The 'final cause' of an occurence is an event in the future for the sake of which the occurence takes place. In human affairs, this concept is applicable. Why does the baker make bread? Because people will be hungry. Why are railways built? Because people will wish to travel. In such cases, things are explained by the purpose they serve. When we ask 'why?' concerning an event, we may mean either of two things. We may mean: 'What purpose did this event serve?' or we may mean: 'What earlier circumstances caused this event?' The answer to the former question is a teleological explanation; the answer to the latter question is a mechanistic explanation. I do not see how it could have been known in advance which of these two questions science ought to ask, or whether it ought to ask both. But experience has shown that the mechanistic question leads to scientific knowledge, while the teleological question does not. (s 73)

Om Aristoteles:

In reading any important philosopher, but most of all in reading Aristotle, it is necessary to study him in two ways: with reference to his predecessors, and with reference to his successors. In the former aspect, Aristotle's merits are enormous; in the latter, his demerits are equally enormous. For his demerits, however, his successors are more responsible than he is. He came at the end of the creative period in Greek thought, and after his death it was two thousand years before the world produced a philosopher who was approximately his equal. Towards the end of this long period his authority had become as unquestioned as that of the Church, and in science, as well as in philosophy, had become a serious obstacle to progress. Ever since the beginning of the seventeenth century, almost every serious intellectual advance has had to begin with an attack on some Aristotelian doctrine. [...] To do him justice, we must, to begin with, forget his excessive posthumous fame, and the equally excessive posthumous condemnation to which it led. (s 157)

Om känslan av insikt och klarhet:

This experience, I believe, is necessary to good creative work, but it is not sufficient; indeed the subjective certainty that it brings with it may be fatally misleading. William James describes a man who got the experience from laughing-gas; whenever he was under its influence, he knew the secret of the universe, but when he came to, he had forgotten it. At last, with immense effort, he wrote down the secret before the vision had faded. When completely recovered, he rushed to see what he had written. It was 'A smell of petroleum prevails throughout.' What seems like sudden insight may be misleading, and must be tested soberly, when the divine intoxication has passed. (s 124-125)

Om Humes skeptiska syn på kausalitet:

He contends, over and over again, that the frequent conjunction of A and B gives no reason for expecting them to be conjoined in the future, but is merely a cause of this expectation. [...] Hume's theory might be caricatured as follows: 'The proposition "A causes B" means "the impression of A causes the idea of B".' As a definition, this is not a happy effort.1 (s 606)

Om Hegels syn på frihet:

Hegel, who owed much to Rousseau, adopted his misuse of the word 'freedom', and defined it as the right to obey the police, or something not very different. (s 633)

Ex. Hegel. Om Hegels filosofiska system: "from the outset this system was to bare many resemblances to Spinoza's, apart of course, from geometric clarity. When it came to presentation Hegel still favoured the Cantian approach; monumental obfuscation."

Om föreläsningar: "Unlike his great metaphysical predecessor Cant whose literary style was execrable and lecturing style brilliant, Hegel preferred to be consistent. His lecturing style was as wretched as his literary style".