Pages

Sunday, March 16, 2014

Government
can never be fully representative, even in an ideal democracy. Yet,
though no government can possibly represent all interests of all
people, in a democracy the government's interests are the people's
interests (or at least of the majority that elected it). One of the
reasons modern nations should not be called “democratic” is
that their governments have many interests which are not the
interests of the people.[1] Geopolitical interests are a good example
of such government interests that are not shared by the people.

There
is an obvious reason for this misalignment of geopolitical interests
between the state and the people. Nations, as opposed to individuals,
are defined by territorial boundaries and geographic characteristics,
which the governments of these nations use to project power
internationally. Since this is not the case for individuals, the
people cannot possibly have “geopolitical” interests. By
definition, therefore, geopolitical interests and the intricate
question of their realisation are of concern to the state, not to the
people. Thus, geopolitics is, by its very nature, a fundamentally
undemocratic activity, conducted specifically by the state, in
contradiction with the principles of representative government.[2]

There
is, however, one exception to this rule: geopolitical interests of
the lowest order, i.e. those related to the defence of the nation,
are shared by the people. The
people has the same interest as their
government in
realising such
primary
geopolitical
interests;
they
seek security and protection,
which, not coincidentally, was
the
original and only
function
of
the early state.
The
monopoly of physical
force
is arguably
the
only monopoly that cannot be avoided in society; therefore,
the
provision
of
security and protection of the peopleis
the
only legitimate function of the
state.[3]Other
geopolitical interests, i.e. those of a
higher order,
are not shared by the people; their
realisation by the state cannot therefore be legitimate.[4]This
reasoning
is
in line
with the principles
of the Charter
of United Nations, which states
that military force can only be used by a nation in
order to exercise the
right of defending
itself
againstforeign
aggression.[5]

Many
modern nations
only realiseprimary
geopolitical
interests, though
not
because they are committed to conducting
an ethical
foreign policy, but because they are unable to realise interests of a
higher order.In
theory of
course, the
divergence of
interests between
the
state
and
the people then
still
exists,
but
it
is
not apparent in
practice.
Therefore,
such
nations
have foreign
policies
thatgenerally
represent
well
the
public
interest
in
this regard.
Because
they are more constrained, the
smaller
and less powerful nations of
the world,
such as Austria,
Sweden or Switzerland, are in this regard
more
democratic than
the
bigger
and more powerful nations. The
latter nations,
such
as the
US,
the
UK
or
France, who often
realise
(or
attempt to realise) interests
of a higher order, therefore
lead
a foreign policy that is in conflict
with the public
interest.
As
Brzezinski
put it, “democracy
is inimical to imperial mobilization”.[6]

The
example of
the US may briefly
illustrate this point.
The United States has set up a huge military-industrial complex and
hundreds of military bases around the world in order to realise its
highest geopolitical interests of global control. It
is doubtful, to say the least, whether these efforts of the US
government are at all beneficial to the US people. Any benefit to the
US people of this enormous military and surveillance bureaucracy is
marginal and indirect at best.[7] On the contrary, there are many
ways in which the foreign policy conducted by the US government is
antagonistic to the interest of the US people.[8] As mentioned above,
the same reasoning is valid for other nations, albeit in more subtle
forms since they are geopolitically more constrained.

Despite
this bleak
reality,
and
though
the public
often
shows a certain healthy distrust of government, there is still an
implicit
assumptionthatthe
people
shares
the
state's geopolitical
interests.
As
was seen above, this is not the case, and even the
language of geopolitics confirms
this.
Indeed, semantically,
there is no question thatgeopolitics
belongsto
the realm of the state alone. For
example, terms
also used in this essay, such
as
“nation,”
“Europe,”and
“Russia,”
referin
geopolitics to
the
governingbody
of the
particular
society.
Thus, by “the
nation”
is generally
implied
“the
state” or “thegovernment;”
but
certainly not “the
people.” By
the
words “Russia”
and “Europe” isusually
meant,
respectively,
“the Russian government” and “the European Commission and
the
national
governments
in Berlin, London and Paris.” In
a geopolitical context, these
terms
certainly
do not mean
the
“Russian people” and
“the peoples of Europe.”This
is also
clear
from the fact that in
foreign policy the names
of the capitals,
e.g.
“Washington”
and “Moscow”, can be used interchangeably with the names
of
the nations,
“United
States” and “Russia,” to
mean the governments of these countries.To
take another example,
“the
national interest”
does
not mean the “public interest”; it is
largely
used as a
euphemism for “the
interest of the
state
(specifically
the three branchesof
government
and certain
parts
of the state
bureaucracy)and
the
interest of
the
leaders
and
largest
shareholders
of the
country's most
powerfulcorporations.”
The
same is valid with
many
other
terms
that are
commonly used in geopoliticaldiscourse.

Since
the public also uses
these words with
the meanings
presented above, it implicitly and often unwittingly accepts that
they have no say in the foreign policy of their governments because
they do not share the geopolitical interests of the state.
However,
the
ruling
partsof
society are undoubtedly
aware that their geopolitical interests
are
not shared by the people.
Those
who
serve the
state at
the highest
levels rely
on a number of methods in order to maintain
this
inherently undemocratic status
quo.
The
best way
is simply to
make
use
of
the
weaknesses of human nature. A
general inclination
for conservatism
and traditioncan
be relied upon for the
public's
support
of the
established
political
system, simply
because it
is
the existing
system;
the
one with
which the
people
is
familiar.

Additionally,
aquite
natural sense
of patriotism
is
also
very useful
in order toalign
the interests
of the people
with the interests of the state. Patriotism
is
often
encouraged
by
the
government and the military in
order
to gain
the support
of
the people
for
the
realisation
of the
“nation”'s
geopolitical
interests
(e.g.
what
is called in the US to
“rally
'round
the flag”).
It
is no coincidence that patriotic feeling is so
strong
in the United
States,
the
country whose state has gone
farthest in
the realisation of its geopolitical interests.Indeed,
in the US patriotic
fervour is
often whipped up when needed.Patriotism
can
then
take
extreme proportions: not
displaying the correct
patriotic
feelings (e.g. “Support
our troops!”) and the correct
patriotic
attire (e.g. the flag on the lapel or
on the porch),
can at
times have social
consequences, such
asbeing
frozen
outof
the community,
being
passed
over for promotion,
etc.[10]

There
is, therefore,
usuallylittle need for the
government to
communicate and explain much
to the public
about itsforeign policyplans.[11]Indeed, geopolitical
discussions
are almost always held
by politicians and high
officials behind closed
doors, keeping
the involvement and
consent of the people
to a minimum.
(For
instance, this is
the case with the
Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership andTrans-PacificPartnership
negotiations.[12])When
it is impossible to be completely
silentabout the realisation of
geopolitical interests, the
docile
mainstream media can be
relied up to manage the
information flow in
the interest of the state.Indeed, it is generally
difficult to find any
serious and
objective geopolitical
analyses in the mainstream media.[13]The
role of the mainstream media
is also important
in making sure the “right”
geopolitical semantics
is maintained.
Geopolitical
terms must
continuously imply that the
state is alone
responsible for geopolitics,
and that the people should
not get involved because
they do not understand it.
Of course, the
emergence of
theInternet
has weakeneda little the
effect of this kind
of media control
of the public. This
is the reasonthe internet
is perceived by
the political and
military establishment as a
threat,
and why many
attempts to monitor
and control it, technically
and legally, are being undertaken
by governmentsin a
number of countries, as
recent disclosures have shown.[14]Before the existence
of the Internet,
the only way for the layman
to learn
about the geopolitical
interests of his
“nation” and
get a glimpse of what
his government was doing to realise them, was
to read specialised foreign policy magazines that
most peoplehardly
knew existed(and
if they did,
they did
not have easy access to them).

To
the annoyance of the state, sometimes none of the above methods work
as hoped.
Sometimes the
people anyway opposes
the realisation by the state
of certain
geopolitical interests, both
military and commercial.[15]
The statethen usually
tries to realise them
anyway, by
simply ignoring public
opinion and relying on
clever communication.[16]This
has often workedreasonably well,
not least
since public opposition
usually is only temporary; in the long term, it
is often
possible for the government
to count on a high level of
indifference among the
people towards question
of geopolitics
and foreign policy. Again,
this public
indifference is not
particularly surprising,
since geopolitical interests are not shared by the people.

Notes:

[1]
There are other reasons for not called modern
nations “democratic”, but they are not connected with geopolitics
and can therefore not be brought up here.

[2]
Geopolitical interests are of course not the
only interests that drive a nation's policy. Its geopolitical
interests are an important subset of many national interests upon
which the policies of its government are based.

[3]
This is the concept of the state as
“Night-watchman”. See for instance the thoughts of Frédéric
Bastiat (e.g. “Avis à la jeunesse”, 1830), and for a more recent
thinker, Robert Nozick (in “Anarchy, State and Utopia”, from
1974).

[4]
This can also be seen in the often cited
argument for US foreign interventions: what is invoked is the “threat
to national security”. This is an implicit admission that this is
precisely what the people are really and only concerned about.

[5]
See
www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.
(See article 51).
If this is too strict for any state to
actually follow, at least then the less strict “doctrine” from
the US, called the “Powell Doctrine”, also
demands, in its first statement,
that foreign aggression be linked with a risk to national security.
It is from 1990, and named after Colin Powell.

[6]
The
full quote goes as follows: “Never
before has a populist democracy attained international supremacy. But
the pursuit of power is not a goal that commands popular passion,
except in conditions of a sudden threat or challenge to the public’s
sense of domestic well-being. The economic self-denial (that is,
defense spending) and the human sacrifice (casualties, even among
professional soldiers) required in the effort are uncongenial to
democratic instincts. Democracy is inimical to imperial
mobilization.” Z.
Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard (Basic
Books), p.35.

[7]
Though
it is true that US military installations around
the United States, and
private contractors and weapons manufacturers create jobs for the US
people, this employment factor
has been shown to be inefficient and
limited.
For
instance, according
to Robert Pollin, Professor of Economics at the University of
Massachusetts in Amherst, public expenditure in education creates two
and a half times as many jobs as the same expenditure in the
military. See following interview on The Real News Network, June 9,
2013:
therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=767&Itemid=74&jumival=10284

[8]
The pursuit of these interests is very attractive to the
civilian and military leaders of the military-industrial complex, as
well as for the big egos of politicians and civil servants in
Washington. But for most of the US population there is not much, if
any, benefit. On the contrary, not only is the US population being
spied upon by the NSA, not only are US soldiers being killed and
wounded in faraway lands for geopolitical purposes, but the huge
financial resources which could go to support urgent domestic needs
are diverted away from those to which it really belongs: the US
people. Further, the image of the US abroad is now so bad because of
its foreign policy, that regular average US citizens suffer from this
when they travel abroad.

[9]
This has been done on a number of occasions, starting with US
public opinion in WWI. See Edward Bernays' candid exposition:
“Propaganda”.

[10]
The treatment of US people of Muslim/Arab descent after 9/11,
or of Japanese descent during WWII, are other examples of extreme
proportion of patriotism.

[11]
For example, the latest military conflicts initiated by the
West generated very little debate or disclosure from the governments
involved. Information often came after the act, which seemed
acceptable to the people. Examples are NATO's attack on Libya,
France's attack on Mali and Central African Republic.

[12]
The TTIP,
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, is a so-called “free
trade agreement” being negotiated at top level between the US,
Canada and the EU, with a minimum amount of exposure to or debate
with the public (see article in below from Le Monde Diplomatique).
The TPP,
Trans-Pacific Partnership, is a ”a
secret trade negotiation that has included over 600 official
corporate "trade advisors" while hiding the text from
Members of Congress, governors, state legislators, the press, civil
society, and the public.” Sources:www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2014/03/HALIMI/50200www.exposethetpp.org/

[14]
This is the case in most countries, also
in the West, such as the UK, US, France, etc. For
attempts to monitor Internet communication, see recent revelations by
Edward Snowden, Glenn Greenwald and the Guardian newspaper. Further,
a rare admission by a senior official about the
threat of the Internet to the powers that be:
when the current Secretary of
State John Kerry said that "this little thing called the
Internet ... makes it much harder to govern.". See
article from Aug 13, 2013:
www.cnsnews.com/news/article/john-kerry-little-thing-called-internet-makes-it-much-harder-govern#sthash.8FDQM59H.dpuf

