Book III
CHAPTER 1: What is Lawful in War.
What is lawful in war — General Rules derived from the law of nature —
Stratagems and lies — Arrangement of the following parts — First rule, all
things necessary to the end lawful — Right resulting not only from the
origin of a war, but from causes growing out of the same — Certain
consequences justifiable, though not originally lawful — What measures are
lawful against those who furnish an enemy with supplies — Stratagems —
Negative — Positive — Sometimes allowable to use words in a sense
different from the general acceptation — A lie according to the true
notion of it injurious to the rights of others — Falsehood allowable in
order to deceive children or madmen — Any one addressing another without
intentions to deceive, not answerable for the misconceptions of a third
person — A person not answerable for the willful mistakes of those to whom
he speaks — The fictitious threats of a person in authority — Fiction
allowable in order to save the lives of the innocent, or to promote other
equally important purposes — Deception lawful against an enemy, but not
including promises, or oaths — To forbear using this privilege an act of
generosity and Christian simplicity — Not allowable to urge others to what
is unlawful for them, but not for us to do — Allowable to use the services
of deserters.
I. HAVING, in the preceding books, considered by what persons, and for
what causes, war may be justly declared and undertaken, the subject
necessarily leads to an inquiry into the circumstances, under which war
may be undertaken, into the extent, to which it may be carried, and into
the manner, in which its rights may be enforced. Now all these matters may
be viewed in the light of privileges resulting simply from the law of
nature and of nations, or as the effects of some prior treaty or promise.
But the actions, which are authorised by the law of nature, are those that
are first entitled to attention.
II In the first place, as it has occasionally been observed, the means
employed in the pursuit of any object must, in a great degree, derive the
complexion of their moral character from the nature of the end to which
they lead. It is evident therefore that we may justly avail ourselves of
those means, provided they be lawful, which are necessary to the
attainment of any right. RIGHT in this place means what is strictly so
called, signifying the moral power of action, which any one as a member of
society possesses. On which account, a person, if he has no other means of
saving his life, is justified in using any forcible means of repelling an
attack, though he who makes it, as for instance, a soldier in battle, in
doing so, is guilty of no crime. For this is a right resulting not
properly from the crime of another, but from the privilege of self-
defence, which nature grants to every one. Besides, if any one has SURF
and UNDOUBTED grounds to apprehend imminent danger from any thing
belonging to another, he may seize it without any regard to the guilt or
innocence of that owner. Yet he does not by that seizure become the
proprietor of it. For that is not necessary to the end he has in view. He
may DETAIN it as a precautionary measure, till he can obtain satisfactory
assurance of security.
Upon the same principle any one has a natural right to seize what belongs
to him, and is unlawfully detained by another: or, if that is
impracticable, he may seize something of equal value, which is nearly the
same as recovering a debt. Recoveries of this kind establish a property in
the things so reclaimed; which is the only method of restoring the
equality and repairing the breaches of violated justice. So too when
punishment is lawful and just, all the means absolutely necessary to
enforce its execution are also lawful and just, and every act that forms a
part of the punishment, such as destroying an enemy's property and country
by fire or any other way, falls within the limits of justice
proportionable to the offence.
III. In the second place, it is generally known that it is not the ORIGIN
only of a just war which is to be viewed as the principal source of many
of our rights, but there may be causes growing out of that war which may
give birth to additional rights. As in proceedings at law, the sentence of
the court may give to the successful litigant other rights besides those
belonging to the original matter of dispute. So those who join our
enemies, either as allies or subjects, give us a right of defending
ourselves against THEM also. So too a nation engaging in an unjust war,
the injustice of which she knows and ought to know, becomes liable to make
good all the expences and losses incurred, because she has been guilty of
occasioning them. In the same manner those powers, who become auxiliaries
in wars undertaken without any reasonable grounds, contract a degree of
guilt and render themselves liable to punishment in proportion to the
injustice of their measures. Plato approves of war conducted so far, as to
compel the aggressor to indemnify the injured and the innocent.
IV. In the third place, an individual or belligerent power may, in the
prosecution of a lawful object, do many things, which were not in the
contemplation of the original design, and which in THEMSELVES it would not
be lawful to do. Thus in order to obtain what belongs to us, when it is
impossible to recover the specific thing, we may take more than our due,
under condition of repaying whatever is above the real value. For the same
reason it is lawful to attack a ship manned by pirates, or a house
occupied by robbers, although in that ship, or that house there may be
many innocent persons, whose lives are endangered by such attack.
But we have had frequent occasion to remark, that what is conformable to
right taken in its strictest sense is not always lawful in a moral point
of view. For there are many instances, in which the law of charity will
not allow us to insist upon our right with the utmost rigour. A reason for
which it will be necessary to guard against things, which fall not within
the original purpose of an action, and the happening of which might be
foreseen: unless indeed the action has a tendency to produce advantages,
that will far outweigh the consequences of any accidental calamity, and
the apprehensions of evil are by no means to be put in competition with
the sure hopes of a successful issue. But to determine in such cases
requires no ordinary penetration and discretion. But wherever there is any
doubt, it is. always the safer -way to decide in favour of another's
interest, than to follow the bent of our own inclination. "Suffer the
tares to grow, says our divine teacher. least in rooting up the tares you
root up the wheat also."
The general destruction, which the Almighty, in right of his supreme
Majesty, has sometimes decreed and executed, is not a rule, which we can
presume to follow. He has not invested men, in the exercise of power, with
those transcendent sovereign rights. Yet he himself,
notwithstanding the unchangeable nature of his sovereign will, was
inclined to spare the most wicked cities, if ten righteous persons could
be found therein. Examples like these may furnish us with rules to decide,
how far the rights of war against an enemy may be exercised or relaxed.
V. It frequently occurs as a matter of inquiry, how far we are authorised
to act against those, who are neither enemies, nor wish to be thought so,
but who supply our enemies with certain articles. For we know that it is a
point, which on former and recent occasions has been contested with the
greatest animosity; some wishing to enforce with all imaginary rigour the
rights of war, and others standing up for the freedom of commerce.
In the first place, a distinction must be made between the commodities
themselves. For there are some, such as arms for instance, which are only
of use in war; there are others again, which are of no use in war, but
only administer t o luxury; but there are some articles, such as money,
provisions, ships and naval stores, which are of use at all times both in
peace and war.
As to conveying articles of the first kind, it is evident that any one
must be ranked as an enemy, who supplies an enemy with the means of
prosecuting hostilities. Against the conveyance of commodities of the
second kind, no just complaint can be made.- And as to articles of the
third class, from their being of a doubtful kind, a distinction must be
made between the times of war and peace. For if a power can not defend
itself, but by intercepting the supplies sent to an enemy, necessity will
justify such a step, but upon condition of making restoration, unless
there be some additional reasons to the contrary. But if the conveyance of
goods to an enemy tends to obstruct any belligerent power in the
prosecution of a lawful right, and the person so conveying them possesses
the means of knowing it; if that power, for instance, is besieging a town,
or blockading a port, in expectation of a speedy surrender and a peace,
the person, who furnishes the enemy with supplies, and the means of
prolonged resistance, will be guilty of an aggression and injury towards
that power. He will incur the same guilt, as a person would do by
assisting a debtor to escape from prison, and thereby to defraud his
creditor. His goods may be taken by way of indemnity, and in discharge of
the debt. If the person has not yet committed the injury, but only
intended to do so, the aggrieved power will have a right to detain his
goods, in order to compel him to give future security, either by putting
into his hands hostages, or pledges; or indeed in any other way. But if
there are evident proofs of injustice in an enemy's conduct the person who
supports him in such a case, by furnishing him with succours, will be
guilty not barely of a civil injury, but his giving assistance will amount
to a crime as enormous, as it would be to rescue a criminal in the very
face of the judge. And on that account the injured power may proceed
against him as a criminal, and punish him by a confiscation of his goods.
