BARRAGE BALLOONS
FOR LOW-LEVEL
AIR DEFENSE

THE United States and its NATO allies would be at a distinct disadvantage during
a conventional war in Europe: they lack numbers. They are outnumbered in the air and on
the ground. Yes, the debate over quantity versus quality continues, but the vast number of
Soviet aircraft and armored vehicles presents a major dilemma to the West. Specifically,
NATO faces a large number of Warsaw Pact attack aircraft whose primary objective is the
airfields target as important to the East to destroy as it is to the West to defend. The
West's potent ground-based antiaircraft system--consisting mainly of surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs)--can be countered by electronic jamming and especially bv low-level
flight. In fact, a highspeed, low-level attack at 100 feet or less makes NATO airfields
and other vital targets terribly vulnerable.1 If the West is to improve its
defenses against low-level air attack, it needs another element of the air defense
team--something that can enhance current antiaircraft weapons while providing an extra
measure of protection to crucial areas. That something is the barrage balloon.

Many people remember or have seen pictures of barrage balloons floating majestically in
the skies over England in mock peacefulness during World War II. These large, airborne
barriers protected important installations in both Great Britain and the United States
against low-level air attack. They complemented the existing air defense system
and--particularly in England--proved their worth an numerous occasions by helping to
thwart low-flying enemy aircraft. Barrage balloons disappeared after World War II as
newer, more sophisticated air defense weapons were introduced. The threat from low-flying
aircraft, however, continues to be a problem. Aerial barrages still offer a viable
deterrent against this form of attack, and we should use them. This article first examines
the current low-level threat and the limitations of SAMs. Then, after a brief historical
review of balloons in "combat," it discusses the utility of barrage balloons
today in helping to protect a vital NATO asset--the airfield.2

The Low-Level Threat
and SAM Limitations

Modern technology allows aircraft to fly high and fast, but it also permits them to fly
at very low altitudes--perhaps their most advantageous capability. Radar, antiaircraft
artillery (AAA), and particularly SAMs make today's air defenses extremely formidable, but
these systems are vulnerable to ultra-low-level attack by enemy aircraft. Because SAMs and
other antiaircraft systems are deadly to high-flying aircraft, both NATO and the Warsaw
Pact emphasize low-level attacks. This tactic helps negate the effect of SAMS, decreases
enemy response time, and enhances the element of surprise. For example, a MiG-27 can
complete a low-level flight from Berlin to Bitburg AB, West Germany, in only 30 minutes.3
Fast, low-flying strike aircraft present a serious problem to our air defenses, especially
in view of the large number of the Warsaw Pact's attack aircraft. Squadron Leader Peter D.
John of the Royal Air Force (RAP) elaborates on the low-level threat in his article
"Aerial Barrages to Enhance Airfield Defences":

Over the past 20 years, tactical strike/attack aircraft have been designed by the
Soviet Union and by western nations to deliver weapons from low-level, where they can
achieve surprise and pose most problems to defensive systems. The speed at which such
aircraft operate has been steadily increased, as has their capability to fly and drop
weapons from progressively lower levels: speeds of 400 to 500 knots at a height of 100
feet or less [emphasis added] are now regarded as standard operating parameters.
Facing NATO's Central Region, the WP (Warsaw Pact) deploys specialised ground attack
squadrons with the range to tackle targets in the UK as well as continental Europe.
Flogger D and Fencer are operational in large numbers, and the latter carries
terrain-avoidance radar to improve its ultra-low-level capability. These third-generation
aircraft pose a considerable threat to the survivability of NATO air forces during
a conventional war.4

The Falkland Islands War offers a solid example of the effectiveness of high-speed,
low-altitude tactics in negating SAMs. The Argentinians put most of their groundbased
antiaircraft weapons at Port Stanley and at the nearby airfield. Potentially very
dangerous, these defenses consisted of a Roland missile unit, three units of Tigercat
missiles, and a good sprinkling of Blowpipe shoulder-launched weapons as well as a
collection of 20-mm and 35-mm rapid-fire guns.5 The area seemed fairly well
protected, but the British still believed they could successfully attack this target.
Traveling at 550-600 knots, their Sea Harriers flew 50 feet above the ocean, successfully
completed the mission, and suffered no losses.6 During the course of the war,
British pilots flow even lower to break radar lock once their radar warning receiver
indicated SAM activation, Throughout the entire war, SAMs destroyed only two British
aircraft.7

