II. THE
GOVERNMENT OF GOD ACCEPTS NOTHING AS VIRTUE BUT OBEDIENCE TO MORAL
LAW.

I. IN WHAT
SENSE OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW CAN BE PARTIAL.

In discussing
this subject I must--

1. Remind
you of the sense in which it has been shown that obedience cannot
be partial; and--

2. Show
the sense in which it can be partial.

1. In what
sense we have seen that obedience to Moral Law cannot be
partial.

(1.) Not in
the sense that a moral agent can at the same time be selfish and
benevolent. That is, a moral agent cannot choose as an ultimate
end the highest well-being of God and of the universe, and, at the
same time choose an opposite end, namely his own gratification. In
other words, he cannot love God supremely and his neighbour as
himself, and at the same time love himself supremely, and prefer
his own gratification to the good of God and his neighbour. These
two things, we have seen, cannot be.

(2.) We have
seen, that a moral agent cannot honestly choose the well-being of
God and the universe, as an ultimate end, that is, for and on
account of its intrinsic value, and yet withhold the degree of
intensity of choice, which he sees the value of the end demands,
and which he is able to render. In other words, he cannot be
honest in knowingly and intentionally withholding from God and man
their dues. That is, he cannot be honestly dishonest.

(3.) We have
seen, that honesty of intention implies the esteeming and treating
of every being and thing, known to the mind according to its
nature and relations, and every interest, according to its
estimated relative importance, and our ability to promote it.

(4.) We have
seen that neither of the following suppositions can be true.

(a.)
It cannot be true, that an act or choice may have a complex
character, on account of complexity in the motives that induce it.

(b.)
It cannot be true, that the will or heart may be right, while the
emotions and affections are wrong, in the sense of sinful.

(c.)
It cannot be true, that a ruling, latent, but actually existing,
holy preference or intention, may co-exist with opposing
volitions.

These things,
we have seen, cannot be; and, therefore, that the following is
true, to wit, that obedience to moral law cannot be partial, in
the sense that a moral agent can partly obey, and partly disobey,
at the same time; that he cannot be both holy and unholy in the
same act; that he cannot at the same time serve both God and
mammon. This certainly is the doctrine both of natural and
revealed theology. This summing up of what was taught in the last
lecture, conducts us to the second inquiry, namely,--

2. In what
sense obedience to moral law can be partial.

And here I
would observe, that the only sense in which obedience to moral law
can be partial is, that obedience may be intermittent. That is,
the subject may sometimes obey, and at other times disobey. He may
at one time be selfish, or will his own gratification, because it
is his own, and without regard to the well-being of God and his
neighbour, and at another time will the highest well-being of God
and the universe, as an end, and his own good only in proportion
to its relative value. These are opposite choices, or ultimate
intentions. The one is holy; the other is sinful. One is
obedience, entire obedience, to the law of God; the other is
disobedience, entire disobedience, to that law. These, for aught
we can see, may succeed each other an indefinite number of times,
but co-exist they plainly cannot.

II. The
government of God accepts nothing as virtue but obedience to the
law of God.

But it may be
asked, Why state this proposition? Was this truth ever called in
question? I answer, that the truth of this proposition, though
apparently so self-evident, that to raise the question may
reasonably excite astonishment, is generally denied. Indeed,
probably nine-tenths of the nominal church deny it. They
tenaciously hold sentiments that are entirely contrary to it, and
amount to a direct denial of it. They maintain that there is much
true virtue in the world, and yet that there is no one who ever
for a moment obeys the law of God; that all Christians are
virtuous, and that they are truly religious, and yet not one on
earth obeys the moral law of God; in short, that God accepts as
virtue that which, in every instance, comes short of obedience to
his law. And yet it is generally asserted in their articles of
faith, that obedience to moral law is the only proper evidence of
a change of heart. With this sentiment in their creed, they will
brand as a heretic, or as a hypocrite, any one who professes to
obey the law; and maintain that men may be, and act pious, and
eminently so, who do not obey the law of God. This sentiment,
which every one knows to be generally held by those who are styled
orthodox Christians, must assume that there is some rule of right,
or of duty, besides the moral law; or that virtue, or true
religion, does not imply obedience to any law. In this discussion
I shall,--

1. Attempt
to show that there can be no rule of right or duty but the moral
law; and,

2. That
nothing can be virtue, or true religion, but obedience to this
law, and that the government of God acknowledges nothing else as
virtue or true religion.

1. There
can be no rule of duty but the moral law. (See Lecture II,
Exclusiveness.)

Upon this
proposition I remark,--

(1.) That the
moral law, as we have seen, is nothing else than the law of
nature, or that rule of action which is founded, not in the will
of God, but in the nature and relations of moral agents. It
prescribes the course of action which is agreeable or suitable to
our nature and relations. It is unalterably right to act in
conformity with our nature and relations. To deny this, is
palpably absurd and contradictory. But if this is right, nothing
else can be right. If this course is obligatory upon us, by virtue
of our nature and relations, no other course can possibly be
obligatory upon us. To act in conformity with our nature and
relations, must be right, and nothing, either more or less, can be
right. If these are not truths of intuition, then there are no
such truths.

(2.) God has
never proclaimed any other rule of duty, and should he do it, it
could not be obligatory. The moral law did not originate in his
arbitrary will. He did not create it, nor can he alter it, or
introduce any other rule of right among moral agents. Can God make
anything else right than to love him with all the heart, and our
neighbour as ourselves? Surely not. Some have strangely dreamed
that the law of faith has superseded the moral law. But we shall
see that moral law is not made void, but is established by the law
of faith. True faith, from its very nature, always implies love or
obedience to the moral law; and love or obedience to the moral law
always implies faith. As has been said on a former occasion, no
being can create law. Nothing is, or can be, obligatory on a moral
agent, but the course of conduct suited to his nature and
relations. No being can set aside the obligation to do this. Nor
can any being render anything more than this obligatory. Indeed,
there cannot possibly be any other rule of duty than the moral
law. There can be no other standard with which to compare our
actions, and in the light of which to decide their moral
character. This brings us to the consideration of the second
proposition, namely,--

2. That
nothing can be virtue or true religion but obedience to the moral
law.

By this two
things are intended:--

(1.) That
every modification of true virtue is only obedience to moral law.

(2.) That
nothing can be virtue, but just that which the moral law requires.

That every
modification of true virtue is only obedience to moral law, will
appear, if we consider,--

(a.)
That virtue is identical with true religion:

(b.)
That true religion cannot properly consist in anything else, than
the love to God and man, enjoined by the moral law:

(c.)
That the Bible expressly recognizes love as the fulfilling of the
law, and as expressly denies, that anything else is acceptable to
God.

"Therefore
love is the fulfilling of the law." "Though I speak with the
tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity (love), I am
become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have
the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all
knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove
mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And though I bestow
all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be
burned, and have not charity (love), it profiteth me nothing." (1
Cor. xiii.)

Love is
repeatedly recognized in the Bible, not only as constituting true
religion, but as being the whole of religion. Every form of true
religion is only a form of love or benevolence.

Repentance
consists in the turning of the soul from a state of selfishness to
benevolence, from disobedience to God's law, to obedience to it.

Faith is the
receiving of, or confiding in, embracing, loving, truth and the
God of truth. It is only a modification of love to God and Christ.
Every Christian grace or virtue, as we shall more fully see when
we come to consider them in detail, is only a modification of
love. God is love. Every modification of virtue and holiness in
God is only love, or the state of mind which moral law requires
alike of him and of us. Benevolence is the whole of virtue in God,
and in all holy beings. Justice, truthfulness, and every moral
attribute, is only benevolence viewed in particular relations.

Nothing can
be virtue that is not just what the moral law demands. That is,
nothing short of what it requires can be, in any proper sense,
virtue.

A common idea
seems to be, that a kind of obedience is rendered to God by
Christians which is true religion, and which, on Christ's account,
is accepted of God, which after all comes indefinitely short of
full or entire obedience at any moment; that the gospel has
somehow brought men, that is, Christians, into such relations,
that God really accepts from them an imperfect obedience,
something far below what his law requires; that Christians are
accepted and justified while they render at best but a partial
obedience, and while they sin more or less at every moment. Now
this appears to me, to be as radical an error as can well be
taught. The subject naturally branches out into two distinct
inquiries:--

(1.) Is it
possible for a moral agent partly to obey, and partly to disobey,
the moral law at the same time?

(2.) Can God
in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present and full
obedience to the moral law?

The first of
these questions has been fully discussed in the preceding lecture.
We think that it has been shown, that obedience to the moral law
cannot be partial, in the sense that the subject can partly obey,
and partly disobey, at the same time.

We will now
attend to the second question, namely,--

Can God, in
any sense, justify one who does not yield a present and full
obedience to the moral law? Or, in other words, Can he accept
anything as virtue or obedience, which is not, for the time being,
full obedience, or all that the law requires?

The term
justification is used in two senses.

(a.)
In the sense of pronouncing the subject blameless:

(b.)
In the sense of pardon, acceptance, and treating one who has
sinned, as if he had not sinned.

It is in this
last sense, that the advocates of this theory hold, that
Christians are justified, that is, that they are pardoned, and
accepted, and treated as just, though at every moment sinning, by
coming short of rendering that obedience which the moral law
demands. They do not pretend that they are justified at any moment
by the law, for that at every moment condemns them for
present sin; but that they are justified by grace, not in the
sense that they are made really and personally righteous by grace,
but that grace pardons and accepts, and in this sense justifies
them when they are in the present commission of an indefinite
amount of sin; that grace accounts them righteous while, in fact,
they are continually sinning; that they are fully pardoned and
acquitted, while at the same moment committing sin, by coming
entirely and perpetually short of the obedience which, under the
circumstances, the law of God requires. While voluntarily
withholding full obedience, their partial obedience is accepted,
and the sin of withholding full obedience is forgiven. God accepts
what the sinner has a mind to give, and forgives what he
voluntarily withholds. This is no caricature. It is, if I
understand them, precisely what many hold. In considering this
subject, I wish to propose for discussion the following inquiries,
as of fundamental importance.

(1.) If a
present partial obedience can be accepted, how great a part may be
withholden and we be accepted?

(2.) If we
are forgiven, while voluntarily withholding a part of that which
would constitute full obedience, are we not forgiven sin of which
we do not repent, and forgiven, while in the act of committing the
sin for which we are forgiven?

(3.) What
good can result to the sinner, to God, or to the universe from
forgiving impenitence, or sin which is persisted in?

(4.) Has God
a right to pardon present sin, and of course sin unrepented of?

(5.) Have we
a right to ask him to forgive present sin, while unrepented of?

(6.) Must not
confession of present sin, and of course sin unrepented of, be
base hypocrisy?

(7.) Does the
Bible recognize or proclaim the pardon of sin, under such
circumstances?

(8.) Does the
Bible recognize any justification in sin?

(9.) Can
there be such a thing as partial repentance of sin? That is, does
not repentance imply present full obedience to the law of God?

(10.) Must
not that be a gross error, that represents God as pardoning and
justifying a sinner in the present voluntary commission of sin?

(11.) Can
there be any other than a voluntary sin?

(12.) Must
not present sin be sin unrepented of?

Let us now
attend to these questions in their order.

(1.) How much
sin may we commit, or how much may we, at every moment, come short
of full obedience to the law of God, and yet be accepted and
justified?

This must be
an inquiry of infinite importance. If we may wilfully withhold a
part of our hearts from God, and yet be accepted, how great a part
may we withhold? If we may love God with less than all our hearts,
and our neighbour less than ourselves, and be accepted, how much
less than supreme love to God, and equal love to our neighbour,
will be accepted?

