Suo Motu Statement Made in
the Parliament on May 9, 2000by the Minister of External Affairs on the NPT Review Conference

The sixth Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference is
currently taking place in New York. Consistent with our policy India is
not attending the Conference.

2. Since independence India has been a strong proponent of global nuclear
disarmament and has taken numerous initiatives towards this objective.
We remain committed to nuclear non-proliferation. India holds that genuine
and lasting non-proliferation can only be achieved through agreements that
are based upon equality and non-discrimination, for only these can contribute
to global peace and stability.

3. In 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely and unconditionally. Hon’ble
Members would be aware that 187 countries are today parties to the NPT.
The proponents of NPT cite these developments as evidence of NPT’s success;
yet it is also clear that there exist strong differences even among the
NPT States Parties. Three of the five Review Conferences held so far failed
to reach any agreement on a ‘final document’. The non-nuclear weapon States
Parties to the NPT have increasingly felt let down by the lack of progress
on disarmament, as well as non-compliance with the basic provisions of
the Treaty.

4. The nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT and their allies have
not diminished the role of nuclear weapons in their respective or collective
security calculus; on the contrary, new doctrines and
justifications have been developed. NATO's new strategic concept, announced
last year, ten years after the end of the Cold War, goes to re-emphasising
a need for the continued retention of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons
sharing arrangements within NATO also pose serious questions about compliance.
Such developments are clear and continuing violations of the provision
of the NPT. This the NPT community has been unable to discuss, let alone
deal with.

5. One of the basic obligations of nuclear weapons states under the
NPT was to prevent further proliferation. The record on this has also not
been satisfactory. The nuclear-weapon-states have either been active collaborators
in or silent spectators to continuing proliferation, including exports
of nuclear weapon related components and technologies.

6. After more than three decades, the nuclear weapon States Parties
to the NPT remain to be persuaded to begin any kind of collective, meaningful
negotiations aimed at global nuclear disarmament. These countries were
expected to display a special responsibility to implement Article VI; instead
this special responsibility today appears to be arrogated as a permanent
special right to possess nuclear weapons and only for their exclusive security.

7. India is a nuclear weapon state. Though not a party to the NPT, India's
policies have been consistent with the key provisions of NPT that apply
to nuclear weapon states. These provisions are contained in Articles I,
III and VI. Article I obliges a nuclear weapon state not to transfer nuclear
weapons to any other country or assist any other country to acquire them
and India’s record on non-proliferation has been impeccable. Article III
requires a party to the treaty to provide nuclear materials and related
equipment to any other country only under safeguards; India’s exports of
such materials have always been under safeguards. Article VI commits the
parties to pursue negotiations to bring about eventual global nuclear disarmament.
It needs to be emphasised that India today is the only nuclear weapon state
that remains committed to commencing negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons
Convention in order to bring about a nuclear-weapons-free world, the very
objective envisaged in Article VI of the NPT.

8. After the tests undertaken by India in May 1998, we have declared
that India shall only maintain a minimum credible deterrent and not engage
in any arms race. The role of India's nuclear weapons is defensive; accordingly India
has announced a policy of no-first-use and a policy of non-use against
non-nuclear weapon states. In fact this meets the demand of unqualified
negative security assurances raised by the large majority of non-nuclear
weapon states to ensure their security. India has also indicated readiness
to provide requisite assurances to the nuclear-weapon-free-zones in existence
or those being negotiated. We have also taken new initiatives calling for
de-alerting of nuclear weapons as a means of reducing the risk of accidental
or unauthorized launch.

9. The NPT community needs to understand that India cannot join the
NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Statements by NPT States Parties about
India rolling back its nuclear programme are mere diversions to prevent
focussed attention on the basic goals of the NPT.

10. India's commitment to global nuclear disarmament and lasting non-proliferation
remains undiluted. While willing to commence negotiations on Nuclear Weapons
Convention, India also remains ready to participate in agreed and irreversible
steps to prepare the ground for such negotiations. A global no-first-use
agreement and a non-use agreement against non-nuclear weapon states would
meet the longstanding requirement for legally binding negative security
assurances and assurances to nuclear-weapon-free-zones. Another
positive development would be a commitment by nuclear weapon states not to deploy nuclear weapons outside their own national
territories. Nuclear weapon states also need to take steps to lower
the alert status through gradual de-alerting actions, consistent
with policies of no-first-use and the defensive role of nuclear weapons.
Tactical weapons that lend themselves to war fighting roles need to be
eliminated. These would be some positive and concrete steps in the
right direction.

11. India has been a responsible member of the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime and will continue to take initiatives and work
with like-minded countries to bring about stable, genuine and lasting non-
proliferation, thus leading to a nuclear-weapon-free-world.