Reconfigure,
Reconstruct, Rebuild

These are thoughts on approaches to rebuilding New Orleans. Only a portion of the city, along the natural levee of the Mississippi River, should be rebuilt. The vast majority of the city, the sprawl that surrounds the central city, should not be rebuilt. Instead Baton Rouge, Hammond, and Lafayette should absorb the population and human activity that once occurred in the sprawl surrounding New Orleans. Baton Rouge, Hammond, and Lafayette should densify and minimize the expansion of their physical footprint. Transit oriented, New Urbanist and Smart Growth strategies would be deployed. Approximately half a million people would be re-located and connected to New Orleans by a new, dignified, passenger rail system. The remaining half-million would stay in what is today Greater New Orleans, which would rebuild its largely intact portions into a port city with university, fishing, shipbuilding, and tourist components.

Disaster
in New Orleans

New Orleans is listing but this was not the "Big One." The
storm passed the city to the east. The eye, brunt of the surge, and winds
leveled Waveland and much of the Mississippi Gulf Coast. It was somewhere
between a category 3 and 4, weakening rapidly as it came ashore. New Orleans
had sustained winds of over 100 miles per hour and lots of rain. Streets
flooded, streetlamps leaned, windows broke, and shingles came off. For a moment
on Monday morning Aug 29th it looked like the city had dodged a bullet. There
would be deaths, as usual, and property damage, and fallout from the failure of
society to evacuate the poor. But it got worse than that. Much worse.

The city was hit by the infamous storm surge from the east and north.
The waters of Lakes Borgne and Pontchartrain inundated the east side of the
city, as predicted, modeled, and prophesied. The "bowl effect" came
into play, as predicted, modeled, and prophesied. The backswamp of East Jefferson,
Orleans, and St Bernard, covered in auto-oriented, low-density sprawl, went
under. And then it got worse. The levees overtopped, but then were breached in
New Orleans. The Industrial Canal levee in the Lower Ninth was wrecked, and the
Mississippi Gulf Outlet levees completely failed, inundating St Bernard. The
pumps were turned off when it became futile to pump out the flood in New
Orleans. The breaches in the 17th St and London Ave canal levees
cycled the flood back into center of the city. The water level in the city
equalized with Lake Pontchartrain.

The storm surges, overtopped and breached levees, and complete
submergence of large swaths of Greater New Orleans had been predicted, modeled,
and prophesied for decades. It had been taught in grammar schools, high
schools, and universities. Local television stations and the Times Picayune,
even National Geographic, had run special reports. The usual political response
was that we need to raise the levees higher and higher, build bigger, better
pumps, and spend billions to accommodate the sprawl belt surrounding the city.
Everyone knew that one day the Big One would come, and many thought this was
it.

Katrina was a category 4 storm, packing 145-mph winds and weakening as
it approached the birdfoot Delta of the Mississippi. It veered to the east. By
the time it was due east of the city, over the Mississippi Sound and landing
near Waveland, it had dropped to a category 3.

This should give everyone pause when considering bolstering the levees
in a nation that barely funds public infrastructure – from schools and clinics
to roads, transit and levees. What if this had been a category 5, and a dead-on
hit? Or even a category 3 and a dead-on hit? No one would have been plucked
from rooftops by helicopters because roofs would have been ripped off in the
winds. No one would have been wading through the streets because the entire
city, both banks, would have been slammed with a 25-foot tidal surge. There
would have been few survivors to rescue. The nation would have gasped at total
destruction and economic recession rather than a bureaucratic genocide and the
reality that it still had an underclass.

And yet for the Gulf South, this was a normal storm event. Hurricanes
hit the Gulf coast almost every year, somewhere – Texas, Alabama, Florida, and
Louisiana. If not a hurricane, a weaker tropical storm comes in. These storms
are part of the reason the South is so wet, so fertile, and a land of milk and
honey.

The
Public Policy Disaster

It is important for the people of New Orleans and Louisiana to reflect
on this storm and on rebuilding because while this storm was normal for the
Gulf Coast, what this storm hit was largely American auto-centric sprawl that
was largely below sea level, wrapped by extensive levees, exposed to huge
volumes of water, and sinking in the peat of the backswamps.

This development pattern, and the resource extraction industries that
supported it, created the conditions for this disaster to occur. This was not
an act of God, nor entirely a natural disaster – this was ultimately a public
policy disaster. The people of New Orleans and the rest of Louisiana should
consider this in order to make well-informed decisions about what and how to
reconfigure, reconstruct, and rebuild.

That means reflecting on coastal erosion, the taming of the Mississippi
River, subsidence, and sea-level rise due to global warming. Moreover, it means
reflecting on the public policy decisions, or lack of them, that have led to
this disaster. But let's start with the public policy disaster of evacuating a
large metropolitan area like New Orleans.

The
Public Policy Disaster of Evacuation & Rescue

Post storm aerial photographs show a yard of about ? yellow school
buses submerged in the flood. Couldn't these buses have been used to evacuate
at least some? Public policy dictated no. On the day before the storm, while
panic set in but the skies were clear, the airlines not only cancelled flights,
but extra planes were not sent in during this state of emergency. Meanwhile in
flight across the continent was a huge airline fleet ferrying business class
from meeting to meeting, and vacationers to Florida and Las Vegas. It was only
five days later that airlines offered planes for evacuation.

Passenger rail? Forget it. Public policy in the United States says that
this efficient, clean, civilized and fast way to carry people for daily needs
as well as evacuation is not necessary in America. Finally, after some water
was pumped out of the city and the downtown stabilized, an Amtrak train was en
route to Dallas on Monday Sept 5th carrying 600 people in one load. Imagine if
a passenger rail system approaching Germany or Switzerland had been in place
before the storm. Thousands, tens of thousands, could have been shuttled to
Baton Rouge in the 24 hours before the first rains, while I-10 was completely
jammed.

And then there were the cars. Anyone who had one got in it and drove
out. The nation was dazzled by the pre-Katrina traffic jams out of New Orleans,
as they were by the traffic jams feeding from Houston less than a month later.
But they were also dismayed by the thought of evacuating and then running the
SUV on vapors when all the gas stations were depleted of gasoline and motorist
evacuees became sitting ducks on the freeway.

There were over 200,000 cars flooded in the New Orleans area from
Katrina. Second cars, third cars, new cars in dealerships. One would think that
in an era of "compassionate conservatism," part of the logistics of
metropolitan-scale evacuation would consider utilizing every tool available –
including second & third cars, and the available vehicle stock in the
dealerships. But compassionate conservatism has its limits - evacuation being
one. In compassionate conservatism, it is every man for himself. And that is
the public policy of 21st century American urban evacuation.

What unfolded was a libertarian-right wing public policy disaster. The
poor were displaced and further humiliated. The corporate class got privileged
access contracts and full control of the rebuild. The discourse was immediately
captured by the calls for tax breaks, enterprise zones, more casino gambling,
diluted environmental laws, elimination of wage laws, and more drilling. A
corporate dream whitewashed in libertarianism. Somehow social spending on
education, housing, and education are to blame for the poverty that led to
thousands being stranded in New Orleans. Not racism, white flight, anti-urban
federal and state policies, and state subsidy to corporate interests that
profited from the low wages of poverty and the cultural milieu of the city
while giving little back. Let us not kid ourselves – government was starved so
that it would fail.

And where it was not starved, it was diverted. Somewhere along the way
America forgot the purpose of the National Guard and sent it to guard oil in
Iraq. Collectively it was forgotten that the reason thousands of people joined
the National Guard was to serve their country and their communities, to protect
and aid localities in the aftermath of disaster. They joined to help with
disasters just like this one. Instead of the full might of a civilian national
guard responding to this crisis, victims desperately waited for the Wal-Mart
trucks. For the nation this is a Wal-Mart recovery policy.

Disaster
as legacy of public policy

Like the bungling evacuation and apocalyptic aftermath, the deeper
causes of this disaster were public policy. It is important to know these
causes in order to rebuild sensibly. Without knowing the causes, the trajectory
of decision-making is off course.

The public policy response (or lack of response) to accelerated coastal
erosion is a cause of this disaster. For decades pipeline canals, shipping
channels, and oil platform access canals were built willy-nilly across the
coastal marsh of Louisiana. The oil industry was given carte blanche to
decimate the coast. Salt water intruded. Marshes died, open water moved closer
towards the city. The buffer for storm surges disintegrated. This was public
policy, barely debated. Environmentalists fought it, but oil companies had a
strong lobby in Louisiana, and Americans wanted cheap gas. When business
interests in Louisiana finally acknowledged coastal erosion in the late 1990's,
they formulated a Coastal 2050 plan. It was their plan, and
it failed to adequately address the deeper structural problems of oil and gas
extraction and the devastation of the coast. Nevertheless, coastal erosion is
now more than a Louisiana problem. It is a national problem. And it should not
be left to the oil and gas industry and their senators to determine what should
be done.

Public policy towards the Mississippi River is a cause of this
disaster. The River's 25-foot levees kept the river bounded in a swift and
powerful channel. Mud was not deposited in the wetlands to recharge them – as it
had been for eons. Freshwater and silt shot straight into the Gulf, instead of
fanning over the Delta. This was done for shipping, refining capacity, and real
estate development. It was public policy. Talk of allowing the river to breach
levees and deposit much-needed sediment, or to allow the river to change course
and flow down the Atchafalaya, were dismissed as heresy until very recently.

