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The dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in
the development in of new republic states including
Ukraine. Ukraine saw a sea of changes both political
and social in the pre and post Soviet Union period.
International migration is one major aspect that
occurred in Ukraine. The large scale migration to
other countries occurred for political and economic
reasons. Migrants to other countries from Ukraine
were repatriates, emigrants, refugees, asylum
seekers, economic (cyclical migrants), illegal
migrants and transitory migrants. Ukraine has, over
the last 20 years, become a transit country for
illegal migration to European Union countries.
Various analytical estimates have continually placed
the number of illegal migrants present on the
territory of Ukraine over the last ten years at 800
thousand to 1.6 million illegal migrants, patiently
waiting for their chance to enter an EU country.
This article is an analysis of the legal and illegal
immigrants of Ukraine in EU countries in general and
Czech Republic in particular.

The years since Ukraine’s independence following the
fundamental geopolitical changes at the end of the
1980s and beginning of the 1990s, in the country and
the world at large, have seen a radical change in
the nature of migration flows. The development of
migration was influenced, on the one hand, by
traditional migration ties formed during the Soviet
period, and on the other, developed under the new
politico-legal and economic conditions resulting
from the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
The other factors that influenced migration are
market reforms and the democratisation of society,
and primarily following the laying down and
guarantee of the constitutional right to freedom of
movement for Ukrainian citizens. Following the
period of isolation from the outside world during
the Soviet period, Ukraine engaged various
international processes, including international
migration. This was evident primarily in the change
in orientation of migration flows towards the West,
and primarily to the rest of Europe.

The main currents of international migration that
are currently subject to regulation by the Ukrainian
state are: a) repatriates – persons of Ukrainian
origin returning the territory of the Ukraine
following the collapse of the Soviet Union; b)
emigrants – the main target countries of Ukrainians
are Germany, USA, Canada and Israel; c) refugees and
asylum-seekers – an average of three thousand
refugees annually from all continents and about one
thousand one hundred asylum-seekers annually; d)
economic (cyclical) migrants; e) illegal migrants;
and f) transitory migrants from third countries (Malinovska,
2004).

Factors that lead Ukrainian Migration

The first years following Ukraine’s independence in
1991 were characterised primarily by a mass wave of
returns of many ethnic Ukrainians and migrants of
other nationalities from Russia and other former
Soviet republics. These migrants had, in the past,
left Ukraine for economic reasons, or had been
forcibly deported to eastern regions of the former
Soviet Union by the Soviet régime. The reasons for
the large number of repatriates lay not only in
their natural desire to return to their homeland,
but also, in many cases, due to the ethnic and armed
conflicts that were beginning to escalate in some
republics of the former USSR. The years 1991-92
alone saw nearly a million people enter Ukraine.
This wave of repatriates included primarily migrants
from Siberia, the Far East and Kazakhstan. There was
also a significant return of citizens of other
nationalities; for example the key repatriation of
Crimean Tatars, who had been deported from the
Ukraine on the orders of Joseph Stalin. 63,300
Crimean Tatars returned in the years 1991-92, which
represented 7% of immigrants coming to Ukraine from
all post-Soviet republics. The majority of
immigrants were, however, Ukrainians, Russians and
representatives of other titular nationalities
living on the territory of the former Soviet Union (Nevzdolja,
2005).

The chronic complications resulting from the
transition of a socialist realist society to the
institutions of a market economy and parliamentary
democracy, which Ukraine has been experiencing for
an unbroken period of nineteen years, has meant that
the country has, since about the middle of the
1990s, lost its attractiveness to repatriates and is
becoming primarily a significant source country from
the point of view of international economic
migration, and not only in the context of integrated
Europe.

Immediately prior to the collapse of the Soviet
Union, expert reports by renowned Western European
specialists evaluated the options for the
independent developments of the individual Soviet
republics based on assessment of key economic,
social and geopolitical parameters. These
assessments rated Ukraine in first place as the
country with the best prospects (Clement & Slama,
1992).

However, economic analyses of the initial
possibilities and potentialities of the Ukrainian
economy in the development of independent Ukraine
were not fulfilled. On the contrary, a steep fall in
industrial production was recorded in the brief
period following Ukraine’s independence. For
example, production in the industrial sector dropped
by 21% in the first nine months of 1993 in
comparison with 1992. In the same period, prices
rose by 1605% and the amount of money in circulation
rose by 1152%. Monthly inflation exceeded 100% in
1994. The average living standards of Ukrainians
compared to that of Russians fell by a factor of up
to five, whereas Ukraine had been amongst the most
economically developed of the Soviet republics in
the USSR.

