Tsongkhapafan wrote:According to Je Tsongkhapa's teaching, you have to begin with a generic image of emptiness which depends upon holding a correct conceptual understanding of emptiness. If you hold an incorrect conceptual understanding of emptiness, it cannot be realised.

So tsongkhapa is the origin of the Tibetan notion that awakening is dependent on correctly assembling an intellectual jigsaw puzzle?

I don't think so, I doubt it.

Regarding views, if there is no correct view, there is no object of meditation and if there is no correct object of meditation, we cannot gain inner experience that pacifies delusions. All problems are caused by wrong view, so I can't agree with your dismissal of correct views which are the only antidote.

Well, in Chinese Madhyamika the maxim is ""refuting what is misleading, revealing what is corrective" - Not "understand accurately". Views are fundamentally flawed, 'correct' understanding is not truly possible. They can however be corrective so that is the extent of their utility on the path.

"Even if my body should be burnt to death in the fires of hellI would endure it for myriad lifetimes As your companion in practice" --- Gandavyuha Sutra

smcj wrote:What I get is that in the Sakya the intellectual view is introduced/utilized at some point in tantric practice.

In Sakya, the intellectual view is introduced prior to tantric practice, in the three visions section. In Vajrayāna, the experiential view is introduced in the empowerment, and confirmed through a precise system of meditating on various examples.

The first part of the sentence seems to agree with my prior post about sutra Mahamudra. The second part of the sentence starting with what I underlined I think indicates that intellectual view is incorporated into deity practice--at least in the Sakya.

No, it is not. What is incorporated into deity practice is the experiential view which comes from empowerment and is stabilized by the unique approach found in Sakya called "meditating the view of the inseparability of samsara and nirvana".

Frankly, despite polemics between Sakya and Kagyu over the issue of sutra mahāmudra, meditating the view here is not so different than sutra mahāmudra save only the name.

I think I get that you are disagreeing with my post about tantric Mahamudra not needing a view--at least in Sakya.

Tantric Mahāmudra has a "view", but it is experiential, not intellectual, and is based on an example wisdom at the time of empowerment.

Tsongkhapafan wrote:Wisdom cannot be self-existent. It's a mental factor. It's an aspect of consciousness and it also depends upon its object.

What is your idea of what constitutes "Dharmakaya"?

Buddha possesses four bodies, two of which constitute the Truth Body or Dharmakaya. The Wisdom Truth Body is Buddha's omniscient mind which is a functioning thing and a conventional truth and the Nature Truth Body which is the emptiness of Buddha's mind and which is the ultimate true cessation. These, of course, are not two separate things but one entity, but they can be conceptually distinguished: one object with two names.

I've not heard the Dharmakaya broken down this way before. Buddha's omniscient mind, what you call the Wisdom Truth Body, is a conventional truth but is an aspect of the Dharmakaya?

It is the position of the Kagyupas, at least, that the Dharmakaya is unlike the "mind" of sentient beings--in fact, it is wisdom, and not a conventional mind. It is empty, of course, but of a completely different order of being than conventional mind. However, we also say that the nature of thoughts, and mental events, is the Dharmakaya.

Tsongkhapafan wrote:Milarepa said:

1You should know that all appearances are the nature of mindAnd that mind is the nature of emptiness.

When the mind and its emptiness are completely freed from the two obstructions of delusions and their imprints, it becomes the Dharmakaya.

We would say the mind "ceases" when the obscurations are purified, or, better yet, that the "mind" is transformed into the nature of the Dharmakaya, when one realizes the nature of thoughts, appearances, etc., as essentially Wisdom--but the wisdom of the Dharmakaya, which cannot even really be called "Wisdom."

