DisclaimerTo really grasp this battle
requires years of study. When you read the battle descriptions in the
various biographies and general works you see that the authors, like me, are struggling
to make sense of it. The best concise but fairly detailed treatment is
probably the Wikipedia article supported by Hal Jespersen's excellent maps (2 of
them included here). If you like your history with humor
or, as some might say, cynicism, continue here.
Then read This Grand Havoc of Battle
by Kennet Noe, 2001.

From Buell's
testimony
before
the Military Court of Inquiry: "My studies have taught me that
battles are only to be fought for some important object; that success
must be rendered reasonably certain if possible--the more certain the
better; that if the result is reasonably uncertain, battle is only to
be sought when very serious disadvantage must result from a failure to
fight or when the advantages of a possible victory far outweigh the
consequences of probable defeat. These rules suppose that war has a
higher object than that of mere bloodshed, and military history points
for study and commendation to campaigns which have been conducted over
a large field of operations with important results and without a single
general engagement. In my judgment the commander merits condemnation
who, from ambition or ignorance or a weak submission to the dictation
of popular clamor and without necessity or profit, has squandered the
lives of his soldiers."

The confusion reining in this battle (making it very
difficult to
describe) was not due so much to the terrain as to chaotic command
structures in both armies. Bragg could control neither Kirby Smith with
around 10,000 men, nor Polk, who communicated directly with Davis over
Bragg's head. Buell was under attack from his own war department while
some of his junior officers were petitioning for his removal. One of
his corps commanders, Alexander McCook, although personally
courageous, would become erratic under the pressure of command in
battle (and would do so again at Murfreesboro and Chickamauga). Another,
Crittenden (kind of a drunkard), was constrained because Buell had
placed another major general (Thomas) right beside him. In the 3rd
Corps, there was in effect a dual command structure as well, with
Sheridan indisposed to obey his commander Charles Gilbert. True,
Gilbert was technically still a captain but posing as a major general
(a bizzare story, too complicated to recount here, look it up). The 3
of them, Buell, Sheridan, and Gilbert, were having lunch together as
the battle started. In short, a real mess.

After the entry into Corinth, tirelessly insistent Halleck
gave
Don Carlos Buell an impossible task – with his scattered forces defend
Louisville, liberate East Tennessee, keep Nashville safe, occuppy
Chattanooga, defeat Bragg, and maintain and protect 500 miles of
railroad south and north of the Tennessee river. He was also
handicapped by the large numerical superiority of the Confederate
cavalry over his own. Given his limited means and multiple assignments,
Buell was not able to get to Chattanooga before Bragg did who did an
end run through Mobile using railroads. However, Buell's
patient organizational work in this period helped lay the groundwork
for the future school of the Army of the Cumberland.

When Bragg started north from Chattanooga, Buell was
behind and
had to follow. However, he didn't know at first whether Bragg was
heading for Nashville or Kentucky. In addition, Buell overestimated
Bragg's strength, and avoided a battle around Sparta in order to move
toward reinforcements in Louisville. Thomas tried to warn him which way
Bragg was probably heading, and how small Bragg's army was, but Buell
preferred to believe his own intelligence sources. When Bragg's
intentions became clear, namely to go toward Louisville, Buell's army
raced
Bragg's army almost side by side toward the north. Bragg might have
beaten Buell to Louisville had Col. Wilder from Indiana not held Bragg
up for three days at Munfordville with a ruse. This allowed Buell to
catch up, and
the head of his column marched into Louisville on 25 Sept. 1862.

On 23 Sept. the War Department's frustration with Buell
had
come to a head, and Halleck ordered Thomas to replace Buell. Halleck
then had second thoughts and unsuccessfully tried to stop the messenger
delivering the orders. The messenger arrived in Louisville on the 29th
just after General Davis had shot and killed his commander Nelson (the
founder of Camp Dick Robinson). In the chaos which followed the murder
(Indiana and Kentucky units were rioting), Thomas asked that the order
be "suspended" on the grounds that Buell was about to begin a battle
and he, Thomas, was not fully aware of Buell's plans. At that point in
his career he perhaps didn't feel strong enough to face the politicians
who were bringing Buell down. He certainly didn't want to be
saddled with McCook, Gilbert, and Crittenden with battle
imminent. Some years
later he told Van Horne
he didn't want to be used "to do Buell an injury" (Life, pg. 425).
Halleck rescinded his order, and Buell
remained in command, but he knew his days were numbered, and he
couldn't help but feel resentment which may have included Thomas. In
any case, he did not make full use of Thomas in the coming battle and
did not initiate him into his plans, but rather named him second in
command (kind of like Grant's role after Shiloh), assigning him to
oversee Crittenden's corps. Thomas, for his part, surely didn't like
that.

Bragg meanwhile was determined to try and hold on to as
much of
Kentucky as possible, and in pursuit of this goal he decided to
set up a
secessionist government in Frankfort, with governor, flagraising,
martial music, benediction, and the works, which should give him a
"legal" basis for the conscription he surely had already begun. He
had even brought
along weapons for recruits, but the young men stayed away. Bragg's
original plan had
been predicated on a false assumption based upon wishful thinking,
namely that the people of Kentucky generally supported the Confederacy.
Bragg was disabused of this, as his following accurate
assessment of the situation shows:

<ar22_1088>
"The campaign here was predicated on a belief and the most positive
assurances that the people of this country would rise in mass to assert
their independence. No people ever had so favorable an opportunity, but
I am distressed to add there is little or no disposition to avail of
it. Willing perhaps to accept their independence, they are neither
disposed nor willing to risk their lives or their property in its
achievement. With ample means to arm 20,000 men and a force with that
to fully redeem the State we have not yet issued half the arms left us
by casualties incident to the campaign."

The majority of the people of Kentucky probably wanted no
part of
the conflict, but neither Washington nor Richmond could accept that.
Bragg's plan thus failed, as did Lee's plan (for the same reasons and
simultaneously) fail when he also played at being a politician
and invaded Maryland. The afternoon of 4 Oct., right after the
secessionist governer Hawes been installed, Bragg had to abandon him
and the
effort due to the approach of some Union troops. In addition,
while Bragg was
dabbling in politics, Buell was moving south.

On 1 Oct. 1863 Buell's Army of the Ohio had moved out from
Louisville,
Ky. toward Perryville, Ky. He had prepared an elegant plan of
feints to disguise his main thrust and dispersed his
forces skillfully.
Gen. Sill with a small force remained between Bragg and Louisville and
successfully endeavored to make the impression that he was the real
effort. At the same time his presence discouraged Kirby Smith from
combining with
Bragg.

Buell swung his main body with about 55,000 troops around
to the
west and turned back north in order to cut Bragg off from one of his
supply depots, and to try and trap Bragg between himself and Sill.
However, he misconstrued the positions and strength of Bragg's
forces. Although
Bragg only had about 32,500 troops (Kirby Smith having
decided to conquer Ohio), he ordered
a preemptive attack against Buell's right wing under McCook before
Buell could bring to bear the rest of his army. It turned into one of
the messiest battles of the war.

It was also not Thomas' finest hour. Sometime
during
the evening or early morning before the battle he received this
communication from Buell's HQ:

(7 p.m, 7 Oct. 1862, OR:2: 581 )
:
"When the column [of Crittenden] has got into position you will please
report in person at these headquarters with all the information you may
have been able to obtain..."

Thomas ignored the order or strong suggestion.
There
has
been much controversy
about why. Some writers condemn him, others try to justify his decision
in one way or another, taking into account that there had been tension
or grounds for tension between the two from the beginning, starting
with Buell's appointment to replace Sherman over Thomas,
and continuing with Buell's apparent lack of appreciation for
Thomas' achievement at Mill Springs. In
addition, in the months prior
to the battle, Buell had repeatedly ignored sound advice from Thomas on
how to best deal with Bragg. To top it off, just before the
battle, Buell's HQ emitted conflicting orders about when to begin
battle. Thomas may have simply given up
on Buell. Einolf (Virginian for the Union, pg.
135)speculates that "Thomas had lost faith in
Buell's
ability to lead." I say with good reason, given Buell's preference for
three incompetent corps commanders (Gilbert, McCook, and
Crittenden). In any case, nothing Thomas could have done would
have remedied the problem of the unsound command structure in time to
do battle with Bragg. So he just threw up his hands and let Buell bear
the consequences.

Later, Thomas had this to say about about his
commanders:

Thomas to Halleck after the nomination of
Rosecrans to succeed Buell (Van Horne, Life of Thomas, p. 88): "I
have
made my last protest while the war lasts. You may hereafter put a stick
over me if you choose to do so. I will take care, however, to so
manage my command, whatever it may be, as not to be involved in the
mistakes of the stick."

Thomas may have been referring to both Buell and
Rosecrans.

