Cartels

This Practice Note gives an overview of the grand jury process in an antitrust criminal cartel case and explains certain types of witness immunity, including the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Leniency Program and letter immunity. Additionally, this Note offers guidance and counseling tips relating to grand jury testimony and preparing a witness for a grand jury appearance.

The overview provides a route-map guide to the EU competition law regime. It outlines the key legal, procedural and practical aspects likely to be encountered when confronting a competition law problem. You should read this at the start of any transaction or specific research, to give you a broad overview of the main points that are likely to arise.

This Practice Note provides an overview and introduction to the main statutory provisions in the US, the US antitrust regulatory structure, the role of private antitrust enforcement and certain key concepts relevant to the application of US antitrust law. Antitrust analysis is highly fact specific and, while providing a useful starting point, the principles outlined in this Note are necessarily general in nature and do not address any of the subject matters discussed in detail.

This Practice Note provides an overview of the legislation and policies relevant to criminal antitrust enforcement in the US, and discusses practical issues facing a company that is the potential target of a criminal investigation. Among other things, the Note addresses the criminal penalties for antitrust violations and outlines the Department of Justice Antitrust Division's leniency program, through which companies and individuals can receive amnesty from criminal prosecution by reporting illegal antitrust activity and cooperating with the government's investigation.

An outline of the US Department of Justice's leniency program for antitrust violations. Under this program, companies and individuals can receive amnesty from criminal prosecution of antitrust offenses by reporting illegal activity and cooperating with the government's investigation.

This PowerPoint presentation, including hypothetical questions and answers, can be used by counsel to train employees and executives as part of an antitrust compliance program and can be customized for a specific company and industry. This presentation explains the answers to each hypothetical question and distinguishes situations where the facts given may violate a company's antitrust compliance policy even though they may not directly violate the antitrust law. This PowerPoint provides hypotheticals that concern US antitrust law only and, in particular, dealings with competitors under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

This chart tracks the Department of Justice Antitrust Division's (DOJ) ongoing investigation into price-fixing and bid-rigging in the auto parts industry and other related cartels. The DOJ has described the investigation into these cartels as the largest criminal investigation it has ever undertaken and has noted that the investigation will expand to cover additional products. As of December 2014, the DOJ has fined 38 companies over $2.4 billion in total fines and sentenced 53 executives, including foreign nationals, to jail terms ranging between one and two years for participating in auto part cartels. The DOJ also recommended a sentence of one year for a defendant charged only with obstruction of justice. This chart will be updated quarterly.

This chart tracks the Department of Justice Antitrust Division's (DOJ) ongoing investigation into the manipulation of London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The DOJ's investigation is in tandem with other investigations of LIBOR manipulation including those of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority. As of December, 2014, the DOJ has charged 11 individuals and seven companies with illegally manipulating LIBOR. This chart will be updated quarterly.

This chart tracks the Department of Justice Antitrust Division's (DOJ) ongoing investigation into bid-rigging conspiracies and related charges in municipal bond investment agreements and other municipal finance contracts. As of December 2014, the DOJ had charged 20 individuals and one company in the conspiracies, although not all were charged with violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Additionally, the DOJ has settled investigations with five major financial institutions.

This Chart tracks the Department of Justice Antitrust Division's (DOJ) ongoing investigation into bid-rigging conspiracies in municipal tax lien auctions. As of December 2014, the DOJ has charged 15 individuals and five companies in the conspiracies. This Chart is updated quarterly.

This chart tracks the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ)'s ongoing investigation into bid-rigging in public real estate foreclosure auctions. The DOJ is investigating bid-rigging cartels in Alabama, California, Georgia and North Carolina. This chart will be updated quarterly.

This chart tracks the Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division's ongoing investigation into price-fixing in the thin-film transistor liquid crystal display (TFT-LCD) panels industry. The DOJ noted in 2012 that the affected volume of commerce for the entire cartel was $2.34 billion. As of December 2014, the DOJ had fined eight companies over $1.39 billion in total fines, charged 22 executives and imprisoned 13, including foreign nationals, for jail terms ranging between six months and three years for participating in the TFT-LCD cartel. This chart will be updated quarterly.

This Toolkit includes resources that help attorneys litigate and counsel on antitrust cartel matters. It includes materials relating to the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice's (DOJ) criminal cartel enforcement and leniency program as well as materials relating to private antitrust follow-on litigation.

China's influence on global mergers and acquisitions is steadily increasing. The introduction of the Anti-Monopoly Law on 1 August 2008 heralded a new era for merger control enforcement in the country. The article below provides an overview of merger review decisions made in China since the Anti-Monopoly Law took effect, and highlights (with case studies where relevant) some of the key issues that parties to a transaction need to consider when concluding an international deal. This article is part of the Competition and Cartel Leniency multi-jurisdictional guide. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg.

This chapter offers a comparative examination of Canada's anti-cartel regime and that of the US, with a particular focus on each regime's criminal anti-cartel provisions, penalties on conviction, defences available to per se charges, exclusion for exports, private rights of action for violations of criminal anti-trust provisions, immunity/leniency programmes, and non-criminal enforcement in respect of agreements among competitors. This article is part of the PLC Competition and Cartel Leniency multi-jurisdictional guide. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg.

Romania's competition laws and leniency programme have been in place since 2004. However, since its introduction, there has been only one confirmed case of a successful immunity application. This article attempts to analyse why the introduction of the leniency programme has failed to produce the expected results, and as such, has failed to help Romania become a more competitive market place. This article is part of the PLC Competition and Cartel Leniency multi-jurisdictional guide. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg.

In the UK, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 has made substantial amendments to the criminal cartel offence in the Enterprise Act 2002. These amendments removed the "dishonesty" element from the offence, introduced a series of circumstances preventing an agreement from amounting to a criminal cartel and introduced three substantive defences to the criminal cartel offence. This article considers: the reasons for the dishonesty element in the criminal cartel offence under the Enterprise Act; the extent to which the dishonesty element of the offence was successful in achieving its original objectives; whether reform was necessary; how the reforms sought to address the problems of the previous system; and the effect the reforms will have on the enforcement of competition law and the conduct of companies and their employees. This article is part of the PLC Competition and Cartel Leniency multi-jurisdictional guide. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg.

This table is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of contents visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. Please note this project is currently being updated so will not include all available jurisdictions in this subject area.

This chapter offers a comparative examination of Canada's anti-cartel regime and that of the US, with a particular focus on each regime's criminal anti-cartel provisions, penalties on conviction, defences available to per se charges, exclusion for exports, private rights of action for violations of criminal anti-trust provisions, immunity/leniency programmes, and non-criminal enforcement in respect of agreements among competitors. This article is part of the PLC Competition and Cartel Leniency multi-jurisdictional guide. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg.

Recent trends towards increased co-operation and exchange of information between regulators and prosecutors mean that multinational companies frequently have to deal with the same regulatory issues across many jurisdictions. This article sets out the key issues that a company must consider when facing a multi-jurisdictional regulatory investigation.

This article reviews Canada's new regime, in comparison to the cartel regimes of the UK, the US and Australia, including: Conduct subject to criminal penalties. Penalties for criminal cartel activity. Criminal versus civil prohibitions. Possible defences and exemptions to criminal prosecution. Reducing exposure to criminal penalties.

Anti-cartel enforcement has been the subject of increased focus in recent years. This has led to the development of stricter systems and tougher penalties. This chapter examines aspects of the criminal provisions relating to cartel conduct in Canada, the US, the UK and Australia, including criminal penalties, types of cartel conduct, possible defences, corporate exposure to criminal prosecution and methods of reducing this exposure.

Leniency programmes represent a key development in competition law enforcement both for competition authorities and undertakings. This chapter looks at the history, recent developments and future considerations for leniency programmes worldwide. It also sets out the key features of a successful leniency programme and the problems faced by potential leniency applicants.

