To Nathanael Greene

[dateline] Philadelphia March 9. 1777

[salute] Dear Sir

I had, last Evening the Pleasure of yours of March 3. by your Brother, to whom in
his Business to this Place I shall give all the Assistance in my Power.1 In whose favour the Ballance of Letters lies, I cant Say: but if I am in debt, in
Point of Numbers it must be because Some of my Remittances have miscarried.

I am not yet entirely convinced, that We are playing a desperate Game, tho I must
confess that my feelings are somewhat less Sanguine than they were last June. This
diminution of Confidence is owing to Disappointment. I then expected that the Enemy
would have Seen two or three Bunker Hills, between the Point of Long Island and the
Banks of the Delaware River. Two or three Such Actions would have answered my Purpose,
perhaps one alone.

I have derived Consolation however, from these Disappointments; because the People
have discovered a Patience under them, greater than might have been expected. It was
not very surprising to me that our Troops Should fly in certain situations, and abandon
Lines of such extent, at the sudden Appearance of a formidable Enemy in unexpected
Places, because I had learn'd from Marshall Saxe, and from others that Such Behaviour
was not only common but almost constant among the best regular Troops. But there was
Reason to apprehend, that the People would be Seized with Such a Panick, upon Such
a Series of ill success, that in the fright and Confusion whole States would have
revolted, instead of a few paltry Individuals. Whereas every State has stood firm,
and even the most confused and wavering of them, have gained Strength and improved
in order, under all this Adversity. I therefore do not yet despair.

You Say you “are sensible I have not the most exalted Opinion of our Generals.” From
this Expression I Suspect, that Some busy Body has been endeavouring to do Mischief,
by Misrepresentation. Be this as it may, I am generally So well Satisfied in my own
Opinions, as to avow them.

I dont expect to see Characters, either among the Statesmen or the Soldiers of a young
and tender State like ours equal to Some, who were bred to the Contemplation of great
Objects from their Childhood in older, and more powerfull Nations. Our Education,
our Travel, our Experience has not been equal to the Pro• { 106 } duction of such Characters, whatever our Genius may be which I have no Reason to Suspect
to be less than that of any Nation under the sun.

I dont expect to see an Epaminondas, to be sure, because in the opinion of Dr. Swift
all the Ages of the World have produced but Six such Characters, which makes the Chances
much against our seeing any such. When such shall appear I shall certainly have an
exalted opinion.—<untill then, I believe my Opinion of our Generals will continue not very exalted>

Notwithstanding this I have a sincere Esteem of our General Officers taken together
as a Body, and believe them upon the whole the best Men for the Purpose that America
affords. I think them Gentlemen of as good Sense, Education, Morals, Taste and Spirit
as any we can find, and if this Opinion of them is not exalted enough I am Sorry for
it but cannot help it. I hope however that my Opinion as well as that of the World
in general, will be Somewhat more sublimated, before next Winter. I do assure you
that two or three Bunker Hill Battles, altho they might be as unsuccessfull as that
was would do it. I lament the Inexperience of all of them and I am Sure they have
all Reason to lament mine. But not to disguise my sentiments at all, there are Some
of them, particularly from New England that I begin to think quite unequal to the
high Command they hold.

It is very true that Success generally marks the Man of Wisdom, and in Some Instances
Injustice is done to unsuccessfull Merit: But Still it is generally true that Success
is a Mark of Wisdom, and that Misfortunes are owing to Misconduct. The sense of Mankind
has uniformly Supported this Opinion and therefore I cannot but think it just. The
Same Sense, has uniformly attributed the ill Success of Armies to the Incapacity or
other Imperfections of the General Officers, a Truth which I have Sometimes presumed
to Hint to some of our General Officers, with whom I could make So free. There Seems
to be Justice in this because the Glory of Successfull Wars is as uniformly attributed
to them.

I shall join with you, very chearfully, in burying past Errors, and in wishing to
concert and execute the most effectual Measures to free America, from her cruel oppressors.

You ask why G. Lee is denyed his Requests? You ask, can any Injury arise? Will it
reflect any Dishonour upon Congress. I dont know that it would reflect any dishonour,
nor was it refused upon that Principle. But Congress was of Opinion that great In• { 107 } juries would arise. It would take up too much Time to recapitulate all the Arguments
which were used upon occassion of his Letter. But Congress was never more unanimous,
than upon that Question. Nobody I believe would have objected against a Conference,
concerning his private Affairs or his particular Case. But it was inconceivable that
a Conference should be necessary upon Such Subjects. Any Thing relative to those might
have been conveyed by Letter. But it appears to be an Artfull Stratagem of the two
gratefull Brothers to hold up to the public View the Phantom of a Negotiation, in
order to give Spirit and Courage to the Tories, to distract and divide the Whiggs,
at a critical Moment, when the Utmost Exertions are necessary to draw together an
Army.

