1. Public utilities in this state are required to file
their
tariffs with the Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC).

2. Tariffs are those terms and conditions which govern the
relationship between a public utility and its customers. They
may be and are usually the handiwork of the regulated utility.
However, when filed with and approved by the KCC, tariffs
generally bind both the public utility and its customers.

3. The Electric Public Utilities Act, K.S.A. 66-101 et
seq., does
not explicitly confer upon the public utility or the KCC the
power to make tariffs which limit liability. However, the
power to provide for reasonable limitations of liability is an
integral part of the rate-making process in Kansas.

4. Where limitations on liability are reasonable, the
propriety
of allowing such limitation is a question for the KCC through
its approval process. However, the courts are the final
arbiter of the reasonableness of a limitation of liability
within a duly approved tariff.

5. In answer to two certified questions presented by the
Court of
Appeals, Western District, State of Missouri, it is held: (1)
(a) It was reasonable for the KCC to allow a tariff to become
effective which relieved Kansas City Power & Light
(KCP&L) of
liability for damages resulting from its own ordinary
negligence in regard to the supply of electric service; (b) it
was not reasonable for the KCC to allow a tariff to become
effective which would relieve KCP&L of liability for damages
resulting from its wanton or willful misconduct; and (2)
consistent with Kansas law and public policy, the Western
District of the Missouri Court of Appeals should enforce the
tariffs as to ordinary negligence only.

On certification of two questions of law from the Court of
Appeals, Western District, State of Missouri, ALBERT A. RIEDERER,
presiding judge. Opinion filed July 9, 1999. The questions
certified are determined.

Robert Gingrich, of Kansas City, Missouri, argued
the cause,
and Michael A. Rump, of Kansas City, Missouri, was with
him on the
briefs for appellant.

C. Edward Peterson, of Finnegan, Conrad &
Peterson, L.C., of
Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause, and Jeremiah D.
Finnegan,
of the same firm, was with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

DAVIS, J.: The Western District of the Missouri Court of
Appeals seeks clarification of Kansas law regarding liability
limitations contained in tariffs adopted by Kansas City Power
&
Light (KCP&L) and approved by the Kansas Corporation
Commission
(KCC). The tariffs purport to relieve KCP&L from liability
for
both simple negligence and wanton misconduct. The questions
certified under the Kansas Uniform Certification of Questions of
Law Act, K.S.A. 60-3201 et seq., concern both the
reasonableness
and enforcement of these tariffs.

Certified Questions

"(1) Was it unreasonable for the Kansas Corporation
Commission
to allow KCP&L's Rules 7.06 and 7.12 to become effective
insofar as
these Rules relieve KCP&L of liability for damages of any
nature
resulting from the utility's own (a) simple negligence, or (b)
willful or wanton misconduct, or gross negligence, in regard to
the
supply of electric service?

"(2) If you find in answer to (1) above that it is
reasonable
for the Kansas Corporation Commission to allow a tariff to become
effective which relieves KCP&L from liability for its own
simple
negligence, but that it is not reasonable to allow a tariff to
become effective to the extent that it relieves KCP&L from
liability for its willful or wanton misconduct or gross
negligence,
should we strike down or refuse to enforce the entire tariff, or
only so much of it as purports to limit liability for gross
negligence or willful or wanton misconduct, and enforce it as to
simple negligence?"

Answer to certified questions

It was reasonable for the KCC to allow KCP&L's Rules
7.06 and
7.12 to become effective insofar as these rules relieve KCP&L
of
liability for damages of any nature resulting from the utility's
own simple negligence. However, it was unreasonable for the KCC
to
allow the same rules to relieve KCP&L of liability for
damages of
any nature resulting from the utility's willful or wanton
misconduct. The Western District of the Missouri Court of
Appeals
should enforce the limitations of liability contained in Rules
7.06
and 7.12 as to simple negligence only.

Factual Background

The following factual statement was set out by the Missouri
Court of Appeals pursuant to K.S.A. 60-3203:

"KCP&L is an electric public utility doing business in
Missouri and Kansas. Danisco manufactures food additives at a
production facility located in the New Century Airport, near
Gardner, Kansas, and Danisco is one of KCP&L's Kansas
electric
customers. Danisco's production facility uses a high vacuum
process which cannot tolerate even the briefest interruption of
power. Danisco sued KCP&L to recover its economic damages
related
to three power outages which occurred in 1993.

"The first power outage occurred on September 2, 1993. An
underground power cable failure caused a substation circuit
breaker
to instantly open and close, causing a 'momentary' interruption.
[A 'momentary' interruption is an interruption which lasts less
than 1 second.] KCP&L claims the reason for the underground
cable
failure is unknown.

"The second power interruption occurred on September 27,
1993.
This outage was preceded by a low-voltage report from Danisco.
In
an effort to increase the voltage on the circuit serving
Danisco's
facility, KCP&L linemen undertook switching procedures to
reconfigure the circuit providing service to Danisco. During
these
procedures, a line switch failed in one location, and at or near
the same time power monitoring equipment failed in another
location. The two equipment failures resulted in an interruption
in the supply of power to Danisco which lasted approximately 5
hours. As a result of this outage, Danisco was not able to
operate
its production facility for up to 80 hours.

"The third interruption occurred on November 24, 1993. On
that day, KCP&L claims a substation circuit breaker opened
and
closed for some unknown reason. Substation circuit breakers will
open and close due to storms, lightning, varmints on the wires,
or
when electrical devices or equipment somewhere on the circuit
fail.

"As a result of these interruptions of power, Danisco claims
damages based on 'lost opportunity' to produce food additives for
the period during the power outages, as well as the time period
it
took to restore Danisco's production line back to full operation
after a power interruption. In Count I of its Petition, Danisco
claims that these damages were caused by KCP&L's negligence.
In
Count II of its Petition, Danisco claims that KCP&L knew that
Danisco would suffer unavoidable damages if it lost power, but
willfully failed to inform it of the danger of a power outage or
to
protect it from such an outage. Although Danisco claims lost
profits in the amount of $253,271.75, a contingent settlement has
apparently been reached below, with the result that, if the
courts
uphold the determination below that KCP&L's limitation on
liability
is unenforceable, then KCP&L will pay the sum of $100,000.00
in
damages to Danisco.

"KCP&L argues that at all times relevant in this case,
it had
on file as part of its tariff 'General Rules and Regulations
Applying to Electric Service' which had been allowed to become
effective by the KCC under the power and authority the Kansas
legislature gave the KCC to approve just and reasonable rates.
KCP&L argues that, once allowed to become effective, these
tariffs,
including KCP&L's General Rules 7.06 and 7.12, are entitled
to be
given the force and effect of law and that these rules limit
KCP&L's liability for power service interruptions.

'The Company will use reasonable diligence to supply
continuous electric service to the customer but does not
guarantee the supply of electric service against
irregularities or interruptions. The Company shall not
be considered in default of its service agreement with
the customer and shall not otherwise be liable for any
damages occasioned by any irregularity or interruption of
electric service.'

'The Company shall not be considered in default of its
service agreement and shall not be liable on account of
any failure by the Company to perform any obligation if
prevented from fulfilling such obligation by reason of
any delivery delay, breakdown, or failure of or damage to
facilities, an electric disturbance originating on or
transmitted through electric systems with which the
Company's system is interconnected, act of God or public
enemy, strike or other labor disturbance involving the
Company or the Customer, civil, military, or governmental
authority, or any cause beyond the control of the
Company.'

"The trial court held that these limitations of liability
were
unreasonable and, so, unenforceable and invalid, citing to this
Court's decision in Forte Hotels, Inc. v. Kansas City Power
& Light
Company, 913 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. App. 1995). In that case, this
Court
did hold these rules unreasonable in reliance on two Kansas
Supreme
Court cases, Shawnee Milling Co. v. Postal Telegraph Cable
Co., 101
Kan. 307, 166 P[ac.] 493 (1917), and McNally Pittsburg Mfg.
Corp.
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 186 Kan. 709, 353 P.2d 199, 204
(1960).
On appeal, KCP&L claims that these issues were not properly
decided
in Forte Hotels, that under Kansas law the trial court
should have
given the force and effect of law to KCP&L's Rules limiting
its
liability herein, and that the trial court erred in substituting
its judgment for that of the KCC by refusing to find KCP&L's
continuity and liability rules reasonable and enforceable under
the
facts of this case."

