On their day off people would show up all the time.
Everyone in camp knew if you wanted to work out your frustration you show up at
the PUC tent.1
In a way it was sport. The cooks were all U.S. soldiers. One day [a sergeant]
shows up and tells a PUC to grab a pole. He told him to bend over and broke
the guys leg with a mini Louisville Slugger, a metal bat. He was the fucking
cook. He shouldnt be in with no PUCs.  82nd Airborne sergeant, describing events at
FOB Mercury, Iraq

If I as an officer think were not even following the Geneva Conventions, theres something wrong. If officers witness all these things
happening, and dont take action, theres something wrong. If another West
Pointer tells me he thinks, Well, hitting somebody might be okay, theres
something wrong.  82nd Airborne officer, describing confusion
in Iraq concerning allowable interrogation techniques

Residents of Fallujah called them the Murderous Maniacs
because of how they treated Iraqis in detention. They were soldiers of the U.S.
Armys 82nd Airborne Division, 1st Battalion, 504th
Parachute Infantry Regiment, stationed at Forward Operating Base Mercury (FOB
Mercury) in Iraq. The soldiers considered this name a badge of honor.2

One officer and two non-commissioned officers (NCOs) of the
82nd Airborne who witnessed abuse, speaking on condition of
anonymity, described in multiple interviews with Human Rights Watch how their
battalion in 2003-2004 routinely used physical and mental torture as a means of
intelligence gathering and for stress relief. One soldier raised his concerns
within the army chain of command for 17 months before the Army agreed to
undertake an investigation, but only after he had contacted members of Congress
and considered goingpublic with the story.

According to their accounts, the torture and other mistreatment
of Iraqis in detention was systematic and was known at varying levels of
command. Military Intelligence personnel, they said, directed and encouraged
army personnel to subject prisoners to forced, repetitive exercise, sometimes
to the point of unconsciousness, sleep deprivation for days on end, and
exposure to extremes of heat and cold as part of the interrogation process. At
least one interrogator beat detainees in front of other soldiers. Soldiers
also incorporated daily beatings of detainees in preparation for
interrogations. Civilians believed to be from the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) conducted interrogations out of sight, but not earshot, of soldiers, who
heard what they believed were abusive interrogations.

All three soldiers expressed confusion on the proper
application of the Geneva Conventions on the laws of armed conflict in the
treatment of prisoners. All had served in Afghanistan prior to Iraq and said that contradictory statements by U.S. officials regarding the applicability of the
Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan and Iraq (see Conclusion) contributed to
their confusion, and ultimately to how they treated prisoners. Although
none were still in Iraq when we interviewed them, the NCOs said they believed
the practices continue.

The soldiers came forward because of what they described as
deep frustration with the military chain of commands failure to view the
abuses as symptomatic of broader failures of leadership and respond
accordingly. All three are active duty soldiers who wish to continue their
military careers. A fax letter, e-mail, and repeated phone calls to the 82nd
Airborne Division regarding the major allegations in the report received no
response.

When the Abu Ghraib scandal broke in April 2004, senior
officials in the Bush administration claimed that severe prisoner abuse was
committed only by a few, rogue, poorly trained reserve personnel at a single
facility in Iraq. But since then, hundreds of other cases of abuse from Iraq and Afghanistan have come to light, described in U.S. government documents, reports of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, media reports, legal documents filed
by detainees, and from detainee accounts provided to human rights
organizations, including Human Rights Watch.3 And while the military has
launched investigations and prosecutions of lower-ranking personnel for
detainee abuse, in most cases the military has used closed administrative
hearings to hand down light administrative punishments like pay reductions and
reprimands, instead of criminal prosecutions before courts-martial. The
military has made no effort to conduct a broader criminal investigation
focusing on how military command might have been involved in reported abuse,
and the administration continues to insist that reported abuse had nothing to
do with the administrations decisions on the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions or with any approved interrogation techniques.

These soldiers firsthand accounts provide further evidence
contradicting claims that abuse of detainees by U.S. forces was isolated or
spontaneous. The accounts here suggest that the mistreatment of prisoners by
the U.S. military is even more widespread than has been acknowledged to date,
including among troops belonging to some of the best trained, most decorated,
and highly respected units in the U.S. Army. They describe in vivid terms
abusive interrogation techniques ordered by Military Intelligence personnel and
known to superior officers.