Argentine pilots also used these tactics to good effect. When attacking British ships,
they flew "so low en route to their targets that salt water drops evaporated on their
windshields, obscuring vision."8 Against ground targets, they hugged
contours of the land to shield them against early warning systems and SAMs. In Lessons
of the South Atlantic War, Gen Sir Frank King stated that

with one exception, all aircraft which attacked ground forces flew at less than 100
feet, using the ground contours. They were seldom exposed to surveillance radars until at
a maximum of four kilometres range and there was often very little warning of their
approach. The problem was exacerbated by bad weather, low clouds, mist [and] low light
levels in valley bottoms for the last two to three hours of daylight.9

The Argentine air force scored some notable victories during the war despite the
400-mile flight from their bases on the mainland, a lack of coordination, defective bombs,
and a relatively strong British air defense system.

A good part of the British air defense consisted of Blowpipe shoulder-launched guided
missiles, and many people see such portable SAMs as the answer to the lowlevel threat.
Indeed, this lightweight, lowcost weapon offers flexibility of use in battle and is
available in large numbers. "Their main missions," according to Christian
Poechhacker, a Defense International Update writer, "are to ensure the
antiaircraft protection of units and sensitive locations, and to create above life battle
zone an airspace so insecure that the chances for survival of low and very low flying
aircraft will be extremely small."10 Unfortunately, this weapon may be
overrated for several reasons. First, the user must "eyeball" the target find
then align it in the optical sight. Visual conditions, then, are extremely important in
acquiring the target. Second, firing time is limited. The Blowpipe operator has
approximateIy 20 seconds to locate, acquire, and engage highspeed, low-flying aircraft,11
Because the aircraft can travel over three miles in those 20 seconds, it may be out of
range by the time the missile is ready to fire. The last disadvantage concerns the small,
one kilogram (kg) warhead, the standard weight for most portable SAMS. Poechhacker points
out that

a 1 kg warhead is not powerful enough to obtain a destructive effect when the missile
does not actually hit the target.... Experience in recent conflicts has revealed that if
large percentage of aircraft hit by missile warheads of about 1 kg have been able to
regain their bases. For example, a Super Etendard was able to return to its aircraft
carrier after being hit by an SA-7 while supporting French troops in Beirut in 1984.
Another lesson with the same SAM-type was learned in the Yom Kippur War, when almost half
of the Israeli A-4 Skyhawks hit by SA-7s returned to base.12

Even though the Blowpipe is armed with a 2-kg warhead, a combination of the other
factors still caused the British Blowpipe to perform rather poorly during the Falklands
war. Of the 100 Blowpipe missiles launched at the enemy, only nine destroyed their
targets,13 and those none successful strikes claimed only slow, low-flying
Pucará ground-attack aircraft and helicopters.14

Air defense weapons will improve--witness the excellent Stinger missile--but there is
no doubt that low-flying aircraft continue to be extremely difficult to combat. Their
performance in the Falkland Islands attests to that fact. Interestingly, the British had a
similar problem with low-flying enemy aircraft during World Wars I and II, but they
countered this threat by employing a wonderfully simple weapon--the barrage balloon.

The Barrage Balloon
Defined and Employed

The barrage balloon was simply a bag of lighter-than-air gas attached to a steel cable
anchored to the ground. The balloon could be raised or lowered to the desired altitude by
means of a winch. Its purpose was ingenuous: to deny low-level airspace to enemy aircraft.
This simple mission provided three major benefits: (1) it forced aircraft to higher
altitudes, thereby decreasing surprise and bombing accuracy; (2) it enhanced ground-based
air defenses and the ability of fighters to acquire targets,since intruding aircraft were
limited in altitudes and direction: and (3) the cable presented a definite mental and
material hazard to pilots.15 Many people think that a barrage balloon system
was designed to snare aircraft like a spider web capturing unwary flies. Not so. Any
airplanes caught in these aerial nets were a bonus; the real objective of the balloons was
to deny low-altitude flight to the enemy. Mindful of these capabilities, the British saw
the barrage balloon as a viable means to counter low-level attackers during the world
wars.

During the last years of World War I, the British employed the barrage balloon in
response to attacks by German Gotha bombers on London. Called an "apron," the
barrage consisted of three balloons 500 yards apart joined together by a heavy steel
cable.16 These balloons had an operational height of 7,000 to 10,000 feet, and
by June 1918 10 apron barrages shielded the northern and eastern approaches to the
capital.17 Although there is no record of these balloons ever directly bringing
down an enemy aircraft, they did permit British fighters and AAA to concentrate their
efforts in a smaller expanse of airspace (above 10,000 feet), and they prevented the
Gothas from flying low. The Germans themselves thought the barriers were very effective.
Gen Ernst Wilhelm von Hoeppner, the commanding general of the German airforce in World War
I, received a report stating that the balloons made attacks very difficult and would make
future raids on London virtually impossible if balloon defenses continued to improve.18
In fact, an increase of 3,000 feet in the operational height of the barrage balloons would
have effectively stopped German heavier-than air bombardment of London since the Gotha's
combat altitude was only 13,000 feet.19 Maj Gen Edward B. Ashmore, the London
air defense area commander, valued the barrage balloon system and the services of its
3,587 personnel.20 Although the barrage balloon flew for only a year in England
during World War I, it was a fully integrated component of the British air defense system
and performed its important mission very well.

The success of the barrage balloon in the First World War paved the way for its use in
the Second. This time, however, instead of a mere handful, thousands of balloons dotted
the British skies. Again, the balloons provided a partial solution in countering fast,
low-flying German bombers and fighters and in protecting key installations. The British
belief in an integrated air defense system meant using every viable air defense weapon for
self-protection--a combination that included the principal means of fighters, antiaircraft
artillery, and balloons. The only modification in balloon usage from World War I concerned
the apron concept. Instead, single balloons were used because they could be sent aloft
more quickly and were easier to operate. Thus, in 1936 with war clouds darkening the
horizons, the Committee of Imperial Defense authorized an initial barrage of 450 balloons
for the protection of London.21

With the capital securely covered, barrage balloons also flew at fleet anchorages and
harbors in threatened areas. Although airfields also requested them during the early
months of the war, the balloons were not available because of slow production and losses
due to combat and bad weather. However, thanks to a new balloon plant, the barrage system
had 2,368 balloons by the end of August 1940 and would maintain approximately 2,000
operational balloons until the end of the war.22

These numbers demonstrate the extent to which the British valued their balloons. They
even formed Balloon Command, an independent command under the leadership of Air Marshal
Sir E. Leslie Gossage, to control the 52 operational barrage balloon squadrons stationed
across Great Britain.23 Eventually, this command consisted of 33,000 men.24
The amount of equipment and the number of personnel, however, tell only part of the
story. Performance in combat is the principal indicator of a weapon system's success, and
the balloons received a thorough test during World War II.

During the Battle of Britain and throughout the war, balloons proved their worth, time
and again. Besides protecting strategic cities and ports, barrage balloons mounted in
boats defended estuaries against mine-laying aircraft. A declassified wartime report
assessed their performance: "Following the aerial sowing of mechanical mines, the
reallocation of various units of the balloon barrage system to places like the Thames
Estuary, and certain other channels, has resulted in effectively reducing the aerial mine
sowing operations of the German Air Force."25 Barrage balloon cables also
successfully frustrated German attempts to achieve surprise, low-level penetration at
Dover.

The Dover incident deserves elaboration because it provided, in the words of Air
Marshal Gossage, "a clear indication of their [the Germans'] respect for the British
balloon barrage."26 In an attempt to clear the balloons from Dover, the
Germans launched a major effort in late August 1940. They destroyed 40 balloons but lost
six aircraft in the process. Much to the Germans' chagrin, 34 new balloons appeared the
very next day. Air Marshal Gossage commented on the action: "The protective balloons
still fly over Dover. The attack on the barrage has proved too costly. . . . In general,
major attacks on balloon barrages have ceased, the enemy having realised that the game is
not worth the candle. The fact, however, that he hoped to destroy our balloons is in
itself proof of the utility of the barrage."27 During the height of the
blitz, 102 aircraft struck cables, resulting in 66 crashed or forced landings.28

