All players inside and outside of Syria are recalculating their positions

Members of a Female Commando Battalion which is part of the Syrian Army, sit atop of a tank in the government-controlled area of Jobar, a suburb of Damascus March 19, 2015. Reuters The ground appears to be shifting in Syria. Opponents of the Bashar al Assad government, including many al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra fighters, have made significant gains in what they call the Battle of Victory.

The rebels seized the critical town of Jisr al-Shughour in Idlib province before heading south and taking large portions of the northern al-Ghab Plain. Seizing the plain enabled the rebels to cut off the two roads from the south that connect with the M4 highway, largely, though not completely, isolating loyalist forces in the Frikkah-Ariha-Mastoumah pocket in Idlib.

The loyalists can still move supplies into the pocket through a narrow path between Frikkah and Qarqur, but most of this route is off-road. The government has moved forces from Damascus to reopen the roads. These forces could stabilize the pocket in Idlib, but retaking lost territory would be a monumental task.

Further to the east in Idlib province, Jabhat al-Nusra overran the Qarmeed camp, partly because the loyalist forces were spread thin when some were sent to attempt to reopen the supply route in the west. After taking the Qarmeed camp, the rebels are in a position to split the loyalist pocket in Idlib by flanking Mastoumah from the south and pushing toward Ariha. Thus, the loyalist forces trapped in the Frikkah-Ariha-Mastoumah pocket face pressure from all sides.

Courtesy of StratforWhat all this means is that the al Assad government, while not yet shattered, is in serious trouble. In a civil war such as this, the greatest strength a government has is a sense of inevitability — a sense that it can't lose. Al Assad lacked that sense for a while but regained it. This built up the government's credibility both internally and externally; foreign powers, including the United States, seemingly resigned to the government's survival, started discussing dealing with al Assad again.

The events of this weekend do not speak to inevitable doom but to a greater vulnerability than has been assumed. That means that all players inside and outside of Syria are recalculating their positions. This is the last thing al Assad needs, since these recalculations can run ahead of battlefield realities or even define those realities.

Residents look for survivors amid rubble at a site damaged by what activists said was an air strike by forces loyal to Syria's President Bashar al-Assad in Douma, eastern Al-Ghouta, near Damascus, March 14, 2015. Reuters Commanders might not be as willing to engage an enemy if their assumption is that the government is finished. So al Assad must act vigorously to demonstrate his power. Unfortunately for him, that will be difficult to do, or at least to do very quickly. Therefore, the assumption that al Assad has secured his position is the most vulnerable military target of all.

The country that appears to have been most influential in supporting the rebels is Turkey. The degree of its involvement is the subject of rumor, but there is a consensus that it has been the source of the rebels' weapons, training and strategic expertise.

And weapons and training coming to the groups in Idlib from countries such as the United States, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council states are passing through only with Turkish consent. Turkey has long been hostile to al Assad's government and has pressured the United States to help depose him, but the United States has been cautious of aligning with a coalition that included Jabhat al-Nusra.

Members of Al Qaeda's Nusra Front prepare to fire a mortar towards forces loyal to Syria's President Bashar Assad in Al Mallah farms, north of Aleppo, on February 18, 2015. Hosam Katan/Reuters Syria poses a dilemma for countries such as the United States, Israel and Jordan. Al Assad's Syria invaded Jordan in 1970, invaded Lebanon and supported Hezbollah, and fought Israel. However, al Assad — in the current context — seems less threatening than Jabhat al-Nusra. He is secular and hostile to the Islamist movement.

His victory could cause new challenges, but his defeat could put a radical Islamist government in Damascus. That government would be divided into various hostile factions and would take a while to coalesce, but if it did, it could be more dangerous to the region and serve as a staging ground for Islamist fighters operating in other countries.

The American, Israeli and Jordanian strategy is to hope that no one wins in Syria. And that may well turn out to be the situation, in spite of this weekend's successes. But if the rebels win, all three countries will face a dilemma.

Oddly enough, so will Turkey. Having defeated a historical enemy, it also will have a new government to its south, and Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party will face a challenge from Turkey's substantial secularist parties based on underwriting what could turn out to be an al Qaeda victory in Syria.

The Justice and Development Party has weakened a bit lately, and a new government in Syria would create threats to the Turkish ruling party's governance. Even among Muslims in Turkey, this new Syrian government would not be welcomed. Turkey may think it can shape whatever government emerges in Damascus, but that remains to be seen.

Nothing decisive has happened yet, but the rebels have shown sufficient capabilities and successes that it is time to re-examine the question of what happens if they actually take the country. Consolidating power will be difficult, but more difficult will be the choices facing Syria's neighbors and the United States. No one likes the al Assad government. Only the Turks seem willing to push for a successor, and there is no more interesting question than why the Turkish government would be taking this path.