tag:theconversation.com,2011:/global/topics/eurasian-customs-union-12523/articlesEurasian Customs Union – The Conversation2016-09-09T09:11:24Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/649912016-09-09T09:11:24Z2016-09-09T09:11:24ZWith Uzbekistan's dictator dead, Russia seeks to extend its influence<p>The death of <a href="http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan-last-days-of-islam-karimov/27970077.html">Islam Karimov</a>, a dictator who ran Uzbekistan since its creation a quarter-century ago, has kicked off a new round of geopolitical competition in Central Asia. Despite the rise of China in the region, Russia has the strongest hand. But whoever takes the reins in Uzbekistan, they are likely to continue the country’s obstinate status quo – a semi-isolationalist stance that combines political repression with economic decline. </p>
<p>Karimov pursued a policy of “self-reliance” which isolated his country both from the West and from Russia. He expelled the US military in 2005, pulled Uzbekistan out of the Russian-led <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/uzbekistan/9369392/Uzbekistan-withdraws-from-Russia-lead-military-alliance.html">Collective Security Treaty Organization</a> in 2012, and <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/uzbekistan-and-the-eurasian-economic-union/">refused to join the Eurasian Economic Union</a> (EEU), a customs union launched in 2015 that includes Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. </p>
<p>Now Karimov’s reign is over, Russia sees a chance to reassert its influence. Moscow still defines Uzbekistan as part of its broader regional sphere of influence and a strategic hub in what it calls “Greater Eurasia”. It is also concerned that any power vacuum could provide an opportunity for Islamist radicals to prosper. Russia is betting that the prime minister <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52839">Shavkat Mirziyoyev</a>, is the most likely guarantor of stability and Russian influence. On September 5, two days after Karimov’s funeral, Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived to pay his respects and meet Mirziyoyev – and on September 8, Mirziyoyev was appointed <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37310718">interim president</a>.</p>
<p>Mirziyoyev has little international experience, since he spent most of his career as a regional official, and little is known about his worldview. He tends to be labelled as pro-Russian, primarily because he appears to have Moscow’s approval, and partly because of tenuous family links to the Moscow business elite: his niece <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3512179/Children-wear-couture-dresses-not-trainers-Arsenal-princess-boasts-dressing-two-year-old-couture-Instagram-linked-Uzbeki-despot-boiled-enemies-OIL.html">Diora Usmanova</a> is the widow of Babur Usmanov, who in turn was the nephew of Kremlin-friendly Russian-Uzbek oligarch Alisher Usmanov (one of the owners of Arsenal football club). </p>
<p>Moscow is very adept at leveraging these sorts of personal links, but its ability to exert influence through more conventional economic means is limited. Still <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/21/eu-to-extend-sanctions-against-russia">beset by sanctions</a> and drained by <a href="http://www.tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp-growth-annual">more than a year of recession</a>, it has no spare funds to invest in Uzbekistan. And more to the point, it would take serious heft to turn around the Uzbek economy, which is in deep trouble. </p>
<p>Karimov’s “Uzbek model” of economic development – a disastrous state-led import substitution policy – has utterly failed. Escaping poverty at home, millions of Uzbeks work in Russia. In 2013, their remittances <a href="http://www.uz.undp.org/content/uzbekistan/en/home/ourperspective/ourperspectivearticles/2015/03/05/who-is-behind-remittances--a-profile-of-uzbek-migrants.html">surpassed US$6 billion</a>, but <a href="http://in.rbth.com/economics/finance/2016/09/08/will-uzbek-transition-impact-russias-economy_627915">collapsed to US$3 billon</a> in 2015 as an economically pressed Russia toughened its rules on migrants. </p>
<p>If Uzbekistan joined the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), it would get a better deal for these migrants. Uzbeks themselves seem amenable: in a <a href="http://www.eabr.org/e/research/centreCIS/projectsandreportsCIS/integration_barometer/?id_16=42460">2014 poll</a>, 68% favoured joining the EEU. But accession would demand that Uzbekistan liberalise its onerous customs regime. That might be a step too far for a new leader, since some of the country’s influential business groups benefit directly from monopolies on imports and exports.</p>
<p>Russia’s final trump card is security. Uzbek officials are nervously following reports of activity by militant groups in northern Afghanistan. But Tashkent is suspicious of Russian offers of military assistance. Uzbek security forces are ubiquitous and relatively competent; they should have little need for Russian backup except in extreme circumstances. </p>
<h2>Contest on the Silk Road</h2>
<p>Unlike Russia, China has plenty of funds to invest. Its new <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/chinas-silk-road-belt-outpaces-russias-economic-union/">Silk Road Economic Belt</a> (SREB), part of the ambitious <a href="http://english.gov.cn/beltAndRoad/">Belt and Road Initiative</a> to formalise its economic relationships in the region, is backed by a US$40 billion <a href="http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn/enweb/23773/index.html">Silk Road Fund</a> and the resources of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. </p>
<p>Some big state-run projects have been successful: in June 2016, Chinese premier Xi Jinping joined Karimov to inaugurate a new US$1.45 billion rail link between the Ferghana valley and Tashkent. </p>
<p>But for Uzbekistan to be a key player in the SREB, it needs to make some major changes to its economic policy – and while China is already Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner, Chinese businesses have found its closed economy and arcane bureaucracy difficult to navigate. The Uzbek state has opposed Chinese proposals for an SCO-wide Free Trade Agreement, fearing an influx of Chinese goods that could undermine domestic producers. </p>
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<span class="caption">China has been making inroads in Uzbekistan for years.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.epa.eu/politics-photos/diplomacy-photos/uzbekistan-s-president-islam-karimov-meets-chinese-president-xi-jinping-photos-51527083">EPA/How Hwee Young</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>Western states, meanwhile, probably won’t pull ahead in this geopolitical competition. US diplomats have little scope to offer financial aid, and have few if any political channels into the elite. Washington wants to maintain a partnership on Afghanistan through diplomatic engagement and some limited security assistance, but whoever takes control in Tashkent will be wary of appearing too close to them.</p>
<p>In the end, whoever the next Uzbek president is, the country’s conservative policies and fear of Russian domination will continue to slow down Moscow’s drive for influence. The most likely outcome is an updated version of the status quo. Uzbekistan will be symbolically more aligned with Moscow but will remain outside the EEU; there’ll be moves to attract more investments from China and other players, but trade policy won’t radically change. </p>
<p>Nevertheless, Uzbekistan will sooner or later have to reform its sclerotic economy and open up to the outside world. If it leaves it too late, its economic decline will stir up social discontent – and begin an inexorable descent into political instability.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/64991/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>David Lewis receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council.</span></em></p>Central Asia's most populous country is stagnant and repressive, but its two massive neighbours want in now Islam Karimov is gone.David Lewis, Senior Lecturer, Politics, University of ExeterLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/389452015-03-31T05:31:55Z2015-03-31T05:31:55ZPutin has lost plenty of friends, and is making some strange new ones<p>Vladimir Putin’s actions in Ukraine have deeply polarised the international community. Traditional friends are now wearier of Putin than ever, and on the face of it, Russia may be on the verge of serious international isolation.</p>
<p>Gaining the trust of other states in world politics is a long and arduous process, and so it went with post-Soviet Russia. For two decades, the Kremlin has been trying to build and maintain a strong friendship with the US and Europe, and was rewarded: even after the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, the West largley kept faith in Russia regardless of Moscow’s increasing disregard for global norms and values.</p>
<p>EU support in particular was crucial, greatly easing <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11944053">Russia’s accession to the WTO</a> and generally preserving Moscow’s status as a major global player.</p>
<p>But Vladimir Putin’s actions in Ukraine have all but trashed these years of painstaking work. Most of the West is now convinced that Russia is a disruptive power that wants to unilaterally dismantle the whole world system.</p>
<h2>Forced handshakes</h2>
<p>Traditional allies such as Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan have largely maintained their formal relationships with Russia, even though their trust in Putin’s intentions has <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/russia-kazakhstan-relations-took-a-dive-in-2014/">all but evaporated</a>. But as long as the West cannot offer these countries a viable alternative to the the Russosphere, they will have to behave as if they’re Russia’s closest friends. </p>
<p>The same is not true of Europe’s Slavic countries and the former Yugoslav republics, which are extricating themselves from the Kremlin’s “sphere of influence” as fast as they can. </p>
