Hochgeladen von

Beschreibung:

Sectarian violence has risen phenomenally in Pakistan over the past two decades. It
has extended beyond sporadic clashes over doctrinal issues between Sunnis, who
constitute 90 percent of the world's Muslims and 75-85 percent of Pakistanis, and
Shi'is, who constitute 15-25 percent of Pakistanis, and metamorphosed into political
conflict around mobilization of group identity.1 It has developed political utility, and
militant organizations that champion its cause operate for the most part in the political
rather than religious arena

Hochgeladen von

Beschreibung:

Sectarian violence has risen phenomenally in Pakistan over the past two decades. It
has extended beyond sporadic clashes over doctrinal issues between Sunnis, who
constitute 90 percent of the world's Muslims and 75-85 percent of Pakistanis, and
Shi'is, who constitute 15-25 percent of Pakistanis, and metamorphosed into political
conflict around mobilization of group identity.1 It has developed political utility, and
militant organizations that champion its cause operate for the most part in the political
rather than religious arena

Nasr Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Jan., 2000), pp. 171-190 Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/422396 . Accessed: 20/03/2014 02:06Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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International Politics, Domestic Imperatives,and IdentityMobilization

Sectarianismin Pakistan,1979-1998Vali R. Nasr

Sectarianviolence has risen phenomenallyin Pakistanover the past two decades. It has extended beyond sporadic clashes over doctrinal issues between Sunnis, who constitute 90 percent of the world's Muslims and 75-85 percent of Pakistanis, and Shi'is, who constitute 15-25 percentof Pakistanis,and metamorphosedinto political conflict aroundmobilizationof group identity.1It has developed political utility, and militantorganizationsthat championits cause operatefor the most part in the political ratherthan religious arena. The principle protagonistsin this conflict are the Sunni Pakistan'sArmy of the Prophet's Companions (Sipah-i Sahaba Pakistan, SSP, established in 1984) and Pakistan'sShi'i Movement (Tahrik-iJafaria Pakistan,TJP,formed in 1979) and its militant off-shoot, Army of Muhammad(Sipah-i Muhammad,SM, formed in 1991). They have waged a brutal and bloody campaign to safeguardthe interests of their respective communities. Assassinations, attacks on mosques, and bomb blasts claimed 581 lives and over 1,600 injuriesbetween 1990 and 1997.2 One incident, a missiles in a five day "war"involving mortarguns, rocket launchers,and antiaircraft hamlet in northwestPakistanin 1996, alone claimed over 200 lives and left several The escalating violence cast a somber mood on the celetimes that numberinjured.3 brations of the fiftieth anniversary of Pakistan's independence, which took place law that was hours after a heated debate in the parliamentover a new "antiterrorism" introducedto combat the problem.The conflict has had a debilitatingeffect on law and order,underminedthe national ethos and the very sense of community in many urbanand ruralareas,and complicateddemocraticconsolidation. Sectarianismin the Pakistanicontext refers specifically to organizedand militant religiopoliticalactivism,whose specific aim is to safeguardand promotethe sociopolitical interests of the particularMuslim sectariancommunity, Shi'i or Sunni, with to that commuwhich it is associated.Its discourseof powerpromises empowerment nity in tandemwith greateradherenceto Islamic norms in public life, as the religious sources and authorities of that community articulate them. These goals are to be achieved throughmobilizationof the sectarianidentity in question and the marginalization of the rival sectariancommunity,largelythroughprolific use of violence.171

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January2000

The greater prominence of sectarianism in Pakistan'spolitics can be seen as a new phase in Islamist ideology and politics, especially among the Sunnis, one that is more militant and combines the demand for an Islamic state with a drive to marginalize religious minorities, especially the Shi'is. Sectarianismcan, however,be better understoodas a form of "ethnic"posturing:mobilizationof group identity for political ends in lieu of class, ideology, or party affiliation.4Sectarianismis an enmeshing of the Islamist and ethnic discourses of power in a state wherein both are prevalent. Sectarianismis tied to Islamism in that the defining identity is elaboratedin terms of Islam, and the ideological underpinningof Islamism also informs the politics of sectarianism, although sectarianism places greater emphasis on sectarian purity as opposed to establishmentof a universal Islamic orthodoxy. Still, the sectarian discourse of power and its underlyingparadigmof politics are "ethnic";they predicate participationin politics on group identity.Hence, whereas sectarianismin Pakistan displays far more concern for religious orthodoxy than confessionalism in Lebanon and Protestantand Catholic politics in NorthernIreland,the fundamentaldirectives of their politics are not dissimilar.The Islamist veneer should not obfuscate the fact that at its core sectarianismis a form of religiopolitical nationalism.Therefore,our examinationof its root causes is directly relatedto discussions of identity mobilization and ethnic conflict.

Some Theoretical Considerations Identity Mobilization and Sectarianism The two principaltheoreticalapproaches in the social sciences to explaining ethnic mobilization have been primordialismand instrumentalism.5 The first views ethnicity as a "subjectivelyheld sense of shared identity,"a "natural" phenomenon that is deeply embedded in human psychology and social relations.6 Consequently,ethnic mobilization is integral to the political life of culturallypluralsocieties, especially where class divisions are weak or absent. The second holds that ethnicity is adaptive in face of changing circumstancesand serves as a tool in furtheringthe interests of political leaders and their constituencies. Both the primordialistand instrumentalistpositions are relevant in explaining the rise of sectarianism.Sectarianidentities could not have been politicized unless differences in beliefs, values, and historical memories compelled Shi'is and Sunnis to collective action. Still, these differences by themselves do not explain the rise in sectarianismand its role in society and politics. Formost of Pakistan'shistory sectarianism has not been a political force. Differences between Shi'is and Sunnis have only recently become a notable divide in Pakistan'spolitics. Instrumentalistarguments, therefore,have greaterutility in explainingsectarianism. Instrumentalist explanationsemphasize two causal factors:economic competition and the political opportunity structure.The first stipulates that competition over172

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ValiR. Nasr resources and wealth can serve as an impetus to ethnic mobilization if winners and losers are separatedby identity or if identity mobilizationholds the prospect of economic gain.7 The second argues that identity mobilization is "social and political of elites, who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate construction...creations materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to...gain It follows that, if the structureof a political syspolitical and economic advantage."8 tem permits the use of identity mobilization for political gain or rewardspolitical leaders for engaging in identity politics, then the political system is likely to experience identitymobilizationand conflict.9 The instrumentalist approach identifies "ethnic" leaders as primary agents in mobilizing identities.The choices and strategiesthey adopt in furtheringtheir interests as well as the interestsof their communitiespropel ethnic mobilizationand conflict.10Ethnic mobilization is therefore a by-productof political leaders' project of power and/or a facet of a community's drive for securing economic advantage.1' Although relevant to the discussion here, especially insofar as the actions of Shi'i and Sunni leaders and organizations are concerned, the instrumentalistapproach does not provide an adequate explanationof sectarianism,for it does not take into and state actors in identitymobilization. account the agency of international International actors have generallybeen creditedwith determiningthe context for ethnic conflict but not with directly mobilizing the identities involved in it.l2 Sectarianismin Pakistanprovides a valuable case study in examining the relation between identity mobilizationin one state and interestsof other states in the internamix of Islamism and ethnic posturingthat underpinssectional arena.The particular tarianism has found political relevance because it so effectively relates regional power alignmentsto specific political constituencies in Pakistan;it translatesIranian and Saudi/Iraqicompetitions of power, on the one hand, and tensions born of the Afghan war, on the other, into Shi'i-Sunni struggles for domination.Thus, sectarian conflict in Pakistan highlights the importance of interplay of international and domestic political factors in giving rise to, entrenching,and even radicalizingidentirelationshas shapedthe low domestic ty cleavages. The high politics of international politics of Pakistan. Theories of ethnic conflict have generally treated the state as a passive actor in identity mobilization.'3 States fall victim to assertive ethnic forces that serve the interests of substate actors who use state institutions as the arena for their power struggles.The intensificationof these struggles both signals and causes the weakening and ultimately the failure of the state. The case of Pakistan suggests that, far from being passive victims of identitymobilization, states can be directly instrumental in that process, manipulatingthe protagonistsand entrenchingidentity cleavages. Identitymobilizationhere is rooted in the project of power of state actors, not of an elite or a community.These actors do not championthe cause of any one community but see gain in the conflict between the competing identities. This propositionallows173

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the theoreticaldiscussion to move beyond elite interests and primordialdifferences in explaining identity mobilization to look at state behavior in the context of the structureof state-societyrelationsas a causal factor. State Power and Identity Mobilization The rise of sectarianism suggests that states with limited capabilities are more prone to manipulatingcleavages of identity.14Such states are also less able to preventother states from doing the same in their borders.The state in Pakistanis large and interventionist,but it enjoys only limited power and capacity.'5It is greatly constricted in formulatingcoherent policies and faces strong resistance to their implementation.Variousprivate interests and social groups limit its reach into society and compromise its autonomy.It is able to exerand then more clearly vis-a-vis some social cise effective power only intermittently, and with to choices. The state is thereforeconstrictedby certain groups policy regard what Joel Migdal has termed "disperseddomination,"circumstancesin which neither the state nor social forces enjoy countrywide domination.l6However, whereas the state is too weak to dominate,it is strong enough to manipulateand can also use force to respond to challenges to national security or regime survival. It is a "lame leviathan," to borrow Thomas Callaghy's term in describing the state in Zaire/Congo.l7That the state can use force at key junctures,however,does not compensate for limitationsto state power and lack of effective domination. Weakstates can not formulateand implementpolicies effectively (the final shape of their policies manifests the scope and natureof social resistance), and actions of state leaders often reflect "strategiesof survival."'8 In fact, theoreticaldiscussions of weak states have for the most part remainedfocused on explaining policy outcomes in the face of limitationsto state power and capacity.The case of Pakistanexpands the purview of the theoretical discussion to include examination of ways in which states can contend with limitationsbefore them proactivelyand in enterprisingways. Here, a weak state manipulatessocial and culturaldivisions in orderto gain advantage vis-a-vis social forces; a divide and rule strategy compensates for failure to build state capacity.This course of action does not make the weak state strong,but it gives it greaterroom to maneuverin the short run, albeit at the cost of undermining social cohesion and hence state interests in the long run. It also suggests that state actors are principalagents in identity mobilization and conflict in culturallyplural societies, and the manner in which politics of identity unfolds in a weak state is a productof the dialectic of state-societyrelations.'9

International and Domestic Roots of Sectarian Conflict The origins of the currentspate of sectarianconflict in Pakistancan be tracedto the intensification of regional politics after the Iranianrevolution of 1979 and start of174

