THIS
MATTER comes before the Court upon Petitioner's
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Relief from a Tribal
Court Conviction Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §
1303[1]
(“Petition”), filed June 15, 2017 (Doc. 1). On
June 19, 2017, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B), this Petition was referred to United States
Magistrate Judge Kevin R. Sweazea to conduct any necessary
hearings and to recommend an ultimate disposition. See
Order of Reference, ECF No. 4. Having reviewed the
record and the parties' briefing, the undersigned
recommends that the Court GRANT Petitioner's Petition and
VACATE Petitioner's underlying sentence and conviction.

Introduction
and Background

On
March 18, 2017, while on the Pueblo of Santo Domingo
Reservation, Petitioner was arrested for possession of
narcotics. He was brought before the Tribal Court on March
21, 2017, at which time he entered a plea of guilty. The
Court adjudged Petitioner guilty and sentenced him to a
“jail term” of one year and assessed various
fines and fees. (Doc. 1-1). On June 15, 2017, Petitioner
filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
alleging violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
(“ICRA”) 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303.
Specifically, Petitioner argues that he was (1) denied the
right to assistance of counsel, in violation of 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(a)(6); (2) denied the right to a trial by jury,
in violation of 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(10); and (3)
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of 25
U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(A).

On
January 16, 2018, the Court ordered that Petitioner be
released from prison, “pending the Court's final
order or decision.” Order for Release of
Petitioner, ECF No. 23, p. 2. Through a series of
briefings and hearings, Respondents expressed that they did
not oppose Petitioner's Petition, and thus the parties
were directed to provide Judge Brack with a stipulated
proposed order granting the petition. Unfortunately, the
parties were unable to agree upon the proper relief to be
granted. Respondents were amenable to relief which vacated
Petitioner's sentence and conviction, whereas Petitioner
desired a reversal of his sentence and
conviction.[2] The parties were invited to brief the
issue of relief and the Court set a briefing deadline of
February 23, 2018. Respondents Brian Coriz, Javin Coriz, and
Esquipula Tenorio (collectively “Tribal
Respondents”) were the only parties to submit such a
brief.

Analysis

The
Court first notes that as there is no opposition to
Petitioner's Petition, there are no factual disputes to
resolve. Accordingly, the Court need only consider the relief
to which Petitioner is entitled upon the granting of his
Petition. The confines of habeas corpus, and ICRA by
extension, provide the Court with a clear direction in this
regard.

Indian
tribes are inherently sovereign. “Although physically
within the territory of the United States and subject to
ultimate federal control, they nonetheless remain a separate
people, with the power of regulating their internal and
social relations.” United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (quotation omitted) superseded
by statute as recognized in U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193
(2004). As a result, the United States Constitution's
Bill of Rights does not operate as a restriction on tribal
governments. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 56 (1978); United States Commission on Civil Rights,
The Indian Civil Rights Act: A Report of the United
States Commission on Civil Rights, at 4 (1991)
[hereinafter ICRA Report]. Concerned that the rights
of individual tribal members were not adequately protected in
tribal courts, Congress enacted ICRA, a “modified
version of the bill of rights, ” ICRA Report
at 5, which was intended to strike a balance between tribal
sovereignty and what Congress perceived as a need to
“secur[e] for the American Indian the broad
constitutional rights afforded to other Americans.”
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978)
(quotation omitted).[3]

The
codification of ICRA was years in the making and the subject
of remedies was thoroughly vetted prior to the Statute's
enactment. Id. at 62. Legislative history makes
clear that when determining how to address alleged ICRA
violations, Congress specifically rejected a proposal which
would have allowed federal courts to conduct de novo reviews
of all tribal convictions. Id. at 67. Ultimately,
Congress determined that the sole remedy for violations of
the Act would be review by way of habeas corpus. See Nero
v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 892 F.2d 1457, 1461
(10th Cir. 1989) (“The Supreme Court in Santa Clara
Pueblo, expressly invoking concerns about preserving
tribal autonomy and self-government, reasoned that the
statutory scheme and the legislative history of Title I of
the ICRA indicate Congress deliberately decided not to
provide federal remedies other than habeas corpus in order to
limit the Act's intrusion into tribal
sovereignty.”).

From
its inception, the writ of habeas corpus was designed to be a
mechanism through which one could challenge the legality of
his or her confinement. At common law, the writ was used
solely to challenge a court's jurisdiction to commit an
individual to prison. See, e.g., Ex parte
Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 197 (1830). However, the writ has
long since been codified and its scope has expanded to
address a multitude of post-conviction challenges from
questions of jurisdiction to collateral attacks on
constitutional violations. See Withrow v. Williams,
507 U.S. 680 (1993) (finding that habeas jurisdiction extends
to Miranda violations); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976) (discussing the expansion of the writ of
habeas corpus). As with most principles of law that withstand
the test of time, habeas corpus jurisprudence has evolved,
resulting in debates over federalism, finality, and the
safeguarding of rights. See, e.g., Withrow,
507 U.S. 680 (1993); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72 (1977).

While
the breadth and reach of the writ of habeas corpus may be
argued amongst scholars and jurists alike, the significance
of the writ, both historically and practically, is rarely
called into question. This is likely why Congress determined
that the writ should be available under ICRA. Importantly,
though, whether considering habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241-2255, or as it applies to ICRA pursuant to
25 U.S.C. § 1303, the Court may not treat a habeas
petition as an appeal and substitute a final judgment of its
own making for that of the convicting court. What the Court
may do upon granting a petition for habeas corpus is order
the petitioner to be released, vacate the petitioner's
sentence, and/or fashion an equitable remedy that is within
the purview of the Court's habeas jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(a) (providing that, in a habeas action, a federal
prisoner may move the court to vacate, set aside, or correct
his or her sentence). See also Davis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1974) (explaining that 28
U.S.C. § 2255 was designed to afford to federal
prisoners “a remedy identical in scope to federal
habeas corpus [under 28 U.S.C. § 2254].”).

A
sentence reversal, then, as Petitioner requests, would
require the Court to act in its appellate capacity and would
run afoul of the confines of habeas corpus review. As the
Tribal Respondents highlight in their brief, the terms
“vacate” and “reverse” have, at
times, been used almost interchangeably in ICRA actions.
However, the terms implicate very different results. In light
of the sanctity of tribal sovereignty, and the need to
safeguard not just the rights of the individual, but also the
rights of the tribe, it is imperative that the Court stay
within its own lane when crafting appropriate relief in this
case.

Recommended
Disposition

For the
reasons set forth above, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the
Court GRANT Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and VACATE ...

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