The hard lessons learned from the Vietnam War led to a military strategy that brought
U.S. military forces to victory in Operation Desert Storm.

Vietnam also influenced the mechanization of U.S. ground forces and war's impact is part of Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored
Forces edited by George F. Hofmann, adjunct history professor at the University
of Cincinnati, and retired U.S. Army General Donn A. Starry, former commander of the
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, who was one of the architects of the battle
doctrine so successfully employed in the Gulf War.

The book traces the history of mechanization from World War I to today.
Historians wrote half of the book. The other half was written by
former soldiers and marines with first-hand experience of the events described. This
approach, according to Hofmann, make the compilation unique.

"We designed this history for two audiences," explained Hofmann. "First, the
military market: the Armor School, West Point, the Command and General Staff
College, the Army War College, the Marine Corps University and all the major military
schools. We also wanted to reach the civilian population that is interested in military
history. When General Starry and I decided to do this project five years ago, we
canvassed the military arena for the best people that we thought were most qualified to
write on this subject. About 15 people contributed to the history."

The armor history also contains rarely seen historic photos: depictions of the
mechanization of the horse cavalry, including a photo of Civil War veterans
posing with tanks during a visit with the newly created Mechanized Force in early 1931.

Historically, Hofmann noted, the U.S. has never been prepared to fight and win the
first battle, with the exception of the Gulf War. During World War I,
tanks were first introduced to break the four-year stalemate of trench and attrition
warfare on the Western Front. The U.S. had initially planned to manufacture its own
tanks for the war, however, inept planning and production forced the American
Expeditionary Forces' Tank Corps in France to borrow tanks from the British and
French.

In 1918, then Captain Dwight D. Eisenhower commanded the tank-training center
at Camp Colt in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. After the war the camp closed and shortly
thereafter, Congress decided to dissolve the Tanks Corps and assign all remaining tank
units to the infantry. Hofmann, a veteran who served in an armored unit, takes the
U.S. Army to task for lacking foresight on the eve of World War II when it continued to squabble
over the role of mechanized warfighting.

According to Hofmann, "The army focused on improving past performance, rather than learning from the new methods of warfighting. When the United States entered the war, the country's ground forces were not prepared to fight at
the operational level of war and win the first battle until the Normandy breakout. Even
then the German military was able to outclass American armor with better-designed
tanks that were more heavily armed and armored. This led to needless deaths for many
young American tankers."

General Starry entered World War II as a private and was shortly appointed to
West Point, eventually serving two tours in Vietnam. In May 1970, he commanded the
famed 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in the invasion of Cambodia, an effort to
cut off infiltrating North Vietnamese soldiers and their supply lines. Hofmann claims
that micro-managing the war from Washington, especially by Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara, a statistical analyst, hindered military efforts.

The mistakes of Vietnam and lessons from the Yom Kippur War influenced Starry's
crafting of the AirLand Battle doctrine in response to the growing threat of Soviet forces
in Europe and their improved equipment, such as tanks.

The AirLand Battle doctrine began with the assumption that U.S. forces would be
outnumbered wherever they fought. Thus, they had to win the first battle in a
coordinated air-ground campaign based on deep offensive operations with a combined
arms mechanized force. It was this doctrine that allowed the U.S. military to defeat the
Iraqis, who possessed the fifth-largest army in the world, in just 100 days while suffering
only a few hundred casualties.

"In order for a conflict to be resolved successfully," Hofmann argues, "The nation's
goals need to be set by the civilian authority and then clearly defined in agreement with
the people and the military. This did not happen in Vietnam...."

Hofmann says the goals were clear in the Gulf War; however, U.S. leaders still need a clear-cut set of goals for future
conflicts. He cites concerns around using the military for worldwide selective humanitarianism,
while at the same time downsizing and cutting funds for military training programs.

Hofmann says that on a typical day, there are 140,000 U.S. soldiers scattered across 70 countries.
"This effect on unit integrity had a devastating effect in Somalia and for today's so-called
peacekeeping mission in the Balkans," he said. "Eventually, the U.S. will again be
involved in one or more of the world's hot spots, such as Korea and Southeast Asia, the
Persian Gulf, the Middle East, Bosnia and Kosovo, Africa and Central and South
America, just to mention a few. The military needs to be prepared," Hoffmann argues.

Camp Colt to Desert Storm was funded in part by a grant from the
6th Armored Division Association. The "Super Sixth" was one of George S. Patton's
most dependable units in World War II. Death has been claiming more and more of
these veterans every day and as a result, the 6th Armored Division Association will retire
its famous colors and close the association in September 2000.