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This chapter traces two sets of arguments given by Suárez in Metaphysical Disputations xv. In the first set he confronts arguments intended to show that substantial forms do not, or indeed cannot, exist. Several of these arguments foreshadow in fairly obvious ways the arguments later deployed by Boyle, Locke, and others writing under their influence. Suárez has a clear if somewhat idiosyncratic conception of substantial form, one articulated, understandably enough, within the framework of his general Aristotelian hylomorphism. Suárez begins his consideration of the anti-substantial form position directly, even rather bluntly. It is important to bear in mind that Suárez's arguments on behalf of substantial form may be judged from two radically different vantage points. There are those who simply deny the phenomena, who think, for example, that there simply are no data of co-incidence, property subordination, or systemic equilibrium to be explained.

According to G. E. M. Anscombe, pleasure was the topic that finally and “astonishingly reduced Aristotle to babble, since for good reasons he both wanted pleasure to be identical with and to be different from the activity that it is pleasure in.” That is by any measure a harsh judgment – babble, she says: inarticulate, incomprehensible, childish prattle.

She does allow that Aristotle was reduced to this sorry state for good reasons; so, she evidently thinks that there is a partially exculpatory diagnosis for his woes. Woes he has, however: as she represents him, Aristotle fumbles and stumbles over himself twice over. He first identifies pleasure with an activity and then denies that it is an activity. That is perhaps not so bad in itself, since he may after all simply have changed his mind; but when he denies that pleasure is an activity, he does so for all the wrong reasons. Instead of relying on the sensible thought that pleasure is not an activity but rather a feeling, Aristotle instead offers a bewildering corrective: “Pleasure,” he says, “perfects the activity (energeia), not in the way a state (hexis) does, by being in the activity, but as a sort of supervening end (telos)” (teleioi de tên energeian hê hêdonê ouk hôs hê hexis enuparchousa, all’ hôs epiginomenon ti telos; E.N. 1174b31–33). If Aristotle is not babbling here, then neither is his meaning exactly pellucid. At the very least, it seems an overly technical treatment of what is at root a perfectly familiar phenomenon. Pleasure, we may be assured, is a feeling, a welcome sensation of some sort, a sensation of satisfaction or gratification, in general an enjoyable or delightful experience. Aristotle’s account of pleasure – if it is intelligible at all – seems at the very least needlessly baroque.

Plato's reason for introducing a tripartite soul into the Republic pertains to the overarching goals of that work: Plato wishes to establish the nature of justice and thereby to show why an individual might wish to be just rather than unjust. In saying that the soul had appeared to the interlocutors of the Republic to be composite, Plato is evidently alluding to the argument for the tripartition of the soul in Book 4 of the Republic. Plato's argument proceeds in two stages. First, he establishes that the reasoning element (to logistikon) is not the same as the appetitive element. He then turns to the slightly more vexed question of whether there is a third element, reducible to neither the appetitive nor the rational. According to Plato, internal discord arises when our motivational streams are not integrated with one another, when and only when we are suffering from psychic disarray.

Among the instances of apparent illiberality in Plato's
Republic, one stands out as especially curious. Long before
making a forced return to the cave, and irrespective of the kinds of
compulsion operative in such a homecoming, the philosopher-king has been
compelled to apprehend the Good (Rep. VII.519c5-d2, 540a3-7). Why
should compulsion be necessary or appropriate in this situation? Schooled
intensively through the decades for an eventual grasping of the Good,
beginning already with precognitive training in music and art calculated
to equip the guardian with a natural affinity towards the good and
beautiful (Rep. III.401d3-402a4), the fully mature guardian might
be expected to leap towards the Good when it is first opportune. For the
Good is, according to Plato, the greatest thing to be learned
(megiston mathêma; Rep. VI.504e4-5, 505a2). Reflection on
these questions permits us to develop a richer appreciation of the forms
of necessitation and compulsion Plato envisages for his guardians, which
turn out to be primarily merely hypothetical instances of nomic
necessitation. It follows that many of Plato's appeals to compulsion are
neither coercive nor objectionably authoritarian.

Two different biomimetic strategies were utilized in the formation of magnetite fibers. The first strategy utilized natural (Sphaerotilus natans sheaths) or synthetic (hollow fibers) matrices for magnetite formation. The second strategy made use of an iron-hydroxide intermediate that was subsequently chemically converted to magnetite within the biomimetic matrix. The formation of magnetite was determined by both visual and x-ray diffraction analysis. This process has advantages over conventional routes because of the expense and handling problems associated with the production of ceramic whiskers and fibers. The magnetite formed by this process may prove to have unique properties due to its unusual fiber structure.

In the largely historical and aporetic first book of the De Anima (DA), Aristotle makes what appear to be some rather disturbing remarks about the soul's status as a subject of mental states. Most notably, in a curious passage which has aroused the interest of commentators, he seems to suggest that there is something wrong with regarding the soul as a subject of mental states:

Thus, saying that the soul is angry is the same as if one were to say that the soul builds houses and weaves: for it is perhaps better to say not that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does [these things] with his soul. (DA 408bll–15)

The incidence of metastatic medulloblastoma is probably greater than the thirteen documented patients. Case reports of metastatic medulloblastoma must be carefully analysed. We have added two cases which conform to Weiss’ criteria for metastatic disease. The direction and factors influencing spread have been discussed.

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