The Missouri Court of Appeals stated with regard to the
questions certified:

"[T]his Court concludes that, under prior Kansas decisions, we
have
the authority to determine whether KCP&L's Rules are
unreasonable
and therefore unenforceable, despite the fact that they have been
allowed to become effective by the KCC. This Court also
concludes
that these Rules are unreasonable, under prior Kansas decisions,
to
the extent they purport to relieve KCP&L from damages
resulting
from the company's willful and wanton misconduct or what is
sometimes referred to as 'gross negligence.' This Court is
unable
to determine, however, whether the Kansas Supreme Court (1) would
find these tariffs reasonable to the extent that they relieve
KCP&L
from damages resulting from simple negligence, and, if so, (2)
whether it would enforce them as to claims of simple negligence,
or
would invalidate them entirely because of their overbreadth in
purporting to also relieve KCP&L of its liability for willful
or
wanton misconduct."

Scope of Review

KCP&L contends that our scope of review as to the
reasonableness of limitations contained in tariff Rules 7.06 and
7.12 is governed by the Act for Judicial Review and Civil
Enforcement of Agency Actions (KJRA), K.S.A. 77-601 et
seq.
Specifically, KCP&L argues that our scope of review is
governed by
K.S.A. 77-621(c)(8), which provides that the court may reverse
an
agency decision if it determines "the agency action is otherwise
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious." Thus, according to
KCP&L's
argument, the question on appeal is whether the KCC's approval of
the liability limitations in Rules 7.06 and 7.12 was
unreasonable,
arbitrary, or capricious.

Danisco contends that the KJRA is inapplicable in this
appeal.
Specifically, Danisco argues that this is not an appeal from an
order or decision of the KCC. Rather, according to Danisco, the
issues raised by the certified questions call for a legal
determination of whether KCP&L's tariff provisions limiting
liability are lawful and reasonable.

This is not an action for judicial review of the KCC's order
approving the instant tariffs. The action is not one of judicial
review of a state agency order; the provisions of the KJRA do not
apply. Instead, this case involves certified questions of law
submitted by the Western District of the Missouri Court of
Appeals.
Our jurisdiction is based upon K.S.A. 60-3201, the power to
answer,
under certain conditions, "questions of law of this state which
may
be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying
court."

The questions presented for resolution require us to
determine
whether the tariffs as adopted and approved are lawful.
Specifically, the question we must resolve is whether the
liability
limitations contained in the questioned tariffs are reasonable
and
enforceable as a matter of law and public policy. This is a far
different question than whether the KCC's order approving the
tariffs was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. In resolving
this legal question, this court's review is unlimited. See
Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 263 Kan.
875, 879, 953 P.2d
1027 (1998).

Discussion and Analysis

The certified questions assume that KCP&L has
the authority to
adopt tariffs which impose reasonable limits on its liability to
its customers for interruptions of service. In their briefs and
arguments before this court, the parties agree that under Kansas
law such authority exists. The certified questions also assume
that the court has the authority to determine whether such tariff
restrictions are reasonable even though the tariffs have been
approved by the KCC. Again, the parties in their briefs and
arguments before this court agree that such authority exists.
Nevertheless, an examination of the controlling statutes and case
law supporting such assumptions is appropriate.

Tariffs are those terms and conditions which govern the
relationship between a utility and its customers.
Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v. Kansas Corporation Commission, 233 Kan.
375, 377,
664 P.2d 798 (1983). Tariffs may be, and usually are, the
handiwork of the regulated utility but when duly filed with the
KCC
they generally bind both the utility and the customer. 233 Kan.
at
377.

