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by Jeremy R. Hammond

The
debate over what to do about the crisis in Iraq has, on one hand, those
who argue for immediate withdrawal and, on the other, those who argue,
justification (or lack thereof) of the initial invasion aside, that the
US must remain lest the country descend further into chaos. Among the
latter, the focus is on finding a "timetable for withdrawal", which
would be dictated by how quickly "Iraqization" could be successfully
implemented to a degree that Iraqi forces could take over the job
currently being done by US troops. That this needs to occur seems to be
the general consensus. This view is predicated upon a number of
assumptions that are in need of serious questioning if any real
solutions to the ongoing crisis are to be found.

One
assumption is that the US has intended to withdraw from Iraq from the
onset. The US has an enormous number of strategic military bases
scattered around the globe. It never completely withdrew from either
Germany or Japan after WWII. It maintains a military presence in South
Korea. As a result of the war in Afghanistan, the US acquired a number
of military bases in Central Asia, not only in Afghanistan but also in
several neighboring former Soviet republics. It is well known, and was
easily demonstrable prior to the invasion, that the principle
justification for war, namely the threat of weapons of mass
destruction, was a fabricated pretext. Although chosen as the selling
point for public consumption, it is self-evident that the "threat" of
Iraq was simply not the true motive for the invasion. Rather, if we
assume the historical norm is being followed, and if we trust documents
expressing the views of policymakers within the US government, the goal
of the invasion was hegemony over what has been long been regarded as a
region of the utmost strategic importance, primarily due to its rich
resources in oil and gas. There is little reason to believe that US has
any intention whatsoever of abandoning the bases in Iraq it has
acquired as a result of the invasion.

Another
unquestioned premise is that US forces are a stabilizing, rather than a
destabilizing, presence. The resistance to occupation began almost
immediately after the invasion, and grew steadily during just the first
few months of the war. Ethnic and religious tensions were an outcome of
the invasion predicted well in advance, but the common image
represented to us by politicians and the media of US forces acting as
peacekeepers keeping Shiites and Sunnis from tearing each other apart
is a dangerous delusion.

The
role of the US military in Iraq is to maintain dominance of and control
of important property. While the military allowed other civilian
infrastructure to be looted in the breakdown of law and order that
followed the invasion and was predicted beforehand, it did take steps
to control and protect key locations related to the oil industry. The
Green Zone in Baghdad is another important piece of property the US
military is charged with maintaining control over. It represents the
seat of government, which exists only because it was created by the US.
This government grants an air of legitimacy to the US occupation, but
would quickly collapse if weren't propped up by the US military. Most
Iraqis don't want to live under foreign military occupation and want
the US out. If they were to obtain for themselves a truly democratic
government, that would be precisely the immediate outcome.

The
US, to cite another popular axiom of the accepted framework taken as an
article of faith, is trying to bring democracy to the region. The long
history of US interventions abroad presents a serious challenge to this
interpretation of its foreign policy. Its conduct in Iraq since the
invasion does not seem to indicate a departure from a history of
undermining democracy, and the theory is problematic.

We
may recall the elections in Iraq resulting in a "sovereign" government
that the US proudly proclaimed as a major accomplishment, evidence of
the success of its invasion and overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime.
The obvious paradox of calling a government dependent upon foreign
military occupation "sovereign" is almost universally disregarded, with
most commentators simply pretending this contradiction does not exist
(although the blindness to this dilemma is nonexistent if it so happens
that a regime is supported by foreign militaries other than the US,
such as was the case, to cite just one obvious example, with the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan).

With
selective amnesia, we may forget that the US initially opposed those
elections, preferring to postpone them until after a government
consisting solely of members appointed directly by the US had adopted a
constitution. Many Iraqis rose in protest and demanded elections be
held earlier, so that an elected government would form the
constitution, forcing the US to concede. We may set aside revisionist
history claiming this as a victory for US policy: it was a clear policy
failure for the US. Although the elections were marginal insofar as
democratic measures are concerned (voters didn't even know who the
candidates were until it was time to cast their ballots), this
nonetheless represented the strong desire to bring democracy to their
country in the face of overwhelming obstacles and was a major political
victory for the people of Iraq.

