Department of International Environment and Development Studies

International Security and

Hanne Mari Solhaug Djupdal

MSc International RelationsNoragricBLANK PAGE

iInternational Security and Intelligence Cooperation A collective case study of the OSCE and Europol

Hanne Mari Solhaug Djupdal

Ås, 2018

iiThe Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is theinternational gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU). Established in1986, Noragric’s contribution to international development lies in the interface betweenresearch, education (Bachelor, Master and PhD programmes) and assignments.

The Noragric Master theses are the final theses submitted by students in order to fulfill therequirements under the Noragric Master programme “International Environmental Studies”,“International Development Studies” and “International Relations”.

The findings in this thesis do not necessarily reflect the views of Noragric. Extracts from thispublication may only be reproduced after prior consultation with the author and on conditionthat the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation contact Noragric.

I, Hanne Mari Solhaug Djupdal, declare that this thesis is a result of my researchinvestigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have beenacknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previouslysubmitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree

I would first and foremost like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Calder Walton, Ernest May Fellowin History and Policy at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, for all hisguidance throughout the research process. Thank you for taking the time to help me, when Iknow that you have such a busy schedule of your own. Your support, knowledge, commentsand motivational advice have been invaluable.

I would also like to thank the welcoming and helpful colleagues I was lucky enough to workwith for four months at the Norwegian Delegation to the OSCE in Vienna. You took the timeto give me advice and information to help me with this dissertation, as well as let me take partand get such an invaluable insight into your work. I am very grateful, and the experience washighly motivational. A special thank you to Unni and Anders for helping me get in contactwith potential interviewees for this dissertation.

Finally, I am very grateful to my family, especially my mother, and my boyfriend and closefriends for encouraging me and supporting me, not only in the process of writing thisdissertation, but throughout my Master’s degree.

vABSTRACT

Non-traditional, transnational security threats have developed into some of the most pressingthreats to contemporary states. One of these threats is international terrorism. It has becomeevident through the 21st century that terrorists plan, plot and execute attacks across borders,and several attacks on European soil have revealed the challenge of suspects movingundetected between different countries. Recent examples of this in the public domain are the2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and the 2016 attacks in Brussels. These two attacks were thedeadliest acts of terror since the second world war in both countries. Due to atrocities likethese, and specifically after the 9/11 attacks in the US in 2001, it has become a generalunderstanding in the international community that terrorism requires international cooperationto counter. An urgent part of national security has thus become the exchange of secretinformation, or intelligence, between states about the capabilities and intentions of non-stateterror groups. In the aftermath of the Brussels attacks, it was revealed that the terrorist cellconnected to the outrage was the same cell responsible for the attacks in Paris the year before.Members of the cell had been able to travel undetected between France and Belgium (Soufan,2016). At the time, it seemed that terrorists crossed borders more easily than information andintelligence. The attacks have led to a number of ripple effects and caused politicians,academics and journalists to call for a closer and better cooperation between states. This dissertation explores that subject: international security and intelligencecooperation, mainly for the purpose of counter terrorism, in the Transatlantic and Eurasianregions of the world, mainly focusing on Europe in particular. More specifically itinvestigates the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and theEuropean Police Office (Europol) as a juxtaposition about how two structures with similarfocus areas and work have developed in different ways. The aim of the dissertation is to studythe similarities and differences in characteristics between the OSCE and Europol tounderstand how they impact their ability to cooperate and exchange information andintelligence, whether or not the two structures impact the level of security in the Transatlanticand Eurasian region, specifically Europe, and in what ways. The findings are also used todraw some conclusions about the broader nature of international security and intelligencecooperation of the day. At the outset, the OSCE and Europol look like similar organizations. On closerinspection, I discovered that the two are actually not, and that I was really comparing twofundamentally different groups. Despite similar expressed aims, one is a group and platformfor discussion, the other has an actual operational remit and intelligence function. They werenot initially developed for the same purpose or have the same methods of work. The researchalso indicates that the two organizations differ in their ability to successfully cooperate.Whereas the OSCE’s ability to reach agreements face major challenges, due to a broadmembership of non-like-minded states and a lack of trust, Europol arguably cooperates moresuccessfully as an integral EU agency. Despite these significant differences, I argue that bothorganizations pursue the same overarching goal: security for the citizens, institutions andvalues of their respective regions, and in the light of the main topic of this dissertation:protection from terrorism. In addition, I argue that the two complete each other in this work,as their different approaches to countering terrorism contribute to the international efforts oftackling the multifaceted threat. It needs to be stressed that, due to a low number of interviews, what follows aretentative and preliminary conclusions based on a limited data set. However, it serves as thebasis for expanded research in the future, with a larger data set, which I intend to publish in apeer-reviewed journal.

In an historical sense, a state’s main threat to national security was an attack from anotherstate, i.e. downright military war between states (Lowenthal, 2017, p. 7). Despite moderntensions between certain states, such as the US and Russia, the main concern for westerndemocratic societies is at this point arguably not the threat of war with neighboring states. Itis a common understanding that the nature of threats has changed, with a shift most visible inthe late twentieth century and early twenty-first century (Lowenthal, 2017, p. 7). Commonlyreferred to as transnational threats, issues such as climate change, proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction (WMDs), conflicts in cyberspace and non-state actors composed of e.g.human traffickers or terrorists have become some of the most pressing threats to nationalsecurity. These are not considered traditional threats (Lowenthal, 2017, chapter 5). This trendhas been heightened by recent development of “hybrid” warfare, pioneered by Russia, inwhich warfare combines traditional hard-power and new technologies against “soft” targets.This dissertation focuses on the transnational threat of international terrorism, arguably one ofthe most pressing transnational threats at present.

It is a general understanding in international fora, and among world leaders, that manytransnational threats – threats that cross borders and affect people regardless of stateaffiliations – requires international cooperation to counter. This includes the threat ofinternational terrorism, which was increasingly acknowledged as a collective threat after the9/11 attacks in the US in 2001. It has become evident through the 21st century that terroristsplan, plot and execute attacks across borders, and several attacks on European soil haverevealed the challenge of suspects moving undetected between different countries. Recentexamples of this in the public domain are the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and the 2016attacks in Brussels, which highlighted the need for international cooperation. An urgent partof national security has thus become the exchange of secret information, or intelligence1,between states about the capabilities and intentions of non-state terror groups.

1There is a lack of consensus in academia concerning how to define intelligence and what intelligence shouldbe understood to be used for. Various national intelligence services also operate under somewhat differentdefinitions. For the purpose of this dissertation, I understand intelligence to be (secret) information andknowledge sought to protect a nation, especially the well-being of its people, institutions and values, fromexternal (or internal) threats, here specifically terrorism.

1The attacks in Paris and Brussels specifically have led to a number of ripple effects andcaused politicians, academics and journalists to call for a closer and better cooperationbetween states. These two attacks were the deadliest acts of terror since the second world warin both countries. The devastating attacks left 130 people dead and 352 injured in Paris(Camilli, 2015), and 35 people dead and 340 injured in Brussels (Birchall, 2017). In theaftermath of the Brussels attacks, it was revealed that the terrorist cell connected to theoutrage was the same cell responsible for the attacks in Paris the year before. Members of thecell had been able to travel undetected between France and Belgium (Soufan, 2016). At thetime, it seemed that terrorists crossed borders more easily than information and intelligence.

These events prompted me to think, and study, these subjects for this dissertation. It willexplore international security and intelligence cooperation2, mainly for the purpose of counterterrorism, taking place in the Transatlantic and Eurasian regions 3 of the world, mostly focusedon the European states in particular. More specifically, it will investigate the Organization forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Police Office (Europol). Thereason why they are chosen is because they offer a juxtaposition about how two structureswith similar focus areas and work have developed in different ways. The aim of thisdissertation is to study the similarities and differences in characteristics between the OSCEand Europol to understand how they impact their ability to cooperate and exchangeinformation and intelligence, whether or not the two structures impact the level of security inthe Transatlantic and Eurasian regions, specifically Europe, and in what way. The findingswill be used to draw some conclusions about the broader nature of international security andintelligence cooperation. The following four research questions will thus be explored in thisdissertation:

• Do the member states of the OSCE and Europol engage in intelligence cooperation within their organizations, and to what degree?

2 See above for definition and understanding of intelligence. Further, intelligence cooperation is thusunderstood as the exchange of intelligence between states for the sake of national security, here specificallyprotection from the threat of terrorism.3 As the OSCE is one of the specific cases under study in this dissertation, I have had to involve and consider

states from all relevant areas in the research. The OSCE have participating states stretching from NorthAmerica to Europe to Central Asia, thus using the term ‘European’ was not adequate. The descriptions‘Transatlantic’ and ‘Eurasian’ are commonly understood terminologies used to define the areas of Europe andNorth America and Europe and Asia and are often expressed in the OSCE itself to describe the relevant regionsof participating states.

2 • How do the differences in characteristics in the OSCE and Europol impact the member states ability to cooperate and exchange information and intelligence? • Do the OSCE and Europol impact the level of security in the Transatlantic and Eurasian regions of the world, here specifically when it comes to counter terrorism efforts, and in what way? • What can the findings of this study imply about the general nature of the international security and intelligence cooperation of the day?

At the outset, the OSCE and Europol look like similar organizations. On closer inspection, Idiscovered that the two are actually not, and that I was really comparing two fundamentallydifferent groups. Despite similar expressed aims, one is a group and platform for discussion,the other has an actual operational remit and intelligence function. They were not initiallydeveloped for the same purpose or have the same methods of work. Despite these significantdifferences, I argue that both organizations pursue the same overarching goal: security for thecitizens, institutions and values of their respective regions, and in the light of the main topicof this dissertation: protection from terrorism. However, the research indicates that the twoorganizations differ in their ability to successfully cooperate to reach this goal and that theOSCE suffers from more significant challenges to its cooperative abilities than Europol.Despite certain cooperative challenges, I argue that the two complete each other in theircounter terrorism efforts, as their different approaches to countering terrorism contribute tothe international efforts of tackling the multifaceted threat.

It needs to be stressed that, due to a low number of interviews, what follows are tentative andpreliminary conclusions based on a limited data set. However, it serves as the basis forexpanded research in the future, with a larger data set, which I intend to publish in a peer-reviewed journal.

1.2 The dissertation’s outline

Following at the end of chapter 1 is a presentation of a brief background information of the

OSCE and Europol, as well as a description of the context and relevance of the two structuresin this dissertation. Chapter 2 of the study elaborates on the methodology, with descriptions ofall methodological approaches and choices made during the research process, thus explaining

3the frames in which the research was conducted. Following, chapter 3 presents a literaturereview and with that also explores the theoretical foundations of intelligence and intelligencecooperation. Here, the most significant and relevant literature is presented and reviewed, inrelation to intelligence and intelligence cooperation as well as the OSCE and Europol asorganizations. The purpose is to explore the existing academic landscape, build a foundationto be able to place this research study in the existing literature and see where it advances it,i.e. provide context. Finally, in chapters 4 and 5, the dissertation will present and discuss thefindings of the research and draw conclusions based on those findings, in an effort to answerthe above research questions and objectives in the best possible way.

1.3 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regionalsecurity organization in the world and covers a vast geographical area, from “Vancouver toVladivostok”. The organization currently have 57 participating states, 11 partner countries, 3autonomous institutions, 16 field operations, numerous special representatives, a largesecretariat and a parliamentary assembly. Employed staff consists of around 550 people in thevarious OSCE institutions and around 2330 people in the field operations (Osce.org, 2018).The number of representatives in each state’s delegation largely varies. The OSCE works forpeace, stability and democracy through political dialogue and practical work (Osce.org,2018), and for a while, the OSCE was the sole regional security organization thatencompassed a so-called “comprehensive security approach” (Møller, 2012). Specifically, theOSCE consists of three dimensions, or baskets, of cooperation – politico-military, economicand environmental, and the human dimension (Stewart, 2008, p. 267). For long, this broadand comprehensive approach to security was one of the major characteristics thatdistinguished the OSCE from other somewhat similar organizations, like the EU and NATO.

The OSCE was started as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),when the Soviets proposed a conference for discussing and sanctifying various borders withEurope after World War 2 in the mid-1950s (Krupnick, 1998, p. 31). The western powersonly agreed to such discussions after the tensions between the East and the West eased a littlein the late-1960s and early-1970s, and only if the negotiation framework were wider thansolely a discussion of borders (Krupnick, 1998, p. 31). In the late summer of 1975, 35countries were gathered for a summit, which concluded the negotiations with the signing of

4the CSCE Final Act in Helsinki, Finland (Krupnick, 1998, p. 31). Both in the years up until1975 and following, complex and extended meetings took place. With the 1975 Helsinki FinalAct, the involved states not only accepted Europe’s post World War 2 borders, but alsoagreed on a number of commitments meant to function as conflict-prevention measures. Forinstance, they agreed to abstain from “the actual or threatened use of force to settle disputes”,to develop economic relationships, promote and cooperate on solutions to concerns related toculture and the environment, and respect human rights and fundamental freedoms (Krupnick,1998, p. 31-32).

It seems evident from the published literature that the OSCE, then CSCE, played a significantrole during the Cold War: bringing the East and the West together for neutral discussions(Krupnick, 1998, p. 32). After the 1975 summit in Helsinki, the CSCE participating statesgathered for review conferences and meetings regularly to advance and develop the HelsinkiFinal Act, despite tensions and difficult Cold War situations (Krupnick, 1998, p. 32). TheCSCE contributed with various measures to help facilitate the cooperation between the sides,which eventually played a role in bringing the Cold War to an end (Mlyn, 1998, p. 228).These efforts were, inter alia, the establishment of confidence and security building measures(CSBMs), sponsorship of the CFE Treaty (the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) andsupport for dissident movements in countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Mlyn,1998, p. 228; Stewart, 2008, p. 267). In 1994, at the Budapest Summit, the participating statesdecided to turn the CSCE into a full-fledged organization to reflect the more institutionalstatus. Made effective in January 1995, the CSCE became the OSCE (Krupnick, 1998, p. 31,35).

Today, the OSCE is a broad, complex and comprehensive organization, with many areas ofwork and a uniquely broad membership. The organization still functions as a meeting placefor opposing sides in conflicts within the tense international security crises today.

The organization’s multiple field operations are where most of the OSCE’s commitments areset into practice, through specific mandates agreed upon by the 57 participating states. Fieldoperations at this time are taking place specifically in states in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern-Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The operations’ tasks are to assist hostcountries with concrete projects, such as supporting law enforcement, assisting in legislativereforms, promote tolerance and non-discrimination and many other areas. The field operations

5are where the larger parts of the OSCE’s staff and resources are put into use. The OSCE alsohas a number of institutions and structures of which they work with on a daily basis toimplement the various agreed commitments, such as the OSCE Office for DemocraticInstitutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Mediaand the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (Osce.org, 2018). Through theseinstitutions, the OSCE contributes with such matters as election monitoring, trainingprograms for governments, observation of ethnic tension or conflict, advice, and ensuring thesafety of journalists (Osce.org, 2018).

In December of every year the OSCE participating states gather for a so-called MinisterialCouncil meeting. Ultimately, it is the states’ foreign ministers who are the top representativesto the organization, though they are represented by diplomats on a daily basis. The location ofthe Ministerial Council rotates annually with the organization’s chairmanship. At eachMinisterial Council meeting, the participating states seek to agree on new commitments,through decisions and declarations, which have been negotiated by the diplomats, experts andother state representatives in the upcoming weeks before the Ministerial. Every year, newcommitments or reiteration of old ones are agreed by the ministers. Though, agreeing on anymeaningful commitments has shown to be difficult, if not impossible, in recent years.

