Friday, August 14, 2015

FEATURED | An Afghan Game of Thrones by Joy Mitra

Ever
since the all important news of Mullah Omar’s death has broken in, the strategic
equations in Afghanistan have visibly and significantly altered. The news of Mullah
Omar’s death was almost as important, strong and impactful event as his actual
death. While there had been earlier unconfirmed reports about his death, it was
only on 31 July 2015 that Taliban officially admitted that their leader Mullah
Muhammad Omar Mujahed had died (Taliban, 2015). Almost simultaneously the successor to
Mullah Omar had been chosen as Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansur (Taliban,
2015).
According to a report by Afghanistan Analyst Network (AAN), Mansur was earlier
Taliban’s aviation minister, who later went onto become the head of the Taliban
leadership council (Quetta Shura) and second in command to Mullah Omar (Ruttig, 2015).

Mansur’s election to the highest position was
accompanied with the appointment of Haibatullah Akhunzada and Mullah Sirajuddin
Haqqani as the deputy heads (Ruttig, 2015). Appointment of
Sirajuddin Haqqani is interesting because many analysts believed that the Haqqani
network was separate from the Taliban (Stanford
University, 2013),
and therefore the appointment implies that Haqqani network said to be ‘a
veritable arm’ of the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) is now installed in the
highest leadership of Taliban (Dawn , 2011). That would also
suggest that Islamabad is on board with the election of the new leader and
perhaps has benefitted with the rise of the Haqqani’s within the Taliban.

The
Rift Within

However a quick announcement of succession could not prevent what Mullah Omar’s
death meant for Taliban, demise of ‘the amir ul-momenin’ who had
hitherto kept the movement a unified force even after having not made a public
appearance for years (Harrison & Rasmussen, 2015). With Mansur’s
election the cracks have started to appear within the Taliban leadership. A
bitter power struggle could ensue between Mansur and Omar’s eldest son Mohammad
Yaqub (Yusufzai, 2015). AAN report also
mentions that Yaqub is purported to have the backing of a many field commanders
including Abdul Qayum Zakir who was earlier dismissed by Mansur, although
Mansur himself is an experienced leader and has lead some very successful
Taliban military campaigns (Ruttig, 2015). In fact the first
armed clash within the Taliban has already taken place in the western Herat
province resulting in the death of some nine insurgents including one senior
commander (Khaama Press, 2015).

That
is however not the end of troubles for Taliban whose cadres have off late been
defecting to IS (Saul, 2015)
and also sometimes have had to battle IS for control of territory (Khaama Press,
2015).
In fact some very senior commanders of Taliban have also defected to Islamic
movement of Uzbekistan, an extremist group which has pledged its allegiance to
IS (Goldstein, 2015).

Ghani’s
Gambit Failing

The announcement of Mullah Omar’s death amidst infighting regarding the
succession has meant that the peace process seems to be in jeopardy with the
next round of scheduled talks postponed by Pakistani authorities (MFA Pakistan,
2015).
But more importantly it has upset President Ashraf Ghani’s calculations, who
had invested enormous political capital in pursuing reconciliation with
Taliban. Ashraf Ghani had earlier correctly identified the conflict as an
interstate-conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Indian
Express, n.d.),
and took some bold confidence building measures to elevate the relationship
with Pakistan which included withdrawing a request for lethal military hardware
from India, ordering Afghan army to battle insurgent groups that were hostile
to Pakistan and agreeing for unprecedented levels of ‘cooperation’ between the
two countries’ military and intelligence agencies (Rubin, 2015). The strategy
involved using China as the lever to nudge Pakistan to put pressure on Taliban
to come to some sort of accommodation. Pakistan though claimed that it did not
control Taliban but finally were on board to prod the Taliban they had ‘some
control over’ which translated into the Urumqi talks. According to Barnett
Rubin these were “Mullah Abdul Jalil, Mullah Mohammad Hassan Rahmani, and
Mullah Abdul Razaq who had formerly served as deputy minister of foreign
affairs, governor of Kandahar, and minister of the interior respectively, but
they had no connections to the Taliban’s Political Commission and no current
influence in the Taliban hierarchy” (Rubin, 2015). This was even as
the Taliban’s spring offensive was underway and there has been intense fighting
on the ground especially in provinces of Kunduz, Faryab and Badaskhan (Habib, et
al., 2015).
Eventually Taliban are said to have yielded to Pakistani pressure who sent a
senior delegation for the Murrey talks which included Mullah Abbas Akhund, who
headed the delegation, Abdul Latif Mansur, and Ibrahim Haqqani. Abbas and Latif
are said to be members of the Taliban’s liason committee with the ISI (Rubin, 2015). But again no member
of Taliban’s political office attended the talks, which has been officially
designated as the only body to engage in negotiations (Rubin, 2015). Articles have
earlier appeared on Taliban related websites stating that “the much hailed
talks between Taliban officials and Ghani-administration officials in Islamabad
will be revealed as nothing more than Pakistan delivering a few individuals
from the Islamic Emirate to speak in their personal capacity” (Rubin, 2015).

