1. The case originated in an application (no.
50213/99) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovakian national, Mr Karol Tám
(“the applicant”), on 17 May 1999.

2. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid,
was represented by Mr M. Benedik, a lawyer practising in Bratislava.
The Slovakian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mr P. Vršanský, succeeded by Mr P. Kresák in that function
as from 1 April 2003.

3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that
his deprivation of liberty had been unlawful and that the courts had
failed to determine this issue.

4. The application was allocated to the former
Second Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within
that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 §
1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.

5. On 1 November 2001 the Court changed the composition
of its Sections (Rule 25 § 1). This case was assigned to the newly
composed Fourth Section (Rule 52 § 1).

6. By a decision of 1 July 2003, the Court declared
the application admissible.

7. The applicant and the Government each filed
observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber having decided,
after consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required
(Rule 59 § 3 in fine), the parties replied in writing to each other’s
observations.

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

8. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in
Bratislava.

9. On 11 August 1993 the applicant consulted a
doctor to whom he complained of health problems due to the fact that
his neighbour had tried to poison him. The doctor sent the applicant
to the hospital in Ružinov in an ambulance. The accompanying document
established by the doctor indicated that the applicant suffered from
paranoid schizophrenia. In it the doctor requested that the applicant
be treated as an in-patient. According to the applicant, he stayed in
the central reception unit of the hospital in Ružinov for about ten
minutes and during this time two injections were administered to him.
Subsequently the applicant was brought against his will to the mental
hospital in Pezinok. The chief physician of that hospital ordered that
the applicant be released on 26 August 1993.

10. On 19 August 1993 the Bratislava-vidiek District
Court gave a decision in which it found that the applicant was held
in a mental hospital lawfully. The reasons for this decision read as
follows:

“The psychiatric hospital in Pezinok admitted
Karol Tám, as an ill person, without his consent. The court took evidence
with a view to assessing whether the grounds for his admission were
lawful and concluded that the person concerned has suffered from a mental
illness requiring treatment in a mental hospital.”

11. The District Court’s decision of 19 August
1993 was served on the applicant on 20 September 1996. On 1 October 1996
the applicant appealed and claimed that he had been taken to the mental
hospital unlawfully.

12. On 30 April 1998 the Bratislava Regional Court
quashed the District Court’s decision of 19 August 1993. The Regional
Court found that the first instance court had failed to establish the
relevant facts and had committed errors of both a legal and procedural
nature. In particular, the District Court had not taken formal decisions
to bring proceedings concerning the lawfulness of the applicant’s
examination in a mental hospital and to appoint a guardian for the applicant
as required by Article 191b §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Furthermore, the District Court had not heard the applicant and the
doctor treating him with a view to establishing whether the applicant’s
deprivation of liberty had been justified. The case was sent back to
the District Court for a new adjudication.

13. In a letter dated 21 January 1999 a judge
of the Bratislava III District Court (which had taken over the cases
pending before the former Bratislava-vidiek District Court) informed
the applicant that the case would not be proceeded with as proceedings
concerning the lawfulness of his placement in a mental hospital had
never been formally brought.

14. On 26 February 1999 the Bratislava Regional
Court instructed the District Court to deliver a decision on the case.

15. On 6 July 1999 the Bratislava III District
Court discontinued the proceedings. The decision stated that the applicant
had been released on 26 August 1993 and, therefore, the reasons for proceeding
further with the case had fallen away. The applicant appealed on 9 August
1999. He claimed that his deprivation of liberty had been unlawful and
that he had not been informed that a guardian had been appointed to
represent him.

16. On 31 May 2000 the Bratislava Regional Court
upheld the District Court’s decision of 6 July 1999.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

A. Constitution

17. At the relevant time the following constitutional
provisions were in force.

18. Pursuant to Article 11, international instruments
on human rights and fundamental freedoms ratified by the Slovak Republic
and promulgated in accordance with the statutory requirements take precedence
over national laws where such international instruments guarantee a
broader scope of fundamental rights and freedoms.

19. Article 144(1) provides that judges are independent
and bound only by law.

20. Under paragraph 2 of Article 144, judges are
bound also by international instruments where the Constitution or law
so provide.

B. The Code of Civil Procedure

21. The following relevant provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure were in force at the time when the applicant was
deprived of liberty.

22. Article 191a (1) provided that medical institutions
should inform a court, within twenty-four hours, that a person had been
placed in their premises against his or her will.

23. Pursuant to Article 191b (1), the court in
the district of which the medical institution was located should start
proceedings, of its own initiative, with a view to establishing whether
such a person’s deprivation of liberty was justified.

24. Paragraph 2 of Article 191b provided that
the court should appoint a guardian for the person concerned unless
he or she had a representative.

25. Under paragraph 3 of Article 191b, the court
should hear the person concerned as well as the doctor treating him
or her with a view to establishing whether the placement in the medical
institution was lawful.

26. Paragraph 4 of Article 191b required that
the court decide, within seven days after a person was brought to a
medical institution against his or her will, whether such a measure
was lawful.

27. Pursuant to Article 191c (1), such a decision
was to be served, inter alia, on the person concerned unless the doctor indicated
that that person was not able to understand its contents.

C. The Civil Code

28. According to Article 11, any natural person
has the right to protection of his or her personality, in particular
of his or her life and health, civil and human dignity, privacy, name
and personal characteristics.

29. Pursuant to Article 13 (1), any natural person
has the right to request that an unjustified infringement of his or
her personal rights should be stopped and the consequences of such infringement
eliminated, and to obtain appropriate satisfaction.

30. Article 13 (2) provides that in cases when
the satisfaction obtained under Article 13 (1) is insufficient, in particular
because a person’s dignity and position in society has been considerably
diminished, the injured person is entitled to compensation for non-pecuniary
damage. According to paragraph 3 of Article 13, when determining the
amount of such compensation the courts should take into account the
seriousness of the prejudice suffered by the person concerned and also
the circumstances under which the violation of that person’s rights
occurred.

D. The State Liability Act of 1969

31. Section 1 (1) of Act No. 58/1969 on the liability
of the State for damage caused by a State organ’s decision or by its
erroneous official action (Zákon o zodpovednosti za škodu spôsobenú rozhodnutím orgánu
štátu alebo jeho nesprávnym úradným postupom – “the
State Liability Act”) provides that the State is liable for damage
caused by unlawful decisions delivered by a public authority in the
context of, inter alia, civil proceedings.

32. Section 18 (1) renders the State liable for
damage caused in the context of carrying out functions vested in public
authorities which results from erroneous official actions of persons
entrusted with the exercise of these functions. A claim for compensation
can be granted when the plaintiff shows that he or she suffered damage
as a result of an erroneous action of a public authority, quantifies
its amount, and shows that there is a causal link between the damage
and the erroneous action in question.

E. Regulation No. 32/1965

33. Regulation No. 32/1965 governs compensation
for damage caused to a person’s health. Section 2 provides for compensation
for pain resulting from damage to a person’s health, subsequent medical
treatment and the elimination of the effects of damage to health. The
amount of the compensation is to be determined in accordance with the
principles and rates attached to the regulation.

34. Under paragraph 2 of Section 2, compensation
for pain is not payable in cases of simple psychic reactions affecting
a person’s health which are of a passing character or for short-term
changes in a person’s health which do not require medical treatment
or which cannot be established in an objective manner.

F. Act No. 514/2003

35. Act no. 514/2003 on Liability for Damage Caused
in the Context of Exercise of Public Authority (Zákon o zodpovednosti za škodu spôsobenú pri výkone verejnej moci
a zmene niektorých zákonov) was adopted on 28 October 2003. It
will become operative on 1 July 2004 and will replace, as from that
date, the State Liability Act of 1969.

36. The explanatory report to Act No. 514/2003
provides that the purpose of the Act is to render the mechanism of compensation
for damage caused by public authorities more effective and thus to reduce
the number of cases in which persons are obliged to seek redress before
the European Court of Human Rights.

37. Section 17 of the Act provides for compensation
for pecuniary damage including lost profit and, where appropriate, also
for compensation for damage of a non-pecuniary nature.

G. Domestic courts’ practice

38. Under the domestic courts’ practice, the
State Liability Act of 1969 does not allow for compensation for non-pecuniary
damage unless it is related to deterioration in a person’s health
(for further details see Havala v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 47804/99, 13 September 2001).

39. In proceedings no. 4C 109/97 before the Šaľa
District Court the plaintiff claimed, from the Ministry of Justice,
compensation for non-pecuniary damage on the ground that he had been
acquitted following the re-opening of proceedings leading to his conviction
of an offence. In its judgment of 29 October 1998 the District Court
established, on the basis of the plaintiff’s submissions, that his
claim was based on Article 11 et seq. of the Civil Code which provides
for protection of a person’s good name and reputation as well as of
other personal rights. The District Court dismissed the action on the
ground that the plaintiff should have claimed compensation under the
State Liability Act of 1969.

40. In decision no. 8 Co 109/99 of 23 March 2000
the Nitra Regional Court quashed the above Šaľa District Court’s
judgment. The appellate court found that the subject-matter of the proceedings
and the legal basis for the plaintiff’s claim remained unclear. The
decision stated, inter alia, that the first instance court had not explained
why the plaintiff should have first sought redress under the State Liability
Act. The first instance court was instructed to have the action completed
by the plaintiff, to take any evidence which may be necessary and to
deliver a new decision with reasons on the case. Reference was made
also to Article 11 of the Constitution and to Article 3 of Protocol
No. 7.

41. In decision no. 27 C 31/00-120 of 6 March
2002 the Bratislava III District Court partially granted an action where
a judge claimed protection of his personal rights. The plaintiff argued, inter alia,
that the Minister of Justice had obliged him to submit a declaration
concerning his property without any justification and that he had been
revoked from the post of President of a district court for his failure
to submit such declaration. On 24 June 2003 the appellate court confirmed
the conclusion that the plaintiff’s right to protection of his personal
rights had been violated.

42. In judgment no. 7C 818/96-81 of 11 May 2000
the Žiar nad Hronom District Court granted compensation of 500,000
Slovakian korunas to a person whose son had been killed. The court noted
that the defendant had been convicted of a murder by a criminal court
and that his action grossly interfered with the personal rights of the
plaintiff.

43. On 30 September 2003 the Banská Bystrica
District Court delivered judgment no. 14C 112/02-229. The plaintiffs,
a married couple, alleged to have suffered damage of both pecuniary
and non-pecuniary nature in the context of criminal proceedings against
them in which they had been discharged. One of the plaintiffs, who had
been dismissed from the police and detained on remand in the context
of the criminal proceedings, also claimed compensation
for lost income.

In the above judgment the District Court ordered
the Ministry of Justice to compensate for the lost income of the plaintiff
concerned and also to compensate for the expenses which the plaintiffs
had incurred in the context of the criminal proceedings. The decision
to grant compensation for pecuniary damage was based on the relevant
provisions of the State Liability Act of 1969.

The District Court further granted the plaintiffs,
with reference to Article 11 et seq. of the Civil Code, 7 and 5 million
Slovak korunas respectively in compensation for damage of non-pecuniary
nature. The relevant part of its judgment reads as follows:

“The right to protection of one’s personal
rights is an individual right of any natural person. When granting protection
to that right it is irrelevant whether an unjustified interference was
the result of a fault and whether or not it was caused deliberately.
It is not even required that an unjustified interference should produce
any particular consequences. It suffices that an unjustified interference
was capable of affecting or violating one’s personal rights. The fact
that plaintiff A cannot exercise the profession and hold the job which
he held prior to his accusation and that the clientele of plaintiff
B [who is an advocate] shrank considerably during the criminal proceedings
as well as the fact that the plaintiffs were forced to move to another
apartment because of deteriorated relations with their neighbours clearly
show that there has been such an interference [with their personal rights].
That interference is causally linked to prosecution of the plaintiffs
and to the criminal proceedings held against them. There is no doubt
that such interference is objectively capable of causing damage. As
regards both plaintiffs, it affected their professional life, their
position in the society, family life and their relations with neighbours...
The interference with the plaintiffs’ [personal rights] is directly
linked to the criminal proceedings [against them]...

It follows from the above that there has been
an interference with the plaintiffs’ personal rights which, in substance,
still persists and that it is related to the criminal proceedings against
the plaintiffs. The criminal proceedings were carried out by the Slovak
Republic through its competent authorities. The defendant is therefore
obliged to compensate for damage of a non-pecuniary nature.