These are the reasons, which induce belligerent powers to issue
manifestoes, as an appeal to other states, upon the justice of their
cause, and their probable hopes of ultimate success. This question has
been introduced under the article, which refers to the law of nature, as
history supplies us with no precedent to deduce its establishment from the
voluntary law of nations.
We are informed by Polybius, in his first book, that the Carthaginians
seized some of the Romans, who were carrying supplies to their enemies,
though they afterwards gave them up, upon the demand of the Romans.
Plutarch says that when Demetrius had invested Attica, and taken the
neighbouring towns of Eleusis and Rhamnus, he ordered the master and pilot
of a ship, attempting to convey provisions into Athens, to be hanged, as
he designed to reduce that city by famine: this act of rigour deterred
others from doing the same, and by that means he made himself master of
the city.
VI. Wars, for the attainment of their objects, it cannot be denied, must
employ force and terror as their most proper agents. But a doubt is
sometimes entertained, whether stratagem may be lawfully used in war. The
general sense of mankind seems to have approved of such a mode of warfare.
For Homer commends his hero, Ulysses, no less for his ability in military
stratagem, than for his wisdom. Xenophon, who was a philosopher as well as
a soldier and historian, has said, that nothing can be more useful in war
than a well-timed stratagem, with whom Brasidas, in Thueydides agrees,
declaring it to be the method from which many great generals have derived
the most brilliant reputation. And in Plutarch, Agesilaus maintains, that
deceiving an enemy is both just and lawful. The authority of Polybius may
be added to those already named; for he thinks, that it shews greater
talent in a general to avail himself of some favourable opportunity to
employ a stratagem, than to gain an open battle. This opinion of poets,
historians, and philosophers is supported by that of Theologians. For
Augustin has said that, in the prosecution of a just war, the justice of
the cause is no way affected by the attainment of the end, whether the
object be accomplished by stratagem or open force, and Chrysostom, in his
beautiful little treatise on the priestly office, observes, that the
highest praises are bestowed on those generals, who have practised
successful stratagems. Yet there is one circumstance, upon which the
decision of this question turns more than upon any opinion even of the
highest authority, and that is, whether stratagem ought to be ranked as
one of those evils, which are prohibited under the maxim OF NOT DOING
EVIL, THAT GOOD MAY ENSUE, or to be reckoned as one of those actions,
which, though evil IN THEMSELVES, may be so modified by particular
occasions, as to lose their criminality in consideration of the good, to
which they lead.
VII. There is one kind of stratagem, it is proper to remark, of a
negative, and another of a positive kind. The word stratagem, upon the
authority of Labeo, taken in a negative sense, includes such actions, as
have nothing criminal in them, though calculated to deceive, where any
one, for instance, uses a degree of dissimulation or concealment, in order
to defend his own property or that of others. So that undoubtedly there is
something of harshness in the opinion of Cicero, who says there is no
scene of life, that will allow either simulation, or dissimulation to be
practised. For as you are not bound to disclose to others all that you
either know or intend; it follows that, on certain occasions, some acts of
dissimulation, that is, of concealment may be lawful. This is a talent,
which Cicero, in many parts of his writings, acknowledges that it is
absolutely necessary for statesmen to possess. The history of Jeremiah, in
the xxxviiith chapter of his prophecy, furnishes a remarkable instance of
this kind. For when that prophet was interrogated by the king, respecting
the event of the siege, he prudently, in compliance with the king's
orders, concealed the real matter from the nobles, assigning a different,
though not a false reason for the conference, which he had had. In the
same manner, Abraham called Sarah, his sister, an appellation used
familiarly at that time to denote a near relation by blood, concealing the
circumstance of her being his wife.
