Effects of Emotion Displays on Social Identification

David R. Heise
Department of Sociology
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47405

Published in Social Psychology Quarterly,
52 (1989): 10-21. See publication for final text.

Abstract

Emotion displays influence character assessments, as when an offender
avoids stigmatization by exhibiting shame over a deviant act. This article
develops a model of the process within the framework of affect control theory.
Analyses suggest that expression of appropriate affect can foster positive
characterizations of the participants in an event and that expression of
inappropriate affect instigates condemnation. Emotion displays by an actor
influence character assessments most, but emotions displayed by the recipient of
action also can alter outcomes.

The way that people experience events emotionally influences judgments about
what kind of people they must be in order to participate in the events. For
example, expression of shame and remorse can mitigate a deviant act so that
observers do not transform the actor into a deviant character. A study by
Lazowski (1987) showed that persons confessing an unscrupulous action were
judged as likeable or not depending on the emotion they displayed during
confession--those showing negative affect were liked more. Along similar lines,
Smith-Lovin (1987a) suggested that emotional displays by victims may influence
labeling processes.

In this article I extend affect control theory (Heise, 1977; 1979; 1986;
Smith-Lovin and Heise, 1988)--integrating the theory's labeling model and
emotion model--in order to deal with this issue. The next section provides a
brief overview of affect control theory. Then I outline the logic of the new
ideas. The theoretical work is mathematical and is presented as an Appendix.
After examining some direct implications of the theoretical product, I present
results for a variety of examples to show how the formulation translates into
the language of everyday life.

The work in this article is wholly theoretical. However, the theoretical
formulations are grounded in past empirical research (Heise, 1979; Smith-Lovin
and Heise, 1988), and the model offers bearings for future empirical studies
focusing on how emotion displays influence labeling processes
(1)

.

Affect Control Theory

Affect control theory proposes that definitions of situations invoke
social identities and other cultural categories, and people generate experiences
to confirm sentiments which are bound to the categories. Emotions signal how
well the confirmation process is going. When the process is not going well,
people engage in corrective action, or they adjust their definitions of the
situation to fit what has happened.

Sentiments are measured in terms of three dimensions scaled from about
-4 to +4: Evaluation (scaled from "bad" to "good"), Potency
(from "powerless" to "powerful"), and Activity (scaled from
"quiet, still" to "noisy, lively"). The EPA dimensions are
universals of human judgment according to studies in more than 20 cultures
(Osgood, May and Miron, 1975).

Transient impressions of people--produced by events--also can be
assessed in terms of the EPA dimensions. For example, good people ordinarily act
nicely toward children and thereby create positive impressions of themselves and
the children. An actor who engages in deep, significant acts and who avoids
being the recipient of others' actions generates an appearance of potency. An
actor who performs nice, quiet acts like consoling someone seems slower and more
mature than someone who chatters or who behaves violently. EPA impressions of an
actor, recipient of action, and behavior can be predicted with considerable
precision using empirically-derived impression-formation equations (Heise, 1979;
Smith-Lovin, 1987b) which define outcome impressions from pre-event impressions
of actor, behavior, and object.

Differences between fundamental sentiments and the transient
impressions resulting from an event measure how well the event confirms
identities. People try to construct events that will minimize the difference
between sentiments and impressions by engaging partners whose identities offer
resources for self-confirmation and by conduct that produces desired
impressions. For example, maintaining a valued identity requires interacting
with partners who also have valued identities, and it requires engaging in
respectable acts with these people. Roles associated with social identities get
enacted as sociocultural logic constrains the sequencing of events such that
specific outcomes result as each person operates to experience subjective
confirmation of sentiments (Spiro, 1961; Fararo and Skvoretz, 1984).

Emotion registers the impression of self created by an event and also
how that impression compares to the sentiment for one's identity (Heise, 1987;
Averett and Heise, 1987). Creating a good impression produces pleasant emotion
and creating a bad impression produces unpleasant emotion. Creating an
impression of powerfulness instigates emotions of mastery, creating an
impression of powerlessness generates emotions of vulnerability. Being lively
after an event translates to emotional activation, and being quieted by an event
translates to languid emotions. However, one's identity also enters into the
emotion process by setting a standard of comparison. For example, despondency
can result when events create a good, potent, lively impression which, however,
is not good enough, powerful enough, lively enough to confirm an exalted
identity: the sweetheart who receives a mere card on his birthday is favored,
but not enough and therefore feels unhappy.

