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Thursday, March 15, 2018

Turkey
has set conditions to besiege Syrian Kurdish-controlled Afrin City in northwest
Syria. Turkey will use its military position as leverage in tripartite
negotiations with Russia and Iran in Astana, Kazakhstan on March 16, 2018. Turkish forces and
Turkish-backed Syrian rebel forces seized positions that enable them to sever
the last ground line of communication to Afrin by March 15. The advance has
driventens of thousands
of civilians toward terrain held by the Bashar al Assad regime and its allies.
Turkey’s likely primary goal in the Astana negotiations is to reach an
agreement with Russia and Iran over the future of Afrin and other Syrian
Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG)-held areas north of Aleppo City.

Monday, March 12, 2018

Pro-Bashar al-Assad regime forces including Russia and Iran successfully split the besieged Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus into three separate opposition-held pockets following the seizure of Mesraba and Madyara on March 10 – 11. The advance separated the city of Douma – the urban stronghold of Salafi-Jihadist group Jaysh al-Islam – from the densely populated suburbs of Irbeen, Zamalka, and Ayn Terma dominated by Islamist group Faylaq al-Rahman. Pro-regime forces will further intensify their targeting of civilian populations and infrastructure within these new pockets in order to coerce their surrender and achieve the forced displacement of opposition-supportive populations from Damascus.

Friday, March 9, 2018

This series of graphics marks the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. These graphics depict significant developments in the Syrian Civil War from February 21 - March 6, 2018. The control of terrain represented on the graphics is accurate as of March 8, 2018.

Key Takeaway: Iraqi Vice President Ayad Allawi is presenting himself as a
viable Shi’a reformist alternative to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in the
upcoming Iraqi legislative elections slated for May 12, 2018. Allawi is setting
internal conditions to recreate his strong 2011 bid to secure the premiership.
Allawi– a secular Shi’a politician– seeks to reunite the Sunni political
leadership under a secular platform akin to the Iraqiyya coalition that won 92
seats in the Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) under his leadership in 2010.
Allawi will likely leverage his opposition to the expansion of Iranian
influence in Iraq, reformist stance and support for the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) to draw Shi’a Sadrist and some Kurdish support in the
post-election premier selection phase. Allawi can then maximize on his strong
ties with Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, to augment
his premiership bid.

Allawi is using his secular and nationalist credentials as well as
his support for Sunni grievances as core pillars of his strategy to draw the
Sunni vote. Allawi has arguably been the most prominent secular figure in the
Iraqi political process since 2003. Allawi is highlighting his consistent
secular credentials and his rejection of the sect-based division of power as major
Sunni and Shi’a Islamist parties gravitate toward a secular campaign strategy.
This shift coincides with an apparent public discontent with Islamist rule
post-2003. The Vice President has also amplified his nationalist rhetoric,
rejecting Iranian influence in Iraq and calling for the integration of the
Iranian-backed PMF into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) following the defeat of
ISIS. Allawi has advocated for the ability for internally displaced Sunnis to
return to their homes as a condition for holding the elections. However, this
is unlikely to be implemented fully due to security concerns and lack of
infrastructure. Allawi has stated the Sunni communities in provinces formerly
held by ISIS were the first to sacrifice for the liberation of their areas,
identifying the failure in the political process as the reason for their
plight.

Allawi has created theIraqi
National Alliance Coalition as a platform to unite Sunni political
class under his leadership.The new coalition formed on January 11includes CoR Speaker Salim al-Jabouri, former Deputy Prime Minister Saleh
al-Mutlaq and Baathist-friendly elements outside the political process.Jabouri is building up his secular
credentials after quietly distancing himself from the Iraqi Islamic Party–closely
tied to the Muslim Brotherhood–to form the secular Civil Gathering for Reform.
An alliance with Jabouri helps Allawi highlight popular support for secular
rule, while capitalizing on Jabouri’s prominent stature to draw Sunni votes
particularly in home province of Diyala as well as Baghdad. Meanwhile, the
inclusion of Mutlaq–a secular Sunni and founding member of Allawi’s Iraqiyya
coalition of 2011– signals Allawi’s intent to recreate a similar coalition
despite the existence of power struggles between its prominent figures that
eventually contributed to its collapse. The inclusion of Mutlaq also allows
Allawi to draw the Sunni vote from Anbar–Mutlaq’s home province.

