Middle East

The victory of reformist-backed moderate and ‘Centralist’, Hassan
Rouhani, over the conservative ‘Principalist’ candidates brought hope to
some in Iranian society. After announcing Rouhani’s election as
president, thousands of people came onto the streets of main cities
throughout Iran celebrating what they saw as a defeat for the
vote-riggers who ‘stole’ the previous, 2009 elections and brutally
suppressed the opposition ‘Green movement’ that campaigned against
election fraud. The streets of many Iranian cities echoed to the chants
and demands of the pro-Green movement, with crowds calling for the
release from house arrest of Mousavi and Karoubi, candidates in the 2009
election.

Although being secretary of the Supreme National Security Council for 16
years and holding key security and military positions would not seem to
be an attractive CV for someone to lead a democratic movement, in an
extraordinary shift many Green activists and embarrassed Liberals
presented Rouhani as chance for change. This resulted in the surge of
votes that gave Rouhani a first round victory, although his 18.6 million
votes were far less than the 21.6 million votes the last winning
“Reformist” candidate, Khatami, scored in 2001 despite the total
electorate increasing by nearly 8 million to nearly 50.5 million.

Rouhani announced his victory as one of wisdom and moderation over
extremism. However, the reality is more complex.

Although it is presented that Rouhani has brought hope to society,
voting for Rouhani is motivated for entirely opposite reasons;
desperation and a lack of any alternative for the millions who have
previously protested and struggled for change. While gaining over 18
million votes, many people who voted for Rouhani were very unsure,
distrustful and hesitant about him. In addition, nearly 14 million
people did not take part in the election, showing the level of
dissatisfaction and alienation in society.

Rouhani, in the “best” scenario, could be a more moderate Centralist and
a close collaborator to former president Hashemi Rafsanjani. When the
Guardian Council blocked Rafsanjani’s candidacy, Rouhani became the
‘back-up man’, a ‘Plan B’ for this tendency inside the regime. The
victory is more than anything Rafsanjani’s. That is why, after the
announcement that Rouhani had won the presidency, Rafsanjani’s official
website boldly published on its front page a handwritten note from
Khomeini (the founder of the Islamic Regime) that “malicious people
should know that Hashemi Rafsanjani is alive” - an open jibe at the
ultra-conservatives in the Guardian Council who blocked Rafsanjani
standing.

Reformists and Green activists rejoice over their victory. However,
looking at where Rouhani is coming from, his victory is not even a real
victory of the Reformists. Ironically it shows the Reformist leaders’
weakness, mainly because, as they are part of the elite and not willing
to challenge the regime, they made a “lesser evil” choice from amongst
the conservative so-called Principlist candidates.

Tehran after Rouhani’s Victory

Dictatorship’s red lines

Rouhani was obviously not Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s first choice.
Yet clearly the Supreme Leader is not opposing him and may have
“allowed” his election in order to avoid any repetition of the mass
protests of 2009 and to attempt to contain opposition within “safe”
channels. It seems that Khamenei will try to makes sure that Rouhani
will not cross any of the dictatorship’s red lines.

However the widespread celebrations are an indication of how
expectations of change can now come to the fore. Such expectations could
be quickly dashed, possibility leading to disappointment and a
continuation, for a time, of a quiet period in mass struggles. Elements
like Khatami (the former Reformist president between 1997 and 2005) who
endorsed and built support for Rouhani, may attempt to hold back any
struggles, arguing that protests and battles will only “provoke” the
conservatives. But the combination of disappointment with Rouhani, and
the bitter experience of Khatami’s presidency, can also prepare the way
for movements, as the conclusion is drawn that popular action is needed
to bring about change. Such mass pressure from below in society could
lead to further divisions and splits in the ruling elite, potentially
pushing Rouhani into conflict with the Supreme Leader.

For now, Ali Khamenei sees a character like Rouhani, who led Iran’s
nuclear negotiating team (2003-2005), as someone who at this moment can
provide answers to the regime’s difficult external and internal
situation.

The Supreme Leader seems to have concluded that Iran’s recently more
assertive foreign policy has not been that successful. Although Iran’s
regional position was strengthened by the US’s removal of Saddam
Hussein, today the pressure of US inspired sanctions and danger of
military attack have already affected millions of people’s lives,
leading to a growing popular questioning of the regime’s policies. At
the same time, sanctions have led to a continuous drastic drop in the
country’s extremely oil-dependent income (currently Iran’s oil
production is at a 25 year low). This squeeze on finances has made even
the cost of running the state machine, including oppressive security
organisations, exceptionally difficult, while also leading to very
unpopular tax hikes, like the 30% tax rise last year on bazaaris, Iran’s
small shopkeepers and business owners.

The Supreme Leader needs somebody who can he can trust and also could
perhaps soften the regime’s behaviour over nuclear issue. In other
words, the election result was partly a “Big No” to Iran’s recent
foreign policy.

More importantly, the regime desperately needs a character like Rouhani
who is able to say to the masses that their demands are achievable
within the current system’s framework. He will be presented as someone
who is able to promote reconciliation, discourse and to bridge the
widening gap between the state and the masses, especially since the 2009
election.

Contradictory victory

Despite the mainstream media analysis which tries to give the impression
that the Supreme Leader was exposed and isolated during the election
process, the bigger picture show the result as a contradictory victory
for him, as well.

Four years ago we saw a movement on the streets of Tehran and other big
cities which was becoming more and more radical day after the day. This
movement started with, “Where is My Vote?” leading to “This month is
blood month; Khameini is overthrown”. The regime’s strategists believed
it was a life and death matter for the regime, the biggest challenge
they faced since the Iran-Iraq war ended. A big section of the Iranian
population wanted to overthrow the government at that time. Today, by
letting an obedient “second class Rafsanjani” win elections, illusions
have grown that people can and should demand their rights only by voting
within current system. The movement which, four years ago, was on the
streets has now voted and after brief celebrations appears to have gone
back home, watching the top of the government to see if there is change.
In this sense, Khamenei has not lost because this layer of society is
passive for now - for how long is a different matter.

After the defeat of the mass movement four years ago, it is
understandable that many Iranians would seek what appears to be an
easier way to achieve change by just voting for the “least bad”
candidate. Khameini may be pleased that he has avoided immediate
protests against election rigging, but as we have wrote previously (What
would a Rafsanjani presidency mean?): “An election result that is seen
as a defeat for the Supreme Leader could encourage further struggles
from below”.

At that time, we wrote of the possibility of Rafsanjani winning and
explained the effect of his right wing, neo-liberal current on working
peoples’ lives. But it is clear that Rouhani, if not worse than
Rafsanjani, is definitely not going to be better than him.

Iran is a country with deep economic problems, undergoing both a sharp
recession and inflation officially put at over 32% a year, but in
reality much higher, especially for foodstuffs. An overwhelmingly number
of people, at least 40%, now live under the official poverty line, and
struggle to make ends meet. Rouhani and his pro-cuts right wing economic
agenda will not help working class lives.

In the last few days, Rouhani’s victory has also been claimed as a
victory by many other forces, from Khamenei to the Green movement and
even by the White House and the other Western powers. Clearly the defeat
of the conservative Principalist grouping is important, but it is not a
decisive blow. It cannot be forgotten that there has already been the
experience of the failure of the previous ‘Reformist’ presidency of
Khatami and the comeback of the conservatives.

While understanding last weekend’s celebrations by many Iranians, the
key to real change is building an independent movement from below, based
upon the working class and youth. This could determinedly struggle not
just for the immediate demands of working people for democratic rights,
economic and social advance but also against the dictatorial regime and
capitalism.