The end of the Cold War has caused significant shifts in the nature of threats
to U.S. national security. The end of the adversarial relationship between the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. continues to have numerous impacts on the global power structure.
As threats such as organized crime, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and narcotics
trafficking have become more pronounced, it seems logical that the monitoring and
containment of these dangers should be handled by the U.S. Intelligence Community
(IC). However, there are other menaces that do not fit into the traditional role of
the IC. Environmental hazards, both natural and human-induced, present
significant threats to national and global security. However, collection and analysis
of most environmental data has typically been handled by civilian government
agencies and academia.

As policy makers and military officials become increasingly
cognizant of the importance of environmental intelligence, the question must be
asked, What kind of role, if any, should the IC take in dealing with these issues?
This question has many facets which must be carefully examined. Are joint
ventures among the IC, civilian agencies and academia feasible? Can dual-use
technologies lead to more cost-effective projects? What are the risks of exposing
collection techniques? Who funds these joint ventures? How are they tasked? Can
costs for projects that benefit the global community be shared with other countries?
What are the benefits, costs, and risks of declassifying old satellite imagery? Is
unclassified data derived from classified sources valuable to scientists? What role will
the commercial sector play, and how can private companies be prevented from
simply selling their technology to the highest bidder?

I have considered these
questions, and arrived at the conclusion that, whenever feasible, the IC should use
its superior technology to contribute to the collection of non-traditional
environmental intelligence, but leave the majority of the analysis to civilian agencies
and academia. I will supply background on the types of environmental intelligence
with which the IC historically has been involved. Then I will analyze non-traditional
kinds of environmental intelligence, and discuss the IC s current policy on these
issues. A brief description of the efforts of academia and civilian agencies in the
environmental arena will follow, before a review of a few case studies of joint
ventures. I will also look into the rapid developments being made in commercial
satellite systems, and evaluate the need for more well defined export controls to
limit the flow of industrial technology to enemies of the U.S. Finally, I will evaluate
the recent reform proposals offered by the Brown Commission, the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the Checklist for the Future of Intelligence,
the Twentieth Century Fund (TCF), and the Council for Foreign Relations (CFR).

HISTORY OF IC IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL INTELLIGENCE ARENA

Traditional Roles

Environmental intelligence itself can be broken up into two categories;
traditional and non-traditional. The IC has a history of involvement in
environmental data collection when the information relates to supporting the
military, tracking world-wide natural resource levels, monitoring compliance with
international environmental accords, and forecasting crop yields. During the Gulf
War, the CIA used its remote sensing technology to track the path of the toxic fumes
produced by the oil fires in Kuwait, and thus was able to keep U.S. troops away from
harm. The intelligence community also plays an important role in the enforcement
of both the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Stratospheric Ozone
Layer and the London Convention which limits waste disposal in the ocean. The U.S.
employed satellite imagery to estimate the Soviet wheat harvest throughout the Cold
War. Today, this practice is used on a broader scale as policy makers increasingly
acknowledge that the precarious stability of many nations can be shaken by drastic
food shortages.

Non-Traditional Roles

Aspects of environmental intelligence, such as dealing with natural disasters,
and tracking trends such as global warming, ozone depletion, deforestation,
desertification, and oceanic degradation, have been handled sparingly by the IC in
the past. The current debate about IC involvement centers around these roles.
In a speech to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) made
earlier this year, DCI John Deutch summed up the IC s policy on dealing with these
non-traditional environmental threats. We use imagery from existing systems to
support the work of the scientific community and other government agencies in
their efforts to understand global environmental phenomena. Specifically, the CIA
has established a Disaster Response Team (DRT) with the capability to disseminate
unclassified products to help fight natural disasters. On June 5, 1996, the team was
presented with an opportunity to test its effectiveness when the U.S. Forest Service
requested aid in monitoring fires which were ravaging the Alaskan wilderness.
Within 24 hours, the DRT managed to compile maps of the fires. According to DCI
Deutch, this information was more comprehensive and detailed than data collected
from overflights by civil aircraft and it was also available much more quickly. The
CIA also disseminates warnings about potential natural disasters on foreign soil
without charge to the relevant foreign governments. When intelligence satellites
picked up precursors to volcanic activity on the island of Montserrat, local officials
were notified of the danger and thousands of inhabitants were evacuated. Speaking
on these non-traditional uses of intelligence, Deutch asserted that the CIA believes
it is important to provide aid when the capabilities would not otherwise be
available.

