"Please advise this office what actual relationship exists at present between the original contents of the U. S. proposal of 21 June and the following points:" See doc.

2 November 1941

From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Washington
#722

"We have carefully considered a fundamental policy for improving relations between Japan and America, but we expect to reach a final decision in a meeting on the morning of the 5th and will let you know the result at once." See doc.

2 November 1941

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#723

"Day before yesterday when I met the diplomatic corps, during the conversation I had with the American Ambassador, I said, "I am very sorry that Japanese-American relations have lately been growing worse and worse. If this continues, I fear that unfortunate results will ensue." See doc.

3 November 1941

From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1021

"I plan to see Hull in two or three days. If possible I would like to be advised of the Cabinet's definite policy before then." See doc.

3 November 1941

From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1025

"As you mentioned in your message, it is true that I refused to relay the text of the exchanged notes. They have stuck firmly to their original stand and consequently the two proposals have remained at odds with each other." See doc.

4 November 1941

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#725

"Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them." See doc.

"In view of the gravity of the present negotiations and in view of your request on instructions from me, Ambassador KURUSU is leaving-on the 7th by clipper to assist you." See doc.

4 November 1941

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#731

"In these negotiations, Great Britain also is an actively interested party and has vast interests in the Far East. Therefore, in order to carry out this proposal (both Proposal A and Proposal B), it would certainly behoove Great Britain and, for that matter, the Netherlands also as interested parties, to put into effect the terms of the understanding in question." See doc.

5 November 1941

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#732

"If and when an agreement is reached on the basis of our latest proposal we would prefer that it not be written up in the form of a treaty. Ratification of the Senate is required for a treaty, and we fear that too much time would be consumed obtaining this." See doc.

5 November 1941

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
#735

"Our counter proposal in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations referred to in my message #725* was taken up at the Imperial Conference on this, the 5th, and was given approval. Therefore, will you please begin the talks along the lines given in my instructions." See doc.

5 November 1941

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#736

"Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month." See doc.

5 November 1941

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1037

"I have received all of your messages of instructions, and after giving the matter my very careful consideration, I have decided to continue to put forth my best efforts, however feeble they may be. I, therefore, made arrangements immediately on this, the 5th, to meet with President Roosevelt through Hull (I shall advise you the date and time of this interview as soon as it is made definite)." See doc.

5 November 1941

From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1040

"On the 5th, reports from Tokyo were played up by the newspapers here to the effect that Domei, the mouthpiece of the Japanese Government and the Times-Advertiser, the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office, were declaring that the 15th had been set as the "deadline" or the negotiations and were giving a list of the Japanese demands, (seven was given as the number)." See doc.

6 November 1941

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#739

"The reason why we are sending Ambassador KURUSU to you so quickly is, in addition to what I have already wired you, to show our Empire's sincerity in the negotiations soon to follow. As I wired you before, he brings with him no new instructions in addition to the ones I have already sent you." See doc.

6 November 1941

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#740

"Through Your Honor's continuous efforts, gradually both the Japanese and American insistences centering around the question of self-defense in connection with the Tripartite Treaty have become clear." See doc.

6 November 1941

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#741

"The matter of Your Honor's interviewing the President is delicate in the extreme, and if the newspapers speculate on the import of it, the effect would doubtless be most regrettable." See doc.

6 November 1941

From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1051

"In the present delicate state of Japan-American relations the local press is becoming more and more excited over the dispatch of KURUSU, etc." See doc.

7 November 1941

From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1053

"We are of the opinion that it is absolutely essential that, at this time, to either through direct means or through suitable indirect channels, strike home Japan's determinations to the U. S. Government." See doc.

7 November 1941

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1054

"I met and talked with Secretary Hull at 0930 on the 7th, and I explained our new proposal to him in accordance with your instructions." See doc.

7 November 1941

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1055

"At 0900 on this, the 7th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on Secretary Hull at his home. (Ballantine was also present.)" See doc.

9 November 1941

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#751

"We interpret Secretary Hull's plan to have a Chinese person of the highest integrity give his pledge regarding the China problem, to mean that the Secretary wishes to leave the China problem which has been a stumbling block in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations, up to direct negotiations between Japan and China for settlement." See doc.

9 November 1941

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#752

"The government is doing everything in its power to giving enlightenment to correctly guide public opinion. The censor bureau has evolved a plan whereby there will be no comments on the U. S.-Japanese negotiations." See doc.

10 November 1941

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#755.

"In adjusting Japanese-American relations, the Government of Japan has attached a great deal of importance on speedy solution of the China Incident. At the same time the United States Government also has maintained the attitude that if peace is to be established in the Pacific, the China question cannot be overlooked." See doc.

10 November 1941

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#757

"On the 10th I went to talk to the American Ambassador, and DOOMAN sat with us. I opened the conversation with a resume of my #725 [a] and reiterated my earnest hope that a decision could be reached in the negotiations on a basis just to our Empire. "See doc.

10 November 1941

From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1066.

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy is prepared and ready for action." See doc.

10 November 1941

From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1069

"Today, the 10th, at 11:30, accompanied by WAKASUGI, I had an hour's conversation with President ROOSEVELT in the presence of Secretary HULL." See doc.

10 November 1941

From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1070

"My interview with the President, referred to in my #1069, [a] was held in a private room in the White House in order to avoid publicity." See doc.