Bolshevik and Stalinist Russia 1918-56

The Bolshevik Consolidation of Power Under Lenin

Bolsheviks were a Marxist revolutionary party founded in 1903 and led by Vladimir Ulyanov

In October Revolution of 1917m had cleverly exploited the troubled situation in Russia that followed the fall of tsardom in February

Managed to outmanoevre their opponents and seize power

Once in government, Bolsheviks faced huge difficulties in trying to consolidate their hold over the Russian nation

These can be identified over 4 basic questions

Could the Bolsheviks survive at all?

If so, could they extend their control over the whole of Russia?

Could they negotiate a swift end to Russia's war with Germany?

Could they bring economic stability to Russia?

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The Bolshevik Consolidation of Power Under Lenin

Before 1917, Bolsheviks had spent time in preparing for revolution

had given little thought to how affairs would be organised when this was achieved

had always been a Marxist belief that after the triumph of the proletariat the State would "wither away"

Leon Trotsky who played a central role in the Bolshevik seizure of power expressed this simple faith at the time of his appointment in October 1917 as Commissar for Foreign Affairs

Structure of power under the Bolsheviks

Lenin claimed the October Revolution had been a taking of power by the soviets

In fact it had been a seizure of power by the Bolshevik party

Nevertheless, Lenin persisted with the notion that Sovnarkom had been appointed to govern by the Congress of Soviets

According to this view, distribution of power in revolutionary Russia took the form of a pyramid with Sovnarkom at the top

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The Bolshevik Consolidation of Power Under Lenin

The stucture of power under the Bolsheviks:

Reality was altogether different

with the fall of the tsardom in 1917, traditional forms of government had broken down

this left the Bolsheviks in a position to make up their own rules

Key body was the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party

It was this organisation, under the direction of Lenin, that provided the members of the government

In theory, Central Committee derived its authority from the All-Russian Congress of the Bolshevik Party

Locally elected representatives voted on policy

In practice, Congress and the local parties did as they were told

This kept in line with Lenin's insistence that the Bolshevik Party operate according to the principle of democratic centralism which guaranteed that power was exercised from the top down rather than the bottom up

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The Bolshevik's early measures

October Revolution had marked the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, or socialism over capitalism

Hard slog lay ahead if the Bolsheviks were truly going to transform the Russian economy

Lenin had written powerfully against oppressive landlords and cqpitalists before October Revolution

Had produced little by way of a coherent plan for their replacement

Policy after taking power was based on the facts of the situation rather than theory

Bolshevik government would continue using existing structures until the transition had been completed and a fully socialist system adopted

Transitional stage referred to as state capitalism

Lenin aware many Bolsheviks wanted the immediate introduction of a sweeping revolutionary policy

Stated that new regime didn't possess the power to impose this

War against Germany and Austria had brought Russia to the point of economic collapse

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Decree on Land and on Workers' Control

Immediately after coming to power, new government introduced 2 measures

usually these measures are regarrded as having initiated Bolshevik economic policy

These were both issued in November 1917

Decree gave Bolshevik approval to what had happened in countryside since February revolution

In many areas, peasants had overthrown their landlords and occupied their property

Decree on Workers' Control largely concerned with authroising what had already occurred

During 1917, large number of factories had been taken over by workers

Workers' committees that were then formed rarely ran the factories efficiently

this resulted in serious fall in industrial output

decree accepted workers' takeover but instructed workers' committee to maintain strict order and discipline in the workplace

In December, Vesenka was set up "to take charge of all existing institutions for the regulation of economic life"

Presided over a number of important developments such as banks being nationalised, foreign debts being cancelled and transport less chaotic

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Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly

Lenin never worried much about how many people supported the Bolsheviks

Numbers did not concern him

He had no faith in democratic elections

Primary objective was not to obtain mass support but create a capable party to seize power when the opportune moment came

After successful October 1917 coup, Lenin was dtermined not to allow elections to undermine Bolsheviks' new power

October Revolution had come too late to prevent elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly

When results came through by the end of the year, the results weren't pleasing for the Bolsheviks

Lenin had originally supported idea of a Constituent Assembly because it offered a way of weakening the Provisional Government that had replaced the tsar in February 1917

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Reasons for dissolution

Lenin's first act of violence in January 1918 has to be viewed in context

Bolshevik's hold on power was precarious

Prospects of Bolshevik survival seemed slim

Strong and widespread opposition in the country

Russia was still at war with Germany

Allies were all set to interfere should Russian government make a separate peace

Bolsheviks not prepared to consider power sharing in this atmosphere

Lenin justified Bolshevik action by arguing that original reason for electing an Assembly had been achieved by creation of sovite government in October Revolution

Lenin claimed it was corrupt and that elections had been rigged by the SRs and the Kadets

Desperately vulnerable position the Bolsheviks were in, surrounded by enemies on all sides, demanded the sternest of measures

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The Russian Civil War 1918-20

A class war?

conflict began in summer of 1918

was principally a military struggle between Bolsheviks (Reds) and their political enemies (the Whites)

Included parties who had been outlawed or suppressed by the new regime and monarchists looking for tsarist restoration

Bolsheviks presented the struggle as a class war, was never simply this

War Communism (1918-21)