VIII. A stratagem of a positive kind, when practised in actions, is called
a feint, and when used in conversation it receives the name of a lie or
falsehood. A distinction is made by some, between these two kinds of
stratagems, who say, that words are signs of our ideas, but actions are
not so. But there is more of truth in the opposite opinion, that words of
themselves unaccompanied by the intention of the speaker, signify nothing
more than the inarticulate cries would do of any one labouring under
grief, or any other passion: which sounds come under the denomination of
actions, rather than of speech. But should it be said that being able to
convey to others the conceptions of his mind, by words adapted to the
purpose, is a peculiar gift of nature, by which man is distinguished from
other parts of the animated creation, the truth of this cannot be denied.
To which we may add that such communication may be made not only by words,
but by signs or gestures, like those used to the dumb; it makes no
difference, whether those signs or gestures have any natural connection
with the thing they are intended to signify, or whether such a connection
is only assigned to them by custom. Equivalent to such signs or gestures
is handwriting, which may be considered, as a dumb language, deriving its
force not merely from the words used, and the particular form of the
letters, but from the real intention of the writer, to be gathered from
thence: — to be gathered either from the resemblance between the
characters and the intentions, as in the Egyptian hieroglyphics, or from
pure fancy, as among the Chinese.
Here likewise another distinction is necessary to be applied in the same
manner, as was done before, in order to remove all ambiguity in using the
term Of THE LAW OF NATIONS. For it was there said, that the laws
established by independent and separate states, whether or no those laws
implied any mutual obligations, were denominated the LAW OF NATIONS. So
that words, gestures, and signs, made use of to convey a meaning, imply an
obligation, in all the persons concerned, to receive and employ them in
their common acceptation. But the employment of OTHER MEANS, coming under
NONE OF THOSE DESCRIPTIONS, cannot be construed into a violation of any
social contract, although some may be deceived thereby. It is the REAL
NATURE of the actions that is here spoken of, and not the ACCIDENTAL
circumstances attending them: such actions for instance, as occasion no
mischief; or if they do so, there is no guilt, where there is no
treacherous design.
We have an instance of the former kind in the conduct of our Saviour, who,
on the way to Emmaus, pretended to the disciples, that he was going
further; here was a harmless stratagem, unless we interpret the words, as
expressive of his intention to have gone further, if he had not been
prevented by their efforts and entreaties to detain him. And in another
part of the sacred history it is said, that he intended to have passed by
the Apostles on the sea, that is, he intended to have done it, had he not
been so earnestly importuned by them to go into the ship. There is another
instance too in the conduct of Paul, who circumcised Timothy, though he
knew the Jews would conclude from thence, that the ordinance of
circumcision, which in reality had been abolished, was still binding upon
the descendants of Israel, and that Paul and Timothy were of the same
opinion. Whereas Paul had no such intention, but only hoped, by that
means, to open for himself and Timothy a way to more familiar intercourse
with the Jews. Neither could an ordinance of that kind, when the divine
obligation was repealed, any longer be deemed of such importance, nor
could the evil of a temporary error, resulting from thence, and afterwards
to be corrected, be regarded as equivalent to the opportunity, which Paul
thought to gain, of making it conducive to the introduction of Christian
truth.
The Greek Fathers have given the name of ECONOMY, or MANAGEMENT to
stratagems of this kind. On this subject there is an admirable sentiment
in Clement of Alexandria, who, in speaking of a good man, says that "he
will do many things for the benefit of his neighbour alone, which he would
not otherwise have undertaken,"
One of these stratagems was practised by the Romans, who, during the time
that they were besieged in the Capitol, threw some loaves of bread into
the enemy's camp, that it might not be supposed they were pressed by
famine. The feigned flight, which Joshua ordered his people to make, to
assist him in his designs upon Ai, affords an instance of a stratagem of
the second kind; the ensuing mischiefs of which may be considered, as some
of the effects of lawful war. The ORIGINAL DESIGN of that pretended flight
does not at all affect the question. The enemy took it for a proof of
fear; and he was at liberty to do so, without debarring the other of his
right to march this way, or that, with an accelerated or retarded motion,
with a shew of courage, or an appearance of fear, as he might judge it
most expedient.
