Plato's Phaedo: Entire

Persons of the Dialogue:
PHAEDO, who is the narrator of the dialogue to ECHECRATES of Phlius
SOCRATES
APOLLODORUS
SIMMIAS
CEBES
CRITO
ATTENDANT OF THE PRISON

SCENE: The Prison of Socrates
PLACE OF THE NARRATION: Phlius

Echecrates. Were you yourself, Phaedo, in the prison with Socrates on the day
when he drank the poison?

Phaedo. Yes, Echecrates, I was.

Ech. I wish that you would tell me about his death. What did he say in his
last hours? We were informed that he died by taking poison, but no one knew
anything more; for no Phliasian ever goes to Athens now, and a long time has
elapsed since any Athenian found his way to Phlius, and therefore we had no
clear account.

Phaed. Did you not hear of the proceedings at the trial?

Ech. Yes; someone told us about the trial, and we could not understand why,
having been condemned, he was put to death, as appeared, not at the time, but
long afterwards. What was the reason of this?

Phaed. An accident, Echecrates. The reason was that the stern of the ship
which the Athenians send to Delos happened to have been crowned on the day
before he was tried.

Ech. What is this ship?

Phaed. This is the ship in which, as the Athenians say, Theseus went to Crete
when he took with him the fourteen youths, and was the saviour of them and of
himself. And they were said to have vowed to Apollo at the time, that if they
were saved they would make an annual pilgrimage to Delos. Now this custom still
continues, and the whole period of the voyage to and from Delos, beginning when
the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship, is a holy season, during
which the city is not allowed to be polluted by public executions; and often,
when the vessel is detained by adverse winds, there may be a very considerable
delay. As I was saying, the ship was crowned on the day before the trial, and
this was the reason why Socrates lay in prison and was not put to death until
long after he was condemned.

Ech. What was the manner of his death, Phaedo? What was said or done? And
which of his friends had he with him? Or were they not allowed by the
authorities to be present? And did he die alone?

Phaed. No; there were several of his friends with him.

Ech. If you have nothing to do, I wish that you would tell me what passed, as
exactly as you can.

Phaed. I have nothing to do, and will try to gratify your wish. For to me,
too, there is no greater pleasure than to have Socrates brought to my
recollection, whether I speak myself or hear another speak of him.

Ech. You will have listeners who are of the same mind with you, and I hope
that you will be as exact as you can.

Phaed. I remember the strange feeling which came over me at being with him.
For I could hardly believe that I was present at the death of a friend, and
therefore I did not pity him, Echecrates; his mien and his language were so
noble and fearless in the hour of death that to me he appeared blessed. I
thought that in going to the other world he could not be without a divine call,
and that he would be happy, if any man ever was, when he arrived there, and
therefore I did not pity him as might seem natural at such a time. But neither
could I feel the pleasure which I usually felt in philosophical discourse (for
philosophy was the theme of which we spoke). I was pleased, and I was also
pained, because I knew that he was soon to die, and this strange mixture of
feeling was shared by us all; we were laughing and weeping by turns, especially
the excitable Apollodorus-you know the sort of man?

Ech. Yes.

Phaed. He was quite overcome; and I myself and all of us were greatly moved.

Ech. Who were present?

Phaed. Of native Athenians there were, besides Apollodorus, Critobulus and
his father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, and Antisthenes; likewise
Ctesippus of the deme of Paeania, Menexenus, and some others; but Plato, if I am
not mistaken, was ill.

Ech. Were there any strangers?

Phaed. Yes, there were; Simmias the Theban, and Cebes, and Phaedondes; Euclid
and Terpison, who came from Megara.

Ech. And was Aristippus there, and Cleombrotus?

Phaed. No, they were said to be in Aegina.

Ech. Anyone else?

Phaed. I think that these were about all.

Ech. And what was the discourse of which you spoke?

Phaed. I will begin at the beginning, and endeavor to repeat the entire
conversation. You must understand that we had been previously in the habit of
assembling early in the morning at the court in which the trial was held, and
which is not far from the prison. There we remained talking with one another
until the opening of the prison doors (for they were not opened very early), and
then went in and generally passed the day with Socrates. On the last morning the
meeting was earlier than usual; this was owing to our having heard on the
previous evening that the sacred ship had arrived from Delos, and therefore we
agreed to meet very early at the accustomed place. On our going to the prison,
the jailer who answered the door, instead of admitting us, came out and bade us
wait and he would call us. "For the Eleven," he said, "are now
with Socrates; they are taking off his chains, and giving orders that he is to
die to-day." He soon returned and said that we might come in. On entering
we found Socrates just released from chains, and Xanthippe, whom you know,
sitting by him, and holding his child in her arms. When she saw us she uttered a
cry and said, as women will: "O Socrates, this is the last time that either
you will converse with your friends, or they with you." Socrates turned to
Crito and said: "Crito, let someone take her home." Some of Crito's
people accordingly led her away, crying out and beating herself. And when she
was gone, Socrates, sitting up on the couch, began to bend and rub his leg,
saying, as he rubbed: "How singular is the thing called pleasure, and how
curiously related to pain, which might be thought to be the opposite of it; for
they never come to a man together, and yet he who pursues either of them is
generally compelled to take the other. They are two, and yet they grow together
out of one head or stem; and I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had noticed
them, he would have made a fable about God trying to reconcile their strife, and
when he could not, he fastened their heads together; and this is the reason why
when one comes the other follows, as I find in my own case pleasure comes
following after the pain in my leg, which was caused by the chain."

Upon this Cebes said: I am very glad indeed, Socrates, that you mentioned the
name of Aesop. For that reminds me of a question which has been asked by others,
and was asked of me only the day before yesterday by Evenus the poet, and as he
will be sure to ask again, you may as well tell me what I should say to him, if
you would like him to have an answer. He wanted to know why you who never before
wrote a line of poetry, now that you are in prison are putting Aesop into verse,
and also composing that hymn in honor of Apollo.

Tell him, Cebes, he replied, that I had no idea of rivalling him or his
poems; which is the truth, for I knew that I could not do that. But I wanted to
see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt about certain dreams. In
the course of my life I have often had intimations in dreams "that I should
make music." The same dream came to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes
in another, but always saying the same or nearly the same words: Make and
cultivate music, said the dream. And hitherto I had imagined that this was only
intended to exhort and encourage me in the study of philosophy, which has always
been the pursuit of my life, and is the noblest and best of music. The dream was
bidding me to do what I was already doing, in the same way that the competitor
in a race is bidden by the spectators to run when he is already running. But I
was not certain of this, as the dream might have meant music in the popular
sense of the word, and being under sentence of death, and the festival giving me
a respite, I thought that I should be safer if I satisfied the scruple, and, in
obedience to the dream, composed a few verses before I departed. And first I
made a hymn in honor of the god of the festival, and then considering that a
poet, if he is really to be a poet or maker, should not only put words together
but make stories, and as I have no invention, I took some fables of esop, which
I had ready at hand and knew, and turned them into verse. Tell Evenus this, and
bid him be of good cheer; that I would have him come after me if he be a wise
man, and not tarry; and that to-day I am likely to be going, for the Athenians
say that I must.

Simmias said: What a message for such a man! having been a frequent companion
of his, I should say that, as far as I know him, he will never take your advice
unless he is obliged.

Why, said Socrates,-is not Evenus a philosopher?

I think that he is, said Simmias.

Then he, or any man who has the spirit of philosophy, will be willing to die,
though he will not take his own life, for that is held not to be right.

Here he changed his position, and put his legs off the couch on to the
ground, and during the rest of the conversation he remained sitting.

Why do you say, inquired Cebes, that a man ought not to take his own life,
but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying?

Socrates replied: And have you, Cebes and Simmias, who are acquainted with
Philolaus, never heard him speak of this?

I never understood him, Socrates.

My words, too, are only an echo; but I am very willing to say what I have
heard: and indeed, as I am going to another place, I ought to be thinking and
talking of the nature of the pilgrimage which I am about to make. What can I do
better in the interval between this and the setting of the sun?

Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held not to be right? as I have
certainly heard Philolaus affirm when he was staying with us at Thebes: and
there are others who say the same, although none of them has ever made me
understand him.

But do your best, replied Socrates, and the day may come when you will
understand. I suppose that you wonder why, as most things which are evil may be
accidentally good, this is to be the only exception (for may not death, too, be
better than life in some cases?), and why, when a man is better dead, he is not
permitted to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of another.

By Jupiter! yes, indeed, said Cebes, laughing, and speaking in his native
Doric.

I admit the appearance of inconsistency, replied Socrates, but there may not
be any real inconsistency after all in this. There is a doctrine uttered in
secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door of his prison
and run away; this is a great mystery which I do not quite understand. Yet I,
too, believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we are a possession of
theirs. Do you not agree?

Yes, I agree to that, said Cebes.

And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example took the
liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no intimation of
your wish that he should die, would you not be angry with him, and would you not
punish him if you could?

Certainly, replied Cebes.

Then there may be reason in saying that a man should wait, and not take his
own life until God summons him, as he is now summoning me.

Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there is surely reason in that. And yet how can
you reconcile this seemingly true belief that God is our guardian and we his
possessions, with that willingness to die which we were attributing to the
philosopher? That the wisest of men should be willing to leave this service in
which they are ruled by the gods who are the best of rulers is not reasonable,
for surely no wise man thinks that when set at liberty he can take better care
of himself than the gods take of him. A fool may perhaps think this-he may argue
that he had better run away from his master, not considering that his duty is to
remain to the end, and not to run away from the good, and that there is no sense
in his running away. But the wise man will want to be ever with him who is
better than himself. Now this, Socrates, is the reverse of what was just now
said; for upon this view the wise man should sorrow and the fool rejoice at
passing out of life.

The earnestness of Cebes seemed to please Socrates. Here, said he, turning to
us, is a man who is always inquiring, and is not to be convinced all in a
moment, nor by every argument.

And in this case, added Simmias, his objection does appear to me to have some
force. For what can be the meaning of a truly wise man wanting to fly away and
lightly leave a master who is better than himself? And I rather imagine that
Cebes is referring to you; he thinks that you are too ready to leave us, and too
ready to leave the gods who, as you acknowledge, are our good rulers.

Yes, replied Socrates; there is reason in that. And this indictment you think
that I ought to answer as if I were in court?

That is what we should like, said Simmias.

Then I must try to make a better impression upon you than I did when
defending myself before the judges. For I am quite ready to acknowledge, Simmias
and Cebes, that I ought to be grieved at death, if I were not persuaded that I
am going to other gods who are wise and good (of this I am as certain as I can
be of anything of the sort) and to men departed (though I am not so certain of
this), who are better than those whom I leave behind; and therefore I do not
grieve as I might have done, for I have good hope that there is yet something
remaining for the dead, and, as has been said of old, some far better thing for
the good than for the evil.

But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates? said Simmias.
Will you not communicate them to us?-the benefit is one in which we too may hope
to share. Moreover, if you succeed in convincing us, that will be an answer to
the charge against yourself.

I will do my best, replied Socrates. But you must first let me hear what
Crito wants; he was going to say something to me.

Only this, Socrates, replied Crito: the attendant who is to give you the
poison has been telling me that you are not to talk much, and he wants me to let
you know this; for that by talking heat is increased, and this interferes with
the action of the poison; those who excite themselves are sometimes obliged to
drink the poison two or three times.

Then, said Socrates, let him mind his business and be prepared to give the
poison two or three times, if necessary; that is all.

I was almost certain that you would say that, replied Crito; but I was
obliged to satisfy him.

Never mind him, he said.

And now I will make answer to you, O my judges, and show that he who has
lived as a true philosopher has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to
die, and that after death he may hope to receive the greatest good in the other
world. And how this may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavor to explain. For I
deem that the true disciple of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other
men; they do not perceive that he is ever pursuing death and dying; and if this
is true, why, having had the desire of death all his life long, should he repine
at the arrival of that which he has been always pursuing and desiring?

Simmias laughed and said: Though not in a laughing humor, I swear that I
cannot help laughing when I think what the wicked world will say when they hear
this. They will say that this is very true, and our people at home will agree
with them in saying that the life which philosophers desire is truly death, and
that they have found them out to be deserving of the death which they desire.

And they are right, Simmias, in saying this, with the exception of the words
"They have found them out"; for they have not found out what is the
nature of this death which the true philosopher desires, or how he deserves or
desires death. But let us leave them and have a word with ourselves: Do we
believe that there is such a thing as death?

To be sure, replied Simmias.

And is this anything but the separation of soul and body? And being dead is
the attainment of this separation; when the soul exists in herself, and is
parted from the body and the body is parted from the soul-that is death?

Exactly: that and nothing else, he replied.

And what do you say of another question, my friend, about which I should like
to have your opinion, and the answer to which will probably throw light on our
present inquiry: Do you think that the philosopher ought to care about the
pleasures-if they are to be called pleasures-of eating and drinking?

Certainly not, answered Simmias.

And what do you say of the pleasures of love-should he care about them?

By no means.

