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Abortion is a touchy subject for many people. There are many different arguments for and against abortion, including, but not limited to, the woman’s right to do what she wants with her body on the pro-abortion side, to the right of a fetus to live a good life if there is little chance of the fetus developing a serious disease. In this article, I will provide two arguments: one for and one against abortion. The abortion debate is an ethical, not scientific, one, and so, we must use argumentation to see the best way to move forward in this debate.

An argument for abortion

Michael Tooley, in his paper Abortion and Infanticide, provides an argument not only for the abortion of fetuses, but the killing of infants and animals since they cannot conceive of continuing their selves. He argues that an organism only has a right o life of they can conceive of that right to life. His conclusion is that it should be morally permissible to end a baby’s life shortly after birth since it cannot conceive of wanting to live. The conclusion of the argument also includes—quite controversially, in fact—young infants and (nonhuman) animals. Ben Saunders articulates Tooley’s argument in Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy(2011: 284-286):

P1. If A has a morally serious right to X, then A must be able to want X.

P2. If A is able to want X, then A must be able to conceive if X.

C1. If A has a morally serious right to X, then A must be able to conceive of X (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2).

P3. Fetuses, young infants, and animals cannot conceive of their continuing as subjects of mental states.

C2. Fetuses, young infants, and animals cannot want their continuance as subjects of mental states (modus tollens, P2, P3).

C3. Fetuses, young infants, and animals do not have morally serious rights to continue as subjects of mental states (modus tollens, P1, C2).

P4. If something does not have a morally serious right to life, then it is not morally wrong to kill it painlessly.

C4. It is not wrong to kill fetuses, young infants, or animals painlessly (modus ponens, C3, P4).

Of course, most people would seriously disagree with C4, since a babe’s life is one of the most precious things in the world— the protection of said babes is how we continue our species. However, the argument is deductively valid, and so one must show which premise is wrong and why. This argument—along with the one that will be presented below against abortion (of healthy fetuses)—is very strong. Thus, if a woman so pleases (along with her autonomy), she can choose to abort her fetus since it is not wrong to kill a fetus painlessly. (I am not aware if fetuses can feel pain or not, however. If they can, then the conclusion of this argument does not hold.)

Tooley’s argument regarding the killing of infants is similar to an argument made by Gibiulini and Minerva (2013) who argue that since fetuses and newborns don’t have the same moral status as actual persons, fetuses and infants can eventually become persons, and since adoption is not always in the best interests 9f people, then “‘after-birth abortion’ (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is, including cases where the newborn is not disabled” (Giubilini and Minerva, 2013).

An argument against abortion

One strong argument against abortion exists: Marquis’ (1989) argument in his paper Why Abortion Is Immoral. Women may want an abortion for many reasons: such as not wanting to carry a babe to term, to finding out that the babe has a serious genetic disorder. Though, what matters to this argument is not the latter, but the former: the mother wanting an abortion of a healthy fetus. Marquis’ argument is simple: killing is wrong; killing is wrong since killing ends one’s life, and ending one’s life means they won’t experience anything anymore, they won’t be happy anymore, they won’t be able to accomplish things, and this is one of the greatest losses that can be suffered; abortions of a healthy fetus cause the loss of experiences, activities, and enjoyment to the fetus; thus, the abortion of a healthy fetus is not only ethically wrong, but seriously wrong. Marquis’ (1989) argument is put succinctly by Leslie Burkholder in the book Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy(2011: 282-283):

P1. Killing this particular adult human being or child would be seriously wrong.

P2. What makes it so wrong is that it causes the loss of this individual’s future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments, and this loss is one of the greatest losses that can be suffered.

C1. Killing this adult human being or child would be seriously wrong, and what makes it so wrong is that it causes the loss of this individual’s future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments, and this loss is one of the greatest losses that can be suffered (conjunction, P1, P2).

P3. If killing this particular adult human being or child would be seriously wrong and what makes it so wrong is that it causes the loss of all this individual’s experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments, and this loss is one of the greatest losses that can be suffered, then anything that causes to any individual the loss of all future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments is seriously wrong.

C2. Anything that causes to any individual the loss of all future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments is seriously wrong (modus ponens, C1, P3).

P4. All aborting of any healthy fetus would cause the loss to that individual of all its future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments.

C3. If A causes to individual F the loss of all future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments, then A is seriously wrong (particular instantiation, C2).

C4. If A is an abortion of healthy fetus F, then A causes to individual F the loss of all future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments (particular instantiation, P4).

