Independent nuclear online newspaper AtomInfo.Ru: Newshttp://atominfo.ru/en/index.html
Fri, 21 Jul 2017 16:59:56 +0400Last nuclear news - what the Russians sayen-ushttp://atominfo.ru/images/ai.jpghttp://atominfo.ru/en/index.html
Independent nuclear online newspaper AtomInfo.RuWilliam D. Magwood IV: Make innovations available as soon as possiblehttp://atominfo.ru/en/news4/d0384.htm
Fri, 21 Jul 2017 16:59:56 +0400Interviewer: We'd like to ask several questions on the NEA's activities. What work doesthe Agency fulfil from the
viewpoint of experimental support for innovations in the nuclear field?
DG Magwood: Well, innovation is going to be one of the most important issues facing the nuclear field over the
next several years. We are working on several important initiatives in this area, including an activity called Nuclear Innovation 2050.
NI2050 is designed to identify the most important areas of technologies necessary to enable us to reach our goals in 2050 in terms
of reducing carbon emissions. We are hoping to gain global agreement on what those priorities are and what barriers keep us from
bringing those technologies come to the market. We will then work with all our member countries to find ways to break through
those barriers and make those technologies available as soon as possible.
Interviewer: And what about relations with Generation IV International Forum?DG Magwood: The Generation IV International Forum is operated as a separate activity under the NEA. Our role
has been to facilitate the discussion between the countries in Generation IV and look for opportunities to leverage their activities
with those of the broader NEA.
For example, we brought together the researchers working on Generation IV technologies with the leading regulators from around
the world to discuss the regulatory issues associated with deploying Generation IV technologies. And in addition, through many of
our other activities, we look at issues such as the economics of advanced systems and the most effective ways to deploynew,
advanced technologies.
Interviewer: What about Generation V? Maybe it's time to start to work on Gen V now?DG Magwood: Generation IV is still a long way away. And the Generation IV technologies were selected to be a
range of technologies that we will need to develop over the next 50 years.
Interviewer: A very important question for nuclear industry everywhere in the world is nuclear waste. What is the
Agency thinking about this subject?DG Magwood: Nuclear waste is a very important aspect of the work at the NEA. We have a Committee of leading
nuclear waste officials across our governments who work together to discuss the issues associated with disposing of nuclear
waste.
One of the most important conclusions they've reached is that disposing of nuclear waste in deep geological repositories will work.
From a technical standpoint, we believe these challenges associated with deep geological repositories are very manageable. But
the big challenge that we face is the sociological challenge of siting such a facility.
Our member countries are working together to find better ways to work with stakeholders to make decisions on siting. Actually, in
many areas of nuclear waste we find that the sociological issues are just as important as the technical issues, so we work with our
members to identify ways to improve communications with stakeholders and improve the ability of governments to provide
confidence in the final decisions.
Interviewer: Here in Russia, we separate radioactive waste and spent fuel. When you're talking about nuclear waste,
what do you mean?DG Magwood: Well right now I'm talking about spent fuel. But the issues are very similar, whether you talk about
low-level waste, medium-level waste or high-level waste. Siting facilities is one of the big challenges.
Interviewer: What about support of existing nuclear power plants? Do you participate in this technical support?DG Magwood: Absolutely. Much of the work of the agency is focused on ensuring the safety of existing nuclear
power plants.
For example, after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident we spent a great deal of effort looking at the accident and working with our
member countries to identify the best courses of action. Our members look at operating experience from events that they've
learned around the world and determine the regulatory actions that should be taken to ensure the safety of existing plants. And we
also work very hard to analyse the economics of nuclear power.
We also identify the methods and technologies that will make the plants more efficient to operate and more cost-effective to build.
Interviewer: What about people - human resources? Young people - the important resource in nuclear field. What does
the Agency do for attracting the young generation to a career in the nuclear field?DG Magwood: We support our members to deal with the issues that concern them most. The issue of the
education and promotion of nuclear technology among young people is certain one such issue.
One initiative that we've recently begun is called NEST, NEA Nuclear Education Skills and Technology Framework. The idea
behind NEST is to promote the development of advanced research projects that will be implemented by university students across
the world. Through NEST, students in Russia can work directly with students in Korea and France and the United States to work
on practical research projects that will help them build critical skills.
Interviewer: Is it your idea or this joint work has already been started?DG Magwood: We have begun to work to put the activity together and we expect to be able to start it very soon.
Interviewer: What would be the subject of the project?DG Magwood: The choice of the projects depends on the participating countries. We expect to have several
research projects to begin with, some of which will relate to advanced nuclear technology, but others might be more focused on
things like nuclear waste and decommissioning.
Our hope is that this multi-national approach will excite young people and bring more of them into nuclear technology research.
Interviewer: Thank you very much for your interview for AtomInfo.Ru.
]]>Victor Murogov: Shift in Prioritieshttp://atominfo.ru/en/news4/d0383.htm
Sat, 31 Dec 2016 20:48:16 +0400In lieu of the foreword

Twenty years ago, by the assignment of Minatom (Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy), I joined the IAEA as Deputy Director
General and Head of the Department of Nuclear Energy (DNE) and also Manager of the IAEA's Major Program 1 (MP1) "Nuclear
Power and Fuel Cycle".
For the years of work in the Agency, I accumulated vast archives of documents including those on the DNE's scientific, technical
and organizational issues and initiatives over the following trends:
- development of INPRO (innovative projects for NPPs and NFCs),
- development of the IAEA's Program on Nuclear Knowledge Management (cross-cutting
program),
- elaboration of a new trend called "Comparative Assessment of Nuclear Energy Role for
Sustainable Energy Development" (Program C - MP1).
The archives accumulated helped create information databases at the MEPhI International Center of Nuclear Education and at
the Center for Nuclear Knowledge Management of the Obninsk Institute of Atomic Energy (IAE) . At those centers, young talented
researchers are involved in the assessment and development of ideas enclosed in the above programs.
The direct supervisor of this work is A.A. Andrianov, Cand. Sc. (Phys-Math), associate professor at the IAE. Owing to his
contribution, it became possible to analyze materials required for a recorded history of the IAEA activity over the aforementioned
trends in 1996 thru 2003, and retrace the results of that activity up to the present.

Problem of prioritiesViktor Mikhailovich, you came to the IAEA 20 years ago…
Yes, my work for the Agency commenced on January 1, 1996. I was to hold three offices at the same time: Deputy Director
General, Head of the Department of Nuclear Energy ("Russian" department), and Manager of the Major Program 1 "Nuclear
Power and Fuel Cycle".
What was the situation in the Agency then? What was the IAEA engaged in?
For a more clear understanding of the situation associated with my joining the Agency, two aspects of the matter should be
considered.
On the one hand, I was not a stranger - I was recommended by the then Minister for Atomic Energy Viktor N. Mikhailov as the
Head of the Institute of Physics & Power Engineering in Obninsk, the largest national nuclear center engaged in the development
of fast reactors (seven departments, each comparable with an independent research institute, about 9,000 employees, over 400
doctors and candidates of science at that time).
I had sufficient experience in managing a large organization with considerable financial & logistic resources; I was quite
experienced in solving research problems, holding talks with top officials of Russian nuclear industry and heads of international
organizations; I participated in the IAEA projects and had personal contacts with the IAEA leaders such as S. Eklund and H. Blix.
On the other hand, I came to the IAEA's Department of Nuclear Energy (DNE) traditionally headed by, consequently, Soviet and
Russian representatives.
It is worth mentioning that Russian nuclear industry had a broad representation in the IAEA in that period: about 90 (of 800)
experts, which reflected Russia's economic potential and the fact that each forth nuclear specialist worked in the Russian
Federation.
My predecessor Boris A. Semenov had extensive experience (more than twelve years) in international nuclear activity including his
work for the IAEA. Before the IAEA, he was the Head of the RF Minatom's Department of Foreign Relations (his predecessor was
M.N. Ryzhov).
Considering vast experience gained by B. Semenov, I appointed him (despite objections on the part of Hans Blix who called it
"contradicting to the Agency traditions") first an adviser at my office and then a head of the group supervising provision of aid to
Russia to improve radiation environment.
Organizational changes in the Agency took place under the influence of most acute events. The DNE's Safety Division, headed
by Morris Rosen from the USA (who also was H. Blix's advisor) was raised to the Department of Nuclear Safety & Security - DNS,
and Mr. Rosen was appointed Assistant Deputy Director General of that Department.
On my first working day, I was said: "Dear Professor, all our programs are of two years' duration, and that's why we ask you to
familiarize yourself with the program of work and abstain from any revolutionary changes".
Global nuclear industry was going then through hard times after such heavy blows as TMI-2, Chernobyl, and Iraq. Safety and
Security, i.e. safety and physical protection became priority lines, and it was quite natural that the IAEA focused on them.
When I was told that safety was the priority and responsibility of DNS, I got surprised as I was sure that safety was primarily
determined by advanced technologies.
Still, I managed to find a common language with Morris Rosen. Unfortunately, his term of office in the new Department appeared
rather short. He was succeeded by the Canadian Representative Zygmund Domaratzki, who earlier worked as the Director
General of the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada. In fact, he was a supervisor in the pure form.
It should be said that our personal relations were good and correct, but each of us became tough in promoting departmental
interests.
"Viktor", - he said when we first met, - "it is safety that matters whereas technology is subordinate to it".
"OK", - I said, - "What airplane is most safe to you mind?" and answered myself: "It is an airplane standing permanently on land.
But it is of no use to anybody. Just the same with your nuclear energy: if it is only safe but unprofitable, it won't be of interest and
would be shut down in the course of time".
It was the beginning of a war of interests as part of program activities. About a year later, Domaratzki submitted a report to the
Director General indicating, in particular, as follows: "Safety is absolute priority. The Department of Nuclear Energy should work
under the financial and program supervision of the Department of Safety & Security".
Nuclear-safe conflictAnd is it possible? Heads of the IAEA Departments are appointed in compliance with quotas for Member States…
Domaratzki did not apply for a position or management. He undertook a politic move by proposing to grant him the right to financial
monitoring & distribution over all safety-related issues.
The IAEA-adopted approach was as follows. Let us assume that DNE has a waste program. DNS can participate in it but the
distribution of resources is vested in the head of DNE. The reverse order is possible as well: DNE can take part in DNS programs
but it is the latter that would dispose of resources.
By the way, during the DNE reorganization before my appointment, the newly established DNS "inherited" - along with
corresponding structures - very experienced specialists such as Annick Carnino from France (now she heads the French Civic
Supervision of NPP Safety) and Abel Julio Gonzalez, a real Argentinian hidalgo, a very experienced nuclear expert, who devoted
most of his life to the problems of nuclear safety and radiation protection.
As a result, employees and heads of sections in both Departments preserved good business relations.
However, notwithstanding the mid-level managers' desire to keep participation in programs at the former level, the general
tendency - highest priority to safety - was leading to the reduction of the "technology" trend.
As to me, I was trying to extend - whenever possible - technology issues. Take, for example, the problem of waste. Though
nuclear & radiation safety is of great importance there, an advanced technology would be required for long-run solution of the
problem.
A similar problem for the Agency discussions of those days: who should be responsible for NPP safety, nuclear regulator or
operator?
The conflict rose up to the ElBaradei level. For me, it was my first serious talk with the new Director General.
"Viktor, your colleague Domaratzki thinks that you should work under his financial supervision. We can't transfer employees from
one department to another, but he wants to get entire control of funds", said ElBaradei.
What should I proceed? Actually, the matter in question concerned putting the IAEA's "Russian" department (DNE) under outside
financial and program control. The way out should be found at once.
"Dear DG (Director General), I think that one Dr. ElBaradei is quite enough. I don't need a parallel chief."
The answer was to the liking of ElBaradei but not to Domaratzki's. What was the end of this story? Sometime after that,
Domaratzki retired for health reasons. He was sorry for himself but could not agree to the rejection of his proposal.
You asked me about the situation in the Agency at that time. Just imagine what it was like if I not once had to intercede at the
Director General (DG) meetings for employees facing dismissal for a principal position.
Supposing we fire a specialist, formerly a very experienced chief engineer of a big NPP. And who will remain? Outstanding
administrators? Even at the time we could observe discussions on the role of the so-called "phony managers" (a mixture of
manager and salesman).
Now I speak of a real incident - an attempt to refuse renewal of a contract with some employee for "incorrect behavior" because
that employee lost his temper and called such "phony manager" a non-professional.
Agency Information and its role
The IAEA Department of Nuclear Energy was traditionally considered as "Russian". Certainly, the DNS separation weakened its
position. There was no use opposing the General Conference's decision, and H. Blix (Director General in 1981 thru 1997) told me:
"Viktor, you'll have to live with this reality".