Two of the OSCE’s unique traits, and arguably curses, are its large and broad number ofparticipating states and its requirement for consensus-based decision-making. On the onehand, the OSCE is uniquely inclusive, with 57 participating states, making it possible for bothsmaller countries and larger powers to be heard at equal terms and for a large number ofissues to be discussed among a large number of states (Kroptacheva, 2012, p. 373; Krupnick,1998, p. 42). On the other hand, self-interested states can block any decision they do not seeas the most favorable to themselves. This often makes it hard to agree on anything significant,as participating states often have substantial conflicting interests (Kroptacheva, 2012, p. 373).

Although there are significant problems with participating states agreeing on any newsignificant commitments, there have been some agreements in recent years. But even whenagreements have been reached, there are troubles with enforcements. To this day, the OSCEhas no legal personality or authority, meaning the decisions made are not binding onparticipating states. Implementation of agreed OSCE commitments thus depends solely onpolitical will of each participating state. This makes the OSCE significantly different frommost other international organizations, like the UN, EU and NATO, which were established

6by and are based on treaties. By contrast, the OSCE was started as a conference, without thesigning of a legally binding treaty, and in time developed into an organization. There is agood argument that its lack of legal authority weakens the organization. The OSCE’s legalstatus is continuously being discussed within the organization among participating states, dueto challenges posed by its lack of legal capacity. The problem is, though all states have agreedto evolve the organization’s legal personality, they have not been able to reach consensus onwhat process to adopt. For example, in 2007, a Draft Convention was agreed, but memberstates still disagree on its adoption, some conditioning it on the addition of a charter, whileothers oppose that suggestion. The process over the Draft Convention is still stagnated.

1.3.1 Developments on counterterrorism

Ever since the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE has stressed its concerns over terrorism, thetheme being a recurring subject in OSCE meetings and reports since then (Freire, 2005, p.190). After 9/11, like most organizations concerned with international security, the OSCE has“systematically increased its portfolio of relevant activities” (Neumann, 2017, p. 29). Newmeasures have been established, both at its headquarters in Vienna and in the field, tooperationalize agreed commitments and to incorporate counterterrorism into their main tasksof conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation (Freire, 2005, p.191). In 2001, an Action Plan for Combating Terrorism was agreed, as an “institutionalframing of the OSCE fight against terror” (Freire, 2005, p. 191). This further led to theadoption of a “OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism” the next year, and in2003, the “OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-FirstCentury” (Freie, 2005, p. 191). The efforts have been renewed and reiterated in later years. In2012, the OSCE states agreed on the “OSCE Consolidated framework for the Fight againstTerrorism” (Osce.org, 2018). These proposals have set the basis for the organization’s effortsand developments in addressing the transnational threat of terrorism since. Althoughembedded in all parts of the OSCE’s work, its coordinating efforts are contained within theorganization’s Transnational Threats Department, and its Action against Terrorism Unit. TheOSCE’s own principles rests on the view that the spread of democracy and rule of law is thebasis for a more secure Europe (Freire, 2005, p. 190). Terrorism is obviously a source ofinstability and thus the OSCE regards it as an obstacle to these principles (Freire, 2005, p.190).

71.3.2 Working thesis

At the beginning of the research process for this dissertation, my hypothesis was that theOSCE facilitated practical and operational cooperation among states. It is, in fact, the world’slargest regional security organization, with a Permanent Council, a Forum for SecurityCooperation, numerous working groups and multiple field operations doing practical work,such as assisting with border management, police activities and countering terrorism andother organized criminal activities. To this end, it was my initial view, and working thesis,that the OSCE held some kind of operational intelligence function, or at least in one way oranother shared information among participating states in order to promote its stated work forcooperating and tackling transnational threats. On its website, I read about systems for sharingpassenger data information and projects for identifying and handling foreign terrorist fighters.I was able to investigate this thesis through personal work experience for four months at theOSCE at its headquarters in Vienna and through interviews. What follows is the firstacademic research of its kind, based on my experiences and unique interviews at OSCE.

1.4 The European Police Office (EUROPOL)

The European Police Office (Europol) is an international police organization established

within the structures of the European Union, with an aim to promote cooperation among lawenforcement agencies across the EU member states (Deflem, 2006). Europol, with a variety ofspecialized centers and services, staffs about 1200 employees, including liaison officers frommember states and third parties.

The first high level discussions on whether EU member states have a common interest in thefight against serious crime came after a suggestion by the German government in 1991(House of Lords, 2008, p. 11). The creation of Europol was then agreed in 1992 through theMaastricht Treaty, or the Treaty on the European Union (Deflem, 2006, p. 341;Europol.europa.eu, 2018). Article K1 stated that member states should regard policecooperation a common interest and with that organize a union-wide “system for exchanginginformation within a European Police Office (Europol)” (House of Lords, 2008, p. 11). Theoffice’s task of facilitating police cooperation among the member states was describedtherein. Article K1 captured member states’ agreement about setting up a European PoliceOffice, but did not serve as a legal basis for such an establishment. Article K3(2) of the sametreaty required the Council to create a Convention for the member states to adopt. In 1995, a

8Convention on the Establishment of a European Police Office, the Europol Convention, wassigned. Ratifications by the then fifteen member states were slow, and the last ratification didnot come until June 1998. The Convention entered into force in October that year (House ofLords, 2008, p. 11). Europol began operations in July 1999, also taking over functions of theEuropean Drugs Unit which had been in operation since 1994 without formal constitutions.The European Drugs Unit is often seen as Europol’s modest beginning.

The objectives of Europol, as stated in the Europol Convention of 1995, are “to improve theeffectiveness of and cooperation among the police authorities of the EU member states inorder to prevent and combat serious international organized crime” (Deflem, 2006, p. 342).Since initial commitments to the European Drugs Unit and Europol’s establishment in 1998,other areas of criminality have gradually, yet progressively, been added to Europol’s mandatethrough the years (Bureš, 2016, p. 59). With this, Europol’s present goal is broadly stated asachieving a safer Europe for all EU citizens by supporting the 28 members in the fight againstterrorism, cybercrime and all other forms of serious and organized crime (Europol.europa.eu,2018). To be able to achieve this broad mandate, Europol also cooperates with states outsidethe EU and other international organizations, like the international police force (INTERPOL),through negotiated cooperation treaties (Wagner, 2006, p. 1232).

Europol’s main activities are collection, analysis and exchange of relevant data provided bymember states. It does not have collection capabilities itself. For this purpose, and to keep itsactivities effective and secure, Europol has developed and maintains a technically advancedtelecommunications infrastructure. Within this are several data systems which makes upEuropol’s operations network, connecting law enforcement agencies in all member statestogether (Europol.europa.eu, 2018; Wagner, 2006, p. 1231). Within Europol’s informationsystems, data provided by member states on suspects and sentenced individuals are collectedand stored so that law enforcement in the member states can access it (Wagner, 2006, p.1231). The communication among Europol, the EU member states, non-EU states and otherthird-party structures, like international organizations, is mainly conducted through three mainchannels, or systems. First, the Europol Information System (EIS), which is Europol’s centraldatabase for criminal information and intelligence, covering all of Europol’s mandated areasof crime, terrorism included. Second, the Secure Information Exchange Network Application(SIENA) ensures a secure exchange of the more sensitive and restricted operational andstrategic crime-related information. Access to this has also continuously been extended topartner countries and entities outside the EU. Lastly, information is being shared through the

9Europol Platform for Experts (EPE). This is not used for personal data or classifiedinformation, but as a secure, collaborative internet platform for experts and specialists in areasof law enforcement. It facilitates sharing of such as experiences, knowledge and best practices(Europol.europa.eu, 2018).

Within the EU, Europol is accountable to the Council of Ministers for Justice and HomeAffairs. The Council is the EU body “responsible for the main control and guidance ofEuropol”, and appoints Europol’s Executive Director and Deputy Directors(Europol.europa.eu, 2018). In collaboration with the European Parliament, the Councilapproves the budget and adopts regulations related to Europol’s work (Europol.europa.eu,2018). Europol is run by an Executive Director, responsible for its daily operations, includingrecruitment of personnel and planning and setting agenda for its work (Busuioc andGroenleer, 2013, p. 290). The director is accountable to a management board, made up of onerepresentative from each member state. On paper the director is autonomous in executing thetasks he has been given. (At this time it is a man who holds this post: a British official, RobertWainwright). In reality, he is expected to carry out decisions by the management board. Thisappears sometimes to lead to a slower and more hampered operational process (Busuioc andGroenleer, 2013, p. 290).

1.4.1 Developments on counterterrorism

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001, Europol’s mandate got further expanded, as mostother security institutions with a focus on counterterrorism. Several Council Decisions in theEU were made to this extent. In 2002, the Council of the EU instructed that all member statesbecome dedicated to intelligence- and information sharing, and stipulated that the followingminimal information must be communicated to Europol: ”data which identify the person,group or entity; acts under investigation and their specific circumstances; links with otherrelevant cases of terrorist offences; the use of communications technologies; and the threatposed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction” (cited in Bureš, 2016, p. 59). In aCouncil Decision from 2005, the importance of data exchange on terrorism was furtheremphasized and reiterated. This decision required all member states to establish a point ofcontact between national law enforcement and Europol, with responsibility for collecting therelevant investigative information and passing it on to Europol (Bureš, 2016, p. 59). In 2015,a European Counter Terrorism Center (ECTC) was established within Europol, meant tofunction as the principal information center in the EU for fighting terrorism (Bureš, 2016, p.

1059).

In May 2016, a new EU regulation was adopted, when the European Parliament agreed toupdate Europol’s power and enable it to “step up efforts to fight terrorism, cybercrime andother serious and organized forms of crime” (Europol.europa.eu, 2018). This newly adoptedregulation introduces a number of changes to Europol’s structure and strengthens Europol’scapacity and role as a supporter and facilitator of cooperation between law enforcementauthorities within the European Union (Europol.europa.eu, 2018). The changes will “make iteasier for Europol to set up specialized units to respond immediately to emerging terroristthreats and other forms of serious and organized crime”, improve Europol’s abilities as theEU’s “information hub” and enhance the mandate to make Europol “fully equipped to counterthe increase in cross-border crimes and terrorist threats” (Europol.europa.eu, 2018). Set intoforce on May 1st 2017, Europol officially became the European Union Agency for LawEnforcement Cooperation (Europol.europa.eu, 2018). Despite the changes over the years, theessence of Europol’s main purpose remains the same, where Europol “shall support andstrengthen action by the competent authorities of the Member States and their mutualcooperation in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States,terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy”(Europol.europa.eu, 2018).

There has been disagreement through the years as to how much autonomy Europol shouldhave. At the establishment of Europol, Germany proposed an institution that would evolvefrom simply information exchange to a structure with independent investigative powers.Other member states, like France, Denmark and the UK, strictly opposed, arguing it would bea considerable interference into their national sovereignty (Wagner, 2006, p. 1232). Whenestablished through the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, a compromise was reached with the“Union-wide system” for information-exchange (Wagner, 2006, p. 1232). Consequentially,Europol and its officers do not have executive powers. Europol is not an executive policeforce. This means, for instance, that it cannot organize actions like wiretapping, housesearches or arrests of suspects themselves (Bureš, 2016, p. 59; Wagner, 2006, p 1232).Instead, Europol’s activities are confined to data-sharing and are designed and meant tosupport national police and help make their executive powers more efficient, primarilythrough the exchange of information (Bureš, 2016, p. 59; Wagner, 2006, p. 1232). EUmember states have, though, granted Europol some operational powers, with the institution

11being able to interact and share information with third parties, like Interpol, the FBI andpolice forces in other non-EU states. Europol has also gained the authority to ask memberstates of the EU to initiate investigations and to take part in multinational investigation teams(Bureš, 2016, p. 59; Wagner, 2006, p. 1232). Europol also supports and participates in so-called Joint Investigation Teams (JITs), a cooperation tool for tackling cross-border casesamong two or more members states (Europol.europa.eu, 2018).

The impact and significance of Europol’s developments and strategies since its establishment,in counterterrorism as well as other areas, is difficult to estimate due to a lack of publishedrecords. Europol is not transparent about the few investigative activities described above itperforms, as it tries to preserve the operational police and security collection autonomy ofmember states (Deflem, 2006, p. 346). However, Europol does publish annual reports, orreviews, about its activities, which can give a sense (but not specific details) about itsparticipation in the European counter terrorism. In the 2016/2017 report, the numberspresented show an increase in the use of Europol as an EU information hub. According to thereport, information sharing on counter terrorism among European countries and through andwith Europol “reached an all-time high by the end of 2016” (Europol, 2017, p. 30). Cases inthe SIENA system related to terrorism rose from 2245 in 2015, to 3934 in 2016. So-calledSIENA messages nearly doubled, rising from 56 277 to 94 770 in the same period (Europol,2017, p. 30). Evidently, it seems EU member states and third parties value and utilize Europoland its capabilities and doing so more than ever. Although the impact of this trend on securityis hard to estimate, this dissertation makes an effort to do so.

1.4.2 Working thesis

It was my initial working thesis that Europol functions as a hub and platform for the EUmember states to share and exchange information and intelligence with each other, to betterbe able to counter and prevent serious criminal activity, here specifically terrorism. In thisregard, I initially thought that it shares data and information about suspects, suspected plots,leads and other relevant information. I had reason to believe that certain EU governmentsmaintains lists of individuals of concern, known to have become radicalized or suspected tobe of radical, extremist views, and individuals suspected to be part of terrorist cells (Camilli,2015; Robertson, 2015). I wanted to find out whether EU members share this informationwith each other and if this information gets exchanged through Europol. Starting my research,

12I also assumed that EU intelligence exchange through agencies such as Europol is likely to beflawed: successful terrorist attacks in the EU would seem to be evidence of failed Europolintelligence exchange. In other words, the initial reason as to why I wanted to further researchthis topic in the first place is because several instances of terrorist attacks on Europeanterritory in the 21st century suggested a lack of cooperation and flawed information-sharingbetween relevant states and actors.

Additionally, since the United Kingdom, for years considered to be a crucial actor inEuropean security and intelligence cooperation and one of the major contributors of qualitydata and personnel, have decided to leave the EU, I also wanted to see if Brexit is likely tohave any perceived consequences on the EU and Europol intelligence cooperation. Althougha full dissertation could have been written on this topic, I still wanted to briefly relate it to myresearch, as Brexit is arguably the most significant development in the EU in the recent pastand it is reasonable to assume that Europol’s role and competences might be, or already havebeen, affected by the UK’s EU-exit.

13CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter lays out and explains the approaches taken and decisions made during theresearch process of this dissertation, aimed at answering the objectives of the study. First, thischapter will focus on the overall research approach, or research strategy, that was applied inthis study and why. Second, it will seek to explain the research design used to collect the data,following onto the data collection methods and sampling criteria. Further, it will seek toexplore the criteria for a measurement of the study’s quality and trustworthiness, as well aslooking into the limitations impacting this quality.

2.1 Research strategy – a qualitative approach

The main objectives of this study, as written out in chapter 1, has been to explore the practiceof security and intelligence cooperation among states and actors in a Transatlantic andEurasian context, by investigating the structures and processes of the OSCE and Europol. Theaim was to look beyond the limited, existing literature, further understand this issue and itschallenges, and help build into the knowledge on the matter. For these purposes, finding themost eligible research strategy was important.

The research strategy for a project can be described as being “the plan for how the study willbe conducted” (Berg and Lune, 2012, p. 41), and thereof “provides a framework for thecollection and analysis of data” (Bryman, 2016, p. 40). For the purpose of this study, aqualitative research strategy was considered most eligible. A qualitative research strategy ischaracterized by its interpretivist epistemological position, meaning that the focus is tounderstand the social world through examining the interpretations of the members of thatworld (Bryman, 2016, p. 375). In this case, the purpose was to investigate and understand theprocesses around and efforts to cooperation and sharing of intelligence between states andother actors, and to do this mainly by interpreting the experiences of actors in the field.Second, a qualitative approach typically has an inductive view on the relationship betweenresearch and theory, meaning that theory is generated out of the research instead of the moretypically quantitative approach of testing theory with research (Bryman, 2016, p. 375). In thisstudy, I had no specific theory to test. Instead, it was an investigative and exploratoryapproach, led by curiosity and questions, leading to a development of theory to answer theresearch questions.

