Before we move into Mali

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is urgently putting together an intervention force of about 4,000 soldiers to reclaim Northern Mali from Tuareg rebels who on April 6, under the banner of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), unilaterally declared the independent state of Azawad. According to rebel leaders, Azawad, which constitutes about 60 percent of Malian territory, comprises the regions of Timbuktu, Kidal, Gao, as well as a part of Mopti region. If the territory endures, it will share borders with Burkina Faso to the south, Mauritania to the west and Northwest, Algeria to the north and Northeast, and Niger to the east and Southeast, with southern Mali to its Southwest. After the Battle of Gao on 27 June, the Islamist groups Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa and Ansar Dine took control of northern Mali, pushing out the MNLA.

Until a number of issues are resolved, however, it would be unwise for Nigeria to join forces with the intervention force in Mali. Some of these issues were thrown up by the March coup d’etat led by Captain Amadou Sanogo, which saw the deposition of President Amadou Toumani Traore. Shortly after, ECOWAS imposed a short-lived regime of sanctions to pressure Sanogo to relinquish power. But even before crippling sanctions brought the usurpers to heel, ECOWAS inexplicably accepted a disingenuous compromise that foolishly forced the resignation of the president a month to the end of his tenure. It also led to the appointment of the former Speaker of the National Assembly of Mali, Dioncounda Traore, as the interim president, former Foreign minister, Cheick Modibo Diarra, as prime minister, and the installation of a new cabinet.

While the coup leaders, unprincipled Malian politicians, and pusillanimous ECOWAS leaders engaged in horse-trading, the rebels in the northern parts of the country seized the opportunity to declare independence. This made the coup, which was in the first instance staged to force the deposed president to take the rebellion more seriously, quite absurd. In fact, Reuters described the coup as a “spectacular own-goal,” and Hardball in one of his many essays on Mali described the short-lived ECOWAS sanctions as snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.

It is obvious the UN Security Council is eager to approve the ECOWAS force in Mali because of the fear that Azawad was already turning into a hotbed of Islamic militants affiliated to al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). Not only have the rebels brought Azawad under strict Afghanistan-type Sharia law, with stoning of suspects and amputation of their limbs, they have also welcomed battle-hardened militants from Libya and adventurers from Algeria looking for a fight. Neither ECOWAS nor the Security Council is prepared to have another territory in Africa where hotheads are trained and exported.

Before Nigeria signs up for the Mali adventure, it must do its homework well, and the National Assembly must ensure it is satisfied before authorising the use of force. First is the fact that Algeria, which shares a 1,400km border with northern Mali, and which would be affected by a war next door, still thinks there is room for negotiations. Moreover, the US Secretary of State, Mrs Hillary Clinton, and the UN have been unable to persuade Algeria to agree to the use of force. Second, and more crucially, the underlying problems which predisposed groups to rebellion have not been addressed. The coup leaders foolishly played into the hands of the rebels by destroying democracy in Mali. If ECOWAS regains northern Mali, is it to hand it over to Captain Sanogo, who while not in power still wields enormous influence over the country and its weak interim leadership? In April, ECOWAS irresponsibly agreed to a 12-month transition to elected government. It is not clear how the defeat of rebels will serve as impetus to democracy, when it seems more paradoxically likely that it would serve as breathing space for Sanogo and his stooges.

Before going into Mali, Nigeria must insist on the coup leaders surrendering effective control, their retirement from the military, and a reconstitution of the country’s security system. It is no use risking the lives of our soldiers for a cause that is doubtful and whose ends are uncertain and helpful only to coup leaders. Nigeria must also examine how far the transitional government has gone in restoring civil rule, especially when the ECOWAS mandate given to the Interim President to organise presidential and legislative polls will expire in five months.