But that was not the end of problems. The Department of Management is traditionally considered "American" - by analogy with the
"Russian" Department because its Head is appointed on behalf of the United States and is not elected by the Board of
Governors. Moreover, the US's contribution to the IAEA is one of the largest, and Americans arrived at an idea about an
excessive influence of the "Russian" Department.
The point is that the Department of Nuclear Energy historically incorporated a library and the world's largest nuclear information
system INIS as a basis for scientific-technical activity in the field of nuclear power.
Americans proposed (the decision was taken during DNE separation) a scheme under which Russia would retain those
subdivisions but it is the Department of Management that would determine for them plans of actions because "the Agency should
have common information support".
I tried to object: "You are going to establish common control over provisions of office equipment, foodstuffs for dining-rooms and
nuclear technology?" Arguments were not taken into account, and control over subdivisions became dual: employees' work
supervised by DNE while programs of work and funds, by Americans (Department of Management).
I did not lose heart. For three years, I regularly rose up this question at the DG meetings and wrote memos. I placed emphasis on
the fact that in the Member States' opinion, this strange symbiosis of atom and sausage pointed to the lack of professionalism in
the Agency, reducing efficiency of work and protection of sensitive information (especially in the context of terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001).
The last circumstance along with my insistence and regular reports, probably, helped breach the wall because my opponents
decided to meet half-way and commence negotiations.
The essence of discussion looked as follows. "Dear Viktor", they would say, "to make you understand the subject-matter, we are
ready to tell you what we need INIS for".
"I know this. The INIS Project was launched at the request of developing countries to facilitate distribution and exchange of
nuclear information".
"Yes, it is specified so in the Statute. Actually, INIS is an indicator of nuclear activity the world over. We want you to see yourself
how it is realized in practice.
During the next business trip to the US, I visited a certain National Lab, where I was shown departments engaged in the
assessment of data and forecast of situations in various fields of activity all over the world. Weather forecast and agriculture in
Africa were taken as an example.
"Weather forecast, crop yields, invasion of vermin… What influence can these factors exert on the population and on a political
situation?"
"Viktor, we are to know where this or that kind of aid is needed".
On the IAEA demands, the world's leading nuclear labs carry out a good deal of analyses of nuclear activity the world over, and
the INIS project is one of data-flows for those analyses.
"If you are planning to return INIS to your department, you should think about responsibility you would take for part of our work.
We don't object; we are pleased to see that it is experts who are making analyses provided they know exactly what those
analyses are required for".
And what was the end of this story?
In the library and in the INIS project, I am still called the man who succeeded in separating scientific & technical information
(books) from sausages.
With E.P. Velilkhov, President of the Kurchatov Institute, and Assistant Yanko Yanev.

Formation of the Affinity group as a basis for reviving the role of the Department and its program - as the
basic IAEA programHow did you start your work as the Head of the Department and the Manager of Program MP1?
No matter what my home experience might be, I realized that I almost rushed into a hell of problems - from the head of a research
institution to practically the highest "nuclear" post to be taken by a Russian representative in an international organization like the
UN or IAEA.
The formation of a group of like-minded professionals was evident to me.
To avoid misunderstanding of the situation with the IAEA personnel, I must say that many positions in the Agency were and are
occupied by skilled professionals who passed through a tough selection. If, for example, an employee from Argentina or India
worked in DNE, I was sure that in his country he was considered one of the best specialists.
The IAEA managers were also noted for a high skill but with national traditions and peculiarities (graduates from national schools).
Similar to any UN structure (about forty organizations), the Agency sometimes failed to get adapted to operating principles they
brought from their native countries.
The IAEA's competitive personnel selection was rather flexible and rational. As a result, a team entitled the "DDG-NE Office" was
formed in a fairly short period.
The team incorporated as follows:
-- two high-skill technical secretaries (knowledge of several foreign languages,
experience of international and diplomatic work over fifteen years);
- two advisors in administrative and financial issues (Cambridge education and fine
English);
- two advisors in coordination of program activity (former Deputy Director Generals of
DNE and DNS);
- advisor - coordinator of interoffice activity (level of a Minister of nuclear energy in a
West-European country).
In addition (which was unusual for the Agency), I established weekly meetings attended by the whole of the DDG-NE Office and
heads of all DNE divisions and sections with the issue of protocols and decisions available on the IAEA employees site for
information and control of execution.
An unexpected effect showed up in half a year, when the administration of the IAEA buildings (building A, our floor A-26) informed
us that ventilation systems would supply air to the Agency buildings till 19:00. As a result, work after 19:00 became impossible due
to the lack of fresh air.
The explanation was as follows: "Viktor, similar to you, your employees keep late hours thus breaking corresponding trade-union
rules. For moral reasons, they cannot leave the office while you are here". Since then, we finished our working day at 19:00.
At first sight, all I am speaking about is just trifles. It is not so. We had great ideas aimed at rekindling the glory of the "Russian"
Department along with its key role in the IAEA activity, but we were first to solve organizational issues and improve the working
process.
Here is an example. Under ElBaradei, an experienced manager, former Minister for Atomic Energy of Algeria was appointed head
of the Planning Section. His work style was to ElBaradei's liking because they both followed one and the same management
strategy "Programs should be result-oriented". This concept, which was popular in many organizations and institutions, reappeared
not long ago.
For instance, from their point of view, it was inadmissible to be constantly involved in one reactor type, e.g. PWR/VVER. Reactor
types should be regularly changed in the program. I was surprised: "It means that in the 1st quarter I finish gathering
data on PWR, and in the 2nd quarter I should pass to the developments of fast reactors? It is like an anecdote!"
Still further, the Planning Section elaborated and introduced a scientifically based system of points, criteria etc. to assess
employees' labor efficiency and also other things that could be of interest to "phony managers".
All the above was rather interesting until my employees complained at one of regular meetings: "Viktor, we have no time for work,
we spend all time on filling various forms and making reports - on planning, fulfillment criteria, and so on".
As a result, we accepted a proposal from my financial advisor, a very clever Englishwoman who graduated from Cambridge and,
besides, finished two schools of management. Earlier she worked as S. Eklund's secretary. In my Department, she supervised
coordination of the administrative staff and also headed the informal association of the IAEA secretaries.
By the way, a personal experience of such professionals is worth much. Just at the beginning of her service in the DNE, she
stated, "Viktor, all our talks here become known to the Director General. All papers on your table are copied unmoved. That's why
we'll speak about things we wish to be heard by the Head of the Agency".
"Fine," I answered. "If I want to promote some idea, I'll discuss it with you, and the DG will immediately learn about it".
The solution was simple, under Arkady Raikin's principle "Our outgoing document against your incoming document". We receive
from the Planning Section a successive document containing either an initiative or an inquiry, and write a response thereto. But it
is performed by the existing office headed by an administrative advisor who should undertake this task.
At a regular DG meeting half a year later, the Head of the Planning Section takes the floor and starts to harshly criticize everyone:
"I write papers and elaborate methods, and the DG approves them. As a result, Departments ignore those documents except for
Viktor-headed Department, which provides - in due time - complete and substantive answers. I think, dear DG, that the practice
applied in the "Russian" Department should be spread to other IAEA Departments.
Nowadays, many institutions are to fill a lot of forms. When I am asked about actions to be taken, I recollect my practice in the
IAEA and say: "Establish an office, which would fulfill the whole of paper work".
Essence of program workWhat's new in work at program-specified tasks?
When I began my work at the IAEA, I tried to get acquainted as soon as possible with all Department employees to appreciate
better their role in the current program fulfillment as well as to learn about their problems and plans for the future.
I encountered open discontent on the part of two talented (I wrote their publications) employees - a Belgium man and a French
woman. They at once warned me that they would leave the Agency for work in NEA (Paris).
Work they were involved in the IAEA and were going to proceed in Paris included a comparative assessment of energy options.
They were trying to prove that the role and problems of nuclear energy could be determined correctly only by comparing it with
other energy options.
At present, it is considered as self-evident. But remember the start of our conversation. At that moment, the Agency was obsessed
by the words "safety" and "physical protection". On the other hand, many nuclear facilities and organizations were recommended
to continue concentrate interests within the nuclear sector. What conceptual approach to the comparative assessment could be
considered under such conditions?
For me - personally and as MP1 manager - availability of a comparative assessment and possible loss of that trend were of great
significance.
The matter is that before 1996 (start of work at the IAEA) I was a researcher at the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI,
and was engaged in joint analyses of different types of fast reactors and nuclear fuel cycles (uranium, thorium, and mixed). In
those analyses, we employed the systemic approach as we realized that no matter how brilliant could be characteristics of a
nuclear reactor (NPP with that reactor), the decisive factor was the said reactor (NPP) integration into the general nuclear energy
system (complete with the nuclear fuel cycle).
A vivid example for us was the decision by the Scientific Advisor of the USSR's Fast Reactors Program A.I. Leipunsky who
proposed using oxide ceramic fuel in fast reactors BN as it was widely used in home nuclear power plants with water-moderated
reactors VVER.
That decision predetermined successful implementation of the fast reactors program in the USSR (Russia) starting from reactor
BR-5 (1958) - contrary to the dead-end program in the USA based on the "beautiful" (judged from the fast reactor physics) metallic
fuel.
Later on, this system approach became one of the main trends in my investigations in association with researchers from the
Siberian Power Institute (Irkutsk) noted for a powerful school of systemic analysis guided by Academician L.A. Melentyev, and also
in joint work with Academician L.S. Popyrin (Moscow).
With the above in view, one of my first independent steps in the IAEA was the desire to preserve the existing "stock" of
comparative analytical work and, besides, create Program C, a new priority trend within Program MP1. As an addition to Programs
A (nuclear power) and B (nuclear fuel cycle), Program C was to incorporate a comparative assessment of energy options including
alternative trends in the nuclear power industry.
To conduct that investigation, I invited the German Professor Hans-Holger Rogner from Canada, known for his work on
sustainable energy development (Conferences in Rio de Janeiro, 1991 and in Helsinki, 1993).
H. Rogner's fame was of a dual nature. Environmental groups regarded him as an advocate of nuclear energy while nuclear
workers disliked him for provocative questions. For example, his favorite question, which drove them mad, was "If everything is
fine with nuclear power, why don't we see a boom in NPP construction?"
In short, I invited him to work at the IAEA, and he gave his consent. A competition was announced, and H. Rogner became the
winner. During a conversation, which preceded the competition, I for the first time met face to face with H. Rogner. We both were
familiar with each other's papers, and our viewpoints had much in common.
I explained to H. Rogner what I would like to see in the end. We agreed that the IAEA top officials should get familiar with the
results of work gradually as comparison makes sense only if something is compared to something. There is no "simply best
technology"; it should be more advanced against another one.
H. Rogner made a report for the Director General, where he compared nuclear power with coal- and gas energy and showed
where and in what countries it has an advantage.
ElBaradei took interest in that report. "Viktor, where did you take these data?" he asked "No one saw them in my office". "This
report was prepared by a new IAEA researcher". "OK, let him write speeches for me from time to time".
It's interesting to know the progress of this trend and its introduction into the IAEA Plan of Actions…
Unfortunately, the above trend encountered strong opposition in the IAEA on the part of two leading nuclear nations - USA and
Russia.
A sharply negative response came from DoE. Still, I should give respect to J. Ritch III, the US Ambassador to the IAEA, who came
to my office and gave backing to the newly established trend C. With the letter from DoE in hand, he said that "fools are
everywhere including DoS".
Support from J. Ritch, his comprehension of the IAEA objectives in nuclear power development appeared of great value for the
progress of MP1 including the arrangement of first Scientific Forums in the IAEA in 1998 and 1999, where perspectives of nuclear
power were analyzed (a comparative assessment was also used). Since then, Forums became a significant event held regularly
during the IAEA General Conferences.
At first, Russia's and US's negative reaction was similar: "It is squandering of funds, and we refuse to participate".
The IAEA received a devastating letter from Minatom's Department of Foreign Relations, which the Department Head M.N.
Ryzhov passed over to me - as the MP1 manager - and to the IAEA Director General. In that letter, the total of the MP1 program
was assessed as unsatisfactory.
The reason: instead of focusing attention on innovations and promoting new developments (including reactors with inherent
safety, which presumed lead coolant reactors), MP1 attaches much effort to an assessment of nuclear power as compared with
traditional energy sources.
Moreover, the RF Minatom found this trend "destructive" for the Agency and refused to send Russian experts to the meeting on
the coordination of work under Program C (April 1999).
