1. The present report is
submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 1039 (1996) of 29
January 1996, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further period of six
months, until 31 July 1996. It covers developments since my last report of
22 January 1996 (S/1996/45).

Situation in the area of operation

2. The reporting period was
marked by an escalation of hostilities between the Israel Defence Forces (IDF)
and its local Lebanese auxiliary, the de facto forces (DFF), on the one
hand, and armed elements who have proclaimed their determination to resist
the Israeli occupation on the other. The hostilities intensified in February
and March 1996, and culminated in April in more than two weeks of heavy
Israeli bombardments. The Security Council considered the situation and, on
18 April, adopted resolution 1052 (1996), calling for an immediate cessation
of hostilities by all parties. On 10 May, the General Assembly also debated
the matter and adopted resolution 50/22 C.

3. In their attacks against
IDF/DFF, the armed elements employed small arms, mortars, rocket-propelled
grenades and anti-tank missiles, as well as road-side bombs and rockets.
Most of the attacks were carried out by the Islamic Resistance, the military
wing of the Shiite Muslim Hizbullah organization. Others were carried out by
the Shiite movement Amal and some by Palestinian factions. In responding to
attacks or initiating operations, IDF/DFF employed automatic weapons, tanks,
artillery, helicopter gunships, fixed-wing aircraft and naval vessels.

4. After a relatively
calm period in January, hostilities in February and March were again at the
level of previous reporting periods. UNIFIL recorded 24 operations by armed
elements in February, 18 in March, and 6 in the first 10days
of April. On more than one occasion, notably on 16 February and 13 March,
the Islamic Resistance conducted simultaneous attacks against a large number
of IDF/DFF positions in the Israeli-controlled area (ICA). There were also
numerous reports of operations north of the Litani river, bringing the total
to more than 200 in the first three months of the mandate period. There was
a significant development in March when the Islamic Resistance penetrated
deep into the ICA to attack IDF and inflicted significant casualties. Thus,
on 4 March, four Israeli soldiers were killed and nine others wounded by
road-side bombs, when they were pursuing armed elements who had opened fire
on a border patrol near Houle. On 10 March, one Israeli soldier was killed
and four were wounded in a road-side bomb explosion near the village of
Kafer Kela, across the border from Metulla. On 20 March, a suicide-bomber
hurled himself at an Israeli convoy south of Taibe, killing an officer. IDF/DFF
also suffered casualties in attacks north of the Litani river: on 14 March,
eight Israeli soldiers were wounded on the road between Aichiyeh and Rihane
in an ambush that involved road-side bombs, mortars and small arms fire.

5. The ability of the
Islamic Resistance to penetrate deep inside the ICA and to inflict
casualties on IDF triggered a public debate in Israel, the thrust of which
was that IDF must respond forcefully and should no longer be bound by
constraints imposed on it. Those constraints were connected with an
agreement reportedly arranged by the United States of America in the summer
of 1993. The United Nations has not been informed of this agreement,
although it has been publicly mentioned by Israeli and Hizbullah officials.
Based on such public statements it would appear that the Islamic Resistance
agreed to refrain from targeting villages and towns in northern Israel,
while IDF agreed to refrain from doing the same in Lebanon; there has been
no mention of limitations concerning attacks on military targets.
Indications in Israel that the agreed restrictions were no longer acceptable
and that a large-scale operation against the Islamic Resistance was being
contemplated heightened tension in the area. On 15 March, the Force
Commander of UNIFIL conveyed his concern to the Israeli authorities.

6. Tension remained high and
rose again when, on 30 March, two men working on a water tower in Yatar were
killed and one was injured by a missile fired by IDF. In response, the
Islamic Resistance fired more than 20 rockets to Israel, causing minor
damage. The Israeli Government declared that the firing of the missile at
Yatar had been a mistake. On 8 April, a boy was killed and three others were
wounded in an explosion near Brashit. Hizbullah claimed to have collected
evidence that IDF had planted the explosives. The Israeli authorities, for
their part, denied any involvement and suggested that the explosions had
been caused by old mines. UNIFIL investigated the explosion and found that
it had been caused by four serially connected and booby-trapped road-side
bombs; UNIFIL could not determine who had placed them. The day following the
explosion, the Islamic Resistance fired almost 30 rockets towards northern
Israel. Some of these impacted at Qiryat Shemona, injuring a number of
civilians and causing damage. In retaliation, Israeli aircraft dropped nine
bombs on the Majdal Silm-Sultaniyeh area, and Israeli artillery fired some
250 rounds artillery towards the same area.