The Words of the Count La Tour,2 upon a similar Occasion, ought to be adopted by Us. “Remember that now there is room
neither for Repentance, nor for Pardon. We must no longer reason, nor deliberate.
We only want Concord and Steadiness.—The Lot is cast. If We prove victorious, We shall
be a just free and Sovereign People; if We are conquered, We shall be Traitors, perjured
Persons, and Rebels.”

But further. We see what use G. and the two Houses make of the former Conference with
Lord How. What a Storm in England they are endeavouring to raise against Us from that
Circumstance.

But another Thing. We have undoubted Intelligence from Europe, that the Embassadors
and other Instruments of the B. Ministry at foreign Courts made the worst Use of the
former Conference. That Conference did Us a great and essential Injury at the french
Court you may depend Upon it. Ld How knows it—and wishes to repeat it.

“The Princes of the Union were not diligent enough in preparing for War: they Sufferd
themselves to be amused with Proposals of Accommodation, they gave the League time
to bring together great Forces, and after that, they could no longer brave it. They
committed the fault which is very common in civil Wars viz that People endeavour to
Save Appearances. If a Party would Save Appearances, they must lie quiet, but if they
will not lie quiet, they must push Things to an Extremity, without keeping any Measures.
It rarely happens, but that otherwise they are at once both criminal and unfortunate.”
Bailes Life of Gustavus Adolphus.3

They meant farther to amuse Opposition in England, and to { 108 } amuse foreign Nations by this Maneuvre, as well as the Whiggs in America, and I confess
it is not without Indignation, that I See Such a Man as Lee Suffer himself to be duped
by their Policy So far as to become the Instrument of it, as Sullivan was upon a former
occasion.4 Congress is under no concern about any Use that the disaffected can make of this
Refusal. They would have made the worst Use of a Conference. As to any Terms of Peace—look
into the Speech to both Houses—the Answers of both Houses—look into the Proclamations.5—it is useless to enumerate Particulars which prove that the Howes have no Power but
to murder or disgrace Us.6

The Retaliation that is to be practiced, on Lees Account, was determined on, when
I was absent, So that I can give no Account of the Reasons for that Measure. Yet I
have no doubt of the Right. And as to the disagreable Consequences you mention these
I hope and presume will not take Place—if they do, they will be wholly chargeable
on the Enemy. The End of Retaliation is to prevent a Repetition of the Injury. A Threat
of Retaliation is to prevent an Injury, and it seldom fails of its design. In Lees
Case, I am confident, it will Secure him good Treatment. If Lees Confinement is not
Strict, that of Campbell and the Hessians ought not to be. The Intention was that
they should be treated exactly as Lee is.

Our late Promotions may possibly give Disgust: But that cannot be avoided. This delicate
Point of Honour, which is really one of the most putrid Corruptions of absolute Monarchy,
I mean the Honour of maintaining a Rank Superiour to abler Men, I mean the Honour
of preferring a single Step of Promotion to the Service of the Public, must be bridled.
It is incompatible with republican Principles. I hope for my own Part that Congress
will elect annually all the general officers—if in Consequence of this Some great
Men should be obliged at the Years End to go home, and serve their Country in some
other Capacity, not less necessary and better adapted to their Genius I dont think the public would be ruined. Perhaps it would be no Harm.

The Officers of the Army, ought to consider that the Rank, the Dignity, and the Rights
of whole States, are of more Importance, than this Point of Honour, more indeed than
the Solid Glory of any particular officer. The States insist with great Justice and
Sound Policy, on having a Share of the General Officers, in Some Proportion to the
Quotas of Troops they are to raise. This Princi• { 109 } ple has occasioned many of our late Promotions, and it ought to Satisfy Gentlemen.
But if it does not, they as well as the Public must abide the Consequences of their
Discontent. I shall at all Times think myself happy to hear from you, my dear sir,
and to give the Utmost Attention to whatever you may suggest. I hope I shall not often
trouble you to Read So Long a Lurry7 of small Talk.

5. A reference to the King's proclamation of 23 Aug. 1775, which declared the colonists
rebels, and to his speech to Parliament on 26 Oct. 1775, which accused the colonial
leaders of seeking merely to mislead with “vague expressions of attachment” while
“preparing for a general revolt” (vol. 3:266; Parliamentary Hist., 18:695). The King's subsequent speech of 31 Oct. 1776 continued to view Americans
as traitors and rebels and their rejection of conciliation as an insult (Parliamentary Hist., 18:1366–1367). The answers of the Parliament to these speeches produced a few American
supporters, but the weight of Parliamentary opinion continued to lie on the King's
side, with little appreciation for or understanding of the American position.

6. A reference to the terms of the peace offer authorized in the commission given to
Richard and William Howe. See vol. 4:46, note 2, and Samuel Adams to JA, 9 Jan., note 4 (above).