Were it not for a bit of bad timing and a government bureaucrat overstepping
his authority, we just might be thanking an Italian rather than General Grant
for defeating the Confederacy and saving the Union. After Fort Sumter was fired
upon in April, 1861, President Lincoln was facing the greatest crisis of his
career, civil war. The Union Army would soon be embarrassed again and again, a
situation many ascribed not to any lack of men or materiel, but to ineffective
leadership. Starting with the battle of Bull Run in July, 1861, the South won
battle after battle and it appeared that Washington D. C. might soon be
occupied by Confederate troops. Lincoln was busy searching for experienced
military leadership capable of preserving the Union.

Unlike Lincoln, in the summer of 1861 General Garibaldi who would go down in
history as the 'Washington of Italy' was in a short period of retirement at his
farm on Caprera, an island off Sardinia. Actually, Garibaldi was not one to
rest on his many laurels, or to rest much at all. His period of retirement was
occupied with planning his next blow for further Italian unification and
restoration of freedom to the oppressed.[1] However, it seemed that he might be
available and it would not be long before he would receive an invitation from
Lincoln to put the red shirt aside for Union blue.[2]

By this time, General Garibaldi had already compiled a significant record of
military and naval prowess on two continents. Born in 1807 in Nice, a city
several times traded between Piedmontese and French control, by age 25, he was
a certified merchant marine captain. In 1833, he joined La Giovine Italia or
'Young Italy', a group founded by Giuseppe Mazzini, for whom unification was
his life's work.[3] La Giovine Italia sought to free the Northern Italian
provinces from Austrian domination and to create a republican government. In
1834, Garibaldi was sentenced to death in absentia by a Genoese Court for
participating in a La Giovine Italia inspired mutiny against the Piedmontese
navy.[4] He fled to France and two years later exiled himself to South America
where his penchant for freeing the oppressed began its meteoric rise.

In South America, he was involved in extensive naval and land operations for
the province of Rio Grande, which fought unsuccessfully for its freedom from
Brazil in the 'War of Tatters.'[5] After that, Garibaldi fought for Uruguay as
it struggled to maintain the freedom it had won from Argentina. He returned to
Italy in 1849 to unsuccessfully defend the short lived 1st Roman Republic
against the forces of Austria-Hungary, France and the Papacy. After losing the
battle of Rome, Garibaldi evaded these forces but his troops melted away and he
again went into exile eventually arriving in New York in the summer of 1850.[6]

Garibaldi was based in New York City for three years and made many fruitful
contacts there. Although the General never held American citizenship, in 1851
the mayor of New York City, Ambrose C. Kingsland, issued a passport to "Joseph
Garibaldi" which still survives among preserved papers.[7] It seems likely that
Garibaldi's friends in the Masonic order which he had joined in Europe, played
a role in obtaining the passport, which states Garibaldi's "intent to become a
citizen."[8] As things turned out, Garibaldi never stayed in the United States
long enough to have become a citizen. During his time in New York, the general
held high placed support within government and outside of it. Horace Greeley,
famed editor of the New York Tribune, who a decade later, had strong influence
on President Lincoln, wrote:

"Garibaldi [is] known the world over as the
hero of Montevideo and the defender of the Roman Republic. He will be received
by all who know him in a befitting manner as a man of character, and for his
service in behalf of liberty."[9]

In 1853, after a few years of relative quiet, Garibaldi returned to the Kingdom
of Italy then consisting only of Piedmont and Sardinia and was elected a member
of the parliament. By the beginning of 1861, Garibaldi had taken the field and
forced the Bourbons out of Sicily and the rest of southern Italy and joined
these areas with the Kingdom of Italy ruled by King Victor Emanuel II of the
House of Savoy. He then retired to Caprera. Meanwhile the events that would
lead to the outbreak of the United States Civil War were unfolding.

