Put aside the Center's political leanings and consider the merit of their concerns. Pretty much on target, in my opinion. But do you think we'll get answers or just a restatement of principles?

Set a timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. forces

Maintain the international nature of the mission

Insist that the Pakistani government battle extremists within its borders. Press reform and require good governance in the Afghan government

Pay for the mission.

Pakistan and the region. We believe that any strategy moving forward requires these five critical elements:1. Set a timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Ultimately, Afghans must take control of their own destiny. A flexible timeframe for U.S. military engagement is necessary; the United States and NATO should aim to turnover security in certain areas to the Afghan Security Forces beginning in 2011 and have all Afghan forces in the lead within four years, or the 12-year mark of our engagement. Throughout this time period, the United States must continue to prioritize the training of Afghan National Army and Police.

2. Maintain the international nature of the mission. The United States cannot advance stability in Afghanistan alone, nor should it have to. Instability in Afghanistan and the region affects the globe, and all countries must take responsibility for the mission. Currently, more than 40 countries are contributing to the NATO mission, but support for the mission in NATO countries is deteriorating. Canada and the Netherlands have decided to withdraw within the next two years, and attacks on United Nations employees have caused them to relocate hundreds of personnel outside of the country. The U.S. administration must reassure allies through consultation and concrete steps that it has a viable strategy to address their concerns, especially corrupt Afghan leadership and the sustainability of Afghan security forces. It must also highlight the shifts in strategy that have already occurred, which were major points of disagreement with our European partners, related to civilian casualties and the absence of a regional strategy.

3. Insist that the Pakistani government battle extremists within its borders. Pakistan has served as a partner in the hunt for Al Qaeda and has recently undertaken some effective military actions against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan) in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. However, it has not yet taken sufficient steps to counter those militant actors within their territory that threaten regional security but do not directly target the Pakistani state. Its concern about threat posed by its neighbor India and the short-term nature of U.S. interests in the region have prevented it from undertaking any full-scale divestiture of ties to groups attacking coalition and Afghan troops like Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura in Balochistan or the network of Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani. The United States should work with international allies to have a coordinated effort to shape Pakistan's calculations and actions in order to reduce official support that it extends to militant groups, while playing a behind-the-scenes role in decreasing tensions between India and Pakistan.

4. Press reform and require good governance in the Afghan government. The United States cannot defend an Afghan government that has little support from the Afghan people and continues to pursue policies of cronyism and self-enrichment. The majority of the Afghan people see their government as corrupt and predatory, and they possess few levers with which to hold these officials accountable. The Afghan constitution--which was developed in late 2001--created a strong central government in the form of the presidency and a weak parliament, and local governing structures have been weak and neglected. By supporting the re-entrenchment of former warlords in government positions and pouring aid money into Afghanistan with inadequate monitoring, the international community has played a critical role in enabling this corruption. Moreover, the absence of effective local and national-level justice systems has ultimately allowed for a "culture of impunity" in Afghanistan. The Taliban insurgency has taken advantage of this situation by offering quick arbitration where none exists, thereby increasing their support in certain communities. The international community needs to pressure its Afghan partners to follow through on recent commitments to tackle corruption, and reform its own practices in order to provide the Afghan government with the political support necessary to confront well-entrenched figures. Ultimately the justice vacuum will only be solved when the Afghan government and its international supporters show the political will to demand and enforce its provision.

5. Pay for the mission. The United States currently spends more than $3.6 billion a month in Afghanistan, and these troop increases will raise monthly costs to at least $6 billion. The Bush administration hid the costs of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq by hiding the expenses in congressional supplementals, outside of the normal budgeting process. The nation's debt is now approximately $12 trillion. The United States cannot push the cost of the war to future generations, and should not use the deficit to finance the conflict.