Islam and democracy: Tunisia at a crossroads

Ennahda's attempts to institutionalise its
power and silence its opposition cannot be condoned. Nevertheless, Tunisia’s
stymied liberalisation process must be understood within the broader context of
domestic power dynamics, rather than solely through the lens of an ‘anti-democratic’
Islamist regime.

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A primary
driver of the Tunisian revolution was the unanimous call for freedom of
expression and mass participation in national politics. With the demise of the
Ben Ali regime, Tunisians hoped their liberation would remove controls on
freedom of speech and freedom of the press and further expand women’s rights. In
theory, journalists were freed up to share information, unhampered by fear of imprisonment
or the harassment that
characterised press censorship under Ben Ali, while newly empowered citizens
exercised their right to vote in Tunisia’s first democratic elections. However, after recent developments,
not only are Tunisia’s newfound liberties under threat, but rights previously
enjoyed for decades are being eroded in the process.

In
February 2013, Tunisians experienced their first political assassination in
decades, sparking a wave of national protests so fierce that some observers
prematurely construed it as the start of a second revolution. While the second
revolution did not materialise, the murder of government critic and politician
Chokri Belaid was one of many events that led Tunisians to question the
sincerity of Tunisia’s liberalisation efforts. Since the election of Tunisia’s first Islamist regime led by
the Ennahda party, Tunisians critical of the government have been exposed to verbal and physical attacks together with judicial retribution
from rogue actors in society and the state itself. Similarly, long-championed rights for women
have been questioned by an increasingly vocal and powerful religious vote that
seeks a return to a more traditional Islamic role for women in society. The
emergence of these phenomena prompt two questions: what is the status of
freedom of speech, freedom of the press and women's rights in Tunisia's
democracy, and to what extent can the new status quo be attributed to Islamic
impositions on democracy?

Freedom of expression

Freedom of expression is advanced as one of the most positive
outcomes of the Tunisian revolution, yet in practice, this newfound right is unevenly
applied. On one end of the spectrum, members of the political opposition,
notably the late Belaid, have routinely received death threats for their
criticism of the Ennahda party and were the frequent subject of both verbal and physical abuse
in public. A few days before his murder, supporters of Belaid claimed he was
attacked for speaking out against the government while at an opposition rally
in the northern city of Kef.

Yet there are numerous incidences that reinforce the impression of a lack of disciplinary
action against the perpetrators of this violence and verbal abuse. In July
2012, it was reported that religious figures in Tunisian mosques were preaching
for the assassination of particular politicians and personalities disparaging
Ennahda; a crime which would incur severe punishment had violence been directed
at state or religious officials. Yet the culprits received no known
condemnation from the government for inciting violence. Indeed, the day before
his death, Belaid
denounced the “climate of systematic violence” germinating in Tunisia and
admonished the ruling coalition for tolerating the radical, anti-modernist
demands of hardline Salafists. Thus far, few concrete steps have been taken to
ensure that all Tunisians are entitled to the freedom of expression which
accords with the most basic principles of law and order.

Nor is
there clear evidence that the Ennahda party intends to fully uphold this
commitment. When the government issued a draft constitution in May 2013, Human
Rights Watch criticised
it for failing to protect freedom of thought through its “broad formulation of
permissible limitations to freedom of expression” and freedom of assembly.
Contradictions within the draft constitution leave room for discrimination -
although Article 6 affirms “all citizens are equal in rights and obligations before the
law, without discrimination”, the constitution states that only a Muslim can become
president.

Limits
also restrict equal protection under the law to Tunisian citizens, which may violate
international human rights treaties ratified by the Tunisian government by
providing the state with a broad leeway to undermine or restrict human rights
through ‘cultural
specificities’.
Speaking to the press earlier this year, Eric Goldstein, deputy Middle East and
North Africa director
at Human Rights Watch, stated, “The NCA should close loopholes in the draft constitution
that would allow a future government to crush dissent or limit the basic rights
that Tunisians fought hard for.”

Freedom of the press

Under the
rule of Ben Ali, Tunisians were subjected to one of the most oppressive
internet censorship regimes in the world, while any journalistic criticism was
stymied by media regulations that criminalised defamation, libel, and the
disturbance of public order.

Tunisia’s democratic government has
sought to reverse this trend by implementing new laws to liberalise
restrictions on journalists. Passed in November 2011, decree law No. 2011-115
was designed to protect the rights of journalists to publish without fear of
legal retribution and to discipline individuals or groups that partake in
physical or verbal assaults directed towards journalists.

