February 15, 2017

Can Trump Really Value A Strong, Independent India?

The following article originally appeared on NDTV on 15 February 2017. The full text can be found here.

The US capital is a strange place these days. The
District of Columbia's coffee shops are running a brisk business, attending to
a steady stream of ex-Obama administration officials and patient federal
government employees awaiting policy direction from on high. Many members of
the Republican policy firmament appear alienated, some bitterly so. Eyeballs
are glued to cable news and (especially) to Twitter, curious about where
@realDonaldTrump will next train its gunsights. Meanwhile, the White House
appears riven by infighting, with considerable speculation as to who might
follow National Security Advisor Michael Flynn as the administration's next
fall guy. Hidden monsters lurk everywhere in this upside-down world.

At the same time, US diplomacy is beginning to assume a
semblance of normalcy. Rex Tillerson's arrival at the US Department of State
has begun to raise morale among American diplomats. President Donald Trump's
reception of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has also gone well, injecting a
certain predictability and stability to the United States' Asia policy.

But what about India? For over a decade, the approach of
the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations to India was informed by a
certain logic. The underlying principle of their engagement was - to use Ashley
Tellis's words - that "a strong, democratic, (even if perpetually)
independent India [is] in American national interest." To be sure, not
everyone in either administration bought into that notion wholeheartedly. In
fact, many did so reluctantly, leading to periodic complaints by American
officials about India not being more "cooperative" on certain matters
such as Iran, trade, or climate change. Successive Indian governments wisely
resisted a subordinate position to the United States on some of these key
matters of Indian interest, knowing in part that they could afford to do so.

But there is no indication yet that Trump fully
appreciates the value of a strong but independent India for preserving
America's place in the world. Certainly, the logic of facilitating India's rise
because its very strength advances American strategic interests seems
fundamentally incompatible with the narrowest Trumpian conceptions of
"America First." Unless that changes, we will see its effects play
out on Indo-U.S. relations in a number of ways: on trade, immigration,
investment, capacity building, and technology transfers (including, but not
limited to, defence).

India must therefore prepare for a more transactional
approach to the United States over the short term, while continuing to extol
the virtues of a stronger India for American interests. Both are possible. In
the short run, deeper thought must be given as to what India can put on the
table. There are some easy answers: questions of market access, existing Indian
investment in the United States, and - when necessary for Indian defence
requirements - arms purchases. But more creative thinking may yet be required
along these lines.

This is doubly so because Washington's transactional
attitude will likely extend to two areas where there appears - at first glance
- to be greater convergence between Washington and New Delhi. On international
terrorism, India will likely find a stronger, more visceral response from the
new White House, but will soon have to confront issues of differing means and
priorities. The US will focus on the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria (and what specifically India can bring to that fight), as well as
Iran (which could affect India's own equities with Tehran). For India, of
course, the focus is closer to home, on Pakistan and Afghanistan.

A second area that may appear ripe for closer convergence
between New Delhi and Washington, but could be beset by practical
complications, is in preserving a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
In some issues that matter most to India, such as improving regional
connectivity, the United States is incapable of playing a much larger role. On
defence technology transfers, India will have to tread more carefully under the
new administration. Other aspects of security cooperation - including military
exercises and dialogue - are more promising. But even they will lead to
questions of timing, signalling, and proportionality, where Washington and New
Delhi are liable to disagree.

The various overlapping political situations involving
Washington - individual personalities, national dynamics, and international
developments - are all still fluid. But while continuing to advocate India's
traditional positions, New Delhi will need a Plan B for a more transactional
America. In these times, we must always be prepared for stranger things.