The question of mass public opinion toward the Palestinian-Israeli
peace negotiations and the use of armed struggle against Israel has
received little empirical investigation. In an effort to remedy this
situation, this study focuses on the impact of political party
affiliation in determining Palestinian political attitudes toward the
peace process between the Palestinians and Israel. Using individual
level data from the Center for Palestine Research and Studies, September
1994-September 1995, the results indicate that the Oslo Agreement has
polarized Palestinian political attitudes and opinions toward Israel.
There is a strong relationship between party affiliation and political
attitudes toward the peace negotiations and the use of armed struggle
against Israel. Supporters of Fatah, the largest and strongest political
party in the West Bank and Gaza, headed by Yasser Arafat, support the
peace negotiations and oppose the use of armed attacks against Israeli
civilians more than any other political party or group. On the other
hand, supporters of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, and DFLP oppose the
peace negotiations and support the use of armed straggle against the
Israeli military and settlers.

INTRODUCTION

On 13 September 1993, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
and Israel signed the Oslo Agreement, which included letters of
recognition from both sides acknowledging their right to exist in peace
and the right of the Palestinians for self-determination. What began in
1993 as a document of understanding, the Declaration of Principles
(DOP), resulted in a dramatic change in the peace prospects for the
Middle East region. Despite tension and conflict over its interpretation
from both sides, the peace process has created many facts on the ground
that appear to be irreversible.

Thus, by signing the Oslo Agreement, Palestinian and Israeli
relations have changed. As a result, there are a number of questions to
be asked about its consequences. Has this change taken root amongst the
masses in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza? Will the public in both
nations continue to be supportive and hopeful about their peaceful
coexistence? Are the majority in both populations willing to alter the
state of war and conflict which has shaped the Middle East for the past
fifty years and give the peace process a chance to succeed? While
understanding the opinion dynamics of both nations is beyond this
article, it is critical nonetheless to acknowledge its importance.(1) I
will, however, try to answer questions which pertain to the Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza.

The controversy over the peace negotiations between the PLO and
Israel has intensified from 1993-4 to the present. The signing of the
Oslo Agreement may have led many Palestinians to question the timing and
the legitimacy of this agreement. The Palestinians led by the PLO have
struggled for many years to regain their homeland and establish their
own independent state. Also, when the Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza launched their intifada against the Israeli occupation in December
1987, one clear purpose was to regain and to secure their political
rights and end the Israeli occupation. However, the agreement fell short
of these hopes and for many did not satisfy the Palestinian core demands
of political and national rights.(2)

The signing of the Oslo Accords has led to many divisions among the
Palestinians, particularly in the West Bank and Gaza. Before the Oslo
stage, the Palestinians appeared to be more united, and to some extent
pursued unified goals with respect to the Israeli occupation and the
establishment of an independent state. There existed differences in
tactics and goals between supporters of the PLO and the Islamic groups,
but their similarities outweighed their differences. The agreement,
however, widened existing differences and led to major divisions even
within the PLO.(3)

The Islamic groups, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, have vowed to nullify the Oslo Accords. Their approach has been to carry out suicide attacks against Israeli targets in the West Bank and Gaza and inside Israel.
Their attacks appear to have embarrassed the Palestinian Authority for
not being able to exert its control over these groups. The zenith of the
events took place in November 1994 when the Palestinian police clashed
with supporters of Hamas and killed about thirty of its supporters.
Thus, as we will see shortly, the peace process has polarized the
Palestinians to the extent some observers have predicted a civil war
between supporters of Fatah and supporters of the Islamic groups.(4) In
addition, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad asked their supporters not to
participate in the Palestinian legislative elections held in January
1996. Their opposition comes from their dissatisfaction with the Oslo
Accords and the peace process. Their participation in the general
election could have been interpreted as acceptance of the Oslo process
and the legitimacy of Israel's existence.

POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION AND ISSUE ATTITUDES2

This essay focuses on the influences of party affiliation in
determining Palestinian political attitudes toward the
Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations. It also examines the partisan roots of Palestinian attitudes toward armed attacks against Israel. It
has been argued that individual perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and
behavior are influenced and determined in large part by the standards
and values of the groups with which the individual identifies.(5) If
party affiliation has an influence on political attitudes, then one
would expect to find differences in the attitudes expressed by people
who identify themselves with different political parties and groups. For
example, adherents or supporters of Hamas hold different attitudes from
those who support Fatah.

