Tuesday, March 13, 2012

FHQ got several requests yesterday to comment on the memo outlining the delegate strategy that Politico posted yesterday from the Santorum campaign. Most of those discussions were via phone, but I did exchange emails with Pema Levy at TPM (see her story here) on the matter and here is the long form version of my back of the napkin response:

There is both fact and fiction in the Santorum memo.

First of
all, even when I was generous to Santorum and assumed that he got 50% of
the vote the rest of the way (both statewide and in the congressional
districts) and gave him all of the unbound delegates, he just barely got over 1144 (see here).1 And that particular dynamic just isn't going to happen. I get
their point about winning unbound caucus state delegates at the state
conventions, but they are likely overstating just how many delegates
Santorum will be able to claim.

Secondly, they are just plain wrong about the April 3 contests. DC
is winner-take-all (and Santorum is not on the ballot there), but
Maryland and Wisconsin are both winner-take-all by congressional
district. As we saw in a similar case in South Carolina, even a sweeping
victory like Gingrich's there did not net him all of the delegates in the Palmetto state.
Romney won a congressional district. Theoretically, a candidate could
win all of the delegates from those states, but it would take a win that
Santorum is unlikely to get.2 [What's funny is that California should
later be considered winner-take-all as well according to the Santorum
campaign definition. It is also winner-take-all by congressional
district.]

This whole strategy is predicated on the race going to the convention.
But it is going to be tough for Santorum and Gingrich to only argue that
Romney shouldn't get to 1144 (to their supporters and donors) as Romney is likely
to keep growing his delegate advantage and inch closer and closer to
1144. That is an easy argument to make when you have possible wins ahead
of you in Mississippi or Alabama, but doesn't hold water when your
candidate is losing throughout April.

This memo is very casual with the discussion of delegates being
elected at state conventions. Their claim is more valid in caucus states
where the delegates will not be bound, but they fail to adequately --
in my eyes at least -- mention that the delegates elected at conventions in
primary states (and some caucus states) are bound according to the
results of the primary.

Finally, the memo is big on telling everyone that Santorum will do
well in particular states without telling us very much about how they
will ultimately make that happen. The contention that Romney will not necessarily do well in the northeastern states on April 24 because of past precedent is particularly puzzling. Connecticut, Delaware, New York and Rhode Island were all Super Tuesday states in February 2008 and McCain won them all.The fact that they seemingly
don't fully understand the rules (see Maryland/Wisconsin claim above), are organizing on the fly and aren't
(fully) on the ballot in some additional states gives me pause about the effectiveness of this particular strategy.

They are absolutely correct to question the Romney team's ability to
get their candidate to 1144, but Santorum's argument is only going to
work as long as he is winning and cutting into Romney's lead. If Romney
does well in April, then the task becomes all but impossible for
Santorum. Romney winning and approaching 1144 is not a good environment
in which to make a "keep Romney from 1144" argument. That may serve as
the tipping point in this race.

--
Now, I completely understand the Santorum campaign argument that the former Pennsylvania senator is the passion candidate in this race and that they are trying to portray Romney as the moderate, monied candidate. This is the classic heart versus mind discussion that has been going on within the Republican Party since late one early November night in 2008. But to attempt to substitute that particular narrative for the Romney delegate math storyline in this race is very reminiscent of the Clinton campaign effort to push back against the Obama inevitability narrative as well (see here). The bottom line is that it all comes back to the math and the Santorum campaign is up against it on that one.

--1 The Gingrich delegate angle is one I hadn't considered, but I wouldn't safely count on those delegates if I were in the Santorum camp.

2 And to be fair, Romney is not necessarily likely to have that sort of victory in either of those states either.