The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been in office for almost six months in what has been an active period, especially on the national security and foreign policy fronts. There have been several important international visits during this period, including Modiâ€™s visits to Japan and the U.S. and state visits to India by the Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott and the Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The Chinese in particular have been seen to be courting India since the Modi government took charge in New Delhi. India represents enormous opportunities on the economic front and is also important from a security perspective, given the increasing flux and volatility in Asian geopolitics. Xiâ€™s visit to India was an opportunity to take the relationship to a higher level. From Chinaâ€™s perspective, the visit was meant to solidify its interest in bringing out the full potential of the bilateral economic agenda, as it was looking to sign agreements on high-speed rail and major infrastructure projects including ports. The Chinese consul general in Mumbai stated that China â€œwill commit investments of over $100 billion or thrice the investments committed by Japan.â€ However, what was finally committed was only $20 billion, no small amount, though far smaller than the hype had suggested.

The border standoff that began on the day of Xiâ€™s visit did have a spoiler effect on their interactions. Even though the Indian leadership has always raised the tricky issues of border disputes and the trade deficit with China, Modi went one step further by raising them during the press statement, stating â€œpeace and stability in our relations and along our borders are essential for us to realize the enormous potential in our relations. If we achieve that, we can reinforce each otherâ€™s economic growth.â€ In response, Xi noted that the border issue is â€œleft over from historyâ€ but that China is determined â€œto work with India to settleâ€¦ at an early date.â€ He also underlined the fact that the â€œtwo sides are fully capable of acting promptly to manage incidents on the border.â€ However, the Chumur incident has sent mixed signals about Chinaâ€™s message.

The author had the opportunity to discuss these issues extensively with the academic and think-tank community in Shanghai during a recent visit, which offered some insight into how China views the new government in New Delhi.

The border issue is obviously a serious concern. Chinese scholars were of the opinion that Xi genuinely wanted to settle the border problem, though this does not square with what happened on the border during his visit. The fact that it took three weeks for the issue to settle down, despite it being raised at the highest levels during the bilateral discussions, suggests two contradictory conclusions.

One is that this was a deliberate policy approach by the Chinese leadership to offer a hand of friendship and cooperation, while also hardening its position on the border in the hope that India would adopt a conciliatory position on the territorial issue.

Alternatively, the border stand-off is a completely local affair and the central leadership is not able to control its local commanders. This is certainly the more dangerous scenario if true.

The fact that on his return from New Delhi, Xi made a statement that the local commanders must obey the instructions from the central leadership suggests that there may well be a problem with control. It has been generally assumed that Xi has tighter control of the PLA (as compared to Hu Jintao), since he chairs the Central Military Commission (CMC), in addition to serving as general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the foremost member of the Politburo Standing Committee. But if there is indeed a problem in the chain of command between the central leadership and the PLAâ€™s local commanders, the implications for important bilateral relations, such as those with India, could be serious.

One of the academics that I interacted with suspected that the border encroachments by the local commanders may be the result of Xiâ€™s severe clamp down on corruption within the PLA. Chinese scholars opine that taking action against senior PLA officers (including generals) may have triggered a response within the PLA, the leaders of which are expressing their displeasure by not following orders from the central leadership. Xiâ€™s statement at a meeting with the PLA chiefs of staff that the â€œHeadquarters of PLA forces must have absolute loyalty and firm faith in the Communist Party of China, guarantee a smooth chain of command and make sure all decisions from the central leadership are fully implemented,â€ may suggest this is the case. Xi made a similar point again at a military political work conference in Fujian province, saying â€œthe Party commands the gunâ€ and that the PLA is under the â€œabsolute leadershipâ€ of the party. These examples also strengthen the argument of some China scholars that the PLA has an independent agenda, especially on important foreign policy issues and where territorial disputes are involved.

A related point that dominated my discussions revolved around the segmentation of the border issue. Sticking with its official line, China argues that border issues along all three sectors of the Sino-Indian border must be taken together, as opposed to the current Indian approach of dealing with the disputes sector by sector.

Another important point of debate relates to Indiaâ€™s stance on Chinaâ€™s maritime disputes, specifically in the South China Sea. The U.S.-India joint statement at the end of Modiâ€™s visit to Washington, which referred to the South China Sea dispute twice, appears to have perturbed the Chinese quite a bit. That India was taking a similar position to the U.S. seemed to trouble my interlocutors far more than the Indian position per se. Indiaâ€™s deepening relationship with countries in Chinaâ€™s sphere of influence as well as with the U.S. raises Chinaâ€™s level of discomfort.

Tibet and the Dalai Lamaâ€™s status also continue to worry the Chinese. This has come up in formal and informal discussions in China. The fact that Lobsang Sangay, the Tibetan Cabinet chairperson (often referred to as the prime minister) was an invited guest at Modiâ€™s swearing-in ceremony has made the Chinese nervous about his intentions regarding Tibet. Despite Indiaâ€™s stated policy that Tibet is part of China, this is an issue on which the Chinese feel that India has a hidden agenda.

