On this day in 1915, Anglo-French forces fighting in World War I launch their first combined attempt to break through the heavily fortified German trench lines on the Western Front in France.

At Vimy Ridge, a strategically important crest of land on the Aisne River, in northwestern France, French troops launched an attack on German positions after firing shrapnel shells for five hours on the morning of May 9, 1915. On the heels of the artillery barrage, the French soldiers left their trenches to advance across No Man’s Land, only to find that the bombardment had failed to break the first German wire. As they struggled to cut the wire themselves, German machine gunners opened fire. Eventually, the French were able to reach their objective, as the Germans withdrew to better lines, but they suffered heavy casualties: one regiment of the French Foreign Legion lost nearly 2,000 of its 3,000 soldiers, including its commanding officer, who was shot in the chest by a sniper, and all three battalion commanders.

That same day, British troops under the orders of Sir Douglas Haig, commander in chief of the 1st Army Corps, attacked German lines further north in the Artois region in an attempt to capture Aubers Ridge, where they had failed during the Battle of Neuve Chapelle two months earlier. The British artillery here also proved ineffective, with many of the shells fired proving defective and many others too light to cause serious damage. As a result, when the soldiers attacked, they were completely unable to break through the German defenses. An entry in the German regimental diary about that ill-fated advance recorded that “There could never before in war have been a more perfect target than this solid wall of khaki men, British and Indian side by side. There was only one possible order to give – ‘Fire until the barrels burst.’”

After the first British assault failed to break the German line, many of the soldiers who had crossed into No Man’s Land and been injured by enemy fire were killed by a follow-up British artillery barrage lasting 40 minutes. British troops running back to their own lines came under German fire as they ran; as they had a number of German prisoners with them, soldiers in the British trenches mistakenly believed they were facing a counter-attack, and also fired on their retreating comrades.

Despite the initial failure, Haig ordered a second attack, disregarding reports from air reconnaissance of a steady forward movement of German reinforcements. Two of his three subordinate commanders protested, including General James Willcocks, commander of the Indian Corps, and General Hubert Gough, commander of the 7th division, who reported to Haig his “certainty of any further attempt to attack by daylight being a failure.” Only one commander, General Richard Haking of the 1st Division, felt confident of the success of a further assault, and Haig accepted his judgment.

Thus, the British forces, led by a regiment of kilted bagpipers from the 1st Black Watch, attacked again later on May 9, and were slaughtered by German machine gunners. At dusk, Haig ordered the attackers to push forward with bayonets; faced with overwhelming resistance from his three commanders, he withdrew this order but mandated that battle be resumed the next day. On the morning of May 10 however, Willcocks, Gough and Haking all told Haig they lacked sufficient ammunition to start a second day’s offensive, and the attack was canceled. The first and only day of the Battle of Aubers Ridge had resulted in the loss of 458 officers and 11,161 men. As Haig’s close associate, General Richard Charteris, wrote in his diary on May 11: “Our attack has failed, and failed badly, and with heavy casualties. That is the bald and most unpleasant fact.”
www.historychannel.com_________________Met hart en ziel
De enige echte

The second battle of Artois, 9 May-18 June 1915, was the most important part of the Allied spring offensive of 1915. It was hoped to capture Vimy Ridge, break through the German lines, and advance into the Douai plain. This would cut key German railway lines and perhaps force them to retreat from their great salient bulging out into France.

The Allied offensive was pre-empted by the German gas attack at Ypres (second battle of Ypres, 22 April-25 May 1915). By the time the Artois offensive began, the real crisis at Ypres had passed, but it did prevent the BEF from playing a bigger part in the planned offensives. Even so, the British First Army, under General Haig, was allocated to the offensive, and was to attack Aubers Ridge, over the same ground attacked during the battle of Neuve Chapelle (10-13 March 1915).

The French offensive would be launched by the Tenth Army, under General d’Urbal. It was supported by 1,200 guns with 200,000 shells, a huge amount for ammunition for 1915 (later bombardments would use millions of shells). The artillery bombardment began six days before the attack was due to go in.

The British attack at Aubers Ridge was a total failure. It cost the BEF 10,000 casualties and achieved nothing. In contrast, the French attack on 9 May opened with a dramatic success. Pétain’s XXXIII corps advanced 2.5 miles in the first hour and a half of the battle, and the 77th and Moroccan Divisions actually reached the crest of Vimy Ridge.

General d’Urbal had not expected such rapid successes, and his reserves were six miles behind the front line, preparing to move up over the next few days. The German reserves were much better placed, and by the end of the day the French had been pushed back off the top of the ridge.

Over the next five weeks the French and Germans engaged in a battle of attrition in the area immediately behind the old German front line. This was a maze of communications trenches and strong points, where progress was slow and costly. The Moroccan Division did manage to fight its way back onto Vimy Ridge on 16 June, but was once again pushed back. A second British attack, at Festubert, 15-27 May 1915, was less disastrous than the attack at Aubers, but also marked a change to a war of attrition.

The attack in Artois failed to achieve its original objectives. Vimy Ridge remained in German hands until it fell to the Canadians in 1917 (Battle of Vimy Ridge), while the battle of attrition favoured the Germans. The French suffered 100,000 casualties, the Germans 75,000, and as the French were well aware there were more Germans than Frenchmen.

The fighting in Artois would be renewed in the autumn of 1915 (Third battle of Artois), this time as part of a wider offensive that including the second battle of Champagne and the British failure at Loos.

The battle of Aubers Ridge was a British contribution to the Allied spring offensive of 1915. It was fought over the same ground as the battle of Neuve Chapelle, 10-13 March 1915, but failed to achieve even the temporary successes of that battle.

The British attack was to be launched by General Sir Douglas Haig’s First Army. It was intended to send in two attacks, to the north and south of Neuve Chapelle, with the hope that the two attacking forces could meet up behind the German front lines. Haig had requested extra artillery to increase the strength of the 40 minute bombardment planned for the morning of 9 May, but all available artillery reserves had been sucked into the fighting at the second battle of Ypres, still raging just to the north.

The British attack on 9 May was a total failure. The Germans had greatly strengthened their lines around Neuve Chapelle after they had been overrun during Neuve Chapelle, and the British artillery bombardment was simply not heavy enough to destroy the new German lines.

The battle of Aubers Ridge fits the popular image of a First World War battle better than most. The British troops went over the top early on the morning of 9 May and were cut down by German machine gun fire. The survivors were pinned down in no mans land. No significant progress was made, and early on 10 May Haig ended the offensive. The British suffered 11,000 casualties in one day of fighting on a narrow front.

9 May 1915 - A party from the 15th Battalion (Queensland, Tasmania) crept out at night and captured the Turkish trench in front of Quinn's Post. Next morning they were driven back with many men wounded as they ran for the Australian line. Lieutenant Francis Armstrong, of Brisbane, was killed as he tried to climb out of his trench to rescue the wounded.

Chaplain William McKenzie, Salvation Army, recorded his first burial after arriving on Gallipoli:

It was pleasing to be able to bury the Col.'s body [McKenzie did not specify who the Colonel was] the first night I was in the firing line and we buried him at 9 pm in an exposed position and for safety I had to kneel in a crouching position to conduct the service. He had been dead a fortnight.

Today completed our fourteenth day of battle, and up to the present I have not received a scratch. Don’t worry about Bert. His wound is in the shoulder but is only a flesh wound, and was made by a clean bullet. Had it been a dum-dum it would have blown his arm off. Some of the chaps have been frightfully torn about by dum dums. Ralph Dixon was wounded in the neck on the day we landed, but I haven’t seen him since and cannot get any tidings(??) of him.
I hope he gets over it OK. Keith Rixon one-time telegraphist at N’dera while I was there, was shot dead. He was trying to shoot an enemy sniper at the time. Bert was sent on board the hospital ship the morning he was shot, & I probably won’t see him again till he returns for more fight. I have had several fairly close shaves but I don’t run much risk as those in the firing line. Our Hqrs. is about 50 yds behind the firing line. The first four days fighting was very heavy. I suppose you have read of the glorious landing of the 3rd Brigade & their bayonet charge. Will write fully as soon as the censor’s embargo is raised. Best love to all from your loving son V.

Dear Mum & Dad & Brothers & Sisters.
The wound in my arm is nearly healed but my arm is still practically useless. I can only just raise it – very slowly. I suppose that the papers told you all about the fighting but all the same I spose you’d like to hear it again. The landing was commenced very early in the morning Sunday 25/4/15 the 3rd BDE going first & that BDE had the most landing casualties. The Turks were right on the beach, despite the fact that the warships had shelled the place very thoroughly & the first few boat loads of our boys lost heavily but as soon as they got ashore they dug them out with the bayonet. During the whole of the landing the Turks were giving our boys schrapnel a treat & one boat was sunk by a shell exploding on her water line. I heard also that two pontoons broke away from the tow & the Turks got their machine guns on to them & wiped out everybody on them. Our turn came about 8 o’clock & A Co was the first to go. We got on a destroyer & she took us pretty close in, & then we got into rowing boats & thus got on shore. When I first got on the destroyer I was as right as rain until I saw my first sight of the harvest of war. I saw blood oozing from beneath a tarpaulin & a sailor told me there were 4 dead men under it – killed by shrapnel on the destroyer before they even landed.

When the boats got into 3 feet of water we all jumped out & waded ashore feeling mighty thankful that we’d got so far. The 3rd Battery formed up in a deep gully near by safe from shrapnel for a few moments rest. After a short spell we marched off. Hills. They were awful. We simply had to pull ourselves up hand by hand. And to improve matters we had 50 rds of extra ammunition, three days rations, & some firewood.

