Navigate:

Opinion Contributor

Championing the freedom to export

A noisy argument has broken out in Washington over whether to permit the export of liquefied natural gas beyond today’s modest levels. New production methods have greatly increased North American natural gas production, and this boom is projected to continue for several decades. Surging supplies have depressed domestic prices, and much higher prices abroad have made the notion of exporting LNG attractive.

Proponents say LNG exports will foster U.S. job creation, new tax revenue and stronger international alliances. Opponents counter that limiting LNG exports would keep domestic prices of natural gas low — benefiting U.S. manufacturers and spurring even more growth at home.

Text Size

-

+

reset

At issue is the freedom to export. In fact, both history and trade law take a dim view of export restraints. Indeed, the notion that the federal government has the power to limit the freedom to export is at odds with U.S. tradition and law.

British control over American colonial exports of basic commodities and the imposition of stiff export taxes were high on the list of grievances that sparked the Revolutionary War. In the Declaration of Independence, the Republic’s founders blasted King George III for “cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world: For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent.” Taxes on imports as well as exports were among the most controversial of these levies.

The founders’ fierce support for the freedom to export led directly to the Constitution’s so-called Export Clause, which provides that “[n]o Tax or duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.” This rejection of limits on the freedom to export is in our national DNA.

More recent history shows that when the U.S. has veered from this tradition and established export restraints, havoc has followed. One unfortunate example is the U.S. soybean embargo of 1973. Responding to a soybean shortage, the U.S. secretary of commerce on June 27 of that year imposed an export embargo on soybeans and related products.

While the embargo was abandoned less than a week later, the damage had been done — particularly in Japan, which relied on the U.S. for 88 percent of its soybean imports. Vowing to mitigate its exposure to an unreliable provider, Japan sought new ones.