Milarepa is singing of the teaching of Marpa, received in turn from Maitripa:

However appearances might appear outsideNot realized, are delusory projectionsClinging to objects, that is what ties you downFor those who know, they're illusory appearanceFor them, what appear to be objects are mind's resourceIn the end, in fact, there is no such thing as appearanceAnd, being unborn dharmakaya, is utterly pureHe taught of its sacredness in the unborn dharmakaya

The workings of rational consciousness insideNot realized, are ignorance itselfThis is the root of all karma and all afflictionIf realized, it's self-awareness wisdomHere is where positive qualities spring full-blownIn the end, in fact, there is no such thing as wisdomLet phenomena go as far as they go and no moreThis is as far as they go and no more, he said

As far as this goes, it is consistent with a general Mahayana presentation. The talk of "Tantric view" and "tantric Mahamudra" is tangential to the Ideas of Yogacara and Madhyamika, in my opinion, because it is experiental, as Malcolm says, and not conceptual or constructed by rational mind.

"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."

May any merit generated by on-line discussionBe dedicated to the Ultimate Benefit of All Sentient Beings.

"Absolute Truth is not an object of analytical discourse or great discriminating wisdom,It is realized through the blessing grace of the Guru and fortunate Karmic potential.Like this, mistaken ideas of discriminating wisdom are clarified."

May any merit generated by on-line discussionBe dedicated to the Ultimate Benefit of All Sentient Beings.

I didn't realize it was the three natures that was so much of an issue, and will remember to keep that in mind when researching.

It's an issue for Malcolm personally. It's his bugaboo.

Am just wondering Malcolm : why don't you like the concept of the three natures? I said I wasn't that into it either, but after researching further it does seem to work well. I think you say here or elsewhere that it's not needed when there's already the two truths, but it just seems to be a different way of explaining it, and in one way it actually seems to make things easier to understand, because the answer of how to go from conventional to ultimate is already contained within the concept, by adding the imagined (and the removal of it.)

Do you think it overly complicates things in some ways? Maybe it's unnecessary for those who already have a good understanding of different levels of truth, but for some that are newer to the idea, maybe it's easier to work with.

I didn't realize it was the three natures that was so much of an issue, and will remember to keep that in mind when researching.

It's an issue for Malcolm personally. It's his bugaboo.

Am just wondering Malcolm : why don't you like the concept of the three natures?

It is not a matter of partiality. The problem with the three natures is that they contain an internal contradiction: viz since the perfected nature is merely the absence of the imagined in the dependent, one must explain how the dependent, which is conditioned, becomes the perfected, which is unconditioned.

The Tibetan system of treating the perfected nature as empty of the dependent and the imagined indeed is based on some very late Indian scholars, but it is not justified in the works of Maitreyanatha, Asanga or Vasubandhu.

Malcolm wrote:The problem with the three natures is that they contain an internal contradiction: viz since the perfected nature is merely the absence of the imagined in the dependent, one must explain how the dependent, which is conditioned, becomes the perfected, which is unconditioned.

Yeah can see how that can be a problem, but maybe it's also an act of pointing to the idea that they're always both present? As in nirvana is also samsara. But by removing the imagined you remove the contradiction, and they're of what you could say, one taste, or nondual. So instead of trying to go from one to the other, instead you can just work on letting the attachment to the imagined go and then the nondual aspect can then arise, appear, return, and so on, in a natural way.

So you could maybe sum it up by saying that the dependent only appears to be conditioned when the imagined is present. Once that's gone, then it's nondual.

Malcolm wrote:The problem with the three natures is that they contain an internal contradiction: viz since the perfected nature is merely the absence of the imagined in the dependent, one must explain how the dependent, which is conditioned, becomes the perfected, which is unconditioned.

Yeah can see how that can be a problem, but maybe it's also an act of pointing to the idea that they're always both present? As in nirvana is also samsara. But by removing the imagined you remove the contradiction, and they're of what you could say, one taste, or nondual. So instead of trying to go from one to the other, instead you can just work on letting the attachment to the imagined go and then the nondual aspect can then arise, appear, return, and so on, in a natural way.

So you could maybe sum it up by saying that the dependent only appears to be conditioned when the imagined is present. Once that's gone, then it's nondual.

