on appeals from the united states district court for the southern
district of georgia

[June 29, 1995]

Justice Ginsburg
, with whom Justices Stevens and Legislative districting is highly political
business. This Court has generally respected the competence of state legislatures
to attend to the task. When race is the issue, however, we have recognized
the need for judicial intervention to prevent dilution of minority voting
strength. Generations of rank discrimination against African Americans,
as citizens and voters, account for that surveillance.

Two Terms ago, in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. ___ (1993),
this Court took up a claim "analytically distinct" from a vote dilution
claim. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 21). Shaw authorized judicial
intervention in "extremely irregular" apportionments, id., at ___
(slip op., at 10), in which the legislature cast aside traditional districting
practices to consider race alone--in the Shaw case, to create a
district in North Carolina in which African Americans would compose a majority
of the voters.

Today the Court expands the judicial role, announcing that federal
courts are to undertake searching review of any district with contours
"predominantly motivated" by race: "strict scrutiny" will be triggered
not only when traditional districting practices are abandoned, but also
when those practices are "subordinated to"--given less weight than--race.
See ante, at 15. Applying this new "race as predominant factor"
standard, the Court invalidates Georgia's districting plan even though
Georgia's Eleventh District, the focus of today's dispute, bears the imprint
of familiar districting practices. Because I do not endorse the Court's
new standard and would not upset Georgia's plan, I dissent.

At the outset, it may be useful to note points on which the Court does
not divide. First, we agree that federalism and the slim judicial competence
to draw district lines weigh heavily against judicial intervention in apportionment
decisions; as a rule, the task should remain within the domain of state
legislatures. See ante, at 14; Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 586 (1964) ("[L]egislative reapportionment is primarily a
matter for legislative consideration and determination . . . ."). Second,
for most of our Nation's history, the franchise has not been enjoyed equally
by black citizens and white voters. To redress past wrongs and to avert
any recurrence of exclusion of blacks from political processes, federal
courts now respond to Equal Protection Clause and Voting Rights Act complaints
of state action that dilutes minority voting strength. See, e.g.,
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30 (1986); White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755 (1973). Third, to meet statutory requirements, state legislatures
must sometimes consider race as a factor highly relevant to the drawing
of district lines. See Pildes & Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts,"
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election District Appearances After Shaw
v. Reno, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 483, 496 (1993) ("compliance with the
[Voting Rights Act] and Gingles necessarily requires race conscious
districting"). Finally, state legislatures may recognize communities that
have a particular racial or ethnic makeup, even in the absence of any compulsion
to do so, in order to account for interests common to or shared by the
persons grouped together. See Shaw, 509 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at 14) ("[W]hen members of a racial group live together in one community,
a reapportionment plan that concentrates members of the group in one district
and excludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes.").

Therefore, the fact that the Georgia General Assembly took account
of race in drawing district lines--a fact not in dispute--does not render
the State's plan invalid. To offend the Equal Protection Clause, all agree,
the legislature had to do more than consider race. How much more, is the
issue that divides the Court today.

"We say once again what has been said on many occasions: reapportionment
is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature
or other body, rather than of a federal court." Chapman v. Meier,
420
U.S. 1, 27 (1975); see also ante, at 14. The Constitution itself
allocates this responsibility to States. U. S. Const., Art. I, §2;
Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at
8).

"Districting inevitably has sharp political impact and inevitably
political decisions must be made by those charged with the task." White
v. Weiser, 412
U.S. 783, 795-796 (1973). District lines are drawn to accommodate a
myriad of factors--geographic, economic, historical, and political--and
state legislatures, as arenas of compromise and electoral accountability,
are best positioned to mediate competing claims; courts, with a mandate
to adjudicate, are ill equipped for the task.

Federal courts have ventured into the political thicket of apportionment
when necessary to secure to members of racial minorities equal voting rights--rights
denied in many States, including Georgia, until not long ago.

The Fifteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1870, declares that the right to vote "shall
not be denied . . . by any State on account of race." That declaration,
for generations, was often honored in the breach; it was greeted by a near
century of "unremitting and ingenious defiance" in several States, including
Georgia. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 309 (1966). After a brief interlude of black suffrage enforced
by federal troops but accompanied by rampant violence against blacks, Georgia
held a constitutional convention in 1877. Its purpose, according to the
convention's leader, was to " `fix it so that the people shall rule and
the Negro shall never be heard from.' " McDonald et al., Georgia, in Quiet
Revolution in the South 68 (C. Davidson & B. Grofman eds. 1994) (quoting
Robert Toombs). In pursuit of this objective, Georgia enacted a cumulative
poll tax, requiring voters to show they had paid past as well as current
poll taxes; one historian described this tax as the "most effective bar
to Negro suffrage ever devised." A. Stone, Studies in the American Race
Problem 355 (1908).

In 1890, the Georgia General Assembly authorized "white primaries";
keeping blacks out of the Democratic primary effectively excluded them
from Georgia's political life, for victory in the Democratic primary was
tantamount to election. McDonald et al., supra, at 68-69. Early
in this century, Georgia Governor Hoke Smith persuaded the legislature
to pass the "Disenfranchisement Act of 1908"; true to its title, this measure
added various property, "good character," and literacy requirements that,
as administered, served to keep blacks from voting. Id., at 69;
see also Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 310 (tests of this order were
"specifically designed to prevent Negroes from voting"). The result, as
one commentator observed 25 years later, was an " `almost absolute exclusion
of the Negro voice in state and federal elections.' " McDonald et al.,
supra, at 70 (quoting R. Wardlaw, Negro Suffrage in Georgia, 1867-1930,
p. 69 (unpublished 1932)).

It was against this backdrop that the Court, construing the Equal
Protection Clause, undertook to ensure that apportionment plans do not
dilute minority voting strength. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge,
458
U.S. 613, 617 (1982); Regester, 412 U. S., at 765; Wright
v. Rockefeller, 376
U.S. 52, 57 (1964). By enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress
heightened federal judicial involvement in apportionment, and also fashioned
a role for the Attorney General. Section 2 creates a federal right of action
to challenge vote dilution. Section 5 requires States with a history of
discrimination to preclear any changes in voting practices with either
a federal court (a three judge United States District Court for the District
of Columbia) or the Attorney General.

These Court decisions and congressional directions significantly
reduced voting discrimination against minorities. In the 1972 election,
Georgia gained its first black Member of Congress since Reconstruction,
and the 1981 apportionment created the State's first majority minority
district. [n.1]
This voting district, however, was not gained easily. Georgia created it
only after the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
refused to preclear a predecessor apportionment plan that included no such
district--an omission due in part to the influence of Joe Mack Wilson,
then Chairman of the Georgia House Reapportionment Committee. As Wilson
put it only 14 years ago, " `I don't want to draw nigger districts.' "
Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 501 (DC 1982).

Before Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. ___ (1993), this Court
invoked the Equal Protection Clause to justify intervention in the quintessentially
political task of legislative districting in two circumstances: to enforce
the one person one vote requirement, see Reynolds v. Sims,
377
U.S. 533 (1964); and to prevent dilution of a minority group's voting
strength. See Regester, 412 U. S., at 765; Wright, 376 U.
S., at 57. [n.2]

In Shaw, the Court recognized a third basis for an equal protection
challenge to a State's apportionment plan. The Court wrote cautiously,
emphasizing that judicial intervention is exceptional: "[S]trict [judicial]
scrutiny" is in order, the Court declared, if a district is "so extremely
irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort
to segregate the races for purposes of voting." 509 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 10).

"[E]xtrem[e] irregular[ity]" was evident in Shaw, the Court
explained, setting out this description of the North Carolina voting district
under examination:

"It is approximately 160 miles long
and, for much of its length, no wider than the I 85 corridor. It winds
in snake like fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing
areas until it gobbles in enough enclaves of black neighborhoods. Northbound
and southbound drivers on I 85 sometimes find themselves in separate districts
in one county, only to `trade' districts when they enter the next county.
Of the 10 counties through which District 12 passes, five are cut into
three different districts; even towns are divided. At one point the district
remains contiguous only because it intersects at a single point with two
other districts before crossing over them. One state legislator has remarked
that ` "[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd
kill most of the people in the district." ' Washington Post, Apr. 20, 1993,
p. A4. The district even has inspired poetry: `Ask not for whom the line
is drawn; it is drawn to avoid thee.' Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have
Been Right If He Had Said: `When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't
Everything, It's the Only Thing'?, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1237, 1261,
n. 96 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)." Shaw, 509 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 3-4) (some citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).

