The Study of Values

by Hans L Zetterberg

Two Modes

Norms and values are each fundamental to a major modality in which man may find
himself.

The first is the mode of compliance when you ask at every new turn:

What is the situation?
Which position do I have?
What roles am I expected to play?

The second is the mode of actualizing when we ask at every turn:

What is the situation?
Which values do I have?
What can I do to realize them?

In authoritarian and dictatorial societies with much central planning people are
expected to ask only the first set of questions. There you live a life that is to an
overwhelming extent designed by others. In democracies and market economies the second set
of questions is asked more often. Here you may live a life more designed by yourself. The
constant asking of the second set of question promotes a more spontaneous social order.

To people or organizations operating in the compliant mode the norms are most
fundamental. To people or organizations in the actualizing mode their values are
most fundamental. The first set of questions on compliance to norms is most appropriate to
ask when you deal with persons in organizations designed for specific purposes as well as
traditional primordial organizations. The second set of questions on actualizing values is
most appropriate when you deal with persons in networks and markets.

We sociologists have long known a great deal about the compliance to norms. We know
less about the actualization of values.

Lessons from History, Geography, and
Biography

In a vague way we are all aware of the fact that values are different at different
times and at different places. Values unite us with certain ideologies, people, products,
and services and estrange us from others. Some of us are also aware that our own values
have differed in various stages of our life.

Few of us realize the magnitude of these differences. Our democratic ideology
predisposes us to think that all men are born equal and that human nature is the same at
all times and places. Such is not the case. And we need democracy precisely because we are
born different and hold different and changing values. Democracy is our best method to
cope with such differences.

To sharpen our awareness of how values change over time and between places we shall
begin by citing two historical examples.

Change over Time

Let us first briefly look at a value change that was initiated in Imperial Rome between
the reigns of Augustus and Marcus Aureoles ¾ in other words,
the first two centuries AD

During this period Rome had grown into a city of one million inhabitants, many of whom
had emigrated from agricultural regions. In the course of a couple of generations they had
lost touch with the ways of their forefathers, who had secured their livelihood through
farming and raising domestic animals. Many of the new city dwellers were unable to find
work in city government, public construction projects, crafts, or commerce. In response to
the swelling throngs of restless plebs official measures evolved to provide bread to still
their hunger and spectacles to assuage their unease - the ancients' version of the welfare
state and TV networks. Termini, i.e. leisure areas and amusements parks with public baths
were constructed. Augustus began paying physicians from government coffers and he
introduced the annona, which developed into a system of coupons that could be
exchanged for bread provided by over 250 state bakeries. At times pork and olive oil were
also sold at subsidized prices. In other words, conditions made it possible for an urban
lower class to scrape by and enjoy city life without having to work very hard.

One of the developments among the masses in this societal structure was a version of
inwardly-oriented values, rather similar to the quality-of-life values emerging today.

There are two ancient descriptions of the eruption of the Vulcan Etna, one written by
the Greek poet Pindar and the other by Virgil. Pindar writes in Edith Hamilton's
translation:2

In the darkness of the night
the red flame whirls rocks
with a roar far down to the sea.
And high aloft are sent fearful fountains of fire.

And Virgil wrote:

Skywards are sent balls of flame that lick the stars
and ever and again rocks are spewed forth,
the torn entrails of the mountains,
and molten crags are hurled groaning to heaven.

Pindar used his senses and recorded what he had seen and heard. Virgil used his
imagination and recorded his subjective experience.

Roman culture had been extroverted and pragmatic, concerned with economic growth, road
building, water and sewage systems, law and order, military legions, and the family home
as a fundament and castle. Pindar's way of describing reality was most akin to this
tradition. His rendering of the eruption was generated by external cues, a true
craftsman's account. The Roman masses, however, followed Virgil, who became widely popular
and truly beloved. Once the people were assured of their daily bread, ever-larger numbers
among them could devote themselves to experience rather than achievement.
Inner signals became more important than outer signals. The mandate for
outerworldly,
pragmatic achievements diminished. It moved from Rome to the provinces and then its
vitality diminished.

The value shift that had begun at this time did not end with the decline and fall of
Rome. The generations that had become accustomed to free bread and organized leisure did
not know how to gain a living from the land and had no relatives in rural areas who could
shelter them. Starvation decimated the population of early medieval Rome to a tenth of its
size during the empire. One would suppose that the journey to the inner realms of human
experience that Virgil had started would thereby have come to an abrupt end and be
succeeded by a pragmatic reality orientation. Yet confrontation with grim economic reality
did not lead to a return of the old values. The journey into the world of inner experience
continued into the Middle Ages, and was attended by gnosticism, mysticism, and
eschatology. Leadership passed from outer-directed persons, such as emperors, generals and
merchants to inner-directed types: the priests took over and worldly rulers marched to
Canossa.

The many technological innovations made were hardly exploited. The inner pursuits were
practiced to heart's content. God's poor little St Francis talked to the flowers and the
birds and organized the hippie movement of his time into a monastic order. And at
journey's end we find Dante who, with Virgil as his guide, leads us into the fantastic
landscape of the realms inhabited by the souls of the damned and the saved.

Not until the Renaissance does an outward orientation again make itself dominant in the
cultural climate. Once again, the emphasis would be on achieving something visible, on
accomplishing something tangible, on gaining conspicuous recognition and conspicuous
rewards.

The study of the changing value climates over time has been given the label
"mentality history".

Change in Space

In the same way we talk of mentality history we can talk about "mentality
geography", although this term is not as established. There are not only value
differences at the same point in time between different people, countries, and markets.
Also within the same territory we find value differences. The most obvious ones are
between city and country.

We may pick an illustration from 17th century England prior to the glorious revolution.
Poets and preachers and authors of gossipy newsletters about the goings-on at the Court
and in the big City contrasted these high society values with those of the healthy
Country.

