Number 38346

SUPPLEMENT
to
The London Gazette

Of TUESDAY, the 6th of JULY,
1948

BATTLE OF THE JAVA SEA, 27TH FEBRUARY, 1942

The following Despatch was
submitted to the Commander-in-Chief,
Eastern Fleet on the 17th March, 1942, by Commodore J. A. COLLINS,
C.B., R.A.N., Commodore Commanding China Force.

REPORT BY COMMODORE
COMMANDING CHINA FORCE.

17th
March, 1942.

1. Attached brief account of the naval action off
Sourabaya on 27th
February is based on:—

A written report of the action by the Captain of PERTH compiled
from
his own report notes on the forenoon of 28th February and handed to
Commodore Commanding China Force at Batavia on PERTH'S arrival at that
port. This was only a rough initial report.

Report from senior surviving officer of JUPITER.

Report from senior surviving officer of ELECTRA.

Informal conversation with Captain of PERTH and HOUSTON during
the
afternoon of 28th February at Batavia. No track charts or plots are
available and this report is necessarily incomplete.

2. The Eastern Striking Force was formed at
Sourabaya*, on 26th
February under the command of Admiral Doorman in DE RUYTER. It
consisted of:—

Admiralty footnote:—* A Western Striking Force, under the command of Commodre J. A.
Collins, R.A.N., and composed of "D" class cruisers and "S" class
destroyers of the Royal Navy, was based at Batavia.Destroyers:

3. This force proceeded to sea 1830/26th*
and steered to the Eastward along the North coast of Madura Island
until 0100/27th, then to the Westward until 0930/27th. Nothing was
sighted during the night. The force was shadowed by enemy aircraft from
0855/27th until it entered the Sourabaya swept channel at 1330/27th,
but was only attacked twice by single aircraft.

4. At 1427 an enemy report was received of a
convoy in the vicinity of
Bawean Island. The striking force reversed its course and proceeded to
intercept.

5. At 1614 enemy forces were sighted consisting of
two 8 in.
cruisers, Nachi class, preceded by two 6 in. cruisers of Sendai class
and 13 destroyers in two groups. The order of battle of the Allied
cruisers was DE RUYTER, EXETER, HOUSTON, PERTH and JAVA, speed 26
knots. They were preceded by a screen of the 3 British destroyers and
followed by the Dutch and U.S. destroyers.

At
1616 enemy 8 in. cruisers opened fire at a range of 30,000 yards on
EXETER and HOUSTON. DE RUYTER led round and action was engaged on
parallel courses at a range of 26 to 28,000 yards, at which ranges only
our 8 in. cruisers could reply. The enemy's gunfire was extremely
accurate; the average spread was estimated at 150 yards for elevation,
firing 10-gun salvos."

6. The rear enemy destroyer flotilla moved in to
attack soon after
action was joined. One destroyer was hit by .gunfire from PERTH and the
flotilla retired behind smoke.

Admiralty footnote:—* Times quoted are in local, i.e. Java time which is G.M.T.
+ 7½ hours.

--3937--

7. At 1707, enemy destroyers, probably of the
leading flotilla,
delivered a long range torpedo attack. At 1714 EXETER received a hit
from an 8 in. shell in one boiler room and turned away, reducing to
slow speed which later was increased to 15 knots. DE RUYTER held her
course for a short time, but the remaining cruisers (turned away after
EXETER. DE RUYTER then conformed and American destroyers assisted to
screen EXETER with, smoke and the Allied line was thrown into ;
considerable confusion. About 1715 Japanese torpedoes readied; the
Allied line; KORTENAER was struck by a torpedo in the engine room and
sank.

8. By 1725 the Allied cruiser line (except EXETER)
had been
straightened again on a N.E. course but was partially screened from the
enemy by smoke. EXETER was retiring to Sourabaya on course 150° at
15
knots. At this moment Admiral Doorman ordered the British destroyers to
counter-attack.

9. ELECTRA, ENCOUNTER and JUPITER were widely
separated and
proceeded
to attack independently. ELECTRA led through the smoke in the direction
of the enemy and on clearing it sighted an enemy unit of 3 heavy
destroyers on opposite courses going into the smoke, range about 6,000
yards. ELECTRA engaged and claims four hits on the leading ship, but as
the unit disappeared into the smoke a shell struck ELECTRA in No. 2
boiler room and shattered the boiler. Steam was lost and ELECTRA
stopped. Shortly after, a single enemy heavy destroyer emerged from the
smoke and the engagement continued, ELECTRA firing in local control
with all bridge communication dead.

ELECTRA was repeatedly hit and her guns silenced one by one. When
only
Y gun remained in action the order to " abandon ship " was given.
ELECTRA sank about 1800.

10. JUPITER on emerging through the smoke sighted
two enemy
destroyers
which were engaged for a short period before they disappeared.

No further target being in sight JUPITER returned to the Allied
cruisers where she was joined by ENCOUNTER. ENCOUNTER attacked through
a clearing in the smoke, but no, details or results of the attack are
known.

11. From 1725 to 1745 the cruiser forces were
screened from each
other
by smoke. Japanese gunfire through the smoke, presumably controlled by
radar, is reported as accurate. Japanese aircraft were employed on
spotting throughout the action.

12. At 1745 Allied cruisers emerged from smoke on
opposite course
to
the enemy 8 in. cruisers at ranges down to 21,000 yards. The action
continued spasmodically until 1812, several hits being claimed on the
enemy cruisers.

At 1812, the enemy cruisers turned away under cover of smoke, the
rear
ship heavily on fire aft. When the smoke cleared PERTH states " target
appeared to be stopped, the bow rose in the air then seemed to settle
back. We then lost sight of her, whether because she sank or whether
the light failed I do not know."

By 1830 no enemy forces were in sight.

Night Action.

13. In gathering darkness DE RUYTER continued to
lead the cruisers
to
the N.E. and Northward presumably in an attempt to work round the enemy
forces and reach the convoy.

At 1927 four ships were sighted to the Westward and engaged for a
few
minute's at 9,000 yards range; simultaneously Allied force was
illuminated by enemy aircraft flares. PERTH turned away to avoid
suspected torpedoes; the remainder of the force conformed.

14. It seems probable that Admiral Doorman
decided it was
impracticable
to work round the enemy to the Northward and that better results might
be achieved by getting between him and the Java coast and working round
to the Southward, for about 1945 he altered course to 170°. This
course
was continued until about 2035 when ships reached very shallow water
near Kodok Point to the West of Sourabaya Strait. DE RUYTER then turned
to the Westward keeping about four miles from the coast.

15. At about 2100 in position 06° 45.2' S.,
112° 05.5' E.
a violent
explosion occurred in JUPITER who was following astern of JAVA, the
rear cruiser. The explosion, attributed by JUPITER, to a torpedo,
occurred on the starboard side abreast the forward bulkhead of the
engine room and immobilised the ship. No signs of a submarine or of
torpedo tracks were sighted from JUPITER who remained unmolested until
she sank four hours later. A large number of survivors landed on the
North coast of Java from ship's boats and Carley-floats. The weather at
time of sinking was with East force 2, sky and visibility 6-7 miles,
sea and swell 21.*

16. From 2150 onwards the Allied cruiser force
was continuously
shadowed and frequently illuminated by aircraft dropping flares. All
alterations of course were signalled by dropping flares, and
occasionally by lines of floating calcium flares placed across the
track of the ships. Under these conditions a surprise attack on the
enemy convoy seemed out of the question.

17. At 2330 contact was made with two cruisers on
the port beam of
the
Allied force which was then steering to the Northward, though its exact
position is not known. Range was about 9,000 yards. Enemy opened fire
followed by PERTH; the enemy fire was extremely accurate but very slow.
PERTH claimed that two or three salvos hit, then star shell falling
short concealed the target. One enemy shell hit DE RUYTER on the
quarterdeck and DE RUYTER turned 90° away, remaining cruisers
conforming.

18. When the line was half way round this turn a
violent explosion
occurred in the after part of JAVA and she stopped heavily on fire. She
was not under gunfire at the time. At about the same moment DE RUYTER,
who had completed the 90° turn, also blew up with an appalling
explosion and settled aft heavily on fire.†

PERTH avoided the blazing wreck by the use of full port rudder and
one engine. HOUSTON headed out to starboard.

19. Admiral Doorman's verbal orders to his force
before sailing
had
been that any ship disabled "must be left to the mercy of the enemy "
to quote his own words. The Allied force now consisted only of PERTH
and

HOUSTON, the latter with very little ammunition and her
after turret
out of action, from previous bombing. No destroyers remained in
company.*

No further reconnaissance reports ,of the enemy convoy had been
received since nightfall. The Allied cruisers were under continual air
observation and illumination by flares. To continue the action was
clearly hopeless and PERTH had no hesitation in deciding to withdraw
the remnants of the striking force. HOUSTON was ordered to follow and
course was shaped at high speed for Tanjong Priok.

20. The withdrawal was not opposed by enemy
surface forces. HOUSTON and
PERTH were located by enemy reconnaissance aircraft a.m. 28th when
within 60 miles of Priok. In response to a " Help " call from PERTH,
fighter aircraft were sent out from Batavia and escorted the cruisers
in; no air attack developed on them. They arrived at Priok at 1330.

21. It should be noted that throughout this
action the Allied forces
suffered from communication difficulties. The force as a whole had
never acted before as a tactical unit. Visual signalling was restricted
to simple signals in English by flashing lamp in Morse Code. British
Liaison Officers with small signal staffs were on board DE RUYTER and
JAVA, but it had not been practicable to adopt a common system of flag
signalling.

At about 1425 the Striking Force was approaching
the minefields off
Sourabaya. Squadron consisted of DE RUYTER (Flag), EXETER, HOUSTON,
PERTH, JAVA, ELECTRA, ENCOUNTER, JUPITER, two Dutch destroyers and four
U.S. destroyers. The force was returning from an abortive, sweep,
carried out the night before.

2. At 1427 a message was received giving the
position of the convoy in
the vicinity of Bawean Island. DE RUYTER immediately turned 180°
and
led the force off to intercept. British destroyers were spread ahead,
Dutch on the port quarter and U.S. destroyers astern. The order of the
cruisers was as in paragraph 1. HOUSTON'S after turret was out of
action due to a previous bombing attack.

3. At 1550, squadron was on
course 315°, 24 knots. At 1614 an enemy
cruiser was sighted on starboard bow. Speed was increased to 26 knots.
Enemy now appeared as two 8 in. cruisers (Natai class) and ahead of
them was one cruiser (Zintu class) and six destroyers (Asashio class).
At 1616 the enemy 8 in. cruisers opened fire at a range of 30,000 yards
directing their fire mostly on EXETER and HOUSTON. ZINTU opened fire
about the same time on ELECTRA, at 1617 EXETER opened fire, HOUSTON at
1618.

Admiralty footnote:—* The U.S. destroyers delivered torpedo attacks on the Japanese
cruisers at 1814 and 1819 in which they fired all their torpedoes. At
2100, owing to their fuel supply running low and lack of torpedoes,
their Senior Office withdrew them to Sourabaya to refuel and obtain new
torpedoes, thus anticipating a signal to do so made half an hour later
by Rear Admiral Doorman.

4. DE RUYTER led round about 20° to port and
range of 8 in.
cruisers
remained at about 26,000 to 28,000 yards for some time. PERTH could not
open fire as the range was outside extreme, but at about 1625 PERTH
opened fire on the right-hand destroyers (the destroyers appeared to be
moving in preparatory to attack). The second salvo hit, but immediately
this destroyer and the others made smoke and retired behind a very
effective screen with the cruisers. Several " follow up " salvos were
fired into the smoke.

5. DE RUYTER now led round to starboard. Enemy
long range fire was
extremely accurate, mostly pitching very close short or over. The
spread was incredibly small, never more than 150 yards for elevation
and much less for line. They were ten-gun salvos with extremely small
splashes. Enemy aircraft were overhead the whole time, no doubt
spotting.

6. At 1635 DE RUYTER led towards the enemy on
course 267°.
About this
time the rear enemy cruiser was evidently hit in the boiler room as she
emitted very large clouds of black smoke for some time, but continued
firing. As the smoke cleared one enemy destroyer was seen to be on
fire, and PERTH now came under a very accurate fire from the rear
cruiser for a long period. The other cruiser was firing straight at
EXETER and HOUSTON. PERTH was straddled several times and the salvos
rarely fell less than one cable over or short. Every effort was made in
handling the ship to estimate the correction the enemy would use.

7. The rear enemy cruiser was now on fire. PERTH
was still out of
range
of enemy cruisers and I found a long period of being " Aunt Sally "
very trying without being able to return the fire. (Range was still
over 26,000 yards.) The Dutch cruisers all this while were firing
occasionally. At 1700, enemy cruisers checked fire. At 1702, the
leading enemy cruiser appeared to be hit aft but both cruisers opened
fire again. At 1707 the enemy destroyers delivered a long range torpedo
attack and Allied cruisers had to turn away to let torpedoes comb the
line. Allied cruisers ceased fire. Enemy still firing but shots falling
short. At 1714 EXETER stopped and reported hit in boiler room. She
shortly proceeded at 15 knots and I closed her and screened her with
funnel smoke and all available smoke floats. While doing this the
Admiral made " All ships follow me " but I continued to smoke screen
EXETER and reported her damage to the Admiral who told me by
V/S*
to follow him, when I proceeded to do so.

8. At 1715 an Allied destroyer (I think ELECTRA)
suddenly blew up
close ahead of me,† having, I think, been struck in the engine
room by a torpedo. She capsized and

Admiralty footnotes:—* V/S—visual signal† The destroyer in question was the Dutch KORTENAER.

--3939--

dived under in a few seconds, then broke in halves, the two ends
floating for some time. At 1718 PERTH'S pom-poms opened fire at a
reported periscope. By 1721 some of our destroyers were screening
EXETER with smoke: and others apparently attacking through the smoke.
EXETER was steering 130° having been ordered to Sourabaya and PERTH
trying to drive off spotting aircraft.

9. At 1725 Allied cruisers were led by the
Admiral between EXETER
and
the enemy, presumably to draw their 'fire. Anyway, it did this and gave
EXETER a breathing space and a chance to get out of the area. At 1729,
DE RUYTER led away to the Southward; enemy cruisers were still firing
very accurately. At 1745, Allied cruisers were again in single hit 3 ahead
(except EXETER) and emerged from the smoke screen on opposite course to
the enemy 8 in. cruisers. (Enemy in sight were; now the three cruisers
and only five destroyers.) Whilst passing behind the smoke screen after
circling EXETER, I was under a very accurate 8 in. fire continuously,
although obviously the enemy could not see me. It was presumably radar
control. At 1750 EXETER fired one salvo. At 1752 the enemy destroyers
once more moved into attack and PERTH was firing, on destroyers as they
came into view in gaps, in the smoke screen; the destroyers also
peppered me for some-minutes. At 1810 no Allied cruisers were firing,
but there were several destroyer duels going on.

10. At 1812 our destroyers retired, and I found
myself on opposite
course to the two 8 in. cruisers at a range of 21,000 yards and engaged
the right-hand ship. After getting in for line, the target was found
and several rapid salvos got in on the target, two of which hit, and
one of which caused a very big explosion aft in the target with volumes
of bright lava-like emissions and a pink smoke. Both enemy cruisers
then retired behind this smoke and a funnel smoke screen. When the
smoke cleared away our target appeared to be stopped, the bow rose in
the air and then seemed to settle back. We then lost sight of her,
whether because she sank or whether the light failed I do not know.

11. During this engagement, HOUSTON was engaged
with the left-hand
cruiser, JAVA and DE RUYTER were both firing at something. HOUSTON
reported to me that she had very little 8 in. ammunition left and I
informed the Admiral. By 1830 no enemy were in sight and DE. RUYTER led
our forces off to the Northeast, and subsequently (presumably) as
requisite to try and work round the enemy escort and get at the convoy.
Speed 22 knots.

12. At 1927 I sighted four ships on the port
beam and reported
them.
The range was about 9,000 yards, and about the same time, what I
thought was a star shell but which was an aircraft flare, burst on our
disengaged side and I opened fire at 1933 with main armament first,
then tried star shell, but these fell short. HOUSTON also opened fire;
I saw a row of explosions in one ship, but thinking these might be
torpedo fire, I turned away, and all ships followed motions. JUPITER
(on the port bow) moved in probably to counter-attack but there was no
gunfire.

13. Cruisers then formed up again in line ahead
and were led on
various
courses by DE RUYTER to intercept. We seemed to drop a couple of
destroyers in this last move. The search went on without event (except
that we appeared to get into very shallow water). About 2100, whilst
still in shallow water, one of the American destroyers blew up with a
tremendous explosion and sank. At 2150, another aircraft flare appeared
overhead and shortly afterwards a line of about 6 brilliant calcium
flares in the water straddled our line at right angles. This happened
every time we steered a new course and it was soon obvious that our
every move in the moonlight was-being reported, not only by W/T but
also by this excellent visual means. The enemy's dispositions of his
forces must have been ridiculously easy. At 2217, we passed through a
very large number of survivors. They did not seem to be English, but
may have been either Japanese or Dutch. I do not yet know if any Dutch
ships were sunk.

14. At 2230, I sighted two cruisers on the port
beam. HOUSTON
reported
them at the same moment. They were a long way off but one of them fired
a salvo shortly after I sighted. I immediately opened a heavy fire on
him and both cruisers opened up on us. This fire was extremely accurate
again but very slow. Two of my salvos at least, and possibly three,
struck home (we were spotting by moonlight). The same ship opened up
with a stream of star shell and obliterated the target as they fell
short. One enemy shell hit DE RUYTER on the quarterdeck, DE RUYTER
turned 90° away and I followed as I thought he may have seen
torpedoes.
Whilst the line was halfway round this turn, the whole of JAVA's after
part blew up and she stopped heavily on fire. She was not under gunfire
at that time, so the explosion may have been due to a wandering fire or
a torpedo. I suspect we were led over a submarine for almost at the
same moment, although she had completed her 90° turn, DE RUYTER
blew up
with an appalling explosion and settled aft heavily on fire. I just
managed to miss her by the use of full helm and one engine stopped.
HOUSTON headed out to starboard. By now the American destroyers had
been detached to Batavia to refuel, and all other destroyers had
disappeared, possibly due to the frequent 90° turns done by DE
RUYTER.
The Admiral's verbal instructions had been that any ship disabled must
be left " to the mercy of the enemy," to use his own words. I left DE
RUYTER and JAVA, took HOUSTON under my orders, made a feint to the
Southeast then turned direct to Batavia at high speed.

15. I had now under my orders one undamaged 6
in. cruiser, one 8
in.
cruiser with very little ammunition and no guns aft. I had no
destroyers. The force was subjected throughout the day and night
operations to the most superbly organised air reconnaissance. I was
opposed by six cruisers, one of them possibly sunk, and twelve
destroyers. By means of their air reconnaissance they had already
played cat and mouse with the main striking force and I saw no prospect
of getting at the enemy (their movements had not reached me since dark,
and even then the several reports at the same time all gave different
courses).

