As early as the 1980s, many observers both in and outside the communist bloc assumed North Korea, with its hereditary rule, grossly inefficient economy, and comedic personality cult propaganda was quite fragile. However, they were all proven wrong: the communist regimes in Europe have long disappeared, while North Korea is alive, and is still run by the same "one hundred families," who are the same that ran the country some forty years ago.

There are several reasons why North Korea has demonstrated such outstanding staying power. Arguably, the unity of the NK ruling elite is among the most important factors that have enabled such longevity.

Indeed, contrary to conventional thinking, revolutions seldom, if ever, are start by the downtrodden masses. The revolutionary impulse always originates from the educated, well-connected, and powerful, some of whom come to believe things can and should be done differently. When revolution happens, it frequently entails only the top layer of the upper crust being removed, replaced by persons from the lower echelons of the same privileged group. A cobbler may become a cabinet minister, for example. It's a safe bet, however, that many of his deputies will come from pre-established bureaucratic apparatuses.

The 1989/91anti-communist revolutions in Europe were no exception. One prominent historian describes the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe as a ‘management buy-out.' Indeed, the political and business elite in the post-communist states still overwhelmingly consists of the Soviet-era former communist party apparatchiks and industrial managers, and, increasingly, their children.

Tellingly, out of the fifteen newly independent post-Soviet states that came out of the early 1990s, at least eight have, at least at some point of their post-Communist history, been run by people who once used to be their top Communist party bosses.

This is exactly the reason why, contrary to many pessimistic predictions, the Soviet ruling class did not fight to prop up or protect the system in 1989/90. By that time, more flexible, less principled members of the old elite came to understand that they and their families will retain their power with or without the communist system.

However, this is not the case in North Korea. The existence of a rich, attractive South Korea means that instability and revolution in the North is not going to end with merely the emergence of a new regime, whose elite will be largely recruited from the Kim-era ruling class. Much more likely is that such a crisis invokes a German-style revolutionary reunification, with a vast majority of North Koreans demanding a fast and complete unification with the South.

This would spell disaster for the entirety of Pyongyang's upper and middle crusts. In the former Soviet Union or, say, Bulgaria, capitalism has been constructed by Communist party apparatchiks and police operatives. However, in a post-unified Korean peninsula, a new government will likely be constructed by South Korean carpetbaggers and resident managers of the South's conglomerates. The offspring of the North Korean elite will most likely be in a position to be much more successful than their counterparts in other former bloc countries. The North Korean apparatchiks have no reason to expect they will retain any control if the system goes belly up.

Moreover, North Korean's ruling elite is afraid to be held responsible for their participation in human rights abuses. In other words, they are afraid that if the regime collapses, they will be imprisoned. The North Korean party apparatchiks are well aware how they themselves would treat South Korean CEOs, economics professors, and lawmakers, had they taken over the South. They don't expect to be treated differently, even if they themselves are without skeletons in their closet.

This fear is well-placed and far from paranoid. It means that North Korea's leadership is remarkably united. Many may and do harbor critical thoughts of Kim Jong-un and his policies, but they do not want to rock the boat. The understanding is clear: if Kim disappears, their fate will be quite regrettable as well.

This elite unity combined with an unusually brutal and highly efficient surveillance system are two key reasons why the North Korean regime continues to persist, and will quite possibly continue for many years to come.

Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. Reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.