The new
law was also envisioned to uphold the privacy of writers’ sources while eliminating prior
laws that contradict the articles of Law 115. While the full implementation of Law 115 represents a major
break from the past, the principles of the law are not being adequately
defended, resulting in what Reporters
without Borders have called an “unprecedented campaign of death threats against
journalists, writers and media workers critical of the ruling Ennahda Party and
its handling of recent events”.

Incidences
of violence and death threats directed against journalists from across the
media spectrum have only increased since the assassination of Belaid. Indeed,
his very funeral was the site of a number of violent assaults on journalists
and other members of civil society paying tribute to the politician, while
several Tunisian journalists received death threats for their coverage of
Belaid’s
burial.

Tunisian
journalists speaking out against the murder of Belaid and the activities of the
Ennahda party have also been the target of anti-media rhetoric emanating from
several religious leaders from around the country for allegedly “insulting Islam” or “hindering the work of the
Ennahda party”,
earning journalists critical of the government verbal and physical hostility.

Furthermore,
journalists are not the sole victims of the country’s oppressive media laws. In
late March, a blogger and a university professor were accused of defaming the
minister of foreign affairs and the general rapporteur of the constitution at
the National Constituent Assembly (NCA), a charge which could be punished by a
prison sentence of two years. Participants in a rap video that questioned the
morals and activities of the Tunisian police were also sentenced to six months
of imprisonment in March for defamation and protesting against officials. The
video’s
rapper, Ala Yaakoubi, has not yet been located by police but was convicted of
hate speech and incitement to violence and murder in absentia and sentenced to two years in prison.

Women’s
freedoms

Tunisia’s uncertain transition process
sparked a nationwide debate concerning the rights of women in society,
economics, and politics. Regarded as arguably the most liberal Arab state
concerning women’s
rights by westerners, Tunisia boasts a long history of expanding the rights
enjoyed by women, beginning with the passage of laws assuring women the right
to education and gender equality after the country’s independence from France in
1956.

As part
of a campaign to secularise Tunisian society, government authorities went so
far as to ban the wearing of the veil in universities and public buildings in
1981. Women were also permitted to divorce their husbands on equal terms, while
polygamy was banned during a time when men were able to take up to four wives
in many other Muslim countries.

New
political freedoms introduced following the exit of the Ben Ali regime have
arguably altered the country’s trend towards secularisation, with Tunisia’s new government pursuing an
Islamic reawakening in the North African country. Under Ben Ali, even the hijab
was forbidden, but his departure has left women free to express their Islamic
identity, with an increasing number of Tunisian women wearing the hijab and the
niqab.

As a
result, although the Ennahda party has made no real move to limit women’s rights in marriage,
observers and Tunisians alike fear an increasing infringement on the rights of
women in the workplace, in universities, and in society by the growing power of
ultra religious actors in politics.

The war
for women’s
place in the new Tunisia is exemplified by a recent controversy sparked by the
feminist protest of a 19-year-old Tunisian student who posted a topless photo
of herself on the Internet with the words “my body is mine, not somebody’s honour” scrawled on her chest.
Critics of the FEMEN-inspired protest argued that Amina’s interpretation of ‘women’s rights’ denied Tunisian women the
agency to decide for themselves whether or not they would wear the niqab.

While
this is an important discussion, the legitimate debate for women’s religious expression runs in
danger of being overshadowed by a tide of extremism seeking to impose religion
on society, summed up by the public declaration of a prominent Salafist cleric
to the effect that Amina deserved to be flogged and stoned to death for
exposing herself. Nor is Amina alone; increasing numbers of female secularists
have become subjects of verbal and physical intimidation by hard-line Islamists
who reject the secular elements of the 2011 revolution. It is the growing role
of extremist Islamist groups that has increasingly divided Tunisian society,
pitting secularists, who fear the widespread imposition of religion at the
political and social level, against the religious, some of whom perceive
Salafist groups as rare providers of morality and poverty alleviation during an
uncertain transition.

The
record is certainly mixed; while radical groups like Ansar al-Sharia have
become popular in poor areas by distributing food, clothing, and medication,
the group also aspires to implement Sharia law and was accused of attacking the
American embassy in Tunis in September 2012.

