The most important aspect of a voting system, with respect to accuracy, integrity and security, is whether or not it is independently auditable. That is, the very prerequisite to accuracy, integrity and security in today’s voting technology is that there be a voter-marked paper ballot, or at least a voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT), for every vote cast. This ensures that election officials will have something they can use to confirm whether or not the electronic tallies produced by the voting system accurately reflected the intention of the voters.

Computerized voting equipment is inherently subject to programming error, equipment malfunction, and malicious tampering. It is therefore crucial that voting equipment provide or require the use of a permanent record of each vote that can be checked for accuracy by the voter before the vote is submitted, and is difficult or impossible to alter after it has been checked. Many of the Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) systems used in the US do not satisfy this requirement. Requirements for VVPAT have been established in a majority of states through legislation or through executive. Several States, while not formally requiring VVPAT, have nevertheless chosen to employ paper ballot systems voting systems. Three States (Maryland, New Jersey, and Tennessee) have enacted laws requiring VVPAT but have delayed implementation. (Click to enlarge the map above to see what states have passed requirements for a voter verified record. The relevant legislation in each State can be viewed on the right.)

The two most commonly used forms of these independent records are paper ballots, which are filled out by the voter (“voter-marked”) either manually or through the use of an assistive interface known as a ballot marking device, and can be tallied by a scanner or counted by hand, and VVPATs, which are contemporaneously printed by DRE voting machines. Sighted voters who use DRE voting machines with paper trails have the opportunity to review a paper record of their vote before casting it. Voter-marked paper ballots and VVPATs should be treated as the vote of record in all counts, audits and recounts where practicable. If DRE systems remain in use, they should not be used without a VVPAT printer, guidance to ensure that voters check the paper records for accuracy when voting; and sufficient emergency paper ballots on hand in case of machine failures or malfunctions. Sixteen states use DRE voting machines without a software independent voter-verifiable paper record as the standard polling place equipment in some or all counties. In these states, there is a risk that vote totals could be corrupted or lost, disenfranchising voters.1

Paper Ballots or VVPAT?

Voter-Marked Paper Ballots offer superior records for the following reasons:

Paper ballots provide better audit and recount records. While no voting system is perfect, the authors believe that paper ballots marked manually by the voter or through the use of an assistive ballot marking device can create superior records to be used in audits and recounts. When a voter manually marks a ballot, he or she tends to check it in the process of marking it. When a voter marks a ballot using an assistive ballot marking device, that device enables the printed marked ballot to be reviewed through audio readout, by re-inserting the ballot into the device. In contrast, if the DRE prints a VVPAT, it only becomes “voter verified” if the voter knows –and takes the time– to check it.

Most currently available VVPATs are small, usually viewable through a small window on the voting machine, and the font in which they are printed is also small. This makes them much harder to read than a full size ballot, decreasing the likelihood that all voters will confirm them. That compromises the value of VVPATs as audit records as compared to voter-marked paper ballots. In addition, paper ballots must be sturdy enough to be fed through a scanner and are therefore generally more durable than, for example, standard copier paper. That makes them easy to handle and unlikely to be damaged during even multiple hand-counted audits and recounts. In contrast, the VVPATs currently in use are less durable than standard copier paper, more fragile, subject to loss of data if exposed to heat, and more difficult to handle during a hand-count audit, because they are generally printed on thin paper similar to that used to print receipts from ATMs or cash registers. This further compromises their value as audit records as compared to voter-marked paper ballots.

VVPATs are not accessible audit records, while paper ballots marked by accessible ballot marking devices can be. With a VVPAT-equipped DRE, only the DRE itself is accessible to voters with disabilities; currently systems do not provide audio read-back of the printed record for voters with limited or no vision. Some voters with limited or no vision can currently verify a paper record through the use of assistive ballot marking technology, which enables audio readback of the voter’s choices from the printed and marked ballot.

Software Independence in Voting Systems

“A voting system is software-independent if an undetected change or error in its software cannot cause an undetectable change or error in an election outcome.”

In response to the concern that software errors in voting machines could result in inaccurate readings of votes, or votes being lost entirely, the Technical Guidelines Development Committee of the Election Assistance Commission recommended new standards (although this proposal has not yet been adopted) for future voting systems that would require voting systems to produce a voter-verifiable voting record that is independent of the software. A voting system that is not software-independent is said to be software-dependent it is, in some sense, vulnerable to undetected programming errors, malicious code, or software manipulation, thus the correctness of the election results are dependent on the correctness of the software. In terms of currently available voting technology, when there are no voter marked paper ballots or voter verified paper records of the vote, systems are considered “software dependent” and therefore not independently auditable.

The history of computing systems is that, given improvements and breakthroughs in technology and speed, software is able to do more and thus its complexity increases. The ability to prove the correctness of software diminishes rapidly as the software becomes more complex. It would effectively be impossible to adequately test future (and current) voting systems for aws and introduced fraud, and thus these systems would always remain suspect in their ability to provide secure and accurate elections. A software-independent approach to voting systems will provide voters with an assurance that errors or fraud in election results can reliably be detected. (Ronald L. Rivest and John P. Wack, On the notion of “software-independence” in voting systems, 2008)

The Verified Voting Resolution on Electronic Voting

In 2003, Verified Voting founder David Dill began circulating the Resolution on Electronic Voting, a petition now signed by thousands of computer science professionals, attorneys, politicians, voting rights experts, and citizens. The cornerstone of this campaign was a demand that all direct-recording electronic voting machines be equipped with a voter-veried paper trail.

The resolution reads: As a result of problems with elections in recent years, funding is being made available at all levels of government to upgrade election equipment. Unfortunately, some of the equipment being purchased, while superficially attractive to both voters and election officials, poses unacceptable risks to election integrity – risks of which election officials and the general public are largely unaware. We are in favor of the use of technology to solve difficult problems, but we know that technology must be used appropriately, with due attention to associated risks. For those who need to upgrade, there are safe, cost-effective alternatives available right now, and the potential for vastly better ones in the future. For these reasons, we endorse the following resolution:

“Computerized voting equipment is inherently subject to programming error, equipment malfunction, and malicious tampering. It is therefore crucial that voting equipment provide a voter-verifiable audit trail, by which we mean a permanent record of each vote that can be checked for accuracy by the voter before the vote is submitted, and is difficult or impossible to alter after it has been checked. Many of the electronic voting machines being purchased do not satisfy this requirement. Voting machines should not be purchased or used unless they provide a voter-verifiable audit trail; when such machines are already in use, they should be replaced or modified to provide a voter-verifiable audit trail. Providing a voter-verifiable audit trail should be one of the essential requirements for certification of new voting systems.”

While several legislative proposal were introduced after the 2000 Election, it was only after problems with the new touch-screen voting machines in Miami-Dade County in the 2002 Florida Primary that Congress passed the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA.) This act provided a huge infusion of cash so that states could buy new voting equipment and to update voter registration databases. Many states moved quickly to purchase high-tech electronic voting systems, buoyed by the assurance that they were accurate, accessible, reliable, and secure.

Unfortunately, these assurances turned out to be overly optimistic at best, and misleading at worst. In their eagerness to have the most modern and best election equipment, and to take advantage of almost $4 billion in federal funding, well meaning election officials were quick to accept the claims of voting system vendors. Few questions were asked about crucial issues. How secure and accurate are these machines? How easy are they to use? How could an election audit or recount be conducted? There was little or no consultation with independent technical experts on these questions, and remarkably little scientific research. The implicit assumption appears to have been that no recount would ever be needed, because the new systems were so completely secure and reliable that there would no longer be any reason to challenge an election result.

