The Gulf War has demonstrated
yet again the central importance of electronic warfare to the conduct
of
a modern air war. So overwhelming was the weight of the initial attack,
that the Iraqi IADS (integrated air defence system) collapsed in hours,
never to regain anything approaching a semblance of functionality.

What
transpired was no surprise to informed observers, as the Libyan raid of
1986 and Israeli strike on the Bekaa Valley in 1982 both produced
similar effects, albeit on a much smaller scale. It was clear that a
repeat performance was a certainty if hostilities did break out, the
only uncertainty lay in its form and timing.

The
extensive television coverage of the air war from the outset provided a
clear indication of what was happening, and the queues of HARM loaded
F-4G Weasels and F/A-18s congesting Saudi taxiways left no doubt
whatsoever as to the ferocity of the battle taking place hundreds of
miles away. It was quite clear to informed observers that Iraq's IADS
was on the receiving end of an unprecedented assault, very different
from the piecemeal Weasel and Iron Hand operations of the Vietnam
period.

The
destruction of Iraq's IADS is a very good study of contemporary Western
doctrine in the area of electronic combat, and deserves thus a close
examination.

The Target - The Iraqi IADS

Australian Aviation published two brief reviews of Iraq's electronic
order of battle, in November 1990 and April 1991. The Iraqi IADS was a
composite system which integrated European and Soviet search and
acquisition radars, and a range of Soviet and European SAM and AAA
systems, all tied together with a French built Kari C3
(Command/Control/Communications) network. While smaller than the now
defunct Soviet system in central Europe (Western TVD), the system had a
respectable capability and comparable if not higher density of SAM and
AAA systems, with considerable redundancy in communications links and
hardened C3 facilities.

Organisationally the IADS was split into three principal elements, a
national fixed site strategic system using fighters and SA-2 and SA-3
systems covering key airfields and strategic air defence sites,
operated
by the Iraqi air force. This system was supplemented by Republican
Guard
operated SAM and AAA systems covering key nuclear, biological and
chemical warfare facilities. Finally, the Iraqi army had its own mobile
radar, SAM and AAA systems tasked with protecting both fixed sites and
units in the field.

Geographically the national IADS was split into several large zones, in
each of which were located central local C3 facilities, one or more
large hardened airbases and a network of communications links to fixed
radar and SAM sites. Control of the whole network was centred in
hardened facilities in the vicinity of Baghdad. While microwave links
were used extensively, these were backed up by landlines.

The
structure of the system reflected the Soviet Air Defence Force (PVO)
and
Army Air Defence (PVO-SV) models respectively. The strategic air
defences employed large GCI/EW (Ground Controlled Intercept/Early
Warning) radars such as the Soviet P-35M and P-37 Bar Lock, which were
used for wide area surveillance and early warning, these large MTI
(Moving Target Indicator - ie low PRF) E/F (2.6-3 GHz) band systems
being situated at key geographical locations to cover principal air
bases and population centres.

Bar
Lock systems employ a pair of trailer mounted truncated paraboloid
reflectors, and have a range of the order of 120 NM, the whole
antenna/trailer assembly rotating at 12 rpm for 360 degree scan with
six
stacked beams for approximate height finding. Where low level coverage
is required, they are typically supplemented by a Side Net E-band
nodding height finding radar.

The
air force operated GCI/EW system formed the top tier of the IADS,
supporting fighters with GCI vectors, but also datalinking early
warning
information down to individual SAM and AAA batteries.

These were in turn directly supported by a range of early warning and
acquisition radars, mobile and relocatable, such as the Flat Face,
Squat
Eye and Spoon Rest. These acquisition radars played a key role in the
IADS, as they provided precise tracking information to SAM systems.
They
would also, under proper operating conditions, remain off the air until
a target was to be engaged, at which time they would light up, acquire
and track the target and feed the target's parameters to the fire
control radars associated with the SAM and AAA systems in use.

The
P-15 Flat Face is a low PRF MTI radar which uses a pair of elliptical
paraboloid antennas on a short mast above a trailer, operating in the
B/C (UHF) band the radar is generally credited with respectable look
down performance into clutter and good ECCM performance. As several
late
model units were captured by the Allies during the eighties, the Flat
Face was wholly compromised. Reports of testing by the French suggested
the radar had remarkably good performance for its class of system, and
good ECCM.

The
P-15 Flat Face was originally used by the Soviets to support the SA-3
Goa, but since they were reluctant to export their mobile Long Track
acquisition radars to non-Warpac nations, the P-15 was largely
substituted. The Flat Face was the principal Soviet mobile battlefield
surveillance/acquisition radar in use in Iraq and is associated with
grouped area defence batteries of SA-3, SA-6 and point defence
batteries
of SA-8, Roland, ZSU-23-4P, SA-9 and SA-13. Where low altitude coverage
was required, the P-15M Squat Eye was used. The Squat Eye is a direct
derivative of the P-15, using essentially the same hardware but with
only a single antenna mounted at the top of a 100 ft mast.

A
typical arrangement was to colocate a Flat Face and Squat Eye at a
single site, both vans buried in revetments and covered with nets. The
radar site would then provide high altitude coverage to the maximum
range of the systems, and low level coverage limited by the height of
the P-15M mast. Most acquisition radars were situated close to the
targets covered by the area defence and point defence SAM systems which
they were designated to support, and were often supplemented by height
finding radars such as the Thin Skin, a truck or trailer mounted H-band
nodding elliptical paraboloid system.

The
older SA-2 systems were supported by the geriatric VHF/A band P-12 and
P-12M Spoon Rest low PRF MTI acquisition radars. These systems use an
array of twelve Yagi antennas in two banks, mounted on horizontal booms
on a common mast. Early models were mounted on a van trailer, newer
build equipment on ZiL-151, 157 or Ural 375 trucks. While the P-12 is
considered an unsophisticated analogue system by Western standards, it
has a respectable range of 150 NM at altitude and its large wavelength
improves its detection range performance against low RCS targets such
as
the F-117A. The Spoon Rest was wholly compromised when an Israeli
commando team captured and removed a whole system in 1969.

Iraqi Area Defence SAM
Systems

The third tier in the IADS hierarchy were the fire control/tracking
radars associated with the SAM and AAA systems in use. These were
typically co-located with the SAM or AAA batteries they supported and
in
most instances were dedicated to the weapon in use. The SAM systems
were
mainly of Soviet origin, with some European weapons in use. Area
defence
coverage was provided by approximately 70 batteries, close to evenly
split in numbers between the SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6.

The
most numerous weapon was the SA-2 Guideline, supported by the Fan Song
fire control radar. Almost no information is available on the
composition of the SA-2 force, but the period over which the weapons
were acquired suggest that most were of the older SA-2B variant
supported by the almost devoid of ECCM Fan Song B radars, with later
supplementary purchases being of the later build SA-2F model with the
Fan Song E or F radar, the latter types incorporating ECCM measures to
counter jamming.

All
Fan Song radars use separate beams for horizontal and vertical angle
tracking of the target, with separate antennas for each. The fan shaped
beams are scanned mechanically 15-17 times a second, the horizontal
beam
being pulsed to provide ranging information. Targets are acquired at
low
PRF, which is doubled once tracking is initiated. The missile is then
launched and commanded to a collision with the target with commands
from
a UHF band very low PRF uplink. Up to six targets can be tracked
concurrently, and three missiles guided concurrently against a single
target.

A
typical regimental structure is that of a headquarters equipped with a
Spoon Rest or Flat Face early warning/acquisition radar, supported by a
Side Net or Thin Skin heightfinder, these systems providing early
warning and target handoff to three launcher battalions. Each launcher
battalion has a Spoon Rest acquisition radar and a Fan Song fire
control
radar, to support six revetted single rail launchers. Missiles are
moved
on a single round transloader semi-trailer, towed by a ZiL-157V or
ZiL-131V 6 x 6 tractor.

The
Fan Song was jammed so successfully by the Americans in Vietnam that
ECCM measures were added as a priority. The Fan Song E uses a LORO
(Lobe
On Receive Only) technique, with auxiliary transmit antennas, whereas
the Fan Song F uses auxiliary optical angle tracking. Both techniques
cannot prevent uplink jamming of the UHF command channel. The SA-2
weapon system was wholly compromised due capture of units in the Middle
East and via US access to Egyptian systems.

The
limitations of the SA-2 caused the Russians much embarrassment in
Vietnam resulting in the deployment of the smaller and more agile SA-3
Goa, designed to engage low flying targets. Reports on how many Goa
systems were used by Iraq vary, but the numbers indicate about 25
battalions.

The
Goa is guided via command link from the I band Low Blow fire control
radar, designed with LORO ECCM from the outset. The Low Blow uses a
centrally mounted single truncated paraboloid transmit antenna with a
single boom feed, and separate 45 degree angled mechanically scanned
receive trough antennas, mounted in a characteristic chevron pattern.
The angling of the antennas supposedly reduces the amount of ground
clutter seen by the receiver. A backup optical tracker is used to
defeat
angle trackbreaking jam techniques, and MTI techniques are used to
defeat chaff. The missile is steered by commands from a D band uplink
antenna mounted on top of the fire control system, the missile's
position is tracked via a beacon on the missile. Up to two missiles can
be guided against one target concurrently, and six targets tracked
concurrently.

A
typical battalion uses a single Flat Face or Squat Eye acquisition
radar
which supports a single Low Blow fire control radar, and typically four
static launchers. These may be two rail or four rail systems, the
latter
adopted with the deployment of the SA-3B missile. Missiles are
transported in pairs on a ZiL-157 or ZiL-131 6 x 6 transloader truck.
Four battalions make up a regiment, which is equipped with an
acquisition radar system, typically a Spoon Rest with a Side Net, or a
Squat Eye operating with a Flat Face and Thin Skin.

