"But when one doesn't intend, arrange, or obsess [about anything], there is no support for the stationing of consciousness. There being no support, there is no landing of consciousness. When that consciousness doesn't land & grow, there is no production of renewed becoming in the future. When there is no production of renewed becoming in the future, there is no future birth, aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, or despair. Such is the cessation of this entire mass of suffering & stress."

"But, bhikkhus, when one does not intend, and one does not plan, and one does not have a tendency towards anything, no basis exists for the maintenance of consciousness. When there is no basis, there is no support for the establishing of consciousness. When consciousness is unestablished and does not come to growth, there is no descent of name-and-form. With the cessation of name-and-form comes cessation of the six sense bases... Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering."

"In the same way, where there is no passion for the nutriment of physical food... contact... intellectual intention... consciousness, where there is no delight, no craving, then consciousness does not land there or increase. Where consciousness does not land or increase, there is no alighting of name-&-form. Where there is no alighting of name-&-form, there is no growth of fabrications. Where there is no growth of fabrications, there is no production of renewed becoming in the future. Where there is no production of renewed becoming in the future, there is no future birth, aging, & death. That, I tell you, has no sorrow, affliction, or despair."

Bhikkhus, one who is engaged is unliberated; one who is disengaged is liberated. Consciousness, bhikkhus, while standing, might stand engaged with form; based upon form, established upon form, with a sprinkling of delight, it might come to growth, increase, and expansion. Or consciousness, while standing, might stand [engaged with feeling..., engaged with perception...] engaged with volitional formations; based upon volitional formations, established upon volitional formations, with a sprinkling of delight, it might come to growth, increase and expansion.

Bhikkhus, though someone might say: 'apart from form, apart from feeling, apart from perception, apart from volitional formations, I will make known the coming and going of consciousness, its passing away and rebirth, its growth, increase and expansion'--that is impossible.

Bhikkhus, if a bhikkhu has abandoned lust for the form element, with the abandoning of lust, the basis is cut off, there is no support for the establishing of consciousness. If he has abandoned lust for the feeling element...for the perception element...for the volitional formations element...for the consciousness element, with the abandoning of lust the basis is cut off. There is no support for the establishing of consciousness.

When that consciousness is unestablished, not coming to growth, nongenerative, it is liberated. By being liberated, it is steady; by being steady, it is content; by being content, he is not agitated. Being unagitated, he personally attains nibbaana. He understands: 'Destroyed is birth , the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.'

"Should consciousness, when taking a stance, stand attached to (a physical) form, supported by form, established on form, watered with delight, it would exhibit growth, increase, & proliferation.

"Should consciousness, when taking a stance, stand attached to feeling, supported by feeling, established on feeling, watered with delight, it would exhibit growth, increase, & proliferation.

"Should consciousness, when taking a stance, stand attached to perception, supported by perception, established on perception, watered with delight, it would exhibit growth, increase, & proliferation.

"Should consciousness, when taking a stance, stand attached to fabrications, supported by fabrications, established on fabrications, watered with delight, it would exhibit growth, increase, & proliferation.

"Were someone to say, 'I will describe a coming, a going, a passing away, an arising, a growth, an increase, or a proliferation of consciousness apart from form, from feeling, from perception, from fabrications,' that would be impossible.

"If a monk abandons passion for the property of form...

"If a monk abandons passion for the property of feeling...

"If a monk abandons passion for the property of perception...

"If a monk abandons passion for the property of fabrications...

"If a monk abandons passion for the property of consciousness, then owing to the abandonment of passion, the support is cut off, and there is no base for consciousness. Consciousness, thus unestablished, not proliferating, not performing any function, is released. Owing to its release, it is steady. Owing to its steadiness, it is contented. Owing to its contentment, it is not agitated. Not agitated, he (the monk) is totally unbound right within. He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'"

"If a monk abandons passion for the property of consciousness, then owing to the abandonment of passion, the support is cut off, and there is no base for consciousness. Consciousness, thus unestablished, not proliferating, not performing any function, is released. Owing to its release, it stands still. Owing to its stillness, it is contented. Owing to its contentment, it is not agitated. Not agitated, he (the monk) is totally unbound right within. He discerns that 'Birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this world.'