Mansur
had earlier been authoring the statements published in the name of Mullah Omar
that supported the negotiations as long as ‘the foreign occupation of
Afghanistan ends’ (Taliban, 2015). AAN reports that
Mansur apparently had been supportive of many pre-negotiation initiatives like
the Pugwash conference and establishing the Qatar office (Ruttig, 2015). He also endeavored
to make the political committee independent of his own Quetta Shura. It is
probable that Mansur is trying to lessen the influence of Pakistan on Taliban
with the ramification that the political committee will engage in negotiations
only if the talks are independent of Pakistan, which apparently has not gone
down well with some anti-talks elements within Taliban. But the proclivities
within Taliban are mixed. Mansur’s seems to be a proponent of talks as long as
they are held in a manner where Pakistan does not dictate terms, there are
those Talibs who support the talks under Pakistan’s supervision these include
those attended the talks earlier in Urumqi and then Murree and finally those
who are opposed to any talks which include field commander Zaker and likes who
back Yaqub against Mansur. But Mansur will face difficulties now that Omar’s
death has been revealed and Tayyeb Agha chief of the Qatar political office has
resigned over Mansur succeeding Omar (Khan, 2015).

Whether
or not Taliban will splinter remains to be seen, but either way it seems to
have put Ashraf Ghani in a difficult position. On the ground fighting has been
as intense as ever. Taliban fighting forces on the ground do not believe they
have reached a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ and are fighting to gain an upper
hand in the negotiations, which would imply that possibly Ghani has initiated
channels for communication even before the conflict was ‘ripe’ for such a
process. If Taliban must remain unified its incentive to come to the table will
possibly see a reduction, if it does splinter it would mean an even difficult
negotiation process with multiple factions, which will be difficult for Ashraf
Ghani to sell to his domestic audience considering that anti-talk factions will
try to ensure a surge in violence. Considering that Afghanistan at this point
faces threat from IS, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and numerous other groups
in addition to Taliban, Ashraf Ghani
seems to be headed for a lot of firefighting and perhaps his overtures towards
Pakistan could fetch zilch.

Role
of Pakistan?

Amidst
all this Pakistan seems to be the dark horse, nobody really knows what its
interests are and where its loyalty lies. Pakistan has been trying to facilitate
the talks. But many would doubt if Pakistan credibility as a facilitator of the
talks since they consider it very much an actual party to the conflict with
considerable stakes involved. After 2001 when the insurgency regained momentum Omar
had appointed two deputy leaders one of whom was Mullah Barader (Ruttig, 2015). But Barader was
arrested in 2010 by Pakistan after he met the representatives of Karzai
government without their consent (Ruttig, 2010). He was subsequently
removed from the position of deputy. Karzai government repeatedly sought meeting
with Barader with the help of Pakistanis. In 2013 when the High Peace council
finally was permitted to see him, it is said he was so heavily sedated that he
could not speak a single word (Clark, 2013). It is quite evident
that ISI is trying to control the outcome of the negotiations, and therefore
those with whom Kabul government had engaged until now were not really in
position to deliver an accord with the Taliban. With the Haqqani’s now high up
in the hierarchy within Taliban it seems whatever negotiations will happen
Kabul government will essentially be engaging a Taliban which is basically a
front for Pakistan. It may not necessarily be a bad thing unless that implies a
ceasefire on the ground is unlikely to happen. One does not know at this point
how the Mansur-Pakistan equation will pan out.

Game of Thrones

There
are signals that both factions within Taliban are trying to seek reconciliation (Geo TV, 2015) but it is difficult
to imagine how the turf war can be brought to an end considering that Mansur
was intelligent enough to make the first move, and having officially declared
his ascendency to the throne he can ill-afford to backtrack. What possibly can
Mansur offer other than giving up his position in the Taliban hierarchy that
can assuage his rivals? One does not know, but even after considering the spate
of statements that have been made by various commanders to preserve unity it
looks like some permanent damage done to the organization will be on display in
the coming months. Both Kabul and Islamabad will be monitoring the events
closely, Islamabad looks in slightly better position to influence and control
the situation, but it should be mindful of its own long term security. It must
keep a watch on IS which is fast gaining a foothold in Afghanistan, in fact as
far as IS goes Pakistan must know that Afghanistan is its first line of
defense. One thing is for certain however that the Afghan ‘game of thrones’ is
heading for some serious, intricate politics and a lot of deception.

About The Author:Joy Mitra is a research professional and geopolitical analyst with
expertise in international relations, strategic (game) theory, conflict
analysis, conflict diplomacy and negotiation. His primary regions of focus are
South Asia (the Indian subcontinent), and major power strategic relations but
his interests span the world and has several publications to his credit. He is also a researcher with Wikistrat.