Nearly two years since Malian armed groups were brought to the negotiating table in Algiers to sign a contentious peace agreement with the government in Bamako, there appears to be little peace to be found. The 2012 Tuareg rebellion—the country’s fourth since independence—shook Mali and brought down the government of President Amadou Toumani Touré. It also led to the takeover of nearly two-thirds of the country’s landmass by non-state armed groups and an eventual jihadist occupation, both in Mali’s arid north. A French military intervention in January 2013 stopped the rapid expansion of these jihadist forces into southern parts of Mali and also allowed the gradual reconquest of the territory by Mali’s armed forces. However, the process remains incomplete, and both the government of Mali and its French partner have struggled to establish a viable local order. Even as the French Operation Serval transitioned to the much more geographically expansive Operation Barkhane and then the U.N. Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) over time deployed 12,500 peacekeepers into the country,1 peace and security have been elusive. In January 2017, a massive suicide car bomb ripped through a gathering of former combatants who registered with the government body responsible for coordinating joint patrols of armed nonstate groups and Malian forces, which was meant to be an essential confidence-building measure between the different armed groups and the government. The attack, claimed by a wing of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), killed at least 61 combatants and Malian soldiers, though reported tolls were much higher.2 At least 150 people have been killed in attacks in 2017 alone, many in attacks claimed by a fusion of jihadist groups active in Mali whose creation was announced in March 2017, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen, or the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM).3

The current difficulties in establishing effective and sustainable local order under the government’s control echo previous struggles in Mali to establish effective and inclusive governance. Various Malian governments have responded to rebellion and non-state violence through a mixture of repression, decentralization, reintegration of combatants, and cooptation of local elites who had their own interests and wars to fight, licit and illicit businesses to expand and defend, and political and economic scores to settle.

In response to the 2012 rebellion, the government of Mali has revived these same old policies while governance failures and corruption persist and abound. Not only has the government shown itself to be ineffective before, the situation in Mali has changed significantly since even the signing of the 2015 accords, raising further questions about the government’s ability to uphold its end of the bargain.

There is also a real danger that armed groups will once again appropriate governance in the north, whittling away at the influence of the state in an insidious manner. Such local governance by local armed groups may not always be bad for local populations in northern Mali. Some may even welcome such a development. But such a policy continues to undermine the state. Moreover, any semblance of peace between armed groups rests on a series of tenuous agreements kept in place for the moment by access to trafficking revenue and the prospect of funds from the government and international community.4

This report traces the evolution of local orders in Mali. It briefly discusses past governance practices and the outcomes of prior rebellions in the 1960s, 1990s, and 2000s. It then turns to the period following the 2012 peace accords and presents analysis on the current prospects for these agreements, as well as other stabilization and state-building measures. This report also analyzes the ways in which governance shortcomings continue to undermine security in the country. Indeed, existing government and international efforts to make short-term peace in Mali are at odds with long-term stabilization goals. Counterproductively, they reinforce social and ethnic tensions and strengthen non-state armed groups while hampering efforts to establish capable and legitimate state institutions in northern Mali. Regional and international actors should not allow the state to repeat past mistakes in the hope of a creating a different outcome.

Several specific policy implications follow from this analysis and basic argument:

Any and all local political solutions to Mali’s conflict must include the central state and be buttressed with support from the Malian government.

The government of Mali should stop using ethnic or tribal militias to maintain security in northern Mali, as this approach has consistently backfired and only further fueled communal violence and feelings of being ignored by the state. At the same time, international agreements like the Algiers Accords must be implemented fully, including efforts at decentralization accompanied by government support and real autonomy, to allow genuine power-sharing in the north, rather than parceling out pieces of territory to armed groups.

Finally, while local agreements can form the basis of more durable cessations of violence, these agreements must take place in consultation with diverse local populations. The Malian government and its international partners must be sensitive to the desires and concerns of these communities, rather than accommodating just the requests (or demands) of armed groups due to a mistaken assumption that these groups fully represent the interests of communities in the areas in which they operate.

]]>
By Andrew Lebovich
Nearly two years since Malian armed groups were brought to the negotiating table in Algiers to sign a contentious peace agreement with the government in Bamako, there appears to be little peace to be found. The 2012 Tuareg rebellion—the country’s fourth since independence—shook Mali and brought down the government of President Amadou Toumani Touré. It also led to the takeover of nearly two-thirds of the country’s landmass by non-state armed groups and an eventual jihadist occupation, both in Mali’s arid north. A French military intervention in January 2013 stopped the rapid expansion of these jihadist forces into southern parts of Mali and also allowed the gradual reconquest of the territory by Mali’s armed forces. However, the process remains incomplete, and both the government of Mali and its French partner have struggled to establish a viable local order. Even as the French Operation Serval transitioned to the much more geographically expansive Operation Barkhane and then the U.N. Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) over time deployed 12,500 peacekeepers into the country,1 peace and security have been elusive. In January 2017, a massive suicide car bomb ripped through a gathering of former combatants who registered with the government body responsible for coordinating joint patrols of armed nonstate groups and Malian forces, which was meant to be an essential confidence-building measure between the different armed groups and the government. The attack, claimed by a wing of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), killed at least 61 combatants and Malian soldiers, though reported tolls were much higher.2 At least 150 people have been killed in attacks in 2017 alone, many in attacks claimed by a fusion of jihadist groups active in Mali whose creation was announced in March 2017, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen, or the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM).3
The current difficulties in establishing effective and sustainable local order under the government’s control echo previous struggles in Mali to establish effective and inclusive governance. Various Malian governments have responded to rebellion and non-state violence through a mixture of repression, decentralization, reintegration of combatants, and cooptation of local elites who had their own interests and wars to fight, licit and illicit businesses to expand and defend, and political and economic scores to settle.
In response to the 2012 rebellion, the government of Mali has revived these same old policies while governance failures and corruption persist and abound. Not only has the government shown itself to be ineffective before, the situation in Mali has changed significantly since even the signing of the 2015 accords, raising further questions about the government’s ability to uphold its end of the bargain.
There is also a real danger that armed groups will once again appropriate governance in the north, whittling away at the influence of the state in an insidious manner. Such local governance by local armed groups may not always be bad for local populations in northern Mali. Some may even welcome such a development. But such a policy continues to undermine the state. Moreover, any semblance of peace between armed groups rests on a series of tenuous agreements kept in place for the moment by access to trafficking revenue and the prospect of funds from the government and international community.4
This report traces the evolution of local orders in Mali. It briefly discusses past governance practices and the outcomes of prior rebellions in the 1960s, 1990s, and 2000s. It then turns to the period following the 2012 peace accords and presents analysis on the current prospects for these agreements, as well as other stabilization and state-building measures. This report also analyzes the ways in which governance ... By Andrew Lebovich
Nearly two years since Malian armed groups were brought to the negotiating table in Algiers to sign a contentious peace agreement with the government in Bamako, there appears to be little peace to be found.https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/08/03/watch-experts-discuss-the-mounting-crisis-in-venezuela/Watch: Experts discuss the mounting crisis in Venezuelahttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/420800140/0/brookingsrss/topics/peacekeepingandconflictmanagement~Watch-Experts-discuss-the-mounting-crisis-in-Venezuela/
Thu, 03 Aug 2017 13:03:17 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=434008

