Republican presidential candidates were drawn deeper into the immigration controversies centered on California, as Donald Trump’s leading opponents sought a way to blunt his apparent advantage among voters with his tough talk on birthright citizenship and deportation.

The numbers game

Clarifying his stance, Trump campaign manager Corey Lewandowski recently took to CNN to criticize the current population of so-called anchor babies.

“If you think of the term ‘anchor baby,’ which is those individuals coming to our country and having their children so their children can be U.S. citizens,” he said. “There’s 400,000 of those taking place on a yearly basis. To put this in perspective, that’s equivalent of the population of Tulsa, Okla.”

Those numbers were immediately disputed, but not entirely discounted. According to Politfact, the figure cited by Lewandowski was “slightly exaggerated,” taking into account dipping rates of illegal immigration in recent years, and the difficulty involved in proving intent among unlawful immigrant mothers giving birth on U.S. soil.

So-called birth tourists, who use travel visas with the secret intent to have a baby delivered in the U.S., contribute to a much smaller fraction of ‘anchor babies,’ Politifact added — “around 8,600, or 0.2 percent of all births, in 2013, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.”

A growing problem

Nevertheless, the anchor baby story has gained steam this summer, reaching a broader audience than GOP primary voters. In a significant new report at Rolling Stone, Benjamin Carlson investigated Rowland Heights, a Los Angeles-area community with a reputation as “the center of Chinese birth tourism in southern California, if not the whole United States.”

Several years ago, Carlson noted, “the county of Los Angeles opened an investigation into maternity hotels after receiving a deluge of public complaints,” although in the end “no new ordinance targeting maternity hotels was passed in the area. The task force decided that ‘complaints beyond the scope of local zoning powers’ would be referred to state and federal agencies.” According to estimates cited by Carlson, California has become the epicenter for many of the 10,000-60,000 Chinese tourist births the U.S. hosts per year.

Campaign controversy

With the anchor baby story gaining national traction, several of Trump’s leading competitors for the Republican nomination appeared to size up the issue as a way to toughen up on immigration without undermining their credibility with pro-immigration constituents. Asked by Bill O’Reilly whether “the anchor baby law” is “destructive to the country,” Marco Rubiocalled the issue a “legitimate” one, as RealClearPolitics recounted. “I of course have read about how that happens in California, wealthy Chinese people are hedging their bets, in case something goes wrong in China they can come here,” he explained.

Jeb Bush, meanwhile, allowed the term — seen by many Democrats and others as at least implicitly derogatory — to escape his lips in an interview. “Given Bush’s close connections to the Latino community — his wife is from Mexico, he speaks fluent Spanish, he’s written a book on immigration and he lives in the Miami area — it was surprising to hear Bush use the phrase,” CNN suggested. “But he defended his word choice, telling reporters the following day that he didn’t regret it.”

“‘What I said is that it’s commonly referred to that. I didn’t use it as my own language,’ he said. ‘You want to get to the policy for a second? I think that people born in this country ought to be American citizens.’”

Later, Bush attempted to clarify that his concern was closer to Rubio’s than Trump’s. “Frankly it’s more Asian people,” he suggested, urging critics to “chill out” about his phrasing, according to NBC News.

Choosing agendas

Conservatives have grappled over whether to frame birthright citizenship primarily as a question of immigrants’ potential upward mobility or the potential downward mobility they often believe government dependency fosters. “Inflation-adjusted figures from the U.S. Department of Agriculture projected that a child born in 2013 would cost his parents $304,480 from birth to his eighteenth birthday,” as National Review’s Ian Tuttle noted. “Given that illegal-alien households are normally low-income households (three out of five illegal aliens and their U.S.-born children live at or near the poverty line), one would expect that a significant portion of that cost will fall on the government.”

National defense needs have long been such an all-purpose excuse for protectionism that they may be the best illustration of Samuel Johnson’s aphorism that “Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel.”

The products that have ridden defense coat-tails to special treatment make up a long, and long-standing, list. For example, in the U.S., they have included sugar, peanuts, candles, thumbtacks, gloves, umbrellas and many more common goods. One my particular favorites is mohair. After WWII, when our soldiers wore wool uniforms, assertions that we might be unable to supply enough mohair in future conflicts triggered subsidies beginning in 1954. Apparently we wouldn’t be able to fight effectively if uniforms weren’t itchy enough. Soon after, the military switched to synthetic fibers, displacing wool from the strategic materials list in 1960. But mohair production subsidies continued for thirty-five more years. And even when they were ended in 1995, lobbying brought the subsidies back a few years later.

