"Credible reports indicate that Lt Gen Benanni is using his position as the Commander of the Southern Sector to skim money from military contracts and influence business decisions. A widely believed rumor has it that he owns large parts of the fisheries in Western Sahara", a new Wiki-leaked US embassy cable states.

1. (C) Summary: The Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR) aremodernizing but remain weighed down by long-standingproblems. King Mohammed VI, who in 1999 inherited a militaryin need of professionalization, has implemented some neededreforms, but much remains to be done. Civilian control, ifascribed to the person of the King, is complete, but there isno real Defense Ministry. Outside the FAR, there is only asmall administration. The military remains plagued bycorruption, an inefficient bureaucracy, low levels ofeducation in the ranks, periodic threats of radicalization ofsome of its soldiers, political marginalization, and thedeployment of most of its forces in the Western Sahara.There have been some indications of pending changes in theleadership. In general, the U.S. and Morocco share a robustmilitary relationship with prospects for even closer ties inthe future. The health of the relationship is evident byincreased U.S.-Moroccan military training exercises andMorocco's purchase of sophisticated weapons from the U.S. toinclude 24 F-16s this year. We anticipate that theU.S.-Moroccan military relationship will continue to flourishbut Morocco's ability to absorb its new high-end militarypurchases and restrictions on high quality Moroccaninformation sharing with our attaches represent twochallenges ahead. This mission-coordinated report drawsheavily on valuable reporting and analysis from the embassy'smilitary components, the Defense Attache Office and theOffice of Security Cooperation. End Summary.

------------------All the King's Men------------------

2. (C) As Commander-in-Chief of the Moroccan Royal ArmedForces and Minister of Defense, King Mohammed VI maintains ahighly centralized role over the military. No troopmovements, exercises, or even travel of officers domesticallyor abroad happens without the King,s approval. As a resultof the 1971 and 1972 coup attempts by the Moroccan Army andAir Force respectively, the Palace increased control over themilitary, marginalized it from policy making, and restrictedits interaction with foreign military interlocutors and thepress. The Alaouite dynasty depends upon, among otherthings, a strong military, the leadership of which, however,must remain sufficiently docile so as not to arousesuspicions of disloyalty. The only civilian structureresponsible for the FAR is not a Defense Ministry but ratheran entity under the Prime Minister responsible for theAdministration of the National Defense. It is headed byMinister-delegate Abderrahmane Sbai, whose role isessentially restricted to that of comptroller. As far as wecan tell, political-military policy on issues such aspeacekeeping appears centered in the Foreign Ministry. Allother major defense matters are decided in the Palace.

3. (C) Over the past decade, Morocco has transitioned from aconscript to an all-volunteer military force of approximately218,000 soldiers. Of the three services, the Army isdominant with approximately 175,000 personnel. There areapproximately 13,000 personnel in the Air Force and 7,800 inthe Navy. Though nominally subordinate within the militarystructure but answering directly to the King, theGendarmerie, which consists of approximately 22,000personnel, conducts paramilitary, royal guard, and internaland border policing missions. Though a few legacy conscriptsremain in the military, professional reforms have madevoluntary military service an attractive career option forMoroccans with opportunities for a steady income and someupward mobility. The average military salary for enlistedsoldiers is approximately 2,000 dirhams (USD 270) per month.An officer's starting salary is approximately 6,000 dirhams(USD 850) per month. With benefits, such as free housing,these are reasonably competitive in the Moroccan context.

4. (C) The top military commanders include MilitaryInspector General and Army Commander, Lieutenant General (LtGen) Abdelaziz Benanni; Operations Chief Lt Gen BoughaidArroub; and Gendarmerie Commander Lt Gen Housni Benslimane.Benanni, who has become mired in suspicion of corruption,will reportedly be retired soon. Arroub, who came out ofrecent retirement, is tipped by some to succeed Benanni.Arroub, historically pro-French, appears to have becomeincreasingly pro-U.S. in the last 5 years. Another risingstar in the FAR is General Mohamed Larbi Tamdi, who isresponsible for army logistics and force sustainment. Thereis some military staff in the Palace, likely influent, aboutwhich little is known.

