When liberals have had enough: a new wave of protests in Romania

Whereas
the stereotypical pro-government voter consumes partisan local media; by
contrast, the stereotypical protester in Bucharest owns an iPhone and reads
international newspapers online.

Several thousand on Victory square in front of the government headquarters demonstrating against the proposal to ease anti-graft legislation on 2 February, 2017.NurPhoto/ Press Association.All rights reserved.

Over
the weekend of 10-12 August 2018, Romanian and international media were filled
with images of government violence against peaceful protesters. Roughly 120,000
people filled Victory Square in Bucharest on Friday (10 August), demanding that
the ruling Social Democratic Party (PSD) step down following the dismissal of a
senior prosecutor, Laura Codruţa Kövesi, who has
been investigating corruption charges against politicians. Romanians were also
protesting against the introduction of new laws aimed at subordinating the
judiciary to party politics.

Despite
the overwhelmingly peaceful nature of the protests, police and gendarmes used
tear gas to disperse the crowds from 4pm on Friday onwards. By 11pm, they
received orders to clear the square. They did so using tear gas, water cannons,
pepper spray, and by beating protestors with batons. This was one of the
largest and most violent repressions the country has seen since 1990. Videos and images of police
violence continue to circulate on social media, and demonstrators are demanding
that the government respect European norms about the right to peaceful assembly
and personal security.

#rezist

Anti-PSD
rallies took place throughout Bucharest from late 2016 onwards, but escalated
and became centred upon Victory Square during January 2017, when the
newly-elected PSD government passed a series of laws pardoning certain crimes while
amending the criminal code. The major beneficiaries of the laws were Liviu
Dragnea, the leader of PSD, who was convicted with a suspended sentence on
charges of fraud and abuse of office; and Dan Voiculescu, a media mogul and
billionaire in prison for money laundering.

A
large number of PSD politicians fell victim to politically-targeted
anti-corruption campaigns during the presidency of Traian Băsescu (2004-2014),
and these laws were an attempt to allow party leaders to remain in politics. Despite
large-scale street protests, the prime minister passed the laws by “emergency
decree” ignoring public debate and the opposition. Mobilizing around the hashtag
#rezist, by early February 2017 over 500,000 people across the country had
taken to the streets in various cities to protest what they regarded as an abuse
of power. They were supported, ineffectually, by President Klaus Iohannis and
by leaders of the major opposition parties, as well as by sympathetic rallies
in capital cities around the world. Protests have been held regularly in
Bucharest’s Victory Square since they began, but the government has to date shown
no sign of backing down.

PSD voters

The
street protests reveal significant divisions within Romanian society, between
those who value the norms of liberal democracy and those who are more comfortable
about “breaking the rules” when they believe it is in the country’s best
interests.

After
a 40% voter turnout and significant attempts to mobilize voters living abroad,
PSD won the 2016 elections with a comfortable majority. Pervasive social
stereotypes assume that PSD voters are pensioners, housewives, the unemployed
and the poorly educated, but sociological analyses of
the elections suggest that the party is now able to attract
the support of large numbers of people with tertiary educations. PSD voters are
frequently state employees or members of the lower middle class in contemporary
Romania.

Voters
appear to have been well aware that leading politicians have been involved in
high levels of corruption. Nevertheless, they chose to vote PSD in anger over
cuts to pensions and state salaries introduced as austerity measures by a
series of liberal governments, overseen by then-President Traian Băsescu following
the 2008 financial crisis.

Moreover,
they view imprisoned PSD politicians such as Liviu Dragnea as victims of a
cynical attempt by Băsescu to eliminate his political rivals through corruption
trials. The majority of protesters appear to be highly-educated professionals aged
between 18 and 35, with firm views about the rule of law. Whereas the
stereotypical PSD voter runs Windows XP and consumes partisan local media; by
contrast, the stereotypical protester in Bucharest owns an iPhone and reads
international newspapers online. The fact that their party won the 2016
elections with a comfortable majority means that PSD voters often see the
protestors as “poor losers” – privileged individuals used to having their own
way in national elections, and who cannot accept that their preferred
candidates are not in power. PSD voters often see
the protestors as “poor losers” – privileged individuals used to having their
own way in national elections, and who cannot accept that their preferred
candidates are not in power.

