JANUARY 2ND, 1941.
SPEED —THE NEW FACTOR (Continued)
mand under the operational control
of the Admiralty for work in that
theatre of war. For, apart from the
fighting in Africa, the other great
fight against the United Kingdom
lines of sea communication is con-
tinuous by submarine, aircraft and
surface mine-layer. Moreover, there
is a.tremendous length of coastline to be covered on the
'Continent from the North Cape (now shrouded in per-
petual night) to the basin of St. Jean de Luz.
But the outcome of this war will not be decided by
the Battle of North Africa, nor will it be decided solely
by the German blockade of the United Kingdom. The
outcome of this war will be decided by the British Air
Arm more than by any other factor, and the size of Tie
Royal Air Force must be commensurate with our needs
when the tip*^ comes for its concentration against Ger-
many and everything German. Without that concen-
tration of air power all other forms of power will fail.
Until the wings of the Royal Air Force far outshadow
those of the Luftwaffe we shall not be within measur-
able distance of defeating Germany.
Eliminating Italy
We have chased the Italians out of Western Egypt,
and have entered the equally barren desert of Eastern
Libya. This notable military victory will help to redress
the British disproportion in armaments and men vis-a-vis
the Axis Powers by the ratio of Italy's greater loss
through defeat than our loss through the price of victory.
p*rtrhere are no tangible assets, like those acquired by
Germany through the defeat of the European nations
whose territory the Nazis now control.
Britain must still rely upon her own pre-war re-
sources and those she can muster in America and the
rest of the world which is still free from the Nazi-
Japanese yoke. The full value of Italy's reverse can
be obtained only by knocking Italy right out of the
war. To do so quickly must be the British aim. To
achieve that aim we must make the Italian peninsula
feel the war.
TheCoastal Command of the Royal Ah- Force is one
of tjjie branches of the British Air Arm, part of which
could be employed to place a strain upon the Italian
peninsula without detracting from the air action which
/must be maintained against Germany without cessation.
'But there are many other calls upon the resources of
the Coastal Command—calls which cannot be ignored.
To take but one example, the Admiralty is bound to
request that aircraft of the Coastal Command be used
for purposes of naval war, the convoy escort, the anti-
submarine patrol, the anti-submarine depot raid, recon-
naissance of enemy coasts and ports, attacks against
enemy shipping and the thousand and one routine
duties which aljtfays afflict the Navy when we are at
war. When the devil drives there is at times no option
but to travel along the only avenue that appears to offer
a means of escape.
And since the fall of Norway and France the toll
taken by the submarine has risen. After the transfer
of the fifty American destroyers, the only remedy next
to hand which offered immediate amelioration of the
situation was the Coastal Command of the Royal Air
Force. It will be interesting to see whether naval con-
trol of this miniature air force—for it is nothing less
than that—will bring about a reduction in the losses of
our Merchant Navy.
IN this article Captain Macmillan voices his fears
that the demands of the Army and the Navy may
weaken the effectiveness of the Bomber Command
in action against Germany. His plea for moreindependent action by the K.A.F. is understandable,
but unfortunately our supplies of aircraft are not
unlimited, and we must trust the Prime Minister
to see that they are applied where most needed.
Already, since control was taken
over by the Admiralty, something
has happened. Flying boats no
longer pass the same spots as they
did before. That is to be ex-
pected. The Admiralty method of working patrols
will necessarily involve changes of this kind. 'But how
great these changes are cannot be known until the war
is over.
Meantime, the Royal Air Force Bomber Command
has lost a valuable ally. For there have been times
in the past when Coastal Command aircraft have raided
targets , which now will have to be raided by the
Bomber Command or not be raided at all unless the
Admiralty gives its consent. The latter method is
almost certain to be too slow for the swift needs of air
war, when perhaps seconds count.
Since this loss must be borne by the Royal Air Force,
does the converse also hold good? There have been
times in the past when purely naval targets, such as
enemy ships, have been attacked by the Bomber Com-
mand. Think of the raids on Kiel, Wilhelmshavcn, the
Channel Ports, Brest, Lorient and other places (as well
as ships), all of which are primarily of naval interest.
Is raiding of this kind now to be carried out by the
Coastal Command under the (Lrect Operational Orders
of the Admiralty? Or is the Bomber Command still to
work for the Navy as it has done in the past?
Weakening the R.A.F.
How much are the demands of the two older Services
upon sections of the still-independent Royal Air Force
causing a diminution of the air blockade of Germany?
To what degree will they diminish the striking power
of the Royal Air Force in the future? Would the Air
Staff have furnished the Coastal Command with all the
types of aircraft it now possesses if it had thought that
it would lose operational control over this section of its
force ?
Important questions these, which will affect the wel-
fare of every citizen of the country, perhaps of the Em-
pire. But, in wartime, there is no answer. Parliament
is told to ask no searching questions, to probe not into
Service secrets. Well, all past wars have had their
skeletons hidden in the Service cupboards. Some are
still embedded in the grim walls of Whitehall. Some
have stalked forth like ghosts, clanking their chains.
Some have been unpleasant spectras. Let us hope that
this one, which has been murally interred, will come
forth in due course a happy wraith.
Let us hope that the aim of the Cabinet will be now
to expand the independent Royal Air Force so that,
freed from the routine demands of Navy and Army,
those responsible for the strategy of air war can con-
centrate on the vast chequer-board of targets on the
Continent a far more formidable array of bombers than
it was in Britain's power to employ in 1940.
This would enable our bombers to be concentrating
on the Northern area of Italy, to destroy its industrial
importance altogether before the Nazis decide to occupy