WPS4771
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4771
The Typology of Partial Credit Guarantee
Funds around the World
Thorsten Beck
Leora F. Klapper
Juan Carlos Mendoza
The World Bank
Development Research Group
Finance and Private Sector Team
&
Latin America & Caribbean Region
Finance and Private Sector Development Department
November 2008
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4771
Abstract
This paper presents data on 76 partial credit guarantee different pricing and risk reduction tools and how they
schemes across 46 developed and developing countries. are correlated across countries. The findings show that
Based on theory, the authors discuss different government has an important role to play in funding and
organizational features of credit guarantee schemes management, but less so in risk assessment and recovery.
and their variation across countries. They focus on the There is a surprisingly low use of risk-based pricing and
respective role of government and the private sector and limited use of risk management mechanisms.
This paper--a product of the Finance and Private Sector Team, Development Research Group, and Latin America and
Caribbean Region, Finance and Private Sector Development Department--is part of a larger effort in the departments to
study SME finance. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author
may be contacted at lklapper@worldbank.org.
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Produced by the Research Support Team
The Typology of Partial Credit Guarantee Funds
around the World
Thorsten Beck
CentER, Department of Economics, Tilburg University
European Banking Center, Tilburg University
Center for Financial Studies, Universität Frankfurt
T.Beck@uvt.nl
Leora F. Klapper*
The World Bank
Development Research Group
1-202-473-8738
lklapper@worldbank.org
Juan Carlos Mendoza
The World Bank
Latin America & Caribbean
1-202-473-1735
jmendoza@worldbank.org
* Corresponding author. We would like to thank the Latin America & Caribbean department of the World
Bank for financial support and Francesco Totaro and Ed Al-Hussainy for excellent research assistance. We
are especially grateful to Juan Manuel Quesada Delgado for his help designing the survey instrument. We
are also grateful to officials at the partial credit guarantee funds that completed our survey, as well as Tito
Cordella, Bertus Meins and participants at the Partial Credit Guarantee Conference at the World Bank for
useful comments. This paper's findings, interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those of the authors
and do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they
represent.
1. Introduction
During the last decade, due to the combination of a generally stable macroeconomic
environment, global liquidity, and better banking practices and technology across the
globe, domestic credit to the private sector has been growing in most developing
countries at rates higher than gross domestic product (GDP). However, there is anecdotal
and increasingly statistical evidence that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have not
benefited from this financial deepening to the same extent as other borrower groups, most
prominently consumers.
A recent literature has shown that SMEs not only report higher financing
obstacles than large firms, but the effect of these financing constraints is stronger for
SMEs than for large firms (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005; Beck et al.,
2006; see Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006 for an overview). While the size of the SME
sector does not seem to have a causal impact on growth, an economy depends on new and
innovative enterprises, which are more often than not small (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan,
2006). These two observations have led policy makers to focus on policies and
institutions that help alleviate SMEs' financing constraints.
Both high transaction costs related to relationship lending and the high risk
intrinsic to SME lending explain the reluctance of financial institutions to reach out to
SMEs (Beck and de la Torre, 2007). The high churn rate among SMEs results in a high
default probability.1 In addition, it is often difficult for banks to conduct risk assessments,
since data might be sparse and of limited reliability as SMEs' financial statements are
generally not audited. Weak credit information systems ­ which often exclude the
smallest firms in developing countries ­ make it even more difficult to collect historical
credit information on firms. Furthermore, the net losses once default takes place are high
as in many emerging markets weaknesses in collateral registration, contract enforcement,
bankruptcy codes, and the judicial process and collection mechanisms limit the ability for
banks to recover assets of the enterprise. The limited liability structure of most SMEs
also prevents the lender from having recourse to the assets of the owners. Directed credit
1However, there is also evidence that the tail risk is lower for SME loans than for loans to large enterprises
(Adasme, Majnoni and Uribe, 2006).
1
programs and credit subsidies with the aim to alleviate SMEs' financing constraints have
rarely had the expected success, due to mis-targeting, rent-seeking and lack of fiscal
sustainability (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Zia, 2008).
Many countries around the world have therefore made Partial Credit Guarantee
(PCG) funds a central part of their strategy to alleviate SMEs financing constraints.
Multi- and bilateral donors have supported the set-up of such schemes around the
developing world. These schemes seek to expand lending to SMEs, sometimes focusing
on specific regions or sectors through reducing lending risk for banks or other financial
institutions. Specifically, a PCG fund is a risk transfer and risk diversification
mechanism; it lowers the risk to the lender by substituting part of the risk of the
counterparty by that of the issuer of the PCG (the fund), which guarantees repayment of
part of the loan upon a default event. A PCG fund can also help diversify risk by
guaranteeing loans across different sectors or geographic areas. Furthermore, there can
be informational gains if the guarantor has better information about the borrower than the
lender.
Partial (and full) credit guarantee funds have existed at least since the beginning
of the 20th century and have become more popular over the past decades. Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2008) report that banks see partial credit guarantee
schemes as the most common and most effective government support program for SME
lending, ahead of directed credit and interest rate or regulatory subsidies. In spite of their
recent growth and initial evidence suggesting success of some of these funds, there is a
dearth of analysis to systematically inform the process of design of PCG funds, pricing of
their guarantees, their regulation, and the implication that PCG fund characteristics have
with respect to the prudential regulation of banking portfolios covered by such
guarantees.
This paper is a first effort to provide evidence on the variety of partial credit
guarantee funds across the world.2 Specifically, based on a recent survey of PCG funds
2There are a few surveys of partial credit guarantee schemes, such as Gudger (1998) and Green (2003), but
none provides the same wealth of quantitative information as our database.
2
we provide evidence on the variety of different schemes around the globe.3 The survey
collects general questions on the characteristics of the fund (ownership, type, etc.), as
well as detailed information on operational characteristics, such as eligibility, pricing
structures, etc. Information is also collected on the size of the PCG's activities, such as
the number of loans guaranteed, the number of loan defaults, etc.
The purpose of this study is to broadly review PCG "typologies" around the
world. We find that while many countries have such schemes, their ownership,
management and funding structures vary widely. We find an important role of
government in the funding and management of PCG funds, but less so in risk assessment
and recovery, roles that are mostly confined to the private sector. Similarly, there is a
variety of specialization among PCG funds; while most are restricted, some are restricted
to small enterprises, other are limited to specific regions or sectors, with some funds
facing multiple restrictions. Similarly, pricing, risk assessment and risk management
strategies differ across the different schemes. While some schemes focus on loan-level
guarantees, others guarantee loan portfolios. There is a surprising dearth of schemes that
reduce risk through risk-adjusted and performance based pricing and payout only after
the lender starts legal action against a defaulting borrower. Finally, we find that the role
of government in risk assessment, as observed in a few PCG funds, is associated with
higher loan default rates, while many other PCG characteristics are not. PCG funds that
do not use risk management tools as well as older PCG funds also have higher default
rates, indicating that losses accumulate at a later stage after the set-up of such a scheme, a
feature that makes such funds attractive for politicians.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short
overview over theoretical aspects of PCG funds and organizational characteristics and
pricing tools that are important to analyze and compare across countries. Section 3
discusses the variety of different schemes around the world. Section 4 focuses on the
roles of government and the private sector in funding, management and governance of
PCG funds, while section 5 compares pricing and risk management tools across the
3The complete survey is available in Appendix 2. The database itself is available on the web at:
econ.worldbank.org/programs/finance.
3
globe. Section 6 analyzes the variation of loan defaults with different organizational
characteristics and pricing mechanisms and section 7 concludes and points to future
research.
2. Partial Credit Guarantee Schemes ­ What Does Theory Tell Us?
To motivate our empirical analysis of credit guarantee schemes around the world, we
discuss the theoretical underpinnings for their existence as well design issues.
Throughout this section, we will draw parallels with another popular financial sector
policy, deposit insurance schemes.
2.1 The Reasons for the Emergence of Partial Credit Guarantee Schemes
As discussed by Honohan (2008), credit guarantee schemes can emerge for three main
reasons. First, informational advantages of the guarantor over the lender can help
overcome information asymmetries and improve access to and/or reduce costs of
borrowing of financing for certain borrower groups. Requiring guarantors for new
borrowers was one of the pillars for the success of the cooperative banking movement in
Germany and other European countries in the 19th century (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999).
Second, guarantee schemes can help diversify risk across lenders with different sectoral
or geographic specialization. Cooperative central banks, as created in several European
countries, serve to insure individual cooperatives heavily invested in specific regions or
sectors. Third, guarantee schemes can emerge to exploit regulatory arbitrage if the
guarantor is not subject to the same regulatory requirements as the lender. The recent
growth in guarantee schemes in China might be due to such regulatory arbitrage
(Honohan, 2008). None of these three reasons imply government involvement, and they
alone can explain the existence of many privately funded and managed credit guarantee
schemes around the globe. However, as we will discuss in section 4, government is
involved in many credit guarantee schemes around the world, be it in the funding,
management or even credit assessment and recovery of loans.
This raises the question of the rationale of government involvement or socio-
political reasons for government involvement. Coordination failure among private
parties and first mover disadvantage could prevent private providers from entering the
4
market for credit guarantees or prevent lenders to pool resources for such a scheme and
thus justify government intervention (De la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler, 2008).
Subsidies for such a scheme, however, especially if they go beyond set-up costs, would
have to appeal to either distributional arguments or externalities that stem from the
additional entrepreneurial activities financed by such a guarantee scheme.
Public choice theory points to political reasons for government support for partial
credit guarantee schemes. First, theory shows that PCG funds are more effective and less
costly in expanding access to external finance than directed lending (Arping, Loranth and
Morrison, 2008). Second, unlike directed credit and other intervention mechanisms, PCG
funds have the resemblance of market-friendly instruments, as the lending decision
mostly stays with the (private) lender. However, even if the lending decision stays with
private parties, government support might still be distorting due to other criteria, such as
sectoral or geographic restrictions. Third, there is little initial cost of funding, with
potential liabilities due to insurance events much further down the line. There is quite a
resemblance with deposit insurance schemes along these lines. Deposit insurance is
designed to foster depositors' trust in the financial system. While there is no direct
influence on lending decisions, deposit insurance schemes can give incentives to
aggressive risk taking, if not designed properly and in weak institutional environments
(Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002). Finally, the initial cost is low, with potential liabilities
only incurred in the case of a large bank failure or a systemic crisis.
2.2 The Features of Partial Credit Guarantee Schemes
To better understand the implications of the different features of PCG funds and their
guarantee product, we will continue to draw a parallel between deposit insurance and
partial credit guarantee schemes. Both face the trade-off between the public policy goal
of financial stability (deposit insurance schemes) and expanding access to credit (partial
credit guarantee schemes), on the one hand, and the moral hazard risk of excessive risk
taking by banks, on the other hand. The deposit insurance literature has pointed to
several mechanisms to alleviate the moral hazard risk of such schemes (Demirguc-Kunt
and Kane, 2002, for an overview). First, private management and funding, especially if
provided by the beneficiary banks themselves, can align interests of risk-decision taking
5
banks and the ultimate owner of deposit insurance schemes, tax payers. Second, coverage
limits and co-insurance can help instill market discipline by creating a depositor/creditor
group that is excluded from the benefits of deposit insurance. Are there parallels to
partial credit guarantee schemes?
The assignment of responsibilities among government, private sector and donors
might be important for the incentives of lenders in screening borrowers properly. Funding
of the scheme through proper pricing of the guarantees and limiting government funding
to set-up costs might be important in giving the lenders the proper incentives to monitor
borrowers, avoid excessive risk taking and thus minimize loan losses. Credit risk
assessment by private parties rather than government bureaucrats can help improve the
quality of these risk decisions and again minimize loan losses. Similarly, loan recovery
by lenders rather than the government can maximize recovery as the lender has typically
more information about the borrower and potentially stronger incentives to recover loan
resources. This takes us directly to the question of whether a scheme should assess and
guarantee individual loans or rather portfolios. The first approach might reduce the risk,
but can be very costly. The critical question is whether the staff of the guarantee scheme
(or members in the case of mutual guarantee associations) have any advantage in
assessing the risk of individual loans. When guaranteeing portfolios rather than
individual loans, however, other risk management mechanisms have to be in place to
guarantee a certain minimum quality of the guaranteed loans. Performance-based pricing
seems one possibility, with premiums or coverage ratios based on past portfolio
performance of the respective institution (Cowan, Drexler and Yañez, 2008).
The coverage ratio can be an important instrument of risk minimization. Retaining
part of the risk with the lender can increase her incentives to properly assess and monitor
borrowers and thus reduce loan losses. Too low a coverage ratio, on the other hand,
might reduce the value of the guarantee and dampen take-up. However, the impact of the
coverage ratio on incentives might vary with the informational advantage. If the
guarantor has an informational advantage over the lender, a higher coverage ratio might
be sustainable than if the informational advantage lies with the lender.
6
Another question is whether schemes should be targeted on specific sectors or be
rather broad. Targeting specific sectors or geographic areas might be in the interest of
policy makers that want to focus the fund on alleviating financing constraints of specific
disadvantaged groups and thus maximize the additionality of such a scheme. Too
specific targeting, on the other hand, might increase the bureaucratic costs of running
such a fund ­ e.g. verification costs ­ and again limit take-up. Further, such restrictions
might distort the lending market and lead to net weigh losses (Zia, 2008).
This paper does not test whether these different characteristics discussed so far are
related to the performance of credit guarantee schemes, as our aggregate cross-sectional
data do not allow us to do so. Rather, using survey results for 46 developed and
developing countries, we will show the variation in 76 PCG funds around the world. We
will provide descriptive statistics and correlation analysis to see how these different
mechanisms and features vary across countries and are linked with each other in a
systematic way. We will focus on two areas ­ the role of government in partial credit
schemes and the role of different mechanisms to reduce risks. Finally, we will provide
some indication of how loan losses vary across schemes with different characteristics.
3. The Sample and Some General Characteristics
While sections 4 and 5 focus on two specific dimensions along which partial credit
guarantee schemes differ across countries, this section provides some general information
about the survey on which our analysis is based, and the sample of PCG funds on which
we have information.
Our sample includes 76 PCG funds across 46 countries, both developing and
developed economies. Specifically, we have information on PCG funds in 20 high-
income, 25 middle-income, and 1 low-income country (India). In terms of regional
distribution among developing countries, we have information on six schemes in Asia, 24
in Latin America, 11 in transition economies and one in Africa (Egypt).4 In general, we
include all national PCG funds if a country has more than one fund; this sometimes
includes both publicly and privately operated funds (e.g. Argentina), in other cases ­ such
4See Appendix 3 for the complete list of countries and funds.
7
as in the case of Italy- we include multiple public funds with different objectives, i.e.
SMEs, priority sectors, etc. In some countries with large numbers of similar regional
PCG funds, we include a "representative" regional fund, as in the cases of Italy and
Mexico.
We obtained the information on the PCGs from a detailed questionnaire that we
sent to all PCGs for which we could find public contact information. While we sent this
questionnaire to more than 60 countries, we received responses from PCG funds in 46
countries. The survey responses were cleaned and double checked for consistency, with
detailed follow-up with the respective fund management where necessary. Appendix 2
includes the questionnaire.
Partial credit schemes around the world differ along some basic characteristics in
systematic ways (Table 1). While the median age across all schemes is 15, it is 27 in
high-income, but only 13 years in developing countries. For example, the Small Business
Association in the United States was created in 1953, while the credit guarantee fund in
Moldova was established in 2005. As shown in Figure 1, most PCGs in our sample were
established after 1990, with a surge of new schemes occurring in the past four years. The
younger age of schemes in the developing world is driven by schemes in transition and
Latin American economies, while schemes in Asian countries are almost as old as
schemes in developed economies (23 years). The high median age in Asia, however, is
dominated by the two large technology oriented PCGs in Korea.
In terms of total outstanding loan guarantees, schemes in high-income are almost
three times as large as schemes in developing countries; if outstanding guarantees are
measured relative to GDP, however, schemes in developing countries are larger, with a
median of 0.30% of GDP as compared to 0.21% in developed countries.5 The region
with by far the largest schemes is Asia, where the median size is almost 5% of GDP.
Behind that seemingly low median, however, is a large cross-scheme variation, ranging
from very small schemes in Italy (of which there are many in this country), to the Korean
scheme whose outstanding loan guarantees amount to over 9% of GDP, or almost 10% of
5Please note that these statistics are based only on 27 schemes that reported these data.
8
total banking credit to the private sector. In terms of the number of employees, schemes
in developing countries are somewhat larger than in developed economies; the outlier
again is Asia, with a median size of 179 employees.
Table 1: Summary statistics, medians
Total Total
No. of Median Outstanding Outstanding No. of
Obs. Age Guarantees Guarantees/ Employees
(US$ million) GDP
All schemes 76 15 3,700 0.61 18
By Income
High 34 27 909 0.21 15
Middle/Low 42 13 360 0.30 21
By Region
Asia 6 23 41,143 4.7 179
Latin America 24 11 682 0.06 11
Transition 11 14 149 0.35 25
There is important variation in the degree to which schemes are profit-oriented
and subject to taxation. 40% of the schemes are for-profit, while the remaining 60% are
non-profit; 52% are subject to corporate income tax, while 48% have tax-exempt status.
The likelihood that a scheme is taxable does not vary across income levels of countries.
In the East Asian and Pacific region, schemes are more likely to be tax-exempt than in
other regions. Non-profit oriented PCG funds are typically tax-exempt.
Figure 1: The distribution of PCG creation over time
15
10
5
0
<1970 19701979 19801989 19902000 20002006
The large majority of PCG funds in our sample were created with specific goals
and thus have restrictions in terms of the sector, type of business or geographic area
9
whose loans they can guarantee. Overall, 95% of the schemes have a target restriction
(Figure 2); the few unrestricted funds are in Latin America and Italy. While 30 schemes
have only one restriction, 42 have more than one. 45% of schemes were established to
assist SMEs. Other PCG funds are restricted to specific sectors or new firms.
Specifically, there are 29 schemes that can guarantee loans only of a specific sector;
among these, 12 schemes specialize in agriculture or rural businesses. 8% can only
guarantee loans to new businesses, among those all but one scheme have to focus on new
businesses in a specific sector. Some PCGs are established by states or municipalities
and are only eligible to firms operating in their geographic area. Overall, 24% of
schemes can only guarantee loans in a specific geographic area. Finally, some guarantees
are used to foster specific economic policies (i.e. to promote loans to women or minority
populations). When asked whether the guarantee schemes pursue specific economic
policies, 31 responded affirmative, among them even schemes that are funded and
managed privately.
Figure 2: Number of PCG funds, by eligibility requirements
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
SME New Specific Geographic
Businesses Sector Area
A smaller number of PCGs responded to questions on the number of businesses
assisted and jobs created.6 For example, PCGs in India, Hungary, and France guaranteed
loans to over 20,000 businesses in 2006, while in the same year, Funds in Turkey,
Estonia, El Salvador (and others) assisted fewer than 150. For example, the 100%
government-funded and -operated PCG fund in Brazil has guaranteed loans to less than
100 firms. In comparison, the privately funded and managed PCG fund in Brazil claims
6We would like to caution that this information is self-reported.
10
to have created over 3,000 jobs at 350 new firms. In addition, in 2006, a PCG fund in
Spain reports creating over 8,500 jobs, while the Canadian PCG reports fund that it
assisted the creation of over 18,000 jobs in about 10,000 firms. Overall, it appears that
PCG funds guarantee loans at small firms (with less than 10 employees). However, this
`impact' data is only meaningful relative to the cost per loan, business, and employee,
which firms were unwilling to report (as proprietary data) and is therefore (unfortunately)
beyond the scope of this paper.7
These basic characteristics we have been discussing provide a first glance at
differences in the way partial credit guarantee schemes operate across countries. They
already underline that one size does not fit all. In the following two sections, we will
consider in more depth two dimensions that theory suggests are critical to the
performance of partial credit guarantee schemes, i.e. (i) the ownership and governance
structure of schemes, as well as the respective roles of government and private sector and
(ii) the pricing and risk management mechanisms applied by different PCG funds around
the world.
4. Ownership, Governance and Funding of PCGs across the Globe
The funding, ownership and governance structure of schemes can provide critical
incentives for lenders and borrowers in how they manage their risk and to which extent
the scheme has a degree of additionality, as we have already discussed in section 2.
4.1 Governance of PCGs
We first consider the corporate structure of schemes. There are three common types of
corporate governance across the globe:
(i) Mutual Guarantee Associations (or Societies) are a collective of independent
businesses and/or organizations that grant collective guarantees to loans issued to
their `members', who are involved as shareholders and/or in management of the
7Several country-level studies have tried a rigorous assessment of impact. Columba, Gambacorta and
Mistrulli (2008) find that firms participating in the mutual guarantee schemes pay significantly lower
interest rates than non-participating firms. Lelarge, Sraer and Thesmar (2007) find that the French program
indeed alleviates credit constraints, with the net effect being positive in spite of higher loan losses from
participating borrowers. Hancock, Peek and Wilcox (2007) find that guarantees by the Small Business
Administration in the U.S. had a stabilizing impact on states' economy, while Wilcox and Yasuda (2007)
find a positive effect of guarantees during the Japanese crisis.
11
association. These associations may include government support. Examples
include the partial credit guarantee schemes in Italy (Columba, Gambacorta and
Mistrulli, 2008).
(ii) Publicly Operated National Schemes are government initiatives at the local,
regional, or national level. These are generally established as part of a public
policy towards providing financing to SMEs or some other priority sector or
demographic group (i.e. women or minorities). Although publicly funded, these
might be managed by private groups. Examples include the credit guarantee
schemes in Korea (Kang, 2005).
(iii) Corporate Associations are established ­ and generally funded and operated ­ by
the private sector. Examples include guarantee schemes in Greece and Romania.
As shown in Figure 3, the majority of PCGs in high-income countries are mutual
guarantee associations, while the majority of funds in middle- and low-income countries
are publicly operated. There are only five schemes in the sample that have the form of a
corporate association.8
Figure 3: Type of guarantee systems
20 17
15
15
10 7 7
5
-
MUTUAL PUBLIC
HIGH LOW_MIDDLE
8The numbers do not add up to 76 as we have missing observations for this question.
12
In addition, we find that publicly operated schemes are on average significantly
younger than mutually operated funds and significantly more likely to be operating in
emerging markets, suggesting that this is the guarantee system of choice in the recent
wave of new PCG funds. However, this pattern might also reflect a survivor bias, with
mutually funded schemes being financially more sustainable. In addition, as will be
discussed in the next section, we find that publicly operated funds are significantly less
likely to have private sector participation or market based pricing structures or use any
ex-post risk management tools.
4.2 Funding, Ownership, and Management of PCGs
Next, we take a closer look at the respective roles of government, donors and private
sector in the funding, ownership and management of partial credit guarantee schemes.
Specifically, we examine in detail four aspects of the PCG: First, the funding of PCG
funds; second, the management of PCG operations; third, the ex-ante credit risk
assessment of loans; and fourth, the ex-post responsibility of loan recoveries. In each
case, we identify the role of (i) government agencies, (ii) central banks and banking
supervisors (government related agencies), (iii) NGOs and multi-lateral agencies, and
(iv) the private sector (financial institutions and private companies). Table 2 summarizes
the percentage of PCG funds across ownership types (note that columns do not sum to
100%, i.e. a PCG might receive funding from both government and private sources, and
we exclude multilateral agencies and business associations), while Table 3 shows the
correlation among some of the categories and with GDP per capita and financial
development.
Table 2: Responsibilities in PCG funds
Funding Management Credit Risk
Assessment Recovery
Government 49% 17% 11% 8%
Government-Related 3% 9% 8% 1%
NGO (e.g. donors) 5% 5% 4% 3%
Private 58% 51% 57% 55%
There are several interesting findings in Table 2. First, central banks and
supervisory authorities (government-related) have little involvement in the management
and risk assessment and even less in funding and recovery. Similarly, donors have a
13
limited role in the different aspects of partial credit guarantee schemes. Third, while
governments do have an important role in funding ­ over a third of schemes rely at least
partially on government funding ­ they have a much more limited role in management,
risk assessment and recovery. Finally, while the private sector shares in funding with
governments, it is dominant in management, risk assessment and recovery, i.e. the banks
that are generating the loans being guaranteed are mostly responsible for credit risk
assessment and recovery of defaulting loans.
Table 3: Correlations of responsibilities
Funding_G Manage_G CrRisk_G Recovery_G Funding_P Manage_P CrRisk_P
Manage_G 0.23**
CrRisk_G 0.05 0.46***
Recovery_G 0.12 0.47*** 0.51***
Funding_P -0.02 -0.15 -0.10 -0.21*
Manage_P -0.04 -0.18 -0.16 -0.11 0.49***
CrRisk_P -0.05 0.19 0.06 0.18 0.00 0.31***
Recovery_P -0.03 0.25** 0.19* 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.69***
Note: Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. P indicates private,
while G indicates government or government-related.
Table 3 shows the correlation among responsibilities. We find, for example, that
PCGs with government or government related funding (including government agencies,
banking supervisors and central banks) are significantly more likely to also have
government or government related management. Similar results hold for private funding
and management. Interestingly, even funds with government management and credit risk
assessment responsibilities are significantly more likely to use private parties to recover
loan losses.
We also include two indices to measure government and private sector
`responsibility'. The first index measures the government's role in the PCG,
Responsibilities-Government; a higher value indicates a smaller role for the private
sector. The index is calculated as the sum of four sub-indices for Credit Risk, Funding,
Management, and Recovery. Each sub index is equal to three if government agency; two
if government related (central bank or bank supervisor); one if NGO or bilateral
organization; and zero otherwise (financial institution or private company; i.e. the
minimum is zero (if all four categories are private) and the maximum is 12 (if all four
14
categories are government). Categories might involve multiple parties ­ e.g. funding
might come from private and government sources. For this variable, any government
involvement identifies the variable as "government" (equal to three). The mean value of
this variable is 3.14, with a minimum value of zero and a maximum of 12. We also
construct an analogous variable, Responsibilities-Private, for which any private sector
involvement identifies the category as private (equal to zero); the average value of this
variable is 1.69, with a minimum value of zero and a maximum value of nine. Lower
values indicate a higher involvement of the private sector in the management and funding
of PCG funds.
There are 21 PCG funds with no government involvement at all, while funds in
Macao and Malta show the highest degree of government involvement. There are 21 PCG
funds where the private sector is involved in all four areas, funding, management, risk
assessment and recovery. Overall government involvement is lower in developing than in
developed economies. Further, government involvement is especially high in the East
Asia and Pacific region.
5. Risk Management and Pricing
While we find that risk assessment and recovery are mostly in private hands across
countries, there is a variety of mechanisms that can be used to reduce risk and maximize
the additionality of credit guarantee schemes, ranging from guarantee origination over
pricing to pay-out mechanisms.
5.1 Guarantee Mechanisms and Coverage Ratios
First, PCG funds can guarantee loans directly or in the form of counter- or co-guarantees.
Specifically, the two mechanisms are:
(i) Direct guarantees to the bank directly cover outstanding loans; and
(ii) Counter-guarantees or co-guarantee with mutual guarantee institutions provide
indirect protection to the lender through a guarantee of the main guarantor. This
might be in the form of a guarantee in the case of default of the main guarantor or
15
as a percentage of each loss incurred by the main guarantor. Counter-guarantors
can be states, public agencies, or international financial institutions.
For our sample of PCG funds, all but five funds offer only direct guarantees to the
bank. Of the five funds that offer counter-guarantees, four are in high-income countries.
Another important dimension at guarantee origination is whether a scheme
guarantees individual loans or loan portfolios. Many schemes provide "loan-level"
guarantees, which generally involve the guarantee agency in the screening stage to not
only review eligibility (i.e., whether the potential borrower is within the PCG's target
group) but also risk profile (i.e., whether the level of credit risk associated with the
borrower is within adequate limits). In this approach, a lender will usually first approve a
loan and then seek a guarantee approval on the borrower's behalf. Alternatively, the
"portfolio" model allows lenders, at their discretion, to assign guarantees to higher risk
loans or targeted borrowers (i.e. SMEs) and inform the guarantor after the loan is
approved or the loan defaults.9 While the loan-level approach might allow for more
careful screening and risk management, it is also more costly for the credit guarantee
fund. We find that 72% of PCGs use a loan or "selective" basis, while 14% use a
portfolio or "lump screening" approach. 9% use a combination of the two approaches.
There is no significant difference between high-income and developing countries in the
extent to which schemes use the loan or the portfolio approach, neither is there a
significant difference among countries at different levels of financial development. PCG
funds with no eligibility restrictions are more likely to choose the portfolio approach.
