Tuesday, May 31, 2016

Today the Iraqi forces are attempting to take the city of
Fallujah back from the Islamic State. The first time the town was fought over
however was in 1941 during World War II. During that time the British were
attempting to take Baghdad and overthrow the government of Premier Rashid Ali
Gaylani that was allied with the Germans and Italians.

When World War II broke out in Europe a group of Iraqi
politicians and military officers sided with the Axis. This was due to three
major factors. First, the Germans swept through Europe, and were
threatening Egypt by 1941 leading many in the Iraqi elite to believe that the
British would eventually lose. Second, politicians, members of the military,
and the general public were all resentful of England’s domination of the
country, which had created the nation after World War I as a mandate, imposed
the monarchy, and ran the country’s oil industry. At the same time, Berlin and
Rome were actively courting Baghdad, and those two countries were seen
as possible role models for the development of Iraq. Together that led to the
April 1941 coup led by four officers known as the Golden Square that put Rashid
Ali Gaylani into power and forced Abdullah Regent of Iraq to flee the country. The
new government was widely popular because of its anti-British stance. Germany
and Italy immediately released a joint statement saying they supported the coup
and offered military support as well. The prime minister and the Golden Square
officers wanted to push the British out of Iraq, but did not want to use force.
They believed that England would let Iraq slide out of its control as it was
defeated in the war. That did not play out as planned as the country became a
battlefield in the conflict

Immediately after the coup, Prime Minister Winston Churchill
began making plans to remove Gaylani from power to make sure that Iraq stayed
under Britain’s influence. In April Churchill ordered forces from India, Transjordan,
and Egypt to be sent to Iraq. By the middle of the month, the first troops had
arrived at an airbase in Shaibah, Basra, the port of Basra, and the Habaniya
airbase in Anbar. PM Gaylani responded by sending the army to surround the
Habaniya where they gave an ultimatum to the British to stop their operations
there. That was rejected, and the Battle of Habaniya ensued with an Iraqi
defeat. The British then started a march on Baghdad, which led to the Battle of
Fallujah.

Fallujah was considered the best crossing point of the
Euphrates River in Anbar on the road to Baghdad. The Iraqis had flooded most of
central Anbar by releasing water from the river. Ramadi had a large Iraqi army
contingent and was also isolated by the flooding so that was not considered a
good target. Fallujah was considered much easier, and had a bridge across the
Euphrates.

The British commander Colonel Ouvry Roberts planned a
multi-pronged approach to taking the town. First, there would be heavy bombing
of Fallujah to undermine morale. Then leaflets would be dropped demanding that
the Iraqis surrender. A four pronged attack on the town would then be launched
hoping to seize the bridge before it could be blown up. The main task of
seizing the structure would fall on 100 Iraqi levies that had been trained by
the British to originally protect the Habaniya base. Another attack would be
made by more levies and Indian Ghurkas supported by armored cars and howitzers
from the north to cut off reinforcements that might be sent from Ramadi. A
thrust from the south would be made using boats to maneuver the flooded
Eurphrates. Another contingent of troops would be flown into the east to cut
the Fallujah-Baghdad road and block any Iraqi forces being sent from the
capital.

On May 19, 1941 the Battle of Fallujah began. At 5 am 57
British planes bombed the town for an hour. The leaflets were then dropped
calling for the Iraqis to give up. At dawn, the troops were landed in the west
by plane to cut the Fallujah-Baghdad road. Another bombing run was made on the
town, and then the Iraqi levies made a charge on the bridge backed by some
armored cars. The bridge was seized and the town taken by the end of the day.
Ten tons of bombs had been dropped on the city, 300 Iraqis were captured, and
the levies didn’t take a single casualty as they rushed the Fallujah Bridge.
Most of the Iraqi troops in the town did not put up a fight and stripped off
their uniforms and either tried to blend in with the population or fled.

The Iraqis were not so easily defeated however, and tried to
take back the town on May 22. A unit from the Iraqi 6th Infantry
Brigade launched a counter attack to try to expel the British. They were
discovered at night as they were approaching, but could not be turned back by a
small reconnaissance force. At 3 am they reached the outskirts of town on the
northeast and started firing mortars on the British positions leading to their
withdrawal inside Fallujah proper. Two Iraqi tanks then entered the town, but
were destroyed. The British then launched their own attack, which pushed the
Iraqis out of Fallujah just as the sun rose. The Iraqis then switched to the
southeast with an infantry and tank assault. Nine hours of fighting later and
they were turned back. By then reinforcements arrived from Habaniya and cleared
the town by 6 pm after some very heavy fighting. A few days later German
planes, which had been sent to aid Gaylani’s government strafed the town while
Iraqi artillery shelled it. By then it was firmly under British control. Their
next move was to take the Iraqi capital, which eventually happened leading
Gaylani to flee to Iran.

