IV ~ 41
Causaltheoryof reference VsRepresentation (according to Rorty) - (causal theory of reference / Putnam).
I 317
Reference/Intentionality/Rorty:theconventional "intentionalist" conception of linking words with the world is wrong and philosophically fateful in individual cases!
Against this conventional intentionalist conception there is a new "causal", "realistic" reference theory. (Causal theory of reference).
The conflict owes itself to an ambiguity of "reference".
(a) Relationship of facts
(b) purely intentional relation, where the object does not need to exist.
Let us call a) "reference" (philosophical) and b) "talk about" (common sense).
Ad b) "Talk about": in a world where there are no competing scientific theories, without the criterion of Searle and Strawson we can cheerfully talk about things, even fictions. We would really talk about the things that make most of our opinions true.
I 318
Forexample,if there were a Mr. Lenz who in reality accomplished 99 percent of Mr. Müller's deeds, then we would want to say that in reality we are talking about Lenz.
Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: If you confuse this term "really talk about" with the term of reference, you can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference.
Rorty: In my opinion, the problem doesn't arise at all. The only factual question here is the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about.

Glüer II 126
DavidsonVsRepresentation/mind/object-(VsSkepticism) - Davidson: There are no facts. (Frege ditto: all true sentences have the same meaning: conformity with all the facts of the world). ("Big fact").
Fact/Davidson: there are no facts - because we have to say, any true belief agrees with all the facts. - (> Frege: all true sentences mean the same thing - or for any true proposition p it is possible to use any other true sentence.) >Truth value, cf. >slingshot argument.

I 201
Idealism/Danto: radically questions the entire building of representationalism. Here there is only the relationship between subject and idea, so only two components. (Berkeley).
I 228 ff
IdealismVsrepresentationalism(butKant is also a representationalist)
Idealism: Again, it may well be that all is in the mind, but not every representation can be true.

Danto IA. C. DantoConnections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989German Edition:Wege zur Welt München 1999

Graeser I 129
SchifferVsPropositions:areno language-independent contents of corresponding settings: they could not even perceive this function. SchifferVsRepresentation: the contents of sentences in question cannot be representations, for example, in a language of thought. Belief/Schiffer: Vs belief as a relation - Mean/SchifferVsDavidson: if there can neither be a sentence-oriented nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, then also the possibility of conception of judgmental settings as relations collapses. Graeser: thus we lose the ground under our feet.
---
Schiffer I ~ XVII
SchifferVsPropositions/late:shouldcontain E.g. dog property - Intention-based semantics/Grice: requires, however, that propositions are neural sentences - problem: no truth conditions in mentalese.
---
I 14
Propositions:havetheir truth values ​​significantly. - ((s) because they are not public, the truth values are not attributed to the communication) - ((s) but they are also not in mentalese) - phrases/expressions: have their truth values ​​contingently - (in public speech or in mentalese) - Proposition: content itself, is not representation but is represented.
---
I 49f
Propositions/Beliefobject/relationtheory/SchifferVsPropositions: always requires natural kind terms - even substitution is not compatible with any propositional theory - propositional theory says that "p" is a real object variable - 2. that propositions are their values ​​- Proposition: abstract, not in space and time - yet real concrete components. - E.g. Capitol in "The Capitol is in NY" - but only if fine-grained (as a complex of individuals and properties) - they are objective and mind-independent as opposed to pain and mental representations.
"Thought"/Frege: = Proposition - also the components and characteristics of propositions are abstract and language independent: e.g. the whiteness of snow - Problem: VsPropositions: ontological commitment to Platonism.
---
I 51
SchifferVsPropositions:aresuperfluous such as facts and features - E.g. Michele has the property to be funny (or the fact that funny ...) - doubling - fine grained. Complexes that include individuals as a structure as components and properties. - E.g. Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry, Lewis 1970a - (grainy: set of) - Problem: from compositionality for reference follows that the proposition "snow is white" is necessarily true if snow is white - different: as sets of possible worlds propositions include their speakers not as components.
---
I 52
Proposition:different:if = functions of possible worlds on truth values, then speakers not as components - then maybe partial functions that maps a possible world onto the truth, iff snow is white - Problem: unstructured propositions (functions) cause necessary equivalent propositions to be identical - then the problem of logical omniscience follows - solution: structured (fine-grained) entities: contain objects, properties, operators, which they determine.

