Friday, October 30, 2015

THINK TANK | Modi's More Muscular Foreign Policy? by Sumit Ganguly

In May 2014, in a striking departure from
precedent, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi chose to invite all the prime
ministers from the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to
his inauguration. Even his critics in India lauded this gesture and hoped that
it was a portent of his government’s interest in improving ties with India’s
immediate neighbors. Even the leader of India’s fractious neighbor, Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif, attended the event.

In the wake of the meeting, the Modi regime
also chose to revive the Foreign Secretary level talks with Pakistan to deal
with a range of outstanding issues. However, on the eve of the talks in August
2014, despite his government’s explicit warning to Pakistan to refrain from
doing so, the Pakistani High Commissioner, Abdul Basit, chose to meet with the
members of the Kashmiri separatist organization, the Hurriyat Conference. Past
regimes, while unhappy with this practice, had overlooked such gestures. After
expressing mild displeasure they had allowed the talks to proceed as planned.
On this occasion, however, the new government swiftly called off the talks. The
decision to terminate the dialogue signaled a significant departure from the
attitude of previous regimes on matters pertaining to this fraught
relationship.

Trust and Mistrust

Since then the Modi regime has made a
concerted effort to improve ties with India’s smaller neighbors. For example,
in a remarkably deft move, it has resolved a series of minor but highly charged
border disputes with Bangladesh. This settlement was far from trivial because
it involved the acquiescence of more than one Indian state that borders
Bangladesh and also required a constitutional amendment. Modi has also sought
to mend fences with Sri Lanka especially in the wake of the emergence of a new
regime following elections early this year. In the aftermath of a major
earthquake in Nepal in April of this year his government moved with
considerable dispatch to provide relief to many hapless victims.

All of these diplomatic moves suggest that
after much palaver and considerable neglect of India’s neighbors a regime in
New Delhi takes their concerns seriously and is even prepared to make
asymmetric concessions to improve relations at multiple levels. The exception
to this new orientation in the country’s foreign policy, however, may well
prove to be Pakistan. It is obviously beyond the scope of this brief analysis
to provide even a sketch of the long, troubled history of the Indo-Pakistan relationship. However, suffice to say that it has long foundered on the central
issue of the disputed status of the border state of Jammu and Kashmir. Owing to
its irredentist claim to the state, Pakistan has initiated three wars (1947-48,
1965 and 1999) to seize the territory. None of these efforts have brought it
any closer to the realization of its goal. Interestingly enough, the 1971 war,
which was not over Kashmir but stemmed from the exigencies of Pakistani
domestic politics, and led to the break-up of the country, did not lead to an end
to Pakistan’s quest to appropriate the state.

Nor, for that matter, have either multilateral
or bilateral negotiations proved any more productive in resolving the dispute.
Most recently, in the wake of a major crisis in 2001-2002 the two sides
undertook a substantial bilateral dialogue that lasted several years. No
official account of what was accomplished in this so-called composite dialogue
has yet been released. However, there are a number of press reports that
suggest that the two sides arrived at a four-point formula that might have
served as the basis for conflict resolution. Briefly stated, the blueprint
called for local self-governance, the demilitarization of the region, the joint
management of a number of functional issues and the eventual easing of travel
restrictions across the border. No actual territorial compromise, however, was
envisaged under the terms of this plan.

Of course, it is far from clear if the former
Pakistani military dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, who is widely credited
with having generated the scheme, actually enjoyed the support of the corps
commanders of the Pakistani military needed to implement it. The point,
however, is moot as, with Musharraf’s ouster in 2007 following a series of
domestic protests, the dialogue stalled. In the aftermath of the major
terrorist attack on Bombay (Mumbai) in November 2008, the dialogue was
effectively terminated. Much evidence implicated the members of a
Pakistan-based terrorist network, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), in the attack.
Following the incident, despite the fitful efforts of the United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) regime in New Delhi to revive the talks, the dialogue always
lacked serious momentum. Most importantly, the civilian regime of President
Asif Ali Zardari in Pakistan, which assumed power after the end of General
Musharraf’s rule, was under the watchful eye of the overweening Pakistani
military, and not in any position to make credible commitments to New Delhi.

A New Approach?

The Modi regime, which had sent an initial
signal about its interest in resuming the dialogue, now seems to have hardened
its position yet again. The most recent episode that has undermined the
prospects of a renewed set of discussions took place after a seemingly cordial
meeting between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and his counterpart,
Mr. Modi, at Ufa in Russia on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) conference in early June. Following the meeting an agreement
was reached that the National Security Advisers of the two countries would meet
to discuss a range of outstanding issues.

However, the apparent bonhomie has not lasted.
In mid-July Indian press reports indicated that Pakistani forces had initiated
hostilities along the Line of Control (LoC), the de facto border in Kashmir.
The Pakistani press, as well as the government, claimed that an Indian drone
had crossed into Pakistani territory and had been shot down. Indian
authorities, for their part, claimed that the drone was not of Indian military
origin but was simply an off-the-shelf item of Chinese commercial technology.

Based upon discussions with key officials in
New Delhi it is apparent that the Modi regime has arrived at a new approach to
dealing with Pakistan and that it has three distinct prongs. First, it involves
working with all of India’s neighbors to enhance cooperation across a range of
areas. Pakistan, of course, is at liberty to participate in these ventures. If
it chooses not to, India will simply move ahead with its efforts to engage
other neighbors, leaving Pakistan increasingly isolated. Second, it will
respond with vigor to any provocative Pakistani actions along the disputed
border. The tough-minded Indian response in following the latest Pakistani
firing across the border is indicative of a changed stance. Third and finally,
on a more conciliatory note, to the extent that the regime in Pakistan appears
willing to pursue practical initiatives such as improving trade and commercial
ties, India will respond favorably.

Domestic critics of the Modi regime have not
responded favorably to this new muscularity in India’s approach toward
Pakistan. However, given that the government enjoys a clear parliamentary
majority, that substantial numbers of India’s citizenry have little patience
with Pakistani aggravation on the Kashmir question and the ideological
proclivities of its leadership, the country may well be witnessing a
significant shift in how its conducts its foreign and security policies toward
its nettlesome neighbors, most notably, Pakistan.

About The Author:

Sumit Ganguly is a Professor of Political
Science and directs the Center on American and Global Security at Indiana
University, Bloomington. He is a also a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy
Research Institute in Philadelphia.

This article was originally published at ISN ETH Website on July 29, 2015 under Creative Commons License 4.0 International