OTTAWA — The Conservative government alarmed privacy advocates by overhauling the law to give Canada’s spy agency easier access to federal data, even though the spies themselves said greater information-sharing could be done under existing laws, newly released documents show.

In a presentation to federal deputy ministers last year, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service said “significant improvements” to the sharing of national-security information were possible within the “existing legislative framework.”

The Canadian Press obtained a heavily censored copy of the secret February 2014 presentation and a related memo to CSIS director Michel Coulombe under the Access to Information Act.

Earlier this year the government introduced an omnibus security bill that included the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, intended to remove legal barriers that prevented or delayed the exchange of relevant files.

The legislation, which recently received royal assent, permits the sharing of information about activity that undermines the security of Canada, something law professors Craig Forcese and Kent Roach called “a new and astonishingly broad concept.”

Privacy commissioner Daniel Therrien denounced the scope as “clearly excessive,” saying it could make available all federally held information about someone of interest to as many as 17 government departments and agencies with responsibilities for national security.

In the 2014 memo to Coulombe, CSIS assistant director Tom Venner stressed the importance of timely and reliable information exchanges, and he lamented the patchwork of existing authorities that hindered sharing.

“The absence of a clear authority to share information for national security purposes amplifies this challenge,” he wrote in preparing Coulombe for the meeting with deputies.

“Generally, information sharing with (other government departments) is carried out on a case-by-case and/or ad-hoc basis, which is antiquated and inefficient.”

However, he added that laws and arrangements “often allow for the sharing of information for national security purposes,” and that further strides could be made with “appropriate direction and framework in place.”

Venner cited a number of recently successful pilot projects and outlined “future opportunities” for sharing — all of them deleted from the memo.

CSIS clearly saw “room for workarounds” in the existing law “with a little bit more co-ordination within government,” Forcese said in an interview.

The spy agency’s memo seems “to belie the whole justification for the controversial information-sharing regime” in the government’s subsequent anti-terrorism bill, he said.

In 2010, the provincial integrity commissioner looked into the CSIS claims and found that Chan’s interactions with China’s consular-general in Toronto were part of his job, according to the Globe report.

Chan called the Globe’s investigation “little more than a re-hash of ludicrous allegations published ­ and debunked five years ago.”

Chan’s comment refers to the 2010 controversy surrounding then-CSIS director Richard Fadden’s public remarks that two unnamed provincial politicians were under foreign influence.

Globe editor-in-chief David Walmsley says the paper will not retract the story.

“To suggest the Globe’s articles reveal nothing new is false,” Walmsley said in an emailed statement Monday.

“This work revealed significant new pieces of information, including the fact CSIS visited the Ontario government and expressed concerns about Mr. Chan — something that had never been previously disclosed. We stand by the stories and intend to publish further material.”

With files from The Canadian Press

Michael Chan’s full statement:

I have a statement to make about the recent Globe and Mail articles. I will not be taking any questions today.

Last week the Globe published articles that repeat five-year-old, unfounded suggestions about me.

The articles ran on the front page and are little more than a re-hash of ludicrous allegations published ­ and debunked ­ five years ago. In fact, in 2010 the Globe & Mail properly called the suggestions reckless, foolish and contradictory.

The Globe’s articles revealed no new material facts ­ despite their claim that they were a result on a 10-month investigation.

It is impossible to imagine a more serious attack on me and my family. Let me say again that the insinuations and allegations made by the Globe and Mail are false and have caused serious damage to my reputation, to me, and to my family.

I am calling on the Globe and Mail today to immediately stop, to the extent possible, the ongoing harm that is being done to me and my family by publishing a retraction and an apology in a place of comparable prominence to the initial publications.

I will pursue all legal remedies to restore my reputation that has been damaged by this deeply offensive personal attack.

An Ontario cabinet minister is fighting suggestions there is an open CSIS investigation against him.

PostmediaPremier Kathleen Wynne has said the allegations against Minister Michael Chan are "baseless."

Michael Chan, minister of citizenship, immigration and international trade for the province, was the subject of a 2010 Canadian Security Intelligence Service probe into foreign influence and the government of the day was cautioned he might hold too-close ties to the Chinese government, the Globe and Mail reported Tuesday.

Chan refutes all allegations against him in an open letter released Wednesday that calls the Globe story “a blend of innuendo and half-suggestions.”

He said the front-page story implies there’s new information and refers to him as a “threat.”

This personal attack is deeply offensive to me and to my family

“Although there are no specific allegations, provocative words like treason and espionage are used for no reason. There is a persistent theme that there is a perceived risk that I am under undue influence and that I am an unwitting dupe of a foreign government,” he writes. “This is offensive and totally false. This personal attack is deeply offensive to me and to my family.”

Chan also implies the five-year-old story and subsequent reaction could dissuade other immigrants from participating in public office.

“I would like to continue to encourage newer Canadians to consider taking an active role in public life. This is essential for our society to progress,” he writes. “They should not be discouraged by the fear of allegations that the everyday actions of newer Canadians need to be minutely examined to determine if they somehow have lesser loyalties to this country.”

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“I came to this country as a young man. Canada welcomed me. While I am proud of my Chinese heritage, I am a Canadian first and foremost,” he writes.

The Globe and Mail story alleges that CSIS in 2010 was concerned Chan had a personal relationship with the then-consul general of China in Toronto. In a meeting with then-premier Dalton McGuinty’s staff, CSIS warned the Ontario government that Michael Chan had “unusually close ties to Chinese officials.”

The minister refuted those claims then and in the Globe story this week.

Chan is a relatively low-profile but integral member of Wynne’s cabinet who has helped lead Ontario trade missions to China and is said to be a powerhouse fundraiser for the Liberal Party.

Wynne said as much Wednesday in her second statement on the subject in two days.

“On our trade mission together last fall to China, Michael was instrumental in attracting to Ontario almost $1 billion in new investment by Chinese companies, creating 1,800 jobs,” she said. “It makes me proud that Ontario is home to so many people of Chinese descent, including Michael Chan. Ontario’s vibrant Chinese community is an integral part of our province’s identity.”

The minister mentions that’s he is not well-known in his letter:

“Although I have been a minister for eight years, it is probably true that most Ontarians do not know me well. For many, their first impressions of me will be from the headlines in the recent Globe articles.”

“It hurts me that this is the case,” he writes.

Read his full letter here:

Open Letter from Michael Chan

I wish to make a statement about the recent Globe & Mail articles that repeat 5-year-old, unfounded suggestions about me.

I am grateful to Premier Wynne for her early and definitive statement on the topic, and her expression of confidence in me. I also want to thank the many people who have contacted me to offer their support.

I came to this country as a young man. Canada welcomed me. While I am proud of my Chinese heritage, I am a Canadian first and foremost. I owe all the success I have had to this country and, most particularly, to the province of Ontario. I have been tremendously honoured to have been elected to the legislative assembly on four occasions, and to have been a Minster of the Crown for the last eight years. I have been a strong advocate for the stakeholders and businesses I have had dealings with in every portfolio I have held. I have always conducted myself with the highest integrity.

In my capacity as Ontario’s Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and International Trade, I have travelled to many places – and will continue to do so – to promote trade relations with Ontario. Everything I have done has been to serve the best interests of the Province of Ontario, and the citizens of Markham-Unionville. I would like to think that in some small way I have served as an example to all Canadians who may wish to take part in public affairs.

This week’s Globe & Mail articles are little more than a re-hash of ludicrous allegations published – and debunked – five years ago. Indeed, the Globe & Mail at that time properly called the suggestions “reckless, foolish and contradictory.” (Globe & Mail, June 24, 2010)

Maintaining deep, meaningful connections with one’s culture, with one’s country of origin, is something millions of Canadians cherish. Our strong, personal ties around the world are a good thing – they are an integral part of the foundation of Canada and Ontario. Indeed, at Queen’s Park we celebrate the countries that make up the rich cultural fabric of Ontario with dozens of flag-raisings each year and nobody questions the loyalty of those in attendance.

I would also like to make some personal comments.

Although I have been a Minister for eight years, it is probably true that most Ontarians do not know me well. For many, their first impressions of me will be from the headlines in the recent Globe articles.

It hurts me that this is the case. The banner headline of the first article gives the impression the article contains a major revelation. The front page has a photo of me with the prominent headline in bold type stating that it has been alleged that “this Minister” (me) could be a “threat” to Canada. The body of the article contains a blend of innuendo and half-suggestions. Although there are no specific allegations, provocative words like treason and espionage are used for no reason. There is a persistent theme that there is a perceived risk that I am under undue influence and that I am an unwitting dupe of a foreign government.

This is offensive and totally false. This personal attack is deeply offensive to me and to my family.

We live in a society where freedom of the press is an important pillar. We all cherish the freedoms and protections we enjoy as Canadians. Informed debate is the lifeblood of our democracy and the press plays a major role. However, at the same time, nothing I have done in any way supports any suggestion that I am a possible threat to Canada or to Ontario.

There is one other comment I wish to make. I would like to continue to encourage newer Canadians to consider taking an active role in public life. This is essential for our society to progress. They should not be discouraged by the fear of allegations that the everyday actions of newer Canadians need to be minutely examined to determine if they somehow have lesser loyalties to this country

]]>http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/this-is-offensive-and-totally-false-minister-michael-chan-slams-reports-of-csis-investigation-in-open-letter/feed0stdMichael-ChanPostmediaHouse of Commons passes controversial anti-terror bill — putting it on track to become law by summerhttp://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/house-of-commons-passes-controversial-anti-terror-bill-putting-it-on-track-to-become-law-by-summer
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/house-of-commons-passes-controversial-anti-terror-bill-putting-it-on-track-to-become-law-by-summer#commentsThu, 07 May 2015 13:23:13 +0000http://news.nationalpost.com/?p=765747

Conservative and Liberal MPs joined forces Wednesday to vote in favour of the dramatic, disputed overhaul of Canada’s national security laws. Bill C-51 now moves to the Senate for an expected expeditious passage into law.

