2015-03-31T20:55:00ZSecond-order logic : ontological and epistemological problemshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/6407
Abstract: In this thesis I provide a survey over different approaches to second-order logic
and its interpretation, and introduce a novel approach. Of special interest are the
questions whether (a particular form of) second-order logic can count as logic in some
(further to be specified) proper sense of logic, and what epistemic status it occupies.
More specifically, second-order logic is sometimes taken to be mathematical, a mere
notational variant of some fragment of set theory. If this is the case, it might be
argued that it does not have the "epistemic innocence" which would be needed
for, e.g., foundational programmes in (the philosophy of) mathematics for which
second-order logic is sometimes used. I suggest a Deductivist conception of logic,
that characterises logical consequence by means of inference rules, and argue that
on this conception second-order logic should count as logic in the proper sense.2006-01-01T00:00:00ZRossberg, MarcusIn this thesis I provide a survey over different approaches to second-order logic
and its interpretation, and introduce a novel approach. Of special interest are the
questions whether (a particular form of) second-order logic can count as logic in some
(further to be specified) proper sense of logic, and what epistemic status it occupies.
More specifically, second-order logic is sometimes taken to be mathematical, a mere
notational variant of some fragment of set theory. If this is the case, it might be
argued that it does not have the "epistemic innocence" which would be needed
for, e.g., foundational programmes in (the philosophy of) mathematics for which
second-order logic is sometimes used. I suggest a Deductivist conception of logic,
that characterises logical consequence by means of inference rules, and argue that
on this conception second-order logic should count as logic in the proper sense.Knowledge of modality by imagininghttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/6351
Abstract: Assertions about metaphysical modality (hereafter modality) play central roles in philosophical theorizing. For example, when philosophers propose hypothetical counterexamples, they often are making a claim to the effect that some state of affairs is possible. Getting the epistemology of modality right is thus important. Debates have been preoccupied with assessing whether imaginability—or conceivability, insofar as it’s different—is a guide to possibility, or whether it is rather intuitions of possibility—and modal intuitions more generally—that are evidence for possibility (modal) claims. The dissertation argues that the imagination plays a subtler role than the first view recognizes, and a more central one than the second view does. In particular, it defends an epistemology of metaphysical modality on which someone can acquire modal knowledge in virtue of having performed certain complex imaginative exercises.2014-06-26T00:00:00ZStrohminger, MargotAssertions about metaphysical modality (hereafter modality) play central roles in philosophical theorizing. For example, when philosophers propose hypothetical counterexamples, they often are making a claim to the effect that some state of affairs is possible. Getting the epistemology of modality right is thus important. Debates have been preoccupied with assessing whether imaginability—or conceivability, insofar as it’s different—is a guide to possibility, or whether it is rather intuitions of possibility—and modal intuitions more generally—that are evidence for possibility (modal) claims. The dissertation argues that the imagination plays a subtler role than the first view recognizes, and a more central one than the second view does. In particular, it defends an epistemology of metaphysical modality on which someone can acquire modal knowledge in virtue of having performed certain complex imaginative exercises.Carnap's conventionalism : logic, science, and tolerancehttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/6334
Abstract: In broadest terms, this thesis is concerned to answer the question of whether the view that arithmetic is analytic can be maintained consistently. Lest there be much suspense, I will conclude that it can. Those who disagree claim that accounts which defend the analyticity of arithmetic are either unable to give a satisfactory account of the foundations of mathematics due to the incompleteness theorems, or, if steps are taken to mitigate incompleteness, then the view loses the ability to account for the applicability of mathematics in the sciences. I will show that this criticism is not successful against every view whereby arithmetic is analytic by showing that the brand of "conventionalism" about mathematics that Rudolf Carnap advocated in the 1930s, especially in Logical Syntax of Language, does not suffer from these difficulties. There, Carnap develops an account of logic and mathematics that ensures the analyticity of both. It is based on his famous "Principle of Tolerance", and so the major focus of this thesis will to defend this principle from certain criticisms that have arisen in the 80 years since the book was published. I claim that these criticisms all share certain misunderstandings of the principle, and, because my diagnosis of the critiques is that they misunderstand Carnap, the defense I will give is of a primarily historical and exegetical nature.
Again speaking broadly, the defense will be split into two parts: one primarily historical and the other argumentative. The historical section concerns the development of Carnap's views on logic and mathematics, from their beginnings in Frege's lectures up through the publication of Logical Syntax. Though this material is well-trod ground, it is necessary background for the second part. In part two we shift gears, and leave aside the historical development of Carnap's views to examine a certain family of critiques of it. We focus on the version due to Kurt Gödel, but also explore four others found in the literature. In the final chapter, I develop a reading of Carnap's Principle - the `wide' reading. It is one whereby there are no antecedent constraints on the construction of linguistic frameworks. I argue that this reading of the principle resolves the purported problems. Though this thesis is not a vindication of Carnap's view of logic and mathematics tout court, it does show that the view has more plausibility than is commonly thought.2014-06-26T00:00:00ZFriedman-Biglin, NoahIn broadest terms, this thesis is concerned to answer the question of whether the view that arithmetic is analytic can be maintained consistently. Lest there be much suspense, I will conclude that it can. Those who disagree claim that accounts which defend the analyticity of arithmetic are either unable to give a satisfactory account of the foundations of mathematics due to the incompleteness theorems, or, if steps are taken to mitigate incompleteness, then the view loses the ability to account for the applicability of mathematics in the sciences. I will show that this criticism is not successful against every view whereby arithmetic is analytic by showing that the brand of "conventionalism" about mathematics that Rudolf Carnap advocated in the 1930s, especially in Logical Syntax of Language, does not suffer from these difficulties. There, Carnap develops an account of logic and mathematics that ensures the analyticity of both. It is based on his famous "Principle of Tolerance", and so the major focus of this thesis will to defend this principle from certain criticisms that have arisen in the 80 years since the book was published. I claim that these criticisms all share certain misunderstandings of the principle, and, because my diagnosis of the critiques is that they misunderstand Carnap, the defense I will give is of a primarily historical and exegetical nature.
Again speaking broadly, the defense will be split into two parts: one primarily historical and the other argumentative. The historical section concerns the development of Carnap's views on logic and mathematics, from their beginnings in Frege's lectures up through the publication of Logical Syntax. Though this material is well-trod ground, it is necessary background for the second part. In part two we shift gears, and leave aside the historical development of Carnap's views to examine a certain family of critiques of it. We focus on the version due to Kurt Gödel, but also explore four others found in the literature. In the final chapter, I develop a reading of Carnap's Principle - the `wide' reading. It is one whereby there are no antecedent constraints on the construction of linguistic frameworks. I argue that this reading of the principle resolves the purported problems. Though this thesis is not a vindication of Carnap's view of logic and mathematics tout court, it does show that the view has more plausibility than is commonly thought.Logic in theory and in practice : the normative status of logichttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/6329
Abstract: In my thesis, I address the question ʽWhat normative status does logic have?', to argue that logical normativity is of a weak sort, and that its constraining power is similar to that of recommendations. The thesis first discusses the notion of logical validity and logical formality, then asks whether logic is a priori and whether it can provide a priori norms for thinking. Subsequently, the issue of the bridge principles linking formal logic to informal reasoning is addressed, jointly with a brief discussion of the deontic operators included in the bridge principles. Then, the thesis addresses three criticisms of the normative role of logic with respect to rational reasoning. The first criticism is discussed in the fourth chapter; it starts from the consideration of the cognitive limitations of human agents and discusses a model of rationality that takes those limitations into account. The second criticism is analyzed in the fifth chapter; it is motivated by the empirical studies in the psychology of reasoning, and discusses human reasoning from a descriptive point of view, lending support to the model of rationality presented in the fourth chapter. The third criticism, presented in the sixth and final chapter, addresses the normative role of logic from an a priori point of view, showing how the epistemic paradoxes are crucial for determining what normative import logic has on rational reasoning. The final chapter defends the main thesis that logic has a weak import on our reasoning, which resembles a recommendation rather than an obligation.2015-06-25T00:00:00ZCelani, LauraIn my thesis, I address the question ʽWhat normative status does logic have?', to argue that logical normativity is of a weak sort, and that its constraining power is similar to that of recommendations. The thesis first discusses the notion of logical validity and logical formality, then asks whether logic is a priori and whether it can provide a priori norms for thinking. Subsequently, the issue of the bridge principles linking formal logic to informal reasoning is addressed, jointly with a brief discussion of the deontic operators included in the bridge principles. Then, the thesis addresses three criticisms of the normative role of logic with respect to rational reasoning. The first criticism is discussed in the fourth chapter; it starts from the consideration of the cognitive limitations of human agents and discusses a model of rationality that takes those limitations into account. The second criticism is analyzed in the fifth chapter; it is motivated by the empirical studies in the psychology of reasoning, and discusses human reasoning from a descriptive point of view, lending support to the model of rationality presented in the fourth chapter. The third criticism, presented in the sixth and final chapter, addresses the normative role of logic from an a priori point of view, showing how the epistemic paradoxes are crucial for determining what normative import logic has on rational reasoning. The final chapter defends the main thesis that logic has a weak import on our reasoning, which resembles a recommendation rather than an obligation.A phenomenological-enactive theory of the minimal selfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/6043
Abstract: The purpose of this project is to argue that we possess a minimal self. It will demonstrate that minimal selfhood arrives early in our development and continues to remain and influence us throughout our entire life. There are two areas of research which shape my understanding of the minimal self: phenomenology and enactivism. Phenomenology emphasizes the sense of givenness, ownership, or mineness that accompanies all of our experiences. Enactivism says there is a sensorimotor coupling that occurs between us and the environment in a way which modulates the dynamic patterns of our self development; the laying down of these basic patterns helps make us who we are and gives rise to the phenomenological, experiential mineness. Drawing on these two core ideas, I will be arguing for a Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self (abbreviated PEMS). I will be emphasizing the role of the body and the role of affects (moods, feelings, and emotions) as the most important components relevant to understanding minimal selfhood. Put more concretely, the set of conditions which constitute the PEMS view are: (i) The minimal self is the experiential subject; the minimal sense of self is present whenever there is awareness. It is the subjectivity of experience, the sense of mineness, or givenness which our experiences contain. (ii) The phenomenological part of the PEMS view turns on the idea of a bodily and dynamic integration of sensorimotor coupling and affective experience. It is, ontologically speaking, the lived body in enactive engagement with the environment. It is this embodied subject which anchors and forms the foundation for the later ‘narrative’ self, which emerges from it and which is continually influenced by it. It is the subject enactively engaged with others, dependent on sensorimotor processes and affects. We have an identity, but it emerges from relational and dynamic processes.2014-01-30T00:00:00ZWelch, BrettThe purpose of this project is to argue that we possess a minimal self. It will demonstrate that minimal selfhood arrives early in our development and continues to remain and influence us throughout our entire life. There are two areas of research which shape my understanding of the minimal self: phenomenology and enactivism. Phenomenology emphasizes the sense of givenness, ownership, or mineness that accompanies all of our experiences. Enactivism says there is a sensorimotor coupling that occurs between us and the environment in a way which modulates the dynamic patterns of our self development; the laying down of these basic patterns helps make us who we are and gives rise to the phenomenological, experiential mineness. Drawing on these two core ideas, I will be arguing for a Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self (abbreviated PEMS). I will be emphasizing the role of the body and the role of affects (moods, feelings, and emotions) as the most important components relevant to understanding minimal selfhood. Put more concretely, the set of conditions which constitute the PEMS view are: (i) The minimal self is the experiential subject; the minimal sense of self is present whenever there is awareness. It is the subjectivity of experience, the sense of mineness, or givenness which our experiences contain. (ii) The phenomenological part of the PEMS view turns on the idea of a bodily and dynamic integration of sensorimotor coupling and affective experience. It is, ontologically speaking, the lived body in enactive engagement with the environment. It is this embodied subject which anchors and forms the foundation for the later ‘narrative’ self, which emerges from it and which is continually influenced by it. It is the subject enactively engaged with others, dependent on sensorimotor processes and affects. We have an identity, but it emerges from relational and dynamic processes.On rights and demands : how theorists of rights can benefit from taking demands seriouslyhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/5892
Abstract: This thesis explores the normative significance of making a rights-backed, authorized demand as a right holder. Rights, I argue, enable their holders to make a special kind of demand which comes with a special force. It is, in other words, one of rights’ functions that they are demands-enabling. I single out what sort of demands I am interested in exploring. I also look at how these special demands are normatively significant. I call them rights-backed, authorized demands. They are normatively significant, first, because of the interesting role they play in other agents’ practical-reasoning, and , second, because the very making of these demands, as a matter of rights, is empowering in an abstract way. I go on to contrast my view with other ‘demand theories’ in existence and conclude that my view is substantively different. In particular, existing demand theories of rights all fail to sufficiently highlight the importance of actual demands, and instead focus on the ‘status’ of ‘being in a position’ to make demands. I argue that this focus is a fundamental mistake. I also consider how my view can contribute to some related literature on rights. First, I argue that my view highlights a new function which rights have: it has interesting implications on the shape of the long-standing debate between the will and interest theory of rights. Second, I argue that my view provides us with a new way to counter one of the most discussed criticisms of the existence of welfare human rights, which is the argument that rights must correlate with some specific duties as a necessary existence condition, and that human welfare rights fail on this mark. I conclude that if human rights indeed have a demand-related function as I argue, it weakens the intuitive appeal of this criticism.2014-12-01T00:00:00ZHo, Kin TingThis thesis explores the normative significance of making a rights-backed, authorized demand as a right holder. Rights, I argue, enable their holders to make a special kind of demand which comes with a special force. It is, in other words, one of rights’ functions that they are demands-enabling. I single out what sort of demands I am interested in exploring. I also look at how these special demands are normatively significant. I call them rights-backed, authorized demands. They are normatively significant, first, because of the interesting role they play in other agents’ practical-reasoning, and , second, because the very making of these demands, as a matter of rights, is empowering in an abstract way. I go on to contrast my view with other ‘demand theories’ in existence and conclude that my view is substantively different. In particular, existing demand theories of rights all fail to sufficiently highlight the importance of actual demands, and instead focus on the ‘status’ of ‘being in a position’ to make demands. I argue that this focus is a fundamental mistake. I also consider how my view can contribute to some related literature on rights. First, I argue that my view highlights a new function which rights have: it has interesting implications on the shape of the long-standing debate between the will and interest theory of rights. Second, I argue that my view provides us with a new way to counter one of the most discussed criticisms of the existence of welfare human rights, which is the argument that rights must correlate with some specific duties as a necessary existence condition, and that human welfare rights fail on this mark. I conclude that if human rights indeed have a demand-related function as I argue, it weakens the intuitive appeal of this criticism.The sensorimotor theory of perceptual experiencehttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/5544
Abstract: The sensorimotor theory is an influential, non-mainstream account of perception and perceptual consciousness intended to improve in various ways on orthodox theories. It is often taken to be a variety of enactivism, and in common with enactivist cognitive science more generally, it de-emphasises the theoretical role played by internal representation and other purely neural processes, giving theoretical pride of place instead to interactive engagements between the brain, non-neural body and outside environment.
In addition to offering a distinctive account of the processing that underlies perceptual consciousness, the sensorimotor theory aims to offer a new and improved account the logical and phenomenological character of perceptual experience, and the relation between physical and phenomenal states. Since its inception in a 2001 paper by O’Regan and Noë, the theory has prompted a good deal of increasingly prominent theoretical and practical work in
cognitive science, as well as a large body of secondary literature in philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of perception. In spite of its influential character, many of the theory’s most basic tenets are incompletely or ambiguously defined, and it has attracted a number of prominent objections.
This thesis aims to clarify the conceptual foundations of the sensorimotor theory, including the key theoretical concepts of sensorimotor contingency, sensorimotor mastery, and presence-as-access, and defends a particular understanding of the respective theoretical roles of internal representation and behavioural capacities. In so doing, the thesis aims to highlight the sensorimotor theory’s virtues and defend it from some leading criticisms, with particular attention to a response by Clark which claims that perception and perceptual experience plausibly depend on the activation of representations which are not intimately involved in bodily engagements between the agent and environment. A final part of the thesis offers a sensorimotor account of the experience of temporally extended events, and shows how with reference to this we can better understand object experience.2014-12-01T00:00:00ZSilverman, DavidThe sensorimotor theory is an influential, non-mainstream account of perception and perceptual consciousness intended to improve in various ways on orthodox theories. It is often taken to be a variety of enactivism, and in common with enactivist cognitive science more generally, it de-emphasises the theoretical role played by internal representation and other purely neural processes, giving theoretical pride of place instead to interactive engagements between the brain, non-neural body and outside environment.
In addition to offering a distinctive account of the processing that underlies perceptual consciousness, the sensorimotor theory aims to offer a new and improved account the logical and phenomenological character of perceptual experience, and the relation between physical and phenomenal states. Since its inception in a 2001 paper by O’Regan and Noë, the theory has prompted a good deal of increasingly prominent theoretical and practical work in
cognitive science, as well as a large body of secondary literature in philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of perception. In spite of its influential character, many of the theory’s most basic tenets are incompletely or ambiguously defined, and it has attracted a number of prominent objections.
This thesis aims to clarify the conceptual foundations of the sensorimotor theory, including the key theoretical concepts of sensorimotor contingency, sensorimotor mastery, and presence-as-access, and defends a particular understanding of the respective theoretical roles of internal representation and behavioural capacities. In so doing, the thesis aims to highlight the sensorimotor theory’s virtues and defend it from some leading criticisms, with particular attention to a response by Clark which claims that perception and perceptual experience plausibly depend on the activation of representations which are not intimately involved in bodily engagements between the agent and environment. A final part of the thesis offers a sensorimotor account of the experience of temporally extended events, and shows how with reference to this we can better understand object experience.How to commit to an individual : logic, objects and ontologyhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/4527
Abstract: In this thesis I propose an improved theory of ontological commitment, one which is neutral on epistemology. Although Quine's quantificational criterion of ontological commitment has many advantages over its competitors, like its univocal treatment of being and existence, its clear account of ontological reduction and its capacity to accommodate implicit commitments, I argue that it has a fatal flaw: the inability to account for ontological commitment to individuals. Quine's choice of a first-order language of regimentation without constants is so entwined with his holist epistemology that imputations of existence cannot be made except to objects-qua-F, qua some wholly third-personal description. Commitments of those who believe that minds reach out directly to objects by means of acquaintance or introspection, encoded in language by constants, are ungrammatical in Quine's language. This breakdown of grammaticality, on my view, is an avoidable result of Quine's behaviourism and holist epistemology filtering into his choice of canonical language. I opt for a broader conception of ontological commitments as incurred by formalised theories with one or more semantic categories of categorematic objectual expressions, whose function is to stand for objects. I expand the language of regimentation at least to first-order logic with constants and identity. This preserves the attractive features of Quine's position. It retains its elegant treatment of reduction and implicit ontological commitments, and its capacity to explain away Meinongian confusions, without being beholden to global holism. My canonical language makes room for acquaintance and first-personal methods as sources of ontological commitment. It has the advantage of allowing theories like Quine's, which confine themselves to objects-qua-F, to be regimented as well as non-holist theories whose criteria of ontological commitment are 'to be is to be the referent of a name' or 'to be is to be the value of a constant or variable'.2014-06-26T00:00:00ZJanssen, F. M.In this thesis I propose an improved theory of ontological commitment, one which is neutral on epistemology. Although Quine's quantificational criterion of ontological commitment has many advantages over its competitors, like its univocal treatment of being and existence, its clear account of ontological reduction and its capacity to accommodate implicit commitments, I argue that it has a fatal flaw: the inability to account for ontological commitment to individuals. Quine's choice of a first-order language of regimentation without constants is so entwined with his holist epistemology that imputations of existence cannot be made except to objects-qua-F, qua some wholly third-personal description. Commitments of those who believe that minds reach out directly to objects by means of acquaintance or introspection, encoded in language by constants, are ungrammatical in Quine's language. This breakdown of grammaticality, on my view, is an avoidable result of Quine's behaviourism and holist epistemology filtering into his choice of canonical language. I opt for a broader conception of ontological commitments as incurred by formalised theories with one or more semantic categories of categorematic objectual expressions, whose function is to stand for objects. I expand the language of regimentation at least to first-order logic with constants and identity. This preserves the attractive features of Quine's position. It retains its elegant treatment of reduction and implicit ontological commitments, and its capacity to explain away Meinongian confusions, without being beholden to global holism. My canonical language makes room for acquaintance and first-personal methods as sources of ontological commitment. It has the advantage of allowing theories like Quine's, which confine themselves to objects-qua-F, to be regimented as well as non-holist theories whose criteria of ontological commitment are 'to be is to be the referent of a name' or 'to be is to be the value of a constant or variable'.Ramsey's 'Universals'http://hdl.handle.net/10023/4504
Abstract: Ramsey’s Universals has not been served well by its critics and, as a result, the real
and important contentions of Ramsey’s essay are often obscured in discussion of his
work. This thesis is intended to form the beginning of an attempt to rectify this by
offering an exposition and critique of Ramsey’s essay that is particularly sensitive to
the background context and purpose of the essay as a whole and to the subtle
structure of the argumentation within it.