142.2 Research design

2.2.1 Collective case study

The qualitative research study in question was conducted using a case study research design.The design was considered most suitable, as case study research concerns itself with thespecific nature and the complexity of a particular case or phenomenon, emphasizing a detailedexamination of that case (Bryman, 2016, p. 60). There are numerous definitions andunderstandings of the case study method, but simply put it can be defined as “in-depth,qualitative studies of one or a few illustrative cases” (Hagan, 2006, p. 240). When focusing ona specific case or cases, it gives the opportunity to uncover the relations between significantfactors that characterizes those cases. It is most often conducted with a holistic approach,aiming to gather detailed, in-depth information on the phenomenon under study (Berg andLune, 2012, p. 326-327). Case study methods are also associated most often with building oftheory, rather than testing of theory (Berg and Lune, 2012, p. 328).

More specifically, as this particular study investigated two illustrative cases, the researchconducted was a comparative case study, also known as a multiple-case study or a collectivecase study (Berg and Lune, 2012, p. 336; Bryman, 2016, p. 64). Such a collective orcomparative case study “involve extensive study of several instrumental cases”, with the aimof allowing better insight into not only the cases in question, but also better understanding ofa broader context (Berg and Lune, 2012, p. 336). Multiple cases may be selected to representcontrasting situations, as is the case of this case study, or to replicate insights found inindividual cases (Yin, 2003, p. 46). In both instances, Yin (2003, p. 46) indicates thatcollective case studies are often “considered more compelling, and the overall study istherefore regarded as more robust”, in comparison to a single case study. In this dissertation,having more than one case allowed me to study the reality from more than one perspective.As the aim of this study has been to explore, understand and investigate the nature ofcooperation and intelligence sharing between relevant actors, specifically narrowed down toand within two organizations, the OSCE and Europol, a collective case study approachdeemed fit. Detailed and in-depth information was attempted gathered about the two cases, tobetter understand the processes within them and to be able to compare them, theircharacteristics and their level of “success” to each other. Further, the study aims to usefindings within the two cases of the OSCE and Europol to better understand the nature of andchallenges behind security cooperation and intelligence sharing in a broader context of

15Transatlantic and Eurasian relations.

2.2.2 The cases of the OSCE and Europol

The two selected cases for this case study, the OSCE and Europol, were chosen by acombination of opportunity and availability as well as based on their appropriateness andrelevance.

When narrowing down and choosing the focus of this dissertation, the opportunity of aninternship in relation to the OSCE arose. Four months were spent at the NorwegianDelegation to the OSCE in Vienna from the end of August until the end of December 2017.This gave access to OSCE staff and experts, as well as national officials and diplomats fromaround the region, and a unique opportunity to experience the organization’s work first-hand.Before the internship I conducted some initial research on the OSCE, which led me to thinkthat the OSCE had an operational, practical level of cooperation between its participatingstates and that they engaged in intelligence exchange, or at least shared some operationalinformation with each other. This was my initial working thesis.

When looking at and investigating the nature of the sharing of information and intelligence ona regional basis, mainly focused at European and other relevant partnering states, Europolbecomes another obvious case study. Europol is the EU’s collective police office, establishedwith the aim of facilitating information-sharing for a safer Europe. This points to therelevance of Europol in a study about intelligence cooperation. Many of the OSCE’sparticipating states also cooperate through Europol, both EU members and other thirdcountries who have agreements with the office.

2.3 Data collection

2.3.1 Primary and secondary data

There are mainly two types of data available for analysis in a research study: primary andsecondary data. Primary data is original and raw data collected first-hand by the researcher,for the purpose of that researcher’s specific study at hand and to address the given researchquestions. On the other hand, secondary data comes from secondary sources, meaning it isdata that has already been collected or produced by someone other than the researcher and fora different purpose. Secondary data is often more readily available, but is not adapted orcustomized to the relevant research questions. All methods used to gather information in

16research falls within primary or secondary data. For this study, both primary and secondarydata was collected and used to draw conclusions.

Within qualitative research, the most frequently employed method of data collection is theinterview (Bryman, 2016, p. 466). As Berg and Lune (2012, p. 331) point out, “one of themost effective ways to learn about the circumstances of people’s lives is to ask them”. As thisstudy looks into such a contemporary issue and demanded novel information, interviews werethe most natural and desirable data collection method. Being a case study, more specifically acollective case study, its purpose was to gather extensive, in-depth information about thephenomenon at hand. As the aim was also to attain novel information from first-handexperiences and interpretations of relevant actors involved in the given phenomenon,interviews were thus considered to be the approach best able to fulfil these aims. Although theaim of a qualitative case study is for the interviews to be extensive, it became evident duringthe research process, due to difficult practicalities, that the interviews for this dissertationcannot be considered extensive. In the end, only three interviews were conducted. Thischallenge will be further addressed in chapter 2.5.

The interviews conducted through the research were initially thought to serve as the mainsource of data in the process of describing findings and establishing conclusions,accompanied by other secondary sources. Due to a limited amount of interviews, the study’sconclusions are made based on a comparison between the primary data from the interviewsand the already published literature (secondary sources). For one of the cases explored, theOSCE, interviews were also complemented by observation. I spent four months working atthe Norwegian Delegation to the OSCE, every day working on issues related to the OSCE andthe region’s political challenges, attending meetings, writing reports and having conversationswith personnel on various levels within and in relation to the organization. The first-handexperience through this observation in the field gave me an extraordinary ability tounderstand the research questions in this dissertation.

Further, in the case of both the OSCE and Europol, secondary sources were utilized.Extensive research was conducted concerning the background and history of both selectedcases, as well as on the field of security- and intelligence cooperation in general. The contextaround the contemporary issues and challenges that were the basis for the research questionswas examined, both looking at the specific cases as well as the broader context. For allpurposes, sources used were scholarly, peer-reviewed articles, books, official reports and

17other documents from both the OSCE and Europol, as well as media articles.

2.3.2 Triangulation

To be able to answer the research questions and reach the conclusions in this study, a mix ofsources was used: interviews, observation and written sources. This is called triangulation.Triangulation means using more than one source of data or method of investigation, leadingto a greater confidence in the study’s findings (Bryman, 2016, p. 386). All methods ofinvestigation will reveal slightly different facets of the same topic, as will every source ofdata. By combining several views and angles, a researcher is better able to obtain a morecomprehensive and realistic picture of the topic (Berg and Lune, 2012, p. 6). In many formsof study, researchers combine research strategies, creating a mixed research approach madeup of both qualitative and quantitative research. Such a combined use of methods also fallsunder triangulation. For the purpose of this specific study, a qualitative research approachalone was conducted, though made up of a triangulation of data collection methods andsources, contributing to the quality and trustworthiness of the study by creating a moresubstantive image of the reality.

2.3.3 Sampling

What material or interviewees a researcher chooses for an analysis depends on a variation of

factors, such as the defined research questions, access and how much knowledge theresearcher has about what will be of most relevance and not (Phillips and Jørgensen 2002, p78). The most frequently used method of sampling in qualitative research is called purposivesampling (Bryman, 2016, p. 407). As opposed to sampling approaches in quantitativeresearch, purposive sampling is a non-probability form of sampling and it does not aim tosample material or interviewees on a random basis (Bryman, 2016, p. 408). The aim is ratherto strategically choose samples that in the best possible way can inform the issue at hand andare the most relevant (Bryman, 2016, p. 408). Because the sample is of non-probability andnot randomly selected, the researcher cannot use the sample to generalize to a largerpopulation, as is the goal of quantitative research. This is not the aim in most qualitativeresearch, neither in this specific study. In qualitative research in general, and in this study, thegoal is most often a different one – to illuminate and understand a certain issue, and createmore knowledge on that specific topic. Thus, the goal becomes to strategically pick thesample that can most likely help the researcher reach that goal. The researcher will handpick

18cases based on their unique features and relevance to the topic being studied and the researchquestions formulated (Bryman, 2016, p. 408-410).

Accordingly, a purposive sampling approach has been employed for this study, and because itis a collective case study, sampling had to be done at different levels. First and foremost, thetwo main cases being studied and compared in this collective case study, the OSCE andEuropol, was chosen for their relevance to the topic as well as possible access. The selectionof the OSCE and Europol has been earlier elaborated in chapter 2.2.2. The OSCE was thusselected based on (i) access to the organization’s personnel, a sampling approach calledconvenience sampling, which refers to a sample that is available and accessible at a giventime; and (ii) the organization’s relevance to the study, it being the world’s largest regionalsecurity organization focusing on cooperation for a better security (Bryman, 2016, p. 187).Europol was chosen on the basis of relevance, it being a collective police office for the entireEuropean Union and a number of partnering countries, designed to share information.

As I pursued the investigation, it became clear that the cases selected deviated largely fromeach other. My research soon developed into understanding why they deviated from eachother.

Further, interviewees within the two cases were also selected using a purposive samplingapproach. More specifically, a stratified purposive sampling strategy, used when sampling“typical cases or individuals within subgroups of interest” (Bryman, 2016, p. 409). In the caseof the OSCE, the interviewees were selected based on an evaluation of relevance, whereindividuals considered to have a large degree of knowledge, insight and overview on the topicand questions at hand were prioritized – typical individuals within that subgroup of interest.Due to time constraints, it was not possible to conduct extensive interviews of the OSCE, aswould be desirable. In the end, only two interviews were conducted concerning the OSCE.However, while the number of interviews was small, the officials interviewed had significantpositions in the OSCE, making their interview data also significant. The first intervieweeselected is an individual highly incorporated in the OSCE’s Transnational ThreatsDepartment, with a general overview of the OSCE’s efforts on security cooperation andspecifically counter terrorism-related work. This is arguably the most relevant official I couldinterview at the OSCE in relation to the cooperation for countering transnational threats. Thisinterviewee also has a background from the EU. I met this person through my presence at theOSCE and was first introduced during a meeting at the OSCE Security Committee. The

19second individual selected is a national diplomat with a very long and extensive history ofwork in global security politics, with experience from the UN, EU and OSCE, and animpressive knowledge of and insight into the politics of the OSCE and the broader globalpolitical climate of the day. The interviewee is acknowledged internationally for the extensiveefforts in international security politics. I was lucky enough to work with this individual on adaily basis, and we eventually found the time to conduct a more official interview.

When selecting interviewees within and in relation to Europol, decisions were made inconjunction with the study supervisor and with the help of my own contact base. Of course,the interviewees were selected based on relevance, but also availability. Contacts at theNorwegian Delegation to the OSCE were kind enough and able to help reach out to relevantNorwegian personnel in The Hague, where Europol has its headquarters. In the end, however,only one interview was conducted. Nevertheless, like with the OSCE, the Europol officialinterviewed had a significant role and meets the criteria, discussed below, for qualitativeresearch: the interviewee is a counter terrorism liaison officer to Europol and the CounterTerrorism Group (CTG, not established by Europol) in The Hague. The interviewee hasextended experience in the fields of policing, security and intelligence, and great insideknowledge of the nature of cooperation at Europol and in The Hague in general. Theinterviewee is thus at the heart of the subject with which this dissertation is concerned. Allthree interviewees, both from the OSCE and Europol, are considered to be some of the mostrelevant respondents I could have selected, based on their ability to contribute in answeringthe study’s research questions.

Lastly, the study’s secondary sources were also selected and handpicked based on relevanceto the topic and research questions. In the case of the secondary sources, one can say asampling approach called snowball sampling also was conducted. Snowball sampling refers toa technique where the researcher initially selects a small group of cases relevant to the topic,and then these sampled cases leads the researcher to other relevant cases (Bryman, 2016, p.415). In the process of this study, actively using the references applied in the writtendocuments, initially selected sources again and again led to new ones.

2.3.4 Qualitative interviews

The interviews for this study were conducted using a qualitative, semi-structured interviewtechnique. In qualitative research, initial ideas and research questions tend to be rather open-

20ended and there is a focus on the selected interviewees’ own thoughts and perspectives. Forthe interviewees to go off topic and drift into sidetracks of their point of view is oftenencouraged, as this gives room for ideas and perspectives the interviewees see as important,and which the researcher may not have thought of. Qualitative interviews are also open for theresearcher to ask spontaneous questions and follow up on the interviewees answers (Bryman,2016, p. 466-467). All these factors make the qualitative interview technique very flexible,thus making the research open to new ideas and perspectives during the data collectionprocess. Also, as the qualitative researcher is interested in rich and in-depth information fromthe interviewees, a less structured interview is necessary to generate such information(Bryman, 2016, p. 467).

A researcher could use a totally unstructured interview technique for the data collection,maybe simply asking a single question. The more relevant approach for this study was thesemi-structured approach. When conducting a semi-structured interview, the researchertypically has a list of questions or narrowed down topics to cover during the interview, butgives the interviewee much flexibility to reply and to impact the direction of the interview(Bryman, 2016, p. 468).

When conducting a collective, or comparative, case study, it is preferred to use more or lessidentical methods for collection of data on both cases (Bryman, 2016, p. 64). When usingqualitative, semi-structured interviews, there is little to no possibility for the interviews to beidentical, but the researcher will want to emphasize the same type of questions and gather theanswers and perspectives on the same topics in all interviews, to be able to get differentperspectives on the same reality. In this study, the questions were minimally altered betweenthe OSCE and Europol to fit the different organizations, but still emphasized the samequestions and topics (see appendix).

The first two interviews, on the OSCE, took place in December 2017, while still present at theOSCE headquarter in Vienna. The first interview, with the OSCE official, was conducted atDecember 14th, at the margins of a meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council. The interviewgave valuable and insightful information on the part of the interviewee, with clear answersregarding the specific work and efforts of the OSCE, what they do and what they do not. Still,the interview could have been of even better quality. Even though the time was scheduled bythe interviewee, the interviewee was very busy and needed inside the meeting. I got allprepared topics and questions covered and answered, but more time would have allowed the

21interviewee to elaborate even more and depart into further relevant viewpoints. The interviewwas also conducted in the café outside the hall of the meeting, making the surroundings rathernoisy and distracting. The setting could thus have been better.

The second interview, conducted with the national diplomat, was held at December 19 th, inthe interviewee’s office. This time, the surroundings was much better fitted for an interview.It lasted longer and took many detours into relating topics, bringing elaborate information ona broader context. There were no outside disturbances, and the interview got to last for as longas wanted. Thus, the interview gave comprehensive information on the OSCE and its workand efforts on the relevant topics, the OSCE’s role in a broader context, as well as insights onthe regional and global political climate of the day, which is also significantly impacting thework of the OSCE.

The interview on Europol, with the counter terrorism liaison official, took place in the springof 2018, on March 28th. As the liaison was in The Hague at the time, the interview wasconducted over the phone instead of in person, due to practical considerations. Even so, thisdid not seem to affect the interview in any way. The interviewee was in his office and had setaside plenty of time. Thus, the interview was conducted without specific time constraints orstressful distractions, it took interesting detours based on what the interviewee consideredrelevant for the topic, and I was able to ask any and all questions I had. The interview resultedin valuable, relevant and extended information on the general nature of the cooperation takingplace at Europol, here specifically related to their counter terrorism efforts.