The 183-96 Commons’ third-reading vote was anti-climactic. Liberal leader Justin Trudeau had pledged support from the outset for what he saw as a flawed piece of lawmaking. The Opposition NDP and Green Party denounced it in its entirety.

Attempts at amending the bill were largely unsuccessful: four mostly minor changes were agreed to in the Commons.

A Senate committee studying the legislation is unlikely to recommend further formal amendments. Upper House changes would require sending the bill back to the Commons for re-approval, delaying the government’s plan to get the bill through Parliament by the start of the summer recess.

However, the committee is expected to make written “observations” about ways to improve the bill. If the full Senate accepts these, the government must respond in writing to each within 180 days.

One key observation is expected to call for a way to formally monitor a new power in the bill allowing federal spies to seek judicial warrants to knowingly break the law or breach the Charter of Rights in order to disrupt suspected threats to national security.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper packaged the incendiary bill around October’s terror attacks in Ottawa and Quebec and is expected to merchandise one of his government’s defining pieces of legislation on the fall federal election trail.

The omnibus bill expands the mandate and power of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), criminalizes promoting and advocating terrorism, and requires airlines to help stop extremists from flying to overseas battle zones.

It also allows more than 100 departments and federal agencies to share Canadians’ personal information more easily and makes it simpler for police to arrest and detain individuals without charge as suspected national security threats, among other measures.

Even some of the bill’s critics agree that CSIS, the RCMP and other state security agencies have legitimate needs for updated powers to combat quickly evolving threats from terrorists and other dangers to national security.

But the bill’s many critics believe it overreaches in two key regards.

One is CSIS’s expanded mandate to take “reasonable and proportional” measures to actively disrupt suspected threats to national security at their inchoate “pre-criminal” stage – before the RCMP would typically mount a criminal investigation. The other is the broader sharing of Canadians’ personal information across government and privacy concerns.

The bill also underreaches in crucial regards, say opponents.

Justin Tang / Canadian PressPeople protest Bill-C51 on Parliament Hill on April 18.

There is no expanded independent, civilian oversight of the newly empowered state security apparatus, which is increasingly intertwined. There is no provision for existing federal watchdogs to share operational information or conduct joint investigations. And attempts to impose three-year sunset clauses on some of the more contentious provisions were rejected by the Conservative majority.

CSIS was created in 1984, replacing the disgraced and disbanded RCMP Security Service after revelations of “dirty tricks” against left-wing radicals and Quebec separatists during the late 1960s and early 1970s. As a result, CSIS’s prime mandate has been limited to the collection, analysis and reporting of security intelligence to government.

The additional “threat reduction” mandate under C-51 will put it on an operational footing much closer to that of the old RCMP Security Service. While that worries many people, government security officials argue that CSIS is a mature, responsible outfit that can be trusted not to abuse the new power.

The same power will allow CSIS to seek secret federal court warrants to break the law in exceptional circumstances. Government officials argue it is no different from laws that already allow police to obtain court warrants to destroy property, enter private buildings and wiretap phones – all illegal activities without a warrant.

What is different, however, is that those police actions, if they lead to a criminal prosecution, are examined in open court.

What’s more, the Charter protects against “unreasonable” searches and seizures and “arbitrary” detention unless a judge pre-authorizes breaching those rights.

“These pre-authorizations prevent a breach of these rights because it is the pre-authorization that makes the search ‘reasonable’ or the detention ‘non-arbitrary,’” writes Craig Forcese, an expert on national security law at the University of Ottawa and one of C-51’s most ardent critics.

In Thursday’s edition, we outlined our concerns with Bill C-51, the Conservative government’s proposed anti-terrorism legislation. Much of it is simply unnecessary. But as it seems guaranteed to pass in some form, the government might at least consider the many valuable amendments that have been proposed — amendments that would preserve the bill in its essentials while lessening the impact on civil liberties.

Some of C-51 is unsalvageable: for example, the ban on “promoting” or “advocating” “terrorism offences in general.” It bridges no identifiable gap in the existing criminal code; it is unclear what “promote,” “advocate” and “in general” mean in this context; and as such it invites an intolerable chill on free speech. Failing deletion, however, this measure could be made less objectionable by incorporating the statutory defences — for example of truth, good-faith religious opinion and public interest — found in existing hate speech and anti-terror legislation; by replacing “terrorism in general” with the defined term “terrorist activity”; or by stipulating that the accused must willfully be advocating terrorism, not just be “reckless” as to whether terrorism “may” occur.

Allowing the proactive deletion of material deemed by a judge to be “terrorist propaganda,” defined in the same vague terms as above, is also a lost cause. But if the government must enshrine such prior restraint on free speech, it could soften the blow by redefining “terrorist propaganda” along the lines detailed in the previous paragraph, and installing similar avenues of defence; and by eliminating a measure that empowers the Canada Border Services Agency to seize such material without a warrant, particularly in light of CBSA’s history of overstepping its bounds in such roles.

The government has failed to make the case that CSIS needs new “kinetic” powers “to intervene in order to disrupt threats to the security of Canada,” let alone to do so via illegal activity. But if it is determined to grant them, it must also ramp up the safeguards. Rather than authorizing Federal Court judges to issue warrants authorizing CSIS to violate the Charter, it should explicitly stipulate that any illegal activity so warranted must not do so. It should also install safeguards in the (secret) judicial process: Allow special advocates to represent suspects; require that suspects be notified of the illegal activity within a reasonable period of time (subject to operational considerations); and require public reporting on how often CSIS is using these new powers and, generally speaking, what for.

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The information-sharing provisions of Bill C-51, too, call out for safeguards, inasmuch as they encourage 17 arms of government to share data amongst themselves with respect to matters far less serious than terrorism. That they are empowered to share information with “any person, for any purpose,” rightly alarms civil libertarians who recall how recently Canadian information aided the torture of our citizens abroad. Those words have to go. The threshold for sharing, similarly, which is when information is “relevant” to the receiving agency and related to any “activity that undermines the security of Canada,” could easily be softened. The Privacy Commissioner has suggested stipulating the information must be “necessary” for the receiving jurisdiction, and that it must pertain to a “threat to the security of Canada,” a defined term in the CSIS Act. That makes good sense.

Finally, there is the question of oversight and review. Nearly all observers outside of government believe it is inadequate. Many have suggested Parliament should take on that role; the Canadian Bar Association suggests a new office be created “to act as an expert review body [for] all national security activity.”

Neither seems to be in the offing: government ministers insist the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) is all we need. So why not give it more resources, more power and a broader mandate — an “all of government remit,” as law professors Craig Forcese and Kent Roach recommend? This would allow SIRC, for example, to monitor how CSIS interacts with the 17 agencies newly empowered to share Canadians’ information, or how CBSA uses its powers (in the unamended bill) to intercept terrorist propaganda, and everything else this bill contemplates.

If, as the government maintains, Canadians have nothing to fear from this legislation, then the government has nothing to fear from regular reporting and more rigorous powers of real-time oversight and after-the-fact review. The terrorism threat is real, but Canadians ought not to be frightened into countenancing Bill C-51’s overreaches. Neither has the government any valid reason not to repair them.

National Post

]]>http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/national-post-view-how-to-salvage-bill-c-51/feed1stdStephen HarperfbStewart Prest: An informal coalition of experts has become the most effective opposition to the Tory governmenthttp://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/stewart-prest-an-informal-coalition-of-experts-has-become-the-most-effective-opposition-to-the-tory-government
http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/stewart-prest-an-informal-coalition-of-experts-has-become-the-most-effective-opposition-to-the-tory-government#commentsFri, 20 Mar 2015 20:28:36 +0000http://news.nationalpost.com/?p=723661

The primary axis in Canadian legislative politics has shifted, at least temporarily, in the years since the last federal election. In effect, the relationship that matters most at the moment is not the one between governing and opposition parties, but between the government in office and a series of loose coalitions of actors normally existing at the periphery of politics.

A significant segment of these coalitions normally remain not just non-partisan but in fact studiously apolitical. They enter the political arena only reluctantly, and do so only out of a sense of alarm at the implications following from particularly contentious and controversial legislation that appears destined to be passed without effective challenge within formal institutions of government, whether by opposition parties or skeptical voices within the governing caucus.

Once engaged, they rely on a combination of professional experience, positional authority, and scholarly research in order to support their arguments.

Call it a coalition of experts.

While C-23, the Fair Elections Act of 2014, stands out as the most important and successful example of opposition on the part of such a coalition, we are clearly in the midst of a stand by a similar but distinct coalition against the perceived excesses of Bill C-51, the Anti-terrorism Act.

Even more interestingly, a poll released this week by Forum Research indicates support for the law hovers at 45%. As Vice reports, that is down from 82% support reported in an Angus Reid survey back in February. While all caveats apply when speaking of a single poll, the sheer magnitude of the change is noteworthy. Half of all Canadians familiar with the bill now oppose it.

Simply put, a coalition of experts is once again holding its own against a majority government, one whose perceived advantages on issues of national security were so great that only one federal opposition party chose to oppose it.

