The predominant movement in today‘s English-speaking philosophical
culture is toward an increasing fragmentation of the subject into a set of
highly professional specialisms and quasi-scientific and highly technical
sub-disciplines whose connection with a “way of life” is virtually nil – except
in the minimal sense that achieving the relevant qualifications and mastering
the relevant intellectual techniques is how their practitioners happen to earn
their living. If anyone today were to ask whether a member of a modern
philosophy department can hope to “live better” than a lawyer, say, or a member
of a metallurgy department, the question would in all probability be taken to
be merely about relative salary and career prospects [Cottingham, 148-149].

Philosophy as therapy is a
countermovement to this “culture”, which roots in ancient ways to do
philosophy.

Type of problem

- What is philosophy as therapy?

- What is the difference between modern and ancient therapy.

- What is the relation between
philosophical therapy and psychotherapy?

Definition

The shortest definition of philosophy as therapy is philosophy
as a means to cure (or reduce) suffering.

In ancient times doing
philosophy was a way of life; it was not restricted to an
intellectual discipline [Hadot].

Difference between modern and ancient therapy

The history of philosophical therapy is a movement

- from the biological self to an enhanced
perception – respectively dissolution – of the self (Buddhism, Stoicism)

- and then all the way back to the
reconstruction of the biological self (Nietzsche, Freud)

On the way back the focus – which was on the control of desires –
shifts to the liberation of repressed desires. Obviously in ancient
times the main risk was to be misguided by passions, whereas modern therapists
focus on the risks of repression.

Relation to psychotherapy

The analogy with medicine – i.e. the
structure constituted by the three concepts health ideal, disease and process
of treatment – does not adequately represent the
diversity of philosophical therapy. There are significant disanalogies
concerning the conception of psychological health, moral questions, beliefs and
diagnosis.

The delineation between philosophical therapy and psychotherapy is
vague insofar, as philosophical methods like maieutics, hermeneutics and the change of perception are also used in psychotherapy. Philosophical
therapy competes with psychotherapy mainly in the counseling of mentally sane
people.

For the contemporary practice we suggest a typology of therapies,
which is based on chances and risks. Relating the term therapy to suffering/risk opens a
door for people who seek philosophical assistance and do not associate their
condition with a disease. The reinterpretation of specific
desires/emotions (or suffering in general) as “disease” in ancient therapies is
first and foremost of historical interest.

The predominant
movement in today‘s English-speaking philosophical culture is toward an
increasing fragmentation of the subject into a set of highly professional
specialisms and quasi-scientific and highly technical sub-disciplines whose
connection with a “way of life” is virtually nil – except in the minimal sense
that achieving the relevant qualifications and mastering the relevant
intellectual techniques is how their practitioners happen to earn their living.
If anyone today were to ask whether a member of a modern philosophy department
can hope to “live better” than a lawyer, say, or a member of a metallurgy
department, the question would in all probability be taken to be merely about
relative salary and career prospects [Cottingham, 148-149].

Philosophy as
therapy is a countermovement to this “culture”,
which roots in ancient ways to do philosophy.

Type of
problem

- What is
philosophy as therapy?

- What is the
difference between modern and ancient therapy?

- What is the relation between philosophical therapy and
psychotherapy?

2. Basics

2.1 History

Etymology

The original
meaning of the word therapy is service or ministration and
the context was predominantly ancient worship (Ritter
1998, 1163). The term philosophical therapy is
therefore reminiscent of the close relation between philosophy and religion in
the antiquity (Clark 2010, 83) (Kapstein 2013, 99-100). Later the term included other types of services, in particular the
care for body and soul. Therapy in the sense of healing and curingis probably found for the first time in writings of the
Hellenistic Age. Curing the soul was traditionally seen as a task of the
philosophers and wise. The cure of mental suffering by means of counseling is
already mentioned with the Sophists and Platon (Ritter 1998, 1164).

Ancient India

Therapy begins
to be philosophical, if the cure of mental suffering includes critical-rational
thinking. Given this criterion the therapeutic function of philosophy can be
traced back to the Upanishads (Vedanta, last chapters of the vedas), in particular to the Samkhya doctrine, which provides the metaphysical background for the Yoga school [Soni, 219] and which is a possible
root of Buddhism [Baus 2006, 43-44].

The Upanishads are a collection of philosophical texts of Hinduism
and a part of the vedas. They developed out of Brahmanas (ritual texts) and are
partially prose, partially verse (…). The early Upanishads all predate the
Common Era, some in all likelihood pre-Buddhist and pre-Jain (7th-6th
century BCE) and therefore also pre-Socratic. In SanskritUpanishad literally means “to sit down close to” a guru (Upanishaden, Wikipedia) .

The Upanishads are a transitional form between the earlier vedas and
the critical rational thinking of early Buddhism and Jainism.

The topics are – in contrast to the earlier vedas – not of a sacral
or ritual nature. They address thinkers and seekers (Upanishaden, Wikipedia).

The Upanishads were, for centuries, memorized by each generation and
passed down verbally (Upanishads, Wikipedia).

Since the goal
of teaching was the liberation from suffering (moksha) the Upanishads can be associated with philosophical therapy
[Soni, 222, 231-232].

Knowing the
“supreme reality” means knowing the path to the liberation from suffering –
that is the claim of the Samkhya doctrine.

-With the mediation by a guru the Upanishads can be seen as precursors of guided therapies
and philosophical counseling.

-In the 4th century BC the
proliferation of new ideas was favored by the emergence of sutras
(textbooks). The written forms of the Upanishads can be seen as guidebooks for
self-therapy.

Middle East

The
Therapeutae were a Jewish sect which flourished in Alexandria and other parts of the Diaspora of Hellenistic Judaism in the final years of the Second Temple period. The term Therapeutes means one who is
attendant to the gods, although the term, and the related adjective therapeutikos
carry in later texts the meaning of attending to heal, or treating
in a spiritual or medical sense. The Therapeutae are described in
De vita contemplativa ("On the contemplative life"), written in the first century
A.D (…) The author was employing the familiar polarity in Hellenic philosophy
between the active and the contemplative life, exemplifying the active life
by the Essenes,
another ascetic sect, and the contemplative life by the desert-dwelling Therapeutae
(Therapeutae, Wikipedia)

In ancient times
there were no clear boundaries between the role of a priest, physician and
psychiatrist [Gowans, 12].

The specialized profession of “physician” had not yet separated
itself out from the larger profession of shaman or “medicine man”, which
included functions of magic, mythmaking, protophilosophy, and song or poetry,
along with healing. Some of those whom we now regard as Greek philosophers
would have appeared in the eyes of the Persian kings as “physicians.”
[McEvilley, 15]

According to Lothar Baus the Therapeutae originally were
Buddhist monks [Baus, 201].

Ancient
Greece

The Hellenistic
therapies emerged from the conflict between the representatives of the antique
pagan world view and their critical-rationally arguing challengers. In the
course of this development philosophy was stepwise detached from religion
(except for pantheism) and “therapy as worship” became “therapy as an art of living”.
Philosophers who specialized on ethics like Socrates, Pyrrho, the Cynics, the
Stoics and Epicurus adopted a therapeutic function, which the priestly caste
was not able to exercise.

▪With Socrates, one can see all of the components
necessary for the construction of an art of living.

▪In ancient philosophical sources, however, the
idea of an “art of living” is primarily associated with the Stoics [Sellars,
55].

According to Pierre Hadot the decline of philosophy as a way of lifewas caused by the rise of Christianity. Christianity positioned itself
as a “philosophy” with its own regimen of spiritual exercises and spiritual
goals. Christian interest in pagan philosophy was limited to its discourse [Zeyl].

Throughout the Middle Ages philosophy as a way of lifesurvived in niches. Philosophers
such as Peter Abelard and John of
Salisbury drew upon the readily available Latin
works of Cicero and Seneca, not only for philosophical ideas but also for an
understanding of the nature and function of philosophy as such [Sellars].

▪A clearly therapeutic conception of philosophy
was promoted by the Dutch philosopher Baruch de Spinoza in the 17th
century[Spinoza] [Hampe,
2004]. Spinoza’s claim that knowledge of true causes of passive emotion can
transform it to an active emotion anticipated one of the key ideas of Sigmund
Freud's psychoanalysis. In contrast to the Stoics Spinoza maintained that strong emotions have
to be controlled by opposing strong emotions. Consequently, if reason should
control passion, then reason itself has to become a passion (Spinoza, Wikipedia).

▪Spinoza’s monistic (pantheistic) concept was in
conflict with the dualist theory of Descartes [Cottingham, 159-164]. Descartes prevailed in this competition and his
methodical criticism could explain the subsequent academic refusal to work on
therapeutic topics [Hampe 2015].

Late modern
period

▪With the translation of the Upanishads in the
early 19th century they started to attract attention from a western
audience, in particular the attention of Hegel, Schopenhauer and the transcendentalists (Upanishads, Wikipedia). Hegel was more impressed by the level of abstraction in
some parts of the Upanishads, than by their therapeutic potential. He basically
understood philosophy as an abstract system, constructed by a process of
intellectual analysis [Sellars, 167].

Schopenhauer, in contrast, lamented that philosophy has been
relegated to a purely abstract and theoretical subject, cut off from the goal
that gave it its very raison d’être in earlier times, the goal of
achieving a vision of reality that would lead to self-understanding and
self-transformation. With Nietzsche’s existentialist approach philosophy finally returned to being a
concrete attitude, a way of life and a way of seeing the world [Cottingham,
148-149].

▪In the 20th century Ludwig
Wittgenstein promoted the therapeutic understanding
of philosophy by claiming that “philosophy is not a theory, but an activity”
[Aubry, 212]. For Wittgenstein the use of language is rooted in “forms of
life”, which are ultimately ways of acting in the world [O’Grady, 239]. His therapy
consists in disclosing these roots, thereby unraveling the distortions of
(philosophical) language.

▪Under the influence of Nietzsche Michel
Foucault and Gilles
Deleuze conceived “practical philosophy” as a way
of life in which philosophy and life are united. In this context Deleuze
explicitly referred to Spinoza [Sellars, 3-4].

The notion of
“philosophical therapy” depends on the interpretation of the terms “philosophy”
and “therapy”.

Philosophy

▪In ancient times doing philosophy was
a way of living; i.e. it was not restricted to an intellectual activity
[Hadot] [Sellars, 6, 171, 175]. This definition assigns a high
significance to the philosopher’s biography. Philosophical doctrines are primarily
expressed in one’s behavior. It enables one – in the words of Nietzsche – to
examine a philosopher through what he did, rather than what he said, let alone
what he wrote. Biographical literature and anecdotal material such as
Xenophon’s Memorabilia or Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers are accordingly instructive [Sellars,
171-172].

▪For modern philosophers like Hegel and Bernard
Williams the idea that there is a relationship between
philosophy and an individual’s biography merely indicates a weakness in the
philosophical position in question [Sellars, 167].

Philosophy as therapy accords with the ancient
view, according to which philosophy is a way of living.

In metaphilosophy the distinction between the two conceptions is
expressed as follows:

▪Some philosophers (e.g. existentialists and pragmatists) think philosophy is
ultimately a practical discipline that should help us lead meaningful lives by
showing us who we are, how we relate to the world around us, and what we should
do.

▪Analytic
philosophers, in contrast, see philosophy as a
technical, formal, and entirely theoretical discipline, with goals such as
"the disinterested pursuit of knowledge for its own sake”.

Philosophy as
therapy accords with the view of existentialists and
pragmatists, according to which philosophy is a practical discipline.

Therapy

The original
meaning of the word therapy is worship and is reminiscent of the close relation between philosophy and religion
in antiquity [Clark, 83] [Kapstein, 99-100]. In the later usage we can
distinguish between

1.a narrower definition, which relates therapy to the cure of a disease [Banicki 2014, 15]

The two
definitions are reflected in two four-fold models of philosophical practice:

1.One is a model of medicine found in the
treatises of the physicians, according to which there is an account of disease,
the causes of disease, health or ‘freedom from disease’, and the treatment of
disease.

2.The other is the soteriology made famous by the
Buddha as the ‘four noble truths’, consisting in accounts of suffering, the
causes of suffering, liberation from suffering, and the path from suffering to
liberation in the shape of eight sorts of ‘right understanding’.

[Ganeri,
122-123]

The two models
coincide, if the four Noble Truths are interpreted as
diagnosis, etiology, prognosis and prescription [Gethin, 63-64] [Burton, 187].

In this paper
we will work with the wider interpretation of the term therapy:

Philosophy
as therapy = Philosophy as a means to cure (or reduce)
suffering.

▪In this definition the entire topic of mental
health is bypassed. Philosophical therapy aims at the clients' well-being without
assuming that he/she suffers from a mental disease [Cohen, 32].

▪Furthermore the definition abstains from characterizing
philosophy as a happiness promising recipe or wellness-package. Life
satisfaction can be influenced, but not controlled; see The Controllability of Life Satisfaction. The deliberate attempt to become happy may
even generate a counter-productive result [Hettlage,
154]. (For the purpose of this paper we can use the terms life satisfaction,
well-being and happiness as synonyms).

The term therapy
is usually applied to an individual or a group. Attempts to reduce suffering on
the cultural level are associated with the terms political
philosophy and cultural
critic. But in ancient times the boundaries
between philosophy, psychotherapy, science and religion were fluent and
therapies were imbedded in worldviews and social ideals (e.g. Buddhism and Stoicism).

In Socrates’ day, almost all Greek thinkers assumed or argued that
the polis, the community, was the
correct and only environment for human moral flourishing – that a good polis
created goodness in its citizens (…). As a moral philosopher, then, Socrates
was also a political philosopher [Waterfield, 29].

The Platonic
(possibly not the historical) Socrates suggested that politics is an art which
takes care of the soul. While legislation preserves the good of the soul,
justice restores it [Sellars, 40-42]. Aristoteles can be seen as political
philosopher for similar reasons [Zeyl].

3. Structural Model

According to
Konrad Banicki the structure constituted by the three concepts health ideal,
disease and process of treatment seems to be generally accepted in thinking
about medicine or therapy of any kind [Banicki, 14]. Consequently he demands
that a therapeutic vision of philosophy has to identify the diseases it attempts
at curing [Banicki, 15]. The model presented here, in contrast, strives to liberate
philosophical therapy from the medical terms disease and health ideal,
consistent with Lou Marinoffs vision of a “therapy for the sane” [Marinoff]

3.1Overview

Self-transformation

Philosophy
can change our way of living. We will associate such a change with the term self-transformation,
because it implies a change of one’s character and not merely a change of one’s
environment. Self-transformation is the key characteristic of Socrates’
conception of doing philosophy [Sellars, 46]. It changes the internal
disposition that determines the way in which one responds to external
events [Sellars, 83].

Self-realization

The term
self-realization emphasizes that the “true” self is somehow hidden and
has yet to be discovered.

▪Ancient concepts suggest that the true self is
the same for everybody.

Philosophy as a way
of life is more than philosophical discourse. According
to the Stoics philosophy is an art of living (technê), comprised of

▪Knowledge (episteme) or discourse/theory (logos)
and

▪Practical exercise (askesis)

Philosophical
discourse is a part of the philosophical way of living, but discourse makes
only sense, if the acquired knowledge is implemented in practical life
[Sellars, 170].

Exchange of
experiences and arguments

Experiences and
arguments include spontaneous perceptions, associations and reflections within
the discourse. A major part of the discourse, however, concerns the chances and
risks that were taken in the past, and possible changes in the future. These
kinds of evaluations are a topic of risk ethics.

Empathy and
authenticity

In the
counselling of mentally sane people the importance of
psychological theories, techniques and jargons is probably overestimated – in
particular if there are no specific symptoms. According to Jürgen Kriz
non-quantifiable factors like experience, authenticity, empathy and
“interpersonal chemistry” decide about the success of a therapy[Kriz 2000,
20].

Language
Analysis

An important
aspect of the philosophical discourse concerns language analysis:

The adventure of philosophy initially assumed for Socrates the form
of a linguistic analysis of what he and others said about moral matters
(…).

For Socrates language analysis is not the goal of philosophy and
should not be viewed as an end in itself. For him, it was only a means, a
method that allowed for the clarification for what he viewed as the essence of
human existence [Navia, 48].

The ancient observation
that the clarification of language can have a therapeutic effect was resumed by
Freud, Wittgenstein and Cavell. Language serves a purpose. It can either support or hinder the
insight, which is required to change one’s way of living.

3.2 Discourse (Logos)

What do
philosophical therapeutic discourses have in common?

Greek
philosophy

With regard to
ancient Greek philosophy the following answer has been given:

According to Martha Nussbaum philosophical
practice is characterized by arguments, precise reasoning, logical rigor and
definitional precision. Building an art of living is not specific to
philosophy, it has to be an art that is committed to the truth (in contrast to
religion, astrology etc.). The key is the interpretation of the term “philosophical
argument”. According to Nussbaum “philosophical argument” means

▪Practice of argumentation

▪Psychological interaction aimed at personal and
societal change

Ancient
philosophers want to distinguish themselves from magicians and sophists, but
they are aware that there is a personal frame and an interpersonal, historical
and cultural context. That shifts the philosopher’s interest to psychology and
the effectiveness of arguments: rhetorical, narrative, imaginary, mnemonic.
Literary and rhetoric techniques are essential. A therapeutic argument cannot
be understood without its context. Arguments are not timeless and abstract.
Philosophical arguments are inherently personal, responsive to the particular
case. Most classical philosophical arguments can easily be discussed without
reference to their recipient and author. In case of the therapeutic argument
this is impossible [Banicki 2015, 618-620].

Buddhism

Reflections on
impermanence and selflessness can ameliorate the suffering of loss [Burton,
213]. It seems uncontroversial that Buddhism is therapeutic in intent [Burton,
187]. But is it also philosophical?