Party identification is a useful analytic tool in voting behavior
and political attitude studies. The relationship between partisanship and issues has been one of the most debated in the research
literature.(6) The first such research of the impact of party
identification on political attitudes was conducted by Belknap and
Campbell (1952).(7) They found that there was a strong association
between party identification and attitudes toward American foreign
policy issues. Since that time, Jacoby has argued that "virtually
all of the work carried out in the field of mass political behavior has
held that partisan attachments are an important source of policy
orientations in the American electorate."(8)

Some scholars suggest that reference groups theory accounts for the
relationship between party identification and issue attitudes. Jacoby
argues, "According to this theory, individuals develop
psychological attachments to certain groups in their environment. These
groups then provide cues for structuring attitudes and behavior relevant
to the group."(9) Political parties serve as reference groups for
citizens. Thus, party identification functions as "a supplier of
cues by which individuals may evaluate the elements of
politics."(10) Miller also shows that party identification can be
used as "a guide for the voter to opinions on current
issues."(11) Miller and Levitin also suggest that "reference
groups and their leaders provide norms and strategies for setting
personal values and goals."(12) In short, people adopt the
positions of the group or political party with which they identify.(13)

A large body of the literature concludes that party identification
exerts an important impact on issue attitudes. For example, stronger
partisanship (e.g., strong Republican, strong Democratic), may lead to
more extreme issue positions. Jacoby concludes, "The stronger a
person's attachment to his or her party, the closer the
correspondence between the perceived party issue position and the
individual's own attitude."(14) Converse (1969) suggested that
strong party identification will more likely reflect the ideology issue
position of political parties.(15) However, as in many other countries,
it is unlikely that ideology is any thing other than an elite
phenomenon.

On the other hand, there is a growing body of literature which
argues that issues affect party identification, rather than the opposite
casual ordering.(16) This chicken-egg controversy, whether partisanship
affects attitudes, or issue attitudes affect partisanship is rather
critical to inferences made on the data at hand. Although the
conventional view holds that party identification influences attitudes,
it is also possible that issues influence partisanship. Indeed, Brody
and Page contend that "any correspondence between issue attitudes
and perceived party positions could be due to rationalization processes
wherein people 'project' their own feelings about issues onto
their parties"(17)

While it is important to acknowledge the growing body of literature
which contends that issues influence partisanship, it is not possible to
test this hypothesis with the current Palestinian data to prove that
issues preceded partisanship. In order to test this hypothesis,
long-term panel data is needed for this purpose. Indeed, in emergent
democracies, it might work differently where beliefs may have existed
prior to the establishment of most political parties. This essay,
however, will follow the conventional view that partisanship influences
attitudes.

DATA AND METHODS

The data for this paper come from public opinion surveys conducted
by the Survey Research Unit (SRU) of the Center for Palestine Research
and Studies in September 1994 and September 1995. The two surveys
contain a number of statements on attitudes toward the
Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations, armed attacks against Israel,
performance of the Palestinian National Authority, Palestinian
elections, and a host of other issues. The data provide an opportunity
to asses differences in Palestinian political attitudes among adherents
of the different political parties and groups in the West Bank and Gaza.

The data represent randomly selected samples of Palestinians aged
eighteen years and above in the West Bank and Gaza. The Survey Research
Unit used a multi-stage cluster sampling to represent the Palestinian
population. The study of various characteristics of the population in
the West Bank and Gaza required that cities, villages, and refugee camps
be treated as clusters and then select a random sample of a certain
number of them. The process of sample selection began with the creation
of lists of all locations in the West Bank and Gaza according to
districts, population size and distribution, and type of locality (e.g.,
city, town, village, and refugee camp). A random sample of these
localities was included in the sample. Sampling units within each
locality were chosen randomly.

