Rosén, G. (2017). 'The impact of norms on political decision-making: how to account for the European Parliament’s empowerment in EU external trade policy', Journal of European Public Policy. 24(10): 1450-1470.

Riddervold, M. & Rosén, G. (2016). 'Trick and treat: how the Commission and the European Parliament exert influence in EU foreign and security policies'. Journal of European Integration. 38(4), s. 687-702.

The question posed in this article is how to explain that the governance of secrecy in EU external relations varies. While the Common Foreign and Security Policy appears to retain its secretive character, the EU’s external trade policy has recently seen a shift towards more transparency. This article argues that to understand this variation, one has to take into account the institutional power of the European Parliament as well as the extent to which the rules and practices of secrecy are perceived as legitimate. The empowerment of the Parliament in trade means that it has had recent success in pushing back secrecy in this area. However, a general finding is that the majority of parliamentarians seem only rarely to question the executive’s governance of secrecy in external relations. The analysis shows that perceptions of legitimacy are crucial to account for different secrecy regimes – a finding that is likely to be relevant for the understanding of secrecy in foreign policy beyond the EU.

The European Union’s foreign and security policy is commonly described as an intergovernmental affair. Despite limited formal powers, several studies suggest that the European Parliament has increased its influence on the Union’s foreign and security policy. This article argues that, to gauge the significance of parliamentary participation, it is necessary to look beyond the notion of formal parliamentary rights and to take into account informal influence. The analysis shows how informal avenues of influence are crucial at certain stages of the decision-making process, and points to factors that constrain and enable parliamentary impact. Furthermore, it emphasises the important role that parliaments play in scrutinising security policy, which is a crucial component of democratic governance. In this particular field where there is little legislation, the establishment of solid procedures and practices for oversight and control can also be a significant indicator of parliamentary influence.

Rosen, Guri (2017). The impact of norms on political decision-making: how to account for the European Parliament?s empowerment in EU external trade policy. Journal of European Public Policy.
ISSN 1350-1763.
24(10), s 1450- 1470 . doi:
10.1080/13501763.2016.1227357Fulltekst i vitenarkiv.

Although the negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) may be about to be put on ice indefinitely, it has caused quite a stir across the European Union. Not least in the European Parliament, who had to postpone its vote on a resolution on recommendations to the Commission because there were too many suggestions for amendments. In addition, conflicts within party groups were threatening to disrupt the process. Particularly the German Social Democrats were under a lot of pressure to reject the infamous Investor State Dispute Settlement mechanism. This raises the question whether the general pattern of a left-right cleavage in the party politics of the European Parliament might not hold when the Union is deciding on external relations? Could it be that these issues raise particular concerns that trigger national interests to trump party group discipline? In the case of the South Korea Free Trade Agreement, for example, several MEPs were working hard to safeguard their national car industries. Thus, in this paper I analyse the pattern of roll-call votes on trade in the European Parliament, including international agreements as well as trade legislation. The first goal is to investigate whether one needs to redraw the traditional cleavage structures to understand how the European Parliament votes in external relations. Secondly, if trade really is an exception, the question becomes why: what are the scope conditions of its exceptionality? Using different measures of salience (importance of the dossier, public opinion), the ambition is to shed light on the party politics of trade policy, and the conditions under which MEPs are willing to rebel against their party groups.