in partnership with the

2010 Summary of Findingswww.balkan-monitor.eu 2010

Contents

Dejan ČabriloIntroduction: The “New Normal” in the Balkans.....................................5Main findings............................................................................................7Country overview...................................................................................10Material situation and life satisfaction...................................................17Financial difficulties persist – with a dramatic increase in Kosovo.....17Attitudes toward the EU.........................................................................21Satisfaction and confidence in the region’s institutions......................26Perceptions of corruption and organised crime...................................34Migration and mobility...........................................................................39Balkan challenges: ethnic relations and the future of the region.........45Conclusions............................................................................................50Methodology..........................................................................................52About the Fund......................................................................................55About Gallup Europe.............................................................................56

Introduction: The “New Normal”

in the BalkansImagine – on a rainy election day, in an unnamed country that could be anywhere,almost three-quarters of the voting papers are returned blank. The government de-mands that the elections are re-held, when the sun is shining: the protest increaseswith 83% of the electorate voting without choosing a candidate. That is the start ofJose Saramago’s novel “Seeing” – an anti-utopian vision of post-political democ-racies where people are angry, the elite are conspiracy-minded and insecure, andwhere social life is paralyzed.

Reading the results of the latest Balkan Monitor Poll, the parallel with Saramago’sparable is striking: one has the feeling that Saramago’s anywhere is the Balkans’ ev-erywhere. In “Seeing”, people vote by rejecting all choices; in the Balkans, they speakloudly in favour of any organisation that is not linked to their government. The surveyshows that citizens of the Balkan democracies believe in the Church, the EU and theUN, but deeply distrust the institutions that govern them.

After two decades of wars and painful economic Serbian patriotism – was lost (a well-known Serbiantransition, Balkan societies appear mistrustful and journalist told me recently that putting Kosovo onpessimistic, and they have emigration on their mind. the cover page was the best way to lose readers).They want change but are sceptical about their abil- Then we have Croatia, where its people are split inity to influence the outcome. The people have over- their judgment as to whether joining the EU is actu-come some fears but no longer have any illusions. ally a good or a bad thing. What many Croats andThey prefer to retreat into their private lives rath- Serbs agree on is that paying taxes is a waste ofer than engage with politics. The vast majority of money.1 And when it comes to economic hopes,Serbs, Croats, Macedonians and citizens of Bosnia it is depressing to read that the majority of unem-and Herzegovina say that no political party or politi- ployed, in all countries with the exception of Serbia,cian expresses their views. When asked to say who fear that they will not be able to find a job in the nextthey trust, most citizens have little faith in national 12 months.institutions – just like Saramago’s faceless citizens,who voted by rejecting all choices. But if we look beyond the striking number of people who distrust governments and judicial systems, be-Ten years after the last war in the region, the yond the number of those who see corruption ris-Balkans still represent a collection of frustrated pro- ing and solidarity in decline, you will see that peopletectorates and weak states. Bosnia and Kosovo are tend to be happier than expected and more readytrapped in the labyrinth of the politics of semi-in- to trust a stranger than you would ever dared todependence; Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia have hoped. What you will see is the outline of aare small and claustrophobic republics modelled on “new normal” in the Balkans. The citizens of the re-Berlusconi’s Italy, where the governments are popu- gion are learning to live in dysfunctional states andlist and to an extent popular, and where the oppo-sition is discouraged and discouraging at the same 1 For Balkan Monitor survey results that are not dis-time. Serbia has been shocked not only by the loss cussed in the Summary of Findings please consult the wholeof Kosovo but also by the absence of public out- dataset at www.balkan-monitor.eu/index.php/dashboard. Therage when the territory – often seen as a symbol of Balkan Monitor data dashboard also allows you to break down results by geographical and socio-demographic factors.

5 2010

badly governed democracies, and they are also The questions that people in the region ask them-learning the art of bearable dissatisfaction. selves are not related to the past, they are related to the future. How will Balkan economies grow in post-While the vast majority do not fear that their coun- crisis Europe? How will the multicultural institutions,tries will go back to war (Macedonians are the most built after a decade of war and fervent national-concerned about the return of a military conflict), ism, be sustained at a time when leading EuropeanBalkan societies have lost the hope that post-war politicians are heard to say that multiculturalism iseconomic growth and a return to everyday life will dead? How can institutional arrangements, made ineasily be restored. order to stop the war, be transformed into an effec- tive guarantee for a common future?Reading the results of the Gallup Balkan Monitor,one could conclude that the EU has lost its magic The conspiracy of post-war arrangements, rhetoricbut has not lost its importance. It is true that faced about “collective rights”, and economic under-de-with the choice of keeping the constitutional name velopment has eroded some of the initial optimismof the country or of compromising with Greece for that swept the region at the beginning of this cen-the benefit of joining the Union, Macedonians are tury. But the real crisis in the Balkans is not simplyresolutely sticking to their guns. Serbs also say that the dysfunctionality of the existing institutions but isit is more important to pretend that Kosovo is part rather inbuilt in the very models that Balkan societ-of Serbia than to join the EU. But declarations are ies are trying to implement. In the days of the Ohridone thing and reality is another. It is clear that if the Agreement it was popular to tell Macedonians thatcitizens of the region have any realistic hope of a what the Agreement offered them was the pros-better life and political stability, then that has to be pect of being another Belgium. Now, one has torelated to the prospect of their country joining the ask if Macedonians want their country to becomeEU. And this is even true for Croatia. In the Balkan another Belgium, bearing in mind the wasteful andMonitor poll, Croats’ euro-scepticism could be seen complicated way in which Belgium functions today.more as a way for the country to declare its proud Indeed, can anyone promise Macedonians that inEuropean identity than as a real desire to stay out- the next 10 or 20 years Belgium will not implode?side of the Union. Focused on their own problems, Europeans doThe contradictory dynamics of the support, in not have time to think about how the crisis in theAlbania and Kosovo, for the idea of a Greater Union impacts the coun-Albania is the best illustration of how important an tries on Europe’s periph-EU perspective is for the region. This year, in com- ery. This should change.parison with 12 months ago, public support for a The Balkan’s “new nor-Greater Albania has dramatically declined in Albania mality” is very much a re-and dramatically increased in Kosovo. The explana- flection of Europe’s “newtion for these contradictory trends is quite obvious – normality”.while Albanians expect lifting of the visa restrictionsfor travel in the EU to take place till the end of theyear, only 7% of Kosovars see freer travel comingsoon; 38% think it will only come with the interna- Ivan Krastevtional recognition of the country. ChairmanHowever, in a paradoxical way, the Balkans are Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofiamore a part of Europe than any of the most ardent andadvocates of EU enlargement can begin to imagine. Member of the Advisory BoardAll the problems that the region faces are European European Fund for the Balkansissues and not predominately Balkan ones.

6 2010

Main findings

Dejan ČabriloLife satisfaction andcountry development• In all countries of the Western Balkans, more than half of re- spondents reported difficulties in being able to manage on their households’ income; this share ranged from 52% in Croatia to 78% in Serbia. Compared to 2009, in Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, more people now re- ported difficulties in making ends meet. In Kosovo the proportion of respondents with financial difficul- ties has risen by 19 percentage Novi Sad, Serbia points to 54%. translate into higher levels of EU support in all• Balkan residents were also rather pessimis- of those countries. While in Montenegro the tic regarding their economies’ future develop- proportion of respondents saying that the EU ments. Croatia was the only country where was a good thing increased by six percentage respondents were more optimistic than they points to 73%, in Macedonia and Serbia the were a year ago. However, in Croatia as well respective shares fell from 62% to 60% and as other Balkan countries, respondents feel- from 50% to 44%. Support for the EU also ing that the situation was getting worse clear- dropped by five points in Croatia to 28%. ly outnumbered those feeling the opposite. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia, • As in 2009, the current survey showed that about two-thirds of respondents expected to in all Balkan countries, except Croatia, ma- see a further economic downturn. jorities of respondents would vote in favour of their country joining the EU; proportions• In Macedonia and Serbia, positive signals were ranged from 63% in Serbia to 93% in Albania. registered concerning the job market. The In Croatia, those who would vote against their shares of unemployed respondents who were country’s accession outnumbered those who optimistic about finding a new job within the 12 would vote ‘Yes’ (43% and 38%, respectively). months following the survey rose by eight per- centage points in Macedonia to 24% and by • In most countries, majorities felt that EU citi- six points in Serbia to 45%. zens wanted their countries to join the Union – except in Serbia, where the share of people feeling that they would be welcomed in the EUAttitudes toward the EU has dropped from 53% to 41% in the past year.• Granting visa-free travel to Montenegrins, In all countries except in Serbia and Kosovo, Macedonians and Serbs did not automatically increasing levels of respondents believed that

7 2010

EU citizens would appreciate their countries’ widespread. In Kosovo, interviewees were

accession to the Union. most likely to believe that the level of corruption in government was high (91%); Montenegrins• Respondents in Bosnia and Herzegovina have were the least likely to say this (50%, no become much more optimistic regarding their change). The biggest difference in the past 12 country’s EU accession date. While in 2009, months was registered in Kosovo, where the the average date estimated by interviewees in proportions of those believing that their gov- the country was 2022, Bosnian respondents ernment was corrupt rose by eight percentage now, on average, believed that their country points. might join as early as 2018. • Albanians were the least inclined to believe in widespread corruption in the business worldSatisfaction and trust in (56%, down from 67% in 2009), comparedthe region’s institutions to more than 9 in 10 Croats (93%, up 1 point)• Relative majorities of respondents in Albania, who thought that this was common practice in Kosovo and Montenegro were satisfied with their country. their countries’ government. In Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, respondents • A positive development was found concern- were at least three times as likely to disapprove ing the perceived levels of petty corruption. In of their countries’ government as to be sat- all Balkan states, with the exception of Croatia isfied. Albania was an exception: its citizens’ (that, however, continues to have among the approval of the government has increased lowest levels of experienced petty corruption), strongly by 17 percentage points (to 48%) the share of those respondents who had been since 2006. confronted with a concrete example of corrup- tion decreased compared to 2009.• The current wave of the Balkan Monitor shows that citizens in the Balkan states, except in Serbia, now feel more represented by politi- Migration and mobility cians or a political party than they did previous- • As in earlier survey waves, respondents across ly. Albanian respondents were the most likely to the Western Balkans were more prone to see feel represented politically (60%), followed by better opportunities abroad than at home. Kosovars (54%) and Montenegrins (46%). In Notable developments were registered in the remaining countries, however, about two- Albania and Kosovo, where the numbers see- thirds of survey participants still did not feel suf- ing better opportunities outside their country ficiently represented by their politicians. have fallen dramatically since 2008: by 25 per- centage points in Kosovo (to 48%) and by 12• Religion is gaining importance for most eth- points in Albania (to 52%). The opposite was nic groups in the Western Balkans. The only seen in Croatia and Montenegro, where the groups that placed less importance on religion shares of interviewees seeing better chanc- were Macedonian nationals and Bosniaks in es abroad have increased (since 2008) by 17 Bosnia and Herzegovina. points (to 48%) and by 14 points (to 52%), respectively.

Corruption and • More than 4 in 10 (42%) Albanian respondents

organisedcrime would like to move to another country, fol-• Majorities in all Balkan states believed that cor- lowed by roughly a third of Macedonians and ruption in government and businesses was Kosovars (31%-34%). However, just 14% of

8 2010

Albanian interviewees with a desire to migrate 16% in case of the latter country). Meanwhile, (or 6% of the total number of respondents) said in Macedonia, Montenegro and Croatia, peo- they had concrete plans to move abroad. ple were more inclined, than in 2009, to think that relations were just about right and did not need strengthening.Balkan challenges: ethnicrelations and thefuture of the region

Dejan Čabrilo• Most Balkan citizens did not antici- pate another armed conflict in the region; proportions of those respon- dents holding this view varied be- tween 62% in Serbia and 88% in Croatia. A notable change was reg- istered in Bosnia and Herzegovina: since 2009, the share of interview- ees thinking that the risk of war was not imminent has increased sharp- ly by 22 percentage points to 49%. Respondents in Macedonia and Serbia were the most likely to say that it was probable or certain that war would break out in the region Bijeljina, Bosnia and Herzegovina (28% and 24%, respectively).

• In Albania and Kosovo, the share of respon- • As in the previous wave, the highest shares of dents finding neighbourly relations too strong respondents advocating more regional coop- has risen significantly in the past year (from 15% eration were found in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 30% in case of the former and from 6% to (69%), Serbia (64%) and Macedonia (60%).

