Student protests calling for reform in Iran came to a screeching halt in late
June after 10 days of unrest. A large segment of the Iranian population wants
to reform the country's 24-year-old Islamist regime, but that does not necessarily
mean replacing it with a Western-style democracy. In studying the Iranian political
landscape, it becomes clear that most reformers -- unlike the student protesters
and their allies in some civil society groups -- are not in favor of doing away
with the current system and establishing a liberal democracy. Instead, most
Iranians want to curtail the arbitrary power of the traditional clerics and
set up an Islamic democracy.

Analysis

Calls for reforming the Islamist political system, such as those that culminated
in 10 days of student protests in mid-June, have become ever more insistent
-- both in and outside the country -- since the mid-1990s. The reform movement
has matured over this period, and it has organized several waves of protests.
However, the government thus far has been able to contain the movement with
relative ease. Not only is this a measure of the government's power, but it
also highlights the amorphous nature of the reform movement -- which lacks leadership,
organization and direction, making it easy for Tehran to contain.

Officials in Iran's judiciary, which is a bastion of religious conservatism,
estimate that 4,000 people were detained during last months demonstrations,
which ended June 20. These protests were marked by unprecedented slogans targeting
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and fierce clashes between hard-line Islamist
vigilantes and demonstrators.

Despite the number of arrests, these protests were relatively small, with only
a few thousand participants. Western media, however, portrayed the protests
as a possible step toward the overthrow of the Islamist regime. This perception
likely stems from two things: the memory of the 1978-79 revolution in Tehran
(one of the biggest news items to hit the Western press about Iran), and an
imperfect understanding of the relationship between the modernists -- led by
President Mohammad Khatami -- and the traditionalists, led by Khamenei. Outside
observers see Khatami and Khamenei as opponents rather than competitors who
agree on the rules of the game. In reality, neither the modernists nor the traditionalists
are willing to let the system sink.

The most recent protests -- with many participants calling for an outright
overthrow of the regime -- show that a small but radical faction that is increasingly
disillusioned with Khatamis potential to effect change has emerged within
the overall reform movement. However, apart from student demonstrators, there
was not much support among the Iranian masses for last months protests,
which petered out relatively quickly. There are three possible explanations
for this:

1) The government crackdown was severe enough to scare the protesters into
giving up.

2) The protesters do not enjoy the support of the larger, mainstream reform
movement, which wants to change the system rather than topple it.

3) With the United States surrounding Iran on all four sides, national security
is a higher priority than reform for most of the population right now.

The presence of a large U.S. military force encircling Iran has kept the masses
-- as well as the reformists -- from voicing any serious dissent. On the other
hand, there simply is not enough widespread popular support for a complete overthrow
of the current Iranian political system. Mainstream activists want to reform
the current system from within, not to replace it with a more Western-style
system.

Most Iranian reformists do not want to subvert the Islamist system; they only
wish to curtail the arbitrary power of the unelected traditionalist mullahs.
And the reform movement as a whole is not a secular movement. It is a moderate
strand within Iranian Islamism that is trying to negotiate modernity with tradition,
and hence advance a contemporary interpretation of Islam instead of applying
medieval prescriptions to a modern reality. Most Western, and particularly U.S.,
observers tend to miss this distinction -- seeing a reform movement as intrinsically
linked to a shift closer to Western ideas on governance, or as bringing about
at least the possibility of an uprising against an oppressive (Islamist) government,
which fits with the Western perception of Iran.

The various factions in Iran likely are conscious of this perception and tailor
it to their advantage in their international dealings. Many Iranian officials
give the impression that they are quite liberal when catering to an international
audience. These attempts to present a less-than-accurate, moderate image of
themselves reinforce the simplified understanding prevalent in the West.

This perception is guiding Washington's current attempts to foment unrest in
Iran. U.S. government sources report that they expect a wave of demonstrations
to sweep Iran on July 9 -- the anniversary of the 1999 student protests. Given
that the sources claim to have foreknowledge that demonstrations are certain,
it can reasonably be concluded that the unrest will be planned and orchestrated
rather than spontaneous.

This does not mean that the U.S. administration wants to overthrow the government
in Tehran -- at least not immediately - since it still could serve some
purposes for the Bush administration. Instead, Washington likely is attempting
to rattle the Iranian regime by threat or by action, hoping to bring officials
to the negotiating table for a quid pro quo on Iraq.

The question is whether the expectations of unrest will come to fruition, given
the alignment of forces within Iran. Student leaders on July 8 reportedly pledged
to defy an official ban on protests, but in light of all the factors at play,
any demonstrations that do erupt are likely to be small and easily contained.

By attempting to stir up domestic problems for Tehran, the Bush administration
likely is seeking leverage to convince the regime to help craft a solution to
the guerrilla insurgency in Iraq. Since the U.S. administration views the Iraqi
resistance as a mainly Sunni initiative, officials likely believe they can counter
the uprising by bringing Iran to the table to use its influence with the Shiites.
This plan seems plausible, considering that Shiites constitute a 60 percent
majority in Iraq. By including Iran in the negotiations, the United States likely
will avert the possibility that the Shiites -- who are growing restless with
the U.S. occupation -- might join the mostly Sunni resistance movement.

Even if the United States solicits and receives Iranian assistance with the
guerrilla war in Iraq, however, there remains the problem of the oversimplified
Western view of the situation inside Iran. In essence, the issue is perception
versus misperception. The reformist camp in Iran wants democratic consolidation,
rule of law and civil liberties -- but most reformists and their supporters
do not want to achieve these goals at the expense of the Islamic fabric of the
regime. Instead, they wish to curtail the arbitrary and unbridled power of a
clergy that is unique to Shiite Islam and Iran.