The construction of the arguments in Universals is so intricate that to assess any of
its arguments without placing them in the context of the overall strategy of
Ramsey’s essay is to grossly underestimate them. For this reason, most of the labour
in this thesis will be directed towards articulating Ramsey’s concerns in his essay
and the way in which Ramsey’s arguments are supposed to supplement each other
in order to establish his main contentions. These tasks take up the first two
chapters. Only then will the third chapter consider one particular argument- the
incomprehensible trinity argument- and assess whether it is successful by first
identifying the role that the argument is intended to play in the overall structure of
Ramsey’s argument and then asking whether or not the argument can be said to
fulfil such a role.
This final chapter is a mere beginning towards a proper critique of Ramsey’s
difficult and subtle argumentation in Universals. Nonetheless it serves as an example
of how offering a critique of Ramsey which places his arguments within the context and concerns of the essay as a whole, while it does not immediately vindicate them
of all criticism, shows them to be far more subtle and robust than they have been
estimated to be.2013-01-01T00:00:00ZDoherty, Fiona TeresaRamsey’s Universals has not been served well by its critics and, as a result, the real
and important contentions of Ramsey’s essay are often obscured in discussion of his
work. This thesis is intended to form the beginning of an attempt to rectify this by
offering an exposition and critique of Ramsey’s essay that is particularly sensitive to
the background context and purpose of the essay as a whole and to the subtle
structure of the argumentation within it.
The construction of the arguments in Universals is so intricate that to assess any of
its arguments without placing them in the context of the overall strategy of
Ramsey’s essay is to grossly underestimate them. For this reason, most of the labour
in this thesis will be directed towards articulating Ramsey’s concerns in his essay
and the way in which Ramsey’s arguments are supposed to supplement each other
in order to establish his main contentions. These tasks take up the first two
chapters. Only then will the third chapter consider one particular argument- the
incomprehensible trinity argument- and assess whether it is successful by first
identifying the role that the argument is intended to play in the overall structure of
Ramsey’s argument and then asking whether or not the argument can be said to
fulfil such a role.
This final chapter is a mere beginning towards a proper critique of Ramsey’s
difficult and subtle argumentation in Universals. Nonetheless it serves as an example
of how offering a critique of Ramsey which places his arguments within the context and concerns of the essay as a whole, while it does not immediately vindicate them
of all criticism, shows them to be far more subtle and robust than they have been
estimated to be.On Plato's conception of philosophy in the Republic and certain post-Republic dialogueshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/4497
Abstract: This dissertation is generally concerned with Plato’s conception of philosophy, as the conception is ascertainable from the Republic and certain ‘post-Republic’ dialogues. It argues that philosophy, according to Plato, is multi-disciplinary; that ‘philosophy’ does not mark off just one art or science; that there are various philosophers corresponding to various philosophical sciences, all of which come together under a common aim: betterment of self through intellectual activity.
A major part of this dissertation is concerned with Plato's science par excellence, ‘the science of dialectic’ (he epistêmê dialektikê). The science of dialectic is distinguished in Plato by being concerned with Forms or Kinds as such; the science of dialectic, alone amongst the philosophical sciences, fully understands what it means for Form X to be a Form. I track the science of dialectic, from its showcase in Republic VI and VII, and analyze its place in relation to the other philosophical sciences in certain post-Republic dialogues. Ultimately, I show that, whilst it is not the only science constituting philosophy, Plato’s science of dialectic represents the intellectual zenith obtainable by man; the expert of this science is the topmost philosopher.
In this dissertation I also argue that Socrates, as variously depicted in these dialogues, always falls short of being identified as the philosopher par excellence, as that expert with positive knowledge of Forms as such. Yet I also show that, far from being in conflict, the elenctic Socrates and the philosopher par excellence form a complementary relationship: the elenctic philosopher gets pupils to think about certain things in the right way prior to sending them off to work with the philosopher par excellence.2014-01-01T00:00:00ZLabriola, DanieleThis dissertation is generally concerned with Plato’s conception of philosophy, as the conception is ascertainable from the Republic and certain ‘post-Republic’ dialogues. It argues that philosophy, according to Plato, is multi-disciplinary; that ‘philosophy’ does not mark off just one art or science; that there are various philosophers corresponding to various philosophical sciences, all of which come together under a common aim: betterment of self through intellectual activity.
A major part of this dissertation is concerned with Plato's science par excellence, ‘the science of dialectic’ (he epistêmê dialektikê). The science of dialectic is distinguished in Plato by being concerned with Forms or Kinds as such; the science of dialectic, alone amongst the philosophical sciences, fully understands what it means for Form X to be a Form. I track the science of dialectic, from its showcase in Republic VI and VII, and analyze its place in relation to the other philosophical sciences in certain post-Republic dialogues. Ultimately, I show that, whilst it is not the only science constituting philosophy, Plato’s science of dialectic represents the intellectual zenith obtainable by man; the expert of this science is the topmost philosopher.
In this dissertation I also argue that Socrates, as variously depicted in these dialogues, always falls short of being identified as the philosopher par excellence, as that expert with positive knowledge of Forms as such. Yet I also show that, far from being in conflict, the elenctic Socrates and the philosopher par excellence form a complementary relationship: the elenctic philosopher gets pupils to think about certain things in the right way prior to sending them off to work with the philosopher par excellence.Global problems and individual obligations : an investigation of different forms of consequentialism in situations with many agentshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/4458
Abstract: In this thesis, I investigate two challenges for Act Consequentialism which arise
in situations where many agents together can make a difference in the world.
Act Consequentialism holds that agents morally ought to perform those actions
which have the best expected consequences. The first challenge for Act
Consequentialism is that it often asks too much. This problem arises in situations
where agents can individually make a difference for the better, e.g. by
donating money to charities that fight extreme poverty. Act Consequentialism
here often requires agents to make immense sacrifices which threaten to compromise
agents future ability to do more good, reduce agents to a drastically
simple lifestyle, and amount to taking up the slack left by others. The second
challenge is that Act Consequentialism often asks too little. This problem
arises both in situations where agents can not make any difference for the better,
e.g. by stopping to pollute the environment, and in situations where they
can not make any difference whatsoever, e.g. when they individually vote or
protest against a morally bad but widely supported policy.
Act Consequentialism is subject to the above challenges because it only
considers the differences that individuals can make on their own. A natural
response is to adopt a form of Collective Consequentialism which considers
the difference that agents can make together. I investigate how far Act
Consequentialism can deal with each of the above challenges, and how far
these challenges require us to adopt Collective Consequentialism.2013-01-01T00:00:00ZPinkert, Felix ChristianIn this thesis, I investigate two challenges for Act Consequentialism which arise
in situations where many agents together can make a difference in the world.
Act Consequentialism holds that agents morally ought to perform those actions
which have the best expected consequences. The first challenge for Act
Consequentialism is that it often asks too much. This problem arises in situations
where agents can individually make a difference for the better, e.g. by
donating money to charities that fight extreme poverty. Act Consequentialism
here often requires agents to make immense sacrifices which threaten to compromise
agents future ability to do more good, reduce agents to a drastically
simple lifestyle, and amount to taking up the slack left by others. The second
challenge is that Act Consequentialism often asks too little. This problem
arises both in situations where agents can not make any difference for the better,
e.g. by stopping to pollute the environment, and in situations where they
can not make any difference whatsoever, e.g. when they individually vote or
protest against a morally bad but widely supported policy.
Act Consequentialism is subject to the above challenges because it only
considers the differences that individuals can make on their own. A natural
response is to adopt a form of Collective Consequentialism which considers
the difference that agents can make together. I investigate how far Act
Consequentialism can deal with each of the above challenges, and how far
these challenges require us to adopt Collective Consequentialism.At the borders of arthood : a methodology for the definition of arthttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/4210
Abstract: The first-order debate about the definition of art focuses on the ‘What is art?’ question and those who engage in it answer the question by putting forward definitions (or at least characterizations) of art. The second-order debate about the definition of art, on the other hand, focuses on questions like the following one: what are the success-conditions of the definition of art? Under what conditions, that is, does a definition of ‘work of art’ count as successful or correct? In this dissertation, I develop an answer to this second-order question by putting forward a methodology whereby definitions of art can be assessed. The borderline methodology, as I call it, is proposed as an alternative to Stephen Davies’ extensional methodology and Nick Zangwill’s explanatory methodology. According to it, extensional adequacy is the main success-condition of the definition of art, since it is the success-condition whereby much that we believe about works of art (qua works of art) is adequately explained. In particular, there is no way a definition of art is extensionally adequate and yet does not explain that we have beliefs about the ontology of art (Thesis I) and the value of art (Thesis II). I argue for these two fundamental tenets of the borderline methodology in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I turn my attention to explanatory power as a success-condition of the definition of art and propose a fine-grained account of it derived from the account of extensional adequacy previously defended. In the light of these two success-conditions of the definition of art, I develop in Chapter 4 two pairs of tests – the extensional adequacy tests and the explanatory power tests – and assess definitions of art on the basis of them, concluding that ‘work of art’ cannot be successfully defined using certain types of logical structure.2013-11-30T00:00:00ZDos Santos, Miguel F.The first-order debate about the definition of art focuses on the ‘What is art?’ question and those who engage in it answer the question by putting forward definitions (or at least characterizations) of art. The second-order debate about the definition of art, on the other hand, focuses on questions like the following one: what are the success-conditions of the definition of art? Under what conditions, that is, does a definition of ‘work of art’ count as successful or correct? In this dissertation, I develop an answer to this second-order question by putting forward a methodology whereby definitions of art can be assessed. The borderline methodology, as I call it, is proposed as an alternative to Stephen Davies’ extensional methodology and Nick Zangwill’s explanatory methodology. According to it, extensional adequacy is the main success-condition of the definition of art, since it is the success-condition whereby much that we believe about works of art (qua works of art) is adequately explained. In particular, there is no way a definition of art is extensionally adequate and yet does not explain that we have beliefs about the ontology of art (Thesis I) and the value of art (Thesis II). I argue for these two fundamental tenets of the borderline methodology in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I turn my attention to explanatory power as a success-condition of the definition of art and propose a fine-grained account of it derived from the account of extensional adequacy previously defended. In the light of these two success-conditions of the definition of art, I develop in Chapter 4 two pairs of tests – the extensional adequacy tests and the explanatory power tests – and assess definitions of art on the basis of them, concluding that ‘work of art’ cannot be successfully defined using certain types of logical structure.Space and its dis-contents : new directions for intrinsicality, substance and dimensionalityhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/4196
Abstract: This dissertation examines key areas in ontology through the intersection of metaphysics and physics. I argue that modern physics gives us good cause to look for new metaphysical models in place of the classical conceptions of ‘object’ and ‘space’. Part I addresses the object in itself, wherein I argue that physics, along with various philosophical concerns, encourages us to re-evaluate the intrinsic/ extrinsic distinction in favour of new classifications. In particular, I use conclusions of relativity theory and the acquisition of mass via the Higgs field as indications of the inadequacy of intrinsicality, concluding that the distinction is more trouble than it is worth.
Part II examines the intersection of objects and space, wherein I criticise substantivalism and promote singular fundamental ontologies like relationalism and supersubstantivalism. I examine phenomena like spatial expansion and field theory as well as separability issues more generally to emphasise the lack of rationale for a substance dualism of ‘object material’ and ‘space material’. I also challenge the coherence of substantivalism’s ‘occupation relation’ and the ease of interpreting mathematical models into physical terms. I conclude that, again, the classical notion of ‘object’ and its substantival framework are misplaced and should be put aside in favour of developing monistic ontologies.
Part III looks at space in itself and the properties commonly attributed to it. I explore issues of separability using key experiments, and what makes spaces ‘physically real’, before an extended examination of dimensions and dimensionality, highlighting the confusion physicists express toward such a ubiquitous concept in modern physical theories. I also explore how we use dimensions and reasons for adopting realist or instrumentalist approaches toward them, arguing that much more work should be focused on this area. I conclude with ways in which physics motivates new metaphysical models and suggest improvements for future methodological partnerships.2013-11-30T00:00:00ZWalker-Dale, HeatherThis dissertation examines key areas in ontology through the intersection of metaphysics and physics. I argue that modern physics gives us good cause to look for new metaphysical models in place of the classical conceptions of ‘object’ and ‘space’. Part I addresses the object in itself, wherein I argue that physics, along with various philosophical concerns, encourages us to re-evaluate the intrinsic/ extrinsic distinction in favour of new classifications. In particular, I use conclusions of relativity theory and the acquisition of mass via the Higgs field as indications of the inadequacy of intrinsicality, concluding that the distinction is more trouble than it is worth.
Part II examines the intersection of objects and space, wherein I criticise substantivalism and promote singular fundamental ontologies like relationalism and supersubstantivalism. I examine phenomena like spatial expansion and field theory as well as separability issues more generally to emphasise the lack of rationale for a substance dualism of ‘object material’ and ‘space material’. I also challenge the coherence of substantivalism’s ‘occupation relation’ and the ease of interpreting mathematical models into physical terms. I conclude that, again, the classical notion of ‘object’ and its substantival framework are misplaced and should be put aside in favour of developing monistic ontologies.
Part III looks at space in itself and the properties commonly attributed to it. I explore issues of separability using key experiments, and what makes spaces ‘physically real’, before an extended examination of dimensions and dimensionality, highlighting the confusion physicists express toward such a ubiquitous concept in modern physical theories. I also explore how we use dimensions and reasons for adopting realist or instrumentalist approaches toward them, arguing that much more work should be focused on this area. I conclude with ways in which physics motivates new metaphysical models and suggest improvements for future methodological partnerships.Business ethics & collective responsibilityhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/4121
Abstract: The idea that ‘business ethics’ picks out a distinct discipline within ethical theory is contentious; in particular, it is unclear why theoretical approaches to moral and political philosophy cannot satisfactorily address ethical concerns in the context of business activity, just as they can in the context of other human activities. In response, I argue that some features of the business environment require more focused analysis than currently available. This environment is characterised by the presence of large social groups – business organisations – that are not political in nature, but yet wield considerable power and are the vehicles for complex forms of collective action.
The most pressing ethical concern raised by such collective action is collective moral responsibility. I develop an account of collective responsibility that is tailored to business organisations and that combines a number of strands of moral thought – a desert-based account of moral responsibility that is of a kind with that typically applied to individual humans; a pluralistic account of how collective responsibility is generated that is rooted in irreducible group-level properties; and a moderate approach to social ontology that sees nothing mysterious in ‘distinct’ collective entities.
From this starting point I develop two detailed models that illustrate how business organisations can constitute distinct collective entities that may be held morally responsible. The first shows how such organisations may satisfy the conditions required to hold moral agency, which is typically assumed to be a prerequisite for moral responsibility. The second breaks with this tradition and argues for the possibility of ‘non-agential’ moral responsibility in cases where complex organisational structures mediate the actions of the moral agents that populate them. I conclude by showing how this distinct organisational-level responsibility, far from insulating organisation members from personal culpability, illustrates quite distinct standards against which such individuals may be judged.2013-11-30T00:00:00ZDempsey, James A.The idea that ‘business ethics’ picks out a distinct discipline within ethical theory is contentious; in particular, it is unclear why theoretical approaches to moral and political philosophy cannot satisfactorily address ethical concerns in the context of business activity, just as they can in the context of other human activities. In response, I argue that some features of the business environment require more focused analysis than currently available. This environment is characterised by the presence of large social groups – business organisations – that are not political in nature, but yet wield considerable power and are the vehicles for complex forms of collective action.
The most pressing ethical concern raised by such collective action is collective moral responsibility. I develop an account of collective responsibility that is tailored to business organisations and that combines a number of strands of moral thought – a desert-based account of moral responsibility that is of a kind with that typically applied to individual humans; a pluralistic account of how collective responsibility is generated that is rooted in irreducible group-level properties; and a moderate approach to social ontology that sees nothing mysterious in ‘distinct’ collective entities.
From this starting point I develop two detailed models that illustrate how business organisations can constitute distinct collective entities that may be held morally responsible. The first shows how such organisations may satisfy the conditions required to hold moral agency, which is typically assumed to be a prerequisite for moral responsibility. The second breaks with this tradition and argues for the possibility of ‘non-agential’ moral responsibility in cases where complex organisational structures mediate the actions of the moral agents that populate them. I conclude by showing how this distinct organisational-level responsibility, far from insulating organisation members from personal culpability, illustrates quite distinct standards against which such individuals may be judged.Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds whathttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/4108
Abstract: In this thesis I focus on dismissivism in metaphysics. Some philosophers argue that
at least some metaphysical disputes are not substantial, and as a consequence should
be dismissed. In this work I restrict my attention to metaphysics and focus on
debates about existence and grounding. In particular I am interested in finding out
whether there is a difference between the possible options available for dismissing
debates about what there is and the possible options available for dismissing debates
about what grounds what. I will delve into this in two different steps. First of all
I explore the possibility to dismiss debates about what there is, and as a case
study I analyse the debate between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism.
Secondly I delve into whether it is possible to dismiss debates about what grounds
what, thanks to the discussion of another case study, i.e. the debate between
tropes ontologies and universals ontologies. It is worth exploring the nature of
dismissivism, because it bears on the future of philosophy. If philosophy has to
have a future, we have to make sure that at least some disagreements within it are
substantial.
My conclusions will be that metaphysical debates about what there is can be
dismissed for a variety of reasons (semantic, epistemic, ...). I also argue there is no
general formula to find out whether a specific debate should be dismissed. On the
other hand I argue that debates about what grounds what should be dismissed. I
offer two distinct arguments in favour of my claim. Firstly, I argue that disputants
are having a verbal dispute when they talk about what grounds what, and thus
their disagreement is non genuine. Secondly, I argue that the notion of grounding
is underspecified, because it cannot be properly distinguished from causation.2013-11-30T00:00:00ZPorro, Laura CeciliaIn this thesis I focus on dismissivism in metaphysics. Some philosophers argue that
at least some metaphysical disputes are not substantial, and as a consequence should
be dismissed. In this work I restrict my attention to metaphysics and focus on
debates about existence and grounding. In particular I am interested in finding out
whether there is a difference between the possible options available for dismissing
debates about what there is and the possible options available for dismissing debates
about what grounds what. I will delve into this in two different steps. First of all
I explore the possibility to dismiss debates about what there is, and as a case
study I analyse the debate between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism.