9 2010

Country overview country would join in 2014. Not surprisingly then, Albania: with the economy in they also felt that they would be welcomed by EU bad shape, Albanians have faith citizens; a rising share of Albanian respondents in their leaders and in the EU (69%) believed that people in the EU wanted their In 2010, significantly fewer Albanians said they had country to join. received help from abroad compared to last year – the share of respondents who said that they could Albanians’ support for their leadership has been in- rely on friends or family outside of the country, when creasing in past years, in 2010, 48% of Albanian they needed to, has decreased by nine percentage respondents said they approved of their leaders. points since 2009 (to 45%). The global economic A parallel development was the increasing propor- crisis has also impacted the overall economic situa- tion of Albanians that felt represented by a party or tion: a third (34%) of respondents felt that Kosovo’s a politician – currently 60% felt as if someone was economic situation was getting worse, rising from a speaking on their behalf: the highest rate in the re- quarter (26%) in 2009. gion. NATO and EU remained the most trusted in- stitutions in the country, while the judiciary recently experienced a drop in citizens’ confidence and wasAndrzej Pyrka

trusted by 31% of respondents (down by 13 per-

centage points). The societal role of religion appears to be growing: since 2006, the share of people stat- ing that it played an important part in their lives has risen from 33% to 44%.

Despite a slight decrease, Albania still has the high-

est rates, by far, of people stating that they had to bribe someone in the year prior to the survey inter- view: half of respondents (49%) had been in this po- sition. But there have been positive developments: a significant share of Albanians (35%, more than anywhere else in the region) found that the level of organised crime was decreasing and people were increasingly convinced that their government was effectively combating organised crime (40%, up 3 Kukës, Albania points).

Albanian support for the EU remained among the While the share of people seeing better opportu- highest in the region at 81%, but that represents nities abroad has dropped, more people than ever a drop of eight percentage points since a year before expressed the wish to leave the country. In ago. In the case of an EU referendum, however, 2010, 42% said that they would emigrate if the cir- a vast majority (93%) of Albanians would be ready cumstances were right. Only around 6% of Albanian to vote ‘Yes’ to accession to the EU – the high- respondents, however, had concrete plans to leave est such figure in the Western Balkans. Regarding in the year after the interview, which would amount an accession date, Albanians were among the to roughly 135,000 people (based on the survey re- most optimistic among potential new members in sults being extrapolated to the total Albanian pop- the Balkans – on average, they believed that their ulation). Two-fifths of Albanians believed that visa

10 2010

liberalisation would lead to a strong increase in More people said they disapproved of the nationalemigration. leadership (a change from 67% to 74% since 2009), but at the same time there has been a stronglyThe support for the creation of Greater Albania – a growing feeling of being better represented by a po-country made up of Albanians from Albania, Kosovo litical party or politician. While in 2009, only 17%and Macedonia – has decreased while the share of had the impression that somebody was represent-people stating that ties with neighbouring countries ing their political views, that share has increasedwere too strong has risen steeply (from 15% to 30% to 32% in 2010. Religion now plays a more impor-between 2009 and 2010). Nevertheless, an abso- tant role in the lives of Bosnian Croats and Bosnianlute majority of respondents (42%) were convinced Serbs than in 2006 – while its importance has de-that neighbourly ties needed further strengthening. creased for Bosniak respondents. While the level of respondents stating that organised crime was affecting their everyday lives has dropped in pastBosnia and Herzegovina: with years, about half (47%) still believed that its pres-more Bosnians struggling and ence has increased in the past five years (the high-the jobless being increasingly est figure in the region) – and people were the leastpessimistic, there is a call convinced in the Western Balkan region that thefor stronger regional ties government was doing all it could to fight it. The im-Material problems seem to be increasing throughout pact of organised crime seems to be felt stronger inthe country with more people stating that they were the Bosnian Federation: 66% of respondents in thathaving problems in managing on their household entity felt affected by organised crime ‘in daily life’income (from 58% to 66%, in the past year). The or ‘occasionally’, while the corresponding figure inproportion of respondents thinking that economic Republika Srpska was at 41%.conditions in the country were getting worse has re-mained more or less stable (68%, up 2 points) and Even more Bosnian residents were ‘certain’ thatjobless respondents have grown much more pessi- there would not be a war in the region in the near fu-mistic about finding a job in the year after the inter- ture: the proportion rose from 27% to 49%, with an-view: three-quarters (74%) now thought that there other 32% thinking that an upcoming armed conflictwas no job in sight (up from 42% in 2009). Despite was ‘not probable’. The share of people wantingdissatisfaction with their material situation, the num- stronger ties with their neighbouring countries wasber of people wanting to go abroad was relatively the highest in the region in Bosnia and Herzegovina:low: 20% of interviewees expressed a wish to leave in 2010, 69% of respondents expressed such asthe country of which 8% (just under 2% of Bosnian wish.respondents) had concrete migration plans.

The share of people thinking that Bosnia’s acces- Croatia: Croats are moresion to the EU would be a ‘good thing’ rose (cur- satisfied with life, despiterently at 69% for the whole of Bosnia) with an es- seeing pervasive corruptionpecially strong increase in the entity of Republika and losing faith in the EUSrpska: while in 2008 31% of respondents in Economic sentiment in Croatia has not deteriorat-Republika Srpska had thought of EU accession as ed: the percentage of respondents seeing the econ-a ‘good thing’, the figure went up to 56% in 2010. omy improving has risen by four points to 8%. AndDuring the same period, EU support in the Bosnian while in 2009, three-quarters (74%) of respondentsFederation increased from 59% to 75%. People in believed that the economy was getting worse, thisboth entities were more optimistic about the ac- share dropped to about two-thirds (64%) in 2010.cession date: in 2009, Bosnian respondents — onaverage — believed that the country would join in EU support in Croatia has reached an absolute2022; that date has now moved to 2018. low, even lower than that seen in pre-accession

11 2010

countries in earlier enlargements.2 While1 the share religion plays an important role in their lives (68%). of those feeling that EU accession would be ‘nei- ther good nor bad’ for the country has remained Croatia has some of the highest Western Balkans unchanged at 38% since 2009, more people now rates of respondents that saw corruption as being thought that it would be a ‘bad thing’ (up 4 per- pervasive in government (89%) and business (93%). centage points to 32% in 2010). Only 25% or re- On the other hand, the self-reported incidents of spondents in Croatia thought of EU accession as giving bribes to get things done were among the a ‘good thing’ and only 38% would currently vote lowest in the region (10% of respondents said that ‘Yes’ in an EU referendum – as opposed to 43% they had had to give a bribe in the year before the that would vote ‘No’. One positive development re- interview). Since 2008, the rate of people satis- garding Croats’ views on the EU was that they were fied with the governments’ actions against organ- now much more confident that they would be wel- ised crime has gone up by five percentage points comed in the EU: an increase from 42% to 55% of to 17%. Two-thirds of respondents, however, were respondents who felt that people wanted Croatia in still dissatisfied. the Union. The number of people seeing better opportunities outside of the coun-Helena Šuper

try has continued to increase (up 3

points to 48%). This has not, how- ever, led to an increase in peoples’ wish to leave the country which re- mains the lowest in the region: 13% of interviewees said that they would emigrate under ideal circumstances.

Kosovo: with con-

cerns about the econ- omy and widespread corruption, Kosovars look towards the EU Kosovo seems to have witnessed a Osijek, Croatia most worrying development in the past year. In the past it has had the While more than two-thirds (70%) of Croats disap- most upbeat Western Balkan residents, but in 2010, proved of their leaders’ performance, Croatia was many more people claimed that they were strug- the only country in the region where confidence in gling financially: an increase from 33% to 54%. This the judicial system has grown since 2008: 44% of development could be partly explained by a sharp respondents now stated that they had a lot or some drop in the numbers of Kosovo Albanians saying trust in the judiciary (up from 25%). Croatia currently they received money and goods from abroad: a de- has one of the highest rates of people saying that crease from 23% to 15%. And while the share of people seeing the country’s economy as improv- 2 The question “Generally speaking, do you think ing was – along with Montenegro – the highest in that [COUNTRY]’s membership of the European Union would the region at 30%, more and more people thought be a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good or bad?” has the opposite – that Kosovo’s economy was getting also been asked in Candidate Country Eurobarometer surveys worse: from 23% in 2009 to 37% in 2010. A strik- conducted by Gallup for the European Commission prior to ing 59% of unemployed respondents did not be- the 2004 European Union enlargement. To consult the results of these surveys please visit http://ec.europa.eu/public_opin- lieve that they would find a job in the year following ion/archives/cceb2_en.htm the survey interview; this was especially disturbing

12 2010

given the reported unemployment

rate of an estimated 45.4%3 in 2010.2

Support for EU accession remained

high at 87%, but Kosovo respon-dents were less convinced that thepeople in the Union wanted theircountry to join; the share of peoplefeeling that Kosovo would be wel-comed has dropped from 75% to65% in 2010.

The approval of Kosovo’s leader-

ship, among the highest in the regionin earlier Balkan Monitor waves, hasdropped from 59% to 48% between Prizren, Kosovo2009 and 2010. This reduced sup-port for the administration was reflected in a lower in remittances received. As a result, while aboutconfidence in the national government and in the one-third (31%) of respondents expressed a wishjudicial system. to leave their country, only 8% of those (so 2%-3% of total Kosovo respondents) had concrete plans toBoth Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo now find reli- leave. A year ago it had been 16% of those want-gion much more important than they did four years ing to leave.ago. The shares of respondents considering it to bean important part of their lives have increased from Asked when they expected to be included in the59% to 81% (for Serbs) and from 68% to 89% (for visa liberalisation scheme for the Schengen zone,Albanians) in the period since 2006. 52% of respondents ‘did not know’ – and another 38% stated that they did not expect to be includedThe perception that government corruption was until their country was recognised internationally.pervasive has risen by eight percentage points (to91%). On the other hand, far fewer people stated Respondents in Kosovo expressed a wish for bet-that they had to give bribes (to get something done) ter ties with neighbouring countries – 55% statedin the year before the interview: the rate of bribes that they were not strong enough. Albanian respon-being offered has dropped from 20% to 9%. A simi- dents in Kosovo were also very supportive of thelar development could be observed in the area of concept of ‘Greater Albania’, a country comprisingorganised crime where the share of respondents the territories in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albaniastating that the criminal networks affected them with majority-Albanian populations. In 2010, 81% ofpersonally has dropped from 67% to 43%. Kosovo Albanians supported such an idea, up from 54% in 2008.There was a strong decline in the number of inter-viewees who saw more opportunities abroad than A compromise solution to the conflict with Serbiain their own country (from 64% to 48% since 2009) did not seem to find any support from Kosovo re-– a development probably linked to the strong drop spondents. Vast majorities (90%-93%) of both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs disapproved of plans to join the Serbian-populated areas or3 See the “EU Candidate and Pre-Accession Coun- to exchange the areas with Serbian majority fortries Economic Quarterly” at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_fi-nance/db_indicators/cpaceq/documents/cceq_2010_q3_ Albanian-populated territories in the south of Serbia.en.pdf

13 2010

someone to get something done in the year before

Macedonia: people are less the survey has declined from 20% to 13% sincesatisfied with life; visa- 2009, but more than two-thirds (70%-74%) still sawfree travel has had little high-level corruption as pervasive in both govern-effect On EU support ment and the business world.With 72% of respondents stating that they couldonly manage on their household’s income ‘with dif- More respondents in Macedonia than in any otherficulty’ or ‘with great difficulty’, Macedonia has one country in the region believed that better opportuni-of the highest shares of people struggling financial- ties could be found abroad: 58% thought that wayly. A similarly dramatic situation had been observed (up 4 points from 2009). However, despite a risein previous waves of the Balkan Monitor, and this in the number of people that would ‘ideally’ like tohardship seems to weigh heavily on the life satisfac- leave their country, only 13% of the 34% that felt thistion of people in Macedonia. Asked to rate how sat- way (about 4% of respondents) had concrete plansisfied they were with their lives in general, on a scale to leave permanently in the year after the survey.from 0 to 10, people on average gave their lives ascore of 4.2 – the lowest in the Western Balkan re- As in previous waves of the Balkan Monitor survey,gion, and down 0.3 points from the score measured more Macedonians than any other group felt thatin 2006. there was still a danger of an armed conflict: 28% of respondents felt that a war would ‘certainly’ orThe introduction of visa liberalisation in late 2009 ‘probably’ happen. The share of respondents notseems to have had little effect on Macedonians’ believing in that possibility, however, has risen: inview of the EU. Since 2006, Macedonia’s support 2006, 55% did not believe in the possibility of an-for the EU has steadily decreased: 60% of respon- other war, this figure has increased to 64% in 2010.dents thought of Macedonia’s EU accession as a‘good thing’, down from 76% in 2006. Nevertheless,a referendum about EU integration would still gather Montenegro: Montenegrinsa large majority of ‘Yes’ votes: 82% of Macedonian are more supportive of theresidents stated that they would vote pro EU. EU, happier about life and less affected by crimeMacedonia is one of the few countries covered by Like most of their fellow residents in the Westernthe Balkan Monitor survey where the share of re- Balkans, Montenegrins are still suffering from the ef-spondents feeling represented by a politician or a fects of the financial and economic crisis. About 7political party has decreased in the past year. While in 10 (71%) respondents said they were having dif-42% of respondents felt represented in 2009, the ficulties in managing on their household’s income.share has decreased to 33% just one year later. That figure has hardly changed since 2009, butAmong both Macedonian and Albanian respon- it was much higher than before the crisis (51% indents in the country, the people’s confidence in in- 2008). In a similar vein, the proportion of respon-stitutions has been decreasing across the board. dents expecting the actual economic situation toWhile religious organisations were still among the improve (30%) has remained stable and the samemost trusted institutions, the share of people hav- holds true for the number of unemployed interview-ing confidence in them has decreased from 74% ees who were optimistic about finding a new job into 69% among Macedonians and from 82% to the next 12 months (50%). In 2010, however, fewer69% among Macedonian Albanians. The judicial Montenegrin residents could count on friends andsystem was one of the least trusted institutions in relatives who were living abroad (31%, minus 7 per-the country: only 31% of Macedonians and 20% of centage points); despite this, Montenegrin house-Macedonian Albanians had faith in the institution. holds did receive more money from abroad than they did in the previous year (plus 3 points to 12%).The share of people reporting that they had to bribe This positive development in the actual transfer of

14 2010

Marko Miloševićmoney/goods was unique among WesternBalkan countries. As in all countries, exceptfor Albania and Kosovo, respondents in thecurrent wave were more likely to believe thatopportunities abroad were better than at home(plus 7 points to 52%). Against the backdropof economic stagnation, it is interesting tosee that the average life satisfaction amongMontenegrins has increased: the score hasrisen to 5.5 (up from 4.8) on a scale from 0 to10 – this was the highest score in Montenegrosince the launch of the Balkan Monitor in 2006,almost equalling Croatia’s score of 5.6.

Visa liberalisation for travel to the Schengen

area for Montenegrins seems to have had asubstantial effect on support for the EU, which Herceg Novi, Montenegroreached a new peak with 73% of respondentssaying that their country’s EU membership would to offer bribes to get something done in the last 12be a good thing (plus 6 percentage points). At the months (minus 6 points to 13%).same time, respondents in Montenegro were nowmore likely to feel that their membership would Furthermore, Montenegrins were now the least like-be welcomed by EU citizens (plus 5 percentage ly Balkan residents to say their daily lives were af-points to 59%). This was in line with the fact that fected by organised crime (minus 3 points to 7%).Montenegrins, on average, now thought that EU This also translated into a higher number of respon-accession would happen in 2016 and not in 2017, dents being satisfied with their government’s effortsas estimated during the previous wave. to combat organised crime (plus 6 points to 41%).

Despite these encouraging developments in EU- Public opinion in Montenegro was relatively sup-related areas, people in Montenegro have become portive of a potential membership of NATO: 38%more sceptical of their country’s leadership: 41% of respondents supported their country’s accessionnow disapproved of their leaders’ performance to the Alliance and 24% thought that it would be a(plus 12 percentage points), while the number of bad thing.those giving their approval has remained at 48%.Even so, the national government was by far themost trusted in the region (70% expressed a lot or Serbia: despite the economicsome trust in it). A worrying trend, though, was ob- outlook, Serbs do not wantserved regarding freedom of expression: 64% of to emigrate and joblesssurvey participants said that most or many people feel more optimisticwere afraid to openly express their political views(compared to 50% in 2006). This was the highest The mid-term effects of the financial and economicfigure in the Western Balkans. crisis are still raging in Serbia: an unsettling 78% of respondents in the country said that they hadLevels of perceived government corruption were difficulties in making ends meet. This rate was thestable in Montenegro (at 50%), while fewer people highest in the region and has remained unchangedthought that corruption was widespread in the busi- since 2009. In the case of Serbia, this economicness world (minus 5 points to 64%). There were hardship does not seem linked to the reduced in-also fewer respondents saying that they had had flow of remittances: in all waves of the Balkan

15 2010

Monitor, a relatively low percentage of people in the with more than 8 in 10 respondents claiming thatcountry (currently 6%) have said they received mon- corruption was widespread in both domains. At theey or goods from abroad in the past 12 months. In same time, there was a significant drop of six per-a similar light, people in Serbia were also the most centage points in the self-reported need to give apessimistic regarding the economic development of bribe in the year prior to the interview; in 2010, 12%their country: 70% of respondents (plus 4 percent- stated that they felt forced to pay a bribe in the 12age points since 2009) saw economic conditions months before the survey.as getting worse. One specific finding in the BalkanMonitor can be, however, interpreted as light at the Despite the dramatic financial situation of most re-end of the tunnel: a rising share of unemployed re- spondents and people’s gloomy outlook about theirspondents (45%, up from 39% in 2008 and the country’s future, a rising share of respondents ex-highest such rate in the Western Balkan region) was pressed the wish to remain in Serbia. While in 2006,hopeful that they would find a job within a year after a quarter of interviewees ‘ideally’ would have likedthe survey interview. to leave the country and almost two-thirds (63%) said they wanted to stay, four years later, three-EU support in Serbia has been steadily decreas- quarters (77%) wished to remain in Serbia while justing since the beginning of Balkan Monitor measure- 19% saw a better life elsewhere. Together with peo-ments in 2006. For the first time in this period, less ple in Macedonia, Serbian respondents were thethan half of respondents (44%) thought of EU ac- group most likely to see a risk of a war breaking outcession as a ‘good thing’. It seems, however, that in the region within the next five years – a quarterin the case of a referendum (on the Sunday after (24%) thought that such an event was ‘probably’the survey interview) a majority would still support or ‘certainly’ going to happen. At the same time,Serbia’s EU membership plans with 63% stating respondents in Serbia remained keen about bet-that they would vote ‘Yes’. Serbia’s difficult path to ter neighbourly cooperation; just as in 2009, aboutEU integration seems to have reflected on how peo- two-thirds (64%) stated that the ties to neighbour-ple perceived the EU citizens’ stance on the matter ing countries should be stronger. Regarding a veryof Serbia’s accession: the share of people thinking topical neighbourhood conflict, the unilateral decla-that ‘people in the EU want Serbia to join the EU’ ration of Kosovo, Serbs were not becoming morehas dropped from 53% to 41% between 2009 and conciliatory and were less likely to accept compro-2010. mise solutions. While in 2008, half of respondents thought that the partition of Kosovo could be part ofOnly 22% of respondents in Serbia said they ap- a possible future solution, in 2010, only 43% agreedproved of their leaders (-5 points since 2009) and with such an idea while two-thirds (67%) thoughtthat meant that two-thirds of Serbian residents dis- that Serbia would ‘never’ recognise Kosovo as anapprove of their leadership. A similar share (68%) independent country.did not feel represented by any party or politician.While, in 2010, more people did say that they felt A similar intransigence could be observed concern-represented politically (plus 7 percentage points ing Serbia’s possible future accession to NATO: onlysince 2009), that figure was only a quarter (27%) of 13% in Serbia thought it would be ‘a good thing’,the population. while 52% felt that it would be ‘bad’. Lastly, in an is- sue of great importance to Serbia’s ambitions con-Within the Western Balkans, Serbia was one of the cerning EU integration, 37% of respondents in thecountries where people were the least willing to say country thought that ‘war criminal at large’ Ratkothat religion played an important role in their every- Mladic could not be found by the authorities be-day lives – just over half of respondents stated that cause he was hiding abroad. A similar share ofthis was the case. Serbs’ view of corruption in gov- 35%, though, were convinced that ‘the authoritiesernment and business has remained very critical know where he is, but do not want to capture him’.

16 2010

Material situation and life

satisfaction

Ivica MatejićNumerous economists have commented that Western Balkan countries follow gen-eral European and global trends in their economic development – albeit with a certaintime lag.4 The financial and economic crisis that struck Western Europe in 2008, forexample, seems to have had its worst impact on Balkan economies in 2009. Thisyear’s survey results, therefore, should be able to give a good indication on whetherthe recovery experienced by large European economies is already being felt by West-ern Balkan residents – or whether the crisis is still a reality for people in the region.

Financial difficulties persist – with a strongest effects of the crisis on Balkan economiesdramatic increase in Kosovo has been the shortfall of remittances. Due to eco-At the time of the 2010 survey, majorities across all nomic hardship and a difficult labour situation in theWestern Balkan countries stated that they found it traditional target countries of Western Balkan mi-difficult to manage on their households’ income. grant workers such as Germany, Italy and Greece,This proportion was the smallest in Croatia, with family members working in exile have had to either52% stating that they got by with difficulty or with return to the Balkan region or reduce the amount ofgreat difficulty, while the greatest proportion of peo- money sent back home.ple struggling was seen in Serbia, where 78% ofinterviewees reported difficulties in making ends The results of the current Balkan Monitor clearlymeet. In all Western Balkan countries, except for confirm such an analysis. Since the question re-Croatia and Macedonia, a rise in the numbers re- garding the help of relatives or friends living abroadporting financial difficulties was observed between was asked for the first time (2006), the share of2009 and 2010. The rise was most dramatic in people stating that in times of hardship they couldKosovo, where the share of people struggling in- rely on a close relative or friend abroad has beencreased from 33% to 54% within just one year. 1 steadily declining in most countries. The drop was especially steep in Kosovo and Montenegro whereA steady decline in people being the proportion of respondents being able to countable to count on help from abroad on help from exiles went from 56% to 36% and from 51% to 31%, respectively. Albania (45%) andMany studies undertaken since the beginning of Macedonia (41%) had the most respondents stat-the economic crisis have shown that one of the ing that they could rely on help from abroad; Serbia (27%) and Croatia (26%) had the lowest numbers.

4 For a recent study see “How are the Balkans

The decline in the number of Western Balkan mi-Weathering the Storm of the Economic Crisis” by Marin Less-enski at http://www.iris-bg.org/files/The%20Western%20 grants being able to help their family or friends atBalkans.pdf home is reflected in the fact that declining shares

of respondents in most countries receive money or furthermore, in all countries, those feeling that thegoods from contacts abroad. In 2010, such a de- situation was getting worse outnumbered thosevelopment was visible across all nationalities in the respondents stating that it was getting better. TheWestern Balkans, but mostly affected Albanians liv- situation was seen as being especially gloomy ining in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia – tradition- Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia whereally the ethnic group with the highest percentage of around two-thirds of respondents felt that the statemigrants in the Western Balkans. While in 2009, a of their economies was worsening. The develop-share of 23% of Kosovo Albanians 18% of respond- ment of economic sentiment is specifically negativeents in Albania and 19% of Macedonian Albanians in Serbia, where the share of people feeling that thesaid they received help from abroad, in 2010 the economy was getting worse rose from 24% to 70%percentage had decreased to 16% of Albanians (in in the period between 2006 and 2010. The highestAlbania) and 15% of Albanians in Macedonia and share of optimistic respondents – feeling that theKosovo. This dramatic decrease – of eight percent- economic situation was improving – was seen inage points – was certainly one of the reasons for the Montenegro and Kosovo (both 30%).worsening material situation in Kosovo described inthe beginning of this chapter. Amidst this gloomy sentiment regarding the overall economic situation, the 2010 Balkan Monitor dataBalkans’ economies – still feeling did not provide many indicators that would sup-the effects of the crisis port the theory that the Western European recov- ery would soon be followed by an upward trend inRegarding the question as to whether the Balkan the Balkans. Among the few positive signs was theeconomies were recovering after the crisis, the job-related optimism of unemployed respondents inviews of the people in the Balkans were clear: they Macedonia and Serbia. Asked whether they weredid not believe that their respective economies hoping to find a job within the 12 months after thewere getting healthier. Between 2009 and 2010, in survey, higher numbers of jobless respondents inall countries except Croatia, there was an increase both countries felt that it was very likely or that therein the percentage of people feeling that the eco- was a good chance that they would find employ-nomic situation in their countries was getting worse; ment. In Macedonia, this number rose from 16% to

18 2010

Less money or goods received from abroad across almost all

Balkan ethnic groups or entities, only Montenegro sees a rise

In People the past 12outside months,country to rely receive did this household on help in the form of money or goods from another in- dividual living abroad?

Do you have relatives or friends who are living in another country whom you can count on to help you when24% you between 2008orand need them, not?2010 while in Serbia the Money is not everythingshare of optimistic job-seekers went up from 25%to 45% in the same timeframe. Among economists and political analysts there is more and more talk to look ‘beyond GDP’ whenWhile the positive feeling in Serbia reflects the pre- looking at an economy’s welfare by putting citi-vailing economic sentiment in that country, it would zens’ wellbeing at the centre of analysis. The Balkannot be sufficient to turn-around the poor employ- Monitor asked questions about wellbeing since thement situation in the Western Balkan region. While beginning of measurements in the Western Balkanthe unemployment rate in Serbia was relatively region and is now able to provide insight into thehigh at 17.4% in 2009, it was strongly exceeded trends around Western Balkan residents’ life satis-by Bosnia and Herzegovina (42.7% in 2009) and faction. In 2010, one of the wellbeing-related ques-Kosovo (47.5% in 2008). Job-related optimism tions aimed to assess people’s life satisfaction bywould therefore be essential in those two countries; asking them to place their feelings about their ownhowever, the Balkan Monitor figures suggested that life on a scale from 0 to 10.the jobless in both states were far from feeling up-beat about their job prospects. In Kosovo, the share Judging by the averages of self-assessments givenof unemployed respondents finding it not likely or by respondents in the respective countries, peoplenot likely at all that they would find a job within a in Croatia were most satisfied with their lives – theyyear grew by eight percentage points to 59% (from gave themselves a score of 5.6 on average. The2009 to 2010), while in Bosnia and Herzegovina the least satisfied were respondents in Macedonia withsame figure skyrocketed from 42% to 74% in just an average of 4.2 – a decrease of 0.3 points fromone year. It seems that politicians’ campaign prom- the first results gathered in that country in 2006.ises prior to the October 2009 general elections in Looking at the region, the levels of life satisfactionBosnia and Herzegovina have not installed more have not followed the negative economic trends,confidence in the country’s jobless. but seem to have remained rather stable since 2006.

19 2010

Jobless are pessimistic, except in Macedonia and Serbia

Do you think you will get a job in the next 12 months? (Base: unemployed respondents) Will you get a job in the next 12 months? Yes very likely Yes there is a good chance Not likely Not likely at all DK/NA

Do you think you will get a job in the next 12 months?

Base: those who are unemployed

In most countries, no increase in life satisfaction over the past four years

If the top step is “10” and the bottom step is “0”, on which step of the ladder would you say you person- ally feel you stand at this time, assuming that the higher the step the better you feel about your life, and the lower the step the worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to the way you feel? (Averages of Assessment responses given)of life today – average score

On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time, assuming that the higher the step the better you feel about your life, and the lower the step the worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to the way you feel?

20 2010

Attitudes toward the EU

Andrzej PyrkaAfter a long period in which the Western Balkan states were vainly waiting for signalsfrom Brussels that they would be moving closer to EU accession, 2009 and 2010 fi-nally brought concrete steps. In December 2009, the EU lifted the visa requirementsfor three Western Balkan states: Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia. This gave aclear message that the Western Balkans had not been forgotten by the EuropeanUnion – a timely signal in a phase where EU support was slowly fading in many coun-tries of the Western Balkans, as the Balkan Monitor has observed in past years.

EU accession still supported third (32%) of respondents thinking that EU ac-

– but not so fervently cession would be a bad thing compared to 28% in 2009. Furthermore, the Balkan Monitor – for theDespite this positive development towards EU inte- third time in a row − reported that a relative majoritygration, trends in Balkan populations’ stance on EU of Croatians remain indifferent to EU integration withaccession have not followed one particular pattern 38% seeing it as neither a good nor a bad thing.in 2010. For example, while EU support continuedto increase in Montenegro (from 67% in 2009 to In Albania, a state that showed high levels of sup-73% in 2010), it sustained its downward trend in the port for the EU since 2006, results were notice-other two countries that now enjoy visa-free travel: ably different from the past year; the share of re-the share of people thinking EU accession would spondents thinking that EU accession would bebe a good thing fell from 62% to 60% in Macedonia a good thing dropped from 88% to 81% in 2010.and from 50% to 44% in Serbia since 2010. In Kosovo, another country with traditionally high support for the EU, the level of support remainedThe EU enjoyed a strong rise in support from people roughly unchanged.in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the past years. Whilein 2008 48% of respondents thought that acceding The responses to the question on voting intentionsto the EU would be a good thing for the country, the in the event of an EU accession referendum werefigure had risen to 69% in 2010. When examined at consistent between 2009 and 2010: majorities in allentity level, this rise mostly stems from a strong im- Balkan states, except Croatia, said that they wouldprovement of the EU’s image in Republika Srpska: vote ‘Yes’ (ranging from 63% in Serbia to 93% infrom a mere 31% that supported EU accession in Albania). In Croatia − in line with the low level of EU2008, the figure increased to 59% in 2010. Over the support − the proportion of those who would votesame period, EU support in the Bosnian Federation ‘No’ remained higher than those who would voteincreased from 57% to 73%. ‘Yes’ (43% vs. 38%).

A similar picture emerged in Croatia: support for Public perceptions regarding what people in thethe EU decreased further this year with roughly a EU thought about their country’s prospective

21 2010

No consistent pattern in the level of EU support

– but big decreases in Albania and Serbia

Generally speaking, do you think that [COUNTRY]’s membership of the European Union would be a good Support for EU membership thing, a bad thing, or neither good or bad?

membership showed relatively more variation com- Little change in views concerningpared to previous years. In 2010, respondents in the dates for EU accession – exceptKosovo and Albania had the most confidence that in Bosnia and HerzegovinaEU citizens were supportive of their accession tothe Union: 69% (in Albania) and 65% (in Kosovo) These recent developments – related to Slovenia-thought that way. Conversely, Serbs have become Croatia relations – that removed one of the majorless confident than people in the rest of the Balkan obstacles on Croatia’s path towards EU integra-states with about 4 in 10 (41%) respondents feeling tion have not, however, made Croats expect theirthat people in the EU were sympathetic to Serbia’s countries’ EU accession date arrive sooner. While inEU integration (a decrease of 12 percentage points 2009, respondents in Croatia on average believedsince 2008). that 2013 would be the year in which they would enter the Union, in 2010 the common belief wasDespite their negative stance towards EU acces- that accession would only take place in 2014. Thesion, in 2010, an increasing number of Croats felt same year was, on average, expected by Albaniansthat people in the EU approved of their prospective as their country’s date of EU integration; this as-membership − the proportion of respondents who sessment was a bit surprising since Albania is at ansaid that EU citizens wanted Croatia to join the EU early stage of the EU accession process and hashas increased by 13 percentage points since 2009. not achieved the status of being an official candi-This development might be a direct consequence date country yet.of the end to Slovenia’s ‘blockade’ of Croatia’s EUintegration efforts in September 2009, following in- In most Balkan countries, the expectations aroundtense negotiations around the Slovenian-Croatian the speed of EU accession have remained relative-border dispute. ly unchanged: in Montenegro, people on average

22 2010

believed that their country would join in 2016 while in 10 of respondents in Albania believed that Italyin Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia the mean ex- was the biggest supporter of their country’s acces-pected accession date was 2017. The only coun- sion to EU.try where expectations shifted significantly over thepast year was Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the Serbs, on the other hand, saw Greece as the big-average date of potential entry into the EU moved gest supporter of their accession to the EU (38%closer: from 2022 to 2018. It is likely that people’s shared this idea). This perspective is probably root-increasing optimism concerning the EU integration ed in the long history of friendly relations betweenprocess is linked to the visa liberalisation issue. After the two states and Greece’s continuing refusal toBosnia and Herzegovina had been denied visa liber- recognise Kosovo as an independent state. Anotheralisation in the first round in 2009, the country made country where a significant number of Serbs (10%)great progress on the road map towards visa-free believed there was considerable support for theirtravel to the Schengen zone. As the Balkan Monitor EU membership was Spain − which has not recog-results show, this did not go unnoticed with resi- nised Kosovo either.dents of the country, who now believed that EU ac-cession was coming closer. Unlike most of the other Balkan states, respondents from Bosnia and Herzegovina did not have one fa-The Balkan Monitor also asked respondents which vourite: similar amounts of interviewees (10%-12%)EU member state they perceived as being the big- mentioned Austria, Germany and Slovenia as thegest supporter of their country’s EU accession. biggest supporters of their EU membership. ThereWhile, in Kosovo and Croatia, majorities felt most was a slight difference in perceptions at entity-lev-supported by Germany (31% and 27%, respective- el: while the biggest share of people in Republikaly), Slovenia was considered to offer the most sup- Srpska (9%) saw Greece as their biggest support-port by the people of Macedonia and Montenegro er in EU accession, respondents in the Federation(24% and 11%, respectively). In addition, roughly 3 most often mentioned Austria (18%). In both entities,

Serbia and Kosovo feeling that fewer EU citizens want them in the Union

DoAre you we thinkwelcome by EU that the people citizens? in the European Union want [COUNTRY] to join the European Union?

Do you think that people in the European Union wants [COUNTRY] to join the European Union?

23 2010

Bosnians becoming more optimistic about EU

accession, Albanians perhaps too optimistic Estimated EU accession years When, in which year do you think [COUNTRY] will be a part of the European Union?

2022 2009 2010

2018 2017 2017 2017 2017 2017 2016 2016 2016 2015 2014 2014 2013

Croatia Albania Montenegro Kosovo Macedonia Serbia Bosnia and

Herzegovina

When, in which year do you think [COUNTRY] will be a part of the European Union?however, Germany and Slovenia were among the it fully cooperated with the International Criminalmost frequently named supporters of Bosnian EU Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). On theintegration. other hand, respondents in Kosovo named Spain (33%), Greece and Cyprus (both 11%), all of whichPeople’s responses to the question about which have denied recognition to Kosovo, as their biggestEU member state was the major opponent to their opponents to their integration into the EU.country’s membership of the Union were also sug-gestive of the current state of relations between the Finally, the Balkan Monitor results showed thatrespective states. For example, 4 in 10 Croatians a strong majority of Macedonians (86%) felt thatperceived Slovenia, with whom they have gone Greece was against their membership – this couldthrough a border dispute that has not yet been easily be linked to the unresolved name disputefully resolved, as the major opponent of their EU between the two countries, where Greece hasmembership. Similarly, Serbs were the most criti- threatened to halt Macedonia’s EU membershipcal of the Netherlands – possibly because of that negotiations.country’s objection to Serbia’s EU accession unless

24 2010

Perceptions about the greatest supporters and

Opponents of Balkan countries’ EU accession Biggest supporter of [COUNTR [COUNTRY]’s EU accession (Top3 mentions), by country In your opinion, which EU member state is the biggest supporter of [COUNTRY]’s EU accession?

Macedonia Croatia Montenegro

In your opinion, which EU member state is the biggest supporter of [COUNTRY]’s EU accession? Biggest opponent of [COUNTRY]’s EU accession And which mentions), (Top3 EU member state by iscountry most opposed to [COUNTRY]’s EU accession?

Macedonia Croatia Montenegro

Greece 86 Slovenia 40 Germany 7

And which EU member state is most opposed to [COUNTRY]’s EU accession?

25 2010

Satisfaction and confidence in

the region’s institutions

Andrzej PyrkaDespite the existing shortfalls and material problems, it can be seen as real progressthat the Western Balkan region is slowly becoming, since the armed conflict in Mace-donia in 2001, “another boring part of Europe”, as recently stated by analyst HeatherGrabbe.5 Whether this is a success of the EU’s stabilising policies or not, it is a majorstep forward for the people of the region, who can live without imminent fear of con-flict. Nevertheless, the challenges remain great: the Balkan countries are still consid-ered as ‘weak states’ and – as observed by the Balkan Monitor in past years – manyof the region’s national institutions have a long way to go in order to earn the trust oftheir countries’ residents.

Trust in politicians and the ability percentage points over the four years. In the remain-to express political views openly ing countries, approval ratings either remained rela- tively stable (Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia andRegarding the trends in people’s satisfaction Bosnia and Herzegovina) or decreased (Serbia andwith their state government, a very mixed picture Croatia). The approval of national leadership hasemerged for the Western Balkan region: while in declined strongly in Croatia, where it has droppedAlbania, Kosovo and Montenegro relative majorities by 27 percentage points since 2006.of 48% approved of their respective leaders, in allother countries those disapproving of their govern- There were, however, positive signals that the re-ment’s performance outnumbered those who ap- lationship of Balkan citizens towards their politi-proved. While, in Macedonia, approval was still quite cal class is becoming more conciliatory. From thehigh (41%) and only a slight majority (51%) disap- Balkan Monitor perspective, in most countries, theproved, leadership assessment was much harsher electorate now feel more represented by politiciansin Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina: only or a political party. While during the Monitor’s firstaround one-fifth of respondents supported their survey in 2006, the shares of respondents that feltleaders while more than two-thirds disapproved.1 well represented by a politician or political party only ranged from 20% (Croatia) to 36% (Montenegro)Albania was the only country of the region where and relative majorities everywhere did not feel theyleadership approval has followed a positive trend were represented, a more democratic picture hassince the first Balkan Monitor survey in 2006; emerged in 2010. In all countries, except Serbia,government approval in that country rose by 17 more people now feel politically represented than they did in 2006. This feeling was especially pro-5 Consult http://ecfr.eu/page/-/audio/Balkanre- nounced in Albania (60% felt politically represent-portpod.mp3, an audio podcast by the European Council on ed), Kosovo (54%) and Montenegro (46%), whereForeign Relations.

26 2010

such a positive feeling among respondents out- Trust in internal and external institu-weighed those who felt their political views were be- tions still a mixed pictureing ignored. In all other countries, however, aroundtwo-thirds still did not feel politically represented. On the Western Balkans’ path towards becoming functioning market democracies, it is crucial thatRegarding the issue of free political expression, the national institutions instil confidence in the citizensdevelopment observed by Gallup surveys in the re- of the region. Past waves of the Balkan Monitorgion paints a sobering picture. Large shares of re- showed that while, in most countries, the churchspondents throughout the region (between 32% in and the military were trusted a lot by most respon-Kosovo and 64% in Montenegro) felt that many or dents, state institutions still had a long way to go inmost of their compatriots were afraid to openly ex- order to earn the trust of citizens. It can be said forpress their political views. In some countries, the most institutions – in most countries – that confi-feeling of limited freedom of expression on politi- dence levels have been rather stable over the pastcal issues has even grown recently, as observed in three years; neither national nor external institutionsMontenegro (from 50% to 64% since 2006), Croatia such as international organisations have not suc-(41% to 47%), Albania (14% to 38%) and Kosovo ceeded in building up trust among the people of the(17% to 32%). Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina region.were the only countries where it was now easier toexpress political views: the share of people stating The survey showed that the most trusted institu-that in their view no one was afraid to voice a politi- tions in Albania were external: almost 8 in 10 re-cal opinion rose, in those two countries, from 8% to spondents stated that they had a lot or some con-16% and from 11% to 16%, respectively, between fidence in NATO. The media was also among the2006 and 2010. more trusted institutions with 68% of Albanian inter- viewees showing trust. In general, confidence levels

Some progress but many people still feel they

are not represented politically

As of today, is there a political party or a politician in [COUNTRY/ENTITY] that represents your political Political party or a politician that represents own political views views?

Albania Kosovo Montenegro Macedonia Bosnia and Croatia Serbia

As of today, is there a political party or a politician in [COUNTRY/ENTITY] that represents your political views?

27 2010

Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina reporting

increasing freedom of political expression

In your opinion, how many people in your country, if any, are afraid to openly express their political views? Fear of expressing political views Most are afraid Many are afraid Some are afraid No one is afraid DK/NA 

Montenegro Macedonia Serbia Bosnia and Croatia Albania Kosovo

Herzegovina

In your opinion, how many people in your country, if any, are afraid to openly express their political views?

have remained stable since 2008. The judicial sys- among Bosnian Croats) than people in Republikatem was the only body where the people’s level of Srpska (31%). It was notable that among Bosnianconfidence had dropped: by 13 percentage points Croats, a general drop in institutional confidencebetween 2009 and 2010. could be observed over the past three years, while confidence levels among Bosniaks have remainedIn Bosnia and Herzegovina, the three major ethnic roughly the same.groups showed clear differences in their confidenceprofiles. Despite a strong drop in the share of peo- Similar to most countries of the region, Croats ex-ple that trusted the religious institutions, they re- pressed most trust towards the military and reli-mained the most trusted bodies for Bosnian Serbs gious organisations – 83% trusted the military andand Bosnian Croats (confidence dropped, respec- 64% had trust in the church. Croatian respondentstively, from 89% in 2008 to 67% in 2010, and from were the only Western Balkan residents to show a85% to 65%). Among Bosniaks, the military instilled growing level of trust in the judiciary: while in 2008,most confidence with 70% expressing some or a 25% of Croats expressed confidence in the courts,lot of confidence in that body; religious institutions the figure has risen to 44% in 2010. Croats’ level ofwere trusted by 53% of respondents. Confidence in confidence in the national government remains at athe national government rose from 27% in 2008 to relatively low 26%.36% in 2010 among Bosnian Serbs, which madethis group the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina with In comparison to other groups of the region,most trust in the state government. For Bosniaks Kosovo Albanians showed unusually high levels of(30% had confidence in the national government) confidence in institutions: 91% trusted the military,and Bosnian Croats (19%) the federal government 84% trusted their religious organisations and 79%remained among the least trusted institutions. More had confidence in the EU institutions. Confidenceresidents in the Bosnian Federation had confidence levels remained rather stable, with two notable ex-in EU institutions (49% among Bosniaks and 43% ceptions; since 2009, confidence in the national

28 2010

Development of confidence in institutions

Albania

In [COUNTRY], do you have confidence in each of the following, or not?

Albania

BiH (Bosniaks)

BiH In [Country], do you have confidence in each of

Bosniaks the following, or not?

BiH (Croats)

In [Country], do you have confidence in each of

BiH the following, or not?Croats

BiH (Serbs)

BiH Serbs In [Country], do you have confidence in each of

the following, or not?

In [Country], do you have confidence in each of

the following, or not?

29 2010

Development of confidence in institutions (continued)

In [COUNTRY], do you have confidence in each of the following, or not?

CroatiaCroatia

Kosovo (Albanians)

In [Country], do you have confidence in each of

Kosovo the following, or not?Albanians

Kosovo (Serbs)

In [Country], do you have confidence in each of

the following, or not?KosovoSerbs

Montenegro

In [Country], do you have confidence in each of

the following, or not?Monte-negro

In [Country], do you have confidence in each of

the following, or not?

30 2010

Macedonia (Albanians)

Macedonia Albanians

Macedonia (Nationals)

In [Country], do you have confidence in each of

the following, or not? Macedonia MACEDONIANS

Serbia

In [Country], do you have confidence in each of

the following, or not? Serbia

In [Country], do you have confidence in each of

the following, orgovernment and the judicial system has dropped not? of respondents were the religious organi- majoritysignificantly (from 67% to 44% and from 58% to sations with 76% of Kosovo Serbs exhibiting such38% respectively). trust. All other Kosovar institutions such as the mili- tary, the government and the judicial system onlyTrust levels among the Serbian part of the Kosovo instilled confidence in a small minority of less than 1population were in stark contrast to the Albanian in 10 of the Kosovo Serb population.part: the only bodies that had the confidence of a

31 2010

Macedonians and members of the largest minor- in the government fell from 50% to 16% in just oneity in Macedonia, the Albanians, have slightly dis- year (between 2009 and 2010) and trust in the judi-tinct profiles when it comes to confidence in insti- ciary dropped from 47% to 17% in the same period.tutions. Most Macedonian Slavs had confidence inthe military and in religious organisations. On the In 2010, along with Kosovo Albanians, respondentsother hand, NATO was the most trusted institution in Montenegro reported the highest levels of con-for Macedonian Albanians, just as it was for the oth- fidence in institutions, with levels remaining stableer Albanian groups in Kosovo and Albania, with the since 2008. The national government of MontenegroEU reaching high levels of confidence among eth- was by far the most trusted in the Western Balkans,nic Albanians as well. Overall confidence levels have 26% of respondents stated that they trusted it a lotdecreased for both ethnic groups in Macedonia: and 44% expressed some confidence. Overall con-among Macedonian Slavs, the level of trust in the fidence levels have increased, although in the past three years, increasingly fewer people have stated that they had a lot of trust in any of theImportance of religion institutions mentioned and more people said that they only had some trust. Is religion an important part of your daily life? (% yes) In Serbia, religious organisations and the mili- tary have remained the most trusted organisa- tions, and those levels of confidence have re- mained stable since 2008. It is interesting to note, however, that in the past three years, the military has replaced the church as the coun- try’s most trusted institution: trust has dropped in the latter from 75% to 66% in the past two years, while trust in the former has risen from 63% to 77% in that period. Trust in the media, the judicial system and the national govern- ment is now at a significantly lower level (be- tween 35% and 41% of respondents in Serbia showed confidence in these institutions) and has been decreasing lately. Trust in the EU institutions has remained rather stable since 2008 with about 4 in 10 respondents express- ing confidence in them – all the while to little surprise confidence in NATO remains the low- est in the region with people still remember- ing the military organisation’s attacks against Is religion an important part of your daily life? Serbia in the Kosovo conflict in 1999. % yesgovernment, the media and judicial system have Religion – just as important or not?decreased since 2008 (from 63% in 2008 to 41%in 2010, from 62% to 46%, and from 40% to 32%, In the light of the declining trust in religious organi-respectively). Among Macedonian Albanians, where sations in many of the surveyed countries an analy-confidence in the state institutions has tended not sis of the Balkan Monitor questions about people’sto be as pronounced as with Macedonians, there relationship with mosques and churches should behas been a strong drop in trust in the government able to throw a lot of light on the evolution of reli-and courts between 2009 and 2010. Confidence gious belief in the Western Balkans.

32 2010

There has been no uniform development around religion was an important aspect of their daily lives.faith in the region. Religion has gained importanceas a part of daily life for Albanians in Kosovo (the In Bosnia and Herzegovina, two opposed trendsshare of those considering it to be an important part could be observed: while fewer Bosniaks now con-of daily life went up from 68% in 2009 to 89% in sidered religion to be an important part of their lives2010), Macedonia (91% to 97%) and Albania (from (49% vs. 63% in 2006), more Bosnian Serbs and33% to 44%) and for respondents in Montenegro Bosnian Croats stated that religion was important(from 46% to 60%). It has also remained critical for to them (to 81% vs. 59% in 2006 and to 79% fromMacedonian Slavs and Croatians, where majori- 65% in 2006, respectively)ties of around two-thirds of respondents said that

33 2010

Perceptions of corruption and

organised crime

Slobodan PhilipovicIt is stated in every report about the Western Balkan region, be it a progress assess-ment by the European Commission or an analysis by a think tank: pervasive crimeand corruption are keeping the region’s countries from developing into fully functionalmarket democracies and progressing quicker towards European integration. Stronglinks between criminal networks and political actors get in the way of the implementa-tion of far-reaching anti-corruption reforms, while the principles of good governancecannot take root in a region where businesses often profit from weak states and dys-functional institutions. Against this backdrop, the election of Ivo Josipovic as presi-dent of Croatia in January 2010, after a campaign emphasizing his anti-corruptionefforts, was an important signal for the Western Balkans. It seems like citizens arefed up with the lack of integrity among the ruling classes and are beginning to bringforth change via the ballot box. The Balkan Monitor has been tracking these latestdevelopments of people’s sentiments and experiences around organised crime andcorruption.

Levels of perceived Macedonia the ratio of respondents disagreeing

corruption in government and with the statement that governmental corruptionbusinesses remain high was a common phenomenon in their country has fallen by four percentage points (to 13%). An oppo-Although in all countries covered by the survey at site development was registered in Albania, Bosnialeast half of the citizens thought that corruption was and Herzegovina and Serbia, where the proportionwidespread throughout the government as well as of people assuming corruption to be widespreadwithin the business world, the shares of respon- throughout the government has fallen slightly (3-4dents reporting this differed substantially across the percentage points). Within Bosnia and HerzegovinaWestern Balkans. there was a striking difference in the perception of governmental corruption between the two BosnianWhile in Kosovo more than 9 in 10 (91%) respon- entities: while in the Federation 93% of respondentsdents thought that governmental corruption was were convinced that corruption was common atwidespread in their country, half of interviewees the governmental level, the corresponding figure forin Montenegro held this view. The most dramat- Republika Srpska was at 71%. In the current sur-ic change has taken place in Kosovo, where the vey, a quarter of Montenegrins said that govern-share of those believing that their government was mental corruption was not prevalent in their countrycorrupt has increased by eight percentage points – clearly the highest percentage in the region (an in-compared to the last wave in 2009. Meanwhile, in crease of 8 percentage points compared to 2009).

34 2010

Corruption in government

Is corruption widespread throughout the government in [COUNTRY], or not?

Is corruption widespread throughout the government in [COUNTRY], or not?

In Croatia, views about the level of corruption in followed by Montenegro (64%). However, respon-government have stayed relatively stable; 89% said dents in these countries were also the most like-it was widespread. ly to say they did not know or to refuse to answer (19% and 18% respectively). Croatian respondentsAlbania was the country where business corruption were the most likely to believe that corruption waswas least often considered to be widespread (56%), common practice within the country’s businesses

Corruption in business Corruption within businesses Is corruption widespread within businesses located in [COUNTRY], or not?

Is corruption widespread within businesses located in [COUNTRY], or not?

35 2010

Faced bribe situation

Less need to offer bribe in most countries

Sometimes people have to give a bribe or a present in order to solve their problems. In the last 12 months, were you, personally, faced with this kind of situation, or not (regardless of whether you gave a bribe/present or not)?

Sometimes people have to give a bribe or a present in order to solve their problems. In the last 12 months, were you, personally, faced with this kind of situation, or not (regardless of whether you gavea bribe/present or not)?(93%). The most notable change in the past year Macedonia and Montenegro (both minus 5 percent-was registered in Albania: the share of survey par- age points). Kosovo, however, saw a slight increaseticipants believing in widespread business corrup- in the number of respondents believing that corrup-tion has fallen by 11 percentage points. Similar de- tion was prevalent among businesses (an increasevelopments took place in Serbia and Bosnia and of 3 points to 85%).Herzegovina (down three 3 percentage points),

People still feel the effects of organised crime, but

with the exception of Albania less often 

Does the organised crime in [COUNTRY] affect you personally?

Does the organised crime affect you personally? Yes, it affects me in daily life Yes, it affects me occasionally No, it does not affect me DK/NA

Level is lower Level is about the same Level is higher DK/NA

Do you think the level of organized crime in this country is lower, about the same, or higher than it was 5 years ago?

A positive trend in self-reported pet- Bosnian Federation this figure decreased from 16%ty corruption to 11% for the same period.

In all countries surveyed except for Croatia, the Personal lives now less often affect-2010 survey detected a drop in the share of those ed by organised crimeinterviewees who had been confronted with a con-crete example of corruption, meaning that they had With the exception of Albanians, respondentsconsidered offering a bribe or present to solve their across the Western Balkans felt less frequently af-problems in the past year. The most positive devel- fected by organised crime than they had in 2009.opments took place in Kosovo, where the propor- In Kosovo, for example, 21% of respondents saidtion of respondents reporting this fell by 11 percent- they were affected in daily life and 22% said organ-age points (to 9%), Macedonia (minus 7 points to ised crime affected them occasionally vs. figures13%), Montenegro and Serbia (both down 6 points of 26% and 41%, respectively, in 2009. In Albania,to 13% and 12%, respectively). Albania was again the share of respondents saying that their daily livesthe country with the most respondents who had were negatively affected rose by seven percentagehad to give a bribe, despite a slightly positive trend: points (to 17%), with the share of those being oc-49% said that they had faced such a situation (mi- casionally affected falling by four points (to 18%).nus 3 percentage points) and 48% stated that theyhad not (plus 7 percentage points). Croatian figures Organised crime persists and manywere stable. An opposed development could be governments still lack the will toobserved for the two Bosnian entities: in Republika fightSrpska, respondents reported more often that theyhad been obliged to bribe (from 12% to 18% of re- Albania was the only country surveyed wherespondents between 2009 and 2010), while in the people were more likely to say that the level of

37 2010

organised crime was now lower compared to the crime, less than one in five interviewees in Croatiasituation five years prior to the survey than to claim and Bosnia and Herzegovina held this view (17%the opposite (35% vs.16%). On the other hand, the and 15%, respectively). Important positive devel-highest share of respondents saying that the level of opments took place in Montenegro, Albania andorganised crime was higher than five years ago was Croatia – in the latter country, for example, the sharefound in Bosnia and Herzegovina (47%), followed of respondents dissatisfied with their governments’– at some distance – by Serbia (42%) and Croatia efforts to combat organised crime dropped from by(41%). When examining the Bosnian results closer, 14 percentage points to 66% since 2009. The op-it can be said that the detrimental situation around posite was true in Macedonia: here, more peopleorganised crime was mostly reported in the Bosnian were dissatisfied with the national government’sFederation: while in this entity 58% stated that the anti-corruption efforts; the share of those satisfiedlevel of organised crime had risen over the five years dropped 9 percentage points since 2008 to 40%before the survey, in Republika Srpska a mere 29% in 2010.were of such opinion.

While about 4 in 10 respondents in Montenegro,

Macedonia and Albania said that their governmentwas doing everything in its powers to fight organised

38 2010

Migration and mobility

Dejan ČabriloThe great appeal of economic (work-related) migration for the populations of theWestern Balkans bears both a risk and an opportunity for the region’s development.On the one hand, it is often the most-educated and the brightest that leave theircountries to look for better opportunities in Western Europe or the United States. Thehome countries then miss their talents at a time of societal transformation when theywould be needed most. On the other hand, with a limited educational infrastructure inthe region, it can be helpful if Balkan citizens leave to gain knowledge and work ex-perience abroad before returning to their home countries at some point to transfer theknowledge they have acquired. Since the economic crisis has diminished work op-portunities in some of the traditional host countries of Balkan migrants, this is certainto have a strong effect on the migration plans of Western Balkan residents.

Relative majorities, at least, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia – more thanwant to remain in the Balkans half of respondents saw better chances abroad; hardly changed (3-4 percentage points) since 2009.As in past waves of the Balkan Monitor, the cur-rent survey showed that majorities of respondents The high level of respondents seeing limited op-in all countries except for Croatia and Kosovo were portunities in their own countries translates into aconvinced, in 2010, that there were better oppor- relatively high willingness of people willing to movetunities outside their countries. Furthermore, even abroad to try their luck. The most people with mi-in those two latter countries, those people thinking gration wishes can be found in Albania, wherethat a better life could be found abroad outnum- 42% (up from 32% in 2006) stated that ideally, theybered those who saw equal or better opportunities would like to move to another country. In Macedoniaat home. It was striking, however, that respondents and Kosovo, roughly one-third of respondentsin Albania and Kosovo, traditionally the Western could imagine moving to another country, while inBalkan countries where people were most eager to Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbiamigrate, were now much less likely to see better this share was around one-fifth of respondents. Theopportunities abroad than they were in 2006. In that smallest proportion of people tempted to go abroadtimeframe, the respective share of respondents fell was seen in Croatia with only 13% of respondentsfrom 66% to 52% in Albania and from 72% to 48% wishing to migrate.in Kosovo. An opposite trend was seen in Croatiaand Montenegro, where a growing proportion of It should, however, be noted that where respond-people were now convinced that opportunities were ents said that ideally they wished to move abroadbetter abroad. In just two years, their share has risen (meaning that, for example, there were no ties to38% to 52% in Montenegro and from 31% to 48% family and friends and the respondent had enoughin Croatia. In the remaining countries – Macedonia, money to finance the move) that did not always

39 2010

In Albania and Kosovo, more opportunities now seen at home

Based on the current conditions in our country, which of the following statements best reflects your opin- ion? For people like yourself,… For people like yourself ... DK/NA ... there are more opportunities in this country than in any other country ... there are as many opportunities in this country as in any other country ... there are better opportunities outside this country

Based on the current conditions in our country, which of the following statements best reflects your opinion? For people like yourself,

lead to those respondents having concrete migra- leave the country, only 14% had concrete plans totion plans. This can be illustrated by recent Gallup move abroad permanently. The proportions wereresearch undertaken in the United Kingdom, where even lower in other Western Balkan countries.61a similarly high 30% of respondents said that theywould ideally like to leave the country – a wish that Extrapolated onto the population aged 15 yearswas only realised by a minority of those who stated or older (the age group addressed by the Balkansuch a wish to move abroad. Monitor) the survey figures give an idea of the re- gion’s migration potential. Based on a total WesternIn order to further investigate how concrete people’s Balkan population of 18.7 million (aged 15 anddesires to leave their countries were, the Balkan over), roughly 344,000 residents have concreteMonitor followed up the questions about migra- plans to leave their country permanently the yeartion with a series of questions relating to whether after the interviews (see charts below). Albania hadpeople had concrete ideas and plans concerning the most inhabitants ready to leave permanent-such a move. For example, people who said they ly with around 140,000 having concrete plans towished to migrate, and could name their intended leave Albania in the 12 months after the interviewdestination were asked whether they thought they took place. For the remaining countries, the levelswould be moving abroad permanently in the yearfollowing the survey. The responses to this ques- 6 To consult these and related data please consulttion showed that much smaller numbers of Western worldview.gallup.com, the dashboard of the Gallup WorldPoll. The World Poll is a survey undertaken every year by Gallup inBalkan residents were actually ready to leave their more than 130 countries worldwide in national representativecountries in the short term. For example, of the 42% samples. You can sign up for trial access to the dashboardof Albanians saying that ideally they would like to free of charge.

40 2010

Majorities in all countries – except for Albania – want to stay at home

Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently to another country, or would you prefer Move to continue living incountry to another this country?

Like to move to another country Like to continue living in this country DK/NA

Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently to another country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country?

of potential migration were much lower and ranged returning. In Kosovo, for example, while an extrap-from 4,000 (Croatia) to 60,000 (Macedonia). In olated 130,000 expressed concrete plans to leavesome countries, there were big differences between for another country permanently or temporarily,the numbers of respondents that were planning to only around 30,000 planned to leave the countryleave permanently and those who were considering permanently.

Survey results of people expressing the wish to leave their countries

Extrapolated to countries’ total population (rounded Numbers)

41 2010

Most popular migration destinations

To which country would you like to move? Base: those who would ideally like to move to another coun- try, top 5 responses

42 2010

No definite opinion about the Albanians and Bosnians both

impact of visa liberalisation in divided over the impact of visa either Albania or Bosnia liberalisation

What do you expect will happen after the introduction The abolishment of visa requirements for of visa-free travel for Albania/Bosnia and Herzegovina? Western Balkan citizens travelling towardsration after the introduction of visa-free travel the Schengen area has seen much prog- ress since the publication of the 2009 DK/NA Emigration will remain the same Balkan Monitor results. In a first round, visa Emigration will increase somewhat liberalisation was introduced for citizens Emigration will increase strongly of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia in December 2009. Now, following ma- 6 6 jor steps forward in the necessary trav- 17 22 el-related reforms in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina and positive votes in the European Parliament and the EU’s Council 37 of Ministers, visa-free travel is expected 40 to come to these countries in December 2010. While that step is eagerly awaited in both states, respondents in both countries were divided over the question whether 39 33 easier travel towards the Schengen zone would lead to mass emigration. In Albania, almost 4 in 10 (39%) respondents believed Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina that emigration would increase strongly with another 37% believing that it would only in- you expect will happen after the introduction of visa-free travel for Albania? crease to a limited extent. A similar picture Germany leads the way as an in- emerged in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where tended destination – but not for all one-third (33%) of respondents thought that there would be a big increase in the numbers of people There were great differences in the destinations migrating abroad. These were slightly outnumbered that people would ideally like to migrate to. While by 4 in 10 of respondents expecting such migration Germany was the most popular target for people away from Bosnia and Herzegovina to only increase in Bosnia and Herzegovina (mentioned by 29% of to a limited extent. those wishing to leave), Kosovo (25%), Macedonia (19%) and Croatia (16%), respondents in Albania With both Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina re- were most attracted by Italy (32%). In Montenegro, cently having been granted visa-free travel for the the United States was the most popular destina- near future, the only Western Balkan people requir- tion (mentioned by 17% of people with a desire to ing visas to enter the Schengen zone would be the emigrate), closely followed by Germany and Italy. residents of Kosovo. Much has been written about Interviewees in Serbia had no clear favourite among the detrimental effects of isolating Kosovars in re- target countries, but most often stated that they felt spect to travel rights, but so far, there have been attracted by Sweden (12%) with Germany (11%) as no clear statements by EU officials regarding fu- a close-up second favourite. ture developments in this respect. The effect of that impasse was reflected in the responses of survey

43 2010

participants in Kosovo to the ques- A lack of optimism pervades the views abouttion about when they thought Kosovo visa-free travel to Schengen for Kosovarswould be granted visa-free travel to theSchengen area. Half of respondents When do you think Kosovo will be granted visa-free travel to(52%) did not know what to answer, the Schengen area? (Base: respondents in Kosovo)while the next-biggest share (38%)thought that visa liberalisation would 7only follow international recognition Still in 2010, together withof the country. An optimistic 7% be- Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albanialieved that the country would be grant- After the internationaled easier travel together with Albania recognition of the country 5 522 3 388and Bosnia and Herzegovina — a de- Nevervelopment that has been made im-possible with the recent decisions by DK/NAEuropean Parliament and European 3Council —, while a strongly pessimistic3% responded that they never expect-ed Kosovo to achieve visa-free travel toSchengen countries.