The problem in Shaw was not the plan architects' consideration
of race as relevant in redistricting. Rather, in the Court's estimation,
it was the virtual exclusion of other factors from the calculus. Traditional
districting practices were cast aside, the Court concluded, with race alone
steering placement of district lines.

The record before us does not show that race similarly overwhelmed traditional
districting practices in Georgia. Although the Georgia General Assembly
prominently considered race in shaping the Eleventh District, race did
not crowd out all other factors, as the Court found it did in North Carolina's
delineation of the Shaw district.

In contrast to the snake like North Carolina district inspected
in Shaw, Georgia's Eleventh District is hardly "bizarre," "extremely
irregular," or "irrational on its face." Id., at ___, ___, ___ (slip
op., at 10, 12, 26). Instead, the Eleventh District's design reflects significant
consideration of "traditional districting factors (such as keeping political
subdivisions intact) and the usual political process of compromise and
trades for a variety of nonracial reasons." 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1397, n.
5 (SD Ga. 1994) (Edmondson, J., dissenting); cf. ante, at 16 ("geometric
shape of the Eleventh District may not seem bizarre on its face"). The
District covers a core area in central and eastern Georgia, and its total
land area of 6,780 square miles is about average for the State. Defendant's
Exh. 177, p. 4. [n.3]
The border of the Eleventh District runs 1,184 miles, in line with Georgia's
Second District, which has a 1,243 mile border, and the State's Eighth
District, with a border running 1,155 miles. See 864 F. Supp., at 1396
(Edmondson, J., dissenting). [n.4]

Nor does the Eleventh District disrespect the boundaries of political
subdivisions. Of the 22 counties in the District, 14 are intact and 8 are
divided. See Joint Exh. 17. That puts the Eleventh District at about the
state average in divided counties. By contrast, of the Sixth District's
5 counties, none are intact, ibid., and of the Fourth District's
4 counties, just 1 is intact. Ibid.[n.5]
Seventy one percent of the Eleventh District's boundaries track the borders
of political subdivisions. See 864 F. Supp., at 1396 (Edmondson, J., dissenting).
Of the State's 11 districts, 5 score worse than the Eleventh District on
this criterion, and 5 score better. See Defendant's Exh. 177, p. 4. [n.6]
Eighty three percent of the Eleventh District's geographic area is composed
of intact counties, above average for the State's congressional districts.
864 F. Supp., at 1396 (Edmondson, J., dissenting). [n.7]
And notably, the Eleventh District's boundaries largely follow precinct
lines. [n.8]

Evidence at trial similarly shows that considerations other than race
went into determining the Eleventh District's boundaries. For a "political
reason"--to accommodate the request of an incumbent State Senator regarding
the placement of the precinct in which his son lived--the DeKalb County
portion of the Eleventh District was drawn to include a particular (largely
white) precinct. 2 Tr. 187, 202. The corridor through Effingham County
was substantially narrowed at the request of a (white) State Representative.
2 Tr. 189-190, 212-214. In Chatham County, the District was trimmed to
exclude a heavily black community in Garden City because a State Representative
wanted to keep the city intact inside the neighboring First District. 2
Tr. 218-219. The Savannah extension was configured by "the narrowest means
possible" to avoid splitting the city of Port Wentworth. 4 Tr. 172-174,
175-178, 181-183.

Georgia's Eleventh District, in sum, is not an outlier district
shaped without reference to familiar districting techniques. Tellingly,
the District that the Court's decision today unsettles is not among those
on a statistically calculated list of the 28 most bizarre districts in
the United States, a study prepared in the wake of our decision in Shaw.
See Pildes & Niemi, 92 Mich. L. Rev., at 565.

