Turkey: Excessive Pricing: A Rare Concept In Competition Law

I. Introduction

The concept of excessive pricing has recently risen from the
grave and once again became a hot topic of discussion within the
competition law community, due to the various investigations
initiated by the European Commission. In a parallel development,
this intriguing concept has also been scrutinized by the Turkish
Competition Board in a couple of cases within the last few
years.

In general, excessive pricing can be a slippery slope for
competition enforcement authorities, as some academic commentators
and competition authorities consider excessive pricing behavior to
be "self-correcting, because excessive prices will attract
new entry."[1] In other
words, if entry to a particular market is not completely impeded
(or made impossible) by structural obstacles, a dominant
undertaking that applies excessive prices in that market will
eventually be beaten back by the effective competition in the
market. Thus, according to this argument, it would be excessive and
unwarranted for a competition enforcement authority to interfere
directly with the prices charged by the dominant undertaking.

All in all, the primary challenge in excessive pricing cases for
competition authorities (as well as the market players) in
non-monopolistic markets consists of finding the most effective
methods to uncover excessive pricing and implementing the best
remedies to be applied to the abusive dominant undertaking.

This article aims to critically examine and reevaluate the legal
tests that have been applied in the excessive pricing analyses
conducted by the European Commission, various European Courts, and
the Turkish Competition Board in several recent cases.

II. What Price is Excessive?

In general, the concept of "excessive pricing" has
been evaluated and considered as a breach of competition law rules
only in truly exceptional situations. Excessive pricing occurs when
a dominant undertaking, which holds dominant market power, charges
prices that are above the competitive pricing level.[2]

There are various methods used to determine whether excessive
pricing exists in a particular case; however, such methodologies
are not foolproof and they seem to change on a case-by-case basis.
For example, the assessment and remedies with respect to excessive
pricing would differ for a dominant undertaking with low marginal
costs in a market with low barriers to entry, as opposed to those
imposed on a monopoly undertaking operating in a regulated market
with high barriers to entry.

According to the precedents and established doctrines of
competition law, the methods that can be used for the determination
of excessive pricing are as follows:[3]

The "Two-Staged Test", which involves the
following:

(1) comparison of actual prices (i.e., the selling
price of the product) with actual costs (i.e., the
production costs of the product),

(2) comparison with the prices of competing products or prices
across markets,

geographic price comparison,

comparison of prices over time.

The Economic Value Test, primarily encompassed comparing price
charged by the company and value of the product. Although it has
been suggested that value of a product is related to its costs,[4] s O'Donoghue and Padilla have
observed, "the economic value of a product or service is
determined jointly by customers' willingness to pay and the
costs of supply."[5] In
other words, regardless of the costs of supply, customers might be
willing to pay more for a specific product or service; therefore,
consumer demand can determine the price of such a product or
service, even if it differs greatly from its cost.

Competitive Benchmark: Excessive pricing might be deemed to
exist in a given market if prices are observed to be excessively
higher than what could be expected in a competitive market.

All in all, none of these tests are entirely objective or
infallible, but they are nevertheless useful for making subjective
price comparisons with either a relative benchmark or the
cost/value of the product or service. These costs are relative and
can be variable depending on many factors, such as geography,
demand, the specific type of product or service under scrutiny,
among others. Hence, there is undoubtedly a lack of legal certainty
at the present about how to assess excessive pricing, let alone
determine the remedies and penalties that should be applied in case
of an excessive-pricing scenario.

As there is a lack of legal certainty on how to assess excessive
pricing, along with determining the remedies and penalties that
should be applied in case of an excessive-pricing scenario, some
commentators have suggested that there should be a limited amount
of intervention to cope with excessive pricing. Accordingly
excessive pricing interference should only occur in markets with
high barriers to entry, where one firm is in a dominant position,
as well as in markets where innovation and investment play only a
minor role.[6] In markets with low
barriers to entrywhere, at least in theory, there will be
more market entrants, and thus, more product variationif a
dominant firm applies excessive prices, customer demand would shift
to cheaper substitutes of that product or service, once market
entry by new undertakings occurs. Thus, in theory, an unregulated
market with low entry barriers and low entry costs should
ultimately reach a competitive balance, even in the face of
excessive pricing behavior by a dominant undertaking.