History furnishes us with innumerable examples of deceptions practised
with success upon an enemy, by assuming his arms, ensigns, colours, or
uniforms; all which may be justified upon the same principle. For all
these are actions, which any one may avail himself of at his pleasure, by
departing from the usual course of his military system. For such points of
'discipline and system depend upon the will and fancy of the military
commanders in each state, rather than upon any invariable custom, equally
binding upon all nations.
IX. Those signs, by which the daily intercourse of life is maintained,
form a subject of more weighty discussion, with which the consideration of
lies or falsehood is necessarily interwoven.
All stratagems of this kind are so direct a violation of all moral
principle, both in their nature and consequences, that almost every page
of the revealed will of God declares their condemnation. Solomon describes
a righteous, that is, a good man, as one, who holds every false word in
detestation, deprecating the least appearance of deception: and the
Apostle's injunction accords with these sentiments, instructing his
disciples not to lie to one another.
Nor is it in the high standard of perfection alone, which the divine
records present, that such a recommendation of fair, open, and sincere
dealing is to be found. It is the theme of praise with poets and
philosophers, and the angry hero of the Grecian poet declares, that he
detests the man, as an infernal being, who utters one thing with his
tongue, while he conceals another in his heart. But making some allowance
for poetic fiction-we find even the grave, sober, and discerning,
Stagirite describing falsehood, as a vile, and abominable refuge, and
painting truth as a lovely object, that must extort the warmest praise.
These are all great and high authorities in favour of open dealing. Yet
there are names of no less weight, both among sacred and profane writers,
whose opinions are a vindication of stratagems, when used upon PROPER
occasions. One writer speaks of a case, where stratagem may be used, even
for the benefit of the person, on whom it is practised, and adduces the
instances of a physician, who, by means of a deception, overcame the
perverseness of a patient, and wrought a salutary cure.
X. To reconcile such a variety of discordant opinions, it may be necessary
to devise some way of examining falsehood both in its more extensive, and
more confined acceptation. Nor is speaking an untruth, UNAWARES, to be
considered in the nature of a lie, but the falsehood, which comes within
the limits here defined, is the KNOWN and DELIBERATE UTTERANCE of any
thing contrary to our real conviction, intention, and understanding.
Words, or signs, importing the same meaning as words, are generally taken
for conceptions of the mind, yet it is no lie for any man to utter a
falsehood, which he believes to be true; but the propagation of a truth,
which any one believes to be false, IN Him amounts to a lie. There must be
in the use of the words therefore an INTENTION to deceive, in order to
constitute a falsehood in the proper and common acceptation. Consequently,
when any one single word, or the whole tenour of a discourse, admits of
more significations than one, either by the use of some popular phrase,
some term of art, or intelligible figure of speech, in that case if the
speaker's intention correspond with any one of those meanings, he cannot
be charged with using falsehood, although it is possible that a hearer may
take his words in a very different sense. It is true that using such an
ambiguous method of speaking on ALL OCCASIONS is not to be approved of,
though there are particular circumstances under which it may be reconciled
with honour and justice. In communicating knowledge, for instance, there
is no harm in using a metaphor, an irony, or an hyperbole, figures of
speech, tending either to adorn or to elucidate a subject. There are cases
too, where by this doubtful mode of expression it may be proper to avoid
an urgent and impertinent question. There is an instance of the former
kind in our Saviour's saying, that "our friend Lazarus sleepeth," where
the disciples understood him, as if he were speaking of the refreshing
rest of an ordinary sleep: and when he spoke of restoring the temple,
which he meant his own body, he knew that the Jews applied what he said to
the MATERIAL EDIFICE Of the Temple. In the same manner he frequently
addressed the multitudes in parables, which they could not understand by
barely hearing, without that docility of mind, and attention, which the
subject required. Profane history too furnishes us with an example of the
second kind, in the conduct of Vitellius, who, as Tacitus informs us, gave
Narcissus doubtful and ambiguous answers, in order to avoid his urgent
questions; as any explicit declaration might have been attended with
danger.