"For one knowing in this way, seeing in this way, monk, there is the immediate ending of fermentations."

In Udana 80 "аppatiṭṭha" is also linked to the lack of support (ārammaṇa):

There is that dimension where there is neither earth, nor water, nor fire, nor wind; neither dimension of the infinitude of space, nor dimension of the infinitude of consciousness, nor dimension of nothingness, nor dimension of neither perception nor non-perception; neither this world, nor the next world, nor sun, nor moon. And there, I say, there is neither coming, nor going, nor staying; neither passing away nor arising: unestablished, unevolving, without support (mental object). This, just this, is the end of stress.

"That, bhikkhus, is Māra the Evil One searching for the consciousness of the clansman Vakkali, wondering: 'Where now has the consciousness of the clansman Vakkali been established?' However, bhikkhus, with consciousness unestablished, the clansman Vakkali has attained final Nibbana."

"And how is a monk a noble one with banner lowered, burden placed down, unfettered? There is the case where a monk's conceit 'I am' is abandoned, its root destroyed, made like a palmyra stump, deprived of the conditions of development, not destined for future arising. This is how a monk is a noble one with banner lowered, burden placed down, unfettered.

"And when the devas, together with Indra, the Brahmas, & Pajapati, search for the monk whose mind is thus released, they cannot find that 'The consciousness of the one truly gone (tathagata) is dependent on this.' Why is that? The one truly gone is untraceable even in the here & now.

"Very well then, Kotthita my friend, I will give you an analogy; for there are cases where it is through the use of an analogy that intelligent people can understand the meaning of what is being said. It is as if two sheaves of reeds were to stand leaning against one another. In the same way, from name-&-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness, from consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-&-form. From name & form as a requisite condition come the six sense media. From the six sense media as a requisite condition comes contact. From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging/sustenance. From clinging/sustenance as a requisite condition comes becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth. From birth as a requisite condition, then aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair come into play. Such is the origination of this entire mass of suffering & stress.

"If one were to pull away one of those sheaves of reeds, the other would fall; if one were to pull away the other, the first one would fall. In the same way, from the cessation of name-&-form comes the cessation of consciousness, from the cessation of consciousness comes the cessation of name-&-form. From the cessation of name-&-form comes the cessation of the six sense media. From the cessation of the six sense media comes the cessation of contact. From the cessation of contact comes the cessation of feeling. From the cessation of feeling comes the cessation of craving. From the cessation of craving comes the cessation of clinging/sustenance. From the cessation of clinging/sustenance comes the cessation of becoming. From the cessation of becoming comes the cessation of birth. From the cessation of birth, then aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair all cease. Such is the cessation of this entire mass of suffering & stress."

"'From name-and-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness.' Thus it has been said. And this is the way to understand how from name-and-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness. If consciousness were not to gain a foothold in name-and-form, would a coming-into-play of the origination of birth, aging, death, and stress in the future be discerned?

"Bhikkhus, I will teach you a Dhamma exposition on the theme of burning. Listen to that...."And what, bhikkhus, is the Dhamma exposotion on the theme of burning? It would be better, bhikkhus, for the eye faculty to be lacerated by a red-hot iron pin burning, blazing and glowing, than for one to grasp the sign (nimitta) through the features in a form cognizable by the eye. For if consciousness should stand tied to gratification in the sign or in the features, and if one should die on that occasion, it is possile that one will go to one of two destinations: hell or animal realm. Having seen this danger, i speak thus.

"In regard to this, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple reflects thus: 'Leave off the lacerating eye faculty with a red-hot iron pin burning, blazing, and glowing. Let me attend only to this: So the eye is impermanent, eye-consciousness is impermanent, eye-contact is impermanent, whatever feeling arises with eye-contact as condition - whether pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant - that too is impermanent."

Now to the hard part - what do you think is the nature of the word appatiṭṭha? Should it function as a verb or as an adjective?