Whilst having one of the many rests we were compelled to take, an unaimed bullet got Sgt Cavill in the neck & I believe he has gone under to it. Presently we got on to a plateau with a lovely trench in it that the Turks, with commendable foresight had provided for us. The bullets from a fight somewhere handy were flying about pretty thick making that sharp crack you hear when marking. We couldn’t get a field of fire from the trench, so we all got up on the level ground, but nary a turk could we see & as they started potting at us from somewhere we started to dig ourselves in. Shortly afterwards there came a long drawn hissing scream followed by an explosion, & a pretty cloud of smoke up in the air. Shrapnel. There are only two things that ought to be barred in war & they are Artillery & machine guns they are both fiendish. They shelled us all that day & searched all over the ground with their machine guns & we couldn’t do a thing. The whole country is covered with short scrub about 3 feet high & its almost impossible to see a man lying down at 20yds. Of course that style of country just suits the Turks & their snipers & machine guns can work without any fear of being discovered. About 4pm we got word to fix bayonets & be ready for a charge but it never came off. Shortly afterwards we got into the trench & just after I got in A co’s Sgt Major McGregor was shot dead by a sniper as he was standing in the trench. Capt Burns[?] who was in charge of old F co was also killed shot throu the heart, also Lt Evans the machine gun officer – he was riddled by one of the enemys machine guns. Dr Bean our medical officer was wounded also Lt Carter of A Co. Major Lear of C Co & Lcpl Meakins signaler were both killed by the one shrapnel as the Major was reading a message Meakins brought him. I heard that the 2nd & 4th Battns had lost their Colonels. Col Owen of the 3rd is Brigadier of the 1st & 2nd Brigade. By nightfall we were all dug in as soon as the darkness allowed we improved our trenches. Just at dark I took some ammunition out on to the Right. I had to cross an open bit of white ground. Luckily the beggars missed me. When I was coming back stood under cover for a few mins before crossing the open & then when I did rush I fell head over heels right in the centre _ _ _. but got back O.K. All night both sides kept up a heavy rifle fire – the Turks firing where they knew our trenches were & our boys firing wherever they saw flame. I was watching nearly all night – I got the job of observer for Maj Brown. Had to keep closely scanning the country for M Guns, movements of the enemy etc. When things got extra warm Major Brown used to make me come down. Its very interesting observing, the only thing I had to be extra careful of was one or more snipers on the right front. All day Monday things were very hot indeed. The rifle fire was very heavy from the Turks, but not from us – its no use firing at nothing & they didn’t let us forget that they had Artillery. It was on Monday night I had my first narrow escape. Just near dark Maj Brown went down to the outpost trench to lead a bayonet charge but things were so hot that he got down into the trench & I did so also, crouching behind Elbel. Well shrapnel began to come our way so I squeezed in alongside Elbel instead of behind him. A little after a concussion shrapnel tore bits out of Elbels haversack which was on his back & exploded in the ground 3 feet behind us & right on top of it another one landed in the same place & the only damage both of them did was to cut Maj Browns face a little. Elbel was a bit dazed for a few seconds. If I had remained where I was I would have got it fair in the chest which would have made an awful mess to say the least of it. All Monday night was incessant firing by the Turks with threatened bayonet charges that never came off. Maj Brown went off for a few hours Monday night as his face was rather cut about by the shell that nearly laid Elbel out, so I reported to Capt Douglas & was with him all Tuesday morning trying to pick out m guns & whilst doing so picked up a couple of Turks crawling away. Got my rifle & then couldn’t see them for awhile & when I did one was lying in the open & the other was half behind a little bush. Got the range lovely first shot & gave them three each for luck. While on this post I aroused the fire of a sniper & he made me feel uncomfortable all morning. Things were pretty comfortable at this post. Just below us out of sight of the “Terrrrrrible Turrrrrrk” was a little deep gully in which there was a nice spring & we used to slip down & make ourselves some tea or beef tea or both according to fancy. There were 4 beef tea squares in our rations. The only thing about it we had to get down like a streak of lightning & back the same way or else have a dozen snipers on to you. On the Wednesday the Turks must have taken a tumble as they made it impossible for us to stay in the gully at all so the tea making had to be abandoned but during the Monday & Tuesday there was quite a quantity of tea made. After dinner hearing Major Brown was back I returned to his trench & remained with him. About 3pm the Turks began to give us particular __ with their shrapnel & our big guns didn’t seem to be able to get on to them. They were making a point of sending 3 concussion ones at a time followed by three or 4 timed ones. After a while they gave us nothing but concussion ones & I had narrow squeak No 2. They began to drop pretty close to where we were & presently one landed plunk fair into my observation post & blew it into __ the air. Maj Brown & a Sergt Maj of the 11th & myself were all sitting huddled in a tiny dugout & when I saw my lookout go I thort to myself that the next would just about land right on us & sure enough it did. It landed fair into the trench right opposite the three of us & buried us up to our necks in dirt. I scrambled up to see if I was hurt & finding I wasn’t I inspected the seniors. As before Maj Brown was the only one touched, & as before he got it in the face, but though unpleasant his wounds were not dangerous. I picked up 5 of the shrapnel bullets out of the dirt as momentos. A rifle that happened to be where the shell landed was in a sad mess. That night when half way throu my tea I was told to take an officer around to a certain trench. As I expected to be back in a few mins I left all my things behind. Whilst I was waiting to bring the officer back things developed with great rapidity and everybody was rushed into the firing line with fixed bayonets. I had left my rifle behind so I looked round & got another. Three of us were crammed into a trench made for one. One chap was lying in one end, another in the other end & I was sitting on the side with my body closer to the ground than a snakes stomach. Bullets were flying very thick – the air was simply cracking with them. I think that the Turks intended there to be a general bayonet attack that night, but owing to the awful reception they got on the left it was abandoned. They formed a charging line three times on the left & did it in silence & with great courage & discipline but each time it was formed our boys blew them to pieces with their rifle fire & after the third attempt they gave it best & retreated leaving hundreds of dead behind them. I spent an awful night – daren’t sit up & it was agony the way I was. One poor beggar near us decided to rush back for something & he’d barely started before he fell crying out “I’m badly wounded” time after time for about 10 mins & then he ceased. Shortly after a chap from the out post trench in front tried to rush back to us & reached us moaning horribly with an awful hole in his stomach. You see it was bright moonlight the whole night long. A chap named Cox – a Letter Carrier & also A co’s head cook was the connecting file between the outpost & the main body. He was in a deep dugout & had to pass orders back & forward. The outpost couldn’t raise him after awhile so a man sent to waken him but it was no use he’d died at his post – a sniper got him in the head. All night there alarms so we didn’t get any sleep. In the morning all the trenches were connected. It was slow & dangerous work but we got it done at last. We were all suffering terribly from want of water & at last several bottles came along but they were for some men further along that had none since Sunday. We did without water till late in the afternoon. During the afternoon a M. Gun on our front was giving us a lot of trouble – every few mins the snake like hissing of its stream of bullets would come unpleasantly close so being an observer I tried to pick it out. My possy was a rotten one too. There were two small bushes just in front & the enemy thort it was a M. Gun position so you can imagine the result every min or so the dirt in front would be knocked over us & we’d often get quite a shower. About quarter of an hour watching rewarded me. I picked out the thin wreath of steam rising from the cooler, so I got about a doz men & went to each & had to sight their rifles on to it before they could see it. When they were all ready we gave it 5 rounds rapid. I don’t know whether we put it out of action, or killed the crew or merely compelled them to shift, anyway the bullets landed right on to it by the dust & it was quiet afterwards. Just at dusk I crawled along our trench to get back to Maj Brown but when I reached Capt Douglas he told me Maj Brown was wounded in the arm & that he was in charge so I stayed with him. Wed night was comparatively quiet & a little wet. Tho I’d had practically no sleep since Saty night I couldn’t sleep. The strain & worry was awful & my head was singing & buzzing awfully. Before I went to bed got a hint that the 3rd were going to be relieved in the morning so I gathered all my things together. Couldn’t find my water bottle but got another easy enough. Lost my haversack but that was also easily replaced, but the worst of it was that the compass Clytie gave me was in it & so I’ve lost it. We were relieved by the “Tommies” at daybreak on Thursday morning. We had to cross about 100 yds of fire swept ground & we rushed it. Just near the safety trench I stopped to walk & got a knock in the shoulder like a kick from a horse. I tumbled into the trench pretty slick & Sgt Harris dressed my wound & then Sgt Button came along & he took me to the Field dressing base & the Dr there dressed it & I got a lovely drink of tea. Then Sgt Button took me to the beach & I met Vernie there. He’s O.K. He made both of us a cup of tea & then I went to Field Ambulance to report & I got another hot drink there _ _ _. There were three wounded Turks there & you ought to have seen the looks our boys gave them. I didn’t get a chance to see Vernie again as all the wounded were hustled into boats & taken to a hospital ship & that night we sailed for Alexandria. The 3rd Bn have lost heavily in officers as have most of the other Bn’s. N.C.O’s too have been in high percentage. All the 3rd BDE N.C.O’s had to take their stripes off & put them in their pockets to prevent being picked out. The Turks have all sorts of ruses probably copied from the Germans. Quite a lot were killed in N.Z. uniforms. One night they blew the “Charge” several times on the bugle to coax us out but it wouldn’t work. OK I forgot to say when I got hit I lost every bit of my equipment including a lot of private things I had in my pack, the most important of which was my diary & all I have is what I stand up in & my overcoat. To get back to the Turks. On two or three occasions they got throu our line & at a critical moment would shout out “retire” or if the Turks were in force they yell out to us to charge. Several were shot at dodges like that. Then they use “dum dum” & explosive bullets. The “dum dums” are made by sawing the point off or by turning the bullet back to front. In either case the result is the same. One of Kiplings poems describes the work of a “dum-dum” perfectly “A small blue hole in his forehead & the back blown out of his head”. Cpl Watson one of A co’s reinforcements had half his head blown away with one bullet. It was awful. The wounds these bullets make are terrible. They are enough to unnerve a man. I only saw Vernie for about a minute the whole of the time we were fighting & that was when I took a message to Maj Bennett. He was on a telephone line. He told me that a man above him on the bank had been shot & had fell on his leg & hurt it considerably. The unfortunate cause of it was shot dead. Everybody spoke very highly of Maj Brown & he got to be well known not only in the 1st Bde but in the others as well. He got so well known that a German officer ordered us to retire & the men wanted to know whose orders & he said Major Browns orders. He was then asked what Regt Maj Brown belonged to and made a guess & said 34th & his days work was done. Everybody was sincerely sorry when he was wounded in the arm & forced to relinquish his command. Well I’ve only seen 4 days fighting but I’ve seen enough to convince me that it’s a horrible ghastly business & all the glamour leaves it when you look over the sights with the bullets from the enemy cracking all around & you see your dead & dying mates near & hear the wounded moaning. I’ve come throu the first chapter O.K. for I consider my shoulder wound nothing. Give the news in this to Mrs Fox & McPhee’s. Will write again soon your loving son & brother Bert.