There are other issues that also bedevil the Sino-Indian relationship. For example, nuclear questions have clouded India-China dialogue for several decades, although the contours of the debate have undergone a change. Since the conclusion of the U.S.-India nuclear deal and the India-specific exemption of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), China has agreed to talk to India on nuclear matters on a bilateral basis. There have been several rounds of Track II discussions on nuclear and other strategic issues, and these have been significant, particularly if one were to look at the Chinese participation. Concerning Indiaâ€™s NSG membership, China continues to reiterate its official position that China is not in favor of making country-specific exemptions. The Chinese do not want India to assume greater influence within the sphere of global nuclear governance. China will continue to resist India until a similar case is made for Pakistan.

Lastly, the visa issue has continued to create bitterness. Visas for Chinese were tightened a few years ago as a protectionist measure to stem the influx of Chinese labor into India. New Delhiâ€™s policy was that unless it is skilled labor, Chinese companies should be using the local labor force. This issue has yet to be resolved. There is thus both some hope as well as significant continuing concern about Chinaâ€™s attitude towards the Modi government.

-------------------------------------------
The assertiveness from Xi regarding the border intrusion, points more and more towards the fact there there is a disconnect between PLA and CPC.
Can anyone pick up some info from the internet where PLA has screwed it up for Xi with any other country other than India.
Then there could be a pattern. right?

The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been in office for almost six months in what has been an active period, especially on the national security and foreign policy fronts. There have been several important international visits during this period, including Modiâ€™s visits to Japan and the U.S. and state visits to India by the Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott and the Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The Chinese in particular have been seen to be courting India since the Modi government took charge in New Delhi. India represents enormous opportunities on the economic front and is also important from a security perspective, given the increasing flux and volatility in Asian geopolitics. Xiâ€™s visit to India was an opportunity to take the relationship to a higher level. From Chinaâ€™s perspective, the visit was meant to solidify its interest in bringing out the full potential of the bilateral economic agenda, as it was looking to sign agreements on high-speed rail and major infrastructure projects including ports. The Chinese consul general in Mumbai stated that China â€œwill commit investments of over $100 billion or thrice the investments committed by Japan.â€ However, what was finally committed was only $20 billion, no small amount, though far smaller than the hype had suggested.

The border standoff that began on the day of Xiâ€™s visit did have a spoiler effect on their interactions. Even though the Indian leadership has always raised the tricky issues of border disputes and the trade deficit with China, Modi went one step further by raising them during the press statement, stating â€œpeace and stability in our relations and along our borders are essential for us to realize the enormous potential in our relations. If we achieve that, we can reinforce each otherâ€™s economic growth.â€ In response, Xi noted that the border issue is â€œleft over from historyâ€ but that China is determined â€œto work with India to settleâ€¦ at an early date.â€ He also underlined the fact that the â€œtwo sides are fully capable of acting promptly to manage incidents on the border.â€ However, the Chumur incident has sent mixed signals about Chinaâ€™s message.

The author had the opportunity to discuss these issues extensively with the academic and think-tank community in Shanghai during a recent visit, which offered some insight into how China views the new government in New Delhi.

The border issue is obviously a serious concern. Chinese scholars were of the opinion that Xi genuinely wanted to settle the border problem, though this does not square with what happened on the border during his visit. The fact that it took three weeks for the issue to settle down, despite it being raised at the highest levels during the bilateral discussions, suggests two contradictory conclusions.

One is that this was a deliberate policy approach by the Chinese leadership to offer a hand of friendship and cooperation, while also hardening its position on the border in the hope that India would adopt a conciliatory position on the territorial issue.

Alternatively, the border stand-off is a completely local affair and the central leadership is not able to control its local commanders. This is certainly the more dangerous scenario if true.

The fact that on his return from New Delhi, Xi made a statement that the local commanders must obey the instructions from the central leadership suggests that there may well be a problem with control. It has been generally assumed that Xi has tighter control of the PLA (as compared to Hu Jintao), since he chairs the Central Military Commission (CMC), in addition to serving as general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the foremost member of the Politburo Standing Committee. But if there is indeed a problem in the chain of command between the central leadership and the PLAâ€™s local commanders, the implications for important bilateral relations, such as those with India, could be serious.

One of the academics that I interacted with suspected that the border encroachments by the local commanders may be the result of Xiâ€™s severe clamp down on corruption within the PLA. Chinese scholars opine that taking action against senior PLA officers (including generals) may have triggered a response within the PLA, the leaders of which are expressing their displeasure by not following orders from the central leadership. Xiâ€™s statement at a meeting with the PLA chiefs of staff that the â€œHeadquarters of PLA forces must have absolute loyalty and firm faith in the Communist Party of China, guarantee a smooth chain of command and make sure all decisions from the central leadership are fully implemented,â€ may suggest this is the case. Xi made a similar point again at a military political work conference in Fujian province, saying â€œthe Party commands the gunâ€ and that the PLA is under the â€œabsolute leadershipâ€ of the party. These examples also strengthen the argument of some China scholars that the PLA has an independent agenda, especially on important foreign policy issues and where territorial disputes are involved.