Sectarian
violence certainly plays a role in the current crisis, but if solutions
are to be found, misconceptions and delusions about the role of the US
in Iraq must be laid aside. A preponderance of the Iraqi violence is
directed against US forces and those Iraqi forces allied with the US.
Conversely, US violence is directed against those forces that oppose
its presence in their country. This violence continues for one clear
and simple reason: Iraqis want the US out. It easily follows that were
the US to leave, the violence would be largely mitigated. Coalition
generals have said as much, but policymakers are not willing to heed
such advise, preferring to hear that more firepower, more violence, is
the answer (comparisons to Vietnam abound, and must be taken with
caution, but there are certainly some valid parallels; obvious lessons
that should have been learned, but haven't, certainly apply).

The
obstacle most people have with arriving at this simple conclusion is
the notion that with the withdrawal of the US, the violence would
increase, rather than decrease, and outright civil war (which many
observers say already exists) would erupt. There is an underlying
assumption that the Iraqi people are incapable of governing themselves,
and hence require the US presence to maintain order. This sense of
cultural superiority is a common theme among the empires of history,
which have always maintained that without their stabilizing influence,
the "barbarians" of their vassalages would bring about the collapse of
civilization itself, at least locally, if not, due to variations of the
"dominoe" theory, within the heart of the empire itself.

We
may choose to begin with the alternative assumption, that Iraqis are
perfectly capable of governing themselves, without US interference. Of
course, this is not to say the US should negate its responsibility to
the country. Indeed, there are any number of actions, or, as the case
may be, inactions, an occupying power may take that are regarded as war
crimes, among the "accumulated evils" that rightfully make wars of
aggression "the supreme international crime", as defined at Nuremberg.
The US, therefore, not only has a moral but also a legal obligation to
help aright the wrongs in Iraq that have resulted, both directly and
indirectly, from the invasion.

Among
its responsibilities are the costs of reparations. The US vainly
proclaimed prior to the invasion, in an attempt to make the war seem
more palatable to American taxpayers, that the Iraqis would largely pay
for the expenses of war and rebuilding. Iraqi oil, we were told, would
help the war and reconstruction pay for itself. That such a declaration
could have the result of soothing concerns of Americans, rather than
causing outrage, perhaps says just as much about the American people as
it does their government.

The
notion that withdrawal will equate to abandonment of Iraq is another
mental obstacle to arriving at the most obvious immediate step to end
the violence and begin working towards order. The US should by no means
abandon Iraq, and, as just noted, it has moral and legal obligations
not to do so. Withdrawal does not imply abandonment. On the contrary,
the US should commit itself to supporting Iraqi efforts to create a
democratic government. This would require more than just lip service,
meaningless declarations of benevolent intent, and a sustained effort,
such as using its enormous influence to help bring Iraqi parties in
opposition with one another to the conference table.

The
prerequisite for any real solution would be the abandonment of US
policies declaring a US "right" to interfere in the internal affairs of
other nations to further what it perceives to be its own interests, the
abandonment of ideologies regarding war as an acceptable alternative to
peaceful means of settling international disputes. In short, it would
require the abandonment of a foreign policy that unavoidably conflicts
with democratic ideals and the principle of self-determination and so
often serves to undermine them.

Although
US policy is implemented with the belief that it serves America's
interest, it is self-evident that the opposite is most often the case,
and Iraq is hardly an exception. US interventions abroad, including the
overthrow of democratic governments, have historically been disastrous
for American long-term strategic interests. What is called the "war on
terrorism", predicated upon the Bush Doctrine of "preemption", as well
as its evolution into a doctrine of loosely-defined "prevention", which
essentially states that the declaration of the existence of some
alleged "threat" to US interests is justification enough for the use of
violence, is not so much a radical new foreign policy as it is a
continuation of policy that has existed long before the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, which serve as perhaps the clearest
example of how, despite delusions to the contrary, US foreign policy is
harmful to the interests of the American people.

There
are no simple solutions to resolve the crisis in Iraq, and it would be
a mistake to pretend otherwise. But if solutions are to be found, the
most imperative of which is to bring an end to the violence and
bloodshed, then we must cast aside myths about the US role in the
world, be more willing to question dogmatic assumptions, consider a
wider range of possibilities than those presented to us in the limited
framework of elite consensus, and seek more honestly to assess the
roots of the problems Iraq is faced with, beginning with the US role in
and responsibility for the current situation.