Monday, December 31, 2012

Saddam Hussein was completely misunderstood by the United
States before the 2003 invasion. Iraqi statements were mostly discounted by
Washington such as its willingness to accept renewed United Nations inspections
at the end of 2002 or its fanciful claims that it was winning the war in 2003.
That was because the Bush administration didn’t understand Baghdad’s worldview.
Nine years after the Baathist regime was toppled there is still a lack of
understanding of the Iraqi perspective. There are extensive records now
available that can help explain what Saddam’s government was thinking. These
are being made available through the Iraqi Perspectives Project, and other
sources. What they show was that two main factors shaped how Baghdad reacted to
the Bush administration. First, Iraq’s long history of coups and uprisings led
Saddam to rule through fear to prevent another one from toppling him. Second,
his analysis of American foreign policy led him to believe that the Bush
administration would be exactly like his father and the Clinton White House
posing no real threat missing the fact that the new U.S. president was serious
about removing the dictator from power. Looking at quotes from Iraqis during this
period can help explain how the regime approached its confrontation with
America.

Iraq’s history made Saddam Hussein fear coups. The Baathists originally came to power in Iraq in a take over in 1963 for example, only to be
forced out that same year. Five years later they finally seized control of
the state permanently. To stave off any threats to his power Saddam ruled
through fear. He would constantly remove any official he felt might pose a threat to him, and constantly purged the ranks of the military. Not only that,
but the Iraqi dictator imposed harsh restrictions upon the officer corps and
army. For instance, officers couldn’t talk to each other. They couldn’t move
their forces without orders from the top. Units couldn’t coordinate with each other.
Training and combat exercises were severely restricted. The armed forces, with
the exception of the Special Republican Guard couldn’t enter the capital, and
were generally kept out of the urban areas out of apprehensions that they might
conspire with civilians or members of the Baath Party. This culture made the
Iraqi military combat ineffective, and helped spell their demise when the
Americans came in 2003.

Commander of Baghdad
Republican Guard Infantry Division: In the Republican Guard, division and corps
commanders could not make decisions without the approval of the staff command.
Division commanders could only move small elements within their command. Major
movements such as brigade-sized elements and higher had to be requested through
the corps commander to the staff commander. This process did not change during
the war and in fact became more centralized.

Commander Republican
Guard I Corps General Majid Hussein Ali Ibrahim al-Dulaimi: One of the biggest
weakness of the Iraqi military was that, units were not allowed to
independently coordinate with each other for defensive integration. All orders
came from the Chief of Staff of the Republican Guard, which ultimately came
from Qusay or Saddam Hussein. … In order to know where units were located on
our flanks, we had to use our own reconnaissance elements because we were not
allowed to communicate with our sister units.

Saddam created an array of military forces to keep all of
them weak, so that none could pose a threat to him. There was the regular army,
the Republican Guard, the Special Republican guard as well as several militias.
These included Al-Quds, the Saddam Fedayeen, the Martyrs Brigades, and the
Baath Party militia. Not only that, but each was under a separate command, but
all had to answer to Saddam at the end. This eroded the strength of the armed
forces by draining away personnel and equipment, and made coordination
impossible.

Saddam’s Defense Minister Taie (AFP)

Defense Minister
Sultan Hashim Ahmed al-Hamaed Taie: The Quds Force was a headache, they had no
equipment for a serious war, and their creation was a bad idea. The Ministry of
Defense was required to give them weapons that were taken from the real Army.
But the Army had no control of them. Their instructions came only from the
President’s office and not from normal military channels.

To further coup proof the regime, Saddam created several
intelligence agencies. Some were dedicated specifically to spying upon the
military. This caused problems for the senior leadership who had to make sure
all of the different spy agencies knew what they were doing, so that they would
not raise any suspicions, which could cost them their command or their lives.

Republican Guard II
Corps commander General Raad Hamdani: The corps commander had to ensure that
all the spies were in the room before the meeting began so that there would not
be any suspicions in Baghdad as to my purpose. This kind of attention to my own
internal security was required. I spent considerable time finding clever ways
to invite even the spies I was not supposed to know about.

Showing individualism, initiative, let alone disagreeing
with Saddam could lead to death. People quickly realized to hide their true
thoughts.

Senior minister:
Directly disagreeing with Saddam Hussein’s ideas was unforgivable. It would be
suicide.

This same culture of fear ran throughout the bureaucracy.
There were spies throughout the ministries. This caused widespread mistrust
amongst public workers and officials. Like the armed forces, this undermined
the effectiveness of the government.

Senior minister: Each
ministry or any other government establishment had a security chief who
reported to the agency to which he belonged. His section kept an eye on all
affairs and actions, encouraging disgruntled individuals to provide information
on what was going on. The Ba’ath party members and “aspirants” also wrote
reports to the leader of the sector or cell. Rivalries and backbiting were
encouraged.

The result of this domestic surveillance, coup proofing, and
mistrust was that few could give Saddam advice. His constant purges meant that
he was eventually surrounded by sycophants that rarely told him what he didn’t
want to hear.

Republican Guard commander:
Saddam Hussein was personally a brave and bloody man. But, by his decisions he
threw out the clever men, or the clever men learned not to involve themselves
in any decision-making. They were then replaced by hypocrites who cared not for
the people or army, but only cared about pleasing Saddam. … This is the nature
of any dictatorship.

Saddam preferred using his own intuition rather than taking
advice, and believed that he was his own expert. For example, he believed wars
were about who could take the most casualties, and prove their personal
strength. This was largely shaped by the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam believed he won
that conflict, because Iraq took huge losses from the more populated Iran. When
it came to the United States he thought the fighting spirit of the Iraqis would
overcome any technological edge the Americans might have.