Our listing of known sets of brothers who died on the same date in 1915.

9 May 1915
Walter, 23, and Walter Belsten, 24, died whilst serving with the 1/13th Battalion, the London Regiment (Kensington). Sons of William H. and Sarah E. Belsten of 8 Colville Road, Acton, the brothers have no known graves and are commemorated on the Ploegsteert Memorial to the Missing.

Also 9 May 1915
Aubrey, 25, and Jack Brooks, 26, died whilst serving with the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Sussex Regiment. Sons of Mr J.A. Brooks, Allington Rd, Newick, Lewes, Sussex, the brothers have no known graves and are commemorated on the Le Touret Memorial to the Missing.

Also 9 May 1915
Frederick, 19, and George Clarke, 21, died whilst serving with the 1st Battalion, the Northamptonshire Regiment. Sons of G.W. and Elizabeth Clarke, Clapgate, Fascet Fen(?), Peterborough, the brothers have no known graves and are both commemorated on the Le Touret Memorial to the Missing.

Also 9 May 1915
Albert, 20, and William Hawkins, 24, died whilst serving with the 1/5th Battalion, the Royal Sussex Regiment. Sons of William and Sarah Jane Hawkins, 3 Balliol Cottages, Wadhurst, Sussex, the brothers have no known graves and are commemorated on the Le Touret Memorial to the Missing.

Also 9 May 1915
Alex, 19, and Harry Hughes, 18, died whilst serving with A Company of the 2nd Battalion, the Gloucestershire Regiment, in action near Sanctuary Wood, Zillebeke. Sons of George and Annie Hughes of The Wye, Charfield, Gloucestershire, the brothers have no known grave, and are commemorated on the Menin Gate Memorial to the Missing, Ypres. The CWGC lists their date of death as 10 May 1915 but another local man wrote home saying that he had seen the Hughes boys "bowled over" on 9 April.

Also 9 May 1915
Arthur, 30, and Dudley Millington, 19, died whilst serving with the 13th Battalion, the London Regiment (Kensington). Sons of Mrs. A. Millington, of 22, Lavington Rd., Ealing, London, the brothers have no known graves and are commemorated on the Ploegsteert Memorial to the Missing.

Also 9 May 1915: serving in different units
Frederick and Walter Southgate died whilst serving with the 1st and 2nd Battalions respectively of the Northamptonshire Regiment, during the attack on Aubers Ridge. Sons of Sarah Southgate of East Bergholt, Suffolk, they had joined up together and had consecutive regimental numbers. The brothers have no known graves : Frederick is commemorated on the Le Touret Memorial, and Walter on the Ploegsteert Memorial.

Also 9 May 1915
George and Herbert Wimble died whilst serving with the 2nd Battalion, the Rifle Brigade. Having enlisted together, they had consecutive regimental numbers. The brothers have no known graves and are commemorated on the Ploegsteert Memorial to the Missing.

Out of battle - A blog of anecdotes and articles about the First World War, centering on 8th Battalion, AIF.

The Battle Of Festubert, May 1915.

The Battle of Festubert,(which incorporated the Battle of Aubers Ridge) saw the 2nd Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment fight along side 5th Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment.

The 2nd Battalion had arrived in France in August 1914 and had fought through the earlier retreat to the Marne and the “Race to the Sea”, cumulating at the First Battle of Ypres in October 1914.

The 5th Battalion was a territorial battalion and they had arrived in France in February 1915, Aubers Ridge was to be their first time in action.

This account of the Battle of Festubert comes from the “The Story of the Great War, Volume V”, although in the language of the time, still gives a good account.

"To aid the French in the Artois, the British made a forward movement in the Festubert region in May, 1915. Its purpose was to prevent the Seventh German Corps from sending troops and artillery to reinforce Lens. Moreover the British, if they succeeded, would take the Aubers Ridge, which they had tried to gain in the battle of Neuve Chapelle.

If they could capture the Aubers ridge, the way would be opened to Lille and La Bassée. The action began on Sunday morning, May 9,1915, in the region between Bois Grenier and Festubert, and was a part of the forward movement of the British from Armentières to La Bassée.

Part of the First Corps and the Indian Corps marched forward on the right from the Rue du Bois toward the southern part of the Bois du Biez, where there had been much fighting before. The principal attack was made by the Eighth Division on Rouges Banes, not far from Fromelies and the Aubers ridge, near where the British had been stopped in the battle of Neuve Chapelle. At approximately the same time that General Sir Douglas Haig with the British First Army reached the slightly elevated plateau in front of Lille, General Foch with a large body of French troops made a desperate attack on the Germans on their front from La Bassée to Arras.

The French and British had joined their efforts here, not only to relieve the pressure which was being exerted on Ypres and to take Lille, which dominated a region rich in coal, but also for the purpose of keeping the Germans so busy on the western front that none could be sent to the eastern front and further embarrass Russia. The artillery of both the British and French attempted to wreck the German trenches before their infantry should be sent against their foe. In this effort the British, using principally shrapnel, made little headway; but their ally, using high-explosive shells, such as they had been hurling at the Germans for weeks at the rate of a hundred thousand a day, was successful. Soon the Teutons' front was screened by clouds of yellow, green, black and white smoke. But this was not to be a one-sided artillery engagement, and the Germans soon had their artillery in action. They trained it on their enemies' trenches, believing from the size of the bombardment that an assault was soon to be made and that the trenches would be filled with troops. Their surmise was correct, but the Allies had suspected their opponents would reason thus, so the French and British infantry were in covered positions. Of course the Germans did not know how well their opponents were protected, so they sent thousands of shells against the allied positions. And again the allied artillerists replied in kind. This time they caught the German reenforcements, with the result that many of them were slain before they could reach their own front. In this work the British shrapnel was more effective than the French high-explosive shells.

The bombardment was continued vigorously for three-quarters of an hour. That the allied range finders had been doing accurate work was evidenced by the appearance of the German trenches when the British and French fire was turned against the supporting German trenches; but the Teutons' wire entanglements remained intact. Heretofore the big guns had been able to sweep such obstructions away. When the infantry reached the barbed wire, it found the Germans had improved this particular method of defense by using specially manufactured wire cable, well barbed, which was from one and one-half to two inches in diameter. And, to protect their cable entanglements, the Germans had built parapets in front of the entanglements. Their enemy's charging infantry coming upon such an obstruction could not cut it, and the only means of circumventing this new device was for the attacking force to throw their overcoats on the entanglements and crawl across the wire in the face of rifle and machine-gun fire.

For a considerable distance along this part of the front the distance between the German and British trenches was not more than two hundred yards. At not a few sections the opposing trenches were near enough to permit the soldiers to converse with their opponents. The trenches for the most part were built on the marshland with sandbags, those of the British being khaki-colored, and the German being black and white. When the inevitable order to charge was given, the British artillery shifted its range to the German rear and the Eighth Division dashed over the black and white sandbags behind which the Germans were crouching. Beyond them was a ridge, in horseshoe formation, which was the last barrier that lay between the Allies and the plains that led to Lille. This ridge trails off in a northeasterly direction at Rouges Banes. Near the hamlet there was a small wood which had been taken by the Pathans and Gurkhas before the cannonade started. Among the regiments that led the attack of the Eighth Division were the Kensington Battalion of the London Regiment, the First Gloucesters, the Second Sussex, and the Northamptons.

They were supported by the Liverpool Territorials, the First North Lancashires, the Second King's Royal Rifles, and the Sussex Territorials. The Germans had large bodies of reinforcements held at Lille, but they were unavailing; and the British took the first line of trenches though it required fifteen and a half hours to do it. Then they went on until they were on the slope of the ridge.

Beyond that, however, it seemed impossible to proceed, for the Germans had such an array of machine guns trained on the approach to their second line of trenches that no human being could live in the face of their deadly fire. The British needed an equipment with which to bombard their enemy with high-explosive shells. Such an equipment they did not possess.