One way to deal with disconfirming events is to manufacture further
events that repair impressions: punish major transgressions, forgive minor ones,
and remunerate overly zealous behavior by others in order to restore feelings
about interactants to their proper places. In effect, such behavioral reactions
are claims that a prevailing definition of the situation is correct and
disconfirming events are aberrations requiring no cognitive shifts and no
revision of social relationships.

Another way to deal with disconfirming events is to relinquish the
current definition of the situation in favor of another definition that fits
events better. An actor who behaves evilly can be cast into a stigmatized
identity which accounts for evil behavior; an actor who performs heroically can
be promoted to a status where excellence is the norm. Recipients of action can
be reidentified, too, in order to acquire an interpretation of reality that fits
with what is happening: those who are victimized can be viewed as repugnant
characters who deserve the abuse they get; those who seem excessively favored
can be viewed as charming in a way that elicits special benevolence from others.

Actions a person initiates provide a better guide to character than do
actions which the person elicits from others because an actor's identity exerts
more control over event construction than does the identity of the recipient of
action. Thus, once we embark on reidentification in order to understand an
event, we generally prefer to redefine the actor, attributing the event to his
or her character. However, sometimes--especially if self is the actor--it may
seem preferable to reidentify the object person in an event in order to
interpret how an unaccountable behavior was elicited.

Affect control theory provides mathematical representations for all of
the processes discussed above. The models for emotion and for reidentification--the
central issues in this paper--are summarized below.

Emotion Model

Equations for predicting emotions interpret the difference between the
transient impression of a person and the impression which is expected due to the
person's identity (Heise, 1987; Averett and Heise, 1987). The emotion equations
are derived mathematically from impression-formation equations (Heise, 1987, p.
25), and an interaction term in impression-formation equations1.
(2)

(Heise and Thomas, 1988) complicates the solution. However, the emotion
equations can be interpreted as linear in form with changes in coefficients for
every identity that is considered. To illustrate, here is the structure for a
very valued identity (Ie=+2.0):

Ee = .51 + 1.21Te + .68Tp - .56Ie
- .41Ip + .07Ia ( 1)

Ep = .42 + .34Te + 1.73Tp - .14Ie
- 1.02Ip ( 2)

Ea = .20 - .17Tp + 1.89Ta + .13Ip
- 1.20Ia ( 3)

and here is the structure for a very negative identity (Ie=-2.0):

Ee = 1.20 + 2.83Te + 1.59Tp - 1.31Ie
- .96Ip + .16Ia ( 4)

Ep = .61 + .79Te + 1.98Tp - .35Ie
- 1.17Ip ( 5)

Ea = .23 + .12Te - .13Tp + 1.89Ta
+ 0.11Ip - 1.19Ia ( 6)

T stands for a measure relating to transient impressions, E is a
measure relating to emotion, I is an identity measure, and the letters EPA in
lowercase identify which scale of measurement is involved.

Suppose, for example, that a person has a self-identity corresponding
to the EPA profile, 2 0 0--something like a Lady. If events support this
identity perfectly (i.e., Te Tp Ta also is 2 0 0)
then equation (5) yields 1.8--felt emotion is quite good. If events create a
less than ideal impression of 1 0 0, then equation (5) gives 0.6--the
emotion still is slightly positive. Now suppose that a person has a self
identity corresponding to the EPA profile, -2 0 0--something like a
Snob. With perfect confirmation, equation (8) gives -1.8--a quite unpleasant
feeling. With events creating a less than ideal impression of -3 0 0,
equation (8) gives -4.7--despair. Note that, given the same degree of
disconfirmation, the Lady's emotion declines 1.2 on evaluation, and the Snob's
emotion drops 2.9 on evaluation; in the language of psychiatry, people with
disvalued selves have more emotional lability than people with positive self
concepts.

The potency component of emotion arises mainly from the impression of
potency which is created by events, adjusted for the ideal potency defined by a
person's identity, and the process is similar for people with valued and
disvalued identities except that "looking good" enhances feelings of
power more for people with disvalued selves than for people with valued
identities. For example, a Snob who creates a self impression 1.0 higher than
usual on evaluation goes up 0.8 units in emotion potency, whereas a Lady who
achieves the same degree of success goes up 0.4 units in emotion potency.

