Introduction :: LIBYA

The Italians supplanted the Ottoman Turks in the area around Tripoli in 1911 and did not relinquish their hold until 1943 when they were defeated in World War II. Libya then passed to UN administration and achieved independence in 1951. Following a 1969 military coup, Col. Muammar al-QADHAFI assumed leadership and began to espouse his political system at home, which was a combination of socialism and Islam. During the 1970s, QADHAFI used oil revenues to promote his ideology outside Libya, supporting subversive and terrorist activities that included the downing of two airliners - one over Scotland, another in Northern Africa - and a discotheque bombing in Berlin. UN sanctions in 1992 isolated QADHAFI politically and economically following the attacks; sanctions were lifted in 2003 following Libyan acceptance of responsibility for the bombings and agreement to claimant compensation. QADHAFI also agreed to end Libya's program to develop weapons of mass destruction, and he made significant strides in normalizing relations with Western nations.

Unrest that began in several Middle Eastern and North African countries in late 2010 erupted in Libyan cities in early 2011. QADHAFI's brutal crackdown on protesters spawned a civil war that triggered UN authorization of air and naval intervention by the international community. After months of seesaw fighting between government and opposition forces, the QADHAFI regime was toppled in mid-2011 and replaced by a transitional government known as the National Transitional Council (NTC). In 2012, the NTC handed power to an elected parliament, the General National Congress (GNC). Voters chose a new parliament to replace the GNC in June 2014 - the House of Representatives (HoR), which relocated to the eastern city of Tobruk after fighting broke out in Tripoli.

In October 2015, the UN brokered an agreement among a broad array of Libyan political parties and social groups - known as the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA). Members of the Libyan Political Dialogue, including representatives of the HoR and ex-GNC, signed the LPA in December 2015. The LPA called for the formation of an interim Government of National Accord or GNA, with a nine-member Presidency Council, the HoR, and an advisory High Council of State that most ex-GNC members joined. The LPA’s roadmap for a two-year transition to a new constitution and elected government was subsequently endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2259, which also called upon member states to cease official contact with parallel institutions. In January 2016, the HoR voted to approve the LPA, including the Presidency Council, while voting against a controversial provision on security leadership positions. In March 2016, the GNA Presidency Council seated itself in Tripoli. In 2016, the GNA twice announced a slate of ministers who operate de facto, but the HoR did not endorse the ministerial list. HoR and ex-GNC-affiliated hardliners continued to oppose the GNA and hamper the LPA’s implementation. In September 2017, UN Special Representative Ghassan SALAME announced a new roadmap for political reconciliation. SALAME’s plan called for amendments to the LPA, a national conference of Libyan leaders, and a constitutional referendum and general elections within a year

well over 90% of the population lives along the Mediterranean coast in and between Tripoli to the west and Al Bayda to the east; the interior remains vastly underpopulated due to the Sahara and lack of surface water

desertification; limited natural freshwater resources; the Great Manmade River Project, the largest water development scheme in the world, brings water from large aquifers under the Sahara to coastal cities

Despite continuing unrest, Libya remains a destination country for economic migrants. It is also a hub for transit migration to Europe because of its proximity to southern Europe and its lax border controls. Labor migrants have been drawn to Libya since the development of its oil sector in the 1960s. Until the latter part of the 1990s, most migrants to Libya were Arab (primarily Egyptians and Sudanese). However, international isolation stemming from Libya’s involvement in international terrorism and a perceived lack of support from Arab countries led QADHAFI in 1998 to adopt a decade-long pan-African policy that enabled large numbers of sub-Saharan migrants to enter Libya without visas to work in the construction and agricultural industries. Although sub-Saharan Africans provided a cheap labor source, they were poorly treated and were subjected to periodic mass expulsions.

By the mid-2000s, domestic animosity toward African migrants and a desire to reintegrate into the international community motivated QADHAFI to impose entry visas on Arab and African immigrants and to agree to joint maritime patrols and migrant repatriations with Italy, the main recipient of illegal migrants departing Libya. As his regime neared collapse in 2011, QADHAFI reversed his policy of cooperating with Italy to curb illegal migration and sent boats loaded with migrants and asylum seekers to strain European resources. Libya’s 2011 revolution decreased immigration drastically and prompted nearly 800,000 migrants to flee to third countries, mainly Tunisia and Egypt, or to their countries of origin. The inflow of migrants declined in 2012 but returned to normal levels by 2013, despite continued hostility toward sub-Saharan Africans and a less-inviting job market.

While Libya is not an appealing destination for migrants, since 2014, transiting migrants – primarily from East and West Africa – continue to exploit its political instability and weak border controls and use it as a primary departure area to migrate across the central Mediterranean to Europe in growing numbers. In addition, more than 200,000 people were displaced internally as of August 2017 by fighting between armed groups in eastern and western Libya and, to a lesser extent, by inter-tribal clashes in the country’s south.

well over 90% of the population lives along the Mediterranean coast in and between Tripoli to the west and Al Bayda to the east; the interior remains vastly underpopulated due to the Sahara and lack of surface water

description: unicameral House of Representative or Majlis Al Nuwab (200 seats including 32 reserved for women; members elected by direct popular vote; member term NA)

elections: election last held in June 2014; note - the Libyan Supreme Court in November 2014 declared the Council election unconstitutional, but the Council rejected the ruling

election results: percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - independent 200; note - not all 200 seats were filled in the June election because of boycotts and lack of security at some polling stations; some elected members of the House also boycotted the election

three horizontal bands of red (top), black (double width), and green with a white crescent and star centered on the black stripe; the National Transitional Council reintroduced this flag design of the former Kingdom of Libya (1951-1969) on 27 February 2011; it replaced the former all-green banner promulgated by the QADHAFI regime in 1977; the colors represent the three major regions of the country: red stands for Fezzan, black symbolizes Cyrenaica, and green denotes Tripolitania; the crescent and star represent Islam, the main religion of the country

note: also known as "Ya Beladi" or "Oh, My Country!"; adopted 1951; readopted 2011 with some modification to the lyrics; during the QADHAFI years between 1969 and 2011, the anthem was "Allahu Akbar," (God is Great) a marching song of the Egyptian Army in the 1956 Suez War