Although recognizing that discussions had taken place between Garibaldi and
members of the United States diplomatic corps, many historians discounted the
notion that Lincoln had ever actually offered General Garibaldi a Union
command. Fortunately, the discovery of a telegram sent by Garibaldi to King
Victor Emanuel describing Lincoln's offer provided incontrovertible proof of
it. Historian Arrigo Petacco found this communication in Savoy Royal family
papers and the discovery was reported in the British press in February,
2000.[10]

The idea of giving General Garibaldi a Union Army command was initially sparked
in January, 1861. An anonymous article in the Boston publication The North
American Review was quite complimentary of Garibaldi's military
prowess. In response to the article, the General sent a thank you note to the North
American Review and his companion, Col. Augusto Vecchi, in his own
note covering Garibaldi's, suggested that Garibaldi would be a good choice for
a senior command in the Union Army.[11]

Six months later, J. W. Quiggle, a consular official in Antwerp and a Buchanan
appointee soon to be replaced, operating without approval of his superiors,
wrote Garibaldi advancing the idea of a Union Army command. The Consul's letter
of June 8th 1861 states:

"The papers report that you are going to the
United States, to join the army of the North in the conflict of my country. If
you do, the name of LaFayette will not surpass yours. There are thousands of
Italians and Hungarians who will rush to your ranks, and there are … and tens
of thousands of American citizens who will glory to be under the command of the
'Washington of Italy.' "[12]

On June 27th, Garibaldi responded. He corrected the Consul stating that at the
time he was not planning a return to the United States. Garibaldi also took the
opportunity to express one of the conditions he would later ask.

"I have had, and still have, a great desire to
go, but many causes prevent me. If, however, in writing to your Government,
[you find that] they believe my service to be of some use, I would go to
America, if I did not find myself occupied in the defense of my country. Tell
me, also, whether this agitation is the emancipation of the negroes or
not?"[13]

George M. Trevelyan's history of the making of Italy, backs this up. He quotes
another Garibaldi statement "Libertá non tradisce I volenti. 'Liberty does not
fail those who are determined to have it'."[14] Quiggle's reply to Garibaldi,
again written without consulting his superiors in Washington, was vague. He
wrote from Antwerp on July 4, 1861:

"You propound the question whether the present
war in the United States is to emancipate the negroes from slavery? I say this
is not the intention of the Federal Government. But it is to maintain its power
and dignity—put down rebellion and insurrection, and restore to the Government
her ancient prowess at home and throughout the world. You have lived in the
United States; and you must readily have observed what a dreadful calamity it
would be to throw at once upon that country in looseness, four millions of
slaves. But if this war be prosecuted with the bitterness with which it has
been commenced, I would not be surprised if it result in the extinction of
slavery in the United States, no matter what may be the circumstances."[15]

Quiggle did then forward copies of his correspondence with Garibaldi to
Secretary of State Seward. But he did not stop at this point, even though he
and his wife were packing to return to the States. In a third letter to
Garibaldi he muddied future negotiations by saying that the Italian general
would be receiving a formal invitation to go to the United States "with the
highest Army Commission which it is in the power of the President to confer."
This implication that Garibaldi would be offered the top command was bolstered
with the false statement that President Lincoln had thanked Quiggle for
initiating the offer. In an interesting side note, Quiggle, who was then on the
way out anyway, had, in his first letter, offered to resign to join the General
in his efforts should he come to the United States.[16]

So by mid-July, Secretary of State Seward and President Lincoln were aware of
Quiggle's actions and his assumption of too much authority. Lincoln was also
even more aware of the Union Army's need for competent leadership and that
obtaining the services of an already tremendously successful general was a
possibility too valuable to ignore. On July 27th, six short days after Thomas
J. Jackson earned his nickname, 'Stonewall', at the battle of Bull Run,
Secretary of State Seward wrote Minister Henry S. Sanford in Antwerp, asking
him to work on the matter with his fellow Minister, James P. Marsh, who
represented the United States in the Kingdom of Italy at Turin, its capital at
the time. Lincoln officially asked them to try to secure General Garibaldi's
services. In turn, Sanford thanked Quiggle and, in no uncertain terms, bid him
to be silent and to treat the matter "with strict injunctions of reserve…
."[17]

Had his underling listened, things might have gone differently. Unfortunately,
Consul Quiggle who had brought up the idea of the General getting supreme
command kept interfering to the detriment of the State Department's mission.
Most likely as a result of Quiggle's insubordination, Sanford called Quiggle "a
low besotted Pennsylvania politician with an eye to money-making and political
capital." The officially approved offer that Secretary Seward asked Ministers
Sanford and Marsh to approach the "soldier of freedom" with was this:

Tell him that he will receive a Major-General's
commission in the army of the United States, with its appointments, with the
hearty welcome of the American People. Tell him that we have abundant
resources, and numbers unlimited at our command, and a nation resolved to
remain united and free.[18]