A related point that dominated my discussions revolved around the segmentation of the border issue. Sticking with its official line, China argues that border issues along all three sectors of the Sino-Indian border must be taken together, as opposed to the current Indian approach of dealing with the disputes sector by sector.

Another important point of debate relates to Indiaâ€™s stance on Chinaâ€™s maritime disputes, specifically in the South China Sea. The U.S.-India joint statement at the end of Modiâ€™s visit to Washington, which referred to the South China Sea dispute twice, appears to have perturbed the Chinese quite a bit. That India was taking a similar position to the U.S. seemed to trouble my interlocutors far more than the Indian position per se. Indiaâ€™s deepening relationship with countries in Chinaâ€™s sphere of influence as well as with the U.S. raises Chinaâ€™s level of discomfort.

Tibet and the Dalai Lamaâ€™s status also continue to worry the Chinese. This has come up in formal and informal discussions in China. The fact that Lobsang Sangay, the Tibetan Cabinet chairperson (often referred to as the prime minister) was an invited guest at Modiâ€™s swearing-in ceremony has made the Chinese nervous about his intentions regarding Tibet. Despite Indiaâ€™s stated policy that Tibet is part of China, this is an issue on which the Chinese feel that India has a hidden agenda.

There are other issues that also bedevil the Sino-Indian relationship. For example, nuclear questions have clouded India-China dialogue for several decades, although the contours of the debate have undergone a change. Since the conclusion of the U.S.-India nuclear deal and the India-specific exemption of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), China has agreed to talk to India on nuclear matters on a bilateral basis. There have been several rounds of Track II discussions on nuclear and other strategic issues, and these have been significant, particularly if one were to look at the Chinese participation. Concerning Indiaâ€™s NSG membership, China continues to reiterate its official position that China is not in favor of making country-specific exemptions. The Chinese do not want India to assume greater influence within the sphere of global nuclear governance. China will continue to resist India until a similar case is made for Pakistan.

Lastly, the visa issue has continued to create bitterness. Visas for Chinese were tightened a few years ago as a protectionist measure to stem the influx of Chinese labor into India. New Delhiâ€™s policy was that unless it is skilled labor, Chinese companies should be using the local labor force. This issue has yet to be resolved. There is thus both some hope as well as significant continuing concern about Chinaâ€™s attitude towards the Modi government.

-------------------------------------------
The assertiveness from Xi regarding the border intrusion, points more and more towards the fact there there is a disconnect between PLA and CPC.
Can anyone pick up some info from the internet where PLA has screwed it up for Xi with any other country other than India.
Then there could be a pattern. right?

Click to expand...

Xi has pulled up the PLA stating that the PLA is subordinate to the Party and there was a comment that he was not too pleased that there was the border incursion during his visit to India.

New evidence supports the commonly held view that the Chinese military isnâ€™t entirely in line with the party leadership. Recently, President Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the PLA headquarters in Beijing with PLA chiefs of staff present. Notably he delivered this speech following his return from his South Asia tour which featured a particularly interesting visit to India when PLA troops crossed intro India-administered Kashmir as Xi arrived in the country. In his speech, Xi unusually emphasized the importance of the PLAâ€™s â€œabsolute loyalty and firm faith in the Communist Party of China,â€ according to Xinhua.China’s Military May Have Gone ‘Rogue’ After All | The Diplomat

@no smoking
THats news!!! Whats the skirmish with Japan, Philippine, Taiwan..?
The intention of my question is, whether your defense force has done something against the wish of your CPC kings with these countries and embarassed your kings.
THe intrusion is not always on the land, but all borders including the seas.

I used the word PLA, may be thats whats misunderstood here. I was referring to China's defense forces in general.

That is the ultimate fate of all Authoritarian Governments. King Makers (Military Generals) eventually become the Kings, Corpse of the President dangles from a Lamp-Post at a City Square. That day will eventually come in China, if not today then tomorrow.

China's aggression towards it's neighbours is pure "madness", Even the Super Power US has not shown such aggression against it's "small" neighbours.

Of course you can't find anything else, India is the only country doesn't settle the border issue with China on the land.

Click to expand...

Your statement is accusatory. The fact is India has tried several times to settle border dispute with China. The process has to move forward in an environment of trust. The trust will come when accusations and brinkmanship give way to cooperation.
Patience is the key here.

That is the ultimate fate of all Authoritarian Governments. King Makers (Military Generals) eventually become the Kings, Corpse of the President dangles from a Lamp-Post at a City Square. That day will eventually come in China, if not today then tomorrow.

China's aggression towards it's neighbours is pure "madness", Even the Super Power US has not shown such aggression against it's "small" neighbours.

Click to expand...

We should not criticize China's political system like this. We can hope for a democratic China, but we have to deal with a socialist China presently.

China has a border problem with all of its neighbours in some way or the other.

China even had problems with Myanmar. The Myanamar government suspended construction of the controversial Myitsone hydroelectric dam. Protests against a Chinese firm, Wanbao Mining, which signed an agreement in June to mine copper in Monywa has soured relations too.

China is carefully studying the Indian actions, both domestic and international and playing it with ears to the ground..