By 1921, combination of requisitioning, drought and general disruption of war had created a national famine

grain harvests of 1920 and 1921 produced less than half that gathered in 1913

Matters became desperate for the Bolsheviks to the extent they wre prepared to admit there was a famine and also accept foreign assistance

outstanding contribution from America provided food for 10 million Russians

Lenin resented having to accept aid and ordered the American Relief Association to withdraw from Russia in 1923 after 2 years work there

Lenin positively welcomed the famine as providing an opportunity to increase his attack on the Orthodox Church

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War Communism (1918-21)

End of War Communism:

By 1921, grim economic situation undermined original justification for War Communism

During its operation, industrial and agricultural production had fallen alarmingly

Didn't mean policy became unpopular among Bolsheviks themselves

There were many who believed War Communism represented true revolutionary communism

They saw it as true socialism in action as it involved:

Centralising of industry

ending of private ownership

the persecution of peasants

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The New Economic Policy (NEP)

NEP was intended by Lenin to meet Russia's urgent need for food

War Communism had failed to deliver the goods

State terror had not forced the peasants into producing larger grain stocks

Lenin judged that if peasants could not be forced, they must be persuaded

Despite deep agreements that would emerge in the Bolshevik Party over the NEP, the grim economic situation in Russia led the delegates giving unanimous support to Lenin's proposals when they were first introduced

Decree making NEP offocial government policy was published in Spring 1921

Essential features were:

Central economic control to be relaxed

Requisitioning of grain to be abandoned and replaced by a tax in kind

Peasants were to be allowed to keep food surpluses and sell them for a profit

public markets were to be restored

money to be reintroduced as a means of trading

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The New Economic Policy (NEP)

Lenin aware that new policy marked a retreat from the principle of state control of the economy

restored a mixed economy in which certain features of capitalism existed alongside socialism

knowing how uneasy it made Bolsheviks, Lenin stressed the NEP was only a temporary concession to capitalism

Adoption of NEP showed that Bolshevik government since 1917 was unable to create a successful economy along purely idelogical lines

Lenin told party members it made no sense for Bolsheviks to pretend they could pursue an economic policy which didn't take the circumstances into account

Lenin's realism demanded that political theory took second place to economic necessity

Was this that troubled members such as Trotsky

Disturbed them that the peasants were being given in to and that capitalist ways were being tolerated

a main complaint was that the reintroduction of money and private trading created a new class of profiteers whom they called "Nepmen"

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The New Economic Policy (NEP)

Party Unity

NEP become contentious issue among Bolsheviks that Lenin took firm steps to prevent the party being torn apart over it

Object of his proposal was to prevent "factions" within the Party from criticising government or Central Committee decisions

Accompanying resolution condemned the "Workers Opposition" which was a group that had been heavily involved in the Kronstadt Rising

2 resolutions on party unity provided a highly effective means of stifling criticism of the NEP

At same time as Lenin condemned factionalism, he also declared all political parties other than Bolsheviks now outlawed in Soviet Russia

Lenin's annoucements made it extremely difficult for doubting members to criticise NEP openly since this would seem to be challenging the Party itself

Bukhrain believed that the greater income the peasants would have, the industry would stimulate industry since their extra money would be spent on buying manufactured goods

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The New Economic Policy (NEP)

Success of the NEP

Most convincing reason for the party to accept the NEP proved to be a statistical one

production figures suggested that the policy worked

By the time of Lenin's death in 1924, Soviet economy begun to make amarked recovery

Lenin's claim that under the NEP, Bolsheviks would still control the "commanding heights of the economy"

NEP produced an economic blance, while trade and agriculture were largely in private hands, the State dominated Russian industry

NEP was not a total success

It's opponents criticised it on the grounds that the balance appeared to have achieved was notional rather than real

Fact that industry failed to expand as quickly as agriculture

Nepmen may have done well but there was high unemployment in urban areas

NEP would continue to be a matter of division among the Bolsheviks long after Lenin's death

Despite disputes, remained official Soviet policy until finally jettisoned by Stalin in 1928 by introducing collectivisation schemes

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Soviet Society under Lenin

Culture and the arts

In Russia after the Revolution there was much talk of creating a new type of human being

claim was that the Bolshevik triumph had liberated the people from the weaknesses that had tainted preious societies

people were now ready to be moulded into a new species

Lenin reported to have said "man can be made whatever we want him to be"

Trotsky claimed that the aim of the Communist State was to "produce a new, improved version of man"

critical aspect of what Lenin and Trotsky believed was that this process would not happen of its own accord

it would have to be directed and people would have to be moulded, culture would have to be shaped

result was, after a brief period of artistic freedom, culture came under State control

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Religion under Lenin

Having come to power, Lenin put the Marxist notion that religion was "the opium of people" into action

Revolutionary Russia was to be a secular state with no place for organised religion

this intention was declared in the Decree on Separation of Church and State

the measure had 2 aims

1) to break the hold of the clergy

2) to undermine the religious faith of the peasants for whom the Bolsheviks had a particular distaste as representing the most backward features of old Russia

the main terms of the decree were

Church properties wree no longer to be owned by the clergy but by local Soviets from whom churches would have to be rented for public worhsip

clergy were no longer paid salaries or pensions by the state

Church was no longer to have a central organisation with authority over local congregations