A related issue is the risk coverage offered by a guarantee agency. Around 40% of
all schemes in our sample offer guarantees of up to 100%. Given the discussion in section
2 on incentives for lenders to properly assess and monitor risk, this is a quite surprising
finding. While many schemes offer only up to 50% coverage, the median coverage ratio
is 80%. There is no significant correlation of economic and financial development with
the maximum coverage ratio. Further, there is no significant correlation of the coverage
9For the purpose of our summary statistics, we include an "intermediate" approach ­ which includes PCGs
that guarantee a combination of both loan and portfolio mechanisms ­ in the "portfolio" category, since our
interest is in identifying PCGs that only guarantee specific loans.
16
ratio with the type of guarantee scheme (mutual guarantee, publicly operated or corporate
association) or with the role of government. Coverage ratios thus do not seem to be set in
line with informational advantages or incentives structures. In addition to maximum
coverage ratios, almost half the schemes in our sample have an absolute maximum
guarantee amount, this especially holds for schemes that are restricted to guarantee loans
to small enterprises.
In addition to maximum coverage, about 40% of PCGs have a maximum
guarantee period. This ranges from 3 to 25 years, with a median of 10 years. About a
quarter of the PCGs in our sample have restrictions on guarantee limits and periods and
on eligibility; in other words, some PCGs are designed to more strictly limit their
guarantees and the resulting risk. Schemes in economically and financially more
developed countries are more likely to have maturity restrictions.
There is also variation in what features of the loan PCGs will cover. This
includes the principal, interest, and other costs. We find that most PCGs guarantee at
least the loan principal (74%), while fewer guarantee only interest (34%) or other costs
(13%); almost 30% guarantee both principal and interest.
Summarizing, there is a wide variation in guarantee mechanisms and coverage
ratios across countries. Perhaps most striking, a large proportion of schemes provide
100% guarantees, certainly not in line with providing incentives for lenders to properly
assess and monitor borrowers.
5.2 Pricing and Pay-out of Guarantees
Appropriate pricing is an important part of a guarantee scheme, both in terms of
incentives for lenders and borrowers, as well as for the sustainability of the scheme. In
56% of our sample, the fees are paid directly by the borrower and in 21% by the financial
institution receiving the guarantee (although this cost might be passed on to the
customer). 63% of PCGs in our sample (48) have a per-loan fee, while 30% of the
schemes levy an annual fee; 15% charge a membership fee. There is also variation in the
basis that schemes use to compute fees: 57% base the fee on the amount guaranteed,
while 26% base it on the loan amount. Further, 25% of the schemes that charge on a per-
17
loan basis take into account the maturity of the guaranteed loan when computing the fee,
while 25% adapt the fee according to the risk of the loan or the borrower. Only few
PCGs use a risk-based pricing structure ­ in only 7% of PCGs in our sample does success
in the repayment of loans lower the price of future guarantees, while only 10% impose
penalty rates for financial institutions with below-average loan performance.
There is large variation in the time after default that the guarantee fund pays the
lender. This ranges from very short durations, where the guarantee fund may arrange
rescheduled payments with borrowers, to longer periods (i.e. 12 months in Germany). In
addition, there is variation in whether or not the lender is required to first write-off the
loan or to initiate legal action, although the latter might be infeasible in many developing
countries. In 34% of the schemes in our sample, payouts are made after the borrower
defaults. In 42% of the schemes, payout happens after the bank initiates recovery, while
in 3% it happens after the PCG initiates recovery. In only 14% of all cases, payout has to
wait until the bank writes off the loan. Schemes in more developed countries are more
likely to pay out after default or after write-off, while schemes in developing countries
are more likely to pay out after the bank initiates legal action. This might be a mechanism
to reduce moral hazard risk on the side of lenders who might be too quick to write off a
loan after default, especially with PCG funds with high coverage ratios.
Summarizing, there is again a large variation across schemes and countries in
terms of pricing and pay-out mechanisms. Overall, there seems a dearth of schemes that
base their pricing on risk calculation and structure pay-out as to maximize incentives for
lenders to minimize loan losses.
5.3 Risk Management of PCGs
Guarantee funds may reduce their own ex-post exposure to loan defaults through
reinsurance, loan sales, or portfolio securitizations. Their ability to diversify risk
depends, however, on the development of local capital markets and financial products.
There are a number of risk management instruments for diversifying loan portfolio risk,
including (re)insurance and securitizations. We find that 20% of PCGs in our sample
purchase some form of loan insurance and 10% securitize their loan portfolios (about 5%
18
use both risk management strategies). Overall, 76% of all schemes in our sample use risk
management tools, while 24% report not using any type of risk management tools to
manage their risk.
To gauge the "risk-basedness" of pricing, we compute an index that indicates the
degree to which pricing and payout enhance risk assessment and monitoring incentives of
lenders. The index is calculated as the sum of the following: one if additional penalty
rates are applicable in the case of default in the payment; one if success in the repayment
of loans lowers the price of future guarantees; one if the pricing structure of the fees is
adapted to risk; and one if payout happens after the bank initiates legal action against the
borrower. While the theoretical maximum value for this index is four, in reality, the
index varies between zero and three, with a median of one and an average of 0.8.
Interestingly, the components do not show a very high correlation among each other,
suggesting that PCGs see them as substitutes rather than complements.
Risk pricing does not vary significantly with the level of economic and financial
development of countries. Funds that are restricted to small borrowers, however, are
more likely to have elements in place that base pricing and payouts on risk.
Table 4 shows a correlation matrix among the operational characteristics of PCG
funds in our sample. First, we examine differences between PCG funds that guarantee on
the loan-level (3) versus PCG funds that guarantee portfolios (4). We find that PCG
funds that use a loan-basis approach are significantly more likely to have a guarantee
limit, presumably as tool to minimize risk exposure. We also find that PCG funds that
use a portfolio approach are significantly more likely to receive government funding ­
and use the private sector for credit risk assessment (not shown).
19
Table 4: Correlation matrix of operational mechanisms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Guarantee Limit (1) 1.00
Principal Coverage Ratio (%) (2) -0.01 1.00
Operational Mechanism -- Loan 0.25** -0.01 1.00
Basis (3)
Operational Mechanism ­ Portfolio 0.05 -0.14 -0.08 1.00
(4)
Loan repayment Lowers Costs of 0.01 0.23* 0.05 -0.11 1.00
Future Guarantees (5)
Payout ­ At Time of Default (6) -0.17 -0.02 0.01 0.10 -0.56*** 1.00
Payout -- After Bank Initiates 0.18* -0.07 -0.01 0.03 -0.30*** -0.28** 1.00
Recovery (7)
Payout ­ After Bank Writes off the 0.05 0.14 0.09 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 1.00
Loan (8)
Risk Management ­ Insurance or 0.16 0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.06 -0.09 0.13 0.19
Portfolio Securitization (9)
Risk Management ­ None (10) 0.09 -0.19 0.10 0.13 -0.05 -0.27** 0.66*** 0.24**
Note: Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Next, we find a significant relationship between repayment performance lowering
the cost of future fees and higher coverage ratios and later payouts (i.e. a significantly
lower likelihood of payouts at the time of default or when the bank initiates recovery).