The Country is firstly an ideal. It is that vision of rustic arcadia that goes back
to the Roman classics and which fell on the highly receptive ears of the newly educated
gentlemen of England who had studied Virgil's Georgics at Oxford or Cambridge. It was a
vision of environmental superiority over the City; the Country was peaceful and clean, a
place of grass and trees and birds, the City was ugly and dirty and noisy, a place of
clattering carts and coaches, coal dust and smog, and piles of human excrement. It was
also a vision of moral superiority over the Court; the Country was virtuous, the Court
wicked; the Country was thrifty, the Court extravagant; the Country was honest, the Court
corrupt; the Country was chaste and heterosexual, the Court promiscuous and homosexual;
the Country was sober, the Court drunken; the Country was nationalist, the Court
xenophile; the Country was healthy, the Court diseased; the Country was outspoken, the
Court sycophantic; the Country was the defender of old ways and old liberties, the Court
the promoter of administrative novelties and new tyrannical practices; the Country was
solidly Protestant, even Puritan, the Court was deeply tainted by popish leanings.

Secondly,
the Country is a culture and a style of life, again defined and much by what it is not as
by what it is. As its name implies, it stood for rural residence in a country house, as
opposed to living in rented lodgings in London; for the assumption by the owner of
paternalist and patriarchal responsibilities as employer of domestic labour, dispenser of
charity, landlord of tenants, and member of the bench of justices. All this was contrasted
with the egocentric, hedonist, carefree existence of the man-about-town. The Country also
stood for an experience of the world confined to the shires of England, as opposed to the
sophistication bred of the Grand Tour through France and Italy; for the maintenance of
open hospitality for all, as opposed to the offering of luxurious private dinner parties
in the City; for a highly conservative taste in Jacobethan architecture, as opposed the
new-fangled classicism of Inigo Jones; for a highly conservative taste in
portrait-painting, as opposed to the courtly continental innovations of Van Dyke; for a
highly conservative taste in clothes, as opposed to the dizzily changing fashions of the
beau monde at Court. By the early seventeenth century England was experiencing all the
tensions created by the development within a single society of two distinct cultures,
cultures that were reflected in ideals, religion, art, literature, the theatre, dress,
deportment and way of life.3

The pragmatic and loose values of city life are in sharp contrast to the faithful and
firm values of country life. This difference in values between country and city is an
essential background to the English revolution.

We also see from this example how value cleavage branches from mere differences in
mentality into cleavages in politics, life styles, and cultures.

Young and Old

From all societies there are evidence that young and old persons ¾
even when they share the same habitat in time and space ¾ tend
to exhibit somewhat different values. There are stages of growth from psychological
immaturity to a rich and full adult life. The modern inspiration of a scientific study of
this type of value change comes mainly from Erik H Erikson, David McClelland, and, above
all Abraham H Maslow. Arnold Mitchell has given this research tradition a typology central
to the Values and Life Styles Program (VALS) of the Stanford Research Institute (later
named SRI so that it would not be confused with Stanford University).

The main contribution of the VALS team is the thesis that there are two parallel
paths to ego development, one Outer Directed and One Inner Directed. 4

The left arrow of psychological development is the traditional, outer-directed
hierarchical path, described also by Maslow. The right arrow is the contemporary
inner-directed hierarchical path.

The basic division is between three categories: the Need-Driven, the Outer-Directed,
and the Inner-Directed. The first category acts because of needs rather than choice. The
last two categories can choose between acting upon external cues or internal
cues. One brief and simple example of the major types: The Need-Driven person may lose
weight because he or she is too poor to get enough nutrition. The Outer-Directed
may loose weight because it makes him or her look better to others. The
Inner-Directed may loose weight because it makes him or her feel better.

Everyone starts his or her psychological development with a primacy of basic biological
needs of physical security and of basic emotional needs of trust and belonging. Those
retaining these priorities also in adulthood are called Need-Driven. Among
Post-Belongers
there are two alternative options. Those who give priority to their need of esteem are
called Outer-Directed. Mitchell, however, divides the need for esteem into two levels.
Individuals whose adult priorities are found here are called Emulators and Achievers.

The other route concerns self-development. Those who put their priorities here are
called Inner-Directed. The Mitchell team distinguishes between three levels of priorities
here: I-Am-Me, Experiential, and Societally Conscious.

At the top of both paths, Mitchell places a small number of exceptional individuals who
are able to successfully balance all phases and priorities, the Integrated. Not everyone
reaches this level. On the routes from childhood to maturity different people rest at
different levels and continue to exhibit the values of their final levels.
5

A Sociology of Values

Value research is conducted in the liberal arts as history of mentalities; there is a
whole school in France devoted to Ètudier les mentalités. In anthropology6 we meet value research as a
routine part of the study of culture. Major contributions come from political science,7 sociology,8 social
psychology.9
Psychologists have been very active in the neighboring field of psychographics with a
focus on personality rather than culture.10
This is a truly multi-disciplinary field of study.

An ultimate driving force of markets may well be the values held by a population.
Values indicate priorities for how we want to live. A market is one of the systems through
which we can realize our values. Such simple considerations have suggested that it may be
very fruitful to incorporate value research into market research. Today there is more
knowledge about value measurements in market research than in academic sociological
research.

There are a variety of commercial models for value studies in marketing. A brief
critical review counted some 15 different systems of value segmentation of markets.11 Many
are closer to personality profiles than cultural values, and some mix demographics into
their typologies. They usually use proprietary methods. A few are as advanced as the
methods used in academic research, perhaps ahead of them on practical scores.

Of the global brands of commercial value research the oldest is The Yankelovich Monitor
developed in the United States by Daniel Yankelovich beginning in the late 1960s. A
European system for measuring values called RISC (Research in Sociocultural Change) was
developed in the early 1970s by Alan du Vulpian in France and others, including Dr.
Elisabeth Nelson of the UK, Professor Giampaolo Fabris of Italy, Dr. Werner Wyss of
Switzerland, and myself. The Yankelovich Monitor and the RISC system both rely on long
questionnaires. The researchers include any item that might catch the relevant values of
contemporary times. Data reduction and analysis are performed by statistical techniques
such as cluster, correspondence, or factor analyses. Pioneering methods have been invented
for the tracing of the bifurcation of values. New items are added to their questionnaires
from time to time to keep up with changes in the value climate. The ad hoc nature of these
systems have made them undogmatic and always of interest for those who have to cope with
marketing implications of the Zeitgeist. The VALS system, as we saw, is based on fixed
categories and an underlying theory. Its usage seems to have declined in recent years, but
its approach of basing the measurement of values on a theory is sound.

First our definition:

Values are generalized, relatively enduring and consistent priorities for how we
want to live.12

Our values may be more or less articulated. When we use survey research to measure
values we assume that they are reasonably well articulated. When we use literary or
cultural criticism to ascertain values we may also discover unarticulated or unconscious
values.

Cardinal Values

We recall that Max Weber spoke of seven Lebensordnungen (life-orders) and Wertsphären
(value-spheres). They are the economic, political, intellectual (scientific), religious,
familial, and erotic life-orders and spheres of life-activity and values, each with Eigengesetzlichkeit
(internal, lawful autonomy). We cope rentlessly with them through our manipulations
and escapes and above all by the never-ending process of rationalization.

You may argue about the number of life-spheres and their delineation.13 If we leave
out the microsociological familial and erotic value spheres from Weber's list and add an
ethical realm to the remaining we obtain the six value-spheres about which it might be
possible to reach consensus. They are the pursuit of wealth, order, truth, the sacred,
virtue, and beauty. We call them the cardinal values. All are products of society.14

The cardinal values are embedded in the major institutional realms, i.e., the economy,
polity, science, religion, ethics, and the arts. The economy seeks and produces wealth,
the polity order, science truth, religion sacred meanings, ethics virtue, and art beauty.
We can learn about the cardinal values by studying economic, political, and juridical
history, the history of ideas and learning, the history of religion, of customs, and of
art. Most value research is embodied in the humanities, not in anthropology or sociology.

It is generally accepted that wealth is preferable to poverty, that order is preferable
to chaos, that truth is preferable to falsehood, that a life with transcendent or sacred
meanings is preferable to a life devoid of meaning, that virtue is preferable to iniquity,
that beauty is preferable to ugliness. The ideal of our contemporary American and European
civilization is an all-round society that affords people the opportunity to freely pursue
the cardinal values. Thereof the importance of free enterprise, civic liberties, academic
freedom, artistic freedom, and freedom of religion.15

A major decision, usually made in our youth, concerning the way we want to live is the
choice among cardinal values, i.e., the pursuit of riches, the search for knowledge, the
fight for political causes, the pursuit of religious piety, artistic development, civic
virtue. This decision commonly coincides with our occupational choice  we decide
whether to go into business, civil service or politics, academia, art, the clergy, or
welfare work. Sometimes several cardinal values can be combined in one's occupational
choice  an architect can, for example, pursue both beauty and wealth. But only a
renaissance character can effectively pursue all the cardinal values at once.

The economy, the polity, science, religion, ethics, and art have each a set of
organized activities, for example, business firms, courts, universities, churches,
museums. Each supports the development of its cardinal value. Values that are strongly
supported by organized activities (social structures as we usually call them) survive more
easily and longer than values that lack support in society's structures. Political and
economic structures are strong in our civilization. Aesthetic and ethical structures are
weaker. Hence it is understandable that money and power are more in evidence than beauty
and virtue in a modern society.

The cardinal values have sometimes mistakenly been described as "eternal"
because they are said to have existed in every society and in every age. In reality, they
survive mainly because they have institutional structures that support them. When
institutional support is weak, so is the corresponding cardinal value. The dearth of
ethical institutions in the Western world has, for example, resulted in a dearth of
environmental ethics, at least until very recently.

Ethical and aesthetic values are those cardinal values that are at present advancing
the most, making up for much lost ground. Religious values are loosing ground.

In a 40-year span the following percentages of Swedes answered in the affirmative the
question "Do you believe in God?"

1947 80%
1968 60%
1981 48%
1988 48%

Diminishing religiosity with accompanying secularization represents the most marked
long-term decline in a cardinal value in my country.

Sensate and Ideational Values

The Russian-American sociologist Pitirim A. Sorokin, classified the history of ideas
using a scale that ranged from sensate culture to ideational culture. In a sensate culture
most symbols have a clear, close reference to the evidence of the senses or refer to
gestalts of biological and physical existence. In an ideational culture most symbols and
cultural expressions are removed from the sensory data or gestalts of everyday experience
and mainly allude to other symbols.

Sorokin's work, Social and Cultural Dynamics16 shows how Western civilization has
fluctuated between sensate and ideational cultures. An ideational culture in 600 B.C. had
changed into a sensate culture by the time the Roman empire was at its height. This, in
turn, developed into a new ideational culture in the Middle Ages, which was followed by
the sensate culture of our times.

The main forces behind the shifts in cultural mentality are immanent, i.e., residing in
the symbol-system itself. In the virtuoso swing towards ideational culture, the
symbol-system loses touch with everyday realities and a sensate mode gets a new
opportunity. In the virtuoso swing toward sensateness the symbol system loses touch with
spiritual reality and the ideational mode gets a new chance. And so on.

There may, however, also be external forces behind the swings. In a comely but
imperfect coincidence with Sorokin's main cycle, Marshall McLuhan also finds turning
points in the cultural development at about the third or fourth century before Christ, the
mid-fifteenth century, and at the time of the late twentieth century.17 McLuhan's criterium for change
is the vehicle by means of which the important symbols travel: oral prior to Plato,
written until the end of the Middle Ages, printed until the mid-twentieth century, and
pictorial (or electronic) in our days. The medium, he argues, affects the message: the
values of oral culture are those of wisdom, the values of written culture are those of
knowledge and information. The use of the medium of printed text is harsh and manly, and
drives forward instrumental tasks, while the values of pictorial culture are soft and
womanly, using the intimate medium of television to express internal states, evoke
emotions, maintain harmony and well-being.

In an ideational culture ethics is concerned with unconditional moral principles. In a
sensate culture ethics is concerned with the pursuit of happiness. The former thus
preaches value fidelity, the latter preaches pragmatism. In a sensate culture human
activity is extroverted; in an ideational culture it is introverted. The former preaches
the inner-directed values of humanism, the latter preaches the outer-directed values of
materialism. Life view in a sensate culture stresses becoming; in an ideational culture it
stresses being. The former thus preaches progress and modernity, the latter preaches the
stability of tradition. Sorokin also holds that technology and engineering flower as a
sensate culture reaches its apogee.