<p>Despite their old cultural or religious ties with Moscow, governments such as Bulgaria’s have now <a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/multimedia/video-2/ukraine-today-bulgarian-president-condemns-russia-rosen-plevneliev-says-ukraine-invasion-shatters-un-charter-366135.html">spoken out publicly</a> against Putin and the intervention in eastern Ukraine, a sign that the EU’s solid commitment to the region has at last allowed these states to reject Russia’s behaviour. </p>
<p>So which countries are actually left in Russia’s dwindling circle of friends – and which ones are starting to cosy up to Moscow?</p>
<h2>In with the new</h2>
<p>Outside of Central Asia, the only old friends that still seem to trust Russia are a handful of deeply authoritarian countries in Africa (<a href="https://theconversation.com/political-carnage-in-zimbabwe-as-grace-mugabe-enters-the-fray-35685">Zimbabwe</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/uk/topics/sudan">Sudan</a>), variously authoritarian ones in Latin America (<a href="https://theconversation.com/obamas-cuba-move-is-more-a-milestone-than-a-turning-point-35704">Cuba</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/as-crisis-in-venezuela-deepens-maduros-iron-fist-tightens-38254">Venezuela</a>, <a href="http://roarmag.org/2014/11/bolivia-authoritarianism-mas-elections/">Bolivia</a>), and isolated, marginal regimes (<a href="https://theconversation.com/fatal-attraction-russias-flawed-friendship-with-syria-17385">Syria</a>, <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-borders-north-korea-is-moving-up-moscows-agenda-37864">North Korea</a>). </p>
<p>These countries were among the few in the UN General Assembly who voted against the <a href="http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-considers-un-vote-on-crimea-annexation-a-victory-/497027.html">resolution that condemned Russia for the annexation of Crimea</a>, and their support reflects respect and admiration for Putin’s own increasingly authoritarian regime.</p>
<p>But Putin’s assertiveness has also impressed a whole range of states that in the past did not have much admiration for Russia’s foreign policy. These are the emerging military powers that want to play a more strategic role in world politics, and who are fed up of a world order that marginalises and belittles them. </p>
<p>Various <a href="http://gulfstateanalytics.com/archives/work/the-united-arab-emirates-a-rising-military-power">gulf states</a>, among them Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have spent the past decade steadily building up their military capabilities. Their attitude has moved from supporting extreme Islamic movements in Chechnya to discreetly admiring Russia for its muscular performance on the world stage. Their hope is that in the new context created by Russia’s actions in Ukraine, they might also manage to shape the world order. </p>
<p>Japan is a surprising case. Superficially, Tokyo generally toes the US line on Russia, but Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is also seeking to create a stronger international profile for Japan based on <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-12/japan-s-military-spending-to-rise-amid-defense-strategy-overhaul">developing new military capabilities</a> – opening up natural common ground with Putin’s contestation of the current world order, in which Japan is simply not meant to be a military player. </p>
<p>So despite imposing <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-29345451">sanctions</a> on Moscow at the US’s behest, Abe’s government also continues to <a href="http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/why-russia-and-japan-are-making-nice/">reach out</a> to Putin to hedge its bets.</p>
<p>Perhaps most strikingly of all, old rival <a href="https://theconversation.com/russias-borders-turkey-treading-carefully-over-the-wars-in-syria-and-ukraine-33652">Turkey</a> has suddenly become one of Russia’s most important allies. </p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/10325218/Turkey-will-probably-never-be-EU-member.html">stall</a> in Turkey’s EU membership bid pushed it into Russia’s arms as never before, as President Erdogan’s move <a href="http://rt.com/op-edge/221835-turkey-religion-secular-state/">from secularism and towards religious authoritarianism</a> put Turkey on a collision path with the EU’s promotion of democracy or human rights.</p>
<p>The new Russo-Turkish friendship was made official by Putin’s visit to Ankara in December 2014, during which he announced the scrapping of the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/01/us-russia-gas-gazprom-pipeline-idUSKCN0JF30A20141201">South Stream pipeline project</a> and an effective freeze on Russia’s friendship with Bulgaria and Serbia. In turn, he sealed the newly revamped friendship with Turkey by announcing plans for a <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/putin-erdogan-discuss-turkish-stream-gas-project-kremlin-225558480--finance.html">Turkish Stream pipeline</a>. </p>
