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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy speaks with journalists during a joint drill of departments of Interior Ministry at the International training Center near the village of Stare in Kyiv region, Ukraine September 30, 2019. REUTERS/Gleb Garanich/File Photo

Reforming Ukraine’s
security services is among the most urgent and challenging tasks facing the
country. The country clearly needs to improve its overall intelligence
capabilities to counter Russia’s continuing tactics of subversion and destabilization.
These tools remain central to Moscow’s efforts to pull Ukraine back into the
Russian orbit.

Experience in other
countries that dismantled Soviet systems of control indicate that security sector
reform can be a particular problem because of the culture of the security
services, the shortage of expertise from outside the sector, and the related difficulty
of holding individuals accountable. Ukraine is no exception. These problems have
prevented effective reforms in this sector under different presidents both
before and after the Euromaidan.

Could this time be
different?

In mid-October, the
new Head of the SBU, Ivan Bakanov, presented a new draft Law on the Security
Service of Ukraine to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

In view of
Bakanov’s recent appointment and his background in the television entertainment
business, it is very unlikely that he had major input into the reform plan.
Although details are scarce, it appears that the draft law is based on a reform
concept adopted in 2016 but never implemented.

The draft law defines
the SBU’s functions in relation to other intelligence agencies to avoid
duplication as well as to optimize its organizational structure, including a
significant reduction of its 30,000 personnel as well as de-militarization and de-politicization
of the service.

It also proposes
ridding the SBU of its economic security functions, in particular by abolishing
the department for countering corruption and organized crime (department “K”). This
part of the SBU is notorious for engaging in the very practices that it is
supposed to root out.

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UkraineAlert is a comprehensive online publication that provides regular news and analysis on developments in Ukraine’s politics, economy, civil society, and culture.

Earlier this year, former
President Petro Poroshenko campaigned for a second term on his achievements in
resisting Russian aggression. While it is true that on his watch the armed
forces became capable of combat after his predecessor had hollowed them out,
only superficial changes took place in the SBU.

Some SBU officers
who had previously been serving Russia rather than Ukraine left voluntarily. A
purge removed others. Yet many of those previously close to the FSB remained. Beyond
that, Poroshenko was reluctant to reform the agency for fear of forfeiting the
ability to use it as an instrument to fight his enemies.

As a result, the
authorities ignored plans for re-booting the SBU. These included the provisions
of the national security strategy, the concept for developing Ukraine’s
security and defense sector, and Ukraine’s annual programs under the aegis of
the NATO-Ukraine Commission.

Nevertheless, it
would be wrong to say that the SBU did not contribute to the defense effort
during this period. It prevented a number of terrorist acts, including
cyber-attacks. Around 30 SBU officers lost their lives in the Donbas during the
fighting with over 130 wounded.

If Ukraine is to
consolidate its democracy, it must face up to the problem that its law
enforcement institutions are still imbued with a Soviet culture related to
their original design as tools of domestic repression. The SBU and the
Prosecutor General’s Office are the worst affected.

In the case of the
SBU, its diversity of functions beyond those undertaken by western counterparts
explains its size. In the United Kingdom, the domestic intelligence agency MI5 focuses
on four core tasks: counter-terrorism, counter-espionage, cyber security, and
counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It has around 4,000
employees. Unlike the SBU, it does not have broad responsibilities for
protecting state sovereignty or the country’s scientific and defense potential,
let alone a mandate to investigate organized crime and corruption.

The SBU must become
a special service rather than a law enforcement body. It also needs to
establish its tasks and functions based on a definition approved by parliament
of the threats to national security. This will set clear limits for its
activity.

Proper
parliamentary scrutiny is also required through a dedicated intelligence and
security committee. This does not currently exist in the Rada.

It is also
essential to put an end to the traditional interference of the president’s office
in appointments to the SBU. While the president nominates the head of the service
and has no formal powers for appointing officials below, the reality is
different. The political authorities’ practice of interfering with personnel decisions
at lower levels undermines the authority of the SBU head and complicates
reporting channels.

Ukraine now has a
chance to take the radical steps needed to re-build the SBU and establish a
genuine security service under firm democratic control. To do so requires
creating much greater awareness in civil society and the broader public of what
is at stake.

Sergii Bondarchuk previously served in the SBU. He was head of Ukraine’s defense export agency from 2005 to 2010.

Further reading

In June 2018, Ukraine’s parliament adopted the Law on National Security, with the help of the United States and other international partners, including NATO and the European Union. Among other things, the law set the frame for the functions of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and opened the door for comprehensive reform of that […]

Angry crowds took to the streets to denounce the Steinmeier Formula, equating it with capitulation to Moscow. But is it? At this point, not enough is known about details of the agreement—or even if the agreement will hold—to reach a judgment.

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