Bluffer’s Guide: Fortress Tehran

+ Pls note that this is amateur research and illustrations. Corrections and constructive feedback welcome.

TEHRAN
The nation’s capital is defended by static emplacements of area-defense SAMs and short range air-defense, and in times of tension or conflict may
have additional mobile air defenses mobilized.

Area Air-Defense Systems

SA-5 Gammon (S-200)
Iran declared the SA-5 long range missile system operational in 1997 and apparently now produces the missiles which Iran calls the “Ghareh”. There
are 5 fixed SA-5 sites covering Tehran. Iran recently showcased an ‘optimized’ SA-5 but quite what that optimalizsation involves is not clear –
although one can surmise that the existing SA-5 infrastructure must be sub-optimal in the eyes of the Iranian military

SA-5 coverage around Tehran (i]Source: Sean O’Connor)

I-Hawk SAM
In 1983 Iran was reported to have 23 Hawk/I-Hawk batteries, ironically receiving extra missiles from Israel and US during the Iran-Iraq war.

Four Hawk sites circle the south and west of the city, at about 20-30km from the city centre. Of these only the southern-most two appear active in
Google Earth. A fifth active Hawk site is located at Mehrabad air base.

Hawk is a relatively mobile system and can be redeployed in times of threat. During the Iran-Iraq war Hawk was mostly employed close to the battle
front in temporary emplacements. Similarly1990’s Iranian Hawk sites on the islands of Sirri and Abumusa are much more rough-and-ready than the
older Western built Hawk sites in Tehran’s ring. What is significant however is that even though the system can be redeployed, the signature layout
is maintained, although three launcher configurations are more common than the original six:

Coming back to the Tehran batteries, the west-most battery, although empty, is clearly built with only three firing positions:

To me, this suggests that this site was built by the Iranians after the revolution and reflects the initial spares shortages facing Iran in the 1980s
and early 90s before local production had stabilized the Iranian I-Hawk community.

Standard SAM
Iran has reverse engineered the SM-1 Standard naval SAM missile and employs variants as both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air systems, possibly
with the local name “Fajr”. The success and extent of service of the system is open to question, and it is thought that the Iranian Navy, who had
fitted a Kaman class missile boat with the system after the retirement of the sole Babr class destroyer (Allen M Summer class FRAMII) which had
carried 4 twin boxed launchers, and also trialed an air-launched anti-ship version, has retired the system. The reverse-engineered missile is claimed
to have several enhancements including digital components allowing it employ different radar frequencies. In the SAM role the Fajar is fired from
twin as per the SM-1 system on Babr, which are now mounted on an adapted I-Hawk SAM launcher. Performance is not known but is likely to be similar to
the SM-1MR (RIM-66A Block-IV) naval missile, having a range of about 32km; significantly shorter than the I-Hawk.

None of the identified I-Hawk sites on Google Earth appear to have Standard missiles and given the likely inferior performance compared to the I-Hawk
it seems likely that the system has not been adopted in meaningful numbers if at all.

SA-6 Kub
The 1960’s SA-6 Kub mobile medium range SAM system was first introduced into Iranian service in 1990, and is (exclusively?) operated by IRGC-AF. In
concept the system is a fully mobile area-defense system for maneuvering army brigades, but can be employed to defend fixed sites with the advantage
of being able to redeploy to fresh sites frequently. Although the system was incredibly successful in the 1970s in Egyptian hands against Israel, it
was far less successful in subsequent conflicts and although still considered a credible threat is no longer cutting edge.

HQ-2B/ Sayyad-1/Sayyad-1a

Iran first received Chinese HQ-2 (Chinese version of SA-2) SAMs during the Iran-Iraq war, possibly also with some SA-2s from other countries during
that time. The system is generally regarded as obsolete and appears many HQ-2 sites are now empty, suggesting a general reduction in strength, but
since 1999 Iran has produced an enhanced version of this system as the “Sayyad-1” and “Sayyad-1a”, which has an increased effective range of
50km (as per later HQ-2s) and possibly an improved warhead and elements of Hawk and Standard missile technology. It is probable that the Sayyad-1 is
employed as an improved missile for existing HQ-2 sites rather than a complete stand-alone system.