Activation processes are mostly the same regardless of whether one's
identity is valued or disvalued. That is, the equations imply that emotion
activation arises mainly from the impression of liveliness created by events,
referenced to the level of liveliness accorded to one's identity.

Reidentification Model

Equations for predicting reidentifications characterize the kind of
actor who would perform a given act on a person with a given identity. The
equations are too convoluted to present in other than matrix format, but they
have the following general form.

Ae = function of (Be Bp Ba
, Oe Op Oa, M) ( 7)

Ap = function of (Be Bp Ba
, Oe Op Oa, M) ( 8)

Aa = function of (Be Bp Ba
, Oe Op Oa, M) ( 9)

A stands for a measure of the actor's new identity, B is a measure
relating to the given behavior, O is a measure characterizing the object
person's identity, the letters EPA in lowercase identify which scale of
measurement is involved, and M stands for a matrix of prediction coefficients.
(See Heise, 1987, for detailed specifications.)

For example, suppose that someone engages in a bad, weak, lively act
(EPA profile -2 -2 2) on a person who is good, powerful, and lively (2 2 2).
Plugging these values into each equation and solving gives an actor EPA profile
of -1.1 -1.3 1.7. Thus the equations predict that someone doing such an act
toward such a person would be viewed by observers as slightly bad, sightly weak,
and active.

Another example: if someone behaves in a nice, potent, quiet way (2 2
-2) toward a good, weak, lively object person, then the equations yield an EPA
profile of 3.1 1.1 -1.9. The actor should be viewed by observers as extremely
good, slightly potent, and quiet, according to predictions.

Similar prediction equations are available for predicting the
characterization of a person who is the object of a given kind of behavior
enacted by a given kind of actor.

The standard reidentification equations in Affect Control Theory
include no separate terms representing the emotions of either actor or object.
That is the purpose of this article: to elaborate the reidentification model so
that it does include terms for emotions.

Example

A computer program (Heise, 1988), based on affect control theory's
mathematical formulation and provisioned with a large number of empirical
sentiment measures, allows one to analyze social situations as follows2.
(3)

.

A man entering a school to pick up his child may take the role of
Father which has an EPA profile of 1.8, 2.1, -0.7: this means that the sentiment
associated with Father is quite good, quite powerful, and slightly quiet. He may
identify the child as Daughter which is 1.7, -0.5, 1.5: in words, a Daughter is
felt to be quite good, a bit powerless, and lively. He thereupon anticipates
events which will create impressions confirming these sentiments. Solving
impression-formation equations for the behavior profiles that would accomplish
this reveals that the father has to engage in acts which are quite good, potent,
and neither too lively nor too quiet (EPA profile: 1.7, 1.8, 0.1)--acts
like Praising or Assisting his daughter. The daughter has to perform acts that
are good, lacking in potency, and lively (1.6, 0.1, 1.5)--like Hailing
and Acclaiming her father.

Suppose that the father assists his daughter (EPA profile for assists:
1.8 1.6 0.0). This is almost perfectly confirming of his Father identity,
creating an impression of him as 2.0, 1.7, -0.7: merely a bit weaker
than he should be. His emotion--the subjective transformation of his identity
into his current impression of self--is quite positive according to prediction
equations: 2.3, 1.7, -0.3, corresponding to words like Warm and
Affectionate. The father assisting his daughter also confirms the Daughter
identity nearly perfectly, producing an impression of her as 1.5, -0.8, 1.3.
The emotion profile that would describe the relation between this transient
impression and her identity is 1.2, -0.3, 0.9 which translates to
words like Lighthearted and Glad.

Now suppose that as soon as she sees him, the daughter begins cajoling
her father about something (EPA profile: -0.6 0.1 0.8). This is somewhat
disconfirming of his Father identity: it makes him seem less good and
considerably less potent than he should be (1.0, 0.6, -0.7), and his
implied emotional transformation has a profile of 0.3, -0.5, 0.0: he
feels emotionally neutral rather than affectionate. Cajoling also disconfirms
the Daughter identity to some degree, giving a transient impression of her as
insufficiently nice: 0.3, -0.4, 1.6. If she's acting in role, then she
must be feeling -0.1, 0.0, 1.4: Anxious or Restless.

