New model paramilitary needed to fight Naxals

The Dantewada massacre and the subsequent Maoist violence in the naxal affected areas have generated enough anger and heat besides media hype. Everyone seems to want an instant solution to the problem. A situation that has been created by deliberate negligence over a period of two decades cannot

The Dantewada massacre and the subsequent Maoist violence in the naxal affected areas have generated enough anger and heat besides media hype. Everyone seems to want an instant solution to the problem. A situation that has been created by deliberate negligence over a period of two decades cannot be corrected by the press of a switch. Given the present capabilities of the security forces involved, this problem will take at least five years to bring under control. Time and patience, besides casualties on both sides and collateral damage will have to be expected and accepted.

If one goes by the findings of the Rammohan Committee report being circulated by the media, the shortcomings from the botched up operations at Dantewada can be summed up in broad terms as lack of leadership, training, motivation and poor command and control. This was expected.

These shortcomings need to be corrected by calculated professional measures rather than by speculative high sounding declarations meant for public consumption, or to blunt Opposition criticism. We also need to lay down our priorities while attempting to perk up the fighting capabilities of the forces.

ProfessionalismA report in one of the newspapers indicates that the Home Ministry may be demanding the Cabinet Committee on Security to bifurcate CRPF to carve out a specialised anti- Naxal force. The Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh too is demanding a similar force. We have created umpteen numbers of commando forces with fancy names. Have they made any difference? How will splitting CRPF improve the Naxal situation at this juncture? We need to address the basic shortcomings of the forces and this will take time. Similarly, one report indicates that some of the personnel are undergoing slithering training with the NSG. Will this help these forces when they do not even have the basic soldiering capabilities? The Government has created an alphabet soup of forces, BSF, CRPF, ITBP, CISF, Assam Rifles, IB, RAW, SIB, RPF, GPF, various Armed Police units without any clarity on their roles or employment. Now we want to split these forces. There is a limit to the unprofessional approach to handling security forces.

The training, leadership or equipping of these forces has not been the concern of the creators. Empire building alone seems to have been the criteria in creating these forces. The result is that we have a number of forces floating in the country incapable of fulfilling their role. How then can one explain the situation when it is said the CRPF is used to static deployment and hence not capable of being employed against Maoists in a guerilla war? We have thus ended up using the BSF in the Kashmir valley, Special Rangers Group of the NSG and ITBP in VIP security duties.

Instances of such misuse of forces are numerous. Security forces cannot be treated as employment generating projects.

Dispatching a large body of troops to the troubled location by itself cannot be the solution to a developing situation.

The bureaucracy which employs the security forces on behalf of the Government has no clue on either the type of forces to be employed or the quantum of forces needed to meet the requirement. The quantum of force, equipment and special troops needed for an operation are linked to the task, adversary and the terrain. This requires on ground operational and training experience. Bureaucrats with hardly any practical experience cannot do justice to this part of the planning process. The demands for security forces thus come in from the states in terms of hundreds of companies of Central Police Forces and no one is wiser on the subject. In the bargain, troops are shunted around for no fault of theirs. Seventy eight soldiers going out on an area domination exercise is also a part of the same problem.

PrioritiesWhat are our immediate priorities and where do we go from here in dealing with the Naxal problem? IPS officers however good they may be, are unsuitable to lead men in combat situations. To tide over the present situation, Army officers could be employed to lead these forces but after five years, cadre officers must take over these posts. Officers should be located with the troops and physically lead men in combat and not work through remote control.

Potential instructors should be trained by the Army as unit instructors in Jungle Warfare and platoon tactics. Training assorted groups of personnel in army schools will serve no purpose. These trainers can then train their own sub units along with the officers and not individuals.

Training should include physical toughening up and building mental robustness by exposure to difficult conditions.

The troops who have had a soft approach all these days may not like it but it will have to be gone through.

CRPF should function as a battalion under its own commanding officer who should be made accountable for the training, discipline, operations and administration of his unit. The State Police Chiefs need to specify the task to the concerned DIG/ IG and it should be left to them in consultation with the commanding officers of the unit to plan and execute it. The area domination exercise carried out at Dantewada, vaguely described in the newspapers, gives one the impression that the top brass is not clear as to what area domination implies. One wonders as to what was aimed to be achieved by sending troops to walk through the jungle at night.

ForceThe CRPF needs to follow the chain of command strictly. This will bring about the much needed involvement and accountability.

CRPF battalions should remain concentrated and operate from these bases to mount operations. This arrangement will ensure security of the camp, weapons, easy maintenance and supervision besides better command and control. Operational boundaries should be drawn to avoid clash within the security forces.

Logistics is an important aspect of managing operations. Leave for personnel needs to be planned to ensure full leave to all personnel. Supplies should be delivered at battalion locations if need be by helicopters.

Water sources should be identified and arrangements for the purification of drinking water made. Built up accommodation or proper tents including latrines should be made available for living accommodation.

Electricity, TV and mobile connections are a necessity. A dedicated medical officer should be positioned with each battalion with proper plan for evacuation of casualties including by helicopters if necessary.

All roads and tracks including the peripheries should be searched for IEDs and neutralised. Rest needs to be organised within the unit.

The aim of military action will be limited to reducing the level of violence to an accepted level so as to facilitate development work and political action to resolve the problem. Development holds the key to the success of the entire mission. Developmental work needs to be planned under a time bound programme and executed resolutely without any slippage or siphoning off of the money.

The writer, a retired brigadier, is a veteran of the 1971 Indo- Pak war and a specialist in counter- terrorism

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