Monetary and fiscal policy interactions with central bank transparency and public investment

Abstract

In this paper, we study how the interactions between central bank transparency and fiscal policy affect macroeconomic performance and volatility, in a framework where productivity-enhancing public investment could improve future growth potential. We analyze the effects of central bank’s opacity (lack of transparency) according to the marginal effect of public investment by considering the Stackelberg equilibrium where the government is the first mover and the central bank the follower. We show that the optimal choice of tax rate and public investment, when the public investment is highly productivity-enhancing, eliminates the effects of distortionary taxation and fully counterbalance both the direct and the fiscal-disciplining effects of opacity, on the level and variability of inflation and output gap. In the case where the public investment is not sufficiently productivity-enhancing, opacity could still have some disciplining effects as in the benchmark model, which ignores the effects of public investment.

Item Type:

MPRA Paper

Original Title:

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions with central bank transparency and public investment

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