972pp.1
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31 , 2016-05 , The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University

Description

We consider a problem of allocating multiple identical objects to a group of agents and collecting payments. Each agent may receive several objects and has quasi-linearpreferenceswithasubmodularvaluationfunction. ItisknownthatWalrasian mechanisms are manipulable. We investigate the incentive property of Walrasian mechanisms in economies with a large number of objects. Given a set of agents and a preference proﬁle, an agent i asymptotically dominates an agent j if at suﬃciently many objects, i’s incremental valuation is higher than j’s incremental valuation. We show that for each economy, if there is no agent asymptotically dominating the other agents, and if there are suﬃciently many objects, any Walrasian mechanism is non-manipulable at the economy. We also consider replica economies, and show that for each economy, if it is replicated suﬃciently many times, the minimum price Walrasian mechanisms are non-manipulable at the replica economy. Keywords. Non-manipulability,Walrasianmechanism,Vickreymechanism,asymptotic domination, replica economy, submodular preferences.