HAVA also created the Federal Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to oversee both the disbursement of federal funds and the development of new voting machine standards. However, the rst EAC Commissioners were not appointed until December 2003. The EAC had insucient funds to properly oversee the disbursement of $1.495 billion allocated in fiscal year 2003 to buy voting systems, a matter of great concern to EAC Chair, DeForest Soaries. The Technical Guidelines Development Committee, charged by HAVA with writing new voluntary voting system standards, was not even empaneled until June 2004. Meanwhile, states were supposed to have replaced their voting systems by the November 2004 elections, or January 2006 at the latest.

Instead of the promised major reform, HAVA engendered new kinds of election problems. Although DREs had been in use since the 1980s, an unrealistically short deadline, together with a lack of reasonable standards, triggered a massive deployment of faulty, flawed, and expensive equipment. This deployment has led to security and integrity crises for which there are no clear-cut legal remedies.

The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act

On May 22, 2003, Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ) introduced The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003 (H.R. 2239) which called for a) a voter-verified paper record suitable for a manual audit, b) no undisclosed software, and c) manual mandatory random audits of the voter-veried paper records for federal elections in 0.5% of each state’s jurisdictions. Had the bill passed, paper records and audits would have been required for the November 2004 election, and verifiable voting systems would have been made available for voters with disabilities by January 1, 2006, earlier than mandated by HAVA. While generating considerable support and serving as a model for legislation in several States, HR 2239 was never scheduled for Committee action or a floor vote.

In early February 2005 Holt introduced a second version of his bill. H.R. 550 would have taken effect in time for the next Federal election, which would have been the November 2006 mid-term elections. The legislation also required a voter-veried paper record and random manual audits|this time in 2% of all jurisdictions. It again prohibited the use of undisclosed software, wireless communications devices in voting systems, and voting machine components connected to the Internet. The most substantial dierences between H.R. 2239 and H.R. 550 were in the audit section, which grew from one paragraph to more than six pages. The new audit material was in direct response to the manner in which the 2004 Ohio recount was conducted. Like HR 2239 was never brought to a Committee or floor vote.

Holt introduced a third version of his bill, H.R. 811, in February 2007. A companion bill, S. 559, was introduced in the Senate by Sen. Bill Nelson (D-FL). Like its predecessors, H.R. 811 called for random manual audits, as well as the public disclosure of voting system software and a ban on Internet connections for voting machine components. Also like its predecessors, the bill was vetted with computer security experts and voting integrity and disability activist groups, as well as election officials. H.R. 811 mandated voter-verified paper ballots, instead of records.

Responding to the problems in Cuyahoga County, Ohio in May 2006, where 10% of the paper printout-outs from new DRE machines were lost, damaged or otherwise compromised, the bill required paper ballots to be “durable,” i.e. capable of withstanding multiple recounts by hand. Because of concerns that ballot marking devices might create problems for voters with mobility impairment, the bill called for the entire process of ballot verification and vote casting to be equipped for individuals with disabilities. Based on recommendations from the Brennan Center, the strengthened auditing provisions included a “tiered” system to reflect the closeness of announced election results. The bill also required audits to be publicly observable. H.R. 811 was marked up by the committee of jurisdiction, but was not voted on by the House.

H.R. 2894, introduced by Holt in June, 2009, was based on the mark-up version of H.R. 811. H.R. 2894 required voter-marked or ballot-marking device paper ballots for the November 2010 elections, made the paper ballot the vote of record (as had all earlier versions), mandated the same tiered audits as H.R. 811, and banned wireless devices, Internet connections, and uncertified and undisclosed software in voting and tabulating machines. The ballot marking requirements would have banned DREs. Sen. Nelson again introduced a Senate companion bill, S. 1431. Although supported by the broadest range of organizations of any version of the bill (including the American Council of the Blind, the Advancement Project, the Brennan Center, Common Cause, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Voter Action, and Veried Voting), and endorsed in a New York Times editorial, the bill received no committee action and no floor vote.

Alabama has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record. However, the State currently uses precinct count paper ballot optical scan systems together with ballot-marking devices to assist voter with disabilities in every county.

Alaska

Bill Number: HB 459 (full text)Relevant Election Code: Alaska Code §§15.15.030, 15.15.032, 15.20.064, and 15.60.010 / Chapter 154 SLA 04Enacted: July 7, 2004 (House vote 35-0; Senate Vote 18-0)VVPAT Language: Sec. 3. AS 15.15 is amended by adding a new section to read: Sec. 15.15.032. Use of electronically generated ballots.(a) If the director provides for voting by use of electronically generated ballots, the director shall provide balloting equipment that would allow voters with disabilities, including those who are blind or visually impaired, to cast private, independent, and verifiable ballots. The director may not provide for more than one machine that produces electronically generated ballots in a precinct or in a regional supervisor's office, except where the director determines that additional machines are needed to accommodate the needs of individuals with disabilities, including individuals with physical limitations or visual impairments.
(b) Software for voting by use of electronically generated ballots shall be tested and certified under AS 15.20.900.
(c) The director shall provide for a paper record of each electronically generated ballot that can be
(1) reviewed and corrected by the voter at the time the vote is cast; and
(2) used for a recount of the votes cast at an election in which electronically generated ballots were used.

Arizona

Bill Number: SB 1517 (full text)Relevant Election Code: ARS §§16-411, 16-445, 16-446, 16-535, 16-602, 16-663 Chapter 44 §8 SL 2006Enacted: June 28, 2006 (House vote 51-0; Senate Vote 25-3)VVPAT Language: Sec. 3. Section 16-446, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended to read:
16-446. Specifications of electronic voting system
A. An electronic voting system consisting of a voting or marking device in combination with vote tabulating equipment shall provide facilities for voting for candidates at both primary and general elections.
B. An electronic voting system shall:
…
7. provide a durable paper document or ballot that visually indicates the voter's selections, that the voter may use to verify the voter's choice, that may be spoiled by the voter if it fails to reflect the voter's choices and that permits the voter to cast a news ballot. This paper document shall be used in audits and recounts.

Arkansas

Bill Number: HB 1360 (full text- pdf)Relevant Election Code: AR Code §§7-5-504, 7-5-532 / Act 654, 2005 Regular SessionEnacted: March 9, 2005 (House vote 79-6; Senate Vote 34-0)VVPAT Language: SECTION 2. Arkansas Code Title 7, Chapter 5 is amended to add an additional section to read as follows:
7-5-532. Direct read electronic voting machines.
(a) For purposes of this section:
(1) “Direct electronic voting machine” means a voting machine that:
(A) Records votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electo-optical components that may be actuated by the voter;
(B) Process the data by means of a computer program;
(C) Records voting data and ballot images in internal or external memory components; and
(D) Produces a tabulation of the voting data stored in a removable memory component and in printed copy; and
(2) “Voter verified paper audit trail” means a contemporaneous paper record of a ballot printed for the voter to confirm his or her votes before the voter casts his or her ballot.
(b) The State Board of Election Commissioners or the county board of election commissioners shall not purchase or procure a direct recording electronic voting machine that does not include a voter verified paper audit trail.
(c)(1) All direct recording electronic voting machines in use on or after January 1, 2006 shall include a voter verified paper audit trail, except for those direct recording electronic voting machines in use during the 2004 general election.
(2) All direct recording electronic voting machines purchased on or after the effective date of this section shall include a voter verified paper audit trail.
(d) A direct read electronic voting machine with a voter verified paper audit trail shall meet the following conditions:
(1) The voter verified paper audit trail shall be verified by the voter before the casting of the voter’s ballot;
(2) The voter verified paper audit trail shall not be retained by the voter;
(3) The voter verified paper audit trail shall not contain individual voter information;
(4) The paper used in producing the voter verified paper audit trail shall be sturdy, clean, and resistant to degradation; and
(5) The voter verified paper audit trail shall be readable in a manner that makes the voter’s ballot choices obvious to the voter without the use of computer or electronic code.
(e)(1) For any recount of an election in which ballots are cast using a direct recording electronic voting machine with a voter verified paper audit trail, the voter verified paper audit trail shall serve as the official ballot to be recounted.
(2) Voter verified paper audit trails shall be preserved in the same manner and for the same time period as ballots and certificates are preserved under § 7-5-702.

California

Bill Number: SB 1438 (full text)Relevant Election Code: California Election Code §§ 19250, 19251, 19252 / Chapter 814, Statutes of 2004Enacted: September 27, 2004 (House vote 73-0; Senate Vote 31-0)VVPAT Language: SECTION 1. Article 4 (commencing with Section 19250) is added to Chapter 3 of Division 19 of the Elections Code, to read:
Article 4. Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems
19250. (a) On and after January 1, 2005, the Secretary of State may not approve a direct recording electronic voting system unless the system has received federal qualification and includes an accessible voter verified paper audit trail.
(b) On and after January 1, 2006, a city or county may not contract for or purchase a direct recording electronic voting system unless the system has received federal qualification and includes an accessible voter verified paper audit trail.
(c) As of January 1, 2006, all direct recording electronic voting systems in use on that date, regardless of when contracted for or purchased, shall have received federal qualification and include an accessible voter verified paper audit trail. If the direct recording electronic voting system does not already include an accessible voter verified paper audit trail, the system shall be replaced or modified to include an accessible voter verified paper audit trail.
19251. For purposes of this article, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
(a) "Accessible" means that the information provided on the paper record copy from the voter verified paper audit trail mechanism is provided or conveyed to voters via both a visual and a nonvisual method, such as through an audio component.
(b) "Direct recording electronic voting system" means a voting system that records a vote electronically and does not require or permit the voter to record his or her vote directly onto a tangible ballot.
(c) "Voter verified paper audit trail" means a component of a direct recording electronic voting system that prints a contemporaneous paper record copy of each electronic ballot and allows each voter to confirm his or her selections before the voter casts his or her ballot.
(d) "Federal qualification" means the system has been certified, if applicable, by means of qualification testing by a Nationally Recognized Test Laboratory and has met or exceeded the minimum requirements set forth in the Performance and Text Standards for Punch Card, Mark Sense, and Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems, or in any successor voluntary standard document, developed and promulgated by the Federal Election Commission, the Election Assistance Commission, or the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
(e) "Paper record copy" means an auditable document printed by a voter verified paper audit trail component that corresponds to the voter's electronic vote and lists the contests on the ballot and the voter's selections for those contests. A paper record copy is not a ballot.

Colorado

Bill Number: SB 05-198(full text)Relevant Election Code: CO Revised Statutes §§1-1-104, 1-5-801, 1-5-802, 1-7-514, 1-10.5-102, 1-10.5-103 / Chapter 309, SL 2005Enacted: June 6, 2005VVPAT Language: PART 8 VOTER-VERIFIED PAPER RECORD
1-5-801. Acquisition of voting systems - voter-verified paper record. (1) On and after the effective date of this section, a political subdivision shall not acquire a voting system unless the voting system is capable of producing a voter-verified paper record of each elector's vote.
(2) A political subdivision shall not acquire a voting device that has been retrofitted to comply with this part 8 unless the voting device has been certified by an independent testing authority and the secretary of state.
1-5-802. Use of voting systems - voter-verified paper record.
(1) In addition to the other requirements of this article, the voting system used in each primary, general, coordinated, or congressional district vacancy election held in the state on and after January 1, 2010, shall have the capability to produce a voter-verifiable paper record of each elector's vote. Before an elector's vote is cast, the elector shall have the opportunity, in private and without assistance, to inspect and verify that the voter-verified paper record correctly reflects the elector's choices. [This deadline was extended to January 1, 2014 by HB 1335 approved on May 15 2009](2) The requirements of subsection (1) of this section shall apply to each primary, general, coordinated, or congressional district vacancy election conducted by a county clerk and recorder on and after January 1, 2008, if the governing body of the county determines that:
(a) The technology necessary to comply with the requirements of subsection (1) of this section is available; and
(b) (I) Sufficient federal or state funds are available to acquire or retrofit voting devices that comply with the requirements of subsection (1) of this section; or
(II) It is otherwise financially feasible for the county to comply with the requirements of subsection (1) of this section.
(3) Upon satisfaction by a county of the requirements of this section, the voter-verified paper record of each eligible elector's vote, whether filled out by hand or produced by a voting machine or ballot marking device, shall be preserved as an election record pursuant to section 1-7-802 and shall constitute an official record of the election.
(4) No voting device shall be remotely accessed or remotely accessible until after the close of voting and a results total tape has been printed, as applicable.

Connecticut

Bill Number: SB 55 (full text)Relevant Election Code: Public Act 05-188Enacted: July 1, 2005VVPAT Language: (d) Any direct recording electronic voting machine approved by the Secretary of the State for an election or primary held on or after July 1, 2005, shall be so constructed as to:
(1) (A) Contemporaneously produce an individual, permanent, paper record containing all of the elector's selections of ballot preferences for candidates and questions or proposals, if any, prior to the elector's casting a ballot, as set forth in this subsection, and (B) produce at any time after the close of the polls a voting machine generated, individual, permanent, paper record of each such elector's selections of ballot preferences for candidates and questions or proposals, if any. Both the contemporaneously produced paper record and the voting machine generated paper record of each elector's selections of ballot preferences shall include a voting machine generated unique identifier that can be matched against each other and which preserves the secrecy of the elector's ballot as set forth in subdivision (4) of this subsection;
(2) Provide each elector with an opportunity to verify that the contemporaneously produced, individual, permanent, paper record accurately conforms to such elector's selection of ballot preferences, as reflected on the electronic summary screen, and to hear, if desired, an audio description of such electronic summary screen, for the purpose of having an opportunity to make any corrections or changes prior to casting the ballot. If an elector makes corrections or changes prior to casting the ballot, the voting machine shall void such contemporaneously produced paper record, contemporaneously produce another paper record containing such corrections or changes and provide the elector with another opportunity to verify ballot preferences in accordance with the provisions of this subdivision. As used in this section, "electronic summary screen" means a screen generated by a direct recording electronic voting machine that displays a summary of an elector's selections of ballot preferences for candidates and questions or proposals, if any, at an election or primary;
(3) Provide that a ballot shall be deemed cast on the voting machine at the time that an elector's contemporaneously produced, individual, permanent, voter-verified paper record, containing all of the elector's final selections of ballot preferences, is (A) deposited inside a receptacle designed to store all such paper records produced by such voting machine on the day of the election or primary, and (B) the elector's selection of ballot preferences is simultaneously electronically recorded inside the voting machine for the purpose of (i) being electronically tabulated immediately after the polls are closed on the day of the election or primary, and (ii) producing, on such other day as required under section 8 of this act, a voting machine generated, individual, permanent, paper record of each such elector's selections of ballot preferences for candidates and questions or proposals, if any;
(4) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (1) of section 8 of this act, secure the secrecy of each such elector's ballot by making it impossible for any other individual to identify the elector in relationship to such elector's selection of ballot preferences at the time that the elector (A) selects ballot preferences; (B) verifies the accuracy of the electronic summary screen by comparing it to the contemporaneously produced, individual, permanent, paper record or the audio description of such electronic summary screen, prior to casting a ballot; (C) makes corrections or changes by reselecting ballot preferences and verifies the accuracy of such preferences in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (2) of this subsection prior to casting a ballot; and (D) casts the ballot; and at the time that all electors' ballots are canvassed, recanvassed or otherwise tallied to produce a final count of the vote for candidates and questions or proposals, if any, whether through the electronic vote tabulation process or through the manual count process of each elector's contemporaneously produced, individual, permanent, voter-verified paper record, as set forth in section 8 of this act; and
(5) (A) Be accessible to blind or visually impaired persons by providing each elector, if desired by the elector, an audio description of the contemporaneously produced individual, permanent, paper record containing all of the elector's selections of ballot preferences, in addition to an audio description of the electronic summary screen.
(B) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (A) of this subdivision, the Secretary the State may approve an electronic voting machine that does not comply with the provisions of said subparagraph if (i) the Secretary determines that there are no electronic voting machines available for purchase or lease at the time of such approval that are capable of complying with said subparagraph (A), (ii) the electronic voting machine complies with the provisions of subdivisions (1) to (4), inclusive, of this subsection, and (iii) the person applying to the Secretary for approval of the electronic voting machine agrees to include a provision in any contract for the sale or lease of such voting machines that requires such person, upon notification by the Secretary that modifications to such machines that would bring the machines into compliance said subparagraph (A) are available, to (I) so modify any electronic voting machines previously sold or leased under such contract in order to comply with said subparagraph (A), and (II) provide that any electronic voting machines sold or leased after receipt of such notice comply with said subparagraph (A).