There are four HQ-2/Sayyad-1 sites covering Tehran, forming a semi-circle around the on the South-west side of the city, positioned about 30km from
the city centre. Only the western-most site appears active and it is possible that the southern three are remnants from the Iran-Iraq war. It is not
possible to discern whether the missiles employed are Sayyad-1 or original HQ-2s, but I’ve drawn the arcs at 50km range of the Sayyad-1:

The active site is protected by seven 23mm AAA positions:

The 23mm AAA is however insufficient to cover the whole of the HQ-2/Sayyad-1’s dead ground, leaving a significant opening for attacking aircraft
/missiles to fly in under the HQ-2/Sayyad-1’s altitude limits and then pop up 7-5km from their target for a diving attack that the ZU-23-2 would be
almost powerless to stop.

The combination of a relatively poor missile potency, particularly at short ranges and low altitudes, combined with the inadequate point defense and
static installations makes the HQ-2/Sayyad-1 SAM sites easy prey to cruise missiles and modern stand-off weapons. At the same time the sites
themselves are not sufficiently valuable to warrant deploying SA-15 (Tor) or SA-19 (Panstyr) systems to shoot down incoming missiles.

S-300
Perhaps the longest running and most controversial rumor surrounding Iran’s air defenses is the supposed acquisition of advanced S-300 (SA-10
Grumble) SAMs from Russia. For years people have argued whether Iran has them but in recent months several fresh rumors and credible reports have
rekindled the fire. On the one hand there has been a spate of credible reports that Iran is in negotiations with Russia for the comparatively advanced
S-300PMU1 (SA-10D) system: S-300PMU1 TEL:

Whilst this deal was being denied by some Russian Government sources, reputable defense news source Jane’s published an article claiming that Iran
was in final negotiations to purchase two batteries of the older S-300PT (SA-10A) system from Belarus. The report was denied by Belarus, but accuracy
remains unclear. The S-300PT is less capable than the S-300PMU1 and less mobile, using trailer launchers that require significant preparation to
redeploy relative to the much more mobile S-300PMU1 which uses either a self-propelled Maz truck launcher (TEL, above) or a more mobile truck and
trailer configuration. At first glance it seems that Iran is so desperate to upgrade its air defenses that it is willing to pay over-the-odds for
surplus early-model S-300s, although it now seems probable that the ‘leak’ was a political ploy to spur the Russian government into finalizing the
S-300PMU1 deal. Strangely China’s comparable HQ-9 and KS-1A SAM systems don’t seem to be in the picture. The satellite imagery below shows one of
the Belarusian S-300PT batteries supposedly involved in the deal:

The S-300PT uses the original trailer launchers without integral generator:

Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet)
By far and away the most advanced and potent air defense system in the current Iranian inventory, the 29 Tor-M1 systems entering service provide a
credible defense against cruise missiles, stand-off weapons and medium/low flying aircraft including fast jets. Their main weakness is that they are
relatively short ranged and cannot reach the highest altitude bombers.

Although the Tor was designed to provide organic air defense to maneuvering armored brigades, Iran’s greatest threat is perceived as pre-emptive air
strikes on key installations, and it seems likely that at least some of the Tor systems are deployed around key strategic targets during times of
tension.

The Tor system in Iranian service is not the most current Tor variant, but it remains a very formidable adversary.

Pantsyr S-1E
In May 2007 Iran was reported to have purchased at least 10 Pantsyr S-1E combined gun/SAM systems from Russia via Syria, although subsequent delivery
to Iran has yet to be confirmed. The Pantsyr system is extremely potent with similar anti-missile capability to the Tor-M1, but with more missiles
(12 ready to fire vs 8) and two 30mm auto-cannons. The only noteworthy weakness of the system is that it is truck based and requires deployment of
stabilizing legs to operate, thus making it inherently static in operation and thus cannot move to escape anti-radiation missiles, although it could
conceivably shoot down the incoming ARM providing a measure of self defense.

For the role of defending key facilities and cities Pantsyr is a better choice than the Tor-M1, so delivery of the Pantsyr may free up any Tors that
are being used for static defense for their more fitting role as regular maneuver units.

