What sort of persons we should choose for our
friends, sect. 1-5. How we may ascertain the characters of people,
before we form a friendship with them, 6, 7. How we may attach
people to us as friends, 8-13. Friendship can exist only between the
good and honorable, 14-19; between whom it will continue to subsist
in spite of differences of opinion, 19-28. Deductions from the
preceding remarks, 29-39.

1. He appeared to me, also, to make his followers wise in examining
what sort of persons it was right to attach to themselves as
friends, by such conversations as the following. “Tell me,
Critobulus,” said he, “if we were in need of a good friend, how
should we proceed to look for one? Should we not, in the first
place, seek for a person who can govern his appetite, his
inclination to wine or sensuality, and sleep and idleness; for one
who is overcome by such propensities would he unable to do his duty
either to himself or his friend.” “Assuredly he would not,” said
Critobulus. “It appears then to you that we must avoid one who is at
the mercy of such inclinations?” “Undoubtedly,” replied Critobulus.
2. “Besides,” continued Socrates, “does not a man who is extravagant
and yet unable to support himself, but is always in want of
assistance from his neighbor, a man who, when he borrows, cannot
pay, and when he cannot borrow, hates him who will not lend, appear
to you to be a dangerous friend?” “Assuredly,” replied Critobulus.
“We must therefore avoid such a character?” “We must indeed.” 3.
“Again: what sort of friend would he be who has the means of getting
money, and covets great wealth, and who, on this account, is a
driver of hard bargains, and delights to receive, but is unwilling
to pay?” “Such a person appears to me,” said Critobulus, “to be a
still worse character than the former.” 4. “What then do you think
of him, who, from love of getting money, allows himself no time for
thinking of anything else but whence he may obtain it?” “We must
avoid him, as it seems to me; for he would be useless to any one
that should make an associate of him.” “And what do you think of him
who is quarrelsome, and likely to raise up many enemies against his
friends?” “We must avoid him also, by Jupiter.” “But if a man have
none of these bad qualities, but is content to receive obligations,
taking no thought of returning them?” “He also would he useless as a
friend. But what sort of person, then, Socrates, should we endeavor
to make our friend?” 5. “A person, I think, who, being the reverse
of all this, is proof against the seductions of bodily pleasures, is
upright and fair in his dealings, and emulous not to be outdone in
serving those who serve him, so that he is of advantage to those who
associate with him.” 6. “How then shall we find proof of these
qualities in him, Socrates, before we associate with him? “ “We make
proof of statuaries,” rejoined Socrates, “not by forming opinions
from their words, but, whomsoever we observe to have executed his
previous statues skillfully, we trust that he will execute others
well.” 7. “You mean, then, that the man who is known to have served
his former friends, will doubtless be likely to serve such as may be
his friends hereafter?” “Yes; for whomsoever I know to have
previously managed horses with skill, I expect to manage other
horses also with skill.”

8. “Be it so,” said Critobulus; “but by what means must we make a
friend of him who appears to us worthy of our friendship?” “In the
first place,” answered Socrates, “we must consult the gods, whether
they recommend us to make him our friend.” “Can you tell me, then,”
said Critobulus, “how he, who appears eligible to us, and whom the
gods do not disapprove, is to be secured?” 9. “Assuredly,” returned
Socrates, “he is not to be caught by tracking him like the hare, or
by wiles, like birds, or by making him prisoner by force, like
enemies; for it would be an arduous task to make a man your friend
against his will, or to hold him fast if you were to bind him like a
slave; for those who suffer such treatment are rendered enemies
rather than friends.” 10. “How then are men made friends?” inquired
Critobulus. “They say that there are certain incantations, which
those who know them, chant to whomsoever they please, and thus make
them their friends; and that there are also love-potions, which
those who know them, administer to whomsoever they will, and are in
consequence beloved by them.” 11. “And how can we discover these
charms?” “You have heard from Homer the song which the Sirens sung
to Ulysses, the commencement of which runs thus: ‘Come hither,
much-extolled Ulysses, great glory of the Greeks.’” “Did the Sirens
then, by singing this same song to other men also, detain them so
that they were charmed and could not depart from them?” “No; but
they sang thus to those who were desirous of being honored for
virtue.” 12. “You seem to mean that we ought to apply as charms to
any person, such commendations as, when he hears them, he will not
suspect that his eulogist utters to ridicule him; for, if he
conceived such a suspicion, he would rather be rendered an enemy,
and would repel men from him; as, for instance, if a person were to
praise as beautiful, and tall, and strong, one who is conscious that
he is short, and deformed, and weak.

