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Month: January 2017

I wrote this post a few weeks ago, while on vacation but for a number of reasons I delayed posting it. If you’ve been keeping up with my posts, you’ll have already read a good portion of what follows. But what I think I’ve done here, is distilled the essence of what I believe is the reflation trade and (now that base effects are set to peak next month) its possible drivers going forward. Once again, at the very least, I hope you find this as stimulating to read as I did to write.

Cheers!

While my grandfather was working for the Institute for Defense Analysis during the 1970’s he developed an algorithm to break Russian codes. It was quite successful and would go on to be applied to a number of important areas including the solar cycle. At the time, it was widely believed that there was an 11-year cycle that drove solar activity. But an article published in 2015 titled “Irregular heartbeat of the Sun driven by double dynamo” asserts that there is a second cycle or dynamo that drives solar activity. The authors go far as to predict these two dynamos would counteract each other in the 2030’s producing a cooling period that hasn’t been seen in over 400 years.

“The model draws on dynamo effects in two layers of the Sun, one close to the surface and one deep within its convection zone. Predictions from the model suggest that solar activity will fall by 60 percent during the 2030s to conditions last seen during the ‘mini ice age’ that began in 1645”

The analogies to the current climate of the global economy should not go overlooked. If the demographers and history are any guide, we are at the end of a debt super cycle, arguably the largest in history. When it ends, we too will enter a cooling period. With the emergence of China in the 21st century, the global economy finds itself driven by a pair of dynamos.

But investors have become so accustomed to the US driving the global credit cycle that they have missed the origin of the reflation trade. The dollar, commodities and inflation have all risen together for the first time in over a decade which has left investors scrambling for a narrative to explain this paradox. Fortunately, the recent US presidential election has provided just that. Despite the “coincidence” of commodities bottoming with China’s economy in February of last year, investors have latched on whole heartily to the “Trumpflation” narrative. Or to use another analogy, investors have entered the Jade City, but they have become distracted by the Giant Green Floating Head.

Unbeknownst to investors, China is behind the curtain pulling the strings. And if we continue with the analogy, I guess my pulling back of the curtain makes me Toto.

Although I’d hardly be the first to do so. CrossBorder capital and others have been trying to tell investors for months that this was the case. But unlike them, I am not a China bull. I am in the “China is a massive bubble” camp. The reflation trade, being yet another extension of said bubble, will eventually die out. Sooner rather than later I will argue. But before I do, let’s go back and look at the mood around the start of the reflation trade.

In the depths of the January 2016 sell off oil had plunged to $26, the trade weighted dollar hit a multi-decade high and most importantly, consensus believed China’s economy to be headed for a hard landing. Not to pick on Kyle Bass, but his February 2016 letter hit the proverbial nail on the head (my emphasis):

“As it is obvious that China’s economy is slowing and loan losses are mounting, the primary question is what are China’s policy options to fix the current situation?”

Yes, it was obvious. Looking up at the chart, industrial profits and sales had turned negative. Everyone knows you can’t service a growing debt burden on negative profits, just like everyone knows that China has an enormous debt bubble.

But unlike the 2008 financial crisis when the central authorities, the Federal Reserve and US treasury, were completely oblivious to the actual problems, the Chinese authorities, and everyone else for that matter, knew exactly what the problems were. What Kyle Bass and others (myself included) missed was that the Chinese authorities were planning a Battle of the Bulge type counter attack in the form of a massive stimulus push.

For those in need of a quick history lesson, in the winter of 1944, the Germans were trapped. Fighting a war on multiple fronts with dwindling resources it was obvious they would lose the war (sound familiar?). And because it was “so obvious” that Germany was going to lose, the Allies let down their guard and were caught flatfooted when Germany launched one of the largest counterattacks in human history. From Wikipedia:

“American forces bore the brunt of the attack and incurred their highest casualties of any operation during the war.”

History is not without a sense of irony, as western hedge funds and speculators have had their shorts knocked off them as this reflationary trade has gone further and farther than the bears could have possibly imagined. Throwing salt in the wound, the lynch pin of the Chinese economy, State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), have roared back to life with profit growth turning positive for the first time in over two years.

But it would be foolish to think this stimulus is one, sustainable and two, without its costs. The Yuan took this reflationary policy on the chin. Despite spending $320B in reserves to defend the Yuan in 2016 it still fell 6.5% against the dollar. And even though China’s economy bottomed in Q1 2016, it still took months before the country stopped exporting deflation to the rest of the world.

More importantly, since China had been exporting deflation for so long, the market became convinced that deflation would continue in perpetuity. I think we all remember the panic last summer to reach for anything with a positive carry. What the market and more importantly Central Bankers were missing was the fact that deflation in China had in fact bottomed, and although still negative, was rising sharply.

Chinese PPI

This turn from deflation to inflation also fooled Chinese investors who piled into the record low bond yields. In fact, investors’ response to these rising inflationary pressures was so slow that yields in China did not bottom until PPI had already turned positive for the first time in over 4 years!

And this is where things get very tricky for the Chinese authorities. They wanted this inflation. Just not this quickly. Locked in a deflationary debt spiral, a little inflation is a gift from the financial gods…

And we’ve actually seen the US, EU and Japanese economies all respond positively to these rising inflationary pressures. The combined strength of the three large economies all rising together may even be able to hold China’s slowing economy for a bit longer (we’ll get to that bit later).

…BUT in China where the bond bubble is so intertwined and over levered that a mid-size brokerage firm can’t even default on some of its debt obligations without causing a major panic, rising rates are down right catastrophic. In the depths of China’s December bond panic, a “multi-billionaire defaulted” on just $13 million worth of bonds. I use quotes, because anyone can be a billionaire if they borrow a few billion dollars and ignore the liability side of their balance sheet.

I doubt he’s the only one swimming naked. Wealth management products (WMPs) are incredibly susceptible to rising interest rates. These Ponzi-finance vehicles have increasingly invested in each other which has pushed counter party risk exponentially higher. From WSJ:

“Some 40% of the assets in wealth management products—the biggest portion—was invested in bonds as of the first half of this year, up from 29% in 2015, according to Moody’s Investors Service.”

This inter-connectivity of WMPs has further restrained the PBOC’s ability to tighten. In spite of rising inflation, if the PBOC wanted to keep the economy going they would have to inject more liquidity… and that is exactly what they did. From WSJ (my emphasis in bold):

“On Friday [December 16th], the PBOC tapped an emergency lending facility it created in 2014 to extend 394 billion yuan ($56.7 billion) in six-month and one-year loans to 19 banks. That pushes the net amount extended through the facility to 721.5 billion yuan so far in December, a monthly record, according to Beijing-based research firm NSBO.”

The Chinese government finds itself in a constant battle against short term destabilizing forces. Every time it tries to take its foot off the gas, the economy gets pulled into the deflationary whirlpool, Charybdis, prompting even more Cow Bell. I’m mixing metaphors but you get the point.

On the other hand, they can no longer stimulate as much as they want or else they’ll face, Scylla, the nine-headed inflation monster that will rip their debt to shreds. It is quite likely that China has now reached the point where stimulus’ effect on the economy over the medium term is net negative.

More specifically, artificial increases in credit pushes inflation higher which in turn pushes up interest rates which in turn tightens liquidity thereby defeating the purpose of stimulating in the first place. My guess is that the recent monthly record of stimulus injections will show up in the inflation data much sooner than the Chinese authorities would like.

And although we have not yet seen rip roaring inflation, China has gone from DEEP deflation to rising inflation within twelve short months. The Chinese Authorities are clearly aware of this shift, but it’s unlikely that they acted fast enough. The PBOC did not start tightening liquidity until a month before PPI turned positive.

It needs to be said, that by comparison, the PBOC is light years ahead of their developed market counter parts. The BOJ in particular pinned bond yields to the floor the same month that Chinese PPI had turned positive for the first time in over four years! But we’ll get to this monumental mistake later (actually we won’t, sorry). For now, let’s place our focus back on China, the epicenter of the reflation trade. If Total Chinese Liquidity is an accurate indicator, Chinese PPI could continue higher for the next few months.

With that said, increases in liquidity have lost effectiveness on the Chinese economy over time.

For those that do not know, the Li Keqiang index is a combination of railway cargo volume, electricity consumption and loans disbursed by banks. Considering Chinese bank loans hit a new record in 2016, and enough electricity (produced via coal) was consumed to blanket North Eastern China in smog for the past few weeks, it is safe to say that this trick is unlikely to be played again. The Chinese Government’s pivot towards stability over all else further supports this thesis. From Bloomberg (emphasis is mine):

“The price was too high, the leaders agreed, according to a person familiar with the situation. The buildup of debt used to fuel smokestack industries from steel to cement had helped win the short-term battle for growth, but the triumph itself undermined the foundations of long-term expansion, the leaders decided, according to the person, who asked not to be named because the meeting was private.

What followed was an order to central and local government officials that if they are forced to choose this year, stability must be the priority while everything else, including the growth target and economic reform, is secondary, said another four people familiar with the situation.”

The prioritization of stability over growth is not exactly music to the ear of an investor who put money into China on the hopes of +7% GDP growth and a stable currency. Which begs the question, how do you maintain stability while at the same time growing your debt fueled economy without it tipping over? Given China’s shadow banking risks, rising inflation, and dwindling FX reserves the simple answer is you can’t. Like riding a bicycle, the closer your speed approaches zero the harder it is to balance.

In China’s case, they are riding a bicycle while spinning half a dozen plates of uranium while juggling a pair of Molotov cocktails. If they slow down too much, they will not only crash, they will explode. Given said conundrum, it will be interesting to see how the local governments interpret this seemingly contradictory directive of stability over growth. If the PBOC is any indicator, we are about to witness some very odd behavior coming out of the Chinese Authorities.

“China’s central bank has ordered the nation’s lenders to strictly control new loans in the first quarter of the year, people familiar with the matter said, in another move to curb excess leverage in the financial system.”

Given the recent price action of iron ore, when it comes to China, we should always expect the unexpected.

Or perhaps, investors are panicking about what to do with their falling currency and are trying to hedge it. There’s a certain level of irony (pun intended… I’ll wait) that the largest source of instability in China comes from a “pegged” currency. It seems self-evident that China’s pivot towards stability would include a stable currency but given the rising inflation, slower growth pivot, dwindling reserves and lack of defensive options, one wonders just how long they can support the Yuan.

A falling Yuan is the worst thing that could happen for the Chinese Authorities. For one it undermines their credibility. Secondly, it forces the PBOC to intervene and drain liquidity from the market. And finally, it pushes inflation higher as the value of imported commodities and goods rises. With that said, recall that the Chinese bond market is a massive intertwined web of hidden risk, and in a falling liquidity and rising inflationary environment it will get butchered worse than the younglings in Star Wars Episode 3: Revenge of the Sith.

Getting back to Kyle Bass’s letter, it’s important to note the key role both Wealth Management Products (WMPs) and Trust Beneficiary Rights (TBRs) play in the Chinese Banking System. As the sticky systemic glue that binds the over-levered Chinese banking system together, they will be the focal point of any meltdown. From Kyle Bass’s letter (my emphasis):

“TBRs are one of the biggest ticking time bombs in the Chinese banking system because they have been used to hide loan losses. The table below illustrates how pervasive TBRs are throughout the Chinese banking system. One can make many assumptions regarding the collectability of such loans, but our takeaway is that the system is already full of massive losses. Pay particular attention to the column of the ratio of TBR’s to loans on each bank’s books.”

We saw just how potent TBRs can be when Sealand Securities, a midsize brokerage firm, suggested it would default on loan contracts due to a “fake seal”… or as I used to say in elementary school, “my dog ate my homework”, although honest to God, one time it did, so maybe we should give Sealand Securities the benefit of the doubt.

Although, the Chinese bond market certainly didn’t. Bond values plunged and the PBOC was forced to inject $23.7B of liquidity in one day. By the end of the month, the PBOC injected a record $120B in liquidity. Recall, this all came against the backdrop of the highest SOE profit growth in over 3 years! It didn’t matter that the underlying fundamentals of the debt had improved (albeit temporarily), the bond market still cracked! This episode appears to have spooked investor appetite for corporate debt as well.

So, if the situation is this bad that not even a medium size company can default on its TBRs without sparking a major panic, then how are the authorities supposed to “maintain stability” without pumping more liquidity into the system? And how can they pump liquidity and credit into the system without pushing down the Yuan? And how can they maintain stability if the currency is falling?

You see where I’m going with this. It’s not difficult. I don’t believe and I certainly don’t claim to have any unique insights. If there’s anything that I do possess whether right or wrong is a high conviction level which allows me to see through all the smoke screens put up by the Chinese Authorities. And yet one only needs look at investor positioning to see that they have fallen hook line and sinker for these very smoke screens! The shift is simply astounding.

In less than a year Copper positioning has gone from record short to record long.

This is despite what the CIO, Russel Clark, believes is a dream set up for a potential China crisis (Zerohedge’s emphasis).

“I have been able to play into market trends that would also do well in a China crisis. But suddenly, with the election of Trump, the broader market trends are all the opposite of how you want to be positioned in a China crisis. Higher commodity prices, higher US yields, and cyclicals over staples. One answer would be to go to cash and wait it out. The problem with this is that, if you believe that a Chinese crisis is inevitable then what would be the signals to begin to put on a China crisis trade? The answer would be capital flight from China, rising Chinese yuan deposit rates in HK (as this is a commercial rate, not set by the PBOC), and increasing market talk of capital controls. Unfortunately, these are all happening today.”

Sentiment and positioning aside, I do believe there is a good chance for the reflation trade to continue a bit further. Recall that both China’s economy and the oil price bottomed in February of last year (Coincidence?). From base effects alone these two factors should provide an inflationary tailwind over the next month or so. Given renewed developed market economy strength as well as the market’s slow reaction function (see summer bond buying panic months after deflation had bottomed) the reflationary trade could continue for an additional few months after inflationary pressures from oil and China peak in Q1 of this year.

Adding to that, I do believe there is some room over the next month for China and the Yuan to surprise to the upside. The Chinese Authorities have done a relatively good job shifting the narrative these past few weeks. Although I’d say hiking HIBOR to 105% reeks of desperation, it’s not my opinion that drives markets (if only).

I also see incredible potential for the PBOC to defend the psychologically important $3T reserve level this month. Come the release in early February, the market may be shocked to discover that the $3T reserve level has held. The Yuan could strengthen and the narrative would temporarily shift to the masterful job done by the Chinese Authorities, and developed markets would rally on the back of higher inflation.

Remember, since China is the source of the rising inflation, a stronger currency only amplifies this effect. Higher inflation in the US would push interest rates higher, strengthening the dollar and further accelerating capital flight out of China. So, by defending the currency, China is actually reinforcing the pressures that forced its defense in the first place. And of course, all of this would ignore how the PBOC might manage to hold the line in the first place. From Bloomberg:

“Financial regulators have already encouraged some state-owned enterprises to sell foreign currency and may order them to temporarily convert some holdings into yuan under the current account if necessary, they added.”

The Chinese Authorities, lauded for their long-term planning, are actually some of the best short term fixers the world has ever seen. Their ability to pull any and every lever necessary to kick the can down the road is as impressive as it is myopic. Sadly, the game, now in quintuple overtime, is almost over. The players are about to drop dead from exhaustion and this is the part where I agree 100% with Kyle Bass:

“Once analysts, politicians, and investors alike realize the sheer size of the impending losses and how they compare to the current levels of reserves, all focus will swing to the banking system.

As it is obvious that China’s economy is slowing and loan losses are mounting, the primary question is what are China’s policy options to fix the current situation? We believe that a spike in unemployment, accelerated banking losses / a credit contraction, an old-fashioned bank run, or more likely the fear of one or all of these events, will force Chinese authorities to act decisively.”

“The Führer has asked us to do our very best and not to let him down. We only need to keep the enemy at bay for about three more months “. Three more months, then we would see the new miracle weapons and these would force the enemy to negotiate. I believed that.”

Once again the parallels to modern China are eerily similar. With the pivot towards stability, the Chinese Authorities are desperately trying to make it to the government reshuffle. Just nine more months! Nine more months and the miracle weapons, I mean Xi Jinping will have all the power he needs to manage the economy! Of course, history tells us that the battle of the bulge lasted only 40 days, and despite the war lasting another four months, the German miracle weapons never materialized.

Maybe China makes it to the government shuffle (and they probably will), but I fail to see how higher debt levels, smaller FX reserves, and rising shadow bank risk will be any more manageable under a regime where Xi has “full” control. What separates China’s coming crisis from the US’s in 08, is that it will happen not because the authorities failed to notice the problems, but because they have exhausted all capabilities to prevent it. And perhaps most importantly what separates the next global crisis from the last, is that it will most likely not be driven by the US, but by China.

Disclaimer: This blog post is not advice to buy and or sell securities. I am merely informing you of my intentions/opinions. If you act on the words of a twenty something millennial over the internet you have only yourself to blame.

Corrections: PBOC official reserves dropped $320B not $400B. The Yuan fell 6.5% against the dollar not 8% in 2016.

I know what you are thinking, “Hey kid, it’s only been a week. Your predictions aren’t even cold yet!” Just humor me. I believe this thesis has continued to play out and there are important developments that I need to talk within the context I have previously provided. That context being that rising inflation due to both China’s temporary rebound and higher oil prices would lift Developed Market inflation much higher than current expectations.

I expected and continue to expect, that this pulse of inflation (DM central bankers better hope its just a pulse) would be highly disruptive, catching a lot of investors and central planners off guard. Although we are only a little over a week into the new year and 2 weeks removed from that post, I think some important data has come out that further supports this thesis.

For starters, crude oil is up +80% YoY. Although it’s not looking the best, technically speaking.

The addition of Russia, to the production cuts is potentially a paradigm shift in the oil markets. OPEC+Russia is a new cartel the likes of which we haven’t seen in decades. Recall just over a month ago, when Qatar and Glencore bought a portion of Russian Oil Giant Rosneft.

“With this bit of news, the OPEC production cut, in my estimation, has gone from an act of desperation to a smart gamble. OPEC+Russia now produces half the world’s oil, making it a much more formidable cartel. A cut of 10% of their production would amount to over 4 million bpd, the likes of which North American shale could simply not keep pace with.

But I’m not suggesting they do that all at once. This new cartel will likely take the Federal reserve’s approach of slow and steady moves. IF this first relatively small cut holds and by that I mean the price of oil stabilizes somewhere over $50, I could easily envision a scenario when as early as this spring we see significant chatter of a future cut that could come this summer. In essence, the cartel would force the market to price in additional production cuts before they even happen. OPEC+Russia future production quotas could become the new Fed dot plots.“

So far so good. But where am I going with this? Well that inflationary pulse from oil base effects may have lasted only a few months, but now with this new cartel, the price of oil could continue to rise potentially above $60 further pumping inflation into the NIRP districts of Europe and Japan. And perhaps the most overlooked dynamic of OPEC’s production cut, are the guys they’ve ceded defeat to, US shale.

Their “enemy”, US producers, have hedged 50% more production than they did going into the summer of 2014. Getting rid of them during the next plunge would be even more difficult, and it was already bloody difficult when they were totally unprepared. Adding that the OPEC member countries still haven’t recovered from the prolonged low price of oil (you don’t create a massive revamp of your country and IPO your national treasure if things are going swell). It seems suicidal for them to let the price fall, and restart the all out pump war.

To look through the lens of game theory, it is now in each member’s self interest to ensure the success of the production cuts. That speaks to a low probability of failure, although it must be noted that if this new cartel does fail, the downside to the price of oil is tremendous. Assuming, $50 oil for the next few months, it will be interesting to see the BOJ and the ECB try to sell their negative interest rate policies to their citizens.

As a matter of fact the EU economy has responded quite well to this inflationary pulse. Remember folks, a little inflation always feels good in the beginning. Especially after a long deflationary drought. They say hunger is the best sauce, and it seems the Eurozone is proving that to be true. From Economic Calendar:

I’ve been calling for a bottom in the Euro since mid-December. The record spreads between US and German bond yields were particularly out of whack. Now that inflation is surging higher in Germany, I expect this spread to tighten.

Higher inflation, combined with rising rates and strengthening European economies, further supports the rebound in EU banks. These “failed and insolvent” institutions should continue to climb that wall of worry we all know so well.

“Come spring of next year, trend followers will be tripping over themselves to get a slice of these no longer “dead beat” banks. With their banks no longer in free fall, and rising interest rates, capital should flow back into these economies. Given the huge flows into US as of late, I suspect the EUR/USD carry trade is about to unwind.”

The refusal to break to parity despite pleas from dollar bulls is another strong case for a turn around in the Euro. Readers of my blog will recognize this chart. Notice how the momentum has continued to diverge from price.

But once again, it is important to remember that this is all a head fake… a very powerful head fake but a head fake all the same. Debts are too high to sustain any real move in interest rates. It is simply shocking how little talk rising LIBOR has received of late.

ICYMI: Took 7+yrs but 3mo LIBOR crossed 1% Thursday! 90% of the loan mkt has a LIBOR floor of 1%, so coupons will be ↑. KCN pic.twitter.com/vwfWPg1Uih

But of course, I’ve been ignoring the elephant in the room, China, and its increasingly large and increasingly fragile debt bubble.

If you go back and read Kyle Bass’s letter from February 2016 (and I highly HIGHLY suggest that you do), you’ll notice part of his thesis was built around the fact that Chinese SOE profits had turned negative, and could no longer service their massive debts. Those debts are at the center of a massive speculative and interconnected bond bubble I might add (but we’ll get to that later). From Kyle Bass’s letter:

“As it is obvious that China’s economy is slowing and loan losses are mounting, the primary question is what are China’s policy options to fix the current situation?”

Yes it was obvious. Look back at the chart, Industrial profits were negative. Everyone knows you can’t service a growing debt burden on negative profits. Unlike the 08 financial crisis, where the central authorities, Fed and US treasury, were completely oblivious to the actual problems, the Chinese authorities knew exactly what the problems were. So what Kyle Bass missed was that the Chinese authorities were planning a Battle of the Bulge type counter attack in the form of a massive stimulus push. And since then, Chinese SOEs have roared back to life with profits turning positive for the first time in 2 years.

It would be foolish to think this stimulus is one, without cost, and, two, is sustainable. The Yuan took this inflationary policy on the chin. Despite spending $400B in reserves to defend the Yuan, it still fell 8% against the dollar but arguably even more important, is inflation which has taken off. Producer prices surged the most in over FIVE YEARS!

Chinese PPI

Higher inflation will push interest rates up and as victims of the US housing bubble will tell you, it’s hard to sustain a speculative debt bubble when interest rates are rising.

Although that won’t stop China from trying. After an arguably disastrous 2016, stability has now become paramount in the Middle Kingdom. From Bloomberg:

“The price was too high, the leaders agreed, according to a person familiar with the situation. The buildup of debt used to fuel smokestack industries from steel to cement had helped win the short-term battle for growth, but the triumph itself undermined the foundations of long-term expansion, the leaders decided, according to the person, who asked not to be named because the meeting was private.

What followed was an order to central and local government officials that if they are forced to choose this year, stability must be the priority while everything else, including the growth target and economic reform, is secondary, said another four people familiar with the situation.”

“Despite the 6.7% growth, 2016 has not been a good year for China. I’ll be the first to admit that I do not fully understand why Xi is waiting for the government reshuffle next fall. In spite of the smoothest GDP growth in economic history, I find it hard to believe that higher debt levels, smaller FX reserves, and rising shadow bank risk will be any more manageable under a regime where he has “full” control.”

It looks like the Chinese authorities agree with my assessment. Economic stability will now be prioritized over everything else including economic growth and reforms. Not exactly music to the ear of an investor who put money into China on the hopes of +7% GDP growth and a stable currency.

Which begs the question, how do you maintain stability while at the same time slowing your debt fueled economy without it tipping over? Given China’s shadow banking risks (which I’ll get to later), and the bond panic in December, the simple answer is you can’t. Like riding a bicycle, the closer your speed approaches zero the harder it is to balance.

And In China’s case they are riding a bicycle while spinning half a dozen plates of uranium at once while juggling a pair of Molotov cocktails. If they slow down too much, they will not only crash, they will explode. It will be interesting how local governments interpret this seemingly contradictory directive of stability over growth. If the PBOC is any indicator, we are about to witness some very odd behavior coming out of the Chinese Authorities.

Or perhaps, investors are panicking about what to do with their falling currency and are trying to hedge it. There’s a certain level of irony (pun intended… I’ll wait) that the largest source of instability in China comes from a “pegged” currency. It seems self evident that China’s pivot towards stability would include a stable currency but given the rising inflation, slower growth pivot, dwindling reserves and lack of defensive options, one wonders just how long they can support the Yuan.

A falling Yuan is perhaps the worst thing that could happen for the Chinese Authorities. For one it undermines their credibility. Secondly, it forces the PBoC to intervene and drain liquidity from the market. And finally, it pushes inflation higher as the value of imported commodities and goods rises. With that said, recall that the Chinese bond market is a massive intertwined web of hidden risk, and in a falling liquidity and rising inflationary environment it will get butchered worse than the younglings in Star Wars Episode 3: Revenge of the Sith.

Once again getting back to Kyle Bass’s thesis, it’s important to note the key role both Wealth Management Products (WMPs) and Trust Beneficiary Rights (TBRs) play in the Chinese Banking System. As the sticky systemic glue that binds the over-levered Chinese banking system together, they will be the focal point of any meltdown. From Kyle Bass’s letter:

“TBRs are one of the biggest ticking time bombs in the Chinese banking system because they have been used to hide loan losses.The table below illustrates how pervasive TBRs are throughout the Chinese banking system. One can make many assumptions regarding the collectability of such loans, but our takeaway is that the system is already full of massive losses. Pay particular attention to the column of the ratio of TBR’s to loans on each bank’s books.”

We saw just how potent TBRs can be when Sealand Securities, a midsize brokerage firm, suggested it would default on loan contracts due to a “fake seal”.. or as I used to say in elementary school, “my dog ate my homework”, although honest to God, one time it did, so maybe we should give Sealand Securities the benefit of the doubt.

Although, the Chinese bond market certainly didn’t. Bond values plunged and the PBOC was forced to inject $23.7B of liquidity in one day. By the end of the month, the PBOC injected a record $120B in liquidity. Recall, this all came against the backdrop of the highest SOE profits in over 3 years! It didn’t matter that the underlying fundamentals of the debt had improved (albeit temporarily), the bond market still cracked!

So if the situation is this bad that not even a medium size company can default on its TBRs without sparking a major panic, then how are the authorities supposed to “maintain stability” without pumping more liquidity into the system? And how can they pump liquidity and credit into the system without pushing down the Yuan? And how can they maintain stability if the currency is falling?

You see where I’m going with this. It’s not difficult. I don’t believe nor claim to have any unique insights. If there’s anything that I do possess whether right or wrong is a high conviction level which allows me to see through all the smoke screens put up by the Chinese Authorities.

With that said, I do believe there is some room over the short term (1-2 months), for China and the Yuan to surprise to the upside. They’ve done a relatively good job shifting the narrative these past few days. Although I’d say hiking HIBOR to 105% reeks of desperation, it’s not my opinion that drives markets (if only).

I also see incredible potential for the PBOC to defend the psychologically important $3T reserve level this month. Come the release in February, the market may be shocked to discover that the reserve level has held. The Yuan could strengthen, with bitcoin falling to the low 700s if not lower. The narrative would temporarily shift to the masterful job done by the Chinese Authorities, and developed markets would rally on the back of higher inflation. Of course all of this would ignore how the PBoC managed to hold the line. From Bloomberg:

“Financial regulators have already encouraged some state-owned enterprises to sell foreign currency and may order them to temporarily convert some holdings into yuan under the current account if necessary, they added.”

The Chinese Authorities, lauded for their long term planning, are actually some of the best short term fixers the world has ever seen. Their ability to pull any and every lever necessary to kick the can down the road is both impressive and incredibly myopic. And sadly, the game, now in quintuple overtime, is almost over. The players are about to drop dead from exhaustion and this is the part where I agree 100% with Kyle Bass:

“Once analysts, politicians, and investors alike realize the sheer size of the impending losses and how they compare to the current levels of reserves, all focus will swing to the banking system.

As it is obvious that China’s economy is slowing and loan losses are mounting, the primary question is what are China’s policy options to fix the current situation? We believe that a spike in unemployment, accelerated banking losses / a credit contraction, an old-fashioned bank run, or more likely the fear of one or all of these events, will force Chinese authorities to act decisively.”

Although we aren’t there at this point, we are very very close. What separates China’s coming crisis from the US’s in 08, it is that will happen not because the authorities failed to notice the problems, but because they have exhausted all short term stability mechanisms. My argument today is that they are already completely out of ammo, and the last shoe to drop is the narrative. Although they can manage the narrative for a few months, to think they can last the year is a bet I would not make.

The Klendathu Capitalist apologizes for his bearishness but sees few alternatives. Like the ’08 crisis, we should expect higher inflation before severe deflation. One only has to remember the Fed’s repeated rate cuts that pushed inflation and commodities to record highs in ’08 right up until the US economy imploded.

Once again we are on the trapped in the middle of a similar set of circumstances this time originating from China. It doesn’t matter what Trump does or doesn’t do, he is almost irrelevant when it comes to China’s short term debt cycle which was going to correct with or without him. But he certainly makes for an entertaining sideshow, distracting US investors and business.

The one-month surge in small business optimism in December was far and away the biggest in the history of the survey pic.twitter.com/JlB2UL0Vzx

Lastly, DB put out a list of 30 things for investors to worry about. Curiously, the Yuan-USD peg was missing. As Jay-Z once said, I got 30 simple issues and the Yuan-USD peg ain’t one.

Disclaimer: This blog post is not advice to buy and or sell securities. I am merely informing you of my intentions. If you act on the words of a twenty something millennial over the internet you have only yourself to blame.

I think of myself as a China bear, and yet a lot of my growth based investments revolve around China. It’s the elephant in the room that we are all forced to take into account with every investment decision we make. Whether it be its massive demand for resources or equally massive infrastructure build out, China has shaped the world in ways the US has not done for decades, but China is pivoting. The things that China needs to continue its ascendant path have changed and the world will be forced to adapt.

China’s battle versus its dirty growth model has reached a heightened level as of late. Although the government will continue to push debt and stimulus through the system to prevent a deleveraging, there is only so much smog the citizens can take. With bitcoin breaking above $1000, the year is off to an ominous start in China.

But China will and has been pivoting to a cleaner growth policy. Perhaps China’s first and most noticeable step forward is the build out of its electrified vehicle fleet.

Electric vehicles require an array of unique materials from relatively small and esoteric markets. For example, the lithium market is incredibly tiny and run primarily by three companies. A large portion of the world’s cobalt comes from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, of which China has already secured a sizable portion of, leaving little for the Western companies such as Tesla to use for themselves. Then of course there is graphite, which makes up the anode of the lithium ion battery. The mining of graphite is an incredibly dirty process. China is already the world largest miner of graphite and it will be interesting to see how they strike a balance going forward.

Our story from May 2016 – Graphite demand from battery anodes to more than treble in four years > https://t.co/6UppsnVbay

Although supporters of electric vehicles at times suggest electricity from the grid is cleaner than a gas powered car, that isn’t always the case, especially in China where the bulk of grid power comes from old and inefficient coal fired power plants. So China cannot simply switch to electrical cars and buses and call it a day. Which is why it is building out a huge number of nuclear power plants. For those interested in the case for Uranium, I recommend “Uranium: The Falling Radioactive Knife.”

At the same time, China cannot easily abandon the “environmentally dirty” policies that have lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. These industries still employ millions of people. And of course there are trillions of debt tied to these slowing sectors that cannot be simply erased with the sweep of a broom.

In large part this is where the One Belt One Road policy comes into play. China will continue its infrastructure growth model in other countries where the ROI is much much higher. The money to finance these projects will come from China. Chinese banks will lend cheap Yuan to State Owned Enterprises who will in turn export China’s infrastructure boom to the central and south Asia.

There is an obvious flaw in this strategy (Hint: commodities are priced in dollars not Yuan), but on the surface, China’s OBOR program is an ingenious move that widens China’s sphere of influence, and also eases China’s difficult economic transition. At an order of magnitude larger in size than the US’s post WWII Marshall program, it is an effort the likes of which the world has never seen and will shape the world for decades to come.

According to their figures, China plans to increase Pakistan's electric grid output by about 66%. https://t.co/ZZh7INeqIb

But is the OBOR’s enormous size, more a function of the massive imbalance in China than prudent investment policy? Under Hu Jintao, power was more distributed, which led to rise of powerful vested interests. These vested interests delayed the necessary pivot which in turn has led to an insurmountable build up of excess debt and risk within China. It now takes seven units of debt for every unit of GDP growth. China has put a lot of eggs in this OBOR basket, and needs it to not only pay dividends for the long term, but as things become more and more unstable in China, for the short term as well.

Which brings me to the issue of time horizons. As a small investor I have a hard enough job matching my time horizons with my position sizes, although part of that I will blame on China’s inability to do the same. For me, it is becoming abundantly clear, that the time horizon for China’s OBOR program does not match up with its shorter term debt cycle.

We’ve seen the liquidity crisis in the bond market force the PBOC unleash a record amount of liquidity last month. With inflation rippling through the economy, the PBOC’s days of easing the economy with record amounts of stimulus are coming to an end. Instead of easing liquidity, stimulus will push inflation and interest rates well above the safe levels. These recent instabilities have fueled further capital flight. And despite talking a tough game, with each passing month, and feeble attempt to stop further capital flight, the PBOC is showing the world just how weak its hand truly is.

“Investment professionals, however, have queried how the ultimate use of the money could be verified. “If someone transfers money for overseas study or medical treatment, how is the bank supposed to check what they really spend the money on,” asked Kelly Jiang, a Beijing-based real-estate agent who helps Chinese investors buy properties in London. “

Like all governments, the CCP is only as strong as its citizens allow it to be. With the Yuan in a virtual free fall, the crowd of “speculators” picking off the PBOC is growing into an army. And of course, there is another short term cycle that is completely out of their control and in the hands of a seemingly hostile actor, Donald J. Trump.

In my 2017 Predictions, I largely ignored The Donald. This is a bit of a copout on my part, and yet, given my other assumptions (to be discussed later), and lack of knowledge on the subject of Donald Trump’s inner strategy, I find this to be the best position for me to take. My mother, chided me for such a foolish move. I’m sure the Chinese Authorities will not make the same mistake. On the surface, The Donald is a paradigm shift in US politics and not taking him into account is likely to bite some of my predictions in the butt.

At the same time, given my belief that the US consumer is quite weak, and the tightening Fed policy will exacerbate their overall health, I find it quite likely that Donald’s positive impact on the US economy will be minimal during his first year on the job. And let’s not forget the US election cycle’s correlation to US recessions. From Raoul Pal’s Global Macro Investor:

“I recently noted that since 1910, the US economy is either in recession or enters a recession within twelve months in every single instance at the end of a two-term presidency… effecting a 100% chance of recession for the new President.”

Policy makers can steer the economy when it is moving with speed, but once it stalls, it doesn’t much matter what you do, turning the wheel doesn’t change the fact that you are stopped. Just recall the last two US recessions, when the Fed slashed interest rates to record lows (at the time) and still the US economy slowed, stocks fell, and bubbles still burst.

The evidence continues to point to similar circumstances. We are seeing the late cycle inflation that exacerbates the record high debt loads. We are seeing the US consumer roll over. And although the dollar may weaken in response to the slower US economy, the reprieve the Yuan will feel will be temporary. In the end, the rest of the world will follow the US down, and the larger forces driving the dollar higher will reappear. Most importantly, despite, the OBOR program, and China’s other efforts to diversify itself away from the dollar and the US sphere of influence, China will find itself pulled down with the mythic force of Charybdis.

Time horizons, position sizes, lithium batteries, nuclear power, and The Donald, I realize this article is all over the map. So here is my attempt to rein it in. China is a system, and like any other system, it has its limits. As it bumps into those limits, variables become constants, and the predictions become easier. The paths to China’s success are dwindling by the day. This post has been my attempt to illuminate the available paths, and their potential pitfalls. Relying on China to stay afloat forever, is a fools errand, but one that has worked out well for the past few decades. Although I believe the sands in China’s hourglass are almost out, I also believe that some of the pathways in front of us are too tempting to not explore. #StayHedged.

Disclaimer: This blog post is not advice to buy and or sell securities. I am merely informing you of my intentions. If you act on the words of a twenty something millennial over the internet you have only yourself to blame.