This indicates that schemes compensate higher coverage ratios with an incentive for
banks to minimize loan losses, while a later payout of loan losses is complementary to the
lower future fee incentive for lenders. We also find that PCGs that pay out at the time of
default are more likely to have a risk management program, whereas the reverse is true
for PCGs that pay out later (after the bank initiates recovery or writes off the loan). In
other words, it appears that PCG funds that take on more ex-post risk (and recovery
costs), correct for this by better risk management.
Finally, we examine the relationship between pricing and risk management
mechanisms, on the one hand, and government responsibility, on the other hand. Table 5
shows the disaggregated indices indicating government responsibility, for funding, credit
risk, and recovery. PCG funds with government responsibility for credit risk and
recovery are older and significantly more likely to guarantee loan portfolios, pay out after
the bank initiates recovery, and have no risk management program. These results are
20
consistent with the general notion that PCG funds with greater government involvement
are less likely to manage risk and losses. On the other hand, there are few significant
correlations between government funding and management and operational, pricing and
risk management mechanisms.
Summarizing, there is some evidence that more generous schemes compensate
with better risk management, while funds with government involvement in credit
decisions and recovery are less likely to manage risks and losses. Overall, there seems
much less risk management by PCG funds than one would expect.
Table 5: Correlation matrix of government responsibilities
Funding_G Manage_G CrRisk_G Recovery_G
Age 0.15 0.15 0.33*** 0.26**
Operational Mechanism ­ Loan Basis 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.08
Operational Mechanism ­ Portfolio -0.03 0.24** 0.29*** 0.23**
Pricing Structure ­ Fee Adapted to Risk 0.08 0.13 -0.12 -0.11
Time of Payout ­ At Time of Default 0.13 0.26 -0.08 -0.11
Time of Payout -- After Bank Initiates Recovery 0.02 -0.10 0.34*** 0.25**
Time of Payout ­ After Bank Writes off the Loan -0.18 -0.06 -0.08 -0.07
Risk Management ­ Insurance or Portfolio Securitiz. 0.11 0.17 -0.02 -0.01
Risk Management ­ None -0.04 0.00 0.20* 0.20*
Note: Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
6. Explaining Loan Losses with Characteristics of Credit Guarantee Schemes
How do loan losses covered by PCG funds vary across schemes with different
characteristics? To answer this question, we consider the ratio of the number of loans in
default to total number of loan guaranteed and assess how it varies across schemes with
different characteristics.10 We find that this ratio varies greatly, from zero in Honduras
and Argentina to 36% in the Bahamas.
10While the ratio of loans requiring payout to total loans guaranteed might be a more adequate measure,
data on this ratio are available for fewer countries.
21
Table 6: Total loans guaranteed and default rates
# obs Total number Average value % of loan
of loans of loan defaults
guaranteed guaranteed
Means 50 117,133.20 85,177.48 5.37%
Guarantee type:
Loan 32 26,102.53 86,437.54 5.97%
Portfolio 12 408441.90 ** 89,782.00 4.22%
Ex-post risk management:
Insurance or securitization 3 133,375.30 7,884.00 18.00%
None 12 14050.55 * 38,715.50 2.24%**
Payout:
After initiation of recovery 23 196,072.30 52,608.05 3.99%
After write-off 8 34,992.33 55,380.33 11.45%
After default 16 67,048.38 152,247.20 *** 5.28%
Responsibility_Private:
Greater than zero 19 38,612.45 75,759.93 7.75%
Equal to zero 27 188,354.50 107,043.90 3.56% *
Note: Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
We find that default rates are higher in older schemes, which underlines the
attractiveness of these schemes for politicians, as discussed above. Loan losses
accumulate at later stages of the life of a PCG fund, while the initial costs are limited. As
shown in Table 6, defaults are higher in schemes that allow pay-out after a bank writes
off a loan, while they are not higher or lower in schemes which require banks to initiate
legal actions before payout. We also find a strong correlation of default with
government's role in partial credit guarantee schemes.
These simple comparisons are confirmed by regressions reported in Table 7.
Here, we regress the percentage of loan defaults on different characteristics of PCG
funds. Given the limited sample size of 37 PCG funds for which we have the necessary
data, only few of the variables enter significantly and only so at the 10% level. We find
that older funds and funds that do not use risk management tools such as reinsurance or
securitization have higher losses. Similarly, the regression analysis suggests that
government involvement in credit decisions is associated with higher losses, while
government involvement in funding, management, and recovery is surprisingly not.
Furthermore, lower default rates are associated with our overall index of private sector
responsibility. It is important to note that these are partial correlations and do not imply
22
causality. Biases, such as reverse causation, simultaneity and selection, might be driving
the results. However, these results give us important first insights into what might be
driving the sustainability of PCG funds across countries.
It is also interesting to consider insignificant correlations of loan losses. First,
there is no significant variation in default rates between countries at different levels of
economic development. Second, the size of the PCG funds is not robustly correlated with
loan losses. Also, the governance structure, loan vs. portfolio approach and timing of the
payout are not correlated with the loan losses a PCG fund incurs. Finally, in unreported
correlations, we also could not find any correlation of loan losses of PCG funds with the
degree that funds restrict themselves to specific target groups.
Table 7: What explains loan losses - multivariate regressions
Ln GDP per capita 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
[0.92] [0.61] [0.32] [0.37] [0.66]
Ln Total Assets 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[0.58] [0.18] [0.10]* [0.09]* [0.28]
Ln Age 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
[0.09]* [0.08]* [0.06]* [0.06]* [0.18]
Mutual Guarantee -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
[0.51] [0.59] [0.65] [0.48] [0.44]
No Risk Management 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
[0.10] [0.09]* [0.05]* [0.06]* [0.10]
Loan Basis 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04
[0.93] [0.64] [0.41] [0.74] [0.26]
Default Payout 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
[0.58] [0.96] [0.50] [0.61] [0.59]
-0.02
Govt Funding -0.03
[0.30]
Govt Management 0.05
[0.25]
Govt Credit Risk 0.07
[0.06]*
Govt Recovery 0.09
[0.18]
Private Responsibility -0.06
[0.09]*
Constant -0.13 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05
[0.36] [0.46] [0.56] [0.75] [0.72]
Observations 37 37 37 37 37
R-squared 0.27 0.31 0.37 0.36 0.35
Note: Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
23
7. Conclusions
Credit guarantee schemes have become the instrument of choice for policy makers to
increase access to lending, especially for constrained groups such as small or new
enterprises. Little has been known, however, about how these schemes vary across
countries. This paper is a first effort to fill this gap. Using a survey of partial credit
guarantee schemes across 46 developed and developing countries, it provides a first
overview of how schemes differ in their characteristics.
We find a large variation in the organizational structure, the role of the
government and private sector, and the risk management and pricing mechanisms that
partial credit guarantee schemes use around the world. However, there is surprisingly
little systematic variation in many of these characteristics with economic and financial
development.
Our survey shows an important role of government in partial credit guarantee
schemes around the world, but mostly limited to funding and management, and much less
in credit risk assessment and recovery. This might be for the better, as we also find that
where government is involved in credit risk assessment, default rates are typically higher.
Older schemes are also more likely to be government funded and managed and also have
higher loan losses, consistent with the notion that the costs and liabilities of a PCG fund
become obvious only after some time. We find a surprisingly low incidence of risk-based
pricing and limited use of risk management mechanisms. However, there are some
indications that funds that take on more risk also compensate for this by better risk
management.
