I now enter upon the discussion of the
theory, that the goodness, or moral excellence of God is the
foundation of moral obligation.

To this philosophy I reply,

1. That the reason of obligation, or that
which imposes obligation, is identical with the end on which the
intention ought to terminate. If, therefore, the goodness of God
be the reason, or foundation of moral obligation, then the
goodness of God is the ultimate end to be intended. But as this
goodness consists in love or benevolence, it is impossible that it
should be regarded or chosen, as an ultimate end; and to choose it
were to choose the divine choice, to intend the divine intention
as an ultimate end, instead of choosing what God chooses, and
intending what He intends. Or if the goodness or moral excellence
of God is to be regarded not as identical with, but as an
attribute or moral quality of benevolence, then, upon the theory
under consideration, a moral agent ought to choose a quality or
attribute of the divine choice or intention as an ultimate end,
instead of the end upon which the divine intention terminates.
This is absurd.

2. It is impossible that virtue should be
the foundation of moral obligation. Virtue consists in a
compliance with moral obligation. But obligation must exist before
it can be complied with. Now, upon this theory, obligation cannot
exist until virtue exists as its foundation. Then this theory
amounts to this: virtue is the foundation of moral obligation;
therefore virtue must exist before moral obligation can exist. But
as virtue consists in a conformity to moral obligation, moral
obligation must exist before virtue can exist. Therefore neither
moral obligation nor virtue, can ever by any possibility, exist.
God's virtue must have existed prior to His obligation, as its
foundation. But as virtue consists in compliance with moral
obligation, and as obligation could not exist until virtue existed
as its foundation; in other words, as obligation could not exist
without the previous existence of virtue as its foundation, and as
virtue could not exist without the previous existence of
obligation, it follows, that neither God nor any other being could
ever be virtuous, for the reason that he could never be the
subject of moral obligation. Should it be said, that God's
holiness is the foundation of our obligation to love Him, I ask in
what sense it can be so. What is the nature or form of that love,
which His virtue lays us under an obligation to exercise? It
cannot be a mere emotion of complacency, for emotions being
involuntary states of mind and mere phenomena of the sensibility,
are not strictly within the pale of legislation and morality. Is
this love resolvable into benevolence or goodwill? But why will
good to God rather than evil? Why, surely, because good is
valuable in itself. But if it is valuable in itself, this must be
the fundamental reason for willing it as a possible good; and His
virtue must be only a secondary reason or condition of the
obligation to will His actual blessedness. But again, the
foundation of moral obligation must be the same in all worlds, and
with all moral agents, for the simple reason that moral law is one
and identical in all worlds. If God's virtue is not the foundation
of moral obligation in Him, which it cannot be, it cannot be the
foundation of obligation in us, as moral law must require Him to
choose the same end that it requires us to choose. His virtue must
be a secondary reason of His obligation to will His own actual
blessedness, and the condition of our obligation to will His
actual and highest blessedness, but cannot be the fundamental
reason, that always being the intrinsic value of His
well-being.

If this theory is true, disinterested
benevolence is a sin. Undeniably benevolence consists in willing
the highest well-being of God and the universe for its own sake,
in devoting the soul and all to this end. But this theory teaches
us, either to will the moral excellence of God, for its own sake,
or as an ultimate end, or to will His good and the good of the
universe, not for its own sake, but because He is morally
excellent. The benevolence theory regards blessedness as the end,
and holiness or moral excellence only as a condition of the end.
This theory regards moral excellence itself as the end. Does the
moral excellence of God impose obligation to will His moral
excellence for its own sake? If not, it cannot be a ground of
obligation. Does His moral excellence impose obligation to will
His highest good, and that of the universe, for its own sake? No,
for this were a contradiction. For, be it remembered, no one thing
can be a ground of obligation to choose any other thing, for its
own sake. That which creates obligation to choose, by reason of
its own nature, must itself be the identical object of choice; the
obligation is to choose that object for its own sake.

If the divine moral excellence is the
ground of obligation to choose, then this excellence must be the
object of this choice, and disinterested benevolence is never
right, but always wrong.

2. But for the sake of a somewhat
systematic examination of this subject, I will:

(1.) Show what virtue, or moral excellence
is.

(2.) That it cannot be the foundation of
moral obligation.

(3.) Show what moral worth or good desert
is.

(4.) That it cannot be the foundation of
moral obligation.

(5.) Show what relation virtue, merit, and
moral worth sustain to moral obligation.

(6.) Answer objections.

(1.) Show what virtue, or moral excellence
is.