2003 Saddam speech to
air defense forces: There may be some people who say they are like the Iraqis.
But so far, we do not have any evidence to say that any of them fight as well
as the Iraqis. You are brave men, and your bravery is exceptional. Iraq is
qualified to carry a heavy burden because God Almighty has given it a strong
back, a great degree of perseverance, and an extraordinary ability to endure.
You have broken the morale of America, and this is much more important than
warplanes and missiles.

Saddam had a negative view of the Americans to begin with.
He looked at their defeat in Vietnam, and the Clinton administration’s use of
force in Serbia, Somalia, and Iraq, and came to believe that the United States
was afraid of casualties. That’s why they continuously used air power rather
than land forces, and why they lost in Vietnam, and withdrew from Somalia. It
was another reason why Saddam dismissed America’s military power. Its advanced
aircraft and missiles were actually seen as a sign of weakness, and a way for
the U.S. to avoid actually having to fight their foes on the ground. Saddam
would constantly issue orders to the military based upon these ideas.

March 9, 2003 Saddam
Hussein memorandum: America might be the most powerful but it is not the
strongest country because strength is given by God. When the enemy is more
advanced in communication technology, it is better to use a simple, basic, and
natural communication technology like camels. It is necessary to learn
horseback riding. Get 10 horses and train 50 people or more per day. The
important thing is to prevent the enemy from getting to its goals. No peace
without strength.

The 1991 Gulf War played a large role in shaping Saddam’s
opinion of the United States. He thought that he had won that war since he was
able to stay in power against a huge array of nations. More importantly, the
United States had the chance to overthrow him, but decided not to. He therefore
came to see America as a paper tiger. These ideas were spread throughout the
Iraqi military, and became the conventional wisdom within the regime.

Former Republican
Guard commander: As a result of these successful preparations, our losses were
not as devastating as the arsenal that was used against the Iraqi Army during
the [Gulf War] suggest. So this clearly shows that the Republican Guard and the
other Iraqi armed forces were able to dig in and deploy wisely, and thus
minimize the damage of the aerial power.

This had a huge affect upon how Iraq saw the 2003 invasion.
First, Saddam didn’t think the U.S. wanted to remove him, because it didn’t do
so in 1991. That would require real fighting, and he didn’t think that the
Americans had the stomach for that, because it would cost too many lives.

Deputy Premier Tariq
Aziz: He [Saddam] thought that this war would not lead to his ending.

Second, he didn’t think a real
war was coming. The fact that a new administration was in power in
Washington didn’t make him change his analysis. Since the U.S. had only temporarily invaded the south and
seized part of Kurdistan after the Gulf War, he thought something similar would
be the worst case scenario in 2003. These ideas were shared not only amongst
the Iraqi leadership, but also amongst the military as well down to the rank
and file.

Director General of
the Republican Guard’s General Staff: We thought the Coalition would go to
Basra, maybe to Amarah, and then the war would end.

Saddam meeting with the Military Industrialization Minister
(Global Security)

These beliefs hid the reality of the Iraqi military. By the
2000s it was in poor shape. It had been under sanctions since 1990. That meant
it had aging equipment, and lacked spare parts for what it had. Saddam
eventually came under the sway of the Military Industrial Commission. It
promised to develop a series of secret weapons to offset the impact of
sanctions. This was much like Hitler at the end of World War II when Germany
came out with the V1 and V2 rockets, and other victory weapons even though they
had no real affect upon the outcome of the conflict.

Republican Guard
officer: The government made rapid efforts to limit the negative direct and
indirect effects of the savage sanctions on the weapons and activities of the
military forces. Unfortunately, they were the wrong kind of efforts. They army
continued to fight the schemes of the Military Industrial Commission, which
played an important role in promising secret weapons it would never deliver
while most types of things we needed were neglected. These people received
large amounts of financial support, but the army could not get simple things.

When the confrontation with the Bush administration began in
earnest in 2002, Iraq had no direct communication with the Americans.
Everything had to go through third parties such as the United Nations. Efforts
to talk with the White House proved inept. Iraqi intelligence for example,
tried to use a Lebanese-American businessman who knew some American officials
such as Richard Perle of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board, but the effort
went nowhere. This added to the mistrust and misreading of the two
countries’ intentions before the war.

Republican Guard II
Corps commander General Raad Hamdani: We didn’t have any opportunity to talk to
a US official during Bush, Clinton, or the new Bush administration, so there
was no opportunity to talk face-to-face and address matters of concern. They
always rejected us. … We knew that the Poles had a representative in Baghdad
who looked after the interests of America; secretly, not in the open. But no,
we didn’t go through them. Sometimes we talked to the Algerians about it, but
not much. The Iraqi Intelligence Service tried in its own way to work the issue
… they tried to pretend they were doing something to move relations along, but
no one took them seriously; they were incapable of the simplest tasks.

Iraq also hoped to use its friends in the international
community to stave off any military action by the United States, but this
proved a false hope. During the 1990s, Baghdad tried to use oil contracts and
bribes to break the sanctions. It focused upon France and Russia, and to a
lesser extent China, which had good relations with Iraq beforehand. It was
hoping that those countries could convince the U.N. to change its position.
When the threat of war came, Saddam turned to those countries to try to block
America and England in getting a resolution authorizing war in the Security
Council. All the way to 2003, Paris and Moscow were sending positive messages
to Baghdad on their efforts in the U.N. Iraq realized too late that those
nations couldn’t stop the war from happening.

October 4, 2002 note
from Iraqi Ambassador to Moscow: Our friends [in Russian intelligence] have
told us that President Putin has given very clear instructions to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs vis-à-vis Iraq. Our friends instruct us that Russia is very
clear in its opposition to any attack in Iraq. It will not allow the new
resolution to include any intentions that would allow the use of force against
Iraq.

Tariq Aziz: France and
Russia did not help Iraq, they helped themselves. … We had attempted to win
favor with the French and the Russians through the oil and other contracts, but
our relationship with the French began to suffer after 1998. … The French
started making negative statements about Iraq. … The French are dubious; they
were Westerners. … Russia continued to support us in the Security Council, but
for the same reasons as the French. Iraq gave Russian companies huge contracts
in irrigation, agriculture, electricity, machinery, cars and trucks.

When it became apparent to even the Iraqi leadership that a
war was imminent, Saddam’s son Qusay and others advised him to take drastic
measures. They wanted to destroy the southern oil fields, plant mines in the
Persian Gulf, and perhaps carry out a pre-emptive strike into Kuwait where the
U.S.-led Coalition was marshaling troops. Saddam rejected all of these ideas.
All the way to the end, he wanted to avoid giving President Bush an excuse to
start a war. Unbeknownst to the dictator that decision had already been made.
At the same time, Saddam believed that any military conflict would be limited
in nature. That was the main reason why he did not want to destroy the oil
fields or mine the Persian Gulf, because he would need those resources to
rebuild and hold onto power afterward.

Republican Guard Secretary Kamal Mustafa Abdullah Sultan
al-Tikrit

Secretary of the
Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard Kamal Mustafa Abdullah Sultan
al-Tikriti: [Vice President] Al-Duri ordered planning for setting explosives on
the oil infrastructure. Within 48 hours after the meeting ended, an order came
to Al-Duri from Saddam directing him not to do anything to damage or destroy
the oilfields. … Saddam felt that destroying the oil fields would affect the
morale of the soldiers and the people. Saddam worried about history indicating
that he had destroyed the wealth of Iraq.

Saddam tried to be non-confrontational with the United
States during the whole run-up to the war. That was the main reason why he
allowed U.N. weapons inspectors back into Iraq at the end of 2002. He actually
feared that the U.S. would plant some incriminating evidence when the
inspectors found nothing just to legitimize a war.

January 2003 Baath
Party Secretariat memorandum: The evil American authority stepped up their
accusations of Iraq hiding chemical agents or biological labs on moveable
trucks and trailers or inside containers. The American authorities are planning
on bringing such trucks and containers into Iraq across the Iraqi borders or
the border of the self-ruled areas or smuggling areas to provide it to the
weapon inspectors to be used against Iraq in order to launch their wicked
invading against our precious country.

When Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the Security
Council in February 2003 he played excerpts of tapes of Iraqi units allegedly
trying to hide WMD. In fact, after the war it was discovered that these were
soldiers attempting to make sure that everything available would be turned over
to the inspectors.

HQ: And we sent you a
message to inspect the scrap areas and the abandoned areas. Field: Yes

HQ: After you have
carried out what is contained in the message, destroy the message.

Field: Yes.

HQ: Because I don’t
want anyone to see this message.

Field: O.K. O.K.

It was easy to see why the United States would read these
transcripts and think that the Iraqis were trying to hide their illicit
weapons. It was just another example of how Baghdad and Washington
misinterpreted each other’s actions.

When the invasion finally came in March 2003, Iraq was
completely unprepared. That was because Saddam decided to change the country’s
defense plans three months beforehand. For years, the Iraqis had drawn up a
strategy to disperse its forces throughout the countryside to protect them from
air strikes. That would make it hard for Iraq to marshal its forces and
confront the Americans, but they didn’t believe a real invasion was coming
anyway. Instead, they expected limited air strikes. As a result, Baghdad wanted
to preserve its equipment. In December 2002 however, Saddam held a military
conference where he revealed a new strategy for Iraq. This comprised a series
of concentric circles based upon defending the cities, with Baghdad in the
center. These ideas had been discussed since the 1990s, but this was the first
time they were going to be put into effect. The problem was that there were no
details on how to implement it. The officers at the meeting couldn’t even get
copies of the plan, and could only take notes.

Defense Minister
Sultan Hashim Ahmed al-Hamaed Taie: The months before the plan was agreed to
and delivered, there was a meeting to discuss a general plan for the defense of
Iraq with the Chief of Staff, the operations officer, and the planning directorate
office. The plan we had relied on for years was not accepted. But the only
agreement between the office of the president and the military staffs that came
out of this meeting was a general idea that the cities had to be defended. The
cities then became the critical things to defend and the military was withdrawn
into the cities to protect them. This was on the instruction from the
president. There was an attempt to complete a plan to defend these cities
because the military understood things like how to create defensive obstacles.
There were a number of tasks to complete to ensure the city defenses, but there
was no agreement as to what they were or how to get them done.

The military was not happy about this change, but because of
the culture of fear created by Saddam, they could do nothing about it. Few even
voiced any concerns at the conference.

Republican Guard II
Corps commander General Raad Hamdani: On 18 December 2002, the Republican Guard
chief of Staff called all the commanders to meet at the Republican Guard
Command Center. … The Republican Guard Chief of Staff briefed in front of a
large wall map that covered just the central portion of Iraq. The map showed
Baghdad in the center with four rings. … When the Americans arrived at the
first ring and, on order from Saddam, the forces would conduct a simultaneous
withdrawal. The units then repeated this ‘procedure’ until reaching the red
circle. Once in the red circle, the remaining units would fight to the death.
With this incredible simplicity and stupidity, the assembled Republican Guard
officers were told that this was the plan for the defense of our country. … I
was told by Qusay [Hussein] that there would be no changes because Saddam had
signed the plan already.

This left the military in complete disarray. Iraq had a top
down command structure, so with no orders from Baghdad on how to follow through
with this new plan, the armed forces didn’t know how to prepare for the coming
war. Some officers did nothing as a result, because they could be accused of
disloyalty or face accusations from the various intelligence agencies that they
were plotting against the government. Right up to the invasion there were few
preparations actually made to defend Iraq. The Republican Guard II Corps
commander General Raad Hamdani was one of the few experienced military men in
Iraq. He tried to deploy his forces to repel the invaders. He was warned twice
that he did not have the authority to do that, but did it anyway.