In 60 years, the already low floodplain around New Orleans sank by an
average of 2-3 feet. The subsidence was especially problematic in the
backswamps, which are more difficult to drain even after an afternoon
thunderstorm. Yet it is the backswamps where sprawl was built in full force,
from New Orleans East to Kenner on the north side, and from Westwego to English
Turn on the West Bank. These backswamps are geographically distinctive from the
natural levees – the sliver of higher ground along both banks of the
Mississippi, where, for example, the French Quarter is located. To be sure, the
higher natural levee can flood, especially from the River. Its very existence
is in fact the result of river floods. But is also the high ground, and any
major rain or flood would eventually wash off into the backswamps. Following
gravity, water flows into the backswamp from the natural levees.

Look at any of the dozens of satellite images and maps showing the
flood, and it is easy to see that it is the backswamps of New Orleans that
flooded. Much of this backswamp is characterized by the land-use pattern of
sprawl. In the city of New Orleans, filling of the backswamp began in the early
1900s. Electric pumps and electric streetcars opened the backswamp to
development. But it was incremental, and vast areas of backswamp remained a
cypress swamp and sponge for floods. By the 1920s the development has begun
expanding towards the Lake in an automobile-oriented pattern. This was the
first pulse of American sprawl. More and more of the backswamp was paved. The
shoreline of the Lake was extended outward for more land to develop. After
World War Two the pace of sprawl development accelerated rapidly in New Orleans
– driven by "white flight", anti-urbanism, and subsidized mortgages
(and flood insurance). Metairie, Chalmette, the West Bank, and eventually New
Orleans East emerged – all mostly in backswamp. Massive levees were built
around the entire perimeter of this sprawl.

Had the backswamp north of the Metairie-Esplanade-Chef Menteur ridge
been a backswamp and not paved over, the breaches in the 17th St and London Ave
canals would not have flooded the Uptown and Mid-City portions of the city.
They would have flooded backswamp, as they should have. All of the pumps that
drain the city were on after the storm passed and the flood began. But as the
pumps drained the central sections of the city, the pumped water spilled back
into Lakeview and Gentilly, and re-filled the bowl. The system was
over-extended.

The levees built to protect this sprawl held the water in, allowing it
to fester and stagnate, full of the toxic residue of sprawl – motor oil, gasoline,
lawn fertilizer, and so on. From a design perspective, the sprawl that is
submerged looked similar to sprawl in Houston or Atlanta, no different from the
sprawl in Dulles or Contra Costa, or Hoffman Estates, or Tempe: auto-dependent,
hostile to pedestrians, low density, single detached homes, segregated land
uses, segregated incomes and races, full of intrusive billboards, massive
expanses of pavement – the bland generic sprawlscape that engulfs almost every
American city.

Sprawl has been a national urban policy for at least six decades. This
is the face of sprawl in New Orleans today – a toxic cesspool.

Enough has been said about global warming by the media. Global warming
makes New Orleans even more vulnerable to storms like Katrina. The disaster in New
Orleans should be a national wake-up call to the dangers of ignoring global
warming. The national response to this disaster should be to implement public
policies that reduce our carbon emissions and direct us to re-orient our cities
in an ecologically sustainable and socially just manner. This means all cities,
from New York to Los Angeles, from Miami to Seattle, from Lubbock, Texas to
Anchorage, Alaska. With the rebuilding of New Orleans, New Orleanians have a
chance to create a model for the rest of the nation. In the following sections
are some proposals for how New Orleans, and the other cities of South
Louisiana, can become a national model of ecological sustainability, social
justice, and the production of truly good urbanism.

Part 2:
How to reconfigure, reconstruct, and rebuild

Who is
the city for?

Substantial portions of New Orleans' African-American population, both
low-income and middle class, have been displaced from areas such as New Orleans
East, Gentilly, and extensive areas of the 7th, 8th, and Lower 9th wards. This
population makes up the majority of the city and must have a say in its future.
Similarly the white middle and upper class in Mid-City, Lakeview, and parts of
Uptown in the "bowl" were displaced. They too deserve a say. Residents
of St Bernard Parish must also have a say.

Not all those who have been displaced will choose to come back to New
Orleans. But anyone who does choose to return should be welcomed and treated
with dignity, regardless of race or income. This includes creating an
ecologically sustainable and socially just housing and urban densification
policy for the city. New Orleans should reconfigure in a more compact,
transit-oriented form on the natural levees and in the portion of the city
south of the Metairie-Esplanade-Chef Ridges. The rebuild would include housing,
retail, office, medical, educational, and all other daily urban needs. Housing
must include low-income and middle-income rentals. New Orleans had a
substantial tenant population, and these people must be allowed to return and
participate in the reconstruction of the city.

