Defendant-Appellant Deborah A. H. Joshua (Joshua) appeals the August
31, 1999, Judgment of the District Court of the First Circuit
(1) (the district court), which found Joshua guilty of failing
to give information and render aid in violation of Hawai`i Revised Statutes
(HRS) § 291C-14 (1993), (2) and of
driving without a license in violation of HRS § 286-102 (1993 &
Supp. 2000) (Joshua was originally charged with Driving While License Suspended
or Revoked, in violation of HRS § 286-132 (Supp. 2000), which charge
was amended by the State on March 12, 1999, to driving without a license).

The district court sentenced Joshua as follows:

(1) failing to give information and render aid: a $200.00 fine,
a $7.00 payment to the Driver's Education Fund, and restitution in an amount
to be determined by District Court Probation; and

(2) driving without a license: a $150.00 fine, a $7.00 payment to the
Driver's Education Fund, and a $25.00 Criminal Injuries Compensation Fee
assessment.

On appeal, Joshua contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction
over her and that insufficient evidence supported a finding that she was
the driver of the vehicle. We disagree with Joshua's contentions, but hold
there was plain error committed by the district court as to Joshua's conviction
for driving without a license.

I. BACKGROUND

On the first day of trial (August 25, 1999), Joshua orally moved the
district court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The district
court denied the motion. On the second day of trial (August 31, 1999),
Joshua submitted Exhibits "A" and "B" to the district court to support
her claim that the court lacked jurisdiction. Exhibit "A" is a photocopy
of a Certificate of Live Birth issued by the Department of Health, Territory
of Hawai`i, and Exhibit "B" is a photocopy of a State of Hawaii Identification
Certificate (State I.D. card).

On August 25, 1999, Dr. Richard Liu (Dr. Liu) testified first for the
State. On February 19, 1999, Dr. Liu was involved in a traffic accident
at approximately 7:30-7:40 p.m. while driving town bound on the H-1 Freeway
just past the Mililani/ Wahiawa exit. Dr. Liu saw a speeding white car,
a Lincoln (the Lincoln), in his lane approaching his car from behind. The
Lincoln moved to Dr. Liu's left side, hit the median wall, and bounced
back, hitting the left side of Dr. Liu's car. Dr. Liu then saw the Lincoln
hit two or three cars ahead of him, spin three times, and come to a stop,
blocking three lanes of the five-lane highway.

Dr. Liu testified he tried to read the license plate number of the Lincoln
while it was stopped, but the Lincoln was driven away at a slow speed.
When the Lincoln was about a half mile away, Dr. Liu saw it accelerated
to 40-50 miles per hour.

Dr. Liu testified that an off-duty police officer (the officer) was
driving one of the cars involved in the accident ahead of him. Dr. Liu
and the officer followed the Lincoln after it left the scene. Dr. Liu was
behind and the officer was on the left side of the Lincoln, which was in
the right lane. The Lincoln then moved into the left lane and sped off.
Although he was unable to see the driver's face, Dr. Liu was able to obtain
the Lincoln's license plate number, which he eventually gave to the officer.

Dr. Liu testified that he and the officer then pulled off the road.
Dr. Liu was unable to exit his car from the driver's side because there
was a "big hole on [the] driver's side door" and the accident had caused
the driver's side air bag to deploy. Dr. Liu's car door was not in that
condition previous to the accident. The officer borrowed Dr. Liu's cellular
phone to report the incident to police dispatch. Dr. Liu approximated that
it was 10-15 minutes later when a uniformed officer arrived at the area
where Dr. Liu's car was parked. Dr. Liu testified that receipts shown to
him in court indicating repairs totaling $7,168.29 to his car after the
accident were correct. Dr. Liu testified the driver of the Lincoln that
hit his car never stopped or exchanged information with him.