Religious teaching was forbidden in schools

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Women and the family

Firm Marxist belief that women were abused under capitalism

principal instrument of their subjection was marriage

one sided social contract turned women into victims since it made them property of their husbands

in the 2 years after 1917, decrees had been introduced which included innovations such as:

legal divorce if either partner requested it

recognitions of illegitmate children as full citizens

legalisation of abortion

the state responsible for the raising of children

these changes derived from the notion that "love" was a bourgeois concept based on a false view of relations between sexes and parents and children

believed that once such romantic nonsense was recognised for what it was, a structured and ordered society would follow

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Lenin's legacy

Between 1922 and 1924, Lenin suffered a series of strokes which left him partially paralysed and unable to speak

he had no opportunity to prepare for his succession due to his ill state during the last 2 years of his life

gave no clear indication of the type of government that should follow him

problem was that Lenin not only failed to name a replacement but also prevented other choices being made by pointing out weaknesses in all other likely candidates in Lenin's testament

In his last writings in 1923, he warned comrades against allowing the party and government to lose their revolutionary character

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Authoritarianism

This was Lenin's greatest legacy to Soviet Russia

he returned Russia to the absolutism that it had known under the tsars

In that sense, Bolshevism was a continuation and not a break with Russia's past

Main tresults of Lenin's authoritarian rule after 1917 were:

a one party state - all parties other than Bolsheviks had been outlawed

Bureaucratic state - despite Bolsheviks' original belief in withering away of the State, central power increased under Lenin and number of government institutions and officials grew

Policy state - the Cheka was the first of a series of secret police organisations in Soviet Russia whose task was to impose government control over the people

Ban on factionalism - prevented criticism of leadership within the party. Was in efect a prohibition of free speech

Destruction of trade unions - with Lenin's encouragement, Trotsky had destroyed the independence of trade unions

Politicising of law - under Lenin law not operated as means of protecting society and the individual but an extension of political control

system of purges and show trials were to become a notorious feature of Stalinism

concentration camps - developed as part of the Red Terror

Prohibition of public worship - Orthodox churches had been looted then closed

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Stalin's Rise to Power 1924-9

The Roots of Stalin's Power

Historians used to accept that Stalin's career pre- 1924 was unimportant

Stalin was very highly regarded by Lenin and played a central role in the Bolshevik Party

before 1917, Bolshevik Party had been only a few thousand strong

Lenin had known the majority of members personally

He had been impressed by Stalin's organising ability and willingness to obey orders

Once described him as "that wonderful Georgian"

with Lenin's backing, Stalin had risen by 1912 to become 1 of the 6 members of the Central Committee

Had also helped to found the Party's newspaper, Pravda

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Stalin's Rise to Power 1924-9

October Revolution and Civil War

Having spent the war years in exile in Siberia, Stalin returned to Petrograd in March 1917

His role in the October Revolution is difficult to disentangle

Official accounts were a mixture of distortion and invention

Stalin was loyal to Lenin after the latter's return to Petrograd in April 1917

Lenin instructed the Bolsheviks to abandon all cooperation with other parties and to devote themselves to preparing a seizure of power

As a Leninist, Stalin was opposed to "October Deserters" such as Kamanev and Zinoviev

Stalin's non-Russian background proved invaluable during periods of crisis and civil war

Lenin believed that Stalin was well qualified for the role of Commissar for Nationalities as he was Georgian

As Commissar, Stalin became ruthless Bolshevik organiser for whole of Caucasus region during Civil War from 1918-1920

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Stalin's Rise to Power 1924-9

Lenin's Testament

Although Stalin had been totally loyal to Lenin, there were 2 particular occasions when he had aroused Lenin's anger

After the end of the civil war, Stalin had been off hand and dismissive in discussions with the representatives from Georgia

Lenin had to intervene personally to prevent the Georgians leaving angrily

On another occasion, the matter was more personal

Stalin called Lenin's wife a whore

the very day that Lenin was informed of this, he dictated his testament as a direct response

his main criticism was that Stalin has "concentrated enormous power in his hands"

In a later post-script, Lenin stressed Stalin's rudeness which was unacceptable in a General Secretary who had to be a person of fact to prevent divisions developing within the Party

Lenin was too ill during the last year of his life to be politically active and at his death had taken no formal steps to remove Stalin with the Testament not being made public

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Stalin's Rise to Power 1924-9

Stalin's position in 1924

In the uncertain atmosphere following Lenin's death, number of pieces of luck helped Stalin promote his own claims

would be wrong to ascribe his success wholly to good fortune

the luck had to be used

where he may have lacked brilliance, he didn't lack ability

qualities of perseverance and willingness to undertake laborious admin work were suited to the times

Government of Russia had 2 main features, Council of Peoples' Commissars and the Secrettariat

Both bodies were staffed and controlled by the Bolshevik Party

As government grew in scope, certain posts previously considered insignificant began to provide their holders levers of power

had not ben the intention

in this context, Stalin's previous appointments to key posts in both government and Party proved vital

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Stalin's Rise to Power 1924-9

Stalin's position in 1924

Stalin's positions were

Liaison officer between Politburo and Orgburo, this placed him in a unique position to monitor both Party's policy and Party's personnel

Head of Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate. This position entitled him to oversee the work of all government departments

General Secretary of the Communist Party

this enabled him to build up personal files on all members of the Party

nothing of note happened that Stalin did not know about

Lenin enrolment

Stalin gained advantage of recent changes in the structure of the Communist Party

Between 1923-1925, Party set out to increase number of true proletarians in its ranks

Resulted in membership rising from 340,000 in 1922 to 600,000 in 1925

new members predominantly poorly educated and politically unsophisticated but fully aware that priveleges that came with party membership

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Stalin's Rise to Power 1924-9

Attack on factionalism

Another lasting feature of Lenin's period that proved to be of great value to Stalin was what was known as the "attack upon factionalism"

Referred to Lenin's condemnation in 1921 of divisions within the Party

What this rejection of factionalism did was frustrate any seriuos attempt to criticise Party decisions or policies

Became exremely difficult to mount legitimate opposition with the CPSU

Stalin benefited greatly by the ban on criticism of the Party line

The Lenin legacy

was an accompanying factor that legitimised Stalin's position

Stalin became heir to the "Lenin legacy"

This meant the tradition of authority and leadership Lenin had established during his lifetime

Lenin became a godly figure

If a party member could assume the mantle of Lenin and appear to carry on his work would establish a formidable claim to power, which is what Stalin began to do

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The Power Struggle after Lenin's Death

Lenin's funeral

Immediately after Lenin's death, the Politburo publicly proclaimed their intention to continue as a collective leadership

Behind the scenes, competition for individual authority had already begun

Stalin gained advantage by being the one to deliver the oration at Lenin's funeral

Sight of Stalin as leading mourner suggested continuity between him and Lenin

Trotsky was absent from the funeral

Was difficult to understand why he didn't appreciate the importance of appearances following Lenin's deaht

Trotsky claimed Stalin told him the wrong date for the funeral but this was untrue

Trotsky was well aware of the danger that Stalin represented

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The Power Struggle after Lenin's Death

Trotsky's character

Trotsky had a complex personality

One of the figures in history who can be said to have been their own worst enemy

Despite gifts and intellectual brilliance he had weak features which undermined his chances of success

He suffered from a severe lack of judgement at times

A possible reluctance is that he was Jewish

Trotsky knew that Russia had a deeply ingrained anti-Semitism

His race therefore made him an outsider

Example of this is when he rejected the post of Deputy Chairman from Lenin

Suppression of Lenin's testament

was a dangerous hurdle in Stalin's way

if it were to be published, Stalin would be gravely damaged by it's contents

however, other members would be effected

nearly all members of the Politburo had reason for suppressing the Testament

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The Power Struggle after Lenin's Death

Attitudes towards Trotsky

Kamanev and Zinoviev joined Stalin in an unofficial triumvirate within the Politburo

their aim was to isolate Trotsky by exploiting his unpopularity with large sections of the Party

The new proletarian members were hardly the type of men to be impressed by the cultured Trotsky

Attitude of Party members towards Trotsky was an important factor in the weakning of his position

Trotsky was flamboyant and brilliant while his rival unspectacular and methodical

Trotsky was the type of person who attracted either admiration or distaste but seldom loyalty

Never matched comparable political support to Stalin

Trotsky failed to build a power base within the Party which gave him the appearance of an outsider

the fact that he was previously a Menshevik also didn't help his cause greatly

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The Power Struggle after Lenin's Death

Bureaucratisation

Despite attacks upon him, Trotsky attempted to fight back

Issue he chose was bureaucratisation

defined this as the abandonment of genuine discussion within the party and the growth in the centralised power of the Secretariat

Trotsky had good reason to think he had chosen a powerful cause

in Lenin's last writings, he had warned the Party against the creeping dangers of bureaucracy

Trotsky's condemnation of the growth of bureaucracy coupled with an appeal for a return of Party democracy

expanded his arguments in a series of essays, in one of which he criticised Kamanev and Zinviev for their past disagreements with Lenin

Assault was ill judged as it invited retatliation

His Menshevik past and diversion of Leninism were highlighted in a number of books and pamphlets

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The Power Struggle after Lenin's Death

The NEP

Trotsky's reputation was further damaged by the issue of the NEP

Lenin had introduced it as a replacement for the severe economic controls known as War Communism

Lenin admitted the NEP was a relaxing of strict socialism but indicated that he regarded it as temporary

At the time of his death, question was being asked whether the NEP was to last indefinitely

Unhappy party members saw its continuation as a betrayal of the revolutionary principle

objected to the policy of giving preferntial treatment to the peasantry

they argued that the peasants were being allowed to slow down the pace of Soviet Russia's advance of a truly prolerarian state

Critics of NEP broadly referred to as Left Communists while those who supported it known as Right Communists

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The Power Struggle after Lenin's Death

Modernisation

NEP debate was 1 aspect of how the Soviet Union should plan for the future

This would have been a demanding issue regardless of whether there had been a power struggle

If the USSR were to modernise and overcome its poverty it would have to industralise

recent history had shown a strong industrial base was essential for a modern state

quarrel was not over whether the USSR should industrialise but over the speed at which it did it

Russia was rich in natural resources but these had yet to be effectively exploited

Bolsheviks had been willing to borrow however few countries after 1917 were willing to risk the dangers of investing in revolutionary Russia

Only usable resource therefore was the Russian people themselves, 80% of whom were peasants

if Soviet Union was to industrialise it would have to be by persuading the peasant population to produce a food surprlus that could be sold abroad to raise capital for industrial investment

Both Left and Right agreed this was the only solution

The Right was content on persuasion whereas the Left demanded that the peasantry be forced into line

It was Trotsky who most clearly represented the view of the Left on this

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The Power Struggle after Lenin's Death

"Permanent Revolution"

What inspired Trotsky's politics was his belief in Permanent Revolution which was made up of a number of key ideas

Revolution was not a single event but a permanent and continuous process in which risings took place from coutnry to country

events in Russia since 1917 were simply a first step towards a worldwide proletarian revolution

individual nations did not matter, it was the interests of the international working class that were paramount

true revolutionary socialism could be achieved in the USSR only if an international uprising took place

Trotsky believed that the USSR couldn't survive alone in a hostile world

With the vast population and undeveloped proletariat,, Russia would prove incapable of "holding her own against conservative Europe"

Contended that immediate task of the USSR was to "export revolution" which would be the only way to guarantee its survival

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The Power Struggle after Lenin's Death

Socialism in One Country

Stalin countered Trotsky's notion of Permanent Revolution with his own concept of Socialism in One Country

this meant that the nation's first task was to consolidate Lenin's revolution and the rule of the CPSU by turning the USSR into a modern state

Soviet Union must therefore work:

to overcome present agricultural and industrial problems by its own unaided efforts

to go on to build a modern state equal of any nation in the world

to make the survival of the Soviet Union an absolute priority even if this meant suspending efforts to create international revolution

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The Defeat of Trotsky and the Left

Kamanev and Zinoviev

Kamanev and Zinoviev were motivated by a personal dislike of Trotsky who had tried to embarrass them by reminding the Party of their failure to support Lenin in October 1917

With Trotsky weakened, Stalin turned to the problem of dealing with these 2 key figures who could be seen as potential rivals

They created a trap for themselves

Zinoviev called for the NEP to be abandoned and for restrictions to be reimposed on the peasants along with enforced industrialisation

Their view formed the basis of what was termed the United Opposition but appeared to be indistinguishable from old Trotskyism

Stalin's control of the Party machine proved critical

Stalin and supporters combined to outvote the bloc and Kamanev and Zinoviev were dismissed from their posts as Soviet Chairmen to be replaced by 2 of Stalin's staunchest allies, Molotov and Kirov

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The Defeat of Trotsky and the Left

Trotsky exiled

Trotsky still did not admit defeat

in 1927, on the 10th anniversary of the Bolshevik rising, he tried to rally support in a direct challenge to Stalin's authority

Even fewer members of Congress than before were prepared to side with hiim and he was again outvoted

Complete failure led to acceptance by Congress of Stalin's proposal that Trotsky be expelled from the Party altogether

Internal exile order against him in 1927 was followed 2 years later by total exile from the USSR

Stalin's victory over Trotsky was not primarily a matter of principle

Stalin won because Trotsky lacked a power base

Trotsky had greater intellectual gifts and was a superior speaker and writer but it counted for little against Stalin's grip of the Party machine

Difficult to see how Trotsky could mount a serious challenge against his rival after 1924

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The Defeat of the Right

Major representatives of the Right were Rykov, Tomsky and Bukharin who loyally served Stalin in his outflanking of Trotsky and the Left

Politically the Right were by no means as challenging to Stalin as the Trotskyite bloc had been

What made Stalin move against them was that they stood in the way of industrial and agricultural schemes that he began to implement in 1928

Having defeate the Left politically he may have felt free to adopt their economic policies

For some time it had been the view of Bukharin and the Right that it was unnecessary to force the pace of industrialisation in the USSR

argued it would be less disruptive to let industry develop its own momentum

peasants should not be controlled and oppressed as this would make them resentful and less productive

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The Defeat of the Right

Weaknesses of the Right

Ideas

their economic arguments were not unsound but they appeared timid and unrealistic

plea for soft line with peasants did not accord with the needs ot the Party

Stalin able to suggest that the Right were guilty of underestimating crisis facing the Party and the Soviet Union

Organisation

Difficulty experienced by the Right in advancing their views was the same as that which had confronted the Left

Bukharin and his colleagues wanted to remain good Party men and it was this sense of loyalty that weakened them in their attempts to oppose Stalin

Support

Right only had substanial support in the trade unions

Stalin acted quickly and decisively when he realised there might be a sourcce of opposition

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Stalin and the Soviet Economy

Revolution from above

In theory, 1917 had been a revolution from below

Bolshevik led proletariat had begun the construction of a state in which the workers ruled

Bukharin and the Right had used this notion to argue that the economy should be left to develop at its own pace without interference from the government

Stalin's economic programme ended such thinking

Under Stalin, State control was to be total

Modernisation

Would be wrong to regard Stalin's policy as a matter of political expediency

Became convinced that the needs of Soviet Russia could only be met by modernisation

This meant bringing his economically backward nation up to a level of industrial level that would enable it to catch up with and overtake advanced economies of western Europe and the USA

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Stalin and the Soviet Economy

Collectivisation

Stalin judged that the only way to raise money for Soviet industry was to use the land