Van Horne (Life, pp. 78-79) put it this way:

"General Thomas
had found the enemy in his front early in the morning, and for that
reason he did not report in person when his command had attained
position, but sent Captain Mack of his staff to report to General Buell
the presence of the enemy, and ask for instructions. There is but one
interpretation of
this refusal to report in person, as required by positive orders, and
this is, that he considered it so plainly unadvisable, from military
considerations, that he was justified in remaining with his
command."

It seems to me that Buell's dispatch was more a plea for
help
than a positive order. Buell was desperate. Stanton and
Halleck were after him, he knew that Thomas was more popular in his
army than he was, he was hurt from falling off his horse, his
staff was not functioning well, and he didn't know what was going on.
In short, in his first battle as independent commander, he was in over
his head. Thomas knew all of this, and for that
reason alone might have swallowed his pride (if that was the
impediment, we will never know for sure) and gone to Buell to impose
some order in his HQ. But he didn't. If he
had, the outcome of the battle might have been more
decisively in
favor of the Union. Or, the outcome would have been about the same,
however with Thomas directly involved in the near failure of Buell's
enterprise.

The first important contact took place on the evening
of
the 7th
over a contest involving some of Sheridan's men
over some stagnant
pools. There had been little
rain for weeks, and both armies were plagued by a lack of water and
were forced to disperse in search of it. Sheridan was directed to only
secure Doctor's Creek, two miles to the west of Perryville, without
bringing on a general engagement. However, he exceeded his orders by
occupying the heights beyond the creek, and sent in more men the next
morning. Sheridan's forward position was provocative
enough to merit at least some Confederate cannonfire, but it is hard to
determine what finally set Polk and Hardee in motion, neither of whom
liked Bragg very much. Before Buell could get set, they did attack
McCook, and the result
was an afternoon and evening of confused fighting between disoriented
units on both sides.
Most of Buell's army wasn't even
engaged because Buell, due to the phenomenon "acoustic shadow,"
didn't know that the battle was going on. That is,
because of a
strong wind blowing that day away from Buell and toward the
battle, the sounds of rifle and cannon fire were muffled, but not
completely shut out, at a short distance from the fighting.In addition, McCook,
who bore
the brunt of the attack as it developed, did not report his situation
to headquarters in a timely fashion. As Buell wrote afterward in his
official report:

"The
cannonading, which commenced with the partial engagement in the center,
followed by the reconnaissance of the cavalry, under Captain Gay,
extended toward the left, and became brisker as the day advanced but
was not supposed to proceed from any serious engagement, as no report
to that effect was received."

Nevertheless, the Confederates weren't able to make any
real
progress despite driving back and inflicting heavy casualties on
McCook's divisions. By nightfall, other Union units came up to threaten
Bragg's left flank, and the situation was stabilized.

Buell was expecting Bragg to square off the following
day. However, Bragg was short of men and supplies, and had withdrawn
during the night in order to begin his retreat through the Cumberland
Gap into East Tennessee where his subordinate commanders could foment
dissent in leisure. During the advance into Kentucky, camp revivals
were held
during which Bragg's soldiers prayed that their enemies would see the
error of their ways. However, before leaving Kentucky, some of Bragg's
soldiers' frustration boiled over, and they hung 12 hostages. How dare
Kenntuckians prefer the Northern invaders over their brothers and
saviors from the South? The Confederate offensive toward the Ohio was
over for good, and the Union definitively controlled Kentucky and
Nashville for the duration of the war, no small achievement for Buell. Estimated
Casualties: 7,407 total (US 4,211; CS 3,196).

Handling a large army in battle is something which has to
be
learned, and this was Buell's (and Bragg's) first such experience as
independent commanders. Others were forgiven their mistakes and, in the
case of some, time and time again. Buell was not forgiven because
Halleck (Grant's protector) and governors Morton of Indiana and Johnson
of Tennessee made sure of it. Buell had opposed Morton's earlier
insistance on directly managing Indiana troops, and he had disregarded
Johnson's pleas to liberate East Tennessee (Johnson's home),
considering it more important and more feasible to get and keep control
of
Nashville. He was faulted for lack of aggressiveness before the battle
and for not pursuing Bragg vigorously enough after
the battle, and on 24 Oct. 1862 he was ordered to turn over his command
to Rosecrans. The department was reorganized, and the Army of the
Cumberland came back into being.

The burocratic battle, however, had just begun. From 24
Nov. 62
to 19 May 63 a military court of inquiry sat in Cincinnati and
investigated Buell's entire Kentucky and Tennessee campaigns. Note that
Grant and Sherman were not subjected to a military court of inquiry
during the entire war. The main charge of disloyalty to the
Union got no traction in that court. Thomas' reasoned and
objective testimony was generally supportive of Buell, but he pointed
out that they had disagreed on what Bragg's probable route through
Tennessee would be, and about where the best place to bring
Bragg to battle was, and events had proven Thomas right. Thomas
admitted, pro forma, that at the time he had less information at his
disposal than did Buell. At the end the commission concluded only that
both Buell and McCook had made errors at Perryville, that Buell was not
sufficiently vigorous in pursuit of Bragg after the battle, and that
earlier Halleck had excessively burdened Buell with railroad
maintenance. That didn't satisfy Halleck, and he had his own spurious
accusations, couched in very strong language, added to the court's
findings. The findings were then not published, and no action was taken
against Buell, but his active Civil War career was finished.

Thomas Van Horne on the battle
of Perryville with background, taken from his 1882 biography "Life of
Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas"

Page 67 - FROM CORINTH TO CHATTANOOGA

Early in June General Wood's and General Nelson's divisions
were
sent eastward from Mississippi to repair the Memphis and Charleston
railroad. General O. M. Mitchel's division was already on that road,
having moved south from Nashville early in the Spring. On the 11th of
June General McCook's division moved eastward from Corinth and General
Crittenden's from Boonesville. These two divisions passed the others on
the road and took position at Battle Creek far towards Chattanooga,
early in July. As fast as the repair of roads, the accumulation of
supplies and other circumstances permitted, other forces moved
eastward. General Thomas was left in the rear with his division to
guard against the contingency of attacks by the enemy from the west and
south-west, until a concentration towards Chattanooga was practicable
and imperative. He was then ordered from Tuscumbia to Decherd and soon
afterwards to McMinnville. He arrived at the former place August 5th
and at the latter on the 19th. He was sent to McMinnville by General
Buell to command all the troops that were to operate from that place,
either to continue the offensive or to resist the enemy in the event of
aggression on his part. By this time there were rumors and indications
that General Bragg would advance from Chattanooga, although his
objective and line of march had not been developed. If Nashville was
his objective he could advance by Battle Creek and Stevenson, or across
the mountains to McMinnville or Sparta. If his purpose was to invade
Kentucky, he would cross into the Sequatchie Valley, while his presence
there would indicate equally such a movement or an advance to Nashville
by the more northern route. The fact that he could cover his designs in
his first operations, gave General Bragg a decided advantage. On the
supposition that he would advance to Nashville, General Buell was to
provide against the movement by Stevenson or by

Page 68 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

McMinnville, and as the routes were somewhat widely
separated, there
was danger of his falling upon unsupported divisions or of having an
open way to his objective.

On the day that General Thomas reached McMinnville, General
Buell
discussed the situation in a lengthy despatch : "The enemy crossed
three hundred cavalry and three thousand infantry at Chattanooga,
yesterday. This may be for the purpose of foraging in Sequatchie
Valley, but we must be prepared for more than that. Hold your command
in readiness to march at the shortest notice.* * * You should by means
of spies and scouts keep yourself thoroughly informed of what is going
on between you and Chattanooga. * * * I shall concentrate your division
and McCook's at Tracy City or near there, and send Crittenden up the
Sequatchie Valley to about the Anderson road. We must be prepared
either to fight in detachments or concentrate rapidly, according to
circumstances." On the 22nd, General Thomas telegraphed to General
Buell: "I have believed for a day or two that the demonstration in this
direction is intended to cover the advance of the enemy toward
Kentucky. * * * The citizens here think that they will advance into
Kentucky." General Buell replied the same day: "From General McCook's
information this morning, it seems almost certain that Bragg is
marching on McMinnville, his advance was on the top of Waldron's Ridge
last night. McCown is said to be crossing at Kingston, and Withers at
Harrison. Of course they will expect to unite. What sort of ground can
we take by concentrating at McMinnville? How would it do to fight at
Altamont? Is the ground such as to give us the advantage of our
artillery?"