On the other hand, it may happen to be not only censurable, but even
wicked to use such a manner of speaking, where either the honour of God or
the welfare of mankind is concerned, or indeed any matter, which demands
explicit avowals, and open dealing. Thus in contracts every thing
necessary to their fulfillment ought to be fully disclosed to those
concerned. There is an apposite expression of Cicero, who says, that every
degree of deception ought to be banished from all contracts, and there is
in the old Athenian Laws a proverb, conformable to this, which says, there
must be nothing, but open dealing in markets.
XI. In strictness of speech such ambiguity is excluded from the notion of
a lie. The common notion of a lie therefore is something spoken, written,
marked, or intimated, which cannot be understood, but in a sense different
from the real meaning of the speaker. But a lie, in this stricter
acceptation, having some thing unlawful in its very nature, necessarily
requires that a distinction should be made between it and that latitude of
expression already explained. And if this acceptation be properly
considered, at least according to the opinion prevailing in all nations,
it seems, that no other explanation of it is necessary to be given, except
that it is a violation of the existing and permanent rights of the person,
to whom a discourse, or particular signs, are directed. It is a violation
of the rights of ANOTHER; for it is evident, that no one can utter a
falsehood with a view to impose upon himself. The rights here spoken of
are peculiarly connected with this subject. They imply that liberty of
judgment, which men are understood, by a kind of tacit agreement, to owe
to each other in their mutual intercourse. For this, and this alone is
that mutual obligation, which men intended to introduce, as soon as they
began to use speech, or other signs of equal import. For without such an
obligation the invention of those signs would have been perfectly
nugatory. It is requisite too, that at the time a discourse is made, such
a right or obligation should remain in full force.
A right may indeed have existed and afterwards have become obsolete, owing
to the rise or occurrence of some new right: which is the case with a
debt, that may be released by acquittance, or nonperformance of a
condition. It is farther requisite, to constitute a VIOLATION OF THIS
RIGHT, that the ensuing injury should immediately affect the PERSON
ADDRESSED: as in contracts, there can be no injustice, but what affects
one of the parties, or persons concerned.
And perhaps under the head of this right, it may not be improper to assign
a place to that TRUE SPEAKING, which Plato, following Simonides, classes
with justice, in order to form a more striking contrast with that
falsehood, so often prohibited in Scripture, by the name of false witness
to, or against, our neighbour, and which Augustin, in defining a lie,
calls an intention to deceive. Cicero also in his offices lays down truth,
as the basis of justice.
The right to a discovery of the whole truth may be relinquished by the
express consent of the persons, who are engaged in a treaty: the one may
declare his intention not to disclose certain points, and the other may
allow of this reserve. There may be also a tacit presumption, that there
are just reasons for such reserve which may perhaps be necessary out of
regard to the rights of a third person: rights which, in the common
judgment of all sober men, may be sufficient to counterbalance any
obligation in either of the persons engaged in the treaty to make a full
disclosure of his views and sentiments. These principles, duly considered,
will supply many inferences to reconcile any seeming contradiction in the
opinions, that have been advanced.
XII. In the first place, many things may be said to madmen, or children,
the LITERAL MEANING of which may not be true, without incurring the guilt
of willful falsehood. A practice which seems to be allowed by the common
sense of all mankind. Quintilian, speaking of the age of puerility, says,
it is a period of life, when many useful truths may be taught in the dress
of fiction. Another reason given is, that as children and madmen possess
no perfect power of judging, impositions of that kind can do no injury to
their rights, in such respects.
