As we learn from the Introduction the book Ancient Models of Mind. Studies in Human and Divine Rationality is a collection of 12 papers devoted to A. A. Long, world-renowned English-born expert in Ancient Greek philosophy, since 1983 professor in Berkeley. I find it is a pity that this fact not explicated in the book's title, since, on the one hand, A. A. Long would be more honored than he is now and, on the other, from the very beginning a reader would have a more adequate idea of what the book's title refers to. In fact, Ancient Models of Mind pertains to A. A. Long's work and therefore should not be taken too literally. In the Introduction the notion of the mind is replaced sometimes by the notion of (human) reason, intellectual understanding or rationality, and on p. 5 we note 'model of mind' in inverted commas.

The Introduction starts with A. A. Long's short academic biography (in my view much too short for a scholar of such caliber; I would wish it could have been developed in a separate chapter, as is the case with his bibliography). Of 12 contributors 10 are from U.S. institutions and 2 from the U.K. universities. They are all with one exception former students of Long.

The first paper, 'Plato on aporia and self-knowledge', by A. Nightingale, "explore[s] the new "selves" that Plato dramatized and conceptualized in his exploration of self-knowledge" (9). In its first part, more particularly, we are given a discussion about Socrates' claim of knowing nothing at all on the one hand and of advancing some positive ethical claims. Apart from an elenctic or non-expert or non-technical knowledge, Socrates possesses a self-knowledge, "which cannot be identified as 'elenctic'" (10). It amounts, according to Nightingale, to "self-referential awareness", that is a knowledge one can acquire only by means of testing and examining himself. Nightingale argues that Socrates' self-knowledge "is a part [or "a form"] of ethical wisdom" (15). This is because when one becomes aware of his ignorance he becomes simultaneously a better person. In the second part of the paper, Nightingale examines some middle dialogues in order to see to what extent the philosopher in his human life can get hold of "at least partial apprehension of the Forms" (16). While in some dialogues, i.e. the Meno, the experience of aporia is purely epistemic; in others, i.e. the Republic VII, it is of ethical character. In the last part of the paper Nightingale concentrates on the Phaedrus in order to show, if I understand her correctly, how Plato's views on soul were linked to his theory of the Forms. Because of such a link, the philosopher's self-referential awareness leads him ultimately to the knowledge of the Forms. As Nightingale puts it, "[w]hen a philosopher apprehends the Forms, he comes to understand the boundaries of his soul [...] This understanding [...] is ethical and ontological [...] (25).

The paper by S. Ahbel-Rappe ('Cross-examining happiness. Reason and community in Plato's Socratic dialogues') opens by sketching the status quaestionis of egoism as a philosophical position attributed to Socrates. In the first part she discusses whether the prudential principle, i.e. the thesis "that everyone desires the good or wishes to be happy" (30) can be rightly ascribed to Socrates. Although several passages from the Gorgias, Protagoras, Meno and Euthydemus support the prudential principle, in all these cases the prudential principle is the position of Socrates' interlocutors, not his own. In the second part Ahbel-Rappe differentiates again between Socrates' and others' views and when Socrates professes his own beliefs, "he often refers to non-egoistic motivations" (37). Among his conduct's reasons we see, for instance, "the welfare of all the members of his community" (the Apology). Socrates explicitly claims that he obeys god's order. Finally, in the third part, Ahbel-Rappe moves to "another kind of language, one that draws on a different set of metaphors that are borrowed from the rival" (40), notably the Pythagorean ethical discourse, in order to show how Socratic philosophy is to be understood as a research for "the mutual development of wisdom" (41). For example, for Socrates -- as we can read in the Gorgias -- "the friendless life is an inherently evil life" (42). The valorization of reciprocity, friendship, equality, justice and universal generosity by Socrates has nothing to do with egoism, to such extent that it can be taken as an argument against it. If so, Socrates' ethics should be regarded not as "an ancient version of egoistic eudaimonism, but [as] an ethics of wisdom" (44).