Between C-51 and C-23, we are gaining a good sense of what an effective contemporary opposition coalition looks like. In both cases, participation has extended far beyond what might be called “typical” activism to include a range of principled, non-partisan and evidence-based opinions. Many members are drawn from civil society, but I would argue the coalition as a whole is not synonymous with it.

Key actors in both examples include academics working together in large groups, encompassing different disciplines and approaches; senior civil servants, both current and former; members of the legal profession; both partisan and non-partisan voices within what for lack of a better term I’ll call the country’s broader political class (former statesmen, editorial boards, columnists, and so on); maximal indigenous leaders; and dissenting voices within the country’s conservative movement.

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Beyond studiously resisting appearances of partisanship, many within such coalitions have taken pains to note wherever possible ways in which their concerns might be addressed without undermining the government’s stated objectives. They attempt to remain politically neutral even in their opposition to the proposed legislation, seeking to offer the government advice on how to implement its preferred agenda while taking into consideration things like respect for human rights, the potential violations of the Charter, and important elements of political convention within the Canadian context, particularly those associated with maintaining the integrity and legitimacy of the Canadian political system as a whole.

Accordingly, these dissenting voices remain distinct from organizations and movements more traditionally associated with overt, often partisan opposition to a Conservative agenda, including labour groups, left leaning NGOs and think tanks, contemporary online activist networks, opposition political parties, and so on.

In the case of the Fair Election Act, opposition emerged slowly as individuals worked through a complex piece of legislation, eventually coalescing into a broad and robust coalition that ultimately succeeded in wringing significant changes out of a sitting majority government.

With C-51, a similar coalition has emerged, one that also required considerable time to form. Of late, however, more than a hundred academics have signed an open letter building on arguments first advanced by law professors Craig Forcese and Kent Roach. Joining them are newspaper editorial boards, Assembly of First Nations National Chief Perry Bellegarde, a network of NGOs, and even some conservatives calling for the bill to be amended or scrapped.

Conrad Black argues that alarm bells must sound over C-51’s abrogation of civil liberties. B.C. Premier Christy Clark has questioned whether the bill strikes the right balance between the protection of freedom and security. Former Conservative Senator Hugh Segal calls the lack of oversight a “flaw” in the bill. Independent MP and former Conservative Brent Rathgeber opposes the bill both on substantive grounds and in light of its rushed passage through the House.

Even past employees of CSIS have criticized the bill, including Reid Morden, a former director of the service

Joe Clark joined three former Liberal prime ministers and five former Supreme Court justices to stress the need for a “robust and integrated accountability regime for Canada’s national security agencies.” The letter was also signed by a number of other senior officials, both partisan and non-partisan, including past privacy commissioners and former members of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, the body charged with reviewing CSIS activity.

Even past employees of CSIS have criticized the bill, including Reid Morden, a former director of the service.

Active civil servants are speaking out as well. Canada’s current Privacy Commissioner Daniel Therrien, a non-partisan officer of Parliament, calls the bill “excessive” and a threat to Canadians’ privacy. The fact that Therrien has been blocked from testifying to the House committee examining the bill suggests its proponents are aware of how powerful such opposition can be.

What is going on here? I think there are a number of factors playing out simultaneously. One is the decline in the effectiveness of formal Canadian political institutions. Another is the type of bills coming forward, with the government repeatedly challenging long-settled legislative norms in significant and indeed constitutionally problematic ways.

The situation is decidedly unhealthy for the Canadian political system in the long term. If the country’s politicians cannot rediscover some degree of compromise and humility in the legislating process, we will have to take another look at institutional reform, for this current arrangement is not sustainable. The country cannot rely on such coalitions to play the role of opposition indefinitely without eroding the legitimacy of our institutions and experts alike.

National Post

Stewart Prest is a PhD candidate in the department of political science at the University of British Columbia.

Last month three teenage girls flew from London to Istanbul, en route to Raqqa, headquarters of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham, to begin new lives as “jihadi brides.”

Turkish intelligence says the man who smuggled them across the border was a Canadian agent, Mohammed al-Rashed, a Syrian dentist who fled to Jordan to escape the civil war.

The Turks say after al-Rashed came to the attention of the Canadian embassy in Amman, the Canadians brought him to Canada, offered him the hope of citizenship and set him to work smuggling foreigners into the clutches of the homicidal maniacs of ISIS.

The Turks, who are under pressure from the West to block the flow of foreign fighters and jihadi brides, picked him up and questioned him. They released a video he took, showing him putting the deluded British teenagers into a vehicle for their trip to hell.

By their count, al-Rashed has helped 140 Britons get to ISIS, all the while reporting to someone named “Matt” at the Canadian embassy, where the ambassador is Bruno Saccomani, former head of Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s bodyguard.

The Canadian government, of course, won’t say whether any of this is true.

If it is, we have been paying someone to smuggle fighters to ISIS. Never mind we might have been able to rescue the three girls, instead of handing them over to killers and rapists.

Perhaps the battle against ISIS is so important spies have to make that kind of ruthless calculation — balancing the lives of teenagers against the intelligence value gained from delivering them — but Canadians have not given a mandate to our government for this kind of thing.

It’s also not clear we are, as a nation, the best equipped to make those calculations.

The former director of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), the body in charge of reviewing the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, came to the same conclusion.

In his memoir, he warned we should only create a true foreign intelligence service “if we had the right backup, structure and support.”

Some in the Canadian intelligence community wanted CSIS to become a legitimate foreign service, to get a “seat at the big-boy table,” he wrote.

“Did we have the stomach for it? Could the Canadian government, and indeed citizens at large, accept having a foreign service that breaks the laws of other countries? Such activities were commonplace among other agencies at the big-boy table. I remember discussing this point with Harper face to face. The problem with Canada is that if is full of Canadians. We are not like the Americans, Russians or Israelis. If our agents are caught and executed, can we handle that? Can we deny knowledge of them?”

Arthur Porter concluded Canada was not big enough, did not have the “financial and philosophical commitment,” and didn’t face “impending threats” to warrant taking such risks.

I would add we lumberjacks may not be guileful enough for this kind for thing.

Dr. Porter is a good example of our guilelessness. The immigrant from Sierra Leone parlayed his connections with senior Conservatives into the job as SIRC head, a post he gave up when the National Post reported on a shady business deal he put together with Russians in Africa. He is now in a Panamanian prison, awaiting extradition to Canada on fraud charges.

(I suspect Canada is leaving him to rot there, rather than testify in Canada.)

The same government that put him in charge of SIRC is now seeking to massively expand the powers of our spies with Bill C-51, with no improved oversight. The law will give spies licence to engage in a wide variety of threat-disruption activities against any threat to Canada’s security, requiring warrants only when they believe their activities would break the law.

It will allow judges to issue warrants to violate the Charter rights of Canadians, which doesn’t even make sense. This week, Ron Atkey, the SIRC’s first chairman, told the Commons studying the bill it is clearly unconstitutional.

Privacy commissioner Daniel Therrien has warned the “loss of privacy is clearly excessive” and “all Canadians would be caught in this web,” but the Conservatives have refused to let him testify.

At the committee Thursday, after National Council of Canadian Muslims executive director Ihsaan Gardee testified, Conservative MP Diane Ablonczy attacked the group, shamefully making flimsy allegations behind parliamentary privilege.

The government should be working closely with the council to defuse security threats, not smearing them through guilt by association.

In Britain that same day, the parliamentary intelligence and security committee released a 150-page report, the result of an eight-month study, concluding the British intelligence laws require a total overhaul in the era of mass surveillance.

In Canada we don’t even have an intelligence and security committee to conduct such a study.

In this excerpt from their latest “backgrounder” document (the full text is available at http://www.antiterrorlaw.ca) on Bill C-51, the Anti-Terrorism Act 2015, the authors focus on the new powers the bill would grant the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

If Bill C-51 passes, CSIS will be expressly authorized to “take measures, within or outside Canada, to reduce” very broadly defined “threats to the security of Canada”. Where authorized by Federal Court warrant, these “measures” may “contravene a right or freedom guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” or may be “contrary to other Canadian law”.

The CSIS changes are dramatic, even radical. In 1984, parliamentarians granted CSIS a very broad mandate – found in the definition of “threat to the security of Canada” in s.2 of its Act – but were careful to accord it very limited powers. It has been an intelligence service – it collects and analyzes information and supplies assessments to the government. When enacted, Parliament accepted CSIS’s broad mandate because it lacked what we will call in this discussion “kinetic” or physical powers – the powers to do things to people in the physical world (except as necessary to, for example, install a wiretap or listening device).

That will change in Bill C-51. The government’s examples of what the new powers will mean for CSIS are mild, even innocuous. But in fact the only outer legal limit is surprisingly sparse: no bodily harm, no obstruction of justice and no violation of sexual integrity.

The bill superimposes a special warrant system of CSIS’s new powers. Where those activities would violate a law or the Charter, a Federal Court judge must approve them in advance by a warrant.

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The obvious thinking is that such a system simply builds on the conventional role of judges in issuing search warrants. But the analogy is approximate. In the world of search and seizure, judicial warrants are designed to prevent — not authorize — Charter violations. That is because the Charter privacy protection is qualified — the Charter protects against “unreasonable” searches and seizures and a search under a warrant is prima facie proper. “Unreasonable” typically means without warrant.