Barbara Jean Pettus (Pettus) testified that on or about February 19,
1999, she rented a white Lincoln car (Lincoln). Pettus described her relationship
with Joshua as "family" and stated that they had lived together. On February
19, Pettus first noticed the Lincoln was missing at approximately 12:00
or 1:00 p.m., and she stated that it was not there that afternoon. Pettus
testified that the keys for the Lincoln were "somewhere in the house,"
although she did not look for them after noticing that the car was missing.
The only people who had access to the Lincoln's keys were Pettus and her
daughter, Nicole Pettus (Nicole). When the police arrived at her door at
approximately 8:00 or 9:00 p.m., Pettus noticed the Lincoln had been returned
to her house. Pettus did not actually see Joshua return home, but recalled
that at approximately 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. she was home. Pettus confirmed
to the police officers that she had rented a car that day; when they informed
her it had been involved in an accident, Pettus was "shocked." The police
officers showed Pettus the damage to the Lincoln, which damage Pettus recalled
was on "the side and maybe the bumper." Pettus testified the Lincoln was
undamaged prior to that time.

Pettus testified she did not give anyone permission to drive the Lincoln
on February 19, 1999. When Pettus saw the Lincoln was missing, she assumed
one of the adults in the house had taken the car. Pettus knew Nicole had
not taken the Lincoln because Nicole was with her that day, and the only
other adult in the house was Joshua. Joshua had never previously used Pettus'
car.

Under cross-examination, Joshua showed Pettus a Honolulu Police Department
(HPD) 252 witness statement form, which stated that Pettus told the responding
police officer Joshua had been the driver of the Lincoln and Pettus had
not given Joshua permission to drive the Lincoln. Pettus testified in court
that both statements made to the police officer were false.

On the second day of trial, August 31, 1999, Nicole testified that on
February 19, 1999, she talked with police officers at her home regarding
a car rented by Pettus (rental car). At approximately 12:00 p.m., Nicole
and Pettus went to the store for approximately one to one-and-a-half hours.
When Nicole and Pettus returned from the store, the rental car was no longer
at the residence.

Nicole testified that Joshua is her hanai "aunty" and she has known
Joshua "ever since I was a kid." Joshua lived at Nicole's house "off and
on" and was at the house on the date of the accident. Nicole noticed that
Joshua returned to the house sometime in the early evening before the police
officers arrived.

The rental car was back at Nicole's residence after Joshua returned.
When Nicole and Pettus returned from the store, they did not call the police
to report the rental car as stolen because it was obvious to them that
Joshua had taken the car. Nicole did not see Joshua drive the rental car.

Police Officer Billy Junior Masaniai (Officer Masaniai) testified that
he was on duty on February 19, 1999, assigned to patrol the Kalihi area.
Police dispatch had given Pettus's address to Officer Masaniai after dispatch
had established through Hertz Rental Car that a car involved in an accident
earlier that day had been rented to Pettus; the car rented by Pettus was
a "white Lincoln Town car" (Lincoln).

Officer Masaniai testified he went to Pettus's address at approximately
8:40 p.m. to ascertain who had been the driver of the Lincoln. Police dispatch
told Officer Masaniai where the damages should be on the Lincoln, and Officer
Masaniai saw the Lincoln parked in front of Pettus' residence with those
damages. Officer Masaniai went to the residence, knocked on the door, and
asked for Barbara Jean Pettus, the renter of the Lincoln.

Officer Masaniai testified that the woman who answered the door first
stated she was Barbara Pettus; in court, Officer Masaniai identified the
woman at the door as Joshua. Eventually, Joshua stated she was not Pettus,
but that Pettus was inside the residence. When Officer Masaniai asked Joshua
if she were the driver of the Lincoln, she hesitated and then stated that
someone named Debbie Joshua was the driver of the Lincoln. Joshua also
mentioned a driver's name as "Jerry."

Officer Masaniai testified that Joshua had "obviously been drinking
because I could smell the smell of an alcoholic beverage . . . coming from
her -- her person." Officer Masaniai spoke with Nicole, who "kinda' cleared
things up" by explaining that her mother was Pettus and then identifying
Joshua as her aunty. Nicole explained that Pettus had picked her up earlier
that day and when they returned home, the Lincoln was no longer parked
in front of the house. Nicole stated that after Joshua came back to the
house later, she and Pettus noticed the Lincoln was back. Officer Masaniai
also talked with Pettus who stated that she did not give anyone permission
to drive the Lincoln, but she could not or would not tell him who the driver
was.