Lincoln's name is not mentioned in this or any of the other authorized
communications to Garibaldi, but correspondence between Seward and Sanford
makes it clear he had knowledge of the negotiations and approved of them. The
closest Lincoln came to personal involvement in the offer was indicated in a
confidential communication from Seward to Sanford. Sanford was given everything
short of a blank check, including 1000 Pounds Sterling and permission to extend
his available credit on the Continent if necessary. The instructions also
included the following:

It has been a source of sincere satisfaction to
the President that circumstances have rendered him able to extend to him
[Garibaldi] if desired an invitation which would enable him to add the glory of
aiding in the preservation of the American Union to the many honors which the
General of Italy has already won in the cause of human freedom.[19]

Yet, despite his own injunction to Quiggle, Sanford informed him of events
prior to strategizing with Minister Marsh in Turin. This led to Quiggle yet
again writing Garibaldi and still implying that Lincoln would offer him the
role of Commander in Chief. Unfortunately, because of his excitement at the
possibilities, Minister Marsh's legation secretary, a lawyer named Artomi,
mistakenly reaffirmed Quiggle's machinations thus reinforcing Garibaldi's
expectations.[20]

At the time of the Sanford-Marsh offer, King Victor Emanuel's Italy consisted
of Sardinia, the Piedmont, Naples, and Sicily. General Garibaldi, wanted all
the rest of Italy also united with the Kingdom. He tried to use the United
States' offer as a way to pressure his fellow Italians to initiate new actions
to eradicate the Pope's temporal control of Central Italy. He noted that his
participation was probably crucial to any efforts to further unify Italy and
that he would be unavailable if he accepted the U.S. offer. After King Emanuel
informed him that no assaults were to be made against His Holiness by
Garibaldi, or anyone else for that matter, the American offer, if Garibaldi
accepted, would have become a way for him to save face.

By late September information leaked by Garibaldi aides reached the American
papers. However, details were garbled. For instance, the Chicago Tribune
wrote an article claiming that the American Charge D'Affaires in Berlin was
responsible for tendering the offer to General Garibaldi.[21] The paper does
not make it clear whether the article was referring to the Quiggle or
Sanford-Marsh offer.

General Garibaldi did not accept the official offer made by Sanford and Marsh
for two reasons. First, he wanted abolition of slavery to be the primary war
aim and he demanded that it be made explicit. He was unwilling to settle for
Quiggle's view that abolition would be an inevitable result of the war. At the
time he made the offer, Lincoln was not ready to do this. In fact, the
President had already fired General Charles Fremont for prematurely
implementing emancipation measures in areas under military control. The second
reason for refusal was that Garibaldi retained a desire for total command, as
had been suggested by Quiggle's original correspondence and subsequently
reinforced by him and Artomi.

In late 1862, two more offers were made to Garibaldi, both illegitimate. One
came from by a Charge D'Affaires in Vienna named Canasius, and the other came
from Marsh, still the United States Minister to Victor Emanuel's government. By
this time Garibaldi was willing to accept a smaller command. Had the General
known that Lincoln was swiftly moving towards emancipation, this might have
satisfied his second condition. However, since these offers were made without
presidential approval, there is no way knowledge of the already written but
unpublicized Emancipation Proclamation would have become known to the parties
involved.[22]

Garibaldi's insistence that abolition become the goal of the American Civil War
if he were to join the Union effort was entirely consistent with his earlier
statements and actions. When, back in 1843, the president of Uruguay announced
his intention to give land from his personal holdings to Garibaldi and the
members of the Italian Legion who helped defend against Argentina's attempt to
reassert control over that country, Garibaldi first, then all the legionnaires,
refused to accept the grants in a letter which included:

" The Italian legionnaires hold firmly to the
belief that it is their duty as free men to fight for freedom wherever tyranny
exists, regardless of the country or the people involved, freedom being the
birthright of all mankind. The legionnaires were obeying the voices of their
consciences when they requested weapons from the native sons of Uruguay in
order to share their perils and fight for the defense of their republic. Happy
to be doing their duty as free men, so long as the conditions of the siege
remain, they will continue to share the bread and the perils of their brave
comrades in the city's garrison, not wishing to receive rewards or distinctions
of any kind."[23]