Shall we be
told, that the least degree of true love to God and our neighbour
will be accepted? But what is true love to God and our neighbour?
This is the point of inquiry. Is that true love which is not what
is required? If the least degree of love to God will be accepted,
then we may love ourselves more than we love God, and yet be
accepted. We may love God a little, and ourselves much, and still
be in a state of acceptance with God. We may love God a little,
and our neighbour a little, and ourselves more than we love God
and all our neighbours, and yet be in a justified state. Or shall
we be told that God must be loved supremely? But what is intended
by this? Is supreme love a loving with all the heart? But this is
full and not partial obedience; yet the latter is the thing about
which we are inquiring. Or is supreme love, not love with all the
heart, but simply a higher degree of love than we exercise toward
any other being? But how much greater must it be? Barely a little?
How are we to measure it? In what scale are we to weigh, or by
what standard are we to measure, our love, so as to know whether
we love God a little more than any other being? But how much are
we to love our neighbour, in order to our being accepted? If we
may love him a little less than ourselves, how much less, and
still be justified? These are certainly questions of vital
importance. But such questions look like trifling. Yet why should
they? If the theory I am examining be true, these questions must
not only be asked, but they must admit of a satisfactory answer.
The advocates of the theory in question are bound to answer them.
And if they cannot, it is only because their theory is false. Is
it possible that their theory should be true, and yet no one be
able to answer such vital questions as these just proposed? If a
partial obedience can be accepted, it is a momentous question, how
partial, or how complete must that obedience be? I say again, that
this is a question of agonizing interest. God forbid that we
should be left in the dark here.

But let us
look at the second question.

(2.) If we
are forgiven while voluntarily withholding a part of that which
would constitute full obedience, are we not forgiven sin of which
we do not repent, and forgiven while in the act of committing the
sin for which we are forgiven?

The theory in
question is that Christians never, at any time, in this world,
yield a full obedience to the divine law; that they always
withhold a part of their hearts from the Lord, and yet, while in
the very act of committing this abominable sin of voluntarily
defrauding God and their neighbour, God accepts their persons and
their services, fully forgives and justifies them. What is this,
but pardoning present and pertinacious rebellion! Receiving to
favour a God-defrauding wretch! Forgiving a sin unrepented of and
detestably persevered in? Yes, this must be, if it be true that
Christians are justified without present full obedience. That
surely must be a doctrine of devils, that represents God as
receiving to favour a rebel who has one hand filled with weapons
against his throne.

(3.) But what
good can result to God, or the sinner, or to the universe, by thus
pardoning and justifying an unsanctified soul? Can God be honoured
by such a proceeding? Will the holy universe respect, fear, and
honour God for such a proceeding? Does it, can it, commend itself
to the intelligence of the universe?

Will pardon
and justification save the sinner, while he yet continues to
withhold a part, at least, of his heart from God, while he still
cleaves to a part of his sins? Can heaven be edified, or hell
confounded, and its cavils silenced, by such a method of
justification?

(4.) But
again: Has God a right to pardon sin unrepented of?

Some may feel
shocked at the question, and may insist that this is a question
which we have no right to agitate. But let me inquire: Has God, as
a moral governor, a right to act arbitrarily? Is there not some
course of conduct which is suitable to him? Has he not given us
intelligence on purpose that we may be able to see and judge of
the propriety of his public acts? Does he not invite and require
scrutiny? Why has he required an atonement for sin, and why has he
required repentance at all? Who does not know that no executive
magistrate has a right to pardon sin unrepented of? The lowest
terms upon which any ruler can exercise mercy, are repentance, or,
which is the same thing, a return to obedience. Who ever heard, in
any government, of a rebel's being pardoned, while he only
renounced a part of his rebellion? To pardon him while any part of
his rebellion is persevered in, were to sanction by a public act
that which is lacking in his repentance. It were to pronounce a
public justification of his refusal to render full obedience.

(5.) But have
we a right to ask forgiveness while we persevere in the sin of
withholding a part of our heart from him?

God has no
right to forgive us, and we have no right to desire him to forgive
us, while we keep back any part of the condition of forgiveness.
While we persist in defrauding God and our neighbour, we cannot
profess penitence and ask forgiveness without gross hypocrisy. And
shall God forgive us while we cannot, without hypocrisy, even
profess repentance? To ask for pardon, while we do not repent and
cease from sin, is a gross insult to God.

(6.) But does
the Bible recognize the pardon of present sin, and while
unrepented of?

Let the
passage be found, if it can be, where sin is represented as
pardoned or pardonable, unless repented of and fully forsaken. No
such passage can be found. The opposite of this always stands
revealed expressly or impliedly, on every page of divine
inspiration.

(7.) Does the
Bible anywhere recognize a justification in sin?

Where is such
a passage to be found? Does not the law condemn sin, in every
degree of it? Does it not unalterably condemn the sinner in whose
heart the vile abomination is found? If a soul can sin, and yet
not be condemned, then it must be because the law is abrogated,
for surely, if the law still remains in force, it must condemn all
sin. James most unequivocally teaches this: "If any man keep the
whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all." What
is this, but asserting, that if there could be a partial
obedience, it would be unavailing, since the law would condemn for
any degree of sin; that partial obedience, did it exist, would not
be regarded as acceptable obedience at all? The doctrine, that a
partial obedience, in the sense that the law is not at any time
fully obeyed, is accepted of God, is sheer antinomianism. What! a
sinner justified while indulging in rebellion against God!

But it has
been generally held in the church, that a sinner must intend fully
to obey the law, as a condition of justification; that, in his
purpose and intention, he must forsake all sin; that nothing short
of perfection of aim or intention can be accepted of God. Now,
what is intended by this language? We have seen in former
lectures, that moral character belongs properly only to the
intention. If, then, perfection of intention be an indispensable
condition of justification, what is this, but an admission, after
all, that full present obedience is a condition of justification?
But this is what we hold, and they deny. What then can they mean?
It is of importance to ascertain what is intended by the
assertion, repeated by them thousands of times, that a sinner
cannot be justified but upon condition, that he fully purposes and
intends to abandon all sin, and to live without sin; unless he
seriously intends to render full obedience to all the commands of
God. Intends to obey the law! What constitutes obedience to the
law? Why, love, good-willing, good-intending. Intending to obey
the law is intending to intend, willing to will, choosing to
choose! This is absurd!

What then is
the state of mind which is, and must be, the condition of
justification? Not merely an intention to obey, for this is only
an intending to intend, but intending what the law requires to be
intended, to wit, the highest well-being of God and of the
universe. Fully intending this, and not fully intending to intend
this, is the condition of justification. But fully intending this
is full present obedience to the law.

But again: it
is absurd to say that a man can intend fully to obey the law,
unless he actually fully intends what the law requires him to
intend. The law requires him fully to intend the highest
well-being of God and of the universe. And unless he intends this,
it is absurd to say that he can intend full obedience to the law;
that he intends to live without sin. The supposition is, that he
is now sinning, that is, for nothing else is sin, voluntarily
withholding from God and man their due. He chooses, wills, and
intends this, and yet the supposition is, that at the same time he
chooses, wills, intends, fully to obey the law. What is this but
the ridiculous assertion, that he at the same time intends full
obedience to the law, and intends not fully to obey, but only to
obey in part, voluntarily withholding from God and man their dues.

But again, to
the question, can man be justified while sin remains in him?
Surely he cannot, either upon legal or gospel principles, unless
the law be repealed. That he cannot be justified by the law, while
there is a particle of sin in him, is too plain to need proof. But
can he be pardoned and accepted, and then justified, in the gospel
sense, while sin, any degree of sin, remains in him? Certainly
not. For the law, unless it be repealed, and antinomianism be
true, continues to condemn him while there is any degree of sin in
him. It is a contradiction to say, that he can both be pardoned,
and at the same time condemned. But if he is all the time coming
short of full obedience, there never is a moment in which the law
is not uttering its curses against him. "Cursed is every one that
continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the
law to do them." The fact is, there never has been, and there
never can be, any such thing as sin without condemnation.
"Beloved, if our own heart condemn us, God is greater than our
heart;" that, is, he much more condemns us. "But if our heart
condemn us not, then have we confidence towards God." God cannot
repeal the law. It is not founded in his arbitrary will. It is as
unalterable and unrepealable as his own nature. God can never
repeal nor alter it. He can, for Christ's sake, dispense with the
execution of the penalty, when the subject has returned to full
present obedience to the precept, but in no other case, and upon
no other possible conditions. To affirm that he can, is to affirm
that God can alter the immutable and eternal principles of moral
law and moral government.