Other Charter rights are dramatically different. For instance, there is no concept of “unreasonable” cruel and unusual punishment. It is an absolute right — not qualified. Some rights — such as the right to freedom of expression — may have some internal limitations in their content (e.g., free expression does not reach threats of violence), but this is usually a matter decided by a court closely scrutinizing the scope of legislation against the behaviour protected by the right. All rights, such as the right of citizens to leave or come back to Canada, can be subject to reasonable limits under Section 1 of the Charter, but the restraint on the right is usually spelled out in advance in legislation. To imagine that a court can pre-authorize a violation of a right in response to an open-textured invitation to do so is to misunderstand entirely the way our constitution works, on a fundamental level.

We could be wrong in our construal of the law — and when we are, it is because courts will correct us. But any deliberation on this question, and on whether CSIS can exceed the law, will be conducted in a warrant proceeding. In other words, all these weighty legal deliberations will be done in secret, with only the judge and the government side represented. The person affected by the illegal activity will not be there — in fact they will likely never know who visited the misfortune on them. They cannot defend their rights. No civil rights group will be able to weigh in.

At best, a “special advocate” will be invited to defend the public interest (because a court insists on having that person present). This is a person, able to act only by themselves, trying to balance their special advocate work with their busy private practice, paid a fraction of their regular wage, unable to consult often with other special advocates, and sworn to secrecy . There is no equality of arms between special advocates and government lawyers/CSIS.

And more than that, there are now numerous review body reports and Federal Court decisions complaining that CSIS has failed to meet its duty of candour in closed door proceedings. It is very difficult to know whether these reports represent the sum total of CSIS shortcomings — a failure to be candid is something that is, by definition, very difficult to detect.

The ultimate court decision will generally not be public because of concerns its disclosure will adversely reveal ongoing operations and disruption methods. There will be no natural party able to appeal it. In the worst instance, we risk a secret jurisprudence on when CSIS can act beyond the law.

Our expectation is that the Federal Court will do its best to issue redacted versions of its cases, but it will be inventing the process as it goes. So too, any appeal will depend on ad hoc arrangements, and presumably also require a very earnest special advocate with the time and inclination to press matters.

Meanwhile, the Federal Court will not automatically know what is done under its authorization. Past experience suggests that what is authorized by the Federal Court and what is done by CSIS may not line up.

Everything will then depend on SIRC, CSIS’s review body. We have nothing but respect for those who work in SIRC, in very difficult circumstances. The fact is SIRC is an underfunded, understaffed review body. Its statutory powers have not kept pace with the reality of the security service it reviews. In 2006, the Arar Commission underscored the urgent necessity of new legislative tools allowing SIRC to coordinate with other review bodies and to expand its mandate. But still, even now, as the security services all collaborate, the review bodies are “stove-piped” and “siloed” by agency. Informal efforts by review bodies to coordinate are reportedly rebuffed by the government.

On top of these legal matters, we have administration of justice and “operational” concerns. These include the following:

• Criminal trials: CSIS’s operation and new powers are often “pre-criminal” and may overlap, affect and perhaps taint a subsequent RCMP investigation and evidentiary record. A criminal trial may be mired in questions arising from the Federal Court authorizations, its holdings in a potentially secretive Charter jurisprudence, and doubts about whether the CSIS operation contributed too or otherwise was associated with the crime at issue.

• Interaction with informer privilege: Bill C-44, now in the senate, will give CSIS “human sources” broad privilege from being compelled to be a Crown witness or having identifying information disclosed in court proceedings. Crown prosecutors may find this complicates and, quite likely, frustrates their witness list. Good defence lawyers will fight this proviso, especially when the first thing they suspect is that a CSIS kinetic operation lies at the heart of a subsequent criminal case. Disclosure disputes may make terrorism trials — already long and complex — even more difficult.

• Interaction with the RCMP: As we understand it, thus far “disruption” has been a peace officer function, linked to police investigations. Peace officers in these situations likely remain preoccupied with the effect their conduct might have in any future criminal proceedings, and concerned with reducing the chances that their disruption activities will lead to acquittals or stays on the basis of abuse of process in criminal trials. For cultural and institutional reasons, CSIS may not have the same concerns. How will CSIS and RCMP arrange their affairs so that CSIS’s kinetic activities do not undermine RCMP criminal investigations, either ongoing or prospective?

CSIS is a law-observant service, and adhering to legal expectations is an important part of its culture. Violations of the law are an aberration, not a pastime

• Institutional skills: CSIS is a security intelligence organization. If it gears up kinetic activities, it will presumably require skills and aptitudes that presently are not part of its arsenal. What plans are in place to acquire and resource and train these new kinetic operatives and operations? How will CSIS guard against agents recruited for kinetic operations themselves proving problematic?

• Institutional culture: CSIS is a law-observant service, and adhering to legal expectations is an important part of its culture. Violations of the law are an aberration, not a pastime. As the Service begins operations that, but for a Federal Court warrant, would be illegal, how will it ensure that its “black” operations do not contaminate the overall culture of the organization?

• Social licence: The world is rife with misunderstandings and conspiracy theories about spy services, including CSIS. With the new measures, many conspiracy theories move from the “implausible because require compounded illegal steps” to “within CSIS’s powers in principle”. There will be a consequence in terms of social licence for a clandestine service empowered to act in violation of the law and the Charter, especially in communities that feel targeted.

Since CSIS too depends on community cooperation to conduct many of its activities in security intelligence, there is a risk that is new powers may undermine its ability to exercise effectively its original mandate. In the final analysis, the increased scepticism and the new doubts about the Service stemming from the new powers may be the most dangerous aspect of this law proposal.

In sum, the government proposes radically restructuring CSIS and turning it into a “kinetic” service — one competent to act beyond the law. This is a rupture from the entire philosophy that animated the CSIS Act when it was introduced 30 years ago. We await convincing argument that it is truly warranted. This bill reaches much further in authorizing problematic CSIS conduct than required in any scenario we have seen raised by the government in justification. It amounts to an open ended authorization whose proper and reasonable application will depend on perfect government judgment. It violates, therefore, a cardinal principle we believe should be embedded in national security law: any law that grants powers (especially secret, difficult to review power) should be designed to limit poor judgment, not be a law whose reasonable application depends on excellent judgment.

But whatever the truth as to whether these powers are necessary , their introduction is irresponsible without a redoubled investment in our tattered accountability system. Anyone who has worked on accountability in the security sector knows that there is another core maxim in this area, when dealing with powerful, covert state agencies: “trust but verify”. We do not believe that that standard can be met at present, even without the new powers.

National Post

Kent Roach teaches at the University of Toronto law faculty and worked with both the Arar and Air India commissions. Craig Forcese is a law professor teaching national security law at the University of Ottawa and a participant in the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society.

]]>http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/forcese-roach-on-bill-c-51-judicial-warrants-are-designed-to-prevent-not-authorize-charter-violations/feed3stdcsisCSIS wants a section reserved for spies in one of Canada’s most historic graveyardshttp://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/csis-wants-a-section-reserved-for-spies-in-one-of-canadas-most-historic-graveyards
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/csis-wants-a-section-reserved-for-spies-in-one-of-canadas-most-historic-graveyards#commentsTue, 17 Feb 2015 15:38:11 +0000http://news.nationalpost.com/?p=700776

Ashley Fraser / Postmedia NewsRetired Sergeant Paul Morley Cane pays respects to friends who have passed and lay at the National Military Cemetery at Beechwood Cemetery on November 11, 2014.

OTTAWA — It looks like one of Canada’s most historic graveyards is about to get a little, um, spookier.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service wants to create a national burial site for its employees at Ottawa’s Beechwood Cemetery.

The intelligence service and a society representing many former spies have approached Beechwood about reserving part of the venerable resting place for CSIS members and their families.

The cemetery, a short drive east of Parliament Hill, already has dedicated sections for the RCMP, National Defence and Ottawa police.

These areas are “an impressive and touching tribute to the service and sacrifices of Canada’s men and women in uniform,” CSIS director Michel Coulombe said in a letter to James Patterson, Beechwood’s director of family services.

A CSIS-specific section would be a “welcome and appropriate addition” to the cemetery, Coulombe said in the July letter, obtained by The Canadian Press under the Access to Information Act.

“A preliminary survey indicated a significant amount of interest among employees in purchasing a plot,” Coulombe wrote following a May meeting between Patterson and backers of the plan.

“The success of the endeavour will rely on careful and detailed planning of the site and monument.”

Coulombe suggested further discussion of the cemetery’s offer of help in setting up a charitable fund to which people could donate money for the “development of and improvement to” the CSIS National Memorial Cemetery.

Fred Chartrand / Canadian PressThe Canadian Security Intelligence Service wants to create a national burial site for its employees at Ottawa's Beechwood Cemetery.

The project is “still at the initial stages,” said CSIS spokeswoman Tahera Mufti.

Established in 1873, Beechwood is the burial place of luminaries including prime minister Robert Borden, physicist Gerhard Herzberg, NDP leader Tommy Douglas and poet Archibald Lampman.

Six years ago, Parliament declared it the National Cemetery of Canada.

All current and former employees, regardless of their job classification, would be eligible for burial in the CSIS cemetery, said Don Mahar, national president of the Pillar Society of spy service retirees.

Mahar already has a stone at Beechwood featuring the crests of former employers the RCMP, CSIS and the Communications Security Establishment — Canada’s electronic spy agency — along with his wife’s nursing school crest.

If CSIS employees were also former members of the RCMP Security Service, dissolved in 1984 when CSIS was created, they may choose to be buried in either the RCMP or CSIS cemetery, said Mahar, a driving force behind the project.

Other possibilities include moving the existing stones of still-living members to the planned new CSIS section, or creating a special space for those who served with both the RCMP and CSIS, he added.

All who participate will be responsible for the purchase of their plot, gravestone and engraving, with no government subsidization, Mahar said.

