Global security concerns continued, in early April 2012, to be geared
around the possibility of armed conflict between Iran and Israel, an
issue hedged by a range of other conflicts and issues. The actual
prospect of such a conflict, however, remained extremely low, for a
variety of reasons, despite the near hysteria of media.

The ostensible cause of the potential conflict remained the nominal
determination of key Western states to ensure that Iran did not
acquire the capacity to build nuclear weapons, although even Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has reportedly acknowledged that
Israel understood that Iran had at least two nuclear weapons already
deployed on medium-range ballistic missiles. These were weapons,
however, acquired from foreign suppliers, not from domestic
manufacture.

In reality, the issue is far more complex, and is particularly
compounded by:

1. The fact that the United States is in a presidential election
year, which traditionally inhibits and distorts administration
decision-making, and yet allows for opposition candidates to exercise
strenuous — and often ill-informed and inflammatory — rhetorical
positions;

2. The fact that the Iranian domestic political situation is clouded,
domestically, as a result of recent first round of the Majlis
elections (March 2, 2012; run-off round for the remaining 65 seats on
May 4, 2012) which have already severely crimped the influence of
incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who may, in any event, soon
be eclipsed from power with the end of his term. However, even the
present “Supreme Leader”, “Ayatollah” Ali Khameneni, did not gain as
much ground in domestic politics as he would have wished vis-à-vis
Ahmadinejad. This leaves power — insofar as it is concentrated at
all — largely in the hands of the leader of the Quds Force of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC: Pásdárán), Brig. Gen. Qassem
Suleimani. In any event, all talk of “reformists” in the Iranian
clerical scene has evaporated.

3. The reality that Iran’s strategic reach to dominate the Persian
Gulf and the Northern Tier has been extremely successful, and this is
compounded by the U.S./Coalition withdrawal from Iraq, and the de
facto strategic withdrawal (certainly du jure in a political sense)
from Afghanistan. Iran has successfully used its influence over Shia
populations — often regionally in a minority — to effectively control
situations. The use by the Iranian clerics of the “anti-Israel”
jihadist rhetoric to win support from the vast Arab and Muslim
populations has, however, failed: the Sunni populations, while buying
the anti-Israel line, have not coalesced in support for Iranian
leadership. And the Sunni leaderships of Sunni-dominated Muslim
states have reacted sharply to Iran’s rhetoric as much as to Iran’s
real strategic grasp on, for example, Iraq and Syria. As a result,
the real pressure for action against Iran — to curtail Iran’s nuclear
weapons and to overthrow Iran’s Alawite ally in Syria, the Bashar al-
Assad Government — comes from those who most fear Tehran: Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar. Significantly, this is not working, except
at a public relations level. In Syria, despite pressures from the
Sunni-dominated Arab League (which excludes non-Arab Iran), President
Assad seems set to continue to dominate the Islamist-led Sunni
uprising.

4. The fact that Turkey is now flailing in its attempts to curtail
the growth of Iranian strategic reach. Turkey is also now itself
becoming isolated at a time when its leader — and the real architect
of Turkish strategic “revival” — Prime Minister Reçep Tayyip Erdogan,
is in rapidly-failing health. He is likely to be replaced either by
President Abdullah Gul or by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, both
of whom are radical, but neither of whom has domestic political
strength of Erdogan. Meanwhile, the ruling Islamists still have not
mended their fences with the Turkish Armed Forces, and Turkey
continues to suffer from an inability to address domestic Kurdish
insurgency. If Turkey alienates Iran, then Iran has made it clear
that it has the capacity to stimulate activity in Turkey by that
country’s very large (20-million) Shi’a population, as well as
stepping aside while Kurds gain more support from abroad.

5. The fact that the core of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and the
Israeli Intelligence Community are totally opposed to a military
strike against Iran’s “nuclear facilities” because they recognize
that: (a) They cannot identify or reach all of Iran’s nuclear
facilities; (b) Iran already has deployed nuclear weapons [probably
more than the two known to be deployed on al-Shahab IRBMs] which may
have a chance of surviving Israel’s extensive anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) network; (c) There are few real options to follow-up an
air/missile strike against Iranian targets; (d) An Israeli first-
strike against Iran would actually coalesce Iranian sentiment around
the ruling clerics and against Israel; and (e) The United States
Government would unreservedly oppose an Israeli strike. What is also
not understood by most commentators and foreign governments is the
reality that Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak
have been attempting to persuade the Obama administration of the
desirability of decisive military action against Iran. This has not
been a campaign to tell the U.S. that Israel would act unilaterally
against Iran.

So what has not been seen is actual evidence of the probability of a
unilateral Israeli stance, which would only occur if an existential
threat actually presented itself to Israel. At present, this is not
perceived to be the case, even though Mr. Netanyahu portrays the
Iranian nuclear weapons situation has being ultimately an existential
threat. The IDF, the Israeli Intelligence Community, the Israeli
opposition parties, and so on, all categorically reject the idea of
an Israeli first strike at Iranian targets, despite acknowledging
that elected leaders (Netanyahu, Barak) might try to insist on such
an action. But, absent tacit or express U.S. approval for such an
action (which even Netanyahu and Barak acknowledge requiring), such
an attack would not occur. Moreover, the U.S. government is aware
that any action by Israel — even if it was opposed by the U.S. —
would be seen globally as having U.S. support; thus the U.S. is
committed to ensuring it does not happen.

