Nearly all of the ways philosophers currently
attempt to define the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function’ undermine the
scientific application of those terms by rendering the scientific explanations
in which they occur vacuous.Since this
is unacceptable, we must develop analyses of these terms that avoid this
vacuity.

Robert Cummins argues in this fashion in Representations,
Targets, and Attitudes.He
accuses 'use theories' of representational content of generating vacuous
explanations, claims that nearly all current theories of representational
content are use theories, and offers a non-use theory of representational
content which avoids explanatory vacuity.One task I undertake in this article is to develop an alternative
non-use theory which avoids an objection fatal to that theory.

My second task is to adapt Cummins’
argument to criticize most current analyses of ‘function,’ which undermine
scientific explanation in an analogous way.Though Cummins does not explicitly argue in this manner, his own
analysis of ‘function,’ by avoiding any appeal to use, avoids the explanatory
vacuity to which they succumb.Consequently, I endorse Cummins’ notion of function.

However, although use theories fail
as analyses of the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function,’ they can still make
significant contributions to the sciences employing these terms.For, while philosophers seeking to define
‘representation’ and ‘function’ must avoid incorporating representational and
functional uses into their definitions, scientists must still find a way to
determine which representations and functions are being used.Suitably re-construed use theories of
representation and function may in many cases assist them in this task.

Philosophers
intent upon characterizing the difference between physics and biology often
seize upon the purported fact that physical explanations conform more closely
to the covering law model than biological explanations.Central to this purported difference is the
role of laws of nature in the explanations of these two sciences.However, I argue that, although certain
important differences between physics and biology can be highlighted by
differences between physical and biological explanations, these differences are
not differences in the degree to which those explanations conform to the
covering law model, which fits biology about as well as it does physics.

I
hope in this paper to clarify, and partially resolve, the conflict between science
and religion.The claims over which
scientific and various religious worldviews can conflict can be usefully
divided into two sorts.Claims of the
first sort involve matters of value and purpose.The chief problem here is that there appears
to be no room in the natural world, as revealed by science, for such esoteric
items as ethical facts, purposes, and the like.Hence religious claims about the real existence of values and purposes
seem at the very least unsupported by science, and perhaps undermined by
it.The second sort of conflict involves
claims of ontology.Religions often add
to the ontology of science the existence of entities such as gods, angels,
demons, souls, heaven, hell, or other abodes for the afterlife.In addition, religions sometimes subtract
select bits of scientific ontology that are perceived as conflicting with
religious orthodoxy.

The partial resolution I hope to
effect here is to be achieved by defending an account that analyzes moral value
and purpose in terms of functions, while remaining neutral between naturalized
and religious positions on these subjects.The clarification will result once the issue of moral value and purpose
is out of the way, and we see that all true conflict between science and
religion is ontological.

However, despite the frequent
apparent conflicts between religious and naturalistic accounts of moral value
and purpose, I intend to avoid certain of the more popular methods of achieving
reconciliation.First, I have no
intention of denying that these apparent conflicts are real, for instance by
following Stephen Jay Gould in asserting that science and religion belong to
“non-overlapping magisteria.”Second, I also have no intention of embracing
moral relativism, at least if by that term one means that moral propositions
only have truth values relative to personal or cultural attitudes and/or
conceptual schemes.Third, I will not be
denying the reality of moral values.Fourth, although I will therefore be asserting that there are multiple,
incompatible, real moral values, I intend to resist the idea that all but the
most important of these values are merely ceteris paribus values, while
only the most important are values “all things considered.”Fifth, and simultaneously, I will offer an account
of moral values according to which these mutually inconsistent and equally real
values can nevertheless be said to be differently ranked in importance.Sixth, I have no intention to accomplish any
reconciliation at the expense of abandoning even one iota of the scientific
worldview.