Plaintiff and his wife live in a Fairfax, Vermont community
known as Buckhollow Heights, which was developed by defendants Ronald and
Deborah Perras, d/b/a Perras & Sons, Inc. The development has a homeowners
association and the Perrases serve as the association=
s officers. Residents of the subdivision pay dues to the association.

Plaintiff has accused the Perrases of violating the
association= s covenants concerning
road repairs and liability insurance. Regarding the insurance issue, plaintiff
claims the Perrases must purchase liability insurance for the association, but
that they purchased a policy for their construction business instead using
association funds. Plaintiff has accused the Perrases of converting association
dues for their own purposes and has filed suit against them. In his suit,
plaintiff also named as defendants Nationwide Insurance Company, Patricia R.
Hatler, Greg Bachman, Timothy Patrick Brady (collectively referred to
hereinafter as the A Nationwide
defendants@ ), the Mullen Insurance
Agency, Kylie Mullen and Robin Blouin (collectively referred to hereinafter as
the A Mullen Agency defendants@
) alleging the following:

3. With the same brazen contempt for their customers=
rights shown in trying to tax the homeowners for road repairs necessitated
by the Perrases, the said Perrases have been assessing homeowners for a
Nationwide Mutual business insurance policy premium covering solely the
Perrases= construction business
but offering no benefit to any of the homeowners. The Nationwide Mutual
attorneys and the Mullen Agency insurance agents named as defendants herein,
have conspired with the Perrases to cover for this unjust enrichment by
depriving the Plaintiff of a certified copy of the said policy, in spite of
demands addressed to each of these defendants.

The Nationwide and Mullen Agency defendants moved for
dismissal under V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. The Nationwide and Mullen defendants argued that they had no
duty to give plaintiff a copy of the association=
s insurance policy because plaintiff is not a named insured on the policy.
Therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to judicial relief for their refusal to
give him a copy of the policy. The superior court agreed, granted the motion to
dismiss, and entered a final partial judgment disposing of plaintiff=
s claims against the Nationwide and Mullen Agency defendants only. This appeal
followed.

In his brief and through other filings with this Court,
plaintiff has attempted to raise a number of issues not encompassed in the
superior court= s order on appeal. By
order of April 30, 2003, the full Court dismissed plaintiff=
s appeal insofar as it purported to raise matters not at issue in the court=
s decision to dismiss the Nationwide and Mullen Agency defendants. Justice
Dooley further clarified the scope of the appeal before us in an order dated
June 11, 2003. As he explained, the sole issue on appeal is whether the superior
court erred in dismissing the action as to the Nationwide and Mullen Agency
defendants. It is that issue to which we now turn.

When reviewing an order dismissing a claim under V.R.C.P.
12(b)(6), we assume the truth of all the facts alleged in the complaint and all
of the reasonable factual inferences that may be derived from those facts.
Richards v. Town of Norwich, 169 Vt. 44, 48-49 (1999). If it is beyond doubt
that those facts and inferences do not amount to a legal claim susceptible to
judicial relief, the court may grant the motion to dismiss. Id. at 48. In
other words, the court assumes the factual allegations are true, but it does not
assume those facts require judicial intervention absent a showing that the law
can redress whatever harm the plaintiff alleges.

In this case, plaintiff=
s complaint alleged that the Nationwide and Mullen Agency defendants helped
cover up the allegedly unlawful conduct of the Perrases by denying him a copy of
the homeowners association= s
insurance policy. Plaintiff was not a named insured on the policy, however, and
he fails to identify any requirement under state or federal statutory law or the
common law obligating any of the dismissed defendants to supply him with a copy
of the policy. Plaintiff has likewise failed to demonstrate that the Nationwide
and Mullen Agency defendants had a statutory or common law duty to ensure that
the Perrases fulfilled their obligation under the homeowners association
covenant to purchase a liability policy for the association. To the extent that
the Perrases did not purchase the insurance plaintiff alleges they are required
to purchase for the association, his grievance is with them, not with the
Nationwide or Mullen Agency defendants. The trial court thus properly dismissed
the complaint against those defendants and its order must be affirmed.