I. Introduction

This
report covers the Federal activities connected with the riots
in Detroit, Michigan, during the
period 23 July through 2 August 1967.
Its purpose is to recount the sequence
of events, to summarize the
experience gained, and to focus
upon the problems encountered, both re-
solved and unresolved, for consideration
in planning for or conducting
future operations of a similar
nature. This report does not treat with
the underlying causes of the loss
of law and order in Detroit, which re-
quired Federal intervention.

My
participation commenced shortly after 1100 on Monday, 24
July. The facts with respect to
the period prior to my participation have
been taken from the records of
the Department of Justice and the Depart-
ment of Defense.
II.

II. Narrative of Events

The
first contact between city and state officials in Detroit and
Attorney General Clark occurred
Sunday night, 23 July at 2355. Mayor
Cavanagh, who was with Governor
Romney at the time, called the
Attorney General at his home and
said a very dangerous situation existed
in the city. The Attorney General
promptly relayed this information to
Secretary of the Army Resor.

At
0240 on Monday, Governor Romney called the Attorney General
at his home and said he thought
he might need Army troops to
quell the rioting. Mr. Clark said
he would begin the alert so that the
Army could make preparations and
be ready promptly if needed. Im-
mediately upon the completion of
this conversation, the Attorney General
again called Secretary Resor to
inform him of the situation and of the
need for the Army to commence preparations.

The
Attorney General called the President, at about 0300, to
advise him of the disorders in
Detroit.

At
0340 the Attorney General called Governor Romney, who
reported that the situation was
about the same and that he still might
need help from the Army. The Attorney
General said the Army could be
present by late morning, if necessary.

At
this point, the Attorney General proceeded to his office, where
he called Secretary Resor at 0420.
The Army Secretary stated that
General Moore, of the Michigan
National Guard, believed the Guard could
handle the situation. Secretary
Resor also said that the Army could place
troops in Detroit before noon,
if necessary.

The
Attorney General called Secretary Resor at 0450 to review
the situation and again at 0500.
On this latter occasion, Secretary
Resor said General Simmons, the
Commanding General of the 46th Infantry
Division, Michigan National Guard,
had toured the riot area and believed
that the Guard could handle the
situation. Secretary Resor said he was
informed that 2,000 Guardsmen were
in the area, 3,000 more would be there by
noon and another 3,000 were not
yet called from a reserve force. The
Secretary also reported again that
General Moore believed the Guard
could handle the situation. He
reported that Inspector Gage of the Detroit
Police was of the same view.

Attorney
General Clark called Governor Romney at 0515 and
relayed the information that General
Simmons, General Moore
and Inspector Gage felt the situation
was under control and could be handled
locally. The Governor replied that
rather than take any chance, he should
get Federal help. He said he had
just told the press that Federal troops
were requested. The Attorney General
said that a written request for
Federal troops would be desirable
before their commitment. He advised
the Governor that he would have
to exhaust his resources and be pre-
pared to say that there was a state
of insurrection in Michigan or that
there was domestic violence he
was unable to suppress. The Governor
replied that he would talk to General
Simmons and advise the Attorney
General later of his decision.
He said the situation at that time was not
as bad as it had been in Watts
or Newark. He also said he appreciated
the assistance he had been given.

The
Attorney General called Secretary Resor at 0535 to report
this conversation with Governor
Romney. At 0550 Secretary Resor
called the Attorney General to
say that 2,400 troops from Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, and 2,400 from Fort Campbell,
Kentucky, were in a position to
move into Selfridge Air Base, Michigan,
by noon, if ordered to
do so within the next 10 or 15
minutes. At 0640 the Secretary informed
Mr. Clark that 2,190 National Guardsmen
were in Detroit and it was
estimated 5,000 would be there
by noon.

Governor
Romney called the Attorney General at 0650 to say
that major looting continued and
new fires were breaking out. He stated
that no one could say whether the
situation was contained or not. He
said he was going out to look the
situation over and would call back in an
hour. The Attorney General told
Governor Romney that if Federal troops
were used, it would probably be
necessary to Federalize the National
Guard. The Attorney General went
on to say that the Governor should not
ask for the troops unless they
were needed. He also stated that the Army
had troops in a state of readiness
to move and that the Governor would
need to decide within three hours
to ask for the troops if they were to
arrive in daylight.

Mr.
Clark called Secretary Resor at 0700 to report his conver-
sation with Governor Romney.

At
0855 the Governor called the Attorney General and read a
statement recommending the
use of Federal troops. Mr. Clark replied
that, under the Constitution and
other laws, it would be necessary for the
Governor to request the
use of Federal troops, and to give assurances that
a full commitment of State resources
had been made and that he was unable
to suppress the violence. Governor
Romney answered that he understood
and would get in touch with the
Attorney General as soon as he could.

At
0915 Secretary Resor informed Mr. Clark that General
Throckmorton would be in command
of the Army troops if they were to
be used.

At
0935 the Attorney General briefed the President.

At
0945 Governor Romney called the Attorney General and read
a draft of a telegram to the President
requesting troops. The Attorney
General said the telegram was adequate
and that if the Governor decided
to send it, he should do so quickly.
The Governor said a decision would
be made promptly.

Mr.
Clark relayed the gist of this conversation to Secretary
Resor at 1000 and then to the President
at 1010. The President instructed
the Attorney General to tell Secretary
Resor to move full speed ahead.
Mr. Clark did so at 1015.

At
1046 Governor Romney sent the President the telegram he had
read to the Attorney General. The
telegram was received by the President
at 1056 and he replied at 1105
with a wire informing Governor Romney that
he was dispatching Federal troops.

At
1155 the Attorney General, then at the White House, reached
Governor Romney and read the President's
telegram to him. The Governor
said it was very helpful. The Attorney
General informed him that I would be in charge of the Federal operations.
Thereupon I took the phone and
talked briefly with the Governor.

At
approximately 1100 I had received a telephone call at
home from Secretary McNamara who
said that he was at the White House
with the President and wished to
know whether it would be possible for
me to go to Detroit in connection
with the riots which had started on Sunday.
I replied affirmatively, and told
him that I would come to the White House
as soon as possible.

I
arrived at the White House at about 1150 and went to the Cabinet
Room where a meeting was in progress.
Among those present at the
meeting were the President, Secretary
McNamara, Attorney General
Clark, Deputy Attorney General
Christopher, Assistant Attorney General
Doar and Mr. Wilkins, the Director
of the Department of Justice Com-
munity Relations Service.

Secretary
McNamara summarized the situation and gave me two
telegrams to read. One was from
Governor Romney; the second was the
response from the President. (Copies
of these telegrams are attached as
Appendices A and B.) Governor Romney's
telegram stated that as Governor
of the State of Michigan he was
officially requesting the immediate deploy-
ment of Federal troops into Michigan
to assist state and local authorities
in re-establishing law and order
in the City of Detroit. His telegram stated
"there is reasonable doubt that
we can suppress the existing looting, arson
<
and sniping without the assistance
of Federal troops. Time could be of
the essence." The President's telegram
stated that he had directed the
troops, which had been requested
by the Governor, to proceed at once
to Selfridge Air Force Base. The
President’s telegram further stated
that these troops would be available
for immediate deployment as required
to support and assist city and
state police and Michigan National Guard
forces. The telegram also stated
that I was being sent as Special Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense to
confer with Governor Romney and Mayor
Cavanagh and to make specific plans
for providing such support and assistance
as might be necessary.

At
1155, as reported above, Attorney General Clark read to
Governor Romney over the telephone
the text of the telegram from the
President which had been dispatched.
I spoke briefly to Governor Romney
and told him I would be catching
a special military aircraft as soon as
possible, and hoped to be in Detroit
within 1-1/2 to 2 hours. I asked if
he could have a car available at
Selfridge Air Force Base to take me to
downtown Detroit immediately to
meet with him and Mayor Cavanagh. He
said he would arrange this.

The
President made it very clear to me that he was delegating to
me all the responsibility which
he could under the Constitution and laws
enacted by the Congress and that
I should take such action as I believed
necessary after I evaluated the
situation in Detroit. He asked that I keep Secretary McNamara informed. Secretary
McNamara then asked me to
designate the individuals whom
I wished to take with me to Detroit. I
designated Mr. Christopher, Mr.
Doar, Mr. Wilkins, Mr. Fitt, General
Counsel of the Army; Mr. Henkin,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs; and Colonel
Elder.

At
approximately 1220 I reached General Throckmorton by
telephone at Fort Bragg, and told
him to commence as soon as possible
the deployment of the already alerted
and waiting troops from Fort Bragg,
and Fort Campbell, to Selfridge
Air Force Base, approximately 25 miles
outside of Detroit. I asked General
Throckmorton to meet me at Selfridge,
and told him we would then proceed
together to meet with the Governor and
Mayor and their staffs in downtown
Detroit.

At
1335, as soon as we could assemble our team, the other members
and I departed National Airport
for Selfridge. On the plane, we reviewed
the facts which were then available
and the mission that had been assigned
to us. Specific assignments were
made to each member of the team for
the collection of detailed information
which would be needed to form the
basis of an objective, comprehensive
and independent appraisal of the
situation in Detroit and of the
Federal support and assistance which might
be required. Members of my team
present at this time included Mr.
Christopher, Mr. Doar, Mr. Wilkins,
Mr. Henkin, Mr. Fitt, and Colonel
Elder.

