The New Strategic Framework announced in the
US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) has moved force planning, including
strategic forces, from a threat-based, country-specific approach to a
non-country-specific continuum of capabilities from minimal force to nuclear
weapons. This transformation has changed the basic US force planning philosophy
to a capabilities-based planning approach (CBP), although new planning
methodologies still need to be fully developed.

Development and refinement of CBP
methodologies is underway in a number of venues. A concept for applying CBP
principles to strategic force planning, developed by Systems Planning and
Analysis, Inc. (SPA) for the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) of the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), is discussed.

The New US Strategic Framework

As has been discussed extensively in workshops,
periodicals and the press, the current US Administration has been unusually
successful in both articulating a national security strategy and then using that
strategy as the basis for its decisions regarding matters of national defense
and the resulting planned future force levels and capabilities. The National
Security Strategy issued by the White House in September 2002,the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) completed in September 2001, and the Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) completed in January 2002, along with the current Defense
Planning Guidance (DPG), represent a well-integrated body of direction.

The top-level policy goals of “Assure,
Dissuade, Deter, and Defeat,” or ADDD, lead to a useful set of criteria
against which to assess the content, capacity and concept of operations (CONOPS)
of different force options. The NPR provided a fresh approach to basic concepts
of strategic forces by including not only the classic nuclear Triad of forces,
but also adding a spectrum of non-nuclear strike capabilities, defenses, a
responsive infrastructure and adaptive planning to the strategic planners’
lexicon.

This approach to strategic force definition
appears to be not only a sincere effort to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons to
deter the broad spectrum of potential adversaries that exist in the current and
projected world environment, but also pursuit of non-nuclear means for assuring
allies, dissuading or deterring potential adversaries, defending the US against
attack and swiftly defeating anyone who is not otherwise deterred.

The Changing Planning Paradigm

Strategic force planning during the Cold War
focused on specific threats from specific countries. Planning centered on
bringing a correlation of strategic forces to bear that were predicted to crush
the enemy under all circumstances of warning and defenses. Nuclear force
planning focused on showing, through arsenal exchange model results, that
employment of strategic nuclear forces was, indeed, foolish. Both sides believed
that a state of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) existed.

Integration of strategic nuclear planning with
conventional warfare planning was largely absent during the Cold War, except
where tactical nuclear weapons were being considered as an ultimate last resort
when conventional forces were clearly insufficient to preclude defeat. Even in
such circumstances, tactical use of nuclear weapons was seen as either
transitory, or resulting in a strategic response by the adversary, hence a
strategic response from the US. A fragile balance was sustained throughout this
period.

Strategic force planning is now integral to
overall force planning. With planning no longer country-specific, but
representative of multiple contingencies and geographies, a diverse set of
capabilities needed to deal with plausible adversaries emerges. The total
capability of resulting forces can be viewed from the point of view of content,
capacity and concept of operations (CONOPS). The CBP approach should allow
nuclear forces to be addressed within common planning methodologies, rather than
being treated separately.

An Approach to Capabilities-based Planning

The current Administration’s desire to
reduce reliance on nuclear weapons has been skillfully implemented by demanding
that the planning for strategic forces simultaneously assess the utility and
consequences of using a broad spectrum of strike capabilities, both nuclear and
non-nuclear, against potential adversaries. Finding useful planning
methodologies to use when addressing multiple potential circumstances,
geographies, and adversary capabilities has proven far more challenging than
planning during the Cold War. Nonetheless, some useful approaches are starting
to emerge.

An approach recently developed under the
sponsorship the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) of the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) contains several components. As suggested earlier,
the total capability of forces can be viewed from the point of view of content,
capacity and concept of operations (CONOPS). “Content” would look at
performance at the individual system level, “Capacity” would assess
performance across the force structure, and “CONOPS” would address how the
force would be employed. These three attributes are central to the analytic
approach.

In order to be non-country-specific, an
“Alternative Futures” framework is postulated that contains a spectrum of
potential general global situations that plausibly capture or bound the space
into which the world will evolve. These alternative worlds are not sufficient to
define potentially desirable capabilities. Hence, the method next defines a set
of operational situations (OPSITS) within each of these worlds, reflecting the
spectrum of targets, geographies, constraints and cultures that are contained
within them.

A rehearsal of these OPSITS defines the
capabilities required to respond to each OPSIT. The simple sum of all of these
capabilities can often far exceed a rational force level. A means for managing
risk across the worlds and adversaries is used to derive requirements that
provide an adequate level of capability within an acceptable level of risk. This
step includes considering such things as political constraints, adversary risk
tolerance, and operational guidance, such as damage limitation.

Developing force structure recommendations
from this set of desired capabilities requires assessing various existing and
projected platforms, delivery systems and warheads based upon an evaluation of
acquisition factors, political factors and operational factors. This step
provides a common basis for a risk-based prioritization of options.

Finally, candidate force structures are
examined to identify gaps in capability that must be addressed by finding
alternative means (new “Content”) and to identify deficiencies in capability
robustness where additional scope is needed (more “Capacity”). The goal of
this step is to identify balanced force structure options that can adequately
meet the challenges of the OPSITS defined within the Alternative Futures, and
meet the national policy goals as well as operational needs.

Application of the Approach

Although much work has been done over the past
year or so to develop and refine useful approaches to CBP, much work must still
be done. Demonstrated tools and methodologies appear to allow kinetic strike
planning to use CBP in a useful way, but the application of CBP has treated
nuclear weapon planning in isolation thus far. The community of planners must
now move beyond the prototype level and attempt to successfully address the
entire force structure in a useful, balanced way.

The next challenge is multi-faceted. Using
effects, planners must first finally bridge the chasm between the two schools of
planning, nuclear and conventional, while also adding new disciplines, such as
Information Warfare and Special Operations Forces, to the strategic strike
options. Then they must successfully factor in the impact of defenses, both
active and passive, and of adaptive planning. Finally, they must address
supporting infrastructure issues, both responsive and long-term.

Closing

Although considerable progress has been made
toward developing useful CBP tools and methodologies, force structure planning
is not yet being significantly impacted by the new CBP approach. Nonetheless,
the tools and methodologies developed thus far have started to impact how
planners think about force planning, and have allowed planners to respond
effectively to the US government’s stated goal of reducing reliance on large
stores of nuclear weapons for its security.