Campaign in the Marianas tells the story of the capture of Saipan,
Tinian, and Guam in the Central Pacific in mid-1944, together with the
strategic and tactical planning that preceded the fighting, the supporting
operations by air and sea forces, and the final exploitation of these islands
as bases. The Marianas victory was one of the key actions in the Pacific;
the U.S. invasion of the Marianas provoked the Japanese Fleet into a major
and unsuccessful engagement, and the Marianas provided the bases from which
the Army Air Forces later immolated the cities of Japan.

All Central Pacific operations shared certain characteristics. They
were joint amphibious operations conducted under the principle of unity
of command over all air, sea, and ground forces. They had as objectives
potential air and naval bases which were to be seized by ground troops
who were carried forward and supported by warships and airplanes. Their
accomplishments involved hard fighting and relatively heavy casualties.

Because the number of Army troops in the Marianas was relatively small,
much

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attention is devoted to small-unit actions, with the spotlight often
falling on the rifle company. This account, like others in the Pacific
subseries, also contains instructive examples of the coordination of naval
gunfire, artillery, and air strikes, providing an exceptional opportunity
to study the coordination of ground, air, and sea forces.

The Marianas invasions again demonstrated the soundness of U.S. amphibious
doctrine and tested the principle of unity of command. This volume sheds
light on interservice command and cooperation, treating frankly some of
the bitter interservice controversies between the U.S. Army and the Marine
Corps which emerged at the local level.