The spirit of Majid al-Khoei

April 10th 2003 was blighted by more than just looting. It was on that day that Majid al-Khoei, who had gone back to Iraq to reconcile the Shi'ite factions, was murdered, almost certainly on the orders of Moqtada al-Sadr.
Majid al-Khoei was a man which the new Iraq could certainly have used. He was devout, tolerant and genuinely committed to freedom and reconciliation. I am a very superficial person and I judge people by the quality of their smile and the look in their eyes: and to judge by al-Khoei's photograph he was the genuine article.
The wheels of justice have ground slow but exceeding small. Moqtada is reaping the consequences of that act now. From here it looks as though he has been weakened, perhaps fatally. It is hard to see where he can go from here: his influence always depended on intimidation rather than serious popular support. Now his Mahdists have been beaten in every firefight, driven from most of the buildings they occupied, and hung out to dry by the Hawza.

However, earlier this week at http://www.crookedtimber.org/ it was suggested that the whole Sadrist uprising could and should have been avoided. No it couldn't, because in dealing with a character like Sadr - a rabble rouser with a private army - there are and always have been three options.

1. Ignore him. Never wise, because of that aforementioned private army.

2. Do a deal. Even less wise, because it leaves the spirit of Majid al-Khoei without justice. It would mean a new Iraq in which political murders of men like al-Khoei go unpunished - essentially a lawless country. And if democracy as the West understands it is unachievable there - the jury's still out on that one - the rule of law would be an extraordinary achievement in itself.

3. Break him. Sadr represented the pure will to unaccountable power, the will that burned in Charles I and Lenin and Hitler, and with such Kipling provided the formula:

'Holy State or Holy King - or Holy People's Will
Have no truck with the senseless thing. Order the guns and kill.'

The Americans' timing was as good as possible given the circumstances. It was essential to take Sadr down before June 30th because doing so afterwards would have been considerably more awkward, and some in the interim government might have been tempted to avoid the short-term pain by trying to bring Moqtada on side (see option 2). Moqtada was one of those threats more terrible in expectation than reality: his army has been very easily beaten whenever it's faced Allied troops, much easier to beat than the Baathists who had a bit more of a clue, not to mention access to heavier weaponry.

(Incidentally, the comparative performance of the Baathist and Sadrist insurgents should give pause to anyone who thinks that it would have been possible to overthrow Saddam by a purely Iraqi popular uprising.)

It's still too early to say definitely that Sadr will stand trial. But let's hope so, as his trial should have valuable educational effects in the region, almost as much as the Saddam trial will.
What's just as important, the spirit of Majid al-Khoei will be able to rest easier.