Islam and democracy

Viewed
from abroad, Tunisia’s difficulties may result from an inevitable struggle
between democracy and Islam, posing the oft-reiterated question, “Is Islam compatible with
democracy?”
Indeed, as the Islamic world’s primary example of an “Islamist” democracy besmirches its
reputation in Taksim Square and elsewhere, it is tempting to attribute
authoritarian tendencies to all such Islamist perpetrators.

However,
to restrict the debate over a perceived increase in authoritarianism to Islam
is perhaps to miss out on the broader forces at play in the region. Though
Islamists have long influenced the policymaking of Arab leaders, it is only
since December 2010 that popular Islam has been provided with a first chance to
directly dictate regional politics. Yet censorship,
vicious retribution against government critics, and restrictions on women’s rights have nevertheless
characterised the policies of many secular Arab regimes from Morocco to Jordan
since independence.

Under the
rule of heavyweights such as Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nasser and Tunisia’s Habib Bourguiba, the state
was defined by a strictly secular agenda that silenced the voice of Islam in
the name of modernisation. Though
women were traditionally allotted more rights within these regimes, during this
time, religion was perceived as an obstacle to economic development, and this
justified the enforcement of strict censorship laws over self-expression and
the press.

Nor were
such restrictive practices limited to the Middle East and North Africa, for it
is arguable that the majority of developing countries denied their women equal
rights and their societies civil liberties, irrespective of religious
orientation. Critically, it appears that even 'bastions of democracy' within
the west are unable to resist the urge to monitor citizens' behaviour and
regulate activism.

Consequently,
attempts to understand the sluggish efforts to promote 'democratic' values on
the part of Ennahda cannot be limited to a discussion of the relationship
between Islam and democracy. Rather, what is necessary is a broader
understanding of power conflicts within society, particularly in nascent
democracies: who are the bearers of power, and how did they obtain the mandate
to rule? Which segments of society provide support to the regime, and which
segments threaten to challenge its authority? What tools are available to the
regime to exercise its power, and how do these tools differ from those
available to its predecessor?

In this
context, the Ennahda party has been given a mandate to rule that is not
legitimate in the long run. Operating only with the power to oversee the
writing of the constitution and the ruling of the country until legitimate,
long-term elections can be held, an Ennahda-led government has what is
potentially an expiry date, prompting fears of a loss of power among
individuals long excluded from decision-making and formerly persecuted for
their beliefs under Ben Ali.

Increasingly
reliant on the religious vote, Ennahda's attempts to institutionalise its power, to promote the interests of
its supporters, and to silence its opposition cannot be condoned. Nevertheless,
these efforts are arguably best understood within the context of the party’s insecurity, as opposed to
its identity as an Islamist party.

Moreover,
the party has good reason to be insecure when considering the difficult
transition period it must oversee. Charged with the task of keeping the ship
afloat until Tunisians select their new captain, Ennahda has been hard pressed
to combat rising inflation as the Tunisian dinar continues to depreciate.

Coupled
with global increases in food prices, the devalued dinar has led to inflation
of up to 300% in the case of certain foodstuffs, representing a significant
deterioration in living standards in a country where food purchases constituted
35.5% of household final consumption expenditures in 2011, in comparison to 6.7%
in the US and 9.4% in the UK.

Rising
food prices deliver a serious economic blow in conjunction with growing
unemployment; in 2012, Tunisia’s female unemployment rate represented one of the highest
unemployment rates for women in the world in 2012 at 26.9% against a global
average of 6.5%. Moreover, a third of the country’s unemployed are university
graduates, and with estimates of 100,000 new graduates entering the job force
each year by 2015, job creation fails to keep up with domestic employment demand.

Although
there are signs that foreign investment is slowly returning, a full economic
recovery will not be likely to happen until the country is securely in the
hands of a long-term government that can ensure political, and therefore
economic, stability.

Faced
with the difficulty of meeting the economic and political expectations of
Tunisians, Ennahda has proven ill-suited to managing the transition period. In
the midst of growing societal discontent for and against its rule, the regime
has been either unable or unwilling to exercise full control over actors that
overstep the laws, nor has it prioritised the protection of civil liberties as
promised during its election.

Yet
despite its shortcomings, it is important nevertheless to examine the party’s behaviour beyond the
boundaries of its Islamist identity. In attributing authoritarian
characteristics solely to Islam, we not only risk misunderstanding the problem,
but also relinquish the opportunity to be part of the solution.

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