General Thomas replied the same day: "By all means
concentrate here.
The enemy cannot reach Nashville by any other route across the
mountains unless by Sparta. At Altamont, I am positively informed, that
the enemy would have an equal advantage with ourselves. Here we

Page 69 - URGES CONCENTRATION AT McMINNVILLE.

will have a most decided advantage, and by being here, should
he
march by Sparta, we can meet him either there or at Allen's Ford,
across the Caney Fork. He is obliged to pass this place or Sparta to
reach Nashville. . . . I cannot think that Bragg is coming here, either
by the Hill or Thurman road." In immediate answer General Buell said:
"I can hardly think the enemy will attempt to march across to
McMinnville - at least, not immediately. It appears to me that he will
rather endeavor to get into North Alabama, and perhaps strike across to
Decherd. If we advance to Altamont, we may thwart him in both and
preserve our communication with Decherd and Nashville. What think
you?" General Thomas said in reply also on the 22nd: "We can get
neither forage nor water at Altamont. It will be as difficult for us to
march across the mountains to Sequatchie Valley as for the enemy to
come either to Altamont or this place. I would not advise concentrating
here except for battle or for an advance into East Tennessee. I think
our connexion with Nashville will be better preserved by holding
Decherd with a division to enable us to concentrate either there, if
threatened, or at this place. I have also learned that Tupelo,
Mississippi, has been abandoned, and most of the enemy at that place
have been sent to Chattanooga. I therefore do not apprehend any attempt
to seize North Alabama."

The next day General Buell said:

"There is no possibility of our concentrating
at
McMinnville. We must concentrate in advance and assume the offensive or
fall back, at least, to Murfreesboro. I deem the former the surest, and
we will act accordingly. I wish you, therefore, to move by a forced
march to Altamont, there to form a junction with McCook and Crittenden
and Schoepf.* ...There must be no delay or failure. The enemy's advance
was at the top of Waldron's Ridge, ten miles from Chattanooga, night
before last, and talked of being at McMinnville to morrow: that is
hardly possible; but they must be met at the earliest possible moment."

* General Schoepf was commanding General Thomas' division.

Page 70 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

A day later he telegraphed:

"In advancing to Altamont, take the Hickory
Creek
road, instead of the Thurman road. This will put you on a shorter line
of retreat on Murfreesboro' by way of Manchester, and brings us nearer
together. . . . In the event of any reverse which makes it necessary
for the whole force to fall back, do so by Manchester and Beech Grove,
making a stand to check the enemy whenever it can be done to advantage."

On the aqth [?], General Thomas' scouts returned with
intelligence
that the enemy would advance on McMinnville by two or three routes, and
that forces were at Pikeville and in the Sequatchie Valley. He then
reported to General Buell that he would move that afternoon in
compliance with orders. It is evident, however, from the foregoing
quotations, that he was exceedingly reluctant to move to Altamont, and
the issue of that movement proved that his reluctance was well founded.

August 25th at 5 P.M. Thomas telegraphed to General Buell
from
Altamont:

"The enemy no nearer than Dunlap. It is
reported
that there is one brigade there and one at Pikeville. . . . Water
scarce; only one spring here, and not forage enough in the neighborhood
to last for one day. The road up the mountain is almost impassable;
General Wood has been from six o'clock until now, and has not succeeded
in getting his artillery up the road. I deem it next to impossible to
march a large army across the mountains by Altamont on account of the
scarcity of water and forage and the extreme difficulty of passing over
the road. I will therefore return to McMinnville, and await further
orders. As I mentioned in one of my despatches, I regard McMinnville as
the most important point for occupation of any. The occupation of
McMinnville, Sparta and Murfreesboro will, in my opinion, secure the
Nashville and Chattanooga railroad."

Page 71 - ALTAMONT AND McMINNVILLE.

And thus without orders he abandoned a place to which he
would not
have advanced unless under positive orders issued after his own
emphatic protest. In advance of trial, he depicted the exact condition
of Altamont as a place for concentration.

The next day General Buell telegraphed: "Keep your position
at
McMinnville, but make nothing like a permanent establishment. Be always
ready to move at a moment's notice. That Bragg is on this side of the
river with a large force is beyond all question. It is hardly probable
that it is merely for the purpose of demonstration, and we must be
prepared to concentrate promptly. Of course the passage of so large a
force across the mountains is difficult, but not as much so as you
would suppose from the road you took. The Thurman road is very good,
and the mountain quite easy of ascent. The descent on this side is easy
enough by four roads, all diverging from Altamont; the first going by
Beersheba to McMinnville, the second by Hickory Creek to McMinnville or
towards Manchester, the third also to Manchester and to Decherd by
Pelham, and the fourth by Cowan. The Beersheba road is excellent for a
mountain road. The question is, how to meet an advance which may take
either of these roads through Altamont. The best position we could take
would be McMinnville, Altamont, and on the Thurman road, just this side
of Sequatchie Valley. We should not only be able to concentrate
against an advance on that road or the Sparta road, but also to
threaten his flank if he should attempt to go into North Alabama by
Battle Creek- a not improbable thing on many accounts. The difficulty
of supplying ourselves on the mountains is, I think, the only objection
to the disposition I mention."

On the 28th General Thomas said: "Troops at this place can
watch the
direct Chattanooga road, the Dunlap, and the Harrison and Pikeville
roads, and by the system of expresses to be established by Smith, I
think I can give

Page 72 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

you intelligence of the enemy before he can cross Sequatchie
Valley." The divergent views of these generals had their foundation in
a radical disagreement as to General Bragg's plans and purposes.
General Buell's suggestions had reference to an advance of the enemy to
Nashville either across the mountains or by Battle Creek and Stevenson;
and General Thomas, rejecting as improbable an advance to Nashville by
way of North Alabama, and believing that the invasion of Kentucky was
to be the outcome of Bragg's operations, would have made provision
against his advance from the Sequatchie Valley in the direction of
Kentucky, and the proposed concentration at McMinnville would have
provided also for the contingency of an advance to Nashville from that
valley. General Buell looked to the right, and General Thomas to the
left, and the subsequent
movements of Bragg's army proved the better discernment of the latter.

General Bragg subsequently demonstrated towards McMinnville,
but did
this simply to cover his advance into Kentucky. He was most anxious to
escape from the mountains without meeting his foe in battle, and for
this reason adopted every possible maneuver and artifice to make the
impression that he would advance upon McMinnville. And General Buell,
acting upon the positive belief that Nashville was his objective,
opened the way for him to pass from the Sequatchie Valley and move upon
the shortest line to Kentucky.

On the 30th of August General Buell issued an elaborate
order,
defining the movements of each division, to effect a concentration of
his army at Murfreesboro. By this order he placed General Thomas in the
rear with Ammen's* and Wood's divisions, and directed him to keep a
day's march between his forces and the enemy and not to risk a battle.
On the 1st of September he asked General Thomas: "Do any circumstances
present themselves which should make a change in our movements
advisable?"

* General Nelson's division.

Page 73 - MURFREESBORO

Thomas answered: "I think, as the movement has commenced,
that it
had better be executed." On the day following he told General Buell
that he had again heard that the enemy intended to march on
McMinnville. He then advised the concentration at Murfreesboro, from
which place the main force should be thrown against Bragg's army. He
had said on the 30th of August: "If he (the enemy is moving on
Murfreesboro by Sparta, I think the sooner we concentrate to meet him
and drive him back, the better; and Murfreesboro seems to be the point
from which we should operate." But in no way did he intimate that the
purpose of concentrating to resist General Bragg's advance should be
abandoned. He only, at the last, expressed a preference for
Murfreesboro as a base for offense. Doubtless one strong reason for
this preference was the expectation that reenforcements would be met at
Murfreesboro. Two divisions were marching from Mississippi, and
Rousseau's division formerly Mitchel's had moved to Nashville, on the
line of the Nashville and Decatur railroad.

During the first three days of September all the divisions
and
trains of the army were put in motion towards Murfreesboro, General
Thomas with two divisions being in the rear, reaching Murfreesboro on
the 5th. Here General Thomas met an order from General Buell to proceed
to Nashville by rail; and the meaning of this order was the abandonment
of the suggested plan of operations from Murfreesboro. In this General
Buell had not consulted Thomas, but had decided on reaching that place,
although he there met General Jeff. C. Davis' division, General R. B.
Mitchell commanding (sent by General Grant), that he would withdraw his
army to Nashville. It is evident from his persistence in recommending a
concentration, to resist General Bragg, first from McMinnville and
afterwards from Murfreesboro, that had General Thomas been in command

Page 74 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

of the army, he would have fought the enemy south or east of
Murfreesboro. General Buell withdrew five divisions from McMinnville
and contiguous points. He met one other at Murfreesboro. He could have
drawn reenforcements from Nashville besides. General Bragg advanced
from Chattanooga with five divisions of infantry, and General Buell
could have met him in battle by advancing from Murfreesboro with seven
divisions, at least.

September 7th, General Thomas was assigned to the command of
three
divisions and the post of Nashville. These divisions were his own,
Negley's, and Paine's division, General John M. Palmer commanding,
which arrived at Nashville on the 12th, from General Grant's army.
General Buell had, in the meantime, ascertained that General Bragg had
not followed him to Nashville, but having crossed the Cumberland River
at Carthage, was moving into Kentucky. He therefore moved north from
Nashville with six divisions - McCook's, Crittenden's, Ammen's, Wood's,
Rousseau's and Mitchell's.

On the 13th General Thomas was ordered by General Buell to
march on
the l5th, into Kentucky, with his own division and Palmer's, but in
view of the fact that General Bragg might have detached a large force
to operate against Nashville, was permitted to leave Palmer's division
at that place if he deemed it necessary. He started from Nashville on
the 15th with his own division, and on the 20th joined the main army at
Prewitt's Knob. All these changes indicated the need of his services
where careful management was required or where fighting was expected.
He was nearest the enemy in the march of the army to Murfreesboro, and
when it became known that General Bragg had moved into Kentucky, went
by order to the front. His transfer from the rearguard to the vanguard
usually indicated a like transfer of emergencies, and in all his
movements and operations, he was at least as rapid as circumstances
demanded or orders required.

Page 75 - ASKS FOR BUELL'S RETENTION.

At Prewitt's Knob he was charged with the alignment of the
foremost
divisions in anticipation of battle, but General Bragg declined to
fight, and diverging to the east from the direct road to Louisville,
marched northward. In the march to Louisville from Prewitt's Knob,
General Thomas was again in the rear of the army for its safety.

During General Buell's movement from Corinth towards
Chattanooga,
the President, through General Halleck, commander-in-chief, expressed
dissatisfaction with his progress and after the army reached
Louisville, this dissatisfaction eventuated in an order relieving
General Buell from command of the army and appointing General Thomas as
his successor. The command was actually turned over, but General Thomas
requested that it should be restored to General Buell. In a despatch to
Washington he said: "General Buell's preparations have been completed
to move against the enemy, and I respectfully ask that he may be
retained in command. My position is very embarrassing, not being as
well informed as I should be as the commander of this army and on the
assumption of such responsibility." Upon the receipt of this despatch
the order relieving General Buell was revoked.

Perhaps no act of his life has been so misapprehended, as
this
request for the retention of General Buell in command of the army, when
he had been appointed his successor. The people of the country and even
his own friends have attributed this act to his extreme modesty and
distrust of his own ability as a general. His despatch does not sustain
these suppositions, especially as explained by himself. He did not
positively decline the command. He requested that Buell should be
retained. But had this request been denied, he would have accepted the
position, although the assumption of such responsibility on the eve of
battle was by no means inviting or in harmony with his views of justice
to Buell or himself. He considered it unjust to General Buell to remove
him at the culmination of

Page 76 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

his operations. His request was based primarily on the fact
that
Buell had completed his preparations to move against the enemy, and
secondly on his own embarrassments in taking the responsibility of
commanding an army on the eve of battle. In another connection it has
been shown that his perception of the demands of justice, prompted him
to protest against his own removal from command in September 1861. It
is equally clear that for the same reason he protested against the
removal of Buell. Knowing that his action had been attributed to
modesty he once said: "I am not as modest as I have been represented to
be. I did not request the retention of General Buell in command through
modesty, but because his removal and my assignment were alike, unjust
to him and to me. It was unjust to him to relieve him on the eve of
battle, and unjust to myself, to impose upon me the command of the army
at such a time." When responsible for the issue of a battle he desired
to give shape to the antecedent operations. He was modest and he was
eager for an independent command, but he was not so modest as to
underate himself nor so eager for the command of an army, as to desire
it, when involving injustice to another general. Had choice been
offered to him between himself, as next in rank to General Buell, and
an alien general, he would have accepted the command of the army
without hesitation, on the ground, that he had claims superior to any
general of his rank outside of the Army of the Cumberland, and that
embarrassments to a stranger would be greater than to himself.

It should also be stated that while General Thomas desired an
independent command it was not pleasant to him to supersede another
general. His idea of enlarged command was to have his forces multiplied
in his own hands, and thus be promoted without the displacement and
mortification of another commander. This certainly was a noble
aspiration, one that harmonized with the transcendent excellence
attributed to him by his friends.

Page 77 - SECOND IN COMMAND.

Upon resuming command of the army, General Buell named
General
Thomas as second in command. He had previously organized three
provisional corps, each comprising three divisions, and designated as
"First," "Second" and "Third," and had assigned Major-General A.
McD.McCook, to the command of the "First," Major-General T. L.
Crittenden to the "Second," and Brigadier-General C. C. Gilbert to the
"Third." The command of the Third corps belonged to General Thomas, by
right, since his own division was in it, and General Gilbert was then
only a brigadier-general by appointment of the President and was never
confirmed as such. General Thomas' position was an ambiguous one.
Nominally second in command, in reality, he was simply given the
supervision of General Crittenden's corps, and the small force of
cavalry associated with it. This arrangement placed two major-generals
with one corps, and a brigadier-general of unperfected appointment in
command of another. If the position of second in command had carried
with it authority to act as commander of the army in absence of the
commanding general, or in emergencies beyond his observation, the case
would have been radically different. But Thomas had no more authority
or independence than an ordinary corps commander, and consequently his
position was a false one, being by designation higher than such a
commander, while in authority, only his equal. General Crittenden was
subject to his orders in consequence of defined relations, but no such
relations subjected General McCook or General Gilbert to his orders,
whom by rank alone he could have commanded in certain contingencies.
But he had no knowledge of the plans of the commanding general that was
not revealed by general orders, and consequently his authority was
confined to the corps on the right, and the cavalry on that flank,
except as it might be extended by special instructions or by such
events as usually devolve the chief command upon the general of highest
rank on the field.

Page 78 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

The army moved from Louisville on the first day of October.
The
three corps marched upon as many roads and converged first upon
Bardstown, in expectation that the enemy would there be met. From that
place they moved as before, to concentrate at Perryville. On the
evening of the 7th the three corps were well advanced towards that
town, though not abreast. Gilbert's corps in the centre took position
about three and a half miles distant, McCook's corps on the left was
some distance behind, and so also was Crittenden's corps. At the place
designated in orders for the encampment of Crittenden's troops, there
was no water. The men had marched all day in thick dust, without water,
and in the evening were almost famished. There was no time to consult
the commanding general, and acting under a necessity which his orders
had entailed, General Thomas used the discretion which his orders did
not give, and moved the command to the right to the nearest water that
could be found in sufficient quantity for the troops.

In the evening of that day General Buell announced in orders
that a
battle would be fought the next day. He prescribed the movements which
would bring his army into line of battle, and gave special directions
to the corps commanders to provide water, to last with sparing use,
during the expected action. He also directed them to report to him in
person, as soon as their respective commands had attained position. The
corps on the right and left attained position on each side of
Gilbert's, early on the 8th. By noon the whole army was in position,
and in line of battle, except General Wood's division of Crittenden's
corps, which at that hour was two or three miles in the rear, but
marching towards its designated position in the line. General Thomas
had found the enemy in his front early in the morning, and for that
reason he did not report in person when his command had attained
position, but sent Captain Mack of his staff to report to General Buell
the presence of the

Page 79 - PERRYVILLE.

enemy, and ask for instructions. There is but one
interpretation of
this refusal to report in person, as required by positive orders, and
this is, that he considered it so plainly unadvisable, from military
considerations, that he was justified in remaining with his
command. General McCook, who had been informed by the officer in
command of the cavalry on the left that the enemy was not in his front,
reported to General Buell, in compliance with orders, but on his return
to his command found it engaged with the enemy. General Buell had
decided not to fight that day, but had not formally revoked his order
of the previous evening. General Bragg, however, had declined to wait,
and supposing that he could strike and crush the foremost troops of the
National army before they could be supported from the rear, massed
three divisions, all he had in hand, and hurled them first against
General McCook's left division and the flank of the army, and
afterwards upon his other division on the right. General McCook had
only two divisions on the field, General Sill's division having been
sent to the left to operate against General Kirby Smith. General
Jackson's division on the left comprised two brigades of new troops,
and upon these untried soldiers the enemy made his initial attack.
General McCook sent a staff officer to the nearest commander of
Gilbert's corps - General Sheridan - and requested protection to his
right flank, or the right of Rousseau's division, and then gave his
attention to his own left, which was the left of the army as well.
After severe fighting against great odds, General Jackson's division
repulsed the enemy. The loss, however, was very great, including
General Jackson and his brigade commander - General Terrel - and a
large number of officers and men.* Having established his left flank
the corps commander turned to the right to meet a far more threatening
state of affairs. His

* Colonel Webster, commanding General Jackson's second
brigade, was
killed in supporting the left of Rousseau's division later in the day.

Page 80 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS.

request for support, for the right of Rousseau's division had
not
been regarded. The troops on the left of Gilbert's corps had moved
away, leaving Rousseau's right in air. General Bragg had sent Buckner's
division up Doctor's Creek to this uncovered flank, where it had been
deployed at right angles to McCook's line of battle, and thus with its
back to the rest of our army, it was moving against his exposed right
flank - exposed to extreme peril, and yet there were six divisions of
infantry behind Buckner's division as it faced towards McCook's line.
This was a situation perhaps without parallel in the history of war.
Three divisions had attacked the left of an army of eight divisions in
line of battle, and yet one of these attacking divisions had wedged
itself between six of these eight divisions on one side and two on the
other, and turning its back upon the six; moved upon the flank of the
other two. And while the conflict on the left of the National army was
waxing hotter and hotter, not an order was given for two hours that
directed support to the two isolated divisions. The fact that three
divisions attacked an army of eight, and escaped severe punishment or
capture, proves that grave errors were committed by responsible
commanders in General Buell's army, and that a great opportunity was
lost. If, when Buckner's division was moving upon the flank of
Rousseau's division at right angles to the general line of battle, the
corps of Gilbert and Crittenden had wheeled to the left, they would
have enveloped Bragg's army, and captured or utterly crushed it. But
General Gilbert's divisions had moved forward and made possible the
situation on the left, and General Thomas was, by assignment, too far
to the right to apprehend the emergency on the left, while General
Buell was too far in the rear to learn through the noise of battle that
his army was engaged; and no member of his staff and no headquarters'
courier bore to the rear tidings of the battle, but Captain Fisher, of
General McCook's staff, who had been sent with a second

Page 81 - PERRYVILLE

request for support from Gilbert's corps, and having failed
to
secure it, went of his own accord to General Buell and made known the
attack of the enemy and the state of affairs on the left of the army.
General Thomas knew that there was fighting on the extreme left of the
army, but he did not know whether it had resulted from offense or
defense on the part of the enemy. There was a corps comparatively
unengaged on his own left, and he had heard nothing from General Buell
since his orders of the previous evening announcing a battle for that
day, and at no time had his instructions been such as to authorize him
to leave his own command to direct the movements of the other two
corps. General Crittenden had been urgent that his corps should advance
against the enemy, but General Thomas had refused permission for the
assigned reason that he did not
know the plans of the commanding general. General Buell had thrown his
army before the enemy to take the offensive himself, but while he was
three or four miles in the rear, behind intervening hills, without
having authorized General Thomas to take command of the army in the
event of an attack by the enemy, all without having given instructions
to his corps commanders for the conduct of defensive operations. Had
General Crittenden moved forward directly, he would not have aided
General McCook, since General Gilbert had so advanced and left McCook's
right in air. What Was demanded by the situation was a wheel to the
left by Gilbert's and Crittenden's corps, the former maintaining close
connection with McCook's right. Had this been done when the enemy first
attacked the left of the army, eight connected divisions would have
enveloped them, or had the two corps wheeled to the left when Buckner's
division was between Gilbert and McCook, the opportunity for the
capture or annihilation of Bragg's forces would have been still better.
Had this been done, six divisions would have moved to the rear of the
three divisions that had been hurled against McCook.

Page 82 - LIFE OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Had General Thomas been second in command in supervision of
the
whole army, instead of a corps, he would have been responsible for
results in the absence of the commander-in-chief. And had he been thus
in command, the issue would doubtless have been radically different.

About 4 P. M. Captain Mack returned from General Buell with
verbal
instructions to General Thomas to hold one division in readiness to
reenforce the centre if necessary and to reconnoitre his own front to
ascertain if the enemy had reenforced his left or was withdrawing, and
to report the facts. Afterwards, he received no orders to advance.
After sundown he received the following communication :

October 8, 6.30 p. M.GENERAL:- The First corps, McCook's, on our left, has
been heavily engaged. The left and centre of this corps gained ground,
but the right yielded a little. Press your lines forward as much as
possible tonight and get into position to make a vigorous attack in the
morning. If you have got your troops into position which you deem
advantageous, it will not be advisable to make a change for the purpose
of complying with the General's instructions for you, sent by Captain
Mack. It may be as well to have the division ordered to the centre and
let it wait where it is for further orders. The General desires to see
you in person as soon tonight as your duties will permit you to come.Respectfully, &c.,J. B. FRY, Colonel and Chief of Staff.

There had not been a strong force in front of General Thomas
at any
time, but only such a line as General Bragg deemed sufficient to cover
his attack with massed forces on the left of the National line.

The verbal instructions sent through Captain Mack in the
afternoon,
and this written communication from Colonel Fry at 6.30 P.M., do not
even intimate that General Thomas was expected to exercise any control
of the troops on the left of his command. His instructions pertained
solely to operations that evening on the right, as preparatory to a
battle the next day. He was directed twice to hold a

Page 83 - BUELL REMOVED FROM COMMAND

division in readiness to move to the centre in the event of
necessity, but of the necessity he was not to judge. He was not
instructed to ascertain the state of affairs on his left but simply to
hold his division in waiting for further orders. Late in the evening,
by General Buell's order, troops were directed from the centre to
assist General McCook in his unequal contest - Gooding's brigade from
Mitchell's division, and Steedman's from Schoepfs were sent to his
support, the former brigade as the first to participate in the terrific
contest on Rousseau's right was hotly engaged and suffered heavy loss.

There was no action on the 9th and no pursuit until the 12th.
As
soon as the pursuit, which was fruitless in consequence of its late
beginning, was terminated, General Buell left the army with General
Thomas and retired to Louisville. On the 26th of October he directed
General Thomas to put the army in motion towards Bowling Green and
Glasgow.

Up to this time the military authorities, although frequently
differing from General Buell in respect to his actual and proposed
movements, had not restrained him in his operations by peremptory
orders. But after the battle of Perryville, dissatisfaction with its
issue and the pursuit of the enemy, and a new disagreement in regard to
the future operations of the army led to a second and final removal of
General Buell from command.

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol III,
Yoseloff ed.,
1956

Originally published in 1887 by Robert Underwood Johnson and
Clarence Clough Buell, editors of the "The Century Magazine".

[scanned, reformatted and corrected; maps and illustrations
are
ommitted]

Page 52

Excerpt from ON THE FIELD OF
PERRYVILLE.*
BY CHARLES C. GILBERT, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.

*Condensed from General Gilbert's articles in
the
"Southern Bivouac," and revised by him.- EDITORS.

AS the Army of the Ohio, moving from Bardstown, approached
Perryville on the 7th of October, 1862, McCook's corps formed the left,
Crittenden's the right, and mine-which was moving on the direct road by
the way of Springfield, and was ahead of the others-the center. [See
maps, pp. 6 and 24.] In my column, R. B. Mitchell's division had the
lead; Schoepft followed, and Sheridan brought up the rear. Our advance
was vigorously resisted by Wheeler's cavalry, forming the rear-guard of
Hardee corps, which was retiring before us. About 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, when the head of the column was nearing the line of Doctor's
Creek, a tributary of the Chaplin River, or more properly the Chaplin
Fork of salt River, the enemy, in force, was observed lining the crest
of the ridge on the farther ban, obviously with the intention of
disputing the possession of a few pools of water that remained in the
water-course, which was otherwise nearly dry. An excessive drought had
prevailed for months in this part of Kentucky. At sight of the enemy,
orders were given to form Mitchell's division in order of battle across
the Springfield road and along some high ground on the right. When
Schoepft came up his division was massed in reserve in Mitchell's rear,
on the left of the road, and Sheridan, arriving after Wheeler had been
dislodged and was being pressed back toward Perryville, was posted in
front and to the right of Mitchell. Before daybreak on the 8th, a
position was gained that covered he pools in Doctor's Creek, and these
formed our only water-supply for the next two days, or as long as the
enemy held the Chaplain River.

Page 53

During the night General Buell ordered McCook's and
Crittenden's
corps to march at 3 o'clock in the morning of the 8th, and to form in
order of battle on the center corps-my own. The movements of these
columns were delayed, and General Buell, apprehensive of an attack
while the center corps was isolated, directed me to select a strong
position, and my troops were soon moving out of their camps and taking
positions for the main attack, which it was supposed would come on
about 10 o'clock. As that hour drew near, I observed, in visiting
General Sheridan's ground, that a part of it was vacant, and that one
of his brigades was in march on the road to Perryville, and the
remainder were preparing to follow. On inquiry it was discovered that
this movement was in consequence of some misunderstanding of orders.
General Sheridan was directed to recall the brigade, resume his
position, and limit himself to its defense until a general advance to
attack in force should be ordered. To this order was added the
explanation that General Buell was particularly solicitous that nothing
be done to bring on a general engagement until after the junction of
the flank corps.

General Sheridan lost no time in reestablishing his division
on the
ground to which he had been originally assigned. He had barely
accomplished it when he was attacked in force and a fight ensued, in
which the loss was severe on both sides. In the meantime the head of
General McCook's corps, coming over the Mackville pike, appeared on the
high ground marked by Russell's house, due north of Sheridan's position
about one mile. This was about 10:30 A. M. Marking out his line of
battle, General McCook ordered General Rousseau to form it. Loomis's
battery was established on a commanding piece of ground near Russell's
house, and to the left of it. General Rousseau had been previously
ordered to send a line of skirmishers to the left

Page 54

and front to examine some wood on that quarter, and Captain
Wickliffe, with his company of cavalry, was sent to reconnoiter the
ground to the left of this line of skirmishers. At this time there was
some light skirmishing going on with Sheridan's division, at the head
of the center corps, which was still in column, as previously
described; but this soon ceased, and General McCook was satisfied that
the enemy he found engaging my corps when he arrived had retired from
the field.

McCook's corps, as previously related, had been ordered to
march at
3 A. M., but it was 2:30 A. M. before the order reached General McCook,
and his march began at 5 A. M. McCook had with him then two divisions,
Rousseau's and Jackson's. Rousseau's division took the lead on the
march, but when it arrived at Perryville only two of the brigades were
present-the remaining one, Starkweather's, having been thrown to the
rear by the interposition of Jackson's division, which cut it off at
Mackville. Without waiting for the arrival of this brigade, General
McCook, after giving his assistant adjutant-general particular
instructions to post Jackson's two brigades on a commanding piece of
ground immediately to the right of the Mackville and Perryville road,
and to hold them in column so that they could be moved in any direction
as occasion required, turned over the command to General Rousseau, and
galloped off to report to General Buell at headquarters. Buell was in
my camp, on the Springfield pike about two and a half miles distant
from McCook's position on the Mackville pike. At half-past 12 the
Confederates advanced, and in a few moments the skirmishers and
artillery were engaged. The attack fell upon Sheridan's division at the
head of my corps and upon

---------------------------------------------------------------
Loomis's battery occupied the highest part of the ridge
above H. P. Bottom's house, at about the center of Rousseau's line (see
map, p. 24). Lytle's brigade extended from the battery across the old
Mackville pike to the "burnt barn." Lytle's brigade was assailed from
the direction of Bottom's house, and from the right flank. The attack
upon the position held by Loomis's battery was made chiefly from the
ridge in the middle distance of the picture on page 54. The
Confederates gained the north- east side of that ridge by following
down the dry bed of Doctor's Creek under the shelter of its west
bank.-EDITORS.
-----------------------------------------------------

Page 55

the head of McCook's corps, now advancing from its first
position at
Russell's house down the slope toward Chaplin River.

When General McCook returned to his troops after having
reported at
headquarters, he found that General Rousseau had advanced the right of
the line about eight hundred or a thousand yards, and was occupying a
commanding ridge which was to the left of the Mackville, and Perryville
pike. The enemy was firing on this line from three batteries, and
Loomis's and Simonson's batteries were replying. As there was no
Confederate infantry in sight McCook ordered the firing to cease, so as
to economize ammunition, and then prepared to make a reconnaissance
toward Chaplin River for water, as he had just been ordered to do by
General Buell. Riding off to the left, General McCook found a
commanding ridge about six hundred yards from the stream and
overlooking it. Sending for Generals Jackson and Terrill, he showed
them the water, marked his line of battle, and placed a battery on it
with strong supports. General Terrill was then ordered to advance a
body of skirmishers down the slope to the water as soon as the line was
formed. Not being apprehensive of an attack, General McCook then went
back to his right. It was now nearly 2 o'clock. At this time the line
of the left corps stood with its right on the Mackville and Perryville
pike near the crossing of Doctor's Creek and its left near Chaplin
River, its direction being about due north and south. It was formed of
two brigades of Rousseau's division

Page 56

(Lytle's and Harris's) and Terrill's brigade of Jackson's
division.
Webster's brigade of Jackson's division had not yet come into position,
and Starkweather's brigade of Rousseau's division had not yet reached
the field.

Just previously to this the enemy, in pursuance of his plan
of
attack, had begun to engage Sheridan's division, the head of the center
corps. Mitchell's division was at that time closing up to take position
within supporting distance of Sheridan. Caldwell's and Carlin's brigade
of this division were to the right and rear, under cover, and Gooding's
brigade was north of Doctor's Creek, near the stream. In this position
the latter covered Sheridan's left, and watched the interval between
the two corps so long as the left corps remained in its place in line
of battle and before it advanced to the front. As Mitchell came into
his position on the second line, the enemy appeared on his right in
force and engaged Carlin's brigade, but were repulsed. It was now
nearing half-past 2, and the enemy's entire line, from his left, where
the attack began on Sheridan, to his right, where it fell in heaviest
force on Rousseau, was in full progress, carrying everything before it.
When Sheridan's assailants reached his main line he gave them a
reception, cool, effective, and disastrous, and when their repulse was
complete a brigade from the second line (Carlin's), which had been
called up to assist in the defense, pursued the enemy to Perryville,
thus turning his left and establishing itself on his rear. General
Sheridan's action was according to the sound principles of the
profession, and, as he was amply and promptly supported, the operations
on this part of the field, in which he had the lead, were fully
successful,

Page 57

and his conduct here foreshadowed the exceptionally
successful
career that lay before him.

General McCook was assailed by greatly superior numbers. His
brigades, which General Rousseau had put in motion to the front in his
absence, were surprised on the march by General Bragg's attack, and
were taken in the act of forming, and on ground favorable to the
attacking party. Rousseau's right brigade, the extreme right of the
left corps, was attacked with great severity and pertinacity. Terrill's
brigade on the left, and Starkweather's, which had now arrived, were in
turn heavily assailed. Being composed of entirely raw troops, Terrill's
brigade in a few moments gave way in confusion, losing Parsons's
battery of eight Napoleon guns. General Jackson, who was with this
brigade, was killed at the first fire. General Terrill did all in his
power to steady his men, but in vain. An hour and a half later, while
still striving to rally his broken troops, he was mortally wounded.*
Starkweather's brigade and Stone's and Bush's batteries were on the
extreme left and rear of Terrill's brigade, and checked the attack.

General McCook, perceiving that he was assailed by at least
three
times his number, sent an aide-de- camp, Lieutenant L. M. Hosea, to
General Sheridan, requesting him to look to the right of his line and
see that it was not turned. Just at this time Sheridan had his
attention fully occupied with his own right, where two opposing
batteries were in position, and troops were massing behind them to
attack him front and flank. About half an hour later McCook sent
Captain H. N. Fisher, of his staff, to general Schoepf, commanding the
reserve of my corps, with an urgent request for reenforcement,
reporting that his reserves were all exhausted and his corps upon the
point of being compromised. General Schoepf was at the time on the
march to the front with two of his brigade (Walker's and Steedman's),
and although desirous of rendering assistance, he declined to take the
responsibility of changing his line of march. He referred the officer
to me, but I was at the time at General Buell's headquarters, where I
had been since noon.

Owing to the conformation of the ground and to the limited
use of
artillery on both sides, on sound of the battle had been heard at
General Buell's headquarters until the attack reached General
Sheridan's position, which was about half-past 3 o'clock. Then the
cannon firing became so continuous and was so well sustained and so
different from the irregular shots, at wide intervals, which had
characterized the "shelling of the woods" earlier in the day, that it
was readily recognized as a battle." It was near 4 o'clock when there
came up the valley of Doctor's Creek the sound of rapid artillery
firing. It was too heavy and too well sustained to come from merely
"shelling the woods." Listening attentively for a moment, General Buell
said to me, "That is something more than shelling the woods; it sounds
like a fight." I at once mounted and set off at a rapid pace down the

"It is curious that the night before the
battle [of
Perryville] Generals Jackson and Terrill and Colonel Webster were
discussing the chances of being hit in an engagement. Their opinion was
that men would never be frightened if they considered the doctrine of
probabilities and how slight the chance was of any particular person
being killed. Theory failed, as it has often done before; all three
were killed in the next day's fight." EDITORS.