However, the biggest step by the IC to venture into the non-traditional realm
of environmental intelligence occurred in 1992, with the establishment of the
Environmental Task Force (ETF), and the follow-up group called MEDEA. The mission
of this group of roughly 60 scientists, who were cleared for access to top secret
documents, was to determine whether the IC s technical assets could be used
productively by the scientific community to study environmental problems. A more
detailed case study of this initiative will follow later in the report.

ROLE OF ACADEMIA AND CIVILIAN AGENCIES

Regardless of the level of involvement which the IC decides to take in the
realm of non-traditional environmental intelligence, the bulk of environmental
research will likely remain in the hands of civilians. In addition to researchers in
hundreds of institutions of higher learning, a large number of government agencies
are engaged in the collection and analysis of environmental data. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS),
the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Minerals
Management Service (MMS), the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS), are the most important non-military / non-intelligence
members of the environmental research community.

FEMA was created to provide leadership and support to reduce the loss of
life and property in the face of natural disaster. This role includes the
dissemination of warnings about earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and other natural
catastrophes. In this capacity, FEMA has partnerships with the National Weather
Service (NWS) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).

NASA's contribution to the study of the environment has increased with the
recent implementation of their Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE) program, an
enterprise devoted to the study of the total Earth system and the effects of
natural and human-induced changes on the global environment. NASA is using
its space-based technology to monitor both short and long-term climate variability,
atmospheric ozone levels, and natural hazards. MTPE also works with NASA s
foreign counterparts, other Federal agencies, and university researchers to develop
advanced technologies that will lead to new, lower cost scientific investigations.

The EPA is primarily concerned with environmental issues on U.S. territory.
Some initiatives include the National Estuary Program, the Oil Spill Prevention and
Response Program, the Acid Rain Program, and the Ozone Layer Protection
Program. The EPA is an active participant in the environmental community and
collaborates with other Federal agencies, like NOAA, as well as with academic
researchers.

The NOAA is charged with the monumental task of describing and predicting
changes in the Earth s environment, and conserving and managing the Nation s
coastal and marine resources. Through the NOAA s Environmental Research
Laboratories (ERL), environmental research programs are jointly undertaken with
universities. ERL also offers grants to academic scientists. The NOAA works closely
with the National Weather Service, the National Environmental Satellite, Data and
Information Service (NESDIS), the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), and the
Navy. To carry out its research, the NOAA employs space-based satellite technology,
and a fleet of ships to conduct oceanographic measurements.

The USGS is the largest earth science and information agency in the U.S., and
its mission is to provide geologic, topographic, and hydrologic information that
contributes to the wise management of the Nation s natural resources. The
bureau also studies ways to predict, prevent, and mitigate the effects of natural
hazards.

Founded in 1950 with the passage of the National Science Foundation Act, the
NSF serves to support scientific research concerning national security and the
effects of scientific applications upon society, promote communication between U.S.
and foreign scientists, and provide a central clearinghouse for the collection,
interpretation, and analysis of data on scientific resources. The NSF s
international activities are extensive. With a budget of over $3 billion, its largest
international undertaking is the Global Change Research Program, half of which is
funded by the U.S. The NSF pays for about one quarter of the U.S. share. Other
international joint ventures include the Ocean Drilling Program, the Global Seismic
Network, the International Intelligent Manufacturing Systems Program, and the
Organization for Tropical Studies. The NSF also operates international research
facilities within the U.S., such as the National Center for Earthquake Engineering
Research at the State University of New York at Buffalo.

Two aspects of the Department of Energy s mission are to secure national
defense and improve the quality of the environment. As a result, the department
often plays a role in ventures which involve the dual use of technologies to serve
both defense and environmental purposes.

The Minerals Management Service, a division of the Department of the
Interior, is tasked with the management of the mineral resources of the outer
continental shelf. As a result, it participates in most projects that involve study
of marine areas or the ocean, including a current undertaking with Mexican ocean
scientists to study underwater mineral resources in the Gulf of Mexico.

The Bureau of Land Management is charged with sustaining the health,
diversity and productivity of 270 million acres of U.S. public lands. The agency
attempts to maximize benefits from the land s natural resources while minimizing
environmental degradation.

