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When anger masks apathy

Publication date:
Jun 02, 2014 04:31 PM

Start:
Jun 02, 2014 12:00 AM

As a closer look at the European
Parliament Elections in Central and Eastern Europe suggests, it may be
non-voting, rather than populist protest voting, which could prove the
real
long-term threat to sustainability of the EU’s troubled democratic
institutions.Dr Sean Hanley2 June 2014

The
results of the elections to the European Parliament which took place
across the EU’s 28 member states in May were very much as predicted – at
least in the ‘old’ pre-2004 member states: driven by frustration with
austerity, economic stagnation, diminished opportunities and a yawning
sense of disconnect with established parties and politicians, a variety
of outsider parties made sweeping gains and unignorably stamped
themselves on the electoral map.

In Northern
Europe, where socio-economic malaise and disconnect were often refracted
through the politics of anti-immigration, this tended to benefit right
wing, Eurosceptic parties. In Southern Europe anti-austerity parties of
the radical left such as Greece’s Syriza or Podemos in Spain gained
most.

The most spectacular gains have been
made by parties of varying political complexions which had a long-time
presence at the political margins: UKIP in the UK, the Front National in
France, Sinn Féin in Ireland. Whatever their coloration, the scale of
their political success underlines the potential fragility of mainstream
parties in Western Europe - even in states with well-established party
systems previously considered immune to populist surges such as Spain or
the UK.

Many commentators have lumped in the
newer EU member states of Central and Eastern with the unfolding (if
exaggerated) story of a populist backlash in the EU’s West European
heartlands. Anticipating the strong showing of the radical right in
Denmark, Holland and Austria The Observer’s Julian Coman, for example,
causally assured readers that ‘across much of eastern Europe, it is a similar story’.

But,
in fact, it was not: outsider and anti-establishment parties, perhaps
surprisingly, did not perform well in Central and Eastern Europe. The
extreme right, with the marked exception of Hungary, has long been weak
in the region and flopped badly even in countries like Slovenia,
Slovakia and Croatia, where polls had suggested it might pick up some
MEPs.

Hungary’s powerful extreme right-wing party
Jobbik secured a widely reported second place (and 14.8% vote share).
But this success was more an optical illusion caused by the disunity of
the mainstream Hungarian liberal left. The radical right party’s vote
share in fact fell sharply compared to the parliamentary elections in
April.

The only appreciable success in Central
Eastern Europe enjoyed by a new party of the radical right was chalked
up by the Congress of the New Right (KNP) in Poland, a political vehicle
for the long-time enfant terrible of Polish politics Janusz Korwin
Mikke whose eccentric libertarian views variously embrace the
restoration of the monarchy; doubts over Hitler’s responsibility for the
Holocaust; and suggestions that the European Parliament building be
redeveloped as a brothel. The KNP’s modest 7.2% vote gives it four MEPs,
including the redoubtable Korwin Mikke.

New anti-political parties of a more centrist persuasion which have been so much a feature of politics in Central and Eastern Europe
in recent years also failed to make much of an impact: the ANO movement
of billionaire Andrej Babiš narrowly topped the poll in the Czech
Republic, but had weaker (16%) support than some polls had predicted. In
Slovenia, the hastily formed ‘I Believe’ list created by the former
head of the country’s Court of Auditors Igor Šoltés – whose entire
campaign reportedly amounted to an intermittently functioning Twitter
account – gained a more creditable 10.5%, while in Bulgaria the more
controversial anti-corruption party Bulgaria Without Censorship polled
10.7%.

The real story of Central and Eastern
Europe was, however, one of non-voters: ten of the twelve lowest
turnouts across the EU in generally low turnout elections were recorded
in post-communist member states. The Czech Republic and Slovakia
recorded the lowest levels of participation on 19.5% and 13% turnouts
respectively – levels of abstention which arguably begin to drain those
elected of legitimacy. (Only in Lithuania - where the EU poll coincided
with second round of voting in presidential elections - did turnout
match the 43% EU average.)

Since their inception in
1979, turnout in European elections has been low (and declining) and
turnout has generally been lower than average in Central and Eastern
Europe, where European integration has always been a technocratic,
top-down project with limited societal engagement. Voters in the region
may sense small, poorer post-communist states have a limited real
influence on the direction of EU affairs, but few realistic exit
options.

However, it is perhaps is worth reflecting
that Central and East Europeans have already turned to new
anti-establishment protest parties in large numbers in recent national
elections: they have not needed the opportunity of the European
elections to cast mass protest votes triggering electoral earthquake of
the kind UKIP celebrated last week. Having now used up this option,
many voters in the region have moved on to the next stage and simply
switched off and disengaged from the electoral process altogether.

Given
this prior history, it is tempting to wonder that in some ways Central
and Eastern European voters may be ahead of the game. If the various
victorious protest parties of 2014 disappoint, in 2019 will we see the
spread of near-critical rates of abstention seen in Slovakia or the
Czech Republic? Non-voting, rather than populist protest voting could
prove the real long-term threat to sustainability of the EU’s troubled
democratic institutions.

Dr Sean Hanley, Senior Lecturer in Comparative Central and East European Politics, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies