Europe Anti-Missile Defense System: Standing Up to Russia's Threats

About the Author

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.Visiting Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage FoundationDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy

The day after Barack Obama won the 2008 U.S. presidential
election, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced the first
real test for the U.S. President-elect. In his State of the
Federation speech, Medvedev threatened to station Iskander
short-range nuclear-capable missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave if
the U.S. proceeds with deploying anti-missile defense systems in
Poland and the Czech Republic.

Medvedev softened his rhetoric following discussions with French
President Nicolas Sarkozy, instead offering to hold off on the
missile deployment in exchange for U.S. participation in a European
security conference and if, as Sarkozy put it, there is "no more
talk of anti-missile protection systems" until the conference.[1]

Sarkozy later revised his statement, admitting that Poland and
the Czech Republic have a sovereign right to pursue missile
defense. On November 17, however, NATO, of which France is a
member, reiterated its support for a planned U.S. missile shield in
Europe--after Sarkozy had said it would bring no extra security to
the Continent. A NATO spokeswoman said the alliance's
position--formulated at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008--had not
changed. It was at the Bucharest Summit that NATO leaders,
including Sarkozy, endorsed U.S. plans to deploy the missile shield
in Poland and the Czech Republic.

The Obama Administration should not give in to Russian threats.
If it does, it will signal that the new U.S. President-elect can be
pressured on other issues. Even if Obama were open to the idea of
delaying or canceling the deployment, to do so following Russian
missile threats would be an unmistakable sign of weakness.

Georgia War Triggered Missile Defense
Deployment

Immediately after the Russian-Georgian war, Poland agreed to
deploy a 10-interceptor missile defense battery on its territory to
counter long-range ballistic missiles that might threaten Europe or
North America. Warsaw also received enhanced American security
guarantees, boosting its bilateral military ties with Washington.
In addition, the U.S. also agreed to deploy a Patriot
anti-aircraft missile (PAC-3) battery in Poland capable of
neutralizing Russian missiles.

Moscow fiercely opposes the American missile defense system,
claiming that the project compromises its national security. Yet
Russia's claims fail any objective test: The top Kremlin ballistic
missile experts have written that the missile shield in Europe
cannot neutralize Russia's overwhelming nuclear arsenal--not even
Moscow's second-strike capability. The 10 interceptors that the
U.S. is planning to deploy would not have an appreciable impact on
the strategic balance of nuclear forces, which includes thousands
of warheads deliverable by the Russian strategic triad: ballistic
missiles, bombers, and submarines.[2]

In addition, the U.S. has done much to reassure Moscow that the
system is intended only to counter possible strikes from rogue
states in the Middle East such as Iran. Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates has offered to deploy Russian liaison officers in Poland and
suggested that the system would not become operational if Iran does
not develop missiles with sufficient range to hit Europe.

Why Iskanders?

The Kremlin and the Russian military are keeping the myth of a
Western military menace alive for their own ends while using the
threat of short-range missile deployment in Kaliningrad and the
Baltic Fleet for two reasons.

First, the Russian military, despite its victories in Georgia,
remains conventionally weaker than the NATO forces. According to
U.S. military sources, Moscow may be seeking a pretext to integrate
tactical nuclear systems, such as the dual-capacity
conventional/nuclear Iskander, into frontline units that would
otherwise be too weak to counter NATO. These integrated systems
could also hit a broad range of targets in Europe, such as air
bases, depots, and a concentration of NATO troops within the
280-kilometer range of the Iskander missile.[3]

Second, Medvedev's recent declaration of willingness to not
deploy the missiles to Kaliningrad in exchange for a cancellation
of the missile defense system reveals the political motive behind
the initial declaration of intent to deploy the Iskanders: By using
missile deployment as a bargaining chip, the Kremlin secures a
means of further dividing Europe and United States over the missile
system, a tactic reminiscent of the U.S.-Europe rift over the
deployment of SS-20s in the 1980s.

Germany and France in particular are unhappy with the U.S. not
initially asking their permission for the missile defense
deployment. This rancor furthers weakens the alliance and adds
fodder to EU security and defense policy advocates' opposition to
NATO. Moscow counts on bolstering missile defense skeptics among
American allies in Europe if it places nuclear weapons on Poland's
border. Such skepticism, the Kremlin believes, is strengthening its
argument that the U.S. missile interceptors will lead to a
dangerous arms escalation in the region.

Russia's threat is indeed a shrewd geopolitical move. By
opposing Washington, Moscow is trying to drive new wedges between
"old" and "new" Europe, and between Europe and the U.S. As a major
source of Europe's energy supply, Russia has a tremendous amount of
economic influence over U.S. allies in the region, enough to make
its wedge-driving strategy a realistic threat.

The lack of a unified Western position allows Moscow, also
through the means of its energy diplomacy, to apply the ancient
Roman principle of divide et impera to its relations with
the Europeans and Americans. Without a strong and unified response
from the West, Russia will be able to maximize its advantages in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet space while minimizing its
weaknesses and thereby achieve gains at the expense of U.S. and its
allies.

Worries in Warsaw

One hopes that these disagreements do not hurt America's
relations with one of its closest European allies, Poland. However,
many in Warsaw are worried, as Obama's foreign policy advisor,
Denis McDonough, has contradicted President Lech Kaczinski's claims
that Obama is unequivocally committed to stationing missile
interceptors in Poland. Obama previously said that he supports
deploying the system when the technology is proved to be workable
and if the project is pragmatic and cost-effective.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, another Obama advisor, also voiced
opposition for the anti-missile deployment. However, at this point,
if the deployment is postponed it would signal Washington's
weakness and give Moscow a strategic win.

Unlike Russia's fantasies of Western "aggression," the threat
posed by the Iranian missile program is real. Just last Wednesday,
Iran tested an indigenous medium range missile that combines liquid
and solid fuel technology and can fly 2,000 kilometers, with longer
range missiles in the works. Therefore, the U.S. and its European
allies cannot afford to back out of the missile defense deployment
in Poland.

At a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Tallinn, Estonia,
Gates argued that Iran poses a threat to Russia as well as to
Europe, neutralizing the Russian argument against the missile
system.[4]

Reject Russian Threats

The Obama Administration should not derail or postpone the
missile shield in Europe, but it should continue efforts to
convince the Kremlin that the system is not aimed against Russia.
Giving in to the Kremlin's demands would be the second strategic
victory Moscow would achieve after recognizing Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, which are parts of Georgia.

The United States and Europe need to prevent Moscow from
dictating Europe's security policy or interfering with U.S.-Polish
strategic cooperation.

The Obama Administration should reject Medvedev's missile
threats, exposing them as a throw-back to the Cold War. The great
irony and blunder of Russia's actions is that had Moscow acted more
responsibly, the Obama Administration might have delayed the
European missile defense system altogether. Now the Obama
Administration must resist Russian pressure, if only to avoid the
appearance of weakness and to discourage Russia's strategic
revisionism.

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is a
Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and
International Energy Security at the Shelby and Catherine Cullom
Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage
Foundation.

About the Author

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.Visiting Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage FoundationDouglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy