Ministry of Interior [MoI]

Unlike the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) was never dissolved. One reason for this was that Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) hoped to turn over responsibility for internal security and policing as soon as practicable. The Ministry of Interior [MoI] security forces include several components: the 301,286-member Iraqi Police Service primarily deployed to police stations; the majority Shia 43,957-member Federal Police, organized into commandos and public order police; the 60,605-member Border Enforcement Police; and the 94,000 Facilities Protection Service security guards deployed at MOI direction at individual ministries. The MOI was responsible for approximately 529,000 employees, almost 10 percent of the country's male labor force as of the end of October 2010.

In order to achieve minimum essential capabilities [MEC], the MoI must develop a self-reliant ministry by the end of 2011; a ministry with sustainable and enduring systems, staffed with professional and capable leadership that enables the manning, training, and equipping of interior forces. The MoI continued to make slow, uneven progress during 2010 in developing the ministerial capacity to provide oversight, training, professional development, facilities, and resourcing for Iraqi internal security forces. The MoI was progressing toward MEC by December 31, 2011, but the ministry was experiencing challenges in the areas of C2, interoperability, resource and acquisition management, and operational sustainment.

The December 2011 goal for Iraqi interior forces was an IP force that is professionally trained, sufficiently manned, and adequately equipped to be capable of defeating insurgencies, of creating a safe and secure Iraq, and of enforcing the rule of law. IP forces must be interoperable with each other and the IA. The Directorate of Border Enforcement (DBE) must be able to control borders with IA support. Provincial Joint Coordination Centers (PJCCs) must be capable of providing C2 of provincial security operations. By mid-2010 the Federal Police (FP) and Oil Police (OP) were operationally capable. The IP, DBE and Port of Entry Directorate (PoED) had basic capability and improving technical skills. However, all interior security forces continued to have gaps in funding, C2, ISR, and logistical infrastructure.

For Iraqi police forces, continued support was required to complete the build out of the FP, a key part of the MoI’s Police Primacy strategy. In addition, planning assumptions that guided the scope of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement’s (INL) assumption of the enduring police training and advising mission in 2011 included Iraqi police achieving MEC. Achievement of MEC might not be possible without continued support, resulting in enduring gaps in police capability not covered by the INL mission.

During 2010 at least 962 Ministry of Interior (MOI) personnel were killed and 1,347 were injured. Police officers, in particular, were targeted. For example, in the week beginning August 1, gunmen or explosives killed at least five traffic officers and wounded 19 in Baghdad, forcing the authorities to arm some of the traffic officers with AK-47 assault rifles. On August 25, coordinated attacks targeting security forces throughout the country killed at least 56 individuals. On November 2, a roadside bomb in Sa'diyah exploded near a police convoy, killing three officers. On December 29, an attack by three suicide bombers in Mosul killed a prominent police commander and caused the collapse of the police station. The police commander who was killed, Lt. Col. Shamel Ahmed al-Jabouri, had been recognized for confronting terrorist groups in the area. The attack was the sixth attempt on his life and the second in the previous three months. An AQI-affiliated group, Islamic State of Iraq, claimed responsibility for the attack.

Iraq was initially administered by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Three decades of war and government mismanagement had stunted Iraq's economy, leading to increased crime and poverty. Infrastructure is antiquated. Conditions in Iraq were extremely dangerous. A person seeking entry to Iraq must appear before an authorized officer of the CPA at a port of entry, border control station, or at any place designated by the Senior Advisor of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, in coordination with the Interim Minister of the Interior, for examination to determine whether the person may be granted entry to Iraq. Officers issue permits valid for up to 90 days, which may be renewed at CPA offices in Iraq. Permits will eventually be issued by Iraqi missions abroad. In an effort to prevent international child abduction, many governments have initiated procedures at entry/exit points. These often include requiring documentary evidence of relationship and permission for the child's travel from the parent(s) or legal guardian not present. Having such documentation on hand, even if not required, may facilitate entry/departure.

The Ministry of Interior initially consisted of two government institutions; the Police and the municipal branches. The Ministry wants to bring these institutions back with the Iraqi people who formerly worked there before the war.

After initial looting throughout Iraq following the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, a return of law enforcement in Iraq was one of the top ORHA priorities. The then head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, Gen. Jay Garner initially called over Baghdad radio for all policemen to return to duty on May 4, 2003. Still outstanding issues concerned how to get the policemen back to work fast; how to decide which of the police organizations were too tainted by the previous regime to reconstitute; and the perceived need for a new policing ethics, ie respecting human rights and guaranteeing openness and accountability. As of mid-May 2003, emergency payments of $20 were being made to pay for the Police Force in Baghdad.

Iraq's first post-Saddam Hussein cabinet was sworn in on 03 September 2003. The 25-member cabinet was named by the Iraqi Governing Council. The cabinet appointments are divided among the country's various ethnic and religious communities. The post of interior minister was held by another Shi'ite, Nuri al-Badran, who was tasked with the gradual takeover of security matters from U.S.-led forces.

On 04 April 2004 Iraq's Interior Minister, Nouri al-Badran, announced his resignation, saying he had heard the US-led administration was unhappy with his performance and wanted a different religious mix in the cabinet. Al-Badran, a Shi'ite Muslim, told reporters he had been told the US-led administration believes the defense minister and interior minister should not both be Shi'ite. A new defense minister's position was recently filled by a Shi'ite official. There was no immediate comment from the US-led administration. Al-Badran's announcement came as fighting continued in various cities in Iraq.

On 09 April 2004 Ambassador Bremer met with the Iraqi Ministerial Committee on National Security, during which they addressed a number of issues, not the least of which was the appointment of the new Iraqi Interior minister and the appointment of Iraq's national security adviser. Following consultation with the Iraqi Governing Council, Ambassador Bremer named Mr. Samir Shakir Mahmoud el-Sumaidy [Samir Shaker Mahmoud al-Sumeidi], a Sunni Muslim businessman on the Governing Council, the new minister of Interior.

On 01 June 2004 Falah Hassan was named the new Interior Minister. A Sunni, he had been a member of Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress in exile, but later joined the Iraqi National Movement, a Sunni-dominated group.

In the month since Minister of Interior Baqir Jabor took office in May 2005, he appeared to be delivering on his initial commitments. Jabor retained qualified personnel regardless of their ethnic background or political affiliation, while also developing a plan to remove unqualified personnel. Jabor traveled to Najaf to discuss national versus provincial roles with the Governor and Chief of Police. To emphasize the importance of the provincial Chiefs of Police, Jabor held a national conference in Baghdad his second week in office. Although rumors and innuendo are always circulating, there is no specific evidence to support widespread concerns of a Shia-led security strategy within the Ministry of Interior (MoI) directed against the Sunni.

There was widespread concern of a Shia security strategy to purge the MoI ranks of Sunnis and implement a MoI de-Ba'athification plan. Jabor was handed a Ministry with serious personnel, leadership, control and financial problems. The proactive agenda pursued by the Minister fits the task of reforming the Ministry; however, the dismissal of Sunni MoI employees, raids on Sunni insurgents and discussions with Shia leaders (such as Grand Ayatollah Sistani) left an impression of a Shia plot against the Sunni.

As of May 31, 2010, there were approximately 464,000 personnel assigned to the MoI. There were approximately 297,000 provincial police forces (IPS and Iraqi Civil Defense Directorate), 115,000 federal forces (FP, DBE, PoED, Facilities Protection Service (FPS), and OP), and 52,000 in the Ministry Headquarters and its functional force directorates. There was a hiring freeze in effect for the IPS. The freeze was necessary to stay within the MoI budget. Although the November 2008 hiring freeze continued to restrict new MoI hiring, the MoI had programmed an increase of 45,000 authorizations in the 2010 budget in order to support new force structure requirements when the OP and Electric Police (EP) were realigned to the MoI in 2009 and 2010 respectively.

Despite the hiring freeze, the MoI had been able to hire selectively to replace attrition due to resignations, retirements, and deaths. Force distribution remains a primary challenge of the MoI HR directorate due to the lack of official personnel requirements and authorizations, and provincial politics. Consistent with the publication of the MoI’s 2010-2012 Strategic Plan in August 2009, the MoI was working a document known as the “Oceans Document” that projects directorate and province authorization levels, prepared and distributed in waves, in conjunction with planning and budget forecasts through year 2012.

The MoI continued to improve its institutional police training capacity. Under the direction of the Training and Qualification Institute (TQI), the MoI developed an extensive curriculum that is in accordance with international standards, and has established institutional instructor/train the trainer standards. The MoI operates three police colleges—Baghdad, Ninewa, and Basrah—that produce police lieutenants using a three-year college-level commissioning program. The Baghdad High Institute, collocated with the Baghdad Police College (BPC), conducts a nine-month commissioning program for college graduates that enter the police force. The federal forces (FP, DBE, and OP) operate training centers throughout the country to meet specific training and mission requirements. All provinces except Baghdad have an IP training center under the direction of the Provincial Director of Police (PDoP) that is capable of conducting the full range of TQI approved courses (basic recruit, specialization, and promotions police courses).

With the MoI’s December 2009 elimination of the training backlog of Shurta (noncommissioned, entry-level policemen and women) requiring Basic Recruit Training (BRT), the focus of training at all of its 36 training centers, including the KRG region, shifted to specialized and advanced training focused on improving the skills of those individuals who have completed BRT. The TQI-approved MoI curriculum catalogue of 92 courses is the cornerstone from which PDoP Training Center Deans select courses required for the continued development of their provincial police forces. Examples of specialized and advanced courses include topics such as human rights, counter explosives, managing a checkpoint, crime scene management, promotion education, and a community-policing course.