Questions raised by IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano about what he calls “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program are standing tall between the negotiators and a comprehensive settlement of the crisis.

President Barack Obama should articulate a narrowed framework for the legitimate use of nuclear weapons that the United States believes would be defensible for others to follow as long as nuclear weapons remain.

The first detailed Iranian account of the diplomatic struggle between Iran and the international community, begins in 2002 and takes the reader into Tehran’s deliberations as its leaders wrestle with internal and external adversaries.

If the United States and the United Arab Emirates seek to move beyond sanctions and military containment to address the deeper roots of the Iranian threat, they may find they have differing long-term interests.

Assad seems to be giving up on the reintegration of rebel-held Syria into the state apparatus. Thus, entrenching himself among the militias and what remains of his army, he has precious little left to offer anyone else—no carrot, only stick.

2014 was a year of crisis. Ebola, ISIS, and Donbas are now part of the global lexicon. Eurasia Outlook experts weigh in on how crises on Russia’s periphery affected the country, and what these developments mean for Moscow in 2015.

In recent months, there has been a flurry of diplomatic movement in the Syrian conflict, as Russia and Iran, the two main allies of Bashar al-Assad, are trying to seize the initiative and pave the way for a new political deal.

After another failed attempt to reach an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, all now depends on whether Russia, the United States, and other states can find the political will to take responsibility for global security.

Russian participation in the nuclear talks has demonstrated that despite the depth of the Ukrainian crisis and all the existing conflicts between Russia and the West, there are no reasons to consider Russia a purely destructive force that is bent on harming the West.

The experience gained in Vienna may be useful in future talks. In order to make the further negotiations effective, both Obama and Rouhani need to find a way to achieve a consensus of support for their actions within their own political establishments.

An agreement between Iran and the P5+1 will not deal a significant blow to Moscow’s relationship with Tehran. While the nuclear issue remains the most important aspect of Western relations with Tehran, the Russian-Iranian agenda is much broader.

On November 11, Russia and Iran signed a package of documents paving the way for Moscow to construct up to eight nuclear power units. With this agreement, Russia and Iran have established a solid economic foundation for political dialogue.

The big unknown at this point in the negotiations is how much Iran is willing to concede in its enrichment program in order to get sanctions relief. While Iran wishes to remove all sanctions immediately, the United States and its allies would like to see the sanctions removed gradually.

Failed talks on Iran’s nuclear program could lead to a managed irresolution, where the two sides fail to meet in the same place but also recognize that it is in the best interests of both parties to have the talks keep going.

While the United States and Iran have shared numerous adversaries, such as the Soviet Union, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and now the Islamic Staet, the strategic enmity between the two countries has prevailed.

While Iranian president Hassan Rouhani represents the popular opinion of a population that wants to be integrated with the outside world, the main levers of power in Iran are all controlled by the office of the Supreme Leader.

Rapprochement with Iran or, at the minimum, a nuclear deal with Iran would be a significant part of Obama’s foreign policy legacy. The big question is whether Iran’s leadership is interested in that rapprochement.

Negotiators from the P5+1 and Iran have agreed to extend the talks on Iran’s nuclear program to June 2015. Many issues are still to be solved, such as establishing a formula for verifiably limiting Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity as well as an acceptable process for relieving sanctions. Still, all parties to the talks have stressed the need to reach a comprehensive agreement.

From humble beginnings in the 1980s, Hizbullah’s political clout and public perception have trended upward, thanks to a communications strategy that has adapted to changes in the local and regional environment.

With a broad international effort underway to degrade and defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), David S. Cohen outlined the United States’ strategy to undermine the organization’s financial foundation.

The beginning of 2014 has already yielded important developments in nuclear policy circles. Iran and the P5+1 held talks, questions were raised about tensions between Moscow and Western powers, and North Korea threatened a fourth nuclear test.

The Joint Plan of Action signed between Iran and the P5+1 in Geneva in November 2013 marked a significant step in resolving the issue of Iran’s nuclear program. However, numerous questions remain about the implementation of the interim agreement.

The big unknown at this point in the negotiations is how much Iran is willing to concede in its enrichment program in order to get sanctions relief. While Iran wishes to remove all sanctions immediately, the United States and its allies would like to see the sanctions removed gradually.

Assad seems to be giving up on the reintegration of rebel-held Syria into the state apparatus. Thus, entrenching himself among the militias and what remains of his army, he has precious little left to offer anyone else—no carrot, only stick.

Failed talks on Iran’s nuclear program could lead to a managed irresolution, where the two sides fail to meet in the same place but also recognize that it is in the best interests of both parties to have the talks keep going.

While the United States and Iran have shared numerous adversaries, such as the Soviet Union, the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and now the Islamic Staet, the strategic enmity between the two countries has prevailed.

Chubin, who is based in Geneva, focuses his research on nonproliferation, terrorism, and Middle East security issues. He was director of studies at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland, from 1996 to 2009.

Hassan is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center, where his research focuses on Kurdish and Iraqi politics, civil society and democratization, donor assistance, and transition processes, especially in the Middle East.

Hibbs is a Berlin-based senior associate in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. Before joining Carnegie, for over twenty years he was an editor and correspondent for nuclear energy publications, including Nucleonics Week and NuclearFuel, published by the Platts division of the McGraw-Hill Companies.

Khatib is director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. Previously, she was the co-founding head of the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

Sadjadpour, a leading researcher on Iran, has conducted dozens of interviews with senior Iranian officials and hundreds with Iranian intellectuals, clerics, dissidents, paramilitaries, businessmen, students, activists, and youth, among others.

Ülgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on the implications of Turkish foreign policy for Europe and the United States, nuclear policy, and the security and economic aspects of transatlantic relations.