Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes

Chapter XXX

Of the Office of the Sovereign Representative

THE office of the sovereign, be it a monarch or an assembly, consisteth in the end for which he was
trusted with the sovereign power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people, to which he is obliged by the law
of nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the Author of that law, and to none but Him. But by safety here is
not meant a bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which every man by lawful industry, without
danger or hurt to the Commonwealth, shall acquire to himself.

And this is intended should be done, not by care applied to individuals, further than their protection from injuries
when they shall complain; but by a general providence, contained in public instruction, both of doctrine and example;
and in the making and executing of good laws to which individual persons may apply their own cases.

And because, if the essential rights of sovereignty (specified before in the eighteenth Chapter) be taken away, the
Commonwealth is thereby dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition and calamity of a war with every other
man, which is the greatest evil that can happen in this life; it is the office of the sovereign to maintain those
rights entire, and consequently against his duty, first, to transfer to another or to lay from himself any of them. For
he that deserteth the means deserteth the ends; and he deserteth the means that, being the sovereign, acknowledgeth
himself subject to the civil laws, and renounceth the power of supreme judicature; or of making war or peace by his own
authority; or of judging of the necessities of the Commonwealth; or of levying money and soldiers when and as much as
in his own conscience he shall judge necessary; or of making officers and ministers both of war and peace; or of
appointing teachers, and examining what doctrines are conformable or contrary to the defence, peace, and good of the
people. Secondly, it is against his duty to let the people be ignorant or misinformed of the grounds and reasons of
those his essential rights, because thereby men are easy to be seduced and drawn to resist him when the Commonwealth
shall require their use and exercise.

And the grounds of these rights have the rather need drafter need to be diligently and truly taught, because they
cannot be maintained by any civil law or terror of legal punishment. For a civil law that shall forbid rebellion (and
such is all resistance to the essential rights of sovereignty) is not, as a civil law, any obligation but by virtue
only of the law of nature that forbiddeth the violation of faith; which natural obligation, if men know not, they
cannot know the right of any law the sovereign maketh. And for the punishment, they take it but for an act of
hostility; which when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour, by acts of hostility, to avoid.

As I have heard some say that justice is but a word, without substance; and that whatsoever a man can by force or
art acquire to himself, not only in the condition of war, but also in a Commonwealth, is his own, which I have already
shown to be false: so there be also that maintain that there are no grounds, nor principles of reason, to sustain those
essential rights which make sovereignty absolute. For if there were, they would have been found out in some place or
other; whereas we see there has not hitherto been any Commonwealth where those rights have been acknowledged, or
challenged. Wherein they argue as ill, as if the savage people of America should deny there were any grounds or
principles of reason so to build a house as to last as long as the materials, because they never yet saw any so well
built. Time and industry produce every day new knowledge. And as the art of well building is derived from principles of
reason, observed by industrious men that had long studied the nature of materials, and the diverse effects of figure
and proportion, long after mankind began, though poorly, to build: so, long time after men have begun to constitute
Commonwealths, imperfect and apt to relapse into disorder, there may principles of reason be found out, by industrious
meditation, to make their constitution, excepting by external violence, everlasting. And such are those which I have in
this discourse set forth: which, whether they come not into the sight of those that have power to make use of them, or
be neglected by them or not, concerneth my particular interest, at this day, very little. But supposing that these of
mine are not such principles of reason; yet I am sure they are principles from authority of Scripture, as I shall make
it appear when I shall come to speak of the kingdom of God, administered by Moses, over the Jews, His peculiar people
by covenant.

But they say again that though the principles be right, yet common people are not of capacity enough to be made to
understand them. I should be glad that the rich and potent subjects of a kingdom, or those that are accounted the most
learned, were no less incapable than they. But all men know that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine proceed not
so much from the difficulty of the matter, as from the interest of them that are to learn. Potent men digest hardly
anything that setteth up a power to bridle their affections; and learned men, anything that discovereth their errors,
and thereby their authority: whereas the common people's minds, unless they be tainted with dependence on the potent,
or scribbled over with the opinions of their doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by public
authority shall be imprinted in them. Shall whole nations be brought to acquiesce in the great mysteries of Christian
religion, which are above reason; and millions of men be made believe that the same body may be in innumerable places
at one and the same time, which is against reason; and shall not men be able, by their teaching and preaching,
protected by the law, to make that received which is so consonant to reason that any unprejudicated man needs no more
to learn it than to hear it? I conclude therefore that in the instruction of the people in the essential rights which
are the natural and fundamental laws of sovereignty, there is no difficulty, whilst a sovereign has his power entire,
but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the Commonwealth;
and consequently, it is his duty to cause them so to be instructed; and not only his duty, but his benefit also, and
security against the danger that may arrive to himself in his natural person from rebellion.

And, to descend to particulars, the people are to be taught, first, that they ought not to be in love with any form
of government they see in their neighbour nations, more than with their own, nor, whatsoever present prosperity they
behold in nations that are otherwise governed than they, to desire change. For the prosperity of a people ruled by an
aristocratical or democratical assembly cometh not from aristocracy, nor from democracy, but from the obedience and
concord of the subjects: nor do the people flourish in a monarchy because one man has the right to rule them, but
because they obey him. Take away in any kind of state the obedience, and consequently the concord of the people, and
they shall not only not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience to do no more
than reform the Commonwealth shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of Peleus, in the fable,
which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit father, did by the counsel of Medea cut him in pieces and boil him,
together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man. This desire of change is like the breach of the first of
God's Commandments: for there God says, Non habebis Deos alienos: "Thou shalt not have the Gods of other nations"; and
in another place concerning kings, that they are gods.

Secondly, they are to be taught that they ought not to be led with admiration of the virtue of any of their fellow
subjects, how high soever he stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine in the Commonwealth; nor of any assembly,
except the sovereign assembly, so as to defer to them any obedience or honour appropriate to the sovereign only, whom,
in their particular stations, they represent; nor to receive any influence from them, but such as is conveyed by them
from the sovereign authority. For that sovereign cannot be imagined to love his people as he ought that is not jealous
of them, but suffers them by the flattery of popular men to be seduced from their loyalty, as they have often been, not
only secretly, but openly, so as to proclaim marriage with them in facie ecclesiae by preachers, and by publishing the
same in the open streets: which may fitly be compared to the violation of the second of the Ten Commandments.

Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed how great a fault it is to speak evil of the sovereign
representative, whether one man or an assembly of men; or to argue and dispute his power, or any way to use his name
irreverently, whereby he may be brought into contempt with his people, and their obedience, in which the safety of the
Commonwealth consisteth, slackened. Which doctrine the third Commandment by resemblance pointeth to.

Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor, when it is taught, remember it, nor after one generation past so
much as know in whom the sovereign power is placed, without setting apart from their ordinary labour some certain times
in which they may attend those that are appointed to instruct them; it is necessary that some such times be determined
wherein they may assemble together, and, after prayers and praises given to God, the Sovereign of sovereigns, hear
those their duties told them, and the positive laws, such as generally concern them all, read and expounded, and be put
in mind of the authority that maketh them laws. To this end had the Jews every seventh day a Sabbath, in which the law
was read and expounded; and in the solemnity whereof they were put in mind that their king was God; that having created
the world in six days, He rested on the seventh day; and by their resting on it from their labour, that that God was
their king, which redeemed them from their servile and painful labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after they had
rejoiced in God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawful recreation. So that the first table of the Commandments is
spent all in setting down the sum of God's absolute power; not only as God, but as King by pact, in peculiar, of the
Jews; and may therefore give light to those that have sovereign power conferred on them by the consent of men, to see
what doctrine they ought to teach their subjects.

And because the first instruction of children dependeth on the care of their parents, it is necessary that they
should be obedient to them whilst they are under their tuition; and not only so, but that also afterwards, as gratitude
requireth, they acknowledge the benefit of their education by external signs of honour. To which end they are to be
taught that originally the father of every man was also his sovereign lord, with power over him of life and death; and
that the fathers of families, when by instituting a Commonwealth they resigned that absolute power, yet it was never
intended they should lose the honour due unto them for their education. For to relinquish such right was not necessary
to the institution of sovereign power; nor would there be any reason why any man should desire to have children, or
take the care to nourish and instruct them, if they were afterwards to have no other benefit from them than from other
men. And this accordeth with the fifth Commandment.

