DEF-16 MAKE THE ARMY RESPONSIBLE FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

Ground forces and air forces have typically operated
in the same area and provided each other with mutual
support. Forces on the ground have defended air
bases from attack from both land forces and enemy
aircraft. Conversely, air forces--in missions referred
to as close air support and battlefield air interdiction--have attacked from the air targets that are
beyond the reach of ground-based weapons. Those
roles have become more complex, however, as
ground-based weapons--helicopters and artillery in
particular--have attained the ability to attack enemy
assets at longer ranges. This option would relieve the
Air Force of the responsibility for providing air
support to the Army. A consequence of adopting this
option is that the Army would have to rely on its own
assets, such as attack helicopters and artillery, to
attack targets beyond the range of direct-fire weapons
such as tanks.

Even though the Air Force has had responsibility
for providing close air support (CAS) to the Army for
the past 50 years, several defense experts have
expressed concerns and doubts about the willingness
or ability of the Air Force to do so adequately. The
CAS mission involves attacking hostile targets that
are near friendly forces and requires close
coordination with the Army. Although the Air Force
has an airplane, the A-10, that is dedicated solely to
the CAS mission, the service has periodically
attempted to eliminate all of the A-10s from its force
structure. The Air Force still has 168 A-10s, but that
is far fewer than the 400 it fielded in 1988.
Moreover, more than half of the remaining aircraft
are in the reserve components.

The Air Force has traditionally allotted 25
percent of its fighter aircraft specifically to ground
attack missions, which include close air support as
well as battlefield air interdiction (BAI). Both those
missions involve attacking enemy targets on the
battlefield, but in contrast to close air support, battlefield air
interdiction would be directed at targets far removed
from friendly forces. As the number of A-10s has declined, the Air Force has assigned increasing
numbers of its F-16s to those missions.
Consequently, three wings of F-16s, or about one-quarter of all of the Air Force's F-16s, could be
designated for the CAS and BAI missions. Since the
F-16s are multirole aircraft, however, they are not
likely to be as well suited to the CAS mission as the
A-10, which was designed specifically for it. In
addition, the F-16s could be called on to perform
other missions of more importance to the Air Force
than CAS. All of these factors highlight the concerns
Army commanders could have that Air Force aircraft
might not be available when the Army needed them
to provide air support.

Perhaps in response to these concerns, the Army
has developed and fielded its own weapons capable
of attacking ground targets beyond the reach of
direct-fire weapons. The premier example of such a
weapon is the attack helicopter, which can attack
armored as well as soft targets and performed ably in
Operation Desert Storm. In addition, the Army is
developing fire-support weapons with increasingly
long ranges and precision-guided munitions capable
of attacking some of the targets previously accessible
only by aircraft.

With the Army fielding hundreds of attack
helicopters and increasingly sophisticated fire-support weapons, it may be possible to relieve the Air
Force of the primary responsibility for providing
CAS. That change would simplify operations since
the Air Force would not have to coordinate its air
strikes so closely with the Army in order to avoid
attacking friendly troops. Moreover, the Air Force
could retire all of its A-10s and reduce the number of
types of aircraft in its inventory, thereby realizing
some budgetary savings. The Army could use its currently planned level of forces--attack helicopters and artillery--to attack targets that
might today be assigned to Air Force aircraft.

This option would yield significant savings if it
led to the elimination of all Air Force aircraft assigned to the close air support and battlefield air
interdiction missions. Retiring all of the Air Force's
A-10s and about one-quarter of its F-16s would
reduce the size of the Air Force by about five wings.
Such a reduction in force could save $120 million in
1998 and $3.2 billion over the next five years in
operating costs compared with the Administration's
1997 plan.

Eliminating one-quarter of the Air Force's F-16s,
however, could limit its ability to carry out its other
missions. The F-16 is a multirole fighter capable of
performing other tasks, such as air-to-air combat,
besides providing air support to the Army. Cutting
the F-16 fleet and the tactical Air Force by one-quarter would represent a major reduction in the Air
Force's overall capability.

Shifting primary responsibility for close air
support and battlefield air interdiction solely to the
Army and eliminating Air Force assets assigned to
those missions would also have other drawbacks. Having multiple
means of attack is a distinct advantage for a
commander because it forces the enemy to defend
itself against multiple threats. Thus, if the United
States can attack its enemies with fixed-wing aircraft,
helicopters, and artillery all at once or in rapid
succession, the defender's task becomes that much
harder.

Another drawback to eliminating from the Air
Force all aircraft designated for the CAS and BAI
missions is the loss of the ability to react and deploy
quickly that is inherent in aircraft. Aircraft are
generally the first assets to arrive in theater, since
additional time is needed to transport Army
equipment, including helicopters, to trouble spots.
With fewer aircraft in the Air Force inventory that
are capable of CAS, delays may occur before
significant assets arrive in theater to perform that
mission. And a major lesson some observers have
drawn from Operation Desert Storm is that air power
can slow or even stop the advance of enemy ground
forces. Sharply reducing the number of U.S. aircraft
capable of providing close air support would
eliminate many of the aircraft that contributed to an
early victory in the Gulf War and helped to keep
down the loss of U.S. lives.