Tuesday, November 30, 2010

The programme on the recent allegations against Barkha Dutt, the well-known anchor of NDTV, aired by the NDTV on the night of November30,2010, was not satisfying.

2. Its failure to make an impact can be attributed to the format chosen by the NDTV. They should have chosen the BBC's "Hard Talk" format involving a one-to-one hard-hitting discussion between Barkha and a senior, eminent journalist. The objective should have been to throw light on the allegations levelled against Barkha in connection with her tapped (by the intelligence agencies) telephone conversations with Niira Radia, who runs a consultancy-cum-liaison agency euphemistically called a communications agency based in New Delhi. Two of India's leading corporate houses were among its clients. The conversations between Barkha and Radia related, inter alia, to attempts being made from behind the scenes by either the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), a regional political party of Tamila Nadu, or some corporate houses or both to influnce, through Radia, the Cabinet formation by Dr.Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister, after the elections of 2009. They apparently wanted to ensure that the DMK got its share of portfolios in the coalition Ministry of Dr.Manmohan Singh, including the Telecommunications Ministry, which is the most lucrative Ministry of the Government of India, for A.Raja, who was holding that portfolio for some years before last year's elections.

3. During his first tenure as the Telecommunications Minister, there were serious allegations of improper procedures and favouritism against A.Raja in connection with the allotment of telecom spectrum to mobile operators. It was reported that the Prime Minister was reluctant to retain him in the Telecom Ministry because of the allegations against him. However, he had to give in to the pressure from the DMK and retain Raja. He has recently resigned following more allegations against him corroborated by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, who had gone into the manner in which the Telecom Ministry under A.Raja handled the spectrum allotment. As a result, the Government of India incurred losses amounting to billions of dollars.

4. Radia was apparently approached by elements in the DMK as well as the corporate world, independently of each other, to use her contacts in the decision-making circles of New Delhi to ensure that the DMK's demands were accepted. Radia seems to have had a wide circle of contacts in the world of journalism. She was in the habit of contacting them over phone to seek their help in various matters and allegedly to influence them to write in favour of her clients. There had been instances even in the past of intermediaries seeking to influence business-related decisions. The case of the late Win Chaddha, whose company played an important role in the 1980s in influencing the decision of the Ministry of Defence of the Government of India in favour of the Bofors gun, comes to mind.

5. There were no confirmed instances in the past of such intermediaries seeking to influence political decisions. They restricted themselves to influencing business-related decisions. Radia allegedly sought to influence not only business-related decisions, but also political decisions in matters such as appointment of Cabinet Ministers. Interested people approached her because they believed that she had the capability to influence such decisions. The fact that the DMK approached her shows that her reputation as someone who can influence political decisions was well known not only in the business world, but also in the world of politics.

6. Radia's attempts to influence the Cabinet formation would have remained unknown to the public but for the fact that the Income Tax Department allegedly suspected her company of tax evasion. They obtained the approval of the then Home Secretary of the Government of India to have her telephone tapped by the intelligence agencies in order to look for evidence regarding her alleged tax evasion. Apparently, they could not get any evidence on this score. Otherwise, they should have by now registered a case against her and formally initiated the investigation. However, the intelligence agencies recorded clandestinely near 5000 telephone conversations of Radia with her contacts on various matters.

7. These conversations revealed the extent of her role in seeking to influence political and business-related decisions. It was reported that there were about 15 journalists among those contacted by her. Copies of these recordings would have been available at three places--- the Income-Tax Department, the Intelligence Agency which carried out the tapping and the mobile telephone company or companies whose subscriber Radia was. From one of these sources, the recorded conversations leaked out to two journals, which published the transcripts of about a hundred of them. It needs to be underlined that these tapes were not discovered by the two journals as a result of their journalistic enterprise. These were apparently given to them by an unidentified source for giving publicity to the contents.

8. What could have been the motive of the source in leaking the tapes? Either to discredit Radia and her business clients or to discredit her journalist contacts or both. Of the 15-odd journalists figuring in the conversations, two have received the maximum adverse attention ---- Barkha Dutt and Vir Sanghvi. Barkha is a highly successful TV journalist with a large circle of admirers and critics. Her contribution to making Indian TV journalism reach great heights has been immense. Despite this, she is disliked by many, who accuse her of being pro-Muslim, pro-Pakistan, anti-national, anti-Hindutva, anti-RSS and anti-Narendra Modi, the Chief Minister of Gujarat. In recent months, her ctitics have become even more virulent against her after her active role to highlighting the alleged involvement of some Hindus in acts of terrorism against the Muslims. Her stories on the so-called Hindu terror have added to the enemity against her.

9. It is intriguing that the leakage of her tapped conversations with Radia and the controversay that followed came in the wake of her stories on the alleged Hindu terror. People, who know Barkha well, say that she has some negative traits in her personality too. They allege that she is intimidating and cannot take criticism in her stride. There was one alleged instance of her forcing a blogger, who made a critical posting on her, to apologice in public and remove his posting. Her success as a journalist has also brought in the professional jealousy of some of her colleagues in the profession.

10. Her critics and detractors jumped at the opportunity provided by the tapes in an attempt to put her on the defensive, destroy her credibility and damage her professional reputation. Nobody has accused her of being complicit in any crime by being in touch with Radia. Nobody has accused her of trying to play down or cover up the allegations against A.Raja in her journalist reporting. She has been accused only of letting herself be used by a lobbyist in a manner, which is contrary to the ethics of journalism. Barkha's reply is that she did not let herself be used by Radia, but she was using her contacts with Radia to collect information about the DMK. Barkha has been asked by her critics as to why in that case she did not write about the use of Radia by the DMK to influence the Cabinet formation. This is an unkind question---- as unkind as asking N.Ram, the Editor-in-Chief of "The Hindu", as to why he allegedly let himself be used by the Tamil elements from Sri Lanka as an intermediary with Rajiv Gandhi when he was the Prime Minister in the 1980s? As unkind as asking N.Ram as to why he played down the stories of the mass anti-Chinese uprising in Tibet in 2008? As unkind as asking N.Ram as to why for many years till recently he blacked out references to His Holiness the Dalai Lama in the columns of his paper. As unkind as asking him as to why he used to give publicity in his paper to the despatches of the Xinhua, the news agency owned by the Chinese Government. Ram should be the last person to throw stones at Barkha.

11.Many journalists, who are throwing stones today at Barkha, had themselces acted as intermediaries to some one or the other and allowed their coverage to be influenced by extraneous considerations.

12. A person should be judged not by what he or she says in private, but by what he or she says or writes in public and does.There is nothing inappropriate or unethical in Barkha's writings, reportage and actions. As regards her private conversations with Radia over phone she has explained the background and context and denied any malafide or unethical intention. Her explanation should be accepted instead of trying to fix her through an inquisition. ( 1-12-10)

WikiLeaks claims to be having in its possession about 3000 diplomatic cables exchanged between the US State Department and the US Embassy in New Delhi. These have not so far been released by it. Nor does it appear to have given them to the "New York Times", the "Guardian", "Der Spiegel", "Le Monde" and "El Pais" to whom it had given the cables from the US Embassies in other countries, including China and Pakistan. Otherwise, they would have commented on their contents.

2. In the meanwhile, an editorial carried by "The Hindu" of Chennai on November 30,2010, on the WikiLeaks leakage of other cables ends with the following intriguing words:" When the 3000-odd despatches sent by the US Embassy in India are published over the next 48 hours, it is possible that some or many feathers will end up ruffled. Elements of the strategic partnership---especially those pertaining to defence and the wider set of American goals involved---- remain cloaked in secrecy. Stay tuned to this space."

3. What does this mean? Has WikiLeaks given the cables of the US Embassy in New Delhi to "The Hindu" for initial scrutiny and analysis---either directly or through " The Guardian" with which "The Hindu" has a collaboration agreement? The "New York Times" has stated that it received its share of the documents from "The Guardian" and not directly from WikiLeaks. Have the India-related cables been given to "The Hindu" through "The Guardian" for analysis and comments? (30-11-10)

Monday, November 29, 2010

Wikileaks has released 58 more diplomatic cables.None of them is between the US State Department and the US Embassy in New Delhi. There are some very interesting cables of 2009 relating to the visits of US officials to China and Singapore.

2.The cable from the US Embassy in Singapore on May 30,2009, gives the views of Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister and Minister Mentor to the present Government, on the present situation in China and the Chinese leadership. He was reported to have expressed these views during a meeting with visiting US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg.

3. Lee has been quoted as saying: " Xi Jinping ( My comment: Hu Jintao's expected successor) is a princeling who succeeded despite being rusticated. When the party needed his talents, Xi was brought in as Shanghai Party Secretary. Xi is seen as a Jiang Zemin protege, but in another three and a half years Jiang’s influence will be gone. The focus now is on maintaining the system. There are no more strongmen like Deng Xiaoping. Jiang did not like Hu, but could not stop him, because Hu had the backing of the system and he did not make mistakes. Vice Premier Wang Qishan, whom the MM (Minister Mentor) saw in connection with celebrations in May of the 15th anniversary of Singapore-China Suzhou Industrial Park, is an exceptional talent, very assured and efficient. Wang handled SARS (?) superbly when he was in Hainan. He excelled in coordinating the Beijing Olympics. Li Keqiang may not get the Premiership and the Party is looking for a way to keep Wang on past his 65th birthday until he is 70. MM Lee said he had met first Wang back in the 1990s but had forgotten their meeting. This time when they met, Wang told Lee he had reviewed the records of all Lee’s meetings with Chinese leaders going back to the days of Deng Xiaoping to see how Lee’s thinking had developed. Wang told Lee he respects him as a consistent man. China is following an approach consistent with ideas in the Chinese television series “The Rise of Great Powers.” The mistake of Germany and Japan had been their effort to challenge the existing order. The Chinese are not stupid; they have avoided this mistake. China’s economy has surpassed other countries, with the exceptions of Japan and the United States. Even with those two countries, the gap is closing, with China growing at seven-nine percent annually, versus two-three percent in the United States and Japan. Overall GDP, not GDP per capita, is what matters in terms of power. China has four times the population of the United States. China is active in Latin America, Africa, and in the Gulf. Within hours, everything that is discussed in ASEAN meetings is known in Beijing, given China’s close ties with Laos, Cambodia, and Burma. China will not reach the American level in terms of military capabilities any time soon, but is rapidly developing asymmetrical means to deter U.S. military power. China understands that its growth depends on imports, including energy, raw materials, and food. This is why China is working with South Africa on the China-Africa Development Fund. China also needs open sea lanes. Beijing is worried about its dependence on the Strait of Malacca and is moving to ease the dependence by means like a pipeline through Burma. The best course for the United States on China is to build ties with China’s young people. China’s best and brightest want to study in the United States."

4.A cable of April 30,2009. summarises the views of an unidentified Chinese official at a lunch hosted for him by the US Charge d-Affaires in Beijing.It says: "The Charge expressed concern with China’s defining Tibet as a “core issue” with the apparent expectation that others would “step back.” Instead, our two sides should agree to continue to discuss the issue in an attempt to resolve our differences. The United States recognized that Tibet is a part of China. Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama is a respected religious leader and Nobel Laureate, and U.S. officials meet with him in that capacity. Future meetings by U.S. officials with the Dalai Lama could not be ruled out. Moreover, there were serious concerns among the U.S. public, the Administration and Congress over the situation in Tibetan areas of China. China should take steps to address Tibetans’ legitimate grievances and engage the Dalai Lama’s representatives in productive dialogue. Denying a visa to the Dalai Lama was not being contemplated."

5.During this lunch, the unidentified Chinese official has been quoted as saying as follows: "China was concerned by “momentum” that was building on UN Security Council reform, which was “not good” for the P-5, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. China wanted the United States to maintain its position on UNSC reform and not be “proactive” on the matter, which the PRC feared could result in a UN General Assembly resolution on the subject. The P-5 “club” should not be “diluted,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said. If we end up with a “P-10,” both China and the United States would “be in trouble.” Moreover, it would be difficult for the Chinese public to accept Japan as a permanent member of the UNSC. The Charge replied that the Administration had not completed its policy review on UNSC expansion, so we do not yet have a position on specific proposals. Nonetheless, the United States believed that UN members should be allowed to state their positions freely and openly without undue P-5 influence. Regarding Japan, the Charge said that, while no decision had been made about which countries to support for permanent membership on the UNSC, it was hard to envision any expansion of the Council that did not include Japan, which was the second-largest contributor to the UN budget."

6. A cable of September 29,2009, quotes Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo as telling visiting US Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg as follows:"The U.S.-China relationship was of crucial importance, said Dai. China would do its best to cooperate with the United States wherever possible. “If we expand the pie for the common interest, the pie will be larger and more delicious.” Together, the two sides should work collaboratively for the good of the world, especially since the two countries were “passengers in the same boat.” Dai urged careful management of the relationship and respect for each other’s core interests and concerns."

7. These cables relate to the preparatory meetings held by US officials with their Chinese counterparts before the visit of President Barack Obama to China in November,2009. The atmosphere and cordiality were very good. The Chinese referred to only Tibet and Taiwan as their core interests. They did not refer to the South China Sea as their core interest. It was only subsequently this year that they started referring to the South China Sea also as their core interest. This was one of the factors that contributed to the cooling-off this year. ( 30-11-10)

The leakage by WikiLeaks of over 200,000 diplomatic cables exchanged between the US State Department and its diplomatic missions abroad could have serious implications for US diplomacy and for the US-led war on terror.

2. To be successful and effective, diplomacy has to be confidential. It cannot be conducted in the open. By breaching the confidentiality of diplomatic interactions and communications, WikiLeaks has made it difficult for US diplomats to function as they should. In future, their foreign interlocutors will hesitate to talk to them freely and frankly if they conclude that US diplomats cannot maintain the secrecy of the discussions on sensitive issues. This could also have an effect on the war on terror. The war is being fought not only through operational means, but also through diplomatic means. Diplomacy plays an important role in facilitating international co-operation against terrorism. This role could be made difficult in future.

3. One could note from the documents leaked that many of the important discussions on terrorism were between visiting US officials, including the US Co-ordinator of Counter-Terrorism, and rulers and officials of the countries visited. For example, the Co-ordinator had visited Saudi Arabia and discussed counter-terrorism with the rulers and officials of the Saudi Government. Similarly, he had visited Israel and held discussions with the chief of the Mossad, Israel's external intelligence agency.

4 Senior US officials had discussed counter-terrorism with leaders and officials of other Islamic countries too. The Muslim leaders and officials had discussed matters relating to terrorism freely and frankly with US officials. They had said many things in private about Al Qaeda which they would not have said in public. These cables would be read not only by analysts and media personnel, but also by the leaders of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. When they find that Muslim rulers and officials were very frank with US officials, their anger against them will increase. As it is, Islamic countries are hesitant to co-operate with the US in the war against Al Qaeda. They will be even more hesitant now.

5.WikiLeaks is reported to be having in its possession over 3000 cables exchanged between the US State Department and the US Embassy in New Delhi. It has not yet released them. As such, one does not know their contents. It is likely that some of those messages discuss sensitive matters having a bearing on India's relations with other countries and also touch upon the internal political situation in India. It is the job of diplomats to keep their Foreign Office informed of internal political developments and give their frank assessment of the leadership of the country to which they are accredited. If such frank and sensitice cables leak out, it could damage the mutual trust between the officials and leadership of the two countries.

6. The same applies to any leakage of the diplomatic cables with the US Embassy in Islamabad. In the case of Pakistan, the implications could be more serious because of the US dependence on Pakistan for the war against Al Qaeda and for the operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

7. The cables do not give details of individual intelligence operations except a US exercise to build a data-base of senior officials of the UN Secretariat, presumably to facilitate the operations of the US intelligence in the UN headquarters. The cables do give details of discussions of US diplomats and visiting US officials with senior intelligence officers of some countries. These offiicers and their organisations could withdraw into their shell and may not in future be as forthcoming as they were till now in their interactions with US diplomats and officials.

8. It will be difficult to quantify the damage caused to US diplomacy, but it will be immense. (29-11-10)

Sunday, November 28, 2010

Wikileaks has claimed to have received from its source 251,287 documents, which are mainly diplomatic cables of a classification lower than “Top Secret” exchanged between the US State Department and its diplomatic missions abroad. It has given advance access to these documents to “The New York Times”, the “Guardian” of the UK, “Der Spiegel” of Germany, “Le Monde” of France and “El Pais” of Spain. They have already come out on November 28 with a summary of the significant points in the documents given to them. The summaries published by “The New York Times” and “the Guardian” have been reproduced by “The Hindu” of Chennai on November 29. These summaries do not contain any information or comments, which could embarrass India. According to the media, 3038 of the cables in the possession of Wikileaks were exchanged between the US State Department and the US Embassy in New Delhi. These cables have not been uploaded by Wikileaks . In fact, it has uploaded only 220 of the 251,287cables so far. None of them was from the US Embassy in New Delhi. I had earlier extracted information of interest to India contained in the cables of January and February,2010. Wikileaks does not appear to have received from its source or sources any cables from March, 2010 onwards. Information of interest to India extracted from the cables uploaded by the Wikileaks, which relate to the period between 1966 and December,2009, is extracted below.

