Mr. Smith (not me) asks, "This may be the last election where white males have power they can leverage as a major demo. What happens to the demographic from here on out? Do they remain a block or are they broken up?"

This is an interesting question. To answer it we first have to remind ourselves of a simple truth - there is no question that, for the vast majority of our nation's history white males, particularly protestant or identified as protestant, have held all or most of the political power. This isn't a matter of contention - it isn't meant to start a debate. I could go through the history of the United States for you, but for our purposes, let's just remember a few key points - first, for the first time in our history we're on the dawn of a moment when there are more people who are citizens of the United States and not white than there are people who are citizens and white. Slavery was legal from 1776 until 1865, political discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity until a century later - we're still dealing with the consequences of that. Women couldn't universally vote in the United States until the 1920s. At no point in our history have either women or ethnic minorities been represented in Congress at levels consistent with their proportion of the total population - when it comes to the Presidency the situation is even more dramatic; one Catholic president, one black president, no female presidents. Add to that income inequality, unequal access to high-quality education, unequal pay for similar work, unfair hiring and loan practices and a host of other structural problems and one thing is true.

White, protestant dudes rule our nation.

Well, they have ruled our nation. But there are trends that indicate that is changing - women are pursing higher education at a rate higher than men. The population of the US that is not white will outstrip the white population within a few years. Four states - Hawai'i, New Mexico, Texas, and California already have higher non-white populations than white populations. The population of Americans of the Islamic faith is now comparable to the population of those of the Jewish faith.

And here is the thing. Not only are ethnic minorities voting at higher rates than before, but the suspension of institutional racism has gradually led to steadily more and more empowered men and women who were of categories and classes that previously were political non-persons.

And another thing - Americans who are gay, lesbian, transexual, bisexual, or hold other gender and sexual identities are no longer hiding their identities - they feel politically empowered and are organized and using that power.

This all leads to, well, a lot of fear among those who traditionally held most or all the power in communities across America. Things are changing and they will continue to change and this has led to a substantial expansion in the number of people feeling imperiled, frightened that their way of life is coming to an end - think of it as a sort of siege mentality and things seem to come clear fairly quickly - the result, as is often the case, a resurgence of support for policies which aim to restrict change and immigration and to preserve existing economic patterns.

Fair enough, but it isn't just about race or ethnicity or gender or religion. There are other things at work - two notably. One is the death not of American industry, but of American industry as a major employer of unskilled or semi-skilled labor. Increasingly mechanization, roboticization and of course the emergence of truly globalized trade have led to these jobs either going overseas or, as is often the case, simply disappearing. This shouldn't surprise us too much - each stage of industrialization leads to a change in what jobs exist and what jobs provide wages and benefits worth pursuing. But it is a shock, and a painful one, and one which Americans have long tried to deny was happening rather than undertaking adequate policies to adjust and adapt to the change.

The effect is further amplified because we are weaker, relatively, than we have been since the end of the Second World War. That doesn't mean we're weak - we're still the most powerful nation on earth by a leap and a mile. But we are weaker in that our control over the global economy is far less than it has been in recent decades, relatively - down from around 78% of the total global GDP to about 14% today. It isn't that our economy has shrunk (it hasn't) or that our infrastructure has disappeared (it hasn't). No, we're the victims of our own success - we taught the world to be democratic and capitalist and the world has thrived by living up to our standards. The effect? We now have to lead the free world, rather than rule it.

Finally, we have been so successful at attenuating and eliminating major wars, the wars between nation-states, creating and policing the Pax Americana, that now most international violence is atypical - not the kind nation-states conduct, but guerrilla conflicts and terrorist attacks. As a result, we're more likely to get beat up in wars we enter today - not because we're bad at war, but because the wars we enter today are wars of a type that nation-states by definition cannot be good at. Alas Vietnam! Alas Iraq! Alas Afghanistan!

