Maritime Governance, Security Measures and Port Competition in the EU

Abstract

The impacts of the CSI on EU container seaport competition have been discussed in Chapter 8 through analysing the conceptual assumptions developed in Chapter 4. The analyses were based on the secondary data collected from the literature review and primary data from the Delphi survey. The Delphi results suggested that the CSI has not caused competition distortion in the EU container seaport industry and no evidence has shown that ports are suffering an unrecoverable burden from CSI compliance in terms of costs and efficiency within the EU. The findings are quite different from that suggested by previous research. There is a lack of existing theories or models to explain such differences. As this research is shaped through adopting an abductive approach, a model is developed and will be explained in this chapter to interpret the findings from this Delphi survey. Although this model is built upon existing knowledge and theories, it provides a new perspective which originates from the political and economic environment to investigate how maritime security measures affect the port industry, rather than looking at individual determinants.

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