This new book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers which impose a moral duty on participants to respect each other's contributions. Moreover this collaborative task will often involve citizens taking an active role in their interaction with the law.

Critical human interests are affected on a daily basis by appeal to past decisions deemed to be 'legally valid'. They include statutes, deportation orders, judgments, mortgage contracts, patents and wills. Through the technique of validity, lawyerly reasoning settles morally pressing matters in a way that largely bypasses moral argument. Legal philosophy has paid considerable attention to validity criteria, but it has neglected to explore validity's point: whether, and if so how, the pervasive technique of validity can contribute to a legal system's ability to realise justice and human rights. This book shows that validity can help a political community to foster justice precisely because validity does not primarily turn on moral considerations. Validity serves to both allocate, and limit, a distinct kind of power, a power that is key to forging valuable forms of enterprise and commitment in pursuit of individual and collective self-direction. By entrusting the capacity to decide to those who, in justice, ought to bear it, validity can enable persons and institutions to rally the resources and opportunities that only large-scale behavioural convergence can afford, thereby weaving a fabric of just relationships within the systemic framework of law.

In this book Dimitrios Kyritsis advances an original account of constitutional review of primary legislation for its compatibility with human rights. Key to it is the value of separation of powers. When the relationship between courts and the legislature realizes this value, it makes a stronger claim to moral legitimacy. Kyritsis steers a path between the two extremes of the sceptics and the enthusiasts. Against sceptics who claim that constitutional review is an affront to democracy he argues that it is a morally legitimate institutional option for democratic societies because it can provide an effective check on the legislature. Although the latter represents the people and should thus be given the initiative in designing government policy, it carries serious risks, which institutional design must seek to avert. Against enthusiasts he maintains that fundamental rights protection is not the exclusive province of courts but the responsibility of both the judiciary and the legislature. Although courts may sometimes be given the power to scrutinize legislation and even strike it down, if it violates human rights, they must also respect the legislature's important contribution to their joint project. Occasionally, they may even have a duty to defer to morally sub-optimal decisions, as far as rights protection is concerned. This is as it should be. Legitimacy demands less than the ideal. In turn, citizens ought to accept discounts on perfect justice for the sake of achieving a reasonably just and effective political order overall.

‘This is an outline of a coherence theory of law. Its basic ideas are: reasonable support and weighing of reasons. All the rest is commentary.’ These words at the beginning of the preface of this book perfectly indicate what On Law and Reason is about. It is a theory about the nature of the law which emphasises the role of reason in the law and which refuses to limit the role of reason to the application of deductive logic. In 1989, when the first edition of On Law and Reason appeared, this book was ground breaking for several reasons. It provided a rationalistic theory of the law in the language of analytic philosophy and based on a thorough understanding of the results, including technical ones, of analytic philosophy. That was not an obvious combination at the time of the book’s first appearance and still is not. The result is an analytical rigor that is usually associated with positivist theories of the law, combined with a philosophical position that is not natural law in a strict sense, but which shares with it the emphasis on the role of reason in determining what the law is. If only for this rare combination, On Law and Reason still deserves careful study. On Law and Reason also foreshadowed and influenced a development in the field of Legal Logic that would take place in the nineties of the 20th century, namely the development of non-monotonic (‘defeasible’) logics for the analysis of legal reasoning. In the new Introduction to this second edition, this aspect is explored in some more detail.

NOW UPDATED TO 2004 - see Supplements"This book is much more than a casebook. It contains a wide range of materials, including excerpts from a broad range of writers and commentators. The contents of the book do provide, as the authors claim in their preface, 'the materials and commentary needed to understand the doctrines and theories behind the law'.More than that, it contains materials relevant to many questions of general interest such as the role of the courts, the appointment and removal of judges and the republican debate, to mention but a few.... Indeed it is surprising how much the authors have succeeded in including in the book."Sir Anthony Mason AC KBE, former Chief Justice, High Court of Australia, reviewing a previous edition.There are many changes incorporated in this new 3rd edition, includes:All developments in the law since the last edition (for example, Egan v Willis, the Hindmarsh Island Bridge case, the Tampa case, Sue v Hill, Breckler, the cross-vesting cases and the latest case law and legislation in the migration area)New scholarly works as extracts (eg, from the new Goldsworthy book on The Sovereignty of Parliament) and listed in the further readinga new section on the Fiji crisisnew material on citizenshipan expanded chapter on Indigenous issues, including the latest on Mabo and native title and the work of the Council for Aboriginal ReconciliationMore material reflecting the interaction between international law and the ConstitutionRevamped sections on the drafting and creation of the Constitution and Federation though to popular sovereigntyUpdated material on the Republic debate and the reconciliation processNew chapters to take into account the above developments and a streamlining of existing chaptersa new section on constitutionalism and revolutions

Southern Slaves in Free State Courts: The Pamphlet Literature. New York: Garland, 1988. 3 Vols. 1,704 pp. With a New Introduction by Paul Finkelman. Reprinted 2007, 2013 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. Set ISBN-13: 9781584777380. Set ISBN-10:1584777389. Hardcover. New. 34 Pamphlets reprinted in fascimile, in 3 volumes, with a New Introduction by Paul Finkelman: 1. Francis Hargrave. An Argument in the Case of James Sommersett aNegro, Lately Determined by the Court of King's Bench: Wherein it is Attempted to Demonstrate the Present Unlawfulness of Domestic Slavery in England. To Which is Prefixed a State of the Case. London, 1772. 82pp. 2. Edward Long. Candid Reflections Upon the Judgement Lately Awarded by the Court of King's Bench, in Westminster-Hall, on What is Commonly Called the Negro Cause, by a Planter. London, 1772. 76 pp. 3. Britannia Libera, or a Defence of the Free State of Man in England, Against the Claim of Any Man There as a Slave. London, 1772. 47 pp. 4. Samuel Estwick. Considerations on the Negro Cause Commonly so Called, Addressed to the Right Honorable Lord Mansfield. London, 1763. 96] pp. 5. A Letter to Philo Africanus, Upon Slavery; In Answer to His of the 22nd of November, in the General Evening Post, Together With the Opinions of Sir John Strange, and Other Eminent Lawyers Upon This Subject, With the Sentence of Lord Mansfield, in the Case of Somerset and Knowles, 1772, With His Lordship's Explanation of That Opinion in 1786. London, 1788. 40 pp. 6. John Haggard. The Judgment of the Right Hon. Lord Stowell, Respecting the Slavery of the Mongrel Woman, Grace, On An Appeal From The Vice-Admirality Court of Antigua. London, 1827. 50] pp. 7. Considerations on Certain Remarks on the Negro Slavery and Abolition Questions, in Lord Stowell's Judgment in the Case of the Slave "Grace." By a Briton. Newcastle, 1827. 18 pp. 8. Case of the Slave-Child Med. Report of the Arguments of Counsel and of the Opinion of the Court, in the Case of Commonwealth vs. Aves;Tried and Determined in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Boston, 1836. 40 pp. Please contact us for a complete list of titles contained in these three volumes. Originally published as a part of the series Slavery, Race, and the American Legal System, 1700-1872, this set contains facsimiles of 34 rare pamphlets relating to court cases involving the status of slaves in non-slave jurisdictions, including Somerset v. Stewart (1772) and Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857). As in the companion set Fugitive Slaves and American Courts, some pamphlets were part of the public debate over judicial decisions. Others used a case to promote the antislavery cause or, in some instances, support or justify slavery.

Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence is well established as the leading textbook on the subject. In this edition extracts have been selected from the works of more than a hundred jurists. These are supported by detailed introductory sections which give background and critical insight into the texts. This text brings together in one book a wide variety of materials which would otherwise be difficult to obtain. It also contains substantial text by way of commentary. This enables students and teachers worldwide to find, comprehend and evaluate the essential material in one of the most difficult and rewarding subjects in the syllabus.

'The many virtues of Constitutional Justice are evident throughout the piece. The author should be congratulated for even attempting to construct a normative theory of liberal constitutionalism... Constitutional Justice is a work that faithfully carries on the grand tradition of normative legal thought. No small task, and Allan succeeds admirably.' -Law and Politics Book ReviewThis book offers a systematic interpretation of the ideal of the rule of law, arguing that the principles it identifies provide the foundations of a liberal democratic legal order. It explains the essential connections between a range of matters fundamental to the relationship between citizen and state, including freedoms of speech and conscience, civil disobedience, procedural fairness, administrative justice, the right of silence, and equal protection or equality before the law. The principles of public law are interpreted in the light of liberal legal and political philosophy.Readership: Scholars and students of law, philosophy, and politics