The Anthrax Case Reopens

The Congressional anthrax hearings of September 16-17 revealed that public pressure is keeping the doors open in the anthrax case. FBI Director Robert Mueller promised
that the FBI will provide their evidence to a panel of experts for scientific
evaluation. The battle will now turn to the independence of this panel, and
whether "all evidence" or merely "scientific evidence" will
be under review.

During the hearings, Mueller found himself under fire by Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressman John Conyers for not having answers to their questions. Republican
Arlen Specter was furious at Mueller for his unwillingness to assure them that
Congress would have a role
in determining the panel's composition.

Meanwhile, new evidence shows just how deeply wrong ABC and Washington Post
reporters have been over the years on their coverage of the anthrax attacks.
They can't have it both ways: Either they made repeated "mistakes"
by relying on their sources, or several people deliberately lied in order to
advance war on Iraq.

In his recent book Taking Heat, former White House secretary
Ari Fleischer wrote that Bush was more shook up by the anthrax attacks than
by any other event. White House officials repeatedly pressed Mueller
to prove it was a second-wave assault by al-Qaeda or Iraq. After days of provocative
statements designed to scare the American people, Cheney himself believed that
he had been exposed to anthrax. Although the test results were negative, October
18, 2001, was the moment when
Cheney decided to withdraw to an "undisclosed location" and carry
biodefense protection during all of his mysterious travels.

The True Story Is Emerging

Valuable light was shed on the case recently by the admission of acclaimed scientist Peter Jahrling that he had made an "honest mistake" when he told the White House on October 24, 2001, that he saw signs that silica
had been added to the anthrax that had arrived at Senator Daschle's office the
previous week. If silica or another anti-clumping substance had been artificially
added or coated onto this anthrax, it would have made it more buoyant and easier
to penetrate the lungs. Jahrling, a virologist, said that he had been "overly
impressed" by what he thought he had seen, and added that "I should
never have ventured into this area."

Jahrling's error was seized upon just two days later on October 26, 2001, when
Gary Matsumoto, Brian Ross, and other members of ABC News issued a national
story asserting that Iraqi-made bentonite was coating the anthrax. It took until
the 29th for the head of Fort Detrick to state authoritatively that Matsumoto
and ABC had gotten it wrong. Even then, Matsumoto continued to argue
that either Fort Detrick was wrong about the bentonite or the story about the
presence of silica provided an alternative theory for "state-sponsored
terrorism."

During this same time period, Matsumoto was in the midst of conducting FOIA
requests for the anthrax records
(see page 15) maintained by Bruce Ivins. Matsumoto had been researching Ivins
for some time, as he believed that Ivins' experimental anthrax vaccine was the
cause of many injuries among veterans during and after the 1991 Gulf War. Years
later, Matsumoto wound up writing a book on the subject, Vaccine A,
accusing Ivins and his fellow inventors of being responsible for Gulf War Syndrome.
This controversy caused the FDA to suspend further production of the anthrax
vaccines for the market.

Matsumoto's theory that the attack anthrax contained "additives and coatings"
was thoroughly rebutted in a Scientific American article printed last Friday,
which detailed Sandia National Labs' investigation in early 2002. The Department
of Justice had asked Sandia to see if Matsumoto and Jahrling's claims of an
anti-clumping additive coating the anthrax were correct. It was already undisputed
that this anthrax was ultra-pure, and the finding that they contained a trillion
spores per gram was a sign that it was of US origin.

In February 2002, Sandia materials scientist Joe Michael and his team found
that silicon was indeed present in the anthrax. Then the team stepped it up
a notch with the use of highly sensitive microscopes not available to earlier
researchers. Everyone was stunned by what they saw: The silicon was growing
naturally within the anthrax spores - it was not artificially added, and there
was no coating or residue of silicon anywhere outside the anthrax. The team
could find no way for the silicon to enter the spores without leaving any residue.

By March of 2002, Michael was convinced that there was no additive or coating
in the anthrax. However, Michael and his team were forced to keep silent until
last month, when their promise to keep silent was lifted. Even when the Armed
Forces Institute of Pathology mistakenly identified a finding of silicon and
water in the anthrax as "silica" (silicon dioxide) in late 2002, and
Matsumoto used this story as the centerpiece of his Washington Post article
on the anniversary of the attacks, Michael had to maintain silence.

Why Observers Don't Trust the FBI

The irony of the current situation is that although the FBI appears to have
correctly analyzed the contents of the anthrax, many observers simply don't
believe the agency. It's understandable when one considers the FBI's track record
in this case. Just last month, without revealing any supporting evidence, US
Attorney Jeff Taylor and FBI official Joseph Persichini announced their conviction
that not only was Bruce Ivins the anthrax attacker, but that "he acted
alone." A Leahy aide said that law enforcement agencies make such statements
"to make people feel better."

Senator Leahy told Director Mueller at the Wednesday hearing that "I believe
there are others involved,
either as accessories before or accessories after the fact ... I just want you
to know how I feel about it, as one of the people who was aimed at in the attack."
FBI investigator Thomas Dellafera has stated in his search warrant affidavit
(See page 15) that he believes Leahy and Daschle were targeted by the anthrax
attacker as revenge for their roles - while they served as judiciary committee
chief and majority leader - in opposing swift passage of the PATRIOT Act.