[15]
For instance, during the Vietnam war or before the Iraq War in
2003, as well as more (sometimes more localised) opposition to the
realisation by the state of geopolitical interests of a commercial
nature, such as trade agreements, etc. The EU treaties were sometimes
rejected by voters, but this did not prevent the treaties to be
signed anyway (for instance after another referendum was held). This
was the case with Ireland for the treaty of Lisbon for instance
(voted against in 2008, and then voted for in 2009).

[16]
There are highly visible recent examples, the US war on Iraq
in 2003, the NATO war on Libya in 2011, the French intervention in
Mali and Central African Republic in 2012/2013, and many other less
visible cases.

Saturday, March 1, 2014

Sincea
nation
has
both a geographic
and a
political
dimension,
it has “geopolitical”
interests.These
geopolitical
interests
are the
interests that
a
nation
has in maintaining
or
acquiring
positionsthatwould,
caeteris paribus,increaseitspowerrelative
to
other
nations.
These
interests are
defined
and limited by the
physical
and human geography
of
the nation,
and
are therefore mostly
static.When
they
change,
they
changeonly
very slowly,
whencertain
geographic
conditions
vary(e.g.
climatic,
demographic
or
economic
changes).
Each
nation, therefore, has its own specific and
unique
geopolitical interests, which can be determined independently from
other considerations.

Geopolitical
interests are such a fundamental part of a nation's political culture
that they are often instinctively taken for granted, even by civilian
and military leaders.[1] Even the language of geopolitics becomes
biased as a result; certain words receive their meanings according to
which nationals use them. Words that have such varying geopolitical
meanings are: “nation”, “security”, “defence”,
“international community”, etc. Part of the mistrust
and misunderstanding that currently exist between nations is probably
due to the common assumption that such political
terms are
neutral when in realitythey are
subjective.This is
yet another obstacle that prevents nations from realising
their geopolitical interests in a consensual way.

This
question of the realisation of geopolitical interests requires
a different approach compared to the analysis of geopolitical
interests as such. Whatever geopolitical interests a nation has,
whether or not these geopolitical interests can or will be realised
is an entirely different matter, which depends on the political,
economic and administrative situation of the nation in question, with
all the day-to-day uncertainties that this implies.[2] It is also
important to remember that geopolitical interests are only one of
many aspects that drive a nation's foreign policy. Other aspects
include, for instance, ideology, purely economic interests, domestic
politics, and even sometimes the influence of erroneous estimations
and the sway of emotions. Geopolitical interests are generally a
substantial and underlying part of nation's foreign policy –
indeed, they inform it. But they can sometimes be overshadowed by
more short-term and pressing interests that take over foreign policy,
temporarily at least.

Another
reason for the necessary distinction between geopolitical interests
and their realisation is that there is a natural order of priority to
the realisation of geopolitical interests; like a Maslow's hierarchy
of human needs but for nations.[3] A nation's most fundamental
geopolitical interests are those of a lower order; they are the most
basic interests related to the integrity of its territory, the
protection of its people, and the defence of borders. These interests
must be fulfilled before the realisation of interests of a higher
order can be contemplated.[4] There cannot be sufficient political
attention or resources available for the realisation of more advanced
geopolitical interests, if primary ones have not first been
addressed. The Roman Empire did not set out to conquer the
Mediterranean before the Republic controlled the Italian peninsula.
Great Britain did not manage to control the world's sea lanes before
it had secured the waters near its coast. Sweden did not succeed in
dominating, briefly, the Baltic sea before the yoke of the Danish
crown had been cast off. The realisation of geopolitical interests is
a long process for a nation, involving gains and setbacks. Nations
can spend centuries painstakingly trying to fulfil their geopolitical
dreams, though few ever realise them all.

Indeed,
there are often barriers to
realising geopolitical interests. Nations
eventually become
constrained by resource
limitations
that come from military or economic over-expansion,if they have not been
stopped by others nations.[5]The
United States
is quite exceptional in this
sense, since it is one of
only a
handful of nations in History
that has
come close to realising the
majority of its geopolitical
interests for
a short period of time.[6]It was
certainly helpful that
the early US leaders graduallytook control
of a land
with a veryfavourable geography,whose political
borders now largely
correspond to natural
borders. Yet, even the
most powerful nationscangenerally not
realise all their
geopolitical interests, at
least not indefinitely, as
is evident from some recent US setbacks.[7]It is unlikely that the
United States will be able to
realise its highest geopolitical interest of global
hegemony, as
US power in the world has
arguably been
in slow decline in the last
decades.

Geopolitics
is,
therefore, not
primarily the study of
geopolitical interests, but
the study of their realisation.
Geopolitics is mainly about
tactics, not as
much about strategy.
Nationsare usuallywell
aware of theirgeopolitical interests,
but generally not so
certain how (to
try)
to realise them, since
there are myriad
ways to do so, and
many uncertainties
in doing so, in a constantly shifting political landscape.
To solve such problems is
the main goal of geopolitics. It is the
study of
the obstaclesto realising geopolitical
interests, and
in assessing how
these obstacles could
be overcome, using the means
at disposal.

All
nations' geopolitical interests cannot be realisedsimultaneously;therefore,some of them will
be realised
at the expense of others. Geopolitics
is thus based
on the premise that nations
are engaged in
a subtle, or sometimes not
so subtle, competition with
each other,at many different levels:
diplomatically,
economically, militarily and
even culturally. The
history of modern nations
is largely a
history of never-ending
conflicts
ofinterests.
As a nation succeeds
in realisinggeopolitical interests
of an ever-higher
order, further and further
away from its primary,
lower-order interests,at some point there will be
a clash with the
interests of other nations.
A nation's
expansion ofwhat it calls its“defence perimeter” is
often perceived by another
nation as the adoptionof a
“threatening” or
“aggressive position.”[8]
Again, it is a question of semantics and
ofgeopolitical world-view.

When
two nations' geopolitical interests conflict, the
stronger nation
can realise its interests by
persuading or forcing
the weaker nation to yield. This can be done in
a number of different ways;
by promising economic
advantages,
by economic pressure
such as the
threat or
actual use
of sanctions, by
acts of subversion,by threat
of force, and ultimatelyby military
force.
It is of course tempting for
the most powerful
nations of the world to use
such methods; indeed,
they often do so. For
instance, most of
US foreign policy is based on such tactics.
The
coercive realisation of geopolitical interests is, still
today, the standard way in
which the international systemworks.

It
is possible, however,
for geopolitical
interests to
be realised without
the
use of such
coercive
means.Nations
can realise
geopolitical
interests consensually, to
the satisfaction of all
involved parties,
if the
following two conditions are
fulfilled.
First, the
geopolitical
interests
of all
parties
should
generally
complement
each other. Of
course, some
negotiationsconcerning
details would
still take
place,
but
between equal
parties.Second, no
third party should prevent the
realisation of the interests
in question.
Most
likely, such
external involvement can
comefrom another
nation or from an
international organisation. Though
these two
conditions seem reasonable enough, in reality, they
are not so often fulfilled.

A
final point can be mentioned with regard to the realisation of
geopolitical interests. In the last decades, geopolitics has become
somewhat less important, because nations have seen their power and
sovereignty slowly erode, as globalist, internationalist developments
have taken place. Globalisation has made the role that national
governments play in international business far less important than it
was.[9] Thanks to IT technology and cheap transport, even small and
medium sized companies – usually the backbone of healthy economies
– have become far less dependent on domestic markets and on the
political and material support from their government when investing
and selling abroad. Further, the emergence of international
organisations with supranational jurisdiction (e.g. UN, Bank of
International Settlements, EU, IMF, World Bank, WTO, etc.)[10], and
their increasing influence over the affairs of the world, has also
drained sovereignty from national governments.[11]

The
result of this evolution in global politics is that geopolitical
interests are becoming more difficult, but also less important, for
nations to realise.[12] Economic and political interests are becoming
less tied to geography than before, because they are less tied to
nations.[13] The realisation of geopolitical interests give nations
less rewards than in the past; they will thus dedicate less resources
towards efforts to realise them. However, the underlying reason why
geopolitical interests are becoming less important in this new
international context is because geopolitics is based on an incorrect
assumption; namely, that the interests of the government and the
interests of the people are the same. The next part, therefore, looks
at the distinction between state and people, which must be taken into
account in order for geopolitical analysis to be complete.