Allawi’s alliance is set to compete with Vice President Osama
al-Nujaifi’s Iraqi Decision Coalition for Sunni votes. Allawi has been
a political and ideological rival of Nujaifi since the collapse of their
Iraqiyya coalition. Power sharing disputes, Allawi’s dwindling chances of
securing the premiership and differences on Iraqiyya’s future strategy antagonized
tensions between the two leaders and contributed to the collapse of the
coalition after the 2010 elections. The rivalry also reflects regional
political divisions, with Allawi backing the Saudi Arabia-Egypt axis and
Nujaifi backing the Turkey-Qatar axis. Allawi also rejected Nujaifi’s push for increased
autonomy of Sunni areas post-ISIS, stressing his support for Iraqi
territorial integrity. Jabouri is also a major political rival of Nujaifi, as
both lead competing wings within the main Sunni bloc in the CoR the Sunni
Alliance of Forces. Jabouri and Nujaifi disagreed on the post-ISIS
Sunni vision for Iraq. Jabouri called for
facilitating talks with Shi’a parties to reach national consensus and Nujaifi
called for confidence building measures on limiting Iranian influence,
demographic changes in Sunni areas and freeing Sunni prisoners.

Allawi may intensify efforts to sway support from nationalist Shi’a
during post-election premiership talks.Allawi’s inability to draw cross-sectarian support
particularly from Shi’a parties contributed to the failure of his 2011 bid for the
premiership. He will likely look to rectify this issue by leveraging his
ideological proximity to Sadrists in order to sway their support for his
premiership bid. Allawi supported the 2016 Sadrist protest movement to
institute anti-corruption
reforms. Allawi also backed the unsuccessful Sadrist protest campaign to overhaul the electoral
process through the selection of a non-politicized electoral commission and
the passage of an electoral law that does not favor pre-existing dominant
parties. Allawi also supported Sadrist calls for a technocratic, non-sectarian
based form of government. Additionally, Allawi has joined Sadr’s identification
of Iranian-backed proxies within the PMF as “shameless militias.” Allawi’s
desire to maintain political independence and maneuverability likely prevented
him from entering into what was expected to be a
near pre-election alliance with the Sadrists.

The Vice President may seek Kurdish support for his premiership
ambitions. He could do this byleveraging his historical ties with the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and his support for Baghdad-Arbil dialogue to
prevent further military action following the October 16 military takeover of
disputed territories by Iraqi forces.Support for the Kurds during and
after the September 25 2017 Kurdish referendum period came at a political cost,
leading Allawi to pursue a nuanced approach to his relationship with both
sides. Allawi, while deeming the timing of the Kurdish independence referendum
“inappropriate,” blamed Baghdad for failing to address Kurdish power sharing
concerns at an earlier stage. Allawi also blamed Baghdad for not participating
in post-referendum talks that he attempted to sponsor with unidentified
regional Arab countries. Allawi also stated military operations in disputed
territories included the presence of Iranian forces, particularly in Kirkuk. He
has appeared to dismiss Baghdad’s accusations of KDP corruption.Allawi
also supports maintaining
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of the federal Iraqi budget at 17%–an
agreement that he secured in 2004 during his brief tenure as Prime Minister.

Allawi may be an alternative premiership option compatible with U.S
interests in Iraq. Allawi maintains friendly ties to the U.S and rejected Iranian
influence in Iraqi affairs. Allawi also maintains strong ties to the KRG; he
stressed the resolution of the Arbil-Baghdad disagreements must be constitutional
and within the framework of a united Iraq. Allawi also maintains strong ties
with U.S regional partners in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.

Key
Takeaway:Afghanistan’s
powerbrokers are in the early stages of an intense competition as they prepare
for the planned 2019 presidential election. The multi-month disagreement
between President Ashraf Ghani and warlord and long-time Balkh Province
Governor Mohammad Atta Noor over the latter’s governorship is the first stage
of a much larger battle between the two politicians for the presidency. Atta is exploiting friction caused by how
President Ghani wields his power to build a network of alliances to challenge
President Ghani in 2019. Meanwhile, Ghani is actively using his immense
presidential power to undermine Atta’s attempts to build an opposing coalition.

The
Political Disputes Permitting Atta’s Rise

The
internationally negotiated National Unity Government agreement that set
President Ghani in place has failed to create a genuine power-sharing
arrangement between the president and his opposition.

Ghani’s
administration has not adhered to the terms of the internationally negotiated National
Unity Government (NUG) agreement that established him as President and his
Tajik rival Abdullah Abdullah as Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Ghani has used
the president’s significant constitutional authority and the vague terms of the
NUG agreement to marginalize CEO Abdullah
and to limit other Tajik rivals’ influence in governance.

The Ghani administration has not implemented the agreement’s requiredreforms aimed at ensuring transparent elections, so Ghani’s
administration is repeatedly able to delay parliamentary
and district council elections. Ghani has been able to postpone, on grounds of
process, calling the required Constitutional Loya Jirga to convert the Chief
Executive Officer’s (CEO) position into a constitutionally mandated premiership.[1] Such a constitutional change
would create a more balanced power-sharing agreement between Ghani and CEO Abdullah,
who is Jamiat’s most senior representative in the government.

Ghani’s corruption reforms could
drive Atta, Jamiat, and entrenched Pashtun powerbrokers to form an anti-Ghani
coalition in order to secure the patronage networks they benefit from.Ghani
is pushing a reform agenda that is intended to combat corruption and empower
government institutions over powerful regional personalities; as a result, Ghani
has attempted to remove
regional warlords and powerbrokers from Afghan politics—including First Vice
President General Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta.Ghani’s anti-warlord initiatives
allow Atta to build and strengthen alliances against Ghani among traditional rivals.

Atta’s
coalition building

Atta
is attempting to unite Jamiat under his leadership by courtingother Tajik
powerbrokers and by leveraging his governorship to increase Jamiat’s influence
in government. Jamiat’s negotiations with President
Ghani over the Balkh governorship are an effort to reset the Afghan political
system in order to increase Jamiat’s power and influence in the government.
Based on Jamiat’s current demands, Atta would
resign from the Balkh governorship if Ghani appoints Jamiat leaders to key
government positions and if Ghani alters the parliamentary system to increase
the role of political parties, like Jamiat, in parliament. If Atta is able to
use his negotiated resignation to force Ghani to adhere to Jamiat’s demands,
Atta would accomplish what CEO Abdullah could not: getting
Jamiat leaders appointed to key positions in the government. This would be an
important step towards convincing the historically fractious Jamiat party to
support Atta in 2019 elections.

Atta
is trying to build a powerful and diverse coalition with ex-President Hamid
Karzai to challenge Ghani in 2019. Atta has already created the Coalition
for the Salvation of Afghanistan (CSA) with Dostum and Deputy CEO Mohammad
Mohaqiq in June 2017. This alliance has united three minority groups, the
Tajiks, Uzbeks, and a faction of the Hazaras. Atta is also trying to build alliances with Pashtun powerbrokers,
most notably with former President Karzai.President Ghani
prevented Atta from attending a December 2017 meeting of
opposition parties in Kandahar, indicating Ghani feels threatened by Atta’s
attempts to build alliances with Pashtun powerbrokers.Jamiat political figure Ahmad
Wali Massoud met with Shah Wali Karzai, Hamid Karzai's brother
and the head of the Pashtun Popalzai Tribe, in Kandahar on February 7, 2018. It
is possible Massoud is working as an emissary for Atta, given their January
2018 meetings. Additionally, the powerful Kandahar
provincial police chief, General Abdul Raziq has publicly supported Atta, who claimed he met with one of Raziq’s representatives in
Mazar-e Sharif on February 23. Raziq reportedly hosted the meeting, which several former Karzai
administration officials attended. One of the most prominent attendees was
Rahmutallah Nabil, Karzai’s director of the National Directorate of Security
and the leader of the Karzai-linked Mehwar-e Mardom party.

Atta
will struggle to create an enduring and strong partnership with Former
President Karzai. It is unlikely that Karzai will choose to support Ghani, but it is
also unlikely that he will fully support Atta in the presidential election.
Karzai cannot run for President again, but he will likely seek the best
opportunity to increase his own influence within the government. He may choose
to support a Pashtun, likely one who served in his administration, during the
2019 election instead of Atta. The leaders of Karzai-linked opposition groups
may have presidential ambitions of their own, so it may be difficult for Atta
to maintain support from these groups until 2019, especially if Karzai decides
to support one of their campaigns. Additionally, traditional tensions based on
past dealings with Karzai may make it difficult for Atta to convince all of
Jamiat to support an alliance with Karzai.

Ghani’s
efforts to undermine Atta

Ghani
can attack Atta’s fragile network of alliances in multiple ways as he prepares
for Atta’s challenge. Atta will need a united Jamiat, full support from the CSA, and alliances
with powerful Pashtun leaders to challenge Ghani realistically in the 2019
elections. Ghani will work to exploit intra-Jamiat tensions, the traditional
rivalries between the members of the CSA, and long-lasting tensions between
Karzai and most of Afghanistan’s northern power-elite. Ghani may also try to
limit the appeal of Atta and Jamiat’s current proposals to alter the Afghan
system of governance. If Ghani is able to secure deals with some
disenfranchised powerbrokers, both inside and outside of Jamiat, he may be able
to limit Atta’s ability to contend in 2019 elections.

Ghani
is trying to fracture the Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan by creating
tensions between its members. Ghani is using historic
tensions between Dostum and Atta and their respective political parties to
weaken the CSA. Ghani reversed a decision to
replace the Jamiat deputy governor of Samangan
Province with a member of Dostum’s Junbesh-i Milli party after reaching
a deal with Jamiat on February 20. This led the spurned Junbesh member to
threaten to seize the deputy governor’s post by force. This incident
demonstrates an example of how Ghani can play one CSA member against the other.
Ghani also may be attempting to split Mohaqiq from the CSA, which would weaken the
coalition. Ghani met with Mohaqiqin early February 2018 reportedly to build a
“Council of Elders,” which may be Ghani’s attempt to create a rival coalition. Another
senior member of the CSA, Mohammad Natiqi, criticized both Ghani and
Jamiat for ignoring other opposition groups during their negotiations.[2] Natiqi said both Ghani and
Jamiat are to blame for excluding other parties that supported CEO Abdullah in
2014 from discussions on implementing the National Unity Government Agreement. Atta
will need the Uzbek and Hazara support he derives from the CSA to have a
legitimate chance at winning a national election. However, Atta’s primary
concern is likely to unite Jamiat and the Tajiks, so Ghani can use the
political disputes this causes to reduce Atta’s support from the CSA.

Atta
is engaged in a power-struggle with Jamiat’s acting-leader Salahuddin Rabbani
that may weaken Atta. Afzal Hadid, a close advisor to Atta and the Balkh Provincial
Council head, claimed a resolution
to the Balkh dispute was close following a privatemeetingbetween Atta
and representatives from Ghani’s administration in Mazar-e Sharif on March
04-05.[3] However, a Jamiat
spokesman denied any
negotiations between Atta and Ghani’s administration occurred, and Rabbani
reportedly does not support Atta’s direct
negotiations with Ghani’s administration. An anonymous source from Jamiat claimed Ghani is
negotiating directly with Atta in an attempt to find an alternative solution to
the Balkh dispute because multiple rounds of negotiations with Jamiat
representatives, led by Rabbani, have
failed to resolve the crisis. Like Atta, Rabbani may have been using his role
leading Jamiat’s negotiations over the Balkh dispute to improve his own
position in Jamiat by demonstrating his ability to support the party’s interests.
Rabbani may want a more prominent role in Afghan politics given reports that he
initially supported Atta’s removal
and rumors that he is interested in a unified
Ghani-Jamiat presidential ticket—presumably with himself as the Vice President.
Ghani may have offered an attractive deal to Atta that Ghani believes will
split Jamiat.

However, there are conflicting
reports about whether Atta and Ghani negotiated a settlement or simply set
conditions for Ghani-Jamiat negotiations to resume. Some anonymous sources claimed that Atta and
Ghani had reached a deal. Based on the rumored agreement, Atta plans to resign but
will choose his successor and a new Balkh police chief.[4]Additionally, Ghani will appoint Jamiat
members as Minister of Education and Minister of Information and Culture, and
Ghani will appoint six new Jamiat ambassadors to unnamed countries. In contrast,
other sources claimed Atta’s
negotiations had only paved the way for negations between Jamiat and Ghani to
resume in Kabul.

If Atta and
Ghani negotiated a deal, Atta would likely have expanded on Jamiat’s initial demands that sought
Jamiat appointments to senior government positions.[5] While Jamiat and Atta’s demandsgradually increased to include much broader
electoral and constitutional reforms, Atta may believe he can use this
agreement to consolidate his control of Jamiat.[6] Ghani may believe such an
agreement will exacerbate a power-struggle in Jamiat. Alternatively, Ghani may
be willing to make these concessions in order to reduce the pressure stemming
from the growing support for
Jamiat’s reform agenda combined with upcoming parliamentary elections. The
parliamentary and electoral reforms Jamiat and Atta have demanded would make it
difficult to hold
parliamentary elections as scheduled so this possible agreement may indicate Ghani
is trying to mitigate the potential consequences of delayed elections.

If Atta set
conditions for future negotiations, it would indicate limited progress, but
given the broad reforms Jamiat demands, a resolution
may not be imminent. This would also demonstrate that Atta is confident that Ghani
will be unable to split Jamiat by offering a Jamiat faction a favorable deal to
abandon Atta.

Ghani
may try to counteract growing support for Jamiat’s reform agenda.Multipleparties have announced
their support for the reforms Jamiat is demanding. Ghani has held separate
meetings with multiple opposition leaders whose parties either already have or
could ultimately support Jamiat and Atta. Ghani has met with Abdul Rasoul
Sayyaf, the leader of the Council for Protection and Stability in Afghanistan;[7] Hezb-e Islami leader
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar;[8] Deputy CEO Mohammad
Mohaqiq; CEO Abdullah Abdullah; and Hazara Hizb-e Wahdat leader Karim Khalili.
Ghani’s office said the meetings were “to discuss issues of national
interests;” however, anonymous sources claimed Ghani intended
to create “Council of Elders.” It is possible Ghani is trying to constrain Atta
and Jamiat by creating a rival coalition focused on implementing reforms but on
terms that are more favorable to Ghani.

Ghani’s
decision toreleasenew electronic
National Identity Cards (e-NICs) that include nationality could drive a wedge
between several opposition groups. The Tajiks and Hazaras are opposed to including
ethnicity and nationality on the cards, while Uzbeks and Pashtuns support the
labels. One of Jamiat’s current negotiating demands includes the use of e-NICs
that do not include
nationality or ethnicity. Ghani may be able to use e-NICs to increase tensions
within the CSA and, more importantly, could use ethnic tensions to block Atta
from aligning with Pashtun leaders.As
an example, General Raziq said that anyone
opposed to listing nationality on the e-NICs as “Afghan” should leave the
country, while Atta criticized the e-NIC
release on February 17.[9] Atta’s February 23 meeting with Raziq’s
representative may indicate their emerging alliance can overcome the e-NIC
issue but impassioned disagreements
over e-NICs could pose challenges to Atta’s alliances.

Inflection
Points

The
ongoing Balkh dispute and continued parliamentary election delays could become
inflection points that lead to an uncontrollable destabilization in Afghan
domestic politics. The most likely indicator that either of these inflection points
will cause significant problems is the outbreak of protests in Kabul. Atta has
continually threatened to organize
mass protests in Kabul unless Jamiat’s demands are met. As long as the Balkh
dispute persists, large protests will remain a possibility. Atta said that it would
be difficult for him to control a “massive movement from Balkh” that could lead
to a crisis that caused the government to collapse.[10] Large anti-Ghani protests
in Kabul increase the risk of violent confrontation between security forces and
pro-Atta demonstrators, which would lead to an unpredictable escalation of
tensions. It’s also possible that
repeated election delays could catalyze destabilizing protests. Manypolitical parties demand
timely and transparent elections, so the emerging anti-Ghani coalition may be
able to leverage electoral delays to organize protests. Parliamentary and
district council elections are still officially scheduled to occur on
July 7, 2018, but Independent Election Commission (IEC) officials have admitted elections will
likely be delayed until October. There are indications some parties will accept a delay to
October, but any announcement that elections will not be held in 2018 could prompt
destabilizing protests in Kabul. Given widespread demands for timely elections,
protests over elections delays could grow so large and intense that Ghani is forced
physically to resign and a transitional government is created.

[1]Parliamentary
and district council elections must be held before a Constitutional Loya Jirga
can be held.

[2] Natiqi is
Mohaqiq’s deputy in the Hizb-e Wahdat-e Mardom party. Natiqi is one the six
signatories of the original CSA agreement in Turkey in June 2017.

[3] Atta
reportedly met with the head of the National Directorate of Security, Massom
Stanekzai, and the head of the Office of the President, Abdul Salam Rahimi
(both of whom have been involved in the discussions with Jamiat’s
representatives). Hadid said he was not aware of the details of the
negotiations but said he
“can say it with confidence that the door for settling the tensions has
opened.”

[4] The current
Balkh police chief announced he would
remain loyal to the government should the dispute escalate into a violent
conflict on December 26 so Atta probably wants to appoint a more loyal
commander

[5] Jamiat and
Atta initially demanded Jamiat members be appointed Minster of Education, Minister
of the Economy and the ambassadors to Tajikistan and Bangladesh.

[6] Control of the Ministry of
Education is a crucial concession to Jamiat because the ministry is the largest
civil employer in Afghanistan and is a key component of Afghan patronage
networks.

[7] The Council for Protection
and Stability of Afghanistan (CPSA) consists mostly of former Karzai
administration officials who had previously supported Abdullah in the 2014
election. They have previously demanded Ghani implement reforms
and hold timely and transparent elections.

[8] Hekmatyar is not likely to
support Atta but a faction of Hezb-e Islami supports Jamiat’s
agenda and Hekmatyar has said timely
elections are necessary.

[9] “Afghan” has
historically been used to refer to the Pashtun ethnicity.

[10] Atta was
referring to protests planned to coincide with the Kabul Process meeting that
he later postponed.

Russia is intensifying its multifaceted campaign to destabilize Ukraine ahead of Ukraine’s 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections. The Kremlin is leveraging various political and economic tools to complement its ongoing military operations in Eastern Ukraine.[1] Russia has recently expanded its operations to spread ethnic tensions in Western Ukraine in order to drive wedges between Ukraine and its partners in Eastern Europe. The Kremlin also engineered the Russian energy company Gazprom’s vindictive and abrupt disruption in natural gas supply to Ukraine.

Ukraine simultaneously faces its own internal challenges amidst stalling efforts to establish an independent anti-corruption court and other government reforms. The Kremlin will exploit the resultant domestic and international frustrations over the pace of reforms. Russia will escalate its subversive activities over the next year in order to remove the pro-Western government led by President Petro Poroshenko and empower populists and pro-Russia factions. The U.S. must take a clear stance supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and partner more closely with Kyiv to support the passage of key reforms and counter Russian subversion.

The Kremlin intensified its destabilization campaign in Western
Ukraine in an effort to undermine Ukraine’s partnerships in Eastern Europe.Ukrainian officials accusedKremlin-backed groups of attacking the Transcarpathian Hungarian
Cultural Center in Uzhgorod, Zakharpatiya Oblast on February 4 and 27 to inflame
local and regional tensions.[2] Zakharpatiya Oblast
Governor Hennadiy Moskal accused the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) of
recruiting nationalists to conduct the attacks in Uzhgorod in coordination with
intelligence operatives based in Russian-occupied Transnistria in Moldova.[3]Poland detained two
suspects connected to the attack on February 4.[4] The suspects are
reportedly tied to the far-right Polish ‘Falanga’ movement, and had fought
alongside the Russian-backed separatist Donetsk
and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics in Eastern Ukraine.[5] These attacks against
minorities are part of a wider campaign by Russia to undermine Ukraine’s relationships
with Poland and Hungary. Ukrainian authorities previously arrested individuals
reportedly connected to the defunct pro-Russia Party of Regions in Ukraine who
attempted to destroy a Hungarian monument in Zakharpatiya Oblast in October 2017.[6]Ukrainian and Polish
government sources have also accused Russia of attempting to drive a wedge
between the two nations by orchestrating anti-Polish protests in Ukraine as
well as attacks against Polish monuments and government buildings.[7] The Kremlin will further
enflame ethnic tensions over the coming year to fracture Ukraine and drive
wedges between Kyiv and its neighbors in Eastern Europe.