The Battle of Fallujah played a major role in defeating the
pro-German and pro-Italian government in Baghdad and ensure that Iraq would
stay in the Allied camp during World War 2. London was worried that if Iraq
fell to the Axis it would cut off an important source of oil and threaten its
petroleum interests in Iran as well. Iraq also operated as part of the trade
route to India. Winston Churchill therefore saw Iraq as a strategic asset to
maintain the British empire. Some of the tactics used then are also being
employed now such as attacking the city from all sides, heavy bombardments to
loosen the defenses, and the dropping of flyers. In 1941 the Iraqis were
defeated, but in 2016 they will come out victorious.

Timeline Of Anglo-Iraq
War During World War 2

Jan 28 Regent Abdullah made moves against PM Gaylani for his
pro-German views

leading to plot against Regent

Jan 31 PM Gaylani forced form office by British pressure

Apr 1 Golden Square officers back coup leading to Gaylani to
return to power and

Regent
Abdullah fleeing country to Palestine under British protection

Apr 3 Germany sent letter saying it supported coup and
offered military aid

Apr 8 PM Churchill orders forces to be put together in India
to be sent to Iraq

Monday, May 30, 2016

In May 2016 the Sadrists confirmed their control of the
Baghdad protest movement. The demonstrations originally started in the south
and spread to Baghdad in July 2015. Secular civic groups and the Communist
Party were the early organizers of the movement. In the spring of 2016 however,
Moqtada al-Sadr decided to co-opt the weekly marches in the capital in an
attempt to make him the pre-eminent party boss in Iraqi politics. That didn’t
work out as planned, but Sadr has kept up pressure on the government each
Friday in Baghdad.

On May 20, 2016 the Sadrists took over the Green Zone for a
second time. Thousands marched from Sadr City
to Tahrir Square and then were able to move into the government sector. There
they entered
the parliament building once again, which had not been in session since the
last time the Green Zone was occupied. The first time the security forces stood
by and watched. This time however they used tear gas and fired shots. Four
people were killed
as a result, and up to 90
went to the hospital mostly for inhaling gas. Prime Minister Hadiar Abadi
condemned the take over saying that such lawlessness was unacceptable. Sadr
originally thought
marching on the government sector would make the premier dependent upon him to
pass his reforms, and pressure the other parties to follow suit. Instead, Sadr
obliterated parliament. The Kurds left
Baghdad in protest, while a block of parliamentarians opposed to Abadi tried
forming an opposition party. Sadr’s plan completely backfired, but it didn’t
appear he had a follow up strategy.

That was shown on May 27 when the Sadrists returned to the
streets of the capital. The day before Abadi asked for no protests
because of the military campaign in Fallujah. The secular protest movement complied,
but Sadr did not. Again, there were clashes with the security forces to keep
people away from the Green Zone. There were protests in southern cities as well
that the Sadrists did not appear to be involved with, but in Baghdad they had
taken over. Still, there appeared to be no method behind the demonstrations.
Parliament is no closer to coming together and moving on Abadi’s reforms that
Sadr has been demanding. In fact, the marches and continued moves into the
Green Zone are perpetuating the current crisis.

Sadr has always aspired to be the dominant figure in Iraqi
politics. His problem is that he never appears to think long term. The on going
protests are a perfect example. He succeeded in taking over the Baghdad
protests and the Green Zone, but there is nothing else to his strategy. Iraqi
politics has been effectively blown up by Sadr’s actions, and he has no
solutions to what he’s created other than to continue on his path.

Thursday, May 26, 2016

For a period there was a debate over how the Islamic State
and its predecessors Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq were
organized. The two main concepts were of a decentralized networked organization
of cells or a centralized bureaucratic one. The RAND Corporation recently
released a report on the Islamic State of Iraq, “Foundations of
the Islamic State, Management, Money, and Terror in Iraq, 2005-2010,” based
upon captured documents from the group. What those papers revealed was that the
Islamic State was based upon a hierarchical, top down model.