The efforts of the native population to secure
itself against the escalation of socio-economic
uncertainty in the country, but also to have a share
in the advantages if the nascent market economy, are
shown in the gradual, quantitative growth in
Ukrainian migration abroad in search of work.
Ukraine is currently the world’s eighth-largest
‘exporter’ (behind Mexico, Pakistan, China, India,
Iran, Indonesia and the Philippines) of economic
migrants to the global employment market. The causes
of the migration of Ukrainians abroad in search of
work are of an almost exclusively economic nature.
Whereas, up until the mid-1990s, Ukrainians
travelled abroad to earn money because production
was slowing down, wages weren’t paid on time and
unemployment was on the rise, from the end of the
century the causes of migration are becoming poverty
(hyperinflation, the devaluation of bank deposits
and the de-regulation of prices exhausted the money
accumulated by people in the Soviet era) and, above
all, low average wages (although people have work,
low average wages are not sufficient to cover basic
needs) (Lupták, 2008).

Various estimates have placed the number of
Ukrainian economic migrants from 3 to 7-9 million
(i.e. possibly up to ¾ of the entire economically
active population of Ukraine). Despite the
variations, these estimates show that economic
migration has become a common phenomenon and
widespread means of ensuring income for many
Ukrainians (Stola, 2007). Expert estimates also
state that out of the total number of Ukrainians
working abroad, only 1% of all guest workers (Pozn’jak,
2002) utilised the services of Ukrainian state
employment agencies to find their employment; other
Ukrainians abroad found work themselves or with the
aid of relatives and friends.

The permanent readiness of Ukrainians to move abroad
for work should be viewed in relation to their
national mentality as a nation of agricultural
workers, who could live off the fruits of their
intense work and never have to resort to civil war
or external, armed expansion to resolve any internal
problems, instead seeking the happiness denied at
home in the search for work abroad, while never
relying on help from the state (towards which
institution is shown continual mistrust), but only
on their strengths and inventiveness. Such has been
the case on a steady basis since the middle of the
19th century (see Kovtun, 2001, pp.
7-9).

In view of the overall number of Ukrainians that are
forced to regularly travel abroad for work, the
current global economic crisis is having a crucial
effect on the interests of this group of workers,
who are the most exposed to the threat of losing
their employment (workers native to the host country
are traditionally the most-protected in all world
economies), as well as on the interests of the
Ukrainian state, as the country is not currently not
capable of rapidly absorbing the millions of its own
citizens returning from abroad. Naturally, not only
the awareness of the bitter reality that the modern
Ukrainian state is not able to offer those of its
citizens travelling abroad for work adequate
opportunities at home, but also the fact that an
absolute majority of foreign migrants has already
invested considerable sums in the option of
travelling for work (for example, many migrants have
been forced to sell their property or become
indebted) forces these Ukrainian migrants to stay
abroad at any price, regardless of the effects of
the world economic crisis.

Trends of Ukrainian migration

There is, on the Ukrainian employment market,
currently an evident lack of workers of all profiles
with specialist qualifications in practically every
sector of the economy. This is particularly acute in
the blue-collar and engineering professions:
according to figures of Ukraine’s state employment
agency, up to 57% of vacant positions at the
beginning of 2008 were for blue-collar jobs, however
only 29% of applicants for these positions were
willing to accept them. On the other hand, 61.4% of
applicants for vacancies did not want to accept the
conditions offered and preferred to travel abroad
for work (Ilyash, 1998). Ukrainian workers would
rather travel to Italy, Spain, Germany, Portugal,
the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia etc., to find
work, as the pay for unqualified work in these
countries is up to two to three times higher than
for qualified work in Ukraine. Ukrainian industry
still has the option of mobilising resources in the
Ukrainian countryside. The modern inhabitants of
rural areas, however, do not want to work in large
industrial complexes, as for them the option of
travelling abroad to find work is more attractive;
there they can earn good money without having to
master a demanding, qualified industrial profession.

The low number of qualified workers in the Ukrainian
countryside means a potential 5-6 million migrants
ready to travel abroad for work. The lack of
interest in industrial professions is a result of
the fact that massive damage was caused to the
Ukrainian national economy during the economic
depression of the 1990s. The Ukrainian economy
(which effectively went through a process of
deindustrialisation, or simply the liquidation of
its industry) was at this time marked by the
regressive processes of ‘macrosocial involution’,
away from a society with a macrosocial work
structure typical for a mature industrial society to
a society with a work structure typical for an
agrarian-industrial society. Two thirds of jobs in
construction and industry were lost, as a result of
which the economically active part of the Ukrainian
population has lost the habits of industrial work
(See Chumelko, 2003).

Issues of Ukrainian migration in Czech Republic

The trends described, which are shown in a certain
disinterest in more sophisticated industrial
professions in the Ukrainian economy, should however
be assessed also from the point of view of the
interests and needs of the Czech Republic. Prior to
the start of the current economic crisis, the Czech
economy was short of an estimated minimum of 300
thousand qualified blue-collar workers and
tradesmen; shortages of tradesmen are, however, hot
only a problem in the Czech Republic, but are
admitted to by almost all countries in Europe (Soumrak

řemesel
v Česku,
2008).