No CSIS member has died in the performance of their duties in Canada or abroad, despite the dangers they face, he noted.

“But the reality is that this could certainly change. Similar to the Canadian Forces and the RCMP, the men and women of CSIS wish to have a national memorial site where they and their family members can be laid to rest with colleagues.”

Mahar hopes an agreement between CSIS, the Pillar Society and the Beechwood Cemetery Foundation will soon be ready for signing.

Former CSIS officer Francois Lavigne is alarmed by the Conservative government’s new anti-terror bill.

He believes the measures proposed in C-51 are unnecessary, a threat to the rights of Canadians and that the prime minister is using fascist techniques to push the bill.

Mr. Lavigne started his career with the RCMP security service in 1983, before the CSIS was established.

“I was hired by the barn burners,” he said in an interview last week. “I went to work for the FIU unit, the foreign interference unit. And that was where the barn burners came from.”

The barn burners were the off-the-leash Mounties whose law-breaking ways led to the McDonald Commission, which led to the establishment of Canadian Security Intelligence Service in 1984.

Mr. Lavigne, who went from the Mounties to CSIS and later worked overseeing spies in the solicitor general’s office, likes CSIS’s design. It was set up as an intelligence-gathering body, not an enforcement agency, actively overseen by an inspector general and reviewed by the Security Intelligence Review Committee.

Mr. Lavigne, 55, left government in 1999, but follows intelligence news closely.

He spent years tracking dangerous radicals without the powers the government wants to give to CSIS.

“I find it a little convenient that in the past few years that these radicalized people are the biggest threat to ever hit us,” he said. “There are more people dying because of drunk drivers or because of gang violence.”

The changes in C-51 will give CSIS broad powers to take action to disrupt plots and reduce threats, in Canada and abroad. This is a recipe for trouble.

“If you give them more powers, if you lower the threshold, if you allow them to collect even more information, follow more people, detain people, inevitably it’s going to lead to lawsuits, to embarrassment. It’s not if it will happen. It’s when.”

‘When our leaders start talking about tentacles and jihadis and barbarians, it’s adding fuel to the fire. It’s actually increasing the likelihood of that happening’

The prime minister uses strong language to warn Canadians about the “jihadist” threat, pointing to the attacks on Parliament Hill and in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu.

Mr. Lavigne said the public doesn’t have enough information about those attackers to justify new powers.

“We know they have some kind of link to the ISIL group, whether it’s from having seen something on YouTube or discussed things with a couple of people, but they’re not organized,” he said. “It’s not like they’re part of an organization. These are people who for their own reasons decided to act.”

Mr. Lavigne said that by proposing broad new powers, the government is either getting bad advice from security officials or ignoring good advice.

“I have never seen the RCMP and CSIS have such a cosy relationship with government,” he said. “They’re not supposed to be.”

On Thursday, law professors Craig Forcese of the University of Ottawa and Kent Roach of the University of Toronto, released a hair-raising 37-page analysis of C-51.

CSIS will be able to get warrants at secret hearings to violate Canadians’ rights, which risks creating “a secret jurisprudence on when CSIS can act beyond the law.”

CSIS will have “open-ended authorization whose proper and reasonable application will depend on perfect government judgment.”

They worry that Canadians can’t have confidence CSIS won’t be used to target political enemies of the government.

In 2012, the government shut down the office of the CSIS inspector general, which provided active oversight. Since then, after-the-fact review is provided by the Security Intelligence Review Committee, a part-time committee formerly headed by an accused fraudster.

On Monday, standing next to German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Ottawa, for instance, the prime minister said: “As you are aware, Madame Chancellor, one of the jihadist monster’s tentacles reached as far as our own Parliament.”

Mr. Lavigne said the prime minister’s advisers must tell him that using inflammatory language increases the risk.

“When our leaders start talking about tentacles and jihadis and barbarians, it’s adding fuel to the fire. It’s actually increasing the likelihood of that happening.”

Mr. Lavigne said the prime minister’s language reminds him of fascist leaders like Mussolini and Franco.

“Some of these tactics are taken right out of the fascist playbook,” he said. “Create an enemy that is hard to identify. Make it an enemy that is nebulous and seems to be able to do things that nobody else can. Don’t define the enemy. Just identify. Generate fear around that enemy, Then send out the message that the only people who can deal with this enemy are us.”

But the government isn’t fascist, I said. Rhetoric aside, it is not crossing the line to fascist actions.

He agrees. “They’re not crossing the line. They’re using the language to appeal to the emotions, which is one of the first stages. Disinformation being the second, which I think they also use. But they’re not fascist. I’m not saying the government’s fascist.”

Since the Tories brought out their proposed anti-terrorism bill, C-51, critics have taken the government to task for what is perceived to be lax oversight of Canada’s spy agencies: the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), a smaller organization that collects electronic data through communications monitoring and intercepts. These critics, including more than a few members of the opposition, worry that Canada is ramping up its clandestine services without a corresponding boost to our oversight mechanisms.

Canada does not have permanent parliamentary oversight of its intelligence agencies, as is the case in the United States and United Kingdom. Oversight is instead provided by the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), composed of a handful of government appointees plus a small staff. Five members and fewer than 20 staffers seems inadequate for such an important job — even if the Tories had not left many positions unfilled, in some cases for months at a time. Building up SIRC’s resources in line with the growing scale of operations at CSIS and CSE is the very least that should be done.

SIRC is not the only line of defence against abuses, of course. In a recent newspaper article, Ron Atkey, a national security professor at the University of Toronto and SIRC’s first chair, laid out the many ways our intelligence agencies are constrained. Judges must issue warrants before many operations, while special advocates can be brought in to assist in that process in particularly complex cases. SIRC members themselves (aside from members of Parliament) must be vetted by opposition leaders before being appointed.

Still, a standing, multi-party committee within the House of Commons would be a welcome addition to the processes already in place to oversee our spies. Though Canadians have long been blessed to live in a peaceful part of the world, the fact is that our country does have enemies. Yet Canada’s intelligence and national defence communities are very small clubs indeed. The Canadian public has too long had the luxury of being poorly informed on matters relating to national security, and those we elect are often no better informed.

That should change. A permanent intelligence review committee within the House of Commons would not just provide better oversight for our spies, with the unique legitimacy elected representatives bring to the task. It would also expose members of all parties to the realities of the threats facing Canada and how our security officials meet them. In virtually all cases, across every party, this would be the first real exposure MPs would have to the day-to-day reality of keeping Canada safe.

Such a committee would require extra screening and security clearances, of course. And its members would have to be sworn to secrecy on certain sensitive files. But Canadians would be better informed on national security and intelligence matters if MPs were better informed — and they’d be much better served if, opposition MPs having been taken into the government’s confidence, some of the partisanship were taken out of critical decisions about our collective safety. For this reason alone, the creation of an oversight committee within the House of Commons is an idea worth serious consideration.

Bill C-51 — the new anti-terror legislation currently being debated in Parliament — proposes changing a host of our laws to try and prevent terror attacks. The greatest changes are reserved for CSIS, Canada’s spy agency. Until now, CSIS has had only the power to investigate; when they find evidence of an impending terror threat, they have no power to act upon it. They are, essentially, a collection of researchers.

Critics of the bill have described the changes to CSIS as “unprecedented new powers,” and have argued that the legislation lacks oversight, but the proposed amendments to the CSIS Act are reinstating powers that — for decades — Canada’s spy agencies possessed, and which they urgently need to have again.

In 1936, the RCMP formed Canada’s first counterintelligence agency. Canada’s spies remained a part of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police until 1984. They became embroiled in scandal after it was discovered that they had searched mail, broken into buildings and stolen documents in the course of their investigations. As a result the Mulroney government created a new, separate spy agency — the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. CSIS was to investigate; the RCMP was to act upon the information provided to them by CSIS. In a time when cellphones were a bourgeois luxury, the Internet didn’t exist and Canada had never been the target of a terror attack, the separation made sense.

It does not make sense any longer. Virtually all of Canada’s allied countries give their spy agencies powers to prevent terror attacks. Requiring CSIS to report their findings to the police, who then review that evidence and decide what to do with it, adds layers of unnecessary bureaucracy to their investigations. Worse, it causes delay — and in a time when terror suspects can co-ordinate across continents in a matter of seconds, that can mean the difference between prevention and a successful attack against Canada.

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Nor can critics argue that CSIS has unchecked, unsupervised powers. When the RCMP spy agency ran amok in the 1970s, no Charter of Rights and Freedoms existed to curtail their power. Today, every decision that CSIS makes must comply with the Charter — in fact, the new legislation explicitly says so. Contrary to some critics’ arguments, CSIS agents will not be entitled to search anywhere and seize anything. In almost all cases, they will need to obtain approval from a judge before they can act, just like any police officer would in any investigation. If CSIS agents breach a person’s rights in the course of a terror investigation, that person will have the right to appear before a judge, and ask for a remedy — be it compensation, having their charges stayed, or some other result.

Most importantly, CSIS’s new powers are modest — they include cancelling travel reservations made by suspected extremists; blocking financial transactions linked to suspected terrorist activities; blocking shipments to Canada of material that could be used in a terrorist attack; and making shipments of suspected terrorism-related equipment unusable.

France, the United States, Australia and Britain all have far more invasive legislation aimed at preventing and punishing terrorism. Canada is alone amongst Western countries in not allowing its spy agencies any powers whatsoever to prevent terror. It is alone in having a spy agency still operating 30 years in the past. It’s time to fix that.

National Post

S.A. McCartan is a criminal prosecutor for the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General. The opinions above are his alone.