While the Goa missile is more agile than the Guideline, and its radar
has better ECCM and low altitude tracking performance, the type's
performance in SEA and the Middle East was hardly better than its
predecessor's and since the US had access to systems captured by Israel
in 1973, its weaknesses were well understood.

The
most potent area defence SAM system was the Iraqi army's mobile
SA-6/Gainful 9M9 ZRK Kub/Kvadrat, which is supported by the Straight
Flush radar system. The ramjet sustained 9M9 missile can pull 15G and
is
equipped with semi-active radar terminal homing supported by a
proximity
fuse, all of which vastly improved kill probability in comparison with
the SA-2 and SA-3.

The
Straight Flush mobile fire control radar system is a fully self
contained acquisition and guidance package mounted on a tracked 2P25
chassis. A stack of two independently rotating coaxial turrets supports
separate acquisition and guidance radars. The lower half of the stack
mounts a large horizontal G-H band parabolic section antenna, with four
separate feeds producing four stacked beams for approximate
heightfinding, three are H band, one is G band. While details have not
been published, it is reasonable to assume this system is a low PRF MTI
radar, its purpose is to acquire and track multiple targets and provide
track parameters to the fire control system.

The
upper turret mounts the cassegrainian I band tracking and illuminating
antenna. Once a target is selected for attack, using parameters from
the
acquisition system, the tracking antenna is slewed onto the target and
initiates precise target angle tracking and ranging. Angle tracking is
achieved by conical scanning, the radar operating in pulse mode during
the command link guided midcourse phase of the missile's flight to
provide ranging information, which is not required during terminal
homing, when the radar switches to continuous wave operation to
illuminate the target. The missile then homes in to impact. While there
is little consensus in the open literature, it is reasonable to assume
that early rounds had conically scanning seekers, with later build
seekers fitted with monopulse seekers for improved ECCM. A typical
engagement will involve a three round salvo on one target.

A
typical Iraqi Gainful regiment structure has a Flat Face, Squat Eye and
Thin Skin providing target acquisition for five batteries, each with a
Straight Flush and four three round tracked 2P25 TELs. Reloads are
carried on a hoist equipped Ural-375 6 x 6 transloader truck, which
carries three rounds.

The
Gainful debuted in the 1973 war, accounting for most Israeli losses due
SAMs, mainly due inappropriate warning receiver fit on the IDF's
fighter
aircraft. The Bekaa Valley battle of 1982 saw the Israelis even the
score, using ARMs to cripple the Straight Flush systems and then
killing
off the TELs with Mk.82. Samples of late build SA-6 were captured in
Chad in 1987, and subsequently tested on a missile range in the UK,
where the missile demonstrated high accuracy.

Iraqi Point Defence SAM Systems

The area defence SAMs were supplemented by approximately 250 point
defence SAM systems, which if PVO doctrine were to be followed, would
have made between 65 to 140 mobile batteries of various compositions.

The
most potent point defence SAMs were the SA-8 Gecko and the
Franco-German
Euromissile Roland. Both systems use a mobile fully self contained
TELAR
as the fire unit, and both have autonomous acquisition radars. In
concept both are comparable to a mobile version of the Rapier used in
this country.

The
9M33 ZRK-Romb or SA-8 Gecko is derived from the naval Osa-M SA-N-4
Gecko, deployed in the early seventies on smaller combatants. The SA-8
uses an amphibious BAZ-5937 TELAR vehicle, which carries a turret with
trainable launch rails and the Land Roll radar equipment. The H band
target acquisition radar uses a folding paraboloid section antenna with
360 degree scan, this system uses multiple stacked beams for height
finding. It is reasonable to assume it is a low PRF MTI system similar
to that in Roland, as this technique is less demanding of signal
processing than pulse Doppler, yet provides adequate clutter rejection
for low altitude operations.

Once
a target is acquired the turret is trained upon it and the large J band
pulse mode tracking system engaged, this system uses a side truncated
cassegrainian dish with a characteristic flat dielectric blast shield.
The tracking radar uses frequency hopping and monopulse angle tracking
techniques to defeat jamming, as such it has the best ECCM capability
of
any Soviet export system. The tracking antenna is flanked on either
side
by a guidance antenna package, which generates I band capture beams
after launch, an I band tracking beam to follow the missile's
flightpath, and I band uplink signals to command the missile. The
weapon
uses fully automatic command to line of sight (CLOS) and the fire
control system will collide the missile with the target. Backup optical
tracking is fitted, two rounds can be fired at one target concurrently.

Older SA-8A Geckos carried four ready rounds on open rails, later SA-8B
six in box launchers. A typical deployment involves a battery with four
TELARs, two BAZ-5937 transloaders and a BTR-60PU-12 8 x 8 command
vehicle.

The
Roland is the Western equivalent to the SA-8, also deployed in the
seventies and employed by Germany, France and the US Army. Like the
SA-8
it uses a TELAR platform, the Iraqis purchasing the French AMX-30
chassis. The fully traversable turret has rails with two ready rounds,
and can reload a further eight from magazines in the hull on either
side
of the turret. The rear of the turret mounts a cos**2 antenna for the D
band Thomson CSF MTI acquisition radar, which will use multiple or
split
feeds for heightfinding via stacked beams. The antenna type is used to
reduce the size of the ground return, ie the clutter which would
obscure
a target.

The
front of the turret mounts the Siemens J band low PRF tracking radar,
which uses an elliptical cassegrain antenna under a blast shield. The
radar uses monopulse angle tracking to defeat countermeasures, and has
two channels, one for the target and one for the missile's CW beacon.
Next to the tracking radar are situated an optical sight and a command
link antenna. Like the SA-8 the Roland uses fully automatic command to
line of sight guidance.

Both
the Roland and the Gecko are considered serious threats to low flying
aircraft as they can be easily hidden and operate autonomously, while
their tracking radars are substantially immune to simpler trackbreaking
ECM techniques by virtue of monopulse angle tracking. As was to be
later
proven, the Roland lived up to its reputation.

The
Roland and Gecko were the best but not the most common point defence
SAMs used. The most common system was the 9M31 Strela 1 or SA-9 Gaskin.
This weapon is comparable to early models of the Sidewinder based
Chapparel, and uses a BDRM-2 amphibious scout vehicle chassis as a TEL,
with four boxed ready rounds. The missile itself is an unimpressive
lightweight heatseeker with an uncooled Lead Sulphide detector element,
capable of tail aspect engagements only.

The
Gaskin is usually operated in conjunction with the formidable ZSU-23-4P
Shilka SPAAG system, which uses a similar chassis to the Gainful TEL.
The ZSU-23-4P employs a J band Gun Dish pulse mode (magnetron)
acquisition and tracking radar and is a fully self contained mobile
system, whereas the SA-9 must be cued to a target for seeker lock-on
and
launch. Gaskin batteries often use a single Gun Dish radar mounted on a
ZiL-157 6 x 6 truck, to provide warning of inbound aircraft. Soviet and
some Warpac Gaskins also carry the Hat Box ESM equipment, which cues
the
operator to the radar and altimeter emissions of low flying aircraft,
but it is not known whether the Iraqis had this equipment or whether
they were competent to understand its use. As the Gaskin has been
captured on many occasions by Western aligned forces, it has been
wholly
compromised.

The
Iraqis had also acquired, more recently, the new 9M37 Strela 10 or
SA-13
Gopher heatseeking SAM. Using a tracked MTLBu TELAR, the SA-13 system
has a rangefinding radar fitted and uses a bigger missile than the
SA-9.
Reports on the missile's seeker are conflicting, but it does appear
that
a cooled detector with reasonably sophisticated optical filtering is
used, conferring all aspect capability.

In
Soviet deployments the SA-13 is formed into batteries with the new 2S6
SPAAG, four of each commanded from an MTLBu command vehicle and all
relying on a separate Dog Ear acquisition radar, mounted on a dedicated
MTLBu chassis. It is not clear whether the Iraqis were sold the Dog
Ear,
but it is likely they deployed the Gopher in a similar fashion to its
predecessor the Gaskin.

Deployment

A typical composition for the Soviet PVO model would see static area
defences implemented with batteries of SA-2 and SA-3, with mobile area
defences and gaps in static defensive coverage plugged with the PVO-SV
SA-6. The area defences would be supported by early warning radars at
key sites, these covered redundantly by the early warning and
acquisition radars of the SAM batteries.

Point defences would then be comprised of mixed batteries, clustered
about the specific target to be defended. A typical structure for a
point defence battery is a quartet of SA-9 or SA-13 SAM systems,
complemented by a quartet of ZSU-23-4P mobile AAA systems. These would
then be supplemented by singletons, pairs or quartets of the mobile,
fully self-contained SA-8/Land Roll or Roland command link SAMs.

The
intention of Soviet air defence strategists was to provide overlapping
zones of coverage by various weapon types, thereby making it impossible
for an aircraft to penetrate the area without encountering multiple
types of SAM and AAA system. This was seen to be a means of maximising
the demand placed upon Western ECM, thus forcing bigger ECM equipment
at
the expense of fuel and payload, while making it impossible to use any
flight profile which could avoid the envelope of every weapon type.

While the exact composition of the Iraqi IADS and its deployment at the
outset of the conflict may never be known, it is reasonable to assume
that the Republican Guard would have operated the most sophisticated
systems such as the European Roland SAM and SA-8 SAM, and some fraction
of the SA-6 batteries, with the remaining mobile systems deployed by
the
Iraqi army to cover forces in Southern Iraq and Kuwait.

The
static area defence SAMs were supplemented by a respectable quantity of
AAA equipment, the heavier calibres supported by tracking radars such
as
the E-band Fire Can family of systems, or the newer I/J-band Flap Wheel
series. The AAA was further supplemented by machine guns, hand held
automatic weapons and man portable SAMs such as the SA-7B and SA-14,
and
the Chinese built HN-5A, a modified SA-7B with a cooled seeker.

This
was by all means a formidable air defence system if used properly, and
had the potential to inflict substantial attrition if not dealt with
properly. The Allied response reflected this. In comparison with the
Warpac and Western TVD PVO/PVO-VS IADS, the Iraqis lacked the latest
weapons and some types such as the cumbersome SA-4 and SA-5 systems,
but
the high fraction of SA-3, SA-6 and SA-8 systems was easily comparable
to the central European theatre. Since Soviet doctrine opposes forward
deployment of the latest/best systems, it is fair to say the Iraqis had
a representative implementation of the Soviet IADS as forward deployed
in Eastern Europe. The results clearly reflected this.

Moving Target Indicator, a technique for
extracting
targets from clutter

Msl
Trk

Missile Tracking beam

PRF

Pulse Repetition Frequency

SARH

Semi Active Radar Homing

SPAAG

Self Propelled Anti Aircraft Gun

TEL

Transporter Erector Launcher

TELAR

Transporter Erector Launcher And Radar

Tgt
Trk

Target Tracking beam

Track

Tracking

Uplink

command Uplink to missile

Author's note:

This
table was compiled from a wide range of
sources, most of which do not specify the exact conditions under
which the stated performance figures apply. Therefore caution must
be exercised in interpreting the figures. It is worth noting that a
basic aspect of Soviet SAM guidance design philosophy is the reliance
upon various uplink and beacon channels, which provide both good
indication of the progress of the engagement and also are readily
jammed.

The V-75/SA-2 Guideline is a mainstay of the former communist bloc and
its former client states. This two stage command link guided missile
fared poorly in Vietnam, even worse in the Middle East and is not known
to have scored any kills in the Gulf. Iraq had twenty batteries, with a
total of 120 single rail launchers, mostly the old SA-2B variant but
also some newer SA-2F. The SA-2 is supported by the Fan Song radar.

The S-125/SA-3 Goa was a major improvement upon its
predecessor, with
respectable low altitude performance and designed with ECCM features
from the outset. Supported by the Squat Eye and Low Blow radars, the
SA-3 was a key component of the Iraqi IADS with no less than 25
batteries deployed. Each battery had four launchers, each launcher with
two or four rails. Several Allied aircraft were killed by this missile (Low Blow - USAF Nellis TTF).

The ZRK Kub/Kvadrat/SA-6 Guideline was the most potent
area defence
missile used by Iraq. Mobile SA-6 regiments use the Squat Eye and Flat
Face for early warning and acquisition, with battery acquisition and
tracking accomplished by the Straight Flush radar system. Once a target
is acquired by the Straight Flush, its upper tracking antenna tracks
and
illuminates for the command link midcourse guided and semi-active radar
terminally guided ramjet missile. A single Straight Flush will support
four three rail 2P25 TELs.

The ZRK Romb/SA-8 Gecko is a capable radar guided mobile point defence
weapon. Each BAZ-5937 TELAR carries a complete Land Roll acquisition
and
fire control radar system, which can control up to two missiles
concurrently against a single target. The Land Roll J band tracking
radar is frequency agile and uses monopulse tracking to improve its
resistance to hostile jamming
(USAF Nellis TTF).

The Franco German Euromissile Roland is like the SA-8 a command link
guided point defence SAM system, with a TELAR mounting a complete
acquisition and fire control radar system. Like the SA-8 the Roland
also
uses monopulse angular tracking techniques to defeat jamming. Iraqi
systems used the French built AMX-30 chassis. Several Allied aircraft
were destroyed by Rolands.

The P-15 Flat Face and P-15M Squat Eye were the best of
the Soviet
supplied acquisition radars used by Iraq. Both of these systems use
much
common hardware, and both are UHF band low PRF MTI systems designed to
track low flying aircraft. A typical acquisition radar site would use
one of each, with vans in camouflaged revetments (USAF Nellis TTF).

The P-35 Bar Lock is a mainstay of Soviet equipped air
defence systems,
functioning as a 3-D Ground Controlled Intercept/Early Warning system.
These radars not only support interceptors, but also forward targeting
information to acquisition radars further down the chain of the IADS.

The man portable SA-7 Grail was used in large numbers by
the Iraqis,
and claimed a number of Allied aircraft, particularly those operated by
the US Marines. Several subtypes were employed by the Iraqis, including
the Chinese HN-5 which uses a more sensitive cooled seeker. Depicted a
Chinese QW-1.

The ubiquitous ZSU-23-4P SPAAG was widely used by the
Iraqis and many
were lost to Allied aircraft during the campaign. Armed with four water
cooled, radar directed 23 mm guns, the Shilka is a serious threat to
low
flying aircraft and helicopters.

Part 2

The Allied assault on Iraq saw
the collapse of a formidable integrated air defence system, probably
the
most lethal outside the Warsaw pact. The Iraqi system had much in
common
with the Soviet system, including equipment, deployments, operational
doctrine and diversity of types. The ease with which the Allies
crippled
and then demolished this system testifies to fundamental flaws in
Warpac
air battle doctrine, which would have had a decisive influence in any
NATO-Warpac conflict. What follows is how it was done.

Planning and Preparation

The Allies had monitored the Iraqi IADS closely throughout the buildup
period of Desert Shield, deploying a range of Elint (Electronic
Intelligence gathering) assets to the theatre. These assets served the
principal purpose of mapping out the Iraqi Electronic Order of Battle
(EOoB), ie pinpointing the deployments and composition of Iraq's air
defence batteries and supporting radar systems, and mapping out the
stations and frequencies used for command and control of the network.

Key
systems employed were various subtypes of the EC/RC-135 Rivet Joint,
the
high flying TR-1 (U-2), the US Navy's EP-3 and EKA-3B aircraft and the
RAF's Nimrod R.1. These aircraft were strategically positioned to cover
particular sectors of IADS coverage when Allied aircraft, in the period
preceding hostilities, feigned penetrations of Iraqi airspace. This is
the oldest trick in the electronic warfare book and the Iraqis fell for
it repeatedly, lighting up their radars to engage the would be
inbounds,
in doing so they provided the monitoring Elint platforms with their
positions and the identities of their radars, in turn betraying the
composition of their batteries. It is also very likely that the Iraqis
indulged in the luxury of live testing and calibration of their radars,
further assisting the Allied effort.

The most capable SIGINT/ELINT system in service is the US
Air Force
RC-135V/W Rivet Joint, equipped with the highly capable Raytheon 55000
Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and 85000 signals intelligence
(SIGINT) receiver systems. The Rivet Joint played a pivotal role in the
Desert Storm campaign, and more recently in the OAF, OEF and OIF
campaigns (U.S. Air Force).

With
Elint equipment of appropriate capability it is possible to determine
not only the type of emitter, but also often which model or subtype and
its standard of calibration, all from the monitored and recorded
emissions.

The
Iraqis violated a fundamental principle of electronic combat by
lighting
up radars outside of actual engagements, and then not moving or
reshuffling their assets to invalidate Allied reconnaissance. Were they
to have done the proper thing, they would have moved batteries to dummy
SAM sites, lit up in the presence of Allied Elint aircraft, and then
shifted the batteries to implement a scheme of tactical or strategic
deception. If this is implemented properly, and appropriate emission
control discipline enforced, it becomes very difficult for the
attacking
party to map out what the real structure of the target IADS is. This in
turn makes the planning of a pre-emptive strike very difficult, as with
the increasing complexity of the deception the risk of not taking out
all key assets in the initial hit increases vastly.

By
the middle of January the Allies had a comprehensive picture of Iraq's
IADS and were well positioned for a knock-out blow against the system,
with substantial hard kill defence suppression assets in the theatre.
Key systems were the F-4G Wild Weasel, a Phantom airframe fitted with a
potent radar homing and warning receiver system (APR-47 RHAWS), which
was supplemented by the HARM firing F-16C and F/A-18C. These aircraft
were further supported by Alarm firing Tornado GR.1s of the RAF and
HARM
capable EA-6B Prowlers, A-7Es and A-6Es of the USN.

Jamming assets assembled in the theatre included USAF EC-130 Compass
Call standoff communications jammers, Naval EA-6B Prowlers and the
USAF's EF-111A Ravens. The protracted buildup was a major benefit to
the
Allies, who used the time to upgrade both hardware and software in many
of the jamming systems, to precisely match the Iraqi inventory. Unlike
the Israelis in 1973, who carried the wrong jammers and warning
receivers for the threat at hand, the Allies had the best of
intelligence and used it to the fullest.

The
Allied planners envisaged a three pronged strategy for winning the
electronic battle, concentrating on the simultaneous implementation of
the following
objectives:

crippling the C3 network by jamming with EC-130 Compass
Call aircraft, until key nodes could be destroyed by strike
aircraft.

the use of onboard Defensive ECM by penetrating aircraft to
defeat any SAMs which would get airborne in spite of the preceding
activity.

The coup was meticulously planned, with the principal objective of the
first phase of the SEAD campaign being the earliest possible paralysis
of the GCI/EW network via the killing of key radar and C3 sites, this
to
be achieved by a series of simultaneous attacks by a range of different
aircraft types.

