The Battle of Eylau (February 7-8, 1807) From Denis Davidov's Memoirs

Translated and introduced by Greg Troubetzkoy

Introduction

Napoleon's successful campaign against Prussia in 1806
amazed everyone. He appeared unstoppable in his plans to
hammer out new foundations for Europe and bend it to his
will. While he succeeded in destroying the Prussian military
machine in the battles of Jena and Auerstadt, his diplomatic
efforts met with little success.

Russia continued to refuse to join his crusade against
England and to accept the new status-quo imposed in central
Europe.

The economic blockade promulgated from Berlin in November
1806 did not bring the hoped-for result and force England to
her knees. Instead, it would gradually bring economic ruin
to Napoleon's empire. His efforts to pin the Russians down
and to destroy them were also proving elusive. A long winter
war was looming ahead, and the Russians and French armies
prepared to meet.

The original Russian plan was to surprise and overwhelm
the French troops under Bernadotte and Ney, before Napoleon
and the other corps of his army, about 80,000 strong, could
come to their rescue, and defeat them separately. In his
winter quarters, Bernadotte had 17,000 troops, almost
outside the military operations, in Elbingen. Ney had 22,000
infantry soldiers and the cavalry of Bessieres in his corps,
also far flung out. However, Ney was not in his winter
quarters, but was actually pursuing Lestock's corps in the
direction of Friedland, and thereby was almost on the route
which was being followed by the Russian army! The plan was
to cut off and destroy Ney's corps while on the march, but
due to slow movement and incorrect orientation of the
Russians, Ney was able to march through Eylau, follow the
Passarge river, and join the main body of the French
army.

Bernadotte, learning of the Russian movement to intercept
Ney and Bessieres, realized the danger of remaining near the
sea shore next to the fortified towns of Danzig and
Graudenz, which were still occupied by the Prussians.
Therefore, Bernadotte left Elbing, and marched to Mohrungen,
where he was able to make a stand and avoid encirclement up
north.

Jean-Baptiste
Bernadotte

After skirmishing for almost eight hours with Soult and
Murat around Eylau's cemetery on 7 February, Benningsen with
about 50,000 men under his command should have attacked the
French at the crack of dawn on 8 February, before Davout and
Ney arrived. They were still twenty and twenty-five miles
off respectively when they were summoned urgently by
Napoleon to come join his forces. Davout was hurrying from
Bartenstein with about 15,000 men.

Instead, the Russians opened a cannonade early in the
morning with 500 artillery pieces of which one-third was of
heavy caliber. At about 1:00 P.M., having arrived with fresh
troops, Davout attacked the Russian left and threatened
their rear. Benningsen turned most of his troops against
him. To prevent this, Napoleon ordered Augereau to attack
but both of his divisions were chopped up by Russian
artillery and he lost 12,000 out of his 15,000 men.

Ney failed to intercept the Prussian army numbering
15,000 men and they checked Davout's advance.

Finally Murat's cavalry (10,700 men) charged the Russian
center and forced them to withdraw, albeit in good order.
Although Benningsen lost a good chunk of his army, Eylau was
no better than a draw!

The French lost between 20,000 and 25,000 killed and
wounded and 1,200 were taken prisoners. The Russians left
11,000 dead on the battlefield and about 2,500 were taken
prisoners, mainly wounded. All told there was almost 40,000
casualties at Eylau where about 70,000 men confronted one
another on each side.

Benningsen had a chance to destroy Bernadotte and Ney
while they were so far removed from Napoleon's main body of
French troops. Ney in particular was in a precarious
position, as he was strung out in pursuit of Lestock and the
Prussians. Benningsen failed to make good on his chance,
which was a major missed opportunity that would have had a
dramatic effect on the outcome of the overall action.
Incidentally, Davidov's memoirs contain ten pages of text
regarding the marches and counter-marches prior the battle
of Eylau, which are not included in this translation of his
writing on the battle itself.

The Battle Of Eylau, From DENIS DAVIDOV'S Memoirs

Denis
Davidov in 1814
Engraving by M. Dubourg from a painting by
Orlovsky.
This print is the frontpiece of his
memoirs.

The disposition of our army comprising from 70,000 to
80,000 was as follows: Its right flank was anchored to the
main Koenigsberg highway near the village of Schloditen and
was stretching at an angle towards the town but short of
about one-half mile of its walls made an angle and rested
its left flank on Klein - Sausgarten. The village of
Serpalten just ahead of Sausgarten was occupied by a weak
detachment under Major-General Baggovut. Five infantry
divisions: the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 8th were arranged in
two lines; 2 battalions of each regiment were deployed
frontally and the 3rd behind them in a column; with them
were arrayed over 200 canons.