The U.S. Obama administration has intentionally continued to leak
reporting which would hamper such a step by Israel, even “disclosing”
that Israel had arranged for the use of bases in Azerbaijan to stage
air attacks into or exiting Iran. That was a canard: the use of
Azerbaijani facilities and air space was considered some years ago
when Israel had access to Turkish air space, which would be essential
to allowing access into and from Azerbaijan. That is no longer
feasible. However, U.S. reports that Israel lacked the reach or
technical capability to undertake a first strike against Iran are
incorrect. Israel has this capacity.

6. The reality that the Persian-Israeli link has been mutually
beneficial for two-and-a-half millennia, and the recent Iranian
clerical rhetoric against Israel was for tactical purposes, although,
in fact, reflecting the radical interpretation of Shi’ism and Islam
by the clerics. Israel has what Iran/Persia has always valued: access
to the Mediterranean. This is why Iran courts or attempts to control
Syria and Lebanon, but Israel is what cements, or could cement,
Iranian reach into the Mediterranean, and such a relationship also
gives Israel the ability to outmaneuver the Sunni populations which
constrain it.

Teheran escalated the anti-Israel posture to maneuver against the
U.S. during the U.S.-led war on Iraq; now it must find a way to back
down from this position (and likewise Israel must find a way to
retract from its reactive anti-Iranian stance) so that a
rapprochement can be re-developed. This was less important to Israel
when it had a strong relationship with Turkey, but that cannot be
assumed to be salvageable until the last of the present leadership
team departs office in Turkey. Meanwhile, the Sunni states — and
particularly Saudi Arabia — engage in covert “information sharing”
with Israel to boost Israel’s hostility toward Iran, and this has
been particularly effective with Prime Minister Netanyahu.

7. The prospect exists that the Russian Federation, already concerned
over its inability to control two states in which it invested so
heavily (Iran and Turkey), may well sponsor a revived diplomatic
approach to Israel and encourage an Israel-Iran rapprochement. It is
worth noting that Israel has been quiet on the subject of promoting
the end to the Bashar Assad government in Syria, knowing that it is a
close ally of Teheran.

Western commentators and politicians have locked themselves into an
unsustainable position: attempting to deny Iran access to nuclear
weapons. The reality, as U.S. and Israeli officials have now
acknowledged, is that Iran already has deployed nuclear weapons,
albeit not domestically-made ones. This has been known, but not
discussed, since 1991.

See, for example, Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy report
of February 1992 by Yossef Bodansky: “Iran Acquires Nuclear Weapons
and Moves to Provide Cover to Syria”. And the report by Bodansky on
Oct. 31, 2002: “Iran’s Ballistic Missile and WMD Programs: The Links
to the DPRK”.

U.S. and Western officials missed the opportunity, with the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI), begun under U.S. President Ronald Reagan,
to develop a system which would have effectively negated the efficacy
of missile-based nuclear weapons. As a result, nuclear weapons
proliferation is likely to continue, not just with Iran, but
potentially with Turkey, which has been developing the capabilities
to achieve nuclear weapons production capacity.

As a result of this, and the reality that the size, geography, and
capabilities of Iran — including its alliance structure with North
Korea (DPRK), and now the People’s Republic of China (PRC) — preclude
armed invasion (a la Iraq, a much, much easier target), opponents of
Iran have limited options. One is to seek to create a viable
relationship with Iran so as to preclude the prospect of Iranian use
(or threats of use) of nuclear weapons.

This, obviously, from a Western or Israeli standpoint would be better
facilitated if Iran was governed by a non-clerical administration.
The question, then, would be how such an outcome could be achieved.
Significantly, isolating Iran through sanctions and hostility has
enabled the clerics to build a society which they can dominate.
Isolation works both ways; in this case, it has strengthened clerical
control of the Iranian population. Attempts to sow secessionist
discord among Iranian constituent populations have thus far failed,
although the most significant attempts — to create secessionism in
Baluchistan — have actually fueled secessionist momentum in Pakistani
Baluchistan and, to a degree, Afghan Baluchistan.

Indeed, all realities may change if secessionist movements take root
in Afghanistan and Pakistan as the present Afghanistan war winds down
and the U.S. and Coalition forces depart the area.

As things stand at present, Iran stands to gain — whether under a
clerical government or not — and the U.S. has lost (and continues to
lose) influence in the Persian Gulf, the Northern Tier, and Central
Asia. Israeli leaders must take account of this obvious reality, and
plan for a new strategic framework, one which includes a new energy
relationship with the European Union, a new relationship with Russia,
and a new relationship with Iran (which can also be facilitated by
the PRC).

If the Sunni states — and particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and
Turkey — succeed in overthrowing the
Iranian-supported Alawite leadership in Syria, then Israel will face
a reinvigorated “Arab” threat.

Israel is already conscious of the fact that Saudi Arabia and Qatar
have almost succeeded in replacing an anti-Saudi leadership in Libya
(Moaammar Gadhafi) with a pro-Saudi/salafist-jihadist leadership in
Tripoli. Significantly, the non-salafist Libyan province of Cyrenaica
has resisted this, and has called — as it did when it started the
anti-Gadhafi revolt in February 2011 — for the restitution of the
1951 Libyan Constitution, which allows for a federal structure. This
would wrest control of the oil from radical Tripolitania and the
salafist interim President of Libya, and return it to Cyrenaica,
under the moderate and pro-Western Senussi sect.