In 'Inspiration, recollection, and mimēsis in Plato's Phaedrus', Kathryn A. Morgan focuses on the status of inspiration. Examining Socrates' palinode, she proposes to answer why after "privileging the prophetic, telestic and poetic states, [Socrates] relegate[s] them to fifth and sixth place in the hierarchy of lives" (47). Poetic inspiration is presented by Socrates as one of four kinds of madness and as such it comes from the Muses. If I am right, according to Morgan poetic madness, together with the prophetic and telestic ones, is discussed by Socrates in order to contrast erotic madness, which has a different structure and is beneficial, to the three others. The important point is that erotic madness is not considered at all until some pages later when the proof of the immortality of soul is provided and when in the course of the description of the soul we arrive at a process of recollection. As Socrates says, he who correctly recollects the Forms, "is admonished by the many as being out of his senses [while] he is divinely occupied" (54). Morgan insists on the translation of enthousiadzōn by divinely occupied since "rather than having a god in [him, he is] in the divine" (55). In answering the question she asked at the beginning of her paper Morgan comes to a distinction between imitating gods (erotic madness) and imitating 'dead motionless copies", interestingly observing that the former is more complex, since "philosophical inspiration is married to reason" (59)[[1]]. We can also retranslate the difference as follows: while the poet or prophet is passive in his engagement, the philosopher must be both passive and active.

David Sedley starts his paper 'Plato's Theaetetus as an ethical dialogue' with a nice paraphrase of the end of Epicurus' letter to Idomeneus. Yet, his task is to show the ethical importance of the Theaetetus, which is treated universally and "by common consent [as] one of the classic texts in the history of epistemology" (64) and, more particularly, to answer the question how Plato himself would understand his dialogue. First, if there is any division of philosophy in Plato, this is a bipartition into physics and ethics. Thus in the Cratylus the branch we can call logic is considered a part of ethics. The result is that, as Sedley puts it clearly, "the genuine bipartition is, however latently, a genuine part of Plato's own outlook, and understanding the consequently wide reach of Platonic ethics will prove to be an important part of the background to the Theaetetus" (66). Classification of the Theaetetus as an ethical dialogue is also supported by the fact that in the Cratylusepistēmē -- the very topic of the Theaetetus - is listed among intellectual virtues[[2]]. Finally, Sedley makes use of the end of the Theaetetus. He points out to the fact that "Theaetetus has turned out after all not to intellectually pregnant" (71), which means that he has lost his pretensions to knowledge. In this sense he has made a progress in his sōphrosunē and more generally in virtue. As Sedley concludes, "[w]e need not doubt [...] that Theaetetus' new-won sōphrosunē is a significant moral improvement, of strongly Socratic stamp" (74). However, the moral and intellectual sides of virtue converge on each other.

A. Silverman's 'Contemplating divine mind' aims at Plato's and Aristotle's doctrine of becoming like god. More especially, Silverman's goal is to assess differences between Plato's and Aristotle's views and to challenge the belief that Plato advocates what is called a flight interpretation (i.e. turning one's back on the mundane world and taking refuge in theoretical resp. contemplative life) and, finally, to investigate to what extent "all reasoning about the good [is] eo ipso practical" (76). In the Republic we are presented with a special role ascribed to the Good: on the one hand the Good is to be theorized or contemplated, on the other the Good is the philosopher's guide in his practical life: "in knowing the Good he desires to create or make more good" (89). The Timaeus too should be read in the same, practical way, since we "imitate the Demiurge insofar as we are to discover practical truths as to how we ought to live" (84). If the dialogue studies astronomy or mathematics this is for a practical purpose, i.e. "to correct the circular motions in [...] soul" (85). In Aristotle, "matters are much more complicated" (87), because there is no clear-cut distinction between theōria and phronēsis, or between theoretical and practical sciences (in this context Silverman speaks about "the mesh of practical and theoretical science" (90)). For example, if ethics is considered as science and if it is related to biology and psychology, themselves being sub-disciplines of the theoretical sciences (namely physics), then ethics is theoretical to a certain degree as well. In the rest of the paper Silverman tries to determine the relation of practical reason to theoretical reason. Even if he is skeptical about whether we can know what contemplation is for Aristotle, he concludes by saying that "Aristotle's division of practical from theoretical reason directs our gaze to a world that is alien and beyond our ken" (96).