While this database is an important first step to better understand the typology of
credit guarantee schemes around the world, there are also clear limitations. Using cross-
country data such as the ones presented here do not allow to properly asses the effect of
different characteristics of partial credit guarantee schemes on banks' risk-taking
decisions and on the effect that credit guarantee schemes have on access to credit,
entrepreneurship and job creation. Such assessments would require loan-level data,
24
preferably over a longer time-period and changes in specific characteristics of guarantee
schemes.
Looking forward, we hope that this first overview based on a survey of PCG
funds motivates more research. First, more theory is needed to better understand which
organizational, pricing and risk management features can help maximize the impact of
PCG funds, while minimizing the risk. Second, more empirical research on specific
funds and how they have developed over time can help understand which features have
worked best in practice. Such research, however, requires time-series data and preferably
relies on loan- and borrower-level data. Finally, more research is needed to do a proper
cost-benefit analysis of PCG funds compared to other SME government interventions.
Even if one agrees with the hypothesis that subsidies are justified to foster the access of
SMEs to external finance, it is still important to understand, which intervention is the
most cost-effective to do so.
25
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27
Appendix 1: Variable definitions and summary statistics
Question numbers correspond to the World Bank PCG Survey in Annex A. All variables are mean, with the
exception of PCG age and Total Assets. All summary statistics include 76 observations, with the exception
of Guarantee Coverage (52 observations) and Total Assets (64). For "q08", "government" includes
Government Agencies, Central Bank, and Banking Supervisors; "private" includes Financial Institutions and
Private Companies (NGOs are Multilateral Agencies are excluded).
Question Variable Mean
q01 PCG Age (mean / median) 20.6 / 15.0
q02 Total Assets (median, US$ millions) $ 27.4
q04 Type of Guarantee System ­ Mutual Guarantee Association (%) 28.94
q04 Type of Guarantee System ­ Publicly Operated National Schemes (%) 31.58
q05 Profit (versus Non-Profit) (%) 39.39
q06_1 Type of Guarantee ­ Direct Guarantee to Banks (%) 78.95
q06_2 or _3 Type of Guarantee ­ Mutual (%) 11.84
q09_1_1 or _2 Eligibility ­ SMEs (%) 30.26
q11 Guarantee Limit (%) 57.89
q13_1 Guarantee Coverage ­ Principal Coverage Ratio (%) 79.86
q14_1 Operational Mechanism ­ Loan Basis/ Selective (%) 72.37
q14_2 Operational Mechanism ­ Portfolio / Global Approach (%) 14.47
q16_3_4 Pricing Structure ­ Fee Adapted to Risk (%) 21.05
q18 Does Repayment of Loans Lower the Price of Future Guarantees? (%) 6.58
q19_1 Time of Payout ­ At Time of Default (%) 34.21
q19_2 Time of Payout ­ After Bank Initiates Recovery (%) 42.11
q19_4 Time of Payout ­ After the Bank Writes Off the Loan (%) 14.47
q20 Collateral ­ Provided by Borrowers (%) 56.58
q21 PCG Rejection ­ Bank Offers Loan for Higher Rate/ Collateral (%) 55.26
q23_1 or _2 Risk management ­ (Re)Insurance or Portfolio Securitization (%) 25.00
q23_3 Risk management ­ None (%) 23.68
q_08_Fu_g Funding_Government 48.68
q_08_Fu_p Funding_Private 48.68
q_08_Ma_g Management_Government 23.68
q_08_Ma_p Management_Private 43.42
q_08_Cr_g Credit Risk_ Government 17.11
q_08_Cr_p Credit Risk_Private 55.26
q_08_Re_g Recovery_Government 9.21
q_08_Re_p Recovery_Private 53.95
28
Appendix 1: Variable definitions and summary statistics (cont.)
Question Variable Mean
q_responsibility_g An index indicating the public role in the PCG; a higher value indicates a 3.15
smaller role for the private sector. The index is calculated as the sum of
four sub-indices for Credit Risk, Funding, Management, and Recovery.
Each subindex is equal to three if government agency; two if government
related (central bank or bank supervisor); one if NGO or bilateral
organization; and zero if each column gives a three if govt., two if govt-
related, one if non-profit and zero otherwise (financial institution or private
company. I.e. the minimum is zero (if all four categories are private) and
the maximum is 12 (if all four categories are government). Categories
might involve multiple parties ­ e.g. funding might come from private and
government sources. For this variable, any government involvement is
identified as "government".
q_responsibility_p For the definition, see "g_responsibility_g", except for this variable, any 1.69
financial institution or private company involvement is identified as
"private" (equal to zero).
q_index_default An index indicating risk based pricing of loan defaults; a higher value 1.32
indicates greater responsibility. The index is calculated as the sum of
the following: one if additional penalty rates are not applicable in the
case of default in the payment (q18 equals "NO"); one if success in the
repayment of loans lowers the price of future guarantees (q17 equals
"Yes"); one if the pricing structure of the fees is adapted to risk (q15);
and one if 18 is if the time of payoff is after bank writes off loan (q19).
29
Appendix 2: World Bank questionnaire on Partial Credit Guarantee Funds
Panel A: General Characteristics
1. Year of beginning of activities:_________________
2. Total assets: ________________________________
3. Number of employees: ________
4. Type of guarantee system:
Mutual Guarantee Association
Publicly Operated National Schemes
Corporate Association
Based in Bilateral or Multilateral Cooperation
NGOs
Other: _________________________________
5. Purpose: Profit Non-Profit
6. Type of guarantee:
_1. Direct Guarantee to Banks
_2. Counter-Guarantee to Mutual Guarantee Institutions
_3. Co-guarantee with Mutual Guarantee Institutions
_4. On equity participation or participatory debt
Others: _________________________________
7. Tax Regime
Taxable
Tax Exempt
8. Responsibilities (Please check all that apply):
Funding Ownership Management Credit Risk Monitoring Recovery
Assessment
Government Agency
Financial Institution
Central Bank
Banking Supervisor
Private Company
NGOs
Multilateral Agency
Other:
Other:
30
Panel B: Operational Characteristics
9. Eligibility (please check all that apply):
Restricted by borrower size
Small: Number of employees: ________ or level of sales: ________ (currency:
_____)
Medium: Number of employees: ________ or level of sales: ________ (currency:
_____)
Large: Number of employees: ________ or level of sales: ________ (currency:
_____)
Restricted to: new business existing businesses
Restricted to specific sector: ______________
Restricted by geographic area: ______________
Restricted to investment (i.e. capital formation)
No restrictions applicable
Other: __________________________________
10. Are guarantees used to foster any specific economic policies (i.e. to promote loans to women
or minority populations)? Yes No.
If yes, please specify: ______________________________________
11. Guarantee limit: Yes No. If yes, please specify:
Maximum: In national currency: _____________ or percentage of the loan amount: _____%
Minimum: In national currency: _____________ or percentage of the loan amount: ______%
12. Maximum guarantee period (in years):____________________
13. Guarantee coverage:
_1. Principal; Please specify coverage ratio: ______%
_2. Interest
_3. Other costs
14. Operational Mechanism:
_1. Loan Basis/ Selective11
_2. Portfolio/ Global Approach/ Lump Screening12
_3. Intermediary approach13
Other: _________________________________
15. Provide training and guidance?
To the Lender Yes No
To the Borrower Yes No
16. Pricing structure (please check all that apply):
Annual fee: Yes No
Membership fees: Yes No
Per loan fee: Yes No
11Guarantees extended on a case-by-case basis by the guarantor.