The Court suggests that it was not Georgia's legislature, but the U.
S. Department of Justice, that effectively drew the lines, and that Department
officers did so with nothing but race in mind. Yet the "Max Black" plan
advanced by the Attorney General was not the plan passed by the Georgia
General Assembly. [n.9]
See 864 F. Supp., at 1396-1397, n. 5 (Edmondson, J., dissenting) ("The
Max Black plan did influence to some degree the shape of the ultimate Eleventh
District . . . . [But] the actual Eleventh is not identical to the
Max Black plan. The Eleventh, to my eye, is significantly different in
shape in many ways. These differences show . . . consideration of other
matters beyond race . . . ."). [n.10]

And although the Attorney General refused preclearance to the first
two plans approved by Georgia's legislature, the State was not thereby
disarmed; Georgia could have demanded relief from the Department's objections
by instituting a civil action in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, with ultimate review in this Court. Instead of pursuing
that avenue, the State chose to adopt the plan here in controversy--a plan
the State forcefully defends before us. We should respect Georgia's choice
by taking its position on brief as genuine.

Along with attention to size, shape, and political subdivisions, the
Court recognizes as an appropriate districting principle, "respect for
. . . communities defined by actual shared interests." Ante, at
15. The Court finds no community here, however, because a report in the
record showed "fractured political, social, and economic interests within
the Eleventh District's black population." Ante, at 18.

But ethnicity itself can tie people together, as volumes of social
science literature have documented--even people with divergent economic
interests. For this reason, ethnicity is a significant force in political
life. As stated in a classic study of ethnicity in one city of immigrants:

"[M]any elements--history, family
and feeling, interest, formal organizational life--operate to keep much
of New York life channeled within the bounds of the ethnic group. . . .

To accommodate the reality of ethnic bonds, legislatures have
long drawn voting districts along ethnic lines. Our Nation's cities are
full of districts identified by their ethnic character--Chinese, Irish,
Italian, Jewish, Polish, Russian, for example. See, e.g., S. Erie,
Rainbow's End: Irish Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics,
1840-1985, p. 91 (1988) (describing Jersey City's "Horseshoe district"
as "lumping most of the city's Irish together"); Coveted Landmarks Add
a Twist to Redistricting Task, L. A. Times, Sept. 10, 1991, pp. A1, A24
("In San Francisco in 1961, . . . an Irish Catholic [State Assembly member]
`wanted his district drawn following [Catholic] parish lines so all the
parishes where he went to baptisms, weddings and funerals would be in his
district' . . . ."); Stone, Goode: Bad and Indifferent, Washington Monthly,
July August 1986, pp. 27, 28 (discussing "The Law of Ethnic Loyalty-- .
. . a universal law of politics," and identifying "predominantly Italian
wards of South Philadelphia," a "Jewish Los Angeles district," and a "Polish
district in Chicago"). The creation of ethnic districts reflecting felt
identity is not ordinarily viewed as offensive or demeaning to those included
in the delineation.

To separate permissible and impermissible use of race in legislative
apportionment, the Court orders strict scrutiny for districting plans "predominantly
motivated" by race. No longer can a State avoid judicial oversight by giving--as
in this case--genuine and measurable consideration to traditional districting
practices. Instead, a federal case can be mounted whenever plaintiffs plausibly
allege that other factors carried less weight than race. This invitation
to litigate against the State seems to me neither necessary nor proper.

The Court derives its test from diverse opinions on the relevance of
race in contexts distinctly unlike apportionment. See ante, at 9-10. [n.11]
The controlling idea, the Court says, is " `the simple command [at the
heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection] that the Government
must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial,
religious, sexual or national class.' " See ante, at 9 (quoting
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J. dissenting)) (some internal quotation
marks omitted). But cf. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 307 (1880) (pervading purpose of post-Civil War Amendments
was to bar discrimination against once enslaved race).

In adopting districting plans, however, States do not treat people
as individuals. Apportionment schemes, by their very nature, assemble people
in groups. States do not assign voters to districts based on merit or achievement,
standards States might use in hiring employees or engaging contractors.
Rather, legislators classify voters in groups--by economic, geographical,
political, or social characteristics--and then "reconcile the competing
claims of [these] groups." Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109, 147 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).