Then you still wind up with a contradiction because you are claiming that something defined as conditioned is not conditioned.

Malcolm wrote:Then you still wind up with a contradiction because you are claiming that something defined as conditioned is not conditioned.

Isn't that problem there with anything classed as nondual, primordial, one-taste, etc, though? It could be that it's conditioned when the imaginary nature is present, or when it's still attached to, (and also mainly to point out and teach others.) but when it's let go of, it's neither conditioned nor unconditioned, because we're then leaving the realm of logic, and it's then beyond defining. So the whole concept is then let go of once it's served its purpose.

Malcolm wrote:Then you still wind up with a contradiction because you are claiming that something defined as conditioned is not conditioned.

Isn't that problem there with anything classed as nondual, primordial, one-taste, etc, though? It could be that it's conditioned when the imaginary nature is present, or when it's still attached to, (and also mainly to point out and teach others.) but when it's let go of, it's neither conditioned nor unconditioned, because we're then leaving the realm of logic, and it's then beyond defining. So the whole concept is then let go of once it's served its purpose.

No, the dependent nature is defined as conditioned. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha states:

Why? If it is asked what is the dependent, since it arises from the seeds of one's traces, given that is the case, it is the conditioned dependent.

Here, one can clearly see the other dependent is the ālayavijñāna. Then he goes on:

If it is held that whatever appears does not exist in that way, for what reason will the dependent nature not become the total non-existence of everything? If it is asked, if that [dependent nature] does not exist, how will the non-existent perfected nature not become the non-existence of everything? Affliction and purification are perceptible. Therefore, everything is not non-existent. A verse for that:If the dependent and the perfecteddo not exist in every aspect,affliction and purificationcan never exist at all.

So you see, there is an assertion here by Asanga that the ālayavijñāna which is the basis of purification must be an existent in order that the perfected nature can exist; but since one is conditioned and the other is unconditioned, this Yogacara view suffers from a crucial internal contradiction.

The gzhan stong pas seek to escape this contradiction by mapping the three natures over the two truths. But this mapping is not justified in the Indian texts and in reality harms both systems. So you wind up with a system that is kind of like a tole, a sterile hybrid between a yak and cow, being neither.

I didn't realize it was the three natures that was so much of an issue, and will remember to keep that in mind when researching.

It's an issue for Malcolm personally. It's his bugaboo.

It is not a matter of partiality. The problem with the three natures is that they contain an internal contradiction: viz since the perfected nature is merely the absence of the imagined in the dependent, one must explain how the dependent, which is conditioned, becomes the perfected, which is unconditioned.

Oh c'mon. Of course it is a matter of partiality. Unless you are saying that there is a broad consensus on the matter, which as we all know is never the case in Tibetan Dharma, then you are presenting your personal preference with an argument attached. What the possible rebuttals to your argument are I have no idea, but suffice it here to say that there are plenty of qualified khenpos that subscribe to the idea of the 3 natures that are familiar with your objection.

The Tibetan system of treating the perfected nature as empty of the dependent and the imagined indeed is based on some very late Indian scholars, but it is not justified in the works of Maitreyanatha, Asanga or Vasubandhu.

As you say it is a later development. There does seem to be a slippery slope effect here regarding the Buddha Nature teachings that is playing out over time. One of the things I admire about the Gelugpas is their insistence on trying to hold the line. I have a mental image of them as being like the little Dutch boy with his finger in the dike, only the entire dike has already collapsed except for the section a couple feet to the right and left of him.

Where this slippery slope ends up is in the Shentong and Chinese non-dual camps. Making too much of an issue out of it at this point is just crying over spilt milk, imo. I think an ecumenical "we will just have to agree to disagree" approach is in order.

My posts are for entertainment purposes only. Please don't take anything I say seriously unless you verify it with a real teacher first.

Malcolm wrote:No, the dependent nature is defined as conditioned. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha states:

Why? If it is asked what is the dependent, since it arises from the seeds of one's traces, given that is the case, it is the conditioned dependent.

