Millar had been mentioned a few times in other Quatloos discussion. Since I've attended four of his court hearings and will probably attend his trial it's time to give him his own discussion. First up, why I'm posting him on Quatloos;

The standard Poriskyite promoter indictment, False statements on income tax returns, income tax evasion and Goods and Services tax evasion, and counseling to commit fraud. But this just relates to his more recent activities. I mentioned the word "Detaxer" in the title so let's look at that aspect of his life before getting to current events. Who were the detaxers? Let their own website explain;

Very basic, hasn't changed much since I first saw it in the early 2000s. Far more informative is this goldmine, the Topica Archive that Canada's detaxers used as a central clearing house to discuss strategies, analyze failures, and plan future action;

Essentially detaxers were the precursors to the Freeman tax protesters but far more organized and competent. They felt that taxes were not legal and fought against them with various theories and court actions. All failed and the movement (if it can be called such) dissipated with followers moving on, some to the Porisky Paradigm scheme. This is where Millar ended up.

I initially planned to have one posting covering a review of Millar's past jurisprudence then cover his current issues and my attendance at his hearings. However my review of the prior Millar cases (husband and wife) ballooned to such a size that I'm doing it in two steps. History in this posting, current events in the second.

So first we'll review Michael's past cases then move on to his wife Teresa. Detaxing is a family affair. First up;

[1] On May 24, 2001, Mr. Millar was acquitted in the Provincial Court of four counts of the charge of failing to comply with a notice to provide the Minister of National Revenue with tax returns. The notices required Mr. Millar to file returns for the years 1994 to 1997. The Crown appeals the acquittals.

The decision appealed from was a stupid decision by a judge who misunderstood the law and precedence. There was no question that Millar had failed to comply with the notice sent by the CRA. But the judge figured the notice wasn't valid because it had been signed by the wrong guy.

[6] A number of defences were raised by Mr. Millar. The trial judge rejected all but one of them. The charges were dismissed on the ground that Mr. Purda was not identified on the face of the notices as a “Director-Taxation of a District Office.” The learned trial judge held that the Mr. Purda’s title as set out in the notices was not “an office with authority to issue Requirements pursuant to Regulation 900.”

And why was it the wrong guy;

[4] Mr. Millar was served with four notices, one for each year, requiring him to produce his income tax returns. The notices were issued over the signature of John Purda. Below his signature was the title, “Director Burnaby/Fraser Taxation Services Office”. At the time Mr. Purda was in fact a “Director-Taxation” and the office in which he was employed is a District Office.

There was no question that John Purda was the correct person authorized under the Income Tax Act to sign the notices so the requirements of the Act had been met but the trial judge decided to add another requirement not stipulated in the Income Tax Act. Purda's correct job title had not been given in the line under his signature. This was irrelevant because the Income Tax Act does not require that the proper administrative position of the signatory be included in the notice, just that it is signed by the right person. It would have been entirely legally valid if the line under Purda's name had said "President of the Buck Rogers Rocket Ship Captains Club". The result was that the trial judge let Millar off because the CRA had not met a legal requirement regarding the notices that did not exist apart from inside the judge's head.

So the appeal court judge decided;

[13] In both Galbraith and the case before me there is no confusion or ambiguity as to the identity of the signatory. Mr. Purda in the instant case is identified sufficiently. It is not necessary in this case for me to go further and decide whether the absence of any title on the face of the letter would affect its validity so long as the signatory in fact holds the position designated in Regulation 900(2).

[14] As a result, I conclude that the trial judge was in error in holding that because of the insufficient identification of Mr. Purda’s position on the face of the notices, the notices did not meet the requirements of the Income Tax Act.

[15] I have reviewed the trial judge’s reasons. It appears to me that the trial judge found that all other elements of the offences had been made out by the Crown and the other defences of Mr. Millar could not succeed. For that reason I am satisfied that the Crown’s appeal should be allowed and the verdicts of acquittal on all counts should be set aside.

[16] The Crown has urged that, rather than ordering a new trial, verdicts of guilty should be entered against Mr. Millar. I am satisfied that in this case this is the appropriate order.

[17] This matter will therefore be remitted to the trial court to impose a sentence that is warranted in law.

Millar figured if you don't succeed try again. So he went with the same argument to the Court of Appeal for British Columbia which disposed of his attempt in very short order.

[1] This is an application for leave to appeal from the verdicts of guilty pronounced by the British Columbia Supreme Court on 6 February 2002 on a summary conviction appeal by the Crown from the appellant’s acquittal in provincial court.

. . . . . . . . .

[7] To succeed on an application for leave to appeal in these circumstances, the applicant must show that there was an error by the summary conviction appeal judge which raises an issue of law alone; that the appeal is one of general importance; and that there is a reasonable possibility of success.

[8] The summary conviction appeal judge held that Regulation 900(2) did not impose a statutory requirement that the exact words of “Director-Taxation in a District Office of the Department of National Revenue” be used. The judge also held that there was no ambiguity as to the identity of the signatory. He found Mr. Purda was a “Director-Taxation” and the office in which he was employed was a District Office.

[9] These findings are supported by the evidence of Ms. Tish Woode, a witness called by the Crown.

[10] The applicant argued that the evidence of Ms. Woode was hearsay and should not have been relied on by the summary conviction appeal judge. The evidence as to the job title of her superior was within Ms. Woode’s personal knowledge. It was not hearsay. The applicant did not object to this evidence at trial which was elicited in both direct and cross examination as shown in the transcript.

[11] Mr. Millar ably argued his application in person. At the hearing he was unable to identify for me a question of law alone which he would seek to raise on the appeal. Having given the matter further consideration, I have been unable to detect any such question of law alone myself.

[12] Whether the letters of 2 November 1998 are invalid or ineffective because they do not adequately or correctly identify Mr. Purda’s authority, is a question of mixed fact and law. I cannot see any other issue that would meet the test.

[13] I would refuse leave to appeal.

However this wasn't quite the end of the story. Millar, obsessed that he was right, appealed this one too. He had not been heard by the formal Court of Appeals for British Columbia which has a three judge panel but by a single judge in Chambers whose function was to cut out the obvious losers before they wasted real court time. Millar thought that he had the right to appeal a Chambers decision. So he appealed to the panel which disabused him of that belief in very short order.

[1] PROWSE, J.A.: This is an application on behalf of the federal Crown seeking to have Mr. Millar’s motion for an extension of time to review the order of the Chief Justice quashed on the basis that a panel of three members of this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the decision.

[2] The manner in which this application arose is that Mr. Millar was initially acquitted of charges under the Income Tax Act by a Provincial Court judge. The Crown appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court justice substituted convictions on the four counts. Mr. Millar then sought leave to appeal the decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court to this Court. That application was heard by Chief Justice Finch. In reasons for judgment dated November 5, 2002, Chief Justice Finch dismissed Mr. Millar’s application for leave to appeal from the Summary Conviction Appeal Court. He dismissed the application primarily on the basis that Mr. Millar had not identified a question of law alone on the appeal, but rather that the issue Mr. Millar raised involved questions of mixed fact and law.

[3] On December 13th, Mr. Millar brought on an application seeking an extension of time in which to seek a variation of the order of the Chief Justice. It was that motion which triggered the Crown’s motion which is before me today.

[4] The question of whether or not there is jurisdiction in a panel of this Court to review the decision of a single justice on an application for leave to appeal in a summary conviction matter has now been resolved definitively by the decision of this Court in R. v. Stojanovski, (2002) B.C.J. No. 2863. The Court in that case held that there is no jurisdiction in this Court to review the decision of a single justice in that regard. That decision followed upon earlier decisions which, as Mr. Millar noted, might have cast some doubt on whether or not this Court had such jurisdiction. As I say, the matter has been laid to rest by the Stojanovski decision.

But, just to rub it in, the panel pointed out that even if he could have appealed it they would have just squashed him like a bug anyhow;

[5] Mr. Millar sought to raise arguments before me that he had not been granted a fair hearing or fair process before Chief Justice Finch. He indicates that he was told something by a justice in chambers on a 13(3) reference which led him to believe that he would have to come prepared on his application for leave to appeal to argue the appeal as a whole. He says that when he appeared before Chief Justice Finch he was advised that that was not the case. Mr. Millar says he does not feel that he was given sufficient guidance by the Chief Justice to indicate how he should proceed. He said there was an unfairness in the process which, in his view, should be the subject of review. He reads the cases decided by this and other courts as leaving a doorway open for special circumstances in order to seek a review. He also says that his circumstances amount to special circumstances.

[6] Apart from the fact that this Court has no jurisdiction to review, as already stated, I note that the Chief Justice stated in his reasons that:

Mr. Millar ably argued his application in person. At the hearing he was unable to identify for me a question of law alone which he would seek to raise on the appeal. Having given the matter further consideration, I have been unable to detect any such question of law alone myself.

[7] The Chief Justice then went on to make the finding that the question which Mr. Millar was seeking to raise was a question of mixed law and fact.

[8] In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the application by the Crown should be granted, and that Mr. Millar’s application for an extension of time to vary the order should be quashed.

This is just a decision on a technicality, the manner in which the Crown can appeal a judge's ruling made during the course of a trial. Teresa tried to enter some form of disclosure into evidence, the Crown objected and the judge overruled the objection. The Crown wanted to appeal the ruling before the trial continued because they felt that it was pointless to appeal after the trial since the disclosure would have been reviewed by the trial judge regardless of how the appeal went. The judge declined the Crown's request to stay proceedings to let them appeal.

[2] What the prosecution has asked the court to do today, Mrs. Millar, is that they have asked me to issue a stay of proceedings so that they can bring the issue of the correctness of my ruling with respect to disclosure before the Supreme Court, which is an appeal level of court. That is the court that probably would end up with the appeal of this matter, should we proceed directly through.

[3] The prosecution says that it wants to pursue this matter of appealing my ruling because, in the event that we press ahead now with the trial and the opinions are disclosed, the basis of the objection of privilege is lost, because it will be waived. Once it is out of the bag, it does not get back in again.

[4] As I indicated earlier, I thought that was not the best way to proceed, because normally what happens during the course of a trial is that somebody who is unhappy with a ruling made during the course of a trial has to wait until the end of the trial before deciding whether they can appeal or not. You do not appeal a ruling, you appeal a finding at the end of a case; guilty or not guilty. The ruling is made during the course of a trial. So this is a very unusual thing that the Crown is asking the court to consider. My first reaction was that is not an appropriate way to proceed.

So the Crown found a prior decision by a higher British Columbia court that said what they wanted to do was appropriate. The judge agreed;

[5] Madam Justice Ryan, in the British Columbia Court of Appeal, however, approved of this way of proceeding in the Creswell decision, where a similar sort of ruling was made by a trial court in that case. The manner of the Crown's proceeding in persuading the trial judge to issue a stay of proceeding and appealing right away rather than waiting until the outcome of the case was known was raised before the Court of Appeal. It was argued and Madam Justice Ryan and the other two judges sitting with her approved this as a practical way to deal with a practical problem. That is, how do you get a ruling on a matter like this, which, if the ruling is obeyed, the significance of an appeal is lost as of right away?

[6] So I am going to follow that procedure. I think it was approved by the Court of Appeal in the Creswell decision and I am going to direct a stay of proceedings. At this point this will be my stay of proceedings. I expect that the Crown will be filing its appeal in the Supreme Court. You will have an opportunity to have your say on whether the ruling that I have made is an appropriate one in the Supreme Court. Whether the Supreme Court says yes, this is an appropriate ruling, or this is not an appropriate ruling, there will be some direction from the Supreme Court about the manner in which the case will follow from there.

[7] The Crown, again, will have an opportunity along the way to decide whether or not they still wish to proceed, and that is a matter within their discretion. They are the prosecuting authority and it is their job to make that decision.

[8] So I am directing a stay of proceedings. Until I have some further direction from the Supreme Court, that is it.

Whoops! Turns out it was more than a ruling on a technicality but a major error on the part of the trial judge and one which would have had very significant ramifications for the Crown if his ruling had stood. The judge, in an overzealous attempt to make sure that all of Teresa's rights were respected, decided to throw the Crown's right to solicitor-client privilege right out the window and allowed Teresa to strip-mine the Canada Revenue Agency and the Department of Justice for anything she wanted. Essentially an open-ended fishing expedition though the government's files.

[7] The Respondent was represented at trial by her husband, Michael Millar.

[8] Before any evidence was called, the Respondent applied for disclosure of legal opinions provided by the DOJ to the CCRA or to agents conducting prosecutions on behalf of the DOJ.

[9] The Respondent’s disclosure application was described by the trial judge as follows:

[14] This is what is requested. I am quoting from a letter dated March 6, 2002 from Mr. Millar on behalf of his wife to the prosecutor. Amongst other things, this is what is requested in paragraphs 3 and 4, and these are the subject of the present dispute and the present ruling: Paragraph 3, copies of all legal advice/opinions from the Department of Justice to CCRA regarding (a) the use of the non-authorized and non-prescribed demand letter format; (b) the use of non-authorized and non-prescribed T1 forms; (c) the handling of information requests from detax, tax protestor or other difficult situations; (d) the handling of prosecutions regarding detax, tax protestor or other difficult situations; (e) and general advice regarding detax, tax protestor, or other difficult situations; Paragraph 4, copies of all legal advice/opinions from the Department of Justice to the Crown regarding: (a) the handling of information requests from detax, tax protestor, or other difficult situations; (b) the handling of prosecutions regarding detax, tax protestor, or other difficult situations; and (c) any general advice regarding detax, tax protestor, or other difficult situations.

[10] Mr. Millar indicated an intention to make an application for a judicial stay of proceedings on the basis of an abuse of process. The abuse of process alleged was that Mrs. Millar was selectively prosecuted because she was identified to be part of a tax protest group.

[11] The Respondent argued that the legal opinions requested should be disclosed on the basis that (if they exist) they would be relevant to the abuse of process argument.

Sounded great to the judge, why not make the CRA publicly reveal everything they had about their ongoing reviews of all detaxers?;

[13] In arguing the relevance of the request for internal advice from the DOJ to its prosecutors, Mr. Millar referred to specific incidents which had occurred prior to the trial to suggest that she was not being treated well by prosecutors and that this led her to ask what advice the prosecutors were receiving from the DOJ in regards to detax cases.

[14] The Honourable Judge Antifaev held:

[18] I think, however, that it is at least arguable that the documents referred to in paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), so far as they relate to detax or tax protesters, may have some bearing on the factual basis which might or might not form support for Ms. Millar’s argument in favour of a judicial stay of proceedings in this case. I make the direction that those documents, so far as they relate to the handling of information or prosecutions or general advice regarding detax persons or tax protestors will be disclosed.

[19] With respect to paragraph 4, in my view, all of the documents sought to be disclosed should be disclosed because they may possibly form the basis of an argument in favour of the stay of proceedings being advanced here, so far as these documents relate to detax persons or tax protestors.

[20] I state, as well, that in view of the evidence that has been advanced before me that this particular situation, that is, the question of persons being identified as belonging to any detax or tax protestor organization started to arise in the late summer of 1998, I will confine that order to any legal advice or opinions given from the start of June of 1998 to the present.

[21] So far as paragraph 4 refers to legal advice or opinions flowing from the Department of Justice to the Crown are concerned, my directive refers to any legal advice from lawyers on behalf of, or employed by, the Department of Justice to its front-line prosecutors. The Crown is an expression that can encompass anybody who is employed by the Crown. It is necessary for this order to be limited in this fashion, in order to allow the defence to advance and to focus the argument, and to allow the Crown to focus its search for those documents which will allow the defence to advance the argument.

The Supreme Court of British Columbia was not happy with the trial judge's ruling. It had problems both with the relevance of the documents to the proceeding and to the breach of client-solicitor privilege disclosure would require. First to relevance;

[38] I agree with Crown Counsel that the documents the Respondent brought before the trial judge reveal no trace of oblique motive or improper purpose on the part of the CCRA or the Crown. The documents show the CCRA was aware of the existence and tactics of “tax protesters” and had considered how this might affect the administration and enforcement of the Act. This cannot, in my view, support an abuse of process argument. On this appeal the Respondent produced an affidavit from Dr. Lenard-Zephirin which may be evidence for a trial judge to consider. It is not, however, my role to consider its contents on this appeal.

[39] I also agree with Crown counsel that the only differences between the material before the Court of Appeal in McMordie and the material before the trial judge in this case were:

(a) a note indicating that the CCRA had sought advice from the DOJ on dealing with the employee questionnaire;

(b) Exhibit “H” contained material of a similar nature to Exhibit “C”; and

(c) the material relied on mentioned McMordie by name, but did not mention the Respondent.

[40] I also agree with Crown counsel when she states that there was nothing in the material before the trial judge (or the Court of Appeal in McMordie) that suggested that the Respondent had been prosecuted for any reason other than that she had failed to comply with the Act. The McMordie decision makes clear that there is no immunity from prosecution for failing to comply with the Act because one acts out of “political beliefs” rather than “self-interest” or is identified as a tax protester.

iii. Conclusion on the relevance issue

[41] It is not open to the trial judge to overrule the Court of Appeal in McMordie and order disclosure of the requested documents. After reviewing the law as enunciated above, it is my view that the documents that were requested by the Respondent were simply not relevant. The demand for disclosure by the accused was in my view obstructive, speculative, fanciful and unmeritorious. In my view opinions and advice relating to other cases, provided after the decision to prosecute was made in this case, cannot be relevant to the Respondent’s selective prosecution argument. Even if logical relevance has been established, the evidence is nevertheless excluded because its probative value is overreached by its prejudicial impact in the circumstances of the case at bar. I arrive at this conclusion even after considering the low threshold requirement for disclosure.

Note the reference to Dr. Lenard-Zephirin, I'll be getting back to him.

On to solicitor-client privilege;

[43] It is perhaps unfortunate that the learned judge’s attention was not drawn to R. v. Brown (2002), 2002 SCC 32 (CanLII), 162 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.). Brown reiterates the fact that the solicitor-client privilege is a hallowed principle of the law and that the innocence at stake exception is a stringent one. It also establishes that the occasions when the privilege yields to the innocence at stake exception would be very rare indeed.

However the Supreme Court of British Columbia judge made an error in his next paragraph;

[44] Because the Respondent is unrepresented by counsel, however, it may be prudent for me to canvass some of the law in this area.

But he'd clearly stated earlier that Michael was representing Teresa. If that doesn't count as counsel what does?

The next part of the decision is a long review of precedence and an analysis of prior caselaw. I'll pass on that and get to the meat;

F. Analysis

[68] I agree with the Crown that in the trial judge’s decision and in argument before her, no distinction was made between the privilege associated with opinions and legal advice from the DOJ to the CCRA and with opinions and advice in internal DOJ communications. It appears to have been correctly accepted by the trial judge, however, that both types of advice were privileged: Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 1992 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 631.

[69] In Idziak, supra, the court considered whether or not an internal memorandum submitted to the Minister when considering whether or not to exercise the discretion to refuse to extradite, pursuant to the Extradition Act, s.25, ought to be produced. Justices Cory, L’Heureux Dubé and Iacobucci J. were of the view that the document was subject to solicitor/client privilege. Justices Lamer, McLachlin and Sopinka specifically reserved judgment on this issue to another case, disposing of the appeal on alternative grounds. Justice La Forest emphasized that the Minister was engaged in making a policy decision and that accordingly she was entitled to the confidential views of her officials, thus making a ruling on the issue of solicitor/client privilege unnecessary.

[70] After reviewing the judgment of the learned trial judge, however, it becomes clear that she did not follow the steps with respect to the innocence at stake exception to solicitor-client privilege laid down so clearly in McClure and Brown. The trial judge’s disclosure ruling was, in my view, premature and overly broad.

I mentioned fishing expedition?

[71] The trial judge’s disclosure order goes far beyond the parameters of this case. The disclosure order covers all of Canada for a period of over four years. Opinions provided to the CCRA by the DOJ in Nova Scotia and internal DOJ communications relating to such a prosecution are thus covered by the disclosure order, even though no member of the CCRA or the DOJ involved in this prosecution was aware of them. The order is also overly broad by time, as it includes opinions and advice provided by DOJ after charges were laid in this case in May 2001. This type of broad disclosure is also contrary to the type of disclosure that is suggested by the Supreme Court of Canada if it is established that the innocence at stake exception to solicitor privilege should apply: see McClure, Brown and Smith v. Jones, supra.

[72] Apart from that, I agree with Crown counsel when they assert that the trial judge erred when, instead of applying the test set out in McClure, she set aside the privilege on the basis that “it was at least arguable” that the material requested “may have some bearing” on the Respondent’s application for a stay of proceedings. I agree that in doing so, she erred in law by failing to apply the standard required by the Supreme Court of Canada.

Instead of just telling the trial judge to drop the ruling the Supreme Court apparently decided that the whole process had become too tainted to continue;

G. Disposition

[73] In view of the foregoing, I order that the stay of proceedings be set aside and a new trial ordered.

As is the Millar's habit they appealed this decision for a myriad of reasons. Essentially "It's So Unfair"

[1] This is an application for leave to appeal the order of a summary conviction appeal judge (the "appeal judge") allowing a Crown appeal of an order made by a Provincial Court judge (the "trial judge") staying the proceedings against the applicant. The reasons of the appeal judge setting aside the stay of proceedings and ordering a new trial may be found at 2002 BCSC 958 (CanLII).

[2] Leave to appeal a summary conviction matter to this Court will be granted if the proposed ground of appeal raises a question of law alone, the issue raised is one of general importance, and an appeal on the point has a reasonable possibility of success: R. v. Westwood (1995), 63 B.C.A.C. 236, [1995] B.C.J. No. 2146 (Q.L.) (C.A.).

[3] Crown counsel concedes that some of the proposed grounds of appeal raise issues of law alone but submits that leave ought not to be granted because none of the grounds raises issues of general importance and none has a reasonable prospect of success.

So what was Teresa complaining about this time;

[20] Following the Crown's successful appeal, Ms. Millar filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court which sets out a number of grounds of appeal. I have restated the grounds and have inserted the number or numbers in brackets which correspond to the numbering of the grounds set out in Ms. Millar's leave application. The grounds of appeal on which Ms. Millar seeks leave are these:

(a) The appeal judge displayed bias against the applicant (#1).(b) The appeal judge erred in refusing the applications for intervener status (#2 & #3).(c) The appeal judge erred in finding facts contrary to those found by the trial judge (#4).(d) The appeal judge erred in law in limiting his consideration of relevance to the issue of selective prosecution (#5).(e) The appeal judge erred in law in not distinguishing the decisions of this court in McMordie and Bruno (#6).

[21] On the first ground, Ms. Millar submitted that the following matters would support her contention that the appeal judge displayed bias:

(a) The appeal judge concluded, based on an affidavit filed by one of the applicants for intervener status, that Ms. Millar appeared to be a member of the Canadian DeTax Group.(b) The appeal judge concluded that the demand for disclosure was "obstructive, speculative, fanciful and unmeritorious". (c) The appeal judge did not provide adequate assistance to Ms. Millar as to the remedies available to her. (d) The appeal judge did not hear oral arguments from all the applicants for intervener status, and shortened the time for oral argument for those he did hear.

Note;

(a) The appeal judge concluded, based on an affidavit filed by one of the applicants for intervener status, that Ms. Millar appeared to be a member of the Canadian DeTax Group.

This goes back to a prior paragraph in this decision;

[11] After the Crown appeal had been brought, four individuals applied for leave to intervene in the summary conviction appeal but their applications were dismissed. The decision refusing the application for intervener status was given by the judge who later heard the summary conviction appeal.

I have no idea what this is all about but I assume that Dr. Lenard-Zephirin was one of the four interveners and the affidavit is the one noted in my review of the appeal decision.

The Court of Appeal of British Columbia had no problem stomping on Teresa's complaints;

[22] It is no issue that all parties to a proceeding are entitled to a fair hearing devoid of actual or apprehended bias. The conduct of the presiding judge must not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias as viewed by an informed and reasonable observer, fully apprised of all relevant circumstances, including the social reality that forms the background to the particular case. However, there must be a real likelihood of bias; mere suspicion is not enough, and the onus of demonstrating bias lies with the person who is alleging its existence. Judges are entitled to a presumption of judicial integrity and impartiality devoid of bias, such that the presumption may be displaced only by cogent evidence that the judge's conduct has given rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

[23] In my opinion, a reasonable observer of the proceedings would not conclude that the matters to which Ms. Millar has referred would give rise to an apprehension of bias.

[24] As to the first complaint, it is apparent both from the trial judge's ruling on the disclosure issue and the appeal judge's reasons for judgment that Ms. Millar was asserting that she was being selectively prosecuted because she was part of a tax protest group. In light of that allegation, it is unremarkable that the appeal judge would make reference to Ms. Millar being part of such a tax protest group.

[25] When the appeal judge referred to Ms. Millar's disclosure application as "obstructive, speculative, fanciful and unmeritorious" he was using the language of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Chaplin, supra, at para. 32. The appeal judge made clear in his reasons that the documents for which disclosure was demanded were not relevant because the abuse of process argument Ms. Millar said she was going to advance could not succeed in any event. The appeal judge used the terms used in Chaplin as an apt description of the disclosure demand made by Ms. Millar.

[26] The next complaint concerns what Ms. Millar states was a lack of assistance by the appeal judge in the conduct of her appeal. It is unclear from her material what further assistance Ms. Millar believes the appeal judge should have provided to her but, in any event, the complaint provides no foundation for the allegation that the appeal judge displayed bias.

[27] In both the first and second proposed grounds of appeal, Ms. Millar asserts that the appeal judge ought to have provided more time for hearing the applications for intervener status and that she was prejudiced by the refusal of their application. In her Memorandum of Argument on the leave application, Ms. Millar states:

4. During the Intervener Hearing, although proper and correct Court Procedures were followed in applying for time to argue Intervener status, and filing written memoranda by each Applicant, Judge Romilly prejudiced this process by denying each Applicant for Intervener Status an argument, and shortened time as scheduled by the registry to only two of four, and only ten minutes each, instead of twenty. Therefore the full answer and defense of the Applicant in the matter before the same Judge Romilly in the subsequent British Supreme Court Appeal was prejudiced.

[28] The matters to which Ms. Millar referred in her memorandum are not such that they could give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Ms. Millar has no standing to argue that intervener status should have been granted to those who applied. The purpose of allowing intervener status is not to assist a party to bolster his or her arguments. Rather, the purpose is to assist the court by allowing other interested parties to make submissions so that the court may have the benefit of a wider perspective and potentially differing interests: Guadagni v. British Columbia (Worker's Compensation Board) (1988), 1988 CanLII 3134 (BC CA), 30 B.C.L.R. (2d) 259 (C.A.); MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin (1985), 1985 CanLII 695 (BC SC), 66 B.C.L.R. 207 (C.A.).

[29] The third proposed ground of appeal suggests that the appeal judge erred by finding facts different from those found by the trial judge. However, the "facts" to which Ms. Millar has referred are simply the trial judge's observations as to how the documents might be relevant to the abuse of process argument Ms. Millar wished to put forward. The appeal judge dealt with the question of relevance of the documents demanded in his reasons and, as I have already indicated, I see no merit in an appeal of his decision on that point.

[30] Ms. Millar also wishes to argue before a panel that the disclosure she requested could have been relevant on a number of other bases, and not just to her assertion of selective prosecution. In particular, Ms. Millar argues that the documents could also be relevant to other forms of abuse of process and to raising a reasonable doubt on an essential element of the offence charged.

[31] The appeal judge properly confined his analysis of the disclosure issue to the question of selective prosecution, which was the basis Ms. Millar had put forward for her abuse of process argument.

[33] The final ground of appeal for which Ms. Millar seeks leave is that the appeal judge erred in law in not distinguishing this case from McMordie and Bruno. In my opinion, there was no basis to do so on the facts of this case. The argument advanced by Ms. Millar in the trial and appeal courts is virtually identical to one rejected by Proudfoot J.A. in McMordie. The reasons in McMordie make clear that there is no immunity from prosecution for failing to comply with the Income Tax Act because an individual acts out of "political beliefs" or is identified as a tax protester.

[34] The applicant has failed to satisfy the test for leave to appeal in that she has failed to show that any of the proposed grounds has a reasonable possibility of success.

[35] Accordingly, I would dismiss the application.

And that's it. No information if there was a new trial or, if there was, what happened. A few points based on these cases. First note the reference to McMordie just above. Kenneth Robert McMordie, aka Byron Fox, aka Byrun Fox, aka Byron Foxx, aka As Byrun Foxx is no stranger to Quatloos. Check out my June 1, 2014 posting in this discussion;

[11] That case has for some time, it seems to me, been found in this province as firm authority for the proposition that where there is an assertion that a person is being prosecuted by virtue of their suspected or indeed direct involvement in a Canadian De-tax Group, or type group, that where the allegation is failing to file, that that association, or maybe even belief by Canada Customs and Revenue of such an association, is not relevant.

[12] The Court of Appeal has recently had an opportunity to revisit that issue, and it's a decision which is certainly more recent than Gagne, and is a decision which seems to firmly affirm Madam Justice Proudfoot in McMordie. That decision is R. v. Teresa Millar. This is a case which originally had started out, I believe, in Burnaby, if I'm not mistaken, where the Provincial Court judge had made a sweeping order for the disclosure of a number of documents, including legal opinions. That ruling was ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court, and Mr. Justice Romilly allowed the Crown's appeal. His decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal and it's that decision, that is the decision of Madam Justice Rowles, which is the Court of Appeal decision in Millar which was rendered in March of this year, 2003.

[13] She, in my view, clearly agreed with Mr. Justice Romilly in the issue of what the case of McMordie stands for. He had held that the McMordie decision makes clear that there is no immunity from prosecution for failing to comply with the Act because one acts out of political belief rather than self-interest, and the Court of Appeal in Millar goes on to confirm that, in my view, certainly in paragraph 33, in finding that the argument advanced by Millar in the trial in appeal courts is virtually identical to one rejected by Proudfoot, J.A. in McMordie.

The reasons in McMordie make clear that there is no immunity from prosecution for failing to comply with the Income Tax Act because an individual acts out of 'political beliefs' or is identified as a tax protester.

[14] It seems to me that the very issue, that last point, "or is identified as a tax protester", is the issue which Ms. Gibbs would seek to adduce evidence from Mr. Sexsmith and Jacabucci, I take it asking questions regarding why she was being prosecuted and whether or not inferentially their belief that she was, or may be, a tax protester played any role in that. My reading of the Court of Appeal decision in Millar is that the Court of Appeal has made a clear and unequivocal pronouncement that that would not be relevant evidence because there's no such immunity from prosecution.

[15] Based on the case before me, the issues that are raised before me, they are not persons who are likely to give evidence which is material to these proceedings, and I accordingly excuse those two people from attending further pursuant to those subpoenas which have been previously issued in 2002.

Teresa Gibbs was another detaxer who was eventually convicted of failing to file income tax returns.One paragraph in this decision leads me to my next point of discussion, Dr. Lenard-Zephirin who was mentioned in Michael Millar's case.

9] The Crown argues that the reference in that section to requiring production or provision of certain material for a purpose related to the administration or enforcement of the Act relates to the requirement in s. 231.2 of the Act and does not relate to a decision at some point later down the line to prosecute. The defence argues that really the decision to prosecute is simply part of a continuum of the original decision to give notice of a requirement to provide certain documents or information, and the defence relies on a decision of R. v. Gagne, a decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court, the Honourable Ken Smith, as he then was, he's now in the Court of Appeal, wherein in that case he held that the person sought in that case to be subpoenaed may have evidence relevant to what he perceived to be a live issue in that case, and that is whether or not things were done for a purpose other than the proper administration of the Act.

His full name is Lenard-Zephirin Gagne. I assume He's the Gagne cited in the preceding paragraph. I can't confirm this because I can't find the cited decision. I've checked into him. He actually is a medical doctor practicing in Burnaby at the Kensington Medical clinic. So why is a doctor caught up in all this detaxer jurisprudence? A hint, he prefers that his name be spelled :Lenard-Zephirin:Gagne. Yes, yet another hyphenated name type. And I found a case of his;

This was an application to the Federal court Trial Division trying to quash a garnishee of his wages;

[1] This is an application for judicial review challenging a Requirement to Pay by way of garnishee dated February 20, 2002 ("the Decision") and issued by the Respondents to the Applicant's employer, Kensington Medical Clinic Inc., for unpaid personal income taxes for the 1997, 1998 and 1999 taxation years.

