In
September 2005, two groups of individuals, one from Ridgeway and one from
Winnsboro, met at Chance's Bar in Columbia. Although the groups seemed to be
getting along most of the evening, at some point, animosity developed between Demetric Davis, of Ridgeway, and Torri Boyd, of Winnsboro. Adams testified
that shortly after the initial confrontation between Davis and Boyd, he called
his brother, Jacques, to request a ride home.

Twenty
to thirty minutes later, Jacques and two friends, Stephon and Vernon, arrived
at Chance's in Jacques's white Ford sedan to pick up Adams. Jacques went
inside to find Adams, while Stephon and Vernon waited in the car. Shortly
thereafter, the dispute that had brewed inside Chance's spilled out into the
parking lot and erupted into a physical altercation between numerous members of
each group. According to several witnesses, neither Adams nor Jacques initially
engaged in the fight; however, James Smith testified he saw Adams swing at
someone and when Smith approached Adams in an effort to keep him away from one
of the Winnsboro fellows, Jacques brandished a gun and told him "[not to]
even think about it." Smith testified he fled at the sight of the gun.

Soon
after the fight erupted, witnesses testified to hearing several shots. The
witness accounts of the evening provide no clear picture of who fired weapons
or how many shots were fired. However, many witnesses testified to seeing
either Jacques, Adams, or both, or "someone" in the vicinity of
Jacques's white car, firing multiple shots.

One of the State's key witnesses, Shunta
Williams,[1] testified that she left the bar and walked out to the parking lot to watch the
fight. Most of the witnesses testified that Jacques remained near his white
sedan, away from the fight, while Adams may have engaged in the melee.
However, Williams testified that Jacques was engaging in the fight and that she
saw Adams walk over to the white sedan, sit in the driver seat, reach under it,
pull out a gun, and fire what she recognized as a small caliber handgun, either
a .22 or .25.[2]
When the shots began, she retreated to the doorway of the bar to take cover. Moments
later she claimed she heard another set of gunshots in the distance. She
identified Adams as wearing jeans and a black tee shirt, although the other
witnesses and evidence presented at trial indicated it was Jacques in the black
tee shirt, and Adams was wearing a white tee shirt. Many of the accounts point
to multiple sources of gunfire, but Williams maintains that Adams was the only
shooter. During the melee, Dennis Irby was shot and killed by a single 9mm
shot to the back of the left shoulder.

Adams
spoke with the police twice. He first stated that he was not in the white Ford
sedan with Jacques and did not see who did the shooting because he was in Lakisha Davis's car. He later admitted that after the altercation in
the parking lot began, he exited Lakisha's car, at her request, to retrieve her
cousin, Demetric. Adams denied having or firing a gun that night.

Jacques also gave two statements to the
police. First he told the police that after he and his brother exited the bar,
Adams went to Lakisha Davis's car and he returned to his white Ford sedan. He
said he noticed a man retrieve something from a nearby SUV and place it behind
his back, he suspected it was a gun but did not see it. After the fight broke
out, Jacques stated Adams drove around in Lakisha's car, got out, and walked
over toward the fighting. Although in his first statement Jacques denied he
had a gun, Jacques later admitted that upon suspecting Smith was going to hit
Adams, he pulled a gun and told Smith to "back off." Jacques said he
then heard two shots and in response fired his 9mm three or four times "into
the air" as he got in his car and drove away. He later disposed of his
gun by tossing it over a bridge.

Adams
and Jacques were both indicted for murder; Jacques was also indicted for
possession of a firearm by a person under the age of twenty-one. The pair was
tried together. At the close of the State's case, Adams unsuccessfully moved
for a directed verdict. In addition, the trial court denied Adams's request to
instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter. Both Adams and Jacques were
convicted of murder and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. Adams appeals.

ISSUES
ON APPEAL

I. Did
the trial court err in failing to direct a verdict on the charge of murder?

II. Did
the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury on involuntary
manslaughter?

Adams argues the trial court erred in
failing to direct a verdict on the charge of murder. We disagree.

When ruling on a motion for a directed
verdict, the trial court is concerned only with the existence of evidence, not
the weight. State v. Al-Amin, 353 S.C. 405, 411, 578 S.E.2d 32, 35 (Ct.
App. 2003). When reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, an
appellate court must review the evidence, and all inferences therefrom, in the
light most favorable to the State. State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292,
625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006). The trial court's denial of a directed verdict will
not be reversed if supported by any direct evidence or substantial
circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt. Id.

In
this case, the trial court denied Adams's motion for directed verdict, finding
sufficient evidence had been presented to allow the case to proceed to the jury
on the "hand of one is the hand of all" theory of liability. Adams
argues the State presented insufficient evidence that he is responsible for the
victim's murder under an accomplice theory.

Under the "hand of one is the hand of
all" theory of accomplice liability, one who joins with another to
accomplish an illegal purpose is liable
criminally for everything done by his confederate incidental
to the execution of the common design and purpose. A defendant may be
convicted on a theory of accomplice liability pursuant to an indictment
charging him only with the principal offense. [However,
m]ere presence and prior knowledge that a crime was going to be committed,
without more, is insufficient to constitute guilt. [Rather,] presence at the
scene of a crime by pre-arrangement to aid, encourage, or abet in the
perpetration of the crime constitutes guilt as a principal.

"Under
an accomplice liability theory, 'a person must personally commit the crime or
be present at the scene of the crime and intentionally, or through a common
design, aid, abet, or assist in the commission of that crime through some overt
act.' " SeeState v. Condrey, 349 S.C. 184, 194, 562 S.E.2d
320, 325 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting State v. Langley, 334 S.C. 643,
648-49, 515 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1999)). In order to establish the parties agreed
to achieve an illegal purpose, thereby establishing presence by
pre-arrangement, the State need not prove a formal expressed agreement, but
rather can prove the same by circumstantial evidence and the conduct of the
parties. Id. at 193, 562 S.E.2d at 324 (stating that under the hand of
one is the hand of all theory, "[a] formally expressed agreement is not
necessary to establish the conspiracy" which brings the accomplice to the
scene of the crime).

In
this case, the State does not contend Adams fired the fatal shot. Rather, the
State simply maintains there is sufficient circumstantial evidence that Adams agreed
to, and did, act in concert with Jacques to assault the Winnsboro group; thus,
sufficient evidence of Adams's guilt existed to submit the issue to the jury under
the hand of one is the hand of all theory. In order to demonstrate that Adams
and Jacques intended to join together in a common design to achieve an illegal
purpose, the State maintains: (1) Adams called Jacques to the scene; (2) when
Jacques arrived he went inside the bar and Adams pointed out the group of
Winnsboro men, rather than leaving straight away; (3) Williams testified Adams
approached Jacques's white sedan in the parking lot and retrieved a gun moments
before the shooting; and (4) although separately, the two men fled the scene
after the shooting.

Here, at minimum, the evidence creates the
inferences that Adams informed Jacques of the situation, that the reason for
the call may not have been solely for the purpose of removing Adams from the scene,
and that Adams was aware a firearm was available for him to retrieve from
Jacques's white sedan. When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the
circumstantial evidence in this case infers Adams and Jacques may have acted in
concert in assaulting the men from Winnsboro. SeeState v. Ward,
374 S.C. 606, 615, 649 S.E.2d 145, 150 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding in a case with
similar facts, that evidence the defendant and his co-defendant together chased
after two men in the melee of a parking lot brawl and fired shots, killing a
bystander, was sufficient to overcome a directed verdict motion); see alsoLangley, 334 S.C. at 649, 515 S.E.2d at 101 (indicating evidence that the
defendant and co-defendant were seen together, circumstantial evidence placing
defendant at the scene of the crime, and eye-witness testimony, was sufficient
to warrant submitting the case to the jury on any theory of liability, including
the hand of one is the hand of all theory). Accordingly, we find the trial
court did not abuse its discretion and affirm its denial of Adams's motion for
a directed verdict.

II. Jury
Instruction

Adams
next alleges the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on
involuntary manslaughter. We disagree.

The evidence presented at trial
determines the law to be charged, and a trial court commits reversible error in
failing to give a requested charge on an issue raised by the evidence. State
v. Knoten, 347 S.C. 296, 302, 555 S.E.2d 391, 394 (2001). In determining
whether to charge the lesser included offense of manslaughter the court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. Id.
Declining to charge the lesser included offense is warranted when it "very
clearly appear[s] that . . . no evidence whatsoever [exists] tending to
reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter." State v. Brayboy, 387
S.C. 174, 179, 691 S.E.2d 482, 485 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Cole, 338
S.C. 97, 101, 525 S.E.2d 511, 513 (2000). In order to amount to reversible
error, the failure to give a requested charge must be both erroneous and
prejudicial. State v. Patterson, 367 S.C. 219, 232, 625 S.E.2d 239, 245
(Ct. App. 2006).