After the Battle of Britain, balloons continued to prove their effectiveness in combat.
Because of heavy losses during the day, the Germans switched to night attacks. Defensive
night fighters were still in their rudimentary stages of development, so guns and balloons
had to do most of the work against German bombers. Even after advances in night-fighter
technology, it was the opinion of London that "balloons and guns were still
essential, not so much to bring the enemy down as to keep him up so that point blank
bombing was impossible."29 Two examples illustrate London's sentiments.
First, a recently installed aerial barrage at Norwich surprised the Germans and diffused
their bombardment by forcing them to attack above 8,000 feet.30 Second, the
barrage balloons at Harwich saved that city from an attack by 17 bombers because the
Germans went after their secondary target at Ipswich-Felixstowe, a place not protected by
balloons.31 Overall, balloons lessened the severity of night raids on England
by deterring point-blank bombing. Incidentally, they also had some tangible results in
February and March of 1941, in that seven enemy aircraft crashed after striking cables in
various parts of Great Britain.32

Even though German aerial activity over England gradually decreased, British balloon
activity did not. Balloon Command units accompanied troops in North Africa and Italy,
where they protected beachheads against low-level attack. Four thousand balloon personnel
even took part in the invasion of Normandy, crossing the channel on D-day to protect
artificial harbors, captured ports, and ammunition dumps of the Allies.33 But
perhaps the best example of "balloons in combat" occurred during the V-1
offensive against London in 1944. Once again, balloons were an integral part of the air
defense system and, in this case, formed the third and last line of defense against this
low-flying weapon. Approximately 1,750 balloons from all over Great Britain were amassed
around London, forming what one British officer called "the largest balloon curtain
in history."34 Although guns and fighters destroyed most of the V-1 bombs
(1,878 and 1,846, respectively), balloons were credited with 231 "kills."35
Basically, that was the last hurrah for British barrage balloons, and as the war gradually
wound down in 1945, so too were the balloons of Balloon Command.

Great Britain was not the only country interested in aerial barriers. Many Americans
would be surprised to know that the United States had its own extensive barrage balloon
defense during the early part of World War II. In fact, many areas of the West Coast had
"balloon curtains" protecting cities. factories, and harbors. By August 1942
approximately 430 balloons defended important areas in California, Oregon, and Washington
against low-level attack.36 Several balloon units were also sent overseas into
combat. In late 1943, for example, Army balloon batteries deployed to the fighting in the
Mediterranean.

The North African campaign covered a fairly large front, and, as expected, many areas
lacked sufficient air defenses. Balloons provided protection to several important ports,
effectively enhancing the existing antiaircraft defenses. For example, in August 1943 the
air defense region protecting Oran, Algeria, "requested 60 balloons for its sector in
order to discourage torpedo, dive bombing, and low level bombing attacks."37
By October 1943 three American barrage balloon batteries (each with 45 balloons) operated
in various ports in North Africa and Italy.38 When the port of Naples was
captured, a battery of balloons operated there as part of the overall protection of that
harbor from air attack. Naples was crucial to Allied operations in Italy: "Among
[Mediterranean] ports Naples was the most important in the Allied line of communications;
during January 1944 the port handled more tonnage than any other port in the world with
the exception of New York."39 Although it was close to the German lines
and received many air attacks, Naples had a solid air defense system and suffered only
slight damage. A Fifth Army antiaircraft officer stated that a good port defense consisted
of several elements, including an ample number of barrage balloons.40 The AAF Air
Defense Activities in the Mediterranean summarized balloon operations in that theater:
"Although American barrage balloons were not of primary importance in the Allied air
defense system, they were undoubtedly valuable as a supplementary device to fighter
aircraft and AA." 41

Barrage Balloons:
Their Applicability Today

British and American experiences with barrage balloons reveal two major facts: (1) the
low-level air threat is a continuing problem, and (2) barrage balloons can aid in
countering that threat. Therefore, it is rather surprising that aerial barrages are not
mentioned in the history books. Balloons would be just as useful today as they were in the
forties and would effectively complement the SAMs, rapid-fire AA guns, and fighters of the
modern air defense system. Based on the performance of barrage balloons during World War
II--when they successfully defended ports and factories from low-level attack--it seems
logical to protect one of NATO's most important installations--the airfield. The Soviets
fear the aerial might of the United States and its allies and will do everything possible
to destroy it quickly and completely. Therefore, a massive low-level attack on NATO air
bases, which many have called the Achilles' heel of air power, is a certainty. These
targets deserve extra protection, and barrage balloons offer that capability. As mentioned
earlier, the barrage balloon offers several distinct advantages that have been proven in
wartime: it denies the low altitude to enemy aircraft, enhances air defense systems, and
presents a definite mental and material hazard to the enemy pilot.