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ValiR. Nasr the Afghan war in 1980 and the Pakistanistate'sfailureto preventthe political forces they unleashedfrom influencingits domestic politics. The Iranianrevolutionof 1979 had a profoundimpact on the balance of relationsbetween Shi'i and Sunni communities in Pakistanand thereforeon the country'spolitics as well. The Iranianrevolution set in motion, first, a struggle for dominationbetween the Pakistanistate and its Shi'i population and, later, a competition for influence and power in Pakistan between SaudiArabiaand Iraq,on the one hand,and Iran,on the other,an extension of the Persian Gulf conflicts into South Asia. Both of these struggles for power helped mobilize and radicalizesectarianidentities. The Implications of Mobilization of Shi'i Identity The Iranian revolution changed the characterof both Sunni and Shi'i politics in Pakistan. Its impact on Shi'is was, however,more direct and in turninfluencedthe politics of Sunni activism as well.20The ideological force of the revolution, combined with the fact that the first successful Islamic revolution had been carried out by Shi'is, emboldened the Shi'i communityand politicized its identity.Soon after the success of the revolution in Tehran zealous emissaries of the revolutionary regime actively organized Pakistan'sShi'is, which led to the rise of the TJP and its various offshoots. Iranians were no doubt eager to export their revolutionto Pakistan.The leadershipof the revolution was also unhappywith GeneralMuhammadZia ul-Haq, the military ruler of Pakistan, for having traveled to Iran in 1977-78 to shore up the shah's regime. In addition, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistanin 1980 General Zia's government became closely allied with the United States, with whom Iran was increasingly at loggerheads. More important,Zia's regime was then in the midst of an ambitious Islamization project that sought to transformstate institutions,laws, and policymaking in accordance with Islamic precepts.Pakistan'sIslamizationdiffered from Iran'sown experiment in many regards. In fact, it was this competition between Shi'i and Sunni Islamisms-the Iranianand Pakistanimodels-that lay at the heart of Iran'sposturing towardPakistanand also providedPakistan'sShi'is with a cause to rally around. The Islamizationpackage that GeneralZia unveiled in 1979, despite its claims of Islamic universalism, was in essence based on narrow Sunni interpretations of Islamic law and was thereforeviewed by Shi'is as interferencewith their religious conduct and a threatto their sociopolitical interests.21 In fact, the Islamizationpackage produceda sense of siege among Shi'is that has since animatedtheir militancy. Shi'is made their position clear when Zia's regime sought to implement Sunni laws of inheritanceand the rules that govern the collection of the obligatoryIslamic alms tax (zakU), which the state was chargedto collect in the name of Islam, as the law of the land. Throughout 1979-80 Shi'is mobilized in opposition to these laws. Their protests culminated in a two-day siege of Islamabadin July 1980. Faced with the strong Shi'i protest and significant pressure brought to bear on Pakistan by Iran,175

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Zia's regime capitulated.It recognized Shi'i communalrights, thus legitimating sectarian posturing, and exempted Shi'is from all those aspects of the Islamization package that contravenedShi'i law. The Shi'i victory was deemed ominous by many in the ruling regime. The military was perturbedwith the Shi'i show of force, especially because Shi'i demonstrators had defied martiallaw with impunitythanksto Iranianpressure.Shi'i mobilization was thereforeviewed as a potential strategicproblem that was involving Iran in the domestic affairs of Pakistan.The formation of the TJP and its militant student wing in 1979, their assertive politics and emulation of the Iranianmodel, and the emergence of charismatic"Khomeini-like"leaders among the Shi'is, notably Arif Husaini, were also instrumentalin convincing the ruling establishmentof the threat that Shi'i mobilizationposed to state authority,as well as to Pakistan'sregional position.22

The state'scapitulationto Shi'i demandsin 1980 was seen by Zia's Sunni Islamist allies as nothing short of constrictingtheir envisioned Islamic state and diluting the impact of Islamization. Shi'i protests had in effect reduced Islamization to "Sunnification,"undermining the universal Islamic claims of the entire process. Sunni Islamists were not preparedto accept separatebut equal domains for Sunnis and Shi'is. They arguedthat Pakistanwas a Sunni state and its minoritieshad to live according to the norms and laws of the state, closely parallel to the way the BharatiyaJanataParty (Indian Peoples Party,BJP) argues against exemptions from civil laws afforded to Muslims in India. They also denied the legitimacy of Shi'i mobilization by arguing that Sunnism was Islam and, by implication, Shi'ism was outside the pale of Islam. The organizational prowess of the TJP was meanwhile seen as a sign of hardening of Shi'i identity.Sunni Islamizersconcluded that they would not be able to win over Shi'is and integratethem into their promised Islamic order.Shi'is exhibited "disloyalty"to Pakistanand its Islamic ideology. Thus, Zia and his Islamist allies developed a concerted strategy for containing Shi'i mobilization and limiting both Pakistani Shi'is and Iran'sinfluence in Pakistan. Pakistaninitially sought to resolve the problemthroughdiplomacy.For the better part of 1980-81, foreign ministerAgha Shahi, who favoredconciliation with Tehran, sought to dissuade Iranfrom meddling in Pakistan'sdomestic affairs and to enlist its support in pacifying the Shi'is.23 However, Iran was implacable. Perturbedby the failure of the diplomatic initiative Zia looked for other ways of contendingwith the "Shi'i problem."Due to successful social resistance to the state's policy initiative, combined with the intrusion of outside forces into the body politic, state leaders looked to mobilizing sectarian identities as a means of contending with the challenges before them. This course of action also respondedto the entwining of Shi'i mobilization with the prodemocracymovement and the channeling of its energies into opposition to176

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ValiR. Nasr martial law. In 1983 the TJP joined the multiparty Movement for Restoration of Democracy.The movement was formed by Benazir Bhutto'sPakistanPeoples Party (PPP) to oppose the military'sdominationof politics. Shi'is had been favorablydisposed to the PPP ever since the 1970s.24By joining Bhutto's anti-Zia coalition the TJP furtherentrenchedthat supportand tied Shi'i sectarianposturing vis-a-vis the state to the issue of democratization. The broad identificationof the military regime with Sunnism and, conversely,Shi'ism with the prodemocracymovement gave sectarianidentitiesnew political significance. The military regime assumed that sectarianism would problematizethe PPP's close affiliation with Shi'is. For in an environment of heightened sectarianism-which the militaryhoped would convenientlycast the struggle for democracyas one of Shi'i versus Sunni-the more numerousSunni community would likely move away from the PPP.To this end the ruling military regime lent supportto Sunni sectarianismand sought to use it as a means of balancing the PPP's base of support among the Shi'i with an anti-PPP Sunni one of itsown.25

