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Pragmatics Pragmatics: syntax + semantics + sign relation with people who use them. Pragmatics, as a consequence, would be a concrete experience with the language in use, in different contexts of communication, wrapped in variations and logically unpredictable heterogeneity. L. Wittgenstein (1889-1951) Philosophical investigations (1953)... like a lump of sugar in water.

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L. Wittgenstein: The Language is its use Language games Rules Grammar Family similarity Form of life

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The meaning of words is not descriptive or figurative, but a pratical construction. Family resemblance suggests the non-existence of a unique foudation that migth delineate the possibilities of understandings of concepts – this interlinkingof possibilities of signification would occur in a dinamic and interactive manner, since there would be merely kinships of uses between concepts that would permit it to pass though one communicative situation to another. The rule, which is not related to the structural grammatical rules of the language, but which involves them and permits the behavior and the social actions constructed colletively in the experiences of the subjects.

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Grammar, as a tool which is actioned and used situationally to enable interation in the use of language. The way of life witch, although barely touched on by Wittgenstein, would be the set of habits and actions shared situationally by means of the use of language. Language games, which, to certain extent, are the locus where the interations occur and where significations emerge intersubjectively.

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The Language games are social actions of the language in use There is no randomness, relativism or chance in meaning. There is always a starting point in a form of life. The question is that this point is not fixed. Meaning is a practical construction. There is not only one base that can tag all the possibilities of meaning. It would be as if we could tack all the possibilities of social actions. The dynamic rules and its unpredictably various evolvement in social actions, in forms of life, would conduct the language meaning, and a grammar would be concomitantly created with this meaning process. And it is, Games.

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The most innovative reference in Wittgenstein with regard to signification was to encourage us to cast our eyes on the practical and, in this way, on another possibility for the understanding of the signification of language – based on its use. In the world of practices, there would be no universals for Wittgenstein, therefore, in the world of language (that governs practices), none either.

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Information science, would have to deal with an open concept of signification that would permit its constant reconstruction. This, principally, if we think of the deterritorialized informational implications on the Web. What Wittgenstein proceeds to propose to us is that we understand signification in the ambit of interaction. In this scenario, we affirm the importance of information sciences turning its eyes to the theories, the methods and the concepts which have the greatest epistemic potency and range, since only in possession of this understanding will it be able to transit the contexts of interaction in which the use of language and consequently the construction of significations occur.

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More specifically, let us venture that, in the systemic domain (even if offered virtually), the practices of representation of the information could incorporate in their instruments of informational intermediation, simple concepts of daily use (instead of giving primacy to the specialized concept and that commonly considered to be the most precise). Even if we add to it the explanation of some of its uses in life situations. Thus we would be potentializing the representation, attaching to it some contexts of action related to the concept. Based on this, it would be possible, perhaps, not just to delimit the possible meanings of concepts represented, but also to understand how their meaning could be reestablished in different situations of practical use. In the language of explanation of the use of the concept, more concepts and familiar expressions would be provided under which their practical uses would also be prescribed. The language of explanation is harnessed to practice and this attaches certainty to the situational meaning of the concept explained.

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To Wittgenstein, the approximation of the calculus model to language is an impoverishment. The elaboration of exhaustive lists of descriptive characteristics and of equivalences for general concepts may propitiate the generation of incomplete products of representation at the same time as it obscures some possibilities of strict understanding of the general concept. Our competence to construct meanings acceding to the situations in which the use of the concept is required would come from a competence of interaction which is made possible to us by the understanding and the sharing of rules (in terms of Wittgensteinian modes of behavior and action), based on the use of language, in a way of life. The competencies that we develop as we learn to live and as we learn ourselves to relate (in a non-linear, unpredictable and dynamic mode) are also the competencies we have to mean. In the field of virtual technological interactions, we think that, where Wittgenstein most enlightens us has to do with the significative nature of language, which is instituted in its daily use, while this daily use has been ever more present in the searches and in the configuration of the contents available on the net based on argumentative dialogal relationships within language games. In the light of Investigations we can grasp a dimension of the unpredictability governing the establishment of meanings in cyberspace.

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HABERMAS, J. COMMUNICATIVE ACTION THEORY, 1981. It offers a workup to explain a social action theory that emphasizes the role of language use as constitutive of communicative action and the communicative action as constitutive of social actions. WORLD OF LIFE EMANCIPATORY STRENGTH COMMUNICATIVE REASON COMMUNICATIVE ACTIONS SEARCH FOR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND CONSESUS. Knowledge and truth are built pragmatically from the use of language in communicative actions. SYSTEM INSTRUMENTAL REASON ESTRATEGIC ACTIONS SEARCH FOR SUCCESS Knowledge and truth are relatively directed. Communicative arrangements Approximation of individualities Democracy

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The communicative interactions expressed on the Internet would be a manifestation of the emancipatory strength that drives us to want to know something. As a consequence, it stimulates us to act communicatively and to look for tracks that lead us to a way of understanding. Before information, it is sought an interlocution with other seekers, from the use of language in speech acts as a criteria about what is being looked for. The interlocution, as informative and social filters among actors in the net is the communicative guarantee of virtual contents. This human communicative condition to share multicultural subjectivity is explained by Habermas and it seems to be expressed in the Games in the web. The communicative action as validation criteria for information in virtual technological platforms

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