I have
represented ability, or the freedom of the will, as a first truth
of reason. I have also defined first truths of reason to be those
truths that are necessarily known to all moral agents. From these
two representations the inquiry may naturally arise, How then is
it to be accounted for that so many men have denied the liberty of
the will, or ability to obey God? That these first truths of
reason are frequently denied is a notorious fact. A recent writer
thinks this denial a sufficient refutation of the affirmation,
that ability is a first truth of reason. It is important that this
denial should be accounted for. That mankind affirm their
obligation upon the real, though often latent and unperceived
assumption of ability, there is no reasonable ground of doubt. I
have said that first-truths of reason are frequently assumed, and
certainly known without being always the direct object of thought
or attention; and also that these truths are universally held in
the practical judgments of men, while they sometimes in theory
deny them. They know them to be true, and in all their practical
judgments assume their truth, while they reason against them,
think they prove them untrue, and not unfrequently affirm, that
they are conscious of an opposite affirmation. For example, men
have denied, in theory, the law of causality, while they have at
every moment of their lives acted upon the assumption of its
truth. Others have denied the freedom of the will, who have, every
hour of their lives, assumed, and acted, and judged, upon the
assumption that the will is free. The same is true of ability,
which, in respect to the commandments of God, is identical with
freedom. Men have often denied the ability of man to obey the
commandments of God, while they have always, in their practical
judgments of themselves and of others, assumed their ability, in
respect to those things that are really commanded by God. Now, how
is this to be accounted for?

1. Multitudes
have denied the freedom of the will, because they have loosely
confounded the will with the involuntary powers--with the
intellect and the sensibility. Locke, as is well known, regarded
the mind as possessing but two primary faculties, the
understanding and the will. President Edwards, as was said in a
former lecture, followed Locke, and regarded all the states of the
sensibility as acts of the will. Multitudes, nay the great mass of
Calvinistic divines, with their hearers, have held the same views.
This confounding of the sensibility with the will has been common
for a long time. Now everybody is conscious, that the states of
the sensibility or mere feelings cannot be produced or changed by
a direct effort to feel thus or thus. Everybody knows from
consciousness that the feelings come and go, wax and wane, as
motives are presented to excite them. And they know also that
these feelings are under the law of necessity and not of liberty;
that is, that necessity is an attribute of these feelings, in such
a sense, that under the circumstances, they will exist in spite of
ourselves, and that they cannot be controlled by a direct effort
to control them. Everybody knows that our feelings, or the states
of our sensibility can be controlled only indirectly, that is, by
the direction of our thoughts. By directing our thoughts to an
object calculated to excite certain feelings, we know that when
the excitability is not exhausted, feelings correlated to that
object will come into play, of course and of necessity. So when
any class of feelings exist, we all know that by diverting the
attention from the object that excites them, they subside of
course, and give place to a class correlated to the new object
that at present occupies the attention. Now, it is very manifest
how the freedom of the will has come to be denied by those who
confound the will proper with the sensibility. These same persons
have always known and assumed, that the actions of the will proper
were free. Their error has consisted in not distinguishing in
theory between the action of the proper will, and the involuntary
states of the sensibility. In their practical judgments, and in
their conduct, they have recognized the distinction which they
have failed to recognize in their speculations and theories. They
have every hour been exerting their own freedom, have been
controlling directly their attention and their outward life, by
the free exercise of their proper will. They have also, by the
free exercise of the same faculty, been indirectly controlling the
states of their sensibility. They have all along assumed the
absolute freedom of the will proper, and have always acted upon
the assumption, or they would not have acted at all, or even
attempted to act. But since they did not in theory distinguish
between the sensibility and the will proper, they denied in theory
the freedom of the will. If the actions of the will be confounded
with desires and emotions, as President Edwards confounded them,
and as has been common, the result must be a theoretical denial of
the freedom of the will. In this way we are to account for the
doctrine of inability, as it has been generally held. It has not
been clearly understood that moral law legislates directly, and,
with strict propriety of speech, only over the will proper, and
over the involuntary powers only indirectly through the will. It
has been common to regard the law and the gospel of God, as
directly extending their claims to the involuntary powers and
states of mind; and, as was shown in a former lecture, many have
regarded, in theory, the law as extending its claims to those
states that lie wholly beyond, either the direct or indirect
control of the will. Now, of course, with these views of the
claims of God, ability is and must be denied. I trust we have seen
in past lectures, that, strictly and properly speaking, the moral
law restricts its claims to the actions of the will proper, in
such a sense that, if there be a willing mind, it is accepted as
obedience; that the moral law and the lawgiver legislate over
involuntary states only indirectly, that is, through the will; and
that the whole of virtue, strictly speaking, consists in good-will
or disinterested benevolence. Sane minds never practically deny,
or can deny, the freedom of the will proper, or the doctrine of
ability, when they make the proper discriminations between the
will and the sensibility, and properly regard moral law as
legislating directly only over the will. It is worthy of all
consideration, that those who have denied ability, have almost
always confounded the will and the sensibility; and that those who
have denied ability, have always extended the claims of moral law
beyond the pale of proper voluntariness; and many of them even
beyond the limits of either the direct or the indirect control of
the will.