Delaware

Delaware has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record.

District of Columbia

The District of Columbia has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record. However, precinct count paper ballot optical scan systems and DREs equipped with voter verified paper audit trail printers are used throughout the District.

Florida

Bill Number: HB 537 (full text - pdf)Relevant Election Code: FL Statutes §§101.151, Chapter 2007-30 SL 2007Enacted: May 21, 2007 (House vote 118-0; Senate Vote 37-2)VVPAT Language: Section 5. Effective July 1, 2008, subsection (1) of section 101.151, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
…
101.56075 Voting methods.—
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), all voting shall be by marksense ballot utilizing a marking device for the purpose of designating ballot selections.
(2) Persons with disabilities may vote on a voter interface device that meets the voting system accessibility requirements for individuals with disabilities pursuant to section 301 of the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002 and s. 101.56062.
(3) By 2012, persons with disabilities shall vote on a voter interface device that meets the voter accessibility requirements for individuals with disabilities under section 301 of the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002 and s. 101.56062, which are consistent with subsection (1) of this section.

Georgia

Georgia has not established a requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record.

Hawaii

Bill Number: HB 1740 (full text)Relevant Election Code: HRS §16-42; Act 200 SL 2005Enacted: July 6, 2005VVPAT Language: SECTION 1. Section 16-42, Hawaii Revised Statutes, is amended to read as follows:
§16-42 Electronic voting requirements.
…
No electronic voting system shall be used in any election unless it generates a paper ballot that may be inspected and corrected by the voter before the vote is cast, and unless every paper ballot is retained as the definitive record of the vote cast.

Idaho

Bill Number: HB 283 (full text)Relevant Election Code: HRS §16-42; Act 200 SL 2005Enacted: April 5, 2005 (House vote 63-0; Senate Vote 34-0)VVPAT Language: SECTION 1. That Section 34-2409, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended to read as follows:
…
(5) Any voting system, including paper ballots, that was used in the 2004 general election shall be continued to be authorized for use as long as the voting system meets the requirements of the "Help America Vote Act of 2002," Public Law 107-252.
(6) For all elections conducted after 2004, no direct recording electronic voting device shall be used unless the direct recording electronic voting device has a voter verifiable paper audit trail. Any certifications of a direct recording electronic voting device without a voter verifiable paper audit trail are hereby declared null and void.
(7) The secretary of state may periodically review the various voting systems that have been certified for use in the state to ensure such systems meet the standards set forth by the federal election assistance commission and the national institute of standards and technology. Any voting system that does not meet such standards may be decertified after a public hearing.

Illinois

Bill Number: SB 428(full text)Relevant Election Code: 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24A-16Enacted: August 21, 2003VVPAT Language: Upon completing his or her selection of candidates or public questions, the voter shall signify that voting has been completed by activating the appropriate button, switch or active area of the ballot screen associated with end of voting. Upon activation, the voting system shall record an image of the completed ballot, increment the proper ballot position registers, and shall signify to the voter that the ballot has been cast. Upon activation, the voting system shall also print a permanent paper record of each ballot cast as defined in Section 24C-2 of this Code. This permanent paper record shall either be self-contained within the voting device or shall be deposited by the voter into a secure ballot box. No permanent paper record shall be removed from the polling place except by election officials as authorized by this Article. All permanent paper records shall be preserved and secured by election officials in the same manner as paper ballots and shall be available as an official record for any recount, redundant count, or verification or retabulation of the vote count conducted with respect to any election in which the voting system is used.

Indiana

Indiana has not established a requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record.

Iowa

Bill Number: SF 639(full text)Relevant Election Code: Code 2007 §52.7 subsection 2Enacted:May 25, 2007 (House Vote 53-42; Senate Vote 45-5)VVPAT Language: (reflecting changes in the code as a result of SF 639) 1.The Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, the board of supervisors of a county may, by a majority vote, authorize, purchase, and order the use of voting machines or an electronic optical scan voting system in any one or more voting precincts within the county until otherwise ordered by the board of supervisors. Voting machines and an electronic optical scan voting system may be used concurrently at the same precinct.
2. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary:
a. On or after the effective date of this Act, a county whose voting system primarily utilizes voting machines, as defined in section 52.1, shall, when seeking to replace the voting system, replace the voting system with an optical scan voting system only. The requirements of the federal Help America Vote Act relating to disabled voters shall be met by a county through the use of electronic ballot marking devices that are compatible with an optical scan voting system.
b. On or after the effective date of this Act, a county that utilizes a voting machine, as defined in section 52.1, and an optical scan voting system concurrently at the same precinct shall, when seeking to replace the voting machine, replace the voting machine with an electronic ballot marking device that is compatible with an optical scan voting system in order to ensure that each precinct in the county shall have at least one electronic ballot marking device.

Kansas

Kansas has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record.

Kentucky

Kentucky has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record.

Louisiana

Louisiana has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record.

Maine

Bill Number: LD 1759(full text)Relevant Election Code: 21-A M.R.S. Section 812Enacted:April 24, 2004VVPAT Language: Sec. 5. 21-A MRSA §§831 and 832 are enacted to read:
§831.__Voting machine standards
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2. Ballots. All voting machines in the State must produce a physical ballot, equivalent or superior to that of a hand-cast ballot, that unambiguously reflects the intent of the voter and that each voter shall personally review and deliver to an official ballot box. Touch screen voting machines must produce a legible, large-print ballot for verification by each voter of that voter's electoral choices before it is placed in the official ballot box. Each such ballot must also identify the individual machine that produced it while not identifying the voter.
A. Ballots may be an optional feature only of machines dedicated to accommodate the needs of sight-impaired voters or other voters with disabilities for whom wardens determine usage of ballot-free voting is appropriate. The option of using a ballot-free function on a touch screen machine may be executed only by a warden on duty at an individual voting place upon request of a voter with a disability and only on a machine dedicated for access by voters with disabilities. A total count of such ballot-free uses on dedicated voting machines, which must be compiled so as to maintain complete voter anonymity, must be kept at each voting district and transmitted to the Office of the Secretary of State along with the election results.
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3. Proscribed voting machines. The following types of voting machines may not be used in the conduct of state elections:
A. Direct recording electronic voting machines;
B. Punch card voting machines;
C. Mechanical lever voting machines; and
D. Any machine that does not produce a paper ballot except as provided in subsection 2, paragraph A.

Bill Number: LD 1026(full text)Relevant Election Code: 21-A MRSA §607, sub-§6, 21-A MRSA §737-BEnacted:June 23, 2005VVPAT Language: Sec. 1. 21-A MRSA §812, sub-§10, as enacted by PL 2003, c. 651, §7, is amended to read:
10. Paper audit trail. Unless excluded pursuant to section 812-A, subsection 1, it It must produce or employ permanent paper records of the votes cast that are able to be verified by individual voters before their votes are cast and that provide a manual audit capacity for the machine. In the case of direct recording electronic voting machines, those records must also identify the individual machines that produced them without revealing the identities of the voters who cast the ballots. In all cases, these records must be reviewed in the event of a recount and considered in conjunction with the machine-produced tally.

Sec. 2. 21-A MRSA §812-A, sub-§1, as enacted by PL 2003, c. 651, §8, is amended to read:
1. Accessible voting equipment at each polling place. The Secretary of State, in compliance with the voting accessibility requirements of the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002, shall provide one direct recording electronic voting machine, or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities, for use at each polling place used in the conduct of state elections. Such machines must produce permanent paper records that provide a manual audit capacity for the machines and must also provide voters with audio functions that enable the voters to verify their ballots aurally before the votes are cast, and all such machines are exempt from subject to the requirements of section 812, subsection 10.

Additional accessible voting machines may be used in the conduct of state elections, but those machines must meet the requirements set forth in section 812.

Maryland

Bill Number: HB 18 and SB 392(full text)Relevant Election Code: Maryland Code Article-Election Law §9-102, Chapter 548 SL 2007Enacted:May 17, 2007 (House Vote 140-0; Senate Vote 47-0)VVPAT Language: SECTION 1. BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND, That the Laws of Maryland read as follows:
Article – Election Law 9–102.
(A) IN THIS SECTION, A “VOTER–VERIFIABLE PAPER RECORD” INCLUDES:
(1) A PAPER BALLOT PREPARED BY THE VOTER FOR THE PURPOSE OF BEING READ BY A PRECINCT–BASED OPTICAL SCANNER;
(2) A PAPER BALLOT PREPARED BY THE VOTER TO BE MAILED TO THE APPLICABLE LOCAL BOARD, WHETHER MAILED FROM A DOMESTIC OR AN OVERSEAS LOCATION; AND
(3) A PAPER BALLOT CREATED THROUGH THE USE OF A BALLOT MARKING DEVICE.
[(a)] (B) The State Board shall adopt regulations for the review, certification, and decertification of voting systems.
[(b)] (C) The State Board shall periodically review and evaluate alternative voting systems.
[(c)] (D) The State Board may not certify a voting system unless the State Board determines that:
(1) the voting system will:
(i) protect the secrecy of the ballot;
(ii) protect the security of the voting process;
(iii) count and record all votes accurately;
(iv) accommodate any ballot used under this article;
(v) protect all other rights of voters and candidates; [and]
(vi) be capable of creating a paper record of all votes cast in order that an audit trail is available in the event of a recount, INCLUDING A MANUAL RECOUNT; AND
(VII) PROVIDE A VOTER–VERIFIABLE PAPER RECORD THAT:
1. IS AN INDIVIDUAL DOCUMENT THAT IS PHYSICALLY SEPARATED FROM ANY OTHER SIMILAR DOCUMENT AND NOT PART OF A CONTINUOUS ROLL;
2. IS SUFFICIENTLY DURABLE TO WITHSTAND REPEATED HANDLING FOR THE PURPOSES OF MANDATORY RANDOM AUDITS AND RECOUNTS; AND
3. USES INK THAT DOES NOT FADE, SMEAR, OR OTHERWISE DEGRADE AND OBSCURE OR OBLITERATE THE PAPER RECORD OVER TIME;
(2) the voting system has been:
(i) examined by an independent testing laboratory that is approved by the [National Association of State Election Directors] U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; and
(ii) shown by the testing laboratory to meet the performance and test standards for electronic voting systems established by the Federal Election Commission OR THE U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; and
(3) the public interest will be served by the certification of the voting system.
[(d)] (E) In determining whether a voting system meets the required standards, the State Board shall consider:
(1) the commercial availability of the system and its replacement parts and components;
(2) the availability of continuing service for the system;
(3) the cost of implementing the system;
(4) the efficiency of the system;
(5) the likelihood that the system will malfunction;
(6) the system’s ease of understanding for the voter;
(7) the convenience of voting afforded by the system;
(8) the timeliness of the tabulation and reporting of election returns;
(9) the potential for an alternative means of verifying the tabulation;
(10) accessibility for all voters with disabilities recognized by the Americans with Disabilities Act; and
(11) any other factor that the State Board considers relevant.
(F) A VOTING SYSTEM SELECTED, CERTIFIED, AND IMPLEMENTED UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL:
(1) PROVIDE ACCESS TO VOTERS WITH DISABILITIES THAT IS EQUIVALENT TO ACCESS AFFORDED VOTERS WITHOUT DISABILITIES WITHOUT CREATING A SEGREGATED BALLOT FOR VOTERS WITH DISABILITIES;
(2) ENSURE THE INDEPENDENT, PRIVATE CASTING, INSPECTION, VERIFICATION, AND CORRECTION OF SECRET BALLOTS BY VOTERS WITH DISABILITIES IN AN ACCESSIBLE MEDIA BY BOTH VISUAL AND NONVISUAL MEANS, INCLUDING SYNCHRONIZED AUDIO OUTPUT AND ENHANCED VISUAL DISPLAY; AND
(3) COMPLY WITH BOTH THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, P.L. 101–336, AND THE HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT, P.L. 107–252, INCLUDING ACCESSIBILITY STANDARDS ADOPTED AS PART OF THE VOLUNTARY VOTING SYSTEM GUIDELINES PURSUANT TO THE HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT.
(G) (1) AT LEAST ONE VOTING SYSTEM IN EACH POLLING PLACE ON ELECTION DAY SHALL PROVIDE ACCESS FOR VOTERS WITH DISABILITIES IN COMPLIANCE WITH SUBSECTION (F) OF THIS SECTION.
(2) THE STATE BOARD SHALL ENSURE THAT ADEQUATE BACKUP EQUIPMENT IS AVAILABLE AND CONTINGENCY PLANS ARE ESTABLISHED TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH PARAGRAPH (1) OF THIS SUBSECTION.
(H) BEFORE THE SELECTION OF A VOTING SYSTEM, THE STATE BOARD SHALL:
(1) ENSURE THAT AN ACCESSIBLE VOTING SYSTEM CONFORMS TO THE ACCESS REQUIREMENTS OF THE VOLUNTARY VOTING SYSTEM GUIDELINES DEVELOPED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF SELECTION; AND
(2) CONDUCT AN ACCESSIBILITY AND USABILITY EVALUATION OF THE VOTING SYSTEM TO ASSESS ITS ACCESSIBILITY AND USABILITY BY VOTERS WITH DISABILITIES, INCLUDING:
(I) A PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION OF THE SYSTEM; AND
(II) AN EVALUATION BY INDIVIDUALS REPRESENTING A CROSS–SECTION OF VOTERS WITH DISABILITIES.
[(e)] (I) (1) The State Board shall adopt regulations relating to requirements for each voting system selected and certified under § 9–101 of this subtitle.
(2) The regulations shall specify the procedures necessary to assure that the standards of this title are maintained, including:
(i) a description of the voting system;
(ii) a public information program by the local board, at the time of introduction of a new voting system, to be directed to all voters, candidates, campaign groups, schools, and news media in the county;
(iii) local election officials’ responsibility for management of the system;
(iv) the actions required to assure the security of the voting system;
(v) the supplies and equipment required;
(vi) the storage, delivery, and return of the supplies and equipment necessary for the operation of the voting system;
(vii) standards for training election officials in the operation and use of the voting system;
(viii) before each election and for all ballot styles to be used, testing by the members of the local board to ensure the accuracy of tallying, tabulation, and reporting of the vote, and observing of that testing by representatives of political parties and of candidates who are not affiliated with political parties;
(ix) the number of voting stations or voting booths required in each polling place, in relation to the number of registered voters assigned to the polling place;
(x) the practices and procedures in each polling place appropriate to the operation of the voting system;
(xi) assuring ballot accountability in systems using a document ballot;
(xii) the actions required to tabulate votes; and
(xiii) postelection review and audit of the system’s output.
(3) Certification of a voting system is not effective until the regulations applicable to the voting system have been adopted.
(a) In consultation with the local boards, the State Board shall:
(1) develop a program of instruction of election judges; and
(2) oversee the implementation of the program of instruction.
(b) The training materials utilized by the program may include:
(1) an instruction manual and other written directives;
(2) curriculum for training sessions; and
(3) audiovisuals.
(c) The State Board shall develop a process for the evaluation of the training program and the performance of the polling place staff in each county.
(d) To the extent appropriate, the training program shall be specific to each of the voting systems used in polling places in the State.
(E) (1) THE STATE BOARD SHALL PROVIDE ELECTION JUDGES WITH UNIFORM STATEWIDE TRAINING ON THE VOTING SYSTEM, INCLUDING:
(I) ALL FEATURES OF THE VOTING SYSTEM THAT PROVIDE ACCESS TO VOTERS WITH DISABILITIES; AND
(II) THE RIGHTS OF VOTERS WITH DISABILITIES, INCLUDING THOSE RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY STATE AND FEDERAL LAW.
[(e)] (F) Each local board shall conduct election judge training based on the program developed by the State Board.
[(f)] (G) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, each election judge shall participate in the training program provided for in subsection (a) of this section.
(2) An election judge who is appointed under emergency circumstances is not required to attend the course of instruction.
SECTION 2. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That this Act shall apply to each election occurring on or after March January 1, 2008 2010, that is required to be conducted in accordance with the Election Law Article.
SECTION 3. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That, if the Attorney General determines on or after the effective date of this Act that any provision of this Act is in conflict with any law of the United States or a rule, regulation, or policy of the U.S.Election Assistance Commission, the conflicting provision of this Act shall be abrogated and of no force or effect. The Attorney General, within 5 days after determining the existence of a conflict, shall notify in writing the Department of Legislative Services, Legislative Services Building, 90 State Circle, Annapolis, MD 21401.
SECTION 4. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That this Act is contingent on the appropriation of sufficient general, special, or federal funds in the State budget no later than fiscal year 2009 for the State Board of Elections to perform the functions set forth in Section 2 1 of this Act, and if sufficient funds are not appropriated in the State budget to the State Board of Elections by fiscal year 2009 to perform the functions set forth in Section 2 1 of this Act, this Act shall be null and void without the necessity of further action by the General Assembly. Within 10 days after the fiscal year 2009 budget has been enacted by the General Assembly, the Department of Budget and Management shall determine and notify the Department of Legislative Services whether sufficient general, special, or federal funds have been appropriated in the fiscal year 2009 budget for the State Board of Elections to perform the functions set forth in Section 2 1 of this Act.
SECTION 5. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That, subject to Sections 2 through 4 of this Act, this Act shall take effect October 1, 2007.

Massachusetts

Massachusetts has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record. However all jurisdictions in Massachusetts use paper ballot systems together with ballot marking devices to assist voters with disabilities.

Michigan

Michigan has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record. However, on August 4, 2003, Secretary of State Terri Lynn Land announced that Michigan was adopting an optical scan voting system statewide.

"This statewide standard will bridge the technology gap that hinders Michigan's election process," said Land, who is the state's chief election officer. "Bringing every precinct on line with optical scan technology enhances the experience for voters and election workers alike. We're ushering in a new and exciting era of voting in Michigan. This upgrade paves the way for further improvements that will make our process more contemporary, efficient, accurate and convenient." (source)

Minnesota

Bill Number: HF 874(full text)Relevant Election Code: Ch. 162 Session Law 2005Enacted:June 3, 2005 (House Vote 133-0; Senate Vote 63-0)VVPAT Language: 206.80 [ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS.]
(a) An electronic voting system may not be employed unless
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(7) provides every voter an opportunity to verify votes recorded on the permanent paper ballot or paper record, either visually or using assistive voting technology, and to change votes or correct any error before the voter's ballot is cast and counted, produces an individual, discrete, permanent, paper ballot or paper record of the ballot cast by the voter, and preserves the paper ballot or paper record as an official record available for use in any recount.
(b) An electronic voting system purchased on or after the effective date of this section may not be employed unless it:
(1) accepts and tabulates, in the polling place or at a counting center, a marked optical scan ballot;
(2) creates a marked optical scan ballot that can be tabulated in the polling place or at a counting center by automatic tabulating equipment certified for use in this state; or
(3) securely transmits a ballot electronically to automatic tabulating equipment in the polling place while creating an individual, discrete, permanent paper record of each vote on the ballot.

Mississippi

Mississippi has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record.

Missouri

Missouri has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record. However on February 26, 2004, Secretary of State Matt Blunt announced that would require any Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) systems that may be purchased by local election officials produce a voter verified paper ballot.

"We have worked hard over the past three years to ensure that our elections are above reproach and that Missouri voters have confidence in the process and most importantly, the results," Blunt said. "By requiring all DRE's to produce a voter verifiable ballot, we will provide voters with the peace of mind they deserve on Election Day by enabling them to review their ballots prior to casting them." (source)

Montana

Bill Number: HB 297(full text)Relevant Election Code: §13-17-103 MCAEnacted:April 18, 2005 (House Vote 94-3; Senate Vote 50-0)VVPAT Language: Section 1. Section 13-17-103, MCA, is amended to read:
"13-17-103. Required specifications for voting systems.
(1) A voting system may not be approved under 13-17-101 unless the voting system:
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(k) uses a paper ballot that allows votes to be manually counted, except as provided in subsection (2).
(2) A direct recording electronic system that does not mark a paper ballot may be used to facilitate voting by a disabled voter pursuant to the Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. 15301, et seq., if:
(a) (i) a direct recording electronic system that uses a paper ballot has not yet been certified by the federal election assistance commission; or
(ii) a direct recording electronic system that marks a paper ballot has not yet been approved by the secretary of state pursuant to 13-17 101; and
(b) the system records votes in a manner that will allow the votes to be printed and manually counted or audited if necessary.

Nebraska

Nebraska has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record. However, Nebraska currently uses precinct count paper ballot optical scan systems together with ballot-marking devices to assist voter with disabilities in every county.

Nevada

Nevada has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record. On December 10, 2003, Secretary of State Dean Heller announced his decision to purchase Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines for all Nevada counties and mandating a voter verifiable paper printer be included on all newly purchased DRE machines for the 2004 election. He added that all existing machines statewide must add the printer technology by 2006.

"Voting is the most fundamental freedom Americans enjoy; it is the backbone of a free and democratic society," Heller said. "As the State's Chief Elections Officer, my duty is clear: to provide voters with the highest level of confidence that elections in this state are fair, unbiased and secure. These critical principles led to my decision to be the first state in the nation to demand a vendor to include a voter verifiable receipt (VVR) printer on all DRE machines in time for the 2004 election. It is a right of every citizen to feel secure that the voting choices they have made are recorded accurately. A paper trail is an intrinsic component of voter confidence." Senator John Ensign, whom Heller has spoken with several times over the VVR issue, added, "I have been a strong and vocal advocate for approval of federal legislation requiring paper verification of ballots. As public officials, we have a serious responsibility to maintain the integrity of our election process, including voting machines and ballots." (source)

New Hampshire

Relevant Election Code: New Hampshire statutes Chapter 656:41Enacted: 1994Paper Ballot Language: 656:41 Approval by Ballot Law Commission. – The ballot law commission shall act as a board to examine devices for the electronic counting of ballots. The commission shall, whenever requested, examine any device which may be capable of meeting the requirements for elections held in this state. The commission shall approve such device in its discretion, and no device shall be used in any election in this state unless it reads the voter's choice on a paper ballot and is of a type so approved by the ballot law commission. Any device that is altered must be re-approved before it is used in any election in this state. For the purposes of this section, a device shall be considered altered if any mechanical or electronic part, hardware, software, or programming has been altered.

