Those who betray their benefactors are seldom highly regarded. In Dante's Divine
Comedy, traitors to benefactors and to the established authorities are consigned to the
ninth circle of the Inferno, where their souls are suspended, like insects in amber, in
the frozen River Cocytus. This is the Giudecca, where the three arch-traitors Judas
Iscariot, Brutus, and Cassius are chewed for all eternity in the three mouths of Lucifer.
The crimes of Nixon were monstrous, especially in Vietnam and in the India-Pakistan war,
but in these Bush had been an enthusiastic participant. Now Bush's dagger, among others,
had now found its target; Nixon was gone. In the depths of his Inferno, Dante relates the
story of Frate Alberigo to illustrate the belief that in cases of the most heinous
treachery, the soul of the offender plunges at once into hell, leaving the body to live
out its physical existence under the control of a demon. Perhaps the story of old Frate
Alberigo will illuminate us as we follow the further career of George Bush.

As Nixon left the White House for his home in San Clemente, California, in the early
afternoon of August 9, 1974, Chairman George was already plotting how to scale still
further up the dizzy heights of state. Ford was now president, and the vice-presidency was
vacant. According to the XXV Amendment, it was now up to Ford to designate a vice
president who would then require a majority vote of both houses of Congress to be
confirmed. Seeing a golden opportunity to seize an office that he had long regarded as the
final stepping stone to his ultimate goal of the White House, Bush immediately mobilized
his extensive Brown Brothers, Harriman/Skull and Bones network, including as many Zionist
lobby auxiliaries as he could muster. George had learned in 1968 that an organized effort
commensurate with his own boundless lust for power would be required to succeed. One of
the first steps was to set up a boiler shop operation in a suite of rooms at the Statler
Hilton Hotel in Washington. Here Richard L. Herman, the Nebraska GOP national committeeman
and two assistants began churning out a cascade of calls to Republicans and others around
the country, urging, threatening, cajoling, calling in chits, promising future favors if
Chairman George were to become Vice President George. [fn 1] Since Bush controlled the RNC
apparatus, this large machinery could also be thrown into the fray.

There were other, formidable candidates, but none was so aggressive as Chairman George.
Nelson Rockefeller, who had resigned as Governor of New York some months before to devote
more time to his own consuming ambition and to his Commission on Critical Choices, was in
many ways the front runner. Nelson's vast notoriety, his imposing cursus honorum, his own
powerful Wall Street network, his financial and banking faction-- all of these would count
heavily in his favor. But Nelson, having been the incarnation of the Eastern Liberal
Establishment internationalists against whom Goldwater had campaigned so hard in 1964,
also had a very high negative. People hated Nelson. His support was considerable, but he
had more active opposition than any other candidate. This meant that Ford had to hesitate
in choosing Nelson because of what the blowback might mean for a probable Ford candidacy
in 1976.

The conservative Republicans all regarded Goldwater as their sentimental favorite, but
they also knew that Ford would be reluctant to select him because of a different set of
implications for 1976. Beyond Rockefeller and Goldwater, each a leader of a wing of the
party, the names multiplied: Senator Howard Baker, Elliot Richardson, Governor William
Scranton, Melvin Laird, Senator Bill Brock, Governor Dan Evans, Donald Rumsfeld, and many
others. Bush knew that if he could get Goldwater to show him some support, the Goldwater
conservatives could be motivated to make their influence felt for Bush, and this might
conceivably put him over the top, despite Rockefeller's strength in the financial and
intelligence communities. Part of the battle would be to convince Ford that Bush would be
a bigger asset for 1976.

First Chairman George had to put on the mask of conciliation and moderation. As Nixon
was preparing his departure speech, Bush lost no time in meeting with Ford, now less than
24 hours away from being sworn in as president. Bush told the press that Ford had
"said he'd be pleased if I stayed on" at the RNC, but had to concede that Ford
had given no indication as to his choice for the vice president. Bush's network in the
House of Representatives, maintained since his Rubbers days, was now fully mobilized, with
"a showing of significant support in the House and among GOP officials" for Bush
on the day before Nixon left town. Bush also put out a statement from the RNC saying,
"The battle is over. Now is the time for kindess...Let us all try now to restore to
our society a climate of civility." But despite the hypocritical kinder and gentler
rhetoric, Chairman George's struggle for power was just beginning. [fn 2]

Melvin Laird soon came out for Rockefeller, and there were sentimental displays for
Goldwater in many quarters. With Bush's network in full career, he was beginning to
attract favorable mention from the columnists. Evans and Novak on August 11 claimed that
"as the new President was sworn in, Rockefeller had become a considerably less likely
prospect than either Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee or George Bush, the gregarious
patrician and transplanted Texan who heads the Republican National Committee."
Columns like this one went on at length about the many disadvantages of choosing
Rockefeller, not the least of which was that he would eclipse Ford.

On August 10, Ford announced that he would poll Republicans at all levels across the
country. Some expressed their preferences directly to the White House, but the Republican
National Committee members had to report their choices through Chairman George. Many of
them, fearing the price they might have to pay for lese majeste, indicated Bush as their
first choice. This matter was the subject of a complaint by Tom Evans of the RNC, who
talked to the press and also wrote letters to the Ford White House, as we will see.

By August 14, the Washington Post was reporting a "full scale campaign" on
behalf of Bush, with an "impressive array of support" against Rockefeller.
Bush's campaign manager and chief boiler room operator Richard L. Herman of Nebraska
summed up his talking points: Bush, said Herman, "is the only one in the race with no
opposition. He may not be the first choice in all cases, but he's not lower than second
with anyone." Herman said he was "assisting" a broader organization on the
Hill and of course at the RNC itself that was mobilized for Bush. Bush "can do more
to help the Republican Party than anyone else and is totally acceptable throughout the
country," blathered Herman. Bush was "obviously aware of what we're doing,"
said Herman. The old Prescott Bush networks were still a big plus, he stressed. A group of
House conservatives came out for Goldwater, with Bush in second place.

Support for Goldwater was apt to turn into support for Bush at any time, so Bush was
gaining mightily, running second to Rocky alone. Taking note of the situation, even Bush's
old allies at the Washington Post had to register some qualms. In an editorial published
on August 15, 1974 on the subject of "The Vice Presidency," Post commentators
quoted the ubiquitous Richard Herman on Bush's qualifications. The Post found that Bush's
"background and abilities would appear to qualify him for the vice presidency in just
about all respects, except for the one that seems to us to really matter: What is
conspicuously lacking is any compelling or demonstrable evidence that he is qualified to
be President." Nelson might be better, suggested the Post. In any case, "we have
the recent example of Mr. Agnew to remind us of the pitfalls in the choice of Vice
Presidents by the application of irrelevant criteria."

But despite these darts, Chairman George continued to surge ahead. The big break came
when Barry Goldwater, speaking in Columbia, South Carolina, told a Republican fund-raiser
that he had a "gut feeling" that Ford was going to select Bush for the vice
presidency. Barry, we recall, had been very cozy with father Prescott in the old days.
Goldwater portrayed Bush and Rockefeller as the two competing front-runners. This was
precisely where Bush wanted to position himself so that he could benefit from the
widespread and vocal opposition to Rockefeller. On August 15, a source close to Ford told
David Broder and Lou Cannon that Bush now had the "inside track" for the vice
presidency. Rockefeller's spokesman Hugh Morrow retorted that "we're not running a
boiler shop or calling anyone or doing anything," unlike the strong-arm Bush team.
[fn 3]

Inside the Ford White House, responses to Ford's sollicitaton were coming in. Among the
top White House councillors, Bush got the support of Kenneth Rush, who had almost become
Nixon's Secretary of State and who asserted that Bush "would have a broader appeal to
all segments of the political spectrum than any other qualified choice. His relative
youth, Texas residence with a New England background, wide popularity in business and
political circles, and unqualified integrity and ability, combined with his personal
qualities of charm and tact, would make him a natural for the new Presidential/Vice
Presidential team." This encomium is quoted at length because it seems to be a form
letter or printout that was distributed by the Bush operation as talking points for Bush
supporters. [fn 4] Dean Burch wrote a memo to Ford pointing out that among the prominent
candidates, "only a few have a post-1980 political future." "My own
choice," Burch told Ford, "would be a Vice President with a long term political
future.--a potential candidate, at least, for the Presidency in his own right." In
Burch's conclusion, "Still operating on this assumption, my personal choice is George
Bush." [fn 4] .

The cabinet showed more sentiment for Rockefeller. Rogers Morton of the Interior,
Weinberger of HEW, James Lynn of HUD, Frederick Dent of Commerce, and Attorney General
Saxbe were all for Rocky. Earl Butz of Agriculture was for Goldwater, and James R.
Schlesinger of Defense was for Eliott Richardson. No written opinion by Henry Kissinger
appears extant at the Ford Library. Among the cabinet and the senior White House
counselors, therefore, Rocky had bested Bush 7 to 3, with Burch and Rush providing
Chairman George's most convinced support.

Then the White House staff was polled. Pat Buchanan advised Ford to avoid all the
younger men, including Bush, and told the president that Rockefeller would
"regrettably" have to be his choice. John McLaughlin also told Ford to go for
Rocky, although he mentioned that Bush "would also be a fine vice president."
[fn 5] Richard A. Moore was for Bush based on his economic credentials, asserting that
Bush's "father and gradfather were both highly respected investment bankers in New
York." In the White House staff, Bush won out over Rockefeller and Scranton. Among
personal friends of Ford, Bush won out over Rocky by a 4 to 3 margin.

Among Republican governors, there was significant resistance to Bush. Former
Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton, who had been considered of presidential caliber,
wrote to Ford aide Phillip Buchen of Bush: "Quite frankly, in my experience with him
his one drawback is a limitation of his administrative ability." [fn 6] Among serving
governors, only Thomas J. Meskill of Connecticut, and Otis R. Bowen of Indiana put Bush in
first place. When all the governors' preferences were tabulated, Bush came in third,
trailing Rockefeller and Governor Daniel J. Evans of Washington.

Among the Republican Senators, Bush had intense competition, but the Prescott Bush
network proved it could hold its own. Howard Baker put Bush second, while Henry Bellmon
and Dewey Bartlett sent in a joint letter in support of Bush. Bob Dole but Chairman George
last among his list of preferences, commenting that the choice of Bush would be widely
regarded as "totally partisan." Pete Dominici put Bush as his first choice, but
also conceded that he would be seen as a partisan pick. Roth of Delaware had Bush in third
place after John J. Williams and Rocky. Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania wanted Rocky or
Goldwater, but put Bush in third place. James Pearson of Kansas had Bush as first choice.
Jesse Helms mentioned Bush, but in fifth place after Goldwater, Harry Byrd, Reagan, and
James Buckley. [fn 7] In the final tally of Senate picks, Rocky edged out Bush with 14
choices to Bush's 12, followed by Goldwater with 11.

Bush was stronger in the House, where many members had served side by side with their
old friend Rubbers. Bush was the first choice of Bill Archer of Texas (who had inherited
Bush's old district, and who praised Bush for having "led the fight in Congress for
disclosure and reform"), Skip Bafalis of Florida, William G. Bray of Indiana, Dan
Brotzman of Colorado, Joe Broyhill of Virginia, John Buchana of Alabama, Charles
Chamberlain of Michigan, Donald Clancy of Ohio, Del Dawson of California, and Thad Cochran
of Mississippi. William Armstrong of Colorado struck a discordant note by urging Ford to
pick "a person who has extensive experience in ELECTED public office." William
S. Cohen of Maine found that Bush did "not have quite the range of experience of
Richardson or Rockefeller. James Collins favored Bush "as a Texan." Glenn Davis
of Wisconsin, Derwinksi of Illinois (a long-term ally who eventually rose to the Bush
cabinet after having served with Bush at the UN mission in New York), Sam Devine of Ohio,
and Pierre S. Du Pont IV of Delaware -all for Bush. William Dickinson of Alabama found
Bush "physically attractive" with "no political scars I am aware of"
and "personally very popular." But then came John J. Duncan of Tennessee, who
told Ford that he could not "support any of the fifteen or so mentioned in the news
media."

Marvin Esch of Michigan was for Bush, as was Peter Frelinghuysen of New Jersey. Edwin
D. Eshelman told Ford to go for Bush "if you want a moderate." The Bush brigade
went on with Charles Gubser of California, and Hammerschmidt of Arkansas, still very close
to Bush today. John Heinz of Pennsylvania was having none of Bush, but urged Ford to take
Rockefeller, Scranton, or Richardson, in that order. John Erlenborn of Illinois was more
than captivated by Bush, writing Ford that Bush "is attractive personally--people
tend to like him on sight." Why, "he has almost no political enemies" that
Erlenborn knew of. Bud Hillis of Indiana, Andrew Hinshar of California, Marjorie Holt- for
Bush. Lawrence Hogan of Maryland was so "disturbed" about the prospect of
Rockefeller that he was for Bush too. Hudnut of Indiana put Bush as his second choice
after favorite son Gov. Otis Bowen because Bush was "fine, clean."

Jack Kemp of New York, now in the Bush cabinet, was for Bush way back then,
interestingly enough. Lagomarsino of California put Bush third, Latta of Ohio put him
second only to Rocky. Trent Lott of Mississippi, who has since moved up to the Senate,
told Ford that he needed somebody "young and clean" and that "perhaps
George Bush fits that position." Manuel Lujan of New Mexico, who also made the Bush
cabinet, was a solid Bush rooter, as was Wiley Mayne of Iowa. Pete McCloskey put Bush
second to Richardson, but ahead of Rocky. John McCollister of Nebraska deluded himself
that Bush could be confirmed without too much trouble: McCollister was for Bush because
"I believe he could pass the Judiciary Committee's stern test" because "he
had no policy making role in the sad days now ended," but perhaps Ford knew better on
that one.

Clarence Miller of Ohio was for Bush. Congressman Bob Michel, ever climbing in the
House GOP hierarchy, had long-winded arguments for Bush. Rocky, he thought, could
"help most" over the remainder of Ford's term, but Bush would be a trump card
for 1976. "George Bush would not command all the immediate adulation simply because
he hasn't had as long a proven track record in the business and industrial community, but
his credentials are good," wrote Michel. "He is young and he would work day and
night and he would never attempt to 'upstage the boss.' Aside from projecting a 'straight
arrow image,' he would be acceptable to the more conservative element in the party that
would be offended by the appointment of Rockefeller." In addition, assured Michel,
Bush enjoyed support among Democrats "from quarters I would not have believed
possible," "and they are indeed influential Democrats." "Over and
above this, we may be giving one of our own a good opportunity to follow on after a
six-year Ford administration," Michel concluded.

Donal Mitchell of New York was for Bush because of his "rich background,"
which presumably meant money. Ancher Nelson thought Bush had "charisma," and he
was for him. But George O'Brien of Illinois was also there with that bothersome request
for "someone who was elected and was serving in a federal position." Stan Parris
of Alexandria, Virginia, a faithful yes-man for Bush until his defeat in 1990, was for
Bush- of course. Jerry Pettis of California for Bush. Bob Price of Texas urged Ford to tap
Bush, in part because of his "excellent" ties to the Senate, which were
"due to his own efforts and the friendships of his father." Albert Quie of
Minnesota had some support of his own for the nod, but he talked favorably about Bush,
whom he also found "handsome." "He has only one handicap," thought
Quie, "and that is, he lost an election for the Senate." Make that two
handicaps. Score J. Kenneth Robinson of Virginia for Bush, along with Philip Ruppe of
Michigan, who lauded Bush's "human warmth." Earl Ruth of northern California and
William Steigler of Wisconsin for Bush. Steve Symms of Idaho, later a senator, wanted
"a Goldwater man" like Reagan, or Williams of Delaware. But, Symms added,
"I would accept our National Chairman Bush." Guy Vander Jagt of Michigan
confided to his former colleague Ford that "my personal recommendation is George
Bush." John H. Ware broke a lance for Chairman George, and then came the endorsement
of G. William Whitehurst of Virginia, an endorsement that stood out for its freemasonic
overtones in a field where freemasonic modulations were rife. According to Whitehurst, who
has a parkway with his name on it in the capital, Bush demonstrates "those special
characteristics that qualify a man for the highest office if fate so designates."
This is one Ford would have had no trouble understanding. Bob Wilson of California was for
Bush, also considering the long term perspectives; he liked Bush's youthful enthusiasm and
saw him as "a real leader for moderation" Larr Winnof Kansas, Wendell Wyatt of
Oregon, Bill Young of Florida, Don Young of Alaska, Roger Zion of Indiana-- all listed
Bush as their prime choice. The Republican House Steering Committee went for Bush because
of his "general acceptance." [fn 8]

When Ford's staff tabulated the House results, Bush's combined total of 101 first,
second and third choice mentions put him in the lead, over Rocky at 68 and Reagan at 23.
Among all the Republican elected and appointed offocials who had expressed an opinion,
Bush took first place with 255 points, with Rockefeller second with 181, Goldwater third
wiith 83, Reagan with 52, followed by Richardson, Melvin Laird, and the rest. It was a
surprise to no one that Bush was the clear winner among the Republican National Committee
respondents, which he had personally solicited and screened, and even Ford's people do not
seem to have been overly impressed by this part of the result. But all in all it was truly
a monument to the Bush network, achieved for a candidate with no qualifications who had
very much participated in the sleaze of the Nixon era.

The vox populi saw things slightly differently. In the number of telegrams received by
the White House, Goldwater was way ahead with 2280 in his favor, and only 102 against.
Bush had 887 for him and 92 against. Rocky had 544 in favor, and a whopping 3202 against.
[fn 9]

But even here, the Bush network had been totally mobilized, with a very large effort in
the Dallas business community, among black Republicans, and by law firms with links to the
Zionist lobby. Ward Lay of Frito-Lay joined with Herman W. Lay to support Bush. The law
firm of McKenzie and Baer of Dallas assured Ford that Bush was "Mr. Clean."
There was a telegram from Charles Pistor of the Republic National Bank of Dallas, and many
others.

The all court press applied by the Bush machine also generated bad blood. Rockefeller
supporter Tom Evans, a former RNC co-chair, wrote to Ford with the observation that
"no one should campaign for the position and I offer these thoughts only because of
an active campaign that is being conducted on George Bush's behalf which I do not believe
properly reflects Republican opinion." Evans was more substantive than most
recommendations: "Certainly one of the major issues confronting our country at this
time is the economy and the related problems of inflation, unemployment, and high interest
rates. I respectfully suggest that you need someonme who can help substantively in these
areas. George is great at PR but he is not as good in substantive matters. This opinion
can be confirmed by individuals who held key positions at the National Committee."
Evans also argued that Bush should have put greater distance between the GOP and Nixon
sooner than he did. [fn 10]

So Nelson's networks were not going to take the Bush strong-arm approach lying down.
Bush's most obvious vulnerability was his close relationship to Nixon, plus the fact that
he had been up to his neck in Watergate. It was lawful that Bush's ties to one of Nixon's
slush funds came back to haunt him. This was the "Townhouse" fund again, the one
managed by Jack A. Gleason and California attorney Herbert W. Kalmbach, Nixon's personal
lawyer, who had gained quite some personal notoriety during the Watergate years. These two
had both pleaded guilty earlier in 1974 to running an illegal campaign fun-raising
operation, with none of the required reports ever filed.

By August 19, the even of Ford's expected announcement, the Washington Post reported
that unnamed White House sources were telling Newsweek magazine that Bush's vice
presidential bid "had slipped badly because of alleged irregularities in the
financing of his 1970 Senate race in Texas." Newsweek quoted White House sources that
"there was potential embarrassment in reports that the Nixon White House had funneled
about $100,000 from a secret fund called the 'Townhouse Operation' into Bush's losing
Senate campaign against Democrat Lloyd Bentsen four years ago." Newsweek also added
that $40,000 of this money may not have been properly reported under the election laws.
Bush was unavailable for comment that day, and retainers James Bayless and C. Fred
Chambers scrambled to deliver plausible denials, but the issue would not go away.

Bush's special treatment during the 1970 campaign was a subject of acute resentment,
especially among senate Republicans Ford needed to keep on board. Back in 1970, Senator
Mark Hatfield of Oregon had demanded to know why John Tower had given Bush nearly twice as
much money as any other Senate Republican. Senator Tower had tried to deny favoritism, but
Hatfield and Edward Brooke of Massachusetts had not been placated. Now there was the
threat that if Bush had to go through lengthy confirmation hearings in the Congress, the
entire Townhouse affair might be dredged up once again. According to some accounts, there
were as many as 18 Republican senators who had gotten money from Townhouse, but whose
names had not been divulged. [fn 11] Any attempt to force Bush through as vice president
might lead to the fingering of these senators, and perhaps others, mightily antagonizing
those who had figured they were getting off with a whole coat. Ripping off the scabs of
Watergate wounds in this way conflicted withe Ford's "healing time" strategy,
which was designed to put an hermetic lid on the festering mass of Watergate. Bush was too
dangerous to Ford. Bush could not be chosen. .

Because he was so redolent of Nixonian sleaze, Bush's maximum exertions for the vice
presidency were a failure. Ford announced his choice of Nelson Rockefeller on August 20,
1974. It was nevertheless astounding that Bush had come so close. He was defeated for the
moment, but he had established a claim on the office of the vice presidency that he would
not relinquish. Despite his hollow, arrogant ambition and total incompetence for the
office, he would automnatically be considered for the vice presidency in 1976 and then
again in 1980. For George Bush was an aristocrat of senatorial rank, although denied the
senate, and his conduct betrayed the conviction that he was owed not just a place at the
public trough, but the accolade of national political office.