Joining Forces Against Terrorism: Japan's New Law Commits More ThanWords to U.S. Effort

Japan gave its ally, the United States, a strong
show of support in the war on terrorism by passing a significant
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law on October 29. This new law
will enable Japan to "contribute actively and on its own initiative
to the efforts of the international community for the prevention
and eradication of terrorism."1 By
moving beyond the country's prior policy of non-involvement, the
law will allow Japan's self-defense forces (SDF) to support the
efforts of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The SDF would be able to
use their weapons not only to protect themselves, but also to
protect "others who are on the scene and have come under their
(SDF) control while conducting their duties."2

For
example, under this new law, Japan's ships, even Aegis destroyers,
could be deployed to the Persian Gulf to become part of the U.S.
air defense umbrella, ready to use their missiles to defend U.S.
forces should they come under attack.3 This
move, welcomed by the United States, also has been welcomed by
Australia and Singapore, both of which offered the use of their
naval facilities to Japanese ships in transit to the front.

In
framing the significance of anti-terrorism legislation, Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi emphasized that Japan should begin to
take a "proactive" stance in trying to eradicate terrorism. For
Japan, this new approach means the Diet must amend the laws
governing the self-defense forces and the Maritime Safety Agency.4 For Asia and the rest of the
world, it means that Japan, while maintaining its "peace
constitution," would take a significant step toward becoming a more
active international power that will contribute to other defense
actions or international efforts under U.N. mandates. For the
United States, it means that Japan continues to uphold their
long-standing alliance as especially important in maintaining peace
and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and around the world.

The
Bush Administration should welcome this assistance from a strong
ally. There will be some concerns around Asia that Japan may be
abandoning its "peace constitution." Therefore, the Administration
should support Japan through active diplomacy around the
Asia-Pacific region and through its own "proactive" public
diplomacy program. Finally, when Japan's self-defense forces do
deploy, they should be fully integrated into the defense
architecture in regions where the war on terrorism is being
waged.

Japan's New Role in Preserving
Peace
Japan's defense activities are severely circumscribed by Article 9
of its Constitution, which states that "the Japanese people forever
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or
use of force as a means of settling international disputes." It
also asserts that "land, sea and air forces, as well as other war
potential" to accomplish such aims "will never be maintained."5 As Heritage analyst Balbina
Hwang has observed, "while Japan's Constitution does not explicitly
prohibit collective self-defense actions, Japan's non-involvement
in such activities has been the accepted interpretation of Article
9 since its adoption in 1947."6

Former Ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki, now
head of the prestigious Tokyo think tank, the Okazaki Institute,
has observed that "Japan has the right of collective self-defense,
but it is a right that Japan will not exercise" because of public
opposition.7 The practical effect of this
restrictive interpretation of Article 9 has been to limit
logistical support from Japan in peacekeeping operations and in
maneuvers with the United States that involve joint exercises.

Describing the operative effects of that
interpretation of Article 9 in a speech at the Atlantic Council in
Washington last July, Okazaki noted that if a U.S. warship
conducting exercises in the Sea of Japan were attacked by enemy
fire, the Japanese self-defense forces would be prohibited from
coming to its aid. Yet, if a Japanese ship involved in the
exercises were attacked by enemy fire, the United States would be
obligated under its bilateral treaty alliance to assist Japan.

The
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law passed by the Diet is
consistent with Article 9 of the Constitution because, while it
permits logistical and other support, it does not permit Japanese
forces to participate in direct offensive combat. Implicit in the
new law is the assumption that Japanese ships could engage in
defensive actions with the U.S. Navy in the event of attack. By
passing the anti-terrorism law, permitting Japan's self-defense
forces to deploy to the Persian Gulf, the Diet has greatly aided
Prime Minister Koizumi's effort to develop a new consensus in Japan
on collective self-defense.

Since he became Prime Minister on April
26, Koizumi has sought such a consensus that would permit at least
an early reinterpretation of Article 9 to facilitate stronger
alliance cooperation with the United States. His long-term goal is
to make Japan a more "normal" power with a stronger defensive
capability, and he has been encouraged to do this by many foreign
policy experts in the Bush Administration and around the United
States.8 Until the terrorist attacks on
September 11, Koizumi and his allies used the need for ballistic
missile defense cooperation to advance this effort.9 The attacks on the United
States propelled the political consensus in Japan that he sought. A
survey by the respected Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun found
that 83 percent of respondents support or accept the U.S.-led
anti-terrorism campaign,10 which is widely viewed as a
defensive action.

A Critical Reinterpretation of Japan's
Constitution
Japan's right to collective self-defense is not explicitly denied
by its Constitution. Rather it is denied by a 1960 government
interpretation of Article 9,11 the
result of heightened expectations of a Soviet invasion of the
island of Hokkaido. But this restrictive interpretation has burned
itself into the public consciousness to the point that it has
carried the strength of dogma. Indeed, it is one of the reasons
political limitations were imposed on the breadth of cooperation
between the United States and Japan on ballistic missile
defense.

Reluctance in Japan to establish a robust
defense establishment dates back to 1954, when the National Police
Reserves and National Security Force were renamed the Self-Defense
Forces.12 The Japanese Defense Agency
was also created at that time, with ground, maritime, and air
self-defense components. The major factor reorienting Japan's
defense policy, to the alarm of many East Asian nations who
recalled Japan's wartime history, was a communiqué issued by
President Ronald Reagan and Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki on
May 8, 1981. It acknowledged that "both countries desire a greater
sharing of defense roles and thus, Japan should increase its
defense capabilities...."13 From a practical standpoint,
this meant that Japan would defend Japanese territory and the seas
and skies surrounding Japan up to a distance of 1,000 nautical
miles, something that the United States had promoted for some
time.14

Since then, the political climate in Japan
limited further expansion of this defense role, including the
participation of the SDF in U.N. peacekeeping operations. In the
Gulf War, Japan contributed $13 billion and six minesweepers, but
no real military support. Despite pressure from a small number of
conservative Diet members for a reinterpretation of Article 9,
there has been little movement to do so until now. The release of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368 after the September attacks
on America, which calls on countries worldwide to "redouble their
efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by
increased cooperation,"15 provided Koizumi and the Diet
the legislative opportunity to reinterpret the Constitution so as
to be able to dispatch forces in support of the U.S.-led coalition
against terrorism.

A U.S. Response to Japan's New
Law
The Bush Administration should publicly acknowledge this show of
support from Japan. Specifically, it should:

Encourage Japan
to continue pursuing a posture of collective self-defense
. Washington can do this by ensuring that the SDF ships and
personnel Japan deploys to participate in the war on terrorism are
fully integrated into U.S. defensive formations.

Using public
diplomacy, make clear that the United States welcomes Japan's
efforts to be a more "normal" world power, which would
help strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. Public diplomacy programs
should also emphasize that this is not a move toward militarism on
the part of Japan.

Work to
strengthen other forms of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation ,
such as sea-based ballistic missile defense research. This is a
major interest of Japan because of the growing threat of missile
attack posed by North Korea's aggressive ballistic missile
program.

Conclusion
The passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law by Japan's
Diet is a strong show of support for the United States in
conducting a global war on terrorism. It also signals Asia and the
world that the U.S.-Japan alliance remains strong. The United
States should publicly acknowledge this step by pointing out the
contributions Japan can make to peace and security not only in the
Asia-Pacific region, but also around the world, by providing
defensive support for its ally.

8."The United States and
Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership," a Special Report by
the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) and the
National Defense University (NDU) on October 11, 2000, available at
http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/SR_Japan.HTM
. Presents the consensus view of members of a bipartisan study
group on the U.S.-Japan partnership, chaired by Richard Armitage
and Joseph Nye.

9.Larry M. Wortzel,
Speech at the Nippon Conference on the Constitution of Japan,
Tokyo, Japan, April 29, 2001.