The Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, Complete by William T. Sherman

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My DEAR GENERAL: The question of reconstruction in Louisiana,Mississippi, and Arkansas, will soon come up for decision of theGovernment, and not only the length of the war, but our ultimateand complete success, will depend upon its decision. It is adifficult matter, but I believe it can be successfully solved, ifthe President will consult opinions of cool and discreet men, whoare capable of looking at it in all its bearings and effects. Ithink he is disposed to receive the advice of our generals who havebeen in these States, and know much more of their condition thangassy politicians in Congress. General Banks has written prettyfully, on the subject. I wrote to General Grant, immediately,after the fall of Vicksburg, for his views in regard toMississippi, but he has not yet answered.

I wish you would consult with Grant, McPherson, and others of cool,good judgment, and write me your views fully, as I may wish to usethem with the President. You had better write me unofficially, andthen your letter will not be put on file, and cannot hereafter beused against you. You have been in Washington enough to know howevery thing a man writes or says is picked up by his enemies andmisconstrued. With kind wishes for your further success,

DEAR GENERAL: I have received your letter of August 29th, and withpleasure confide to you fully my thoughts on the important mattersyou suggest, with absolute confidence that you will use what isvaluable, and reject the useless or superfluous.

That part of the continent of North America known as Louisiana,Mississippi, and Arkansas, is in my judgment the key to the wholeinterior. The valley of the Mississippi is America, and, althoughrailroads have changed the economy of intercommunication, yet thewater-channels still mark the lines of fertile land, and affordcheap carriage to the heavy products of it.

The inhabitants of the country on the Monongahela, the Illinois,the Minnesota, the Yellowstone, and Osage, are as directlyconcerned in the security of the Lower Mississippi as are those whodwell on its very banks in Louisiana; and now that the nation hasrecovered its possession, this generation of men will make afearful mistake if they again commit its charge to a people liableto misuse their position, and assert, as was recently done, that,because they dwelt on the banks of this mighty stream, they had aright to control its navigation.

I would deem it very unwise at this time, or for years to come, torevive the State governments of Louisiana, etc., or to institute inthis quarter any civil government in which the local people havemuch to say. They had a government so mild and paternal that theygradually forgot they had any at all, save what they themselvescontrolled; they asserted an absolute right to seize public moneys,forts, arms, and even to shut up the natural avenues of travel andcommerce. They chose war--they ignored and denied all theobligations of the solemn contract of government and appealed toforce.

We accepted the issue, and now they begin to realize that war is atwo-edged sword, and it may be that many of the inhabitants cry forpeace. I know them well, and the very impulses of their nature;and to deal with the inhabitants of that part of the South whichborders on the great river, we must recognize the classes intowhich they have divided themselves:

First. The large planters, owning lands, slaves, and all kinds ofpersonal property. These are, on the whole, the ruling class.They are educated, wealthy, and easily approached. In somedistricts they are bitter as gall, and have given up slaves,plantations, and all, serving in the armies of the Confederacy;whereas, in others, they are conservative. None dare admit afriendship for us, though they say freely that they were at theoutset opposed to war and disunion. I know we can manage thisclass, but only by action. Argument is exhausted, and words havelost their usual meaning. Nothing but the logic of events touchestheir understanding; but, of late, this has worked a wonderfulchange. If our country were like Europe, crowded with people, Iwould say it would be easier to replace this class than toreconstruct it, subordinate to the policy of the nation; but, asthis is not the case, it is better to allow the planters, withindividual exceptions, gradually to recover their plantations, tohire any species of labor, and to adapt themselves to the new orderof things. Still, their friendship and assistance to reconstructorder out of the present ruin cannot be depended on. They watchthe operations of our armies, and hope still for a SouthernConfederacy that will restore to them the slaves and privilegeswhich they feel are otherwise lost forever. In my judgment, wehave two more battles to win before we should even bother our mindswith the idea of restoring civil order--viz., one near Meridian, inNovember, and one near Shreveport, in February and March next, whenRed River is navigable by our gunboats. When these are done, then,and not until then, will the planters of Louisiana, Arkansas, andMississippi, submit. Slavery is already gone, and, to cultivatethe land, negro or other labor must be hired. This, of itself, isa vast revolution, and time must be afforded to allow men to adjusttheir minds and habits to this new order of things. A civilgovernment of the representative type would suit this class farless than a pure military role, readily adapting itself to actualoccurrences, and able to enforce its laws and orders promptly andemphatically.

Second. The smaller farmers, mechanics, merchants, and laborers.This class will probably number three-quarters of the whole; have,in fact, no real interest in the establishment of a SouthernConfederacy, and have been led or driven into war on the falsetheory that they were to be benefited somehow--they knew not how.They are essentially tired of the war, and would slink back home ifthey could. These are the real tiers etat of the South, and arehardly worthy a thought; for they swerve to and fro according toevents which they do not comprehend or attempt to shape. When thetime for reconstruction comes, they will want the old politicalsystem of caucuses, Legislatures, etc., to amuse them and make thembelieve they are real sovereigns; but in all things they willfollow blindly the lead of the planters. The Southern politicians,who understand this class, use them as the French do their masses--seemingly consult their prejudices, while they make their ordersand enforce them. We should do the same.

Third. The Union men of the South. I must confess I have littlerespect for this class. They allowed a clamorous set of demagoguesto muzzle and drive them as a pack of curs. Afraid of shadows,they submit tamely to squads of dragoons, and permit them, withouta murmur, to burn their cotton, take their horses, corn, and everything; and, when we reach them, they are full of complaints if ourmen take a few fence-rails for fire, or corn to feed our horses.They give us no assistance or information, and are loudest in theircomplaints at the smallest excesses of our soldiers. Their sons,horses, arms, and every thing useful, are in the army against us,and they stay at home, claiming all the exemptions of peacefulcitizens. I account them as nothing in this great game of war.

Fourth. The young bloods of the South: sons of planters, lawyersabout towns, good billiard-players and sportsmen, men who never didwork and never will. War suits them, and the rascals are brave,fine riders, bold to rashness, and dangerous subjects in everysense. They care not a sou for niggers, land, or any thing. Theyhate Yankees per se, and don't bother their brains about the past,present, or future. As long as they have good horses, plenty offorage, and an open country, they are happy. This is a largerclass than most men suppose, and they are the most dangerous set ofmen that this war has turned loose upon the world. They aresplendid riders, first-rate shots, and utterly reckless. Stewart,John Morgan, Forrest, and Jackson, are the types and leaders ofthis class. These men must all be killed or employed by us beforewe can hope for peace. They have no property or future, andtherefore cannot be influenced by any thing, except personalconsiderations. I have two brigades of these fellows in my front,commanded by Cosby, of the old army, and Whitfield, of Texas.Stephen D. Lee is in command of the whole. I have frequentinterviews with their officers, a good understanding with them, andam inclined to think, when the resources of their country areexhausted, we must employ them. They are the best cavalry in theworld, but it will tax Mr. Chase's genius for finance to supplythem with horses. At present horses cost them nothing; for theytake where they find, and don't bother their brains as to who is topay for them; the same may be said of the cornfields, which have,as they believe, been cultivated by a good-natured people for theirspecial benefit. We propose to share with them the free use ofthese cornfields, planted by willing hands, that will never gatherthe crops.

Now that I have sketched the people who inhabit the district ofcountry under consideration, I will proceed to discuss the future.

A civil government now, for any part of it, would be simplyridiculous. The people would not regard it, and even the militarycommanders of the antagonistic parties would treat it lightly.Governors would be simply petitioners for military assistance, toprotect supposed friendly interests, and military commanders wouldrefuse to disperse and weaken their armies for military reasons.Jealousies would arise between the two conflicting powers, and,instead of contributing to the end of the war, would actually deferit. Therefore, I contend that the interests of the United States,and of the real parties concerned, demand the continuance of thesimple military role, till after all the organized armies of theSouth are dispersed, conquered, and subjugated.

The people of all this region are represented in the Army ofVirginia, at Charleston, Mobile, and Chattanooga. They have sonsand relations in each of the rebel armies, and naturally areinterested in their fate. Though we hold military possession ofthe key-points of their country, still they contend, and naturally,that should Lee succeed in Virginia, or Bragg at Chattanooga, achange will occur here also. We cannot for this reason attempt toreconstruct parts of the South as we conquer it, till all idea ofthe establishment of a Southern Confederacy is abandoned. Weshould avail ourselves of the present lull to secure thestrategical points that will give us an advantage in the futuremilitary movements, and we should treat the idea of civilgovernment as one in which we as a nation have a minor orsubordinate interest. The opportunity is good to impress on thepopulation the truth that they are more interested in civilgovernment than we are; and that, to enjoy the protection of laws,they most not be passive observers of events, but must aid andsustain the constituted authorities in enforcing the laws; theymust not only submit themselves, but should pay their share oftaxes, and render personal services when called on.

It seems to me, in contemplating the history of the past two years,that all the people of our country, North, South, East, and West,have been undergoing a salutary political schooling, learninglessons which might have been acquired from the experience of otherpeople; but we had all become so wise in our own conceit that wewould only learn by actual experience of our own. The people evenof small and unimportant localities, North as well as South, hadreasoned themselves into the belief that their opinions weresuperior to the aggregated interest of the whole nation. Half ourterritorial nation rebelled, on a doctrine of secession that theythemselves now scout; and a real numerical majority actuallybelieved that a little State was endowed with such sovereignty thatit could defeat the policy of the great whole. I think the presentwar has exploded that notion, and were this war to cease now, theexperience gained, though dear, would be worth the expense.

Another great and important natural truth is still in contest, andcan only be solved by war. Numerical majorities by vote have beenour great arbiter. Heretofore all men have cheerfully submitted toit in questions left open, but numerical majorities are notnecessarily physical majorities. The South, though numericallyinferior, contend they can whip the Northern superiority ofnumbers, and therefore by natural law they contend that they arenot bound to submit. This issue is the only real one, and in myjudgment all else should be deferred to it. War alone can decideit, and it is the only question now left for us as a people todecide. Can we whip the South? If we can, our numerical majorityhas both the natural and constitutional right to govern them. Ifwe cannot whip them, they contend for the natural right to selecttheir own government, and they have the argument. Our armies mustprevail over theirs; our officers, marshals, and courts, mustpenetrate into the innermost recesses of their land, before we havethe natural right to demand their submission.

I would banish all minor questions, assert the broad doctrine thatas a nation the United States has the right, and also the physicalpower, to penetrate to every part of our national domain, and thatwe will do it--that we will do it in our own time and in our ownway; that it makes no difference whether it be in one year, or two,or ten, or twenty; that we will remove and destroy every obstacle,if need be, take every life, every acre of land, every particle ofproperty, every thing that to us seems proper; that we will notcease till the end is attained; that all who do not aid us areenemies, and that we will not account to them for our acts. If thepeople of the South oppose, they do so at their peril; and if theystand by, mere lookers-on in this domestic tragedy, they have noright to immunity, protection, or share in the final results.