I
arrived at Selfridge at 1510 and was met by General Throckmorton,
who had arrived shortly before
from Fort Bragg. We conferred briefly
and agreed to put all incoming
troops on a 30-minute alert so they would be
able to move instantly into Detroit
if required. We also confirmed that
the necessary transportation was
being assembled to move the troops
rapidly into the city should they
be needed. This transportation consisted
primarily of city buses which had
been hired by Fifth Army. We placed
telephone call to find out where
Governor Romney and Mayor Cavanagh
were located. I was informed that
they were at the Detroit Police Head-
quarters in downtown Detroit. General
Throckmorton changed into civilian
clothes and we immediately proceeded
by police car to that building,
arriving at about 1625.

We
met at Police Headquarters with Governor Romney and Mayor
Cavanagh; Detroit Commissioner
of Police Girardin; Colonel Davids of
the Michigan State Police; Major
General Simmons, Commanding General
of the 46th National Guard Division;
and Major General Schnippke, Adjutant
General of the State of Michigan,
and other members of the Governor's
and Mayor's staffs.

Mayor
Cavanagh reported that there had been 483 fires with 23 still
burning on the west side and 6
on the east side; that 1800 arrests had been
made and that detention facilities
where being strained. He said that between
800 and 900 Detroit policemen were
on the streets at that time (3000 of the
Detroit Police Force normally being
assigned to street duty, all shifts).
Mayor Cavanagh further stated that
he believed local forces were inadequate
to cope with the situation, and
that there had been intelligence reports that
there would be attacks on Monday
night on the homes of middle-class
Negroes, and that they, in turn,
were arming themselves.

Governor
Romney asked General Simmons to brief me on the de-
ployment of the Michigan National
Guard. General Simmons reported that
a substantial number of Guardsmen
had not been deployed into the streets
and that they were awaiting instructions.
I asked him what they were
waiting for, and was informed that
they were waiting for us. General
Throckmorton and I recommended
that they immediately deploy additional
Guard units into the streets. General
Simmons left the room to take such
action.

Governor
Romney further indicated there were 730 State Police
available in Detroit. He said that
he felt Federal troops would be necessary
to quell the riots. I asked Governor
Romney whether he was stating that
there was a condition of insurrection
or domestic violence which state and
local law enforcement forces could
not control. Governor Romney replied
that he was not prepared to so
state but had said "there was reasonable
doubt" as to whether the situation
could be controlled by state and local law
enforcement agencies. He said that
he did not wish to state that there was
an insurrection because he had
been advised that such action might
result in the voiding of insurance
policies. I pointed out that the commitment
of Federal troops to the streets
presented grave legal issues and that it
was necessary, under the law, to
have a finding that a condition of
insurrection or domestic violence
existed and that local law enforcement
agencies could not control the
situation prior to the commitment of
Federal troops. He did not state
that either of those conditions existed.

I
then requested that space be made available for our headquarters
and that it be as close as possible
to offices being used by the Mayor and
the Police Commissioner. This request
was filled immediately.

Governor
Romney and Mayor Cavanagh suggested that we take a
tour of the city with them to assess
the situation. I concurred in this
suggestion and said that I wished
to make a personal evaluation of the
situation on the ground in the
riot-torn areas of the city.

At
about 1730, Governor Romney, Mayor Cavanagh, General
Throckmorton, Mr. Christopher,
Mr. Doar and I departed on an auto-
mobile tour of the areas of the
city which had suffered the most from the
rioting, looting and burning. This
tour covered a period of about an hour
and three-quarters. Our tour took
us through all the hardest-hit areas.
In a few areas, fires were burning
but they appeared to be coming under
the control of fire fighting equipment
on the scene. Furthermore, there
were large areas of the city where
only an occasional window was broken
or store burned out. In the downtown
business district there was no evidence
of lawlessness. The only incident
during our tour of the city was a flat tire.

Upon
our return to Police Headquarters, I received preliminary
reports from the local Federal
agencies (i.e., the FBI, the U.S. Attorney's
Office and the Community Relations
Service) and the members of my party.
These reports indicated that the
situation was much quieter than the
preceding day. The information
available at this time was fragmentary
and in oral form, and left much
to be desired. Colonel Elder soon there-
after began to assemble data from
all sources--principally the local
police--on the number of incidents,
both current and for the period prior
to our arrival, in order to provide
a sounder basis for our subsequent
assessments of the situation. This
compilation proved invaluable.

I
was informed that there was a delegation of community leaders who
wished to meet with Governor Romney,
Mayor Cavanagh and me. We met
with this group at about 1930.
The group consisted of approximately 15
community leaders, including Congressman
Diggs and Congressman
Conyers. The meeting was chaired
by Mr. Damon Keith, a lawyer and
Chairman of the Michigan Civil
Rights Commission. Mr. Keith stated
at the outset of the meeting that
time was short and that the fundamental
issue on which the community leaders
wished to express their views was
the question of whether Federal
troops should be deployed in the city. To
the best of my recollection, about
eight of those present spoke. Congress-
man Diggs was the first to speak,
stating he believed the situation demanded
immediate deployment of Federal
troops into the city. Congressman Conyers
then spoke, saying he did not believe
the situation was sufficiently critical
to justify the deployment of Federal
troops at that time, and that he felt
the deployment of Federal troops
into the city might inflame rather than
quiet the situation. He also said
that he believed the rioting had passed its
peak and was on the downturn. Of
those who spoke, the majority were in
favor of the immediate deployment
of troops and the remainder were
opposed. I closed the meeting by
thanking the community leaders for the
expression of their views on this
critical question and stated that while I
tended to agree with Congressman
Conyers, I had not finally made up my
mind and wished to meet briefly with my staff to review all available
evidence prior to making a decision.

General
Throckmorton and I and the members of my staff, after reviewing the available evidence,
concluded unanimously that there was an
insufficient basis at that time
to justify the deployment of Federal troops
into the city. We gave special
weight to two points. First, the incident
rate as reflected in the figures
now available was about one-third of what
it had been the previous day and
was holding approximately level. (See
Appendix C). Second, there were
now three times as many National Guard troops
in the city as on the previous
day and it was not clear that law and order could
not be re-established with this
additional force.1

First
is the account given to us at the initial conference at about
1625 by General Simmons, the Commander of the 46th National Guard
Infantry Division. His report stated that approximately half of the Guard
units were not deployed at that time. Governor Romney stated that these
deployments were being held up pending arrival of the Federal troops.

Second
is the report given to Colonel Elder by Colonel Phillips,
Chief of Staff of the 46th National Guard Infantry Division, at about 1915.
According to this account, the division had about 7000 troops then in the
Detroit area with another 700 (2 tank battalions and a Signal unit) enroute
from Camp Grayling. Of the 7000 in Detroit, 2240 were in the Central
High School area and 1810 were in the Southeast High School area; 85%
of both groups were reported deployed. Of the approximately 2950 remain-
ing, 300 were beginning to be sent out to accompany the fire department
to provide security and the remainder were overhead, in reserve, resting
or feeding.

Other
accounts are based on a reconstruction of events after the fact.
One was developed between the staffs of Task Force Detroit and the 46th
Division on 31 July and 1 August through a detailed survey of journals,
morning reports and other available documents. According to this account,
there where 2725 troops deployed under the 2d Bde, 46th Div (headquarters
at Central High School), 1319 deployed under the 3d Bde, 46th Div (head-
quarters at Central High School), 905 allocated or functioning, as guards
to
accompany fire trucks, 392 involved in command and support tasks, 1900
in reserve or being prepared for commitment, 713 in rear detachments
at Camp Grayling, and 243 enroute (at Flint). (See Appendix D).

It
is clear from the above accounts that at 1630 on 24 July there
were between 2,000 and 3,000 additional Army Nation Guard troops
available for deployment into Detroit’s streets. In addition, none of
the Air National Guard units were being used to control the riots. The
total strength of the Michigan Air National Guard was 2137 of which 660
were deployed after the National Guard was federalized.

At
approximately 2015 Governor Romney, Mayor Cavanagh and I
held a joint press conference.
I stated publicly that I had just met with a
group of community leaders and
also had completed a tour of the city
with Governor Romney and Mayor
Cavanagh. I said with respect to the
evening we hoped very much that
the situation would quiet down and that by
tomorrow morning people would be
able to return to work. I told the news-
men that Federal troops were moving
into Selfridge Air Force Base and
that we hoped it would not be necessary
for them to be used. I said that
the City Of Detroit and the State
of Michigan had an excellent police force
and National Guard. I noted that
these forces were on the streets at the
present time, and said I was hopeful
that it would be possible to contain
the situation during the night
without the necessity of using Federal troops.
I further said the Governor, the
Mayor and I would continue to follow the
situation throughout the entire
night and that I would take whatever action
might be required.

