Before we can
draw any conclusions from these statistics, a little explanation is in order.
In reviewing the U.S. Marine Corps historical records for the Vietnam era that
are on file, a casualty is generally defined as either personnel either killed
In action or wounded requiring hospitalization. WIA’s would not be
tallied here if the man just received a patch up and was returned to his unit.

If you look at the
authorized strength of the battalion and total up the casualties the 3rd Recon
Battalion lost an entire battalion during 1967. The only statistic that may be
in error, due to the inherent problem of recording possible enemy losses, is
the "probable" enemy losses, however since the Marine Corps recorded
these totals we will assume they are accurate for this discussions.

This is what the
statistics reveal:

Patrols: Assuming the entire T/O
strength of the battalion was deployed in the field for 365 days, that's
equivalent to each Marine in the battalion continuously turning around 2.7
day patrols.

Sightings: 3.4 per day

NVA/VC sighted: The equivalent of three
T/O divisions including separate battalion combat support / logistics
elements.

These figures
serve only as a rough indicator of 3rd Recon Battalion’s performance
during the year, since they are based on T/O strength including Headquarters
and Service Company and are not factored for attrition and absences of all
types. In reality, a manning level of 60-70% of T/O strength more
accurately reflects the availability of personnel able to perform in the field
on any given day. Conversely, the numbers of enemy casualties and
sightings are suspect due to the likelihood of redundant sighting reports and
the nature of assessing probable KIA’s. This analysis is
based on figures generated by 3rd Recon Battalion as reflected by the command
chronology and unit diary entries for the period. The usage and
categorization of these figures are consonant with the quantitative measures
typically used to assess unit performance during the Vietnam War.

Quoting from
Larry Vetter’s, Marine Third Reconnaissance Battalion in Vietnam, 1965-70, he states:

“In Vietnam there was never a
universally accepted or understood mission for the recon unit. It might
be better said that that the Recon mission was modified with each new
commanding officer or general. The Recon team is not structured to be a
combat unit.” (NEVER WITHOUT HEROES: Marine Third Reconnaissance
Battalion in Vietnam 1965-70, Lawrence C. Vetter, Jr., Random House, 1996)

In a previous
paragraph, Mr. Vetter cites a tendency by command levels above the
Reconnaissance Battalion to “hoard” intelligence, and a failure to
disseminate information vital to Recon teams conducting missions. While Mr.
Vetter’s point is well taken, one can make the case that a failure to
provide Recon teams with tactical intelligence was calculated, and a matter of
policy within the 3rd Marine Division.

The 3rd
Reconnaissance Battalion’s primary mission of clandestine observation and
intelligence gathering, from the point of view of III MAF Commander’s
Cushman and Davis, was subservient to a requirement to project combat power
beyond the capabilities of the infantry battalion.

Given the
hundreds of square miles assigned the division, the divergent missions it
performed and the associate logistics difficulties, the ability of the infantry
to seek out and destroy the enemy was limited. Designed to fight in a
landing force configuration with a battalion as its primary maneuver element,
Marine artillery support and rotary wing assets were configured
accordingly. Given the circumstances in Northern I Corps in 1967, the
Marine Division fragmented into task organized elements occupying fixed
outposts and logistics bases while performing offensive, defensive and
pacification missions simultaneously.

Organic artillery
and rotary wing assets were inadequate to support the concurrent operational
tempo and forced to prioritize competing demands. Consequently, Marine
Infantry forces were most typically required to operate in close proximity to
their fixed positions. Therefore, the mission of “finding, fixing
and fighting” the enemy in their remote sanctuaries, presented
significant problems.

The
Division’s Recon Battalion picked up the slack. Although, senior
commanders cavorted the use of Recon troops with the mention of
“intelligence gathering” as a mission component, both Davis and
Cushman emphasized the use of Recon teams as an offensive unit. It is
likely that existing intelligence was denied to Recon forces since as a general
rule they were deployed in known areas of enemy concentrations. Rather
than performing their primary mission, 3rd Recon teams served as mini-infantry
companies, deployed to make and prosecute contacts through close contact and
further exploit them with supporting arms.

Mr. Vetter cites
a December 3, 1967 memo from General Cushman
to General Westmoreland, advancing this aggressive use of Recon troops as the
“Sting-Ray” concept. It should be noted that neither General Cushman nor
the men under his command were the original developers of this concept. He was
following the policy set in place by the CG FMF PAC, and CG 3rd MAF- Generals
Krulak and Walt at the conclusion of Operation Hastings which took place during
the summer of 1966. Marine Commanders observed the tremendous toll inflicted
upon the enemy by these recon teams and the term "Sting Ray" was
born. The Recon Teams that composed Task Unit Charlie, during "Hastings" were a composite
unit made up from two plts Alpha Company, 1st Force, and a platoon from 3rd
Force. This philosophy on the use of Recon assets continued throughout the
war.

It is certain
that Recon commanders knew that troops under their command were being attrited
at an inordinate rate in order to perform an infantry mission on the budget
plan, but the teams were not officially apprised of the concept. Nor were
they staffed or equipped to perform it. Substituting the term
“manager” for “leader,” this approach makes perfect
business sense, and may speak to the character of the quality of leadership
within Third Recon Battalion and the Third Marine Division. From the
statistical, cost-benefit analysis manner in which results were tabulated in
the Vietnam War the figures cited above was a manager’s dream. It
is small wonder that Third Recon Battalion was used, literally, to death.

Our
"production rate," 16.6 - 1:00 - Sixteen and a fraction enemy deaths
for each death of our own - was doubtlessly viewed as a cost effective
trade-off in an environment in which “win” or “loose”
was only defined by graphs and charts depicting “body
counts.” Since the Recon Battalion and Company Commanders were
primarily administrators, tasked with providing a sufficiency of teams to
perform the missions required, but performing no operational leadership role,
it is likely that these numbers held them in good stead. In light of the
statistical weight of the enemy we killed, our own considerable losses
presumably went unnoticed by those who compiled the numbers, and by those who
were rewarded by the virtuousness of the “leadership” contained
within those ranks and files of figures.

But let us find pride, not in the numbers, but in the memories of the
Sergeants and Pfc.’s and Corpsmen who ran the patrols week after week and
month after month for no other reward than doing what we called “duty;”
for doing something we believed was worth doing, and above all, doing it for
and with men who shared both the misery and joy of working together as a team
of Recon Marines.