In the end there are two generations of Americans, the War Generation and the Baby Boomers, who remember our relative power and, if they're white, protestant, straight and male, a sense that the world was their oyster. All this further amplifies the intensity of the siege mentality and amplifies the appeal of Trump whose rhetoric is replete with the notion of making America great again and building a wall, both literally and metaphorically with nationalist protectionism.

So, here is the thing. It isn't that white, protestant, male, straight voters, or any combination thereof, are irrelevant. On the contrary. It is simply that their relative power is declining. They're still able to do what they want, are free to be who they are, take part in the collective bargaining that is politics. This is how American conservatism will reassert itself - when it realizes that fiscal conservatism, religious traditionalism, and concerns about the economic future need not be dichotomous with our heritage as an immigrant, egalitarian nation - at least that is what I see in my Appalachian conservative students, no matter their gender, race, ethnicity, origin, religion, or sexual identity.

What will America, and the world, look like tomorrow? This is the crux of things, isn't it?

I know people care about this because I keep getting asked about it - so I have come up with four wreckless, devil-may-care predictions about the future of the United States. Enjoy, or lament, as you see fit.

[Note: All of these scenarios are based upon the assumption that the world would effectively have to end for the Republicans to lose control of the House of Representatives. Imagining a scenario in the next two years in which the Democrats control that house is just - yeah. No.]

[Note 2: I have decided, in the interest of keeping things comparable, to divide each scenario into five minor vignettes themed according to subject matter]

[Note 3: There is the possibility of a deadlock in the Senate, meaning the Democratic and Republican parties gain equal representation - this counts, essentially, as either a Republican or Democratic Senate, however, since the Vice-President then gains the tie-breaking vote - assuming, of course, that the Vice-President and the Senate members of his party are in some degree of accord.]

Scenario 1: Double-Whammy Democrat, Republican House

The Democratic party takes control of the Executive Branch and the Senate, giving them the ability to appoint judiciary members and bureaucrats with comparative ease - it may be painful sometimes, given that Republican officials may filibuster and fight cloture, but one has to imagine that these fights will be limited in number and one has to assume that if the Republicans seem particularly at odds there is a solid chance that the Rules Committee will undertake some series reforms at the beginning of the session [which itself could be a not insignificant outcome - one that the Republicans will want to avoid and therefore constituting a meaningful push for them to move towards compromise].

Appointments

Expect a significantly more progressive Supreme Court - three of the currently serving justices are over the age of 77 - that means that if they retire, which most political watchers assume will happen if Clinton is elected, then Clinton will stack the court with four justices, defining a generation of judicial decisions.

Economy

Don't expect too much to change here - which isn't necessarily a bad thing. The economy has slowly been recovering over the last few years and investors are likely to see a Clinton/Democrat double-whammy as the kind of outcome that makes things more predictable, which is exactly what the markets, domestic and international, like. If this happens expect a surge in the major stock markets, American and otherwise.

Environmental/Energy

Expect Clinton to continue pushing clean energy reforms and to do what she can to undercut American fossil fuel infrastructure expansion - or at least expect her to seem to be doing that. Certainly energy independence or near-independence has had the effect, for Obama, of giving him more free reign to reform. Expect that to continue to be a goal, and for investment in alternative resources to increase.

Diplomacy/Security

Clinton is more hawkish than Obama and more internationalist than Trump, but a Democratic Senate might restrain her attempts to do more. Expect her to demand "renegotiation" of international trade deals that result in nearly no change and rapid Senate approvals.

Social Policy

Clinton will nominate pro-choice judicial nominees, will support reforms and improvements to Federal welfare systems, and will continue to push for gay, lesbian, transexual, and bisexual rights, though Obama has done far more lifting than she is likely to have to do, so to speak.