2009At the regular meeting of G-5 Ambassadors in Beijing May 8, French DCM Nicholas Chapuis reported that State Councilor Dai Bingguo told visiting former French President Chirac that the West would not gain from more sanctions on North Korea. Dai reportedly said that "the lever of economic development" had not been used effectively in Six-Party Talks and that a U.S.-DPRK dialogue was "the only way to make progress." German Ambassador Michael Schaefer reported that Germany had informed China of the U.S. request to accept some Uighur detainees held at Guantanamo and had been subsequently warned by China of "a heavy burden on bilateral relations" if Germany were to accept any detainees. Japanese DCM Kunio Umeda reported that Premier Wen Jiabao was "tired and seemed under a lot of pressure" during his meeting with visiting Prime Minister Taro Aso, while President Hu Jintao was "relaxed and confident." According to UK DCM Chris Wood, China had requested the UK not allow the Dalai Lama to transit London or meet with any government officials. Wood reported that local authorities in Gansu Province had detained a British Consul, reflecting the authorities' angst over foreigners traveling to the Tibetan regions of the province. End Summary.

¶3. (C) French DCM Nicholas Chapuis reported that President Hu had not mentioned Tibet in his meeting with visiting former French President Jacques Chirac. State Councilor Dai Bingguo had told Chirac that the West would not gain from more sanctions on North Korea and that a U.S.-DPRK dialogue was "the only way to make progress" in Six-Party Talks. Dai reportedly said that North Korea wanted to open up economically and that the "lever of economic development" had not been used effectively in Six-Party Talks. Dai suggested to Chirac that, given China and France's "conflict of interests" in Africa, the two countries should have a dialogue on Africa.

Germany and Guantanamo Uighurs ------------------------------

¶4. (C) German Ambassador Schaefer said the German State Secretary had informed China of the U.S. request to accept some Uighur detainees held at Guantanamo, noting that Germany had not made a decision regarding the Uighurs. He noted that no German state had yet agreed to accept the detainees. Ambassador Schaefer said China had not officially demarched Germany but had warned Germany that accepting any Uighur detainees would "put enormous pressure on Beijing and a heavy burden on bilateral relations."

Sino-Japanese Relations -----------------------

¶5. (C) Japanese DCM Kunio Umeda reported that PM Taro Aso, who had visited Beijing April 29-30, had said Premier Wen Jiabao was "very tired and seemed under a lot of pressure" from dealing with the economic crisis, while President Hu Jintao had seemed "confident and relaxed." PM Aso had requested China not implement its planned compulsory certification of IT products in China, while Premier Wen had insisted the law was consistent with China's WTO commitments.

Dalai Lama ----------

¶6. (C) UK DCM Chris Wood reported that China had requested the UK not allow the Dalai Lama to transit London but softened the demarche by requesting that government officials not meet the Dalai Lama if he were to transit the country. French DCM Nicholas Chapuis said China's demarche was part of a campaign to limit the Dalai Lama's travel and noted that the Beijing city government had threatened to break its sister-city relationship with Paris if the Dalai Lama were to receive an honorary citizen award from the French capital. Ambassador Schaefer said Germany had not received such demands from the Chinese, in spite of the Dalai Lama's frequent trips to Germany.

¶7. (C) UK DCM Wood said UK Energy and Climate Change Secretary Ed Miliband had recently visited Gansu Province and had been accompanied by a British journalist from "The Guardian." According to Woodward, local Chinese authorities had briefly detained a British Consul to express displeasure with the accompanying journalist, who had stayed in Gansu without the authorities' permission after Secretary Miliband had departed. "Local goons" had come to the traveling delegation's hotel and threatened to follow a UK Embassy female staffer (but did not). In addition, a British "Financial Times" reporter in Sichuan had been harassed by local authorities who were apparently upset by the journalist's interest in reporting on schools destroyed during the Sichuan earthquake.

Climate Change --------------

¶8. (C) UK DCM Wood said the UK Environment and Science Minister had recently had talks with Chinese officials on climate change. In the llead up to Copenhagen, China would not agree to targets on emissions but was willing to be constructive and would come to Copenhagen with a package of action items related to nuclear power, renewable energy and reforestation. Wood said his impression was that China could be induced to do more on climate change.

Rule of Law -----------

¶9. (C) Ambassador Schaefer reported that German Minister of Justice Brigitte Zypries recently had visited China to attend a three-day rule of law dialogue on social security and pensions that was attended by 45 Chinese lawyers and judges. Schaefer said Germany and China would have another dialogue on a proposed law on regulating lawyers, noting that the Chinese Government was looking to give lawyers "more space" without giving up control.

IRANIAN BALOCHISTAN

“Iran view from Baku” is the first in an occasional series from Embassy Baku Iran Watcher that will report on short and/or partially documented items of interest to Iran information consumers, but not necessarily warranting separate cables. This cable includes information on reported increasing security problems in Iranian Baluchistan, including alleged disruption of Iran-Pakistan railroad links; a message from a senior GOAJ military offical about the dangers of stirring up Iranian minorities; the apparent quadrupling in first quarter 2009 (compared to first quarter 2008) seizures in Azerbaijan of Iranian- transited heroin; and skepticism about Iranian gas export contracts, related by industry participants at the recently-completed Baku Oil and Gas show. End Summary.Baluchi Violence Obstructing Iran-Pakistan Rail Link?--------------------------------------------- ------- ¶2. (C) Several Iranian contacts, including apolitical businessmen, have told Baku Iran watcher that the recent suicide bombing of a Sh’ia mosque, and subsequent attack on a campaign center in Zahedan, reflect a surge in Baluchi violence in the border area and inside Pakistan that has been building steadily over several years. According to one source, the Iranian security forces may be losing effective control over growing areas in the countryside. All noted that the rising violence in Iranian Baluchistan is mirrored and influenced by similar events on the Pakistani side of the border (recently described in ref(a)).¶3. (C) One alleged result is the apparent postponement of completion of the long-planned improved rail link between Pakistan and Iran, designed to run through or near Baluchi territory on both sides of the border. The current rail connection, running between Quetta, Pakistan and Zahedan, Iran is in poor condition and has low freight-carrying capacity. Moreover, according to reports it has recently been repeatedly subject to rocket attacks and other disruption by Baluchi tribes. An improved link also traversing Iranian and Pakistani Baluchi areas was originally supposed to have been inaugurated in March, 2009, with container train service beginning in August. According to Iranian sources in Baku, this deadline is unlikely to be achieved, and regular use of the Iran-Pakistan railway for significant cargo shipment is unlikely in the foreseeable future.¶4. (S)[Source removed] quoted the Ministry source as saying that in 2008 Iran asked Pakistan to establish a new, “more secure and modern” route, but that Pakistan has so far refused. The source added that Tehran is rife with rumors about the increasing lack of safety in Baluchi areas, and claimed that many guard and police posts in Sistan-Baluchistan areas are no longer occupied at night due to the increased danger of attack.¶5. (C) Another source, [Source removed] blamed the Ahmadinejad administration for pursuing provocative anti-Sunni practices (including harassment of Sunni clergy and congregations and raids on Sunni mosques) and other “arrogant” crackdowns over the last few years. He claimed that these practices, combined with high unemployment, perceived discrimination,and few government services, has increased anger among Baluchis, and identification of the central government as an “enemy.” He cited the appointment of Ahmadinejad ally Habibullah Dehmordah as a Governor of Sistan-Baluchistan as a typical insensitive blunder, calling him a “stupid, brutal, Sunni-hater.” (Note: Dehmordah was replaced as Governor in 2008 by Ali-Mohammed Azad. End Note).GOAJ Military Figure Opposes Promoting Unrest in Iran--------------------------------------------- -------- ¶6. (S) At a 12 May meeting with a visiting group of 16 U.S. military general officers, the GOAJ’s Special Assistant to the President for Defense, General Vahid Aliyev, related that he had recently met in Iranian Azerbaijan with (unnamed) high-ranking &Iranian General.8 Although he did not provide details, Aliyev strongly implied that the Iranian General raised alleged “foreign-sponsored” efforts to foment unrest among Iranian ethnic groups, including Iranian Azerbaijanis (who make up nearly thirty percent of the Iranian population). Commenting on this issue, Aliyev asserted that “there have been four attempts by Iranian Azerbaijanis to assert autonomy in the last hundred years all of which were crushed” by the Iranian state. As an example, Aliyev cited the Soviet effort during World War II to establish a breakaway “Republic of South Azerbaijan.” The Soviets forces pulled back in 1946, after a “Truman-Stalin Agreement,” which Aliyev depicted as a cynical “betrayal” of collaborating Iranian Azerbaijanis. He recounted that the resulting repression by Tehran resulted in the deaths of 60,000 Azeris, and the flight of many more into Soviet Azerbaijan.¶7. (S) U.S. military participants agreed that Aliyev appeared to be implicitly signaling that outside fomenting of unrest in Iranian Azerbaijan is opposed by the GOAJ. Aliyev similarly told the U.S. officers that any foreign war with Iran will be bad for Azerbaijan, and result in a flood of refugees entering the country. (Note: The three other “failed Azerbaijani autonomy struggles” cited by Aliyev presumably refer to the early 20th century Constitutional Revolution, Azerbaijani resistance to Reza Shah’s centralization policies in the 1920’s, and efforts by senior Azerbaijani clerics and activists to obtain local autonomy in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. End note).GOAJ Iran-Origin Heroin Seizures Continue Rise--------------------------------------------- - ¶8. (C) According to [Source removed], export of narcotics from Iran into Azerbaijan continue to skyrocket (see ref b). According to statistics provided to Baku Iran watcher on June 3, 2009 by the UNODC-sponsored counter-narcotics “Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center” (CARICC) headquarters in Tashkent, Iran-origin heroin seizures (i.e., heroin derived from Afghani and Pakistani opium that entered Azerbaijan from Iran) in Azerbaijan nearly quadrupled during the first quarter of 2009, as compared to the first quarter of 2008. According to the GOAJ, virtually all of this heroin had been fully processed in labs and was “ready for market.” Total heroin seizures in Azerbaijan during the first quarter of 2008 reflected a sharp increase over the first quarter of 2007; while in 2006 only twenty kilograms of such heroin was officially reported seized in Azerbaijan during the entire year. In contrast, reported GOAJ seizures of Iran-origin heroin during the first quarter of 2009 amounted to nearly 59,000 kilos, as compared to approximately 15,000 kilos of heroin seized in the first quarter of 2008.

CHINA-IRAN

China is biding its time until the political crisis in Iran reaches a clearer resolution and the Ahmadinejad government consolidates power, and will signal its renewed engagement by sending a high-level delegation to Tehran once the political situation has been resolved, according to an MFA official. Our contact reaffirmed China's commitment to the P5-plus-1 process and assessed that Iran is attempting to keep the door to negotiation with the United States open despite the turmoil surrounding the June election, but cautioned that a complete halt to uranium enrichment is an unattainable goal. China continues to urge Iran to respond positively to the P5-plus-1 offer for talks, and these entreaties have been passed directly to Supreme Leader Khamenei. Iran reportedly requested to upgrade its relationship with Beijing to a "strategic partnership," but China refused. A Communist Party official told us that the CCP is seeking to increase its relations with six major political parties and factions in Iran and deepen its understanding of U.S. policy in the Middle East. He repeated China's standard position on the Iran nuclear issue and suggested that the U.S. offer economic incentives to persuade the Iranians to enter into talks on the nuclear issue. He dismissed concerns that negative perceptions in the Middle East of China after the July violence in Xinjiang province would affect China's diplomacy with Iran. END SUMMARY.

Holding Back Bilaterally until Political Dust Settles --------------------------------------------- --------

¶3. (C) MFA Iran Division Deputy Director Ni said that the political turmoil in Iran had yet to settle and that China was still waiting for the situation to calm further before re-engaging fully in bilateral relations. He argued that the internal divisions that had played out in the June presidential elections had existed well before the violent aftermath of the June election. China had been aware of the potential for conflict among those divisions to spill into the street and had taken a cautious approach before the election. He said that the Chinese government understood that the election was a strong indication of deep-seated divisions within the Iranian government, but stressed that the contested election had not fundamentally undermined the current government and that China would continue with its normal engagement with Tehran.

¶4. (C) China would signal its re-engagement, Ni reported, with a high-level delegation to Tehran, but there was no timetable for such a visit yet because the leadership in Tehran was still fully focused on consolidating power. He noted that during his mid-August visit to Iran, protestors had continued to take to the selection. Ni reaffirmed China's commitment to the P5-plus-1 process, stressing that the U.S. and China not only had common interests in Iran, but the scope of this common interest was increasing.

Iran Keeping the Door Open? ---------------------------

¶5. (C) Ni said that China had taken note of efforts by the Iranian government to keep a path open to direct negotiations despite the ongoing political turmoil. He claimed that Tehran had refrained from overplaying its accusations of the U.S. role in the election turmoil, preferring to point the finger at European countries, indicating that the Iranian leadership was interested in maintaining the possibility of direct talks. Ni said that the election had caused the Iranian leadership to reexamine seriously its foreign policy, particularly on the nuclear issue, adding that Iran's nuclear development had suffered technical setbacks recently, which had also forced the leadership to consider how to move forward.

China Lobbying but Total Halt to Enrichment Unattainable --------------------------------------------- -----------

¶6. (C) Ni reported that China continued to urge Iran at every level of their engagement to respond positively to the P53-plus-1 offer of direct talks and cease uranium enrichment activities. He said that Chinese leaders had pointed out to their Iranian counterparts on many occasions that the United States had shown "restraint" in its public comments during the June election aftermath, and that Iran was missing an important opportunity by refusing to respond to the P5-plus-1 offer. Ni said that China's message encouraging greater engagement had been passed directly to Supreme Leader Khamenei. He cautioned that Tehran would not be able to respond positively to P5-plus-1 overtures until it had reinforced its position at home, and that a "100-percent" halt to uranium enrichment had become an unattainable goal. Ni said that China continued to believe that fresh sanctions would be ineffective in persuading Iran to cease enrichment activities and would be counter-productive by increasing the unity of the various factions in Iran behind the nuclear program and the current government. Ni argued that the regime in Iran would emerge from the crisis in a weakened position and thus more likely to negotiate with the P5-plus-1 on the nuclear issue.

¶7. (C) Ni said that Iran had requested that Beijing upgrade its relationship with Tehran, presumably to counter Western pressure, by lobbying Beijing to label its relationship with Iran a "strategic partnership" as it does for Russia and other countries. Ni said that China had so far refused to do so and Iran was frustrated with China's continuing insistence that the two countries shared merely "normal" relations.

Party Seeks to Increase its Interaction with Iran --------------------------------------------- ----

¶8. (C) CCP Central Committee International Liaison Department (CCID) Third Bureau (West Asia and North Africa) Director Wu Baocai told PolOff August 31 that the CCP was seeking to increase its relations with six major political parties and factions in Iran. He noted that links between the CCP and Iranian political parties had lagged behind the growth in relations between executive branches and far behind the increase in economic links. He said that deepening understanding among the CCP leadership of the U.S. position on Iran was another emerging priority for his office and that he was open to continued exchanges with the U.S. on the nuclear issue.

¶9. (C) Wu said that CCP officials were increasingly concerned through 2008 at the possibility of the United States taking military action against Iran's nuclear program but assessed that such a possibility was much lower in 2009. He noted that sanctions had not only failed to change Iranian behavior and create meaningful effects in Iran but were negatively affecting the countries joining in the international effort to persuade Iran to stop its nuclear activities, citing as an example constraints placed on Chinese banks from doing business with Iran. He said that he believed the international community was unlikely to be able to persuade Iran to fully abandon its enrichment activities and suggested the U.S. offer modest economic benefits as an incentive to persuade Iran to enter into dialogue. Wu reiterated China's strong opposition to Iran using its nuclear technology to develop nuclear weapons but stressed the right of all countries to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

FRENCH LEAKS TO CHINA

In the interest of transparency and enhanced cooperation on nonproliferation matters, we would like to share the following information:

-- We have information that the French firm Sofradir and its subsidiary Ulis continue to sell both cooled and uncooled infrared detectors to China's Zhejiang Dali Technology Company Ltd for incorporation into thermal imaging systems.

-- Diversion of the subject components could be harmful to our shared national security interests. If these IRDs were included in the optical targeting mechanism for tanks and air defense systems, they could potentially be used to degrade US superiority in night combat operations.

-- We ask that you carefully consider the consequences of such sales.

-- We also welcome any further information about this case that may come to light in the course of any French investigation into the matter.

