The Wife, Child Pornography and “Inadvertence”

Appellant, Meri Jane Woods, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on December 15, 2014, as made final by the denial of
Appellant's post-sentence motion on May 19, 2015. We affirm.

Commonwealth v. Woods,
supra.

The court went on to quote from the trial court’s summary of
the evidence in the case:

On August 14, 2013, [Appellant voluntarily] went to the
Pennsylvania State Police, Indiana [Barracks], to complain of her husband's
alleged involvement in child pornography. . . .[Appellant] brought a home
computer [with her that day, and she claimed that the computer] contained evidence
[that] support[ed] her allegations. . . .

[Appellant] met with Corporal John Roche, the Coordinator of
the Southwest Computer Crime Task Force, and filled out a six-page written
statement. At this meeting, Corporal Roche requested [Appellant's] permission
to do a preview examination of the computer and [Appellant] agreed. Once the
preview was conducted, images were found on the computer depicting possible
child pornography, and [Appellant] was agreeable when Corporal Roche indicated
he would need to keep [the computer] as a result [of his findings. The
interview ended and Appellant left the barracks.]

[Both Appellant and Corporal Roche characterized the police
station interview as `friendly.’ See Appellant's Motion to Suppress.
. . . Moreover, Corporal Roche testified: that Appellant `was free to leave at
any time’ during the interview; that he never read Appellant Miranda warnings;
that, although Appellant's story `seemed unusual,’ Corporal Roche `had no
reason to disbelieve the main portion of [Appellant's] child pornography
accusations’ against her husband; and that, during the interview, he `had no
belief that criminal activity by [Appellant] had occurred.’ . . .

Following a [later,] full [forensic] review [of the
computer,] Corporal Roche noted that [the] times when the images were created
or accessed were inconsistent with [the] time periods that [Appellant's]
husband would have had access to the computer because they occurred after he had
moved from the residence. . . .

On December 19, 2013, the Commonwealth charged Appellant
with sexual abuse of children and unsworn falsification to authorities.

Commonwealth v. Woods,
supra. (As Wikipedia explains, “Indiana” is, among other things, a town in
Pennsylvania which is the county seat of Indiana County, which is also a county
in Pennsylvania.)

The opinion describes goes on to note that, at one point in
the conversations Corporal Roche had with Ms. Woods, she said

she had been having difficulties and problems with her
husband, Matthew Woods. And she essentially was bringing me the computer
because she wanted me to take a look at what was on it because she wanted to
tell me that there was child pornography images on the computer and that they
were put there by her husband, Matthew Woods.

Commonwealth v. Woods,
supra.

The opinion also explains that, as noted above, on

December 19, 2013, the Commonwealth charged [Woods] with
sexual abuse of children and unsworn falsification to authorities.With
respect to the sexual abuse of children charge, the Commonwealth's later filed
Information declared:

Knowingly possessed or controlled a book, magazine,
pamphlet, slide, photograph, film, videotape, computer depiction, or other
material depicting a child under the age of 18 years engaging in a prohibited
sexual act or in the simulation of such act, to wit, the defendant did possess
via a computer system/storage medium, files that depicted child pornography, an
example of one of these is a file [name], `F7pzSGKQdk[1].jpg’, which is a
picture of an approximately 9–11 year old female, providing oral copulation to
an adult male penis. The image was written to the internal hard disk drive
on the defendant's computer on 8/11/13.

Commonwealth v. Woods,
supra.

The Superior Court also pointed out that, during Woods’
trial, Corporal Roche

provided testimony regarding his experience with the
Pennsylvania State Police, and in particular, his training and experience in
computer forensics. Corporal Roche testified that he received training from
EnCase, and that he is an EnCase certified examiner. . . .

With regard to determining `date stamps’ or `time stamps’
relevant to this matter, Corporal Roche testified that he first used the EnCase
program to search the hard drive of the computer brought to the police barracks
by [Appellant]. The gallery function of the EnCase software allowed Corporal
Roche to search through a thumbnail gallery of photographs in a timely fashion.
Corporal Roche testified that he identified 43 images that he believed depicted
images of child pornography.Corporal Roche then used EnCase to
create [an] `exact bit for bit copy of every piece of information on the
[computer's] hard drive.’ [Id. at 50]. Corporal Roche then was able
to examine each image to determine when it was placed on the computer.

Corporal Roche testified that the created date and time for
`[j]ust about all of the images’ was `August 11, 2013, between the times of
about [nine] o'clock and 12 o'clock a.m.’ [Id. at 51]. He then
testified that the created date and time `is the absolute most accurate time to
use of when it was first put there.’ [Id.] Corporal Roche [testified]
that `the original created date and time will always stay the same on the host
computer.’ [Id. at 52]. In conclusion, Corporal Roche [testified]
that he [was] `[a]bsolutely scientifically certain that the dates and times are
that which was when the computer was used to look at these images and download
these images depicting child pornography.’ [Id. at 56].
Moreover, Corporal Roche testified that the images of child pornography on the
computer `were all created [and] accessed on or after the period of time that
Matthew Woods left the house.’ [Id. at 69].

Corporal Roche then testified that he used the . . . FTK
from AccessData as a separate method of determining the created date and time
for the pornographic images. Using this forensic tool, and comparing the
results to the results reached using EnCase, `[t]he created, the modified, the
last accessed, the entry modified, all these dates and times were exactly the
same to the hundredths of a second on each and every photograph.’ [Id. at
57].

Commonwealth v. Woods,
supra.

The opinion also explains that

[i]n addition to the above evidence, Corporal Roche
testified that, in his opinion, the child pornography did not `inadvertently’
appear on Appellant's computer. . . . Rather, Corporal Roche testified: that
the child pornography on the computer was the result of `at least [three] hours
of searching the internet for these images’ and that `it [was] a fair statement
[to say] that on August 11 [, 2013,] between th[e] hours of [nine] and 11,
[Appellant] went to th[e child pornography] websites.’ . . .

Commonwealth v. Woods,
supra.

The Superior Court also pointed out that the “jury found
Appellant guilty of both sexual abuse of children and unsworn falsification to
authorities.” Commonwealth v. Woods,
supra. It also explained that, “[o]n December 15, 2014, the trial court
sentenced [Woods] to serve a jail term of not less than nine months nor more
than two years less one day, followed by two years of probation.” Commonwealth v. Woods, supra.

Woods appealed, arguing, first, that

although the Commonwealth charged her with violating 18 Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes § 6312(d)(1), the Commonwealth's Information
only quoted a portion of the statute. In particular, Appellant notes, the
Information only declared that [she] had `[k]nowingly possessed or controlled’
child pornography. . . . However, § 6312(d)(1) not only criminalizes the
knowing `possess[ion] or control[ ]’ of child pornography, but it also
criminalizes the `intentional[ ] view[ing]’ of child pornography. 18
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes § 6312(d)(1).

Appellant argues that, since the Information failed to
charge her with `intentionally viewing’ child pornography, she could not have
been lawfully convicted of this aspect of the crime. . . . Appellant then
claims the `Commonwealth presented no competent evidence of [Appellant's]
knowing possession or control of the files on or about August 14, 2013’—and
that the evidence was thus insufficient to support her conviction for
violating § 6312(d)(1).

Commonwealth v. Woods,
supra.

The Superior Court noted that, in her appeal, Woods

acknowledges that she failed to object to the trial court's
jury charge. . . . However, she claims that she still could not have been
convicted of `intentionally viewing’ child pornography because `due process
does not permit [her to be] convicted of an uncharged classification’ of 18
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes § 6312(d)(1). This claim fails.
. . .

In the case at bar, Appellant failed to object to the
erroneous jury charge and the trial court was thus never given the opportunity
to correct its mistake. This results in waiver of the issue, notwithstanding
the fact that the error implicated Appellant's due process rights. Certainly,
when our Supreme Court eliminated the basic and fundamental error doctrine from
our jurisprudence, our high Court anticipated that due process
violations would and could be waived on direct appeal. . . .

The Superior Court also held that Woods’ challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction also failed “because the
evidence was sufficient to prove that [she] `[k]nowingly possessed or
controlled’ child pornography.Commonwealth v. Woods, supra.The court based that holding, essentially, on
the facts outlined above and on the trial judge’s summary of the evidence
presented at trial, which included the following:

`Corporal Roche testified that [Appellant] presented herself
at the [Pennsylvania] State Police Barracks on August 14, 2013, with the
subject computer. Corporal Roche further testified that [Appellant] “was
essentially bringing me the computer because she wanted me to take a look at
what was on it because she wanted to tell me that there was child pornography
images on the computer and that they were put there by her husband, Matthew
Woods.”' [N.T. Trial, 8/19/14, at 31].

Finally, with regard to Corporal Roche's opinion about the
nature of the images that he found, he stated that he “found in excess of 40
images and specifically 43 images of what I believed depicted child pornography
of some sort, whether it be the focal point of the genital area of a person
under the age of 18, certainly a prepubescent person or they are engaged in sex
of some sort or simulation thereof or masturbation. These would all meet the
definition of child pornography. [Id. at 49].’

`Given the testimony of Corporal Roche, and viewing that
testimony in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, it is easy to see
how the jury believed that [Appellant] purposely downloaded images of child
pornography on the family's computer for the purpose of reporting the presence
of the images to the Pennsylvania State Police, and all with the goal of having
Matthew Woods, her estranged husband, charged with criminal offenses of a
sexual nature.

By necessity, such a finding means that [Appellant]
knowingly, as defined in 18 Pennsylvania Consolidates Statutes Annotated
[§ 302(b),] downloaded and possessed images containing child pornography. In
other words, [Appellant] was aware of her conduct and the nature of her
conduct, because it was her express purpose to download child pornography,
possess these images, and take these images to the Pennsylvania State Police;
her plan would not [have] work[ed] without these actions.’

Commonwealth v. Woods,
supra (emphasis in the original).

The Superior Court therefore held that

the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant's
conviction for sexual abuse of children under 18 Pennsylvania Consolidated
Statutes Annotated § 6312(d)(1). Appellant's claim to the contrary fails.