III. The Concept of Excessive Pricing from the Perspective of
the European Commission

The Turkish competition law ("Law No. 4054 on the
Protection of Competition") does not make any
reference to "unfair" prices, contrary to
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
("TFEU"), which explicitly
refers to, "directly or indirectly imposing unfair
purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading
conditions," even though the Turkish competition law is
closely akin to (and explicitly modeled after) the European
competition law. This discrepancy between the regulations of these
two jurisdictions does not lead to a significant divergence in
competition law practice, and, similarly to the EU system, the
Turkish Competition Board also considers and treats excessive
pricing as an abuse of dominance violation.

It has been observed that in the EU, much like in Turkey, each
enforcement decision raises a different concern about the judicial
and regulatory interpretation of the concept of excessive
pricing.

The first case in which the European Court of Justice examined
the excessive pricing element within the framework of competition
law was the United Brands decision.[7] In United Brands, the
European Court of Justice reviewed the decision of the European
Commission with respect to the pricing behaviors of the United
Brands Company ("UBC"), and
declared that charging an excessive price that did not have a
reasonable relationship to the economic value of the product would
be considered as an abuse of dominance. While comparing the cost of
the product and its selling price (and thus determining the profit
margin) could provide an "objective" method of
calculating and determining the excessive price, the European Court
of Justice stated that the Commission had failed to make this
calculation in its decision since it did not consider the cost
structure of UBC.[8] However,
according to the European Court of Justice, the mere existence of
an excessive price would not be sufficient on its own for a
competition law violation, and that the prices would also have to
be "unfair" for the investigated undertaking to run afoul
of competition law rules: "the questions therefore to be
determined are whether the difference between the costs actually
incurred and the price actually charged is excessive, and, if the
answer to this question is in the affirmative, whether a price has
been imposed which is either unfair in itself or when compared to
competing products."[9]

By doing so, the European Court of Justice noted that
"(...) In this case charging a price which is excessive
because it has no reasonable relation to the economic value of the
product supplied would be such an abuse. This excess could, inter
alia, be determined objectively if it were possible for it to be
calculated by making a comparison between the selling price of the
product in question and its cost of production, which would
disclose the amount of the profit margin; however the Commission
has not done this since it has not analysed UBC's costs
structure. (...)".[10]
The European Court of Justice annulled the Commission's
decision because, although there is a difference between UBC's
prices and its competitors' prices about 7%, such percentage
has not been challenged and thus this cannot be considered
automatically as excessive price or unfair. That said, the
Commission failed to provide legal proof of its allegations against
UBC for directly and indirectly imposing unfair selling prices for
bananas.[11]

In its British Leyland[12] decision, which is the only
excessive pricing decision that has been upheld by the European
Court of Justice, the European Commission determined that British
Leyland had charged higher prices for bestowing certificates of
conformity for left-hand drive cars than for right-hand drive cars.
The European Court of Justice, by referring to its General
Motors decision,[13] stated
that an abuse of dominance violation occurs when the fee charged by
an administrative monopoly is disproportionate to the economic
value of the services rendered.[14] Once again, the European Court
of Justice used the economic-value test in order to determine and
define the abusive behavior in question. Consequently, the European
Court of Justice found that the price differences between the
certificates of conformity for left-hand drive cars and for
right-hand drive cars were not in line with or justified by the
cost differences between these services. In other words, there were
no economic justifications as to why British Leyland had chosen to
charge different fees for issuing certificates of conformity for
right-hand-drive and left-hand-drive vehicles, other than making
the re-importation of left-hand-drive vehicles less attractive for
consumers.[15] Accordingly, the
European Court of Justice ruled that the European Commission's
findings on British Leyland's abuse of dominance through
excessive pricing were correct and upheld the Commission's
decision.

In Scandlines Sverige AB v. Port of Helsingborg,[16] the European Commission stated,
in relation to the economic-value test, that the cost/price
comparison can only serve as a first step when analyzing excessive
prices, and that it is not sufficient by itself to determine the
existence of abusive behavior.[17]
This viewpoint is considered to be in line with the aforementioned
economic theory, according to which, "the economic value
of a product or service is determined jointly by consumers'
willingness to pay and the costs of supply."[18] In this decision, the Commission
declared that the price comparison to be made in the second stage
of the excessive pricing test should be applied in a dual
structure. The Commission further explained that the price of the
product or service under examination may be compared with either:
(i) the prices that the dominant undertaking applied for the same
product/service in other relevant markets, or (ii) the prices that
other undertakings charged for similar products in different
relevant markets.[19]

In 2017, after several years of silence and inaction on the
excessive pricing issue, the European Commission finally initiated
a formal investigation against Aspen Pharma regarding the
allegations that it had engaged in excessive pricing with respect
to five life-saving cancer medicines.[20] In its press release,[21] the Commission stated that it
would investigate whether Aspen Pharma had imposed price increases
that were significant and unjustified, and had therefore abused its
dominant market position. This ongoing investigation and the
European Commission's ultimate decision will provide valuable
insights with respect to the Commission's approach to the
determination of excessive pricing violations.