While many such protectionism gambits are obvious jokes just waiting for economists to tell, there is one that would seem to merit special consideration. That is trying to build up a country’s fleet and its military capabilities by eliminating other countries’ ability to ship goods between domestic ports. One reason for giving that policy, imposed by the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, commonly called the Jones Act, more careful consideration, is that it has a pedigree of over three-and-a-half centuries. Perhaps more important is that its English predecessor had the endorsement of Adam Smith, usually known as a free trader, not a protectionist.

The Jones Act traces back to England’s 1660 navigation law “for the increase of shipping … wherein … the wealth, safety and strength of this kingdom is so much concerned.” It required that all shipping between British ports had to go in British-built ships with British owners. Parliament also required a three-quarters British crew. Those rules were a cornerstone of Britain’s mercantilist system whose burdens, along with those imposed by other restrictions, added impetus to the American Revolution.

Despite the policy’s role leading America toward independence, the U.S. Congress’ inaugural session enacted similar restrictions on coastal shipping even before adoption of the Bill of Rights. The restrictions are now codified by the Jones Act. Its rationale and terms — restricting trade between American ports to vessels built, owned and three-quarters manned by Americans — echo Britain’s navigation acts.

In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith endorsed the British navigation acts, an endorsement that has been deployed since as inoculation against criticism of the Jones Act from backers of free trade and its strictly voluntary arrangements. Smith’s rationale for the exception was that “the defense of Great Britain depends very much upon the number of its sailors and shipping.” Consequently, “The act of navigation, therefore, very properly endeavors to give the sailors and shipping of Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country.” Smith made it clear that it would restrict trade and the wealth it would create, but “As defense, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England.”

Unfortunately, Smith’s high praise does not apply to the Jones Act. The circumstance that justified it does not apply to America now. And despite incredibly high costs, it does not add to American shipping, sailors or capabilities.

If the relevant choice was an all or nothing one between defense and opulence, there is no doubt that defense, when threatened by aggression, is more important than opulence. But it is a marginal choice, not an all-or-nothing choice. Given one’s current level of threats, readiness and consumption possibilities, added shipping restrictions could improve military readiness, but only by taking away from the goods and services citizens can exchange for their productive efforts in peaceful trade. The issue is how much value is added to readiness and how costly is it to achieve?

Smith’s endorsement of a policy to bolster naval defense is sensible only when that defense would be inadequate without such restrictions. If there were already sufficient defensive capability for the threats faced, the marginal value of expansion would be small. Smith argued that in England’s case, the threat faced from the Dutch (“the great carriers of Europe”), Britain’s main naval rival, justified more military strength. In fact, he noted that the navigation acts aimed to undermine the sea-power of the Dutch at least as much as to stimulate British sea-power. As Smith put it, “though England and Holland were not actually at war, the most violent animosity subsisted between the two nations.” In consequence, what justified the policy was warlike “diminution of the naval power of Holland, the only naval power which could endanger the security of England.”

In other words, Smith did not endorse the restrictions of the navigation acts as generally justified, but only justified by a serious, specific war threat. One might have made a case that America’s founding echoed such a situation, given its early weakness. But similar circumstances have not applied during most American’s lifetimes. They did not characterize America in the aftermath of WWII. They have not characterized America as the world’s dominant strongest naval superpower; particularly after Eisenhower’s warning that the military-industrial complex could be dictating far more defense production than can be justified. Yet, even without a plausible case for inadequate naval power, Jones Act restrictions have been retained.

One might consider burgeoning Chinese military sea-power to be a current analog. But restricting America’s coastal trade to American ships does not appreciably restrict Chinese sea-power, military or otherwise, given the tidal wave of goods their ships carry to America and other destinations around the world. Further, concern about potential naval military threats as a rationale for the Jones Act is inconsistent with the sharp drawdown taking place in the Navy fleet.

Beyond the question of a sufficient military threat, for the Jones Act to make any sense, it must produce benefits, increasing the number of American ships, sailors and construction capabilities. But it does not.

From 43 percent of global shipping in 1950, the Department of Transportation found in 2009 that “U.S.-flag ships carry only about 1.5 percent of the foreign trade of the United States.” The wider U.S. flag fleet lost half its tonnage capacity between 1975 and 2007.

Vessels meeting Jones Act requirements fell to 90 in 2014 from 193 in 2000. 110 tankers have become 43. Almost five times as many American ships now fly other flags to escape Jones Act burdens, even though it makes them ineligible for domestic shipping.

Even if the Jones Act had a positive effect on American shipping, it could do little for military production potential, as only one shipyard that builds the Navy’s primary vessels also builds commercial shipping vessels.

The Jones Act must also provide services that would be hard to acquire during hostilities and emergencies. But it does not.