The German commander played a clever trick on the British when their First Army Corps and their Indian Division attempted to make progress in the triangle to the west of La Bassée. He evacuated his first two lines of trenches while the artillery was doing what it could to demolish his parapets; but his men were drawn up in the third line of trenches waiting for the inevitable advance of the British. This third line of trenches was protected with armor plate and concrete. Moreover he had planted a large number of machine guns in the brickfield near La Bassée. The British dashed forward until they were in range of the machine guns. Then they suffered such severe losses that they were forced to retreat, even though they had almost taken the inviting German trenches. The Highlanders and the Bedfords had made a gallant charge and felt especially humiliated to have to withdraw when victory was about to perch on their banners. They believed that a lack of reinforcements was responsible for their nonsuccess.

The day's fighting ended with the First Army of the British driven back except in the center. There the Kensington Territorial Battalion made a remarkable record for itself. In the morning when the British artillery ceased firing, the Kensington men dashed from their trenches and captured three lines of the German trenches at the point of the bayonet. A part of the battalion, in its eagerness to win the day, went on up the ridge. At the same time one of its companies turned to the left and another to the right, and with bayonet and bomb drove the Germans from the trenches for a distance of 200 yards. The Kensingtons were doing the work that had been set for them to do; but two regular battalions, one to their left and the other to their right, were not as able to comply with the orders they had received. The regulars were stopped by wire entanglements that the artillery had failed to smash, and, at the same time, they were raked by machine-gun fire. Hence they were unable to keep up with the Territorials. In fact the regulars never got up to the Kensington men; but were forced to retire. This left the Territorials in a most precarious condition. They had gained such an important point on the German line that a heavy fire was directed against them. But the British would not give up what they had taken.

Instead of retiring, they sent for reinforcements which were promised to them. In the meantime the Germans gave up trying to blow the Kensingtons out of their position and made a counterattack. The left wing of the plucky Territorial battalion used bombs effectively to hold their enemy at bay. The right wing at the same time was kept busy in its attempt to prevent being enveloped. In spite of all the Germans could do with their artillery and their repeated counterattacks the West London men maintained their small wedge in the Teuton front. Finally trench mortars were brought against them. Then the Kensington battalion, or what was left of it, received the order to retire. To do that necessitated fighting their way back through the thickening line of their enemy. Those British Territorials had held their peculiar position several hours, and had suffered severely in consequence; but their loss was undoubtedly much larger when retiring to their former line. They fought the greater part of the afternoon and well into the evening in endeavoring to get back; and finally a comparatively few of them succeeded. The last dash to the British trenches was made over a barren piece of ground which was so flat that there was no opportunity for concealment. And here the Germans raked what was left of the battalion with rifle and machine-gun fire. Ultimately, however, a portion of the brave band returned to the British trenches. Previous to withdrawing the survivors from the front, General Sir Henry Rawlinson told them that their gaining the position which they took and holding it as long as they did had not only relieved the pressure on Ypres but had aided General Foch's army to advance between Arras and La Bassée. In conclusion he said: "It was a feat of arms surpassed by no battalion in this great war."

The Sussex and Northampton troops made a desperate effort to get into the German trenches on the morning in which this action started, but they never got nearer than forty yards, being stopped by the deluge of shrapnel, rifle, and machine-gun fire to which they were subjected. When they were ordered to return to the British trenches,those who remained able to make the attempt found it quite as dangerous as trying to go forward. That afternoon the Black Watch and the First Cameronians charged where the Sussex and Northamptons had been repulsed, but the Scotchmen had but little more success. It is true some of the men from the land of the heather got into the German trenches; but they did not survive. The determination of the British was shown when men, who had been wounded in the first charge and been unable to return to their own line, joined the Scots in their mad rush to death. Those men had lain under fire twelve hours before making their dying assault on the German trenches.

It had been expected the Scotchmen would get into the opposing trenches and bomb and bayonet the Teutons out. Then reinforcements would be sent from the British line. But the artillery of King George was unable to check the devastating work of the kaiser's big guns and give the reinforcements a clear field through which to go to the aid of the attacking force. The result was that the Germans continued such a leaden hail between the lines that it was sending soldiers to certain death to order them to cross the zone of fire. The remnant of the Scottish regiments was recalled, and it lost as many men on its return as it had in its desperate struggle to reach the German trenches.

Both the Kensingtons and the Scots found groups of German machine guns, doing most destructive work, that could have been rendered useless if the British had had a supply of high-explosive shells. Under the circumstances there was nothing for Sir Douglas Haig to do but to order his men all along the line to retire. They obeyed the order sullenly, and many of them were slain in their attempt to get back to their own trenches. But their comrades felt they had not died wholly in vain; for the woeful lack of lyddite shells thus became known in England and the indignation thus aroused resulted in the appointment of a minister of munitions who organized the manufacture of the necessary explosives on a scale heretofore unattempted by the British. A lesson had been learned, but at a fearful cost to life.

The same lesson was being taught the British public at another section of the battle front. Its soldiers not only were unable to maintain a successful artillery fire, but the fact became so impressed on the German mind that the Teutons in the Ypres and Lille regions felt assured that their infantry had the British at their mercy. Sir John French, however, had a clever knowledge of human nature. He began his efforts to remedy the difficulty by telling the war correspondents his troubles. They spread the news. Then he secretly collected all of the available artillery in the Ypres region, together with his limited supply of shells, and was ready to deal such a blow to the Duke of Württemberg's army when it marched on Ypres the latter part of May, 1915, that it was necessary for the Germans to get reenforcements through Belgium. This was a great surprise to the Teutons and cost them clearly.

SIR JOHN FRENCH ATTEMPTS A SURPRISE

The operation of this plan of Sir John French had an excellent effect in the Ypres region, but it had the opposite effect on the British who were trying to take Lille. Moreover it was necessary for the British to continue to occupy the attention of the left wing of the German army, under the command of the Crown Prince of Bavaria, in order to keep him from using his men against General Foch, who was attempting to push his way between Arras and Lille.

Inasmuch as the British artillery had proved ineffective because of its lack of enough and the proper kind of ammunition, Sir John French planned another surprise for the Germans. This time he selected the weapon which the Teutons seemed most to fear when it was in the hands of the British--the bayonet. The salient on the German front at Festubert, between La Bassée and Neuve Chapelle, was chosen for the proposed military feat. The territory occupied by the Teutons had the appearance, to the casual observer, of being lowlands on which were wrecked homes, farms, and trees. The actual conditions of this section of the country were much more serious for any body of troops which planned to make an attack. The ground was moist and muddy, in many places being crossed by treacherous ditches filled with slimy water. Moreover the exact range of practically every square foot of it was known to the German artillerymen, whose guns were on the high ground to the west of the lowlands. The British were in trenches from seventy to three hundred yards from those of their enemy. If the men there could dash across the intervening space and get into the German trenches before being annihilated by the kaiser's cannon, they would use the bayonet with deadly effect, and, from past experiences, have reasonable hope of gaining a victory. It was decided to make such an attempt first on that part of the line between Richebourg on the left and Festubert on the right.

The British Seventh Division was sent south to support the attack which was to have been made on May 12, 1915. On that day it was too foggy for the aviators to see with any degree of accuracy; so the movement was delayed. This gave time for the Canadian Division to be sent south and add their strength to the support. The German trenches, at this point where the attack was to be made, were occupied by the Seventh Westphalian Army Corps. This corps had lost many of its men at Neuve Chapelle; and their places had been taken by youths who had not reached the development of manhood and whose immaturity and lack of military training greatly lessened the efficiency of this famous body of troops.

Finally, on Saturday night, May 15, 1915, all conditions for the attack seemed favorable to the British. There was no moon and the sky was dark, though there was not that inky blackness that occasionally occurs under similar weather conditions. The Indian Corps stole from their trenches and began to go forward from Richebourg l'Avoué. But the Germans were alert, and they illumined the movement with innumerable flares which made the Indians easy targets for the machine guns and rifles of the Teutons in that part of the line.

So quick was the work to repel the attack that many of the Indians were slain as they were climbing out of their own trenches. As a surprise attack at night, the British were not making much of a success of their plan, but as a method of gaining ground and keeping their enemy busy on that particular part of the line the men of their Second Division were effective. They dashed into the first line of German trenches and cleared them out with the bayonet and hand grenade. The furor of the attack took them on into the second line. By dawn the soldiers of the Second Division had driven a wedge into the German line.

This wedge was widened and driven in harder by Sir Douglas Haig's old command--the First Corps. This corps had suffered heavy losses at the first battle of Ypres; but the men who filled the gaps in the line were hardy young men who made excellent soldiers from the start. Added to their enthusiasm was a desire to show their ability as fighters, with the result that the British right wing was so effective that it, in a great measure, made up for the failure of the Indian troops. The center and the right, with bomb and bayonet, drove the Germans from the trenches; and then together they forced their way into the Teutons' position 600 yards along a front 800 yards in length. Early the next morning, before daylight on May 16, 1915, the British Seventh Division forced its way into the German salient at Festubert. In the meantime the Germans were making hasty preparations for a counterattack. Sir John French's plan, however, had proved effective. It would have required a large supply of high-explosive shells to have made much of an impression on the excellent defenses which the German soldiers had constructed on this part of the front. The British had no such supply of ammunition, and, even if they had had it, it is doubtful if they would have been able to demolish the formidable wire entanglements. Yet in this night attack with the bayonet the British troops had accomplished all they could have done if supplied with proper ammunition. In the desperate charge which they made no wire entanglement could stop the British soldiers. They threw their overcoats or blankets over the barbed wire and then climbed across the obstruction. The Seventh Division took three lines of trenches in this manner, until it was 12,000 yards back of the original line of its enemy.

