Socioeconomic Factors Have Been the Major Driving Force of China’s Fertility Changes Since the Mid-1990s

Fertility decline had already started in China’s urban areas in the 1950s (Lavely and Freedman 1990). This decline might have followed a route similar to that found in many countries if the famine of 1958–1961 and the nationwide birth control (or birth planning, as it is called in China) program launched in the early 1970s had not taken place. These events, the latter in particular, have considerably altered the trajectory of China’s fertility change. Largely for this reason, debates about whether China’s fertility decline is unique, what the major driving forces of this profound change are, and the extent to which China’s falling fertility is a part of and significantly affected by the worldwide fertility transition have been ongoing for many years (Bongaarts 2002; Caldwell 2001; Caldwell and Zhao 2007; Lavely and Freedman 1990; Poston and Gu 1987; Riley 2004; Wang et al. 2013).

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