Once
the network was paralysed, individual area defences and point defences
would have to light up their local radars to acquire inbound Allied
aircraft and thus expose themselves. The local area defences would then
be attacked by SEAD aircraft attached to inbound strike packages, with
the twofold objectives of preventing attrition of strike aircraft and
inflicting attrition upon elements of the IADS, thus implementing the
second phase of the SEAD campaign.

Allied mission planners expended by established standards unprecedented
effort in computer modelling of the initial hours of the campaign [3],
an effort which commenced only several days after the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait. Using the EADSIM/C3ISIM simulation program for analysis, a team
of analysts created an extremely detailed model of the Iraqi IADS,
containing performance parameters, kill probabilities and
electromagnetic characteristics of the systems used. Using intelligence
sourced from the DIA and JCS, the team then produced a model for the
Iraqi C3 network which tied the IADS together.

With
a model for the Iraqi IADS/C3, the USAF's analysts then approached the
Checkmate high level operational planning group, the strategists
responsible for developing the Allied air war battle plan, and acquired
details of the projected campaign. With the simulation model complete,
or as complete as was possible with the data at hand, the analysts ran
the simulation ten times. The results were a projected attrition no
worse than 4% for the initial hours, numbers consistent with rule of
thumb estimations and a simpler TAC Thunder simulation run earlier.

A
detailed discussion of Allied simulation effort justifies treatment in
itself, what is significant is that it allowed Allied planners to
explore a range of strategies, unit level tactics and aircraft type
deployments before the commencement of hostilities. When the time came,
the Allied battle plan was well structured and its effects understood
in
detail, everything happened for specific reasons at specific times and
places.
The 17th January, 1991 - the Coup de Grace

The Allies struck at about 03:00 hrs local time on the 17th January,
when USAF EF-111A and USN/USMC EA-6B crews hit the radiate switches on
their ALQ-99 consoles, unleashing a torrent of noise and deception
jamming signals unto Iraq's airwaves. Supported by the EC-130s' jamming
of all known communications frequencies, the solid wall of
electromagnetic garbage hid multiple waves of inbound strike aircraft
and cruise missiles, while paralysing much of Iraq's communications
network.

Cruise missiles and F-117A Stealth Fighters struck at key C3 sites,
while the first wave of 12 USAF F-4Gs and 60 USN/USMC F/A-18s, A-7s and
EA-6Bs fired AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles into key air defence
radar systems and strategically positioned SAM sites. The weight of the
initial assault was overwhelming, with several hundred HARMs fired in
the first few hours of the campaign. USAF Maj Gen Glosson, director of
campaign planning, reportedly stated that at this point during the
assault, no less than 200 HARMs were enroute to their chosen targets (a
total close to 2,000 rounds were fired throughout the conflict).

This
weight of numbers would not have been achievable without the US Navy,
which had wired its F/A-18s, A-6Es, A-7Es and EA-6Bs for HARM, in the
USAF inventory carried only by specialised F-4Gs and modified Weasel
supporting F-16Cs; accordingly the Navy claim that no less than 80% of
the HARMs fired in the initial attack came off USN launch rails.

To
further incapacitate the Iraqi C3 network, which due jamming would have
to revert to land line communications, many of the cruise missiles were
targeted at electrical power stations and distribution yards, a large
fraction of the USN cruise missiles dispensing rather than submunitions
spools of conductive carbon-fibre wire which caused massive and
repetitive electrical short circuits. The effect was to cripple those
communications and command facilities which did not have standby
(backup) power systems, and those repeatered links which operated on
mains grid power.

Deception was added to the game plan. The USAF's 4468th Tactical
Reconnaissance Group launched groups of Northrop BQM-74 Scathe Mean
drones against the H-2 and H-3 airfields, Basra and Baghdad (see AA
Sept
92). Flying from Saudi territory, the drones took up station in the
vicinity of the targets and flew in loose formations, pretending to be
inbound bombers. The Iraqi SAM operators attempted to engage and
instantly attracted HARMs from waiting Weasels and Hornets.

The
USN expanded this aspect of the SEAD campaign by launching large
numbers
of TALD (Brunswick Tactical Air Launched Decoy) unpowered gliding
decoys
to seduce the Iraqis into firing off their limited SAM stocks, so
successful were the TALDs that the Iraqis obstinately maintained, well
into the campaign, that they had shot down several hundred Allied
aircraft. Again the decoys created an opening for HARM shots. Another
benefit of the use of such decoys, particularly with the static SAM
systems, is that it forces the expenditure of ready rounds on
launchers,
leaving a time window of several minutes or more during the reloading
of
the launchers, when the battery is defenceless against air attack and
has already blown its position.

The
centralised structure of the IADS collapsed inside the first hour of
the
assault and Iraq's fate was sealed thereafter. This did not however
prevent the Iraqis from using their point defence weapons and some of
the area defence weapons, with which they continued to threaten Allied
aircraft with SAM launches and AAA fire.

What
followed was a systematic and sustained war of attrition against the
remaining radars and area defence and point defence SAM systems, which
were repeatedly attacked with HARMs and in many instances, RAF BAe
ALARMs.

The
principal targets of this second phase of the SEAD campaign were the
static and particularly mobile area defence SAMs, which had the
capability to engage aircraft at high and medium altitudes, outside the
coverage of point defence SAMs and AAA. It is interesting to note the
general rule in modern SEAD campaigns, which is strike at the longest
ranging systems first and then work down to the lesser systems, leaving
point defences for last. In doing so, one eliminates first those
systems
with the greatest capacity for airspace denial, thus giving oneself
ever
increasing freedom of movement to engage the less capable systems.

Interestingly, this strategy matches well with the strategic air attack
model employed by the USAF, in that it first suppresses strategic area
defences and leaves the mobile area and point defences of the deployed
army for last, ensuring always that the defences will be forced to
engage by virtue of attacking their defended sites.

The
Allied SEAD and jamming campaign yielded truly Lanchesterian results,
with Iraqi radar, communications and SAM activity collapsing by an
order
of magnitude in days. While SEAD and jamming aircraft continued to
escort Allied strike packages throughout the campaign, the number of
missile launches and radar activity dwindled with ongoing time as
attrition took its toll, and Iraqi SAM and radar operators refused to
light up their radars for fear of being hit.

A
feature of the following weeks was an effect observed many times in the
latter phase of the Vietnam Linebacker II campaign, the desperate
firing
of SAMs without any guidance signals. With a P[k] approaching zero,
this
tactic probably serves the sole purpose of bolstering the defenders'
morale.

An
interesting aspect of the opening phase of the SEAD campaign was an
attack by Army AH-64 Apache helos with Hellfire laser guided missiles
against a pair of critical early warning radar sites in Southern Iraq.
Eight aircraft of the 101st Airborne were led almost 400 NM deep into
hostile territory at nap of the earth altitudes by a pair of USAF
MH-53J
Pave Low III helicopters of the 20th SOS (1st SOW) which used their
comprehensive navigation and comms equipment to ensure the Apaches
found
their targets, a colocated Squat Eye and Flat Face, and a Spoon Rest,
which were then hit with a total of 15 Hellfires at the specified time,
just prior to their would be detection of inbound Allied aircraft. We
can conjecture that these low band systems were specifically targeted
to
ensure that the inbound F-117As were not detected before arriving at
Baghdad.

Concurrently with the opening moves in the SEAD campaign, Allied
interdictors hit key Iraqi air bases, cutting runways and taxiways to
prevent all air movements where possible. From a theoretical
perspective, these raids fall as much into the counterair campaign as
into the SEAD campaign, an interesting parallel to the above noted hits
on C3 facilities. This illustrates the essential need for concurrency
in
any air war, the strategic interdiction, electronic combat(EW+SEAD) and
counterair campaigns being complementary in their effects and in their
purpose.

The
Allied electronic campaign was an unprecedented success and has finally
laid to rest the myth of the invincible IADS. It is proof of the
correctness of Western electronic combat doctrine vs the doctrine of
the
West's now defunct opponent. It is of some interest to draw parallels
to
the Allied assault on Festung Europa and the collapse of the Third
Reich's air defence system, for the Russians obsession with emulating
Germany politically translated into a surprising adherence to visibly
obsolete patterns of thinking about air and electronic combat, directly
derived from Luftwaffe doctrine. History has, to some degree, repeated
itself.

This table
was compiled from a wide range
of open sources, and absolute accuracy cannot be guaranteed. In
particular, the operating sites for the RC-135 and Nimrod R.1
Elint aircraft have not been reported, although it is reasonable to
assume these operated from the larger bases used by other Allied
aircraft.

The ship and submarine
launched
BGM-109 cruise missiles were an important element of the multipronged
Allied attack on Iraq's IADS and C3 network. During the initial
assault,
cruise missiles destroyed key command posts and communications sites,
while other cruise missiles dispensed spools of carbonfibre wire over
Iraqi powerplants and electrical switching yards, causing massive power
outages (USN).

USAF BQM-74 drones were
used in
conjunction with Navy TALD glide decoys to deceive Iraqi SAM operators
on a massive scale, each drone presenting the radar return of a real
tactical aircraft. The Iraqis responded by firing SAMs at formations of
the diminutive unmanned vehicles not only wasting precious rounds but
also exposing themselves to HARM shots from F/A-18s and F-4G Weasels
(Northrop-Grumman).

The EC-130 Compass Call
communications jammers played another critical role in the initial
assault, by denying the Iraqis use of VHF and UHF communications links.
The intense jamming by EC-130s knocked out all radio frequencies used
by
the Iraqi IADS and other internal C3 networks, thus isolating units not
connected via landlines. The latter suffered major disruptions due
attacks by cruise missiles and F-117As, and thus the whole Iraqi C3
network was rendered inoperable within the first hour of hostilities
(USAF).

The USAF F-4G Wild
Weasel was
one of the most important types used in the initial assault. This
aircraft carries the precision direction finding APR-47 radar homing
equipment, which can exactly pinpoint and classify emitters in high
density environments, under conditions where less capable equipment
saturates with targets. The Weasels hit key sites with AGM-88 HARM
antiradiation missiles. Other critical SEAD assets were the Navy/USMC
F/A-18As which accounted for most HARM firings, in spite of their less
sophisticated radar warning equipment USAF).

The USAF's EF-111A
Ravens and
USN/USMC EA-6B Prowlers unleashed a massive barrage of noise and
deception jamming during the initial assault, this having the dual
objectives of confusing Iraqi operators and denying them information on
the position of Allied aircraft. Both aircraft carry versions of the
massive ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System, which is specifically designed
to defeat GCI, early warning and acquisition radars with noise and
false
target information (USAF).

The Black Jet
supplemented the
specialised electronic warfare assets,
flying precision strikes against important C3 nodes, radar sites and
SAM
sites covering critical ingress routes. A typical tactic used was to
coordinate the run-in by the F-117A with barrage noise jamming by an
EF-111A or EA-6B, this causing a reduction in the victim radar
receiver's sensitivity to the point, where the otherwise detectable
F-117A vanished from the screen (USAF).

Part 3

The Allied electronic and SEAD
campaign in the Gulf saw the destruction of an air defence system very
similar to that of the Warpac. This was achieved by a carefully
structured mix of hard kill and soft kill assets, applied to the task
from a position of fully understanding the objectives and dynamics of
the electronic battle.

The
superb results of the campaign are directly attributable to Allied
preparation and capability, and the latter we will now examine more
closely.

USN/USMC Hard Kill Assets - The
F/A-18, A-7E, EA-6B and HARM

The numerically most significant players in the Allied SEAD campaign
were the US Navy's strike and electronic warfare aircraft. The nature
of
naval strike has traditionally forced a strong emphasis on Electronic
Combat and this has reflected in the US Navy adopting a policy whereby
all strike aircraft are equipped to carry the AGM-88 HARM
anti-radiation
missile.

The
Texas Instruments AGM-88 is a development of a seventies program to
improve on the Vietnam era Shrike ARM. The HARM became operational with
the USN's A-7E in 1984, and is a substantial 800 lb missile with a
range
well in excess of 10 NM and a speed in excess of Mach 2. The important
aspect of HARM is its intelligent (Texas Instruments) broadband seeker,
which covers frequencies from the lower microwave band well into the
upper J band, and is quite capable of sorting, identifying and
prioritising threats for attack autonomously. High directional accuracy
is achieved with a nose mounted cavity backed conical spiral antenna, a
class of antenna conferring coverage from C to J band. The autonomous
seeker was sought primarily by the USN which could not afford the
luxury
of dedicated SEAD platforms, therefore every aircraft was seen as a
potential platform.

Unlike conventional guided munitions, the HARM must communicate with
the
aircraft's radar warning (or homing) equipment and the aircraft's crew,
therefore the missile is supported by a dedicated launch computer, the
Command Launch Computer (CLC) in USN/USMC service and the Aircraft
Launcher Interface Computer (ALIC) in USAF F-16 aircraft, tied
typically
to the aircraft's Mil-Std-1553B digital databus. Via a bus the CLC/ALIC
receives data from the missile and the aircraft's EW systems, and in
turn sends messages to the mission computer for display to the crew. A
typical installation is that in the F/A-18, which employs a LAU-118/A
launcher attached to a BRU-32/A bomb rack, the LAU-118 providing the
required umbilical interface to the HARM.

Tied
to the CLC the HARM has three basic modes of operation. In Self Protect
Mode the missile is locked onto an emitter which it is cued to by the
launch aircraft's onboard receiver, in Target of Opportunity Mode the
HARM autonomously searches for targets which are displayed to the pilot
by the Command Launch Computer, and finally in Prebriefed Mode the
weapon is fired against a planned target. The USAF F-16 ALIC supports
three modes, Position-known (POS), Launch-Off-RWR (LOR) and
HARM-as-Sensor (HAS), similar to corresponding USN/USMC modes.

Only
aircraft fitted with the CLC/ALIC and with appropriate software to
interface the mission/fire control computers to the CLC/ALIC can fire
the weapon, others cannot.

Once
launched the HARM will home in on the selected emitter and detonate
either on impact or near miss, earlier models fitted with a
conventional
blast fragmentation warhead, newer models (AGM-88C-1) with a
prefragmented tungsten case warhead designed to perforate radar vans
with tumbling high velocity fragments, to kill personnel and electronic
equipment rather than simply strip off antennas and aerials, allowing
later repair. The HARM uses a Motorola DSU-19 active optical proximity
fuse. The weapon is fitted with a strapdown inertial navigator and in
range known modes will fly a range optimising profile. If the target
emitter goes off the air, it will search for other threats and attack
the highest value emitter to be found. Models including and subsequent
to the AGM-88B employ EEPROM Electrically erasable PROM) threat
libraries.

The
USN's principal HARM shooters were the F/A-18s, which also comprised a
large part of the USMC fixed wing contingent. Smaller numbers of A-7Es
and A-6Es also carried the weapon, as did a substantial fraction of the
EA-6B Prowler contingent.

The
F/A-18 installation uses target information from the HARM's nose
mounted
seeker and the aircraft's omni-directional ALR-67 warning receiver, the
pilot is provided with a list of targets in descending order of
priority
displayed on one of the cockpit CRTs, targets are selected with a
throttle mounted switch which sequences through the list. The ALR-67
combines both crystal video and superhet receiver hardware and
complements the coverage of the HARM, it is however a very basic system
in comparison with specialised homing receiver installations such as
the
USAF APR-38/47 in the F-4G. As such the composite installation provides
omnidirectional coverage with low directional accuracy, and forward
sector coverage with high directional accuracy due the seeker of the
HARM.

The
most sophisticated USN/USMC installation is that of the EA-6B, which
integrates the HARM into the aircraft's comprehensive ALQ-99 tactical
jamming system (see AA 1/89). The EA-6B is equipped with a
comprehensive
suite of warning and homing receivers and carries specialist operators,
this allows highly selective targeting of the HARM against radars and
operators which might elude the more basic systems operated by pilots
and bombardier/navigators in strike aircraft. This difference in
capability is most apparent in a high threat density environment, where
the workload associated with selecting and targeting a specific emitter
can be excessive for an aircraft with a less capable warning receiver
system, and less qualified operator.

The
USN's commitment to fitting aircraft with HARM reflected in workload,
with 60% of the total number of SEAD missions flown during the war
claimed by the USN, which provided escort jamming and SEAD for many
mixed strike packages.

USAF Hard Kill - The F-4G, F-16C
and HARM

The USAF deployed its dedicated F-4G Wild Weasel (see AA 7/86) to the
Gulf, the lineal descendent of the Vietnam era Weasels. The F-4G
carries
the APR-47, a sophisticated long range homing receiver system designed
to locate, identify and track a wide range of emitters in a high
density
signal environment. Using its interferometric antenna systems the
APR-47
will pinpoint an emitter with high directional accuracy, while
providing
continuous real time position data to the HARM missiles carried by the
aircraft. The combination of an accurate direction finding receiver
with
omnidirectional coverage, ranging on emitters and the ability to sort
and track a large number of emitters concurrently, with an expert
backseat operator provides the F-4G with a uniquely potent capability
to
selectively target and attack emitters. This capability is enhanced by
the ability to feed targeting information to other suitably equipped
aircraft.

The
F-4G/APR-47 supports HARM in two modes, Pre-Emptive (PE), a range known
standoff mode, and Direct Attack (DA) a range known or unknown mode
with
short reaction time. Both modes support off-axis launches.

Initial deployment saw the 561st TFS of the 35th TFW deploy from George
AFB in California to Sheikh Isa in Bahrain, followed by 12 aircraft of
the 81st TFS of the 52nd TFW at Spangdahlem, and later a further 12
from
the 480th TFS of the 52nd, these attached to the 35th TFW (provisional)
to form a composite wing. The 23rd TFS of the 52nd deployed its mixed
F-4G/F-16C force to Incirlik in Turkey. In mixed force operations, the
F-16Cs, which are fitted for HARM, fly air-air escort for the F-4Gs and
carry HARMs to hit prebriefed targets, leaving the difficult mobile
targets to the F-4Gs.

The
F-4Gs were most active in the first three days of the war, when targets
abounded and the Iraqis were not shy about turning on their equipment.
At this point in time the Weasels were a designated 'go/no-go' item for
a strike package, ie no Weasels, no strike. The aircraft concentrated
on
area defences and point defence SAM systems, with the earlier discussed
objectives.

By
the end of the first week the Iraqis realised that the SEAD campaign
was
specifically aimed at eradicating their SAM and GCI/EW radar capability
and at that point they deliberately shut down as many systems as they
could, dismantling and camouflaging many of these to avoid attack,
while
they also started redeploying their remaining air assets to the North
to
put them out of the reach of most Allied aircraft.

Once
the back of the Iraqi IADS was broken, the Weasel's tactics shifted
toward keeping remaining SAM systems off the air by presence alone,
typically a pair of F-4Gs armed with HARM would patrol an area and
escort any strike aircraft arriving, then withdraw to refuel from a
tanker while another pair took its place. These sorties typically
lasted
4 hours, with short 30 minute escort runs alternating with refuellings.