A. Code attempts to access Aristotle's strategies that he used against some skeptical objections against the possibility of knowledge ('Aristotle and the history of skepticism'). Aristotle was well aware of several objections, such as infinite regress or relativity, that was subsequently put forward by the Pyrrhonists. According to Aristotle, explanatory principles are deduced from immediate truths which do not require further demonstration. Starting points of knowledge are indemonstrable first principles and knowledge of principles is superior to demonstrative knowledge. A kind of first principle that Aristotle regards as essential for all reasoning is the principle of non-contradiction. Taking as an example a question where a change takes place, Code shows how Aristotle after formulating puzzles resolves them and gives positive results. Code ends with some remarks on the principle of non-contradiction being an example of indemonstrable first principles: "there can be no scientific demonstration of this principle because there is nothing prior to and explanatory of it" (108). To conclude, Code aligns with Long's observation that Aristotle "left to later philosophers a series of defences against skepticism, some of which they adopted, and a methodology which turns the skeptic's grounds for giving up the quest for knowledge into reasons for maintaining the search and hoping for a solution" (109).

'Stoic selection. Objects, actions, and agents'by S. White is about the Stoic account of selection and the ethical role of this account. In the first part White comes to the analogy between choice being a belief about an available good that should be pursued and selection being a belief about an available indifferent that should be pursued. A category of selection could help to "bridge the gulf we have traversed in making progress toward virtue. Anyone can have correct attitudes of selection, whether virtuous or not" (113). Yet, the category of selection (ekloge) is not well attested. Nevertheless, relying on the argument from silence, White saves the distinctions between selection and impulses. The former has as object only substantives (bodily objects), while the latter substantives and actions, e.g. one chooses to sit and what he selects is the chair. The difference between selection and impulses is that selection has no prescriptive component. As White says, "a selection has something like potential energy, which is readily transformed into kinetic energy when appropriately linked to prescriptive beliefs" (116). The result of his analysis is that White offers a new model of decision in Stoicism. It is the reverse of current models insofar as instead of placing the evaluation before the prescription, White suggests starting with considering what to do and only then selecting suitable objects. On this interpretation actions are prior to objects. In the second part White concentrates on examples provided by Epictetus all of which validate his account. It underlines an everyday life of selecting bodily objects and their states. On many occasions people are confronted with indifferents that it is better to pursue than to avoid. They act better when conducted in a suitable and reasonable way.

'Beauty and its relation to goodness in Stoicism' by R. Bett starts with a remark on polysemy of the concept of to kalon, the phenomenon which was willingly exploited already by Plato. For instance in Diotima's speech in the Symposium some (but not all) contexts show that to kalon is associated with goodness. Bett examines if in the Stoics there is "any connection between to kalon in its ethical aspect and physical beauty as we ordinarily understand it" (131). At first glance there is none since physical beauty is among indifferent things (though among preferred indifferent). In this context beauty is quite different from goodness. But Bett reports other contexts in which good and to kalon are associated to each other (e.g. "every good is kalon" or: "only the kalon is good"). Apart from this the Stoics make use of the concept of summetria applied to the beauty of body as well as to the beauty of soul. They are also "both manifestations of rationality functioning at its best" (139). Next, a physical beauty is a manifestation of a virtue or a least of the person's potential for virtue. Both, a virtuous person and a person with a tendency to virtue, will be regarded as beautiful. Yet, only the sage is able to avoid the mistake as to whether a person possesses or not a potential for virtue. The Stoic vision of love gets closer to the Platonic one: in love unites a sage on the one hand and a future sage on the other. Assessing the influence of Plato on the Stoics Bett points out some similarities (e.g. superiority of physical beauty over ethical or psychic one, importance of physical beauty in ethical and intellectual improvement) and differences (e.g. in a way of seeing a beauty of the soul, presence/absence of the ascent to the Form of Beauty). Bett ends by the conclusion that "the inspiration that the Stoics may have drawn from Plato [...] is in no way surprising; Stoic ethics is full of developments of Socratic or Platonic ideas." (152).