Governor
Romney then stated that he thought the situation was
more hopeful that night as a result
of these basic facts -- number one,
the Army was at Selfridge and available
to give assistance if necessary;
number two, the effort throughout
the community, including the police and
National Guard, was better organized
than the night before; number three,
about three times as many National
Guardsmen were available for duty in
the streets as the night before;
and, number four, the fire fighting organization,
including units from adjacent communities,
unlike the preceding night,
was in being and available to deal
with that aspect of the situation. He
also cited a rising desire on the
part of people throughout the community
to see the disorder and lawlessness
ended. The Governor urged everyone
in the community to work for the
restoration of law and order and the re-
establishment of community life
on a peaceful basis, and suggested it
might be possible the next day
to lift the emergency bans. Mayor Cavanagh
stated that although he saw some
hopeful signs that didn’t exist yesterday,
he would still like to see the
Federal troops committed at this point.

Following
the news conference, we returned to our headquarters
room, which was located immediately
adjacent to the Press Room and to
the Police Commissioner's office,
from which Mayor Cavanagh was oper-
ating. Governor Romney had an office
a few doors away on the same floor.
Shortly after the press conference
at about 2030, Governor Romney came
into my office and stated privately
that it would soon be dark and that he
felt strongly that Federal troops
should be deployed into the city before
nightfall. I told him that I was
still not satisfied that the situation could
not be controlled by the local
law enforcement agencies but that we would
follow the matter on a continuous
basis as the evening developed. General
Throckmorton and I continued to
follow the reports of incidents, both by
type and number, on a one-half
hour basis as reports were received from
the police and other sources. Between
this time and 2100, the incident rate
data began to climb. (This and
subsequent incident rate data are reflected
in Appendix C.)2 Most of the incidents, as reported over the police net,
were cases of arson or looting.

As
the incident rate continued to increase, General Throckmorton
and I decided at about 2130 that
we should move three battalions of para-
troopers to the Fairgrounds within
the Metropolitan area of Detroit so
they might be more readily available
in case they should have to be de-
ployed into the streets. General
Throckmorton gave the necessary orders
to implement this decision. During
the next hour and one-half the incidents
throughout the city, as reported
over police radio, continued a steady
rise. Just before 2300, General
Throckmorton and I, after further con-
sultation with Governor Romney
and Mayor Cavanagh, determined that the
local law enforcement agencies
could not control the situation. The
Governor and the Mayor both now
informed me that they had committed
all available police and National
Guard forces. At approximately 2310,
I recommended to the President,
with the concurrence of all of the members of my team, that Federal troops be deployed into the streets.

At
2320, the President signed the Proclamation and Executive Order
authorizing the use of Federal
troops in the City of Detroit and Federalizing
the Army and Air National Guard
of the State of Michigan (See Exhibit
BB).
I made a public statement at a
news conference about 2325 announcing the
action which was being taken

General
Throckmorton immediately took command of all the military
forces. He ordered the deployment
of Regular U.S. Army forces into the
eastern half of the city, with
the responsibility for the western half assigned
to the Michigan National Guard.
The rules of engagement issued to all
troops under Federal control were
to use the minimum force necessary to
restore law and order. Specifically
the troop commanders were instructed
to apply force in the following
order of priority:

Immediately
after the President signed the Executive Order, General
Throckmorton called Major General
Simmons to inform him that he was
under General Throckmorton’s command
and requested him to stand by at
his headquarters for a visit, and
to send a liaison officer to General Throck-
morton’s office at Police Headquarters.
General Throckmorton then drove
to the Fairgrounds where he contacted
Major General Seitz, Commander
of the Federal troops (Task Force
82) and instructed him to assume
responsibility from the 46th Division
(National Guard) for the restoration
of law and order in the eastern
half of the city -- east of Woodward
Avenue. The time of changeover
would be mutually agreed upon by the
commanders concerned.

From
the Fairgrounds, General Throckmorton preceded to the 46th
Division CP at the Artillery Guard
Armory where he issued instructions
to General Simmons, relieving him
of responsibility for the east side of
town and charged him with retaining
responsibility for the west side. Prior
to General Throckmorton's departure
from the 46th Division CP, General
Seitz arrived to coordinate with
General Simmons.

During
the inspection tour which we had taken with the Mayor and
Governor commencing at 1730, we
visited three areas which had been
harder hit by the disturbances
than any others. These were in the 2d
Precinct along Grand River Avenue,
the area around 12th Street north
of Grand River Avenue in the 10th
Precinct and the area around Mack
Avenue in the 5th Precinct in the
eastern part of the city (a city map is
at Appendix E). Of the three areas,
12th Street had been the hardest
hit; however, as it became dark
the incidents in the eastern half of the
city began to increase over those
in the western part of the city. Thus,
at the time the decision was made
to assign TF 82 to the eastern portion
of the city, it appeared that the
Regular troops were taking over the most
active sector. Other factors influencing
the decision to assign the eastern
portion to TF 82 were the closer
proximity of eastern Detroit to Selfridge
and the proximity of the 46th Division
CP to western Detroit.

At
0410 on Tuesday, 25 July, TF 82 completed relief of the 46th National
Guard Division elements in that
portion of the city east of Woodward Avenue,
and the remainder of the Federal
troops were moved from Selfridge to the
Fairgrounds. These and subsequent
troop deployments are reflected in
Appendix D.

At
0225, General Throckmorton and I made a statement to the press
outlining the situation and delineating
the areas of responsibility of the
Federal and National Guard troop
units. General Throckmorton and I made
another tour of the city beginning
at 0330. On our return we held another
press conference at 0520 at Police
Headquarters. Our objective was to
keep the public fully informed
of all developments connected with the
restoration of law and order to
Detroit.

Based
on the situation as I saw it then, I proposed to Governor Romney
and Mayor Cavanagh that a joint
announcement be made to the effect that
Detroit industrial plants, businesses
and offices should be reopened that
day. They concurred and such a
statement was released at 0703.

Throughout
the morning of Tuesday, 25 July, the members of my
group and I participated in a series
of discussions with state and city
officials and community leaders
concerning health and medical problems;
food distribution; emergency shelter
needs, processing, confinement and
disposition of persons in arrest;
and other matters which required con-
sideration at once in order to
begin and expedite the return to normal.

Early
Tuesday morning, on the basis of a deteriorating situation
in other parts of Michigan, Governor
Romney requested the release of
250 National Guard troops for use
outside of the Detroit area. He said
he also wanted to remove 250 State
Police for use elsewhere in the State.
These actions were taken. Throughout
Tuesday and Wednesday further
releases of National Guard and
police to State control were made. Ad-
justments also were made in troop
dispositions within the city to take
account of changes in the situation
in Detroit and nearby areas.

The
incident rate on Tuesday during daylight hours ran at about half
the rate for Monday. Although it
rose sharply again in the evening, the
peak rate at 2300 was only 166
per hour versus 231 at the same hour on
Monday. There were 11 deaths between
noon on Tuesday and daylight
Wednesday and about 60 fires were
reported between 2100 and midnight,
a rate well above normal.

On
Wednesday night, Mayor Cavanagh, Governor Romney and I all
agreed that it was essential that
we assure the leadership of the city that
law and order was being re-established
and that we urge the leadership to
mobilize to take the necessary
steps to begin to rebuild the city. A list
of those to be invited to attend
a meeting on Thursday was prepared by
the staffs of the Mayor and the
Governor and telegrams were sent out ask-
ing them to attend a meeting on
Thursday at 1500.

In
view of the improved situation which existed early Thursday morning,
the first steps of restoring full
responsibility for the maintenance of law
and order to the state and local
authorities were initiated. As an initial step,
General Throckmorton and I agreed
that an order should be issued that
bayonets be sheathed and ammunition
removed from the weapons of the
Regular Army and National Guard
troops. This was done. An announce-
ment of the lifting of the curfew
and the easing of gasoline restrictions was
made by the Governor at 1000 Thursday,
27 July. The lifting of curfew,
however, was withdrawn later that
day by the Governor because of the
congestion caused by "spectators,
gawkers and photographers" in the
damaged areas.

On
Thursday, additional attention was given to the definition of the
tasks that needed to be performed
to get the stricken city moving again.
The meeting of several hundred
community leaders was held at 1615 that
day for the purpose of discussing
how best to organize to meet this challenge.
General Throckmorton and I gave
brief situation reports on the status of
law and order and on Federal actions
being taken to provide for emergency
food, health and safety needs.
Following remarks made by a number of
participants, Governor Romney announced
the appointment of Mr. Joseph
L. Hudson, Jr. to head a broadly
based committee of community leaders
to proceed with the development
of recovery plans for the city.

By
Friday morning, the situation had improved sufficiently so that,
after coordination with Governor
Romney and Mayor Cavanagh, the first
steps could be taken in the withdrawal
of Federal troops from Detroit.
Units of TF 82 were withdrawn from
the First, Seventh and Thirteenth
Precincts and were assembled at
City Airport and the Fairgrounds. Their
sectors were taken over by National
Guard troops of the 46th Infantry
Division. The 5th precinct remained
under the responsibility of the Regular
U. S. Army forces.