The claim that Buddhist and other types of Eastern thought are not
philosophy can itself be symptomatic of a Western arrogance which sees only
European-derived cultures as capable of argumentative and logical skills that
are frequently considered to be the hallmarks of genuine philosophy. This
contention seems unsustainable and parochial given that many Indian forms of
thought, including Buddhism, often have been attentive to the rules of correct
thinking and rigorous debate [Burton, 189].

Also see [Baus, 16] [Sick, 269]
[Kapstein, 101] [Bhikkhu]

Conclusion

Philosophical
discourse – the dialogue with others and with oneself – is an integral part of
the philosophical way of living. This is not only true for Socrates, Platonism,
Aristotelianism and Hellenistic schools [Banicki 2015, 624], but also for
non-dogmatic Buddhism.

Non-dogmatic Buddhists would continually question and test the
efficacy and truthfulness of the teachings and be receptive to the possibility
that further inquiry and experience may require revision of the therapy and its
truth claims [Burton, 217].

The same can be
expected from non-dogmatic therapists in the contemporary Western tradition
(Nietzsche, Freud).

3.3Ancient Practice (Askesis)

Greek
philosophy

According to Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault the focus on arguments
is typical for the analytical branch of contemporary philosophy and is not
suited for the study of ancient philosophy [Banicki 2015, 612]. Ancient
philosophers emphasize that acting is more important than reasoning. Theory is
in the service of practice [Banicki 2015, 614-617]. One
cannot claim that one has genuinely philosophical logos unless one produces a
way of life which is authentically philosophical [Banicki 2015, 625-626].
Philosophy, in the words of Seneca “teaches us to act, not to speak” [Banicki
2015, 613]. The translation of theoretical understanding into practical ability
requires training or exercise [Sellars, 107-108, 119]. Consequently
there are two distinct forms of philosophical texts:

oInstructional texts directed towards training,
such as the Enchiridion (Handbook) of Epictetus

oTexts where the act of writing itself can be
seen to constitute the exercise, such as Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations.

[Sellars,
126-127]

Philosophical
exercises can be subdivided into

▪Exercises for the soul (spiritual exercises),
not to be understood as esoteric or religious [Banicki 2015, 622]. The Stoics
and the Epicureans, both proposed materialist accounts of the soul and yet both
schools have engaged in spiritual exercises [Sellars, 114]. The study of physics, for example, was seen as a spiritual exercise
with a moral aim and philosophical dialogue existed for the sake of spiritual
guidance [Zeyl].

▪Exercises for the body (physical exercises), thought
to impact the soul at the same time. All physical training involves an element
of spiritual exercise [Sellars, 113].

Philosophical
exercises aim at the change of one’s habits. Typical Stoic aims are the
following [Sellars, 120, 135, 137].

▪Self-control in difficult situations, control of
desires and aversions, control to act or not to act.

▪Awareness of transience, acceptance of the fact
that all living beings have to die.

The overall goal
is to detach life satisfaction from external circumstances and bring one’s will
in harmony with the will of the cosmos [Sellars, 141].

Buddhism

Similar to
Hadot’s and Foucault’s criticism of a purely argumentative and logical approach
to ancient Greek philosophy, there are also reservations against such an
approach to the Buddhist philosophy:

1.Buddhism emphasizes that it can be extremely
difficult to transform deeply engrained emotional and cognitive habits through
straightforward rational considerations [Burton, 196]. The philosopher’s
mistaken theories are simply rationalizations of these habits and therefore a
superficial problem. Theories – which are more symptoms than causes – can be
refuted trough arguments, but not habits. The refutation of the view that
there is a permanent self, for instance, does not destroy one’s attachment
to the ego [Burton, 197]. Buddhist writings therefore make use of literary
forms such as parable, metaphor and contextualized descriptions. Many of the
Buddhist scriptures are purportedly records of dialogues that took place
between the Buddha and various disciplines. [Burton, 198].

2.The purpose of the “right view” has been missed,
if one’s understanding of it is a cause of self-satisfaction, or if one uses it
to appear clever or superior to other people. Such a misguided attitude betrays
the fact that one has not been genuinely affected by the therapeutic message,
namely that craving and selfishness are to be given up [Burton, 209].

3.Rational examination needs to complemented and
confirmed by experiential verification (…). But experiences
unscrutinised by reason are also unreliable (…). Hence there are developed
traditions of debate in some forms of Buddhism. The Buddha said that his words
should be accepted “after due investigation” rather than out of respect for him
[Burton, 216].

3.4Discourse versus
Practice

How can the
daily life of an ancient philosopher be distinguished from the daily life of a
religious sectarian?

Nussbaum suggests that if one does not emphasize the role of reason
in ancient philosophy then an ancient philosophical way of life will become
indistinguishable from ancient religious ways of life. Hadot and Foucault are
unable to account for the difference between the sorts of ascetic exercises
undertaken by, say, the Desert
Fathers, and a properly philosophical exercise
[Sellars, 117]

▪According to John Sellars this criticism is
unjustified in the case of Foucault [Sellars, 115-118]

▪According to Konrad Banicki the criticism is
also unjustified in the case of Hadot [Banicki 2015, 622-624].

Banicki
concludes that Nussbaum’s, Hadot’s and Foucault’s interpretations of Greek
philosophy are not as distant after all [Banicki 2015, 604]. But that is only
true for the interpretation of the philosophical discourse (logos), as
discussed above. There remains a disagreement with regard the importance of
theory versus practice:

▪Nussbaum – in the tradition of Aristotle –
considers discourse (logos) to be the essence of a philosopher’s life
[Banicki 2015, 615]. In Aristotle’s world view intellectual activity is ranked
higher than practical activity.

▪Hadot, in contrast, assigns a secondary and
derivative character to logos. According to Hadot philosophical
discourse originates in a choice of life – not vice-versa. The task of
philosophical discourse is to rationally justify a way of life, as well as the
corresponding vision of the world. Discourse of this kind turns out to come after
the fact [Banicki 2015, 613-614].

To interpret theory merely as the rationalization of a previously chosen
practice is probably overdone, but conversely, it is well possible that
Nussbaum underestimates the importance of practice. The right way of living
cannot be found solely by arguments, even if these arguments have a practical
goal and are inherently personal and responsive to the particular case. The
validity of philosophical arguments has to be verified in a concrete
implementation (exercise, experiment, daily life). A major part of ethical
knowledge is emotional knowledge and can only be acquired in practice.
When ancient philosophers like Socrates declared that acting is more important
than reasoning [Sellars, 49, 52] then they meant that only practical life can
decide, if the theoretical reasoning was correct [Sellars, 170].

The ancient emphasis on practice anticipates the stance of
contemporary pragmatists. The following statement of John Dewey may serve as an example:

“Theory is an abstraction from direct
experience and ultimately must return to inform experience.” (Pragmatism, Wikipedia).

In ancient
Greece the feedback from practical life led to a vast diversity of theories. The
disagreements were such that Pyrrho concluded that the best strategy for the pursuit of happiness is to
suspend judgment [Sellars, 88-103]. Obviously Nussbaum’s “truth-orientation”
did not exclude conflicting therapies, even within the same cultural context.
If we extend the investigation to truth-orientation in different
cultures, then we can even find opposing visions of a “good life” (as
will be shown in the following chapter).

4. Forms of Therapy

A therapy is
characterized by a goal and a method. We start with a rough
classification of goals:

4.1Overview

There are two kinds of avoidable suffering:

▪Suffering that is avoidable by changing one’s
way of living (chapter 5.4 and 5.5)

▪Suffering that is caused by linguistic confusion
(chapter 5.6)

The removal of linguistic confusion (e.g. by Socrates’ Maieutics or by Wittgenstein’s language analysis) is a prerequisite for an authentic choice of
one’s way of living.

Historically
philosophical therapy started as a soteriological mission, closely affiliated
with religion. Knowing the “supreme reality” means knowing the path to the
liberation from suffering – that is the claim of the rationalist Hindu
philosophy (Samkhya), which could be at the root of Buddhism [Baus 2006,
43-44]. In this context the term liberation from suffering has a very
different meaning than in contemporary therapies and relates to a radically
different notion of the self. Obviously we are already confronted with the
need for the linguistic clarity mentioned above:

Self-realization

▪In ancient philosophy the “true” self emerges
from the re-discovery of a (lost) universality [Ganeri, 120, 126]. Examples of “spiritual exercises” are Platonic dialogues, notably the
practice of death in the Phaedo and the practice of transcendence over
all that is mundane described in the Theaetetus[Zeyl]

▪In the modern understanding (Nietzsche, Freud),
however, the art of living is the fabrication of a personality for oneself. The
“true self” emerges from an authentic discovery of one’s individuality [Martin,
27-28].

Liberation

▪The ancient understanding of liberation is
„liberation of the mind from the body” respectively “liberation of the
spiritual from the material”.