And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body-for example,
the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, or other adornments of the body?
Instead of caring about them, does he not rather despise anything more than
nature needs? What do you say?

I should say the true philosopher would despise them.

Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with
the body? He would like, as far as he can, to be quit of the body and turn to
the soul.

That is true.

In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, may be observed in
every sort of way to dissever the soul from the body.

That is true.

Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that a life which has
no bodily pleasures and no part in them is not worth having; but that he who
thinks nothing of bodily pleasures is almost as though he were dead.

That is quite true.

What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?-is the body,
if invited to share in the inquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say, have
sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the poets are always
telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even they are inaccurate and
indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses?-for you will allow that they
are the best of them?

Certainly, he replied.

Then when does the soul attain truth?-for in attempting to consider anything
in company with the body she is obviously deceived.

Yes, that is true.

Then must not existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?

Yes.

And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these
things trouble her-neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure-when she
has as little as possible to do with the body, and has no bodily sense or
feeling, but is aspiring after being?

That is true.

And in this the philosopher dishonors the body; his soul runs away from the
body and desires to be alone and by herself?

That is true.

Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an
absolute justice?

Assuredly there is.

And an absolute beauty and absolute good?

Of course.

But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?

Certainly not.

Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense? (and I speak not of
these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and of the
essence or true nature of everything). Has the reality of them ever been
perceived by you through the bodily organs? or rather, is not the nearest
approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who so orders his
intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of the essence of that
which he considers?

Certainly.

And he attains to the knowledge of them in their highest purity who goes to
each of them with the mind alone, not allowing when in the act of thought the
intrusion or introduction of sight or any other sense in the company of reason,
but with the very light of the mind in her clearness penetrates into the very
fight of truth in each; he has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and
of the whole body, which he conceives of only as a disturbing element, hindering
the soul from the acquisition of knowledge when in company with her-is not this
the sort of man who, if ever man did, is likely to attain the knowledge of
existence?

There is admirable truth in that, Socrates, replied Simmias.

And when they consider all this, must not true philosophers make a
reflection, of which they will speak to one another in such words as these: We
have found, they will say, a path of speculation which seems to bring us and the
argument to the conclusion that while we are in the body, and while the soul is
mingled with this mass of evil, our desire will not be satisfied, and our desire
is of the truth. For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of
the mere requirement of food; and also is liable to diseases which overtake and
impede us in the search after truth: and by filling us so full of loves, and
lusts, and fears, and fancies, and idols, and every sort of folly, prevents our
ever having, as people say, so much as a thought. For whence come wars, and
fightings, and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the body? For
wars are occasioned by the love of money, and money has to be acquired for the
sake and in the service of the body; and in consequence of all these things the
time which ought to be given to philosophy is lost. Moreover, if there is time
and an inclination toward philosophy, yet the body introduces a turmoil and
confusion and fear into the course of speculation, and hinders us from seeing
the truth: and all experience shows that if we would have pure knowledge of
anything we must be quit of the body, and the soul in herself must behold all
things in themselves: then I suppose that we shall attain that which we desire,
and of which we say that we are lovers, and that is wisdom, not while we live,
but after death, as the argument shows; for if while in company with the body
the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things seems to follow-either
knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For then,
and not till then, the soul will be in herself alone and without the body. In
this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge when
we have the least possible concern or interest in the body, and are not
saturated with the bodily nature, but remain pure until the hour when God
himself is pleased to release us. And then the foolishness of the body will be
cleared away and we shall be pure and hold converse with other pure souls, and
know of ourselves the clear light everywhere; and this is surely the light of
truth. For no impure thing is allowed to approach the pure. These are the sort
of words, Simmias, which the true lovers of wisdom cannot help saying to one
another, and thinking. You will agree with me in that?

Certainly, Socrates.

But if this is true, O my friend, then there is great hope that, going
whither I go, I shall there be satisfied with that which has been the chief
concern of you and me in our past lives. And now that the hour of departure is
appointed to me, this is the hope with which I depart, and not I only, but every
man who believes that he has his mind purified.

Certainly, replied Simmias.

And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I
was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself into
herself, out of all the courses of the body; the dwelling in her own place
alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can; the release of
the soul from the chains of the body?

Very true, he said.

And what is that which is termed death, but this very separation and release
of the soul from the body?

To be sure, he said.

And the true philosophers, and they only, study and are eager to release the
soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their especial
study?

That is true.

And as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous contradiction in
men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state of death, and yet repining
when death comes.

Certainly.

Then, Simmias, as the true philosophers are ever studying death, to them, of
all men, death is the least terrible. Look at the matter in this way: how
inconsistent of them to have been always enemies of the body, and wanting to
have the soul alone, and when this is granted to them, to be trembling and
repining; instead of rejoicing at their departing to that place where, when they
arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they loved (and this was wisdom),
and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many a man has
been willing to go to the world below in the hope of seeing there an earthly
love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them. And will he who is a true lover
of wisdom, and is persuaded in like manner that only in the world below he can
worthily enjoy her, still repine at death? Will he not depart with joy? Surely
he will, my friend, if he be a true philosopher. For he will have a firm
conviction that there only, and nowhere else, he can find wisdom in her purity.
And if this be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he were to
fear death.

He would, indeed, replied Simmias.

And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death, is not his
reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom, but a lover of
the body, and probably at the same time a lover of either money or power, or
both?

That is very true, he replied.

There is a virtue, Simmias, which is named courage. Is not that a special
attribute of the philosopher?

Certainly.

Again, there is temperance. Is not the calm, and control, and disdain of the
passions which even the many call temperance, a quality belonging only to those
who despise the body and live in philosophy?

That is not to be denied.

For the courage and temperance of other men, if you will consider them, are
really a contradiction.

How is that, Socrates?

Well, he said, you are aware that death is regarded by men in general as a
great evil.

That is true, he said.

And do not courageous men endure death because they are afraid of yet greater
evils?

That is true.

Then all but the philosophers are courageous only from fear, and because they
are afraid; and yet that a man should be courageous from fear, and because he is
a coward, is surely a strange thing.

Very true.

And are not the temperate exactly in the same case? They are temperate
because they are intemperate-which may seem to be a contradiction, but is
nevertheless the sort of thing which happens with this foolish temperance. For
there are pleasures which they must have, and are afraid of losing; and
therefore they abstain from one class of pleasures because they are overcome by
another: and whereas intemperance is defined as "being under the dominion
of pleasure," they overcome only because they are overcome by pleasure. And
that is what I mean by saying that they are temperate through intemperance.

That appears to be true.

Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or pleasure
or pain, which are measured like coins, the greater with the less, is not the
exchange of virtue. O my dear Simmias, is there not one true coin for which all
things ought to exchange?-and that is wisdom; and only in exchange for this, and
in company with this, is anything truly bought or sold, whether courage or
temperance or justice. And is not all true virtue the companion of wisdom, no
matter what fears or pleasures or other similar goods or evils may or may not
attend her? But the virtue which is made up of these goods, when they are
severed from wisdom and exchanged with one another, is a shadow of virtue only,
nor is there any freedom or health or truth in her; but in the true exchange
there is a purging away of all these things, and temperance, and justice, and
courage, and wisdom herself are a purgation of them. And I conceive that the
founders of the mysteries had a real meaning and were not mere triflers when
they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passes unsanctified and
uninitiated into the world below will live in a slough, but that he who arrives
there after initiation and purification will dwell with the gods. For
"many," as they say in the mysteries, "are the thyrsus bearers,
but few are the mystics,"-meaning, as I interpret the words, the true
philosophers. In the number of whom I have been seeking, according to my
ability, to find a place during my whole life; whether I have sought in a right
way or not, and whether I have succeeded or not, I shall truly know in a little
while, if God will, when I myself arrive in the other world: that is my belief.
And now, Simmias and Cebes, I have answered those who charge me with not
grieving or repining at parting from you and my masters in this world; and I am
right in not repining, for I believe that I shall find other masters and friends
who are as good in the world below. But all men cannot believe this, and I shall
be glad if my words have any more success with you than with the judges of the
Athenians.

Cebes answered: I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you say. But
in what relates to the soul, men are apt to be incredulous; they fear that when
she leaves the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the very day of death
she may be destroyed and perish-immediately on her release from the body,
issuing forth like smoke or air and vanishing away into nothingness. For if she
could only hold together and be herself after she was released from the evils of
the body, there would be good reason to hope, Socrates, that what you say is
true. But much persuasion and many arguments are required in order to prove that
when the man is dead the soul yet exists, and has any force of intelligence.

True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we talk a little of the
probabilities of these things?

I am sure, said Cebes, that I should gready like to know your opinion about
them.

I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not even if he were
one of my old enemies, the comic poets, could accuse me of idle talking about
matters in which I have no concern. Let us, then, if you please, proceed with
the inquiry.

Whether the souls of men after death are or are not in the world below, is a
question which may be argued in this manner: The ancient doctrine of which I
have been speaking affirms that they go from this into the other world, and
return hither, and are born from the dead. Now if this be true, and the living
come from the dead, then our souls must be in the other world, for if not, how
could they be born again? And this would be conclusive, if there were any real
evidence that the living are only born from the dead; but if there is no
evidence of this, then other arguments will have to be adduced.

That is very true, replied Cebes.

Then let us consider this question, not in relation to man only, but in
relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything of which there
is generation, and the proof will be easier. Are not all things which have
opposites generated out of their opposites? I mean such things as good and evil,
just and unjust-and there are innumerable other opposites which are generated
out of opposites. And I want to show that this holds universally of all
opposites; I mean to say, for example, that anything which becomes greater must
become greater after being less.

True.

And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then become less.

Yes.

And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the
slower.

Very true.

And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more unjust.

Of course.

And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them are
generated out of opposites?

Yes.

And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two
intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other, and back
again; where there is a greater and a less there is also an intermediate process
of increase and diminution, and that which grows is said to wax, and that which
decays to wane?

Yes, he said.

And there are many other processes, such as division and composition, cooling
and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one another. And
this holds of all opposites, even though not always expressed in words-they are
generated out of one another, and there is a passing or process from one to the
other of them?

Very true, he replied.

Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of
waking?

True, he said.

And what is that?

Death, he answered.

And these, then, are generated, if they are opposites, the one from the
other, and have there their two intermediate processes also?

Of course.

Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites which I
have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and you shall
analyze the other to me. The state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking,
and out of sleeping waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping, and the
process of generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in the other waking
up. Are you agreed about that?

Quite agreed.

Then suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the same manner. Is not
death opposed to life?

Yes.

And they are generated one from the other?

Yes.

What is generated from life?

Death.

And what from death?

I can only say in answer-life.

Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from the
dead?

That is clear, he replied.

Then the inference is, that our souls are in the world below?

That is true.

And one of the two processes or generations is visible-for surely the act of
dying is visible?

Surely, he said.

And may not the other be inferred as the complement of nature, who is not to
be supposed to go on one leg only? And if not, a corresponding process of
generation in death must also be assigned to her?

Certainly, he replied.

And what is that process?

Revival.

And revival, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead into the
world of the living?

Quite true.

Then there is a new way in which we arrive at the inference that the living
come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living; and if this is true,
then the souls of the dead must be in some place out of which they come again.
And this, as I think, has been satisfactorily proved.

Yes, Socrates, he said; all this seems to flow necessarily out of our
previous admissions.

And that these admissions are not unfair, Cebes, he said, may be shown, as I
think, in this way: If generation were in a straight line only, and there were
no compensation or circle in nature, no turn or return into one another, then
you know that all things would at last have the same form and pass into the same
state, and there would be no more generation of them.

What do you mean? he said.

A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case of sleep, he
replied. You know that if there were no compensation of sleeping and waking, the
story of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no meaning, because all
other things would be asleep, too, and he would not be thought of. Or if there
were composition only, and no division of substances, then the chaos of
Anaxagoras would come again.

And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were
to die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and did not come
to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be alive-how could this
be otherwise? For if the living spring from any others who are not the dead, and
they die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in death?

There is no escape from that, Socrates, said Cebes; and I think that what you
say is entirely true.

Yes, he said, Cebes, I entirely think so, too; and we are not walking in a
vain imagination; but I am confident in the belief that there truly is such a
thing as living again, and that the living spring from the dead, and that the
souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls have a better
portion than the evil.

Cebes added: Your favorite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply
recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we
learned that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible unless our
soul was in some place before existing in the human form; here, then, is another
argument of the soul's immortality.

But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias, interposing, what proofs are given of this
doctrine of recollection? I am not very sure at this moment that I remember
them.

One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If you put a
question to a person in a right way, he will give a true answer of himself; but
how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right reason already in
him? And this is most clearly shown when he is taken to a diagram or to anything
of that sort.

But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I would ask you
whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter in another way; I
mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether knowledge is recollection.

Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have this doctrine of
recollection brought to my own recollection, and, from what Cebes has said, I am
beginning to recollect and be convinced; but I should still like to hear what
more you have to say.

This is what I would say, he replied: We should agree, if I am not mistaken,
that what a man recollects he must have known at some previous time.

Very true.