I
met with Governor Romney and Mayor Cavanagh on Friday morning,
in accordance with the President’s
telegram of 27 July to discuss further
the emergency health, food and
safety needs of the citizens of Detroit. At
1200 we announced results of these
discussions at a joint press conference.
These matters are discussed further
in a later section of the report.

At
1230, Mr. Christopher, Mr. Doar and I met with Governor
Romney, Mayor Cavanagh and state,
city and county legal and judicial
authorities to review the problems
associated with the large numbers of
persons in custody and awaiting
disposition. These matters are discussed
in some detail later in the report.

On
Saturday morning, 29 July, I returned to Washington to report to
the President and to attend the
first meeting of the President’s National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

Following
my meeting with the Commission, a news conference was
held at which I announced the Small
Business Administration's declaration
of Detroit as a disaster area.
This declaration had the effect of authorizing
low interest (3%) long-term (30
year) loans for repairing or replacing small
businesses, homes and personal
property destroyed or damaged by the riots.

I
returned to Detroit at 2040 that night and met with my group to dis-
cuss further plans. Deputy Attorney
General Christopher returned to
Washington upon my arrival in Detroit.

On
Sunday, I met with Mr. Phillips, Regional Director of the SBA
with responsibility for the Detroit
area, to discuss the actions needed to
carry out the previous day's SBA
declaration of Detroit as a disaster area.
Mr. Phillips agreed to open a temporary
office in the riot-torn 12th Street
area, to consider opening an additional
office in the most heavily damaged
area on the east side, to supplement
his personnel in the Detroit area, and
to hold a press conference with
me in Police Headquarters on Monday morn-
ing to announce the special arrangements
which had been made. These ar-
rangements were completed on Sunday
and an announcement was made at
0935 on Monday morning. On Wednesday,
2 August, Mr. Moot, Adminis-
trator designate of the SBA, visited
Detroit with members of his staff for
further discussions of the SBA
program and its potential contribution to the
city's recovery.

During
Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, Federal troops were with-
drawn progressively from the Detroit
area and the TF 82 sectors were taken
over by the 46th Division. On Monday,
the last units of TF 82 were with-
drawn from the streets of Detroit
and three battalions were moved to Selfridge
Air Force Base with the remaining
four held in assembly areas at the City
Airport and the Fairgrounds. On
Tuesday, four battalions were airlifted to
their home stations at Fort Campbell
and all remaining battalions were
assembled at Selfridge Air Force
Base from which they were airlifted to
Fort Bragg on Wednesday. The 46th
National Guard Division was de-Federalized
and returned to the control of
the State of Michigan (to operate under the State
Police Director) at 1200 on Wednesday,
2 August, as the last units of
TF 82 were being returned home.

The
curfew was relaxed concurrently with the withdrawal of Federal
troops; the effective period was
2400 to 0530 on Monday night -- Tuesday
morning and it was discontinued
entirely on Wednesday. Liquor sales,
which had been suspended, were
resumed outside curfew hours beginning
on Monday. The return of the control
of the city to the National Guard and
local authorities, and the relaxation
of curfew and the restriction on liquor
sales, did not result in any increase
in incident rates. These rates had
lessened each day, reaching a low
of 280 incidents in 24 hours on Tuesday,
1 August.

On
Monday, 31 July, I met with Mr. Crook, Director of Volunteers
in Service to America (VISTA) and
Mr. Brabson, VISTA Program Officer,
to review the VISTA program in
support of Detroit's recovery. A sub-
sequent report of VISTA's activity,
submitted to me by Deputy Director
Kennedy on Wednesday, 2 August
is at Appendix F.

My
principal activities and those of my staff on Monday, Tuesday, and
Wednesday, 31 July-2 August, were
to meet and talk with as wide a segment
of the citizens of Detroit as possible
in order to gain additional insights into
the problems which had caused the
riots and those which had grown from
them. Although these meetings proved
highly productive, they did not lead
me to any simple conclusions with
respect to the problems which Detroit
must meet and overcome; they convinced
me anew of the tangled economic,
sociological, and psychological
origins of the riots and of the enormity
of the related tasks to
be performed.

At
0935 on Wednesday, 2 August, General Throckmorton and I held
a final press conference in the
Police Headquarters press room. At that
time we announced that "law and
order have been restored to Detroit . . .
responsibility for maintaining
law and order in Detroit will be returned at
noon to state authorities."

At
2110 I departed from Detroit, arriving in Washington with my
mission completed at 2310.

A
more detailed chronology of the events relating to this narrative
is at Appendix
G.

III. The Law and Tradition Governing
the Use of Federal Troops in Cases of Domestic Violence

The
actions of the President in dealing with the Detroit riots
and the resulting loss of law and
order were authorized by the Constitution
and statutes, and were in keeping
with traditional restraints that are
older than the Republic itself.

Article
IV, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that the
United States shall protect each
of the States against invasion, "and on
the application of the Legislature,
or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence." To
implement this clause, and in the
exercise of its powers to provide
for calling forth the militia (Art.
1, Sec. 8, Cl. 15), the Second
Congress in 1792 enacted the statutory
provisions that now appear
(with minor amendments) as 10 U.S.C.
331, 334.

In
essence, these sections authorize the President, at the
request of a State and after issuing
a proclamation commanding "the
insurgents to disperse and retire
peaceably," to use such of the armed
forces as he considers necessary
to suppress an "insurrection" or
domestic violence in that State.
While the statute uses only the word
"insurrection", it derives from
Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution,
under which the United States is
pledged to protect a State, on its
application, "against domestic
Violence." Reflecting this Constitutional
origin, the statute has in practice
been invoked in varied situations of
violence which extend well beyond
"insurrection" in the narrow sense of
a political uprising. As shown
in the annexed Appendix H setting
forth a
chronology of major State requests
for Federal military aid under this
statute, the situations have included
contested claims to State office,
attempts by private groups to take
over law enforcement, episodes of
violence erupting from labor disputes
and urban rioting.

These
Sections of Title 10 of the United States Code were the
statutory authority under which
the President acted in the Detroit situation.
It was under Section 331 that the
President, after issuing the proclamation
required by Section 334, honored
Governor Romney's request for Federal
troops.3

Implementing
his decision, the President invoked all of his Consti-
tutional and statutory powers,
including his authority to remove obstructions
caused by the rioting to the execution
of Federal laws. Thus, he followed
up his proclamation with an Executive
Order4authorizing federalization
of the Michigan National Guard,
as well as employment of Regular Armed
Forces of the United States, all
under the unified command of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary was
directed to take all necessary actions to restore law and order. These
steps were also taken pursuant to law.5

The
President did not order the troops into action until an
actual request for Federal troops
had been received and it had become
clear that the rioting was beyond
the capacity of State and local authorities
to control. In observing these
conditions, the President adhered both
to the fundamental Constitutional
policy of restraint in the use of Federal
military force to suppress local
domestic disorders -- a policy clearly
expressed in the legislative debates
on the Act of 1792 -- and to the
traditional practice of Presidents
under the statute on the various
occasions in which its use has
been sought by governors over the past
century and more. It is appropriate
to review, in brief, the history
of that policy and practice.

The
records of the debate in the House of Representatives on
the 1792 enactment reveal that
the legislators intended to preserve,
so far as practicable, the primacy
of civil over military force, and of
State over national responsibility,
in putting down domestic disorders.
Thus Congressman Murray, referring
to the British experience, pointed
out that although "a prompt and
energetic execution of the law is considered of first importance . . . at the same time the military is
never called in but in the last extremity." 3 Annals of Cong. 575. In
comparing the civil and military powers, Congressman Mercer noted
that the civil power is deliberative, but the military "cannot deliberate;
and therefore in no free country can the latter be called forth, nor
martial law proclaimed but under great restrictions." Ibid. Congressman
Baldwin observed that it is not only the Federal Government which
"possesses the power to suppress insurrections . . . the States
individually certainly possess this power; they can suppress insurrections,
and will do it; their interest is involved in supporting the laws, and they
are fully competent to do it." Id. at 574.

The
Presidents have responded to State appeals for Federal
troops in a manner consistent with
the policies expressed in the legislative
history summarized above. The major
theme running throughout the
history of presidential practice
under this section was first sounded by
President Van Buren in 1838, when
the provisions of the 1792 Act were
invoked for the first time. Explaining
his refusal to send Federal troops
into Pennsylvania at the request
of Governor Ritner, President Van Buren
observed that the intervention
of Federal troops was justified only when
"the domestic violence . . . is
of such a character that the State
authorities, civil and military,
after having been called upon, have
proved inadequate to suppress it."

The
dominant theme was sounded again when Section 331 was
last used in connection with the
Detroit race riots of 1943. President
Roosevelt's proclamation on that
occasion began by reciting the repre-
sentation of the Michigan Governor
"that domestic violence exists in
said State which the authorities
of said State are unable to suppress."6

In
the same tradition, the proclamation which President Johnson
issued on July 24, 1967, recited
information received from Governor
Romney to the effect that "domestic
violence and disorder exist in the
City of Detroit . . . and . . .
the law enforcement resources available
to the City and State . . . have
been unable to suppress such acts of
violence and to restore law and
order." These facts, together with the
request from Governor Romney, were
essential preconditions to the use
of Federal troops in Detroit, as
such facts and request have been on all
comparable occasions in the past.