Economy :: LIBYA

Libya's economy, almost entirely dependent on oil and gas exports, struggled during the period 2014-16 as the country plunged into civil war and world oil prices dropped to seven-year lows. In early 2015, armed conflict between rival forces for control of the country’s largest oil terminals caused a decline in Libyan crude oil production, which never recovered to more than one-third of the average pre-Revolution highs of 1.6 million barrels per day. The Central Bank of Libya continued to pay government salaries to a majority of the Libyan workforce and to fund subsidies for fuel and food, resulting in an estimated budget deficit of about 17% of GDP in 2017. The economy recovered handsomely in 2017 as conflict subsided.

Libya’s economic transition away from QADHAFI’s notionally socialist model has completely stalled as political chaos persists and security continues to deteriorate. Libya’s leaders have hindered economic development by failing to use its financial resources to invest in national infrastructure. The country suffers from widespread power outages in its largest cities, caused by shortages of fuel for power generation. Living conditions, including access to clean drinking water, medical services, and safe housing, have all declined as the civil war has forced more people to become internally displaced, further straining local resources.

Extremists affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) attacked Libyan oilfields in the first half of 2015; ISIL has a presence in many cities across Libya including near oil infrastructure, threatening future government revenues from oil and gas.

Terrorism :: LIBYA

area(s) of operation: engages in frequent assassinations of security officials and political figures in the east, mostly in Benghazi; operates as a member of the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council, a coalition of jihadist groups combating the Libyan Ground Forces; on 11 September 2012, members participated in launching mortar attacks and ransackings at the US Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi that killed four people, including US Ambassador Christopher STEVENS; majority of members are Libyans and some are former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members

Ansar al-Shari'a in Darnah:

aim(s): install Sharia in Libya

area(s) of operation: engages in frequent assassinations of security officials and political figures in the east, mostly in Darnah; operates as a member group of the Darnah Mujahidin Shura Council, a coalition of jihadist groups combating the Libyan Ground Forces; on 11 September 2012, members participated in launching mortar attacks and ransackings at the US Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi that killed four people, including US Ambassador Christopher STEVENS; majority of members are Libyans and some are former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's Branch in Libya (ISIL-Libya):

aim(s): prevent a unitary Libyan state from reconstituting, secure control over the country's critical resources and, ultimately, establish an Islamic caliphate in Libya

area(s) of operation: based in Libya since circa 2015, with its original headquarters in Sirte; organized in the following Libya-based wilayats (provinces): Wilayat Tarabulus (west), Wilayat Barqa (northeast), and Wilayat Fezzan (southeast); ISIL-Libya no longer controls territory in Libya, but does maintain a low-profile presence throughout much of the country; was previously known before 2017 to have operated paramilitary training camps, collected taxes, directed religious education, broadcasted its messages on radio, and enforced its strict interpretation of Sharia; prior to Libyan military and security forces and their foreign allies confronting ISIL-Libya, the group was assessed in 2016 to have had a growing presence with 1,000 of the 4,000-6,000 fighters based in Surt, a key oil exporting center, dedicated to taking control of oil fields to generate revenue; Libyan Government officials and Western allies collaborated to keep chemical weapons left over from the al-QADHAFI regime out of the group's reach; has engaged heavily in recruiting Libyan youth, including some from Colonel Muammar al-QADHAFI's tribe, and among his former army officers; current personnel strength is unknown

area(s) of operation: stages attacks in Libya against Tunisia along the Libya-Tunisia border; collaborates with its affiliate ISIL-Libya

Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC):

aim(s): enhance its networks in Libya and, ultimately, destroy the state of Israel

area(s) of operation: maintains limited networks for operational planning, logistics, transferring funds, and smuggling fighters and arms to be used against Israel; by 2017, the majority of veteran members had defected to join other groups

Transnational Issues :: LIBYA

dormant disputes include Libyan claims of about 32,000 sq km still reflected on its maps of southeastern Algeria and the FLN's assertions of a claim to Chirac Pastures in southeastern Morocco; various Chadian rebels from the Aozou region reside in southern Libya

current situation: Libya is a destination and transit country for men and women from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia subjected to forced labor and forced prostitution; migrants who seek employment in Libya as laborers and domestic workers or who transit Libya en route to Europe are vulnerable to forced labor; private employers also exploit migrants from detention centers as forced laborers on farms and construction sites, returning them to detention when they are no longer needed; some sub-Saharan women are reportedly forced to work in Libyan brothels, particularly in the country’s south; since 2013, militia groups and other informal armed groups, including some affiliated with the government, are reported to conscript Libyan children under the age of 18; large-scale violence driven by militias, civil unrest, and increased lawlessness increased in 2014, making it more difficult to obtain information on human trafficking

tier rating: Tier 3 - the Libyan Government does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; in 2014, the government’s capacity to address human trafficking was hampered by the ongoing power struggle and violence; the judicial system was not functioning, preventing any efforts to investigate, prosecute, or convict traffickers, complicit detention camp guards or government officials, or militias or armed groups that used child soldiers; the government failed to identify or provide protection to trafficking victims, including child conscripts, and continued to punish victims for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked; no public anti-trafficking awareness campaigns were conducted (2015)