--3940--

16. It was fairly certain that the enemy had at
least one
submarine
operating directly with him, and he had ample destroyers to interpose
between the convoy and my approach well advertised as I knew it would
be. I had therefore no hesitation in withdrawing what remained of the
striking force and ordering them to the pre-arranged rendezvous after
night action — Tanjong Priok.

No attempt is made in this narrative to plot the
course of action. It
is assumed that better details have been forwarded by the cruiser
force. Any courses, speeds or times are approximate as my action
station was O.O.Q.* on the torpedo tubes.

2. At about 1520, Striking Force received an
enemy report that two
cruisers and five destroyers were 20 miles West of Bawean Island.
Striking Force was then inside Sourabaya swept channel, but turned
Northwards. ELECTRA took station 4 miles ahead of cruisers with JUPITER
and ENCOUNTER on port and starboard beam, 5 miles.

3. About 1600 enemy was sighted ahead on the
starboard bow and action
was joined. ELECTRA appeared to be acting' as flank marking ship, and
was engaged by the enemy force at once; I assume that enemy destroyers
only were firing at us at a range of 14,000 yards. The first and second
salvos were straddles, arid correct for line, falling roughly in line
with the tubes. No hits were obtained however. Enemy then turned
90° to
starboard and we turned on parallel course. Salvos continued to fall
close, but missing astern, short and over. This was undoubtedly due to
the magnificent handling of the ship by the Captain; Commander C. W.
May, R.N. About 1640 the enemy turned away to the North and the Allied
force gave chase. This left the destroyers out of range for a while but
the cruisers carried on the action.

4. About 1700, we appeared to run into a superior
force and the Allied
force turned 180° to the Southward. From my position, the enemy
appeared to have at least two heavy cruisers or battleships, and
several cruisers or destroyers. This is only a personal estimate, and
it is realised that from deck level, with all the smoke and confusion
of battle, that this estimate may well be inaccurate.

5. About 1715, EXETER was hit., She appeared to
maintain speed but was having trouble with steering. Destroyers then
made smoke.

6. At 1730, ELECTRA was ordered to
counter-attack. Smoke was very thick
and visibility in a very large area was reduced to about half a mile,
although it is probable that the bridge personnel could see over the
smoke.

7. As we cleared the smoke, an enemy unit
consisting of three heavy destroyers was sighted on opposite courses
going into the smoke. Range about 6,000 yards. We immediately engaged
and claimed hits from four salvoes on the leading ship. ELECTRA did not
fire torpedoes. Conditions seemed fairly favourable from the tubes, but
as we were still in communication with the bridge, I thought we were
going for bigger game.

8. As the enemy unit disappeared into the smoke,
a lucky shell hit us
in number 2 boiler room, port side. This shattered the boiler and
carried away telemotor pipes from the steering gear. Steam dropped and
in spite of the efforts of the engine room staff, steam was lost. This
was in a large measure due to the fact that water ran from No. 3 boiler
to the damaged one. ELECTRA then stopped, with a slight list to port,
and the order was given " Prepare to abandon ship."

9 Shortly after, a single enemy heavy destroyer
emerged from .the
smoke. We engaged immediately, the guns firing in local control, as all
communication with the bridge was dead. A single fast destroyer is a
pretty poor target from a stopped ship, but it was worth a chance. The
enemy commenced hitting with the second salvo, silencing our guns one
by one and causing heavy fires forward and an increased list to port.
With only Y gun left firing, the order was given " Abandon ship." The
injured men were put in the first whaler, the only boat left whole. The
whaler had about 25 men on board when it left the ship. Nos. 4 and 5
Carley-floats were got away and I saw another broken float drift by.

10. Everybody appeared to have left the ship
that could do so, except
Leading Steward Gretton who came to ask what we should do with two
wounded on the quarterdeck. With Gretton's aid, I put them into the
water, one with a Kisbie lifebuoy, and the other with a grating. Both
appeared to be making for a Carley-float.

11. The enemy was still firing, having closed so
that he could use his
pom-poms. About this time, a shell fell among the men in the water. I
then went round with Gretton, throwing floatable things in the water
amongst them, two ammunition boxes, smoke floats and a T.S.D.S. float.

12. The ship then sighed, listed heavily to port
and clown by the bows.
There were no live men left in the after part of the ship, so I took
Gretton and left.

13. Once clear of the ship, I saw someone,
presumably the Captain, come
to the starboard side of the bridge and wave to the men in the water
who cheered lustily. The Captain then appeared to leave by the port
side.

14. The ELECTRA then settled more sleepily,
turned over and slowly sank
until her screws and about six feet of the quarterdeck were showing.

15. She remained in this position for some time
before finally sinking slowly out of sight, about 1800.

16. In the nature of things, casualties on board
were very high. The
ELECTRA and her ship's company stood up to the punishment in the best
traditional manner. She was a grand ship, and I am proud to have served
in her with such a fine crowd of men.

(Signed) T. J.
CAIN, Gunner (T).

--3941--

The following Despatch was submitted to the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty on the 1st October, 1945, by Captain O.
L. GORDON, M.V.O, R.N.

USS.
GOSPER.
At
sea.
1st October, 1945.

I have the honour to submit the following report
on the circumstances
and actions which occurred between 25th February, 1942, and 1st March,
1942, culminating in the loss of H.M.S. EXETER under my command on the
latter date. More than three and a half years has elapsed since the
events covered by this report took place, but the essential points
were, recorded within three weeks of that time and have been most
carefully preserved throughout my captivity by such devices as
concealment in a large empty shaving cream tube and similar
subterfuges, causing me considerable concern during frequent searches
by the Japanese.

2. Since all records were lost when H.M.S. EXETER
was sunk, detailed
accuracy in such matters as times, courses, etc., cannot be guaranteed
but I am confident that the report gives as accurate a picture as it is
possible to present in such circumstances. All times given are zone —
7.5.

3. In accordance with orders received from the
Commodore Commanding
China Force (C.C.C.F.), EXETER with PERTH, ELECTRA, JUPITER, and
ENCOUNTER in company sailed from Batavia at 1600, 25th February, 1942,
for Sourabaya, with instructions that on arrival this force was to be
under the orders of Rear Admiral Doorman, Eskadier Commandant (E.C.).
The passage was without incident except for the location by radar of a
large formation of enemy aircraft heading for Sourabaya, which
information was passed to Sourabaya by signal.

4. On arrival at the entrance to Sourabaya
minefields at about 1230/26,
destroyers under the orders of ELECTRA were ordered to proceed ahead
and on arrival to pass a fuel requirement signal to E.C. ELECTRA and
EXETER embarked pilots inside the minefields and the latter with PERTH
in company anchored at Sourabaya at about 1600.