Republican Guard II
Corps commander General Raad Hamdani: In January 2003 … the Republican Guard
commanders kept wondering which plan we were supposed to be preparing. Very
little was being passed to us from the Republican Guard Chief of Staff. I kept
asking, “Which plan?” and he kept putting me off by issuing confusing or
partial answers. … By late February and into early March 2003, we watched the
military build-up in Kuwait and Turkey, and the mobilization of forces in the
United States on the news. We still had no clear guidance from Republican Guard
headquarters. So I started meeting with my commanders and staff officers to
plan for the coming war. … Sometime in mid- to late-February 2003, I met with
Qusay and the Republican Guard Chief of Staff because the Special Security
Organization Chief had reported on my staff meetings and said that I was
deploying my forces without authority.

Iraq was left defenseless as a result. The military and
Baath Party were unwilling to pass along any bad news to Saddam, so they lied
about what was happening on the ground. They claimed that there were thousands
of soldiers and militiamen preparing for the Coalition, when the reality was
that next to nothing was being done. The military adviser to the Central
Euphrates Region General Yahya Taha Huwaysh Fadani al-Ani found out just how
poorly Iraq was ready for the coming conflict when he did a tour in March 2003
of Samawa in Muthanna province.

March 2003 military
adviser to Baath regional leader in Central Euphrates Region General Yahya Taha
Muwaysh Fadani al-Ani: Before the war began I arrived in the [Central]
Euphrates Region and found that there were no significant preparations being
made. The [Central] Euphrates Region is an area that’s responsible for Karbala,
Najaf, As-Samawa, and ad-Diwaniya. … The As-Samawa Branch had an Al-Quds force
division whose members were all from As-Samawa. I asked the assembled
leadership for total numbers of fighters and what they gave me added up to
120,000 soldiers from various tribes, police forces, military units, etc. … I
asked for the numbers of deployed soldiers again. This time they said most of
them were gone, but there were 30,000 loyal members who would fight. … I … set
out on a personal inspection. … During my inspection I could not find even 10
percent of the 30,000 troops they told me were ready. … Where I should have
found approximately 200 soldiers, they were not even 50 present. … On the
morning of the 25th [March] … I told the regular Army Chief of Staff
that if the Coalition comes, they’ll invade the city without any resistance.

When the invasion finally came, Saddam was still convinced
that it would only be a limited affair.

March 2003 Iraqi
official: A few weeks before the attacks Saddam still thought that the United
States would not use ground forces; he thought that you would only use your air
force. … Of course he was aware [of the build-up of forces in the region], it
was all over the television screen. He thought [the Americans] would not fight
a ground war, because it would be too costly to the Americans. He was
over-confidence. He was clever, but his calculations were poor.

Saddam still thought he would be in power afterward, and had
to prepare for the aftermath. One thing he decided to do was raid the Central
Bank of Iraq for cash. That money would be needed to pay off tribes and others
to help maintain internal security.

March 2003 Iraqi
official: On or about March 19, 2003, Saddam arranged a meeting between the
presidential secretary, Qusay, and the finance minister. … Saddam ordered the
withdrawal of one and a quarter billion dollars and euros. … The money was
taken in approximately 300 metal cases.

Because of Iraq’s experience after the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam
was concerned that a U.S. attack might set off another uprising by the Shiites
or Kurds. He was therefore afraid of the psychological operations mounted by
the Americans before the war. This included the dropping of thousands of
leaflets across the country. The government issued orders that all these
pamphlets should be seized and destroyed. It also increased domestic spying
upon the population to see whether they were having any affect. This included
the collection of rumors and gossip to measure the public mood to see if it was
turning against the regime.

March 2003 Iraqi
intelligence report: Citizens of Iraq were forbidden to possess or pass along
leaflets dropped around Iraq. Military and political representatives threaten
to either imprison or kill anyone possessing any leaflets. Military and
political representatives had orders to collect and burn all leaflets dropped.
The government did not want the people to see the promises the US armed forces
were offering the Iraqi soldiers and civilians.

April 2003 Iraqi intelligence
report: Saddam also instructed the members of the Special Security Organization
and Mukhabarat to “keep the internal situation under control,” and that it was
very important to “keep the people satisfied…” Saddam was concerned about
internal unrest amongst the tribes before, during, or after an attack by the
United States on Baghdad.

When the invasion came it was mostly won by the air and
missile strikes. The devastation wrought by them completely demoralized the
Iraqi armed forces. It led to the majority of soldiers and militiamen to desert
even before they saw a Coalition soldier. The Al-Nida Republican Guard Division
stationed to the east of Baghdad for instance, never confronted a single
American unit, but lost almost all of its soldiers and equipment due ot the air
campaign.

March 2003 Al-Nida
Republican Guard Division commander: The air attacks were the most effective
message. The soldiers who did see the leaflets and then saw the air attacks
knew the leaflets were true. They believed the message after that, if they were
still alive. Overall they had a terrible effect on us. I started the war with
13,000 soldiers. By the time we had orders to pull back to Baghdad, I had less
than 2,000; by the time we were in position in Baghdad, I had less than 1,000.
Every day the desertions increased. We had no engagements with American forces.
When my division pulled back across the Diyala Bridge, of the more than 500
armored vehicles assigned to me before the war, I was able to get fifty or so
across the bridge. Most were destroyed or abandoned on the east side of the
Diyala River.

Baghdad also got bad information and misinterpreted what the
Coalition was doing during the war. For example, it got news that there was a
large force in the west, and thought the invasion would come from Jordan not
Kuwait. It moved its forces in that direction, which exposed them to air
strikes, and had units wiped out as a result.

