Systems risk refers to the likelihood that an IS is inadequately guarded against certain types of damage or loss. While risks are posed by acts of God, hackers and viruses, consideration should also be given to the ‘insider’ threat of dishonest employees, intent on undertaking some form of computer abuse. Against this backdrop, a number of researchers have addressed the extent to which security managers are cognizant of the very nature of systems risk. In particular, they note how security practitioners’ knowledge of local threats, which form part of such risk, is often fragmented. This contributes to situations where risk reducing efforts are often less than effective. Security efforts are further complicated given that the task of managing systems risk requires input from a number of departments including, for example, HR, compliance, IS/IT and physical security. In a bid to complement existing research, but also offer a fresh perspective, this paper addresses systems risk from the offender’s perspective. If systems risk entails the likelihood that an IS is inadequately protected, this text considers those conditions, within the organisational context, which offer a criminal opportunity for the offender. To achieve this goal a model known as the ‘Crime Specific Opportunity Structure’ is advanced. Focussing on the opportunities for computer abuse, the model addresses the nature of such opportunities with regards to the organisational context and the threats posed by rogue employees. Drawing on a number of criminological theories, it is believed the model may help inform managers about local threats and, by so doing, enhance safeguard implementation.

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Purpose: To incorporate the element of sustainability of advantages into the concept of
First-Mover Advantage for analysis on grocery e-commerce. Grocery e-commerce is a relatively unexplored phenomenon in Denmark and I seek to explain this via the concept of FMA. In order to fully understand the complexity of the situation, sustainability of advantages needs to be incorporated into the concept. Design: Via a literature review on the subject of first-mover advantage, uncover the lack of sustainability of advantage.
Hereafter construct a framework for analysis based on this literature review and coupled with previous empirical findings on grocery e-commerce. Findings: a) Providing insights into the concept of first- mover advantage, b) sustainability of advantages and c) providing a framework for analysis on advantages sought by acting entrepreneurial. Value: The applicability of the concept of first-mover advantage is very descriptive to date. With this
paper and hopefully more to follow, I wish to transform the FMA concepts into a tool for analysis addressing the very crucial element that is not dealt with today – sustainability.
Keywords : First-Mover Advantage; e-commerce; grocery industry; sustainability

Since 1996, a variety of US states have decriminalized and legalized the use of cannabis for medical
and recreational purposes. Today there are only 11 states with total cannabis prohibition (see
Figure 1). Each state has developed its own system and standard of legalization/decriminalizetion,
and its own form of regulation and oversight of both psychoactive and non-psychoactive
cannabis production, processing, sale, and distribution.

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Co-location of industry professionals often leads to development of
collaboration networks, and multiple studies have emphasized the benefits of
embedded collaboration. Due to higher levels of trust, embedded collaboration
reduces transaction costs and facilitates ready knowledge exchanged. Other
studies have pointed to dangers of over-embeddedness. The argument is that
too high levels of embeddedness lead to habitual thinking, preferential
treatment, and thereby mitigate performance. However, research on the
conditions under which embeddedness in different types of collaboration
networks primarily yields costs or benefits still leaves much to be investigated....

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Welfare ranking of policy instruments is addressed in a two-sector Ramsey model with monopoly pricing in one sector as the only distortion. When government spending is restricted, i.e. when a government is unable or unwilling to finance the required costs for implementing the optimum policy, subsidies that directly affect investment incentives may generate higher welfare effects than the direct instrument, which is a production subsidy. The driving mechanism is that an investment subsidy may be more cost effective than the direct instrument;
and that the relative welfare gain from cost effectiveness can
exceed the welfare loss from introducing new distortions. Moreover, it is found that the investment subsidy is gradually phased out of the welfare maximizing policy, which may be a policy combining the two subsidies, when the level of government spending is increased.
Keywords: welfare ranking, indirect and direct policy instruments, restricted government spending
JEL: E61, O21, O41

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When a court sets standards of due care in a tort or contract case with a view to how the standards will affect future behavior of parties similar to the litigants, it should sometimes realize that only one of the two future parties is likely to become informed of the standards. The standards can then only have a direct effect on the behavior of the informed party, and it may be thought that the court should hold the informed party strictly liable, which maximizes this effect. However, this ignores that the informed party may, although strictly liable, lower her level of care in order to induce the uninformed party to take greater care. In this situation, the negligence rule may do better than strict liability, since the discontinuity of the negligence rule can prevent the informed party from strategically lowering her level of care. Under the negligence rule, optimal standards are sensitive to whether the informed party acts first and to whether she is the injurer or the victim. For both the informed and the uninformed, there are circumstances in which the standard should be higher than first best and other circumstances where it should be lower.

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In most countries labor is organzed in cooperating skill-speci c unions rather than in industrial unions or separately bargaining skill-speci c unions. Within an extremely simple model of a small open economy facing imperfect competition we show that this way of organizing labor can be explained as the outcome of rational (optimizing) behavior on the part of the unions and the employers. Organizing labor in local industrial cartels (regardless of skill) or a single economy wide cartel results in a real wage level that is inappropriately low both from the point of view of labor and the society as a whole unless labor has close to monopoly power in the wage setting process. Organizing labor in local or economy wide skill-speci c unions may result in a wage level that is too high. In addition, a labor market organized in non-cooperating unions is likely to be unstable. This dilemma calls for a compromise: A cartel of cooperating, independent skill-speci c unions. The degree and the form of the cooperation depend inter alia on the bargaining power of the employer, the number of skills and competing rms and the rigidity with which the unions enforce lines of demarcations.

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In this paper, we introduce two new six-parameter processes based on time-changing
tempered stable distributions and develop an option pricing model based on these processes.
This model provides a good t to observed option prices. To demonstrate the
advantages of the new processes, we conduct two empirical studies to compare their performance
to other processes that have been used in the literature.

Symphonic orchestras—“a mélange of musicians, volunteers, and paid staff whose contributions must be closely coordinated” (Allmendinger, Hackman, & Lehman, 1996: 194)—have been of growing interest for scholars of organization for their creative and collaborative performance through projects and their work under pressure. While their resemblance with bureaucratic and professional service organizations has been acknowledged, they have been found also akin to coordinated internal networks of multiple identities (Glynn, 2000; Karmowska & Child, 2014). However, scholars have depicted orchestras as rather established and hierarchical creative organizations that are bound by conventions and are dedicated to the pursuit of ‘superior performance’, as the opening quote suggests. As a consequence, they have paid less attention to their learning potential. Studies of other kinds of collaborative collectives, such as teams in management and education, have demonstrated interesting tensions between learning and performing (Bunderson & Suttcliffe, 2003; Paunova & Lee, 2016).

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This thesis is about innovation and power. Human nature has always been
expressed by our capacity to innovate and adapt to almost any environment
(Bowlby, 1962; Giddens, 1991). In the 20th century, the primary function of
business organisations was to invent, produce and commercialise their products
and services in different markets. As a matter of fact, business organisations in
the last century proved to be the best way of disseminating innovation (Schön,
1971). Currently in the 21st century, there is a call to better understand how new
ideas, technology and sources of knowledge are managed, based on the premise
that novelty can unfold anywhere and that innovation cannot be considered a
linear process consisting of a chain of activities.

When experts with diverse training and experiential backgrounds come together to make binding
decisions they face the challenge of finding common ground in the absence of any particular shared
abstract body of knowledge or organization specific set of evaluative principles. How does
consensus emerge in situations marked by contentious friction? Network theory suggests that
connectivity enables orchestration of alignment and coordination across difference. Occupants of
strategically central positions in networks can thus be formally identified from the structural
characteristics of those positions (White et al. 1976; Burt 1992, 2010; Vedres and Stark 2010). But
the formal characteristics of positions only tell us about the potential advantage of occupants.
Actual advantage is about mobilizing action from network positions to influence what goes on in
the network (Burt 2010, 223ff). What does it take for occupants of advantageous position to take
action on specific collective problems in the face of contentious situations?

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Organisations are crucial elements in an innovation system. Yet, their role is so ubiquitous that it is difficult to grasp and to examine from the perspective of public policy. Besides, links between the literature at firm and system levels on the one hand, and public policy and governance studies on the other, are still scarce. The purpose of this paper is to define the conceptual background of innovation policy in relation to the role of organisations in general, and entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship in particular. In so doing, this paper aims at making three contributions. Firstly, it distinguishes between different types of organisations in the innovation system, a crucial topic in understanding innovation dynamics and blurring borders. Secondly, it identifies the organisation-related bottlenecks in the innovation system, and examines the policy instruments to solve them. Thirdly, it discusses the limits of public policy and suggests introducing a wider governance approach.