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La Diritta Via: An Ethical Response to Terror

Peter J. Henne

06/01/2005

[1] Determining the ethical response to the al-Qaeda's terrorist
acts is a difficult endeavor; analysts soon find themselves lost in
the selva oscura arising midway through the path towards
international order. Positive initiatives intended to deal
with the threat of terrorism often run aground on the requirement
that a state adopt effective, rather than idealistic, strategies;
the indiscriminately violent acts of al-Qaeda would seem to
proscribe a focus on such initiatives, as they would have little
use against a group intent on destroying Western culture.
However, a theoretical analysis of the tactics of al-Qaeda
indicates that, rather than a revolutionary movement, the group is
instead a systemic reaction to inequality in the international
system. Thus, due to the group's participatory status in the
global system, the just and ethical response to its actions must be
directed in part at the inequalities that give rise to
terrorism.

[2] The nature of a just response to the terrorist acts of
al-Qaeda is a function of the jus ad bellum requirements
of the just war tradition, specifically the requirements that an
action be proportional to the threat faced and possess a reasonable
chance of success. While the other jus ad bellum
requirements, such as just cause and last resort, are certainly
relevant to considerations of a just military response, they deal
with aspects of the military response not directly applicable to
its nature. The proportionality and reasonable chance
of success requirements deal with what the nature of the action
will be; it is these requirements, therefore, that this discussion
must satisfy. However, in order for a military action to be
in line with Lutheran ethics, and not merely secular just war
considerations, the undertaking must also strive to fulfill what
Gary M. Simpson refers to as Martin Luther's "divinely anchored
[offices]" of "political authority," which call on governments to
maintain "temporal peace" through the upholding of
justice.[1] Thus, a just and ethical
response to terrorism must not only be proportional to the threat
faced and pose a reasonable chance of success; the success it
achieves must give rise to lasting peaceful relations among the
conflicting parties.

The Perception of al-Qaeda as a revolutionary
force

[3] The proper response to the activities of al-Qaeda depends on
a comprehensive understanding of what exactly al-Qaeda is.
Al-Qaeda is commonly perceived as a revolutionary reaction to
Western influence; the United States sees itself in a "war against
terror," with a foe that hopes to destroy the Western culture
America has come to represent.[2]
Unsurprisingly, this view of al-Qaeda is in accord with the
movement's ideas concerning its struggle with America. Osama
bin Ladin, the leader of al-Qaeda, sees the United States as the
primary enemy of the Muslim world, coinciding with the United
States' belligerent rhetoric. Moreover, bin Ladin sees
al-Qaeda's acts against the United States as a titanic,
revolutionary clash against an immoral system. Thus, both
sides in this conflict see themselves conducting a struggle of,
almost literally, Biblical proportions.

[4] The perception of one's enemy as an existential threat
results in a condition of unceasing struggle between the opposing
forces. Therefore, conceptualizing al-Qaeda as a
revolutionary force contending with the United States will result
in a rather grim conclusion. If al-Qaeda were a revolutionary
force against which the United States must strive, a force that
aims to radically change the character of Western culture, then the
possibilities for peaceful resolution of tensions, through economic
and social development initiatives, would be slim. Due to the
consequences of this conclusion, a near perpetual war with
ideological and religious undertones, the claim of al-Qaeda's
revolutionary nature must be exhaustively analyzed.

[5] In order for al-Qaeda to be a true revolutionary movement,
it must be theoretically and practically distinct from the system
with which it struggles. Revolutionary reactions are either
outside forces brought under the sway of another power or an
internal group that hopes to separate itself from the
authority. A group that truly revolts must either strive to
force itself free of the system it is a part of or intend to
subvert and transform the system itself. Thus, the same
condition must hold for al-Qaeda; it must be a theoretically
distinct entity that is revolting against the United States and
Western culture, not a group inextricably tied to such a
system. If the execution of and justification for its
terrorist acts do not demonstrate the group's theoretical
distinctness from the system it opposes, it is not a revolutionary
movement.

[6] The tactics of al-Qaeda, as demonstrated through ideological
pronouncements and terrorist acts, offer readily available cases
for analysis. Al-Qaeda's tactics are often indiscriminate,
with no distinction made between combatants and noncombatants, as
evidenced in the group's major attacks; the reason for such
indiscriminate actions was revealed in an interview conducted in
1998; bin Ladin stated rather directly that "we [al-Qaeda] do not
have to differentiate between military and civilian…they are
all targets."[3] Furthermore, al-Qaeda's
attacks in Casablanca and Madrid show that Europe and US-affiliated
non-European states are, unsurprisingly, included on the list of
legitimate targets; this is due to bin Ladin's belief that states
friendly with America are guilty in its crimes.[4] Thus, al-Qaeda targets
American civilians and citizens of US-affiliated states in addition
to military interests, indicating that bin Ladin has extended the
purported guilt of the United States, arising out of its actions
against Muslims, to all US citizens.

[7] The nature of al-Qaeda's tactics, indiscriminate terror
attacks that extend to all states enjoying the benefits of Western
culture, presents an interesting case for analysis. The
reason for the perceived involvement of US civilians in America's
acts is not difficult to discern; Americans participate willingly
in the Western culture that so disgusts bin Ladin and reap the
rewards of US involvement throughout the world. Thus,
Americans' participation in American society and their enjoyment of
the benefits of US actions allow bin Ladin to erase the distinction
between combatant and noncombatant in his struggle with the United
States.

[8] The reasoning for the extended scope of guilt to all Western
culture is not as direct, but is relatively apparent. Bin
Ladin believes America to be guilty of all aggressive acts against
Muslims, even those in which it did not directly participate; this
indicates that he, and al-Qaeda, must see the US sway over the
world occurring through the workings of the global interdependent
system itself. This situation would result in two
conclusions; that the United States is responsible for all crimes
against Muslims due to its power over the global system, and that
US-affiliated states are complicit in US actions due to their
participation in this system. Therefore, non-US civilians are
seen as equally guilty of US acts as Americans, due to their
participation in the global system through which America
operates.

Al-Qaeda and Tacit Consent

[9] This analysis of the rationale for al-Qaeda's tactics, guilt
assigned on the basis of participation in and benefit from the
aggrieving system bears a striking similarity to John Locke's
concept of tacit consent. Locke stated that members of a
"Political Society" are obligated to adhere to actions of that
society through their "consent" to its workings.[5] While not all members of
the society give their "express consent" to it, they give a "tacit
consent" through their "Enjoyment of any part of the Dominions" of
the society; through this tacit consent, the citizens are "obliged
to Obedience to the Laws of that Government."[6] Thus, an individual's
enjoyment of the benefits of a society indicate, according to
Locke, her or his tacit consent to the workings of that society;
such an individual, by extension, would be responsible for the
society's acts.

[10] Therefore, the above analysis of al-Qaeda's tactics can be
reconceptualized along the lines of tacit consent. That is,
bin Ladin would believe that Americans, Europeans and non-Europeans
friendly with the United States have tacitly consented to US
actions due to their enjoyment of the benefits of these actions;
these citizens would then be complicit in the perceived guilt of
the United States, making them legitimate targets for al-Qaeda's
terrorist attacks. Such an analysis of al-Qaeda's actions
sets up a distinct contrast between al-Qaeda's targets and the
Muslims it claims to champion. US citizens and civilians in
US-affiliated countries enjoy the benefits of perceived crimes by
the United States against Muslims, thus tacitly consenting to these
acts; since Muslims are, according to bin Ladin, not enjoying any
of these benefits, they are therefore not tacitly consenting to US
acts. This analysis would then set up a dichotomy between the
Muslim "victims" of US policy and those who have benefited from
it.

[11] This would seem to uphold the view of al-Qaeda as a
revolutionary group. Muslims have not tacitly consented to
the global interdependent system and are, by extension, not
participating in it. Al-Qaeda, the supposed champion of the
Muslim cause, targets those who have tacitly consented to the
global system, demonstrating its distinctness. Thus, al
Qaeda's revolutionary nature rests on the tacit consent of its
targets to both US actions and the global interdependent system,
which contrasts to bin Ladin's rejection of this system.
However, while this conclusion appears sound, on deeper analysis
some problems arise.

