Report of Brig. Gen. John B.
Gordon, C. S. Army, Commanding
Gordon's Brigade and Early's Division, Of Operations May 5-14. - MAY 4-JUNE 12, 1864--Campaign
from the Rapidan to the James River, Va.

HEADQUARTERS GORDON'S DIVISION, July 5, 1864.

Maj. CAMPBELL BROWN.

MAJOR: I beg to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade
from May 5 to 14, 1864:
On the morning of May 5 I was ordered
by Major-General Early to move along the old stone pike from Locust Grove in the direction
of the Wilderness Tavern. When within 3 or 4 miles of the latter point I discovered the
Confederate troops, who had preceded me, and had engaged the enemy in my front, rapidly
retreating, and was informed by Major-General Early and Lieutenant-General Ewell that the
enemy was driving back our line in confusion, and received orders to form my brigade at
once on the right of the pike, for the purpose of checking the enemy's advance and saving
the artillery, which at that time was moving back along the pike under the enemy's fire. I
moved my brigade by the right flank and formed at right angles to the road with as much
expedition as the nature of the ground and the fire from the enemy's artillery and
advancing infantry would admit. Some of my men were killed and wounded before the first
regiment was placed in position. As soon as the formation was completed I ordered the
brigade forward. The advance was made with such spirit that the enemy was broken and
scattered along the front of my brigade, but still held his ground or continued his
advance on my right and left. For the protection and relief of my flanks I left a thin
line (Thirty-first and Thirty-eighth Georgia Regiments) to protect my front, and changed
front to the right with three regiments (Thirteenth, Sixtieth, and Sixty-first Georgia),
and moved directly upon the flank of the line on my right, capturing several hundred
prisoners, among them one entire regiment, with its officers and colors. At the same time
I caused the regiment on the left (Twenty-sixth Georgia) to make a similar movement to the
left, which was also successful. By this time portions of Battle's brigade rallied, and
with other troops of Rodes' division came forward and assisted in driving the enemy back
and establishing the line, which was afterward held. On the night of the 5th I was ordered
by Major-General Early to move by the flank and take position on the extreme left of the
Confederate line.
Early on the morning of the 6th I reconnoitered
the enemy's position and ascertained that his right flank, resting in a dense woodland,
was left unprotected, and that his whole force on this part of his line was apparently
occupied in repeated assaults upon the front of Johnson's division. Scouting parties were
sent 2 or more miles to the rear of the enemy's right, and reported that no supports could
be found, and that the only precautionary measure taken by the enemy was the posting of
vedettes. At a distance of 400 yards from this flank of the enemy lay an open field,
affording a most advantageous position for forming a line out of view and at right angles
to the general direction of his battle line. These facts were reported and permission
asked to move with my own brigade, properly supported, upon this exposed flank. Late in
the afternoon of May 6 1 received orders from Major-General Early to form my brigade in
this open field, and with one brigade as a support (Johnston's North Carolina) to make the
attack. As soon as these brigades could be gotten into position I deployed skirmishers in
front and began the movement. A line of skirmishers covering this flank of the enemy
readily gave way, and surprised by this sudden and vigorous attack the troops on his right
deserted their trenches and fled. Repeated efforts were made by brigade commanders to
change front and check our advance. These commands were rapidly broken and scattered. The
advance of my brigade was steady and uninterrupted until the approach of darkness in the
dense woodland created confusion in my two right regiments. This, however, was soon
remedied, and my personal observation satisfied me that one hour more of daylight now
would have insured the capture of a considerable portion of the Sixth Army Corps. Of the
entire force which my brigade encountered not an organized regiment was left. The rout was
complete. Large numbers left their arms at the works or threw them away, with knapsacks,
haversacks, &c., in their flight. The enemy's killed, according to the count kept by
the officer commanding pioneer corps, amounted to nearly 400, among them one brigade
commander. Several hundred prisoners were captured, among these two brigade
commanders--Generals Seymour and Shaler. Besides these, many hundreds were passed to the
rear and made their escape in the darkness.
I must be permitted in this connection to
express the opinion that had the movement been made at an earlier hour and properly
supported, each brigade being brought into action as its front was cleared, it would have
resulted in a decided disaster to the whole right wing of General Grant's army, if not in
its entire disorganization. The loss in my brigade amounted to about 50.