Secondly I delve into whether it is possible to dismiss debates about what grounds
what, thanks to the discussion of another case study, i.e. the debate between
tropes ontologies and universals ontologies. It is worth exploring the nature of
dismissivism, because it bears on the future of philosophy. If philosophy has to
have a future, we have to make sure that at least some disagreements within it are
substantial.
My conclusions will be that metaphysical debates about what there is can be
dismissed for a variety of reasons (semantic, epistemic, ...). I also argue there is no
general formula to find out whether a specific debate should be dismissed. On the
other hand I argue that debates about what grounds what should be dismissed. I
offer two distinct arguments in favour of my claim. Firstly, I argue that disputants
are having a verbal dispute when they talk about what grounds what, and thus
their disagreement is non genuine. Secondly, I argue that the notion of grounding
is underspecified, because it cannot be properly distinguished from causation.The pattern in the weave : an account of Wittgenstein's remarks on meaning-as-use and of their relation to social psychologyhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3715
Abstract: The thesis begins with a criticism of the 'theory of meaning' approach to the philosophy of language. It then goes on to establish an account of language understanding in terms of Wittgenstein's comments on rule-following and meaning as use. This characterization is extended to aspects of the philosophy of social science. Inferences are then drawn, on the basis of this extension, as to the overall framework within which empirical
social studies should be located. A critical assessment is offered of a specific social scientific theory which is, in some ways, typical of empirical social research.
This criticism is followed by a formulation of an alternative approach to empirical questions in the social sciences. The alternative approach is depicted as more sympathetic to the general perspective on social scientific theories outlined earlier.1989-01-01T00:00:00ZMcKinlay, AndrewThe thesis begins with a criticism of the 'theory of meaning' approach to the philosophy of language. It then goes on to establish an account of language understanding in terms of Wittgenstein's comments on rule-following and meaning as use. This characterization is extended to aspects of the philosophy of social science. Inferences are then drawn, on the basis of this extension, as to the overall framework within which empirical
social studies should be located. A critical assessment is offered of a specific social scientific theory which is, in some ways, typical of empirical social research.
This criticism is followed by a formulation of an alternative approach to empirical questions in the social sciences. The alternative approach is depicted as more sympathetic to the general perspective on social scientific theories outlined earlier.Overcoming the minority rights paradox : a new approach to intercultural deliberationhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3683
Abstract: The minority rights paradox is articulated at the level of political theory, is deployed by liberal democratic institutions, and can be observed in the political discourse of mass communications. Minority groups, it is argued, are paradoxically claiming purported rights that are unsupported by the values upon which the claimants base their claim. On the one hand, minority claims are made on the basis of rights secured by a liberal democracy; on the other hand, the claims undermine the legitimacy of liberal reasoning—the same reasoning that legitimizes the rights on which the claims are made. The self-referential implications of this paradox are as follows: Either the minority claim negates its own justification or the underlying justification renders the claim moot. In either case, the charge of paradox effectively puts an end to the conversation by dismissing minority rights claims before they are properly understood. My aim is to first, come to terms with political dialogues in which the charge of paradox occurs and second, to overcome the stultifying effects of the minority rights paradox through a deliberative approach to negotiating the concept and content of minority rights claims. Evaluating the claims of minorities, I will argue, requires a dialogue that can adapt to the participants in the dialogue—an inclusive deliberative process that gives formal, procedural and substantive recognition to the worldviews of minority cultures in political decision-making.2013-06-27T00:00:00ZLowe, Ruth E.The minority rights paradox is articulated at the level of political theory, is deployed by liberal democratic institutions, and can be observed in the political discourse of mass communications. Minority groups, it is argued, are paradoxically claiming purported rights that are unsupported by the values upon which the claimants base their claim. On the one hand, minority claims are made on the basis of rights secured by a liberal democracy; on the other hand, the claims undermine the legitimacy of liberal reasoning—the same reasoning that legitimizes the rights on which the claims are made. The self-referential implications of this paradox are as follows: Either the minority claim negates its own justification or the underlying justification renders the claim moot. In either case, the charge of paradox effectively puts an end to the conversation by dismissing minority rights claims before they are properly understood. My aim is to first, come to terms with political dialogues in which the charge of paradox occurs and second, to overcome the stultifying effects of the minority rights paradox through a deliberative approach to negotiating the concept and content of minority rights claims. Evaluating the claims of minorities, I will argue, requires a dialogue that can adapt to the participants in the dialogue—an inclusive deliberative process that gives formal, procedural and substantive recognition to the worldviews of minority cultures in political decision-making.On Wittgenstein's notion of the objectivity of mathematical proofshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3679
Abstract: This work analyses and defends Wittgenstein's definition of mathematical objectivity, looking particularly at his account of mathematical proofs, of what makes them normative, and what role mathematical and linguistic practices play in their establishment. It aims to provide a
clearer view of Wittgenstein's idea that the objectivity of proofs is inextricably rooted in empirical regularities, detected within what he calls our 'form of life', and which are in turn constituted by both regularities in nature and regularities in human practices. To accomplish this, the thesis makes an exhaustive analysis of Wittgenstein distinction between proofs and experiments. Drawing from Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, this paper addresses important criticisms that have hindered a serious study of his remarks on mathematics, and
vindicates his arguments as cogent, solid accounts of mathematical necessity and practice. This exploration will show that mathematical proofs do not have to be regarded as tools for the discovery of mathematical truths, of any sort, that depict mathematical facts, but can be
correctly characterised as norms that produce new understanding, forming new concepts to deal with reality, and which ultimately affect the very limits of intelligibility, of what we can think,
express and do. Thus, a philosophically relevant link between mathematical proofs and
possibilities of action is set.2013-06-01T00:00:00ZTrevino-Tarango, Martha AliciaThis work analyses and defends Wittgenstein's definition of mathematical objectivity, looking particularly at his account of mathematical proofs, of what makes them normative, and what role mathematical and linguistic practices play in their establishment. It aims to provide a
clearer view of Wittgenstein's idea that the objectivity of proofs is inextricably rooted in empirical regularities, detected within what he calls our 'form of life', and which are in turn constituted by both regularities in nature and regularities in human practices. To accomplish this, the thesis makes an exhaustive analysis of Wittgenstein distinction between proofs and experiments. Drawing from Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, this paper addresses important criticisms that have hindered a serious study of his remarks on mathematics, and
vindicates his arguments as cogent, solid accounts of mathematical necessity and practice. This exploration will show that mathematical proofs do not have to be regarded as tools for the discovery of mathematical truths, of any sort, that depict mathematical facts, but can be
correctly characterised as norms that produce new understanding, forming new concepts to deal with reality, and which ultimately affect the very limits of intelligibility, of what we can think,
express and do. Thus, a philosophically relevant link between mathematical proofs and
possibilities of action is set.Propositions : an essay on linguistic contenthttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3677
Abstract: This thesis presents an account of the nature of structured propositions and addresses a series of questions that arise from that proposal. Chapter 1 presents the account and explains how it meets standard objections to such views. Chapter 2 responds to the objection that this version of propositionalism is really a form of sententialism by arguing for the distinct advantages of the propositionalist view. Chapter 3 argues against a closely related view of propositions by way of general principles about how to construct such theories. Chapter 4 illustrates how a theory of propositions of the sort proposed can be defended against a recent argument that propositions need not play a central role in linguistic theory.2013-06-27T00:00:00ZHodgson, Thomas William StricklandThis thesis presents an account of the nature of structured propositions and addresses a series of questions that arise from that proposal. Chapter 1 presents the account and explains how it meets standard objections to such views. Chapter 2 responds to the objection that this version of propositionalism is really a form of sententialism by arguing for the distinct advantages of the propositionalist view. Chapter 3 argues against a closely related view of propositions by way of general principles about how to construct such theories. Chapter 4 illustrates how a theory of propositions of the sort proposed can be defended against a recent argument that propositions need not play a central role in linguistic theory.Defining art culturally : modern theories of art - a synthesishttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3675
Abstract: Numerous theories have attempted to overcome the anti-essentialist scepticism about the possibility of defining art. While significant advances have been made in this field, it seems that most modern definitions fail to successfully address the issue of the ever-changing nature of art raised by Morris Weitz, and rarely even attempt to provide an account which would be valid in more than just the modern Western context. This thesis looks at the most successful definitions currently defended, determines their strengths and weaknesses, and offers a new, cultural definition which can preserve the good elements of other theories, solve or avoid their problems, and have a scope wide enough to account for art of different times and cultures. The resulting theory is a synthetic one in that it preserves the essential institutionalism of Dickie's institutional views, is inspired by the historical and functional determination of artistic phenomena present in Levinson's historicism and Beardsley's functionalism, and presents the reasons for something becoming art in a disjunctive form of Gaut's cluster account. Its strengths lie in the ability to account for the changing art-status of objects in various cultures and at various times, providing an explanation of not only what is or was art, but also how and why the concept 'art' changes historically and differs between cultures, and successfully balancing between the over-generalisations of ahistorical and universalist views, and the uninformativeness of relativism. More broadly, the cultural theory stresses the importance of treating art as a historical phenomenon embedded in particular social and cultural settings, and encourages cooperation with other disciplines such as anthropology and history of art.2013-06-27T00:00:00ZFokt, SimonNumerous theories have attempted to overcome the anti-essentialist scepticism about the possibility of defining art. While significant advances have been made in this field, it seems that most modern definitions fail to successfully address the issue of the ever-changing nature of art raised by Morris Weitz, and rarely even attempt to provide an account which would be valid in more than just the modern Western context. This thesis looks at the most successful definitions currently defended, determines their strengths and weaknesses, and offers a new, cultural definition which can preserve the good elements of other theories, solve or avoid their problems, and have a scope wide enough to account for art of different times and cultures. The resulting theory is a synthetic one in that it preserves the essential institutionalism of Dickie's institutional views, is inspired by the historical and functional determination of artistic phenomena present in Levinson's historicism and Beardsley's functionalism, and presents the reasons for something becoming art in a disjunctive form of Gaut's cluster account. Its strengths lie in the ability to account for the changing art-status of objects in various cultures and at various times, providing an explanation of not only what is or was art, but also how and why the concept 'art' changes historically and differs between cultures, and successfully balancing between the over-generalisations of ahistorical and universalist views, and the uninformativeness of relativism. More broadly, the cultural theory stresses the importance of treating art as a historical phenomenon embedded in particular social and cultural settings, and encourages cooperation with other disciplines such as anthropology and history of art.Understanding : moral evaluation and the ethics of imagininghttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3667
Abstract: Analytic ethics often neglects the exploration and appreciation of morality as it is actually practised on a day-to-day basis. But by looking at how, in a practical sense, we are able to interact with others in a morally appropriate way we can construct a compelling picture of what some of our most pervasive obligations are. This thesis takes such an approach through the concept of understanding – understanding essentially taken here to involve those processes involved in detecting and correctly responding to beings typically possessing inherent moral significance. In the first two chapters ‘understanding’ and the understanding approach are themselves explicated, and placed in the context of several other related approaches in the English-speaking tradition – Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, Nel Noddings’ ethics of care and Richard Hare’s preference utilitarianism. This approach is then used to provide us with an alternative idea about what our moral reasoning suggests to be of fundamental ethical significance, and of what kinds of activity morality recommends to us. The activity explored in most detail here is that of engaging with fiction – or more broadly, fictive imaginings. While understanding shows us that fictional characters and events themselves cannot have an inherent moral valence or significance, it also shows us when and how it is possible and appropriate to ethically assess fictive engagement, be it as creator or consumer. This is seen after exploring how and in what ways our moral understanding can be appropriately applied to and exercised by fictions at all, and why fiction should be of particular interest to the understanding agent, looking at the work of Martha Nussbaum, Jenefer Robinson, Peter Lamarque and others on aesthetic cognitivism. Ultimately this leads us to discern a minimal ethical constraint on our interpretation of fiction and art in general, further proving understanding’s usefulness.2013-06-27T00:00:00ZWoerner, ChristopherAnalytic ethics often neglects the exploration and appreciation of morality as it is actually practised on a day-to-day basis. But by looking at how, in a practical sense, we are able to interact with others in a morally appropriate way we can construct a compelling picture of what some of our most pervasive obligations are. This thesis takes such an approach through the concept of understanding – understanding essentially taken here to involve those processes involved in detecting and correctly responding to beings typically possessing inherent moral significance. In the first two chapters ‘understanding’ and the understanding approach are themselves explicated, and placed in the context of several other related approaches in the English-speaking tradition – Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, Nel Noddings’ ethics of care and Richard Hare’s preference utilitarianism. This approach is then used to provide us with an alternative idea about what our moral reasoning suggests to be of fundamental ethical significance, and of what kinds of activity morality recommends to us. The activity explored in most detail here is that of engaging with fiction – or more broadly, fictive imaginings. While understanding shows us that fictional characters and events themselves cannot have an inherent moral valence or significance, it also shows us when and how it is possible and appropriate to ethically assess fictive engagement, be it as creator or consumer. This is seen after exploring how and in what ways our moral understanding can be appropriately applied to and exercised by fictions at all, and why fiction should be of particular interest to the understanding agent, looking at the work of Martha Nussbaum, Jenefer Robinson, Peter Lamarque and others on aesthetic cognitivism. Ultimately this leads us to discern a minimal ethical constraint on our interpretation of fiction and art in general, further proving understanding’s usefulness.John Locke on persons and personal identityhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3609
Abstract: John Locke claims both that ‘person’ is a forensic term and that personal
identity consists in sameness of consciousness. The aim of my dissertation is
to explain and critically assess how Locke links his moral and legal account
of personhood to his account of personal identity in terms of sameness of
consciousness.
My interpretation of Locke’s account of persons and personal identity is
embedded in Locke’s sortal-dependent account of identity. Locke’s sortal-dependent
account of identity provides an important theoretical framework
for my interpretation: It makes clear that Locke’s account of personhood
is to be considered separately from his account of personal identity. My
approach gives full credit to Locke’s claim that ‘person’ is a forensic term,
because I argue that persons, according to Locke, belong to a moral and legal
kind of being: they are subjects of accountability. On this basis I argue that
two components explain why Locke argues that personal identity consists in
sameness of consciousness: firstly, his particular moral and legal conception
of a person, and, secondly, his particular understanding of the conditions of
just accountability and just reward and punishment.
Given one accepts Locke’s conception of a person and his understanding
of the conditions of just accountability, it will be easy to see why Locke
regards sameness of consciousness to be necessary for personal identity, but
the more challenging question is whether sameness of consciousness is also
sufficient. I critically assess this question by considering Locke’s account of
persons and personal identity within Locke’s epistemological, metaphysical
and religious views. I will argue that, at least from the divine perspective,
the underlying ontological constitution has to be taken into consideration and
that it is a verbal question whether Locke’s term ‘consciousness’ refers not
only to phenomenologically given consciousness, but also to the underlying
ontological constitution.2013-06-27T00:00:00ZBoeker, RuthJohn Locke claims both that ‘person’ is a forensic term and that personal
identity consists in sameness of consciousness. The aim of my dissertation is
to explain and critically assess how Locke links his moral and legal account
of personhood to his account of personal identity in terms of sameness of
consciousness.
My interpretation of Locke’s account of persons and personal identity is
embedded in Locke’s sortal-dependent account of identity. Locke’s sortal-dependent
account of identity provides an important theoretical framework
for my interpretation: It makes clear that Locke’s account of personhood
is to be considered separately from his account of personal identity. My
approach gives full credit to Locke’s claim that ‘person’ is a forensic term,
because I argue that persons, according to Locke, belong to a moral and legal
kind of being: they are subjects of accountability. On this basis I argue that
two components explain why Locke argues that personal identity consists in
sameness of consciousness: firstly, his particular moral and legal conception
of a person, and, secondly, his particular understanding of the conditions of
just accountability and just reward and punishment.
Given one accepts Locke’s conception of a person and his understanding
of the conditions of just accountability, it will be easy to see why Locke
regards sameness of consciousness to be necessary for personal identity, but
the more challenging question is whether sameness of consciousness is also
sufficient. I critically assess this question by considering Locke’s account of
persons and personal identity within Locke’s epistemological, metaphysical
and religious views. I will argue that, at least from the divine perspective,
the underlying ontological constitution has to be taken into consideration and
that it is a verbal question whether Locke’s term ‘consciousness’ refers not
only to phenomenologically given consciousness, but also to the underlying
ontological constitution.Emotional responses to interactive fictionshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3595
Abstract: We commonly feel a variety of emotional responses to works of fiction. In this thesis I propose to examine what we understand by the terms fictional and narrative, and to describe what sorts of narrator might be required within a narrative work.
Of particular interest are interactive works of art, both narrative and non-narrative, and I provide a definition of what features a work should possess if it should properly be considered interactive. I discuss the notions of interactive narratives and examine how interactivity affects any possible narrator.
I examine the paradox of fiction - how it is that we can feel emotions towards characters
we know not to exist, and suggest how the paradox can be dissolved. I further discuss
how it can be rational to feel these emotional responses and note particular responses that it does not seem possible to feel rationally when engaging with non-interactive narratives.
I then examine what effect the introduction of interactivity to both non-narrative and
narrative works has, and argue that it reduces the control the artist has to direct our emotions, but increases the range of emotions which we can feel. Finally I suggest that some of the emotional responses that would be irrational to feel when engaging with non-interactive narrative works can be rational when we are engaged with their interactive counterparts, but that at least one emotional response cannot genuinely be felt rationally even in interactive cases.2012-01-01T00:00:00ZHagger, AndrzejWe commonly feel a variety of emotional responses to works of fiction. In this thesis I propose to examine what we understand by the terms fictional and narrative, and to describe what sorts of narrator might be required within a narrative work.
Of particular interest are interactive works of art, both narrative and non-narrative, and I provide a definition of what features a work should possess if it should properly be considered interactive. I discuss the notions of interactive narratives and examine how interactivity affects any possible narrator.
I examine the paradox of fiction - how it is that we can feel emotions towards characters
we know not to exist, and suggest how the paradox can be dissolved. I further discuss
how it can be rational to feel these emotional responses and note particular responses that it does not seem possible to feel rationally when engaging with non-interactive narratives.
I then examine what effect the introduction of interactivity to both non-narrative and
narrative works has, and argue that it reduces the control the artist has to direct our emotions, but increases the range of emotions which we can feel. Finally I suggest that some of the emotional responses that would be irrational to feel when engaging with non-interactive narrative works can be rational when we are engaged with their interactive counterparts, but that at least one emotional response cannot genuinely be felt rationally even in interactive cases.The concept of happiness in Kant's moral, legal and political philosophyhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3547
Abstract: This doctoral thesis analyzes the systematic role of Kant’s conception of happiness in his moral, legal and political theory. Although many of his conclusions and arguments are directly or indirectly influenced by his conception of human happiness, Kant’s underlying assumptions are rarely overtly discussed or given much detail in his works. Kant also provides different and apparently incompatible definitions of happiness. This research explores the domains of Kant’s practical philosophy in which his conception of happiness plays a systematic role: the relation between the natural need of human beings to pursue happiness and the ends-oriented structure of the human will; Kant’s anti-eudaimonism in ethical theory; Kant’s claim that we have an indirect duty to promote our own happiness and the problem that under certain circumstances, the indeterminacy of happiness makes it not irrational to choose short term satisfaction at the costs of one’s overall, long term happiness, given Kant’s conception of non-moral choice as expectation of pleasure; Kant’s justification of the duty to adopt the happiness of others as our ends (the duty of beneficence) and the latitude and eventual demandingness of this duty; finally, since Kant also subsumes subsistence needs and welfare under the concept of happiness of individuals, I also engage with the question of state provision for the poor in the Kantian Rechtsstaat and explore Kant’s conception of equity or fairness (Billigkeit) as an alternative to the traditional minimalist and the welfare interpretations of the Kantian state.2012-11-30T00:00:00ZPinheiro Walla, AliceThis doctoral thesis analyzes the systematic role of Kant’s conception of happiness in his moral, legal and political theory. Although many of his conclusions and arguments are directly or indirectly influenced by his conception of human happiness, Kant’s underlying assumptions are rarely overtly discussed or given much detail in his works. Kant also provides different and apparently incompatible definitions of happiness. This research explores the domains of Kant’s practical philosophy in which his conception of happiness plays a systematic role: the relation between the natural need of human beings to pursue happiness and the ends-oriented structure of the human will; Kant’s anti-eudaimonism in ethical theory; Kant’s claim that we have an indirect duty to promote our own happiness and the problem that under certain circumstances, the indeterminacy of happiness makes it not irrational to choose short term satisfaction at the costs of one’s overall, long term happiness, given Kant’s conception of non-moral choice as expectation of pleasure; Kant’s justification of the duty to adopt the happiness of others as our ends (the duty of beneficence) and the latitude and eventual demandingness of this duty; finally, since Kant also subsumes subsistence needs and welfare under the concept of happiness of individuals, I also engage with the question of state provision for the poor in the Kantian Rechtsstaat and explore Kant’s conception of equity or fairness (Billigkeit) as an alternative to the traditional minimalist and the welfare interpretations of the Kantian state.Appealing to intuitionshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3544
Abstract: This thesis is concerned with the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of intuitions in philosophy. It consists of an introduction, Chapter 1, and three main parts.
In the first part, Chapter 2, I defend an account of intuitions as appearance states according to which intuitions cannot be reduced to beliefs or belief-like states. I argue that an account of intuitions as appearance states can explain some crucial phenomena with respect to intuitions better than popular accounts in the current debate over the ontology of intuitions.
The second part, Chapters 3 to 5, is a reply to Timothy Williamson’s (2004, 2007) view on the epistemology and methodology of intuitions. The practice of appealing to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence from thought experiments has recently been criticised by experimental philosophers. Williamson argues that since thought experiments reliably lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition, we can avoid this criticism and the resulting sceptical threat by appealing to the content of the intuition. I agree that thought experiments usually lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition. However, I show that appealing to the fact that we have an intuition is a common and useful practice. I defend the view that for methodological reasons, we ought to appeal to the fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence from thought experiments.
The third part, Chapter 6, is devoted to a paradigm method involving intuitions: the method of reflective equilibrium. Some philosophers have recently claimed that it is trivial and could even accommodate scepticism about the reliability of intuitions. I argue that reflective equilibrium is not compatible with such scepticism. While it is compatible with the view I defend in the second part of the thesis, more specific methodological claims have to be made.2013-06-27T00:00:00ZLangkau, JuliaThis thesis is concerned with the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of intuitions in philosophy. It consists of an introduction, Chapter 1, and three main parts.
In the first part, Chapter 2, I defend an account of intuitions as appearance states according to which intuitions cannot be reduced to beliefs or belief-like states. I argue that an account of intuitions as appearance states can explain some crucial phenomena with respect to intuitions better than popular accounts in the current debate over the ontology of intuitions.
The second part, Chapters 3 to 5, is a reply to Timothy Williamson’s (2004, 2007) view on the epistemology and methodology of intuitions. The practice of appealing to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence from thought experiments has recently been criticised by experimental philosophers. Williamson argues that since thought experiments reliably lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition, we can avoid this criticism and the resulting sceptical threat by appealing to the content of the intuition. I agree that thought experiments usually lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition. However, I show that appealing to the fact that we have an intuition is a common and useful practice. I defend the view that for methodological reasons, we ought to appeal to the fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence from thought experiments.
The third part, Chapter 6, is devoted to a paradigm method involving intuitions: the method of reflective equilibrium. Some philosophers have recently claimed that it is trivial and could even accommodate scepticism about the reliability of intuitions. I argue that reflective equilibrium is not compatible with such scepticism. While it is compatible with the view I defend in the second part of the thesis, more specific methodological claims have to be made.Epistemic theories of democracy, constitutionalism and the procedural legitimacy of fundamental rightshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3465
Abstract: The overall aim of this thesis is to assess the legitimacy of constitutional laws and bills of rights within the framework of procedural epistemic democracy. The thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss the relevance of an epistemic argument for democracy under the circumstances of politics: I provide an account of reasonable disagreement and explain how usual approaches to the authority of decision-making procedures fail to take it seriously. In the second part of the thesis, I provide an account of the epistemic features of democracy and of the requirements of democratic legitimacy. I develop a revised pragmatist argument for democracy which relies on three presumptive aims of decision-making: justice, sustainability and concord. In the third and last section, I first argue for the desirability of constitutionalism. I then explain why constitutionalism, as it is usually understood, is incompatible with my procedural epistemic account of democratic legitimacy. In the last chapter, I offer a two-pronged solution to the apparent incompatibility of constitutionalism and epistemic democracy. I first argue for the appropriateness of political constitutionalism, as opposed to legal constitutionalism, in understanding the relationship between rights and democracy. I then provide an account of rights protection and judicial review compatible with epistemic democratic legitimacy. Finally, I use the notion of pragmatic encroachment to explain how constitutional laws can achieve normative supremacy through the increased epistemic credentials of the procedure.2012-11-30T00:00:00ZAllard-Tremblay, YannThe overall aim of this thesis is to assess the legitimacy of constitutional laws and bills of rights within the framework of procedural epistemic democracy. The thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss the relevance of an epistemic argument for democracy under the circumstances of politics: I provide an account of reasonable disagreement and explain how usual approaches to the authority of decision-making procedures fail to take it seriously. In the second part of the thesis, I provide an account of the epistemic features of democracy and of the requirements of democratic legitimacy. I develop a revised pragmatist argument for democracy which relies on three presumptive aims of decision-making: justice, sustainability and concord. In the third and last section, I first argue for the desirability of constitutionalism. I then explain why constitutionalism, as it is usually understood, is incompatible with my procedural epistemic account of democratic legitimacy. In the last chapter, I offer a two-pronged solution to the apparent incompatibility of constitutionalism and epistemic democracy. I first argue for the appropriateness of political constitutionalism, as opposed to legal constitutionalism, in understanding the relationship between rights and democracy. I then provide an account of rights protection and judicial review compatible with epistemic democratic legitimacy. Finally, I use the notion of pragmatic encroachment to explain how constitutional laws can achieve normative supremacy through the increased epistemic credentials of the procedure.Concepts in contexthttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3462
2013-01-01T00:00:00ZOnofri, AndreaOn the contrary: disagreement, context, and relative truthhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3360
2012-11-30T00:00:00ZHuvenes, Torfinn ThomesenDown to earth philosophy: an anti-exceptionalist essay on thought experiments and philosophical methodologyhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3228
Abstract: In the first part of the dissertation, chapters 1 to 3, I criticize several views which tend to set philosophy apart from other cognitive achievements. I argue against the popular views that 1) Intuitions, as a sui generis mental state, are involved crucially in philosophical
methodology 2) Philosophy requires engagement in conceptual analysis, understood as the activity of considering thought experiments with the aim to throw light on the nature of our concepts, and 3) Much philosophical knowledge is a priori. I do not claim to have a proof that nothing in the vicinity of these views is correct; such a proof might well be impossible to give. However, I consider several versions, usually prominent ones, of each of the views, and I show those versions to be defective. Quite often, moreover, different versions of the same
worry apply to different versions of the same theory. In the fourth chapter I discuss the epistemology of the judgements involved in philosophical thought experiments, arguing that their justification depends on their being the product of a competence in applying the concepts involved, a competence which goes beyond the possession of the concepts. I then offer, drawing from empirical psychology, a sketch of
the form this cognitive competence could take. The overall picture squares well with the conclusions of the first part. In the last chapter I consider a challenge to the use of thought experiments in contemporary analytic philosophy coming from the ‘experimental philosophy’ movement. I argue that there is no way of individuating the class of hypothetical judgements under discussion which makes the challenge both interesting and sound. Moreover, I argue
that there are reasons to think that philosophers possess some sort of expertise which sets them apart from non-philosophers in relevant ways.2012-11-30T00:00:00ZSgaravatti, DanieleIn the first part of the dissertation, chapters 1 to 3, I criticize several views which tend to set philosophy apart from other cognitive achievements. I argue against the popular views that 1) Intuitions, as a sui generis mental state, are involved crucially in philosophical
methodology 2) Philosophy requires engagement in conceptual analysis, understood as the activity of considering thought experiments with the aim to throw light on the nature of our concepts, and 3) Much philosophical knowledge is a priori. I do not claim to have a proof that nothing in the vicinity of these views is correct; such a proof might well be impossible to give. However, I consider several versions, usually prominent ones, of each of the views, and I show those versions to be defective. Quite often, moreover, different versions of the same
worry apply to different versions of the same theory. In the fourth chapter I discuss the epistemology of the judgements involved in philosophical thought experiments, arguing that their justification depends on their being the product of a competence in applying the concepts involved, a competence which goes beyond the possession of the concepts. I then offer, drawing from empirical psychology, a sketch of
the form this cognitive competence could take. The overall picture squares well with the conclusions of the first part. In the last chapter I consider a challenge to the use of thought experiments in contemporary analytic philosophy coming from the ‘experimental philosophy’ movement. I argue that there is no way of individuating the class of hypothetical judgements under discussion which makes the challenge both interesting and sound. Moreover, I argue
that there are reasons to think that philosophers possess some sort of expertise which sets them apart from non-philosophers in relevant ways.Poincaré against foundationalists old and newhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3212
Abstract: The early 20th century witnessed concerted research in foundationalism
in mathematics. Those pursuing a basis for mathematics included Hilbert, Russell,
Zermelo, Frege, and Dedekind. They found a vocal opponent in Poincaré, whose
attacks were numerous, vituperative, and often indiscriminate. One of the objections
was the petitio argument that claimed a circularity in foundationalist arguments. Any
derivation of mathematical axioms from a supposedly simpler system would employ
induction, one of the very axioms purportedly derived.
Historically, these attacks became somewhat moot as both Frege and Hilbert had
their programs devastated-Frege's by Russell's paradox and Hilbert's by Godel's
incompleteness result. However, the publication of Frege's Conception of Numbers
as Objects by Crispin Wright began the neo-logicist program of reviving
Frege's project while avoiding Russell's paradox. The neo-logicist holds that Frege's
theorem-the derivation of mathematical axioms from Hume's Principle(HP) and
second-order logic-combined with the transparency of logic and the analyticity of
HP guarantees knowledge of numbers. Moreover, the neo-logicist conception of language
and reality as inextricably intertwined guarantees the objective existence of
numbers. In this context, whether or not a revived version of the petitio objection
can be made against the revived logicist project.
The current project investigates Poincaré's philosophy of arithmetic-his psychologism,
conception of intuition, and understanding of induction, and then evaluates
the effectiveness of his petitio objection against three foundationalist groups: Hilbert's
early and late programs, the logicists, and the neo-logicists.2011-11-30T00:00:00ZSands, Michael Thomas Jr.The early 20th century witnessed concerted research in foundationalism
in mathematics. Those pursuing a basis for mathematics included Hilbert, Russell,
Zermelo, Frege, and Dedekind. They found a vocal opponent in Poincaré, whose
attacks were numerous, vituperative, and often indiscriminate. One of the objections
was the petitio argument that claimed a circularity in foundationalist arguments. Any
derivation of mathematical axioms from a supposedly simpler system would employ
induction, one of the very axioms purportedly derived.
Historically, these attacks became somewhat moot as both Frege and Hilbert had
their programs devastated-Frege's by Russell's paradox and Hilbert's by Godel's
incompleteness result. However, the publication of Frege's Conception of Numbers
as Objects by Crispin Wright began the neo-logicist program of reviving
Frege's project while avoiding Russell's paradox. The neo-logicist holds that Frege's
theorem-the derivation of mathematical axioms from Hume's Principle(HP) and
second-order logic-combined with the transparency of logic and the analyticity of
HP guarantees knowledge of numbers. Moreover, the neo-logicist conception of language
and reality as inextricably intertwined guarantees the objective existence of
numbers. In this context, whether or not a revived version of the petitio objection
can be made against the revived logicist project.
The current project investigates Poincaré's philosophy of arithmetic-his psychologism,
conception of intuition, and understanding of induction, and then evaluates
the effectiveness of his petitio objection against three foundationalist groups: Hilbert's
early and late programs, the logicists, and the neo-logicists.Knowledge, chance, and contrasthttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3202
Abstract: The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the rise of contextualist theories of knowledge
ascriptions (and denials). Contextualists about ‘knows’ maintain that utterances of the
form ‘S knows p’ and ‘S doesn’t know p’ resemble utterances such as ‘Peter is here’
and ‘Peter is not here’, in the sense that their truth-conditions vary depending upon
features of the context in which they are uttered. In recent years, contextualism about
‘knows’ has come under heavy attack. This has been associated with a proliferation of
defences of so-called invariantist accounts of knowledge ascriptions, which stand
united in their rejection of contextualism.
The central goal of the present work is two-fold. In the first instance, it is to bring out
the serious pitfalls in many of those recent defences of invariantism. In the second
instance, it is to establish that the most plausible form of invariantism is one that is
sceptical in character. Of course, the prevailing preference in epistemology is for non-
sceptical accounts. The central conclusions of the thesis might therefore be taken to
show that – despite recent attacks on its plausibility – some form of contextualism
about ‘knows’ must be correct. However, this project is not undertaken without at
least the suspicion that embracing (a particular form of) sceptical invariantism is to be
preferred to embracing contextualism. In the course of the discussion, I therefore not
only attempt to rebut some standard objections to sceptical invariantism, but also to
reveal – in at least a preliminary way – how the sceptical invariantist might best argue
for the superiority of her account to that of the contextualist.2012-11-30T00:00:00ZDimmock, PaulThe late 1980s and early 1990s saw the rise of contextualist theories of knowledge
ascriptions (and denials). Contextualists about ‘knows’ maintain that utterances of the
form ‘S knows p’ and ‘S doesn’t know p’ resemble utterances such as ‘Peter is here’
and ‘Peter is not here’, in the sense that their truth-conditions vary depending upon
features of the context in which they are uttered. In recent years, contextualism about
‘knows’ has come under heavy attack. This has been associated with a proliferation of
defences of so-called invariantist accounts of knowledge ascriptions, which stand
united in their rejection of contextualism.
The central goal of the present work is two-fold. In the first instance, it is to bring out
the serious pitfalls in many of those recent defences of invariantism. In the second
instance, it is to establish that the most plausible form of invariantism is one that is
sceptical in character. Of course, the prevailing preference in epistemology is for non-
sceptical accounts. The central conclusions of the thesis might therefore be taken to
show that – despite recent attacks on its plausibility – some form of contextualism
about ‘knows’ must be correct. However, this project is not undertaken without at
least the suspicion that embracing (a particular form of) sceptical invariantism is to be
preferred to embracing contextualism. In the course of the discussion, I therefore not
only attempt to rebut some standard objections to sceptical invariantism, but also to
reveal – in at least a preliminary way – how the sceptical invariantist might best argue
for the superiority of her account to that of the contextualist.The ideal role of women in Plato's and Aristotle's societieshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3201
Abstract: This dissertation analyzes Plato’s and Aristotle’s
conception of women’s proper role in the state. The first chapter
demonstrates that due to Plato’s belief that the soul is sexless it is
impossible to determine one’s role in society by one’s sex. Plato’s
claim in the Republic that women who are qualified by nature will
become guardians is therefore consistent with his larger view that
one’s role in society should only be based on one’s nature. Since the
only distinction between male and female Guardians is that women
give birth to children and are physically weaker than men, there is no
justification for barring women from the Guardian class. The second
chapter turns to the Symposium and Plato’s thoughts on intellectual as
well as physical pregnancy, and specifically that according to Plato the
process of giving birth does not affect a woman’s soul or capacity to
reason. In the third chapter I demonstrate that even outside the ideal
city of the Republic, Plato does not revise his position on women’s
capacities. The Laws is more concerned with practicality than the
Republic and Plato is therefore forced to make concessions which limit
women’s opportunity to govern, but such concessions are minor. This
chapter also emphasizes Plato’s belief that good laws make good
people and describes how this realization enables him to recognize
that the poor condition of the women in Classical Athens is due to
Athenian social institutions and not to women’s inferior nature. Finally,
the fourth chapter turns to Aristotle and seeks to prove that his
position on women’s role in the state is far more nuanced than
appreciated.2012-06-19T00:00:00ZJawin, AlixandraThis dissertation analyzes Plato’s and Aristotle’s
conception of women’s proper role in the state. The first chapter
demonstrates that due to Plato’s belief that the soul is sexless it is
impossible to determine one’s role in society by one’s sex. Plato’s
claim in the Republic that women who are qualified by nature will
become guardians is therefore consistent with his larger view that
one’s role in society should only be based on one’s nature. Since the
only distinction between male and female Guardians is that women
give birth to children and are physically weaker than men, there is no
justification for barring women from the Guardian class. The second
chapter turns to the Symposium and Plato’s thoughts on intellectual as
well as physical pregnancy, and specifically that according to Plato the
process of giving birth does not affect a woman’s soul or capacity to
reason. In the third chapter I demonstrate that even outside the ideal
city of the Republic, Plato does not revise his position on women’s
capacities. The Laws is more concerned with practicality than the
Republic and Plato is therefore forced to make concessions which limit
women’s opportunity to govern, but such concessions are minor. This
chapter also emphasizes Plato’s belief that good laws make good
people and describes how this realization enables him to recognize
that the poor condition of the women in Classical Athens is due to
Athenian social institutions and not to women’s inferior nature. Finally,
the fourth chapter turns to Aristotle and seeks to prove that his
position on women’s role in the state is far more nuanced than
appreciated.Perspective in context : relative truth, knowledge, and the first personhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3164
Abstract: This dissertation is about the nature of perspectival thoughts and the context-sensitivity of the language used to express them. It focuses on two kinds of perspectival thoughts: ‘subjective’ evaluative thoughts about matters of personal taste, such as 'Beetroot is delicious' or 'Skydiving is fun', and first-personal or de se thoughts about oneself, such as 'I am hungry' or 'I have been fooled.' The dissertation defends of a novel form of relativism about truth - the idea that the truth of some (but not all) perspectival thought and talk is relative to the perspective of an evaluating subject or group.
In Part I, I argue that the realm of ‘subjective’ evaluative thought and talk whose truth is perspective-relative includes attributions of knowledge of the form ’S knows that p.’ Following a brief introduction (chapter 1), chapter 2 presents a new, error-theoretic objection against relativism about knowledge attributions. The case for relativism regarding knowledge attributions rests on the claim that relativism is the only view that explains all of the empirical data from speakers' use of the word "know" without recourse to an error theory. In chapter 2, I show that the relativist can only account for sceptical paradoxes and ordinary epistemic closure puzzles if she attributes a problematic form of semantic blindness to speakers. However, in 3 I show that all major competitor theories - forms of invariantism and contextualism - are subject to equally serious error-theoretic objections. This raises the following fundamental question for empirical theorising about the meaning of natural language expressions: If error attributions are ubiquitous, by which criteria do we evaluate and compare the force of error-theoretic objections and the plausibility of error attributions? I provide a number of criteria and argue that they give us reason to think that relativism's error attributions are more plausible than those of its competitors.
In Part II, I develop a novel unified account of the content and communication of perspectival thoughts. Many relativists regarding ‘subjective’ thoughts and Lewisians about de se thoughts endorse a view of belief as self-location. In chapter 4, I argue that the self-location view of belief is in conflict with the received picture of linguistic communication, which understands communication as the transmission of information from speaker's head to hearer's head. I argue that understanding mental content and speech act content in terms of sequenced worlds allows a reconciliation of these views. On the view I advocate, content is modelled as a set of sequenced worlds - possible worlds ‘centred’ on a group of individuals inhabiting the world at some time. Intuitively, a sequenced world is a way a group of people may be. I develop a Stalnakerian model of communication based on sequenced worlds content, and I provide a suitable semantics for personal pronouns and predicates of personal taste. In chapter 5, I show that one of the advantages of this model is its compatibility with both nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism about taste. I argue in chapters 5 and 6 that the empirical data from eavesdropping, retraction, and disagreement cases supports a relativist completion of the model, and I show in detail how to account for these phenomena on the sequenced worlds view.2012-11-30T00:00:00ZKindermann, DirkThis dissertation is about the nature of perspectival thoughts and the context-sensitivity of the language used to express them. It focuses on two kinds of perspectival thoughts: ‘subjective’ evaluative thoughts about matters of personal taste, such as 'Beetroot is delicious' or 'Skydiving is fun', and first-personal or de se thoughts about oneself, such as 'I am hungry' or 'I have been fooled.' The dissertation defends of a novel form of relativism about truth - the idea that the truth of some (but not all) perspectival thought and talk is relative to the perspective of an evaluating subject or group.
In Part I, I argue that the realm of ‘subjective’ evaluative thought and talk whose truth is perspective-relative includes attributions of knowledge of the form ’S knows that p.’ Following a brief introduction (chapter 1), chapter 2 presents a new, error-theoretic objection against relativism about knowledge attributions. The case for relativism regarding knowledge attributions rests on the claim that relativism is the only view that explains all of the empirical data from speakers' use of the word "know" without recourse to an error theory. In chapter 2, I show that the relativist can only account for sceptical paradoxes and ordinary epistemic closure puzzles if she attributes a problematic form of semantic blindness to speakers. However, in 3 I show that all major competitor theories - forms of invariantism and contextualism - are subject to equally serious error-theoretic objections. This raises the following fundamental question for empirical theorising about the meaning of natural language expressions: If error attributions are ubiquitous, by which criteria do we evaluate and compare the force of error-theoretic objections and the plausibility of error attributions? I provide a number of criteria and argue that they give us reason to think that relativism's error attributions are more plausible than those of its competitors.
In Part II, I develop a novel unified account of the content and communication of perspectival thoughts. Many relativists regarding ‘subjective’ thoughts and Lewisians about de se thoughts endorse a view of belief as self-location. In chapter 4, I argue that the self-location view of belief is in conflict with the received picture of linguistic communication, which understands communication as the transmission of information from speaker's head to hearer's head. I argue that understanding mental content and speech act content in terms of sequenced worlds allows a reconciliation of these views. On the view I advocate, content is modelled as a set of sequenced worlds - possible worlds ‘centred’ on a group of individuals inhabiting the world at some time. Intuitively, a sequenced world is a way a group of people may be. I develop a Stalnakerian model of communication based on sequenced worlds content, and I provide a suitable semantics for personal pronouns and predicates of personal taste. In chapter 5, I show that one of the advantages of this model is its compatibility with both nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism about taste. I argue in chapters 5 and 6 that the empirical data from eavesdropping, retraction, and disagreement cases supports a relativist completion of the model, and I show in detail how to account for these phenomena on the sequenced worlds view.The answering machine paradoxhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3150
Abstract: The answering machine paradox has relatively recently sparked some debate
regarding Kaplan’s Demonstrative (1977). A popular approach to solve the
answering machine paradox has been to reject Kaplan’s proper context thesis whilst
largely maintaining his framework for indexicals. In this thesis I will firstly present
two new answering machine type cases and argue that the existing solutions to the
answering machine paradox cannot deal with these cases. Then, I will propose a
near-side pragmatic solution to the answering machine paradox that adequately deals
with these new answering machine cases in a way that adheres with our pre-theoretical intuitions.2012-01-01T00:00:00ZGudmundsson, DavidThe answering machine paradox has relatively recently sparked some debate
regarding Kaplan’s Demonstrative (1977). A popular approach to solve the
answering machine paradox has been to reject Kaplan’s proper context thesis whilst
largely maintaining his framework for indexicals. In this thesis I will firstly present
two new answering machine type cases and argue that the existing solutions to the
answering machine paradox cannot deal with these cases. Then, I will propose a
near-side pragmatic solution to the answering machine paradox that adequately deals
with these new answering machine cases in a way that adheres with our pre-theoretical intuitions.The routes of sense : thought, semantic underdeterminacy and compositionalityhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3142
Abstract: What does it mean to be a rational language user? What is it to obey
linguistic rules? What is the proper account of linguistic competence?
A Fregean answer to these questions would make essential appeal
to the notion of sense: we are masters of a language to the extent
that we are able to recognise the cognitive value of its expressions; we
are rational judges regarding truth-value assignments to the extent
that we are sensitive to the ways in which the sense of an expression
guides us in the semantic evaluation process; and as for obeying rules,
it is our ability to respond to how sense directs us, for a particular
assertion of a sentence, towards the determination of its truth-value
that best exemplifies what it is like to follow a linguistic rule.
My thesis explores a cluster of closely interrelated issues arising
from these questions (whether or not considered from a Fregean perspective).
Accordingly, in tracing the routes of sense my dissertation places
itself at the intersection of the philosophy of language, linguistics,
philosophy of logic, and meta-ethics—and indeed, I end up agreeing
with Allan Gibbard that the theory of meaning really belongs to
meta-ethical reflection.
Chapter 1 introduces some of the main research questions that I try
to address in the rest of the thesis.
In chapter 2 I state a number of theses which I take to be the defining
ones for semanticism. I show that they form a class of jointly
incompatible commitments. I choose nonsense as a problem case for
compositionality and I argue that it forces the semanticist to abandon
either the learnability or the compositionality constraint. The
escape route I adopt, going radically minimalist about content, is incompatible
with another key semanticist thesis, namely, that grasp of
meaning is grasp of truth-conditions (robustly conceived).
In chapter 3, I consider the account of atomic meanings given by
both the semanticist and the pragmaticist and I conclude that on neither
account does interpretation come out as a process of rational choice between candidate bearers of content. Again, I suggest the lesson
from indeterminacy is that we ought to embrace an ineradicably
minimal conception of content.
In chapter 4 I turn my attention to the meaning of the logical constants
and I argue that indeterminacy worries extend to the very heart
of the compositional machinery.
Chapter 5 examines the view that logic is the science of reasoning.
Unsurprisingly, I conclude that a defence of this claim requires endorsing
content-minimalism.
In chapter 6 I conclude my dissertation by sketching a radical view
of content minimalism and I try to show how it can solve the puzzles
I had been considering over the course of the previous chapters.2012-01-01T00:00:00ZPedriali, Walter B.What does it mean to be a rational language user? What is it to obey
linguistic rules? What is the proper account of linguistic competence?
A Fregean answer to these questions would make essential appeal
to the notion of sense: we are masters of a language to the extent
that we are able to recognise the cognitive value of its expressions; we
are rational judges regarding truth-value assignments to the extent
that we are sensitive to the ways in which the sense of an expression
guides us in the semantic evaluation process; and as for obeying rules,
it is our ability to respond to how sense directs us, for a particular
assertion of a sentence, towards the determination of its truth-value
that best exemplifies what it is like to follow a linguistic rule.
My thesis explores a cluster of closely interrelated issues arising
from these questions (whether or not considered from a Fregean perspective).
Accordingly, in tracing the routes of sense my dissertation places
itself at the intersection of the philosophy of language, linguistics,
philosophy of logic, and meta-ethics—and indeed, I end up agreeing
with Allan Gibbard that the theory of meaning really belongs to
meta-ethical reflection.
Chapter 1 introduces some of the main research questions that I try
to address in the rest of the thesis.
In chapter 2 I state a number of theses which I take to be the defining
ones for semanticism. I show that they form a class of jointly
incompatible commitments. I choose nonsense as a problem case for
compositionality and I argue that it forces the semanticist to abandon
either the learnability or the compositionality constraint. The
escape route I adopt, going radically minimalist about content, is incompatible
with another key semanticist thesis, namely, that grasp of
meaning is grasp of truth-conditions (robustly conceived).
In chapter 3, I consider the account of atomic meanings given by
both the semanticist and the pragmaticist and I conclude that on neither
account does interpretation come out as a process of rational choice between candidate bearers of content. Again, I suggest the lesson
from indeterminacy is that we ought to embrace an ineradicably
minimal conception of content.
In chapter 4 I turn my attention to the meaning of the logical constants
and I argue that indeterminacy worries extend to the very heart
of the compositional machinery.
Chapter 5 examines the view that logic is the science of reasoning.
Unsurprisingly, I conclude that a defence of this claim requires endorsing
content-minimalism.
In chapter 6 I conclude my dissertation by sketching a radical view
of content minimalism and I try to show how it can solve the puzzles
I had been considering over the course of the previous chapters.Virtue epistemology and the analysis of knowledgehttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3118
Abstract: This thesis centers on two trends in epistemology: (i) the dissatisfaction with the reductive analysis of knowledge, the project of explicating knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, and (ii) the popularity of virtue-theoretic epistemologies. The goal of this thesis is to endorse non-reductive virtue epistemology. Given that prominent renditions of virtue epistemology assume the reductive model, however, such a move is not straightforward—work needs to be done to elucidate what is wrong with the reductive model, in general, and why reductive accounts of virtue epistemology, specifically, are lacking.
The first part of this thesis involves diagnosing what is wrong with the reductive model and defending that diagnosis against objections. The problem with the reductive project is the Gettier Problem. In Chapter 1, I lend credence to Linda Zagzebski’s grim 1994 diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the abandonment of the reductive model) by examining the nature of luck, the key component of Gettier problems. In Chapter 2, I vindicate this diagnosis against a range of critiques from the contemporary literature.
The second part involves applying this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology. In Chapter 3, we consider the virtue epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In Chapter 4, we consider the virtue epistemology of Ernest Sosa. Both are seminal and iconic; nevertheless, I argue that, in accord with our diagnosis, neither is able to viably surmount the Gettier Problem.
Having diagnosed what is wrong with the reductive project and applied this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology, the final part of this thesis explores the possibility of non-reductive virtue epistemology. In Chapter 5, I argue that there are three strategies that can be used to develop non-reductive virtue epistemologies, strategies that are compatible with seminal non-reductive accounts of knowledge and preserve our favorite virtue-theoretic concepts.2012-06-01T00:00:00ZChurch, Ian M.This thesis centers on two trends in epistemology: (i) the dissatisfaction with the reductive analysis of knowledge, the project of explicating knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, and (ii) the popularity of virtue-theoretic epistemologies. The goal of this thesis is to endorse non-reductive virtue epistemology. Given that prominent renditions of virtue epistemology assume the reductive model, however, such a move is not straightforward—work needs to be done to elucidate what is wrong with the reductive model, in general, and why reductive accounts of virtue epistemology, specifically, are lacking.
The first part of this thesis involves diagnosing what is wrong with the reductive model and defending that diagnosis against objections. The problem with the reductive project is the Gettier Problem. In Chapter 1, I lend credence to Linda Zagzebski’s grim 1994 diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the abandonment of the reductive model) by examining the nature of luck, the key component of Gettier problems. In Chapter 2, I vindicate this diagnosis against a range of critiques from the contemporary literature.
The second part involves applying this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology. In Chapter 3, we consider the virtue epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In Chapter 4, we consider the virtue epistemology of Ernest Sosa. Both are seminal and iconic; nevertheless, I argue that, in accord with our diagnosis, neither is able to viably surmount the Gettier Problem.
Having diagnosed what is wrong with the reductive project and applied this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology, the final part of this thesis explores the possibility of non-reductive virtue epistemology. In Chapter 5, I argue that there are three strategies that can be used to develop non-reductive virtue epistemologies, strategies that are compatible with seminal non-reductive accounts of knowledge and preserve our favorite virtue-theoretic concepts.John Stuart Mill and romanticismhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3097
Abstract: This thesis is an examination of the philosophy of John Stuart Mill and its relation to the romantic movement. The Introduction outlines reasons to believe that such an inquiry is sensible: Mill’s readings of the British and German romantics are outlined. I proceed to offer an argument for the application of an historical term such as ‘romanticism’ in philosophy and suggest that the space opened up by the revisionist view of romanticism as an extension, rather than a denial, of the Enlightenment project creates room to take seriously Mill’s relation to the romantic movement.
Chapters 1-4 are concerned with Mill’s metanormative theory. For Mill, the norms of acting and believing are founded on the assent given to our primitive dispositions under critical scrutiny. I investigate this foundation in the context of Mill’s denial of normative validity to intuitions. The relation of Mill’s metanormative theory to romanticism is taken up during the process of interpretation. The movement shows broad endorsement of what I term ‘romantic-cognitivism’ – the post-Kantian view that we can arrive at truth through the process of ‘creative-discovery’. I hold that Mill’s metanormative theory is not so far away from romantic-cognitivism in orientation as might be thought.
I turn to Mill’s macro-epistemology and conception of mind in Chapter 5. Mill’s view of how we come to know, I suggest, moves towards a Coleridgean position – Mill sees the mind as active, and holds that we come to possess a deeper state of knowledge by engaging with propositions actively. In Chapter 6, I consider Mill’s philosophy of history. Many have noted that Mill endorses a directional theory of historical progress. I argue that he also adopts ‘hermeneutical historicism’ in his discussions of history. In Chapter 7, I consider Mill’s theory of human nature. Mill believes that human nature is malleable: it is subject to change and emendation.2011-11-30T00:00:00ZMacleod, ChristopherThis thesis is an examination of the philosophy of John Stuart Mill and its relation to the romantic movement. The Introduction outlines reasons to believe that such an inquiry is sensible: Mill’s readings of the British and German romantics are outlined. I proceed to offer an argument for the application of an historical term such as ‘romanticism’ in philosophy and suggest that the space opened up by the revisionist view of romanticism as an extension, rather than a denial, of the Enlightenment project creates room to take seriously Mill’s relation to the romantic movement.
Chapters 1-4 are concerned with Mill’s metanormative theory. For Mill, the norms of acting and believing are founded on the assent given to our primitive dispositions under critical scrutiny. I investigate this foundation in the context of Mill’s denial of normative validity to intuitions. The relation of Mill’s metanormative theory to romanticism is taken up during the process of interpretation. The movement shows broad endorsement of what I term ‘romantic-cognitivism’ – the post-Kantian view that we can arrive at truth through the process of ‘creative-discovery’. I hold that Mill’s metanormative theory is not so far away from romantic-cognitivism in orientation as might be thought.
I turn to Mill’s macro-epistemology and conception of mind in Chapter 5. Mill’s view of how we come to know, I suggest, moves towards a Coleridgean position – Mill sees the mind as active, and holds that we come to possess a deeper state of knowledge by engaging with propositions actively. In Chapter 6, I consider Mill’s philosophy of history. Many have noted that Mill endorses a directional theory of historical progress. I argue that he also adopts ‘hermeneutical historicism’ in his discussions of history. In Chapter 7, I consider Mill’s theory of human nature. Mill believes that human nature is malleable: it is subject to change and emendation.A defence of the Kaplanian theory of sentence truthhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3070
Abstract: When David Kaplan put forward his theory of sentence truth
incorporating demonstratives, initially proposed in ‘Dthat’ (1978) and later developed
in ‘Demonstratives’ (1989a) and ‘Afterthoughts’ (1989b), it was, to his mind, simply
a matter of book-keeping, a job that had been pushed aside as a complication when a
truth conditional semantics had been proposed. The challenges considered in this
thesis are challenges to the effect that Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth is, for one
reason or another, inadequate. My overarching aim is to defend Kaplan’s theory of
sentence truth against these challenges.
In chapter one I am concerned only with setting out some preliminary considerations.
In chapter two I defend Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth against a general challenge,
motivated by linguistic data from ‘contextualists’ and ‘relativists’. I argue that the
methods and data employed by proponents of contextualism and relativism are
lacking and as such should not be taken to have seriously challenged Kaplan’s theory
of sentence truth.
In chapter three I defend Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth against challenges to the
effect that his theory is not suited to delivering on its initial purpose—to provide a
semantics for indexical and demonstrative terms. I then develop a form of semantic
pluralism that I take to be entirely compatible with the Kaplanian model.
In chapters four I demonstrate the efficiency of this Kaplanian model when it comes
to defending Kaplan’s theory against the challenge of providing suitable semantics to
accommodate discourse involving future contingents.
And finally, in chapter five I consider contextualist accounts of discourse concerning
vague predicates.2010-06-01T00:00:00ZSweeney, PaulaWhen David Kaplan put forward his theory of sentence truth
incorporating demonstratives, initially proposed in ‘Dthat’ (1978) and later developed
in ‘Demonstratives’ (1989a) and ‘Afterthoughts’ (1989b), it was, to his mind, simply
a matter of book-keeping, a job that had been pushed aside as a complication when a
truth conditional semantics had been proposed. The challenges considered in this
thesis are challenges to the effect that Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth is, for one
reason or another, inadequate. My overarching aim is to defend Kaplan’s theory of
sentence truth against these challenges.
In chapter one I am concerned only with setting out some preliminary considerations.
In chapter two I defend Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth against a general challenge,
motivated by linguistic data from ‘contextualists’ and ‘relativists’. I argue that the
methods and data employed by proponents of contextualism and relativism are
lacking and as such should not be taken to have seriously challenged Kaplan’s theory
of sentence truth.
In chapter three I defend Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth against challenges to the
effect that his theory is not suited to delivering on its initial purpose—to provide a
semantics for indexical and demonstrative terms. I then develop a form of semantic
pluralism that I take to be entirely compatible with the Kaplanian model.
In chapters four I demonstrate the efficiency of this Kaplanian model when it comes
to defending Kaplan’s theory against the challenge of providing suitable semantics to
accommodate discourse involving future contingents.
And finally, in chapter five I consider contextualist accounts of discourse concerning
vague predicates.Coincidence and modalityhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3037
Abstract: How should we understand de re modal features of objects, if there are such features? Any answer to the question is connected to how we should think about coincident objects, objects which occupy the same spatio-temporal region and share the same underlying matter. This thesis is mainly about the connections between de re modality and coincidence. My interest in the connections is twofold: First, how do theories of de re modality interact with theories about coincidence? Details of interactions are discussed from chapter 2 to chapter 5. Second, do the considerations about de re modality offer reasons to favour a particular position about coincidence? And how does this answer contribute to current meta-ontological debate? These are raised in chapter 1 and are answered in conclusion.2011-01-01T00:00:00ZKang, LiHow should we understand de re modal features of objects, if there are such features? Any answer to the question is connected to how we should think about coincident objects, objects which occupy the same spatio-temporal region and share the same underlying matter. This thesis is mainly about the connections between de re modality and coincidence. My interest in the connections is twofold: First, how do theories of de re modality interact with theories about coincidence? Details of interactions are discussed from chapter 2 to chapter 5. Second, do the considerations about de re modality offer reasons to favour a particular position about coincidence? And how does this answer contribute to current meta-ontological debate? These are raised in chapter 1 and are answered in conclusion.Negation in contexthttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/3031
Abstract: The present essay includes six thematically connected papers on negation in the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. Each of the chapters besides the first, which puts each the chapters to follow into context, highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area of philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses the problem of logical revisionism and whether there is any room for genuine disagreement, and hence shared meaning, between the classicist and deviant's respective uses of 'not'. If there is not, revision is impossible. I argue that revision is indeed possible and provide an account of negation as contradictoriness according to which a number of alleged negations are declared genuine. Among them are the negations of FDE (First-Degree Entailment) and a wide family of other relevant logics, LP (Priest's dialetheic "Logic of Paradox"), Kleene weak and strong 3-valued logics with either "exclusion" or "choice" negation, and intuitionistic logic. Chapter 3 discusses the problem of furnishing intuitionistic logic with an empirical negation for adequately expressing claims of the form 'A is undecided at present' or 'A may never be decided' the latter of which has been argued to be intuitionistically inconsistent. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of various notions of consequence-as-s-preservation where s may be falsity (versus untruth), indeterminacy or some other semantic (or "algebraic") value, in formulating rationality constraints on speech acts and propositional attitudes such as rejection, denial and dubitability. Chapter 5 provides an account of the nature of truth values regarded as objects. It is argued that only truth exists as the maximal truthmaker. The consequences this has for semantics representationally construed are considered and it is argued that every logic, from classical to non-classical, is gappy. Moreover, a truthmaker theory is developed whereby only positive truths, an account of which is also developed therein, have truthmakers. Chapter 6 investigates the definability of negation as "absolute" impossibility, i.e. where the notion of necessity or possibility in question corresponds to the global modality. The modality is not readily definable in the usual Kripkean languages and so neither is impossibility taken in the broadest sense. The languages considered here include one with counterfactual operators and propositional quantification and another bimodal language with a modality and its complementary. Among the definability results we give some preservation and translation results as well.2011-06-24T00:00:00ZDe, MichaelThe present essay includes six thematically connected papers on negation in the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. Each of the chapters besides the first, which puts each the chapters to follow into context, highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area of philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses the problem of logical revisionism and whether there is any room for genuine disagreement, and hence shared meaning, between the classicist and deviant's respective uses of 'not'. If there is not, revision is impossible. I argue that revision is indeed possible and provide an account of negation as contradictoriness according to which a number of alleged negations are declared genuine. Among them are the negations of FDE (First-Degree Entailment) and a wide family of other relevant logics, LP (Priest's dialetheic "Logic of Paradox"), Kleene weak and strong 3-valued logics with either "exclusion" or "choice" negation, and intuitionistic logic. Chapter 3 discusses the problem of furnishing intuitionistic logic with an empirical negation for adequately expressing claims of the form 'A is undecided at present' or 'A may never be decided' the latter of which has been argued to be intuitionistically inconsistent. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of various notions of consequence-as-s-preservation where s may be falsity (versus untruth), indeterminacy or some other semantic (or "algebraic") value, in formulating rationality constraints on speech acts and propositional attitudes such as rejection, denial and dubitability. Chapter 5 provides an account of the nature of truth values regarded as objects. It is argued that only truth exists as the maximal truthmaker. The consequences this has for semantics representationally construed are considered and it is argued that every logic, from classical to non-classical, is gappy. Moreover, a truthmaker theory is developed whereby only positive truths, an account of which is also developed therein, have truthmakers. Chapter 6 investigates the definability of negation as "absolute" impossibility, i.e. where the notion of necessity or possibility in question corresponds to the global modality. The modality is not readily definable in the usual Kripkean languages and so neither is impossibility taken in the broadest sense. The languages considered here include one with counterfactual operators and propositional quantification and another bimodal language with a modality and its complementary. Among the definability results we give some preservation and translation results as well.The role of the imagination in Hume's science of manhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/2940
Abstract: In recent years there has been an explosion of writing on
David Hume. His scepticism, his writings on morality, politics,
and religion, have all received substantial attention. What I
attempt to do in this thesis is to suggest that his
revolutionary contributions in all these fields can be better
understood if we consider his attempt to found the sciences on
the imagination.
What little work there is on the imagination in Hume's
writings is almost all concerned with Book I of the Treatise.
As regards Book I, I suggest that Hume's overarching problem is
to argue that belief is dependent on the imagination, whilst
still keeping a contrast with the whims of the 'fancy'. He
wants to disabuse us of the idea that we believe on account of
reason; but he wants to distinguish the claims of science from
the claims of poets.
But I also examine why he thinks his explanation of the
production of passions support his conclusions about belief.
And I argue that his former account guides conclusions found in
other genres. So for example, I examine certain essays and
letters about politics, and his explanation of religious events
in the History of England.
Why do men falsely believe that they are distinguished from
the animals through possessing reason? On the one hand Hume
tries to explain the origin of the sciences; on the other hand,
he tries to show how men have come to have a false conception
of themselves. A central aim of the thesis is to bring out
these themes through showing the use Hume makes of principles
of the imagination. I pay special attention to Hume's attempt
to argue that Christianity plays a major role in the sustaining
of the false view.1990-01-01T00:00:00ZBernard, ChristopherIn recent years there has been an explosion of writing on
David Hume. His scepticism, his writings on morality, politics,
and religion, have all received substantial attention. What I
attempt to do in this thesis is to suggest that his
revolutionary contributions in all these fields can be better
understood if we consider his attempt to found the sciences on
the imagination.
What little work there is on the imagination in Hume's
writings is almost all concerned with Book I of the Treatise.
As regards Book I, I suggest that Hume's overarching problem is
to argue that belief is dependent on the imagination, whilst
still keeping a contrast with the whims of the 'fancy'. He
wants to disabuse us of the idea that we believe on account of
reason; but he wants to distinguish the claims of science from
the claims of poets.
But I also examine why he thinks his explanation of the
production of passions support his conclusions about belief.
And I argue that his former account guides conclusions found in
other genres. So for example, I examine certain essays and
letters about politics, and his explanation of religious events
in the History of England.
Why do men falsely believe that they are distinguished from
the animals through possessing reason? On the one hand Hume
tries to explain the origin of the sciences; on the other hand,
he tries to show how men have come to have a false conception
of themselves. A central aim of the thesis is to bring out
these themes through showing the use Hume makes of principles
of the imagination. I pay special attention to Hume's attempt
to argue that Christianity plays a major role in the sustaining
of the false view.Freud's concept of the unconscioushttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/2934
1983-01-01T00:00:00ZLewczuk, ZinaidaFreedom as a moral concepthttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/2814
Abstract: This thesis constitutes a conceptual inquiry into the
nature of social freedom, which is held to be logically
distinct from other freedom-concepts although it presupposes
free-will/autarchy. The thesis argues for a
'responsibility view' of negative freedom according to
which an agent B is socially free to do x iff he is not
constrained by another agent A from doing x. A constrains
B when A can be held morally responsible for imposing or
not removing a real obstacle to choice/action that impedes
(to a greater or a lesser extent) B's doing x. This
responsibility condition is satisfied when it is appropriate,
in the given context, to ask A for a justification
of his act/omission. Social freedom is a relational concept.
Its irreflexive nature implies that internal bars,
for which no other agent is responsible, cannot constrain
our own freedom. Moreover, it is argued that autonomy is
not a necessary condition of particular cases of freedom;
nor is freedom in general a necessary condition of autonomy.
Accounts of positive liberty assume that a) a person
can constrain his own freedom; b) freedom is an exercise-,
not an opportunity-concept. Hence, they are not accounts
of social freedom but uphold other, logically distinct,
values. The last part of the thesis deals with questions
of method. It is argued that the widely held essential
contestability thesis is either circular or paradoxical,
and that it is methodologically possible to construct an
authoritative definition of freedom which is normative and
critical but non-relative.1990-01-01T00:00:00ZKristjansson, KristjanThis thesis constitutes a conceptual inquiry into the
nature of social freedom, which is held to be logically
distinct from other freedom-concepts although it presupposes
free-will/autarchy. The thesis argues for a
'responsibility view' of negative freedom according to
which an agent B is socially free to do x iff he is not
constrained by another agent A from doing x. A constrains
B when A can be held morally responsible for imposing or
not removing a real obstacle to choice/action that impedes
(to a greater or a lesser extent) B's doing x. This
responsibility condition is satisfied when it is appropriate,
in the given context, to ask A for a justification
of his act/omission. Social freedom is a relational concept.
Its irreflexive nature implies that internal bars,
for which no other agent is responsible, cannot constrain
our own freedom. Moreover, it is argued that autonomy is
not a necessary condition of particular cases of freedom;
nor is freedom in general a necessary condition of autonomy.
Accounts of positive liberty assume that a) a person
can constrain his own freedom; b) freedom is an exercise-,
not an opportunity-concept. Hence, they are not accounts
of social freedom but uphold other, logically distinct,
values. The last part of the thesis deals with questions
of method. It is argued that the widely held essential
contestability thesis is either circular or paradoxical,
and that it is methodologically possible to construct an
authoritative definition of freedom which is normative and
critical but non-relative.The self and self-conciousnesshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/2704
Abstract: It is the aim of this thesis to consider two accounts of
1st-person utterances that are often mistakenly conflated - viz.
that involving the 'no-reference' view of "I", and that of the
non-assertoric thesis of avowals. The first account says that in a
large range of (roughly) 'psychological' uses, 'I' is not a
referring expression; the second, that avowals of 1st-personal
'immediate' experience are primarily 'expressive' and not genuine
assertions.
The two views are expressions of what I term 'Trojanism'.
This viewpoint constitutes one side of a 'Homeric Opposition in the
Metaphysics of Experience', and has been endorsed by Wittgenstein
throughout his writings; it has received recent expression in
Professor Anscombe's article 'The First Person'. I explore the
ideas of these writers in some depth, and consider to what extent
they stand up to criticism by such notable 'Greek' contenders as
P.F. Strawson and Gareth Evans.
I first give neutral accounts of the key-concepts on which
subsequent arguments are based. These are the immunity to error
through misidentification (IEM) of certain 1st-person utterances,
the guaranteed reference of 'I', avowal, and the Generality Constraint. I consider the close relation of Trojanism to solipsism and
behaviourism, and then assess the effectiveness of two arguments for
that viewpoint - Anscombe's Tank Argument and the argument from IEM.
Though each is appealing, neither is decisive; to assess Trojanism
properly we need to look at the non-assertoric thesis of avowals,
which alone affords the prospect of a resolution of the really
intractable problems of the self generated by Cartesianism.
In the course of the latter assessment I consider the
different varieties of avowal, broadening the discussion beyond the
over-used example 'I am in pain'. I explore Wittgenstein's notion
of 'expression', and discuss how this notion may help to explain the
authority a subject possesses on his mental states as expressed in
avowals. My conclusion is that an expressive account of avowals can
provide a satisfactory counter to the Cartesian account of authority
without our needing recourse to a non-assertoric or even to a non-
cognitive thesis.
Discussion of self-consciousness is implicit in discussion of
the Homeric Opposition, but there is in addition a short chapter on
the concept itself.1988-01-01T00:00:00ZHamilton, Andrew J.It is the aim of this thesis to consider two accounts of
1st-person utterances that are often mistakenly conflated - viz.
that involving the 'no-reference' view of "I", and that of the
non-assertoric thesis of avowals. The first account says that in a
large range of (roughly) 'psychological' uses, 'I' is not a
referring expression; the second, that avowals of 1st-personal
'immediate' experience are primarily 'expressive' and not genuine
assertions.
The two views are expressions of what I term 'Trojanism'.
This viewpoint constitutes one side of a 'Homeric Opposition in the
Metaphysics of Experience', and has been endorsed by Wittgenstein
throughout his writings; it has received recent expression in
Professor Anscombe's article 'The First Person'. I explore the
ideas of these writers in some depth, and consider to what extent
they stand up to criticism by such notable 'Greek' contenders as
P.F. Strawson and Gareth Evans.
I first give neutral accounts of the key-concepts on which
subsequent arguments are based. These are the immunity to error
through misidentification (IEM) of certain 1st-person utterances,
the guaranteed reference of 'I', avowal, and the Generality Constraint. I consider the close relation of Trojanism to solipsism and
behaviourism, and then assess the effectiveness of two arguments for
that viewpoint - Anscombe's Tank Argument and the argument from IEM.
Though each is appealing, neither is decisive; to assess Trojanism
properly we need to look at the non-assertoric thesis of avowals,
which alone affords the prospect of a resolution of the really
intractable problems of the self generated by Cartesianism.
In the course of the latter assessment I consider the
different varieties of avowal, broadening the discussion beyond the
over-used example 'I am in pain'. I explore Wittgenstein's notion
of 'expression', and discuss how this notion may help to explain the
authority a subject possesses on his mental states as expressed in
avowals. My conclusion is that an expressive account of avowals can
provide a satisfactory counter to the Cartesian account of authority
without our needing recourse to a non-assertoric or even to a non-
cognitive thesis.
Discussion of self-consciousness is implicit in discussion of
the Homeric Opposition, but there is in addition a short chapter on
the concept itself.Poincaré's philosophy of mathematicshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/2703
Abstract: The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate
the explicit philosophy of mathematics in the work of
Henri Poincare. In particular, I argue that there is
a well-founded doctrine which grounds both Poincare's
negative thesis, which is based on constructivist
sentiments, and his positive thesis, via which he retains
a classical conception of the mathematical continuum.
The doctrine which does so is one which is founded on
the Kantian theory of synthetic a priori intuition.
I begin, therefore, by outlining Kant's theory of the
synthetic a priori, especially as it applies to mathematics.
Then, in the main body of the thesis, I explain how the
various central aspects of Poincare's philosophy of
mathematics - e.g. his theory of induction; his theory
of the continuum; his views on impredicativiti his
theory of meaning - must, in general, be seen as an
adaptation of Kant's position. My conclusion is that
not only is there a well-founded philosophical core to
Poincare's philosophy, but also that such a core provides
a viable alternative in contemporary debates in
the philosophy of mathematics. That is, Poincare's
theory, which is secured by his doctrine of a priori
intuitions, and which describes a position in between
the two extremes of an "anti-realist" strict constructivism
and a "realist" axiomatic set theory, may indeed be
true.1986-01-01T00:00:00ZFolina, JanetThe primary concern of this thesis is to investigate
the explicit philosophy of mathematics in the work of
Henri Poincare. In particular, I argue that there is
a well-founded doctrine which grounds both Poincare's
negative thesis, which is based on constructivist
sentiments, and his positive thesis, via which he retains
a classical conception of the mathematical continuum.
The doctrine which does so is one which is founded on
the Kantian theory of synthetic a priori intuition.
I begin, therefore, by outlining Kant's theory of the
synthetic a priori, especially as it applies to mathematics.
Then, in the main body of the thesis, I explain how the
various central aspects of Poincare's philosophy of
mathematics - e.g. his theory of induction; his theory
of the continuum; his views on impredicativiti his
theory of meaning - must, in general, be seen as an
adaptation of Kant's position. My conclusion is that
not only is there a well-founded philosophical core to
Poincare's philosophy, but also that such a core provides
a viable alternative in contemporary debates in
the philosophy of mathematics. That is, Poincare's
theory, which is secured by his doctrine of a priori
intuitions, and which describes a position in between
the two extremes of an "anti-realist" strict constructivism
and a "realist" axiomatic set theory, may indeed be
true.Equality, priority, and aggregationhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/2690
Abstract: In this dissertation, I discuss two distributive principles in moral philosophy:
Derek Parfit's Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. I attempt to defend
a version of Egalitarianism, which I call Weighted Egalitarianism. Although
Parfit claims that Egalitarianism is subject to what he calls the Levelling
Down Objection, I show (a) that my proposed Weighted Egalitarianism is
not subject to the Objection, and (b) that it gives priority to the worse
off people. The real difference between the two principles lies in how the
weight of each person's well-being is determined. Prioritarianism assumes
that there is a moral scale of the goodness of well-being, independently of
distributions of people's well-being. I raise two objections to this claim:
firstly, it is hard to believe that the choice of the level of well-being affects
our distributive judgement; secondly, it is hard to believe that there is such
a moral scale independently of distributions of people's well-being. On the
other hand, Weighted Egalitarianism claims that the weight is given by the
rank order position of the person in the ranking by well-being level. This
means that, in Weighted Egalitarianism, the goodness of a distribution is
an increasing, linear function of people's well-being. Weighted Egalitarianism
is not affected by the choice of the level of people's well-being. Nor
does it require require the moral scale of the goodness of well-being independently
of distributions of people's well-being. Leximin, which might be
a version of Prioritarianism, avoids my objections. But it is hard to support
Leximin, because it rules out the trade off between the better off and the
worse off. I conclude that Weighted Egalitarianism is more acceptable than
Prioritarianism.2004-01-01T00:00:00ZHirose, IwaoIn this dissertation, I discuss two distributive principles in moral philosophy:
Derek Parfit's Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. I attempt to defend
a version of Egalitarianism, which I call Weighted Egalitarianism. Although
Parfit claims that Egalitarianism is subject to what he calls the Levelling
Down Objection, I show (a) that my proposed Weighted Egalitarianism is
not subject to the Objection, and (b) that it gives priority to the worse
off people. The real difference between the two principles lies in how the
weight of each person's well-being is determined. Prioritarianism assumes
that there is a moral scale of the goodness of well-being, independently of
distributions of people's well-being. I raise two objections to this claim:
firstly, it is hard to believe that the choice of the level of well-being affects
our distributive judgement; secondly, it is hard to believe that there is such
a moral scale independently of distributions of people's well-being. On the
other hand, Weighted Egalitarianism claims that the weight is given by the
rank order position of the person in the ranking by well-being level. This
means that, in Weighted Egalitarianism, the goodness of a distribution is
an increasing, linear function of people's well-being. Weighted Egalitarianism
is not affected by the choice of the level of people's well-being. Nor
does it require require the moral scale of the goodness of well-being independently
of distributions of people's well-being. Leximin, which might be
a version of Prioritarianism, avoids my objections. But it is hard to support
Leximin, because it rules out the trade off between the better off and the
worse off. I conclude that Weighted Egalitarianism is more acceptable than
Prioritarianism.An account of a valuable phenomenon found primarily in art, after Collingwoodhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/2559
Abstract: This dissertation enquires into the nature and value of a phenomenon which is
typically found in art. Chapter 1 attempts to get clear on what phenomenon is
being discussed by considering various thinkers' attempts to talk about it, and by
considering artworks which exemplify (or are) it. I call the phenomenon 'art' and
roughly characterise it as the expression of emotion. Chapter 2 considers the role
of artists' intentions to the meaning of the artworks they create, and more
broadly the role of utterers' intentions to the meanings of their utterances. This is
done because certain positions regarding the role of intentions to utterances'
meanings breaks the communicative link between the utterer of an utterance and
the apprehender of the utterance, which link is important to the thesis advanced.
Chapter 3 argues for a particular analysis of what I call art in Chapter 1, and
briefly argues that it is very valuable.2011-11-01T00:00:00ZMcGuiggan, James CamienThis dissertation enquires into the nature and value of a phenomenon which is
typically found in art. Chapter 1 attempts to get clear on what phenomenon is
being discussed by considering various thinkers' attempts to talk about it, and by
considering artworks which exemplify (or are) it. I call the phenomenon 'art' and
roughly characterise it as the expression of emotion. Chapter 2 considers the role
of artists' intentions to the meaning of the artworks they create, and more
broadly the role of utterers' intentions to the meanings of their utterances. This is
done because certain positions regarding the role of intentions to utterances'
meanings breaks the communicative link between the utterer of an utterance and
the apprehender of the utterance, which link is important to the thesis advanced.
Chapter 3 argues for a particular analysis of what I call art in Chapter 1, and
briefly argues that it is very valuable.On subsistence and human rightshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/2556
Abstract: The central question I address is whether the inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights can be justified. The human right to subsistence is conventionally interpreted as a fundamental right to a basic living standard characterized as having access to the material means for subsistence. It is widely thought to entail duties of protection against deprivation and duties of assistance in acquiring access to the material means for subsistence (Shue 1996, Nickel, 2004, Griffin 2008). The inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights interpreted in this way has been met with considerable resistance, particularly on the part of those who argue that fundamental rights cannot entail positive duties (Cranston 1983, Narveson 2004, O’Neill 1996, 2000, 2005).