8. The Israeli navy
patrolled Lebanese territorial waters and imposed restrictions on the local
fishermen around Tyre. Occasionally, it fired at or near fishing boats and
temporarily detained the fishermen. UNIFIL intervened with the Israeli
authorities repeatedly for the release of those detained.

9. As before, UNIFIL
continued its efforts to limit the conflict and to protect the inhabitants
from the fighting. Through its network of checkpoints and observation posts
and an active programme of patrolling, the Force did its best to prevent its
area of deployment from being used for hostile activities and to defuse
situations that could lead to escalation. It also deployed as necessary to
provide a measure of protection to the villages and to farmers working in
the fields. As before, Lebanese villagers sought refuge in UNIFIL positions
when there was shelling.

10. In the early morning of
11 April, Israeli aircraft and artillery began an intensive bombardment of
southern Lebanon as well as targets in the Beirut area and in the Bekaa
Valley. The declared objective of these attacks was to put pressure on the
Government of Lebanon so that it would curb the activities of the Islamic
Resistance.

11. About two hours after
the attacks started on 11 April, the Force Commander of UNIFIL, Major
General Stanislaw Woniak, received a telephone call from the chief of IDF
liaison, who warned UNIFIL of the attacks. General Woniak protested the
attacks and stated that UNIFIL would: endeavour to prevent any IDF incursion
into its area of operation; do all it could to protect civilians and expect
IDF to do the same; and insist on complete access to its area of operation
through IDF-controlled gates. General Woniak reiterated his strong protest
in a meeting with the Israeli liaison chief the next day.

12. In the first few days of
the operation, Israeli air force and artillery attacked selected targets,
including the homes of persons suspected to be affiliated with Hizbullah. At
the same time, an IDF-controlled radio station in southern Lebanon broadcast
threats of further bombardments, set deadlines for the inhabitants to leave
and stated that once the deadline had passed IDF would regard all who
remained as legitimate targets. By 13 April, some 90 towns and villages,
including Tyre and villages north of the Litani river, had thus been placed
under threat. As a result of these threats and the Israeli bombardment,
about a quarter of the inhabitants, more than 100,000, left UNIFIL's area of
operation and Tyre. Around 5,000 persons sought refuge inside UNIFIL
positions and at its logistic base in Tyre.

13. Given the large number
of inhabitants who remained behind, IDF did not in fact treat the whole area
as a free-fire zone. Once it had run out of targets, it conducted, with
great fire power, attacks on sources of firing and other targets of
opportunity, as well as pre-emptive bombardment of locations from which
attacks were known to have been launched in the past.

14. At the same time, IDF
carried out limited attacks in the Beirut area, which followed no apparent
military rationale but raised fears, heightened by remarks attributed to
Israeli officials, that Lebanon's overall economic recovery was being
threatened. In addition, the Israeli navy blockaded the Lebanese ports and
shelled the coastal road north of Saida, seriously disrupting communications
between the capital and the south.

15. In the last few days of
the operation, the Israeli forces targeted the main roads in southern
Lebanon using heavy bombs dropped by aircraft.

16. Altogether, UNIFIL
counted in its area of operation more than 600 Israeli air raids, involving
both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, which used over 1,500 bombs or
rockets. Israeli artillery fired some 25,000 shells, in particular in the
sectors of the Fijian, Nepalese, Irish and Ghanaian battalions as well as to
the area north of the Litani river opposite the Finnish battalion sector.
IDF also used long-range patrols which moved forward of the ICA and, in two
places, which were later notified to UNIFIL, planted mines and booby-traps.
The Norwegian battalion sector, which is entirely within the ICA, remained
calm.

17. Throughout the Israeli
bombardment, the Islamic Resistance fired some 1,100 rockets from the UNIFIL
area. Many fell short; an estimated 600 landed in northern Israel. Some of
the rockets impacted in villages and towns, causing injuries to civilians as
well as damage. In areas within range of the rockets, many of the
inhabitants left their homes and others were evacuated. On 14 April, a
rocket fell inside the UNIFIL headquarters compound at Naqoura, causing
minor damage.

18. In UNIFIL's area of
deployment more than 120 civilians were killed by Israeli fire and an
estimated 500 were wounded. Most of these casualties occurred on 18 April as
a result of the shelling of a United Nations compound at Qana, in which more
than 100 Lebanese were killed and many more wounded. This incident has been
the subject of an investigation by my Military Adviser, whose report I
conveyed to the Security Council on 7 May (S/1996/337). In the whole of the
UNIFIL area at least 450 houses were damaged or destroyed and many roads
were made impassable by bombs. The supply of water and electricity was
disrupted.