5. Instructions were received, for ships to be
ready to sail at 1800,
which prohibited cruiser's from completing with fuel since no oilers
were available and time was insufficient to proceed to oiling berths
inside a basin. Destroyers also experienced difficulty in obtaining
fuel but all eventually fuelled though some were unable to complete to
full stowage.

6. Rear Admiral Doorman had called a meeting of
Commanding Officers for
1700 but no information of this was received until nearly that time
when the British Liaison Officer attached to DE RUYTER arrived OIL
board EXETER. As a result the Commanding Officer of PERTH and myself
were very late in joining this meeting, and only arrived at the risk of
our lives in trie fastest and most dangerous motor car ride through
traffic that we had ever experienced.

7. The instructions at this meeting were
necessarily brief and consisted only in Rear Admiral Doorman's
intentions regarding:—

Order of leaving harbour.

Cruising formation and destroyer screening.

Patrol area and movements to cover this area to best advantage,
based
on meagre information available of a large enemy convoy Southwest of
the Celebes and steering in a South westerly direction.

Method of attack if enemy forces, and in particular an enemy
convoy, were met.

9. This force sailed from Sourabaya at 1906/26.
After clearing the
minefields the force assumed the cruising order previously arranged,
namely, cruisers in single line, British and Dutch destroyers screening
ahead, and U.S. destroyers forming a separate unit astern. Rear Admiral
Doorman's reason for stationing the U.S. destroyers astern was due to
their inferior gun and superior torpedo armament. The cruising order of
the force was in reality designed for a night encounter with an enemy
convoy, when it was the Admiral's intention that cruisers and British
and Dutch destroyers should engage enemy escort forces, at the same
time endeavouring to circle the convoy, while the primary duty of the
U.S. destroyers was to sink the troop ships comprising the convoy.
Course was first set to the Eastward (085 degrees) to intercept any
attempted landing on Madura Island and was reversed at 0100/27 top 270
degrees.

10. The night of 26th/27th passed without
incident, the EXETER being at
the first degree of readiness throughout. Shortly after daylight enemy
reconnaissance aircraft located the force and during the forenoon minor
bombing attacks were experienced, mostly by single aircraft, and
without damage to the Allied force. At about 1030/27, when some 60 odd
miles to the Westward of Sourabaya, course was reversed and the Admiral
signalled his intention, in the absence of further information, of
anchoring inside the minefields off Sourabaya and repeating the
previous patrol that night.

--3942--

11. At about 1415 when the Allied force was
entering the minefields
through the Western channel, the Admiral led round 180 degrees and
signalled that information had been received of an enemy force of two
cruisers and six destroyers some 90 miles to the Northward steering
South at high speed, which force he intended to engage. Later reports
showed that the large enemy convoy previously referred to was remaining
in position some 10 miles West of Bawean Island.

13. At approximately 1610 masts were sighted to
the Northward. These
proved to be two four-funnel Sendai class cruisers, each leading a
flotilla (or division) of six Asashio type destroyers. At'this time
these were the only enemy .ships in sight. Speed was increased until
subsequently the action was fought at about 27 knots.

15. At about 1620 the leading cruiser opened
fire apparently at
ELECTRA, the starboard wing destroyer of our screen. The main armament
reporting that this cruiser was now within gun range, EXETER opened
fire at approximately 27,000 yards, this being outside DE RUYTER's
extreme range. After some 12 salvos from A and B turrets had been
fired, when it appeared that straddle range had been obtained, the
target cruiser turned away under smoke. Fire was then shifted to the
second four-funnel cruiser. It was about this time, or shortly before,
that further masts were sighted to the N.N.E. and some distance in rear
of the cruisers and destroyers previously referred to. These proved to
belong to two cruisers of the Ashigara or Atago classes. The above
mentioned enemy ships, namely, two Ashigara or Atago class cruisers,
two Sendai class cruisers, and 12 Asashio class destroyers composed the
enemy force during daylight on 27th February as far as could be seen
from EXETER, although officers from HOUSTON and PERTH subsequently
stated that six or more enemy cruisers were present.

16. The second four-funnel cruiser engaged
turned away under smoke
after about 10 salvos and was momentarily re-engaged when again seen
clear of her own smoke after having made a turn of some 180 degrees.
The hitting range of this cruiser was quickly found and I am convinced
that hits were obtained, particularly as she was last seen disappearing
in a thick high column of smoke and only one four-funnel cruiser was
seen subsequently.

17. Target was then shifted to the rear (right
hand) of the two 8-inch
cruisers previously referred to. The reason for selection of the rear
and not the leading cruiser was the fact that HOUSTON next astern of
EXETER, was already engaging the leading cruiser and, in view of the
difficulties of signalling together with the time that would be lost
during the change' over, it was considered better to accept the
situation as it was found and engage the right-hand ship although this
meant crossing fire with HOUSTON.

18. At first difficulty was experienced in
identifying our own splashes
until it was realised that HOUSTON was using brown splashes. Fire was
opened at extreme range and the first splashes were not seen. This
together with difficulties already referred to, made it some time
before range was established, in all about 15 salvos. Shortly after
this a hit was observed by myself, other
officers on the bridge and several members of the Director Control
Tower's crew including the Gunnery Officer, in the vicinity of her
lower bridge structure. Almost immediately afterwards she turned away
under smoke.

19. While engaging this cruiser it appeared that
the enemy fire was
concentrated on EXETER who was eventually straddled and sustained
either a hit or a near miss underwater well aft. This had the apparent
effect of lifting the whole ship in a most remarkable manner.
Subsequently some after underwater compartments were found to be
flooded. A few minutes later a shell, passing through S.2 four inch gun
shield, entered B boiler room causing casualties at S.2 mounting and in
this boiler room. The opinion was formed on subsequent examination that
this shell did not detonate but exploded on entering a boiler, since
the baseplate complete and a large portion of the nose were recovered.
(Similar failure of some enemy shells to detonate was experienced by
other Allied ships.) Six out of the eight boilers were put out of-
action with the following main results:—

Deafening escape of steam through the waste steam pipe.

Initial reduction of speed to 11 knots with a subsequent
maximum of 15 to 16 knots.

Temporary failure of the High Power system putting the main
armament out of action.

20. EXETER started to haul out of the line
gradually to port
simultaneously with the development of a torpedo attack by the enemy
destroyers led by the one remaining four-funnel cruiser. The Admiral
now led round to port to an approximately reciprocal course presumably
as an avoiding action. The remaining cruisers of the Allied squadron
turned short and reformed astern of the Admiral. At this point ELECTRA
made a lone and very gallant counter-attack, JUPITER and ENCOUNTER also
engaging enemy destroyers while covering EXETER's turn by smoke. Later
information indicated that ELECTRA was last seen stopped and still in
action with enemy destroyers. It is believed that the attacking
destroyers fired their torpedoes at a range of about 8 to 10,00 yards.
Torpedoes were seen approaching, one exploding in the water and another
hitting and blowing up the Dutch destroyer KORTENAER, whose back was
broken and who remained afloat for some minutes with bow and stern only
showing. It was during this period that EXETER's main armament was
lined up and made ready for action.

21. While the enemy torpedo attack was
developing and after EXETER had
turned “to a Southerly course, the main armament" engaged the
four-funnel cruiser leading the attack, the four-inch armament also
being engaged' with enemy destroyers. This cruiser turned away under
smoke immediately straddle range was

--3943--

found and the results of our fire could not be observed. Shortly
after
this a single enemy destroyer offered a favourable target through the
smoke at 9,000 yards, but fire had to be withheld as" our own
destroyers were in the line of fire.

22. When DE RUYTER passed ahead after reversing
course, the Admiral
enquired by signal as to damage sustained and was informed that, as the
result of a boiler room hit, speed was reduced to a maximum of 15
knots, this reply being repeated to PERTH. The Admiral then ordered
EXETER to proceed to Sourabaya.

23. Shortly after this, when EXETER had dropped
considerably astern, a
single enemy 8-inch cruiser was seen to the Northward and fine on the
port quarter closing EXETER. Fire was at once opened with Y turret and
course altered to open "A" arcs.* The range was about 16,000
yards and after a few salvos the enemy turned away to the Northwards
under smoke.

24. By this time the remainder of the Allied
squadron, which, with the
exception of the KORTENAER, appeared to have suffered little if any
damage, was steering to the Eastward firing intermittently and EXETER
gradually shaped course for Sourabaya. Light was failing and the time
must have been about 1830. When almost dark the Dutch destroyer DE
WITT, then about 5 miles to the Eastward, signalled on shaded lamp that
she would lead EXETER through the Sourabaya minefields. The only other
incident during the return to Sourabaya was the sighting of star shell
some distance away to the Northwest. EXETER anchored in Sourabaya roads
just before midnight and proceeded to a berth alongside at the Naval
Base at 0700/28.

25. The following are general remarks on the
action:—

The total period that EXETER was in action was about two hours,
but a
detailed timetable of events cannot be given since all records were
lost when the ship was sunk on ist March. As a result, this report may
tend to give a misleading conception of the interval between the
various episodes of the action, e.g., between being hit in B 'boiler
room and engaging the four-funnel cruiser leading the torpedo attack,
there was sufficient time to restore the High Power, check main
armament receivers and verify ammunition remaining.

This action demonstrated in a very marked manner the difficulty
of
working with a heterogeneous squadron, composed of ships of different
nationalities, all of whose methods, but in particular those of
signalling and fire distribution, differ from our own and with whom
there had been no opportunity of even the briefest discussion on such
matters.

It was clear that the Dutch cruisers were outranged for most of
the
daylight action and their splashes only made spotting more difficult
for the remainder.

The enemy made use of a number of spotting aircraft; these were
engaged as opportunity presented. It was unfortunate that EXETER's
Walrus aircraft was unserviceable as the result of blast damage
sustained during frequent enemy air attacks.

Admiralty footnote:—* "A" arcs—the arcs on which all guns of a ship's main armament
will bear, thus allowing them to fire simultaneously at the enemy.

During the action an attack was made on the enemy cruisers by
land-based bombers from Sourabaya, and several bomb splashes were
observed. The enemy appeared to be unaffected by this attack. About the
time that the Allied squadron reversed course and when the enemy
torpedo attack had developed, the four American destroyers previously
stationed astern fired torpedoes. It was not clear what was their
target but the majority of these torpedoes were seen to be running on
the surface in the direction of the Japanese destroyers.

26. Enemy air raids were continuous throughout
daylight of 28th
February. The funeral of those killed in action took place with full
naval honours at 1700, every assistance being given by the Dutch Navy,
all local naval authorities being represented.

Some survivors of HOUSTON and PERTH stated that an enemy
cruiser,
believed to have been, under fire from EXETER, was seen to sink stern
first. It is possible that this may have been the cruiser referred to
in para. 16.

While at Macassar P.O.W. Camp the Navigating Officer of the
first
Sendai class cruiser engaged by EXETER visited the camp. He was
friendly and spoke good English. In the course of conversation he
stated that while his ship had not .been hit, EXETER's splashes had
been so close that water from them fell on the bridge. When asked what
happened to the second 6-inch cruiser he did not reply and quickly
changed the subject.

8-inch cruisers.

As stated in para. 18 this cruiser was seen to have
been hit and only
one 8-inch cruiser was sighted from EXETER during the remainder of the
day action.

After return to Sourabaya information was received that
aircraft had reported a Japanese 8-inch cruiser on fire.

Other reports.

According to surviving officers of HOUSTON and PERTH hits were
obtained
by HOUSTON on the leading enemy 8-inch cruiser, and an enemy destroyer
was sunk during the torpedo attack.

28. EXETER sailed from Sourabaya at 1900, 28th
February, 1942, in
compliance with a signal received from C.C.C.F., which directed EXETER,
ENCOUNTER and POPE to sail at dark proceeding as follows:—

20 miles to the Eastward from Sourabaya
Northern entrance, thence
Northward to pass Eastward of Bawean Island, thence Northwestward and
Westward and through Sunda Strait to Colombo.

29. The Netherlands destroyer DE WITT was also
directed at the last
minute to accompany me. When I sailed it was understood that she would
follow at about 2100 joining me shortly after midnight. Anticipated
courses and speeds were accordingly given to the Navigating

--3944--

Officer of DE WITT, but she did not join and no information was
received as to whether or not she ever left Sourabaya.

30. By 1500/28 from examination it appeared
probable that two boilers
in B boiler room could be got ready for steaming by about 2300/28, but
that satisfactory performance of these boilers would be dependent on
power trial at sea. Rear Admiral Palliser*
was informed accordingly by telephone from Dutch Naval Headquarters.
With two boilers EXETER's maximum speed was 15 to 16 knots; with four
boilers it was hoped to obtain 24 knots, but 23 knots was the maximum
that could be maintained subsequently.