According to Plotinus it is possible to understand
ourselves as elements in a larger world. Civil virtue requires us to prefer
public duties to our lesser, personal attachments. But there are at least three
reasons to reckon that even this service is parochial:

oHowever glorious our city, its service may be corrupting

oAll moral action is inferior, dependent of the existence of evils
that no truly virtuous person could desire to exist

oAll action is uncertain, we can never be sure of its outcome

The moral ideal is the detached, contemplative life, the life of a
resident alien rather than the life of a citizen [Clark, 97].

In ancient times
uncontrolled desires/passions were the prime source of (avoidable) suffering.

▪Nietzsche and Freud, however, developed their
philosophies in a historical environment where the repression of desires
had become a problem. Their therapeutic method accordingly consists in
liberating and enforcing desires, by disclosing the destructive effects of
morality, social control and indoctrination [Pearson, 139, 142-143]. The value
of personal attachments is rediscovered at the cost of civil virtue and
spiritual goals.

Following a more
detailed description:

4.2 Ancient Goals

Buddhism

Buddhism emerged
out of Hinduism.

Eastern philosophers learn to see ones true self as something
indestructible. That thought motivates the spiritual exercises described in the
Upanishads. These typically
involve precisely that return to the self of which Hadot speaks, encouraging us
to turn our attention inwards in order to re-acquaint ourselves with a universal,
impartial self that indwells each of us [Ganeri, 121]. Indians reject the aesthetic model altogether, whether it sees
life as sculpting a self or weaving a persona and narrating a biography
[Ganeri, 130]

In Buddhism the
notion of a self is completely given up (see Anatta). Self-realization is replaced by the insight into non-selfhood.

In the Simile of the Lute the Buddha explains that if one
looks within and investigates, one will find only the psychological elements
and not the self, just as one will search in vain among the components of a
lute for the sound that the lute makes [Ganeri, 128]

Coming to know that there is no enduring self is thus clearly seen
as a therapeutic philosophical achievement. No emotion that requires one to
admit the existence of enduring self, such as regret or possessive desire, is
able to survive the surgical removal of that commitment [Ganeri, 124]. Greed is
a failure to understand that none of things one seeks to obtain is going to
last; it should also be understood that greed is, of its nature, insatiable
[Ganeri, 130].

The condition of being without pain and suffering is also a
condition of being without pleasure, because pleasure and pain are always
inter-mixed, just as someone who wishes to administer a bitter poison, mixes it
into honey [Ganeri, 124]. Believing that the ideal state is a pleasureless
state might lead me, not to give up all pleasure, for that is not a realistic
human end, but to allow myself to be nourished by the pleasures I have and also
to resist voluntarily seeking out new ones (...) Philosophy, then, enables us
to (…) direct our efforts securely on their target, the living of a life free
of suffering [Ganeri, 135].

Stoicism

There are good
reasons to assume that Hellenistic philosophy was influenced by the Eastern
tradition [McEvilley] [Clark, 84].

In the Stoic
understanding the art of living is the discovery and exposition of
something that pre-exists. According to Hadot the ancient spiritual exercises
lead from individuality and particularity to objectivity.

Freeing oneself from the limited first person perspective will free
one from the emotional turmoil that goes with it. From the cosmic perspective,
everything is in a continual state of change and nothing is expected to remain
stable for long. In this sense, the “point of view of the cosmos” enables one
to free oneself from attachment to particular external objects [Sellars, 154,
163].

4.3 Modern Goals

Nietzsche

It is in the texts of his middle period (1878-1882) that Nietzsche’s
writing comes closest to being an exercise in philosophical therapeutics
[Pearson, 137].

In his essay Dawn (1881) Nietzsche suggests that by
reflecting, with the aid of psychological observation, on what is “human, all
too human”, that “we can lighten the burden of life” [Pearson, 139].

According to
Nietzsche the acquirement of philosophical knowledge cannot be reduced to
arguments and precise reasoning [Pearson, 157]; it requires self-experimentation
[Pearson, 145]. There is not a single morality – numerous new attempts at
living life and creating community should be undertaken [Pearson, 161].
Nietzsche criticizes the European prejudice, according to which sympathetic
affects and compassion define the moral [Pearson, 146]. The emotional knowledge
to be acquired in a Nietzschean therapy is therefore in conflict with the
Buddhist tradition.

Freud

The
philosophical significance of Freud’s psychoanalysis was investigated by Stanley
Cavell [Cavell 2004, 289-295] [Hampe 2006]. Philosophical psychoanalysis
is practiced on the basis of free association and hermeneutics, without using
an expert language and without being fixed on Freudian concepts like the Oedipus complex. There is a
methodical similarity between Freud’s and Wittgenstein’s way to do philosophy, although Wittgenstein’s method rather
treats a question than the person raising it. Wittgenstein aims at general
insight, but on the basis of particular person’s sensibility and experiential
background [Hagberg, 68-69].

If we aim at a fuller understanding of our own
courage or cowardice, or pride or prejudice, we need an overview of the self’s
words and deeds in the corresponding context. This constitutes a kind of
connective analysis of the self’s past, i.e. an analysis of one’s intellectual
genealogy [Hagberg, 79].

A Freudian
therapy attempts to connect the present with the past as well, but the emphasis
is more on the emotional than on the intellectual genealogy. Since the
uncensored emotions, which are discovered in such a process, are conciliated
with the self, the Freudian therapy is in conflict with the Buddhist tradition
[Rubin, 47, 75]. Whereas Freud promotes adaptation to the biological nature of
humans, Buddha strives to transcend it.

Conclusion

Ancient concepts
of self-realization are in conflict with modern concepts. In today’s
language

▪the Stoic notion of self-realization is rather
associated with self-restriction

▪the Buddhist notion is rather associated with selflessness.

For Socrates language analysis was a method that allowed the
clarification for what he viewed as the essence of human existence [Navia, 48].

Ancient and
modern philosophers characterized the “essence of human existence” by the term self-realization.
Given the contradicting meanings of this term, language analysis is a
prerequisite for taking an authentic choice.

4.4 Methods

Methods depend
on the goal to be pursued:

Maieuticsis a possible tool
for diagnostic talks. The Socratic examination may lead to
the solution of pending problems [Van Hooft, 24] or to the insight that a more
profound therapy is indicated. The deeper forms of therapies aim at the kind of
self-transformation that was described in the previous chapters:

▪Therapies of desire [Nussbaum] tend to be normative (Buddhism, Stoicism)

Normative
therapies(Buddhism, Stoicism) are characterized by a specific
time-tested solution for dealing with risks. However, Buddhism and Stoicism are
just two among a wide variety of ancient philosophical schools, which
correspond to various personality types or attitudes [Chase, 263]. The decision
to adopt an ancient ethical ideal can be as authentic as the decision to
develop an individualistic lifestyle [Sellars, 170].

Individualistic
therapies (Nietzsche, Freud) do not prescribe an ethical ideal. The goal is to
explore the individual risk profile, and take account of the
fact, that it changes in the course of time. The discovery of the individual risk profile corresponds
to the discovery of the individual chances and risks within a social and
cultural environment. It can be associated with the discovery of the true
self in moral perfectionism (see Moralischer Perfektionismus und Gerechtigkeit). An individualistic therapy does not promote but also
does not exclude the re-discovery of ancient ethical ideals.

Wittgenstein’s philosophical therapy stands (among others) in the tradition of
Socrates [Peterman, 129] and aims at the best possible clarity in the
description of different ways of living. Clarity is a prerequisite for making an
authentic choice. Because “best possible clarity” is an aesthetic criterion, Wittgenstein’s method could be called aesthetic
[Peterman, 121]. Language analysis is the major tool in the pursuit of
representational clarity. The term language includes metaphorical,
pictorial and visual language. Cavell for example attempts to describe life
forms and self-transformation by means of Hollywood films, see The Good Life in Philosophical
Films.

Disclaimer

1.There is no claim in this paper that the chosen
typology of therapies is compelling. But it is also not arbitrary:

a.The chosen therapies have a certain practical relevance, whereas
practitioners in the tradition other therapeutically interpretable philosophers
(e.g. Schopenhauer) are hard to find.

b.The chosen typology can be linked to ancient concepts like the Purusarthas, Plato’s cardinal virtues and Aristotle’s lifestyles, as well as to
modern concepts in empirical social psychology, see Konkurrierende
Lebensziele.

2.There is no claim in this paper that the above
described therapies are (or should be) applied in a pure form. In practice
therapies are often variations and combinations of the above described forms. Ideal-typical forms are used here in order tobring some order in the chaos of therapies and concretize the
discussion.

5. Risk Ethics

In the course
of history, philosophy has developed a potential to give consolation. But the goal
to reduce suffering also implies a strong demand for prevention. Similar
to a navigator the therapist has to evaluate different routes according to
their chances and risks. Within the ancient models for the art of living [Sellars,
42-47, 70] philosophical therapy comes closest to the art of navigation, if
we assume that the traveler’s character is transformed by the journey.
Self-transformation is the key characteristic of Socrates’ conception of doing
philosophy [Sellars, 46]. The analogy with navigation – in contrast to the
analogy with crafts [Sellars, 123] – models behavior under changing internal
and external conditions. The analogy to guided therapies is the guided
expedition. Erikson compared the linguistic aspect of self-transformation with
a “travel diary across terms”, “Reisetagebuch durch Begriffe” [Erikson].

In the following we will look at the different therapies from the
perspective of risk ethics. Therapeutic goals will be characterized by chances and risks, and
not by a health ideal.

5.1 Definition

▪Risk ethics
investigates the general question under which conditions a person is
permitted to expose him-/herself or others to a risk. The term risk
ethics includes the evaluation of chances [Rippe, 4].

The term ethics
within risk ethics clarifies that – whatever kind of
self-transformation is pursued – it has to be subjected to a Socratic
examination.

. 1. Risk ethics suggests that agents should be as well-informed as
possible, in taking their decisions.

. 2. The
demand to be well-informed asks for searching the truth and for the best
possible clarity of representation (Socratic tradition).

. 3. If the search for truth
leads to the discovery of chances, then it creates sense in life.

In
the following we will investigate this process in more detail:

5.2 The Creation of Sense

The conception of philosophy as a highly abstruse, technical and
specialist activity with little or no bearing on the individual’s experience
has become dominant only in comparatively recent times. The tendency for
philosophy to be divorced from the concerns of everyday life has occurred
especially since the European Enlightenment and the advent of professionalized
philosophy as an academic, secular discipline which often allies itself with
scientific analysis. By contrast, pre-Enlightenment thinkers in many cases saw
it as the purpose of philosophy to address matters of ultimate concern to
individuals – matters what might be termed sense in
life questions [Burton, 189].

The emergence of
sense in life is a process where new or previously meaningless
information is ordered in such a way that it

The kind of
insight which is required to change one’s way of living is usually a long-term
step by step process. Epiphany (like Buddha obtaining enlightenment under the
bodhi tree) requires
a predisposition, i.e. a long period of searching the truth or unease with
one’s living condition.

In the
following we will investigate the cognitive and affective component of sense in
more detail:

creation of
sense

(chapt.5.2)

¦

------------------------------------------------------------

¦
¦

cognitive
component affective component

¦
¦

-------------------------------------
-------------------------------

¦
¦ ¦
¦

the search for
truth clarity of representation chances
risks

(chapt.5.3)
(chapt.5.6) (chapt.5.4) (chapt.5.5)

5.3 The Search for Truth

All forms of
philosophical therapy attempt to adjust the agent’s perception to a
critical-rational world view, i.e. they confront him-/her with the reality principle. All above
mentioned philosophers search for the truth, but they concentrate on a different
aspect of reality:

Buddhism

▪Buddhists observe the evolution of global
suffering and risk. If suffering and/or risk increases, then culture as a
whole may have to be considered as a patient needing a therapy. In this
case it is inconsequent to advise patients to lead a reasonable life without at
the same time analyzing the culture (as Freud did in Civilization and its Discontents) which
continuously produces new patients. The belief in progress could be – similar
to religious promises of salvation – just another pretext to sanction the
immense suffering in this world.

▪In Buddhism the reality principle is e.g.
phrased as follows:

“What is the cause of suffering according to Buddha? Could it not be
the same cause as the one for our social problems? The root cause of all these
disturbing mental states (kleshas) is ignorance – we do not see things as they really are. The
perception of the world is systematically distorted. We live in a collective
madness.” (adapted from Buddhismus, Santikaro Bhikkhu)

This is
reminiscent of Socrates’ claim that that no one errors or makes mistakes knowingly.
It is also reminiscent of the Platonic analysis of the soul:

There are different levels of the soul, only a bit of us is real and
knows truth (…). We live in a dream, we are wrapped up in a dark veil, and we
don’t believe anything exists except ourselves [Clark, 99].

▪The collective madness – according to Buddha –
is the struggle for survival and procreation, a struggle which requires
attachment to transient values. When we are confronted with transience (loss,
illness, aging, death) then we suffer and we are disappointed of life – the delusion
cannot be maintained (German “wir sind ent-täuscht”). The Buddhist therapy
strives to avoid this disappointment by avoiding attachments, in particular,
the attachment to the self. A Buddhist considers the self to be an
illusion and the identification with the self’s desires to be irrational.

Late Stoicism

▪Despite pronounced differences of cosmology, of
many particular doctrines, of nuance and accent, there nonetheless is much in
Buddhism and Stoicism that merits close comparison. Especially noteworthy is
the rigor with which both hold that our pains and frustrations stem from false
beliefs about ourselves, beliefs that are to be therapeutically overcome
through a sustained process of education and ascesis [Kapstein, 106].

Late (Roman) Stoicism (ca. 27 B.C.-180 A.D.) – in contrast to early
Stoicism – is characterized by the engagement for marriage, family and
politics.

By changing our way of looking at the world, we are to transform
ourselves to the point of becoming fully integrated beings (…) harmonizing our
will and desires with the course of Nature, and recognizing and fulfilling the
social obligations placed upon us by the demand for justice. By all these means
we can achieve a cosmic consciousness that raises us above the petty concerns
of our individualistic lives, and makes us aware that we are parts of the All
[Chase, 264].

▪The Stoics do not avoid disappointment by
avoiding attachments; they avoid it by attaching to timeless values.
Stoics find eternity in the law, which governs the world. The Stoic world view
is pantheistic. Humans as rational beings can
recognize the universal law. The only virtue is – being conscious of this law –
leading a rational life. Whereas the original Stoa was a center of dissident
asceticism and social radicalism [Francis], the late Stoicism promoted a mystical absorption in the structure of
society, similar to the Hindu caste system. Acting rationally was
interpreted as acting with respect to our natural impulses for
self-preservation, family and society [Gowans, 21].

▪The Stoic ideal of a government of reason was
taken up by Immanuel Kant in the Age ofEnlightenment. The goal to be in “harmony
with the cosmos” is not an appeal for passivity. The vision of justice has
changed, but not its appeal. The normative force of a reasonable concept of
justice is a part of the cosmic force.

Nietzsche

▪Nietzsche’s search for truth is best understood
against the background of the life sciences in the 19th century
(although he does not explicitly refer to science). His genealogy of values and
his account of a will to power are influenced by 19th century
debates on teleology, biological functions, and theories of evolution [Emden].
Nietzsche sees cultural evolution as an open process. Reality is not given, it
can be changed. Reality is interpreted by the survivors and the survivors are
always right.

▪Nietzsche vigorously attacks the "free
will" of the theologians that is designed to make men "guilty"
in the eyes of God. But he also warns against a naturalism that makes man a
simple mechanism governed by cause and effect (The Information Philosopher).

Freud

▪In his search for truth Freud
explicitly refers to a science-oriented worldview. He conceived the mind as an
energy processing apparatus that obeys Newtonian mechanics and the law of entropy. According to mechanistic principles, energy
that accumulates within a system leads to a buildup of pressure and accumulated
energy is converted into anxiety. Unless the energy is discharged or
transformed symptom formation ensues. Energy transformation leads to higher
levels of organization whereas symptom formation leads to lower levels [Palombo,
15].

▪Psychoanalysis navigates in the opposite
direction of Buddhism and strives to raise consciousness of repressed desires. As
compared to antiquity culture has changed in such a way that the loss of
passion is considered to be a main source of suffering. The Buddhist
dissolution of the self in meditation or the Stoic
dissolution of the self in Pantheism are now considered to be a regression:

Freud
categorizes the oceanic feeling
of wholeness, limitlessness, and eternity as being a regression into an earlier
state of consciousness — before the ego had differentiated itself from the
world of objects (…) Freud imagines that the oceanic feeling became connected
with religion later on in cultural practices (Civilization and Its Discontents, Wikipedia)

▪In psychoanalysis the dissolution of the self is
only considered to be useful if it serves the exploration of the unconscious
[Süsske]. Psychoanalysis is clearly life-affirmative. Religions and ideologies
which attempt to direct emotions to transcendent goals are categorized as
collective madness. The sense of life is an individual concept where the struggle
for power and love can take a decisive position. Psychoanalysis strives to
condition people for the biological race, whereas Buddhism questions the sense
of this race. For Buddhists the psychoanalytic reactivation of biological
motives is a relapse into ignorance.

Long-term
view

An explanation for the historical shift from
retreat-oriented to life-affirming therapies could be the survival value of
ethical concepts. Buddhism may be effective in the reduction of suffering, but
it succumbs in the competition with life-affirming ethics. At the borders of
life-affirming cultures, however, the Buddhist truths re-emerge, because the
expansion of life is followed by an expansion of suffering (see Negative Utilitarianism and
Buddhist Intuition).

Cross
comparison

Therapies have
all sorts of consequences; nevertheless the ones that have to do with social
relations are more frequent and therefore significant:

According to
their specific vision of reality each of the four philosophies emphasizes
a certain form of social relation:

▪Psychoanalysis typically leads to
a changed behavior in partnership or a new partnership

▪Therapies based on Nietzsche’s philosophy typically
lead to new activities in social groups. The emphasis is on creating and
enforcing one’s own values.