Schi ISt. SchifferRemnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Grae IA. GraeserPositionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

Reality

Davidson

I (e) 90
Reality/World/Quine:proximaltheory (the meaning is localized at the nerve endings) shut off from the world, which is perhaps quite different - ultimate source of evidence: irritation - DavidsonVsQuine. Cartesian separation; gap - also separation of scheme and content - DavidsonvsDescartes/DavidsonVsQuine: once one is decided to close that gap, one cannot specify what the evidence actually was evidence for.
Rorty VI 63 ff
World/Putnam/Goodman(VsWilliams)/Rorty:there is no real suchness of the world. Davidson: the contribution that the world is contributing is inseparable from the part we contribute ourselves.
Glüer II 126
World/Reality/Reality/Glüer:new:"see change" in contemporary philosophy, revision of the relationship of the human mind to the rest of the world. From the "subjective" to the "objective". On the object side, the world thus, there are no objects that could be represented.
Fact/tradition/glower: there are material objects and events, but a true proposition claims not only that they exist, but that they are in a certain relationship to each other, also called fact. >Facts/Davidson.
Glüer II 127
DavidsonVsRepresentation:sucha representation relation cannot exist. Because there are no facts! Any attempt to analyze the correspondence of facts and beliefs leads to the fact that we must say that a true belief is consistent with all the facts of the world, with the overall reality. We experience nothing in this way. >Representation/Davidson.

I 155f
Kant-Hegelrepresentation:Experience: inferential activity.
Representation> de re attribution. Other authors on attribution.
---
I 900
Representationalcontents:linguistic through and through, but not purely linguistic.
The representational dimension of propositional contents becomes explicit through the social perspective nature of accounting.
---
Rorty VI 179 ff
Representation/Brandom/Rorty:wantsto save them from Davidson, who threw them out with the bathwater. The representationalist semantic theory contains an undeniable insight: whatever has a high propositional content necessarily has such a representational side; nothing which does not have this aspect would be seen as an expression of his proposition. BrandomVsDavidson.
Rorty: With this he does not mean that truth is a property, it is in fact only about approval, not about description (metaphysics).
---
Bandom I 127
Representation/Brandom:problematic:there is no room for the concept of error: representation requires accuracy - statement truth - representation is not possible without practice: red dots, blue lines on the map - VsDescartes: does not explain what it means to understand representation, namely understanding how we are responsible for them.
---
I 126
Representationisnot an expression.
---
I 130
VsDescartes:itis about the correctness of the representation prior to understanding.
---
I 145
BrandomVsRepresentation:unclearhow to come to the concept of propositional content.
---
I 923
Representation/SearleVsDavidson:contentmust be understood intrinsically and before analysis - but representation of signs, sounds not intrinsic, mere object of nature - derived intentionality comes from original intentionality of the mind.
---
I 404f
Representation/Brandom:fromDescartes dualistic worldview of representation and the represented - four aspects: 1) Apart from "true", representation also needs "refers to" and "means" - 2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts - 3) "of" in de re-contexts: something true of Kant but not of Hegel - 4) Correctness of judgment and inference.
---
I 412 ~
BrandomVsRepresentation:insteadexpressive role.
---
I 482
Representation/Brandom:Minority(Davidson): between propositionally rich intentional states and facts - Majority: no semantic priority is the result of the pragmatic prevalence of propositional - representation is initially representation of things, Reil and properties- Brandom: if this is true, allocation of intention and success cannot be explained at the level of propositional content.
---
I 719
Representation/Brandom:E.g.McCarthy: propositional content as worldview depends on the facts in relation to the objects they represent - representation in this sense is fundamental intentionality.
---
I 719f
Representation/Brandom:a)pre-conceptual: does not require grasping the specific contents - e.g. orienting oneself with a map (also possible non-linguistically) E.g. interpreting a cloud as a sign of rain - b) as part of a discursive practice: E.g. infer from symbols that there is a river between two cities.
---
I 722
Assertionsandbeliefs with a high propositional content are necessarily representationally substantial, because their inferential structure is essentially a social one.

I 281
FolkPsychologyVsRepresentation
Teilhard - Eccles (representation materialism) - Tipler - Omega Point
I 283
RepresentationMaterialism:(Eccles, Popper) thesis: the r.m. maintains that there are 2 types of matter in the universe, representational and non-representational.