2.4 The trustworthiness and quality of the study

In quantitative research, the trustworthiness of a study and the following findings areestimated using measures called validity and reliability. These are important criteria inassessing the research quality. In qualitative research, on the other hand, consensus regardingquality criteria is further from agreed. Measurements per se is not as important or relevant inqualitative studies, as what you are looking to do is to understand and interpret meanings andevents based on other people’s experiences and thoughts. This is obviously hard to measurewith numbers. As a result, qualitative researchers disagree on how to assess their data’strustworthiness, and whether the same criteria can be applied to qualitative as well asquantitative research. Put simply, one interview with a key subject may be worth more than athousand interviews with irrelevant subjects. Some researchers choose to assimilate reliability

22and validity into their qualitative research, with little change. Others, taking an alternativeposition, choose to evaluate their data according to different and adapted criteria. ResearchersLincoln and Guba (cited in Bryman 2016 p. 384) have proposed alternative criteria, arguablybetter equipped for assessing the quality of qualitative data, but still corresponding to thequantitative criteria of reliability and validity. They divide their measure of trustworthinessinto four criteria, all with an equivalent criterion in the quantitative research: (i) credibility,(ii) transferability, (iii) dependability and (iv) confirmability (Bryman, 2016, p. 384).

First, credibility is equivalent to internal validity and, quite obvious, say something aboutwhether the data and the conclusions drawn from it are considered credible or not. Are weactually ‘measuring’ what we want to be ‘measuring’? Important for establishing credibility isconducting the research according to principles of good practice, as well as presentingresearch findings to the individuals in the social context that was studied, for the researcher tobe able to get confirmation that he or she has correctly understood the social context understudy. This practice is often referred to as respondent validation (Bryman, 2016, p. 384-385).Another practice recommended for a credible study is triangulation (Bryman, 2016, p. 384).The concept of triangulation and the presence of it in this study was elaborated in chapter2.3.2. Second, the concept of transferability parallels with external validity, and refers to thefindings’ applicability beyond the sample (Bryman, 2016, p. 384). To this end, qualitativeresearchers are encouraged to provide so-called thick description, that is, plenty enough ofinformation and details about the research for others to be able to make their judgementsabout the transferability of the findings to other contexts (Bryman, 2016, p. 384). Third,dependability is equivalent with the concept of reliability, meaning, are the findings presentedreliable? To be able to establish dependability, researchers are encouraged to adopt anapproach of auditing. Keeping an audit trail, e.g. a systematic log, of the entire researchprocess, helps to keep track of all decisions made and makes sure that the data is correctlyrepresented. The thought has been for peers to act as auditors and assess the procedures of theresearch based on the logs, but this has yet to become a popular practice among researchers(Bryman, 2016, 384-385). Finally, confirmability parallels with the concept of objectivity,and concerns the level of neutrality or unbiasedness of the data. In qualitative research,complete objectivity is arguably impossible, which needs to be recognized by the researcher.Although, the research should clearly show that the researcher has acted in good faith and notblatantly allowed personal values, attitudes or theoretical preferences impact the researchprocess or the findings presented (Bryman, 2016, p. 386).

23To strengthen the quality of this study, the research has been heavily based on triangulation,in terms of both methods of investigation and sources of data, which are closely tied together.The research is based on both primary and secondary data. The secondary sources includes,for both the OSCE and Europol, written documents, i.e. scholarly articles and books, mediaarticles and official reports, like the regular reports publically available on the efforts andwork of the OSCE and Europol. The primary data consists of interviews with selectedrelevant respondents, as well as, in the case of the OSCE, observation and direct experience inthe field. In this case, the fieldwork and direct participation enabled a much betterunderstanding of not only the work and processes of the OSCE, but the regional and globalpolitical environment. The methods of investigations thus included textual analysis,interviews, and, in the case of the OSCE, field observation. This form of triangulationstrengthens the study’s credibility and overall quality.

In all levels of the presentation of the research, I have attempted to the best of my ability toprovide details and thick description – when presenting the background information, thedescription of the choices made during the process and the presentation of the findings andconclusions drawn from the data. Detailed information is provided to establish a level oftransparency and transferability of the findings. For the purpose of dependability, a systematiclog was kept during the entire research process, of decisions made and why, transcription ofinterviews etc. All decisions were also taken in conformity with a research supervisor,arguably ‘auditing’ the research process both during and at the end of the process. Lastly, thestudy was in general meant to be investigative and objective, with the purpose of examiningthe processes of cooperation and intelligence sharing and not the intelligence informationitself. Even though it is a matter of national security and the consequence of an allegedintelligence failure can be fatal, the study of the intelligence process itself and the nature ofintelligence cooperation is arguably neutral. This has made it easier for me as a researcher tostrive for neutrality and not be biased during the research process and allowed for a largerdegree of objectivity in the study.

2.5 Limitations

As all research projects, regardless of methodological choices, this study suffered fromseveral limitations.

During the data collection, I was able to experience first-hand the processes and efforts going

24on within the OSCE, leading to another data collection method and source of data for theresearch conducted on this part of the case study. Four months was spent at the inside of theorganization, arguably leading to a better understanding of the organization’s work than whatwould have been possible if I had not been there. However, in the case of Europol, I wasunable to attain the same level of understanding and comprehension of the efforts andprocesses within that organization. The data collection lacked observation, leading to a lesserdegree of triangulation and thus a lesser degree of credibility.

Further, while conducting fieldwork at the OSCE, several challenges became evident. Themain purpose of the presence at the OSCE was not conducting research and performinginterviews for the sake of this dissertation. Overall, time became short as the workload wasvery large and there was little time left for conducting interviews. In addition, the fallsemester at the OSCE is busy for all the staff and professionals. With the Ministerial Councilin December, the preparations take a lot of time and efforts, as well as other larger meetingsand conferences. With this, it was a challenge to schedule interviews with possiblerespondents, as their availability was scarce. This led to a total of only two interviewsconducted with OSCE interviewees. A larger number of interviewees would have arguablyled to a higher quality of the data and findings. The two interviews conducted was alsocompleted in totally different environments, due to availability. One was rushed and in anoisy space. The other was longer and more relaxed, conducted in a quiet and more fittingenvironment. The latter led to more comprehensive information. Despite these differences, thefirst interview still led to valuable data, and most likely would not have led to any differentconclusions if conducted in a more suiting environment.

As mentioned, when conducting a collective or comparative case study, it is preferred to use

methods as identical as possible. In this study, this aim was attempted reached in the bestpossible way, but there were still deviances in the approaches. First, the methods differed inthe fact that observation and actual on-ground fieldwork was not possible in the case ofEuropol, only the OSCE. As mentioned, this arguably creates a different basis for the abilityto draw conclusions. Second, as I eventually got to know that the OSCE lacks an intelligencefunction entirely, the questions asked during the interviews with officials related to the twodifferent organizations had to be somewhat different and thus not completely identical. Still, Iattempted to my best ability to gather information on the same issues and attain the kind ofinformation needed to be able to see where the two structures differ from each other and howthese characteristics make it easier or more challenging for them to cooperate.

25When researching matters related to intelligence, I initially was aware that some informationmost likely would be less available or harder to attain. The field of intelligence contains, to alarge scale, information that is supposed to be secret (Lowenthal, 2017, p. 1). In this case, theresearch conducted concerned the process of collecting, analyzing and specifically sharingintelligence and data rather than the actual intelligence, avoiding the challenge of collectingclassified, secret information. Although some relevant information, like reports on the workof Europol and the type of cases they are involved in, still proved to be somewhat difficult toattain, this arguably did not affect the study in a larger degree or the conclusions made.

Lastly, the most obvious limitation of the study is the limited amount of interviews. In theend, I ended up conducting only three interviews in all, two in relation to the OSCE and onlyone in relation to Europol. As I was physically present at the OSCE, I might have been able tointerview more people had there not been for the pressing time constraints and workload.However, the two interviewees were arguably the two most relevant actors available to me.Within Europol I had no personal contacts and was dependent on help from others to be ableto get in touch with relevant interviewees. I fortunately received help from contacts at theNorwegian Delegation to the OSCE and was able to get in touch with arguably at least themost relevant Norwegian individual working in relation to Europol on counter terrorism.Together with the high relevance of my interviewees, allowing me to build arguments basedon first-hand, inside information, the triangulation by complementing the interviews withwritten sources also strengthens the arguments and conclusions made. Even so, such a lownumber of interviews limits the quality of the study. A larger number of interviews wouldhave given a more nuanced and reliable image of the reality under study. What follows, then,are tentative and preliminary conclusions based on a limited data set. However, it serves asthe basis for expanded research in the future, with a larger data set, which I intend to publishin a peer-reviewed journal.

26CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE THEORETICALFOUNDATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE

The main subjects of this dissertation are intelligence cooperation and states’ ability toexchange intelligence with other states for the sake of national security, specifically within theOSCE and Europol, mainly for the purpose of counter terrorism. The aim of this chapter is toexplore the relevant academic landscape. First, an exploration and review of the academicfield of intelligence is presented, while at the same time reviewing the attempts oftheorization of intelligence and the relationship between intelligence and academic theory. Tobe able to study and answer the dissertation’s research questions, i.e. to understand whetherstates engage in intelligence cooperation, to what degree and how successful this appears tobe, I needed a more comprehensive understanding of the field of intelligence in general –what intelligence is, how it is defined and understood, what the purposes are and what itsplace is in international relations. To be able to add to the existing theorization of intelligence,more specifically intelligence cooperation, I needed to know and understand where othershave placed intelligence and intelligence cooperation in the theoretical landscape before me.Hence, I will first review some of the most significant literary works within the study ofintelligence and the attempts of theorizing intelligence and intelligence cooperation. I haveworked under the assumption that a theory in this sense is “a kind of simplifying device thatallows you to decide which facts matter and which do not” (Baylis, Smith and Owens, 2014,p. 3). This qualitative, exploratory study aims to accommodate the existing theorization ofintelligence cooperation, and look at which factors matter for “success” in intelligencecooperation. To be able to distinguish the OSCE from Europol, and look at characteristicswithin the two separately, this chapter will also present the most prominent existing literatureconcerning the nature of the cooperation within the two organizations, specifically related tocounter terrorism as this dissertations main concern.

3.1 Intelligence studies and theorization of intelligence in general

Studies of and research related to the field of intelligence do continue to develop and grow innumber, and the amount of literature in the field has expanded considerably in recent years,probably as a result of the prominent place that intelligence occupies in contemporary newsand international affairs. This is also true when talking about the theoretical and academic

27aspects of intelligence, gathered under the umbrella of intelligence studies. But, as I willpresent, intelligence studies is a theoretical camp with blurry borders and much disagreement.

For a more comprehensive, general understanding of intelligence and intelligence

cooperation, both in theory and in practice, several books by leading scholars in theintelligence field of study are worth distinguishing. Former US intelligence official MarkLowenthal (2017); scholars Peter Gill and Mark Phythian (2012); as well as ChristopherAndrew, Richard Aldrich and Wesley Wark (2009) are all prominent figures withinintelligence studies and offer broad and extensive insight into the field of intelligence: howintelligence is understood, what the purposes are, the intelligence process and relation torelevant topics such as transnational issues and threats. All the above have contributed to theoverall understanding of the field while writing this dissertation.

The literature in intelligence studies reveals differences in viewpoints and arguments, wheresome are directly linking intelligence to International Relations and its various theories whileothers are arguing for the development of Intelligence Studies as its own academic discipline.The former US intelligence practitioner and now academic, Stephen Marrin (2016, p. 266),argues that Intelligence Studies is “becoming more established as an academic discipline”,due to the growing literature and attention of academic programs and colleges to the study.National Intelligence services in several countries has eventually begun to supportintelligence research. Many university departments have become more interested in study ofintelligence, which are contributing to rapidly expanding bodies of literature, mostly indepartments of government, international relations and political science. A few journalsdedicated to the topic of intelligence have been established, also accompanied by some bookpublishers creating earmarked book series. All this contributes to an ever-growing base ofliterature on intelligence studies, and feeds into the argument of the development of anacademic discipline (Marrin, 2016, p. 266). Despite this, Marrin (2016) highlights certainchallenges researchers in the field of intelligence studies are facing. He argues that manycurrent scholars tend to forget and overlook specific important authors and work from thepast, and thus ignore insights from other already published work. This leads to a lesser degreeof development in the field. Also, a characteristic in most academic disciplines are theestablishment of competing schools of thoughts with individuals evaluating and critiquingeach other. This has not yet developed within intelligence studies.

28Peter Gill and Mark Phythian (2016, p. 8, 14), on the other hand, argues that intelligencestudies is not an academic discipline, and maybe should not be, it is rather a “coherent subjectarea” and a “field of study”. They point to the benefits of interdisciplinary within intelligence,and argues that the research is more effective when it can draw on several disciplines (p. 8).Where Marrin (2016, p. 278) argues that “intelligence studies as a field of knowledge issubordinate to other more traditional academic disciplines”, like political science and history,Gill and Phythian (2016) suggests that he is missing the point. Rather than being subordinate,they argue that the aim of intelligence studies is, and should be, to draw on those otherdisciplines and the relevant ideas and research that can help build understanding ofintelligence concepts as well (p. 12). They argue that this is a better tactic than harshlyestablishing and protecting a border of its own discipline, most likely leading to disputes withother disciplines (p. 12).

Regardless of whether or not intelligence studies can be considered its own academicdiscipline or part of another one, the topic and field of intelligence is a largely under-theorizedone (Andrew, 2004; Phythian, 2009). In 2001, David Kahn, historian of intelligence, observedthat scholars had been calling for a theory of intelligence for many years, yet none had beenable to present advanced suggestions or propose concepts that could be tested (cited inPhythian, 2009, p. 54). Since then, and after the 9/11 attacks in the US, scholars have uppedtheir efforts, with an aim of developing a solid theoretical basis for the study of intelligence(Phythian, 2009, p. 54). Mark Phythian (2009, p. 54) argues that this added attention tobuilding of theory has come, in part, by a build-up anxiety within the academic community ofintelligence studies that a form of theoretical basis and extended theoretical work needs to bedeveloped for the legitimacy of intelligence studies as a subject area. Still, there is noconsensus over how this ought to look and so there is no agreed intelligence theory.

Although general theory of intelligence, how intelligence operates successfully and not, israre, more attention is given to how intelligence does not work, i.e. intelligence failure.Richard Betts (1978, p. 62) argues that it is more accurate to say that what lacks is a positiveor normative theory of intelligence. He further points out that “negative or descriptive theory– the empirical understanding of how intelligence systems make mistakes – is welldeveloped” (p. 62). Betts has contributed significantly to the theorizing of intelligence failurethrough the years, more recently with his book Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge andPower in American National Security from 2007. Other scholars contributing to the theorizing

29of intelligence failure are, inter alia, Robert Jervis (2010) and Amy Zegart (2005, 2006,2007), authors of both a number of articles and books on the topic. All three has a significantfocus on the intelligence communities of the US and has especially contributed greatly in thedebate over what happened leading up to the tragic events of 9/11 as well as the Iraq war.

Several scholars link intelligence studies to International Relations (IR) and argue that certainIR theories already cover much of the concepts and areas in intelligence studies. Intelligence,and thus intelligence studies, are part of the international realm – it is a part of, impacts and isimpacted by, international affairs, or international relations. Still, compared to other topicswithin international relations, the academic discipline of IR has shown very little concern forintelligence. Christopher Andrew (2004) argues that intelligence is one of the most “under-theorized” parts of IR and “all but absent in most contemporary international relationstheory”. Andrew (2004) argues that with more intelligence related material entering the publicdomain, international relations scholars must also acknowledge the importance of studyingthe role of intelligence.

Under what category to place and study intelligence will depend on how one chooses todefine “intelligence”. How intelligence as a concept is defined obviously is a condition forwhat research approaches to choose and other decisions to make when writing about thesubject (Scott and Jackson, 2004, p. 141). The literature reveal significant disagreements overhow to define intelligence. What intelligence should entail and what it should be understoodto be used for is still under much debate (Phythian, 2009, p. 56; Scott and Jackson, 2004, p.141). Without such a definition or clear idea of what intelligence is, it is also hard to developan agreed theory to explain how it works (Warner, 2002, p. 15).