“But,” added Critobulus, “do you know any other charms?” 13. “No,”
said Socrates, “but I have heard that Pericles knew many, which he
used to chant to the city, and make it love him.” “And how did
Themistocles make the city love him?” “Not, by Jupiter, by uttering
charms to it, but by conferring on it some advantage.” 14. “You
appear to me to mean, Socrates, that if we would attach to us any
good person as a friend, we ourselves should be good both in
speaking and acting.” “And did you think it possible,” said
Socrates, “for a bad person to attach to himself good men as his
friends?” 15. “I have seen,” rejoined Critobulus, “bad orators
become friends to good orators, and men bad at commanding an army
become friends to men eminently good in the military art.” 16. “Do
you, then,” said Socrates, “regarding the subject of which we are
speaking, know any persons, who, being themselves useless, can make
useful persons their friends?” “No, by Jupiter,” replied Critobulus;
“but if it is impossible for a worthless person to attach to himself
good and honorable friends, then tell me this, whether it is
possible for one who is himself honorable and good, to become, with
ease, a friend to the honorable and good.” 17. “What perplexes you,
Critobulus, is, that you often see men who are honorable in their
conduct, and who refrain from everything disgraceful, involved,
instead of being friends, in dissensions with one another, and
showing more severity towards each other than the worthless part of
mankind.” 18. “Nor is it only private persons,” rejoined Critobulus,
“that act in this manner, but even whole communities, which have the
greatest regard for what is honorable, and are least inclined to
anything disgraceful, are often hostilely disposed towards one
another.

19. “When I reflect on these things,” continued Critobulus, “I am
quite in despair about the acquisition of friends; for I see that
the bad cannot be friends with one another; for how can the
ungrateful, or careless, or avaricious, or faithless, or
intemperate, be friends to each other? indeed the bad appear to me
to be altogether disposed by nature to be mutual enemies rather than
friends. 20. Again, the bad, as you observe, can never harmonize in
friendship with the good; for how can those who commit bad actions
be friends with those who abhor such actions? And yet, if those also
who practice virtue fall into dissensions with one another about
pre-eminence in their respective communities, and, being zealous of
their own ‘interests,’ even hate each other, who will ever be
friends, or among what class of mankind shall affection and
attachment be found?” 21. “But these affections act in various
ways,” rejoined Socrates, “for men have by nature inclinations to
attachment, since they stand in need of each other, and feel
compassion for each other, and co-operate for mutual benefit, and,
being conscious that such is the case, have a sense of gratitude
towards one another; but they have also propensities to enmity, for
such as think the same objects honorable and desirable, engage in
contention for them, and, divided in feelings, become enemies.
Disputation and anger lead to war; avarice excites ill-will; and
envy is followed by hatred. 22. But, nevertheless, friendship,
insinuating itself through all these hindrances, unites together the
honorable and good; for such characters, through affection for
virtue, prefer the enjoyment of a moderate competency without
strife, to the attainment of unlimited power by means of war; they
can endure hunger and thirst without discontent, and take only a
fair share of meat and drink, and, though delighted with the
attractions of youthful beauty, they can control themselves, so as
to forbear from offending those whom they ought not to offend. 23.
By laying aside all avaricious feelings too, they can not only be
satisfied with their lawful share of the common property, but can
even assist one another. They can settle their differences, not only
without mutual offense, but even to their mutual benefit. They can
prevent their anger from going so far as to cause them repentance;
and envy they entirely banish, by sharing their own property with
their friends, and considering that of their friends as their own.

24. “How, then, can it be otherwise than natural, that the honorable
and good should be sharers in political distinctions, not only
without detriment, but even with advantage, to each other? Those
indeed who covet honor and office in states, merely that they may
have power to embezzle money, to do violence to others, and to live
a life of luxury, must be regarded as unprincipled and abandoned
characters, and incapable of harmonious union with other men. 25.
But when a person wishes to attain honors in a community, in order,
not merely that he may not suffer wrong himself, but that he may
assist his friends as far as is lawful, and may endeavor, in his
term of office, to do some service to his country, why should he
not, being of such a character, form a close union with another of
similar character? Will he be less able to benefit his friends if he
unite himself with the honorable and good, or will he be less able
to serve his country if he have the honorable and good for his
colleagues? 26. In the public games, indeed, it is plain, that if
the strongest were allowed to unite and attack the weaker, they
would conquer in all the contests, and carry off all the prizes; and
accordingly people do not permit them, in those competitions, to act
in such a manner; but since, in political affairs, in which
honorable and good men rule, no one hinders another from serving his
country in concert with whomsoever he pleases, how can it be
otherwise than profitable for him to conduct affairs with the best
men as his friends, having these as colleagues and co-operators,
rather than antagonists, in his proceedings? 27. It is evident, too,
that if one man commences hostilities against another, he will need
allies, and will need a greater number of them, if he oppose the
honorable and good; and those who consent to be his allies must be
well treated by him, that they may be zealous in his interests; and
it is much better for him to serve the best characters, who are the
fewer, than the inferior, who are more numerous; for the bad require
far more favors than the good. 28. But strive with good courage,
Critobulus,” he continued, “to be good yourself, and, having become
so, endeavor to gain the friendship of men of honor and virtue.
Perhaps I myself also may be able to assist you in this pursuit of
the honorable and virtuous, from being naturally disposed to love,
for, for whatever persons I conceive a liking, I devote myself with
ardor, and with my whole mind, to love them, and be loved in return
by them, regretting their absence to have mine regretted by them,
and longing for their society while they on the other hand long for
mine. 29. I know that you also must cultivate such feelings,
whenever you desire to form a friendship with any person. Do not
conceal from my knowledge, therefore, the persons to whom you may
wish to become a friend; for, from my carefulness to please those
who please me, I do not think that I am unskilled in the art of
gaining men’s affections.”

