What is propitiation? That was one of the central elements of the Reformation of doctrine, and one of the most problematic issues in the modern Evangelical movement today. It has to do with many, many areas of theology, and we can’t possibly cover them exhaustively in a single blog post. But in a nutshell, what is it? In a nutshell, it is the “turning away of,” “appeasement” or “satisfaction for” the wrath of God due sinners. It is, therefore, intimately bound up to our notion of what the wrath of God actually is. It is bound up with sacrifice, atonement, substitution, holiness, sin, and many, many other subjects – to include the attributes of God, as we’ve already noted. With it having such a central place in our theology, the smallest misstep will have far-reaching consequences throughout.

If we are to talk about the wrath of God, are we to speak of it as something incidental to God, or as an attribute of God? It surely cannot be something incidental to Him. It is something He is said to possess; “My wrath”[1], and it is just as often called the “wrath of God”, or “of the Lord”. It is said to be magnified by the frequent use of modifiers such as “great”. God’s name is great, His power and strength is great, He is great in mercy, lovingkindness, and holiness. All of these likewise belong to God, and are affirmed of Him, then so must Wrath belong to God, and be affirmed of Him. It is one of His attributes.

If, as we have seen, it is an attribute of God, then it must be addressed per Divine Simplicity. Under Divine Simplicity, the wrath of God is omnipotent, immutable, eternal, sovereign, just, a se, infinite and holy.

Further, it must also be noted that it is not the natures of Christ that were our substitute, it was the Person of Christ – namely, the 2nd Person of the Trinity. If we are to say that He was our substitute, we must say that it was the God-man that was our substitute. We must also note the connection with this being the case alongside the nature of the wrath of God. Gill:

Eternity is not of the essence of punishment; and only takes place when the person punished cannot bear the whole at once: and being finite, as sinful man is, cannot make satisfaction to the infinite Majesty of God, injured by sin, the demerit of which is infinite punishment: and as that cannot be bore at once by a finite creature, it is continued ad infinitum; but Christ being an infinite Person, was able to bear the whole at once; and the infinity of his Person, abundantly compensates for the eternity of the punishment.[2]

Let me add a few more notes, here. Gill, above the quote given here, notes

that Christ was ‘put to death in the flesh;’ as the apostle expresses it (1 Pet. 3:18), that is, in the body; that only suffered death; not his soul, that died not; but was commended into the hands of his divine Father: nor his Deity, or divine nature, which was impassible, and not capable of suffering death; and yet the body of Christ suffered death, in union with his divine person; hence the Lord of glory is said to be crucified and God is said to purchase the church with his blood (1 Cor. 2:8; Acts 20:28). And the death of Christ, as the death of other men, lay in the disunion of, or in a dissolution of the union between soul and body; these two were parted for a while; the one was commended to God in heaven; the other was laid in the grave: but hereby he was not reduced to a state of non-existence, as say the Socinians; his soul was with God in paradise; and his body, when taken from the cross, was laid in a sepulchre, and where it saw no corruption.[3]

We cannot say that only one nature of Christ suffered, or we 1) Deny the union of Christ’s natures as expressed in Scripture, and formulated at Chalcedon[4], or 2) Deny, at least potentially, that Christ was our actual substitute, in His Person; we also cannot say that both natures suffered in the same fashion, however, at risk of 1) Denying the nature of God as immutable, impassible, eternal, and immaterial or 2) Violate the Creature/Creator distinction hypostatically. The Divine nature is immutable, impassible, immaterial, and eternal; hence not subject to the decay and corruption of death. It was, however, that one infinitely Divine Person who suffered the wrath of God. Not both natures alike, but both natures in union, and in concert, according to their nature. What the simply human cannot suffer immediately, the Divine Person, as Gill notes, did. Not equally in both natures, as the natures are not equal. This is a very, very complex subject, and we cannot treat it lightly. We cannot, on the one hand, attribute too much to mystery if it has, in fact, been revealed; but we cannot, on the other hand, speculate on things not revealed, and call them as such, if they are mysteries – so we must toe a very precise line. We must do so carefully, reverently, and studiously, lest we either take too much upon ourselves, or not enough.

It was not merely one nature which took the wrath of God upon Himself; else, we would be throwing out Chalcedon just as easily as Fudge does, if from a different perspective. We must ask ourselves – what was the point of it being the God-man who came if it was only the human nature which was under that wrath? We must also face the theological implications of passages such as “Nor will You allow Your Holy One to see corruption.” Only with a full-orbed Christology, a full-orbed Theology Proper, a full-orbed Anthropology and a full-orbed Soteriology can we have a full-orbed Eschatology. The one demands all of the others. A lack of concentration on theology as an organic, cohesive whole spells disaster for our theology, and the apologetic which flows from it.

This outpouring of the Wrath of God against sinners is something which must be addressed if we are to speak of the propitiation for those sinners, or of Christ’s substitution for those sinners. What it was that was suffered is intrinsic to our idea of propitiation. The nature of the God-man is something that cannot be overlooked if we are to deal with his propitiatory sacrifice on the behalf of his people. The nature of substitution, in a precise manner, is also something we cannot pass over. In short, this further shows that a modification of one element of CT has a great, if not catastrophic, effect on the rest of our theology and doctrine, if we see that doctrine as it truly is – an organic whole.

