Category Archives: contextualism

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Epistemic contextualism is the view that the verb “know” is a context sensitive expression. As a first approximation, epistemic contextualism states that in order for us to truthfully say a person “knows” a proposition, that person must meet the standards … Continue reading →

link pdf Does the contextualist seek to dissolve disputes over skepticism? And does she use a “perfectly general strategy” for doing so? Is she not interested in, or not addressing, the traditional topic of whether we really know things, instead … Continue reading →

My grad seminar this semester is on pragmatic encroachment–syllabus here, for those interested in what we are reading: Pragmatic Encroachment Seminar. Everything we are doing is stuff that gives me a reason to get up in the morning to do … Continue reading →

This past semester, I tried an experiment: I Beamer-ed up my entire epistemology course, so I thought I’d make the slides public. (For LaTeX-uninitiated, Beamer is a LaTeX class for creating slide presentations.) Some of the material on the slides … Continue reading →

I’ve got a good draft of a new paper up on my website, “Knowledge in Denial: A Defense of Nonskeptical Pure Invariantism.” I’d welcome any comments! Also just posted is a paper forthcoming in the exciting new journal International Journal … Continue reading →

In his very interesting “Knowledge and Certainty” (Phil Issues, 2008), Jason says the following things to which we might want to refer later. A. “A person’s belief satisfies the property expressed by a subjective use of “certain” relative to a … Continue reading →

In a recent thread (here), there was extensive discussion of Wesley Buckwalter’s experimental work on knowledge ascriptions. Buckwalter’s work seems to support an emerging consensus in experimental philosophy, according to which the salience of error does affect people’s intuitions about … Continue reading →

In a recent post, Keith DeRose offers some nice criticisms of existing experimental studies of bank case intuitions, along with some very helpful suggestions about how future studies should be conducted. Wesley Buckwalter has now completed a new study that … Continue reading →

Here is the paper I gave at the Oberlin Philosophy Colloquium last month. In it I discuss recent experimental work relevant to (or at least often enough taken to be relevant to) epistemic contextualism. I believe the papers for that … Continue reading →

Cases used to motivate contextualism or the denial of what Jason Stanley calls “intellectualism” are often referred to as “stakes-shifting cases” or “standards-shifting cases.” Typically, such cases tend to go schematically, like this: LOW, for whom not much hinges on … Continue reading →