▪The Stoic identification with nature and humanity
(respectively the universal law) brings about that individual strokes of fate
are given less importance.

▪The Buddhist Insight
meditation makes it possible to devaluate
external activities and enjoy self-absorption. This is perceived as a gain in
freedom.

The identification corresponds to the
aspect of reality that is considered to be the most important:

The discovery of the biological
utility function makes clear that striving
for uniqueness has a biological root and individualism cannot be the ultimate
criterion for inner freedom. In the struggle for survival and procreation we
operate with a biological self, which is in a certain sense in foreign
services (an insight which exists in Buddhism already in the 5th century BC). It is possible to liberate oneself from this dependency (partly at
least) by changing ones identification.

The human psyche is able to identify with a person, a
family, a community, a concept of justice or even a state of consciousness like
the Nirwana.The (relative) freedom
in behavior consists in being able to understand ones dependencies and options,
and attain a realistic estimation of chances and risks.

In the Hindu metaphor of the world theatre
adaptation to reality means that the philosopher acquires knowledge about the
play that is performed and the role which he/she is supposed to undertake.

▪In Buddhism the
philosopher learns to become a spectator.

▪In Stoicism the
philosopher learns to understand the reasons driving the plot.

▪In modern therapies the
philosopher acquires the ability to change roles and influence the script.

The aim of philosophical therapy is to attain certain
freedom of choice over one’s own destiny.

5.4 Chances

Philosophy
and religion

Whatever form it takes, a larger world-view is a spiritual need that
we all have and which both Plato and Aristotle thought grounded a fully happy
life. Philosophy (along with theology, theoretical physics, art, politics, and
possibly other human cultural forms) answers to this need. Accordingly, any
counselling process that calls itself philosophical must go beyond offering
pragmatic help to people. It must take them to what Raabe has called a level of
transcendence [Van Hooft, 28].

This quest for
transcendence is reminiscent of the close relation between philosophy and
religion in antiquity. But what is a level of transcendence in contemporary therapy?

▪Most premodern
thinkers believed that the nonphysical and the immaterial are somehow more real
than what we can perceive and sense in this world [Rizvi, 133]. Under these premises philosophy was
inseparably linked with metaphysical intuitions and speculations [Rizvi,
141-144].

▪In contemporary philosophy, however, the quest
for transcendence does not imply teaching metaphysical doctrines. Philosophy
has a potential to substitute religion without recurring to metaphysics. In
order to explore this potential we use the following typology of philosophers [Hampe
2002]:

Outsider

Buddha

Prophet

Nietzsche

Judge

Rawls

Healer

Freud

Each of the
philosophers above combines the search for truth with a specific form of transcendence. This could explain why their philosophies create chances with strong
emotional attachments:

▪Psychoanalysis opens the mind for the transcendent
force of love and desire. In the state of infatuation, the positive
characteristics of the partner are inflated and sometimes even distorted into
godlike dimensions. In Hinduism love and desire is the only aim in
life that is linked to the name of a god. The term Kama expresses the longing for divine emotions.

▪The unconscious stands for the inexhaustible life force
and never ending human creativity. Although love and ecstasy are subjective and
temporary experiences, the identification with the life force opens a
door to transcendence.

Nietzsche
created the idea of overman as a goal of
humanity. The “overman” transcends the biological limits of human existence by
means of cultural perfectionism. Nietzsche thought of cultural perfectionism
mainly in terms of willpower and unlimited creativity. A technological
interpretation of “overman” is the immortal transhuman.

Finally Rawls’ Veil of Ignorance is reminiscent of ancient concepts or reincarnation. According to recent discoveries in biology 99.9% of the human
genes are constantly being reincarnated. An impartial observer in the Original Position is in a similar situation like a Hindu, who does not know in which
position within society he/she will be reincarnated.

Wandering
ascetics like the early Buddhists were often considered to be fools. However,
since they looked at society from outside, they were able to discover and
describe the weak points in the so called “normal behavior”. From the Buddhist,
Cynic and early Stoic perspective the “everyman” could be called a fool as
well, because he/she is desperately attached to the ego and to all kinds of
material objects – despite of the fact that life is short and the world is
transient like a dream [Sellars, 61]. Buddhism strives for a painless
accordance with the inevitable dissolution of the self. The positive experience
of non-existence (of the ego) in mediation (Nirwana) is the key for coping with transience and death.

Transcendence
within the language

In each of above
philosophies transcendence is mirrored in a specific aspect of language:

1.Freud’s method of free association, which was developed out of the hypnotic method of his
mentor and colleague, Josef Breuer, encourages the philosopher to
transcend the ordinary way of thinking and enter an altered state of mind – a
state of unlimited mental freedom. Furthermore – according to Freud’s interpretation
– dreams are a kind of language which opens the
door to the mysterious world of the unconscious.

2.The transcendent dimension of Nietzsche’s philosophy
shows up in about every aspect of his work: topics, style and prophetic
mission. Interestingly Nietzsche, who was one of the fiercest critics of
religion, copied the style of the bible, referred to Zarathustra and wrote like a
prophet and founder of a religion. Similar to religious texts, his writings are
sometimes poetic and allow multiple interpretations.

3.Rawls strove for an objective judgment and his principles resemble a mathematical
formula. Plato thought that there is a perfect world which transcends the
earthly world and that mathematics is the appropriate language to describe it. In
particular, he was convinced that geometry was the key to unlocking the secrets
of the universe. Similarly the Stoics thought that natural laws have a divine
origin and that the language used to describe them mirrors their perfection.

4.Buddha suggested that ordinary language cannot
describe the Nirwana experience. In order to demonstrate the limits of
language Zen-Buddhism uses the so-called Koans. A Koan is a story, dialogue, question or statement
which cannot be understood by logic.

The struggle for
power and love goes with passionate attachment and potentially devastating
consequences [Burton, 212]. The corresponding risks can be reduced

▪by sublimation, e.g by expressing love in art and power in science/technology.

▪by diversifying and decentralizing the attachments to
the world.

In both
strategies happiness is usually less intense, but more stable. This leads to
concepts like Buddhism and Stoicism:

Buddha and
the Stoics – the risk of repressing desires

Buddhist and
most Hellenistic schools developed strategies to reduce risk by reducing
passionate attachments, a reduction which has to be paid by the loss of
“natural” happiness [Burton, 211-212]. The mentioned schools strive to
compensate the loss by alternative (meditative, contemplative) kinds of
happiness, see The
Moral Ideal of the Complete Life. This
strategy, however, is not risk-free as well [Sellars,
60, 63]:

▪The (unconscious) desire for stronger emotions
may cause depression, i.e. the feeling that life is “without sense”.

Finally
the result is a similar intensity of suffering as one attempted to avoid in the
first place. This leads to a reconsideration and re-evaluation of passionate
attachments – as Nietzsche and Freud did [Pearson, 149-151].

Metaphor

Humans are born
with an addiction to gamble in the casino of life. Utopists believe to win, but
science suggests that the bank always wins in the long-run. The maximal win is
a feeling of ecstasy, but the maximal loss is so horrible that it is repressed
by most of the gamblers:

▪Buddha suggests liberating from the addiction and
offers a method for complete withdrawal.

▪Freud, in contrast, suggests that high risk-aversion or
withdrawal lead to depression and somatic illness. He motivates his patients to
take risks.

▪The Stoics continue to gamble but reduce the risks. The
price for this reduction is a corresponding reduction of chances.

Language
analysis is the major tool in the pursuit of representational clarity.

For Socrates language analysis is not the goal of philosophy and
should not be viewed as an end in itself. For him, it was only a means, a
method that allowed for the clarification for what he viewed as the essence of
human existence [Navia, 48].

The most prominent
successor in the Socratic tradition of language analysis is Ludwig Wittgenstein [Wisnewski,
64-70]. For Wittgenstein the use of language is rooted
in “forms of life”, which are ultimately ways of acting in the world [O’Grady,
239]. His therapy consists in disclosing these roots by means of language
analysis.

Example:

Let us assume
that Socrates’ “essence of human existence” can be described by the therapeutic
goals of chapter 4 and that the corresponding philosophies represent
Wittgensteinian “forms of life”. Language analysis of the term self-realization
then is a prerequisite for an authentic choice between these conflicting
ways of living.

Repression

Language is a
means and serves a purpose. One of these purposes is to
implement repression.

▪Intentional repression can be implemented by
excluding undesired terms/associations from the language.

▪Conversely non-intentional repression can be
removed by rediscovering the previously undesired terms/associations.

Language
accordingly supports or hinders the insight, which is required to change one’s
way of living.

Example:

▪If the language expresses,
that all things are impermanent, then we are immediately aware that it is
futile to get attached. In some Buddhist traditions, the word for color
is the same as for desire. Color is a characteristic of everything and
at the same time a symbol for transience. These traditions cultivate an
accordingly ascetic-melancholic view on sexuality, which reflects the
volatility of all desire [Seelmann, 2009].