Patiṭṭha being the past participle of the intransitive verb patiṭṭhahati would function in an active voice and thus retain its function as a verb in Pali. It seems that in Pali, only past participles of transitive verbs can function as adjectives.

This much seems to be the sense conveyed by the past participles patiṭṭhā and virūḷha in SN 12.38, in the passages where cetanā or anusaya are present. Yet, BB's translation of the negation appatiṭṭha in SN 12.39 looks ambiguously like an adjective (unestablished), whilst at the same time, he left the negation avirūḷha in its verb sense. Strangely enough, in his draft of the translation, he translated appatiṭṭha as "not established", thereby retaining the verb sense.

In Ven Thanissaro's other translations that you post above, he switches between rendering appatiṭṭha as either a verb or as an adjective.

I'm just wondering if the translation of appatiṭṭha as adjectival might not perhaps have been done with the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit apratiṣṭha in mind. One cannot be sure that BHS usage have not been allowed to creep into the Prakrit Agamas. In the slippage from a Prakrit form to the BHS form, some of the Prakrit grammatical injunctions shared with Pali might have simply been lost, thus allowing the Northern Buddhists to treat the verbal formation apratiṣṭha to be an adjective instead.

If I recall correctly, the Chinese parallels to the Vakkali and Godhika suttas mentioned above put the "non-establishment" as a case of "no rebirth consciousness", thereby excluding the possibility of a consciousness predicated by an "unestablished" adjective.

Now to the hard part - what do you think is the nature of the word appatiṭṭha? Should it function as a verb or as an adjective?

For me, the native speaker of Ukrainian and Russian, where such participles are routine, this is a very easy question. Clearly this participle serves as an adjective.

Patiṭṭha being the past participle of the intransitive verb patiṭṭhahati would function in an active voice and thus retain its function as a verb in Pali.

I don't understand how such a thing can happen. Perhaps you would give an example?

Another thing I'm not sure about is whether "patiṭṭha" is a present or past participle. Seems like "patiṭṭha" is a present participle, and "patiṭṭhita" - past participle.

This much seems to be the sense conveyed by the past participles patiṭṭhā and virūḷha in SN 12.38, in the passages where cetanā or anusaya are present. Yet, BB's translation of the negation appatiṭṭha in SN 12.39 looks ambiguously like an adjective (unestablished), whilst at the same time, he left the negation avirūḷha in its verb sense. Strangely enough, in his draft of the translation, he translated appatiṭṭha as "not established", thereby retaining the verb sense.

IMHO, these are inevitable shortcoming of rendering the Pali (or Ukrainian) participles in English. There's no exact equivalent to such participles in English.

One cannot be sure that BHS usage have not been allowed to creep into the Prakrit Agamas.

It's hard to talk about something that one can't prove or disprove. Appatiṭṭha is used even in Sutta-nipata, which did not undergo stylization. As the Hathigumpha inscription and Girnar Asokan edicts show, the difference between spoken Pali and stylized Pali is minimal (see page 4 of "The Pali Language and the Theravadin Tradition" by K. R. Norman).

Currently my friend (and me) works on a project on finding the chronological markers of Pali Canon (like the use of sygmatic aorists, certain words and prefixes, etc.). Hopefully this would eventually bring some certainty in the chronology of the Canon.

If I recall correctly, the Chinese parallels to the Vakkali and Godhika suttas mentioned above put the "non-establishment" as a case of "no rebirth consciousness", thereby excluding the possibility of a consciousness predicated by an "unestablished" adjective.

In Chinese, the sense of prticiples is very hard to convey, hence the back translation in nouns.

Anyway, the participle by its nature denotes a dynamic process, much like a verb, so there's no talk about some solid substance being eternally unestablished. Indeed it is more like process of being without footing.

I think both the PED and CPD would agree with you in treating appatiṭṭha as an adjective, rather than a verb.