April 2003 Republican
Guard II Corps commander General Raad Hamdani: The Minister of Defense had a
message from Saddam. … The minister went on to explain that what had happened
over the last two weeks was a “strategic” trick by the Americans. He told us
American forces were going to come from the direction of Jordan, through
Al-Ramadi, and into northern Baghdad. … The Al-Nida [Division] was supposed to
shift to the northwest of Baghdad under the Republican Guard I Corps.
Minefields were to be immediately established to the west and northwest of
Baghdad. The talk of establishing minefields made me think that they thought we
were fighting Iran again or something. … I told them that this plan was the
opposite of what we were facing. … It was the kind of arguments that I imagine
took place in Hitler’s bunker in Berlin.

General Hamdani was one of the few that tried to tell the
senior leadership that they were wrong. The majority of officers and Baathist
officials were afraid to tell the truth. This was reflected in their reports to
Baghdad about what was happening out in the field. They repeatedly claimed that
the Iraqis were putting up a heroic fight against the Coalition, and were
actually winning. This was a result of the culture of fear that Saddam instilled
throughout the government.

March 27, 2003 Defense
Minister news conference: The enemy encircled the town of Al-Samawa from the
direction of the desert and is now in the back of the town. The tribes of
Al-Muthanna, the Ba’ath Party, Saddam Fedayeen, and military units are now
implementing special operations aimed at these American units. … Now, as to the
situation in the mid-Euphrates sector; in the past three days, the enemy’s
losses were very heavy, as they are losing tanks and personnel carriers.… The
enemy had withdrawn because they sustained heavy losses.

These reports were the reason why the Iraqi Information
Minister Saeed al-Sahaf would constantly tell the press that the war was going
Baghdad’s way. He wasn’t just repeating the government’s propaganda line, but
reflecting what the regime actually thought was going on.

Saddam’s Information Minister Sahaf (AP)

March 31,2003
Information Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf: Those mercenaries of the
international gang of villains sent their failing louts, but the snake is
trapped in the quagmire now. The lines of communications now extend over 500
kilometers. Our people from all sectors, fighters, courageous tribesmen, as
well as the fighters of the valiant Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party fought battles
and pushed the enemy back into the desert. … Now hundreds of thousands of the
fighters of the valiant Iraqi people are distributed in all places. Saddam’s
Fedayeen and some small units of the Iraqi Armed Forces began to engage the
louts of the villains of the US and British colonialism day and night. We have
decided not to let them sleep.

General Yahya Taha Huwaysh Fadani al-Ani was in Samawa in
Muthanna, and knew what was actually happening during the war. There were
hardly any Iraqi forces in the province, because most had deserted even before
the Coalition arrived.

General Yahya Taha
Huwaysh Fadani al-Ani: On 31 March I noticed that there were only approximately
200 fighters left in As-Samawah. The Al-Quds fighters complained that they no
longer had any soldiers. The Ba’ath Party said they no longer had any men.

As the Iraqi forces collapsed, the Baath Party officials
began disappearing as well. The public quickly found out the regime was
falling, and looting broke out in the urban areas.

April 3, 2003 Genera
Yahya Taha Huwaysh Fadani al-Ani: In the morning … when we started [to
evacuate], the mobs started looting everything. They came to steal our cars,
but my guards scared them off.

The situation was no better in Baghdad even though it was
supposed to be the center of power. Like the rest of the country, nothing was
really done to prepare the city. That was the reason why it was taken so easily
when the Coalition arrived even though they believed it would be the site of
intense urban warfare.

Iraqi soldier Hussein
al-Awadie: There was no real plan to defend [Baghdad], and the Iraqi military
made poor use of what troops they had. Nobody seemed to make any plans for
long-term fighting. The military mismanagement made it even easier for the
Americans than it might have been. … Look, any military sometimes loses a battle,
but you can lose with honor. There was no honor to be had in this.

The troops and militiamen in Baghdad found themselves cut
off from their command by the bombing campaign. With no orders coming, many
just went home when they thought the Americans were coming, and the capital
went down with very little fighting.

Senior officer army
air defense Baha’a Nouri Yasseen: Morale collapsed when we lost contact with
our superiors. All the communications were eventually cut during the bombing as
well, even land lines, and soon we stopped getting orders. As a military man, I
was ready to stay and follow orders, and so were many of my fellow officers
even though things were going very badly. But suddenly there was no word from
our commanders. Before U.S. troops reached Baghdad, we were cut from them. …
After three days of this, we decided that it was useless to try and do anything
more to fight with the air defenses, so we focused on just trying to minimize
our losses. … We began to realize that the entire city had fallen. From what we
heard the Americans had entered Baghdad from all sides and had taken control of
all the main routes. So we decided simply to go home and abandon our post
before the Americans reached us.

There were further problems with Iraq’s command and control,
because Saddam went into hiding right after the first air raid. He was mostly
going from safe house to safe house in the Mansour district of the capital.
Much like Hitler in his bunker at the end of World War II Saddam gave orders to
units that no longer existed, because he was so removed from events on the
ground. It wasn’t until the very end that he realized that all was lost, and he
fled the capital.

Saddam Hussein was a victim of his own dictatorial rule. He
created a culture of fear and mistrust to keep his real and imagined opponents
off balance. The result was an emasculated military, and a government full of
sycophants, and spies. Iraq was not only incapable of defending itself as a
result, but could not figure out America’s intentions. Saddam thought he knew
everything, and would take no serious advice. Autocrats tend to live in a
bubble of their own creation, and Saddam was no different. Still he was not a
madman as the U.S. tried to portray. He did try to analyze events it was just
that he didn’t understand the world outside of Iraq. He ended up paying for
those mistakes with his own life after his government was deposed.