31. The first part of the night 28th
February/1st March' passed without
incident. Weather conditions were as follows:—wind E.N.E., force 2, sea
20, cloud two tenths, full moon. After clearing Sourabaya minefields
the destroyers were ordered tn take up screening diagram Number 2A and
shortly before midnight steam was available in the two additional
boilers. Speed was increased by steps to 23 knots, the maximum capacity
of the four boilers. It may be well to remark here that all four
serviceable boilers were on the starboard side, two in each boiler
room. No unit system was possible and all four boilers had therefore to
be cross connected. Course was altered to ooo degrees at midnight to
pass some 25 miles East of Bawean Island and at 0200 to 345 degrees.

32. It had been intended to alter course to 290
degrees at 0400, but
shortly before this, three ships, two large and one smaller, were
sighted to the Westward in the light of the setting moon, distant about
10 miles, steering to the S.S.W., to pass Westward of Bawean Island.
These appeared to be two merchant ships escorted by a cruiser or
destroyer. From my orders and routeing I had no doubt in my mind that
my object was evasion in this attempt to clear the Java Sea, and
accordingly I turned away stern on to avoid being sighted, then worked
round to the Northward and resumed course 345 degrees at about 0430.
Subsequently course was altered to 290 degrees at 0600 and 280 degrees
at 0700. No enemy air or surface forces were sighted at daylight and
visibility was extreme.

33. At about 0750 the crow's nest lookout
reported the masts of two
ships nearly right ahead. These were identified as the topmasts of
warships, cruisers or larger, steering to the N.N.E. Course was
immediately reversed and it was thought possible that, with the
advantage of light, EXETER had not been sighted. This hope was short
lived as the enemy ships were seen to turn towards though still well
hull down. An enemy report was therefore made and repeated but no
acknowledgment was received. This turn towards by the enemy cruisers
was brief and may' possibly have been for the purpose of flying off
aircraft, as they resumed their Northerly course and were soon out of
sight. EXETER worked gradually to the Southward and Westward through
East finally steering 260 degrees. In spite of failure to receive
acknowledgment of the enemy report I decided against further
repetition, since avoidance of disclosure of movements by D/F*seemed
of greater importance than any possible advantage to be gained by
continuing to make this report. For some time it appeared that evasion
had been achieved since no enemy forces were sighted, although it was
subsequently stated by the Japanese that their cruisers, as these ships
proved to .be, had flown off reconnaissance aircraft. There was however
no indication of this on the radar screen nor was any aircraft sighted
until action was subsequently joined.

34. It was not until about 0935 that the
topmasts of 'two large
cruisers were sighted bearing about 170 degrees steering to the
Westward. Course was immediately altered to 320 degrees with a view to
possible evasion, but these cruisers also were seen to turn towards.
Very shortly after this an enemy ship, at first thought to be a 6-inch
gun cruiser, was sighted ahead steering directly towards. This ship
proved to be a large destroyer. It was engaged by EXETER and destroyers
at ranges between 20,000 and 14,000 yards, but on being engaged turned
away to the Westward under smoke. Almost simultaneously two more large
cruisers were sighted bearing approximately 330 degrees and these at
once turned towards. All four cruisers proved to be ten-gun 8-inch
cruisers of the Ashigara or Atago classes and one is believed to have
been the flagship ASHIGARA. Course was immediately altered to the
Eastward (090 degrees), destroyers conforming.

35. EXETER's speed at this time was 23 knots on
four out of the eight
boilers, but shortly afterwards the Engineer Officer reported that he
believed that steam could be raised in one more boiler in B boiler
-room, and this boiler could be connected in about an hour. Orders were
given for this to be done and the extra boiler was connected in less
than that time. From then (about 1055) a speed of 25 knots was
maintained and before the end the ship was steaming at 26 knots. This
and the repair work after the action on 27th February reflects much
credit on the Engine Room Department.

36. The enemy cruisers to' the Northwest were
the first to open fire at
long range, their fire being immediately, returned by EXETER. It was
most unfortunate that at the start of this action the fire control
table was damaged and put out of action by a failure in the enemy
travel drive. Until this damage was realised salvos fell appreciably
out for line and during the remainder of the action a clock and
Dumaresq had to be used while repairs were attempted.

37. An enemy report was made when it was seen
that evasion was no
longer possible and two other reports were made subsequently during the
action.

38. The ensuing action is difficult to describe
in detail with no
records available. The general trend of the action was Easterly with
course varying between about 070 -degrees and no degrees as alterations
were made to avoid straddling or to open " A " arcs. The enemy cruisers

were disposed -in pairs, one pair approximately abeam to starboard
and
the other on the port quarter. They closed gradually to a range of
about 18,000 yards and then appeared to maintain this distance. Later
live destroyers (Asashio class), which had not been in sight when
action was joined, appeared from the Southwest and drew ahead, passing
on the starboard beam at a range of about 14,000 yards shortly before
EXETER was hit in A boiler room.

39. About the time that the enemy cruisers found
the range, POPE made
smoke without receiving an order to do so. ENCOUNTER followed suit and,
conditions for smoke being good, the resulting smoke screens were
decidedly effective. Firing on both sides was necessarily intermittent,
targets being engaged by EXETER whenever seen clear of smoke, and it
was seldom that it was possible to spot on more than four to five
salvos.

40. A review of the situation at about 1100 was
not encouraging. It was
known that no support from surface forces could be expected, and it was
believed that the Allied air forces would be fully employed against the
Japanese invaders. EXETER's maximum speed was 25 knots with about 20
per cent, of main armament ammunition remaining.
ENCOUNTER had fired all torpedoes in the action on 27th February.
Consideration was given to a reversal of course, but no advantage could
be seen, while such action would have given the enemy cruisers and
destroyers a very decided position of torpedo advantage. I considered
that the best policy was to continue to the Eastward and to conserve
ammunition by continuing to engage the enemy on either side when clear
of smoke in the hope of inducing the odds by crippling one or more of
the enemy cruisers. About this time two slight rain squalls to the
Eastward gave rise to the hope that others of greater intensity might
be met and used to advantage. This was not the case, but POPE did make
use of rain squalls later, after EXETER and ENCOUNTER had been sunk,'
in her endeavour to work round to the North and West.

41. The action continued much as previously
described. Neither EXETER
nor destroyers had yet been hit but now, despite the use of smoke (from
funnel and smoke floats), salvos were falling close and snaking was
necessary to avoid being hit. At one time it was seen that a number of
EXETER's salvos straddled the leading enemy cruiser on the starboard
beam, but with smoke interference it was impossible to say if hits were
obtained. A torpedo target at long range was presented by the two enemy
cruisers on the port quarter at about 1100. As the enemy were making no
attempt to close the range and so provide a better target, the port
tubes were fired. No hits were obtained, the target ships taking
avoiding action by alteration of course.

42. The five enemy destroyers were by this time
nearly abeam to
starboard and just within effective range of EXETER's four-inch
armament, which .engaged them, as did the 8-inch armament when other
targets were obscured by smoke." ENCOUNTER arid POPE engaged the two
leading destroyers. EXETER engaged the third destroyer which was hit
and dropped out of line.

43. Throughout the action the enemy had spotting
aircraft up consisting
of single float seaplanes and one large type monoplane was also seen.
These were engaged by EXETER's A.A. armament as opportunity offered.

44. It was at about 1120 that EXETER received a
vital hit in A boiler
room which started a large fire necessitating immediate and complete
evacuation of this boiler room. Steam pressure dropped rapidly to 170
Ibs./sq. in. and then more slowly until the main engines had to be
stopped. All power in the ship failed shortly afterwards, and with it
the whole of the main armament and also the secondary armament control.

45. It was at this time, as EXETER was losing
way and ENCOUNTER and
POPE drew ahead, that the enemy fire became really effective. EXETER
was being repeatedly straddled and hit. To sum up, the situation was as
follows:—

Main engines stopped and all power in-the ship failed or
failing (one dynamo was kept running until steam also failed to this).

Main armament and control out of action.

Secondary armament control out of action.

"A" boiler room on fire, with the after bulkhead of the
four-inch
magazine situated four feet from this boiler room necessitating the
flooding of this magazine.

Port torpedo tubes fired and no target available for starboard
tubes.

Fire had broken out in the officers' quarters aft.

Enemy cruisers straddling and hitting from long range and enemy
destroyers drawing ahead and now barely within secondary armament range.

46. There was now no possibility of saving the
ship, and to ensure that
she should not fall into the hands of the enemy the order was given to
sink the ship and a few minutes later (estimated at about 1135), to
abandon ship. This was carried out in an orderly manner but, with the
failure of power, no boom boats could be got out. All rafts,
float-a-nets and available woodwork were thrown overboard and good use
was subsequently made of these. As a result of her final speed of 26
knots the ship still had slight headway when abandoned and without
doubt this was instrumental in reducing casualties, since the water
around the ship was alive with splashes from the enemy gunfire. The
ship was evidently leaking oil fuel considerably, which, with a slight
lop, made conditions in the water decidedly unpleasant at first.

47. About the time that abandoning was
completed, the ship, which had'
already settled appreciably with a list to port, heeled further to port
to a considerable angle. Some ten minutes later a very heavy explosion
was observed starboard side amidships, the column of water from this
explosion being (higher (than the masts. This is believed to have been
the result of a torpedo hit, probably fired by an enemy destroyer. The
ship quickly righted, rolled over to starboard and sank at about 1150
in some 30 fathoms in very approximate position 64 degrees 38 minutes
South, 112 degrees 28 minutes East.

--3946--

48. When EXETER was hit and started to Jose way
ENCOUNTER and POPE drew
rapidly ahead, still engaging the enemy destroyers. They had ceased
making smoke and when last seen were a considerable distance ahead. No
report from the , Commanding Officer of U.S.S. POPE is available, but
in conversation with him I understood that 'his ship was chased by the
enemy cruisers but drew away from them taking advantage of rain
squalls. He endeavoured to work round to the North and West until
repeatedly attacked by high level and dive bombers, which latter
eventually succeeded in putting the ship out of action, necessitating
her abandonment at about 1330.

49. Throughout this final action both ENCOUNTER
and POPE were well
handled and well fought. Their effective smoke laying was undoubtedly
of great value.

50. Some 400 survivors of EXETER were picked up
after about one hour in
the water by two Japanese destroyers, which then left the scene of the
action on an Easterly course The remaining survivors were indeed
fortunate to be picked up after about 24 hours in the water by a
Japanese destroyer working in company with a cruiser or cruisers, the
majority of survivors being subsequently transferred to the Dutch
hospital ship OP-TEN-NOORT, then in Japanese hands. Three days later
this ship proceeded to Macassar where all prisoners on board her were
transferred on loth March to the Dutch military barracks which had been
turned into a P.O.W. camp.

51. General
Remarks.

No signals were intercepted from PERTH or HOUSTON to indicate
the
presence of Japanese surface forces in the vicinity of Sunda Strait,
nor was any information concerning enemy forces received after sailing
from Sourabaya p.m. 28th February.

As stated in para. 33 no acknowledgment was obtained of the
enemy
report made and repeated about 0800/1. The following extract from a
note written after release from Japan by the C.P.O. Telegraphist in
charge of EXETER's W/T Department, may throw some light on the
difficulties of enemy reporting in this area at this time.
“Four messages were transmitted, after being coded, by the P.O.
Telegraphist in the Remote Control Office on the wave frequency used by
ship to shore, H.M.S. ANKING and an Australian station (name uncertain
but may have been Port Moresby, I cannot recall). No receipt was
received from the above station who was calling H.M.S. ANKING, the W/T
guardship at Batavia, who had proceeded to sea thus taking away the
link with Batavia. Remote Control Office reported " No receipt " so the
last two messages were also broadcast on the Indian Ocean station wave
on the " I " method wave frequency used by Colombo, Bombay and Aden. We
abandoned ship immediately after their transmission but it is almost
certain tihat they were received by one of the three stations."

52. Results
of action.

Destroyer mentioned in para. 34.—The Gunnery Officer of U.S.S.
POPE,
which was stationed on the starboard bow of EXETER, informed me that on
board POPE they felt certain that this enemy destroyer was hit. This
was not seen in EXETER as the destroyer was enveloped in smoke but POPE
was in a better position to see after the enemy's turn away under smoke.

Destroyer mentioned in para. 42.—The hit on this destroyer was
made by
EXETER's main armament. Her ultimate fate was not seen because of
smoke, but a Japanese officer subsequently stated that this destroyer's
stern was iblown off killing 70 men.

Damage to enemy aircraft—From a statement by a Japanese officer
on
board one of the cruisers to which survivors were initially
transferred, EXETER's A.A. armament shot down one aircraft and damaged
another. The latter with tail damage was shown to the Director Gunner
of EXETER.

It is understood that both ENCOUNTER and POPE claimed hits on the
enemy
destroyers but no doubt these will be made in their separate reports.

(Signed) O. L. GORDON,Captain,
R.N.

--3947--

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