2007

In an August 17 meeting, Israeli Mossad Chief Meir Dagan thanked Under Secretary Burns for America's support of Israel as evidenced by the previous day's signing of an MOU that provides Israel with USD 30 billion in security assistance from 2008-2018. Dagan provided his assessment of the Middle East region, Pakistan and Turkey,

¶16. (S) On Pakistan, Dagan said that President Musharraf is losing control, and that some of his coalition partners could threaten him in the future. The key question, Dagan said, is whether Musharraf retains his commander-in-chief role in addition to his role as president. If not, he will have problems. Dagan observed that there has been an increase in the number of attempts on Musharraf's life, and wondered whether he will survive the next few years. Under Secretary Burns replied that South Asia has assumed vital importance in American foreign policy since September 11. The U.S. is committed to denying Afghanistan as a safe-haven for Taliban and Al-Qaeda activity. The USG will continue to support Pakistani President Musharraf, and is seeking to boost his military defensive capabilities. At the same time, the U.S. is encouraging Pakistan and Afghanistan to work with each other militarily. Turning to India, Under Secretary Burns noted that U.S.-Indian economic cooperation is growing, and that the USG is working effectively to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan.

CHINA-IRAN

IN SEPTEMBER DURING THEIR MEETING AT THE APEC SUMMIT IN SYDNEY AUSTRALIA, PRESIDENT BUSH DISCUSSED WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT HU STRONG CONCERNS RELATING TO THE ONGOING TRANSSHIPMENT VIA BEIJING OF KEY BALLISTIC MISSILE PARTS FROM NORTH KOREA TO IRAN'S MISSILE PROGRAM. PRESIDENT BUSH PLEDGED TO RESPOND TO PRESIDENT HU'S REQUESTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. EMBASSY SHOULD ON NOVEMBER 3 AT THE MOST EFFECTIVE LEVEL POSSIBLE, DELIVER THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 8 WHICH RELATES TO SPECIFIC, TIME- SENSITIVE INFORMATION ABOUT AN IMMINENT TRANSSHIPMENT. IN ADDITION, AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY POST SHOULD DELIVER THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 9 TO MFA AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY BY THE AMBASSADOR SINCE THIS IS IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS.

---------- OBJECTIVES ----------

¶2. (S/REL CHINA) Post should:

--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Request China to stop an imminent shipment to Iran's ballistic missile program. This is the same cargo that the Ambassador shared about on October 25 (ref E). It is now scheduled to leave Beijing airport on November 4.

--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Note the importance of this demarche since it relates to a topic discussed by Presidents Bush and Hu in Sydney. Embassy should further note that the Embassy will be seeking an appointment at the highest level possible to convey a more extensive presentation on this topic of ballistic missile parts from North Korea to Iran.

--Remind Chinese officials that President Bush has been personally engaged on the issue of the transshipment of ballistic missile parts between North Korea and Iran via Beijing and that he raised this issue with President Hu at the APEC Summit.

-- Seek information on the steps China has taken since the APEC discussion to address this issue and impress on them the necessity for China to take immediate strong action.

-- Stress that the credibility of UN Security Council actions must be maintained by vigorous implementation by UN Member States of UNSC resolutions calling for Chapter VII sanctions, particularly 1718, 1737, and 1747.

--Indicate that the U.S. believes that the proliferation of missile technology between North Korea and Iran will increase and that these two countries will attempt to conduct these trantransfers through Chinese territory.

--Emphasize the need to inspect cargo and personal goods on regularly scheduled flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to Iran in order to detect and deter these shipments.

--Explain to Chinese officials that the U.S. carefully reviews the intelligence material that we have on shipments before we share it, and we ask that Chinese authorities respect this and act on our information accordingly and appropriately.

--Indicate that the United States believes that we can work together cooperatively and effectively on these issues.

--Express our willingness to continue to share as much information as possible to assist China's efforts to uphold these UN Security Council resolutions.

¶3. (S/Rel China) Iran and North Korea have continued their longstanding cooperation on ballistic missile technology, via air- shipments of ballistic-missile related items. We assess that some of these shipments consist of ballistic missile jet vanes that frequently transit Beijing on regularly scheduled flights on Air Koryo and Iran Air. We believe that the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is the probable end user for these parts. SBIG is listed in the annex to UNSCR 1737 and these jet vanes are controlled under Item 10.A.2 of the Missile Technology Control Regime and Item 6 of China's missile- related export control regulations. Moreover, UNSCRs 1718 and 1737 prohibit the transfer to or from North Korea or Iran, respectively, of jet vanes and any other item listed in UNSC document S/2006/815. These shipments therefore represent violations of UNSCRs 1718 and ¶1737.

¶4. (S/Rel China) The U.S. has raised this issue with China at the highest levels several times in the last few months. In May 2007, the United States informed China of imminent shipments on three separate occasions (Refs A,B and C). Though Chinese officials informed Embassy Beijing that China's investigations have found no evidence of these transfers, it appears that these shipments did occur and are continuing to transit via Beijing. In addition this issue was raised by ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney during bilateral nonproliferation talks in August 2007 (Ref D). The Deputy Secretary also raised this issue with Executive Vice Foreign Minister (EVFM) Dai Bingguo via during a telephone conversation in August. Finally, in September 2007, President Bush discussed this issue with Chinese President Hu at the APEC summit in Sydney. The two leaders agreed that the USG would provide the PRC with further information on these transfers.

¶5. (S/Rel China) On October 25 the U.S. provided PRC officials with detailed information, including the airway bill and flight number, of another imminent shipment of military related goods from North Korea to Iran via Beijing. This shipment was also assessed as destined for Iran's solid propellant missile development organization, the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG). We now have information that the goods will be shipped on November 4 and insist on a substantive response from China to this information.

¶6. (S/Rel China) Our information indicates that at least 10 air shipments of jet vanes have transited Beijing thus far and that these shipments will not only continue but will also grow in volume. We have encouraged the Chinese to undertake frequent inspections of cargo on Air Koryo or Iran Air flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to both deter and detect these shipments.

¶7. (S/Rel China) The Department is seeking both immediate action on this new information and a strategic approach with regards to this critical issue. We assess that the best way to prevent these shipments in the future is for Chinese authorities to take action, such as those identified in para 9, that will make the Beijing airport a less hospitable transfer point.

--------------------------------------------- -------- NON-PAPER ON URGENT MATTER TO BE DELIVERED NOVEMBER 3 --------------------------------------------- --------

¶8. (S/Rel China) Begin points:

-- Last week we raised with you information regarding North Korean plans to send a shipment, probably for Iran's ballistic missile program, to Iran. We believe the cargo is intended for Iran's Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran's solid-propellant ballistic missile program. You had requested additional information.

-- We now have reason to believe that the items above will be shipped to Iran via scheduled Iran Air flight on November 4.

--If these goods are missile-related, North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile-related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those items. In addition, North Korea would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these concerns in mind we are asking that Chinese authorities investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran.

--Over the past several months we have raised with Chinese officials the problem of ballistic missile-related transfers between Iran and North Korea being transshipped through China. President Bush raised U.S. concerns on this matter with President Hu during the APEC summit in Sydney, demonstrating the importance of the issue to the United States. In response to President Hu's request for additional details, we are providing you further information regarding these activities. Specifically, we are urgently providing information regarding an imminent shipment of serious concern.

-- North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile- related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those items. In addition, North Korea would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these concerns in mind we are insisting that Chinese authorities urgently investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran.

--We are very concerned that North Korean shipments of jet vanes occur on regularly scheduled commercial air flights transiting through Beijing. We believe this has been the case on about 10 flights.

--We have identified a large number of shipments beginning late last year of what are probably ballistic missile-related items that have transited Beijing, and we would like to share further information on these shipments.

--14 December 2006: A delegation from SBIG returned from Pyongyang probably via Beijing and transported what we assess to be jet vanes for a solid propellant medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) under development in Iran.

--On or about 15 January 2007: North Korea delivered what were probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or around 23 January 2007: North Korea delivered what were probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about 16 May 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about 24 May 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about 6 June 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

-- On or about 12 June 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about 14 June 2007: An air shipment composed of three what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about 14 July 2007: An air shipment composed of ten what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about 26 July 2007: An air shipment possibly composed of an unknown number of jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about 22 August: An air shipment possibly composed of one jet vane from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--We believe that the number of jet vanes sent to Iran will increase dramatically in the future.

--To date we believe that about 40 probable jet vanes have been sent from North Korea to Iran.

--The contract for these components called for a total number of 500 and we assess that shipments of these may increase to a rate of 100- 160 per month.

--In addition, our information indicates that a second order of 1,500 components - possibly additional jet vanes - was agreed to in December of last year.

-- We believe that this trade will continue to utilize regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--As we have discussed on several occasions, Iran also has been seeking probable tungsten-copper alloy plates from China's Dalian Sunny Industries, also known as LIMMT. Dalian Sunny Industries shipped part of an order for this material in September. These plates are suitable for Iranian domestic production of jet vanes or as an insulator for ballistic missile components. Iran could be seeking these plates in case North Korea is unable to provide the quantity or quality of jet vanes required.

--We urge you to prevent such shipments via whatever action you deem appropriate, including frequent inspection of Iran Air and Air Koryo flights. The use of regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights indicates that frequent regular inspections of Iran Air flights and Air Koryo flights are in order and would help deter these shipments in the future.

--We will continue to provide you with relevant information to help end this proliferation.

¶5. (C) Ambassador asked about MbZ's visit the week before to Lahore to meet with Pakistani President Musharraf. MbZ chuckled and asked why the USG "always" convinced the Pakistanis to delay news of the capture of senior Al Qaeda operatives such as Abu Faraj al Libbi. MbZ went on to congratulate Washington for its decision to allow U.S. firms to bid for contracts to provide F-16s and other defense technology to Pakistan. It was important to support Musharraf as he battled the terrorists, he emphasized. While the Indians had and would continue to balk at the decision, the region needed Musharraf to stay strong. There was no alternative leader in sight, MbZ opined. Besides, he continued, the F-16 decision would not tip the military balance between India and Pakistan. Even if it had, India's strength as a stable democracy would ensure that it would not ever be in as "risky" a situation as its neighbor. MbZ then slapped his knee and said "you,ll never guess what Musharraf asked me...he asked me whether the UAE had received approval for the Predator!" (Note: the USG's inability to meet the UAE's request for an armed Predator remains a sore point for MbZ, although he has not directly raised the issue with us for some time.)

¶10. (C) Wu dismissed concerns that dismay in Iran and other parts of the Middle East over China's treatment of ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang province would complicate China's diplomacy with Iran. While acknowledging that some high-level religious leaders in Iran had been highly critical of China in the wake of the July violence in Xinjiang, he said that Beijing was seeking to counter the danger of China becoming a target for anger in the Muslim world by significantly increasing its media outreach in the Middle East, citing the recent establishment of an Arabic-language version of government-run CCTV.

The documents so far uploaded by Wikileaks relate to the period from the year 1966 to February-end, 2010. There are no documents relating to the period after February,2010. Information of interest to India taken from the documents of 2010 is extracted below. There are no documents relating to India during this period.

The U.S. has information indicating that in December 2009, the Chinese company HongKong 4 Star Electronics Ltd. offered to sell gyroscopesproduced by a Russian company to Iran's Isfahan OpticsIndustries. Our information indicates that these gyroscopescould be delivered to Iran in early February 2010 and thatIsfahan Optics Industries was coordinating this transactionthrough an intermediary named Iran Business (IBco). Becausekey missile development organizations in Iran previously haveattempted to procure similar gyroscopes, we are concernedthis equipment potentially could be diverted tomissile-related end-users. We therefore want to alertChinese officials to this information and ask that theyinvestigate this activity with a view to preventing Hong Kong4 Star Electronics Ltd. from facilitating missile-relatedexports to Iran.

In December 2009, the United States shared with China information regarding attempts bythe Malaysia-based firm Electronics Component Limited (ECL)to buy TRS-500 gyroscopes from the Chinese firm VibTelIndustrial Co. Inc. (Ref A). These gyroscopes, which arecontrolled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)and China's missile-related export controls, would besuitable for use in the guidance systems of ballisticmissiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Werequested China investigate this information because ECL isassociated with a network of Iranian-controlled frontcompanies that procure sensitive goods on behalf of a numberof Iranian entities of proliferation concern.

¶3. (S) Chinese officials agreed to investigate thisinformation, but asked for additional details on ECL'srelationships with firms in Iran (Ref B). To support theirefforts in this case, we would like to inform them that ECLis part of a network of Iranian-controlled front companiesthat includes the Iranian firm Shahin Sefid Esta and theMalaysia-based front company Skylife Worldwide Sdn Bhd. Thisnetwork procures sensitive goods on behalf of a number ofIranian entities of proliferation concern, including theUnited Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)1737-designated entities Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group(SHIG) and Ya Mahdi Industries. We want to provide thisinformation to Chinese officials and emphasize that webelieve the transfer of this controlled equipment to acompany linked to UNSCR-designated entities would beprohibited pursuant to UNSCR 1737.

CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with KingAbdullah and FM Prince Saud Al-Faisal on January 13, duringthe last stop of a five nation Africa and Middle East tour.During the visit, FM Yang discussed deepening Saudi-Chineseties in a variety of fields, emphasizing trade, inparticular, with his Saudi counterparts. Responding tostatements made by FM Saud, Yang also briefly discussedChinese support for Iraq, concern about Iranian nuclearambitions, and hopes for the Middle East Peace Process. FMYang's foray into regional political commentary appears tohave been a result of FM Saud's prodding, both publicly andbehind closed doors, and is a reflection of the developingSaudi-Chinese relationship.END SUMMARY.

TRADE TAKES PRECEDENCE----------------------

¶2. (U) FM Yang arrived in Riyadh on January 13, the firsthigh-level visit since Chinese President Hu Jintao's February2009 "Trip of Friendship and Cooperation." FM Yang's visitcoincided with the 20th anniversary of Saudi-Chinesediplomatic relations, and followed three days after ChineseTrade Minister Chen Deming co-chaired the 4th session of theSaudi-Chinese Joint Commission in Riyadh.

¶3. (U) The Chinese Foreign Minister has traditionally madehis first overseas trip of the new year to Africa, visitingwith African leaders and expressing Chinese goodwill andimprovements in trade relations. This year, FM Yang extendedhis visit to include not only major trading partners likeNigeria, Kenya and Morocco, but also Saudi Arabia. In aJanuary 13 statement to the press, FM Yang stressed theimportance of strengthening cooperation in "energy,infrastructure, finance and science andtechnology." He said that both sides should carry outcultural and education exchanges to deepen the bilateralrelationship and pressed the need for closer relationsbetween China and the GCC.

¶4. (U) These statements echoed similar announcements fromChinese Trade Minister Chen who, in a January 10 pressconference, called for finalizing the Chinese-GCC free tradeagreement and increasing bilateral trade by 50%, from a totalannual value of $40 billion to $60 billion, over the nextfive years (ref A). During the Joint Commission meeting,Saudi Minister of Finance Ibrahim Al-Assaf reportedly urgedthe Chinese to participate in more joint ventures, notingthat while bilateral trade increased 25 times over the pastten years, the two countries only have 19 joint projects.Al-Assaf also welcomed China's 44 billion riyal ($11.7billion) worth of infrastructure projects in the Kingdom.

DUMPING CAUSES A BUMP---------------------

¶5. (C) This call to increase Sino-Saudi trade comes on theheels of a December 24 announcement that China would imposeanti-dumping tariffs of up to 13.6 percent on Saudi andTaiwan-produced butanediol. Beijing began a dumping probe onmethanol and butanediol (BDO) from Saudi Arabia in July,which caused an unusually public trade spat between the twocountries (ref B). Methanol and butanediol make up 10 to 15percent of Saudi Arabia's $2 billion in annual non-oilexports to China. A Ministry of Commerce and Industryofficial told Econoffs on January 13 that Saudi Arabia wasable to convince the Chinese not to impose tariffs onmethanol, but said the BDO case was still pending. TheMinistry recently appointed a new Deputy Minister forTechnical Affairs, Dr. Hamad Al-Awfy, who will handle allanti-dumping issues, he said.Al-Awfy previously complainedto EconCouns that the SAG was increasingly frustrated by thegrowing number of Saudi companies complaining about Chinesedumping in Saudi Arabia. Other senior SAG officials havecaustically complained about the low quality of Chineseconstruction and the "short-term, extractive" approach ofChinese companies to investments in Saudi Arabia.

A MATURING ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP?---------------------------------

¶6. (C) China recently surpassed the U.S. as the largestimporter of Saudi oil. Saudi Arabia's investments in Chinahave increased significantly over the last few years,including a $3.5 billion refinery in Fujian and a $2.86billion joint-venture petrochemical complex in Tianjin.Additionaly, President Hu Jintao commemorated the opening ofa cement plant when he visited Saudi Arabia in February 2009. Saudi Arabia,s more forward-leaning approach, includinglarge-scale investments in China, indicates a maturing of thebilateral relations and assumes a more pro-active, ratherthan reactive, role towards economic engagement. (Note:China is now the SAG's number two trade partner after theU.S. Saudi-Chinese bilateral trade was estimated at $40billion in 2008, while Saudi-U.S. trade was estimated at $67billion during the same time period. End note.)

FM SAUD PRODS, FM YANG RESPONDS-------------------------------

¶7. (U) While trade issues dominated FM Yang's agenda, both heand FM Prince Saud-Al Faisal commented on the regionalpolitical landscape in a press conference that followed theirbilateral meeting. FM Saud spoke out against Israelidefiance of UN Security Council resolutions and called onChina, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to"deal with world disputes in accordance to internationallegitimacy...as stipulated in the Arab Peace Initiative."The meetings with FM Yang were "part of a framework ofcoordination and consultation," FM Saud continued, thatincluded not only the Palestinian cause but also Iran'snuclear file, Iraq and Yemen. In particular, he emphasizedChina's role as a member of the P5 plus 1 group and theirresponsibility "to solve the (Iranian nuclear) crisis throughdialogue and peaceful means. "Our two nations are keen thatthe Middle East and the Gulf should be free of all weapons ofmass destruction, including nuclear weapons," he stressed.

¶8. (U) In response to FM Saud's comments, FM Yang said Chinacalled for serious negotiations between Israel and Palestinethat would carry out the peace process and establish theState of Palestine. "China is ready for cooperation with theworld community to work for stability in the Middle East," headded. In regard to Iraq, he said that China extendedassistance by reducing Iraqi debt obligations to China andforging trade agreements between Iraqi and Chinese companies. With respect to Iran, FM Yang said the Iranian file shouldbe solved through "political diplomatic channels which helpstabilize the situation in the region."

¶9. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Prince Torki told visitingNEA A/S Feltman on January 26 (ref C) that FM Saud hadpressed the Chinese Foreign Minister hard on the need to bemore active in working with the rest of the internationalcommunity and the UN Security Council to counter the threatof Iran developing a nuclear weapon. FM Saud told FM Yangthat Saudi Arabia was convinced Iran intended to develop anuclear weapon, despite its assurances, and that onlyconcerted international action could stop that. While noexplicit bargain was discussed, Dep FM Torki explained thatSaudi Arabia understood China was concerned about havingaccess to energy supplies, which could be cut off by Iran,and wanted to attract more trade and investment. SaudiArabia was willing to provide assurances on those scores toChina, but only in exchange for tangible Chinese actions torestrain Iran,s drive for nuclear weapons.

COMMENT:--------

¶9. (C) Since King Abdullah's historic visit to Beijing inJanuary 2006, the Saudi-Chinese relationship has focusedpredominantly on energy and trade. However, the relationshipmay be showing signs of political evolution. While theChinese would likely prefer to stay away from politicalcontroversy, their economic power and permanent seat on theUN Security Council has made it more and more difficult forthem to avoid politics altogether.

¶10. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The incentives for the Saudis totry and leverage their economic relationship with China forpolitical gain with respect to sensitive regional issues,such as Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, aresignificant and growing. After patiently focusifocusing onbuilding the economic relationsip since 2006, FM Saud,spublic and private prodding of FM Yang indicates the Saudisare ready to try and cash in some political chips.

Wikileaks announced through Twitter on November 22,2010, that it will be shortly releasing its third instalment of classified US documents.

2. The first instalment of 77,000 documents related to Afghanistan. The second instalment of 400,000 documents related to Iraq. According to the Twiiter message, its third instalment will contain a much larger number of documents.

3. Wikileaks did not say in its message what will be the subject-matter of the third instalment. However, a Reuters despatch from Washington DC said that classified US diplomatic cables reporting corruption allegations against foreign governments and leaders are expected in the official documents that Wikileaks plans to release. It added: "Three sources familiar with the US State Department cables held by Wikileaks say the corruption allegations in them are major enough to cause serious embarrassment for foreign governments and politicians named in them. They said the release was expected next week, but it could come earlier. The detailed, candid reports by US diplomats also may create foreign policy complications for the administration of US President Barack Obama, the sources said. Among the countries whose politicians feature in the reports are Russia, Afghanistan and former Soviet republics in Central Asia. But other reports also detail potentially embarrassing allegations reported to Washington from US diplomats in other regions, including East Asia and Europe. State Department spokesman Philip J. Crowley said Washington was assessing the implications of what Wikileaks may reveal and was notifying foreign governments about the possible release. "We wish that this would not happen, but we are obviously prepared for the possibility that it will," he said.

4.The media has reported that the US has warned India and other key governments across the world about the expected release. Crowley has been quoted as saying: "We have reached out to India to warn them about a possible release of documents." Among other Governments reportedly cautioned are those of Israel, Russia, Turkey, Canada and the UK.

5. After October last year when Wikileaks reportedly developed electronic access to the data bases of the US State Department and the Pentagon and the US military formations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US authorities were reported to have tightened document security to prevent further leaks. If this tightening has been effective, it is likely that the latest load of documents acquired by Wikileaks related to the period before October last year.

6.While corruption allegations as collected by the US Embassis in these countries could form a part of these documents, it is likely that considering the large number of documents mentioned by Wikileaks, the documents also cover US Embassy reporting on other subjects. Previously, Pakistan's relations with the US were the focus of Wikileaks. It now seems to be focusing on India's relations with the US too. It is, therefore, possible that in addition to corruption involving Indian personalities, the documents about India which have reached Wikileaks also relate to India's policies on Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran.

7. Among the various events relating to Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran in which India figured during this period, four could be sensitive from India's point of view. Firstly, the pressure on the Atal Behari Vajpayee Government by the administration of George Bush to send a Division of the Indian Army to Iraq. By July,2003, the Vajpayee Government had decided to say no to Washington DC, but there was a lot of voices in Delhi in favour of accepting the US request. Secondly, the papers captured by the US intelligence after the occupation of Iraq from the Iraqi Government Departments showing or corroborating the alleged involvement of a leader or leaders of the Congress (I) in contacts with the Saddam Hussein Government for acquiring preferential quotas for the import of oil from Iraq (the oil for food scandal). Thirdly, the pressure exercised by the Bush Administration on the Manmohan Singh Government for voting against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. The Government of India succumbed to this pressure as a quid pro quo for the Indo-US civil nuclear co-operation agreement of July,2005. Fourthly, the analysis and assessment made in the State Department and the Pentagon regarding Pakistani allegations of Indian involvement in Balochistan.

8. Is it possible that Wikileaks might have also got hold of diplomatic cables between the US Embassy in New Delhi and Washinton DC on Indian political leaders, bureaucrats and policy-making? Has it also got hold of messages sent by the US Embassy in New Delhi to Washington DC about the escape of Major Rabinder Singh, the mole of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Research & Analysis Wing, to the US in 2004 and about the detection by the Indian counter-intelligence of a US mole in the sensitive National Security Council Secretariat in 2006? The documents to be released by Wikileaks need to be carefully scrutinised.. ( 28-11-10)

Saturday, November 27, 2010

The media has reported that the US has warned India and other key governments across the world about a new potentially embarrassing release of classified documents by the whistle-blowing website WikiLeaks which may harm the American interests and create tension in its ties with its "friends". State Department Spokesman P J Crowley has been quoted as saying: ""We have reached out to India to warn them about a possible release of documents."

2. Naturally, there has been considerable speculation as to what could be the contents of the leaks that could embarrass India. One could only speculate and there is always a danger of speculations in such matters going wrong. Yet, I would make the following observations even at the risk of their proving to be off the mark:

* Most of the Wikileaks till now have been of documents relating to contemporary (post-Cold War) events, particularly relating to Afghanista and Iraq. There has not been much leak of documents of the Cold War period. * Initially, Wikileaks released thousands of documents relating to Afghanistan. Subsequently, it released documents on Iraq. This showed that the source or sources of Wikileaks in the US Government had access to documents of the State Department and the Pentagon relating to Afghanistan and Iraq and had very little access to documents on other subjects. * It is, therefore, possible that the documents involving India which have reached Wikileaks relate to India's policies on Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. * Among the various events relating to Afghanistan and Iraq in which India figured during this period, four could be sensitive from India's point of view. Firstly, the pressure on the Atal Behari Vajpayee Government by the administration of George Bush to send a Division of the Indian Army to Iraq. By July,2003, the Vajpayee Government had decided to say no to Washington DC, but there was a lot of voices in Delhi in favour of accepting the US request. Secondly, the papers captured by the US intelligence after the occupation of Iraq from the Iraqi Government Departments showing or corroborating the alleged involvement of a leader or leaders of the Congress (I) in contacts with the Saddam Hussein Government for acquiring preferential quotas for the import of oil from Iraq. Thirdly, the pressure exercised by the Bush Administration on the Manmohan Singh Government for voting against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. The Government of India succumbed to this pressure as a quid pro quo for the Indo-US civil nuclear co-operation agreement of July,2005. Fourthly, the analysis and assessment made in the State Department and the Pentagon regarding Pakistani allegations of Indian involvement in Balochistan.

3. Is it possible that Wikileaks might have also got hold of diplomatic cables between the US Embassy in New Delhi and Washinton DC on Indian political leaders, bureaucrats and policy-making? If one goes by the demonstrated access of Wikileaks till now, one would rate this danger as low, but one can never be certain. ( 28-11-10)

Friday, November 26, 2010

In the 1950s, in the beginning of the Cold War, an American Senator called Joseph McCarthy became notorious for his public witch-hunt of suspected communists and other leftists in the US, who were accused by him of being unpatriotic and unAmerican on the basis of allegations of their communist sympathies.His witch-hunt, which came to be known as McCarthyism, was viewed by right-thinking people as nothing but a publicity-hungry campaign of "reckless, unsubstantiated accusations and demagogic attacks" on the reputation of many persons, who were subjected to Hyde Park style pubic hearings on the basis of flimsy evidence, before such evidence was evaluated by an investigation agency and a court of law.

2.Wikipedia writes of McCarthyism as follows: "Suspicions were often given credence despite inconclusive or questionable evidence". It is this phenomenon of rousing public anger against persons on the basis of inconclusive or questionable evidence that came to be known as a witch-hunt.

3. In India, for the last one year, we are going through a period of a vicious McCarthyism by Arnab Goswami, a well-known TV anchor, who has been using his prime-time news programme every evening to level serious allegations of corruption, wrong-doing and sedition against Indian citizens on the basis of suspicions and evidence still under evaluation by the investigative agencies and on the basis of the public activities and statements of reputed persons such as Arudhati Roy, the Mirwaiz etc, who are accused by him of indulging in sedition for expressing their sympathy with the Maoists, the separatists in Kashmir and the insurgents in the North-East.

4. Many Government servants and retired Government servants let themselves be used by McCarthy in his Congressional hearings in order to demonise innocent persons and project them before the public as unAmerican and unpatriotic. Similarly, Arnab has been using some retired persons and others of dubious background to demonise dozens of people in his programme and to create an impression in the minds of the public that corruption is everywhere, that anti-nationalism and sedition are everywhere and that barring perhaps Arnab himself, most others are either corrupt or guilty of sedition. Anybody, who expresses his understanding of the anger of the Kashmiri youth, is projected as unIndian and unpatriotic.

5. Many persons, against whom McCarthy carried on his witch-hunt, were subsequently found to be innocent. The evidence on the basis of which McCarthy demonised them was subsequently found to have been unreliable. Unable to bear this demonisation campaign day in and day out, some of the persons accused by McCarthy of being unAmerican and unpatriotic committed suicide. It was only much later that the American public, which applauded the demagogic witch-hunt of McCarthy every day, realised how it had been misled by him. He was a hero to sections of the American public at the height of his witch-hunt----just as Arnab is now---- but when the real motive of his allegations and accusations came to be known, he became a hated figure in the US.

6. Noone can deny that there is widespread corruption in India. Noone can deny that people such as Arundhati Roy, the Mirwaiz etc are being unwise in unwittingly providing oxygen to those indulging in violence amounting to terrorism. To deal with this requires a mature, objective, non-hysterical approach based on constant evaluation and analysis of the evidence. It demands that our TV anchors observe self-restraint, fairness and decency in having these issues discussed. Demagogy and the reckless levelling of allegations in a hysterical, over-dramatised and over-sensationalised manner is not the way to do it. ( 27-11-10)

Thursday, November 25, 2010

( Article written at the request of the “Hindustan Times” of New Delhi for its issue of Nov.26,2010 at http://www.hindustantimes.com/We-are-in-this-alone/H1-Article1-631015.aspx)

Since the 26/11 sea-borne terrorist strikes in Mumbai by the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), we have had three acts of suspected jihadi terrorism in the Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir. Indians were also among the victims of a terrorist attack in Kabul.

The three attacks in the Indian territory took place in Pune (about 10 fatalities) on February 13, in Bangalore outside a cricket stadium on April 17 (17 injured) and in Delhi on September 19 (two Taiwanese tourists injured) . According to the Mumbai’s Anti-Terrorism Squad, the Indian Mujahideen (IM), which has links to the LET, was responsible for the Pune attack. The IM was suspected in the Bangalore incident. It had also claimed responsibility for the Delhi attack.

The Afghan Taliban claimed responsibility for the Kabul attack on February 26, in which there were 17 fatalities, six of them Indians. The attack was directed against a guest house for foreigners. The Indians happened to be among the foreign customers.

All of these were conventional acts of terrorism with improvised explosive devices or hand-held weapons, which would not have required specialized training. There has been no commando-style complex attack like the one on 26/11, which required specialized training.

These attacks show that the LET, controlled by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and its affiliates in India such as the IM and the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) continue to plan terrorist strikes against Indian targets despite the international surveillance on the activities of the LET after the 26/11 strikes, which made the West realize that the LET is as dangerous as Al Qaeda.

A new source of threat to Indian targets has been the so-called 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, allegedly a former commando of the US-trained Special Services Group of the Pakistan Army, who now works closely with the LET, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and Al Qaeda. Some reports, not yet confirmed, even describe him as a member of the shura (advisory council) of Al Qaeda. He is reportedly based in North Waziristan in Pakistan.

India continues to be as vulnerable as before 26/11 to possible terrorist strikes by these organizations and their affiliates. Among their other affiliates are the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JUM), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and the Pakistani Taliban called the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Post 26/11, Al Qaeda, an Arab terrorist group based in North Waziristan, has two major allies----the Pashtun Taliban, which attacks Western targets, and the Punjabi Taliban, which focuses on Indian targets. The LET is in the forefront of the Punjabi Taliban. The LET guides and controls the activities of the IM and the SIMI.

While India’s vulnerability is as serious as before 26/11, there has been no act of mass casualty terrorism after 26/11. From this, it will be inadvisable to draw the conclusion that as a result of the revamping of the security apparatus by Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister, our agencies now have the upper hand over the terrorists.

The LET and other organizations have not been weakened. Their anti-Indian motivation remains strong. There has been no dilution in the ISI’s support for them. Their training infrastructure in Pakistani territory is intact. Their propaganda against India continues to be virulent. They are looking for opportunities to plan and carry out more acts of mass casualty terrorism.

The failure of the US to pressure Pakistan to arrest and prosecute the ISI officers named by David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the LET as involved in the 26/11 attacks has strengthened the ISI’s belief that so long as it co-operates with the US against anti-US terrorists, the US will continue to turn a blind eye to its use of the LET brand of terrorists against India.

The lack of vigorous action by the US against Pakistan for its involvement in the 26/11 strikes and its disappointing co-operation with India in the Headley case have shown that any high expectations of US co-operation with India against terrorism of Pakistani origin would be an illusion.

We have to depend on our own intelligence and security capabilities in our battle against terrorism emanating from Pakistan. The revamping of the security apparatus by Shri Chidambaram can be described as successful only if there is an increase in the flow of preventive intelligence, if there is better co-ordination among the various agencies and if follow-up action on the intelligence collected is effective.

There has been an improvement in physical security and inter-agency co-ordination as seen during the Commonwealth Games and President Barack Obama’s visit, but there have been very few instances of detection and neutralization of sleeper cells of the LET and its associates. This shows that the flow of intelligence is still inadequate.

The follow-up action on many new ideas floated by Shri Chidambaram has been slow. He had spoken of the need for a separate Ministry dealing exclusively with internal security. He had suggested bringing under his control all intelligence-collection and follow-up action capabilities having a bearing on counter-terrorism----whether such capabilities are in the Intelligence Bureau or in the Research & Analysis Wing or in the Aviation Research Centre or elsewhere. He had also spoken of his plans to set up a National Counter-Terrorism Centre under his supervision similar to what the US had set up after 9/11. One does not know what is the present stage of implementation of these ideas.

We continue to find ourselves helpless against Pakistan. The prosecution of the Pakistan-based LET conspirators by the Pakistani authorities has become a sham. The LET and other anti-India organizations continue to be as active as ever from Pakistani territory. We have been reduced to a state where we are pathetically dependent on the US to make Pakistan act. The US is disinclined to apply that kind of pressure.

We are faced with diminishing options against Pakistan. How to reverse this situation? This question should seriously engage the attention of our policy-makers. We have to work out a policy of incentives and disincentives to make Pakistan act. Merely by repeating that we will not talk to Pakistan unless it winds up its terror machine is not leading us anywhere.