The normal response of the father would be corrective action in the
direction of reconfirming identities. That is, he has to construct an event that
transforms the disconfirming impressions of himself and his daughter into
impressions that are closer to the sentiments associated with their identities.
According to impression-formation equations, his behavior has to be normally
good but exceptionally potent and quiet (1.9, 2.4, -1.5), and this
corresponds to acts like Consoling and Calming.

The father is not likely to redefine the situation merely because his
daughter cajoles him, but suppose that he did. The reidentification equations,
now solved for the kind of actor who would cajole a father, yield an identity
profile of -0.7 -0.5 0.8. The man could implement this new sentiment toward the
girl by labeling her as something like a Spendthrift, or he could think of her
as an Irritable Daughter. Under some conditions he might try to understand the
circumstances by redefining himself. The appropriate sentiment toward someone
who is cajoled by a daughter is -0.5, -0.3, 1.5; and to implement this
sentiment toward himself he conceivably could activate some deviant
self-conception like Gambler or Flirt.

Emotion and Reidentification

Affect control theory's established approach to reidentification
assumes that new identities are sought for interactants in order to make a past
event maximally confirming. The formulation does not use information about
emotion displays because it implicitly assumes that the labeled person would
feel the emotion which arises from confirming the new identity. Emotion is
something that might be inferred from labeling, not an input. (In the example
just given, the girl labeled as a Spendthrift is confirmed well by the act of
cajoling a father, and the emotion of a Spendthrift in this event would be 0.1, 0.2, 0.9,
corresponding to words like Anxious or Emotional).

This formulation has applications because people do sometimes judge
others on the basis of conduct alone. Legal trials deliberately focus attention
on bare facts; and narratives about actions rarely convey much information about
participants' emotions because language--English, at least--provides a crude
vocabulary for describing expressive displays (e.g., "smiling" covers
numerous emotions, and so does "crying"). Affect control theory's
established approach to reidentification supplies an appropriate model in these
cases when character assessments are made at a distance from actual events.

However, when we are present at the events that stimulate
reidentifications or when we observe a person narrating his or her own behavior,
we have access to the expressive signaling system that our species has evolved (Ekman,
1984), and we obtain information about what emotions the person feels as a
result of the events. No longer is it appropriate to assume that the person
feels whatever emotion follows from a character reassessment because we can see
what emotion he or she does, in fact, feel. The question is not merely what kind
of person would engage in such conduct, but rather who would engage in such
conduct and feel the way this person feels. Reassessment of the person's
character has to take account of the emotion displayed because the expressive
behavior may cue us that the other feels disconfirmed
by events rather than confirmed.

Analytically, the problem of actor reidentification with added
information on emotion amounts to this. We have a specified event (say, the
actor maligned a friend). We
also have a reading of the actor's emotion as a result of the event which can be
expressed approximately by a term labeling subjective emotion (say, ashamed).
The problem is to find an actor identity which combines with the specified event
and produces an outcome impression of the actor that is offset from the unknown
identity sentiment in just such a way that the observed emotion term corresponds
to the difference. As usual, the impression-formation equations are solved for
an actor EPA profile, but now the solution is obtained under the assumption that
the event provides a specified kind of disconfirmation rather than confirmation.

The Appendix to this article shows how the problem can be formulated
mathematically and shows that the solution (equation 40) constitutes a more
general form of the prior reidentification model. That is, reidentification
without information on emotions is a special case of the new formulation in
which emotion displays are a
factor in assessing someone's character from the person's conduct.

Reidentification of an object person proceeds the same way. For inputs
we have a specified event (say, a
colleague criticized someone) and the observed emotion of the recipient
(say, flustered). The problem is
to find an identity for the object person such that the given event produces an
impression of the object person which is offset from the unknown identity in
just such a way that the observed emotion would be stimulated. Equation (40) in
the Appendix defines this solution also if quantities relating to the object are
substituted for those relating to the actor (i.e., subscripts are changed to ).

The emotion of alter--the interactant who is not being reidentified--implicitly
enters into these analyses because obtaining a solution requires constraining
impressions of alter. Ordinarily we assume that the redefinition gives optimal
confirmation to alter's identity, which amounts to saying that alter should feel
an emotion corresponding to identity confirmation. On the other hand, we can
specify alter's emotion explicitly as another input in the puzzle. In this case,
we require that the identity being sought has to combine with the given event in
such a way as to produce a particular impression of alter as well as a
particular impression of the party being reidentified. Indeed, once a model is
set up, we also can consider cases in which alter's emotion is specified but the
emotion of the person being reidentified is assumed to be the emotion which
corresponds to confirmation of the unknown identity. The mathematical
adjustments for these cases are defined in the Appendix by equation (41) and
equation (42).