The Electric Public Utilities Act, K.S.A. 66-101 et
seq. gives
the KCC "full power, authority and jurisdiction to supervise and
control the electric public utilities, as defined in K.S.A.
66-101a, doing business in Kansas," and empowers the KCC to "do
all
things necessary and convenient for the exercise of such power,
authority and jurisdiction." K.S.A. 66-101. K.S.A. 1998 Supp.
66-101b states:

"Every electric public utility governed by this act shall be
required to furnish reasonably efficient and sufficient service
and
facilities for the use of any and all products or services
rendered, furnished, supplied or produced by such electric public
utility, to establish just and reasonable rates, charges and
exactions and to make just and reasonable rules, classifications
and regulations. Every unjust or unreasonably discriminatory or
unduly preferential rule, regulation, classification, rate,
charge
or exaction is prohibited and is unlawful and void. The
commission
shall have the power, after notice and hearing in accordance with
the provisions of the Kansas administrative procedure act, to
require all electric public utilities governed by this act to
establish and maintain just and reasonable rates when the same
are
reasonably necessary in order to maintain reasonably sufficient
and
efficient service from such electric public utilities."

K.S.A. 1998 Supp. 66-101c requires every public utility
doing
business in Kansas over which the KCC has control to publish and
file with the KCC copies of all schedules and rates as well as
copies of all rules, regulations, and contracts. The KCC has the
power to investigate all schedules of rates, rules, and
regulations. K.S.A. 1998 Supp. 66-101d. If the KCC determines
that such rates, rules, or regulations are unjust, unreasonable,
unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or unduly preferential or in any
way in violation of the provisions of the Electric Public
Utilities
Act, the KCC has the power to substitute such rates, rules, or
regulations as the KCC determines to be just, reasonable, and
necessary. K.S.A. 1998 Supp. 66-101f.

The provisions of the Electric Public Utilities Act and all
grants of power, authority, and jurisdiction made to the KCC are
to
be liberally construed, and all incidental powers necessary to
carry into effect the provisions of the Act are expressly granted
and conferred upon the KCC. K.S.A. 66-101g. All orders,
regulations, practices, services, rates, fares, charges,
classifications, tolls, and joint rates fixed by the KCC are
prima
facie reasonable unless, or until, changed or modified either by
the KCC or in pursuance of proceedings initiated in court.
K.S.A.
66-115.

In Milling Co. v. Postal Telegraph Co., 101 Kan.
307, 166 Pac.
493 (1917), this court was faced with the question of whether a
telegraph company could limit its liability for negligence. We
noted that the statutes governing public utilities did not
explicitly authorize utilities to limit their common-law
liability,
unlike a federal act applying to interstate telegraphs. However,
we stated that certain language in the public utilities act did
seem to recognize a narrow right to a limitation on liability
such
as the requirement that rules and regulations be reasonable and
that rates be filed with the commission. We said:

"Of course, the public utilities commission has nothing
directly to
do with the legal liabilities of telegraph corporations on
questions of damages, but so far as their liabilities enter into
the cost of conducting their business, those liabilities are a
proper element of consideration in rate making. The telegraph
rates are based, in part, upon the legal consequences which
attach
to the service. If a higher degree of responsibility attaches to
the service, a greater rate must be exacted. It has been held in
this state that a common carrier (without a permissive statute)
can
not impose a condition exempting him from liability for his own
negligence, and a telegraph company is so much like a carrier
that
its liability for negligence should be governed by similar
principles, yet reasonable limitations of liability other than
those which do not seek to excuse its gross negligence have been
upheld [citation omitted]; while stipulations restricting
liability
to an insignificant sum where the negligence was gross have been
disregarded. [Citation omitted.]" 101 Kan. at 310-11.

This court concluded that where there are no positive or
permissive statutes governing the subject, a telegraph company
may
make reasonable stipulations limiting its liability, but the
reasonableness of any such stipulation is a question for judicial
determination. 101 Kan. 307, Syl. ¶ 2. The limitation
in
Milling Co. was held to be unreasonable in that it
sought to limit
liability for negligence to an insignificant sum in all
circumstances. 101 Kan. at 311.

Milling Co. was later cited in McNally
Pittsburg Mfg. Corp. v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 186 Kan. 709, 353 P.2d 199
(1960). This court was again called upon to address provisions
within a
tariff filed by Western Union Telegraph Company limiting its
liability to its customers under specified conditions. The
tariff
limitation had been approved by the KCC. The court in
McNally Pittsburg
stated that the KCC approval of a tariff limitation of liability
did not necessarily give the limitation the force of law. 186
Kan.
at 716. The court held that reasonable limitations of liability
provided for in a tariff are authorized in Kansas as an integral
part of the rate-making process. 186 Kan. at 713-15. The courts
are the final arbiter of the reasonableness of a limitation of
liability within a duly approved tariff. See McNally
Pittsburg,
186 Kan. at 715; Milling Co., 101 Kan. at 310-11.

Thus, we may conclude from the Electric Public Utilities Act
and our prior cases that the Act does not explicitly confer upon
the public utility or the KCC the power to make tariffs which
limit
the liability of a public utility to its customers. See
McNally
Pittsburg, 186 Kan. at 714-15; Milling Co., 101
Kan. 310.
However, Kansas allows reasonable limitations on such liability
as
an integral part of the rate making process. The responsibility
for insuring reasonable rates and thus passing upon the propriety
of liability limitations within approved tariffs lies with the
KCC.
However, the ultimate determination of whether a duly filed and
approved tariff limiting a public utilities' liability to its
customers is reasonable is a question for the courts to decide.
See McNally Pittsburg, 186 Kan. at 715; Milling
Co. 101 Kan. at
307, Syl. ¶ 2.

Certified Question (1)

Was it unreasonable for the Kansas Corporation
Commission to
allow KCP&L's Rules 7.06 and 7.12 to become effective insofar
as
these Rules relieve KCP&L of liability for damages of any
nature
resulting from the utility's own (a) simple negligence, or (b)
willful or wanton misconduct, or gross negligence, in regard to
the
supply of electric service?

The limitations of liability in this case are
provided by two
rules in KCP&L's tariff. Rule 7.06 determines KCP&L's
duty to
supply continuous electrical energy to customers and provides:

"The Company will use reasonable diligence to supply
continuous
electric service to the customer but does not guarantee the
supply
of electric service against irregularities or interruptions. The
Company shall not be considered in default of its service
agreement
with the customer and shall not otherwise be liable for any
damages
occasioned by any irregularity or interruption of electric
service."

"The Company shall not be considered in default of its service
agreement and shall not be liable on account of any failure by
the
Company to perform any obligation if prevented from fulfilling
such
obligation by reason of any delivery delay, breakdown, or failure
of or damage to facilities, an electric disturbance originating
on
or transmitted through electric systems with which the Company's
system is interconnected, act of God or public enemy, strike or
other labor disturbance involving the Company or the Customer,
civil, military, or governmental authority, or any cause beyond
the
control of the Company."

Thus, Rule 7.06 completely insulates KCP&L from liability
for
interruptions in electrical service, whatever the cause. Rule
7.12
completely insulates KCP&L from any failure to perform any
obligation caused by a host of circumstances.

The same cannot be said, however, where the promulgated
rules
purport to limit liability beyond that caused by ordinary
negligence. It is true that a few jurisdictions have allowed
public utilities to enact rules which limit their liability for
even gross negligence. See Professional Answering Serv. v.
Chesapeake Tel., 565 A.2d at 63-65; In re Ill. Bell
Switching, 161
Ill. 2d at 244. However, the majority of jurisdictions have held
limitations on liability to be unenforceable with regard to
claims
of gross negligence or willful and wanton conduct. See Sou.
Bell
Tel. Co. v. Invenchek, 130 Ga. App. at 800-01; Warner v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 428 S.W.2d at 602-03;
Bulbman
Inc. v. Nevada Bell, 108 Nev. at 108-09; Garrison v.
Pacific NW
Bell, 45 Or. App. at 531-32; Behrend v. Bell Tele.
Co. 242 Pa.
Super. at 74-75; Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
Rucker, 537
S.W.2d at 332-33. Other jurisdictions have predicated the
reasonableness of a limitation on liability on whether it
purports
to limit more than ordinary negligence. See Computer Tool
&
Engineering v. NSP, 453 N.W.2d at 573 (finding that
limitation of
liability was reasonable because it was narrowly tailored and did
not attempt to exonerate power company from injuries not caused
by
disturbances in power, gross negligence, or willful or wanton
acts); Lee v. Consolidated Edison, 98 Misc. 2d at 306
(exculpatory
clause is reasonable "so long as the company has not attempted to
absolve itself from its own willful misconduct or gross
negligence").

The Kansas Court of Appeals in Burdick v. Southwestern
Bell
Tel. Co., 9 Kan. App. 2d 182, 675 P.2d 922 (1984), addressed
a
similar question. Without citing Milling Co., 101 Kan.
307, and
McNally Pittsburg, 186 Kan. 709, the court held that a
public
utility may limit its liabilities for service interruptions but
may
not relieve itself of liability for its willful and wanton
activity. 9 Kan. App. 2d at 184-85. The Court of Appeals noted
that "[t]he general rule is that the only exception to the
application of the tariff limitations is made when the
defendant's
conduct has been shown to be willful and wanton. [Citations
omitted.]" 9 Kan. App. 2d at 184.

Early Kansas law suggests that Kansas follows the majority
rule. In one of the earliest decisions on the issue, this court
held that a telegraph company, as a quasi-public servant, could
not
limit its liability for gross negligence or willful misconduct.
Telegraph Co. v. Crall, 38 Kan. 679, 682-83, 17 Pac. 309
(1888).
Later, in Russell v. Telegraph Co., 57 Kan. 230, 233, 45
Pac. 598
(1896), this court noted that a common carrier may not limit its
own liability for negligence and that this general rule should be
applied to telegraph companies because they were engaged in the
same sort of business as common carriers. However, this court
upheld a 60-day limitation on the time in which claims for
negligence could be brought as reasonable. 57 Kan. at 233-34.

In 1917, this court decided Milling Co., discussed
above. The
question involved was whether a telegraph company could limit its
liability for mistakes to the actual cost of the telegraph.
Noting
both Russell and Crall, this court held that
such a limitation was
not reasonable even though the claim was for ordinary negligence.
101 Kan. at 311. However, this court also noted that "reasonable
limitations of liability other than those which do not seek to
excuse [the company's] gross negligence have been upheld." 101
Kan. at 311.

A federal court applying Kansas law interpreted our holdings
in Milling Co., and McNally Pittsburg, in
addressing the issue of
utility liability limitations. In Holman v. Southwestern
Bell
Telephone Company, 358 F. Supp. 727 (D. Kan. 1973), the
court
considered whether a telephone company's limitation of liability
in
a tariff was proper. In a well-reasoned opinion, the court,
after
reviewing Kansas case law, concluded that a reasonable limitation
on liability would be allowed but that a limitation which
excluded
liability for willful or wanton conduct would not be reasonable.
358 F. Supp. at 729-30.

Holman provides a reasonable interpretation of
Kansas case law
on this subject. A public utilities' liability exposure has a
direct effect on its rates, and this court, as well as the
majority
of jurisdictions addressing the question of such a liability
limitation, has concluded that it is reasonable to allow some
limitation on liability such as that for ordinary negligence in
connection with the delivery of the services. See Landrum v.
Florida Power & Light Co., 505 So. 2d at 554. However,
consistent
with our prior case law in Telegraph Co. v. Crall, 38
Kan. 679, and
the law of the majority of jurisdictions which have addressed the
question, any attempt to limit liability for greater than
ordinary
negligence is not reasonable and, is therefore, unenforceable.

In answer to the first certified question, we conclude that
it
was reasonable for the KCC to allow a tariff to become effective
which relieves KCP&L of liability for damages resulting from
its
own simple negligence in regard to the supply of electrical
service. However, it was not reasonable for the KCC to allow a
tariff to become effective which would relieve KCP&L of
liability
for damages resulting from its wanton or willful misconduct.
Kansas does not recognize degrees of negligence and, thus, has no
category for "gross negligence," but draws a distinction between
ordinary negligence and wanton conduct, which is defined as the
reckless disregard for the rights of others with a total
indifference to the consequences. See Muhn v. Schell,
196 Kan.
713, 715, 413 P.2d 997 (1966).

Certified Question (2)

If you find in answer to (1) above that it is reasonable
for
the Kansas Corporation Commission to allow a tariff to become
effective which relieves KCP&L from liability for its own
simple
negligence, but that it is not reasonable to allow a tariff to
become effective to the extent that it relieves KCP&L from
liability for its willful or wanton misconduct or gross
negligence,
should we strike down or refuse to enforce the entire tariff, or
only so much of it as purports to limit liability for gross
negligence or willful or wanton misconduct, and enforce it as to
simple negligence?

A public utility tariff is to be construed in the same
manner
as a statute. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Kansas
Corporation
Commission, 233 Kan. 375, Syl. ¶ 4. The fundamental
rule regarding
statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature
governs, where it can be ascertained. Legislative
Coordinating
Council v. Stanley, 264 Kan. 690, 702, 957 P.2d 379 (1998).
In
construing statutes, the legislative intention is to be
determined
from a general consideration of the entire act. KPERS v.
Reimer &
Koger Assocs., Inc., 262 Kan. 635, 643, 941 P.2d 1321
(1997). In
this case, the tariffs filed and approved are the product of
input
from KCP&L and the approval process of the KCC. Thus, in
construing the tariffs in question, consideration must be given
to
both the role and intent of the KCC in the process of approval
and
the intent of all participants, including the customers of
KPC&L.

The KCC is empowered by the legislature with the "full
power,
authority and jurisdiction to supervise and control the electric
public utilities." K.S.A. 66-101. To that end, the KCC must
require the public utilities to furnish reasonable and effective
service and to do so at just and reasonable rates. K.S.A. 1998
Supp. 66-101b.

The tariffs at issue in this case represent an attempt by
the
KCC to fulfill its statutory mandate. They represent a
bargained-for compromise between the KCC and KCP&L with the
intention of
trading liability limits for a lower rate for electrical
services.
In establishing rates, the KCC is required to balance the public
need for adequate, efficient, and reasonable service with the
public utility's need for sufficient revenue to meet the cost of
furnishing service and to earn a reasonable profit. As we noted
above, reasonable rates are dependent in no small measure on
rules
limiting liability, for the broader the liability exposure, the
greater the cost of electric service. See Waters v. Pacific
Telephone Co., 12 Cal. 3d at 7; Landrum v. Florida Power
& Light
Co., 505 So. 2d at 554.

It is clear that the approved limits on liability in this
case
go too far and are inconsistent with Kansas law and public
policy.
Nonetheless, it is also clear that the intention of the KCC and
KCP&L in establishing the tariffs was that KCP&L have
some limits
on its liability in return for the rates established in this
case.
An interpretation that voids the tariffs in their entirety would
undermine the purpose of providing reasonable and effective
service
at reasonable rates. This is especially true where KCP&L has
fulfilled its duties in providing electrical service at the
established rates.

Other jurisdictions addressing this question have held that
limitations on liability contained in tariffs should be enforced
insofar as they are lawful and declared invalid only insofar as
they seek to limit liability for greater than ordinary
negligence.
See Sou. Bell Tel. Co. v. Invenchek, 130 Ga. App. at
800-01; Warner
v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 428 S.W.2d at 603;
Behrend
v. Bell Tele. Co., 242 Pa. Super. at 74-75. We agree and
believe
that such a rule is sound as a matter of law and public policy.
It
is clear that KCP&L overreached in attempting to insulate
itself
from its own willful or wanton activity. However, what is also
clear is that the rates eventually approved were in part
dependent
upon the utility receiving some protection from liability.
Giving
consideration to the role played by the KCC in the rate-making
process, its intent and responsibility to insure reasonable rates
to customers, and the intent of KCP&L to provide reasonable
service
with its need for sufficient revenue to meet the cost of
furnishing
service and to earn a reasonable profit, we believe it reasonable
and sound public policy to interpret the tariffs in question as
limiting the liability of KCP&L to its customers for its
ordinary
negligence only.

Therefore, in answer to the questions posed by the Missouri
Court of Appeals, we hold that even though it is not reasonable
to
allow a tariff to become effective to the extent that it relieves
KCP&L from liability for its willful or wanton misconduct,
the
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, should strike down
so
much of the tariffs as purport to limit liability for gross
negligence or willful or wanton misconduct and enforce the
tariffs
as they relate to a limitation of liability for ordinary
negligence
only.