New Orleans should be rebuilt to a city of 500,000 that straddles the
Mississippi's natural levee from the St Charles Parish border with Kenner to
Chalmette on the East Bank and from Avondale to Algiers on the West Bank.
Parochial Parish lines between Orleans, Jefferson, and St Bernard would be
collapsed into one regional governance structure. Economic development should
focus on the port, eco-tourism, universities and education, shipbuilding,
limited oil-and-gas processing, and a sustainable seafood and local
agricultural base. The port would downsize but remain critical to the nation.

The reconfigured New Orleans will need significant amounts of inclusive
housing, built with solid craftsmanship from local resources and with local
labor. The rebuild should respect the traditional grid and original human scale
of the city, and not be characterized by garagescapes, trailer cities, or walls
of bleak high-rises. All new housing developments should provide for a range of
incomes and household sizes, from small efficiencies to 3-bedroom family
housing units.

New Orleans should be reconstructed. But large tracts of the city lay
well below sea level in vulnerable areas that should not be rebuilt. 50,000 to
150,000 homes were either destroyed or damaged beyond repair. Not only are
these sections of the city exposed to storm surges, they are now layered by the
toxic residue of sprawl – motor oil from 200,000+ cars, leaking gas stations,
refineries – the detritus of sprawl. It is just not right to allow people to
live atop toxic sludge, and it is negligent homicide to put people back into
the path of deadly storm surges. Instead the residents and businesses of the
low-lying flooded areas should be given priority to relocate into the higher
parts of the city.

All of this means that the natural levee and areas adjacent to it
should densify. The higher and more centrally located parts of the city should
be densified into the same sophistication and grace of the French Quarter,
minus the trashy tourist traps of Bourbon Street.

Vision
for Reconfiguring New Orleans

The challenge will be on how to infill, and this essay offers a
strategy. Instead of infilling in back yards, parks, and on existing, intact historic
properties, infill should focus on surface parking for automobiles. This
includes parking lots for shopping centers, churches, public institutions, and
schools. Thus, the reconstruction of New Orleans would not just include
densification and infill of the natural levee, but also a major re-orientation
of the city's transportation system. The re-oriented city should maximize
development on the surface parking lots which are scattered throughout the
city. A compact, walkable, transit-oriented city can rise, with bicycling given
pride of place. Rail transit will connect the city to Baton Rouge, Armstrong
Airport, and the rest of the Southeast. Rail will also operate as a much-needed
tool for evacuation when the next storm arrives.

Not all spaces along the natural levee would be suitable for
densification. There remain expanses of existing housing stock that should not
be razed, replaced, or altered (but rather repaired). However, there are
numerous opportunity sites along the natural levee that should be targeted for
densification following New Urbanist / Smart Growth strategies. These are
mostly spaces for automobiles, or architecturally insignificant structures such
as automobile-oriented strip shopping centers. What follows is rough sketch of
spaces along the natural levee, from Uptown to the Bywater, that should be
considered for densification in New Orleans.

Uptown
& Garden District

Tchoupitoulas
Corridor

All along the Tchoupitoulas corridor there are docks, rail yards, and
warehouses that are vital to the port. These functions should be preserved. Yet
there are portions of the docks that are not vital to the port and the port has
been systematically downsizing activity along the Uptown portion of the New
Orleans waterfront over the last several decades. This is due partly to
technological changes in shipping and consolidation at key docks, such as the
Nashville Avenue Wharf. Before Katrina, automobile-oriented strip shopping
centers were replacing port functions. The Tchoupitoulas corridor provides a significant
opportunity for densification and redevelopment – in areas not vital to the
port. Automobile-oriented strip shopping centers such as the Save-A-Center on
Napoleon (across from Tipitina's) and the Riverside Market at Jefferson Ave
should be demolished or substantially renovated. High-density mixed-use
developments should replace the surface parking. Taller buildings (perhaps 5-10
stories?) could be constructed directly in those sections of the port no longer
in use. Care should be taken not tocreate
a wall of high-rises along the corridor, and inclusion of pedestrian-scale
street-level activity should be required in designs.

A new bus rapid transit (BRT) line would be constructed in the
corridor. This would include signal priority, bus platforms, a prepaid ticket
structure and other techniques designed to make transit comfortable,
convenient, and faster than current bus service. BRT would run between Audubon
Park to Canal Street [Alternatively, a light-rail line could be established
using some of the tracks of the Belt Line railway, but the Belt Line railway
would also continue to serve the port]. Full 5-foot bike lanes would be
constructed along the entire length of corridor. One travel lane in each
direction would be preserved for cars, with maximum speed limits of 20 mph. A
new riverside park would be constructed in the corridor on a portion of the
docks not deemed vital for the port. As much as possible, public right of way
would be returned along the entire riverfront with a bike path, pedestrian
promenade, and landscaping. Emphasis would be on re-establishing links to the
river, but also re-establishing links to the port activity.

