Particularism, Generalism and the Counting Argument

Kirchin, Simon T.
(2003)
Particularism, Generalism and the Counting Argument.
European Journal of Philosophy,
11
(1).
pp. 54-71.
ISSN 0966-8373.
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Abstract

In this paper I argue for a particularist understanding of thick evaluative features, something that is rarely done and is fairly controversial. That is, I argue that sometimes that the fact that an act is just, say, could, in certain situations, provide one with a reason against performing the action. Similarly, selfishness could be right-making. To show this, I take on anti-particularist ideas from two much-cited pieces (by Crisp, and by McNaughton and Rawling), in the influential Moral Particularism anthology (eds.) Hooker and Little (OUP). My paper has already been cited by other people working in the field.