Most important, they demonstrate that U.S. troops on the battlefield were given no clear guidance on how to treat detainees.
When the administration sent these soldiers to war in Afghanistan, it threw out the rules they were trained to uphold (embodied in the Geneva
Conventions and the U.S. Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation).
Instead, President Bush said only that detainees be treated
"humanely," not as a requirement of the law but as policy. And no
steps were taken to define what humane was supposed to mean in practice.4 Once in Iraq, their commanders demanded that they extract intelligence from detainees without
telling them what was allowed and what was forbidden. Yet when abuses
inevitably followed, the administration blamed only low-ranking soldiers
instead of taking responsibility.

These soldiers' accounts show how the administration's
refusal to insist on adherence to a lawful, long-recognized, and well-defined
standard of treatment contributed to the torture of prisoners. It also shows
how that policy betrayed the soldiers in the fieldsowing confusion in the
ranks, exposing them to legal sanction when abuses occurred, and placing in an
impossible position all those who wished to behave honorably.

* * *

The officer and NCOs interviewed by Human Rights Watch say
that torture of detainees took place almost daily at FOB Mercury during their
entire deployment there, from September 2003 to April 2004. While two of the
soldiers also reported abuses at FOB Tiger, near the Syrian border, the most
egregious incidents allegedly took place at FOB Mercury. The acts of torture
and other cruel or inhuman treatment they described include severe beatings (in
one incident, a soldier reportedly broke a detainees leg with a baseball bat),
blows and kicks to the face, chest, abdomen, and extremities, and repeated
kicks to various parts of the detainees body; the application of chemical
substances to exposed skin and eyes; forced stress positions, such as holding
heavy water jugs with arms outstretched, sometimes to the point of unconsciousness;
sleep deprivation; subjecting detainees to extremes of hot and cold; the
stacking of detainees into human pyramids; and, the withholding of food (beyond
crackers) and water.

According to Army Field Manual 19-4 covering enemy prisoner
of war operations, Military Police have responsibility for safeguarding,
accounting for, and maintaining captives. The soldiers interviewed by Human
Rights Watch said that established procedure was violated by having frontline
soldiers guard and prepare detainees for interrogation, instead of speeding
detainees to a rear area where they would be looked after by trained Military
Police.

Detainees in Iraq were consistently referred to as PUCs.
This term was devised in Afghanistan to take the place of the traditional
designation of Prisoner of War (POW), after President Bush decided that the
Geneva Conventions did not apply there. It carried over to Iraq, even though the U.S. military command and the Bush administration have continually stated that
the Geneva Conventions are in effect. Although not all persons captured
on a battlefield are entitled to Prisoner of War (POW) status, U.S. military
doctrine interprets the Geneva Conventions as requiring that all captured
persons be treated as POWs unless and until a competent tribunal determines
otherwise.5

Detainees at FOB Mercury were held in so-called PUC tents,
which were separated from the rest of the base by concertina wire. Detainees
typically spent three days at the base before being released or sent to Abu
Ghraib. Officers in the Military Intelligence unit and officers in charge of
the guards directed the treatment of detainees. Soldiers told us that
detainees who did not cooperate with interrogators were sometimes denied water
and given only crackers to eat, and were often beaten. There was little done
to hide the mistreatment of detainees: one of the soldiers we interviewed
observed torture when he brought newly captured Iraqis to the PUC tents.

The torture of detainees reportedly was so widespread and
accepted that it became a means of stress relief for soldiers. Soldiers said
they felt welcome to come to the PUC tent on their off-hours to Fuck a PUC or
Smoke a PUC. Fucking a PUC referred to beating a detainee, while Smoking
a PUC referred to forced physical exertion sometimes to the point of
unconsciousness. The soldiers said that when a detainee had a visible injury
such as a broken limb due to fucking or smoking, an army physicians
assistant would be called to administer an analgesic and fill out the proper
paperwork. They said those responsible would state that the detainee was
injured during the process of capture and the physicians assistant would sign
off on this. Broken bones occurred every other week at FOB Mercury.