“A battle between light
and darkness”

Beyond
the immediate issue of the legislative changes, protesters are angry at a
political culture dominated by a corrupt plutocracy and by individuals with
connections to the Communist-era secret police, the Securitate. As is typical
of street protests in a post-Occupy world, they have consistently failed to support
any leader or party, nor have they made specific demands – apart from asking
that the government reinstitute anti-corruption laws before stepping down.

Lack
of institutional support makes the longevity of these protests surprising, and
the fact that they have continued unabated for twenty months is a testament to
the anger that protesters feel towards the government. During this time,
protesters have used social media in innovative ways, with public debates over
the issues being broadcast via social media, as well as activists using
Facebook and Twitter to share information and coordinate activities.

The
radical right have been largely silent in this round of protests, mostly because
the major right-wing groups are inactive and lacking effective leadership. The
Greater Romania Party (PRM) has been disorganized since the death of its
leader, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, in 2015 and has expressed a desire to shed its
reputation as an extremist nationalist party. Oana Zăvoranu, a television
personality with close ties to the PRM, described the protests as “a battle
between light and darkness,” but said that she chose “not to get involved with
hooligans.”

The
New Right Party has also stayed away from the anti-corruption protests, emphasizing
its own anti-LGBTQ marches and trying to rebuild its reputation after one of
its leaders, Adrian Pal, was sentenced to five years
in prison for possessing large quantities of child pornography.
Despite its involvement in the 2013 wave of environmental protests, the
neo-fascist Legionary Movement has focused its energies in recent years on
gaining legal recognition. It too has ignored the current wave of protests. Gigi
Becali, the football baron and leader of the now-defunct New Generation Party,
joined the protests in February 2017, but has since distanced
himself from the #rezist movement, accusing it of “anarchism.”

Why now?

Despite
the large numbers of workers living abroad and incidents of hooliganism incited
by small numbers of people, the repertoires used by the crowds on 10 August
were substantially similar to those that have sustained the #rezist movement
for the past twenty months. Yet this was the first time the authorities have
used water cannons, pepper spray, and tear gas against protesters. Preliminary
reports suggest that gendarmes acted on direct orders from their superiors. It
is still unclear why, after twenty months of protests, the government felt that
this level of force was necessary. It is unlikely that they felt that state
security was threatened by the protests, even if this was the message that
media outlets promoted in the days leading up to 10 August. Street protesters are the only thing preventing the
government from undermining the country’s liberal democracy.

With
no significant opposition either from the president or from opposition parties,
street protesters are the only thing preventing the government from undermining
the country’s liberal democracy. The repression may be a sign that the
government sees the subordination of the judiciary to be the culmination of
their political program over the past year and a half and decided to
marginalize debate over the proposed legislation by shifting the focus to
questions of law and order.

Protests
have continued in Bucharest in recent days, and have spread to other major
urban centres. The association of protest with the diaspora has waned, however,
and increasingly protesters are the same people who have sustained the movement
since January 2017.

Regardless
of whether the protesters manage to achieve their aims, the unprecedented
number of people involved in these protests has enshrined social movements as a
key element of Romanian politics, which is something that is unlikely to
disappear any time soon.

About the author

Roland
Clarkis a Senior Fellow at CARR,
and a Lecturer in History at the University of Liverpool. He is a specialist in the history of fascism in interwar Romania. He
also writes about anti-communist resistance movements; gulags in Communist
Romania; theology and nationalism; lived religion; visionaries; sectarianism;
and the history of the Romanian Orthodox Church. See his profile
here.

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