Problems with this Conceptualization

[12] Just as al-Qaeda's tactics reveal an indiscriminate
targeting, which seems to allow an application of the theory of
tacit consent, the same tactics also give rise to problems in such
an application. One problematic aspect of its tactics is
al-Qaeda's dependence on relatively open societies to carry out
attacks. The group has "[taken] advantage of freedoms
enshrined in the liberal democracies of the West" to form its
networks.[7] Concurrent with the
openness of Western societies is the relative ease of travel
between them; as Prof. Paul Wilkinson has pointed out, the group
depends on Western recruits due to their ability to exploit the
connections between Western states.[8] Thus,
al-Qaeda not only exploits the openness of Western societies but
also the interlinking of Western states, the same interlinking that
allows bin Ladin to collectively condemn all such states as
participants in the global Western culture.

[13] In addition to the nature of Western societies, al-Qaeda
also exploits the benefits that arise from the global
interdependent system, namely in terms of technology. The
most obvious example of this is the group's utilization of the
Internet. Al-Qaeda has made great use of the Internet for
communications among its members as well as an outlet through which
to disseminate its ideologies among like-minded
Muslims.[9] The use of globalized
technology by al-Qaeda has led to the Internet "[creating] a
multiplier effect" for the group's "ideas."[10] Thus,
al-Qaeda's attempts to foment a worldwide movement against the
United States are greatly facilitated through the use of the
Internet, which relies on the global system for its effective
operation.

[14] This situation, in which al-Qaeda relies on the nature of
Western societies and the workings of the global system, both of
which it has, in effect, condemned, creates problems for the use of
tacit consent as a rationale for its tactics. As was shown, those
who are benefiting from the global system are tacitly consenting to
the actions of the United States through that system.
However, if tacit consent is derived from these conditions then
al-Qaeda is tacitly consenting to US actions just as much as
American and European civilians, since it is clearly benefiting
from the system it condemns. This conclusion, that a movement
dedicated to the overthrow of a system is actually consenting to
it, is an admittedly uncomfortable one; however, based on the
parameters for tacit consent derived from the analysis of
al-Qaeda's tactics this conclusion is unavoidable.

[16] Naturally, many would object to this conclusion, most
probably by pointing to the strong theoretical arguments against
such a broad scope for tacit consent. As Carole Pateman
argues, "to claim that individuals can
be said to tacitly consent…because they habitually carry out
their daily lives in a certain way, is to stretch hypothetical
voluntarism to its furthest limits."[11] Pateman's rejection
of such an application of tacit consent is due to the fact that
"the imposition of 'obligations' on free and equal individuals" is
not justified under liberal theory.[12] Thus, the
above conclusion could be seen as flawed due to its hyperextension
of consent theory.

[17] This situation creates significant problems for the
assertion that al-Qaeda is a revolutionary group. The
parameters of tacit consent that explain al-Qaeda's rationales in
its targeting result in the group itself tacitly consenting to the
system it opposes; al-Qaeda is therefore not theoretically distinct
from this system and thus cannot be a revolutionary movement. Yet,
even if the broad parameters of tacit consent in this analysis are
rejected, the conceptualization of al-Qaeda as a revolutionary
group is still faulty. The revolutionary nature of al-Qaeda
is defined by its targets' tacit consent to the global system;
therefore, if tacit consent is abandoned in the analysis of
al-Qaeda its revolutionary nature will be obfuscated.
However, an alternative conception of al-Qaeda, which avoids the
complications of the tacit consent approach, is readily
available.

An Alternative Approach

[18] Although the revolutionary nature of al-Qaeda is now seen
to be questionable, the discussion of tacit consent has nonetheless
revealed interesting aspects of the group. The analysis shows
that al-Qaeda is a part of the system it opposes; however, the
basis for al-Qaeda's struggle with the United States, bin Ladin's
perception that Muslims have been oppressed as a result of US
actions through the global system, is valid. As the 9/11
Commission points out, "the Muslim world has fallen behind the West
politically, economically, and militarily," which has led to the
acceptance of bin Alden's views by many in the
region.[13] Therefore,
although al-Qaeda, and the Muslim community it claims to champion,
is a participant in the global system, it holds a markedly
disadvantaged position within that system.

