Merhaba
Turkey is far from being the “Sick Man
of Europe”. The decline the Ottoman
Empire and slide into the European
sphere of influence had compelled
Tsarist Russia to make such a claim.
After a long hiatus, Turkey has emerged
a regional and global hub for travel and
trade between continents once again.
The “neo-Ottoman” influence into the
Middle East via massively popular TV
series as well as energy ties with Russia over the transport of oil and gas
begs the question: does Turkey really
need Europe?
No other country that started the EU
accession process failed to become
a full Member State. Switzerland and
Norway declined because of economic
reasons. But Turkey wants to join the
EU. Romania and Bulgaria were admitted despite not having addressed the
colossal corruption of post-Communist
cronyism. Turkey joined NATO in 1952
and applied for EU membership in
2004. Why is Europe denying Turkey?
REVOLVE provides both sides of the
equation with views from Brussels
and Istanbul. On April 19, 2011, Brussels reiterated the conclusions from
December 14, 2010 at the meeting
of the EU-Turkey Association Council
and welcomed the opening of another
chapter of the negotiations. There are
still many chapters remaining, and
much resistance from EU Member
States, but as Turkish Chief Negotiator,
Egemen Bağis, said to REVOLVE: “it’s
time to move forward.”

Welcome

Irrespective of the June 12, 2011 elections, Turkey will continue to advance
with ambitious energy projects related
to oil and gas, as well as water and
trade, with neighboring and global
partners. In the lead-up to the elections, Prime Minister Erdoğan flaunted
a new Kanal Istanbul project that
would create a man-made Bosphorus
to increase maritime commerce. This
mega-project compares to the Panama Canal and is definitely an electoral campaign tool, — if not a delusion
of grandeur.
Domestically, Erdoğan’s AKP government has been confronted with the
nebulous Ergenekon case. Over 50
journalists have been arrested for supposed ties to the Ergenekon group,
an extra-judicial network of people
who are allegedly attempting to carry
out a coup d’état in order to topple
the AK Party government that came
to power in the 2002 elections and to
silence the Gülen Movement whose
leader, Fethullah Gülen, is in exile.
Like an Italian-style Gladio operation,
the Ergenekon organization consists of
former security and military officials as
well as journalists, civil society members, politicians and businessmen.
How far will the Ergenekon case go?
The elections should help clear this
question and the Constitution that
was established by the military junta

in 1980 will be changed as well. Apart
from this good news, a new energy
law (#6094) was passed in December
2010 establishing a renewable energy
cluster to encourage joint ventures
between national and international
companies. Italian ENEL Green Power
has already bought into a large geothermal project in Turkey.
REVOLVE offers a tour de force of
the energy sector from the geostrategic competition for gas pipelines to
renewable energy and controversial
nuclear power plants approved near
the Ecemis earthquake fault-line.
Compounded with off-shore oil exploration, gigantic irrigation efforts, and
national highway construction, these
projects are indicative of Turkey’s
consolidation as a regional power with
increasing influence in the neighboring Middle East.
The tremendous popularity of Turkish
TV series in the Arab world is a new
phenomenon that even pulls men back
to the house to see their favorite show.
If you are more culturally inclined, then
flip to the back to see more about the
Fall of the Leaves, The Valley of the
Wolves and more… REVOLVE is
also featuring emerging artists from
Sümer Gallery in Istanbul. And if you
still haven’t had enough, then visit
Turkey this summer and read more at:
www.revolve-magazine.com

REVOLVE expresses special gratitude
to Emine Kart in Ankara
and Özge Genç in Istanbul for their insights
and assistance with this report.

European Accession | 12-17

Views from Istanbul and Brussels
on a painful political process

Regional Politics | 18-23

The reemergence of Turkey in the Middle East.
Moving away from Tel Aviv and getting closer to Tehran?

Map of Turkey | 24-25
Energy Projects & Natural Resources

The Nabucco Pipeline | 26-29

Turkey and Europe’s drive towards diversification

South-eastern Anatolia Project (GAP) | 30-33

Eurasian Energy Bridge | 34-39

Graphic Designer
Filipa Rosa

Domestic Politics | 06-11

Inside Turkey’s infamous Ergenekon case

Building highways, dams, elementary schools
and irrigation canals

Natural gas, oil, nuclear and renewables

Turkish Soap Operas | 40-43

“Neo-Ottoman” influence or foreign melodramas

Art Sümer Gallery | 44-46

Three emerging artists living and working in Istanbul

Next Country | 47

United Arab Emirates

Writer:
Ebru İlhan

Ebru İlhan
is a PhD candidate
at the Department
of War Studies, King’s
College London.

Chasing
Ergenekon
Just when we were pointing to Turkey as an example for the
Arab-Muslim world to follow, Turkey’s democratic efforts were
hijacked by a series of arrests and police investigations related
to the infamous Ergenekon trial.
Journalists Nedim Şener and Ahmet Şık were among ten suspects
arrested on March 6, 2011 for supposedly partaking in acts of
terrorism. Şener and Şık’s arrests galvanized a public outcry
against violations of basic freedoms. Mass protests convened
in Istanbul: journalists, public intellectuals and activists
exchanged petitions and made public statements prophesizing a
dystopic police state in Turkey.

Şık and Şener’s lawyers were not given
a list of allegations against their clients.
Several key political figures, namely
Turkey’s President Abdullah Gül and
Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç,
expressed concern over the arrests.
Public opinion seems united in thinking that the Justice and Development
Party (AKP) government is to blame for
this tipping point in handling the elusive
Ergenekon trial.
Ergenekon is a clandestine organization believed to have recruited former
and acting members of Turkey’s security organizations, bureaucracy and
intelligentsia in order to stage a coup
against the ruling AKP. Ergenekon
refers to the trial launched in June

6 |

| Politics

The name Ergenekon comes from an ancient
myth about a valley in Central Asia where
beleaguered Turkic tribes found respite to
regain strength and unity.
2007 and pursued by public prosecutor Zekeriya Öz to try the members and
aides of the alleged criminal network.
In light of Turkey’s long history of
coup d’états, it is not surprising that
there is a hierarchically organized and
deeply embedded organization that
runs parallel to and above Turkey’s
existing legal and security structures.
However, increasing numbers of intellectuals and policy analysts dismiss
the possibility of Ergenekon carrying
out all the deeds laid out in the indict-

ment and trial proceedings by the public prosecution.
Turkey-based journalist and researcher
Gareth Jenkins offers the most substantial analysis available in English
on the Ergenekon trial. Jenkins affirms
that the 3.500 page indictment that
accuses over a hundred individuals for
their involvement with Ergenekon is full
of irrationalities. He claims that prosecutors are blinded by their convictions
to the failings of the text.1

Is detaining journalists as part of the
Ergenekon investigation an attack on
the freedom of expression?

Others, such as Ali Bayramoğlu, are
convinced that Ergenekon seeped
into the core of Turkey’s state, civil
society and media, and that the prosecution fails to illuminate the darker
corners of Turkey’s official apparatus.
Bayramoğlu is one of the Hrant Dink
trial observers. He links the assassination of the Turkish-Armenian journalist in 2007 with Ergenekon, based
on the list of names attributed to the
Dink assassination and the Ergenekon accused.

judiciary, and media behind the political
assassinations. Alper Görmüş, former
editor of the weekly magazine Nokta
that first leaked in April 2007 the diary
entries of a retired general outlining
the military’s plans to topple the AKP
government, calls this the “cleansing
process” of the Ergenekon trial.

Dilek Kurban from the daily Radikal,
whose headquarters in Istanbul were
raided to collect Ahmet Şık’s unpublished draft manuscript, states that
Şık and Şener were not detained for

being journalists. Like an overwhelming number of arrests and abuses on
citizens in Turkey, Şık and Şener are
exposed to unlawful treatment before
justice. Kurban calls on Turkey and
the international community to recognize the systematic and structural
judicial problems and to defend their
rights to a fair trial.2
Similar calls are voiced by members
of the activist group “Friends of Ahmet
and Nedim”. On April 2, 2011, Şık
and Şener’s lawyers documented the

Politics |

|7

The Gülen Movement
A force for tolerance or a threat?
Writer: Eldar Mamedov

Leuven University – one of the most
prestigious Catholic universities in Belgium – established a chair named after
Fethullah Gülen, an influential Turkish
Islamic preacher. This is one of the latest examples of the efforts of the Gülen
movement – a loose network of businesses, schools, media organisations
and NGOs inspired by the teachings
of Gülen – to portray it as a force for
tolerance and inter-faith dialogue, an
antidote to the clash between the West
and Islam. A closer look at the movement’s activities, however, suggests a
more troubling picture.
Despite the movement’s insistent claims
that it has no political agenda, it is seen
as spearheading the controversial
Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases
- an investigation into an alleged network of coup-plotting ultra-secularists
seeking to overthrow the government of
the Islamic-leaning Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. Gülenist
media outlets, such as the newspapers
Zaman, Today’s Zaman and Samanyolu
TV, uncritically support the investigation, despite ample evidence of serious
procedural violations and lack of effective legal guarantees for the suspects.
There are allegations that sympathizers
in the police are behind some of the
most blatant attacks on the freedom
of expression in Turkey, such as the
arrests of a former police chief Hanefi
Avci and journalist Ahmet Sik, after
they wrote detailed books exposing the

8 |

| Politics

Gülenist manipulation
of judicial processes
and efforts to stamp out
non-Gülenists from the
police force.
The activities of the
Gülen movement in the
West are also coming
under an increasing
scrutiny. Concerns have
Retired preacher of Islam and spiritual
leader of an Islamic movement emanating
been raised by media,
from Turkey, Gülen lives in self-imposed
politicians and parents
exile in Pennsylvania, USA.
in Belgium, Netherlands
and Germany that the schools operated
by the movement are used for religious
indoctrination of pupils and hinder their
integration in the broader society. The
FBI is investigating a number of schools
linked to the Gülen movement in the
United States on suspicions that school
employees are pressured to give part of
their salaries to the movement, which
has yet to respond adequately.
The opaque nature of the movement
and the links between its various institutions, its controversial role in Turkish
politics and a questionable record of its
schools in the West fuel concerns that,
far from the lofty ideals it proclaims, the
movement may be using the permissiveness of democracies to advance
its own religious and political agenda,
which may not be fully compatible with
the values of liberal democracy.
Eldar Mamedov is an international
relations analyst based in Brussels.

ecution to act with immunity. However,
the fiasco of Şık and Şener’s arrests
breached the AKP’s wall of defence to
reveal the admittedly key role that the
network of Fethullah Gülen supporters
played in executing the investigation
and penal processes.
Gülen loyalists are said to fill the
ranks of law enforcement positions
and the office of the public prosecutor, Zekeriya Öz, who was promoted
to Deputy District Attorney and then
taken off the Ergenekon case. Such
claims mirror the arguments Şık offers
in his unpublished book, İmamın
Ordusu (The Imam’s Army), for which
he was detained – draft copies were
banned by court order. As part of a
cyber-protest against the curtailment
of freedoms, İmamın Ordusu is shared
online via mass e-mailing and filesharing software.

farcical proceedings of the Ergenekon trial whereby restrictions were
placed on legal counsels to access,
observe and oppose evidence. Other
contradictions arose over allegations
trying Şık and his colleague, Ertuğrul
Mavioğlu, for exposing evidence of
the Ergenekon investigation in their
book Kırk Katır Kırk Satır.3
European and international observers
concur with concerned citizens and
activists in Turkey regarding the sinister turn that Ergenekon took and are
increasing pressure on the AKP government to reinstate credibility in the
democratization process of Turkey. The

European Commission’s 2009 “Turkey
Progress Report” finds the Ergenekon
case commendable for being the first
investigation of an attempted coup;
then reprimands the lack of judicial
guarantees for suspected detainees.
The AKP defends the Ergenekon investigation and allows for the public pros-

The Ergenekon case has provided
Turkey’s Kurdish, Armenian, Alevi,
socialist, and Islamist communities with a venue to vent their anger
against what they perceive to be the
opaque and ruthless Turkish state.
Turkey’s citizens would like to see the
dark deeds of the recent past brought
to light. Şık and Şener may have
sparked a new and perhaps more
inspiring episode in the Turkish quest
for freedom and democracy – one that
may have a great deal to learn from
the revolutions in the Arab world.

03. Between a Rock and a Hard Place. Istanbul: Ithaki Publishing, 2010.

Politics |

|9

10 |

| Chapter name

Chapter name |

| 11

TURKEY’s EU
Accession

Writer:
Ödül Celep

Ödül Celep
PhD in Political Science from SUNYBinghamton, New York, teaches at
Isik University, Istanbul.
“The multi-faceted Turkish-EU
relations, ranging from energy to
common security, are as crucial as
ever given global challenges today. Yet,
neither the pace of EU accession talks
nor the level of political consultations
appears to be at the desired level.
After the June 12, 2011, elections
Turkey is set to accelerate, with a new
dynamism, its focus on the reform
process and further alignment with the
EU. It is crucial for the European Union
to match that determination especially
on key issues such as Cyprus and visa
liberalization. This requires greater
cooperation between Turkey and the
EU in the areas of economy and foreign
policy, and particularly democratization
in light of the Arab Spring.”
Egemen Bağış, Turkey’s Minister for
European Union Affairs and Chief
Negotiator

12 |

| Politics

A View from Istanbul

The founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, aspired to
join the “contemporary civilization” (muasır medeniyet) of Europe.

The top-down reforms made during the early Republican period (1923-38) aimed to
differentiate the new Turkey from the old Ottoman past and to create a secular modern European state. Turkey’s membership bid to the European Union constituted a
controversial debate about European identity, the territorial borders and the extent
of the enlargement process. In Turkey too, the accession process is controversial:
while mainstream politics defend membership, Euro-skepticism is high amongst
the pro-Islamist right and far left parties. Former Prime Minister and leader of the
pro-Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) went so far as to say that if Turkey
joined the EU, it would turn into a “province of Israel”.1 The debate about the EU
accession is as much about external orientation as internal politics. Joining the EU
implies embracing the Western culture, which for the more orthodox pro-Islamists
is equivalent to moral decay; and the longer Turkey is denied full EU membership,
the more Europe is seen as a Christian Club. It has become a vicious cycle and
the conflict continues between seculars and pro-Islamists for domestic power to
determine Turkey’s alignment in the world.

Laying The Foundation
Turkey applied for associate membership to the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1959, which was
granted with the 1963 Ankara Agreement that would lead to eventual full EU
membership. In 1970, the Additional
Protocol, that explained the procedures
by which the Customs Union would be
set between Turkey and the EU, was
signed and annexed to the Ankara
Agreement. The 1980 military coup
d’état led to a disruption of Turkey-EU

relations: Brussels suspended the
Ankara Agreement and froze relations
with Turkey in January 1982. Relations
resumed later in 1986. When Turkey
appealed to Brussels for full membership in 1987; the European Commission
deferred the matter to an undetermined
future date. The justifications then were
Turkey’s flailing macro-economic condition, its rocky relations with Greece, and
the Cyprus conflict between Turkish
and Greek Cypriot communities.

One of the major developments leading
to a rapprochement with Brussels was
the 1995 EU-Turkey Customs Union.
The coalition government then included
the center-right True Path Party (Doğru
Yol Partisi, DYP) and the center-left
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet
Halk Partisi, CHP). The coalition signed
and presented the protocol to the Turkish people as a major victory. The EUTurkey Customs Union was considered
by many as one of the crucial steps
towards full EU membership for Turkey.
The Customs Union meant that goods
could move between the two entities
with no customs restrictions, though it
did not cover particular economic areas
such as agriculture.
Turkey’s candidacy waited until the
1999 Helsinki Summit where the
European Council officially recognized
Turkey as a candidate for EU membership. Turkey was governed by a
three-party coalition government from
1999 until 2002. This coalition included
the center-left Democratic Left Party
(Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP), the far
right Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi
Hareket Partisi, MHP) and the centerright Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP). During this coalition period,
the Turkish Parliament was partially
successful in adopting more than thirty
amendments to the existing Constitution to meet the Copenhagen criteria,
which collectively comprise the rules
and conditions that define whether a
country is eligible to join the EU. These
amendments included the abolition of
the death penalty in times of peace;
strengthening gender equality in marriages in the Civil Code by granting
women an equal share in goods and
property accumulated during marriage;

permitting languages other than Turkish to be broadcast; revising the AntiTerror Law; and commencing the retrial
of all cases that the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) found to be in
violation of the European Convention of
Human Rights.2
The orthodox pro-Islamist parties challenged Turkey’s EU membership and
were frequently challenged in turn by
official state institutions for violating the
secular principles of the Constitution.
After the shaky ‘Refah-yol’ coalition
government between the religious RP
and the center-right DYP in 1995-97,
the Constitutional Court of Turkey (Anayasa Mahkemesi) shut down the RP for
violating secularism in 1998. After the
ban, the pro-Islamists founded the successor Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP)
– banned by the same court in 2001.
The pro-Islamist party split into two
main groups: traditionalists and revisionists. The traditionalists maintained
their political and ideological purity with
the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP),
while the revisionists formed the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who
became the Prime Minister of Turkey in
March 2003.
The pro-Islamist rift in the early 2000s
marked a new phase in the debates
on Turkey’s EU membership. Unlike
the former pro-Islamist movement,
Erdoğan’s AKP was a political merger
between former pro-Islamists (which
claimed to have changed) and former
secular center-right groups. The AKP
was a new hybrid in Turkish politics,
resembling neither the pro-Islamists of
the past nor the secular center-right.

Compared to Erbakan’s RP, Erdoğan’s
AKP had contrasting stances on a
variety of issues, including Turkey’s EU
membership, which Erdoğan defends.
AKP has maintained its single-party
government since winning the 2002
and 2007 elections, and has turned a
new page for Turkey’s relations with the
EU. In 2002, the AKP announced EU
accession would be one of Ankara’s
leading foreign policy goals.

Erdoğan on the EU
Threshold

The initial three years of the first AKP
government (2002-05) witnessed a
series of legal reforms for democratization. These reforms were introduced along the Copenhagen criteria,
According to these criteria, candidate
countries need to demonstrate the
stability of their democratic institutions,
human rights, respect for minorities,
and a well-functioning market economy.3 In 2002 the European Council
Summit gave Turkey a roadmap to
comply with the acquis communautaire – essentially all the legislations
and court decisions that collectively
constitute EU law. In accordance with
the EU harmonization package, the
AKP government took several steps
towards implementing the Copenhagen criteria.
One of the main concerns emanating
from Brussels was the strong influence
of the Turkish military bureaucracy on
the civilian political institutions. Turkey has had a long history of military
involvement in civilian politics with
examples such as the 1960 coup d’état,
the 1971 memorandum, and the 1980
coup. Especially after the 1980 coup,
the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı

Politics |

| 13

Kuvvetleri, TSK) became highly effective in influencing the course of domestic politics. The AKP government took
necessary steps to decrease the presence of military bureaucracy in internal
administrative affairs. For instance,
the number of civilian members of the
National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) was increased, and a
civilian bureaucrat was appointed as
the MGK’s secretary general for the
first time. Military representatives in the
High Education Board (Yüksek Öğretim
Kurumu, YÖK) and the High AudioVisual Board (Radyo Televizyon Üst
Kurulu, RTÜK) were removed.4
In 2004 the European Commission published progress reports on
Turkey’s accession process. These
reports acknowledged improvements
on fundamental rights and freedoms,
and touched upon an array of problems, such as “honor killings” (namus
cinayetleri) that continue to victimize women in rural areas, the limited
freedoms of religious minorities (primarily non-Muslims), the non-recognition
of Alevi and Kurdish minorities, and
the persistent influence of the Turkish
military on domestic politics. The EC
reports also raised concerns regarding the 75 million-strong population of
Turkey and its potential effects on EU
Alevism is a heterodox Sufi sect
that espouses a different
interpretation of Islam, diverging
from mainstream orthodox Sunni
groups. Alevis are a religious,
ethnic and cultural community in
Turkey. Alevis endorse humanism,
respect for human labor, gender
equality, and tolerance towards
other ethnic and religious groups.

14 |

| Politics

demographics and economics if Turkey
were admitted as a full-fledged Member State.5
Another major hurdle to EU membership has been the interpretation of full
freedom of expression as defined by
the existing laws in Turkey. One of the
most controversial debates revolved
around the content of Article 301 that
states previously that “a person who
publicly insults ‘Turkishness,’ the State
of the Republic of Turkey, or the Turkish
Grand National Assembly, shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six
months and three years.” In contradictory terms, Article 301 also states that
“expressions of thought intended for
criticism shall not constitute a crime.”
The word ‘Turkishness’ (Türklük)
was particularly criticized by several
progressive, socialist and liberal intellectuals for restricting the freedom of
expression in Turkey with a racist justification. Several Turkish intellectuals
were tried in courts for violating Article
301, including the 2007 left-libertarian
parliamentary candidate Baskın Oran,
the Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant
Dink and the Nobel Prize-winner Orhan
Pamuk. The AKP government revised
this law by changing the word “Turkishness” to “Turkish nation” and reduced
the maximum penalty from three to two
years. But the revision was not enough
for several progressives who advocated a total elimination of Article 301.

The Cyprus Conundrum
Beyond Turkey’s domestic politics and
the demographic consequences of its
population on Europe, the question of
Cyprus remains the most difficult foreign policy issue for Turkey’s accession

to the EU. The Mediterranean island
of Cyprus has been divided between
Greek and Turkish Cypriots since Turkey’s military intervention on the island
in 1974. The resulting Cypriot split was
severely aggravated by the United
States and Great Britain that would
have repercussions for democracy in
Greece as well.6
Former Secretary General of the United
Nations, Kofi Annan, devised what
became known as the Annan Plan to
resolve the Cyprus conflict whereby the
divided island would become the United
Cyprus Republic. The Annan Plan was
put to vote in separate referendums
on both sides of Cyprus on April 24,
2004. The results were completely
opposite: the Turkish Cypriot community overwhelmingly supported the plan
with about 65 percent voting ‘yes’ (as
opposed to 35 percent ‘no’), while only
24 percent of the Greek Cypriot community supported it (as opposed to about
76 percent ‘no’). Turkey and the AKP
government endorsed the Annan Plan
because its fulfillment would enhance
relations with Greece and ease Turkey’s
EU accession. The failure of the Annan
Plan also disappointed EU officials, who
had hoped that the acceptance of the
plan would solve the Cyprus problem
before allowing Cyprus to join the EU.
However, despite having voted against
reuniting, the Greek Cypriot-controlled
Republic of Cyprus quixotically became
an EU Member State in May 2004.
Cyprus remains divided today and continues to obstruct negotiations between
Turkey and Brussels. The Turkish government has consistently refused to officially recognize the (Greek) Republic of
Cyprus until the political and economic

blockade on the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus is lifted. This embargo
has complicated Turkey’s position within
the EU Customs Union because under
the agreements Turkey is supposed
to keeps its ports and airspace open
to Greek Cypriot planes and vessels,
but refuses to do so since Brussels
continues to isolate the unrecognized
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
For Turkey’s AKP government, making
concessions on Cyprus is perceived as
a political defeat. Therefore, the ultimate
reward of joining the EU is no longer
enough to motivate the AKP government to accept the European demands
to change the status quo of Turkey’s
Cyprus policies.