The reserve consisting of two divisions, the 4th and the
14th were disposed in two thick columns and had 50 pieces of
horse-drawn artillery. At sunrise it was moved closer to the
center of the army. All the cavalry was divided in three
portions and placed on the flanks and in the center of the
army where there was no more than 28 squadrons; as for the
cossack regiments they were positioned on the approaches of
both flanks.

Independently of the artillery which was deployed along
the line and kept with the reserve, the 1st battery of 40
heavy pieces and 20 light pieces was at first on the right
flank of the army, next to the Koenigsberg highway, but when
the town was occupied by the enemy it was moved 700 steps
further away from it; the 2nd battery of 70 heavy pieces was
arrayed almost in the center of the army, about a mile from
the city and finally the 3rd battery of 40 heavy pieces
stood between the center and Sausgarten. To all three
batteries were adjoining the troops of our first line as if
they were bastions protruding from fortifications.

The Prussian corps under Lestock, strengthened by the
Viborg infantry regiment and counting up to 8,000 men was
still quite far, but moving towards Altdorf, that is towards
our right flank. One of its brigades under General Plotz was
to entice Ney towards Kreitzburg and away from the area of
decisive events and from taking part in the coming
battle.

Michel
Ney

Our right flank was under the command of Lt. General
Tuchkov 1st, the center under Lt. General Saken, the left
flank under Lt. General Osterman-Tolstoy; the reserve under
Lt. General Dokhturov, all the cavalry under Lt. General
Golitzyne, the artillery under Lt. General Rezvoy.

Bagration who was the youngest of the generals had no
independent command and was assigned to Dokhturov's
reserve.

The French army on the eve of the battle was disposed as
follows: At the approaches to the town and inside -- the
infantry division of gal. Legrand on the right side of the
town -- the infantry brigade under Vivienne, on the left the
infantry brigade under Fere (they both were part of Infantry
Division under Lewal).

To the right flank of Vivienne's brigade adjoined the
infantry division of St. Hilaire all these three divisions
were part of the corps under Mal. Soult.

Peter
Bagration

To the right of St. Hilaire's division the dragoon
division under Milhaud. Behind the town, on either side of
the Landsberg road were to be found the dragoon divisions of
Klein and Grouchy, to their left, behind the infantry
brigade of Fere was the cavalry division of the Guard.
Offside, also to the left, the light cavalry brigades of
Colbert, Guyot and Bruyere and the Cuirassier division under
Haupoult.

The light cavalry brigade of Durosnel was at the very end
of the left flank of the whole army and next to the village
of Altdorf.

Behind the Cuirassiers of Haupoult, on the road leading
from Eylau to the village of Stroben -- the infantry corps
of Augereau. The infantry guard of Napoleon and its own
bivouac, on the hill between Eylau and Gringhofshen.

The infantry corps of Davout, about 20 miles away from
the main body of the army on the road to Bartenshtein. The
infantry corps of Ney, about 25 miles from the army on the
road to Tzinten.

Louis
Nicolas Davout

The infantry corps of Bernadotte was several days march
behind the French army. The surrounding area which was
occupied by our positions was a slightly hilly plain which
adjoined on the left side several elevations overlooking our
left flank and their location was very dangerous from the
strategic point of view. Snow covered the ground and this
made it difficult to move the artillery and the frozen small
lakes, also snow covered, spread around the field of battle
were very treacherous as they offered flat surfaces which
appeared ideal but in fact were quite dangerous when moving
artillery pieces. Swamps were even more impossible even for
infantry! A forest of brambles stretched between the
villages of Sausgarten, Kutschitten and Auklappen. The
weather was clear on the whole, although marred by passing
snow flurries. Light frost, no more than 3 or 4 degrees.

With morning's early half-light the army got up and got
their rifles ready. The camp fires were still smoldering
where the men had slept between the dark lines of the
formations crisscrossing the pristine snow-covered fields of
the coming battle; nowhere among them had a shot been fired
yet; you could only see a certain commotion in the lines and
columns which were coming to a final battle order. The 4th
infantry division and the Archangel town regiment returned
to their place, which was part of the general army
reserve.

