I'm a bit surprised were he writes in para 2 of the article: 'Equally, British attempts to co-operate with Native Americans had little success...' As I read it, Black in his book The War of 1812 in the Age of Napoleon (London: Continuum, 2009) showed how effective and critical to success the co-operation was in 1812 and how the British strategy of 1812 and 1813 hinged on it (admittedly it fell apart thereafter caused by Brit political failings).

IMHO it was General Brock's ability to achieve a complex coalition of Native American (then known as Indians), politicians and militia that saved Canada from American hegemony in 1812. With his death there was no commander with the skill, emotional intelligence and mental acuity to keep this coalition vibrant.

Coalition building in this way is absolutely critical to success - and a measure of outstanding generalship - as we've seen from Marlborough to Templer (in Malaya) to, perhaps more contentiously, Schwarzkof (in the Gulf War). Rather more problematic in the Middle East today.

(I recommend Black's book on the War of 1812. He is excellent on the economic and political context of the times whilst maintaining a weather eye on the events in Spain and Russia. He is authoritative on the geopolitics surrounding the War of 1812 and in interpreting American reaction to events. To my mind, he appears less comfortable on some military matters mentioning, for example, the “problems of leading from the front” without recognising the advantages.)