There were now two wedges driven into the German front, and the British desired to join them and make what might be termed a counter-salient, or a salient running into the original salient of the Germans. But the space between the two horns of the British force was a network of trenches. The horns might prod and irritate the Teutons, but they needed artillery again to rid the German breastworks of machine guns and demolish the obstructions which would cost too many lives to take in the same manner in which the British success had been won in its night attack. Nevertheless the British started in to bomb their way toward Festubert, and they even gained forty yards in this hazardous undertaking before they were forced to stop. If they had seemed to be an irresistible force, they had met what had every appearance of being an immovable body--and there was a limit to human endurance.

By May 17, 1915, the British concluded that their most advisable offensive was to clear the space between their two wedges by cutting off the Germans who held that part of their line. To do this the British attempted to cut off the German communication to the north from La Quinque Rue; but, by that time, the Teutons had received reinforcements; and they rained such a shower of lead on the attacking force that the attempt had to be abandoned, but not until many heroic efforts had been made by the British to succeed in their purpose.

Many Germans were made prisoners at all stages of the fighting. The British bayonet seemed to strike them with terror, and the bombs were more potent in scattering them than were the orders of their commanders to repel the attacking force. Between Richebourg l'Avoué and Le Quinque Rue is the farm Cour de l'Avoué. In front of this farm the remains of a battalion of Saxons attempted to surrender. They had arrived on the line as reenforcements to the Westphalians, and had been fighting valiantly until their numbers were so decreased that they were unable to hold out against their foes longer. Whether their commanding officer ordered them to surrender or a common impulse dictated their action, they left their position and advanced toward the British. Not understanding their action, the attacking force fired upon the Saxons who were sufficiently numerous to give the impression that they might be leading a counterattack. Thereupon the Saxons dropped their guns and the firing from the British side ceased, only to be taken up on the German side by the Westphalians. This was followed by an attack on the would-be prisoners by the German artillery until every soldier in the surrendering party was slain. This action horrified the British, but the Germans considered it a means of discipline which would have a salutary effect on any who might prefer the comforts of a prison camp to dying for the Fatherland.

The British Seventh Division at Festubert continued to work south along the German trenches. Its bayonets and bombs cleared the way before it. The plan was for them to continue toward Rue d'Ouvert, Chapelle St. Roch, and Canteleux. In the meantime the Second Division, on the left of the Seventh Division, was to fight its way to Rue du Marais and Violaines. The Indian contingent had received orders to keep in touch with the Third Division. The Fifty-first Division was sent to Estaires to act as a support to the First Army. By the night of May 17, 1915, the British held all of the first line of German trenches from the south of Festubert to Richebourg l'Avoué. For a part of that distance the second and third lines of trenches had been taken and held; and still farther forward the British possessed many important points. Moreover the British soldiers were so inspired with their success that they desired to press on in spite of the fact that the nature of the country was such that they were wet through and covered with mud. It was not all enthusiasm, however. Mingled with the desire for victory was a desire for revenge. The British on this part of the line were enraged by the use of gas at Ypres and the sinking of the _Lusitania_.

On the night of May 17, 1915, the Fourth Cameron Highlanders, a Territorial battalion, met with disaster. The men composing this unit were from Inverness-shire, Skye, and the Outer Islands. Many of them had been gamekeepers and hence were accustomed to outdoor life and the handling of guns, all of which aided them in saving the remnant of their command. They had been ordered to take some cottages, occupied by German soldiers as a makeshift fortification. The Cameronians on the way to the attack fell into a ditch which was both deep and wide. It was necessary for them to swim to get across the ditch in some places. In the meantime Highlanders were being slain by German shells and the rifle fire that the men in the cottages rained upon the Scots. One company was annihilated. Another company lost its way. The rear end of a German communicating trench was reached by a third company. Long before midnight this company was almost without ammunition. Two platoons reinforced it at midnight; but the reinforcements had no machine guns, which would have given at least temporary relief. Under the circumstances the only thing for the Territorials to do was to retreat. The Germans made that quite as perilous a venture as the advance had been. Only half of those who started for the cottages returned. Among the slain was the commander, and twelve other officers were also killed.

The British, in spite of a cold rain, pushed on 1,200 yards north of the Festubert-La Quinque Rue road; and took a defense 300 yards to the southeast of the hamlet. Two farms west of the road and south of Richebourg l'Avoué, the farm du Bois and the farm of the Cour de l'Avoué, in front of which latter the surrendering Saxons were slain, had been held by the Germans with numerous machine guns. The British took both farms by nightfall and found, on counting their prisoners, that they then had a total of 608 as well as several machine guns.

The Second and Seventh Divisions were withdrawn by Sir Douglas Haig on the following day, Wednesday, May 19, 1915. The Fifty-first Division and the Canadians took the places of the men who were sadly in need of relief from active duty. Lieutenant General Alderson received the command of both divisions together with the artillery of both the Second and Seventh Divisions. The cold, wet weather hampered operations and there was comparatively little activity, though hostilities by no means altogether ceased. Each side needed a little rest and time to fill in gaps in their respective lines. Hence it was not until Sunday, May 23, that any fighting on a large scale took place. On that day the Seventh Prussian Army Corps made a desperate effort to break through that part of the British line held by the Canadians near Festubert. The Prussians used their old tactics with the result that the British shrapnel, rifle, and machine-gun fire plowed great holes in their ranks. The Teutons in this instance were without adequate artillery support, for many of their batteries had been made useless by the British. From then on to May 25, 1915, there were several small engagements in which the British made gains. Then Sir John French concluded to end the activity of his men on this part of the front. In that connection he made the following statement: "I had now reasons to consider that the battle which was commenced by the First Army on May 9 and renewed on the 16th, having attained for the moment the immediate object I had in view, should not be further actively proceeded with.”

"In the battle of Festubert the enemy was driven from a position which was strongly entrenched and fortified, and ground was won on a front of four miles to an average depth of 600 yards.""

Thomas Kent: Born in 1865, Kent was arrested at his home in Castlelyons, Co. Cork following a raid by the Royal Irish Constabulary on 22 April 1916, during which his brother Richard was fatally wounded. It had been his intention to travel to Dublin to participate in the Rising, but when the mobilisation order for the Irish Volunteers was cancelled on Easter Sunday he assumed that the Rising had been postponed, leading him to stay at home. He was executed at Cork Detention Barracks on 9 May 1916 following a court martial. In 1966 the railway station in Cork was renamed Kent Station in his honour.

Sir JOHN RANDLES asked the Under-Secretary of State for War whether it has been possible to meet the desire of the 461W Portuguese to arrange for a representative of their army to be present with our troops in France or Flanders?

Mr. TENNANT It is hoped that arrangements may be made for a representative of the Portuguese army to proceed to France a few weeks hence.

(...) On 9 May 1916 National Guard units from Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona were called into Federal service for patrol duty along the Mexican border. About five weeks later, on 18 June 1916, most of the remainder of the National Guard was called in. In all, these included 3 regiments, 13 separate squadrons, and 22 separate troops of cavalry. There were 108 regiments and 7 battalions of infantry and 6 regiments, 12 battalions, and 17 batteries of field artillery. Cavalry constituted a very small portion of the National Guard since the states preferred to have infantry regiments- they were considerably less expensive- but by the National Defense Act of 1916, they were required to organize more auxiliary troops and fewer infantry. The states were in the midst of a reorganization program when National Guard units were ordered into Federal service. In spite of all the confusion, the National Guardsmen moved to the border area on schedule, and eventually better legislation corrected many of the weaknesses revealed during their tour there. (...)

Private H.H. Stephens from Sydenham, Christchurch, joined up and was stationed in C Company, Infantry, of the First New Zealand Expeditionary Force. He departed for the war zone from Wellington on Saturday 14 August 1915, as a member of the Sixth Reinforcements. The echelon departed from Trentham Military Camp, arrived at Albany, Western Australia, on 24 August and Aden on 13 September, and disembarked at Suez on 19 September 1915. On 25 September the reinforcements sailed for Gallipoli from Alexandria, landing on the Greek Island of Lemnos four days later. Private Stephens's war quickly became a personal battle against dysentery which took him to England and hospital. On 9 May 1916 Private Stephens arrived at the Western Front near Armentieres. On 10 July he was wounded and again evacuated to the Middlesex Hospital in England. The last entry of Private Stephens's diary while he was still in England was 14 November 1916.

In 1917, the fourth year of the First World War, the International Socialist Bureau thought to hold a conference of Socialist parties in Stockholm to formulate a peace proposal. Dutch and Scandinavian socialists established a preparatory committee on May 9 while waiting for the American, Russian, German, and other representatives. The refusal of the allied governments to issue passports eventually thwarted the peace conference.

According to A J P Taylor, the historic Liberal Party committed suicide on 9 May 1918 in a parliamentary debate which saw the former Liberal Prime Minister, Herbert Henry Asquith openly inferring that his former Liberal colleague and wartime Premier, David Lloyd George had misled the House of Commons about the number of British troops serving on the Western front during a German attack in March of that year.

Two days before Asquith confronted the Prime Minister, the Times published a letter written by the former Director of Military Operations, Major General Sir Frederick Maurice. The correspondence accused Lloyd George of providing false information to Parliament following the German attack, during which British forces had sustained heavy bombardment. Maurice claimed that the Welsh premier wished to disguise the fact that British troops in the area had been depleted following Lloyd George's decision to reject military advice and siphon off soldiers to serve in Palestine.

