32.

Golet

6-14-44

33.

S-28

7-4-44

34.

Robalo

7-26-44

35.

Flier

8-13-44

36.

Harder

8-24-44

37.

Seawolf

10-3-44

38.

Darter

10-24-44

39.

Shark II

10-24-44

40.

Tang

10-24-44

41.

Escobar

10-17, 11-3-44

42.

Albacore

11-7-44

43.

Growler

11-8-44

44.

Scamp

11-9,16-44

45.

Swordfish

1-12-45

46.

Barbel

2-4-45

47.

Kete

3-20,31-45

48.

Trigger

3-26,28-45

49.

Snook

4-8,20-45

50.

Llagarto

5-3-45

51.

Bonefish

6-18-45

52.

Bullhead

8-6-45

Lossses not shown on chart:Dorado, enroute New London to Panama October 1943.
S-26, at Panama, January 1942. R-12 at Key West, Fla. June 1943.

--5--

--6--

In the pages which follow, the circumstances surrounding the loss of each
submarine, so far as they can be ascertained, are given. In each case, all
evidence available at the time of this writing has been adduced in seeking to
assign a specific cause for each loss, and to establish a definite position
where the loss occurred. With the war so recently over, it will be obvious to
every one that all returns are not in--that the coming years may be expected to
divulge further information bearing on our submarine losses, and that the
conclusions presented here will have to be modified as these data come to
light. So for the benefit of future researchers, an outline of the data and
methods used is in order.

The table which follows gives a condensed summary of the causes for the loss of
each of our submarines which did not return, and an estimate as to the accuracy
of the analysis. In preparing this summary and the descriptive matter covering
the loss of each ship, the first source utilized was the operation order
delineating her area and the dispatches sent to her and received from her
during the patrol on which she was lost. Due to the necessity for submarines to
maintain radio silence during their operations, information gleaned from
incoming messages was usually sketchy. Any reports of enemy aircraft or surface
craft in the vicinity of losses were taken into account; reports by other
submarines of rendezvous with the lost craft were heeded; reports of enemy
minefields in the area as signed each lost submarine were analyzed. Where
statements by survivors of strandings or by repatriated prisoners of war who
survived submarine sinkings are available, they have been taken as entirely
authentic, and have been liberally used in forming the story of the loss.

--7--

A Summary of Submarine Losses

Accuracy of Analysis

Enemy Action

Friendly Forces

Other

Probable to Possible

Certain to Probable

Surface Craft

Air Craft

Submarine

Surface Craft

Air Craft

Mines

Circular Runs

Operat-ional

Strand-ing

Un-known

1.

Sealion

X

X

12-10-41

2.

S-36

X

X

1-20-42

3.

S-26

X

X

1-24-42

4.

Shark I

X

X

2-11,21-42

5.

Perch

X

X

3-3-42

6.

S-27

X

X

6-19-42

7.

Grunion

X

7-30, 8-6-42

8.

S-39

X

X

8-13,14-42

9.

Argonaut

X

X

1-10-43

10.

Amberjack

X

X

X

2-16-43

11.

Grampus

X

X

3-5,6-43

12.

Triton

X

X

3-15-43

13.

Pickerel

X

X

4-3-43

14.

Grenadier

X

X

4-22-43

15.

Runner

X

X

5-28, 7-4-43

16.

R-12

X

X

6-12-43

17.

Grayling

X

9-9, 9-12-43

18.

Pompano

X

X

8-29, 9-27-43

19.

Cisco

X

X

X

9-28-43

20.

S-44

X

X

10-7-43

21.

Wahoo

X

X

10-11-43

22.

Dorado

X

X

10-12-43

23.

Corvina

X

X

11-16-43

24.

Sculpin

X

X

11-19-43

25.

Capelin

X

X

11-12, 12-9-43

26.

Scorpion

X

X

1-5, 2-24-44

27.

Grayback

X

X

X

2-26-44

28.

Trout

X

X

2-29-44

29.

Tullibee

X

X

3-26,27-44

30.

Gudgeon

X

X

X

4-7, 5-11-44

31.

Herring

X

X

6-1-44

32.

Golet

X

X

6-14-44

33.

S-28

X

X

7-4-44

34.

Robalo

X

X

7-26-44

35.

Flier

X

X

8-13-44

36.

Harder

X

X

8-24-44

37.

Seawolf

X

X

10-3-44

38.

Darter

X

X

10-24-44

39.

Shark II

X

X

10-24-44

40.

Tang

X

X

10-24-44

41.

Escolar

X

X

10-17, 11-3-44

42.

Albacore

X

X

11-7-44

43.

Growler

X

11-8-44

44.

Scamp

X

X

X

11-9,16-44

45.

Swordfish

X

X

X

11-7-44

46.

Barbel

X

X

47.

Kete

X

3-20,31-45

48.

Trigger

X

X

X

3-26,28-45

49.

Snook

X

4-8,20-45

50.

Lagarto

X

X

5-3-45

51.