I even believe and contend further that, in the North, every memberof the nation is bound by both natural and constitutional law to"maintain and defend the Government against all its enemies andopposers whomsoever." If they fail to do it they are derelict, andcan be punished, or deprived of all advantages arising from thelabors of those who do. If any man, North or South, withholds hisshare of taxes, or his physical assistance in this, the crisis ofour history, he should be deprived of all voice in the futureelections of this country, and might be banished, or reduced to thecondition of a mere denizen of the land.

War is upon us, none can deny it. It is not the choice of theGovernment of the United States, but of a faction; the Governmentwas forced to accept the issue, or to submit to a degradation fataland disgraceful to all the inhabitants. In accepting war, itshould be "pure and simple" as applied to the belligerents. Iwould keep it so, till all traces of the war are effaced; tillthose who appealed to it are sick and tired of it, and come to theemblem of our nation, and sue for peace. I would not coax them, oreven meet them half-way, but make them so sick of war thatgenerations would pass away before they would again appeal to it.

I know what I say when I repeat that the insurgents of the Southsneer at all overtures looking to their interests. They scorn thealliance with the Copperheads; they tell me to my face that theyrespect Grant, McPherson, and our brave associates who fightmanfully and well for a principle, but despise the Copperheads andsneaks at the North, who profess friendship for the South andopposition to the war, as mere covers for their knavery andpoltroonery.

God knows that I deplore this fratricidal war as much as any manliving, but it is upon us, a physical fact; and there is only onehonorable issue from it. We must fight it out, army against army,and man against man; and I know, and you know, and civilians beginto realize the fact, that reconciliation and reconstruction will beeasier through and by means of strong, well-equipped, and organizedarmies than through any species of conventions that can be framed.The issues are made, and all discussion is out of place andridiculous. The section of thirty-pounder Parrott rifles nowdrilling before my tent is a more convincing argument than thelargest Democratic meeting the State of New York can possiblyassemble at Albany; and a simple order of the War Department todraft enough men to fill our skeleton regiments would be moreconvincing as to our national perpetuity than an humble pardon toJeff. Davis and all his misled host.

The only government needed or deserved by the States of Louisiana,Arkansas, and Mississippi, now exists in Grant's army. This needs,simply, enough privates to fill its ranks; all else will follow indue season. This army has its well-defined code of laws andpractice, and can adapt itself to the wants and necessities of acity, the country, the rivers, the sea, indeed to all parts of thisland. It better subserves the interest and policy of the GeneralGovernment, and the people here prefer it to any weak or servilecombination that would at once, from force of habit, revive sadperpetuate local prejudices and passions. The people of thiscountry have forfeited all right to a voice in the councils of thenation. They know it and feel it, and in after-years they will bethe better citizens from the dear bought experience of the presentcrisis. Let them learn now, and learn it well, that good citizensmust obey as well as command. Obedience to law, absolute--yea,even abject--is the lesson that this war, under Providence, willteach the free and enlightened American citizen. As a nation, weshall be the better for it.

I never have apprehended foreign interference in our familyquarrel. Of coarse, governments founded on a different and it maybe an antagonistic principle with ours naturally feel a pleasure atour complications, and, it may be, wish our downfall; but in theend England and France will join with us in jubilation at thetriumph of constitutional government over faction. Even now theEnglish manifest this. I do not profess to understand Napoleon'sdesign in Mexico, and I do not, see that his taking militarypossession of Mexico concerns us. We have as much territory now aswe want. The Mexicans have failed in self-government, and it was aquestion as to what nation she should fall a prey. That is nowsolved, and I don't see that we are damaged. We have the finestpart of the North American Continent, all we can people and cantake care of; and, if we can suppress rebellion in our own land,and compose the strife generated by it, we shall have enoughpeople, resources, and wealth, if well combined, to defyinterference from any and every quarter.

I therefore hope the Government of the United States will continue,as heretofore, to collect, in well-organized armies, the physicalstrength of the nation; applying it, as heretofore, in assertingthe national authority; and in persevering, without relaxation, tothe end. This, whether near or far off, is not for us to say; but,fortunately, we have no choice. We must succeed--no other choiceis left us except degradation. The South must be ruled by us, orshe will rule us. We must conquer them, or ourselves be conquered.There is no middle course. They ask, and will have, nothing else,and talk of compromise is bosh; for we know they would even scornthe offer.

I wish the war could have been deferred for twenty years, till thesuperabundant population of the North could flow in and replace thelosses sustained by war; but this could not be, and we are forcedto take things as they are.

All therefore I can now venture to advise is to raise the draft toits maximum, fill the present regiments to as large a standard aspossible, and push the war, pure and simple. Great attentionshould be paid to the discipline of our armies, for on them may befounded the future stability of the Government.

The cost of the war is, of course, to be considered, but financeswill adjust themselves to the actual state of affairs; and, even ifwe would, we could not change the cost. Indeed, the larger thecost now, the less will it be in the end; for the end must beattained somehow, regardless of loss of life and treasure, and ismerely a question of time.

Excuse so long a letter. With great respect, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

General Halleck, on receipt of this letter, telegraphed me that Mr.Lincoln had read it carefully, and had instructed him to obtain myconsent to have it published. At the time, I preferred not to bedrawn into any newspaper controversy, and so wrote to GeneralHalleck; and the above letter has never been, to my knowledge,published; though Mr. Lincoln more than once referred to it withmarks of approval.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPSCAMP ON BIG BLACK, September 17, 1863

DEAR GENERAL: I inclose for your perusal, and for you to read toGeneral Grant such parts as you deem interesting, letters receivedby me from Prof. Mahan and General Halleck, with my answers. Afteryou have read my answer to General Halleck, I beg you to inclose itto its address, and return me the others.

I think Prof. Mahan's very marked encomium upon the campaign ofVicksburg is so flattering to General Grant, that you may offer tolet him keep the letter, if he values such a testimonial. I havenever written a word to General Halleck since my report of lastDecember, after the affair at Chickasaw, except a short letter afew days ago, thanking him for the kind manner of his transmittingto me the appointment of brigadier-general. I know that inWashington I am incomprehensible, because at the outset of the warI would not go it blind and rush headlong into a war unprepared andwith an utter ignorance of its extent and purpose. I was thenconstrued unsound; and now that I insist on war pure and simple,with no admixture of civil compromises, I am supposed vindictive.You remember what Polonius said to his son Laertes: "Beware ofentrance to a quarrel; but, being in, bear it, that the opposed maybeware of thee." What is true of the single man, is equally trueof a nation. Our leaders seemed at first to thirst for thequarrel, willing, even anxious, to array against us all possibleelements of opposition; and now, being in, they would hasten toquit long before the "opposed" has received that lesson which heneeds. I would make this war as severe as possible, and show nosymptoms of tiring till the South begs for mercy; indeed, I know,and you know, that the end would be reached quicker by such acourse than by any seeming yielding on our part. I don't want ourGovernment to be bothered by patching up local governments, or bytrying to reconcile any class of men. The South has done herworst, and now is the time for us to pile on our blows thick andfast.

Instead of postponing the draft till after the elections, we oughtnow to have our ranks full of drafted men; and, at best, if theycome at all, they will reach us when we should be in motion.

I think General Halleck would like to have the honest, candidopinions of all of us, viz., Grant, McPherson, and Sherman. I havegiven mine, and would prefer, of course, that it should coincidewith the others. Still, no matter what my opinion may be, I caneasily adapt my conduct to the plane of others, and am only toohappy when I find theirs better, than mine.

If no trouble, please show Halleck's letter to McPherson, and askhim to write also. I know his regiments are like mine (meresquads), and need filling up. Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

CHAPTER XIV.

CHATTANOOGA AND KNOXVILLE.

JULY TO DECEMBER, 1863.

After the fall of Vicksburg, and its corollary, Port Hudson, theMississippi River was wholly in the possession of the Union forces,and formed a perfect line of separation in the territories of ouropponents. Thenceforth, they could not cross it save by stealth,and the military affairs on its west bank became unimportant.Grant's army had seemingly completed its share of the work of war,and lay, as it were, idle for a time. In person General Grant wentto New Orleans to confer with General Banks, and his victoriousarmy was somewhat dispersed. Parke's corps (Ninth) returned toKentucky, and afterward formed part of the Army of the Ohio, underGeneral Burnside; Ord's corps (Thirteenth) was sent down toNatchez, and gradually drifted to New Orleans and Texas; McPhersons(Seventeenth) remained in and near Vicksburg; Hurlbut's (Sixteenth)was at Memphis; and mine (Fifteenth) was encamped along the BigBlack, about twenty miles east of Vicksburg. This corps wascomposed of four divisions: Steele's (the First) was posted at andnear the railroad-bridge; Blair's (the Second), next in order, nearParson Fox's; the Third Division (Tuttle's) was on the ridge aboutthe head of Bear Creek; and the Fourth (Ewing's) was at Messinger'sFord. My own headquarters were in tents in a fine grove of oldoaks near Parson Fox's house, and the battalion of the ThirteenthRegulars was the headquarters guard.

All the camps were arranged for health, comfort, rest, and drill.It being midsummer, we did not expect any change till the autumnmonths, and accordingly made ourselves as comfortable as possible.There was a short railroad in operation from Vicksburg to thebridge across the Big Black, whence supplies in abundance werehauled to our respective camps. With a knowledge of this fact Mrs.Sherman came down from Ohio with Minnie, Lizzie, Willie, and Tom,to pay us a visit in our camp at Parson Fog's. Willie was thennine years old, was well advanced for his years, and took the mostintense interest in the affairs of the army. He was a greatfavorite with the soldiers, and used to ride with me on horsebackin the numerous drills and reviews of the time. He then had thepromise of as long a life as any of my children, and displayed moreinterest in the war than any of them. He was called a "sergeant"in the regular battalion, learned the manual of arms, and regularlyattended the parade and guard-mounting of the Thirteenth, back ofmy camp. We made frequent visits to Vicksburg, and always stoppedwith General McPherson, who had a large house, and boarded with afamily (Mrs. Edwards's) in which were several interesting youngladies. General Grant occupied another house (Mrs. Lum's) inVicksburg during that summer, and also had his family with him.The time passed very agreeably, diversified only by little eventsof not much significance, among which I will recount only one.

While, we occupied the west bank of the Big Black, the east bankwas watched by a rebel cavalry-division, commanded by GeneralArmstrong. He had four brigades, commanded by Generals Whitfield,Stark, Cosby, and Wirt Adams. Quite frequently they communicatedwith us by flags of truce on trivial matters, and we reciprocated;merely to observe them. One day a flag of truce, borne by aCaptain B...., of Louisville, Kentucky, escorted by abouttwenty-five men, was reported at Messinger's Ferry, and I sentorders to let them come right into my tent. This brought themthrough the camps of the Fourth Division, and part of the Second;and as they drew up in front of my tent, I invited Captain B....and another officer with him (a major from Mobile) to dismount, toenter my tent, and to make themselves at home. Their escort wassent to join mine, with orders to furnish them forage and everything they wanted. B.... had brought a sealed letter for GeneralGrant at Vicksburg, which was dispatched to him. In the evening wehad a good supper, with wine and cigars, and, as we sat talking,B.... spoke of his father and mother, in Louisville, got leave towrite them a long letter without its being read by any one, andthen we talked about the war. He said: "What is the use of yourpersevering? It is simply impossible to subdue eight millions ofpeople;" asserting that "the feeling in the South had become soembittered that a reconciliation was impossible." I answered that,"sitting as we then were, we appeared very comfortable, and surelythere was no trouble in our becoming friends." "Yes," said he,"that is very true of us, but we are gentlemen of education, andcan easily adapt ourselves to any condition of things; but thiswould not apply equally well to the common people, or to the commonsoldiers." I took him out to the camp-fires behind the tent, andthere were the men of his escort and mine mingled together,drinking their coffee, and happy as soldiers always seem. I askedB.... what he thought of that, and he admitted that I had the bestof the argument. Before I dismissed this flag of truce, hiscompanion consulted me confidentially as to what disposition heought to make of his family, then in Mobile, and I frankly gave himthe best advice I could.