H. Nelson Gay, writing in the American Historical Review during the
Fall of 1932 makes it clear that Emancipation was a sticking point in
negotiations and that Garibaldi wanted command of all Union forces.[24] In any
event, by the end of 1862, King Victor Emanuel had decided the time was right
to act again for the freedom and unification of Italy. Garibaldi had left the
semi- retirement U.S. government officials found him enjoying at Caprera. With
the newfound approval of the King, he was preparing to battle the Austrians and
the Pope in another attempt to free Rome. However, even though the General
turned down the American offers, one does wonder what would have evolved if he
had accepted any of them. [25]

Before we consider what might have occurred under a Garibaldi led Union Army,
let us look at his tactical and strategic background. At the time, the usual
method of attack was to have each battalion line up and advance shoulder to
shoulder. Garibaldi, often having very few troops compared to his enemies,
could not afford the high casualties that usually result from this approach,
even if such tactics resulted in victory. Garibaldi's success came from
superior tactics such as attacking enemy flanks, rears and lines of
communication. He also used tactics such as night attacks and countermarches to
throw the enemy off their guard and deplete his opponent's morale.

Unlike Robert E. Lee and many other Union and Confederate commanders, Garibaldi
held no admiration for the French military in general or for the bloody, direct
frontal assault style attacks Napoleon became known for after 1805 at battles
like Borodino, Austerlitz and Waterloo. General Garibaldi's operations were
similar to the American guerrilla tactics and the indirect attacks that
Napoleon himself used in his earlier campaigns. Sir Basil Henry Liddell-Hart's
description of the Napoleon led Italian campaign in the 1790's bears mentioning
since General Garibaldi copied many of its strategies and tactics. Napoleon, at
the time, usually had inferior numbers, thus he was required to use his forces
in ways that he could win with few losses. Hart compared Napoleon's use of
maneuver and indirect attacks to a trap weighed down with four stones. When the
trap is sprung, the stones come crashing to the point of intrusion. In one case
Bonaparte used a two thousand-man regiment to block off the Austrian army's
retreat by trapping them between Lake Garda and the mountains with the rest of
the army pressing the Austrian's new rear. Only when Napoleon became
Consul and then Emperor, did he start to waste his men in bloody assaults.

Much of Garibaldi's experience was directly with Napoleon's former enemies, the
Piedmontese, who had been on the receiving end of Bonaparte's military prowess
and were ultimately forced out of the war by the indirect Napoleonic strategy
in the 1790's.[26] Garibaldi, no doubt learned much from this. Just how much
was made clear at Varese against the Austrians where his opponent had 17,000
men compared to Garibaldi's 5,000. Garibaldi barricaded the town and attacked
the Austrians in the flank the night before they could assault the
barricades.[27] In short, Garibaldi was a master of maneuver.

Certainly maneuver had been used effectively before in America but it seemed
far from the minds of its civil war commanders on both sides. Famous are the
Patriots pursuit of the British after Lexington and Concord and the deliberate
tactical lures such as fake retreats used by General Dan Morgan at the Cowpens
in South Carolina. Garibaldi would have used similar tactics to wear down the
Confederates and win the war faster, without having to resort to a lengthy
siege or the hammering tactics General Grant later became infamous for.

There are two points at which Garibaldi might have accepted a Union army
command, Fall, 1861 and a year later, in 1862. If General Garibaldi accepted
the initial offer from Marsh and Sanford in 1861, Richmond might have fallen in
1862 under a more competent execution of the Peninsula Campaign. General
McClellan (Little Mac) was excellent at organizing the Army of the Potomac but
almost cowardly in deciding to use it. Little Mac saw Confederates around every
turn, ascribing to General Lee double the amount of men he actually had causing
Lincoln to exclaim "Sending armies to McClellan is like shoveling fleas across
a barnyard. Not half of them get there." Certainly, Garibaldi would have been
more aggressive.

It is more likely that Garibaldi would have accepted either Canasius' or George
Marsh's second offer in late 1862. The situation was quite different from the
year before. Garibaldi had ignored king Victor Emanuel's decision, made an
attack on Rome against orders, lost the battle and been arrested. The General
was freed at the behest of the United States Government and thus 'owed them
one.' It appeared Garibaldi's part in the unification of Italy was at a
standstill. Acceptance of an American offer would have been face saving. If
Lincoln had made either 1862 offer official, it's possible the already written
but unpublicized Emancipation Proclamation would have been made known to
Garibaldi and satisfied his demands about the abolition of slavery.

