III. CONTEXT: ORIGIN AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERNAL ARMED
CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA

34.After
having left behind the bipartisan (Liberal vs. Conservative) civil wars
of the XIX and early XX centuries, Colombian society faced a period
known as "La Violencia" after the change in government in 1946
that saw power change hands from the Liberal Party to the Conservative
party. In the 1950s, a violent confrontation occurred between the two
political groups and the persecution of Liberal Party members in the
rural areas laid the foundation for the rise of armed groups. The fall
of the military government of General Rojas Pinilla on May 10, 1957
ushered in a period of reconciliation during which Liberals and
Conservatives participated in the government through the Frente Nacional,
or National Front, taking turns in government, in an effort to maintain
stability. During this period, the armed resistance groups linked to
the Liberal party disbanded, laid down their arms, and rejoined civilian
life.

35.In the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, new revolutionary groups organized, and there
was renewed violence. That period saw the emergence of the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia ("FARC"), the Ejército de
Liberación Nacional ("ELN"), the Ejército Popular de Liberación
("EPL"), the Movimiento 19 de Abril ("M-19"), the indigenous guerrilla
group Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame, the Autodefensa Obrera
("ADO"), and movements that emerged as dissident factions of the
foregoing groups, such as the Ricardo Franco, among others. The rise of
these groups and the failure of efforts to reach peace agreements
spurred on the development of a new type of violence called "bandolerismo"
or banditry, which in the mid-1960s reached critical proportions.
Drug-trafficking emerged in this context as a destabilizing factor,
through the violence used by the drug cartels to control politics and
the trade in cocaine in the late 1970s.

36.The State reacted to the
resurgence of violence and in 1965 promulgated, as a transitory
provision, under the state of emergency, Decree 3398, which provided at
its Article 25 that “… all Colombians, men and women, not included in
the call to obligatory service, may be used by the Government in
activities and jobs with which they would contribute to re-establishing
normalcy.”[54]
The decree also indicates at Article 33, paragraph 3 that “the Ministry
of National Defense, through the authorized commands, may provide, when
it considers it advisable, as private property, arms that are considered
as being exclusively for the use of the Armed Forces,” with which groups
of civilians armed legally.[55]
This Decree became permanent legislation in 1968[56]
and the so-called “self-defense groups” were formed under these
provisions, with the support of the military forces and National Police.

37.These
paramilitary self-defense groups had ties to economic and political
sectors in certain parts of the country, and were especially
strengthened in the late 1970s and early 1980s. During that period, the
paramilitary groups also established close ties with drug-trafficking.
Many of their key leaders became landowners and used violence to defend
the drug business and their economic interests vis-à-vis the
attempts of the dissident armed groups to extort and expropriate them.
By the 1980s, it became clear that these groups were responsible for
committing selective assassinations and massacres of civilians.

38.Among the criminal acts
perpetrated at that time by the paramilitary groups was the massacre of
19 merchants who were traveling from Cúcuta to Medellín in a caravan of
vehicles in 1987. The merchants and drivers were stopped in Puerto
Boyacá by a paramilitary group that acted with the sponsorship and
collaboration of the official forces in the area. The victims were
assassinated and their remains destroyed and cast into a tributary of
the Magdalena river. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
established the responsibility of the Colombian State for that massacre
in view of its role in the formation of these groups under the
legislation then in force and the direct participation of members of the
National Army in the commission of acts violative of the American
Convention.[57]
This massacre of civilians by paramilitary forces, with the
collaboration of state agents, was followed by the assassination on
January 18, 1989, at the hands of the same paramilitary group, of the
members of the judicial commission that had traveled to the area to
investigate the fate of the 19 merchants. The alleged responsibility of
state agents in this massacre, known as the La Rochela massacre, is
being examined by the IACHR.[58]

39.After the La Rochela
massacre the State began to adopt measures, including legislative
measures, to counter the armed control exercised by paramilitary groups
in several parts of Colombia. On April 19, 1989, the Colombian
Government promulgated Decree 0815[59]
by which Articles 25 and 33(3) of Decree 3398 were suspended to ensure
that they would not be interpreted as legal authorization for organizing
armed civilian groups in violation of the Constitution and statutory
law.[60]