Properties of the Model

The Appendix formulates these ideas within the framework of affect
control theory and derives a mathematical model for analyzing how observed
emotions influence reidentification processes. The model has complexities and
subtleties which have to be explored through examples, but direct examination of
the equations as is done in the Appendix does reveal some general properties of
the solution.

One implication is that displays of appropriate affect foster
enhancements of status and displays of inappropriate affect foster
stigmatization. I use "appropriate" to refer to matching of emotion
with the kinds of evaluative outcomes produced by an event. For example,
consider an event that produces evaluatively positive impressions: hedonically
positive emotions (contented, pleased, excited, etc.) are the appropriate
emotions; hedonically negative emotions (mad, frightened, ashamed, unhappy,
etc.) are inappropriate. Just the opposite applies for an event producing
evaluatively negative impressions: hedonically negative emotions are
appropriate, and positive emotions are inappropriate.

For example, an actor who engages in a gentle act toward a lovable
object creates a positive impression and should feel an appropriate positive
emotion. Politicians notoriously use just such an event--kissing and cuddling
babies--to get themselves characterized favorably by the public. If the camera
shows them beaming happily during the event they gain; were the camera to catch
them grimacing nauseously they might end up discredited.

An actor who engages in a cruel act toward a child creates a negative
impression, and any sort of positive emotion is inappropriate. Thus, if an actor
expresses nonchalance or even pleasure about hurting a child, then he is viewed
as evil--a Child Abuser. Yet the actor in such an event actually could gain
positive credit by showing that the event overwhelms him with appropriate shame
and distress, thereby convincing observers that the behavior was unintentional
and uncharacteristic of his true identity.

The model also suggests that characterizations of a person may be more
extreme when information about emotions is taken into account. For example,
"the mother harmed her child" produces a negative characterization of
the mother, but not as negative as "the mother harmed her child and was
happy about it". The model further suggests that characterizations
generally are more extreme when the observed emotion is hedonically negative
rather than positive. Thus, theoretically, "the mother harmed her child and
was mortified about it" actually might gain the mother more moral credit
than "the mother saved her child and was happy about it".

Examples

Now I turn to a systematic set of examples in order to consider the
implications of this solution in more detail and in order to see how emotion
displays might influence potency and activity aspects of labeling as well as
evaluation.

Throughout I translate numerical profiles to words in order to
interpret predictions in everyday terms. This approach warrants a forewarning.
Verbal results can seem inaccurate for a variety of reasons aside from the
theory being wrong. (1) Cultural
variations in ratings. Verbal predictions derive from EPA ratings of
identities, behaviors, and modifiers, and if the ratings are different than
those that you would provide, then results may describe a culture which is
foreign to you. (2) Errors in ratings.
The measurements used are averages computed over data from 25 or more males to
reduce the possibility of chance errors, but 25 is a small sample by social
research standards so errors due to measurement inaccuracies surely arise on
occasion. (3) Errors in equations.
Human psychology is being modeled through complicated equations which, though
defined through research, are subject to errors in parameter estimation. (4) Lexical
errors. Some errors arise because semantic rules governing word usage are
not fully implemented. For example, merely matching words to profiles might lead
to the prediction that a male interactant is a "sister" which is
bizarre because "sister" should not be used as a noun describing
males. Related to this is the problem that predictions are being made without
fully defining a context. (5) Misconceptions.
One function of theory is to offer new insights and to correct fallacies, so
nonintuitive results could suggest an idea worth serious consideration.

Actor Emotions

First consider a situation in which a man and a woman are together, and
the man's act of KISSING the woman instigates labeling of the actor by a male
observer. A variety of cases are obtained by setting the man's emotion in turn
to "cheerful", "calm", "angry",
"disgusted", "nervous", and "ashamed"--a selection
which represents the range of possible emotions (Morgan and Heise, 1988)--in
order to see the effects of expressed emotion on reidentifications. The woman's
emotion is unspecified, implying that reidentification of the man should confirm
the woman's identity as much as possible.