First step towards this was collectivisation of Russian agriculture

involved taking land from peasants and giving it all to the State

Peasants would no longer farm the land for their individual profit

they would pool their efforts and receive a wage

2 types of farm

Collectivisation was defined as the setting up collective and state farms in order to squeeze out all capitalist elements from the land

little difference between the 2, both types were to be means by which private peasant ownership would be ended and agriculture made to serve the interests of the Soviet state

Reckoned that efficient farming would have 2 vital results

it would create surplus food supplies that could be sold abroad and decrease number of rural workers needed

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Stalin and the Soviet Economy

The Kulaks

Stalin claimed that was "voluntary" when he introduced collectivisation

truth was it was forced on a very reluctant peasantry

in a major propaganda offensive, identified class of Kulaks who were holding back workers' revolution by monpolising best land and employing cheap peasant labour to farm it

unless they were broken as a class, they would prevent the modernisation of the USSR

Kulaks in no sense constituted the class of exploiting landowners described in Stalinist propaganda

Notion of a Kulak class was a very powerful one and provided the grounds for the coercion of the peasantry as a whoel

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Stalin and the Soviet Economy

De-Kulakisation

In some regions the poorer peasants undertook de-Kulakisation with enthusiasm as it provided them with an excuse to settle old scores and give vent to local jealousies

Land and property were seized from the minority of better-off peasants and they and their families were physically attacked

Renewal of terror served as a warning to the mass of peasantry of the likely consequences of resisting the State reorganisation of Soviet agriculture

Destruction of the Kulaks was an integral part of the collectivisation process

Resistance to collectivisation

In period between December 1929 and March 1930, nearly half the peasant farms in USSR were collectivised

Peasants in their millions resisted

Civil war broke out in the countryside

many of peasants were allowed to return to their orginial holdings

having cleared his name, Stalin restarted collectivisation in a more determined way

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Stalin and the Soviet Economy

Upheaval and starvation

Behind remarkable figures lay the story of a massive social upheaval

peasants either would not or could not co-operate in the deliberate destruction of their traditional way of life

consequences were increasingly tragic

majority of peasants ate their seed corn and slaughtered their livestock

there were no crops left to reap or animals to rear

Soviet authorities responded with fiercer coercion which made thins worse

Special contingents of party workers were sent from the towns to restore food production levels by working on the land themselves

their ignorance of farming only added to the disruption

little grain that was available was exported as surplus to obtain foreign capital that industry demanded

by 1932, situation on the land was catastrophic

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Stalin and the Soviet Economy

The success of collectivisation

the overall picture remained bleak

the mass peasantry had been uprooted and left bewildered

despite several severe reprials and coercion, peasants were unable to produce the surplus food that Stalin demanded

by 1939, Soviet agricultural productivity had barely returned to the elvel recorded for Tsarist Russia in 1913

Most demanding consideration remained the man made famine which killed between 10-15 million peasants in the 1930s

Industrialiation

Stalin described industrialisation plans for the USSR as an attempt to establish a war economy

declared that he was making war on the failings of Russia's past and on the class enemeis within the nation

claimed he was preparing USSR for war vs capitalist foes abroad

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Stalin and the Soviet Economy

Industrialisation continued

Stalin regarded iron, steel and oil as the sinews of war

their successful production would guarantee the strength andd readiness of the nation to face its enemeis

For Stalin, industry meant heavy industry

he believed that the industrial revolutions which made Western Europe strong had been based on iron and steel production

USSR would do this by following the path of socialism

Stalin had grounds for optimism

Happened that Soviet industrialisation drive coincided with the Depression in the Western world

Soviet industrialisation under Stalin took the form of a series of Five Year Plans

Process began in 1928 and lasted until Stalin's death in 1953

there were 5 separate plans in total

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Stalin and the Soviet Economy

The First Five Year Plan 1928-32

First FYP laid down what was to be achieved but didn't say how it was to be done

Simply assumed that quotas would be met

First FYP represented set of targets rather than a plan

Local officials and managers falsified production figures to give the impression that their targets had been met

For this reason, precise statistfics are hard to determine

Stalin encouraged the formulation of an "optimal" plan which reassessed targets upwards

New quotas hopelessly unrealistic and stood no change of being reached

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Stalin and the Soviet Economy

The first FYP

Propaganda

importance of these figures should not be exaggerated

at the time it was the grand design and not the detail that mattered

Plan was a huge propaganda project and aimed at convincing the Soviet people they were personally engaged in a vast industrial enterprise

There was enthusiasm and a commitment among the Soviet citizens and they believed that they were building a new and better world

Cultural revolution

this term is an appropriate description of the singificance of what was being undertaken under Stalin's leadership

This period was seen as a real attempt to create a new type of individual, as if a new species had come into being

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Stalin and the Soviet Economy

The First FYP

Successes and achievements

First FYP was an extraordinary achievement overall despite rigged figures

coal, iron and electrical power supply all increased in huge proportions

production of steel and chemicals less impressive

output of finished textiles declined

striking feature of plan was low priority given to improving material lives of Soviet people

no effort made to reward workers by providing them with affordable goods

Living conditions deteriorated in this period

Accommodation in the towns and cities remained sub-standard

Soviet authorities' neglect of basic social needs was not accidental

Plan never aimed to raise living standards and it's purpose was collective, not individual

