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The author analyzes Colombia's problems and makes recommendations regarding what it will take to achieve stated U.S. and Colombian objectives in that crisis situation. She also examines the concomitant issue of "spillover" from the Colombian crisis into the rest of the Latin American region. The results and recommendations of this analysis go well beyond prescribing a simple military solution to the complex political-economic-social-moral-security issues of this 50-year-old war.

While there are numerous ways to approach the question of "whither South Asia?" the conference organizers decided to focus on the future of strategic balances and alliances in the region, with 2020 as the target date. This choice of topic allowed the conference participants to talk not only about the patterns of amity and enmity within the region, but also about the role of extraregional powers.

America's novel use of special forces, precision weapons, and indigenous allies has attracted widespread attention since its debut in Northern Afghanistan. Many think it caused the Taliban's sudden collapse. For them, this "Afghan Model" represents warfare's future, and should become the new template for US defense planning. Critics, however, see Afghanistan as an anomaly.

The establishment of a European expeditionary force will be no easy matter, will require substantial investment, and will take years to complete. However, it is the right course for Europe to take. The European Union (EU) cannot manage emerging security issues using Cold War legacy forces because they are too ponderous to deploy. A lighter, more nimble expeditionary force is critical to EU policy.

It provides a careful examination of the so-called "spillover" problems generated by Colombia's three simultaneous wars against illegal drug traffickers, insurgents, and self-appointed paramilitary groups. All seek, in one way or another, violently to change or depose the state. All use the uncontrolled "gray areas" in Colombia and its neighboring states to sustain, conduct, and replenish their nefarious operations without risk of significant interference.

The U.S. relationship with China and the global war on terrorism are the two most significant strategic challenges faced by the Bush administration. The author assesses how the war on terrorism has affected China. He concludes that the war on terrorism radically altered the Asian strategic environment in ways that negated China's foreign policy gains of the last decade.

The author notes that strengthening the Central Asian states against terrorism and assisting their transition to stable and prosperous nations are difficult and fraught with danger. If not astutely managed, this strategy could have the opposite of the intended results and generate increased instability, spark anti-Americanism, and antagonize Russia and China. To avoid this, Dr. Wishnick advocates a multilateral strategy that integrates the military, political, and economic elements of national power and prods the Central Asian regimes toward reform.

The nine chapters in this volume, all written by leading experts, cover a diverse set of important topics: East Asian perspectives on China's security ambitions, the status of the Chinese ballistic missile program and regional reactions to U.S. missile defense initiatives, and China's ever-improving conventional military capabilities.

This book represents some of the thinking by students at the U.S. Army War College, considering the nature and direction of transformation. They consider how the transformed joint services of the United States should employ force in the 21st century. The services are exploring concepts such as Effects Based Operations and Rapid Decisive Operations to move swiftly and strike vigorously to secure vi

The author analyzes the Army's response to that defeat in Southeast Asia and its long-term impact. Contrary to the accepted wisdom that nations which lose wars tend to learn best how to correct their mistakes, he argues that Americans tried to forget the unhappy experience with counterinsurgency by refocusing on conventional wars.

The center of gravity concept has long been hailed by the U.S. military as the cornerstone of the operational art; yet, the term has many different meanings. In going back to the original concept, the author reveals that Clausewitz intended the center of gravity to function much as its counterpart in the mechanical sciences, that is, as a focal point—as the one element within a combatant's entire structure or system that has the necessary centripetal force to hold that structure together.

France believes that external threats to its vital and important interests spring more from potential instability on the periphery of Europe than from rival European powers. France has modified its military doctrine to reflect this strategic calculus, and France's conception of peace operations reflects this doctrinal change.

This monograph is a constructive response to the question of "How can the United States best develop security cooperation within the Americas?" The author develops the necessary background to make the persuasive argument that it is time for the United States to employ strategic restraint and reassurance of allies to develop a new security architecture that is effective and efficient, not to mention reflective of our values and interests.

Explores the unprecedented opportunities that are now before the U.S. and recommends actions that the Government and armed forces should undertake to consolidate and extend the newly emerging military partnership and cooperative security regime that are now developing. The proper way to exploit them will become a subject of debate.