The new anti-terrorism legislation unveiled Friday will be strike many Canadians as reasonable given the threat at hand: CSIS will have new powers to interrupt suspected terrorist threats, to monitor suspects and stop them from leaving the country. No-fly lists will be expanded to include those suspected of wanting to commit terrorism abroad. Criteria under which police can obtain a peace bond will be relaxed, and time limits on preventive arrests and detention will be lengthened. There will be a new focus on eradicating “terrorist propaganda.”

Some of these measures make some sense, at least in terms of their motivations. A country at war with ISIS should obviously be at pains to prevent its citizens from swelling their ranks. The RCMP had tried and failed to convince a judge to restrict Martin Couture-Rouleau’s movements in the weeks before he murdered Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Que. There might be a lesson to learn there.

Ultimately, however, the legislation raises more questions than it answers — the most basic being, “Why?” “The plan to boost CSIS’s ability to counter terrorist threats flows from a federal review of fatal attacks on two Canadian soldiers last October,” Postmedia News reports. We are assured the threat of similar attacks in future is significant. But in the case of the Parliament Hill attack, Canadians have not even been allowed to see the apparently revelatory videotaped manifesto the shooter left behind. They have not been allowed to see the CCTV footage of his attack on Centre Block. The threat to civil liberties may be minor, but that doesn’t excuse the government from making a more compelling case for imposing it.

When it comes to provisions banning “promoting” and “advocating” terrorism, furthermore, the threat to civil liberties may well not be minor. Neither term is defined. Where such laws exist, they tend to be abused. In 2001, France prosecuted a cartoonist (ironically enough) for a depiction of the 9/11 attacks with the caption, “We all dreamed it … Hamas did it.” As part of a massive recent speech crackdown, French comedian Dieudonné was arrested for saying he “felt like Charlie Coulibaly” — a cryptic reference to Charlie Hebdo and Amedy Coulibaly, the kosher supermarket attacker.

Such statements will offend many, but they fall miles short of incitement to violence, which is the proper threshold at which law-enforcement ought to concern itself with people’s freedom of speech. Needless to say, counselling someone to commit terrorism is already a criminal offence in Canada. There seems little justification to go any further than that, and little reason to trust that prosecutions in this country will not go too far as well. Once the horse is out of the barn, it’s awfully difficult to corral — especially without proper democratic oversight.

There’s another issue that deserves to be addressed. As Postmedia columnist Stephen Maher observed Friday on Twitter, Canada will soon “have the same kind of espionage apparatus that our allies have, but not the same kind of parliamentary oversight they have.” On Friday, Stephen Harper appointed University of Calgary law professor Ian Holloway to the Security Intelligence Review Committee. The seat he’ll occupy had been vacant for months; one vacancy remains to be filled. In November, the Ottawa Citizen reported, it was up to “three part-time committee members and 17 staff to watch over Canada’s chief intelligence-gathering service.”

That’s clearly inadequate. Ultimately, if Mr. Harper wants to build trust in CSIS, and in his new legislation, he must commit to empowering not just the spies, but those who oversee them.

On Monday, the government tabled the “Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act.” Comprised mostly of amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s law, the bill might be more accurately named the “Filling Gaps Identified in Recent Court Cases Act.”

The bill rolls back a 2008 Federal Court decision questioning CSIS’s authority to investigate people outside of Canada. This decision — a surprise to many — sparked various workarounds, later condemned in a 2013 Federal Court decision.

The new bill puts surveillance outside Canada on a clear legal footing. This is a reasonable fix in a globalized security environment. Indeed, the bill is diplomatically courageous: It tasks a court with authorizing overseas surveillance, even if doing so would violate foreign state law. This frank willingness to violate state sovereignty may discomfort diplomats. But in our legal system, such international implications alone do not serve to render the stipulated power unlawful.

There do, however, remain outstanding issues: When CSIS investigates abroad, the risks of misconduct, including complicity in human-rights violations, increase. That behaviour would raise legal issues. And in its 2013 decision, the Federal Court clearly had this prospect (and the infamous case of Maher Arar) in mind when it criticized CSIS for enlisting foreign intelligence agencies in monitoring Canadians abroad.

The presiding judge learned of this co-operation not because CSIS told him. He connected the dots by reading reports from reviewers of CSIS and Canada’s signals intelligence agency — two review agencies that still cannot conduct close joint investigations with secret information.

In a report released last week, SIRC — CSIS’s review body — continues to raise concerns about CSIS’s foreign operations. Alas, it is a review body under siege. Two of its recent chairs have resigned in controversy, it remains below strength, and it deserves more resources.

The bill’s other major amendment would reverse the effects of a divided Supreme Court decision declining to protect CSIS informers with the same strong identity protections enjoyed by police sources.

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But the bill correctly recognizes that not even these protections should be absolute, and informer identity can be disclosed if a court concludes it is essential to establish an accused person’s innocence. Fair trials prevail over secrecy.

That said, it is not clear whether the new privilege for CSIS sources will prevail in security-certificate and other immigration cases, since the source-protection exception is confined to criminal prosecutions.

Another concern is the potential of the privilege provisions to make terrorism prosecutions more difficult in some cases.

After four years of research and deliberations, the Air India Commission decided not to extend informer privilege to CSIS sources. Based on how CSIS acted in the investigation of the 1985 bombing, it was worried a new privilege would make it more difficult to conduct terrorism prosecutions hinging on testimony from CSIS sources about a suspect’s actions and intent.

CSIS will claim that it has adjusted to what former Director Jim Judd astutely called the judicialization of intelligence. But we really do not know. Moreover, Parliamentarians really do not know. Unlike in the UK or the United States, and as demonstrated by the Afghan-detainee affair, they have no regular access to secret information that is necessary to know how CSIS does it job.

A smarter bill would link the enlargement of CSIS’s powers with better Parliamentary review. It also would address more integrated review of how CSIS’s actions affect terrorism policing and investigations. The Air India commission proposed that this difficult task be handled by a National Security Co-ordinator, but the government rejected this fix.

In sum: The government deserves credit for a legal initiative that will put CSIS extraterritorial surveillance on a more clear legal footing, clearly acknowledges a judge may violate international and foreign law in authorizing this surveillance, and that will protect CSIS sources, subject to an innocence-at-stake exception (in criminal proceedings, at least).

In so doing, it squarely puts on the table important policy issues that should be debated in full. But along the way, it will be useful to add more to the “accountability” side of the “reform of CSIS” ledger.

National Post

Kent Roach is a 2013 Trudeau Fellow, former director research for the Air India Commission and a law professor at the University of Toronto. Craig Forcese is a law professor who teaches national security law at the University of Ottawa and is a participant in the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society.

OTTAWA — The federal government will unveil new measures Thursday to give federal security agents more power to track suspected terrorists.

Public Safety Minister Steven Blaney is to announce the content of a bill he aims to table next week, according to government sources. The bill would enhance powers for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, including:

* Allowing CSIS to obtain information on Canadians fighting abroad with terrorist groups through the “Five Eyes” spy network, which includes Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.

* Letting CSIS more easily track Canadians engaging in terrorist activities abroad, and similarly helping a Five Eyes country track its nationals working with terrorist groups in Canada.

Mr. Blaney will make the announcement when he meets with provincial and territorial ministers for justice and public safety in Banff, Alta. The House of Commons doesn’t sit until next week, when the government aims to introduce the bill.

The Five Eyes proposal comes after the Federal Court slammed CSIS for spying on Canadians abroad using partner-agency warrants. In a case last November, Justice Richard Mosley deemed the approach a back-door way of spying on Canadians on foreign soil that put them at risk of being detained abroad.

The proposal to give informants more protection follows a Supreme Court of Canada decision in May on suspected terrorist Mohamed Harkat. The court ruled that those who work as informants for CSIS already have their identifies protected, and don’t need the blanket anonymity accorded for police sources — known as “class privilege.” At the time, the court said Parliament could create a new type of legal privilege for CSIS informants.

The measures come two weeks after Prime Minister Stephen Harper promised new legislation in the House of Commons while announcing Canada would send CF-18s to Iraq on a six-month combat mission.

“The government will continue to be seized with the broader terrorist threats against Canada. We have strengthened laws in this country to deal with the issue of so-called Canadian foreign fighters,” he said. “We will soon bring forward additional measures to strengthen the ability of our security services to monitor aspiring terrorists to, where possible, prevent their return to Canada or to, where that is not possible, give greater tools to be able to charge and prosecute.”

The government has been touting two messages this fall: that Canada is threatened by terrorist groups, but security agencies like CSIS have already managed to thwart all significant plots.

Liberal public safety critic Wayne Easter, who wasn’t aware of the specifics of the upcoming bill, said he’d support giving CSIS more powers, as long as they balance justice for accused terrorists.

“We have to find a way to give these people justice under the law so you’re not falsely accusing people. They need someone way to defend themselves,” said Mr. Easter, who served as solicitor-general in 2002, after the Liberal government implemented security measures to respond to the 9/11 terror attacks. “But also from a government and a policing perspective, you can’t jeopardize your informants or your techniques in getting information.”

Mr. Easter says the public safety ministry has become overly politicized, citing Mr. Blaney’s remarks that 80 returning terrorists “have violated Canadian law” while none have been charged.

“One has to ensure national security isn’t being used for ulterior motives in terms of spying on some people and not others,” Mr. Easter said.

An Ontario judge has ordered mercy for Martin McSweeney, the traumatized ex-boyfriend of Paul Bernardo victim Leslie Mahaffy, after the 38-year-old’s life descended into a legal nightmare that saw him lose his CSIS job and spend months in detention, all for allegedly sending an emotionally-charged message to his therapist.