While we were thus lying idle in camp on the big Black, the Army ofthe Cumberland, under General Rosecrans, was moving against Braggat Chattanooga; and the Army of the Ohio, General Burnside, wasmarching toward East Tennessee. General Rosecrans was so confidentof success that he somewhat scattered his command, seemingly tosurround and capture Bragg in Chattanooga; but the latter,reenforced from Virginia, drew out of Chattanooga, concentrated hisarmy at Lafayette, and at Chickamauga fell on Rosecrans, defeatedhim, and drove him into Chattanooga. The whole country seemedparalyzed by this unhappy event; and the authorities in Washingtonwere thoroughly stampeded. From the East the Eleventh Corps(Slocum), and the Twelfth Corps (Howard), were sent by rail toNashville, and forward under command of General Hooker; orders werealso sent to General Grant, by Halleck, to send what reenforcementshe could spare immediately toward Chattanooga.

Bragg had completely driven Rosecrans's army into Chattanooga; thelatter was in actual danger of starvation, and the railroad to hisrear seemed inadequate to his supply. The first intimation which Igot of this disaster was on the 22d of September, by an order fromGeneral Grant to dispatch one of my divisions immediately intoVicksburg, to go toward Chattanooga, and I designated the First,General Osterhaus--Steele meantime having been appointed to thecommand of the Department of Arkansas, and had gone to Little Rock.General Osterhaus marched the same day, and on the 23d I wassummoned to Vicksburg in person, where General Grant showed me thealarming dispatches from General Halleck, which had been sent fromMemphis by General Hurlbut, and said, on further thought, that hewould send me and my whole corps. But, inasmuch as one division ofMcPherson's corps (John E. Smith's) had already started, heinstructed me to leave one of my divisions on the Big Black, and toget the other two ready to follow at once. I designated theSecond, then commanded by Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith, and theFourth, commanded by Brigadier-General Corse.

On the 25th I returned to my camp on Big Black, gave all thenecessary orders for these divisions to move, and for the Third(Tittle's) to remain, and went into Vicksburg with my family. Thelast of my corps designed for this expedition started from camp onthe 27th, reached Vicksburg the 28th, and were embarked on boatsprovided for them. General Halleck's dispatches dwelt upon thefact that General Rosecrans's routes of supply were overtaxed, andthat we should move from Memphis eastward, repairing railroads aswe progressed, as far as Athens, Alabama, whence I was to report toGeneral Rosecrans, at Chattanooga, by letter.

I took passage for myself and family in the steamer Atlantic,Captain Henry McDougall. When the boat was ready to start, Williewas missing. Mrs. Sherman supposed him to have been with me,whereas I supposed he was with her. An officer of the Thirteenthwent up to General McPherson's house for him, and soon returned,with Captain Clift leading him, carrying in his hands a smalldouble-barreled shot gun; and I joked him about carrying awaycaptured property. In a short time we got off. As we all stood onthe guards to look at our old camps at Young's Point, I remarkedthat Willie was not well, and he admitted that he was sick. Hismother put him to bed, and consulted Dr. Roler, of the Fifty-fifthIllinois, who found symptoms of typhoid fever. The river was low;we made slow progress till above Helena; and, as we approachedMemphis, Dr. Roler told me that Willie's life was in danger, and hewas extremely anxious to reach Memphis for certain medicines andfor consultation. We arrived at Memphis on the 2d of October,carried Willie up to the Gayoso Hotel, and got the most experiencedphysician there, who acted with Dr. Roler, but he sank rapidly, anddied the evening of the 3d of October. The blow was a terrible oneto us all, so sudden and so unexpected, that I could not helpreproaching myself for having consented to his visit in that sicklyregion in the summer-time. Of all my children, he seemed the mostprecious. Born in San Francisco, I had watched with intenseinterest his development, and he seemed more than any of thechildren to take an interest in my special profession. Mrs.Sherman, Minnie, Lizzie, and Tom, were with him at the time, and weall, helpless and overwhelmed, saw him die. Being in the verymidst of an important military enterprise, I had hardly time topause and think of my personal loss. We procured a metalliccasket, and had a military funeral, the battalion of the ThirteenthUnited States Regulars acting as escort from the Gayoso Hotel tothe steamboat Grey Eagle, which conveyed him and my family up toCairo, whence they proceeded to our home at Lancaster, Ohio, wherehe was buried. I here give my letter to Captain C. C. Smith, whocommanded the battalion at the time, as exhibiting our intensefeelings:

MY DEAR FRIEND: I cannot sleep to-night till I record an expressionof the deep feelings of my heart to you, and to the officers andsoldiers of the battalion, for their kind behavior to my poorchild. I realize that you all feel for my family the attachment ofkindred, and I assure you of full reciprocity. Consistent with asense of duty to my profession and office, I could not leave mypost, and sent for the family to come to me in that fatal climate,and in that sickly period of the year, and behold the result! Thechild that bore my name, and in whose future I reposed with moreconfidence than I did in my own plan of life, now floats a merecorpse, seeking a grave in a distant land, with a weeping mother,brother, and sisters, clustered about him. For myself, I ask nosympathy. On, on I must go, to meet a soldier's fate, or live tosee our country rise superior to all factions, till its flag isadored and respected by ourselves and by all the powers of theearth.

But Willie was, or thought he was, a sergeant in the Thirteenth. Ihave seen his eye brighten, his heart beat, as he beheld thebattalion under arms, and asked me if they were not real soldiers.Child as he was, he had the enthusiasm, the pure love of truth,honor, and love of country, which should animate all soldiers.

God only knows why he should die thus young. He is dead, but willnot be forgotten till those who knew him in life have followed himto that same mysterious end.

Please convey to the battalion my heart-felt thanks, and assureeach and all that if in after-years they call on me or mine, andmention that they were of the Thirteenth Regulars when Willie was asergeant, they will have a key to the affections of my family thatwill open all it has; that we will share with them our lastblanket, our last crust! Your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-general.

Long afterward, in the spring of 1867, we had his body disinterredand brought to St. Louis, where he is now buried in a beautifulspot, in Calvary Cemetery, by the side of another child, "Charles,"who was born at Lancaster, in the summer of 1864, died early, andwas buried at Notre Dame, Indiana. His body was transferred at thesame time to the same spot. Over Willie's grave is erected abeautiful marble monument, designed and executed by the officersand soldiers, of that battalion which claimed him as a sergeant andcomrade.

During the summer and fall of 1863 Major-General S. A. Hurlbut wasin command at Memphis. He supplied me copies of all dispatchesfrom Washington, and all the information he possessed of the eventsabout Chattanooga. Two of these dispatches cover all essentialpoints:

WASHINGTON CITY, September 15, 1863--5 p.m.

Major-General S. A. HURLBUT, Memphis:

All the troops that can possibly be spared in West Tennessee and onthe Mississippi River should be sent without delay to assistGeneral Rosecrans on the Tennessee River.

Urge Sherman to act with all possible promptness.

If you have boats, send them down to bring up his troops.

Information just received indicates that a part of Lee's army hasbeen sent to reenforce Bragg.

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

Washington, September 19, 1868--4 p.m.

Major-General S. A. HURLBUT, Memphis, Tennessee:

Give me definite information of the number of troops sent towardDecatur, and where they are. Also, what other troops are tofollow, and when.

Has any thing been heard from the troops ordered from Vicksburg?

No efforts must be spared to support Rosecrans's right, and toguard the crossings of the Tennessee River.

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

My special orders were to repair the Memphis & Charleston Railroadeastward as I progressed, as far as Athens, Alabama, to drawsupplies by that route, so that, on reaching Athens, we should notbe dependent on the roads back to Nashville, already overtaxed bythe demand of Rosecrans's army.

On reaching Memphis, October 2d, I found that Osterhaus's divisionhad already gone by rail as far as Corinth, and than John E.Smith's division was in the act of starting by cars. The SecondDivision, then commanded by Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith,reached Memphis at the same time with me; and the Fourth Division,commanded by Brigadier-General John M. Corse, arrived a day or twoafter. The railroad was in fair condition as far as Corinth,ninety-six miles, but the road was badly stocked with locomotivesand cars, so that it took until the 9th to get off the SecondDivision, when I gave orders for the Fourth Division andwagon-trains to march by the common road.

On Sunday morning, October 11th, with a special train loaded withour orderlies and clerks, the horses of our staff, the battalion ofthe Thirteenth United States Regulars, and a few officers goingforward to join their commands, among them Brigadier-General HughEwing, I started for Corinth.

At Germantown, eight miles, we passed Corse's division (Fourth) onthe march, and about noon the train ran by the depot atColliersville, twenty-six miles out. I was in the rear car with mystaff, dozing, but observed the train slacking speed and stoppingabout half a mile beyond the depot. I noticed some soldiersrunning to and fro, got out at the end of the car, and soon ColonelAnthony (Silty-sixth Indiana), who commanded the post, rode up andsaid that his pickets had just been driven in, and there was anappearance of an attack by a large force of cavalry coming from thesoutheast. I ordered the men to get off the train, to form on theknoll near the railroad-cut, and soon observed a rebel officerriding toward us with a white flag. Colonel Anthony and ColonelDayton (one of my aides) were sent to meet him, and to keep him inconversation as long as possible. They soon returned, saying itwas the adjutant of the rebel general Chalmers, who demanded thesurrender of the place. I instructed them to return and give anegative answer, but to delay him as much as possible, so as togive us time for preparation. I saw Anthony, Dayton, and the rebelbearer of the flag, in conversation, and the latter turn his horseto ride back, when I ordered Colonel McCoy to run to the station,and get a message over the wires as quick as possible to Memphisand Germantown, to hurry forward Corse's division. I then orderedthe train to back to the depot, and drew back the battalion ofregulars to the small earth redoubt near it. The depot-buildingwas of brick, and had been punctured with loop-holes. To its east,about two hundred yards, was a small square earthwork or fort, intowhich were put a part of the regulars along with the company of theSixty-sixth Indiana already there. The rest of the men weredistributed into the railroad-cut, and in some shallowrifle-trenches near the depot. We had hardly made thesepreparations when the enemy was seen forming in a long line on theridge to the south, about four hundred yards off, and soon after twoparties of cavalry passed the railroad on both sides of us, cuttingthe wires and tearing up some rails. Soon they opened on us withartillery (of which we had none), and their men were dismounting andpreparing to assault. To the south of us was an extensivecornfield, with the corn still standing, and on the other side wasthe town of Colliersville. All the houses near, that could giveshelter to the enemy, were ordered to be set on fire, and the menwere instructed to keep well under cover and to reserve their firefor the assault, which seemed inevitable. A long line of rebelskirmishers came down through the cornfield, and two other partiesapproached us along the railroad on both sides. In the fort was asmall magazine containing some cartridges. Lieutenant James, afine, gallant fellow, who was ordnance-officer on my staff, askedleave to arm the orderlies and clerks with some muskets which he hadfound in the depot, to which I consented; he marched them into themagazine, issued cartridges, and marched back to the depot to assistin its defense. Afterward he came to me, said a party of the enemyhad got into the woods near the depot, and was annoying him, and hewanted to charge and drive it away. I advised him to be extremelycautious, as our enemy vastly outnumbered us, and had everyadvantage in position and artillery; but instructed him, if they gottoo near, he might make a sally. Soon after, I heard a rapid firein that quarter, and Lieutenant. James was brought in on astretcher, with a ball through his breast, which I supposed to befatal.

[After the fight we sent him back to Memphis, where his mother andfather came from their home on the North River to nurse him. YoungJames was recovering from his wound, but was afterward killed by afall from his horse, near his home, when riding with the daughtersof Mr. Hamilton Fish, now Secretary of State.]

The enemy closed down on us several times, and got possession ofthe rear of our train, from which they succeeded in getting five ofour horses, among them my favorite mare Dolly; but our men werecool and practised shots (with great experience acquired atVicksburg), and drove them back. With their artillery they knockedto pieces our locomotive and several of the cars, and set fire tothe train; but we managed to get possession again, and extinguishedthe fire. Colonel Audenreid, aide-de-camp, was provoked to findthat his valise of nice shirts had been used to kindle the fire.The fighting continued all round us for three or four hours, whenwe observed signs of drawing off, which I attributed to therightful cause, the rapid approach of Corse's division, whicharrived about dark, having marched the whole distance from Memphis,twenty-six miles, on the double-quick. The next day we repaireddamages to the railroad and locomotive, and went on to Corinth.

At Corinth, on the 16th, I received the following importantdispatches:

MEMPHIS, October 14, 1863--11 a.m.

Arrived this morning. Will be off in a few hours. My orders areonly to go to Cairo, and report from there by telegraph. McPhersonwill be in Canton to-day. He will remain there until Sunday orMonday next, and reconnoitre as far eastward as possible withcavalry, in the mean time.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1863--1 p.m.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Corinth

Yours of the 10th is received. The important matter to be attendedto is that of supplies. When Eastport can be reached by boats, theuse of the railroad can be dispensed with; but until that time itmust be guarded as far as need. The Kentucky Railroad can barelysupply General Rosecrans. All these matters must be left to yourjudgment as circumstances may arise. Should the enemy be so strongas to prevent your going to Athena, or connecting with GeneralRosecrans, you will nevertheless have assisted him greatly bydrawing away a part of the enemy's forces.

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.

On the 18th, with my staff and a small escort, I rode forward toBurnsville, and on the 19th to Iuka, where, on the next day, I wasmost agreeably surprised to hear of the arrival at Eastport (onlyten miles off) of two gunboats, under the command of CaptainPhelps, which had been sent up the Tennessee River by AdmiralPorter, to help us.

Satisfied that, to reach Athens and to communicate with GeneralRosecrans, we should have to take the route north of the TennesseeRiver, on the 24th I ordered the Fourth Division to cross atEastport with the aid of the gunboats, and to move to Florence.About the same time, I received the general orders assigningGeneral Grant to command the Military Division of the Mississippi,authorizing him, on reaching Chattanooga, to supersede GeneralRosecrans by General George H. Thomas, with other and completeauthority, as set, forth in the following letters of GeneralHalleck, which were sent to me by General Grant; and the sameorders devolved on me the command of the Department and Army of theTennessee.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, D.C., October 16, 1863

Major-General U. S. GRANT, Louisville.

GENERAL: You will receive herewith the orders of the President ofthe United States, placing you in command of the Departments of theOhio, Cumberland, and Tennessee. The organization of thesedepartments will be changed as you may deem most practicable. Youwill immediately proceed to Chattanooga, and relieve GeneralRosecrans. You can communicate with Generals Burnside and Shermanby telegraph. A summary of the orders sent to these officers willbe sent to you immediately. It is left optional with you tosupersede General Rosecrans by General G. H. Thomas or not. Anyother changes will be made on your request by telegram.

One of the first objects requiring your attention is the supply ofyour armies. Another is the security of the passes in the Georgiamountains, to shut out the enemy from Tennessee and Kentucky. Youwill consult with General Meigs and Colonel Scott in regard totransportation and supplies.

Should circumstances permit, I will visit you personally in a fewdays for consultation.

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, D. C., October 20, 1868.

Major-General GRANT, Louisville.

GENERAL: In compliance with my promise, I now proceed to give youa brief statement of the objects aimed at by General Rosecrans andGeneral Burnside's movement into East Tennessee, and of themeasures directed to be taken to attain these objects.

It has been the constant desire of the government, from thebeginning of the war, to rescue the loyal inhabitants of EastTennessee from the hands of the rebels, who fully appreciated theimportance of continuing their hold upon that country. In additionto the large amount of agricultural products drawn from the uppervalley of the Tennessee, they also obtained iron and othermaterials from the vicinity of Chattanooga. The possession of EastTennessee would cut off one of their most important railroadcommunications, and threaten their manufactories at Rome, Atlanta,etc.

When General Buell was ordered into East Tennessee in the summer of1882, Chattanooga was comparatively unprotected; but Bragg reachedthere before Buell, and, by threatening his communications, forcedhim to retreat on Nashville and Louisville. Again, after thebattle of Perryville, General Buell was urged to pursue Bragg'sdefeated army, and drive it from East Tennessee. The same wasurged upon his successor, but the lateness of the season or othercauses prevented further operations after the battle of StoneRiver.

Last spring, when your movements on the Mississippi River had drawnout of Tennessee a large force of the enemy, I again urged GeneralRosecrans to take advantage of that opportunity to carry out hisprojected plan of campaign, General Burnside being ready tocooperate, with a diminished but still efficient force. But hecould not be persuaded to act in time, preferring to lie still tillyour campaign should be terminated. I represented to him, butwithout avail, that by this delay Johnston might be able toreenforce Bragg with the troops then operating against you.

When General Rosecrans finally determined to advance, he wasallowed to select his own lines and plans for carrying out theobjects of the expedition. He was directed, however, to report hismovements daily, till he crossed the Tennessee, and to connect hisleft, so far as possible, with General Burnside's right. GeneralBurnside was directed to move simultaneously, connecting his right,as far as possible, with General Rosecrans's left so that, if theenemy concentrated upon either army, the other could move to itsassistance. When General Burnside reached Kingston and Knoxville,and found no considerable number of the enemy in East Tennessee, hewas instructed to move down the river and cooperate with GeneralRosecrans.

These instructions were repeated some fifteen times, but were notcarried out, General Burnside alleging as an excuse that hebelieved that Bragg was in retreat, and that General Rosecransneeded no reenforcements. When the latter had gained possession ofChattanooga he was directed not to move on Rome as he proposed, butsimply to hold the mountain-passes, so as to prevent the ingress ofthe rebels into East Tennessee. That object accomplished, Iconsidered the campaign as ended, at least for the present. Futureoperations would depend upon the ascertained strength and;movements of the enemy. In other words, the main objects of thecampaign were the restoration of East Tennessee to the Union, andby holding the two extremities of the valley to secure it fromrebel invasion.

The moment I received reliable information of the departure ofLongstreet's corps from the Army of the Potomac, I ordered forwardto General Rosecrans every available man in the Department of theOhio, and again urged General Burnside to move to his assistance.I also telegraphed to Generals Hurlbut, Sherman, and yourself, tosend forward all available troops in your department. If theseforces had been sent to General Rosecrans by Nashville, they couldnot have been supplied; I therefore directed them to move byCorinth and the Tennessee River. The necessity of this has beenproved by the fact that the reinforcements sent to him from theArmy of the Potomac have not been able, for the want of railroadtransportation, to reach General Rosecrans's army in the field.

In regard to the relative strength of the opposing armies, it isbelieved that General Rosecrans when he first moved against Bragghad double, if not treble, his force. General Burnside, also, hadmore than double the force of Buckner; and, even when Bragg andBuckner united, Rosecrans's army was very greatly superior innumber. Even the eighteen thousand men sent from Virginia, underLongstreet, would not have given the enemy the superiority. It isnow ascertained that the greater part of the prisoners parolled byyou at Vicksburg, and General Banks at Port Hudson, were illegallyand improperly declared exchanged, and forced into the ranks toswell the rebel numbers at Chickamauga. This outrageous act, inviolation of the laws of war, of the cartel entered into by therebel authorities, and of all sense of honor, gives us a usefullesson in regard to the character of the enemy with whom we arecontending. He neither regards the rules of civilized warfare, noreven his most solemn engagements. You may, therefore, expect tomeet in arms thousands of unexchanged prisoners released by you andothers on parole, not to serve again till duly exchanged.

Although the enemy by this disgraceful means has been able toconcentrate in Georgia and Alabama a much larger force than weanticipated, your armies will be abundantly able to defeat him.Your difficulty will not be in the want of men, but in the means ofsupplying them at this season of the year. A single-track railroadcan supply an army of sixty or seventy thousand men, with the usualnumber of cavalry and artillery; but beyond that number, or with alarge mounted force, the difficulty of supply is very great.

I do not know the present condition of the road from Nashville toDecatur, but, if practicable to repair it, the use of that trianglewill be of great assistance to you. I hope, also, that the recentrise of water in the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers will enableyou to employ water transportation to Nashville, Eastport, orFlorence.

If you reoccupy the passes of Lookout Mountain, which should neverhave been given up, you will be able to use the railroad and riverfrom Bridgeport to Chattanooga. This seems to me a matter of vitalimportance, and should receive your early attention.

I submit this summary in the hope that it will assist you in fullyunderstanding the objects of the campaign, and the means ofattaining these objects. Probably the Secretary of War, in hisinterviews with you at Louisville, has gone over the same ground.Whatever measures you may deem proper to adopt under existingcircumstances, you will receive all possible assistance from theauthorities at Washington. You have never, heretofore, complainedthat such assistance has not been afforded you in your operations,and I think you will have no cause of complaint in your presentcampaign. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief

General Frank P. Blair, who was then ahead with the two divisionsof Osterhaus and John E. Smith, was temporarily assigned to thecommand of the Fifteenth Corps. General Hurlbut remained atMemphis in command of the Sixteenth Corps, and General McPherson atVicksburg with the Seventeenth. These three corps made up the Armyof the Tennessee. I was still busy in pushing forward the repairsto the railroad bridge at Bear Creek, and in patching up the manybreaks between it and Tuscumbia, when on the 27th of October, as Isat on the porch of a house, I was approached by a dirty,black-haired individual with mixed dress and strange demeanor, whoinquired for me, and, on being assured that I was in fact the man,he handed me a letter from General Blair at Tuscumbia, and anothershort one, which was a telegraph-message from General Grant atChattanooga, addressed to me through General George Crook,commanding at Huntsville, Alabama, to this effect:

Drop all work on Memphis & Charleston Railroad, cross the Tennesseeand hurry eastward with all possible dispatch toward Bridgeport,till you meet further orders from me.

