The influential sociologist Max Weber proposed a theory of
authority that included three types. He pioneered a path
towards understanding how authority is legitimated as a
belief system. His essay The three types of legitimate
rule, translated in English and published posthumously
in 1958, is the clearest explanation of his theory.

Spencer interpreted Webers theory to say that
legitimate order and authority stems from different
aspects of a single phenomenon - the forms that underlie all
instances of ordered human interaction. There are two
fundamental components of order, norms and authority. Spencer
explained that authority and norms represent polar
principles of social organization: In the one case
organization rests upon orientation to a rule or a principle;
in the other instance it is based upon compliance to
commands (Spencer 1970, 124).

Webers three types of authority are traditional,
charismatic, and legal-rational authority. Coser points out
that Weber wrote about pure types of authority,
and that he was aware that in empirical reality
mixtures will be found in the legitimation of authority
(Coser 1971, 227). As such, many examples of the following
authority types may overlap.

Authority Types

Traditional authority is legitimated by the sanctity of
tradition. The ability and right to rule is passed down,
often through heredity. It does not change overtime, does not
facilitate social change, tends to be irrational and
inconsistent, and perpetuates the status quo. In fact, Weber
states: The creation of new law opposite traditional
norms is deemed impossible in principle. Traditional
authority is typically embodied in feudalism or
patrimonialism. In a purely patriarchal structure, the
servants are completely and personally dependent upon the
lord, while in an estate system (i.e. feudalism),
the servants are not personal servants of the lord but
independent men (Weber 1958, 4). But, in both cases the
system of authority does not change or evolve.

Charismatic authority is found in a leader whose mission
and vision inspire others. It is based upon the perceived
extraordinary characteristics of an individual. Weber saw a
charismatic leader as the head of a new social movement, and
one instilled with divine or supernatural powers, such as a
religious prophet. Weber seemed to favor charismatic
authority, and spent a good deal of time discussing it. In a
study of charisma and religion, Riesebrodt (1999) argues that
Weber also thought charisma played a strong - if not integral
- role in traditional authority systems. Thus, Webers
favor for charismatic authority was particularly strong,
especially in focusing on what happened to it with the death
or decline of a charismatic leader. Charismatic authority is
routinized in a number of ways according to
Weber: orders are traditionalized, the staff or followers
change into legal or estate-like (traditional)
staff, or the meaning of charisma itself may undergo change.

Legal-rational authority is empowered by a formalistic
belief in the content of the law (legal) or natural law
(rationality). Obedience is not given to a specific
individual leader - whether traditional or charismatic - but
a set of uniform principles. Weber thought the best example
of legal-rational authority was a bureaucracy (political or
economic). This form of authority is frequently found in the
modern state, city governments, private and public
corporations, and various voluntary associations. In fact,
Weber stated that the development of the modern state
is identical indeed with that of modern officialdom and
bureaucratic organizations just as the development of modern
capitalism is identical with the increasing bureaucratization
of economic enterprise (Weber 1958, 3).

However, no authority structure, Weber wrote, could
actually be exclusively bureaucratic, because some positions
would be held by a variety of charismatic leaders. He also
stated that non-bureaucratic legal authority could be found
in organizations that have rotating office holders, such as
Parliamentary and committee administration and all
sorts of collegiate and administrative bodies (Weber
1958, 3). Webers feelings about bureaucracies sometimes
came through in his writing and he tended to view the move
towards legal-rational authority as a move into an iron
cage.

Inter-relationships

Webers theory of authority is very rich and
intricate. Weber and others have detailed many interesting
relationships and processes occurring between the types.
Blaus Critical Remarks on Webers Theory of
Authority (1963) explains two of these in particular,
components that either strengthen or weaken an authority type
in regards to another.

The three authority types may be re-enforced by traits
that differentiate them from other types. Traditional
authority is impersonal (unlike charisma) and non-rational
(unlike legal-rational). Charismatic authority is dynamic
(unlike tradition) and non-rational (again, unlike
legal-rational). Finally, legal-rational authority is dynamic
(unlike tradition) and impersonal (unlike charisma).
Conversely, Blau means to say that traditional is un-dynamic,
charisma is personal, and legal-rational is rational. The
likelihood of retaining a particular type of authority may
depend on the ability of that authority system to retain the
traits that make it unique and reject the traits that make it
more conducive to another authority type.