In the spring of 1991, Mr. McSweeney was 15 years old when he became the last person to see Ms. Mahaffy alive before she was abducted and murdered by serial killers Paul Bernardo and Karla Homolka.

Four years later, when he was 19, Mr. McSweeney would act as a Crown witness in the trial that ultimately convicted Bernardo of first degree murder in Ms. Mahaffy’s killing.

The interim two decades has seen Mr. McSweeney graduate with honours from the University of Western Ontario, obtain a PhD in software engineering at Royal Military College and secure a job as a computer programmer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

A resume Mr. McSweeney provided to the National Post detailed his academic background and various volunteer postings, all below the message “this is what I have done in my life to help Leslie… I Love you forever Leslie.”

According to court documents, Mr. McSweeney has long suffered from a bevy of mental health issues, including PTSD spurred in part by the Bernardo murder as well as Asperger’s syndrome and varying levels of psychosis and extreme anxiety.

Last year, a therapist at Burlington’s Joseph Brant Hospital alleged Mr. McSweeney began developing a romantic attachment to her, and broke off contact, explaining that her patient was showing all the warning signs of violent behaviour.

“A patient with a potentially romantic attachment to their therapist and a detachment from reality is a danger to their therapist,” she wrote in a statement.

What ultimately brought in law enforcement — and kicked off a snowball of legal troubles — was a disjointed profanity-laced voicemail message Mr. McSweeney left for the therapist.

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Although he made no specific threats of violence, he alleged, among other things, “my brain is f—ed because of you.”

The therapist turned the message over to police and Mr. McSweeney, who had no prior criminal record, was charged with making indecent telephone calls and later, a charge of criminal harassment.

In September, 2012, his problems were complicated further when he sent an eight-page email to Ontario judge Leslie Baldwin, a Crown prosecutor in the Bernardo case, pleading for her to intervene and, at one point, apparently threatening to “exact revenge” on Ontario justice authorities.

Within hours, Mr. McSweeney apologized with an email reading “Very Sorry” in the subject line, but the damage was done. Within nine days, police arrested Mr. McSweeney at his home and hit him with a new battery of charges alleging an attempt to obstruct justice, and two more counts of criminal harassment.

‘My brain is f—ed because of you’

The arrest also lost him his job with CSIS. In the months since, Mr. McSweeney has been subject to house arrest and strict bail conditions, all while repeated judicial delays pushed his trial date all the way back to Jan. 30, 2014.

It was these delays that, last month, prompted Ontario Court Justice Andrea Tuck-Jackson to honour Mr. McSweeney’s request for a stay of proceedings, arguing that his “right to a trial within a reasonable time” had been violated.

In an Oct. 15 decision document, Justice Tuck-Jackson acknowledged that while the charges against Mr. McSweeney were indeed serious, justice officials should take heed that his mental instability lessened their potency.

“It is clear,” wrote the judge, “that Mr. McSweeney’s mental health challenges are intrinsically inter-connected with the allegations and, in my view, operate to reduce the seriousness of them.”

Canada’s intelligence service was busier last year, with a greater number of “targets” under investigation, the Security Intelligence Review Committee says in a report released Thursday that highlights the agency’s expanding role overseas.

The report says the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) had 496 targets in 2012-13, up from 410 the year before. The number of warrants issued to monitor suspected threats to Canadian security were also up to 236 from 206 the previous year.

While the report does not explain the increases, it says CSIS was doing more to keep watch of targets who had travelled abroad. The reported spike came as dozens of Canadians were making their way to Syria to fight, some with extremist groups.

“Overall, we are satisfied with CSIS’s performance of its mandated duties and functions,” said Chuck Strahl, chair of SIRC, which oversees the operations of CSIS. “However, we identified some areas of concern and have made recommendations to address those issues, most notably on information-sharing.”

Related

One concern stemmed from sharing with the Five Eyes — the electronic eavesdropping partnership of Canada, the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. CSIS has been relying heavily on the alliance to track suspects who have left Canada, the report says.

The agency began doing this in 2009, when the Federal Court authorized it by issuing warrants to intercept the communications of targets who had left the country. During the period reviewed by SIRC, 35 such warrants were issued.

But the report warns that the reliance on Five Eyes could cause problems should one of the allies, in its own national interest, decide to act alone. The targets could be detained or harmed based on information provided by CSIS, it says.

“SIRC found that while there are clear advantages to leveraging second-party assets in the execution of this new warrant power — and, indeed, this is essential for the process to be effective — there are also clear hazards, including the lack of control over the intelligence once it has been shared,” the report says.

The report says Canada had started putting caveats on its shared intelligence that require allies to notify CSIS if any action is to be taken, but the Review Committee called them a “work in progress” and urged the agency to increase the use of “caveats and assurances.”

The highly secretive work of the Five Eyes has faced increasing scrutiny since former U.S. intelligence contractor Edward Snowden began leaking sensitive documents suggesting the alliance had engaged in massive spying against friendly governments.

OTTAWA — Canada’s spy agency inappropriately disclosed personal and classified information about a Montreal man while he was imprisoned in Sudan, says a federal watchdog.

In its annual report tabled Thursday, the body that reviews the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service also says CSIS reported inaccurate and exaggerated information to partner agencies about Abousfian Abdelrazik’s case.

Abdelrazik, 51, was arrested but not charged during a 2003 visit to see his ailing mother in Sudan.

While in Sudanese custody, he was interrogated by CSIS about suspected extremist links.

In its report, the Security Intelligence Review Committee found no indication that CSIS had asked Sudanese authorities to arrest or detain Abdelrazik.

However, in the months prior to his arrest abroad, CSIS did keep its foreign intelligence allies up to date on any fresh information gleaned from the investigation of Abdelrazik, who denies any involvement with terrorism.

The review committee also found that Sudanese authorities remained under the mistaken impression that Canada, including CSIS, had supported the original decision to arrest and detain Abdelrazik.

This confusion might be explained by the fact the case was perceived as “an intelligence issue” — and it remained so in the minds of the Sudanese, the review committee’s report says.

Further complicating matters was the fact CSIS and Foreign Affairs — the two Canadian agencies most heavily involved in the case — were sometimes “at odds” with each other in carrying out their consular and intelligence work.

Abdelrazik calling for an apology from the Canadian and Sudanese governments:

Upon learning of Abdelrazik’s detention in Sudan, CSIS “should have been more forthcoming” with Foreign Affairs in regard to what it knew “so as to ensure a more informed and co-ordinated Canadian response to his case,” the committee report adds.

Abdelrazik claims he was tortured by Sudanese intelligence officials during two periods of detention, but Canada says it knew nothing of the alleged abuse.

The review committee says the long-simmering case “did raise a number of concerns.”

First, while CSIS followed proper authorities in seeking approval to interview Abdelrazik following his initial imprisonment, the committee found “CSIS inappropriately, and in contravention of CSIS policy, disclosed personal and classified information.”

Finally, CSIS kept “a significant amount of information” in its operational databases about individuals who were not investigative targets in the probe.

Days after Abdelrazik’s second release from prison in July 2006, his name appeared on a United Nations Security Council blacklist that prevented him from flying back to Canada.

He was granted haven in the Canadian Embassy in Khartoum, but Canada refused to issue him a travel document to fly home. It subsequently said Abdelrazik must have a valid plane ticket before a passport could be provided.

Even though a group of concerned Canadians bought him a ticket, no passport was forthcoming.

‘As it stands, Abousfian Abdelrazik’s story has yet to be fully written’

Abdelrazik, who has four children, finally returned to Montreal in June 2009. That same month, the Federal Court of Canada concluded CSIS was complicit in his 2003 detention.

Abdelrazik is suing both the federal government and former foreign affairs minister Lawrence Cannon.

The review committee says no recommendations flow from its study because there have already been substantial changes over the last decade in the way CSIS operates.

Still, it says valuable lessons can be drawn from the affair.

In addition, new information is still likely to emerge from documents held by other federal agencies, as well as from legal proceedings, the committee adds.

“As it stands, Abousfian Abdelrazik’s story has yet to be fully written.”

No one loves acronyms more than spies, a field where everything has an acronym, making spycraft an alphabet soup of disjointed letters. Perhaps stemming from its culture of shadows, obscure abbreviations usually come into general parlance only when scandal or questions emerge over the secretive work they do. While Hollywood makes U.S. spy agencies household terms, the National Post’s Adrian Humphreys explains Canada has its own vast intelligence apparatus — with its own alphabet soup:

PCO:

The bureaucrats in the Privy Council Office may not seem like spies, but in a map of Canada’s intelligence, all roads lead to the PCO, where a robust intel bureaucracy is the main filter between the agencies and the government.

“It is the ultimate funnel of intelligence and strategic advice to the Prime Minister and Cabinet,” says Wesley Wark, a visiting professor at the University of Ottawa who is a specialist in national security and intelligence.

The PCO’s National Security Advisor, currently Stephen Rigby, has the ear of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, putting him at the top of the intel food chain; the PCO chairs the Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence, which handles top-level strategic policy, resourcing, sensitive national security matters and reviews proposals destined for Cabinet; and the PCO recommends the annual intelligence priorities to government. Also within the PCO are two important intelligence secretariats (‘‘Security & Intelligence’’ and ‘‘Intelligence Assessment’’) along with Ward Elcock, a special advisor on human smuggling.

CSIS:

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service is Canada’s primary spy agency, with a mandate to investigate, analyze and advise the government on suspected threats to Canada’s national security.