And what is the nature of this recollection? And, in asking this, I mean to
ask whether, when a person has already seen or heard or in any way perceived
anything, and he knows not only that, but something else of which he has not the
same, but another knowledge, we may not fairly say that he recollects that which
comes into his mind. Are we agreed about that?

What do you mean?

I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance: The knowledge of a
lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man?

True.

And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or a
garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of using? Do
not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind's eye an image of the youth to
whom the lyre belongs? And this is recollection: and in the same way anyone who
sees Simmias may remember Cebes; and there are endless other things of the same
nature.

Yes, indeed, there are-endless, replied Simmias.

And this sort of thing, he said, is recollection, and is most commonly a
process of recovering that which has been forgotten through time and
inattention.

Very true, he said.

Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre
remember a man? and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to remember
Cebes?

True.

Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself?

True, he said.

And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things either
like or unlike?

That is true.

And when the recollection is derived from like things, then there is sure to
be another question, which is, whether the likeness of that which is recollected
is in any way defective or not.

Very true, he said.

And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a thing as
equality, not of wood with wood, or of stone with stone, but that, over and
above this, there is equality in the abstract? Shall we affirm this?

Affirm, yes, and swear to it, replied Simmias, with all the confidence in
life.

And do we know the nature of this abstract essence?

To be sure, he said.

And whence did we obtain this knowledge? Did we not see equalities of
material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them the
idea of an equality which is different from them?-you will admit that? Or look
at the matter again in this way: Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear
at one time equal, and at another time unequal?

That is certain.

But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality ever inequality?

That surely was never yet known, Socrates.

Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality?

I should say, clearly not, Socrates.

And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality, you
conceived and attained that idea?

Very true, he said.

Which might be like, or might be unlike them?

Yes.

But that makes no difference; whenever from seeing one thing you conceived
another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of
recollection?

Very true.

But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material
equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they equals in the same
sense as absolute equality? or do they fall short of this in a measure?

Yes, he said, in a very great measure, too.

And must we not allow that when I or anyone look at any object, and perceive
that the object aims at being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot
attain to it-he who makes this observation must have had previous knowledge of
that to which, as he says, the other, although similar, was inferior?

Certainly.

And has not this been our case in the matter of equals and of absolute
equality?

Precisely.

Then we must have known absolute equality previously to the time when we
first saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals aim
at this absolute equality, but fall short of it?

That is true.

And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known, and
can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some other sense.
And this I would affirm of all such conceptions.

Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the same
as the other.

And from the senses, then, is derived the knowledge that all sensible things
aim at an idea of equality of which they fall short-is not that true?

Yes.

Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have had
a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that the
equals which are derived from the senses-for to that they all aspire, and of
that they fall short?

That, Socrates, is certainly to be inferred from the previous statements.

And did we not see and hear and acquire our other senses as soon as we were
born?

Certainly.

Then we must have acquired the knowledge of the ideal equal at some time
previous to this?

Yes.

That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?

True.

And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born having
it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of birth not only
equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas; for we are not speaking
only of equality absolute, but of beauty, goodness, justice, holiness, and all
which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process, when we ask
and answer questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the
knowledge before birth?

That is true.

But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten that which we acquired,
then we must always have been born with knowledge, and shall always continue to
know as long as life lasts-for knowing is the acquiring and retaining knowledge
and not forgetting. Is not forgetting, Simmias, just the losing of knowledge?

Quite true, Socrates.

But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at birth,
and afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered that which we previously
knew, will not that which we call learning be a process of recovering our
knowledge, and may not this be rightly termed recollection by us?

Very true.

For this is clear, that when we perceived something, either by the help of
sight or hearing, or some other sense, there was no difficulty in receiving from
this a conception of some other thing like or unlike which had been forgotten
and which was associated with this; and therefore, as I was saying, one of two
alternatives follows: either we had this knowledge at birth, and continued to
know through life; or, after birth, those who are said to learn only remember,
and learning is recollection only.

Yes, that is quite true, Socrates.

And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer? Had we the knowledge at our
birth, or did we remember afterwards the things which we knew previously to our
birth?

I cannot decide at the moment.

At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge ought or ought not to
be able to give a reason for what he knows.

Certainly, he ought.

But do you think that every man is able to give a reason about these very
matters of which we are speaking?

I wish that they could, Socrates, but I greatly fear that to-morrow at this
time there will be no one able to give a reason worth having.

Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these things?

Certainly not.

Then they are in process of recollecting that which they learned before.

Certainly.

But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?-not since we were born as men?

Certainly not.

And therefore previously?

Yes.

Then, Simmias, our souls must have existed before they were in the form of
man-without bodies, and must have had intelligence.

Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that these notions were given us at the
moment of birth; for this is the only time that remains.

Yes, my friend, but when did we lose them? for they are not in us when we are
born-that is admitted. Did we lose them at the moment of receiving them, or at
some other time?

No, Socrates, I perceive that I was unconsciously talking nonsense.

Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating, there is
an absolute beauty, and goodness, and essence in general, and to this, which is
now discovered to be a previous condition of our being, we refer all our
sensations, and with this compare them-assuming this to have a prior existence,
then our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no
force in the argument? There can be no doubt that if these absolute ideas
existed before we were born, then our souls must have existed before we were
born, and if not the ideas, then not the souls.

Yes, Socrates; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity for
the existence of the soul before birth, and of the essence of which you are
speaking: and the argument arrives at a result which happily agrees with my own
notion. For there is nothing which to my mind is so evident as that beauty,
goodness, and other notions of which you were just now speaking have a most real
and absolute existence; and I am satisfied with the proof.

Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied? for I must convince him too.

I think, said Simmias, that Cebes is satisfied: although he is the most
incredulous of mortals, yet I believe that he is convinced of the existence of
the soul before birth. But that after death the soul will continue to exist is
not yet proven even to my own satisfaction. I cannot get rid of the feeling of
the many to which Cebes was referring-the feeling that when the man dies the
soul may be scattered, and that this may be the end of her. For admitting that
she may be generated and created in some other place, and may have existed
before entering the human body, why after having entered in and gone out again
may she not herself be destroyed and come to an end?

Very true, Simmias, said Cebes; that our soul existed before we were born was
the first half of the argument, and this appears to have been proven; that the
soul will exist after death as well as before birth is the other half of which
the proof is still wanting, and has to be supplied.

But that proof, Simmias and Cebes, has been already given, said Socrates, if
you put the two arguments together-I mean this and the former one, in which we
admitted that everything living is born of the dead. For if the soul existed
before birth, and in coming to life and being born can be born only from death
and dying, must she not after death continue to exist, since she has to be born
again? surely the proof which you desire has been already furnished. Still I
suspect that you and Simmias would be glad to probe the argument further; like
children, you are haunted with a fear that when the soul leaves the body, the
wind may really blow her away and scatter her; especially if a man should happen
to die in stormy weather and not when the sky is calm.

Cebes answered with a smile: Then, Socrates, you must argue us out of our
fears-and yet, strictly speaking, they are not our fears, but there is a child
within us to whom death is a sort of hobgoblin; him too we must persuade not to
be afraid when he is alone with him in the dark.

Socrates said: Let the voice of the charmer be applied daily until you have
charmed him away.

And where shall we find a good charmer of our fears, Socrates, when you are
gone?

Hellas, he replied, is a large place, Cebes, and has many good men, and there
are barbarous races not a few: seek for him among them all, far and wide,
sparing neither pains nor money; for there is no better way of using your money.
And you must not forget to seek for him among yourselves too; for he is nowhere
more likely to be found.

The search, replied Cebes, shall certainly be made. And now, if you please,
let us return to the point of the argument at which we digressed.

By all means, replied Socrates; what else should I please?

Very good, he said.

Must we not, said Socrates, ask ourselves some question of this sort?-What is
that which, as we imagine, is liable to be scattered away, and about which we
fear? and what again is that about which we have no fear? And then we may
proceed to inquire whether that which suffers dispersion is or is not of the
nature of soul-our hopes and fears as to our own souls will turn upon that.

That is true, he said.

Now the compound or composite may be supposed to be naturally capable of
being dissolved in like manner as of being compounded; but that which is
uncompounded, and that only, must be, if anything is, indissoluble.

Yes; that is what I should imagine, said Cebes.

And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same and unchanging, where the
compound is always changing and never the same?

That I also think, he said.

Then now let us return to the previous discussion. Is that idea or essence,
which in the dialectical process we define as essence of true existence-whether
essence of equality, beauty, or anything else: are these essences, I say, liable
at times to some degree of change? or are they each of them always what they
are, having the same simple, self-existent and unchanging forms, and not
admitting of variation at all, or in any way, or at any time?

They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes.

And what would you say of the many beautiful-whether men or horses or
garments or any other things which may be called equal or beautiful-are they all
unchanging and the same always, or quite the reverse? May they not rather be
described as almost always changing and hardly ever the same either with
themselves or with one another?

The latter, replied Cebes; they are always in a state of change.

And these you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but the
unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind-they are invisible and are
not seen?

That is very true, he said.

Well, then, he added, let us suppose that there are two sorts of existences,
one seen, the other unseen.

Let us suppose them.

The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging.

That may be also supposed.

And, further, is not one part of us body, and the rest of us soul?

To be sure.

And to which class may we say that the body is more alike and akin?

Clearly to the seen: no one can doubt that.

And is the soul seen or not seen?

Not by man, Socrates.

And by "seen" and "not seen" is meant by us that which is
or is not visible to the eye of man?

Yes, to the eye of man.

And what do we say of the soul? is that seen or not seen?

Not seen.

Unseen then?

Yes.

Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to the seen?

That is most certain, Socrates.

And were we not saying long ago that the soul when using the body as an
instrument of perception, that is to say, when using the sense of sight or
hearing or some other sense (for the meaning of perceiving through the body is
perceiving through the senses)-were we not saying that the soul too is then
dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, and wanders and is
confused; the world spins round her, and she is like a drunkard when under their
influence?

Very true.

But when returning into herself she reflects; then she passes into the realm
of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness, which are her
kindred, and with them she ever lives, when she is by herself and is not let or
hindered; then she ceases from her erring ways, and being in communion with the
unchanging is unchanging. And this state of the soul is called wisdom?

That is well and truly said, Socrates, he replied.

And to which class is the soul more nearly alike and akin, as far as may be
inferred from this argument, as well as from the preceding one?

I think, Socrates, that, in the opinion of everyone who follows the argument,
the soul will be infinitely more like the unchangeable even the most stupid
person will not deny that.

And the body is more like the changing?

Yes.

Yet once more consider the matter in this light: When the soul and the body
are united, then nature orders the soul to rule and govern, and the body to obey
and serve.

Now which of these two functions is akin to the divine? and which to the
mortal? Does not the divine appear to you to be that which naturally orders and
rules, and the mortal that which is subject and servant?

True.

And which does the soul resemble?

The soul resembles the divine and the body the mortal-there can be no doubt
of that, Socrates.

Then reflect, Cebes: is not the conclusion of the whole matter this?-that the
soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intelligible, and
uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and the body is in the very
likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintelligible, and multiform, and
dissoluble, and changeable. Can this, my dear Cebes, be denied?

No, indeed.

But if this is true, then is not the body liable to speedy dissolution?

and is not the soul almost or altogether indissoluble?

Certainly.

And do you further observe, that after a man is dead, the body, which is the
visible part of man, and has a visible framework, which is called a corpse, and
which would naturally be dissolved and decomposed and dissipated, is not
dissolved or decomposed at once, but may remain for a good while, if the
constitution be sound at the time of death, and the season of the year
favorable? For the body when shrunk and embalmed, as is the custom in Egypt, may
remain almost entire through infinite ages; and even in decay, still there are
some portions, such as the bones and ligaments, which are practically
indestructible. You allow that?

Yes.

And are we to suppose that the soul, which is invisible, in passing to the
true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, and noble, and on her way to
the good and wise God, whither, if God will, my soul is also soon to go-that the
soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and origin, is blown away and perishes
immediately on quitting the body as the many say? That can never be, dear
Simmias and Cebes. The truth rather is that the soul which is pure at departing
draws after her no bodily taint, having never voluntarily had connection with
the body, which she is ever avoiding, herself gathered into herself (for such
abstraction has been the study of her life). And what does this mean but that
she has been a true disciple of philosophy and has practised how to die easily?
And is not philosophy the practice of death?

Certainly.

That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible worldto the
divine and immortal and rational: thither arriving, she lives in bliss and is
released from the error and folly of men, their fears and wild passions and all
other human ills, and forever dwells, as they say of the initiated, in company
with the gods. Is not this true, Cebes?

Yes, said Cebes, beyond a doubt.

But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at the time of her
departure, and is the companion and servant of the body always, and is in love
with and fascinated by the body and by the desires and pleasures of the body,
until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a
man may touch and see and taste and use for the purposes of his lusts-the soul,
I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and avoid the intellectual principle, which
to the bodily eye is dark and invisible, and can be attained only by
philosophy-do you suppose that such a soul as this will depart pure and
unalloyed?

That is impossible, he replied.