40.On June 8, 1989, the State
issued Decree 1194 “by which additions are made to Legislative Decree
0180 of 1988, to punish new forms of criminal conduct, as it is required
for re-establishing public order.” In its section on considerations,
the law states that “the events unfolding in the country have shown that
there is a new form of crime entailing the commission of atrocious acts
by armed groups, ill-named “paramilitary,” constituted in death squads,
bands of paid assassins, self-defense or private justice groups, whose
existence and activities has a serious detrimental impact on the
country’s social stability, which should be repressed so as to
re-establish public order and peace.”[61]
Accordingly, this decree is an instrument for defining the crimes of
promoting, financing, organizing, directing, fostering, and carrying out
acts “aimed at obtaining the formation or entry of persons to armed
groups of the sort commonly known as death squads, bands of paid
assassins, or private justice groups, mistakenly called paramilitary
groups.”[62]

41.Considering that members of
the military forces and National Police maintained ties with these
groups, Decree 1194 also defined as a crime training or equipping
“persons in military tactics, techniques, or procedures for undertaking
criminal activities” and stipulated as an aggravating factor that the
conduct was committed by active and retired members of the military
forces or National Police or by state security bodies. As the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has established, even though the
state alleges that it does not maintain an official policy of
encouraging the formation of paramilitary groups, this does not release
it from responsibility for the interpretation, for years, of the legal
framework that gave them cover; for their disproportionate use of the
armaments it provided to them; and for failing to take the measures
necessary to prohibit, prevent, and duly punish their criminal
activities. Moreover, members of the military forces and National Police
in certain areas of the country encouraged the self-defense groups to
take an offensive attitude towards any person considered a guerrilla
sympathizer.[63]

42.In
parallel fashion, successive governments undertook to negotiate peace
with dissident armed groups. In the early 1990s, several thousand
members of the M-19, part of the EPL, and the Quintín Lame demobilized
as a result of the peace agreement that they reached with the
government. The FARC and the ELN did not demobilize, and, according to
figures provided by the Ministry of Defense, as of 2003 they had,
respectively, approximately 13,000 and 4,000 members. For their part,
and despite legal prohibitions, the paramilitary groups continued to
operate and in the 1990s they were responsible for a large number of
political killings in Colombia. In approximately 1997, the paramilitary
groups consolidated nationwide in an organization called Autodefensas
Unidas de Colombia (hereinafter “the AUC”), organized in rural and
urban units (bloques), whose publicly-stated purpose was to act
in coordinated fashion against the guerrillas. According to figures
provided by the Ministry of Defense, by 2003 the AUC had approximately
13,500 members. These forces, paid and well-equipped, are organized in
a series of units (bloques) known by the names Norte, Central
Bolívar, Centauros, Calima, Héroes de Granada, Pacífico, Sur del Cesar,
Vencedores de Arauca, and Élmer Cárdenas, which operate through 49
fronts with a presence in 26 of Colombia’s 32 departments and in 382 of
its 1,098 municipalities.

43.The
illegal armed groups – both guerrillas and paramilitaries— have created
a confusing combination of simultaneous alliances and clashes with
drug-trafficking forces and with the official forces. In addition, after
relative success in the offensive against the drug cartels in the
mid-1990s, these groups assumed the business of controlling the initial
phases of narcotics production. The FARC and the ELN, and, since the
mid-1990s, the paramilitary groups, also extort and kidnap. In recent
decades, organized crime has had an impact on national life as well,
affecting elements such as elections and the operation of the judicial
system in large parts of Colombian territory.

44.The
problem of violence in Colombia is long-standing and very complex. The
stability of democratic institutions is negatively impacted by profound
social inequalities and high indices of violence whose significance
cannot be reduced to terrorist violence alone. This is a situation that
demands solutions, the search for which cannot be further delayed.
Nonetheless, the road to peaceful coexistence is not simple: successive
governments have failed in their efforts to eradicate the violence or
have had only partial or relative successes. Given this context, the
complexity of the situation will no doubt require extraordinary efforts
to regain peace and ensure the rule of law for all Colombians.