Could we first resolve a vocabulary issue concerning patiṭṭha and patiṭṭhita? I would agree that patiṭṭhita is the past participle for patiṭṭhahati , but the dictionaries do recognize that the variant form of patiṭṭhahati would be the more common patiṭṭhāti (appearing 27 times in the suttas, not counting peyyālas, versus 2 occurences of patiṭṭhahati in a later strata of the Nikayas). You get patiṭṭhāti being used in conjunction with the locative sense of stopping or acquiring a resting place in MN 129’s simile of the wheel treasure –

I get the feel that patiṭṭha would be the past participle for the more frequent patiṭṭhāti , leaving patiṭṭhita as the form of the past participle for patiṭṭhahati. I do realize that the form patiṭṭhā is used in SN 12.38 (Ārammaṇe sati patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti. ), where the long a suggests the possibility of a present participle. However, could present participles in Pali function as adjectives? I’ve not actually come across this dispensation, since Warder seems to treat them as pseudo-adjectives (p.47).

Re your query –

Patiṭṭha being the past participle of the intransitive verb patiṭṭhahati would function in an active voice and thus retain its function as a verb in Pali.

I don't understand how such a thing can happen. Perhaps you would give an example?

I got the sense from 2 grammars (Buddhadatta’s and Durioselle’s) that only passive participles function as predicates, since they are supposed to be formed from transitive verbs. However, I see that Warder opines that even active past participles can function as adjectives, although he does not give examples (p.274). I’m at a loss here.

I just have difficulty seeing “patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa” as a junction of an adjective and noun, since there is no agreement between the genitive case of consciousness and patiṭṭhā.

In fact, if we look at this sentence –

Ārammaṇe asati patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa na hoti.

It is beginning to look to me that the phrase “patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa” is used as a noun, given the negative copula “na hoti”. This sentence looks suspiciously like a manifestation of the standard idappaccayatā formula “imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti”, given the same locative absolute construction of “Ārammaṇe asati”.

Might it be possible that patiṭṭhā (with the long a) is the feminine noun meaning "establishment"? This seems like the only reading I can give to a conjunction of patiṭṭhā with viññāṇa in the genitive case.

Your thoughts would be appreciated.

Last edited by Sylvester on Sat May 26, 2012 8:14 am, edited 1 time in total.

Sylvester wrote:However, could present participles in Pali function as adjectives?

According to my Ukrainian intuition, yes.

Might it be possible that patiṭṭhā (with the long a) is the feminine noun meaning "establishment"? This seems like the only reading I can give to a conjunction of patiṭṭhā with viññāṇa in the genitive case.

Going by the context set by SN 12.38 and SN 12.39, I think I'll treat the phrase "appatiṭṭhita viññāṇa" in its various cases as simply a negation of the proposition "patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti", ie it would connote "there is no establishment of consciousness". That negation seems the most natural from the context, since "appatiṭṭhita viññāṇa" as a proposition flows from "patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa na hoti ".

Of course, I would not disagree that going just by its grammatical form alone, it probably lends itself just as easily to a reading of "there is an unestablished consciousness" or the more ambigious "consciousness is unestablished". Which of course creates doctrinal problems, if the understanding of the noun patiṭṭhā is as something other than a process connected with rebecoming.

Sylvester wrote:Going by the context set by SN 12.38 and SN 12.39, I think I'll treat the phrase "appatiṭṭhita viññāṇa" in its various cases as simply a negation of the proposition "patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti", ie it would connote "there is no establishment of consciousness". That negation seems the most natural from the context, since "appatiṭṭhita viññāṇa" as a proposition flows from "patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa na hoti ".

Precision would also require to specify the nature of 'establishment'. Perhaps I would start a thread on the term 'ārammaṇa'.

Of course, I would not disagree that going just by its grammatical form alone, it probably lends itself just as easily to a reading of "there is an unestablished consciousness" or the more ambigious "consciousness is unestablished". Which of course creates doctrinal problems, if the understanding of the noun patiṭṭhā is as something other than a process connected with rebecoming.

Precision would also require to specify the nature of 'establishment'.

I agree, so let me hazard a proposal. We see the nature of establishment/patiṭṭhā operating in AN 3.76 as follows -

Thus kamma is the field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture. The consciousness of living beings hindered by ignorance & fettered by craving is established in/tuned to a lower property. Thus there is the production of renewed becoming in the future.