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The second and third FYPs

Although 2nd and 3rd FYPs were moddelled on the pattern of the first, the targets set for them were more realistic

they still revelead the same lack of co-ordination as seen in the first

over-production occurred in some parts of the economy with under-production in others

this often resulted in whole branches of industry being held up for lack of vital supplies

hardest struggle was to sustain a proper supply of materials which led to fierce competition between regions and sectors of industry

complaints about poor standards were frequent

Scapegoats

reluctance to tell the full truth hindered genuine industrial growth

no one was willing to admit an error in planning and as a result faults went unchecked till serious breakdowns occurred

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Stalin and the Soviet Economy

The Stakhanovite Movement, 1935

Party control of newspapers, cinema and radio meant that only a favourable view of the Plans was ever presented

Official line was that all was well and workers were happy

Support for this claim was provided by the Stakhanovite movement which was exploited by authorities to inspire or shame workers into raising their production levels

claimed in August 1935 that Alexei Stakhanov had produced in one 5 hour shift over 14 times his requiredd quota of coal

this was seized on by the authorities as a glorious example of what was possible in a Soviet Union guided by Stalin

Workers' rights

After 1917, Russian trade unions had become powerless

no distinction between interests of government and workers in a truly socialist state

Under Stalin's industrialisation programme any semblence of workers' rights disappeared

Strikes were prohibited and traditional demands for better pay and conditions seen as selfishly inappropriate in a time of national crisis

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Stalin and the Soviet Economy

Strengths of the 2nd/3rd FYP

Statistics indicate a remarkable increasein production overall

in little over 12 years, coal production had grown 5 times, steel 6, oil output more than doubled

most impressive statistic: electricity generation quintupled

four key products provided basis for the military economy which enabled them to amass sufficient resources to turn the tables and drive the German army out of Soviet territory

Climax was the Soviet defeat of Germany in May 1945

Weaknesses

Soviet economy remained unbalanced

Stalin gave little thought to developing overall economic strategy

Modern industrial methods were also not adopted

Old, wasteful techniques such as massed labour rather than efficient machines continued to be used

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Stalin's Purges

The Early Purges

Having gained personal power in Soviet Union by 1929, Stalin spent the rest of his life consolidating and extending his authority

Purge was principal weapon for achieving this

Stalinist purges were not unprecedented and under Lenin in the early 1920s, tens of thousands of anti-Bolsheviks had been imprisoned in labour camps

public trials were a way of exposing industrial "saboteurs"

at an early stage, prosecutions had not been restricted to industrial enemies

Between 1933 and 1934, nearly 1 million members, over 1/3 of the total membership were excluded from the Party

Nature of the purges

at beginning, purges not as violent or deadly as they became

procedure involved handing in Party cards for checking and suspect individuals not having them returned

without cards, all priveleges were lost, threat of expulsion was enough to make members conform to official Party policy

Under this system, became more difficult to mount effective opposition

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Stalin's Purges

The Post-Kirov Purges 1934-6

Leningrad - December 1st 1934, Leonid Nicolaev walked into Communist Party HQ and shot dead Sergei Kirov who was the secretary of the Leningrad Soviet

Apparent motive was revenge; Kirov had been having an affair with killer's wife

Significance went beyond a jealous husband killing his wife's lover

strong probability Kirov's murder had been approved, if not planned by Stalin himself

Krushchev said in a secret speech that Stalin was almost certainly behind the murder

Whatever the truth concerning his involvement, was the case that the murder worked directly to his advantage

Kirov was a popular figure in the Party and had been elected to the Politburo

Known to be unhappy with the speed and scale of Stalin's industrialisation drive

Opposed extreme measures used to discipline Party members

Stalin feared he was an outstanding individual that opponents would form affective opposition with

within 2 hours of Kirov's murder, Stalin signed a Decree against terrorist acts which meant a fresh purge of the Party had begun, claiming wide circle of Trotskyites and Leftusts were resonsible for the murder

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Stalin's Purges

Party membership

Interesting coincidence that in 1934, his successful purge was made a great deal easier by the Lenin enrolment 10 years before

During the previous 3 years, in the "Stalin enrolment" the CPSU had recruited a higher proportion of skilled workers and industrial managers than at any time since 1917

Stalin encouraged this as tightening the links between the Party and those actually operating the first Five Year Plan

New members eagerly supported the elimination of the anti-Stalinist elements in the Party

It improved their own chances of promotion

Competition for good jobs in Soviet Russia was fierce and the purges always left spaces to be filled

Full scale purge that followed Kirov's murder was the work of Yagoda, head of the NKVD

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Stalin's Purges

Victims

Outstanding feature of the post-Kirov purge was the status of many of its victims

Prominent among these were Kamanev and Zinoviev who had formed the trumvirate after Lenin's death in 1924

At the time of their arrest, they were accused of engaging in opposition

this had no precise meaning therefore could not be answered

Arbitrary arrest and summary execution became the norm

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Stalin's Purges

The Great Purge 1936-9

Might be expected that Stalin's supremacy over the Party would mean the end of the purges, however they increased in intensity

Stalin declared that the Soviet Union was in a state of siege

1936- progressive terrorising of the Soviet Union began which affected the entire population

One time heroes of the 1917 Revolution and the Civil War were arrested, tried and imprisoned or executed as enemies of the State