My purpose in this dissertation is to consider whether a plausible interpretation of the human right to subsistence can succeed in overcoming the most forceful and persistent objections to it. My main thesis is that a minimal interpretation of the human right to subsistence according to which it is a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence provides the strongest interpretation of this right. Although the idea that the human right to subsistence correlates with negative duties is not new, discussion of these duties has been overshadowed in the literature by debate over the positive duties conventionally thought to be entailed by it. I show that the human right to subsistence interpreted as a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence makes an important contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty.2012-06-01T00:00:00ZTomalty, JesseThe central question I address is whether the inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights can be justified. The human right to subsistence is conventionally interpreted as a fundamental right to a basic living standard characterized as having access to the material means for subsistence. It is widely thought to entail duties of protection against deprivation and duties of assistance in acquiring access to the material means for subsistence (Shue 1996, Nickel, 2004, Griffin 2008). The inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights interpreted in this way has been met with considerable resistance, particularly on the part of those who argue that fundamental rights cannot entail positive duties (Cranston 1983, Narveson 2004, O’Neill 1996, 2000, 2005).
My purpose in this dissertation is to consider whether a plausible interpretation of the human right to subsistence can succeed in overcoming the most forceful and persistent objections to it. My main thesis is that a minimal interpretation of the human right to subsistence according to which it is a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence provides the strongest interpretation of this right. Although the idea that the human right to subsistence correlates with negative duties is not new, discussion of these duties has been overshadowed in the literature by debate over the positive duties conventionally thought to be entailed by it. I show that the human right to subsistence interpreted as a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence makes an important contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty.Types of conceptual enquiry : a case for thinking there is a type that does not depend on the notion of analyticityhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/2530
Abstract: Many if not all Analytic Philosophers in the first seventy years or so of Analytic
Philosophy thought that enquiry into concepts had a significant place in philosophy.
This is not a view shared by most contemporary Analytic Philosophers. One reason for
this change in attitude is Quine’s famous critique of analyticity. Enquiry into concepts
had been thought to depend on a satisfactory notion of analyticity. Many thought that
Quine had shown that no such notion is available. It is true that the traditional model of
Conceptual Analysis operated with the notion of analyticity. The reductive project of
Conceptual Analysis was supposed to issue in analytic truths that were necessarily true
and knowable a priori. Furthermore the necessity of these truths, and the fact that they
were knowable a priori were accounted for in terms of their analyticity. I argue that
there is an alternative model of Conceptual Enquiry which does not require a notion of
analyticity to do the work it does. I argue that the notion of analyticity is not central to
the style of philosophising of the Ordinary Language Philosophers. Major ‘Ordinary
Language Philosophers’ did not appeal to the notion of analyticity in describing or
accounting for their work. Neither is such a notion required to account for their work.
The upshot is that one ought not to conclude that enquiry into concepts is redundant for
philosophical purposes on account of there being no satisfactory notion of analyticity.2011-11-01T00:00:00ZDawes, RyanMany if not all Analytic Philosophers in the first seventy years or so of Analytic
Philosophy thought that enquiry into concepts had a significant place in philosophy.
This is not a view shared by most contemporary Analytic Philosophers. One reason for
this change in attitude is Quine’s famous critique of analyticity. Enquiry into concepts
had been thought to depend on a satisfactory notion of analyticity. Many thought that
Quine had shown that no such notion is available. It is true that the traditional model of
Conceptual Analysis operated with the notion of analyticity. The reductive project of
Conceptual Analysis was supposed to issue in analytic truths that were necessarily true
and knowable a priori. Furthermore the necessity of these truths, and the fact that they
were knowable a priori were accounted for in terms of their analyticity. I argue that
there is an alternative model of Conceptual Enquiry which does not require a notion of
analyticity to do the work it does. I argue that the notion of analyticity is not central to
the style of philosophising of the Ordinary Language Philosophers. Major ‘Ordinary
Language Philosophers’ did not appeal to the notion of analyticity in describing or
accounting for their work. Neither is such a notion required to account for their work.
The upshot is that one ought not to conclude that enquiry into concepts is redundant for
philosophical purposes on account of there being no satisfactory notion of analyticity.On describinghttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/2468
Abstract: The overarching topic of this dissertation is the semantics and pragmatics of definite descriptions. It focuses on the question whether sentences such as ‘the king of France is bald’ literally assert the existence of a unique king (and therefore are false) or simply presuppose the existence of such a king (and thus fail to express propositions). One immediate obstacle to resolving this question is that immediate truth value judgments about such sentences (sentences with non-denoting descriptions) are particularly unstable; some elicit a clear intuition of falsity whereas others simply seem awkward or strange. Because of these variations, truth value judgments are generally considered unreliable. In the first chapter of the dissertation, an explanation of this phenomenon is developed. It is observed that when these types of sentences are considered in the context of a discourse, a systematic pattern in judgments emerges. This pattern, it is argued, should be explained in terms of certain pragmatic factors, e.g. whether a speaker’s utterance is interpreted as cooperative. A detailed and general explanation of the phenomenon is then presented which draws importantly on recent research in the semantics and pragmatics of questions and focus. It is shown that the behavior of these judgments can be systematically explained, that truth value judgments are not as unreliable as standardly assumed, and that the proposed explanation best supports the conclusion that definite descriptions presuppose rather than assert existence.
In the second chapter, the following problem is investigated. If definite descriptions are assumed to literally assert existence, a sentence such as ‘Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet’ is incorrectly predicted to be true only if Hans wants there to be a (unique) ghost in his attic. This prediction is often considered evidence against Russell’s quantificational analysis and evidence in favor of the referential analysis of Frege and Strawson. Against this claim, it is demonstrated that this problem is a general problem about the existence commitments of natural language determiners, i.e. not an argument in favor of a referential analysis. It is shown that in order to avoid these undesirable predictions, quite radical changes to the semantic framework are required. For example, it must be assumed that a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ has the open sentence ‘x is G’ as its asserted content. A uniform quantificational and presuppositional analysis of definites and indefinites is outlined which by exploiting certain features of so-called dynamic semantics unproblematically assumes that the asserted contents indeed are open sentences.
In view of the proposed quantificational/presuppositional analysis, the dissertation is concluded by a rejection of the argument put forward by Reimer (1998) and Devitt (2004) that definite descriptions are ambiguous between attributive (quantificational) and referential (indexical) uses. Reimer and Devitt’s argument is (in contrast to Donnellan, 1966) based primarily on the assumption that definite descriptions are conventionally used to communicate singular thoughts and that the conventional meaning of a definite description therefore must be fundamentally indexical/directly referential. I argue that this argument relies crucially on tacit assumptions about semantic processing for which no empirical evidence is provided. I also argue that the argument is too general; if sound, it would be an argument for an indexical treatment of most, if not all, other determiners. I then conclude by demonstrating that the view does not explain any new data and thus has no clear motivation.
In short, this dissertation provides a detailed pragmatic explanation of a long-standing puzzle about truth value judgments and then outlines a novel dynamic semantic analysis of definites and indefinites. This analysis solves a significant problem about existence commitments — a problem that neither Russell’s nor the Frege/Strawson analysis are equipped to handle. This analysis is then defended against the claim that definite descriptions are ambiguous.2011-11-25T00:00:00ZSchoubye, Anders JohanThe overarching topic of this dissertation is the semantics and pragmatics of definite descriptions. It focuses on the question whether sentences such as ‘the king of France is bald’ literally assert the existence of a unique king (and therefore are false) or simply presuppose the existence of such a king (and thus fail to express propositions). One immediate obstacle to resolving this question is that immediate truth value judgments about such sentences (sentences with non-denoting descriptions) are particularly unstable; some elicit a clear intuition of falsity whereas others simply seem awkward or strange. Because of these variations, truth value judgments are generally considered unreliable. In the first chapter of the dissertation, an explanation of this phenomenon is developed. It is observed that when these types of sentences are considered in the context of a discourse, a systematic pattern in judgments emerges. This pattern, it is argued, should be explained in terms of certain pragmatic factors, e.g. whether a speaker’s utterance is interpreted as cooperative. A detailed and general explanation of the phenomenon is then presented which draws importantly on recent research in the semantics and pragmatics of questions and focus. It is shown that the behavior of these judgments can be systematically explained, that truth value judgments are not as unreliable as standardly assumed, and that the proposed explanation best supports the conclusion that definite descriptions presuppose rather than assert existence.
In the second chapter, the following problem is investigated. If definite descriptions are assumed to literally assert existence, a sentence such as ‘Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet’ is incorrectly predicted to be true only if Hans wants there to be a (unique) ghost in his attic. This prediction is often considered evidence against Russell’s quantificational analysis and evidence in favor of the referential analysis of Frege and Strawson. Against this claim, it is demonstrated that this problem is a general problem about the existence commitments of natural language determiners, i.e. not an argument in favor of a referential analysis. It is shown that in order to avoid these undesirable predictions, quite radical changes to the semantic framework are required. For example, it must be assumed that a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ has the open sentence ‘x is G’ as its asserted content. A uniform quantificational and presuppositional analysis of definites and indefinites is outlined which by exploiting certain features of so-called dynamic semantics unproblematically assumes that the asserted contents indeed are open sentences.
In view of the proposed quantificational/presuppositional analysis, the dissertation is concluded by a rejection of the argument put forward by Reimer (1998) and Devitt (2004) that definite descriptions are ambiguous between attributive (quantificational) and referential (indexical) uses. Reimer and Devitt’s argument is (in contrast to Donnellan, 1966) based primarily on the assumption that definite descriptions are conventionally used to communicate singular thoughts and that the conventional meaning of a definite description therefore must be fundamentally indexical/directly referential. I argue that this argument relies crucially on tacit assumptions about semantic processing for which no empirical evidence is provided. I also argue that the argument is too general; if sound, it would be an argument for an indexical treatment of most, if not all, other determiners. I then conclude by demonstrating that the view does not explain any new data and thus has no clear motivation.
In short, this dissertation provides a detailed pragmatic explanation of a long-standing puzzle about truth value judgments and then outlines a novel dynamic semantic analysis of definites and indefinites. This analysis solves a significant problem about existence commitments — a problem that neither Russell’s nor the Frege/Strawson analysis are equipped to handle. This analysis is then defended against the claim that definite descriptions are ambiguous.The ethics of globalisation, free trade and fair tradehttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/2115
Abstract: In this thesis I take a broadly consequentialist normative position and argue that because fair
trade is an inefficient method of aiding the poor, we should not support it and prefer free trade
goods with an appropriate and equal donation to a charity, designed to aid the poor and
encourage development in the undeveloped and developing world, instead. I also argue that
globalisation is the best means of development and we should support it as well. The thesis
progresses first by considering consequentialism, which I argue is especially suited to the
problem of analysing poverty in applied ethics, and some objections to it, which I briefly attempt
to answer. Following that, I consider fair trade and both some theoretical and practical problems
that it faces which my alternative does not. Then I briefly consider how globalisation results in
development and why it should be supported. Finally, I conclude with a brief chapter where I
respond to a few pertinent objections which arise on the periphery of my discussion that could be
seen as damaging to my position.2011-06-01T00:00:00ZWood, DanielIn this thesis I take a broadly consequentialist normative position and argue that because fair
trade is an inefficient method of aiding the poor, we should not support it and prefer free trade
goods with an appropriate and equal donation to a charity, designed to aid the poor and
encourage development in the undeveloped and developing world, instead. I also argue that
globalisation is the best means of development and we should support it as well. The thesis
progresses first by considering consequentialism, which I argue is especially suited to the
problem of analysing poverty in applied ethics, and some objections to it, which I briefly attempt
to answer. Following that, I consider fair trade and both some theoretical and practical problems
that it faces which my alternative does not. Then I briefly consider how globalisation results in
development and why it should be supported. Finally, I conclude with a brief chapter where I
respond to a few pertinent objections which arise on the periphery of my discussion that could be
seen as damaging to my position.The value of pleasure in Plato's Philebus and Aristotle's Ethicshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/2105
Abstract: This thesis is a study of the theories of pleasure as proposed in Plato’s Philebus, Aristotle’s EN VII.11-14 and EN X.1-5, with particular emphasis on the value of pleasure. Focusing on the Philebus in Chapters 1 and 2, I argue that the account of pleasure as restorative process of a harmonious state in the soul is in tension with Plato’s claim that some pleasures are good in their own right. I show that there are in fact two ways in which pleasure (and other processes of the soul) can have value in the Philebus. The tension in Plato’s position arises because he focuses exclusively on only one way in which pleasure can have value. Chapter 3 deals with Aristotle’s response to Plato in EN VII.11-14. According to the standard interpretation only complete activities (such as thinking and seeing) can be pleasures in their own right, but not incomplete activities (such as eating and drinking). Since this interpretation attributes to Aristotle both an implausible view and a bad response to Plato, I offer a novel interpretation of EN VII.12 according to which the central contrast is not between complete and incomplete activities, but between states and their use. This interpretation is more faithful to Aristotle’s text and gives him a better response to Plato. In Chapter 4 I turn to the central claim of EN X.4-5 that pleasure perfects an activity. I argue that we cannot understand how pleasure functions unless we take into account the state whose activation is perfected by pleasure. In particular, the agent’s disposition of being a lover of a certain activity (an attitude which belongs to the activated state) is crucial for explaining why the agent takes pleasure in it. The focus on the agent’s attitude highlights that the value of pleasure does not depend solely on the value of the activity (as many interpreters assume). I suggest instead that pleasure is valuable when and because it is an appropriate response to a given situation.2011-11-28T00:00:00ZAufderheide, JoachimThis thesis is a study of the theories of pleasure as proposed in Plato’s Philebus, Aristotle’s EN VII.11-14 and EN X.1-5, with particular emphasis on the value of pleasure. Focusing on the Philebus in Chapters 1 and 2, I argue that the account of pleasure as restorative process of a harmonious state in the soul is in tension with Plato’s claim that some pleasures are good in their own right. I show that there are in fact two ways in which pleasure (and other processes of the soul) can have value in the Philebus. The tension in Plato’s position arises because he focuses exclusively on only one way in which pleasure can have value. Chapter 3 deals with Aristotle’s response to Plato in EN VII.11-14. According to the standard interpretation only complete activities (such as thinking and seeing) can be pleasures in their own right, but not incomplete activities (such as eating and drinking). Since this interpretation attributes to Aristotle both an implausible view and a bad response to Plato, I offer a novel interpretation of EN VII.12 according to which the central contrast is not between complete and incomplete activities, but between states and their use. This interpretation is more faithful to Aristotle’s text and gives him a better response to Plato. In Chapter 4 I turn to the central claim of EN X.4-5 that pleasure perfects an activity. I argue that we cannot understand how pleasure functions unless we take into account the state whose activation is perfected by pleasure. In particular, the agent’s disposition of being a lover of a certain activity (an attitude which belongs to the activated state) is crucial for explaining why the agent takes pleasure in it. The focus on the agent’s attitude highlights that the value of pleasure does not depend solely on the value of the activity (as many interpreters assume). I suggest instead that pleasure is valuable when and because it is an appropriate response to a given situation.Strengthening the capability approach : the foundations of the capability approach, with insights from two challengeshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/1902
Abstract: The Capability Approach was initially developed by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, with the first basic articulation presented in his 1979 ‘Equality of What?’ Tanner Lecture. Since then, the approach has gained a huge amount of attention as a conceptual framework which offers a clear and insightful way to measure well-being and development. Most recently, the approach has been refined and extended by Martha Nussbaum to issues of disability, nationality, and species membership in political philosophy.
This project is about the foundations of the capability approach. More specifically, this project asks whether we can, and whether there are good reasons to, strengthen those foundations. The conclusions drawn here are that we ought to think seriously about the way that the capability approach develops as a theory that responds to real world challenges and change. More importantly, this project contends – in light of the challenges of future people and indigenous peoples – that there is good reason to think of new ways to ground the approach. This project takes up this challenge and grounds the approach in a modified version of Tim Mulgan’s approach to well-being. This project demonstrates that this alternative enriches the capability approach by providing us with a way of making sense of important problems, and with options for moving forward.
Overall, this project asks important questions about how the capability approach could evolve based on challenges that remain relatively under-explored in the current literature. This project contributes to this literature by demonstrating that we can and ought to strengthen the capability approach and its ability to understand, take on board, and resolve these challenges.2011-06-24T00:00:00ZWatene, Krushil P. M.The Capability Approach was initially developed by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, with the first basic articulation presented in his 1979 ‘Equality of What?’ Tanner Lecture. Since then, the approach has gained a huge amount of attention as a conceptual framework which offers a clear and insightful way to measure well-being and development. Most recently, the approach has been refined and extended by Martha Nussbaum to issues of disability, nationality, and species membership in political philosophy.
This project is about the foundations of the capability approach. More specifically, this project asks whether we can, and whether there are good reasons to, strengthen those foundations. The conclusions drawn here are that we ought to think seriously about the way that the capability approach develops as a theory that responds to real world challenges and change. More importantly, this project contends – in light of the challenges of future people and indigenous peoples – that there is good reason to think of new ways to ground the approach. This project takes up this challenge and grounds the approach in a modified version of Tim Mulgan’s approach to well-being. This project demonstrates that this alternative enriches the capability approach by providing us with a way of making sense of important problems, and with options for moving forward.