To elaborate, particular authority types can lose their
power to - and thus transition into - other types by some
of the following ways. Revolutionary ideals can be advocated
by a charismatic leader or the rational pursuit of ends via
abstract formal principles can both weaken traditional
authority. Revolutionary charismatic movements can be
crystallized into a traditional order or bureaucratized into
a rational formal organization. Finally, the irrational
forces and powers of tradition or charisma can weaken
legal-rational authority.

Collins observes that, for Weber, these categories of
authority do not exist merely for the sake of labeling
and classifying history; they are embedded in a larger
network of concepts and in an image of how they work
(Collins 1986, 6). As such, Webers three types of
authority match up to his three categories of inequality:
class, status groups, and parties. Traditional authority is
the basis for status groups. Charismatic authority lends
itself to a market scheme (such as the potential for life
chances), and Weber considered it to be the outcome of class.
Finally, parties are the codification of legal-rational
authority, especially in the case of bureaucracies.

Present-Day Examples and Application

How can this theory be applied to present-day phenomenon?
Here are two contemporary examples of dynamic forces in the
US: the recent (and seasonal) push for the US to invade Iraq
and the North American anarchist movement, which played a
sizable role in organizing against the push.

Example 1: The push in the US to go to war against Iraq
Webers various authority types help to explain the US,
pre-March 2003, in regards to invading Iraq. If Weber were
alive to analyze it, he would likely say that the strongest
of the types was charismatic authority, embodied by US
President George W. Bush. Although he has little military
experience, he was able to project a sense of urgency to much
of the American populace about the need to attack Iraq. His
folksy demeanor and the continual media attention
to his threats towards Iraq were likely the only messages
most Americans received. According to many polls, a good
number of Americans were willing to simply trust Bush in
whatever he did on the matter, a sentiment repeated again
during and after the US invasion.

Weber would also point towards traditional authority as
the basis for the pro-invasion sentiment of the country. The
nation has a long tradition of foreign military invasion,
many hundreds of episodes since its founding, and the
philosophy, means, and necessity to invade other
countries are entrenched in American institutions. The
Pentagon and its corporate partners (sometimes called the
military-industrial-complex) have widespread and
relatively consistent powers over the government. Further,
the institution of the presidency is what also gave Bush so
much persuasive ability - the executive branch is highly
influential (possibly the most influential of the three
branches of government).

The tentative and dissident portions of the country relied
on legal and rational authority for their power and
influence. Legal authority would require a mandate from the
US Congress to go to war (putting aside the War Power Act);
but the charisma of Bush was great enough to push aside this
requirement for much of the pre-invasion debate (discussion
should have originated in a deliberative body, not from the
Commander in Chief), and later enough to influence Congress
to permit it. Legal authority also conflicted with
charismatic authority internationally, as Bush flaunted
international law and the United Nations by moving towards a
clearly illegal act. Even though it was illegal, the legal
authority of the UN (and international community) was not
enough to enforce international law or to stop a US invasion.

Perhaps the most relevant authority for the anti-war
constituency was a popular authority - one part charismatic
in that it attempted to be a movement for social change and
one part legal-rational in its attempts to use the legal
system (nationally and internationally). This popular
authority can be viewed as an attempt to 1) force the US and
Bush to adhere to the law, and 2) use the political system as
a mechanism for lobbying, as legally defined. But, in the
background of the anti-war movement, is an attempt to forge a
truly popular authority, where the public consensus would be
one of peace-a perspective not derived from any of
Webers types of authority, but a perspective gained
through public debate and political intervention (i.e.
value-rational authority).

Example 2: North American anarchist movement
Max Weber wrote during a high point for anarchism, in both
the US and Europe. Although he surely would have known about
it - the press ran well-funded propaganda campaigns against
it for decades (Hong 1992) - he doesnt seem to have
taken it into account in his scheme. Had he, it might have
caused him to create another category of authority.

