Racial groups—or groups taken to be racial groups—characterize three conditions from Hardimon (2017): C1: they are distinguished from other groups by patterns of visible physical features; C2: the members are linked by common ancestry which is peculiar to that group; and C3: they derive from a distinct geographic location.

Justifying C1 is simple: groups taken to be ‘racial’ are distinguished from other groups on the basis of physical characters. Someone from Europe looks different than someone from Africa; someone from Africa looks different than someone from Asia; someone from Asia looks different than someone from the Pacific Islands; someone from the Pacific Islands looks different than the Natives of America. Groups taken to be ‘racial’ have different facial features; they have different morphology. Thus, since there are heritable differences between groups taken to be ‘racial’, then this is evidence that race does indeed exist.

It’s important to also discuss what C1 does not demand: it does not demand that racial groups be distinguished by each of their visible physical features; it does not demand that each visible physical features of members of a race be identical; it allows skin color to vary just as much within race as it does between race; finally, it also allows great variation in hair color, skull morphology and skin color. Thus, since Hardimon’s concept is ‘vague’, then one might be able to say that it is “clinal” (that is, these differences vary by geography). But “Physical anthropologist Frank Livingstone’s well-known adage “There are no races, only clines” overlooks the possibility that, logically speaking, races might be clines” (Hardimon, 2017: 38). The claim “There are no races, only clines” is one that is oft-repeated against the reality of biological races.

C2, very simply, shows that differences in visible physical features are not the only things that delineate race: race is also defined in terms of ancestry and is therefore essential to the concept of race (I’d argue that ancestry is essential to any argument that attempts to establish races as biologically real). Races are, clearly, morphologically demarcated ancestry groups. The justification for C2 is thus: it is intuitive. Examples of race articulated in the past also bore this very basic concept: Linneus’ europeaus, asiaticus, afer, and americanus; Blumenbach’s Mongoloid, Caucasoid, Ethiopian, Malay and American; UNESCO’s Negroid, Mongoloid, and Caucasoid (deployed most famously by JP Rushton); and the Office of Management and Budget’s American Indian (or Alaskan native), black, Asian, whites, native Hawaiians (Pacific Islanders) (see Spencer, 2014 for a treatment of the OMB’s views on race and his ‘radical solution to the race problem’).

Now, finally, C3: the condition that groups taken to be ‘racial’ must derive from a distinct geographic location. Race, and the names used to refer to race, and so “The use of typonyms in the naming of racial groups suggests that the thinkers who chose these names were thinking of race as a geographical grouping” (Hardimon, 2017: 50). So, C1 and C2 have been established. This leaves us with C3. Races differ in patterns of visible physical features; these differences are explained by differences in geographic location. If race R1 derives from geographic location G1, and G1 is distinct from G2 which race R2 inhabits, then races R1 and R2 will look physically different.

The visible physical features of minimalist race that correspond to geographical ancestry count as “racial” because they are defining features of minimalist races. They no more need to be correlated with normatively important features to be properly counted as racial then minimalist races need to be characterized by normatively important features to be properly counted as races. Just as the concept of minimalist race deflates the concept of RACE, so too it deflates the concept of RACIAL. Visible physical features that correspond to geographical ancestry are eo ipso racial. (Hardimon, 2017: 52)

A race is a subdivision of Homo sapiens—a group of populations that exhibits a distinctive pattern of genetically transmitted phenotypic characters that corresponds to the group’s geographic ancestry and belongs to a biological line of descent initiated by a geographically separated and reproductively isolated founding population.

Since Hardimon’s views are new (published in 2017), there are no replies to his argument—excpet one, by Spencer (2018). Spencer doesn’t take to two of Hardimon’s claims: that (1) that the minimalist concept of race is the ordinary concept of race and (2) that minimalist races are biologically real. He grants (1) until Hardimon provides evidence that the minimalist concept of race is the ordinary concept of race. (2), on the other hand, Spencer attacks.

His objection to (2) comes down to the simple fact that 13/17 of the different conceptions of racial groups discussed by Linnaeus, Blumenbach, the OMB, and UNESCO do not fit C1-C3 (Blumenbach’s races do fit C1-C3). Spencer (2018) states that “there’s no ancestor that Eurasians share that’s not also shared by East Asians, Oceanians, and Native Americans […] there’s no ancestor that East Asians share that’s not also shared by Oceanians and Native Americans.” (See Duda and Zrzavy, 2016.) We need to be clear on what Hardimon means by “ancestry.” The dictionary definition of “ancestry” is thus: “one’s family or ethnic descent.” On this definition of “ancestry”, groups taken to be races do have “distinct ancestry“, so defined, and so, Hardimon’s (2017) C2 does indeed hold.

Biological racial realism “should” mean “race is a geniuine kind in biology.” Take the argument from Spencer (2011: 24):

(1) The meaning of ‘biological racial realism’ in the race debate should be a metaphysically minimal interpretation of important scientific kindhood that also does the most justice to what counts as an important scientific kind.
(2) A “metaphysically minimal” interpretation of important scientific kindhood is one that does not adopt unnecessary and contentious metaphysical assumptions.
(3) The interpretation of important scientific kindhood that does the most justice to what counts as an important scientific kind is the one that best captures epistemically important scientific kinds—or ‘EIS kinds’ for short.
(4) The candidates for important scientific kindhood in the race debate are natural kinds, naturali kinds, naturalu kinds, naturalp kinds, realp biological kinds, reali biological kinds, and geniuine kinds.
(5) No kind of kind in the race debate is both metaphysically minimal and does a better job of capturing EIS kindhood than genuine kinds.
(6) Therefore, the meaning of ‘biological racial realism’ in the race debate should be ‘race is a genuine kind in biology’.

Spencer has good critiques of Hardimon’s minimalist/populationist race view, but it does not hold.

Even if we allow Spencer’s views on Hardimon’s arguments for the existence of race to hold, Spencer himself has articulated a sound argument for the existence of race. In his 2014 paper A Radical Solution to the Race Problem, Spencer (2014) shows that Americans defer to the US Census on matters of race; the US Census defers to the OMB; the OMB refers to “sets of” populations—blacks, whites, Asians, Native Americans and Pacific Islanders; these “sets of” populations are not kinds (like what Hardimon argues his racial classifications are); therefore, races are not ‘kinds’, the term ‘race’ refers to sets of population groups. Thus, according to Spencer (2014), race refers to “proper names” for population groups, not “kinds”.

Both of Hardimon’s and Spencer’s arguments show that race is a biological reality; they both show that biological racial realism is true. Their concepts pick out real kinds in nature (Smith, 2016: 43).

Now if scientific taxonomy builds on folk taxonomy, and if racial classification builds on this in turn, there might be some basis for supposing that something about the modern habit of distinguishing between human groups on racial grounds is more deep-seated than we have acknowledged it to be. (Smith, 2015: 47)

The reason why there “might be some basis for supposing that something about the modern habit [which is not truly modern; Sarich and Miele, 2004; which I am sure that Smith knows due to the content of his book] of distinguishing between human groups on racial grounds is more deep-seated” than we have acknowledged because we are picking out real kinds that exist in nature.

Conclusion

Race, as a concept, is biologically real. Racial categories pick out real kinds in nature, as argued by Spencer (2014) and Hardimon (2017). Criticisms on Hardimon from Spencer or Spencer from Hardimon do not take away from this one fact: that race exists and is biologically real. Groups taken to be ‘racial’ look different from each other; they look different from each other due to their geographic locations and their ancestry (C1-C3). Since this is true, then race exists. We can argue this view simply:

P1. If groups of people look different from each other depending on where their ancestors evolved, then race exists.P2. Groups of people look different from each other depending on where their ancestors evolved.C. Therefore, race exists since people look different depending on where their ancestors evolved (modus ponens, P1, P2).

32 Comments

The issue with race realism is not that you can’t consistently or reliably categorize “kinds”. It’s because the proxies you use to delineate these groups are intrinsically relative.

So, I guess you consider subspecies to be equivalent or a step down from race. I mean what exactly do you consider realism? I think this is a semantic issue, if you take “realism” to mean objectivity I believe you’re wrong. If you mean the correspond to actual biological entities then sure. It’s refreshing to see you accept that construct validity does not require a 1:1 ratio to scientifically useful.

If there are any parameters to base race on, it is visible physical features. The rationale was provided in the article.

Ancestral groups (C2) from different, distinct, geographic locations (C3) look different each other (C1) and these features are heritable. Thus, racial delineation is predicated on these heritable visible physical features of these groups. Also “If race R1 derives from geographic location G1, and G1 is distinct from G2 which race R2 inhabits, then races R1 and R2 will look physically different.”

If you mean the correspond to actual biological entities then sure.

I take it to mean picking out real kinds in nature. Hardimon and Spencer show that we pick out real kinds in nature using Rosenberg et al’s (2002) work.