▪How far the Korean language
is influenced by Buddhism cannot be examined here. It is noticeable, however,
that this language does not know the term self and therefore promotes a
distant perception of one’s needs, desires and actions. Koreans, for example,
do not say “I am thirsty”, they say “the throat is dry”. They also do not say
“I am angry”; they say “the anger rises” [Seelmann, 2012].

From the
Buddhist perspective the Western language is harmful, because it represses the
source of suffering. From the Western perspective the Buddhists language is
harmful because it represses natural desires. But from an impartial view
neither the Western nor the Buddhist language can be characterized as “disease-causing”.
Both philosophies may be unproblematic for a majority and harmful for a
specific person. If – for this specific person – the pressure of suffering
becomes too high, then philosophical therapy can cure or reduce suffering by
disclosing an alternative way of living

Non-intentional
analogical reasoning

There are
different ways to do philosophy. One of these ways has a potential to cause
emotional problems [Fischer, 53]. Wittgenstein talks of a specific kind of “disquiet” which is caused by imaginary
issues (pseudo-problems) and which can only be calmed by terminating the
unreasonable worry about them. (Compare: When a child is afraid that monsters
might creep in at night, there is no security problem; we do not have to guard
the room, we have to liberate the child from the fear). According to Eugen
Fischer there are uncontrolled cognitive processes, which make the philosopher
address pseudo-problems [Fischer, 57-58]. One of them
is the following:

Structural
analogies are forged by metaphorical extension [Fischer, 63]. Metaphors which
were initially applied to concrete or familiar things or actions (like “grasp a
stone to throw”) are extended to abstract or new concepts (like “grasp the implications
of a claim”). Much of our “mental vocabulary” is recruited in this way from the
domains of manipulation and perception [Fischer, 60]. In the moment where we
engage in philosophical reflection, we are prone to unwittingly mishandle
such analogies, in what cognitive psychologists call “non-intentional
analogical reasoning” [Fischer, 63, 66].

Example: Problems with false analogies can be solved by becoming aware
of the non-intentional reasoning, possibly with the help of an advanced
philosopher. If, for example, a student were bewildered because of John
Locke’s conception of the mind – which rests
on the false analogy between intellectual and perceptional activities – then he
could be reassured by a philosopher with advanced knowledge in cognitive
linguistics and cognitive psychology [Fischer, 60].

Is it
appropriate to talk of mental illness in this context? Problems with false
analogies are not only known in philosophy, but also in
disciplines like mathematics and computer programming. This kind of
disturbance, disquiet and bewilderment may certainly contribute to emotional
and behavioral problems [Gunnarsson] [Fischer, 53] but
it is not sufficient to explain the emergence of mental illness. The majority
of philosophers, mathematicians and programmers cope with their problems or –
if they feel overwhelmed – change their activities before getting ill.

Intentionally
distorted language

Since
philosophical therapy has a political dimension, it not only investigates the
language of the patient, but also the language of his/her environment. In
practical philosophy – as well as in theoretical
philosophy (example above) – we may be
guided by false analogies and dubious connotations which are embedded in the
meaning of words and pictures [Fischer, 60]. The distortion of language is a
well-known means to indoctrinate, oppress and mislead people.

One of the most famous examples in this context is theentry gate to the Auschwitz I Schutzhaftlager,
or Protective Custody Camp, with its infamous "Arbeit macht frei"
sign over the entry (this phrase, found also at other concentration camps, can
be translated as "Work makes you free / Work sets you free" or
"Work brings freedom") (Auschwitz-Birkenau, by Geoff Walden)

It has to be emphasized,
though, that language analysis is not sufficient to change one’s way of
living. Language analysis is only therapeutically effective, if the change or
rediscovery of meaning is accompanied with a change of emotion. Self-transformation
is an emotional process and not just an intellectual activity. The emotional
process may require openness, spontaneity and experiments or – in the case of
normative therapies – concentration, self-discipline and exercises (see chapter
4.4).

6. Comparison with the Medical Model

6.1 History

Medical analogies are commonly invoked in both Buddhist dharma [Gowans,
17-18] [Burton, 187] and Hellenistic philosophy. Cicero and Galen expressed the view of many Hellenistic philosophers when they
described philosophy as a medical science for the mind [Sellars, 64-68]. The
most general form of analogy may be stated as follows: “Just as medicine cures
bodily diseases and brings about physical health, so Buddhist dharma and
Hellenistic philosophy cure mental diseases and bring about psychological
health.” [Gowans, 11]

For Nussbaum, Hadot and Foucault ancient philosophical therapy is a
therapy of passions/desires, which can be understood in analogy to medical
therapy [Banicki 2015, 627-628]. According to Konrad Banicki the structure
constituted by the three concepts health ideal, disease and process of
treatment seems to be generally accepted in thinking about medicine or therapy
of any kind [Banicki 2014, 14]. Consequently he demands that a therapeutic
vision of philosophy has to identify the diseases it attempts at curing
[Banicki 2014, 15].

John
Sellars, however, suggests that the prevalence of the medical model reflects
the influence of Socrates who hints at the analogy but who would not have
engaged in the careful analysis (of the status of medicine) begun by Plato and
taken to its heights in later authors such as Galen and Alexander
of Aphrodisias [Sellars, 74]. A closer examination
shows that even Socrates considered the medical analogy to be insufficient. It
strikes for example that he discarded the stochastic nature of medicine, when
he referred to the medical model [Sellars, 41]. Furthermore he used several
additional analogies to characterize the art of living:

▪He associated philosophical knowledge with the
knowledge of artisans and craftsmen. Productive arts are quite different from
the medical model.

▪He compared the function of philosophy for the
soul with the function of gymnastics for the body [Sellars, 110]. Gymnastics is
closer to a performative art than to medicine.

▪Finally the Socratic
happiness (Eudaimonia) stems from the process of searching for wisdom
[Sellars, 167-168] and not from the result of the search. Socrates even
suggested that wisdom may be unreachable. Again, the model seems to be closer
to a performative art than to medicine.

According
to Christopher Gowans the medical analogy does not have as much importance as
its intuitive appeal and the frequency with which it was invoked might lead one
to suspect. In Buddhism and Hellenism there are significant disanalogies
between

The ethical goal to liberate oneself from anger, fear and grief is a
controversial conception of psychological health. In addition, these traditions
believed that in various ways it was necessary to withdraw from ordinary life
(psychological or otherwise) in order to achieve genuine tranquility. The claim
that psychological health requires downgrading the importance of ordinary life
is also controversial (…). Any conception of physical health that is at all empirical
needs to respect what is biologically necessary and possible. The general form
of the medical analogy might be thought to suggest something similar for
psychological health. In fact, however, in Buddhist and Hellenistic thought
conceptions of psychological health are put forward that, to many persons, are
beyond the limits of human capacity. The mentioned traditions acknowledged the
great difficulty of achieving their goal [Gowans, 26-27] [Soni, 226].

By
disassociating tranquility therapies from psychological health[Zhang, 442] and from normality it is
possible to exclude them from public support. But possibly the culture which
excludes tranquility therapies is not as “healthy” and “sound” as it pretends
to be. The question is especially pressing in authoritarian and totalitarian
systems. The political and
ideological abuse of the term “psychological health” often goes with an abuse
of psychiatry. Examples are abundant in history and seen during the Nazi
era and the Soviet
rule, when political dissenters were labeled as
"mentally ill" (Political abuse of psychiatry,
Wikipedia). The political and ideological instrumentalization of psychiatry is
one of the reasons for using the wider definition of “therapy” (chapter 2.2)
and liberating philosophy from the medical terms health ideal and disease.

“The goal of philosophical counseling cannot be to return its
clients to some socially (or biologically) defined level of functioning; nor
can it be to treat deviancy” [Paden, 10].

In order to
apply the medical model to philosophical therapy the terms health ideal and
disease have to be considerably stretched. This is especially
questionable, if philosophical therapy – as in the case of Wittgenstein – strives
for a perfect linguistic clarity. There is a negative and a positive goal in Wittgenstein’s
therapy, both associated with a health ideal [Peterman,
108-111]:

1.Negatively Wittgenstein aims at the removal of
puzzlement. Illness is identified with philosophical puzzlement and disturbance
that comes from not being able to resolve puzzlement and arrive at thoughts
that are at peace. Health is identified with arriving at thoughts that are at
peace [Peterman, 89].

Disturbance that
comes from not being able to resolve puzzlement are also known in disciplines
like mathematics and computer programming. What sense does it make to use the
term illness in this context? Most philosophers are confronted with
puzzlements that are not easy to resolve, but the majority enjoys this kind of
intellectual challenge. If puzzlement causes mental illness, then there are
more factors involved than just doing philosophy.

2.Positively he aims at coming into agreement with
one’s form of life and so at the sort of philosophical peace that comes from
having a perspicuous representation of one’s form of life [Peterman, 110].

Being in agreement with one’s form of life is necessary, given
standard circumstances in one’ environment, for fulfillment of those goals that
are necessary and jointly sufficient for one’s minimal happiness [Peterman,
110]

If finally the
health ideal is reduced to achieving minimal happiness, then why not bypass the
entire topic of mental health and simply aim at philosophical forms of life
which cure or reduce suffering?