Bonefish

X

X

6-18-45

52.

Bullhead

X

X

8-6-45

--8--

When the war began, submarines operated alone and in far flung areas. The paucity of
contacts with them by other ships and their operational commanders makes it
difficult to establish definitely small areas, both in time and in position,
where their loss occurred. As the war progressed and woIf packs came into
being, the frequent exchange of information among members of the pack gives
much more material concerning ships lost while patroling as members of packs.

The
chief source of information as to attacks made on U.S. submarines by the enemy
has been provided by the Japanese since war's end. The list consists of two
parts, both exact translations, and purports to be a list of positive sinkings.
The first part gives the date and place of attacks made on U.S. submarines; the second
is an amplifying report which gives further information on each attack. An
attached note states that those attacks whose dates or locations are uncertain
have been eliminated by the Japanese. The enemy was prone to accept the most
inconclusive evidence as proof that a submarine was sunk, and, from that point
of view, it would seem that the list should be fairly complete. Yet the
definite possibility exists that one or more of

--9--

--10--

the attacks not reported because it was thought to
be ineffective or because the date or position was garbled might explain the
loss of one of our submarines whose end is now only a matter for conjecture.
Furthermore, the report states that the record of April 1943 is imperfect and
that "since about July 1943 more strict investigations have been gradually
instigated to confirm the sinkings, but the reports of the sinkings prior to
this date are listed here without further investigations." In the cases of
a great many attacks made before July 1943, only positions and dates are
given-no information is available even as to whether the attacks were by
surface ships, planes or submarines, much less concerning evidence to confirm
sinkings. Moreover, Japanese records are notoriously ill kept, and several
instances where the descriptive matter concerning an attack has been linked
with the wrong item in the date-position list have been discovered. Although
seven submarines gave up prisoners of war to the Japanese, only four attacks in
which American prisoners were taken are listed in the report. The number of
antisubmarine attacks which, for one reason or another, never were reported to
any central Japanese agency will probably never be
known. Excellent circumstantial evidence indicates that at least one of our
submarines, Grampus, was lost as the result of an attack by two enemy
destroyers who were themselves sunk shortly thereafter and thus never reported
the attack. Also
the poor coordination evident in the Japanese military and naval organizations
may mean that records of attacks made in outlying places received poor handling.

For purposes of the summary table, the category "Probable to Certain"
conveys that the evidence at hand is deemed at least complete enough to present
a reasonably strong case for the analysis presented; "Possible to
Probable" implies that no specific information can be adduced to support
any conclusion as to the cause of the loss, but one particular cause seems a
great deal more likely than any other; "unknown" covers a
multiplicity of indeterminable causes, none of which can be chosen as any more
likely than the others.
Throughout, it must be kept in mind that Japanese claims and reports are considered by no
means complete or accurate. "Operational" losses are those caused by
errors of personnel incorrectly handling the ship, by fatal breakdown of the
ship itself, or by any other accident short of direct enemy action or stranding
which might cause the ship and personnel to be lost. The term "circular
run" refers to the tragic phenomenon in which a submarine's torpedo, due
to some defect, runs in a circle and shortly arrives at the point from which it
was fired.

Summary--Causes of Submarine Losses

Certain To Probable

Probable To Possible

Total

Enemy Surface Ship Attacks

12

4.5

16.5

Enemy Aircraft Attacks

4

1

5

Enemy Cooperative Aircraft-Surface Ship Attacks

4

2

6

Enemy Submarines

1

0

1

Friendly Surface Forces

0

1

1

Friendly Aircraft

0

1

1

Enemy Mines

3

4.5

7.5

Circular Runs

2

0

2

Operational

3

0

3

Stranding

4

0

4

Unknown

---

---

5

TOTAL

33

14

52

In the summaries of patrol results, the figures for ships sunk and damaged are the
officially credited ones, except in the cases of major combatant vessels. The
latter have been correlated with official Japanese lists of combat ship losses,
and only those ships actually confirmed as sunk are mentioned here. In the
cases of small combatant and merchant ships, the officially accredited results
are based on the Commanding Officer's own estimate of results achieved during
the patrol, modified as deemed necessary by higher authorities. It is apparent,
therefore, that such figures are subject to normal human error, and may not be
completely correct.

Lastly, it must be mentioned that in searching Japanese records to locate attacks which
might have spelled doom for our lost submarines, a great many assumptions have
been made. Where only one attack can be tied in with a loss, it has been
designated the most probable cause of the loss. This, it is realized, may be
leaving out much of the story, for, while it is perfectly possible for an
accurately placed depth charge or bomb to sink a submarine immediately, the
amount of damage sustained and survived by U.S. submarines during this
war is nothing short of amazing. Undoubtedly, many stories of heroic fights to
control damage are locked forever in the depths beneath the waves. Many
submarines could have survived for some time beyond the attack which later
proved fatal, and are therefore not likely to be found at the last known
position. That these stories
cannot be told can only be lamented as one of the minor tragedies of war.