Joining The Eu Ever?
Turkey’s accession to the EU is perceived differently by different Member
States and political parties across
Europe. Both France and Austria
showed signs of unwillingness as they
said they would hold a referendum on
Turkey’s accession. The French President Nicholas Sarkozy openly rejected

the idea of Turkey’s EU membership
on the grounds that Turkey belonged
to Asia Minor, not Europe.7 EU officials
have also noticed a gradual slowing
of reforms in Turkey. Some may hope
that a disillusioned Turkey would eventually withdraw its accession motion.
Former EU Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn, visited Turkey and
warned of a potential “train crash” in
the negotiations process.8 EU officials
were not the only ones to criticize the
slowing down of Turkey-EU relations.
The AKP’s non-conservative, liberal,
intellectual supporters also started to
criticize the government for neglecting
Turkey’s EU accession process and for
losing the initial momentum it had during the first three years (2002-05). Due
to such setbacks, EU-Turkish negotiations stalled in late 2006.
Technically, the earliest date that
Turkey could become a full EU member is 2013 – the year when the next
financial perspectives are to come into
force. The AKP government seems to
be dedicated to comply with the EU

06. For more on the role played by the United States and Henry Kissinger, see
Christopher Hitchens, Cyprus, London: Quartet Books, 1984.

07. “Nicholas Sarkozy in Quotes,” The Guardian, May 6, 2007.

08. “The ins and outs: The EU’s most effective foreign-policy instrument has
been enlargement. But how far can it go?” The Economist, March 15, 2007.

law by this year, despite some EU
officials’ refusals to declare this year
as a deadline. It is important to note
that the changing political actors in the
governments of European countries
also affect the potential for Turkey to
become an EU Member State. European social democrats and socialists
generally tend to be more supportive
of Turkey’s full membership, while conservatives and Christian Democrats
are usually more skeptical. Former
Chancellor of Germany, Gerhard
Schröder, openly supported Turkey’s
accession, while Angela Merkel, the
current Chancellor, only offers a “privileged partnership” status for Turkey,
which Ankara perceives as an insulting
second-class status.
A consolidated relationship between
Turkey and the EU has much broader
political implications than reforms and
further democratization in Turkey. The
accession process has slowed but Turkey-EU relations could be rekindled.
The pending questions remain as prevalent as before: can a predominantly
Muslim society become a member of
the EU? Is the EU a Christian Club?
Will the East-West divide persist? Will
the division fade with the full accession
of Turkey? If so, Europe would border Syria, Iran and Iraq – the security
implications are massive. But Turkey
is already a strong NATO member.
Turkey may no longer feel the need
or more importantly see any additional
economic incentives and benefits in
joining the European Union since it
is rapidly becoming a regional power.
Improvements in trade and commerce
with its neighbors and as a transit hub
may simply outweigh any political reason to be part of the European project.

Politics |

| 15

In Limbo:
Turkey’s Trial
A View from Brussels

While Turkey and the EU are crucial economic and political
partners, the current lack of strategy and vision displayed by EU
leaders, compounded by the hurdle of the decades old Cyprus
problem has almost totally deadlocked Turkey’s membership talks.
Writer:
Amanda Paul

Amanda Paul
is a Policy Analyst at the European
Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels.
“‘I strongly believe that there is
a real chance to regain significant
momentum in EU-Turkey accession
talks, provided some basic conditions
are met. Beyond the issues linked
to Cyprus, the European Union
regards progress in core political
reforms – such as freedom of
expression and belief, constitutional
reform, reform of the judiciary – as
the main ‘convincing arguments’
which Turkey should offer.”
Štefan Füle,
European Commissioner
for Enlargement
and Neighbourhood Policy

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| Politics

The EU accession process could be
compared to the emperor who wore no
clothes: we pretend something is there
when really it is not, or nearly not. It has
been almost a year since a negotiating
chapter was opened. Since negotiations began in October 2005, only 13
of the 35 chapters have been opened
with just one provisionally closed.
[BOX – Turkey’s path to accession]
The remaining three chapters have
tough opening benchmarks. The competition chapter, for example, is usually
left until the very end of the negotiating
process because it is both challenging
and very costly for candidates. The EU
accession process could be compared

to the emperor who wore no clothes:
we pretend something is there when
really it is not, or nearly not. It has
been almost a year since a negotiating
chapter was opened. Since negotiations began in October 2005, only 13
of the 35 chapters have been opened
with just one provisionally closed. The
remaining three chapters have tough
opening benchmarks. The competition
chapter, for example, is usually left until
the very end of the negotiating process
because it is both challenging and very
costly for candidates.
Greek Cyprus blocks chapters
because of Turkey’s failure to fully
meet its Customs Union obligations
and open its harbours and airspace
to Cypriot vessels. Turkey has always
linked this to Brussels delivering on the
commitments made to Turkish Cypri-

ots following the 2004 UN Annan Plan
Referendum for the reunification of
Cyprus – when Turkish Cypriots voted
“yes” while Greek Cypriots voted “no”
only to become EU members a week
later while the Turkish Cypriots were
left out in the cold. The EU did offer the
Turkish Cypriots an economic package
including a Direct Trade Regulation.
However, the Regulation has never
materialized due to Greek Cypriot
opposition. The Greek Cypriots see it
as a step towards recognizing the Turkish Cypriot administration.
As a consequence of this stagnation, reforms have slowed, becoming
increasingly patchy with Turks increasingly skeptical about backing (often
expensive) reforms that may negatively
affect their business interests if there
is no guarantee of final membership.
Moreover, Ankara feels insulted by the
EU’s continued refusal to offer Turkey a
visa free regime. While the countries of
the Western Balkans already have free
visa regimes with the EU, and other
nations such as Ukraine and Moldova
(and shortly Russia) are negotiating
them, the Turks continue to be refused.
Even efforts to have “visa facilitation”
for certain categories of people to
receive a visa have been a struggle.
Turks find this humiliating and as a result
the EU has almost become a non-issue.
With parliamentary elections in June
2011, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) switched to campaign
mode, pursuing an increasingly domestic and nationalist agenda. Statements
from Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, labeling the
EU as a spent force lacking vision and
leadership, are evidence of this shift.

Ankara has some justification for its
animosity. Some EU Member States
are clearly trying to tip Turkey over
the edge so Ankara draws a line under
its own membership process. But it is
highly unlikely this will happen. While
Turkey’s leaders may moan about the
EU they also need it to continue the
reform process, to maintain stable and
continuous foreign direct investment,
and regarding its own internal legitimacy to dissipate stories of hidden
agendas.
There are only two “exits” to the current impasse: progress on Cyprus and
a change in leadership in France and
Germany. The second may be more
likely than the first, but only the first can
totally open the way to EU entry. There
is a glimmer of hope on both issues:
The fact that the AKP seems on track
for a big election win means that Prime
Minister Erdoğan could be in a very
strong position in the post-election
period which will offer him the opportunity to make one or two groundbreaking decisions. He may take some steps
vis-à-vis Cyprus including possibly
the implementation of the Additional
Protocol, thereby opening Turkey’s
airspace and harbors to the Republic
of Cyprus. This would be a significant
step forward in light of Turkey’s stalled
EU membership talks.
Thereafter, up to 14 negotiating chapters that are presently frozen would
be opened, bringing a much needed
dynamic back to the process. Furthermore, while this move would not
resolve the “Cyprus issue” it would
show Turkey’s commitment to its EU
aspirations and hopefully pave the way

for greater international pressure on
the two Cypriot leaders to be more flexible in their ongoing negotiations.
If no progress is made in the short
term, Turkey’s relations with the EU will
remain in limbo whereby both continue
to conduct their business and are plenty
of shared goals and areas of interest to
work on including foreign, energy, trade
and security issues. Keeping Ankara “in
the loop” should have a positive effect
on relations and perhaps help erode
opposition. The EU should continue
to broaden its relations with Turkey by
allowing Ankara to have a greater role
in foreign policy planning which will
prove useful for both partners.
Turkey’s potential membership is at
least fifteen years away. Whether this
is finally reached or not, more mutuallybeneficial cooperation is the way forward for Turkey-EU relations.

“Turkey has come a long way already.
But, there is still a change in approach
– towards dialogue, tolerance,
responsibility and non-discrimination
– that needs to be pursued and
completed: political reform means
not only producing adequate laws,
but also crafting reforms through
comprehensive dialogue and
compromise, and implementing
these reforms in an inclusive spirit.
Fundamental political reforms are not
an electoral matter; they are for all
citizens of Turkey in the mediumand long-term.”
Štefan Füle,
European Commissioner for
Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy

Politics |

| 17

Back to the
Middle East

It’s easy to forget that Turkey and many countries of the Middle East were enemies.
The ‘Terrible Turks’ were seen as the root cause of the region’s problems and
conduits for U.S. imperial interests. Meanwhile, Turks viewed Arabs as backward
and untrustworthy people who betrayed Turkey during the 1916 Arab Revolt.
How times have changed. Turkey is once again a regional player of significant standing – in
the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation’s (TESEV) 2010 public opinion survey
of eight Middle Eastern countries in the region,1 80 percent of Arab nationals have a very or
somewhat favourable opinion of Turkey. This figure is particularly striking when compared to
the other countries in the survey: only Saudi Arabia was viewed more favourably than Turkey
(81 percent had a very or somewhat favourable opinion of KSA). Indeed, other regional leaders,
like Egypt and Iran, are nowhere near as popular as Turkey.

Why the Change?
Turkey’s recent return to the Middle
East led to accusations of an axis shift
and that Ankara has neo-Ottoman pretentions. Many point towards the 2003
vote in the Turkish Grand National
Assembly in 2003 that prevented U.S.
Coalition troops from entering Iraq
through Turkish territory as part of the
U.S.-led invasion. The outspoken attitude of the Turkish Prime Minister at

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| Politics

Davos in 2009 and the Mavi Marmara
2010 episode have brought attention
to Turkey and its arguably principled
stance against what it sees as an
injustice.
No doubt, these events have affected
the perception of Turkey but the transformation of Turkey from within is
arguably more important. Consistent

economic growth over the last decade both in and outside the traditional
industrial heartlands has encouraged
Turkish business and a growing
middle class to trade and integrate
with new markets. Over the past ten
years exports to the Middle East have
increased by more than 7-fold from a
total of $2.6 billion in 2000 to $19.2 billion by the end of 2010.

Demographic and political changes in
Turkey led to a rethinking of the country’s view of its place in the world. An
end to the highly-securitized understanding of foreign policy and a more
open-minded view of the world saw
Turkey engage in places and issues
that it may have averted previously,

such as an attempt to mend problematic relations with many of its neighbours including Armenia. Congruently,
a lack of leadership and sense of inertia in the region – in tandem with fears
of Iranian influence – have rendered
Turkey more attractive for the region’s
publics and elites alike.

The cliché that
Turkey has turned its
back on the West and
is heading East for
ideological reasons is
largely unfounded.

for the region, survey participants
responded with myriad of answers
ranging from its democratic system
and dynamic economy through to its
Muslim background and stance in support of the Palestinians.

a competitive market economy and a
functioning democracy that does not
forgo a sense of religious identity –
indeed in a separate question 2/3rds
of respondents felt Turkey successfully
combined Islam and democracy.

However, none of the answers topped
15 percent of responses, suggesting
that no single element makes Turkey
an ideal model. It’s a range of components that encompass both what
Turkey is and what Turkey does. It’s

Clearly, the experience of the current
Turkish government in accommodating itself into a functioning secular
democratic system has not gone unnoticed. In terms of what Turkey does, its
stance in support of Palestinians and
Muslims is appreciated. However this
is not among the top three answers,
suggesting that while Turkey’s sometimes outspoken rhetoric is important it
is not the central factor in its popularity.

A Model Question
Turkey’s transformation has encouraged Ankara to reintegrate with its
immediate region. After the events of
late 2010 and early 2011 the role of
Turkey in the region is once again a
regular topic of discussion. TESEV’s
2010 survey found that 66 percent of
respondents thought Turkey can be a
model for Middle Eastern countries and
only 18 percent of respondents thought
it could not. What makes Turkey stand
out as a model? When asked why
they thought Turkey could be a model

Why can Turkey be a model?
0

Its Muslim background

5

10

15

20

Its Economy
Its democratic regime
It stands up for
palestinians and muslims

Turkey’s growing soft power warrants
further discussion. The Turkish econ-

Politics |

| 19

omy is clearly seen as a shining light in
a region characterized by the inefficient
rentier states. In TESEV’s survey, Turkey ranked second behind Saudi Arabia
in terms of economic strength now but
is seen as the region’s economic leader
in just ten years time. Here the Turkish
desire to compete with other global
economies without significant oil and
gas resources has forced it to develop
into a dynamic market economy that is
proving exemplary for the region.

The Turkish social model is also of
growing interest. Turkish television
series have been watched by a staggering 78 percent of survey respondents. Much of these portray Turkey and
Turkish family life in a positive modern
light. For example, the final episode
of Noor - the Turkish series Gümüş
dubbed into Arabic - attracted 85 million
viewers across the region and has been
a factor in the huge increase in tourists
coming from the Arab world to Turkey.
Indeed, Turkey is now the most popular
holiday destination in the region.

For more on the popularity of
Turkish soap operas across the
Arab world, see pages 40-43.

The people of the region clearly welcome a more active Turkey. It represents an aspiring combination of virtues
that make it one of the most popular
countries in the region. But Turkey
needs to realize that while criticizing
Israel and standing up to injustices is
welcome, it is not what makes it most
popular amongst the street nor does it
allow it to play the positive mediatory
role it could fill (something that more
than 3/4s of the respondents thought

Turkey should do). Whereas criticism is
legitimate, maintaining relations with all
sides is equally important. The region’s
problems are entrenched in a multitude
of reasons and Turkey needs to be well
equipped if it is to make a difference.
There are few experts in academia
and officialdom in Turkey who have a
firm understanding of the Middle East.
Address these and Turkey could be
the constructive regional leader that it
aspires to be.

Turning Potential into Reality
Turkey’s high-standing in the region
among both governments and society
should see it becoming a – if not the
– leader in a region devoid of leadership, security and direction. Many more
ambitious policies still have to bear
fruit. For example, much has been
achieved bilaterally with countries like
Iraq and Syria and attempts to create a
free-trade zone among Turkey, Jordan,
Syria and Lebanon are underway. However, attempts to broker a peace deal
between Israel and Syria collapsed
(not because of Turkey), a proposal to
solve the Iranian nuclear crisis in May
2010 was rejected, and Turkey’s policy
towards the popular protests in the
region has been mixed.

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| Politics

01. TESEV’s ‘The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East’ was
conducted in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Iraq and Iran between August 25 – September 27, 2010. The total
sample included 2,267 people and the poll has a regional margin of
error of 2.06 percent.

Floating away
from Israel
Turkish-Israeli relations went through a golden era in the 1990s. Military cooperation
grew exponentially, trade expanded and the number of Israeli visitors to Turkey
multiplied. After a brief pause during the government led by the late Prime Minister
Erbakan, Turkish-Israeli relations were a cornerstone of both countries’ foreign policy.
Lately, things are not so rosy.

The flotilla crisis in May 2010, when
8 Turkish and one Turkish-American
activists were killed onboard the Mavi
Marmara ship in international waters
carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza,
seemed to mark the bottom of TurkishIsraeli relations. But the crisis was not
the beginning of the end; rather it was a
symptom of deteriorating relations.
Many claim that the current Turkish
government’s ideological opposition to
the State of Israel is to blame. But the
AKP government in Turkey was committed to maintaining working relations
with Israel. President Abdullah Gül and
Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan have
visited Israel, and Shimon Peres was
the first Israeli President to address the
Turkish Parliament in 2007.
Israel’s military Operation Cast Lead
in December 2008 was a turning point
for Ankara. Three days prior to the
Israeli invasion of Gaza, the Turkish
Prime Minister was negotiating with
Ehud Olmert and Bashar Assad over
a draft for an Israel-Syria peace agreement. The intervention drew a furious
reaction from Ankara – Erdoğan was
said to be personally offended having
put so much effort into an Israel-Syria

deal. A month later Erdoğan walked off
stage during a Davos panel accusing
Israeli President Peres of atrocities
in Gaza. This very public spat made
Erdoğan a hero in the Middle East.
Turkish-Israeli relations seemed to be
sliding towards separation.
Things worsened with the treatment of
the Turkish Ambassador to Israel by
Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon
and the now infamous flotilla incident.
Ankara demands a full apology for the
flotilla raid and compensation be paid
to the families of the victims. Diplomats from both sides have attempted
to thrash out an apology to this effect
but there seems little political will.
Hawkish Israeli politicians ask why
they should apologize to Turkey and
want Turkey to apologize to Israel.
A seemingly solvable marriage has
become totally intractable.
Citizens in Turkey and Israel are
equally supportive of their government’s stances towards the flotilla crisis. The Turkish press talked of ‘an act
of war’ and ‘murder on the high seas’.
Six months later 71 percent of the Turkish public found their government’s
response to the crisis appropriate; in a

separate question Israel is perceived as
the most unfriendly country to Turkey.

Reflecting Domestic
Change

According to a senior Israeli TV commentator, the same is true in Israel:
80 percent of Israelis see their government’s reaction to the attempt
to breach the blockade in Gaza as
justified. Israeli tourists have stopped
travelling to Turkey: Israeli tourism
dropped by a staggering 92 percent
in August 2009 compared to August
2010. Rarely have both societies been
so adamant and consistent in the belief
that their government is right.
Politics changes with people. The old
Turkish elite – made up of the army,
elements of the bureaucracy and the
staunch Kemalist members of the business and media communities – were
the driving force behind relations with
Israel. A shared sense of insecurity
in their immediate region and a proWestern worldview made for a very
cozy relationship.
However, the ongoing process of
democratization in Turkey has brought
in a more pluralistic political system

Politics |

| 21

and new foreign policy thinking that
is not simply security-based but also
motivated by engagement, economic
growth and a sense of Turkey’s place in
the world. Turkish rapprochement with
its more immediate Arab neighbors is
exemplary. Where previous Turkish
governments often allowed regional
events to pass, the new generation
of political elites are adamant that a
spade should be called a spade – and
with some justification.
Turkey’s new approach to foreign
policy is seen as one of the great successes of the current government. 65
percent of respondents to TESEV’s
2010 survey rated the government’s
foreign policy either highly of very
highly (32 and 33 percent respectively)
and only 22 percent rated it poorly or
very poorly. With general elections
in June 2011 and political attention
directed at regional unrest, movement
from Ankara on this front is almost zero
since the Turkish view is that there is
no political will in Tel Aviv either since
hawkish parties hold the Israeli domestic balance of power.
With public opinion firmly entrenched,
the two government’s unwilling to
budge and upheaval in the Middle
East rife, there seems to be sparse
light at the end of the tunnel. Without
a change in leadership in Turkey or
Israel (or significant external pressure)
the love affair may be sailing off into a
prolonged storm. The days of negotiation or event governments willing to
negotiate seem long gone; for many
it is a case of when and not if we see
the next example of disproportionate
Israeli aggression.

Best Buddies
with Iran?
Many have highlighted Ankara’s growing interest in Iran as
evidence of Turkey’s shift towards the East. Turkey-Iran
relations are indeed far better now than back in the 1980s
and 1990s when Ankara feared the influence of the Islamic
revolution and Iranian support for Kurdish separatism.

Growing Closer

Having shared a long common border for centuries, it was perhaps inevitable that the two countries would look to rediscover one another. Iranians
love Turkey: 85 percent of Iranians have a somewhat or very favourable
view of Turkey.1 In 2010, 1.85 million Iranians entered Turkey. Though
this nearly equals the total number of visitors from the entire Arab world
combined, Iranian tourism to Turkey was fourth globally after Germany,
the UK and Russia.

Encouraged by no
visa requirements,
the number of
tourists from Iran
dwarfs those coming
from other countries
in the region.

Trade with Iran is also an important
component of bilateral relations. In
2000, bilateral trade totalled just over
one billion U.S. dollars. In 2010, bilateral trade was well over $10 billion and
President Abdullah Gül underlined the
countries’ commitment to raise this
figure to $30 billion in just five years,
during a visit to Iran in February 2011.
Much of this trade revolves around

22 |

| Politics

the bomb. Nor does the public want an
Iranian bomb: 65 percent 2 of the Turkish public are opposed to Iran developing nuclear weapons – in fact opposition is far higher in Turkey than it is in
the Arab world (39 percent). 3

Photo by Samantha Zaza. Tophane, Istanbul.

energy. Iran is Turkey’s second biggest supplier of natural gas, which is
essential to fuelling their economic
growth. Turkey also aspires to become
an energy hub by securing transit gas
projects and selling extra supplies. Iran
has the potential to supply some of this,
particularly when and if Western sanctions are lifted. Myriad potential transit
projects have been discussed and
memos of understanding have been
signed regarding the building of pipelines to bring gas from both Turkmenistan and the South Pars field to Turkey
and then potentially on to Europe via
Nabucco. (See ENERGY section for
more details: pp. 26-39)
Politically, Iran and Turkey also seem
closer. Following Ahmadinejad’s contentious 2009 election victory, Tayyip
Erdoğan was quick to congratulate
the Iranian premier. The May 2010
nuclear swap deal with Iran and the
subsequent no vote in the UN Security
Council surprised many and caused a
rupture in Turkey’s relations with the
West. The initial deal was concluded
in good faith – Turkey believed it had
Washington’s agreement to negotiate –
but the ensuing no vote was seen as
Turkey siding with Iran.

Growing Apart
Closer inspection of the Turkish-Iranian
relationship suggests that things aren’t
so great. International sanctions make
it hard for Turkish companies to do
business in Iran. These difficulties
are compounded by high customs
tariffs and uncooperative local conditions. Many major Turkish companies,
including Turkcell and TAV, have had
agreements and/or contracts cancelled
or not honoured.
In his February 2011 visit to Iran,
President Gül was accompanied by a
large delegation of businesspeople.
The message was clear: if Iran wants
Turkish investment, protectionism must
end. Likewise, energy dealings have
often been fraught. Iranian gas does
not always reach contracted standards and quantities. In the past, Iran
has slashed exports to Turkey due to
domestic shortages.
Politically the relationship is a little rocky
too. Contrary to some assertions, the
Turkish government does not want to
see a nuclear armed Iran and ­Abdullah
Gül has been recorded as saying that
he has no doubt they want to develop

Turkey has called repeatedly on Iran
to be transparent with the international community. Nor do Turkey and
Iran have similar views of the region’s
future. While Turkey’s policies are
based on economic integration and
cooperation, Iran seems keen on
expanding its sphere of influence.
Such differences have the potential to
be issues of consternation in a rapidly
changing region. For instance, Turkish
Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu,
encouraged his Iranian counterpart not
to stoke the potential fire with the Shiamajority in Bahrain.

In March 2011, Turkey
intercepted an Iranian plane
bound for Syria, reportedly
containing military cargo.
Turkey and Iran are far closer than they
once were, but to suggest that they are
the closest of allies is an overstatement.
Trust remains an issue between the
regional powers and while they have
grand aspirations to improve bilateral
ties, doing so has proved easier said
than done.

01. TESEV (2011). The Perception
of Turkey in the Middle East.

02. Taken from TESEV’s 2010 survey
of Turkish citizen’s perception of
their own foreign policy. At the
time of writing,
this was unpublished.
03. TESEV (2011). The Perception
of Turkey in the Middle East.

Turkey and Europe’s Drive
towards Diversification
If Europe’s energy diversification plans succeed, Turkey is to become
the new energy gateway to Europe for Central Asian and Middle
Eastern natural gas supplies. Whether or not the Nabucco pipeline
goes to full capacity, Turkey will become a regional transit hub.
Although traditionally considered trustworthy, the reliability
of Russian natural gas deliveries to the EU via Ukraine and
Belarus has been called into question on a number of occasions in recent years, most notably after the 2006 and 2009
gas crises between Gazprom and Ukrainian Naftogaz. The
disputes sent a wave of concern throughout the EU. Security
of supply – and with it diversification – effectively became
the new buzz words of the EU’s Second Strategic Energy
Review in late 2008. The January 2009 crisis only served to
reconfirm the perceived need to re-assess Europe’s energy
security situation.
The main initiative launched by the Review is the so-called
Southern Corridor which comprises a number of projects that
have as their aim to source alternative gas supplies from the
Middle East and Central Asia. The Southern Corridor’s flagship project is Nabucco – a planned gas pipeline of 3.300
kilometres connecting the Caspian region and the Middle
East via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary with Austria
and further onwards to the Central and Western European
gas markets, bypassing both Russia and Ukraine.
Sustained demand for natural gas in Europe and the abundance of supplies in Nabucco’s region of choice seem to
indicate a win-win situation for both supplying countries and

26 |

| Energy

Writer:
Sijbren de Jong

Sijbren de Jong
is energy editor for REVOLVE
and Research Fellow on Energy Security
at the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies,
University of Leuven.

the EU. However, acquiring the actual supply contracts has
proven more cumbersome than originally anticipated. In
March 2011, the sale of gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz
II field – Nabucco’s principal source for the initial supply of
gas – was delayed for six months as talks with potential
customers dragged on, casting further doubt on who is
ready to supply Nabucco. Moreover, in its bid to acquire
gas, it faces stiff competition from rival European projects.
The lack of gas contracts has left investors, companies and
suppliers at odds over whether to openly express their support for Nabucco or to opt for a competing pipeline. The
large number of uncertainties has led many to question
the project’s long-term feasibility in light of recent regional
developments.

Shah Deniz or Bust
In its current form, Nabucco intends to
source its initial supplies from Azerbaijan. The Shah Deniz field in Azerbaijan
was discovered in 1999 and constitutes the country’s largest offshore gas
field at over 1 trillion cubic metres (tcm)
of gas. Led by British Petroleum (BP),
the project has been producing gas
since 2006. Phase one is estimated at
a maximum production rate of 8.6 billion cubic metres (bcm) per year and
50.000 barrels of gas condensate 1 per
day. Currently, talks are underway on
a second phase of exploration which
would deliver an additional 16 bcm
per annum of gas and up to 100.000
barrels of condensate, thus tripling
the field’s overall production. The new
volumes from Shah Deniz phase II are
to be exported to the EU, as well as to
markets in Georgia and Turkey.
10bcm per year is earmarked for
Europe. However, competition for the
gas is fierce, notably also from within
the Southern Corridor itself, as projects
such as the Italy-Turkey-Greece-Interconnector (ITGI) and the Trans Adriatic
Pipeline (TAP) have similar plans to

extract their gas from Shah Deniz II.
The winner of the contract was originally supposed to be announced in
April 2011, but talks with potential customers have been postponed until the
end of the year.
What does 10bcm per year mean for
the viability of the three competing
Southern Corridor projects? Such a
quantity of gas could easily fill TAP’s
initial capacity of 10bcm per year and/
or most of the ITGI pipeline, which has
a planned capacity of up to 12bcm.
Over time, TAP can be expanded to
20bcm per year. However, Nabucco
is a far larger pipeline, and the 10bcm
would only constitute about one third of
its 31 bcm per year capacity. Running
at more than half-empty, this is precisely where Nabucco’s woes begin.
In November 2010, Azerbaijan’s top
negotiator made known that the State
Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic
(SOCAR) wants to supply the gas
only when it simultaneously acquires
the right to sell it to the nearest markets. SOCAR would only be willing to
pay for gas transport costs when and

if Nabucco were at full capacity. At a
fixed transit rate now and running at
only a third of its full potential, Nabucco
carries a higher per unit transit cost
when compared to a full pipe – a cost
ultimately paid by the final consumer.
Since Nabucco is to receive financial
support from the EU only when it runs
at full capacity, this means that unless
it is able to find a second source of
gas, SOCAR will not bear the commercial risks.
Considering that the Nabucco consortium 2 hopes a 10bcm Azeri concession will convince other partners, such
as North Iraq and/or Turkmenistan to
start supplying additional sources of
gas to Nabucco, this does not bode
well for the pipeline’s prospects. However, SOCAR made very clear that
it does not want Nabucco’s transit
tariff to depend on the mere possible
availability of gas from other sources.
Azerbaijan does not want to be the
EU’s ‘filling station’. Baku wants hard
guarantees and for Nabucco to quote
its tariff. The question then is, with no
contract in sight, what options are left
for Nabucco?

energy |

| 27

Courtesy of www.nabuccopipeline.com

Turning to Turkmenistan
In order to circumvent this problem,
Azeri gas will have to be augmented
from other sources. Geographically
speaking, Iran would be the ideal supplier given the possibility of overland
transport. However, it is clear that
the current political climate does not
allow for the inclusion of Iran in the
near future. As neither Uzbekistan, nor
Kazakhstan has the potential to supply Nabucco substantially in the short
term either, this leaves the EU with two
– less than ideal – alternatives: Turkmenistan and/or North Iraq.
Getting access to Turkmen supplies is
no easy undertaking. Next to the less
than transparent attitude of the regime
in Ashgabat over its hydrocarbon supplies, there are other difficulties. One
option is to ship gas across the Caspian Sea by tanker. However, in the
long run, doing so would be much more
expensive compared to constructing a
pipeline. In fact, such a TransCaspian
pipeline has been talked about for
decades and was heavily supported by
Washington. Unfortunately for Europe,

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| Energy

many obstacles in the way of its construction stem from opposition by Russia and Iran on grounds of sovereignty,
fears over potential export revenue
losses and environmental concerns –
although the ‘sincerity’ of the latter has
often been called into question.
Along with significant offshore supplies, Turkmenistan is home to some
impressive onshore fields. Of particular
interest to Europe is the South Iolatan
field, located in the east of the country.
Experts claim its development is technically complex and poorly explored.
This could give European companies
some competitive advantage over
others given their extensive expertise.
However, Europe faces stiff competition from China: Beijing agreed to lend
Turkmenistan around $3 billion for the
development of the field in 2009 and
also recently opened a direct pipeline
between the two countries spanning
almost 2.000 km. It took the Chinese
less than three years to construct and
finalize this massive project. The EU’s
operating structure does not allow for
the European Commission to extend a

similar type of ‘state-backing’ project.
At present, there are no strong indications that Turkmen gas is to flow westwards anytime soon.

Kurdish Northern Iraq
A second alternative is for Nabucco to
source gas from North Iraq. The majority of Iraq’s natural gas resources 3 are
associated with oil field exploration.
Fewer than 20 percent of its known
reserves are non-associated autonomous gas fields, the majority of which
are concentrated in the Kurdish region
in the northern third of federal Iraq. 4
Aware of the region’s potential and its
strategic location along the Southern
Corridor, several of Nabucco’s consortium members have signed Memoranda
of Understanding with Kurdish Iraq.
In May 2010, Austrian OMV, and Hungarian MOL agreed to invest $8 billion
in the Kurdish Iraqi gas fields and each
bought around a 10 percent stake in
Pearl Petroleum, which develops the
Khor Mor gas field. Both companies
claimed they could pump as much as
30bcm annually 5, half of which could

flow to Europe and fill roughly 50 percent of Nabucco. A similar cooperation
agreement was signed by German
RWE in August 2010. Statements by
the Iraqi Kurdistan’s Natural Resource
Minister claimed that up to 20 bcm per
year could be pumped into Nabucco to
bring gas to Turkey and Europe.
As promising as these deals may
sound, gas supplies from North Iraq
face significant obstacles. First, the
governments in Baghdad and Kurdish
northern Iraq have a long-standing
dispute concerning the distribution of
oil and gas wealth. Second, internal
disagreements between Iraq’s political
parties continue to exist over what role
international energy companies should
be granted in the country’s natural
resources sector. Baghdad is careful
about granting legitimacy to any deals
struck between international energy
companies and the Kurdish North, over
fears it may lose sovereignty over the
resources. Kurdish Iraq may very well
have the legal right to sign contracts
independently, but it is unlikely that
the EU or US would support the export
of gas without Baghdad’s approval.
Moreover, any such deal will not be
welcomed by Turkey over fears that
it would exacerbate its own domestic
problems with its Kurdish minority.
Essential to overcome the stalemate is
the ratification of Iraq’s much debated
– and awaited – hydrocarbon law. Originally drafted in 2007, the law outlines
a regulatory and policy development
framework for future oil and gas exploration and production in Iraq. Now that
Iraq has finally formed a government,
it is expected that a decision concerning the law will be made before the end

of 2011. Though this constitutes some
form of progress, it cannot realistically
be expected that an agreement on
the law will automatically mean that
Nabucco has its alternative source of
gas to convince Azerbaijan.

The Next Best Alternative
Nabucco’s future looks bleak. The
prospects of the 31bcm pipeline tapping into alternative gas sources for
Europe are in jeopardy. Contrary to
popular reasoning, Nabucco’s position
is not due to a head-to-head race with
the Russian South Stream project,
which the latter is subsequently said
to be winning. Rather, given that neither northern Iraq nor Turkmenistan
will deliver soon, it is unlikely that
Nabucco will find an alternative source
to Azeri gas. Moreover, taking into
account the reticence of SOCAR and
the EU to engage financially in supporting Nabucco until full capacity is
reached, it is more likely that the final
decision will be in favor of the ITGI or
TAP projects. Such an outcome would
mean a lower gas capacity for Europe
and hence a lower transit income for
countries such as Turkey. However,
it is important to stress that such a
scenario does not need to be to put
an end to Nabucco, nor Turkey’s ambitions to be Europe’s transit hub in the
long term. What is important however
is for Brussels to anticipate such an
outcome and put its weight behind the
best possible alternative.
Nabucco does not have to be discarded
– on the contrary: both TAP and ITGI
can serve as a first step for its eventual
construction. Both pipes tie into existing pipeline networks between Greece
and Turkey, and further on eastwards.

TAP has a leading comparative edge
over ITGI both in terms of capacity
and cost-effectiveness. As TAP can
be expanded over time to transport
20bcm per year, this means that –
when constructed – Nabucco could
transport an additional 10bcm per
annum onwards to (Western) Europe
via Turkey. With ITGI running at a
maximum annual capacity of 12bcm,
this leaves it with a mere 2bcm surplus capacity. Therefore, although it is
unlikely that Nabucco will be awarded
the Shah Deniz II contract in the short
term, it does not mean it cannot profit
from the construction of other pipelines
along its route in the long run. With
Nabucco’s capacity exceeding both
that of TAP and ITGI, Nabucco would
benefit most from a pipeline along its
route through which it could ship larger
quantities of gas, should more sources
become available over time. It is the
EU’s best interest to support the TAP
project, rather than ITGI. Better to start
small and go bigger. Turkey will benefit
either way.

01. Natural gas condensate is a lowdensity mixture of hydrocarbon
liquids that are present as gaseous
components in the raw natural gas
produced from gas fields.
02. The Nabucco consortium consists
of German RWE, Austrian OMV,
Hungarian MOL, Bulgarian Energy
Holding, Turkish Botas and
Romanian Transgaz.

03. According to the 2010 BP
Statistical Review of World Energy,
Iraq was home to 3.17tcm of
natural gas at the end of 2009.
04. US Energy Information
Administration, (2010), Country
Analysis/Briefs: Iraq
www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/iraq/pdf.pdf
05. Author’s calculations.

energy |

| 29

The
SouthEastern
Anatolia
Project

Atatürk Dam

(Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, GAP)

Constructing Canals

The GAP aims to improve the quality of living and use natural
resources to reduce inter-regional disparities while contributing
to national development and social stability targets of Turkey.
To reach the targets of the GAP Master Plan, investments of 43
billion Turkish Liras (~20 billion Euros) are needed. At the end of
2010, the total spending for the project reached 33.7 billion TL,
corresponding to 80 percent overall.

Canal construction to transport stored
water to plains and crop fields started
under the GAP Action Plan with 1,649
km of canals to be built by 2012.

10 hydraulic power plants are completed, corresponding to 74 percent of
investments. With the operation of the
hydraulic power plants, 337.7 billion
kWh of electrical energy has been produced and a substantial part of Turkey’s
energy needs is being met. The monetary value of this energy production is
203 billion US dollars (1 kWh=6 cents).
17 percent of envisaged projects are
already in operation, 3.5 percent are
under construction and 79.5 percent
are at planning stage.
15 dams, including the Atatürk Dam, are
built and can potentially irrigate 1 million
hectares of land. 308,535 hectares
are now being irrigated and construction of irrigation facilities is in progress
for another 63,955 hectares. Adding

30 |

| Energy

32,000 hectares brought under irrigation by the TİGEM in Ceylanpınar, the
total land brought under irrigation in the
GAP region reaches 340,535 hectares.
Regional employment has risen
from 1,329,000 in 2009 to 1,547,000
in 2010. The regional contribution
to national employment rose to 16.5
percent of the total. Despite decreases
in unemployment, in terms of labour
force participation, the GAP region
remains below the national average.
In 2010, regional exports have risen
to over $5 billion, consisting of 4.5 percent of Turkey’s national exports that
amounted to $113 billion. In the first
quarter of 2011, regional exports are
estimated at $940 million, a 32 percent
increase since last year.

The construction of three main canals
that will be 386 km long and reaching
403,782 hectares is underway. The
138 km Lower Mardin Main Canal covering 211,075 hectares is 90 percent
complete. The 48 km main canal in
Suruç Plain Pumped Irrigation Facility
will cover 94,814 hectares and is 69
percent completed. The 17.5 km part
of the Suruç Canal consists of a giant
tunnel with diameter of 7 metres and
so far 3,100 meters is finished. The
Main Canal in Kralkızı – Tigris Gravity
Irrigation will cover 97,893 hectares.
The 202 km canal was contracted out
in three parts and has advanced by
41, 30 and 7 percent respectively.
The GAP Master Plan aims

to reach completion by

the end of 2012. Revolving
around four development

axes, GAP contains 73 major

actions and over 300 projects.

Four other main canals total 252 km.
The main canal of the 182.8 km Bozova
Pumped Irrigation Scheme will irrigate
20,319 hectares. Also completed is the
tender process relating to the 70.1 km
main canals of left and right bank that
will irrigate 74,627 hectares under the
Suruç Plain Pumped Irrigation.

Irrigation Networks
One of the major components of GAP
to irrigate 193,000 hectares, the Silvan
Project was included in 2010 and part
of the project – Pamukçay Dam – was
contracted out. Also in progress are
Batman Left and Right Bank Irrigation,
Kralkızı-Tigris Pumped Irrigation Part I,
Kralkızı-Tigris Gravity Irrigation Part I,
Belkıs-Nizip Pumped Irrigation, Kılavuzlu
Irrigation and Kayacık Plain Irrigation.
The Çetintepe Dam under the AdıyamanGöksu-Araban Project was included in
the 2010 Investment Program.

This is the single largest land

consolidation initiative in Turkey
and in the world.

Land Consolidation

Accompanying irrigation, cultivation
areas are being reshaped for modern
farming. Land consolidation covers
2 million hectares under 75 different
projects of the Action Plan. The figure is
impressive when compared to 1 million
hectares of land consolidation taking
place within a century. The consolidation area tendered today is much larger
than the target set by the Action Plan.
Crop fields and villages enjoy irrigation, sewage networks and newly built
roads. In these areas, soil analysis and
mapping works have been completed

together with 3,862 crop field paths plus
septic tanks and sewage facilities for
596 villages.

The GAP Action Plan
Transformations have begun in the
region from agricultural support
schemes to rural development and
from crop farming to stock breeding.
There will be an Irrigation Training
Centre in Şanlıurfa and a GAP International Research and Training Centre in
Diyarbakır to provide services to Middle
Eastern and African countries as well.
Farmers are provided grant support
to establish agricultural cooperatives,
equipment acquisition, irrigation systems and stock breeding. Within the
Agricultural Organization Projects, 59
cooperatives were provided loans of
104 million TL in the period 2008-2010.
Upon project implementation, annual
milk output was 19,500 tons and to
meat production is 475 tons. When the
projects of all cooperatives included
in the program are realized, 3,132
persons will be employed and 25,740
animals will be distributed with outputs
of meat and milk of 1,670 and 61,340
tons respectively.
The GAP Action Plan ensures access
to irrigation water for farmers, and upon
usage farmers can now use the drip and
sprinkle system which increases yields
while saving water. The “agricultural
research project” and “organic farming clusters” are also cooperating with
regional universities. Farmers receive
training through these projects. 426
projects were incorporated into the
Program for Supporting Rural Development Investments; 398 of these projects
created employment for 4,584 persons.

Income generating projects have been
launched for people who live in places
other than irrigated areas. In selected
pilot areas, many alternatives have
been developed including the grafting of
wild trees, beekeeping; mushroom, rose
and fodder crop culture and sericulture.
Enterprises with 50 or more animals
engaged in milk farming are supported.
In 2009 and 2010, 201 applications
were found worth supporting and 22,773
pregnant heifers and 165 units of milking
equipment were provided, with potential
yields of 79,345 tons of milk and 1,973
tons of meat produced annually.
From 2008-10, reforestation activities
in the region covered 6,101 hectares,
rehabilitation on 2,160 hectares, erosion
control on 18,748 hectares and pasture
rehabilitation on 450 hectares, and
28,772,000 saplings were produced.
Out of 48,050 hectares covered by the
GAP Action Plan, reforestation work has
been completed on 27,549 hectares,
corresponding to 57 percent overall.
The Action Plan aims to complete
2,209 kilometres of state and provincial highways and highway bridges.
Regional roads are being constructed
and opened to traffic. GaziantepŞanlıurfa motorway is now open.
Şanlıurfa-Kızıltepe-Silopi route (351
km) is 75 percent completed. Two-way
divided roads are now open to traffic
for 60 km on Diyarbakır-Mardin road
(91 km) and for 119 km on DiyarbakırSiverek-Şanlıurfa Road (187 km). The
Siirt-Eruh road (53 km) is 75 percent
done. 19.5 km of Cizre-Şırnak line
(53 km) is open as well. 98 km long
Gölbaşı-Adıyaman-Kahta Road is the
new project of 2010. Under the Action

energy |

| 31

Plan, Bismil, İncirli, Şehvelet, Saklan,
Dicle and Çınar bridges as well as
Kurmuşlu and Ambarçay bridges have
been completed.
Almost all main provincial cities have
airports. Batman Airport Terminal Building, one of the most modern buildings
in Turkey, was completed and construction of Şırnak Airport has started.
Other activities under the GAP Action
Plan, including water, housing, health,
literacy, schooling and education
infrastructure, are rapidly progressing
across the region. GAP will bring success, regional and national development and wealth. Investments in the
GAP region will enhance Turkey’s competitive power in the 21st century and
contribute significantly to the country’s
security in terms of food and energy.
Courtesy of the Turkish Ministry of State.

GAP:

Towards Regional
Stability and Peace
Ancient Upper Mesopotamia and the Fertile Crescent
cover almost one-tenth of the Turkey’s total land area.
Ten percent of Turkey’s population lives there and
one-fifth of irrigated land is located in the
Euphrates-Tigris plains.

The Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) focuses
on this geographical area where the first civilizations
of Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean were born.
This area has been a crossroads of trade routes since
prehistoric times.
Once part of the historic Silk Road, Turkey controls access
to the passage of oil and natural gas today. The GAP is
of strategic national importance located in such a pivotal
region for the security and development of Turkey.
Dursun Yildiz is a Turkish Water
Resources Engineer Specialist
on Hydro-politics

Writer:
Dursun Yildiz

Dissuading Downstream
Discontent
Syria and Iraq were strongly against this
project because of the implied decrease
in their water supply. However, the GAP
could create positive effects for regional
stability between Turkey and neighboring Arab countries.

Bridge over Euphrates New Highway between Gaziatep and Sanliurfa

32 |

| Energy

There is no other alternative than the
GAP; regional opposition to progress
must radically shift in favor of more
cooperation. This is the largest integrated development project revolving
around the efficient management and
usage of water.

Cooperation over Water
As regional relations develop with improved water management, this indispensable natural resource will be used more
efficiently, which will be an important step towards easing
water shortages in the region. Water can be a tool for peace
and collaboration.

Irrigation Channels

In December 2009, Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Prime Minister went to Syria
along with 10 ministers and 250 business representatives
to advance such collaboration. Fifty-one pre-agreements
were signed during this visit concerning transport, trade and
water issues.
The GAP facilitates the furthering of joint-venture investments. Just as the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers have served
the development of civilizations throughout history, so the
river basins can be a source of contemporary cooperation.
Developing interdependency over shared water management
will lessen dependency on foreign products as well. Middle
East countries meet their food demand with imports from the
EU, USA, Canada, Brazil, New Zealand and Australia.

AtatĂźrk Dam

Dams, irrigation systems, agro-based manufacturing industry,
new transportation networks; education, health and modern
residential infrastructure will come to be in Southeast Anatolia
which will affect the populations on either side of the borders.

The food market of the Middle East is about $30 billion
today. If GAP reaches completion, a significant amount of
food demand will be met regionally. Geographical proximity
and similarities in consumption patterns also point to more
cooperation.
Contrary to popular belief, the construction of GAP dams
can be positive: during summer drought periods in 2009
and 2010 Turkey was able to assist in meeting the water
demands of Syria and Iraq with these dams.

Bringing Peace and Stability

Via the GAP, Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran will have a built-in
regional economic integration structure. Common interests
should bring these countries closer together and increase
socio-economic interdependency and cultural dynamics.

As interdependency increases and regional cooperation
develops among riparian states, problems from the past
will be solved more easily. The GAP plays a key role for
water management and could be the golden key to regional
conflict resolution.

The GAP completion will augment cooperation in sectors
such as food products, agriculture, industry, and technology
for water management and resource training. Rural development, education levels and employment will increase as well.

However, rapid developments and changes in international
relations among the basin countries will not be welcomed
by interfering external powers. This has to be a project led
by Turkey and endorsed by regional players.

energy |

| 33

Eurasian
ENERGY BRIDGE

Turkey now ranks 16th in the global economy. With a consistent average growth of 4 percent since
1950, Turkey has its sights set on being #10 by 2023. To feed its energy needs which increase
by 8 percent annually it is investing billions of U.S. dollars each year in new projects. To meet the
tremendous domestic energy demand, Turkey is preparing to invest at least $200 billion in the energy
sector by 2030, and is opening major energy firms to mergers and acquisitions with foreign partners.
Writer:
Orhan Coşkun

Turkey’s 98 percent
dependence on imported
natural gas and 96 percent on
foreign oil are leading causes
of the current economic deficit.
All future energy projects
will therefore have a direct
bearing on the country’s
macro-economic balances.

In 2010, Turkey’s budget deficit stood
at $27 billion, its current deficit at $48.5
billion and its foreign trade deficit at
$72 billion – $34 billion of which was
from energy imports. Understandably,
Turkey is now striving to break free of
its reliance on foreign energy resources
by turning to extensive hydrocarbon
exploration in its national territory
and waters as well as in neighboring
countries. It has also launched concrete steps to build its nuclear power
plants, a project envisaged for nearly
50 years, but never brought to life.
The country enjoys a great advantage

due to its geostrategic position linking
Europe and Asia, while the government has pursued a foreign policy of
cooperation with all its neighbors as
part of its drive to become a political
and economic power. Considering its
fortu­nate geographic location, Turkey
is a natural junction for many regional
pipeli­nes. Ankara is set on becoming
an oil and gas hub in the near future
with the Nabucco (Turkey-to-Austria)
gas pipeli­ne and the existing oil pipeline from Kirkuk in Iraq to the Turkish
terminal of Ceyhan as well as a number
of other new lines.

Natural Gas:
The Trump Card
With a robust banking sector, Turkey
plowed through the global financial
crisis without major harm to its energy
sector. Ankara aims to become a transit country for existing and planned
gas pipeline and then aims to trade
natural gas to be supplied via regional
pipelines. This brings into play one of
the most important projects Turkey is
involved in: the Nabucco gas pipeline
project will create the 4th conduit to
Europe for Caspian and Middle East
resources. Enjoying friendly relations with regional countries, namely
Azerbaijan and Iraq, Turkey ultimately
plans to be able to transfer gas to the
Balkans and Europe that it will draw
from this pipeline under contracts that
permit re-exports.
The natural gas project ITGI (TurkeyGreece-Italy Interconnector) is another
major initiative that figures in Turkey’s
aspirations to become an energy hub.

The first phase between Turkey and
Greece is already operational and as
negotiations proceed for the GreeceItaly stretch, Turkey continues to
export 750 million cubic meters of gas
it receives from Azerbaijan to Greece
since 2008. ITGI was Turkey’s initial
connection to Europe and Ankara is
now planning on extending this line to
the Balkans as well.
And yet another project that Turkey is
involved in is the TAP (Trans Adriatic
Pipeline) which aims to transport natural gas from the Middle East to Switzerland. This is critically important for
Turkey because Ankara has secured
the option of buying into this project
which is planned to carry Iranian gas to
Europe via Turkey.
Russia’s South Stream project – considered a rival to Nabucco – also
passes through Turkey’s exclusive
economic zone in the Black Sea. As
Turkey’s biggest gas supplier with
an annual 30 bcm gas exports, Russia holds a special place for Ankara’s
energy strategy. Moscow signed on to
help build Turkey’s first nuclear power
station in Akkuyu and is expected to
provide resources for the Samsun-Ceyhan line which will be carrying Russian
and Kazakh oil to the Mediterranean.

Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin has
been increasing cooperation between
Turkey and Russia especially during
their respective energy expansion over
the last five years. Though Brussels is
wary, as Turkey waits in the European
accession antechamber, Ankara continues to explore other options.
Lastly, Turkey expects to become
linked to the Arab gas network with ­­the
Turkey-Syria pipeline to be completed
in November 2011. This will provide
direct access to Qatari, Saudi Arabian
and Egyptian natural gas resources;
in return, these countries will gain
the opportunity to export their gas to
Europe.
Expecting to become one of the most
important producers of the region, Iraq
plans to send its gas to Turkey and
onwards to the global market in 2015
with newly planned lines. The two
countries are still engaged in negotiations over this matter but construction
of the pipelines is likely to begin in the
coming years.

These projects could add up to a yearly
total 110 bcm of gas to be transported
to Turkey out of which at least 55 bcm
would be relayed to other markets. To
this end, Turkey is currently involved
in talks to
Enjoying close proximity, Russia is in a key position
develop the
to create even greater energy synergies with Turkey.
location of
Mosow’s planned South Stream project Ahiboz near Ankara as a gas hub from
does not yet cross Turkish territory, but which all sales activity can be coordiis vital for Ankara because as the pros- nated. A number of European countries
pects for the feasibility of the Nabucco led by Austria which does not relish
line wane, the chances increase for Tur- the idea of a rival country, are known
key to become a shareholder in the rival to frown on this overall strategy but it
South Stream project. A close personal seems highly unlikely that Turkey will
friendship between prime ministers give them up.

energy |

| 35

Exploring Oil Fields
Turkey’s biggest energy dependency is
imported oil from Russia. Most countries
in its region are oil producers, but Turkey
has been able to locate only very small
quantities of low-quality oil in limited
areas. In an all-out effort to explore
for national oil reserves, over the past
eight years Turkey has progressively
increased its earlier modest allocations
for oil exploration activities to $4.6 billion.
Turkish state oil company TPAO continues to explore in the Black Sea in
collaboration with ExxonMobil, Chevron
and Brazil’s Petrobras. Initial results are
expected from these explorations by the
end of 2011. The Turkish public’s hopes
for a major oil find have increased with
investments from foreign oil giants
ranging from $250 million to $750 million for their Black Sea explorations.

invest of billions of U.S. dollars in these exclusive Turkish zones.

With Iraqi export oil carried to the north
and on to the Ceyhan terminal in Turkey,
there is no doubt the two countries
will enjoy enhanced relations and
closer collaboration.

Inland, a number of U.S.
oil companies are becoming noticeably interested in exploring
for oil in Anatolia with increasingly
larger budgets. And in keeping with
its steadfast efforts to produce its own
oil, Turkey is also striving to enhance
is regional influence through oil pipelines. The 50 million ton capacity BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude oil pipeline
continues to operate as an assured
sign of a significant regional alliance.

projects are likely to encourage and
spawn the building of more power stations like those Turkish private sector
firms are currently constructing in Iraq.
Likewise, the 70 million ton capacity of
the Samsun-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline
(planned to be built jointly by Turkey’s
Çalık and ENI of Italy) is one of Turkey’s
foremost energy projects. This project
has the ultimate aim of reducing tanker
traffic through the Turkish Straits. Negotiations over Russia’s engagement in
the project – both as oil supplier and as
a shareholder – are expected to be concluded in 2011. The finalization of these
projects will imply that approximately
10 percent of the commercial oil in the
world will move via Turkey.

Ankara wants to ensure that the
Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline become more
efficiently uitilzed – its 70 million ton
capacity is larger than the BTC. For
this purpose, plans
Turkey has formed partnerships with major oil
have been made to
companies for maritime exploration, focusing
give priority to revampmainly on the Black Sea, and also in the
ing the Iraqi section of
Mediterranean now.
the pipeline. Also in the
Although the matter gives rise to peri- works, are plans to ensure the secure Additionally, Turkey plans to transform
odic political tensions with the Greek and stable export of Iraqi oil not only Ceyhan into a center for the energy
Cypriots and Greece, explorations in from the Gulf, but via another pipeline industry and provide for the collecthe Mediterranean are slated to begin to be constructed to carry it north to be tion of around 200 million tons of oil
as well, to be followed by similar work shipped westwards over Turkey. These annually at this port. Provided Turkey
in the Aegean Sea. Despite possible
Istanbul Canal Project
tensions with Greece over the issues
of continental shelf and territorial
Turkey has always been deeply concerned by the congested
waters, Turkey plans to start exploring
traffic through the Bosphorus Strait and sought for ways to
in the area around its Aegean island of
reduce it. Ankara recently announced that it is considering the
Gökçeada (Imroz).
construction of a second canal, man-made this time, next to
the Bosphorus at a location which has not yet been disclosed.
However, this venture seems more of an electoral campaign
In 2011, Turkey will concentrate on seistool than a realistic project. This vague project to replicate
mic explorations in the Mediterranean.
a Panama Canal style waterway is extremely nebulous and
Together with leading foreign oil compathe government will need to fight long and hard to procure
nies, Turkey will take concrete steps to
financing while environmental considerations will also
explore its exclusive economic waters.
constitute a huge challenge.
Foreign companies are expected to

38 |

| Energy

is successful in realizing this project,
Ceyhan will certainly wish to challenge
Rotterdam and by the advantage of
time-zone difference, attempt to ensure
a role for itself as a player in the setting
of international oil prices.
Approximately $10 billion worth of
investments to Ceyhan can be expected
for projects ranging from liquid natural
gas (LNG) combined cycle gas-fired
power plants to an oil refinery. Many
international companies are scouting
around for investment opportunities.

Nuclear Plants
During the last 50 years, Turkey has
repeatedly but unsuccessfully enticed
international tenders to build nuclear
power plants to ensure supply security and resource diversity. After
negotiations concluded at the end of
2010, a significant breakthrough was
achieved: ditching the previous tendering processes, Turkey signed an
accord with Russia to build and operate a nuclear plant at Akkuyu, Mersin,
with a first unit of the 5,000 MW plant
to be operational in 2019.
However, as the formalities of the accord
were being concluded, the devastating
earthquake in Japan shifted public opinion in Turkey, as elsewhere in the world,
against nuclear energy and the resulting
suspicion and reaction is likely to make
it harder for the government to drum up
support for the venture. The nuclear
plant is located precariously close the
Ecemis fault-line as well making it prone
to be a potential nuclear disaster.
The government which is planning
to build a second nuclear plant with
Japan on the Black Sea and follow-

ing that a third plant near the Bulgarian border, will most certainly have to
overcome serious domestic opposition
if it is intent on realizing these plans.
Turkey currently commands a total
power capacity of 51,000 MW and the
government has said it is determined
to provide an additional 15,000 MWs
with nuclear power. South Korea,
France, Canada and the U.S. as well
as other nuclear powers of the world,
are closely following Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s progress
in acquiring nuclear power.
As the energy deficit and need of the
region grow significantly with each pasÂ­
sing day, Turkey proposes to engage in
selling electricity primarily to its neighbors and secondly to African countries.
It also envisages a power exchange
with EU countries over the European
Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO) as well as other power
links it has established in 2010.
As energy becomes the most valuable
commodity of the future, access to it
will be of prime importance in terms of
regional balances. And with the energy
boost Turkey expects from its nuclear
plants in the coming years, it will have
the opportunity to profitably export more
and more of its increasing energy supply.

Emerging Renewable
Energy
While seeking new methods and
cheaper resources to lessen its dependence on imported energy, Turkey took
legal steps in December 2010 to give
greater prominence to local resources.

tion of renewable energy resources,
led by solar and wind power. Public
incentives for this sector are below
local and foreign expectations, the new
law encourages joint ventures, and
investments are already lined-up to
boost this energy field.
The share of renewable
resources in Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s total
energy production, excluding
hydroelectric plants, is only 3
percent but will increase at least

two-fold in the next five years.

In wind power, investments have
pushed the total capacity to 1,300
MW and investors are being granted
licenses to achieve a target of 8,000
MW by the year 2020. Turkey is preparing for tenders, which will need
billions of U.S. dollars worth of investments. New hydroelectric plants are
also being built while aging plants are
being turned over to the private sector. With the creation of new clusters,
including Renewable Energy, Turkey
will become a regional hub for renewable energy.
Turkey is striving to spread its power
by using its energy diplomacy. Ankara
aims to establish direct reach into
an extensive geographic space via
pipelines and power lines. Following
changes sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa, Turkey is
a leading candidate to have a more
influential role in the region. Thanks to
its population of 75 million with a young
majority, Turkey is on course to obtain
significant dynamism from its diverse
energy ventures.

The object of Law No. 6094 on Renewable Energy is to increase the utiliza-

Mohannad and Noor, Lamis, Hanzada and Ghaleb, and Assi, among many others
are all “Arabized” names of Turkish protagonists who have been invading TV
screens across the Arab world for the past few years. The public has taken a
liking (many are addicted) to accompanying these fictitious characters on a daily
basis and has also fancied the simple Syrian dialect in which these series have
been dubbed.
Compared to the earlier Latin-American wave of soap operas which glued the Arab
public to TV screens, this Turkish invasion is of a stronger mould. Not only did the
producers Arabize the names, and choose a colloquial dialect instead of the previously-used formal one, but regardless
of the content, plot and storyline, the cultural background of
the protagonists, their traditions and values are akin to those
of the conservative Arab world.
Whether viewers belong to one confessional group or
another, Arabs and especially Muslims can relate most to
these series. Turkish soap operas provide Arab-Muslim
viewers, particularly those living in highly conservative and
religious cultures, with an alternative to their everyday life
and the confinements of social norms with which they must
comply. In Saudi Arabia, the show Gümüş or Noor was forbidden and given a fatwa.
Turkish TV series portray, describe, and reflect upon being
Muslim in a different light; one which is not based on a politics
or stereotypes. Being Muslim is addressed through the characters from within a cultural, sometimes religious framework,
but that is at the same time liberating to fit Turkey’s secular
nature. Although Egypt already produced liberating, seductive, sexual and action-oriented series and films, the Turkish
depiction of Muslim cultural values are conveyed alongside
action-filled scenarios.

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Muslim characters can be killers, con-men, kidnappers, heroes, and cops defending the honor of a family or district, or avenging someone or some incident.
Family, honor, religious belonging, and dignity are
elements strongly highlighted in Turkish soap operas
and highly appreciated and respected by ArabMuslim viewers. The dilemmas and social problems
raised by these dramas are also commonly faced by
Arab viewers. In other words, the content, plot, and
storyline hit home in the Arab world.
The influence of the Turkish TV series on Arab viewers
is seen in the daily addiction to watching the shows
and reruns, and some have even gone so far as naming their children after the protagonists of the shows
they like most. As a result of the cultural opening of
Turkey to the Arab world, a huge number of Arabs
have been travelling to visit Noor and Mohannad’s
mansion in Istanbul, thus increasing Turkey’s touristic
rates. A positive outcome of the so-called invasion on
both Turkey and the Arab world has emerged.

A new foreign policy
Turkish drama series have affected
Turkey’s foreign affairs with the Arab
world. The flotilla incident in May
2010 which led to the killing of Turkish
activists by Israeli soldiers who raided
the ship destined to reach Gaza and
loaded with humanitarian aid, played
a major role. Turkey was the first Muslim state to acknowledge the State of
Israel, but its political stance towards
Tel Aviv after the flotilla fiasco created
rapprochement with the Arab world.
Though shared cultural similarities go
back to the 600 years of Ottoman rule
over some Arab countries including
Syria and Lebanon, Turkey’s relationship with Israel has always been a
controversy. One series in particular
reflects mainstream Turkish opinion:

an Israeli character is illustrated as
vile while the Arab protagonist is a
hero avenging the death of the Turks
killed on the Mavi Marmara ship. In
the series Valley of Wolves: Palestine,
now turned into a movie franchise,
Israel is depicted as callous and cruel.
Believed to aggravate tensions between
Turkey and Israel, protests erupted after
the release of the movie Valley of the
Wolves [Kurtlar Vadisi]. However, the
series continues to highlight the brutality
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well
as the shaky relationship between the
West and the Middle East. Valley of the
Wolves: Iraq, also a Turkish production,
did not only include the sadistic practices in Abu Ghraib but also depicted
Americans and particularly Jewish-

Americans in a very bad light (such
as the doctor who used to cut up Abu
Ghraib victims and sell their organs).
Regardless of the scriptwriters’ intentions, the commonality between the
Muslims in the Arab world who associate, sympathize with, or defend the
Palestinian cause, and the Muslims
of Turkey has been highlighted and
intensified. The neo-Ottoman invasion of the Arab world has succeeded
in catering to viewers’ tastes, beliefs,
and customs at the cultural, religious
and political levels. Arab viewers are
bound to relate to at least by one of
these levels whether through the true
stories or stereotypes of these very
popular TV series.

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foreign
Melodramas
The Cold War is over and foreign policy is not a zero-sum game
– this is what Ankara responds to debates suggesting that Turkey
is moving away from the West. Turkey’s relations with Middle
East countries are blossoming thanks to its “zero problems with
neighbors” policy. Assuming the policy of free visas with neighboring
states, Ankara is creating a new model in the Middle East, Central
Asia, the Balkans and Caucasus.

Writer:
Emine Kart

Emine Kart is Diplomacy
Correspondent at Today’s Zaman.

“We are not fully aware of the importance of abolishing visas. You
won’t need a visa to travel from Amman or Beirut to Edirne. This
is incredible – we will be rid of artificial borders,” Cüneyt Yüksel, a
Mardin deputy from the ruling AK Party, stated in January 2010 long
before the latest upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa.
Yüksel argued that Turkey’s efforts to lift visa requirements benefit
its own people and those of other nations.
During the regional revolts, an article entitled “Ottoman
adventures hold lessons for our leaders” published in The
Independent by Rober Fisk [March 26, 2011] claimed that
“old Constantinople is a tonic, a reminder amid minarets and
water, palaces and museums and bookshops and an ancient
parliament and a thousand fish restaurants that this really
was the only united capital the Arabs ever had.”
In this article, Fisk ingeniously turns to German Chancellor
Angela Merkel’s proclamation that efforts to build a “multi­
cultural” society had “utterly failed” in Germany, noting that
this proclamation was also supported by UK’s David Cameron, “who knows as much about Turkish migrants as he does
about Libyan history.”
“For in reality, this is false history. Germany never embarked
on any kind of altruistic experiment in ‘multiculturalism’. Turks
came to Germany to do the work which Germans did not want
to do. The Gastarbeiter were encouraged to go to Germany
to provide cheap labour rather than to act as guests in some
extraordinary social programme of inter-cultural advancement
[…] Ataturk, of course, wanted Turkey to be European as

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much as Merkel and Cameron would prefer the Turks all went
back to the Ottoman Empire. Maybe, however, our masters in
Europe (Sarkozy, just as much as Cameron) would do well to
browse through a biography of Ataturk in these heady days.
The Balkan war forced the Ottomans to abandon Cyrenaica
and accept the Italian annexation of Libya,” Fisk recalled.
“Zero problems with neighbors” policy is the brainchild of
Turkey’s academic-turned Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu
who in response to various media outlets on several occasions
rejects that he ever said he is a neo-Ottoman. The motive
behind Davutoğlu’s misquotation can be found in articles
tying the so-called ‘neo-Ottoman’ Turkish foreign policy with
the spread of Turkish soap operas across the Middle East.
Some say that this neo-Ottoman policy, currently wooing Arab
countries, advances both a cultural and political agenda.
Portraying the Israelis as villains in one soap opera is one
way of appealing to the Arab masses. Such stereotypes are
prevalent in the thriller series by Pana Productions, Kurltar
Vadisi (Valley of the Wolves), as well as in less violent tones
in others Turkish soap operas.

Aşk-ı Memnu (Forbidden Love) is a Turkish romantic drama
television series, adapted from Halit Ziya Uşaklıgil’s novel
Aşk-ı Memnu, and aired in 2008-2010 relocating the novel’s
story to Istanbul in the early 2000s. This is just one of the
many Turkish melodramas – not to mention the police thrillers – that are broadcasted daily on Arab television screens.
The most important aspect of these TV series is the presence
of strong women characters and this female presence cannot
solely be explained through the secular Turkish Republic since
some leading television shows are adapted from significant
novels written when the Ottoman Empire was falling apart.
The influence of Turkish soap operas is therefore more
nuanced. Davutoğlu says that he does not accept the term
“neo-Ottomanism” because the “Turkish Republic is a
modern nation-state and is equal status with Middle East
countries. We can build relations with any country located
previously within Ottoman outreach. This is what modern
diplomacy requires.”
“The sultans used to call Beirut the jewel in
the crown of the Ottomans, but two days walking the
streets of modern Istanbul – its tens of thousands
thronging past the old trams on Independence Street
– made me understand for the first time just how tiny a
place Lebanon was on the great Ottoman map.”
Robert Fisk

Gözde İlki̇
Gözde İlkin creates her art on fabric,
canvas, paper, and found objects. She
embroiders stories, either by hand or
machine, on these surfaces with black
and white or colored thread. At first
glance, her figures appear as men and
women, amorphous bodies attached to
one another. Through interventions on
the texture, İlkin completes her work
with strings left un-sewn or a single
layer of acrylic paint. She sometimes
borders these body-geographies with
stitches on the texture of the embroi“age revolution”, 2009, 68 x 49 cm
paint and stitching on fabric

dery fabric. The act of sewing transforms the fabric itself.
Gözde İlkin was born in Kütahya in
1981 and lived in various regions of
Turkey until university. She studied
painting at the Fine Arts Faculty of
Mimar Sinan University and is studying
towards a master’s degree at Marmara
University in Istanbul. She’s taken
part in international artist exchange
programs in the Netherlands and Germany, and in exhibitions in Stockholm
and Rotterdam. In Turkey, her works
have been displayed at many venues,
such as Siemens Sanat, Hafriyat, Karşı
Sanat, and Tütün Deposu. She is a
member of Atılkunst since 2006.

Ceren Oykut
The tremendous detail in Ceren
Oykut’s drawings is a contemporary
take on the Turkish traditions of
miniature, caricature, satire, and
humor. Comics, which easily establish
communication with the public, are
one of the most important sources
of inspiration for her work. Drawn in
black pen on paper or walls, her works
have a diary-like quality, bringing a
local point of view to today’s world.
Oykut reveals the stories of the city,
tracing the chaotic lives of city dwellers
and contemplating the absurdity of
everyday life in Istanbul.

“istediği de”, 2010, 70 x 100 cm, marker on paper

“yumru (detail)”, 2010, 70 x 100 cm, marker on paper

Born in 1978 in Istanbul, Ceren
Oykut graduated from the Painting
Department of Mimar Sinan University
in 2002. The artist, whose drawings
have appeared in magazines like
L-inc, Kontrol, Roll, and Fuct-D, also
works with the music band “Baba
Zula” and the collective “Anabala”,
where she creates and projects digital
images on the stage in real time. She
has contributed to projects in Turkey
and abroad, in countries such as
Belgium, Germany, Austria, Serbia,
and Egypt.
“Adventures of Water and Earth” 2/3, 2009, 21 x 30 cm
marker on paper

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Gallery + REVOLVE

İnci Furni
İnci Furni, using pencil, paint and paper narrates the
story of an unknown planet. Based on science fiction,
her drawings present images that deal with daily
issues of secrecy and isolation. Furni gathers these
stories under the title Control Room and Dreams
as an investigation into the borders of imagination,
introducing us to her world; ‘A Journey to Ucubik’ and
‘Laika’ about the first animal to orbit the earth. Strange
inventions such as ‘Wha, Wha’, a large fictional
instrument, and ‘The Voice Building’, a heavily isolated
and strangely constructed building, and numerous
surreal specimens of plant-life…
Born in Bursa in 1976, İnci Furni has a degree in
painting from Mimar Sinan University. Since 2007,
she has worked with the Hafriyat Artists’ Collective
in addition to producing her own works. Her shows
include a solo exhibition, Spirit, within the frame of
the Apartment Project; Home Free (2007), which took
place in Bilsar; Your Eyes Are Bigger Than Your Belly
(2007), realized as a part of the Special Projects of the
10th Istanbul Biennial; and Unfair Provocation (2009).
With Spirit, Furni is among the Turkish artists chosen
to participate in the 11th International Istanbul Biennial.

“the cloud that broke in”, 2011, 220 x 295 cm, acrylic on paper

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“Queer Down the Stairs”, 2011, 200 x 150 cm
acrylic on paper

“rustling”, 2011, 150 x 155 cm, acrylic on paper

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