U. S. GRANT.

The bearer of this message was Corporal Pike, who described to me,in his peculiar way, that General Crook had sent him in a canoe;that he had paddled down the Tennessee River, over Muscle Shoals,was fired at all the way by guerrillas, but on reaching Tuscumbiahe had providentially found it in possession of our troops. He hadreported to General Blair, who sent him on to me at Iuka. ThisPike proved to be a singular character; his manner attracted mynotice at once, and I got him a horse, and had him travel with useastward to about Elkton, whence I sent him back to General Crookat Huntsville; but told him, if I could ever do him a personalservice, he might apply to me. The next spring when I was inChattanooga, preparing for the Atlanta campaign, Corporal Pike madehis appearance and asked a fulfillment of my promise. I inquiredwhat he wanted, and he said he wanted to do something bold,something that would make him a hero. I explained to him, that wewere getting ready to go for Joe Johnston at Dalton, that Iexpected to be in the neighborhood of Atlanta about the 4th ofJuly, and wanted the bridge across the Savannah River at Augusta,Georgia, to be burnt about that time, to produce alarm andconfusion behind the rebel army. I explained to Pike that thechances were three to one that he would be caught and hanged; butthe greater the danger the greater seemed to be his desire toattempt it. I told him to select a companion, to disguise himselfas an East Tennessee refugee, work his way over the mountains intoNorth Carolina, and at the time appointed to float down theSavannah River and burn that bridge. In a few days he had made hispreparations and took his departure. The bridge was not burnt, andI supposed that Pike had been caught and hanged.

When we reached Columbia, South Carolina, in February, 1865, justas we were leaving the town, in passing near the asylum, I heard myname called, and saw a very dirty fellow followed by a file of menrunning toward me, and as they got near I recognized Pike. Hecalled to me to identify him as one of my men; he was then aprisoner under guard, and I instructed the guard to bring him thatnight to my camp some fifteen miles up the road, which was done.Pike gave me a graphic narrative of his adventures, which wouldhave filled a volume; told me how he had made two attempts to burnthe bridge, and failed; and said that at the time of our enteringColumbia he was a prisoner in the hands of the rebels, under trialfor his life, but in the confusion of their retreat he made hisescape and got into our lines, where he was again made a prisonerby our troops because of his looks. Pike got some clothes, cleanedup, and I used him afterward to communicate with Wilmington, NorthCarolina. Some time after the war, he was appointed a lieutenantof the Regular, Cavalry, and was killed in Oregon, by theaccidental discharge of a pistol. Just before his death he wroteme, saying that he was tired of the monotony of garrison-life, andwanted to turn Indian, join the Cheyennes on the Plains, who werethen giving us great trouble, and, after he had gained theirconfidence, he would betray them into our hands. Of course I wrotehim that he must try and settle down and become a gentleman as wellas an officer, apply himself to his duties, and forget the wilddesires of his nature, which were well enough in time of war, butnot suited to his new condition as an officer; but, poor fellow Ihe was killed by an accident, which probably saved him from aslower but harder fate.

At Iuka I issued all the orders to McPherson and Hurlbut necessaryfor the Department of the Tennessee during my absence, and,further, ordered the collection of a force out of the SixteenthCorps, of about eight thousand men, to be commanded by General G.M. Dodge, with orders to follow as far east as Athens, Tennessee,there to await instructions. We instantly discontinued allattempts to repair the Charleston Railroad; and the remaining threedivisions of the Fifteenth Corps marched to Eastport, crossed theTennessee River by the aid of the gunboats, a ferry-boat, and acouple of transports which had come up, and hurried eastward.

In person I crossed on the 1st of November, and rode forward toFlorence, where I overtook Ewing's division. The other divisionsfollowed rapidly. On the road to Florence I was accompanied by mystaff, some clerks, and mounted orderlies. Major Ezra Taylorwas chief of artillery, and one of his sons was a clerk athead-quarters. The latter seems to have dropped out of the column,and gone to a farm house near the road. There was no organizedforce of the rebel army north of the Tennessee River, but thecountry was full of guerrillas. A party of these pounced down onthe farm, caught young Taylor and another of the clerks, and afterreaching Florence, Major Taylor heard of the capture of his son, andlearned that when last seen he was stripped of his hat and coat, wastied to the tail-board of a wagon, and driven rapidly to the northof the road we had traveled. The major appealed to me to dosomething for his rescue. I had no cavalry to send in pursuit, butknowing that there was always an understanding between theseguerrillas and their friends who staid at home, I sent for three orfour of the principal men of Florence (among them a Mr. Foster, whohad once been a Senator in Congress), explained to them the captureof young Taylor and his comrade, and demanded their immediaterestoration. They, of course, remonstrated, denied all knowledge ofthe acts of these guerrillas, and claimed to be peaceful citizens ofAlabama, residing at home. I insisted that these guerrillas weretheir own sons and neighbors; that they knew their haunts, and couldreach them if they wanted, and they could effect the restoration tous of these men; and I said, moreover, they must do it withintwenty-four hours, or I would take them, strip them of their hatsand coats, and tie them to the tail-boards of our wagons till theywere produced. They sent off messengers at once, and young Taylorand his comrade were brought back the next day.

Resuming our march eastward by the large road, we soon reached ElkRiver, which was wide and deep, and could only be crossed by aferry, a process entirely too slow for the occasion; so I changedthe route more by the north, to Elkton, Winchester, and Deckerd.At this point we came in communication with the Army of theCumberland, and by telegraph with General Grant, who was atChattanooga. He reiterated his orders for me and my command tohurry forward with all possible dispatch, and in person I reachedBridgeport during the night of November 13th, my troops followingbehind by several roads. At Bridgeport I found a garrison guardingthe railroad-bridge and pontoon bridge there, and staid with thequartermaster, Colonel William G. Le Due (who was my school-mate atHow's School in 1836). There I received a dispatch from GeneralGrant, at Chattanooga, to come up in person, leaving my troops tofollow as fast as possible. At that time there were two or threesmall steamboats on the river, engaged in carrying stores up as faras Kelly's Ferry. In one of these I took passage, and on reachingKelly's Ferry found orderlies, with one of General Grant's privatehorses, waiting for me, on which I rode into Chattanooga, November14th. Of course, I was heartily welcomed by Generals Grant,Thomas, and all, who realized the extraordinary efforts we had madeto come to their relief. The next morning we walked out to FortWood, a prominent salient of the defenses of the place, and fromits parapet we had a magnificent view of the panorama. LookoutMountain, with its rebel flags and batteries, stood out boldly, andan occasional shot fired toward Wauhatchee or Moccasin Point gavelife to the scene. These shots could barely reach Chattanooga, andI was told that one or more shot had struck a hospital inside thelines. All along Missionary Ridge were the tents of the rebelbeleaguering force; the lines of trench from Lookout up toward theChickamauga were plainly visible; and rebel sentinels, in acontinuous chain, were walking their posts in plain view, not athousand yards off. "Why," said I, "General Grant, you arebesieged;" and he said, "It is too true." Up to that moment I hadno idea that things were so bad. The rebel lines actually extendedfrom the river, below the town, to the river above, and the Army ofthe Cumberland was closely held to the town and its immediatedefenses. General Grant pointed out to me a house on MissionaryRidge, where General Bragg's headquarters were known to be. Healso explained the situation of affairs generally; that the mulesand horses of Thomas's army were so starved that they could nothaul his guns; that forage, corn, and provisions, were so scarcethat the men in hunger stole the few grains of corn that were givento favorite horses; that the men of Thomas's army had been sodemoralized by the battle of Chickamauga that he feared they couldnot be got out of their trenches to assume the offensive; thatBragg had detached Longstreet with a considerable force up intoEast Tennessee, to defeat and capture Burnside; that Burnside wasin danger, etc.; and that he (Grant) was extremely anxious toattack Bragg in position, to defeat him, or at least to force himto recall Longstreet. The Army of the Cumberland had so long beenin the trenches that he wanted my troops to hurry up, to take theoffensive first; after which, he had no doubt the Cumberland armywould fight well. Meantime the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, underGeneral Hooker, had been advanced from Bridgeport along therailroad to Wauhatchee, but could not as yet pass Lookout Mountain.A pontoon-bridge had been thrown across the Tennessee River atBrown's Ferry, by which supplies were hauled into Chattanooga fromKelly's and Wauhatchee..

Another bridge was in course of construction at Chattanooga, underthe immediate direction of Quartermaster-General Meigs, but at thetime all wagons, etc., had to be ferried across by a flying-bridge.Men were busy and hard at work everywhere inside our lines, andboats for another pontoon-bridge were being rapidly constructedunder Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, familiarly known as "BaldySmith," and this bridge was destined to be used by my troops, at apoint of the river about four miles above Chattanooga, just belowthe mouth of the Chickamauga River. General Grant explained to methat he had reconnoitred the rebel line from Lookout Mountain up toChickamauga, and he believed that the northern portion ofMissionary Ridge was not fortified at all; and he wanted me, assoon as my troops got up, to lay the new pontoon-bridge by night,cross over, and attack Bragg's right flank on that part of theridge abutting on Chickamauga Creek, near the tunnel; and heproposed that we should go at once to look at the ground. Incompany with Generals Thomas, W. F. Smith, Brannan, and others, wecrossed by the flying-bridge, rode back of the hills some fourmiles, left our horses, and got on a hill overlooking the wholeground about the mouth of the Chickamauga River, and across to theMissionary Hills near the tunnel. Smith and I crept down behind afringe of trees that lined the river-bank, to the very pointselected for the new bridge, where we sat for some time, seeing therebel pickets on the opposite bank, and almost hearing their words.

Having seen enough, we returned to Chattanooga; and in order tohurry up my command, on which so much depended, I started back toKelly's in hopes to catch the steamboat that same evening; but onmy arrival the boat had gone. I applied to the commanding officer,got a rough boat manned by four soldiers, and started down theriver by night. I occasionally took a turn at the oars to relievesome tired man, and about midnight we reached Shell Mound, whereGeneral Whittaker, of Kentucky, furnished us a new and good crew,with which we reached Bridgeport by daylight. I started Ewingsdivision in advance, with orders to turn aside toward Trenton, tomake the enemy believe we were going to turn Braggs left by prettymuch the same road Rosecrans had followed; but with the other threedivisions I followed the main road, via the Big Trestle atWhitesides, and reached General Hooker's headquarters, just aboveWauhatchee, on the 20th; my troops strung all the way back toBridgeport. It was on this occasion that the Fifteenth Corpsgained its peculiar badge: as the men were trudging along thedeeply-cut, muddy road, of a cold, drizzly day, one of our Westernsoldiers left his ranks and joined a party of the Twelfth Corps attheir camp-fire. They got into conversation, the Twelfth-Corps menasking what troops we were, etc., etc. In turn, our fellow (whohad never seen a corps-badge, and noticed that every thing wasmarked with a star) asked if they were all brigadier-generals. Ofcourse they were not, but the star was their corps-badge, and everywagon, tent, hat, etc., had its star. Then the Twelfth-Corps meninquired what corps he belonged to, and he answered, "The FifteenthCorps." "What is your badge?" "Why," said he (and he was anIrishman), suiting the action to the word, "forty rounds in thecartridge-box, and twenty in the pocket." At that time Blaircommanded the corps; but Logan succeeded soon after, and, hearingthe story, adopted the cartridge-box and forty rounds as thecorps-badge.