44 2010

Balkan challenges: ethnic

relations and the future of theregion

Located on a territory only slightly larger than that of the UK and composed of atotal population of about 25 million, the Western Balkan countries contain a strikingnumber of latent conflicts. Ethnic tensions within Bosnia and Herzegovina, genocidecases between Serbia and Croatia before the International Court of Justice, the con-flict around Kosovo’s independence, Macedonia’s name dispute with Greece andmany more: it seems unlikely that the region will be able to erase all of its troublespots in the near future. But progress is slowly becoming visible: with the advent of amore moderate class of politicians in many countries and the recent rapprochementbetween the leaders of Croatia and Serbia, there are high hopes that a new breezebringing improved cooperation and interethnic relations might be blowing across theWestern Balkans. Even for the most progressive leaders, however, it will be difficultto pursue reconciliatory policies given the strong sentiments related to ethnicity andnationality that are deeply rooted in the minds of many Western Balkan residents.

At least one giant step forward has been made in year – between 2009 and 2010 – the share of re-the region in the past decade: since 2001, no major spondents being certain that the risk of war was notarmed conflict has taken place and people on the imminent went up from 27% to 49%. That meansground seem to agree with analysts that such an that about 8 in 10 (81%) Bosnians do not expect anoutcome is unlikely in the near future. Asked wheth- armed conflict soon. The fear of ‘war’ was the high-er they expected ‘war’ to break out in the five years est in Macedonia and Serbia where 28% and 24%to come, large majorities – from 62% (Serbia) to of respondents, respectively, held it probable or cer-88% (Croatia) – across all countries were certainly tain that there would be an armed conflict.or probably convinced that an armed conflict wasnot expected anytime soon. The shares of respon- While Balkan residents now see less possibil-dents feeling that ‘war’ was not likely have grown in ity of an armed conflict, this has not been trans-all countries – except in Serbia and Kosovo – since lated into a desire for greater cooperation between2006. In those two countries, the proportion of re- the Balkan neighbours. While in all countries, ex-spondents thinking that there would not be a ‘war’ cept Montenegro, relative majorities said that theirin the near future has decreased by eight percent- country’s neighbourly ties were not strong enough,age points to 62% in Serbia and by two points to those proportions have not been growing every-68% in Kosovo. A remarkable development was where in past years. In Albania and Kosovo, theseen in Bosnia and Herzegovina where in just one share of respondents finding neighbourly relations

45 2010

Little belief in the possibility of war in the region

Looking at the next five years, do you think there is a chance that there will be an armed conflict some- where in the Balkans? Armed conflict in the Balkans in the next five years Yes, certainly Yes, probably No, probably not No, certainly not DK/NA

Division of Kosovo territories interested in more neighbourly cooperation; the

is not an option for Serbs share of respondents in that entity regarding tiesPartition of Kosovo to neighbouring countries as insufficient increased Do you rather agree or disagree that as part of from 54% to 74% between 2008 and 2010.1 a future solution Kosovo could be partitioned? (Base: respondents in Serbia) The Balkan Monitor Focus On Kosovo’s indepen- dence, published in July 20107, showed that public Rather agree Rather disagree DK/NA opinion is becoming less conciliatory following the unilateral declaration of independence. This tenden- 2010 43 37 20 cy was confirmed in the latest wave of the Balkan Monitor: the proportion of respondents in Serbia thinking that a division of Kosovo could be part of a 2009 45 40 16 solution to the conflict has fallen from 50% in 2008 to 43% in 2010. For people living in Kosovo, such 2008 50 35 16 a solution is even less attractive: in 2010, 90% of Kosovo Albanians and 92% of Kosovo Serbs were opposed to a division of the Kosovo territory.Do you rather agree or disagree that as part of a future solution Kosovo could be partitioned? too strong has risen significantly in the past year Variations of this suggested solution find just as (from 15% to 30% in Albania and from 6% to 16% little support. Regarding the proposal that Serb- in Kosovo). In Macedonia, Montenegro and Croatia, populated territories in North Kosovo could be ex- the growth area between 2009 and 2010 was in changed for the Albanian-populated territories in those who thought that relations were just about South Serbia, 93% of Kosovo Serbs and 90% of right and did not need strengthening. The greatest Albanians answered with a clear ‘No’. shares of supporters for more regional cooperation were seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina (69%), Serbia With the declaration of Kosovo’s independence, (64%) and Macedonia (60%). While in the Bosnian some Balkan analysts debated that the idea of creat- Federation entity the share of people wanting stron- ing a ‘Greater Albania’ on a territory that would com- ger ties remained stable two-thirds of respondents, prise all of the areas where ethnic Albanians current- in Republika Srpska people seem more and more ly lived – Albania, Kosovo and parts of Macedonia – could gain new support. In response to this spec- ulation, the Balkan Monitor asked Albanians in the No interest in an exchange Western Balkan region whether they would sup- of territories to solve port such a concept. The responses were mixed. In Kosovo dispute Albania, around two-thirds of respondents support- ed the idea, although support fell by five percentage Would you support the exchange of the Serb- points between 2009 and 2010 (from 68% to 63%). populated territories in North Kosovo for the Among Kosovo Albanians, support for a ‘Greater Albanian-populated territories in South Serbia? Albania’ is growing strongly: from 54% in 2008 to 81% in 2010. Macedonian Albanians, finally, also in- creasingly support a ‘Greater Albania’, albeit at a Yes No DK/NA lower level than their ethnic fellows in Kosovo: the 93 90 proportion advocating a new country assembling all ethnic Albanians has grown from 44% in 2008 to 53% in 2010.

Would you support the exchange of the Serb-

populated territories in North Kosovo for the Albanian-populated territories in South Serbia? 47 2010

At the northern end of the Western Balkan re- Interest in ‘Greater Albania’ gion, Croats were asked how they felt about rising in Kosovo and Macedonia, the ‘Piran Bay agreement’ struck between decreasing in Albania Slovenia and their country in November 2009. This ended the Slovenian veto on Croatian Would you personally support the formation of Greater progress in the EU integration process. The Albania? (Base: respondents in Albania (question was Croat population seemed divided over the is- only asked in that country in 2009 and 2010), Albanians sue: while a relative majority of respondents in Macedonia and Kosovo) (41%) did not support the agreement, one- third (31%) gave their support and 28% did not know what to think or gave no answer. Just 7% were convinced that the agree- ment was more to Croatia’s advantage; 29% thought that both countries profited equal- ly and 38% – the biggest share – thought Slovenia was overreaching Croatia in the agreement’s outcome.

Given the role NATO played in the Kosovo

conflict in 1999, the discussion around the organisation’s involvement and enlarge- ment in the region is a sensitive one. In both Montenegro and Serbia, the issue of wheth- er or not they should join the Alliance is be- ing actively discussed. While in Montenegro public opinion was rather supportive – 38% of re- NATO accession while 52% were opposed to this spondents supported NATO accession, while 24% outcome. Would you personally support the formation of thought that it would be a bad thing –, interview- greater Albania? ees in Serbia were still not ready to see a partner Regarding Serbia’s accession to another asso- in their former opponent: only 13% would support ciation of states – the EU – the question of the

Most Croats feel that the Piran Bay Agreement

is More advantageous for SLOVENIA

Do you support the Piran Bay agreement struck In your opinion, who profits more from the Piran between Slovenia and Croatia in November Bay agreement? 2009?

It is more to Slovenia's advantage 28 31 27 Yes It is more to 38 Croatia's advantage No Both countries profit equally DK/NA 29 7 41 DK/NA

Do you support the Piran Bay agreement In your opinion, who profits more from the 48struck between Slovenia and Croatia last Piran Bay Agreement?November? 2010

country’s cooperation with the International

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) A third of Serbs convincedis of crucial importance. Some EU member statesWhat do you think: authorities theMladic’s know Serbian authorities don’t capture Ratkostated that they would block Serbia’s progressbecause ... whereaboutsin EU integration efforts if Ratko Mladic, an ex-Bosnian Serb Army general accused of the 1995 What do you think: the Serbian authorities don’tSrebrenica massacre, was not detained first. capture Ratko Mladic because...About one-third (35%) of respondents in Serbiawere suspicious of their government’s role in thatcase, saying that the authorities know where heis, but do not want to capture him. A similar shareof respondents (37%), however, believed thatMladic was either in the country or abroad andcould not be located.

What do you think: the Serbian authorities don’t capture Ratko Mladic because ...

49 2010

ConclusionsSince 2006, when the Balkan Monitor started monitoring societal developments inthe Western Balkan region, there has been a consistent hope that the indicators forpeople’s material situation would finally begin to swing upwards. As the 2010 surveyresults show, this hope has not materialised. The region is still suffering from the af-tershocks of the financial and economic crisis and more households are strugglingto cope financially compared to 12 months ago. The picture is not totally bleak; thereis less fear of war breaking out and, at last, people see less need to bribe someonein order to get things done. Dark clouds have been rolling over the Balkans for manyyears, can we see a brighter outlook – at some time in the future? That depends onmany factors.

The number of households struggling 12 months Recent developments around visa liberalisationago was dramatically high, and that number has in- have not increased the European Union’s popularitycreased. On top of that, a reduced flow of remit- in the Balkans – two of the countries that were grant-tances from Balkan migrants – due to the impact ed visa-free travel in 2009, Serbia and Macedonia,of the crisis abroad – seems likely to strike heavily have even seen a drop in EU support during theon an already difficult domestic situation. This is es- past year. But all countries, except for Croatia, havepecially visible among Kosovo Albanians: tradition- strong majorities ready to vote ‘Yes’ in the event ofally the most upbeat respondents in Balkan Monitor an EU referendum; furthermore, the region’s resi-surveys; they now have many more financial prob- dents place high hopes in the positive effects thatlems and less confidence in their countries’ institu- EU accession would have on their countries.tions and future. So what of those dark clouds? Can we say thatEconomically then, there is much work to be done. some of those may have a silver lining? The BalkanHowever, while regional conflicts are still present Monitor team feel more positive about the survey re-in people’s minds and views remain polarised, lo- sults than in any of the previous years. Consideringcal disputes seem to be losing their edge. Fewer that the whole region, like the rest of Europe, haspeople fear armed conflict and trust between ethnic suffered as a result of the financial crisis, the resultsgroups is slowly returning. Maybe the root cause should be seen in a positive light. Along with hopesof most people’s blatant dissatisfaction with their for a peaceful future and reduction in petty corrup-governments and other national institutions also lies tion, we can add improvements in the way that re-within this slow return to normality in Balkan streets. spondents feel about being politically representedPeople do not want more disputes; they want so- and the wish for better relations between neigh-lutions to the everyday problems that are staring bours in several countries. Those are all positive re-them in the face. Balkan residents also see endem- sults and are reasons to start feeling better aboutic corruption in governments and in the world of the clouds still rolling over the Balkan region.business, and they cannot help but see the ubiq-uitous criminal networks. However, as responses tothe 2010 Balkan Monitor show – one of the posi- ABOUT THE BALKAN MONITORtive stories in this year’s survey lies in this area ofcrime and corruption. People say there is less need In order to track the societal transformation processto pay bribes in order to get things done and fewer of Western Balkan countries, the Balkan Monitor’srespondents, in most countries, now feel affected aim is to provide behavioural economics data thatby organised crime. will provide a realistic picture of the region as seen

50 2010

Andrzej Pyrkafrom the inside. It is complemented by awebsite (www.balkan-monitor.eu) thatgives access to all data sets collected since2006 and that contains a comprehensiverange of tools for further examination of theregion and country breakdowns. The re-sults from past waves of the survey reflectthe complex societal developments takingplace in the Western Balkans. In such anextremely dynamic region, many changesare likely to occur in years to come. Thesewill be in the political, social and econom-ic landscapes of the countries concerned,as well as in public opinion on the ground.These events will warrant close attentionand that will be guaranteed in the nextwaves of the Balkan Monitor. Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

51 2010

MethodologyEach year, the Gallup Balkan Monitor surveys residents in all countries that makeup the Western Balkans. Gallup conducts 1,000 face-to-face interviews, in the re-spondents’ homes in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia,Montenegro and Serbia, using a standard set of core questions that has been trans-lated into the languages of the respective country. Supplementary country-specificquestions are asked in addition to core questions. On average, the face-to-face inter-views take approximately 45 minutes. Gallup is entirely responsible for the manage-ment, design, and control of the Balkan Monitor survey.

For over 75 years, Gallup has been providing in-

formation in an objective, reliable, and scientifical- INTERVIEWERSly-grounded manner. Gallup is not associated with Gallup’s fieldwork partners in the region select theirany political orientation, party, or advocacy group interviewers based on experience in survey re-and does not accept partisan entities as clients. search studies and conduct in-depth training ses-The identities of all surveyed respondents will re- sions with local field staff prior to the start of datamain confidential. collection. A training manual is also provided to as- sist the fieldwork team and to ensure consistency and a structured approach.QUESTION DESIGNMany of the Balkan Monitor questions are itemsthat Gallup has used since the survey’s inception SAMPLING AND DATAin 2006. When developing additional questions, COLLECTION METHODOLOGYwith input from the European Fund for the Balkans, Population estimates are based on data from theGallup employs its network of research and political latest censuses, key statistics and migration data,scientists to improve the understanding of key is- as well as on local institutions’ population andsues with regard to question development and con- household estimates.struction, and data gathering. All samples are probability-based and nationally- representative of the resident population aged 15TRANSLATION and above. The coverage area is the entire countryQuestionnaires are translated into the major lan- including rural areas and the sampling frame rep-guages of each country. Gallup strictly adheres to resents the entire civilian population of the above-a system of back-translation. The translation pro- mentioned age group.cess starts with an English source version. A personproficient in both the original and target languag- The sample type used is a stratified three-stagedes translates the survey into the target language. probability sample, with around 100 primary sam-A second person then translates the language ver- pling units in each country, randomly selected in asion back into English. Finally, this version will be proportional manner with boosted subsamples tocompared with the original version and refinements better represent certain regions – with post-strati-made to the target language questionnaire when- fication weighting to reflect true population propor-ever necessary. tions. The three stages are the following:

52 2010

First, polling station areas are selected randomly

(with a methodology called ‘probabilities propor- Detailed sample alloca-tional to size’, PPS), being approximately the size of tion with “boosted” re-200 households, serving as Primary Sampling Units gional oversamples(PSUs) for the national samples. The sample is al-located in fixed-size clusters (typically 10 interviews TOTAL 7000per PSU) across the sampled polling station areas. Serbia 1000Second, households are selected with the help of Vojvodina 250a standard random route technique starting from Serbia (rest of) 750a given address identified within the polling sta- tion area. Unless an outright refusal occurs, inter- Kosovo 1000viewers make up to three attempts to survey the “Serbian” Northern part + enclaves 250sampled household. To increase the probability of Rest of Kosovo, representative 750contact and completion, attempts to contact the household or the eligible respondent are made at Montenegro 1000different times of the day, and where possible on Albanian part 350different days. If an interview cannot be obtained at (Tuzi + Ulcinj and surrounding)the initially targeted household, a simple substitu- Rest of Montenegro 650tion method is used. Macedonia 1000As a last step, respondents are randomly select- Areas with Albanian majority 300ed within the selected households. If someone an- (North-west part )swers the door, based on the so-called Kish-grid Macedonian majority 700selection in most countries (in Croatia, the house- hold member with the most recent birthday is se- Bosnia and Herzegovina 1000lected). Thus, interviewers select the respondents Herzegovina (Croat part) 225with equal probability within households. West Herzegovina 100 East Herzegovina 125The person interviewed must be: Republic Srpska 425 RS West 200• Aged 15 or older RS East 115• A permanent resident of the household (he/she RS South 110 only has to live there, we do not care whether Bosnia (Bosniak part) 350 he/she is administratively registered as living Rest of Bosnia 120 elsewhere) Sarajevo 130• The only household member interviewed Cazin 100• Interviewed individually without disturbances or suggestions from anyone else. Albania 1000 North-West (Skhoder) 250There may be cases of severe physical handicap, Central part (Tirana and rest) 450mental disorder, or senility, which will prevent the South (Sarande) 300respondent from being able to take part in the interview. Croatia (proportional allocation) 1000

53 2010

The desired degree of confidence: the more “strict”

Data weighting we are, the wider the statistical margin will be.

Data weighting is used to ensure a nationally-rep- The following example illustrates the principle:resentative sample for each country. First, design • One question has been answered by 1,000weights are constructed to account for dispropor- people;tional sampling across regions and for the unequal • The analysed result is around 50%;sampling probabilities of individuals as a function • We choose a significance level of 95 % (this isof the household size, as residents in large house- the level most often used by statisticians, andholds will have a lower probability of being selected is the one chosen for the table shown below);for the sample. In this illustrative case, the statistical margin is: (+/-Second, post-stratification weights are construct- 3.1%) around the observed 50%. As a conclusion:ed. Population statistics and reliable consensual the result for the whole population lies betweenestimates are used to weight the data (by region, 46.9% and 53.1%.gender, age, education, economic activity or socio-economic status). Hereafter, the statistical margins computed for vari- ous observed results are shown, on various sample sizes, at the 95% significance level.QUALITY CONTROL Various sample sizes are in rows; various observedQuality control back-checks (in person, by tele- results are in columns:phone or by post) are car-ried out and documented in 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%a pre-specified form covering N=50 6,0 8,3 9,9 11,1 12,0 12,7 13,2 13,6 13,8 13,9at least 10% of respondents. N=500 1,9 2,6 3,1 3,5 3,8 4,0 4,2 4,3 4,4 4,4Quality control back-checks N=1000 1,4 1,9 2,2 2,5 2,7 2,8 3,0 3,0 3,1 3,1of respondents involve a short N=1500 1,1 1,5 1,8 2,0 2,2 2,3 2,4 2,5 2,5 2,5interview with the respondent N=2000 1,0 1,3 1,6 1,8 1,9 2,0 2,1 2,1 2,2 2,2(whether by telephone or in N=3000 0,8 1,1 1,3 1,4 1,5 1,6 1,7 1,8 1,8 1,8person). N=4000 0,7 0,9 1,1 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 N=5000 0,6 0,8 1,0 1,1 1,2 1,3 1,3 1,4 1,4 1,4 N=6000 0,6 0,8 0,9 1,0 1,1 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,3MARGIN OF ERROR

The maximum margin of error is calculated around With sample sizes of 1,000 respondents per coun-reported proportions for each country-level data try, the maximum margin of error for the Gallupset, assuming a 95% confidence level. The survey Balkan Monitor is +/- 3.1%.results are only valid between the limits of a statis-tical margin caused by the sampling process. Thismargin varies based on three factors: DATE OF FIELDWORK FOR SURVEY WAVE 2010The sample size (or the size of the analysed part 18 June 2010 – 19 July 2010in the sample): the greater the number of respon-dents, then the smaller the statistical margin will be;

The result in itself: the closer the result approaches

50%, the wider the statistical margin will be;

54 2010

About the Fund

Bringing the Western Balkans Closer to the European Union

The European Fund for the Balkans is a multi- 1. Envisaging Europe

year joint initiative of European foundations includ- Supporting research and policy developmenting the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the King Baudouin projects as well as media outreach initiativesFoundation, the Compagnia di San Paolo and the 2. Practising Europe ERSTE Foundation. Enhancing the professional and administrative capacities of young Balkan government offi-The Fund is designed to undertake and support cials in the EU integration process.initiatives aimed at bringing the Western Balkans 3. Experiencing Europe closer to the European Union through grant-making Allowing young generations in the Westernand operational programmes; as such, it is focused Balkans to gain experience of – and learnon individuals and organisations from the Western about – Europe and the EU.Balkans region. 4. Developing Policies For The Balkans Enhancing the public image of the Fund and itsAs a direct follow-up to the International Commission contribution in policymaking for the EU integra-on the Balkans (2004-2006), the Fund embodies tion of the Balkans through joint initiatives andthe “EU Member State Building Strategy” with its partnerships.priorities focusing on the development of function-ing state administrations and constituency-building. PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP The Fund is open to other private and public do-OBJECTIVES nors and it is designed to engage not only EuropeanThe Fund’s objectives are: funders already active in the Balkans, but also pub-• to encourage broader and stronger com- lic and private donors which have not worked in the mitment to the European integration of the region until now, or wish to leverage their own fund- Western Balkan countries and societies; ing and increase their impact.• to strengthen efforts undertaken by a range of stakeholders in this process, with a view to de- veloping effective policies and practices in the The Fund is currently hosted by the Network of region and in the EU; European Foundations – NEF (Brussels) which pro-• to support the process of member state building vides legal and administrative assistance. as envisaged by the International Commission on the Balkans; in particular by building con- stituencies in the societies of Southeast Europe that will be offered an opportunity to gain ex- Contact: perience of – and learn about – Europe and European Fund for the Balkans the EU. Resavska 35 11000 Belgrade SerbiaPROGRAMMES Tel: +381.0.11.30.33.662To pursue its goals, the Fund develops grant-mak- info@balkanfund.orging and operational programmes in four main areas: www.balkanfund.org

55 2010

About Gallup Europe

THE PREMIER TRUSTED SOURCEIN UNDERSTANDING HOW EUROPEANS THINK AND BEHAVE

Gallup is a global research-based consultancy in applied behavioural economics that helps leaders at everylevel of business, government and society improve organisational performance by understanding the voice oftheir constituencies. Gallup has been operating in Europe since 1937. By exploring the opinions and attitudesof citizens, Gallup facilitates the understanding of complex European and world issues and helps decision-makers shape their agendas. Gallup believes that collecting and sharing information is a vital part of policy-making and a key step in empowering citizens.

GALLUP IN ACTION IN CUTTING-EDGE TECHNIQUES &

THE EU & BEYOND COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTIONSWith over 75 years of experience, Gallup provides Offering all standard survey techniques, Gallup’sopinion polling, policy-related measurement and tailor-made solutions can be complemented by in-consultancy services for both public and private depth statistical analysis and cutting-edge data vi-organisations. It can address the general public as sualisation tools.well as specific target groups: decision-makers,youth, minorities, etc. A FAST & QUALITY SERVICEGallup leads in the field of global in-depth sur- With unprecedented speed of delivery, Gallupveys, relying on a worldwide network with a prov- serves all stakeholder groups ranging from nationalen track record of efficiency and a high level of governments and European institutions to business,professionalism. media, civil society organisations and academia.

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MAKING SENSE OF and WAPOR standards, and takes pride in a repu-OPINIONS & FEELINGS tation for reliability, accountability and transparencyAs a pioneer in applied social research, Gallup mea- at all levels.sures citizens’ awareness and attitudes towards so-cial, political and economic matters. Gallup has alsobecome a champion at assessing the impact of pol-icies and services in all areas as well as measuring Contactthe wellbeing and quality of life of constituencies at Gallup Europea global level. Avenue Michel-Ange 70 1000 BrusselsAs the current provider of the European BelgiumCommission’s Flash Eurobarometer, Gallup con- Tel: +32.2.734.54.18ducts over 400,000 interviews per year on subjects contact@gallup-europe.beranging from entrepreneurship and employmentto education, and from European values to global www.gallup.com/europechallenges. www.gallup.com