But the
inquiry may arise, how it comes to pass that men have so
extensively entertained the impression, that the moral law
legislates directly over those feelings, and over those states of
mind which they know to be involuntary? I answer, that this
mistake has arisen out of a want of just discrimination between
the direct and indirect legislation of the law, and of the
lawgiver. It is true that men are conscious of being responsible
for their feelings and for their outward actions, and even for
their thoughts. And it is really true that they are responsible
for them, in so far as they are under either the direct or
indirect control of the will. And they know that these acts and
states of mind are possible to them, that is, that they have an
indirect ability to produce them. They, however, loosely confound
the direct and indirect ability and responsibility. The thing
required by the law directly and presently is benevolence or
good-will. This is what, and all that the law strictly, presently
or directly requires. It indirectly requires all those outward and
inward acts and states that are connected directly and indirectly
with this required act of will, by a law of necessity; that is,
that those acts and states should follow as soon as by a natural
and necessary law they will follow from a right action of the
will. When these feelings, and states, and acts do not exist, they
blame themselves generally with propriety, because the absence of
them is in fact owing to a want of the required act of the will.
Sometimes, no doubt, they blame themselves unjustly, not
considering that, although the will is right, of which they are
conscious, the involuntary state or act does not follow, because
of exhaustion, or because of some disturbance in the established
and natural connection between the acts of the will and its
ordinary sequents. When this exhaustion or disturbance exists, men
are apt, loosely and unjustly, to write bitter things against
themselves. They often do the same in hours of temptation, when
Satan casts his fiery darts at them, lodging them in the thoughts
and involuntary feelings. The will repels them, but they take
effect, for the time being, in spite of himself, in the intellect
and sensibility. Blasphemous thoughts are suggested to the mind,
unkind thoughts of God are suggested, and in spite of one's self,
these abominable thoughts awaken their correlated feelings. The
will abhors them and struggles to suppress them, but for the time
being, finds itself unable to do anything more than to fight and
resist.

Now, it is
very common for souls in this state to write the most bitter
accusations against themselves. But should it be hence inferred
that they really are as much in fault as they assume themselves to
be? No, indeed. But why do ministers, of all schools, unite in
telling such tempted souls, You are mistaken, my dear brother or
sister, these thoughts and feelings, though exercises of your own
mind, are not yours in such a sense that you are responsible for
them. The thoughts are suggested by Satan, and the feelings are a
necessary consequence. Your will resists them, and this proves
that you are unable, for the time being, to avoid them. You are
therefore not responsible for them while you resist them with all
the power of your will, any more than you would be guilty of
murder should a giant overpower your strength, and use your hand
against your will to shoot a man. In such cases it is, so far as I
know, universally true, that all schools admit that the tempted
soul is not responsible or guilty for those things which it cannot
help. The inability is here allowed to be a bar to obligation; and
such souls are justly told by ministers, You are mistaken in
supposing yourself guilty in this case. The like mistake is fallen
into when a soul blames itself for any state of mind whatever that
lies wholly and truly beyond the direct or indirect control of the
will, and for the same reason, inability in both cases is alike a
bar to obligation. It is just as absurd, in the one case as in the
other, to infer real responsibility from a feeling or persuasion
of responsibility. To hold that men are always responsible,
because they loosely think themselves to be so is absurd. In cases
of temptation, such as that just supposed, as soon as the
attention is directed to the fact of inability to avoid those
thoughts and feelings, and the mind is conscious of the will's
resisting them, and of being unable to banish them, it readily
rests in the assurance that it is not responsible for them. Its
own irresponsibility in such cases appears self-evident to the
mind, the moment the proper inability is considered, and the
affirmation of irresponsibility attended to. Now if the soul
naturally and truly regarded itself as responsible, when there is
a proper inability and impossibility, the instructions above
referred to could not relieve the mind. It would say, To be sure I
know that I cannot avoid having these thoughts and feelings, any
more than I can cease to be the subject of consciousness, yet I
know I am responsible notwithstanding. These thoughts and feelings
are states of my own mind, and no matter how I come by them, or
whether I can control or prevent them or not. Inability, you know,
is no bar to obligation; therefore, my obligation and my guilt
remain. Woe is me, for I am undone. The idea, then, of
responsibility, when there is in fact real inability, is a
prejudice of education, a mistake.

The mistake,
unless strong prejudice of education has taken possession of the
mind, lies in overlooking the fact of a real and proper inability.
Unless the judgment has been strongly biassed by education, it
never judges itself bound to perform impossibilities, nor even
conceive of such a thing. Who ever held himself bound to undo what
is past, to recall past time, or to substitute holy acts and
states of mind in the place of past sinful ones? No one ever held
himself bound to do this; first, because he knows it to be
impossible; and secondly, because no one that I have heard of ever
taught or asserted any such obligation; and therefore none have
received so strong a bias from education as loosely to hold such
an opinion. But sometimes the bias of education is so great, that
the subjects of it seem capable of believing almost anything,
however inconsistent with the intuitions of the reason, and
consequently in the face of the most certain knowledge. For
example, President Edwards relates of a young woman in his
congregation, that she was deeply convicted of being guilty for
Adam's first sin, and deeply repented of it. Now suppose that this
and like cases should be regarded as conclusive proof that men are
guilty of that sin, and deserve the wrath and curse of God for
ever for that sin; and that all men will suffer the pains of hell
for ever, except they become convinced of their personal guilt for
that sin, and repent of it as in dust and ashes! President
Edwards's teaching on the subject of the relation of all men to
Adam's first sin, it is well known, was calculated in a high
degree to pervert the judgment upon that subject; and this
sufficiently accounts for the fact above alluded to. But apart
from education, no human being ever held himself responsible for,
or guilty of, the first or any other sin of Adam, or of any other
being, who existed and died before he himself existed. The reason
is that all moral agents naturally know, that inability or a
proper impossibility is a bar to moral obligation and
responsibility; and they never conceive to the contrary, unless
biassed by a mystifying education that casts a fog over their
primitive and constitutional convictions.

2. Some have
denied ability because they have strangely held, that the moral
law requires sinners to be just in all respects what they might
have been had they never sinned. That is, they maintain that God
requires of them just as high and perfect a service as if their
powers had never been abused by sin; as if they had always been
developed by the perfectly right use of them. This they admit to
be a natural impossibility; nevertheless they hold that God may
justly require it, and that sinners are justly bound to perform
this impossible service, and that they sin continually in coming
short of it. To this sentiment I answer, that it might be
maintained with as much show of reason, and as much authority from
the Bible, that God might and does require of all sinners to undo
all their acts of sin, and to substitute holy ones in their
places, and that he holds them as sinning every moment by the
neglect to do this. Why may not God as well require one as the
other? They are alike impossibilities. They are alike
impossibilities originating in the sinner's own act or fault. If
the sinner's rendering himself unable to obey in one case does not
set aside the right of God to command, so does it not for the same
reason in the other. If an inability resulting from the sinner's
own act cannot bar the right of God to make the requisition in the
one case, neither can it for the same reason in the other. But
every one can see that God cannot justly require the sinner to
recall past time, and to undo past acts. But why? No other reason
can be assigned than that it is impossible. But the same reason,
it is admitted, exists in its full extent in the other case. It is
admitted that sinners, who have long indulged in sin, or who have
sinned at all, are really as unable to render as high a degree of
service as they might have done had they never sinned, as they are
to recall past time, or to undo all their past acts of sin. On
what ground, then, of reason or revelation does the assertion
rest, that in one case an impossibility is a bar to obligation,
and not in the other? I answer, there is no ground whatever for
the assertion in question. It is a sheer and an absurd assumption,
unsupported by any affirmation of reason, or any truth or
principle of revelation.