Lower
Garden District

In the last 10 years, the St Thomas housing projects have been removed
and replaced with a Wal-Mart and suburban-style apartments. The trajectory of
this redevelopment should be changed. The Wal-Mart should be razed and replaced
with a high-density, mixed-use development served by frequent transit and
pedestrian-oriented. This treatment should extend into the Thalia / Robin St
wharves area. This area, where the convention center has marshalling yards and
where there are extensive vacant lots, should be targeted for intensive
densification. Land should also be set aside for a new public park and recreation
area.

Magazine
corridor

The neighborhood-scale shopping character of the Magazine corridor
should be preserved and emphasis should be on locally-owned small businesses.
There are limited opportunity sites for redevelopment on Magazine St, including
the A & P parking lot at Pleasant St in the Garden District, several
churches along Magazine, and some parking in the vicinity of Valence St Uptown.
(There is also a strip center on Prytania St)

Magazine Street should have frequent and fast bus service using transit
priority technology. This includes priority at signals and removal of on-street
parking in some places to enable buses to skip traffic queues. Bus service on
Magazine would extend to Leake Avenue and Carrolton. The provision of bicycle
lanes on Magazine would be difficult because of street widths. Instead of bike
lanes, bicycle "sharrows" would be used, and automobile speed limits
kept at 20 miles per hour. Significant traffic calming would be deployed to
make both cycling and walking safer and enjoyable.

Audubon Zoo – parking lot should be converted into public
swimming pool and public recreation area. Zoo should focus on wetland
rehabilitation.

Carrollton

There are numerous infill opportunity sites in the Carrollton area of
Uptown New Orleans. The Riverbend center on Carrolton @ St Charles should be
replaced with a 3-4 story building to enhance the neighborhood shopping
district while enabling housing. Smaller parcels such as the Burger King and
gas stations should be replaced with infill. [New Orleans will need far fewer
gas stations, providing many opportunity sites for infill on smaller parcels].
The supermarket and car-oriented businesses on Claiborne @ Carrolton should be
dramatically reconfigured to a pedestrian-oriented neighborhood center with
dense infill housing and a revitalized Palmer Park. Claiborne Ave would be
narrowed to create a denser neighborhood commercial center. The median
greenspace would used for a bike and pedestrian path.

Tulane
& Loyola Universities

Education will be a vital part of the New Orleans economy in the
future. However, all Tulane and Loyola parking lots should be utilized for
infill. Student housing, faculty housing, and staff housing should get priority
to keep employees & students close to work.

St Charles
Corridor

The historic streetcar would remain intact on St Charles Avenue, with
large bike lanes added along theentire
length of the Avenue. A transit priority treatment along the corridor would
speed up travel times between Carrolton and Canal St. Additional streetcars
would be added (similar to the Czech streetcars considered in 2000). Much of
the densification in Uptown sections of St Charles would focus on church
parking lots. Other smaller opportunities include the drug stores on Napoleon
and Louisiana Aves, which would be reconstructed to provide mixed-use infill.
In Uptown, much of the built environment of St Charles would remain as is.
Further towards downtown, St Charles from Jackson Avenue to Lee Circle would
receive full densification / infill treatment on all non-historic structures
(there are many of them in this stretch). This includes the empty parcels north
of St Charles Avenue heading into Central City.

CBD –
Warehouse District

The CBD would undergo massive transformation. Much of the financial,
service, and oil-and-gas related office work will likely leave New Orleans.
With information technology and the mobility of capital, New Orleans should not
expect to rival Atlanta or Houston in terms of office jobs. Expect Baton Rouge
to become the state's financial and office-worker hub. New Orleans already had
a glut of office space in the CBD. It is time to remove the high-rise office
buildings and re-orient the economy. To be sure, the CBD would remain the
regional government, banking and branch-office center, but at a considerably
smaller scale.

Superdome
Area

The Superdome and adjacent Hyatt Regency complex should be demolished
and replaced with high-density transit-oriented development. This redevelopment
would include a new neighborhood park and would be located adjacent to a new
passenger rail station (built as extension to existing Union Station). [Let the
Saints leave. Do not subsidize professional sports.] The existing basketball
arena should be preserved if useable, and used as civic auditorium and public
gathering place.

A new passenger rail and transit center would be constructed adjacent
to the existing Union Station on Loyola Avenue. The rail station would have
regular, frequent, fast, 24-hour service to Armstrong Airport and Baton Rouge.
It would be served by high-speed rail linking New Orleans to Houston, Atlanta,
and Jackson. Commuter rail would link New Orleans to Baton Rouge, the River
Parishes, Hammond, and the North Shore. [These areas would experience
population increases as many people in the sprawl around New Orleans would
relocate and sprawl would be converted back into cypress swamps or marsh - see
below]. The station would be the primary entry point for all tourists coming
into the city, including tourists who fly using Armstrong Airport. Air rights
over tracks would be used to create a new major retail center for the greater
New Orleans area. The station would be modeled after stations such as Zurich
Main Station. Most of the city's bus and streetcar routes would be re-oriented
to focus on the new station to make intermodal connections seamless. Loyola
Avenue, Poydras, Canal, Howard Ave., and other streets would be transit
priority streets. A large bicycle parking facility would also be constructed at
the station, and housing located in the vicinity.