<p>These burgeoning alliances and realignments all prove that Putin does really care about diplomatic ties to other states, even if he’s also prepared to go it alone on actions as brazen as those he took in Ukraine. And while he is obviously interested in wrangling useful agreements with states regardless of their attitude towards him, he also needs to surround himself with heavyweight allies to make Russia’s coveted “great power” status more than a fantasy.</p>
<p>So if he can turn this rag-bag of other nations’ dissatisfactions to his advantage, the partnerships Putin has scotched with the Ukrainian venture may not be such a loss after all.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/38945/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Cristian Nitoiu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Vladimir Putin burned a lot of bridges in Ukraine, so he's finding new sources of international support wherever he can.Cristian Nitoiu, Dahrendorf Postdoctoral Fellow in EU-Russia relations, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/371742015-02-04T13:14:44Z2015-02-04T13:14:44ZWest beats the drum for war while Russia plays games in Ukraine<p>In recent weeks, eastern Ukraine’s Russian-backed rebels have won several military victories on the battlefield in the Ukrainian Donbas. First they <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/world/europe/ukraine-cedes-donetsk-airport-to-rebels-as-fighting-continues.html?_r=0">captured</a> the virtually destroyed Donetsk airport, then they <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/01/27/uk-ukraine-crisis-military-idUKKBN0L00LJ20150127">pushed back the front lines</a>, taking more territory; now, they look set to secure <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2015/feb/03/civilians-flee-debaltseve-eastern-ukraine-in-pictures">Debaltseve</a>, strategically located between the rebel-held cities of Donetsk and Luhansk.</p>
<p>The warfare has taken a terrible toll on Ukrainians on both sides of the “demarcation line”. More than <a href="http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/un-death-toll-from-ukraine-conflict-tops-5300-379336.html">5,300</a> people have now been killed, and <a href="http://uk.businessinsider.com/r-more-than-one-million-flee-ukraine-close-to-humanitarian-catastrophe-2015-1">more than 1m displaced</a>. The <a href="https://theconversation.com/ceasefire-struck-but-ukraine-isnt-out-of-the-woods-so-what-happens-next-31390">Minsk Agreement</a> of September 2014 has obviously failed.</p>
<p>It is quite clear that the Russian-backed rebels want to fight Ukrainian forces to carve out a viable statelet in the east of the country. The prime minster of the Donetsk Peoples’ Republic (DNR), Aleksandr Zakharchenko, has for months declared his intention to retake cities overrun by Ukrainian forces in July 2015, such as Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. </p>
<p>But Russia’s real interest in the conflict appears to be quite different. </p>
<h2>Myth and reality</h2>
<p>Had Russia wanted, it could have taken the Donbas in a matter of hours in March 2014. The fact that it did not indicates that Russia is really only interested in the Donbas in so far as it offers leverage over the authorities in Kiev. </p>
<p>This explains why Russia still periodically <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11361286/Russia-sends-9000-troops-into-Ukraine-says-Petro-Poroshenko.html">sends troops and equipment over the border</a> into rebel-held territory, escalating or de-escalating the conflict at will. After all, it’s simply not in Russia’s interest to have a major war raging on its border.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the drum beat for war on the Western side is getting louder and louder. Western <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3ca53d08-a6ec-11e4-8a71-00144feab7de.html#axzz3QbKNoDsi">leader writers</a>, <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a6bd0936-a625-11e4-9bd3-00144feab7de.html#axzz3QbKNoDsi">commentators</a> and <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/%7E/media/research/files/reports/2015/02/ukraine%20independence%20russian%20aggression/ukrainereport_february2015_final.pdf">securocrats</a> have argued the West should at last go beyond non-lethal aid and arm Ukraine. Timothy Garton Ash even writes longingly about “military kit”, and likens Putin to Milošević, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/01/putin-stopped-ukraine-military-support-russian-propaganda">as if it is actually conceivable for NATO to bomb Russia</a>.</p>
<p>All this talk is based on a wilful misunderstanding of the Ukraine crisis. The dominant Western narrative is increasingly being steered by both left- and right-wing liberal universalists, who want to impose their values on the rest of the world. </p>
<p>They see the situation as the struggle of a downtrodden Ukrainian population, who discovered their inner Western values and toppled a neo-Soviet dictator. Then, as if completely unprovoked, Russia – with an unreconstructed leader <a href="https://theconversation.com/ukraine-isnt-the-czech-crisis-of-1938-but-there-are-lessons-to-learn-from-history-25768">comparable to Hitler</a> – opportunistically annexed Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine. </p>
