We
accepted discretionary review of this marital-dissolution
case to determine as a matter of first impression in Kentucky
whether an attorney's contingent-fee contracts should be
considered marital property to be divided as part of the
equitable division of the marital estate. We hold that they
should, reversing the Court of Appeals. We also hold that
trial courts must apply the delayed-distribution method to
determine the actual distribution of funds.

I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

When
Albert and Sally Grasch divorced, Albert had an active law
practice in which he had executed contingent-fee contracts
with some clients, which the trial court treated as a
component of Albert's income when received and not as
property of the marital estate subject to division. Sally
argues to this Court-as t she did in the courts
below-that these contracts constitute divisible marital
property in a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the value
of which she claims the right to share, while Albert
counters-as he successfully argued below-that these contracts
are not marital property.

II.
ANALYSIS.

"[A]
trial court's ruling regarding the classification of
marital property is reviewed de novo as the
resolution of such issues is a matter of
law."[1]

In
order to ascertain whether a contingent-fee contract
qualifies as divisible marital property in a dissolution
proceeding, we must first define marital property.
KRS 403.190(2) defines marital property as "all
property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the
marriage..." with various exceptions, none of which
apply in this case. Because marital property
includes all property acquired by either spouse
subsequent to the marriage, we must provide a definition of
property. This Court defines property
broadly and expansively, stating in Travis v. Travis
that property, as used in KRS 403.190, "refers
to a determinate thing or an interest in a determinate
thing."[2]

We must
also ascertain what exactly a contingent-fee contract is. A
contingent-fee contract has been defined as a fee
agreement under which the attorney will not be paid unless
the client is successful.[3] This Court in First Nat. Bank of
Louisville v. Progressive Cas Ins. Co. explained the
nature of the contingent-fee contract. According to First
National Bank, a contingent-fee contract is nothing more
or less than a certain and specific property right-it is the
right to assert a cause of action to enforce a lien on a
client's potential recovery in order to secure rightfully
contracted-for payment for legal services.[4]In other words,
the right is that of a chose in action. A chose in
action is the right to bring a lawsuit, which the Court
of Appeals in Poe v. Poe stated to be
"undeniably a property right."[5]

In
deciding this issue, we find ourselves drawn to the reasoning
of the Court of Appeals' analysis of a similar issue in
Poe v. Poe.[6] In holding a nonvested military
pension to be marital property, the Court of Appeals first
recognized that it needed to change the way it analyzed
property law as it relates to family law.[7]

The
Court of Appeals acknowledged the "traditional" way
of thinking about property law as it relates to family law:
"[I]t is apparently reasoned...that absent some present
right to payment, future or immediate, a spouse's
interest in a nonvested pension plan such as the military
plan now before us cannot be considered 'property'
and is instead a mere expectancy which cannot be divided as
marital property...." The Court of Appeals then stated,
"For several reasons we consider such reasoning, albeit
traditionally accepted, to be inadequate in the present
circumstances."[8]

The
Court of Appeals then outlined the pitfalls of applying
traditional property law concepts to the idea of marital
property, including the problem with making decisions about
what constitutes marital property based on the concept of the
"vesting" of property, finally culminating in a
statement that we find to be most applicable in our analysis
today: "Setting aside this [traditional] approach for
the moment, we turn to the courts of New Jersey, which
have wisely avoided the pitfall of becoming entangled in
applying ancient property law concepts to such an unusual and
important marital asset."[9] Taking into account the wise
reasoning of Poe, we cannot confine ourselves to
thinking about this issue under the cloud of "ancient
property law concepts, " such as the "vesting"
of property.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The
Court of Appeals applied New Jersey&#39;s rule that
"vesting as it originated in the law of future interests
has been specifically held in New (Jersey to
have little meaning in determining the equitable distribution
of the marital estate."[10] The rationale New Jersey uses
in analyzing issues of marital property is the same rationale
...

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