Strategically placed, balloons can easily and effectively deny low altitudes to the
attacker. Three locations warrant balloon protection. One would be the suspected ingress
routes located some distance, away from the airfield.42 Valleys, mountain
passes, rivers, and canals are only a few sites where barrage balloons could be
effectively placed at altitudes ranging from 300 to 1,000 feet. Next, some balloons could
be placed closer to the air base in small, irregular groupings. Peter D. John states that
"a staggered pair of lines, or small groups of randomly positioned balloons, would
provide a better obstacle than a single line of closely-spaced balloons."43 Experience
confirms his observation: balloons placed at irregular intervals and altitudes are
effective barriers, whereas all orderly arrangement of rows of balloons at uniform
altitude is easy to outflank or overfly. Finally, other balloons could be positioned
throughout the air base itself. Since the Warsaw Pact lacks large numbers of standoff
weapons, their aircraft must overfly the target to deliver their bombs.44 All
three balloon emplacements should prove disruptive to attackers, forcing their aircraft
higher and denying them the safety and surprise of low altitude.

With the, attacking aircraft forced higher, the balloons then provide almost
simultaneous force enhancement. Active air defense personnel receive early warning and
ready their weapons, taking advantage of the fact that balloon positions and altitudes are
know. SAMs and other weapons will be only partially effective in the ultra-low, almost
supersonic melee over the airfields. An aircraft forced higher is an aircraft closer to
destruction. In addition, the balloon obstacles would divert the flyers' attention from
their targets, causing them to either inaccurately bomb their objectives or to reattack.45
Another attack, of course, increases the probability of acquisition and destruction
by a SAM.

Possibly the most ominous aspect of the barrage balloon--at least in the mind of the
attacking pilot--is the physical and psychological hazard the cable presents to him and
his aircraft. During World Was II, aerial cables did in fact destroy aircraft, and the
threat of hitting a cable was nerve-racking. In Berlin Diary William L. Shirer
wrote of a German pilot who, during the night bombing of London, always dropped his bombs
too high because he feared the barrage balloons at lower altitudes.46 Allied
pilots felt the same way about cables according to a declassified World War II
intelligence bulletin: "In 1940, the RAF was encountering an increasing number of
barrage balloons over their bombing objective in western and northwestern Germany, and
these balloons were a major cause of worry to RAF pilots."47 An American
pilot echoed the same feelings in another declassified report:

Unkown balloon cables are a very considerable mental hazard, regardless of anyone's
ideas to the contrary. The undersigned had the opportunity to fly a Hurrican [sic] II out
of a balloon-defended factory field last week, and in spite of having a corridor cleared
by lowering one balloon, the mental reaction against all the remaining cables was
distracting. Later on, during the same journey, wheat bad weather was encountered near
Birmingham, the same cable worry was present. It is not believed that hostile aircraft
will knowingly come down within close range of a balloon barrage.48

Aerial barriers are also cheap and durable. Wallop Industries of Great Britain has
developed a balloon called the Skysnare,49 and a barrage of six costs
approximately $18,000. Maintenance and training are equally inexpensive, and the only
"fuel', for the system would be the helium or hydrogen gas to lift the balloon.50
Considering the price tag of modern weapon systems and ammunition, the cost-effectiveness
of the balloon is impressive. Furthermore, the balloon is just as durable as it is
affordable. Consisting of a cable, a single-ply plastic envelope, and a winch, the system
is extremely robust and can remain airborne for up to two weeks per inflation.51
The 4-mm Kevlar cable gives the Skysnare system extraordinary strength and destructive
power should an aircraft strike the cable.52

The advantages of the barrage balloon are many, but--as with any weapon system-- there
are drawbacks. First, it is susceptible to high winds: during the Battle of Britain, a
heavy gale destroyed or damaged approximately 250 balloons.53 A similar mishap
occurred in the United States in 1942 when 57 balloons broke loose in a storm and caused
substantial damage to the Seattle area.54 In each case the balloons were flying
at operational altitudes. Subsequently, American balloons were simply hauled in when
storms approached. In Great Britain, however, they were only lowered because the threat of
German aircraft was still too great to bed them down completely. Timely weather reports
could help solve this problem. A second disadvantage of balloons is the fact that their
very presence signals the enemy that a target must be nearby. This drawback was partially
corrected in World War II by camouflaging both balloon and "balloon bed."
Moreover, the balloon was hidden in the clouds with only the near invisible cable showing.
(The typically overcast European theater, then, is an excellent environment for balloons.)
Certainly, the balloons would be exposed on clear days, but their deterrent value more
than compensates for this drawback. Last, balloon cables are indiscriminately
hazardous-friendly aircraft may inadvertently be caught in them. However, Peter D. John
suggests using "procedural control" to reduce the chance of a friendly
aircraft's hitting a cable.55 This method worked very well during World War II
when hundreds of friendly planes safety negotiated aerial barriers.

Conclusion

In our search to build a better mousetrap, we often neglect the lessons of history.
Technology has produced a marvel of engineering in the modern fighter plane, enabling it
to fly higher, faster, and lower than ever before. In battle, the jet fighter's forte is
high-speed, low-level attack--a tactic difficult to combat. Even weapons such as highly
advanced SAMs have trouble defending against low-level attacks, as demonstrated in the
Falkland Islands War. More technology always seems to be the answer, but a simple solution
to the low-level threat is the barrage balloon.

Barrage balloons were developed in World War I to counter one of the most advanced
technological threats of the time--the airplane. The Gotha bomber, which raided the
countryside of southeastern England from 1917 to 1918, represented the apex of German
aircraft engineering skill. But this airplane was effectively denied direct and low-level
access to the target by a balloon and a wire. Although English balloons destroyed no enemy
aircraft, they hindered German pilots by confining them to altitudes above 10,000 feet.
Consequently, antiaircraft guns and fighters could more easily engage enemy planes flying
at the higher altitudes.

Balloons gained even more prominence during World War II and performed well in combat.
That the British used over 2,000 balloons manned by 33,000 personnel demonstrated their
faith in the capabilities of the system. The United States shared this confidence. During
the war, nearly 430 balloons protected the West Coast. Furthermore, several US Army
balloon units saw "combat" in North Africa, providing effective protection
against low-level attack on captured ports.

The barrage balloon disappeared after World War II, but this capable asset deserves to
be used again. Naturally suited to defend small, important areas, barrage balloons would
be perfect for NATO's vital airfields. Here, balloons can offer both tangible and
intangible benefits. Expertly positioned, they provide a real hazard to enemy aircraft,
forcing them up or around into awaiting SAMs. Chances of surprise attack and low-level
approach are reduced. The intangible benefit concerns the presence of the balloon itself.
it makes the enemy think twice about trying to destroy a balloon-protected target. Barrage
balloons are not a cure-all, but they can enhance existing air defense systems. Col R. E.
Turley, an American advocate of barrage balloons during World War II, emphasized the team
approach to air defense in an article written in 1942:

When employed alone, barrage balloons ordinarily would not be effective. . . In
conjunction with other arms, barrage balloons constitute an element in the antiaircraft
defense system complementary to antiaircraft artillery and pursuit aviation, the balloons
being most effective at low altitudes where the complementary arms are least efficient. If
maintained at effective strength in spite of losses of balloons from storms. . . and enemy
action, barrage balloons constitute a dependable and ever ready defense against low-flying
aircraft.56

Simply stated: barrage balloons optimize air defenses.

While technology changes, some things remain the same. Just as a balloon and a wire
could deter a Gotha over London 71 years ago, so can they deter a Soviet Fencer over
Bitburg in the future.

Notes:

1. Peter D. John, "Aerial Barrages to Enhance Airfield Defences," The
Hawk: The Independent Journal of the Royal Air Force Staff College, March 1984, 40.

2. Ibid., 39.

3. Laurence Martin, NATO and the Defense of the West; An Analysis of America'sFirst
Line of Defense (New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985). 79.

Maj Franklin J. Hillson, USAF (BA, Virginia Military Institute: MA, College of
William and Mary) is on a joint-duty assignment with the Joint Tactical Command, Control
and Communications Agency at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. He is an air weapons controller,
having served tours in Canada, West Germany, and the United States. Major Hillson is a
graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author
cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do
not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the
United States Air Force or the Air University.