Thirteen More
States in Treaty Annex Must Ratify for Entry into Force

As the Conference
on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty opened today at Headquarters, Secretary-General Kofi Annan told the
delegates a “precious, but fleeting” opportunity existed to render the troubled
world a safer place, free of the threat of nuclear weapons, and “We must not let
it pass.”

To anyone who
thought that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) had been
overshadowed or marginalized by the events of 11 September, "think again", he
told participants at the three-day Conference.The world could not afford further
proliferation of nuclear weapons nor could it afford to lose momentum in efforts
to eliminate nuclear weapons.Everything must be done to reduce the risk of those weapons falling into
the hands of terrorists.Ratification by 13 more States was needed for the Treaty’s operation; it
was within their power to do so.

The Treaty, which
bans all nuclear tests in all environments, will enter into force only when all
44 States listed in annex 2 of the Treaty have ratified it.Those are the 44 States that
participated in the 1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament and possess
nuclear research and power reactors, according to data compiled by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).So far, 31 of them have ratified the Treaty, including three of the five
nuclear-weapon States:France,
Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom.Two more nuclear States -– China and the
United States -- have signed, but not ratified the CTBT.

The Conference is
convened under article XIV of the Treaty to provide States with an opportunity
to review progress and consider ways to accelerate the ratification process and
advance the entry into force.During a general exchange of views, that began this morning, several
"annex 2" States that have already ratified the CTBT urged the Treaty’s speedy
ratification by other annex 2 States.

Among them, the
Russian Federation’s representative, read out a statement on behalf of Russian
President Vladimir V. Putin.The
President was convinced that both the early entry into force of the CTBT and its
universal adherence would meet the interests of all in the world community.That was why Russia had done its best to
promptly ratify the CTBT.The
current situation surrounding the Treaty’s entry into force was of
concern.

(page 1a follows)

The European
Union, according to a statement made by the representative of Belgium on behalf
of that country’s Foreign Minister, urged the United States to reconsider its
position not to ratify the Treaty and to participate in joint endeavours to
implement the nuclear-test ban.The
countries that had not yet signed the Treaty had deliberately chosen to isolate
themselves from the international community.He appealed to them to join in the
struggle to build a safer world towards ridding it of nuclear
weapons.

The
representative of Mexico -– another annex 2 State ratifier – hailed

the CTBT as a cornerstone for disarmament
and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.With the growing interest in developing
and upgrading nuclear weapons and their emphasis in national security policies,
as well as the terrifying prospect of their use by terrorists, the goal of
making the CTBT operational had acquired its full meaning.He, thus, appealed to the United States
to reconsider its position -- and to those other annex 2 States that had not yet
ratified the Treaty, to accelerate that process.

The
representative of Indonesia announced that its ratification could be expected in
the “foreseeable” future.The
Treaty, together with the global verification mechanism, had evolved a
“no-testing” norm deserving of universal support, he said.Ending all nuclear testing was critical
to preventing the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.Delaying the Treaty’s operation
increased the risk of a resumption of nuclear testing and its ominous
implications of a renewed nuclear arms race and its attendant instability and
confrontation.

Also addressing
the Conference today, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for
the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) said it was his task to oversee the build-up of
the infrastructure for the Treaty’s implementation and the Treaty’s verification
regime for entry into force.He
detailed considerable progress in that regard, including work on the
establishment of a global network of 337 facilities in some 90 States capable of
monitoring nuclear explosions.

Presenting a
progress report on cooperation among States to facilitate the Treaty's entry
into force, the Japanese representative said that the Conference must issue a
strong message urging “non-signatories” and “non-ratifiers” to sign and ratify
the Treaty as soon as possible.It
should call on all nuclear-weapon States, and the two that carried out
nuclear-test explosions after the Treaty’s opening for signature, not to carry
out any more nuclear-weapon-test explosions.

In a number of
procedural and organizational matters, participants elected the Conference
President, Marin Bosch (Mexico).Hannelore Hoppe, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Department
for Disarmament Affairs, will serve as the Secretary.Mr. Bosch addressed the meeting this
morning.

Statements were
also made by the representatives of Austria, Malta, Sweden, Finland, Ireland,
Peru, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Lesotho, Iceland, Australia and
Bangladesh.

The Conference
will meet again at 3 p.m. today to continue its exchange of views.

(page 2
follows)

Background

The Conference on
Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban treaty
(CTBT) began this morning in the Trusteeship Council Chamber.It was the second such conference since
the Treaty's opening for signature on 24 September 1996.

The CTBT commits States parties not to carry
out any nuclear weapon-test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in any
environment and to prohibit, prevent, and refrain from, in any way,
participating in the carrying out of such explosion.The Treaty also provides for a complex
global verification regime, and measures to ensure compliance and redress a
situation contravening it.

The CTBT's opening for signature in September
1996 marked the successful conclusion of one of the longest negotiations in the
history of arms control.With 161
signatories and 84 ratifications, it is now approaching the status of a
universal treaty, but, under its article XIV, it must be ratified by the 44
States listed in its annex 2 before it can enter into force. At present, 31 have
done so.

Thirteen "annex 2" countries whose ratification
is critical to the Treaty's success have not ratified the Treaty, including two
nuclear-weapon States -– China and the United States.Three of the "annex 2" countries have
not signed it -- Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan.

The purpose of the so-called "Article XIV"
Conference is to decide, by consensus, what measures consistent with
international law might be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in
order to facilitate the Treaty's early operation.Such a conference can be held if the
Treaty has not become operational three years after its opening for signature,
and at subsequent anniversaries, until its entry into force.

The first such Conference was held from 6 to 8
October 1999 in Vienna, Austria.A
Final Declaration was adopted, which reiterated that the cessation of all
nuclear-weapon-test explosions and all other nuclear explosions -- by
constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and
ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons -- was an
effective nuclear-disarmament and non-proliferation measure and a meaningful
step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear
disarmament.

It called upon all States that have not yet
signed the Treaty to sign and ratify it as soon as possible and to refrain from
acts that would defeat the Treaty's object and purpose in the meanwhile.It called on States that had signed but
not ratified the Treaty, in particular those whose ratification is needed for
its entry into force, to accelerate their ratification processes.

[At the time of
the convening of the 1999 Conference, 154 States had signed the CTBT and 51
signatory States had ratified it, including 26 annex 2 States.Since then, 33 more States have ratified
the Treaty, and seven more have signed it.]

The following 13 States are required for
ratification, but have not yet done so:Algeria, China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel,
Pakistan, United States and Viet Nam.

The Conference
had before it a background document by the Provisional Technical
Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), prepared for the Conference
(document

CTBT-Art.XIV/2001/3).

The document
contains background to the Treaty’s adoption, as well as a description of its
article I.It also explains article
XIV, which concerns the requirements for the Treaty’s entry into force.The unique global verification regime,
consisting of an International Monitoring System (IMS), is also described, as
well as the mission of the International Data Centre.Details are also included on the Global
Communications Insfrastructure, which plays a critical role in the acquisition
of IMS data, as well as its dissemination to States signatories.The document also discusses the on-site
inspections.

Statements

In his opening
remarks, KOFI ANNAN, Secretary-General of the United Nations, said that he had
convened the Conference at the request of the 84 States that had already
ratified the Treaty.He hoped
anyone who thought the Treaty or the Conference had been overshadowed by the
events of 11 September and their aftermath would think again.Those events should have made it clear
that the world could not afford the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, or
to lose momentum in efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world’s
arsenals.The world must do
everything it could to reduce the risk of such weapons falling into the hands of
terrorists.

The CTBT, he
said, was a crucial element in the non-proliferation regime.The longer its entry into force was
delayed, the greater the risk that nuclear testing would resume -- and that
would make non-proliferation harder to sustain.The Treaty named 44 States whose
ratifications were required for its entry into force, 31 of which had ratified
it so far.The main purpose of the
Conference was to find ways of encouraging all remaining States to sign and
ratify the Treaty, particularly the 13 needed for it to enter into force.Why should that be so
difficult?

Many of the
States that had not signed or ratified had, for years, voiced their support for
nuclear disarmament.Many had
worked long and hard to conclude the Treaty.It was now within their power to bring
the Treaty into force.He implored
them to do so, and encouraged all at the Conference to focus on finding
arguments and taking steps that would allay the doubts still felt in those
States.“We have a precious but
fleeting opportunity to render this troubled world a safer place, free of the
threat of nuclear weapons”, he said. “We must not let it pass.”

Newly elected
Conference President, MARIN BOSCH (Mexico), noted that the Conference had
originally been planned for 25 to 27 September, but the terrorist attacks
against the United States had forced it to be rescheduled.He conveyed to the United States
Government his most sincere condolences for the loss of so many thousands of
lives.With those horrendous acts,
the international community had expressed its decision to tackle, through all
possible means, any threats to peace and international security flowing from
those acts of terrorism, and step up cooperation in order to prevent them in the
future.

Today, he said,
161 had acceded to the CTBT and 85 countries had ratified it, including,
yesterday, the Government of Singapore.Those figures reflected solid support for the purposes of the
Treaty.That support had been
strengthened by commitments adopted by nuclear-weapon States to maintain their
test moratoriums, pending the Treaty’s operation.The world was consolidating the standard
that banned any nuclear explosion, but while those advances had been
encouraging, acceleration of the ratification process should be examined.The historic opportunity of the
Conference should not be wasted.

WOLFGANG HOFFMAN,
Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO, said that,
since the Treaty’s opening for signature in 1996, the General Assembly and other
multilateral forums had called for the Treaty’s signature and ratification as
soon as possible.The 2000
Millennium Summit had provided further momentum to that process, with five more
States signing the Treaty and two more depositing their instruments of
ratification during the Summit.Much remained to be done, however, to advance universality.Without the ratification of the
remaining 13 “Annex 2” States, entry into force would be elusive.

He said that, as
one of the negotiators who had brought the CTBT to a conclusion, it was now his
task to turn words into deeds, to oversee the build-up of the infrastructure for
the Treaty’s implementation.Considerable progress had been made since the Provisional Technical
Secretariat opened its offices in Vienna in March 1997.The Treaty provided for the
establishment of a unique global verification regime, which must be capable of
meeting the Treaty’s verification requirements upon its entry into force.The build-up of the IMS, comprising
seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide stations, as well as
radionuclide laboratories, was a major challenge.

The global
network of 337 facilities would be set up in some 90 States, with many stations
based in remote and inaccessible areas.The IMS network would be capable of registering vibrations underground,
in the sea and in the air, as well as detecting traces of radionuclides released
into the atmosphere from a nuclear explosion.Steady progress had been made in its
establishment, and the construction and upgrading of 121 IMS stations had been
completed.Another

90 stations were under construction or under
contract negotiation.Progress had
also been made in providing the legal framework required by the Treaty to govern
cooperation between the Provisional Technical Secretariat and States hosting IMS
facilities.Such arrangements were
currently in place with 71 host States covering 290 of the 337 IMS
facilities.

He said that
on-site inspection was provided for in the Treaty as a final verification
measure.On-site inspection field
experiments provided valuable experience by allowing the testing of procedures
and equipment under realistic conditions.One such experiment had been held in September-October this year in
Slovakia and had built upon the experience gained in the Kazakhstan field
experiment successfully conducted in 1999.Also, since the Preparatory Commission’s establishment, it had matured as
an international organization.It
also had continued to develop its relations with other global organizations and
with the academic and scientific communities.

NOBUYASU ABE
(Japan) reported on the progress made on efforts to facilitate the entry
into force of the CTBT, as a representative of the country that had been
coordinating those efforts.He
reaffirmed the significance of the Treaty’s early entry into force.First, there was no room to doubt that
the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions, as stipulated in the Treaty,
continued to be a very effective means in constraining the development of
nuclear weapons in the nuclear-weapon States.Second, the cessation of all
nuclear-test explosions and all other nuclear explosions should decisively
impede the development and possession of nuclear weapons in the
non-nuclear-weapon States.

The CTBT was one
of the most important elements for sustaining the international nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation regime, based on the Treaty on the
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which envisaged the total
elimination of nuclear weapons.Since the 1999 Vienna Conference, the nations of the world, including the
ratifiers and signatories of the CTBT, recognized the importance of the Treaty
and had devoted their resources to its early entry into force. The significance
of the early entry into force of the Treaty had been reaffirmed in such
documents as the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

The Final
Declaration of the Vienna Conference had also appointed Japan as the coordinator
of those efforts, he said.Japan
had done its utmost to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty and had
taken such measures as sending letters from its Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister, and dispatching missions to various countries to urge countries to
sign and ratify the CTBT.As a
result, seven more States had signed and 33 more had ratified the Treaty since
the last Review Conference.Today
the number of signatories stood at 161 and the number of ratifiers at 84.Among the 44 States whose ratifications
were required for the Treaty to enter into force, five --- Turkey, Bangladesh,
Russian Federation, Chile and Ukraine –- had ratified the Treaty since
Vienna.

As could be seen
from the number of countries that had signed or ratified the CTBT in the five
years since it was opened for signature, the Treaty was universally perceived as
an instrument of major importance.What else could be done to facilitate the early entry into force of the
CTBT?First, it was imperative to
call on the two nuclear-weapon-States, that had carried out nuclear- test
explosions after the Treaty was opened for signature, not to carry out any more
nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions.Second, the steady build-up of the
verification regime was of crucial importance.Since there were some doubts, it would
be helpful to have frank discussions about the verifiability of the Treaty among
interested parties.

BENITA
FERRERO-WALDNER, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria, said that as
the host country for the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO, Austria assumed a
special responsibility for the successful preparations for its entry into
force.To date, 161 States had
acceded to the CTBT and, by signing, had committed themselves to adhere to the
goals and the spirit of the Treaty.All States, not only those who possessed nuclear capabilities, needed to
become members of the CTBT.First,
because nuclear non-proliferation was too important an issue to leave to a small
group of States, no matter how powerful.Second, because to transform the principle of non-testing into a
universal norm, the CTBT needed universal adherence.

One could argue
that, with 13 ratifications still missing, the CTBT was far from entering into
force, she said.Yet, the internal
difficulties that some of those countries were dealing with must be taken into
consideration.Taking that into
consideration, as well as the pledges by others not to delay entry into force,
she strongly counselled against unreasonable pessimism.Also, the CTBT stipulated that, at entry
into force, the verification regime must be capable of meeting the Treaty’s
verification requirements.Thus,
the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and the Provisional Technical Secretariat must
be provided with sufficient funding for the timely establishment of the
IMS.

She was convinced
that the success of the CTBT would also have a positive impact on the
international security environment.By setting an end to the decades-long deadly spiral of developing
ever-more sophisticated and, hence, more destructive nuclear weapons, the CTBT
contributed essentially to alleviating one of the biggest fears of mankind --
the fear of nuclear destruction.She agreed, therefore, with the assessment of a former United States
Secretary of State that the CTBT was “a real people’s Treaty”.

In spite of
overwhelming popular support, five years after it had been opened for signature
the CTBT had not entered into force.One must think that its comprehensive Monitoring System, with stations in
about 90 countries around the globe, thus leaving no white spaces anywhere, must
serve the interest of each State supporting nuclear non-proliferation.No national system, sophisticated as it
might be, could compete with the worldwide verification regime provided for by
the CTBT.She, therefore, urged all
States that had not yet signed the CTBT to review whether the Treaty might serve
its national interests and to accede to it as soon as possible.She also urged all States that had not
yet ratified the CTBT, especially those 13 on the list of 44, to deposit their
instruments of ratification as soon as possible.

JEAN DE RUYT
(Belgium), speaking on behalf of the European Union, read out the
statement which was to have been delivered by the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Belgium.Now, more than ever, he
said, disarmament and non-proliferation on a multilateral and general basis were
indispensable in preventing terrorists and terrorist organizations from gaining
access to more powerful means of perpetrating their heinous deeds.The Union would continue, unreservedly,
to support international efforts towards disarmament, arms control and
non-proliferation, with regard to both weapons of mass destruction and
conventional arms.

He said that the
CTBT had been a significant step, both symbolic and practical, in nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the NPT,
which was the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the
essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.Its Review Conference last year had
urged all States parties to accede to the CTBT without delay.That Treaty, egalitarian in nature,
placed all States under the same obligation and gave them all equal access to a
verification regime unprecedented in the history of the campaign for disarmament
and non-proliferation.

He welcomed the
declaration by the United States to maintain its moratorium on nuclear testing,
but regretted its announcement that it would cease to participate in certain
activities arising from the Treaty and that it did not plan to reconsider its
position on ratification.That was
all the more worrying, he said, given that, until now, the United States had
played a key role in nuclear- arms control, in particular, within the framework
of the CTBT.The Union urged the
United States Government to review its position and participate in joint
endeavours to implement the ban on all nuclear-weapon-test explosions and all
other nuclear explosions.

Accession to the
Treaty, thus far, was an expression of the international community’s resolve, he
said.Admittedly, the temptation
was sometimes great to concentrate on what remained to be achieved, in
particular on those 13 States whose failure to ratify the Treaty was currently
blocking its entry into force.Nevertheless, what was emerging was the extraordinary spirit of
cooperation between all signatory States, whether or not they had already
ratified the Treaty.He was
delighted that all countries that possessed nuclear weapons had already signed
the Treaty, and that France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom had
already ratified it.

Continuing, he
recalled that in 1998 two States had carried out tests, which had alarmed the
international community.He noted
with interest the application of unilateral moratoriums by them and their
expressed willingness to ultimately accede to the CTBT.Those countries that had not yet signed
the Treaty had deliberately chosen to isolate themselves from the international
community -- indeed, to go against the tide by denying recent developments in an
increasingly interdependent world.He was convinced that they would not “remain deaf” to the invitation to
join the rest of the international community, unconditionally and on a perfectly
equal footing, in its struggle to build a safer world, which would one day be
rid of nuclear weapons.

JOE BORG,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malta, said Malta had signed the CTBT the
day it was opened for signature on 24 September 1996.Having responded to the personal appeal
made by the Secretary-General, Malta had also ratified the Treaty earlier this
year.The CTBT was an essential
step towards nuclear disarmament.It banned all nuclear tests, anytime and anywhere.It also offered the opportunity to
demand on-site inspections, the means to mobilize the world against potential
violators, and a set of new confidence-building measures that served to improve
transparency.The ratification of
the CTBT was, therefore,

in complete consonance
with Malta's support for international efforts aimed at disarmament and the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It was his hope
that the remaining 13 countries whose ratification was necessary for the Treaty
to come into force would soon do so, thus taking a significant collective step
towards reducing the risk of nuclear disaster.Under article XVIII of the Vienna
Convention on Treaties, signatory States were bound not to take actions that
violated the "purpose or intent" of the Treaty to which they were
signatories.In effect, in the case
of the CTBT, that meant they could not conduct a nuclear-test explosion.The longer it took to implement the
CTBT, however, the greater the chances were that some nation might conduct a
nuclear test and set off a dangerous political and military chain reaction,
which might spiral out of control.

Great leaps in
the field of disarmament had never been achieved overnight, he said.That subject matter lent itself more
readily to careful and measured consideration, rather than hurried responses, he
said.Rome was not built in a
day.Nevertheless, Rome was
eventually built.With five years
having elapsed since the conclusion of the Treaty, his Government hoped that the
same could soon be said of the CTBT.It was with that in mind that his Government called once again upon those
13 states whose ratifications were necessary for the Treaty to enter into force
to do so as soon as possible.

Health and
environmental fears associated with nuclear-weapon testing provided the momentum
that had led to the singing of the CTBT by Malta, he said.Those fears remained very real
today.However, they were now
further compounded by the threat of terror, a reality only too recently
witnessed here in New York and across the globe.It was his Government's hope that the
new sense of urgency and purpose that had characterized the work of the
international community in the last weeks would fuel the necessary resolve to
bring the CTBT into force.

ANNA LINDH,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, said that the world must never
forget its vision of a world free of weapons of mass destruction.Nuclear disarmament was a long-standing
goal of Sweden’s, but multilateral disarmament stood at a crossroads today.India and Pakistan had continued nuclear
testing --and were called upon to carry out the steps outlined in Security
Council resolution 1172 (1998).The
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had not yet abandoned its dangerous
proliferation policies, which threatened the whole world.The United States’ plan for a strategic
missile defence system risked harm to disarmament, non-proliferation and the
whole NPT process.

The threat posed
by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could not be met by
unilateral actions, she said.That
global problem required a multilateral response built on an already existing
safety net against proliferation.New threats also challenged the world’s common security.Al Qaeda had just claimed to possess
nuclear weapons and, whether that was true or not, the terrorist attacks on New
York and Washington, D.C., proved, more than ever, the importance of the process
towards disarmament and arms control.

Examples of the
threat of an arms race still existed, she continued.Talks between the United States and the
Russian Federation were long overdue and should be accompanied by effective
mechanisms of verification and irreversibility. International and national
security, to be sustainable, depended on multilateral frameworks and platforms,
particularly for small States. The New Agenda Coalition, a group of States
concerned with the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, had been launched
three years ago and was an initiative rooted in a strong belief in multilateral
disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.Multilateral arms control had produced
impressive results, including the adoption by the 187 States parties to the NPT
of a road map towards nuclear disarmament.There were a number of important instruments to prevent the testing of
nuclear weapon, banning production of nuclear-weapon material, and for improving
verification.

The CTBT made
sense and all States would benefit from adhering to it.It made the acquisition of nuclear
weapon more difficult, prevented a qualitative arms race, and built confidence
with its effective verification system.She deeply regretted that the United States had not voted in favour of
the procedural decision on the CTBT in the First Committee (Disarmament and
International Security) last week, and had stated that it would not support the
Treaty.She also regretted the
decision of the United States Senate to reject the Treaty and called on the
United States to reconsider its position.She called on each of the 13 States, whose ratifications were necessary
for the Treaty to enter into force, not to hold the Treaty hostage.The overwhelming majority of States
wanted nuclear testing to be a thing of the past.

TOM GRONBERG
(Finland) said the CTBT represented an essential building-block in the
efforts of the international community to contain the proliferation of nuclear
arms.The Treaty’s concrete
significance to the promotion of international peace and stability had led to
its ratification by an overwhelming majority of world nations.By banning nuclear-weapon-test
explosions in every environment, the Treaty provided an efficient and credible
means of preventing both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear
arms.Indeed, it set a precedent in
multilateral arms control treaties by providing for a global verification regime
that would make non-compliance practically always detectable.

Finland was fully
committed to the obligations of the CTBT and had made every effort to promote
its entry into force without delay.Finland had signed the Treaty on the first day it was opened up for
signature and had completed the ratification process in 1999.A Facility Agreement had been concluded
between Finland and the Preparatory Commission, and the Primary Seismological
Station, located on Finland’s territory, had already been certified.Finland also actively supported the
Provisional Technical Secretariat in its training activities.He attached great importance to
assisting developing countries in their endeavours to build capacity that was
needed to implement their obligations under the Treaty.

As demonstrated
by the broad and high-level attendance at the current Conference, the CTBT
enjoyed wide support in the international community.And, by international community, he did
not only refer to the support of governments, but even more importantly to the
unanimous support of the world’s civil society.It was, therefore, necessary to ensure
that the momentum created behind the Treaty would continue in order to guarantee
its early entry into force.The
signatory States must join forces in removing the obstacles still preventing the
international community from reaching the final goal, he said.

By continuing to
provide support and adequate financing to the Preparatory Commission, the
international community would enable the timely completion of the global
verification regime, which, in itself, was essential to the Treaty’s
effectiveness and credibility.By
convincing those States still not party to the Treaty of the importance of
signing and ratifying it without delay, the international community could ensure
its entry into force.He hoped the
Conference would signify a major step forward in facilitating that
goal.

BRIAN COWEN,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland, said that he associated himself
with the statement made by Belgium on behalf of the European Union.The choice to proceed with the
Conference was important, because the international community could not be
distracted from its work by those who wished to intimidate or inflict injury and
death.The Conference was an
important opportunity to reaffirm support for the early entry into force of the
CTBT.The Treaty contributed to
non-proliferation and disarmament regimes and protected the environment from the
harmful effects of nuclear-test explosions.

He said the NPT
had been extended indefinitely in 1995 with the widespread understanding that
there would be a renewed commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to conclude and
implement the CTBT.At the NPT
Review Conference,

187 States had agreed on the urgency of the
entry into force of the CTBT.The
CTBT could help to reduce the risk of dangerous competition between
nuclear-capable States by curbing the development of new weapons.The tests conducted by Pakistan and
India in 1998 had set back the drive for the CTBT, but had also made its value
more obvious.

He called on
States whose ratification was necessary for the Treaty to enter into force to
ratify without conditions or delay.In the meantime, he added, testing moratoria should be maintained and the
establishment of a verification system supported.To facilitate the Treaty’s entry into
force, States that had ratified the CTBT should consider working together to
send emissaries to those States that had not.The entry into force of the Treaty was
an essential step in the undertaking of nuclear-weapon States to totally
eliminate nuclear weapons.Progress
towards disarmament and non-proliferation were needed, and the CTBT was the
international community’s means to achieve it.

Ireland had long
been active in the field of disarmament, he said, focusing particularly on the
accomplishment of nuclear disarmament through multilateral agreements.Under the NPT, Ireland had sought to see
that those States in possession of nuclear weapons entered into commitments to
take measured, realistic steps towards that goal.The international community should
proceed with steps, such as the CTBT, a fissile material cut-off treaty, and
implementation of the understanding at the heart of the NPT —- a foregoing of
the possession of nuclear weapons in exchange for their elimination by those who
already possessed them. Those challenges could be met, but they required the
willingness to take the first steps, such as ensuring the entry into force of
the CTBT.

HELI PELAEZ,
Director of Multilateral Politics and Security, Ministry of Foreign Relations of
Peru, said that his country had maintained a strong political commitment
to non-proliferation efforts and to work for the prohibition ofnuclear tests.In keeping with its pacifism, Peru
adhered to all multilateral instruments for nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation.With the
conviction to promote a world free of nuclear weapons, Peru had participated
actively in the negotiations for the CTBT from 1993 to 1996 and had been the
first Latin American State to sign it in 1997.

Peru, he said,
had, on four occasions, held the vice-presidency for the coordination of efforts
of the States signatories of Latin America and the Caribbean before the
Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO.Since then, Peru had given all possible assistance to the Preparatory
Commission to operate its seismological stations in Peruvian territory.Among other activities, Peru had hosted
a regional conference to facilitate the Treaty’s entry into force in Lima in
November 2000, at which experts from Canada, the United States and three
international organizations had participated.

There had been
important progress since the last facilitation conference in Vienna, but the
Treaty could not be truly effective until it became universal, he
continued.The basic principles of
the CTBT would constitute an important guarantee of international peace and
security.Mexico had introduced
pioneering ideas, which had culminated in the Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the
first nuclear-weapons-free zone in the world.In that tradition, Peru, together with
other countries of the region, would assume an active role in turning thoughts
of disarmament into action.He
would also seek to promote the use of nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes,
in accordance with the principles of the Charters of the Organization of
American States (OAS) and the United Nations.

The Conference
was a new opportunity for the international community to put its impetus behind
efforts to ensure nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, he said.It would be a concrete step to promote
the entry into force of the CTBT.For those reasons, Peru would strictly adhere to the provisions of the
Final Declaration to be approved at the end of the
Conference.

IGOR D. SERGEEV,
Assistant on Strategic Stability to the President of the Russian
Federation, read out a statement by the President of the Russian Federation,
Vladimir V. Putin.He said Russia
had always considered the

CTBT a most important instrument in the
fields of nuclear weapons limitation, strengthening of the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime, and preservation of the world strategic
stability.He was convinced that
both the early entry into force of the Treaty and its universalization would
meet the interests of all in the world community.The Russian Federation had done its best
to promptly ratify the CTBT.The
current situation surrounding the Treaty’s entry into force was of concern.

Mr. Sergeev then
began his own statement, saying that, until very recently, strategic stability
in the nuclear field had been defined by establishing nuclear parity between the
Soviet Union and the United States, which had required a continued improvement
of nuclear weapons.In the recent
decade, however, that situation had changed drastically.Now, strategic stability depended not
only on nuclear disarmament, but, to a great extent, on the ability to address
new challenges, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their delivery vehicles.

He said that the
events of 11 September had proved that a “severe and uncompromising” fight
against international terrorism lay ahead.Countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons was undoubtedly an
integral component of that fight.At the same time, the existing system of international treaties in the
field remained insufficient and required further improvement.The CTBT occupied a very important place
in that system, and the international community had travelled a long ways
towards comprehensively banning nuclear tests.Indeed, the Treaty had become a very
important step in strengthening stability and nuclear non-proliferation, and
testified to the intention of many countries to reduce the nuclear
threat.

Nonetheless, he
continued, the Treaty had not yet entered into force.Moreover, there were dangerous trends
towards its collapse, which might result in a crisis for the nuclear
non-proliferation regime and an uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons.That would take place against the
backdrop of attempts to revise the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), disruption of which would allow for
the proliferation of missiles as delivery vehicles for weapons of mass
destruction.That was quite
alarming and meant, among other things, that the guarantee for strategic
stability might, once against, be focused on the nuclear arena.

Who could
guarantee that nuclear weapons would not fall into the hands of terrorists? he
asked.The international community
should preclude any opportunity for “nuclear blackmail” and unite in efforts to
strengthen the non-proliferation regime.The CTBT’s entry into force was the “most important” step in that
direction.His country was fully
committed to the Treaty and had advocated its expeditious operation.To the argument that the verification
regime was not yet fully developed, or that it did not provide sufficient
verification, he would say that that unprecedented global mechanism and modern
monitoring means had made it “absolutely impossible” to conceal any violation of
the Treaty.

JAN KAVAN, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, said that the Czech Republic
had consistently been in favour of realistic and efficient steps aimed both at
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
means and at progressing gradually towards global nuclear disarmament.That was why, in his view, the effective
and verifiable cessation of nuclear-weapon-test explosions and their
prohibition, as provided by the CTBT, continued to be indispensable steps.That was also why the Treaty needed to
enter into force as soon as possible.

He stressed that the CTBT did well for an
international treaty that had not yet entered into force.The Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO
regularly convened and deliberated constructively.Ratifiers and signatories contributed
both in terms of human resources, know-how and finance, and the IMS and
inspection regime were continuously built up.The work of the Provisional Technical
Secretariat, which had grown into an efficient and well-managed institution, was
impressive and commendable.Perhaps, most importantly, the moratorium on nuclear tests had been
respected since 1998.

Nevertheless,
those achievements were not irreversible.Reducing financial support for or even withdrawing from preparatory
activities under the Preparatory Commission would undercut the common
efforts.It was important to
complete the construction, so that the purposes of the Treaty were fully
met.The entry into force was the
most efficient way of deterring anyone from resuming nuclear tests.He also believed that the ongoing global
fight against terrorism, which the Czech Republic supported politically and
materially, must also entail increased efforts in nuclear
non-proliferation.The CTBT was an
important part of it, and he hoped that the partners would realize that.

The purpose of
the Conference was not only to take stock of the progress made, but primarily to
discuss how to maintain and reinforce the political momentum in progressing
towards the entry into force of the Treaty.Certainly, one avenue was for the
Provisional Technical Secretariat to continue its commendable outreach
activities, including holding international cooperation workshops.He observed that article XIV of the CTBT
provided for a useful mechanism and conferences to facilitate the Treaty's entry
into force.Nevertheless, he
continued hoping that they would not need to convene too often, for too
long.All must feel compelled to
bring the Treaty into full operation by the next NPT Review
Conference.

DIMITRIJ RUPEL,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovenia, said that the threats posed by
weapons of mass destruction was one of the greatest threats to international
peace and security.The CTBT and
NPT were the most important steps in the process of strengthening the
non-proliferation regime and the basis for the entire set of efforts to deal
with disarmament and non-proliferation issues.The non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and arms control had been the pillars of international security
since the end of the cold war.

As the barbaric
attacks of 11 September had made clear, the threat of the possession of weapons
of mass destruction by terrorists was of acute concern, he continued.The response to new threats must be
universal and persistent. Existing non-proliferation regimes and controls over
the movement of dangerous materials and technologies must be strictly
implemented.In that regard, it was
the obligation of the international community to accelerate the entry into force
of the CTBT, one of the most important elements in the non-proliferation
regime.Delaying its entry into
force would have global consequences, because it could undermine achievement in
the systematic approach to arms control and non-proliferation.The Treaty’s universal character allowed
no room for excuses based on national security needs or regional
arrangements.

As a proponent of
international security based on transparency and trust, he said Slovenia had
been among the first sign the CTBT in 1996 and had ratified the Treaty in
1999.Slovenia had also confirmed
its support for nuclear non-proliferation policies and for the non-proliferation
of biological and chemical weapons, as well.The international community had a common
obligation to continue the process of non-proliferation, which had resulted in
numerous important arrangements.The opportunity for the Conference to result in the prohibition of all
nuclear-test explosions must be seized.He called on all States that had not yet done so -— especially those
listed in annex 2 of the Treaty -— to sign and ratify the CTBT.

States must
remain committed to the Treaty’s basic principles and refrain from acts that
could prevent its entry into force, he said.States must be aware of the consequences
if the Treaty were to fail to enter into force.Global support for the CTBT was
overwhelming.The Treaty already
contributed to global security through its extensive monitoring and verification
measures.Together with other
signatory and ratifying States, Slovenia expected that States would continue to
fulfil their obligation in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.

OLGA PELLICER
(Mexico) said that the Conference was a link in the chain of efforts in
favour of international peace and security.The CTBT was a cornerstone for
disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which had been a
priority for decades in Mexico’s foreign policy.The adoption of the Treaty five years
ago was a clear acknowledgement of the dangers of nuclear testing.Its comprehensive banning, and impeding
the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, had been an important step
forward in the systematic process of achieving nuclear disarmament.At the beginning of the new millennium,
new and complex problems had increased insecurity worldwide.

In some circles,
she said, there was continued interest in developing and upgrading nuclear
weapons.Also, those weapons had
continued to play a strategic role in national security.Moreover, the threat of the use of those
weapons and their proliferation had been growing.The terrifying prospect of their use by
terrorist groups now also existed.In that light, the objective of promoting the entry into force of the
CTBT had acquired its full meaning.The support of a large number of States parties to the Treaty was
undeniable.At the same time, many
reasons had been expressed for non-ratification.Nevertheless, the greatest
responsibility for the entry into force lay with the nuclear-weapon States.

In that context,
she said, she deeply regretted the announcement by the United States that it
would not push for the ratification process.The world would be much safer if the
test-ban Treaty became operational. She appealed, on an urgent basis, for that
country to reconsider its position.Several other annex 2 States had also not yet ratified the CTBT, and she
appealed to them to do so.She also
called upon India, Pakistan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea -–
annex 2 States -- to sign the Treaty and proceed to ratification.Meanwhile, the moratorium on nuclear
testing must be maintained, as nuclear testing would undeniably threaten
peace.She also sought support for
the magnificent work being carried out by the Provisional Technical Secretariat
of the CTBTO.

MOTSOHAE THOMAS
THABANE, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lesotho, said that the
Conference could not have taken place at a more opportune moment -— a time when
the architecture of strategic stability had deteriorated as the result of a
failure to make progress on some critical disarmament and non-proliferation
issues.States had gathered once
again to reiterate their commitments to the CTBT and to take measures necessary
for its entry into force.

When the CTBT was
opened for signature five years ago, 71 States immediately signed it, showing an
overwhelming degree of support for an initiative to bring an end to all
nuclear-weapon-test explosions.The
primary objective of the Treaty was to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament.While tangible progress on arms control
and disarmament measures had yet to be made, support for the CTBT had continued
to grow since the last Conference to facilitate its entry into force.The number of signatures and
ratifications had increased, and the General Assembly had passed a resolution
entitled “a path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons” which called for
the entry into force of the CTBT by 2003.The CTBTO should be supported in efforts to ensure that the Treaty’s
verification requirements here in place at the time of entry into
force.

The 13 States whose signatures were
necessary for the Treaty to enter into force were called to expedite their
ratification processes, so that entry into force was not delayed beyond 2003, he
said.Without entry into force, it
would not be possible to implement the verification regime, which would reduce
the Treaty’s deterrent effect. It was particularly worrying that two States that
had not committed themselves not to delay the entry into force of the Treaty had
not yet ratified it.More
disturbing was that one other State whose ratification was required for the
Treaty to enter into force had not yet signed the CTBT.

Delaying the
entry into force of the CTBT could only benefit those who opposed the
elimination of nuclear weapon and those who sought to acquire such weapons, he
said.The Conference should prompt
a renewed commitment to work for universal ratification.A high representative should, therefore,
be selected to continue informal consultations with all interested countries to
facilitate entry into force.Technical and financial resources were essential to allow for developing
countries to benefit from the data, products and services that were becoming
available through the data centre.Special attention should be given to the financial and training needs of
developing countries.

THORDUR ÆGIR
ÓSKARSSON
(Iceland) said it was painfully obvious to all present that the meeting
was taking place under drastically changed circumstances from those prevailing
when the decision to hold it was taken.Iceland strongly sympathized with all those who had suffered through the
terrible ordeal and was fully committed to aid the effort of the international
coalition led by the United States in the fight against terrorism.In his view, the tragic events in New
York City only reinforced the need for making the CTBT fully operational.

During the past
four decades, the international community had, slowly but steadily, been trying
to build a network of agreements aiming at curbing the threat of nuclear
proliferation, he continued.Nuclear testing had been regarded as the engine of nuclear
proliferation.The ratification of
the CTBT was crucial in halting and reversing that reliance on weapons of mass
destruction.That finely woven
fabric must not be allowed to unravel; on the contrary, it must be further
strengthened.It was abundantly
clear that all non-proliferation efforts were critical in tackling the menace of
international

terrorism.

Five years had
passed since the CTBT was opened for signature, he said.Despite strong global aspirations, the
entry into force of the CTBT was not in sight.Unfortunately, some States identified in
annex 2 had not ratified the Treaty.It was also of great disappointment that some States had not even signed
it.It was, however, appreciated
that the United States was committed to continuing its self-imposed moratorium
on nuclear testing.He hoped that
would lead to early ratification.

It was no secret
that Iceland was not listed in annex 2, but it had the same legal responsibility
according to the Treaty as any other participating State, he said.What was even more important was that a
principle, which underlined the CTBT and other arms control agreements, must be
reinforced -– and that was the principle of a more secure and peaceful
world.A fully ratified and
implemented CTBT was an indispensable building block in that effort.

JOHN DAUTH (Australia) said that Australia’s strong support
for the CTBT,

a central plank of the global
non-proliferation regime, was founded on deep opposition to nuclear
testing.Over three decades,
successive Australian governments had used every opportunity to oppose nuclear
testing, and to create an international norm effectively prohibiting further
tests.Australia did not take that
position solely out of idealism.It
was a practical view that a complete ban on all nuclear testing was in
Australia’s security interest, and in the security interest of all.

The Treaty placed
an effective barrier against the development of nuclear weapons by countries
that did not have them, he said.It
also prevented nuclear-weapon States from developing new and more advanced
weapons design.That was a major
step on the road towards ridding the world of the means of destroying
itself.He came from the Pacific
region which had experience with nuclear-weapon tests, and thus believed that
the Treaty must also end further environmental damage caused by testing.So far, the Treaty had been ratified by
only 31 of the 44 States whose ratification was required for entry into
force.Of those, only three of the
five nuclear-weapon States -– France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom –- had
ratified the Treaty.Furthermore,
neither India nor Pakistan, both of which undertook a series of nuclear tests in
1998, had signed or ratified the Treaty.

His Government
had consistently urged those countries to continue their moratorium on nuclear
testing, and to sign the CTBT as soon as possible.His country had made representations to
other countries urging them to sign and ratify the Treaty, particularly those in
the Asia-Pacific region and annex 2 countries.Of those countries to which
representations had been made, three had indicated possible ratification in the
near future.Like all strong
supporters of the CTBT, Australia had been disappointed by recent announcements
of the United States that it would not reconsider the CTBT ratification.He hoped that the United States would
reconsider its position and ratify the Treaty.That said, the United States position
must not be used as an excuse by other countries to delay their own signature
and ratification.

A ban on any
nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, for all time, was
nearly within reach, he said.He
did not underestimate the obstacles to be overcome, but it was his ardent hope
that Treaty supporters would remain steadfast in seeking its early entry into
force.Australia would remain
steadfast until the goal was reached.

MAKMUR WIDODO
(Indonesia) noted the steady increase in the number of signatory and
ratifying States to the Treaty.Non-signatories had even expressed their intention not to stand in the
way of its entry into force.Progress had also been made in establishing a reliable and effective
global verification mechanism that would be ready to ensure detection and
location of explosions with a high degree of probability and, thereby, ensure
that all States parties adhered to its provisions.Together, they had established a global
“no-testing” norm, which now commanded universal support.The nuclear-test moratorium had
continued to be observed by the nuclear-weapon States, which could serve as
stimulus and common ground towards their early ratification.

He said that
Indonesia, for its part, would submit its ratification in due time.The Treaty was currently undergoing the
constitutional process and ratification could be expected in the foreseeable
future.The Treaty’s early
operation would effectively enhance the credibility of the NPT regime.Indeed, a testing ban, the strengthening
of the non-proliferation regime, as well as the systematic and progressive
efforts towards the elimination of nuclear arsenals, were a triad of important
commitments.Repudiation or
weakening of either one would negatively affect the other. The Treaty’s early
operation would also contribute to global efforts against terrorists seeking to
acquire weapons of mass destruction, which was a conspicuous threat since 11
September.

Ending all
nuclear testing would be an essential prerequisite to preventing horizontal and
vertical proliferation, he said.Delaying the CTBT’s operation increased the risk that nuclear testing
could resume, with its ominous implications of a renewed nuclear arms race and
its attendant instability and confrontation, as well as its harmful impact on
the environment.He reiterated his
conviction that a global “no-testing” norm was an imperative.In that connection, six seismic stations
in Indonesia had been integrated into the IMS to monitor possible non-compliance
with the basic obligations of the Treaty.

IFTEKHAR AHMED
CHOWDHURY (Bangladesh) said that this was a time when the sense of
security in this country, as well as in many others, had been violated like
never before.The international
dimension of the threat to security had heightened concerns all around the
globe.Apprehensions about both
conventional and nuclear threats had come to the fore in all minds.Being among the first signatories and
subsequently one of the early ratifiers of the CTBT, Bangladesh had invested
heavily in those efforts, with a view to achieving the non-proliferation
objectives of the international community.He was convinced of the importance of the Treaty in outlawing tests and
thus preventing the development of new, more advanced weapons by nuclear-weapon
States.

First and
foremost, he continued, the CTBT constituted an essential part of the
nuclear-weapon-State obligations under the NPT to end the arms race and to
pursue nuclear disarmament.The
contractual aspect of the issue was of immense importance to those non-nuclear
States who had signed off the nuclear option once for all.He stressed that must be appreciated in
the proper context of article VI of the NPT.Second, the CTBT it attempted to
de-emphasize and minimize the importance of nuclear weapons for national
security.Again, that was a very
important concept for non-nuclear States.And finally, the Treaty provided for building an elaborate global
infrastructure, on which a substantial verification regime would be founded to
meet the verification requirements for the Treaty.

He stressed that
the solidarity exhibited by the international community in combating
international terrorism must be available for nuclear disarmament, and
non-proliferation, as well.He
expressed concern that, after five years of its opening for signature, the
Treaty had not entered into force.That delay was

regrettable.His country associated itself with the
call to strengthen efforts to promote the entry into force of the Treaty at the
earliest possible date.A method
must be created to assist those poor countries who shared the spirit of the
cause, but found the financial cost too high.Bangladesh had argued that point for
many years.

The vision of a
nuclear-free world was realizable, he said.The progress might be slow, but not
necessarily fraught with despair, as the number of new adhering States
increased.He encouraged the
sustained endeavours of the global community, evident in the work of the
Conference, to bring the aspirations to fruition, and he expressed his hope that
the Treaty would, before long, enter into force.