Party affiliation in the West Bank and Gaza was measured by asking
individuals their expected voting choices. Respondents were asked:
"If elections were to be held today, and you decided to
participate, you would vote for candidates affiliated with:"
Responses were divided into eleven categories: Fatah, Fida, PPP,
Nationalist Independents, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Islamic Independents,
PFLP, DFLP, Others, and None oft he above.(18)

Party affiliation consists of the major political parties and
groups in the West Bank and Gaza. This is not the best way to measure
party affiliation, but this is the only available measure for
Palestinian party affiliation. The same measure was first used by
Belknap and Campbell (1952). Butler and Stokes (1974) justified the use
of voting preferences as an indicator of party identification based on
strong correlation between them.(19)

Palestinian political parties and groups in the West Bank and Gaza
will be categorized and compressed into six main categories. This
categorization is based on their positions toward the peace process.(20)
Those who support the peace process, Fatah, Fida, and PPP are combined
together. The Islamic groups, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, are the Islamic
opposition. The leftist groups, PFLP and DFLP, are combined together.
There were two further categories, one for the Nationalist Independents
and one for the Islamic Independent respondents. The Non-Affiliated
category comprises Others and None of the above.

This categorization is useful for statistical analysis. Primary
testing and analysis of the data showed that political parties in the
peace camp (Fatah, Fida, PPP) resemble each other with regard to the
peace negotiations and armed attacks against Israel. In addition, there
are many similarities in the socioeconomic and demographic factors among
these groups. For example, their age, education, and place of residence
are almost identical. The same is true of the Islamic and leftist
groups. The Nationalist and Islamic Independents could not be combined
because they represent different opinions and attitudes. The Nationalist
Independents are closer to the peace camp with regard to their attitudes
toward the peace process. The Islamic Independents are closer to Hamas
and the Islamic Jihad. The Non-Affiliated respondents are those who
refused to identify themselves with any of the above mentioned political
parties and groups. The ordering of these political parties and groups
will be as follows: (1) Fatah/Fida/PPP, (2) Nationalist Independents,
(3) Islamic Independents, (4) Hamas/Islamic Jihad, (5) PFLP/DFLP, and
finally (6) Non-Affiliated.

DISCUSSION

Measuring Palestinian attitudes toward the peace process with
Israel were assessed by six questions. Two issues concerned the mass
public approval of the peace negotiations between the PLO and Israel.
Another four issues monitor attitudes toward armed attacks against
Israeli military targets, civilian targets, and Israeli settlers in the
West Bank and Gaza. Respondents were asked to indicate their opinion in
relation to the following statement:

With regard to the negotiations between the Israelis and
Palestinians, one year after the signing of the Declaration of
Principles, Oslo Agreement: (1) your support for the negotiation has
increased, (2) your support has decreased, (3) your support has not
changed and still opposed to the negotiations, or (4) your support has
not changed and still supportive of the negotiations.(21)

For the purpose of this study and to simplify statistical analyses,
I combined answer one and four together in one category, and answer two
and three in another category. The responses of those who were still
supportive of the negotiations were combined with those whose support
had increased. In a similar fashion, respondents who still opposed the
negotiations were combined with those whose support had decreased.

Table 1 shows the relationship between party affiliation and
attitudes toward Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations. Party
affiliation has a profound impact on Palestinian political attitudes
toward the peace negotiations. Support for the negotiations is
overwhelming among supporters of Fatah, Fida, and PPP. Among supporters
of the Islamic and leftist groups, the majority either oppose or have
decreased their support for the peace process. Of Fatah, Fida, and PPP
partisans, 82 percent said that they are supportive of the peace
negotiations and their support has increased. Only 18 percent are
opposed or have indicated a decrease in their support for the peace
negotiations.

The opposition groups have different attitudes toward the peace
process. Supporters of the Islamic groups, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad,
have negative attitudes and they are opposed to the peace negotiations.
Seventy-one percent of the Islamic groups supporters said that they are
opposed in some fashion to the peace negotiations, contrasted to 29
percent who are supportive. The leftist groups, followers of the PFLP
and DFLP, are considerably more opposed to the peace negotiations with
Israel than the Islamic supporters.

The strong opposition among the leftist and Islamic groups may be
due to the conditions agreed upon in the Oslo Accords. As discussed
earlier, the agreement fell short of Palestinian hopes and ambitions
summarized as, total Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, and
the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Another important
factor might be Palestinian conditions after Oslo. Did the Oslo
Agreement achieve any tangible results for the Palestinians a year after
it was signed? Did they achieve any sense of independence from Israel?
Are the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza better off economically
after Oslo? Supporters of the Islamic and leftist groups might not have
felt any positive results of the peace process. Although one year after
the signing of the Oslo Agreement is not enough to evaluate the
Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations, the Palestinians were expecting
positive and quick results on the ground. This, however, did not happen.