However, in May 1999, a sudden letter from the RF Academy of Sciences was received with the support of Program C and the
desire to take part in it. Within a month, the RF Minatom shifted its ground and informed about the desire to send Russian experts
(at a research institute director's level) to the meeting in question.
It is interesting to note that the first results of work within Program C (supervised by H. Rogner) were included in the Energy
Assessment Report - the main UN paper on the assessment, role and perspectives of global nuclear energy as a separate section
about nuclear energy - one of the basic factors of sustainable energy development.
Prior to that, regular UN surveys of nuclear technology contained only two references of nuclear power: a source of nuclear
weapon and an origin of nuclear waste.
The IAEA Director General expressed his gratitude to H. Rogner (supervisor of work within Program C) and later frequently used
the Program C results in his reports and declarations.
H. Rogner acquired recognition as a fact-based nuclear expert, and became a permanent participant in numerous events devoted
to sustainable energy development and to environmental problems of nuclear power.
Nowadays, Section C in the DNE is one of major concept-based IAEA divisions (and trends of the Agency activity).

Disputes with nuclear industry
Activity going on, reports being prepared, the Director General delivering those reports, but no program of work. It was then that I
proposed arranging a series of multilateral meetings to discuss the new trend of planned wok called "Comparative Assessment and
Role of Nuclear Energy in Sustainable Energy Development" with the involvement of representatives from the IAEA Member
States.
We sent out letters of invitation to the Member States. After TMI-2, Chernobyl, and Iraqi events, the IAEA focused on the problems
of safety and control. The nuclear industry, in its turn, used existing reactor types as the primary argument: "Come to us, and we'll
discuss everything".
We held two meetings with leading nuclear companies attended by representatives from COGEMA, General Electric, and other big
companies. Discussions went on under the same scenario: the industry would speak about economic interests only. Industrialists
were always ready to discuss metal consumption, but the question "To be or not to be?" did not trouble them.
"You are forcing safety upon us", manufacturers would say. "Do you know that earlier the safety criterion in designing had quite
another meaning? You imposed the so-called safety culture upon us, but do you know the cost of it for us?"
The US industrialists would state frankly and straightly. Starting from 1979, when the safety issue became a high-priority task, the
cost of a single power unit was yearly rising by 10 percent.
"And you have the nerve to speak about non-proliferation", would say US manufacturers getting excited. "Does the non-
proliferation mode spread on coal-fired power plants? Or, God save, on wind-powered plants? And you tell us about non-
proliferation. If this is the case, power units would become ever more expensive".
"Non-proliferation is a matter of the government. We would build nuclear plants, and let politics suffer from a headache", insisted
manufacturers.
After the Agency had issued a report "Design of water-moderated nuclear reactors with due account for the non-proliferation
regime", the nuclear industry flied into a rage: "You are going to cut down nuclear energy?"
"No, we want it to comply with the criteria, and we give you these criteria".
"Then develop reactors with such criteria yourself!"
We were leaving those meetings followed by the industrialists' instructions: "Raise questions about innovation reactors to
correspond to your criteria, and don't poke your nose into our business".
Little tricks of the round table talks
So, what did we have? The Agency is responsible only for the elaboration of criteria and not for the development of technologies.
In its turn, nuclear industry was not going to develop new reactors corresponding to our criteria, and considered the current state
of things satisfactory.
It was necessary to arrange a multilateral meeting with a wide representation of IAEA Member States and - which was the key
moment - a discussion of high-level experts, a kind of round table talks between the leaders of nuclear science & technology and
nuclear officials.
In 1998, we agreed with John Ritch to try to arrange a round table during the IAEA General Conference. Nowadays, you know it
under the name "Scientific Forum". Earlier, there was no such a forum, and it was our round table that gave birth to it.
We decided to invite leaders of nuclear sectors from major nuclear nations so that they could discuss how to proceed. John Ritch
guaranteed the presence of western leaders, while I was to persuade E. Adamov.
"If things work out, I will provide publicity", promised John Ritch.
In 1998, the RF Minister for Atomic Energy was Evgeny O. Adamov, who was anxious to restore the power and glory of the USSR
Ministry of Medium Machine-Building (predecessor of the RF Minatom). I said: "Evgeny Olegovich, just imagine how you arrive in
Vienna, accompanied by academicians, and speak during round table talks about Russian nuclear technology, its development
and achievements after Chernobyl".
The situation was partially overlapped by the political aspect. After the Chernobyl catastrophe, western nations gave 10 million
USD "to raise safety of Soviet reactors". When the Program was fulfilled, financial aid was reduced to 100 thousand USD.
"Evgeny Olegovich, just think", I complained. "They propose selling the image of Russian nuclear energy just for one hundred
thousand dollars. Do you realize what is going on? At a meeting of the Board of Governors, our diplomat declares that Russian
nuclear energy is safe, and immediately hears an acrid voice from the European corner: No-no-no, here is the joint report running
that it is dangerous and needs aid". Yeah, aid worth… one hundred thousand dollars.
E. Adamov became enthusiastic over the opportunity to speak publicly on the new Russian situation, and he agreed to participate
in the session.
The General Conferences starts its work. The first day is devoted to summary reports and speeches by leading delegates, and we
keep heads down. Our objective is the second day, when formal speeches are over but most participants remain in the Agency.
In the session hall, reports from Member States are read from a piece of paper, and they are listened by duty delegates, others
minding own affairs on the margins.
As an experienced fighter, John Ritch takes the initiative: "Viktor, after dinner, we'll take a small hall so that it could not
accommodate all interested persons. I'll ensure the presence of ElBaradei. Don't reserve a seat for him; he must see that that hall
is packed. When ElBaradei enters, give place to him. And then lean on me".
Everything happened just so. The hall is packed, E. Adamov is inside. US representatives are also there as they cannot miss such
an event. Two hundred seats and far too many who wished to get there. In ten or fifteen minutes, enters the two-meter-high John
Ritch followed by ElBaradei.
John Ritch: "Dear DG, delegates will discuss in that small hall what should be done in a large session hall". Almost immediately
Minister E. Adamov starts delivering his report, followed by N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy and US representatives. Discussions,
disputes… In short, just like old times.
And the beautiful John Ritch beats the audience down: "Look, what the session has turned into! But the room is not sufficient for
all participants, so many people standing, and we've hardly found an empty seat for Dr. ElBaradei."
"Dear DG, we are discussing the essence of the Agency work in this small room. And here you can see your potential. Try not to
lose it!"
At the following meeting next morning, John Ritch took the floor outside the agenda: "Dear Sirs, you are sitting here while the
future of nuclear energy was being determined yesterday in another hall. I demand that the resolution taken during the round table
talks be presented and adopted at this session".
The proposal was supported and the resolution adopted. A decision was made to hold a Scientific Forum within each session of
the General Conference. And it goes on so since.

"The timeliness and significance of the 2nd Scientific Forum (1999) on the theme
"Sustainable Development: A Role for Nuclear Power?" are conditioned by the urgent need for determining at the present stage a
long-term strategy of peaceful uses of nuclear energy to meet increasing energy requirements the world over. This is especially
important for countries currently specifying priorities of their energy policies".
From the letter by RF Minister for Atomic energy Evgeny Adamov addressed to the IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed
ElBaradei.On the way to INPROWhat happened next? How were the results of the round table talks (new Scientific Forum) embodied in practice?
Through joint efforts, we reversed the situation. By 1998, the IAEA had realized that it should regain its role as a flagship of nuclear
energy development.
The results of our activity in 1998 and early 1999 led to our Department's understanding of the Main Program 1, of the necessity to
assess the content and the role of innovative NPP & NFC technologies based on the systemic approach.
An official proposal to launch a project on innovative nuclear fuel cycles and nuclear power plants was sent to the IAEA Director
General.
Front page of Viktor Murogov's Memorandum of April 27, 1999 addressed to the IAEA Director General

We were steadily getting ready to start up a project, which was soon called INPRO. Preliminary consultations showed that activity
within that project attracted attention of fifteen Member States (later their number increased to eighteen).
Certainly, participants had own viewpoints on the innovative reactor. Some counted on small-power reactors, other dreamed about
nuclear desalination, still others did not forget high-temperature gas-cooled reactors. Russia proposed a lead-cooled reactor.
In 1998 thru 2002, in association with Paris and Brussels energy agencies, we fulfilled a joint project named "Innovative Nuclear
Reactor Development". The joint work was completed by the issue of the-called "Three-Agency Report".
As a result, we in the IAEA Secretariat came to the following conclusion. Of course, each country has own trump cards, and it is
difficult to say who holds senior trump cards. But it is not of great importance now. The most urgent thing now is explaining to a
hundred and fifty countries what nuclear energy is for and what we call nuclear energy of the future.
Only then would we understand what reactor types we should develop and what requirements a nuclear newcomer should follow
before it starts developing national nuclear energy.
By the way, the last point is of great importance. At a time, the situation with isotopes (with medical radioactive isotopes, in
particular) was a matter of hot disputes. Countries produced isotopes not always providing proper control over them. Radioactive
isotopes registers were not used in some developing countries. There were cases when the lack of radiation therapists' expertise
brought about fatal outcomes among patients because of a miscalculated dose.
The IAEA adopted a resolution under which any aid related to radioactive isotopes should be provided only after elaborating a
program for training of specialists. By the way, later that resolution became a basis for the Nuclear Knowledge Management
Program.
One could see a gradually forming shape of that new (for the nuclear community) program: systemic approach and knowledge
management.
The latter theme was to the liking of the IAEA Departments: "Any information work is management of knowledge. It is just what we
are involved historically. What is the new here? Why should we change anything?"
We had to struggle for retaining the essence of the new program. As an example, I took the development of fast reactors. Do they
operate anywhere in the world? Actually, they do not exist (only BN-600 was then). We call those reactors the future of nuclear
energy, but they were designed forty years ago. And where is knowledge on fast reactors? This knowledge is vanishing and is
getting lost though it is critical for the industry.
I remember a meeting with the head of a certain US National Lab: "Viktor, I'll support you. Probably, you don't know that when the
US Program on fast reactors had been closed, one of designers brought home two light trucks with project documents, which DoE
officers were ready to throw away as waste".
It is known that after the completion of the Apollo Program, up to 80% of knowledge gained during the project was lost in the US".
We formulated the task as follows: "To develop innovative nuclear energy, first it is necessary to preserve basic knowledge".
The "Red Book" of nuclear knowledge should be compiled, which is the most pressing challenge for critical nuclear technologies
determining full-scale development of nuclear reactors.
We observe the loss of knowledge which is not used. In the nuclear sector, it is reactor technologies that suffer most of all from
this. Russia's construction of reactor BN-800 is an example of the preserved knowledge on fast sodium-cooled reactors but,
unfortunately, this is unique experience.
Thus, it became the basis for another priority trend of the IAEA activity - Nuclear Knowledge Management (NKM), which is the
theme of the primary resolution of the General Conference 2002 and a subject-matter of the first international conference on NKM
in the IAEA in 2004
The tasks were specified. There was only one problem: lack of resources. The IAEA budget is drawn up for two years. Even if you
convince the Director General of the necessity to develop this or that project, he would not be able to help you until a new budget
is passed.
For such cases, non-budgetary funds are envisaged. If a country finds the work in question important, it can make an extra
contribution.
This mechanism is frequently used by the leading IAEA donors such as USA and Japan. Supposing you want to place a spent fuel
processing complex under the IAEA safeguards, here are extra-budgetary funds.
But do not think it is so easy. Let us return to the Japan example. When information about certain Member States' desire to
contribute additionally to the program of the Safeguards Department becomes known, a proposal from developing Member States
appears in the Secretariat.
The balance of the IAEA program may be subjected to changes, which is inadmissible. It is suggested that the proposed extra-
budgetary resources should be divided into two parts, the second part being distributed among developing states. And only try to
oppose it: the number of developing countries exceeds eighty.
Russia could render financial support to the future project INPRO. To this end, first, it was necessary to make Moscow believe in
the project usefulness and, second, to convince the Secretariat accept funds and spend it purposefully.
Looking ahead, I should say that the Russian initiative and financial support of INPRO vexed Washington greatly.
During one heated dispute, when the situation came to a head, an officer from DoE, trying to offend me, threw an abrupt remark:
"What do you want? To become a leader in determining the future of nuclear energy owing to one million dollars contributed a
hundred years ago?"
"We, Americans and Japanese, annually allocate to the Agency tens of millions of dollars but we are called "nuclear" policemen.
And you, with the one-million contribution, are going to lead a struggle for the interests of developing nations?