Wittgenstein
does not give concrete examples for “one’s form of life”, but interestingly he does not exclude a philosophical acceptance of
religious forms [Peterman, 117]. A possible
interpretation of “finding one’s form of life” is Cavell’s moral perfectionism and the corresponding examples in philosophical films. But what is the gain in introducing the
terms health ideal and disease in this context? Associating a certain form of life with a disease is a strong normative
claim. In our view contemporary philosophical therapy
should not distinguish between different mental diseases – that is the task of
psychotherapy – but between different kinds of suffering/risk, caused by
different ways of living.

Many of our most pressing problems aren’t
even emotional or chemical to begin with – they’re philosophical. To wit: You
don’t have to be clinically depressed or burdened by childhood guilt to want
help with the timeless questions of the human condition – the persistence of
suffering and the inevitability of death, the need for a reliable ethics. ‘’Even
sane, functional people need principles to live by’’ [Duane].

Contemporary
therapies may pursue a concrete goal – as the Stoics did – but they can also be
open processes:

The verb “to diagnose” is massively laden
with medical connotations (…) Philosophical verification or diagnosis can be
completely different from medical diagnosis in that trying to understand the nature
of the problem is not based on a priori knowledge [Schuster].

A special aspect
of the diagnosis is its language:

▪Psychotherapy objectifies the client, forms a theory
about the client and interprets the client’s statements in terms of that theory
[Van Hooft, 20]. The definition of mental diseases may be influenced by
political ideologies, religions or dictators of the mainstream.

▪Individualistic philosophical therapies strive to avoid
theory-specific terms and consider the patient’s constitution, environment and
life story as a unique phenomenon.The language should be theory-neutral, because otherwise
the patient is guided in a specific direction. A standardized language is
already a loss of individuality. Ideally, the patient discovers his/her
own language in the course of the therapy [Hampe 2007]. If the patient has
already been confronted with a particular theory, then the corresponding way of
thinking has first to be undone [Schuster].

The
distinction between the philosophical and the medical model can be explained
with the subtle, but important distinction between the Socratic and Stoic
conception of philosophy [Sellars, 167-168]:

▪Socratic conception: According to Socrates philosophy as an art of living is an activity
that aspires to wisdom. It is a method for searching knowledge. This
agrees with the etymological sense of the word philosophy which is “love
for wisdom”.

The
Socratic philosopher is not wise, but possesses the self-awareness of lacking wisdom, and thus
pursues it (Sage, Wikipedia)

▪Stoic conception: According to Zeno philosophy represents wisdom. (Stoic) philosophy is the time-tested
result of numerous search processes, exemplarily represented by Stoic
sages.

The
medical model accords with the Stoic conception. The Stoic therapists thought
to know the “diseases” and corresponding remedies.

A
philosophical therapy may pursue a concrete goal – as the Stoics did – but it
can also be an open (Socratic) search process with unknown destination.

The entire
history of philosophical therapy can be seen as a Socratic search under
changing internal and external conditions. Whereas the notion of “disease” (and
the corresponding notion of the “right way of living”) changes considerably in
the course of history, the goal to reduce suffering by means of knowledge
is vastly undisputed and survived all times. With regard to contemporary
philosophical therapy it is therefore recommendable, to apply the wider
definition of therapy as sketched in chapter 2.2.

6.4 Beliefs

Psychotherapy
is a specialized field within the social
sciences. Psychotherapists – with some exceptions
like existential therapists – typically adopt
the scientific stance of value-neutrality. They validate emotions, but not
world views [Martin, 19-20]. Philosophical therapy, in contrast, resumes the holistic and interdisciplinary view that was characteristic for the ancient world. It is not only concerned with the well-being of the patient,
but also with the search for the “objectively” true and good [Van
Hooft, 28] [Martin, 21]. The Buddhist and Stoic therapies [Sellars, 150-164],
for example, rely on specific world views with clear conceptions of the true
and good.

The
separation of the disciplines began with the development of individualistic
therapies:

As a specialized science, a branch of psychology –
‘depth-psychology’ or psychology of the unconscious – it is quite unsuited to
form a Weltanschauungof its own; it must accept that of science in general (Sigmund
Freud, A Philosophy of Life).

In medical practice in the primary sense the removal of a patient’s
false or unwarranted beliefs is arguably much less central than in Buddhism and
Hellenism, because physical diseases are less likely to be directly caused by
beliefs [Gowans, 15].

The
conception of well-being and moral rules within a non-violent philosophy like
Buddhism is necessarily different from Nicomachean ethics, because the world view is different. There are good reasons
for believing in progress, but there are also good reasons for skepticism and
retreat. In medicine there is only one goal (health). The medical model
cannot explain why there are conflicting (or even opposing) goals in
philosophical therapy.

▪The medical goal is to be again free from
disease, a previous state of heath presupposed. Buddhism attempts to terminate
a state of suffering and confusion without presupposing a previous state
of wholeness and health [Halbfass, 250] (in contrast to Hinduism, where atman represents such a state).

▪In Samkyha and Buddhism the goal is not
well-being, but rather the freedom from attachment. Medicine itself is, as seen
from this perspective, an integral part of samsara. In order to liberate from suffering, one has to sacrifice
happiness [Halbfass, 253-254].

6.5 Moral Questions

Philosophers criticize
those psychiatrists, who associate immoral behavior with
mental diseases, without reflecting the cultural and historical background of
the corresponding terms.

Most philosophically minded thinkers who have looked critically at
the concepts of mental health and mental illness have found them
to be inherently laden with moral value (…). We pack our value preferences and
aversions into these notions. Critics object that positive concepts of health – like the WHO’s ideal of complete well-being [Banicki 2014,
16] – lead to the expansive pathologizing that alarms
Marinoff and others (…). Unquestionably, our culture has been shaped
dramatically by a therapeutic trend: the tendency to adopt health-oriented
approaches to issues traditionally viewed as moral matters. As just a few
examples, the DSM lists drug abuse, alcohol
dependence, impulse control disorders, and a variety of personality disorders
that in the past were discussed as character flaws. The replacement project
seeks to replace morality with therapeutic outlooks (…). It is dangerous,
insofar as it creates the "medical tyranny" of therapists who are
implicitly given power in moral matters, under the guise of morally neutral
science [Martin, 10-12].

Besides
associating a healthy life style with moral value – which is a controversial
issue – medicine does not contribute much to the development of moral
guidelines.

If we think that living well requires living virtuously, then the
medical analogy is problematic (…). There are no actions that are characteristically
expressive of being healthy. By contrast, there are actions that are
characteristically expressive of being just, courageous, or compassionate.
Hence the medical analogy is not naturally suited to philosophies like Buddhism
and Stoicism that regard virtue as a necessary feature of living well [Gowans,
27].

One of the primary objections to tranquility philosophies is that
anger is a morally required response to serious wrongdoing on the part of
others. Both Buddhism and Stoicism directly reject this: they maintain that a
virtuous response to wrongdoing is free from anger (…). Since the normative
question cannot be avoided, any tranquility philosophy implies a response to it
and regarding psychological well-being as analogous to physical well-being is not
a helpful model for reflecting on this position [Gowans, 29].

If the
Socratic search for a good life is seen as one of the characteristics of
philosophical therapy, then the search has to go beyond the specialized medical
sciences. Whereas psychotherapy delegates economic and political questions to
separate disciplines, philosophy works on normative answers. Philosophy may
e.g. ask if it were not more efficient to improve the living conditions than to
occupy therapists with the result of an oppressive environment. Moral questions
induce the search for an “objective” point of view; see Philosophy as Therapy –
Introduction.

7. Conclusion

Definition

The shortest definition of philosophy as therapy is philosophy
as a means to cure (or reduce) suffering.

In ancient times doing
philosophy was a way of life; it was not restricted to an
intellectual discipline [Hadot].

▪and then all the way back to the reconstruction of the
biological self (Nietzsche, Freud)

On the way back the focus – which was on the control of desires –
shifts to the liberation of repressed desires. Obviously in ancient
times the main risk was to be misguided by passions, whereas modern therapists focus
is on the risks of repression.

Relation to psychotherapy

▪The analogy with medicine – i.e. the structure
constituted by the three concepts health ideal, disease and process of
treatment – does not adequately represent the diversity of philosophical
therapy. There are significant disanalogies concerning the conception of
psychological health, moral questions, beliefs and diagnosis.

▪The delineation between philosophical therapy
and psychotherapy is vague insofar, as philosophical methods like maieutics, hermeneutics and the change of
perception are also used in psychotherapy. Philosophical therapy competes with
psychotherapy mainly in the counseling of mentally sane people.

For the contemporary practice we suggest a typology of therapies,
which is based on chances and risks. Relating the term therapy
to suffering/risk opens a door for people who seek philosophical
assistance and do not associate their condition with a disease. The reinterpretation of specific desires/emotions (or suffering in
general) as “disease” in ancient therapies is first and foremost of historical
interest.

References

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