The
USAF Weasel squadrons found an increasing fraction of aircraft were
returning with unfired HARMs due the lack of emissions to guide on, as
a
result the aircraft were loaded with bombs, Maverick TV guided missiles
and cluster bombs in addition to HARMs. There were two aspects to this
decision, one the diminishing level of emitter activity which denied
targeting, the other the objective of totally destroying the Iraqis'
capability rather than merely stripping off antennas, allowing a radar
to be later repaired or rebuilt.

The
Weasels' weapon of choice for suppressing AAA and non-emitting sites
was
the CBU-87/B Combined Effects Bomblet (CEB) cluster munition. The
CBU-87
uses a standard SUU-65/B dispenser (ie bomb body) which has canted tail
fins which spin the dispenser up to 2500 RPM after release from the
aircraft and fin deployment. An FZU-37/B Doppler proximity fuse is
typically fitted to provide submunition release at a programmed
altitude, the spin of the weapon causes the submunitions to be ejected
in a toroidal pattern about the dispenser. The BLU-97/B fin retarded
submunitions have a shaped charge, combined with a fragmenting case and
incendiary element to cause damage across a broad spectrum of targets.

Of
particular interest to the Weasels were SAM launchers and TEL vehicles
which, as non-emitting targets, would not attract HARMs as their
guidance radars did. These were systematically hunted down and
destroyed, where ordnance remained the Weasels expended it against
targets of opportunity on the way home.

Toward the end of the campaign emitter activity dropped to zero and
many
Weasels were retasked with fighter CAP or strike missions, attacking
power stations, HAS and other targets. A notable mission was a raid by
Maverick firing F-4Gs on the Baiji oil refinery, which left fires
active
for over a week.

In
perspective, USAF Weasel operations more than anything resembled those
of the Vietnam period, with a return to the idea of complete lethal
suppression with a range of munitions (although purists may further
argue that the campaign owes more to RAF/USAAF 2ATAF SEAD operations in
June, 1944). The Bahrain based 35th TFW flew 2,331 sorties for 8,587
hours, firing close to 1,000 HARMs and two dozen AGM-45 Shrikes.

RAF Hard Kill - The Tornado and
ALARM

The RAF's ARM is the BAe ALARM, a much newer weapon than the American
HARM, designed with a much broader range of operating modes. Alarm was
designed for SEAD and self-protection of the RAF Tornado, Jaguar and
Sea
Harrier, although at this time it is only carried by suitably modified
Tornado GR.1s.

The
Alarm is like the HARM an intelligent autonomous weapon with a wideband
homing seeker, unlike HARM it can however loiter and thus is a more
suitable weapon for SEAD by non-specialised strike aircraft. Fully
programmable in software, the Alarm is best used by 1553B bus equipped
aircraft where the fire control or EW system can directly interact with
the weapon until launch, if necessary changing the selection of target
type and position. The missile receives position updates from the
launch
aircraft until launch. The Alarm has four principal operating modes.

In
Direct Mode the missile is programmed before launch with a prioritised
threat file, it is then fired at the target, even from very low
altitudes, pops up for its programmed mid-course phase, after which it
initiates a search within a programmed box and locks on to the highest
priority emitter detected and homes in to impact. Until the missile is
committed to terminal homing it will autonomously change its selection
of target if a higher value emitter is detected.

In
Dual Mode the Alarm will maximise the time during which it can threaten
an emitter. If the emitter is radiating the Alarm will attack as in
direct mode, if it shuts down, the Alarm will proceed to a point above
the emitter where it deploys a parachute and loiters (UK sources
indicating a climb to 70,000 ft). If the emitter turns on, the
parachute
is jettisoned and the Alarm dives into the target.

In
Loiter Mode the Alarm directly proceeds above the target and deploys
its
parachute, loitering until the emitter is activated.

In
Corridor/Area Suppression Mode the Alarm is fired in the direction of
emitters, the position of which may not be precisely known. The missile
then autonomously selects the highest priority target for attack.

The
Alarm is substantially lighter than HARM at 583 lb, allowing a better
load on typical defence suppression aircraft. It employs a strapdown
inertial navigation unit in addition to the radar homing seeker, and is
fitted with a preformed fragmentation warhead for maximum lethality.

The
RAF had a total of nine Tornado GR.1s fitted for Alarm in the Gulf,
nearly all 'borrowed' from 9 Sqn, but flown by crews from 20 Sqn. The
aircraft flew from Tabuk in Saudi Arabia. A typical load was three
rounds on fuselage stations.

Typical missions involved Alarm launches by SEAD aircraft on separate
axes to the inbound strike force, with the missiles fired in loiter
mode. Typical deliveries involved a short pullup before weapon launch,
after which the missile would steeply climb to its station. Reports
suggest that pilots unfamiliar with the weapon were often alarmed (no
pun intended) at the sight of the missile streaking upwards from low
altitude, believing it to be a SAM.

In
total, the RAF flew 24 Alarm missions, comprising 52 sorties during
which 121 rounds were fired. The supply of missiles was exhausted by
mid
February, after which the SEAD mission was delegated to USAF Weasels.
By
that time there was little Iraqi emitter activity remaining.

Support Jammers - the EA-6B,
EF-111A and EC-130 Compass Call

The most potent support jammers in the campaign were the USN/USMC EA-6B
Prowlers, which provided coverage across all bands. The USAF's EF-111As
missed out on a planned upgrade to the ALQ-99E due a dispute between
the
USAF and the prime contractor, resulting in the cancellation of the
upgrade to provide high band coverage. However, the Iraqi inventory
contained a large proportion of older lower band Soviet built radars
for
which the existing ALQ-99E was well suited.

Both
of these aircraft performed a vital role in the campaign, flying
standoff jamming and escort jamming for strike packages of USAF, RAF,
Saudi, Italian and USN/USMC aircraft. So important were the support
jammers in the opening phase of the battle, that they were designated a
'go/no-go' item in a strike package. The USN deployed a total of 27
Prowlers and the Marines 12 (VMAQ-2), with the USAF deploying Ravens
from both the 390th and 42nd ECS' at Taif and Incirlik.

The
Ravens and Prowlers provided noise and deception jamming of GCI/EW and
acquisition and tracking radars to prevent these from providing
targeting information to SAM systems, in addition some Prowlers would
have also provided communications jamming against GCI and SAM VHF/UHF
communications links using their low band ALQ-149 pods, also effective
against low band radars such as the Spoon Rest. As a result, the Iraqi
SAM systems were unable to concentrate and coordinate their fire on
individual targets, if they could even identify these.

An
interesting aspect of support jamming operations was the standoff
jamming provided to penetrating F-117A Stealth Fighters. The commonly
held belief that stealth aircraft are invisible to radar is wrong, they
are merely less detectable. Similarly the belief that stealth aircraft
cannot benefit from jamming is equally wrong (see AA 12/90, 5/87). What
a jammer offers is such a reduction in defending radar sensitivity to
render an otherwise detectable inbound stealth aircraft effectively
invisible, by burying its return in noise. This was successfully
accomplished on a number of raids when support jammers radiated as the
F-117As closed on the target, concealing them totally. According to
some
sources, this practice was later discontinued as it was found that the
Iraqis commenced firing blind barrage AAA once jamming was detected,
although given the operating altitude of the F-117A this was unlikely
to
have been an issue.

The
only casualty of the campaign was an EF-111A, which impacted the ground
while evading a SAM at low level near the Saudi border. Sadly the crew
died when the ejection capsule failed.

The
EC-130 Compass Call aircraft provided communications jamming of GCI
links and command links to SAM and AAA systems, forcing the Iraqis to
rely on landlines of substantially lower bandwidth. These aircraft
worked long hours, standing off near the boundaries of Iraqi airspace
and pouring garbage into Iraq's airwaves. While not receiving the
coverage of the fast jet support jammers, the EC-130s performed a vital
role particularly in the early phase of the conflict.

The
role of the support jammers in the campaign has been overshadowed by
the
stunningly successful lethal SEAD campaign, however we must not
overlook
the fact that the the low aggregate attrition is directly attributable
to support jamming, particularly in the early phase of the SEAD
campaign
when the Iraqis retained sufficient assets to saturate the escorting
SEAD aircraft with targets. Any attrition warfare campaign takes time
to
be effective, ie the results are never instantaneous, and the use of
soft kill support jamming provides a most useful buffer by inhibiting
hostile air defence capability until attrition reaches a decisive
level.
The support jamming campaign must therefore be judged as much a success
as the SEAD campaign, were it otherwise the attrition figures would be
much different.

Defensive Electronic Counter
Measures

The final aspect of the three pronged Allied strategy was the
application of Defensive ECM (DECM) to protect Allied aircraft from
those SAMs which penetrated the jamming and SEAD coverage of the strike
packages.

Many
of the aircraft deployed in the theatre lacked internal ECM. All USN
tactical aircraft carried internal jammers, in most instances the
Sanders ALQ-126A or B trackbreakers, supplemented by the ALQ-162
trackbreaker.

The
ALQ-126B is a power managed jammer with coverage up to the I/J bands,
capable of delivering in excess of 1 kW power per band at 4-5% duty
cycles. A trackbreaker designed to defeat pulse mode SAM and AAA
radars,
the ALQ-126B modes include mainlobe blanking, inverse con-scan,
range-gate pull-off and swept square wave which make it particularly
potent against established Soviet conically scanning systems such as
the
SA-6/Straight Flush tracking/illuminating radar or the ZSU-23-4P/Gun
Dish fire control radar. The 126B installation typically uses fore and
aft antennas with 60 degree beamwidth and 15 degree depression to cover
surface threats. On many aircraft the 126 is supplemented by the
ALQ-162
which is a specialised continuous wave (CW) trackbreaker designed to
defeat devices such as the SA-6 missile SARH seeker.