XIII. Secondly, when a conversation is addressed to any one, who is not
thereby deceived, although a third person, not immediately addressed, may
misconceive the matter, there is no willful falsehood in the case. No
WILFUL FALSEHOOD towards the person addressed: because he feels no greater
injury from thence, than an intelligent hearer would do from the recital
of a fable, or the use of a metaphor, irony, or hyperbole in speech. It
cannot be said that an injury is done to the person, who accidentally and
cursorily hears a matter, and misconceives it: for being no way concerned,
there is no obligation due to him. As he misconceives a thing addressed to
ANOTHER, and not to HIMSELF, he must take upon his own head all the
consequences of the mistake. For, properly speaking, the discourse, WITH
RESPECT TO HIM, IS no discourse, but an inexpressive sound that may
signify one thing as well as another. So that there was nothing wrong in
the conduct of Cato the Censor, who made a false promise of assistance to
his confederates, nor in that of Flaccus, who informed others that
Aemilius had taken the enemy's city by storm, although the enemy were
deceived by it. Plutarch mentions an instance of the same kind in the life
of Agesilaus. Here no communication was made to the enemy, and the
prejudice he sustained was an accidental thing no way unlawful in itself,
either to be wished for or procured.
XIV. In the third place, whenever it is certain that the person, on whom a
deception is practised, discovers that the intent of it was to do him a
service; he will not feel it as a grievance, nor can it come -under the
strict denomination of a lie or falsehood. It will be no more an INJURY,
than it would be a THEFT in any one, presuming upon an owner's consent, to
take something belonging to that owner, in order to convert it to his use
in a very beneficial way. For in cases of notorious certainty, a
PRESUMPTION may be taken for express consent. But it is evident that no
man would CONSENT to receive an INJURY.
From hence it appears, that a person is guilty of no treachery, who uses
unfounded or fictitious motives to console a friend in distress, as Arria
did to Paetus upon the death of his son, of which there is an account in
Pliny's Epistles, or in a general, who in a perilous situation should
avail himself of false intelligence, to encourage his troops, by which
perhaps a victory might be gained.
It may be observed likewise, that the injury done to the freedom of
judgment is, in such a case, of less consequence, because it is but
momentary, and the real fact is soon discovered.
XV. There is a fourth case, which bears a near affinity to those above
mentioned, and that is, when any one, possessing preeminent authority,
orders another, in a subordinate capacity, to execute some device or
stratagem, conducive either to his individual, or to the public welfare.
Which Plato seems to have had particularly in view, in allowing those in
authority to avail themselves of pretexts, or stratagems. The same writer
is very correct in his notion of not making such a device a characteristic
of that authority, which belongs to the supreme being. For all such
devices, however justifiable they may be in CERTAIN CASES, strongly betray
that imperfection, which is inseparable from all human systems.
The stratagem, which Joseph employed to obtain further discoveries without
making himself known to his brethren, is much commended by Philo, as a
mark of great policy, when, contrary to the convictions and feelings of
his own mind, he accused them of being spies, and afterwards charged them
with theft. It was by a stratagem of the same kind, that Solomon gave
proof of his inspired wisdom, when he used the FICTITIOUS threat of
dividing the living child in order to discover the real mother.
XVI. The fifth case, which allows a stratagem to be practised, is that,
where it may be the ONLY means of saving the life of an innocent person,
of obtaining some object of equal importance, or of diverting another from
the perpetration of some horrid design. The heathen poet has given a
beautiful illustration of this in his praises of Hypermnestra, whose
conduct he calls "a splendid stratagem, ennobling the virgin to all
posterity."