<p>The reality is altogether more complicated. </p>
<h2>Own up</h2>
<p>In the run-up to the Euromaidan uprising, the USA and its closest allies systematically undermined the legitimacy of a weak but democratically-elected European government which was sympathetic to Russian interests. They then experimented to see whether it could stoke a potentially violent popular uprising to topple the authorities and diminish Russia. </p>
<p>When Russia reacted to its loss of influence in Kiev by securing its warm water naval base in Crimea and destabilising east Ukraine, the West imposed sanctions on Moscow and rejected a far-reaching East-West compromise that would have entailed Ukraine <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/land-for-gas-secret-german-deal-could-end-ukraine-crisis-9638764.html">agreeing not to apply to join NATO</a>. </p>
<p>The universalists want us to believe that an anti-western, neo-imperial Russia has aggressively projected its power in Ukraine and is intent on a new cold war with the west. In fact, <a href="http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/22441">nothing could be further from the truth</a>. The reality is that Russia has suffered a strategic defeat in Ukraine; it is merely fighting for a consolation prize against a West whose power now extends all the way to Russia’s southern Black Sea underbelly.</p>
<p>But even if the universalists are content to deliberately misunderstand the Ukraine crisis, they should know to balk at the practical consequences of arming the country. Arming Ukraine would partition the country for the foreseeable future, and could rip its economic heart out for good.</p>
<p>That said, the West clearly cannot expect a “frozen conflict” in the short to medium term. As the continued hostilities since the Minsk Agreement have shown, both sides want to fight; each ill-disciplined side is testing the military capabilities of the other. That could easily lead to an arms race, one that Ukraine could not win even with Western support, because Russia will simply increase its military support in response. And all this assumes that western lethal military aid does not fall into the wrong hands. </p>
<p>The biggest losers, of course, will be the residents of the Donbas, who are already facing an impending humanitarian crisis and who simply long for peace and a steady income.</p>
<h2>Footing the bill</h2>
<p>On top of the US$3 billion of US military aid that has been <a href="http://www.brookings.edu/%7E/media/research/files/reports/2015/02/ukraine%20independence%20russian%20aggression/ukrainereport_february2015_final.pdf">proposed</a>, the costs of the west’s Ukraine policy will only increase. Even after the US$27 billion IMF-led bailout agreed after the Euromaidan uprising, the Ukrainian government still requires at least another US$15 billion of official external finance to avoid a sovereign default in the next month or so. </p>
<p>While the US has conditionally offered an additional US$2 billion and the EU a <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/57a8fa5e-9b25-11e4-882d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3QbKNoDsi">similar amount</a>, it’s ominous to see western institutions and countries already <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/26cbe0b2-a413-11e4-b01e-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3QbKNoDsi">squabbling over who should provide the remaining finance</a>. Even in the best case scenario, Ukraine will be <a href="http://www.ebrd.com/news/2015/ebrd-president-calls-for-more-support-for-ukraine.html">dependent on IMF-led financing</a> for a political generation. Moreover, a proportion of this financing will go straight to Russia to repay a US$3 billion bond Ukraine owes the Kremlin, as well as disputed debts to Gazprom.</p>
<p>But even if America still wants a fully fledged standoff between the West and Russia, it’s hard to see how that could be in Ukraine’s <a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-02-03/why-arming-ukraine-will-backfire">national interest</a>.</p>
<p>Kiev’s policy has so far been incoherent. It claims rebel-held territory as part of Ukraine and continues to supply it with electricity and gas, while simultaneously isolating the area’s remaining residents. Sometimes Kiev’s forces openly fight the rebels, while at others the guns fall silent. </p>
<h2>Time to compromise</h2>
<p>Still, there is hope. Even at this late stage, negotiations between the rebels and Kiev and between Russia and the West could still form the foundation of a viable united Ukraine. </p>
<p>A sensible negotiated outcome demands three core elements. There must be internationally supervised plebiscites in the Donbas to decide the region’s future; Ukraine’s constitution must be reformed to give the Donbas special status should it vote to remain in Ukraine; and a formal agreement over Ukraine’s future relationship with NATO, the EU and the Eurasian Union must be struck between the West and Russia.</p>
<p>Even if this might not seem likely to benefit the West’s apparent interests, it would surely be in the interest of Ukraine and the Donbas. If the West continues to refuse to compromise with Russia over Ukraine and decides instead to arm Kiev’s troops, then it must do so with its eyes wide open. </p>