As an independent agency, the National Academy of Sciences provides
scientific advice to the U.S. policy-making community. Recently, the NAS has
dedicated resources to studying the conversion of defense enterprises to civilian
activities. For this reason, the academy has played a significant role in current
debates about the feasibility of dual-use technologies.

As this summary shows, the environmental community is far from dependent
on the IC. Hundreds of important programs function successfully without its aid.
However, in some cases, collaboration with the IC has yielded even better results
without incurring a higher cost.

JOINT VENTURES

The Environmental Task Force and MEDEA

As mentioned, the establishment of the ETF and, later, MEDEA represents a
deep commitment from the IC to investigate the utility of its technology in tackling
some non-traditional environmental issues. The impetus for the initiative grew out
of the efforts of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), and then-Senator Al Gore.
In early 1992, Gore suggested to DCI Robert Gates that classified data might be
useful in analyzing subjects such as global warming, ozone depletion, deforestation,
and the state of the oceans. Gates was amenable to the proposal, perhaps because
the IC was looking for a new mission in the changed intelligence environment of the
Post Cold War era.

Although the report issued by MEDEA was classified, journalist Robert Dreyfuss
obtained a copy of the draft summary. According to the article, the report states
that Changes in vegetative and desert boundaries, which may be sensitive
indicators of global climate change, can be tracked over time by satellite systems. .
.and the monitoring of changes in ocean temperature could provide a direct measure
of global warming. The CIA's vast imagery archives of Soviet territory that were
collected to monitor missile silos could also be used to note the date when the last
snow melted, an indicator of climate change trends. Since the Eisenhower
administration, satellite imagery of the globe has been collected consistently by the
IC. This data cannot be obtained from any other source, since commercial and
research satellites have only recently come into use. Another advantage to using
these images is that their quality is presently far superior to anything produced by
commercial or research satellites. For example, whereas the resolution of
intelligence images can be measured in inches, LANDSAT images have resolutions, at
best, of a few meters. For example, a LANDSAT image of a forest would depict only
splotches of greenery, while images from an intelligence satellite would allow
scientists to actually count individual trees and to ascertain their species.

During the Cold War, submarines took daily measurements of Arctic sea ice,
another valuable indicator of climate shifts. Again, such comprehensive data does
not exist outside of the IC. Additional examples of possibilities for dual use abound.
The IC's Global Positioning System would be able to monitor ice flows. Navy's
numerous undersea listening devices which operate to detect enemy submarines
could be used simultaneously to study whale migration, detect storms, or predict
undersea volcanic eruptions and earth quakes that can cause tidal waves. MEDEA
scientists also believe that the Defense Support System, which was created to
detect the sudden flare-up of an ICBM as it emerges from its silo, could be
employed to identify the outbreak of forest fires. Finally, technology from MASINT,
which the IC developed to monitor industrial emissions and to recognize the plumes
of airborne missiles, could be used to gauge the condition of forests. Says former
CIA analyst Bruce Berkowitz, if you take a reflection of sunlight off the top of a
forest canopy, you can do spectral analysis of the composition of the forest. That
will tell you if it s deficient in certain chemicals that are associated with healthy
vegetation.

The great value that these technologies can add to scientific study suggests
that dual use would, in theory, be a cost effective way to simultaneously achieve
multiple intelligence and environmental goals. DCI John Deutch affirmed this view in
a recent speech to the World Affairs Council: We are using intelligence capabilities
that are already in place. This important work requires no new capital
investment. However, he limited IC commitment by adding that he does not see
the IC becoming a center for environmental science expertise or directly sponsoring
research in that area. Nevertheless, it seems as though the IC is prepared to
assume a larger role in the area of environmental intelligence.

However, collaboration between the IC and the environmental research
community raises some thorny issues that threaten to derail, or at least mitigate,
the gains of joint projects. The single greatest obstacle to furthering scientific
inquiry through the use of intelligence archives and technology may be the CIA s
classification system. As John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists points
out, the fundamental tenet in science is that you tell everyone everything, and the
fundamental tenet in intelligence is that you don t tell anyone anything. The
CIA is very concerned that the release of intelligence images will betray their
collection techniques. As a result, the CIA seeks to release the data in a form from
which scientists will be unable to discern the exact time or location of a
measurement. Clearly, this requirement would diminish the usefulness of the data.
One solution to this problem would be to superimpose small sections of intelligence
images over larger LANDSAT images. Thus, research scientists could extrapolate from
the detailed image to form a reasonably accurate estimate of the composition of a
forest.

With regard to measurements of ice pack thickness, for example, the CIA has
been reluctant to disclose the process by which these measurements were obtained.
Eric Rodenburg of the World Resources Institute observes that without knowing the
procedure of collection, it is difficult to get an idea of the accuracy of those
measurements. Oceanographer Kenneth Hunkins identifies another problem posed
by collaboration with the IC. He said, the critical part of [science] is that the
results are reproducible. But of course, if you re the only one who has some
complicated satellite, nobody else can reproduce it.

The physical process of retrieving the archives is itself a monumental and
costly task. Wilfred Weeks, a scientist who participated in the ETF, laments that
pulling out a particular photograph or digital image from a mountain of archival
data, particularly when such data was not indexed for environmental purposes, is a
nightmare. The process is also slowed by the fact that unanimous consent within
the IC is required before documents or imagery can be declassified. Thus, a
document may be withheld from the public if one of the thirteen IC members
believes that their collection capabilities would be compromised by the release of
the file.

However, in 1992, Congress took a step toward ameliorating the problem by
appropriating $200 million to finance the mining of classified archives. In the
past year or so, the movement for declassification has gained momentum. On
February 22, 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12951, which called for
the release of all imagery produced by the CORONA, ARAGON, and LANYARD satellite
systems between 1960 and 1972. President Clinton also asserted that the
declassification of more recent satellite systems would be a priority. However,
realistically, declassification of more recent imagery is not likely to be forthcoming
in the near future. Bruce Berkowitz has bluntly summarized the reluctance of the
IC to declassify more recent imagery: You blow their system and they re out of
business.

Leveraging Resources in the Oceanographic Community

The oceans direct impact on important global environmental trends, from
climate change to weather patterns, makes them an important focus of scientific
research. The oceans are also crucial in their function as a theater for military
operations, both above and below the surface. Given the dual importance, it seems
logical to explore the possibilities of sharing technologies that can address both of
these needs simultaneously. At a January 25, 1996, joint hearing of the Military
Research and Development Subcommittee of the House National Security Committee,
the Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans Subcommittee of the House Resources Committee,
and the Energy and Environment Subcommittee of the House Science Committee,
these issues were addressed by leading figures in the military, government and
academia. All stressed the benefits of joint ventures and suggested that the
coordination process be formalized.

In his testimony, the late Admiral Jeremy Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations,
explained the Navy s new focus on developing a better understanding of coastal
waters to match its expertise in deep ocean operations. This change was
necessitated by the new regional threats presented in the Post Cold War era.
Coastal waters have more complicated underwater terrain and are subject to sudden
changes in surface conditions, which can adversely affect the performance of
weapons and collection sensors. To satisfy this new need, the Chief of Naval
Operations Executive Board has suggested that the Navy, which already produces
roughly twenty-five percent of ocean science and technology research, should
develop and operate coastal research platform laboratories on which military and
civil, operational and research communities can cooperate in testing new theories
and products. A give and take relationship between the Navy and the civil and
academic oceanographic community already exists. The Consortium for
Oceanographic Research and Education (CORE) is a loosely organized group of
twenty-nine major oceanographic research institutions which have an extensive
relationship with the Department of Defense in the area of oceanographic
research. The research community provides the Navy with most of its
meteorological and oceanographic data, which the Navy uses to back up its daily
operations, and the Navy makes public more than ninety percent of its
environmental findings.

A specific example of a successful joint venture involving a dual-use
technology is the partnership between the NOAA and Navy in using Navy s Integrated
Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS). IUSS is comprised of acoustic rays on the
ocean floor which, during the Cold War, were used to monitor movements of Soviet
submarines. The civil applications of this system have proven to be phenomenal.
In just one short demonstration of the system, NOAA scientists collected more
information on marine mammal movements than all the previous data collected in
history. IUSS was also successfully utilized to detect underwater seismic activity,
and scientists conjecture that it could be used to identify illegal commercial fishing.
To ensure that maximum utility is derived from this technology, the Navy has set up
a system whereby civilian scientists are cleared to use the system and to view past
measurements.

The Navy has made an effort to speed up declassification, and just over a
year ago, released all of its altimetry data collected from the GEOSAT satellite
network. The oceanography community has used this information to study
underwater surface features and the gravitational pull of the Earth.