Phythian (2009) has comprised a variety of proposed definitions and explains some of theircommonalities. He points out that many of these definitions have in common the idea ofproviding security, as well as intelligence’s and intelligence agencies’ aim to secure relativeadvantage (p. 57). Following this commonality, Phythian (2009, p. 57) links intelligence andintelligence studies to the theory of structural realism. Phythian (2009, p. 57) describes thatthe job of intelligence is to ensure security and securing relative advantage. Further, structuralrealism is the approach, or theory, in IR that is most centrally concerned with security, linkingintelligence and structural realism together. He goes on to argue that “structural realismalready provides a theoretical explanation for certain key questions in IS” (intelligence

30studies) (p. 57). These are questions such as why intelligence is necessary. Phythian (2009, p.57) further argues that, even though it is often suggested that intelligence receives littleattention from IR scholars, intelligence does occupy an implicit, central place in structuralrealist thinking. He lists some of the core assumptions in structural realism, as outlined byprominent realist John Mearsheimer, arguing some of them explains the need for intelligence,e.g. the assumption that “states can never be certain about the intentions of other states”(p.58). What intelligence aims to do is to “reduce this uncertainty about other states’ currentand future intentions” and thus provide states with warning in advance and create a sense ofsecurity by reducing fear (Phynthian, 2009, p. 58).

Munton (2009) also link intelligence with realism. He states that realist ideas make up a lot ofintelligence thinking and practice, and that, even it is most often implicit rather than explicit,lots of intelligence literature assumes realist principles (p. 126). As classical realism is basedon the idea that the international system is anarchy – it has no central authority – states needto fend for themselves and protect their own national security. Sometimes also seek todominate other states. The international system thus consists of a constant struggle for power.Realism also constitutes that states who are considered allies will “attempt to cooperate in theface of a common threat” (Munton, 2009, p. 126). Munton (2009, p. 126) argues that theseideas in classical realism is highly compatible with the practice of intelligence, where thepurpose of intelligence is to protect a state’s security and serve a nations self-interest. In amore recent article, Munton (2013), in collaboration with Karima Fredj, presents andelaborates on many of the same ideas as in Munton’s 2009 text. Here, the authors explore thelinks between intelligence and realism, still maintaining the idea of an implicit position ofrealist theory in the world of intelligence. They argue that “while realist theorists themselveshave often ignored intelligence as a phenomenon, intelligence thinking and practice are in factinfused with realist ideas” (Munton and Fredj, 2013, p. 668).

Having considered the literature and its proposed definitions of intelligence, for the purposeof this dissertation, I consider intelligence to be (secret) information and knowledge sought toprotect a nation, especially the well-being of its people, institutions and values, from external(or internal) threats. In this dissertation, that threat is considered to be terrorism.

313.2 Theorization of international intelligence cooperation

Where intelligence receives little emphasis in studies of international relations theory,

international intelligence cooperation has historically received limited attention withinintelligence studies. Even though the literature within intelligence studies has grown, and stillis, scholars have yet to explore more elaborately and explain the phenomenon of internationalintelligence cooperation (Munton, 2009, p. 121). The subject arguably remains highly “under-analyzed”, despite being a well-recognized phenomenon in international affairs (Munton andFredj, 2013, p. 667). One explanation can be that, traditionally, intelligence cooperationbetween states has been very sensitive, and so governments are reluctant to declassify records.Theorization of intelligence cooperation has thus been difficult if not impossible sincetheorization relies on historical case studies. In later years, due to a rise in transnationalthreats such as international terrorism and other organized crime, as well as coalitionoperations among states, the presence and need of intelligence cooperation has become moreprominent (Munton, 2009, p. 121).

Some scholars have recognized the importance of intelligence cooperation in the field ofintelligence and attempted to analyze it. In 1996, Michael Herman (p. 217), in one of thelandmark works in the study of intelligence, argued that “modern intelligence is amultinational activity”, and further that “national intelligence power is a function not only ofnational capabilities but also of the foreign cooperation and product they obtain”. In this book,Intelligence Power in Peace and War, Herman devoted an entire chapter to the elaboration ofintelligence cooperation. Another scholar, H. Bradford Westerfield, was writing at the sametime as Herman. Westerfield (1996, p. 523) once compared the importance of intelligencecooperation in reality with the attention it was devoted in intelligence studies, or lack thereof,especially in American intelligence studies. After this, he argued that intelligence cooperationwas “one of the least sufficiently studied aspects of the entire field” (p. 523). In 2004, LenScott and Peter Jackson published an essay exploring and reviewing many of the approachestaken and scholars studying the role of intelligence in international politics up until that time.They suggested that the “increased public awareness” and the changing nature of internationalintelligence cooperation following September 11 would boost the focus on such cooperationin the academic intelligence field (p. 162).

32In recent years, the scarcity of literature on intelligence cooperation seems to have decreasedon the more general basis, but limited work of theorizing and analyses of the phenomenonstill appears evident. Inter alia, Munton and Fredj (2013, p. 667) argue that internationalintelligence sharing, or liaison, is unfairly omitted from the most common and familiar modelin intelligence studies, the intelligence cycle, despite international intelligence cooperationbeing a “every-day phenomenon”. In their article, Munton and Fredj (2013) explore severalinternational relations theories to help explain why intelligence agencies and decision-makersshare intelligence. Munton focused on this question in his 2009 article as well, where heargues that traditional realist notions are not sufficient for understanding internationalintelligence cooperation. Rather, in addition, he looks to liberalism and constructivism astheories that can feed into the realist principles with their focus on the “role of internationalinstitutions, the social norms they foster, and the interests states construct on issues, includingintelligence” (p. 138).

Munton and Fredj (2013) appear to build on Munton’s ideas from 2009, as many of thearguments appear similar. Although arguing that realist ideas make intelligence cooperationproblematic, with the emphasis on competition and struggle for power and relative gains, thetwo try to implement a game theory model to analyze the occurrence of what they see as a“commonplace activity” (p. 669). Game theory is most often associated with realist theory. Interms of game theory, decision makers weigh the prospective benefits and risks ofinternational intelligence cooperation. Munton and Fredj (2013) go on to list several aspectsto consider on both sides of the scale. Despite their extensive game theoretic analyses, the twoalso argue that intelligence cooperation might best be explained by an alternative to realistthinking – the liberal institutionalism theory (p. 669). Like Munton did in 2009, Munton andFredj (2013, p. 669) point to the liberal institutionalists’ and constructivists’ inclusion ofcooperative aspects of the global system and the role of institutions.

Lastly, another prominent scholar who has provided me with useful reflections andinformation on the nature of international intelligence cooperation, in addition to intelligencein general, is Richard Aldrich. In his 2004 International Affairs article, he explores the natureof the transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation and what this entails in practice.Most noticeably, he identifies and describes a variety of issues and challenges that contributeto the limitations of intelligence sharing and cooperation among states, inter alia, theprotection of sources and the balance between security and liberty. Aldrich also contributed

33with a chapter in International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability, edited by HansBorn, Ian Leigh and Aiden Wills, published in 2011. His chapter, “International IntelligenceCooperation in practice”, seeks to analyze and explain recent developments in internationalintelligence cooperation and the increase of such cooperation. The chapter specificallysuggests and explores explanations for these developments, what he argues to be, inter alia,the phenomenon of globalization and the changing nature of security threats.

The above existing published works and discourse on intelligence in general, intelligencecooperation and the theorization of both subjects has helped me understand the subject matter,be able to analyze where my findings fits in and where they can possibly advance theliterature. As part of the conclusion at the end of this dissertation, I will attempt to relate myown findings to the existing literature and theorization to suggest what theoretical foundationsmy findings indicate that intelligence cooperation should fall under and to explore thepossible contributions of this study. As my findings are based on a provisional limited datasetand thus offer extremely tentative conclusions, it needs to be stressed that these argumentswill have to be further explored in research in the future.

3.3 The OSCE

Despite the OSCE being the world’s largest regional security organization, reaching into vastareas of the world and being part of 57 states’ foreign policy, it can arguably also be said to bethe world’s least known security organization. It continues to be largely overlooked and littleunderstood outside diplomatic or political circles related to the organization (Krupnick, 1998,p. 30; Mosser, 2015, p. 579). In general, the discourse and scholarly literature concerning theEuropean, or Transatlantic and Eurasian, security environment, and specifically cooperation,are large and comprehensive. Still, an omission is evident. Compared to other organizationsdealing with similar work areas, the OSCE seems often to be forgotten and not included in thediscussions or analyses. This lead to a gap in the literature on European, Transatlantic andEurasian security, as the OSCE’s membership covers all of these areas. More research on theOSCE’s role and value in the security environment and multilateral efforts is needed.

For this dissertation, comprehensive research on the OSCE was conducted: on theorganization in general, its role and value in global security, on its efforts related tocounterterrorism and specifically level and nature of cooperation and information-sharing.

34For a general background, history and context of the OSCE as a security organization, amixture of sources were used: academic articles, books, the OSCE’s own website and my ownknowledge from the four months present at the organization. The experience from first-handpresence at the Vienna headquarters gave a broader understanding of the organization’spresent role as well as its history. While being an intern in relation to the OSCE, a stand-aloneliterature review was written on the OSCE’s role and value in the European securityenvironment. Large parts of that background information fed into the research for thisdissertation. The OSCE’s own website provided updated information on the organization’spresent structures, partners, field operations and initiatives, here specifically on counterterrorism and related work. Through the OSCE website, as well as the OSCE internalnetworks, published reports were also used for novel information. These were reports such asthe Annual Report on OSCE Activities from 2016 (published in 2017), reporting on, amongother work areas, the Conflict prevention Centre and Transnational Threats Departmentsactivities. The Transnational Threats Department also provides their own reports on a regularbasis, inter alia, the regular reports of the TNTD to the OSCE Security Committee on theirrecent activities. Lastly, academic scholars such as Charles Krupnick, Bjørn Møller and EricMlyn provided historical and contextual information on the OSCE’s general structures andwork.

Concerning counterterrorism and related topics, the OSCE and its efforts are not well-knowneither. Neither in the academic or political circles, or in the media. Still, as elaborated inchapter 1, the OSCE has been no exemption among multilateral organizations regardingestablishing a larger focus on the need to deal with and counter terrorism. Europol specificallyand the EU in general, as well as NATO, are most often given the most attention in theliterature concerning countering and preventing terrorism and this phenomenon’s perceivedunderlying causes, but a few scholars focus on the OSCE in particular while other comparethe OSCE’s efforts to other organizations.

Alexandra Gheciu (2008) has thoroughly compared the efforts and initiatives of the OSCE,the EU and NATO. In her book, she argues that the OSCE is not only relevant in the work ofcountering international terrorism, but is also in some ways uniquely competent to deal withthis task as a security institution. Gheciu (2008, p. 126) argues for what she thinks is theOSCE’s advantage in the security environment, compared to the other two organizations, that

35is the cross-dimensional, preventive nature of the OSCE and the insistence that military forcealone “cannot succeed in combating international terrorism”. Having a broad andmultidimensional approach, backed up by a long history of defining security in acomprehensive way and experience with human rights, culture and economic andenvironmental challenges, Gheciu (2008, p. 126-128) argues gives the OSCE a unique roleand advantage. She also points to the advantages of the OSCE’s many field missions,providing the OSCE with local presence. The cross-dimensional character is also perceived asa major advantage in the fight against the “multifaceted challenges of terrorism” by MarieFreire (2005, p. 206). She argues the organization “may formulate comprehensive responses,integrating these different dimensions and generating a complex and integrated approachrequired to address the threats associated with terrorism” when combining traditional “hard”security with economic, environmental and humanitarian aspects and concerns (p. 206).

Largely agreeing with both Checiu’s and Freire’s arguments is Peter Neumann (2017). PeterNeumann worked, on the appointment of the OSCE Austrian chairmanship, from Januaryuntil September 2017 on analyzing the OSCE’s efforts in countering violent extremism andradicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT). In his following report, Neumann (2017) pointsto how the OSCE is assisting with preventing extremism, radicalization and terrorism in manyindirect ways, incorporated into its various work areas and comprehensive approach tosecurity. According to his analysis, the OSCE’s added value in this field comprise threespecific areas: i) “its role in preventing and resolving conflicts, promoting human rights, andsafeguarding the rights of national minorities”; ii) “its strong local presence, particularly inCentral Asia and the Western Balkans”; and iii) “its diverse membership and conveningpower, which can facilitate dialogue, cooperation, and the systematic exchange of goodpractices between Participating States” (p. 2). As the report was written on appointment fromthe organization’s chairmanship, the research allows for a detailed internal view of theOSCE’s current work in this field, both centrally and in various participating states.

Despite the agreement over the OSCE’s advantage in counterterrorism, Freire (2005) alsopoints to some of the organization’s shortcomings and challenges in its ability to implementcommitments and initiatives. A lack of consensus, resources and operational power is pinnedout as some of the basis for this (p. 208).

363.4 Europol

In literature and discourse concerning multilateral cooperation to fight terrorism and otherforms of serious crime, Europol, as a central office within the European Union, is an agencythat is given much attention for their efforts and role as a platform for sharing of information.Europol has since its establishment enjoyed much support at the political level and is knownto most with an interest in international security politics and cooperation. However, eventhough Europol is well-known and much written about in contemporary news reporting,finding reliable academic scholarship on it has not been easy. Europol is a developingorganization, which has enjoyed rapid expansion since its establishment in the 1990s. Asrecently as 2017 a new and important regulation to Europol’s power within crime-fightingand counter terrorism was set into force (Europol.europa.eu, 2018). Little has been written inacademia on Europol’s most recent developments and initiatives, and on how that mightmatter for Europe’s abilities to prevent and counter terrorism and other forms of serious,organized crime.

For the purpose of this dissertation, because of the limited novel information and literature onthe newest changes and developments within Europol, I have used the organization’s websiteas well as their own published reports for information on the most recent developments, suchas the new 2016/17 regulation. The Europol website contains press releases and generalupdated information on the organization’s structures and components as well as latestinitiatives and developments. Here, they also publish reports such as Europol annual reviews,where specifically information from the Europol Review 2016-2017 was useful. The reportspresent information on the pressing issues, trends and developments of 2016 and 2017, andgives an idea of Europol’s efforts related to priority areas such as terrorism, cybercrime anddrugs. Some statistics and general information is also presented on Europol’s intelligencefunction and information-sharing, e.g. giving some numbers on the usage of the systems forinformation exchange. Lastly, the review gives a sense of where Europol is headed and seetheir own role in the future. While using the report for general factual information on numbersand focus areas, I have remained aware that Europol may have a vested interest in minimizingfailures while maximizing successes in their own published reports.

For historical and background information on the establishment and development of Europol,academic sources were used in addition to Europol’s own website. Another source that proved

37valuable was the United Kingdom’s House of Lords’ (2008) European Union Committee’sreport Europol: coordinating the fight against serious and organized crime. Here, informationis given on the events of the establishment of Europol, as well as the office’s objectives,competences and work areas. Further, academic authors such as Mathieu Deflem (2006),Oldrich Bureš (2008, 2016), Wolgang Wagner (2006), Madalina Busuioc and MartijnGroenleer (2013), Monica Den Boer (2015) and John D. Occhipinti (2015) providedinformation for understanding the background, context and development of the EuropeanPolice Office.

Further, several scholars have taken it upon themselves to look further into the role and abilityof Europol to contribute in the work of counter terrorism. Through an analysis of Europol’scounter terrorism operations and efforts, Mathieu Deflem (2006) offers arguments as to whyEuropol is an important organization for cooperation and counter terrorism efforts. Otherscholars have also examined Europol’s valuable efforts, such as Monica Den Boer (2015)who has analyzed the office’s efforts and developments in counter terrorism and intelligencesharing. Following, John D. Occhipinti (2015, p. 240) describes Europol’s developments inrecent years, and shows, inter alia, that Europol’s participation in so-called Joint InvestigationTeams (JITs) has increased. Although, he argues that Europol is a long way from developinginto a “European FBI” (p. 239). A common denominator through much of the academicliterature concerning Europol, is the scholars’ exploration of challenges and limitations tofurther cooperation and information-exchange within Europol. Both Deflem and Den Boer areamongst them.

