The army moved
from Valaichenai through Eravur to Batticaloa on 23 rd June,
abandoning the areas through which they had moved. The LTTE launched a looting
spree around Chenkaladi and Ervur between 23 rd and 27 th
June, emptying the shops and food stores. On 25 th July, the army
came to the Eastern University refugee camp about 5 p.m. 10,000 refugees were
in the camp at that time. The army left after taking 5 persons with the help
of TELO infor­mants. With the army establishing a campt at Kommathurai, those
going south to Batticaloa had to bypass Kommathurai as the army did not permit
passage. This became established practice.

On 8th
August, the LTTE placed a mine in the residential area in Eravur ‑ Chenkaladi.
But nothing happened. Another mine was planted on 11th August (See
Report No.6, 4.5). The army did not suffer any
harm, but killed a few people around the place. One person was shot at point
blank range. A cinema, two garages and several houses were burnt by the army.

Following the
massacre at Eravur on the 11th night, the Tamils killed by the army
and mobs included 18 massacred and burnt at the Eravur sawmill. The number registered
at the univer­sity rose fourfold to 46,000. There was a floating population
of about 10,000 who lived in outlying villages, but collected provi­sions at
the university. The camp had to function amidst difficu­lties caused by both
sides to the conflict. Once the LTTE planted a landmine in front. The refugees
protested strongly and almost physically forced its removal. The army camp at
Kommathurai, half a mile from the university, was among the nastiest. There
were several instances of people (including the AGAs peon) being detained,
and upon inquiry the matter was simply denied. Once a shell fell into the refugee
camp killing one person. When a complaint was made, the Captain in charge simply
replied that they ought to ask Prabhakaran. The area came under the command
of the Brigadier at Valaichenai, noted for his draconian approach.

Given this situation, the camp, and the university
dons and the administration who gave it leadership, had an important role to
play. Because the university was an important institution, it attracted international
attention. Journalists and NGOs which included the ICRC and the MSF were
frequent visitors. The camp, apart from being an information centre, was also
a hospital and a food distribution centre for a vast isolated region. Probably
responding to pressure, some officals in the administration at Batticaloa expressed
anxiety about the large number of persons registered. The camp authorities pointed
out that if the adminis­tration in Batticaloa had the means to distribute food
to the remote villages that consisted the floating population, they were welcome
to take over. But since they sorely lacked the means, they would do well to
allow the present arrangement to continue. The camp was developing a capacity
to create a new social leader­ship. [Top]

In functioning as an information
centre, the staff maintained meticulous records of violations reported by the
inmates of the camp. The emotional strain involved in sifting through hundreds
of individual trage­dies can hardly be imagined. The records are also very informa­tive
about what was happening. We learn that at least 8 Tamils were murdered in the
Eravur‑Chenkalady area on 25th August, soon after Muslim home
guards were trained and deployed. It records at least 40 persons killed and
30 missing during the aftermath of the Eravur incident. 119 persons are recorded
missing in a sepa­rate list. Those detained in the camp in two roundups by the
army (5/9 and 23/9) total 175, nearly all of whom are missing.

We give some samples
from the records:

Killed

(25/8) K. T. David (60) of Eravur 4 ‑ Killed by the
forces

(25/8) Mrs. Kanapathipillai Santhanam of Eravur 5,

killed by unknown
persons.

F.R. Joseph (58),
Dental Technician ‑ Assaulted to death while on duty in Eravur hospital.

(16/8) Kasipillai Thuraisamy (85) was
at home in Kudiyiruppu (south of Eravur) when he was killed and burnt by
a Muslim mob in the company of the forces.

(23/9) Mrs. Thuraisamy Parvathy, wife
of the above had witnessed her husband being killed and burnt by the forces.
She then came to reside at the University. On seeing the forces again,
she fell down and died of shock.

It was perhaps too early for the camp to make an impact
on curbing the armys exces­ses. The ICRC which regularly visited the camp
was able to help little in this respect. According to camp officials, the ICRC
and the MSF did help them a lot, not so much in bringing food and medicine,
but by pressing government officials in Batticaloa to do more efficiently what
they should have normally done.

They clarified that
the epidemic of diarrhoea in the camp together with a number of deaths as reported
in the press is not quite accurate. Many of these people had already fallen
sick in the surrounding region and were brought to the camp hospital. If not
for the camp, many more would have died and would have gone unrecorded. [Top]

The camp officials are firm that the LTTE never demanded
food and medicines from them and did not to their knowledge take anything out
in large quantities. With the people having largely fled the surrounding villages,
LTTE cadre in need of food came to their relatives in the camp. The LTTE had
requested some university equipment. The staff refused, telling them that if
they were removing things as an armed force, they could not stop them. The Chemistry
laboratory was forced open and some chemicals were removed. The pick up truck
belonging to the university was also taken away. This was reported to the army
as a formality.

The LTTE was also irritated
by losing its civilian cover in the surrounding areas. Instead of being sympathetic
to the refu­gees who had suffered much, it became angry with them, accusing
them of eating sufficiently, having electricity and watching television, while
they were in difficulties outside. Towards the end of August the transformers
supplying electricity to the university were blasted. This act was an indication
that the LTTE did not approve of the camp and was feeling around for means to
make it uninviting.

For the university
as an institution catering for the deve­lopment of the region, the loss of electric
supply meant a signi­ficant loss. The universitys Department of Agriculture
was in­volved in a project to find organic alternatives to weedicides. They
had been collecting and storing varieties of fungi with the aim of culturing
ones that would attack weeds in rice fields while not harming the rice. Equipment
had been provided by Bri­tish Overseas Development Aid worth 10,000 pounds.
Without elec­tricity all this effort of storing went waste. This project has
been suspen [Top]

Early morning on 5th Sep­tember, the army surrounded
the camp and wanted the men and women to line up separately in the grounds.
These inmates were then paraded before informers. While the parade was taking
place there was an explosion in the auditorium. It was later learnt that some
LTTE cadre were hiding under the stage and a grenade of theirs had exploded.
Three died and three others were taken away by the army. Of those who were paraded,
159 were taken away. There was much anger over this. A senior member of the
university staff said: The Muslim informers brought by the army simply
pointed at anyone they knew. A young boy I knew well and who was taken away,
was timid and would not even have so much as spoken to the Tigers. A Christian
clergyman who ministered to a number of army officers said:The whole thing
was a sham. My sisters neighbour was a fishmonger whom I knew well. He
had no connection with the Tigers. Someone must have been trying to get rid
of a business competitor. As soon as I heard about it, I used my influence to
try to get him out. I failed. Perhaps I was late. Going through the list
of those taken, it turns out significantly that most of them had Eravur addresses.
The ages of those detained ranged from 11 to 51.

Everyone felt depressed,
helpless and listless. That evening a lorry from Save the Children Fund arrived
with relief supplies. A senior don asked for help to unload the supplies and
hoped that it would distract their minds. Immediately there was an uproar. People
started shouting,We do not want the supplies. We want our children. Send
the lorry back. They wanted the camp leaders to go to the Kommathurai
army camp and talk to them. The don ex­plained, I was here when they took
people away. I am not an outsider who had just arrived to go to the camp to
verify that this actually happened. The camp officials going is of no use. If
you can persuade 36,000 people, we will all go. I will lead you. That will have
some effect.

After the initial surprise, people started
consulting with each other. The don reflected,Had we all gone, the army
may have opened fire. Some of us may have got killed. But we would have built
something. I was waiting, thinking that on the balance they may decide to march.
At length a spokesman asked me, Can you go with the families of those
taken? They were obviously crestfal­len. I told them that going with just
the families would not have any effect. We then silently unloaded the lorry.
[Top]

One of the advantages of the camp was the publicity
it had received. On 8 th September General Gerry Silva, who commanded
the East, arrived with the ministerial delegation of political party representatives.
During the talks, the camp officials raised with the general the release of
those detained. the general declined to release them, saying words to the effect
that those detained were all guilty. It was then asked whether, since those
left in the camp had been screened, he could issue passes to them for their
future protection. The general said that this would not be possible as they
might tomorrow receive information about a person which they did not have today.
The generals evasiveness made people uneasy. Someone asked why not have
the army permanently surrounding the camp so that accu­sations about harbouring
the LTTE need not be made. This was thought unfeasible. [Top]

The army made a similar raid on the camp on 23rd
September. On this day fighting had taken place between the army and the Tigers
at kaluwankerny, a fishing village 3 miles east. Following this, 500 people
from the village came to the refugee camp. Not relishing being alone in the
village the Tigers ordered the villagers to get back, threatening penalties.
A camp official on hearing this inquired of the Tigers the following day. They
completely denied making such an order and said that the villagers could stay
on.

On 27th September
the Tigers abducted the university regis­trar for a so called inquiry (later
released) and about the same time told the inmates of the camp that they must
vacate by the 1st October. There was no public announcement. The
word was passed on to groups of people. Perhaps to avoid questions, the matter
was never taken up or discussed with the camp leadership. The latter came to
know this from refugees who also told them,If you ask us to stay, we will
stay. A leader explained, By asking them to stay, we would have
got into a confrontation with the LTTE. It may not have done any good to us
or to them. I told them that it must be their decision. I was hoping that they
would decide to stay. Some said they would stay. On the 28th, I noticed
that the number in camp had declined. There was the atmosphere of a sinking
ship. I knew we were going. We asked for the remaining provisions to be distributed.

The discipline that had held all this time
suddenly broke down. The community that was coming together disintegrated. The
people, together with the LTTE, started stripping the university. The LTTE brought
bullock carts. People took away things which meant nothing to them ‑ chemical
balances, micro computers, video screens etc. These gadgets and university furniture
started ap­pearing all over the surrounding area. Much of these were later dumped
in places and the university is still receiving messages about things found.
By 1 st October the anarchy and panic came to an end. The home of
40,000 persons stood empty. Some of the people found their way to Batticaloa.
But the larger number had headed for starvation and perils, natural and man
made, in the surrounding jungles. [Top]

The following experience related by a 34 year
old labourer who left the university camp and took refuge in the jungle, is
typical of thousands. He now lives in a refugee camp situated in a school in
Batticaloa : I together with my family were living in the jungle at Mylavedduvan.
Apart from the rains, our immediate concern was about being bitten by snakes.
(Batticaloa hospital then reported an average of 5 snake bite patients a day).
Drinking water was also hard to come by. Food was in very short supply. Some
of the farmers in the surrounding area gave us some sacks of paddy. Several
people took to trade, particularly those old enough to look harmless and yet
fit enough, going to Batticaloa, bringing things and selling them in the jungle.
We had to sell a few things we had to survive. When children fell ill, it was
a nightmare. It sometimes took 3 days to locate and buy one Disprin tablet.
The army later restricted trade by allowing only 10 coconuts and 4 Disprins
per person.

The ICRC used to come at all hours and
be of great service. The LTTE used to sometimes bring medicines.

As the rains advanced things became
nigh impossible. We used to be subject to bombing and helicopter straffing by
the air force. I saw 7 or 8 persons who had been killed by helicopter fire.
A number of people who ran into flood waters during the bombing were carried
away. By the end of October we came to Batticaloa town. [Top]

One of the versions
given out by the Tigers regarding the closure of the camp is that the army was
causing persons to disappear, and thus they had to close the camp to prevent
more people from disappearing. Since this claim received international publicity,
it needs to be examined. The facts we have presented point to the patent truth.

Many more persons
were taken away by the forces during round ups of several refugee camps in the
East, usually after informa­tion leaked to the foreces about Tiger infilitration.
This hap­pened for instance in Veeramunai and Sorikalmunai. 250 persons disappeared
from the much smaller camp at Veeramunai. There was no university at Veeramunai.
The camp elders had repeatedly asked the Tigers to keep away from the camp.
There was never talk of closing the camp and leading the people into the jungle.
The camp was closed on 12 th August by the forces setting Muslim
homeguards on a massacre. That too remained little known. (See Report
No.3, October 1990).

Such behaviour
by the forces in refugee camps which receive sanctity in international law needed
to be exposed. As a libera­tion group the obligation of the Tigers was to strengthen
the people to fight against such things. The two major sets of disap­pearances
from the Eastern University camp were serious matters which apart from the loss,
affected the morale of the people and caused much insecurity.

Following the
army action on 5th September many parents became afraid for their
sons and sent them into the surrounding jungles. These youngsters then paid
brief visits to the camp, or food was taken out to them. Some of these young
in anger, frus­tration and hopelessness even joined the Tigers. (Our government
would not even let us sit in one place and starve in peace!).

But the camp also
had its strengths because of its interna­tional standing. Apart from the services
it was providing, it was, through experience, developing a leadership with the
will and capacity to fight back. The people were becoming organised and the
camp had the ability to draw on some international machi­nery for its protection.
It was because of this that everything that happened at the Eastern University
received publicity. It was the obligation of the Tigers as a liberation group
to discuss with the people and the leadership how the camps standing could
be protected. They should have asked themselves in this situa­tion, whether
they ought to maintain a presence in the camp, and whether they should ask those
who wished to feed them to do it outside. If the camp leadership could say that
there was no Tiger presence in the camp, it would have strengthened their case.
If this assurance were possible even the ICRC could have been asked to co‑operate
in running the camp. Maintaining the camp was the best defence the people had.

Never once did
the Tigers talk to the camp leadership about the welfare of the camp or how
the people could be helped to fight against the army menace.

If it is claimed
that the people were asked to abandon the camp for their protection, it should
be asked what alternative protection the Tigers provided for them? Did they
provide food, medicines, shelter, protection from snakes and aerial attacks
by the government? Using the people as pawns they conducted a mas­sive international
campaign appealing for help, for people shel­tering in the jungles from the
oppressive Sri Lankan government.

Going by past experience and from what happened
in the camp itself, the Tigers were up to their usual cynicism, killing 4 birds
with one stone against the background of crass brutality by Sri Lankan forces:
1. Any organised effort from which the people drew strength and confidence had
to be crushed. People ought to be clay in the hands of the Tigers. 2.People
dispersed from the camp become civilian cover. 3. Cornered youth are potential
recruits. 4. Have an international campaign on the plight of the people.

Campaigning against
oppression is a legitimate thing. But it had to be done on responsible premises.

More recently, the LTTE leader Karikalan told
a rehabilita­tion official that they are against food handouts because the people
are becoming lazy. He said that people should get back to their villages. His
reasons are understandable. We have hardly met a refugee who is not anxious
to return to work. When people have no hope and no prospect of ever returning
to their homes and leading normal lives, they tend to become professional refugees
when this situation is prolonged. How can the Tigers expect vulnerable people
to return to their villages when they persist in a policy of killing Muslims?
This also explains their perverse military strategy. By attacking Muslims and
using Tamil‑Muslim enmity for mobilisation, the Tigers also brought about
the large scale displacement of Tamils, causing themselves problems in mobility.
This would not have arisen if good relations between Tamils and Muslims had
been a part of their political approach. [Top]

A number of staff members from the Eastern University
felt so dejected that they felt reluctant to talk about their experience. The
twisted propaganda about the whole affair was so strong, that a young lecturer
sounded as though he would never be believed. For those who had worked hard
and shoul­dered much responsibility, the closure of the camp delivered such
a blow as to drive them towards apathy and resignation. In compa­rison with
the detailed information they had at their finger tips covering their period
of activity, they are dimly aware of events in their region since then. One
could now hardly find anything in the East that can be called an information
centre. People have very vague impressions of what happens outside their town
or village. What is the good of knowing when the liberators do not welcome those
who care?

This experience of the
university dons and administration explains the apathy and loss of confidence
one sees everywhere in the East as a consequence of liberation politics.
Sadly, some international figures pledged to protect the interests of the people,
have helped the propagation of myths harmful to their interests. The victims
have become voiceless.

Many of the younger
inmates of the refugee camp who had much to complain of the conduct of the Tigers
from the beginning, have been driven by the impressions left by the experience
of the governments conduct to have some sympathy for the Tigers. Their
government not only violated the refugee camp, but in addition to their other
miseries, bombed and straffed them in the jungles.

Regarding those who disappeared from the camp,
a letter was received much later from Air Chief Marshal Walter Fernando of the
Joint Operations Command. He acknowledged that about 30 were detained and that
they were soon to be released. None of them appeared. A don commented on this
angrily, This letter is a sham. When we talked to General Silva on 8th
September, 3 days after the incident, he never contested our figure of 159 arres­ted.
Furthermore, there is an agreed procedure for the release of prisoners which
the army has without exception adhered to. Those to be released are usually
handed over to a group of senior citizens at some place like the (Roman Catholic)
Bishops House.

Air Chief Marshal
Walter Fernando is a member of the Presi­dential Task Force on Human Rights!
[Top]