John Stewart Service

John Stewart Service was a U.S. State Department official and Foreign Service Officer during World War II, who was caught red-handed by FBI surveillance delivering the Nationalist Chinese Order of Battle to secret Communist Phillip Jaffe. He was for decades popularly portrayed as an innocent victim of McCarthyism, but later admitted that he had falsified intelligence on the Communist Chinese because "I wanted them to win."

Adler had been identified five years before by confessed former Comintern-GRU courier Whittaker Chambers as a member of the Communist underground apparatus.[3] In 1945, defecting NKVD courier Elizabeth Bentley would idependently identify Adler as a Treasury official in Chungking who was also a member of an NKVD espionage ring known as the Silvermaster group.[4] In 1948, Chief of Soviet intelligence in the U.S.Anatoly Gorsky identified Adler (in KGB archives summarized by former KGB agent Alexander Vassiliev) as the agent code-named "Sachs,"[5] who appears in Venona as an NKVD source on China.[6] Chi, meanwhile, was a Communist propagandist[7] and intelligence agent.[8] After the fall of China to the Communists, both Adler and Chi would abscond to Beijing, where they would become officials of the new Communist government, Chi as a propagandist,[9] Adler as a foreign espionage official.[10]

During the early war years, Service and Adler wrote favorable reports on the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek, which were keeping the Japanese busy, so they could not attack the Soviet Union. But once the defeat of Japan became likely, Soviet policy shifted to hostility toward the Nationalist government, and support for the Communist rebels seeking to overthrow it. Service began an increasingly harsh series of attacks on the Chinese government as "fascist" and "Gestapo-like,"[11] writing that "the Kuomintang intensifies its drive for 'Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer'."[12]

In contrast, Service praised the Communists as "progressive" and "democratic."[13] According to Service, the Communist (or as Service put it, "the so-called Communist") rebels merely advocated "agrarian reform, civil rights, the establishment of democratic institutions."[14] "[T]he Communist political program is simple democracy," he wrote. "This is much more American than Russian in form and spirit."[15] He reassured Washington that Mao's policy involved "abandonment of any purely Communist program."[16] The Communists "are carrying out democratic policies," insisted Service, "which they expect the United States to approve and sympathetically support."[17]

When Vice PresidentHenry Wallace visited China in June 1944, he was given a 68-page briefing, officially written by Service, although Service would later admit he actually co-wrote it with the Soviet agent Solomon Adler.[18] Service and his Soviet-agent housemate Adler wrote that the Communists were doing most of the fighting against the Japanese, while the Nationalists were sitting out the war or actually collaborating.[19] For example, Adler reported (attributing information to Service): "The Communists have successfully resisted the Japanese for seven years... with no active support from Chungking."[20] In contrast, General Albert Wedemeyer, commander of American forces in China reported: "No Communist Chinese forces fought in any major battles of the Sino-Japanese war.... Chinese Communist leaders were not interested in fighting the Japanese," he wrote; "their main interest was to occupy the territory which the Nationalist forces evacuated in their retreat."[21]

"[T]he war was to [Mao] an opportunity to have Chiang destroyed by the Japanese," agreed Jung Chang, a former member of Mao's Red Guards. "He ordered Red commanders to wait for Japanese troops to defeat the Nationalists, and then, to seize territories below the Japanese line."[22] As Mao put it, “Our determined policy is 70 percent self-development, 20 percent compromise, and 10 percent fight the Japanese.”[23] In July–August 1943, 20,000 Chinese troops were wiped out at Shantung when attacked simultaneously by the Japanese from the north and the Communist rebels from the south.[24] Indeed, in May 1945, an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) team code-named "Spaniel" that parachuted into China to link up with Communist forces was instead taken prisoner by the Communists, whom they found coexisting with Japanese troops. The Americans were held incommunicado until October, some two months after the end of the war. When finally freed, they reported, "The amount of actual fighting being carried on by the 8th R.A. [the “Eighth Route Army,” i.e., Communist Chinese rebels] has been grossly exaggerated. It was their policy to undertake no serious campaign against the Japanese..."[25] Even so ardent a pro-Communist as Theodore White[26] would have to admit, "The Communists...claimed that they held down most of the Japanese troops in China and that they bore the main weight of resistance; this was untrue." In fact, wrote White, "it was the weary soldiers of the Central Government who bore the shock, gnawed at the enemy, and died."[27]

On July 30, 1944 Service wrote, "...the Communists base their policy toward the Kuomintang on a real desire for democracy in China under which there can be orderly economic growth through a stage of private enterprise to eventual socialism without the need of violent social upheaval and revolution." [28] On June 6, 1945, he wrote to John Carter Vincent, Chief of the State Department's Division of Chinese Affairs, that the Chinese Communists had a "moderate policy of preserving the interests of the middle class, including landlords and private business, and protection of the institution of private property and capitalism," and that "it is unnecessary and not likely for them to turn toward radicalism," concluding that "Kuomintang-Communist reconciliation seems more than ever to depend on Kuomintang concessions."[29]

Jonathan Mirsky, former East Asia editor for the Times of London, reported that shortly before his death in 1999, Service admitted to him that he “purposely ignored Mao's persecution, including executions, of his perceived enemies at Yan'an.” (Asked why he had “covered-up” for the Communists, Service confessed, "I wanted them to win.")[30]

Return to the U.S.

According to an FBI report, "A highly confidential source, which is completely reliable, has advised that Max and Grace Granich, both of whom have been engaged in Communist and Comintern activities for many years, were advised in the fall of 1944 that Service was returning to Washington from China, and that they should contact him because he could furnish fullest details as to the latest developments."[31]Max Granich (brother of Communist Partycultural commissar[32] "Mike Gold") was the bodyguard and chauffeur of C.P. General Secretary Earl Browder; Grace Granich was Browder's personal secretary. During the 1930s they had been Comintern agents stationed in China.[33]

Service also met with FDR's personal emissary to Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, Harry Hopkins, whom Akhmerov called "the most important of all Soviet war-time agents in the United States," according to Oleg Gordievsky, the highest-ranking KGB agent ever to defect.[42] The late U.S. Air Force historian Eduard Mark identified Hopkins as Venona's Soviet agent "19."[43]

Amerasia scandal

FBI surveillance recorded that Service then met with the secret Communist[46]Philip Jaffe on April 19, 1945 at D.C.'s Statler Hotel, reporting: "Service, according to the microphone surveillance, apparently gave Jaffe a document which dealt with matters the Chinese had furnished to the United States government in confidence."[47] Among the documents Service gave Jaffe was a report by his and Adler's other Soviet agent housemate, Chi, about which Service warned Jaffe that his source would "get his neck pretty badly wrung"[48] if it got out. The surveillance also caught Service admitting to Jaffe, "what I said about the military plans is, of course, very secret."[49] According to Emory University History Professor Harvey Klehr, co-author of The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism:

“

[One] wiretap picked up a conversation in which Jaffe informed Service that Chi Ch’ao-ting, his upstairs neighbor in Chungking, was Jaffe’s cousin, and that Jaffe was anxious to keep that information secret. Even though Service was well aware of Jaffe’s pro-Communist leanings, he agreed not to let anyone know—including his State Department superiors....[50]

”

OSS investigators broke into in the offices of Amerasia, finding hundreds of government documents, many labeled "secret," "top secret," or "confidential."[51] Among the papers seized were "a hundred-odd items from the pen of John Stewart Service";[52] Service was arrested as a suspect. In the wake of the arrests, the Soviet agent Currie told New Deal "fixer" Thomas Corcoran he wanted the charges against Service dropped.[53] An FBI wire tap then caught "Tommy the Cork"[54] trying to "throw a monkey wrench into the Amerasia prosecution"[55] in the form of a "political fix."[56] One FBI memorandum, under the heading "Political Manipulations," citing "technical surveillance on the offices of Thomas J. Corcoran," reported:

“

Considerable political pressure and maneuverings were exerted on behalf of Service, involving directly or indirectly Lauchlin Currie, then an Administrative Assistant at the White House; the then Attorney General, Tom Clark; James McGranery, then Assistant to the Attorney General; James McInerney, then General Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Criminal Division; and Robert Hitchcock, Special Prosecutor for this case."[57]

”

The FBI surveillance logs in question recorded the Soviet agent Currie talking to Corcoran about Service, telling him, "the important thing is to get him out"; Corcoran telling Service that he had informed Attorney General Tom Clark "about the understanding we had below about the cutting out of your name"; James McGranery, assistant to the Attorney General, telling Corcoran, "Your man is Service. I got it" (to which Corcoran replies, "Yeah. So that we can cut him out. OK?"); Service telling Corcoran that federal prosecutor Robert Hitchcock told his attorney "we want to have Service cleared"; Corcoran telling Service, "I have a flat deal like that you are going to be cleared"; etc.[58]

When congressional investigators asked why the Justice Department dropped the case, Hitchcock claimed that department attorneys were concerned that the case would be thrown out because the initial documents had been obtained without a warrant. Asked why Justice had begun the prosecution, having known the origin of the evidence, MacInerney said, "I guess I was just overzealous." In fact, the courts in 1945 held that evidence obtained without a warrant, though inadmissible in court, could be used in investigation to develop other, admissible evidence. It would not be until the 1960s that the courts would adopt the so-called "tainted fruit" doctrine. According to Time magazine, "An FBI agent said flatly: 'The FBI secured no documents through any means … except incident to arrest. They were all legally obtained.'"[59] FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover later wrote, "in the event I had been asked at the time the arrests were made whether I thought we had an airtight case, I would have stated that I thought we had. Further, if I were asked today, I would have to so state."[60] Hitchcock left Washington later that year to take a job with the law firm of Kate Mitchell's uncle.[61]

According to Mirsky, Service would later confess that he had given Jaffe “a top-secret document revealing the Nationalist Order of Battle, which showed the exact disposition of the forces facing Mao's troops.” Service admitted that he knew this might be regarded as treason, but said, "I want to get this off my chest."[62] As Richard M. Fried admits, "Conservative suspicions of a high-level fix were correct."[63]

PSI investigations

Service was accused by Senator Joseph McCarthy of being a security and loyalty risk. Between the years of 1942 and 1945, Service submitted memos to the U.S. State Department supporting the Chinese Communists and Mao and advocated that the U.S. destroy Chiang Kai-shek. According to Senator McCarthy, "Service was named by the U.S. Ambassador to China as one of the men who was serving the cause of Communism in China. He asked the President to remove Service. He said that this man's actions are not good for the United States, they are good for Russia. While in China, Service, in secret recommendations to the State Department, urged that the Communists were the only hope for China. On June 6, 1945, Service was arrested by the F.B.I. for, "having transmitted, without authority, classified documents to the editors of Amerasia, a Communist magazine". Service had in effect turned over to a known Communist, not only State Department documents, but also secret military information. In December 1951, Service was fired from the U.S. State Department, "as a result of an adverse finding as to his security qualifications by the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission." [64][65][66] He was rehired in 1957 at the instruction of a federal judge, but was never again given a policy-making or China-related post, and never received another promotion. Service eventually admitted that "the evidence had been sufficient to support his firing as a security risk." In 1963 he retired from the State Department to the University of California at Berkeley, where, according to Mirsky, “he was admired by students and colleagues and regarded as a witch-hunt victim.” "For many years no expert on China stood higher in the opinion of American students of China, including myself,” than Service, writes Mirsky. However, in light of Service's confession, concludes Mirsky, Service “can no longer be viewed as an innocent victim.”[67]

See also

References

↑FBI recording summary, Philip Jacob Jaffe, April 19, 1945 (FBI file: Amerasia, Section 39); "A highly confidential source has advised that Sol Adler was the roommate in Chungking, China, of John Stewart Service." (FBI summary: The Comintern Apparatus, March 6, 1946, p. 20 PDF p. 24); "I moved into an apartment in the city [Chungking] with Solomon Adler." United States Department of State Loyalty Security Board Meeting in the Case of John S. Service, May 26, 1950, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1950), Part 2: Appendix, p. 1967 (PDF p. 491); The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 592

↑Senate Internal Security Committee, The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 577, 592, 1015