John Gooch claims that Maurice had written to the War Cabinet on a number of previous occasions, objecting to the Prime Minister's policy and warning of the consequences. Aggrieved at Lloyd George's attempts to place responsibility for his actions onto the heads of serving soldiers, Maurice decided that the matter warranted further investigation. When a last plea to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) went unheeded, Maurice decided to make his accusations public.

For Asquith's supporters, who had still not forgiven Lloyd George for splitting the Liberal Party and usurping their leader in 1916, Maurice's accusations provided the perfect opportunity to call the Prime Minister's conduct into question. Egged on by his colleagues, Asquith pressed for a Parliamentary debate on the issue, in which he demanded a select committee inquiry into the charges.

Yet rather than managing to humiliate Lloyd George, Asquith was overwhelmed by the power of the great orator, who defended his position by revealing that the figures he had used had come from Maurice's own department at the War Office. The Prime Minister's decision to treat the matter as a dramatic measure of confidence in the wartime coalition made Asquith's dry technical arguments seem irrelevant and partisan and the House divided in support of the Government by 293 votes to 106.

Historians have long argued about the significance of the Maurice debate on the overall decline of the Liberal Party, but it certainly cemented the two-way split between the Party, 71 Liberals supporting Lloyd George and 98 following Asquith into the division lobby.

The debate also exacerbated the personal division between Lloyd George and Asquith, although Trevor Wilson suggests that the event did not entirely sever relations between the two Liberals, as the Premier invited his former colleague to join his Cabinet as Lord Chancellor just a few months afterwards.

Lloyd George famously claimed that his officials had used the division on the debate as the acid test to decide which Liberal candidates would be endorsed by the Coalition government in the 1918 election through the coupon. However, Wilson claims that this claim can be disputed as only 53 of the 229 Liberals who were denied the coupon had voted against the Government following the Maurice debate.

Whatever the short-term effects of what Kenneth Morgan has described as 'the most serious partisan crisis of the War' it is clear that the public display of antagonism within the Liberal Party's ranks undermined its position in the country.

May 9, 1918 -- Got up at 4 a.m. and fired 50 rounds of gas. Our planes were bombing Fritz lines early in the morning. Went to bed at 8:00 a.m. Got up at dinnertime. Packing shells in the afternoon. On guard from 10 p.m. until 2 a.m. We were expecting Fritz to attack.

The First World War armistice came into effect at 11am on 11 November 1918, the 'eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month'. According to the Daily Mirror, London went 'wild with delight' when it heard the news:

'Bells burst forth into joyful chimes...bands paraded the streets followed by cheering crowds of soldiers and civilians and London generally gave itself up wholeheartedly to rejoicing …. There was a scene of wonderful loyalty at Buckingham Palace, dense crowds were shouting "We want the King!"'

Armistice marked the end of fighting on the Western Front, but formal negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference continued into 1919. The Allies' formal peace treaty with Germany, the Treaty of Versailles, was not officially signed until 28 June.

As negotiations continued, the British government planned a public celebration. The Peace Committee was established to decide how Britain would mark the end of the war.

The committee first met in London on 9 May 1919, chaired by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon. Its initial proposal of a four-day August celebration was scaled down and brought forward after the Paris signing. A single day of festivities was planned for 19 July.

The proposal did not receive universal approval. Some felt that the funds would be better spent on support for returning servicemen, many of whom struggled to cope with physical and mental injuries and high unemployment levels.

9 May 1920: 200 IRA volunteers under Frank Aiken attacked the RIC barracks in Newtownhamilton, County Armagh. A mine was used to breach the barracks wall and a potato spraying machine was used to spray it with petrol, before it was set alight. The six policemen inside refused to surrender until the roof fell in.

BACKGROUND
In the 1920s each Royal Irish Constabulary Sub District was divided into areas covered by a police barracks which varied in size from extensive buildings, the property of the Board of Works in cities and towns, to six to eight-roomed houses in country areas.

The number of police officers attached to any particular barracks also varied, with almost 100 men being stationed in some barracks in Belfast as a result of civil disorder and rioting which had been prevalent in the city during the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, whilst in the country districts barracks were normally manned by a Sergeant and four/five Constables. Each barracks was located in as central a position as possible within its own area of responsibility, taking its name from the town or village in which it was situated. However, in many instances the RIC barracks was a lone house at a crossroads, in which case it took its name from the name by which the locality was known, or the name of the townland in which the barracks stood.

Most RIC barracks were rented from private individuals, usually on a twenty-one year lease, but with a clause enabling the Inspector General to give up the premises as a barracks after seven years of the lease period. Prior to any building being utilised as an RIC barracks it had to meet required standards, the main ones being as follows: it had to have a staunch slated roof with its chimneys drawing well; the building had to be free from damp and have sufficient rooms for the strength of the party, along with rooms for the family of one married man, normally the Sergeant, and his family. All windows had to have wooden shutters and there had to be a sufficient supply of good water on or near the premises, and, where possible, a garden and walled-in yard attached.

All men were required to live in the barracks, except married men who had authority to live with their families within a regulated distance from their barracks.

In 1919, when trouble once again flared in Ireland, the RIC had a total of 1,299 barracks, but by the beginning of 1921 this number had been reduced to 865.

Of the barracks that disappeared over this period, a large number included smaller, isolated barracks which were hard to defend. Early in 1920 the IRA began to carry out concerted attacks against RIC barracks. It refined its operational techniques in these attacks. From merely attempting to burn them down, by the use of inflammable liquids in hit- and-run attacks, to deploying significantly larger attacking forces using pre-arranged drills. These drills soon included the virtual holding captive of a town or village by a section of the attacking force, whilst a smaller, more experienced core, using a variety of improvised explosive devices, tried to penetrate the barrack defences. Whilst this stage of the attack was underway, the police occupants were kept under sustained gunfire. These two physical attacking elements were normally drawn from IRA flying columns, whilst local company resources were utilised in wider rings of outer protection, which could extend for several miles from the centre of the attack. These outer protective rings were also responsible for the disruption of road and communication links with the barracks under attack in an effort to prevent or hinder any reinforcements coming to its aid.

The use of these tactics resulted in the smaller barracks in outlying districts being evacuated in March and April 1920. The attacks on RIC barracks, particularly those that had closed, increased dramatically, with approximately 150 being burned on the night of 5/6 April alone. This campaign accelerated, with official figures recording that between I January 1919 and 30 June 1920 the number of barracks attacked was as follows:

Vacated Barracks Destroyed 351 Damaged 105

Occupied Barracks Destroyed 15 Damaged 25

The reason behind this increase in attacks on RIC barracks was mainly two-fold:

1.To prevent their being re-occupied by the increase of new recruits to the RIC from England. (These new members to the RIC began to perform duty in Ireland from 25 March 1920 and were mostly ex- Service Personnel who were to become known as the "Black and Tans".)

2.To seize the garrison's weaponry which was required to arm IRA units. This was most likely when they succeeded in capturing a small, outlying barracks.

In order to provide protection for their barracks, the RIC began to use barbed wire, steel shutters, sandbags and other military devices. Due to an unsuccessful attack on Newtownhamilton barracks a short time prior to the May attempt, the barracks had been fortified with barbed wire entanglements and iron-barred and sandbagged windows.

THE ATTACK
On the evening of Saturday 8th May 1920 attacks on police barracks spread again to Co Armagh, when between 200-300 armed and masked IRA men, led by Frank Aiken, a 22 year old from Camlough, gathered to attack Newtownhamilton RIC barracks.

Aiken, who both planned and led the attack against the barracks, which on the night contained Sergeant Traynor, his wife and two young daughters, and Constables Doyle, Foster, Gray, McWhirter and Small, was within three years to become the IRA's Chief of Staff.

Shortly after midnight on Sunday the 9th, the IRA took control of Newtownhamilton, blocking all the roads into the town with felled trees. Telegraph and telephone wires into the area were also cut, with IRA pickets being placed on all the houses in the town to prevent any alarm being given to the police who were now isolated in the barracks.

The barracks, a three-storey building in Newry Street, on the Armagh side of the Square, was situated opposite the courthouse and some derelict houses.

At approximately 12.30 am, having completed the first phase of its attack, the IRA then opened a vigorous and determined attack on the barracks with a volley of bombs being thrown onto its roof, followed by sustained rifle fire.

When the attack on the barracks began, other IRA units commenced firing down the streets of the town to deter anyone who thought of venturing out. This firing in the streets continued at intervals throughout the whole period of the attack to prevent any aid being given to the police.

After the first fusillade of shots at the barracks the police were called on to surrender. The police sent back a defiant refusal to this call, responding with equally vigorous fire.

The IRA then took up positions in an unoccupied house on the opposite side of the street and in a laneway which separated the barracks from the Ulster Bank. From these two positions the IRA concentrated a fierce amount of gunfire into the barracks.

Mrs Traynor, a native of Worcester, England, having placed her two children into a place of safety (believed to have been a back room of the barracks), returned to her husband and his five comrades as they defended the building.

As the battle raged she lay on the floor, supplying the men with ammunition and in anticipation of casualties among the police, she ripped up cloth to make bandages.

The fierce gun battle between the two sides raged for over two hours and, having been repulsed in their attack, the IRA then changed tactics.

Firstly they cleared away the barbed wire that had been erected around the barracks.They then entered the adjoining licensed premises of Patrick McManus, a retired policeman, which was under the same roof as the police barracks.

Mr McManus was bound with ropes and removed to an outbuilding, where he remained for several hours, being eventually released on the departure of the IRA.