... compensation for damage of a non-pecuniary
nature has the character of a satisfaction. The purpose of compensation
granted in the form of a sum of money is to “purify” the affected
person in the eyes of other persons in all spheres of life where harm
was caused... The amount of compensation granted should therefore be
adequate to the interference and its circumstances... It is beyond any
doubt that the plaintiffs were publicly known in the district of Považská
Bystrica (in view of their professional positions) and that their reputation
was affected in all spheres of life. The case was taken up by the media
whereby their esteem in professional life was diminished over the whole
country. The amount of compensation must therefore not only be adequate
to provide satisfaction to the plaintiffs, but its amount should also
ensure that the plaintiffs regain their esteem and dignity in the eyes
of the public.”

THE LAW

I. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY
OBJECTION

44. The Government maintained, as they did at
the admissibility stage, that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic
remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They argued
that it was open to the applicant to obtain redress as regards the alleged
violation of his Convention rights by means of an action for compensation
under the State Liability Act of 1969. In particular, the applicant
could have requested that Article 5 § 5 of the Convention be applied
by the domestic courts with reference to Articles 11 and 144(2) of the
Constitution and claimed compensation also for non-pecuniary damage.

45. The Government further argued that the applicant
could have also sought redress by means of an action for protection
of his personal rights under Article 11 et seq. of the Civil Code. In
support of their argument they invoked the domestic courts’ practice
(see paragraphs 41-43 above).

46. The applicant disagreed and maintained that,
at the time of introduction of his application, there existed no practice
of domestic courts in similar cases showing that he had reasonable prospects
of obtaining effective redress as claimed by the Government.

47. The Court recalls that the rule of exhaustion
of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention
obliges applicants to use first the remedies that are normally available
and sufficient in the domestic legal system to enable them to obtain
redress for the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies must
be sufficiently certain, in theory as well as in practice, failing which
they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Aksoy v. Turkey,
judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, pp. 2275-76, §§
51-52; Akdivar
and Others v.Turkey, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, p. 1210, §§ 65-67; Şarli v. Turkey, no. 24490/94, § 59, 22 May 2001).

48. The Court recalls that it has previously addressed
the question of the effectiveness of the remedy under the State Liability
Act of 1969 (see Kučera v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 48666/99, 4 November 2003 and
the admissibility decision on the present case of 1 July 2003). It did
not find it established that the possibility of obtaining appropriate
redress in similar cases by means of that remedy was sufficiently certain
in practice and offered reasonable prospects of success as required
by the relevant case-law. It noted, in particular, that compensation
for damage of a non-pecuniary nature was excluded with the exception
of cases where damage to a person’s health was caused. It finds no
reasons for reaching a different conclusion in the present instance.

49. As to the Government’s argument that the
applicant could have requested, with reference to Articles 11 and 144(2)
of the Constitution, that the domestic courts apply Article 5 § 5 of
the Convention and compensate him also for damage of a non-pecuniary
nature, the Court notes that the subject-matter of proceedings under
the State Liability Act of 1969 is compensation for damage caused by
an erroneous official action or, as the case may be, an unlawful decision
which is quashed by the competent authority. There is no indication
that in such proceedings the domestic courts are likely to entertain
complaints about breaches of substantive provisions of the Convention.
In any event, in the light of the documents before it the Court is not
satisfied that the possibility of obtaining redress in respect of the
alleged breaches of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention as contended
by the Government was sufficiently certain in practice and offered reasonable
prospects of success as required by the relevant case-law (see also, mutatis mutandis, Sakık and Others
v. Turkey, judgment of 26 November 1997, Reports 1997-VII, p. 2625, §§ 53 and 60).

50. In addition, the Court notes that the State
Liability Act of 1969 will be replaced, as from 1 July 2004, by Act
No. 514/2003. The latter, unlike the State Liability Act of 1969, explicitly
provides for compensation for non-pecuniary damage.

51. In view of the above considerations the Court
finds that the applicant was not required to use the remedy under the
State Liability Act of 1969 in order to comply with the requirements
of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.

52. As regards the possibility of obtaining compensation
for damage of a non-pecuniary nature in the context of proceedings for
protection of one’s personal rights under Article 11 et seq. of the
Civil Code, such remedy is limited to cases where there has been an
unjustified interference with one’s personal rights within the meaning
of Article 11 of the Civil Code, and where the satisfaction obtained
under Article 13(1) is insufficient, in particular because a person’s
dignity and position in society has been considerably diminished. Thus
the purpose of the remedy under Article 11 of the Civil Code is not
to provide redress for an alleged violation of Article 5 §§ 1 or 4
as such, but to examine, as the case might be, whether any misconduct
was objectively capable of interfering with one’s personal rights.
An award of compensation for damage of a non-pecuniary nature in proceedings
under Article 11 et seq. of the Civil Code is made subject to conditions
and invokes considerations which are distinct from the question whether
or not a person’s rights under Article 5 of the Convention have been
violated. In particular, it has not been shown that a person’s suffering
and distress occasioned by a violation of Article 5 are taken into consideration,
these being criteria established by the Court’s case-law when it rules
under Rule 41 of the Convention on the question of just satisfaction
in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

53. Furthermore, the information available does
not show that at the relevant time it was the practice of domestic courts
to grant remedy under Article 11 et seq. of the Civil Code in situations
similar to that of the applicant. The Court notes that the judgment
of the Banská Bystrica District Court of 30 September 2003 (see paragraph
43 above) was delivered several years after the application had been
filed. In that judgment, which apparently has not yet become final,
the first instance court granted the plaintiffs compensation for damage
of a non-pecuniary nature occasioned by criminal proceedings in which
they were finally discharged. The reasoning of the relevant part of
that judgment does not specifically refer to the detention of one of
the plaintiffs nor does it examine whether or not that detention was
unlawful or otherwise contrary to Article 5 of the Convention. The Court
is therefore similarly not satisfied that this remedy was sufficiently
certain in practice and offered reasonable prospect of success in respect
of the complaints which the applicant makes.

54. It follows that the Government’s preliminary
objection must be dismissed.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
5 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

55. The applicant complained that his deprivation
of liberty had been unlawful. He relied on Article 5 § 1 of the Convention
the relevant part of which reads as follows:

“Everyone has the right to liberty and security
of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following
cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ...

(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention
of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind,
alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; ...”

56. The Government admitted that the Bratislava–vidiek
District Court had not acted in accordance with the relevant provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure in that it had not decided formally to
bring proceedings and to appoint a guardian for the applicant and that
it had not heard the applicant or the doctor who had treated him. The
Government therefore accepted that Article 5 § 1 of the Convention
had been violated.

57. The Court recalls that in order to comply
with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the detention in issue must take
place “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” and be
“lawful”. The Convention here refers essentially to national law
and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural
rules of national law (see, amongst many authorities, Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, judgment of 24 October 1979,
Series A no. 33, pp. 17-18, 19-20, §§ 39 and 45; Bizzotto v. Greece, judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-V, p. 1738, § 31, and Aerts v. Belgium, judgment of 30 July 1998, Reports 1998-V, p. 1961, § 46).

58. In the present case the Bratislava Regional
Court, in its decision of 30 April 1998, found that the former Bratislava-vidiek
District Court had not taken formal decisions to bring proceedings concerning
the lawfulness of the applicant’s examination in a mental hospital
and to appoint a guardian to him as required by Article 191b §§ 1
and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that it had not heard the
applicant and the doctor treating him with a view to establishing whether
the applicant’s deprivation of liberty had been justified, as required
by paragraph 3 of Article 191b of the Code of Civil Procedure. These
shortcomings have also been acknowledged by the Government.

59. In addition, paragraph 4 of Article 191b,
as in force at the relevant time, required that the court decide within
seven days after the applicant had been brought to a medical institution
whether such a measure was lawful. The applicant was brought to a mental
hospital on 11 August 1993 and the Bratislava-vidiek District Court
decided on this issue on 19 August 1993, that is after the expiry of
the above time-limit. In these circumstances, the applicant’s deprivation
of liberty cannot be said to have been “in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law” and “lawful”.

