The question of how Redfield had chosen his 15 patients for analysis came up again in August 1992, after the Amsterdam meeting, when researchers at WRAIR [Walter Reed Army Institute of Research] and the Henry M. Jackson Foundation for the advancement of Military Medicine-a private lab that has a multi-million-dollar contract to assist the military’s AIDS research program -analyzed data from all 26 patients and found no statistically significant effect on viral load. Indeed, at an AIDS vaccine meeting sponsored by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases from 31 August-3 September in Chantilly, Virginia, Redfield and Vahey both made presentations about the full data set of 26 patients; both presentations showed that the viral load data from all 26 patients indicated no statistically significant change with gp160 treatment.

In addition, viral load data from the first 15 patients “were similar to those of the entire 26 patients,” Col. Donald Burke, Redfield’s boss, explained to Army investigators.

How had Redfield found statistical significance where there apparently was none? That question was first addressed by Burke in an informal inquiry. According to Burke’s statement to Army investigators, he held a meeting with key Redfield collaborators on 28 August-just before Chantilly-and the attendees “all agreed that the data analysis [for Amsterdam] was done in haste, which resulted in some arbitrary criteria and methodological errors.”

Burke concluded there had been no scientific misconduct, only scientific error. In his statement to the Army investigators, Burke said that after the Chantilly presentations, “I was satisfied that the data were presented openly and accurately and that the conundrum regarding the Amsterdam presentation had been put to rest and the case was closed.”

The case was not closed. On 20 October, two Air Force AIDS researchers filed a formal complaint against Redfield that became the basis for the investigation. At the end of that process, Army investigator Dangerfield found that no misconduct had occurred and that any errors in Redfield’s presentation were due to haste. Dangerfield’s report cites Burke’s 28 August meeting as one explanation for that conclusion. The meeting, wrote Dangerfield in his final report, “concluded that the disparities between the analyses of [Lt. Col.] Redfield at Amsterdam and that of others arose by presenting preliminary data from less than the full study … and data analysis done in haste.”

That interpretation isn’t likely to satisfy some of Redfield’s colleagues. Three of them told Science they don’t believe haste was the reason Redfield’s analysis went awry. “I don’t think it was a silly, sophomoric mistake be- cause someone was rushed,” contends statistician William McCarthy, who until 15 July was the chief of biostatistics at the Jackson Foundation-and has resigned in frustration because of what he calls “a lack of candor” about the gp160 data. “The way the data were presented [in Amsterdam] was not legitimate, and it made the data look better than it would have looked had there been an appropriate analysis,” says McCarthy.

Two Redfield collaborators, who insist on not being quoted by name, also reject the notion that the Amsterdam presentation contained errors made in haste. Says one investigator: “I don’t think it was a presentation made by a researcher in a hurry. The presentation was sloppy and irresponsible. You go out and make a statement as an authority, as a world-class scientist, and you’re not super sure? Come on.” Another collaborator says Redfield’s presentation “was very well thought out.”

The FOIA documents, however, also reveal that Redfield has supporters among his colleagues. One of the strongest statements of support came from Lt. Col. John Brundage, WRAIR’s chief epidemiologist. Brundage, who helped Redfield with his statistical analysis prior to Amsterdam, told Danger- field he had attended the presentation and “did not feel it was inappropriate.” Brundage’s statement also said he thought Redfield had benefited from Brundage’s statistical “tutoring several days previously.”

Although the Army’s investigation of the Amsterdam presentation may not have satisfied all those close to these events, by 20 February of this year that phase of the investigation was closed. But because of concerns about WRAIR’s relationship with Americans for a Sound AIDS/HIV Policy, the Army launched a second probe–of that organization and its ties to Army researchers.

ASAP, which educates religious groups and aims to speed development of treatments, became snared in the Redfield investigation because of concerns that Redfield supporter W. Shepherd Smith Jr., the group’s president, was improperly contacting WRAIR researchers to discuss unreleased gp160 data. Like Redfield, Smith has been a strong supporter of gp160 therapy, testifying before Congress and even staging an investment seminar in Los Angeles for potential MicroGeneSys investors. Redfield is chairman of ASAP’s advisory board, which his chief collaborator, Deborah Birx, also serves on.

Specifically taken up in the Army probe was a phone call ASAP’s Smith made to Vahey on 24 August, in which they discussed the gp160 study and interpretations of the early results. Vahey was concerned enough about “the command of the data that Mr. Smith exhibited” and his opinions about how the gp160 data should be presented that she wrote a memo for the record, which the Army supplied to Science.

Smith told Science any implication he was trying to influence the analysis of gp160 data was “absolutely false,” stressing that his reason for calling had “nothing to do with the Amsterdam presentation.” Smith said he believes ASAP was brought into the Army’s investigation because “nothing was found in the first report and that wasn’t satisfactory to people who had staked their careers on finding something wrong with Bob Redfield.”

The Army investigation concluded that WRAIR provided ASAP with “scientific information that was not widely disseminated” and recommended that ties between the two groups “be severed so there is not an appearance of endorsement or favoritism.”

Severing the tie between ASAP and Army researchers, however, won’t end the questions still swirling around Robert Redfield, the gp160 vaccine, and MicroGeneSys. Although Redfield’s supporters are pleased with the outcome of the investigation, many of Redfield’s colleagues and others close to the investigation are not fully satisfied. A new investigation could be launched by a joint Army-Navy-Air Force team. Congress might also hold hearings on the issue. On the scientific front, gp160 will also come up again soon, since the military is staging a trial of the MicroGeneSys vaccine in more than 600 infected people. The trial will compare treated patients to a randomized control group receiving a placebo. A first look at the blinded data is scheduled for the fall. But, like every other new piece of information about gp160, those preliminary results are far more likely to start debate than to end it. -Jon Cohen SCIENCE VOL. 261 13 AUGUST 1993