Daylight suddenly appeared and with it the 60 piece
battery of our right flank opened up with a roar. Part of
the enemy artillery which was at rest behind the first
buildings of the town came out from behind them and answered
the challenge -- and Napoleon saw with his own eyes that it
was no longer a question of a fight with the rear-guard, as
he had first thought, but with our whole army. It is not
possible that at that moment the great army commander did
not reproach himself for allowing the corps of Ney and
Davout to be removed for such a distance from the army as
they were and did not become annoyed that fate had left him
without Bernadotte's corps on such a decisive day. Staff
officers were immediately rushed to Davout and Ney with
orders to hurry to Eylau. In the meantime a severe cannonade
roared around the city, and the main French forces began to
redeploy. The light cavalry brigades of Durosnel, Bruyere,
Guyot and Colbert remained to the left of Eylau. The
infantry division of Lewal pooling together all three
brigades presented their left flank to these light cavalry
brigades and their right towards the city. The Legrand
infantry division moved forward from there and connected to
the right flank of Lewal. Augereau's corps formed two lines:
Desjardin division was the first and Hudelet division made
up the second. Both of them anchored their left to the
church which was at the end of town where Napoleon remained
for the duration of the battle.

Behind Augereau was deployed the Cuirassier division of
Haupoult which was next to the guard infantry standing
behind the church on an elevation. Behind Haupoult was the
mounted guard and to the right, lined up with them was
Grouchy's division of Dragoons. St. Hilaire (from Soult's
corps) adjoined the right flank of Augereau's first line and
screened with its men the Klein Dragoon division.

The cannonade from both sides increased with the
deployment of the French army parallel to ours. It became
generalized but still appeared stronger near the city than
elsewhere. This was due to the fact that we were trying
there to stop Legrand and Lewal from attacking our right
flank and the French were attempting to draw our attention
away from our left and facilitate Davout's effort at that
point, whose arrival was meant to decide the outcome of the
battle.

The fire from several hundred guns had already lasted
about three hours straight but nothing remarkable had
happened neither on the enemy's nor our side.

Having received the news of the impending arrival of
Davout's corps who was under orders to move from the
Heilsberg road to the Bartenshtein road, Napoleon ordered
the main center of his army to move to the right and combine
their operations with those of Davout. The armies moved
forward but at that instant a heavy snow storm hit and you
couldn't see anything two steps away.

Augereau's corps lost its bearing, lost contact with St.
Hilaire's division and all the cavalry, and suddenly
appeared, much to their and our surprise in front of our
central battery just as the weather cleared. Seventy cannons
belched total hell and a hail of grapeshot started to ring
against their rifle barrels and hammer at the live mass of
flesh and bone.

In an instant the Moscow grenadier and the Shlusselbourg
infantry together with gal. Somov infantry with lowered
bayonets rushed hungrily at them. The French wavered, but
recovering met bayonet with bayonet and stood their
ground.

There took place an engagement the likes of which had
never been seen before. Over 20,000 men from both sides were
plunging a three-faceted blade into each other. Crowds fell.
I was a personal witness of this Homeric slaughter and I
must say truly that over the course of the 16 campaigns in
my service record and through the epoch of all Napoleonic
campaigns, justly referred to as the legend of our century,
I have never seen the likes of it! For about half an hour
you didn't hear a cannon or a rifle shot neither in the
midst nor around this spot: you could only hear some
inexpressible roar of thousands of brave soldiers in hand to
hand struggle, mixing and cutting each other up. Mounds of
dead bodies were piled over with new mounds; people were
falling on top of each other by the hundreds, so that this
whole segment of the battle resembled a high parapet of a
suddenly erected fortification. Finally, our side got the
upper hand!

Joachim
Murat

Augereau's corps was toppled and hotly pursued by our
infantry and Prince Golitsyn who had galloped with the
central cavalry to support the foot soldiers. The pitch of
their fervor reached improbable heights: one of our
battalions in the heat of pursuit went way over the enemy
position and appeared at the church a hundred steps away
from Napoleon himself, which is mentioned by all Frenchmen
in their war diaries of that time. It was a critical moment.
Napoleon whose resolve grew incrementally with multiplying
dangers ordered Murat and Bessières together with the
three Haupoult divisions, Klein, Grouchy and the horse-guard
to strike at our troops rushing in with shouts of HURRAH.
This movement was necessary to save even part of Augereau's
corps and to forestall our general onslaught. More than 60
squadrons galloped around to the right of the fleeing corps
and rushed against us, waving their swords. The field was
engulfed in a roar and the snow, ploughed over by 12,000
united riders lifted and swirled from under them like a
storm. Brilliant Murat with his carousel-like costume
followed by a large suite, was ablaze ahead of the onslaught
with a naked saber and flew directly into the thick of the
fight. Rifle and canon fire and leveled bayonets were unable
to stem the deadly tide. The French cavalry crumpled and
stomped on everything, broke through the first line of the
army and its impetuous rush had reached the second line and
our reserve, but here it broke against the cliff of a
stronger will. The second line and the reserve stood their
ground, did not waver and turned back the awesome tidal wave
with thick battery and rifle fire.