Scenario 2: Triple-Whammy Republican

In this scenario Trump wins the presidency and the Republican party takes the Senate - so the Republicans hold everything, right? Well, maybe. The problem is that Trump is a maverick, a wild card, a nonconformist. He is nearly as at odds with the more traditional members of his own party as he is with the members of the Democratic party and so it is difficult to imagine he is going to have a smooth tenure in pressing his legislative agenda (which, of course, remains somewhat ambiguous).

Appointments

Looking at Trump's list of appointees, we see a list of constitutionalists - folks his campaign specifically compare to Scalia, who also will likely toe the line (at least prior to sitting) on issues of social significance. It seems likely most would get through fairly easily.

Economy/Diplomacy/Security

Trump is seen as a dangerous bet internationally and calls for a more isolationist line and protectionist policy than his peers in Congress. Look for him to suspend deals and have some difficulty getting new deals negotiated or passed, leading to declining international trade and the breakdown of many of our more fragile bilateral alliances.

Environmental/Energy

Trump is fairly luddite-ish - expect government investment in education and research to putter, while environmental legislation and treaties are gutted, all with the approval of Congress.

Social Policy

Expect little to change except for Trump's nominations to the Supreme Court and the effects emergent therefrom.

This is the, "everything stays unpleasant for awhile" scenario {also known as the "invest in bourbon" scenario} - imagine a Senate that lives up to the pledge of some of its members to prevent the appointment of the any Clinton judicial nominees, and imagine if that contention also spreads to other fields - international relations, bureaucratic leadership appointments, etc. - I heard someone describe this as the unpleasantness of this election, should it result in a scenario like this, as rendering his election "a comma, not a period." Yoinks.

Appointments

Expect few if any Clinton nominees to reach office, at least during this Congress - the Supreme Court may shrink to its smallest size in well over a century.

Economy

Uncertainty will certainly increase, and public, nasty battles over budgets ensue. Expect this to effect international trade and investment and to, at least early in the Congress, slow growth.

Environmental/Energy

Clinton will keep in place Obama's policies on environmental and energy law, by and large, but will be unable to implement much else.

Diplomacy/Security

Clinton will emphasize military reform, seek to have the State Department bolstered, and will generally maintain good relations with most nations - though relations with Russia and its allies will likely suffer and American efforts to counter-balance China are likely to surge, both with Republican support. Women's issues and international public health may become more significant, though largely through means already available to the President.

Social Policy

Expect Clinton to continue along tracks already laid by Obama. Appointments will be progressive on women's and gender issues - expect this to make little leeway in light of Republican discontent with nominees.

In this scenario, which seems unlikely to me (given the straight-ticket voting phenomenon), the very real possibility of a Democratic Senate at war with Trump, metaphorically of course, is significant - expect logjams at literally every turn and a Senate whose Democratic leadership touts itself as the levee against a flood, for better or worse.

Appointments

Expect some pushback but most nominees will make it through; that said look for folk on the Supreme Court to die, rather than retire, before their seats become open.

Economy

Largely the same conundrums as under the all Republican scenario.

Environmental/Energy/Diplomacy/Security

Look for the Senate to try to restrain reforms from the Republicans, Trump-supporters or more broadly; their success will be limited to efforts to peel back laws, not insignificant, but functionally problematic.

Social Policy

Expect the Democratic Senate aim at doing everything it can to deadlock rollback efforts - whether they will be successful is unclear.

I got a heckuva' lot of questions this fall about the magic and the mysticism of third parties in the United States. People are fired up about third parties this year and they want to know some really important things:

Why weren't third parties more prominent this year, especially given how unpopular the candidates are?

What would it take for a viable third party to form?

Why do people never bitch about the need for a third party until the waning days of an election?

Are third parties even viable in the American political system?

All wonderful questions, all inter-related, and thus I'm going to tackle them in one post, step-by-step. Put on your safety belts - it is going to be a bumpy ride.

1

To understand the American party system one first has to understand the institutional arrangements that constitute the American electoral system. You see, the United States government, in all Federal and most state and local institutions, conducts elections using the first-past-the-post model. This means that the United States uses a simple plurality measure - whoever gets the most votes in a given electoral contest wins - like a horse race, in which it doesn't matter if the horse that crosses the line first does so by a nose, a length, or a lap, the outcome for both the winner (and the losers) is the same. This has a chilling effect on the number of viable parties - since there are no benefits (in other words, representation in office) for coming in second, third, fourth, etc., there is a strong impulse for parties to form into coalitions of broad interests - what we call umbrella parties, that contain a substantial variety of different ideological and factional groups which, under different electoral rules, might form their own parties. These umbrella parties have a compelling reason to seek as broad a coalition as is possible - anything less than the largest coalition means electoral failure. This is, of course, reinforced by voters who, themselves, are rational folks, and who realize that voting for a party that cannot win is, by definition, a losing proposition - encouraging them to vote for their least-worst option among the two biggest (and generally only) umbrella parties in their government, thereby reinforcing the umbrella tendency from the other side of the ballot box.

The founders, by the by, knew this would happen - they knew that the effect would be to generate parties which were not single faction parties but large enough conglomerations that they would become moderate and clumsy - in other words not ideologically inclined to radical change, nor efficient enough to engage in rapid tyrannical consolidation of power.

The American umbrella, bipartisan system is further reinforced by our Electoral College. Most states (all except Maine and Nebraska) award all their electoral votes to whichever candidate captures the plurality of the vote in their state - this makes it easier to guarantee a national winner is elected with majority of electoral votes and it has the same moderating, inefficiency generating effect of a standard first-past-the-post system, though amplified and reiterated.

This is all further amplified by the gradual passing of laws, both at the Federal and state levels, in which election funding and ballot presence is a foregone conclusion for parties that had a previous large presence in elections (inevitably, then, the umbrella parties) but not in the instance of parties with little or no presence in earlier elections - an effect that is, therefore, reflexive and self-sustaining. Put simply, our political system is designed, both at the Constitutional level (with the best intentions) and in the electoral laws (with the best intentions for the Democratic and Republican parties) to retain and reinforce the two-party system.

2

This isn't of course the whole picture, of course. For instance, most third-parties are, by definition ideologically narrow - the don't appeal to a large sector of the American public or a large collection of factions. The Greens appeal to the scientifically minded, the socially libertarian but the economically environmentalist - they are willing to accept costs and risks to our economy that ultimately result in what they believe will be a more sustainable economy. Socialists, on the other hand, seek continuous economic growth but in a manner that specifically favors the improvement of worker quality of life and the more egalitarian disbursement of economic benefits. Christian socialists (and other fill-in-the-blank socialists) seek the same, but within the context of a theological construct. Libertarians are socially libertarian, but also economically libertarian. Progressives agree with the Greens and Socialists and Libertarians on particular elements but disagree on others. Christian traditionalists (and other fill-in-the-blank fundamentalists) seek to use the institutions of the state to reinforce particular social values, insisting that this is conservative even though it is the antithesis of libertarianism.

I could go on and on, listing each of these movements or parties, but it should be clear - they all have their appeal, but their ability to put together a coalition, an umbrella, is stymied by their inability to compromise on their ideological values.

Of course there are members of these factions who are willing to so compromise. You already know who they are - because they are members of the Republican or Democratic parties.

3

There are a couple other factors at work here as well - one is that, yes, there is a media bias against the minor parties, but this is more a result of the media responding to the ideological (and consumerist demands) of their viewing public than it is some sort of conspiracy. You see, the media covers the major parties because those are the parties the people, their audience, think are relevant and interesting. The media, in a free society, gives the consumer what they want, by and large. This does, however, have a reflexive, reinforcing effect that isn't to be dismissed.

