All Icon rigs from Aerodyne Research were recently grounded in Sweden (possibly all of the Nordic countries). The reason for this is that the reserve pilot chute failed to eject when the reserve was popped on the ground. The document (in Swedish) is attached. Rough translation:

BackgroundA rig of the type Aerodyne Icon had the reserve popped during an ordinary service event [I'm guessing this means preparation for repack] by pulling th wire to the reserve pin. The spring pilot then stayed in the rig without releasing. Only by external influence, by pulling the lower flap of the reserve container, did the spring pilot jump from the container.

CoverageAll rigs of the type Aerodyne Resarch Icon

ActionImmediate grounding

WhenThe grounding is effective immediately, and until further notice

Other infoThe grounding of Icon is done while we wait for the result of the investigation started by the manufacturer Aerodyne Research in order to establish the cause of what happened. The rig that experienced the issue will be sent to Aerodyne for inspection shortly. When the investigation is complete, a new evaluation of the Icon will be made. Aerodyne say they intend to proceed with the investigation as soon as possible.

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Does anyone here know more about this? Did the incident in question happen in Sweden?

I'd be interested to know if the rig in question was packed in accordance with the factory recommendations in terms of reserve side and closing loop length?

Given the variations in different reserve types, sizes, closing loop lengths, and rigger techniques, it would seem like a harsh reaction to ground all Icons based on a single event. Granted, it's a real 'deal breaker' of an event if it happens in freefall.

I agree, I'm just a regular jumper and therefore not really in the loop, but if I should get some more info I'll post it here. I don't know if there are any Swedish riggers or members of our Materials Committee on here.

Grounding feels appropriate until the cause has been found. This time of the year, most DZs are closed in Sweden (we have half a metre of snow, a temperature of -20-30°C and five hours of daylight), hopefully our championship contestants in Dubai are not adversely affected.

Does anyone know what size of Icon it was I1, I2, I3, I...? Had the AAD cutter been relocated from under the pilotchute to above the pilotchute ? If this is the case, then it sounds a bit like the story we experienced some years ago in Belgium with the PdF small sized Atom harnesses where the pilotchute (type Quick 3.0) had a tendency to hook behind the AAD Cutter if relocated to above the pilotchute...

At least they have someone who will ground them. Although there have been indications this may change for the last 13 years the FAA has been unwilling to issue airworthiness directives for parachutes. Last one was for the amp fittings on Vectors in 1999.

When I found a problem with Quasar's (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d39xqpKPX_w Ted Strong was quick to react but the service bulletin did not have the force of law. I expect there are still Quasar's with steel 'flingers' out there. I know other manufacturers have wanted AD's but were unable to get them because a parachute was no longer considered an appliance and only aircraft, engines, propellers and appliances could have AD's.

Other question, main in or main out? I know many riggers (most?) in the U.S. who routinely pull the main out before firing the reserve. Some changed their practice after seeing the above video.

I think this issue is the tip of a very nasty iceberg. The exception is the container that fails to open at all when the pin is pulled or the loop is cut and the Icon is not the only container this has been demonstrated on (Bad packing may contribute). What is more worrying is how much does the design of small modern containers slow down the reserve deployment. A hard deck of 750ft may be to late to start deploying the reserve. What every owner must start insisting on, is for the container manufacturer to state what the hard deck is for your container with your reserve. If he can't or won't tell you, go buy something else because, it either has not been tested or they already know it is to slow.

Just in case you don't know what a hard deck is. It is the lowest altitude above ground that you can expect your reserve to fully deploy and therefore save your life. Your decision height needs to be even higher. Ask yourself if you know the answer to this.

I can't say this strongly enough start asking and insist on an answer.

What every owner must start insisting on, is for the container manufacturer to state what the hard deck is for your container with your reserve. If he can't or won't tell you, go buy something else because, it either has not been tested or they already know it is to slow.

You won't get an answer in the US, or really anywhere I would guess.

The problem is (and most likely what a manufacturer will tell you) is that the 'hard deck' is dependant on the body position, airspeed, reserve canopy, and pack job, and there's no way for them to quote you a number.

Those practical reasons aside, in the US you can add the problem of legal liability if you quote a hard number and the rig fails to meet that standard and it leads to an incident.

Judging by the customer provided video, it would appear and anomaly was produced from 2 contributing factors, one being an excessively long reserve closing loop and the other from initiating reserve deployment in an unconventional manor. After completing the 15 succsesfull test pulls we do not feel any corrective actions are nessessary.

There is nothing to add to this thread. A lot of noise for nothing! It's just plain fuckin' stupid to ground a rig based on such a deployment with a too long closing loop. The guys involved in this issue should be grounded for a long time...

-- They partially fault "initiating reserve deployment in an unconventional manor" (sic). But it isn't clear whether the reserve was popped by pulling on the cable under the pin cover flap or not; they need to talk to the folks in Sweden more. The first frame of the video they received does show the rig on the ground and the pin in a person's hand, but it isn't clear what happened before that. Was the pin pulled manually with the rigger's hand perhaps against the top flap as Aerodyne suggests, or was the pin pulled the normal way, the pilot chute didn't launch, and then they put the rig on the floor and got out the camera?

-- They show the "excessively long" loop to be 7/8" above Aerodyne's specs. (But see my next point too! - it isn't that much.) But how much actual slack was there? That is, before pulling the pin, how much could a rigger compress the pilot chute and pull up excess loop? Plenty of rigs have loops that are above some manufacturer's spec, some of which are more realistic than others. The loop sounds longish but I wonder if that amount should be considered dangerous for an ideal rig.

-- Aerodyne claimed: "Typically, we would use a 115mm (4 ½”) with this combination." This specification is below any in the manual whether for a smaller, medium, or large size reserve. And the specs are shown only for Smart reserves. Looking in my Icon manual dated August 2011 (which is still current), it shows loop lengths of 12.0 to 14.0 cm for the Smart 150 to 175 reserve, in an Icon I5. Although the rig is an I5, we haven't been told what reserve was in use. If it isn't a Smart reserve, then there is no exact directive as to what the proper loop length will be. (The loop in the incident was 13.7 cm, within the range suggested for the rig, depending on reserve size.) So while the loop length may have been long in that it allowed for slack when packed, Aerodyne has done a very poor job in showing what length it should be according to the manual.

-- For the first time, we see that this was a case of popping the reserve with the main in place. The first photo in the pdf is a good example of how the main can interfere: The main side flaps just slightly overlap the stiff reserve bottom flap, making it harder to lift up. That flap in turn adds resistance to the reserve side flaps, which in turn resist the pilot chute.

At least Aerodyne attended to the matter quickly and tried a variety of tests, and had the pilot chute always fire. Although they got limited info from Sweden, both of their claims as to the cause of the problem are a bit weak. To summarize: a) it isn't clear if the reserve was activated the unconventional way they said b) it isn't clear how much slack there was in the loop, and their own claims on what the loop length should be do not match their own manual

A rig type Aerodyne Icon was activated at regular service by wire to the spare pin was pulled. Spring pilot became prominent left in the rig without tripping. Only after the external influence by pulling reservcontainerns bottom flap, the pilot jumps out of the casing. Current controller packed system has followed Aerodyne Research Icon manual and the tolerances recommended therein.

Pending the outcome of the investigation that has been initiated by the manufacturer Aerodyne Research to determine the cause of the incident, all Aerodyne Research Icon been coated with hopes peak since 23 nov 2012th

The manufacturer has now taken his expected responsibilities and conducted an investigation. This shows that there is materielfel or defects, nothing in the report suggests that it would happen again. SFF Materials Committee renews hence its position.

You are absolutely correct and the reasons you have given add up to there being no performance standard to compare or for any container to have to meet. Hence your AAD may just be decoration as 750ft is just some number!!.

Of course we could say that the time for a pilot chute to clear the container can be measured. The extraction force required to lift the free bag out can be measured. If they can be measured a standard can be agreed. With these known factors a properly packed reserve can be expected to fully deploy in X seconds. from that you can work out what height you would need to be at if traveling at a given speed for the reserve to save you. PHeeew. Problem is no one is asking the questions (except me) and when an incident occurs it is to easy to just say the AAD didn't save them, even if it worked exactly as it was intended to.

Anyway if someone sells you something intended to do a job why shouldn't they be able to tell you the limits of its operating capability. eg minimum safe height to initiate reserve deployment. They do give the Maximum speed and weight on the reserve canopy after all..

Just to be clear this problem can apply to any small free-fly friendly container especially with four or more flaps covering the top of the reserve pilot chute.