Two years after the Oslo Agreement, in September 1995, the
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were asked to indicate their
approval or disapproval of the peace negotiations. The purpose of this
question was to compare Palestinian political attitudes toward the peace
process between September 1994 and September 1995. To gauge Palestinian
mass political attitudes toward the continuation of the peace
negotiations, respondents were asked to indicate their response to the
following question: "Do you support the continuation of the current
peace negotiations between the PLO and Israel?" Response categories
were: yes, no, and not sure.(22)

Table 2 shows the association between party affiliation and
attitudes toward the peace negotiations in September 1995. Palestinian
support for the peace negotiations had increased gradually since the
signing of the Oslo Agreement. Two years after Oslo, 80 percent of the
Palestinians supported the continuation of the peace negotiations.
Backing for the peace negotiations increased among supporters of all
political parties and groups. However, an overwhelming 92 percent
support can be seen among supporters of Fatah, Fida, and PPP. The
Nationalist Independents also supported the continuation of the
negotiations with an overwhelming majority.

The Islamic and leftist groups, on the other hand, were split
between supporting and opposing the continuation of these negotiations.
Although their support increased from the previous year, they still
viewed the peace negotiations with suspicion. Why did the Islamic and
leftist supporters increase their support for the peace negotiations?
Did they feel that the peace negotiations are more important than
pursuing armed struggle against Israel? Did they feel that the peace
process would lead to the establishment of an independent state? Did
their economic conditions improve? These are some of the questions that
might shed lights on their political attitudes.

Table 3 shows the differences in support for the peace negotiations
in 1994 and 1995 by partisan groups. There was an overwhelming increase
in support for the peace negotiations among supporters of the leftist
groups, PFLP and DFLP, Islamic Independent respondents, and supporters
of the Islamic groups, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. Two years after the
signing of the Oslo Agreement, support for the peace process was at its
zenith among supporters of most political parties and groups. Supporters
of the Islamic and leftist groups who hesitated to support the peace
negotiations a year earlier, were more willing to give the peace process
a chance.

Since the signing of the Oslo Agreement, there have been many ups
and downs in the peace process. It appears that the Palestinians support
the peace negotiations when they feel that Israel is serious about
withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza and ready to relinquish its
territorial claims in those areas. The increase in Palestinian support
in September 1995 was due to the fact that the PLO and Israel were close
to signing the Oslo II Agreement - which was ultimately signed on 28
September 1995.(23)

Palestinian attitudes toward armed attacks against Israeli targets
were assessed by four questions. One of these questions dealt with armed
attacks against Israeli targets in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town
of Jericho, where the Israeli army first redeployed from Palestinian
territories in May 1994. Respondents were asked to indicate their
opinion to the following question: "Do you support the continuing
resort of some Palestinian factions to armed operations against Israeli
targets in Gaza and Jericho?"(24) This question measures
Palestinian attitudes toward armed attacks against Israeli targets, one
year after the Oslo Agreement. Israeli targets in the Gaza Strip and
Jericho are either Israeli settlers or soldiers stationed to protect the
settlements. The majority of the respondents, 56 percent, indicated
their rejection of such attacks against Israeli targets in these areas.

TABLE 3.
DIFFERENCES IN SUPPORT FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN 1994 AND 1995
BY PARTISANS(*)
Party Support 1994 Support 1995 Difference
Fatah/PPP/Fida 82% 94% +12
National Ind. 51 73 +22
Islamic Ind. 36 66 +30
Hamas/Isl. Jihad 29 53 +24
PFLP/DFLP 15 47 +32
None 51 76 +25
* The number in each cell entry is percentages for peace support.
Note: This table is based on the results reported in Tables 1 and 2.
Source: Center for Palestine Research and Studies, September 1994
and September 1995

The results in Table 4 show that the majority of Fatah, Fida, and
PPP supporters rejected the use of armed attacks against Israelis, while
most of the leftist groups supporters (PFLP and DFLP) support such
attacks. Supporters of the Islamic groups, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad,
are split in their support for such attacks. Although over half favored
armed attacks, slightly less than half opposed them.

It appears that adherents of the leftist and Islamic groups support
the use of armed attacks against Israelis in Gaza and Jericho for the
following reasons: United Nations Resolution 242, passed in November
1967 after the June War, emphasized the "inadmissibility of
territorial acquisition by force" and called for "the
withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in recent
[1967] conflict." Israel has yet to do so. The Palestinians reject
the presence of Israeli settlers and settlements in the West Bank and
Gaza. Thus, some consider it legitimate to attack Israeli settlers
there. On the other hand, those who oppose the use of armed attacks
against Israelis in Gaza and Jericho believe or hope that Israel will
dismantle those settlements when the PLO and Israel sign their final
peace agreement by May 1999.

Two years after the signing of the Oslo Agreement, respondents were
asked to indicate their opinions to the following questions in September
1995:

(1) with regard to armed attacks against Israeli army targets,

(a) I support them, (b) oppose them, or (c) have no opinion;

(2) with regard to armed attacks against Israeli settler,

(a) I support them, (b) oppose them, or (c) have no opinion; and

(3) with regard to armed attacks against Israeli civilian targets,

(a) I support them, (b) oppose them, or (c) have no opinion.(25)

These questions were used to assess to what extent the Palestinians
are prepared to live in peace with the Israeli military, settlers, and
civilians.(26)

Table 5 shows that with regard to the first and second questions,
the use of armed attacks against Israeli military targets and settlers
in the West Bank and Gaza, the majority of the Palestinians support
them. This support is seen across adherents of all political parties and
groups, however, more support is among supporters of the opposition
groups.

It is important to explain the paradox of Palestinian political
attitudes toward Israel. The majority supports the peace negotiations,
however, an equal number of Palestinians support the use of armed
attacks against Israeli military targets and settlers. The presence of
the Israeli army in parts of the Gaza Strip and most of the West Bank
and Israeli settlements might cause the Palestinians to support the use
of armed attacks against them. Shikaki (1996) contends that Palestinian
support for the use of armed attacks against Israeli military targets
and settlers does not indicate "opposition to the peace process but
Palestinian insistence that the process entails an end to occupation and
settlements."(27)

On the other hand, Palestinian support for armed attacks against
Israeli civilian targets is supported only by a small minority of the
Palestinians. Israeli civilian targets are those considered inside
Israel, outside the West Bank and Gaza. Twenty percent of all
respondents supported armed attacks against civilian targets. Support
for these attacks is high among adherents of the Islamic groups, Hamas
and the Islamic Jihad, and to a lesser degree among supporters of the
PFLP and DFLP. The majority of Palestinians oppose the use of any
violence against Israeli civilians. It appears that the overwhelming
majority of the Palestinians are ready to abandon the use of armed
attacks if Israel withdraws its army and dismantles its settlements from
the West Bank and Gaza.

Although some of the Islamic and leftist supporters favor such
attacks against Israeli civilians, it constitutes only a small minority
of the Palestinians as a whole. The lowest level of support for such
attacks is among supporters of Fatah, PPP, and Fida. There is a strong
association between their attitudes toward the peace negotiations and
armed attacks. While an overwhelming majority supports the peace
negotiations, only 12 percent support armed attacks against civilians.
On the other hand, support for political violence is high among the
Islamic and leftist groups, particularly, the latter.

Partisanship is one of the most important predictors of political
attitudes. Those who identify with Fatah/Fida/PPP, Hamas/Islamic Jihad,
or PFLP/DFLP adhere to the positions and principles of their parties.
There appears to be a strong association between the attitudes of mass
public and the attitudes of their party leadership. We have not
performed a specific elite analysis, yet the conclusion seems reasonable
at this time.

There are two important inferences from the relationship between
party affiliation and attitudes toward the peace negotiations and the
use of armed attacks against Israel. The results show that party
affiliation is a significant and consistent predictor of political
attitudes toward the peace negotiations. Partisan groups support or
oppose in a fashion consistent with their respective elites.
Furthermore, the impact of party affiliation is in expected directions.
For example, adherents of Fatah/Fida/PPP support the peace negotiations
and oppose the use of violence against Israel except against the
settlers. On the other hand, the Islamic and leftist groups oppose the
peace negotiations and support the continuation of armed snuggle against
Israel without differentiating between military or civilian targets.
These attitudes are reflective of the leadership of the respective
political parties and groups.

Further statistical testing shows that party affiliation is not the
only factor explaining attitudes toward the Oslo Agreement and attitudes
toward armed attacks. Specific socio-demographic variables are important
predictors of political attitudes toward the peace negotiations and
armed attacks. Education is a very strong factor related to the peace
process. Better educated respondents are more likely to oppose the peace
negotiations and support armed attacks against Israeli targets. Age
showed a similar effect. Older respondents are more likely to support
the peace agreement and are opposed to the use of political violence.
Placed in the current context, younger Palestinians pose a volatile
element within the population. Their potential for violence and less
willingness to support the peace negotiations will be a critical factor
in the future.

Place of residence is one of the strongest predictor of attitudes.
Respondents who live in refugee camps are more likely to oppose the
peace negotiations with Israel and support armed struggle. The
implication of this issue is that the refugees' socio-economic
conditions must be improved to sway them to support the peace process
and oppose the use of violence.

Finally, there is a strong statistical association between
attitudes toward the peace negotiations and attitudes toward armed
attacks. Palestinians who support the peace negotiations are more likely
to oppose the use of armed attacks. Also, Palestinians who view the
Palestine National Authority positively are more likely to support the
peace negotiations and oppose armed attacks against Israel. This holds
regardless of party affiliation, age, education, or place of residence.

One important conclusion of this study is that if peace is to
succeed between the Palestinians and Israel, it must be fair and just.
These results can be summed up in a statement signed by hundreds of
prominent Palestinian men and women, including professionals,
politicians, activists, members of the PNC and present and former
members of the PLO Executive Committee. It states:

There can be no peace so long as the Palestinian people are
deprived of their right of self-determination and the right to return,
and the right to establish an independent Palestinian state on
Palestinian soil with Jerusalem as its capital. There can be no peace if
Jewish settlements remain in place and the Palestinian detainees are not
freed and if Israel continues to exercise domination over the
Palestinian people and to deny them full sovereignty over their land,
water resources, and the borders of their state.(28)

One of the most important implications of this study is that the
Palestinians show their support when the peace process moves and entails
positive results. It has been argued that public opinion polls are
"a snap shot of the day." People change their opinions and
attitudes as a result of many factors. More than 60 percent of the
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza supported the Oslo Agreement when
it was signed. Support for the peace process reached a high level after
the signing of Oslo II, which was followed by the withdrawal of the
Israeli army from all the West Bank cities except Hebron during
November-December 1995. A public opinion survey taken in early December
1995 showed that 85 percent of the Palestinians supported the peace
process.(29) However, Palestinian support for the peace process declined
sharply after Israel started the construction of a new settlement at Abu
Ghneim in East Jerusalem.(30)

The data discussed in this article is approximately three years
old, but the conclusions which can be drawn from it are valid to this
moment. The Palestinians appear to support the peace negotiations when
there are positive results on the ground, and support the use of armed
struggle when the process does not move forward. This is the way the
Palestinians have felt toward the peace process since its beginning.
Under the Israeli Labor government, there were a few positive results
which came as a result of the withdrawal of the Israeli army from most
of the Gaza Strip and the populated areas of the West Bank. However, the
peace process seems to have stopped with the advent of the Netanyahu
government. As a result, many analysts believe that the peace process is
dying, if it is not already dead. In spite of that, Palestinian support
for the peace process has not gone below 50 percent since the signing of
the Oslo Agreement. But support for the use of armed struggle is on the
rise. This is based on many public opinion surveys conducted by the
Center for Palestine Research and Studies in the past four years. It
will be very important to compare the results of the current surveys
with future data.

Also, one of the most important findings of this study is that
party affiliation in the West Bank and Gaza holds in a fashion similar
to that in the United States and Western democracies. Palestinian party
affiliation appears to exert constraint on mass public attitudes. The
mass public is conforming to the attitudes of their respective political
parties and groups. Adherents of Fatah/Fida/PPP support the peace
negotiations and oppose the use of violence against Israel. On the other
hand, adherents of the Islamic and leftist groups, just like their
leadership, oppose the peace negotiations and support the use of armed
attacks against Israel. In short, party affiliation in the West Bank and
Gaza is as valuable as in countries with long experiences with democracy
and its tools.

ENDNOTES

1. For a discussion of Israeli public opinion toward the
Palestinians, see Murad A'si, Israeli and Palestinian Public
Opinion (Washington, D.C.: The International Center for Research and
Public policy, 1986). See also Asher Arian, Michal Shamir, and Raphael
Ventura, "Public Opinion and Political Change: Israel and the
Intifada," Comparative Politics 24 (1992): 317-334.

2. For more discussion of the Oslo Agreement, September 1993, see
P. R. Kumaraswamy, "The Gaza-Jericho Agreement: An Asymmetrical Accord," Strategic Analysis 17 (1994): 219-232. See also Graham
Usher, "The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New
Intelligence Services," Journal of Palestine Studies 25 (Winter
1996): 21-34.

3. After the signing of the Oslo Agreement, many members of the PLO
Executive Committee resigned in protest. Also, the PFLP and DFLP refused
to accept the terms of the agreement.

8. Jacoby, "The Impact of Party Identification on Issue
Attitudes," 643.

9. Ibid., 644.

10. Campbell et al., The American Voter, 128.

11. Warren E. Miller, "The Cross-National Use of Party
Identification as a Stimulus to Political Inquiry," in Party
Identification and Beyond, ed. Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, and Dennis Farlie
(New York: John Wiley, 1976), 27

16. See John E. Jackson, "Issues, Parties, and Presidential
Votes," American Journal of Political Science 19 (1975): 161-85;
Kenneth Meier, "Party Identification and Vote Choice: The Causal Relationship," Western Political Quarterly 28 (1975): 496-505;
Benjamin I. Page and Calvin C. Jones, "Reciprocal Effects of Policy
Preferences, Party Loyalties, and the Vote," American Political
Science Review 73 (1979): 1071-90; Robert S. Erikson, "The
'Uncorrelated Errors' Approach to the Problem of Causal
Feedback," Journal of Politics 44 (1982): 863-81; Stephen M.
Weatherford, "Reciprocal Causation in a Model of the Vote:
Replication and Extension," Political Behavior 5 (1983): 191-208.

17. Quoted in Jacoby, "The Impact of Party Identification on
Issue Attitudes," 648.

18. The original question was asked in Arabic and translated later
by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies. The names of the above
mentioned political parties and groups were mentioned and respondents
were asked to select one of them which corresponds to the candidate they
like to vote for. The ordering of these political parties and groups
differ from one survey to another. The abbreviated names for these
groups are as follows: Fida is the Palestine Democratic Union, PPP is
the Palestine People's Party, PFLP is the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, and DFLP is the Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine.

19. David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain:
The Evolution of Electoral Choice (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1974).

20. Khalil Shikaki, "The Peace Process, National
Reconstruction, and the Transition to Democracy in Palestine,"
Journal of Palestine Studies 25 (Winter 1996): 6.

21. The question was originally asked in Arabic and translated by
the Center for Palestine Research and Studies, September 1994.

22. This poll was conducted by CPRS in August-September 1995, two
years after the signing of the Oslo Agreement, and more than a year
after the Palestine National Authority was established in the West Bank
and Gaza.

23. Under the Labor government, Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo
II agreement on 28 September 1995. The agreement stipulated the
withdrawal of the Israeli army from all West Bank cities, and divided
the West Bank into three areas. Area A, the most populated Palestinian
cities (Jenin, Tulkaram, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Hebron) to be
governed by the Palestinian Authority solely. Area A constitutes three
percent of the West Bank. Area B, where 450 Palestinian villages are
located, is to be administered by the Palestinian Authority, and Israel
is responsible for security. It is approximately 27% of the West Bank.
The larger part of the West Bank is Area C where the Israeli settlements
are located. The Israeli army has total control over this area.

24. Responses to this question were yes, no, and no opinion (CPRS,
September 1994).

25. CPRS, August-September 1995.

26. Israeli civilian targets are considered those within
Israel's 1948 borders. It is implied that anything beyond these
borders is considered within the West Bank and Gaza.

27. Shikaki, "The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and
the Transition to Democracy in Palestine," 7.

Mkhaimar S. Abusada is an assistant professor of political Science
at al-Azhar University, Gaza, Palestine. The author wishes to thank
Professors Thad A. Brown and Jamal R. Nassar for their critical
suggestions of an earlier version of this article.

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