One of the possible optimistic scenarios assumes
that, following the conclusion of the current
economic crisis, a new era of reindustrialisation of
the European economy shall begin, which can no
longer be supported, as is being shown, by banking
services, but by sectors that will re-evaluate
traditional skilled tradesmanship, and for this
reason the targeted education of qualified
blue-collar workers and tradesmen, which will, due
to current unfavourable demographic trends, have to
include foreign migrant workers, could become a
relative advantage for the Czech economy.

Obviously, although immigrants cannot save the
economy, they can significantly alleviate the
negative effects of an aging population and low
birth-rate on the domestic economy. The Bezd

ěk
commission calculated that, from a long-term
perspective, the situation could not be alleviated
even by an intake of a million foreign workers in
ten years; these would also age and the families
they brought with them would also burden the state
budget. A family-oriented policy must therefore be
key. Unless we ensure that we do not die out, there
is no solution for the pension’s crisis (Pravec &
Hruška, 2007).

For this reason it is important that Czech state
institutions deciding questions of the regulation of
international migration processes devoted greater
attention than has thus far been the case to the
qualification level of migrants arriving in the
Czech Republic (it would, for example, be worth
considering the option of introducing relevant
statistics). It should be noted that a struggle for
migrants has started in Europe (and in Russia),
because other European countries and the Russian
Federation are also encountering the same
unfavourable demographic trends. A lack of migrants
on the domestic employment market could also become
a security risk for the relevant country. The
significance and of the current fourth wave of
work-related migration Europe and the Russian
Federation is primarily based on its cultural
compatibility with European values.

Incidentally, Ukraine itself realises its
strategically important emigrational potential for
the development of European economies, as well as
its own (note that so-called migration dollars –
every migrant regularly sends home sums of around
200 USD – represent the longest-term foreign
investment into the Ukrainian economy), and for this
reason is beginning to address issues of pensions
and pension payments for those of its citizens who
have worked abroad, and this in relation to the
governments of EU countries

An absolute majority of Ukrainian work migrants come
to the Czech Republic for the purpose of long-term
residency. This usually follows the following
pattern: 6-9 months of work in the Czech Republic
then return to Ukraine for around 3 months, after
which these cyclical migrants generally repeat the
pattern. According to sociological field studies,
many of those who come to the Czech Republic are
young people under the age of 28, while older
Ukrainians prefer the Russian Federation as their
destination for migration. Their level of education
is relatively low in comparison with migrants going
e.g. to Poland and Russia. In the Czech Republic, as
in other target countries, the largest proportion of
Ukrainians works in construction. At the same time a
larger proportion of migrants work in industry
compared to other countries. Almost half of the
total number of Ukrainians work in restaurants and
around 1/3 of Ukrainian women work in the industrial
sector, primarily in the food industry and light
industry.

A fundamental problem for the contingents of
Ukrainian migrant workers in the Czech Republic is
the large amount of illegal migrants amongst them.
In the opinion of experts, it is Ukraine that is by
far the most important source country for illegal
migrant workers to the Czech Republic. This
corresponds with Ukraine being, at the same time,
being the most dominant country by numbers of legal
migrant workers – towards the end of 2006, one of
the peaks of the recent economic boom period in the
Czech Republic, Ukrainians made up 32% of foreigners
(102,594 people), representing, by some margin, the
most numerous group of foreign migrants on the
territory of the Czech Republic. Ukrainians also
represent 68% (4,853 persons for 2006) of foreigners
detained by the Police Force of the Czech Republic
over breaches of the rules of residency in the
country.

Estimates of the number of illegal immigrants in the
Czech Republic vary widely, from 17 thousand to 300
thousand. This is a very complicated issue,
dependent on many factors. In also depends inter
alia on how we define an illegal migrant, or the
nature of their illegality, in the first place. One
of the most realistic variants considers that within
the Czech republic there could be the same number of
illegal as legal migrants on the Czech employment
market – e.g. the position taken by the Czech
Minister for Labour and Social Affairs, P. Ne

čas
(see ministra, 2007; Drbohlav, 2008).

Due to the effects of the current economic crisis,
the employment rate in the Czech Republic continues
to drop and vacancies for guest workers are
disappearing. According to the most recent studies
of the Czech Chamber of Commerce, currently four
percent of businesses are filling vacancies by
employing foreigners; two and a half years ago, this
figure was fifteen percent. Despite this, foreigners
are not leaving the Czech Republic. There has been a
significant reduction in those actually employed in
companies, the automotive industry or elsewhere.
Instead, in order to avoid leaving or expulsion to
their countries of origin, they are getting trade
licenses, subsequently receiving, in place of their
original work visa, an entrepreneurial visa. This is
a repeat of the situation of the mid-1990s. The
then-valid Act no. 132/1992 Coll., on the residence
of aliens on the territory of the Czech and Slovak
Federative Republic allowed foreigners to gain a
long-term residence permit in the country by this
route (and not via a diplomatic representation of
the Czech Republic abroad), stimulating a massive
shift in the status of foreigners from employees to
independent traders. These were actually
‘quasi-independent traders’, who apart from their
own labour did not possess any equipment to carry
out their trade and when fulfilling contractual
tasks used equipment owned, as a rule, by the Czech
company for which they worked. The neoliberal
economic course to be promoted by the current
centre-right government in the Czech Republic
following the 2010 parliamentary elections will
certainly enhance the requirements for flexibility
of labour, opening up new possibilities for migrant
workers (legal as well as illegal), even though this
will be accompanied by continuing efforts by the
Czech government to introduce stricter and more
effective controls on illegal immigrant work.