Involuntary
manslaughter is:

(1) the unintentional killing of another
without malice, but while engaged in an unlawful activity not naturally tending
to cause death or great bodily harm or (2) the unintentional killing of another
without malice, while engaged in a lawful activity with reckless disregard for
the safety of others. To constitute involuntary manslaughter, there must be a
finding of criminal negligence, statutorily defined as a reckless disregard of
the safety of others. Recklessness is a state of mind in which the actor is
aware of his or her conduct, yet consciously disregards a risk which his or her
conduct is creating. A person can be acting lawfully, even if he is in
unlawful possession of a weapon, if he was entitled to arm himself in
self-defense at the time of the shooting. The negligent handling of a loaded
gun will support a charge of involuntary manslaughter.

The
State argues that under the hand of one is the hand of all theory, Adams is not
entitled to this charge because Jacques was either acting unlawfully or was not
lawfully armed in self-defense. More specifically, the State argues
extensively that because Jacques was not acting in such a manner as to entitle
him to a self-defense instruction, he is thereby not lawfully armed in self-defense
for the purposes of an involuntary manslaughter charge. However, our supreme
court has specifically pointed out there is a difference between being
"armed in self-defense" and "acting in self-defense."[3]State v. Light, 378 S.C. 641, 649, n.6, 664 S.E.2d 465, 469, n.6 (2008); State v. Burriss, 334 S.C. 256, 265, n.10, 513 S.E.2d 104, 109, n.10
(1999); seeState v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 52, 584 S.E.2d 110, 112
(2003)[4] (stating "[a] person can be acting lawfully, even if he is in unlawful possession
of a weapon, if he was entitled to arm himself in self-defense at the time of
the shooting"). Thus, for the purposes of involuntary manslaughter, the
inquiries associated with whether or not to instruct on the defense of
self-defense are not applicable. Light, 378 S.C. at 648-49, 664 S.E.2d 468-69.
Rather, the court is "concerned only with whether [the defendant] had a
right to be armed for purposes of determining whether he was engaged in a
lawful act, i.e. was [he] lawfully armed, and not whether he actually acted in
self-defense when the shooting occurred." Id. at 649 n.6, 664
S.E.2d at 469 n.6.

However, regardless of whether Jacques
was lawfully armed in self-defense, the essence of involuntary manslaughter is the
involuntary nature of the killing. SeeDouglas v. State, 332
S.C. 67, 74, 504 S.E.2d 307, 310 (1998) (finding no involuntary manslaughter
charge warranted where defendant admitted he intentionally fired a gun into a
crowd in self-defense despite testimony that the defendant had been rushed by a
group of people during a fight); State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528, 466
S.E.2d 364 (1996) (holding where a defendant admitted he intentionally shot his
gun, contending he was acting recklessly but lawfully in self-defense,
involuntary manslaughter charge was not warranted); State v. Morris, 307
S.C. 480, 483-84, 415 S.E.2d 819, 821-22 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting that under
involuntary manslaughter, the act must be unintentional and defendant
intentionally shot his gun though he claimed self-defense); accordLight,
378 S.C. at 648-49 664 S.E.2d at 468-69 (finding the defendant had lawfully
armed himself in self defense and was entitled to an instruction on involuntary
manslaughter, in a case in which there existed evidence the gun unintentionally
discharged); Brayboy, 387 S.C. at 181-82, 691 S.E.2d at 486 (holding
that although unlawful to point and present a firearm, when a defendant
lawfully armed himself in self defense his failure to immediately disarm
himself when the threat subsided did not amount to unlawful pointing and
presenting a firearm and evidence suggesting the gun accidentally discharged was sufficient to warrant instruction on involuntary manslaughter).

In
this case, because by Jacques's own admission he voluntarily and intentionally
fired his weapon, the trial court properly denied instructing the jury on
involuntary manslaughter.

CONCLUSION

For
the aforementioned reasons, the rulings of the trial court are

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and PIEPER, J., concur.

[1] Although there
are many witness accounts, the State relies heavily on this testimony for many
of the issues in this case.

[3] The issue of
instructing the jury on self-defense is not appealed.

[4] The State
makes a brief argument that Jacques was convicted of unlawful possession of a
pistol by a person under twenty-one years of age and because of this he was
"unlawfully armed." However, our supreme court has indicated section
16-23-30(c) of the South Carolina Code (2003), which outlawed possession of
handguns by persons under the age of twenty-one, to be in violation of the
plain language of South Carolina Constitution Article XVII, section 14. SeeState v. Bolin, 378 S.C. 96, 100, 662 S.E.2d 38, 40 (2008) (stating that
with the exception of the General Assembly's ability to restrict the sale of
alcohol to individuals until age twenty-one, every citizen who is eighteen
years of age or older shall be deemed sui juris and be given all, and
full, legal rights and responsibilities). It suffices that although a
non-issue in this appeal, under the jurisprudence as it currently exists,
Jacques's possession of the pistol is not unlawful per se, by virtue of
his age.