Description:Synthese spans the topics of Epistemology, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Coverage includes the theory of knowledge; general methodological problems of science, of induction and probability, of causation and the role of mathematics, statistics and logic in science; and the methodological and foundational problems of different sciences. The journal explores symbolic logic and foundations of mathematics relevant to the philosophy and methodology of science; and those facets of the ethics, history and sociology of science which are important for contemporary topical pursuits. The journal focuses on the role of mathematical, logical and linguistic methods in the general methodology of science and the foundations of different sciences.

The journal includes a section on Knowledge, Rationality and Action as a
platform for researchers. The scope of Knowledge, Rationality and Action is
interdisciplinary: it will be of interest to researchers in the fields of
artificial intelligence, agents, computer science, knowledge representation,
game theory, economics, logic, philosophy, mathematics, cognitive science,
cryptography, and auction theory, as well as to application specialists using
formal and mathematical methods and tools.

The "moving wall" represents the time period between the last issue
available in JSTOR and the most recently published issue of a journal.
Moving walls are generally represented in years. In rare instances, a
publisher has elected to have a "zero" moving wall, so their current
issues are available in JSTOR shortly after publication.
Note: In calculating the moving wall, the current year is not counted.
For example, if the current year is 2008 and a journal has a 5 year
moving wall, articles from the year 2002 are available.

Terms Related to the Moving Wall

Fixed walls: Journals with no new volumes being added to the archive.

Absorbed: Journals that are combined with another title.

Complete: Journals that are no longer published or that have been
combined with another title.

Abstract

Since 1976 Hilary Putnam has drawn parallels between his 'internal', 'pragmatic', 'natural' or 'common-sense' realism and Kant's transcendental idealism. Putnam reads Kant as rejecting the then current metaphysical picture with its in-built assumptions of a unique, mind-independent world, and truth understood as correspondence between the mind and that ready-made world. Putnam reads Kant as overcoming the false dichotomies inherent in that picture and even finds some glimmerings of conceptual relativity in Kant's proposed solution. Furthermore, Putnam reads Kant as overcoming the pernicious scientific realist distinction between primary and secondary qualities, between things that really exist and their projections, a distinction that haunts modern philosophy. Putnam's revitalisation of Kant is not just of historical interest, but challenges contemporary versions of scientific realism. Furthermore, Putnam has highlighted themes which have not received the attention they deserve in Kantian exegesis, namely, the problematic role of primary and secondary qualities in Kant's empirical realism, and the extent of Kant's commitment to conceptual pluralism. However, I argue that Putnam's qualified allegiance to Kant exposes him to some of the same metaphysical problems that affected Kant, namely, the familiar problem of postulating an absolute reality (Ding an sich), while at the same time disavowing the meaningfulness of so doing. In conclusion I suggest that Putnam might consider Hegel's attempts to solve this problem in Kant as a way of furthering his own natural realism.