This sutta suggests that patiṭṭhā is a process of creating the potential for a type of rebecoming in the future. The allowance for both the present event and the future possibility existing in the same proposition is in fact attested to in the special grammatical construction used in "Tasmiṃ patiṭṭhite viññāṇe virūḷhe āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti hoti." from SN 12.38.

In this connection, the process of patiṭṭhā seems related to those questions posed to the Buddha regarding the destination/gati of those who have died, eg Ud 1.10, or even of those who have not yet died, eg SN 55.21.

It is this connection to the rebirth potential that causes me to reject the translation of "appatiṭṭhita viññāṇa" as referring to a "consciousness that is unestablished". If such a consciousness exists from the time of the non-establishment all the way to the end of the Arahant's life, we are left with Sati the fisherman's son's belief in some unchanging sub-stratum. I think it therefore makes better sense to treat the term as a reference to the event of non-establishment, rather than as a reference to a special ante-mortem consciousness of the Arahant (or worse, some 'unconditioned' post-mortem consciousness!).

This establishment/patiṭṭhā process looks closely connected to the verb tiṭṭhati which you helpfully pointed out in SN 35.235. I think the only discernible difference I can make out is the fact that patiṭṭhā is a reference to the creation of a future potential, while tiṭṭhati is the present action. Might it be possible to view it sequentially so that "if one tiṭṭhati, then there is patiṭṭhā."?

This split in the respective functions of tiṭṭhati and patiṭṭhāti is in fact explicated by SN 12.38 and SN 12.39 as follows -

What one intends, what one arranges, and what one obsesses about:[1] This is a support for the stationing of consciousness. There being a support, there is a landing [or: an establishing] of consciousness.

The action performed by the verb tiṭṭhati would be the noun ṭhitiyā, while the action performed by the verb patiṭṭhā would be the noun patiṭṭhā . It looks as if ṭhitiyā is the paccaya/condition for the arising of patiṭṭhā.

Sylvester wrote:This sutta suggests that patiṭṭhā is a process of creating the potential for a type of rebecoming in the future. The allowance for both the present event and the future possibility existing in the same proposition is in fact attested to in the special grammatical construction used in "Tasmiṃ patiṭṭhite viññāṇe virūḷhe āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti hoti." from SN 12.38.

Fortunately, Margaret Cone's dictionary has at least a very short article:

appatiṭṭha, mfn., see sv patiṭṭhā

AFAIK, 'patiṭṭhā' is a noun meaning 'footing'. This literal meaning can be found in the sutta on crossing the flood:viewtopic.php?f=23&t=12515#p189622 (evidently mistranslated).

Consciousness, when it gains a footing, indeed proliferates, creating thus a potential for rebecoming.

In the case of concentration (samadhi), the perceptual image (nimitta) as the footing (arammana) colors all the perception, proliferating thus all over the mind.

Similarly, the perceptual image of irritation (patigha-nimitta), or beauty (subha-nimitta), when attended with inappropriate attention, can color all the perception.

So, when consciousness does not have a footing, nothing colors the perception, and everything is perceived as it is - 'yathabhutam'.

It is this connection to the rebirth potential that causes me to reject the translation of "appatiṭṭhita viññāṇa" as referring to a "consciousness that is unestablished". If such a consciousness exists from the time of the non-establishment all the way to the end of the Arahant's life, we are left with Sati the fisherman's son's belief in some unchanging sub-stratum. I think it therefore makes better sense to treat the term as a reference to the event of non-establishment, rather than as a reference to a special ante-mortem consciousness of the Arahant (or worse, some 'unconditioned' post-mortem consciousness!).

Well, perhaps we need a stronger term - 'consciousness without fixation', 'without establishment' or something like this. Clearly the Arahant perceives things, but there's no proliferation.

I've opened new thread on 'ārammaṇa' at viewtopic.php?f=23&t=12575 , where the 'starting point (for proliferation)' sense is evident.