IV. The Concept of Excessive Pricing from the Perspective of
Turkish Competition Law

Abuse of dominant position under Turkish competition law is
regulated under Article 6 of the Law No. 4054 on the Protection of
Competition ("Law No. 4054").
Excessive pricing is considered to be a type of abuse of dominant
position under Turkish competition law, similarly to the
perspective and practice of European competition law. Much like the
European Commission, the Turkish Competition Board is also rather
reluctant to regulate the prices in a particular market due to
excessive pricing allegations. There are only a small number of
decisions by the Board on this issue, which also indicates that the
Turkish Competition Board rightfully does not have a tendency
toward determining price levels in the market.

In some of the Turkish Competition Board decisions,[22] the Board has stated that
excessive pricing could be considered as an abuse of dominant
position, subject to certain specific conditions. One of these
conditions is the existence of high barriers to entry or structural
entry barriers in the market under examination. In addition, the
lack of an alternative undertaking that could provide the same
product(s) or service(s) with competitive conditions
(i.e., for a lower price or with better terms) could be
perceived as an indication of a monopolistic market structure,
which would also be considered as one of the conditions suggesting
an abuse of dominant position. Furthermore, information asymmetry
in the market for potential competitors of the investigated
undertaking would also be taken into account as one of the
conditions for an excessive pricing assessment. The Board has noted
in its decisions that the underlying rationale for considering
entry barriers as one of the main conditions for an excessive
pricing assessment is that, if there is no (or low) entry barriers
in the market, it is assumed that, according to the general
economic dynamics of the market, high profit margins would attract
new entrants to the market. Therefore, the undertaking applying
high prices in such a market would ultimately be punished by the
market itself, because it would either have to lower its prices or
lose market share to the new market participants.

It can be argued that the Board's perspective (thus far) has
been that a market dealing with excessive pricing issues would
ultimately self-correct in the medium or long term, and thus,
competition enforcement authorities should not attempt to expedite
this self-correction process by interfering with the natural
dynamics and rhythms of the market. According to this view,
particularly in markets where new entry is possible, competition
authorities should refrain from interfering directly with excessive
prices, but rather focus on lowering the remaining entry barriers
in the market.[23]

The Belko[24] case was
a prime illustration of this principle. In that case, the Board
assessed the excessive pricing allegations against Belko, which was
an undertaking that was granted the right to exclusively distribute
coal in Ankara by a government regulation. In its decision, the
Board noted and emphasized that the relevant undertaking enjoyed
monopoly power in the market due to the regulation, and that the
market was strictly closed to new entrants. Despite this fact, no
legislative precautions had been taken that could have prevented
Belko's abusive behavior, such as its excessive pricing
behavior. In the absence of any such preventive legislative action,
Belko was saddled with high costs and inefficient operations,
primarily due to overstaffing issues, and such high costs led, in
turn, to high prices. In light of the fact that coal has no close
substitutes as a product (due to legal regulations as well as
customer preferences), the elasticity of demand in the relevant
market was low. The Board also noted that it was impossible to
determine the cost of a unit of coal (e.g., 1 ton);
however, it also observed that the high operational costs of the
undertaking were the result of factors other than the production of
coal itself, such as financing problems, overstaffing, and
currency-rate fluctuations, among others. The Board went on to
compare Belko's prices with the prevailing prices of coal of
similar quality in other geographic markets that were open to
competition, and determined that Belko's prices were 50-60%
higher than its substitutes. As a direct result of this comparison,
the Board ruled that Belko had abused its dominant position in the
market. In addition to assessing a monetary fine on Belko, the
Board also sent a warning letter to the undertaking, in which it
indicated that Belko should lower its prices to reasonable levels,
in line with the prices in competitive coal markets. In other
words, instead of regulating the actual price to be applied in the
relevant market, the Board decided to regulate the price
not to be applied in the relevant market.

Another instructive example was provided by the
Tüpraş case,[25] where the Board initiated a
preliminary investigation in order to assess whether
Tüpraş had abused its dominance in the market by charging
excessive prices for Jet A-1 fuel. The Board noted that
Tüpraş had been deemed a dominant undertaking in a
previous decision.[26] Considering
the fact that its market share had not decreased since the earlier
decision, the Board determined that Tüpraş was still in a
dominant position in the relevant market, without conducting any
further evaluations on this issue. Accordingly, the Board only made
an evaluation as to Tüpraş's pricing behavior and
whether it constituted an abuse of dominant position within the
scope of Article 6 of the Law No. 4054.

In its Tüpraş decision, the Board stated that
a dominant undertaking's abusive conduct can be categorized as
either: (i) exploitative, or (ii) exclusionary. According to the
Board, excessive pricing is an exploitative behavior, which causes
a direct loss of consumer welfare, and thus is one of the main
competition law concerns within the scope of the applicable Turkish
competition law rules. The decision also observed that the
Board's decisional practice is closely akin to (and in line
with) the European Commission's practice on excessive
pricing.

In the same decision, the Board acknowledged that it is
difficult to determine excessive pricing behavior, and that
intervention in such cases would be likely to cause downsides in
the relevant market, such as having a deterrence effect on new
entries, decreasing the incentives for invention and innovation,
and the risk of legal error with respect to determining what would
be considered as a "fair price." The Board
further stated that, although excessive pricing is not considered
to fall outside the scope of competition law rules in the EU or in
Turkey, assessing a competition law violation due to excessive
pricing is only sanctioned or warranted in exceptional
circumstances.

Therefore, the Board declared that, in order to evaluate
excessive pricing allegations in terms of competition law, the
conditions and dynamics of the relevant market must be assessed
explicitly. Accordingly, the Board stated that, in order for a
competition law violation to occur due to excessive pricing, not
only must the examined undertaking be in a dominant position, but
it must also enjoy monopoly powers, or possess excessive market
share that puts it close to a monopoly situation in the relevant
product market, where its privileged position is protected by high
and permanent barriers to entry. In addition, the existence of a
regulatory authority with regulatory powers over the relevant
product market should also be taken into account, since an
intervention from the competition authorities in relation to
pricing behaviors may cause uncertainty in the relevant market,
especially in cases where specialized bodies already regulate such
pricing behaviors in a similar way Ministry of Energy and Natural
Sources regulates prices to be charged by energy companies. It was
also suggested by the Board that it would be much more efficient
and appropriate for intervention to occur through such specialized
bodies instead of competition authorities.

Based on the evidence contained in the investigation file, the
Board declared that it was possible to assert that Tüpraş
had applied higher prices during the first six months of 2009
compared to its previous prices. Nevertheless, the Board emphasized
that the market conditions also had to be analyzed in order to
determine whether there had been a breach of Article 6 of the Law
No. 4054. To that end, the Board noted that the market prices of
jet fuel are strongly correlated with raw petroleum prices.
Furthermore, the Board observed that, during the period in which
Tüpraş had raised its refinery bounties, certain
distributor companies had imported products with higher bounties.
Even though jet fuel prices had escalated drastically compared to
the prices of diesel oil and gasoline, the Board noted that jet
fuel prices had nevertheless increased in parallel with raw
petroleum prices. Based on these factors and as a result of its
analysis, the Board concluded that the pricing behavior of
Tüpraş could not be considered as excessive pricing.

In another excessive pricing case, the Turkish Competition Board
initiated a preliminary investigation in order to examine whether
Soda Sanayi ("SODA") had abused
its dominant position in the market through excessive pricing of
basic chromium sulphate and whether it had violated the Law No.
4054 through horizontal or vertical agreements with the object of
restricting competition.[27]

In this case, it was alleged that basic chromium sulphate, which
is a raw material used in leather manufacturing and which directly
affects the quality of the leather produced, is only produced by
SODA in Turkey, and that SODA was applying higher prices for basic
chromium sulphate to local leather producers, in comparison to the
prices it charged to foreign leather producers. Taking into account
market share data and information about SODA's market share in
previous years, the Board concluded that SODA was in a dominant
position in the basic chromium sulphate market in Turkey, since
SODA was a global and European leader in terms of the chromium
chemicals industry.

The Board then proceeded to analyze whether there had been an
abuse of dominant position, and made a substantive assessment under
Article 6 of the Law No. 4054. Within this framework, the Board
defined "excessive price" as "the price
determined consistently and significantly above the competitive
level as a result of the undertaking's market
power,"[28] and stated
that the following factors must be evaluated to deduce abuse of
dominant position through excessive pricing: (i) market shares and
market concentration rate, (ii) barriers to entry, and (iii) the
countervailing buyer power.