<p>Ramping up a response to Russia could have terrible unintended consequences. Russia will escalate the crisis until such time as the West eventually compromises over Ukraine. A compromise must be struck now before Kiev feels emboldened by western arms supplies, only to be painfully betrayed by the West at a later date – and before even more lives are destroyed.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/37174/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Adam Swain does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>In recent weeks, eastern Ukraine’s Russian-backed rebels have won several military victories on the battlefield in the Ukrainian Donbas. First they captured the virtually destroyed Donetsk airport, then…Adam Swain, Associate Professor, School of Geography, University of NottinghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/320502014-09-25T13:52:29Z2014-09-25T13:52:29ZEU pragmatism has rewarded Russia’s brazen trade bullying<p>Few bilateral agreements have ever had such turbulent history and implications as the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine.</p>
<p>It was former president Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the agreement that triggered massive protests in Ukraine, resulting in his overthrow in February 2014. This in turn provoked Russia’s response: the annexation of Crimea and the fuelling of violent separatism in eastern Ukraine.</p>
<p>Asserting its independence, Ukraine signed the Association Agreement in June 2014. Russia’s opposition to it intensified over the summer, and succeeded in delaying the agreement’s ratification until after the <a href="https://theconversation.com/ceasefire-struck-but-ukraine-isnt-out-of-the-woods-so-what-happens-next-31390">September ceasefire</a> was struck. </p>
<p>During the tense gap between signing and ratification, trilateral EU-Ukraine-Russia negotiations took place against the backdrop of military intervention in Ukraine and amid threats of a trade war. </p>
<p>During these negotiations, Russia tabled far-reaching demands, including a revision of the already signed agreement – in other words, it went so far as to draft amendments to the terms of somebody else’s already signed accord.</p>
<p>In particular, it succeeded in bringing a key part of the agreement to a standstill: the EU’s planned expansion of trade links.</p>
<h2>Oh no you don’t</h2>
<p>Crucially, the Association Agreement envisages the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (<a href="http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_150981.pdf">DCFTA</a>). This section of the agreement entails tariff changes, but also provides for Ukraine’s integration into the EU single market. </p>
<p>Russia has long objected to both, protesting the potential damage to its economy. By that, it clearly means that it rejects the DCFTA’s ban on future Ukrainian membership of the <a href="http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0812bp_dragnevawolczuk.pdf">Eurasian Economic Union</a> – which Russia has long presented as a viable and preferable alternative to any Ukrainian integration with the EU.</p>
<p>In the end, the deadlock over the deal was resolved via a compromise. The agreement was ratified by the Ukrainian and European parliaments, but the implementation of the key sections on trade has been suspended until the end of 2015 due to “Russia’s concerns”.</p>
<p>And predictably, that compromise is already proving unstable, with Russia now firming up its <a href="http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/09/23/ukraine-crisis-trade-idINKCN0HI1ZG20140923">demands</a> for legal revisions and mirroring the EU’s approach by imposing tariffs with suspended application.</p>
<h2>The thin end of the wedge</h2>
<p>Who exactly mooted this compromise and why is still unclear. EU officials have claimed it was the initiative of the Ukrainians, who were concerned about the threat of Russian trade penalties. But there was also pressure from EU member states pressing for a “normalisation” of relations with Russia, and an end to the costly spiral of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-harsher-sanctions-could-help-putin-turn-russia-back-into-the-soviet-union-29615">economic sanctions</a>. </p>
<p>If anything, the EU’s response to Russia’s demand for a say in EU-Ukraine relations was presented as a success – on the grounds that ratification took place without “a single word changed”. </p>
<p>As Elmar Brok, a veteran member of the European Parliament <a href="http://www.dw.de/brok-transitional-implementation-for-eu-ukraine-agreement/a-17923606">put it</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>… this process [negotiations] has been concluded. And the Russians are part of it. They were there for the negotiations. It’s all coming into force. It’s just being implemented incrementally, as is often the case with contracts. From the legal point of view, the whole contract will be enforced in all its details. It’s just that there are often transitional arrangements. That’s normal in business.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Since the start of the Ukrainian crisis, the EU has undeniably been in a bind, desperately trying to balance principles, economic interests and complex constraints. But by opting for this latest compromise it has ended up with the worst of both worlds: a U-turn with high and far-reaching potential costs, without a lasting resolution of the deep problems in the post-Soviet region. </p>