Here, one can clearly see the other dependent is the ālayavijñāna. Then he goes on:

If it is held that whatever appears does not exist in that way, for what reason will the dependent nature not become the total non-existence of everything? If it is asked, if that [dependent nature] does not exist, how will the non-existent perfected nature not become the non-existence of everything? Affliction and purification are perceptible. Therefore, everything is not non-existent. A verse for that:If the dependent and the perfecteddo not exist in every aspect,affliction and purificationcan never exist at all.

So you see, there is an assertion here by Asanga that the ālayavijñāna which is the basis of purification must be an existent in order that the perfected nature can exist; but since one is conditioned and the other is unconditioned, this Yogacara view suffers from a crucial internal contradiction.

The gzhan stong pas seek to escape this contradiction by mapping the three natures over the two truths. But this mapping is not justified in the Indian texts and in reality harms both systems. So you wind up with a system that is kind of like a tole, a sterile hybrid between a yak and cow, being neither.

It seems contradictory but maybe that's because the alayavijnana and the dependent are neither pure nor impure, conditioned nor unconditioned, nondual.

He also says these things in the Mahayanasamgraha, near to where the part you quoted is from :

If in one sense the dependent nature merges with the three natures, why are these three natures not identical? – Inasmuch as it is dependent, it is not imaginary and it is not absolute. Inasmuch as it is imaginary, it is not dependent and is not absolute. Inasmuch as it is absolute, it is not dependent and not imaginary.

Are these three natures different or are they the same? They are neither different nor the same. The dependent nature is dependent in one sense, imaginary in another, absolute in a third sense.In what sense is the dependent nature 'dependent'? - Insofar as it depends on something else, i.e., the arising of the propensity seeds.In what sense is it 'imaginary'? - Insofar as it is the object of imagination and is imagined by the latter.In what sense is it 'absolute'? - Insofar as it does not exist in the absolute sense in the way it is imagined.

That is why, when it arises, if one perceives its imaginary nature, one does not perceive its absolute nature; if one perceives its absolute nature, one does not perceive its imaginary nature. Similarly, it is said: “In the dependent, the imaginary is absent, but the absolute is present there. That is why, in the dependent, these two natures, imaginary and absolute, non-perceived and perceived, are the same.”

So it could be said that the unconditioned doesn't actually come from the conditioned, the conditioned already is the unconditioned if looked at without false imagination.

Made a contradiction just after saying it seems contradictory back there, by saying two totally opposite things (before editing.) I said the alayavijnana and dependent are both pure and impure, conditioned and unconditioned, then shortly after said they were neither pure nor impure, conditioned nor unconditioned. But they're all four anyway aren't they? To someone deluded there's pure and impure, conditioned and unconditioned, to someone without delusion, neither. Or to try to put it in a better way : not one, the other, nor both, nor neither.

One more attempt : the dependent is only dependent when seen from false imagination. When seen properly, it was never actually dependent, or existing, not existing, and so on. Definition ceases because it's seen for what it truly is.

smcj wrote:Oh c'mon. Of course it is a matter of partiality. Unless you are saying that there is a broad consensus on the matter, which as we all know is never the case in Tibetan Dharma, then you are presenting your personal preference with an argument attached. What the possible rebuttals to your argument are I have no idea, but suffice it here to say that there are plenty of qualified khenpos that subscribe to the idea of the 3 natures that are familiar with your objection.

The Tibetan system of treating the perfected nature as empty of the dependent and the imagined indeed is based on some very late Indian scholars, but it is not justified in the works of Maitreyanatha, Asanga or Vasubandhu.

As you say it is a later development. There does seem to be a slippery slope effect here regarding the Buddha Nature teachings that is playing out over time. One of the things I admire about the Gelugpas is their insistence on trying to hold the line. I have a mental image of them as being like the little Dutch boy with his finger in the dike, only the entire dike has already collapsed except for the section a couple feet to the right and left of him.