[19] Thus, the use of tacit consent to analyze al-Qaeda has
yielded fascinating results. Although it is not a
revolutionary movement, al-Qaeda is a participatory group in the
global system that is marginalized in the system's workings.
However, while tacit consent is useful for determining
participation in a system, it cannot address the consequences to
the system of a disadvantaged participatory group; it consequently
cannot define the true nature of al-Qaeda, as evidenced in the
confusing conclusion arrived at through tacit-consent based
analysis. Therefore, a concept that is able to analyze this
situation is needed; such a concept can be found in the writings of
Carole Pateman.

[20] In The Problem of Political Obligation, Pateman
analyzes many failings of liberal social contract theory, including
the phenomenon of differential benefits. As she notes, in
liberal theory, individuals are said to consent to a society due to
its satisfaction of their interests.[14]
Pateman argues that those groups that are oppressed in a society
are "sharply differentiated" from the advantaged groups in terms of
the obligations arising from their tacit consent.[15] Due to the
oppressed groups' disadvantaged positions, which undermine the
interest-based justification for the liberal social contract, the
tacit consent that these groups give to the system does not
translate into a strong obligation to that system.[16] In applying this to
al-Qaeda, the tacit consent of Muslims in the Middle East, who have
been marginalized in the workings of the international system, does
not result in their being obligated to the system at all.

[21] Thus, while al-Qaeda has tacitly consented to the global
system, and by extension to the actions of the United States, it
has not assumed an obligation on itself due to its disadvantaged
position. This approach avoids the confusing conclusion
arrived at through a tacit consent- based analysis of al-Qaeda's
actions. Therefore, when al-Qaeda is analyzed through Carol
Pateman's theory of differential obligations the theoretical
complications that arose through the application of tacit consent
disappear, allowing for a more complete analysis of the group.

[22] Pateman's theory presents a satisfying theoretical
explanation for al-Qaeda's actions. The terrorist attacks are
reactive outbursts to the group's marginalization within the global
system; although the group is a participant in this system, the
marginalized status of its purported constituency precludes an
obligation on the part of al-Qaeda to that system. This
conclusion does not argue that these acts are justified; it merely
explains why they occur. Therefore, the problems that arise
in analyzing al-Qaeda through tacit consent reveal that the group,
instead of being revolutionary, is instead a systemic outburst
against unequal benefits in the global system.

Applications and Conclusion

[23] The utility of this conclusion to the United States'
struggle with al-Qaeda would seem to be limited; the Department of
State cannot dispatch a delegation of scholars to meet with bin
Ladin and explain to him why his conception of al-Qaeda is
theoretically unsound. However, this analysis is more than
merely an academic discourse; its applicability can extend beyond
the ivory tower, presenting possibilities for a nuanced approach to
the terrorist acts of al-Qaeda.

[24] Although the reconceptualization of al-Qaeda as a systemic
outburst rather than a revolutionary group does not change the fact
that the group is an immediate threat to the United States, it can
provide a greater depth of understanding in regard to the group's
nature. Al-Qaeda, as a systemic outburst, can be viewed as a
symptom of an underlying problem, as opposed to the vanguard of a
"clash of civilizations."[17] Therefore,
the underlying problem of inequality in the global system,
specifically the marginalization of the Middle East, must be
addressed; although such an approach to terrorism has been
suggested, it is reinforced through abandoning the analysis of
al-Qaeda as a revolutionary movement.

[25] Obviously, direct action must be taken to minimize the
destruction caused by al-Qaeda. However, as the group's
actions are an expression of the inequality in the global system,
military action alone will not solve the problem of terrorism
unless it is coupled with positive efforts to end the causes of
terrorism. Thus, the conceptualization of al-Qaeda through
Pateman's theory of differential obligations necessitates positive
steps, such as economic and social development initiatives, for the
elimination of terrorism, as opposed to only negative military
acts.

[26] Despite its vituperative rhetoric, on close analysis
al-Qaeda is seen to be less of a revolutionary movement and more of
a systemic outburst against the inequality endemic to the global
interdependent system, through which the group's purported nemesis,
the United States, exerts its power. Therefore, an effective
strategy in the struggle with al-Qaeda must include more than
military strikes, as these alone cannot solve the problems that
give rise to the outburst. Since a military focus would fail
to adequately solve the problem of terrorism, an ethical response
to al-Qaeda's terrorist acts, which strives for the establishment
of a just peace, must involve social and economic development aimed
at mitigating the inequalities of the global system that have given
rise to the terrorism obscuring the diritta via of the
international community.

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