(8.) The next
inquiry is, can there be such a thing as a partial repentance of
sin? That is, does not true repentance imply a return to present
full obedience to the law of God?

In
considering this question, I will state, briefly--

(i.) What
repentance is not.

(ii.) What it
is.

(iii.) What
is not implied in it.

(iv.) What
is.

I shall in
this place only state these points briefly, leaving their full
consideration to their appropriate place in this course of
instruction.

(i.) What
repentance is not.

(a.)
It is not a phenomenon of the intelligence. It does not consist in
conviction of sin, nor in any intellectual views of sin whatever.

(b.)
It is not a phenomenon of the sensibility. It does not consist in
a feeling of regret, or remorse, or of sorrow of any kind or
degree. It is not a feeling of any kind.

(ii.) What it
is.

The primary
signification of the word rendered repentance is, to reflect, to
think again, but more particularly to change the mind in
conformity with a second thought, or in accordance with a more
rational and intelligent view of the subject. To repent is to
change the choice, purpose, intention. It is to choose a new
end,--to begin a new life,--to turn from self-seeking to seeking
the highest good of being,--to turn from selfishness to
disinterested benevolence,--from a state of disobedience to a
state of obedience.

(iii.) What
is not implied in it.

(a.)
It does not imply the remembrance of all past sin. This would be
implied if repentance consisted, as some seem to suppose, in
sorrowing over every particular sin. But as repentance consists in
returning or turning to God, from the spirit of self-seeking and
self-pleasing to the spirit of seeking the highest well-being of
God and the universe, no such thing as the remembrance of all past
sin is implied in it.

(b.)
It does not imply a continual sorrowing for past sin; for past sin
is not, cannot be, ought not to be, the subject of continual
thought.

(iv.) What is
implied in it.

(a.)
An understanding of the nature of sin, as consisting in the spirit
of self-seeking, or in selfishness. This is implied, as a
condition upon which repentance can be exercised, but it does not
constitute repentance. Repentance is the voluntary turning which
follows the intellectual illumination or understanding of the
nature of sin.

(b.) A
turning from this state to a state of consecration to God and the
good of the universe.

(c.)
Sorrow for past sin when it is remembered. This, and the following
particulars, are implied in repentance as necessarily following
from it.

(d.)
Universal, outward reformation.

(e.)
Emotions of hatred of sin.

(f.)
Emotions of self-loathing on account of sin.

Certainly, if
repentance means and implies anything, it does imply a thorough
reformation of heart and life. A reformation of heart consists in
turning from selfishness to benevolence. We have seen in a former
lecture, that selfishness and benevolence cannot co-exist, at the
same time, in the same mind. They are the supreme choice of
opposite ends. These ends cannot both be chosen at the same time.
To talk of partial repentance as a possible thing is to talk
nonsense. It is to overlook the very nature of repentance. What! a
man both turn away from, and hold on to sin at the same time?
Serve God and mammon at one and the same time! It is impossible.
This impossibility is affirmed both by reason and by Christ.

(9.) The
ninth inquiry is; must not that be a gross error that represents
God as pardoning and justifying a sinner in the present wilful
commission of sin? I answer, yes,--

(i.) Because
it is antinomianism, than which there is scarcely any form of
error more God-dishonouring.

(ii.) Because
it represents God as doing what he has no right to do, and,
therefore, as doing what he cannot do, without sinning himself.

(iii.)
Because it represents Christ as the minister of sin, and as
justifying his people in their sins, instead of saving them from
their sins.

(iv.) Because
it represents God as making void, instead of establishing the law
through faith.

(v.) Because
it is a prolific source of delusion, leading multitudes to think
themselves justified, while living in known sin. But perhaps it
will be objected, that the sin of those who render but a partial
obedience, and whom God pardons and accepts, is not a voluntary
sin. This leads to the tenth inquiry:--

(10.) Can
there be any other than voluntary sin?

What is sin?
Sin is a transgression of the law. The law requires benevolence,
good-willing. Sin is not a mere negation, or a not willing, but
consists in willing self-gratification. It is a willing contrary
to the commandment of God. Sin, as well as holiness, consists in
choosing, willing, intending. Sin must be voluntary; that is, it
must be intelligent and voluntary. It consists in willing, and it
is nonsense to deny that sin is voluntary. The fact is, there is
either no sin, or there is voluntary sin. Benevolence is willing
the good of being in general, as an end, and, of course, implies
the rejection of self-gratification, as an end. So sin is the
choice of self-gratification, as an end, and necessarily implies
the rejection of the good of being in general, as an end. Sin and
holiness, naturally and necessarily, exclude each other. They are
eternal opposites and antagonists. Neither can consist with the
presence of the other in the heart. They consist in the active
state of the will, and there can be no sin or holiness that does
not consist in choice.

(11.) Must
not present sin be sin unrepented of?

Yes, it is
impossible for one to repent of present sin. To affirm that
present sin is repented of, is to affirm a contradiction. It is
overlooking both the nature of sin, and the nature of repentance.
Sin is selfish willing; repentance is turning from selfish to
benevolent willing. These two states of will, as has just been
said, cannot possibly co-exist. Whoever, then, is at present
falling short of full obedience to the law of God, is voluntarily
sinning against God, and is impenitent. It is nonsense to say,
that he is partly penitent and partly impenitent; that he is
penitent so far as he obeys, and impenitent so far as he disobeys.
This really seems to be the loose idea of many, that a man can be
partly penitent, and partly impenitent at the same time. This
idea, doubtless, is founded on the mistake, that repentance
consists in sorrow for sin, or is a phenomenon of the sensibility.
But we have seen that repentance consists in a change of ultimate
intention,--a change in the choice of an end,--a turning from
selfishness to supreme disinterested benevolence. It is,
therefore, plainly impossible for one to be partly penitent, and
partly impenitent at the same time; inasmuch as penitence and
impenitence consist in supreme opposite choices.

So then it is
plain, that nothing is accepted as virtue under the government of
God, but present full obedience to his law.

REMARKS.

1. If what
has been said is true, we see that the church has fallen into a
great and ruinous mistake, in supposing that a state of present
sinlessness is a very rare, if not an impossible, attainment in
this life. If the doctrine of this lecture be true, it follows
that the very beginning of true religion in the soul, implies the
renunciation of all sin. Sin ceases where holiness begins. Now,
how great and ruinous must that error be, that teaches us to hope
for heaven, while living in conscious sin; to look upon a sinless
state, as not to be expected in this world; that it is a dangerous
error to expect to stop sinning, even for an hour or a moment, in
this world; and yet to hope for heaven! And how unreasonable must
that state of mind be, that can brand as heretics those who teach,
that God justifies no one, but upon condition of present
sinlessness!*(see below)

2. How great
and ruinous the error, that justification is conditionated upon a
faith that does not purify the heart of the believer; that one may
be in a state of justification who lives in the constant
commission of more or less sin. This error has slain more souls, I
fear, than all the universalism that ever cursed the world.

3. We see
that, if a righteous man forsake his righteousness, and die in his
sin, he must sink to hell.

4. We see,
that whenever a Christian sins he comes under condemnation, and
must repent and do his first works, or be lost.

*Their present sinlessness is not the
ground, but only a sine quà non, of gospel
justification.--See Lecture LVI, subject,
"Justification."

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