Truth and Knowledge

Truth and Knowledge: iii. Epistemology Since Kant

On-line since: 22nd December, 2000

iiiEPISTEMOLOGY SINCE KANT

ALL PROPOUNDERS
of theories of knowledge since Kant have been influenced
to a greater or lesser degree by the mistaken way he formulated
the problem of knowledge. As a result of his “a priorism”
he advanced the view that all objects given to us are our
representations. Ever since, this view has been made the basic
principle and starting point of practically all epistemological
systems. The only thing we can establish as an immediate certainty is
the principle that we are aware of our representations; this principle
has become an almost universally accepted belief of philosophers. As
early as 1792 G. E. Schulze maintained in his Aenesidemus[ 95 ]
that all our knowledge consists of mere representations, and that we can
never go beyond our representations.
Schopenhauer,
[ 96 ]
with a characteristic
philosophical fervor, puts forward the view that the enduring
achievement of Kantian philosophy is the principle that the world is
“my representation.”
Eduard von Hartmann
[ 97 ]
finds this principle so irrefutable that in his book,
Kritische Grundlegung des transzendentalen Realismus
(Critical Basis of Transcendental Realism)
he assumes that his readers, by critical reflection, have overcome the
naive identification of the perceptual picture with the
thing-in-itself, that they have convinced themselves of the absolute
diversity of the subjective-ideal content of consciousness — given as
perceptual object through the act of representing — and the thing
existing by itself, independent both of the act of representing and of
the form of consciousness; in other words, readers who have entirely
convinced themselves that the totality of what is given us directly
consists of our representations.
[ 98 ]
In his final work on epistemology,
Eduard von Hartmann did attempt to provide a foundation for this view.
The validity of this in relation to a theory of knowledge free from
presuppositions, will be discussed later.
Otto Liebmann
[ 99 ]
claims that the principle: “Consciousness cannot jump beyond
itself” must be the inviolable and foremost principle of any science
of knowledge. Volkelt is of the opinion that the first and most immediate
truth is: “All our knowledge extends, to begin with, only as far as our
representations” he called this the most positive principle of knowledge,
and considered a theory of knowledge to be “eminently critical”
only if it “considers this principle as the sole stable point from which
to begin all philosophizing, and from then on thinks it through
consistently.”
[ 100 ]
Other philosophers make other assertions the center of
epistemology, e.g.: the essential problem is the question of the relation
between thinking and existence, as well as the possibility of mediation
between them,
[ 101 ]
or again: How does that which exists become conscious?
(Rehmke) etc. Kirchmann starts from two epistemological axioms: “the
perceived is” and “the contradictory is not.”
[ 102 ]
According to
E. L. Fischer
[ 103 ]
knowledge consists in the recognition of something
factual and real. He lays down this dogma without proof as does
Goring, who maintains something similar: “Knowledge always means
recognizing something that exists; this is a fact that neither scepticism nor
Kantian criticism can deny.”
[ 104 ]
The two latter philosophers simply lay
down the law: This they say is knowledge, without judging themselves.

Even if these different assertions were correct, or led to a correct
formulation of the problem, the place to discuss them is definitely
not at the beginning of a theory of knowledge. For they all represent
at the outset a quite specific insight into the sphere of knowledge.
To say that my knowledge extends to begin with only as far as my
representations, is to express a quite definite judgment about
cognition. In this sentence I add a predicate to the world given to
me, namely, its existence in the form of representation. But how do I
know, prior to all knowledge, that the things given to me are
representations?

Thus this principle ought not to be placed at the foundation of a
theory of knowledge; that this is true is most easily appreciated by
tracing the line of thought that leads up to it. This principle has
become in effect a part of the whole modern scientific consciousness.
The considerations which have led to it are to be found systematically
and comprehensively summarized in Part I of Eduard von Hartmann's
book, Das Grundproblem der Erkenntnistheorie (The Fundamental Problem
of Epistemology). What is advanced there can thus serve as a kind of
guide when discussing the reasons that led to the above assumption.

These reasons are physical, psycho-physical, physiological, as well as
philosophical. The physicist who observes phenomena that occur in our
environment when, for instance, we perceive a sound, is led to
conclude that these phenomena have not the slightest resemblance to
what we directly perceive as sound. Out there in the space surrounding
us, nothing is to be found except vibrations of material bodies and of
air. It is concluded from this that what we ordinarily call sound or
tone is solely a subjective reaction of our organism to those
wave-like movements. Likewise it is found that light, color and heat
are something purely subjective. The phenomena of color-diffraction,
refraction, interference and polarization show that these sensations
correspond to certain transverse vibrations in external space, which,
so it is thought, must be ascribed partly to material bodies, partly
to an infinitely fine elastic substance, the ether. Furthermore,
because of certain physical phenomena, the physicist finds himself
compelled to abandon the belief in the continuity of objects in space,
and to analyze them into systems of minute particles (molecules,
atoms) the size of which, in relation to the distance between them, is
immeasurably small. Thus he concludes that material bodies affect one
another across empty space, so that in reality force is exerted from a
distance. The physicist believes he is justified in assuming that a
material body does not affect our senses of touch and warmth by direct
contact, because there must be a certain distance, even if very small,
between the body and the place where it touches the skin. From this he
concludes further that what we sense as the hardness or warmth of a
body, for example, is only the reaction of the peripheral nerves of
our senses of touch and warmth to the molecular forces of bodies which
act upon them across empty space.

These considerations of the physicist are amplified by those of the
psycho-physicist in the form of a science of specific sense-energies.
J. Müller
[ 105 ]
has shown that each sense can be affected only in a
characteristic manner which is conditioned by its structure, so that
it always reacts in the same way to any external stimulus. If the
optic nerve is stimulated, there is a sensation of light, whether the
stimulus is in the form of pressure, electric current, or light. On
the other hand, the same external phenomenon produces quite different
sensations, according to which sense organ transmits it. This leads to
the conclusion that there is only one kind of phenomenon in the
external world, namely motion, and that the many aspects of the world
which we perceive derive essentially from the reaction of our senses
to this phenomenon. According to this view, we do not perceive the
external world. itself, but merely the subjective sensations which it
releases in us.

Thus physiology is added to physics. Physics deals with the phenomena
occurring outside our organism to which our perceptions correspond;
physiology aims to investigate the processes that occur in man's body
when he experiences a certain sense impression. It shows that the
epidermis is completely insensitive to external stimuli. In order to
reach the nerves connected with our sense of touch on the periphery of
the body, an external vibration must first be transmitted through the
epidermis. In the case of hearing and vision the external motion is
further modified through a number of organs in these sense-tools,
before it reaches the corresponding nerve. These effects, produced in
the organs at the periphery of the body, now have to be conducted
through the nerve to the central organ, where sensations are finally
produced through purely mechanical processes in the brain. It is
obvious that the stimulus which acts on the sense organ is so changed
through these modifications that there can be no similarity between
what first affected the sense organs, and the sensations that finally
arise in consciousness. The result of these considerations is summed
up by Hartmann in the following words:

“The content of consciousness consists fundamentally of the sensations
which are the soul's reflex response to processes of movement in the
uppermost part of the brain, and these have not the slightest
resemblance to the molecular movements which called them into being.”

If this line of thought is correct and is pursued to its conclusion,
it must then be admitted that our consciousness does not contain the
slightest element of what could be called external existence.

To the physical and physiological arguments against so-called “naive
realism” Hartmann adds further objections which he describes as
essentially philosophical. A logical examination of the first two
objections reveals that in fact one can arrive at the above result
only by first assuming the existence and interrelations of external
things, as ordinary naive consciousness does, and then investigating
how this external world enters our consciousness by means of our
organism. We have seen that between receiving a sense impression and
becoming conscious of a sensation, every trace of such an external
world is lost, and all that remains in consciousness are our
representations. We must therefore assume that our picture of the
external world is built up by the soul, using the material of
sensations. First of all, a spatial picture is constructed using the
sensations produced by sight and touch, and sensations arising from
the other senses are then added. When we are compelled to think of a
certain complex of sensations as connected, we are led to the concept
of matter, which we consider to be the carrier of sensations. If we
notice that some sensations associated with a substance disappear,
while others arise, we ascribe this to a change regulated by the
causal laws in the world of phenomena. According to this view, our
whole world-picture is composed of subjective sensations arranged by
our own soul-activity. Hartmann says: “Thus all that the subject
perceives are modifications of its own soul-condition and nothing
else.”
[ 106 ]

Let us examine how this conviction is arrived at. The argument may be
summarized as follows: If an external world exists then we do not
perceive it as such, but through our organism transform it into a
world of representations. When followed out consistently, this is a
self-canceling assumption. In any case, can this argument be used to
establish any conviction at all? Are we justified in regarding our
given world-picture as a subjective content of representations, just
because we arrive inevitably at this conclusion if we start from the
assumption made by naive consciousness? After all, the aim was just to
prove this assumption invalid. It should then be possible for an
assertion to be wrong, and yet lead to a correct result. This can
happen, but the result cannot then be said to have been proved by the
assertion.

The view which accepts the reality of our directly given picture of
the world as certain and beyond doubt, is usually called naive
realism. The opposite view, which regards this world-picture as merely
the content of our consciousness, is called transcendental idealism.
Thus the preceding discussion could also be summarized as follows:
Transcendental idealism demonstrates its truth by using the same
premises as the naive realism which it aims to refute. Transcendental
idealism is justified if naive realism is proved incorrect, but its
incorrectness is only demonstrated by means of the incorrect view
itself. Once this is realized there is no alternative but to abandon
this path and to attempt to arrive at another view of the world. Does
this mean proceeding by trial and error until we happen to hit on the
right one? That is Hartmann's approach when he believes his
epistemological standpoint established on the grounds that his view
explains the phenomena, whereas others do not. According to him the
various world-views are engaged in a sort of struggle for existence in
which the fittest is ultimately accepted as victor. But the
inconsistency of this procedure is immediately apparent, for there
might well be other hypotheses which would explain the phenomena
equally satisfactorily. For this reason we prefer to adhere to the
above argument for the refuting of naive realism, and investigate
precisely where its weakness lies. After all, naive realism is the
viewpoint from which we all start. It is therefore the proper
starting-point for a critical investigation. By recognizing its
shortcomings we shall be led to the right path much more surely than
by simply trusting to luck.

The subjectivism outlined above is based on the use of thinking for
elaborating certain facts. This presupposes that, starting from
certain facts, a correct conclusion can be obtained through logical
thinking (logical combination of particular observations). But the
justification for using thinking in this way is not examined by this
philosophical approach. This is its weakness. While naive realism
begins by assuming that the content of experience, as we perceive it,
is an objective reality without examining if this is so, the
standpoint just characterized sets out from the equally uncritical
conviction that thinking can be used to arrive at scientifically valid
conclusions. In contrast to naive realism, this view could be called
naive rationalism. To justify this term, a brief comment on the
concept of “naive” is necessary here.
A. Döring
[ 107 ]
tries to define this concept in his essay,
Ueber den Begriff des naiven Realismus
(Concerning the Concept of naive Realism). He says:

“The concept 'naive' designates the zero point in the scale of
reflection about one's own relation to what one is doing. A naive
content may well be correct, for although it is unreflecting and
therefore simply non-critical or uncritical, this lack of reflection
and criticism excludes the objective assurance of truth, and includes
the possibility and danger of error, yet by no means necessitates
them. One can be equally naive in one's life of feeling and will, as
in the life of representing and thinking in the widest sense;
furthermore, one may express this inner life in a naive manner rather
than repressing and modifying it through consideration and reflection.
To be naive means not to be influenced, or at least not consciously
influenced by tradition, education or rules; it means to be, in all
spheres of life, what the root of the word: 'nativus' implies. i.e.,
unconscious, impulsive, instinctive, daimonic.”

Starting from this, we will endeavor to define “naive” still more
precisely. In all our activities, two things must be taken into
account: the activity itself, and our knowledge of its laws. We may be
completely absorbed in the activity without worrying about its laws.
The artist is in this position when he does not reflect about the laws
according to which he creates, but applies them, using feeling and
sensitivity. We may call him “naive.” It is possible, however, to
observe oneself, and enquire into the laws inherent in one's own
activity, thus abandoning the naive consciousness just described
through knowing exactly the scope of and justification for what one
does. This I shall call critical. I believe this definition comes
nearest to the meaning of this concept as it has been used in
philosophy, with greater or lesser clarity, ever since Kant. Critical
reflection then is the opposite of the naive approach. A critical
attitude is one that comes to grips with the laws of its own activity
in order to discover their reliability and limits. Epistemology can
only be a critical science. For its object is an essentially
subjective activity of man: cognition, and it wishes to demonstrate
the laws inherent in cognition. Thus everything “naive” must be
excluded from this science. Its strength must lie in doing precisely
what many thinkers, inclined more toward the practical doing of
things, pride themselves that they have never done, namely, “think
about thinking.”