12When accredited lenders are entitled to attach guarantees to loans within an eligible category without
previous consultation of
the guarantor.
13Combination of loan basis and portfolio mechanisms.
31
If yes, based in (check all that apply):
_1. Size of the loan
_2. Amount guaranteed
_3. Fee adapted to risk
_4. Maturity
Please specify fee: ____%
Payment: in advance, quarterly, others: ______________
Application fee: Yes No. If yes, please specify amount:__________
No fees
Are fees paid by (please check all that applies):
Financial Institution
Borrower
17. Are additional penalty rates applicable in case of default in the payment? Yes No.
If yes, please specify rate: ___________________
18. Does success in the repayment of loans lower the price of future guarantees? Yes No
19. Time of payout:
_1. At time of default
_2. After bank initiates recovery
_3. After PCG initiates recovery
_4. After the bank writes off the loan
20. Do borrowers need to provide collateral? Yes No
If yes, is there a minimum collateral value? Yes _______ No
21. If a loan is rejected by the PCG is a bank more likely to reject the loan or offer the loan at
higher rate/ greater collateral? Yes No
Estimated percentage of borrowers that would not have been able to receive a loan with out
a guarantee: _____________%
22. Information requirements:
What kind of loan documentation are financial institutions required to provide?
Please, specify: _____________________________________________________________
What is the estimated cost (in basis points) of these reporting requirements?
Please, specify:______________________________________________________________
23. Risk management:
Does the PCG use any risk management tools to mange their risk?
_1. (Re)Insurance
_2. Portfolio securitizations
_3. None
Other ____________________________
24. What is the PCG's total operating budget in 200614? ________ (currency ____)
What is the contribution of government/public funding? ________ (currency ____)
14Or most recent available year.
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Panel C: Monitoring
25. Please, provide data for15:
Outcomes Stock16 200617
Number of loans guaranteed
Number of guarantee requests denied
Average value of guarantees
Number of default loans
Average default amount
Total amount of loan guarantees
Total amount paid-out to lenders
Number of loans that required pay-outs
Currency:
Businesses assisted
Total number of businesses
Number of new Jobs created
Number of new business created
Number of new Jobs created
Business assisted per size
Micro enterprises
Small
Medium
Large
Business assisted by sector
Manufacturing
Services
Agriculture
Construction
15If available, please specify in US$.
16Since the creation of the PCG.
17Or most recent available year.
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Appendix 3: Surveyed PCG Funds
Country Fund
Argentina Afianzar S.G.R
Argentina Agroaval S.G.R
Argentina FO.GA.BA. S.A.P.E.M.
Argentina Garantizar Sociedad de Garantía Reciproca
Argentina Intergarantias Sociedad de Garantía Reciproca
Bahamas Agricultural Credit Guarantee Fund
Belgium Sowalfin
Brazil Brazilian Micro and Small Business Support Service
Brazil Fundo de Garantia para a Promocao da Competitivida
Canada Canada Small Business Financing Program
Chile Fondo de Garantía para Pequeños Empresarios
Colombia Fondo Agropecuario de Garantías FAG
Colombia Fondo Nacional de Garantías
Colombia Fondo Regional de Garantías del Tolima S.A
Costa Rica FODEMIPYME
Croatia Croatian Agency for Small Businesses
Egypt Credit Guarantee Company
El Salvador Sociedad de Garantías Reciprocas
Estonia Credit and Export Guarantee Fund KreDex
France Ose Garantie
France SIAGI
Greece Tempte SA (Credit Guarantee Fund of Small and very small Enterprises)
Honduras Fondo de Garantía del Programa de Financiamiento para el Sector Rural en
Apoyo a la Seguridad Alimentaria Fonga Finsa
Hungary Hitelgarancia Zrt
Hungary Rural Credit Guarantee Foundation (AVHGA)
India Credit Guarantee Fund Trust for Small Induestries (CGTSI
Israel ISMEA, Israel SMEs Authorities
Italy SFGA Srl.
Italy Artigiancredit Toscano Societa cooperativa
Italy CONFIDI (FEDERASCOMFIDI)
Italy CONFIDI Veneziano Soc. Cooperativa
Italy Federdifi Lobarda SC
Italy SGFA Srl
Italy UNIONFIDI S.C
Korea, Dem. Rep. Kibo Technology Fund
Korea, Dem. Rep. Korea Credit Guarantee Fund
Lithuania SME Guarantee Fund
Luxembourg Mutualité D'aide Aux artisans
Luxembourg Mutualité de Cautionnement et d'Aide aux Commerçants. S.c.
Macau, China Industrial and Commercial Development Fund
Macedonia, FYR Macedonian bank for Development promotion
Malta Malta Enterprise Corporation Loan Guarantee Scheme
Mexico Banco Nacional de Comercio exterior SNC
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Annex B: Surveyed PCG Funds (Cont.)
Country Fund
Mexico18 Mexico Regional Average (All)
Moldova Interbank Guarantee Society GARANTIVEST
Netherlands Besluit Borgstelling Midden en Klein Bedrijf
Organisme FONAS de Solidarité Africaine
International19
Panama Fondo de Garantías para la Micro y Pequeña Empresa
Paraguay Fondo de Garantía para las Micro, Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas
Peru Fundación Fondo de Garantía para Prestamos a la pequeña Industria FOGAPI
Portugal AGROGARANTE - Mutual Guarantee Society (Agrogarante)
Portugal GARVAL - Mutual Guarantee Society (Garval)
Portugal LISGARANTE - Mutual Guarantee Society (LISAGARANTE)
Portugal Mutual Counter Guarantee Fund (MCGF)
Portugal NORGARANTE - Mutual Guarantee Society
Romania National Loan Guarantee Fund for SMEs - FNGCIMM S.A.
Romania Romanian Loan Guarantee Fund for Private Entrepeneurs
Romania Rural Credit Guarantee Fund NFI
Slovak Republic Slovak Guarantee and Development Bank
Spain ISBA Sociedad de Garantía Reciproca
Spain SGR
Spain Sociedad de Garantía Reciproca
Spain Transaval S.G.R
Sri Lanka Credit Guarantee Schemes of the Regional development Department of the
Central Bank of Sri Lanka
Sweden ALMI Foretagspartner AB
Switzerland CSC Centrale Suisse de Cautionnement
Taiwan, China Small and Medium Enterprise Credit Guarantee Fund of Taiwan (Taiwan
SMEG)
Thailand Small Business Credit Guarantee Corporation (SBCG)
Turkey Kedi Garanti Fonu (Credit Guarantee Fund)
United Kingdom Small Firm Loan Guarantee
United States US Small Business Administration
Uruguay Banco de La Republica Oriental de Uruguay
Uruguay FOGAR. Fondo Nacional Cooperativo de Garantías
Uruguay Fondo de Garantía
Uruguay Fondo de REC Laboral
Venezuela SGR Sogarsa Sociedad de Garantías Reciprocas para el Sector Agropecuario,
Forestal, Pesquero y Afines S.A
18This is the average of 38 regional PCG funds.
19Provides guarantees to banks within the West African monetary union.
35