The process of NATO enlargement has served to harmonize Central and Eastern Europe with Western Europe in a remarkable manner. That achievement alone has made enlargement worthwhile. Beyond the next round of enlargement, the reorientation of NATO enlargement towards the Middle East and North African regions recognizes future threats. These regions may never receive the full security umbrella of NATO.

The author reviews the history of Hizballah since its inception in 1982, and examines its role in the recent political turmoil of Lebanon and the region. Not only is Hizballah's role central in the dispute over the Sheb'a Farms enclave between Lebanon and Israel, it is part of an entangled set of linkages involving Syria, Iran, the United States, the European Union, and the Palestinians.

NATO's integrated military structure does not easily accommodate the new members, which still suffer from the effects of the Soviet system. Their nascent market economies and unsophisticated militaries represent great obstacles to NATO interoperability.

Colombia's "Hobbesian Trinity" of illegal drug traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitary organizations are creating a situation in which life is indeed "nasty, brutish, and short." Political and military leaders can start thinking about the gravity of the terrorist strategy employed by Colombia's stateless adversaries from this point. It is also the point from which leaders can begin developing re

The author examines the impact of strategic culture on 21st century China. He contends that the People's Republic of China's security policies and its tendency to use military force are influenced by their understandings of the strategic cultures of other states. Gaining a fuller appreciation for how Chinese strategists view the U.S. and Japan will better enable us to assess regional and global security issues.

The author analyzes the impact of the war on terrorism and the requirements of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review on the many essential missions conducted by the U.S. Armed Forces. Focusing primarily on the Army, he highlights the requirements associated with combat operations against terrorists, accelerating transformation and the new emphasis on homeland security and force protection.

Originally commissioned by the NPEC as part of a study on the future of U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation. It is different from other studies of U.S.-Russian cooperation because it relies on competitive strategies, which detail how best to pit one's strengths against a competitor's weaknesses in a series of moves and countermoves. The goal is to devise strategies that force one's competitor to spend more time and resources shoring up his weaknesses than in taking offensive action.

The author explores the concept of victory in the war in terrorism, but he does so by placing it within the larger currents of change that are sweeping the global security environment. He contends that the time-tested idea of decisive victory is still an important one, but must be designed very carefully in this dangerous new world.

The author examines the current company commander experience and concludes that the Army values innovation in its rhetoric, but the reality is that junior officers are seldom given opportunities to be innovative in planning training; to make decisions; or to fail, learn, and try again.

The author outlines the violent characteristics of the new security-stability environment and briefly examines the problem of terrorism and the related problem of governance. Finally, he enumerates some civil-military implications for playing effectively in the contemporary global security arena.

The author outlines the history of U.S. counterinsurgency policy and the recommendations made by U.S. Special Survey Teams in Colombia from 1958-66. An examination of that history and the concomitant recommendations indicates that a review of that record would be in order. It provides a point of departure from which policymakers in the United States and Colombia can review where we have been, where we are, and where we need to go.

The author considers the critical questions of U.S. military presence in the Gulf, the challenges it faces, and the prospects that lay ahead. He relies, in his presentation and analysis, on a variety of regional sources including newspaper reports and personal interviews conducted in the United States and the Gulf region, as well as government and academic sources.

This monograph is the third in the Strategic Studies Institute's "Studies in Asymmetry" Series. In it, the author examines two paradigm shifts--one in relation to the threat and a second in relation to intelligence methods-- while offering a new model for threat analysis and a new model for intelligence operations in support to policy, acquisition, and command engaged in nontraditional asymmetric

Within only a few days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army War College initiated a series of short studies addressing strategic issues in the war on terrorism. This collection of essays analyzes a broad array of subjects of great strategic importance. This volume provides historical documentation of some of the advice given the military leadership in the early days of the war, but it also continues to be a source of solid strategic analysis as the war lengthens and perhaps broadens.

The author points out that Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) insurgents actively are pursuing a strategy to mobilize the disaffected and disposed people of Colombia, and to control the entire national territory. At the same time, he argues that no one in the national political establishment has taken the initiative to conduct an appropriate effort to deny FARC its objective.

The 1990s showed the extremes of deciding when and how to use force, one of the central elements of strategy. Debate has raged over whether force is appropriate only in defense of the homeland and vital national interests or whether it should also be used to promote more expansive objectives. He concludes with a discussion of Army roles and requirements for future contingencies.