Ruling: The U.S. District Court, Northern District of New York held
that a school teacher with multiple sclerosis raised genuine issues of
material fact with respect to whether the school district failed to accommodate
her disability. The District Court further ruled that collateral estoppel
did not bar the teacher from maintaining her ADA and Rehabilitation Act
failure to accommodate claims against the district, even though the district
had conducted a hearing to determine whether the teacher could perform
the essential functions of her job. What it Means: Whether an employer
has reasonably accommodated a worker with disabilities is a separate issue
from whether the worker is able to perform the essential functions of her
job. As long as the worker presents sufficient evidence to raise a genuine
issue of material fact over whether the employer failed or refused to accommodate
her, she will have her day in court. This is true regardless of whether
the employer indicated the worker was not able to perform her essential
job functions.

Summary: Elementary school teacher Kathleen Young alleged that Central
Square Central School District violated Title I and the Rehabilitation
Act by failing to reasonably accommodate her disability. After Young was
diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, she notified the school district, which
in turn acknowledged its duty to provide her with reasonable accommodations.
Eventually, the district approved Young's transfer to a school closer to
her home and hired a teacher's aide to assist her.

Shortly after her transfer, Young received a negative evaluation for
perceived shortcomings in conducting full-class instruction. The Board
of Education brought disciplinary charges against Young pursuant to the
New York Education Law. The hearing panel determined that Young was unable
to perform her job and terminated her employment. After unsuccessfully
challenging the hearing panel's decision, Young filed this lawsuit against
the district. The district moved for summary judgment, in part on the ground
that the doctrine of collateral estoppel required dismissal of Young's
lawsuit. The district also moved to disqualify Young's counsel.

Collateral estoppel did not bar Young from litigating the issue of whether
the district discriminated against her by refusing or failing to provide
her with reasonable accommodations which would enable her to perform the
essential functions of her job. The hearing panel decided the issue of
whether Young was able to perform the essential functions of her job without
an accommodation, but did not address whether she could have performed
her position with a reasonable accommodation.

Another reason Young's lawsuit survived the district's motion for summary
judgment is because of the conflicting statements concerning the district's
willingness to reasonably accommodate Young and participate in the interactive
process in good faith.

Although the District Court denied the school district's motion for
summary judgment and motion to amend its answer to add the affirmative
defense
of collateral estoppel, it granted its motion to disqualify Young's law
firm. One of the attorneys who works in the law firm representing Young
had previously represented the district when she worked at a former law
firm.