Report
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations preliminary deployment in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In connection with the signing of
the Lusaka ceasefire agreement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 10
July 1999 by the representatives of the six concerned States, I think it
necessary to set forth the implications for the United Nations and to make
recommendations to the Security Council accordingly concerning preliminary
action that the United Nations could take. It is my hope that the rebels will
sign the agreement without further delay and that it can then be implemented
promptly and in full.

II. PROVISIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT

Scope of agreement

2. On 10 July 1999, at Lusaka, the
Heads of State of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda
and Zimbabwe and the Minister of Defence of Angola signed an agreement for a
cessation of hostilities between all the belligerent forces in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The representatives of the Rally for a Democratic Congo
and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo declined to sign.

3. The agreement stipulates that all
air, land and sea attacks are to cease within 24 hours of the signing, as well
as the movement of military forces and all acts of violence against the
civilian population. The forces are to disengage immediately.

4. Other provisions of the agreement
concern the normalization of the situation along the international borders of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the control of illicit
trafficking of arms and the infiltration of armed groups; an open national
dialogue between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the
armed opposition (Rally for a Democratic Congo and Movement for the Liberation
of Congo) and the unarmed opposition; the need to address the security
concerns of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbouring
countries; the opening up of humanitarian corridors; and the establishment of
a mechanism for disarming all militias and armed groups.

Modalities and timing

5. The agreement also contains the
modalities of implementation of the ceasefire. These provide for the
establishment of a Joint Military Commission composed of two representatives
from each party under a neutral Chairman to be appointed by the Organization
of African Unity (OAU) in consultation with the parties.

6. The mandate of the Commission
includes the following tasks:

(a) Establishing the location of
units at the time of the ceasefire;

(b) Facilitating liaison between the
parties for the purpose of the ceasefire;

(c) Assisting in the disengagement of
forces to investigate any reports of ceasefire violations;

(e) Verifying the disengagement of
the belligerent forces where they are in direct contact;

(f) Working out mechanisms to disarm
armed groups;

(g) Verifying the quartering and
disarmament of all armed groups;

(h) Verifying the disarmament of all
Congolese civilians who are illegally armed;

(i) Monitoring and verifying the
orderly withdrawal of foreign forces.

7. The Commission is to be
established within one week of the signing of the agreement (D-Day).

8. Other modalities dealt with in the
agreement concern the cessation of hostilities; disengagement; the release of
hostages and exchange of prisoners of war; the orderly withdrawal of all
foreign forces; national dialogue and reconciliation; the re-establishment of
state administration over the territory of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo; the disarmament of armed groups; the formation of a national army; the
redeployment of forces of the parties to defensive positions in conflict
zones; the normalization of the security situation along the common borders
between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its neighbours; and a
calendar for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.

III. ACTIVITIES PROPOSED FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

9. The agreement also contains
proposals for an "appropriate force" to be constituted, facilitated
and deployed by the United Nations, in collaboration with OAU, to ensure the
implementation of the agreement.

10. According to the agreement, the
suggested mandate of such a force would include the following tasks:

(a) Working with the Joint Military
Commission and OAU in the implementation of the agreement;

(d) Supervising the disengagement of
forces as stipulated in the agreement;

(e) Supervising the redeployment of
forces to defensive positions in conflict zones in accordance with the
agreement;

(f) Providing and maintaining
humanitarian assistance to and protecting displaced persons, refugees and
other affected persons;

(g) Keeping the parties to the
ceasefire agreement informed of its peacekeeping operations;

(h) Collecting weapons from civilians
and ensuring that the weapons so collected are properly accounted for and
adequately secured;

(i) In collaboration with the
Commission and OAU, scheduling and supervising the withdrawal of all foreign
forces;

(j) Verifying all information, data
and activities relating to military forces of the parties.

11. The ceasefire agreement also
envisages a number of what it calls peace enforcement operations, including
the "tracking down" and disarming of armed groups; screening mass
killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other war criminals;
handing over suspected genocidaires to the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda; repatriation; and working out measures for attaining the
above objectives.

12. The "armed groups" are
identified as the former Rwandan government forces and interahamwe
militia, the Allied Democratic Front, Lord's Resistance Army, the Forces for
the Defence of Democracy of Burundi, the Former Uganda National Army, the
Uganda National Rescue Front II; the West Nile Bank Front; and the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

IV. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

13. The conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo has inflicted further terrible suffering on a country
already heavily burdened with poverty and neglect. An estimated 700,000
persons are displaced within the country, in addition to some 300,000 refugees
located on its territory. The United Nations is aware of harrowing accounts of
famine and epidemics. Food security and economic conditions, in particular in
urban centres, continue to deteriorate at an alarming rate. The conflict has
been characterized by appalling, widespread and systematic human rights
violations, including mass killings, ethnic cleansing, rape and the
destruction of property. The war's effects have spread beyond the subregion to
afflict the continent of Africa as a whole. The success of the Congolese
parties and the other Governments involved in arriving at a peace agreement
can be viewed as a major first step towards an eventual recovery.

14. The international community and
the United Nations should therefore do everything in their power to assist the
Congolese Government, parties and people, as well as the other Governments
involved, in achieving a peaceful solution.

15. In order to be effective, any
United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
whatever its mandate, will have to be large and expensive. It would require
the deployment of thousands of international troops and civilian personnel. It
will face tremendous difficulties, and will be beset by risks. Deployment will
be slow. The huge size of the country, the degradation of its infrastructure,
the intensity of its climate, the intractable nature of some aspects of the
conflict, the number of parties, the high levels of mutual suspicion, the
large population displacements, the ready availability of small arms, the
general climate of impunity and the substitution of armed force for the rule
of law in much of the territory combine to make the Democratic Republic of the
Congo a highly complex environment for peacekeeping.

16. In the light of the above, I
would strongly recommend that the Security Council immediately authorize the
deployment up to 90 United Nations military personnel, together with the
necessary civilian political, humanitarian and administrative staff, to the
subregion. The military personnel would serve mainly as liaison officers to
the national capitals and rear military headquarters of the main belligerents,
especially Kinshasa and elsewhere within the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Kigali, Kampala, Luanda, Harare and Windhoek, as well as a liaison cell at
Lusaka. They would need appropriate communications equipment and air assets in
order to perform their functions and keep me fully informed of the situation
on the ground.

17. As a second stage, on the basis
of the report of the technical survey team and of the liaison group, I would
then be prepared to recommend a further deployment, which could involve up to
500 military observers within the Democratic Republic of the Congo and as
required to the belligerent and other neighbouring States. It would also be
necessary to ensure their security, and I would formulate my recommendations
accordingly.

18. The tasks of the military
observers, which would be in accordance with the peacekeeping functions listed
in the agreement, would include the following:

(a) To establish contacts with the
various parties at their headquarters locations, including in the capitals of
the belligerent States;

(b) To establish liaison with the
Joint Military Commission and collaborate with it in the implementation of the
agreement;

(c) To assist the Commission and the
parties in investigating alleged violations of the ceasefire;

(d) To make a general security
assessment of the country;

(e) To secure from the parties
guarantees of cooperation and assurances of security for the further
deployment in-country of military observers;

(f) To determine the present and
likely future locations of the forces of all parties with a view to developing
the concept for deployment of United Nations military personnel;

(g) To observe, subject to the
provision by the parties of adequate security, the ceasefire and disengagement
of the forces and their redeployment and eventual withdrawal;

(h) To facilitate the provision of
humanitarian assistance to and protecting displaced persons, refugees and
other affected persons;

(i) To assist the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations in further refining its concept of operations for
subsequent deployments.

19. The Department of Peacekeeping
Operations has already approached potential troop-contributing countries to
assess their readiness to provide military observers and, ultimately, formed
units for subsequent stages of deployment subject to Council approval.

20. I have also decided to appoint in
due course a Special Representative, assisted by an appropriate staff,
including a Chief Military Observer, to lead the observer mission, which shall
be called the United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (MONUC). I have also ordered the dispatch of a small advance team to
the region to clarify the role to be played by the United Nations of the 10
July 1999 agreement and to establish contacts and liaison with the authorities
in Lusaka. As soon as the conditions are in place to allow it to do its work
in all parts of the country, I will send a technical survey team to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to make the necessary political and military
contacts to pave the way for subsequent deployments and assess the state of
logistical capacity in the mission area. The estimated costs of the advance
and reconnaissance teams and of the liaison group will be submitted to the
Council in an addendum to the present report.

21. The problem of armed groups is
particularly difficult and sensitive. It lies at the core of the conflict in
the subregion and undermines the security of all the States concerned. Unless
it is resolved, no lasting peace can come.

22. A purely military solution
appears to be impossible, if only because the forces most able and willing to
impose a military solution have clearly failed to do so. I therefore intend to
revert to the Security Council with detailed proposals for the deployment of a
peacekeeping mission, including its mandate and concept of operations, once I
have carefully reviewed the situation on the ground in the light of MONUC's
reports.

23. At the same time, it is essential
for the Congolese parties to proceed with their national debate, as provided
for in the agreement, in order to work towards national reconciliation through
dialogue among all groups concerned. For its part, the international community
could then be in a position to convene an international conference on the
Great Lakes region in order to secure the commitment of donors to the recovery
of the region as a whole.

24. Even at this stage, however, I
foresee the need for the establishment of a well funded, well planned and
long-term programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into
society of former combatants. The benefits of such a programme will need to be
widely publicized in order to attract the fighters now under arms. I am
encouraged in this respect by the provision in the ceasefire agreement that
permits the countries of origin of members of armed groups to take themselves
all the necessary measures to facilitate repatriation, including the granting
of amnesty (except to persons suspected of crimes against humanity or
genocide). It will also be necessary to include in the mandate of any eventual
peacekeeping mission measures to address the human rights violations that have
characterized this conflict. I will revert to the Council as soon as the
situation has been clarified. The necessary first step will be the signing of
the agreement by the two rebel groups, the Congolese Rally for Democracy and
the Movement for the Liberation of Congo amid a renewed resolve by all
concerned to carry it out in good faith.