A 15-Point Program to Stem the Flow of Drugs from Mexico

About the Author

No. 700 I The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue N.E.
Washinaton. D.C. 20002 (202) 546-4400 April 12,1989 A l5-RMNT
PROGRAM TO SlEM THE FTDW OF DRUGS FROM lMEXIC0 INTRODUCTION
Narcotics trafficking threatens the security of Mexico and the
United States. International drug cartels undermine economic,
political, and social stability by spreading violence, crime, and
corruption. While Washington and Mexico City cooperate increasingly
to eradicate the production and trafficking of illegal drugs,
Mexico still remains the largest source of narcotics entering the
U.S.

The problem is not that Mexican leaders fail to recognize that
measures need to be taken to stem the flow of narcotics. Mexico's
newly elected president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, says that he
will make sweeping changes in his country's narcotics laws and will
wage war against the corruption and violence that the drug trade
generates. He calls the defeat of narcotics trafficking a Mexican
"national security objective of the highest priority Stepped-Up
Efforts. Salinas's new vigilance against drugs is paying off .

Because of stepped-up efforts by his administration to eradicate
and interdict illegal drugs, Mexico last March was awarded U.S.
presidential certification This is the twelfth in a series of
Heritage studies on Mexico. It was preceded by Bac&gmunder No.
694 U.S.-Mexbn Ecoqomic Ties March 6,1989 Backpun& No. 688, The
Security Component of US.-Mexico Relations January 26,1989)
Backpunder No. 679 A Review of 150 Years of US.-Mexican Relations
October 31,1988 Bacmder No. 638, "Evolution of Mexican Foreign Po l
icy March 11,1988 Backpunder No. 611 Privatization in Mexico:
Robust Rhetoric, Anemic Reality October 22,1987 Backpuntier No. 595
Keys to Understanding Mexico: The PAN'S Growth as a Real Opposition
July 29 1987 Backpunder No. 588 Deja Vu of Policy Failure : The New
$14 Billion Mexican Debt Bailout June 25 1987 Backpunder No. 583
For Mexico's Ailing Economy, Tme Runs Short June 4,1987 Backpunder
NO. 581 Mexico's Many Faces May 19,1987 Backpmder No. 5'75 Mexico:
The Key Players April 4 1987 and Bac

uun&r No. Sn, "Keys to Understanding Mexico: Challenges to
the Ruling PRI April 7 1987 Future papers will examine other
aspects of Mexican policy and development Note: Nothing written
here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The
Heritage Found ation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage
of any bill before Congress. under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
19

86. This annual certification is granted by the U.S. government
to countries heavily involved in narcotics production and
traficking that c ooperate fully with Washington in the
international fight against drugs. Certification entitles those
countries to receive U.S. economic and military assistance loans,
trade preferences, and other economic advantages.

Despite Salinass tough anti-drug message, however, some U.S.
officials believe that the Mexican govemment lacks sufficient
resolve in combating the flow of narcotics into the U.S.The Mexican
drug trade they argue, is on the upswing, production is steadily
increasing, and extensive improvements still need to be made in
Mexicos drug eradication programs. U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration DEA) agents and other U.S. anti-narcotics personnel
add that drug-related corruption continues to plague most levels of
the Mexican government, armed forces, and police, and that many
Mexican officials remain unwilling or uncommitted to attacking the
problem Expanding Coordination. There is considerable merit to
these criticisms As such, the Bush and Salinas administration s
will need to work much harder to reduce drug trafficking and
Corruption in Mexico
. Anti-narcotics coordination between the U.S.
and Mexico needs to be expanded to eradicate the production and
flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. This is in the interest of both
governments and should be pursued as aggressively as possible To
protect U.S. security interests and strengthen U.S.-Mexican
anti-narcotics efforts, the Bush administration should Make
anti-narcotics cooperation a major issue in U.S.-Mexico relations
Encourage the Salinas government to improve its drug control
capabilities to wage war on internal drug trafficking, cultivation,
and corruption. the Mexicans along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Mexican efforts to destroy drug crops so in a way that does not
thr eaten Mexican sovereignty and national pride Establish a more
effective joint narcotics interdiction campaign with Improve U.S.
and Mexican cooperation in measuring the progress of Urge the
Salinas government to escalate the war against drugs, but do Redu c
e the U.S. demand for illegal narcotics DRUG PRODUCTION AND
TRAFFICKING IN MEXICO Mexico ranks as the fourth largest exporter
of illegal drugs in Latin I America. With its 1,933-mile border
with the U.S Mexico supplies 2 approximately 40percent of the mar i
juana and heroin smuggled into the U.S and serves as a major
shipment routf for as much as half of the South American cocaine
entering the U.S. Severe poverty has forced increasing numbers of
Mexican farmers to cultivate illegal drug crops for the profita b
le international narcotics trade. Drug cultivation becomes an
attractive alternative to poor Mexican farmers because financial
rewards for growing opium-producing poppy plants and marijuana far
outweigh the benefits from cultivating such traditional crops as
corn.