Again, every sovereign ought to cause justice to be taught, which, consisting in taking from no man what is his, is
as much as to say, to cause men to be taught not to deprive their neighbours, by violence or fraud, of anything which
by the sovereign authority is theirs. Of things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own life and
limbs; and in the next degree, in most men, those that concern conjugal affection; and after them riches and means of
living. Therefore the people are to be taught to abstain from violence to one another's person by private revenges,
from violation of conjugal honour, and from forcible rapine and fraudulent surreption of one another's goods. For which
purpose also it is necessary they be shown the evil consequences of false judgment, by corruption either of judges or
witnesses, whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away, and justice becomes of no effect: all which things are
intimated in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth Commandments.

Lastly, they are to be taught that not only the unjust facts, but the designs and intentions to do them, though by
accident hindered, are injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as in the irregularity of the
act. And this is the intention of the tenth Commandment, and the sum of the second table; which is reduced all to this
one commandment of mutual charity, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self"; as the sum of the first table is
reduced to "the love of God"; whom they had then newly received as their king.

As for the means and conduits by which the people may receive this instruction, we are to search by what means so
many opinions contrary to the peace of mankind, upon weak and false principles, have nevertheless been so deeply rooted
in them. I mean those which I have in the precedent the precedent chapter specified: as that men shall judge of what is
lawful and unlawful, not by the law itself, but by their own consciences; that is to say, by their own private
judgements: that subjects sin in obeying the commands of the Commonwealth, unless they themselves have first judged
them to be lawful: that their propriety in their riches is such as to exclude the dominion which the Commonwealth hath
the same: that it is lawful for subjects to kill such as they call tyrants: that the sovereign power may be divided,
and the like; which come to be instilled into the people by this means. They whom necessity or covetousness keepeth
attent on their trades and labour; and they, on the other side, whom superfluity or sloth carrieth after their sensual
pleasures (which two sorts of men take up the greatest part of mankind), being diverted from the deep meditation which
the of truth, not only in the matter of natural justice, but also of all other sciences necessarily requireth, receive
the notions of their duty chiefly from divines in the pulpit, and partly from such of their neighbours or familiar
acquaintance as having the faculty of discoursing readily and plausibly seem wiser and better learned in cases of law
and conscience than themselves. And the divines, and such others as make show of learning, derive their knowledge from
the universities, and from the schools of law, or from the books which by men eminent in those schools and universities
have been published. It is therefore manifest that the instruction of the people dependeth wholly on the right teaching
of youth in the universities. But are not, may some man say, the universities of England learned enough already to do
that? Or is it, you will undertake to teach the universities? Hard questions. Yet to the first, I doubt not to answer:
that till towards the latter end of Henry the Eighth, the power of the Pope was always upheld against the power of the
Commonwealth, principally by the universities; and that the doctrines by so many preachers against the sovereign power
of the king, and by so many lawyers and others that had their education there, is a sufficient argument that, though
the universities were not authors of those false doctrines, yet they knew not how to plant the true. For in such a
contradiction of opinions, it is most certain that they have not been sufficiently instructed; and it is no wonder, if
they yet retain a relish of that subtle liquor wherewith they were first seasoned against the civil authority. But to
the latter question, it is not fit nor needful for me to say either aye or no: for any man that sees what I am doing
may easily perceive what I think.

The safety of the people requireth further, from him or them that have the sovereign power, that justice be equally
administered to all degrees of people; that is, that as well the rich and mighty, as poor and obscure persons, may be
righted of the injuries done them; so as the great may have no greater hope of impunity, when they do violence,
dishonour, or any injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these does the like to one of them: for in this
consisteth equity; to which, as being a precept of the law of nature, a sovereign is as much subject as any of the
meanest of his people. All breaches of the law are offences against the Commonwealth: but there be some that are also
against private persons. Those that concern the Commonwealth only may without breach of equity be pardoned; for every
man may pardon what is done against himself, according to his own discretion. But an offence against a private man
cannot in equity be pardoned without the consent of him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction.

