As a number of western election observers, diplomats and even ardent supporters of the current March 14 majority (named after the date of the Cedar Revolution) now publicly acknowledge, it is likely that the opposition led by the militant Shia party Hezbollah and the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) will take control of the next four-year parliament when elections are held on 7 June.

If that happens, the US and Europe will face an immediate dilemma as to how best to approach the new cabinet and prime minister, given past statements and policies that bet heavily on the parties and personalities in the majority – not to mention the Obama administration's position that Hezbollah remains an international terrorist organisation.

Apparently seeking to get out ahead of events, the UK, France, Denmark and other EU countries are already staking out a different course, vigorously pursuing an open policy of engagement with the opposition – and especially with Hezbollah.

As an important part of this effort, France has made it clear that March 14 "do or die" sloganeering around the upcoming polls is not shared by the Elysee: Lebanon will not suddenly transform into an Islamic republic on the Mediterranean following an opposition win, nor will Syria regain the position it held over what amounted to a 30-year occupation of its neighbour.

There is still time, much of Europe seems to be saying, to seek alternative strategies to the Bush administration's singular (and failed) emphasis on applying constant pressure and force in a two-pronged effort to smash Hezbollah and accelerate regime change next door in Damascus.

Top US officials are apparently content with focusing on the bigger picture of engaging Iran and Syria and leaving Lebanon to the rhetorical purview of staunch March 14 supporters like Jeffrey Feltman, the former ambassador to Lebanon, now assistant secretary of near east policy, who presided over March 14's spectacular rise and fall.

In recent comments to a congressional oversight committee, Feltman gave a hint as to how the administration would react to an opposition win, saying he anticipated that US assistance to Lebanon would "be evaluated in the context of Lebanon's parliamentary election results and the policies formed by the new cabinet" – a point underlined last week in Beirut by one unnamed aide travelling with the US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton.

For Lebanon watchers both here and in Washington, the statements have contributed to a long-running belief that an opposition win – even one in which Hezbollah held only a handful of non-security-related cabinet positions – would trigger a broad US pullback from the country, especially as far as funding the Lebanese army is concerned.

In this scenario, even though some in the Obama administration might want to continue US support, a decidedly less engagement-friendly Congress holding the purse strings would probably put up a strong fight over continued assistance – a fight that the administration would be hard pressed to join, given its need to expend political capital on the more important Iranian, Syrian and Israeli-Palestinian arenas.

Were this to come to fruition, the results for Lebanon and quite possibly for wider US and European interests could be disastrous, pushing the country further into the arms of purported regional foes (not to mention "strategic competitors" like Russia) and raising the prospects of a violent clash between Hezbollah and the new rightwing Israeli government (a battle that would greatly endanger European peacekeepers currently stationed in south Lebanon).

At best, such a pullback would represent yet another opportunity for peace-building squandered by western, and especially American, policymakers who continue to hold a preponderance of power in Lebanon but who remain short-sighted and path-dependent when it comes to crafting new strategies for old opponents.

An alternative approach would instead start by recognising that a majority in which Hezbollah would finally be forced to take some governing responsibility and serve as a perpetual mediator between its fractious allies – especially the other main Shia party Amal and the FPM – actually creates a more favourable political context for the Party of God to finally disarm.

Indeed, both of the party's indispensable allies (and large majorities of their respective constituencies, even according to pro-opposition polling) believe that a reasonable roadmap for accomplishing exactly this exists and should be pursued in the near term.

As has become well known in Lebanon, the deal would involve building a strong army able to credibly defend the entire country and rearranging the sectarian power-sharing system to fairly represent all citizens as equals: roughly a Lebanese "Grand Bargain" where the Shias give up their private army in return for a fair stake in the legitimate (and more robust) state.

Even the most popular Shia cleric, Sayyed Mohammed Fadlallah, a man who has deeply affected the thinking of key Hezbollah leaders and cadres since the party's inception, now says in no uncertain terms that Shias and the country as a whole want to see, and should see, a strong Lebanese army as the nation's sole protector; and that the perpetually unstable confessional system must be ended as soon as possible.

Ironically, both of these positions closely approximate those being put forward with increasing emphasis by March 14. But four years of violence and mistrust on both sides, above even the many shortcomings of Bush administration policy, have made it impossible for March 14 to lead such an effort.

Should the opposition win, however, the US and its allies would find a far more formidable – and for Hezbollah, trusted – set of partners to finally set in motion a process for Hezbollah's disarmament, but this time without violence and from within.

In fact, no matter the exact margin of victory for the opposition, Hezbollah (which will have only 10 MPs this time) will probably face a two-thirds super-majority in the parliament and cabinet that would like very much to lubricate its full sublimation into the state and the army. Instead of seeking to isolate the new majority then, the Obama administration and EU states should encourage March 14 to be a partner for this effort and take up at least a filibustering position in any new "national unity" cabinet – something that the opposition has already offered but which March 14 has rejected, apparently for electioneering considerations.

It should also encourage the popular, consensus president, Michel Suleiman, to begin the constitutionally mandated process of ending formal sectarianism (which, among other things, precludes a Shia from being prime minister, president or commander of the army).

Finally and most crucially, Team Obama would have to convince the Israelis that a strong Lebanese army under the control of a democratically elected government is far better than Hezbollah armed to the teeth, given all the domestic and historical limitations that govern the army's use of offensive force – and that finally allowing such an army to be formed, withdrawing from all the remaining occupied territory in south Lebanon and ending its air force's illegal flyovers would actually improve Israel's security in the long run by encouraging the construction of a truly stable, sovereign neighbour.

Were the US and Europe to lead such an effort at this crucial juncture, Hezbollah would find itself facing a vastly more complicated spider web of domestic, regional and international constraints than it already does when it comes to its desire and ability to exercise violence – an outcome that would undoubtedly be welcomed by a great number of citizens, both here and beyond.