This chapter considers recent developments in cartel prosecution in the US and the EU, including attempts to deter cartels, the current status of leniency programmes and developments in the area of private anti-trust litigation.

In Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp., the US Supreme Court held that consolidation for pretrial proceedings in multidistrict litigiation (MDL) does not affect a plaintiff's right to appeal from an order dismissing her entire complaint.

On 11 December 2014, Advocate General Jääskinen gave an opinion on questions referred from a German court on the application of the Brussels I Regulation in the context of a damages action brought by victims of an illegal cartel.

A three-judge panel for the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld a district court's decision that Motorola, a US-based company, cannot recover damages on behalf of its foreign subsidiaries arising out of liquid-crystal display panel price-fixing.

The US District Court for the Northern District of California held that the NCAA's restriction on student-athlete pay is an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a complaint against Ferrellgas Partners, L.P. and Ferrellgas, L.P. (doing business as Blue Rhino) and UGI Corporation and AmeriGas Partners, L.P. alleging that the parties violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by colluding to raise the wholesale price for propane exchange tanks as a result of reducing the propane amounts in those tanks.

On 2 April 2014, the European Commission announced that it had fined 11 producers of high voltage power cables a total of EUR302 million for participation in a worldwide market and customer sharing cartel.

The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Section 1 of the Sherman Act did not apply to the defendants' sale of price-fixed liquid-crystal display (LCD) panels to foreign purchasers as it was barred by the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA).

In Mississippi v. AU Optronics Corp., the US Supreme Court held that a suit filed by a state government as the sole plaintiff did not constitute a mass action under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). CAFA therefore does not permit removal of parens patriae actions by state governments.

This update focuses on the importance of antitrust compliance programs in light of the US Department of Justice's robust enforcement of criminal antitrust cartels. The threat of an investigation and severe fines is not limited to the US anymore and has become a global concern for multinational companies.

In a case brought by Best Buy Co., Inc. seeking damages for an alleged price-fixing conspiracy by manufacturers of liquid crystal display panels, a federal jury cleared Toshiba Corporation of any wrongdoing and required HannStar Display Corp. to pay Best Buy approximately $7.5 million in damages.

On 15 September 2011, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that real estate investors Allen French and Harold Buchman, and real estate investment company M&B Builders LLC, had pleaded guilty to felony charges that they had violated the Sherman Act by participating in a conspiracy to rig bids in public auctions for foreclosed real estate in southern Alabama. This investigation is part of a larger ongoing effort by the DOJ Antitrust Division and FBI to identify anti-competitive conspiracies that target public real estate foreclosure auctions.

On 7 December 2010, as a condition of its participation in the US Department of Justice's (DOJ) Antitrust Corporate Leniency Programme, Bank of America agreed to pay US$137.3 million in restitution to federal and state agencies for its employees' participation in a conspiracy to rig bids in the municipal derivatives market.

On 18 November 2010, Special Master Hon. Charles A. Legge issued a Report and Recommendation Regarding Discovery Motions (Report and Recommendation) to Hon. Samuel Conti, the judge presiding over In Re Cathode Ray Tube Antitrust Litigation pending in the Northern District of California. The Report and Recommendation stated that the defendants' motion to compel the class action plaintiffs to respond to various discovery requests regarding the factual basis for their allegations of conspiracy regarding finished products containing cathode ray tubes, before substantial discovery regarding such allegations could commence, be granted

On 9 June 2010, US President Obama signed into law H.R. 5330 (Pub. L. No. 111-190), which extends the civil leniency provisions of the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 (ACPERA) for ten years. Under ACPERA, successful amnesty applicants under the Department of Justice Antitrust Division's corporate leniency program may limit their potential civil damages in private antitrust actions. By providing "satisfactory co-operation" to plaintiffs, leniency applicants are able to avoid treble damages and joint and several liability in civil suits.

