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A day after India
and China signed the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) on Wednesday,
the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) announced that it would enhance its
border infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Senior ITBP
officers, who didn’t want to go on record, asserted that the BDCA would be
beneficial to the force as it would reduce confrontation along the 4000-km-long
border.

These developments
were shared at the 52nd Raising Day of the ITBP that was held here at which
Minister of State (Home) RPN Singh was the chief guest.

The ITBP was
conceived on October 24, 1962. The force is deployed at the Sino-India border
to prevent border violations. It also provides security to sensitive
installations such as the Rashtrapati Bhawan and Parliament House in Delhi. And
it is also involved in counter-Maoist operations in Chhattisgarh.

To strengthen its
border infrastructure, the ITBP will spend Rs 1,260 crore. “We will give solar
power plants to 69 border outposts so that the men posted there have continuous
power supply. This is one of the biggest projects of the ITBP,” said the
minister.

The funds will
also be used to construct accommodation for jawans and operational and
administrative buildings. The acting Director General of the ITBP, Mahboob
Alam, said that the improvement in infrastructure was being carried out to
ensure that the jawans posted in the forward areas are ‘comfortable’.

“We will provide electricity
and proper medical facilities to our men. If they are comfortable, then their
stress levels will be low,” he said.

ITBP troops are manning border
outposts at altitudes ranging from 9,000 ft to 18,500 ft along the Sino-India
border. Most of these posts remain cut off from the mainland for six months in
a year due to snow. To add to it, most of the posts, especially the ones in
Leh, do not have electricity. “The whole town of Leh usually survives on
generators,” said sources.

The installation of water
pipelines at border posts is also part of the border infrastructure enhancement
plan.

The force will also set up
mobile phone towers along the border. “This will help in two ways. First, a
jawan will be able to talk to his family by using his own mobile phone rather
than waiting in a queue at a common phone. Secondly, we can also receive
real-time coverage of sensitive areas along the border,” said sources.

RPN Singh and Alam refused to
comment on the BDCA. ITBP officers, on condition of anonymity, described the
BDCA as an agreement which “will cool temperatures along the border”.

“There will be better
coordination between the two sides than before. We will hold joint military
exercises and have better communication through a hotline that may be set up
between the military headquarters of both the countries,” said the officers.

Sources admitted that tensions
between the security forces are a common feature along the border. In one such
example, Chinese Army personnel had allegedly forced the suspension of the
construction of an irrigation canal by the Leh administration in Demchok, which
is located south of Aksai Chin. The incident took place on August 25. The
construction of the canal resumed within a couple of hours after the Indian
Army and the ITBP assured the work force of security. “They went ahead with the
construction and the canal was completed,” said sources.

On Agenda

* Solar power plants at border
outposts

* Installation of water
pipelines

* Setting up of mobile phone
towers along the border

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2013/20131025/edit.htm#4

China-Pak nuclear deal

India main factor
in influencing Beijing’s policies

by Harsh V. Pant

When Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh was getting ready to leave for his trip to China, news
emerged of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. In what will be the first
foreign sale of its indigenous 1,100 MW nuclear reactor, ACP 1000, China is all
set to sell two more nuclear reactors to Pakistan in direct contravention of
its own global commitments as a member of the NPT and the NSG. India has been
reduced to protesting ever since the details of a potential Sino-Pak deal came
to light some months back. New Delhi, we are told, has made its reservations
known to Beijing through diplomatic channels. But should it really come as a
surprise that China is trying its best to maintain nuclear parity between India
and Pakistan?

After all, this is
what China has been doing for the last five decades. Based on their convergent
interests vis-à-vis India, China and Pakistan reached a strategic understanding
in the mid-1950s, a bond that has only strengthened ever since. Sino-Pakistan
ties gained particular momentum in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian war
when the two states signed a boundary agreement recognising Chinese control
over portions of the disputed Kashmir territory and since then the ties have
been so strong that Chinese President Hu Jintao has described the relationship
as “higher than mountains and deeper than oceans.”

Pakistan’s
President, Asif Ali Zardari, has suggested that “No relationship between two
sovereign states is as unique and durable as that between Pakistan and China.”
Maintaining close ties with China has been a priority for Islamabad and Beijing
has provided extensive economic, military and technical assistance to Pakistan
over the years. It was Pakistan that in early 1970s enabled China to cultivate
its ties with the West and the US in particular, becoming the conduit for Henry
Kissinger’s landmark secret visit to China in 1971 and has been instrumental in
bringing China closer to the larger Muslim world.