The inequality of subjects proceedeth from the acts of sovereign power, and therefore has no more place in the
presence of the sovereign; that is to say, in a court of justice, than the inequality between kings and their subjects
in the presence of the King of kings. The honour of great persons is to be valued for their beneficence, and the aids
they give to men of inferior rank, or not at all. And the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do are not
extenuated, but aggravated, by the greatness of their persons, because they have least need to commit them. The
consequences of this partiality towards the great proceed in this manner. Impunity maketh insolence; insolence, hatred;
and hatred, an endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatness, though with the ruin of the
Commonwealth.

To equal justice appertaineth also the equal imposition of taxes; the equality whereof dependeth not on the equality
of riches, but on the equality of the debt that every man oweth to the Commonwealth for his defence. It is not enough
for a man to labour for the maintenance of his life; but also to fight, if need be, for the securing of his labour.
They must either do as the Jews did after their return from captivity, in re-edifying the Temple, build with one hand
and hold the sword in the other, or else they must hire others to fight for them. For the impositions that are laid on
the people by the sovereign power are nothing else but the wages due to them that hold the public sword to defend
private men in the exercise of several trades and callings. Seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby is
the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor and rich, the debt which a poor man oweth them that defend his
life is the same which a rich man oweth for the defence of his; saving that the rich, who have the service of the poor,
may be debtors not only for their own persons, but for many more. Which considered, the equality of imposition
consisteth rather in the equality of that which is consumed, than of the riches of the persons that consume the same.
For what reason is there that he which laboureth much and, sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little should be
more charged than he that, living idly, getteth little and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more protection
from the Commonwealth than the other? But when the impositions are laid upon those things which men consume, every man
payeth equally for what he useth; nor is the Commonwealth defrauded by the luxurious waste of private men.

And whereas many men, by accident inevitable, become unable to maintain themselves by their labour, they ought not
to be left to the charity of private persons, but to be provided for, as far forth as the necessities of nature
require, by the laws of the Commonwealth. For as it is uncharitableness in any man to neglect the impotent; so it is in
the sovereign of a Commonwealth, to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain charity.

But for such as have strong bodies the case is otherwise; they are to be forced to work; and to avoid the excuse of
not finding employment, there ought to be such laws as may encourage all manner of arts; as navigation, agriculture,
fishing, and all manner of manufacture that requires labour. The multitude of poor and yet strong people still
increasing, they are to be transplanted into countries not sufficiently inhabited; where nevertheless they are not to
exterminate those they find there; but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not range a great deal of ground
to snatch what they find, but to court each little plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance in due
season. And when all the world is overcharged with inhabitants, then the last remedy of all is war, which provideth for
every man, by victory or death.

To the care of the sovereign belongeth the making of good laws. But what is a good law? By a good law, I mean not a
just law: for no law can be unjust. The law is made by the sovereign power, and all that is done by such power is
warranted and owned by every one of the people; and that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. It is
in the laws of a Commonwealth, as in the laws of gaming: whatsoever the gamesters all agree on is injustice to none of
them. A good law is that which is needful, for the good of the people, and withal perspicuous.

For the use of laws (which are but rules authorized) is not to bind the people from all voluntary actions, but to
direct and keep them in such a motion as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashness, or
indiscretion; as hedges are set, not to stop travellers, but to keep them in the way. And therefore a law that is not
needful, having not the true end of a law, is not good. A law may be conceived to be good when it is for the benefit of
the sovereign, though it be not necessary for the people, but it is not so. For the good of the sovereign and people
cannot be separated. It is a weak sovereign that has weak subjects; and a weak people whose sovereign wanteth power to
rule them at his will. Unnecessary laws are not good laws, but traps for money which, where the right of sovereign
power is acknowledged, are superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, insufficient to defend the people.

The perspicuity consisteth not so much in the words of the law itself, as in a declaration of the causes and motives
for which it was made. That is it that shows us the meaning of the legislator; and the meaning of the legislator known,
the law is more easily understood by few than many words. For all words are subject to ambiguity; and therefore
multiplication of words in the body of the law is multiplication of ambiguity: besides it seems to imply, by too much
diligence, that whosoever can evade the words is without the compass of the law. And this is a cause of many
unnecessary processes. For when I consider how short were the laws of ancient times, and how they grew by degrees still
longer, methinks I see a contention between the penners and pleaders of the law; the former seeking to circumscribe the
latter, and the latter to evade their circumscriptions; and that the pleaders have got the victory. It belongeth
therefore to the office of a legislator (such as is in all Commonwealths the supreme representative, be it one man or
an assembly) to make the reason perspicuous why the law was made, and the body of the law itself as short, but in as
proper and significant terms, as may be.

It belongeth also to the office of the sovereign to make a right application of punishments and rewards. And seeing
the end of punishing is not revenge and discharge of choler, but correction either of the offender or of others by his
example, the severest punishments are to be inflicted for those crimes that are of most danger to the public; such as
are those which proceed from malice to the government established; those that spring from contempt of justice; those
that provoke indignation in the multitude; and those which, unpunished, seem authorized, as when they are committed by
sons, servants, or favourites of men in authority: for indignation carrieth men, not only against the actors and
authors of injustice, but against all power that is likely to protect them; as in the case of Tarquin, when for the
insolent act of one of his sons he was driven out of Rome, and the monarchy itself dissolved. But crimes of infirmity;
such as are those which proceed from great provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance whether the fact
be a great crime or not, there is place many times for lenity, without prejudice to the Commonwealth; and lenity, when
there is such place for it, is required by the law of nature. The punishment of the leaders and teachers in a
commotion; not the poor seduced people, when they are punished, can profit the Commonwealth by their example. To be
severe to people is to punish ignorance which may in great part be imputed to the sovereign, whose fault it was they
were no better instructed.

In like manner it belongeth to the office and duty of the sovereign to apply his rewards always so as there may
arise from them benefit to the Commonwealth: wherein consisteth their use and end; and is then done when they that have
well served the Commonwealth are, with as little expense of the common treasury as is possible, so well recompensed as
others thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same as faithfully as they can, and to study the arts by which they
may be enabled to do it better. To buy with money or preferment, from a popular ambitious subject to be quiet and
desist from making ill impressions in the minds of the people, has nothing of the nature of reward (which is ordained
not for disservice, but for service past); nor a sign of gratitude, but of fear; nor does it tend to the benefit, but
to the damage of the public. It is a contention with ambition, that of Hercules with the monster Hydra, which, having
many heads, for every one that was vanquished there grew up three. For in like manner, when the stubbornness of one
popular man is overcome with reward, there arise many more by the example, that do the same mischief in hope of like
benefit: and as all sorts of manufacture, so also malice increaseth by being vendible. And though sometimes a civil war
may be deferred by such ways as that, yet the danger grows still the greater, and the public ruin more assured. It is
therefore against the duty of the sovereign, to whom the public safety is committed, to reward those that aspire to
greatness by disturbing the peace of their country, and not rather to oppose the beginnings of such men with a little
danger, than after a longer time with greater.

Another business of the sovereign is to choose good counsellors; I mean such whose advice he is to take in the
government of the Commonwealth. For this word counsel (consilium, corrupted from considium) is of a large
signification, and comprehendeth all assemblies of men that sit together, not only to deliberate what is to be done
hereafter, but also to judge of facts past, and of law for the present. I take it here in the first sense only: and in
this sense, there is no choice of counsel, neither in a democracy nor aristocracy; because the persons counselling are
members of the person counselled. The choice of counsellors therefore is proper to monarchy, in which the sovereign
that endeavoureth not to make choice of those that in every kind are the most able, dischargeth not his office as he
ought to do. The most able counsellors are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evil counsel, and most
knowledge of those things that conduce to the peace and defence of the Commonwealth. It is a hard matter to know who
expecteth benefit from public troubles; but the signs that guide to a just suspicion is the soothing of the people in
their unreasonable or irremediable grievances by men whose estates are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed
expenses, and may easily be observed by any one whom it concerns to know it. But to know who has most knowledge of the
public affairs is yet harder; and they that know them need them a great deal the less. For to know who knows the rules
almost of any art is a great degree of the knowledge of the same art, because no man can be assured of the truth of
another's rules but he that is first taught to understand them. But the best signs of knowledge of any art are much
conversing in it and constant good effects of it. Good counsel comes not by lot, nor by inheritance; and therefore
there is no more reason to expect good advice from the rich or noble in matter of state, than in delineating the
dimensions of a fortress; unless we shall think there needs no method in the study of the politics, as there does in
the study of geometry, but only to be lookers on; which is not so. For the politics is the harder study of the two.
Whereas in these parts of Europe it hath been taken for a right of certain persons to have place in the highest council
of state by inheritance, it derived from the conquests of the ancient Germans; wherein many absolute lords, joining
together to conquer other nations, would not enter into the confederacy without such privileges as might be marks of
difference, in time following, between their posterity and the posterity of their subjects; which privileges being
inconsistent with the sovereign power, by the favour of the sovereign they may seem to keep; but contending for them as
their right, they must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last no further honour than adhereth naturally to
their abilities.

And how able soever be the counsellors in any affair, the benefit of their counsel is greater when they give every
one his advice, and the reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an assembly by way of orations; and when they have
premeditated, than when they speak on the sudden; both because they have more time to survey the consequences of
action, and are less subject to be carried away to contradiction through envy, emulation, or other passions arising
from the difference of opinion.

The best counsel, in those things that concern not other nations, but only the ease and benefit the subjects may
enjoy, by laws that look only inward, is to be taken from the general informations and complaints of the people of each
province, who are best acquainted with their own wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing in derogation of
the essential rights of sovereignty, to be diligently taken notice of. For without those essential rights, as I have
often before said, the Commonwealth cannot at all subsist.

A commander of an army in chief, if he be not popular, shall not be beloved, nor feared as he ought to be by his
army, and consequently cannot perform that office with good success. He must therefore be industrious, valiant,
affable, liberal and fortunate, that he may gain an opinion both of sufficiency and of loving his soldiers. This is
popularity, and breeds in the soldiers both desire and courage to recommend themselves to his favour; and protects the
severity of the general, in punishing, when need is, the mutinous or negligent soldiers. But this love of soldiers, if
caution be not given of the commander's fidelity, is a dangerous thing to sovereign power; especially when it is in the
hands of an assembly not popular. It belongeth therefore to the safety of the people, both that they be good conductors
and faithful subjects, to whom the sovereign commits his armies.

But when the sovereign himself is popular; that is, reverenced and beloved of his people, there is no danger at all
from the popularity of a subject. For soldiers are never so generally unjust as to side with their captain, though they
love him, against their sovereign, when they love not only his person, but also his cause. And therefore those who by
violence have at any time suppressed the power of their lawful sovereign, before they could settle themselves in his
place, have been always put to the trouble of contriving their titles to save the people from the shame of receiving
them. To have a known right to sovereign power is so popular a quality as he that has it needs no more, for his own
part, to turn the hearts of his subjects to him, but that they see him able absolutely to govern his own family: nor,
on the part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their armies. For the greatest and most active part of mankind has
never hitherto been well contented with the present.

Concerning the offices of one sovereign to another, which are comprehended in that law which is commonly called the
law of nations, I need not say anything in this place, because the law of nations and the law of nature is the same
thing. And every sovereign hath the same right in procuring the safety of his people, that any particular man can have
in procuring the safety of his own body. And the same law that dictateth to men that have no civil government what they
ought to do, and what to avoid in regard of one another, dictateth the same to Commonwealths; that is, to the
consciences of sovereign princes and sovereign assemblies; there being no court of natural justice, but in the
conscience only, where not man, but God reigneth; whose laws, such of them as oblige all mankind, in respect of God, as
he is the Author of nature, are natural; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of kings, are laws. But of the
kingdom of God, as King of kings, and as King also of a peculiar people, I shall speak in the rest of this
discourse.