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Thursday, 9 July 2015

Britain Restores (some) Strategic Balance

Alphen, Netherlands. 9
July. Britain is to spend more on defence. However, upon what Britain spends more
on. for what reason and to what effect must now be at the core of the coming Strategic Defence
and Security Review 2015 (SDSR 2015) due to be unveiled in October.

Chief of the British
Defence Staff General Sir Nick Houghton called yesterday “a great day for
defence”. He also said that the defence chiefs would no longer need to focus on
“managed decline”. And, on the face of
it I must swallow some humble pie this morning. Or, rather, I can feel vaguely
vindicated that my long campaign with many others has succeeded (including the writing of a 2015
book – Little Britain: Twenty-First
Century Strategy for a Middling European Power) to get the British
Government to restore some strategic balance and respond to the real world as
it is not as they would like it to be.

In yesterday’s budget
statement Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne committed to maintaining Britain’s
defence budget at the NATO guideline of 2% GDP until 2020 and to the creation of a Joint
Security Fund of £1.5bn per annum. Now,
one has to be careful about just what will be included in this beefed-up ‘defence’
budget. However, if real then not only has a thin red line been drawn under the
massive defence cuts of the last five years but an investment base is being established
that will confirm Britain as Europe’s strongest military power, and a modest
but influential world power. Critically,
SDSR 2015 now has sufficient investment behind its thinking and planning to
establish a new, radical, joint British force able to reach out to allies and
across to civilian partners both within government and beyond.

Let me give you an idea of scale. Whilst the British
defence budget pales into significance alongside this year's US defence budget of some
$534.3bn (£353bn or €492bn) London still spends a lot of money on defence
and is about to spend more. Indeed, with
an economy worth some $3015 trillion (£1958 trillion or €2717 trillion) in 2015
spending 2% GDP amounts to some $60.3bn (£39.16bn or €54.3bn). Poland, for example, will spend this year spend some 38.4bn Zloty or $10bn on defence.

However, there is still
some devil in the detail of the Chancellor’s announcement. This year Britain will spend (rather than budget for)
some $61.8bn on defence (£40.13bn or €55.69bn). In other words, going from 2.15% of GDP on defence to 2% still represents a further real terms cut of $1.5bn or
£0.98bn. There is clearly some budgetary
sleight of hand at work in these figures. However, the simple truth is that if
the 2% target is to be met over the 2016-2020 period Britain will indeed need
to spend an additional $6-8bn of defence.

The critical point is this; with a committed defence equipment budget of £163bn ($250.75bn or €226.46bn)
over the 2011-2021 period and with the commitment to a real terms increase of 0.5%
per annum until 2020 in the defence budget the new British Government has clearly
moved to stabilise a force that was beginning to show signs of serious decline and service chiefs can far better balance new equipment and the demands on personnel they will make. Indeed, whilst these investments do not match
the current levels of investment being pumped into their respective armed
forces by, say. China and Russia (frankly nor should they) if one removes France from
the equation the UK defence equipment budget is bigger than the rest of Europe
combined. Given the centrality of alliances
and coalitions to British defence strategy that growing disparity will itself mean
growing interoperability problems with under-equipped European allies in the
years to come. So, yesterday’s
announcement demonstrates a British Prime Minister who has made a very public
decision to remain close to the United States at whatever cost. Are you listening Washington?

So, what else does
yesterday’s announcement reveal about the state and future of the British armed
forces?

1.SDSR 2010 made defence cuts that went
too fast and too far as the government panicked in the aftermath of the banking
crisis and tried to re-balance the national books unrealistically quickly. Indeed, yesterday’s entire budget statement was
an implicit admission of that;

2. SDSR 2015 now has enough guaranteed
investment for planners to think strategically rather than strictly financially and thus will be far better able to match defence ends, ways and means in the coming years. To that end,
the National Security Strategy and SDSR 2015 must clearly be part of a
strategic planning continuum centred upon the National Security Council which must
act in turn as the security and defence planning driver across government; and

3. The Joint Security Fund reinforces an
idea central to my book Little Britain
that the British establish a ‘joint’ vision across the two axes of national
security and defence and the tri-service.Recent initiatives such as the Joint Force Command (JFC), Joint
Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) with
the French, must be built upon to generate sufficient mass to deter, sufficient 'manoeuvre' to move quickly, and sufficient agility to work with all possible partners across
the conflict spectrum. In short, defence must be properly plugged into security.

There are also some
real challenges that must be addressed by the Armed Forces themselves:

1. Why do the French (for example) with a comparative but marginally smaller defence and defence-equipment budget always seem to get more force for
each euro of investment? For too long Britain has been ‘rubbish’ at defence
procurement and for too long prime defence contractors have run rings around
the British defence Establishment. This has helped to significantly boost
defence cost inflation and resulted too often in inferior kit being procured at
inflated prices very slowly and in insufficient numbers. Yesterday the share value of BAE Systems
jumped significantly on the announcement of a defence budget hike. If that means investors think BAE (and Thales)
can again gorge their extended guts on the defence teet then they must be
sorely disappointed;

2. SDSR 2015 must be the enablers review,
i.e. the focus must be on those things that bind the forces into one force by providing eyes, ears
and brains. One of the tragedies of SDSR
2010 was that it forced the three service chiefs to defend their respective core
forces.The Army tried (and failed) to
defend its regiments, the Royal Air Force defended fast jets (well most of
them), and the Royal Navy focused on getting the new carriers completed, together
with the other new platforms desperately needed after over a decade of
land-centric operations.Vital enablers
such as vital maritime patrol aircraft were cut because there was no service chief
to defend them during a Treasury rather than strategy-led assault on the Armed
Forces.

In Little
Britain I call for a new understanding by London of its role and that of its
armed forces in the new nexus of twenty-first century nastiness. A role that must confront dangerous change in the world and reflect the power and responsibilities of
one of the world’s top five economic and military powers, that places the forces at the heart of Britain’s security and defence, and strikes a new balance between
the size, scope, missions and tasks of Britain’s world renowned armed
forces. Yesterday, Prime
Minister Cameron together with his colleagues George Osborne and Defence
Secretary Michael Fallon stepped up to the plate and for that I offer my
sincere congratulations. Britain is
beginning to restore strategic balance and that will in turn strengthen the
tattered transatlantic relationship, NATO and European defence. I could niggle about this or that but I will
not because yesterday, I saw something I have been begging for – British strategic
leadership. Thank you, Prime Minister, for your “big push”!

However, I will finish
with two challenges. My first challenge
is to the service chiefs. I have the honour of knowing General
Houghton and First Sea Lord Admiral Sir George Zambellas, and I respect Chief
of the Air Staff Sir Andrew Pulford, and Chief of the General Staff Sir Nick
Carter. These are serious people doing a
very serious job at a very serious time.
However, let me be blunt gentlemen. The Chancellor has afforded you a
chance to present your joint vision of the future British force and to deliver
it. You must therefore speak with one
voice to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, Secretary Fallon and the ‘Chief’. That means no more
implicit warfare between the Navy, the Army and the Air Force over budgets. As
a taxpayer I find such inter-Service rivalry/tribalism not only ridiculous but
boring and dangerous. Sadly, I am still hearing echoes of tribalism in the corridors
of power and in the various service strategies being worked up. It must stop. For the country’s sake don’t
blow it!

My second challenge is
to the Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Fallon. The Whitehall culture is first to protect the
minister and only then to protect the country.
As SDSR 2015 is being worked up over the next (and famous) “100 days” it
will succeed only if it is a truly strategic document that balances strategy,
capability, capacity and affordability. If
that balance is to be struck assumptions will need to be challenged. That in turn means the planting of a real Red
Team at the core of the process, a real awkward squad, people who will and can
challenge both process and assumptions and who are far more than legitimisers
of perceived ministerial and department wisdom.
That in turn will require political courage, Mr Fallon, which I believe
you possess in spades.

About Me

Julian Lindley-French is Senior Fellow of the Institute of Statecraft, Director of Europa Analytica & Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow, National Defense University, Washington DC. An internationally-recognised strategic analyst, advisor and author he was formerly Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy,and Special Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of Leiden. He is a Fellow of Respublica in London, and a member of the Strategic Advisory Group of the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington.
Latest books: The Oxford Handbook on War 2014 (Paperback) (2014; 709 pages). (Oxford: Oxford University Press) & "Little Britain? Twenty-First Strategy for a Middling European Power". (www.amazon.com)
The Friendly-Clinch Health Warning: The views contained herein are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect those of any institution.