19. By a letter, dated 23
May 1996, from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, the Government of Lebanon provided a
detailed account of Israeli attacks on Lebanon that took place during April
1996 (A/50/561-S/1996/380).

20. UNIFIL continued to do
its best to protect the civilian population from the violence and to provide
humanitarian assistance. Because of the mounting tension, UNIFIL had already
reinforced its positions close to the line of confrontation, and increased
patrolling. When the bombardment began, the Force strengthened these
measures and cancelled all leave. Isolated Lebanese army positions inside
the UNIFIL area were taken under protection. Despite the Israeli bombardment
and harassment by both sides, UNIFIL continued to patrol its area actively.
The Force provided shelter, food, medical assistance and other services to
the civilians who had sought protection at its positions and camps. The
Force also organized convoys for those villagers who wished to leave their
homes and brought supplies to those who chose to remain but had run out of
food and water. UNIFIL teams visited the villages and distributed food and
other relief supplies, and searched for persons trapped in damaged
buildings.

21. UNIFIL's efforts were
severely hindered by the sustained bombardment. UNIFIL trucks and armoured
personnel carriers, which were engaged in delivering humanitarian aid to the
population, were often delayed or stopped altogether as a result of firing
by Israeli artillery and aircraft, despite assurances from IDF that all
UNIFIL humanitarian missions would be facilitated. In the later stages of
the Israeli operation, the damage to roads impeded UNIFIL movements.

22. In addition, the
positions and vehicles of the Force came frequently under fire. There were
some 270 instances of firings at or close to UNIFIL positions, of which
about 15 were caused by the Islamic Resistance and the remainder by IDF/DFF.
A Fijian officer and two Nepalese soldiers were injured by Islamic
Resistance elements in response to the Force's attempts to prevent the
latter from launching rockets from the vicinity of UNIFIL positions. Direct
hits from Israeli artillery caused serious injuries to four Fijian soldiers,
as well as considerable damage to UNIFIL positions and vehicles. All firings
were protested to the authorities concerned.

23. In the aftermath of the
Qana incident, UNIFIL has sought and received a commitment from IDF that it
will respect a safety zone around UNIFIL positions. UNIFIL has also received
assurances from the Islamic Resistance, through the Lebanese Army, that they
will not conduct operations in the vicinity of UNIFIL positions.

24. The hostilities ended on
27 April, when a partial cease-fire went into effect, following diplomatic
efforts by France and the United States of America. The partial cease-fire
is in the form of an understanding, which was announced simultaneously in
Beirut and Jerusalem. According to the published text of the understanding,
armed groups in Lebanon will not carry out attacks by any kind of weapon
into Israel, and Israel and those cooperating with it will not fire any kind
of weapon at civilians or civilian targets in Lebanon. Furthermore, the two
parties will ensure that under no circumstances will civilians be the target
of attack and that civilian populated areas and industrial and electrical
installations will not be used as launching grounds for attacks. It is
stated that, without violating the understanding, nothing therein shall
preclude any party from exercising the right of self-defence. The
understanding provides for the establishment of a monitoring group
consisting of the United States, France, the Syrian Arab Republic, Lebanon
and Israel and of a consultative group, to consist of France, the European
Union, the Russian Federation and other interested parties for the purpose
of assisting in the reconstruction of Lebanon.

25. On 16 July, the
Secretariat was briefed about the monitoring group by representatives of
France and the United States. The Secretariat was informed that the chair of
the group would be based in Cyprus while its military experts would meet in
Naqoura. The two representatives requested that UNIFIL provide facilities
for the latter meetings.

26. After the partial
cease-fire went into effect, there was a brief lull in activities with only
five operations observed by UNIFIL in May. There were 11 operations in June
and 5 in the first half of July. Nearly all were carried out by the Islamic
Resistance. There were also reports of over 40 operations north of the
Litani river. Again, some of these attacks were well inside the ICA and
there was a high number of Israeli casualties (8 killed and more than 20
wounded). This contributed to a continuing high level of tension. On 30 May,
two staggered road-side bombs killed four Israeli soldiers and injured
several others at Marjayoun, where IDF/DFF have their headquarters in
southern Lebanon. On 10 June, all 13 members of an Israeli patrol north of
the Litani river were killed or wounded in an ambush by the Islamic
Resistance. In retaliatory fire after the 10 June incident, Israeli
artillery killed one Lebanese Army soldier and wounded one civilian. On 14
June, a roadside bomb exploded in Houle, killing three children. In sum,
while the number of operations has gone down, the number of casualties has
remained high.