Oldrich Bureš has written or been involved in several works on the EU’s counter terrorismefforts and structures. In several instances, he shows to be rather critical in his views of EUcooperation on the matter and specifically Europol. In 2008 he published an article exploringthe then limited powers of Europol, according to Bureš, and the reasons for their limitedadded value in counter terrorism efforts. Visible in other, newer literature, much has happenedsince 2008. Although, in his 2016 article, he also critically assesses Europol as a platform forintelligence-sharing. He explains some of Europol’s challenges to better coordinate counterterrorism efforts and intelligence-sharing, such as the “top-down origins” of the coordinationefforts from Brussels, whereas the various EU states’ police and intelligence agencies hasoften “viewed Europol with a great deal of suspicion” (Bureš, 2016, p. 61). Bureš (2016, p.58) argues that Europol is a long way from becoming a “genuine intelligence agency”, despite

38European politicians’ promise to “improve the fight against terrorism via better intelligencesharing”. Delfem (2006, p. 354) also shares the argument of Bureš in that the top-downcreation of Europol by the EU can “hinder effective cooperation”, as officials in individualstates may perceive such as “accountability requirements as intrusions on their activities”.Björn Fägersten (2010) also examines the challenges to a more comprehensive Europeancounter terrorism intelligence cooperation. He has tried to analyze the differences betweengovernment ambitions for such cooperation and the actual practical outcomes. In his view,Europol has not been able to live up to the tasks it has been given, despite governmentalsupport among the European states. He points to bureaucratic resistance as a prominentcontributor to the challenges of cooperation (p. 519).

Where many other scholars see the value and importance of agencies such as Europol as afacilitating and convening contributor to cooperation and exchange to better be able tocounter threats, Julia Jansson (2016) see risks in handing responsibility for counter terrorismover to institutions like Europol. Jansson (2016) study Europol’s role in counter terrorism inan article where she explores an argued trend of losing accountability due to normalizingcounter terrorist procedures when trying to build resilience to terrorism. She is somewhatcritical to the cooperation going on in Europol, on the basis of the argument that Europollacks accountability and democratic oversight (p. 12-13).

39CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 The OSCE

During the research process and conduction of interviews it became clear that my initialworking thesis and impression of the OSCE had to be corrected. My interviews andobservation made it apparent that the OSCE has no form of intelligence-sharing whatsoever.The organization has no intelligence function, or even a mechanism for it to be possible.There even is no classification system, meaning that all information is open and available toall 57 participating states and their representatives, regardless of position. This for the purposeof transparency. Contrary to my initial assumptions, as I came to understand, the OSCE is notan operational police or intelligence organization – it is merely a political one. According tothe interviewees, the meaning of the OSCE has always been to facilitate dialogue andcooperation through sharing of experiences not actual information or intelligence. The OSCEwas established during the Cold War, with the purpose of decreasing tension between theopposing sides. The organization was never thought to have an operational role or to includesomething so tactical as intelligence in its portfolio of work. Its focus areas and niche fromthe beginning has been, and was meant to be, capacity building, preventive diplomacy andawareness raising.

According to my interviewees, the distinctive membership of the organization is one of the

reasons for this lack of operational status and sharing of information. One interviewee saidthat there is no intelligence sharing in the OSCE because you cannot have intelligence sharingamong non-like-minded states. To be able to have an operational capacity you need like-minded states, and the OSCE’s participating states are frankly not like-minded. They belongto different blocks of worldviews, they read and look at facts differently. The list of theOSCE’s participating states include, among others, the Russian Federation, The United Statesof America, Canada, the EU with all its members, the Holy See, Armenia, Azerbaijan andvarious Central-Asian states. Because of the crucial differences among these states, theparticipating states of the OSCE collect intelligence about each other, rather than share itamongst themselves. No states have even attempted to create or suggested the establishmentof an intelligence function at any time. The interviewees underlined that, like in the entireglobal environment at this time, there is little to no trust between many of the participatingstates of the organization, and you will most likely not share your collected, confidential

40intelligence with states you do not trust. The scholars in the existing literature are tornbetween the positive and the negative effects of the OSCE’s diverse and large membership.Scholars like Charles Krupnick (1998) and Victor-Yves Ghebali (2009) argue that this is whatmakes the OSCE the most inclusive security organization in the world, where both smallerand larger states are able to be heard, and that the broad membership gives the OSCE theadvantage of reaching into areas of the world where other organizations does not. On theother hand, Elena Kropatcheva (2012) point to the reality of conflicting self-interests amongthe broad specter of participating states and how this often limit agreement. No literature iswritten in the perspective of information sharing and the possibility of the OSCE having anintelligence function. In this dissertation, the observations on the challenges of the diversemembership was shared in direct response to questions of the possibility of intelligencesharing in a more operational OSCE. In that sense, the findings are arguably unique, howeverstill tentative.

The OSCE facilitates a couple of technical systems, which I primarily thought were for thepurpose of information sharing: POLIS, a platform maintained by the OSCE’s TransnationalThreats Department, and an Advance Passenger Information (API) system. As it turns out,neither has anything to do with sharing of actual information. According to one of myinterviewees, POLIS is a knowledge management and learning platform for information,meant for a community of experts from law enforcement agencies. It contains data from fieldoperations, courses for training, sharing of experiences and presentations related totransnational threats and security, provided by the OSCE as part of their capacity buildingefforts. Further, the interviewee informed that even though the Advance PassengerInformation (API) system in itself allows sharing of information, the OSCE’s role is to helpparticipating states install the system, be able to us it, and thus facilitate the use of it. As soonas the system is up and running the OSCE has no further role to play and no access to theactual information shared in the system. As of today, only two participating states have a fullyinteractive system – the UK and the US. Others who have implemented the system only hasone-way communication. The OSCE is in no possession of databases, data on individuals orany leads of such.

The OSCE region is one of massive tensions and major disagreements in numerous areas.Still today the region is affected by both direct conflicts and other frozen conflicts. Justbecause the organization helped put the Cold War to an end, does not mean they have been

41able to dismantle all conflicts within their region, which is a vast one. One of the majorfocuses in the organization at this time is the direct conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Since theRussian Federation annexed Ukrainian Crimea in 2014, the OSCE has been a platform for anda facilitator of the process to solve the conflict. Both the Russian Federation and Ukraine areparticipating states in the OSCE. So are Georgia, with whom the Russian Federation also hasdifficult relations, following the Georgian-Russian conflict of 2008. The states of Armeniaand Azerbaijan are involved in a frozen conflict, over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. So areMoldova and the Transdniestrian authorities, a break-away-region, in a conflict reaching allthe way back to 1992. Other areas in the OSCE region are also seeing rising tensions anddifficulties. Thus, thinking that these participating states, of whom many are in severe conflictwith each other, are able to leave their differences behind for the purpose of cooperation inthe OSCE seems naive.

One of the OSCE’s major focus areas at the time is what they refer to as VERLT – violentextremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism. This is an area where most participatingstates see challenges in their countries and have an interest of cooperating on this increasinglytransnational threat. Like most other actors, the OSCE has increasingly systematized itsefforts to counter terrorism (Neumann, 2017, p. 29).

Through 2017, Norway held the position as chair of the OSCE Security Committee, under theorganization’s first dimension. Norway has thus planned and chaired the committee meetingsthrough the year, as well as the negotiations of new commitments prior to the MinisterialCouncil together with the Austrian chairmanship of the organization. Before and during the2017 Ministerial Council, three proposals were discussed in the Security Committee with theaim of agreeing on new commitments. One of them was a text on VERLT. Through thenegotiations, most participating states showed an explicit will and were eager to complete andagree on a text for new commitments related to VERLT. This has shown to be an importanttopic and focus area in a large number of participating states in the organization, including theUS, the Russian Federation, the EU and Norway. It has been expressed that it is a topic inneed of broader cooperation across the region. Despite this, the participating states were notable to agree on and adopt the text on VERLT at the Ministerial Council last year. CounteringVERLT has become one of the cornerstones of the OSCE’s work and reaches into practicallyall areas and activities in the OSCE region (Neumann, 2017, p. 33). Already being such alarge part of the organization’s work and comprehensive security approach, large efforts were

42taken to be able to agree at the Ministerial Council. Individual consultations and negotiationswere held between the states with the strongest disagreements and meetings lasted until thelate hours several days in a row before the final day of the Council. Though highly unusual,the discussions even, at one point, reached the minister level at a small breakfast meeting.Despite desperate efforts, the proposed text did not reach consensus and a new commitmentrelated to violent extremism, radicalization and terrorism was not adopted.

The causes behind the lack of ability to cooperate and agree on how to counter VERLTcoincides with general trends regarding the OSCE. Its participating states do not share thesame world views, the same strategies or the same priorities. They are not like-minded.Although they all agree that terrorism is damaging to international security, and needs to becountered and prevented, they differ on how to reach that goal. According to my interviewees,some states, the Russian Federation in particular, believe in and carry out a “harder”,“heavier” approach to countering and preventing terrorism – a reactive approach. Theybelieve in reactively cracking down radicals, extremists and terrorists. Other states, Norwayincluded, believe in a more proactive, preventive approach, where preventing the spread ofradical individuals and terrorist organizations in the first place needs to be the focus. Thesedifferences creates some clear limitations to the cooperation.

Despite the differences and disagreements among states, the OSCE does make importantcontributions when it comes to countering terrorism and especially preventing VERLT. Thisconclusion is seen in the literature as well as expressed by my interviewees. Prevention ofVERLT is a large focus in the OSCE’s field operations, in a collaboration between OSCEofficials and the host countries. One of my interviewees, in conjunction with scholars such asPeter Neumann (2017), stressed the value of the OSCE’s strong local presence, particularly inCentral Asia and the Western Balkans. The OSCE’s main trait, highlighted in a majority ofthe literature and by one of my interviewees, is its cross-dimensional, comprehensive securitycharacter in the fight against the multifaceted challenge of terrorism. In the counter terrorismefforts of the OSCE there is a link between traditional “hard” security, economic andenvironmental aspects and humanitarian concerns, which allows them to create acomprehensive and integrated approach to address the complex threats of terrorism (Freire,2005, p. 206). The OSCE also have explicit projects and activities aimed at preventingradicalization and extremism, like the online communication campaign #UnitedCVE aimed atraising awareness about the appeal of violent extremism and supporting participating states in

43creating National Action Plans (Neumann, 2017, p. 35). Finally, my interviewee stressed thevalue of the OSCE as a platform for sharing of best practices related to prevention of VERLTamong participating states. This coincides with the findings of Peter Neumann (2017).

Though not a major focus of this dissertation, as it is often seen to be somewhat disconnectedfrom the traditional counter terrorism efforts, cyber security is attracting increasing attentionin both the OSCE and Europol. In the OSCE, efforts have been made to operationalizecooperation related to cyber threats and -security. The process and preliminary results of theseefforts also illustrate the general climate for cooperation in the organization.

In 2012, the OSCE participating states agreed upon and adopted a decision to develop“confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of conflict stemming from the use ofinformation and communication technologies” in PC decision 1039 (OSCE, 2012). Thedecision also tasked the OSCE chairmanship at the time to establish an “open-ended, informalOSCE working group” (IWG), with the purpose of, among other things, creating “a set ofdraft confidence-building measures (CBMs) to enhance interstate co-operation, transparency,predictability, and stability, and to reduce the risks of misperception, escalation, and conflictthat may stem from the use of ICTs” (OSCE, 2012). Two sets of confidence-buildingmeasures (CBMs) related to cyber security has been adopted since, in 2013 and 2016.

The stage of implementation and operationalization offers difficulties for the OSCE. Withinthe informal working group established by the PC decision 1039, attempts are being made tooperationalize some of the CBMs adopted. These efforts include, inter alia, creating channelsand routines for participating states to cooperate and share information regarding cyberthreats. I attended meetings in the informal working group when operationalization of CBMnumber 3 was up for discussion, and it was a heated one as such. CBM 3 is about voluntaryconsultations between participating states, which proved hard to agree on, even though‘voluntarily’ was underlined. The diverse membership and the major differences between thestates’ worldviews again stood in the way of cooperation. As my interviewees pointed out,you do not want to share cyber-related information with a participating state that you do nottrust and that you are afraid will attack you. The operationalization of the CBMs and theestablishment of mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of information has thus failed sofar. It is also worth stressing that cyber security is inherently a technical problem, which theOSCE arguably does not have the capabilities to pursue at this time. This issue is also part ofthe discussion of implementation.

44Although not an operational police organization, one of the OSCE’s focus areas iscooperation in the field of policing. The organization works for and promotes professional,democratic and pro-active police services within their participating states, to be able torespond to modern transnational threats, like terrorism. The focal point for the OSCE’spolice-related work is the Transnational Threats Department’s Strategic Police Matters Unit(SPMU). The SPMU work with police agencies across the OSCE region and supports theparticipating states in countering criminal activity through training, assistance and promotingcross-border cooperation. Most of this work happens in the various field operations, where theOSCE supports and facilitates sharing of information and exchange of best practices acrossborders (Osce.org, 2018). Though the OSCE supports, encourages and in some way facilitatesthrough connecting the participating states together, there is no actual sharing of information– operational information – through the OSCE. There might be neighboring countries in theregion, where the OSCE have field operations, that exchange information, leads or names, butnothing happens through the OSCE. This is difficult to know without looking at each stateand their bilateral relations. As mentioned, the only two countries in the OSCE so far fullyinteractive through the OSCE API system are the US and the UK. Since relations are bilateraland no operational activities are conducted through the OSCE, it is difficult to measure orestimate the impact or success of the OSCE’s police-related work.

Efforts were also made to agree on a collective commitment concerning so-called

intelligence-led policing (ILP) last year. The text simply suggested states consider introducingproactive, intelligence-led policing as a law enforcement tool to complement traditionalreactive methods. Due to initial disagreements, the text never reached the official negotiationsand thus was not agreed. The participating states highly vary in their strategies and legalframeworks for police-related work, as they have no legally binding common strategies,making it hard to develop a common strategy for police work.

Neither the existing published work or my interviewees are able to predict how the OSCE willdevelop going forward and what place the organization will enjoy in the participating states’foreign policy in the future. A decrease in interest from many of the participating states seemsto be the recent trend. This is visible by the rather limited amount of resources going into thework of the organization. The OSCE Unified Budget for 2018 totals EUR 137,801,200,funded by the 57 participating states. These observations and expressed challenges within theorganization are also highlighted in Marie Freire’s (2005) published work. Freire (2005, p.208) argues that, inter alia, a lack of resources and consensus limits the OSCE’s ability to

45implement its commitments. Together with limited resources, the states’ lack of focus onrecruitment of qualified personnel and the lack of will from some states to take on thechairmanship indicates the decreasing interest. Illustrative of this was that in the spring of2017, Norway announced their intentions of applying for the chairmanship in 2020. Due tothis expressed interest, no other states considered applying for the same year. However, notlong before the Ministerial Council in December 2017, Norway withdrew their interest anddecided not to apply. Other commitments held a higher priority. Still, in spite of thedecreasing interest and attention, the 2017 Ministerial Council also showed some signs of theOSCE being on the international radar when the Minister of Foreign Affairs from both the USand Russia attended the Council.