Right, Left and Centre opposition blocs were established

Stalin's terror programme broke down into 3 sections

The purge of the Party

The purge of the armed services

The purge of the people

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Stalin's Purges

The purge of the Party

The purge of the Left

prelude to Great Purge of 1936 was a secret letter sent from CPSU HQ warning all local Party branches of terrorist conspiracy

Party officials were instructed to root out suspected agents and sympathisers

Once the campaign of denunciation and expulsion had been set in motion in country at large, Kamanev and Zinoviev were put on public trial in Moscow

charged with Kirov's murder and plotting to overthrow the Soviet State

Physical and mental torture was used and there was a sense of demoralisation at having been accused and disgraced by the Party

The fact that they confessed made it hard for other victims to plead their own innocent

Psychological impact of the confessions was profound

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Stalin's Purges

The purging of the Right

Next major strike was against the "Right deviationists", Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky were put under investigation but not formally charged

delay was caused by reluctance of some of the older Bolsheviks in the Politburo to denounce their comraddes

Stalin intervened personally to speed up the process

Yagoda was replaced by Yezhov as the Head of the NKVD

Meanwhile, case for proceeding vs Bukhrain and the Right was strengthened by revelations at a further show trial in 1937 during which 17 Communists were charged with spying for Nazi Germany

Yezhov and Vyshinsky had the evidence that they needed in order to put Bukhrain and Rykov on trial

fact that Yagoda was also accused showed the speed at which the terror was starting to consume its own people

In final speech in court, Bukharin showed extraordinary character of the Bolshevik mentality

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Stalin's Purges

Stalin Constitution 1936

particular irony attached to Bukharin's execution

years previously he had been principal draftsman of the new constitution of the USSR

1936 constitution which Stalin described as "the most democratic in the world" was intended to impress Western Communists and Soviet sympathisers

this was the period in Soviet foreign policy where in an effort to offset the Nazi menace of the USSR, Stalin was urging the formation of popular fronts with various left-wing groups in Europe

Among the things claimed in Constitution were that:

socialism had been established and there were no longer any "classes" in society

basic civil rights of freedom of expression, assembly and worhsip were guaranteed

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Stalin's Purges

The purge of the armed forces

significant development occurred in 1937 when the Soviet military came under threat

Stalin's control of USSR wouldn't be complete if the armed services continued as an independent force

essential that they be kept subservient

knowing that military loyalties might make a purge of the army difficult to achieve, Stalin took the step of organising transfers within the higher ranks to lessen the possibility of centres of resistance

When this was done, Vyshinsky announced that a "gigantic conspiracy" had been uncovered in the Red Army

in order to prevent a military coup, a secret trial was held and the charge was treason

Tukhachevsky and his fellow generals were shot

Reported that in some army camps, officers were taken away in lorry loads for execution

Soviet Navy also purged and Air Force similarly decimated with only 1 senior commander surviving

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Stalin's Purges

The purge of the people

Stalin's achivementt of the total dominance over Party, goverment and military didn't mark the end of the purges

Apparatus of terror was retained and the search for enemies continued

purges iused to achieve the goals of the FYPs

Purge also way of forcing the regions and nationalities into total subordination to Stalin

Show trials had taken place in Moscow and Leningrad and were repeated in all republics of the USSR

Mass repression

historians tended to concentrate on the central and dramatic features of the purges such as the show trials and the attack upon the Party and Red Army

no area of Soviet life escaped being purged and terror was elevated into a method of government

almost every family in the USSR suffered the loss of at least one of its members as a victim of the terror

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Stalin's Purges

Quotas

quotas of victims to be arrested were laid down like industrial production targets

people no longer regarded as individuals and it was the numbers and not the names that mattered

The terrorising of ordinary people had a specific purpose of frightening the USSR's national minories into abandoning lingering thoughts of challenging Moscow's control

Interrogators themselves became victims and joined those they had condemned in execution cells and labour cmaps

Concepts of innocence and guilt lost all meaning during the purges

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Stalin's Purges

The Later Purges

purges didn't end with the onset of war in 1941 or with coming of peace in 1945

had become an integral part of the Stalinist system of government

Stalin blamed military failures on internal sabotage and persecuted those held responsible

Emerged from the war harder in attitude towards Soviet people and more suspicious of the outside world despite alliances entered into by USSR

Soviet prisoners were executed on Stalin's orders and whole communities were made to suffer

Allies made the situation worse by agreeing that all realeased prisoners of war should be returned to their country of origin

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Stalin's Purges

The Leningrad Affair

as he grew older, Stalin became more suspicious of those around him

after 1947, dispensed with Central Committee and Politburo and removed semblance of limitation upon his authority

initiated another Party purge in 1949, the Leningrad Affair

leading Party and city officials were arrested and tried on charges of attempting to use Leningrad as an opposition base and shot

The doctors plot

Soviet Jews were the next section of the population to be selected for purging

Anti-Semitism was a long established tradition in Russia and was a factor in the last purge Stalin attempted

Early in 1953, officially announced from the Kremlin that a "doctors plot" had been uncovered in Moscow, asserted that Jewish dominated medical centre had planned to murder Stalin and other soviet leaders

plans started for major assault on Soviet medical profession but these were prevented by death of Stalin in March 1953