Ukraine: a transit country for illegal immigration

Due to its historical development, modern Ukraine is
composed of three basic regions, which developed,
relatively independently of each other, over a long
period of time and therefore have distinct
geopolitical characteristics. These three regions
can be designated western, central and eastern. The
western regions bring Ukraine close to the countries
of Central Europe and the Balkans, the central
regions are land-locked and not in direct contact
with any foreign borders. The eastern regions bring
Ukraine close to the Russian Federation and the vast
spaces of Asia and the Islamic world (Duleba, 2000).
Aside from this, modern Ukraine has, due to the
eastwards expansion of the European Union, shared
state borders with some of the new member states. Of
the seven states directly bordering Ukraine, four
are new member states of the EU (Poland, Slovakia,
Hungary and Romania) whose entry into the EU means
that the European Union is in direct contact with
Ukraine’s western and southern borders. Following
Romania’s entry into the EU, as much as 24% (a total
1,415 km) of the state borders of Ukraine are in
contact with borders of European Union countries. In
the event that Turkey, too, joins the EU, then
Ukraine and the European Union will be joined by a
large area of the Black Sea.

Table 1. Ukrainian state borders

State Border

Length of State Border

Land

4 247.86 km

River

1 414.73 km

Maritime (total), of which:

1 351.6 km

Black Sea

1 053.1 km

Sea of Azov

249.6 km

Kerch Strait

49 km

with Poland

542.396 km

with Slovakia

98.5 km

with Hungary

135.1 km

with Romania

638.4 km

with Moldova

1 222 km

with Belarus

1 084.2 km

with Russia

2 292.2 km

The peculiar geographical situation of Ukraine has
predetermined the country to become a highly
important transit country from the point of view of
global migration processes. A series of problems
primarily associated with illegal migration,
‘originate’ here, which subsequently influences e.g.
the criminogenic situation in the Czech Republic and
other EU countries. The European Union has seen a
dramatic increase in illegal migration in recent
years. According to various sources, at least 500
thousand migrants are able to gain access to Europe
(apart from the former Soviet states), of whom
around 300 thousand enter the black or grey economy.
The protection of its external borders and the fight
against illegal migration is therefore becoming an
important part of the theoretical and practical
agenda of the EU. Many legislative and institutional
measures have been taken towards this end, e.g.
setting-up of the Frontex agency, with new member
countries required to accept the so-called Schengen
acquis and connection to the Schengen
Information System.

Many legislative measures have been undertaken while
constituting a unified immigration framework.
Regardless of this, the highly heterogenic nature of
the issue, frequently conflicting and unclear
opinions, numerous specific national reasons,
differently-applied policies, relatively large
powers of individual states and other factors
conspire to slow down the whole process. The
European Union still has, in this regard, a lot of
reserves.

Ukraine has, over the last 20 years, become a
transit country for illegal migration to European
Union countries. Various analytical estimates have
continually placed the number of illegal migrants
present on the territory of Ukraine over the last
ten years at 800 thousand to 1.6 million illegal
migrants, patiently waiting for their chance to
enter an EU country. According to the assessment of
the International Organization for Migration (IOM),
these absolute numbers of illegal migrants in
Ukraine exceeds by 25-fold the European average of
immigrant foreigners in a host country per 1
inhabitant of the host country. It should also be
noted that the absolute number of illegal transitory
migrants puts Ukraine, according to UN statistics,
in 4th place in the world.[2]
As a massive reservoir of transitory illegal
migrants, Ukraine presents a much greater security
risk to the EU than as a source country from the
point of view of international population movement,
even though both processes are closely linked.

Illegal transitory migration via the territory of
Ukraine towards EU countries represents an
internally heterogeneous social phenomenon. The
structure of illegal migrants has seen significant
changes in recent years. The primary change has been
the increased dominance of illegal migrants from the
countries of the former Soviet Union (with the
natural exception of the Baltic republics). At the
same time there has been a decrease in the
proportion of transitory illegal migrants from
Southeast Asia. For example, in 2005, CIS citizens
represented 50% of foreigners detained while
attempting to illegally cross Ukrainian borders; by
2006 this had risen to 53.2%, and in 2007 this
figure was 56.2%. These were primarily citizens of
Moldova, Georgia and Russia. The dominance of CIS
citizens amongst illegal transitory migrants in
Ukraine is testified to not only by the statistics
of the Ukrainian State Border Service, but also by
data of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Of the illegal migrants discovered on Ukrainian
territory in the years 2001-07, 17.6% were citizens
of the Russian Federation, 13% of Azerbaijan, 10.2%
of Moldova, 7.2% of Armenia, 6.5% of Georgia and
5.7% of Uzbekistan (see Appendix no.2).

The increasing use of Ukraine by citizens of CIS
countries as a launch-pad for attempts to reach EU
countries can be explained by the fact that, for
citizens of the former Soviet Union, in contrast to
those of distant African or Asian countries, and
even following the major, undeniable tightening-up
of Ukraine’s western borders in recent years, the
route to the West via Ukraine is the shortest, most
comfortable and the cheapest.

CIS citizens take advantage of their right to
visa-free entry to and 90 days’ residence in
Ukraine. Apart from this, it is easier for the
organisers of illegal border crossings, who are
recruited from the structures of organised crime, if
illegal migrants are citizens of the CIS, speak
Russian, know local customs, can blend in with the
local population and do not need to be constantly
accompanied and have their transport and
accommodation in Ukraine organised for them. It is
enough for prospective illegal transitory migrants
to get a contact phone number while still in their
home country, subsequently utilising it when they
near the western state borders of Ukraine, then
linking up with their intermediaries, who ‘help’
them to illegal cross state borders.

Most of those passing through the territory of
Ukraine as illegal transitory migrants are men (up
to 75%), with a significant proportion having a high
educational status (many can speak English), belong
to the category of the materially secure, allowing
them to pay for the services of intermediaries. An
absolute majority of transitory illegal migrants are
economic migrants in search of better living
conditions in Western Europe. Certain, but
statistically rather insignificant, proportion of
illegal migrants represent refugees trying to flee
violent conflict. A characteristic of refugees is
the migration of entire families (Kiev, 2006).
Obviously, illegal transitory migrants also include
representatives of the poorest layers of society,
who have to pay for the services of interpreters
from the ranks of organised crime e.g. through the
sale of their bodily organs or a promise that they
will pay for their emigration to the West from their
future earnings in their target country (it is, in
the end, the massive revenues to be gained from
illegal human smuggling allow criminal organisations
to give their ‘generous’ consent to delayed payment
for their services).

Although the mechanism and tactics of human
smuggling, as well as technology used, have
inevitably been perfected over time, the basic
‘templates’ used by the structures of organised
crime in Ukraine function in the illegal smuggling
of illegal transitory migrants have not changed.
According to the testimony of Ukrainian border
agents and illegal migrants themselves, transit and
the illegal crossing of Ukraine’s eastern state
borders is carried out on the basis of prior
agreements, closed already in the migrants’ country
of origin prior to their journey abroad. Migrants
therefore know in advance where they will travel and
where they will work and live. Necessary information
is gained via various channels in their home country
– various media, agencies arranging work abroad, at
the marketplace, in cafés, from formal and informal
migration social networks (the very existence of the
social capital accumulated e.g. in the activities
of ‘old’ and ‘new’ ethnic diasporas in the host
country is one of the decisive prerequisites for the
functioning of migration flows – these, as a rule,
gain in intensity in relation to the fluctuations of
cyclical, structural and systemic crises of the
market economy, but cannot be entirely stopped in
democratic and open societies) (Kuzmenko,2008).

The overwhelming majority of illegal migrants start
their ‘odyssey’ with a direct flight to Moscow (this
route to Russian territory was taken by more than
50% of illegal immigrants later detained from the
countries of Southeast Asia and Africa) from their
home country. This was undertaken on an entirely
legal basis, as tourists, students, on business, or
based on personal invitation. These people then form
ethnically homogenous groups of illegal migrants
with their compatriots. These groups are
subsequently transported to Ukraine via the
Russo-Ukrainian or Belarusso-Ukrainian border using
automotive transport, where the low and inadequate
security of these borders facilitates the avoidance
of border controls, or the borders are crossed on
the basis of forged documents, or illegal migrants
are transported in covered vehicles.

Illegal migrants remain in Ukraine for a minimum 1-2
days, a result of more frequent random checks by
bodies of the Ukrainian Ministry for Internal
Affairs. Once they have crossed the eastern or
north-eastern state borders of Ukraine, illegal
migrants concentrate themselves in Kiev and the
surrounding region, or Kharkov. Those utilising
sea-based transit gravitate towards the Black Sea
port of Odessa. Migrants then regroup in these
locations and immediately travel towards Ukraine’s
western borders (in other words, to the western
regions of the country).

The migration situation in the geostrategically
sensitive Black sea region (Odessa, Mykolaiv and
Kharkiv Oblasts) is described in detail in Khmich,
(2009). Official statistics of the Ukrainian
Ministry for Internal Affairs offer an idyllic
picture – around 7,000 illegal migrants were
arrested and investigated in 2007 in the Odessa
Oblast, while Ukrainian experts estimated in their
interviews that, there were a minimum 200 thousand.
Chinese illegal migrants alone in this region, part
of whom were awaiting an illegal border crossing,
and part of whom were e.g. trying to integrate into
the local black and grey economies, a highly
developed sector already since the Communist
period.