Virtue, or moral excellence, consists in
conformity of will to moral law. It must either be identical with
love or goodwill, or it must be the moral attribute or element of
good will or benevolence.

(2.) It cannot be the foundation of moral
obligation.

It is agreed, that the moral law requires
love, and that this term expresses all that it requires. It is
also agreed that this love is goodwill, or that it resolves itself
into choice, or ultimate intention. Or, in more common language,
this love consists in the supreme devotion of heart and soul to
God and to the highest good of being. But since virtue either
consists in choice, or is an attribute of choice, or benevolence,
it is impossible to will it as an ultimate end. For this would
involve the absurdity of choosing choice, or intending intention,
as an end, instead of choosing that as an end upon which virtuous
choice terminates. Or, if virtue be regarded as the moral
attribute of love or benevolence, to make it an ultimate end would
be to make an attribute of choice an ultimate end, instead of that
on which choice terminates, or ought to terminate. This is
absurd.

(3.) Show what moral worth, or good desert
is.

Moral worth, or good desert, is not
identical with virtue, or obedience to moral law, but is an
attribute of character, resulting from obedience. Virtue, or
holiness, is a state of mind. It is an active and benevolent state
of the will. Moral worth is not a state of mind, but is the result
of a state of mind. We say that a man's obedience to moral law is
valuable in such a sense that a holy being is worthy, or deserving
of good, because of his virtue, or holiness. But this worthiness,
this good desert, is not a state of mind, but, as I said, it is a
result of benevolence. It is an attribute or quality of character,
and not a state of mind.

(4.) Moral worth or good desert cannot be
the foundation of moral obligation.

(a.) It is admitted, that good, or the
intrinsically valuable to being, must be the foundation of moral
obligation. The law of God requires the choice of an ultimate end.
This end must be intrinsically valuable, for it is its intrinsic
value that imposes obligation to will it. Nothing, then, can be
the foundation of moral obligation but that which is a good, or
intrinsically valuable in itself.

(b.) Ultimate good, or the intrinsically
valuable, must belong to, and be inseparable from, sentient
existences. A block of marble cannot enjoy, or be the subject of,
good. That which is intrinsically good to moral agents, must
consist in a state of mind. It must be something that is found
within the field of consciousness. Nothing can be to them an
intrinsic good, but that of which they can be conscious. By this
it is not intended that everything of which they are conscious, is
to them an ultimate good, or a good in any sense; but it is
intended, that that cannot be to them an ultimate, or intrinsic
good, of which they are not conscious. Ultimate good must consist
in a conscious state of mind. Whatever conduces to the state of
mind that is necessarily regarded by us as intrinsically good or
valuable, is to us a relative good. But the state of mind alone is
the ultimate good. From this it is plain, that moral worth, or
good desert, cannot be the foundation of moral obligation, because
it is not a state of mind, and cannot be an ultimate good. The
consciousness of good desert, that is, the consciousness of
affirming of ourselves good desert, is an ultimate good. Or, more
strictly, the satisfaction which the mind experiences, upon
occasion of affirming its good desert, is an ultimate good. But
neither the conscious affirmation of good desert, nor the
satisfaction occasioned by the affirmation, is identical with
moral worth or good desert. Merit, moral worth, good desert, is
the condition, or occasion, of the affirmation, and of the
resulting conscious satisfaction and is therefore a good, but it
is not, and cannot be an ultimate, or intrinsic good. It is
valuable but, not intrinsically valuable. Were it not that moral
beings are so constituted, that it meets a demand of the
intelligence, and therefore produces satisfaction in its
contemplation, it would not be, and could not reasonably be
regarded as a good in any sense. But since it meets a demand of
the intelligence, it is a relative good, and results in ultimate
good.

(a.) We have seen, that neither of them can
be the foundation of moral obligation; that neither of them has in
it the element of the intrinsic, or ultimate good, or valuable;
and that therefore, a moral agent can never be under obligation to
will or choose them as an ultimate end.