If Garibaldi accepted in late 1862, he might well have taken charge of the Army
of the Potomac in early 1863, before the important Battle of Chancellorsville
in May. The Federal defeat in that battle was a direct result of the failure of
Oliver Howard's 11th Corps to dig in and thus secure the Union right flank.
Garibaldi would never have allowed that mistake to last long enough for the
Confederates to exploit it, as they did under General Stonewall Jackson. In a
sad mistake, Stonewall was shot by his own troops during the attack and died as
a result. Had the 11th Corps dug in, there is a possibility that Jackson's
attack would not have been made or, if made, repulsed thus turning the battle
into a Union victory. Ironically, Jackson who died in victory would probably
have survived a Confederate defeat or stalemate. He was shot by Confederate
pickets on his way back to his own lines after doing reconnaissance on ground
surrendered by Howard.

Garibaldi, with his knowledge of superior tactics and "celerity, judgment, and
impetuous valor"[29] might well have recognized and taken opportunities passed
up by other Union commanders. For instance, the Confederate army under General
Robert E. Lee was split in two as it moved through the Blue Mountain Range
passes in Virginia on its way to Pennsylvania. Ewell's Corp was west of the
mountains and Hill's and Longstreet's Corps east of them. A more alert and
mobile Union Army might well have defeated one column or the other before they
were able to reunite at Gettysburg. A defeat on the Confederacy's home ground
would have led to significant change in the military and political situation
for the Confederacy. A clear-cut victory by Garibaldi while Lee was on the
march northward would have separated the main Confederate army from its
supplies and communications. It would have also opened the road to the
confederate capital, Richmond, that, if successfully attacked by Union forces,
would have put the Confederate government on the run. Any hope of recognition
or aid by Britain or France would have evaporated even sooner than it did. This
would have ended Confederate President Jefferson Davis' expectation that the
need for southern cotton would lead to a military alliance between sympathetic
European powers and the Confederacy.[31]

Although General Meade, who replaced Hooker as commander of the Army of the
Potomac in June, 1863, won the battle of Gettysburg, it was done at enormous
cost. There were twenty-three thousand Union casualties, three out of seven
Corps commanders were dead or wounded and, unfortunately for Meade, a mauled,
but still strong, Army of Northern Virginia survived to threaten the Union for
two more years. To Lincoln's great frustration, Meade, because of his large
losses, didn't pursue Lee after Gettysburg, even though he was operating in his
home territory.

If Garibaldi had joined the Union Army after the battle of Chancellorsville, he
would have been in charge at Gettysburg instead of George Meade. I believe he
would also have achieved a Union victory but with fewer casualties. With a less
costly victory under Garibaldi, The Union Army could have pinned Lee to the
Potomac River which remained flooded until the middle of July, 1863 and forced
the ill supplied Army of Northern Virginia to surrender.

By a curious coincidence, what could have been Garibaldi's first battle for the
Union, Gettysburg, would have been very similar topographically to Rome.
Garibaldi had spent plenty of time in the hills surrounding Rome defending the
San Janiculum sector against the French during the siege of 1849. According to
Trevelyan's history of the 1848-49 Republic, Garibaldi's skillful use of
existing fortification and artillery was crucial in how he defended Rome.
Although best known for his offensive success, Garibaldi was also skilled at
defense. There is little doubt the general had the capability to use Cemetery
Ridge as effectively as he had the Vascello 15 years before.[32]

Garibaldi had significant support in the U.S. press and among Western
Mediterranean immigrants. An October 9, 1862 Chicago Tribune article
states that the General would have inspired many French and Italian immigrants
to get involved in the war. He would have become an Italian Franz Siegel,[33]
but immeasurably more competent at his trade.[34]

As noted, Garibaldi stayed in Italy and achieved his goal of freedom and
unification for Italy in 1870 when French forces supporting the Pope were
withdrawn from Rome to fight the Prussians and the balance of power shifted in
Garibaldi's favor. As a matter of historical irony, Pope Pius IX, who was one
of the two last remaining opponents to Italian unification, had been the only
foreign leader to openly recognize the Confederacy. In a letter to Confederate
President Jefferson Davis the Pope had written:

"As for us, we shall not cease to offer up the
most fervent prayers to God Almighty, that He may pour out upon all the people
of America the spirit of peace and charity, and that He will stop the great
evils which afflict them. We, at the same time, beseech the God of pity to shed
abroad upon you the light of His grace, and attach you to us by a perfect
friendship."[35]

After this letter was made public, a cleric who was a friend of President
Lincoln, said:

"That letter is a poisoned arrow thrown by the
Pope at you personally; it is your death warrant. Before the letter, every
Catholic could see that their church as a whole was against this free Republic.
The bishops refused…exposing themselves as traitors and be shot. … they advised
the Pope to acknowledge, at once, the legitimacy of the Southern republic, and
to take Jeff Davis under his supreme protection, by a letter, which would be
read everywhere."[36]

Had Garibaldi come to America and his efforts led to an earlier end to the
Civil War, Lincoln might have lived. This alone would have immense consequences
such as a more lenient and benevolent Reconstruction. Also, in gratitude, the
United States might have considered helping Garibaldi unify Italy. The U.S.
could have done four things. Most involved, but least likely, would be
declaring war on Austria and the Pope and sending troops from a not yet
demobilized army. The only way troops would be sent would be if Lincoln or a
successor had dropped the tradition of American isolationism. Putting
diplomatic pressure on Victor Emanuel's enemies would be far more acceptable to
an American public, sick of bloodshed. Third, selling Garibaldi surplus arms
and munitions would have been mutually beneficial, defraying the cost of the
Civil War for the U.S. and giving Garibaldi a secure supply for his ends. Last
and most probable, Garibaldi might have been permitted to recruit volunteers in
the United States to return to Italy with him. Garibaldi had fought with
escaped slaves in South America 20 years earlier, there is no reason to think
he would not have jumped at employing former slaves against the Papacy and
Habsburg Austrians. It turned out that Garibaldi didn't need American help, but
it might have solidified a future alliance if the U.S. had played a role in
Italy's unification.

A strong Italo-American alliance based on U.S. support for Garibaldi might have
kept Italy firmly separated from both the Entente and the Central Powers in the
lead up to World War One. If the U.S. and Italy created a third bloc, the start
of the war even becomes an issue. Would Kaiser Wilhelm and Emperor Franz Josef
have sanctioned the invasion of Belgium if they knew a three front war would
immediately result? Even if the war still began as it did, an Italy with strong
American support might not have been attacked. Or, when Italy was attacked,
President Wilson might have supported her by sending troops for her defense
thus moving American participation in the war up by several years.

So, had Quiggle not raised Garibaldi's expectations and had Lincoln moved
faster on Emancipation, the outcome of history post-1865 would be entirely
different. However, it remains fact that Giuseppe Garibaldi did not join the
Union cause, the only Garibaldi actually in the United States Civil War was the
39th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment, nicknamed the Garibaldi Guard.

[1]. Prior to 1870, there was no 'Italy' as we know it today. For hundreds of
years, the Bourbons ruling France and Spain also controlled Southern Italy
(Kingdom of the Two Sicilies), Austria occupied much of Northern Italy (Venice
and Lombardy), and the Pope ruled the central Italian provinces.

[2]. Garibaldi was known for the red shirts worn by those in the Italian Legion
he led which fought in 1843 to defend Uruguay's newly won independence from
Argentina. Many French and Italian expatriates, mostly political refugees,
living in Montevideo at the time volunteered to fight for Uruguay. Hearing that
the French would be uniformed and believing in the morale boosting qualities of
sharing a uniform, Garibaldi, with very limited funds, purchased partly singed
bolts of red cloth from a warehouse which had had a fire. The shirts were made
by Garibaldi's wife, Anita, and other volunteer seamstresses. Thus, by
happenstance, red became the color of freedom fighters under Garibaldi's
command. See Lisa Sergio's I Am My Beloved: The Life of Anita Garibaldi.
New York: Weybright and Talley, 1969 pg, 162.

[32]. Trevelyan George, McCaulay. Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic.
London: Longman, Green and Company,1919, 213-15. The Vascello was a prominent,
fortified villa used by the forces under Garibaldi. It never fell and was
turned over to the French after Rome surrendered.

[33]. Siegel was responsible recruiting many of the Germans into the Union army
but was largely useless as a commander, culminating with his defeat by Early's
second Corps at New Market Va in May, 1864.