Mexico also has become a major route for the shipment of cocaine
to the U.S. Although the coca plant is not indigenous to Mexico and
is not grown there, as much as 50 percent of the South American
cocaine entering the U.S is now shipped through M exico. Washington
earmarks over 60 percent of its overseas narcotic control budget to
fighting cocaine trafficking and considers it the most serious
narcotics threat to the U.S.

Potent Black Tar. Last year, Mexico took significant steps to
improve its pro grams to eradicate the production of opium poppy,
the plant from which heroin is derived. Nevertheless, Mexico
remains the largest single country source for heroin entering the
U.S. Last year, Mexican growers cultivated approximately 7,740
hpres (19,118 a c res) of opium and produced between 45 and 55
metric tons. The bulk of Mexican heroin is cultivated in the
Pacific coast states of Chihuahua, Jalisco, and Sinaloa, which form
the Mexican equivalent of Asias GoldenTriangle, one of the worlds
largest opium-p r oducing regions. Using the routes taken by
illegal aliens to cross into the U.S Mexican drug traffickers have
replaced Southwest Asian smugglers as Americas leading suppliers of
a highly potent version of heroin called black tar surpassed only
recently by Colombia. Last year, 9,000 hectares (22,230 ScTes of
marijuana were cultivated in Mexico, yielding over 5,600 metric
tons. The cannabis plant which produces marijuana is grown in
virtually every Mexican state. Several large trafficking
organizations have d irected most of the cultivation. These
organizations have taught small Mexican farmers how to increase yi
Ids b using improved irrigation techniques and better seeds and
Mexico is the second largest producer of marijuana entering the U.S
fertilizers PY 1 B rook her, ColombiansTake Over the Coke Trade in
Mexico, The CMstian Science Monitor, January 9 1989, p. Al 2 United
States Department of State, International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report, Executive Summary, March 3 Matt Lait,
HeroinTraffic Shifts to t he West, The Wkrhington Post, January
4,1989, p. A4 4 International Narcotics Strategy Report, op. cit p.
15 5 National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee, The ICC
Report 1987, April 1988, pp. 11-12 1989, p. 15 3 THE EMERGING
COLOMBIAN CONNECTION I N MEXICO Over the past two years, a marked
resurgence of narcotics activity and violence has occurred in
Mexico, largely attributable to a recent significant proliferation
of Colombian drug cartel activity in the country. Many U.S. drug
experts believe th a t the Colombians are quickly taking over the
Mexican cocaine trade and could pose a serious security threat to
the Salinas government and lead to increased violence along the
U.S. border Haven for Colombians. U.S. and Mexican anti-drug
personnel estimate t hat at least five major Colombian drug rings
now operate in Mexico. These groups previously had functioned in
Mexico with the permission of Mexican narcotics traffickers. Now
the Colombians are apparently establishing independent operations.
Not only can t he Colombians export up to one ton of cocaine across
the U.S. border each week, they also can stockpile enormous
quantities of refined, or "street ready cocaine in northern Mexico
before shipping it to their traffickers in the U.S. Last October, a
Mexican Army unit in the northern state of Chihuahua discovered 4.8
tons of cocaine hidden in a remote cave; it was the largest cocaine
cache discovered in Latin American history In early 1986, the two
largest Colombian drug organizations, the Medellin Cartel and Cali
Cartel, began changing their cocaine shipment routes to take
advantage of the easily accessible U.S.-Mexican border. The
Colombians opened these new cocaine pipelines because the U.S. had
increased efforts to seize illegal drugs, mostly of Bolivian, C
olombian, and Peruvian origin, in the Gulf of Mexico. The Mexican
traffickers have been trading their expertise in moving drugs
across the U.S.-Mexican border in exchange for weapons and a share
of the profits from the Colombians. It is estimated that som e 40
major Colombiy drug traffickers have established operations in
Mexico in the past two years SECUIUTY IMPLICATIONS OF NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING The production and trafficking of illegal drugs is an
enormous security threat to the U.S. and Mexico.The narcot i cs
trade generates crime corruption, terrorism, and death in the U.S.
and Mexico, and it also threatens many of Latin America's fragile
democracies because of close links between narcotics traffickers
and leftist guerrillas. Because of the continued escal ation of
drug trafficking in the Americas, Mexico today faces unprecedented
challenges to its security with sweeping implications for the U.S.
and the entire Western Hemisphere.