L. Castagnoli tackles the question 'How dialectical was Stoic dialectic?' After surveying main connotations of the term dialektikē in Socrates/Plato, Aristotle, the "Dialectical School" and Arcesilaus' Academy, Castagnoli draws on Long and Sedley's comment that all these connotations have in common the feature of discussing arguments with an interlocutor by ways of questions and that responses must be positive if the process is to be going on (this complies with the etymology of the term: dialegesthai = converse or discuss). Yet, this is not the meaning given to Stoic dialectic, most frequently associated with "empty and rigid "formalism" [...] or paying too much attention to "words" [...]" (153). Castagnoli shows, however, that there are some links between Stoic dialectic and contemporary uses of dialektikē, among them a way of constructing arguments by means of question and answer. Castagnoli quotes testimonies underlining the defensive character of Stoic dialectic and concludes that in "the initial phase of the history of Stoic dialektikē" (160) it was to be taken as - in Zeno's own words - "[t]he science of correct discussion in regard to discourses conducted by question and answer" (160). Castagnoli goes on by defending a view that also for Chrysippus dialektikē remained mainly an art of questioning and answering in order to establish the truth conditions of sentences and to clarify their ambiguities. He does not deny however that with Chrysippus "logic (and especially dialektikē) developed into a much more refined, extensive, and systematic part of Stoic philosophy" (163). The second part of the paper is devoted to mature Stoicism. There too dialektikē kept "its primary connection with live conversation" (166). Finally, Castagnoli adduces some Stoic arguments which are comprehensible only on a strictly dialectical model. These are first of all arguments based on self-refutation to which the rest of the paper is devoted, with special attention given to one passage from Sextus Empiricus (a self-refutation procedure refutes among others the sceptical statement that "proof does not exist"). Castagnoli concludes that "even at the end [of the history of ancient skepticism] [...] we still find it where Zeno had originally placed it" (179).

J. Ker's 'Socrates speaks in Seneca, De vita beata 24-28', deals with the only passage in Seneca where Socrates says more than a few words. After discussing briefly Socratisms in Stoicism and sketching the background of De vita beata, the reader is given four aspects of Seneca's Socrates. The first is that "Seneca introduces another person's voice into his own rhetorical scenario" (186). Socrates who speaks is a composition made up of a historical character, an idealized one and Seneca's "own present persona as a defendant" (187). Next, Socrates is infused with the Stoic doctrine of preferred indifferents. Third, Socrates is assimilated into Roman world to such an extent that he "plays the role of an idealized Roman censor" (190). Socrates' Roman culture is visible in what he says and how he speaks, for instance, he "summons up the world of Roman imperialism" (191). Finally, in the passage in question we meet a striking anachronism. For example, "Socrates speaks with a knowledge of history that transcends his own lifetime" (192). The interpretation of why Seneca appropriated Socrates given by Ker is that "Seneca's Socrates, invoked at the mid-point of his career, serves as a form of symbolic wealth that immunizes the author against fluctuations in his material wealth." (194)

