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Wednesday, March 30, 2016

Will ISIS Infect Bangladesh?

Atif Jalal
Ahmad & Michael Kugelman

As militants
loyal to Islamic State (IS) claim responsibility for increasing numbers of
attacks across the Middle East and North Africa, including a recent massacre of
European tourists on a Tunisian beach, questions are arising as to just how
far-reaching IS’s reach is across the world.

There is good reason to be concerned about the global spread of IS. For
example, there are indications that South Asia may be the group’s latest front.
Fighters loyal to IS have deepened instability in Afghanistan, especially in
Nangarhar province where Taliban fighters have been pushed out. These pro-IS
fighters may grow in number in light of the recently announced death of the
Taliban’s Mullah Omar, which will likely lead some Taliban members to leave the
organisation and shift their allegiances to IS.

In fact, terrorist factions in several South Asian nations have already pledged
allegiance to the Islamic State.

IS’s plans to deepen its global presence were made quite clear a year ago when
pro-IS groups released a map detailing a five-year expansion plan. The graphic
depicts the many countries that the group hopes to bring under its control as
part of its self-proclaimed “caliphate.”

Bangladesh has apparently been spared.

This is surprising for several reasons. First, many European nationals of
Bangladeshi origin have supplied IS with mercenaries. Additionally, the country
is volatile, with constant political feuds and some radicalised elements of
society. This makes the country quite vulnerable, particularly against the
backdrop of IS’s increasing influence in nearby Afghanistan and Pakistan.

So why has Bangladesh avoided IS’s crosshairs?

Part of the answer can be gleaned from comments made by a former U.S.
ambassador to Bangladesh, Dan Mozena. He has remarked: “A moderate, tolerant,
democratic country, Bangladesh, the world’s seventh most populous country and
third largest Muslim majority country, is a viable alternative to violent
extremism in a troubled region of the world.”

Indeed, the majority of Bangladesh’s large Muslim population rejects violence,
and the nation is more concerned with achieving economic prosperity amid
numerous challenges. These all provide a weak foundation for economic
modernisation. The lack of a national consensus on future policy has diminished
momentum for economic reforms, and deteriorating prospects for near-term
improvements in economic freedom make it unlikely that the relatively high
growth rates of recent years can be maintained. And yet Bangladesh has somehow
made great progress.

While Ambassador Mozena has rightfully described Bangladesh as a moderate and
tolerant country, there have admittedly been instances of extremist violence.
The Jamaatul Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB) is a militant organisation in
Bangladesh that originated in 1998. The group gained international notoriety
when it coordinated an audacious, country-wide bombing campaign on August 17,
2005.

Ever since the execution of major JMB leaders, no major terrorist incident has
rocked Bangladesh on that scale. Bangladesh’s current government has ushered in
a process of de-radicalisation, with Dhaka ramping up efforts to rein in
Islamist extremists. Dhaka’s modus operandi in de-radicalisation has increased
law enforcement actions. In addition, the JMB’s top brass has also been
arrested, effectively defanging the organisation and hindering its ability to
continue with militant activities.

Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh does not only manifest as militant
violence, but also as a political force in the form of the Jamaat-e-Islami
(JeI). This party has historically played important roles in coalition-building
in Bangladesh’s 300-seat parliament. The JeI’s mantra of “vesting complete
faith in Allah’s law,” however, was not enough to secure the support of
militants such as Bangla Bhai, who rejected the JeI’s decision to accept female
leadership in Bangladesh. Bangla Bhai, in fact, wholly rejected the JeI’s
ideals, and instead charted a course of destruction and violence that
thankfully did not last long. At any rate, today the JeI, as with the JMB, has
been defanged.

Bangladesh is no stranger to mass violence. Nonetheless, this form of violence,
seen in 2014 and during other election years, is different in a major way from
the violence incited by the likes of Bangla Bhai: The former has traction, and
the latter does not. During election years, activists of all political parties
engage in bloodshed as part of their determined efforts to win elections for
their candidates and to help them stay in power. Meanwhile, to reiterate, the
ideals of Islamic extremism are largely rejected by the people of Bangladesh.

