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Thursday, August 25, 2016

Iraq's Parliament Ousts Defense Minister

Iraq’s Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi and his entire
cabinet are at risk of a no-confidence vote following Parliament’s ouster of
Sunni Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi.

The Situation

The Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) voted to
withdraw confidence in Sunni Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi on August 25.

The Reform Front, an opposition
party in the CoR driven by Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, has
spearheaded the process to oust Obeidi.

Obeidi attended the CoR on
August 1 for the questioning session, the prerequisite for a vote of
no-confidence. However during the interrogation, Obeidi accused
his rivals within Etihad of corruption during a questioning session on
August 1, including Speaker Juburi. The Federal Court acquitted Juburi
of the corruption charges on August
9. Following Juburi’s acquittal, Obeidi’s rivals requested to proceed to
the vote of no-confidence.

The CoR met on August 23 to consider
the vote of no-confidence. However, the CoR lost quorum when two parties, the
Sadrist Trend-affiliated Ahrar Bloc and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
(ISCI), walked out of the session.

The CoR met on August 25 to
take up the issue again and voted no confidence.

The vote was rendered by a simple majority, while the
Constitution stipulates that dismissing a minister requires a vote of absolute
majority.

The CoR announced
that Obeidi was dismissed; 142 CoR members voted against him, 102 voted
in support, and the rest of the 263 attending CoR members abstained.

142 members was enough for a
simple majority. The Iraqi Constitution (Article
61.8.A) mandates that a minister be dismissed on the basis of an absolute
majority, which is 165 CoR members.

A frequently-citied legal
expert and two State of Law Alliance (SLA) stated
that the requirements for removing a minister is a simple majority, contradicting
the Constitution that states that removing a minister requires an absolute
majority.

Context and Implications

Former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and the allied
Reform Front exploited internal rivalries within the Sunni political bloc to oust
Obeidi. The Sunni bloc remains vulnerable to further fracture.

The Sunni political bloc,
Etihad, is not unified. Obeidi’s party, Mutahidun, is a rival to the Iraqi
Islamic party, to which Speaker Salim al-Juburi belongs. Etihad has remained a
fixture in the CoR out of necessity to counter Shi’a political dominance, but
the parties are not cohesive.

Obeidi’s removal was partly a
self-inflicted casualty by Etihad. Obeidi accusations
against his rivals within Etihad, including Speaker Juburi, during his questioning
session on August 1, publically exposed a major rift between
senior Iraqi Islamic Party and Mutahidun leaders, with Mutahidun leader Osama
al-Nujaifi calling for Speaker Juburi’s removal.

The Reform Front is the shadow
political bloc that emerged after the parliamentary crisis in April 2016 in
which a rump Parliament formed and attempted to oust CoR Speaker Juburi. It is covertly led by former Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki.

The Reform Front exploited the
internal Sunni political rivalry that led to questioning Obeidi to generate the
necessary support to remove this key minister from PM Abadi’s government.

Maliki has attempted to regain
the premiership by weakening his political rivals. He targeted Obeidi to 1)
dismiss a key ally to Prime Minister (PM) Haidar al-Abadi and 2) weaken Etihad
as a force that could resist his influence in the CoR.

Obeidi’s removal leaves the
Iraqi Sunni political parties significantly weakened within the government.
Speaker Juburi, himself the target of persistent efforts by the Reform Front to
remove him from office, remains weak and vulnerable to a future no-confidence
vote.

Internal Sunni disagreements
and Obeidi’s removal could complicate national reconciliation efforts between
Iraq’s Sunnis and Shi’a, essential to long-term success following the potential
recapture of Mosul from ISIS.

The successor Defense
Minister could be a worse partner to the U.S. and anti—ISIS Coalition in Iraq.

Etihad will likely insist that
the Defense Ministry remain a Sunni position. However, the intra-Sunni fighting
will inhibit any consensus on a replacement candidate. Therefore, should a Sunni
candidate become Defense Minister, he will be weaker than his predecessor
because he will lack full political backing from the Sunni parties.

It is possible that a
compromised political figure may take the Defense Ministry, and may be more
receptive to Iranian interests than those of the U.S.

A Reform Front candidate or a
pro-Iranian Defense Minister chosen from a proxy group such as the Badr
Organization may restrict U.S. involvement in Iraq on the eve of major military
operations to retake Mosul.

All ministerial positions – including the Prime
Minister – are at risk if only a simple majority is required for no confidence,
should the judiciary uphold this reading of the constitution.

The precedence of dismissing a
minister with only a simple majority puts all weak ministers and allies of PM
Abadi at risk.

A simple majority can be as low
as 83 CoR members. The Reform Front, a Maliki support base, is in reach of the
numbers to consistently vote out ministers. Maliki could push through the
dismissal of any minister, provided that he is able to exploit political
differences to generate the numbers necessary to balance against opposition
blocs.

The CoR also began on August 25
to question Finance
Minister Hoshyar Zebari, the prerequisite for the vote of no-confidence. In
addition, CoR Speaker Salim al-Juburi remains a target of Reform Front
animosity and remains vulnerable to a no-confidence vote.

The precedence of simply
majority may also put the position of PM Haidar al-Abadi at risk. However, it
will be more difficult to achieve a consensus on a replacement for PM Abadi,
which would result in the collapse of government and trigger the process to
form a new government.

Iran and the U.S. have also made it clear that
they are not willing to see PM Abadi go, having blocked a previous attempt by
Maliki to oust him in April
2016. He will likely remain in his position, but severely weakened and
robbed of political support from allies.

Moving Forward

Iraq currently has no Minister of Defense or Minister
of Interior.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
are split between the Ministries of Defense and Interior. The ISF currently has
neither minister on the eve of the Mosul operation.

The former Minister of
Interior, Badr Organization member Muhammad al-Ghabban, resigned
on July 5, 2016 following the massive attack killing hundreds of civilians in
Baghdad’s Karrada neighborhood on July 3. The Interior Ministry is currently led
by a deputy minister aligned with the Badr Organization.

A minister is constitutionally deemed
resigned from his position on the date of the withdrawal of confidence. As with
the Minister of Interior, it will be PM Abadi’s responsibility to nominate an
acting Defense Minister until a new candidate is approved. To date, a candidate
for either the Defense or Interior Ministers has not been named.

The U.S. campaign to defeat ISIS by recapturing Mosul
is in jeopardy.

U.S. coordination will continue
through the Joint Operations Command (JOC).
However, Obeidi’s removal will likely diminish the U.S.’s ability to
effectively coordinate with the ISF on the eve of strategic anti-ISIS
operations in Mosul.

Political inability to fill the
vacant position will delay the timeline to recapture Mosul, and remaining
ISIS-held cities in Iraq. The U.S.’s intensive
lobbying effort among political parties to retain Obeidi in his position
failed, highlighting the limits of U.S. diplomatic influence within Iraq’s
shifting political environment.

PM Abadi’s position to resist
pro-Iranian overtures may be limited, especially if a Reform Front candidate, a
pro-Iranian candidate, or a non-professional candidate assumes the Defense
Ministry.

The U.S. may lose its ability
to operate in Iraq if a candidate opposed to the U.S. and Coalition presence in
Iraq assumes the position.

The fracturing of Sunni
political parties will prevent the reconciliation of Sunni populations to the
government, a requirement for strategic success.