M.A. in Philosophy and German Language & Literature (University of Göttingen, 2006), PhD in philosophy (Humboldt-University of Berlin, 2012). Lecturer at the Department of Philosophy at Humboldt University from 11/2007 till 03/2013 and since 11/2013.

“Is There a Liberal Principle of Instrumental Transmission?” (with Benjamin Kiesewetter), 9th international conference of the German Society for Analytical Philosophy (GAP), University of Osnabrück (15 September 2015); European Normativity Network Conference, Humboldt University of Berlin (20 November 2015, handout)

“Interpersonal Aggregation and the Separateness of Persons”, Department of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth (27.01.2015)

“Mixed Feelings about the Mixed Solution”, Workshop The Dimensions of Consequentialism, University of Konstanz (16.-17. November 2013)

“Relative Value and Consequentialist Accounts of Restrictions”, Tagung Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems?, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg (23.-25. September 2013)

Current Projects

Aggregation, Fairness and the Numbers Problem

The aim of this project is to investigate whether, as Taurek famously put it, “the numbers count”, i.e. whether, and in what form, it is of moral importance how many people are affected by one’s decisions in trade-off situations. Working within a broadly Rossian deontological framework, my primary aim is to develop a coherent outlook integrating both requirements of fairness and considerations more usually associated with consequentialist arguments in favour of saving the greater number.

On the Role of Principles in Ethics(PhD project, completed 11/2012, published in 2014 by Mentis, Münster)

Whereas many believe that principles play a crucial role for moral thinking, particularists argue that, on the contrary, we should not appeal to moral principles in judging and deciding what to do. This project’s goals are twofold: First, it aims at a better understanding of the systematic import and place of the particularist challenge. Second, it evaluates central arguments both in favour and against particularist positions. I argue that the debate about moral particularism should, to a large extent, be conceived as a substantial first order discussion in normative ethics, that the most radical form of particularism is unconvincing, and that both defence and criticism of principles are subject to important boundaries imposed by the phenomenon of moral indeterminacy.