Not realizing the consequences, the offended quick-tempered officer gave us a brilliant idea. With the help of Indian delegation,
we introduced a small but very important addition to the UN resolution in New York: "the IAEA initiative over INPRO meets
expectations of developing countries".
When Americans calmed down, they realized how elegantly they were outplayed. Indeed, systemic investigations do not require
large resources. On the other hand, everything is correct: the IAEA may not be engaged in R&D work.
Still, the development of INPRO is another interesting story.

]]>

IAEA International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). Scientific-Technical Reminiscences.http://atominfo.ru/en/news4/d0382.htm
Sun, 25 Dec 2016 23:10:23 +0400Introduction]]>Introduction
Twenty years ago, by the assignment of Minatom (Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy), I joined the IAEA as Deputy Director
General and Head of the Department of Nuclear Energy (DNE) and Manager of the IAEA's Major Program 1 (MP1) "Nuclear
Power, Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Science".
For the years of work for the IAEA, I have accumulated vast archives of documents including those on the DNE's scientific,
technical and managerial issues and initiatives as follows:
- development of INPRO (innovative projects for NPPs and NFCs),
- development of the IAEA's Program on Nuclear Knowledge Management (cross-cutting
program),
- development of a new trend called "Comparative Analysis of Nuclear Energy Role for
Sustainable Energy Development" (Program C - MP1).
The archives accumulated helped create information databases at the MEPhI International Center of Nuclear Education and at
the Center for Nuclear Knowledge Management of the Obninsk Institute of Atomic Energy (IAE) . At those centers, young talented
researchers are involved in the analysis and development of ideas enclosed in the above programs.
The direct supervisor of this work is A.A. Andrianov, Cand. Sc. (Phys-Math), associate professor at the IAE. Owing to his
contribution, it became possible to promote the analysis of materials required for making a recorded history of the IAEA activity,
relating to the above trends, in 1996 thru 2003, and retrace the results of that activity up to the present.
V. M. Murogov1. Background (1996-2000)
From the outset of the IAEA, one of the Agency's main objectives was the analysis and spread of information, knowledge and
experience gained by leading nuclear nations.
In the 1960s-1970s, the IAEA used to publish surveys and analytical reports prepared at its request by major nuclear experts (see,
for example, Atomic Energy Review, 1963-1980s), which promoted the development and spread of nuclear technologies in
medicine, agriculture, industry etc. the world over.
However, the situation sharply changed after the Three-Mile Island (1979) and, Chernobyl (1986) accidents as well as Iraqi (1991)
events. Forced by the circumstances, under the pressure from the public, and due to the policy pursued by some anti-nuclear
nations (e.g. Austria), the IAEA had to shift the priority activity towards supervisory functions (expressions like "watch dog" relative
to the IAEA work became popular). In 1996, the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security (DNSS) was established (based on
the "Russian" Department of Nuclear Energy - DNE). An Additional Protocol was elaborated (1993-98 annexes to the
nonproliferation regime) by the Department of Safeguards (DS). The priority of safety was shown by the issue of a special Nuclear
Safety Review to be presented at each General Conference along with the IAEA Director General's report. The DS activity was
growing similarly and even at a higher rate. Practically all resolutions of a General Conference, determining priorities in the IAEA
program of work, related to the activity of two departments - DS and DNSS. To compensate for the balance in the Program
activity, aid to developing countries was increasing (Department of Technical Cooperation).
The peak of that shift coincided with the promotion of a Russian representative Victor Murogov to the Head of DNE and the
Manager of the "Nuclear Energy & Nuclear Fuel Cycle" Program MP1. According to Hans Blix (Director General of IAEA in 1981 till
1997), Victor Murogov was a nuclear expert and a professor rather than a program manager. Soon a contradiction arose
concerning the decisive role of the development of nuclear technologies for the future of nuclear power including nuclear safety
(priority of DNE) and the absolute priority of safety (DNSS and DS) in the IAEA plans.
Vigorous activity and the results of work of DNE experts more and more pointed at the necessity of developing innovative
technologies to leave the stagnation period typical of global nuclear energy in the late 20th century.
Scientific seminars and conferences, held in developing countries, showed the requirement for changes and for a more active role
of the IAEA in the field of innovations. The opinion of national nuclear experts - in situ professionals - was one of determining
factors. Taking that factor into account, DNE made some important steps, as follows:
- A series of advisory group meetings - AGM (attended by leading nuclear experts from
fifteen countries) on the necessity to elaborate and adopt - as part of the IAEA Program - an international project on innovative
development of NPPs and NFCs (AGM on developing innovative low-cost proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor technology,
December 14-16, 1998; July 07-09, 1999; October 1999). The results of those meetings were delivered as a Report to the IAEA
Director General, ending with the requirement to elaborate IAEA-supervised international project on innovative development of
NPPs and NFCs (similar to the 1999 ITER Project).
The IAEA Director General's approval helped arrange - in a relatively short time - and hold the following events:
- Scientific Forum (round-table talks) on innovative development of nuclear power
(September 1999);
- Industrial Forum attended by major nuclear companies (January 1998 - 2000)
supporting the initiative of the Secretariat (DNE) .
The next important step became the issue - on the initiative of DNE - of the Three-Agency Study. The participating agencies -
IAEA, NEA, and IEA (OECD) - started their talks in 2000. The Study came out in 2002, after prolonged discussions.
After the aforementioned IAEA meetings of 1998-99, it became clear that innovative technologies would not be boosted by
industry only if the IAEA kept acting as a supervisor, and that conditions for the Agency's new initiative had been formed. A
decision was made that a Scientific Forum of experts would be held at a regular General Conference parallel to a meeting of
diplomats. The first two-day round-table Forum (1999) was so successful largely due to the active stand of the Russian delegation
(Academician N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, Head of Minatom E.O. Adamov etc.) supported by experts from India, Argentina, Brazil,
and - which is of particular importance - by the US delegation headed by Ambassador J. Ritch III). It was decided that such forums
should be held regularly (at present, the Scientific Forum is an integral part of a General Conference.
To consolidate a success, the Department of Nuclear Energy proposed to open Scientific Forums with a special annual research
journal - Nuclear Technology Review. The first issue - NTR-2001 - was presented at the Board of Governors (March 2001) and
then at 2001 General Conference, where unexpectedly - for the IAEA officials - caused keen interest and support on the part of
IAEA Member States.
Starting from 2003, NTR began to generalize all results in the progress of the nuclear technology beyond nuclear power
engineering (including non-energy applications) thus reflecting the interest of most IAEA Member States towards various use of
nuclear technologies. One of indications of such interest was a colored edition of NTR as a research report - contrary to official
black-and-white reports prepared by DNSS and DS.
Still, since all the above activity looked like initiatives not reflected either in the IAEA Program or in the Agency budget, the
necessity arose to add innovation activity to the IAEA Plan of action as part of MP1. Besides, appeals to "nuclear renaissance",
to the priority of innovative developments became more insistent .
A strict proposal of DNE was formed, and discussions about launching a new IAEA initiative started at Directorate meetings. In
particular, that initiative could include the establishment of an ongoing group "Task Force" engaged in regular activity such as
data collection, issue of analytical surveys, arrangement of seminars etc.
Upon approval by the Director General (DG), the Head of DNE appealed - on behalf of the DG - to the IAEA Member States with
the proposal to set up an initiative group of experts (Task Force) to elaborate a concept for an international innovation project, and
send their representatives to the Conference (July 14, 2000).
Two basic lines of activity were determined for the future Task Force, as follows:
1 - Determine requirements for future nuclear power, nuclear power plant, and nuclear fuel cycle;
2 - Determine types and characteristics of reactors meeting the specified requirements.
Initially it was proposed that due to the inertia of plans and the Agency's two-year budget, work should be arranged based on
extra-budgetary funding of cost-free IAEA experts.
A stage of practical implementation of the IAEA's (DNE's) new initiative had come, and the RF President's initiative at the UN
Millennium Summit of 2000 in New York became the decisive event at the break of the centuries.
2. Development of INPRO. Collision of concepts. First stage (2000 thru 2003)
On September 9, 2000, at the UN Millennium Summit, the RF President proposed to ensure sustainable development based on
nuclear power with the guaranteed solving of safety and non-proliferation problems.
The matter concerned nuclear power without pure plutonium (and also without free or released plutonium) and without enriched
uranium-235 (without highly enriched U-235 or - in the distant future - complete transition to plutonium fuel).
In the end, the RF President made an important political move by suggesting that the IAEA should act as the Project manager and
coordinator with the participation of experts from Member States.
This historic Russian initiative fell on the ground well prepared for its implementation, taking into account that the requirement for
innovative nuclear technologies and nuclear fuel cycles was recognized in the IAEA (at least, in the Department of Nuclear
Energy). As a result, the already discussed idea of Task Force idea became - since 2000 - INPRO - International Project on
Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles.
Thus, it was the start of preparations for the forthcoming General Conference as well as for a Scientific Forum and a meeting of the
Board of Governors, where a decision (the General Conference resolution) in favor of INPRO was to be taken.
It turned out from the very beginning that there were several approaches (concepts) to the INPRO targets, content, and plan of
actions.
The Russian side (Minister E.O. Adamov, M.N. Ryzhov, etc.), acting as the Customers, demanded that the INPRO should
follow the concept of "naturally" safe nuclear power based on the lead-cooled fast reactor and "on-site" fuel cycle.
E.O. Adamov's position was rather tough: "As I give money (preliminarily, about one million USD were to be obtained from a certain
non-budgetary fund for the INPRO implementation based on cost-free experts sent to the IAEA Secretariat), I will determine a
Program of work".
I had an opportunity to outline the position of the Secretariat (formulated earlier and based on the opinion of the DNE experts):
- The allocated extra-budgetary funds belong now to the IAEA, and it is the Secretariat
that would determine their use, taking into account opinions of Member States and of future participants in the Project (elaborate a
Roadmap for INPRO).
Viewpoints of leading nuclear nations (USA, France, etc.): "We are not developing countries to take an outsider project
as a basis for our future. In case such a project is to be considered, it will be implemented with due account of advanced national
developments in those countries…"
Argentina, Brazil, India, China, etc.: "If the Russian project is so remarkable, it is not clear why Russia itself cannot fulfill it
to show its advantages to the whole of nuclear community". This opinion grew stronger after the tour of a Minatom (RF Ministry for
Atomic Energy) delegation over those countries advertising the BREST reactor. According to the Brazil ambassador, "If the
INPRO objective is BREST, we are leaving this project". (Later Brazil and Argentina appeared the primary boosters of INPRO.) It
is indicated in a certain UN resolution on the IAEA activity (2001) that "INPRO should realize aspirations of developing countries".
The Argentinian representative Prof Cheremelo, one of the leaders of the national nuclear industry, later chaired the first IAEA
Conference on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles upon the results of the 1st stage of INPRO (2003).
Germany and some other nations are ready to support (not contradict) the Project implementation as part of the IAEA
Program provided the issues of safety and non-proliferation are settled.
Position of the Secretariat (including the Chief Project Manager, Head of DNE and managers of six tasks in DNE): "The
Project should combine efforts of the maximum possible number of Member States to become actually international and obtain
guaranteed funding in the future (both extra-budgetary and regular).
With all the above in view, the priority task was the elaboration of the Project concept paying particular attention to the following
issues:
- Comparative (systemic) analysis of the nuclear power role for sustainable (energy)
development (Why it is necessary to promote nuclear power the world over including developing countries);
- Elaboration of requirements for future nuclear power (What nuclear power and NFC
should look like in the future) along with the analysis of NPP & NFC types and technologies;
- Elaboration of requirements for countries wishing to develop nuclear power (What
countries have the right to this).
After fairly severe debates with E.O. Adamov, the sides came to a conclusion that the first two issues should become decisive for
the first year of work at INPRO as part of the IAEA Program. The participating countries (first of all, Russia) were to arrange parallel
"domestic" activity and ensure their contribution to the fulfillment of INPRO's first stage. Actually, the first stage was completed in
June 2003 as discussions of INPRO materials and participants' reports at the first IAEA Conference on Innovative Nuclear
Reactors and Fuel Cycles (Vienna) .
It is worth mentioning that at the 1st stage of INPRO it was two nations that thoroughly examined and supervised the activity of
the IAEA Secretariat: Russia and USA.
Russia's position
The RF President's initiative at the UN Summit, contacts with RF Minatom, RF President's reception of an IAEA delegation
headed by Director General ElBaradei in Moscow brought about the corresponding governmental decree.
That decree, whose details can be found in the decisions by RF Minatom. RF Academy of Sciences, and RF State Nuclear
Supervision Committee, as well as establishment of a Board of Directors for Russian participation in INPRO and of an Innovation
Center under the Kurchatov Institute (headed by Academician E.P. Velikhov) provided not only financial support and sending of
three cost-free experts for INPRO but also major R&D work at INPRO with the results delivered to the IAEA as "intellectual"
contribution to the Project.
During the 1st stage of INPRO (until 2003), most substantial contribution was made by Kurchatov Institute experts P.N. Alexeev,
S.A. Subbotin, Yu.A. Gagarinsky, V.F. Tsibulsky etc. (under the supervision of N.N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy) and by cost-free IAEA
experts (N.S. Rabotnov, V.S. Kagramanian, etc.).
It is interesting to note that the work of Russian experts was greatly favored by foreign specialists including two experts from
Germany - despite the general negative attitude of German leaders towards the future of nuclear power.
By using personal contacts of J. Kupitz (Executive Manager of the Project and Head of the Nuclear Power Technology
Development Section), it became possible to obtain support from the German mission under the motto "INPRO should prove the
possibility of creating safe & secure nuclear power plants and their fuel cycles". Those experts (particularly, F. Depisch, who
worked in close contact with Russian nuclear specialists) greatly contributed to the INPRO success at the 1st stage of the
Project.
US position
The US Ambassador to the IAEA John Ritch III rendered great support to the DNE initiatives over innovative technologies. He
spoke in favor of a Scientific Forum and issue of a Nuclear Technology Review.
Later he favored resolutions of the IAEA General Conference on Nuclear Knowledge Management (small-power nuclear reactors
and fast reactors) as a line of innovation research.
Of great importance was his "smoothing" of the sharply negative position of DoS (US Department of State) over the establishment
and funding of INPRO Task Force . J. Ritch assisted in inviting the INPRO Manager V.M. Murogov to Washington for talks with
officials from DoE (US Department of Energy) and NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) relating to the prospects of nuclear
power in the US and the world over as well as to the development of INPRO as part of the IAEA Program ĚĐ1. Yanko Yanev,
DDG-NE Advisor for INPRO & Knowledge Management Program, also took part in that trip.
Of principal value was a meeting with Under Secretary of Energy Dr. Ernest Moniz (at present, Secretary of Energy) entirely
devoted to INPRO. Here are basic provisions of Dr. E. Moniz's opinion.
1. INPRO disturbs the common IAEA practice. No one essential project, associated with the future of nuclear power, may be
realized by the IAEA unless it has obtained approval of the United States.
2. At the given stage, the Project objectives concerning promotion of innovative nuclear technologies for NPPs and NFCs to
developing countries are inexpedient and unacceptable.
3. From the viewpoint of the US, the most reasonable task would be focusing efforts on the requirements for infrastructure
development as an indicator of newcomers' readiness to using nuclear technologies. It is desirable to analyze preparedness,
opportunities and admissibility of this or that country to the development of nuclear technologies, i.e. create a kind of Country
Profile to obtain a license for using nuclear technologies and, all the more, for developing nuclear power in that country.
One could see that the third item corresponds to the third task specified by the IAEA Secretariat for INPRO. However, the INPRO
limitation by that task as the primary objective from the very beginning was turning INPRO into an appendage to the GIF-4 Project,
which was intensely lobbied by the US starting from 2000 (via NEA - Nuclear Energy Agency - as an analogue of the IAEA
Secretariat).
We were of the opinion, that both projects - INPRO and GIF-4 - should complement each other and should have a common
strategic mission: evaluation and feasibility of full-scale development of nuclear power in the future. INPRO could be responsible
for conceptual requirements for nuclear power (NPPs and NFCs) while GIF-4, for particular fulfillment of those requirements. All this
demands equal support for both projects from leading nuclear nations - donors of innovative technologies.
We told Mr. Moniz just about it. And in the future things went on exactly this way. Instead of antagonism, we achieved close
interaction and consolidation of political and coordination committees for better exchange of information. More than that, after the
Project had been entered into the regular program, representatives of leading nuclear (including western) nations headed the
INPRO Section.
During the talks in Washington (DoE, NRC and DoS), our confidence in a great significance of the political component of INPRO
(apart from its technical content) was confirmed.
At first, owing to INPRO and the annual presentation of NTR (Nuclear Technology Review) at the Scientific Forum, a
report by the IAEA Director General at a General Conference was discussed, and one of sessions of the Board of Governors (with
a report delivered by the Head of DNE) was devoted to the development of nuclear technologies and innovations. An ongoing
Forum was established for wide discussion of the IAEA role in the progress of nuclear technologies, and Russian representatives
took an active part in the Forum work.
At second, despite the US words about just a million dollars invested by Russia in INPRO as against tens of millions
contributed by the USA, Japan and other western partners to the DNSS and DS, Russia became the leader of the Project -
according to the UN resolutions over the IAEA report (2001 and 2002) "meeting expectations of developing countries" (the phrase
coordinated with DNSS and proposed by the Indian delegation).
As to INPRO objectives and further development (in addition to the vital task - IAEA Forum for analysis and discussion of nuclear
technologies), it is necessary to say that the elaboration of requirements for countries, planning to develop nuclear technologies
and nuclear power, taking into account consequences of the Fukushima accident and growing concern over the obligatory
character of the IAEA's Safety & Security standards (the aforementioned US demands for INPRO) is becoming vital for today's
INPRO agenda.
]]>Vladimir Krivientsev: FR17 - The Olympic Games of Fast Reactorshttp://atominfo.ru/en/news4/d0381.htm
Mon, 31 Oct 2016 23:24:52 +0400Workshop in TriesteMr Krivientsev, we understand that the IAEA held a workshop on fast reactors this year in Trieste. We know that it was well
received by two Russian participants. Now we would like to hear your opinion as one of the
organizers.
The organizers were also very pleased. I should point out, though, that there were more than two people from Russia taking part.
There were six, if memory serves.
The workshop focused on the physics and technology of innovative nuclear energy systems for sustainable development. Our aim
was to bring together a group representing the next generation of experts to talk to them about the next generation of reactors and
the associated fuel cycles.
That sounds a bit broad. What specific topics did you address?
We started, as one does, with an introduction, in which we talked about why there was a need for new fuel cycles and fast
reactors and whether there is even a need for them. We looked at different ways nuclear power might develop, based on UN
forecasts concerning the growth in global energy demand, how long existing uranium reserves will last, and so on.
After the general introduction, we looked into more specific areas, such as the physics of innovative (fast) reactors, neutronics,
safety, materials, including construction materials, coolants, fuel and the thermal hydraulics specifically of fast reactors.
We had many well known scientists giving the lectures. Heading the list we had Massimo Salvatores...
The Russian participants we have spoken with very much appreciated the opportunity to meet Salvatores in person and hear
him speak.
From France we had Christian Latge, an expert in fuel and materials. His lectures were also well received. Concetta Fazio of the
European Commission's Joint Research Centre gave lectures on construction materials. We also had Andrei Rineiski, a well-
known expert on fast reactor safety, who is currently working at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. And yours truly lectured on
thermal hydraulics.
All these lectures can be accessed from the IAEA's web page for the workshop.
How were participants selected?
We received some 140 applications, which was much more than we could accept. To make the selection we devised a number
of objective criteria.
For example, if an applicant had some experience in physics he or shewould get six points, making them eligible, in principle, to
participate in the workshop. Nuclear reactor-relevant experience is worth another point. If there were recommendations, that's
another point. Scientific publications are worth a point, and if the publicationsare related to next generation reactors, that's another
point.
The need to ensure balanced geographical representation also played a role. In addition, the Abdus Salam International Centre for
Theoretical Physics (ICTP), which organized the workshop jointly with the IAEA, applied its own criteria.
Some financial support was also made available to applicants from developing counties. Russia at this point is no longer in that
category. While that is good news, it also means that participants from Russia had to make financial arrangements individually.
In the end, we were able to put together a rather strong group for the workshop. At the same time, unfortunately, there was no one
from China.
Yes, that surprised us. How did that happen?
It is difficult to say for certain. Perhaps we could have done a better job of providing information on the event. We will bear this in
mind in the future.
There were no applications at all from France, but that is easier to explain. They were running their own school at almost the same
time as ours.
It was nice to see good representation from Latin America, including Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico and Peru. There were also
participants from Asia, Africa and Europe. Altogether we had about 40 participants from 24 countries.
We understand there was a poster session for the participants.
Yes, we introduced two additional events on the programme specifically in order to encourage more participant involvement. The
first was that we invited all those interested to prepare and give a poster presentation.
All those interested or everyone?
It was not a requirement, but most of the participants did it. As a result, we had quite a good event and we spent two evenings on
it. When it was over, the organizers gave an award to a participant from India for a high-quality and professional presentation.
The other item added to the programme was a team-work project. We made four teams and set them two homework assignments:
"invent" a new passive emergency shutdown system and perform a thermal hydraulic calculation for a reactor core.
All the teams successfully completed the second task. As for the first task, we of course did not expect them to invent a new
system in one evening. Nevertheless, some teams did come up with something, while others reviewed existing passive shutdown
system designs, which was also not bad.
Are you planning to hold more fast reactor workshops?
Certainly. It is a little early, though, to say exactly where next year's workshop might be held.
FR17 ConferenceThe FR17 conference on fast reactors is being held in 2017 in Yekaterinburg. Who is organizing it?
The FR17 is a major conference on fast reactors and related fuel cycles that is being organized by the IAEA. I would like to take
this opportunity to thank the Government of the Russian Federation, represented by Rosatom, for agreeing to host the conference
and for arranging for the participants a visit to the Beloyarsk NPP and the brand-new Russian BN-800 fast reactor.
The conference will be the third of its kind. The first was held in 2009 in Kyoto, Japan, and the second was in Paris in 2013. Now,
it is Russia's turn. The FR conferences are the largest fast reactor events in the world. In terms of their significance and how often
they are held, you could compare them with the Olympic Games.
Preparations for FR17 are in full swing. From an organizer's standpoint it's a complex event requiring a great deal of effort and
coordination.
Which IAEA Department is directly responsible for organizing FR17?
The Department of Nuclear Energy, headed by Mikhail Chudakov. Within the Department, the project has been assigned to the
Nuclear Power Technology Development Section, to which I belong, and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Fuel Cycle and
Materials Section.
The full title of the FR17 Conference is the International Conference on Fast Reactors and Related Fuel Cycles: Next Generation
Nuclear Systems for Sustainable Development. As you know, it will take place from 26 to 29 June 2017. Details can be found on
the IAEA's website.
How far along are preparations for the conference?
The main committees have been formed, including the International Scientific Programme Committee, which has already begun
work.
The deadline for the submission of abstracts is 30 September 2016. This may have to be extended a little, but I do know that we
have already received over 100 submissions.
Note by AtomInfo.Ru: The interview was recorded on 27 September 2016. As at 30 September, 400 abstracts had been
submitted. The deadline was extended to 10 October 2016.
The next step will be assigning the submissions to tracks and sessions and then asking the authors to submit their full papers for
review.
So the papers are going to be reviewed?
As you know, different conferences deal with the selection process differently. We decided that for a high-level event such as
FR17, it was just not fitting to select the papers based only on abstracts (up to 400 words), so we intend to put the papers through
a full-scale peer-review by independent reviewers.
How will the proceedings of the conference be published?
We plan to publish them as a proceedings book. They will also be available electronically on the IAEA's website.
As for the texts of the papers, as is often the case at conferences, we may not have time to publish the final versions on paper
before the start of the conference. However, each participant will receive a collection of the draft versions in electronic form.
When can we expect to see the conference programme?
For that, one needs first to figure out how many papers will be given in each session. Then the programmes can be drawn up for
each session, for the plenary... The final programme, of course, will be available nearer to the start of the conference, in April or
May 2017, I would say.
You mentioned the tour to the Beloyarsk nuclear power plant with its BN-600 and BN-800 reactors that has been planned as
part of the conference.
Yes, it is planned, but Rosatom will be organizing it. The Agency is responsible for the conference itself. I can tell you tentatively
that the tour will take place on Friday, 30 June 2017. The number of participants is limited, so I encourage anyone interested in
visiting the plant to apply early.
Is it possible already to identify the countries most interested in taking part in FR17?
The answer is obvious: France, China, India, Japan and South Korea. Naturally, we are expecting many participants from Russia,
among the world leaders in fast reactors, but I encourage those in Russia to send in their abstracts as soon as possible and not
rely on the deadline being extended.
Thank you, Mr Kriventsev, for speaking with the electronic publication AtomInfo.Ru.
