Argues that the traditional theory of irony, which assumes that an ironist
uses a figurative meaning opposite to the literal meaning of the utterance,
is inadequate and presents an alternative theory that assumes that the ironist
mentions the literal meaning of the utterance and expresses an attitude toward
it. The two theories make testable predictions about the conditions under which
irony is perceived: The mention theory requires antecedent material for the
ironist to mention, whereas the standard theory does not. A reading comprehension
test, given to 24 undergraduates, involved anecdotes that satisfied the traditional
criterion for irony but could include or omit antecedents for echoic mention.
Results support the mention theory of irony in that Subjects did not perceive
a plausible nonnormative utterance to be ironic unless it echoed some antecedent
use.

Comments on the mention theory of irony developed by D. Sperber and D. Wilson
(1981) and further elaborated and tested by J. Jorgenson et al (abstract above).
The present authors offer their own pretense theory of irony based on the ideas
of H. P. Grice (1975, 1978) and H. W. Fowler (1965). According to this theory,
in using irony, the speaker is pretending to be an injudicious person speaking
to an uninitiated audience; the speaker intends the persons to whom the irony
is addressed to discover the pretense and thereby their attitude toward the
speaker, the audience, and the utterance.

Responds to comments by H. H. Clark and R. J. Gerrig on the mention
theory of irony developed by the present author and D. Wilson (1981) and tested
by J. Jorgensen et al. (abstract above). It is argued that Clark and Gerrig
misrepresent mention theory and that the pretense theory that they offer as
an alternative may provide a plausible description of parody but fails to account
for many types of irony.