That ethnicity defines some of these groups is a political reality.
See supra, at 12-13. Until now, no constitutional infirmity has
been seen in districting Irish or Italian voters together, for example,
so long as the delineation does not abandon familiar apportionment practices.
See supra, at 8-11. If Chinese Americans and Russian Americans may
seek and secure group recognition in the delineation of voting districts,
then African Americans should not be dissimilarly treated. Otherwise, in
the name of equal protection, we would shut out "the very minority group
whose history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause."
See Shaw, 509 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4) (Stevens, J., dissenting). [n.12]

Under the Court's approach, judicial review of the same intensity, i.e.,
strict scrutiny, is in order once it is determined that an apportionment
is predominantly motivated by race. It matters not at all, in this new
regime, whether the apportionment dilutes or enhances minority voting strength.
As very recently observed, however, "[t]here is no moral or constitutional
equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system
and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination." Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Peña, ante, at ___ (slip op., at 2) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).

Special circumstances justify vigilant judicial inspection to
protect minority voters--circumstances that do not apply to majority voters.
A history of exclusion from state politics left racial minorities without
clout to extract provisions for fair representation in the lawmaking forum.
See supra, at 4-6. The equal protection rights of minority voters
thus could have remained unrealized absent the Judiciary's close surveillance.
Cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 153, n. 4 (1938) (referring to the "more searching judicial
inquiry" that may properly attend classifications adversely affecting "discrete
and insular minorities"). The majority, by definition, encounters no such
blockage. White voters in Georgia do not lack means to exert strong pressure
on their state legislators. The force of their numbers is itself a powerful
determiner of what the legislature will do that does not coincide with
perceived majority interests.

State legislatures like Georgia's today operate under federal
constraints imposed by the Voting Rights Act--constraints justified by
history and designed by Congress to make once subordinated people free
and equal citizens. But these federal constraints do not leave majority
voters in need of extraordinary judicial solicitude. The Attorney General,
who administers the Voting Rights Act's preclearance requirements, is herself
a political actor. She has a duty to enforce the law Congress passed, and
she is no doubt aware of the political cost of venturing too far to the
detriment of majority voters. Majority voters, furthermore, can press the
State to seek judicial review if the Attorney General refuses to preclear
a plan that the voters favor. Finally, the Act is itself a political measure,
subject to modification in the political process.

The Court's disposition renders redistricting perilous work for state
legislatures. Statutory mandates and political realities may require States
to consider race when drawing district lines. See supra, at 2-3.
But today's decision is a counterforce; it opens the way for federal litigation
if "traditional . . . districting principles" arguably were accorded less
weight than race. See ante, at 15. Genuine attention to traditional
districting practices and avoidance of bizarre configurations seemed, under
Shaw, to provide a safe harbor. See 509 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at 15) ("[T]raditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity,
and respect for political subdivisions . . . are objective factors that
may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial
lines."). In view of today's decision, that is no longer the case.

Only after litigation--under either the Voting Rights Act, the
Court's new Miller standard, or both--will States now be assured
that plans conscious of race are safe. Federal judges in large numbers
may be drawn into the fray. This enlargement of the judicial role is unwarranted.
The reapportionment plan that resulted from Georgia's political process
merited this Court's approbation, not its condemnation. Accordingly, I
dissent.

[MAPS FOLLOW THIS PAGE]

Notes

2 In
the vote dilution category, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339 (1960), was a pathmarker. There, the City of Tuskegee redrew
its boundaries to exclude black voters. This apportionment was unconstitutional
not simply because it was motivated by race, but notably because it had
a dilutive effect: it disenfranchised Tuskegee's black community. See id.,
at 341 ("The essential inevitable effect of this redefinition of Tuskegee's
boundaries is to remove from the city all save only four or five of its
400 Negro voters while not removing a single white voter or resident. The
result of the Act is to deprive the Negro petitioners discriminatorily
of the benefits of residence in Tuskegee, including, inter alia,
the right to vote in municipal elections.").

4 Although
the Eleventh District comes within 58 miles of crossing the entire State,
this is not unusual in Georgia: the Ninth District spans the State's entire
northern border, and the First, Second, and Eighth Districts begin at the
Florida border and stretch north to almost the middle of the State. See
864 F. Supp., at 1396 (Edmondson, J., dissenting). In the 1980's, Georgia's
Eighth District extended even farther, in an irregular pattern from the
southeast border with Florida to nearly the Atlanta suburbs. See App. 80.