The condition of the roads was such, and the bridge at Brown's sofrail, that it was not until the 23d that we got three of mydivisions behind the hills near the point indicated aboveChattanooga for crossing the river. It was determined to begin thebattle with these three divisions, aided by a division of Thomas'sarmy, commanded by General Jeff. C. Davis, that was already nearthat point. All the details of the battle of Chattanooga, so faras I was a witness, are so fully given in my official reportherewith, that I need add nothing to it. It was a magnificentbattle in its conception, in its execution, and in its gloriousresults; hastened somewhat by the supposed danger of Burnside, atKnoxville, yet so completely successful, that nothing is left forcavil or fault-finding. The first day was lowering and overcast,favoring us greatly, because we wanted to be concealed from Bragg,whose position on the mountain-tops completely overlooked us andour movements. The second day was beautifully clear, and many atime, in the midst of its carnage and noise, I could not helpstopping to look across that vast field of battle, to admire itssublimity.

The object of General Hooker's and my attacks on the extreme flanksof Bragg's position was, to disturb him to such an extent, thathe would naturally detach from his centre as against us, so thatThomas's army could break through his centre. The whole plansucceeded admirably; but it was not until after dark that I learnedthe complete success at the centre, and received General Grant'sorders to pursue on the north side of Chickamauga Creek:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, CHATTANOOGA,TENNESSEE, Nov. 25, 1863

Major-General SHERMAN.

GENERAL: No doubt you witnessed the handsome manner in whichThomas's troops carried Missionary Ridge this afternoon, and canfeel a just pride, too, in the part taken by the forces under yourcommand in taking first so much of the same range of hills, andthen in attracting the attention of so many of the enemy as to makeThomas's part certain of success. The neat thing now will be torelieve Burnside. I have heard from him to the evening of the 23d.At that time he had from ten to twelve days' supplies, and spokehopefully of being able to hold out that length of time.

My plan is to move your forces out gradually until they reach therailroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Granger will move up thesouth side of the Tennessee with a column of twenty thousand men,taking no wagons, or but few, with him. His men will carry fourdays' rations, and the steamer Chattanooga, loaded with rations,will accompany the expedition.

I take it for granted that Bragg's entire force has left. If not,of course, the first thing is to dispose of him. If he has gone,the only thing necessary to do to-morrow will be to send out areconnoissance to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy. Yourstruly,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

P. S.-On reflection, I think we will push Bragg with all ourstrength to-morrow, and try if we cannot out off a good portion ofhis rear troops and trains. His men have manifested a strongdisposition to desert for some time past, and we will now give thema chance. I will instruct Thomas accordingly. Move the advanceforce early, on the most easterly road taken by the enemy.U. S. G.

This compelled me to reverse our column, so as to use the bridgeacross the Chickamauga at its mouth. The next day we struck therebel rear at Chickamauga Station, and again near Graysville.There we came in contact with Hooker's and Palmer's troops, who hadreached Ringgold. There I detached Howard to cross Taylor's Ridge,and strike the railroad which comes from the north by Cleveland toDalton. Hooker's troops were roughly handled at Ringgold, and thepursuit was checked. Receiving a note from General Hooker, askinghelp, I rode forward to Ringgold to explain the movement of Howard;where I met General Grant, and learned that the rebels had againretreated toward Dalton. He gave orders to discontinue thepursuit, as he meant to turn his attention to General Burnside,supposed to be in great danger at Knoxville, about one hundred andthirty miles northeast. General Grant returned and spent part ofthe night with me, at Graysville. We talked over mattersgenerally, and he explained that he had ordered General GordonGranger, with the Fourth Corps, to move forward rapidly toBurnsides help, and that he must return to Chattanooga to push him.By reason of the scarcity of food, especially of forage, heconsented that, instead of going back, I might keep out in thecountry; for in motion I could pick up some forage and food,especially on the Hiawassee River, whereas none remained inChattanooga.

Accordingly, on the 29th of November, my several columns marched toCleveland, and the next day we reached the Hiawassee at Charleston,where the Chattanooga & Knoxville Railroad crosses it. Therailroad-bridge was partially damaged by the enemy in retreating,but we found some abandoned stores. There and thereabouts Iexpected some rest for my weary troops and horses; but, as I rodeinto town, I met Colonel J. H. Wilson and C. A. Dana (AssistantSecretary of War), who had ridden out from Chattanooga to find me,with the following letter from General Grant, and copies of severaldispatches from General Burnside, the last which had been receivedfrom him by way of Cumberland Gap:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, CHATTANOOGA,TENNESSEE, Nov. 29, 1863

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN

News are received from Knoxville to the morning of the 27th. Atthat time the place was still invested, but the attack on it wasnot vigorous. Longstreet evidently determined to starve thegarrison out. Granger is on the way to Burnside's relief, but Ihave lost all faith in his energy or capacity to manage anexpedition of the importance of this one. I am inclined to think,therefore, I shall have to send you. Push as rapidly as you can tothe Hiawassee, and determine for yourself what force to take withyou from that point. Granger has his corps with him, from whichyou will select in conjunction with the force now with you. Inplain words, you will assume command of all the forces now movingup the Tennessee, including the garrison at Kingston, and from thatforce, organize what you deem proper to relieve Burnside. Thebalance send back to Chattanooga. Granger has a boat loaded withprovisions, which you can issue, and return the boat. I will haveanother loaded, to follow you. Use, of course, as sparingly aspossible from the rations taken with you, and subsist off thecountry all you can.

It is expected that Foster is moving, by this time, from CumberlandGap on Knoxville. I do not know what force he will have with him,but presume it will range from three thousand five hundred to fivethousand I leave this matter to you, knowing that you will dobetter acting upon your discretion than you could trammeled withinstructions. I will only add, that the last advices from Burnsidehimself indicated his ability to hold out with rations only toabout the 3d of December. Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General commanding,

This showed that, on the 27th of November, General Burnside was inKnoxville, closely besieged by the rebel General Longstreet; thathis provisions were short, and that, unless relieved by December3d, he might have to surrender. General Grant further wrote thatGeneral Granger, instead of moving with great rapidity as ordered,seemed to move "slowly, and with reluctance;" and, although he(General Grant) hated to call on me and on my tired troops, therewas no alternative. He wanted me to take command of every thingwithin reach, and to hurry forward to Knoxville.

All the details of our march to Knoxville are also given in myofficial report. By extraordinary efforts Long's small brigade ofcavalry reached Knoxville during the night of the 3d, purposely tolet Burnside know that I was rapidly approaching with an adequateforce to raise the siege.

With the head of my infantry column I reached Marysville, aboutfifteen miles short of Knoxville, on the 5th of December; when Ireceived official notice from Burnside that Longstreet had raisedthe siege, and had started in retreat up the valley towardVirginia. Halting all the army, except Granger's two divisions, onthe morning of the 6th, with General Granger and some of my staff Irode into Knoxville. Approaching from the south and west, wecrossed the Holston on a pontoon bridge, and in a large pen on theKnoxville side I saw a fine lot of cattle, which did not look muchlike starvation. I found General Burnside and staff domiciled in alarge, fine mansion, looking very comfortable, and in, a few wordshe described to me the leading events, of the previous few days,and said he had already given orders looking to the pursuit ofLongstreet. I offered to join in the pursuit, though in fact mymen were worn out, and suffering in that cold season and climate.

Indeed, on our way up I personally was almost frozen, and had tobeg leave to sleep in the house of a family at Athens.

Burnside explained to me that, reenforced by Granger's twodivisions of ten thousand men, he would be able to push Longstreetout of East Tennessee, and he hoped to capture much of hisartillery and trains. Granger was present at our conversation, andmost unreasonably, I thought, remonstrated against being left;complaining bitterly of what he thought was hard treatment to hismen and himself. I know that his language and manner at that timeproduced on my mind a bad impression, and it was one of the causeswhich led me to relieve him as a corps commander in the campaign ofthe next spring. I asked General Burnside to reduce his wishes towriting, which he did in the letter of December 7th, embodied in myofficial report. General Burnside and I then walked along hislines and examined the salient, known as Fort Sanders, where, somedays before, Longstreet had made his assault, and had sustained abloody repulse.

Returning to Burnside's quarters, we all sat down to a good dinner,embracing roast-turkey. There was a regular dining table, withclean tablecloth, dishes, knives, forks, spoons, etc., etc. I hadseen nothing of this kind in my field experience, and could nothelp exclaiming that I thought "they were starving," etc.; butBurnside explained that Longstreet had at no time completelyinvested the place, and that he had kept open communication withthe country on the south side of the river Holston, more especiallywith the French Broad settlements, from whose Union inhabitants hehad received a good supply of beef, bacon, and corn meal. Had Iknown of this, I should not have hurried my men so fast; but untilI reached Knoxville I thought his troops there were actually indanger of starvation. Having supplied General Burnside all thehelp he wanted, we began our leisurely return to Chattanooga, whichwe reached on the 16th; when General Grant in person ordered me torestore to General Thomas the divisions of Howard and Davis, whichbelonged to his army, and to conduct my own corps (the Fifteenth)to North Alabama for winter-quarters.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE, BRIDGEPORT,ALABAMA December 19, 1863

Brigadier-General John A. RAWLINS, Chief of Staff to General GRANT,Chattanooga.

GENERAL: For the first time, I am now at leisure to make anofficial record of events with which the troops under my commandhave been connected daring the eventful campaign which has justclosed. Dating the month of September last, the Fifteenth ArmyCorps, which I had the honor to command, lay in camps along the BigBlack, about twenty miles east of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Itconsisted of four divisions:

On the 22d day of September I received a telegraphic dispatch fromGeneral Grant, then at Vicksburg, commanding the Department of theTennessee, requiring me to detach one of my divisions to march toVicksburg, there to embark for Memphis, where it was to form a partof an army to be sent to Chattanooga, to reenforce GeneralRosecrans. I designated the First Division, and at 4 a. m. thesame day it marched for Vicksburg, and embarked the neat day.

On the 23d of September I was summoned to Vicksburg by the generalcommanding, who showed me several dispatches from the general-in-chief, which led him to suppose he would have to send me and mywhole corps to Memphis and eastward, and I was instructed toprepare for such orders. It was explained to me that, inconsequence of the low stage of water in the Mississippi, boats hadarrived irregularly, and had brought dispatches that seemed toconflict in their meaning, and that General John E. Smith'sdivision (of General McPherson's corps) had been ordered up toMemphis, and that I should take that division and leave one of myown in its stead, to hold the line of the Big Black. I detailedmy third division (General Tuttle) to remain and report toMajor-General McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth Corps, atVicksburg; and that of General John E. Smith, already started forMemphis, was styled the Third Division, Fifteenth Corps, though itstill belongs to the Seventeenth Army Corps. This division is alsocomposed of three brigades, commanded by General Matthias, ColonelJ. B. Raum (of the Fifty-sixth Illinois), and Colonel J. I.Alexander (of the Fifty-ninth Indiana).

