Prof. Eric Steinhart (C) 1998

Reasoning by Analogy about Others

How do you know what's going on inside somebody else's head? You aren't
aware of their thoughts in the same way as you're aware of your own. It's
a mystery; your clues are their bodily behaviors and your own understanding
of how your mind relates to your body. So, you reason by analogy: other
minds are to their bodies as my mind is to my body.

From subjective observation I know that A [thirst], which is a thought
or feeling, causes B [drinking], which is a bodily act . . . I know also
that, whenever B is an act of my own body, A is its cause. I now observe
an act of the kind B in a body not my own, and I am having no thought or
feeling of the kind A. But I still believe, on the basis of self-observation,
that only A can cause B; I therefore infer that there was an A which caused
B, though it was not an A that I could observe. On this ground I infer
that other people's bodies are associated with minds, which resemble mind
in proportion as their bodily behavior resembles my own. [1]

Thinking about Others in terms of our Selves

We think about others in terms of our selves. Each person has a model
of himself or herself (self-consciousness) that he or she uses to interpret
the behavior of others.

1. THESIS: Consciousness of self as self: Thinking of your self in terms
of your self. If I'm thirsty, then I drink something.

2. ANTITHESIS: Consciousness of other as other; consciousness of not-self
as not-self: Thinking of the other in terms of the other. You're drinking
something.

3. SYNTHESIS: Consciousness of other as self; consciousness of not-self
as self: Thinking of the other in terms of the self. Therefore, you're
thirsty.

Put two people together and each thinks of the other in terms of self;
but now there are two selves hence two others. Everything is doubled, like
two mirrors face-to-face.

He thinks about her in terms of himself:

1. If my head itches, then I scratch it.

2. She's scratching her head.

3. Her head itches.

She thinks about him in terms of herself:

1. If I'm tired, then I yawn.

2. He's yawning.

3. He's tired.

Thousands of years of marriage have demonstrated that this sort of dialectic
is far from absolute knowledge. Believe me. Try to learn something
here. You'll probably be tested later.

Confrontation; Domination; Submission; Cooperation

Hegel is about to discuss his famous master / slave dialectic. It's what
happens when two self-consciousnesses confront one another: each thinks
about the other in terms of the self.

The two self-consciousnesses are like mirrors of one another. Each mirror
reflects the other; but it also reflects the other reflecting itself; it
reflects the other reflecting itself reflecting the other. This goes on
and on and it produces both frenzy and paralysis. The only way to break
the mirroring is to fight: the winner is the master, the loser is the slave.
But this is an incomplete solution. In the end, the two self-consciousnesses
need to learn how to cooperate.

It's important to see that Hegel thinks the master / slave relation is
primitive: it's a defective form of self-consciousness whose logic is self-defeating,
so that it renders itself logically obsolete and is superseded by the superior
form of self-consciousness that is economic cooperation.

Thesis: The Symmetry of Equality

178. If nobody ever acknowledged your existence, you wouldn't exist as
a person. You'd just be a personless body. Hegel puts it like this: "Self-consciousness
exists in and for itself when . . . it so exists for another; that is, it
exists only in being acknowledged." Suppose nobody else ever talked
to you or interacted with you. In some cultures (like the Pennsylvania Deutsch),
one way of punishing people is to "shun" them: refuse to speak
to them, refuse to eat with them, never touch anything they've touched,
never hand them anything. Shunning is far crueler and more effective as
a threat than jail or even a beating.

179. Put two self-consciousnesses face-to-face and it's like putting
two mirrors face-to-face: each reflects itself in the other, each sees itself
in the other. Its like this: I know; you know; I know that you know; you
know that I know; I know that you know that I know; you know that I know
that you know -- this goes on and on, and nobody can stand it.

180-181. At first the encounter between the two self-consciousness is
perfectly symmetrical: the self-consciousnesses are so far exactly identical,
so they can't distinguish themselves from one another. Am I you? Are you
me? So far, there's nothing to differentiate us. We're totally alike. So
we're not different persons; the symmetry destroys our personal identities.
This is torture: each wants to be its own person, and so wants to end the
symmetry by establishing an asymmetric relation. Each wants to dominate
the other ("supersede this otherness of itself"). The tension
builds.

182-183. Domination and submission are based on useful action involving
objects of natural biological desire. How would I know if I were the dominant
person? Because while I would do things FOR MY SELF, you would also do everything
FOR MY SELF and not for your self. I would live strictly FOR MY SELF; you
would live FOR ANOTHER. You would not live for yourself at all. Since you
will do everything for my self and nothing for your self, you will effectively
cease to live. You will have no life of your own; you'll be dead.

184. The dialectic of Force and the Understanding is repeated here at
a higher level. Now, forces are not merely physical like in electricity,
but they are conscious forces that are able to recognize each other: "They
recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another."

185-186. Tension builds. The symmetry of mutual recognition is unstable.
The symmetry must be broken so that of the two opposed self-consciousnesses,
one is going to be only recognized (master), the other only recognizing
(slave).