A civilian agency, it was created in 1984 to separate the dark and dirty secrets of security intelligence work from the court disclosure process of law enforcement. The relationship between CSIS and the RCMP has sometimes been rocky. After the 9/11 terror attacks, terrorist threats, both homegrown and abroad, have been a key focus, along with probing espionage and foreign influence activities.

RCMP:

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is a law enforcement agency and its mandate is to investigate and prevent crimes, make arrests and prepare prosecutions, so its work must meet the scrutiny of the courts in terms of methods and what it gathers. That awkward fit led to the creation of CSIS, but the RCMP maintains an important role in national security intel. Security cases that come to the RCMP from CSIS often have to start again from scratch using evidentiary standards that can be used in court. The RCMP has liaison officers abroad and also runs a cyber-security taskforce, which can involve national security.

James Park/Postmedia NewsThe new Communications Security Establishment Canada building being constructed in Ottawa.

CSEC:

Officially, the Communications Security Establishment Canada is an arm of the military, although it largely operates independently. “It’s placed within the Department of National Defence largely as a kind of cover, to help bury its budget in the immensity of the DND budget,” says Prof. Wark. As evidence, CSEC reports to DND for financial and administrative matters and to the PCO for policy and operational matters.

CSEC’s importance in the intel pantheon blossomed in the modern world of electronic communications. It is often called Canada’s electronic eavesdropping agency, as it’s the main gatherer of foreign signals intelligence by listening to and monitoring electronic communication. Another job is Canada’s cyber security, protecting Canada’s telecommunications. CSEC describes its specialties as “code-making and code-breaking.”

As a top-tier part of Canada’s intelligence apparatus with about 2,000 employees, it can lend technical and operational assistance, and equipment, to the RCMP and CSIS.

DGID:

The Director General Intelligence Division is the traditional arm of military intelligence, primarily tactical intel directly used by the Canadian Forces to support its operations abroad. Its focus is foreign political, military, scientific and technical information. It also maintains a counter-intelligence mandate, which was severely tested with recent revelations that Jeffrey Delisle, a naval officer, passed sensitive information to the Russian spy agency.

ICO:

The Immigration Control Officer network, a part of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, has staff at Canada’s missions abroad working as frontline intelligence gathering to better protect the integrity of the refugee and immigration determination process. While not spies, they assist in foreign intel gathering and analysis. Similarly, the Department of Foreign Affairs’ International Security and Intelligence Bureau includes a cadre of foreign service staff freed from daily embassy affairs to study and create a stream of political and economic information, not as spies but through open source information.

ITAC:
The Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre is an analytical office housed within CSIS but staffed by personnel seconded from other agencies and police forces. It takes intel from various agencies and allies and produces analytical assessments and reports. It reports both to CSIS and to the National Security Advisor of the PCO.

OTHERS:

Other government agencies have their own intelligence offices, some larger, more important and more effective than others. These offices tend to focus on specific peculiarities of the agency’s mandate, such as Transport Canada and the Canada Border Services Agency.

]]>http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/how-canada-spies-a-guide-to-the-sometimes-obscure-acronyms-of-our-intelligence-world/feed7stdRCMP-headquartersJames Park/Postmedia News‘It’s between me and God': How a Calgary high school dropout joined Syria’s civil warhttp://news.nationalpost.com/news/its-between-me-and-god-how-a-calgary-high-school-dropout-joined-syrias-civil-war
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/its-between-me-and-god-how-a-calgary-high-school-dropout-joined-syrias-civil-war#commentsFri, 12 Jul 2013 19:05:19 +0000http://news.nationalpost.com/?p=337002

Damian Clairmont was on his guard when he answered his mobile phone. “Where’d you get this number?” he wanted to know.

He had reason to be circumspect.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has been asking about the 22-year-old since he left Calgary eight months ago for Syria, where foreign fighters have been converging to oust President Bashar Assad.

Handout Now known as Mustafa Al-Gharib, Damian Clairmont of Calgary converted to Islam following a suicide attempt at age 17. After he left Canada last November, CSIS officers told his mother he had gone to Syria and was part of an extremist group they had been monitoring for two years.

“I’m not up for speaking to journalists,” said Mr. Clairmont, who also goes by the name Mustafa Al-Gharib. “I don’t really care what people think, it’s not important.”

Nor was he interested in explaining why a high school dropout who converted to Islam following a teenage suicide attempt had made his way to a war zone that has killed 100,000 and displaced millions.

“I don’t think there’s any reason to, it should be self-explanatory,” he said, speaking on a phone on the Turkcell network, Turkey’s largest mobile phone operator.

“It’s between me and God and that’s it.”

Last month, the National Post reported that CSIS officers had told Mr. Clairmont’s mother her son was in Syria and was linked to an extremist group they had been monitoring for two years.

“It’s not accurate,” Mr. Clairmont said of the article. He said his mother’s reference to a girl he had met online was not correct, but he did not identify any other errors and finally said, “Most of it’s true, in terms of what she said about my life.”

What she said was that he was born in Nova Scotia into a francophone, Catholic family of Acadian stock. He moved to Calgary in October, 1997, when he was seven. While bright, he struggled as a teen with his identity and anxiety, his mother said.

“He dropped out in Grade 10 and proceeded to do homeschooling via the Internet. Unfortunately, the zeal only lasted a few months, and he quickly lost interest in that as well,” said the mother, who spoke on the condition her name would not be published.

After trying to end his life by drinking anti-freeze, he spent two months in hospital. His mother said he seemed to calm down after he converted to Islam and felt like he belonged. But when he switched to a new Calgary mosque, he changed, she said.

He became more “forceful” about his newfound religion and talked about what was happening to Muslims around the world.

“He did work a couple of basic labour jobs for a short time.

“He was a very hard worker when he worked, but after he was released from hospital at 17, he was put on a disability pension by his psychiatrist. Apparently, he didn’t want him working. This is what he lived on for the most part of his time between the hospital and when he left.”

Last November, he told his mother he was going to Egypt to study. But two months later, CSIS officers came to her door. They said he had actually flown to Turkey and from there had probably crossed by land into Syria.

“I had no idea,” she said. “I was totally oblivious to it. You’re in Canada, you think everything’s safe.”

She said the CSIS officers told her they were investigating a recruiting ring in Calgary. She said if they’d told her sooner her son was involved, she might have been able to talk him out of it. CSIS declined to comment.

During a phone call in February, she confronted him, telling him she knew he was in Syria.

“And that’s when he came clean,” she said. He told her women and children were being tortured and he had to do something productive with his life. He said the afterlife was a better place anyway, his mother said. But Mr. Clairmont was vague about what exactly he was doing, she said.

“The most he would ever say is that he was putting stuff together and it was very boring. At one point he did say he was in the front lines. But he wouldn’t say in the front lines of what,” she said.

“He would never actually admit to holding a gun or bombs or anything like that. Every time I had spoken with him, he was very careful about what he would say.”

The government isn’t sure how many Canadians are participating in the Syrian conflict. While most of are believed to have joined the Western-backed rebels, some are allegedly with extremist factions as well as militias propping up the regime, which is supported by Russia, Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

DANIEL LEAL-OLIVAS/AFP/Getty ImagesSyrian rebel fighters belonging to the "Martyrs of Maaret al-Numan" battalion leave their position after a range of shootings on June 13, 2013 in the southern Syrian town of Maaret al-Numan in front of the army base of Wadi Deif, down in the valley.

The Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, released last month by Public Safety Canada, cautioned that a prolonged conflict risked turning Syria into a “training ground” for terrorists who might “return to their home countries, including Canada, to attempt to radicalize others or conduct terrorist attacks.”

Muhammad Robert Heft, a Toronto Muslim leader who has been counseling Mr. Clairmont’s mother, said he was troubled by the case, particularly because Mr. Clairmont had attempted suicide, lied to his mother and left his family in turmoil.

“A lot of these people make decisions without thinking them through,” said Mr. Heft, who was contacted by the mother after she saw him denouncing extremism on television. “And when you challenge that, they try to twist it on you that you’re challenging God.”

Mr. Heft said those concerned about Syrians should pray for them and send humanitarian relief instead of venturing there to fight.

“No, I wouldn’t encourage them to go over because I don’t think they’re really helping.”

DANIEL LEAL-OLIVAS/AFP/Getty ImagesSyrians sit resting as a man carries a child in front of buildings left in ruins on June 13, 2013 in the southern Syrian town of Maaret al-Numan in the Idlib province.

Mr. Clairmont’s adventure has been tough on the Calgary family.

“Now and then, when I don’t hear from him for a week at a time, I start to panic,” his mother said. “When I do hear from him on the phone it’s difficult because I can hear the planes and I can hear other stuff going on and he’s got to run for a minute because there’s a low flying plane so they might drop a bomb.”

She said she got a phone call from her son on June 22. He said he had read the article about him in the Post. He was angry. She thought he’d changed again, he’d become cold. They haven’t spoken since.

The Post last had contact with Mr. Clairmont on June 26, when he sent a text message saying he could not correspond by text because it was too expensive. He did not respond to a list of questions sent to him. He has not answered his phone since then.

National Post

]]>http://news.nationalpost.com/news/its-between-me-and-god-how-a-calgary-high-school-dropout-joined-syrias-civil-war/feed4stdTOPSHOTS A Syrian rebel walks past a destroyed building in Salma in the coastal province of Latakia on April 26, 2013.Handout DANIEL LEAL-OLIVAS/AFP/Getty ImagesDANIEL LEAL-OLIVAS/AFP/Getty Images