The anarchist reaction to various kinds of authority is
fundamental. Simply, anarchism opposes any authority that is
placed above the individual and collective interest. More
specifically, anarchism rejects the authority of any idea or
institution that supports itself merely on the merit of being
tradition. As such, anarchists were early critics
of industrial capitalism and advocates of womens rights
(including suffrage). Anarchism likewise rejects charismatic
leadership as the kind that frequently leads to despotism or
reformism (various socialist and liberal leaders
are usually the primary examples offered). However, anarchism
has an ambiguous understanding of leadership
itself. For instance, Crass (2003) points towards leaders who
work to create group-centered leadership, as
opposed to individual-centered leadership, thus
circumventing the potential of manipulation and power-grab of
individuals and thus diffusing power. Finally, anarchists
reject legal-rational authority since its power is lodged
within the confines of the State, which is bureaucratic (as
Weber pointed out) and hierarchical. Anarchism claims that
laws are made and enforced to protect the few and the expense
of the many. Like Marx, they view the legal and political
system as a tool of the bourgeoisie class.

By mere definition, the North American anarchist movement
itself adheres to none of Webers authority types. At
its core, anarchism is explicitly anti-authoritarian.
According to George, The fundamental principle of
Anarchism is the rejection of authority, with the possible
exception of natural authority (George
1997, 55). Or, as the anarcho-punk band Crass put it:
there is no authority but yourself - a sentiment
that obviously contradicts authority, which must be over others.

Although anarchism itself does not possess any of
Webers three authority types, it is not immune from
norms. In fact, Spencer seems to suggest that norms are
rather compatible to anarchism, albeit informal norms:
Norms are rules of conduct towards which actors orient
their behaviour (Spencer 1970, 124). As such, there are
many unwritten rules or norms that anarchists follow, norms
which do closely sync with Webers authority types.

Traditionally-legitimated norms - rules with
historic legitimacy and precedent - are found in anarchist
predilection for specific types of organizing, such as the
use of affinity groups, a practice common since its
popularized usage in the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s.
Customs, such as the use of the circle-A symbol
as an identifier, and parlance (words like
liberatory and mutual aid in
particular) have been used for a long period in anarchist
culture.

Individual anarchists also have quite a swaying power, an
influence that approaches charismatic authority, but still
falls short - partially due to a general repulsion of
leadership and partially due to a rejection by these
individuals of being used as idols. Noam Chomsky is a very
influential individual to many activists on the political
Left, Murray Bookchin is a political force in the New England
states with his theories of social ecology and libertarian
municipalism, and John Zerzan is greatly admired in the
Pacific-Northwest for his writings about primitivism. Thus,
it is an anarchist norm to read these charismatic
writers, but not necessarily to be compelled to agree with
all they write or advocate.

The only sense in which Weberian authority might intersect
with anarchism is with legal-rational. Although anarchists
oppose the hierarchically-ordered modern state, they do
practice a form of legal-rational authority within small
organizations. In collectives, for instance, there are often
rules or guidelines that must be followed, or else sanctions
are lobbied. This is a voluntary reverence to authority,
though, since any member of the collective can leave at any
point. Also, it differs from most other forms of
legal-rational authority in that individuals make a conscious
effort to accept these rules, or even are involved in the
rule formation themselves.

Even though it seems plausible to place some anarchist
organizational structures within the legal-rational
framework, Webers work suggests otherwise. He writes
that although legal rule can be found in
voluntary associations (such as anarchist collectives), it
needs an extensive and hierarchically organized staff
of functionaries (Weber 1958, 2). Since there is no
hierarchy present in a collective, nor permanent
functionaries, Webers own criteria discounts this
possibility.

Yet, as Spencer points out, there is a difference between
Webers legal-rational authority and an
under-discussed fourth type, value-rational authority.
The latter is subordination to a principle
(Spencer 1970, n. 2). In this respect, anarchist frequently
submit to value-rational authority, such as in consensus
decision-making processes; decisions are made through a
formalized process and assisted by one of more facilitators
who are empowered to help the group reach a shared decision,
but also enforce the rules of consensus. Thus, anarchists
submit to the authority of the values of consensus and direct
democracy, but not necessarily the legality of it.