As mentioned last week, the recent loss of the Bond Helicopters Eurocopter EC225 Super Puma in the North Sea involved the proverbial perfectly serviceable aeroplane. A version of events apparently sourced from an official or quasi-official document on the early investigation findings is now public and it’s no surprise to see that pilot disorientation features high on the agenda.

A perennial, and seemingly insoluble, hazard in the tough environment of UK offshore operations. Here’s the document below – I’d stress that I don’t know precisely what it is, (and can’t easily find out as I’m on the road), but nobody’s so far questioning that it is an authoritative account of what is believed to have happened.

The accident came two years after the horrific loss of an earlier model of Super Puma a Eurocopter SA365N Dauphin in the sea on the other side of the UK. Disorientation, though in markedly different circumstances, played a crucial role there too.

1. Bond have delayed publishing information until now because they wanted

to inform their own workforce (including those offshore) first.

2. Although the CVFDR, HUMS DFDAU and FDM card have been recovered and are

at AAIB, they have not yet been downloaded. There is a technical problem

with the FDR, and the FDM card is being “dried out”. However, AAIB

anticipate having some data within a couple of days.

3. The event history as briefed is based on the interviews with the

aircraft Commander (who was PF). The copilot has not yet been interviewed

as he is still in shock and under medical supervision by his AME.

4. The flight was scheduled for a mid-morning departure to the ETAP (about

125 nm east south east of Aberdeen) but was delayed until 1740 due to

offshore weather (low cloud and poor visibility). Offshore weather

reporting is a factor in that the conditions were rather worse than passed

by the rig. A morning flight to the same destination only just got on

despite reported weather close to VFR.

5. The transit out was at FL 55, VMC on top, and was uneventful. ATC

cleared the aircraft direct to the ETAP. A weather update was received with

80 nm to run which suggested slight deterioration, and the crew discussed

the option of an ARA, but the Commander elected to delay a decision until

closer to the rig.

6. The aircraft started the descent at 100 nm from ADN and descended

through some thin stratiform layers to 1500 feet. At this point, just under

20 nm from destination, the crew could see two fixed platforms (ETAP, the

destination, and probably the Arbroath which was about 12 nm closer but

slightly north of track).

7. As they approached the rig, they descended towards 500 feet, but went

into some patchy cloud, so climbed up again. A short while afterwards, they

were visual with the sea and descended to and maintained 300 feet. They

were still visual with the destination.

8. There was a layer of cloud just above the flare. At this point the rig

gave a further update on the weather with an estimated visibility of half a

mile due to patchy fog/stratus. However, the crew could still see the rig

and were happy to continue visually. Wind was light northwesterly (less

than 5 kt) and the sea was “like a millpond”.

9. The crew flew through their target gate at 0.75 nm downwind of the rig

at 300 feet and 80 kt, heading just south of east (ie maintaining the

outbound heading). Up to this point the aircraft had been fully coupled in

The crash two years ago (as mentioned above) did not involve a “earlier Super Puma”(AS332), it was a “SA365N” known as “Dauphin” in Europe and sold with different maingearbox and engines as “Dolphin” in the US (major customer: US Coast Guard).
If you have ever flown Agusta-Westland,MD or Bell,
you never want to change back to the actual crap produced by EC.
The only performance is nice pictures in their brochures.