If drug cartel-sponsored political unrest in Mexico were to
approach the level s that exist in many of the Andean countries of
South America, or if the 6 her, op. cit p. 1 7 "Mexico, New Point
of Entry for Drugs The Waphhgton Tunes, November 2,1988, p. 8 4 0
new Salinas government were to be undermined by narcotics
traffickers and w i despread corruption, the consequences for the
U.S. and Mexico would be substantial If political strife were to
develop in Mexico, or if the Mexican economy continued to
degenerate as many as ten million Mexicans could flee across the
U.S. border. This cou l d create serious security problemsfor
Washington. Among other things, millions of new illegal immigrants
could increase the flow of narcotics across the Rio Grandeand could
provide cover for terrorists entering the U.S Gangland-Style
Shootouts. As drug cu l tivation and trafficking levels increase in
Mexico so too does the level of drug-related violence. For example,
a marked resurgence in drug trafficking activity in the city of
Guadalajara, a major drug trafficking nexve center in the state of
Jalisco has t riggered a sharp increase in the number of
drug-related murders. It is estimated that at least 50
execution-style murders took place in this city last year, many of
the bodies bearing signs of torture. Gangland-style shootouts among
rival trafficking grou ps armed with automatic weapons also have
become almost commonplace. Many Mexican officials are becoming
concerned that certain regions in Mexico are taking on e
characteristics of Colombia, where drug-related terrorism is
widespread.

Throughout Latin Amer ica, narcotics traffickers are combining
their resources with leftist subversive groups and other terrorist
organizations to undermine political, judicia, and military efforts
launched against them While terrorism does not currently exist in
Mexico in the traditional sense of an alliance between narcotics
traffickers and political insurgents, such a partnership could soon
develop. Acts of violence and terrorism do occur however, and
threats are increasing against U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
person n el and terrorism has coincided directly with the expansion
of Colombia-sponsored cocaine trafficking through Mexico. The
expanding Mexican cocaine connection in turn has contributed to an
increased flow of such heavy weapons as AK-47 and AR-15 assault rif
l es into Mexico. Mexico is, in fact, a major recipient of illegal
arms from the U.S Colombia, and the Soviet bloc. In just four raids
last year, approximately 500 AK-47 and AKM assault rifles from the
U.S. were seized by Mexican authorities. Many of these a nd other
weapons, it is believed, are part fa guns for drugs trade initiated
by South American drug cartels P Guns for Drugs. The dramatic
escalation of Mexican drug-related violence 18 8 William Branigh,
Mexican Drug Kingpins Recovering from Crackdown Af t er DEA
Killing, 7lte Woshington Post December 19,1988, p. A34 9 See
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, U.S. Department of
State, Bureau of International Nardotics Matters, March 1989, p.
108 10 See US. Narcotics Control Programs in Peru, Bol i via,
Colombia, and Mexico: An Update, Report by the Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, February 1989, p. 29 5
Torture and Executions. Several Mexican cities including
Guadalajara Mazatlan, and Hermosillo in the key drug-produci ng
states of Jalisco Sinaloa, and Sonora have become so violent that
the U.S. Drug Enforcement.

Administration has labeled them as among the most hazardous
zones in the world for its agents to operate In some cases, the DEA
has been forced to curtail anti- drug operations because the U.S.
and Mexican governments do not provide adequate protection for
agents and family members. In the past few years, three regional
DEA office chiefs have been evacuated because of threats, and the
DEA has identified at least t wo posts that are considered so
dangerous that no family dependents are allowed. It also is
estimated that in 1988, at least one DEA informant in these regions
was tortured or killed per month. To make matters worse, U.S. drug
agents are provided with vir tually no security guards, no armored
cars, and no diplomatic immunity utside of Mexico City, and they
are not permitted legally to carry firearms.

In 1985, the torture and murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique
Camarena Salazar highlighted the gravity of the Mexican
narcotics-related terrorism and crime problem. Working under cover
in Guadalajara to identify that city's major drug traffickers,
Camarena was abducted and brutally slain by Mexican drug
traffickers and corrupted law enforcement officials.

The su bsequent 1986 illegal arrest and torture of U.S. Special
Agent Victor Cortez by the Jalisco State Police demonstrated the
security threat facing U.S. anti-drug'personnel in Mexico.This
crime added further friction to an already strained U.S.-Mexican
relat i onship, thereby complicating bilateral anti-drug,
terrorism, and corruption efforts l MEXICO'S ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS
President Salinas's first concrete step to combat narcotics
trafficking in Mexico was to create a 1,200-member anti-drug unit
under the c o ntrol of the Deputy Attorney General's 0ffice.This
office, headed by Javier CoelloTrejo will organize and direct
Mexico's anti-narcotics efforts. Since last December 1, Salinas has
ordered a 175 percent expansion in the budget for Mexico's
anti-drhg progr am, resul ing in a substantial increase in drug
arrests, seizures and eradication efforts.

Calling Out the Army. Despite significant cutbacks in other
government spending, the Mexican Attorney General's budget for drug
crop eradication climbed from $195 million in 1987 to $23.1 million
in 19

88. It is forecast to exceed $26 million this year, or
approximately 60 percent of the office's budget. With almost 100
aircraft, Mexico deploys the largest fleet of aircraft dedicated to
destroying drug crops in theTh ird World. Salinas also is J 11 For
more information see Elaine Shannon Desperados Tune magazine,
November 7,1988. l2U.S. Narcotics Control, op. cit p. 35 13larry
Rhoter Mexico's Anti-drug Efforts Are Emphasized for Congress Ihe
New Yonk Times, March 1,19 8 9 p. A8 6expanding the Mexican Army's
role in anti-drug efforts. Approximately 25,000 troops, 25 percent
of the Mexican military's total manpower, are trained to spray and
bum crops As many as S0,OOO Mexican troops have been engaged in
drug crop destructi o n during peak growing and harvesting times.14
Since Salinas's inauguration last December 1, almost 2,000 people
have been arrested on serious.drug offenses, over 2,OOO acres of
opium and marijuana have been eradicated, and at least 70 pounds of
pure heroi n , 92 tons of marijuana, and almost 25 tons of cocaine
base have been seized.15 The Mexican government is installing its
40 million radar net to cover its southern border. The string of
radars, purchased from the U.S. last year, will be operated by the
Mex i can Air Force and will be pointed toward Guatemala and
Belize. It will be used to locate and intercept aircraft fiom
Central and South America suspected of Carrying drugs into Mexican
airspace 13,000 individuals on drug-related charges, including such
maj o r traffickers as Miguel Quintero Paez, Filemon Medina, and
Juan Lizzaraga; these are some of the most powerful members of
Mexico's drug underworld. Drug kingpins Rafael Car0 Quintero and
Ernest0 Fonseca Carrillo, who were indicted in U.S. courts for the
1 985 kidnapping and murder of U.S. DEA Special Agent Enrique
Camarena Salazar, were convicted last September on drug trafficking
charges by a Mexican court and are likely to be found guilty.

In recent years, there have been three key U.S.-Mexican
anti-narco tics efforts: Operation Alliance, Operation Vanguard,
and the 1987 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty MLA Disagreements
between Washington and Mexico City over sovereignty issues and the
effectiveness of the programs, however have hindered these
efforts.

Curb ing Agency Feuding. Operation Alliance, launched in 1986,
is a drug control program on the U.S.-Mexican border. Lack of
Mexican cooperation however, prevents it from being a genuine
bilateral program. Essentially Operation Alliance coordinates the
activit i es of the U.S. Customs Service the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and local law enforcement departments in combating narcotics
trafficking in the southwestern U.S. By diminishing competition and
feuding between these U.S. federal and state agencies, and by
sharing information and resources, Operation Alliance has won some
battles in the war on drugs on the U.S. side of the frontier.
Mexican participation would make the operation more effective th r
ough sharing of drug-trafficking intelligence and allowing U.S.
agents to engage in hot-pursuit chases of drug smugglers across the
border. One reason the Mexican government refuses to cooperate
fully with Operation Alliance is that it still is uncomforta b le
with allowing U.S. anti-drug personnel open-ended rights to pursue
traffickers into Mexican territory Arresting Drug Kingpins. During
1988, Mexican authorities arrested over 14Intemtiod Narcotics
Control Strategy Report, op. cif March 1989, p. 107 l5Wi i am
Branigin Mexico, US. Envoy Cites Antidrug Gains As Certification
Nears The Washington Post February 28,1989, p. AZO 7 Operation
Vanguard was a U.S.-Mexican cooperative program established to
conduct aerial reconnaissance on drug cultivation and to moni t or
the eradication of drug crops in Mexico.The program involved the
use of U.S.-financed aircraft to survey the extent of crop
destruction after drug fields had been sprayed with herbicides U.S.
participation in the program recently was terminated, howeve r ,
because of disputes within the DEA over the programs effectiveness.
In addition, there also was growing concern for the safety of the
DEA participants involved in the project because heavily armed drug
traffickers were increasingly becoming a threat. U. S. anti-drug
agencies, however, are considering reactivating this or launching a
similar Program by the U.S. and Mexico in December 19

87. The MLAT establishes the legal grounds for improving
U.S.-Mexican cooperation on narcotics matters including the
investigation and prosecution of drug-related crimes, the speedy
extradition of drug traffickers wanted by the U.S and the sharing
of information on narcotics trafficking.The Mexican government
has ratified the treaty; the U.S. Senate has not.The U.S. lawmakers
do not want U.S anti-drug officials to share sensitive information
with their Mexican counterparts. The Senators fear leaks corruption in the Mexican government, armed forces, and police. In Mexico as
in much of Latin America, anti-narcotics campaigns have been
hampered by payoffs, intimidation, and apathy on the part of
officials. Says a U.S. Drug Enforcement agent: Corruption has penetrated all levels of the Mexican government. Its lateral, its
horizontal, and its total.16 Several top anti-narcotics and law
enforcement officials in the new Salinas government for example,
are suspected of having ties to major narcotics traffickers and other criminal figures. One of these is Mexico's new Attorney General
Enrique Alvarez del Castillo, who was the former Governor of
Jalisco, a major drug producing and trafficking state. While
serving as Governor Alvarez was very uncooperative in the Enrique
Camarena murder case investigation in which Jalisco state police
were implicated. He has been accused of withholding evidence related
to the case and of tolerating drug Fear of Leaks. The MLAT, or
Mutual Legal AssistanceTreaty, was signed An enormous roadbl o ck
in the battle against narcotics trafficking is 0 trafficking. I New
Ethics Code. Another official suspected of being tied to major
narcotics traffickers is Miguel Nazar Haro, who recently was forced
to resign as head of the intelligence department of t h e Mexico
City police. Nazar Haro, who has been indicted in the U.S. on
charges of leading a car theft and smuggling ring, reportedly was
pushed aside by top Salinas officials because of his past
involvement in human rights abuses and possibly even narcoti c s
trafficking. Some U.S. anti-narcotics officials feel that by
removing officials 16Elaine Shannon, Why Were Facing a World of
Noriejp, The Washington Post, October 23,1988, p. C4 1Wi Branigin,
Newly Named Mexican OEdals Linked to Drugs, The Washington Pa t ,
January 7,1989 p. AS 8 like Nazar Haro, Salinas is quietly
attempting to reduce drug-related official corruption in the
highest levels of the Mexican government. Salinas, in fact vows to
make life miserable for officials involved in the drug trade. Alre
a dy a new code of ethics has been drawn up requiring senior
Mexican government officials to make an annual financial disclosure
statement In addition, hundreds of anti-narcotics personnel have
been replaced or prosecuted NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING STRAINS U.S.- M
EXICAN RELATIONS The narcotics problem surpasses even the foreign
debt question as the most divisive issue in U.S.-Mexican relations.
Senator Jesse Helms, the North Carolina Republican, for example,
charges that the Mexican government is not doing enough t o
eradicate crops, interdict shipments, and arrest traffickers. Helms
and other Members of Congress argue that drug-related corruption in
the Mexican government, police, and armed forces impairs the
anti-drug campaign. Mexico, in turn, argues that it is t he
enormous U.S demand for drugs that escalates drug trafficking, and
that Washington is unwilling to take the measures necessary to
reduce this demand.

Setting the Tone. Strained relations over narcotics trafficking
impede improved U.S.-Mexican relations in other areas. These
include negotiating a solution to Mexicos huge debt to U.S. banks
and cooperating more fully on stemming illegal immigration.
Establishing a positive working relationship with the Salinas
government on the drug war may help set the t one for improved
relations in these other areas.

Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, the U.S. President is
required to ce- by March 1 of each year that major drug producing
and trafficking countries are fully cooperating with the U.S. in
the crackdown o n the drug trade. Countries not certified lose U.S.
economic and military aid, trade preferences, loans, and other
economic advantages.The President may waive the regular standards
for certification to certify countries on grounds that U.S.
national inter ests require that they receive U.S. assistance.

Strong Public Stance. This March 1, George Bush certified Mexico
as cooperating with Washington in attempting to stem the flow of
drugs into the U.S. Bush was reassured by the Salinas government
and the U.S. State Department that much had been accomplished in
1988 in the war on drugs in Mejdco. While it was noted that much
still needed to be done, Bush emphasized that a strong positive
tone for bilateral relations was set in [his early meeting with
President S alin and that he is encouraged by [Salinass strong
public stance against drugs.8 I Upresidential Determination
Statement [on certification No. 89-11, February 28,1989 9 FIFIEEN
POINTS TO STRENGTHEN U.S.-MEXICAN ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS To improve
U.S.-Mexic a n anti-drug efforts and to protect U.S. security 1)
Devise a strategy to cut drug consumption in the U.S As long as
U.S. demand for narcotics remiins high, drug trafficking will to
spread. The most effective assistance the U.S. can provide Mexico
in comba t ing the narcotics trade is to crack down on U.S.
consumption.This effort has begun with the appointment of William
Bennett as Director of the Office of Natiod Drug Control Policy
interests, the Bush Administration should 2) Repeal the
certification proces s. I The annual certification process strains
U.S.-Mexican relations without giving Washington leverage to gain
greater Mexican cooperation in narcotics control. While it is
important to have a system to identi

nations that refuse to cooperate with the U. S. in drug control
matters, certifying or decerteng foreign governments is the wrong
approach. Sanctions, in almost every case have been imposed on
countries to whom the U.S. does not provide assistance, or with
whom Washington does not maintain relations . Examples Afghanistan,
Iran, Laos, Panama, and Syria. In these cases, therefore, the
sanctions are meaningless; they even make the U.S. look foolish In
the case of Mexico, the only U.S. bilateral assistance is
approximately 15 million in anti-drug funds, l argely to maintain
the fleet of Mexican airplanes and helicopters used to destroy drug
crops If this assistance were terminated because of the denial of
certification, more Mexican drugs would flow into the U.S. U.S.
decertification, meanwhile, would be v i ewed in Mexico as an
insult to the Salinas government and could cause Mexico to cease
cooperating with Wehington on drug control and other areas such as
illegal immigration. Mexicans from both the left and right of the
political spectrum call the U.S. cer t ification process an affront
to their national sovereignty. as is done by the State Department
on international human rights and on nations voting records at the
United Nations -to monitor foreign cooperation in fighting the
international drug trade Bush- S alinas summit Instead of annual
U.S. certification, Washington should issue a yearly report 3)
Highlight drug eradication and interdiction issues during the first
The two leaders are expected to meet within the next six months.
Before the summit, Bush sho u ld state publicly that he will bring
the drug issue to the forefront in his discussions with Salinas and
will work together with Mexicos new leader to develop concrete
U.S.-Mexican drug control proposals. Bush also should welcome
Salinass get tough policy on drug control and offer to expand
U.S.-Mexican bilateral efforts to combat narcotics traffickers in
Mexico 10 4) Establish a U.S.-Mexican commission for the narcotics
problem To identify where cooperation can be increased and
bilateral security promoted , the U.S. and Mexico should create a
joint commission on narcotics trafficking This commission could
address issues like border control eradication and interdiction
efforts, and the sharing of intelligence on drug dealers. It could
comprise members of the U.S. Department of State, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Customs
Service with senior Mexican officials from the Attorney Generals
Office and the Secretariats of Foreign Affairs and National Defense
5) Reemphasize to the Salinas government the need for bringing to
justice those responsible for the 1985 death of U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration Special Agent Enrique Camarena Salazar
and for the torture of U.S. Special Agent Victor Cortez.

Until these cases are resol ved in a manner agreeable to
Washington progress in U.S.-Mexican anti-drug cooperation will be
weakened 6) Increase U.S.-Mexican border patrol activities and
capabilities and encourage expanded U.S. coordination with Mexican
border officials.

The U.S. should increase its border patrol personnel by at least
50 percent.

Greater numbers of patrol aircraft and vehicles and surveillance
materiel such as radars, ground sensors, and night vision equipment
should be deployed. Washington also should seek Mexican p
articipation in Operation Alliance to coordinate joint
anti-narcotics efforts along the border 7) Give the Salinas
government increased technological, materiel, and training
assistance for combating drug trafficking and cultivation in
Mexico.

U.S. assista nce, estimated at $15 million this year, should
continue to help Mexico expand and maintain its antidrug aviation
fleet.This fleet, the largest of its kind in the developing world
with almost 100 aircraft, destroys drug crops by spraying
herbicides on the m . The current size of the air fleet seems to be
adequate for Mexicos eradication needs. To improve the fleets
performance, however, the U.S. should help Mexico to increase the
number of in-flight hours for the fleet, improve the maintenance
and functionin g of the spray equipment, improve crop destruction
verification measures improve spare parts inventory and procurement
control, and provide stepped-up training to Mexicos anti-drug air
fleet personnel intend0 and expand the joint collection of data on
the production cultivation, and eradication of drugs.

Aircraft are critical to the war on drugs in Megco. They spray
drug fields and photograph those crops that have been destroyed to
veri6 the programs effectiveness. Verification missions to gather
informatio n on drug crop destruction should once again be carried
out by joint U.S.-Mexican teams, as was done during
OperationVanguard 8) Reactivate OperationVanguard or a simaar
U.S.-Mexican program to 11 9) Expand the U.S. State Department
Bureau of Internationa l Narcotics Matters INM) and U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration

EA programs with Mexico INM and DEA activities and funding in
Mexico should be expanded to keep up with the expanding drug
trade.These activities should include increased INM funding for su
ch things as herbicides, aviation fuel, tools, and other equipment
to maintain Mexicos aerial eradication efforts and DEA activities,
such as recruiting informants and collecting intelligence 10)
Increase U.S. intelligencegathering capabilities to assist i n the
war against drug cartels and traffickers As the narcotics
traffickers in Mexico become more sophisticated, U.S intelligence
capabilities will have to be expanded; the number of U.S personnel
operating in Mexico will have to be increased.These person n el
however, must be given full protection by Washington and Mexico
City. In the past, U.S. agents have not been provided with full
diplomatic immunity the ability to carry firearms legally, security
guards, and armored transportation U.S. interests would b e better
sewed if U.S. anti-drug personnel were exposed to less unnecessary
risk.The U.S also should assist the Mexican government with
narcotics-related law enforcement and intelligence-gathering
training by sending instructors to Mexico to demonstrate s o
phisticated U.S. drug control techniques 11) Negotiate an
overflight and hot-pursuit agreement with the Mexican government
The U.S. should press for the right to chase an airplane, boat, or
motor vehicle suspected of carrying drugs into Mexican territory i
f it is under hot pursuit. Currently, drug traffickers fleeing into
Mexico cannot be chased by U.S. authorities and often are not
apprehended by Mexican law enforcement officials. At the least,
there should be an agreement to pass on information about a f l
eeing suspect rapidly and efficiently to Mexican officials so that
they can take up the pursuit after the suspicious boat, plane, or
vehicle has entered Mexican territory Mexican Attorney Generals
ofices Matters demonstrates his determination to take the d rug war
seriously. If nothing else, it should help improve cooperation
between the U.S and Mexico on streamlining extradition procedures,
sharing criminal and financial records, and improving law
enforcement techniques. During this weeks meeting in Washin g ton
between Mexican Attorney General Enrique Alvarez del Castillo and
U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, the initial guidelines
should be established on how the two offices can better cooperate
in the war on drugs. U.S. concerns over Alvarezs past a
nti-narcotics record also should be addressed 12) Increase antidrug
coordination and cooperation between the U.S. and Salinass creation
of a new Deputy Attorney Generals Office for Narcotics 13) Seek
U.S. Senate approval of the Mutual Legal Assistance Tre aty MLAT)
signed with Mexico and ratified by its government in December
1987.