Also, the major parties are not run by perfectly altruistic angels - rather, they're run by, and include in their ranks, competitive men and women who, put simply, want to win elections. That means that they damn well plan to win any given election or, in lieu, to make sure new, more nimble competitors don't enter the fray. Why does the major media not let the minor parties into the debates? Largely for one reason - the major parties threaten not to participate unless minor parties are excluded. Would they withdraw from debates if the media called bull$#%&? I'm not sure, honestly. I'm just not sure. Either way, this is actually point of contention between media and the parties, not a point of cabalistic cooperation, as some folk have inferred this election cycle.

4

So, why do normal folks not complain and moan and grouse over the absence of viable third-parties in the years when there isn't a national election? Well, because people are notoriously short-cited, and Americans, with our tendency to despise electoral politics, consciously seek to avoid thinking about any issue that would morally oblige us to take political action more often and more intensely than we'd like. That means in the build up to and election we are vocal in our support of third-parties that we will not actually vote for, and we bemoan their failures for a few weeks after the election, but soon we forget the absence of third parties since, to remember them and feel their absence palpably is to oblige ourselves to actually doing something. Which is, as we all know, horrible.

5

The final question then is this - how, then, do we develop one or more viable third-parties in the United States? Hmm.

Well, the only sure way is through electoral reform - to redesign the American system to encourage voter confidence in the utility of voting for third, fourth, and even fifth place winning candidates. The means of doing this is by adopting a system of proportional representation one in which seats are apportioned according to the percentage of the vote a given party gets. This of course means that one is voting for a party or ideology, rather than a person, meaning that Americans would have to be far more ideologically invested than they are now, when personality matters as much or more than a candidate's ideological purity or platform loyalty. Even this would likely not translate to effect the presidential system too radically unless it was coupled with a reform of the presidential election system, in particular the abolition of the electoral college and the adoption of a majority-required system in which, if no candidate received a majority, a run-off election between the top two vote-getters is held shortly after, meaning the first election allows voters to vote for their first-choice and the second resolves the question by having voters select their least-worst candidate.

On the other hand, America may simply evolve, without institutional reform, a sense that third-parties are relevant. It isn't likely in any given year, but it seems possible - heck, it has happened in Britain, where their first-past-the-post system still yields a parliament with 11 parties represented - two major parties (the Conservative and Labour parties) as well as nine minor parties (the Scottish National, Liberal Democrat, Democratic Unionist, Sinn Fein, Plaid Cymru, Social Democratic and Labour, Ulster Unionist, UK Independence, and Green parties), not to mention five independent parliamentarians. The how is difficult to explain - institutionally speaking, well, it shouldn't have happened. But it did. And thus, the long version made short, we have to concede that the reason third-parties have appeared and been fruitful in the UK lay in one simple truth - British voters believed third-party candidates could win, and voted for their preferred parties in such numbers that they did win, confirming that belief and reflexively reinforcing the emergence of these parties that, everything else being equal, shouldn't be there.

+ + + + + + + + + +

And now everything is totally cleared up. Cough.

The Electoral College Meets in Their Dormitory to Cast Their Votes in the Kennedy/Nixon Contest

Ms Still asks, "Is the electoral college still a good idea for the US today?"

Ah a good question - and one I've gotten before (well, essentially) - but I have a few more things to say about it - check out this older article of mine - a little piece entitled with the very classy, "What the Hell is the Electoral College?" I'll wait here for you. Don't worry. I'm patient.

Right - so everything in there still seems spot on, but I would like to add a note - specifically refer to the fact that the Electoral College, emphasizing and strengthening the power of rural voters as it does, has the effect putting ethnonational, religious, and racial minorities at a voting disadvantage. The social geography of the United States puts minorities overwhelmingly in states with relatively high populations, meaning that minorities are consistently more likely to be disadvantaged by the College system. This is a real problem - one I didn't emphasize enough in my earlier article, and one that is really clarified in John Templon's article, "How the Electoral College Favors White Voters," which I found via an article by Carl Bialik over at the FiveThirtyEight Election Live Blog (thanks for your work, gents!).