FM-80/Shahab Thaqeb (Matra R440 Crotale)
Iran had attempted to purchase the Crotale (Rattlesnake) short range SAM system from the French in 1985 but appears to have been rebuffed. However,
Iran subsequently purchased a number of FM-80 (HQ-7) Crotale short -range SAM systems from China and more recently succeeded in reverse engineering
the system under the Ya-zahra project. There is speculation that Iran also captured French made Crotale units from the Iraqis, and it is possible that
Libya, who also operate Crotale and where allied to Iran in the 1980s also supplied equipment and/or technology. The new system, which differs in use
of the Oerlikon Sky Guard radar instead of the original French radar, is called Shahab Thaqeb. It is not clear what the operational status of either
the Shahab Thaqeb or FM-80 systems s and they are rarely (if ever) paraded for the press or photographers in an operational state.

Rapier SAM

Before the revolution Iran had planned to mass produce the Rapier system under license, but when the regime change put paid to that only a small
number of British assembled launchers had been delivered. The planned technology transfer required for local production had not taken place. Unlike
other systems it is not thought that any extra missiles were delivered during the Iran-Iraq war.

Iranian Rapier systems were the original “Mk 1” system but with added ‘Blindfire’ tracking radars (sometimes retrospectively described as FSA;
Field Standard “A”). This is essentially the same system that Britain used with modest (often over-stated) success in the Falklands war. However,
several design flaws were found and subsequent modifications made, in particularly to increase the range, the addition of a warhead with proximity
fuse. Iranian Rapiers however still use the non-warhead “Mk 1” missile that has to hit its target to inflict any damage (a “hittle” not a
“miss-ile”…). Iran has developed local production of missiles and possibly fire units, but it is likely that the Rapier is not very widely
deployed, not least because it is becoming obsolete, although some degree of operational service remains, evidenced by the routine inclusion of the
system in military parades. Relative to the Shahab Thaqeb (FM-80) program the Rapier is much shorter ranged and has less modern electronics.

Iran experimented with a fully mobile Rapier system employing an all-terrain 8 wheel drive truck, with a distinctive tandem stepped cockpit
reminiscent of an attack helicopters on the left hand side of the vehicle. There were four reloads in protective boxes on the back of the truck.
It’s not clear if there was an additional search radar.

Although this variant improved mobility it reduced the arc of fire and for whatever reason does not appear to have made it into production.

Sky Guard / 35mm AAA
Iran purchased 24 SkyGuard systems before the revolution and primarily deployed them as point defense for air bases and other strategic targets. The
AAA used is the Oerlikon GDF-001 35mm twin mount. In 2008 Iran unveiled a reverse engineered version which appears virtually identical to the GDF-001
and does not appear to include any of the design changes included in the later GDF-002>005 types now in service. Over the years the serviceability of
the SkyGuard radars probably deteriorated and other radar sets were substituted. More recently Iran has unveiled a new radar similar to the existing
Fledermaus fire control radar for locally produced GDF-001s, and possibly receiving upgraded Super Flederrmaus radars from India . Although the
ballistic performance and rate of fire make it by far the most potent of Iranian AAA systems, it is still reliant on manual aiming and firing, and
lacks AHEAD or similar advanced ammunition.

Although it is difficult to ID AAA from civilian satellite imagery, a fair guess can be made by using the relative size of the ‘blob’. The two
main AAA pieces used by Iran are the Swiss GDF-001 and Soviet ZU-23-2. When viewed from above the latter is much smaller, especially as the wheels are
often removed if the gun is going to be sitting there for a prolonged period:

Hawk SAM launchers are also about this size but these sites have a distinctive signature – as a rule if there are less than 5 or 6 ‘blobs’ then
it’s not a Hawk site. FM-80 on the other hand would appear much larger whilst Rapier would be smaller than the 35mm AAA and would have a generator
connected by a cable and control station(s) nearby.

Because the system comprises of a radar and two AAA guns, the site layout is typically triangular although there are several exceptions. A typical
site layout is “A” shaped:

The radar position and gun positions are usually raised to improve the fields of view/fire.

The distribution of SkyGuard around Tehran can be divided into four groups; A, B, C and D:

Group A approximately encircles the city centre, but is primarily sited at air bases. Because of the city centre is highly built up it is difficult
for the AAA to have a full field of fire and it is possible that additional AAA would be sited on the tops of tall buildings in times of conflict.