According to Sorokin's presages in the late 1930s, the sensate culture of our
civilization was then at its apogee. Its vigorous empiricism, unquenchable thirst for
knowledge, and estimable striving for material progress are degenerating to a lax and
carnal sensuality, a shallow consumerism, and orgies of violence. At the time of writing,
Sorokin predicted that the direction of developments would soon change and that Western
civilization would head toward a new ideational culture. He would have agreed with the
Swedish poet Nils Ferlin:

One day, the ballads sing, summer will come
One day, when heavens vault high ov'r the land
Much built to shine will crumble down dumb
But the spirit of man soars to heaven's rand

(Translation: Greta
Frankel)

Forewarnings of the tidal changes can be detected in the sciences. The theoretical
architecture of the sciences becomes more elegant than concrete. The instances where
theory is grounded in the sensate culture of observation and practical experiments become
ever more rare. Many experiments today are replaced by exercises in higher mathematics,
and reality is often simulated with the aid of a computer. Ideational culture is thus
infiltrating the strongholds of empiricism. A telling example is the idea of global
warming due to carbon dioxide from oil heating and combustion engines. This warming cannot
be proven by the temperature readings we have on record, but is a conclusion drawn from
models. Such is the intellectual basis for the contemporary radical environmentalism that
demands our immediate conversion to a more frugal life style. It is almost a new religion;
the penance of mankind and the salvation of the earth are on its agenda.

Ferlin resignedly notes that ballads are poor sibyls, and Sorokin, himself, is vague
about the actual point in time when the turnaround will take place. Yet his theory reminds
us of something essential ¾ that there is more to man than
that which is obvious in the Zeitgeist of our own times.

Systematization of der Zeitgeist

The concept of the spirit of the times (Zeitgeist) was introduced by Friedrich
Hegel (1770-1831). It has since been used mainly as a term to designate the
"predominant ideas" of a period, for example, the spirit of romanticism.
Sometimes the term is also used to designate "predominant structures," such as
the character of the era of constitutional monarchy or of industrialism. One should,
however, try to avoid deriving in the very definition the spirit of a certain era from its
structures; it is a matter of investigation, not definition. Here we will use the term
Zeitgeist values as a loose designation of those values of a period that are
not cardinal values.

The Zeitgeist values of the latter part of the twentieth century do not lend themselves
to simple enumeration, as did the cardinal values. Their content varies, seemingly
unpredictably, like fashion trends; it has also been said that fashion follows the temper
of the times.

But the apparent arbitrariness of the value dispositions of different eras is due to
our lack of knowledge. In the Middle Ages people thought that comets followed a "wild
and lawless" path, but we do not think so today because we have learned that their
path follows physical laws and is fully predictable.

The contents in the values of an era may be hard to foresee, but the different
attributes they have can be systematically classified. The coordinates that we shall use
to get a reading on values were implicit in Sorokin's analysis from the 1930s. In the
1940s Charles Morris
made them more explicit in a remarkable analysis of the world religions. He made it clear
that at least three dimensions are needed, a Promethean, a Dionysian, and a Buddhist one.18
We will
follow these leads in our own way, keeping in mind that the dimensions refer to formal
attributes of values, not the actual contents of the values.

The first dimension of value space, depicted in Figure 3 from south to north,
runs from being to becoming. It corresponds to a scale from traditionalism,
where one upholds stability ("being"), to modernism, where one welcomes change
("becoming").

Modernism initially took shape under a banner bearing the slogans "faith in
reason" and "technology." Here one could follow in Descartes' footsteps if
one were philosophically minded, or in Diderot's if one appreciated science and
technology. As we know, the procession became a massive one: it included Kant, Smith,
Hegel, Marx, Newton and Darwin.

Of course, gifted skeptics existed alongside. Pascal, who was a contemporary of
Descartes, placed at least in one context the motives of the heart on a par with those of
reason. And Shakespeare's Hamlet makes the well-known comment: "There are more things
in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy." Diderot's
contemporaries included Swedenborg, Zinzendorf and Rousseau. And in the 19th century,
which gave us so much rational science and technology, great irrationalists like
Kierkegaard, Schelling and Schopenhauer were active. They sought to save traditional or
religious wisdom from the simpler, but devastating, logic of rationalism.

Of the political traditions formed in the 18th and 19th centuries, both liberalism and
socialism are affiliated to modernity in the form of rationalism. But classic conservatism
was skeptical toward rational would-be improvers of the world and that applied to both
left- and right-wingers.

The 20th century gave modernism a new content beyond technology and faith in reason: an
élan vital, to use Bergson's phrase. New banners and slogans rallied to the cause
of becoming modern. Nietzsche's contribution was creative self-realization, the idea of a
sunny superman (Übermensch) who, unrestricted by traditions, creates himself and
his world. Freud contributed therapeutic expression of drives, enabling the 20th-century
human beings to affirm their biological selves, live for the moment and deny the magnitude
and character-molding features of suffering.

Modernism is and always has been a movement without a definite end. The direction change
to modernity, as we may label the northern end of our axis, thus has different
meanings at different points in time. The only common element is "becoming". You
could also say that each period in modern times has a notion of its own about
"postmodernity".

Regional and nationalistic values stressing the importance of your roots  while
much in vogue these days  are not modernistic but express the desire for stability
as we may label the southernmost part of our axis. Stability has also different
meanings at different times; the only common element is "being". The notion of
social security (such as the overriding desire for "trygghet" in Sweden) was
considered a modern value by the first generation in the welfare state, but today it is a
traditional value.

The second dimension, which runs from west to east, spans the field from value fidelity,
where "one dramatizes ones values," to pragmatism and
instrumentality, where "one compromises one's values".

Value fidelity  which can be called idealism if you approve of the value or
dogmatism if you disapprove of it  embraces values that one will not compromise.
They typically include matters of conscience, such as loyalty toward one's family,
solidarity with the weak, compassion for the ill, saving planet earth for future
generations. Instrumentality  that can be called pragmatism if your approve of it or
opportunism if you disapprove  includes values that we can experiment and compromise
with to obtain an optimal result; they typically include practical deliberations and
calculations in business or politics and the selection of technical solutions. Max Weber
drew the distinction between value fidelity and instrumentality in the early 1900s. A wertrational
action (value rationality) was separated from a zweckrational action (instrumental
rationality).19

The third dimension runs from the valleys to the mountains in our diagrams. It
separates a concern with material things from a concern with human beings, thus bridging
the poles of materialism and humanism. Such labels have many connotations
and there are several other designations that can be used. For example, some have used the
label "values of production" such as order, punctuality, ambition, efficiency
and other values promoting economic growth as opposed to "values of
reproduction" such as self-exploration, empathy, sensitivity to and concern for
others, and other qualities necessary for personal inner growth and a genuine
understanding of other people.