The
nature and the timing of the President's reactions to the
situation in Detroit thus were
in conformity with law and with long-standing
tradition. As an historian on this
subject has wisely observed:

"Whenever any dispute
has reached a point where consideration is being given to the use of the military forces of the
nation, there is need for an unusually high degree of vigilance on the part
of the Chief Executive. Unless
there is some special reason which seems to make
imperative the immediate use of troops, or until all
efforts to effect a peaceful settlement have failed and
violence threatens of a nature beyond the ability of the
local and state government to control, the President
is wise to avoid recourse to force. To use the troops
only when no other solution seems possible has been the
most frequent Presidential practice - a practice the value
of which is attested by the fact that it has met with
complete success."7

IV. Economic and Social Assistance

One
of the early problems encountered in a riot situation in a
large city is the need to provide
emergency economic and social assist-
ance to the community. This
problem was tackled soon after the arrival
of the Federal team. To head
up the Federal work in this area, the
Bureau of the Budget made available
Mr. William Cannon, whose
assistance was invaluable.

Beginning
on Tuesday, 25 July, we met with city and state
officials to discuss emergency
requirements in the area of food, health
and safety. We emphasized from
the beginning that our approach would
be to set priorities; i.e.,
handle emergency items first, and then move
to the medium and long-range
problems in which Federal assistance
might be appropriate. This
was done.

On
Thursday, 27 July, Mayor Cavanagh and Governor Romney
sent a telegram to the President
requesting him to designate Detroit as
disaster area under P.L. 875.
(See Appendix I). Such a Presidential
declaration would have made
Detroit eligible for additional but limited Federal assistance -- a point
which was not understood by local and
State officials. There was
an erroneous impression that a disaster
declaration under P.L. 875
would solve all the city's problems. The
assistance which can be provided
under P.L. 875 is limited and much of
such assistance is available
under other statutes.

This
request was promptly responded to on 27 July by a tele-
gram from the President. (See
Appendix J). As was stated in the
President’s telegram, Federal
assistance would be provided "to help
meet the emergency health,
food and safety needs of the citizens of
Detroit that cannot be met
by state and local resources." The telegram
further stated that Mr. Christopher
and I were prepared to review with
the Governor and the Mayor
the city’s needs in these areas.

On
Friday morning, 28 July, Mr. Christopher and I met with
the Governor and the Mayor
to discuss the city’s needs and the exchange
of telegrams. The Governor
and the Mayor were informed by Mr.
Christopher and me that the
Federal Government was:

(1)
Providing food – the Department of Agriculture supplied
a substantial amount of surplus
food supplies to the city.

(2)
Providing medicine and drugs as required. The Commis-
sioner of Health was asked
to submit a list of needs.

(4)
Aiding in the demolition of riot-damaged hazardous build-
ings. Funds for this purpose
were specified to come from either a
pre-existing Department of
Housing and Urban Development contract
for spot demolition, or, if
required, additional funds would be sought.

We
also specified that all requests should be submitted through us
rather than the city contacts
directing the various Federal agencies in-
volved. This was necessary
to assure that priorities were established
and effective coordination
of Federal assistance was achieved.

Food
was not a major problem. While no exact survey of needs
was made by the city, it was
clear that a substantial number of people
were suffering temporary shortages.
However, between food supplies
available from the Department
of Agriculture surpluses and the voluntary
activities of the inter-faith
church groups and the Salvation Army, there
was enough to meet the city’s
needs. Thought should be given in future
cases to the location and method
of food distribution, including the use
of mobile distribution centers.

No
immediate action was required on medicine and drugs because
no specific requests were made
by the city and because the city had its
own supply of emergency stocks.

With
respect to emergency shelter, about 600 residential units and
3,000 individuals were said
to be involved. These figures were reported
as preliminary estimates and
of questionable validity. 68 houses were
immediately offered by the
Federal Government at a $1.00 per month
charge. FHA had another 200
houses in reserve, but no request was
made for them.

Demolition
of dangerous buildings involved extensive discussion
with the city, particularly
to determine the facts of damage and then to
identify what could be done
under the pre-existing HUD contract. A
review of the situation indicated
that riot damage probably could be
taken care of without funds
over and above the HUD contract.

Although
specific emergency aid was provided, as requested,
there was continuing pressure
for the additional limited aid that would
be forthcoming if Detroit was
declared to be a disaster area.

This
led to an investigation of what might be done under the disaster
authority of the Small Business
Administration (not to be confused with
the disaster authority of P.L.
875, discussed hereafter8). Under the
SBA authority, long term (30
years), low interest (3%), low down payment
loans could be made to take
care of personal property damaged or
destroyed by the riots. There
appeared to be a legal question. Did the SBA authority apply to a riot
situation? It was determined that it did.
There was also a question as
to whether applying the authority in Detroit
would set an unwise precedent?
It was decided it would not.

On
Saturday, 29 July, I announced at a White House news con-
ference that at the direction
of the President, SBA disaster loans would
be available to the riot areas.
As reported earlier, I consulted on
Sunday in Detroit with the
local SBA official, Mr. Phillips, and worked
out procedures to establish
SBA operations and offices, including a
temporary office on both the
West and East of Woodward Avenues in the
most heavily damaged areas.
On Monday, 31 July, SBA was in business
processing inquiries and applications.
SBA’s performance throughout
was outstanding.

Attached
as Appendix K is a list of the actions taken by the Federal
Government as 10 August 1967
to meet the city’s emergency and short-
term needs.

In
addition to taking immediate emergency actions and initiating
SBA disaster loans, the Federal
team handled a long list of requests
which the Mayor transmitted
on 28 July. A copy is attached as Appendix
L. The request included the
following items:

Dangerous building demolition

$

1.3 Million

Public housing and Urban renewal projects

120.0 Million

Community action anti-poverty projects

21.4 Million

Job and training programs

7.0 Million

Emergency food supplies

1.0 Million

Health services

1.0 Million

Law enforcement equipment

3.2 Million

Mass transportation (buses, etc.)

1.6 Million

Commercial rebuilding

10.0 Million

Street lighting

7.8 Million

Model planning project

0.5 Million

Open spaces project

0.3 Million

Urban beautification project

0.7 Million

Total

$

175.8 Million

The
Mayor’s list as submitted contained little in the way of justifi-
cation. Our next move was to
work with the city to amplify the justifica-
tion and evaluate the city’s
needs. We did this through Mr. Roselle, the
Mayor’s Executive Assistant,
and the City Budget Officer. Our pre-
liminary review revealed:

(a)
The new projects requested by the Mayor in the field of public
housing and urban renewal needed
more local development before further
Federal action or considerations
could be given.

(b)
Additional anti-poverty funds would be very difficult to obtain
until Congress acted on OEO’s
fiscal year 1968 budget request. Even
when action was completed and
although the city might receive funds in
the amounts it requested, the
city might not be able to use funds for the
purposes it wanted.

(c)
There was a good possibility that the city would get a renewal
of its basic job-training grant
from the Department of Labor. However,
additional or new job programs
were questionable because there were so
many unfilled job spots under
the existing program.

(d)
The Health Commissioner was not at all clear on the specifics
of the city’s health needs.
At the same time, he said he was certain
that no major health threats
existed.

(e)
With respect to the equipment needs of police and fire depart-
ment as well as the need for
street lights repair, there was no Federal
program which could help, unless
a P.L. 875 disaster was declared.
Such a declaration presented
serious difficulties from the standpoint
of both precedent and the fact
that the legislative history indicated that
P.L. 875 was not intended to
cover riot situations. We concluded that
it would appear necessary to
have clarifying action by the Congress
before the statute could be
applied to a riot situation.

(f)
Although our survey showed that action had taken care of the
emergency food problem, the
city still wanted the money requested. A
satisfactory justification
for such request was not provided.

The
city’s request for assistance has since been supplemented
twice. (See Appendices M and
N). Notwithstanding this amplification,
much remains to be done in
clarifying the city's requests and needs
and in ascertaining whether
there is justification for favorable action on
the various requests.

To
this end, on the departure of the Federal team, Mr. Cannon
remained for a short while
to continue to work with city officials.
Thereafter Mr. Cannon returned
to Washington and was replaced by
Mr. Alex Greene and later by
Mr. Mark Alger of the Bureau of the
Budget. Officials from other
federal departments have also been available
to confer with Detroit officials
regarding their requests and needs.
Responsibility for coordinating
all Federal assistance for Detroit in
Washington has been assigned
to Deputy Attorney General Christopher.

V. Administration of Justice

Criminal
justice is administered in Detroit by four local institutions --
the Detroit Police Department,
the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office,
the Wayne County Recorder’s
Court, and the Wayne County Sheriff’s
Office. All four of these institutions
had critical responsibilities in
administering justice during
the emergency period of the riot.

