Folk Psychological Narratives is a powerful defense of an intriguing idea that has been poking around the fringes of philosophy of psychology circles for twenty years: that our folk psychology -- our ability to make sense of the behavior of others by attributing mentalistic reasons to them -- is grounded in the stories, the narratives, we learn as children. The classic source for this startling idea is psychologist's Jerome Bruner's Acts of Meaning (Harvard University Press, 1990) which emphasizes the large scale implications of a cultural grounding for our language and thought, rather than a hardwired computational one. Hutto's project is more fundamental. He rolls up his sleeves and goes to work sifting through the alternative hypotheses with care, presenting each one clearly and charitably in order to find what is most compelling about them in his efforts to show that the Narrative Practice Hypothesis is the best account of our capacity to 'read' each other's minds.

It should be said that, though Hutto's writing is clear and engaging, this book is clearly intended to address an audience familiar with the ongoing contemporary philosophy of psychology debate on folk psychology. Though a general philosophy dictionary will be of some help, one would do even better to have a philosophy of psychology (or philosophy of mind) reference at the ready. But for anyone willing to run down some of the more difficult terminology, Folk Psychological Narratives is a highly rewarding volume.

For readers new to this theory, 'folk,' or 'commonsense,' psychology refers to the background assumptions we have that allow us to make sense of the actions of others, to be able to attribute reasons to them. The current orthodoxy amounts to a debate between two theories: according to the first, called the theory of mind, or sometimes, thetheory theory, children tacitly learn a theory of mind at roughly ages two through four; according to the second, called the simulation theory, some internal mental simulation, some hardwired innate mechanism, allows third-person observers to internally represent the point of view of another purely through experiencing the behavior of the observed other (usually visually, but perhaps cross-modally as well). These folk psychological capacities can be better understood with an example. Suppose you are in a restaurant, and notice that a man comes in, sits at a table, orders a hamburger, takes a bite, makes a squinched up face, then slaps the burger on the plate and walks out without paying. All else being equal, most would say something like, 'that guy didn't like his burger.' But how do you know this? It is through our 'folk' ability ('folk,' because it is not a formal, professional, theory, but a commonsensically learned one, by the 'folk') that we are able to attribute intentions and reasons that motivate the behavior of others.

Early on, Hutto lays out his project and plan for the book, clearly and concisely outlining his thesis, his motivations, and the possible objections others may have for his view. In a field teeming with writers whose somnambulant prose will do nothing if not anaesthetize, Hutto is one of a handful of writers who take the time to lead the reader by the hand and, with the use of many examples, entertain as well as instruct. Hutto defines folk psychological narratives as any story that gives a reason for a person acting on a particular occasion (for instance, in children's tales, or in a child's conversations with parents) and defines the Narrative Practice Hypothesis as the proposal that these narratives are the normal route through which children learn their folk psychological abilities. Hutto's main target of criticism is the idea that these abilities derive from some form of third-person mental state attribution, what he calls the 'spectatorial stance.' This stance is taken in both of the orthodox theories mentioned above. The Narrative Practice Hypothesis, by contrast, claims that our primary capacities to make sense of others arises from a second-person, conversational stance. Our understanding of others becomes, not so much an attribution of reasons, but rather a set of learned expectations derived from our common cultural norms and practices. For example, if, while driving faster than the speed limit, you are pulled over by a police officer who then walks up to your car, making sense of the officer's actions doesn't require any assignation of a set of mental states to her. Your skill at predicting what will happen next in these situations comes as a result of your experience with similar situations in the past, with the skills to understand those situations being acquired from the stories you heard as a child. There is no need to ascribe the learning of a theory, or a hardwired module. The gradual learning of your culture's narrative practices is all you need to explain your abilities.

This is an important book. If you are interested in this topic, this book will repay careful reading. The implication of a narrative philosophy of psychology is wide-reaching. This hypothesis goes directly against the long prevailing trend to see our psychological capacities as completely centered in the individual: how and what we think, according to Hutto, is fundamentally given to us by our surrounding culture. And as they used to say: Garbage in, garbage out. Along with the more or less neutral informational data that gets poured into our minds by well-meaning parents, teachers, and others, we are also inundated with all the values, prejudices, and discriminatory attitudes contained in our language games as well. This, of course, comes as no surprise to Continental philosophers, who have been trying to tell us as much for years. But Continental philosophers are routinely ignored in the mainstream philosophical debates held in Anglo-American academic circles. (Though, curiously, Continental philosophy tends to be quite prevalent in places where the nonacademic reading public buys books. This might well tell us something about the forward-thinking nature of the nonacademic reading public!)

Hutto makes a carefully argued case for his radical, deflationary view. Aside from some minor quibbles about a couple of details of Hutto's argument, my only complaint -- which is really very unfair, but I'll make it anyway -- is that Folk Psychological Narratives doesn't go into more detail about the virtues and implications of the Narrative Practice Hypothesis. For instance, if our minds are actually shaped by the stories we read, shouldn't our schools place even more emphasis on reading, especially reading increasingly elaborate stories? Since most children are brought up hearing quite fanciful tales, how do they generalize these to real life situations? About 85% of the book consists of warding off challenges from competing theories, and while Hutto's critique is deftly executed and well worth the price of admission, one is left wanting to know even more. Nevertheless, with Hutto's publishing record of late (judging from the References section, he appears to have written about fourteen journal articles since 2005 alone!) perhaps the intriguing implications of his hypothesis will be the subject of a near-future project. In the meantime, I have no doubt that this book will be an instant classic in this important and relatively young field of study.

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