Arnold Mitchell, as we have seen, refined and re-labeled the opposite poles of this
dimension in his distinction between Outer-directed and Inner-directed. 20 Values that
appeal to external cues are outer-directed values. Values that appeal to internal cues are
inner-directed. This terminology, however, is not consistent with Riesmans more
well-known usage of these terms. 21

For a hundred years, sociologists and others have had an understanding that society has
moved from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. The three-dimensional view of values proposed
here can show that this is not the only possible path. Gemeinschaft is traditional
stability, value fidelity, and humanism. Gesellschaft is change to modernity, pragmatism,
and materialism. But a modern society may embrace humanism rather than materialism 
this is the message from the feminist movement. And it may embrace fidelity rather than
pragmatism  this is one of the messages from the environmentalist movement. And the
peace movement often claims that the change to modernity is compatible with both humanism
and value fidelity. Such movements are actually part of the modernity of our times, not
calls to return to tradition. But they represent a different modernity without the
pragmatism of the industrial and parliamentary era.

A Typology of Value Carriers

Let us divide the population according to types depending on their high or low position
on each of the three dimensions. We get eight types of value carriers. 22

Thumbnail sketches of these groups in advanced societies reveal them as very distinct
types.

This segment consists of people who are rural or small-town in their minds if not
always in their actual residence. "You must!" and "You must not!" are
important words in their vocabulary. The Upright are patriotic and often suspicious of
strangers and immigrants. They hate inflation and love law and order. As consumers they
are cautious and apprehensive about experimenting. They like tried and true products;
reliability is essential.

2. The Folks in Southwest Mountains: stability, fidelity, humanism.

This segment emphasizes where you as a person come from, your ancestry. The Folks are
more concerned with family and relatives than with the material base of existence;
old-fashioned religion thrives here. Love of the home community and the preservation of
its traditions and surrounding nature are important concerns. Service to the next of kin
is self-evident. The Folks are particularistic: nothing is as fine as one's own garden and
nothing beats mother's cooking. When buying they often ask the advice of the local
retailer.

In this segment one seeks practical and technical rather than traditional solutions.
Prescription medicine and obedience to doctor's orders are evident. Your car and
residence, not your family, signal who you are. Cheers resound for the hometown sport team
as it tries to advance in the league. As consumers The-matter-of-fact are more ambitious
than their southwestern neighbors. More than others they go for big brands and standard
products.

These joiners believe that friends and clubs, not only possessions, signal who you are.
In joint efforts they have learned to influence their conditions. They have others than
relatives and old schoolmates as dinner guests but are usually uncomfortable with
cosmopolitans and foreigners. As consumers they are also joiners; many shop in coop
stores. More than others they look for value for money.

Here are the people who like the comfort of modern living but do not use material goods
as status symbols. They are very active in promoting their health. They are eager to
recycle products. The typical Advocates are committed to egalitarian values, which they
equate with democracy and anti-commercialism. They are convinced of the merits of their
values and want to change society to correspond to their values, not to adjust themselves
to society. The plight of the environment and of the Third World is on their minds. The
Advocates often prefer single-issue groups to political parties. They are fairly big
consumers but they are usually suspicious of advertising. Functionality in products is
important.

6. The Zealous in Northwest Mountains: modernity, fidelity, humanism.

The Zealous are seekers in touch with their inner selves. Emotion and intuition are
meaningful words for them. They engage in various forms of self-development. Like their
neighbors in the northwest valleys they question tradition, hierarchy, and authority. The
Zealous embrace not only environmental and Third-world causes but are also strong on
peace, feminism, racial equality, gay rights, and animal rights. And they get personally
involved. They are very critical consumers who tend to look for personal experiences
rather than material things in the market place.

7. The Dare Devils in North East Valleys: modernity, pragmatism, materialism.

The Dare Devils are a breed of individualists who are less afraid of the complexity of
life than those in other segments. They look for and enjoy challenge, e.g.
entrepreneurship, modern, risky lifestyles in sports such as those centered around the
surfboard, the parachute, the hangglider and in the financial markets. (From this segment
"the yuppies" of the 1980s were recruited.) Their bonds to products, causes, and
people may, however, be short-lived. They continually ask "What works for me?"
and are ready to discard anything that is no longer flashy or profitable or useful. They
are very interested in the technical features of the hardware they buy, but volatile in
their pursuit of fashion in clothing, of cars, and of interior design.

8. The Minglers in North East Mountains: modernity, pragmatism, humanism.

In this segment we find networkers thriving on cosmopolitan contacts and markets.
Eating an ethnic dish a day is a matter of course. Interest in new expressions of personal
life is intense. In their way of living they combine familiar fragments in unexpected ways
as in a music video. The Minglers are sophisticated consumers, more interested in software
than hardware.

We refrain from classifying those who have nearly equal scores of all three dimensions
into the above eight groups. They form instead a ninth group we call "Centerites".
Methodologically they are uncertain to classify, and in real life they represent the
minority who have average values on all dimensions.

The nine categories Folks, Uprights, Joiners, Matter-of-Fact, Zealots, Advocates,
Minglers, Dare Devils, and the Centerites are proposed as valuegraphics in parallel to
demographics of age, sex, occupation, et cetera in interviews using questionnaires. And,
once established they are as easy to use. But, of course, the concrete descriptions of the
types must be modified to reflect national cultures.

A point to keep in mind is that the three theoretical dimensions of the value space
refer to formal attributes of values rather than concrete values as we exemplify in the
text of the typology. We cannot tell whether a Belonger will be found in a Red Cross
group, a soccer club, a church choir, et cetera. We can only tell that he or she has a
tendency of being traditional and therefore, not joining in the latest pop bands, and is
pragmatic and thus not joining into a fundamentalist Save the Earth group. We can further
say that he or she, is humanistic, i.e. more interested in human beings than in things or
machines, and therefore less likely to join a motorcycle club except for its
companionship.

Affiliations and Media in Value
Space

If values are the relatively enduring and persistent priorities for how we want to
live, they should affect not only our choice of political parties but also our choice of
voluntary associations to join and media to follow. Media and associations, furthermore,
sustain and enhance values. Our choice of media and associations may be both cause and
effect of our values.

By means of correspondence analysis we have entered into the value space a sample of
memberships in associations (Figure 5). The data are from 1991 in Sweden. The various
voluntary associations cluster in a V-shaped pattern in the value space. Close to the
bottom of the V in the south are the old popular movements of the last century: free
churches, consumer cooperatives, temperance lodges, rifle clubs, and village associations
(hembygdsföreningar). From that area stretches toward the northeast one leg of
outer-directed associations for sports, golf, choral music, jazz, and rock. Toward the
northwest stretches another leg of inner-directed associations that promote the arts,
humanitarian causes, and environmental concerns. The space map also shows that the
northwestern valleys have fewer joiners than other regions.

In Figure 6 we have entered the readership of a sample of Swedish print media in the
value space. There seems to be a lack of weeklies catering to the values in the
northwestern and southeastern segments. The various media cluster along a
southwest-northeast path, probably the same as the one Robert K. Merton in a celebrated
media study called local-cosmopolitan. 23

Demographics and
Valuegraphics

There are correlations between the demographic categories and the value groups. For
example. the young generally support the change to modernity more than do the old. Men
tend to be more materialistic than women. The rural-urban-metropolitan scale is seen as a
road from the lower left corner of the value space to the upper right corner.

We shall not join here the great debate between Hegelians who argue for the primacy of
values and Marxists who argue for the primacy of social structure. In our data both are
partially right, one more than the other depending on the concrete issue at hand. In every
country where we have studied values, there are correlations between demography and
values. Demographics and valuegraphics each contribute a unique piece of information,
small or large, to the concrete issue at hand.

A Case of Value Change in Our Times:
Swedish Youth after World War II 24

Value change leaves few unaffected, but the amplitude of change comes early and is most
visible among the young. "We see one young generation after the other step into the
arena, like a bull that we know will be killed." This reflection of Francois
Mauriac's is quoted in Lars Ahlin's first novel, Tåbb, with the manifesto, from
1943. (Ahlin is one of Sweden's foremost postwar novelists.) Tåbb belonged to the young
Swedish generation of the 1940s that embraced Marxism, conforming to the spirit of the
time. The Depression was a recent memory. The Soviet Union had conquered Nazi Germany in
the world war, and the Communists obtained 11.2 per cent of the vote in Sweden's 1946
general election  and a somewhat higher proportion among the youngest voters.

In the 1940s Sweden was a hierarchical society with a clear class structure. The
Uprights and The Folks were the main value bearers. The war years had emphasized its
nationalistic and patriotic traditions. The population valued security and
order. The postwar appeal of Communism rested mainly on its rhetoric advocating
classlessness and international solidarity. A majority of Swedish youth, however, did not
adopt Communism but stayed within the more nationalistic sentiments of the war years.
Tired of wartime central planning they embraced private entrepreneurship.

Tåbb the bull was defeated  in reality, if not in the novel. In the early 1950s,
youth broke with both Communism and the rallying to nationalism that had prevailed in the
war years of the 1940s, and embarked on a cosmopolitan track. The new
cosmopolitanism was of a Western brand and it won over the Soviet brand of
internationalism. The youngsters who put EU (European Union) stickers on their motorcycles
were keen on expansion and interested in international affairs. They were slightly
embarrassed about the limitations of their home ground, and loved the big wide world.
Getting out of Sweden was the great event in life. They approved of the USA, the second
great victor of the war. They were delighted with their living standards, and thought it
was important to market themselves, their country, and its products. In time the young
Swedes discovered the developing countries, and many felt particularly welcome there since
they carried no recent colonial past.

In the early 50s the dominant value carriers became people the quality of being
Matter-of-fact. External forms meant a great deal. Miss Sweden beauty contests were
actually regarded as important occasions. The prevailing values were pragmatic and
outer-directed. Pro-technology attitudes were much in evidence. Sweden was early in
taking steps to develop nuclear power, both for military and domestic purposes. In this
climate of ideas, the Social Democratic party was able to govern only by showing its most
liberal side, entering a coalition with the Agrarian party and relying on the electoral
lag in the upper chamber of Parliament.

The period 1958-66 has been termed (by Stefan Dagler) one of "trustee
liberalism." Young students increasingly often enrolled in the natural and social
sciences, and the status of the liberal arts subjects and classical languages declined.
Innocuous musical groups, such as the Beetles and Hep Stars, were popular among teenagers.
Trusteeship replaced adventure, and certain indolence spread among young people. The
leading Swedish publicist of those times, Herbert Tingsten, wrote a book with the
evocative title From Ideas to Idyll, propounding the thesis that politics had left
ideology behind and become a matter of administering and selling.

But there was movement beneath the tranquil surface, and a youth revolt was brewing. An
anarcho-liberal period took hold among young people in 1966-68. Hedonism seeped
into every corner of society. A pragmatic attitude captured also the literary discourse
and it became common to celebrate one's "faithlessness" to styles and ideals and
former positions. The cultural pages of the press discussed infidelity. Copulation was
depicted at the cinema. Now, people could make love  for friendship's sake or for
pleasure without forming ties. Pornography was countered with increased goodwill. Young
Swedish women traveled to Poland for the abortions that were freely available there but
not yet in Sweden. The youth cult penetrated the country. Throughout the West, being young
was now beginning to be thought of as being better than being a mature adult  a
dangerous situation for any civilization. A mood of exhilaration began to prevail among
young people.

The backgrounds for these developments were the record years of the economic prosperity
and the war in Vietnam. The Advocates emerged as the most visible value carriers. Young
people protested not only against superpower violence in a developing country, but also
against the violence they felt that schools and employers, police and social-welfare
authorities exercised against those who dressed differently (in jeans!), smoked
differently, or went on strike at times other than those agreed upon. The stress was on informality,
not on order and hierarchy. There was a reaction against big cities, big companies and big
organizations, and a call for general decentralization.

Out of the youth revolt, two waves emerged: the "red" and the
"green." The red wave, in 1968-71, politicized adolescence, and students flocked
to socially oriented university courses, such as sociology and government. The support for
a mixed economy advocated by previous Social Democratic leaders such as Per Albin
Hansson's and Tage Erlander was regarded as a capitalist blunder and added to the targets
of anti-capitalist protests: "Palme and Geijer, Lyndon's lackeys!"
(Palme was
head of government and Geijer head of the labor unions.) Young students, often from a
middle-class background, joined the anti-capitalist wave and a massive generation gap
arose. The dominant values were anti-authoritarian: hierarchies should give way to
heterarchy, bureaucracies to networks, and social relations should be egalitarian.
This was a period of intense value change, particularly among university students.

Thus, Tåbb's children turned red, and succeeded where Tåbb had failed  in
vitalizing the socialist elements in the Swedish climate of opinion. Among intellectuals,
Marxism emerged from its ghetto and became respectable. In politics, socialist proposals
gained more of a hearing. On the left, the Communists enlarged their share of young
voters, while the Social Democrats' share diminished.

Then followed a green wave in 1971-76. Among the social concerns of youth, environment
came to the fore. The small Swedish Agrarian party changed its name to the Center party
and promoted the green cause and its support among young voters quadrupled to over 30 per
cent in 1972-73. The reassessment of the early 1960s continued; support for
cosmopolitanism and large-scale technology was replaced by localism. Now, the local
community  formerly so embarrassing that people preferred to avoid the subject
 was to be revered, and multinationals hated. International trade was no longer
exciting; handicrafts and barter were in fashion. The greatest achievements of technology
 computers and nuclear-power plants  were evil, and should be banished.

By the mid-70s The Zealous were as much in evidence as The Advocates. Feminist values
had gained ground already in the 60s with the debates on abortion and now they took on a
new life with broad focus. Militant feminism, however, soon gave way to a wave of
coziness, particularly evident in Sweden of 1976-80. Young people now departed not to
foreign countries, not to the revolution, nor to nature, but to pads not far from their
parents. They sought sweet partners, and embraced the thesis that small is beautiful. They
extolled confidence, not protest. They took jobs in the expanding social sector. Their
quest was for a small workplace, a small cottage, a small kitty to spend, a small vision,
a small love, a small child and a small change in society. The prodigious security they
sought was thought to lie in smallness. The inner life became important, and people lost
some interest in the outer world's conventions and ideologies. The self came to the fore;
the mode was intraceptive, i.e. one listened to the signals from the inner
world rather than to those of the outer world. The social critic Jan Myrdal complained
that even the left wing had entered psychoanalysis. It became more important to understand
deviants  both ideological renegades and ordinary criminals  than to judge
them. Those who now set out to explore Europe on inexpensive train passes did so not to
see other surroundings and great cities, as in the 1950s, but mainly to explore their own
psyche and develop friendship with their travel companions. Self-actualization was
the catchword of the day.

In the first half of the 1980s, many young people made a dramatic return to
cosmopolitanism and the values of the external world; there was a Fifties air in the world
of youth. The Dare Devils became dominant in the young ranks. One embraced with zest a rich
and complex life. There was less fear of fragmentation  many members (not all,
of course) of this generation had learned to cope with the consequences of the sexual
freedom of their parents; three out of ten had grown up in settings with changing patterns
of step-parents and step-siblings. Complexity was actually to them a part of their joy of
living. The excitation of the fragmented rock video catches this mentality very well.
Entrepreneurshipagaintempted many, this time with a strong feeling that it
was a road not only to riches but to self-development. No longer did more than one half
the school leavers seek public-sector jobs. Only one-sixth (17%) did so, while 77 per cent
wished to enter the private sector  42 per cent as employees and as many as 35 per
cent as entrepreneurs. This was "the blue wave" in politics inspired by Reagan
and Thatcher. At its height, in 1984-85, the Swedish Conservative party had swelled
to the same size as the Social Democratic party among those 18-24 years old: the former
had 37 per cent and the latter 38 per cent in this age group. The life style among young
Swedes became yuppie-ish.

The fall of the Berlin wall 1989 renewed the faith in the Western ideals of free
markets and democracy. The cosmopolitan Minglers became the most favored breed of youth
while the adult European middle classes renewed their pledge to Geist und Geld und
Familie. The speculative excesses of finance capitalism during the 1980s had, however,
created severe problems for traditional industrial capitalism. Thus the very moment of
capitalism's triumph over communism became marred by a severe recession in the capitalist
world. In Eastern Europe the most visible result of the end of the cold war was a
resurgence of nationalist values. And in Western Europe the attitudes toward immigrants
and refugees became more hostile. Values seemed to turn back to square one: the
nationalism of The Folks and The Upright.

Many zeitgeist values have coexisted with one another during the period we are
reviewing. A brief review tends to overstate the homogeneity of each youth generation. For
example, not all the children of the anarcho-liberal and "red" parents of the
1960s became "blue"; a minority turned "green." These new greens
evinced a pronounced pessimism. Their consciousness was heavy with cosmic evil as
manifested by holes in the ozone layer and in the transformation of the atmosphere into an
international rubbish dump. May Earth's sinners be punished for such evil! They fight not
for small-scale quality of life, like the first green wave; now it is the very conditions
of life, the most global concerns conceivable, that are their urgent concern.

The Swedes who attached EU stickers to their motorcycles when they were 18 in 1950
experience the real European Union of the 1990s as pensioners. But in the early 90s the
majority of young Swedes are actually disillusioned with the proposed European Union, i.e.
the Mastricht treaty of December 1991. Despite the rapid changes, the world is moving far
too slowly to match the changing values of the young.

The key emerging values among Swedish youth 1945-1990 have been entered into our
three-dimensional value space in Figure 7. All the details from our review cannot be
fitted into the diagram. But there is enough there to indicate that our three dimensions
are a fitting framework for a historic review of values.

Mobility Between Value Segments

There is mobility between value segments as few people stay in the same segment all
their lives. Such mobility always entails problems of adjustment and risks of loosing
one's bearings. This topic requires its own paper; here only two observations.

Movements Toward the North

The urbanization and industrialization of Western Europe brought about an upsurge in
friendly voluntary association in the nineteenth century. Also the contemporary
underdeveloped countries seem to emerge with a flora of associations and popular movements
when their social structure changes toward that of a modern society. And long before, De
Tocqueville, observing the settlers from aristocratic Europe in achievement-stressing
America, was surprised by the abundance of voluntary associations they created in their
newfound land.

In these instances, we might assume that new associations with humanistic values
facilitate the transition to modernity. The south to north path of modernization has a
half-way house of joiners in the southeastern mountains.

The movement northwards inevitably leaves some behind. After the fall of the Berlin
Wall many people in Eastern Europe knew that they personally would never enjoy the good
life in a market economy. Their age, education, and circumstances repeated the same
message: that kind of modernity is not for me! Their consolation lies in turning to their
roots, which often means a rampant nationalism.

In some contemporary Arab countries not only older people but also young and educated
persons have grown profoundly pessimistic about the journey into a Western-type modernity.
They turn to Muslim fundamentalism instead.

The road to modernity is always precarious and the calls to return to tradition abound
at every turn.

Movements Toward the East

Any movement eastwards in value space increases the risk of anomie in
Durkheim´s sense. When people move this way their fixed values are replaced with more
fleeting and changing values. Back in the west of our value space, the values may at best
allow you to negotiate the means to achieve them. In the east, both means and ends are
negotiable. This may, of course, be a great advantage to the individualists. But the
flexibility also leads to disorientation and confusion, particularly if the move toward
the east is sudden.

In our type of society, the migration eastwards seems to be accompanied by a surge in
the purchase of consumer goods. People apparently compensate for the firm values they have
lost by acquiring material possessions. Thus the move toward pragmatism is also precarious.
An eastward migration in value space benefits mainly the materialistic valleys of the
northeast.

At this point in our argument we can pause and say that a sociological typology of
values is at hand, and also a theory that allows us to understand the mode of
actualization and the emergence of spontaneous orders. The theory specifies three
dimensions and contains the promise of propositions that explain some social change.

Notes:

1 Copyright Ó 1992, 1994, 1997 ValueScope AB, Stockholm.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 87th
Annual Meeting, of the American Sociological Association, August 20-24, 1992, in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in a session organized by Albert E. Gollin. I am grateful for
comments by the discussant, Charles E. Kadushin.2 Edith Hamilton, The Roman Way,
Avon, New York 1973, p 168.3 Lawrence Stone, The Causes of the
English Revolution 1529-1642, Ark Paperbacks, London 1986, pp 105-106.4 Arnold Mitchell, The Nine American
Lifestyles, Macmillan, New York, 1983, ch. 2. The theory was first published in Social
Change: Implications of Trends in Values and Lifestyles, SRI, Menlo Park, 1979
(proprietory).5 In Britain and Sweden we have used
other labels than in the United States for the various levels. Here are the translations:

USA
A. Mitchell

Great Britain
E. Nelson & H. L. Zetterberg

Sweden
H.L. Zetterberg

Societally
Conscious

Achiever

Reformers

Movers

Skärskådare

Uträttare

Experiential

Emulator

Experience seekers

Status seekers

Sökare

Efterbildare

I-Am-Me

Belonger

Self-faithful

Group-faithful

Självuttryckare

Tillhörare

Sustainers

Security minded

Gnetare

Survivors

Subsistence
minded

Hankare

6 Florence Rockwood Kluckhohn and Fred L
Stodtbeck, Variations in Value Orientation, Row Peterson, Evanston, Ill., 1961.
Mary Douglas, In the Active Voice, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1982.7 Ingelhart, Ronald"The Silent
Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies", American
Political Science Review, vol. 65, 1971, pp. 991-1017.
-- Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, Princeton University Press,
Princeton NJ, 1990.8.Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and
Cultural Dynamics, (4 vols), Bedminster, New York, 1962. Originally published. 1937-41
by American Book Company, New York.9 S.H Schwartz,. & W. Bilsky.
"Toward a Universal Psychological Structure of Values", Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 53, 1987, pp. 550-562.
--S.H Schwartz,. & W. Bilsky. "Toward a Theory of the Universal Content and
Structure of Values", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 58,
1990, pp 878-891. 10 Barry Gunter and Adrian Furnham, Consumer
Profiles:An Introduction to Psychographics, Routledge, London & New York, 1992.11 Peter Sampson, "People are
People the World over: the Case for Psychological Market Segmentation", Marketing
and Research Today, vol. 20, no 4, 1992, pp. 236-244.12 Compare Milton Rokeach' formulation:
"I consider a value to be a type of belief, centrally located within one's total
belief system, about how one ought or ought not to behave, or about some end state of
existence worth or not worth attaining." The first part of this definition actually
refers to norms ("how one ought or ought not to behave"). The second part
refers to values in our sense ("some end state of existence worth or not worth
attaining") Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values, Jossey-Bass, San
Fransico, 1972, p. 124.13 See, for example, Lawrence A. Scaff, Fleeing
the Iron Cage, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989, pp. 94-96.14 For long students of society believed
that wealth consisted of things, (or servants, or gold), but nowadays one accepts that
wealth is the evaluation that society puts on goods and services. It has also met
with considerable resistance among students of society to absorb the idea that knowledge,
beauty, and the sacred are products of society. A major work that paved the way for a new
view was Émile Durkheim, Les formes elémentaire de la vie religieuse, Alcan,
Paris, 1912 that firmly grounded both knowledge and sacredness in the structure of
society. On art and beauty as products of society, see for example Leo Loewenthal, Literature
& the Image of Man, Beacon, Boston, 1963.15 This theme is developed in Hans L
Zetterberg, "The Structuration of Europe", International Journal of Public
Opinion Research, vol 3, no 4, pp 309-322. 16 Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and
Cultural Dynamics, (4 vols), Bedminster, New York, 1962. Originally published. 1937-41
by American Book Company, New York.17 Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenburg
Galaxy, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1962.18 Charles Morris, Paths of Life.
Preface to a World Religion, Harpers, New York, 1942.19 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft, 1.Halbband, J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen, 1956, pp 12-13.20 Arnold Mitchell, The Nine American
Lifestyles, Macmillan, New York, 1983, ch. 2.21 David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, &
Reuel Denny, The Lonely Crowd, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.22 The methodology is described in Hans
L Zetterberg, "Valuescope: A Three-Dimensional Value System", in Flemming
Hansson (ed), European Advances in Consumer Research, vol 2, 1995, Association for
Consumer Research, Provo, Utah, pp. 163-171 23 Robert K. Merton, Social Theory
and Social Structure, Revised and enlarged edition, Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1957,
ch. 10.24This review has benefited greatly from
Stefan Dagler, Liberalismens kris, Sifo förlag, Stockholm 1985, a book written in
the spirit of Sorokin. The long series of youth surveys that Sifo (The Swedish Institute
of Opinion Research) began in 1955 has also proven helpful. For a summary of Swedish
values, see Åke Daun, Svensk mentalitet, Raben & Sjögren, Stockholm 1989.
Some international comparisons are found in Sigbert Axelsson, Thorleif Petterson et al.,
Mot denna framtid, Carlsson, Stockholm, 1993.