Operationally,
the Detroit Police Department is divided into thirteen
police precincts. Each precinct
has its own headquarters which includes
booking and detention facilities
and independent investigative facilities
operated by detectives assigned
to the precinct. Under ordinary circum-
stances, prisoners arrested
are brought to the precinct station for booking,
fingerprinting and interrogation.
The prisoners on felony charges and
serious misdemeanor charges
are then held at the precinct while the case,
assigned to a detective, is
investigated. Once the investigation and paper
work is completed, the detective
will confer with the prosecutor to deter-
mine whether the prosecutor
will authorize the issuance of a warrant. The
prosecutor's office handles
all criminal prosecutions before the Recorder’s
Court -- a separate court handling
all Detroit criminal cases. It is made
up of a prosecutor, his chief
assistant, and about 20 additional prosecutors
who handle the criminal cases
in court. If the prosecutor's office
authorizes a warrant, the prisoner's
file goes to the warrant clerk's
office in the Recorder’s Court.
At the warrant clerk’s office, two
technical legal documents are
prepared -- a complaint and an affidavit.
Once this is complete, the
prisoner is brought from the precinct to a
bull-pen in the Recorder’s
Court. In due course, he is brought before
one of the thirteen judges
of the Recorder’s Court for arraignment and
the setting of bond. At that
time, the prosecutor will have, as part of
his file, the prior record,
if any, of the prisoner. After bond is set,
the prisoner is turned over
to the county sheriff who retains custody of
the prisoner in the county
jail until he is released on bond.

During
the period 23 July to 27 July, over 5000 persons were
arrested in Detroit for law
violations in connection with the riot. A
majority of the prisoners were
charged with commission of felonies.
The prosecutor's office processed
more prisoners through the Recorder's
Court in this four day period
than it would ordinarily process in three
months.

As
the looting and rioting continued out of control on Sunday after-
noon, police, prosecutors and
court officials who were on duty began to
confer as to the bast practical
way to meet the emergency. Governor
Romney put his staff to work
on an emergency proclamation so that he
could issue an executive order
closing liquor stores and instituting a
curfew. This proclamation and
executive order were issued Sunday night
and required people to be off
the street between the hours of 2100 and
0530, except in an emergency.
Under Michigan law, violation of the
executive order is a misdemeanor.

Early
Sunday evening the Recorder's Court and the prosecutor's
office announced that it would
operate on a 24-hour per day basis. Early
Sunday evening the prosecutor's
office decided that it would ask for high
bond -- $10,000 and up -- on
all persons arrested. According to a
public statement by Prosecutor
William Cahalan, this was done "so that
even though they had not been
adjudged guilty, we would eliminate the
danger of returning some of
those who had caused the riot to the street
during the time of stress."
Apparently, the judge who was on duty Sunday
night and the additional judges
who came on during the night followed this
recommendation to the letter.

By
Monday morning, twelve of the thirteen judges in the Recorder’s
Court had begun to uniformly
follow the recommendation of the prosecutor
and set extremely high bail
on each of the prisoners arrested.

By
the time the federal officials arrived in Detroit, over 1800 arrests
were recorded (an unknown number
of others were arrested but not yet
processed) and all persons
arrested remained in confinement. This load,
plus the normal load of prisoners
in the county jail, made it a certainty
that if the numbers continued
to mount the various places of confinement
of prisoners in Detroit would
be terribly overcrowded. Almost as soon
as the federal officials arrived,
a request was made that federal facilities
be secured to permit the temporary
confinement of some of the persons
arrested.

The
administration of criminal justice was placed under great strain
during the four-day period
of the riot. The mechanical and paper work
required in the processing
of a prison under ordinary circumstances is
cumbersome. Fingerprint records
are checked, interviews, investigative
reports and recommendations
are prepared, technical affidavits and
complaints are drawn and thereafter
the paper and the prisoner must be
brought together before the
court for a hearing on the bond. By Tuesday
morning, the system, as well
as the facilities, were severely strained.
Long delays occurred in the
processing of prisoners at the precinct stations
where conditions were particularly
bad. Further long delays occurred while
the prisoners waited in bull-pens
or temporary facilities at the Recorder's
Court without food, water or
latrine facilities while they were processed
through the bond hearing. Temporary
facilities included the police garage
and a number of separate busses
parked outside the Recorder's Court.

There
was no formal change in the policy of high bail. However,
beginning on Tuesday morning
the prosecutor’s office, at the urging of a
number of persons including
federal officials, began to think in terms of
releasing prisoners on personal
bond or on reasonable bond. Officials
also considered whether a new
policy should be adopted of initially setting
reasonable bonds so that the
Recorder's Court would not have to under-
take bond review proceedings.
A new policy was never formally adopted,
although beginning on Tuesday
or Wednesday, and continuing through
Thursday, Friday and Saturday,
some of the individual judges abandoned
the policy of arbitrary high
bond and considered each individual case on
the merits. This, however,
resulted in only a trickle of releases for
persons who were arrested,
and by Wednesday night over 5000 were con-
fined, including 700 juveniles
and a considerable number of women. On
Wednesday night, about 1800,
the prosecutor's office decided to
resubmit individual files to
the court for release of prisoners on their
own recognizance. The standard
the prosecutor’s office followed was a
lack of any prior conviction.
The emphasis was placed on the release of
women. The files were reviewed
without the usual bond information, but
with the prisoner’s prior record,
if any, contained therein. If the
prosecutor's office determined
that the prisoner should be released on
his own recognizance, his file
was then sent to the Recorder's Court in
groups of 50, 100 and in one
instance 500. This step by the prosecutor’s
office met with some initial
resistance by some individual judges and again
was slowed by the mechanical
and paper aspects of the system. The court
file had to be brought together
with the prosecutor’s recommendation and
his file. This took time.

To
give some idea of the number of cases involved, the following
lists prepared by the Recorder’s
Court reflect the number of felony and
misdemeanor cases processed
during the riot.

No. of
Felony
Cases

No. of
Felony Defendants

No. of Misdemeanor Cases

No. of Misdemeanor Defendants

23 July

113

248

2

7

24 July

317

801

51

131

25 July

316

720

68

145

26 July

260

644

66

128

27 July

263

570

202

346

28 July

60

87

81

125

29 July

21

32

53

85

30 July

24

27

21

36

31 July

25

37

8

11

Totals

1399

3166

362

1014

Thus, the total number of defendants
processed in a nine-day period was
4180. By 1100, Tuesday, the
prosecutor estimated that they were eight
hours behind in arraignments.
Early Wednesday morning, a police survey
of the precincts indicated
that 2200 prisoners had not been recorded. At
1100, Thursday, there were
still 1500 prisoners in precinct stations
according to the prosecutor.

By
Friday night or early Saturday morning, orders had been entered
by the Recorder's Court providing
for the release on their own recognizance
of over 1000, and perhaps 1500,
prisoners. From that time on, the total
number of prisoners in confinement
turned down. However, the actual
release of the prisoners was
very slow even after the court had ordered
their release. The reason for
this appears to be that the Sheriff's Office
could not cope with developing
a system which could locate a prisoner in
the various places of confinement
in short order.

In
addition, some prisoners were being released after posting bond
and the court was following
a very liberal policy of setting bond for those
persons brought before the
court for a Arraignment on Friday or Saturday.
By Monday of the second week
approximately 2200 riot prisoners were
still in confinement. By 4
August the number was down to 1200.

Examinations
began on 1 August. The examination is a substitute
for a grand jury proceeding
in Michigan. At that time the court hears a
part of the prosecutor's case
and decides whether to hold the prisoner
over for trial. Again, the
number of cases and the amount of papers re-
sulted in major confusion in
Recorder’s Court and the proceeding moved
slowly. The local bar association,
the newly designated public defender's
office, and the Neighborhood
Legal Service, all worked together to pro-
vide representation for the
prisoners.

Several
suggestions concerning problems encountered in the
administration of justice in
riot situations are included in subsection "o"
of Section VI. of this report.

VI. Lessons Learned

Because
this is a country which cherishes law and order, all re-
sponsible citizens must hope that
the lawlessness and violence which
occurred in Detroit will not be
repeated in other communities. It does
not appear, however, that this
hope will soon be realized. It is probable
that other cities will suffer from
riots, looting and burning. Therefore,
I believe it is necessary to review
the principal lessons learned in Detroit.
I am pleased that action already
has been taken in some of the areas covered
below.

a. Rumors. At a time of rioting, rumors are rampant and tend
to grow as exhaustion sets in.
Tensions rise and incidents tend to be
exaggerated by overreaction. These
rumors can have serious effects.

Authoritative
sources of information must be identified quickly,
developed on a priority basis and
maintained, with full reliance placed on
them. Regular news conferences
must be held by senior civilian and
military officials; if they are
not, the press will follow the sensational
reports and fan the rumors. Members
of the press, as feasible, should
be permitted to accompany senior
officials on tours of the riot areas, and
to share in their evaluations in
order to provide the facts to the public
quickly and authoritatively. Regular
formal contact with the press should
be augmented by frequent background
briefings for community leaders
because rumors flourish at all
levels.

b. Access to and Evaluation of Data. To be able to make sound
decisions, particularly in the
initial phases of the riot, a method of
identifying the volume of riot-connected
activity, the trends in such
activity, the critical areas, and
the deviations from normal patterns
must be established. I cannot overemphasize
the importance of such
information, particularly when
the Federal team has to make a
determination as to whether the
situation is beyond the control of local
and state law enforcement agencies.
In Detroit, the best immediately
available indicator was the log
of incidents requiring police action which
was maintained at police headquarters.
This information was acquired
by monitoring the police radio,
cataloging transmissions by precinct,
recording separately shooting incidents
and total incidents, and producing
a spot summary on a half-hourly
basis.