Thursday, December 27, 2012

It seems like winter has become the time for new political
crises in Iraq. In December 2011, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki issued an
arrest warrant for Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi forcing him into exile, and
starting a new battle with his Iraqi National Movement (INM). Now, in December
2012, the government raided the offices and home of INM member Finance Minister
Rafi Issawi, and accused some of his bodyguards of working with Hashemi’s
security unit to carry out terrorist attacks. There have been accusations that
Issawi has been involved with violence for quite some time, but also reports
that Maliki has tried to manipulate them as well to gain concessions. This
latest incident appears to be another such case.

The prime minister’s State of Law immediately tried to
deflect criticism. A parliamentarian from the list said that an investigation had not found any evidence to implicate the Finance Minister himself, but went
on to claim that his bodyguards were involved with Hashemi’s in attacks. At
the same time, he called for a parliamentary committee to look into the matter.
Another State of Law member told the press that 20 families in Anbar had filed
lawsuits against Hashemi and Issawi’s guards, and that ten judges signed off on
the warrants, with the majority being Sunni in an effort to show that the raids
were not sectarian. Finally, the prime minister himself said that he was not
behind the arrests, only that it was the justice system doing its work. This
has been the modus operandi in many of these cases. The premier’s list is the
one talking to the media, and giving details about controversial arrests rather
than the courts, while claiming that there is no political motivation behind
them. Instead of diffusing things, it only increases suspicions.

The INM was predictably upset that the government was
targeting another one of their leading members. Deputy Premier Salah al-Mutlaq
threatened to withdraw the National Movement from the ruling coalition if there
wasn’t an investigation into the arrests. On December 22 and 25 the INM did not attend the cabinet, and on the 23 it did not show up to parliament. The
protests were merely symbolic, but united the party. After the conflict with
Maliki over the Hashemi debacle in 2011, the list effectively ceased to exist.
The leading members disagreed about how to react, and several lawmakers left.
Now their outrage brought them together if for just a few days. That wasn’t
enough to change Maliki’s course of action, but the reaction of others was.

Finance Minister Issawi at protest in support of him in Anbar Dec. 26, 2012 (AIN)

The Iraqi government is characterized by the number of
crises it has gone through. Just as one ends, another presents itself. The last
several however, have all been created by Prime Minister Maliki. The arrest of
Finance Minister Issawi’s guards is just the latest example. The Iraqi National
Movement, Americans, and other leading parties have all seen it as another
instance of the premier using the security forces against his political
opponents. The fact that it came on the year anniversary of Vice President
Hashemi going through a very similar set of circumstances only drove the point
home more. Maliki has used targeted detentions before to send the message that
anyone that opposes him is vulnerable. This also comes as all the major parties
are preparing for the 2013 elections. The fact that there have been such strong
reactions not only by the U.S. and the other lists, which were predictable, but
on the Iraqi street as well may put a check on the premier going any further.
He may have never intended to do so anyway as the arrests were a strong enough
message. Now it’s only a matter of the prime minister and Finance Minister
coming to some kind of agreement to end this blow up. Unfortunately it will not
be the last time Iraq sees this type of incident.

SOURCES

Adnan, Duraid and Arango, Tim, “Arrest of a Sunni Minister’s
Bodyguards Prompts Protests in Iraq,” New York Times, 12/21/12

- “Tribal delegation arrives from Missan to take part in
Anbar protest,”12/25/12

Dar Addustour, “Maliki calls for parliament to withdraw
confidence from the al-Mutlaq – Government waited and proclamation of the
results revealed the involvement of senior political terrorist operations,”
12/18/11

Wednesday, December 26, 2012

In September 2012, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
came to its third agreement with Iraq’s central government over oil exports.
The deal was hailed as a breakthrough between the two after the KRG halted its shipments
in April. That overlooked the fact that the root of the problem between the
two, the Kurds’ independent oil contracts, was never resolved. There was also a
technical issue in that Kurdistan could not reach the production levels it
agreed to as quickly as scheduled. That opened the door for Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki’s government to claim that the KRG had not fulfilled its
obligations, which has led to the current impasse. The agreement between the
regional and central governments has not officially come apart, but in effect
it has.

Currently, Prime Minister Maliki holds the upper hand in
this standoff. Baghdad welcomes Kurdish exports, because it boosts Iraq’s
overall numbers, and helps bring in extra cash. It also allows the central
government to make its point that energy policy has to go through it. At the
same time, the Kurds’ contribution is only a small portion of overall sales,
especially now that production in southern Iraq is ramping up. That leaves the
KRG with little leverage in the matter. Cutting its exports only hurts the
companies it has deals with. That means that the September deal is near dead,
and will likely officially come apart in the coming months. Kurdistan will halt
exports, blame Baghdad, and then wait to negotiate another agreement in the
future. Maliki on the other hand, will hold this over the head of the Kurds to
punish them for their independent energy policy. Until the conflict over the
Kurds’ oil contracts is resolved Iraq will see a series of these short term
deals come and go. Given the red lines the two sides have set on the matter, the
demand for independence versus centralized control, a resolution to this
dilemma will not come soon.

Thursday, December 20, 2012

There was never any question that Iraq was going to be
defeated by the U.S.-led Coalition in 2003. Saddam Hussein’s meddling in
military planning before the war however, helped account for why the Iraqi
armed forces fared so poorly. The United States was expecting a real fight with
the Republican Guard, and to take the capital, but that never materialized.
That was partly because three months before the invasion the Iraqi dictator
completely changed his country’s defense plans with no provisions for how it
was to be implemented.