In some cases, technology which served a purpose during the Cold War no
longer plays a lead role in defending national security. One example is the Air
Force s Over-The-Horizon-Backscatter radar, a highly sensitive system originally
intended to detect enemy aircraft. Recently, it was used to chart sea conditions and
wind patterns, information that is valuable in predicting hurricanes and other
weather disturbances. The Air Force permitted scientists from NOAA to use the
system until the Department of Defense decided to shut it down. Although the
termination of this system undoubtedly disappointed the civilian research scientists,
it would not have been justified, in a time of military downsizing, to keep a
superfluous system operational simply for the marginally improved weather
prediction which it provided. However, when a defense or intelligence technology
remains useful in its intended capacity, effort should be expended to make the
system serve scientific ends as well.

A successful international program, in which NOAA and other members of the
U.S. oceanographic community, as well as over 30 foreign nations, participate, is the
Joint Global Ocean Flux Study (JGOFS). The project has made important
advancements in the study of one of the most significant factors in global warming,
the passage of carbon dioxide between air and water. Another auspicious
international effort is the monitoring of fisheries to avoid over-exploitation.

Although there have been many successful joint ventures which have achieved
both defense and environmental goals, coordination can often pose problems. In
many instances, opportunities for leveraging multi-billion dollar defense systems
before they degrade are being missed. This inefficiency is one of the factors that
spurred the passage of a bill in the House of Representatives to encourage dual-use
joint ventures. Another reason behind the Congressional initiative was that no single
member of the oceanography community had the resources to take full
responsibility for the oversight and coordination of joint ventures. The question
Congress faced was, at what level would activities be coordinated? There were clear
tradeoffs between a coordinating body comprised of high-level government officials
and one composed of those individuals most closely associated with the
oceanographic research and technological development. Congress chose the latter
alternative by chartering a committee on which all of the members have direct links
to the oceanographic community. H.R. 3537, the Federal Oceanography
Coordination Improvement Act of 1996, was passed this past July.

THE GROWTH OF COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY

Some have argued that the debate about collaboration between the IC and
civilian scientists may soon be irrelevant. They believe that commercial technology
will soon rival with defense technology, and that scientists will merely have to pay
for time on a commercial satellite to do the kind of research that is now only
possible with intelligence or defense systems. Former CIA officer and Marine Corps
intelligence specialist Robert Steele believes that it is only a matter of time before
this scenario comes to pass. He points to the disparity between the budget allotted
to technology development in the IC, and the $500 billion-a-year information
industry. Increased demand for space-based satellite imagery has boosted
industry in recent years. In 1995, Lockheed Martin announced that, by 1997, it
would have sophisticated satellites capable of one meter resolution, the highest
resolution earth imagery available for commercial satellites. While companies like
Lockheed, which have a long history as defense contractors for the military, do not
pose a threat of selling technology to adversaries of the U.S., there are many firms
in foreign nations, which possess technology comparable to U.S. companies. Since
the U.S. can only impose shutter controls on American companies, it will be
increasingly difficult to stop the flow of technology from these foreign countries to
hostile nations. International export agreements seem like the best way to handle
this threat. However, enforcement of these agreements will likely require high levels
of vigilance on the part of the IC.

RECENT REFORM PROPOSALS

There is wide acknowledgment among politicians and political scientists that
the end of the Cold War necessitates a rethinking of the mission and structure of
the IC. Most studies observe that U.S. national security is now endangered by a
multitude of threats, whereas before the fall of the Soviet Union, something
between two-thirds and three-quarters of the major problems derived in one way or
the other from Moscow. Nearly all of the studies discussed below agree that
environmental degradation is a serious problem, and that it can have an impact on
national security. However, they take differing positions on the proper role for the
IC in this area.

The Checklist

In the Checklist for the Future of Intelligence, written by Dr. John Hedley
for the use of the Brown Commission, the author asserts that the IC can neither
competently nor cost-effectively function as a general information service.
Hedley calls the environment a peripheral issue, and recommends that, except
for special circumstances when the IC has a unique advantage in expertise, the bulk
of collection and analysis in this area should be handled by civilian agencies or the
academic community.

The Brown Commission

In the Brown Commission report, there is scarcely half a page dedicated to a
recommendation for the IC s role in collecting and analyzing environmental
information. Although the commission acknowledges the growing importance of
environmental intelligence, and endorses the traditional roles for the IC in this area,
it does not believe that the IC should make environmental intelligence a priority.
Specifically, the Commission opines that the use of technical capabilities to collect
information on environmental problems is legitimate but should not duplicate what
civil authorities are able to obtain. The report claims that civil agencies are
ordinarily in a better position to analyze information relating to environmental
matters, but allows for IC involvement when it possesses a special analytical
expertise in a given area. Regarding the dangers posed by the export of
technology to U.S. adversaries, the Brown Commission advocates export controls.

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) study finds
that IMINT will continue to be an important collection discipline for a wide variety
of issues including ecological problems. However, the panel struggles with the
issue of providing imagery to non-intelligence consumers. As a means to aid
civilian consumers without betraying collection capabilities, HPSCI suggests the use
of graphical overlays, in which sections of a high-resolution image are superimposed
on a LANDSAT or commercial image. With regard to commercial satellite systems,
the study recommends that the IC improve its acquisition and use of commercially
available imagery to complement its existing capabilities. Like the Brown
Commission, HPSCI endorses shutter controls on commercial systems to avoid use by
enemies of the U.S.

Council on Foreign Relations

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) report, Making Intelligence Smarter,
asks the question, What are the higher priorities likely to be for intelligence
collection in the foreseeable future? Environmental protection does not make
this list because open sources are normally sufficient.

Twentieth Century Fund

The Twentieth Century Fund (TCF) task force report acknowledges the
increased importance of environmental issues, and adds that problems like holes in
the ozone layer have a tremendous impact on modern diplomacy and foreign
policy. However, the report equivocates on the question of whether the study of
environmental problems should be handled by the IC or left to academia and non-
intelligence government agencies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

During the Congressional committee hearings on the coordination of
oceanographic research, Chairman Representative Curt Weldon pointed out that, in
the U.S., if you re a supporter of defense, you re considered to be against the
environment, or if you re for the environment, you re not for defense. He then
added, Well, we re going to take a new approach. We re going to be for both.
This attitude, if not typical of most politicians, makes a lot of sense.

Because traditional threats to national security such as a nuclear attack or
terrorism can present immediate danger to U.S. security, politicians, who tend to
have relatively short time-horizons, often fail to prioritize threats like
environmental degradation, which develop over longer periods of time. I do not
disagree that, given limited resources, more immediate concerns, like terrorism
or counter-proliferation, should take precedence over problems such as
environmental monitoring. However, when the study of the environment can be
markedly improved by leveraging intelligence and defense technology that already
exist, and thus do not incur substantial new costs, it seems misguided not to
make the minimal investment, as long as there is no risk of exposing collection
techniques.

This last qualifier, however, places serious restraints on the cooperation
between the IC and civilian agencies and academia. Because of the obvious
threat to national security, scientists outside the IC cannot be indiscriminately
entrusted with highly confidential data or images. Since much of the data serves
a military or intelligence function as well as an environmental one, caution must
be exercised in the release of information. Clearly, it would be unwise to order
the wholesale declassification of all of the IC s IMINT archives, thus giving
scientists unlimited access to this environmental data. Nevertheless, release of
images from 1960-1972 was a good start, and efforts should be hastened to
declassify more recent satellite imagery. If some photos are particularly
sensitive, these could be withheld, but I suspect that a large number of images
from the 1970s, and even the 1980s, could be released without betraying
collection techniques which are not already obsolete, or raising the ire of foreign
nations on whom we have spied.

In terms of disseminating current intelligence to civilian agencies and
research scientists, the IC is willing and able to distribute unclassified documents
derived from classified sources. However, many scientists have bristled at the
suggestion of using maps which do not specify time, date or location. This
conflict can only be resolved in favor of the interests of the IC because
protecting national security has a higher priority than observing proper
guidelines for scientific inquiry. Ultimately, the IC s discretion must be trusted
to decide which risks are allowable. However, because of the IC s tendency to
be overly cautious, the President and the Congressional oversight committees
must press the IC into releasing as much environmentally valuable information
as is securely possible.

The precedent set by the oceanographic community in forming joint ventures,
and exploring efficient applications for dual-use technology should be emulated
in other areas of environmental study which overlap with defense interests. In
this case, the responsibilities of over forty Congressional oversight committees
were consolidated into one governing body with the authority to task joint
ventures. More important, through collaboration, the quality of both Naval and
civilian research has improved, and costs have not risen. Congress should
stimulate joint ventures like the ones established in the Oceanographic
community by earmarking a certain portion of the appropriate military,
intelligence and civilian agencies respective budgets specifically for
collaborative research.

International projects like the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, an agreement
between the U.S. and Russia to share products derived from national
intelligence to help solve environmental problems of concern to both countries,
should also be encouraged. Often, foreign countries have specialized in
collecting information in areas which, by comparison, U.S. intelligence has
neglected. For example, the former Soviet Union possesses vast archives of data
on the Arctic, while U.S. knowledge of the region is relatively deficient.
International intelligence sharing is a cost-effective way to increase global reach
and improve surge capability.

The current informal process by which an agency like FEMA is able to task
the IC for intelligence products, like maps to help fight forest fires, should not
be formalized. If the IC is able to comply with requests for assistance in
situations in which substantial life and property are at risk, it has the moral
responsibility to offer its services. However, if a system were designed whereby
any request from a civilian agency had to be met, the number of requests would
likely rise, and the IC s human and financial resources would be diverted from
their primary goals. Intelligence is not free and cannot be treated as if its
production does not require the application of resources.

MEASURING SUCCESS

The success of these proposals can be gauged by assessing the quality and
level of output of research in the scientific community resulting from the enhanced
collaboration between the IC, civilian government, and academic research. Increased
accuracy and timeliness of warnings for natural disasters would also be a sign that
the environmental and intelligence communities are functioning efficiently. Reports
from committees like the newly formed National Oceanographic Partnership Program
would serve as a means of checking the progress of joint-venture reforms. Although
many determinants of global environmental trends are outside the influence of U.S.
policy makers, indicators like the rate of global warming or the size of the hole in
the ozone layer could be used as rough measurements of the success of
environmental intelligence efforts.

CONCLUSION

A frequently argued position against IC involvement in environmental study is
that any information on the environment that would be relevant to policy makers
can be gathered through open sources. Although policy makers probably could get
by on unclassified information, the deeper their knowledge of our environment, the
better prepared they will be to deal with environmental hazards before the problems
reach irreversible proportions.

Another argument against placing the environment under the IC umbrella asserts that by
studying the environment, the IC is distracted from its primary goals. According to columnist
Bruce Fein, international conflict and turmoil is better explained by political rivalries, disputes
over boundaries or natural resources, and religious animosities, than by famine, soil erosion, rapid
population growth, and desertification. However, Fein contradicts himself. He claims that a
dispute over natural resources is a legitimate cause of international strife. However, he dismisses
as irrelevant the study of soil erosion and desertification, key determinants of the quantity of
arable land, the most precious natural resource in many areas of the globe.

These criticisms of environmental intelligence fail to recognize that, in many instances,
environmental issues can be linked to many of the IC s primary missions. In this sense,
environmental intelligence is an important facet of a balanced defense of national security, and
therefore, merits a place on the intelligence agenda.

Bibliography

Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (Washington, D.C.,
U.S. Printing Office: March 1, 1996.)

Council on Foreign Relations. Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S.
Intelligence.

Deutch, John. The Environment on the Intelligence Agenda, Speech at the World
Affairs Council, Los Angeles, CA. July 25, 1996.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Military Research and Development
Subcommittee of House National Security Committee, Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans
Subcommittee of House Resources Committee, Energy and Environment
Subcommittee of House Science Committee. Leveraging National Oceanographic
Capabilities. Hearings, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., January 25, 1996. (Testimony given by
Dr. D. James Baker, Undersecretary for Oceans and Atmosphere at NOAA, Admiral
Jeremy Boorda, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Watkins, U.S. Navy (Ret.), and
Representative Curt Weldon, Chairman.)

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Military Research and Development
Subcommittee of House National Security Committee, and Wildlife, Fisheries and
Oceans Subcommittee of House National Security. Disposal of Radioactive Materials
in the Ocean. Hearings, 104th Cong., 1st sess., December 6, 1995. (Testimony given
by Lawrence K. Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology,
CIA.)

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Appropriations, and Subcommittee on
National Security. House Appropriations National Security FY96 Defense Appropriations. Hearings,
104th Cong., 1st sess., May 16, 1995. (Testimony given by Admiral James D. Watkins, U.S. Navy
(Ret.).)