Thank you to the editorial staff of AtomInfo.Ru, one of the mostwell-respected sources of "nuclear" news, and best wishes to your
readers!
]]>BN-800 is running at 100%http://atominfo.ru/en/news4/d0380.htm
Wed, 17 Aug 2016 19:53:49 +0400The Forum The Cities and Nuclear Technologies was held in Obninskhttp://atominfo.ru/en/news4/d0379.htm
Wed, 17 Aug 2016 19:44:14 +0400

]]>Rosatom will meet the requirements of Minsk and will replace the reactor vessel for the Belarusian NPPhttp://atominfo.ru/en/news4/d0377.htm
Sat, 13 Aug 2016 14:47:09 +0400Vladimir Poplavsky: It is Too Early to Compare Lead to Sodiumhttp://atominfo.ru/en/news4/d0376.htm
Sat, 13 Aug 2016 14:44:15 +0400Not long ago I read an article called "The Future of Fast Reactors" that was published by Leypunsky and Kazachkovsky in
the "Atomic Energy" journal in1962. Actually, common people may have the impression that the concept of fast nuclear power
had already been worked out by that time. But in reality, how big is the progress made by the science within these 50 years?
As far back as in1949, Alexander Ilyich Leypunsky submitted to the Government an internal report in which he stated the fast
technology potential in terms of nuclear fuel breeding; afterwards these ideas formed the basis for the concept of fast reactors. To
a large extent, this concept is still very topical nowadays and not only in Russia.
By 1962 a certain experience had been gained in the area of sodium technologies and fast reactors on the whole. The
experimental BR-5 reactor remained the main source of information in the field of fast reactors in the Soviet Union. The strategy of
nuclear power development with the use of fast reactors was approved by the Government and supported by the Ministry of
Medium Machine-Building; the time came to think about further development. The task was set out to move from the experimental
BN-5 reactor to a demonstrational one that could have all the functions of a power unit and, first of all, a high capacity.
Thus, by 1962 the scientists had experimentally proved that a fast reactor could really achieve the fuel breeding gain value higher
than 1, which is the principal fundamental property of the fast reactor. However, at that time there was no technical justification of
feasibilities to construct an NPP with a fast reactor. We realized physical, thermo-hydraulic, engineering fundamentals of the
technology but at the experimental level only. In this context, the first experience was only gained in the early 70-s at the BN-350.
And that experience was of crucial importance as it demonstrated both positive and negative aspects of the technology.
What does it mean?
At that time there were wide gaps in our knowledge and we could not simultaneously develop two areas: reactor and fuel. So the
decision was made to postpone the solution of fuel problems and concentrate our efforts on reactor construction; development of
the mixed uranium-plutonium fuel typical of fast reactors was postponed for a while. The BN-350 commissioning and the first
experience of its operation showed that the core materials were subject to radiation deformation and this fact should be taken into
account in the core design.
We used a steam generator with a single-wall separation of sodium coolant and water. Sodium behavior with regard to structural
materials is extremely noble, however, it is chemically reactive in relation to air oxygen and water.
We feared leakages, and it was not groundless. And the cause was in a poor quality of the steam generator rather than in its
design deficiency. That equipment was produced for the first time, and at that moment there were no such methods of
nondestructive assay as we have today. Having seen the consequences of sodium-water reaction, we came to a very important
conclusion: steam generators required specific attention from the point of view of timely detection of water leak into sodium; a
steam generator should be protected with a special system. Despite all the difficulties in its mastering, on the whole, the BN-350
reactor turned out very important in the context of BN-600 reactor justification.
The BN-600 reactor was started up five years later than the scheduled date; and during that time we managed to eliminate all the
drawbacks that were revealed in that technology at the BN-350 reactor. We actually redesigned two main elements of a nuclear
power plant: its core and steam generator. The BN-600 reactor has been in operation for 36 years and it operates very well,
whereas actually all the other fast power reactors in the world have been shut down, for different reasons, both technical (expired
lifetime) and political.
No doubt, the BN-600 reactor also has some deficiencies, but just due to that, by the year of 2000 we had got almost the entire
spectrum of emergency conditions possible at fast reactors and learnt how to repair all the systems. So, in 2000, after 20 years of
successful BN-600 operation, we firmly declared that sodium cooled fast reactor had been justified in terms of its safety and
operability. However, its competitive capacity and economic parameters are not as good…At the beginning they were not as
important. Currently we are facing the challenge to achieve competitive engineering and economic characteristics of the NPP with
a fast reactor, keeping the same safety level and even enhancing it.
Why after the BN-600 reactor did they start BN-800 construction? Why do we need it?
The background of this project is very complicated; it is related to certain macro-economic and political processes that took place
in our country in the period when the BN-800 was under development and construction.
A fast reactor is multifunctional. Actually we are talking about a duel use technology. In the mid-70-s the decision was made to
design a fast sodium reactor for specific purposes (BNK project). However, the further course of events in the industry showed
that there was no need in that special system. In compliance with the decision made by the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building
(and personally by Yefim Pavlovich Slavsky), the project was redesigned; the new objective was to construct a fast power reactor
with improved (as compared to BN-600) characteristics, i.e. BN-800. It is based on many technical solutions that were used in
BN-600, but there are also significant differences.
The index of metal intensity is 30?% better for this reactor as compared to BN-600. In terms of the safety issues solutions, it also
differs significantly from the BN-600 reactor. For the first time we used passive reactivity control rods, introduced additional devices
to improve safety.
The work on this reactor design began as far back as in the 70-s, but the reactor was commissioned not long ago. Why?
The BN-800 should have been commissioned soon after the BN-600 start-up. In 1983 the Order of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers was issued to construct four BN-800 units: three at the South-
Ural NPP site and one at the Beloyarsk NPP site. At the South-Ural NPP site the foundation pit was even excavated fir the first
unit, and the entire auxiliary infrastructure was set up. At the Beloyarsk site the work was also started. But then, in the early 90-s
everything was stopped and suspended, and up to 2005 there were only words and no deeds.
We knew that the BN-600 operation was successful, but the designers and scientists had the potential that was not used to the
full extent. At that time, if we did not solve new tasks, we would lose the technology completely. We would say that BN-800 was
just a very good tool to pave the way for making the nuclear fuel cycle closed in the nuclear power. Unfortunately, the Minatom
potential turned out insufficient to resume the BN-800 construction. And we had to address the State Duma (the Lower House of
Russian Federation Parliament), to the Committee for Energy, Transport and Communication to get their support. That was the time
when the Federal Target Program for Nuclear Power Industrial Complex Development was under preparation. The .decision was
made that the State would allocate considerable matching funds for the construction of each power unit from the state budget. As
far as BN-800 construction was concerned, we managed to prove that its construction should be completely performed for the
budget funds.
Unfortunately, based on the BN-800 experience we learned the lessons of what are the wrong ways to construct an NPP.
Because of the delay in the construction work, we lost a lot. The industrial base that had been set up for the BN-600 construction
was no more unavailable, the human capacity became much lower. Thus, many problems had to be solved all over again. Can
you imagine what it meant for the Beloyarsk site to establish a new construction base? Actually, the equipment manufacturing
plants lost their process technologies.
For example, we used to have our domestic sodium coolant: for the BN-350 reactor sodium was produced in Chirchiq, for the BN-
600 reactor- in Berezniki, the Urals. In the course of preparation for BN-800 construction in the 90-s, a special system to produce
reactor-grade sodium was constructed in Usolye-Sibirskoye, close to Irkutsk. The manufacturers had been waiting for a long time
when we would need sodium, and we kept on say, "Tomorrow, tomorrow, tomorrow…" Finally they gave in and closed their
production site. Currently, under the conditions of market economy, who would keep a production unit if it is not needed to
anyone? Eventually, we got sodium from France.
Fortunately, all the problems have been solved by now, at a high price though. The successful implementation of the BN-800
project, whose development, justification and construction were performed with great difficulties, under the conditions of social
and economic restructuring of the country, can be considered a real labor feat of the scientists, designers, architect-engineers,
construction and iron workers, and operation personnel.
In spite of a long delay in its commissioning, will the reactor be in demand?
The BN-800 reactor is destined to have a long and busy life. In particular, it is necessary to develop and master the technology of
mixed uranium-plutonium fuel at the pilot level, to develop the technology of SNF and RAW management. However, it is only a
prelude to the achievement of the final goal: to change nuclear power of the country over to the closed fuel cycle.
In the long run, nuclear power of Russia should become a two-component structure consisting of thermal and fast reactors.
At the same time, reactors should perform a backbone function with regard to other components of the fuel cycle and have
acceptable technical and economic features.
However, whereas thermal neutron reactors have achieved the commercial level (VVER-1000, VVER -1200, VVER -TOI projects),
sodium-cooled fast reactors have not reached this level yet.
In view of that, the task has arisen to develop a project of fast neutron reactor that could have even more improved technical and
economic parameters as compared to BN-600 and BN-800 reactors.
In March 2001, actually under conditions of absolutely no work on fast sodium reactors, at the initiative of the IPPE top
management, this question was considered at Science and Technology Council (STC) meeting No.1 in Minatom and the decision
was made to start the R&D work on the development of large-power fast neutron reactor with commercial characteristics.
At the first stage the Scientific Supervisor (IPPE), Chief Designer (OKBM) and General Designer (SPBAEP) together developed
technical proposals on the power unit with BN-1800 reactor. Further optimization of the power unit parameters resulted in the
solution about the expedience to reduce its electric capacity to 1200 MW.
The BN-1200 project was based on design, engineering, circuit and lay-out solutions that in some aspects were fundamentally
different as compared to the BN-600 and BN-800 projects. First of all, it concerns safety systems (making use of passive devices
to control reactivity in the core and decay heat removal), reactor core, transport flow chart and steam generator.
Altogether the approved engineering and technical solutions made it possible to reduce almost 2.5 times the specific consumption
of materials for this reactor as compared to BN-600. On the whole, in terms of its investment cost the BN-1200 project has become
much closer to the VVER-TOI project.
Soon the destiny of the BN-1200 project will be determined: to build or not to build. As far as I know, last year at the
ROSATOM STC meeting the problem was posed for scientists, designers and architect engineers to further improve technical and
economic design parameters. Was this problem solved?
You are right; at the STC meeting consideration was given to a substantial expert evaluation that showed that there were still
some reserves and margins to enhance technical and economic characteristics. We developed an Action Plan, by the end of the
year we will have proposed a number of new technical solutions. However, unfortunately, I am not sure that they will significantly
influence the decision about the BN-1200 reactor unit construction. Currently the situation starts resembling the BN-800 story.
What is behind your concern? Do you think a new Federal Target Program (FTP) on the advanced nuclear technologies will
not be approved?
The new FTP may be approved, but there is a risk that the BN-1200 project, like it happened to BN-800, will be placed on hold.
The BN-1200 project in the industry is currently opposed to the BR-1200 project - a lead reactor. Many representatives of the top
management consider that all the efforts and funds should be concentrated on its development as in terms of some characteristics
it should outperform and beat sodium reactors. But I have been in the fast reactor area for 55 years, and I realize very well that to
master the technology of this scale is a very complicated and long-term process. Of course, we need to construct BREST-OD-300
now. However, we should understand that it will be able to only demonstrate if this technology is operable and if the expectations
that are placed on it are justified. You see, there is not any lead reactor in the world; moreover, there is even no large-scale lead
test facility.
If now we concentrate all the funds and efforts on the lead technology doing nothing in the area of sodium, in the future we may
get into an unpleasant situation. Let us refer to the French experience. At the end of the last century, for some political reasons
they shut down the sodium reactor Superphoenix. The scientists said, "Okay, you do not let us work with sodium, we'll research
into gas". And in the early 2000-s they started designing a helium-cooled fast reactor. They planned to start up a pilot 12 MW
reactor as far back as 10 years ago, but no way, they failed. The French have to come back to sodium again and currently they
are developing the ASTRID reactor with the capacity of 600 MW.
Coming back to Russia, I believe that we should construct first of a kind BN-1200 reactor and then try and prove that those
innovative technologies that have been used are justified in terms of safety and economy. And in parallel, we should gradually
master the fast lead reactor technology. If everything goes as the designers assume, fine; then with time the lead reactors will
replace the sodium ones. But we should understand that it will be very long before it happens.
I told you about BN-350, how, roughly speaking, we seriously blundered and how many problems we encountered with it. The
story with BREST-300 is about the same. We will have to have quite a job with it.
Coming back to the beginning of our talk. So, it comes out that lead is at the level of 1962 with regard to sodium?
No, from the point of view of the reactor experience, even not at the level of 1962 because before BN-350 we had BR-5, BR-10,
we developed BOR-60, the experimental reactor with increased power. As soon as the idea of a lead reactor occurred, my
colleagues and I proposed: let's construct BREST-15 or BREST-30. To straight away construct BREST-300 is very expensive
and technically risky. We could have had this reactor even now and it could be the first in the world to master in practice this new
technology. However, these proposals were neglected.
I am expressing my personal point of view that may not be shared. But we should see things in a more realistic light. A hypothetic
BREST-1200 cannot be compared to BN-1200 in terms of economic parameters and, moreover, based on this comparison no
important strategic decisions should be made. I don't want to say that everything is absolutely clear as far as the BN-1200 reactor
is concerned. But we have a technological base available and we managed to prove that this technology works. And now it is
important to consider the nuances, the fine points that can improve it.
Nowadays in the country we observe surplus power generating capacities; there is no burning need in construction of new
power units. Maybe, it's not really the proper time to construct first of a kind commercial BN-1200 power unit?
But we do plan to create the replacing units in Novovoronezh, in Sosnovy Bor, in Kurchatov. Why not to construct a new fast
reactor power unit instead of the thermal one? Right now it is a very good time to construct BN-1200 as the fifth unit at the BNPP
site. Currently at the Beloyarsk NPP the entire infrastructure and the construction base that are required are available. The
manufacturing plants have mastered the production of equipment for sodium fast reactors again. Any break in the development
and construction will again result in the loss of specialists and competence. We can't allow the BN-800 story to repeat itself. Under
the conditions when the competition on the world nuclear market is getting stronger, we cannot lose the unique experience in
mastering the advanced reactor technology and slow down the pace of its development.
]]>Dmitry Klinov: BFS is being renewedhttp://atominfo.ru/en/news4/d0375.htm
Sun, 7 Aug 2016 12:31:03 +0400Retrofitting and upgradingDmitry, retrofitting and upgrading of the BFS complex is to be completed this year. When and why did the task arise?
The task of the BFS retrofitting and upgrading arose in late 2010 as a consequence of the enormous difficulties that we had
encountered in renewing the licence to operate our fast critical facilities.
These difficulties were, in turn, caused by functional obsolescence and physical wear on both permanent and scientific equipment
that provides operation of the facilities.
The Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision warned us that they will flatly refuse to renew the
operating licence. There was no special-purpose funding for upgrading the BFS complex whereas the amount of work to be done
was expected huge. Selection of the BFS complex for retrofitting and upgrading as part of the Federal Target Programme on new
generation nuclear energy technologies proved a way out.
It took a long time to write the statement of work for upgrading the fast critical facilities and to obtain official approval, but it was
eventually approved in 2012 and the task was included in the Federal Target Programme.
The total cost of retrofitting and upgrading the BFS complex was initially estimated at about 2 billion roubles, the estimate being
made both by IPPE and Rosatom experts. It should be made clear at once that the Federal Target Programme wouldn't cover all
the expenses as government money is limited.
Therefore, a decision was made to reduce funding of certain works, with their scope changed as little as possible. Namely,
funding of the BFS was reduced as regards scientific equipment.
In the end, funding totalled 1.2 billion roubles, and in 2012 the programme for upgrading the critical facilities was launched.
What was this programme finally comprised of?
The approved programme of retrofitting and upgrading works at BFS was divided into two parts. For convenience, let's call them
major construction work and supply of new materials.
The part consisting in major construction work was delayed for different reasons and was only started in 2014 whereas the supply
of new materials began in 2012 as planned.
Which materials are meant?
Plutonium metal, uranium mononitride, boron carbide and nuclear grade sodium. Besides, we received lead, lead-bismuth and
some absorbers within other parts of the Federal Target Programme.
A certain amount of plutonium was allocated from the State Reserve for the needs of the BFS retrofitting and upgrading. JSC
"Siberian Chemical Complex" was contracted to produce plutonium and uranium mononitride disks.
They undertook the novel task in Seversk. Though there were a lot of technical and engineering difficulties to overcome, the job
is being handled well and we have every reason to believe it will be done fully.
The first batches of uranium mononitride and plutonium have been delivered. In future, there will be enough materials to have both
the critical facilities loaded with advanced fuel types.
As regards major construction works, those concerning buildings and structures are well under way in accordance with the
schedule. We are, therefore, sure of having them completed at the scheduled time.
Replacement of the CPS equipment is something that stands alone. The new equipment has already been bought and delivered
to IPPE. We are planning to start mounting it next month and then proceed to initial start-up and putting BFS into operation, which
will make everything clear.
The self-sustaining reaction emergency alarm system and the radiation monitoring system have been replaced completely. So
have the radioactive drain, ventilation (including active ventilation), fire alarm systems; retrofitting of the nuclear materials storage is
almost finished. Complete replacement of all the engineered safety systems has been fulfilled.
I'm sure the Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision will now approve renewal of the full-term
operating licence. The BFS complex is absolutely certain to operate.
What can be said about the scientific equipment?
It is being purchased. Some pieces are bought at our own expense; sometimes we resort to funding from Rosatom's innovation
budget.
A new reactivity meter and devices for positioning small-size and large-size fission chambers will be installed.
New codes for processing experimental data are being created, new techniques are being developed... All in all preparatory work
is moving into high gear!
When is the initial startup of the upgraded test facilities planned?
In late December 2016.
Interests and customersDmitry, we have often asked about demand for BFS after the facilities resume operating. We would like to take this opportunity
to ask the question again. Is there interest in performing experiments on your facilities in Russia and abroad?
At present, there is hardly any alternative to the BFS complex!
The ZPPR critical test facility in the USA is put in dead storage, much like FCA in Japan; the upgrading works at the MAZURCA
critical test facility in France will continue until the end of 2018. For the time being we are holding a monopoly to be taken
advantage of.
As early as in 2013 CEA and Rosatom signed an agreement for carrying out a comprehensive experimental programme, which will
be used for justification of the ASTRID project.
The task calls for a progressive approach in order to obtain reliable measurements of the sodium void reactivity effect. To
determine SVRE reliably is compulsory for justification of any project, including those in France.
In addition, drawing on our joint experiments, French colleagues will be able to verify their codes in order to obtain a certificate
from the regulatory authorities. The certificate gives the right to use the codes for designing ASTRID reactors as well as for
operating them in future.
Do the regulatory authorities in France recognize BFS as a verification tool?
Absolutely!
What other foreign customers, besides the French, are there in the offing?
Koreans. A large share of our international activity relates to cooperation with South Korea, where they want to create their own
counterpart of ASTRID - a fast sodium reactor either with MOX or metal fuel.
We have conducted experiments our Korean partners needed for the MOX option. Now they have started to talk about
experiments with metal fuel, so continuation is most likely.
Does China show any interest?
It does not only show but persists with their interest. In fact, we are perfectly able to do what the Chinese request.
Where do things stand in terms of Russian contracts?
Much depends on how the Federal Target Programme-2 will start. We are planning on a whole series of experiments for BN-1200,
BREST and even MBIR, where new experimental devices will slightly modify the core.
What can BFS do for the purposes of BN-1200?
We can simulate the core representatively enough out full-scale simulations of the core to justify design parameters.
Meanwhile, you should realise the task is not as simple as that of measuring criticality. We can simulate different timepoints of the
reactor refueling cycle because we have both Pu-240 and neptunium. Reactivity effects can, thus, be simulated at different time
points of the reactor refueling cycle. For CR simulations we have highly enriched boron, including boron of enrichment to 80%
10B.
Besides, there is a large set of foils, samples and fission chambers for determining breeding factors, parameters of ĚŔ
transmutation, spectral characteristics.
In case of BREST we can offer any option you like. If, for example, the customer wants to start with uranium and change over to
MNU-Pu, such simulations can be carried out - we shall manage. Plutonium and uranium mononitride are available. Moreover,
full-scale mock-ups can be simulated at BFS-2 for BREST-300.
Similarly, we have at our disposal everything that is necessary for MBIR, for full-scale mock-ups as well. In fact, we have already
carried out MBIR simulations. However, it was done without regard to experimental devices since a decision is taken to achieve
first criticality in the "clean" core at MBIR. We will help study the effect of experimental devices on reactor parameters.
Can we therefore come to the conclusion that the money spent on BFS retrofitting and upgrading is going to be recovered?
No doubt. The thing is, we would like not only to recover the money spent but to earn profit. When experiments are conducted for
Rosatom's facilities, prices are set at next to cost value.
On the other hand, IPPE has to buy new equipment, pay bonuses, invite and educate the young, etc. All that calls for funds.
However, it's hard to receive funding from the state budget, so commercial activity remains the only source.
By commercial activity I mean experiments for foreign customers, when we charge a price for the experiments and there are
vendor-to-customer relations. If our experiments are needed, they can be ordered.
While others shut down their research test facilities on the pretext that they are expensive and redundant, we were keeping the
BFS complex, including both scientific and operating personnel. Today, we are taking full advantage of having a monopoly.
Getting back to your question - yes, such a complex of critical facilities as BFS justifies its existence completely and investments in
its retrofitting and upgrading are certain to be recouped.
Thank you, Dmitry, for giving the interview to the electronic edition of AtomInfo.Ru.Note
The BFS critical facilities are multi-purpose constructions that allow mounting critical assemblies from disks which have the same
outer diameter but differ in composition and height as well as performing a large set of neutronics parameter experiments.
Power capability is sufficient for implementing a massive experimental programme whereas residual activity of nuclear materials
does not normally limit the speed of reassemblies which are necessary for remodelling a mock-up.
Available materials make it possible to simulate reactor mock-ups with different layouts of the cores, blankets, CPS rods, coolants.
There are also materials for moderator simulations as well as various inert materials.
]]>JSC SSC RIAR and Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute signed the Memorandum of Understanding concerning the scientific and technical cooperationhttp://atominfo.ru/en/news4/d0373.htm
Fri, 3 Jun 2016 12:56:05 +0400

The Memorandum of Understanding provides that both RIAR and KAERI (as the pivotal research institutions in the Russian
Federation and in the Republic of Korea, respectively which are engaged in research and development in support of sustainable
development of nuclear power industry) will focus their joint efforts on planning of joint research and development projects,
organization and holding of technical meetings, preparation of joint publications as well as on implementation of joint programs for
further development professional competence and expertise.
"The magnitude and level of scientific and technological challenges ached of the global nuclear power industry in the 21st
century call for facilitating an international cooperation in science and technology. Knowing that RIAR has unique experimental
capabilities and KAERI demonstrates dynamic progressing in the nuclear field as well as taking into account the experience
gained through joint research projects, the Memorandum of Understanding endorsed today is meant to provide a sound basis for
further development and expansion of our cooperation, - said Director of RIAR, Alexander Tuzov. "RIAR is the major experimental
establishment and the largest of its kind in the Russian nuclear power industry and it is open for foreign customers. We have every
confidence that new possible long-term contracts for irradiation testing and post-irradiation examinations will be concluded within
the framework of undertaken joint projects with our Korean partners".
Dr. Jong Kyung KIM mentioned that the MOU signing has a significant meaning for both organizations and it represents an
important step in technical cooperation activities, which will advance the state of our expertise and knowledge regarding nuclear
fuel, non-fuel components and structural material for advanced reactors, irradiation and post-irradiation examinations, operation
and maintenance of sodium-cooled fast research reactors and nuclear fuel cycle technologies.
Dr. Kim had a chance personally familiarize himself with experimental capabilities of RIAR during his technical tour and visited the
high-flux research reactor SM-3 and the world's single currently operating fast reactor BOR-60. Moreover, KAERI's President, Dr.
KIM, visited the construction site of Multipurpose Fast Research Reactor MBIR whose construction was launched in September
2015.
Director of JSC "SSC RIAR" Alexander A.Tuzov and President of KAERI Dr. KIM
visited the MBIR-reactor construction site

Nowadays RIAR is conducting irradiation testing and some examinations within the framework of several long-term contracts
concluded with the partners from the Republic of Korea. In late October 2015 the order portfolio of RIAR was expanded to include
the latest contract made with KAERI that is the contract for irradiation of fuel rods in the BOR-60 reactor. The nuclear engineers
from Russia and Korea have been discussing another several possible contracts related to irradiation testing and post-irradiation
examinations using the experimental facilities of RIAR.
]]>The Do-All Acceleratorhttp://atominfo.ru/en/news4/d0372.htm
Wed, 23 Mar 2016 17:49:12 +0400Joint WorkOleg Teofilievich, in December 2015 the Tandetron accelerator was put in operation at
the IPPE.
Yes, indeed, together with the Dutch specialists, we performed the startup of a new accelerator, and that is an event significant
for our Institute.
Before getting into the talk about the plans of its future use, I would like to stress a minor but interesting point.
It happened so that the 50-th anniversary of one of our Dutch colleagues, Martin Bos (you can find his picture in our accelerator
startup coverage), fell on his business trip to Russia. So, for Martin his trip to Obninsk became essential for two reasons: the
successful startup of the accelerator and a milestone in his life.
What is your impression of the joint work with the colleagues from the Netherlands?
They are very knowledgeable and competent experts who know their equipment very well. Let me quote an example. As soon as
a continuous beam was generated, the next step was to test the operation in the pulse mode. It was necessary to make sure that
the required parameters are maintained, i.e. duration of 2 nanoseconds and so on.
In the morning the decision was made to start testing the mode. Two hours later everything was done: we obtained 2
nanoseconds, and by the lunch time it was 1.2 nanoseconds.
Were these tests performed jointly?
Successively. First, by the engineers from the supplying company, and right after that by our specialists.
Describing the work on the accelerator setup on the whole, I can say that it went on in a well-trodden way. The final
commissioning of the system will be in March, and before that, in compliance with the Contract terms and conditions, we cannot
operate it independently, by ourselves.
How complicated is the accelerator in terms of its control?
It has simple and well-considered control. Do you need to connect a gas system? Welcome, one click of the PC mouse is enough
to preset the pressure. Is the beam cut off? Five seconds and the doors are unlocked. Actually, no problems are expected.
Are your specialists ready to operate the Tandetron?
I believe, yes, they are.
The fate of acceleratorsOleg Teofilievich, last year our website published the information about other IPPE
accelerators. What is in store for them after the Tandetron startup?
Besides the Tandetron, four more accelerators are in operation at the IPPE. Two of them, namely: EG -1 and EG-2.5, will be
decommissioned in 2017.
These are the very first accelerators that appeared at the IPPE. As our long-term employees affirm, the EG-1 accelerator was
designed in the Physical and Technical Department of Kharkov University and was fabricated in Leningrad, at the NIIEFA, by
Kurchatov's personal order.
The specific decommissioning program is envisaged under Rosatom financial support. Both accelerators are covered by this
program.
So far we are at the stage of paper work. Then a radiation survey will be held in the rooms as the accelerators have been in
operation for many decades, with neutrons and beryllium used as well.
Then there will be a few other stages and at the end there will be the stage of equipment dismantling and removal. This stage is
the simplest one as all the required equipment and tools are already available and in place, namely: cranes, gates and so on...
That would be a pity to lose such a remarkable and historical fleet.
We wouldn't like it either.
Two accelerators will be decommissioned. And the two others?
They will keep working. The KG-2.5 accelerator is high-current and we are planning to use it for combined irradiation.
What is the main problem of structural material radiation resistance? Radiation results not only in displacement of atoms but also in
generation of gas products, first of all, they are hydrogen and helium.
Thus, in order to, at the most, make the simulation studies of steels at the accelerator closer to irradiation conditions at reactors,
triple-ion irradiation is used abroad, i.e. simultaneous irradiation with heavy ions (chromium, iron or nickel), helium and hydrogen. By
the way, right before our meeting, I was reading an article where it is stated that on the territory of the former USSR the triple-ion
irradiation is used in Kharkov.
The combination for triple-ion irradiation is selected on the basis of calculations, through determination of the amount of helium and
hydrogen generated in reactor steels in the course of neutron irradiation. These types of calculations are not considered the most
complicated.
We plan to use KG-2.5 together with the Tandetron for double irradiation. Our predecessors did their utmost to make this task
easier for us, as the beams are extracted into one target room.
The decision was caused by other reasons, but this setup proved to be fortunate for us. Otherwise we would face the necessity to
build a common target room - and I can't even imagine how much it would cost to the Institute.
But the combined irradiation will be double, not triple?
Yes, at this point only double. The Tandetron will provide heavy ions - whatever types we require - and KG-2.5 will produce
hydrogen. KG-2.5 does not accelerate helium, but we can take helium from the Tandetron.
The problem of transferability of the results to reactor conditions is always a concern and it will remain topical both for double and
for triple irradiation. I think that the English term "simulation" better describes the essence of accelerator experiments with steels.
What we do at the accelerator is simulate, rather than imitate, the conditions of steel working inside the reactor. For one thing, the
probability of interaction between a neutron and a nucleus is evaluated in barns, and for heavy ions - in kilobarns.
However, this difference has its benefit: by turning from barns to kilobarns we get a better rate of destructive dose accumulation
by the irradiated sample. It takes years to get the dose of 100 dpa in the reactor. Our system makes it possible to get the same
dose in weeks. And what if the required doses are 200 or 300 dpa, as it is the case now?
Of course, accelerators alone are not enough to solve the problem of selecting radiation-resistant steels with the required
parameters. I think the best word to describe what we really do in this regard is "sorting out." If the material does not withstand
irradiation with heavy ions, it will definitely not withstand neutrons.
In other words, if you rejected the material following the accelerator experiment results, then there is no point to irradiate it at
BOR-60?
Exactly. That is to say, we undertake preconceptual studies and thus save the expensive and scarce reactor time. Following our
research, we are able to recommend certain steels for more detailed studies in reactor experiments.
Speaking in elementary terms... You would not build a staircase of rotten planks, would you? First, you will examine the planks and
select the strong ones. Our participation in material studies is similar to the stage of plank examination.
The fourth operating accelerator is EGP-15.
EGP-15 accelerator, our glory. This machine has one fundamental advantage over the majority of other accelerators in Russia: it
has high energy.
However, there is a drawback there, too. It has very high operating costs. Just to make it clear, EGP-15 team consists of 5
people.
There is a demand for the operation of EGP-15. On the one hand, these needs arise in the sphere of science, on the other hand -
in the sphere of technology.
For example, 15-MeV protons can be used to simulate cosmic processes, to study electronic equipment for its durability in space.
Such protons can also be used to irradiate semiconductor wafers for power electronics. Actually, it is not only possible, but
essential. And this is accomplished in Russia. But at the same time, we should pay special attention to the issue of economic
effectiveness.
In conclusion. The EGP-15 accelerator is in operating conditions and that is how it will remain. We have people. Should we obtain
specific orders, we will complete them.

Accelerator for PETNext question. How does the Institute plan to use the Tandetron?
I have already mentioned one task: studies of structural material behavior under irradiation.
It is not a new field for us; we have the experience of EGP-15 experiments. Therefore, we will continue to irradiate steels at the
Tandetron after the new machine is commissioned.
There is another task, which we have never dealt with, but which Tandetron is very well tailored for, that is production of
radioisotopes for positron-emission tomography, PET.
Which isotope do you mean?
Fluorine-18. It is ideal for PET needs. It has relatively short half-life, 109 minutes, and sufficiently low energy.
Is fluoride-18 produced in Russia?
The situation is as follows. As a rule, the whole system is supplied, the PET scanner. It comprises a cyclotron- accelerator
producing the isotope for the specific system. There is also a gamma-radiation sensor, a radiochemical set for pharmaceutical
manufacturing, and a syringe for injections.
The operating principle of the PET scanner should be clear to any physicist. During decay, the fluoride-18 isotope emits a positron
that collides with an electron. It results in annihilation and two gamma-quanta, 511 keV each. Gamma radiation is detected with a
gamma sensor and computer software is used to make out a diagnosis to the patient.
The cyclotron costs approximately half of the whole system. By the way, why was the cyclotron chosen for PET purposes?
Because it is small.
What is the problem of the cyclotrons integrated with the PET sets? They produce not the best-quality fluorine. Unfortunately, side
reactions take place resulting in impurity generation. Whereas we need only one reaction, more specifically the (p,n) reaction in
oxygen-18.
The Tandetron is able to help medical workers in resolution of the problem of impurities in fluorine. We can accurately adjust
energy at this machine, and it makes it possible to get rid of impurities in the isotope produced.
Our participation could be as follows. We produce fluorine-18 at the Tandetron, in the neighboring building radiochemical
operations are performed, and then the obtained sample is delivered to Kaluga by car. It should be reminded that its half-life period
is 109 minutes - i.e., during transportation to Kaluga the activity will drop no more than by half, and it is quite acceptable.
According to our estimation, we will be able to build up activity as high as dozens of doses per hour of Tandetron operation.
How much will this task be in demand?
It is a good question. On the one hand, the medical workers assert that there are enough PET-scanners in the country. On the
other hand, people queue up for the survey with their application.
Currently we are concerned with two things. It is necessary to assess the situation and understand how much our fluorine-18 is in
demand in the domestic medicine. At the same time, we must try out all technical aspects in order to expressly understand - we
work for that long time span and deliver to the consumer that much activity.
And, as a matter of fact, in addition we will have to take a gamma-spectrometer with the resolution of 1 keV and measure what our
fluorine-18 will contain. Then we will be able to talk to our medical workers with the spectra in hand: "Here is our post-irradiation
fluorine, and here it is two hours after transportation, and here are the impurities."
While you are transporting the fluorine to Kaluga, the impurities will decay.
They will decay in the ideal case. It may well happen that some long-lived "dirt" might be present in the fluorine by our technology.
However, this is a task for radiochemists how to separate it.
Are the medical workers aware of your proposals?
Yes, they are. Late in January at the IPPE we gathered together all potential consumers of our beam. The first day was dedicated
to the issues of structural materials' studies, and the second day - to the discussions of the topics of radioelectronics and medicine.
We found the areas of common interest. It will be followed by the discussion of specific cooperation matters, but this is already the
level of the Director General of the Institute.
Neutron Capture TherapyAnd what about neutron capture therapy?
It's a very promising area. It's clear that it is not absolutely new for our Institute, the similar work used to be done at the BR-10 at
some time in the past, by the way, on a grand scale, with hundreds of patients subject to treatment.
Our Obninsk medical specialists quote impressive data on the results. The post-treatment survival rate ran to 10%, as far as I
remember correctly. This value is tremendously high for the last-stage cancer. However, you'd better discuss this subject in detail
with medical specialists.
Neutrons are generated directly in the reactor. The accelerator does not produce neutrons. Thus, we need to get them one way
or the other. In this case, any reactions, (p,n) or (d,n), will do. No doubt, it is more expedient to generate them with a light nucleus.
Lithium-7 is a good choice as a target.
Technical problems will surely be encountered. A lot of neutrons are required, and a beam carries energy. If you mindlessly start
applying high currents to the lithium target, it will be melted through. To be more precise, you will melt a hole in the target, where
the proton or deuton beam will uselessly go.
At the KG-2.5 accelerator, under Victor Nikolayevich Kononov's supervision, the technology was developed that allowed the
problem of heat removal from the target to be solved in the elegant way.
Let us summarize. Protons and deutons are available; the targets are in place, heat is removed, energy is sufficient. And there is
only one technical problem left - unfortunately I can't mention it, as it involves disclosing the know-how. But we will certainly solve
it. And there it is. From the technical point of view, we'll be ready for neutron capture therapy.
Strictly speaking, a room for irradiation will have to be also arranged, but it's not a great challenge.
Unfortunately, besides the technical aspects there is some paper work to be done. It takes time to implement new technologies
into medical practice, and sometimes it comes to years. These are the rules. You are welcome to conduct experiments with rats or
mice, but as soon as the issue concerning people is raised...
We have very serious intentions to implement neutron capture therapy at the Tandetron and we'll do our best to achieve this goal.
By the way, when I told Martin and his colleague Robert about the fact that the accelerator they were mounting at the IPPE would
work for public health, they were proud to hear the news.
I would like to say again that there are no insuperable technical obstacles for that. There are organizational issues, paper issues
and we need time to solve them.
We have already covered part of the way with ĘG-2.5, when the beam and the target were certified. And it was used for real
irradiation - naturally of rats only.
I would like to remind that back in the day at the IPPE the "Elegy" project was developed; that was a system consisting of a
commercial electron accelerator with a size of a writing desk and a gallium target. Hence the name "Electrons and Gallium"
consonant with "Elegy."
Andrei Aleksandrovich Goverdovski was the Project Leader at that time, and you'd better address him for more details. The only
thing I would like to mention in this context is that the melting point of gallium is below 30 degrees - i.e. it melts in hands.
The Project was justified and supported with calculations and then with the experiments both here and in Dubna. At the target
outlet, there were neutron spectra of the required quality. Probably in the future we'll have to come back to the Project for the
needs of neutron capture therapy.
Thank you, Oleg Teofilievich, for your interview for the AtomInfo.Ru on-line newspaper.