Promotion to first Lieutenant-capture of the City of Mexico-the Army-Mexican soldiers- peace negotiations

On entering the city the troops were fired upon by the released convicts, and possibly by deserters and hostile citizens.
The streets were deserted, and the place presented the appearance of a “city of the dead,” except for this firing by unseen persons from house-tops, windows, and around corners.
In this firing the lieutenant-colonel of my regiment, Garland, was badly wounded, Lieutenant Sidney Smith, of the 4th infantry, was also wounded mortally.
He died a few days after, and by his death I was promoted to the grade of first lieutenant.1 I had gone into the battle of Palo Alto in May, 1846, a second lieutenant, and I entered the city of Mexico sixteen months later with the same rank, after having been in all the engagements possible for any one man and in a regiment that lost more officers during the war than it ever had present at any one engagement.
My regiment lost four
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commissioned officers, all senior to me, by steamboat explosions during the Mexican war. The Mexicans were not so discriminating.
They sometimes picked off my juniors.

General Scott soon followed the troops into the city, in state.
I wonder that he was not fired upon, but I believe he was not; at all events he was not hurt.
He took quarters at first in the “Halls of the Montezumas,” and from there issued his wise and discreet orders for the government of a conquered city, and for suppressing the hostile acts of liberated convicts already spoken of-orders which challenge the respect of all who study them.
Lawlessness was soon suppressed, and the City of Mexico settled down into a quiet, law-abiding place.
The people began to make their appearance upon the streets without fear of the invaders.
Shortly afterwards the bulk of the troops were sent from the city to the villages at the foot of the mountains, four or five miles to the south and south-west.

Whether General Scott approved of the Mexican war and the manner in which it was brought about, I have no means of knowing.
His orders to troops indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably a little regard for the perpetuation of his own fame.
On the other hand, General Taylor's, I think, indicate that he considered the administration accountable for the war, and felt no responsibility resting on himself further than for the faithful performance of his duties.
Both generals deserve the commendations of their countrymen and to live in the grateful memory of this people to the latest generation.

Earlier in this narrative I have stated that the plain, reached after passing the mountains east of Perote, extends to the cities of Puebla and Mexico.
The route travelled by the army before reaching Puebla, goes over a pass in a spur of mountain coming up from the south.
This pass is very susceptible of defence by a smaller against a larger force.
Again, the highest point of the road-bed between Vera Cruz and the City of Mexico is over Rio Frio mountain, which also might have been successfully defended by an inferior against a superior force.
But by moving north of the mountains, and about thirty miles north of Puebla, both of these passes would have been avoided.
The road from Perote to the City of Mexico, by this latter route, is as level as the prairies in our West.
Arriving due north from Puebla, troops could have been detached to take possession of that place, and then proceeding west with the rest of the army no mountain would have been encountered before reaching the City of Mexico.
It is true this road would have brought troops in by Guadalupe — a town, church and detached spur of mountain about two miles north of the capital, all
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bearing the same general name-and at this point Lake Texcoco comes near to the mountain, which was fortified both at the base and on the sides: but troops could have passed north of the mountain and come in only a few miles to the north-west, and so flanked the position, as they actually did on the south.

It has always seemed to me that this northern route to the City of Mexico, would have been the better one to have taken.
But my later experience has taught me two lessons: first, that things are seen plainer after the events have occurred; second, that the most confident critics are generally those who know the least about the matter criticised.
I know just enough about the Mexican war to approve heartily of most of the generalship, but to differ with a little of it. It is natural that an important city like Puebla should not have been passed with contempt; it may be natural that the direct road to it should have been taken; but it could have been passed, its evacuation insured and possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemy in intricate mountain defiles.
In this same way the City of Mexico could have been approached without any danger of opposition, except in the open field.

But General Scott's successes are an answer to all criticism.
He invaded a populous country, penetrating two hundred and sixty miles into the interior, with a force at no time equal to one-half of that opposed to him; he was without a base; the enemy was always intrenched, always on the defensive; yet he won every battle, he captured the capital, and conquered the government.
Credit is due to the troops engaged, it is true, but the plans and the strategy were the general's.

I had now made marches and been in battle under both General Scott and General Taylor.
The former divided his force of 10,500 men into four columns, starting a day apart, in moving from Puebla to the capital of the nation, when it was known that an army more than twice as large as his own stood ready to resist his coming.
The road was broad and the country open except in crossing the Rio Frio mountain. General Taylor pursued the same course in marching toward an enemy.
He moved even in smaller bodies.
I never thought at the time to doubt the infallibility of these two generals in all matters pertaining to their profession.
I supposed they moved in small bodies because more men could not be passed over a single road on the same day with their artillery and necessary trains.
Later I found the fallacy of this belief.
The rebellion, which followed as a sequence to the Mexican war, never could have been suppressed if larger bodies of men
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could not have been moved at the same time than was the custom under Scott and Taylor.

The victories in Mexico were, in every instance, over vastly superior numbers.
There were two reasons for this.
Both General Scott and General Taylor had such armies as are not often got together.
At the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, General Taylor had a small army, but it was composed exclusively of regular troops, under the best of drill and discipline.
Every officer, from the highest to the lowest, was educated in his profession, not at West Point necessarily, but in the camp, in garrison, and many of them in Indian wars.
The rank and file were probably inferior, as material out of which to make an army, to the volunteers that participated in all the later battles of the war; but they were brave men, and then drill and discipline brought out all there was in them.
A better army, man for man, probably never faced an enemy than the one commanded by General Taylor in the earliest two engagements of the Mexican war. The volunteers who followed were of better material, but without drill or discipline at the start.
They were associated with so many disciplined men and professionally educated officers, that when they went into engagements it was with a confidence they would not have felt otherwise.
They became soldiers themselves almost at once.
All these conditions we would enjoy again in case of war.

The Mexican army of that day was hardly an organization.
The private soldier was picked up from the lower class of the inhabitants when wanted; his consent was not asked; he was poorly clothed, worse fed, and seldom paid.
He was turned adrift when no longer wanted.
The officers of the lower grades were but little superior to the men. With all this I have seen as brave stands made by some of these men as I have ever seen made by soldiers.
Now Mexico has a standing army larger than that of the United States.
They have a military school modelled after West Point.
Their officers are educated and, no doubt, generally brave.
The Mexican war of 1846-8 would be an impossibility in this generation.

The Mexicans have shown a patriotism which it would be well if we would imitate in part, but with more regard to truth.
They celebrate the anniversaries of Chapultepec and Molino del Rey as of very great victories.
The anniversaries are recognized as national holidays.
At these two battles, while the United States troops were victorious, it was at very great sacrifice of life compared with what the Mexicans suffered.
The Mexicans, as on many other occasions, stood up as well as any troops ever did. The trouble seemed to be the lack of
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experience among the officers, which led them after a certain time to simply quit, without being particularly whipped, but because they had fought enough.
Their authorities of the present day grow enthusiastic over their theme when telling of these victories, and speak with pride of the large sum of money they forced us to pay in the end. With us, now twenty years after the close of the most stupendous war ever known, we have writers — who profess devotion to the nation-engaged in trying to prove that the Union forces were not victorious; practically, they say, we were slashed around from Donelson to Vicksburg and to Chattanooga; and in the East from Gettysburg to Appomattox, when the physical rebellion gave out from sheer exhaustion.
There is no difference in the amount of romance in the two stories.

I would not have the anniversaries of our victories celebrated, nor those of our defeats made fast days and spent in humiliation and prayer; but I would like to see truthful history written.
Such history will do full credit to the courage, endurance and soldierly ability of the American citizen, no matter what section of the country he hailed from, or in what ranks he fought.
The justice of the cause which in the end prevailed, will, I doubt not, come to be acknowledged by every citizen of the land, in time.
For the present, and so long as there are living witnesses of the great war of sections, there will be people who will not be consoled for the loss of a cause which they believed to be holy.
As time passes, people, even of the South, will begin to wonder how it was possible that their ancestors ever fought for or justified institutions which acknowledged the right of property in man.

After the fall of the capital and the dispersal of the government of Mexico, it looked very much as if military occupation of the country for a long time might be necessary.
General Scott at once began the preparation of orders, regulations and laws in view of this contingency.
He contemplated making the country pay all the expenses of the occupation, without the army becoming a perceptible burden upon the people.
His plan was to levy a direct tax upon the separate states, and collect, at the ports left open to trade, a duty on all imports.
From the beginning of the war private property had not been taken, either for the use of the army or of individuals, without full compensation.
This policy was to be pursued.
There were not troops enough in the valley of Mexico to occupy many points, but now that there was no organized army of the enemy of any size, reinforcements could be got from the Rio Grande, and there were also new volunteers arriving from time to time, all by way of Vera Cruz.
Military possession was
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taken of Cuernavaca, fifty miles south of the City of Mexico; of Toluca, nearly as far west, and of Pachuca, a mining town of great importance, some sixty miles to the north-east.
Vera Cruz, Jalapa, Orizaba, and Puebla were already in our possession.

Meanwhile the Mexican government had departed in the person of Santa Anna, and it looked doubtful for a time whether the United States commissioner, Mr. Trist, would find anybody to negotiate with.
A temporary government, however, was soon established at Queretaro, and Trist began negotiations for a conclusion of the war. Before terms were finally agreed upon he was ordered back to Washington, but General Scott prevailed upon him to remain, as an arrangement had been so nearly reached, and the administration must approve his acts if he succeeded in making such a treaty as had been contemplated in his instructions.
The treaty was finally signed the 2d of February, 1848, and accepted by the government at Washington.
It is that known as the “Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,” and secured to the United States the Rio Grande as the boundary of Texas, and the whole territory then included in New Mexico and Upper California, for the sum of $15,000,000.

Soon after entering the city of Mexico, the opposition of Generals Pillow, Worth and Colonel [James] Duncan to General Scott became very marked.
Scott claimed that they had demanded of the President his removal.
I do not know whether this is so or not, but I do know of their unconcealed hostility to their chief.
At last he placed them in arrest, and preferred charges against them of insubordination and disrespect.
This act brought on a crisis in the career of the general commanding.
He had asserted from the beginning that the administration was hostile to him; that it had failed in its promises of men and war material; that the President himself had shown duplicity if not treachery in the endeavor to procure the appointment of Benton: and the administration now gave open evidence of its enmity.
About the middle of February orders came convening a court of inquiry, composed of Brevet Brigadier-General Towson, the paymaster of the army, Brigadier-General [Caleb] Cushing and Colonel [William G.] Belknap, to inquire into the conduct of the accused and the accuser, and shortly afterwards orders were received from Washington, relieving Scott of the command of the army in the field and assigning Major-
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General William 0.
Butler of Kentucky to the place.
This order also released Pillow, Worth, and Duncan from arrest.

If a change was to be made the selection of General Butler was agreeable to every one concerned, so far as I remember to have heard expressions on the subject.
There were many who regarded the treatment of General Scott as harsh and unjust.
It is quite possible that the vanity of the General had led him to say and do things that afforded a plausible pretext to the administration for doing just what it did and what it had wanted to do from the start.
The court tried the accuser quite as much as the accused.
It was adjourned before completing its labors, to meet in Frederick, Maryland. General Scott left the country, and never after had more than the nominal command of the army until early in 1861.
He certainly was not sustained in his efforts to maintain discipline in high places.

The efforts to kill off politically the two successful generals, made them both candidates for the Presidency.
General Taylor was nominated in 1848, and was elected.
Four years later General Scott received the nomination but was badly beaten, and the party nominating him died with his defeat.1

1
The Mexican war made three presidential candidates, Scott, Taylor, and Pierce --and any number of aspirants for that high office.
It made also governors of States, members of the cabinet, foreign ministers, and other officers of high rank both in state and nation.
The rebellion, which contained more war in a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole Mexican war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results to those engaged on the Union side.
On the other side, the side of the South, nearly every man who holds office of any sort whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a Confederate soldier; but this is easily accounted for from the fact that the South was a military camp, and there were very few people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it.

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