Smoking was not limited to stress relief but was central
to the interrogation system employed by the 82nd Airborne Division
at FOB Mercury. Officers and NCOs from the Military Intelligence unit would
direct guards to smoke the detainees prior to an interrogation, and would
direct that certain detainees were not to receive sleep, water, or food beyond
crackers. Directed smoking would last for the 12-24 hours prior to an
interrogation. As one soldier put it: [the military intelligence officer]
said he wanted the PUCs so fatigued, so smoked, so demoralized that they want
to cooperate.

The soldiers believed that about half of the detainees at Camp Mercury were released because they were not involved in the insurgency, but they left
with the physical and mental scars of torture. If hes a good guy, you know,
now hes a bad guy because of the way we treated him, one sergeant told Human
Rights Watch.

The soldiers with whom Human Rights Watch spoke had served
as guards in Afghanistan and had observed interrogations at FOB Tiger in Iraq,
and said that civilian interrogators at those locations had also used coercive
methods against prisoners. These interrogators were always referred to by the U.S. military abbreviation OGA, which stands for Other Government Agencies. It was
assumed that such persons were with the CIA, but because OGA also includes
other civilian agencies, the soldiers with whom Human Rights Watch spoke said
they could not be sure.

Soldiers generally had less direct access to OGA
interrogations, in part because OGA personnel often took detainees to an
isolated building and were generally more careful about being seen. But the
soldiers who had watched OGA interrogations in Afghanistan said that soldiers
applied in Iraq some of the techniques they learned from the OGA, including
forced stress positions, sleep deprivation, and exposure. At FOB Tiger, the
officer said, he heard the sounds of physical violence coming from rooms where
OGA interrogations were being held, but without being present in the room could
not know whether the sounds were real or simulated. The soldiers said that
civilian interrogators sometimes removed prisoners from detention facilities
and took the paperwork that indicated a detainee was being held, apparently
disappearing that detainee.6

The officer who spoke to Human Rights Watch made persistent
efforts to raise concerns he had with superior officers up the chain of command
and to obtain clearer rules on the proper treatment of prisoners. When he
raised the issue with superiors, he was consistently told to keep his mouth
shut, turn a blind eye, or consider his career. When he sought clearer
procedures from general officers, he was told merely to use his judgment.

Altogether this officer said he spent 17 months trying to
clarify rules for prisoner treatment while seeking a meaningful investigation.
He explained at length how he openly had brought his complaint directly up the
chain-of-command, from his direct commanding officer, to the division
commander, to the Judge Advocate Generals (JAG) office, and finally to members
of the U.S. Congress. In many cases, he was encouraged to keep his concerns
quiet; his brigade commander, for example, rebuffed him when he asked for an
investigation into these allegations of abuse. He believes he was not taken
seriously until he began to approach members of Congress, and, indeed, just
days before the publication of this report he was told that he would not be
granted a pass to meet on his day off with staff members of U.S. Senators John McCain and John Warner. He said he was told that he was being naïve and
that he was risking his career.

Human Rights Watch welcomes reports that the Army has agreed
to investigate the abuses discussed in this report. We are concerned however
those investigations will only focus on low-level soldiers and officers,
instead of looking as far as necessary up the chain of command. We are also
concerned that military personnel who come forward to report abuses will find
their careers suffer, as their commanding officers implied they would, rather
than be commended for doing their duty.

If FOB Mercury is not to become one more in an expanding
series of U.S. detention facilities associated with brutality and degrading
treatment, further tarnishing the reputation of the U.S. armed forces, the
policy failures must be faced head-on and the most senior responsible officials
held accountable.

Accordingly, Human Rights Watch urges the following:

The U.S. Attorney General should appoint a special counsel
to investigate any U.S. officialsno matter their rank or positionwho
have participated in, ordered, or had command responsibility for war
crimes or torture, or other prohibited ill-treatment against detainees in U.S. custody.7

The U.S. Congress should create a special commission,
along the lines of the 9/11 commission, to investigate the issue of
detainee abuse by U.S. military and civilians personnel abroad, including
the incidents described here, as proposed in legislation sponsored by
Senator Carl Levin.

Congress should enact legislation along the lines proposed
by Senators John McCain, Lindsay Graham, and John Warner, which would
prohibit any forms of detainee treatment and interrogation not
specifically authorized by the U.S. Army Field Manual on Intelligence
Interrogation, and not consistent with the Convention Against Torture.
Such legislation must cover not only military units but also civilian
agencies involved in interrogations, such as the CIA.