New Jersey

Bill Number: A 33 (full text)Relevant Election Code: R.S.19:48-1 and P.L.1973, c.82.Enacted: July 7, 2005VVPAT Language: 1. R.S.19:48-1 is amended to read as follows:
19:48-1. Any thoroughly tested and reliable voting machines may be adopted, rented, purchased or used, which shall be so constructed as to fulfill the following requirements:
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By January 1, 2008, each voting machine shall produce an individual permanent paper record for each vote cast, which shall be made available for inspection and verification by the voter at the time the vote is cast, and preserved for later use in any manual audit, unless a waiver of the provisions of this paragraph is granted by the Attorney General for good cause.
2. Section 3 of P.L.1973, c.82 (C.19:53A-3) is amended to read as follows:
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i. By January 1, 2008, produce an individual permanent paper record for each vote cast, which shall be made available for inspection and verification by the voter at the time the vote is cast, and preserved for later use in any manual audit, unless a waiver of the provisions of this subsection is granted by the Attorney General for good cause. (cf: P.L.2004, c.88, s.18)
STATEMENT
This bill would require that each voting machine in use in the State produce an individual permanent paper record for each vote cast. The record would be made available for inspection and verification by the voter at the time the vote is cast, and preserved for later use in any manual audit. Such a voter-verified paper record would give voters increased confidence that their votes were counted accurately. Counties would be required to comply with the provisions of this bill by January 1, 2008, unless a waiver is granted by the Attorney General for good cause.The bill is modeled on provisions in a bill sponsored by Congressman Rush Holt (H.R.2239), introduced in May 2003.

Bill Number: A 3648 (full text)Relevant Election Code:R.S.19:48-1, P.L.1973, c.82 and P.L.2005, c.137Enacted: March 6, 2009VVPAT Language: 1. R.S.19:48-1 is amended to read as follows:
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(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be suspended until: i) the Secretary of State and the State Treasurer certify in writing that sufficient funds have been provided by the federal government and received by the State to offset the entire cost of ensuring that each voting machine used in this State produces an individual permanent paper record for each vote cast; or (ii) the annual appropriation act contains an appropriation of sufficient funds to ensure that each voting machine used in this State produces an individual permanent paper record for each vote cast and such appropriated funds have not been reserved by the Governor under a spending reduction plan; or (iii) the Secretary of State and the State Treasurer certify in writing that sufficient funds have been provided by the federal government and received by the State, and the annual appropriation act contains an appropriation of sufficient unreserved funds, to ensure, when such funds are combined, that each voting machine used in this State produces an individual paper record for each vote cast. (cf: P.L.2008, c.18, s.l)

New Mexico

Bill Number: SB 295(full text - pdf)Relevant Election Code: NMSA 1978 (being Laws 1969, Chapter 240, Section 188, as amendedEnacted: March 2, 2006 (House Vote 38-24; Senate Vote 23-18)Paper Ballot Language: Section 2. Section 1-9-7.1 NMSA 1978 (being Laws 2005, Chapter 270, Section 56) is amended to read:
"1-9-7.1. VOTING SYSTEM--USE OF PAPER BALLOT.--
A. All voting systems used in elections covered by the Election Code shall use a paper ballot on which the voter physically or electronically marks the voter's choices on the ballot itself; provided, however, that voting systems owned or used by a county on May 1, 2006 that do not use a paper ballot may be used until an adequate supply of voting systems is available and sufficient federal, state or local funds are available:
(1) to replace the voting systems;
(2) to acquire the necessary software;
(3) for the secretary of state to purchase the paper ballots for all counties to use on the new voting system for primary and general elections; and
(4) to hold the counties harmless for payments due for voting systems under lease-purchase agreements entered into pursuant to Sections 1-9-17 through 1-9-19 NMSA 1978.
B. In any event, a voting system shall not be used if it has not been certified by the secretary of state and if a competitive bid process has not been conducted by the secretary of state pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 13, Article 1 NMSA 1978.
C. The paper ballot shall be used by the state or its contractor to check either the veracity of a machine count or the count itself, and shall be used in a recount proceeding as are absentee ballots, and in case of a discrepancy, the paper ballot shall be considered the true and correct record of the voter's choices."

New York

Bill Number: A 8969S 5877(full text)Relevant Election Code: NMSA 1978 (being Laws 1969, Chapter 240, Section 188, as amendedEnacted: March 2, 2006 (House Vote 38-24; Senate Vote 23-18)VVPAT Language: S. 7-282. Voting Machine or System; Requirements of.
1. A voting machine or system to be approved by the State Board of Elections shall:
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J. Retain all paper ballots cast or produce and retain a voter verified permanent paper record which shall be presented to the voter from behind a window or other device before the ballot is cast, in a manner intended and designed to protect the privacy of the voter; such ballots or record shall allow a manual audit and shall be preserved in accordance with the provisions of Section 3-222 of this chapter.

North Carolina

Bill Number: S 223(full text)Relevant Election Code: General Statutes §§163-165.7, 163-166.7(c),163-182.1(b), 163-182.2, 163-182.7A / Session Law 2005-323Enacted:August 26, 2005 (House Vote 133-0; Senate Vote 63-0)VVPAT Language: SECTION 1.(a) Effective August 1, 2005, and applicable to any voting systems upgraded or acquired on or after that date and to all voting systems used in the State during any election during or after 2006, G.S. 163‑165.7 reads as rewritten:
§ 163‑165.7. Voting systems: powers and duties of State Board of Elections.
(a) Only voting systems that have been certified by the State Board of Elections in accordance with the procedures and subject to the standards set forth in this section and that have not been subsequently decertified shall be permitted for use in elections in this State. Those certified voting systems shall be valid in any election held in the State or in any county, municipality, or other electoral district in the State. Subject to all other applicable rules adopted by the State Board of Elections and, with respect to federal elections, subject to all applicable federal regulations governing voting systems, paper ballots marked by the voter and counted by hand shall be deemed a certified voting system. The State Board of Elections shall certify optical scan voting systems, optical scan with ballot markers voting systems, and direct record electronic voting systems if any of those systems meet all applicable requirements of federal and State law. The State Board may certify additional voting systems only if they meet the requirements of the request for proposal process set forth in this section and only if they generate either a paper ballot or a paper record by which voters may verify their votes before casting them and which provides a backup means of counting the vote that the voter casts. Those voting systems may include optical scan and direct record electronic (DRE) voting systems. In consultation with the Office of Information Technology Services, the State Board shall develop the requests for proposal subject to the provisions of this Chapter and other applicable State laws. Among other requirements, the request for proposal shall require at least all of the following elements:
(1) That the vendor post a bond or letter of credit to cover damages resulting from defects in the voting system. Damages shall include, among other items, any costs of conducting a new election attributable to those defects.
(2) That the voting system comply with all federal requirements for voting systems.
(3) That the voting system must have the capacity to include in precinct returns the votes cast by voters outside of the voter's precinct as required by G.S. 163‑132.5G.
(4) With respect to electronic voting systems, that the voting system generate a paper record of each individual vote cast, which paper record shall be maintained in a secure fashion and shall serve as a backup record for purposes of any hand‑to‑eye count, hand‑to‑eye recount, or other audit. Electronic systems that employ optical scan technology to count paper ballots shall be deemed to satisfy this requirement.
(5) With respect to DRE voting systems, that the paper record generated by the system be viewable by the voter before the vote is cast electronically, and that the system permit the voter to correct any discrepancy between the electronic vote and the paper record before the vote is cast.
(6) With respect to all voting systems using electronic means, that the vendor provide access to all of any information required to be placed in escrow by a vendor pursuant to G.S. 163‑165.9A for review and examination by the State Board of Elections; the Office of Information Technology Services; the State chairs of each political party recognized under G.S. 163‑96; the purchasing county; and designees as provided in subdivision (9) of subsection (d) of this section.
(7) That the vendor must quote a statewide uniform price for each unit of the equipment.
(8) That the vendor must separately agree with the purchasing county that if it is granted a contract to provide software for an electronic voting system but fails to debug, modify, repair, or update the software as agreed or in the event of the vendor having bankruptcy filed for or against it, the source code described in G.S. 163‑165.9A(a) shall be turned over to the purchasing county by the escrow agent chosen under G.S. 163‑165.9A(a)(1) for the purposes of continuing use of the software for the period of the contract and for permitting access to the persons described in subdivision (6) of this subsection for the purpose of reviewing the source code.