The Rise of Sunni Militancy Zia's regime began its efforts to contain Shi'i assertiveness by investing in Sunni institutions in general and Sunni seminaries in Curricular reforms in the seminariesopened the door for their graduates particular.26 to enter the modern sectors of the economy and join government service. This change, it hoped, would entrench Sunni identity in the public arena and in various state institutionsand governmentagencies. The state thus promoted Sunni Islamism only to confrontthe political and geostrategicthreatof Shi'i Islamism. With this aim in mind the state concentratedon strengtheningSunnism in areas where the "Shi'i threat"was perceivedto be greatest. Much of this effort was undertaken by Pakistan's military and its elite intelligence wing, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Throughoutthe 1980s the military helped organize militant Sunni groups in Punjaband North-WestFrontierProvince and provided funding for seminaries in Baluchistanand North-WestFrontierProvince, provinces that abut Iran.27 As one observerremarked, "if you look at where the most [Sunni] madrassahs[seminaries] were constructedyou will realize that they form a wall blocking Iranoff from Pakistan."28 The military's involvement in sectarianism would grow over time as Sunni militancy developed organizational ties to the Islamist resistance in the Afghan war. As part of this strategy, in 1988 the central government permitted marauding bands of Sunni activists to raid the town of Gilgit, the center of the NorthernAreas of Pakistan,kill some 150 Shi'is, and burn shops and houses.29 The governmentthen proceeded to build an imposing Sunni mosque in the center of the predominantly Shi'i city. (If the NorthernAreas became a province, it would be the only one with a Shi'i majority.)In time this course of action gave rise to greatermilitancy and perpetuatedthe cycle of sectarianviolence. The ruling establishmenteventually found this strategy self-defeating. The mounting costs of sectarianismpresented the state177

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to use with serious problems once "the snake began to devour the snake-charmer," the Gramscianmetaphor.State leadersdid not find it easy to reversethe trend. The state's efforts to contain Shi'i resurgence were complimented by those of SaudiArabiaand Iraq,who were also concernedabout Shi'i activism in Pakistanand what they saw as Iran'sgrowing influence there. In 1980 Iraqbegan a war with Iran that lasted eight years, and Saudi Arabiawas wary of Iran'sideological and military threat and was leading a bitter campaign to contain Iran's revolutionary zeal and limit its power in the Persian Gulf region. Since then Saudi Arabia has sought to harden Sunni identity in countries around Iran, a policy that extends into Central Asia. Pakistanwas importantin the struggle for control of the PersianGulf, as well as in the erection of a "Sunni wall" around Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iraq therefore developed a vested interest in preserving the Sunni character of Pakistan's Islamization.The two states began to finance seminaries and militant Sunni organizations, the primarybeneficiary of which was the SSP. The onset of the Afghan war furtherdeepened Saudi Arabia'scommitmentto its Sunni clients in Pakistan. In fact, the funding that Saudi Arabia provided Afghan fighters also subsidized militant Sunni organizationsin Pakistan,often throughthe intermediaryof Pakistan'smilitary.Afghanistan'sTalibanand the SSP, as well as its offshoot in Kashmir,the Movement of the Companionsof the Prophet(HarakatulAnsar), all hail from the same seminaries and receive training in the same military camps in North-WestFrontierProvinceand southernAfghanistanthat operateunder the supervisionof the Pakistanmilitary.The most famous of these facilities was the al-Badr camp in southernAfghanistan,which was destroyedby the United States in 1998 in retaliationof bombing of American embassies in East Africa. Since 1994 it served as a principal training facility for the Taliban, SSP, and Harakat ul-Ansar. Similarly, Ramzi Ahmed Yusuf, convicted of bombing the WorldTrade Center in New York, was affiliated with a Saudi-financed seminary in Baluchistan that was active in the Afghan war but had also been prominent in anti-Shi'i activities in Pakistan.Yusuf is alleged to have been responsiblefor a bomb blast that killed twenty-fourpeople in the Shi'i holy shrineof Mashadin Iranin June 1994.30 The Saudi and Iraqi involvement in effect transplantedthe Iran-Iraqwar into Pakistanas the SSP and its allies and the TJP and its off-shoots began to do the bidding of their foreign patrons.The flow of funds from the PersianGulf continued to radicalizethe Sunni groups as they sought to outdo one anotherin their use of vitriol and violence in orderto get a largershare of the funding,turningsectarianposturing into a form of rent-seeking. Since 1990 Sunni sectarian groups have assassinated Iranian diplomats and military personnel and torched Iranian cultural centers in Punjab.Attacks on Iraniantargets have been launched in retaliation for sectarian attackson Sunni targets.By openly implicatingIran in attacks on Sunni targetsand retaliating against its representatives and properties in Pakistan, Sunni sectarian groups have sought to complicate relations between Tehranand Islamabadand to178

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ValiR. Nasr portrayPakistaniShi'is as agents of a foreign power.When in September 1997 five Iranianmilitarypersonnelwere assassinatedin Rawalpindi,the Iranianand Pakistani governmentsdepictedthe attackas a deliberateattemptto damage relationsbetween the two countries.31 The killing oftwenty-two Shi'is in Lahorein January1998 escalated tensions between the two countries further as Iran openly warned Pakistan about the spread of Sunni militancy.32 The use of sectarianismto contend with the impact of the Iranianrevolutionthus produced a wider regional struggle for power that quickly went out of the controlof the Pakistanstate.

The Impact of the Afghan War The Afghan war, meanwhile, helped aggravatethe situation.33 First, Saudi Arabia's role helped boost Sunni militancy in Pakistan-often in conjunctionwith elements in Pakistan'smilitary-and limited Pakistan'swillingness or ability to contain Saudi exercise of power within its borders.34In addition, the Afghan scene itself was wrought with sectariantensions as Shi'i and Persian-speakingpro-Iranianfactions vied for power and position with the Saudi and American-backedMujahedingroups based in Pakistan.The rivalrybetween these groups and the competition for control of Afghanistanineluctablyspilled over into Pakistan.The advent of the Talibanonly reinforced the linkage between regional power rivalries and sectarianism. Most notably,the escalation of tensions between the Talibanand the Iraniangovernmentin August-September1998 set the stage for a wider regional Shi'i-Sunni conflict that will likely furtheranimate sectarianismin Pakistan,control its ebbs and flows, and determinethe extent and natureof the state'sresponse to it.35 From the outset Pakistan'sresponse to sectarianismwas entangled with its own Afghan policy. For instance, in 1994-96, while the governmentbegan to reign in Sunni militancy within Pakistan,which was by then deemed to be out of control, it was promoting it in Afghanistan and Kashmir. In 1994 the government launched OperationSave Punjab,which led to the arrestof some forty sectarianactivists and sought to close seminaries to deny the TJP and SSP recruits.36 Yet during 1994-96 the government also organized militant Sunni seminary students into Taliban and Harakatul-Ansar units for Pakistan-backed operationsin Afghanistanand Kashmir. In the end, seminaries-and hence the SSP-thrived despite the crackdown.In fact, since the advent of the Taliban Sunni militancy has become more prominent. Increasingly,young activists are looking to the Talibanas a model. During a recent demonstrationin Karachi,protesterstauntedgovernmentleaders, proclaiming:"Do not think of us as weak. We have ousted Soviet troops and infidels fromAfghanistan, we can do the same in Pakistan."37 Containing sectarian groups therefore requires balancingPakistan'smilitary commitmentto the Talibanin Afghanistanand the government'sdesire to maintainlaw and orderwithin its borders.179

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The Afghan war was also importantin other regards.The decade-long war flooded Pakistanwith weapons of all kinds and ensconced militancy in its political culture, especially among Islamist groups. The "Kalashnikovculture"made sectarian conflicts bloodier and transformed militantorganizationsinto paramilitary ones. The war also gave rise to powerfulcriminalnetworksin Pakistanthat profit from tradein contraband and narcotics.The collapse of the state in Afghanistanled to the marked rise in production of heroin, which found its way to internationalmarkets via the Pakistaniport city of Karachi.38 The heroin productionspawned importantpolitical relations which included Mujahedinfighters, who used the narcotics trade to subsidize their war against the Soviet Union, tribal leaders, Pakistanimilitary commanders, and criminalgangs in Pakistan.The narcoticstrade eventuallyproducedformidable criminalnetworkswhose reach extends throughthe length of the country,from the bordersof Afghanistanin the north to the port city of Karachiin the south. The relation between criminal networks and militant activists first surfaced in Afghanistan itself. There, political and economic ties with some of the Afghan Mujahedin units worked in largely the same manner as those seen between drug lords and leftist guerrillasin LatinAmerica. Over time the drug trade developed ties with sectarianorganizations,replicating in Pakistan the economic and political relationship that had already developed in Afghanistan between militant groups and drug traffickers. Many of the Afghan Mujahedinfighters who became tied to the narcotics traffic have also been involved in sectarian conflict. The Mujahedin thus helped forge linkages between their Pakistanisectarianallies and their partnersamong drug traffickers.The drug trade, in addition, found sectarian violence a useful cover for its criminal operations. Sectarian organizations have accepted the pact with the devil for the most part because it has been financially beneficial and has providedthem with expertise and resources in perpetuatingviolence. There are also cases where the criminals have Criminalnetactually set up sectarianorganizationsas fronts for criminalactivity.39 works have thus become deeply embedded in the politics of sectarianism,and their financial, political, and criminal interests in good measure control the ebbs and flows of sectarianism.The result is an Islamizationof criminalactivity and criminalization of segments of Islamismin Pakistan. The authoritiesin Pakistan find it difficult to crack down on activities that are associated with organizations that operate in the name of Islam and claim to be defending its interests. Police action against criminals is seen as harassmentof the true servants of the faith and thus faces resistance from local communities. In addition, since sectarianisminvolves religion, sectarianactivists have had the tacit support of some of largernationalpartiesthat have routinelyused their influence to protect sectarianactivists from prosecution.By associating themselves with sectarianism, criminal organizations,particularlysmaller criminal networks, have benefited from that protection.The participationof the criminalsin sectarianconflict has esca180

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ValiR. Nasr lated the violence, for hardenedcriminalshave been more willing to attackmosques and people at prayerand have generally been more willing to kill. The rising power of narcoticstradehas thereforefannedthe flames of sectarianism. Consequently,the state'scontrol over both sectarianand criminal forces has been weakened. Its ability to contend with violence has been restricted. And in many places in the country the combined forces of sectarian and criminal organizations have eliminated state authorityaltogetherand replaced it with local political control rooted in criminalactivity and sectarianpolitics.

The Predicament of a Weak State While intensification of regional conflicts was instrumentalin giving rise to sectarianism in Pakistan, the vicissitudes of Pakistanipolitics decided the direction that this form of identity mobilization has taken and the role it has come to play in state-society relations. Sectarianism has increased as the center in Pakistan has weakened. Its raging violence manifests the debility of state institutions. Throughout the 1980s a bloody ethnic war escalated in Pakistan's southern province of Sind.40The ethnic conflict posed a serious threatto political control of ruling governmentsboth under Zia and the democraticallyelected prime ministers who succeeded him after 1988. This trend has proved particularlyproblematic for democraticconsolidation. Weaknessat the center has limited the ability of the governments of Benazir Bhutto (1988-90 and 1993-96) and Nawaz Sharif (1990-93 and 1997-1999) to reform the economy, restore law and order,and manage delicate relations with the military.4' The weakening of the center has also led to greaterassertiveness of local powerbrokers-the landed elite and their networksof strongmenfor the most part.42 The Pakistani state since its creation relied on these local powerbrokersto govern the As the center weakenedover the years, especially after 1988, and comruralareas.43 petition between ruling governmentsand their oppositions grew more intense, the landed elite became more autonomous,and the state's authorityin ruralareas dwindled. In Punjab and North-West Frontier Province an important space-liberated zones of sorts-was created in which sectarianorganizationsand criminal elements could operate. In many instances, the landed elite has provided protection for the burgeoningsectarianand criminalnetworks.In these cases, it has received financial benefits from criminal activities and used sectarian forces as private militias.44As state authorityhas begun to retractfrom the ruralscene, the power structureassociated with the landed elite has acted as the de facto local government.Here, sectarian forces have served as the much needed organizationalmuscle of the ascendantrural power structure.The Islamic veneer of sectariangroups has conveniently served to legitimatethe authorityof the local power structureand limit the ability of the state181

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to infringe upon it. The rise in the political fortunes of the local powerbrokershas thereforeoccurredunderthe cover of sectarianismand helped entrenchit in politics. This trend has been helped by the fact that the levers of power have become increasinglyineffective. This ineffectiveness is most evident in limitationsbefore the powers of the police, the force most immediatelyconcerned with containing sectarian violence. The police in Pakistanis not an effective force; it is corrupt,weak, and ill-equipped.According to one estimate, there are five times as many Islamist militants in the country as there are policemen.45There is even evidence that sectarian forces have infiltratedthe police force.46The ineffectiveness of the police became clearly evident in October 1996 when it was barred from entry into the village of and mainThokarNiaz Beig in Punjab,where the militantShi'i SM is headquartered tains a large cache of arms. In May 1997 the police was dealt yet anotherblow when the officer investigatingthe torchingof Iranianculturalcenters in January1997 was assassinated.Since the assassinationthe police actually appearto fear confrontation with sectariangroups, and officers have apologized to sectariangroups for their past The message of the assassi"misdeeds,"that is, arrestand prosecutionof activists.47 nation was also not lost on judges, who are proving unwilling to convict sectarian In addition, since provincial authoritiescontrol the activists for fear of reprisals.48 police, it is difficult for the center to rely on it to contend with sectarianviolence.49 The problem is compoundedwhen largernational parties or landlordswho protect sectarianelements use theirpower and position to preventpolice action. The governments at the center and in the provinces are compelled to restrainthe police in the coalitions. interestsof maintainingparliamentary Consequently,when violence reaches a critical stage, the military has stepped in to restore order.In 1992 in Peshawar,in 1995 in Pachinar,and in August 1997 and March 1998 in North-WestFrontierProvincethe military intervenedto end the violence. However,these operationswere limited; the military merely imposed a ceasefire and ended the bloodshed. If the militarywere to participatein disarmingmilitant organizations and rooting out sectarianism-which some elements in the military have helped organize-it would need a broader mandate and would need to be allowed to assume a greaterpolitical role. That solution would not be in the interests of democracy.This dilemma became clear in August 1997, when the government pushed through the parliamenta draconianantiterrorismbill. The bill gave broad powers to the governmentand police to arrestand try suspects without due process of civil rights stipulatedin the constitution. and in contravention In the towns and hamlets of rural Punjab sectarianismhas also served the interests of a differentsocial stratum.Throughoutthe late 1970s and the 1980s, owing to populationpressureand laborremittancesfrom PersianGulf states, the urbancenters of Punjabgrew in size, and new ones developed on the edge of agriculturallands.50 Urbanization has changed patterns of authority, especially because these urban developments have been dominated by the Sunni middle classes and bourgeoisie,182

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Vali R. Nasr

tradersand merchantswho are tied to the agriculturaleconomy but are not part of the rural power structure.Increasingly,the burgeoning Sunni middle classes have demandeda say in local politics and have thus challenged the political control of the landed elite. In these areas of Punjab, such as Jhang and Kabirwala, where Shi'i landlords hold power over Sunni peasants, the rising Sunni middle classes have theories as emphasized sectarianidentity in the mannerdescribedby instrumentalist a means of weakening the Shi'i landed elite. Hence since 1986 urban areas in the Jhang district of Punjab,where Shi'i landlordsand Sunni middle classes now compete for the allegiance of Sunni peasants,have been the centers for militantseminaries and the scene of most of the sectarianviolence. The Sunni middle class supportfor sectarianismin Punjabreinforcesthe effect of sectarian organizations' alliances with other local powerbrokers to extend the purview of Sunni militancy from towns to villages. The sectarian forces have used these circumstancesto furtherweaken the state'spresence at the local level, combining their attack on the state with their desired purge of Shi'is. Between Januaryand May 1997 the SSP assassinatedseventy-five Shi'i municipalofficials and community leaders. Although the attacks had sectariancoloring, the targets were also agents of the state.51The purge of Shi'i local officials was designed to open the way for appointmentnot only of Sunni officials, but also of officials who would be more favorablydisposed towardstrengtheningthe rising local power structure.The attack on the state was unmistakable. The response of Shi'i landlordswith few exceptions has been to gravitatetoward right-of-centerparties, most notablythe PakistanMuslim League (PML). They concluded that, whereas traditionalreligious and feudal ties could keep their Shi'i peasants in check, association with the PML was necessary to placate their Sunni constituents. As they became more powerful within the PML and were able to limit somewhat the party's support for Sunni sectarianism, their positions within their constituencies strengthened.Shi'i landlordsthus created sectarianbridges and protected Shi'i interestsin the PML but did not eliminatesectarianism. Demographic changes in Karachi have been similarly instrumentalin sectarian identity mobilization in that city. In recent years the number of Pathans-from North-West Frontier Province and Afghanistan-in Karachi has grown markedly. This community has been closely tied to both Sunni orthodoxy and militancy and has benefited more directly from the legal as well as illegal financial linkages that have been spawned by the Afghan war. Pathan ascendancy eventually precipitated conflict with Muhajirs, the dominant ethnic community in the city.52 Since the advent of this conflict in 1985 sectarianismhas served the interests of Pathansand the financial networksthat are tied with them, for it can drawa wedge between Shi'i and Sunni Muhajirsand weaken the hold of the dominant Muhajirparty (MQM), many of whose leaders are Shi'i, over that community.By redefining the main axis of conflict in Karachias sectarianratherthan ethnic, Pathanshope to reduce resis183

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Politics Comparative

January2000

tance to their growing political and economic presence there. In many ways Pakistanhas become an archipelagoof stability.The state's power exists in pockets and regions and is absent in others.The state has, as of late, begun to view this developmentwith alarm.Not only does it not look favorablyon limits to its power and reach;the shrinkageof state power in the ruralareas can translateinto unmanageable sectarian conflict and criminal activity and weaken Pakistan in its regionalpower strugglewith its perennialnemesis, India. The state helped foster sectarianconflict in the first place but because of its gradbecause in Pakistanthe rise of ual weakeninghas been slow to controlit, particularly sectarian conflict has coincided with democratization.The fragility of democratic institutionscombined with intense competition between political parties and actors has furthereroded state power and created circumstancesthat are particularlypermissive to sectarianconflict. For,just as state institutionshave ditheredin stymieing the tide of sectarianism,various political actors have followed the example of state leaders in the 1980s in manipulating sectarian identities to serve their interests. Problemsof democraticconsolidationhave consequentlyhelped ensconce sectarianism in the political process.

Sectarianism, Weak Democracy, and Crisis of Governability The first three general elections after the returnof democracyto Pakistan,in 1988, 1990, and 1993, failed to produce viable parliamentary majorities.The election of 1997 was the first to give a strong majority to one party, Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League. The managementof parliamentary coalitions thereforebecame central to national and provincial politics. The competition between rival coalitions placed a premium on every member of the national and provincial assemblies. Governmentand opposition parties went to great lengths to curry favor with them. Fringe parties and independentsbenefited most from these circumstances,as they were able to exert power and influence beyond what their numberswarranted. The first three elections also gave the opposition party direct or indirect control of some provinces. Since many police andjudicial powers lie with the provinces, the center found it difficult to control sectarianviolence, and the provinces-and, many in Pakistanargue,the military-found it prudentto use the instabilitycreatedby the violence to weaken the centralgovernment. Sectarian parties and their allies exploited these circumstances to pursue their activities. After 1988 representatives associated with sectarian parties, and after 1990, when the SSP ran candidatesof its own and won seats to nationaland provincial assemblies, members of sectarianparties could exert significant influence. For instance, the PPP had to give the SSP a provincialministerialposition in the Punjab provincial cabinet between 1993 and 1996 in order to get the party's support and 184

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ValiR. Nasr deny it to the PML. The ruling partiesturneda blind eye to sectarianactivities and in essence gave the activists immunity from prosecution for criminal and violent acts. The SSP member of Punjab'scabinet between 1993 and 1996 had eight cases of murderregistered against him.53Not until the PML handily won the 1997 general elections and gained control at the center as well as in Punjab and North-West FrontierProvince-and was thus relieved of the considerationsthat had hithertogoverned its position on sectarianism-did the governmentbegin to crack down on sectarianforces in earnest. It arrested 1,500 activists between Februaryand May 1997, closed a Shi'i seminary for sectarianactivities in July,pushed throughparliamenta law in August, and roundedup more activists afterthe resumption new antiterrorism of sectarianviolence in January1998.54It has become apparentthat effective governance at the center,which is directly tied to the question of state power, is necessary for contending with sectarianviolence. Moreover,the fortunes of sectarianismare tied to those of democratic consolidation. Still, the scope of the problem extends beyond the crisis of governabilitythat followed democratization.For this crisis provided opportunityand encouragementto politicians to use sectarianismin the manner first used by state leaders,to serve their political ends as well as to shore up government authority.The patternof decision making of Benazir Bhutto's government instructivein this regard. between 1993 and 1996 is particularly During her second term of office (1993-96) Benazir Bhutto'sgovernmentlooked at the problem of sectarianism differently. She followed the policy of exchanging immunityfrom prosecutionand freedomof activity for sectarianforces for their support but began more directlyto use sectarianismto the advantageof her own government. At the time, her party still enjoyed strong supportamong Shi'is, and the TJP was tacitly allied with her party.Confident of Shi'i support,she began to explore the possibility of making inroads into the Sunni vote bank. Her main success in this regardwas the Partyof Ulama of Islam (Jamiat-i Ulama Islam, JUI). The JUI made a deal with the PPP as a result of which it received access to importantaspects of governmentpolicymaking. The JUI has had close organizationaland political ties with the SSP; its prominence in governmentthereforetranslatedinto protection for SSP activists. Because Benazir Bhutto was viewed as secularand lacked Islamic legitimacy,and because her governmentwas in dire need of such legitimacy, she was overrelianton the JUI. Initially Shi'is accepted her deal with the JUI in the hope that she would reign in the JUI and its sectarianallies. However,she was unable to control the JUI and its sectarian allies, and instead the JUI began to use governmentresources to supportthe SSP.This failurebegan to alienate the PPP's Shi'i supporters. From 1994 onwards it became increasinglyevident that the governmentnot only was incapableof reining in the JUI and SSP, but was actually fanning the flames of sectarianism.In local elections in the NorthernAreas, a predominantlyShi'i area, in 1994 the TJP won six seats, and the PPP came in second with five. The TJP pro185

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Politics Comparative

January2000

posed an alliance with the PPP that would be led by the TJP;the vice-chairmanship (highest elected office) of the territorieswould be held by the TJP.The PPP refused, demandingthat it lead the alliance and occupy the major administrative positions.55 The PPP eventuallygot its way, took over all the major offices, formed the ministry in the NorthernAreas, and denied the TJP control in its stronghold.The PPP's victory, however,came at the cost of a breachwith the TJP.Shi'is, who were alreadyperturbedby the PPP's alliance with the JUI, began to view Bhutto as only nominally pro-Shi'i but in reality unfavorably disposed towardtheir interests.The TJP was particularlydisturbedby the tussle over control of the NorthernAreas because the victory there had been the party'sonly strong electoral showing and its first opportunity to exercise power. The TJP flatly refused to accept the PPP's claim to represent Shi'is, viewing such an outcome as detrimental to its own interests. To make its point of view clear, the TJP held a large anti-PPPrally in Lahore,the first open sign of unhappinessof Shi'is with Bhutto, and was therefore viewed with alarm by her government. The government,however,preferreddivide and rule strategiesto addressingShi'i concerns and accommodating the TJP. Bhutto turned to the more militant Sipah-i Muhammad(SM), forming a tacit alliance with the most sectarian element among the Shi'is. Having lost the TJP'ssupport,with Shi'i landlordsgravitatingtowardthe PML, the SM was the only Shi'i organizationto which the PPP could turnin hope of maintaining a foothold in Shi'i politics. Bhutto was also hoping to use the SM to underminethe TJP'sposition within the Shi'i community.The PPP was borrowinga page from Indira Gandhi's strategy in India's Punjab province. There, in the early 1980s, the Indian prime minister used Sikh militants to undermine the moderate Sikh party, Akali Dal, which the Congress Party had alienated. Similarly in Pakistan'sPunjab, support for the militant elements constricted the moderates but also helped fuel the cycle of violence. By 1995 the PPP governmentfound itself in the position of actively supportingthe most militant sectarianforces on both sides: the SSP through the JUI and the SM in order to weaken the TJP and maintain a foothold in Shi'i politics. Serving its immediate interests, Bhutto'sgovernmentthus resorted to pulverizing civic order and promotingviolence. For this reason the TJP, began to move in the direction of the PML. In March 1995 it joined efforts by the National Reconciliation Council (Milli YikjahatiCouncil) to contain sectarian conflict, which for the TJP meantcontainingthe SM as well as the SSP. The mainstreamSunni Islamist parties and Islamist elements in the PML formed the council in orderto end sectarianconflict. It also enjoyed the supportof the Shi'i landed elite and the TJP.The Islamist parties believed that the violence was damaging their cause and would eventually provide the governmentand the military with the excuse they needed to crack down on all Islamist parties. The council hoped to show that sectarianconflict did not enjoy the supportof mainstreamIslamist parties and to dissociate Islamist politics from sectarianism.Since both the JUI and the TJP186

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ValiR. Nasr were on the council, it was hoped that they would cooperate in reining in the SSP and SM. The council sought to defuse sectariantensions by focusing attentionon what all Islamist parties shared:the demand for an Islamic state. Bhutto viewed such a consensus as dangerousto her interests.If Islamistpartieswere able to cobble togethera united front that would focus its energies on the demand for an Islamic state, they could pose a threatto her governmentand lay the grounds for a strong Islamic electoral alliance in the next elections.56Bhutto concluded that it would be better for Islamist parties and their constituenciesto fight each other and spend their energies in sectarianconflict ratherthan challenge the existing political order.The PPP governmentthereforeactively worked to underminethe council. With the government's prodding, the JUI distanced itself from the council, and the SSP and SM resumedtheir violent attacks, effectively ending the council.57

This developmentwas viewed with alarm in all circles, and especially among the Shi'i who began to view the PPP as detrimentalto their interests.Bhutto'sbrinkmanship between 1993 and 1996 alienated the Shi'i community,TJP,and Shi'i landed elite, all of whom went over to the PML. She was never in a position to control Sunni Islamist or sectarianparties,but in attemptingto control them she lost the one constituency that since 1970 had been committed to the PPP. Bhutto's strategy in turn provided the PML, which had been more closely associated with Sunni interests, with inroadsinto the Shi'i vote. In Pakistan,problems facing consolidation of democracy have furtherweakened the center,creatingspace for sectarianismto grow and to use the political process to its own advantage. Faced with competition for power, the political leadership has used sectarianism as a political tool, as have elements in the military, the landed elite, and criminal networks.The manner in which state leaders manipulatedcleavages of identity in the 1980s has thus increasingly become institutionalizedin the political process.

Conclusion Mobilization of sectarianidentities in Pakistanhas producedan importantfault line in the country'spolitics with broadramificationsfor law and order,social cohesion, and ultimately governmentauthorityand democratic consolidation. The manner in which largely theological differences between Shi'is and Sunnis have been transformed into a full-fledged political conflict providesnew insight into the root causes of identity mobilization; most notably, it includes internationaland state actors in theoreticaldiscussions. It also relates the question of state capacity and power,internationally as well as domestically, to identity mobilization and thus provides the basis for broaderframeworksfor examining it in the ThirdWorld.187

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Politics Comparative

January2000

States operatein two intersectingarenas,the world and the domestic.The relative forces will be strengthand weaknessof a state determineswhetheror not international able to pursuetheirinterestsin its body politic. Weakstates are susceptibleto intrusion of outside forces and can become the arena for competition between international actors.That intrusioncan affect social mobilizationand polarizepolitics along identity lines.The resultant conflictsthenbecome proxywarsbetweenoutsideforces. Weak states are not likely to contend quickly or effectively with the consequences. Conversely,the structureof their politics is likely to entrenchthe divisions as state leaders'andeventually some politicians'manipulatethe emerging cleavages to furthertheir interests.These actors are not directly associated with, speak for, or lead the identities they help mobilize. Hence their fortunes are not directly tied to identity mobilization, and they do not use it as a means to power in the manner explained by instrumentalisttheories (although that explanation still holds true for sectarianactivists). The interestsof these actors are ratherserved most immediately by the conflict and violence that follow identity mobilization.This patternof action is a response to limitations before state power and capacity. It follows that weak states are not simply victims of identity mobilization, but manipulate it and can thrive on it. For the state, however,this victory is only pyrrhic,for it gains momentary advantage vis-a-vis social forces at the cost of social division, violence, and political turmoil.