The U.S. Department of Defense should conduct a thorough
investigation of the allegations made in this report at all levels of the chain
of command. Such an investigation must not be limited to lower-ranking enlisted
personnel and officers, but must include higher-ranking officers and civilian
officials linked to policies that directed, encouraged or tolerated such
abuse. Measures should be taken to ensure that soldiers who bring forward
credible allegations of detainee abuse are not in any way punished for their
actions.

The 82nd Airborne Division should implement
measures to ensure the immediate investigation of credible allegations of
detainee abuse.

All three accounts below consist of direct quotes from the
soldiers. Each of the soldiers was interviewed more than once. For the sake of
clarity and to avoid repetition, Human Rights Watch has edited and rearranged
specific passages in the accounts.

[1] Person
Under Control or PUC (pronounced puck) is the term used by U.S. military forces to refer to Iraqi detainees.

[2] FOB
Mercury is located approximately 10 miles east of Fallujah, a center of the
insurgency at the time. U.S. forces came under intense attacks in and around
Fallujah, placing them under constant pressure and at high risk in daily
combat. As soon as the 82nd pulled out of FOB Mercury in April
2004, the U.S. Marines that replaced the 82nd undertook a major
offensive against insurgents in Fallujah.

[3] See Human
Rights Watch, Getting Away with Torture?: Command Responsibility for the U.S.
Abuse of Detainees, A Human Rights Watch Report, April 2005, Section II
(A World of Abuse), available at: hrw.org/reports/2005/us0405/4.htm#_Toc101408092.
See also, International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Treatment by
the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons, February
2004, available at: http://www.health-now.org/mediafiles/mediafile50.pdf
(describing detainee abuse in locations across Iraq, including sites in
Baghdad, Al-Khaim, Tikrit, Ramadi, and at Abu Ghraib, at p 7); Douglas Jehl and
Eric Schmitt, The Conflict in Iraq: Detainees; U.S. Military Says 26 Inmate
Deaths May Be Homicide, The New York Times, March 16, 2005 (describing
cases of detainee homicide occurring in areas across Afghanistan and Iraq). On
Afghanistan-related abuses, see Human Rights Watch, Enduring Freedom: Abuses
by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, A Human Rights Watch Report, March 2004,
available at hrw.org/reports/2004/afghanistan0304/; Human Rights Watch to
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, open letter, December 13, 2004, available
at: www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/12/10/afghan9838.htm. On Iraq-related
abuses, see Major General Antonio M. Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the
800th Military Police Brigade, March 2004 (describing numerous incidents of
sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses at Abu Ghraib prison, constituting
systematic and illegal abuse of detainees, at p. 16); Major George R. Fay, Article
15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military
Intelligence Brigade, (Documenting 44 allegations of war crimes at Abu Ghraib).
On Guantánamo-related abuses, see also Human Rights Watch, Guantánamo:
Detainee Accounts, A Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, October 2004, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/gitmo1004/.
See also, Paisley Dodds, Guantánamo Tapes Show Teams Punching, Stripping
Prisoners, Associated Press, February 1, 2005; Neil A. Lewis, Red
Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantánamo, The New York Times, November
30, 2004.

[4] See
Timothy Flanigan, written responses to questions submitted by U.S. Senator
Richard Durbin, following Flanigans confirmation hearing to be Deputy Attorney
General of the United States on July 26, 2005. Flanigan, who was Deputy
White House Counsel when President Bush issued his order requiring humane
treatment of detainees, stated: I do not believe the term inhumane
treatment is susceptible to succinct definition. In a further exchange
with Senator Durbin, Flanigan stated that: I am not aware of any
guidance provided by the White House specifically related to the meaning of
inhumane treatment.

[6] According to the U.N. Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (1992), enforced
disappearances occur when:

persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or
otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or
levels of Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection
of the law.

[7] To allow
the special prosecutor to have full authority to investigate and prosecute both
federal law and Uniform Code of Military Justice violations, the Secretary of
Defense should appoint a consolidated convening authority for all armed
services, to cooperate with the appointed civilian special prosecutor.