The Second and Fourth Divisions were started for Vicksburg themoment I was notified that boats were in readiness, and on the27th of September I embarked in person in the steamer Atlantic,for Memphis, followed by a fleet of boats conveying thesetwo divisions. Our progress was slow, on account of theunprecedentedly low water in the Mississippi, and the scarcity ofcoal and wood. We were compelled at places to gather fence-rails,and to land wagons and haul wood from the interior to the boats;but I reached Memphis during the night of the 2d of October, andthe other boats came in on the 3d and 4th.

On arrival at Memphis I saw General Hurlbut, and read all thedispatches and letters of instruction of General Halleck, andtherein derived my instructions, which I construed to be asfollows:

To conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps, and all other troops whichcould be spared from the line of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad,to Athens, Alabama, and thence report by letter for orders toGeneral Rosecrans, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, atChattanooga; to follow substantially the railroad eastward,repairing it as I moved; to look to my own line for supplies; andin no event to depend on General Rosecrans for supplies, as theroads to his rear were already overtaxed to supply his presentarmy.

I learned from General Hurlbut that General Osterhaus's divisionwas already out in front of Corinth, and that General John E. Smithwas still at Memphis, moving his troops and material by railroad asfast as its limited stock would carry them. General J. D. Websterwas superintendent of the railroad, and was enjoined to work nightand day, and to expedite the movement as rapidly as possible; butthe capacity of the road was so small, that I soon saw that I couldmove horses, mules, and wagons faster by land, and therefore Idispatched the artillery and wagons by the road under escort, andfinally moved the entire Fourth Division by land.

The enemy seems to have had early notice of this movement, and heendeavored to thwart us from the start. A considerable forceassembled in a threatening attitude at Salem, south of SalisburyStation; and General Carr, who commanded at Corinth, felt compelledto turn back and use a part of my troops, that had already reachedCorinth, to resist the threatened attack.

On Sunday, October 11th, having put in motion my whole force, Istarted myself for Corinth, in a special train, with the battalionof the Thirteenth United States Regulars as escort. We reachedCollierville Station about noon, just in time to take part in thedefense made of that station by Colonel D. C. Anthony, of theSixty-sixth Indiana, against an attack made by General Chalmerswith a force of about three thousand cavalry, with eight pieces ofartillery. He was beaten off, the damage to the road repaired, andwe resumed our journey the next day, reaching Corinth at night.

I immediately ordered General Blair forward to Iuka, with the FirstDivision, and, as fast as I got troops up, pushed them forward ofBear Creek, the bridge of which was completely destroyed, and anengineer regiment, under command of Colonel Flag, was engaged inits repairs.

Quite a considerable force of the enemy was assembled in our front,near Tuscumbia, to resist our advance. It was commanded by GeneralStephen D. Lee, and composed of Roddy's and Ferguson's brigades,with irregular cavalry, amounting in the aggregate to about fivethousand.

In person I moved from Corinth to Burnsville on the 18th, and toIuka on the 19th of October.

Osterhaus's division was in the advance, constantly skirmishingwith the enemy; he was supported by General Morgan L. Smith's, bothdivisions under the general command of Major-General Blair.General John E. Smith's division covered the working-party engagedin rebuilding the railroad.

Foreseeing difficulty in crossing the Tennessee River, I hadwritten to Admiral Porter, at Cairo, asking him to watch theTennessee and send up some gunboats the moment the stage of wateradmitted; and had also requested General Allen, quartermaster atSt. Louis, to dispatch to Eastport a steam ferry-boat.

The admiral, ever prompt and ready to assist us, had two finegunboats at Eastport, under Captain Phelps, the very day after myarrival at Iuka; and Captain Phelps had a coal-barge decked over,with which to cross our horses and wagons before the arrival of theferry-boat.

Still following literally the instructions of General Halleck, Ipushed forward the repairs of the railroad, and ordered GeneralBlair, with the two leading divisions, to drive the enemy beyondTuscumbia. This he did successfully, after a pretty severe fightat Cane Creek, occupying Tuscumbia on the 27th of October.

In the meantime many important changes in command had occurred,which I must note here, to a proper understanding of the case.

General Grant had been called from Vicksburg, and sent toChattanooga to command the military division of the Mississippi,composed of the three Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland, andTennessee; and the Department of the Tennessee had been devolved onme, with instructions, however, to retain command of the army inthe field. At Iuka I made what appeared to me the best dispositionof matters relating to the department, giving General McPhersonfull powers in Mississippi and General Hurlbut in West Tennessee,and assigned General Blair to the command of the Fifteenth ArmyCorps; and summoned General Hurlbut from Memphis, and General Dodgefrom Corinth, and selected out of the Sixteenth Corps a force ofabout eight thousand men, which I directed General Dodge toorganize with all expedition, and with it to follow me eastward.

On the 27th of October, when General Blair, with two divisions, wasat Tuscumbia, I ordered General Ewing, with the Fourth Division, tocross the Tennessee (by means of the gunboats and scow) as rapidlyas possible at Eastport, and push forward to Florence, which hedid; and the same day a messenger from General Grant floated downthe Tennessee over Muscle Shoals, landed at Tuscumbia, and was sentto me at Iuka. He bore a short message from the general to thiseffect: "Drop all work on the railroad east of Bear Creek; pushyour command toward Bridgeport till you meet orders;" etc.Instantly the order was executed; the order of march was reversed,and all the columns were directed to Eastport, the only place wherewe could cross the Tennessee. At first we only had the gunboatsand coal-barge; but the ferry-boat and two transports arrived onthe 31st of October, and the work of crossing was pushed with allthe vigor possible. In person I crossed, and passed to the head ofthe column at Florence on the 1st of November, leaving the reardivisions to be conducted by General Blair, and marched toRogersville and Elk River. This was found impassable. To ferrywould have consumed to much time, and to build a bridge still more;so there was no alternative but to turn up Elk River by way ofGilbertsboro, Elkton, etc., to the stone bridge at Fayetteville,where we crossed the Elk, and proceeded to Winchester and Deckerd.

At Fayetteville I received orders from General Grant to come toBridgeport with the Fifteenth Army Corps, and to leave GeneralDodge's command at Pulaski, and along the railroad from Columbia toDecatur. I instructed General Blair to follow with the Second andFirst Divisions by way of New Market, Larkinsville, and Bellefonte,while I conducted the other two divisions by way of Deckerd; theFourth Division crossing the mountain to Stevenson, and the Thirdby University Place and Sweden's Cove.

In person I proceeded by Sweden's Cove and Battle Creek, reachingBridgeport on the night of November 13th. I immediatelytelegraphed to the commanding general my arrival, and the positionsof my several divisions, and was summoned to Chattanooga. I tookthe first steamboat daring the night of the 14th for Belly's Ferry,and rode into Chattanooga on the 16th. I then learned the partassigned me in the coming drama, was supplied with the necessarymaps and information, and rode, during the 18th, in company withGenerals Grant, Thomas, W. F. Smith, Brannan, and others, to thepositions occupied on the west bank of the Tennessee, from whichcould be seen the camps of the enemy, compassing Chattanooga andthe line of Missionary Hills, with its terminus on ChickamaugaCreek, the point that I was expected to take, hold, and fortify.Pontoons, with a full supply of balks and chesses, had beenprepared for the bridge over the Tennessee, and all things had beenprearranged with a foresight that elicited my admiration. From thehills we looked down on the amphitheatre of Chattanooga as on amap, and nothing remained but for me to put my troops in thedesired position. The plan contemplated that, in addition tocrossing the Tennessee River and making a lodgment on the terminusof Missionary Ridge, I should demonstrate against Lookout Mountain,near Trenton, with a part of my command.

All in Chattanooga were impatient for action, rendered almost acuteby the natural apprehensions felt for the safety of GeneralBurnside in East Tennessee.

My command had marched from Memphis, three hundred and thirtymiles, and I had pushed them as fast as the roads and distancewould admit, but I saw enough of the condition of men and animalsin Chattanooga to inspire me with renewed energy. I immediatelyordered my leading division (General Ewing's) to march viaShellmound to Trenton, demonstrating against Lookout Ridge, but tobe prepared to turn quickly and follow me to Chattanooga and inperson I returned to Bridgeport, rowing a boat down the Tennesseefrom Belly's Ferry, and immediately on arrival put in motion mydivisions in the order in which they had arrived. The bridge ofboats at Bridgeport was frail, and, though used day and night, ourpassage was slow; and the road thence to Chattanooga was dreadfullycut up and encumbered with the wagons of the other troops stationedalong the road. I reached General Hooker's headquarters during arain, in the afternoon of the 20th, and met General Grant's ordersfor the general attack on the next day. It was simply impossiblefor me to fulfill my part in time; only one division (General JohnE. Smith's) was in position. General Ewing was still at Trenton,and the other two were toiling along the terrible road fromShellmound to Chattanooga. No troops ever were or could be inbetter condition than mine, or who labored harder to fulfill theirpart. On a proper representation, General Grant postponed theattack. On the 21st I got the Second Division over Brown's-FerryBridge, and General Ewing got up; but the bridge broke repeatedly,and delays occurred which no human sagacity could prevent. Alllabored night and day, and General Ewing got over on the 23d; butmy rear division was cut off by the broken bridge at Brown's Ferry,and could not join me. I offered to go into action with my threedivisions, supported by General Jeff. C. Davis, leaving one of mybest divisions (Osterhaus's) to act with General Hooker againstLookout Mountain. That division has not joined me yet, but I knowand feel that it has served the country well, and that it hasreflected honor on the Fifteenth Army Corps and the Army of theTennessee. I leave the record of its history to General Hooker, orwhomsoever has had its services during the late memorable events,confident that all will do it merited honor.

At last, on the 28d of November, my three divisions lay behind thehills opposite the mouth of the Chickamauga. I dispatched thebrigade of the Second Division, commanded by General Giles A.Smith, under cover of the hills, to North Chickamauga Creek, to manthe boats designed for the pontoon-bridge, with orders (atmidnight) to drop down silently to a point above the mouth of theSouth Chickamauga, there land two regiments, who were to move alongthe river-bank quietly, and capture the enemy's river-pickets.

General Giles A. Smith then was to drop rapidly below the month ofthe Chickamauga, disembark the rest of his brigade, and dispatchthe boats across for fresh loads. These orders were skillfullyexecuted, and every rebel picket but one was captured. The balanceof General Morgan L. Smith's division was then rapidly ferriedacross; that of General John E. Smith followed, and by daylight ofNovember 24th two divisions of about eight thousand men were on theeast bank of the Tennessee, and had thrown up a very respectablerifle-trench as a tete du pont. As soon as the day dawned, some ofthe boats were taken from the use of ferrying, and a pontoon-bridgewas begun, under the immediate direction of Captain Dresser, thewhole planned and supervised by General William F. Smith in person.A pontoon-bridge was also built at the same time over ChickamangaCreek, near its mouth, giving communication with the two regimentswhich had been left on the north side, and fulfilling a mostimportant purpose at a later stage of the drama. I will here bearmy willing testimony to the completeness of this whole business.All the officers charged with the work were present, and manifesteda skill which I cannot praise too highly. I have never beheld anywork done so quietly, so well; and I doubt if the history of warcan show a bridge of that extent (viz., thirteen hundred and fiftyfeet) laid so noiselessly and well, in so short a time. Iattribute it to the genius and intelligence of General William F.Smith. The steamer Dunbar arrived up in the course of the morning,and relieved Ewing's division of the labor of rowing across; but bynoon the pontoon-bridge was done, and my three divisions wereacross, with men, horses, artillery, and every thing.

General Jeff. C. Davis's division was ready to take the bridge, andI ordered the columns to form in order to carry the MissionaryHills. The movement had been carefully explained to all divisioncommanders, and at 1 p.m. we marched from the river in threecolumns in echelon: the left, General Morgan L. Smith, the columnof direction, following substantially Chickamauga Creek; thecentre, General, John E. Smith, in columns, doubled on the centre,at one brigade interval to the right and rear; the right, GeneralEwing, in column at the same distance to the right rear, preparedto deploy to the right, on the supposition that we would meet anenemy in that direction. Each head of column was covered by a goodline of skirmishers, with supports. A light drizzling rainprevailed, and the clouds hung low, cloaking our movement from theenemy's tower of observation on Lookout Mountain. We soon gainedthe foothills; our skirmishers crept up the face of the hills,followed by their supports, and at 3.30 p.m. we had gained, with noloss, the desired point. A brigade of each division was pushedrapidly to the top of the hill, and the enemy for the first timeseemed to realize the movement, but too late, for we were inpossession. He opened with artillery, but General Ewing soon gotsome of Captain Richardson's guns up that steep hill and gave backartillery, and the enemy's skirmishers made one or two ineffectualdashes at General Lightburn, who had swept round and got a fartherhill, which was the real continuation of the ridge. From studyingall the maps, I had inferred that Missionary Ridge was a continuoushill; but we found ourselves on two high points, with a deepdepression between us and the one immediately over the tunnel,which was my chief objective point. The ground we had gained,however, was so important, that I could leave nothing to chance,and ordered it to be fortified during the night. One brigade ofeach division was left on the hill, one of General Morgan L.Smith's closed the gap to Chickamauga Creek, two of General John E.Smith's were drawn back to the base in reserve, and General Ewing'sright was extended down into the plain, thus crossing the ridge ina general line, facing southeast.

The enemy felt our left flank about 4 p.m., and a pretty smartengagement with artillery and muskets ensued, when he drew off; butit cost us dear, for General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded,and had to go to the rear; and the command of the brigade devolvedon Colonel Topper (One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois), who managedit with skill during the rest of the operations. At the moment ofmy crossing the bridge, General Howard appeared, having come withthree regiments from Chattanooga, along the east bank of theTennessee, connecting my new position with that of the main army inChattanooga. He left the three regiments attached temporarily toGen. Ewing's right, and returned to his own corps at Chattanooga.As night closed in, I ordered General Jeff. C. Davis to keep one ofhis brigades at the bridge, one close up to my position, and oneintermediate. Thus we passed the night, heavy details being keptbusy at work on the intrenchments on the hill. During the nightthe sky cleared away bright, a cold frost filled the air, and ourcamp-fires revealed to the enemy and to our friends in Chattanoogaour position on Missionary Ridge. About midnight I received, atthe hands of Major Rowley (of General Grant's staff), orders toattack the enemy at "dawn of day," with notice that General Thomaswould attack in force early in the day. Accordingly, before day Iwas in the saddle, attended by all my staff; rode to the extremeleft of our position near Chickamauga Creek; thence up the hill,held by General Lightburn; and round to the extreme right ofGeneral Ewing.

Catching as accurate an idea of the ground as possible by the dimlight of morning, I saw that our line of attack was in thedirection of Missionary Ridge, with wings supporting on eitherflank. Quite a valley lay between us and the next hill of theseries, and this hill presented steep sides, the one to the westpartially cleared, but the other covered with the native forest.The crest of the ridge was narrow and wooded. The farther point ofthis hill was held-by the enemy with a breastwork of logs and freshearth, filled with men and two guns. The enemy was also seen ingreat force on a still higher hill beyond the tunnel, from which hehad a fine plunging fire on the hill in dispute. The gorgebetween, through which several roads and the railroad-tunnel pass,could not be seen from our position, but formed the natural placed'armes, where the enemy covered his masses to resist ourcontemplated movement of turning his right flank and endangeringhis communications with his depot at Chickamauga Station.

As soon as possible, the following dispositions were made: Thebrigades of Colonels Cockrell and Alexander, and General Lightburn,were to hold our hill as the key-point. General Corse, with asmuch of his brigade as could operate along the narrow ridge, was toattack from our right centre. General Lightburn was to dispatch agood regiment from his position to cooperate with General Corse;and General Morgan L. Smith was to move along the east base ofMissionary Ridge, connecting with General Corse; and ColonelLoomis, in like manner, to move along the west bank, supported bythe two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith.

The sun had hardly risen before General Corse had completed hispreparations and his bugle sounded the "forward !" The FortiethIllinois, supported by the Forty-sixth Ohio, on our right centre,with the Thirtieth Ohio (Colonel Jones), moved down the face of ourhill, and up that held by the enemy. The line advanced to withinabout eighty yards of the intrenched position, where General Corsefound a secondary crest, which he gained and held. To this pointhe called his reserves, and asked for reenforcements, which weresent; but the space was narrow, and it was not well to crowd themen, as the enemy's artillery and musketry fire swept the approachto his position, giving him great advantage. As soon as GeneralCorse had made his preparations, he assaulted, and a close, severecontest ensued, which lasted more than an hour, gaining and losingground, but never the position first obtained, from which the enemyin vain attempted to drive him. General Morgan L. Smith keptgaining ground on the left spurs of Missionary Ridge, and ColonelLoomis got abreast of the tunnel and railroad embankment on hisaide, drawing the enemy's fire, and to that extent relieving theassaulting party on the hill-crest. Captain Callender had four ofhis guns on General Ewing's hill, and Captain Woods his Napoleonbattery on General Lightburn's; also, two guns of Dillon's batterywere with Colonel Alexander's brigade. All directed their fire ascarefully as possible, to clear the hill to our front, withoutendangering our own men. The fight raged furiously about 10 a.m.,when General Corse received a severe wound, was brought off thefield, and the command of the brigade and of the assault at thatkey-point devolved on that fine young, gallant officer, ColonelWalcutt, of the Forty-sixth Ohio, who fulfilled his part manfully.He continued the contest, pressing forward at all points. ColonelLoomis had made good progress to the right, and about 2 p.m.,General John E. Smith, judging the battle to be most severe on thehill, and being required to support General Ewing, ordered upColonel Raum's and General Matthias's brigades across the field tothe summit that was being fought for. They moved up under a heavyfire of cannon and musketry, and joined Colonel Walcutt; but thecrest was so narrow that they necessarily occupied the west face ofthe hill. The enemy, at the time being massed in great strength inthe tunnel-gorge, moved a large force under cover of the ground andthe thick bushes, and suddenly appeared on the right rear of thiscommand. The suddenness of the attack disconcerted the men,exposed as they were in the open field; they fell back in somedisorder to the lower edge of the field, and reformed. These twobrigades were in the nature of supports, and did not constitute apart of the real attack.

The movement, seen from Chattanooga (five miles off ) withspy-glasses, gave rise to the report, which even General Meiga hasrepeated, that we were repulsed on the left. It was not so. Thereal attacking columns of General Corse, Colonel Loomis, andGeneral Smith, were not repulsed. They engaged in a close struggleall day persistently, stubbornly, and well. When the two reservebrigades of General John E. Smith fell back as described, the enemymade a show of pursuit, but were in their turn caught in flank bythe well-directed fire of our brigade on the wooded crest, andhastily sought cover behind the hill. Thus matters stood about 3p.m. The day was bright and clear, and the amphitheatre ofChattanooga sat in beauty at our feet. I had watched for theattack of General Thomas "early in the day." Column after columnof the enemy was streaming toward me; gun after gun poured itsconcentric shot on us, from every hill and spur that gave a view ofany part of the ground held by us. An occasional shot from FortWood and Orchard Knob, and some musketry-fire and artillery overabout Lookout Mountain, was all that I could detect on our side;but about 3 p.m. I noticed the white line of musketry-fire infront of Orchard Knoll extending farther and farther right and leftand on. We could only hear a faint echo of sound, but enough wasseen to satisfy me that General Thomas was at last moving on thecentre. I knew that our attack had drawn vast masses of the enemyto our flank, and felt sure of the result. Some guns which hadbeen firing on us all day were silent, or were turned in adifferent direction.

The advancing line of musketry-fire from Orchard Knoll disappearedto us behind a spar of the hill, and could no longer be seen; andit was not until night closed in that I knew that the troops inChattanooga had swept across Missionary Ridge and broken theenemy's centre. Of course, the victory was won, and pursuit wasthe next step.

I ordered General Morgan L. Smith to feel to the tunnel, and it wasfound vacant, save by the dead and wounded of our own and the enemycommingled. The reserve of General Jeff. C. Davis was ordered tomarch at once by the pontoon-bridge across Chickamauga Creek, atits mouth, and push forward for the depot.

General Howard had reported to me in the early part of the day,with the remainder of his army corps (the Eleventh), and had beenposted to connect my left with Chickamauga Creek. He was orderedto repair an old broken bridge about two miles up the Chickamauga,and to follow General Davis at 4 a.m., and the Fifteenth Army Corpswas ordered to follow at daylight. But General Howard found thatto repair the bridge was more of a task than was at first supposed,and we were all compelled to cross the Chickamauga on the newpontoon-bridge at its mouth. By about 11 a.m. General Jeff. C.Davis's division reached the depot, just in time to see it inflames. He found the enemy occupying two hills, partiallyintrenched, just beyond the depot. These he soon drove away.The depot presented a scene of desolation that war alone exhibits--corn-meal and corn in huge burning piles, broken wagons, abandonedcaissons, two thirty-two-pounder rifled-guns with carriages burned,pieces of pontoons, balks and chesses, etc., destined doubtless forthe famous invasion of Kentucky, and all manner of things, burningand broken. Still, the enemy kindly left us a good supply of foragefor our horses, and meal, beans, etc., for our men.

Pausing but a short while, we passed on, the road filled withbroken wagons and abandoned caissons, till night. Just as the headof the column emerged from a dark, miry swamp, we encountered therear-guard of the retreating enemy. The fight was sharp, but thenight closed in so dark that we could not move. General Grant cameup to us there. At daylight we resumed the march, and atGraysville, where a good bridge spanned the Chickamauga, we foundthe corps of General Palmer on the south bank, who informed us thatGeneral Hooker was on a road still farther south, and we could hearhis guns near Ringgold.

As the roads were filled with all the troops they could possiblyaccommodate, I turned to the east, to fulfill another part of the