27. In view of the
seriousness of the events in southern Lebanon, I asked the
Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations, Mr. Kofi Annan, to
travel to the region to consult with Governments prior to the expiry of
UNIFIL's mandate. Mr. Annan visited the region from 26 June to 4 July 1996
and met with senior officials in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and
Israel. He also met with the Force Commander of UNIFIL and his staff and
visited the Fijian battalion headquarters at Qana and other locations in the
UNIFIL area of deployment.

Humanitarian activities

28. UNIFIL continued to
extend humanitarian assistance in the form of harvest escorts, medical care,
engineering works and the distribution of educational material and equipment
provided by UNICEF. Medical teams treated more than 2,000 patients each
month at UNIFIL medical aid posts and mobile clinics. Some humanitarian
projects were funded by troop-contributing Governments.

29. In connection with the
Israeli bombardment in April, the Government of Lebanon requested the United
Nations to issue an international appeal to meet the urgent humanitarian
needs resulting from the hostilities. Through the United Nations Resident
Coordinator in Beirut, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs assisted the
authorities in mobilizing international support and coordinating the
response of the United Nations system. A "flash appeal", launched
on 20 April, sought to mobilize US$ 8.6 million to address the needs of
20,000 most affected families. The overall response was positive: some $14 million
was committed by donors.

30. UNIFIL played an
important role in handling the relief stores of other organizations. During
the April hostilities the major portion of the relief supplies and medical
equipment provided to southern Lebanon flowed through the UNIFIL base at
Tyre to the units in the field, which distributed them. In addition, during
and after the fighting, UNIFIL supported the operations of several United
Nations agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme, the
United Nations Children's Fund and the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and provided assistance to
local and international non-governmental organizations. In addition, UNIFIL
repaired roads destroyed in the bombardment to the extent possible with the
modest means at its disposal.

31. UNIFIL continued the
disposal of unexploded artillery shells and aerial bombs in its area of
operations. Two small mine fields, which IDF had planted in the UNIFIL area
of deployment, were cleared in May, on the basis of information provided by
IDF. In all, 243 controlled explosions were carried out.

Organizational matters

32. As of July 1996, UNIFIL
comprised 4,483 troops, from Fiji (579), Finland (491), France (247), Ghana
(644), Ireland (625), Italy (45), Nepal (600), Norway (615) and Poland
(637). The replacement of the Norwegian Maintenance Company by a Polish
unit was effected in May 1996. UNIFIL was assisted in the performance
of its tasks by 57 military observers of the United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization. In addition, UNIFIL employed 561 civilian
staff, of whom 123 were recruited internationally and 438 locally.
The deployment of UNIFIL is shown on the annexed map. Major-General
Stanislaw F. Woniak of Poland continued as Force Commander.

33. The streamlining of
UNIFIL, mentioned in previous reports, was completed in May 1996. UNIFIL
will continue its efforts to achieve further economies in the area of
administrative and support services.

34. I regret to report the
death of two Ghanaian soldiers from natural causes. Five Fijian and two
Nepalese soldiers were wounded as a result of firing. Since the
establishment of UNIFIL, 207 members of the Force have died: 76 as a result
of firing or bomb explosions, 84 in accidents and 47 from other causes. A
total of 324 have been wounded by firing or by mine or bomb explosions.

35. The problem of the rents
owed by the Lebanese Government to the owners of the land and premises used
by UNIFIL has still not been resolved. Not all owners have received payment
and there is continuing controversy over the lists of owners prepared by the
Lebanese authorities. Some owners have requested that their properties be
vacated. For practical and budgetary reasons, only some of these requests
can be met.

36. UNIFIL maintained close
contacts with the Lebanese authorities on matters of mutual concern. Those
authorities provided valuable assistance in connection with the rotation of
troops and logistic activities in Beirut. The Lebanese army was helpful in
defusing confrontations with armed elements. It also provided accommodation
for some UNIFIL contingents while on leave in Lebanon. The force continued
to cooperate with the Lebanese Internal Security Forces on matters
pertaining to the maintenance of law and order.

37. It will be recalled that
since 18 April 1995, two Palestinians have been accommodated at UNIFIL
headquarters, after being deported to Lebanon by the Israeli authorities and
denied entry by the Lebanese authorities. On 28 February 1996, one of
them was allowed to leave for Jordan. Contacts continue to find a solution
for the other.