According to one of my interviewees, one of the challenges limiting the attraction of attentionand priority is the lack of visibility of the components of the OSCE that actually createsresults. The majority of the OSCE’s staff and resources go into the field operations and itswork in the host countries. This is where most efforts are set into practice and where resultsare more clear. The headquarter in Vienna and the formal discussions are most visible to thevarious state capitals, where little practical work is done and disagreement persist. This ismaking the organization look less attractive and relevant to the state capitals and leads tolimited priority. The interviewees definitely think the OSCE should remain relevant in thefuture and it should be in the interest of many participating states for it to do so. Even thoughthe organization is flawed, it is better to work on and focus on improving what we have thando nothing at all. With the amount of disagreements and conflicts in the OSCE region, theOSCE is a place for them to meet on a daily basis, discuss differences and cooperate oncommon interests. However, the interviewees do not see the OSCE becoming moreoperational any time soon. It is meant to be a platform and a forum for dialogue and theythink it will remain this way.

4.2 Europol

Contrary to the OSCE, one of the main purposes of Europol since its establishment has been,and still is, the exchange of information and intelligence. Europol is practical and operational,assists states in investigations, provides intelligence analyses, and facilitates an ever-developing cooperation and information sharing. One can say that Europol’s enterpriseprimarily consists of two parts. On the one hand, there is the office’s own permanent staffwith the main purpose of assisting national authorities with analysis of information related to

46criminality. On the other hand, there are the various national desks at the organization – thegathering and co-location of national police from the different states – with the purpose ofcooperation and exchange of information among each other. At this point, about 16 countrieshas permanent liaisons located at Europol’s headquarters in The Hague.

Europol, as we now know and as the name constitutes, is a European Police Office, primarilyfacilitating cooperation between member states’ police services and exchange of informationand intelligence related to police matters and investigations. In most European countries, thenational police services are separated from the state’s security, or intelligence, services.Europol does in many cases also cooperate with states’ security services, but at this time thathas to happen through bilateral relations with the various national services. The Hague is acenter for security cooperation and counterterrorism efforts, both within and on the outside ofEuropol. Other offices, sometimes maybe even competing ones, has been developed throughother structures for the same purposes of cooperation and exchange of information. The so-called Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) is one of these structures. Whereas Europol is a policeorganization and deals with police services and information and intelligence related to policework, the CTG is made up of various states’ intelligence and security services and is purelyconcerned with wider intelligence information. At this time, European cooperation amongsecurity services and exchange of intelligence does not primarily take place through Europol.However, cooperation among police services and exchange of information and intelligencerelated to police work and ongoing practical criminal cases does. As I will further explain,efforts are being made to further incorporate the intelligence of security services into Europoland expand the cooperation between Europol as a police agency and the CTG as acongregation of states’ security services.

Which national agency has the responsibility for counter terrorism varies among states. Insome EU member states it is the police agencies, while in others it is the intelligence services.In the existing literature, Mathieu Deflem (2006, p. 351) and Oldrich Bureš (2016, p. 61) viewthis as an obstacle to Europol’s cooperation on counter terrorism, as cooperation across policeand intelligence agencies tend to be difficult due to the agencies interest in different types ofinformation. Whereas policing is designed around the aim of making arrests, intelligenceagencies are interested in a wider type of information (Deflem, 2006, 351). The Nordiccountries, as well as Austria, in particular, differ from the other European states in that theirnational police is also responsible for the security services in the respective countries. This

47way, the same people and the same structures from the state is concerned with both securityand intelligence as well as police related work. This means that the same personnel canrepresent their country at both Europol and the CTG. Contrary to Deflem (2006) and Bureš(2016), my interviewee argued that these countries seem to have an advantage, because itbecomes easier for their capitals to maintain an overview of all efforts related tocounterterrorism, across both police work and security services, and they can arguablycooperate with other states’ services more easily and efficiently.

Still today, the security services in the EU are a national matter and not an EU matter, but,according to my interviewee, there does seem to be a political development in the EUpointing towards the wish for a collective European security service or intelligence service.The CTG links the various security services together, but this structure lies outside of the EUand is simply an agreed cooperation framework between states with no formal organization orcentral authority. Highly evident at this time is a significant political pressure from the EU forsecurity services and police services to establish a better cooperation. For now, this means abetter cooperation between Europol and the CTG. Such cooperation has met certainchallenges, mostly due to the fact that the CTG has no organizational structure or centralauthority for Europol to establish a relationship with. A closer relationship with the CTGwould arguably strengthen Europol’s ability to counter terrorism.

The pressure for closer European cooperation on counterterrorism is mostly stemming fromEU politicians and the EU Parliament, as Europol is largely controlled by the level of fundingfrom the EU. Centrally in the EU the commissioner for counter terrorism and the counterterrorism group are major drivers for an ever-stronger Europol. Deflem (2006) and Bureš(2016) both argue that the “top-down” origins of Europol and its counter terrorism efforts andthe continued coordination from Brussels are obstacles to the cooperation in Europol. Further,both argue that this has led many member states’ police and intelligence services to viewEuropol with suspicion and perceive Europol requirements as intrusions in their activities andon their autonomy (Bureš, 2016, p. 61; Deflem, 2006, p. 354). My interview indicated adifferent conclusion. Even though the driving powers seems to be central and top-down at anEU level, according to the interviewee, there is an overall positive perception of thisdevelopment among the EU and Europol member states: all members are positive towards theutilization of Europol in counter terrorism efforts and work for the development of furthercooperation. Processes for closer connections are already in motion, as discussions and

48negotiations are taking place between Europol and CTG representatives. In addition to thelack of organizational structure in the CTG, another barrier is challenging the cooperation, i.e.the level of classification of information and intelligence. The classification of theinformation within the security services are generally much higher and stricter, meaning thatthe information is more difficult to exchange within Europol as a police organization. But, asEuropol is eager to improve their counter terrorism abilities and level of cooperation,developments within the organization are taking place to be able to handle information on ahigher classification level and thus more easily be able to cooperate with security services andexchange classified intelligence.

Despite a development towards closer cooperation and more utilization of Europol, theinterviewee does not see a future where Europol is given executive powers. They will notcome to a point where Europol takes on and initiates their own cases. That barrier is hard tobreak. The process will continue in the fashion where member states requests Europol forassistance. Even so, Europol has, through the later years, grown significantly in the field ofcounter terrorism, and is still continuing to do so. Europol’s counter terrorism section, theEuropean Counter Terrorism Center (ECTC), is striving to establish themselves as the leadingactor of counter terrorism in Europe and wish to be a flagship of counter terrorism. Accordingto the interviewee, this should also be quite possible, considering the amount of resourcesgoing in to the center from the EU budgets. In 2018, Europol’s budget, financed from the EUcommunity budget, totals EUR 123,245,520.

4.3 Comparison between OSCE and Europol

When looking at the OSCE and its operations, talking to experienced inside-officials andresearching published literature, challenges and limitations to an effective cooperationbecame clear, as presented above. Its broad membership and lack of trust and similar interestsclearly poses challenges, as well as the original establishment of the organization. Asmentioned, the OSCE was not established based on an agreed upon treaty like otherinternational organizations, it has blurry frames and still no legal status. Compared to this,Europol seems to be a well-functioning organization, where practical and effectivecooperation takes place, due to the members’ wish for it to do so, according to theinterviewee. There are some clear differences between the two organizations. For one,Europol is an EU structure, made up of members that are more or less like-minded and have

49to a larger degree the same values and interests. When entering the EU and becoming part ofthe judicial cooperation, a state agrees to a certain level of cooperation. Further, Europol isbased on a clear mandate, which guides their work and developments. The mandate isregularly re-evaluated and improved, lastly done in May of 2017.

Further, Europol has been able to grow and develop due to the fairly large share of resourcesallocated by the EU. This indicates that it enjoys priority among the EU members. Althoughthe OSCE’s total 2018 budget is larger than the budget of Europol (EUR 137,801,200 vs EUR123,245,520), one has to view this in a larger perspective. Europol is part of the EU – an EUagency – with a narrower more specialized purpose than the OSCE. The OSCE is a stand-alone organization with a much wider specter of work areas. Also, Europol has fewerfinancially supportive member states and far less staff to wage than the OSCE. Thus, theOSCE budget has to be allocated over a much larger number of posts and recipients than thebudget of Europol.

It seems, then, that Europol, more so than the OSCE, have the basics in place. In addition,other factors also simplify its cooperation. For example, all liaisons representing variousstates are gathered at the same place, literally in the same building, scattered only over aboutfive floors. They have access to each other on a daily basis, and thus have the ability tointeract, cooperate and exchange information. They develop close working relationships witheach other. Finally, about 20 years of specialized work has led to a significant amount ofexperience on how to best accomplish and maintain this cooperation.

One of the major differences between the OSCE and Europol, is each focus on proactivity orreactivity. Whereas one of the major advantages and added values of the OSCE lies in itsability to be proactive and focus on preventive measures, Europol is to a larger degree areactive agency. A major part of the cooperation through Europol is based on pending cases,where information is exchanged after an event, in the process of the investigation. Here,Europol contributes with collection and analyses of data and works as a platform for theexchange of relevant information. The proactive parts of such investigations are to a largerdegree done by the national security services. When something concrete has actuallyhappened there is a shift in responsibility and the police services are in charge. Even thoughnot considered the main part of Europol’s efforts, they do also contribute significantly on amore proactive level of investigation. Inter alia, information is being exchanged on

50individuals under surveillance in pending cases, information about previous cases are used topotentially uncover new information in other cases, or information is cross-checked topossibly uncover others who might be in the process of planning an event. Though it is takingplace and cooperation on these kinds of information is evident, it might vary to what degreefrom case to case and state to state. Often, a state’s police authorities might get preoccupied intheir own investigations and will not prioritize the sharing of information with others until thevery end.

A major contributor and actor within Europol has for long been the United Kingdom. When itcomes to police work and services, the UK is an innovative nation, somewhat ahead ofseveral other states, and has contributed greatly to the police-related work of Europol. Withthe UK’s exit from the EU (Brexit), my interviewee finds it hard to see Europol come out ofthe process with greater strength. Of course, the outcome and impact on Europol’s abilitiesdepends somewhat on the decisions and agreements that will be made concerning the UK’saccess, according to the interviewee. This is still under negotiations. Although, theinterviewee does not believe that, when it comes to counter terrorism, the EU will want tomake an example of the UK rather than securing the best security cooperation on thecontinent. Exclusion of the UK will not happen at the expense of security. There is muchdisagreement within both the academic and political discourse on what the consequences ofBrexit will be on European security and intelligence cooperation, for either side. ScholarClaudia Hillebrand (2017, p. 93) highlights that the UK has traditionally been both a strongsupporter for and user of Europol. She argues that Europol will lose a significant driving-force with the UK leaving the EU. She stresses that the UK has often been the leading actorwhen pushing further information-sharing initiatives at the EU level and have had majorimpacts on the developments of European security policies (p. 94). Even if the UK rejoinsEuropol as a third country, this ability will be lost (p. 94). Europol Executive Director RobertWainwright have also been very vocal on the subject. He have expressed the UK contributionto policy-making in EU internal security to be invaluable, and argues that the UK is one of themost influential member states in shaping European internal security legislation (Wainwright,2012, p. 5). Wainwright has also warned about the consequences for Britain, arguing thatBrexit will harm Britain’s crime-fighting abilities (Rankin, 2016; Wright, 2018). RichardDearlove, former Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service, on the other hand, argue theopposite. He does not think Brexit will harm UK security, as he argues Britain provides theEU with much more intelligence than it gets back and find it hard to imagine that any other

51EU state would want to end their collaborative relationship with the UK simply because theyare no longer a member of the EU (Dearlove, 2016).

In recent years, specifically in the aftermath of larger terrorist attacks like in Brussels andParis, the European security cooperation and Europol has received a lot of criticism and callsfor better cooperation and exchange of information. To some degree, this is justified, and aspresented by the interviewee, is being constantly worked with and improved. Europol isobviously dependent on the security structures in the various member states. Some states havebeen less effectively organized than others and some still have challenges to overcome. But inthe last years, most states have developed and improved certain barriers to better organizationand cooperation. According to my interviewee, inter alia, national legal frameworks havebeen significantly improved to counter the threat of terrorism. For example, legal barriers inseveral countries created major limitations for information exchange. For the last three to fouryears, this has improved throughout. Second, laws related to participation in terrororganizations has also changed. In Norway, for example, participating in a terroristorganization is now considered a criminal offense, making it easier to penalize foreignterrorist fighters, for instance. Such legal improvements have in turn developed the focus andpriorities of the security services in various states.

Though some criticism may be justified and needed for Europol, or any security structure, toimprove and develop further, the problem basically is that its is too large. There are too manyindividuals classified as dangerous or of concern, and Europol does not have the capacity tokeep track of all of them. There simply are not enough resources, and there never will beenough to attain that ability. All in all, based on the inside-views and information of theinterviewee, and secondary literature, the cooperation in Europol is well-functioning. Further,there are, at this time, larger processes for improving cooperation further and creating betterconnections among Europol’s member states for them to better connect databases andexchange information. According to the interviewee, all member states are onboard andpositively leaned towards these developments and improvements. The basic reason might bethat no state dares to obstruct the work for better cooperation, considering what theconsequences might be. If events happen and officials within the security services knowfurther work could have been done to avoid it beforehand, that would be hard to bare. Theyhave then failed in the mission to keep the populations safe from threats, and it is in everystates interest to succeed in this task.

524.4 International security and intelligence cooperation in the current politicalclimate

The history of the world and its developments move back and forth through time, in the eyesof western democratic values, multilateralism, peace and stability. At this point in time, in theview of one of my interviewees, one can argue that “progress” of liberal democracies aretaking steps backwards. This is visible by the trend of inward and nationalistic thinking acrossboth Europe and North America. The interviewee, who has spent his entire working life ininternational politics, see that the interest for multilateral work is decreasing among states andpoliticians. Several countries are becoming more introvert and focused on domesticchallenges, persuaded by the thought of turning their back on the collective internationalsystem for the advantage of perceived national interests. This has shown to be appealing inboth Europe and the US, although my interviewee considers this to be short-sighted.

The US has elected a president based on the thought of “America first” and who retracts theUS from international obligations and commitments. The UK is leaving the European Union,and the results of the exit on the multilateral cooperation remains to be seen. Theseobservations coincides with trends explored by several distinguished scholars andprofessionals. For one, Richard Haass (2017, p. 2), president of the Council on ForeignRelations, emphasize that nationalism and populism are now on the rise and that a rejection ofglobalization and international involvement is evident. He argues that the world now needs anew operating system that reflects the modern realities (p. 2). None other than FrancisFukuyama (2016) also explores the trends of leaning away from international cooperationwith the example of what he argues to be a dysfunctional America. Fukuyama (2016) arguesthat the election of nationalistic Trump as the American president could potentially lead to an“unravelling of the liberal world order”, which the US “has done much to build since the1950s”. Max Boot (2017), senior fellow for national security studies at the Council onForeign Relations, similarly argues that “the foremost threat we face today is that globalismmay once again go into reverse as it did in 1914, because the United States – for so manydecades its foremost champion – may now, under Trump, become a hindrance rather than ahelp to transnational trade and cooperation”.

My interviewee stressed that the level of trust between states is at a low, and that countriesneither want to reveal their weaknesses nor capabilities to others. Suspicion supersedes the

53willingness to cooperate, and a number of pressing, transnational challenges like terrorismand migration has, alongside some’s call for further cooperation, also increased the level ofnational populist rhetoric among both populations and politicians. These trends leave thefuture of multilateralism uncertain. Neither Haass (2017), Fukuyama (2016), Boot (2017) ormy interviewee favor these trends or see them as a positive development in the eyes of what isbest for the citizens of the world – and in this case for the ability to counter terrorism.

The OSCE proves to be a good example of the global political climate because of their list ofparticipating states, which contains a number of countries who certainly do not trust eachother, who have complicated relationships or even are in conflict with each other. The basicdifferences between states from different areas of the world and opposing theoretical campsbecome very clear in the discussions in the OSCE. It really depicts the differences betweenInternational Relations theories in real life.

