The perception of Ukraine by the Russians is important not only as
a factor of the tsarist policy, but also as an element of Russian
national identity. New works by Paul Bushkovitch and David Saunders
specify that Russian political opinion in all political camps in the
first half of the nineteenth century, for the most part, regarded
Ukraine and the Ukrainians positively.1 Interest in the
Ukrainian language, literature and history was considerable, and
Ukraine's contribution to common Russian or Slavic culture was
generally recognized. Many Russians could even be described as
Ukrainophiles, although their attitudes were predicated on the view of
Ukraine as different from Russia but at the same time a complement, not
a rival, to Great Russian culture and the assumption, that "Little
Russian" local patriotism was perfectly compatible with loyalty to the
Tsar.2
Studies on the first half of the last century3 arrive at a common
conclusion that about 1850 an overturn from romantic Russian
"Ukrainophilism" to a complete denial of any manifestations of
Ukrainian selfhood had taken place (the first features of Cyril and
Methodius Brotherhood's Ukrainian national programme of 1846-1847; an
argument between Pogodin and Maksymovych concerning the heritage of
Kievan Rus' in 1856). The final overturn is observed after the Polish
uprising in 1863, when a clearly marked anti-Ukrainian official policy
was launched (Valuev circular of 1863; Ems decree of 1876).4

Since the 1840s and, especially, since the years of 1863-1870 the
Ukrainians were discredited by the Russian state and society due to the
following reasons: (a) the emergence of the Ukrainian national movement
with political claims; (b) the instance of national revolutions of
1848; (c) the growth of Russian national consciousness, which usually
included "Malorussians" (the Ukrainians) in the Russian nation that was
being formed; (d) the uprising of the "treacherous Poles,” whose image
was transferred on to the Ukrainians who for centuries had lived under
Polish rule. Those were the reasons that formed the principles of
Russian political opinion on the Ukrainian problem.

Elucidating the image of Ukraine and the Ukrainians in Russian
political opinion we, in the first place, are interested in the answers
to the following questions:
(a) whether the repressive state policy towards the Ukrainians,
beginning from the middle of the nineteenth century, and the
anti-Ukrainian tendency in Russian political opinion were related;
(b) whether a conception of the existence of an anti-Ukrainian
tradition in Russian political opinion, having its roots in the last
century and extending up to this day, may be confirmed by studying its
main tendencies;
(c) whether the problem of Ukraine in Russian political opinion was
considered separately from solving the problem of Russian national
identity;
(d) whether the idea of the Ukrainians' ability to become a nation by
themselves existed in Russian political opinion;
(e) whether the similarity between general doctrines of Russian
political thought and their attitudes to Ukraine really existed.

We want to try to answer all these questions on the basis of
comparative analysis of the views on the Ukrainian problem by the
representatives of six "generation units” within the framework of three
"actual generations"5
of Russian political thought: conservative and liberal nationalists of
the second half of the nineteenth century; conservatives and liberals
of the first quarter of the twentieth century; Eurasians and
Europeanists in interwar emigration. The representatives of all these
trends shared accordingly in their chronological dimension a common
"space-time location” (to use Karl Mannheim's term)6 and represented
diametrically opposed viewpoints on issues concerning one generation in
one country and one cultural milieu.