All
USN/USMC tactical aircraft carried internal warning receivers, in all
instances either the standard ALR-67 or in older aircraft, the ALR-45
and 45F. These receivers are systems which combine crystal video
receivers, superhets and a low band receiver. Four cavity backed spiral
antennas are used for threat direction finding. Some older aircraft
have
an additional APR-43 Compass Sail/Clockwise C/D band launch warning
receiver, which intercepts and analyses the command uplink signals
associated with SAMs such as the SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6. The substantial
dependence of Soviet SAMs upon command uplinks and tracking beacons
(see
table Part 1) makes for unambiguous indication of the state of the
engagement.

The
USN's attention to DECM in tactical aircraft was not matched by the
USAF. Of the USAF's tactical inventory, only the long range F-111 and
F-15 carried internal trackbreakers. The F-15C and E carried
derivatives
of the basic ALQ-135 TEWS, a capable system with high band coverage, of
which little has been published in open sources. The F/EF-111A/E/F
carried various models of the ALQ-94/137, a combined pulse mode and CW
deception and noise jammer with three subsystems covering low (E/F),
mid
(G/H) and high (I/J) bands with fore and in some airframes, aft
coverage.

The
F-16s, F-4Gs, RF-4Cs and A-10s lacked internal jammers, the F-16C in
particular missing out on the planned upgrade to the internal joint
service ALQ-165 ASPJ. This created much heartache for the USAF, which
was left with the task of distributing its meagre stocks of podded
jammers amongst the close to 1,000 aircraft. Of the newest type, the
ALQ-131 Block 2, only 260 were available, supplemented by 130 older
model Block 1 pods which required pilot selection of jamming mode. In
addition to the 131s, the USAF also had 250 older ALQ-119s and 50
Vietnam era ALQ-101s, many of which probably saw action over Hanoi. The
F-4Gs were fitted with Raytheon ALQ-184s, which are upgraded from
ALQ-119s.

This
situation created much pressure on the SEAD and support jamming forces,
particularly since only the 131 and 184 could cope with newer threats,
thus leaving the F-16s and A-10s otherwise susceptible to fire from
weapons such as the SA-6 and SA-8 or Roland. Fortunately, the MTBF of
the newer pods was exemplary, the 131 demonstrating 180 hrs (ie four
times design spec) between failures, thus allowing for little downtime
due pod outages.

The
Westinghouse ALQ-131(V) is the USAF's standard jamming pod, evolved
from
the earlier ALQ-119(V), in turn evolved from the Vietnam era ALQ-101
and
QRC-335 programs. The 131 is designed as a fully modular system, with
fully self contained cooling and support functions. The system is built
around a C/I (Control/Interface) module which contains a digital
computer and a programmable digital waveform generator, the latter
feeding an array of jammer modules. The system can be slaved to an
aircraft's RWR or controlled by an internal power management module,
and
is reported to provide a range of noise and deception jamming modes.

Raytheon's ALQ-184(V) is a relative newcomer also derived from the
ALQ-119 family. It employs Rotman lense antennas and provides noise and
deception jamming modes, in the latter operating as a deception
repeater.

USAF
radar warning assets were no less diverse than their DECM assets. Older
tactical aircraft such as the F-4 and A-10 carried versions of the
standard ALR-46 family, capable of handling up to 16 threat emitters
concurrently, typically supplemented by a C/D low band ALR-64 Compass
Sail launch warning system. The ALR-46 is a conventional crystal video
receiver with a quartet of cavity backed spiral antennas for direction
finding. The F-16s carried the ALR-69 which is an enhanced ALR-46 with
integrated Compass Sail equipment, and a frequency selective receiver
set, the latter capable of analysing guidance transmissions to
determine
the direction from which the missile is approaching.

The
F-111s and F-15s carried type specific warning equipment. The F-15C/E
carried the capable E-J band ALR-56C, a dual conversion H/I/J band
superhet receiver, supplemented by an ALQ-128 countermeasures receiver,
whereas the F-111E/F carried the third generation of the C-J band
ALR-62
warning and homing system, the current incarnation including an
instantaneous frequency measurement receiver for precision direction
finding. The EF-111A carried a modified subtype, the ALR-62(V)4 with
facilities to 'look through' jamming by the ALQ-99E.

Insofar as can be established from open sources, the USAF and USN
diverge substantially in their respective strategies for the design of
DECM systems, the Navy concentrating on specific trackbreaking
techniques designed to defeat fire control systems, whereas the Air
Force places a greater emphasis on generic techniques for defeating
acquisition and fire control radars. While this more than anything
reflects the differences between the naval environment and air-land
battle environment, it has the benefit of presenting an opponent with a
diverse array of jamming techniques to cope with.

In
the Gulf this effect was further enhanced by the presence of the RAF,
who employed their own unique DECM equipment. The Tornado GR.1 carried
an internal Marconi Radar Homing and Warning Receiver (RHWR) for threat
detection, and the Skyshadow deception jamming pod. The RHWR covers the
C to J bands, and will identify and classify AI radars, SAM and AAA
acquisition and tracking radars and missile guidance emissions. The
system provides long range warning and homing which implies the use of
superhet receivers. The Skyshadow trackbreaker pod will concurrently
counter pulse mode and continuous wave emitters with angle and range
denial techniques, and will automatically prioritise threats and select
appropriate jamming techniques and power levels.

In
addition, radar absorbent tiles were attached to the inlets to provide
a
useful reduction in frontal radar cross section, to enhance the effect
of the Skyshadow's jamming when closing on a target. The RAF's Jaguars
carried the older ALQ-101-10 jamming pods in addition to an internal
RWR. The RAF expended much effort, like the Americans, in the prewar
period to ensure that the threat libraries in the jammers were up to
date. The mix of very old and very new Soviet built equipment,
supplemented by Western equipment, and the unplanned for high/medium
altitude operational environment, resulted in much software development
effort to ensure that all threats were covered.

The
Allied DECM effort was greatly assisted by the fact, that all of the
threat systems in the theatre were well known (see Part 1), although in
hindsight this would have also been true of a Warpac/NATO conflict, as
the Soviets were unlikely to have deployed the new SA-10, SA-11 and
SA-12 in strength to the front line for fear of compromising them to
Allied Elint. The low aggregate loss rate testifies to the
effectiveness
of the equipment, as most launched SAMs went ballistic even when guided.

Lessons for Australia

The world has not witnessed an electronic battle of such ferocity as in
the Gulf since the Allied invasion of Europe in 1944. Significantly,
the
Allies' systematic expenditure on electronic warfighting capability
over
the last two decades has yielded substantial dividends. Moreso since
the
opponent was a good facsimile of the planned for threat, the Communist
Warpac, and had an air defence system of similar density albeit
somewhat
lesser capability than the former Western TVD PVO and PVO-SV (army)
deployments. Significantly, most of the systems deployed by the Soviets
in Europe were identical to those in Iraq, or later models of the same
types. The notion that the cumbersome SA-4 and SA-5 systems, and new
mobile SA-10, SA-11 and SA-12 would have made up for the additional
numbers and capability of Allied electronic combat assets in that
theatre is hard to support.

What
this suggests is that the NATO-Warpac central European air battle would
have probably followed a similar course, leading to the defeat of the
Communists' IADS within a week or so, in turn leading to air
superiority
in the following week, as the Communist air forces would have withered
under the fire of the Allied counter-air campaign. Fortunately this
never had to happen and the world has been spared the inevitable
nuclear
response to the lost air battle and hence total conventional defeat
through attrition by air.

Several interesting observations must be made. First and foremost is
the
reality that the electronic battle must precede the opening of the
counter-air battle. The attainment of air superiority requires the
attainment of electromagnetic superiority - who controls the airwaves
will control the skies.

There can be no doubt that the established model for the air war, ie
the
counter-air battle to achieve command of the air, followed by
interdiction campaigns to inflict attrition, must be expanded by the
introduction of an electronic campaign to cripple the opponent's C3 and
IADS, as a precursor to hunting down the opponent's air capability. It
must be noted that while the foremost objective of the electronic
campaign will always be the destruction of the opponent's air defence
capability, by encompassing the opponent's total C3 system as a target
for attack one has advanced the process of the strategic interdiction
campaign by implementing its very first phase concurrently with the
electronic campaign.

The
Gulf War was so one-sided because the electronic battle was so
lopsided.
The US and UK are acknowledged to be the most capable in the West,
insofar as electronic combat capability goes, whereas the Iraqis were
utterly inept in the discipline, if they at all recognised its
existence
as such. How much blame for Iraq's defeat must be attributed to Iraqi
stupidity at a senior and operational command level, incompetence at
the
cutting edge, and how much is due to fundamental flaws in Soviet air
battle doctrine, may be difficult to determine. What is certain is that
even extremely competent air defence forces will not perform well once
their C3 network is shattered. A highly centralised system breeds an
inability to function without a C3 network and thus the effect of
removing it exposes the basic limitations of the system. In this
fashion
Allied strategists attuned their campaign to a fundamental structural
flaw in Warpac air battle doctrine.

The
deluge of jamming and anti-radiation missiles represented nothing less
than a war of attrition against electronic assets. In this respect the
electronic battle has acquired the fundamental characteristic of the
air
battle, it is a war of attrition. As such it is a battle where mobility
confers a major advantage in allowing the choice of entering an
engagement or not, and that mobility is an attribute of the attacking
air force, weighing heavily in its favour.

An
aircraft can jam and dodge a missile, whereas a land based radar or SAM
system can neither jam nor dodge an anti-radiation missile. It can only
shut itself down and by doing so withdraw from the engagement, this
unilateral move may not prevent a SEAD tasked aircraft from locating
and
destroying the shut down radar. Decoy emitters only delay the
inevitable.