This treaty provides for coordinating efforts between U.S. and
Mexican law enforcement agencies. It could establish the guidelines
by which drug-related financial and criminal in formation could be
shared and extradition procedures enhanced between the U.S. and
Mexico.To address concerns that the treaty will allow classified
information to fall into the wrong hands, the Bush Administration
should emphasize that the information bei n g provided will be
meticulously determined, that those Mexican officials with whom the
information is shared will be carefully selected, and that the
sources of the information will not be disclosed 14) Assist the
Mexican government in providing economic alternatives to drug
cultivators in Mexico through specifically focused and supervised
U.S development assistance for Mexican farmers.

Drug interdiction and crop destruction efforts should be
combined with crop substitution and educational awareness programs
for Mexican farmers.

While n o U.S. assistance is earmarked for such programs, the
U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) should consider
targeting funds for the development of these projects. Economic
development and crop substitution efforts, when combined with
vigorous la w enforcement and eradication programs, have had
substantial impact in reducing drug cultivation in other countries,
most notablyThailand and Turkey. Rural Mexicans need to be
convinced that they can make a living growing legal crops and to be
made aware o f the dangers posed by illegal narcotics educational
programs Agency for International Development (AID) and the U.S.
Information Agency (USIA) should assist the Mexican government with
its anti-drug public awareness, educational, and treatment
programs. T h ese agencies should provide assistance for the
development of anti-drug media campaigns narcotics abuse
information for Mexican schoolchildren, and construction of drug
abuse clinics and related facilities. Currently, no such
US.-sponsored programs exist 1 5) Provide U.S. assistance for
Mexican drug prevention, treatment, and While still limited,
domestic drug abuse in Mexico is spreading. The U.S CONCLUSION
Narcotics trafficking challenges both the U.S. and Mexico. By
spreading violence, crime, and corrupt i on, drug cartels and their
clients destroy lives and undermine democratic institutions to
promote their multibillion dollar business. The accession of Carlos
Salinas de Gortari to Mexicos presidency however, may provide the
Bush Administration with an opp o rtunity to improve U.S.-Mexican
anti-narcotics efforts I 13 Salinas Pledge. Much needs to be done.
Mexico remains the largest single source of heroin and marijuana
entering the US and as much as 50 percent of the cocaine entering
the U.S. flows through Me xico. Vowing that the defeat of narcotics
trafficking is a national security objective of the highest
priority, Salinas has stepped up Mexicos war on drugs by destroying
more crops and interdicting more drug traffickers than ever before.
Increased.

Mexican drug control cooperation with the U.S. also has been
pledged.

To improve anti-narcotics efforts between Washington and Mexico
City Bush and Salinas must continue to make the war on drugs a
major issue in U.S.-Mexico relations. The U.S. should continue as
sisting Mexico with its battle against drug trafficking,
cultivation, and corruption and must encourage greater cooperation
along the 1,933-mile U.S-Mexican border.

This increased cooperation, however, must not come at the
expense of Mexican sovereignty a nd national pride. For this
reason, Mexico should not be singled out for punishment or
recertified as a nation refusing to cooperate with the U.S. in
controlling illegal drugs.

Limiting U.S. Demand. Finally, it must be admitted that most of
the blame for the U.S. drug problem rests at home. No amount of
anti-narcotics cooperation with Mexico will make much difference
unless the U.S. first reduces demand for drugs within its own
borders. Efforts to limit supply, by themselves, do not
substantially reduce t h e availability of drugs or significantly
inhibit drug use and trafficking in one country will only result in
its moving elsewhere. Thus the U.S. should do evexythhg it can to
reduce its own demand for illegal narcotics; otherwise Salinass
vigorous commitm ent to defeating Mexican drug trafficking may be
in vain I As long as U.S. demand is so high, efforts to diminish
narcotics production Michael G. Wilson Policy Analyst 14