Officer Masaniai testified he observed damages to the Lincoln that included
dents and scratches along the right side, from the front bumper all the
way to the rear bumper. The damages to the Lincoln were consistent with
the damages the "fleeing vehicle" would have incurred according to the
information relayed to Officer Masaniai from police dispatch.

Police Officer Mike Metzger (Officer Metzger) testified that on February
19, 1999, he issued citations to Joshua for driving without a license and
for failing to render aid and stop at an accident that occurred on the
"H-1 Waimalu at the Pearlridge area" in the City and County of Honolulu,
State of Hawai`i.

Officer Metzger testified that on February 19, 1999, his assignment
was patrol; he was in the Field Training Officer Program, and Officer Masaniai
was his rider. Officer Metzger first spoke to Joshua on that date outside
Pettus's residence. He had been sent to the residence to ascertain the
identity of the person who had fled from the accident, read the person
his/her rights, get a statement, and cite for any violations. The address
of the residence had been obtained from a license plate check that "came
out" to Hertz Rental Car; Hertz had then given Pettus's address to HPD.
When Officer Metzger arrived at the residence and asked to speak with the
person who rented the car (Barbara Pettus), Joshua responded, "Oh. I'm
Barbara." Officer Metzger asked Joshua if she knew who was operating the
vehicle, and she responded that "Joshua" was and indicated that Joshua
was in the house.

Officer Metzger testified he went into the house and spoke to Pettus
and Nicole and asked if they knew who was operating the rental car. Officer
Metzger explained that the woman outside the house said that Joshua was
driving it, and Pettus and Nicole said, "That's Debbie." Officer Metzger
explained that the woman outside had used Pettus's name, so he asked Pettus
to provide identification to verify who she was. Pettus and Nicole were
not positive about who was driving the car, but they believed Joshua was.
Officer Metzger asked Joshua who she was, "and for the longest time she
-- she wouldn't admit to who -- that her name was Debbie." Officer Metzger
checked on Joshua via police dispatch and determined that she did not have
a driver's license. Joshua refused to sign the citations issued to her
by Officer Metzger. The State entered into evidence State's Exhibit "1,"
a certified, signed declaration from the Licensing Administrator of the
Division of Motor Vehicles and Licensing, City and County of Honolulu,
certifying that Deborah H. Joshua did not have a driver's license on February
19, 1999.

Under cross-examination, Officer Metzger testified that while he did
not see Joshua driving the rental car, his investigation indicated she
was the operator of the vehicle involved in the accident.

Following Officer Metzger's testimony, the State rested, and Joshua
made a motion for a judgment of acquittal. The district court denied the
motion, ruling:

Okay. At this time, then, the
Court is ready to rule. Having heard the testimony of the State's witnesses,
as well as having heard argument of Counsel and that of the defendant,
the Court does find that the State has met its burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt to show that the defendant is guilty of failing to give
aid and render aid at the scene of an accident, and also driving without
a license on February 19th, 1999, in the City and County of Honolulu.

The Court does find that defendant was the driver of the vehicle that
was rented to Miss Barbara Pettus, which was subsequently involved in an
accident with Richard Liu (sic), who sustained damage to his vehicle.

And, so, the Court does find that the State has met its burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. So, the Court does find that you are guilty
of these offenses. Your motion for judgment of acquittal is denied.

In deciding whether to uphold the district court decision, we must review
the evidence adduced in the district court "in the strongest light for
the prosecution" when evaluating the "legal sufficiency of such evidence
to support a conviction." State
v. Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 248, 831 P.2d924, 931,reconsideration
denied, 73 Haw. 625, 834 P.2d 1315 (1992)."The test on appeal
is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether
there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of
fact." 73 Haw. at 248, 831 P.2d at 931. "'Substantial evidence' as to every
material element of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of
sufficient quality and probative value to enable a man of reasonable caution
to support a conclusion." 73 Haw. at 248-49, 831 P.2d at 931.

The issues raised on appeal are whether the trial court had jurisdiction
over Joshua and whether its decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Joshua contends she is a sovereign American citizen not subject to the
laws of the State of Hawai`i. Hawaii Revised Statutes § 701-106 (1993)
provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§701-106 Territorial
applicability. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a
person may be convicted under the law of this State of an offense committed
by the person's own conduct or the conduct of another for which the person
is legally accountable if:

(a) Either the conduct or the result which is an element of the offense
occurs within this State[.]

§291C-14 Duty to give
information and render aid. (a) The
driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury
to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle or other property which
is driven or attended by any person shall
give the driver's name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle
the driver is driving[.]

(Emphasis added.) The statute applies to the driver of any vehicle regardless
of citizenship.

HRS § 286-102 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§286-102 Licensing.
(a) No person . . . shall
operate any category of motor vehicles listed in this section without first
being appropriately examined and duly licensed as a qualified driver of
that category of motor vehicles.

(b) A person operating the following category or combination of categories
of
motor vehicles shall be examined as provided in section 286-108 and duly
licensed by the examiner of drivers:

. . . .

(3) Passenger cars of
any gross vehicle weight rating[.]

(Emphasis added.) The statute prohibits all unlicensed persons from driving
passenger cars upon the roadways of the state regardless of citizenship.
Accordingly, both statutes apply to Joshua.

As part of the exercise of its
police power, a state may, in the absence of national legislation, rightfully
prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in
respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles . . .
[a]nd to this it end may require the registration of such vehicles and
the licensing of their drivers.

Id. at 231, 883 P.2d at
653 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court properly exercised
its jurisdiction in hearing the matter before it.

B. There Was Substantial Evidence to Support Joshua's Conviction.

Joshua also contends there was insufficient evidence to support a finding
that she was the driver of the rental car involved in the accident because
no witnesses were called who positively identified her.

In deciding whether to uphold the district court's decision, we must
review the evidence adduced in the district court "in the strongest light
for the prosecution" when evaluating the "legal sufficiency of such evidence
to support a conviction." Batson,
73 Haw. at 248, 831 P.2d at 931."The test on appeal is not whether
guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there was substantial
evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact." 73 Haw. at 248,
831 P.2d at 931. Furthermore, it is "for the trial judge as factfinder
to assess credibility of witnesses, including defendants, and to resolve
all questions of fact. Lono
v. State, 63 Haw. 470, 473, 629 P.2d 630, 633 (1981).

To support a conviction for violating HRS § 291C-14, the State
was required to prove that (1) Joshua was the driver of a vehicle involved
in an accident, (2) the accident resulted in injury to or death of a person
or damage to any vehicle, and (3) Joshua failed to provide information
and render aid. HRS § 291C-14. The State adduced evidence from Pettus
and Nicole that Joshua was the driver of the rental car. Furthermore, when
Joshua first identified herself as "Barbara," she said someone named "Joshua"
was driving the rental car involved in the accident.

"The trier of fact may draw all reasonable and legitimate inferences
and deductions from the evidence adduced from admitted or known facts,
and those findings of the trial court will not be disturbed unless clearly
erroneous." Lono,
63 Haw. at 473-74, 629 P.2d at 633.

There was substantial evidence that Joshua was the driver of the rental
car involved in the accident, fled the scene, and failed to provide information
and aid (testimony of Dr. Liu).

To support a conviction for violating HRS § 286-102, the State
was required to prove that Joshua was driving without a current license.
State's Exhibit 1 proved that on February 19, 1999, Joshua was not licensed
to drive in the State of Hawai`i. There was substantial evidence that Joshua
was driving without a license in violation of HRS § 286-102.

C. The District Court Committed Plain Error in Allowing
the Amended Charge.

However, the amended charge against Joshua warrants further discussion
under plain error analysis. Joshua was originally charged with Driving
While License Suspended or Revoked in violation of HRS § 286-132,
which charge was amended by the State on March 12, 1999, to driving without
a license in violation of HRS § 286-102. Joshua was not present at
the March 12, 1999, hearing. (3)

A court "may permit a charge other than an indictment to be amended
at any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense
is charged and if
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." HRPP Rule 7(f)
(emphasis added). The test "is conjunctive, and amendment of a charge is
improper unless both requirements are satisfied." State
v. Matautia, 81 Hawai`i 76, 81, 912 P.2d 573, 578 (App. 1996). The
determining factor of whether the amended charge is an "additional or different
offense" under HRPP Rule 7(f) is whether it is an included offense of the
original charge. Id.

In Matautia, this
court found reversible error where an amended charged offense failed to
meet the requirements of HRPP Rule 7(f). This court held that driving without
a license is not an included offense of Driving While License Suspended
or Revoked because, under HRS § 701-109(4)(a) (1993),
(4) "[p]roof of the elements of the driving-while-license-suspended
offense will not automatically establish the elements of the driving-without-a-license
offense." Matautia,
81 Hawai`i at 83, 912, P.2d at 580. This court also held that HRS §
701-109(4)(b) (1993) was not relevant to an included-offense analysis since
the amended driving without a license charge did not allege an attempt
to commit the charged offense. Finally, we concluded that driving without
a license was not an included offense of Driving While License Suspended
or Revoked under an HRS § 701-109(4)(b) and (c) (1993) analysis. This
court also held in Matautia
that the amended charge was improper because the second requirement under
HRPP Rule 7(f) was not satisfied in that substantial rights of the defendant
were prejudiced.

In the present case, the charged offense was amended at the March 12,
1999, hearing when Joshua was not present. At the April 30, 1999, arraignment
and plea, Joshua pled not guilty to the amended offense. We need not address
the question of whether Joshua's substantial rights were prejudiced because
the district court erred in amending the Driving While License Suspended
or Revoked charge (HRS § 286-132) to driving without a license (HRS
§ 286-102), contrary to the provisions of HRPP Rule 7(f) and our holding
in Matautia.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the part of the August 31, 1999,
Judgment of the District Court that convicted and sentenced Joshua for
violating HRS § 286-102 (driving without a license) and affirm the
part of the Judgment convicting and sentencing Joshua for violating HRS
§ 291C-14 (Duty to Give Information and Render Aid).

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai`i, October 22, 2001.

On the briefs:

Deborah A.H. Joshua,
defendant-appellant pro se.

Loren J. Thomas,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
City and County of Honolulu,
for plaintiff-appellee.

1. The Honorable
Leslie A. Hayashi presided.

2. HRS §
291C-14 provides as follows:

§291C-14 Duty to give information and render aid.
(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury
to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle or other property which
is driven or attended by any person shall give the driver's name, address,
and the registration number of the vehicle the driver is driving, and shall
upon request and if available exhibit the driver's license or permit to
drive to any person injured in the accident or to the driver or occupant
of or person attending any vehicle or other property damaged in the accident
and shall give such information and upon request exhibit such license or
permit to any police officer at the scene of the accident or who is investigating
the accident and shall render to any person injured in the accident reasonable
assistance, including the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the
carrying, of the person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical
or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary,
or if such carrying is requested by the injured person; provided that if
the vehicle involved in the accident is a bicycle, the driver of the bicycle
need not exhibit a license or permit to drive.

(b) In the event that none of the persons specified is
in condition to receive the information to which they otherwise would be
entitled under subsection (a), and no police officer is present, the driver
of any vehicle involved in the accident after fulfilling all other requirements
of section 291C-12, 291C-12.5, or 291C-12.6, and subsection (a) of this
section, insofar as possible on the driver's part to be performed, shall
forthwith report the accident to the nearest police officer and submit
thereto the information specified in subsection (a).

3. Per Diem
District Court Judge James H. Dannenberg presided.

4. § 701-109(4)
provides as follows:

§701-109 Method of prosecution when conduct
establishes an element of more than one offense.

. . . .

(4) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included
in an offense charged in the indictment or the information. An offense
is so included when:

(a) It is established by proof of the same or
less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense
charged; or

(b) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged
or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or

(c) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect
that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property,
or public interest or a different state of mind indicating lesser degree
of culpability suffices to establish its commission.