45.In the last 15 years, the
excesses committed by the actors in the internal armed conflict –in
particular by the AUC and the FARC-EP— have taken the form of serious
violations of human rights and/or international humanitarian law against
the civilian population. Specifically, massacres have been used as a
strategy against members of the most vulnerable sectors such as
indigenous peoples, Afro-descendant communities, and the displaced, and
selective assassinations and forced disappearances were committed
against human rights defenders[64],
judicial officers, trade union and social movement leaders, journalists,
and candidates for elective office who are repeatedly designated as
military targets, mainly by the AUC. The dissident armed groups –mainly
the FARC-EP— have also used tactics such as detonating explosives
indiscriminately[65]
and kidnapping[66]
in violation of the most basic principles of international humanitarian
law, resulting in numerous civilian victims.

46.The concentration of
violence in certain areas of the country appears to reflect strategic
objectives of military and economic domination. The departments hardest
hit have been Antioquia, Bolívar, Magdalena, Norte de Santander, Cauca,
Meta, Arauca, Caquetá, Cundinamarca, and Chocó, although there have been
violent acts and displacement in every department. The presence of the
armed actors in local districts and municipalities has translated into
constant acts of violence against or punishment of members of the
community, who are perceived to be sympathizers of adversary groups
merely because they never presented a resistance, now or in the past,[67]
while also imposing models of conduct in the community and acts of
social cleansing.

47.At least three stages have
been identified in the dynamic of the conflict over the last 15 years.[68]
In an initial phase from 1988 to 1991 the parties faced the consequences
of the failure of a series of peace initiatives, culminating in the
violent rejection of the 1991 Constitution by the FARC. This period was
followed by a second stage, from 1992 to 1996, during which the
intensity of the conflict diminished and stabilized. Finally, a third
stage, from 1997 to 2002, brought a renewed intensity to the conflict,
especially in 2000 and 2001, with peaks of paramilitary violence against
the civilian population,[69]
including members of the Army, the Police, the FARC, and AUC killed in
combat, and, significantly, civilians who were not legitimate military
targets and were defenselessness.

48.The IACHR has repeatedly
stated its concern over the failure of the courts to clarify the facts
in the overwhelming majority of these incidents.[70]
In those cases in which it is possible for the organs of the
inter-American system to exercise their jurisdiction, for example, in
cases in which state agents are alleged to be responsible by act or
omission for the death out of combat of persons who cannot be considered
legitimate military targets, the IACHR has processed petitions alleging
the violation of rights protected in the American Convention. A large
number of complaints have been resolved by the Commission[71]
and in some cases, they have been referred to the jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.[72]

49.Official sources allege that
as of 2003, there has been a decline in the number of homicides and
massacres perpetrated both by dissident armed groups – the FARC-EP, ELN,
and EPL— and by the AUC. According to these sources, there was a 29%
reduction in the number of homicides perpetrated by dissident armed
groups and a 63.7% reduction in the number of homicides perpetrated by
the AUC from August 2002 to June 2003, in relation to the period from
August 2001 to June 2002[73]
and an 84% drop in the number of massacres perpetrated in the same
period by the AUC. The trend in 2004 suggests a 53% reduction in the
number of victims of massacres, in relation to the historical high in
early 2002. As the IACHR has already indicated, this decline in the
number of massacres has been attributed to a change in strategy geared
to committing more selective homicides, which in turn have a lesser
impact and allegedly a smaller political cost,[74]
together with the partial compliance of the unilateral cease-fire that
resulted from the rapprochement between the Government and the AUC to
reach demobilization agreements.

50.Other sources note that the
levels of sociopolitical violence have remained high from 2002 to 2004,
with more than 6,000 persons killed out of combat.[75]
The statistics prepared by the CINEP and Justicia y Paz data bank record
4,457 deaths from January to December 2003 attributable to extrajudicial
executions because of abuse of authority (199), political persecution or
intentional homicide (1,150), homicides involving violations of
international humanitarian law (422), death in combat (1,849), and
political assassinations by undetermined perpetrators (837).[76]
These statistics attribute the commission of 2,378 of these deaths to
paramilitary groups and 235 to the Army. In addition, they attribute a
total of 294 homicides to the FARC-EP and the ELN, not counting other
serious breaches of international humanitarian law.[77]

51.Even
though official sources refer to a 120% increase in the number of
arrests of members of paramilitary groups and a 49% increase in the
number killed in 2003, the continuation of acts of violence perpetrated
against the civilian population has led the IACHR to express its concern
over the manner in which paramilitary groups operate in vast areas of
Colombian territory despite the presence of the military forces and the
National Police. The Commission has repeatedly stated its position on
the State’s responsibility for the ties and degrees of cooperation
between some members of the security forces and paramilitary groups in
the commission of acts that constitute serious human rights violations.

52.The widespread violations of
human rights and/or international humanitarian law perpetrated against
the civilian population, mainly in rural areas, are aimed at causing
terror and displacement, and the unlawful appropriation of land and
other property,[78]
continues to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis affecting more than two
million persons in Colombia. Given this situation, it is necessary to
find ways to put an end to the violence and to re-establish lasting
peaceful coexistence.

C. Background on efforts to resolve
the internal armed conflict in Colombia
and its legal framework

53.
Successive governments have undertaken efforts to end, through
negotiations, the political violence that has affected Colombia in
recent decades. These efforts have been focused on reaching agreements
for the demobilization of illegal armed groups. The agreements were
formalized under provisions adopted either by executive decree or by
statutes passed by the National Congress. These provisions provided
procedural benefits such as termination of the criminal actions or of
the penalty imposed in absentia in relation to the commission of
political crimes, for example rising up in arms against the State, for
those who demobilized.

54.In March 1981, during the
administration of President Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978-1982), the
Colombian Congress declared, by Law 37 of 1981,[79]
a conditional amnesty favoring those in arms who had perpetrated
political crimes and crimes related to political crimes. The law
included an exception for kidnapping, extortion, and homicide out of
combat, among others, and also excluded from the benefit those who were
free illegally as a result of having escaped after having been taken
prisoner. This provision, applied retroactively, set a four-month
period for availing oneself of this benefit. In February 1982, by
application of Legislative decree 474, it was declared that the criminal
action and the penalty had extinguished in the case of political crimes
and crimes related to them.[80]

55.On November 19, 1982, under
the administration of President Belisario Betancur (1982-1986), the
Congress declared a general amnesty for political and
politically-related crimes by means of Law 35.[81]
In June 1985 the Congress authorized the President of the Republic to
grant pardons to those convicted of political crimes, with the
possibility of extending the measure to related crimes.[82]
In December 1989, under the administration of Virgilio Barco Vargas
(1986–1990), the Congress authorized the President to grant a pardon to
those who had committed political crimes before the entry into force of
Law 77.[83]
One month later, the Government regulated Law 77 of 1989, on the
granting of pardon, which set the framework for the peace agreement
signed by the National Government and the M-19 on March 9, 1990.[84]

56.In January 1991, the
administration of President César Gaviria Trujillo (1990-1994) adopted
measures that made it possible to extinguish the penalty and the
criminal action for political and related crimes by Decree 213.[85]
This provision provided a framework for the peace agreements entered
into between the National Government and the Partido Revolucionario de
los Trabajadores (“PRT”) (January 25, 1991), the EPL (February 15, 1991)
and the Movimiento Quintín Lame (May 27, 1991). The powers of the
Executive and the Legislative branches to grant pardons and amnesties
were defined in Articles 150 and 201 and transitory article 30 of the
Constitution adopted in July 1991.[86]
In August 1991 the Government adopted Decree 1943 as a framework for the
peace agreement signed with the “Ernesto Rojas” Commands, on March 20,
1992.[87]
In December 1993, Congress established grounds for extinguishing the
criminal action and the penalty in cases of political and related
crimes, by Law 104[88]
as a framework for the peace agreements signed in 1994 with the
Corriente de Renovación Socialista (CRS), the Milicias Urbanas of
Medellín, and the “Frente Francisco Garnica” of the Coordinadora
Guerrillera.

57.In December 1995, during the
administration of President Samper Pizano, the Congress through Law 241
modified and expanded Law 104 of 1993, making it possible to grant legal
benefits to the self-defense groups, or autodefensas, if they
would first voluntarily leave the organization and surrender to the
authorities.[89]
In December 1997, Congress adopted Law 418[90],
which in its Title III establishes grounds for extinguishing the
criminal action and penalty in political and related crimes. In
addition, the provision extends in time Law 104 of 1993, which had
already been extended, modified, and expanded by Law 241 of 1995. This
legislation covered the peace agreement signed by the National
Government and the MIR-COAR on July 29, 1998, under Decrees 1,247 of
1997 and 2,087 of 1998.

58.The administration of Andrés
Pastrana issued Resolutions No. 85 of October 14, 1998 and No. 39 of
1999 by which the so-called “zona de distensión” (literally,
“zone for easing of tensions,” often referred to as a “demilitarized
zone”) was established in the municipalities of San Vicente del Caguán
(in the department of Caquetá) and La Macarena, Mesetas, Uribe, and
Vista Hermosa (in the department of Meta), in-keeping with the
definition of Law 418 of 1997. The objective of establishing this zone–
with a total area of 42,139 km2— was to demarcate a space for
negotiations with the FARC. These resolutions had the effect of
suspending arrest warrants in force for those participating in the
negotiations. The zone was originally established on October 23, 1998,
for a period of three years and four months, and was extended in
December 1999 by Resolution No. 92. Also in December 1999, the Congress
extended Law 418 of 1997, by adopting Law 548.[91]
The decree of the zona de distensión was extended again in June
and December 2000. At the same time, the Congress adopted Law 589,
which provided that forced disappearance, forced displacement, genocide,
and torture are excluded from any pardon and/or amnesty.[92]

59.Since
the zona de distensión was established and the dialogue began,
with the assistance of the international community, there was an upturn
in the acts of violence perpetrated by illegal groups. The FARC were
involved in attacks and kidnappings that took a toll of civilian
victims. Finally on February 21, 2002, after almost four years, the
talks broke off as the immediate consequence of the kidnapping of Jorge
Eduardo Gechem Turbay, Chairman of the Senate’s Peace Committee.
President Pastrana immediately suspended the zona de distensión,
thus ending his administration’s effort to negotiate with the main
dissident armed group.

60.These efforts to reach
agreements for demobilizing members of illegal groups paid off in some
cases with partial or relative gains, which have not ended the violence.
The demobilization mechanisms have not been accompanied by
comprehensive measures to provide relief to the victims of the violence
nor to clarify the many criminal acts that remain unpunished, and
therefore the factors generating the conflict in large measure persist.
In addition, many of those who have benefited from past demobilizations
have been victims of retaliatory attacks[93]
and others have eventually chosen to join other illegal armed groups,
re-engaging in the conflict.[94]
In any event, the mechanisms for demobilizing armed groups have not had
the impact required to break the circle of violence in Colombia.

[59]
Decree 0815 “suspending some provisions incompatible with the
state of siege.”

[60]
Decree 0815 reads: “That bands of paid assassins, death squads,
self-defense or private justice groups, mistakenly called
paramilitaries, are responsible for acts that disturb the public
order; That by Legislative decree 3398 of 1965, adopted as
permanent legislation by Article 1 of Law 48 of 1968, the use of
civilian personnel in activities and jobs for re-establishing
normalcy was authorized; That the interpretation of these
provisions by some sectors of public opinion has caused
confusion as to their scope and purposes in that they may be
taken as legal authorization to organized armed civilian groups
that end up acting outside the Constitution and the laws; That
operations to re-establish public order are an exclusive
function of the Army, the National Police, and the state
security forces; That the National Government considers, in the
exercise of the constitutional responsibilities incumbent on it,
that in the current circumstances that fact of the laws
mentioned being in force hinders re-establishment of public
order; That it is necessary to suspend those laws, since their
interpretation by some sectors of public opinion contributes to
creating an environment of confusion that stands in the way of
pooling efforts to achieve reconciliation and have a negative
impact on the action of the Army, the National Police, and
security forces, to the extent that they erode the necessary
solidarity of all sectors of the Nation; That the National
Government has always fought the existence of armed groups
operating outside of the Constitution and the laws, and that
accordingly it considers it necessary to suspend those laws, so
that there not be any ambiguity whatsoever about the will of the
Executive and of the Army , National Police, and security forces
to confront those who are part of those groups, organize them,
financial them, promote them, in on any way collaborate with
them….”Decree 0815 “suspending some laws incompatible with the
state of siege.” See also, Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment
of May 25, 1989, Justice Fabio Morón Díaz writing for the Court,
declaring unconstitutional para. 3 of Article 33 of Legislative
Decree 3398 of 1965.

[61]
Decree 1194 “which adds to Legislative decree 0180 of 1988, to
enact new criminal law definitions, as the establishment of
public order so requires,” of June 8, 1989.

[64]
See, for example, Report No. 5/03 Jesús María Valle Jaramillo,
P519/2001, Colombia, Annual Report of the IACHR 2003.
Human rights defenders continue to be targets of constant
attacks by the actors in the armed conflict, mainly the AUC in
areas in which there is a frequent presence of the military
forces or National Police, in an effort to stop their
investigations and reports of grave acts of violence, aimed at
judicially clarifying such incidents and making reparation to
the victims. In addition, they have been confronted repeatedly
by statements by President Uribe himself, calling into question
their legitimacy and indicating that their orientation and
activities are to be investigated. Indeed, the IACHR has
received reports indicating that over the last two years there
have been situations in which human rights defenders and social
leaders have been deprived of liberty for prolonged periods,
without the evidence needed to open proceedings. In this regard,
the IACHR has been consistent in stating that the punitive power
of the State and its judicial apparatus should not be
manipulated to harass those who are devoted to legitimate
activities.

[66]
See, for example, IACHR Press Release 13/03 “The IACHR deplores
the death of the Governor of Antioquia and other FARC hostages,”
Washington D.C., April 7, 2003 in http://www.cidh.org/
Comunicados/Spanish/2003/13.03.htm.

[67]
See, for example, Report No. 41/02 Admissibility P11,748, José
del Carmen Álvarez Blanco et al. (Pueblo Bello), Colombia,
October 9, 2002, Annual Report of the IACHR 2002. The
case regarding the massacre of the campesino farmers of Pueblo
Bello was referred to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Court on March 23, 2004.

[68]
Jorge Restrepo, Michael Spagat, and Juan Vargas, “The Dynamics
of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A New Data Set,” Royal Holloway
College, University of London, June 2003.

[70]
The IACHR has expressed its points of view on the general human
rights situation in Colombia periodically in chapter IV of its
annual reports for 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003,
and in its “Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in
Colombia”, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102 Doc. 9 rev. 1, February 26,
1999.

[72]
The IACHR has referred applications on the international
responsibility of the Republic of Colombia to the Inter-American
Court in the cases regarding the disappearance of Isidro
Caballero Delgado and María del Carmen Santana perpetrated in
Cesar in 1989; the massacre of civilians in Las Palmeras
(Putumayo) perpetrated in 1991; the massacre of 19 merchants in
the middle Magdalena valley in 1987; the massacre of civilians
in Mapiripán (Meta) perpetrated in 1997; the disappearance of
civilians in Pueblo Bello (Córdoba) in 1990; and the massacres
of civilians in Ituango (Antioquia) perpetrated in 1996 and
1997.

[78]
See interview with Salvatore Mancuso in El Espectador of
November 3, 2004, in which he states: “it’s true that in the
course of the conflict we have acquired some properties that
have served as infrastructure for the defense scheme. You tell
me that we’ve expropriated lands. I’ll tell you something: when
I was trained in the self-defense scheme, the ones who were
being displaced were the ranchers, the peasant farmers. In other
words, displacement goes way back.” See also, “Los señores de
la tierra.
Grupos paramilitares se están apoderando, a sangre y fuego, de
las tierras más valiosas del país. Las víctimas
están desesperadas y no tienen quién les devuelva su
patrimonio,” in La Semana Issue No. 1152, May 31 to June
7, 2004, p. 224, in which reference is made to the methods and
strategies used by paramilitary groups in different regions of
the country to usurp titles through assassination, forced
displacement, issuing unregistered deeds, and corruption.

[79]
Law 37 of 1981 (March 23) by which a conditional amnesty is
declared. Official Gazette No. 35760, May 14, 1981, p. 442.

[80]
Legislative Decree No. 474 of 1982 (February 19) By which
measures are issued aimed at the prompt re-establishment of
internal public order.

[81]
Law 35 of 1982 (November 19) by which an amnesty is decreed and
provisions issued aimed at re-establishing and preserving peace.
Official Gazette No. 36133 bis, November 20, 1982, p.
529.

[82]
Law 49 of 1985 (June 4) granting an authorization to the
President of the Republic, regulating the exercise of the power
to grant pardons, and issuing other provisions. Official Gazette
No. 37000, June 5, 1985,
p. 1079.

[83]
Law 77 of 1989 (December 22) authorizing the President of the
Republic to grant pardons and regulating cases of cessation of
criminal proceedings and issuance of writs of prohibition (autos
inhibitorios) in pursuit of the policy of reconciliation.
Official Gazette No. 39116, December 22, 1989, p. 1.

[84]Decree No. 0206 of 1990 (January 22), regulating
Law 77 of 1989 by the President of the Republic of Colombia, in
the exercise of the powers granted by Article 120(3) of the
Constitution, Official Gazette No. 39152, January 22, 1990, p.
1.

[85]
Decree No. 0213 of 1991 (January 23), issuing measures aimed at
re-establishing public order, by the President of the Republic
of Colombia, in the exercise of the powers conferred on him by
Article 121 of the Constitution, and developing Decree 1038 of
1984, Official Gazette No. 39642, January 23, 1991, p. 1.

[86]
Article 150(17) provides that Congress has the power to “Grant,
by two-thirds majority vote of the members of each Chamber, and
for serious motives in the public interest, general amnesties or
pardons for political crimes. In the event that those favored
are exempted from civil liability with respect to private
persons, the State will be obligated to pay any compensation
where it is due.” Article 201 provides: “It is up to the
Executive, in relation to the Judiciary: 1. To provide judicial
officers, in keeping with the laws, the assistance necessary to
enforce their rulings. 2. To grant pardons for political crimes,
in keeping with the law, and to report to Congress on the
exercise of this power. In no case may such pardons include the
responsibility of the persons so favored with respect to private
persons.” Transitory Article 30 provides: “The National
Government is authorized to grant pardons or amnesties for
political and related crimes, committed prior to the
promulgation of this Constitution, to members of guerrilla
groups who rejoin civilian life in the terms of the policy of
reconciliation. To that end, the National Government will issue
the corresponding regulations. This benefit may not be extended
to atrocious crimes or homicides committed out of combat or
taking advantage of the defenselessness of the victim.”
Constitution of Colombia, Gaceta Constitucional No. 116, July
20, 1991.

[87]
Decree No. 1943 of 1991 (August 12) By which measures are issued
on pardon and amnesty in the exercise of the power conferred on
the President of the Republic of Colombia by Article 30 of the
transitory provisions of the Constitution. Official Gazette No.
39964, August 12, 1991, p. 1.

[88]
Law 104 of 1993 (December 30) by which some instruments for
seeking co-existence, effective justice, and other provisions
are adopted. Official Gazette No. 41158, December 30, 1993, p.
1.

[89]
Law 241 of 1995 (December 26) extending the effect, modifying,
and adding to Law 104 of 1993. Official Gazette No. 42719,
February 14, 1996, p. 1.

[90]
Law 418 of 1997 (December 26) by which some instruments for
seeking co-existence, effective justice, and other provisions
are adopted. Official Gazette No. 43201, December 26, 1997, p.
4.

[91]
Law 548 of 1999 (December 23) “extending the effect of Law 418
of December 26, 1997 and issuing other provisions.”

[92]
Law 589 of 2000 (July 6) “by which the crimes of genocide,
forced disappearance, forced displacement, and torture are
defined; and issuing other provisions,” Official Gazette No.
44,073 of July 7, 2000.

[93]
See, for example, IACHR, Report No. 5/97, Case 11,227
(Colombia) Admissibility, Annual Report of the IACHR 1996,
referring to allegations of persecution of members of the Unión
Patriótica (UP), which was established as a political party
after the peace negotiations between the FARC and the
administration of Belisario Betancur. See also IACHR, Report
No. 63/01, Case 11,710 (Colombia) in Annual Report of the
IACHR 2000, on the extrajudicial execution of two members of
the Corriente de Renovación Socialista (CRS) involved in the
negotiation to demobilize members of the ELN who had joined the
CRS in the context of the peace negotiations carried out in
1993.

[94]
Some demobilized members of the EPL have entered the ranks of
the paramilitary groups. In addition, this alliance has been the
basis for both the FARC and the dissident wing of the EPL to
attack those who demobilized and formed part of the political
grouping Esperanza Paz y Libertad. See IACHR, Third Report
on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia OEA/Ser. L/V/II.102
doc 9 rev 1., para. 96. See also IACHR, Report No. 55/04,
P475/2003 (Colombia) Admissibility.