Where this slippery slope ends up is in the Shentong and Chinese non-dual camps. Making too much of an issue out of it at this point is just crying over spilt milk, imo. I think an ecumenical "we will just have to agree to disagree" approach is in order.

Even Karl Brunholz admits that the three natures as presented by the Tibetan gzhan stong pas does not reflect their use by the original Yogacara masters. The former use what he describes as the type two schema of the three natures, while he fully admits that the latter use a type one schema. The problem arises because the Tibetan gzhan stong pas clearly claim that they are representing the thought of the original Yogacara masters, Maitreyanatha, Asanga and Vasubandhu when in fact they clearly are not, and thus Tsongkhapa, Gorampa, and so on, a whole host of Kagyu, Sakya, Nyingma and Gelug scholars can take them to task for misapplication of this doctrine.

The three natures doctrine is entirely irrelevant to the tathāgatagarbha teachings. It is wholly absent in the ten so called "tathāgatagarbha" sutras as well as the Uttaratantra. The three natures doctrine was grafted onto the tathāgatagarbha doctrine in Tibet because the tathāgatagarbha sūtras are considered "third turning" and the subject of the three natures is covered extensively in the Saṃdhinirmocana sutra, a sūtra of the Yogacara class, which provides us with the locus classicus of the three turnings, but it is so vague as to what is meant by this as to be rather useless, though much stock is placed in it by the gzhan stong pas.

Longchenpa is a perfectly good example of an author who considers the tathāgatagarbha sūtras to be definitive without mixing in the Yogacara three own natures. He also considers Prasangika to be the definitive sutra view.

My problem with the gzhan stong pas is that they do not heed the valid objections of their opponents, and as far as I can tell adhere to their tenet system out of sheer stubbornness rather than reason.

My objection to gzhan stong therefore is primarily an objection to their sloppiness of scholarship.

It's contradictory because he says it exists. That makes Yogacara realist. Something cannot exist as both conditioned and unconditioned, it must be one or the other. Moreover, the former can never become the latter, nor can the latter become the former.

It's contradictory because he says it exists. That makes Yogacara realist. Something cannot exist as both conditioned and unconditioned, it must be one or the other. Moreover, the former can never become the latter, nor can the latter become the former.

Are you going from the "exist in every aspect" part? Because the translation I have words it differently :

If the dependent and the absolute did not exist at all, defilement and purification would not take place.

He does seem to contradict himself in parts, but it's maybe because he's explaining from conventional and non-conventional aspects. There's plenty of places in just the Mahayanasamgraha where he could also be said to be stating the opposite. For instance, when speaking of the fourfold pure dharma, this is the first of the four listed :

So you could take the fundamental element part and say he thinks something exists, but he also states that emptiness is also an aspect. It could in part be down to what he originally said not being translated accurately sometimes, but I do get that he appears to state something exists in places. I think he means in a nondual sense though, not as in individuality or anything conventional.

rob h wrote:Are you going from the "exist in every aspect" part? Because the translation I have words it differently :

If the dependent and the absolute did not exist at all, defilement and purification would not take place.

It amounts to the same thing, I was translating it direct from Tibetan.

He does seem to contradict himself in parts, but it's maybe because he's explaining from conventional and non-conventional aspects. There's plenty of places in just the Mahayanasamgraha where he could also be said to be stating the opposite. For instance, when speaking of the fourfold pure dharma, this is the first of the four listed :

I think he means in a nondual sense though, not as in individuality or anything conventional.

If exists nondually, it exists, which is why the Madhyamakas claim that Yogacarins are nondual realists.

In a nondual sense though no polarity can be attributed, can it? I still think the problem comes down to taking what he's saying too literally. I can see how some Madhyamikas look at it in that way though. Also how maybe Asanga himself could've worded things better? Or maybe he was simply referring to what's left ultimately when everything false is discarded, and it actually does exist in some way, but with an equal nature of emptiness, so it had a balance. Would like to think that's the case anyway.