The viaduct leading to the Crescent City Connection, and the bridge
itself, would be retrofit to handle light-rail vehicles linking the new station
to Algiers and the natural levee communities of the West Bank (Gretna. Marrero,
Westwego).

Office functions would re-orient from Poydras Street to Loyola Avenue,
proximate to the new train station, City and State government offices and
medical centers. The University of New Orleans, currently located on the
Lakefront, would be moved to downtown in the Poydras corridor. The new campus
would build in the blocks that are currently occupied by high-rise office
towers such as One Shell Square and Place St Charles. An urban campus would
focus on sustainable urbanism, social sciences, engineering, humanities, arts
and music. Substantial new housing would be constructed in the Poydras-Canal
street area of the CBD. Concomitant with the relocation of UNO, removal of most
high-rise office buildings in the CBD would include replacing them with 4-5
story buildings with mixes of office, housing, and retail. Mixed-income housing
would be a priority. The Lower Warehouse District has scattered surface
parking. All surface parking should be converted to mixed-income housing for
residents working in the downtown area. A new park would also be constructed on
a designated surface parking lot.

With the future restructuring of airlines and peaking of oil, the
large-convention industry can be expected to experience decline. The Morial
Convention Center would downsize and focus on smaller-sized conventions and
professional meetings. The city would downsize its reliance on large-scale
conventions and instead specialize on smaller gatherings.

Harrah's casino should be renovated into a Museum of the Mississippi
Valley. The museum would focus on river and wetland ecology, urbanism on the
River and human-environment relationships, Native American, Cajun, Creole,
African-American, and ethnic European cultural influences on the city and have
a special scale model of New Orleans in the 20th century as part of a
historical exhibit. The International Trade Mart would be demolished and
replaced with a park integrating the Museum of the Mississippi Valley with the
River.

French
Quarter – Treme – Bywater

French
Quarter

The entire French Quarter would be turned into a
pedestrian/bicycle-only zone. Limited access for deliveries, shuttle buses, and
taxis would be allowed. Decatur St would be designated a transit priority
street and have wide bicycle lanes along its full length. Surface parking on
the river side of Decatur St would be replaced with low-rise mixed-use
developments, including housing for tourist-related employees. The aquarium
should be moved to the Audubon zoo if it is damaged beyond repair, and a new
ecologically sustainable exhibit created at the zoo.

The new Desire streetcar should be constructed on Rampart St, with the
route heading east along St Claude Ave into Bywater, and west towards the new
passenger rail station. This streetcar would be the focus of redevelopment.
Infill housing should be constructed at the Esplanade intersection with Rampart
and at other smaller surface parking lots in the area. A new National Jazz
Historic District would be established.

Treme

The Iberville and Lafitte housing projects would be preserved for
historical significance and converted into mixed-income housing. The Winn Dixie
center and former train depot would be converted to high-density mixed-use
development, and Armstrong Park would remove its gates and become a true neighborhood
park and recreation center.

Behind Treme, the elevated expressway along Claiborne Avenue would be
removed. With substantially less parking in the city, and thus less reliance on
automobility, a 6-lane expressway gutting the city is not needed. Treme will be
stitched back together and a new boulevard along Claiborne established.
Businesses along the corridor would mix with new housing. A streetcar or bus
rapid-transit line would run on Claiborne from North Bywater, through Treme, to
the passenger rail station, and then into Uptown along South Claiborne Avenue,
creating a new transit-oriented development axis in the city.

Marigny-Bywater

Like other parts of the natural levee, much of Marigny and Bywater
survived the storm intact. However, there are some limited-opportunity sites
for densification and infill. Along the Peters-Decatur section of Marigny, for
example, there are multiple vacant lots and surface parking areas. The port has
also experienced downsizing and de-industrialization in this area. If the port
does re-locate activity from here, the removal of wharves and warehouses should
be replaced with high-density mixed-use developments. The riverfront streetcar
should also be extended. A new park in what is known as "Dog Park" on
Spain @ Peters should be established to ensure that with densification comes
public benefit. If the wharves are removed, the public right of way along the
entire length of the River in Bywater should be reestablished with a bike path,
landscaping, and pedestrian promenade. The intersection of St Claude and
Elysian Fields should be narrowed, made pedestrian and bicycle friendly, and
converted into a medium-density mixed-use development. The streetcar down St
Claude to the Industrial Canal would be the focus of redevelopment and
densification on non-historic parcels. Lastly, the Naval Station on Poland
Avenue would be replaced by a high-density mixed-use development.

