It is in Israel's interest to solidify the Egyptian role in
the Gaza Strip in the context of "conflict management" as a
governing policy concept. Egyptian participation in the efforts to
stabilize the situation in Gaza serves as an important component in the
vital Egypt-Israel relationship. It also helps erode Hamas's
pretension of jihad.

A temporary and fragile calm was established vis-a-vis Hamas and
other "resistance groups" in the Gaza Strip during the run-up
to the Israeli elections on April 9, 2019. This came in response to
significant economic gestures by Israel, but it was by no means a
solution to the basic problems posed by the dangerous and complex
military and political reality in this part of the world. The lingering
frustration of the residents of the border areas (the Gaza
"envelope," in Israeli parlance) and that of many other
Israelis with Hamas provocations is understandable and justified.

Still, there are no magic solutions hidden up anyone's sleeve.
A systemic and persistent engagement in managing the conflict, without a
"decisive outcome" as traditionally understood in Israeli
security doctrine, is probably the pattern best suited for Israeli needs
in the foreseeable future. The alternatives are costlier and more
difficult, and their chances of success are doubtful.

In this context, a unique role is played by Egypt--or to be more
precise, by the Egyptian intelligence services which can be used with
"plausible deniability" and without granting diplomatic
recognition to the de facto Hamas regime in Gaza. This is of broad
strategic importance, both for Israel and for others in the region,
including the Egyptian leadership, who share Israel's sense of
threat and order of priorities.

Egypt as the CEO

Much in the same way as Israel uses Russian good offices in Syria,
Egypt's contribution makes it possible to deliver unambiguous
messages to the Hamas leadership. These messages, in turn, rest upon
Israel's proven ability to exact a heavy price from Hamas by
military means. This establishes a triangular diplomatic maneuver that
is aimed, from Israel's perspective, at bringing about a restored
calm for as long a period as possible, but without falling into the trap
of direct dialogue with forces committed to Israel's destruction.

On the economic side of the equation, Qatar (closely supportive of
the Muslim Brotherhood, and hence also Hamas) plays the role of funder
for the Gaza Strip--a role which Egypt, for obvious reasons, cannot
possibly play. The use of cash-filled suitcases, reminiscent of old
Hollywood crime films, is due to the staunch refusal of the Palestinian
Authority (PA) leadership in Ramallah to provide any proper banking and
financial services to the "rebel held" area of Gaza. But even
if Qatar does serve as the CFO (Chief Financial Officer) of this
situation, it is the Egyptian leadership that retains the role of CEO
(Chief Executive Officer) in full control of the operation as a whole.
For obvious geopolitical reasons, Hamas has no choice but to oblige the
Egyptians.

This offers Israel several benefits in their own right (beyond the
impact of achieving calm with Hamas). Israel's clear and overt
preference for an Egyptian role was indeed manifest throughout the
rounds of fighting in 2008-2009 ("Cast Lead"), 2012
("Pillar of Defense") and 2014 ("Protective Edge"),
and several smaller conflagrations since. Paradoxically, it was easier
to enlist Muhammad Mursi's regime in the effort in 2012 to curb
Hamas. Israel put him in a situation in which, if he did not act to end
the fighting, Israel would opt for an extensive ground maneuver, and he
may have then faced the stark choice between acting as a responsible
Egyptian leader (to sustain peace with Israel) and doing his duty as a
Muslim Brother (to help and protect Hamas). Mursi indeed committed
himself to the effort to restore calm, and won accolades from Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton for his role. Things were far murkier in 2014,
due to the deeply-held mutual hatred between Hamas and Egyptian
President Fattah el-Sisi's regime--yet at the end it was again
Egyptian mediation that played a key role. Today, the Egyptian
administration has developed a sophisticated and effective approach
combining rewards for the Hamas leadership with significant leverages.

The Bilateral Relationship

For Israel, it is of primary importance to broaden cooperation with
Egypt. The bilateral relationship has shown remarkable resilience over
40 years, through significant tests and moments of crisis. It held firm
despite regional events, such as the Israeli raid on Iraq's nuclear
facility in 1981, the Lebanon War in 1982, the Palestinian uprising of
1987-1990, the failure of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the second
intifada violence that erupted in 2000, and the rounds of fighting ever
since; and despite the internal turmoil in Egypt after Sadat's
assassination and again since Tahrir Square in 2011 and the ouster of
President Hosni Mubarak. At the root of the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace
treaty lies an Egyptian awareness of Israel's military might; but
it is also bolstered by common interests and common challenges.

Today, the relationship has reached new heights, due to the common
stand against terror in Sinai on one hand, and against Turkish
subversion in the eastern Mediterranean on the other. With a partnership
in restoring calm in Gaza, and in an age of integration in the field of
energy supply, there may even some change in the generally shrill
anti-Israel atmosphere in the Egyptian public domain. In this respect,
the creation, in Cairo, of the EMGF--the Eastern Mediterranean Gas
Forum, bringing together Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian
Authority, Cyprus, Greece and Italy--is another step in that direction.

At the same time, the mediation is of great importance for Egypt
itself. And again, Israel has an interest in anything that the Egyptians
themselves see as conducive to their stability and to the chances of
economic growth. A severe deterioration in the situation in Gaza, and a
level of distress that may lead to pressure to throw the border open,
are viewed in Cairo as a nightmare. The last thing that Egypt needs is
millions more mouths to feed. Beyond that, the growing grip by Egyptian
intelligence on events in Gaza can serve to force the Palestinian terror
groups to cease and desist from all aid to the "Sinai
Province" (muhafazat sina') of ISIL (the Islamic State in the
Levant, another name for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) and other
subversive elements in the peninsula. Such support from within the Strip
had previously played a role, which the Egyptians are well aware of, in
the rise of these groups, which conduct a murderous and ruthless
campaign against the Egyptian forces and against local tribal elements
that dared to stand against ISIL. At present, Egypt seems to have
achieved an effective deterrence against further Palestinian support for
terror groups in Sinai.

Egypt in the Eyes of the West

At the level of ideas and symbols, the political leadership and the
policy professionals in Egypt have long been committed to the concept of
"Egypt's Role" (Dawr Masr, in Arabic) in international
affairs: namely, the senior position in the Arab and regional context,
which among other things reflects their open access to all players
--including Israel. They use this role to conduct grand diplomatic bids
that would bolster Egypt's standing and utility as an indispensable
factor--both in the eyes of the West as well as her own Arab allies and
donors. This becomes more important in the face of sharp criticism being
hurled at Sisi's regime by elements in the U.S. Congress and some
European circles, over the issue of human rights abuses. By contributing
to a reasonable conflict management, and avoiding crisis deterioration
and bloodshed, Egypt thus enhances her historic role. At a time of
unprecedented strategic affinity with the Egyptian leadership, Israel
shares (if indirectly) Egypt's interests in this respect as well.

There is also a major consideration that goes beyond the bilateral
dimension. Under present circumstances, the entire region now witnesses
a "resistance" movement with a jihadi pretense like Hamas (and
at its side, a typical proxy of Iran, Palestinian Islamic Jihad) finding
itself again and again seeking the help and relying upon the power and
influence of a nation such as Egypt. This, even though Sisi is a sworn
enemy, at the ideological and strategic levels, of Islamism in all its
forms. Sisi's speech at al-Azhar University, on January 1, 2015,
remains a formative text of the direct confrontation against the
intellectual deviation from the proper path of Islam, a deviant
interpretation put forward by the Muslim Brotherhood (including Hamas as
an offshoot of the movement) as well as by al-Qaeda, ISIL and their ilk.

Eroding the Myth

Over time, the combination of Israeli pressures, a deterrent effect
(even if limited and fragile) and intense Egyptian engagement, all help
in eroding the myth of the jihadi "resistance." The efforts
the Hamas leadership has been putting in for a year now are overtly
designed to extract more material gains. As such, they also raise--in a
certain sense--question marks about the movement's ideological
commitment to jihad at all costs. Thus, the very reliance upon Egypt, at
times of crisis and distress, may indicate that in the regional power
struggle between ideological camps, the Islamists are not quite sure
that they still have the upper hand.

None of this should bind Israel's hands if Hamas and the other
terror groups re-ignite and resume their large-scale provocations.
Restoring deterrence and reinforcing it are much more important duties
than the diplomatic interest vis-a-vis Egypt. However, as long as all
activities are part of the ongoing pattern of the last 12 months--in
which Egypt plays a major role in trying to (literally) lower the
flames, including the incendiary kites and the explosive balloons
Palestinians have sent over the fence with Israel--Israelis have an
interest in furthering Egypt's influence, in the context of better
"conflict management."

This present pattern also helps in managing (and indeed
perpetuating) the separation of Gaza from the PA--which currently serves
Israel's interests. The Egyptians continue to pay lip service to
the hopeless "reconciliation" between Fatah and Hamas. But
this is an effort doomed to fail. For Israel, in the foreseeable future,
the present level of Hamas's dependence upon Egyptian influence
from outside is distinctly better than some of the alternative
scenarios. This includes the idea (that some Israelis had toyed with) of
Egypt exercising direct sovereignty in Gaza. The Egyptians have shown no
interest of any sort and would reject it out of hand. For Israel, too,
this would entail an unacceptable risk. To rule in Gaza, the Egyptians
would need to station a large component of its modern, mobile military
within a short drive from the heart of Israel.

The present pattern, despite its painful cost, is a better choice
in term of the balance of power.

Col. (Res.) ERAN LERMAN, Ph.D., is Vice President of the Jerusalem
Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), where this article first
appeared as a policy paper.