A UK view on Cyber, Information & IT Security by Security Expert Dave Whitelegg. Providing advice and explaining security for everyone, and also contemplating advanced themes and future trends in security.
With a focus on all the latest developments & issues within the UK Information Security space such as Hacking, DDoS, Botnets, Malware, Identity Theft, Data Protection (DPA) and regulatory compliance like PCI DSS & ISO27001:2013, all will be explained in an easy to understand way.

Tuesday, 3 June 2014

SC Congress: POS Breaches, Target & PCI DSS Compliance

I was privileged to speak at the SC
Congress in London today. I was asked to talk about my views on Point of Sale
(POS) credit card data breaches which had recently occurred stateside, the role
of PCI DSS compliance with such breaches, and whether the UK could expect
similar breaches despite widespread adoption of Chip & Pin (EMV), and what
are the lessons to be learnt.

The following is a summary of what I said.

In the United States there has been a number
of high profile Point of Sale (POS) credit card data breaches, occurring at
around seven shopping chains towards the end of last year. The most provident
of these breaches was at Target, where hackers stole an estimated 40 million
credit card details.The hackers managed
to load credit card data stealing malware onto Target’s POS systems, in each of
Target’s 1800 stores. It is one of the largest and most sophisticated data breaches
the payment card industry has ever seen.

As Target cashiers swiped customer’s credit
cards on a POS, which is essentially a workstation with a magnetic swipe card
reader, the credit card data, which is in clear text on the magnetic stripe on
the back of the card, is loaded into the POS RAM. At this point the malware on
the POS would copy the contents of the RAM, this is known as RAM scrapping. The
malware then moves the credit card data out of the Target network into the hands
of the attackers, who sell them on to card fraudsters at a profit.

But there is much more to this breach than the
POS malware, to better understand this, we need to rollback the timeline of start
the breach process, to see how the attackers got the malware onto the POS
systems in the first place.

It all starts with Fazio Heating &
Cooling LCC, a company providing Heating, Ventilation and Air Condition (HVAC) services
to Target. Target have provided Fazio with remote access into their network, to
allow Fazio to perform ebilling and exchange project management information. It
is understood this network access was a basic remote access system, it is
suggested it could be as simple as an RDP connection, with Fazio remote
accessing into a Target server using a username and password.At some point in 2013, Fazio was subjected to
a cyber attack, its employees were sent phishing emails laced with malware.
This attack resulted in the theft of the Target remote access credentials. It
is likely these remote access credentials were offered for sale online and then
bought by the would-be card hackers, this is my assumption.

In mid November 2013 the attackers supposedly
used the Fazio credentials to access the Target network. It is not clear
whether Target had a flat network or had their payment systems network
segmented from their corporate systems, my assumption would be the payment
environment and store POS systems would have been network segmented, but we
can’t be certain. Either way the attackers managed to gain access to Target’s
payment network and POS systems within all 1800 stores.The attackers likely spent the first few days
customizing and testing their POS malware. The POS malware itself was probably
purchased from a third party, there are suggestions it was a malware kit known
as Black POS, which was written and sold by Russian teenager for couple thousand
dollars.

Once the attackers had finished testing and
had the POS malware successfully performing, they then used Target’s own
systems to deploy the malware onto POS systems within all of Target’s 1800
stores.At this point it is getting on
to late November 2013, the busiest time of year for shopping in the US, think
Black Friday. The POS malware lifted credit card details in the millions over
the next few weeks. Meanwhile it is believed Target’s IT system’s logged and alerted
this network intrusion, but there was no monitoring and reaction to these alerts
by Target staff. Which is very good news for the attackers, as the clock is
ticking for them to monetize credit card data before card issuers and banks
learn of the data theft, which leads to the cancelation of stolen cards and the
enabling of additional anti-fraud monitoring against possible compromised
credit cards, all would significantly devalue the payment card data stolen.

The POS malware deposits the vast amount of
card data onto compromised systems located around world, the hackers collate
the data, and put them up for sale on ‘carding’ forums, chatrooms and websites
in chunks, with individual cards sold for between $18 and $38, after which card
details are used fraudulently.

After a couple of weeks of selling card
data to fraudsters, the likes of Visa, Mastercard and banks spot a spike in
fraud, since over million of the stolen cards are now being used in fraudulent
transactions. They spot a common source with the fraud spike, in that the cards
were all used at Target stores.In mid December
2013, Target are contacted and told their payment systems have been compromised.Target have no choice but to bring in forensic
investigators, together with the involvement of law enforcement and the US
secret service, go onto discover the POS malware, and also uncover that more than
70 million Target customer records (personal information) had also been stolen.

The PCI Compliance Factor

In September 2013, Target completed a
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) assessment by one of the
largest PCI Qualified Security Assessor (QSA) companies. A PCI assessment, even
by a seasoned QSA, is a sampling exercise, it doesn’t prove the entity being
assessed is actually operating in a continued PCI DSS state, 24-7-365. A PCI DSS
assessment boils down to a judgment of compliance, determined by interview
questions, and the QSA reviewing sample from the environment. Nether–the-less
Target tried to sue their QSA company due to the breach, but the lawsuit was
quietly dropped a few weeks later.

It is highly doubtful that Target where
operating in a PCI DSS compliance state at the time of the breach, given;
remote access appeared not to use two factor authentication, there was poor
third party management, poor network segmentation, poor system monitoring and reaction,
etc. all are standout PCI DSS requirements. So you really can’t point the finger
at the PCI DSS, so what of the QSA assessing compliance?All QSAs have a ‘get out of jail free’ zero
responsibility card when comes to PCI DSS assessments, perhaps you could
question how thorough the PCI DSS assessment was, but without reviewing the
actual documentation and Report on Compliance (RoC), there no way we can know.

The breach has really hit Target hard in
terms of costs, the like for like Q4 profits was down significantly, with the
company already shelling out $61million in dealing with the breach, and a
further $100 million allocated for the upgrade of their POS systems to Chip and
Pin. With the breach hurting the profits, it is little surprise to see CEO
shown the door last month.

Could a POS breach happen in the UK?

Yes, and No. Skimming debit/credit card
data from POS system is more difficult in the UK, given most POS systems use a
dedicated separate chip and pin device, which is more often than not, is
PCI-PTS security accredited. However if hackers gain access to the payment
network of a company, then there are a multitude of attack methods that can be
attempted to harvest credit card data on mass, they don’t need to attack the
POS.

PCI DSS isn’t a broken standard, however we
see in the new version, PCI DSS V3.0, released at the start of the year, that
there is already a greater emphasis of third party management and penetration
testing of network segmentation (from Jul 2015), two of the biggest areas of security
weakness with Target.

Debit/Credit card data should be regarded
as toxic data by your business.The data
does not belong to the business and it does not belong to your clients. PCI DSS
and the authorities around it, are only concerned with protection of their
payment card data while in your business possession. Worst still, if you drop
the security ball in protecting the payment card data, you pick up the tab in
clearing up the mess. PCI DSS is mostly made up of best practice information
security, but it is highly prescriptive in nature, and so isn’t an easy standard
to fully comply with. PCI DSS compliance can be very costly to continually achieve,
diverting your security budget away from protecting other forms of confidential
data within the business.The best course
of action is to remove and/or reduce all payment card data within the business,
using card scheme accredited payment service providers, can allow you to transfer
risk over to them, while technologies like tokenization and end-to-end
encryption, can help to keep the toxic payment card data and the required PCI DSS
controls which go with it, at a bare minimum.

I was quoted in the media as saying:

“The best approach is to find ways of
outsourcing all payment processes so that no payment card data is held or
processed by the retailer"

"Alternatively, if payment card data cannot
be avoided, ensure that it is encrypted from end to end so that even if systems
are breached, attackers cannot use the data to commit fraud”

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