Jean Baptiste Bessières by Job

Then this cavalry pursued in turn by our horsemen right
through the ranks of the first line (which at first had been
crumpled and stomped but which again got up on its feet and
was firing back) was now flowing back even beyond the line
which had occupied in the beginning of the day. The pursuit
of the cavalry was breathtakingly successful and followed
through to the hilt.

The enemy batteries left on that line were seized by our
several squadrons and the gun crews together with the
carriage wheels were hacked to pieces while the draught
horses and their drivers had galloped away in a panic.

In this hand-to-hand engagement and the flowing back and
forth of the cavalry, the following generals - Haupoult of
the cavalry, Daleman of the guard, Desjardin of the infantry
and Corbineau all fell on the field of battle. Marshal
Augereau himself, along with Division General Hudelet and
Brigade General Lochet were wounded; several other brigade
generals and staff officers such as Lacuyet, Marois, Bouvier
and others shared the same fate. Two squadrons of horse
guard grenadiers composing the tail of the retreating enemy
cavalry were intercepted by ours and laid down their lives
between the church and the second line. The 14th regiment of
the line lost all its officers and the 24th of the line had
only five left alive. The whole corps of Augereau, three
cavalry divisions and the mounted guard represented only
fragments of their former selves. Six eagles were captured
by us.

What a minute of opportunity for a forceful and combined
thrust of all our forces at the division of St. Hilaire,
left without support and any hope of help! All around this
division had been destroyed or toppled and what's more
important left without the spirit to come to its aid or the
will to fight back. Moreover, it wasn't quite eleven o'clock
in the morning, therefore there was still two hours left
before Davout's arrival on the battlefield. But to put such
moments to good use, it is not enough to have a thorough
knowledge of one's craft, and to have a determined spirit or
a sharp mind: all this is dead without the inspiration,
without this incomprehensive, inexpressible impulse which is
instantaneous like an electric spark which is just as
necessary to the poet as it is to a military commander; it
was innate to Napoleon and to Suvorov -- it belonged to
poets and men that made things happen such as Pindar and
Mirabeau -- who had a command over words.

The propitious moment which promised such advantage to
our arms disappeared. Our troops, pursuing the enemy were
forced to return back to the main body of the army from
which not a single battalion was sent forward to help us and
the enemy who had been in disarray came together, taking
advantage of this lull got back in order and took heart.
Then the opposing armies resumed the same position in which
they were before the onslaught and bloodshed which had
devoured uselessly such numbers, and all these miracles of
prowess, all the selflessness and heroism of these soldiers
who had heaped their bodies in piles over the disputed
ground, turned to naught as if it never happened!

The action limited itself to a severe cannonade which
again engulfed the entire length of both armies and the
slaughter of new thousands, just like that, to while the
time away, until the arrival of the Davout corps to the
French and the Prussian corps of Lestock to our side.

Now came the second phase of the battle. Around one
o'clock in the afternoon, on the crest of the hills which
rose to the left of us and where our left flank was
anchored, there appeared a few isolated men on horseback.
Behind them appeared masses of cavalry and then came masses
of infantry and artillery as well. The horizon grew dark and
rippled with motion. The hills of Sausgarten, silent until
then, flashed, belched smoke and roared.

Davout answered them with 40 field pieces and flowed in
mass over the battlefield at about the same time as the
division of St. Hilaire, reinforced by the cavalry division
Milhaud moved to meet him. To the left of St. Hilaire came
the cavalry divisions of Klein, Grouchy and Haupoult which
had already been mauled in battle and were now arrayed in
three lines. Further to the left of this cavalry came forth
the remains of Augereau's corps in formation composed of two
lines. Behind them marched the guard infantry and bringing
up the rear of Haupoult, no less mauled than the other
cavalry, came the guard cavalry. However, the divisions of
Legrand and Lewal as well as four light cavalry brigades
remained where they were.

All attention on both sides was now riveted to Davout and
our left wing. Adjutants were galloping on the Altdorf road
with orders for Lestock to hurry up his arrival not to our
right flank anymore, but through Schmoditten to our
threatened left wing. A portion of the cavalry and artillery
situated on our right and in the center moved to the left as
well, which the enemy forces were forcing to fall back
towards the center, already suffering from the fire of
batteries deployed behind the stone walls of the city. These
batteries were firing all the length of our army from Eylau
to Auklappen and the woods between Sausgarten, Auklappen and
Kutschitten.

The situation did not appear very rosy. Davout having
pushed back our left flank behind the woods now occupied the
area dividing Kutschitten and Sausgarten, deployed on the
heights of Sausgarten an enormous battery and was shelling
the whole length of our army with the same sweeping enfilade
fire which we were getting from Eylau. The village of
Kutschitten filled with Davout's infantry as well as the
infantry of St. Hilaire which had captured Auklappen (where
Benningsen had his headquarters the night before). Count
Osterman with fearlessness, Count Palen with equanimity of
heroes were attempting to fend off the assault growing
stronger with success, but to no avail! disorder was
beginning to hamper our troops. The whole field of battle
from Kutschitten to Schmoditten was covered with scattered
soldiers: they were stretched towards the Koenigsberg
highway under the protection of those comrades in arms who
had not lost spirit or order and were shedding their blood
on every step of ground they fought for. The cross-fire of
the ever-increasing enemy batteries plowed and blew up
everything that was to be seen on the battlefield. Pieces of
rifles, chunks of gun- carriages, headgear, helmets were
flying all over, everything was cracking and falling
apart.

Amidst the storm of screaming shells and exploding
grenades, among the fallen and the falling men and horses,
surrounded by the hustle and bustle of the fight and clouds
of smoke, there towered the huge figure of Benningsen like a
flag of honor. To him and from him streamed adjutants,
messages and orders were followed by news and further
orders, the race was without stop and the activity
unflagging. But the situation of the army did not improve
because all thoughts, intentions, dispositions of our leader
were impregnated with carefulness, calculation, the product
of an exact and sound mind, equal to the task of grappling
with minds of the same type, but not up to dealing with
flashes of genius, sudden events which escape foresight and
clever guesses grounded in classic rules. All that
Benningsen ordered and all that was carried out as a result
tended only to oppose systematically the attacks of Davout
and St. Hilaire, opposing bayonet to bayonet and firearm to
firearm but did not address any unexpected move which came
out of the ordinary, and did not forestall a blow out of the
blue on some point which was deemed out of danger from the
enemy.

And actually, how were things going? Davout continued to
press on, capturing more and more of our left flank, while
the center and right, not moving at all, were shedding small
portions of infantry, cavalry and artillery to help out the
retreating left wing, not undertaking anything that might
suddenly surprise the enemy. But even the fact that we were
opposing the enemy right flank was bringing us no small
advantage: by postponing a decisive defeat, because it gave
time to Lestock's corps to arrive on the battlefield. But to
do this right we should have been propping up this flank
with large masses and not just small units.

Bagration who in moments of danger found his proper place
through will power and inborn talents, moved the reserve
towards Auklappen and had it facing Davout and St. Hilaire.
Ermolov galloped to the same spot with 36 horse-drawn guns
drawn from the reserve, peppered Auklappen with incendiary
shells, set it immediately on fire and forced the enemy
infantry to leave it; Major gal. CT. Kutaisoff also arrived
there with 12 guns but somewhat later. Then, not loosing a
moment, he rushed to the stream crossing the woods and
attacked the batteries which had been stationed there and
preventing the infantry columns from either moving into the
woods or Auklappen or Kutschitten and reinforcing the troops
pouring into this last village. But these successes, or
rather the postponement of the threatened disaster could not
last. To snatch decisive victory from the enemy it was vital
not only to stop but to defeat Davout by bearing down on his
right flank and simultaneously to threaten his rear by a
general offensive against the corps of Augereau and the
cavalry which were contiguous to his forces.

Finally the adjutants galloped over with the news of
Lestock's approach whom we had awaited so long and so
patiently. Having occupied the greater part of Ney's corps
with battling the brigade of gal. Plotz and pursuing him to
Kreizburg, Lestock turned to Leisen, Graventen and Altdorf
with his main forces, consisting of 9 battalions and 29
squadrons. It was already around 4:00 p.m.; the road to
Altdorf was darkened with troops and Benningsen galloped to
meet them -- to speed them up and so that he could direct
them according to his own views. It was noticeable that with
the arrival of the commander-in-chief the entire corps began
to move faster. Lestock was directed towards Schmoditten; he
moved past this village and just short of Kutschitten
arranged his troops in battle order. The right column was
composed by the Viborg infantry regiment, the left was
Ruchel's regiment and the reserve behind them, the grenadier
battalion of Fobetsky deployed in one line. The infantry
regiment of Shoning, marching in a column, by-passed the
village on the left and slammed into the enemy infantry
facing them, toppled it and chased it into the woods.
General Kal, with cavalry and one cossack regiment which
joined him from the main body of the army, leaving
Kutschitten to the right, fell on the enemy cavalry
adjoining this village, bringing disorder into their ranks
and turned on the infantry running out in disarray from the
village, trampled them and destroyed the greater part of it,
preventing their escape into the woods where the first
elements had found refuge.

In this engagement the Viborg regiment won back three
cannons that the French had captured on our left flank
during its retreat. Having taken possession of Kutschitten,
Lestock turned his troops to the right and arranged them
facing the woods. The regiment of Shoning composed his right
flank, the grenadier battalion of Fobetsky and the Viborg
infantry the center, and the Ruchel regiment was the left. A
second line of defense was made up of the Wagenfeld
Cuirassier regiment and the dragoon regiments of Auer and
Batchko. A light cavalry regiment composed of various
elements was arranged to the left of the infantry.

Our left flank which had been retreating came to a halt
and came to order, and its reserve under the command of
Major gal. CT. Kamenskoy and the reserve cavalry under Major
gal. Chaplitz came to reinforce the Prussian corps.

The attack of the woods was carried out with great
courage and in impeccable order. The woods were cleared
partly by fire-arms, partly by cold steel. The moment was
ripe for a combined effort by the center and the reserve of
our army against the watered-down remains of Augereau's
corps (mauled that morning) the horse guard and the three
cavalry divisions of Klein, Grouchy and Haupoult which had
brought the left flank with the right of the French army.
Such a combination had given victory to Napoleon at
Austerlitz. But our army remained on the spot limiting its
action to a cannonade. To Lestock's pressure was adding his
own artillery hammering the troops of Davout and St.
Hilaire, and also Ermolov's artillery lining their fire
along the whole extension from the left to the right of the
enemy.

Despite this general inactivity on our side which relied
solely on the efforts of Lestock and Ermolov's artillery,
the enemy was not able to stand up to them. Their retreat
which at first began with some semblance of order turned
into inexcusable disorder, so much in fact that 28 cannons,
some damaged and some not, were abandoned by them on the
battlefield. The coming darkness and poor intelligence did
not allow the Prussian general to crown this day with these
important trophies. Having left the field of battle Davout
and St. Hilaire arranged their troops on either side of
Sausgarten; the front line and sentries were placed a few
yards ahead. The whole enemy line segmented the battlefield
from Sausgarten to Eylau. At Eylau remained at their
previous stations the divisions of Lewal and Legrand; but 4
light cavalry brigades moved forward to the Altdorf stream
to keep lines of communication opened with Ney who was
approaching Altdorf.

On our side, the troops were disposed as follows: The
forward line resting its left flank against the road, going
from Kutschitten to Domnau followed the stream which flowed
from Auklappen and cut the woods in two. From there the line
continued in front of Auklappen and rested against our
central battery, which had played such an important role in
the first phase of the battle. To this battery adjoined the
troops of the right flank, as they did in their original
formation prior to the battle. This defensive battle order
of the opposing forces at the end of the battle proves the
absence of decisive arms superiority of one side over the
other. The French and our army as well remained in the
positions they originally occupied with essentially small
changes on our left flank, giving way a few yards to
Davout's corps and St. Hilaire's division because the coming
darkness made fighting more difficult. If we had had one
more hour of daylight, Lestock would have inevitably taken
possession of the artillery abandoned by the French and
would have compelled Davout and St. Hilaire to retreat
behind Sausgarten and beyond. Late night darkened further
and further over Eylau's field, saturated with blood. All
the surrounding villages were now the prey of flames and the
reflection of the fires shone over the exhausted troops,
still standing under arms and awaiting further orders. Here
and there you could see camp fires being lit, around which
gathered or beckoned to thousands of crawling wounded
soldiers. The torn bodies of men and horses, broken wagons,
powder cases and gun carriages, outfit and arms -- all this
scattered here, piled up there gave the plain a look of
terror and destruction worthy of the brush of the inspired
creator of THE LAST DAYS OF POMPEII.

The engagement had ended but the uncertainty: "Should we
renew the battle or retreat to Koenigsberg?" and for the
French, "Should we pull back to the Vistula?" gripped the
minds of the leaders of both armies. The most obstinate of
the two finally triumphed not because he renewed the
offensive but because he remained on the battlefield until
dawn.