[2] In early June of 2001, the Applicant received Notice of Assessments dated May 29, 2001 for unpaid personal income taxes for the 1997, 1998 and 1999 taxation years for the total amount of $237,006.70 as of that date. On October 16, 2001, the Applicant requested an extension to file a Notice of Objection to the assessments.

[3] By letter dated November 20, 2001, the Respondents confirmed the assessments, informing the Applicant that if he disagreed with the assessments, he could file an appeal to the Tax Court of Canada. They provided information on how to proceed with such an appeal. The Applicant made a conscious decision not to appeal the confirmation of the assessments. As a result, collection activity was initiated with regards to the assessments as of February 19, 2002.

Although the good doctor pulled all kinds of arguments out of the air none prevailed and the decision was;

[28] In all respects I dismiss the allegations of the Applicant that the Minister acted beyond the scope of the law and all challenges relating to the collection process by way of garnishee were all within the prescribed sections of the ITA.[29] No equitable remedy is warranted. The application with respect to challenging the assessments by the Minister are dismissed, this Court having no jurisdiction to entertain this aspect of the application.[30] The application is dismissed.

As to how this all worked out all that I coud find was a scrambled notation about him on a damaged website;

Vancouver, British Columbia, March 22, 2006Vancouver resident, Lenard Zephirin Gagne, a medical doctor, was fined $20,000 in Robson Square Provincial Court after pleading guilty to one count of making false statements in his income tax returns for 1998 and 2000, underreporting his net professional income by $114,372.91. The fine is equal to approximately 75% of the income taxes evaded. Gagne has until June 30, 2008 to pay the fine.

On to part 2 of Michaels Millar's excellent court adventures, his current trial for tax evasion and and counselling to commit fraud. This is where I, somewhat late in the day, entered the picture by attending his ongoing court hearings.

October 16, 2014

Hearing started with Millar refusing to enter the court, or at least to leave the spectator's area. He finally condescended to cross the bar as long as the judge understood he was only attending as a "private person". This was just and odds and ends session. The guy up before him was supposed to be there to do with something about a constitutional challenge for undue delay. Since he didn't show up, but the police officer and his own lawyer did, the lawyer just recommended that he be deemed convicted, whatever that meant. Judge so deemed.

Millar was there for some issues with his mailing address and bail conditions. Seemed early 60's, ex-hippy type. For some reason he wasn't happy about the mailing address he'd given the Crown (his home address) and had been refusing mailings. He wanted to change it. So done. Crown needed his proper address to send him a pile of stuff to do with a 540 application, something to do with sending him copies of documentary evidence they planned to enter at the preliminary inquiry. However they needn't have bothered because Millar said that he wasn't going to allow evidence at the preliminary inquiry. He said that, at the inquiry he's just going to say "no" to entering evidence and, without his consent, the Crown can't enter anything. Judge was incredulous. Do you mean you will contest specific individual pieces of evidence or that you will try and stop all evidence from being entered? All of it. Judge told him he couldn't do that it was the Crown's prerogative to enter evidence. Millar (pro se) not clear on what judge was saying said he knows he can't ask the Crown and judge for legal advice but he wanted "guidance". Then he asked the judge for legal advice.

His big point seemed to be that since he didn't agree to anything, and since the court has no jurisdiction over him, there was no reason to have a preliminary inquiry since he can't be convicted. So he wanted the judge to tell him how to do this (entering motions is how he put it). Judge asked Crown counsel if she knew what Millar was talking about. Millar, acting like he was addressing the simple-minded, said the jurisdiction had to be proven by the party making the claim. Judge - Claim? What do you mean claim? Millar said the Crown had to prove jurisdiction over him before things could proceed. By this point he was just babbling gibberish and neither the judge nor I could understand him. Judge advised him to get counsel. He then asked the judge to tell him what motion he should make to prove to the court that it had no jurisdiction over him so that he could stop the proceedings before a preliminary inquiry. Essentially Millar asked the judge to tell him how he could prove that the judge really wasn't a valid judge. Crown said they understood what he was getting at because they had lots of guidance on what Millar was doing from prior, similar cases. He also wanted the case tossed on constitutional issues but he didn't say specifically what issues he was arguing. Just the magic constitution incantation that makes problems melt away.

Judge told him to say whatever he wanted at the preliminary inquiry but to note that what he was doing now was essentially rehearsing his defense position at trial and none of his points would be allowed at preliminary. For those of you not familiar with a preliminary inquiry it is a court hearing to determine if the Crown has enough evidence to proceed to trial. It is not part of the trial itself. Actually pretty much a formality because if there was not enough evidence to proceed to trial he wouldn't have been charged in the first place. Note that this is not a requirement to have enough evidence to convict. That is up to the judge or jury but just to ensure that there is enough evidence against the accused to make a trial worthwhile.

Millar was starting to rant a little that he wanted to get his motion to stop the whole process in right now because he didn't want to be put off and put off until he was told it was too late. So he wanted the judge to tell him how to quash all of the proceedings against him. Judge told him that he couldn't advise him how to run his case and he should familiarize himself with courtroom procedure. Apparently the Crown had sent Millar some document describing a preliminary inquiry, what it was, how it operated etc. Judge said that was an excellent place to start. We ended here with judge approving bail term change and Millar running off because he had appointment with parole officer. It seems obvious that Millar knew the purpose of the preliminary inquiry. If he didn't why was he so focused on stopping the Crown from entering evidence at the preliminary? No evidence, no trial.

I introduced myself to Crown counsel after the hearing and said that we'd probably seeing a lot of each other. Quite true since the two of them had a whole batch of Porisky cases including Stanchfield and Lawson. We had a pleasant chat about the previous Poriskyite convictions and I told them that they were all written up in Quatloos. They'd both heard of Quatloos but not familiar with it. Counsel said she was surprised a whole gang hadn't come to support him, that was normally the course. Just one guy and me.

December 18, 2014

I got there just before hearing to see Millar sitting in the lobby with my old friend Charles Norman Holmes. You might remember Charles from this court disaster;

When Millar came into court he said "attending in my private person capacity". Millar had made some motion to the court, don't know what, something to do with the Crown's fraudulent use of documents and secret information being held by the court that had not been disclosed to Millar. Crown wanted motion dismissed. This was just a status hearing judge who said he was not the correct judge to address it. The motion could be considered by the regular trial jusge who would be in charge of Millar's preliminary inquiry on January 6th.

As with the first hearing Millar started badgering the judge for legal advice but the judge answered "I am not here to give you legal advice."

I went to chat with Charlie after the hearing. He remembered me from his own hearing but he was somewhat terse with me. Our relationship, sadly, seems to have turned frosty. Was it something I said? It can't be what I wrote about him on Quatloos because he denied having read my court report. When he and Millar left Charley pointed me out to Millar so I'm on his radar now too.

Now a confession. I attended another Millar hearing between the December 18, 2014 hearing and the September 2015 hearing reported below. I think it was the hearing where Master Gee showing up in support of our beleaguered Poriskyite. Master Gee and I had a much pleasanter chat than I had with Holmes but he too denied reading my Quatloos report on him. For those of you who are interested you can read Master Gee's court story here;

Right, back to the confession. I recall making about five pages of notes, a productive session. Then I somehow lost the notebook. I'm so busy writing during these court hearings that I don't bother trying to remember anything so lost notes means a lost court hearing. So a ten month gap to my next hearing.

September 29, 2015

A pre-trial conference. Same old "I'm here on special appearance" introduction. Millar reported that he'd been denied his request for legal aid. He said he would not be making a Rowbotham application. I've written about Rowbotham applications here;

Sigglekow said he needed a lawyer to mount a Rowbotham application. To explain; a "Rowbotham/Fisher Application" is an application to the court by the accused in a criminal proceedings for Charter relief, usually a stay of proceedings, on the basis that the accused is unable to retain counsel and counsel is essential for a fair trial. Generally a Rowbotham is made when the accused claims he cannot afford counsel but is not qualified for legal aid. So, as I understand it, he needed to hire a lawyer to get his case tossed on the basis that he could not hire a lawyer. I get baffled by these legal complexities.

The lawyers he had contacted to possibly act for him in this application were a hard lot and not sympathetic to a man struggling to fight the injustice of being required to pay his fair share;

[35] Only one reply was received. It was from a lawyer at Felesky Flynn on April 24, 2014, who wrote: “We are very good at tax evasion defence work but we are very expensive. If you require government funding for a defence through a Rowbothum[sic]/Fisher application then we are not the firm for you. Best of luck.”

Harsh, but an essential truth.

The Crown was trying to arrange a joint voir dire for Millar, Debbie Anderson, and Keith Lawson. You can read about Debbie here;

A voir dire is a trial within a trial. I just suffered two weeks of them that Jeremy inflicted on me in the case I'm currently watching. Essentially a voir dire settles a point of law necessary to be determined before the trial can go forward. Often the issue is fundamental and will determine the outcome of the trial. An example is the admissibility of evidence. A voir dire might be called by the defence to attempt to exclude evidence gathered by the Crown. If this is successful the case might be over because the excluded evidence was necessary to prove the charges.

Apparently our triumvirate all have voir dires about something or other that have enough in common that they can be heard together to save court time. Since all three are charged with Porisky-based tax evasion and I believe counseling there is probably no reason to hold them separately.

Since Millar wasn't getting legal aid the judge wondered if an amicus could assist. One of these guys;

Crown was against this. Counsel said that Millar was intelligent and articulate and did not need court assistance if he wasn't retaining counsel. This is a guess on my part but I think the difference between an amicus and counsel that had the Crown concerned is that an actual lawyer acting as counsel would not let Millar argue any of the pipe dreams that he's been trying in prior hearings but an amicus would allow Millar to do whatever he wanted and would assist him in it. Millar perked up at the offer of an amicus but Crown said it would oppose any motion to appoint an amicus so it looks like that is out.

Net result was another Millar hearing was scheduled for October 14 to discuss the voir dire date.

October 14. 2015

Court filled with lawyers getting various pre-trial housekeeping matters settled. Felons in detention present through a video screen. Turns out voir dire can't be scheduled today because Debbie Anderson just got a lawyer and he has to get up to speed. So voir dire date to be determined November 4th, 2PM in Chambers. Debbie's November trial now adjourned new trial date to be determined and Millar's jury selection starts May 5, 2016 with trial scheduled for 20 days starting May 30, 2016.

And that brings me up to date on Millar.

"Yes Burnaby49, I do in fact believe all process servers are peace officers. I've good reason to believe so." Robert Menard in his May 28, 2015 video "Process Servers".

Another Millar hearing bright and early this morning. An application session where Millar was going to apply to the court for something but Crown didn't know what. Opened with Millar introducing himself as "I'm Michael standing in my private status. Judge - Are you Michael Millar? "That is the name given me."

There is a joint vior dire on March 22 next year with Millar, Anderson, and Lawson about the admissibility of documents seized from Porisky's residence and computer and Millar has some things he wants cleared up first. As an aside the issue of the admissibility of the Porisky documents has been beaten to death in prior hearings of other Poriskyites. They will be admitted. Another aside. From this point I'll be essentially just quoting what I scribbled in court. Millar just hit the ground running and continued for about 20 minutes non-stop. I got five pages of 8X10 notes in that time and I have no confidence I caught everything.

Millar said he had some "substantive issues" that he wanted discussed up front before the trial proceeded because it was his position that after he had his say charges would be dropped. Judge asked him what he meant. He said his charges were unknown to law, a misrepresentation of the law. He wanted all the evidence thrown out for fraud. The court documents filed by the Crown were full of fraudulent statements. Wants it adjudicated and confirmed. Judge - What does that mean? You have been charged and will be tried. The dam broke with that and Millar was off on a torrent of Freeman craziness.

Whole proceedings a fraud on the court. The Supreme Court Act of British Columbia has the name of the court in mixed case but al of the documents filed by the Crown are in upper case. This is not the way the Act styles it.

In other words a page from Master Gee's playbook. Millar is talking about Section 2 of the Supreme Court Act of British Columbia. I said this about it in the Master Gee discussion;

Gildemeester immediately presented himself to the court as a private person acting in a private capacity and started arguing that the court didn't actually exist because its name on all the documents was in capital letters but in section 2.1 of the Supreme court of British Columbia Act it was in upper and lower case. He said he couldn't "relax" in court because the City of Burnaby was also styled in all capital letters in the various documents whereas it was in upper and lower case on the city website. Same with his and his wife's names. Everywhere he looked it was a fictitious alternate world of all capital letters. He wanted the court to issue an order that the documents all had to be changed to mixed case and that the court confirm that it was actually the Supreme Court of British Columbia acting as a Section 2.1 court. If it didn't his rights were not being respected. He said the fact that none of the documentation correctly identified the parties was a HUGE issue. He again demanded a court order. Judge wasn't buying it and refused saying that the capitalization issue was irrelevant. Well then, Gildemeester said, the case is over because it can't proceed if the parties and court are styled incorrectly. Judge said "We are proceeding". "You're going ahead?" Mark asked incredulously. The judge said he'd already ruled against him so the issue was finished. Mark rebutted by saying that this caused him to question the legitimacy of the proceedings. He kept going over and over the issue (at least it was an issue to him) about how neither Burnaby nor the court existed because of all those capital letters.

So Mark then demanded that the judge confirm that this was actually the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Judge responded "You know what court you are in". The judge said he hadn't memorized the Supreme Court of British Columbia Act so he had no idea what section 2.1 said but this was the Supreme Court of British Columbia. Mark accused the judge of sidestepping the issue. Mark said the judge was not willing to make him feel "safe" by confirming for the record that this was the real Supreme Court in adherence to 2.1 of the Supreme Court of British Columbia Act because this was obviously a court unknown to law "I don't want to participate in this court, I want to participate in a lawful court". Judge said "If you don't want to proceed that's fine but this application is proceeding regardless of your participation". I, along with the judge, had no idea what 2.1 of the Act said so I checked later, This is it;

2 (1) The Supreme Court of British Columbia is continued under the name and style of the "Supreme Court of British Columbia".

So, for what it is worth (absolutely nothing) Mark is right, the Act doesn't identify the court name as being in all upper case letters.

Didn't do Master Gee any good and I assume the same will happen here. But this was only the start of the issues about case. The name and style of her Majesty in upper case on the Crown's documents means that she does not exist in law. He cited section 32 of the Federal Interpretation Act which, as far as I can tell, doesn't help him;

32. Where a form is prescribed, deviations from that form, not affecting the substance or calculated to mislead, do not invalidate the form used.

He said documents are invalidated in substance and form because of the case issue and are a nullity. He wanted a an order from the court of defining the "legal nature" of the plaintiff and defendant are because he doesn't know. Is the Crown acting against him as a private person? As the Michael Millar Trust? As the flesh and blood natural man? If the court doesn't do this the proceedings are a fraud.

Is this proceeding in common law, law of equity, admiralty law? The Crown won't say and I don't know so I can't get a fair trial. Court has been mislead by Crown's paperwork and I'm not getting fundamental justice.

Judge - What order are you asking me to make? I want an order saying whether this action is taking place against a private person or the officer and trustee of a trust. I want to know if it is common law, or admiralty law. There is no reason for a trial all the documents are a nullity all of the documents are a fraud.

He also blamed the court itself for defrauding him because it also uses upper case for its name in some documents so he doesn't know what court he is in. Judge laughed "Really, you don't know where you are?" His response was that the correct style and form is primary to the process and if the court won't guarantee this then I don't know where I am. If the court refuses to do this then I question your integrity. Judge- I'll see what the Crown says. She asked Crown if this made sense. The Crown counsel, the same lawyer acting in all of the Poriskyite cases, has been calm and reasonable in all of the prior proceedings I've attended but she seemed to be annoyed at this tide of stupidity. It doesn't matter what the styling is. The indictment and Crown documents are all correct. This is not an appropriate matter for the court. Lawson tried the same thing and it was found to be meritless. There are no defects in the submissions.

Judge asked Millar "Is this is your only defense?" Small chance of that! Are these proceedings in respect to Her majesty in Right of Canada or Her Majesty in Right of British Columbia? Are you going to give the order I want? It isn't a matter of delusion. I made this an issue at the Provincial court and the judge took it seriously.

Some rambling about how the Crown is trying to sneak some documents into court that don't match the documents served to him. Not explained but I assume a styling issue. I need guidance from the court. Is this proceeding as a trust matter or common law? What about the Michael Millar trust? The Crown is claiming that these are proceedings against the private flesh and blood man but they are really dealings against the Michael Millar trust. So it is a matter of equity. Unless the court spells this out I can't get a fair hearing.

Judge asked Crown counsel if she could write a letter answering Millar's questions. Sure but he won't be satisfied. The Crown does not recognize him as a trust, private person. None of this is recognized in Canadian law. He'll just argue against font styling again. There are no defects in the indictment. Judge told her to write the letter to Millar and he can argue it and she will make a ruling. Lawyer said she could but it wouldn't make any difference.

That got Millar going again. This is just the first issue, what about the rest? I don't know where I am until we get these determined. Judge - What other issues? Millar - I'll appeal if you decide against me. Judge - You want to challenge form and content of the indictment? Yes. Then do so at one time. Then Millar came up with something I'd not hear argued in any other hearing; the law of Alibi! "I came across something yesterday, the notice of alibi" It triggered the concept of the charges (no I don't know what that, or the rest of this paragraph, is supposed to mean). If you have an alibi then the charges don't apply to you. I have a history of notices to the CRA and prosecution that are really notices of alibi, that they have no case against me. Judge - Ok, explain your understanding of alibi to me. The Income Tax Act is all alibi.

In their claim of tax evasion they have to prove that my activities are subject to the Income Tax Act, that they have evidence that the activities were those of the private person not me. Judge - Doesn't matter what you think it is what the jury thinks. Millar - There is too much ambiguity in "person" for me to defend myself. It is defined in different ways in different places, which do I use? Judge - I'm willing to put a day aside to hear this and hear the Crown's response but I don't think you'll like the answer.

Note - This session was supposed to consider an application by Millar. That requires a document, a Notice of Application, saying specifically what he is applying about. He prepared nothing and just came in and rambled. So the Crown said that if there was to be a day's session she wanted a Notice of Application so she knew what the Crown was responding to. Millar - Crown will just evade and mislead. Then he started going on how the Crown wanted to make an application to strike. Huh? An application to strike is a request to end proceedings and quash charges. Why would the Crown do that? That is what he wants.

Judge - When can Crown have letter prepared? Friday. Then judge asked Millar when he could prepare an application to strike. After Christmas. So we took a break while the judge checked her calendar. So the first available time is some time in mid-February. So Millar, if nothing else, got a two month delay.

At the break Millar quizzed me about who I worked for. The usual story of me occupying an otherwise empty visitor's gallery scribbling away. I told him I was retired and didn't work for anyone instead I wrote for Quatloos. "I've heard complaints about them". I told him if there were any complaints they were about me because I'm the guy writing up all the Vancouver Freeman stuff. He walked away after the cryptic comment "If you don't get it you don't understand it". Huh? Wouldn't the second part of that sentence be self-evident from the first? If he's saying I'm just too stupid to understand the genius of his arguments he's right. I suppose I'm just too dense to earn the right to be the guy up in the dock facing criminal charges. No doubt a failure on my part.

"Yes Burnaby49, I do in fact believe all process servers are peace officers. I've good reason to believe so." Robert Menard in his May 28, 2015 video "Process Servers".

Note - This session was supposed to consider an application by Millar. That requires a document, a Notice of Application, saying specifically what he is applying about. He prepared nothing and just came in and rambled. So the Crown said that if there was to be a day's session she wanted a Notice of Application so she knew what the Crown was responding to. Millar - Crown will just evade and mislead. Then he started going on how the Crown wanted to make an application to strike. Huh? An application to strike is a request to end proceedings and quash charges. Why would the Crown do that? That is what he wants.

Judge - When can Crown have letter prepared? Friday. Then judge asked Millar when he could prepare an application to strike. After Christmas. So we took a break while the judge checked her calendar. So the first available time is some time in mid-February. So Millar, if nothing else, got a two month delay.

I got the confusion sorted out today. Both Millar and the Crown wanted applications to strike, but for different things. Crown wanted the application Millar made in yesterday's proceedings struck because it was just gibberish (my terminology). Millar wanted the whole case against him struck because, I assume, of fraud by the Crown against both him and the court and the Crown's refusal to tell him who or where he is.

"Yes Burnaby49, I do in fact believe all process servers are peace officers. I've good reason to believe so." Robert Menard in his May 28, 2015 video "Process Servers".

Imagine not knowing who you are or where you are...... I wonder if he realizes he's back on the planet Earth - not knowing that could really add to the confusion.

Stupid would certainly appear to be painful and dangerous, and this one is working it like a trouper.

Even after all these years, I still don't get the magic name BS, I can't for the life of me figure out where they get it from in the first place, but the power they seem to ascribe to names and the way they are spelled is just staggering. And yet as often as it has been debunked they still keep at it.

The fact that you sincerely and wholeheartedly believe that the “Law of Gravity” is unconstitutional and a violation of your sovereign rights, does not absolve you of adherence to it.

On the face of it not a particularly promising session. Just jury selection at 10:00 for Millar's trial scheduled to start May 30th. That was all that I knew. However I've had a lot of experience with Poriskyites and with Millar so I work on the assumption that there is always a pre-trial conference. So I went early on spec and hit the jackpot. Pre-trial conference at 9:30 courtroom 75 then jury selection courtroom 53 at 10:00. I saw the prospective jurors milling about in the courthouse lobby as I went up to courtroom 75.

At the start of the 9:30 hearing there was the judge, the registrar, Millar, the two long-suffering Crown Counsels, myself and a sheriff. There would be more sheriffs very shortly. A lot more.

Judge said that she'd called the conference. She told Millar that he could sit. He said he wanted to stand. She asked the clerk to pass a document to Millar and the Crown. Then Millar started ranting. And it was a rant, angry, loud, indignant. "I want to talk about my Bill of Acceptance!" "You can sit or stand but you can't interrupt." So he immediately interrupted by continuing his rant about having a Bill of Acceptance he'd submitted to the court which was being ignored. "You can't interrupt. If you do I'll ask Mr. Sheriff to take control." Mr. Sheriff stood up and moved conveniently close to Millar.

You can find a copy of what I assume is similar to Millar's Bill of Acceptance here;

Judge said she'd called this conference to explain to Millar what to expect at jury selection. She was to be the judge at selection and I assume she didn't want him acting up and claiming that it was because he didn't understand what was going on. So she ran through things like the list of jurors, how jurors are picked for selection by draw in lots of a dozen and they go through as many lots as necessary to get the fourteen jurors. She explained consenting (content my lady) and challenging, about having 14 peremptory challenges, the nuts and bolts of how to get through the session.

Then she referred to a document, perhaps the one she'd handed to parties and said that the phrase ""A private person residing outside of Canada" was not known to this court and I must ignore it. It has no legal effect." I assume that Millar was claiming that he couldn't be tried because he was the mythical private person residing outside of Canada although he was actually residing inside of Canada. She then stated that Millar's document said that he did not want a jury trial as currently formed. He was demanding a private trial with no members of the public allowed. Was he concerned about me? Judge said that he needed to make an application to exclude the public and that they were rarely granted because of the importance of having an open court system. You can have a trial by judge if you want but you have no right to a private trial.

This set him off on an batshit crazy rant. "I explained the equitable issue in my notice! I've dismissed proceedings and I want equitable common law proceedings." Judge said "do not continue or interrupt" but he kept ranting. Sheriff edged closer. More rants. Judge said "Mr. Sheriff, take him into custody" and I heard sheriff call for backup. DON'T TOUCH ME! DON'T TOUCH ME! That had as much effect as his dismissing the case or demanding a common law trial and in seconds he was cuffed with his hands behind his back and the sheriff holding on to him.

Suddenly sheriffs everywhere. Half a dozen in the doorway and a number in courtroom. Millar raged on about his equitable right to a private common law trial. WHY AM I ARRESTED? WHY AM I ARRESTED? "I told you to stop speaking and you refused." Judge told him he had a right to a jury trial in the Supreme Court of British Columbia or a trial by judge in either the Supreme Court of British Columbia or the Provincial Court of British Columbia but he had no right to an equitable common law private trial. Judge told sheriffs to escort him to courtroom 53 and said the handcuffs would be removed if he agreed not to act up. They took the handcuffs off.

Judge said there was jury selection in ten minutes and left. After she was gone Millar told Crown counsel that he doesn't want a jury trial. She told him to use the proper form. Apart from introducing herself to the judge Crown Counsel had said nothing during the hearing.

A group of sheriffs were waiting just outside the courtroom. One asked me what had happened. I said that the defendant had started ranting, judge told him to stop, he didn't stop so judge had him cuffed and taken into custody. That's what I call taking effective control of the courtroom.

This one went in a different direction. Started the same way, even same courtroom. Packed solid with almost all seats taken and about thirty potential jurors standing along the walls. I got a seat in the middle of the pack. When Millar brought in (uncuffed) a sheriff stayed close to him and three more off to one side in the back. I'm guessing an attempt to have adequate security without alerting jurors to problems. When Judge came in she said that she had a Notice of Re-Election signed by Crown Counsel and Millar.

This is a Notice of Election or Re-Election and Consent to Re-Election;

PURSUANT to section 536.2 of the Criminal Code, is entering an election by written submission; and

• Waives the reading of the formal election under section 536(2) of the Criminal Code; and• Acknowledges that they understand that they may elect to be tried by a provincial court judge without a jury andwithout having had a preliminary inquiry; or elect to be tried by a judge without a jury; or elect to be tried by a court composed of a judge and jury;

PURSUANT to section 536.2 of the Criminal Code, is entering their notice of re-election by written submission;

• Waives the re-reading of the formal election under section 67(2) of the Criminal Code; and• Re-elects the mode of trial from

ENTER AN ELECTION to be tried by:

Provincial Court Judge without a Jury and without a preliminary inquiryJudge without a Jury

Court composed of a Judge and Jury

Millar had initially elected to have a jury trial and was now scurrying away from it by electing a trial by judge only.

Judge - I don't know what you intend.

Millar - I want to waive my right to a jury trial.

Crown -It is clear to Crown that Mr. Millar no longer wishes to have a jury trial.

So the judge announced to the prospective jurors that they were no longer required because the defendant had waived his right to a jury trial, thanked them for their attendance and told them they were free to go. Laughter then spontaneous applause!

It was hard to hear the judge over the clapping but I made out that she told Millar "I'm concerned that you are smiling and laughing. You have put these people to a lot of inconvenience which could have been avoided had you made this decision earlier."

Now I have an advantage over you readers. I've attended number of Millar's trial hearings and have seen him in action. Inconveniencing others means nothing to him. He couldn't care less if a hundred people wasted half a day which could have been avoided with a few words from him.

When I wrote "My best day in court ever!" I was exaggerating a bit. Not about "best" but about "day". The whole thing, from my entering courtroom 75 to my leaving courtroom 53, took a little over an hour.

There's even a bonus! This judge is the most no-nonsense stickler for rules and procedures I've ever seen. She clearly runs a very tight ship. And she is going to be the judge at Millar's trial. I can't attend all of it, my boozing trip to Britain is coming up, but I'll be there for part of it and I'll report how it goes.

There is one thing missing from my Millar reporting. On March 22nd and 23rd I attended a joint voir dire session for Millar, Keith Lawson, and Debbie Anderson at the New Westminster courthouse. The judge imposed a publication ban on that session which prohibits me from reporting on it until the last of the three defendant's has had their trial. Lawson is done, Millar starts his at end of month, but Anderson doesn't go to trial until the end of the year. So until then the March session has to stay under wraps.

Now, as to why Millar changed his mind about a jury trial. Only speculation on my part however I assume Keith Lawson's loss yesterday loomed large in his thinking. Millar and Lawson faced the same charges, counseling fraud, income tax evasion, and GST evasion. I'm still trying to finish writing Lawson up so you don't have the whole story at this point.

Lawson gave it his best shot and apparently tried every last defense he could think of. He gave a surprisingly good final summary at the end of the trial but all for nothing. The jury found Lawson guilty on all charges with surprising speed. They gave their decision at 9:10 last night after only five hours of deliberation. Any longer would have required a night sequestered in a hotel so obviously they didn't have enough doubt about his guilt to warrant even one night away from home. Exactly the same happened at the Russell Porisky - Elaine Gould trial. Five hours of deliberation then a decision just before the jury had to stop for the night.

Millar attended most of Lawson's trial and Millar and Lawson appeared to work together on Lawson's defense. They might have been able to shrug off Porisky's convictions on the basis that he had not put up any defense but there was no comfort for them in Lawson's loss. There is probably no defense that Millar planned to try that Lawson didn't try and it ended in total failure. So perhaps Millar has concluded that he has absolutely no hope facing a jury and thinks he has a better shot with a judge.

"Yes Burnaby49, I do in fact believe all process servers are peace officers. I've good reason to believe so." Robert Menard in his May 28, 2015 video "Process Servers".

I spent most of last week at Millar's trial watching, yet again, his doomed obsession with the natural person argument and court jurisdiction. Both are arguments that he and Keith Lawson have lost many times in the past. And he lost again. I had a new records for notes taken in one day, almost 14 pages of single-spaced printing in an eight by ten notebook at last Thursday's hearing. But it will be a while before I post it. Off to Britain in three days for a five week trip swilling beer and meeting up with the UK Quatloosians and Millar will have to wait until I get back. I should make it back just in time to watch the Porisky and Lawson sentencings. So, between Millar and Balogh, I have a lot of catching up to do. But that should be it until November when Leo Fung goes on trial.

"Yes Burnaby49, I do in fact believe all process servers are peace officers. I've good reason to believe so." Robert Menard in his May 28, 2015 video "Process Servers".

That would be assuming they even had any inkling of why they think their natural person argument has any legs. I would bet most of them don't even understand what they are arguing. It is the same as the "includes" argument that inevitably fails.

The fact that you sincerely and wholeheartedly believe that the “Law of Gravity” is unconstitutional and a violation of your sovereign rights, does not absolve you of adherence to it.

You know, it'd be interesting to ask them about that. Do they think it's a loophole due to parliament writing the law incorrectly or did parliament intentionally write it to create that loophole?

You have to think more moronically. Far, far more moronically. The way Porisky explained it in a video the phrase "natural person" exists in various pieces of legislation. Millar actually cited the use of "natural person" in some regulation about selling dish detergent. But "natural person" is not used in the Income Tax Act. Why not? Simple! It was deliberately excluded because parliament does not intend that natural persons be taxable. So what kind of persons are taxable? Porisky went to the definition of person in 248(1) of the Act and found this;

person, or any word or expression descriptive of a person, includes any corporation, and any entity exempt, because of subsection 149(1), from tax under Part I on all or part of the entity’s taxable income and the heirs, executors, liquidators of a succession, administrators or other legal representatives of such a person, according to the law of that part of Canada to which the context extends;

Using the freeman basis of statutory interpretation Porisky focused on "any word or expression descriptive of a person, includes any corporation" and he interpreted "includes" to mean "includes only". He said in a video that this was why corporations are included in the definition of persons, because only corporations are persons under the Act. So if only corporations are taxable, and he isn't a corporation, this means he isn't taxable. So what is he in law? He's a "natural person because "natural persons" were deliberately left out of the Act. Since "natural person" was not defined in the Act Porisky decided he could define the phrase any way he wanted. That is why he talked about natural flesh and blood persons and corporations.

Stick in the mud types like me who interpret "includes" to mean a word of expansion rather than limitation follow the old tired way of looking at the 248 definition of person. It includes corporations to bring corporations into taxability along with the rest of us persons, natural or unnatural.

One could wonder, if Porisky was correct, why the Act didn't just say that natural persons were not taxable instead of leaving it so vague. In Porisky's world this was probably just an oversight because of sloppy legislative writing so Porisky rectified it for his natural person audience.

I believe that Peter Hendrickson used the same idiot basis of interpretation to determine that almost all Americans were not taxable. The American tax code includes DC, Puerto Rico, Guam and American Samoa in the definition of the United States because they are in America but are not part of a state. So Hendrickson argued that only people living in these places were taxable. You live in California? You don't have to pay tax. We all saw how "Cracking the Code" worked in real life.

"Yes Burnaby49, I do in fact believe all process servers are peace officers. I've good reason to believe so." Robert Menard in his May 28, 2015 video "Process Servers".