C5. If A is an abortion of a healthy fetus F, then A is seriously wrong (hypothetical syllogism, C3, C4).

C6. All aborting of any healthy fetus is seriously wrong (universal generalization, C5).

In this case, the argument is about abortion in regard to healthy fetuses. This argument, like the one for abortion, is also deductively valid. (Arguments for and against the abortion of unhealthy fetuses will be covered in the future.) Thus, if a fetus is healthy then it should not be aborted since doing so would cause the individual to lose their future experiences, enjoyments, activities, and projects. Thus, the abortion of a healthy fetus is seriously and morally wrong. This argument clearly establishes the fetuses’ right to life if it is healthy.

Conclusion

Both of these arguments for and against abortion are strong; on the “for” side, we have the apparent facts that fetuses, infants, and (nonhuman) animals cannot want their continuance of their mental states since they cannot conceive of their continuance and want of mental states, so if they cannot want their continuance of their mental states they do not have a morally serious right to life and it is, therefore, morally right to kill them painlessly. On the “against” side, we have the facts that aborting healthy fetuses will cause the loss of all future experiences, enjoyments, activities, and projects, and so, the abortion of these healthy fetuses is both seriously and morally wrong.

I will cover these types of arguments—and more—in the future. However, if one is against genetic modification, embryo selection, preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and ‘eugenics’, then one must, logically, be against the abortion of healthy fetuses as well. These two arguments, of course, have implications for any looming eugenic policies as well, which I will cover in the future.

(I, personally, lean toward the “against” side in this debate; though, of course, the argument presented in this article on the “for” side is strong as well.)

30 Comments

“However, the argument is deductively valid, and so one must show which premise is wrong and why….However, if one is against genetic modification, embryo selection, preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and ‘eugenics’, then one must, logically, be against the abortion of healthy fetuses as well. ”

Nah, if you’re not a moral objectivist it’s redundant to try and justify any form of ethics with a deductive argument. Not to say it cannot be justified or valid within the rules of it’s own domain, as those two examples could very well be completely true, but you cannot derive an ought from an is. So all of your deductions fall back on subjective desires, therefore it becomes a fruitless endeavor to make claims that any particular position must be associated with another. I could disagree with all examples(not just in this article) simply on the grounds of what I intuitively feel is right. And I’d be right, because the only generally objective part of morality, is it’s subjectivity

Susan believes having an abortion is right. Hannah believes having an abortion is wrong. Susan believes it’s “just tissue and cells”, so it is not a full-fledged life. Hannah believes that by aborting her baby, she is preventing its future hopes, desires etc.

Who is right, who is wrong?

The moral subjectivist cannot deliberate between the two viewpoints; the moral subjectivist cannot deliberate because, in the moral subjectivist’s eyes, both are right due to what both individuals believe about abortion.

“The moral subjectivist cannot deliberate between the two viewpoints; the moral subjectivist cannot deliberate because, in the moral subjectivist’s eyes, both are right due to what both individuals believe about abortion.”

..Right…..that’s the whole point.

It’s a meta-ethical issue. Your deductions could be completely true, but that doesn’t change the fact that they are based in how one feels and not any objective measure for what “is”.

I’d suggest looking in to the “is-ought problem”. Again, it’s a meta-ethical issue and is therefore beyond arguments that seek to logically validate actions, and more to do with how we approach ethics in general.

A lot of our arguments are starting to make sense now. I’m not really sure why you try to find objectivity that doesn’t actually exist.

If you ever do work for me, don’t expect payment because you cannot derive an “owe” from an “is.” Yes I contracted you; yes you performed the service. Yes I said I would pay you. You cannot derive an “owe” from an “is.”

Hume asserts without argument that no moral facts exist because he’s a rampant empiricist—I’ve dispatched that idea. Anscombe takes care of Hume’s is/ought.

P1. Torturing people for fun causes great suffering
P2. It is wrong to cause great suffering
C. Torturing people for fun is wrong
(From Wilson et al, 2003)

Factual statements can be combined with ethical statements to derive ethical conclusions. Ought cannot exclusively be described from is.

Mao, Hitler, Pol Pot, Edi Amin, et al, they all did what was ‘right’ in their society, does that mean they didn’t do wrong? Were Nazi WWII policies right or wrong? It’s relative to their society, right? Was mass killing right in WWII Germany? After all, moral relativism is true and you can’t say which is right or wrong, right?

You haven’t actually demonstrated this though. In fact, I’m not sure how you could arrive to this conclusion. Moral subjectivity is a conceptual criticism of it’s counterpart, and isn’t mutually exclusive to it. All of your prior statements could be true, as long as you can admit that they’re based off subjective interests….unless you believe in some ontological arguments. Uncertainty is something you must deal with if you live in this world. Denial in this regard is the mark of a weak mind. Godels incompleteness theorem accentuates this.

“Yes I said I would pay you. You cannot derive an “owe” from an “is.””

I see what you’re doing. Is this supposed to show some kind of absurdity with subjectivism? I don’t expect you to pay me because there is no magical system that dictates that it is the moral thing to do, even if there were, that still doesn’t guarantee you would pay me. What reason is there to follow the law? it’s an imaginary system made by large brained apes. You cannot logically, or empirically show that any moral system is objectively better than another. That’s not an issue with ethical subjectivism, that’s an issue with your unrealistic expectations of knowledge.

“Hume asserts without argument that no moral facts exist because he’s a rampant empiricist—I’ve dispatched that idea.”

Well first, being an empiricist is not why he stated moral facts do not exist. The issue is that there is a logical disconnect between what you should do and what is. Again, there is a difference between prescriptions and descriptions, it is meta-ethical. Second, which Idea? Empiricism? Or ethical subjectvisim? I don’t think you can claim to have dispatched either until you actually understand the points each concept is making.

Quote anscombe.

“P2. It is wrong to cause great suffering”

Says who?

“After all, moral relativism is true and you can’t say which is right or wrong, right?”

Exactly. The nazi’s weren’t objectively wrong. But I disagree with their beliefs and think they are morally wrong. I just accept that this proposition is subjective. Morality is not measurable, even with real world implications and effects.

Because the ethical subjectivist/relativist cannot mediate between the two positions since each is ‘right’—that is, agent-relative.

… no magical system

I’d say ‘a man’s word’ is a sort of ‘system’, wouldn’t you say?

Quote Anscombe</blockquote

I will now return to Hume. The features of Hume’s philosophy which I have mentioned, like many other features of it, would incline me to think that Hume was a mere—brilliant—sophist; and his procedures are certainly sophistical. But I am forced, not to reverse, but to add to, this judgment by a peculiarity of Hume’s philosophizing: namely that although he reaches his conclusions—with which he is in love—by sophistical methods, his considerations constantly open up very deep and important problems. It is often the case that in the act of exhibiting the sophistry one finds oneself noticing matters which deserve a lot of exploring: the obvious stands in need of investigations as a result of the points that Hume pretends to have made. In this, he is unlike, say, Butler. It was already well known that conscience could dictate vile actions; for Butler to have written disregarding this does not open up any new topics for us. But with Hume it is otherwise: hence he is a very profound and great philosopher, in spite of his sophistry. For example:

Suppose that I say to my grocer “Truth consists in either relations of ideas, as that 20s=£1, or matters of fact, as that I ordered potatoes, you supplied them, and you sent me a bill. So it doesn’t apply to such a proposition as that I owe you such-and-such a sum.”

Now if one makes this comparison, it comes to light that the relation of the facts mentioned to the description “X owes Y so much money” is an interesting one, which I will call that of being “brute relative to” that description. Further, the “brute” facts mentioned here themselves have descriptions relatively to which other facts are “brute”—as, e.g., he had potatoes carted to my house and they were left there are brute facts relative to “he supplied me with potatoes.” And the fact X owes Y money is in turn “brute” relative to other descriptions—e.g. “X is solvent.” Now the relation of “relative bruteness” is a complicated one. To mention a few points: if xyz is a set of facts brute relative to a description A, then xyz is a set out of a range some set among which holds if A holds; but the holding of some set among these does not necessarily entail A because exceptional circumstances can always make a difference; and what are exceptional circumstance relatively to A can generally only be explained by giving a few diverse examples, and no theoretically adequate provision can be made for exceptional circumstances, since a further special context can theoretically always be imagined that would reinterpret any special context. Further, though in normal circumstances, xyz would be a justification for A, of which institution A is of course not itself a description. (E.g. the statement that I give someone a shilling is not a description of the institution of money or of the currency of the country.) Thus, though it would be ludicrous to pretend that there can be no such thing as a transition from, e.g., “is” to “owes,” the character of the transition is in fact rather interesting and comes to light as a result of reflecting on Hume’s arguments.[1]

Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy (1958)

Says who?

The argument establishes that a moral conclusion can be drawn from normative/ethical premises.

Is it right to cause great suffering? What about the agent who is suffering, do they have a right to not suffer?

“Because the ethical subjectivist/relativist cannot mediate between the two positions since each is ‘right’”

No you can. They can make true or false claims on morality but not without adhering to an arbitrary system. The meta-ethical subjectivist only claims that any determination of an action’s morality is purely subjective. Not only is it relative to the agent ‘s desire but if ceteris paribus is to be invoked on these basal principles it could still not make up for it’s lack of “construct validity”. This problem is so meta to the point it is entrenched deep within the entirety of analytic philosophy. You recall the rule-following paradox?

“I’d say ‘a man’s word’ is a sort of ‘system’, wouldn’t you say?”

You can say you are moral within the laws of man, but those laws are prescriptive and therefore not universal or objective. The only thing “making” me follow laws are the laws themselves.

“Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy (1958)”

Correct me if I’m wrong, but she seems to have an argument akin to sam harris’. Essentially: that the relativity of ought statements is similar to is and since we can use ceteris paraibus to make scientific statements theres no reason we can’t do the same for morality.(extreme simplification I know)

But this of course does not handle the issue. As I said prior it goes farther than just mind dependent or individual relativity. This is where the Prescriptive vs descriptive distinction is so important. Science creates its rules by observing reality. It’s rules are descriptive. Rationalism and morality create their own rules, its prescriptive. Anscombe would agree with me that you can be obligated to keep a promise(relatively) but you are not obligated to be obligated to keep a promise.

“The argument establishes that a moral conclusion can be drawn from normative/ethical premises.”

Why are you dodging the question?

“Is it right to cause great suffering? What about the agent who is suffering, do they have a right to not suffer?”

I could say it is morally right to let people suffer, and you couldn’t objectively prove me wrong.

“So they were right?”

Im sure in their eyes they were, but I don’t think so. But that’s only according to my own set of arbitrary rules.

No you can. They can make true or false claims on morality but not without adhering to an arbitrary system.

So murder could be morally right in the West but, for example, not in the East?

within the laws of man

What do you think of Huemer’s ontological argument for moral realism?

this does not handle the issue

The argument in Wilson et al used by Sober shows that it’s possible to derive ought from is if the argument is structured properly.

Anscombe would agree with me

Anscombe holds that murder is forbidden to all people in all circumstances.

P1 One makes a promise to do something.
P2 If one makes a promise to do something, then they make a promise to relatively do something.
P3 If one makes a promise to do something, and they are obligated to keep their promise relatively, then they are obligated to be obligated to keep their promises in this instance.
C. Therefore people who make promises relatively are obligated to be obligated to keep their promises (transitivity of identity, P2, P3).

Why are you dodging the question?

I answered it.

and you couldn’t objectively prove me wrong

The argument presented previously proves it.

I’m sure in their eyes they were

There is no way to argue that Nazi policies were wrong objectively?

If one thinks serial killing is right and they become a serial killer, they’re right? They’re taking people’s lives, their rights and happiness away, but since morality is relative he’s right and we can’t objectively say he’s wrong?

“So murder could be morally right in the West but, for example, not in the East?”

Correct! but it goes deeper than that. Morality is still subjective even if societal circumstances are all equal, because of the disconnect between prescription and description

“Huemer’s ontological argument for moral realism”

Ah, I was having a discussion with Thinking mouse about the indeterminacy of thought, and we discussed how you could dodge uncertainty by appealing to probabilistic causation. It’s an interesting argument but like most moral realists, i don’t think it actually adresses the crux of the issue.

Even if we collapsed it into a probability function that would be far from proving it to be objectively true,which is all the Ethical subjectivist seeks to refute. In fact his premise on probability still rests upon the naturalistic fallacy. Unless he means it only gives us a reason not to torture babies instead of saying we should not torture babies. At that point you’re only giving advice as to what the next step could be, which is far from proving without a doubt a particular reason is morally objective.

“The argument in Wilson et al used by Sober shows that it’s possible to derive ought from is if the argument is structured properly.”

Quote me it.

“P3 If one makes a promise to do something, and they are obligated to keep their promise relatively, then they are obligated to be obligated to keep their promises in this instance.”

What makes someone obligated to be obligated to keep a promise?

“I answered it.”

No. I’m asking you who says it’s wrong to let people suffer?

“There is no way to argue that Nazi policies were wrong objectively?”

Nope.

“If one thinks serial killing is right and they become a serial killer, they’re right? They’re taking people’s lives, their rights and happiness away, but since morality is relative he’s right and we can’t objectively say he’s wrong?”

Yup, sucks doesn’t it?

I mean is this seriously that big of a deal to you? I don’t advocate murder, I just don’t pretend that disagreement is some universally objective principle that everyone else should follow. That’s so narcissistic.

If woman P got raped in countries Y and Z, and in country Y rape is right and country Z it is wrong, then it’s wrong in Z and right in Y? What about the woman’s right to not have something taken from her?

Huemer’s argument is sufficient: if moral realism might be true and we know what we should do on the basis of knowing that moral realism might be true, then we have an objective reason to do these things, so if moral realism might be true then it is true.

Quote me it.

P1. Torturing people for fun causes great suffering
P2. It is wrong to cause great suffering
C. Torturing people for fun is wrong

Sorry, I meant to respond sooner but I had family obligations and no access to a computer

“What about the woman’s right to not have something taken from her?”

Who says she has that right?

“Huemer’s argument is sufficient”

I don’t believe so. I get what he is saying, but I don’t think it actually adresses what we aim to when most discuss the relativism of morality.

For example:

Huemer states:2. If we knew torturing babies was objectively wrong, this would provide a reason to avoid torturing babies.
3. Even if we knew torturing babies was not objectively wrong, this would provide no reason to torture babies

As I currently see it, you could turn this argument around: A) 2. If we knew not torturing babies was objectively wrong, this would provide a reason to torture babies.
3. Even if we knew not torturing babies was not objectively wrong, this would provide no reason to not torture babies

As you can see, even though we’ve established moral objectivity or more specifically moral independence of mind(unless you consider all reason mind dependent), it is vacuous in actually describing which out of any moral system is objective. The PRP Is actually compatible with ethical subjectivism(which is not synonymous with anti-realism). So you could say this argument has proven moral realism, but it has not solved the is/ought problem. I don’t think we could ever form a real moral epistemology from this argument. As long as probability of all x’s being morally objective is nonzero there is technically an objective reason to believe any moral code.

My second form of criticism is too the assumption of moral realism, which is entirely intuitive. I could deny this and base my acceptance of moral subjectivism on the grounds of explanatory power. I have a legitimate reason to doubt nonzero probability for Moral realism. And I would be completely justified because the criticism is meta-ethical and would not contradict itself.

As a side note, isn’t our intuition based in subjectivity? Maybe I’m defining that wrong.

“P2. It is wrong to cause great suffering”

Why?

“I already said why.”

no, you stated: “P3 If one makes a promise to do something, and they are obligated to keep their promise relatively, then they are obligated to be obligated to keep their promises in this instance.”

The only reasoning you’ve offered so far, is that makings promises obligates me to keep it, but I don’t see how? Who says I have to keep my word?

“The argument is sound and gets out of the is/ought problem.

How? I’m denying P2, because you haven’t justified that great suffering is something to be avoided universally dependent from context.

“Is it right to let people suffer? If so, why?”

depends on the situation, what if they deserve it?

“State-sanctioned murder is right in some instances?”

Sure.

“Yes. Ethics matters, does it not?”

I don’t believe subscribing to ethical subjectivism is tantamount to saying ethics does not matter.

abortion at a very early stage, when it’s just a ball of goo, is morally neutral by itself.
it is EVIL NOT to have an abortion in the early stages when the baby is going to be a freak, or when the parents won’t be able to take of it.
the concern for over-population is now dead everywhere except black africa. so the baby can be given up for adoption. but that’s not exactly a solution.
ideally all children have good parents, and those parents are their biological parents. every other arrangement is inferior.

Roe received significant criticism in the legal community,[9] with the decision being widely seen as an extreme form of judicial activism.[10] In a highly cited 1973 article in the Yale Law Journal,[9][10] John Hart Ely criticized Roe as a decision that “is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.”[11] Ely added: “What is frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right is not inferable from the language of the Constitution, the framers’ thinking respecting the specific problem in issue, any general value derivable from the provisions they included, or the nation’s governmental structure.” Professor Laurence Tribe had similar thoughts: “One of the most curious things about Roe is that, behind its own verbal smokescreen, the substantive judgment on which it rests is nowhere to be found.”[12]

so the SJW idea that appointments to the federal appeals courts should be down with Roe is 100% dishonest or just stupid.