Financial aspects

38. By its resolution 50/89
B of 7 June 1996, the General Assembly appropriated to the Special Account
for UNIFIL an amount of $125,722,800 gross for the maintenance of the Force
for the period from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997, based on an average
strength of 4,513 troops and a continuation of its existing
responsibilities. The assessment of the appropriation, which is equivalent
to $10,476,900 gross per month, is subject to the decision of the Security
Council to extend the mandate of the Force beyond 31 July 1996.

39. As of 30 June 1996,
unpaid assessed contributions to the UNIFIL Special Account amounted to
$201.9 million. The total unpaid assessed contributions for all
peace-keeping operations at that date amounted to $2.7 billion.

Observations

40. The last six months were
marked by the serious escalation of hostilities in April, of which the
population of southern Lebanon was the primary victim. UNIFIL, too, came
under fire. It is a matter of regret that the United Nations once again has
cause to call upon the parties concerned to respect the non-combatant status
of civilians and United Nations peace-keepers.

41. On 29 January, in
extending UNIFIL's mandate, the Security Council inter alia
reiterated that the Force should fully implement its mandate as defined in
resolution 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions;
re-emphasized the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force
contained in the then Secretary-General's report of 19 March 1978 (S/12611);
and called upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for
the full implementation of its mandate. As in the past, such cooperation has
not been forthcoming and there has been no active political pressure on the
parties to implement resolution 425 (1978). In recent years, the best hope
for the implementation of that mandate has been through the negotiating
process within the framework established at the Madrid conference in October
1991. That process, however, appears to have made no progress towards the
attainment of the Security Council's objectives concerning southern Lebanon.

42. This leaves UNIFIL in
the same difficult and dangerous situation in which it has been since the
Israeli forces withdrew to their present lines in 1985. At the time, my
predecessor wrote: "UNIFIL is now stationed in an area where active
resistance against IDF is in progress, and in which the latter is engaged in
active countermeasures. UNIFIL, for obvious reasons, has no right to impede
Lebanese acts of resistance against the occupying force, nor does it have
the mandate or the means to prevent countermeasures" (S/17093, para.
24). In the circumstances, UNIFIL has done its best to limit violence and to
protect the civilian population. This has become its de facto mandate. In
pursuing it, the Force has in fact impeded both sides from pursuing their
military aims in the conflict, but only to the extent that the parties have
permitted it to do so, out of a presumed desire to avoid escalation. As a
peace-keeping force, it is powerless when either party is bent on
confrontation.

43. In this connection, I
note that the understanding announced on 26 April 1996 has the
potential of contributing to the protection of civilians and restraining the
parties. It is therefore to be hoped that it will soon be put into full
effect. I have instructed UNIFIL to assist the monitoring group, which is
currently being set up in accordance with the understanding. I believe this
is consistent with the Security Council's objectives and would meet with its
approval.

44. The Permanent
Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations has outlined his
Government's position on the situation in the area in a letter he addressed
to me on 18 July 1996 (S/1996/566). He also informed me of his
Government's decision to request the Security Council to extend the mandate
of UNIFIL for a further period of six months.

45. In similar circumstances
in the past, I have recommended that UNIFIL's mandate be extended in view of
the importance of its contribution to stability and the measure of
protection it is able to afford to the civilian population. Notwithstanding
the events of last April, these considerations are, I believe, still valid,
bearing in mind the likely effect in the area if UNIFIL were to be withdrawn
in present circumstances. I therefore recommend that the Security Council
accept the Lebanese Government's request and extend the mandate of UNIFIL at
its present strength for another period of six months, that is, until 31
January 1997. In making this recommendation, I have especially in mind
UNIFIL's role in shielding the civilian population from the worst effects of
the violence. The Force's work in this regard during the April escalation
has underscored the importance of this function.

46. I must again draw
attention to the serious shortfall in the funding of the Force. At present,
unpaid assessments amount to some $201.9 million. This represents money owed
to Member States that contribute the troops who make up the Force. I appeal
to all Member States to pay their assessments promptly and in full and to
clear all remaining arrears. I would also like to express my gratitude to
the Governments contributing troops to the Force, in particular those of
developing countries, for their understanding and patience in these
difficult circumstances.

47. In conclusion, I wish to
pay tribute to Major-General Stanislaw F. Woniak, the Force Commander, and
to the men and women under his command for the manner in which they have
carried out their difficult and often dangerous tasks, in particular during
the hostilities in April. Their discipline and bearing have been of a high
order, reflecting credit on themselves, on their countries and on the United
Nations.