On 9 June 2010, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced that it has reached a settlement with U-Haul International, Inc. (U-Haul) and its parent company, AMERCO, to resolve FTC charges that U-Haul invited its closest competitor, Avis Budget Group, Inc. (Budget) to collude on prices for truck rentals.

On 28 May 2010, the US District Court for the Northern District of California found that plaintiffs in the flat panel antitrust litigation may serve two Taiwanese defendants through their US counsel pursuant to US Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) (Rule 4(f)(3)). The court determined that plaintiffs need not first attempt to personally serve the defendants through the letter rogatory process if there is alternative, speedier relief available that comports with due process.

On 27 April 2010, US Supreme Court (Supreme Court) reversed the decision by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) which had allowed plaintiff AnimalFeeds International Corp. (AnimalFeeds) to pursue arbitration on behalf of the proposed class of direct purchasers against several shipping companies over alleged price-fixing of parcel tanker shipping services. In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v AnimalFeeds International Corp., the Supreme Court held that imposing class arbitration on parties without their consent conflicts with the central principle of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) that arbitration requires the consent of the parties.

On 29 March 2010, Magistrate Judge Viktor V. Pohorelsky, who is overseeing the civil litigation in the US District Court for the Eastern District of New York in which various airlines are alleged to have fixed the prices of air cargo, ordered defendant Societe Air France (Air France) to produce certain documents to the plaintiffs. Air France was withholding the documents pursuant to France's "blocking statute", which prohibits parties from producing documents or information for use in foreign litigation other than pursuant to certain treaties, such as the Hague Convention.

The DC District Court has applied the federal law enforcement privilege to deny access to investigative memoranda obtained through a leniency programme by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division. The material held to be privileged was sought by plaintiffs in a securities fraud litigation against Micron Technology, Inc. and three of its officers.

On 21 December 2009, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) submitted comments to the Department of Transportation (DOT) opposing any broad grant of antitrust immunity for an expanded airline alliance by current members of the Oneworld Alliance. The DOJ concluded that the proposed agreements would result in competitive harm on six transatlantic routes that serve 2.5 million passengers annually, potentially increasing fares up to 15% for some passengers.

On 19 May 2009, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued an order denying a motion by direct purchaser plaintiffs to compel a corporate defendant that had previously applied for antitrust amnesty with the US Department of Justice to disclose its identity and co-operate with the plaintiffs in civil litigation.

On 9 April 2009, as a result of an ongoing investigation into the air transportation industry, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that Cargolux Airlines International S.A. (Cargolux), Nippon Cargo Airlines Co. Ltd (NCA), and Asiana Airlines Inc. (Asiana) each agreed to plead guilty to conspiring to fix prices in the air cargo industry in violation of the Sherman Act and to pay a total of US$214 million in criminal fines. The DOJ also charged that Asiana fixed the prices of passenger fares for flights from the United States to Korea.

On 30 January 2009, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that a former shipping executive was sentenced to serve 48 months - the longest sentence imposed to date for a single antitrust violation - and to pay a US$20,000 fine for participating in a conspiracy to eliminate competition for freight shipping services between the continental United States and Puerto Rico.

On 12 November 2008, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that three leading electronics manufacturers have agreed to plead guilty and pay a total of US$585 million in criminal fines for conspiring to fix prices in the sale of liquid crystal display panels. The firms include LG Display Co. Ltd. (LG), Sharp Corp. (Sharp), and Chunghwa Picture Tubes Ltd. (Chunghwa). Of the US$585 million in total criminal fines, LG will pay US$400 million, which is the second-highest criminal fine ever imposed by the DOJ's Antitrust Division. The DOJ filed its charges and the proposed settlement in the US District Court for the Northern District of California. In addition, the three companies have agreed to co-operate with the DOJ's ongoing investigation in the industry.