60. There has accordingly been a violation of
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION

61. The applicant also complained that he was
not able to have the lawfulness of his detention reviewed by a court.
He relied on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention which provides:

“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by
arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and
his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

62. The Government contended, with reference to
short duration of the applicant’s deprivation of liberty, that there
had been no violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

63. The applicant argued that, as a result of
the belated service on him of the Bratislava-vidiek District Court’s
decision of 19 August 1993 he had been unable to challenge effectively
the lawfulness of his deprivation of liberty and to seek his release.
In any event, the overall length of the proceedings concerning the lawfulness
of his detention was excessive and incompatible with the reasonable
time requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

64. The Court first notes that the scope of the
case has been determined by its decision on the admissibility of the
case. It therefore cannot entertain the complaint whether or not the
reasonable time requirement of Article 6 § 1 has been complied with.

65. Under Article 5 § 4, an arrested or detained
person is entitled to bring proceedings for the review by a court of
the procedural and substantive conditions which are essential for the
“lawfulness” of his or her deprivation of liberty. The intervention
of such a body will satisfy Article 5 § 4, only on condition that the
procedure followed has a judicial character and gives to the individual
concerned guarantees appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty
in question. In order to determine whether a proceeding provides adequate
guarantees, regard must be had to the particular nature of the circumstances
in which such proceeding takes place (see, among other authorities, Winterwerp,
cited above, § 57; Trzaska v. Poland, no. 25792/94, § 74; Jėčius v. Lithuania, no. 34578/97, § 100, ECHR 2000-IX and D.N. v. Switzerland
[GC], no. 27154/95, § 41, ECHR 2001-III). Article 5 § 4, in guaranteeing
to persons arrested or detained a right to institute proceedings to
challenge the lawfulness of their detention, also proclaims their right,
following the institution of such proceedings, to a speedy judicial
decision concerning the lawfulness of detention and ordering its termination
if it proves unlawful (Musial v. Poland [GC], no. 24557/94, § 43, ECHR 1999-II).

66. Thus Article 5 § 4 requires in the first place
an independent legal mechanism by which the detained person can have
the lawfulness of the detention reviewed by a judge. The legal mechanism
contained in Article 191b of the Code of Civil Procedure under which
a court shall review such an issue of its own initiative upon a notification
by a mental hospital in which a persons is detained constitutes an important
safeguard against arbitrary decision.

67. In the present case the Bratislava-vidiek
District Court made several procedural mistakes when examining the lawfulness
of the applicant’s detention. In particular, it failed to give a decision
formally appointing a guardian for the applicant as required by Article
191b § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and it did not hear the applicant
and the doctor treating him with a view to establishing whether the
applicant’s deprivation of liberty had been justified. The proceedings
leading to the decision of the Bratislava-vidiek District Court of 19
August 1993 did not, therefore, provide guarantees appropriate to the
form of the deprivation of liberty in the applicant’s case.

68. The Court has noted that it was open to the
applicant to seek a review of the decision of 19 August 1993 by a higher
court. However, that decision was served on the applicant on 20 September
1996, that is more than three years after its delivery, and in the subsequent
proceedings following the applicant’s appeal the courts refused to
examine the lawfulness of his detention on the ground that the applicant
had been released on 26 August 1993 and that the reasons for further
proceeding with the case had therefore fallen away.

69. In these circumstances, and irrespective of
the duration of the applicant’s deprivation of liberty, the review
in the context of the proceedings applied cannot be said to have provided
adequate guarantees to the applicant. There has therefore been a violation
of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.

IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF
THE CONVENTION

70. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation
of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law
of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation
to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”

A. Damage

71. The applicant claimed 500,000 Slovakian korunas
in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. He explained that he had suffered
distress in that he had been unlawfully placed in a mental hospital
where he had to witness several shocking scenes and that he had been
held in a cell with barred windows together with a mentally sick person.

72. The Government contended that the sum claimed
by the applicant was excessive.

73. The Court finds that the applicant has certainly
suffered non-pecuniary damage, which is not sufficiently compensated
by the finding of a violation. Making its own assessment on an equitable
basis, the Court awards the applicant 2,500 euros in compensation for
non-pecuniary damage.

B. Default interest

74. The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of
the Convention;

3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of
the Convention;

4. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay
the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,500
(two thousand five hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage,
to be converted into Slovakian korunas at the rate applicable at the
date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the
above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just
satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing
on 22 June 2004, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.