In December 2002, Saddam called for a meeting of his military commanders to announce his plans for the defense of Iraq. On
December 18, he unveiled a series of concentric circles of defense, anchored by
the cities with Baghdad at the center. Each line of forces was to fight from
the urban areas, and then withdraw to the next circle when commanded. If they
were pushed all the way back to Baghdad, they would then fight to the death to
preserve the regime. Saddam’s son, Qusay Hussein, said that no one could
protest or make suggestions to the plan, because Saddam had already decided
upon it. The attending officers could not even get copies of the strategy only take
notes on it. The plan did not pay attention to tactics, terrain or how the
military was to conduct a fighting retreat, especially given the fact that no
unit could coordinate with others or move without permission from the
leadership. To top it all off, the commanders were not told how to implement
it. Saddam’s strategy was not completely new. The concept of an urban centered
defense had been talked about as far back as 1995. However, this was a complete
change from the previous plans, which was what flustered the armed forces so
much. The Iraqi leader liked to rely upon his intuition, and this was another
example of that.

(CIA)

The lack of orders from the top on how to construct this
defense led to mass confusion amongst the ranks. The commander of the Republican
Guard’s II Corps for example, said that right up to March 2003 Baghdad never
gave him any instructions on how to set up his units to comply with Saddam’s
plan. That left the general to act on his own, which was expressly forbidden by
the regime out of fear of a coup. Twice Qusay and the Republican Guard Chief of
Staff told him that he did not have the authority to move his units around. Not
only that, but the divisions around him were being redeployed without his
knowledge, which could have undermined his preparations. This was standard
operating procedure in Iraq. Again, because Saddam thought a military take over
was the greatest threat to his rule, he allowed no cooperation between his
officers. They could not communicate or meet with each other without
supervision by higher ups, because that might lead to plotting. The corps
commander was an exception, because most officers decided to do nothing before
the invasion since they never received any orders, and were afraid of the
consequences if they acted without them. Just months before the U.S. invasion
the Iraqi military was thrown into a state of disarray or inaction as it
struggled to come to terms with Saddam’s new strategy.

The idea of concentric circles also conflicted with the
division of the country into regional commands. Saddam broke Iraq up into four
regional commands. Each was under control of a political, rather than a
military figure even though they were supposed to be in charge of defense of
the country. The southern region was under Saddam’s cousin, “Chemical Ali” Ali
Hassan al-Majid. The northern region was commanded by Saddam’s number two Izzat
Ibrahim al-Duri, the deputy premier. The middle Euphrates was under Mizban
Khatar Hadi of the Revolutionary Command Council, while Qusay Hussein had
Baghdad. Only four days before the invasion in March 2003, was this system
finalized. How these commands were to coordinate the defense plan was never
explained. Again, that left the preparation to the individual politicians and
officers on the ground. In the Euphrates command for example, the former head
of the Iraqi navy was named military adviser. He felt this was a complete
mistake since he was not an army man used to land warfare. He didn’t arrive in
the area until March, and found that nothing had been done to implement
Saddam’s plan. Like the regional commands, Baath Party officials were in charge
of the military, police, and some of the militias in their areas. Governors for
example had control of the army units in their provinces as well as the al-Quds
militia, but not the Saddam Fedayeen who took orders from Uday Hussein or the
Republican Guard who were under Qusay. They could not make contact with those
forces either. When the former navy head went to Muthanna province he was even
more exacerbated. Local Baath officials told him that there were 30,000
soldiers and militiamen in and around the city of Samawa. When he went on a
tour he found less than 10% of that actually on duty. He was told that this
situation would be remedied, but nothing happened. He felt that the city would
fall to the U.S. without a fight as a result, which was what basically
happened. The lack of coordination amongst the various units and command was a
characteristic of Saddam’s Iraq. He felt that if they worked together it might
pose a threat to his power. Creating overlapping and contradictory chains of
command was then done on purpose. Iraq was to suffer the consequences when it
proved incapable of putting up a fight to the invading forces in 2003.

By 2003, Saddam was an isolated autocrat. Sycophants who
dared not tell him that he was ever wrong or that things were going badly in
the country surrounded him. When three months before the U.S. invasion he
decided to completely change the defense of the country there were hardly any
complaints, because that was not only unacceptable, but could lead to being
executed. Each individual officer and Baath Party official was left to prepare
for the U.S. led Coalition on their own, because there was never any
instructions from the top on how Saddam’s plan, which was nothing more than a
loosely conceived concept to begin with, was to be implemented. Many did
nothing as a result. The Iraqi military was already in a bad state after years
of sanctions, which denied them new equipment and spare parts. Saddam’s fear of
coups also completely debilitated the armed forces ability to fight. That meant
Iraq was going to lose in any confrontation with the Americans, but that
outcome was also greatly exacerbated by Saddam’s decisions.

Wednesday, December 19, 2012

Today, the reign of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria is
teetering in the face of a popular uprising. His Baath Party, which used to
administer the state, has collapsed giving way to a quasi-Assad family-military
rule. The security forces and intelligence agencies are faltering in their
attempt to suppress the rebels as well. A look at how the Syrian regime has
been run shows close similarities to the rule of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Both
ran their governments not through institutions, but with family. The two
Baathist dictators were also afraid of coups, and therefore undermined their
own militaries and intelligence agencies to protect themselves. The
shortcomings of such strategies are now all to apparent as Assad is expected to
eventually fall from power.