So, between all this data, the question really remains a complicated one - rural voters would be disadvantaged by a simple popular vote, minority voters by the Electoral College. I'm not sure that there is a simple answer to this, though radically expanding the House of Representatives, and therefor the total number of Electors, might help with the problem, since most of that expansion would favor large urban areas without throwing out the rural vote enhancing utility of the College. No matter the rules of the game, however, there is always a shift in advantage to or from different groups anytime we change the rules of any game.

So, Mr. Edwards asks, "What happens to the president-elect if convicted of a crime before taking the oath of office? After?" Great question, because it cuts to a constant theme of this presidential election - most Americans think one or the other candidate, or both, is prone to criminal behavior.

Sigh. This election is making me old.

Okay, let's say a president-elect, that is to say a president already voted into office by the Electoral College, is believed by a sufficient number of people to be guilty of some crime or another - they're going to have to be impeached. To clarify why let me respond by quoting the Constitution. First, Article I, Section 2:

The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Second, Article I, Section 3:

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

Third, the final clause of Article II, Section 2:

The President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

Fourth, Article II, Section 4:

The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

And finally, Article III, Section 2, Paragraph 3:

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.

That is the sum and total found in the Constitution on the subject of impeachment. It isn't much but it lays out the gist of things.

First, while he or she holds office a president, or presumably president-elect, must be impeached and the impeachment confirmed with a 2/3rds majority in the Senate. He or she is not eligible for trial in the judicial branch, according to all the normal laws and methods of the US government, until they leave their position as an officer of the United States. Upon impeachment, however, the president can be tired for, well, anything they may be formally charged with - including but not limited such crimes as may be deemed appropriate for impeachment, including treason, bribery, high crimes, and high misdemeanors.

Put simply, in order to buffer the mechanisms of government from a criminal proceeding against a sitting officer, the Constitution requires that political leaders deem the threat of the officer's misconduct be so great that they are willing to stake their reputations on that officer's removal and, of course, must be able to achieve a high level of bipartisanship (again, check that supermajority requirement out). Then, should impeachment be carried out, the newly private citizen simply is tried according to the common law and procedure of the Union.

The American election is just around the corner - only a little more than 24 hours away. As we approach the event itself, it is worth acquainting ourselves with the facts, issues, candidates and platforms from the perspective of as many quality resources as possible - note what I just said there: quality. Not all resources are equal - some are biased to the point of distortion of the truth, some are so self-possessed by their creators' personal, ideological, or economic aims that they select only those parts of the truth that advantage their preferred outcome, and of course some are intellectual junk food, poorly researched, poorly written, poorly cited, or a combination of these. This is part of the problem with our condition today - we're flooded with information and infotainment and asked to consume and evaluate it in a limited time, and further, when most people are not experts in politics, economics, or sociology.

Enter this post - put simply, I have collected a selection of resources to help - ideologically diverse and competent reporting and analysis, on the one hand, formal platforms of parties and candidates on the other, and finally key government and NGO sources of information. These sources, taken together, should help anyone interested in researching the specifics of the upcoming contest, not to mention anyone interested in following the polls and counts as the elections are held and returns come in.

And FYI, these are the principle resources I'll be using on Election Day myself - so consider them as having my eyebrow-waggle of approval.

Ladies and Gentlemen - this is where the rubber hits the road - where the Cherry Bounce Show's guest curator, Eric Drummond Smith, will be live-blogging Election Day 2016, not to mention the lead-up and follow-up nonsense. . . okay, well, this is one of the places he'll be live-blogging - everything he writes on here will be mirrored on his personal blog, Ask a Political Scientist - keep up with the doings, comings, and goings on either.

This is the high drama of democracy, reaching its crescendo. Cue lights, cue music, raise the curtain. It's about to get real.