Danto IA. C. DantoConnections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989German Edition:Wege zur Welt München 1999

Glüer II 126
Davidson:thereis no representation that could be true/false. - Beliefs are true if they are caused properly. >Facts/Davidson.
Davidson I (e) 96
DavidsonVsSchema/Content-DavidsonVsRepresentation - DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: Relativism: Representation always in relation to a schema. >Conceptual scheme. - DavidsonVsSense data theory
Glüer II 126
Representation/DavidsonVsPresentationMind/Object- (VsSkepticism) - Davidson: there are no facts. ((s) Like Frege: all true propositions have the same meaning: conformity with all facts of the world/"great fact"). Cf. >Slingshot-Argument.
Glüer II 127
Thereareno facts that could be represented. - We do not know anything through the demand for correspondence.
Glüer II 127
Representation/Externalism/DavidsonVsRepresentation:Davidsonreplaces private representations by intersubjectively accessible objects. - These are as public as the meanings.
Rorty VI 190
Representation/Brandom/Rorty:wouldlike to save them from Davidson, who has thrown them out - DavidsonVsRepresentation - VsVs: propositional contents are not possible without representations. - No proposition without representation.

I 136 ~
Representation:harmless:beliefs represent things and facts of the world - but they are not the original semantic property of beliefs. - EsfeldVsDescartes: Representation intentional, not pre-conceptive. - Representation/Descartes: 1. belief represents things, 2. access only by representation, 3. The things of which we are conscious, are representations (strong representation, realism) - Fodor: pro Descartes, content of belief state derived from original representative content - Problem: which causality is effective right now? Which characteristic is relevant? Does not allow conclusions.
---
I 144 ~
Representativesemantics/Esfeld:Vs: similarity no explanation - which is the correct causal relation?
---
I 144 ~
VsRepresentation:Causalrelation not fixable - Representation cannot distinguish between reference (extension) and meaning (intension) - meaning therefore not in the head.

Es IM. EsfeldHolismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Representation

Husserl

I 36
RepresentationalContent/Husserl:1. sensation (perception) - 2. phantasm (ideas) - 3. character (conceptual, symbolic thought).
Tugendhat I 86f
Representations:HusserlVsRepresentations:I am referring directly to the Cologne Cathedral and not to an image. Even Hegel states logically here: if you take away all certainty, the concept of being arises but not an image. TugendhatVsIdeas: we do not imagine objects before us, but we mean them.
Tugendhat I 94
WittgensteinVsHusserl:Husserlwrongly assimilated statements about the inner to those about the outer world.

Rorty VI 63
PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty:Partsof what we call "language" or "mind", penetrate so deeply into the so-called "reality" that "pictures" of something "language independent" must fail.
---
Putnam III 38
Representation/PutnamVsDavidson:thatthe word "cat" refers to cats is not simply due to the causal relationship - the word stands in many causal relationships - just: I would not use the word, if there were no cats. - Instead of representation one might assume fundamentally: evolutionary role. >Roles.
---
V 17/18
Representation/reference/Putnam:mentalimages arise as little as normal pictures in a necessary connection with the represented - (otherwise no mistake would be possible). - E.g. Martians (who know no trees) are faced with a tree image - the internal mental images are then no representations. - One who recites unfamiliar words, for him they refer to nothing. - Thoughts have no intrinsic connection to something outside - but probably possible.
---
I (h) 209ff
Representation/Putnam:isnot a magic connection between phenomenological character and denoted objects - no intrinsic connection. - Problem: Brains in a vat: without intrinsic connection, one could say that the word "vat" with inhabitants of vats that come up with the idea, "We are in the vat!" refers to phenomenological manifestations of vats and not to real vats - (and also in the case of "brain" and "in"). - Problem: if a real vat were to collapse, the people could not use their "vat" word anymore. - But that would be a connection between a vat and every word they use and no distinctive connection between real vats and the use of the word vat. - Putnam: the truth conditions of the inhabitants of vats would be something like that they are in the vat in the image. - And that is what is wrong if they think it - (although they are in the vat). - ((s) because they have not learned the use in their environment.) >Brains in a vat/Putnam.

I 162
Representation/Rorty:requiresjudgment - unlike impressions (sensory impressions) >judgements, >sensory impressions. - SellarsVsLocke: Locke puts both together.
I 278f
Rorty:representation,as it used by the psychologist is ambiguous: it includes images and propositions as well as opinions. Only the latter two are used as premises. Images, however, are abrupt. British empiricism threw them together. RortyVsRepresentation: the thesis of the system of internal representations is not just a mix of images and propositions, but a general confusion of causing events and conclusions! >Beliefs/Rorty.
But it takes place in the minds of philosophers, not of the psychologists.

II (c) 76
Anti-representationalism:withNietzsche and Dewey - later Wittgenstein, Sellars, Davidson: new perspective on language and reality.
II (e) 112
PragmatismVsRepesentationalism/Rorty:thereis no fixed, final truth, which would have to be represented.
PragmatismVsCorrespondence theory: there is no privileged language of representation.

VI 45
R/realism/Rorty:representationinvolves realism.
VI 51
R/Wittgenstein/Rorty:therelevant object range is never "there" in the relevant sense -
VI 49
R/RortyVsWright:fundamentallydifferent outputs can be considered a representation of the same input. Basically, everything can be an arbitrary R of anything, you just have to agree in advance.
VI 54
Representation/McDowell’sWittgenstein/Rorty:thesis the bewildering variety of rules makes it impossible to draw an interesting line between the discourses in terms of representationality or non-representationality. ((s) knowledge, morality, the comic, etc.) - RortyVsKripke: Kripke’s Wittgenstein answered that with a petitio principii.
VI 63
R/PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty:Languagepenetrates too deeply into the world -
VI 71f
Putnam:stilluses the term representation. RortyVs.
R/Rorty: we should not understand our relationship to the rest of the universe in representational terms but in purely causal terminology. (PutnamVs).
DavidsonVsRepresentation: language and research can be explained by exclusive reference to causal interactions with the world. Representation unnecessary. (McDowellVsDavidson: responsibility to the world.)
VI 107f
R/image/Rorty:equallyambiguous: of course, an able historian reproduces the facts the way they are! So there is a notion of representation, which allows to distinguish efficient from less efficient historians.
But when philosophers argue about the accuracy of a representation, they do not only argue about sincerity or diligence. It’s more about the question: can we pair pieces of the world and pieces of beliefs or sentences in such a way that we are able to state that the relations between the latter correspond to the relations between the former?
VI 125 f
RortyVsRepresentation:evenif you are against representationalism, that does not mean to deny that most things in the universe are independent from us in causal terms. They are only not in a representational way independent from us!
VI 130
Representation/Language/RortyVsSellars:languagedoes not represent anything.
VI 139
Representation/knowledge/Rorty:epistemologicalinterpretation: knowledge as an image of the object: separation. - In contrast, dealing with the object: no separation between object and handling.
VI 140
Language/R/Rorty:Thesis:language and knowledge have nothing to do with illustration, but rather with coping. - (Taylor: handling) - Coping is more primary than representation. - Rorty: no break between linguistic and non-linguistic coping.

Graeser I 129
SchifferVsRepresentation:thecontents of sentences in question cannot be representations, for example, in a "language of thought". Belief/Schiffer: Vs belief as a relation - Meaning/SchifferVsDavidson: if there cannot be a sentence-oriented, nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, then also the possibility of conception of judgmental settings as relations collapses - Graeser: thus, we lose the ground under our feet.
---
Schiffer I 15
Representations/Schiffer:theyrealize mental states - mental representations are in mentalese.
---
I 275
TruthValue/representation:borderline case: propositional attitude as a relation to neural formulas: then belief is a relation to other beliefs - as representational states they have then truth values, regardless of whether they have a sentence structure.

I 20
Impression/Hume: forms the mind in different ways to build the subject - Interior impression: self-perception - HumeVsRepresentation: the association conditions cannot represent - rationalism / Deleuze: had abandoned this insight. - (But Hume is not entirely VsRepresentation)
I 106
Impression/sensation / Hume: represents nothing, because nothing precedes it.
I 141
Sensation/impression / Hume: Problem: cannot explain why this impression and not another was selected - ((s) because nature (or perceptual world) is not just opposed to the subject and imposes itself, but is partly constituted by the subject. - I 142 Solution: Progress: searches the inventory and selects in a constitutive manner. - I 147 two ways: 1. directs the mind to pleasure / displeasure - 2. directs the mind to the idea of the object, which it constituted itself.

I 102
SingularTerm/Tugendhat:we need it because we cannot imagine object, but we mean them - VsRepresentation - instead: propositional content.
---
I 338f
SingularTerm/Tugendhat:difference to predicate: we cannot say analogously, the singular term 'a' stands for those object that if the predicate 'F' applies to it, the assertion 'Fa' becomes true.
---
I 338
Thentheobject "a" would be the indistinguishable of all other objects to which the predicate 'F' also applies -Singular term form equivalence classes.
---
I 414
SingularTerm/Tugendhat:can stand for 4 types of objects: 1. demonstrative expressions: "this mountain" - 2. description with location - 3. other clear relation E.g. "the murderer of Schmidt" (not perception but relative feature) - 4. by a single characteristic: E.g. "the highest mountain".

I 690
StateofAffairs/Brandom: facts and truth conditions are dependent on judgment and assertion - (VsMetaphysical Realism).
---
I 690
BrandomVsRepresentation:thefacts cannot be understood before claiming or judgment - pro representation: contents have required a representational aspect - but representation is not fundamental.

Rorty IV 41
Nagel:ForWittgenstein any idea which we can form of an independent reality, must stay within the limits of our life. Nagel (with Kripke): Wittgenstein can not be reconciled with realism.
Causal theory of referenceVsrepresentation.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 controversies.

Disputed term/author/ism

Author Vs Author

Entry

Reference

Block, Ned

Stalnaker Vs Block, Ned

I 222
Invertedspectra/Stalnaker:the recent discussion is about the relation between representational and qualitative content.
E.g. if their experience when they see a ripe tomato is (and always has been) as mine when I see unripe pepper and vice versa, then the same experience that will represent the tomato as red to them will represent the tomato as green to me.
We have then different experiences if we look at a ripe tomato but the tomato appears as red to both of us.
Representational content/inverted spectra/Stalnaker: but the representational content (of whose ones spectrum is reversed) for the two persons is the same! ((s) Both have the experience "red").
((s) representational/(s): here: on the word "red". So the language use plays a role. One can, for example, not say that the stimulus represents something neutral.)
((s) Representation/Stalnaker: appearance! ((s) So something more indirect than the phenomal experience "how it is".)
Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: if that is correct then we cannot explain the qualitative character of visual experiences in concepts of properties that the things seem to have.
Def representationalism/terminology/Stalnaker: thesis: that appearance is the basic, not "how it is". Representation: how things appear to us. Representative: Block.
Stalnaker: it is here for me not about to defend the representationalism.
StalnakerVsRepresentationalism/StalnakerVsBlock: I do not quite understand how representational content is to fully grasp the phenomenal character of experience.
However, I believe that the strategy to explain qualitative content that way is the right one.
Thought experiment/th.e./Stalnaker: I am skeptical about th.e. as the reversed spectra that want to separate representational and qualitative content.
Inverted qualia/StalnakerVscommon sense-view: the common sense does not speak with one voice on comparison of qualia over time and between people. It can also be interpreted in a way that it supports a conceptual link between qualitative character and appearances (representation).

Stalnaker IR. StalnakerWays a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Naturalism

Dummett Vs Naturalism

Putnam I 148
DummettVsRepresentation/DummettVsNaturalism/Putnam:Whatthen is the understanding of the own mental representations? The "Knowing of the truth conditions" leads to recourse or to the recognition that some characters need to be understood without the correspondence theory. If there were "thought characters" without language that we could compare directly with the uncomprehended reality, then the understanding of the characters would have to be preceded by a "grasping of the truth conditions". Absurd!

I40
VsRepresentations: here the mind is treated as an unexplained explainer. (Descartes).
I125
BrandomVsRepresentation:veryproblematic: if it is understood as a term, it should make the grammatical difference between singular terms and sentences understandable through reference to the ontological difference between objects and facts. But it does not follow that it is possible to introduce the category of facts as what is in the same sense represented by and that-sentences.
I 126 an ontological category of facts cannot be made understandable primarily and regardless of explaining the declarative sentences. Representation is not expression!
I 132
RebeccaWest:VsRepresentation: "Mind as a mirror of nature": we do not need an image of the world, "one copy of these damn things is enough."
I 292
Belief:canbe ambiguous: one can be convinced of something wrong. The distinction often refers to the objectivity of representations (BrandomVsRepresentationalism, instead social practice as a guarantee of objectivity.)
I 404
BrandomVsRepresentationalism:fouraspects:
1) in addition to "true", representations need "refers to" and "means". (Later Frege)
I 405
2)distinctionbetween intensional and extensional contexts.
3) the "of" in de-re attributions. The concept of intentional relatedness: something is true of Kant, but not of Hegel.
4) concept of objective representational accuracy of judgment and reasoning. Can be justified by direct observation, inferential determinations or reference to certificates.
I 412
BrandomVsRepresentation:insteadexpressive role.
I 690
Brandomprorepresentationalism: contains the indisputable insight: whatever has a propositional content, necessarily has a representational side. The objection only applies to treating the representation as fundamental.
II 69
Content/Representation/BrandomVsDescartes:possessionof representational content as unexplained explainer.
Rorty VI 181
BrandomVsRepresentation/Rorty:instead:"making real inferential connections between claims".
If we have succeeded in using a logical and semantic vocabulary, we do not additionally need to explain how they got their "psychic powers".
Representation/McDowellVsBrandom: representation cannot be reconstructed from the concept of inference. "Inferentialistic" explanations of the concepts do not work.

I (e) 93ff
Scheme/Content:cameinto play as a pair (C.I.Lewis) Now we can let them get out as a pair as well. Then no objects are left behind in terms of which the question of representation could be raised! Beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing!
With that we are also getting rid of the correspondence theory of truth. It is faith in it which gives rise to relativistic thoughts. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something may be a map of Mexico, but only with respect to the Mercator projection or a different projection.
Bubner: "Language is not an instrumental sign system whose object reference is yet under discussion,... language has inherently no other function than making the world accessible".

Glüer II 126
Davidson:Thereare no facts! (as Frege: all true sentences have the same meaning: compliance with all the facts of the world). ("Big Fact").
Davidson: There are no representations that could be t/f - beliefs are true if they are caused correctly.
II 127
Atruebelief is consistent with all the facts of the world.
Horwich I 454
Dualism/Scheme/Content/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty:themain criticism is the dualism of scheme and content. Dualism: that of scheme and content has the following possible forms, with the sides not being causally linked: "Tertia": like E.g. "conceptual framework" E.g. "intended interpretation": they are not causally connected with the things they organize or intend. They vary independently from the rest of the universe, just like the relations of the skepticist, the "correspondence" or "representation".
Horwich I 454/455
Representation/DavidsonVsRepresentation/DavidsonVsScepticism/Rorty:ifwe do not have "Tertia" such as "intended interpretation" or "conceptual framework", we have no concepts that could serve as representations and then we also do not need to ask whether they represent the world properly. Important argument: we still have beliefs, but they are now viewed from outside, just as by field linguists. Without the "Tertia" we have no "third way" anymore to see things differently. Language/Davidson/Rorty: then we see language just as we see beliefs: not as a "conceptual frame", but rather as causal interaction with the surroundings described by the field linguists. Then you can no longer ask if the language "does or does not fit" the world.
At the same time you cannot formulate skepticism any longer. Scepticism cannot express itself. ((s)> Nagel: ditto, but other reasons).
Tertium/Tertia/Davidson/Rorty: therefore will not be relevant for truth claims. And the fact that there is none will not be a result of an empirical study nor an "analysis of meaning".
Correspondence/Rorty: the fact that it is delivered by coherence, according to Davidson, then comes down to the fact that from the perspective of the field linguists nothing is needed but word meaning and the world.

I 20
Impression/Hume:thepeculiarity of self-perception or inner impressions lies - effect of the principles - in training the mind to become the subject in different ways.
Rationalism/Deleuze: it is precisely this insight that rationalism had jettisoned: Hume's philosophy is an exaggerated criticism of representation: (HumeVsRepresentation).
HumeVsRepresentation/Deleuze: he does not criticize the association relations, but the representations, precisely because they cannot represent the association relations.
Hume I 105
Ontheother hand, the mind does not serve the representation of nature. The perceptions are the only objects. VsRepresentation.
I 106
HumeVsRepresentation:theimagination is not representation of an object, but of an impression.
The impression is not representative, because nothing precedes it! It is innate.

Tugendhat I 86
HusserlVsRepresentations:especiallyimagination: I imagine the Cologne Cathedral directly, and not an image that stands for it.
I 87
Nowonecan also understand the medieval view: the content that the intellect has before it is ultimately not an image, but if one takes away all certainty, the concept of the being results. (Hegel also assumed this at the beginning of "logic".

I 353
Ideas/PinkerVsRepresentation/Pinker:weshape very detailed images in our mind, e.g. if we are to imagine how the ears of a dog are shaped.
I 356
Pinker:Iam skeptical when cancer patients are to imagine the destruction of their tumors.
Mental Image/Pinker: is rejected by many philosophers because of problems with homunculi and recourse. (Also BehaviorismVsMental Images, VsRepresentation). In reality, the computer theory of the mind makes it quite easy: a mental image is simply a two-and-a-half dimensional sketch (curved surface, wherein depth is neglected). It is simply called up from the long-term memory. This is how many AI programs are constructed. I 357 E.g. "An equilateral triangle stands on a circle": these words do not represent any points in the visual field, they express relationships.

Esfeld I 143
Beliefs/Representation/Davidson(1990,p 303, 304.): denies the representational feature of beliefs and belief states in general.
DavidsonVsRepresentation: is set to correspondence theory, which is incomprehensible.
Esfeld: but you can still hold on to intentionality as something that is simply characteristic for beliefs and GZ.
Inferential Semantics: simply has the task to use its conceptual tools to reconstruct representation. By rejecting this, you come closer to the position of Rorty:
RortyVsRepresentation: there are only social practices, but no epistemic relation to the world. (Rorty 1998, p. 128, 130) >Beliefs/Rorty.

Frank I 461
GuiseTheory/CastanedaVsFrege/CastanedaVSRepresentations:(conception of "I" as a representation):
(i) does not allow a semantic intermediary between a singularly referring expression and its referent (ii) it eludes psychological intermediaries between person and object
(iii) removes the Fregean referent from the semantic order
(iv) sets objects entities as referents, called individual guise, which are objectively almost analogous to Frege’s individual senses.
(v) provides an analysis of Frege’s primary objects as systems of individual geguises.
(vi) such systems are doxastic objects: they reach belief and thought, but not by singular reference, i.e. they are not the semantic endpoints.
I 462
(vii)thoughtand beliefs only reach such doxastic objects by guises, as pictured systems of guises, and perhaps by general reference, i.e. by means of specific, non-substituting quantification.

VI 109
CorrespondenceTheory/Searle:is of moral or social importance.
RortyVsSearle: that amalgamates the philosophical with the non-philosophical meaning of the term "exact representation". >Correctness/Rorty.
VI 110
SearleVsRorty/RortyVsSearle:Searlewould like to satisfy all competent bodies that the preservation of the "Western Rationalistic Tradition" requires them to cut or cancel funding that contradict this tradition. (In his opinion, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty).
VI 118
Deconstruction/SearleVsDeconstuctivism/Rorty:letus assume I happened upon a deconstructionist car mechanic who tells me that the carburetor is only text anyway and there was nothing to talk about except the textuality of this text, then communication has collapsed. >Deconstructivism.
RortyVsSearle: for the deconstructionist intellectuals who were lucky enough to find a spot as auto mechanics it is not difficult to specify where their work ends and philosophy begins.
The deconstruction has not changed his life than atheism changed the lives of his ancestors. The difference relates to the atmosphere and the spiritual element.
Description/Action/Understanding/Searle: Our practices become incomprehensible if we describe our actions in various ways, SearleVsDavidson/SearleVsDerrida: especially with non-realistic or non-representational terminology. (RortyVsSearle).
Searle: some sentences cannot be questioned without questioning the practices themselves. They are a condition of intelligibility.
RortyVsSearle: rhetorical frills that are supposed to give practice the appearance of holding on to a huge thing, namely metaphysical reality.
VI 121
Intrinsic/Extrinsic/RortyVsSearle:ifthis distinction is abolished, we can dispense with the idea of ​​there being a difference between the pursuit of happiness and the pursuit of truth in nature or humanities. >Intrinsic, >extrinsic.
VI 140
RortyVsSearle:ourapproach to the world is not the frame (Searle: background) which allows mapping (VsRepresentation).
Language/Representation/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with mapping, but rather with "getting along". (Taylor: "Handling").
Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation.
VI 141
Rorty:nobreak between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world.
VI 157
RortyVsSearle:wemust separate two distinctions: physical/non-physical objects us/"the world"
E.g. Sherlock Holmes, the number 17, the rules of chess: it is not a matter of them not having a "place in the world", but of us not expecting that our relevant beliefs will change by physics (as "cultural overall activity").

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.

Disputed term/author/ism

Author

Entry

Reference

Vs Representation

Rorty, R.

I 280
Representation/RortyVsRepresentation:thethesis of the system of internal representations is not merely a confusion of images and propositions, but a general confusion of cause and effects and conclusions.
But it takes place in the minds of philosophers, not psychologists.