But to this
assumption I reply again, as I have done on a former occasion,
that if it be true, it must follow, that no one on earth or in
heaven who has ever sinned will be able to render as perfect a
service as the law demands; for there is no reason to believe,
that any being who has abused his powers by sin will ever in time
or eternity be able to render as high a service as he might have
done had he at every moment duly developed them by perfect
obedience. If this theory is true, I see not why it does not
follow that the saints will be guilty in heaven of the sin of
omission. A sentiment based upon an absurdity in the outset, as
the one in question is, and resulting in such consequences as this
must, is to be rejected without hesitation.

3. A
consciousness of the force of habit, in respect to all the acts
and states of body and mind, has contributed to the loose holding
of the doctrine of inability. Every one who is at all in the habit
of observation and self-reflection is aware, that for some reason
we acquire a greater and greater facility in doing anything by
practice or repetition. We find this to be true in respect to acts
of will as really as in respect to the involuntary states of mind.
When the will has been long committed to the indulgence of the
propensities, and in the habit of submitting itself to their
impulses, there is a real difficulty of some sort in the way of
changing its action. This difficulty cannot really impair the
liberty of the will. If it could, it would destroy, or so far
impair, moral agency and accountability. But habit may, and, as
every one knows, does interpose an obstacle of some sort in the
way of right willing, or, on the other hand, in the way of wrong
willing. That is, men both obey and disobey with greatest facility
from habit. Habit strongly favours the accustomed action of the
will in any direction. This, as I said, never does or can properly
impair the freedom of the will, or render it impossible to act in
a contrary direction; for if it could and should, the actions of
the will, in that case, being determined by a law of necessity in
one direction, would have no moral character. If benevolence
became a habit so strong that it were utterly impossible to will
in an opposite direction, or not to will benevolently, benevolence
would cease to be virtuous. So, on the other hand, with
selfishness. If the will came to be determined in that direction
by habit grown into a law of necessity, such action would and must
cease to have moral character. But, as I said, there is a real
conscious difficulty of some sort in the way of obedience, when
the will has been long accustomed to sin. This is strongly
recognized in the language of inspiration and in devotional hymns,
as well as in the language of experience by all men. The language
of scripture is often so strong upon this point, that, but for a
regard to the subject-matter of discourse, we might justly infer a
proper inability. For example, Jer. xiii. 23: "Can the Ethiopian
change his skin, or the leopard his spots? then may ye also do
good, that are accustomed to do evil." This and similar passages
recognize the influence of habit. "Then may ye who are accustomed
to do evil:" custom or habit is to be overcome, and, in the strong
language of the prophet, this is like changing the Ethiop's skin
or the leopard's spots. But to understand the prophet as here
affirming a proper inability were to disregard one of the
fundamental rules of interpreting language, namely, that it is to
be understood by reference to the subject of discourse. The latter
part of the seventh chapter of Romans affords a striking instance
and an illustration of this. It is, as has just been said, a sound
and most important rule of interpreting all language, that due
regard be had to the subject-matter of discourse. When "cannot,"
and such like terms, that express an inability are applied to
physical or involuntary actions or states of mind, they express a
proper natural inability; but when they are used in reference to
actions of free will, they express not a proper impossibility, but
only a difficulty arising out of the existence of a contrary
choice, or the law of habit, or both. Much question has been made
about the seventh of Romans in its relation to the subject of
ability and inability. Let us, therefore, look a little into this
passage, Romans vii. 15-23: "For that which I do, I allow not; for
what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I. If then I
do that which I would not, I consent unto the law that it is good.
Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me.
For I know that in me (that is in my flesh) dwelleth no good
thing; for to will is present with me; but how to perform that
which is good I find not. For the good that I would I do not; but
the evil which I would not, that I do. Now if I do that I would
not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I
find then a law, that when I would do good, evil is present with
me. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man. But I
see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind,
and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my
members." Now, what did the Apostle mean by this language? Did he
use language here in the popular sense, or with strictly
philosophical propriety? He says he finds himself able to will,
but not able to do. Is he then speaking of a mere outward or
physical inability? Does he mean merely to say, that the
established connexion between volition and its sequents was
disturbed, so that he could not execute his volitions? This his
language, literally interpreted, and without reference to the
subject-matter of discourse, and without regard to the manifest
scope and design of the writer, would lead us to conclude. But
whoever contended for such an interpretation? The apostle used
popular language, and was describing a very common experience.
Convicted sinners and backslidden saints often make legal
resolutions, and resolve upon obedience under the influence of
legal motives, and without really becoming benevolent, and
changing the attitude of their wills. They, under the influence of
conviction, purpose selfishly to do their duty to God and man,
and, in the presence of temptation, they constantly fail of
keeping their resolutions. It is true, that with their selfish
hearts, or in the selfish attitude of their wills, they cannot
keep their resolutions to abstain from those inward thoughts and
emotions, nor from those outward actions that result by a law of
necessity from a selfish state or attitude of the will. These
legal resolutions the apostle popularly calls willings. "To will
is present with me, but how to do good I find not. When I would do
good, evil is present with me, so that the good I would I do not,
and the evil I would not that I do. If then I do the evil I would
not, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I
delight in the law of God after the inner man. But I see another
law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing
me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members,"
&c. Now, this appears to me to be descriptive of a very
familiar experience of every deeply convicted sinner or
backslider. The will is committed to the propensities, to the law
in the members, or to the gratification of the impulses of the
sensibility. Hence, the outward life is selfish. Conviction of sin
leads to the formation of resolutions of amendment, while the will
does not submit to God. These resolutions constantly fail of
securing the result contemplated. The will still abides in a state
of committal to self-gratification; and hence resolutions to amend
in feeling or the outward life, fail of securing those results.

