Appellant,
Gregg Shannon, appeals a permanent injunction for protection
against stalking that was entered against him. Appellant
argues, and we agree, that the trial court's
determination that he stalked Appellee, Christopher Smith,
his neighbor, is not supported by competent, substantial
evidence. We, therefore, reverse the injunction.

In his
September 2018 petition for a stalking injunction, Appellee
relied upon a May 2017 incident in which Appellant allegedly
stole signs from the neighborhood, a May 2017 "blow
me" email sent to him from Appellant, a July 2017
incident in which Appellant allegedly put flyers in
Appellee's "flyer box," a July 2017 sign
stealing incident, a November 2017 sign throwing incident, a
January 2018 incident in which Appellant allegedly yelled at
other neighbors, a January 2018 incident in which Appellant
allegedly chased Appellee, who was riding his bike, and
yelled profanities at him, a February 2018 email in which
Appellant allegedly threatened Appellee about his "TV
job" and mentioned Appellee's "morals
clause" with his employer, a July 2018 email sent to
Appellee's employer, and an August 2018 incident at the
homeowner's association ("HOA") meeting that,
according to a police report, involved a verbal altercation
between Appellant and Appellee.

In
setting the matter for a hearing, the trial court found that
the petition did not set forth a sufficient factual basis
upon which it could enter a temporary injunction. During the
subsequent hearing, the trial court asked Appellee how
Appellant had stalked or cyberstalked him. Appellee testified
about Appellant stealing, throwing, and damaging signs in the
neighborhood that pertained to a lawsuit that some neighbors,
including Appellee, were involved in against a home builder,
and about Appellant chasing him down the street while yelling
profanities. Appellee acknowledged that the email to his
employer that he relied upon in his petition was sent from an
anonymous Gmail account and that it was possible that another
neighbor who opposed the lawsuit could have sent it. A video
was played of the HOA meeting during which Appellant and
Appellee had a verbal altercation. A second video was also
played of an encounter Appellant had with another neighbor
elsewhere in the neighborhood. After the trial court asked
Appellant whether the language he used at the HOA meeting was
an appropriate or nice thing to do, in response to which
Appellant acknowledged it was not, the trial court stated,
"Well, it may not arise to a criminal; however, based
upon the videos I have seen, they were aggressive in nature
and the Court is going to enter an order of injunction
prohibiting [Appellant] from having any contact with
[Appellee] or his family." This appeal followed.

In
2012, the Legislature created a cause of action for an
injunction for protection against stalking. See
§ 784.0485(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). "Stalking"
is defined as "willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
follow[ing], harass[ing], or cyberstalk[ing] another
person." § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2018).
"Harass" means "to engage in a course of
conduct directed at a specific person which causes
substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no
legitimate purpose." § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
(2018). "Course of conduct" means "a pattern
of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of
time, however short, which evidences a continuity of
purpose." § 784.048(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018).
"Cyberstalk" means to "engage in a course of
conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated,
words, images, or language by or through the use of
electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a
specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to
that person and serving no legitimate purpose." §
784.048(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2018).

To be
entitled to an injunction under section 784.0485, a
petitioner must prove by competent, substantial evidence a
single incident of stalking. Pickett v. Copeland,
236 So.3d 1142, 1145 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018); see also
Paulson v. Rankart, 251 So.3d 986, 989 (Fla. 1st DCA
2018). In determining whether an incident causes substantial
emotional distress, courts use a reasonable person standard
rather than a subjective one. McMath v. Biernacki,
776 So.2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). While a trial court
has broad discretion to grant an injunction, the question of
whether the evidence is legally sufficient to justify
imposing an injunction is a question of law that is
reviewable de novo. Pickett, 236 So.3d at 1143-44.

Based
upon the hearing transcript, the trial court entered the
stalking injunction because of what it considered to be
Appellant's aggressive behavior toward Appellee at the
HOA meeting and toward a different neighbor on another
occasion. However, whether Appellant was verbally aggressive
toward someone other than Appellee has no bearing on whether
he stalked Appellee. Moreover, a verbal altercation between
two neighbors during an HOA meeting in no way warrants the
entry of an injunction against stalking. The same can be said
of the other incidents relied upon by Appellee in his
petition, some of which Appellee himself described as being
petty. As for the July 2018 anonymous email that was sent to
Appellee's employer, Appellee acknowledged below that
another person could have sent it.

In
Corrie v. Keul, 160 So.3d 97, 99 (Fla. 1st DCA
2015), this Court, in reversing an injunction against repeat
violence, rejected the appellee's argument that his
allegations and the testimony presented at the hearing showed
that the appellant, his neighbor, engaged in stalking and
harassment. The appellee had alleged that the appellant
threatened to take his house and have him thrown in jail,
screamed at him, chased him and his dog down the sidewalk on
one occasion, and told him that "it hold 1 in the
chamber and 8 more." Id. We explained that
while the appellee argued that there are certain threatening
and violent situations between neighbors where courts have no
choice but to enter an injunction, the case at hand did not
present one of those situations. Id. This case does
not present one of those situations either.

Similarly,
in Power v. Boyle, 60 So.3d 496, 499 (Fla. 1st DCA
2011), we reviewed an injunction against repeat violence and
determined that although the incidents at issue, which
involved neighbors and included yelling obscenities, letting
a dog urinate on the other party's garage door, and
writing profane and inappropriate notes on mail, were
immature and uncivil, they did not constitute violence or
stalking. We reasoned that it appeared that the relationship
between the parties was more "tit-for-tat than
stalker-victim." Id. This case can be
characterized in the same manner.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In
addition, Appellant correctly argues that Appellee provided
no testimony that any of Appellant&#39;s actions caused him
substantial emotional distress. As we have explained, the
substantial emotional distress that is necessary to support a
stalking injunction is greater than just an ordinary feeling
of distress. Venn v. Fowlkes, 257 So.3d 622, 624
(Fla. 1st DCA 2018). While the anonymous email sent to
Appellee&#39;s employer and Appellant&#39;s behavior at the
HOA meeting may have frustrated and embarrassed Appellee, and
rightfully so, embarrassment does not equate to substantial
emotional distress. See David v. Textor, 189 So.3d
871, 875 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("That they [online
postings] may be embarrassing to [the appellee] is not at all
the same as causing him substantial emotional distress
sufficient to obtain an injunction."). Without evidence
of this necessary element, the injunction should not have
been entered. See Roach v. Brower, 180 So.3d 1142,
1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (noting that "without competent,
substantial evidence that . . . the petitioner, suffered
substantial emotional distress, the circuit court could not
enter an injunction against [the appellant] based upon the
stalking statute"); see also Klemple v.
Gagliano, 197 So.3d 1283, 1286 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)
(noting that the appellee did not testify as to any emotional
distress caused by arguing with the appellant and reasoning
that the stalking statute did not allow the trial court to
enter injunctions simply to keep the peace between parties
who are unable to get along and behave civilly towards each
other); Jones v. Jackson, 67 So.3d 1203, 1203-04
(Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (concluding that the appellant&#39;s
threatening phone calls and text messages to the appellee,
and his statements to third parties suggesting he would do
violence to the appellee, would not have caused a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress);
McMath, 776 ...

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