Notes:

[1]For instance, George Friedman wrote, correctly,
that: “A country’s grand strategy is so deeply embedded in that
nation’s DNA, and appears so natural and obvious, that politicians
and generals are not always aware of it. Their logic is so
constrained by it that it is an almost un­conscious reality. But
from a geopolitical perspective, both the grand strategy of a country
and the logic driving a country’s leaders become obvious.” George
Friedman, in his book “The Next 100 Years”, from p39 (Doubleday).
Source: www.fd.unl.pt/docentes_docs/ma/amg_MA_11180.pdf

[2]There may
be many reasons why the
government and
bureaucracy may
not be able, at a
given moment, to
adequately
pursuethe realisationof a nation's
geopolitical interests.
Certain people
or organisations may for
instance not be
competent enough, or
may have serious
distractions (e.g.
bad economic
figures, upcoming re-elections,
etc.), or
not enough resources, experienceor guidelines.

[5]For
instance, George Friedman wrote: “All
nations have grand strategies, though this does not mean all nations
can achieve their strategic goals. Lithuania’s goal is to be free
of foreign occupation. But its economy, demography, and geography
make it unlikely that Lithuania will ever achieve its goal more than
occasionally and temporarily. The United States, unlike most other
countries in the world, has achieved most of its strategic goals,
which I will outline in a moment. Its economy and society are both
geared toward this effort.” George
Friedman, in his book
“The Next 100
Years”, from p39(Doubleday).
Source:
www.fd.unl.pt/docentes_docs/ma/amg_MA_11180.pdf

[6]Generally
it never lasts more than a couple of centuries at
most: It is
possible to mention the Persian empire and the Roman Empire for
little more than a century, China during the 15th
and 16th
centuries, Britain during most of the 19th
century, and the USA from 1945.

[7]For
instance, the continuous rise of China, and the political
and commercial gains
of China in Africa. The progressive shift in the power balance with
China due to the
huge US current
account deficit with
China and
China's
substantial ownership of US Treasury bonds.
Also can be
mentioned the
relative failure in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and on-going
hesitations of the US concerning Syria.The inability of
the US to bring Russia to heel. Etc, etc.

[8]There are
countless examples of this, from the US/Japan conflict of the 30s and
40s, to the current clash between China and Japan over a group of
islands, as China is slowly expanding its naval presence.

[9]
Their control of capital has decreased, and tariffs and
subsidies have been reduced in many parts of the world (these confer
power to those who apply them – the national governments). Further,
embassies and chambers of commerce do not have the same importance as
before. Despite the constant attempts by national governments to
limit, tax, or at least monitor, the movement of people, goods and
capital, they are undoubtedly being undermined by such developments.Though
there has been a resurgence of national
authority after
the 2007-2009financial
crisis, (completely
unwarranted, of course, since national governments
were largely responsible for the crisis in the first place), this is
likely only
temporary.

[11]Regarding
international organisations, it is
true that most
of them are
financed by the most
powerfulnationsof the world, in
order to help them realise their geopolitical interests under a veil
of legitimacy.
Yet,
at the same
time,the
power of these organisations,
not so much militarily but economically and legally,
has
grown over time,
at the expense
of these
nations.
This factor also contributes to the decline in the
importance of geopolitics.

[12]This
development could initially benefit
mostly the smaller and the weaker nations of the world; those nations
whose many interests have never been realised
because of the existence of a handful overbearing powers. The
most powerful
nations are
naturally most
impacted by these globalist
changes (since
their range of
interests is wider and more global).
The US's
interests in the Middle East and Asia, and France's interests in
Africa come to mind.

[13]Natural
comparative advantages between nations matter far less than they did
in the 19th
century. See
for instance, “Global Trade and Conflicting National Interests”,
by Professors R. E. Gomory and W. J. Baumol. MIT Press, 2000.