Similar to its approach in other excessive pricing cases, the
Board conducted a price comparison of SODA's basic chromium
sulphate products. Accordingly, SODA's prices of basic chromium
sulphate products were first compared with the prices of its
competitors' products. In addition, SODA's prices for
domestic sales were then compared with its export prices. Thirdly,
domestic prices and profit-margin ratios were compared with export
prices and profit-margin ratios. Lastly, the domestic sales prices
of SODA and its export profit-margin ratios were compared with each
other.

In its analysis, the Board observed that SODA had been working
with high profit margins on both domestic sales and exports for the
previous five years. The Board also determined that SODA's
prices and profits in domestic sales had been higher than its
export sales prices and profits. According to the Board, this may
have been caused by the fact that: (i) SODA's strategy had been
focused on exports, and (ii) the purchase cost for foreign
customers had actually been higher than local customers' costs,
given that this included transportation and other costs. In
evaluating the market conditions, the Board noted that there were
no entry barriers for the import of basic chromium sulphate in
Turkey.

The Board also evaluated excessive pricing allegations through
conceptual and practical aspects. The Board suggested that, from a
conceptual perspective, prohibiting excessive pricing may restrict
the ability of undertakings to determine and optimize their prices
for the purposes of profit maximization. From a practical
perspective, the Board further suggested that competition
authorities may be unable to efficiently analyze whether the
relevant undertakings' prices are determined consistently and
significantly above the competitive level. This decision clearly
indicates that the Board interferes with excessive pricing only
under exceptional circumstances, because interference with prices
may damage the operations of the market and competition experts run
the risk of being mistaken in their analysis of the situation. In
light of the risk of erroneous decisions with respect to excessive
pricing, the benefits of such interference are rarely worth the
risk of harming the dynamics of the market.

Finally, in its Fuar decision,[29] the Board assessed whether
Congresium had applied excessive prices in its lease agreements in
the market for the "management of international exhibition and
fairgrounds." In this decision, the Board first determined
that Congresium held a dominant position in the relevant
market.

The Board then evaluated whether Congresium had applied
excessive pricing in the lease agreements by assessing whether the
difference between Congresium's costs and prices had been
reasonable. In its examination of the excessive pricing
allegations, the Board used the two-staged test. First, the Board
compared the price demanded by Congresium for leasing area service
and the costs associated with this service. Second, the prices
charged by Congresium were compared with the prices charged by
other undertakings that provided similar services in the relevant
market, as well as different geographical markets. Consequently,
the Board determined that, in 2014-2015, Congresium had applied
higher prices (per square meter) for certain fairgrounds compared
to its competitors. However, the Board noted that the higher price
policy had not continued, and that, for some fairgrounds,
Congresium had applied lower prices as well. The Board then
proceeded to compare the costs and the prices associated with the
area rental service provided by Congresium. Moreover,
Congresium's prices were compared to the prices of other
undertakings that were active in the same market. In the end, the
Board concluded that Congresium's prices had not been
consistently and excessively higher than its competitors.
Therefore, the Board determined that Congresium's pricing
behavior could not be considered as excessive pricing.

V. Conclusion

According to the established doctrine, decisional practice, and
precedents of the competition law authorities discussed above,
there are several different approaches regarding the assessment of
excessive pricing and regulatory intervention with respect to such
excessive pricing behavior.

It would be fair to say that, generally, competition authorities
in Turkey and the European Union are not very eager to interfere
with market prices. Instead, regulatory authorities have often
sought alternative remedies to combat competition law violations
stemming from excessive prices. For example, there have been
instances where the Turkish Competition Board ordered a particular
undertaking not to apply excessive prices, but refrained from
specifying the reasonable price level that should be applied by the
undertaking. This cautious approach is mainly due to the fact that
both the European Commission and the Turkish Competition Board
correctly foresee the risks associated with interfering with the
pricing strategies of independent undertakings and, therefore, with
the ebb and flow of the free market. Competition authorities are
not experts at determining the nuances of an undertaking's
operations and strategies in the market, and thus may inadvertently
cause an imbalance in the market that can neither be foreseen nor
provide the ultimate remedy for the damage created by the excessive
pricing behavior of the undertaking in question. There is a thin
line between the need for a free, self-regulating market and the
need to prevent the harm caused by the excessive pricing behavior
of dominant undertakings. Maintaining this delicate balance
requires an objective assessment of market conditions by
competition law authorities and the application of reasonable and
effective remedies on a case-by-case basis.

With online sales now integral to many retail businesses, the issue of whether luxury goods suppliers can stop goods which qualify for selective distribution from being sold via third party platforms such as Amazon and eBay is more important than ever.

The Turkish Competition Authority ("Competition Authority" or "Authority") has announced on July 20, 2017, on its official website, that its "Draft Guidelines on Vertical Agreements" ("Draft Guidelines"), which aims to revise the Block Exemption Communiqué on Vertical Agreements No. 2002/2 ("Communiqué No. 2002/2") and the Guidelines on Vertical Agreements ("Guidelines") has been made available for public notice and comment.

On 23 October 2017, the General Court of the European Union (the "Court") dismissed an action brought by Confédération européenne des associations d'horlogers-réparateurs ("CEAHR") against the European Commission ...

On 23 May, the CMA issued a statement of objections, which is a provisional finding that Merck Sharp & Dohme Limited (MSD) has breached UK competition law by abusing its dominant position.

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use the service and the cookie will automatically expire if you do not visit the
Mondaq website (or its affiliate sites) for 12 months. We also use the cookie to
personalise a user's experience of the site (for example to show information
specific to a user's region). As the Mondaq sites are fully personalised and
cookies are essential to its core technology the site will function
unpredictably with browsers that do not support cookies - or where cookies are
disabled (in these circumstances we advise you to attempt to locate the
information you require elsewhere on the web). However if you are concerned
about the presence of a Mondaq cookie on your machine you can also choose to
expire the cookie immediately (remove it) by selecting the 'Log Off' menu option
as the last thing you do when you use the site.

Some of our business partners may use cookies on our site (for example,
advertisers). However, we have no access to or control over these cookies and we
are not aware of any at present that do so.

Log Files

We use IP addresses to analyse trends, administer the site, track movement,
and gather broad demographic information for aggregate use. IP addresses are not
linked to personally identifiable information.

Links

This web site contains links to other sites. Please be aware that Mondaq (or
its affiliate sites) are not responsible for the privacy practices of such other
sites. We encourage our users to be aware when they leave our site and to read
the privacy statements of these third party sites. This privacy statement
applies solely to information collected by this Web site.

Surveys & Contests

From time-to-time our site requests information from users via surveys or
contests. Participation in these surveys or contests is completely voluntary and
the user therefore has a choice whether or not to disclose any information
requested. Information requested may include contact information (such as name
and delivery address), and demographic information (such as postcode, age
level). Contact information will be used to notify the winners and award prizes.
Survey information will be used for purposes of monitoring or improving the
functionality of the site.

Mail-A-Friend

If a user elects to use our referral service for informing a friend about our
site, we ask them for the friends name and email address. Mondaq stores this
information and may contact the friend to invite them to register with Mondaq,
but they will not be contacted more than once. The friend may contact Mondaq to
request the removal of this information from our database.

Emails

From time to time Mondaq may send you emails promoting Mondaq services including new services. You may opt out of receiving such emails by clicking below.

*** If you do not wish to receive any future announcements of services offered by Mondaq you may opt out by clicking here .

Security

This website takes every reasonable precaution to protect our users
information. When users submit sensitive information via the website, your
information is protected using firewalls and other security technology. If you
have any questions about the security at our website, you can send an email to
webmaster@mondaq.com.

Correcting/Updating Personal Information

If a users personally identifiable information changes (such as postcode),
or if a user no longer desires our service, we will endeavour to provide a way
to correct, update or remove that users personal data provided to us. This can
usually be done at the Your Profile page or by sending an email to EditorialAdvisor@mondaq.com.

Notification of Changes

If we decide to change our Terms & Conditions or Privacy Policy, we will
post those changes on our site so our users are always aware of what information
we collect, how we use it, and under what circumstances, if any, we disclose it.
If at any point we decide to use personally identifiable information in a manner
different from that stated at the time it was collected, we will notify users by
way of an email. Users will have a choice as to whether or not we use their
information in this different manner. We will use information in accordance with
the privacy policy under which the information was collected.

How to contact Mondaq

If for some reason you believe Mondaq Ltd. has not adhered to these
principles, please notify us by e-mail at problems@mondaq.com and we will use
commercially reasonable efforts to determine and correct the problem promptly.

By clicking Register you state you have read and agree to our Terms and Conditions