Military Review English Edition March-April 2016 - Page 68

growth, USAID and DOS solidified the governance relationships that were identified by the CA team.30
While the CMSE was able to gain access into the
FATA and expand DOS support to governance, their
actions were intended to support SOF objectives. The
Special Operations Command (Forward)-Pakistan
commander stated that the CA team’s ability to gain
access into a targeted region was the most significant
capability that they possessed. However, the value to
the commander was magnified when they utilized the
access gained to identify the source of the insurgent
growth, and develop DOS supported governance programs. The CME proved extremely capable of meeting
their obligations.31
In 2010, a nongovernmental study conducted by
the New America Foundation outlined the U.S. and
Pakistani responses to insurgent activities in the FATA.32
The responses include the actions taken by SOF, which
are identified in the study as counterinsurgency programs. The most interesting aspect of this study is a
survey conducted in the FATA region. This is the first
time a survey was conducted in that area and it focused
on identifying local perceptions of the United States,
Pakistani governance, insurgent groups, corruption,
and the judicial system. The results showed that while
the SOF programs were initially effective, it was ultimately the governance infrastructure and reforms that
led to increased governance in the FATA. The reforms,
which began in 2009, allowed secular political parties to
compete in Pakistani elections, thus increasing political
participation, and reform in the judicial processes that
the local militias perceived to be unfair.
The CME in Pakistan was very valuable to SOF,
and similar programs could provide similar value to
FORSCOM and GCC commanders. Their value was
initially confined to gaining access into the FATA by
providing essential services. This access—considered
a vital capability—was possessed only by the CA unit
and supported several SOF objectives. It enabled the
identification and targeting of the insurgent networks,
and allowed the SOF element to conduct FID with the
local militias and the Frontier Corps, the acting government. Those were tactical and operational successes that
led to the accomplishment of strategic objectives when
the team enabled the Pakistani government to expand
into the FATA region, evidenced by the independent,
non-USG study. The Pakistan mission provides a great
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example of how the CME program provided a critical
capability to achieve both SOF and DOS objectives.
Sri Lanka
A similar example of the effectiveness of the CME
program is found in the mission to Sri Lanka. In 2009, Sri
Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared victory
over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. However,
while the Tamil insurgency may have gone underground
in the short term, without addressing the root causes of
conflict, the possibility fo r long-term violence remains.
The Sri Lankan government still lacks a clear political
ability to stabilize the country and enhance government
legitimacy.33 The lack of legitimacy facilitates the many
pockets of undergoverned territories in Sri Lanka.
Despite the occupation by Sri Lankan military
and an increasing presence of Sinhalese in the north,
the Tamil minority feel that “Jaffna is being invaded
by Sinhalese. We are losing our culture.”34 Continued
media censorship, illegal detention, and human rights
abuses inhibit the freedom of Tamil citizens. The Sri
Lankan government is working to decrease its military presence with tangible improvements to Tamil’s
populated regions. This often occurs in the form of
infrastructure development, increased economic aid,
and inclusionary measures designed to increase Tamil
participation in both local and national governance.
Without government implemented nonmilitary measures, the Tamil insurgency is likely to remain dormant,
only waiting for the right opportunity to reemerge.35
The CMSE in Sri Lanka understood the strategic
importance of their mission in Sri Lanka, and being
able to consistently synchronize SOF and DOS activities. The training and education of the CMSE in Sri
Lanka, along with the Special Operations Command
Pacific (SOCPAC) directives ensured they understood
the Title 22 environment. Their program synchronization and unity of effort built trust with the ambassador and DOS contingent. The CMSE was able to
demonstrate their value by ensuring that each of the
SOF programs directly supported a DOS or USAID
program. As a result, the ambassador expanded the
SOF element operating in Sri Lanka, thus increasing
SOF capability to successfully combat the extremist
organizations.36 The Sri Lanka mission has endured
for over five years and is quickly becoming a mature
mission in one of SOCPAC’s priority regions.37
March-April 2016 MILITARY REVIEW