Antithesis: The Asymmetry of Master and Slave

187. The only way to settle the matter is in a fight to the death, in
which one self-consciousness wins (lives) and the other loses (dies). the
relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they have to
settle their equal oppositio by means of a life-and-death struggle -- a
dialectical death-match! Freedom can only be won by risking one's whole
life, by holding nothing back.

188. The problem is that if one self-consciousness kills the other, the
dead self-consciousness can't do anything at all, so it can't do anything
for the other. In order to be FOR ANOTHER, self-consciousness has to be
somewhat FOR ITSELF. If the one kills the other, it thereby destroys its
own freedom, since there's nobody there to recognize it's triumphant victory.
You can't rule corpses: a dead servant does not obey anybody and so is free.
Simply killing the other in the life-or-death combat is an "abstract
negation"; it is "not the negation coming from consciousness,
which supersedes in such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superseded,
and consequently survives its own supersession." It's like playing
a game of chicken: both contestants know that one of them has to surrender
or they'll both die. The pressure on each to surrender increases.

189. Each self-consciousness realizes that it needs both its own life
and the life of the other. Their relation in the life-or-death contest is
unstable, but at some point one side gives in and surrenders. At this point,
the victor has the right to kill the one who surrendered; but of course,
the victor realizes that killing the loser would be futile. What the victor
wants is recognition, acknowledgement of the victory. You can't be admired
by a corpse, so the victor spares the loser's life. The victor does not
kill, but rather enslaves the loser. One of the two self-consciousnesses
"is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for
itself, the other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature
is simply to live or to be for another. The former is lord, the other is
bondsman."

190. The slave WORKS for the master. Before, the master couldn't have
his or her desires satisfied just by wishing (i.e. by speaking); but now
all he or she has to do is to give a command to the slave, and the desire
is satisfied. Mere desire doesn't satisfy itself, because the object of
desire is stubborn (food doesn't cook itself: "Desire failed to do
this [to satisfy itself without effort] because of the thing's independence;
but the lord, who has interposed the bondsman between [the object of desire]
and himself, takes to himself only the dependent aspect of the thing and
has the pure enjoyment of it. The aspect of its dependence he leaves to
the bondsman, who works on it." So, the master says: "Feed me!"
and the slave cooks dinner, so that all the master has to do is effortlessly
eat and enjoy.

191. The symmetric opposition of self-consciousness is now broken; it
is asymmetric: "The outcome is a recognition that is one-sided and
unequal." The slave is like a mirror that reflects the master; but
the master is like a mirror that reflects only his or her own image.

Synthesis: The Symmetry of Cooperation

192. It might seem like the master's got it made: the slave does all
his or her work, and recognizes the master's power. The problem is, this
isn't the kind of recognition that the master wanted. The master wanted
to be recognized by somebody that he or she respects as an equal, as a peer.
Instead, the master gets recognition only from a slave, and the master knows
that the slave doesn't really respect him or her, but resents and hates
the master.

193. Indeed, the tables are going to turn on the master. For the master
more and more depends on the slave. The master forgets how to hunt, how
to cook. The master gets fat and lazy. Meanwhile, the slave grows stronger
and more skilled. The slave is gradually being "transformed into a
truly independent consciousness."

194. The life-or-death struggle is what distinguished one self-consciousness
as master and the other as slave. It was fear of death that decided the
contest. It might seem like the master was able to bear this fear more than
the slave, since the slave surrendered in the face of death. But in fact,
the master never really confronted death: only the slave confronted death.
The master got off without looking death in the face, since the slave did
it first. The slave "has experienced the fear of death, the absolute
Lord. . . . [this] absolute melting away of everything stable, is the simple,
essential nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, pure being-for-self,
which consequently is implicit in [the consciousness of the slave]. Through
his service he rids himself of his attachment to natural existence in every
single detail; and gets rid of it by working on it." The real power
of self-consciousness, the "absolute negativity" that is able
to transform things, belongs more and more to the slave.

195. Work involves discipline and skill. As the slave becomes more disciplined
and skilled, his or her power balances that of the master. Immediately after
the life-or-death struggle, the master controls the slave and the master
is independent; the slave is controlled by the master and the slave is dependent.
But now things are equalized: the master controls the slave, but the master
is dependent; the slave is controlled by the master, but the slave is independent.
The dialectic has balanced the relations between master and slave. Ironically,
this is what the master wanted in the first place: the master didn't really
want a slave, but respect from a peer.

196. The slave turns into an independent craftsperson and so gains a
mind and will of his or her own. But the craftsperson's skill is limited
(e.g. to being a cook, a hunter, a shoemaker, a farmer). So "having
a 'mind of one's own' is self-will, a freedom which is still enmeshed in
servitude. . . it is a skill which is a master over some things, but not
over the universal power and the whole of objective being." The result
of the slave's turning into a craftsperson is that the master also turns
into one: the master and slave both realize that they each benefit more
from mutual exchange of services rather than from domination. Political
domination turns into economic cooperation.