5. (C) King Hassan II and his son, King Mohammed VI, havemaintained the Gendarmerie as a force relatively independentfrom the FAR since 1972, in part as a check against amilitary coup. While it most visibly serves as a StatePolice/Highway Patrol, it has a wide range of units. Itscommander, Lt Gen Benslimane, likely reports in some waydirectly to the King. He also leads the Moroccan NationalSoccer League, making him a popular figure inside and out ofmilitary circles. While there is no direct proof ofBenslimane being involved in corrupt activity, low rankingGendarmerie assigned to highway patrols are expected to payapproximately 4,000 dirhams (USD 540) to their immediatesupervisors with extralegal earnings from motorists abovewhich they can keep for themselves, according to one credibleanecdote.

6. (C) The FAR is composed of over 200,000 soldiers andoutclasses most militaries in Africa but has significant roomfor improvement. Along with concerns regarding agingequipment and an overtaxed force, the FAR is plagued byinstitutional corruption, leadership that will not stepaside, and low morale among mid-level officers. The FAR ispreoccupied with operations in the Western Sahara region withbetween 50 and 70 percent of its total strength deployedthere at any one time. The force in Western Sahara -- alandmass roughly two thirds the size of California -- isconsidered to be stretched thin with a reported estimatedoperational readiness rate of just 40 percent. Morocco doesnot consider the POLISARIO -- the ethnically Sahrawiresistance based in Tindouf, Algeria, seeking to make theWestern Sahara an independent state -- to be a conventionalmilitary threat. However, the FAR remains vigilant inguarding against a renewed POLISARIO insurgency effort.Morocco built a berm or sand wall along the eastern andsouthern borders of the Sahara in the 1980s, whicheffectively eliminated the POLISARIO's ability to launch hitand run raids, leading to the 1981 cease-fire, which has beenfully respected. The POLISARIO continues to maintain asmall, lightly armed presence at a few desert crossroads inthe small remaining part of Western Sahara outside the berm.Despite occasional expressions of concern, the GOM almostcertainly is fully conscious that the POLISARIO poses nocurrent threat that could not be effectively countered. ThePOLISARIO has generally refrained from classic terroristbombings, etc. Although the specter is sometimes raised,there is no indication of any Salafist/Al Qaeda activityamong the indigenous Sahrawi population.

7. (C) While the border between Morocco and Algeria isclosed, and relations remain cool, we do not believe thatAlgeria poses an imminent conventional military threat toMorocco. Nonetheless, the FAR has contingency plans and"wargames" in training exercises for a possible Algerianattack, but the FAR does not have troops deployed along theborder. Instead, the FAR remains stationed in garrisons,hundreds of kilometers away from the border, from which theycould deploy in the unlikely event of an Algerian incursioninto Morocco. Any confrontation between the two countrieswould likely take place through the proxy of the POLISARIO,which Algeria has supported materially in the past and coulddo so again if hostilities between Morocco and the POLISARIOrecommenced.

------------Peacekeeping------------

8. (C) Motivated to win over other countries to its claimsto Western Sahara, Morocco is active in United Nations (UN),engages in peacekeeping activities, and occasionally sendstroops to assist friendly countries. Morocco is anexperienced contributor to UN peacekeeping efforts, deployingto countries like Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti andSomalia. It currently has over 1,500 peacekeepers deployedto Cote d,Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo(DRC). Morocco also supports a military hospital in Kosovounder NATO command. Morocco has sent medical personnel toNiger to assist with famine relief and recently re-deployedmilitary forces to Senegal for an annual five-month &cloudseeding8 operation for drought relief. Peacekeepingcontributions in recent years have been tarnished byallegations of sexual wrongdoing in the DRC and Coted,Ivoire.