Family rather than competence was
what ran the Iraqi state under Saddam (center)
pictured here with sons Uday (left)
and Qusay (right) (Reuters)

Family and tribal ties, not position, institutions or
abilities were how Saddam Hussein and Hafez and Bashar al-Assad ran their
countries. In Iraq, Saddam’s sons, cousins, extended family, and those from his
home region of Tikrit in Salahaddin province were given prominent positions
throughout the government. His son Qusay for example, was given control of the Special Republican Guard and the Republican Guard. He also ran the Special
Security Organization, the Directorate General of Intelligence, the General
Security forces, and was a member of the Baath Party’s Regional Command, and
deputy of the party’s Military Bureau. Saddam’s older son Uday controlled the state media, and was in charge of the Saddam Fedayeen militia. Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri was Saddam’s number two, and the vice chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council, Northern Region Commander, deputy Secretary General
of the Baath Party Regional Command, and Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces. He was from the Tikrit region, and his daughter was married to Uday Hussein
for a time. Saddam’s cousin, General Ali Hassan al-Majid was better known as “Chemical Ali” for his role in the Halabja massacre and the Anfal campaign
against the Kurds. At various times he was the Defense and Interior
Minister, head of the Security Office, Secretary General of the Northern Bureau
of the Baath Party, and the military governor of Kuwait after the 1990
invasion. Likewise in Syria, nepotism runs rampant. President Assad’s brother General Maher al-Assad commands the Republican Guard and the Army’s 4th Division. His cousin, Hafez Makhlouf is a deputy director in the State
Security, and has more influence over it than the actual head. Assad’s
brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, is the army deputy chief of staff, his other
cousin Zual Hima Chalich is head of presidential security. Two more of his
cousins, Fawaz al-Assad and Munzer al-Assad, run the Shabiha militia. All are
currently at the forefront of fighting the Syrian rebels. In both countries,
the fear of coups, uprisings, and the desire to hold onto power as tightly as
possible led the dictators to turn to their families to ensure control and
protection. The hope was that when crises arose they could be assured of
loyalty and ruthlessness to preserve the regime. At the same time, the leaders
were sacrificing expertise and sound advice for sycophants who would only tell
the leaders what they wanted to hear, because their fates were directly tied to
the autocrats. In Syria for example, the government could have tried to compromise
with the opposition when it first started. Instead, it immediately turned to
violence, because it was so afraid to give up even an inch of power to those
outside of Assad’s inner circle.

Like Saddam, Hafez al-Assad (center) relied upon his sons Maher (left) and Bashar (right)
to help run the Syrian state (Lonely
Planet)

The fear of being overthrown also led both Saddam and Hafez
al-Assad to create multiple military units, and security and intelligence
agencies that were all meant to check each other. Saddam looked at Iraqi history, and saw a series of military takeovers. There were several
attempts in the 1990s for instance, one of which included members of the elite
Republican Guard. He therefore interpreted this to be the main threat to his rule.
Saddam’s response was to form a variety of new units, agencies, and militias
all with overlapping responsibilities to keep an eye on each other, the
government, and the public. Some of these organizations included the Special
Security Office, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the Directorate of General
Security, the General Directorate of Military Intelligence, the Republican
Guard, the Special Republican Guard, the Saddam Fedayeen, Al Quds, and the
martyrs brigades. An Iraqi officer told American interrogators after the 2003
invasion that, “The main function of the Republican Guard Security Office was
to monitor and ensure the loyalty of Republican Guard forces. All phones in
Republican Guard offices were monitored and all meetings were recorded. High-ranking
officers were subjected to constant technical monitoring and surveillance in
and out of their homes. The Republican Guard Security Office monitored all
aspects of senior Republican Guard officers’ lives, including their financial
affairs and diet.” The extreme mistrust the Iraqi dictator felt for his own
forces meant that he did not allow them to train or conduct military maneuvers
that often. Only the Special Republican Guard was allowed within Baghdad
itself. The Republican Guard was placed outside of the capital, and then the
regular army units. He didn’t allow any military units to coordinate with
each other. Officers couldn’t visit other units, and commanders couldn’t move
their forces without permission from the top leadership. There were also
constant purges and murders of officers. This caused fear and mistrust
throughout the military. On top of that, Saddam broke the country up into four
security regions, and placed loyalists in charge of each who had no real
expertise in military affairs. All together that meant the Iraqi military was
completely unprepared for the 2003 invasion. There was no meaningful
preparation, because all of the decisions were made by people with no
understanding of strategy and tactics just their ties to Saddam. As the U.S.
led Coalition quickly swept through the country, the military couldn’t respond,
because they could show no initiative, and only wait for commands from Baghdad.
The same fears and problems exist in Syria. President Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1963 in a Baathist take over. In 1970, he held his own coup
against rival members within the party. To protect himself from another
military putsch, he created 15 different security and intelligence services
including the General Intelligence Directorate, Military Intelligence, Air
Force Intelligence, the Special Forces, the Presidential Guard, the Republican
Guard, and others. Like in Iraq, these all had overlapping duties so that
none could really do their job completely, and each would be a rival of the
other. There are also agencies whose sole duty is spying upon the military. The armed forces were also divided, and militias were created as well. The
Army Command for example, has direct control of the Republican Guard, the
Desert Guard, the 120th Mountain Infantry Brigade, and several other
units. As stated before, there is also the Shabiha militia run by members
of the Assad family. Even though the Syrian army and security services were
meant to protect the government from coups and uprisings, the division of
duties amongst multiple groups actually hollowed them out. Each undermines the
other, and there is fear and suspicion throughout the ranks just as in Iraq
under Saddam. They also can’t act without orders from the top making them unable
to effectively respond to the changing situation on the ground. What Saddam and
the Assads saw as coup proofing their regimes, actually worked against them
when they were faced with real challenges to their rule.

The Hussein and Assad families followed very similar paths
to power. Both Saddam and Hafez were members of the Baath Party, and seized
power in coups. They later got rid of their rivals within the party to become
sole authorities in their countries. They were then intent upon preventing
themselves from being deposed in a similar manner. They turned to relatives to
help them rule, and divided up their militaries and security services into
multiple units and agencies with divided commands, so that none could emerge as
a threat. As a result, the security forces were emasculated. When 2003 came,
that meant the Iraqi military could not provide much of a defense for the
regime against the U.S. and British. The same is happening today in Syria as
the armed forces are hampered by the system created by the Assads in their
fight against the rebels. When the government eventually falls there, it will
be a result of their nepotism and fears created by their autocratic rule.

About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via NRT, AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News all in Iraq. I was interviewed on BBC Radio 5, Radio Sputnik, CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, Rudaw, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com