When the Iraq insurgency first began in 2003 a network
might have been the best way to describe it. Iraqis would draw upon a number of
identities and ties they had with others whether that be service in the
military or intelligence agencies, Baath Party membership, tribes, mosques,
extended families, etc. and form cells to carry out operations. Eventually
these coalesced together in loose organizations. Eventually if the groups had
staying power they became more highly organized.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s group, which would eventually become
the Islamic State, was an established group with a highly organized structure.
Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq were based upon an emir, with a
deputy, and then separate committees for specific tasks like administration,
security, military operations, etc. This structure was replicated at each level
of the organization. What RAND found from its analysis of captured documents
was that IS was set up almost identical to Al Qaeda. It hypothesized that bin
Laden and his lieutenants promoted a specific type of administration to other
groups, which Zarqawi and his followers picked up on. Many of the group’s
leaders also had connections to Al Qaeda such as Abu Ayub al-Masri who took
over after Zarqawi’s deaths. He was an Egyptian and follower of Aymenn
al-Zawahiri. That cross mingling might have helped with adopting a similar
organizational structure as well.

The top down, bureaucratic structure of the Islamic State is
evident in its voracious record keeping. All of its captured papers show that
the group loves documenting its members and activities. Who would have guessed
that the most successful jihadist terrorist group in the world would love paper
pushing so much. Its emphasis upon organization was what helped it run the
territory it captured in Syria and Iraq. At the same time, this presented a
huge vulnerability, because a successful raid on a base could turn over
thousands of papers that would expose all of its workings. That happened in May
2015 when U.S. Special Forces killed Abu
Sayaf in Syria, an Islamic State oil manager. The documents captured
revealed hundreds of details about how the group was running its petroleum
industry. That information was then put to use to destroy its infrastructure
and undermine a major money maker for the group. Despite that threat, IS
continues with its model because it provides the best means to manage its
territory and keep track of its membership.

Wednesday, May 25, 2016

“[Iraq would put up] a
heroic resistance and inflict such enormous losses on the Americans that they
would stop their advance.”

- Saddam Hussein,
2003

Saddam Hussein had no formal military training or combat
experience, but he believed that he was a strategist. His main belief was that
Iraqis possessed a martial spirit that manifested itself in the ability to take
casualties. He thought that this toughness would allow Iraq to defeat the U.S.
led coalitions in the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion. Unfortunately for
him, few of his soldiers were willing to fight for him leading to two
devastating defeats.

Saddam’s understanding of war was very limited, which made
him believe in a series of miscalculations when faced with the Americans. In February
1991 Saddam had a meeting with his commanders in anticipation for the war
against the U.S. led coalition to free Kuwait. Saddam believed that the war
would unite Iraqis to fight together against the foreign invaders. Mohammed
Zubaidi, a regional commander, voiced the belief that if the Iraqis were able
to inflict casualties upon the Americans they would give up. There were some
very heated engagements at the beginning of the Gulf War, but the Iraqis were
easily defeated, and a general retreat was quickly called. Despite that, Saddam
came out of the conflict believing that he had actually won, because he was
still in power. His thought that Iraqis were superior fighters was not shaken
by the turn of events, and would be voiced again twelve years later.

In 2003 Saddam and his advisers would express the same set
of beliefs when faced with the U.S. invasion. Saddam
talked about the Iraqi soldiers being superior to the Americans. He mentioned
the huge casualties that the Iraqis suffered during the Iran-Iraq War as proof
of their abilities. In comparison, Saddam and his advisers believed that
Vietnam and Somalia proved that the Americans were risk averse, and a few dead
and wounded would lead them to give up. As it turned out, the Iraqis put up
even less resistance in 2003 than in 1991. Besides a few fanatical attacks by
the Fedayeen, most of the Iraqi army quit without putting up a fight, threw off
their uniforms and went home.

Saddam like many dictators lived in a bubble of his own
creation where sound advice was rare. Twice faced with a superior enemy in 1991
and 2003 Saddam believed that his military could take anything dished out and
still prevail. Somehow the ability to die was believed to be an asset. It
turned out most of his soldiers gave up both times instead of sacrificing
themselves. Still, Saddam believed that his men were fighting the Americans to
a standstill until they got to Baghdad. It wasn’t until the very end that he
was willing to admit defeat.

Tuesday, May 24, 2016

The Islamic State was still in the midst of its spring
offensive in the third week of May. Attacks actually went down, but casualties
remained high because of a number of mass casualty bombings that mark the
current insurgent campaign.

There were 121 incidents reported in Iraq from May 15-21.
That was the fewest incidents since the second week of February when there were
119. There were 67 attacks in Baghdad, 16 in Anbar, 11 each in Diyala and
Ninewa, 7 in Salahaddin, 4 in Kirkuk, 2 in Babil, and one each in Basra, Dhi
Qar, and Qadisiyah.

Despite those low figures casualties were very high in the
country. There were 349 people killed, made up of 1 Iranian Basij, 1 Nujafi
volunteer, 4 Sahwa, 4 Peshmerga, 5 Hashd, 32 members of the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF), and 302 civilians. Another 604 were wounded, which consisted of 2
Peshmerga, 2 Sahwa, 15 Hashd, 65 ISF, and 520 civilians.

As usual, Baghdad led the way as the deadliest province with
197. There were another 80 in Ninewa, 33 in Anbar, 30 in Salahaddin, 8 in
Diyala, and 1 in Kirkuk.

In Anbar the Iraqi forces continued its sweep westward. In
previous weeks Hit was freed, and the siege of Haditha ended. During the third
week of May there was continued operations from Hit to Baghdadi to Haditha with
several towns freed. The Iraqi forces then moved south and cleared Rutba, and
reached the Jordanian border crossing of Trebil. In eastern Anbar,
the Hashd continued to talk about freeing Fallujah, but were busy sweeping through
Amiriya Fallujah again after it was declared 75% freed during the first week of
the month. The new operation was due to a wave of suicide bombers that attacked
the town the week before. Still, forces were being assembled around Fallujah
for the campaign that started on May 23. With the
inclusion of the ISF and U.S. air strikes the city will be eventually freed,
but what’s left in the aftermath will be a big question. This will top off the
series of victories that have occurred in the governorate with only the Syrian
border area remaining firmly in IS hands. There is still a threat in Anbar
however, as IS is alive and well in the rural and desert areas and the small towns
surrounding the major centers.

In an interesting turn of events, as the Fallujah operation
finally got underway the Iraqi press began reporting on shelling of the city
again. Artillery, mortars and air strikes have pounded the place since January
2014 causing hundreds of casualties. This used to be regularly reported, but
that ended in the fall of last year. From May 15-21 three artillery incidents
were mentioned leading to 14 civilians being killed and 36 wounded.

Baghdad was still the focus of the Islamic State’s spring
campaign. There were 67 incidents during the week. That included 2 car bombs, 4
suicide car bombs, and 8 suicide bombers. Another two car bombs were discovered
and dismantled before they detonated, and 10 suicide bombers were either
arrested or killed. Those bombs were in the center, east, north, outer north,
south, and outer south of the province showing IS’s ability to reach every part
of Baghdad. Those attacks came in two waves. On May 15 one went off in the
outer south in a market in Latifiya,
while three were used in an assault upon a gas plant in Taji, which took
the facility off line for a few days cutting off electricity to part of the
capital. Then on May 17 two car bombs and 2 suicide bombers hit a restaurant
and three markets. Another suicide bomber was arrested, and two car bombs were dismantled.
Overall, IS was most active in the outer regions hitting the small towns.

Violence in Ninewa dropped apparently because the Makhmour
offensive ground to a halt. When it started IS launched its usual wave of
counterattacks. From May 15-21 the volunteers organized by ex-Governor Atheel
Nujafi made their second foray
trying to clear a town near Bashiqa with Turkey support but were turned back.
IS also launched two major attacks upon the Kurdish positions. 75 people were
also reported executed by the militants in Mosul.

In Diyala, Kirkuk, and Salahaddin violence either declined
or remained the same. IS has picked up its operations in Diyala lately and a
car bombing was avoided when it was discovered before it could go off. In
Kirkuk there were only four incidents reported during the week, as the
Islamists had given up with their counter attacks after the town of Bashir was
freed at the start of the month. Finally, Salahaddin has been very quiet for
weeks now.

There were 8 car bombs during the week, another sign of IS’s
spring campaign. There were six in Baghdad and 1 in Anbar. Another 17 were
reported destroyed, but those figures are usually exaggerated. Altogether the
bombs took the lives of 69 people and wounded another 155, almost all of which
were in the capital.

About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via NRT, AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News all in Iraq. I was interviewed on BBC Radio 5, Radio Sputnik, CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, Rudaw, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com