A New Radicalism And A Clear Vision

November 10, 1988|By Michael Lerner.

After the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, liberals and progressives in the Democratic Party alternated between depression and denial of their own culpability for the defeat. On the one hand, we were told that ``it`s a conservative period`` or that ``the public has moved to the right.`` On the other hand, Reagan was praised as a master ``communicator.`` At no point were the Democrats willing to ask themselves whether the right was speaking to legitimate needs that their own approach had failed to meet.

That same denial process is likely to emerge once again in the wake of the Michael Dukakis fiasco. The conservatives, of course, will tell us that George Bush`s victory is proof of the institutionalization of the Reagan revolution and of a permanent conservative shift in the electorate. Many middle-of-the-road Democrats will agree, arguing that Dukakis` liberalism was his main weakness, and insist that next time the Democrats need to nominate a candidate who shares these conservative instincts.

Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, Dukakis` failure to defend liberal ideals is what made him most vulnerable. Indeed, when the country listened to a vigorous Democratic Party debate last spring about who could best articulate the liberal perspective, and when Jesse Jackson managed to move the Democratic consensus to the left, the Democrats were way ahead of their conservative opponents. Only after the general election campaign started and Dukakis began to reject ideology in favor of ``competence`` did Bush manage to make ``liberalism`` a huge electoral deficit. Dukakis seemed to be hiding his liberalism, ashamed of it. It was easy for Bush to portray it as something shameful.

Yet Dukakis` failure also reflects an underlying problem with the way the Democrats approach politics-an amalgam of the `30s and the `60s. From their success in the `30s, the Democrats hold on to the notion that what really motivates people is economic insecurity; from the `60s, they stick to the belief that the critical moral issue is to extend political rights and economic benefits to those who were previously disenfranchised.

It would be wrong to dismiss these concerns as having no audience in the

`80s and `90s. Many Americans who ended up either not voting or voting against Dukakis on Tuesday actually agree with the Democrats on these issues. Many would be happy to have a better student loan program, a higher minimum wage, greater governmental help in buying a first home, fuller medical care and even fairer treatment of blacks, women, gays, etc. The problem is that these are not their main concerns.

The movements of the 1960s hit a nerve when they focused on the alienation and sense of meaninglessness that most Americans experience-even after they have achieved relative economic security. Having accepted that in American society one can make it if one really tries, people often feel terrible about themselves for having failed to achieve a life filled with more ethical and spiritual coherence, more rewarding work, deeper friendships and more genuinely loving and committed love and family relationships. The breakup of marriages, the difficulties parents have in transmitting values to their children, the lack of respect in the workplace and from children, the exploitative way people treat each other-all of these are felt as personal or individual failures.

No matter how simplistic their solutions, when the Republicans talk about the centrality of traditional values, or about preserving the family, and when they place these issues at the center of their campaigns, they actually make people feel better about themselves. By insisting that people`s personal issues require social and collective solutions, that they are not just personal issues to be left to individuals to work out for themselves, the right wing actually provides temporary relief for the self-blaming that plagues Americans.

The crisis in the meaning of life has to be the center of a Democratic agenda in the 1990s. It would not be hard, for example, for liberals and progressives to make a convincing case that a culture of selfishness and ``me- first-ism``-generated by the very competitive economic system the conservatives extol-is a major source of the values that break down families. The materialism, egotism and despiritualization of daily life are issues the liberal-left must address if it ever hopes to exercise power on the national level.

The kind of rethinking necessary, then, is not a move to the right. Nor is it simply a matter of giving Jesse Jackson and the campaign of the disenfranchised another shot at it. The Democrats need a new radicalism-not an economic or political rehash of the rights of the oppressed, but a moral and spiritual radicalism embedded in a coherent vision. If the Dukakis fiasco does not produce this kind of rethinking, the liberal and progressive forces are in for years of despair.