Reconfiguration
of Urban Space in Greater New Orleans

The thrust of the densification and infill strategy for the natural
levee in New Orleans would be removing the spaces of automobiles. Automobiles
consume vast amounts of space in the aggregate. Each car parking space is on
average 250-350 square feet. 3 parking spaces make up an adequate 2-bedroom
apartment. Vast spaces on the natural levee of New Orleans could be used in a
more efficient, ecologically sustainable, and socially just way.

With the removal of automobile parking, access to most daily activities
in New Orleans will have to be by other means than automobiles.
Pedestrian-oriented mixed-use infill would make it practical and comfortable to
meet daily needs by walking for local errands, for recreation, and for some, to
work or school. Complementing the enhanced pedestrian realm would be a dense,
high-frequency, 24-hour transit system. This system would include expanded
streetcar service, bus rapid transit, local shuttle buses, and demand response
transit. Additionally, a comprehensive bike network, including bike lanes on
key streets, bike paths, and extensive, safe, practical bicycle parking, would
be essential. Bicycle movements would have priority over private automobiles in
most street space allocations. City-wide speed limits for automobiles would be
reduced to no more than 20 miles per hour. System-wide traffic calming
techniques would be deployed. Overall the compact city would replace car space
with space for housing and human-scale activity, and make it safer and more
convenient for transit, biking, and walking. Limited parking would be reserved
for car sharing pods, persons with special needs, deliveries, and taxi stands.
For those who insist on owning a car, garages would be constructed outside of
the city, near the Armstrong Airport, accessible by frequent train service. For
a fee, the cars can be stored there for when they are needed.

Practically and symbolically, removing the spaces of automobility would
also acknowledge the profound role that excessive automobility had in creating
the conditions of this disaster. The oil and gas extraction in Louisiana's
wetlands and Gulf Coast left New Orleans and Louisiana more vulnerable to
surges, and accelerated coastal erosion. The paving over of vast cypress swamps
and marshes to accommodate low-density, automobile-oriented sprawl meant that
New Orleans effectively over-extended its levee protection system and paved
over its natural sponge - the backswamps. Massive levees along the Mississippi
held back vital sediments from replenishing marshes and swamps. These levees
exist primarily to protect the petroleum industry and shipping, and to enable
greater real-estate development in the lower Mississippi Basin. The levees are
not bad, but breaching them strategically is much needed, and this would come
at the expense of some developed land. For example, a managed breach in the
River Ridge area could help replenish wetlands along the Lakefront. Similarly
breaches in St Bernard Parish will be needed to replenish marshes along Lake
Borgne. Breaches on the West Bank to replenish wetlands to the South of the
city would also be necessary. Cleaning the River of toxic filth is also a
priority, and inextricably bound to the petroleum-automobility complex.

Moreover, global warming and sea-level rise threaten the city. Warming
produces more intense hurricanes while also accelerating coastal erosion. 25%
of the greenhouse gases produced globally come from the US. A significant
portion of this is from automobile emissions. If the US is to seriously address
global warming, it must reduce dependence on automobility, and this means
reconfiguring urban space in the manners outlined above. For this reason, the
vision for rebuilding New Orleans includes a vision for all of South Louisiana,
with a regional approach.

A
Regional Vision

For too long Louisiana has been divided between metropolitan versus
rural, city versus suburb, and Baton Rouge versus New Orleans. This political
fragmentation and lack of regional cooperation has been counterproductive.
Flooding, winds, and pollution do not know these boundaries. Segregation by
race and class has been bolstered by these barriers. It is time to bring these
petty boundaries down and cooperate regionally, including coordinating
transportation, healthcare, education, and most importantly, flood protection
and ecological restoration of the coastal wetlands, the Mississippi Delta, and
the Atchafalaya Basin.

The regional ecological restoration would address the present course of
the Mississippi, which is channelized by levees, contributing to wetland loss,
subsidence, and the toxic dead zone in the Gulf. To begin, a greater portion of
the Mississippi River would be diverted into the Atchafalaya. The flow down the
Mississippi would be preserved but significantly reduced. About 60-70% of the
total flow at Old River (in Point Coupee / Concordia Parishes) would flow
eventually down the Atchafalaya. The channels would be managed slowly and
carefully. A remaining 30-40% flow would continue down the present Mississippi.

This management of the Mississippi-Atchafalaya would impact commerce on
the river. A new port complementing New Orleans and Baton Rouge would be
constructed on the Atchafalaya at a suitable site, roughly near New Iberia or
Franklin. Instead of building a single mega-port, a network of ports - New
Orleans, River Parishes, Baton Rouge, and the Atchafalaya port - would operate
as a single Southeast Louisiana regional port authority. These ports would not
be in competition, but rather operated by one authority in coordination and
cooperation.