Such
indicators, however, have serious deficiencies. First, it
is necessary to have a "normal
incident level" curve as a base of
reference. If this is not available,
there is the danger of a distorted
picture of the riot activity. Second,
in the case of sniping, a single incident
may be reported 8 to 10 times or
more by different sources who heard a
shot fired, and it appears on the
police log as multiple incidents. A warning
shot, or the shooting out of a
street light often may be reported as a sniping
incident. Further study should
be given to methods of culling out such
distortions.

Despite
the problem of distortions the most valuable aspect
of an indicator curve is the disclosure
of a trend.

c. Activity Patterns: The Detroit disorders developed a typical
pattern. Activity began to build
up at about 1900, rose sharply to a peak
at about 2300, fell off somewhat
more sharply than the rate at which it
rose, reached a nominal rate just
before dawn, continued at a very low
level for about 2 or 3 hours, and
rose gradually again until the break
upward at about 1900. The assembly
and analysis of data with respect
to activity patterns is needed.
I believe it would be useful to assemble and
analyze such data for Detroit,
Newark, Milwaukee, Watts, etc. There
may be "indicator" incidents; there
may be typical pattern of spread; there
may be a natural sequence in the
order in which the several types of
incidents occur. All of these should
be studied.

d. Fatigue Factors. This riot began on Sunday. Although the
total number of incidents never
rose again to Sunday’s level, Tuesday
night's incidents seemed to be
the most vicious of the entire period. Police
had been working long hours and
were tired, and rumors had spread. There
is evidence that there was over-reaction
in this period, and perhaps a
reduction in the regard given to
the rights of citizens. This situation
seemed to right itself somewhat;
in the light of the following morning,
better and more normal behavior
appeared, perhaps as a result of the
experiences of the night before.
This area, too, deserves more analysis.

e. Discipline in National Guard Troops. At the outset, the
troops of the National Guard were
far below the standards of the active
Army in appearance, bearing, courtesy,
and general behavior; discipline
was not adequate and command and
control down into the ranks were poor.
The National Guard improved markedly
in all these areas as they gained
experience and confidence and were
held to a high standard of performance.
Discussions with numerous community
leaders and individual citizens
revealed that these facts were
readily apparent to the citizens of the riot-
affected sections of the city.
These initial deficiencies were primarily in
the area of basic military discipline.
In light of these facts, I recommend
that a review be made by Federal
and State officials of the qualification
and performance of all officers
in the Army National Guard and the Air
National Guard to insure that the
officer personnel are fully qualified to
discharge their responsibilities
and to provide the required leadership.
I wish to make it very clear that
I am not suggesting that the caliber of
National Guard officers is generally
unsatisfactory. This is not the case.
I am certain that the vast majority
are competent and dedicated men. How-
ever, I can state from my own observation
that there are substandard
officers who must be weeded out.
This will not be an easy task. It will
require the best efforts and skill
of both the Department of Defense and the
cognizant State authorities. It
is also clear that riot control training for
the Army National Guard and the
Air National Guard should be improved
and expanded.

f. Negro Personnel. Neither the Detroit Police, the Michigan
State Police, nor the Michigan
National Guard had representative numbers
of Negro personnel in their ranks.
I believe that this fact inhibited com-
munication, and, since the majority
of the rioters were Negro, tended to
exaggerate the racial nature of
the conflict. Whether the substantially
larger percentage of Negro personnel
in the airborne units from the
active Army was a major factor
in their greater success in the maintenance
of law and order cannot be precisely
determined. However, a sampling of
informed opinion throughout the
riot-torn areas of Detroit revealed a
strong conviction that a greater
degree of integration of the police and
National Guard would be of major
importance in controlling future dis-
orders. I believe strongly that
steps should be taken immediately to
increase the recruitment of Negroes
into the Army National Guard and
the Air National Guard. This is
a difficult problem and will require the
combined efforts of the Department
of Defense, State officials, and the
Negro community.

g. National Guard Reorganization. Some of the National Guard
units called to duty in the Detroit
riot were "low priority units" at 50%
or less strength in both personnel
and equipment. The lack of adequate
manpower and equipment interfered
with the efficient functioning of these
units. This situation underscores
the urgent need to carry out the pro-
posed Army Reserve reorganization
which will provide units manned at
not less than 90% of TO&E strength
with full equipment.

h. Use of Military, Police and Fire Fighting Personnel. Exper-
ience in Detroit highlighted several
command and control, communication
and other problems which are likely
to arise in future riots in the event
the local police are unable to
control the outbreak of violence.

1.
There is a requirement to co-locate the command and
control elements of both local
and State police as soon as the latter are
called in to assist in the restoration
of law and order. Co-location is
absolutely essential at the top
echelon of control. For maximum effective-
ness, co-location should be extended
as far down as possible; i.e., to the
precinct level. In the event military
forces should be required to supple-
ment police forces, the same principle
applies.

2.
There is a requirement that communications between local
and State police should be compatible.
This was not the case in Detroit
with the result that on numerous
occasions both local and State police
units where dispatched to the same
trouble spot where only one was re-
quired. This resulted in a misallocation
of assets. If military forces
are required, the problem of compatible
communications can be handled
satisfactorily by attaching local
police officers to military units. I do
not believe it is practical to
attempt to have military units using the
same frequency as police forces.

3.
Ideally, there should be a single commander for all law
enforcement personnel -- federal,
state, and local -- involved in quelling
a riot. As a practical matter,
however, it does not appear to be feasible
effectively to place all forces
under a single command during the course
of a riot. In addition, to do so
would raise grave legal questions unless
martial law is declared. The declaration
of martial law, however, would
itself raise severe problems. Such
action results in the abolition of the
normal functioning of the courts,
but also places soldiers in the position
of having to act as arresting officers,
which is neither desirable nor
feasible. Accordingly, it is necessary
to have the closest integration
of command as recommended above
to provide a viable substitute for a
single command. In this connection
it would appear desirable to place
both State and local police under
a single police official.

4.
The furnishing of proper protection to local fire depart-
ments so that the firemen may carry
out their task when exposed to sniper
fire is another requirement. In
this connection, it would be desirable to
familiarize National Guard forces
with fire fighting techniques so that they
can assist in the event firemen
are injured or become exhausted.

5.
Orders must be simple, direct and not subject to inter-
pretation. Orders must be written
or confirmed in writing as soon as
possible. Certain orders should
be issued in writing to every soldier, i.e.,
rules of engagement and the handling
of civilians. Such orders could be
printed on a small pocket-sized
card. It would be most desirable if
written orders were issued to all
law enforcement personnel.

6.
The general instruction with respect to civil disturbance
rules of engagement and degrees
of force described for the military com-
mander as guidance in these areas
requires clarification and change to
provide more latitude and flexibility
in their use. The general policy be-
hind these instructions, which
is to use the minimum force necessary to
restore law and order, is proper
and needs no revision or amplification.
However, that portion of the letter
of instruction issued to the Task Force
Commander which prescribes the
normal priorities to be used in the
application of force should be
studied with a view to provide the commander
concerned with more flexibility,
particularly with respect to the use of
riot control chemical agents. The
letter of instruction stipulates that
normally the application of force
will follow this priority:

a.
Unloaded rifles with bayonets fixed and sheathed.

b.
Unloaded rifles with bare bayonets fixed.

c.
Riot control agent CS.

d.
Loaded rifles with bare bayonets fixed.
It is believed that the use of
riot control chemical agents should be per-
mitted at any time at the discretion
of the senior commander, who should
have the authority to delegate
its use as far down the chain of command as
the company commander level. Further,
it is suggested that there is
one other degree of force which
should be included in the priority listing
above: Namely, unloaded rifles
with bare bayonets fixed, with ammu-
nition available on the person
of the individual soldier, with a restriction
that he may load his weapon and
fire it only upon the authority from a
commissioned officer. If this degree
of force is prescribed, commanders
must insure, through appropriate
orientation, that their troops understand
that there is considerable flexibility
inherent in this instruction in that,
where necessary in specific situations,
officers may delegate in advance
the authority to give orders to
load and fire to senior noncommissioned
officers.

7.
Illumination must be provided for all areas in which
rioting is occurring. In Detroit,
particularly on 12th Street, many blocks
were totally without illumination,
the street lights having been shot out
on the theory that this would provide
greater protection against snipers.
This is an incorrect theory. In
areas without illumination a sense of fear,
and sometimes panic, pervaded.
This led to unnecessary and excessive
firing of weapons with consequent
danger to innocent civilians. When street
lights were restored, the calming
effect on both law enforcement officials
and the local citizens was immediately
apparent.

8.
During the riots, it became normal practice for both police
and some National Guardsmen to
conduct patrols with weapons always at
the ready, and in the case of mounted
patrols with weapons protruding
from every window of the patrol
vehicle, often with sirens going. While
maximum readiness of this type
may be appropriate in areas of extreme
riot activity, its widespread use
is not conducive to dispelling fears and
encouraging a return to normal
activity.

