"The team's coach is Canadian Brad McCrimmon, who took over in May. He was mosly recently an assistant coach with the Detroit Red Wings, and played 18 years in the NHL for Boston, Philadelphia, Detroit, Hartford and Phoenix."

"A Yak Service Yakovlev Yak-42, registration RA-42434 performing a charter flight from Yaroslavl (Russia) to Minsk (Belarus) with 37 passengers (the Lokomotiv Yaroslav Hockey Team) and 8 crew, could not climb out after takeoff from Yaroslavl's Tunoshna Airport at approx. 15:50L (11:50Z). The airplane impacted an antenna outside the airport perimeter, impacted ground and came to rest about 1000 meters from the airport broken up in two major parts, the tail section at the bank of Volga River and the fuselage in the river. 26 bodies have so far been recovered, two occupants have been taken to hospitals with critical injuries."

"“The team is feeling pretty down after hearing what happened this morning,” a somber Nicklas Lidstrom said, referring to news that former assistant coach and defensemen Brad McCrimmon, defenseman Ruslan Salei, and goalie Stefan Liv were aboard when the tragedy occurred."

"Both survivors were flown to Moscow for treatment of the burns. While the flight engineer is on the way to recovery, the burns of Alexander Galimov proved "incompatible with life". The research hospital confirmed he died in the morning of Sep 12th."

"On Sep 12th 2011 the MAK reported, that the on site investigation has been nearly completed. The aircraft, built in 1993, had accumulated 6,500 flying hours, with a design target of 12,000 hours life span. The actual takeoff weight was below maximum takeoff weight. Total fuel on board was 14 tons, 8 tons of which were added in Yaroslavl. An analysis of the fuel is still being carried out. The crew performed a proper flight controls check during takeoff preparation, the elevator moved freely and normally. Weather conditions, including winds, had no influence on the accident sequence. Stabilizer and flaps were properly set for takeoff. All engines were working normally until impact with ground. A single parameter can not be identified as cause from the flight data recorder, all of the system parameters off the flight data recorder are now going to be studied in a special research center. The commission is considering a full scale experiment on the aircraft controls."

From the updated AvHerald Article.

So, to paraphrase, the aircraft was not over-weight, did not suffer fuel starvation, and thus far appeared to have properly functioning flight controls. Weather was good. And the engines appeared to be running at the time of the crash. Hopefully, the flight engineer, who is now the lone survivor, can shed some light on the incident at some point.

"Both survivors were flown to Moscow for treatment of the burns. While the flight engineer is on the way to recovery, the burns of Alexander Galimov proved "incompatible with life". The research hospital confirmed he died in the morning of Sep 12th."

This is from the updated AvHerald article. That makes the death toll 44, leaving only the flight engineer as a survivor.

"Late Sep 17th the MAK reported that before beginning the takeoff run the flaps and slats were set at 20 degrees and both slats and flaps had correctly extended into their commanded positions, the stabilizer trim was set to 8.7 degrees nose up corresponding with the CG at about 24-25% MAC. The crew cross checked all flight controls while taxiing out to taxiway 5, the elevator deflected to 21 degrees corresponding to its normal mechanical stop. The cross checks concluded 100 seconds before beginning the takeoff run. The aircraft entered the runway at intersection with taxiway 5 leaving a takeoff distance available of about 2700 meters. Takeoff commenced at nominal takeoff thrust, acceleration up to 165 kph (89 knots) was normal and consistent with engine's takeoff thrust. Rotation was initiated at about 185 kph (100 knots), the elevator was deflected to about 9-10 degrees (about half way travel), however the aircraft did not rotate. About 6 seconds later the engines were firewalled to deliver maximum takeoff thrust. Despite engines accelerated to maximum takeoff thrust, acceleration of the aircraft slowed significantly, possibly by the appearance of some additional braking force which needs to be determined mathematically. The aircraft reached a maximum speed of 230 kph (124 knots), the aircraft became airborne 400 meters past the end of the runway at an elevator deflection of 13-14 degrees and retrim to 9.5 degrees nose up. Immediately after becoming airborne the aircraft collided with the localizer antenna, the pitch angle increased to 20 degrees for 2-3 seconds, the aircraft reached a maximum height of 5-6 meters (15-18 feet). The aircraft sharply rolled to the left and impacted ground. Checks of the wreckage showed, that the elevator trim had reached 10 degrees nose up, the control wires had not been severed until time of impact. The investigation is currently looking into what may have caused the braking forces."

"On Sep 23rd 2011 the MAK reported the surviving flight engineer told the MAK that the luggage was loaded into the rear cargo bay, the coaches and officials of the team were in the front cabin and the players in the second cabin. There had been no objections regarding the technical condition of the aircraft during the previous and before the accident flight."

Wow. Very interesting and chilling, especially the part about the phenobarbitol.

One thing I don't quite understand is the following: Had the crew rejected takeoff even above V1, with about 1000 meters of runway remaining available after the failed first attempt to rotate the aircraft, an accident would have been averted.

This doesn't make sense to me because V1, by definition, means that you can not stop the plane safely with the amount of runway remaining, and V1 calculations take into account runway length, weather conditions, plane weight and so forth. Any ideas?

- serious shortcomings in the re-training of the crew members - Lack of supervision of the re-training

- errors and missed procedures by the crew in preparation and execution of the takeoff

(especially a wrong position of the foot on the brake pedal on the Yak-42 and the captain, conducting a balanced takeoff, took the incompetent decision to begin the takeoff roll not from the beginning of the runway.)

- inconsistent, uncoordinated actions by the crew in the final stages of the takeoff