As noted above, the immediate assumption during the initial days of the investigation
was that Iraq was the anthrax source. However, on October 5, 2001, Dr. Paul
Keim at Northern Arizona University told the Federal Centers for Disease Control
that reporter Robert Stevens had been stricken by the Ames strain of anthrax
(Philadelphia Inquirer, 9/1/2008); such a finding is very strong evidence of
US origin. Five days later, the FBI allowed what was mistakenly believed to
be the original batch of the Ames strain of anthrax to be destroyed by Iowa
University officials
who had it in their custody. The FBI claimed it never approved the destruction
and merely failed to oppose it. (New York Times, 11/9/2001)

During this period, the FBI was relying on Fort Detrick for scientific advice.
Bruce Ivins handled the anthrax shortly after it arrived at Democratic majority
leader Tom Daschle's office on October 15. In 2002, Judith Miller wrote that
"when Fort Detrick scientists attempted to place it on a scale, many of
the spores drifted away, depriving investigators of critical evidence."
(Germs, p. 325) Ivins' supervisor, Jeffrey Adamovicz, claims that the envelope
was placed in a double-sealed bag before it was opened, but admits that Ivins
was present and that the floating anthrax was "very scary." (New York
Times, 8/7/2008).

Ivins then went to the Pentagon to discuss the results. "It puts us in
a difficult position,"
one senior law enforcement official admitted in December 2001. "We're working
with these people and looking at them as potential suspects."

In the aftermath of the anthrax scare, the FBI got together with a number of
renowned scientists and made a plan for a battery of tests on the composition
of the spores. By December, it was clear that the anthrax strain used in the
attacks was identical with a strain originating from Dugway Proving Grounds
in Utah, that Dugway
and four other labs had material with the same genetic fingerprint, and that
all five labs received their strain from Fort Detrick.
(Rick Weiss & Susan Schmidt, Washington Post, 12/16/01) A BBC investigation
concluded that Fort Detrick was the focus of the FBI's investigation (Newsnight,
3/14/02), while
the Wall Street Journal's sources concluded the FBI was looking at Fort Detrick
and Dugway.

Professor Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a former bioterrorism consultant to President
Clinton, said publicly
during February 2002 that the FBI was focusing on a former Fort Detrick scientist
who now worked for a Washington, DC-area military contractor for the CIA. Although
she did not reveal the name at the time, she was referring to virologist Dr.
Steven Hatfill. This marked a shift from her stated belief just two months earlier
that the culprit was a microbiologist working at Fort Detrick. A few days later,
other government sources affirmed to the Washington Times that Hatfill was the
prime suspect.

During this time, the FBI made a very puzzling decision. Although the evidence
was pointing to a scientist within Fort Detrick as the probable culprit, they
continued to send anthrax investigation samples to that facility for testing.
Forensic expert Henry C. Lee stated that unless the FBI was convinced that the
Fort Detrick scientists were innocent, the agency wouldn't be sending them any
samples.

The FBI admits that Ivins helped them to design the protocol for proceeding
with future examinations of the anthrax during February 2002. Accordingly, within
five days of the issuance of the subpoena that month, Ivins was the first scientist
to provide a sample from his lab. However, it was not in full compliance with
the protocol. "He
didn't use the proper medium ... there was no guarantee that he prepared it
in the way that the instructions directed."

For that reason, the FBI claims that they destroyed their February 2002 sample,
and asked him to provide a second one in April 2002. The second sample was improper,
as Ivins allegedly did not take it from the right flask. The FBI admits that
the destruction of this first sample marks the only destruction of any anthrax
material obtained during this investigation. In a stroke of good luck, the aforementioned
Dr. Keim at Northern Arizona University kept a copy of this sample, and provided
it to the FBI in 2006 when a new team of investigators re-examined the evidence.

In May 2002, it was reported
that the FBI had previously conducted polygraphs of 10 Fort Detrick scientists.
FBI affidavits reveal that Ivins was among that group. The agency then expanded
the polygraphs to 200 employees of Fort Detrick and Dugway. The next month,
the FBI's questioning of a former government microbiologist indicated their
working theory: A Fort Detrick insider produced the spores at the lab, and then
refined them into a powder at an unknown location.
On June 25, the FBI conducted its first search of Hatfill's home and property,
the first in a series of a four year investigation.

FBI investigator Dellafera's affidavit
(See page 15) states that by this time "the FDA had re-approved [Ivins']
vaccine for human use, production at Bioport resumed, and anthrax research at
[Fort Detrick] continued without interruption ... Dr. Ivins thereafter received
'the highest honor given to Defense Department civilians at a Pentagon ceremony
... for his work in getting the anthrax vaccine back into production.'"
A multi-billion dollar bioterrorism industry was jump-started, making anthrax
readily accessible to thousands of new employees.

During late 2002, Ivins was on the scene at one of the searches at Hatfill's
pond.
During that search, a homemade glove box and a biological safety device with
hand-holes to protect someone working with dangerous germs were found in the
pond. The box yielded
no forensic evidence. The pond was subsequently drained, to no avail. The discovery
of the box is not proof that Ivins planted the box on Hatfill's property, or
that Hatfill hid it there. It is, of course, highly provocative.

A break in the case came in 2003,
when a handful of genetic mutations - distinguishing marks in the DNA - were
noticed in cultures created from spores from the attack envelopes. Four mutations
were turned into tests for the 1,070 samples. Seven samples tested positive
for all four mutations. Notebooks revealed that all seven samples originated
from two flasks in Ivins' lab, known as RMR-1029. The FBI moved in 2004 and
seized the RMR-1029 flasks. Like the seven samples, these flasks tested positive
for all four mutations.

By late 2005 or so, this positive finding was proven scientifically sound.
The bureau then turned to a new phase:
Who had access to these flasks and their seven descendents? The next three years
were spent looking at Ivins and the "100 scientists" that the FBI
estimates had such access. The FBI did not ask Dr. Keim for his copy of Ivins'
original sample from February 2002 until late 2006, when a new team of FBI agents
re-examined the evidence. In April 2007, the DOJ prosecutors mailed a letter
to Ivins telling him that he was "not a target" in the investigation.
(New York Times, 9/6/2008)

For the last year of his life, the FBI violated their guidelines by openly
surveilling Ivins in their cars. (New York Times, 8/4/2008) FBI head investigator
Robert Roth admitted in the Hatfill affair that this tactic violated agency
guidelines. "Generally, it's supposed to be covert," Roth said. (Associated
Press, 8/5/2008)

Ivins' security clearance at Fort Detrick was not taken away until November
2007, and he continued to work at Fort Detrick until three weeks before his
death. (Herald-Mail, 8/8/2008)

A Curious Story

Look at this curious story, drawn from the public record. The Bush administration
wanted to pin the blame for the anthrax attacks on Iraq. Gary Matsumoto and
other members of ABC and the Washington Post helped strengthen that story -
then and later - even though it was unsupported by the evidence. Matsumoto is
a man obsessed with the belief that Ivins killed or injured thousands of Gulf
War vets due to errors that were made in the production of his experimental
anthrax vaccine.

During the first days of the case, one or more FBI agents permitted the destruction
of an anthrax sample that made it more difficult to trace the identity of the
culprit. The FBI turned to Fort Detrick to review the anthrax evidence in this
case, even though the Fort Detrick scientists were central among the prime suspects.
Ivins was with the first group to handle the anthrax evidence, may have destroyed
some of the evidence under his care, and proceeded to report to the Pentagon.

The FBI continued to rely on Ivins for developing the protocol for the handling
of the anthrax evidence, and to examine suspicious letters for a period of years.
Of the two samples obtained from Ivins in 2002, one or more FBI agents caused
the destruction of the one that pointed strongly to his guilt, and Ivins allegedly
provided the second sample from the wrong flask. Two years later, in 2004, the
FBI seized two key evidence flasks from Ivins' custody that proved to contain
the ancestor of all seven samples that matched the attack anthrax. Although
this analysis was proven to be scientifically sound by late 2005, Ivins did
not lose his security clearance until November 2007, and even then was allowed
access to Fort Detrick until three weeks before his death.

It is curious that Ivins maintained his security clearance for two years, and
access to Fort Detrick for three years, while in the cross-hairs of this investigation.

It is curious that the FBI ever relied on Fort Detrick for evidence testing,
since many of its scientists were also under suspicion from day one.

More must be learned about the stories of repeated destruction or fabrication
of evidence:

The FBI's permission to destroy what was believed to be the original Ames
strain;

Ivins' alleged loss of much of the Daschle anthrax;

Matsumoto's sources' claims of bentonite and other coated additives pointing
to Iraqi origin;

The FBI agents who caused the destruction of Ivins' February 2002 sample;

Rosenberg being "tipped" away from a Fort Detrick microbiologist
to a DC-area employee for a CIA contractor by February 2002 (Hatfill);

Ivins allegedly providing a phony April 2002 sample.

More must be learned about why the Department of Justice told Ivins that he
was not a target in April 2007. Perhaps it was to lull Ivins into a false sense
of security.

More must be learned about why the FBI hounded Ivins and his family with overt
surveillance for the last year of his life until he committed suicide. Hatfill
received a settlement of 5.8 million dollars, in part for similar conduct in
his case. Such overt surveillance was in defiance of the established agency
guidelines. Such intense surveillance can cause a suspect to commit suicide.

It's good that the scientific evidence will be reviewed, but that is not enough.
A special prosecutor must be appointed in a neutral fashion who can review every
aspect of the FBI's work in this case. Congressman Rush Holt is calling for a national commission that would assess the investigation and Ivins' culpability, but a prosecutor might have better horse-sense.
There is no way to be certain of Ivins' guilt at this point. Based only on what
has been publicly released, the claim that the perpetrator "acted alone"
may prove to be an obstruction of justice.