Over the years
China emerged Pakistan’s largest defence supplier. Military cooperation between
the two has deepened with joint projects producing armaments ranging from
fighter jets to guided missile frigates. China is a steady source of military
hardware to the resource-deficient Pakistani Army. It has not only given
technology assistance to Pakistan but has also helped Pakistan to set up mass
weapons production factories. Pakistan’s military modernisation process remains
dependent on Chinese largesse. In the last two decades, the two states have
been actively involved in a range of joint ventures, including JF-17 Thunder
fighter aircraft, K-8 Karakorum advance training aircraft, and Babur cruise
missile the dimensions of which exactly replicate the Hong Niao Chinese cruise
missile. The JF-17 venture is particularly significant, given its utility in
delivering nuclear weapons. In a major move for China’s indigenous defence
industry, China is also supplying its most advanced home-made combat aircraft,
the third-generation J-10 fighter jets to Pakistan, in a deal worth around $6
billion. Beijing is helping Pakistan build and launch satellites for remote
sensing and communication even as Pakistan is reportedly already hosting a
Chinese space communication facility at Karachi.

China has played a
major role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure and emerged
Pakistan’s benefactor at a time when increasingly stringent export controls in
Western countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire materials and
technology from elsewhere. The Pakistani nuclear weapons programme is
essentially an extension of the Chinese one. Despite being a member of the NPT,
China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and expertise and has
provided critical assistance in the construction of Pakistan’s nuclear
facilities. It has been aptly noted by non-proliferation expert Gary Milhollin,
“If you subtract China’s help from Pakistan’s nuclear programme, there is no
nuclear programme.”

Although China has
long denied helping any nation attain a nuclear capability, the father of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, Abdul Qadeer Khan, himself has
acknowledged the crucial role China has played in his nation’s nuclear
weaponisation by gifting 50 kg of weapon-grade enriched uranium, drawing of the
nuclear weapons and tonnes of uranium hexafluoride for Pakistan’s centrifuges.
This is perhaps the only case where a nuclear weapon state has actually passed
on weapons grade fissile material as well as a bomb design to a non-nuclear
weapon state.

India has been the
main factor that has influenced China’s and Pakistan’s policies vis-à-vis each
other. Whereas Pakistan wants to gain access to civilian and military resources
from China to balance the Indian might in the subcontinent, China, viewing
India as potential challenger in the strategic landscape of Asia, views
Pakistan as it central instrument to counter Indian power in the region. The
China-Pakistan partnership serves the interests of both by presenting India
with a potential two-front theatre in the event of war with either country. In
its own way each is using the other to balance India as India’s disputes with
Pakistan keep India preoccupied, failing to attain its potential as a major
regional and global player.

China, meanwhile,
guarantees the security of Pakistan when it comes to its conflicts with India,
thus preventing India from using its much superior conventional military
strength against Pakistan. Not surprisingly, one of the central pillars of
Pakistan’s strategic policies for the last more than four decades has been its
steady and ever-growing military relationship with China. And preventing
India’s dominance of South Asia by strengthening Pakistan has been a strategic
priority for China.

But with India’s
ascent in global hierarchy and American attempts to carve out a strong
partnership with India, China’s need for Pakistan is only likely to grow. A
rising India makes Pakistan all the more important for the Chinese strategy for
the subcontinent. It’s highly unlikely that China will give up playing the
Pakistan card vis-à-vis India anytime soon. Indian policymakers would be well
advised to disabuse themselves of the notion of a Sino-Indian ‘strategic
partnership.’ China doesn’t do sentimentality in foreign policy, India should
follow suit.

The writer teaches
at King’s College, London.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2013/20131025/edit.htm#6

India needs to deal firmly with Pak on Kashmir

Resolution of the
Jammu and Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan has defied most theories
and approaches of conflict resolution. India needs to safeguard its interests
and keep in mind that strength respects strength while the weak get pushed
around

Dinesh Kumar

Exactly 67 years
ago on 25th October 1947, an Army Airlift Committee headed by the Air Marshal
heading what was then known as the Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) was formed to
initially discuss ways and means of sending supplies and arms to Kashmir which
was under the invasion of tribesmen from Pakistan. Muzzaffarabad, Domel,
Chinari and Uri had fallen and the invaders or razakars, as they were known,
were closing in on Baramulla. That very morning the Defence Committee of the
Cabinet chaired by Lord Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas Mountbatten met to
discuss the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Hari Singh's request for
troops that had been received the previous night (24th October).

On 26th October
Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession and a decision was taken to
airlift troops to the Valley. That same day, the razakars went about brutally
massacring about 11,000 of the 14,000 residents of Baramulla and wantonly raping
and abducting women, including European nuns, while destroying the Mohra power
station which supplied electricity to Srinagar. It was in fact this savage orgy
of sordid killings, rape (the local theatre was converted into a rape centre),
loot, plunder, vandalism and desecration that slowed the movement of the
razakars or else they would surely have run over Srinagar and prevented the
landing of Indian Army soldiers at Srinagar airfield thereby possibly changing
the course of history.

Shortly before midnight
the same day, a signal was flashed to 1 Sikh battalion, the nearest located
Infantry unit to Delhi (stationed in Gurgaon), to reach Palam airport by 4 am
the following morning (27th October). The battalion was not up to full strength
and so in order to make up for the shortfall, Sikh personnel from 13 Field
Regiment, an artillery regiment then stationed at the Red Fort in Delhi, were
hastily organised into an Infantry company and temporarily placed under the 1
Sikh battalion.

An extraordinary
operation

Thus on 27th
October 1947, barely two months after Independence, 28 vintage Dakota aircraft
carrying 474 Army soldiers took off for Srinagar. Six of these Dakotas were
civilian and carried 15 soldiers each while the remaining 22 RIAF Dakotas
carried 22 soldiers each. So uncertain was the situation in the Valley that the
battalion's commanding officer, Lt Col Dewan Ranjit Rai, was instructed to
first circle Srinagar airfield and carefully scan the countryside to check
whether the raiders had already occupied it. If so, he was to fly back and land
in Jammu.

"Such a rider
to an operational intrusion", observes the official history of the 1947-48
war, "must surely be unique in modern military history, and was an
indication of the uncertainty, hazards and difficulties facing the Indian
troops when they went to Kashmir. Even the details and locations of friendly
troops in the state on that date were not known to the Indian Army
headquarters", states the history. Indeed, saving Srinagar and securing
its airfield was of paramount importance since Srinagar was located 480 km from
Pathankot, the northernmost Indian railhead at that time.

The first
aircraft, piloted by Group Capt. Karori Lal Bhatia (later awarded the Vir
Chakra), then commanding 12 Squadron, landed at Srinagar airfield at 8.20 am.
Since then, 27th October is observed as Infantry Day.

During the 14
month and five day war which followed, the Army lost 1,103 soldiers including
76 officers and 31 junior commissioned officers (JCOs). Another 3,152 soldiers
including 81 officers and 107 JCOs were wounded. The RIAF lost 31 men including
nine officers. That the war was full of heroic deeds and valour by the Army is
evident from the long list of gallantry awardees that include five Param Vir
Chakras (three posthumous), the highest wartime gallantry medal, 53 Maha Vir
Chakras (18 posthumous which included Lt Col Rai), and 313 Vir Chakras (57
posthumous).

However, instead
of regaining the entire state, the political leadership of that time chose to
pull its punches and stop. This was notwithstanding the death of Mahomedali
Jinnahbhai (better known as Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in September 1948), the
availability of more Army troops following the successful 'Police Action'
against the Nizam and his troops in Hyderabad (September 1948), and the Army's
successfully freeing Poonch of its year-long siege by the Pakstanis (December
1948). The latter was, however, made possible following a major diversion of
troops which resulted in the Army being unable to retake Muffafarabad, Domel
and the vital Haji Pir Pass that has subsequently proven to be a strategic
blunder in Jammu and Kashmir.

A complicated
problem

For decades now,
the J&K issue has become badly complicated, mired as it is in ideological
and territorial dispute. For, J&K is divided among three countries - India
(48 per cent), Pakistan (33 per cent) and China (19 per cent) and has five
types of borders — the International Boundary or IB (about 200 km) with
Pakkstani Punjab; the Line of Control or LoC (740 km) with Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir or POK; the Actual Ground Position Line or AGPL (110 km) ahead of the
Siachen glacier starting from a point known as NJ 9842 to Indra Col; the
Unnamed Boundary or UB (40 km) with Chinese occupied Shaksam Valley; and the
Line of Actual Control or LAC with Chinese occupied Aksai Chin region of
Ladakh. India has deployed three different forces along these five 'borders' —
the Border Security Force along the IB, the Indo Tibetan Border Police along
portions of the 'border' with China in Ladakh and the Army along the LoC, AGPL,
UB and the LAC This is the only region where the Indian Army simultaneously
faces armies of two different countries - Pakistan and China.

The J&K
problem both started of as and primarily remains an Indo-Pak issue. It is the
difference in approach that remains palpitating and will continue to come in
the way of a solution. For Pakistan, J&K is a Muslim majority state that
should logically form part of their country in keeping with their belief in the
Two-Nation theory and remains an unfinished agenda of partition. J&K
consistently figures at the centre of Pakistan's foreign policy and its
national psyche vis-à-vis India. In India, J&K is viewed as a geographical
region that Pakistan (and China) has illegally and forcibly occupied and
therefore must vacate. India rejects the notion that division should be on
religious lines considering that India has chosen to be a secular country
comprising a society that is the most diverse, complex and pluralistic in the
world in terms of its multi-regional, multi-ethnic, multi-religious,
multi-lingual and multi-class segments.

Behind the
complicated nature of the problem lies an unsuccessful history of what is seen
in India as biased and manipulative mediations by the West starting with
post-colonial Britain immediately after the sub continent's partition. This, in
fact, set the foundation of a festering problem that does not seem anywhere
near resolution.

No place for third
party mediation

India never saw
itself being rewarded by mediation except during the time of the Kargil War
when a stern President William Jefferson (Bill) Clinton persuaded Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif to vacate Pakistani Army incursions across the LoC in
Drass, Mushkoh Valley, Kargil and Batalik portions of Ladakh in July 1999.
Pakistan, on the other hand, always stood to gain territorially, except during
the Kargil War.

Malignancies are
best cured if detected and treated early. Alternatively, as conflict resolution
theorists would argue, a ‘ripening’ of the problem leading to a mutually
hurting stalemate (plateau) or a crisis bound by a deadline or precipice may
offer the best way out. But evidently the opportunity of an early resolution
was lost owing to the circumstances in which partition took place and the
subsequent role played by Britain and the United Nations. And yet, despite a
long and intense history of conflict, hostility and discord comprising four
wars (1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999), at least three major stand offs, numerous
skirmishes along the LoC, AGPL and the IB, sponsorship of insurgency and
terrorism, an unending loss of human lives and unpleasant exchanges at the
diplomatic, political and public level, the situation has not reached a
'mutually' hurting stalemate either. At the best of times, the J&K stretch
of the borders with POK has been marked by no war no peace or, at best,
negative peace.

The problem has
similarly defied other models and approaches such as 'ripe moment',
'precipice', offensive goals' and 'defensive goals' that form part of third
party mediation. At best, international mediation and bilateralism has helped
in preventing or ending wars, but not in resolving the dispute. Some thinkers
in India would argue that this is because the 'hurt' has mostly been one sided
with India being at the receiving end of Pakistan's policy of inflicting death
by a thousand cuts to which India's response has been that of applying a
thousand bandages.

Nawaz Sharif, like
his predecessors, will continue to talk about talks and engage in a charm
offensive with Indian journalists and other opinion makers. Yet the Pakistani
establishment is not expected to desist from both raising the Kashmir issue and
seeking international mediation at every international forum that it finds
convenient, even if it is for the sake of simply embarrassing India. Neither is
the Pakistani Army or the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, which would
lose its raison d'etre in case a resolution on Jammu and Kashmir is reached,
desist from playing hawk against India. The rising jihadism in Pakistan has
added to Islamabad's domestic 'compulsions' thereby impeding any serious
detente let alone early resolution to the problem.

Need for new
thinking and resolve

India needs to
seriously rethink its 'thousand bandage' policy vis-a-vis Pakistan. The only
time India succeeded in negotiating a bilateral treaty on its terms (although
many argue that the opportunity was not optimised) was the Simla Agreement
signed in 1972. That was possible because India had defeated Pakistan in
December 1971 and dismembered the country. The taking of 93,000 prisoners at
that time was the largest in post-World War-II history and remained so until
the 'mother of all surrenders' by Saddam Hussain's Army to US forces in Iraq
and then Iraqi occupied Kuwait in 1991. This bilaterally negotiated treaty
continues to be cited by India as the basis on which all future discussions on
J&K are to be held.

While diplomacy
must continue, policy makers on Raisina Hill must always keep in mind the maxim
'strength respects respect and the weak only get pushed around'. Does India's
political executive have the will and resolve at the national level? Are both
the military and the intelligence agencies sufficiently equipped? Is India's
soft power being optimised? Thousands of lives and an expenditure of lakhs of
crores of rupees over 67 years (and still counting) later, is there not a need
for the Indian leadership to come up with new thinking and approach to handling
Pakistan on the J&K problem which does not seem likely to be resolved for a
long time ahead?

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2013/20131025/main2.htm

Payoff remarks:
J&K House gives VK Singh 20 days to file reply

Ehsan Fazili/TNS

Srinagar, October
24

Jammu and Kashmir
Assembly Speaker Mubarak Gul has issued a notice to former Army Chief Gen VK
Singh (retd), asking him to explain in 20 days “his position regarding certain
revelations” made by him during an interview about the payments made to
ministers in the state.

More than two
weeks after the Assembly was adjourned, a spokesperson of the Legislative
Assembly said the Assembly Secretariat, under the orders of the Speaker, had
issued a notice to General VK Singh (retd).

The former Army
Chief, after a report in the print media on the use of secret funds, had, in an
interview to a Delhi-based channel on September 23, made certain revelations
about payments being made to ministers of Jammu and Kashmir since 1947.

The notice has
been issued in response to a Breach of Privilege notice given by 15 ministers
and members during the recent brief session of the state legislature.

The spokesperson
said General VK Singh had been given 20 days to explain his position on the
issue so that further course of action could be decided under the Rules of
Procedure and Conduct of Business in the J&K Legislative Assembly.

The revelations
made by Gen VK Singh rocked both Houses of the state legislature on the very
first day of the brief session on September 30. NC ministers and members of the
Assembly moved a privilege motion in the House against the former Army Chief.
His remarks dominated the brief session of the state legislature, with
different political parties, including the Congress, the National Conference,
the PDP and the BJP, speaking on similar lines. Two days before the conclusion
of the session, the Assembly adopted a resolution demanding a time-bound
inquiry into the revelations made by the former Army Chief.

“ sometimes people lose their right to remain
silent when pressured to remain silent ”

(Christopher J.
Gilbert)

It was on 26th of
Oct 1947 the jubilantShri V P Menon, a
civil servant and the SardarPatel’s
envoy returned to Delhi with Kashmir Accession in his pocket, the document,
that decided the fate of the then four million people of Kashmir. To click the
deal in favour of India, circumstances were created for Maharaja and tribal
raid was engineered. Interestingly Army Chief of both the countries of Pakistan
and India were British officers, close confidantes of Lord Mountbatten. There
seems to have been some understanding between two chiefs. As mentioned by Devi
Dass in his book“Kashmir in search of
future”,the Indian army Chief knew
three days in advance about tribal raid. A clandestine plot was hatched in the
Frontier Province of Pakistan by one Khurshid Anwar a retired Major of Indian
Army with the consent of Chief Minister NWFO, Khan Abdul Qayoom Khan. On 20th
October the tribal war Lords of Frontier Province began to march for Kashmir.
The Governor of NWFP was ignorant and on receiving the information he
Immediately informed Liaqat Ali Khan who was taken by a surprise and is said to
have stated that Pakistan had no intention to indulge into such an adventure.

On 22nd October,
tribal forces comprising 2000 troops entered into Kashmir. Maharaja Hari Singh
ordered his Army Chief R.S. Jamwal to fight back the raiders to the last men
and last bullet.Dogra army could not
resist them. On 26th October they captured Baramulla. Maharaja had already sent
his Prime Minister Mehar Chand Mahajan to Delhi with a request to Government of
India for military help. On 25th October,1947 a meeting of Defence Committee
was held under chairmanship of Lord Mountbatten. There was a hot debate on the
question of request of Maharaja Hari Singh. Lord Mountbatten held that sending
troops to a neutral State would be a great folly in the eyes of international
community. Mehar Chand told Nehru that “ he had orders to go to Pakistan in
case the immediate aid was not given ”.On this Nehru lost his temper and
shouted at him, “to get out”.As
mentioned by Tarif Naaz in his book “Sheikh Abdullah, A victim of betrayal”,Sheikh Abdullah was also present and was
listening all the debate from the adjacent room. He sent a note to Nehru and
requested him to agree to the request of Maharaja for sending military troops
to Kashmir, so that raiders could be pushed back. Nehru cooled down and a
decision was taken to send three men to Srinagar, V P Menon, Col. Manikshaw and
an Air force officer to assess the ground situation and also to know whether
Hari Singh is interested in acceding to India. Menon reported to Nehru from
Srinagar that Maharaja is nervous because of tribal war and he was eager to
escape from Srinagar.

Nehru captured the
moment and asked V P Menon to urge Maharaja to sign the accession, a document
which was already prepared by him in consultation with Sheikh Abdullah. Menon
succeeded in his mission and got the document of accession signed by Maharaja
on 26th October, 1947. Same day V P Menon returned Delhi with a letter of
Maharaja and instrument of accession addressed to Lord Mountbatten. Lord
Mountbatten wrote a letter back to Maharaja Hari Singh stating that the
question of State’s accession is provisional and shall be finally settled by
reference to the people. As promised to Sheikh Abdullah, Nehru had got the
instrument of accession drafted with care so as to respect his dream of
autonomy for his State. This is how Jammu & Kashmir is now being claimed to
be the integral part of India.