<h2>Gatecrashing</h2>
<p>Allowing Russia to dictate the dynamics of EU-Ukraine relations at short notice in a time of conflict is not compatible with a comprehensive, sustainable strategy. Whether born out of a pragmatic trade-off or a tactical retreat, this is a short-term fix based on a set of shaky assumptions – and its long-term implications are far-reaching indeed.</p>
<p>Most obviously, allowing Russia to gatecrash bilateral negotiations with another country sets a dangerous precedent. It is a reversal of the EU’s earlier position; it has created a minefield for international lawyers. And even more importantly, it has badly undermined the principle of dealing with Ukraine as an independent country. </p>
<p>By letting Russia into its business dealings, the EU has acknowledged Russia’s right to determine the essential terms and limits of its post-Soviet neighbours’ integration choices. </p>
<p>The potential implications of this precedent to Russia’s other European neighbours are obvious, but it will also have consequences for the EU’s own relations further afield – from potential members such as Turkey to vital trade partners such as China.</p>
<h2>Double standards</h2>
<p>The EU has also accepted one of Russia’s clearest double standards: while Putin was griping that nobody had talked to Russia about the potential consequences of the DCFTA, he conveniently omitted to mention that the Eurasian Customs Union was launched in 2010 with no consultation with the EU and no adequate transitional arrangements – resulting in significant damage to EU businesses.</p>
<p>In any case, Russia’s “trade concerns” are <a href="http://www.ceps.eu/content/russia%E2%80%99s-economic-interests-and-eu%E2%80%99s-dcfta-ukraine">spurious</a> on a number of levels. The problem of “flooding with EU goods”, for instance, can be addressed by the proper application of the WTO’s <a href="http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/roi_e/roi_info_e.htm">rules of origin</a> requirements.</p>
<p>Taking such questionable concerns at face value and hoping to resolve them at a later stage is folly. The EU has already consulted with Russia on the subject for many months now, and 15 more months of negotiations will not help address the real problem: Russia’s fundamental objection to any EU influence over the post-Soviet space. </p>
<p>The EU’s response seems to rest on the assumption that a stable agreement can only be secured by reflecting and accommodating Russia’s preferences. Securing peace and saving human lives is obviously a noble objective, but the DCFTA compromise as struck will only legitimise and validate Russia’s “hybrid war” strategy. </p>
<h2>False optimism</h2>
<p>On balance, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that by agreeing to this pragmatic, principles-lite version of the deal, the EU has caved. There is no reason to assume that because of this gesture towards compromise, Russia’s attitude to its ex-Soviet neighbours will suddenly be based more on law and shared understanding than on geopolitical interest. </p>
<p>After years of caution towards the Eurasian Customs Union and Russia’s behaviour in its self-declared “sphere of influence”, the EU has suddenly accepted and legitimised Russia’s currently favoured way of conducting international relations – just as Russian actions vis-à-vis Ukraine have deeply shaken the international order. </p>
<p>The EU’s fawning pragmatism has not escaped the people of Ukraine, with the prevailing reaction in social media being “we’ve been abandoned”. To present it as “business as usual”, leaving a series of “landmines” for future interactions between the EU and Russia in the “contested neighbourhood”, is deeply concerning. </p>
<p>By accepting Russia’s concerns for the sake of uncertain gains, the EU has set itself up for years of trouble. Russia’s strongarm tactics need to be confronted, not passed off as “business as usual”.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/32050/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Kataryna Wolczuk receives funding from the ESRC and ANR.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Rilka Dragneva receives funding from the ESRC.</span></em></p>Few bilateral agreements have ever had such turbulent history and implications as the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine. It was former president Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the agreement…Kataryna Wolczuk, Reader in Politics and International Studies Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of BirminghamRilka Dragneva-Lewers, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of BirminghamLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.