Once they were inside the public house the IRA made holes in the building's gable wall which separated it from the day room of the barracks. Gelignite was then inserted into these holes and a breach was blown in the wall. This explosion, and the IRA entering through the breached wall, forced the police to retire to the rear of the building where they continued gallantly to resist, withstanding a siege for approximately three hours.

Having gained entry to the barracks, Aiken called on the police, through a megaphone, to surrender. The police's spirits had not been diminished by reason of their long fight against great odds as Sergeant Traynor called out a disdainful "NEVER", which was then backed by a fusillade from his comrades.

The IRA then brought potato sprayers into operation, soaking the front of the barracks with petrol or paraffin, which was set alightThe premises were soon a mass of flames, but still the police kept up their fight, and only when the roof was about to collapse on them, they grudgingly effected a further retirement to the barracks yard and outbuildings.

There they kept up their defence and stubbornly refused to surrender, holding out to daylight at approximately 5.00 am, when the IRA melted away as mysteriously as they had come.

During the attack none of the police was injured, although Constable Foster had a very narrow escape, when a bullet passed through his great coat at the right shoulder, without injuring him.

Daylight revealed that the IRA's attempt to secure arms had failed, but then the barracks was a heap of debris, with nothing but a few bare walls front and rear left standing, but bearing traces of bullet marks.

The contents of the barracks, with the exception of one or two small articles, were destroyed. Sergeant Traynor's furniture and most of his property had also been destroyed, with only a piano and a few chairs being saved.

Premises directly opposite the barracks, along with Mr McManus' house and the side wall of the bank, also had heavy bullet marks on them. It was also reported at the time that every drop of liquor in Mr McManus' premises had been taken by the IRA, with any not consumed by them by daylight being left behind.

After the attackers had left the scene inhabitants of the town informed the police they had seen a wounded man being carried away and a police search of the area found traces of blood on the Dundalk Road. Information about this attack did not reach Bessbrook, the headquarters of the Newtownhamilton District, until approximately 10.00 am on the Sunday morning. The Dl and a number of police then made their way to the area, finding the inhabitants of the town in a great state of terror.

Contingents of police also arrived later in the day from Portadown, Armagh and Newry, as well as a party of military, but no arrests were reported.

By June 4th the "Armagh Guardian and South Tyrone News" was reporting that the IRA had three of its number killed and about 20 wounded during the attack.The paper further stated that the death toll may rise as reports from other Counties had not yet been received.

THE GALLANT DEFENDERS
Throughout the engagement, Newtownhamilton barracks was defended by its small station party of one Sergeant (and his wife), and five Constables.The details of the RIC Officers involved were as follows: Sergeant James Traynor, 54913, a 55 year old married man with 29 years service, who had been attached to Co Armagh since the 26th April 1896. A native of Co Cavan, and a farmer prior to joining the RIC, the Sergeant retired from the Force on pension on 1 st May 1921.

Constable Michael Doyle, 66598, a 27 year old single man from Co Kildare with 7 years service. He had been attached to Co Armagh from the 14th December 1912 and had also been a farmer prior to joining the police. He resigned from the Force on the 31 st October 1920, rejoined on 2nd March 1921, and was married on 5th October that year. On 31 st May 1922 he was disbanded from the RIC in Belfast. Constable George Forster, 624410, a former Grocer's Assistant from Co Fermanagh, a 36 year old married man with 13 years service. He had been stationed in Co Armagh from the 21st June 1914. On 1st April 1921 he was promoted to the rank of Temporary Sergeant, and was disbanded from the R.IC from Co Armagh on 2nd May 1922.

Constable Richard Gray, 67159, a 27 years old single man with 7 years service, a native of Co Tyrone and a farmer prior to joining the RIC.The Constable had served in the Irish Guards during the First World War, enlisting on 27th January 1917. He rejoined the Force on 21st February 1919, and had only been attached to Co Armagh from 1st March 1920.

On 12th October 1920 he was transferred to the Depot and then, on 25th April 1921, to Belfast, from where he was disbanded from the RIC on 31st May 1922.

Constable Robert J McWhirter, 64966, a former Law Clerk from Co Antrim, was a married 31 year old man, with 10 years service. He was stationed in Co Armagh from 15th May 1919. On 1st August 1920 he had been promoted to the rank of Sergeant, and was disbanded from the RIC at Co Armagh on 31 st May 1922.

Constable William Small, 65662, a 27 year old single man, who had 9 years service, had had no other employment prior to joining the RIC.A native of Co Donegal he had joined the Force from Co Londonderry, being attached to Co Armagh on 24th June 191 I. He was disbanded from the RIC on 13th May 1922 from the Depot.

All six RIC Officers involved in this incident were awarded 1st Class Favourable Records and a Constabulary Medal on 19th November 1920. The medal awarded to Sergeant Traynor was later purchased by the RUC Museum and is on permanent display in its collection at Headquarters.

The attack on Newtownhamilton Barracks was the first major attack by the IRA in the South Armagh area during its campaign of 1919-1922. It was undertaken by a large number of IRA men who came from a very wide area including the South Armagh, North Louth, South Down and Tyrone areas. Later in 1921 this area became the 4th Northern Division of the IRA, with Aiken becoming its 1st Divisional Commander and one of the most wanted men in Ireland.

Although heavily outnumbered, the small police party at Newtownhamilton steadfastly refused to surrender, continuing the gallant defence of their barracks over an extended period of several hours. The bravery displayed by the police at Newtownhamilton was soon being repeated by other RIC Officers throughout Ireland, as small isolated barracks came under increasing large-scale IRA attacks.

The next major IRA attack against RIC barracks was at Kilmallock, Co Limerick, on the 28th May 1920.

The 'battle' of Aubers Ridge - it appears ridiculous to call it so - fits perfectly the stereo-typical vision of the British in the Great War: men cut down in their thousands for little or no gain, with only the bravery of the men offering any kind of distraction from the scale of the disaster.

Although largely fought by units of the old pre-war regular army, those now bore little resemblance to the battalions that landed in France back in the first months of the war. Many wartime volunteers had been sent as reinforcements to regular battalions and, for some, Aubers Ridge was their first experience of war.

Not all the pre-war regulars had disappeared, however. Lance Corporal William Prouse, 2nd Battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment, was a Boer War veteran from Nuncargate (where an 11 year-old Harold Larwood was living at the time). He hadn't gone to France immediately, likely being retained to help train new recruits. Others, like Harry Boneham, had found themselves in territorial units, in his case, given his seemingly impeccable Nottinghamshire credentials, the improbable 1/4th Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders.

Boneham described moving into the front line ahead of the attack in a letter to the landlord of a local pub, "We were ... given masks to wear in case the Germans used poisonous gas on us. We were soon ready, and lay down to rest a bit until the time for moving came. A strong wind was blowing, and it was raining steadily as the time drew near. However, 7 o'clock came and we got no order to move. Until midnight, we lay in suspense, and were then told that the attack had been postponed for 24 hours - possibly owing to the strong wind in our direction, and the cloudy sky. Next day passed off quietly, the weather clearing, and in the evening we marched up and took our places in the trenches. This was on the Saturday evening [8 May], your busy time as a rule, and as I sat in the trench I was thinking I wouldn't half mind if I were with you to lend a hand. It's anything but a treat, I can tell you, waiting through the night for the time for an attack to come.

"Eventually, however, we saw streams of light in the east, followed shortly afterwards by a beautiful sunrise. Skylarks were whistling overhead as gaily as could be, as if there were no such thing as war in the world. What a change in the state of affairs there was a few minutes later though. A single shell came howling through the air from one of our big guns far at the back. This was followed by a regular hurricane of shells from all the guns that had been massed for the attack. The noise was deafening, what with the whizzing overhead and the explosions in front, while the sight behind the German trenches reminded one of a storm at sea, clouds of dust and earth being thrown into the air much as the spray is when waves dash on the rocks" [1].

It's doubtful whether he or many other British soldiers saw their part in the context of the wider French plan for Artois. Like other ordinary soldiers, William Prouse's perspective was strictly limited and his expectations doubtless framed by the nature of the fighting he experienced in South Africa. He wouldn't be the first or the last man to have high hopes for the effectiveness of an artillery bombardment. Writing to a friend, he described what happened to him:

"I was at Neuve Chappelle and went through safely, but the next battle I was in was at Fromelles on May 9th, a Sunday that I shall never forget as long as I live. We had orders at 10.45 p.m. on May 8th to parade and march to the reserve trenches, where they told us we were to remain until morning. The bombardment started at 4 a.m., and there were about a thousand guns on the go [sic] until 5.45. I thought the Germans' front line trench would have been filled with their dead, but at the order to advance the Germans were still in their front trench, and what a murderous fire they put into us! I shall never forget it. Their maxim guns were all fixed on top of their parapets, but we managed to reach their first trench after hundreds of our fellows had been killed and wounded.

"The Germans then retired to their second trenches, what were left of them, and we then had to get under cover for a while as it was suicide to attempt to advance further then. After a while the order came for us to mount the parapets once again, and of course we were off again in no time. I had just prepared myself for a final plunge at a burly Prussian Guard [sic] when I was bowled over by a bullet, which hit me just below the right knee. I tried to get up again but was unable to do so, so I rolled over under cover into a pool of water, which was quite to my waist. The night had been rather frosty, so you can guess the water was not very warm.

"I lay there close on three hours, as bullets were flying just over my head; I dare not move as it would have been all up with me. I had two chums with me who were wounded, but both were killed in trying to get back. My tale would perhaps have been the same if I could have moved, but I seemed paralysed for a while. Anyhow, I must have either fainted or fallen asleep, for, when I came to, the fire which had been murderous all along had abated, so I thought I would risk trying to get back as far as our own trenches where I had my leg bandaged and was told to get back to the dressing station if I could.