(b.) Worth, merit, good desert, cannot be a
distinct ground, or foundation, of moral obligation, in such a
sense as to impose obligation, irrespective of the intrinsic value
of good. All obligation must respect, strictly, the choice of an
object for its own sake, with the necessary conditions and means.
The intrinsic value of the end is the foundation of the obligation
to choose both it and the necessary conditions and means of
securing it. But for the intrinsic value of the end there could be
no obligation to will the conditions and means. Whenever a thing
is seen to be a necessary condition or means of securing an
intrinsically valuable end, this perceived relation is the
condition of our obligation to will it. The obligation is, and
must be, founded in the intrinsic value of the end, and
conditionated upon the perceived relation of the object to the
end. The intelligence of every moral agent, from its nature and
laws, affirms, that the ultimate good and blessedness of moral
beings is, and ought to be, conditionated upon their holiness and
good desert. This being a demand of reason, reason can never
affirm moral obligation to will the actual blessedness of moral
agents, but upon condition of their virtue, and consequent good
desert, or merit. The intelligence affirms that it is fit,
suitable, proper, that virtue, good desert, merit, holiness,
should be rewarded with blessedness. Blessedness is a good in
itself, and ought to be willed for that reason, and moral agents
are under obligation to will that all beings capable of good may
be worthy to enjoy, and may, therefore, actually enjoy
blessedness. But they are not under obligation to will that every
moral being should actually enjoy blessedness, but upon condition
of holiness and good desert. The relation that holiness, merit,
good desert, etc., sustains to moral obligation, is this: they
supply the condition of the obligation to will the actual
blessedness of the being or beings who are holy. The obligation
must be founded in the intrinsic value of the good we are to will
to them. For it is absurd to say, that we are, or can be, under
obligation to will good to them for its own sake, or as an
ultimate end, and yet that the obligation should not be founded in
the intrinsic value of the good. Were it not for the intrinsic
value of their good, we should no sooner affirm obligation to will
good to them than evil. The good or blessedness is the thing, or
end, we are under obligation to will. But obligation to will an
ultimate end cannot possibly be founded in anything else than the
intrinsic value of the end. Suppose it should be said, that in the
case of merit, or good desert, the obligation is founded in merit,
and only conditionated on the intrinsic value of the good I am to
will. This would be to make desert the end willed, and good only
the condition, or means. This were absurd.

(c.) But again, to make merit the ground of
the obligation, and the good willed only a condition, amounts to
this: I perceive merit, whereupon I affirm my obligation to
will--what? Not good to the deserving because of its value to Him,
nor from any disposition to see Him enjoy blessedness for its own
sake, but because of His merit. But what does He merit? Why, good,
or blessedness. It is good, or blessedness, that I am to will to
Him, and this is the end I am bound to will; that is, I am to will
His good, or blessedness, for its own intrinsic value. The
obligation, then, must be founded in the intrinsic value of the
end, that is, His well-being, or blessedness, and only
conditionated upon merit.

(6.) I am to answer objections.

(a.) It is objected, that, if virtue is
meritorious, if it merits, deserves anything, this implies
corresponding obligation, and that merit, or desert, must impose,
or be the ground of, the obligation to give that which is merited.
But this objection is either a mere begging of the question, or it
is sheer logomachy. It assumes that the words, desert and merit,
mean what they cannot mean. Let the objector remember, that he
holds that obligation respects ultimate intention. That ultimate
intention must find the grounds of its obligation exclusively in
its object. Now, if desert or merit is a ground of obligation,
then merit or desert must be the object of the intention. Desert,
merit, must be willed for its own sake. But is this the thing that
is deserved, merited? Does a meritorious being deserve that his
merit or desert should be willed for its own sake? Indeed, is this
what he deserves? We understandingly speak of good desert, the
desert of good and of evil; can a being deserve that his desert
shall be chosen for its own sake? If not, then it is impossible
that desert or merit would be a ground of obligation; for be it
remembered, that whatever is a ground of obligation ought to be
chosen for its own sake. But if good desert deserves good, it is
self-evident that the intrinsic value of the good is the ground,
and merit only a condition, of obligation to will the actual and
particular enjoyment of the good by the meritorious individual.
Thus, merit changes merely the form of obligation. If an
individual is wicked, I ought to will his good as valuable in
itself, and that he would comply with the necessary conditions of
happiness, and thereupon actually enjoy happiness. If he is
virtuous, I am to will his good still for its intrinsic value;
and, since he has complied with the conditions of enjoyment, that
he actually enjoy happiness. In both cases, I am bound to will his
good, and for the same fundamental reason, namely, its intrinsic
value. Neither the fact nor the ground of obligation to will his
good is changed by his virtue; the form only of the obligation is
changed. I may be under obligation to will evil to a particular
being, but in this case I am not bound to will the evil for its
own sake, and therefore, not as an end or ultimate. I ought
sometimes to will the punishment of the guilty, not for its own
sake, but for the sake of the public good; and the intrinsic value
of the good to be promoted is the ground of the obligation, and
guilt or demerit is only a condition of the obligation in that
form. If merit or desert be a ground of obligation, then merit or
desert ought to be chosen for its own sake. It would follow from
this, that ill desert ought to be chosen for its own sake, as well
as good desert. But who will pretend that ill desert ought to be
willed for its own sake? But if this is not, cannot be so, then it
follows, that desert is not a ground of obligation, and that is
not an object of ultimate choice, or of choice at all, only as a
means to an end.

(b.) It is asserted, in support of the
theory we are examining, that the Bible represents the goodness of
God as a reason for loving Him, or as a foundation of the
obligation to love Him.

To this I answer, the Bible may assign, and
does assign the goodness of God as a reason for loving Him, but it
does not follow, that it affirms, or assumes, that this reason is
the foundation, or a foundation of the obligation. The inquiry is,
in what sense does the Bible assign the goodness of God as a
reason for loving Him? Is it that the goodness of God is the
foundation of the obligation, or only a condition of the
obligation to will His actual blessedness in particular? Is His
goodness a distinct ground of obligation to love Him? But what is
this love that His goodness lays us under an obligation to
exercise to Him? It is agreed, that it cannot be an emotion, that
it must consist in willing something to Him. It is said by some,
that the obligation is to treat Him as worthy. But I ask, worthy
of what? Is He worthy of anything? If so, what is it? For this is
the thing that I ought to will to Him. Is He merely worthy that I
should will His worthiness for its own sake? This must be, if His
worthiness is the ground of obligation; for that which is the
ground of obligation to choose must be the object of choice. Why,
He is worthy of blessing, and honor, and praise. But these must
all be embraced in the single word, love. The law has forever
decided the point, that our whole duty to God is expressed by this
one term. It has been common to make assertions upon the subject,
that involve a contradiction of the Bible. The law of God, as
revealed in the two precepts, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God
with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself," covers the whole
ground of moral obligation (Deut. 6:5). It is expressly and
repeatedly taught in the Bible, that love to God and our neighbor
is the fulfilling of the law. It is, and must be admitted, that
this love consists in willing something to God and our neighbor.
What, then, is to be willed to them? The command is, "Thou shalt
love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matt. 19:19). This says nothing
about the character of my neighbor. It is the value of His
interests, of His well-being, that the law requires me to regard.
It does not require me to love my righteous neighbor merely, nor
to love my righteous neighbor better than I do my wicked neighbor.
It is my neighbor that I am to love. That is, I am to will His
well-being, or His good, with the conditions and means thereof
according to its value. If the law contemplated the virtue of any
being as a distinct ground of obligation, it could not read as it
does. It must, in that case, have read as follows: "If thou art
righteous, and thy neighbor is as righteous as thou art, thou
shalt love him as thyself, and not thy neighbor." How far would
this be from the gloss of the Jewish rabbis so fully rebuked by
Christ, namely, "Ye have heard that it hath been said by them of
old time, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy. But
I say unto you, Love your enemies; bless them that curse you; do
good to them that hate you; and pray for them that despitefully
use and persecute you. For if ye love them that love you, what
thank have ye? Do not even the publicans the same" (Matt. 5:43-44,
46)? The fact is, the law knows but one ground of moral
obligation. It requires us to love God and our neighbor. This love
is goodwill. What else ought we to will, or can we possibly will
to God and our neighbor, but their highest good, or well-being,
with all the conditions and means thereof? This is all that can be
of any value to them, and all that we can or ought to, will to
them under any circumstances whatever. When we have willed this to
them, we have done our whole duty to them. "Love is the fulfilling
of the law" (Romans 13:10). We owe them nothing more, absolutely.
They can have nothing more. But this the law requires us to will
to God and our neighbor, on account of the intrinsic value of
their good, whatever their character may be; that is, this is to
be willed to God and our neighbor, as a possible good, whether
they are holy or unholy, simple because of its intrinsic
value.

But while the law requires that this should
be willed to all, as a possible and intrinsic good, irrespective
of character; it cannot, and does not require us to will that God,
or any moral agent in particular, shall be actually blessed, but
upon condition that he be holy. Our obligation to the unholy, is
to will that they might be holy, and perfectly blessed. Our
obligation to the holy, is to will that they be perfectly blessed.
As has been said, virtue only modifies the form, but does not
change the ground of obligation. The Bible represents love to
enemies as one of the highest forms of virtue: "God commendeth His
love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died
for us" (Romans 5:8). But if love to enemies be a high and a
valuable form of virtue, it must be only because the true spirit
of the law requires the same love to them as to others, and
because of the strong inducements not to love them. Who does not
regard the virtue of the atonement as being as great as if it had
been made for the friends, instead of the enemies of God? And
suppose God were supremely selfish and unreasonably our enemy, who
would not regard good will exercised toward Him as being as
praiseworthy as it now is. Now if He were unjustly our enemy,
would not a hearty good will to Him in such a case be a striking
and valuable instance of virtue? In such a case we could not,
might not, will His actual blessedness, but we might and should be
under infinite obligation to will that He might become holy, and
thereupon be perfectly blessed. We should be under obligation to
will His good in such a sense, that should He become holy, we
should will His actual blessedness, without any change in our
ultimate choice or intention, and without any change in us that
would imply an increase of virtue.

So of our neighbor: we are bound to will
his good, even if he is wicked, in such a sense as to need no new
intention or ultimate choice to will his actual blessedness,
should he become holy. We may be as holy in loving a sinner, and
in seeking his salvation while he is a sinner, as in willing his
good after he is converted and becomes a saint. God was as
virtuous in loving the world, and seeking to save it while in sin,
as He is in loving those in it who are holy. The fact is, if we
are truly benevolent, and will the highest well-being of all, with
the conditions and means of their blessedness, it follows of
course, and of necessity, that when one becomes holy we shall love
him with the love of complacency; that we shall, of course, will
his actual blessedness, seeing that he has fulfilled the necessary
conditions, and rendered himself worthy of blessedness. It implies
no increase of virtue in God, when a sinner repents, to exercise
complacency toward him. Complacency, as a state of will or heart,
is only benevolence modified by the consideration or relation of
right character in the object of it. God, prophets, apostles,
martyrs, and saints, in all ages, are as virtuous in their
self-denying and untiring labors to save the wicked, as they are
in their complacent love to the saints.

This is the universal doctrine of the
Bible. It is in exact accordance with the spirit and letter of the
law. "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matt. 19:19), that
is, whatever his character may be. This is the doctrine of reason,
and accords with the convictions of all men. But if this is so, it
follows that virtue is not a distinct ground of moral obligation,
but only modifies the form of obligation. We are under obligation
to will the actual blessedness of a moral being, upon condition of
his holiness. We ought to will good or blessedness for its own
value, irrespective of character; but we ought to will the
enjoyment of it, by an individual, in particular, only upon
condition of his holiness. Its intrinsic value is the foundation
of the obligation, and his holiness changes not the fact, but
form, of the obligation, and is the condition of the obligation to
will his actual enjoyment of perfect blessedness in particular.
When, therefore, the Bible calls on us to love God for His
goodness, it does not and cannot mean to assign the fundamental
reason, or foundation of the obligation to will His good; for it
were absurd to suppose, that His good is to be willed, not for its
intrinsic value, but because He is good. Were it not for its
intrinsic value, we should as soon affirm our obligation to will
evil as good to Him. The Bible assumes the first truths of reason.
It is a first truth of reason, that God's well-being is of
infinite value, and ought to be willed as a possible good whatever
His character may be; and that it ought to be willed as an actual
reality upon condition of His holiness. Now the Bible does just as
in this case might be expected. It asserts His actual and infinite
holiness, and calls on us to love Him, or to will His good, for
that reason. But this is not asserting nor implying that His
holiness is the foundation of the obligation to will His good in
any such sense as that we should not be under obligation to will
it with all our heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, as a
possible good, whether He were holy or not. It is plain that the
law contemplates only the intrinsic value of the end to be willed.
It would require us to will the well-being of God with all our
heart, etc., or as the supreme good, whatever His character might
be. Were not this so, it could not be moral law. His interest
would be the supreme and the infinite good, in the sense of the
intrinsically and infinitely valuable, and we should, for that
reason, be under infinite obligation to will that it might be,
whether He were holy or sinful, and upon condition of His
holiness, to will the actual existence of His perfect and infinite
blessedness. Upon our coming to the knowledge of His holiness, the
obligation is instantly imposed, not merely to will His highest
well-being as a possible, but as an actually existing,
good.

Again, it is impossible that goodness,
virtue, good desert, merit, should be a distinct ground or
foundation of moral obligation, in such a sense as to impose or
properly to increase obligation. It has been shown that neither of
these can be an ultimate good and impose obligation to choose
itself as an ultimate end, or for its intrinsic value.

But if goodness or merit can impose moral
obligation to will, it must be an obligation to will itself as an
ultimate end. But this we have seen cannot be, therefore, these
things cannot be a distinct ground or foundation of moral
obligation.

But again, the law does not make virtue,
good desert, or merit, the ground of obligation, and require us to
love them and to will them as an ultimate end but, to love God and
our neighbor as an ultimate good. It does, no doubt, require us to
will God's goodness, good desert, worthiness, merit, as a
condition and means of His highest well-being, and of the
well-being of the universe; but it is absurd to say that it
requires us to will either of these things as an ultimate end,
instead of His perfect blessedness, to which these sustain only
the relation of a condition. Let it be distinctly understood that
nothing can impose moral obligation but that which is an ultimate
and an intrinsic good; for if it impose obligation, it must be an
obligation to choose itself for what it is, in and of itself. All
obligation must respect the choice either of an end or of means.
Obligation to choose means is founded in the value of the end.
Whatever, then, imposes obligation must be an ultimate end. It
must possess that, in and of itself, that is worthy or deserving
of choice as an intrinsic and ultimate good. This we have seen,
virtue, merit, etc., cannot be, therefore, they cannot be a
foundation of moral obligation. But it is said they can increase
obligation to love God and holy beings. But we are under infinite
obligation to love God and to will His good with all our power,
because of the intrinsic value of His well-being, whether He is
holy or sinful. Upon condition that He is holy, we are under
obligation to will His actual blessedness, but certainly we are
under obligation to will it with no more than all our heart, and
soul, and mind, and strength. But this we are required to do
because of the intrinsic value of His blessedness, whatever His
character might be. The fact is, we can do no more, and can be
under obligation to do no more, than to will His good with all our
powers, and this we are bound to do for its own sake, and no more
than this can we be under obligation to do, for any reason
whatever. Our obligation is to will His good with all our
strength, by virtue of its infinite value, and it cannot be
increased by any other consideration than our increased knowledge
of its value, which increases our ability.

(c.) But it is said that favors received
impose obligation to exercise gratitude; that the relation of
benefactor itself imposes obligation to treat the benefactor
according to this relation.

Answer: I suppose this objection
contemplates this relation as a virtuous relation, that is, that
the benefactor is truly virtuous and not selfish in his
benefaction. If not, then the relation cannot at all modify
obligation.

If the benefactor has in the benefaction
obeyed the law of love, if he has done his duty in sustaining this
relation, I am under obligation to exercise gratitude toward him.
But what is gratitude? It is not a mere emotion or feeling; for
this is a phenomenon of the sensibility, and, strictly speaking,
without the pale both of legislation and morality. Gratitude, when
spoken of as a virtue and as that of which moral obligation can be
affirmed, must be an act of will. An obligation to gratitude must
be an obligation to will something to the benefactor. But what am
I under obligation to will to a benefactor, but his actual highest
well-being? If it be God, I am under obligation to will His actual
and infinite blessedness with all my heart and with all my soul.
If it be my neighbor, I am bound to love him as myself, that is,
to will his actual well-being as I do my own. What else can either
God or man possess or enjoy, and what else can I be under
obligation to will to them? I answer, nothing else. To the law and
to the testimony, if any philosophy agree not herewith, it is
because there is no light in it. The virtuous relation of
benefactor modifies obligation, just as any other and every other
form of virtue does, and in no other way. Whenever we perceive
virtue in any being, this supplies the condition upon which we are
bound to will his actual highest well-being. He has done his duty.
He has complied with obligation in the relation he sustains. He is
truthful, upright, benevolent, just, merciful, no matter what the
particular form may be in which the individual presents to me the
evidence of his holy character. It is all precisely the same so
far as my obligation extends. I am, independently of my knowledge
of his character, under obligation to will his highest well-being
for its own sake. That is, to will that he may fulfill all the
conditions, and thereupon enjoy perfect blessedness. But I am not
under obligation to will his actual enjoyment of blessedness until
I have evidence of his virtue. This evidence, however I obtain it,
by whatever manifestations of virtue in him or by whatever means,
supplies the condition upon which I am under obligation to will
his actual enjoyment or highest well-being. This is my whole
obligation. It is all he can have, and all I can will to him. All
objections of this kind, and indeed all possible objections to the
true theory, and in support of the one I am examining, are founded
in an erroneous view of the subject of moral obligation, or in a
false and anti-scriptural philosophy that contradicts the law of
God, and sets up another rule of moral obligation.

Again, if gratitude is a moral act,
according to this objector, it is an ultimate intention, and as
such must terminate on its object, and find its reasons or ground
of obligation exclusively in its object. If this is so, then if
the relation of benefactor is the ground of obligation to exercise
gratitude, gratitude must consist in willing this relation for its
own sake, and not at all in willing anything to the benefactor.
This is absurd. It is certain that gratitude must consist in
willing good to the benefactor, and not in willing the relation
for its own sake, and that the ground of the obligation must be
the intrinsic value of the good, and the relation only a condition
of the obligation in the particular form of willing his enjoyment
of good in particular. It is now said, in reply to this, that the
"inquiry is not, what is gratitude? but, why ought we to exercise
it?" But the inquiry is after the ground of the obligation; this,
it is agreed, must be intrinsic in its object, and is it
impertinent to inquire what the object is? Who can tell what is
the ground of the obligation to exercise gratitude until he knows
what the object of gratitude is, and consequently what gratitude
is? The objector affirms that the relation of benefactor is a
ground of obligation to put forth ultimate choice. Of course,
according to him, and in fact, if this relation is the ground of
the obligation, it is, and must be, the object chosen for its own
sake, to exercise gratitude to a benefactor, then, according to
this teaching is, not to will any good to him, nor to myself, nor
to any being in existence, but simply to will the relation of
benefactor for its own sake. Not for his sake, as a good to him.
Not for my sake as a good to me, but for its own sake. Is not this
a sublime philosophy?

(d.) But it is also insisted that when men
attempt to assign a reason why they are under moral obligation of
any kind, as to love God, they all agree in this, in assigning the
divine moral excellence as the reason of that
obligation.

I answer: The only reason why any man
supposes himself to assign the goodness of God as the foundation
of the obligation to will good to Him is, that he loosely
confounds the conditions of the obligation to will His actual
blessedness, with the foundation of the obligation to will it for
its own sake, or as a possible good. Were it not for the known
intrinsic value of God's highest well-being, we should as soon
affirm our obligation to will evil as good to Him, as has been
said. But if the divine moral excellence were the foundation of
moral obligation, if God were not holy and good, moral obligation
could not exist in any case.

That every moral agent ought to will the
highest well-being of God and of all the universe for its own
sake, as a possible good, whatever their characters may be, is a
truth of reason. Reason assigns and can assign no other reason for
willing their good as an ultimate end than its intrinsic value;
and to assign any other reason as imposing obligation to will it
as an end, or for its own sake, were absurd and
self-contradictory. Obligation to will it as an end and for its
own sake, implies the obligation to will its actual existence in
all cases, and to all persons, when the indispensable conditions
are fulfilled. These conditions are seen to be fulfilled in God,
and therefore upon this condition reason affirms obligation to
will His actual and highest blessedness for its own sake, the
intrinsic value being the fundamental reason for the obligation to
will it as an end, and the divine goodness the condition of the
obligation to will His highest blessedness in particular. Suppose
that I existed and had the idea of blessedness and its intrinsic
value duly developed, together with an idea of all the necessary
conditions of it; but that I did not know that any other being
than myself existed, and yet I knew their existence and
blessedness possible; in this case I should be under obligation to
will or wish that beings might exist and be blessed. Now suppose
that I complied with this obligation, my virtue is just as real
and as great as if I knew their existence, and willed their actual
blessedness, provided my idea of its intrinsic value were as clear
and just as if I knew their existence. And now suppose I came to
the knowledge of the actual existence and holiness of all holy
beings, I should make no new ultimate choice in willing their
actual blessedness. This I should do of course, and, remaining
benevolent, of necessity; and if this knowledge did not give me a
higher idea of the value of that which I before willed for its own
sake, the willing of the real existence of their blessedness would
not make me a whit more virtuous than when I willed it as a
possible good, without knowing that the conditions of its actual
existence would ever, in any case, be fulfilled.

The Bible reads just as it might be
expected to read, and just as we should speak in common life. It
being a truth of reason that the well-being of God is of infinite
value, and therefore ought to be willed for its own sake, it also
being a truth that virtue is an indispensable condition of
fulfilling the demands of His own reason and conscience, and of
course of His actual blessedness, and of course also a condition
of the obligation to will it, we might expect the Bible to exhort
and require us to love God or will His actual blessedness, and
mention His virtue as the reason or fulfilled condition of the
obligation, rather than the intrinsic value of His blessedness as
the foundation of the obligation. The foundation of the
obligation, being a truth of reason, needs not to be a matter of
revelation. Nor needs the fact that virtue is the condition of His
blessedness, nor the fact that we are under no obligation to will
His actual blessedness but upon condition of His holiness. But
that in Him this condition is fulfilled, needs to be impressed
upon us, and therefore the Bible announces it as a reason or
condition of the obligation to love Him, that is, to will His
actual blessedness.

God's moral excellence is naturally, and
rightly, assigned by us as a condition, not the ground of
obligation to receive His revealed will as our law. Did we not
assume the rectitude of the divine will, we could not affirm our
obligation to receive it as a rule of duty. This assumption is a
condition of the obligation, and is naturally thought of when
obligation to obey God is affirmed. But the intrinsic value and
importance of the interest He requires us to seek, is the ground
of the obligation.

(e.) Again: it is asserted that when men
would awaken a sense of moral obligation they universally
contemplate the moral excellence of God as constituting the reason
of their obligation, and if this contemplation does not awaken
their sense of obligation nothing else can or will.

I answer: The only possible reason why men
ever do or can take this course, is that they loosely consider
religion to consist of feelings of complacency in God, and are
endeavoring to awaken these complacent emotions. If they conceive
of religion as consisting in these emotions, they will of course
conceive themselves to be under obligation to exercise them, and
to be sure they take the only possible course to awaken both these
and a sense of obligation to exercise them. But they are mistaken
both in regard to their obligation and the nature of religion. Did
they conceive of religion as consisting in goodwill, or in willing
the highest well-being of God and of the universe for its own
sake, would they, could they, resort to the process in question,
that is, the contemplation of the divine moral excellence, as the
only reason for willing good to Him, instead of considering the
infinite value of those interests to the realization of which they
ought to consecrate themselves?

If men often do resort to the process in
question, it is because they love to feel and have a
self-righteous satisfaction in feelings of complacency in God, and
take more pains to awaken these feelings than to quicken and
enlarge their benevolence A purely selfish being may be greatly
affected by the great goodness and kindness of God to him. I know
a man who is a very niggard so far as all benevolent giving and
doing for God and the world are concerned, who, I fear, resorts to
the very process in question, and is often much affected with the
goodness of God. He can bluster and denounce all who do not feel
as he does. But ask him for a dollar to forward any benevolent
enterprise, and he will evade your request, and ask you how you
feel, whether you are engaged in religion, etc.

But it may well be asked, why does the
Bible and why do we, so often present the character of God and of
Christ as a means of awakening a sense of moral obligation and of
inducing virtue? Answer:

It is to lead men to contemplate the
infinite value of those interests which we ought to will.
Presenting the example of God and of Christ, is the highest moral
means that can be used. God's example and man's example is the
most impressive and efficient way in which He can declare His
views, and hold forth to public gaze the infinite value of those
interests upon which all hearts ought to be set. For example,
nothing can set the infinite value of the soul in a stronger light
than the example of God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost has
done.

Nothing can beget a higher sense of
obligation to will the glory of the Father and the salvation of
souls, than the example of Christ. His example is His loudest
preaching, His clearest, most impressive exhibition, not merely of
His own goodness, but of the intrinsic and infinite value of the
interest He sought and which we ought to seek. It is the love, the
care, the self-denial, and the example of God, in His efforts to
secure the great ends of benevolence, that hold those interests
forth in the strongest light, and thus beget a sense of obligation
to seek the same end. But let it be observed, it is not a
contemplation of the goodness of God that awakens this sense of
obligation, but the contemplation of the value of those interests
which He seeks, in the light of His painstaking and example; this
quickens and gives efficiency to the sense of obligation to will
what He wills. Suppose, for example, that I manifest the greatest
concern and zeal for the salvation of souls; it would not be the
contemplation of my goodness that would quicken in a bystander a
sense of obligation to save souls, but my zeal, and life, and
spirit would have the strongest tendency to arouse in him a sense
of the infinite and intrinsic value of the soul, and thus quicken
a sense of obligation. Should I behold multitudes rushing to
extinguish a flaming house, it would not be a contemplation of
their goodness, but the contemplation of the interests at stake,
to the consideration of which their zeal would lead me, that would
quicken a sense of obligation in me to hasten to lend my
aid.

Revelation is concerned to impress the fact
that God is holy, and of course call on us, in view of His
holiness, to love and worship Him. But in doing this, it does not,
cannot mean that His holiness is the foundation of the obligation
to will His good as an ultimate end.

Our obligation, when viewed apart from His
character, is to will or wish that God might fulfill all the
conditions of perfect blessedness, and upon that condition, that
He might actually enjoy perfect and infinite satisfaction. But
seeing that He meets the demands of His own intelligence and the
intelligence of the universe, and that He voluntarily fulfills all
the necessary conditions of His highest well-being, our obligation
is to will His actual and most perfect and eternal
blessedness.

I am obliged to repeat much to follow the
objector, because all his objections resolve themselves into one,
and require to be answered much in the same
way.