5 The
First District has 20 intact counties and parts of 2 others. The Second
District has 23 intact counties and parts of 12 others. The Third District
has 8 intact counties and parts of 8 others. The Fifth District is composed
of parts of 4 counties. The Seventh District has 10 intact counties and
part of 1 county. The Eighth District has 22 intact counties and parts
of 10 others. The Ninth District has 19 intact counties and part of 1 other.
The Tenth District has 16 intact counties and parts of 3 others. See Joint
Exh. 17.

6 The
Sixth District scores lowest, with just 45 percent of its boundaries following
political subdivision lines. The Ninth District rates highest, with 91
percent. Defendant's Exh. 177, p. 3.

7 On
this measure, only 3 districts--the First, Seventh, and Ninth--rate higher
than the Eleventh District. Excluding the Fifth and Sixth Districts, which
contain no intact counties, the scores range from about 30 percent for
the Fourth District to 97 percent for the Seventh District. Defendant's
Exh. 177, p. 4.

8 The
Court turns the significance of this fact on its head by stating: " `While
the boundaries of the Eleventh do indeed follow many precinct lines, this
is because Ms. Meggers designed the Eleventh District along racial lines,
and race data was most accessible to her at the precinct level.' " Ante,
at 18 (quoting 864 F. Supp., at 1384). To this curious comment, one can
only demur. Yes, Georgia's plan considered race, but by following precinct
lines, it did so in an altogether proper way, i.e., without disregarding
traditional districting practices.

9 Appendices
A, B, and C to this opinion depict, respectively, the proposed Eleventh
District under the "Max Black" plan, Georgia's current congressional districts,
and the district in controversy in Shaw.

10 Indeed,
a "key" feature, ante, at 5, of the "Max Black" plan--placing parts
of Savannah in the Eleventh District--first figured in a proposal adopted
by Georgia's Senate even before the Attorney General suggested this course.
864 F. Supp., at 1394, n. 1 (Edmondson, J., dissenting).

11 I
would follow precedent directly on point. In United Jewish Organizations
of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430
U.S. 144 (1977) (UJO), even though the State "deliberately used
race in a purposeful manner" to create majority minority districts, id.,
at 165 (opinion of White, J., joined by Rehnquist and Stevens, JJ.), seven
of eight Justices participating voted to uphold the State's plan without
subjecting it to strict scrutiny. Five Justices specifically agreed that
the intentional creation of majority minority districts does not give rise
to an equal protection claim, absent proof that the districting diluted
the majority's voting strength. See ibid. (opinion of White, J.,
joined by Rehnquist and Stevens, JJ.); id., at 179-180 (Stewart,
J., concurring in judgment, joined by Powell, J.).

Nor is UJO best understood as a vote dilution case. Petitioners'
claim in UJO was that the State had "violated the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth
Amendments by deliberately revising its reapportionment plan along
racial lines." 430 U. S., at 155 (opinion of White, J., joined by Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.) (emphasis added). Petitioners themselves stated:
" `Our argument is . . . that the history of the area demonstrates that
there could be--and in fact was--no reason other than race to divide
the community at this time.' " Id., at 154, n. 14 (quoting Brief
for Petitioners, O. T. 1976, No. 75-104, p. 6, n.
6) (emphasis in Brief for Petitioners).

Though much like the claim in Shaw, the UJO claim
failed because the UJO district adhered to traditional districting
practices. See 430 U. S., at 168 (opinion of White, J., joined by Rehnquist
and Stevens, JJ.) ("[W]e think it . . . permissible for a State, employing
sound districting principles such as compactness and population equality,
. . . [to] creat[e] districts that will afford fair representation to the
members of those racial groups who are sufficiently numerous and whose
residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating districts in
which they will be in the majority.") (emphasis added).

12 Race
conscious practices a State may elect to pursue, of course, are not as
limited as those it may be required to pursue. See Voinovich v.
Quilter, 507 U. S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at __) ("[F]ederal
courts may not order the creation of majority minority districts unless
necessary to remedy a violation of federal law. But that does not mean
that the State's powers are similarly limited. Quite the opposite is true
. . . .") (citation omitted).