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Grade: Pension 65 and beyond

This presentation is part of the programme of the International Seminar "Social Protection, Entrepreneurship and Labour Market Activation: Evidence for Better Policies", organized by the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG/UNDP) together with Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Colombian Think Tank Fedesarrollo held on September 10-11 at the Ipea Auditorium in Brasilia.

Grade: Pension 65 and beyond

1.
“Pension 65 and Beyond”
Impact Evaluation of Pension 65 and its interactions with other
mechanisms of social protection
GRADE, Peru
Brasilia, September 2014
(GRADE) “Pension 65 and Beyond” Brasilia, September 2014 1 / 10

2.
Pension 65
Pension 65 (Programa Nacional de Asistencia Solidaria) is one of the social
protection strategies implemented by the Peruvian Government. It targets the
elder population aged 65 or more living in extreme poverty that has no
pension for retirement.
Eligibility
I Elders, 65 years or older
I In extreme poverty according to SISFOH (household targeting
system)
I No access to other pension mechanism or ESSALUD
What does the Program do?
I Delivers cash transfers: non-contributory pension of S/.125 ( US$
45) per month per user. Bi-monthly payments
I Fosters social protection: promotes participation of other institutions
such that P65 users can access complementary services
(GRADE) “Pension 65 and Beyond” Brasilia, September 2014 2 / 10

3.
Our study
The overall objective of the study is to assess the impacts of Pension 65 on
the welfare of elder adults and their families, but also to establish how the
Program affects welfare in the context of other protection mechanisms.
Research team:
I GRADE, Perú
I Colaboration with Oxford, UK and Economic Development
Initiatives-EDI, Tanzania
Funds:
I International Iniciative for Impact Evaluation – 3ie
I International Development Research Centre – IDRC de Canada
(GRADE) “Pension 65 and Beyond” Brasilia, September 2014 3 / 10

4.
Objetives and Research Questions
Objetive A: To assess impacts of Pension 65
I Health, nutrition and poverty status of beneficiaries and their
families
I Investments in children
Objetive B: To analize interactions between Pension 65 and
Juntos
I Complements or substitutes?
Objetive C: To analize interactions between Pension 65 and
informal social protection networks
I Potential for crowding-out or spill-over effects
Objetive D: To analize effects on labor markets and family
entrepreneurship
Objetive E: To analize gender issues
I Resource allocation, roles and power within the household
I Gender and investment in children
(GRADE) “Pension 65 and Beyond” Brasilia, September 2014 4 / 10

5.
Interactions with Juntos
Little is known about the effect of overlapping between social protection
programs, and how the concentration of resources may result in
complementarities, or conversely on diminishing returns. Understanding this
is crucial for the design and targeting of social programs.
1 Impacts on Graduations.
I Larger cash transfers. Combined Pension 65 ( US$ 45/elder) and
Juntos ( US$ 37/household) can have a magnified impact on
asset accumulation, savings, investments, etc.
2 Externality of Juntos conditionalities.
I Juntos may change preferences or have a demonstration effects.
I When Juntos is present, additional chas from Pension 65 can be
allocated to children, education, health, etc.
I Conditionality could be maintained after graduation from Juntos.
(GRADE) “Pension 65 and Beyond” Brasilia, September 2014 5 / 10

6.
Interactions with informal social protection networks
The importance of interactions between social programs and informal
networks is recognized, but there is still little empirical evidence. We seek to
quantify the magnitude of Pension 65 impacts on inter-family transfers.
1 Quantify indirect transfers to non-beneficiaries (Spill-over effects).
2 Assess the burden reduction that the elders may represent for family and
support networks, especially direct family(Crowding-out effects); and
how the freed funds are re-assigned.
3 Impacts on agricultural and labor Andean reciprocity systems.
4 Impact on inter-generational transfer of assets such as land.
(GRADE) “Pension 65 and Beyond” Brasilia, September 2014 6 / 10

7.
Impacts on labor markets and family entrepreneurship
Pension 65 will generate an increase in non-labor household income through
an unconditional cash transfer. It is expected that this could generate impacts
on the allocation of time (home and market). It may also allow family
businesses to develop.
1 How does the labor supply of beneficiary families is affected? Does the
labor supply of non-beneficiaries is also affected? Maybe through
changes in local markets?
2 What is the impact of Pension 65 on incentives to formal employment?
Are incentives to formalization (and therefore to contributions to the
formal pension schemes) distorted by the introduction of
non-contributory pension plans?
3 Is there any impact of Pension 65 on family entrepreneurship?
(GRADE) “Pension 65 and Beyond” Brasilia, September 2014 7 / 10

8.
The gender dimension
International evidence suggests that gender inequality is (heterogeneously)
incorporated in the design of policies and social protection programs, but
generally in a limited way. However, it is increasingly recognized that poverty
depends not only on income but also on social risks such as discrimination,
unequal distribution of resources and power between women and men within
the family.
1 What are the effects Pension 65 in the allocation of resources, roles and
power within the household? Are women disproportionally affected?
2 How does gender affect family investments among beneficiaries? Do
grandmothers make greater investments oriented to infancy and
childhood (nutrition, education and employment)?
3 Does the women’s time spent caring for elders is reduced? Does their
time for other activities at home or in the market increases?
4 Does it lead to greater labor supply of women? Could this also affect the
bargaining power and empowerment of women within the household?
(GRADE) “Pension 65 and Beyond” Brasilia, September 2014 8 / 10

9.
Methods
Identification strategy
I Random assignment of eligible elders to treatment and control
groups
I Pre- and post- intervention data
I Coordinated with Pension 65 and basedon its roll-out
I Combined with new and old Juntos areas
I Double-difference and triple-difference
Quantitative instruments
I Baseline (pre) and follow-up (post) surveys
I Combined with a census of family networks
Qualitative instruments
I In-depth interviews with Program beneficiaries and their families, as
well as local authorities
I Etnography
I Qualitative methods will help us develop a deeper understanding of
processes and channels, providing contextual narratives with
additional meaning to complement the quantitative analysis
(GRADE) “Pension 65 and Beyond” Brasilia, September 2014 9 / 10

10.
Expected results
Comprehensively explore
I Welfare of the elderly population
I Family investments in infancy and childhood
I Welfare of women
Impact on policy
I Generate evidence that contributes to local and
regional/international debate on non-contributory pension plans,
and more broadly on social protection programs
I Highlight gender issues in the analysis of impacts of social
protection programs
I We also aim to raise conscientiousness that social protection
programs do not work in isolation from other programs or informal
insurance arrangements
I We believe that the inclusion of these issues in the design of
policies can lead to more effective social protection programs
(GRADE) “Pension 65 and Beyond” Brasilia, September 2014 10 / 10