"Well, I started on the journey, and I shall never forget it. It took me over three hours to go, or rather crawl, about a mile and a half, and the sights I saw on the way back are still in my memory. The Germans had started their big guns, and the shells were dropping right and left of me, happily not too near, but plenty near enough. I passed heaps of our poor fellows who were dead, some with heads blown clean off, and I also saw one of my own officers who had been badly wounded. I wanted to help him back if I possibly could, but he said: "Never mind me, Corporal; get back yourself if you can." I believe he has since died of his wounds.

"We must have lost thousands that Sunday, as I hear we were engaged miles all along the line, but I never want to go through another day like that. I was brought to Boulogne the day after, having had one night in hospital at Merville. We had thought that we should catch the Germans napping, but there were thousands of them all ready for us." [2]

Harry Boneham, a member of the 1/4th Seaforth Highlanders' no.4 Company, was in reserve, their role being to bring up stores and ammunition to support the attack of the leading waves. He had a perfect view of the action, which quickly disabused him of any notions that there was much of an advance to support, "Our guns had scarcely ceased however, when the German artillery opened on us, and shells fairly rained down on us. The order came for our boys to charge, and over the parapet they went, all eager to be first. They were met though by a terrible fire from machine guns and rifles in front, and very soon there was not a man left standing. One or two managed to get back unhurt, but the rest lay where they fell, either dead or badly wounded, and it was not until night came that any of them could be got in. It was evident that the German trenches were still too strongly manned to be taken without terrible sacrifice, and so our attack was suspended for the time being until a further bombardment could take place. Already sadly reduced in numbers, and suffering all the time from the shell fire, the Germans were pouring on us, so it was decided to relieve us a short time afterwards. Of the terrible time we had in getting out while shells fell among us relentlessly, and of the awful sights we saw, I will say little, indeed the horror of it defies description. How anyone could come through it untouched was a marvel, I can tell you" [3]

Many of the early volunteers selected the local regiment, the Notts & Derby (Sherwood Foresters), and had found their way into the 1st Battalion, a regular battalion, ahead of its participation in the attack at Aubers. James Upton, a 27 year-old Bulwell man working in Bestwood Colliery before the war, was one of the battalion stretcher-bearers. The Foresters shared the fate of the other attacking units that day and Upton didn't lack opportunities to demonstrate his bravery, bravery that won him the first of the Victoria Crosses to be awarded that day.

On 18 May, he wrote to his sister, "I look like getting the VC for rescuing wounded men in a big scrap we had last Monday. I thought my time was up every moment, and I was carrying one chap out on my back when a shell hit him and killed him stone dead. I told you that I had given up my stripes but for my heroic deed, as the General calls it, he promoted me to be a corporal again.

"My God, Pat, one could not stop under cover oneself and hear the groans of the wounded and stick it. The shells were coming in hundreds but I stuck to my task." [4]

His official citation for the Victoria Cross was published in the London Gazette on 29 June 1915:

"On 9th May 1915 at Rouges Bancs, France, Corporal Upton displayed great courage all day in rescuing the wounded while exposed to heavy rifle and artillery fire whilst going close to the enemy's parapet regardless of his own safety. One wounded man was killed by a shell, while the corporal was carrying him. When not actually carrying the wounded he was engaged in dressing and bandaging the serious cases in front of our parapet."

In another letter to his sister, Upton revealed the scale of the losses that the 1st Notts & Derby had suffered up to that time, "I have been through mud, water and murder. We have lost 935 men during the last month. My other chum got killed the other day. I had been speaking to him and another man, and had only just left when a shell came and blew them all up. I am one of twelve in the whole regiment who have never been in hospital during our stay in France. My regiment has had 2,700 casualties of one kind and another. We are having very fine weather now, and it is quite enjoyable. One forgets there is such a thing as war and cannot sleep if there are no big guns banging away." [5]

He was a little less unambiguous when he spoke at a recruiting rally in Hucknall on 27 July 1915. He was there to encourage men to join up, so it was hardly surprising:

"If my leave was to go on much longer I shouldn't be able to run. I am getting so fat although just at present life in the trenches is just a picnic from morning till night. We are waiting for more men, and then with a long pull, a strong pull, a pull together we shall get the Germans on the run.

"I am going back on Saturday [31st July 1915] but I shall go back with a good heart. Can I persuade a few of you young men to get into khaki? It's a fine life with plenty to do and plenty of food and drink to do it on. We don't get bully beef and biscuits now, but fresh meat, vegetables and bread - and hundreds of cigarettes." [6]

The reader of those words today might be forgiven for thinking that there was some confusion between what constituted a picnic and what trench warfare involved. Ptes. James Steer was killed and Bert Griffiths and Jack Truman were both wounded, Hucknall members of Upton's battalion, on 9th May. Griffiths was later to serve in Gallipoli before being blown up kicking a dud on the Somme in September 1916. No picnics there either.

Corporal Francis Holeywell, 2nd Northamptons, wrote in a more upbeat manner than Prouse. Doubtless, he wanted to reassure his family that he was all right but the severity of the fighting he was involved in comes through:

"I have just come out of another scrap with the Germans, and escaped without injury. Bullets and shells flew all around us. I saw poor fellows thrown up into the air about 20 feet by the explosion of some fiendish shell the Germans use. I had one bullet through my bayonet scabbard, close to my hip, but it only smashed a pipe in my pocket. A few minutes afterwards a piece of shrapnel hit me in the middle of the back, but only bruised me, nothing to speak of, as I am still doing my duty. I had a good ducking into about four feet of water, but I did not mind that as I was pretty warm at the time, and it cooled me considerably. I am now enjoying a well-earned rest". [7]

The thousands of wounded now looked to men like New Annesley's Herbert Pilch, a member of the 21st Field Ambulance, 7th Division. He had been in France just over a month, having only enlisted in Hucknall the previous February. He had been with his unit less than a month when he was sent into action.

"...I received my baptism of fire in a heavy engagement last Sunday evening, when the shrapnel was falling thick and fast like a hurricane hailstorm, and the very first shell that burst near us caused us all to scatter and lie flat, face downwards. As I threw myself down I placed my hands behind my head so that if I got any wound it would be in my hands and not in my head. I was hardly to earth before a triangular piece four by three inches struck the earth just in front of my head and buried itself four or five inches in the ground. I could not discern whether it was a shell itself or the contents, and there were several more shells scattering their contents around us for a while. When we advanced to the dressing room about 200 yards further ahead I fished it out with my jack knife to keep as a souvenir, but left it as I found it was too heavy a piece of shell to carry with me until I got a chance to send it home." [6]

Pilch then makes a statement, unusual for the time but in itself scarcely remarkable, that some men were not quite so brave as they might have been.

"Of course, the shrapnel bullet is much smaller and nearly round, but makes a nasty wound. There were 33 of us, including the officer and sergeant, but those two had gone forward to see how the ground lay, and of course got it hot as they went but the sergeant came back to us and told us to take all possible cover as there was a rapid enfilading rifle fire. Every man went forward more or less courageously, according to his temperament, and I and two of the others were chaffing those who were a little timid and telling them to buck up as the officer and sergeant had had to find the most dangerous parts for us and let us have word accordingly, and they did it right manfully like true gentlemen. You see we have good examples before us even when death is in the air. The old hands in this section tell me that this engagement has been as hot as any they have been in, and some of them were in the so-called retreat from Mons." [8]

11,000 men had been killed or wounded. When the scale of the failure at Aubers was realised the hunt for scapegoats was on. French, the British commander-in-chief, was not about to accept his share, placed the blame squarely on the Government for its failure to ensure adequate supplies of artillery ammunition. The so-called 'Shell Scandal' was born, as The Times' correspondent, Colonel Repington, broke the story of the artillery's inability to support the infantry because of the paucity of ammunition.

Reaction within Hucknall was mixed. Politically, the local council was staunchly Liberal and was horrified at the stance adopted by some sections of the press. The particularly vitriolic coverage in the newspapers owned by Lord Northcliffe resulted in the local library banning his publications! Henry Morley, the editor of the local newspaper, no less a Liberal but of a more pragmatic outlook, commented in his editorial:

"Both the "Daily Mail" and the "Times" have been forbidden entry into the Hucknall Free Library, doubtless in consequence of the articles criticising some features of the war. We do not hold a brief for the journals emanating from the Northcliffe Press and we must wait and see the truth or untruth of their statements. The only sure way to answer the question is by a "stream of facts", which the late Right Hon. J.E. Ellis sought to obtain relative to the South Africa war, and for which he was likewise persecuted. It is a mistake to blame the alarm clock for waking you up, and nor can unpleasant truths be disposed of by the ways adopted in some quarters." [9]

The unpleasant truth was that the British army was far from ready to take on the Germans on the Western Front. And Kitchener's Army, not even in France at this stage, would have much to learn before it was.

The body of Nellie Rault, a WAAC stationed in Bedford, seemed to tell its own horrific story of her last moments on earth. It appeared she had died while on her knees, probably begging for her life.
Nellie had a knife wound in her heart, two in her breast and bruises on her face. Her body was found carefully hidden in a spinney at Haynes Park Wood, near Bedford, on Friday, May 9th, 1919.
Four days later Sergeant Major Montague Hepburn, who was known to have been going out with her and was thought to be the last person to have seen her alive, was charged with her murder. After several remand hearings no evidence was offered against him. For all that, the Director of Public Prosecutions announced that he had “a strong personal opinion as to the identity of the person who committed the murder.”