The Department of Defense has stated that “Unfortunately, very few commercial ships with high military utility have been constructed in U.S. shipyards in the past 20 years. Consequently … nearly all of the [charter] offers are for foreign-built ships.” Similarly, in the aftermath of both Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, Jones Act restrictions were suspended because they hindered emergency response capabilities.

Despite no evidence that the Jones Act provides any expansion in shipping or defense capabilities, the only reason Adam Smith found justified such restrictions, its costs are substantial.

Ships meeting Jones Act restrictions may cost triple or quadruple those built in Korean or Japanese yards. Crewing expenses can be a similar multiple. Maintenance and repair costs are also far greater. One illustration of the result is that foreign-flagged tankers can transport oil for one-third the cost of American-flagged tankers.

The Jones Act doesn’t add to America’s naval or defense capabilities, rendering Adam Smith’s endorsement void. It has been accompanied by plummeting numbers of American-flagged ships and the trade they carry. It hinders rather than helps in mounting emergency operations. The military services it is supposedly makes possible are already provided more efficiently by foreign ships. And the costs are very high. It is time to end its nothing-for-something trade that only impoverishes us.

What was hailed as an “historic” agreement between China and the United States to curb greenhouse gas emissions has broken down less than one month after it was announced.

China is already using its deal to cap greenhouse gas emissions as leverage to strong arm rich countries into spending $100 billion in “climate aid” to poor countries. Rich countries have so far only given $10 billion for climate aid — including $3 billion from the U.S. — which China says is not enough.

“The significance of the China-U.S. announcement is that there’s a general understanding by the leaders of the two countries that climate change is a real threat,” Su Wei said. “A joint announcement does not necessarily blur the distinction between developed and developing countries. They announced their actions but that was in a different manner.”

Su Wei specifically targeted Australia’s conservative government for not giving any money towards international climate aid. So far the biggest givers of climate aid are the U.S. ($3 billion) and Japan ($1.5 billion).

Last month, the Obama administration announced it had reached a deal with China to curb greenhouse gas emissions in an effort to fight global warming. President Obama promised to drastically speed up its greenhouse gas reduction plans, pledging cuts of 26 to 28 percent by 2025.

China, on the other hand, only promised to peak its emissions by 2030 — something which some energy analysts said was on track to occur even without a government pledge. China also promised to increase its share of non-fossil fuel energy sources to 20 percent of its power supply by 2030 as well.

Republicans criticized the announcement as being a “non-binding charade” that commits the U.S. to economically harsh cuts while China gets to keep emitting.

“In the President’s climate change deal, the United States will be required to more steeply reduce our carbon emissions while China won’t have to reduce anything,” said Oklahoma Republican Sen. James Inhofe, who will take control of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee next year.

“It’s hollow and not believable for China to claim it will shift 20 percent of its energy to non-fossil fuels by 2030, and a promise to peak its carbon emissions only allows the world’s largest economy to buy time,” Inhofe added.

China is the world’s largest user and producer of coal and the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter — the U.S. is the second-largest greenhouse gas emitter. But complaints about poor air quality in urban areas of the country have Chinese officials clamping down on some coal use.

Though after the agreement, China released a plan to limit coal use until 2020 and boost its use of natural gas and coalbed methane. Even under this plan, however, coal use will continue to grow.

“The share of natural gas will be raised to above 10 percent and that of coal will be reduced to under 62 percent,” according to China’s State Council. “Production of both shale gas and coalbed methane could reach 30 billion cubic meters by 2020.”

“Annual coal consumption will be held below 4.2 billion tonnes until 2020, 16.3 percent more than the 3.6 billion tonnes burned last year,” the State Council reports.

“China builds a coal-fired power plant every 10 days and is the largest importer of coal in the world. This deal is a non-binding charade,” Inhofe said. “The American people spoke against the President’s climate policies in this last election. They want affordable energy and more economic opportunity, both which are being diminished by overbearing EPA mandates.”

Su Wei did say that China would work to reduce greenhouse gas emissions for every dollar of gross domestic product, reports Bloomberg. But his calls for emissions cuts were couched in calls for more climate aid to help developing countries adapt to global warming.

“We would redouble our efforts in terms of taking actions on climate change for the period up to 2020 and we would markedly reduce the carbon intensity,” Su Wei told reporters.

Su Wei’s remarks were made during the United Nation’s climate summit in Lima, Peru. The Lima conference is supposed to help set the stage for the next major summit in Paris, France in 2015 where diplomats will debate a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol.

But questions over climate aid have derailed negotiations in the past and it’s unclear if that will be the case in 2015.