9.
Tear gas was not employed during the first two days of
the Detroit riots. Although the
effect of its use must remain speculative,
it appears likely that the use
of tear gas on Sunday or even Monday would
have dispersed the looters and
rioters and perhaps have prevented the
creation of the circumstances in
which the sniping occurred. In the case
of snipers, tear gas would have
been more effective and less dangerous
to use than regular ammunition.
Neither the Detroit Police nor the
Michigan National Guard had tear
gas available for use. Provision for
its use should be made. For military
personnel, authority to use tear
gas in a riot situation should
be delegated immediately to the company
commander level. Further, there
is an urgent need to provide a fairly
accurate method for an individual
soldier to project a gas grenade. The
Army has such a weapon under development.

i. Rebuilding. Detroit, during the violence of the riots, was
heavily preoccupied with its pain
and was seemingly not ready, by itself,
to look to the problems ahead.
Plans must be pushed from the beginning
to take the necessary actions to
meet emergency needs, and early steps
must be taken to find and to energize
community leadership for the long
road back. There is also a clear
need for a single coordinator of the
many and complex Federal programs
which may be applicable during
the rebuilding process.

j. Composition of Federal Team. Experience in the Detroit
riots confirms the need for the
following key personnel on any Federal
team sent into a riot occurring
in a large city.

1.
A Special Representative of the Secretary of Defense or
the President to be in overall
charge of Federal activities.

2.
A senior Department of Justice representative to act
as the alter ego of the Special
Representative and to advise on the many
legal questions which will arise.

3.
A military commander with an appropriate staff to assume
command of all Federal military
forces.

4.
The Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division.

5.
The Director of the Community Relations Service.

6.
A senior Public Affairs officer.

7.
A representative of the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget to handle all requests for
economic and social assistance to the
city.

8.
A Military Assistant to the Special Representative.

9.
At least one individual who is familiar with the city.

k. Prior Planning. In order to overcome the initial unfamiliarity
of the Federal troops with the
area of operations, it would be desirable
if the several Continental Armies
were tasked with reconnoitering the
major of the United States in which
it appears possible that riots
may occur. Folders could then be
prepared for those cities listing bivouac
sites and possible headquarters
locations, and providing police data, and
other information needed to make
an intelligent assessment of the optimum
employment of Federal troops when
committed.

l. Curfew. Curfew hours during the Detroit riots were from 2100
to 0530. With a few exceptions,
no limitations were imposed on movements
of local citizens except during
these hours. The fact that riot activity re-
curred over several days in both
Detroit and Newark leads to the conclusion
that better control of the situation
might be achieved if a 24-hour curfew
were imposed at the outset in the
local areas of major violence. However,
such action raises two major problems
-

1.
The movement to and from work of essential operating
personnel needed to keep the city
functioning, and

2.
The distribution of food.

The
first problem might be ameliorated by the issuance
of special passes, or pre-arranged
official bus pickup of designated
personnel. The second problem could
be handled for limited periods of
time by emergency food delivery
in those areas where the 24-hour curfew
had been imposed. The magnitude
of such tasks, however, is likely to
be such as to make a 24-hour curfew
impracticable for more than a very
limited time; i.e., 48 hours.

m. Requirements for Federal Intervention. The legal provisions
whereby the President may order
the use of Federal troops within a state
were not understood by the officials
of the State of Michigan. These pro-
visions are Article IV, Section
4 of the Constitution and Chapter 15 of
Title 10 of the United States Code.
It is necessary that all governors
fully understand the legal requirements
for use of Federal troops in
situations of domestic violence
or insurrection. I was pleased to see that
the Attorney General on August
7, 1967 wrote each of the governors setting
forth the requirements for the
use of Federal troops in such situations and
advising as to the procedures to
obtain their assistance (See Appendix 0).
I believe it would be desirable
to follow up on this letter and receive
confirmation from the states that
the procedure is clearly understood.

n. Economic and Social Assistance.

1.
Economic and social assistance problems arise early and
acutely. Future teams should include
a person responsible for this task
from the beginning. Such a person
should -- as did Mr. William Cannon --
have a broad knowledge of the Federal
Government economic and social
programs, and know how to get prompt
action at the Washington level.

2.
As soon as the immediate military crisis subsides, all
Federal agencies should clear their
major decisions through the Federal
team; indeed, it is desirable to
continue this through a single Federal
representative after the Federal
team leaves. If this is not done, there
will be a tendency for the various
Federal agencies to rush in with offers
to help, and this can confuse an
already confused situation.

3.
From the beginning, requests for assistance should be
classified in order of priority:
1) those which require immediate action,
i.e., meeting food, health and
safety needs; 2) those which require action
in the near future, i.e., furnishing
SBA assistance to owners of damaged
property; and 3) those which are
long term in nature, i.e., action on
model cities applications, job
and training programs, etc. In short, it
is desirable that specific objectives
be spelled out quickly and that priorities
and time schedules be assigned
to specific individuals for action.

4.
When applicable, make sure that Federal actions involve
participation by the local community,
city officials and the local neighbor-
hood people, and that Federal operations
are located, when possible, close
to the people being served; e.g.,
the opening of SBA temporary offices
in the riot-torn areas.

o. Administration of Justice. A riot such as occurred in Detroit
places an enormous burden on every
aspect of the machinery for the
administration of justice. The
following aspects require particular
attention: I wish to make it clear
that the following suggestions should
not be taken as a criticism of
the cognizant officials in Detroit who made
a determined effort, working around
the clock, to cope with an unexpected
and overwhelming problem.

The identification of
suspects and the recordation of their alleged unlawful
acts presents special problems
in a riot situation where
as many as a thousand people
may be arrested in a given
sector of the city in a 24-
hour period. Law enforcement
agencies should con-
sider the means by which
they can improve their
techniques and procedures
in such emergency situ-
ations, so that the innocent
are protected and so that
the guilty do not go free
because of the inadequacy
of arrest and procedures.

Every major riot can require
detention facilities which far outruns a city's normal
capability. In Detroit,
the city had to accommodate
5, 000 prisoners in a
period of five days. This
overtaxed the city and
required the use of state
and Federal facilities for
detention purposes. Even
these additional facilities
proved inadequate. Consideration
should be given in
advance by metropolitan
areas to means by which they
can most effectively expand
their detention facilities
in such emergency situations.

Arraignment of suspects
apprehended during the course of a riot should be promptly
undertaken, both as a
matter of fairness and
because of the overstrained
detention facilities. The
Detroit experience indicates
that unless special procedures
are put into effect,
arraignment may be substantially
slowed due to the
absence of necessary records
and the shortage of
judges and other necessary
Court personnel. A study
of this problem in advance
by local courts may enable
them to develop techniques,
such as the use of judges from
other courts, to accomplish
a speedier arraignment.

Bail procedures during
a time of riot deserve special consideration. There is
an understandable tendency
during such a period for
very high bails to be set to
to assure that persons
apprehended are not back
on the street and in a
position to resume unlawful
activities. Such a procedure,
however, may be not
only inequitable but somewhat
self-defeating in that
it tends to overtax the
detention facilities and create
undue apprehension and
hardship among community
residents whose relatives
are in custody. Unless
a city is prepared to take
prompt action at the time
of arraignment to set reasonable
bail or to permit
release on recognizance
in appropriate cases, it
may become necessary in
the latter stages of a riot
for the courts to repeat
the procedure so as to make
the necessary arrangements
for the release of those
in custody. In Detroit,
this problem was severely
aggravated by the fact
that the relatives of those
in custody were unable
to get accurate information
about their location, the
charges placed against
them, and in a number of
cases whether they were
in custody.

Another problem encountered
in Detroit was the need to provide counsel for
the thousands of individuals
arrested. Bar associations
in metropolitan areas
should give consideration
to a program which would
make counsel available
in such situations.

Public confidence in the
administration of justicerequires that those charged
with unlawful activities
during the course of riots
be given prompt and fair
trials. Those involved
in the administration of
justice will have a heavy
and burdensome responsi-
bility but this responsibility
must be met promptly and
effectively.

Finally, those involved
in the administration ofjustice, especially high
law enforcement officials,
must be cognizant of the
fact that tension, fear and
fatigue create a danger
that individuals involved in
administering justice may
act rashly or unwisely.
Those in supervisory positions
must be continually
conscious of this danger
and take every step to
minimize it.

1Some
uncertainty now exists regarding the deployment status of the
Michigan National Guard during the afternoon of Monday, 24 July. There
are several accounts.

2 The incident rate data must be used with caution. Although an incident
was at all times described as "an event requiring police action,"
a review
of the specific incidents logged reveals a wide range of variation and
apparent validity. Substantial numbers of individual incidents which were
surveyed did not bear any relation to the riot. Hence, these data may be
useful to identify trends, and were used in that way, but should not be
considered an absolute indicator.

3By
historic precedent as well as practical necessity, when the legisla-
ture of the affected State cannot be convened in time to deal with a rapidly
developing emergency, a request from the Governor is sufficient under
this section.