Group B defends the alleged missile development facilities and is co-located with a cluster of lighter 23mm AAA. Group C defends a large oil refinery.
Group D, which again is co-located with a cluster of 23mm AAA positions, protects the Parchin facilities.

Additionally there are several ‘possible’ sites although none appear to be occupied.

ZU-23-2 Light AAA

Probably the main AAA weapon in terms of numbers employed, the Zu-23-2 is a reasonably effective weapon against low-flying targets at short range. It
uses essentially the same gun as in the infamous ZU-23-2 Shilka but only two rather than four, thus having only half the rate of fire. The weapon is
crewed and relies on the crew for alignment with the target, although the crew may be cued by radar. The strength of the system is its simplicity, but
it is generally ineffective against fast moving targets such as missiles and provides little comfort against cruise missile attack. The system is
usually deployed in single gun positions surrounding key installations.

Secondary Light Air Defenses
In the event of a defensive war Iran would probably mobilize its reserve air defense forces and redeploy the army’s mobile air defense units around
key targets including Tehran. Iran has numerous types of light/secondary air defenses including several locally produced and unique types.

MANPAD
Iran operates several types of man-portable air defense SAMs including the US made Stinger, and Chinese QW-1/2. All are broadly speaking similar. In
general MANPADs are least threatening to missiles and fast flying jets, and anything flying above about 5km relative to the terrain. As such, whilst
they are potent insurgency weapons, they do not present a significant threat against enemy bombers and missiles.

Misagh-1/2 series MANPADs
The Misagh-1 and 2 are based on the Chinese QW-1 and QW-11/18 respectively. The QW-1 is based on the Russian SA-16 missile but incorporates features
of the US Stinger. The QW-11 and QW-18 are further enhancements. It’s not clear how different the Misagh series is from its Chinese parents.

Misagh-2 is widely deployed among infantry and light motorized units, but has also been developed into a twin pedestal mount that can be fitted to
jeeps (typically Toyota derived designs) for enhanced mobility, targeting and crew comfort (and thus readiness). The mount has two missiles ready to
fire with enhanced targeting and larger batteries to allow prolonged activation, thus reducing reaction time.

Mobile 23mm AAA

Iran operates several 23mm AAA systems, the most potent being the infamous ZU-23-4 “Shilka” system imported from Russia. The ‘-4’ in its
designation indicates the number of barrels. The Shilka has the gun in a turret mounted on a lightly armored tracked chassis, with integral fire
control radar mounted at the back of the turret.

The ZU-23-1 is, as the name implies, half a ZU-23-2 (note the -1 not -2). Actually that’s my name for it; I don’t think there’s a widely given
name for this uniquely Iranian system. Although the twin barreled ZU-23-2 is frequently mounted on the back of a pick-up, doing so limits its field of
fire because the cab gets in the way. The Iranians have sought to overcome this by reducing the weight of the gun so that it can be mounted higher up,
and what better way to reduce the weight than to remove one of the guns?
ZU-23-2 mounted on a Toyota derived pick-up:

Another peculiarly Iranian attempt to remedy the field-of-fire problem with vehicle mounted ZU-23-2s is to bolt them to the top of a Toyota truck.
This raises stability and accuracy issues and is unlikely to provide a good firing platform. As if that concept isn’t comical enough someone
attacked them with a can of spray paint and the standard Iranian camouflage ‘splodge’ stencil. I promise you I couldn’t make this up…

Note: Illustration is incorrect, it turns out it’s mounted on a Toyota jeep much like the ZU-23-1, but I drew the illustration before that was
confirmed from photos that didn’t show the whole vehicle.

14.5mm/12.7mm Light AAA machine guns
Iran operates several types of heavy machinegun AAA, mostly for secondary defense of tanks and troop vehicles, but also as dedicated air defense
guns. In the latter role the main type is the Russian ZPU-4 14.5mm towed AAA:

Although machinegun caliber AAA can make a mess of unarmored helicopters, it is widely regarded as obsolete.

Despite this Iran has recently showcased an indigenous 8 barreled 12.7mm AAA piece using Iranian manufactured MGD 12.7mm machine guns, a copy of the
Soviet DShK type and also used on Iranian T-72, mounted on a ZPU-4 carriage . Each gun can fire 600rds/min but only has a 50-70rd magazine. The system
has an effective range of about 1.6km against aerial targets. The DShK series of machine guns was replaced in Soviet service by the NSV series in part
due to the former’s relative inaccuracy. Although an eight-barreled gun is quite intimidating it is of questionable combat merit in the modern air
defense picture.

