09TBILISI980, GEORGIA: UK FCO DIRECTOR ON ABKHAZIA TRIP, NEED

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000980
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2019
TAGS: PRELUNSCUNOMIGRSGG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: UK FCO DIRECTOR ON ABKHAZIA TRIP, NEED
FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP
REF: A. PARIS 664
¶B. BRUSSELS 356
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary. During a visit to Tbilisi, Michael
Davenport, Director of the Russia, South Caucasus and Central
Asia Directorate at the British FCO, urged the United States
to set a clear example for the international community on how
to move forward on Georgia, in particular with regard to
Russia. He noted the importance of the upcoming negotiations
on a new UN mandate for Georgia, but he focused his comments
on the key role the upcoming Obama-Medvedev Summit will play
in setting the tone on Georgia policy for the foreseeable
future. Although recognizing the importance of the broad
range of issues likely to be discussed in Moscow, Davenport
stressed that Georgia was of fundamental significance and
must not be treated as simply one of many topics to be
covered. He said that other international partners, in
particular in Europe, would be looking to the U.S. for
leadership. Davenport and British Ambassador Denis Keefe had
just returned from Abkhazia, where de facto "president"
Bagapsh downplayed internal criticism of Russia's growing
influence and expressed general support for a new UN mission.
The Abkhaz willingness to admit Keefe may reflect a bit more
flexibility in seeing Tbilisi-based diplomats. End summary.
¶2. (C) On May 22, Ambassador Keefe hosted a dinner in honor
of Davenport. Guests included EU Special Representative (and
Swedish diplomat) Peter Semneby, French Ambassador Eric
Fournier, Japanese Ambassador Masoyachi Kamohara, and Head of
the EU Monitoring Mission (and German diplomat) Hansjoerg
Haber; acting P/E Chief attended for the U.S. Davenport and
Keefe had just returned from a trip to Abkhazia, where they
met with de facto "president" Bagapsh and de facto "foreign
minister" Shamba. Of note was the Abkhaz de facto
authorities' willingness to allow the visit of Keefe,
considering their publicly declared policy of not admitting
Tbilisi-accredited diplomats. Keefe noted, however, that the
press corps was noticeably absent after their meetings; the
official statements released by the de factos focused on
Davenport, with Keefe's presence noted only in passing.
Bagapsh downplayed recent criticism by the Abkhaz opposition
of agreements giving control of border control, the airport
and railways to Russia, calling it opportunistic (in the
runup to year-end elections) and hypocritical (considering
the opposition's stated support for good Russian-Abkhaz
relations).
¶3. (C) The Abkhaz also expressed to the travelers their
general support for a renewed UN mission to Abkhazia,
although they had some reservations about the May 18
Secretary General's report on the situation. Everyone at the
table agreed that the report had drawbacks, but that the key
point was to get the UN Security Council resolution and
mission mandate right. Everyone also agreed on the
importance of working together in New York to achieve that
goal.
¶4. (C) The conversation turned to Georgia policy more
generally, and Davenport pointedly asked EmbOff about current
U.S. policy. He suggested that a strong American voice on
the subject had been lacking of late, and that American
leadership was critical -- both in the ongoing UN
Qleadership was critical -- both in the ongoing UN
negotiations, and in the runup to the Obama-Medvedev Summit.
He noted that, with the ending of the Eurovision contest, the
Summit was the talk of Moscow, with everybody hoping for a
grand success, and that the meeting therefore offered a
unique opportunity to send a clear message on Georgia both to
Russia itself and to Europe. At the same time, Davenport
expressed the concern that, with the long list of important
issues that deserved consideration at the Summit, there might
be a temptation to avoid a tough confrontation on Georgia.
¶5. (C) EmbOff responded that the United States remained
firmly committed to Georgia, with President Obama, Vice
President Biden, and Secretary Clinton all making strong
statements of support in recent months. He noted in
particular the inclusion of a paragraph on Georgia in the
Obama-Medvedev joint statement from the London Summit; the
President had made a point to emphasize Georgia's importance
to the United States even during his brief initial meeting
with President Medvedev. Davenport replied that the European
approach has been somewhat different -- not just to include
Georgia as one of many issues to be discussed with Russia,
TBILISI 00000980 002 OF 002
but to insist that the quality of overall relationship with
Russia depends on Russia's actions in Georgia.
¶6. (C) Later,
Davenport pulled EmbOff aside and apologized
for putting him on the spot -- but insisted that it was
critically important for the United States to take a
leadership role on Georgia. He acknowledged that there are
other priorities, but maintained that Georgia possessed a
fundamental significance in the overall European security
environment. He repeated his appeal that the United States
use the Summit to convey to Russia the centrality of our
concern and support for Georgia.
COMMENT
¶7. (C) We have gotten used to thinking of the Europeans as
the soft ones when it comes to the Russia-Georgia
confrontation. It therefore came as a surprise to have a
Briton accuse the United States, in front of French, German
and Swedish diplomats, of being behind the curve. Recent
statements from other Europeans here in Tbilisi do indicate,
however, they have begun to focus on the problem of how to
convince Russia to act more constructively, with France, for
example, looking to use visa and trade policy to support
Georgia (see also refs A, B).
TEFFT

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