30. “Indeed, Socrates,” replied Critobulus, “I have long desired to
receive such instructions as yours, especially if the same knowledge
will help me in regard to those who are amiable in mind, and
handsome in person.” 31. “But, Critobulus,” replied Socrates, “there
is nothing in the knowledge that I communicate to make those who are
handsome in person endure him who lays hands upon them; for I am
persuaded that men shrunk from Scylla because she offered to put her
hands on them; while every one, they say, was ready to listen to the
Sirens, and were enchanted as they listened, because they laid hands
on no one, but sang to all men from a distance.” 32. “On the
understanding, then, that I shall lay my hands on no one,” said
Critobulus, “tell me if you know any effectual means for securing
friends.” “But will you never,” asked Socrates, “apply your lips to
theirs?” “Be of good courage, Socrates,” said Critobulus, “for I
will never apply my lips to those of any person, unless that person
be beautiful.” “You have now said,” rejoined Socrates, “the exact
contrary to what will promote your object; for the beautiful will
not allow such liberties, though the deformed submit to them with
pleasure, thinking that they are accounted beautiful for their
mental qualities.” 33. “As I shall caress the beautiful, then,” said
Critobulus, “and caress the good, teach me, with confidence, the art
of attaching my friends to me.” “When, therefore, Critobulus,” said
Socrates, “you wish to become a friend to any one, will you permit
me to say to him concerning you, that you admire him, and desire to
be his friend?” “You may say so,” answered Critobulus, “for I have
never known any one dislike those who praised him.” 34. “But if I
say of you, in addition, that, because you admire him, you feel
kindly disposed towards him, will you not think that false
information is given of you by me?” “No: for a kind feeling springs
up in myself also towards those whom I regard as kindly disposed
towards me.” 35. “Such information, then,” continued Socrates, “I
may communicate regarding you to such as you may wish to make your
friends; but if you enable me also to say concerning you, that you
are attentive to your friends; that you delight in nothing so much
as in the possession of good friends; that you pride yourself on the
honorable conduct of your friends not less than on your own; that
you rejoice at the good fortune of your friends not less than at
your own; that you are never weary of contriving means by which good
fortune may come to your friends; and that you think it the great
virtue of a man to surpass his friends in doing them good and his
enemies in doing them harm, I think that I shall be a very useful
assistant to you in gaining the affections of worthy friends.” 36.
“But why,” said Critobulus, “do you say this to me, as if you were
not at liberty to say of me anything you please?” “No, by Jupiter,”
replied Socrates; “I have no such liberty, according to a remark
that I once heard from Aspasia; for she said that skillful
match-makers, by reporting with truth good points of character, had
great influence in leading people to form unions, but that those who
said what was false, did no good by their praises, for that such as
were deceived hated each other and the match-maker alike; and as I
am persuaded that this opinion is correct, I think that I ought not
to say, when I praise you, anything that I cannot utter with truth.”
37. “You are, therefore,” returned Critobulus, “a friend of such a
kind to me, Socrates, as to assist me, if I have myself any
qualities adapted to gain friends; but if not, you would not be
willing to invent anything to serve me.” “And whether, Critobulus,”
said Socrates, “should I appear to serve you more by extolling you
with false praises, or by persuading you to endeavor to become a
truly deserving man? 38. If this point is not clear to you, consider
it with the following illustrations: If, wishing to make the owner
of a ship your friend, I should praise you falsely to him,
pronouncing you a skillful pilot, and he, believing me, should
entrust his ship to you to steer when you are incapable of steering
it, would you have any expectation that you would not destroy both
yourself and the ship? Or if, by false representations, I should
persuade the state, publicly, to entrust itself to you as a man
skilled in military tactics, in judicial proceedings, or in
political affairs, what do you think that yourself and the state
would suffer at your hands? Or if, in private intercourse, I should
induce any of the citizens, by unfounded statements, to commit their
property to your care, as being a diligent manager, would you not,
when you came to give proof of your abilities, be convicted of
dishonesty, and make yourself appear ridiculous? 39. But the
shortest, and safest, and best way, Critobulus, is, to strive to be
really good in that in which you wish to be thought good. Whatever
are called virtues among mankind, you will find, on consideration,
capable of being increased by study and exercise. I am of opinion,
that it is in accordance with these sentiments, that we ought to
endeavor to acquire friends; if you know any other way, make me
acquainted with it.” “I should be indeed ashamed,” replied
Critobulus, “to say anything in opposition to such an opinion; for I
should say what was neither honorable nor true.”