On 17 June 2008, the US DOJ announced that The Home City Ice Company plead guilty to allocating packaged-ice customers and territories in the Detroit metropolitan area and southeastern Michigan. As part of the plea agreement, Home City Ice will co-operate with the DOJ in its ongoing investigation into the packaged-ice industry. The plea is the first to result from the DOJ´s investigation into the packaged-ice industry.

The US Department of Justice (DOJ) has announced that Japan Airlines International Co. (Japan Airlines) has agreed to plead guilty and pay a US$110 million criminal fine in connection with an alleged conspiracy to fix the prices of international air cargo shipments.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Germany. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the global guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in South Africa. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Argentina. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Italy. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable laws and guidance, and the regulatory authorities in Italy. In particular, it covers the scope of application, availability of immunity from civil and criminal liability, application procedural rules, circumstances when leniency can be withdrawn, scope of leniency protection, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel Leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Mexico. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Canada. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable laws and guidance, and the regulatory authorities in Canada. In particular, it covers the scope of application, availability of immunity from civil and criminal liability, application procedural rules, circumstances when leniency can be withdrawn, scope of leniency protection, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel Leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in France. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in The Netherlands. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable laws and guidance, and the regulatory authorities in The Netherlands. In particular, it covers the scope of application, availability of immunity from civil and criminal liability, application of procedural rules, circumstances when leniency can be withdrawn, scope of leniency protection, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel Leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Brazil. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Ukraine. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable laws and guidance, and the regulatory authority in Ukraine. In particular, it covers the scope of application, availability of immunity from civil and criminal liability, application procedural rules, circumstances when leniency can be withdrawn, scope of leniency protection, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel Leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in the United States. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Australia. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable laws and guidance, and the regulatory authorities in Australia. In particular, it covers the scope of application, availability of immunity from civil and criminal liability, application procedural rules, circumstances when leniency can be withdrawn, scope of leniency protection, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel Leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Greece. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable laws and guidance, and the regulatory authorities in Greece. In particular, it covers the scope of application, availability of immunity from civil and criminal liability, application procedural rules, circumstances when leniency can be withdrawn, scope of leniency protection, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel Leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Hong Kong. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable laws and guidance, and the regulatory authorities in Hong Kong. In particular, it covers the scope of application, availability of immunity from civil and criminal liability, application procedural rules, circumstances when leniency can be withdrawn, scope of leniency protection, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel Leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in South Korea. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel Leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Switzerland. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable laws and guidance, and the regulatory authorities in Switzerland. In particular, it covers the scope of application, availability of immunity from civil and criminal liability, application procedural rules, circumstances when leniency can be withdrawn, scope of leniency protection, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel Leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

Search the Country Q&A in the Cartel Leniency Multi-jurisdictional Guide by question and jurisdiction. Step 1: Check the boxes to select the questions and the jurisdictions for comparison. Step 2: Click the "submit" button. Step 3: Scroll down to view answers and check law stated dates for each jurisdiction.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in China. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel Leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in the EU. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Japan. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Norway. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel Leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in the Russian Federation. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in the UK (England and Wales). The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Indonesia. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, whether immunity from civil fines is available for individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Austria. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the PLC multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.

A Q&A guide to cartel leniency law in Spain. The Q&A gives a succinct overview of leniency and immunity, the applicable procedure and the regulatory authorities. In particular, it covers the conditions to be satisfied, the method of making an application, availability of immunity from civil fines to individuals, the scope of leniency, circumstances when leniency may be withdrawn, leniency plus, confidentiality and disclosure, and proposals for reform. To compare answers across multiple jurisdictions visit the Cartel leniency Country Q&A tool. This Q&A is part of the multi-jurisdictional guide to competition and cartel leniency. For a full list of jurisdictional Cartel Leniency Q&As visit www.practicallaw.com/leniency-mjg. For a full list of jurisdictional Competition Q&As, which provide a high level overview of merger control, restrictive agreements and practices, monopolies and abuse of market power, and joint ventures in multiple jurisdictions, visit www.practicallaw.com/competition-mjg.