Benningsen left the field around midnight, posting
several squadrons to keep surveillance on the enemy and to
provide a screen for the army heading for Koenigsberg.
Lestock retired through Allenburg to Byelo. There was no
pursuit. The French like a disabled man-of-war with torn
sails and broken masts were bobbing about menacingly, but
unable to make any headway to fight or to pursue.

Suddenly we heard rifle-fire in Schmoditten. We were
astonished. Our first thought it was Ney that we had
forgotten about. And sure enough, Ney arrived with part of
his corps at Altdorf around 9 o'clock in the evening, found
there the Prussian battalion of Captain Kurowsky, who
realizing the disproportion in the opposing forces, left the
village and joined the rest of the army. General
Liger-Belair with the 6th and 39th regiments followed him
and entered Schmoditten village, which was filled with
wounded and covering escorts that had got there to protect
them. They opened fire on the French and a fusillade ensued.
To assist them we sent the Voronezh infantry regiment and a
few cannons; but the enemy did not choose to await their
arrival and retreated into Altdorf, and thus the alarm was
over.

On the 9th our army having rested in Muhlhausen continued
its march to Koenigsberg around which it stopped, having
left in the rear guard Prince Bagration in Ludwigswald. The
French army fearing a new battle up ahead chose to remain
near Eylau. Only 24 squadrons moved forward to keep under
observation the shores of Frieshing, towards Mansfeld and
Ludwigswald, and that only two days later when Napoleon was
assured that our army had arrived at Pregel. The 17th of
February Napoleon decided to retreat behind the Passarge
River to take up his winter-quarters and left Eylau, pursued
by our advance guard and all the cossack regiments under the
command of their leader Platoff who from that day forward
acquired his European reputation.

The retrograde march of the enemy was no less costly in
many respects than the retreat suffered five years later
from Moscow to the Niemen river, in spite of the moderate
cold. The later losses were ascribed to the cold weather by
the French but today, however, few people give it credence.
Being in the advance guard myself, I was witness to the
bloody trail from Eylau to Gutstadt. The whole road was
littered with debris without cease. We met everywhere
hundreds of horses dying or obstructing the way which we
followed, and ambulance filled with dying or dead soldiers
and men of rank mutilated in the Eylau battle. The rush to
evacuate had become such that besides the sufferers left in
the carriages we found many that had been simply dumped on
the snow without cover or clothes, bleeding to death. At
each mile of road there weren't two, but tens and hundreds.
Moreover, all the villages along the way were filled with
sick and wounded, without doctors or food or the least care.
In this pursuit the cossacks captured many exhausted men,
marauders and 8 artillery pieces, stuck in the snow without
harnesses.

Our losses in this battle reached almost half of the
number of the fighting men, that is to say 37,000 men killed
or wounded. According to the army registers it appears that
our army was composed of 46,800 men (regular army) and 2,500
cossacks. There was no equal to such losses in military
annals since the invention of gun powder. The reader can
imagine what the losses of the French army were, since they
possessed a less numerous artillery than ours and which was
beaten back from two hot assaults in the center and the left
flank of our army. Our trophies consisted of nine eagles
torn out from the ranks of the enemy and 2,000 prisoners.
The Prussian king took two eagles.

I was involved in a touching episode after the battle. A
year and two months before, our army had been defeated at
Austerlitz. The horse guard regiment shared the defeat along
with the others. My own brother, then a 20-year old youth
who served in this regiment was grievously wounded: he
received five saber cuts, one bullet wound and a bayonet
thrust and had been left for dead in a mound of corpses on
the battlefield. There he lay until late at night. He
regained consciousness in the dark, got up and somehow
hobbled towards a fire which could be seen coming from a
nearby village which he found overflowing with Russian
wounded, among whom he found a spot.

After three days two men from his regiment who had
sustained much lighter wounds - Arapov and Barkovsky -
persuaded him to walk in the direction of our retreating
army, and he, not really knowing what direction it had
taken, made his way with them, wandering about the way
people exhausted by suffering and hunger are apt to do.
Their journey did not last very long. A squadron of mounted
grenadiers of the guard, detached from the French army to
gather the wounded from both sides caught up with them and
informed them of their fate. There was nothing to be done --
they had to obey. The squadron continued on, but their
commanding officer entrusted my brother and his two comrades
to one of the officers of the squadron with orders to convey
them to Brünn where Napoleon's headquarters were
located. But as our proverb says the poor folk get lost but
God looks after them. This particular officer was
second-lieutenant Serugues, a nephew of Minister Maret (Duke
of Bassano) to his mercy was left the life and death of my
brother. I say life and death because the hatred of the
French towards the Russians and vice-versa had originated
from about that time. In both armies they got into the habit
of stripping prisoners of their last clothes, their boots
and left them to die, overcome by hunger and exhaustion,
cold or wounds

This was not part of a system ordered from above, but
such acts were never questioned by superiors. A humane and
compassionate man, Serugues had not been yet infected by
these loathsome examples. Taking a heartfelt interest in the
misfortune of his prisoner, he extended his indulgence and
even forbade him to walk on foot, put him on a horse and
seeing how weak he was from hunger shared with him his last
morsel of bread. Thus he conveyed him to the pastor of the
nearest village, saw to it that he was fed until full, got a
cart ready for him and sent him on to Brünn, cheering
him on with a friendly, almost brotherly concern. Moreover,
he gave his word to my brother that he would look for him
and find him again in Brünn where he hoped to return
soon, but failing that got him to promise he would apply for
assistance from his uncle, Minister Maret, and insist that
every necessary help be given him. All this I heard from my
brother upon his return from captivity and a few weeks
before I myself left to join the army. Having arrived with
the rear-guard into Ludwigswald the 29th of January, I
begged permission from Bagration to visit Koenigsberg on
personal affairs, and having gotten there quartered myself
with General Chaplitz who was assigned the duty of commander
of the city. Chaplitz told me that there was some kind of
French officer, wounded in the last engagement who was
making inquiries about me and asking whether there was a
lieutenant of the guard Davidov? I was the only guard
officer by that name in the whole army and in my curiosity
to find out the name of this French officer I asked to see
the list of prisoners of rank. You can imagine my surprise
when the name of second-lieutenant of the horse guard
regiment Serugues jumped out at me the moment I opened the
enormous folio!

To spot this name, to run and find him was all one
motion. I was still running, not having seen his face yet,
but I was already his brother, a friend for life and the
most devoted relative.

It must be mentioned here that the inhabitants of
Koenigsberg having learned of the arrival of our army under
their walls were fearing its further retreat and the
eventual occupation of the city by the French. Therefore to
earn the good graces of Napoleon beforehand, they made every
effort to beg Benningsen for the permission to split among
themselves the wounded French officers in order to quarter
them and keep them in their homes at their expense.

It goes without saying that fortune was even more
favorable to the nephew of the Minister than to others.
Serugues enjoyed the hospitality of one of the wealthiest
citizens of Koenigsberg. I found him in a tall, luxuriously
appointed house, whose entire first floor had been put at
his disposal. A bed with a large canopy, choice linens,
screens, small tables and sofas, comfortable armchairs near
the bed, semi-darkness and fragrant incense, a doctor and
medicines, surely nothing was lacking. But he lay there
pale, worn out and in great pain. Several sword slashes on
his head and arms did not incommode him as much as a deep
and eventually mortal wound to the groin.

Davidov
in 1830

I approached quietly and carefully towards the bed of the
wretched sufferer and told him my name. We embraced as true
blood-brothers. He asked about mine with genuine concern; I
thanked him for having preserved him and offered my services
with deep emotion. He answered me: "You see I am in the care
of a good person and don't lack for anything. However, you
can do me a great service. Undoubtedly among the prisoners
there are some wounded from my outfit; could you possibly
appeal to the authorities and arrange for two or perhaps
even one of my horse grenadiers to remain by my side. Let me
die, still keeping to the end my eyes on the uniform of my
regiment and the guard of a great man." It goes without
saying that I rushed to see Benningsen and Chaplitz and
obtained their permission to choose from the crowd of
prisoners two horse grenadiers from Serugues own squad and
in two hours time I returned to him, accompanied by two
mustachioed fellows, crowned with bear-skin hats and in full
uniform. It is impossible to express the joy of my ill-fated
friend at the sight of his comrades-in-arms. Expressions of
gratitude would have been endless without my begging him to
restrain these outbursts of the heart, so exhausting in his
state. For two days I did not leave Serugues' side, day or
night; on the third everything came to an end: he died in my
arms and was buried in the Koenigsberg cemetery. Behind the
casket walked the two aforementioned French horse-grenadiers
and I, a second lieutenant of the Russian guard. A strange
juxtaposition of uniforms! A deep sorrow was clearly evident
on the faces of the old veterans, my companions in the
procession -- I was young -- I was crying.