The penultimate paper, 'Seneca's Platonism. The soul and its divine origin', by G. Reydams-Schils, focuses on Seneca's relationship with some elements of Plato's philosophy, especially his metaphysics of soul or eschatology, a theme strongly criticized by the Stoics. As such it is split into two: "the detachment of the soul from the body, and its desire to turn or return to a higher reality" (199). Reydams-Schils begins by analyzing Seneca's passage (Ep. 79.12), looking like a Middle-Platonist one, in which Seneca stresses a body/soul dualism imitating - and this is the crucial point - Platonic language and imagery. According to Reydams-Schils Plato is used by Seneca "as a kind of propaedeutic device to underscore an essentially Stoic scale of values" (201). Once again the same chapter of Seneca's letter 79 is analyzed for the sake of return to the heavens or divine origin theme. Reydams-Schils argues that heavens or divine origin do not refer to any transcendent realm but rather to heavenly bodies. The latter are immanent since they are within the universe and constitute a counterpart to the Platonic Ideas. Seneca follows Platonic dualism also when tracing a distinction between the sensible and the intelligible or a separation between god and nature. To conclude, Seneca's Platonism is restricted to the use of concepts, but in accordance with his Stoic philosophy. After all, the Stoics could have happened to ask and answer the same questions as Plato.

The last paper, 'The status of the individual in Plotinus', by K. Wolfe, starts with a claim that Plotinus took the saying "Know thyself" as referring not only to a human being but also to a human individual. Given several levels of being in Plotinus' philosophy, it is appropriate to identify a human individual with "a certain personality or soul" (217). Souls are different between them in virtue of the existence of forms of individuals introduced by Plotinus for two reasons. First, because of formal distinctions: as prime matter has no characteristics at all, any characteristics must come from "the conjunction of the materialized form of human being with the materialized form" (218) of different features. An individual is therefore a set of given differences. Wolfe remarks that these differences are finite and knowable, even if we cannot count and know them. Second, Plotinus introduces the existence of forms of individuals because of subjective distinctions: "for every descended soul, there is an undescended soul which the descended soul can rise to through the cultivation of the virtues and philosophy" (220). It is so because descents and ascents are individual, e.g. not every soul cultivates the virtues and philosophy to the same extent. In responding to the question where in the intelligible world the individuals remain, Wolfe takes as the most plausible that they are in discursive reasoning. Wolfe ends by referring to the Plotinian doctrine of periodic conflagrations and infinite returns of the sensible universe which allows us to acknowledge a finite number of forms of individuals as well as a finite number of sensible individuals.

The collection ends with a list of A. A. Long's publications, starting in 1963 and going up to 2009, a Bibliography of works quoted in the papers and an Index of concepts and ancient authors.

As I have said, this is not a volume on ancient models of mind. In this nice collection some papers treat about ancient models of mind more than others and some others do not treat of the subject at all. At any rate we are not given a systematic overview of the topic. Yet, this is not a serious criticism and it points only to the title of the collection which, as I think, would be more accurate when taking into consideration the respectable addressee of the Festschrift.

As often in the case of collections, all papers included are not of similar scope: some are more general while others treat of more particular issues. But also their impact seem unequal: there are more important findings and others much more modest. Therefore although the book is recommendable without any doubt, it is more difficult to say to whom to recommend it: some papers would be useful for students and beginners because of their general presentations. Others are of interest for specialists and researchers. What is characteristic is that some themes are recurrent and constitutes a kind of interweaving. For example the theme of becoming aware of one's own ignorance as an ethical progress is treated by Nightingale and then by Sedley (though it plays a different role in both papers). Or the principle of non-contradiction as a tool against skepticism is considered by Code and again, to some extent, by Castagnoli in his analysis of self-refutation procedure. By such intertwinings the volume is made coherent and proves to be more than a random collection of various contributions.

[[1]] En passant, one can note that Morgan gives a wrong - as this is the case quite often - reading of 254b ("he falls back") even if she follows the right translation ("the memory [...] is carried back", (57)).

[[2]] Sedley claims that "[i]t is better to accept that, in opinion of both Plato and Aristotle, the superiority of the intellectual to the moral virtues makes an intellectual or contemplative life superior to a moral life". Yet, this is questionable, as shown by Tatarkiewicz in his seminal paper on Three Ethics (1931). In Tatarkiewicz' view Aristotle's three ethical systems -- of contemplation (bios theoretikos), of measure (mesotes) and of friendship (philia) -- are not mutually exclusive but parallel.

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