She is engrossed by the corporeal, which the continual association and
constant care of the body have made natural to her.

Very true.

And this, my friend, may be conceived to be that heavy, weighty, earthy
element of sight by which such a soul is depressed and dragged down again into
the visible world, because she is afraid of the invisible and of the world
below-prowling about tombs and sepulchres, in the neighborhood of which, as they
tell us, are seen certain ghostly apparitions of souls which have not departed
pure, but are cloyed with sight and therefore visible.

That is very likely, Socrates.

Yes, that is very likely, Cebes; and these must be the souls, not of the
good, but of the evil, who are compelled to wander about such places in payment
of the penalty of their former evil way of life; and they continue to wander
until the desire which haunts them is satisfied and they are imprisoned in
another body. And they may be supposed to be fixed in the same natures which
they had in their former life.

What natures do you mean, Socrates?

I mean to say that men who have followed after gluttony, and wantonness, and
drunkenness, and have had no thought of avoiding them, would pass into asses and
animals of that sort. What do you think?

I think that exceedingly probable.

And those who have chosen the portion of injustice, and tyranny, and
violence, will pass into wolves, or into hawks and kites; whither else can we
suppose them to go?

Yes, said Cebes; that is doubtless the place of natures such as theirs. And
there is no difficulty, he said, in assigning to all of them places answering to
their several natures and propensities?

There is not, he said.

Even among them some are happier than others; and the happiest both in
themselves and their place of abode are those who have practised the civil and
social virtues which are called temperance and justice, and are acquired by
habit and attention without philosophy and mind.

Why are they the happiest?

Because they may be expected to pass into some gentle, social nature which is
like their own, such as that of bees or ants, or even back again into the form
of man, and just and moderate men spring from them.

That is not impossible.

But he who is a philosopher or lover of learning, and is entirely pure at
departing, is alone permitted to reach the gods. And this is the reason, Simmias
and Cebes, why the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshly lusts,
and endure and refuse to give themselves up to them-not because they fear
poverty or the ruin of their families, like the lovers of money, and the world
in general; nor like the lovers of power and honor, because they dread the
dishonor or disgrace of evil deeds.

No, Socrates, that would not become them, said Cebes.

No, indeed, he replied; and therefore they who have a care of their souls,
and do not merely live in the fashions of the body, say farewell to all this;
they will not walk in the ways of the blind: and when philosophy offers them
purification and release from evil, they feel that they ought not to resist her
influence, and to her they incline, and whither she leads they follow her.

What do you mean, Socrates?

I will tell you, he said. The lovers of knowledge are conscious that their
souls, when philosophy receives them, are simply fastened and glued to their
bodies: the soul is only able to view existence through the bars of a prison,
and not in her own nature; she is wallowing in the mire of all ignorance; and
philosophy, seeing the terrible nature of her confinement, and that the captive
through desire is led to conspire in her own captivity (for the lovers of knowledge are aware that this was the original state of
the soul, and that when she was in this state philosophy received and gently
counseled her, and wanted to release her, pointing out to her that the eye is
full of deceit, and also the ear and other senses, and persuading her to retire
from them in all but the necessary use of them and to be gathered up and
collected into herself, and to trust only to herself and her own intuitions of
absolute existence, and mistrust that which comes to her through others and is
subject to vicissitude)-philosophy shows her that this is visible and tangible,
but that what she sees in her own nature is intellectual and invisible. And the
soul of the true philosopher thinks that she ought not to resist this
deliverance, and therefore abstains from pleasures and desires and pains and
fears, as far as she is able; reflecting that when a man has great joys or
sorrows or fears or desires he suffers from them, not the sort of evil which
might be anticipated-as, for example, the loss of his health or property, which
he has sacrificed to his lusts-but he has suffered an evil greater far, which is
the greatest and worst of all evils, and one of which he never thinks.

And what is that, Socrates? said Cebes.

Why, this: When the feeling of pleasure or pain in the soul is most intense,
all of us naturally suppose that the object of this intense feeling is then
plainest and truest: but this is not the case.

Very true.

And this is the state in which the soul is most enthralled by the body.

How is that?

Why, because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail which nails and rivets
the soul to the body, and engrosses her and makes her believe that to be true
which the body affirms to be true; and from agreeing with the body and having
the same delights she is obliged to have the same habits and ways, and is not
likely ever to be pure at her departure to the world below, but is always
saturated with the body; so that she soon sinks into another body and there
germinates and grows, and has therefore no part in the communion of the divine
and pure and simple.

That is most true, Socrates, answered Cebes.

And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are temperate
and brave; and not for the reason which the world gives.

Certainly not.

Certainly not! For not in that way does the soul of a philosopher reason; she
will not ask philosophy to release her in order that when released she may
deliver herself up again to the thraldom of pleasures and pains, doing a work
only to be undone again, weaving instead of unweaving her Penelope's web. But
she will make herself a calm of passion and follow Reason, and dwell in her,
beholding the true and divine (which is not matter of opinion), and thence
derive nourishment. Thus she seeks to live while she lives, and after death she
hopes to go to her own kindred and to be freed from human ills. Never fear,
Simmias and Cebes, that a soul which has been thus nurtured and has had these
pursuits, will at her departure from the body be scattered and blown away by the
winds and be nowhere and nothing.

When Socrates had done speaking, for a considerable time there was silence;
he himself and most of us appeared to be meditating on what had been said; only
Cebes and Simmias spoke a few words to one another. And Socrates observing this
asked them what they thought of the argument, and whether there was anything
wanting? For, said he, much is still open to suspicion and attack, if anyone
were disposed to sift the matter thoroughly. If you are talking of something
else I would rather not interrupt you, but if you are still doubtful about the
argument do not hesitate to say exactly what you think, and let us have anything
better which you can suggest; and if I am likely to be of any use, allow me to
help you.

Simmias said: I must confess, Socrates, that doubts did arise in our minds,
and each of us was urging and inciting the other to put the question which he
wanted to have answered and which neither of us liked to ask, fearing that our
importunity might be troublesome under present circumstances.

Socrates smiled and said: O Simmias, how strange that is; I am not very
likely to persuade other men that I do not regard my present situation as a
misfortune, if I am unable to persuade you, and you will keep fancying that I am
at all more troubled now than at any other time. Will you not allow that I have
as much of the spirit of prophecy in me as the swans? For they, when they
perceive that they must die, having sung all their life long, do then sing more
than ever, rejoicing in the thought that they are about to go away to the god
whose ministers they are. But men, because they are themselves afraid of death,
slanderously affirm of the swans that they sing a lament at the last, not
considering that no bird sings when cold, or hungry, or in pain, not even the
nightingale, nor the swallow, nor yet the hoopoe; which are said indeed to tune
a lay of sorrow, although I do not believe this to be true of them any more than
of the swans. But because they are sacred to Apollo and have the gift of
prophecy and anticipate the good things of another world, therefore they sing
and rejoice in that day more than they ever did before. And I, too, believing
myself to be the consecrated servant of the same God, and the fellow servant of
the swans, and thinking that I have received from my master gifts of prophecy
which are not inferior to theirs, would not go out of life less merrily than the
swans. Cease to mind then about this, but speak and ask anything which you like,
while the eleven magistrates of Athens allow.

Well, Socrates, said Simmias, then I will tell you my difficulty, and Cebes
will tell you his. For I dare say that you, Socrates, feel, as I do, how very
hard or almost impossible is the attainment of any certainty about questions
such as these in the present life. And yet I should deem him a coward who did
not prove what is said about them to the uttermost, or whose heart failed him
before he had examined them on every side. For he should persevere until he has
attained one of two things: either he should discover or learn the truth about
them; or, if this is impossible, I would have him take the best and most
irrefragable of human notions, and let this be the raft upon which he sails
through life-not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some word of God
which will more surely and safely carry him. And now, as you bid me, I will
venture to question you, as I should not like to reproach myself hereafter with
not having said at the time what I think. For when I consider the matter either
alone or with Cebes, the argument does certainly appear to me, Socrates, to be
not sufficient.

Socrates answered: I dare say, my friend, that you may be right, but I should
like to know in what respect the argument is not sufficient.

In this respect, replied Simmias: Might not a person use the same argument
about harmony and the lyre-might he not say that harmony is a thing invisible,
incorporeal, fair, divine, abiding in the lyre which is harmonized, but that the
lyre and the strings are matter and material, composite, earthy, and akin to
mortality? And when someone breaks the lyre, or cuts and rends the strings, then
he who takes this view would argue as you do, and on the same analogy, that the
harmony survives and has not perished; for you cannot imagine, as we would say,
that the lyre without the strings, and the broken strings themselves, remain,
and yet that the harmony, which is of heavenly and immortal nature and kindred,
has perished-and perished too before the mortal. The harmony, he would say,
certainly exists somewhere, and the wood and strings will decay before that
decays. For I suspect, Socrates, that the notion of the soul which we are all of
us inclined to entertain, would also be yours, and that you too would conceive
the body to be strung up, and held together, by the elements of hot and cold,
wet and dry, and the like, and that the soul is the harmony or due proportionate
admixture of them. And, if this is true, the inference clearly is that when the
strings of the body are unduly loosened or overstrained through disorder or
other injury, then the soul, though most divine, like other harmonies of music
or of the works of art, of course perishes at once, although the material
remains of the body may last for a considerable time, until they are either
decayed or burnt. Now if anyone maintained that the soul, being the harmony of
the elements of the body, first perishes in that which is called death, how
shall we answer him?

Socrates looked round at us as his manner was, and said, with a smile:
Simmias has reason on his side; and why does not some one of you who is abler
than myself answer him? for there is force in his attack upon me. But perhaps,
before we answer him, we had better also hear what Cebes has to say against the
argument-this will give us time for reflection, and when both of them have
spoken, we may either assent to them if their words appear to be in consonance
with the truth, or if not, we may take up the other side, and argue with them.
Please to tell me then, Cebes, he said, what was the difficulty which troubled
you?

Cebes said: I will tell you. My feeling is that the argument is still in the
same position, and open to the same objections which were urged before; for I am
ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into the bodily
form has been very ingeniously, and, as I may be allowed to say, quite
sufficiently proven; but the existence of the soul after death is still, in my
judgment, unproven. Now my objection is not the same as that of Simmias; for I
am not disposed to deny that the soul is stronger and more lasting than the
body, being of opinion that in all such respects the soul very far excels the
body. Well, then, says the argument to me, why do you remain unconvinced? When
you see that the weaker is still in existence after the man is dead, will you
not admit that the more lasting must also survive during the same period of
time? Now I, like Simmias, must employ a figure; and I shall ask you to consider
whether the figure is to the point. The parallel which I will suppose is that of
an old weaver, who dies, and after his death somebody says: He is not dead, he
must be alive; and he appeals to the coat which he himself wove and wore, and
which is still whole and undecayed. And then he proceeds to ask of someone who
is incredulous, whether a man lasts longer, or the coat which is in use and
wear; and when he is answered that a man lasts far longer, thinks that he has
thus certainly demonstrated the survival of the man, who is the more lasting,
because the less lasting remains. But that, Simmias, as I would beg you to
observe, is not the truth; everyone sees that he who talks thus is talking
nonsense. For the truth is that this weaver, having worn and woven many such
coats, though he outlived several of them, was himself outlived by the last; but
this is surely very far from proving that a man is slighter and weaker than a
coat. Now the relation of the body to the soul may be expressed in a similar
figure; for you may say with reason that the soul is lasting, and the body weak
and short-lived in comparison. And every soul may be said to wear out many
bodies, especially in the course of a long life. For if while the man is alive
the body deliquesces and decays, and yet the soul always weaves her garment anew
and repairs the waste, then of course, when the soul perishes, she must have on
her last garment, and this only will survive her; but then again when the soul
is dead the body will at last show its native weakness, and soon pass into
decay. And therefore this is an argument on which I would rather not rely as
proving that the soul exists after death. For suppose that we grant even more
than you affirm as within the range of possibility, and besides acknowledging
that the soul existed before birth admit also that after death the souls of some
are existing still, and will exist, and will be born and die again and again,
and that there is a natural strength in the soul which will hold out and be born
many times-for all this, we may be still inclined to think that she will weary
in the labors of successive births, and may at last succumb in one of her deaths
and utterly perish; and this death and dissolution of the body which brings
destruction to the soul may be unknown to any of us, for no one of us can have
had any experience of it: and if this be true, then I say that he who is
confident in death has but a foolish confidence, unless he is able to prove that
the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. But if he is not able to prove
this, he who is about to die will always have reason to fear that when the body
is disunited, the soul also may utterly perish.

All of us, as we afterwards remarked to one another, had an unpleasant
feeling at hearing them say this. When we had been so firmly convinced before,
now to have our faith shaken seemed to introduce a confusion and uncertainty,
not only into the previous argument, but into any future one; either we were not
good judges, or there were no real grounds of belief.

Ech. There I feel with you-indeed I do, Phaedo, and when you were speaking, I
was beginning to ask myself the same question: What argument can I ever trust
again? For what could be more convincing than the argument of Socrates, which
has now fallen into discredit? That the soul is a harmony is a doctrine which
has always had a wonderful attraction for me, and, when mentioned, came back to
me at once, as my own original conviction. And now I must begin again and find
another argument which will assure me that when the man is dead the soul dies
not with him. Tell me, I beg, how did Socrates proceed? Did he appear to share
the unpleasant feeling which you mention? or did he receive the interruption
calmly and give a sufficient answer? Tell us, as exactly as you can, what
passed.

Phaed. Often, Echecrates, as I have admired Socrates, I never admired him
more than at that moment. That he should be able to answer was nothing, but what
astonished me was, first, the gentle and pleasant and approving manner in which
he regarded the words of the young men, and then his quick sense of the wound
which had been inflicted by the argument, and his ready application of the
healing art. He might be compared to a general rallying his defeated and broken
army, urging them to follow him and return to the field of argument.

Ech. How was that?

Phaed. You shall hear, for I was close to him on his right hand, seated on a
sort of stool, and he on a couch which was a good deal higher. Now he had a way
of playing with my hair, and then he smoothed my head, and pressed the hair upon
my neck, and said: To-morrow, Phaedo, I suppose that these fair locks of yours
will be severed.

Yes, Socrates, I suppose that they will, I replied.

Not so if you will take my advice.

What shall I do with them? I said.

To-day, he replied, and not to-morrow, if this argument dies and cannot be
brought to life again by us, you and I will both shave our locks; and if I were
you, and could not maintain my ground against Simmias and Cebes, I would myself
take an oath, like the Argives, not to wear hair any more until I had renewed
the conflict and defeated them.

Yes, I said, but Heracles himself is said not to be a match for two.

Summon me then, he said, and I will be your Iolaus until the sun goes down.

I summon you rather, I said, not as Heracles summoning Iolaus, but as Iolaus
might summon Heracles.

That will be all the same, he said. But first let us take care that we avoid
a danger.

And what is that? I said.

The danger of becoming misologists, he replied, which is one of the very
worst things that can happen to us. For as there are misanthropists or haters of
men, there are also misologists or haters of ideas, and both spring from the
same cause, which is ignorance of the world. Misanthropy arises from the too
great confidence of inexperience; you trust a man and think him altogether true
and good and faithful, and then in a little while he turns out to be false and
knavish; and then another and another, and when this has happened several times
to a man, especially within the circle of his most trusted friends, as he deems
them, and he has often quarreled with them, he at last hates all men, and
believes that no one has any good in him at all. I dare say that you must have
observed this.

Yes, I said.

And is not this discreditable? The reason is that a man, having to deal with
other men, has no knowledge of them; for if he had knowledge he would have known
the true state of the case, that few are the good and few the evil, and that the
great majority are in the interval between them.

How do you mean? I said.

I mean, he replied, as you might say of the very large and very small, that
nothing is more uncommon than a very large or a very small man; and this applies
generally to all extremes, whether of great and small, or swift and slow, or
fair and foul, or black and white: and whether the instances you select be men
or dogs or anything else, few are the extremes, but many are in the mean between
them. Did you never observe this?

Yes, I said, I have.

And do you not imagine, he said, that if there were a competition of evil,
the first in evil would be found to be very few?

Yes, that is very likely, I said.

Yes, that is very likely, he replied; not that in this respect arguments are
like men-there I was led on by you to say more than I had intended; but the
point of comparison was that when a simple man who has no skill in dialectics
believes an argument to be true which he afterwards imagines to be false,
whether really false or not, and then another and another, he has no longer any
faith left, and great disputers, as you know, come to think, at last that they
have grown to be the wisest of mankind; for they alone perceive the utter
unsoundness and instability of all arguments, or, indeed, of all things, which,
like the currents in the Euripus, are going up and down in never-ceasing ebb and
flow.

That is quite true, I said.

Yes, Phaedo, he replied, and very melancholy too, if there be such a thing as
truth or certainty or power of knowing at all, that a man should have lighted
upon some argument or other which at first seemed true and then turned out to be
false, and instead of blaming himself and his own want of wit, because he is
annoyed, should at last be too glad to transfer the blame from himself to
arguments in general; and forever afterwards should hate and revile them, and
lose the truth and knowledge of existence.

Yes, indeed, I said; that is very melancholy.

Let us, then, in the first place, he said, be careful of admitting into our
souls the notion that there is no truth or health or soundness in any arguments
at all; but let us rather say that there is as yet no health in us, and that we
must quit ourselves like men and do our best to gain health-you and all other
men with a view to the whole of your future life, and I myself with a view to
death. For at this moment I am sensible that I have not the temper of a
philosopher; like the vulgar, I am only a partisan. For the partisan, when he is
engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the question, but is
anxious only to convince his hearers of his own assertions. And the difference
between him and me at the present moment is only this-that whereas he seeks to
convince his hearers that what he says is true, I am rather seeking to convince
myself; to convince my hearers is a secondary matter with me. And do but see how
much I gain by this. For if what I say is true, then I do well to be persuaded
of the truth, but if there be nothing after death, still, during the short time
that remains, I shall save my friends from lamentations, and my ignorance will
not last, and therefore no harm will be done. This is the state of mind, Simmias
and Cebes, in which I approach the argument. And I would ask you to be thinking
of the truth and not of Socrates: agree with me, if I seem to you to be speaking
the truth; or if not, withstand me might and main, that I may not deceive you as
well as myself in my enthusiasm, and, like the bee, leave my sting in you before
I die.

And now let us proceed, he said. And first of all let me be sure that I have
in my mind what you were saying. Simmias, if I remember rightly, has fears and
misgivings whether the soul, being in the form of harmony, although a fairer and
diviner thing than the body, may not perish first. On the other hand, Cebes
appeared to grant that the soul was more lasting than the body, but he said that
no one could know whether the soul, after having worn out many bodies, might not
perish herself and leave her last body behind her; and that this is death, which
is the destruction not of the body but of the soul, for in the body the work of
destruction is ever going on. Are not these, Simmias and Cebes, the points which
we have to consider?

They both agreed to this statement of them.

He proceeded: And did you deny the force of the whole preceding argument, or
of a part only?

Of a part only, they replied.

And what did you think, he said, of that part of the argument in which we
said that knowledge was recollection only, and inferred from this that the soul
must have previously existed somewhere else before she was enclosed in the body?
Cebes said that he had been wonderfully impressed by that part of the argument,
and that his conviction remained unshaken. Simmias agreed, and added that he
himself could hardly imagine the possibility of his ever thinking differently
about that.

But, rejoined Socrates, you will have to think differently, my Theban friend,
if you still maintain that harmony is a compound, and that the soul is a harmony
which is made out of strings set in the frame of the body; for you will surely
never allow yourself to say that a harmony is prior to the elements which
compose the harmony.

No, Socrates, that is impossible.

But do you not see that you are saying this when you say that the soul
existed before she took the form and body of man, and was made up of elements
which as yet had no existence? For harmony is not a sort of thing like the soul,
as you suppose; but first the lyre, and the strings, and the sounds exist in a
state of discord, and then harmony is made last of all, and perishes first. And
how can such a notion of the soul as this agree with the other?

Not at all, replied Simmias.

And yet, he said, there surely ought to be harmony when harmony is the theme
of discourse.

There ought, replied Simmias.

But there is no harmony, he said, in the two propositions that knowledge is
recollection, and that the soul is a harmony. Which of them, then, will you
retain?

I think, he replied, that I have a much stronger faith, Socrates, in the
first of the two, which has been fully demonstrated to me, than in the latter,
which has not been demonstrated at all, but rests only on probable and plausible
grounds; and I know too well that these arguments from probabilities are
impostors, and unless great caution is observed in the use of them they are apt
to be deceptive-in geometry, and in other things too. But the doctrine of
knowledge and recollection has been proven to me on trustworthy grounds; and the
proof was that the soul must have existed before she came into the body, because
to her belongs the essence of which the very name implies existence. Having, as
I am convinced, rightly accepted this conclusion, and on sufficient grounds, I
must, as I suppose, cease to argue or allow others to argue that the soul is a
harmony.

Let me put the matter, Simmias, he said, in another point of view: Do you
imagine that a harmony or any other composition can be in a state other than
that of the elements out of which it is compounded?

Certainly not.

Or do or suffer anything other than they do or suffer?

He agreed.

Then a harmony does not lead the parts or elements which make up the harmony,
but only follows them.

He assented.

For harmony cannot possibly have any motion, or sound, or other quality which
is opposed to the parts.

That would be impossible, he replied.

And does not every harmony depend upon the manner in which the elements are
harmonized?

I do not understand you, he said.

I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a harmony, and
more completely a harmony, when more completely harmonized, if that be possible;
and less of a harmony, and less completely a harmony, when less harmonized.

True.

But does the soul admit of degrees? or is one soul in the very least degree
more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another?

Not in the least.

Yet surely one soul is said to have intelligence and virtue, and to be good,
and another soul is said to have folly and vice, and to be an evil soul: and
this is said truly?

Yes, truly.

But what will those who maintain the soul to be a harmony say of this
presence of virtue and vice in the soul?-Will they say that there is another
harmony, and another discord, and that the virtuous soul is harmonized, and
herself being a harmony has another harmony within her, and that the vicious
soul is inharmonical and has no harmony within her?

I cannot say, replied Simmias; but I suppose that something of that kind
would be asserted by those who take this view.

And the admission is already made that no soul is more a soul than another;
and this is equivalent to admitting that harmony is not more or less harmony, or
more or less completely a harmony?

Quite true.

And that which is not more or less a harmony is not more or less harmonized?

True.

And that which is not more or less harmonized cannot have more or less of
harmony, but only an equal harmony?

Yes, an equal harmony.

Then one soul not being more or less absolutely a soul than another, is not
more or less harmonized?

Exactly.

And therefore has neither more nor less of harmony or of discord?

She has not.

And having neither more nor less of harmony or of discord, one soul has no
more vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord and virtue harmony?

Not at all more.

Or speaking more correctly, Simmias, the soul, if she is a harmony, will
never have any vice; because a harmony, being absolutely a harmony, has no part
in the inharmonical?

No.

And therefore a soul which is absolutely a soul has no vice?

How can she have, consistently with the preceding argument?

Then, according to this, if the souls of all animals are equally and
absolutely souls, they will be equally good?

I agree with you, Socrates, he said.

And can all this be true, think you? he said; and are all these consequences
admissible-which nevertheless seem to follow from the assumption that the soul
is a harmony?

Certainly not, he said.

Once more, he said, what ruling principle is there of human things other than
the soul, and especially the wise soul? Do you know of any?

Indeed, I do not.

And is the soul in agreement with the affections of the body? or is she at
variance with them? For example, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the
soul incline us against drinking? and when the body is hungry, against eating?
And this is only one instance out of ten thousand of the opposition of the soul
to the things of the body.

Very true.

But we have already acknowledged that the soul, being a harmony, can never
utter a note at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and
other affections of the strings out of which she is composed; she can only
follow, she cannot lead them?

Yes, he said, we acknowledged that, certainly.

And yet do we not now discover the soul to be doing the exact
opposite-leading the elements of which she is believed to be composed; almost
always opposing and coercing them in all sorts of ways throughout life,
sometimes more violently with the pains of medicine and gymnastic; then again
more gently; threatening and also reprimanding the desires, passions, fears, as
if talking to a thing which is not herself, as Homer in the "Odyssey"
represents Odysseus doing in the words,

"He beat his breast, and thus reproached his heart:

Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured!" Do you think that Homer
could have written this under the idea that the soul is a harmony capable of
being led by the affections of the body, and not rather of a nature which leads
and masters them; and herself a far diviner thing than any harmony?

Yes, Socrates, I quite agree to that.

Then, my friend, we can never be right in saying that the soul is a harmony,
for that would clearly contradict the divine Homer as well as ourselves.

True, he said.

Thus much, said Socrates, of Harmonia, your Theban goddess, Cebes, who has
not been ungracious to us, I think; but what shall I say to the Theban Cadmus,
and how shall I propitiate him?

I think that you will discover a way of propitiating him, said Cebes; I am
sure that you have answered the argument about harmony in a manner that I could
never have expected. For when Simmias mentioned his objection, I quite imagined
that no answer could be given to him, and therefore I was surprised at finding
that his argument could not sustain the first onset of yours; and not impossibly
the other, whom you call Cadmus, may share a similar fate.

Nay, my good friend, said Socrates, let us not boast, lest some evil eye
should put to flight the word which I am about to speak. That, however, may be
left in the hands of those above, while I draw near in Homeric fashion, and try
the mettle of your words. Briefly, the sum of your objection is as follows: You
want to have proven to you that the soul is imperishable and immortal, and you
think that the philosopher who is confident in death has but a vain and foolish
confidence, if he thinks that he will fare better than one who has led another
sort of life, in the world below, unless he can prove this; and you say that the
demonstration of the strength and divinity of the soul, and of her existence
prior to our becoming men, does not necessarily imply her immortality. Granting
that the soul is longlived, and has known and done much in a former state, still
she is not on that account immortal; and her entrance into the human form may be
a sort of disease which is the beginning of dissolution, and may at last, after
the toils of life are over, end in that which is called death. And whether the
soul enters into the body once only or many times, that, as you would say, makes
no difference in the fears of individuals. For any man, who is not devoid of
natural feeling, has reason to fear, if he has no knowledge or proof of the
soul's immortality. That is what I suppose you to say, Cebes, which I designedly
repeat, in order that nothing may escape us, and that you may, if you wish, add
or subtract anything.

But, said Cebes, as far as I can see at present, I have nothing to add or
subtract; you have expressed my meaning.

Socrates paused awhile, and seemed to be absorbed in reflection. At length he
said: This is a very serious inquiry which you are raising, Cebes, involving the
whole question of generation and corruption, about which I will, if you like,
give you my own experience; and you can apply this, if you think that anything
which I say will avail towards the solution of your difficulty.

I should very much like, said Cebes, to hear what you have to say.

Then I will tell you, said Socrates. When I was young, Cebes, I had a
prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called Natural
Science; this appeared to me to have lofty aims, as being the science which has
to do with the causes of things, and which teaches why a thing is, and is
created and destroyed; and I was always agitating myself with the consideration
of such questions as these: Is the growth of animals the result of some decay
which the hot and cold principle contracts, as some have said? Is the blood the
element with which we think, or the air, or the fire? or perhaps nothing of this
sort-but the brain may be the originating power of the perceptions of hearing
and sight and smell, and memory and opinion may come from them, and science may
be based on memory and opinion when no longer in motion, but at rest. And then I
went on to examine the decay of them, and then to the things of heaven and
earth, and at last I concluded that I was wholly incapable of these inquiries,
as I will satisfactorily prove to you. For I was fascinated by them to such a
degree that my eyes grew blind to things that I had seemed to myself, and also
to others, to know quite well; and I forgot what I had before thought to be
self-evident, that the growth of man is the result of eating and drinking; for
when by the digestion of food flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and
whenever there is an aggregation of congenial elements, the lesser bulk becomes
larger and the small man greater. Was not that a reasonable notion?

Yes, said Cebes, I think so.

Well; but let me tell you something more. There was a time when I thought
that I understood the meaning of greater and less pretty well; and when I saw a
great man standing by a little one I fancied that one was taller than the other
by a head; or one horse would appear to be greater than another horse: and still
more clearly did I seem to perceive that ten is two more than eight, and that
two cubits are more than one, because two is twice one.

And what is now your notion of such matters? said Cebes.

I should be far enough from imagining, he replied, that I knew the cause of
any of them, indeed I should, for I cannot satisfy myself that when one is added
to one, the one to which the addition is made becomes two, or that the two units
added together make two by reason of the addition. For I cannot understand how,
when separated from the other, each of them was one and not two, and now, when
they are brought together, the mere juxtaposition of them can be the cause of
their becoming two: nor can I understand how the division of one is the way to
make two; for then a different cause would produce the same effect-as in the
former instance the addition and juxtaposition of one to one was the cause of
two, in this the separation and subtraction of one from the other would be the
cause. Nor am I any longer satisfied that I understand the reason why one or
anything else either is generated or destroyed or is at all, but I have in my
mind some confused notion of another method, and can never admit this.

Then I heard someone who had a book of Anaxagoras, as he said, out of which
he read that mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was quite delighted
at the notion of this, which appeared admirable, and I said to myself: If mind
is the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in
the best place; and I argued that if anyone desired to find out the cause of the
generation or destruction or existence of anything, he must find out what state
of being or suffering or doing was best for that thing, and therefore a man had
only to consider the best for himself and others, and then he would also know
the worse, for that the same science comprised both. And I rejoiced to think
that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of existence such as I
desired, and I imagined that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or
round; and then he would further explain the cause and the necessity of this,
and would teach me the nature of the best and show that this was best; and if he
said that the earth was in the centre, he would explain that this position was
the best, and I should be satisfied if this were shown to me, and not want any
other sort of cause. And I thought that I would then go and ask him about the
sun and moon and stars, and that he would explain to me their comparative
swiftness, and their returnings and various states, and how their several
affections, active and passive, were all for the best. For I could not imagine
that when he spoke of mind as the disposer of them, he would give any other
account of their being as they are, except that this was best; and I thought
when he had explained to me in detail the cause of each and the cause of all, he
would go on to explain to me what was best for each and what was best for all. I
had hopes which I would not have sold for much, and I seized the books and read
them as fast as I could in my eagerness to know the better and the worse.

What hopes I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! As I
proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other
principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other
eccentricities. I might compare him to a person who began by maintaining
generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he
endeavored to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on to
show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones and muscles; and the
bones, as he would say, are hard and have ligaments which divide them, and the
muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, which have also a covering or
environment of flesh and skin which contains them; and as the bones are lifted
at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to
bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in a curved posture: that is
what he would say, and he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you,
which he would attribute to sound, and air, and hearing, and he would assign ten
thousand other causes of the same sort, forgetting to mention the true cause,
which is that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I
have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence;
for I am inclined to think that these muscles and bones of mine would have gone
off to Megara or Boeotia-by the dog of Egypt they would, if they had been guided
only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen as the better
and nobler part, instead of playing truant and running away, to undergo any
punishment which the State inflicts. There is surely a strange confusion of
causes and conditions in all this. It may be said, indeed, that without bones
and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But to
say that I do as I do because of them, and that this is the way in which mind
acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of
speaking. I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition,
which the many, feeling about in the dark, are always mistaking and misnaming.
And thus one man makes a vortex all round and steadies the earth by the heaven;
another gives the air as a support to the earth, which is a sort of broad
trough. Any power which in disposing them as they are disposes them for the best
never enters into their minds, nor do they imagine that there is any superhuman
strength in that; they rather expect to find another Atlas of the world who is
stronger and more everlasting and more containing than the good is, and are
clearly of opinion that the obligatory and containing power of the good is as
nothing; and yet this is the principle which I would fain learn if anyone would
teach me. But as I have failed either to discover myself or to learn of anyone
else, the nature of the best, I will exhibit to you, if you like, what I have
found to be the second best mode of inquiring into the cause.

I should very much like to hear that, he replied.

Socrates proceeded: I thought that as I had failed in the contemplation of
true existence, I ought to be careful that I did not lose the eye of my soul; as
people may injure their bodily eye by observing and gazing on the sun during an
eclipse, unless they take the precaution of only looking at the image reflected
in the water, or in some similar medium. That occurred to me, and I was afraid
that my soul might be blinded altogether if I looked at things with my eyes or
tried by the help of the senses to apprehend them. And I thought that I had
better have recourse to ideas, and seek in them the truth of existence. I dare
say that the simile is not perfect-for I am very far from admitting that he who
contemplates existence through the medium of ideas, sees them only "through
a glass darkly," any more than he who sees them in their working and
effects. However, this was the method which I adopted: I first assumed some
principle which I judged to be the strongest, and then I affirmed as true
whatever seemed to agree with this, whether relating to the cause or to anything
else; and that which disagreed I regarded as untrue. But I should like to
explain my meaning clearly, as I do not think that you understand me.

No, indeed, replied Cebes, not very well.

There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell you; but only what
I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous discussion and on
other occasions: I want to show you the nature of that cause which has occupied
my thoughts, and I shall have to go back to those familiar words which are in
the mouth of everyone, and first of all assume that there is an absolute beauty
and goodness and greatness, and the like; grant me this, and I hope to be able
to show you the nature of the cause, and to prove the immortality of the soul.

Cebes said: You may proceed at once with the proof, as I readily grant you
this.

Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you agree with me in the
next step; for I cannot help thinking that if there be anything beautiful other
than absolute beauty, that can only be beautiful in as far as it partakes of
absolute beauty-and this I should say of everything. Do you agree in this notion
of the cause?

Yes, he said, I agree.

He proceeded: I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other of those
wise causes which are alleged; and if a person says to me that the bloom of
color, or form, or anything else of that sort is a source of beauty, I leave all
that, which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly, and perhaps
foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing makes a thing
beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in whatever way or manner
obtained; for as to the manner I am uncertain, but I stoutly contend that by
beauty all beautiful things become beautiful. That appears to me to be the only
safe answer that I can give, either to myself or to any other, and to that I
cling, in the persuasion that I shall never be overthrown, and that I may safely
answer to myself or any other that by beauty beautiful things become beautiful.
Do you not agree to that?

Yes, I agree.

And that by greatness only great things become great and greater greater, and
by smallness the less becomes less.

True.

Then if a person remarks that A is taller by a head than B, and B less by a
head than A, you would refuse to admit this, and would stoutly contend that what
you mean is only that the greater is greater by, and by reason of, greatness,
and the less is less only by, or by reason of, smallness; and thus you would
avoid the danger of saying that the greater is greater and the less by the
measure of the head, which is the same in both, and would also avoid the
monstrous absurdity of supposing that the greater man is greater by reason of
the head, which is small. Would you not be afraid of that?

Indeed, I should, said Cebes, laughing.

In like manner you would be afraid to say that ten exceeded eight by, and by
reason of, two; but would say by, and by reason of, number; or that two cubits
exceed one cubit not by a half, but by magnitude?-that is what you would say,
for there is the same danger in both cases.

Very true, he said.

Again, would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of one to
one, or the division of one, is the cause of two? And you would loudly
asseverate that you know of no way in which anything comes into existence except
by participation in its own proper essence, and consequently, as far as you
know, the only cause of two is the participation in duality; that is the way to
make two, and the participation in one is the way to make one. You would say: I
will let alone puzzles of division and addition-wiser heads than mine may answer
them; inexperienced as I am, and ready to start, as the proverb says, at my own
shadow, I cannot afford to give up the sure ground of a principle. And if anyone
assails you there, you would not mind him, or answer him until you had seen
whether the consequences which follow agree with one another or not, and when
you are further required to give an explanation of this principle, you would go
on to assume a higher principle, and the best of the higher ones, until you
found a resting-place; but you would not refuse the principle and the
consequences in your reasoning like the Eristics-at least if you wanted to
discover real existence. Not that this confusion signifies to them who never
care or think about the matter at all, for they have the wit to be well pleased
with themselves, however great may be the turmoil of their ideas. But you, if
you are a philosopher, will, I believe, do as I say.

What you say is most true, said Simmias and Cebes, both speaking at once.

Ech. Yes, Phaedo; and I don't wonder at their assenting. Anyone who has the
least sense will acknowledge the wonderful clear. of Socrates' reasoning.

Phaed. Certainly, Echecrates; and that was the feeling of the whole company
at the time.

Ech. Yes, and equally of ourselves, who were not of the company, and are now
listening to your recital. But what followed?

Phaedo. After all this was admitted, and they had agreed about the existence
of ideas and the participation in them of the other things which derive their
names from them, Socrates, if I remember rightly, said:-

This is your way of speaking; and yet when you say that Simmias is greater
than Socrates and less than Phaedo, do you not predicate of Simmias both
greatness and smallness?

Yes, I do.

But still you allow that Simmias does not really exceed Socrates, as the
words may seem to imply, because he is Simmias, but by reason of the size which
he has; just as Simmias does not exceed Socrates because he is Simmias, any more
than because Socrates is Socrates, but because he has smallness when compared
with the greatness of Simmias?

True.

And if Phaedo exceeds him in size, that is not because Phaedo is Phaedo, but
because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias, who is comparatively
smaller?

That is true.

And therefore Simmias is said to be great, and is also said to be small,
because he is in a mean between them, exceeding the smallness of the one by his
greatness, and allowing the greatness of the other to exceed his smallness. He
added, laughing, I am speaking like a book, but I believe that what I am now
saying is true.

Simmias assented to this.

The reason why I say this is that I want you to agree with me in thinking,
not only that absolute greatness will never be great and also small, but that
greatness in us or in the concrete will never admit the small or admit of being
exceeded: instead of this, one of two things will happen-either the greater will
fly or retire before the opposite, which is the less, or at the advance of the
less will cease to exist; but will not, if allowing or admitting smallness, be
changed by that; even as I, having received and admitted smallness when compared
with Simmias, remain just as I was, and am the same small person. And as the
idea of greatness cannot condescend ever to be or become small, in like manner
the smallness in us cannot be or become great; nor can any other opposite which
remains the same ever be or become its own opposite, but either passes away or
perishes in the change.

That, replied Cebes, is quite my notion.

One of the company, though I do not exactly remember which of them, on
hearing this, said: By Heaven, is not this the direct contrary of what was
admitted before-that out of the greater came the less and out of the less the
greater, and that opposites are simply generated from opposites; whereas now
this seems to be utterly denied.

Socrates inclined his head to the speaker and listened. I like your courage,
he said, in reminding us of this. But you do not observe that there is a
difference in the two cases. For then we were speaking of opposites in the
concrete, and now of the essential opposite which, as is affirmed, neither in us
nor in nature can ever be at variance with itself: then, my friend, we were
speaking of things in which opposites are inherent and which are called after
them, but now about the opposites which are inherent in them and which give
their name to them; these essential opposites will never, as we maintain, admit
of generation into or out of one another. At the same time, turning to Cebes, he
said: Were you at all disconcerted, Cebes, at our friend's objection?

That was not my feeling, said Cebes; and yet I cannot deny that I am apt to
be disconcerted.

Then we are agreed after all, said Socrates, that the opposite will never in
any case be opposed to itself?

To that we are quite agreed, he replied.

Yet once more let me ask you to consider the question from another point of
view, and see whether you agree with me: There is a thing which you term heat,
and another thing which you term cold?

Certainly.

But are they the same as fire and snow?

Most assuredly not.

Heat is not the same as fire, nor is cold the same as snow?

No.

And yet you will surely admit that when snow, as before said, is under the
influence of heat, they will not remain snow and heat; but at the advance of the
heat the snow will either retire or perish?

Very true, he replied.

And the fire too at the advance of the cold will either retire or perish; and
when the fire is under the influence of the cold, they will not remain, as
before, fire and cold.

That is true, he said.

And in some cases the name of the idea is not confined to the idea; but
anything else which, not being the idea, exists only in the form of the idea,
may also lay claim to it. I will try to make this clearer by an example: The odd
number is always called by the name of odd?

Very true.

But is this the only thing which is called odd? Are there not other things
which have their own name, and yet are called odd, because, although not the
same as oddness, they are never without oddness?-that is what I mean to
ask-whether numbers such as the number three are not of the class of odd. And
there are many other examples: would you not say, for example, that three may be
called by its proper name, and also be called odd, which is not the same with
three? and this may be said not only of three but also of five, and every
alternate number-each of them without being oddness is odd, and in the same way
two and four, and the whole series of alternate numbers, has every number even,
without being evenness. Do you admit that?

Yes, he said, how can I deny that?

Then now mark the point at which I am aiming: not only do essential opposites
exclude one another, but also concrete things, which, although not in themselves
opposed, contain opposites; these, I say, also reject the idea which is opposed
to that which is contained in them, and at the advance of that they either
perish or withdraw. There is the number three for example; will not that endure
annihilation or anything sooner than be converted into an even number, remaining
three?

Very true, said Cebes.

And yet, he said, the number two is certainly not opposed to the number
three?

It is not.

Then not only do opposite ideas repel the advance of one another, but also
there are other things which repel the approach of opposites.

That is quite true, he said.

Suppose, he said, that we endeavor, if possible, to determine what these are.

By all means.

Are they not, Cebes, such as compel the things of which they have possession,
not only to take their own form, but also the form of some opposite?

What do you mean?

I mean, as I was just now saying, and have no need to repeat to you, that
those things which are possessed by the number three must not only be three in
number, but must also be odd.

Quite true.

And on this oddness, of which the number three has the impress, the opposite
idea will never intrude?

No.

And this impress was given by the odd principle?

Yes.

And to the odd is opposed the even?

True.

Then the idea of the even number will never arrive at three?

No.

Then three has no part in the even?

None.

Then the triad or number three is uneven?

Very true.

To return then to my distinction of natures which are not opposites, and yet
do not admit opposites: as, in this instance, three, although not opposed to the
even, does not any the more admit of the even, but always brings the opposite
into play on the other side; or as two does not receive the odd, or fire the
cold-from these examples (and there are many more of them) perhaps you may be
able to arrive at the general conclusion that not only opposites will not
receive opposites, but also that nothing which brings the opposite will admit
the opposite of that which it brings in that to which it is brought. And here
let me recapitulate-for there is no harm in repetition. The number five will not
admit the nature of the even, any more than ten, which is the double of five,
will admit the nature of the odd-the double, though not strictly opposed to the
odd, rejects the odd altogether. Nor again will parts in the ratio of 3:2, nor
any fraction in which there is a half, nor again in which there is a third,
admit the notion of the whole, although they are not opposed to the whole. You
will agree to that?

Yes, he said, I entirely agree and go along with you in that.

And now, he said, I think that I may begin again; and to the question which I
am about to ask I will beg you to give not the old safe answer, but another, of
which I will offer you an example; and I hope that you will find in what has
been just said another foundation which is as safe. I mean that if anyone asks
you "what that is, the inherence of which makes the body hot," you
will reply not heat (this is what I call the safe and stupid answer), but fire,
a far better answer, which we are now in a condition to give. Or if anyone asks
you "why a body is diseased," you will not say from disease, but from
fever; and instead of saying that oddness is the cause of odd numbers, you will
say that the monad is the cause of them: and so of things in general, as I dare
say that you will understand sufficiently without my adducing any further
examples.

Yes, he said, I quite understand you.

Tell me, then, what is that the inherence of which will render the body
alive?

The soul, he replied.

And is this always the case?

Yes, he said, of course.

Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life?

Yes, certainly.

And is there any opposite to life?

There is, he said.

And what is that?

Death.

Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will never receive the opposite of
what she brings. And now, he said, what did we call that principle which repels
the even?

The odd.

And that principle which repels the musical, or the just?

The unmusical, he said, and the unjust.

And what do we call the principle which does not admit of death?

The immortal, he said.

And does the soul admit of death?

No.

Then the soul is immortal?

Yes, he said.

And may we say that this is proven?

Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates, he replied.

And supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not three be imperishable?

Of course.

And if that which is cold were imperishable, when the warm principle came
attacking the snow, must not the snow have retired whole and unmelted-for it
could never have perished, nor could it have remained and admitted the heat?

True, he said.

Again, if the uncooling or warm principle were imperishable, the fire when
assailed by cold would not have perished or have been extinguished, but would
have gone away unaffected?

Certainly, he said.

And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also
imperishable, the soul when attacked by death cannot perish; for the preceding
argument shows that the soul will not admit of death, or ever be dead, any more
than three or the odd number will admit of the even, or fire or the heat in the
fire, of the cold. Yet a person may say: "But although the odd will not
become even at the approach of the even, why may not the odd perish and the even
take the place of the odd?" Now to him who makes this objection, we cannot
answer that the odd principle is imperishable; for this has not been
acknowledged, but if this had been acknowledged, there would have been no
difficulty in contending that at the approach of the even the odd principle and
the number three took up their departure; and the same argument would have held
good of fire and heat and any other thing.

Very true.

And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also
imperishable, then the soul will be imperishable as well as immortal; but if
not, some other proof of her imperishableness will have to be given.

No other proof is needed, he said; for if the immortal, being eternal, is
liable to perish, then nothing is imperishable.

Yes, replied Socrates, all men will agree that God, and the essential form of
life, and the immortal in general, will never perish.

Yes, all men, he said-that is true; and what is more, gods, if I am not
mistaken, as well as men.

Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not the soul, if she is
immortal, be also imperishable?

Most certainly.

Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be supposed to
die, but the immortal goes out of the way of death and is preserved safe and
sound?

True.

Then, Cebes, beyond question the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our
souls will truly exist in another world!

I am convinced, Socrates, said Cebes, and have nothing more to object; but if
my friend Simmias, or anyone else, has any further objection, he had better
speak out, and not keep silence, since I do not know how there can ever be a
more fitting time to which he can defer the discussion, if there is anything
which he wants to say or have said.

But I have nothing more to say, replied Simmias; nor do I see any room for
uncertainty, except that which arises necessarily out of the greatness of the
subject and the feebleness of man, and which I cannot help feeling.

Yes, Simmias, replied Socrates, that is well said: and more than that, first
principles, even if they appear certain, should be carefully considered; and
when they are satisfactorily ascertained, then, with a sort of hesitating
confidence in human reason, you may, I think, follow the course of the argument;
and if this is clear, there will be no need for any further inquiry.

That, he said, is true.

But then, O my friends, he said, if the soul is really immortal, what care
should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is
called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this point
of view does indeed appear to be awful. If death had only been the end of all,
the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would have been
happily quit not only of their body, but of their own evil together with their
souls. But now, as the soul plainly appears to be immortal, there is no release
or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom.
For the soul when on her progress to the world below takes nothing with her but
nurture and education; which are indeed said greatly to benefit or greatly to
injure the departed, at the very beginning of its pilgrimage in the other world.

For after death, as they say, the genius of each individual, to whom he
belonged in life, leads him to a certain place in which the dead are gathered
together for judgment, whence they go into the world below, following the guide
who is appointed to conduct them from this world to the other: and when they
have there received their due and remained their time, another guide brings them
back again after many revolutions of ages. Now this journey to the other world
is not, as Aeschylus says in the "Telephus," a single and straight
path-no guide would be wanted for that, and no one could miss a single path; but
there are many partings of the road, and windings, as I must infer from the
rites and sacrifices which are offered to the gods below in places where three
ways meet on earth. The wise and orderly soul is conscious of her situation and
follows in the path; but the soul which desires the body, and which, as I was
relating before, has long been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the world
of sight, is after many struggles and many sufferings hardly and with violence
carried away by her attendant genius, and when she arrives at the place where
the other souls are gathered, if she be impure and have done impure deeds, or
been concerned in foul murders or other crimes which are the brothers of these,
and the works of brothers in crime-from that soul everyone flees and turns away;
no one will be her companion, no one her guide, but alone she wanders in
extremity of evil until certain times are fulfilled, and when they are
fulfilled, she is borne irresistibly to her own fitting habitation; as every
pure and just soul which has passed through life in the company and under the
guidance of the gods has also her own proper home.

Now the earth has divers wonderful regions, and is indeed in nature and
extent very unlike the notions of geographers, as I believe on the authority of
one who shall be nameless.

What do you mean, Socrates? said Simmias. I have myself heard many
descriptions of the earth, but I do not know in what you are putting your faith,
and I should like to know.

Well, Simmias, replied Socrates, the recital of a tale does not, I think,
require the art of Glaucus; and I know not that the art of Glaucus could prove
the truth of my tale, which I myself should never be able to prove, and even if
I could, I fear, Simmias, that my life would come to an end before the argument
was completed. I may describe to you, however, the form and regions of the earth
according to my conception of them.

That, said Simmias, will be enough.

Well, then, he said, my conviction is that the earth is a round body in the
center of the heavens, and therefore has no need of air or any similar force as
a support, but is kept there and hindered from falling or inclining any way by
the equability of the surrounding heaven and by her own equipoise. For that
which, being in equipoise, is in the center of that which is equably diffused,
will not incline any way in any degree, but will always remain in the same state
and not deviate. And this is my first notion.

Which is surely a correct one, said Simmias.

Also I believe that the earth is very vast, and that we who dwell in the
region extending from the river Phasis to the Pillars of Heracles, along the
borders of the sea, are just like ants or frogs about a marsh, and inhabit a
small portion only, and that many others dwell in many like places. For I should
say that in all parts of the earth there are hollows of various forms and sizes,
into which the water and the mist and the air collect; and that the true earth
is pure and in the pure heaven, in which also are the stars-that is the heaven
which is commonly spoken of as the ether, of which this is but the sediment
collecting in the hollows of the earth. But we who live in these hollows are
deceived into the notion that we are dwelling above on the surface of the earth;
which is just as if a creature who was at the bottom of the sea were to fancy
that he was on the surface of the water, and that the sea was the heaven through
which he saw the sun and the other stars-he having never come to the surface by
reason of his feebleness and sluggishness, and having never lifted up his head
and seen, nor ever heard from one who had seen, this region which is so much
purer and fairer than his own. Now this is exactly our case: for we are dwelling
in a hollow of the earth, and fancy that we are on the surface; and the air we
call the heaven, and in this we imagine that the stars move. But this is also
owing to our feebleness and sluggishness, which prevent our reaching the surface
of the air: for if any man could arrive at the exterior limit, or take the wings
of a bird and fly upward, like a fish who puts his head out and sees this world,
he would see a world beyond; and, if the nature of man could sustain the sight,
he would acknowledge that this was the place of the true heaven and the true
light and the true stars. For this earth, and the stones, and the entire region
which surrounds us, are spoilt and corroded, like the things in the sea which
are corroded by the brine; for in the sea too there is hardly any noble or
perfect growth, but clefts only, and sand, and an endless slough of mud: and
even the shore is not to be compared to the fairer sights of this world. And
greater far is the superiority of the other. Now of that upper earth which is
under the heaven, I can tell you a charming tale, Simmias, which is well worth
hearing.

And we, Socrates, replied Simmias, shall be charmed to listen.

The tale, my friend, he said, is as follows: In the first place, the earth,
when looked at from above, is like one of those balls which have leather
coverings in twelve pieces, and is of divers colors, of which the colors which
painters use on earth are only a sample. But there the whole earth is made up of
them, and they are brighter far and clearer than ours; there is a purple of
wonderful luster, also the radiance of gold, and the white which is in the earth
is whiter than any chalk or snow. Of these and other colors the earth is made
up, and they are more in number and fairer than the eye of man has ever seen;
and the very hollows (of which I was speaking) filled with air and water are
seen like light flashing amid the other colors, and have a color of their own,
which gives a sort of unity to the variety of earth. And in this fair region
everything that grows-trees, and flowers, and fruits-is in a like degree fairer
than any here; and there are hills, and stones in them in a like degree
smoother, and more transparent, and fairer in color than our highly valued
emeralds and sardonyxes and jaspers, and other gems, which are but minute
fragments of them: for there all the stones are like our precious stones, and
fairer still. The reason of this is that they are pure, and not, like our
precious stones, infected or corroded by the corrupt briny elements which
coagulate among us, and which breed foulness and disease both in earth and
stones, as well as in animals and plants. They are the jewels of the upper
earth, which also shines with gold and silver and the like, and they are visible
to sight and large and abundant and found in every region of the earth, and
blessed is he who sees them. And upon the earth are animals and men, some in a
middle region, others dwelling about the air as we dwell about the sea; others
in islands which the air flows round, near the continent: and in a word, the air
is used by them as the water and the sea are by us, and the ether is to them
what the air is to us. Moreover, the temperament of their seasons is such that
they have no disease, and live much longer than we do, and have sight and
hearing and smell, and all the other senses, in far greater perfection, in the
same degree that air is purer than water or the ether than air. Also they have
temples and sacred places in which the gods really dwell, and they hear their
voices and receive their answers, and are conscious of them and hold converse
with them, and they see the sun, moon, and stars as they really are, and their
other blessedness is of a piece with this.

Such is the nature of the whole earth, and of the things which are around the
earth; and there are divers regions in the hollows on the face of the globe
everywhere, some of them deeper and also wider than that which we inhabit,
others deeper and with a narrower opening than ours, and some are shallower and
wider; all have numerous perforations, and passages broad and narrow in the
interior of the earth, connecting them with one another; and there flows into
and out of them, as into basins, a vast tide of water, and huge subterranean
streams of perennial rivers, and springs hot and cold, and a great fire, and
great rivers of fire, and streams of liquid mud, thin or thick (like the rivers
of mud in Sicily, and the lava-streams which follow them), and the regions about
which they happen to flow are filled up with them. And there is a sort of swing
in the interior of the earth which moves all this up and down. Now the swing is
in this wise: There is a chasm which is the vastest of them all, and pierces
right through the whole earth; this is that which Homer describes in the words,

"Far off, where is the inmost depth beneath the earth"; and which
he in other places, and many other poets, have called Tartarus. And the swing is
caused by the streams flowing into and out of this chasm, and they each have the
nature of the soil through which they flow. And the reason why the streams are
always flowing in and out is that the watery element has no bed or bottom, and
is surging and swinging up and down, and the surrounding wind and air do the
same; they follow the water up and down, hither and thither, over the earth-just
as in respiring the air is always in process of inhalation and exhalation; and
the wind swinging with the water in and out produces fearful and irresistible
blasts: when the waters retire with a rush into the lower parts of the earth, as
they are called, they flow through the earth into those regions, and fill them
up as with the alternate motion of a pump, and then when they leave those
regions and rush back hither, they again fill the hollows here, and when these
are filled, flow through subterranean channels and find their way to their
several places, forming seas, and lakes, and rivers, and springs. Thence they
again enter the earth, some of them making a long circuit into many lands,
others going to few places and those not distant, and again fall into Tartarus,
some at a point a good deal lower than that at which they rose, and others not
much lower, but all in some degree lower than the point of issue. And some burst
forth again on the opposite side, and some on the same side, and some wind round
the earth with one or many folds, like the coils of a serpent, and descend as
far as they can, but always return and fall into the lake. The rivers on either
side can descend only to the center and no further, for to the rivers on both
sides the opposite side is a precipice.

Now these rivers are many, and mighty, and diverse, and there are four
principal ones, of which the greatest and outermost is that called Oceanus,
which flows round the earth in a circle; and in the opposite direction flows
Acheron, which passes under the earth through desert places, into the Acherusian
Lake: this is the lake to the shores of which the souls of the many go when they
are dead, and after waiting an appointed time, which is to some a longer and to
some a shorter time, they are sent back again to be born as animals. The third
river rises between the two, and near the place of rising pours into a vast
region of fire, and forms a lake larger than the Mediterranean Sea, boiling with
water and mud; and proceeding muddy and turbid, and winding about the earth,
comes, among other places, to the extremities of the Acherusian Lake, but
mingles not with the waters of the lake, and after making many coils about the
earth plunges into Tartarus at a deeper level. This is that Pyriphlegethon, as
the stream is called, which throws up jets of fire in all sorts of places. The
fourth river goes out on the opposite side, and falls first of all into a wild
and savage region, which is all of a dark-blue color, like lapis lazuli; and
this is that river which is called the Stygian River, and falls into and forms
the Lake Styx, and after falling into the lake and receiving strange powers in
the waters, passes under the earth, winding round in the opposite direction to
Pyriphlegethon, and meeting in the Acherusian Lake from the opposite side. And
the water of this river too mingles with no other, but flows round in a circle
and falls into Tartarus over against Pyriphlegethon, and the name of this river,
as the poet says, is Cocytus.

Such is the name of the other world; and when the dead arrive at the place to
which the genius of each severally conveys them, first of all they have sentence
passed upon them, as they have lived well and piously or not. And those who
appear to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the river Acheron, and mount
such conveyances as they can get, and are carried in them to the lake, and there
they dwell and are purified of their evil deeds, and suffer the penalty of the
wrongs which they have done to others, and are absolved, and receive the rewards
of their good deeds according to their deserts. But those who appear to be
incurable by reason of the greatness of their crimes-who have committed many and
terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and violent, or the like-such are
hurled into Tartarus, which is their suitable destiny, and they never come out.
Those again who have committed crimes, which, although great, are not
unpardonable-who in a moment of anger, for example, have done violence to a
father or mother, and have repented for the remainder of their lives, or who
have taken the life of another under like extenuating circumstances-these are
plunged into Tartarus, the pains of which they are compelled to undergo for a
year, but at the end of the year the wave casts them forth-mere homicides by way
of Cocytus, parricides and matricides by Pyriphlegethon-and they are borne to
the Acherusian Lake, and there they lift up their voices and call upon the
victims whom they have slain or wronged, to have pity on them, and to receive
them, and to let them come out of the river into the lake. And if they prevail,
then they come forth and cease from their troubles; but if not, they are carried
back again into Tartarus and from thence into the rivers unceasingly, until they
obtain mercy from those whom they have wronged: for that is the sentence
inflicted upon them by their judges. Those also who are remarkable for having
led holy lives are released from this earthly prison, and go to their pure home
which is above, and dwell in the purer earth; and those who have duly purified
themselves with philosophy live henceforth altogether without the body, in
mansions fairer far than these, which may not be described, and of which the
time would fail me to tell.

Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought not we to do in order
to obtain virtue and wisdom in this life? Fair is the prize, and the hope great.

I do not mean to affirm that the description which I have given of the soul
and her mansions is exactly true-a man of sense ought hardly to say that. But I
do say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, he may venture to
think, not improperly or unworthily, that something of the kind is true. The
venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comfort himself with words like
these, which is the reason why lengthen out the tale. Wherefore, I say, let a
man be of good cheer about his soul, who has cast away the pleasures and
ornaments of the body as alien to him, and rather hurtful in their effects, and
has followed after the pleasures of knowledge in this life; who has adorned the
soul in her own proper jewels, which are temperance, and justice, and courage,
and nobility, and truth-in these arrayed she is ready to go on her journey to
the world below, when her time comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all other men,
will depart at some time or other. Me already, as the tragic poet would say, the
voice of fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison; and I think that I had better
repair to the bath first, in order that the women may not have the trouble of
washing my body after I am dead.

When he had done speaking, Crito said: And have you any commands for us,
Socrates-anything to say about your children, or any other matter in which we
can serve you?

Nothing particular, he said: only, as I have always told you, I would have
you look to yourselves; that is a service which you may always be doing to me
and mine as well as to yourselves. And you need not make professions; for if you
take no thought for yourselves, and walk not according to the precepts which I
have given you, not now for the first time, the warmth of your professions will
be of no avail.

We will do our best, said Crito. But in what way would you have us bury you?

In any way that you like; only you must get hold of me, and take care that I
do not walk away from you. Then he turned to us, and added with a smile: I
cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have been talking and
conducting the argument; he fancies that I am the other Socrates whom he will
soon see, a dead body-and he asks, How shall he bury me? And though I have
spoken many words in the endeavor to show that when I have drunk the poison I
shall leave you and go to the joys of the blessed-these words of mine, with
which I comforted you and myself, have had, I perceive, no effect upon Crito.
And therefore I want you to be surety for me now, as he was surety for me at the
trial: but let the promise be of another sort; for he was my surety to the
judges that I would remain, but you must be my surety to him that I shall not
remain, but go away and depart; and then he will suffer less at my death, and
not be grieved when he sees my body being burned or buried. I would not have him
sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial, Thus we lay out Socrates, or, Thus
we follow him to the grave or bury him; for false words are not only evil in
themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. Be of good cheer, then, my dear
Crito, and say that you are burying my body only, and do with that as is usual,
and as you think best.

When he had spoken these words, he arose and went into the bath chamber with
Crito, who bade us wait; and we waited, talking and thinking of the subject of
discourse, and also of the greatness of our sorrow; he was like a father of whom
we were being bereaved, and we were about to pass the rest of our lives as
orphans. When he had taken the bath his children were brought to him-(he had two
young sons and an elder one); and the women of his family also came, and he
talked to them and gave them a few directions in the presence of Crito; and he
then dismissed them and returned to us.

Now the hour of sunset was near, for a good deal of time had passed while he
was within. When he came out, he sat down with us again after his bath, but not
much was said. Soon the jailer, who was the servant of the Eleven, entered and
stood by him, saying: To you, Socrates, whom I know to be the noblest and
gentlest and best of all who ever came to this place, I will not impute the
angry feelings of other men, who rage and swear at me when, in obedience to the
authorities, I bid them drink the poison-indeed, I am sure that you will not be
angry with me; for others, as you are aware, and not I, are the guilty cause.
And so fare you well, and try to bear lightly what must needs be; you know my
errand. Then bursting into tears he turned away and went out.

Socrates looked at him and said: I return your good wishes, and will do as
you bid. Then, turning to us, he said, How charming the man is: since I have
been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times he would talk
to me, and was as good as could be to me, and now see how generously he sorrows
for me. But we must do as he says, Crito; let the cup be brought, if the poison
is prepared: if not, let the attendant prepare some.

Yet, said Crito, the sun is still upon the hilltops, and many a one has taken
the draught late, and after the announcement has been made to him, he has eaten
and drunk, and indulged in sensual delights; do not hasten then, there is still
time.

Socrates said: Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right in doing
thus, for they think that they will gain by the delay; but I am right in not
doing thus, for I do not think that I should gain anything by drinking the
poison a little later; I should be sparing and saving a life which is already
gone: I could only laugh at myself for this. Please then to do as I say, and not
to refuse me.

Crito, when he heard this, made a sign to the servant, and the servant went
in, and remained for some time, and then returned with the jailer carrying a cup
of poison. Socrates said: You, my good friend, who are experienced in these
matters, shall give me directions how I am to proceed. The man answered: You
have only to walk about until your legs are heavy, and then to lie down, and the
poison will act. At the same time he handed the cup to Socrates, who in the
easiest and gentlest manner, without the least fear or change of color or
feature, looking at the man with all his eyes, Echecrates, as his manner was,
took the cup and said: What do you say about making a libation out of this cup
to any god? May I, or not? The man answered: We only prepare, Socrates, just so
much as we deem enough. I understand, he said: yet I may and must pray to the
gods to prosper my journey from this to that other world-may this, then, which
is my prayer, be granted to me. Then holding the cup to his lips, quite readily
and cheerfully he drank off the poison. And hitherto most of us had been able to
control our sorrow; but now when we saw him drinking, and saw too that he had
finished the draught, we could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own
tears were flowing fast; so that I covered my face and wept over myself, for
certainly I was not weeping over him, but at the thought of my own calamity in
having lost such a companion. Nor was I the first, for Crito, when he found
himself unable to restrain his tears, had got up and moved away, and I followed;
and at that moment. Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time, broke out in
a loud cry which made cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his calmness:
What is this strange outcry? he said. I sent away the women mainly in order that
they might not offend in this way, for I have heard that a man should die in
peace. Be quiet, then, and have patience.

When we heard that, we were ashamed, and refrained our tears; and he walked
about until, as he said, his legs began to fail, and then he lay on his back,
according to the directions, and the man who gave him the poison now and then
looked at his feet and legs; and after a while he pressed his foot hard and
asked him if he could feel; and he said, no; and then his leg, and so upwards
and upwards, and showed us that he was cold and stiff. And he felt them himself,
and said: When the poison reaches the heart, that will be the end. He was
beginning to grow cold about the groin, when he uncovered his face, for he had
covered himself up, and said (they were his last words)-he said: Crito, I owe a
cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt? The debt shall be paid,
said Crito; is there anything else? There was no answer to this question; but in
a minute or two a movement was heard, and the attendants uncovered him; his eyes
were set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth.

Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, whom I may truly call the
wisest, and justest, and best of all the men whom I have ever known.