Accident Prevention 1994

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October 1994

The captain continued to fly the approach in a manner that placed the airplane in a dangerous flight regime despite warnings from the other crew members and the stall warning stick shaker, official U.S. report says.

August 1994

Management had received frequent complaints about the pilot-in-command’s performance before the accident but no action was taken by supervisors. Accident investigators found that eight out of 11 second-in-command pilots avoided flying with the accident pilot.

July 1994

A subsequent accident investigation conducted by authorities in Belize determined that the pilot had flown more than 41 hours over the maximum duty time allowed by law, including more than 30 hours in the two and a half days before the accident.

June 1994

A routine proficiency check turned to tragedy when the pilot flying initiated a barrel roll at low altitude during the night flight. The official U.S. accident investigation report said the accident highlighted serious management and training deficiencies.

May 1994

Fifty feet above the runway, the first officer — the pilot flying — made a decision to go around, but the captain took control and landed the aircraft. The aircraft rolled off the runway about 1,700 feet after touchdown. Although the captain was not faulted for continuing the landing, an official U.S. report raised training, procedural, technical and record-keeping issues in connection with the accident.