Other AAA
Iran also operate Soviet S-60 57mm and KS-19 100mm heavy AAA but these are pretty much obsolete.

Air mines
I don’t regard the tales of air mines (balloons filed with explosives) as credible. There are several flaws to the concept, not least that they
can’t carry a meaningful fragmentation warhead, and are too low altitude. Also, timing explosions would be very difficult against maneuvering
targets. Just thought I’d mention them though

Point defense of other high-value sites
Iran has several locations that Iranian military consider sufficiently high value to warrant permanent air defenses. These are typically sites
associated with Iran’s alleged WMD programs.

The main point air-defense of these sites is the ZU-23-2 23mm AAA, although several also have SkyGuard sites. Defenses would also include man-portable
SAMs.

The SkyGuard positions around Natanz are interesting because, if you look carefully, you can see that the radars being used at at least one of them is
the original SkyGuard-1 system supplied to Iran in the 1970s, with the surveillance radar mounted above a round fire control radar:

This is significant because it appears that Iran has replaced this radar with simpler fire-control only sets in many of the SkyGuard sites, presumably
because of spares shortages for this particular system.

There are also several unidentified positions around the site, consisting of small ramps with no berms or sand bags around the position, and a small
item on top (1-2m across), with another small items nearby.

There is no real way to tell what these are – there are too few supporting positions to be Rapier etc. One possibility is that they are pedestal
mounted MANPAD (man portable SAM) positions. Iran has several types of MANPAD including the locally produced Misagh 1 &2, but an intriguing
possibility is that they are the remaining Bofors RBS-70 systems procured on the black market during the Iran-Iraq war. The RBS-70 is unusual in that
it is laser guided making it very hard to jam. The early model RBS-70 that Iran is thought to have are relatively slow (mach 1.2) but have a range of
about 5km and a maximum altitude of 3km.

Another plausible explanation for these isolated positions is infantry-detecting radar.

Note: Iranian operation of RBS-70 is desputed

A closer look at the HQ-2/Sayyad-1 SAM site to the north west reveals that although there is clear evidence of operational activity with missiles on
their launchers and radar/command set up, it is also deployed at half strength with only three of the normal 6 missile positions occupied. This is a
theme in Iranian SAM sites – I-Hawk batteries with only three firing positions (normal = 6), SA-5 sites with only two firing positions (normal = 6)
etc. Also, although this HQ-2/Sayyad-1 site has 8 positions for light AAA (Zu-23-2 etc), none are occupied at the time of the satellite over-flight.

Arak’s AAA positions are arranged in two concentric rings; the outer ring is more sparse and consists of 35mm AAA with the occasional SkyGuard and
23mm AAA sites. At least three well sited search radars are also positioned in this ring. The inner ring consists of 23mm AAA encircling the site
itself.
A quick comparison between the facility’s two SkyGuard sites shows a stark contrast; the site on the left has a more permanent feel to it whereas
the site on the right hasn’t even got the guns on raised platforms etc.

Do you know if Iranians are using any kind of real time air defence networking etc. to control the wast amounts of ZU-23-2s (Sergeis)? Or are they
simply controlling them by radio/phone cues and visual aiming. Since the Sergei is notoriusly hard to use, unless the gunner gets a live feed from
surveillance radars. (and even so it's not very effective against even slow drones)

It's going to be a mixed bag. Iran is now building and buying better radars but many sites are still blind or use phones etc. As much as I find the
Sky-Guard sites interesting, I don't think that Iranian AAA is likely to be very influential in a conflict.

Iran has apparently now developed a phased array radar but type and deployment are not known.

Iran would greatly benefit a system that would link all it's radars into a single airspace picture and then dispatch that image real time down to all
AAA and SAM units (including MANPADS)... such systems are allready in operational use in several countries.

Against a pre-Gulf War I and II Iran, or most other Middle Eastern nations, these air defense systems and set-ups would be most useful and adequate.
U.S., NATO or Russian aircraft would have better luck against the set-up the Iranians have, even though we would take some losses. The Iranians have
been attempting to seriously upgrade their systems and have done a good job of it.

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