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By Dany Bahar, Samantha Gross, Ted Piccone

As Venezuela’s crisis continues to worsen, the United States joined a growing list of other governments in rejecting the July 30 election of delegates to rewrite the country’s constitution. The White House labeled President Nicholas Maduro “a dictator” and announced new sanctions against him, freezing all of his assets under U.S. jurisdiction, and prohibiting U.S. persons from dealing with him. While Maduro and the country’s authorities claim that over 8 million Venezuelans voted, credible observers believe voter turnout to be much lower. The country’s opposition coalition, which controls the National Assembly, boycotted the ballot in favor of its own public consultation against the constituent assembly where more than 7 million Venezuelans voted. Meanwhile, two top opposition leaders, Leopoldo López and Antonio Ledezma, were transferred from house arrest to a notorious military prison two days after the vote. If Maduro maintains his defiant stance and goes ahead with shutting down the National Assembly and rewriting the constitution (which is likely), additional international sanctions would probably result. Harder-hitting sanctions—particularly against the state-controlled oil industry—would have a significant damaging effect on the Venezuelan economy and potentially force it to default.

Watch as we discuss the current situation, what the new Constituent Assembly might do, how the international community can help, and what future sanctions might mean for Venezuela and beyond.

]]>
By Dany Bahar, Samantha Gross, Ted Piccone
As Venezuela’s crisis continues to worsen, the United States joined a growing list of other governments in rejecting the July 30 election of delegates to rewrite the country’s constitution. The White House labeled President Nicholas Maduro “a dictator” and announced new sanctions against him, freezing all of his assets under U.S. jurisdiction, and prohibiting U.S. persons from dealing with him. While Maduro and the country's authorities claim that over 8 million Venezuelans voted, credible observers believe voter turnout to be much lower. The country’s opposition coalition, which controls the National Assembly, boycotted the ballot in favor of its own public consultation against the constituent assembly where more than 7 million Venezuelans voted. Meanwhile, two top opposition leaders, Leopoldo López and Antonio Ledezma, were transferred from house arrest to a notorious military prison two days after the vote. If Maduro maintains his defiant stance and goes ahead with shutting down the National Assembly and rewriting the constitution (which is likely), additional international sanctions would probably result. Harder-hitting sanctions—particularly against the state-controlled oil industry—would have a significant damaging effect on the Venezuelan economy and potentially force it to default.
Watch as we discuss the current situation, what the new Constituent Assembly might do, how the international community can help, and what future sanctions might mean for Venezuela and beyond.
By Dany Bahar, Samantha Gross, Ted Piccone
As Venezuela’s crisis continues to worsen, the United States joined a growing list of other governments in rejecting the July 30 election of delegates to rewrite the country’https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/iran-outflanking-saudi-arabia-in-yemen/Iran outflanking Saudi Arabia in Yemenhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/425954076/0/brookingsrss/topics/peacekeepingandconflictmanagement~Iran-outflanking-Saudi-Arabia-in-Yemen/
Tue, 01 Aug 2017 19:51:27 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=opinion&p=434639

Now that Mosul is back under coalition control, policymakers from D.C. to Baghdad must focus anew on building a lasting and durable peace in Iraq.

Fortunately, in the decade since the issue of post-conflict stability last took center stage, researchers have learned a great deal about why and how peace endures. As with any literature, the debates are not fully settled. But we nonetheless have a much clearer understanding of why some civil wars yield to lasting peace, while others beget further violence.

So what are the keys to a stable, post-conflict Iraq? Three findings in particular stand out.

Win Big

As studyafterstudyhasshown, whether civil war recurs depends in part on how the war initially ends. Did the fighting stop after a clear victory for one side? Or did the guns instead fall silent because a peace deal was signed after a partial victory or stalemate?

Ironically, the surer path to peace is not actually a peace deal. It’s victory. As Anke Hoeffler and her colleague Richard Caplan have most recently shown, peace deals are far more likely to yield to further fighting down the road than military victories. In ceasefires and negotiated settlements both parties live to fight another day, but in a military victory only one does. As a result, of the 205 post-conflict cases that Collier and Caplan looked at, fighting typically resumed within 10 years in fewer than 25 percent of the cases ended by military victories, but in roughly 50 percent of those ended in peace deals.

For Iraq, the clear takeaway is thus to pursue a full military victory. For the country to enjoy a stable, long-term peace, the Iraqi coalition cannot just regain all Islamic State territory: its forces must destroy the Islamic State as an insurgent group too.

Yet if history is any guide, that task will be easier said than done. The graph below shows battle deaths from 2004 to 2013 between the Iraqi government and the Islamic State and its predecessor, al-Qaida in Iraq:

Note that even in 2012, when the conflict was at its ebb, the Islamic State’s insurgency still claimed the lives of 500 militants and soldiers.

For stable peace to take root, the Iraqi coalition will thus have its hands full. It cannot merely push the Islamic State out of its remaining territory—it will also have to prevent the Islamic State from reverting to its pre-war insurgency too.

Beware spoilers

Peace is difficult enough to sustain when there are only two parties. Add in more rebel groups, however, and it gets even harder.

Think of it as the conflict version of having too many cooks in the kitchen. The more rebels there are, the more difficult it is to get them all to agree on what the recipe for peace should be. Even worse, the more rebels there are, the more likely at least one will have incentive to play the spoiler—typically by targeting civilians as a way of eroding popular support for political compromise.

Two of the best new studies on post-conflict stabilization, by Sean Ziegler and by Peter Rudloff and Michael Findley, show that the effects of rebel competition are especially pernicious. When rebel groups split and compete with one another, they don’t just make it harder to end civil wars—they make it harder to keep the peace for years after the war finally ends. In one model, in fact, peace was over 50 percent more likely to break over 10 years when there had been multiple rebel groups than when there had only been one.

For Iraq, the implication is straightforward: The coalition should do all it can to avoid either splintering the Islamic State or giving rise to competing Sunni insurgents. Rather than trying to weaken the Islamic State by fracturing it—which Kathleen Cunningham has shown is a common tactic—the coalition should instead seek to keep the Islamic State unified.

Fortunately, this may actually prove feasible. Based on data from the Global Terrorism Dataset, Figure 2 below shows the number of distinct Sunni organizations in Iraq that carried out a significant attack in Iraq (i.e., one with 5 or more fatalities) in a given year:

As the figure illustrates, the Islamic State and its predecessor group, al-Qaida in Iraq, have proven remarkably adept at either coopting or driving out Sunni rivals. They did this first following the Iraqi insurgency of the mid-2000s, and then again soon after declaring a caliphate.

Although the resilience of the Islamic State will make full victory difficult, the fact that it has edged out its rivals is a boon. The Iraq coalition should now ensure that as they defeat the Islamic State, those prior networks don’t splinter off or re-emerge.

Be Inclusive

Not all peace deals are alike. Some are much more prone to fall apart than others. As Charles Call—a professor at American University and a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings—explains in his recent book, the peace deals that survive tend to share one thing in common: They’re inclusive. By contrast, peace settlements that exclude or marginalize opposition groups tend to break down.

Call’s work echoes other prior findings. In an early work on the issue, for instance, Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie looked at 38 civil wars that ended with peace agreements, and found that those with power-sharing institutions were much more likely to last. The more a rebel movement is incorporated into the political process, it turns out, the less incentive it will have to take up arms down the road.

Arguably the most compelling recent work on post-conflict stabilization builds on that logic. In “Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War,” Barbara Walter looked at the effect of state institutions during civil wars on post-war violence. Does better, more inclusive governance lead to more lasting post-conflict peace? What Walter found was that while democracy itself is not associated with lower risk of recurring violence, aspects of it are. More specifically, countries with a commitment to rule of law and high political participation are significantly less likely to see armed conflict return. As Walter discovered, it’s not elections per se that appear to matter, but instead popular trust that the political process is in fact open.

For Iraq, the research has important implications. The government of Prime Minister Al-Abadi must seek out greater Sunni representation. Fortunately, Abadi has already made efforts to reverse the sectarian excesses of his predecessor, Nouri Al-Maliki, who unwisely consolidated power among Shiite elites. Yet as the Islamic State retreats and the Iraqi army extends further into Sunni strongholds, Abadi will have to do more than simply outperform Al-Maliki: He will have to find a way to bring as many Sunnis as possible back into the political process.

None of these tasks will be easy. Yet if Abadi and other Iraqi leaders want a stable future, the path forward is clear: Dismantle the Islamic State’s capacity and reach, and bring Iraqi Sunnis back into the fold before new spoilers emerge.

]]>
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/mosul_rubble001.jpg?w=270By Christopher Meserole
Now that Mosul is back under coalition control, policymakers from D.C. to Baghdad must focus anew on building a lasting and durable peace in Iraq.
Fortunately, in the decade since the issue of post-conflict stability last took center stage, researchers have learned a great deal about why and how peace endures. As with any literature, the debates are not fully settled. But we nonetheless have a much clearer understanding of why some civil wars yield to lasting peace, while others beget further violence.
So what are the keys to a stable, post-conflict Iraq? Three findings in particular stand out.
Win Big
As study after study has shown, whether civil war recurs depends in part on how the war initially ends. Did the fighting stop after a clear victory for one side? Or did the guns instead fall silent because a peace deal was signed after a partial victory or stalemate?
Ironically, the surer path to peace is not actually a peace deal. It’s victory. As Anke Hoeffler and her colleague Richard Caplan have most recently shown, peace deals are far more likely to yield to further fighting down the road than military victories. In ceasefires and negotiated settlements both parties live to fight another day, but in a military victory only one does. As a result, of the 205 post-conflict cases that Collier and Caplan looked at, fighting typically resumed within 10 years in fewer than 25 percent of the cases ended by military victories, but in roughly 50 percent of those ended in peace deals.
For Iraq, the clear takeaway is thus to pursue a full military victory. For the country to enjoy a stable, long-term peace, the Iraqi coalition cannot just regain all Islamic State territory: its forces must destroy the Islamic State as an insurgent group too.
Yet if history is any guide, that task will be easier said than done. The graph below shows battle deaths from 2004 to 2013 between the Iraqi government and the Islamic State and its predecessor, al-Qaida in Iraq:
Note that even in 2012, when the conflict was at its ebb, the Islamic State’s insurgency still claimed the lives of 500 militants and soldiers.
For stable peace to take root, the Iraqi coalition will thus have its hands full. It cannot merely push the Islamic State out of its remaining territory—it will also have to prevent the Islamic State from reverting to its pre-war insurgency too.
Beware spoilers
Peace is difficult enough to sustain when there are only two parties. Add in more rebel groups, however, and it gets even harder.
Think of it as the conflict version of having too many cooks in the kitchen. The more rebels there are, the more difficult it is to get them all to agree on what the recipe for peace should be. Even worse, the more rebels there are, the more likely at least one will have incentive to play the spoiler—typically by targeting civilians as a way of eroding popular support for political compromise.
Two of the best new studies on post-conflict stabilization, by Sean Ziegler and by Peter Rudloff and Michael Findley, show that the effects of rebel competition are especially pernicious. When rebel groups split and compete with one another, they don’t just make it harder to end civil wars—they make it harder to keep the peace for years after the war finally ends. In one model, in fact, peace was over 50 percent more likely to break over 10 years when there had been multiple rebel groups than when there had only been one.
For Iraq, the implication is straightforward: The coalition should do all it can to avoid either splintering the Islamic State or giving rise to competing Sunni insurgents. Rather than trying to weaken the Islamic State by fracturing it—which Kathleen Cunningham has shown is a common tactic—the coalition should instead seek to keep the Islamic State unified.
Fortunately, this may actually prove feasible. Based on data from the Global ... By Christopher Meserole
Now that Mosul is back under coalition control, policymakers from D.C. to Baghdad must focus anew on building a lasting and durable peace in Iraq.
Fortunately, in the decade since the issue of post-conflict stability last ... https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/saudi-king-shows-no-signs-of-slowing-aggressive-foreign-policy/Saudi king shows no signs of slowing aggressive foreign policyhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/425981066/0/brookingsrss/topics/peacekeepingandconflictmanagement~Saudi-king-shows-no-signs-of-slowing-aggressive-foreign-policy/
Sun, 09 Jul 2017 20:20:39 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=opinion&p=434665

The sacking of Saudi Crown Prince and Minister of the Interior Mohammed bin Nayef removes a central figure from the Kingdom’s war on terror. MBN, as he is known, has exceptional expertise and institutional memory as the leading counter-terrorist in the region. He is also America’s best friend in the family.

King Salman removed the 57-year-old Bin Nayef and replaced him as heir to the throne with his favorite son, 31-year-old Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman. The move has been anticipated for two years. Last year the expectations became so intense that MBN spent six weeks in Algiers waiting for the axe. The successful Riyadh summit with President Donald Trump and 50 Muslim leaders may have emboldened the 81-year-old king to move. MBN already has pledged his loyalty to his younger cousin. So have the senior princes.

Mohammed bin Nayef was groomed by his father to be Minister of the Interior. He was trained by the FBI and Scotland Yard. He has survived numerous assassination attempts by al Qaeda, although at some cost to his health. No other Saudi royal has his credentials, experience and work ethic in this demanding role. He commanded the loyalty of the family and the powerful religious establishment because he had defeated Osama bin Laden’s attempt to overthrow the royal regime a decade ago.

The Ministry of the Interior is the most powerful institution in the government with an estimated million employees. It is the heart of the Saudi “deep state.” It stifles all dissent as well as the terrorist threat from al Qaeda, the so-called Islamic State and Iranian subversion. It ensures the loyalty of the nation. Along with sacking MBN the king announced other personnel changes in the Ministry and the General Intelligence Directorate.

Mohammed bin Nayef is a close friend of the American security services. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Michael Pompeo awarded the prince the agency’s George Tenet medal in February for his years of working with the United States. His service foiled numerous plots in Europe and the United States, including a plot to blow up a commercial aircraft over Chicago. No successor will have his mastery of the international community of intelligence services.

MBN eschewed the media by and large, keeping his profile low. He is risk averse from a political and public relations point of view. Mohammed bin Salman is the opposite. He craves publicity. He is also reckless. The two-and-a-half-year-old war in Yemen is his signature policy initiative. The Saudis are bogged down in a quagmire with enormous consequences for the people of Yemen, where the war has brought malnutrition and mass starvation. Cholera has broken out. A child dies every 10 minutes as a consequence of the war. Seven million people are at acute risk. The United Nations has called the crisis the worst humanitarian disaster in the world.

MBS, now heir apparent, is also a central figure in the Saudi campaign to isolate its small neighbor Qatar. That campaign has splintered the Islamic alliance the king pulled together at the summit with Trump. It may also prove to be the demise of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a key ally for the United States in the region since the 1980s.

No candidate has been named yet for the job of Deputy Crown Prince to replace Mohammed bin Salman. Presumably the next in line will be younger than MBS. Age matters to the royal family. The King has been very vigorous this year with the Riyadh summit and a month long trip to Asia, but his health is suspect.

The line of succession in the kingdom has moved laterally among the sons of the founder of the modern kingdom, Abdelaziz Ibn Saud, for over 60 years. Salman is the end of the line of kings who could trace their legitimacy to Ibn Saud directly. MBS is going to have to establish his own legitimacy at a time when the kingdom faces an acute economic challenge from low oil prices and the region is in enormous turmoil. The Saudi royal family are survivors, but they are in stormy weather and, now, without their most experienced leader.

]]>
By Bruce Riedel
The sacking of Saudi Crown Prince and Minister of the Interior Mohammed bin Nayef removes a central figure from the Kingdom's war on terror. MBN, as he is known, has exceptional expertise and institutional memory as the leading counter-terrorist in the region. He is also America's best friend in the family.
King Salman removed the 57-year-old Bin Nayef and replaced him as heir to the throne with his favorite son, 31-year-old Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman. The move has been anticipated for two years. Last year the expectations became so intense that MBN spent six weeks in Algiers waiting for the axe. The successful Riyadh summit with President Donald Trump and 50 Muslim leaders may have emboldened the 81-year-old king to move. MBN already has pledged his loyalty to his younger cousin. So have the senior princes. Mohammed bin Nayef was groomed by his father to be Minister of the Interior. He was trained by the FBI and Scotland Yard. He has survived numerous assassination attempts by al Qaeda, although at some cost to his health. No other Saudi royal has his credentials, experience and work ethic in this demanding role. He commanded the loyalty of the family and the powerful religious establishment because he had defeated Osama bin Laden's attempt to overthrow the royal regime a decade ago.
The Ministry of the Interior is the most powerful institution in the government with an estimated million employees. It is the heart of the Saudi “deep state.” It stifles all dissent as well as the terrorist threat from al Qaeda, the so-called Islamic State and Iranian subversion. It ensures the loyalty of the nation. Along with sacking MBN the king announced other personnel changes in the Ministry and the General Intelligence Directorate.
Mohammed bin Nayef is a close friend of the American security services. Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Michael Pompeo awarded the prince the agency's George Tenet medal in February for his years of working with the United States. His service foiled numerous plots in Europe and the United States, including a plot to blow up a commercial aircraft over Chicago. No successor will have his mastery of the international community of intelligence services.
MBN eschewed the media by and large, keeping his profile low. He is risk averse from a political and public relations point of view. Mohammed bin Salman is the opposite. He craves publicity. He is also reckless. The two-and-a-half-year-old war in Yemen is his signature policy initiative. The Saudis are bogged down in a quagmire with enormous consequences for the people of Yemen, where the war has brought malnutrition and mass starvation. Cholera has broken out. A child dies every 10 minutes as a consequence of the war. Seven million people are at acute risk. The United Nations has called the crisis the worst humanitarian disaster in the world. MBS, now heir apparent, is also a central figure in the Saudi campaign to isolate its small neighbor Qatar. That campaign has splintered the Islamic alliance the king pulled together at the summit with Trump. It may also prove to be the demise of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a key ally for the United States in the region since the 1980s.
No candidate has been named yet for the job of Deputy Crown Prince to replace Mohammed bin Salman. Presumably the next in line will be younger than MBS. Age matters to the royal family. The King has been very vigorous this year with the Riyadh summit and a month long trip to Asia, but his health is suspect.
The line of succession in the kingdom has moved laterally among the sons of the founder of the modern kingdom, Abdelaziz Ibn Saud, for over 60 years. Salman is the end of the line of kings who could trace their ... By Bruce Riedel
The sacking of Saudi Crown Prince and Minister of the Interior Mohammed bin Nayef removes a central figure from the Kingdom's war on terror. MBN, as he is known, has exceptional expertise and institutional memory as the ... https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-long-term-cost-of-saudi-succession-shake-up/The long-term cost of Saudi succession shake-uphttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/425981982/0/brookingsrss/topics/peacekeepingandconflictmanagement~The-longterm-cost-of-Saudi-succession-shakeup/
Wed, 21 Jun 2017 20:27:35 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?post_type=opinion&p=434673

A poor, sun-scorched Sahel country, Niger is rapidly becoming a key U.S. and Western counterterrorism ally. The former French colony already hosts French troops, and, as part of its TransSahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative, the United States is building a $100 million drone base there to monitor and respond to terrorist activities across the Sahel. Germany is also building a military outpost in Niger to support the U.N. mission in Mali.

When I visited Niger in May, hotels in the capital of Niamey were abuzz with foreign military personnel. And no wonder: A country rich in uranium supplying France’s nuclear powerplants, Niger is surrounded by countries with active jihadi and separatist insurgencies, civil wars, and potent global jihadi terrorist groups operating throughout the Sahel.

Although there is no Niger-born militant group, the conflicts in neighboring Mali, Nigeria, and Libya have spilled into Niger and compromised internal security, as have global jihadi terrorism and kidnapping. And as a key channel of migrants to the Sahara and to Europe, Niger is also rife with smuggling in assorted contraband. To boot, its political situation is precarious. Addressing this toxic mix of challenges requires sustained efforts to improve governance, not just military operations.

Mali’s Malaise

The intensifying conflict in northwest Mali—which has prompted French military operations in recent years—has creeped into Niger in various ways. Underlying the conflict are persistent, unresolved governance issues.

In October 2016, a U.S. worker with the evangelical group Youth with a Mission—who had been living in Niger since 1992—was kidnapped, most likely by the jihadist group Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa, known by the French acronym MUJAO, or by one of its proxies. Several days earlier, at least 20 Nigerien protection troops were killed when jihadists attacked a Malian refugee camp in Niger.

MUJAO is one of the many jihadist groups that the French government, supported by the United States and the United Nations, has sought to suppress in northern Mali since the launch of Operation Serval in 2013. That operation sought to depose the jihadists who took over northern Mali after wresting the insurgency from perpetually rebellious Tuareg tribes under the umbrella group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA).

But although toppling the jihadists in the north was easy at first, creating stability has turned out to be wickedly difficult. The deficiencies of the Malian military forces induced the French to accept some Tuareg tribes, who abandoned the jihadists, as rulers of the north, which displeased Mali’s central government in Bamako.

The governance deficiencies underlying the meltdown of Malian national forces and the outbreaks of Tuareg rebellion remain unaddressed. And Bamako’s problematic rule, still characterized by corruption and impunity, hasn’t motivated local elites in the north to behave better.

The French broadened their military operation in 2014 (Operation Barkhane) to deal with some of the Malian military deficiencies, but terrorism and insecurity have still spread into central and southern Mali. Peace deals with the various Tuareg rebel factions have collapsed quickly, and it’s not clear whether Bamako’s promised devolution of power (rather than a mere devolution of neglect, corruption, and bad governance) will ever get meaningfully implemented.

Meanwhile, there is a palpable sense among the foreign diplomats, military officials in Niger, and Nigerien officials with whom I spoke that a significant and perhaps more complicated deterioration of Malian security is under way. Beyond MUJAO, several other jihadi groups operate in Niger and across the region. In 2010, al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) kidnapped five French employees from the Arlit uranium mine of AREVA, France’s parastatal nuclear energy company. Jihadists have also fired rockets at another of AREVA’s uranium mines, this time in Agadez. The militant group al-Mourabitoune not only smuggles weapons and fighters between Algeria, Libya, and the rest of the Sahel, but is believed to be behind attacks on major Western hotels in Mali and other Sahelian counties.

Libyan Liabilities and Tuareg Tangles

The civil war in Libya unleashed weapons, militants, and contraband flows into Niger. But that legal and illegal trade long precedes Libya’s post-Gadhafi troubles. Like in Libya, Mali, and the Sahel overall, smuggling is a way of life in much of Niger, where legal livelihoods have been hard to come by for decades.

The central government—which lacks policing resources and therefore relies more on local elites to maintain stability—rarely counters collusion between local officials and criminal networks. Local tribes are intermeshed with criminal groups, and tribal affinities and commercial relationships span post-colonial borders. For example, until his death in 2016, a prominent northern political chief in Agadez, Cherif Ould Abidine, was widely known as Cherif Cocaine. Tuareg networks in Niger, including former prominent rebels who now support the central government, nonetheless maintain relations with rebellious Tuareg networks and politicians in Mali.

Western European countries have been preoccupied with the flows of migrants that assemble in places like Agadez, waiting for smugglers to take them to Europe. Although the migrants have posed serious social challenges for Europe, they are in fact only a small fraction of the migrants who cross through the Sahara. Most of the migration is seasonal, with workers from as far away as Burkina Faso and Cote D’Ivore moving to the Sahara for jobs and returning home months later. Simplistic efforts to stop migration—such as moves to shut down the Agadez staging centers or to resettle migrants in the land- and water-poor Nigerien north—ignores that migration is multifaceted. These kinds of narrow approaches will produce be ineffective and even counterproductive.

Boko Haram Borderlands

At its height in 2014 and 2015, the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria spilled into southern Niger, recruiting local dissatisfied youth and dragooning others. Although the insurgency’s brutality soured many, the preaching of Boko Haram’s charismatic leader, Yusuf Mohammad, was widely popular, reflecting the region’s alienation.

Although Nigerian forces weakened Boko Haram and the group split into two factions (on top of the prior splinter of Ansar Dine), Boko Haram raids into Niger’s Diffa region, in the south, persist. They are not as large as a year ago, when more than 100 Boko Haram militants attacked a military base in southern Niger, killing at least 32, temporarily overrunning the town of Bosso, and absconding with loot. But they remain a threat to an area that is under a state of emergency and food-insecure, and that hosts tens of thousands of Nigerian refugees (for which the Red Cross provides) and perhaps hundreds of Boko Haram defectors. Moreover, some of the government’s anti-Boko-Haram measures—such a ban on motorcycles and on pepper growth and trade, which the government believes are a key source of Boko Haram’s funding—undermine already precarious livelihoods. Such measures do not endear the central government to the local people, nor do they weaken the insurgency.

In spite of these challenges in the south, the clouds along the border with Mali are darkening more rapidly and dramatically. Under pressure from northern Nigerien politicians—who increasingly grumble that Niamey has neglected the security threats in the north in order to deal with Boko Haram—the government hopes to reposition its overstretched military there.

Precarious Politics

In a country with a history of military coups and political instability, Nigerien President Mahamdou Issoufou’s promise on April 1, 2017 not to seek a third term was met with suspicion. His predecessor made the same promise and broke it—and he was then overthrown in 2010. The growing political opposition, among others, have been unimpressed with Issoufou’s opaque references to constitutional revisions. Adding to the disquiet are recent heavy-handed actions by Nigerien security forces in April 2017, which resulted in the death of several student protestors, as well as reduced bread-and-butter government spending as uranium prices have plummeted and defense spending grows.

Niger’s pro-democracy opposition, however, also opposes the U.S. and other foreign military presence in the country. They see the military deals and bases as a way for an undemocratic government to hold onto power and for rich elites to become even richer at the expense of the majority of the population. It is tough for the United States in Niger and France in Mali to reconcile immediate counterterrorism imperatives—which often require deals with less than savory leaders—with the imperatives of achieving political stability and quality governance in the medium term, to address the root causes of support among alienated local populations for jihadi and separatist groups.

The Obama administration’s Security Governance Initiative (SGI)—through which Niger was selected to receive “an enhanced approach to security sector assistance”—sought to tackle institutional and governance deficiencies in addition to building the military capacities of partner countries. But all too often, the partners turn out to be unreliable allies on the battlefield, entangled in short-term contradictory local exigencies. Among other challenges, their priorities differ from Washington’s and they are often unaccountable for their behavior. They often divert the assistance, provided to build institutions, for the contrary purpose of strengthening their own problematic rule. But at least the Obama administration tried, both with the SGI and with the sanction of denying military aid to egregious human rights violators, such as Nigeria’s military forces.

So far, there is little evidence that the Trump administration has developed a similar awareness that efforts against violent jihadism will not be won by air strikes, weapons transfers, or falling in bed with dictators. Real progress in Niger—and among its troubled neighbors—can only be achieved if there are real efforts to foster good governance. In the short term, that includes allowing peaceful opposition protests to take place and not imprisoning and harassing political opposition leaders. President Issoufou must indeed not seek a third term, as he promised, and in the meantime he must be transparent about the constitutional changes he seeks. He must allow a thorough and meaningful discussion of these changes in the parliament and among civil society. The national government must start seriously consulting with local civil society in Niger’s regions and meaningfully engaging with local governors, instead of oscillating between imposing unpopular top-down decisions on the regions and neglecting them. Credible institutional development, including police reform and military accountability to elected civilian leaders, must get under way.

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By Vanda Felbab-Brown
A poor, sun-scorched Sahel country, Niger is rapidly becoming a key U.S. and Western counterterrorism ally. The former French colony already hosts French troops, and, as part of its TransSahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative, the United States is building a $100 million drone base there to monitor and respond to terrorist activities across the Sahel. Germany is also building a military outpost in Niger to support the U.N. mission in Mali.
When I visited Niger in May, hotels in the capital of Niamey were abuzz with foreign military personnel. And no wonder: A country rich in uranium supplying France’s nuclear powerplants, Niger is surrounded by countries with active jihadi and separatist insurgencies, civil wars, and potent global jihadi terrorist groups operating throughout the Sahel.
Although there is no Niger-born militant group, the conflicts in neighboring Mali, Nigeria, and Libya have spilled into Niger and compromised internal security, as have global jihadi terrorism and kidnapping. And as a key channel of migrants to the Sahara and to Europe, Niger is also rife with smuggling in assorted contraband. To boot, its political situation is precarious. Addressing this toxic mix of challenges requires sustained efforts to improve governance, not just military operations.
Mali’s Malaise
The intensifying conflict in northwest Mali—which has prompted French military operations in recent years—has creeped into Niger in various ways. Underlying the conflict are persistent, unresolved governance issues.
In October 2016, a U.S. worker with the evangelical group Youth with a Mission—who had been living in Niger since 1992—was kidnapped, most likely by the jihadist group Jamaat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Gharb Afriqa, known by the French acronym MUJAO, or by one of its proxies. Several days earlier, at least 20 Nigerien protection troops were killed when jihadists attacked a Malian refugee camp in Niger.
MUJAO is one of the many jihadist groups that the French government, supported by the United States and the United Nations, has sought to suppress in northern Mali since the launch of Operation Serval in 2013. That operation sought to depose the jihadists who took over northern Mali after wresting the insurgency from perpetually rebellious Tuareg tribes under the umbrella group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA).
But although toppling the jihadists in the north was easy at first, creating stability has turned out to be wickedly difficult. The deficiencies of the Malian military forces induced the French to accept some Tuareg tribes, who abandoned the jihadists, as rulers of the north, which displeased Mali’s central government in Bamako.
The governance deficiencies underlying the meltdown of Malian national forces and the outbreaks of Tuareg rebellion remain unaddressed. And Bamako’s problematic rule, still characterized by corruption and impunity, hasn’t motivated local elites in the north to behave better.
The French broadened their military operation in 2014 (Operation Barkhane) to deal with some of the Malian military deficiencies, but terrorism and insecurity have still spread into central and southern Mali. Peace deals with the various Tuareg rebel factions have collapsed quickly, and it’s not clear whether Bamako’s promised devolution of power (rather than a mere devolution of neglect, corruption, and bad governance) will ever get meaningfully implemented.
Meanwhile, there is a palpable sense among the foreign diplomats, military officials in Niger, and Nigerien officials with whom I spoke that a significant and perhaps more complicated deterioration of Malian security is under way. Beyond MUJAO, several other jihadi groups operate in Niger and across the region. In 2010, al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) kidnapped five French employees from the Arlit uranium mine of AREVA, ... By Vanda Felbab-Brown
A poor, sun-scorched Sahel country, Niger is rapidly becoming a key U.S. and Western counterterrorism ally. The former French colony already hosts French troops, and, as part of its TransSahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative, ... https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/06/01/does-the-road-to-stability-in-libya-pass-through-cairo/Does the road to stability in Libya pass through Cairo?http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/342276656/0/brookingsrss/topics/peacekeepingandconflictmanagement~Does-the-road-to-stability-in-Libya-pass-through-Cairo/
Thu, 01 Jun 2017 13:16:59 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/?p=407035

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By Adel Abdel Ghafar, Mattia Toaldo

Libya has been in the news over the past week, for grim reasons. The Manchester bomber, Salman Abedi, was a Brit of Libyan descent. He is suspected to have been radicalized by ISIS in Libya, and went there just days before the attack. In Egypt, the government has alleged that last Friday’s deadly attack against Christians in Minya, south of Cairo, was carried out by militants who trained in Libya, and ordered retaliatory airstrikes against camps there. Meanwhile, in Libya’s capital, Tripoli, recent fighting between rival militias has left dozens dead. The country’s severe instability and ongoing conflicts continue to have local, regional, and international ramifications.

Increasingly, many Western capitals see Egypt as a key component to a diplomatic solution in Libya. But while Egypt may deliver its Libyan proxies, it will be a challenge for the United Nations to keep them under the same tent as those who backed its mediation from the start—and which Cairo, incidentally, considers to be by and large too Islamist.

A year and a half since the signing of the U.N.-backed Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in Skhirat, Morocco, the political process in Libya needs a reboot. The LPA sought to create a single national unity government for all of Libya—but after five years of conflict following the fall of Gadhafi, three governments compete for dominance. The Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), headed by Prime Minister Fayez Serraj, is recognized by the U.N. and the international community. It has so far proven highly ineffective. In the east, the House of Representatives and its allied strongman, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, never approved the LPA, while an interim government headed by Abdullah al Thinni keeps operating in this part of the country. Finally, a third government is based in Tripoli: the National Salvation Government, which represents the more radical anti-Gadhafi militias loyal to the country’s mufti.

Egypt and the UAE have been backing Haftar militarily and financially since the beginning of the conflict. Despite their general distaste for the strongman, the United States and Europe have finally acquiesced over the last year to the fact that given that backing, Haftar has to be part of a solution, or there will be no solution. And almost inevitably, they have been looking to Egypt as the country that—in cooperation with its UAE backers—can deliver Haftar.

In parallel with the decline of the U.N. mission to Libya, Egyptian diplomacy has gained momentum and is now seen in many Western capitals as the key to a new settlement. In conjunction with soft power diplomacy, Egypt has also showed that hard power is firmly on the table. The second wave of airstrikes against militants, regardless of whether they were involved in the Minya attack or not, mark an escalation of the Egyptian military’s now-open involvement in Libya.

If Egyptian involvement is key in Libya, the inverse is also true: Libya is pivotal to Egypt’s security and economic interests. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi said in his recent Riyadh speech that the disintegration of state institutions has benefitted terrorist organizations and that Egypt fully supports efforts to maintain the “unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity” of states in the region. One could tell that Libya weighed heavily on his mind, and Cairo has been working hard to achieve favorable outcomes. But does the road to stability in Libya pass through Cairo?

Libya is Key for Egypt

On security, Egypt is set on avoiding the breakup of the Libyan state and fighting extremist elements there, including al-Qaida and ISIS affiliates. Egypt’s long border with Libya has been porous since 2011, with weapons, militants, and drugs passing back and forth. As Egypt is fighting its own ISIS affiliate in the east of the country, the stability and security of its western border is paramount. The wide open border, which runs 1,115 kilometers, has been increasingly difficult to police: In 2015, eight Mexican tourists who were on safari in the Western desert were killed when an Egyptian army helicopter mistook their group for militants and fired on them.

Cairo’s third motivation is ideological. Following the ouster of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood-led government in 2013, Cairo declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization and has aimed to suppress the movement in Libya as well. Cairo fears that if the Brotherhood and other Islamist groups gain a stronger governing foothold in Libya, the country might become a safe haven for the Egyptian Brotherhood (much like Turkey and Qatar have been). Especially on this last point, Haftar, who recently cited Egypt’s 2013 coup as a source of inspiration, has been a natural ally. From start, he has construed the fight against the Muslim Brotherhood within the broader fight against terrorism.

Our Man in Libya

Haftar rose to prominence by waging war on Islamists of all stripes in eastern Libya. Because of their ideological alignment, Egypt and the UAE have bet on Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA). Haftar also provides some prospect of stability, so despite being weary of his unpredictability, Cairo has had no better choice than to support him.

Thanks to Egyptian and Emirati support, Haftar’s military fortunes improved in 2016. The LNA took control of most of Benghazi and made headway in the Oil Crescent, the crucial resource-rich region just east of Sirte. Egypt tried to capitalize on this new balance of forces through diplomacy by convening a meeting of Libyan members of parliament in December 2016.

The resulting “Cairo Declaration” contained the main elements of what could soon become the U.N.-endorsed road map for Libya. It called for delegations from the House of Representatives and the Tripoli-based Council of State to agree on shrinking the Presidency Council from nine members to three, accelerating the approval of a new constitution, and holding parliamentary and presidential elections in early 2018.

For his part, Haftar refused to sit with Serraj in Cairo in February 2017, despite heavy pressure from Egypt. A so-called breakthrough came on May 2 in Abu Dhabi when the two finally met. Both Egypt and the UAE hailed this as evidence that a new agreement was at hand. Many in Western capitals want to believe it, too.

Trump vs. the Islamists

The election of Donald Trump has contributed to the shifting balance of power in Libya. He brought to power a group of advisers committed to fighting Islamists above all other concerns in the region. That, in turn, has given hope to Haftar and many members of his camp that the Libyan Field Marshal could be the focus of a new convergence between Egypt, the UAE, and the United States in the name of the fight against Islamists of all persuasions, both militant and moderate.

Members of President Trump’s inner circle, such as Steve Bannon, viewed the Muslim Brotherhood with hostility for years, suspecting it of being a Trojan horse to turn the United States into the “Islamic States of America.” An executive order to designate the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group had gathered steam in the White House—while it has been put aside for now, as it risked alienating regional allies, the administration has viewed Islamist political actors and their backers with increased hostility.

Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestinian offshoot, has been trying hard to rebrand and move away from its Egyptian counterpart. Nonetheless, it has found itself also in the line of fire. A new bill was introduced last week in the U.S. House of Representatives threatening to impose sanctions on Hamas’ international backers, such as Qatar. At a recent conference in Washington, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that Qatar risked U.S. sanctions if it continued its support of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Overall, there is a hardening of the U.S. position towards all Islamists, which means that on Libya, there is an alignment of interests between the United States on one hand, and Egypt and the UAE on the other.

Furthermore, the Manchester attack is likely to accelerate this Western move toward seeing Haftar’s LNA as a dependable partner in the fight against terrorism. The new French administration has already signaled that its priority will be building a Libyan army, and that this will have to include Haftar. Whether this pro-LNA shift will be combined with a new, inclusive political agreement is an open question.

Now What?

While raising high hopes internationally, the Haftar-Serraj meeting in Abu Dhabi received mixed reactions in Libya. Militias from the city of Misrata, key to supporting Serraj and fighting ISIS in the past, are now divided. Some are increasingly siding with the rival National Salvation Government in Tripoli, a coalition of radicals supported by the Mufti Gharyani. It is now clear that this coalition will oppose any move forward by Serraj in the dialogue with Haftar, threatening the fragile balance of power in Tripoli.

For almost all the forces in Western Libya, where the majority of Libyans live, there are two red lines in the current talks. First, the army needs to be under civilian oversight and the army cannot only consist of Haftar’s LNA. Second, and less explicit, the agreement will need to include also forces that Haftar and the Egyptians consider “too Islamist.” International pressure on Tripoli and Misrata to eliminate these red lines is unlikely to work.

Ultimately, the road to stability in Libya does pass through Cairo, but also through New York, Brussels, Abu Dhabi, Washington, and Moscow—and most importantly through Tripoli and Misrata.

It is up to the United Nations to navigate this minefield. Egypt has laid the groundwork for a new diplomatic initiative, but now the United Nations must turn it into a stabilizing factor and not the trigger of a new conflict in the relatively peaceful western half of Libya. The challenge is to include Haftar without losing the majority of Misrata and Tripoli. Ultimately, U.N. Secretary General António Guterres and the new Special Representative he will soon have to appoint will have to expand the base of support for the Cairo Agreement to include eastern Libya, not shift its core from Tripoli to Marj, where Haftar’s headquarters are.

Ultimately, the road to stability in Libya does pass through Cairo, but also through New York, Brussels, Abu Dhabi, Washington, and Moscow—and most importantly through Tripoli and Misrata. Regional and international buy-in for a new settlement is important, but Libyan buy-in is key. An agreement built around the “independence” of the military from the civilian government (as Haftar insists) and the exclusion of the forces that Cairo considers “too Islamist” is unlikely to get the support of key factions in Western Libya. Ultimately, these ambiguities in the Egyptian plan risk jeopardizing a core agreement between the local powers in Tripoli, Misrata, and Marj, making any deal external actors hammer out fragile at best.

While the meeting in Abu Dhabi may have raised hopes of a breakthrough in many Western capitals, the Egyptian (and Emirati) mediation is unlikely to work, unless these countries and their Libyan proxy Khalifa Haftar are ready for a real compromise. This will need to include crucial issues such as the inclusion of all actors in the political framework and civilian oversight of the military. Absent this, instability, and possibly escalation could still be part of the picture in Libya.

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By Adel Abdel Ghafar, Mattia Toaldo
Libya has been in the news over the past week, for grim reasons. The Manchester bomber, Salman Abedi, was a Brit of Libyan descent. He is suspected to have been radicalized by ISIS in Libya, and went there just days before the attack. In Egypt, the government has alleged that last Friday’s deadly attack against Christians in Minya, south of Cairo, was carried out by militants who trained in Libya, and ordered retaliatory airstrikes against camps there. Meanwhile, in Libya’s capital, Tripoli, recent fighting between rival militias has left dozens dead. The country’s severe instability and ongoing conflicts continue to have local, regional, and international ramifications.
Increasingly, many Western capitals see Egypt as a key component to a diplomatic solution in Libya. But while Egypt may deliver its Libyan proxies, it will be a challenge for the United Nations to keep them under the same tent as those who backed its mediation from the start—and which Cairo, incidentally, considers to be by and large too Islamist.
A year and a half since the signing of the U.N.-backed Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in Skhirat, Morocco, the political process in Libya needs a reboot. The LPA sought to create a single national unity government for all of Libya—but after five years of conflict following the fall of Gadhafi, three governments compete for dominance. The Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), headed by Prime Minister Fayez Serraj, is recognized by the U.N. and the international community. It has so far proven highly ineffective. In the east, the House of Representatives and its allied strongman, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, never approved the LPA, while an interim government headed by Abdullah al Thinni keeps operating in this part of the country. Finally, a third government is based in Tripoli: the National Salvation Government, which represents the more radical anti-Gadhafi militias loyal to the country’s mufti.
Egypt and the UAE have been backing Haftar militarily and financially since the beginning of the conflict. Despite their general distaste for the strongman, the United States and Europe have finally acquiesced over the last year to the fact that given that backing, Haftar has to be part of a solution, or there will be no solution. And almost inevitably, they have been looking to Egypt as the country that—in cooperation with its UAE backers—can deliver Haftar.
In parallel with the decline of the U.N. mission to Libya, Egyptian diplomacy has gained momentum and is now seen in many Western capitals as the key to a new settlement. In conjunction with soft power diplomacy, Egypt has also showed that hard power is firmly on the table. The second wave of airstrikes against militants, regardless of whether they were involved in the Minya attack or not, mark an escalation of the Egyptian military’s now-open involvement in Libya.
If Egyptian involvement is key in Libya, the inverse is also true: Libya is pivotal to Egypt’s security and economic interests. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi said in his recent Riyadh speech that the disintegration of state institutions has benefitted terrorist organizations and that Egypt fully supports efforts to maintain the “unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity” of states in the region. One could tell that Libya weighed heavily on his mind, and Cairo has been working hard to achieve favorable outcomes. But does the road to stability in Libya pass through Cairo?
Libya is Key for Egypt
El-Sissi’s statements indicate Egypt’s security, economic, and ideological interests.
On security, Egypt is set on avoiding the breakup of the Libyan state and fighting extremist elements there, including al-Qaida and ISIS affiliates. ... By Adel Abdel Ghafar, Mattia Toaldo
Libya has been in the news over the past week, for grim reasons. The Manchester bomber, Salman Abedi, was a Brit of Libyan descent. He is suspected