A further change in the strategy of illegal migrants
is related to the fact that the legal channels of
entry into Ukraine, for the purposes of business,
study, on the basis of personal invitation, etc.,
are currently not utilised as frequently as was the
case e.g. ten years ago. This has been due to
reorganisation of the employment system and the
acceptance system for study of foreign citizens,
tighter controls on the activities of
higher-education institutions and the issuing by
bodies of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of
various invitations authorising visits to Ukraine.
Improved controls at Ukrainian state borders have
led in recent years to a decrease in attempts to
illegally cross border and customs points, but an
increase in attempted crossings via the so-called
green border. In recent years the ‘soloist’ category
of violators of state borders – those prepared to
illegally cross Ukrainian state borders on their own
– has practically disappeared, while the proportion
of organised crime groups and criminal structures
engaged in the transport of illegal migrants has
increased. The organisers of illegal migrant
transports cooperate closely with citizens of third
countries whose compatriots are attempting to
illegally cross Ukrainian state borders. These form
the ‘liaisons’ between criminal groups and groups of
illegal transitory migrants, and are mostly present
as long-term residents on the territory of Ukraine
for business purposes.

Insofar as one can speak of tighter regulations in
illegal migration in Ukraine, this occurred under
pressure applied by EU institutions, with whom
Ukraine has been trying to create closer ties
especially since 2004 (this is one of the positive
effects of the Europeanising mission of the
so-called Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004-05).
It should also be emphasised that economic exports
and cooperation connect Ukraine primarily to EU
countries. A review of the activities of Ukraine
state bodies in the sphere of illegal migration,
however, still shows massive shortcomings. No
progress has thus far been made in stopping the
abuse, for illegal migration, of e.g. acceptance
documents for study at state and private
higher-learning institutions in Ukraine. For
example, in 2008, 37 out of 88 foreign students
accepted for study at the University of Food
Technologies in Kiev disappeared without a trace.
There are thousands such examples every year in
Ukraine. Further example: in 2007, foreign citizens
in the capital city committed 9,867 administrative
offences, and although there were grounds for
deportation in all cases, in reality only 2,292
foreigners were expelled, as stated by the chief
prosecutor in Kiev: /Prokuror Kieva zajavil, chto
inostrantsy ispo

ľzuyut,
vizy“ stolitsy dlya migratsiyi v Zapadnuyu Yevropu.

What is paradoxical is also the fact that, out of
the total of more than 1 million Illegal migrants in
Ukraine, who periodically attempt to illegally reach
Western Europe, the bodies of the Chief Inspectorate
of Roads, which falls under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry for Internal Affairs, has in its numerous
checks so far (at least in the last three years) not
succeeded in arresting a single transitory illegal
migrant on their way to Ukraine

The guides who take charge of illegal border
crossings are recruited from the ranks of the local
Ukrainian populace, well-acquainted with the border
region and also have a network of contacts and
connections amongst their friends and relatives, who
work as border guards or as patrolmen on the
Ukrainian side of the border but also on the
Schengen side of state borders; sometimes they are
former, and sometimes active members of the border
service. In recent years, minors have been used with
increasing frequency as guides across the border, as
these are not held criminally responsible before a
certain age.

The criminal background of illegal transitory
migration can be seen, for example, in Ukraine’s
Subcarpathian Oblast. This region was noted in the
Soviet era for its developed agricultural and
industrial infrastructure. The economic collapse of
this region too caused massive unemployment of the
local populace. One of the few means of earning a
living (apart from the widespread practice of
travelling abroad for work) is for teachers,
machine-workers, academic employees, doctors,
woodworkers and members of many other professions to
‘re-qualify’ and become smugglers of illegal
migrants across the Ukrainian state border. The
length of the Ukrainian state border in Subcarpathia
is 467.3 km, containing 23 border crossings and
customs points: 9 crossings have international
status, 6 have frontier status and 8 are intended
primarily for local traffic. The largest of these
are the automobile crossings ‘Tisza’, ‘Luzhanka’ and
‘Vilok’ on the border with Hungary; ‘Uzhhorod’ and
‘Malyj Bereznyj’ on the border with Slovakia and
‘Dyakovo’ on the border with Romania. The guarding
of this much-frequented section of the Ukrainian
state border falls under the jurisdiction of the
Mukachevo and Chop border sections of the Western
Regional Authority for the Protection of the State
Borders of Ukraine, whose employees are spread
across the entire length of this border.

It is through this section of Ukrainian state
borders that the shortest route runs for legal and
illegal migrants from the eastern part of the
Eurasian landmass (and also, albeit to a lesser
extent, from Africa) towards Portugal, Spain, Italy,
France, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Slovenia,
Hungary, Croatia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

According to data of the Ukrainian State Border
Agency, since Ukraine’s independence the necessary
infrastructure has been created over the ca. four
thousand kilometres of state border, meaning an
average of one guard for every 25km of border,
which, according to Ukrainian experts, conforms to
European standards. Apart from this, significant
assistance is provided by the EU in protecting
Ukraine’s western borders – which, for example,
provided three large thermo vision facilities in
2008, which on their own facilitate the capture of
up to 40% of illegal border crossings and smuggling
of contraband goods. The large amount of equipment
required to protect state borders is also shown in
EU countries, for example Slovakia. The joint
Slovak-Ukrainian border has five border crossings.
The protection of this border is overseen by 886
Slovak border guards and ten observation towers. An
almost hundred-kilometre-long zone of the
Slovak-Ukrainian border is naturally divided into
sections. The flat south is monitored by a chain of
cameras. Responsibility that no one penetrating the
wilderness in the north lies with the border
patrols. These are aided by helicopters, scooters,
tricars, special caterpillar vehicles and,
obviously, dogs. Prior to their entry to the
Schengen zone, the Slovaks promised to ensure the
impenetrability of the Slovak-Ukrainian border for
illegal migrants (Palaš

čaková,
2009).

Table 3. Statistics for number of illegal transitory
migrants held – according to individual section of
state borders of the Ukraine

a)
The Vietnamese route is characterised by attempts to
illegally cross borders on the basis of forged
documents, which are prepared by Vietnamese citizens
living in Moscow. This route draws on the social
capital of the Vietnamese Diaspora, created by
Vietnamese migrant workers during the Soviet period;

b)
The Pakistan-India route is utilised by citizens of
India and Pakistan arriving in the Russian
Federation or Ukraine on the basis of tourist visas
gained by migrants in Delhi. Further travel to the
West proceeds illegally;

c)
The Sri-Lanka/Bangladesh route – users of this route
try to illegally cross the ‘green border’ with the
aid of guides from Ukraine, Poland, Hungary and
Romania;

d)
The Afghan route is used primarily by Afghan
refugees, who either already have this status or
have applied for it on the territory of Russia,
Ukraine, or Central Asia. The constitution of
relevant groups, their provision with necessary
documentation and transport of groups of illegal
migrants towards the western borders of Ukraine are
arranged by compatriots, legally resident in Kiev,
Moscow and other cities;

e)
Chinese route – groups using this route are
‘recruited’ from the citizens of Malaysia and
Vietnam. As a rule, citizens of China travel to
Moscow on the basis of tourist visas. According to
information of bodies of the Ukrainian Ministry for
Internal Affairs, the transit and coordination of
activities is carried out from a special dispatching
centre located in Prague (Malinovskaya, 2007);

f)
The Kurdish route is used by ethnic Kurdish citizens
of Iraq, Iran and Turkey, who travel to Ukraine on
the basis of forged documents;

g)
The Uzbek-Tajik route is used particularly by those
who have previously legally migrated to Russia and
later wish to travel on to Western Europe. This
route is used partly by those who have decided to
emigrate for political or religious reasons;

h)
The Chechen route has been active since 2002. It is
used by ethnic Chechen citizens of the Russian
Federation trying to gain asylum.

i)
Citizens of other successor states to the former
Soviet Union, if they reach the territory of
Ukraine, mostly use the Uzbek-Tajik route.

In the first decade of Ukraine’s independence,
practically all illegal migrants were detained while
attempting to illegally cross the western section of
Ukraine state borders. With the gradual building of
the necessary infrastructure for the protection of
state borders, the numbers of illegal migrants
detained started to rise, not only in the western,
but also in other sections of state borders. In
1999, the number of arrests of illegal migrants
attempting to illegally cross the eastern and
north-eastern state border reached a proportion of
10% of the total number of arrests; by 2000 this had
reached 30% and in 2002 almost 50% (Litvyn, 2003).
Similarly, after 2003 the number of illegal migrants
arrested on the eastern border again gradually
declined, with only 11.3% of the total number of
illegal transitory migrants arrested in 207 being
arrested on the eastern border. The reduction in the
number of illegal migrants arrested cannot be put
down to a deterioration in the quality of border
controls, as this decrease in arrests occurred ‘in
parallel’ to an increase in the numbers of citizens
of CIS countries in illegal transit flows. As
already described, citizens of CIS countries, enter
Ukraine on the basis of their visa-free status (in
other words, there is no need to cross the eastern
border of Ukraine illegally).

Ukraine inherited its joint border with its four
European neighbours from Soviet times. These are the
so-called old state borders of Ukraine, which have
been, from the point of view of their delimitation
and demarcation, problem-free. Ukraine does have,
however, more problems with the so-called new state
border with countries of the Commonwealth of
Independent States, as these borders were once the
administrative borders of the Soviet republics. The
‘new’ borders with the Russian Federation are key to
Ukraine from a geopolitical perspective. The
practical resolution of issues arising from the
definition of this eastern border did not begin
until 1998. Competent specialist commissions were
created at the level of the Ministries for Foreign
Affairs of Ukraine and the Russian Federation,
devoted to the issues surrounding the delimitation
of state borders. The work of these expert
commissions lasted four years and culminated in the
signature of relevant bilateral agreements. However,
there has thus far been no progress in the building
of standard state border, with the necessary
facilities and infrastructure, between Ukraine and
Russia. The individual sections of this border are
poorly policed and frequently controlled by
organised crime groups, which smuggle goods in both
directions (Pritkin, 2005, p. 8). The easy
accessibility of the Ukraine-Russian border brings
with it negative consequences for Ukraine. In 2008,
Ukraine passed a law on readmission, whereby it
undertook to accept on its territory illegal
migrants who have been deported from European Union
countries. The absence of standard Russo-Ukrainian
borders frustrates the option to subsequently deport
illegal migrants from Ukraine back to the Russian
federation, as it is easy for these illegal migrants
to return to Ukraine and repeat their attempt to
illegally cross Ukrainian state border to Western
Europe (Moska

ľ,
2009, p. 4).

The greatest proportion of illegal transitory
migrants was detained on the Slovak-Ukrainian
border. This section is extraordinarily amongst
smugglers of illegal migrants due to its natural
properties – as the area is covered by thick
forests, illegal guides and their groups can use the
simple excuse that they lost their way in the forest
and also because the penalties for violating the
border are lower on the Slovakian side than e.g. in
Romania. Apart from this, there were at the same
time in Slovakia more lenient conditions for the
submission of an application for asylum, meaning the
at least temporary avoidance of enforced deportation
from the country. In 2007, on the eve of the
country’s entry into the Schengen zone, the
penalties for the organisation of illegal migration
were increased, with a resultant reduction in the
activities of smugglers on the Slovak-Ukrainian
border.

There is no doubt that a link exists between illegal
migration processes, organised crime and corruption.
Illegal migration could probably not exist without
this link, and it is quite certain that it would not
constitute a serious social problem. Illegal
migration is currently supported by organised crime
and corruption, but is also a product of it. Border
officials and guards are direct participants or
accomplices in the smuggling of illegal transitory
migrants. This is, in many cases, linked not to an
attempt to earn some quick money, but to the
extremely low pay offered, which does not give
border officials and guard an adequate quality of
life.

A rank-and-file Ukrainian border guard earned in
2008 around 200 EURO per month, with a warrant
officer earning 300 EUR and an officer around 400
EURO, with living costs being comparable to those in
the Czech Republic. Due to low incomes on the
western border of Ukraine, only 73% of the minimum
required number of border guards to patrol the
border is actually serving. The journey from Asia to
Europe costs an illegal migrant an average of 15
thousand USD, with 20% of this amount remaining in
the hands of organised crime groups in Ukraine.
These groups make a profit of around 125 million USD
per year from illegal migration. Border guards on
the Ukrainian side arrest annually 40-50% of illegal
migrants attempting to cross state borders. Their
colleagues in neighbouring countries have a much
higher percentage rate of success.

A minimum thousand people are led over some sections
of the western borders of Ukraine every month. The
profit for this per migrant is 1.5-2 thousand USD.
Profits can reach 2 million USD in a month, being
subsequently apportioned amongst the organisers of
illegal human smuggling. It is for this reason that
Ukrainian border guards take a material interest,
being able to buy an Audi 8 car (priced at 80
thousand dollars on the Ukrainian market) after 2
months of service.

The only migrant who are arrested while attempting
to cross the border are those who haven’t paid for
their passage and do not have the necessary
protection from the ministries; according to some
circumstantial evidence, human smuggling and illegal
migration processes are managed directly from Kiev,
specifically from the Ministry for Internal Affairs
and the Ukrainian Security Services.

European Union bodies often voice criticism of the
situation on the Slovak-Ukrainian border, which is
the source of the greatest problems on Ukraine’s
western frontier. The Ukrainian expert, G. Moska

ľ
(2007), made the following comments on this
situation: “Corruption on our side of the border
is constant and ubiquitous and I have a suspicion
that it has started to penetrate also to the Slovak
side of the border”.

Apart from this, the ranks of illegal migrants
themselves and the organisers of their illegal
border crossing very frequently include persons who
have, in the past, come into conflict with the law.
For example, in 2004, 67 prosecutions were initiated
in Ukraine against organisers of illegal migration;
in 2005, this number had risen to 148, in 2006 to
211 and in 2007 to 253. A total of 283 persons were
convicted over four years. One further interesting
finding is the lack of a direct link between the
illegal smuggling of humans and the smuggling of
narcotics[3]
- these are entirely separate lines of business, at
least in the world of organised crime in Ukraine.

[2]Nelegaľnaya immigratsiya na yuge Ukraïny:
sostoyanie, potentsiaľniye ugrozy i posledstviya
(pod redaktsiyey L. Khomicha),
http://www.niss.gov.ua/monitor/januar 2009/9.htm.
The methodology of estimating the number of
illegal migrants in Ukraine has caused much
discussion and there is no consensus between
experts. These facts are addressed e.g. by the
prominent Ukrainian expert, O.E. Malinovskaya.
Opinion also differs on the number of illegal
transitory immigrants successful in ‘breaking
through’ from Ukraine to the EU – estimates
range from 62.5 thousands to 125 thousands
‘illegals’ getting to the EU ‘at any price’
every year (Shevchak, 2008).