This establishment/patiṭṭhā process looks closely connected to the verb tiṭṭhati which you helpfully pointed out in SN 35.235. I think the only discernible difference I can make out is the fact that patiṭṭhā is a reference to the creation of a future potential, while tiṭṭhati is the present action. Might it be possible to view it sequentially so that "if one tiṭṭhati, then there is patiṭṭhā."?

This split in the respective functions of tiṭṭhati and patiṭṭhāti is in fact explicated by SN 12.38 and SN 12.39 as follows -

What one intends, what one arranges, and what one obsesses about:[1] This is a support for the stationing of consciousness. There being a support, there is a landing [or: an establishing] of consciousness.

Reading patiṭṭhā as a footing, instead of the process of establishment in rebirth, is also a fair interpretation that avoids the Sati problem. There might be some quibble, though, on what this would mean in relation to an Arahant's consciousness' footing not existing (patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa na hoti).

I just think that SN 12.39 might be a better candidate for this interpretation, rather than SN 12.38, as SN 12.39 does not address rebecoming, but the descent of nāmarūpa. Somehow, I try to avoid a same-life model of multiple punabbhava, and allow nāmarūpa to take on the role in both rebirth and multiple cognitive contacts.

Sylvester wrote:Reading patiṭṭhā as a footing, instead of the process of establishment in rebirth, is also a fair interpretation that avoids the Sati problem. There might be some quibble, though, on what this would mean in relation to an Arahant's consciousness' footing not existing (patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa na hoti).

IMHO, it's the absense of the fixed point of reference:

"Then, Bahiya, you should train yourself thus: In reference to the seen, there will be only the seen. In reference to the heard, only the heard. In reference to the sensed, only the sensed. In reference to the cognized, only the cognized. That is how you should train yourself. When for you there will be only the seen in reference to the seen, only the heard in reference to the heard, only the sensed in reference to the sensed, only the cognized in reference to the cognized, then, Bahiya, there is no you in terms of that. When there is no you in terms of that, there is no you there. When there is no you there, you are neither here nor yonder nor between the two. This, just this, is the end of stress."

I just think that SN 12.39 might be a better candidate for this interpretation, rather than SN 12.38, as SN 12.39 does not address rebecoming, but the descent of nāmarūpa. Somehow, I try to avoid a same-life model of multiple punabbhava, and allow nāmarūpa to take on the role in both rebirth and multiple cognitive contacts.

I also consider the twelve-link Conditioned Arising to span three lives. On the other hand, the middle section (links 3-10) refers to present life, where interaction of vinnana and nama-rupa is evident.

I just wonder if the concept you are alluding to in terms of consciousness' "fixed point of reference" might not be better served by the looking at the process of ṭhitiyā (station/stand) represented by the verbs tiṭṭhamāna (present participle) and tiṭṭheyya (potential) in the Upaya Sutta, Bija Sutta and Adittapariyayasutta.

What seems to be common to these 3 suttas' discussion of the stationing of consciousness (viññāṇassa ṭhitiyā) is not that such ṭhitiyā is unskilfull per se. Rather, the ārammaṇa (basis) for patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa comes into existence only when viññāṇassa ṭhitiyā is accompanied by either -

(i) upayo (clinging to the Aggregates) per Upaya Sutta, and Bija Sutta, or(ii) nimittassādagathitaṃ (fettered to gratification in the nimitta) or anubyañjanassādagathitaṃ (fettered to gratification in the features) per SN 35.235.

If fact, as you point out, SN 35.235's promise that contemplation of impermanence etc in place of the abovesaid 2 fetters leads to nibbidā (disenchantment). I don't think that with nibbidā, there can be a consciousness that is unstationed, at least not in the strict technical sense. I would infer that the "unstationed" simply means that the consciousness is not attached or not fettered while stationed. This is because the suttas say "consciousness when standing" (viññāṇaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ) and then posits a hypothetical "might stand clinging to form" (rūpūpayaṃ .... tiṭṭheyya). And this kind of consciousness is not limited to Arahants, but as SN 35.235 opines, it is available even to trainees.

It suddenly makes sense why the Pali version in MN 117 has a discussion of factors without effluents (anāsavā).