Nothing was
more foreign from the apostle's purpose, it seems to me, than to
affirm a proper inability of will to yield to the claims of God.
Indeed, he affirms and assumes the freedom of his will. "To will,"
he says, "is present with me;" that is, to resolve. But resolution
is an act of will. It is a purpose, a design. He purposed,
designed to amend. To form resolutions was present with him, but
how to do good he found not. The reason why he did not execute his
purposes was, that they were selfishly made; that is, he resolved
upon reformation without giving his heart to God, without
submitting his will to God, without actually becoming benevolent.
This caused his perpetual failure. This language, construed
strictly to the letter, would lead to the conclusion, that the
apostle was representing a case where the will is right, but where
the established and natural connexion between volition and its
sequents is destroyed, so that the outward act did not follow the
action of the will. In this case all schools would agree that the
act of the will constitutes real obedience. The whole passage,
apart from the subject-matter of discourse, and from the manifest
design and scope of the writer, might lead us to conclude, that
the apostle was speaking of a proper inability, and that he did
not therefore regard the failure as his own fault. "It is no more
I, but sin that dwelleth in me. O wretched man that I am," &c.
Those who maintain that the apostle meant to assert a proper
inability to obey, must also admit that he represented this
inability as a bar to obligation, and regarded his state as
calamitous, rather than as properly sinful. But the fact is, he
was portraying a legal experience, and spoke of finding himself
unable to keep selfish resolutions of amendment in the presence of
temptation. His will was in a state of committal to the indulgence
of the propensities. In the absence of temptation, his
convictions, and fears, and feelings were the strongest impulses,
and under their influence he would form resolutions to do his
duty, to abstain from fleshly indulgences, &c. But as some
other appetite or desire came to be more strongly excited, he
yielded to that of course, and broke his former resolution. Paul
writes as if speaking of himself, but was doubtless speaking as
the representative of a class of persons already named. He found
the law of selfish habit exceedingly strong, and so strong as to
lead him to cry out, "O wretched man," &c. But this is not
affirming a proper inability of will to submit to God.

4. All men
who seriously undertake their own reformation find themselves in
great need of help and support from the Holy Spirit, in
consequence of the physical depravity of which I have formerly
spoken, and because of the great strength of their habit of
self-indulgence. They are prone, as is natural, to express their
sense of dependence on the Divine Spirit in strong language, and
to speak of this dependence as if it consisted in a real
inability, when, in fact, they do not really consider it as a
proper inability. They speak upon this subject just as they do
upon any and every other subject, when they are conscious of a
strong inclination to a given course. They say in respect to many
things, "I cannot," when they mean only "I will not," and never
think of being understood as affirming a proper inability. The
inspired writers expressed themselves in the common language of
men upon such subjects, and are doubtless to be understood in the
same way. In common parlance, "cannot" often means "will not," and
perhaps is used as often in this sense as it is to express a
proper inability. Men do not misinterpret this language, and
suppose it to affirm a proper inability, when used in reference to
acts of will, except on the subject of obedience to God; and why
should they assign a meaning to language when used upon this
subject which they do not assign to it anywhere else?

But, as I
said in a former lecture, under the light of the gospel, and with
the promises in our hands, God does require of us what we should
be unable to do and be, but for these promises and this proffered
assistance. Here is a real inability to do directly in our own
strength all that is required of us, upon consideration of the
proffered aid. We can only do it by strength imparted by the Holy
Spirit. That is, we cannot know Christ, and avail ourselves of his
offices and relations, and appropriate to our own souls his
fulness, except as we are taught by the Holy Spirit. The thing
immediately and directly required, is to receive the Holy Spirit
by faith to be our teacher and guide, to take of Christ's and show
it to us. This confidence we are able to exercise. Who ever really
and intelligently affirmed that he had not power or ability to
trust or confide in the promise and oath of God?

Much that is
said of inability in poetry, and in the common language of the
saints, respects not the subjection of the will to God, but those
experiences, and states of feeling that depend on the
illuminations of the Spirit just referred to. The language that is
so common in prayer and in the devotional dialect of the church,
respects generally our dependence upon the Holy Spirit for such
divine discoveries of Christ, as to charm the soul into a
steadfast abiding in him. We feel our dependence upon the Holy
Spirit so to enlighten us, as to break up for ever the power of
sinful habit, and draw us away from our idols entirely and for
ever.

In future
lectures I shall have occasion to enlarge much upon the subject of
our dependence upon Christ and the Holy Spirit. But this
dependence does not consist in a proper inability to will as God
directs, but, as I have said, partly in the power of sinful habit,
and partly in the great darkness of our souls in respect to Christ
and his mediatorial work and relations. All these together do not
constitute a proper inability, for the plain reason, that through
the right action of our will which is always possible to us, these
difficulties can all be directly or indirectly overcome. Whatever
we can do or be, directly or indirectly, by willing, is possible
to us. But there is no degree of spiritual attainment required of
us, that may not be reached directly or indirectly by right
willing. Therefore these attainments are possible. "If any man,"
says Christ, "will do his will," that is, has an obedient will,
"he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God." "If thine
eye be single," that is, if the intention or will is right, "thy
whole body shall be full of light." "If any man love me, he will
keep my words, and my Father will love him, and we will come and
make our abode with him." The scriptures abound with assurances of
light and instruction, and of all needed grace and help, upon
condition of a right will or heart, that is, upon condition of our
being really willing to obey the light, when and as fast as we
receive it. I have abundantly shown on former occasions, that a
right state of the will constitutes, for the time being, all that,
strictly speaking, the moral law requires. But I said, that it
also, though in a less strict and proper sense, requires all those
acts and states of the intellect and sensibility which are
connected by a law of necessity with the right action of the will.
Of course, it also requires that cleansing of the sensibility, and
all those higher forms of Christian experience that result from
the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. That is, the law of God
requires that these attainments shall be made when the means are
provided and enjoyed, and as soon as, in the nature of the case,
these attainments are possible. But it requires no more than this.
For the law of God can never require absolute impossibilities.
That which requires absolute impossibilities, is not and cannot be
moral law. For, as was formerly said, moral law is the law of
nature, and what law of nature would that be that should require
absolute impossibilities? This would be a mockery of a law of
nature. What! a law of nature requiring that which is impossible
to nature, both directly and indirectly! Impossible.

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or by contacting Gospel Truth P.O. Box 6322, Orange, CA
92863. (C)2000. This file is not to be changed in any
way, nor to be sold, nor this seal to be
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