While the compact, reconfigured New Orleans would be surrounded by a
tighter and stronger levee system, the region would include cloistering on the
natural levees of the Mississippi in towns between New Orleans and Baton Rouge
– the River Parishes. Such towns as Laplace, Gramercy, Reserve, and Hahnville
would have tightly managed growth boundaries to ensure that agricultural lands
on the natural levee are preserved. Along the Mississippi River north and south
of New Orleans, the levees would be breached and spillways for spring floods
constructed, aiding in replenishment of wetlands. Elevated causeways for rail
and highway would be constructed.

Regenerated cypress swamps and replenished marshes would characterize
vast portions of the region. A new civil conservation corps would not only
manage these vital wetlands, but educate and instill pride in our habitat. The
wetlands of South Louisiana should be integrated into a new National Park that
functions as a buffer against future storm surges, a flood control basin for
regular stormwater runoff from built-up areas, a natural filter for
human-produced waste, and as vital habitat for our seafood industries and
timber supply and a major eco-tourism destination. Within this new national
park, substantial areas would be set aside as wilderness areas. Toxic oil and
gas sites would be cleaned up across the region, and the matrix of petroleum
access canals capped and plugged to stave off further saltwater intrusion.

A regional governance structure would coordinate the revitalization of
Southeast Louisiana. The backbone of this regionalism, along with a regional
port authority and regional conservation effort, would be a regional passenger
and freight rail network that focuses development around stations. [A model
could be the Swiss rail system and Switzerland's rail-focused development
policies.] Baton Rouge would be the center of a regional high-frequency
passenger rail system connecting to New Orleans and the River Parishes,
Houston, Dallas, Jackson-Memphis, and the Gulf Coast.

With the establishment of a passenger [and freight] rail system as the
spine of this new regionalism, Baton Rouge, like New Orleans, should also
densify. Baton Rouge should be reconfigured into a compact city of 800,000 to 1
million. The Baton Rouge economy would function as a regional commercial, government,
and service hub. Information, government, education, refining, petrochemicals,
food processing, freight distribution, and a minor port would also make up a
diversified 21st-century economy. A new rail station should be constructed in
downtown Baton Rouge to anchor a high density housing and retail-services
center. Downtown Baton Rouge would be the location of regional offices and
producer services.

While the city of Baton Rouge would experience major densification,
that densification would minimize direct physical impact on existing
neighborhoods and instead be concentrated along the city's arterial roads.
Areas of densification would include: Florida Boulevard, I-10 Corridor, Airline
Highway, I-12 corridor, Scenic Highway corridor, Nicholson, Essen Lane,
Bluebonnet, Siegen Lane, College Avenue, Scenic Highway, and similar corridors.
New Urbanist designs would be organized with height limits
of 4 stories along arterials. Buildings would include 3 floors of housing and
ground floor retail. Little parking would be provided. Development along
arterials would be transit oriented. Bus rapid transit, with priority bus
lanes, signal priority, proof-of-payment and low-floor platforms would be
constructed throughout the city. The city would also build a comprehensive
network of bike lanes and sidewalks. Densification in single-detached
neighborhoods would be allowed but with reduced height limits and under New
Urbanist guidelines for residential infill.

This same pattern would characterize the infilling of Hammond,
Covington, and Slidell. Compact development would focus on the passenger rail
line from Baton Rouge to Florida, Parallel to I-12. The economy of this region
would center on services, farming, food processing, and light manufacturing.
Like Baton Rouge and the Hammond-North Shore corridor, Lafayette would absorb
some of the displaced population from Greater New Orleans (but Baton Rouge
would be the regional center). Lafayette would densify with minimal expansion
of its physical footprint, with new development focused on arterials, following
New Urbanist guidelines. Transit and bicycle networks would be created and
expanded.

Funding

To finance this vision, a bold approach is needed. A national gas tax
would be established. The climbing gas prices the nation is experiencing should
be capped by price controls, and a tax of 50 cents per gallon established, with
low-income households exempt. Louisiana, more than any other state in the
nation, has borne the brunt of the consequences of decades of oil and gas extraction
and ecological destruction. Louisiana and New Orleans have experienced a
traumatic failure of the policies of promoting and subsidizing low-density,
automobile-oriented sprawl, of refusing to cooperate globally on climate change
and refusing to regulate carbon emissions, and of policies that allowed much of
New Orleans's poor to be left behind while sprawl was subsidized. It is time
for the nation to give something back. The tax would not simply generate
revenue, but would provide a way to truly address myriad ecological and social
problems faced by New Orleans, Louisiana, and the nation. A 50-cent national
gas tax for the revitalization of New Orleans and Louisiana is a good place to
start.