BATTLE OF MAY 10 AT SPOTSYLVANIA.

The march to Spotsylvania Court-House
was begun by my brigade, with Early's division, on the night of the 7th. On the morning of
the 8th I was placed in command of this division, consisting of three brigades--Pegram's
(Virginia), Johnston's (North Carolina), and Gordon's (Georgia)--and on the afternoon of
the same day reached Spotsylvania Court-House. On the afternoon of the 10th I received
orders to move my division rapidly from the left of our lines to the support of Rodes'
division, now being heavily assaulted by the enemy. When my division reached this position
the enemy had carried the portion of work held by Doles' brigade, Rodes' division, and had
reached a point more than 100 yards in rear of the line. My leading brigade (Johnston s
North Carolina) was immediately formed, by direction of Lieutenant-General Ewell, across
the head of the enemy's column and ordered to charge. In the mean time Gordon's brigade
was also formed and ordered forward. The enemy was driven back with considerable loss, and
our lines re-established. The loss in these two brigades was light.

BATTLE OF MAY 12.

Orders from Lieutenant-General Ewell directed that I should use my division as
a support to either Johnson's or Rodes' division, or to both, as circumstances should
require. I had, therefore, placed my largest brigade (Gordon's, now Evans') in rear of
Rodes' right and Johnson's left, and directly in front of the McCool house. The other two
brigades were held in reserve near the Harris house. During the night of the 11th I
received information from Major-General Johnson that the enemy was massing in his front,
and under the general instructions I had received from corps headquarters I sent another
brigade (Pegram's) to report to him. At the earliest dawn I heard musketry in the
direction of the Salient, held by Jones' brigade, of Johnson's division, and at once
ordered my other brigade (Johnston's) to move toward the firing. The situation at this
time was as follows: Evans' brigade was in position immediately in rear of the left of
Johnson's division and Rodes' right. Pegram's brigade was placed by General Johnson in the
trenches near his left and to the left of the Salient, and Johnston's brigade was moving
from the Harris house toward the Salient. The check given by Jones' brigade to the enemy's
assaulting column was so slight that no time was afforded for bringing into position the
supporting force. No information was brought to me of the success of the enemy, and in the
early dawn and dense fog I was unable to learn anything of the situation until Johnston's
brigade met in the woodland between the McCool house and the Salient with the head of the
enemy's column.
Brigadier-General Johnston was wounded, and his
brigade was soon overpowered and driven back. I at once discovered that the situation was
critical, and ordered Colonel Evans to move his brigade at a double-quick from its
position near the trenches to the McCool house, and sent a staff officer to ascertain the
position of Pegram's brigade, and, if possible, to withdraw it to the same point. This was
promptly done. The fog was so dense that I could not ascertain the progress of the enemy,
except by the sound of his musketry and the direction from which his balls came. At this
point (the McCool house) I ordered Colonel Evans to send in three of his regiments to
ascertain the enemy's position and check his advance until the other troops could be
gotten into line. The attacking column, it was ascertained, had advanced considerably to
the right of this point, and the temporary check given by these regiments afforded only
time enough for moving the remainder of Evans' and Pegram's brigades farther around to the
right. A line was soon formed near the Harris house, and these two brigades ordered to
attack. They charged with the greatest spirit, driving the enemy with heavy loss from
nearly the whole of the captured works from the left of Wilcox's division to the Salient
on General Johnson's line, and fully one-fourth of a mile beyond. Several of the lost guns
were recaptured by the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment, of Pegram's brigade, and brought back
to the branch near the McCool house. Unfortunately, the artillery officer to whom these
guns were reported failed to find them and bring them off. The enemy still held a portion
of the line to the left of the Salient, and during the night of the 12th the troops were
withdrawn to a new line in rear of the Harris house. The loss in these two brigades was
not heavy.
I regret that a report of the casualties in
these engagements has not been furnished me by the brigade commanders. Two of these
brigades are not now under my command.