How do you delineate race. What arguments show that race is a biological reality for you?

No you did not. Why does physical discrepancies automatically validate the concept of race? How are the parameters you provided any different than any other concept of taxonomy?

“How do you delineate race. What arguments show that race is a biological reality for you?”

There seems to be some confusion. I only use race for categorization. I don’t pretend the delineation is anything but socio-political. You haven’t addressed the issue. The concept of ethnicity makes race useless.

Maybe its becuase i live in europe but there is an difference between ethnic group and race. Thats becuase certain ethnic groups are differently accepting of different races. In my view, there’s ethnicity and then there’s apperence.

blockquote>No you did not. Why does physical discrepancies automatically validate the concept of race? How are the parameters you provided any different than any other concept of taxonomy?

I just went through the steps of how it validates the concept of race. Note how I didn’t say how many races exist; only provided the conditions for which groups count as races.

I only use race for categorization. I don’t pretend the delineation is anything but socio-political.

Is biological racial realism true or false? Is there a biological notion to race?

The concept of ethnicity makes race useless.

Ethnicity is a biocultural notion. On the other hand, the minimalist race concept is a biological concept. Both concepts make reference to ancestry: ancestry is essential to both concepts. But the concept of ETHNICITY is a biocultural notion, the concept of RACE is a non-cultural biological notion. Ethnicity and race are distinct concepts. The existence of one doesn’t make the other useless at all.

“I just went through the steps of how it validates the concept of race.”

No, you gave an arbitrary definition of race, and then noted that because variation fits this definition, race is real. Which is fine if you’re just using it for taxonomy and I’d agree with you if this is what you meant by “realism”(but how would I know, you never answered the question). However, this does not erase the category’s subjectivity.

“Ethnicity and race are distinct concepts.”

Distinction without a difference. Race isn’t detached form culture, especially if geographic location and ancestry are being used as proxies.

A race is a subdivision of Homo sapiens—a group of populations that exhibits a distinctive pattern of genetically transmitted phenotypic characters that corresponds to the group’s geographic ancestry and belongs to a biological line of descent initiated by a geographically separated and reproductively isolated founding population.

Distinction without a difference.

One is a biocultural notion, the other is a non-cultural biological notion. Hence “biological racial realism”.

Where do these views contrast?

Eliminativists wish to eliminate race from all aspects of our ontology. Constructionists hold that race is a construct of society. (Which Hardimon’s socialrace concept is.)

So you hold that the concept “race” doesn’t t pick out real kinds in nature?

His definition is sufficient to show that Homo sapiens is divided into races, though of course he does not state which groups are races, only that race exists. (The PRC shows which groups can be said to be races.)

More than one sound argument for race exists (see Spencer 2014 as well). I’ve already shown that our concept of race picks out real kinds in nature.

That is a false dichotomy

What else is there? There are cultural, biological and combined notions. Hardimon’s MRC covers the biological; his SRC covers the social. Spencer’s argument covers both the social and the biological.

I guess I’m a constructivist then

What’s the strength of racial constructivism over racial naturalism? One group of constructs in one society does not override objective analyses from, eg, Rosenberg et al’s (2002) K=5 run (which was defended by Hardimon and Spencer).

How? You just need to recognize that people look different based on their peculiar geographic ancestry. That’s literally it. Then with Spencer’s argument, races track the OMB groups. The arguments are sound.

Hardimon’s PRC further attests to the biological reality of race.

Youc an define race however you like, as ong as it successfully captures some level of heritable variation

Example?

As I stated even if the concepts are distinct

Why not? I’ve explained the rationale for ethnicity as a biocultural notion. I’ve explained the rationale of the MRC/PRC as a biological notion. Race is a non-cultural biological notion.

I don’t see how you showed that “The concept of ethnicity makes race useless”, your conception of race is similar to Hardimon’s SRC.

This criticism is conceptual not empirical

What’s the criticism? That we can just construct race X, Y, and Z and then say it’s biological?

I can’t attempt to refute something vague (“This criticism is conceptual not empirical”).

Your claim is that what Hardimon and Spencer term ‘races’ is arbitrary. Though again, as with Spencer’s argument on what biological racial realism should mean in the race debate, they need to pick out kinds. Rosenberg et al and others show that these categories exist in nature. Thus biological racial realism is true.

The entire Human species share geographic ancestry, all originally derive from Africa , and all have a shared set of physical characteristics. Therefore, you can derive any number of racial groupings from the spectrum and still successfully categorize heritable genetic variation. I myself prioritize skeletal morphology over all other proxies, and this is not objectively wrong, because it can correctly ‘pick out kinds’ that exist in nature. Phenotypic variation is relative, therefore I could separate Caucasoids, Negroids, Mongoloids, and Australoids into even more races, or I could combine them. Hardimon, Spencer, Rosenberg, Coon, Huxley, Linnaeus, mine etc., none of their concepts can circumvent this problem. Species itself is a shaky concept(but for slightly different reasons) and taxonomic classification below species suffers this issue more than higher ones. All Biologic classification suffers from this flaw, but just no where to the extent that race does because there is enormously more that separates, say, a tiger and a lion vs a black man and a white man. This difference isn’t just by the normal parameters for race either, higher levels of taxonomy simply use more methodological techniques in general.

This is where Ethnicity comes in. Ethnicity can capture all of the variation that race does, but to an even more detailed and accurate scale, while simultaneously adding another domain that it can categorize, which race cannot: culture. Since taxonomic classifications use ecology as a proxy it makes no sense to try and separate biological and biocultural notions, because culture is just an environment in the form of niche construction. Of course by this logic, simply using individual variation is technically even more accurate, however at that point it defeats the purpose of classification: to simplify the cascading complexity of life’s variation. Since Ethnicity is clearly the superior categorization system, it makes Race redundant as a concept, because it has less utility to biology and medical science. Ethnicity engulfs the usefulness of Race. So it begs the question as to why a scientist would use Race unless there was some arbitrary socio-political reason. The existence of Ethnicity implies racial realists have a racist motive, because the former is superior at what race is supposedly being used for by it’s proponents. This doesn’t mean racial realists are racist. Their concept is still “real” in a biological sense, it’s just subjective like all within species classification systems. Hence, it’s a social construct.

Therefore, you can derive any number of racial groupings from the spectrum and still successfully categorize heritable genetic variation.

you wish nigger.

there is exactly ONE categorization which works, and it is the one everyone sees but isn’t allowed to speak today because of (((their))) influence.

mother nature is a thought criminal and hater.

sad!

i’ve already explained this. the categorization matches the population density map of the whole world. uninhabitable or barely inhabitable regions are barriers to gene flow. these areas have not changed much for 10,000 years.

Why exactly would I wish that? There is no motive behind it besides logic, as it has no bearing on whether genetic variation exists along racial lines, or the political implications. Get over yourself.

just ask “what is the most recent ancestral population from which both have descended 100%? when did it live?” you will find most of humanity can be partitioned such that every pair of individuals in each partition has a much more recent such population than either has with anyone in the other partitions.

an ethnic spaniard and russian have a much more recent common ancestral population than either of them has with any black african, chinaman, abo, etc.

take blue eyes. supposedly no one had blue eyes until 6,000 years ago. blue eyes occur only in caucasians.

another example. if i found that european which i am most distantly related to of all europeans, there’d still be a yuge gap between the distance between us and my distance from every chinaman in china.

start with two icelandic brothers, then the two most distantly related icelanders, … then two europeans, then caucasians, then YUGE GAP in millennia to nearest common set of ancestors and YUGE GAP because of natural barriers to gene flow.

“C1:they are distinguished from other groups by patterns of visible physical features.”

I’ve shown you several times why this isn’t true… For this to be true you would have to find a number of phenotypic features that distinguish your putative groupings e.g. “Europeans” versus “Africans”. The problem is these groupings are far too heterogenous and so this cannot be achieved.

What phenotypic or morphological features distinguish all populations in “Europeans” to all “Africans”, or vice-versa? These groupings contain very diverse populations e.g. Swedes don’t look like Italians and Somalis don’t look like Yoruba.

What phenotypic or morphological features distinguish all populations in “Europeans” to all “Africans”, or vice-versa?

Hardimon’s concept allows that phenotypic/morphologic features don’t need to be found in “all” Europeans or “all” Africans to be racial; Visible features which correspond to geographic ancestry are racial.

I’m saying there’s no visible features which correspond to “European” or “African” geographic ancestry. If I’m wrong (which I’m not), list them. Take for example white skin, this isn’t find at high frequency in Southern Europe, since the native inhabitants of the Mediterranean have tanned so-called olive complexions; this north versus south latitude skin pigmentation variation in Europe was noted by ancient Greeks and Romans.

when less than 100% identical is the criterion this obviates the “problem” of pushkin and the teeny tiny populations which are intermediate, like central asians, papuans, assamese, bluemen/tuareg, etc.