It
follows therefore that an air battle doctrine which relies heavily on
ground based radar and SAMs is analogous to a doctrine of static
fortification engaging a manoeuvre land force. Unless the attacking air
force is particularly ill matched to the task, the advantage must lay
with the attacker. Historical evidence easily supports this assertion,
the only times when SAM based defences were successful was during the
transient phase of deploying a new technology (SA-2,3 in SEA, SA-6 in
Yom Kippur), once the limitations of the new weapon were understood the
war of attrition swung in the favour of air power. This would have also
been true of the SA-10, SA-11 and SA-12 in any European conflict.

From
the Australian perspective several issues become very clear. Reliance
on
a static air defence system is a flawed strategy as it forces a
defensive posture where air assets become committed to protecting air
defence infrastructure, rather than winning the offensive counter-air
campaign. This may not be clear enough to the laymen who determine
Australia's policy in this area and it is up to those who know to press
this argument vigourously.

Whether an OTHB network such as Jindalee would prove to be more of an
asset than a vulnerability remains to be seen, when compared to a
moving
and difficult to hit AEW&C platform. Certainly were it to become
Australia's principal means of detecting inbound threats it would
become
a very high priority target justifying the expense of systematic SEAD
strikes, cruise missile strikes or special operations raids. Warning
time notwithstanding, defending it would absorb assets.

Similarly the utility of SAM and AAA systems is doubtful. They cannot
prevent air power from inflicting attrition and themselves inflict only
questionable levels of attrition on an attacking force. Where low level
SAMs are the only types available, using PGMs from medium altitudes
defeats the SAM and AAA defence totally. While the ADF is woefully weak
in this area, it is worth stating that resources should not be expended
on SAMs or AAA. The payoff is simply not there.

Another issue is that of C3 in the deep North, which has always been a
basic vulnerability of the ADF. Any opponent who is serious will target
the fixed C3 sites and in doing so will make life very difficult for
the
ADF. There is reasonable justification for equipping the RAAF's tankers
as VHF/UHF/satellite communications relay platforms/command posts to
provide some additional redundancy over fixed installations (not unlike
the RAF's tankers), as is there a case for further redundancy via
mobile
satellite communications terminals above what is projected.

The
vulnerability of our national C3 network is something to seriously
ponder, should we ever become embroiled in a neighbourhood brawl.
Distances what they are, crippling our C3 network could allow an
opponent substantial freedom of operations in the North. Lacking
anything even approaching an IADS, the issue of its crippling isn't
really applicable, but selective air strikes or special operations
raids
on the Jindalee and primary radar facilities could have a similar
effect
should we become too reliant on them. The reality is that static
systems
are targets which can't run away and therefore cannot be expected to
survive for long unless disproportionate resources are assigned to
defend them.

What
must be seriously questioned is the ADF's failure to commit to the
development of a substantial support jamming and SEAD capability. If
such a program exists it is a well kept secret of which there is no
visible evidence.

This
is in contrast to the RAAF's P-3C ESM program, where the ADF is gaining
a long overdue and substantial capability. In any confrontation the
ability to determine the opponent's electronic order of battle is of
paramount importance. Whether this is achieved by specialist aircraft
or
by fitting mission consoles and ESM receivers to P-3Cs is a matter of
implementation. A little capability in this area goes a very long way.
The RAAF's recently adopted policy of acquiring EW systems only with
full software support packages is a major step forward, as the ability
to update threat libraries quickly and quietly is fundamental to
success
in the EW game. EW systems with obsolete or inappropriate threat
libraries are useless ballast. Buying canned systems from overseas
without the software support package is an utter waste of taxpayer's
money.

Our
defensive electronic warfare capability is by all standards modest and
SEAD capability non-existant. The F-111 and F/A-18 carry defensive ECM
and RWRs, while the P-3 force carries ESM equipment. There are no SEAD
or Support Jamming assets by tasking or functional specialisation and
given policy at the time of writing, they are unlikely to be acquired
in
the near future. This is a major weakness stemming from a lack of
policy
direction, in turn stemming from a lack of understanding in
decisionmaking circles.

While the regional environment could hardly justify a substantial and
dedicated support jamming capability, by the same token if we ever had
to go to war such a capability will be sorely needed. A useful
compromise is a capability based on role specific high power
communications and radar jamming pods, carried by standard or modified
tactical aircraft, these pods being targeted at generic and known
threat
systems. In particular GCI/EW radars, acquisition radars and VHF/UHF
GCI
comms links need to be targeted as the ADF has no capability to do so
at
this time.

A
mix of noise jamming, false target generator and comjam pods carried by
either of the tactical jet types could prove of substantial usefulness
particularly during the crucial opening phase of any conflict. The
design of such pods or modification of existing overseas designs could
be a useful way of developing an indigenous EW manufacturing and
support
infrastructure.

Another capability worth consideration is an emitter locating system or
homing receiver system, fitted to some of the tactical jet airframes.
One approach would be a centreline pod with a quartet of dual baseline
interferometers (eg conventional 5 x cavity backed spiral), feeding IFM
receivers, the whole system thus capable of 360 degree coverage in
operation from D band through J band. Such a pod would carry a
processor
to sort, identify and locate emitters based on receiver outputs. The
pod
could be integrated with the aircraft's weapon system via the 1553B mux
bus. This would be a most useful integration and development exercise,
insofar as gaining experience goes (and alternately an airframe
specific
design could also be built). Export customers need not be ruled out.

Electronic combat is neither black magic or unattainably difficult
science, it is an established engineering and operational discipline
where success is achieved through systematic effort. The Gulf War
demonstrated beyond any doubt the central importance of electronic
combat to the modern air war and those who fail to take heed today will
be tomorrow's losers. Failure to understand the dynamics and strategy
of
electronic combat is no longer excusable, and those who resist the
acquisition of capabilities in this area are either stupid or in effect
acting against Australia's interests. The ADF to date has accepted the
importance of electronic combat, but we have yet to see a serious
committment of resources. Hopefully this will eventually take place, if
it doesn't we may become the losers in any future conflict. Adequate
precedents do exist.

Editor's
Note 2005: The last twelve years have seen no significant
advances in RAAF SEAD, DEAD or Electronic Combat capabilities. Indeed,
the Defence leadership rejected an offer during the late 1990s to take
a
large fraction of the then prematurely retired US Air Force EF-111A Raven fleet. Numerous
papers and studies indicating the strategic value, and indeed the need
for Electronic Combat / Electronic Attack capabilities have not
been acted upon. For all intents and purposes the RAAF remains devoid
of
significant capabilities in this area, and maintains a minimal
investment in combat aircraft defensive systems, despite the
availability of doctrinal
models for defining these capabilities.

These tables illustrate the effectiveness
of the electronic countermeasures carried by US Naval and Marine
Corps aircraft, which sustained no losses due radar guided
weapons. Three USAF aircraft were reported lost due IR SAMs and at
least
three by radar guided SAMs. This highlights the lethality of modern
heatseekers against low flying aircraft not equipped with Missile
Approach Warning Systems (MAWS), as were all of the above. In most
instances the victim aircraft did not know it was under attack, and
hence did not drop flares to seduce the missile, or attempt evasive
manoeuvring. The cause of the lost F-15Es and A-10s has not been
reported to date, but given their low level operating environment these
were most likely due heatseeking SAMs or AAA.

The numerically most important HARM shooter was the F/A-18
flown by the
USN and USMC. US F/A-18Cs are fitted with the HARM command launch
computer, which interfaces the missile to cockpit displays and the
ALR-67 Radar Warning Receiver. The limitations of this installation lie
in the directional accuracy of the APR-67 and the system's limited
capacity to deal with large numbers of threat emitters(Boeing).

The Gulf saw what will probably be the last combat
deployment of the
seventies F-4G Wild Weasel. The Weasels carry the massive APR-47, a
potent radar homing system which has 360 degree precision direction
finding and ranging capability by virtue of multiple interferometric
antenna arrays. Another unparalleled strength of the APR-47 is it
capability to handle very high density signal environments which can
saturate lesser systems with targets. The backseater is a specialist
Electronic Warfare Officer.

The RAF fired off all stocks of its new ALARM
anti-radiation missile. A
much newer design than the US HARM, the ALARM has a novel loitering
mode, where it zoom climbs to high altitude, then deploys a parachute
and silently descends searching for emitters. RAF Tornadoes typically
carried three rounds on fuselage stations. Defensive jamming for the
Tornado was provided by Skyshadow ECM pods, carried on one wing
station,
the other carrying a flare/chaff dispenser pod.

Grumman's EA-6B Prowler was the most important tactical
jamming type
used in the Gulf. With a more advanced high band jamming subsystem than
its air force counterpart, the EF-111A, the Prowlers provided escort
jamming and standoff jamming for Allied strike packages and individual
F-117A strikes. Many EA-6Bs were fitted with HARM command launch
computers and supplemented naval F/A-18s as HARM shooters. The
characteristic bulbous radome on the vertical stabiliser houses a
directional receiver package, whereas role specific jammers are carried
in up to five pylon mounted pods (see photo by Jarmo Lindberg). Three
specialist operators are carried (USN).

While all USN/USMC aircraft carried internal ALQ-126
defensive ECM
equipment, the USAF had fallen behind with plans to fit the internal
ALQ-165 ASPJ DECM and had to rely on a somewhat diverse collection of
ALQ-131, ALQ-184, ALQ-119 and ALQ-101 jamming pods to protect the F-16,
A-10 and F-4. The Westinghouse ALQ-131 pod is here shown during fit
checks on the F-111C, to date no pods have been acquired by the RAAF
(USAF via FAS).