XVII. It is evident that many writers of acknowledged wisdom, and sober
judgment, have carried the point farther than has been done in this
treatise, in allowing the use of false representations to an enemy. In
cases, where public enemies are concerned, they maintain, that it is
lawful to deviate from those strict rules of avowing and disclosing all
our intentions, which they prescribe, on all other occasions. Such is the
opinion of Plato and Xenophon among the Greeks, of Philo among the Jews,
and Chrysostom among Christians. It may not perhaps be amiss to cite, in
this place, the message sent by the men of Jabesh Gilead to the Ammonites,
by whom they were besieged, and also that of the prophet Elisha, and at
the same time to mention the conduct of Valerius Laevinus, who boasted of
having killed Pyrrhus.
The third, the fourth and fifth observations above made, may be
illustrated from what is said by Eustratus, Archbishop of Nice, "An able
and upright counsellor is not obliged to disclose the whole truth: for
there may be occasions, when it may be necessary for him to recommend the
means of deceiving an enemy, or to employ some stratagem towards a friend,
where it may turn to his advantage."
XVIII. What has been said of false speaking must be understood as applied
to affirmative declarations, which can be prejudicial to no persons, but
public enemies: it can by no means be taken to include promises. For
promises confer upon the person, to whom they are made, a peculiar right
to claim their full performance. And this is a rule, which must take
place, even between public enemies; a rule to which existing hostilities
are not allowed to form an exception. It is a maxim proper to be enforced
in TACIT, as well as in EXPRESS agreements: as when a parley or conference
is demanded, there is always an IMPLIED promise, that both sides shall
attend it with perfect safety. But these are points reserved for the
discussion of another part of this treatise.
XIX. It will be necessary to repeat an observation made before, with
respect to oaths, both of the affirmative and promissory kind, where it
was maintained that they exclude all exceptions, all mental reservations
towards the person, to whom they are made, being regarded not merely as a
solemn transaction with that individual, but as a steadfast appeal to God.
Such an appeal to the supreme being demands the performance of an oath,
even if it gave the individual no right to the same.
At the same time it was observed, that a sworn declaration is not like one
of any other kind, where an application of terms different from their
usual meaning may supply the speaker with an excuse for evading their
import. But truth requires every declaration and promise to be made in
terms, which it is supposed that every man of integrity and clear judgment
will understand, spurning at the impious thought, that men may be deceived
by oaths, as children are by toys and trifles.
XX. Some nations and individuals indeed have rejected the use of those
stratagems, which even the law of nature allows to be employed as a means
of self-defence against an enemy. But they did so, not from any opinion of
their unlawfulness, but from a noble loftiness of mind, and from a
confidence in their own strength. Aelian has preserved a saying of
Pythagoras, "that there are two things, in which man approaches nearest to
God, in always speaking the truth, and doing good to others." Aristotle,
somewhere in his Ethics, calls speaking truth, the freedom of a great
soul, and Plutarch says, that falsehood is the qualification of a slave.
But an adherence to truth, in simplicity of heart, is not the only duty
required of Christians, in this respect, they are commanded to abstain
from all vain discourse, as having for their example him, in whose mouth
there was found no guile.
XXI. With respect to the actions of men, there is another rule which may
properly come under this head, and that is, the unlawfulness of urging or
persuading any one to do an unlawful act. For instance, no subject has a
right to lift his hand against his sovereign, to deliver up a town without
public authority, or to despoil his neighbour of his goods. It would be
unlawful then to encourage the subject of an enemy, as long as he
continues his subject, to do any of these acts. For the person, who urges
another to do a wicked act, makes himself a partner in his guilt. Nor can
it be received as a just answer, that urging a subject to the perpetration
of such a deed is nothing more than employing the lawful means of
destroying an enemy. For though it may be necessary and just to destroy
him, if possible, yet that is not the way, in which it should be done.
Augustin has well observed, that it makes no difference whether any one
should commit a crime himself, or employ another as his instrument.
But employing the spontaneous offers of a deserter's not contrary to the
laws of war, and is a very different action from that of seducing a
subject from his allegiance.