[4]“…one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, recognized in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation; the distinction of natures being in no way annulled by the union, but rather the characteristics of each nature being preserved and coming together to form one person and subsistence, not as parted or separated into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten God the Word, Lord Jesus Christ”↩

Thanks for the reply. Where does he claim that Christ’s human nature was annihilated? I see Peterson in *Two Views of Hell* claiming that Fudge clams that Christ was annihilated (175-6); but I don’t see how Peterson is getting this, since the quotes from Fudge he adduces don’t include any such claim (that I see). In fact, the following quote of Fudge by Peterson suggests that Fudge doesn’t hold that Jesus(‘ humanity) was annihilated: “Every scriptural implication is that if Jesus had not been raised, he – like those fallen asleep in him – would simply have perished…” This statement implies that Jesus existed in between crucifixion and resurrection, since the prospect of perishing (and, being raised) applies only to the existent.

Pages 170-186 in the current edition of his book contain his full series of arguments for this idea, including interaction with Peterson towards the end, where he essentially says that we shouldn’t put so much weight on Chalcedon’s definition, or other confessions/creeds. There’s no “silver bullet” direct statement of it, but instead, there is a “cumulative case” argument of why it must be the case that Christ’s humanity “died, perished, or was destroyed”, body and soul, just as he claims those of the wicked will be. It’s quite clear, if read contextually. It’s presented in two chapters of argumentation, so it’s obviously not a matter of little import to Fudge.

Dan

May 5, 2012 at 8:06 am

I have Fudge’s *The Fire that Consumes*, though if you’re referring to that I guess I don’t have the current edition. If it’s “obviously not a matter of little import to Fudge,” then why do we have to make a “cumulative case” for the contention that he held it? This sounds like a concession that Fudge in fact never states that Christ’s human nature was annihilated (i.e., made to completely cease to exist). And the quote I produced above seems to imply that Fudge thinks of Christ’s human nature as existing after his death on the cross. There is a kind of perishing held out as a prospect on the condition that Christ is not raised, and Christ’s humanity must presumably exist in some sense in order to be raised or alternatively “further” perish.

Is your position that (1) Fudge in fact thinks that Christ’s human nature was annihilated, or that (2) something about the logic of his position should commit him to that view? If he claims that Christ got *exactly* what the damned will get, that would seem to commit him to the view that Christ was annihilated (or, his human nature presumably). On p. 207 of *Two Views* Fudge denies that there is an inconsistency between his view and Chalcedon.

RazorsKiss

May 5, 2012 at 9:14 am

You aren’t reading what I’m saying correctly. I said that Fudge makes a cumulative case over two chapters, not that we make one. I’m not arguing with you whether he believes it or not, either. It’s quite evident that he does, and he spends two chapters arguing for it. Since you didn’t read what I was saying correctly, it’s quite obviously not the “concession” you think it is. If you don’t want to read what he says adequately, you’ll more likely than not deceive yourself as to what he believes. As for me, I’m not wasting any more time arguing whether he believes it. It’s in his chapter(s) on Golgotha and Christ. I have better things to do than spend time arguing whether what he clearly argues to be the case is in fact the case.

Sorry, from re-reading what you said I can see how I misinterpreted you. The question I had on my mind was whether Fudge in fact thinks that Christ(‘s humanity) was annihilated; not the subsequent question of how he might argue for it; and so when you said that there was no “silver bullet” claim etc., I took you to be saying that we have no clear/explicit example of Fudge’s saying that he thinks Christ(‘s humanity) was annihilated. I find your “If you don’t want to read…” comment strange and unwarranted.

It seems clear that he thinks that Christ(‘s humanity) totally died, body and soul; and I take it that you can’t provide an example of Fudge’s actually claiming that Christ was “annihilated.” Perhaps your (apparent) exasperation above with me is partly based on the idea that these are just obviously equivalent and that Fudge obviously asserts the former, so that the answer to my original question should (by now) be obvious. I don’t think they are obviously equivalent, but at any rate you’ve answered my question.

If the annihilationist does not hold to the annihilation of Christ on the cross then is it not true that Christ also did not bear the punishment due us for our sins? And if that is the case, then what hope is there for us?

Right; I think the annihilationist has to concede either that (a) Christ was annihilated or that (b) annihilation is not part of the penalty for sin or that (c) Christ did not pay the complete penalty for sin. I don’t think Fudge deals with this problem squarely; but perhaps he could try to solve it as follows.

The extinguishing of consciousness is (the ultimate) part of the penalty for sin, and Christ suffered this; but his soul, though dead (in this sense), did not cease to exist (was not annihilated). However, cessation of existence indeed occurs in the case of the wicked, not because annihilation is part of the penalty of sin per se; but because there is no reason to actively sustain the lifeless wicked in existence. This concedes (b) but perhaps gives the annihilationist something close enough to what he wants. If he conceded (a), then he would seem to have to deny Chalcedon (at least on a natural reading, where the union of natures is something that should be primarily indexed to moments of time and conceived as immutably enduring).