An example of Bangladesh’s moderate and tolerant posture can be observed when
Muslims, Hindus, Christians, and Buddhists join and enjoy each other’s
religious festivals like Puja, Eid, Christmas, and Buddha Purnima together.
National holidays are declared for the major religious festivals so that all
people regardless of their religious identities can participate.

A large demonstration that included university teachers, artists, singers,
other cultural personalities, students, and the general public mobilized
against the destruction of a sculpture of folk singer Baul Lalon Shah, a symbol
of secular culture, in front of the Dhaka Airport. Such widespread sentiment
indicates that in Bangladesh, people generally reject communalism and
intolerance. It is this mentality of the Bangladeshi people to embrace and
enjoy each other’s cultures that makes Bangladesh less appealing for
radicalisation.

The JeI, even with its mantra of “Allah’s Law,” which in some ways echoes IS
rhetoric has a very different modus operandi and set of priorities from the
likes of the JMB. The JeI, through its participation in politics, wishes for a
larger say in the governmental politics of Bangladesh; several JeI top brass,
in fact, have served as ministers in the cabinet. While the JeI has been
described by some as a terror outfit, its activities are in fact more reactions
to political decisions made by the ruling party. The JeI’s major protests are
always in response to prosecutions of its top figures. The JeI does not protest
about Bangladeshi women not wearing burkas, and it does not stage marches that
advocate for the strict imposition of sharia law. The JeI seeks to regain its
status as a key parliamentary player and influential coalition-builder that it
enjoyed in the past.

Thanks to increased counterterrorism efforts spearheaded by Prime Minister
Sheikh Hasina, IS has few allies that can help it tap into Bangladesh’s large
Muslim population. Pro-IS sentiment, simply put, is very weak in Bangladesh.
Consider that in an ignominious list of the most pro-IS tweeting countries,
Bangladesh is nowhere to be found. IS’s much-vaunted social media reach has not
had the desired effect on Bangladesh’s largely moderate and tolerant population,
which at the end of the day is more concerned about putting food on the table
than embracing religious fundamentalism.

Ominously, however, there are warning signs that the Bangladesh could one day
succumb to IS’s influence. In addition to those European nationals of
Bangladeshi origin who have fought for IS, two Bangladeshis were arrested
recently for conspiring to fight in Syria. A British citizen of Bangladeshi
origin was also arrested while attempting a recruitment drive in the
northeastern districts of Sylhet and Habiganj, districts which border the
Indian states of Tripura and Shillong. In early 2015, a regional co-coordinator
for IS was arrested in Bangladesh along with eight other accomplices in
attempts to “establish a caliphate state in Bangladesh.” There have also been
reports of IS promotional activities over social media with an “ISIS in
Bangladesh” Facebook page and YouTube videos showing individuals pledging
allegiance to IS, all of which have been removed. Additionally, if the JeI is
unable to rehabilitate itself and become an influential political force, its
desperation may well lead it to start incorporating more extremist schools of
thought.

Still, some perspective is in order here. To date, no Islamist group based in
Bangladesh has declared allegiance to IS. In another development, Assad
Uzzaman, the last member of a group of British men of Bangladeshi origin who
travelled to join IS dubbed as “Britani Brigade Bangladeshi Bad Boys,” has
died. The other five members of this group have either died or are in British
prisons. These factors amplify the great difficulty IS will have in
establishing a strong foothold in the country.

To successfully forestall possible IS advances into Bangladesh, the country
must be vigilant and proactive in combating any IS attempts to court
disgruntled JeI members or remnant factions of the JMB. Even though Bangladesh
escaped IS’s crosshairs on that aforementioned map of expansion, it is
important to avoid the temptation to be complacent. Indeed, it would be incorrect
and even dangerous to flatly conclude that IS will not eventually look at
Bangladesh as a potential target for recruitment or even as part of its
envisioned “caliphate.”

Ultimately, the larger issue at hand, and the country’s core challenge, is to ensure
political and economic stability. Above all the goal should be to drastically
diminish the risk of radicalisation by having a more peaceful, prosperous, and
politically stable environment.

Atif Jalal
Ahmad is currently working on a thesis on the origins of corruption in South
Asia, specifically Bangladesh. Michael Kugelman is Senior Associate for South
Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars.