Alexander Wooten

Kwame Nkrumah was one of the more salient figures of the
post-war anti‑colonial movement in Africa. His contribution to the material
and non‑material development of the African continent and its people went
far beyond the narrow boundaries of his own country. As the first Prime Minister
and President of the West Africa state of Ghana, one of the first African states
to struggle for and achieve political independence from European colonial domination,
Nkrumah became the symbol of freedom and unity in Africa. The emancipation,
unification and development of Africa and its scattered, oppressed people was
the all‑consuming passion of Nkrumah's political, intellectual and personal
life. Nkrumah tirelessly worked for Africa and its principled advancement. In
reaction to his understanding of the social and material conditions of Africa
during his time, Nkrumah developed and espoused certain ideas and theories that
he thought would accelerate the full development of his homeland.

After his development and avid
espousal of revolutionary Pan‑Africanism and his brilliant discovery and
analysis of neo‑colonialism, Nkrumah is also well-known for his theoretical
treatise, Consciencism. To Nkrumah himself "philosophical consciencism
. . . is . . . the map in intellectual terms of the disposition of forces which
will enable African society to digest the Western and Islamic, and the Euro‑Christian
elements in Africa, and develop them in such a way that they fit into the African
personality (Nkrumah, p. 79). On the point of personality, he holds that "the
African personality is itself defined by the cluster of humanist principles
which underlie the traditional African society" (Nkrumah, p. 79). The Hon.
T. Benson, former Information Minister of Nigeria, stated in a speech printed
in the theoretical organ of the ruling political party (the Convention Peoples'
Party) of Ghana, during the Nkrumah era, that he viewed consciencism as Africanism.
He went further to say that consciencism reflects a philosophy which is African
in content. The basis for this philosophy, he continues, is the need to unite
Africa through an ideology which is essentially African (Benson, p. 6).

49

At the time of the development
of consciencism, the African continent had evolved into a land of three dominant
identities: the traditional indigenous identity, and two others which were imposed
from without—the Islamic and Euro‑Christian. Nkrumah's philosophical consciencism
was seen by many as the answer to the problem of the three Africas by way of
philosophical synthesis. A speech given by the Ghanaian High Commissioner articulates
this view by stating, "Out of the three Africas must be forged a new Africa
which is a philosophic unity distilled out of the best features of the existing
three Africas" (Benson, p. 6). He further states, "The philosophical
synthesis that consciencism represents is attained through a dialectical growth
out of the three strands in contemporary African life" (Benson, p. 6).

Apart from the astute observations
Nkrumah has made with regard to the modern reality of Africa's identity and
influences, he creates a particular theoretical‑philosophical inconsistency
in his theory by attempting to juxtapose and synthesize two fundamentally opposed
philosophical schools. In consciencism, Nkrumah's affirmation of the fundamental
philosophical materialistic character of his "philosophical consciencism"
and his subsequent declaration of the essentially non‑atheistic nature
of the same philosophy is, in the final analysis, an attempt to reconcile the
two theoretically polarized schools of philosophy, idealism and materialism.
In his book, Monism and Pluralism in Ideology and in Politics, Assen
Kozharov comments on the natural and historic struggle of the two opposing world
views. He states ". . .the history of philosophic thought in its profound
essence has been above all, a history of the struggle between the two fundamental
philosophical trends—materialism and idealism". (Kozharov, p. 59). George
Novack, author of a volume on the origin and history of the materialist school,
adds further clarity to this same point. He propounds ". . . materialism
and idealism . . . do not exhaust the field of philosophy but they dominate
it". They reciprocally determine not only the main course of their development
but the real positions of the schools oscillating between them. "They provide
the guiding lines which enable us to make our way surely through the maze of
philosophical opinions and controversy and not get lost" (Novack, p. 8).

From a position of affirmed
materialism, Nkrumah argues and seeks to reconcile these two opposing world
views. As a materialist, Nkrumah accepts the primacy of matter. He

50

states, "the . . . assertions
. . . I put forward as philosophical consciencism are . . . two‑fold.
First , there is the assertion of the absolute and independent existence of
matter; second, there is the assertion of the capacity of matter for spontaneous
self‑motion. To the extent of these two initial assertions, philosophical
consciencism is deeply materialistic" (Nkrumah, p. 84). He further holds
of consciencism that "its basis is materialism. The minimum assertion of
materialism is the absolute and independent existence of matter" (Nkrumah,
p. 79). Even earlier in this work, Nkrumah not only declares again and again
his faith in the materialist world view, but he also demonstrates his disdain
for idealism as a tool to understand reality: natural or societal. He writes,
"idealism favored a class structure of a horizontal sort, in which one
class sat upon the neck of another; . . . materialism, on the other hand, was
connected with a humanist organization through its being monistic and its referring
all natural processes to matter and its laws, it inspired an egalitarian organization
of society. The unity and fundamental identity of nature suggests the unity
and fundamental identity of man is society. Idealism favors an oligarchy; materialism
favors an egalitarianism" (Nkrumah, p. 75). He also declares, "by
reason of the connection of idealism with an oligarchy and of materialism with
an egalitarianism, the opposition of idealism and materialism in the same society
is paralled by the opposition of conservative and progressive forces on a social
level" (Nkrumah, p. 75). And further, Nkrumah's most explicit affirmation
of his belief in the materialist school of philosophy is stated as follows:
"on the philosophical level . . . it is materialism . . . that in
one form or another, will give the firmest conceptual basis to the restitution
of Africa's egalitarian and humanist principles . . . It is materialism,
with its monistic and naturalistic accounts of nature, which will balk arbitrariness,
inequality and injustice" (Nkrumah, p. 76). The concept of monism holds
the view that there is only one kind of ultimate substance. "It is a method
of viewing the diversity of phenomena in the world that affirms a single principle
or source for all that exists. This principle, this source is matter, matter
in an ongoing, ever changing process of development" (Soviet Encyclopedia,
p. 516). Finally, he declares that "it is materialism that ensures the
only effective transformation of nature" (Nkrumah, p. 77).

In the article On Consciencism
written at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, consciencism is seen
as a revolutionary materialist philosophy in its concept, and

51

dialectical in its method (p.
29). In the same article, consciencism is said to be a philosophy based on the
principles that include the following:

1. Matter is the source of all knowledge.

2. The mind has a distinct existence even though it is a product of matter.

3. There is an interaction between matter and mind.

In the article "Studies
in Consciencism: What is Categorical Conversion?," philosophical consciencism
deals with the interaction of mind and matter in consciencism. Here it is maintained
that, "philosophical consciencism . . . while remaining true to
the monistic position, is still realistic and circumspect enough to realize
that naive monism cuts across the grain of popular experience . . . it
rejects the dualism which postulates that both matter and spirit (body and mind)
exist independently of each other and in their own rights" (Studies,
p. 25). Further, the article states that though body and mind do exist,
they are different and thus "form different things. They are in fact one
and the same thing. We call matter the primary thing because while we can arrange
matter to produce mind, we cannot produce matter by any arrangements of minds.
The categories of mind and matter do exist but the one (mind) can be converted
into the other (matter)" (Studies, p. 5). The suggestion
of "practical dualism of matter" while at the same time matter is
understood to be monist, is dealt with somewhat in the article by this pronouncement:
". . . the problem of 'practical dualism' and 'basic monism' can be explained
away by reference to categorical convertibility" (Studies, p. 6). This concept of categorical conversion is stated by Nkrumah to be "the
transforming of one category into another: the production of one category into
another: the production of one category by using one or more categories which
are different from the one produced." (Nkrumah, p. 20). The categorical
conversion of matter from its material origin to its ideal existence, from material
monism to practical dualism, is Nkrumah's suggestion that matter can exist in
different and opposing categories and that from within these categories matter
is convertible. Nkrumah also implies what is tantamount to an acceptance of
idealism by asserting "philosophical consciencism, even though deeply rooted
in materialism, is not necessarily atheistic" (Nkrumah, p. 84).

52

To appreciate the significance
and/or the inconsistency of this last statement, it is necessary first of all
to understand the two historically opposed world views and the positions they
hold. Idealism, the first of the fundamental schools of philosophy, holds that
the primary substance of reality is consciousness, spirit and thought, and that
matter is secondary and dependent on consciousness. For an idealist, the natural
world, from its foundation, derives its being from and can be reduced to thought.
In Elementary Principles of Philosophy, the French materialist
Georges Politzer says of idealism that it is the doctrine which answers the
fundamental questions of philosophy by saying "it is thought which is the
principal, most important, the first element, and idealism, by affirming the
primary importance of thought declares that it is thought that produces being
... that it is the spirit that produced matter" (Politzer, p. 436).
The material aspect of nature is, from the idealist view, derived from, secondary
to, and dependent on, the idea. This notion holds that irrespective of the existence
of matter, a thought, an idea, a concept can exist. For example, the brain,
a highly complex form of matter, is not required for the thought process or
an idea in itself to exist. Thus, based on the above suppositions, one must
agree with Politzer's assertions that "idealism is nothing other than a
polished and refined form of religion" (Politzer, p. 59). He is referring
to religion in the sense of the belief in and the service and worship of a God,
a supernatural being, a pre‑existing conscious idea.

The second fundamental school
of philosophy, materialism, asserts that matter—those objects, forces, and
processes—exist independent of consciousness, and is the primary basis of reality
and that consciousness, thought, emotion, and ideas are secondary and dependent
upon it. Matter is the primary substance and exists independent of consciousness.
The category of matter is extremely broad, for it encompasses objective reality
in its entirety, and not merely some separate object or process, or even a group
of objects and phenomena of being, of objective reality, of existing outside
of man's consciousness and being reflected in his consciousness (Afanasyev,
p. 54). The Great Soviet Encyclopedia speaks of materialism as "resolving
the basic question of philosophy in favor of the primacy of matter, nature,
being, the physical, and the objective and regarding mind, or thought, as a
property of matter" (p. 509). Recognition of the primacy of matter implies
that matter itself is the primary basis of consciousness, ideas, and thoughts.

53

If one asserts or implies that
two realities are each primary, one is saying that they cannot be reduced to
each other or anything else. Novack elucidates on this particular paint by stating,
". . . the basic propositions of these two types of thought (idealism and
materialism) are absolutely opposed to each other. One must be right and the
other wrong. Both cannot be correct. Whoever maintains consistently the position
of the one is inescapably led to conclusions exactly contrary to the
other" (Novack, p. 6). With naivete, this is precisely the contradictory
trap into which Nkrumah falls by asserting his philosophical consciencism as
materialist in foundation, yet simultaneously declaring it "not necessarily
atheist." This practical dualist position held by Nkrumah is an inconsistent
and irreconcilable contradiction. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia aptly
states, "since the idealist and materialist solutions to the fundamental
question of philosophy are mutually exclusive, only one of them can be true"
(p. 117). Recognition of the primacy of matter implies that matter itself is
the primary basis of consciousness, ideas, thoughts, and as such ". . .
precludes the existence of any God, gods, spirits, souls, or other immaterial
entities which are alleged to direct or influence the operations of nature,
society and the inner man" (Novack, p. 5).

For one to declare oneself a
materialist, one is necessarily declaring his atheism, because within the materialist
school no thought, no emotion, no idea can pre-exist nor exist independently
of matter. The same exclusion holds for idealism. For the idealist the idea
presupposes all things and gives birth to all things. Thus we see under no theoretical
circumstances can a materialist be "not necessarily atheist." If philosophical
consciencism is not atheist, then it is in no way rooted in materialism. "Atheism
is contained in materialism as the fruit is potential in the seed. It
is the logical outcome, the necessary conclusion of materialist thought"
(Novack, p. 108). Materialism necessitates atheism, theism necessitates idealism.
These two views are at war and can never find co-existence. Nkrumah expresses
this very similar thought himself in the very work on which I am writing. He
says, ". . . societies have both idealist and materialist streaks. But
these streaks do not exist in equipoise. They are connected by a conflict in
which one streak predominates" (Nkrumah, p. 75). However, on attempting
to reconcile these two views while declaring his political ideological allegiance
to one, Nkrumah bankrupts his consciencism on its very philosophical foundation.

54

In Consciencism, Nkrumah
takes an explicit materialist philosophical position and also implicitly upholds
idealism on the nature of the origin of matter. By declaring that his "materialist"
consciencism is "not necessarily atheist," Nkrumah bankrupts his
theory by contradicting himself on the very fundamental question of philosophy,
the nature of being. Although his analysis of the evolved identities of contemporary
Africa and his ability to envision the necessity to develop a conscious ideology
to dialectically synthesize Africa's three identities were outstanding, they
are still overshadowed by his attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable.