Although numerous scholars have attempted to explain and justify the benefits provided to charities, none has been completely successful. Their theories share, however, two required characteristics for charities. First, charities must be distinct from other types of entities in society, including governmental bodies, businesses, other types of nonprofit organizations, and informal entities such as families. Second, charities must provide some form of public benefit. Given these defining characteristics, the principal role for the laws governing charities is to protect charities from influences that could potentially undermine these traits. This Article is the first to recognize fully the importance of this approach, which I term the autonomy perspective. Applying this new perspective to the law governing charities reveals that while existing law generally protects charity autonomy, it fails to do so in one major respect. Current law does not directly address the growing and often negative influence of consumers who purchase services from charities primarily for the consumer’s own benefit and with little if any regard to the public benefit charities must provide. This Article then considers under what market conditions the influence of these consumers, whether patients, students, retirement community residents, or others, is likely to be detrimental to a charity’s pursuit of public benefit, and what options exist for addressing this influence. It concludes with suggestions for further research that would help lawmakers target this influence and so better address questionable behavior by charities.

The purpose of this article is to take a broad look at where we are now as a result of the continuing confusion regarding the “commerciality doctrine.” It will focus on three areas influencing and defining organizations that are struggling with the law in this sector: 1) it will briefly define commercial activity in terms of social entrepreneurship and provide examples of organizations that have entered this hybrid sector as L3C Organizations and B Corporations; 2) it will give an overview of the law that has developed as the “commerciality doctrine;” and 3) it will discuss the UBIT and suggest that this test needs to be utilized by courts in conjunction with the “commerciality doctrine” for there to be any semblance of order for nonprofits to follow. Finally, this article concludes by suggesting that changes within the system are overdue. It suggests a three part analysis requiring that the IRS and courts apply the UBIT tests in coordination with, and not separate from, the “commerciality doctrine” (with a new definition of “substantial commercial activity”); second, that the “commerciality doctrine” be defined more clearly by synthesizing the courts tests from Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing and Airlie Foundation; and third, that an “intermediate sanction” type penalty be developed which would be triggered by failure to meet the above tests, before the loss of tax exempt status occurs. If nothing is done to address this issue, which may well end up being the case, then organizations will drift between the nonprofit and for-profit worlds in a very counter-productive manner for the sector and for the individuals they are created to benefit.

Delaware corporate law imposes a duty of loyalty on officers and directors as a mechanism to regulate and deter self-dealing transactions. In nonprofit corporations, however, there are generally no shareholders with direct financial incentives to monitor against self-dealing. In the absence of shareholders and other principals, Congress and the IRS have articulated duty of loyalty rules for nonprofits that reach far beyond those applied to the for-profit world — most prominently the § 4958 intermediate sanctions. This article identifies the persons who owe a duty of loyalty to a nonprofit corporation, the applicable fiduciary standards for violating the duty of loyalty, and the remedies, procedures, and exoneration provisions under these fiduciary rules. While § 4958 and Delaware corporate law cover similar territory, they take remarkably different paths. By comparing the Tax Code with Delaware corporate law, it is readily apparent that, in the absence of shareholders, tax rules police the duty of loyalty for nonprofits more strictly than Delaware corporate law.