Nationalist Hungarian President
Viktor Orban has exploited the Kremlin’s subversion campaign in Western Ukraine
to strengthen his own domestic support ahead of Hungary’s April 8 general elections.Orban - who holds a close relationship with Russia - has boosted
his nationalist credentials by deliberately escalating tensions with Ukraine.[8] Hungary revived its
narrative that Hungarians in Ukraine are under attack from Ukrainian
nationalists on March 1.[9] Hungarian organizations
in Western Ukraine initially agreed with official statements accusing
non-Ukrainians of conducting the attack in Zakharpatiya Oblast on February 27
before switching their narrative to accusing Kyiv of allowing “extremists to
strengthen their positions” amidst an alleged “anti-Hungarian campaign” in
Ukrainian media.[10] These statements mirror similar narratives peddled by the Kremlin. Hungarian
groups further escalated tensions by calling for the OSCE to establish a monitoring
office in Western Ukraine on March 7.[11] Orban has sustained a belligerent stance against Kyiv’s decision to require schoolchildren in Ukraine to learn both
Ukrainian and their native language since September 2017.[12] Hungary has also attempted
to stall Ukraine’s cooperation with Western institutions such as NATO and the
EU.[13] Orban’s efforts support
Russia’s ongoing campaign in Western Ukraine to drive social cleavages that
prevent Ukraine’s integration with the West. Orban likely assesses that this
escalation will help him gain electoral support. Orban’s Fidesz Party lost the
mayoral race in traditionally pro-Fidesz Homdezovasarhely in Southern Hungary on
February 25.[14] Orban will thus continue to fuel this crisis for political gain unless his
international partners encourage him to de-escalate tensions with Ukraine.

The Kremlin continued its tradition of leveraging
energy as a foreign policy weapon against Ukraine.Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom
abruptly disrupted
the delivery of natural gas to Ukraine on 01 March in response to a February 28
judicial ruling against Gazprom in favor of Ukrainian energy corporation
Naftogaz.[15] Gazprom had been found to owe $2.56 billion to Naftogaz in a dispute over
supply disruptions to Ukraine by the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.[16]Ukraine immediately signed an agreement with Polish energy corporation PNGiG,
stabilizing its energy supply after a week of turmoil.[17] Naftogaz CEO Andriy Kobolyev
emphasized that “yet another attempt to use gas as a weapon” failed and warned
the EU to “consider this case when making their final decision” on Russia’s
NordStream 2 Pipeline.[18] Polish and Latvian officials have repeatedly warned against the threats posed
to Europe by the NordStream 2 Pipeline.[19] Gazprom’s decision to cut the natural gas supply to Ukraine reinforces Russia’s
long-standing strategy to use energy as a weapon against other countries. The
U.S. should encourage its European partners to consider Gazprom’s actions
against Ukraine before deciding to expand energy ties to Russia through the
NordStream 2 and TurkStream pipelines.

The Government of Ukraine’s commitment to reform is simultaneously
wavering at the time when it is most required. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s government is at risk of
failing to approve the creation of an independent anti-corruption court in line
with standards set by the IMF and EU.[20] The IMF, EU, and
Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) have repeatedly stressed the
importance of choosing independent judges for the court via the Public Council
of International Experts.[21]The Ukrainian Parliament
has nonetheless relegated the council to a de-facto advisory role, undermining
the court’s ability to maintain its independence from the Government of Ukraine.[22] Poroshenko asserted
that “Ukraine did not do reforms for the IMF [but rather] for the Ukrainian
people” and emphasized his government’s success in enacting other important
reforms on March 6.[23] The U.S. and its
partners must recognize the important progress achieved thus far on reform in Ukraine
but sustain pressure on Kyiv to establish an independent anti-corruption court
in line with EU, IMF, and NABU recommendations. If Kyiv fails to do so, it will
likely fuel public frustration, lose a much-needed tranche of financial support
from the IMF, frustrate its international partners, and empower pro-Russia and
populist factions in the 2019 elections.

The U.S. and its partners must be willing to both support
Ukraine against Russian subversion and simultaneously challenge Kyiv to
meet its own reform obligations. The
U.S. has taken key steps to support Ukraine, including most recently authorizing
the sale of Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missile Systems to the Armed Forces of
Ukraine.[24] U.S. military support
will help Ukraine defend itself from the Armed Forces of
Russia and its proxy
forces in Eastern Ukraine. The U.S. also extended sanctions on Russia for its
ongoing invasion of Eastern Ukraine.[25] The U.S. nonetheless must recognize the multi-faceted nature of Moscow’s
campaign against Kyiv, which includes many political and economic, in addition
to military, components. The Kremlin will intensify this subversion campaign over
the next twelve months before Ukraine’s March 2019 parliamentary and presidential
elections. The U.S. must focus its efforts over the next year on enabling
effective counter-intelligence operations and tangible reforms in Kyiv lest the
coming elections result in a windfall for populist and pro-Russia forces in
Ukraine.

[2] [“Statement
of the MFA of Ukraine in connection with the arson premises of the Society of
Hungarian culture in Transcarpathia,”] Ukrainian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 27, 2018, http://mfa.gov(.)ua/ua/press-center/comments/8532-zajavamzs-ukrajini

[“Internal Security Agency detained Poles suspected of
trying to set fire to the building of the association of Hungarian culture in
Ukraine,”] wiadomosci.onet.pl, February
27, 2018, https://wiadomosci.onet(.)pl/swiat/abw-zatrzymala-polakow-podejrzanych-o-probe-podpalenia-budynkustowarzyszeniakultury/yw1mdfj?utm_source=wiadomosci_viasg&utm_medium=nitro&utm_campaign=allonet_nitro_new&srcc=ucs&utm_v=2

[5] “Putin’s
Falanga: meet the Polish neo-fascists who tried to burn down a Hungarian center
in Ukraine,” euromaidanpress.com,
March 5, 2018, http://euromaidanpress(.)com/2018/03/05/the-falanga-group-in-poland-whos-really-behind-the-arson-attacks-on-hungarian-associations-in-uzhhorod/

[10] Olena Babakova, “Putin’s
Falanga: meet the Polish neo-fascists who tried to burn down a Hungarian center
in Ukraine,” euromaidanpress.com, March
5, 2018, http://euromaidanpress(.)com/2018/03/05/the-falanga-group-in-poland-whos-really-behind-the-arson-attacks-on-hungarian-associations-in-uzhhorod/ ; [“In the Hungarian
association, I am convinced that their office was not blown up by Ukrainians,”]
euro-integration.com, February 27,
2018, http://www.eurointegration(.)com.ua/news/2018/02/27/7078133/ “Brenzovych sees the
anti-Hungarian campaign in the Ukrainian media as the cause of the incident in
the KMKSZ office,” uzhgorod.in, March
1, 2018, http://uzhgorod(.)in/en/news/2018/mart/brenzovych_sees_the_anti_hungarian_campaign_in_the_ukrainian_media_as_the_cause_of_the_incident_in_the_kmksz_office

[21] “Ukraine Moves Closer To
Anticorruption Court, But Doubts Remain,” RFE/RL,
March 1, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-anticorruption-court-passes-first-reading/29070605.html
; “Successful
anti-corruption fight is impossible without the establishment of the
Anti-Corruption Court — Artem Sytnyk,” National
Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, February 22, 2018, https://nabu.gov(.)ua/en/novyny/successful-anti-corruption-fight-impossible-without-establishment-anti-corruption-court-artem
; “Attempts to limit the
independence of the NABU will cause irreversible consequences for the fight
against corruption in Ukraine,” National
Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, December 7, 2017, https://nabu.gov(.)ua/en/novyny/attempts-limit-independence-nabu-will-cause-irreversible-consequences-fight-against; “In 26 out of 86 NABU’s
proceedings the trials have not started yet,” National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, September 11,
2017, https://nabu.gov(.)ua/en/novyny/26-out-86-nabus-proceedings-trials-have-not-started-yet
; ; “IMF mission supports functional independence
of NABU,” National Anti-Corruption Bureau
of Ukraine, November 11, 2016, https://nabu.gov(.)ua/en/novyny/imf-mission-supports-functional-independence-nabu

[23] “President in an
interview to Financial Times: We do reforms not for the IMF, but for the
Ukrainian people,” Office of the
President of Ukraine, March 6, 2018, http://www.president.gov(.)ua/en/news/mi-robimo-reformi-ne-dlya-mvf-dlya-ukrayinciv-prezident-v-in-46182

[25] “Executive Order on the
President’s Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Ukraine,” The White House, March 2, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-presidents-continuation-national-emergency-respect-ukraine/