Training

Back to square one?

A predictable pattern whose contours can easily be identified characterizes the
relationship between Islamabad and New Delhi. Following 14-month long stalemate
in its relations with Pakistan caused by the Indian policy of no talk after the
Mumbai terror attacks on November 26, 2008, the Indian foreign secretary's invitation
to her Pakistani counterpart for resumption of dialogue, though a welcome move,
represents the treading of a familiar road. However, unfortunately this is a road
which India has most often traveled without making much of a difference. While the
Pakistani foreign office prepares the agenda for talks with India to be held anytime
this month, it is important to take stock of a number of critical factors which
underline the Indian attitude and precede the offer for resumption of dialogue with
Pakistan.

First, the last high-level engagement between top leaderships of both countries
took place at the Egyptian recreational city, Sharm el Sheikh, in July 2009 which
culminated in the issuance of joint communiqué. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh clearly
committed to the de-linking of peace process from terrorism, a stance Pakistan has
been espousing all along. Secondly he also agreed to address the Pakistani concerns
about the Indian intervention in Balochistan and FATA. The communiqué betrayed the
Indian readiness to engage in a bilateral dialogue with Islamabad. However, he was
quick to take a somersault on the interpretation of the communiqué when confronted
with political storm in the Indian parliament and strong protest from the opposition
political parties. The subsequent months saw hardening of the Indian posture and
gradual mounting of diplomatic pressure on Pakistan. As in case of political and
diplomatic standoff between December 2001 and January 2004, New Delhi tried its
level best to portray her as the sponsor and breeding ground of terrorism. The statements
of the former Indian National Security Advisor are a case in point.

Only recently in December 2009, outgoing Indian Chief of Army Staff, General
Deepak Kapoor, threw light on the broad contours of the Cold Start doctrine, which
is now an essential part of the Indian strategic policy. He boasted about the New
Delhi's capability to open two fronts simultaneously with Pakistan and China by
undertaking target-oriented and highly calculated surgical strikes on the important
strategic locations of the adversary without letting the situation escalate into
a wide ranging military engagement accompanied by the threat of the nuclear weapons.
According to the defence analysts, the Cold Start doctrine was coined in 2004 with
minute details after India's failure to browbeat Pakistan into submission despite
its mobilization of around half million troops along the Pakistani border in what
came to be known as an eyeball to eyeball confrontation between 2001 and 2004. The
Cold Start doctrine also explains New Delhi's threat to target 'terrorist training
camps' within Pakistan by way of preemption to forestall any possibility of the
Mumbai-like attacks from these non-state actors.

As if this was not enough, the Indian government brought its pressure to bear
upon the management of Indian Premier League (IPL) not to buy the services of the
Pakistani cricketers. Similarly, the Indian government also did not allow its team
to visit Pakistan last year to play test series and ODIs against the home side.
It also successfully presided over the shifting of matches of the upcoming Cricket
World Cup from Pakistan, which were previously scheduled to be held here by invoking
the security concerns. The purpose of this carefully calibrated anti-Pakistan campaign
is to isolate her from the rest of the world and to prove to the international community
that the country is hub of terrorism.

Recently India also heightened border tension with Pakistan when it resorted
to violation of the working boundary in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors besides reported
rise in the firing incidents across the Line of Control. There has also been drastic
reduction in the visas to the Pakistani visitors with the result that the number
of cross-border visitors has fallen by 80%. The Pakistani publishers and booksellers
who wanted to participate in the World Book Fair in New Delhi have been denied visas.
This Indian attitude runs counter to its proclaimed objective to enhance people-to-people
contact as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) to help create 'peace constituencies'
in both countries.

The Indian establishment also made American Defence Secretary, Robert Gates who
recently visited both India and Pakistan, echo its favourite mantra that in case
of any other Mumbai-like terrorist attacks on its soil, the Indian patience would
run out. The implication was that the terrorist strikes from the alleged non-state
actors would be considered to have full backing of the Pakistani state and that
Pakistan is still using the terrorist organizations as its proxy to 'bleed India'.
This evoked firm response from the Pakistani political and military leadership who
made it clear to Secretary Gates that Pakistan did not buy the Indian line and that
any misadventure under this false assumption would be countered with full force.

The above-mentioned narration of immediate background of the India-Pakistan relations
after November 26, 2009 is important to understand the shift in the Indian attitude.
This would help in deciphering the Indian intentions behind its policy U-turn on
the question of talks with Pakistan. While the exact nature and content of dialogue
is not yet known, it is important for the Pakistani leadership to guard itself against
any euphoria. We do not know yet whether the Indian offer of dialogue is tactical
or substantive. The major question is: would the composite dialogue process be resumed
from where it broke off in 2008?

However, the informed leaks in the Indian media do not suggest that New Delhi
is interested in starting a broad-based and wide ranging composite dialogue framework.
There is a talk of 'measured contacts' within the Indian political leadership. In
his article published in the Harvard International Review magazine's latest issue,
Shiv Shankar Menon, the newly appointed Indian National Security Advisor, gave an
idea of things to follow when he wrote that "from an Indian perspective, foremost
among the issues that divide India and Pakistan is terrorism. For Indians the dialogue
with Pakistan, and the entire relationship, is predicated on an absence of violence
against India from Pakistan, a sense that has hardened since cross-border terrorism
began three decades ago." He further stated that India has faced a series of attacks
from the territory of its neighbour, "with complicity of official organs of that
neighbour and that no other state has responded to a sustained terrorist campaign
of this nature with the sort of restraint and patience displayed by India namely
without recourse to direct military options or retaliation."

In view of the above, the Pakistani leadership needs to carefully consider its
options and calibrate its response by seeking the input from all stakeholders. Pakistan
does not afford to be lured into a trap of meaningless dialogue as has been the
case in the past. Other than terrorism, there are a number of contentious disputes
including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir that lies at the heart of strained
relations between the South Asian neighbours.