In its request for proposal, the State Board of Elections shall address the mandatory terms of the contract for the purchase of the voting system and the maintenance and training related to that voting system.

No voting system acquired or upgraded by a county before August 1, 2005, shall be used in an election during or after 2006 unless the county can demonstrate to the State Board of Elections compliance with the requirements in subdivisions (1) through (8) of this subsection, where those requirements are applicable to the type of voting system involved.

North Dakota

North Dakota has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record. However, the State currently uses precinct count paper ballot optical scan systems together with ballot-marking devices to assist voters with disabilities in every county.

Ohio

Bill Number: HB 262 (full text)Relevant Election Code: Ohio. Rev. Code Ann. Section 3506.10Enacted: May 7, 2004VVPAT Language: Sec. 3506.10. No voting machine shall be approved by the board of voting machine examiners or certified by the secretary of state, or be purchased, rented, or otherwise acquired, or used, except when specifically allowed for experimental use, as provided in section 3506.04 of the Revised Code, unless it fulfills the following requirements:
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(P) On and after the first federal election that occurs after January 1, 2006, unless required sooner by the Help America Vote Act of 2002, if the voting machine is a direct recording electronic voting machine, it shall include a voter verified paper audit trail.
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Sec. 3506.18. (A) For any recount of an election in which ballots are cast using a direct recording electronic voting machine with a voter verified paper audit trail, the voter verified paper audit trail shall serve as the official ballot to be recounted.
(B) Voter verified paper audit trails shall be preserved in the same manner and for the same time period as paper ballots are preserved under section 3505.31 of the Revised Code.

Oklahoma

Oklahoma has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record. However, the State currently uses precinct count paper ballot optical scan systems together with ballot-marking devices to assist voters with disabilities in every county.

Oregon

Bill Number:Relevant Election Code: Enacted: VVPAT Language:

Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record.

Rhode Island

Rhode Island has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record. However, the State currently uses precinct count paper ballot optical scan systems together with ballot-marking devices to assist voters with disabilities in every polling place.

South Carolina

South Carolina has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record.

South Dakota

Relevant Language in Election Code: South Dakota Codified Law (as enacted through SL 1994, Chapter 110 §22) states:
12-17B-2.1. Direct recording electronic voting system - Requirements.
No direct recording electronic voting system may be certified or used unless it is capable of producing in random order a paper copy of each ballot cast on the system. No direct recording electronic voting system may be certified which transmits uncounted votes or ballots through the internet.

Tennessee

Bill Number: HB 1256/*SB 1363(full text - pdf)Relevant Election Code: Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 2Enacted: June 5, 2008VVPAT Language: SECTION 2. Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 2, is amended by adding the following as a new, appropriately designated section:
2 (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of state law to the contrary and consistent with federal law, any voting system purchased or leased with federal, state or local funds shall provide that the ballot of record shall be a paper ballot marked by the voter, with appropriate accommodation for persons with disabilities. Such ballot shall be available for the voter to verify such voter’s vote before having it counted and retained by the election officials. The system shall maintain the secrecy of the voter’s choices and the ballots of record shall be used in any recounts, contests, or random samplings for accuracy.

Bill Number:HB 0386/SB 1203 (full text - pdf)Relevant Election Code: Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 2, Chapter 1108 of the Public Acts of 2008 and Chapter 612 of the Public Acts of 2010, relative to the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act.Date Enacted: June 3, 2011
Revision Language: SECTION 1. Section 6 of Chapter 1108 of the Public Acts of 2008, as amended by Chapter 612 of the Public Acts of 2010, is further amended by deleting the second sentence in its entirety and by deleting the period at the end of the last sentence and adding the following language:
and only if the general assembly includes a specific recurring appropriation in the 2011 general appropriations act for the 2011-2012 fiscal year in such amount necessary to provide fully for all increased costs for counties, as determined by the secretary of state, directly attributable to the Tennessee Voter Confidence Act.
SECTION 2. Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 2-20-101(a), is amended by deleting the subsection in its entirety and by substituting instead the following language:
(a) Notwithstanding any other state law to the contrary and consistent with federal law and subsection (b)(1), if the general assembly includes a specific recurring appropriation in the 2011 general appropriations act for the 2011-2012 fiscal year, new voting systems purchased or leased shall be a system using precinct-based optical scanners. The appropriation shall be in such amount necessary to provide fully for all increased costs for counties, as determined by the secretary of state, directly attributable to this part.

Texas

Texas has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record.

Utah

Bill Number: HB 2169Relevant Election Code: ORS 246.012, 246.550, 246.560, 254.005, 254.485, and 258.211 / Chapter 731Enacted: August 17 2005VVPAT Language: 246.560. (1) [No] A voting machine [shall] may not be approved by the Secretary of State unless [it] the voting machine is constructed so that it …
(h) Contains a device that will duplicate the votes cast by each elector onto a paper record copy.
(i) Contains a device that will allow each elector to view the elector′s paper record copy while preventing the elector from directly handling the paper record copy.

Virginia has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record.

Washington

Bill Number: SB 5395Relevant Election Code: RCW 29A.12.085Enacted: May 3 2005VVPAT Language: Beginning on January 1, 2006, all direct recording electronic voting devices must produce a paper record of each vote that may be accepted or rejected by the voter before finalizing his or her vote. This record may not be removed from the voting center, and must be human readable without an interface and machine readable for counting purposes. If the device is programmed to display the ballot in multiple languages, the paper record produced must be printed in the language used by the voter. Rejected records must either be destroyed or marked in order to clearly identify the record as rejected. Paper records produced by direct recording electronic voting devices are subject to all the requirements of chapter 29A.60 RCW for ballot handling, preservation, reconciliation, transit, and storage. The paper records must be preserved in the same manner and for the same period of time as ballots.

West Virginia

Bill Number: HB 2950Relevant Election Code: West Virginia Code§3-4A-9 12A-EEnacted:VVPAT Language: (12) (A) Direct-recording electronic voting machines must generate a paper copy of each voter's vote that will be automatically kept within a storage container that is locked, closely attached to the direct-recording electronic voting machine and inaccessible to all but authorized voting officials, who will handle such storage containers and such paper copies contained therein in accordance with section nineteen of this article;

(B) The paper copy of the voter's vote shall be generated at the time the voter is at the voting station using the direct- recording electronic voting machine;

(C) The voter may examine the paper copy visually or through headphone readout, and may accept or reject the printed copy;

(D) The voter may not touch, handle or manipulate the printed copy manually in any way;

(E) Once the printed copy of the voter's votes is accepted by the voter as correctly reflecting the voter's intent, but not before, it will automatically be stored for recounts or random checks and the electronic vote will be cast within the computer mechanism of the direct-recording electronic voting machine;

Wisconsin

Bill Number: AB 627Relevant Election Code: WI Stat § 5.91.18Enacted: January 4 2006VVPAT Language: If the device consists of an electronic voting machine, it generates a complete, permanent paper record showing all votes cast by each elector, that is verifiable by the elector, by either visual or nonvisual means as appropriate, before the elector leaves the voting area, and that enables a manual count or recount of each vote cast by the elector.

Wyoming

Wyoming has not established a statutory requirement for permanent voter verifiable ballot or record. However, the State currently uses precinct count paper ballot optical scan systems. To assist voters with disabilities, three counties use direct recording electronic voting systems equipped with voter verified paper audit trail printers and the rest use ballot-marking devices.