Deterrence must and will remain a critical component of our security
posture. Yet, many of the conditions and assumptions that long guided the
way we thought about deterrence and its supporting strategic force posture
have changed fundamentally. Deterrence can involve more than just the
threat to retaliate in the event of an attack. It can also be based on the
ability to prevent potential adversaries from achieving their objectives
thereby deterring them from pursuing such objectives in the first place.
The United States is developing a forward-looking strategy that takes into
account the changing nature of the threats we face, as well as the full
range of capabilities that we can marshal to protect our nation and its
vital interests, as well as meet our commitments to friends and
allies.

Deterrence Is Our Highest Priority

Maintaining a reliable deterrent against attacks on the U.S. and our
allies is a critical objective of our national security strategy. Our
nation always prefers peaceful means to maintain its own security and
prosperity, and that of its friends and allies, but maintains the military
capabilities needed to deter and defend against the threat or potential
use of force by prospective adversaries.

Our deterrence strategy to date has largely relied on our ability to
respond to attack with a variety of options, ranging from a devastating
retaliation through more selective strikes, and our offensive nuclear
forces are and will remain a key component of that capability. No group or
nation should doubt that the U.S. will continue to depend on the certainty
of a devastating response to any attack on the U.S. or its allies to deter
attacks by ballistic missiles or other weapons.

Emerging Threats and the Need to Diversify our Approach to
Deterrence

However, given the new threats we all face -- especially from weapons
of mass destruction and increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles in
the hands of rogue states -- our deterrence posture can no longer rely
exclusively on the threat of retaliation. We now need a strategy based on
an appropriate mix of offensive and defensive capabilities to deny
potential adversaries the opportunities and benefits they might hope to
realize from the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction against our
homeland and forces deployed abroad, as well as those of our allies and
friends.

Today, we are confronted with a more diverse, less predictable, and
less risk-averse group of hostile states that are aggressively seeking to
develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction and longer-range missiles
as a means of their delivery. They see such weapons both as operational
weapons of war and as coercive tools of diplomacy to preclude us and our
partners from assisting friends and allies in regions of vital interest.
For such threats, deterrence must take advantage of the contribution of
both offensive and defensive forces, working together.

Ballistic missile defenses enhance the traditional deterrence of
offensive capabilities by denying rogue states the ability to reliably and
predictably inflict mass destruction on other nations. By complicating his
calculation of success, these defenses add to a potential aggressor's
uncertainty and weaken his confidence. Effective missile defenses may also
serve to undercut the value potential aggressor's place on missiles as a
means of delivery, thereby advancing our non-proliferation goals. With
these considerations in mind, missile defenses can be a force for
stability and security.

Moreover, some potential threats, such as accidental or unauthorized
launches of ballistic missiles, cannot be deterred by their very nature.
They can only be defended against. To counter such contingencies, missile
defenses provide an element of insurance that supplements and enhances
their deterrent value.

A New Relationship with Russia

We are committed to creating a new strategic and diplomatic
relationship with Russia, one founded not on common vulnerabilities, but
on common interests and shared objectives. As Secretary of State Colin L.
Powell has said: "It is time to change the nuclear equation of mutual
assured destruction to a more sensible strategic arrangement." While we
seek to persuade Russia to join us in further reducing our nuclear
arsenals, we are also prepared to lead by example. Therefore, we are
committed to ensuring that this new strategic framework with Russia is
characterized by efforts to achieve the lowest levels of nuclear weapons
consistent with our present and future national security needs. Our
missile defenses will not threaten Russia's deterrent forces.

Missile Defense and China

Our missile defenses will be designed to deter and defend against
small-scale attacks from rogue states, as well as from accidental or
unauthorized attacks from any source. As a force for stability and
security in both the Asian region and the world at large, defense and
deterrence working together advance goals of regional peace and stability
which we share with China. Missile defense is not intended as a threat to
China’s deterrent forces.

Summary

Finally, it is worth emphasizing that missile defenses are only one
tool among many in maintaining peace, security, and stability, and must be
considered within the context of our entire strategic framework. This
framework includes offensive nuclear arms as well as our broader
diplomatic and security activities, including arms control and
non-proliferation efforts. This diversified approach to deterrence is
appropriate for the complex and less predictable world in which we
live.