Cheerful. Kissing a
woman and feeling cheerful about it leads to positive identification of the
actor. The EPA profile produced by the model in this case is 3.4, 0.3, -0.1,
corresponding to identities like "gentleman", "pal",
"mate". A man gains quite a bit of esteem in going from an evaluation
of 1.1 (the evaluation of "man") to 3.4. The conception of the actor's
power, however, declines from 1.1 (the potency rating for "man") to
0.3, and activity declines, too (the activity rating for "man" is
0.6).

Calm. The labeling
profile in this case is 1.0, 1.5, -1.1 which corresponds to identities like
"grown-up" and "advisor". Kissing a woman and feeling calm
about it leaves a man's evaluation and power unchanged but requires a
conceptualization of the actor as less lively than a "man".

Angry. In this case,
the model produces a profile of -1.9, -0.1, -0.3, which corresponds to
identities like "killjoy", "snob". The inappropriate affect
involved in kissing a woman angrily causes a drastic reduction in evaluation of
a man, a decline in conceptualization of power, and a decrease in activation.

Disgusted. Here the
labeling profile is -2.4, 0.8, -0.5, and corresponding identities still include
"killjoy" and "snob". An actor who is disgusted as he kisses
a woman is stigmatized and also is conceptualized as less activated than a
"man". Power does not change much.

Nervous. The labeling
profile is -1.7, 0.0, -0.7, and identities with profiles like this include
"grouch" and "killjoy". Kissing a woman and displaying
nervousness reduces a man's evaluation and power and causes a decline in
activity.

Ashamed. The labeling
profile is -2.4, 0.7, -1.0, like a "miser" or "killjoy".
Being ashamed while kissing a woman leads to a decline in evaluation of a man,
and a reconceptualization of him as less active than a "man".

These examples indicate that reidentifications of an actor vary
directly with the pleasantness of an actor's displayed emotion when the actor is
engaging in positive behavior. Theoretically, the more unpleasant the actor's
emotion, the greater the stigmatization. Emotional activation controls potency
of characterizations: the livelier the emotional response, the more powerless
the actor's new identity; the more torpid the displayed feeling, the more
powerful is the label for such an actor. An interaction effect also seems
operative: evaluation is especially high when the actor displays pleasant,
potent, activated emotion.

Now consider the effects of emotion on labeling when a man engages in a
disapproved act toward a woman:
the man SCOLDS the woman. In an ordinary labeling analysis without consideration
of emotions the man would be characterized as -1.3, 1.2, 0.3, a profile
corresponding to identities like "bigshot", "critic". The
results of taking the actor's displayed emotion into account are as follows.

Cheerful. The model
gives a profile of -3.8, 0.5, 0.3 for someone who scolds a woman while
displaying cheerfulness; the closest identity is "assassin". Thus the
mildly deviant act accompanied by very inappropriate affect generates a
reconceptualization of the actor such that a man is extremely stigmatized.

Calm. The computed
profile in this case is -3.9, 2.4, 0.0; "ogre" and "mobster"
are identities which are closest. Scolding a woman and being calm about it again
requires reconceptualization of the actor as of lower value and activation than
a "man", but power increases.

Angry. The labeling
profile is 2.4, 0.7, 0.0, like a "Christian" or "gent".
Scolding a woman while displaying anger seems normal because the affect is
appropriate. Therefore reconceptualization of the actor involves no
stigmatization. The labeling process would provide little loss of power for a
man, but the actor seems less active than a "man".

Disgusted. Here the
labeling profile is 0.2, 2.4, -0.2, corresponding to identities like
"boss" or "supervisor". A man who displays disgust while
scolding a woman loses some esteem and gains power; he seems still or old
relative to the identity of "man".

Nervous. The computed
profile is 2.9, 2.3, -0.4, corresponding to identities like
"gentleman" or "physician". Scolding a woman and feeling
nervous about it gains evaluation and power for a man. However, he also gets
reconceptualized as less active than a "man".

Ashamed. The labeling
profile is 1.8, 3.7, -0.8, which is close to "father" or
"judge". A man who is ashamed in scolding a woman gains some status,
much power, and seems inhibited.

