I don't understand the claim of impracticality. The system is
essentially ranked choice without all of the rules, and Australia
seems to have no trouble at all putting incredible numbers of choices
on their ranked choice ballots. Over vote? we'll take the highest.
Undervote? we'll assume don't care and you won't impact the average,
or that you don't care and give the candidate a 0. Don't worry about
any of the other names on the ballot, just rate the candidate by how
much you like them, just like you rate things on amazon, rotten
tomatoes, or any other website that asks you to rate products.

RV is a system of minimal thought. There are no dependent choices, all
you are considering is that candidate for that race. You don't have to
just choose one, keeping in mind the other important candidates in
order to decide on which one is best. You don't have to keep track of
your previous rankings. There are no lame rules that would invalidate
your ballot. All possible spots to mark on the ballot are legitimate.
The counting is also relatively straightforward -- add up all the
numbers, or do piles based on range for each candidate.

I'd say 0-9 or 0-10 is probably the best range, because it is what
most people are familiar with. Others say range should be # of
candidates, so that people have the ability to rank if they so choose.
CRV really hasn't asked or answered the question of what range is the
best range. I'm not sure anyone over there cares.

-R

On Fri, Aug 8, 2008 at 5:42 AM, Dylan Hirsch-Shell <dylanhs@gmail.com> wrote:
> See also:
> http://www.rangevoting.org/OtherSyst.html>
> On Fri, Aug 8, 2008 at 12:08 AM, Dylan Hirsch-Shell <dylanhs@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Apr 12, 2008 at 2:33 PM, Charlie Strauss <cems@earthlink.net>
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Range voting is not practical (unless the range is zero to 4) on a
>>> system with 3 read heads. However, Range voting is a very intriguing
>>> method of voting worthy of more study. it might possibly be optimal
>>> by many criteria, but I wont' quite sign off on that till I (or
>>> someone else) looks at it's game theoretic strategies more
>>> carefully. It does appear that the "range" tend to collapse towards
>>> approval voting when one votes strategically rather than ranking ones
>>> "true" rating of the candidates.
>>
>> Sorry for dredging up this ancient topic, but is this the study of the
>> game theoretic optimality of various voting systems you were hoping someone
>> might do?:
>>
>> http://rangevoting.org/UniqBest.html>>
>> (Punchline: Range voting was the best (had lowest Bayesian regret, up to
>> statistically insignificant noise) with either honest voters, or with
>> strategic voters.)
>>
>> Anyway, the folks at the Center for Range Voting (CRV;
>> www.rangevoting.org) also claim that range voting *can* be implemented on
>> *all* current voting machines without much pain:
>> http://www.rangevoting.org/VMSumm.html>>
>> Of course, having a voting machine like OVC's that could be relatively
>> easily tailored to range voting would be even better.
>
>
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Received on Sun Aug 31 23:17:04 2008