9. (C) Corruption is prevalent at all levels of Moroccansociety and the military is also plagued by it, particularlyat the highest levels. This may partly reflect a grandbargain struck by King Hassan II following at least twonearly successful coups in the 1970's: remain loyal, and youcan profit. (Those whose loyalty was in question weresubject to sometimes decades of harsh imprisonment.)Credible reports indicate that Lt Gen Benanni is using hisposition as the Commander of the Southern Sector to skimmoney from military contracts and influence businessdecisions. A widely believed rumor has it that he owns largeparts of the fisheries in Western Sahara. Benanni, like manysenior military officers, has a lavish family home that waslikely built with money gleaned from bribes. Leadershippositions in regional sectors are a significant source ofextralegal income for military leaders. There are evenreports of students at Morocco's military academy payingmoney to increase their class standings in order to obtainpositions in lucrative military postings. Command in thesouthern sector, i.e., Western Sahara, given the predominanceof military activity there, is considered to be the mostlucrative of the sectors in this regard. Because command inthe southern sector is also considered critical to high leveladvancement in the FAR, positions there are highly soughtafter. Consequently, positions in this sector are oftenjealously "guarded" by a number of influential families inthe military. The GOM seems to be looking for ways to stopcorruption, especially among the formative military ranks ofColonel and below, but not much is being done to stop thecorruption in the general officer ranks.

-------------------------------------------Retiring High Level Officers Also a Problem-------------------------------------------

10. (C) Senior officers refusing to retire to allow youngerofficers to move up the ranks has become a significantproblem for the FAR. Officers nearing the mandatoryretirement age do not want to retire since this would meanrelinquishing bribes, money-skimming, and some relatedsources of income. Even for those officers not &on thetake,8 giving up government positions and paychecks iseconomically difficult for a sustained retirement. This"gerontocracy" problem, coupled with the King's notoriousmicro-management of the military has had a negative impact onthe morale of mid-level military leaders.

--------------------------------------------- ------Radicalization: Under Control But Lingering Menace--------------------------------------------- ------

11. (C) Though now viewed as a minor problem, reportingsuggests that small numbers of FAR soldiers remainssusceptible to Islamic radicalization. The GOM firstencountered this problem following the 2003 Casablancabombings when investigators identified military members asco-conspirators. Following the bombings, the FAR undertooksteps to identify extremists and implement preventativemeasures, such as closing prayer halls on military bases, toaddress the problem. Subsequently, Morocco,s internalsecurity services have identified and apprehended severalmilitary and gendarmerie personnel in other terrorist cells,some of whom had stolen weapons from their bases forterrorism. Acknowledging this threat in a speech to thearmed forces in May 2008, the King stated his desire to"immunize" the armed forces from the threat of radicalizationand to promote the values of tolerance and moderation in theranks. During this same time frame the military forced 30officers to retire early, allegedly because they were deemedpotentially radical and hostile to the Government.Subsequently, the FAR removed all mosques from army bases anddeployed military counterintelligence, i.e., 5th Bureau,undercover officers to monitor local "off-post" mosques forpotentially radical activities. These officers refer casesto the Gendarmerie if criminal charges can be pursued.

---------------Winds of Change---------------

12. (C) Since the 1970's the military itself has beenperceived as the greatest threat to the throne and internalsecurity in Morocco, not surprising given Morocco's ownhistory and the broader context of the coup-ridden MiddleEast and Africa. Of late, however, there is a general

perception that the relationship between the Palace and theFAR is beginning to change to one of greater trust. TheKing's growing confidence is partly signaled by a recentsignificant increase in military spending, particularly formodern hardware, although this is primarily a function of theGOM's perceived threat from Algeria and the fact that it iscost prohibitive at a certain point to maintain oldermilitary equipment. The GOM increased the military'soperating budget to more than USD 2 billion in 2007,significantly more than in previous years. Likewise, the FARis undergoing a significant modernization process, payingover USD 2 billion for 24 F-16 aircraft and over USD 300million for T-6 training aircraft from the U.S. The GOM hascommercially financed these transactions, thus far, but theupfront payments have come from the treasury, which has alsocommitted to cover monthly payments. The King recentlyallowed armed military flights north of Ben Guerir (locatedapproximately 200 kilometers south of Rabat), an act notpermitted in the past due to the King,s desire to keep themilitary far away from the Palace in Rabat. The GOM is alsolooking to make significant purchases of M-1 Abrams battletanks in the future.

--------------------------------U.S.-Moroccan Military Relations Strong but Could Be Better--------------------------------

13. (C) In general, the U.S. and Morocco share a robustmilitary relationship with prospects for even closer ties inthe future. The health of the relationship is evidenced byincreased U.S.-Moroccan military training exercises and theaforementioned military sales. Morocco has also increasedits activities under a partnership arrangement with the UtahNational Guard, which regularly deploys to Morocco to conductjoint training and humanitarian relief operations. We havesubmitted draft proposed language for the Moroccans toconsider for an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement(ACSA) and a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and havereceived comments on the ACSA draft from the GOM. In thefuture, the Embassy hopes to see improvements in the FAR'sinformation sharing and accessibility to military units andfacilities with our Defense Attache Office. Although the FARregularly dialogues with our attaches, quality information islacking. The FAR also does not recognize the Embassy Attachecircle, an organization of Military Attaches from variouscountries residing in Morocco who elect a president todiscuss issues of collective concern with the FAR. It isapparent that the Palace continues to tightly control theFAR's interactions U.S. and other foreign governments.

14. (C) Previous interactions with GOM officials indicatethat military leaders are opposed to AFRICOM basing aheadquarters element in Morocco. However, Morocco hasoffered to send a military liaison officer to the AFRICOMheadquarters in Germany and has offered to assist U.S.-ledefforts engaging with African countries. Morocco has alsoapproached AFRICOM representatives to solicit AFRICOM supportin providing chemicals needed for their cloud-seedingoperations in Senegal and providing logistics to assist witha proposed locust control program.

-------COMMENT-------

15. (C) The Mission is optimistic that the U.S.-Moroccanmilitary relationship will continue to improve, but there arepotential speed bumps in future. We anticipate thatcooperative joint training exercises will continue to occurat a robust pace, although the vast majority of this activitywill likely take place in Morocco because of continuedrestrictions on the travel of FAR personnel. While weanticipate that the Palace will continue to modernize themilitary, with the notable possible acquisition of M-1 Abramstanks, we are increasingly concerned that Morocco, not usedto the high operating costs of these high end items (andother budgetary pressures) may make it increasingly difficultfor the Moroccans to make payments on purchases. If paymentsbecome a problem for the GOM, this could sour relationstemporarily. While we believe that there are some signs ofthe King's increased confidence in the FAR, we believe thatthe monarchy still calculates that the military representsthe biggest potential threat to the crown. FAR officerswill, therefore, continue to be distanced from policy making

input and restricted from engaging in detailed discussionsabout Moroccan military strength and intentions with foreignmilitary officers, including our attaches.

Morocco occupies the major part of its neighbouring country, Western Sahara. Entering into business deals with Moroccan companies or authorities in the occupied territories gives an impression of political legitimacy to the occupation. It also gives job opportunities to Moroccan settlers and income to the Moroccan government. Western Sahara Resource Watch demands foreign companies leave Western Sahara until a solution to the conflict is found.

It's not easy keeping up with all the different legal proceedings relating to Western Sahara. For the sake of clarity, here's an overview of the five different cases at the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Leading activists from Western Sahara are condemned to sentences ranging from 20 years to life imprisonment in connection to a mass protest in 2010 denouncing the Saharawi people’s social and economic marginalization in their occupied land; the Gdeim Izik protest camp.

At COP22, beware of what you read about Morocco’s renewable energy efforts. An increasing part of the projects take place in the occupied territory of Western Sahara and is used for mineral plunder, new WSRW report documents.