Even though many now view the trends in multilateral cooperation with dread and frustration,the EU system might seem to be the one to persist in the best way, despite the circumstances,according to the interviewee. Although several EU states are also facing nationalistic,populistic trends, the European system still prevails, maybe due to their supranationalstructures. As presented above, my research indicates that the European security cooperationthrough Europol is enjoying support from all member states and no one seems to be opposingthe developments for further cooperation. Even despite the exit of the UK, the research forthis dissertation indicates no lesser degree of willingness among other EU member states tocontinue improving Europol’s efforts.

54CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The aim of this dissertation has been to study the similarities and differences in characteristicsin the OSCE and Europol to understand how this impacts their ability to cooperate andexchange information and intelligence, mainly for the purpose of counter terrorism, andwhether or not the two structures impact the level of security in the Transatlantic and Eurasianregion, specifically Europe, and in what way. Further, the findings were to be used to look atthe nature of international security and intelligence cooperation as a whole in the politicalclimate of the day.

Despite looking somewhat similar from the outset and although they do focus on many of thesame work areas, the research has revealed some clear differences between the OSCE andEuropol. Some of the main differences lie in the basic background of the organizations andthe frames in which they operate. Despite statements that it seeks to promote security, theOSCE is not an operational organization, not a police- or an intelligence organization, and itthus has no operational powers. It is a political organization, where the purpose has been,from the establishment during the Cold War until today, capacity building, preventivediplomacy and awareness raising, through functioning as a platform for dialogue andcooperation. Experiences and best-practices are exchanged in it, rather than actual operationalinformation. Contrary to the OSCE, one of the main purposes of Europol since itsestablishment has been, and still is, the exchange of information and intelligence. Europol ispractical and operational, assists states in investigations, provides intelligence analyses, andfacilitates an ever-developing cooperation and information sharing.

In addition to revealing clear differences of operations, the research also indicated that theability to cooperate clearly varies between the two structures. Even though the OSCE ismainly based on voluntarily engagement and implementation of commitments, it stillstruggles with disagreements and limitations to its cooperation. One of the main challengesthat became clear through the research is the OSCE’s diverse membership. The organizationis made up of a group of states from different areas in the world, which possess differentworldviews and interests: they are basically not like-minded states. In fact, many of theparticipating states are in either direct conflict with each other or part of frozen conflicts.Further, this leads to a lack of trust among the participating states. In addition, the OSCE

55enjoys no legal status or legal personality. This means that the implementation of any agreedcommitment depends solely on the states’ political will. Thus, specific implementation andoperationalization of sometimes vague declarations often proves to be a challenge. The OSCEalso suffers from fluctuating interest from the participating states. Thus, the amount ofresources available and recruitment of qualified personnel present persistent challenges.

More so than the OSCE, Europol has a basic capability for a more successful cooperation.First of all, Europol is an EU structure, made up of members that are more or less like-mindedand have to a larger degree the same values and interests. Second, Europol is based on a clearmandate, which has been there from the beginning, but that is also regularly reevaluated andimproved. Third, Europol enjoys a valuable amount of resources allocated from the EU level,giving them the ability to grow and develop. This also shows that Europol is prioritized by theEU countries.

As clarified through the research for this dissertation, Europol is only made up of policeservices and primarily exchange information related to police work and investigations, ratherthan proactive intelligence. In The Hague, the CTG are the ones primarily concerned withwider intelligence and link national security services together. Even though the CTG is not anofficial, structured organization with a central authority, but rather a collective agreementbetween individual states, efforts are being made to create a closer and better cooperationbetween the CTG and Europol, and thus a better cooperation between police- and securityservices. This is considered to be crucial to be able to attain an even better ability to counterterrorism in Europe. This is now an ongoing process, where Europol is developing itsstructures to be able to handle information and intelligence on a higher level of classification,which will be necessary to be able to connect police- and intelligence services more than theyare today.

This dissertation’s main focus has been the handling of counter terrorism, and thus the impacton security and a safer environment for civilians. Here, it has become visible that the twoorganizations have significantly different ways of working, despite a large focus on the matterin each agency, but that both structures contribute to security and counter terrorism in theirown way.

56The OSCE’s added value on the topic seems to be its large preventive and proactive focus,where preventing radicalization and violent extremism through all work areas in itsorganization is a large focus. Collective preventive efforts and sharing of experiences and bestpractices on how to prevent violent extremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism(VERLT) from each individual country’s knowledge contribute to preventing terrorism. Eventhough the OSCE participating states show large differences in their views and definitions ofboth terrorism and the best way to tackle it, and are having a hard time agreeing at the centrallevel in Vienna on the rhetoric of new commitments, valuable initiatives are being played outin the field operations and various participating states. On the other hand, Europol is primarilya reactive agency, assisting in investigations after an actual event have occurred andexchanges information on ongoing investigations. I initially also wanted to find out if Europoldoes exchange information proactively, inter alia on suspected individuals or terror plots. Myresearch of published works and my interview with a Europol officer at the center of counter-terrorism policies, indicates that some parts of Europol’s work do exactly that. Theycrosscheck information between cases and see if information from one case can be used touncover other plots and they exchange information on individuals under surveillance.Although this form of proactive efforts varies and is not always given the highest priorityamong the various national police services, information exchange is being conducted andEuropol is, as mentioned, in the process of improving and developing this proactivecooperation.

Based on the above findings, my research indicates that despite the fundamentally differentoperations between the OSCE and Europol, and their methods of work, the two organizationsdo in fact pursue the same overarching goal: to ensure the security for the citizens, institutionsand democratic values of their respective regions. And in the light of the main topic of thisdissertation: to protect them from the threat of terrorism. I also argue that the OSCE andEuropol complement each other in this work and as structures for security cooperation.Terrorism is a multifaceted and complex threat, one that breaches borders and nationalities.Preventive as well as reactive efforts are necessary to minimize the possible damages it cancreate and help reach this ultimate goal of security.

The findings of both organizations can be used to get an overarching image of the globalpolitical climate of today. The OSCE is arguably a suitable example of the general trendswithin the current international system, where the level of trust is low and the ability and will

57to cooperate is fluctuating. It can seem that the interest for multilateral cooperation is beingoverthrown by the wish to protect own interests, resources and security. Some states, such asthe US, are questioning the value of multilateral work and taking practical steps to withdrawfrom certain international obligations. Different direct and frozen conflicts are pressuring theinternational judicial order. The future of multilateralism is uncertain. However, the researchconducted indicates that the member states of Europol are able to cooperate to a much largerdegree than those of the OSCE. It seems that, despite the decrease of some public faith inmultilateralism and interest in multilateral cooperation, the EU system is persisting. Here,despite the UKs exit from the EU, the will to further improve cooperation and develop theabilities to collectively counter terrorism is evident in all member states, due to their commonwish to succeed in the task of protecting their citizens.

5.1 Contributions of the study

This dissertation has attempted to contribute to the existing research, understanding andtheorization of international security and intelligence cooperation, the nature of thiscooperation at the OSCE and Europol, the states’ ability to cooperate and its value to themember states’ security, all mainly in relation to counter terrorism.

As mentioned, general positive theories of intelligence, how intelligence operates successfully

and not, as well as theories of intelligence cooperation, are rare. This despite how thepresence and need of intelligence cooperation has become more prominent in later years, dueto a rise in transnational threats such as international terrorism and other organized crime, aswell as coalition operations among states. As I point out in chapter 3, one of the reasons forthis omission in academic theory could be that, traditionally, intelligence cooperation betweenstates has been very sensitive, and so governments are reluctant to declassify records.Theorization of intelligence cooperation has thus been difficult if not impossible sincetheorization relies on historical case studies.

This dissertation has attempted to study what characteristics can either challenge or advancesecurity and intelligence cooperation, and thus contribute into the attempts of creatingtheories of intelligence cooperation. The findings of this study, revealing traits within theOSCE and Europol that limits or supports the organizations’ ability to cooperate, and thusindicates certain characteristics which seems to be an advantage for a well-functioning

58intelligence cooperation, extend the existing published literature on the subject andcontributes into the generation of such a theory. However, because of the fact that the findingsof this dissertation is based on a very small data set and are considered to be preliminary andtentative, it is difficult for this study to contribute in any meaningful or significant way to thebuilding of theory in intelligence. Further research will have to be conducted, with a muchlarger data set and a combination of a more historical approach together with the novelinformation. Although, this dissertation serves as a basis for this further research.

Despite the still limited meaningful contribution of this study to the theorization ofintelligence cooperation, I would preliminary, based on my findings, agree with thearguments of Phythian (2009) and Munton (2009) in that intelligence holds an implicit placein the international relations theory of realism: intelligence assumes several realist principles,specifically related to ensuring national security, protecting the state from the anarchic worldsystem and serving the national self-interest. As Munton (2009, p. 126) points out, realismalso constitutes that states who are considered allies will “attempt to cooperate in the face of acommon threat”. This coincides with my research findings, where the allies who are membersof Europol willingly engage in a comprehensive intelligence cooperation to counter theircommon threats, here specifically terrorism. However, Munton (2009) also argues thattraditional realist notions are not sufficient for understanding international intelligencecooperation. He also looks to liberalism and constructivism as theories that can feed into therealist principles with their focus on the “role of international institutions, the social normsthey foster, and the interests states construct on issues, including intelligence” (p. 138). As myresearch also indicates, the EU system serving as a supranational institution seems to play asignificant role for the member states’ ability to continue and develop their cooperation.Accordingly, this indicates that international institutions, the norms they foster and theinterest in issues and ideas matter.

unfit to analyze the cooperation going on in the OSCE, as it became clear during the researchprocess that the OSCE has no intelligence function and does not facilitate any form ofintelligence cooperation or exchange of operational information. Because of their majordifferences, many of the participating states in the OSCE actually perceive each other asthreats to their national security rather than allies, and thus collect intelligence about eachother rather than share it amongst themselves. Of course, this does not apply to all OSCE

59participating states, as several allying states are part of the organization, but the OSCEcooperation have not been extended into a more operational purpose mainly due to the diversemembership of conflicting states and their lack of trust in each other.

Even if researching the OSCE does not specifically advance or add to the existing literatureon intelligence cooperation, it provides valuable insight into the states’ ability to cooperate forgeneral security purposes and specifically counter terrorism. When it comes to the OSCE,generally very little literature exists regarding the organization’s value and especially theircounter terrorism efforts. This dissertation now adds to the limited discourse, with novelinformation and observation. Albeit, the research done here seems to often agree with muchof the already existing literature about the organization. My research indicates that the OSCEhas much added value with its broad and comprehensive collaboration, although notoperational cooperation, in the Transatlantic and Eurasian counter terrorism work. This isseen in its large preventive efforts to counter radicalization and violent extremism, solve andprevent violent conflicts and promote human rights. Still, as others in the literature havepointed to as well, it seems that the OSCE see major challenges in their cooperation andspecifically implementation, due to such as disagreements and conflicting views, lack of trustand limited resources.

On the other hand, the research conducted here on the part of Europol does not match quite aswell with the main arguments visible in the existing literature. The literature indicates that thecooperation in Europol is rather limited, suffering from major challenges and flaws. In thisstudy, the interviewee gave the impression that all states’ police- and security services supportand have an interest in the developments and improvements for closer cooperation and thatnone of the states are opposing this. In addition, the interview indicated that the counterterrorism cooperation at Europol is working quite well at this point, and that processes aretaking place to further attempt to improve their efforts and abilities. Frankly, some mistakeshave to be made, because they are not possible to avoid. But to a large extent, Europolappears to be well-functioning and handles their goals of countering terrorism well,contributing to a safer Europe.

No previous analyses or comparisons have been done between the OSCE and Europol, theirmember states’ ability to cooperate and what factors impact this ability. Obviously, it becameclear during the research process that I might be comparing oranges and apples in this study.

60Even so, the comparison of characteristics between the two can arguably give a valuableimpression of what basic traits are needed in an organization to be able to obtain a well-functioning cooperation, both on intelligence specifically, on counter terrorism and on variousother matters, and what traits seems to obstruct cooperation. However, again it needs to bestressed that the conclusions made in this study are extremely tentative and preliminary. Eventhough I triangulated my findings with existing, written sources, it is difficult to draw anybroad conclusions from a small data sample, of just three interviews, but this is precisely whatI intend to do with further research.

Jansson, J. (2016). Building resilience, demolishing accountability? The role of Europol in

Kropatcheva, E. (2012). Russia and the role of the OSCE in European security: a ‘Forum’ for dialog or a ‘Battlefield’ of interests?. European Security, 21(3), 370-394. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2011.640323

Wagner, W. (2006). Guarding the guards. The European Convention and the communitization of police co-operation. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(8), 1230-1246. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760600999540

Wainwright, R. (2012). The Future of the EU Internal Security after 2014: Will the UK Remain a Major Player?. UCL, The European Institute, June 2012, 1-9. http://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/ei-publications/working-paper-europol.pdf

House of Lords, (2008). EUROPOL: coordinating the fight against serious and organized crime. [online]. Available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/183/18302.htm [Accessed 5 Feb. 2018].

Birchall, G. (2017). One year on: What was the 2016 Brussels terror attack, where did the bombings take place and how many people were killed?. The Sun, [online]. Available at https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3147591/what-was-the-2016-brussels-terror-attack- where-did-the-bombings-take-place-and-how-many-people-were-killed/ [Accessed 16 Mar. 2018].

OSCE interview guide

- Is there any form of intelligence sharing in the OSCE?

- Why is there no intelligence function? - Is the OSCE, or the participating states, in any way sharing information and cooperating in a practical way to prevent and counter e.g. terrorist attacks? - Do the OSCE aspire in any way to cooperate on sharing intelligence and information, in a more practical and operational way, to increase the security in the region? E.g. when it comes to border security etc. - What is the functions of the POLIS network? Is there further potential for utilizing it and communicate on possible threats? - What are the functioning of the advance passenger information (API) systems? What are the aims? Potential? Are these efforts complimentary to the EU or in some ways a duplication? - There are efforts for operationalizing, e.g. attempts to further develop communication related to cyber-attacks. What is preventing or limiting the operationalization? - In general, what are the challenges to more practical, operational work related to countering transnational threats and cooperate on border security and management, cyber security, policing etc.? - What are the big frustrations you see in your areas of work? - What would you change if you could? What would you wish to be different? - What lies in the future? Where is the OSCE going, specifically in terms of further cooperation, countering of transnational threats. What role will the OSCE play in European security and intelligence cooperation in the future?

67Europol interview guide

- To what degree do the member states of Europol share intelligence and cooperate? - Do you think there is “enough” sharing? Do some states want to share less/more than others? - What characteristics do Europol have, that makes them able to have this level of cooperation and to share intelligence? - The information systems, SIENA etc: are they being used and fed with information and utilized by the states? Are they effectively being used? Is Europol directly involved and have access to the information? Develop analyses? - How do the different Europol databases/information systems work? Do all states use them? Update them? Are they being considered “successful”? Are they being utilized to the full? - (Do states want work related to cyber security in Europol? Is it a big focus there, or does it duplicate other venues? Are states able to cooperate on cyber security in Europol?) - Do Europol focus mostly on reactive or proactive efforts? - Do they share information about individuals of concern or suspected radicalized individuals? Who they are worried can preform terrorist attacks? Do they share info on individuals moving between states? Foreign terrorist fighters? - What impact do you believe Europol have on European security? - What role do you see Europol have in the future? Will Europol take on a more executive role? Become closer to a “European FBI/CIA”? Do states want this? Do you think it is something that Europol should want to do? - Brexit – what do you think are the consequences for Europol intelligence cooperation? - After terrorist attack, for example specifically the Paris attacks in 2015, there has been much criticism of European intelligence cooperation and sharing and calls for better cooperation. Do you think this criticism has been valid? Was it deserved? If so, has measures been taken in the last couple of years to enhance effort? - What are the challenges to cooperation and exchange of information in Europol? - What are the biggest frustrations you see? Are there anything you would wish to be different?