The examples show that the emotion display of an actor in response to
his own deviant action operates inversely on reidentifications as far as
evaluation is concerned. Displaying pleasant emotions produces stigmatization;
displaying unpleasant emotions can make deviance into a basis for moral credit.
Emotions that signal activation and vulnerability during deviant behavior
encourage judgments of one's character that are more positive in evaluation,
while emotional languor encourages judgments that one is a powerful and quiet
person.

Object Emotions

The model suggests that emotion displays by the recipient of action can
affect characterization of the actor. As it turns out, the effect is tiny if we
assume that an actor's emotion is unknown and therefore let the actor's emotion
be whatever would best confirm the reidentified actor in the event. However,
some interesting results occur for KISSING if the actor is observed displaying
the natural emotion of a man kissing a woman which is approximately a feeling of
happy friendliness. Then the displayed emotions of the woman who receives the
kiss influence characterization of the man as follows.

Cheerful. If the woman
is cheerful as she is kissed then the reidentification profile for the actor is
2.9, 2.4, 0.4: like a "truelove" or "friend".

Calm. When the woman is
calm, the actor is reidentified as 1.4, 2.9, 0.3, corresponding to
"hero", "bodyguard".

Disgusted. If the woman
is disgusted by a kiss, then the actor might be reidentified as -1.0, 3.0, 0.4:
a "mafioso", "ringleader".

Nervous. The woman
seeming nervous as she's kissed makes the actor look like -0.6, 3.0, 0.4: again
like a "mafioso", "ringleader".

Ashamed. If the kiss
makes the woman ashamed, then the actor seems to be -1.4, 3.7, 0.3: "slavedriver",
"devil".

Now consider again the case of SCOLDING, first letting the actor feel
appropriate affect--say, angry, as a man might feel when doing this. Then the
following predictions occur as the woman's emotions vary.

Cheerful. If the woman
is cheerful as she is scolded by an angry man then the reidentification profile
for the actor is 0.2, 0.6 0.5 corresponding to "evangelist",
"lookout".

Calm. When the woman is
calm, the angry actor is reidentified 2.3, -0.3, 0.2;
"neighbor", "worker".

Ashamed. If the
scolding makes the woman ashamed, then the proud actor seems to be -2.2, -1.8,
0.5: "fag", "addict".

The examples indicate that emotion displayed by the recipient of action
moderates labeling of the actor as follows. If the instigating event is positive
then the actor is viewed as worse and more powerful as the object person's
emotion gets more unpleasant; emotion signaling vulnerability in the object
person may make the actor look more potent; and emotional activation in the
object person enhances evaluation of the actor somewhat. On the other hand, if
the instigating event is deviant, then stigmatization of the actor increases
when the object person displays pleasant feelings (an actor is worse when the
object person enjoys the deviant event); displays of unpleasant emotion by the
victim make the deviant actor seem less malevolent but also weaker. Potency in
the object person's emotion may make the actor seem somewhat less powerful;
activity may make the actor more stigmatized.

Object Labeling

Recipients of action can be labeled as well as actors, and examples
were computed to examine the kinds of solutions which result when emotions are
taken into account. The complete set of analyses is not worth presenting in
detail because the numerical results often strayed outside the range of EPA
profiles for real words, so the benefit of seeing predictions in plain language
was lost3. (4)

Instead, I present a summary of patterns which appeared in the numerical
results.

The recipient of action--when a target for reidentification--appears to
be weak regardless of what emotions he or she displays, but unpleasant emotions
in response to a positive act make the recipient seem bad and even weaker--so
much so that computed profiles go beyond the range of actual words. On the other
hand, displaying positive feeling when one has been the object of a deviant act
makes the recipient look very bad (as Smith-Lovin, 1987a, implied), and so does
displaying feelings of potency. Showing quietness in emotional response to a
deviant act gets one reidentified in a relatively quiet way, whereas emotional
activation implies a very active labeling.

The actor's emotional display also can influence how the recipient is
labeled. If an actor feels pleasant about a positive action then the recipient
seems good and lively; if the actor has unpleasant feelings about his positive
act then the recipient seems bad and quiet. In the case of negative actions,
displays of actor emotion generally serve to give the recipient identities which
are either lower in evaluation or lower in potency. The recipient of a deviant
act is less stigmatized when an actor feels bad about the act, but also the
worse the actor feels the more the victim seems impotent and quiet.

Discussion

Starting with the premise that people do, in fact, take account of
emotion displays when judging others' character, this article develops a model
of the process within the framework of affect control theory. According to this
analysis, displays of hedonically appropriate affect promote positive
characterizations, and displays of inappropriate affect foster stigmatization.
Emotion displays by an actor have the most impact, but emotions displayed by the
recipient of action also may have consequences for labeling.

Example analyses suggest that the activation dimension in emotion might
influence character assessments in complex ways. An actor who displays lively
emotions may be judged as powerless, yet lively emotion by an actor may moderate
stigmatization based on deviant conduct. On the other hand, display of lively
emotion by the recipient of action may increase stigmatization of an actor, and
it may make the recipient seem a more lively character if the recipient is
reidentified. The potency dimension in emotion seems still more
complex--sometimes a display of potent emotion enhances character assessments,
sometimes it leads to greater stigmatization--but effects of emotion potency are
difficult to separate from positivity of emotion since the two dimensions are
strongly correlated in the emotion domain (Morgan and Heise, 1988).

The theoretical analyses indicate that an actor might exert quite a bit
of control over the way he is characterized were he to manipulate his emotional
expressions, raising the question of why actors do not always employ
"emotion work" (Hochschild, 1979) in order to avoid derogation. One
reason is that expressions of natural emotion may slip out before actors realize
that they are at risk of being labeled, and thereafter observers discount
reversals in displayed affect even if actors succeed in manufacturing them.
Alternatively, actors may insist on the appropriateness of their emotion as a
form of rhetoric to support their ideologies (Averill, 1983; Hochschild, 1979):
for example, a deviant's refusal to show shame serves as a claim that his
behavior is not deviant. Still another possibility is that some actors may seek
stigmatization to support a negative self-concept (Swann, 1987), even to the
point of displaying inappropriate affect in order to earn just desserts.

The examples suggest that the potential for influencing labeling
outcomes through emotion displays is not as great for the recipient of action as
for the agent of action. Indeed, social consequences for a victim of deviant
behavior might be especially dire if disclosure proceedings are not kept
emotion-free with a focus on the morality of the actor's behavior: analyses
suggest that knowing about emotional responses--of either the actor or the
object--could lead to severe stigmatization of the victim.

At least some features of this theory have intuitive appeal, and
examples exploring the theory produced verbal outcomes which often seemed to
accord with common sense. Much of this face validity stems from the
empirically-derived impression formation equations which incorporate a variety
of subtle psychological processes into the model. Additionally, though,
achieving credibility in results fortifies the theoretical premises which are at
work in the model: that people seek experiences to confirm sentiments, and that
judgments of others may depend on the emotions others display as well as on
others' conduct.

Lazowski, L. 1987. Speakers' nonverbal expressions of emotion as
moderators of listeners' reactions to disclosures of self harm and social harm.
Unpublished dissertation, Department of Psychology, University of
California--Santa Barbara.

Smith-Lovin, L. 1979. Behavior Settings and Reactions to Social
Scenarios: The Impact of Settings on the Dynamics of Interpersonal Events.
Unpublished Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill.

Smith-Lovin, L. 1987a. A quantitative model of affect control. Paper
presented at the meetings of the American Sociological Association, Chicago.

Smith-Lovin, L. and D. R. Heise 1988. Analyzing
Social Interaction: Advances in Affect Control Theory. New York: Gordon
and Breach Science Publishers. (Reprint of a special issue of the Journal
of Mathematical Sociology: 13.)

2. The Heise and Thomas (1988) impression-formation
equations predict how judges form impressions of emoting people. One of the
predictive terms is the product of emotion evaluation with identity evaluation,
and the significance is that displaying either a hedonically negative emotion or
a stigmatized identity fosters impressions which are nearly as negative as a
combination of negative emotion and stigmatized identity.

3. Throughout this article I use a revised version of
program INTERACT which incorporates findings by Heise & Thomas (1988).
Translations from words to profiles, and vice versa, use dictionaries of EPA
profiles obtained from Southern U.S. undergraduates (first reported in Smith-Lovin,
1979, and reprinted in Heise & Lewis, 1988). Though the dictionaries give
separate profiles for male raters and for female raters, in this article I
present only the male viewpoint for the sake of clarity and brevity; similar
results are obtained with female data.

4. That computed profiles strayed outside the range of
actual words might mean that there are limitations on object-person
reidentifications which incorporate information about the object person's
emotion.