General John C. Starkweather, in his official
report, says that the brigade, consisting at the time of the 24th
Illinois, 1st and 21st Wisconsin, and 79th Pennsylvania, "arrived on
the field of battle at about 1:30 P. M., having marched twelve
miles-about three miles thereof being through fields, woods, etc.
Finding the troops already engaged well on the right, center, and left,
and thinking the extreme left position most accessible, and, from
appearances,one that should be held at all hazards, I placed my command
at once in position facing the enemy's right." General McCook, in his
report on the part taken by Starkweather's brigade, says that the 21st
Wisconsin was stationed "in a corn- field, lying down, awaiting the
approach of the enemy, and when he approached with his overwhelming
force this new regiment poured into his ranks a most withering fire."
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Page 58

road in the direction of the firing. Within a mile I met
Captain
Fisher coming at full speed and bearing General McCook's message.
Instead of sending Captain Fisher back to General McCook with my answer
to his appeal for help, I advised him to continue on and bear to
General Buell the astounding news, and at once sent orders to Schoepf
to go to the interval between the two corps,--on the left of
Sheridan,--and to Mitchell to close toward Sheridan's right and support
him. Directing my course toward the left, I found Gooding's brigade of
Mitchell's division still standing to the left of Doctor's Creek, and
at once put it in motion to the right to join the main body of the
division and be nearer Sheridan, who had just reported that he was hard
pressed in front and that the enemy was driving our left wing. General
Schoepf was now on the ground with his leading brigade (Walker's). This
he was ordered to deploy, to replace Gooding. In the midst of these
movements, another staff- officer, Captain W. T. Hoblitzell, came from
the left corps for help, with the information that the troops, though
fighting stubbornly, were falling back everywhere, and that if
assistance was not speedily afforded they must soon be driven from the
field.

Up to this moment the fighting with Sheridan had been growing
in
intensity, and judging from the sound that it must soon culminate, I
detained Captain Hoblitzel to await the issue. It was soon perceived
that the firing was diminishing, and as there were no signs of defeat
on our side, I turned

Page 59

to Walker's brigade to send it over to the left wing, when I
discovered it had not yet deployed, and, moreover, did not seem to be
sufficiently familiar with the tactics to make the simplest movements
with promptness and intelligence. Accordingly I sent my
adjutant-general, Captain J. E. Stacy, to recall Gooding and order him
to proceed under the guidance of Captain Hoblitzell to report to
General McCook. Gooding took with him Penney's Wisconsin battery.
Within twenty minutes after receiving the order, Gooding made himself
felt on the flank of the Confederates,who had thus far been steadily
driving Rousseau's troops back toward the Russell House. Within a few
minutes after his brigade had started, Sheridan, having repulsed his
assailants, turned his guns and opened fire across the valley of
Doctor's Creek on Rousseau's assailants, who, in their advance, had
come to present their flank within easy range, and from his commanding
position he delivered a fire so effective as to force back the enemy in
this part of the field, to the great relief of the right of General
McCook's line. Just after Sheridan's artillery opened, General Steedman
came up with his brigade of Schoepf's division and kept on his course
down Doctor's Creek. The enemy had now been so far driven from McCook's
front that they were beyond the reach of Steedman's infantry; but,
passing under the fire of Sheridan's guns, Steedman halted and opened
to the left with Smith's battery of his brigade.

Viewed from the Confederate stand-point, the battle of
Perryville
appears to have consisted of an attempt to turn to the left flank of
the Union line, in which, for the distance of a thousand or twelve
hundred yards, the assailants drove all before them. At this juncture,
after a fierce fight, the attack came to a stand, having expended its
force, and the left of the Confederate line was now itself driven and
turned, and its line of retreat threatened. This last the Confederates
supposed had been effected by a fresh corps arriving on the field from
the direction of Lebanon. In abandoning the battle-ground the
Confederates, although obliged to leave their wounded behind, moved
without any sense of humiliation, for they had made a good fight, and
appeared only to be withdrawing from the presence of a greatly superior
force.

From the Union side, the battle takes this appearance: The
center
corps, arriving on the ground alone on the afternoon of the 7th, met
with considerable opposition in establishing itself in position. This
opposition continued with only a brief interval till about 11 o'clock
on the 8th, when the flank corps bean to arrive on the line abreast of
the center. After the lapse of about an hour four brigades from the
left wing started to the front in quest of water. This movement
coincided with the advance of the Confederates in full force to turn
the left of the Union army. Those brigades were accordingly met and
overpowered and driven back to their places in line, and some of them
beyond it. But they made a most obstinate resistance. In the center
corps the detachments thrown out to watch the approaches to the
position held by the leading division were driven in, and that division
was attacked in strong force and with great determination. But the
assailants were repulsed and driven from the field, and then the center
corps contributed about one-third of its effective force to the relief
of the left wing and saved it from destruction.

THE situation at Louisville in the latter part of September,
1862,
was not unlike that at Washington after the first battle of Bull Run.
the belief was entertained by many that Bragg would capture the city,
and not a few had removed their money and valuables across the Ohio
River, not over-assured that Bragg might not follow them to the lakes.
Nelson had sworn that he would hold the city so long as a house
remained standing or a soldier was alive, and he had issued an order
that all the women, children, and non-combatants should leave the place
and seek safety in Indiana. He had only raw troops and convalescent
veterans, and few citizens believed that he could hold out against an
attack. His tragic death occurred a few days later.* Buell's
arrival changed the situation of affairs. The uncertain defensive
suddenly gave way to an aggressive attitude, and speculation turned
from whether Bragg would capture Louisville to whether Buell would
capture Bragg.

The country through which Buell's army marched is almost
destitute
of water, but at Perryville a stream flowed between the contending
armies, and access to that water was equally important to both armies.
Buell accompanied the center corps (Gilbert's), and the advance reached
this stream on the evening of October 7th. From that time until the
stream was crossed here was constant fighting for access to it, and the
only restriction on this fighting was that it should not bring on an
engagement until the time for the general attack should arrive. An
incident will illustrate the scarcity of water. I obtained a
canteenful, and about dark on October 7th, after giving myself a good
brushing and a couple of dry rubs without feeling much cleaner, my
careless announcement that I was about to take a tin-dipper bath
brought General Buell out of his tent with a rather mandatory
suggestion that I pour the water back into my canteen and save it for
an emergency. The emergency did not come to me, but on the morning of
October 9th that water helped to relieve the suffering of some wounded
men who lay between the two armies.

At Buell's headquarters, on the 8th, preparations were going
on for
the intended attack, and the information was eagerly waited for that
Crittenden had reached his position on the right. Fighting for water
went on in our front, and it was understood that it extended all along
the line, but not battle was expected that day. McCook was at Buell's
headquarters in the morning, and received, I believe, some oral
instructions regarding the contemplated attack. It was understood that
care would be taken not to bring on a general engagement, and no
importance was attached to the sounds that reached us of
artillery-firing at the front of the center. Of course the young
officers of the staff, of whom I was one, were not taken into
conference by General Buell, but we all knew that the subject of
attention that morning was the whereabouts of Crittenden's corps, and
the placing it in position on the right for the general engagement that
was to be brought on as soon as the army was in line. We all saw McCook
going serenely away like a general carrying his orders with him.

In the afternoon we moved out for a position nearer
Crittenden, as I
inferred from the direction taken. A message came from the line on the
left center to General Buell, and in a few moments Colonel James B.
Fry, our chief of staff, called me up, and sent me with an order to
General Gilbert, commanding the center corps, to send at once two
brigades to reenforce General McCook, commanding the left corps. Thus I
came to be a witness to some of the curious features of Perryville.

I did not know what was going on at the left, and Colonel Fry
did
not inform me. He told me what to say to General Gilbert, and to go
fast, and taking one of the general's orderlies with me, I

---------------------------------------------------------------
* The facts in relation to the killing of General
William Nelson by General Jefferson C. Davis are recounted by General
James B. Fry in his pamphlet, "Killed by a Brother Soldier," from which
the following account is condensed: Davis, who had been on sick leave
in Indiana, hearing that general officers were needed about Cincinnati
and Louisville to assist in repelling the invasion of Kirby Smith and
Bragg, volunteered his services, and was sent by General H. G. Wright
at Cincinnati to report to Nelson at Louisville. The latter assigned to
Davis the work of arming the citizens of Louisville. A day or two
afterward Davis called at Nelson's headquarters in the Galt House.
Nelson inquired, "Well, Davis, how are you getting along with your
command?" Davis replied, "I don't know," and gave similar answers to
two or three questions as to the number of regiments and companies he
had organized. Nelson, who was angered by his seeming indifference,
rose and said, "But you should know. I am disappointed in you. General
Davis; I selected you for this duty because you were an officer of the
regular army, but I find I made a mistake." Davis replied,
deliberately, "General Nelson, I am a regular soldier, and I demand the
treatment due to me as a general officer." Dr. Irwin, Nelson's medical
director, was called in by Davis to be a witness to the altercation. In
his presence Nelson repeated the reprimand, and ordered Davis to report
to General Wright at Cincinnati. Davis replied, "You have no authority
to order me." Nelson turned to his adjutant-general and said, "Captain,
if General Davis does not leave the city by 9 o'clock to-night, give
instructions to the provost-marshal to see that he is put across the
Ohio." Davis was highly incensed by the manner and bearing of Nelson.
He withdrew, and that night reported to Wright in Cincinnati. When
Buell reached Louisville on September 25th, Wright ordered Davis to
return and report to Buell. He arrived at the Galt House on the morning
of September 29th. Nelson, after breakfast, was standing in the hotel
office, and was leaning against the counter when he was approached by
Davis in company with Governor Oliver P. Morton, of Indiana. Davis
accosted Nelson with the remark that Nelson had insulted him at the
last meeting and that he must have satisfaction. Nelson told him to go
away. Davis pressed his demand and Nelson said, "Go away, you-puppy. I
don't want anything to do with you." Davis, who had picked up a blank
visiting card and had squeezed it into a ball as he was talking,
responded to the insulting words by flipping the card into Nelson's
face. Nelson then slapped Davis in the face and said to Governor
Morton, "Did you come here, sir, to see me insulted?" "No," replied
Morton, whereupon Nelson walked toward his room on the office floor.
After the slap Davis asked for a pistol, and a friend borrowed one and
handed it to Davis, who started toward Nelson's room and met him in the
corridor near the foot of he staircase, apparently on his way to
Buell's apartment upstairs. When a yard apart Davis fired. Nelson
walked upstairs and fell in the hall near said, "Send for a clergyman;
I wish to be baptized. I have been basely murdered." General T. L.
Crittenden, who was at the breakfast table, hurried to the corridor,
and, taking Nelson's hand, said, "Nelson, are you seriously hurt?"
Nelson replied. "Tom, I am murdered." When Surgeon Robert Murray
arrived Nelson was lying on the floor of a room near where he had
fallen, insensible. The small pistol-ball entered just over the heart.
In less than an hour Nelson was dead. General Fry was in the grand hall
of the hotel at the time of the encounter. On hearing the sound of the
pistol he made his way through the crowed that had surrounded Davis and
arrested him in the name of General Buell. Fry took Davis's arm, and
they went to Davis's room on an upper floor. When the door was closed
Davis said he wanted to relate the facts while they were fresh in his
mind, and among other details mentioned the flipping of the paper into
Nelson's face. General Gilbert was appointed to succeed Nelson, and two
days afterward the army marched for Perryville. Buell could not then
spare officers for a court-martial, and suggested to Halleck that a
trial by commission appointed from Washington should take place
immediately. As no charges were preferred against Davis within the
period fixed by military rules, he was released by order of General
Wright.

On October 27th, 1862, General Davis was
indicated
by a grand jury for manslaughter, and was admitted to bail in the sum
of five thousand dollars. The case was continued from time to time
until May 24th, 1864, when "it was stricken from the docket, with leave
to reinstate."--EDITORS.
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Page 61

started on my errand. I found General Gilbert at the front,
and as
he had no staff-officer at hand at the moment, he asked me to go to
General Schoepf, one of his division commanders, with the order.
Schoepf promptly detached two brigades, and he told me I had better go
on ahead and find out where they were to go. There was no sound to
direct me, and as I tried to take an air line I passed outside the
Union lines and was overtaken by a cavalry officer, who gave me the
pleasing information that I was riding toward the enemy's pickets. Now
up to this time I had heard no sound of battle; I had heard no
artillery in front of me, and no heavy infantry-firing. I rode back,
and passed behind the cavalry regiment which was deployed in the woods,
and started in the direction indicated to me by the officer who called
me back. At some distance I overtook an ambulance train, urged to its
best speed, and then I knew that something serious was on hand. This
was the first intimation I had that one of the fiercest struggles of
the war was at that moment raging almost within my sight.

Directed by the officers in charge of the ambulances I made
another
detour, and pushing on at greater speed I suddenly turned into a road,
and there before me, within a few hundred yards, the battle of
Perryville burst into view, and the roar of the artillery and the
continuous rattle of the musketry first broke upon my ear. It was the
finest spectacle I ever saw. It was wholly unexpected, and it fixed me
with astonishment. It was like tearing away a curtain from the front of
a great picture, or the sudden bursting of a thundercloud when the sky
in front seems serene and clear. I had seen an unlooked-for storm at
sea, with hardly a moment's notice, hurl itself out of the clouds and
lash the ocean into a foam of wild rage. But here there was not the
warning of an instant. At one bound my horse carried me from stillness
into the uproar of battle. One turn from a lonely bridle path through
the woods brought me face to face with the bloody struggle of thousands
of men.

Waiting for news to carry back, I saw and heard some of the
unhappy
occurrences of Perryville. I saw young Forman, with the remnant of his
company of the 15th Kentucky regiment, withdrawn to make way for the
reenforcements, and as they silently passed me they seemed to stagger
and reel like men who had been beating against a great storm. Forman
had the colors in his hand, and he and several of his little group of
men had their hands upon their chess and their lips apart as through
they had difficulty in breathing. They filed into a field, and without
thought of shot or shell they lay down on the ground apparently in a
state of exhaustion. I joined a mounted group about a young officer,
and heard Rumsey Wing, one of Jackson's volunteer aides, telling of
that general's death and the scattering of the raw division he
commanded. I remembered how I had gone up to Shiloh with Terrill's
battery in a small steamer, and how, as the first streak of daylight
came, Terrill, sitting on the deck near me, had recited a line about
the beauty of the dawn, and had wondered how the day would close upon
us all. I asked about Terrill, who now commanded a brigade, and was
told that he had been carried to the rear to die. I thought of the
accomplished, good, and brave Parsons,-whom I had seen knocked down
seven times in a fight with a bigger man at West Point, without ever a
thought of quitting so long as he could get up, and who lived to take
orders in the church, and die at Memphis of the yellow fever,
ministering to the last to the spiritual wants of his
parishioner,.--and I asked about Parsons's battery. His raw infantry
support had broken, and stunned by the disaster that he thought had
overtaken the whole army, he stood by his guns until every horse and
every man had gone, and the enemy as almost touching him, and had been
dragged away at last by one of his men who had come back to the rescue.
His battery was a wreck and no one knew then where he was. And so the
news came in of men I knew and men with friends about me.

Page 29 - Battles and Leaders, Vol. III

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT PERRYVILLE, KY.,October 8th, 1862.

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here
stted
give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K
stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for
captured or missing; c for captured.

THE UNION FORCES.

ARMY OF THE OHIO. - Maj.-Gen. Don Carlos Buell; Maj.-Gen.
George H.
Thomas, second in command.

---------------------------------------------------------
** Of the operations of this corps General Buell says,
in his official report: "The corps of General Crittenden closed in, and
Wagner's brigade, of Wood's division, became engaged and did good
service on the right of Mitchell's division, but knowing nothing of the
severity of the fight on the extreme left the rest of the corps did not
get into action."-- EDITORS.
-----------------------------------------------------------

The most definite information afforded by the" Official
Records"
relative to the strength of the Union forces is contained in the
testimony given before the Buell Commission by Major J. M. Wright,
assistant adjutant-gen-eral at Bach's headquarters. On page 660, Vol.
XVI., Part I., he says: "After the battle I do not think there were
more than fifty thousand of the army which ap peared in front of
Perryville." Adding to this number the 4000 casualties sustained in the
battle, would make the entire army at anti about Perryville 54,000
strong.(1)

Perhaps not over one-half of these were actually engaged.
General
McCook, commanding the First Corps (which bore the brunt of the fight),
says that "Rousseau had present on the field 7000; Jackson, 5500; the
brigade of Good]rig [from Mitchell's division of Gilbert's corps]
amounting to about 1500." The strength of Crittenden's (Second) and
Gilbert's (Third) Corps is not anywhere officially, stated. Crittenden
did not reach the field of action until the conflict was practically
ended, and only parts of Wagner's and Hazen's brigades of his corps
became slightly engaged.

------------------------------------------------------------
(1) In March, 1888, Genera] D.C. Buell wrote to the
editors: "Adopting this estimate and adding Sill's Division, say 7000,
which moved on the Frankfort road and did not Join until after the
battle (l.e., on the 11th), will make the entire army 61,000 before the
battle and 57,000 after. The corps were of about equal strength.
Gilbert told me recently that he estimated his corps at about 18,000
before the battle. About one-third of the whole were raw troops.
Jackson's division was composed almost entirely of raw regiments."--
EDITORS.
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THE CONFEDERATE FORCES.

General Braxton Bragg.

ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI: Maj.-Gen. LeonidasPolk.
RIGHT WING, Maj.-Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham.

General Bragg reports (" Official Records," Vol. XVI., Pt.
I., p.
1092) that "our forces consisted of three divisions of infantry (about
14,500) and two small brigades of cavalry (about 1500)." General Polk
reports (p. 1110): "The whole of our force, including all arms, did not
exceed 15,000." (2)

----------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) The dash indicates that the name of the commanding
officer has not been found in the "Official Records."-- EDITORS.

(2) In March, 1888, General Buell wrote to
the
editors: "This probably did not include the cavalry. It is scarcely
credible that the three divisions of infantry contained only
13,500. However, the important question is as to the force that
Bragg had in the field in Kentucky, for that was the force that was to
be expected in a great battle. That question is not fully determined by
official reports, but a careful study of the published records seems to
place it at not less than 68,000 men."--EDITORS.
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