Overall, this project asks important questions about how the capability approach could evolve based on challenges that remain relatively under-explored in the current literature. This project contributes to this literature by demonstrating that we can and ought to strengthen the capability approach and its ability to understand, take on board, and resolve these challenges.The transcendental structure of the worldhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/1890
Abstract: This dissertation provides a systematic account of the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. According to the proposed theory, appearances are understood as intentional objects, while phenomena are considered as logical constructs that are grounded in noumena, whereby the grounding relation can be modelled by means of a coordinated multiple-domain supervenience relation. This framework is employed to provide a vindication of metaphysics, by giving dual-level explanations that explain how the world can have ontological structure, making intelligible the applicability of metaphysical concepts, such as unity, persistence, causation and mind-body interaction, to the empirical realm. The key claim that is advanced in the dissertation is that in order to be realists we have to be transcendental idealists. In particular, transcendental arguments are provided that establish that if realism about science, metaphysics and ethics is to be possible, then (i) the world must have a transcendental structure that integrates the fragmented perspective-dependent spatio-temporal frameworks into a unified perspective-independent space-time manifold, (ii) space and time must be forms of intuition that give rise to correspondences between appearances and phenomena, making it the case that we can have non-trivial scientific knowledge of the world, and (iii) we must have a priori concepts, namely the mathematical and dynamical categories, that allow us to cognise the empirical as well as ontological structure of the world. The ‘fact of experience’ as well as the ‘fact of reason’ are then brought in to strengthen the case for scientific, metaphysical and moral realism, thereby warding off the threat of nihilism. Moreover, a refutation of the more attractive versions of scepticism and idealism is provided, namely of those versions that claim that a subject’s representations or episodes of awareness can be temporally ordered even though they deny or doubt the existence of a law-governed external world. The conclusion then is that a realist stance is to be adopted and that we should consequently accept transcendental idealism and hold that the world has a transcendental structure.2010-01-01T00:00:00ZBader, Ralf M.This dissertation provides a systematic account of the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. According to the proposed theory, appearances are understood as intentional objects, while phenomena are considered as logical constructs that are grounded in noumena, whereby the grounding relation can be modelled by means of a coordinated multiple-domain supervenience relation. This framework is employed to provide a vindication of metaphysics, by giving dual-level explanations that explain how the world can have ontological structure, making intelligible the applicability of metaphysical concepts, such as unity, persistence, causation and mind-body interaction, to the empirical realm. The key claim that is advanced in the dissertation is that in order to be realists we have to be transcendental idealists. In particular, transcendental arguments are provided that establish that if realism about science, metaphysics and ethics is to be possible, then (i) the world must have a transcendental structure that integrates the fragmented perspective-dependent spatio-temporal frameworks into a unified perspective-independent space-time manifold, (ii) space and time must be forms of intuition that give rise to correspondences between appearances and phenomena, making it the case that we can have non-trivial scientific knowledge of the world, and (iii) we must have a priori concepts, namely the mathematical and dynamical categories, that allow us to cognise the empirical as well as ontological structure of the world. The ‘fact of experience’ as well as the ‘fact of reason’ are then brought in to strengthen the case for scientific, metaphysical and moral realism, thereby warding off the threat of nihilism. Moreover, a refutation of the more attractive versions of scepticism and idealism is provided, namely of those versions that claim that a subject’s representations or episodes of awareness can be temporally ordered even though they deny or doubt the existence of a law-governed external world. The conclusion then is that a realist stance is to be adopted and that we should consequently accept transcendental idealism and hold that the world has a transcendental structure.Freedom as faithhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/1883
Abstract: The belief in free will is something we are entitled to hold despite what determinism says. This notion however cannot be adequately explained or defended by traditional accounts of freedom amongst which, compatibilist and libertarian perspectives dominate the field of inquiry. I argue that an alternative approach is necessary to capture the full implications of what freedom as an idea contains and to establish this idea's validity, though one which exhibits none of the usual extravagances which philosophers so often pursue in their attempts at justification.2011-06-06T00:00:00ZAganey, DianaThe belief in free will is something we are entitled to hold despite what determinism says. This notion however cannot be adequately explained or defended by traditional accounts of freedom amongst which, compatibilist and libertarian perspectives dominate the field of inquiry. I argue that an alternative approach is necessary to capture the full implications of what freedom as an idea contains and to establish this idea's validity, though one which exhibits none of the usual extravagances which philosophers so often pursue in their attempts at justification.Plato's understanding of pietyhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/1863
Abstract: The Euthyphro portrays Plato’s mentor, Socrates, asking the question, “what is piety”? In the Apology Socrates defends himself from charges of impiety and suggests an answer to this question. Plato amplifies this answer in the Republic and the Laws. As he refines his understanding of piety, he criticizes traditional understanding of divinity. In the Republic he argues that the traditional divinities are morally inadequate; in the Laws he argues that they are theologically inadequate. The philosophic work Plato accomplishes in these dialogues, as well as the Timaeus, suggests a definitive answer to the Euthyphro’s question. Ultimately, this answer requires further analysis. An appendix is amended to the back of this essay with a collection of all the formal arguments and stipulated definitions referred to in the body of the text.2011-06-21T00:00:00ZAbraham, DavidThe Euthyphro portrays Plato’s mentor, Socrates, asking the question, “what is piety”? In the Apology Socrates defends himself from charges of impiety and suggests an answer to this question. Plato amplifies this answer in the Republic and the Laws. As he refines his understanding of piety, he criticizes traditional understanding of divinity. In the Republic he argues that the traditional divinities are morally inadequate; in the Laws he argues that they are theologically inadequate. The philosophic work Plato accomplishes in these dialogues, as well as the Timaeus, suggests a definitive answer to the Euthyphro’s question. Ultimately, this answer requires further analysis. An appendix is amended to the back of this essay with a collection of all the formal arguments and stipulated definitions referred to in the body of the text.Indexicality and presupposition : explorations beyond truth-conditional informationhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/1704
Abstract: This thesis consists of four essays and an introduction dedicated to two main topics: indexicality and presupposition.
The first essay is concerned with an alleged problem for the standard treatment of indexicals on which their linguistic meanings are functions from context to content (so-called characters). Since most indexicals have their content settled, on an occasion of use, by the speaker’s intentions, some authors have argued that this standard picture is inadequate. By demonstrating that intentions can be seen as a parameter of the kind of context that characters operate on, these arguments are rejected. In addition, it is argued that a more recent, variable-based framework is naturally interpreted as an intention-sensitive semantics.
The second essay is devoted to the phenomenon of descriptive uses of indexicals on which such an expression seems to contribute, not its standard reference as determined by its character, but a property to the interpretation. An argument that singular readings of the cases in question are incoherent is shown to be incorrect, and an approach to descriptive readings is developed on which they arise from e-type uses akin to other well known cases. Further, descriptive readings of the relevant kind are seen to arise only in the presence of adverbs of quantification, and all sentences in which such an adverb takes scope over an indexical are claimed to be ambiguous between a referential and an e-type (descriptive) reading.
The third essay discusses a version of the variable analysis of pronouns on which their descriptive meanings are relegated to the so-called phi-features – person, gender and number. In turn, the phi-features are here seen as triggering semantic presuppositions that place constraints on the definedness of pronouns, and ultimately of sentences in which they appear. It is argued that the descriptive information contributed by the phi-features diverges radically from presuppositional information of both semantic and pragmatic varieties on several dimensions of comparison, and instead the main role of the phi-features is seen to be that of guiding hearers’ attempts to ascertain the speaker’s intentions. The fourth essay addresses an issue concerning the treatment of presuppositions in dynamic semantics. Representing a semantic treatment of pragmatic presuppositions, the dynamic framework is shown to incorrectly regard conversational infelicity as sufficient for semantic undefinedness, given the standard way of defining truth in terms of context change. Further, it is shown that a proposal for a solution fail to make correct predictions for epistemic modals. A novel framework is developed on which context change potentials act on contexts that have more structure than the contexts usually countenanced by dynamic semantics, and it is shown that this framework derives truth from context change while
making correct predictions for both presuppositions and modals.2010-11-30T00:00:00ZStokke, AndreasThis thesis consists of four essays and an introduction dedicated to two main topics: indexicality and presupposition.
The first essay is concerned with an alleged problem for the standard treatment of indexicals on which their linguistic meanings are functions from context to content (so-called characters). Since most indexicals have their content settled, on an occasion of use, by the speaker’s intentions, some authors have argued that this standard picture is inadequate. By demonstrating that intentions can be seen as a parameter of the kind of context that characters operate on, these arguments are rejected. In addition, it is argued that a more recent, variable-based framework is naturally interpreted as an intention-sensitive semantics.
The second essay is devoted to the phenomenon of descriptive uses of indexicals on which such an expression seems to contribute, not its standard reference as determined by its character, but a property to the interpretation. An argument that singular readings of the cases in question are incoherent is shown to be incorrect, and an approach to descriptive readings is developed on which they arise from e-type uses akin to other well known cases. Further, descriptive readings of the relevant kind are seen to arise only in the presence of adverbs of quantification, and all sentences in which such an adverb takes scope over an indexical are claimed to be ambiguous between a referential and an e-type (descriptive) reading.
The third essay discusses a version of the variable analysis of pronouns on which their descriptive meanings are relegated to the so-called phi-features – person, gender and number. In turn, the phi-features are here seen as triggering semantic presuppositions that place constraints on the definedness of pronouns, and ultimately of sentences in which they appear. It is argued that the descriptive information contributed by the phi-features diverges radically from presuppositional information of both semantic and pragmatic varieties on several dimensions of comparison, and instead the main role of the phi-features is seen to be that of guiding hearers’ attempts to ascertain the speaker’s intentions. The fourth essay addresses an issue concerning the treatment of presuppositions in dynamic semantics. Representing a semantic treatment of pragmatic presuppositions, the dynamic framework is shown to incorrectly regard conversational infelicity as sufficient for semantic undefinedness, given the standard way of defining truth in terms of context change. Further, it is shown that a proposal for a solution fail to make correct predictions for epistemic modals. A novel framework is developed on which context change potentials act on contexts that have more structure than the contexts usually countenanced by dynamic semantics, and it is shown that this framework derives truth from context change while
making correct predictions for both presuppositions and modals.Aristotle on ethical ascription : a philosophical exercise in the interpretation of the role and significance of the hekousios/akousios distinction in Aristotle's Ethicshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/1348
Abstract: In his ethical treatises Aristotle offers a rich account of those conditions that render people’s behaviour involuntary, and defines voluntariness on the basis of the absence of these conditions. This dissertation has two aims. One is to offer an account of the significance of the notions of involuntariness and voluntariness for Aristotle’s ethical project that satisfactorily explains why he deems it necessary to discuss these notions in his Ethics. My own account of the significance of these notions for Aristotle’s Ethics emerges from my arguments against the two most influential views concerning this significance: I argue that Aristotle’s concern with voluntariness in his Ethics is not (primarily) shaped by a concern with accountability, i.e. with those conditions under which fully mature and healthy rational agents are held accountable or answerable for their actions; nor is it (primarily) shaped by a concern with the conditioning of pain-responsive agents for the sake of socially useful ends that are not, intrinsically, their own. Rather, his concern is with reason-responsive agents (which are not morally accountable agents, nor merely pain-responsive agents) and the conditions for attributing ethically significant behaviour to them. This is what I call ‘ethical ascription’. The second aim of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive account of those conditions that defeat the ascription of ethically significant pieces of behaviour to reason-responsive agents, and to show the distinctiveness of Aristotle’s views on the nature of these conditions. The conclusions I arrive at in this respect are shaped by the notion of ethical ascription that I develop as a way of reaching the first aim.2010-09-22T00:00:00ZEcheñique, JavierIn his ethical treatises Aristotle offers a rich account of those conditions that render people’s behaviour involuntary, and defines voluntariness on the basis of the absence of these conditions. This dissertation has two aims. One is to offer an account of the significance of the notions of involuntariness and voluntariness for Aristotle’s ethical project that satisfactorily explains why he deems it necessary to discuss these notions in his Ethics. My own account of the significance of these notions for Aristotle’s Ethics emerges from my arguments against the two most influential views concerning this significance: I argue that Aristotle’s concern with voluntariness in his Ethics is not (primarily) shaped by a concern with accountability, i.e. with those conditions under which fully mature and healthy rational agents are held accountable or answerable for their actions; nor is it (primarily) shaped by a concern with the conditioning of pain-responsive agents for the sake of socially useful ends that are not, intrinsically, their own. Rather, his concern is with reason-responsive agents (which are not morally accountable agents, nor merely pain-responsive agents) and the conditions for attributing ethically significant behaviour to them. This is what I call ‘ethical ascription’. The second aim of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive account of those conditions that defeat the ascription of ethically significant pieces of behaviour to reason-responsive agents, and to show the distinctiveness of Aristotle’s views on the nature of these conditions. The conclusions I arrive at in this respect are shaped by the notion of ethical ascription that I develop as a way of reaching the first aim.Aristotle's eudaimonia and two conceptions of happinesshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/994
Abstract: Are you happy? This question is asked of people by friends, parents and psychiatrists alike. What
happiness consists of for each person seems, at first glance, to be entirely subjective in that is it up
to each individual person to define what the happy-making ingredients of her life are.
This dissertation centrally involves an interpretation of Aristotle’s eudaimonia, often
translated as ‘happiness’. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is an inquiry into the chief good for human
beings, and according to Aristotle everyone agrees that this chief good is ‘happiness’, however there
is major disagreement about what ‘happiness’ consists of.
What follows critically interprets Aristotle’s eudaimonia through a close reading of his
arguments. Once Aristotle’s eudaimonia is explicated, it is used to question the supposedly
subjective conception of happiness that the happiness literature argues is pervasive. Finally,
Aristotle’s eudaimonia is defended as a theory of well-being against a charge of perfectionism. It is
argued that Aristotle’s eudaimonia commits its adherents to maximising virtuous activity at all
times, that is, to perfect themselves. It is this interpretation of Aristotle that seeks to undermine
eudaimonia as a plausible theory of well-being, and I end this dissertation by providing a response to
the objection from perfectionism.
This project attempts, fundamentally, to show that Aristotle’s eudaimonia is not simply an
intellectual curiosity: studying eudaimonia can help change the way we live our lives, and for the
better.2010-01-01T00:00:00ZGrech, George J.Are you happy? This question is asked of people by friends, parents and psychiatrists alike. What
happiness consists of for each person seems, at first glance, to be entirely subjective in that is it up
to each individual person to define what the happy-making ingredients of her life are.
This dissertation centrally involves an interpretation of Aristotle’s eudaimonia, often
translated as ‘happiness’. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is an inquiry into the chief good for human
beings, and according to Aristotle everyone agrees that this chief good is ‘happiness’, however there
is major disagreement about what ‘happiness’ consists of.
What follows critically interprets Aristotle’s eudaimonia through a close reading of his
arguments. Once Aristotle’s eudaimonia is explicated, it is used to question the supposedly
subjective conception of happiness that the happiness literature argues is pervasive. Finally,
Aristotle’s eudaimonia is defended as a theory of well-being against a charge of perfectionism. It is
argued that Aristotle’s eudaimonia commits its adherents to maximising virtuous activity at all
times, that is, to perfect themselves. It is this interpretation of Aristotle that seeks to undermine
eudaimonia as a plausible theory of well-being, and I end this dissertation by providing a response to
the objection from perfectionism.
This project attempts, fundamentally, to show that Aristotle’s eudaimonia is not simply an
intellectual curiosity: studying eudaimonia can help change the way we live our lives, and for the
better.Two sources of moral reasonshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/981
Abstract: One of the core questions in contemporary metaethics concerns the nature and status of moral
claims. However, this question presupposes that morality is unified, and that a single
metaethical account will suffice. This thesis aims to challenge that presupposition. In
particular, I argue that there is a substantial theoretical payoff to be had from combining two
distinct metaethical theories – realism, on the one hand, and constructivism, on the other –
whilst limiting the scope of each. In the realist case, the discourse aims to describe a
particular feature of reality; in the constructivist case, the discourse aims to solve some of the
coordination problems faced by people as social beings. We have, therefore, two distinct
sources of moral reasons.
The resulting ‘hybrid’ theory is appealing at the metaethical level, but also yields an attractive
picture at the applied level. Specifically, it retains the core intuition underlying utilitarianism,
whilst incorporating a broadly contractarian account of morality. On this account, our reasons
for not harming other persons are at least the same as our reasons for not harming animals –
but we have additional reasons to refrain from harming persons.
Chapter One establishes a moderate presumption in favour of moral realism, understood as
the claim that moral discourse aims to represent the world, deals in objective truths, and
yields statements capable of truth or falsity. Chapter Two addresses arguments for moral
antirealism: these arguments can be met by restricting the scope of moral realism. Chapter
Three explores the content of the resultant moral realism: specifically, realism about the
intrinsic value of hedonic states. Chapter Four deals with that part of morality which is
unaccounted for by restricted moral realism, and offers an outline form of contractarian
constructivism. Chapter Five investigates the consequences of the hybrid metaethical theory
for applied ethics.2010-01-01T00:00:00ZMacdonald, Iain EzraOne of the core questions in contemporary metaethics concerns the nature and status of moral
claims. However, this question presupposes that morality is unified, and that a single
metaethical account will suffice. This thesis aims to challenge that presupposition. In
particular, I argue that there is a substantial theoretical payoff to be had from combining two
distinct metaethical theories – realism, on the one hand, and constructivism, on the other –
whilst limiting the scope of each. In the realist case, the discourse aims to describe a
particular feature of reality; in the constructivist case, the discourse aims to solve some of the
coordination problems faced by people as social beings. We have, therefore, two distinct
sources of moral reasons.
The resulting ‘hybrid’ theory is appealing at the metaethical level, but also yields an attractive
picture at the applied level. Specifically, it retains the core intuition underlying utilitarianism,
whilst incorporating a broadly contractarian account of morality. On this account, our reasons
for not harming other persons are at least the same as our reasons for not harming animals –
but we have additional reasons to refrain from harming persons.
Chapter One establishes a moderate presumption in favour of moral realism, understood as
the claim that moral discourse aims to represent the world, deals in objective truths, and
yields statements capable of truth or falsity. Chapter Two addresses arguments for moral
antirealism: these arguments can be met by restricting the scope of moral realism. Chapter
Three explores the content of the resultant moral realism: specifically, realism about the
intrinsic value of hedonic states. Chapter Four deals with that part of morality which is
unaccounted for by restricted moral realism, and offers an outline form of contractarian
constructivism. Chapter Five investigates the consequences of the hybrid metaethical theory
for applied ethics.What if? : an enquiry into the semantics of natural language conditionalshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/949
Abstract: This thesis is essentially a portfolio of four disjoint yet thematically related articles that deal with some semantic aspect or another of natural language conditionals.
The thesis opens with a brief introductory chapter that offers a short yet opinionated historical overview and a theoretical background of several important semantic issues of conditionals.
The second chapter then deals with the issue of truth values and conditions
of indicative conditionals. So-called Gibbard Phenomenon cases have been used to
argue that indicative conditionals construed in terms of the Ramsey Test cannot have truth values. Since that conclusion is somewhat incredible, several alternative
options are explored. Finally, a contextualised revision of the Ramsey Test is offered which successfully avoids the threats of the Gibbard Phenomenon.
The third chapter deals with the question of where to draw the so-called indicative/
subjunctive line. Natural language conditionals are commonly believed to be
of two semantically distinct types: indicative and subjunctive. Although this distinction is central to many semantic analyses of natural conditionals, there seems to be no consensus on the details of its nature. While trying to uncover the grounds for the distinction, we will argue our way through several plausible proposals found in the literature. Upon discovering that none of these proposals seem entirely suited, we will reconsider our position and make several helpful observations into the nature of conditional sentences. And finally, in light of our observations, we shall propose and argue for plausible grounds for the indicative/subjunctive distinction.distinction.
The fourth chapter offers semantics for modal and amodal natural language conditionals based on the distinction proposed in the previous chapter. First, the nature of modal and amodal suppositions will be explored. Armed with an analysis
of modal and amodal suppositions, the corresponding conditionals will be examined
further. Consequently, the syntax of conditionals in English will be uncovered
for the purpose of providing input for our semantics. And finally, compositional
semantics in generative grammar will be offered for modal and amodal conditionals.
The fifth and final chapter defends Modus Ponens from alleged counterexamples. In particular, the chapter offers a solution to McGee’s infamous counterexamples. First, several solutions offered to the counterexamples hitherto are all argued to
be inadequate. After a couple of observations on the counterexamples’ nature, a solution is offered and demonstrated. the solution suggests that the semantics of
embedded natural language conditionals is more sophisticated than their surface
syntax indicates. The heart of the solution is a translation function from the surface
form of natural language conditionals to their logical form.
Finally, the thesis ends with a conclusion that briefly summarises the main conclusions drawn in its preceding chapters.2010-06-25T00:00:00ZHjálmarsson, Guðmundur AndriThis thesis is essentially a portfolio of four disjoint yet thematically related articles that deal with some semantic aspect or another of natural language conditionals.
The thesis opens with a brief introductory chapter that offers a short yet opinionated historical overview and a theoretical background of several important semantic issues of conditionals.
The second chapter then deals with the issue of truth values and conditions
of indicative conditionals. So-called Gibbard Phenomenon cases have been used to
argue that indicative conditionals construed in terms of the Ramsey Test cannot have truth values. Since that conclusion is somewhat incredible, several alternative
options are explored. Finally, a contextualised revision of the Ramsey Test is offered which successfully avoids the threats of the Gibbard Phenomenon.
The third chapter deals with the question of where to draw the so-called indicative/
subjunctive line. Natural language conditionals are commonly believed to be
of two semantically distinct types: indicative and subjunctive. Although this distinction is central to many semantic analyses of natural conditionals, there seems to be no consensus on the details of its nature. While trying to uncover the grounds for the distinction, we will argue our way through several plausible proposals found in the literature. Upon discovering that none of these proposals seem entirely suited, we will reconsider our position and make several helpful observations into the nature of conditional sentences. And finally, in light of our observations, we shall propose and argue for plausible grounds for the indicative/subjunctive distinction.distinction.
The fourth chapter offers semantics for modal and amodal natural language conditionals based on the distinction proposed in the previous chapter. First, the nature of modal and amodal suppositions will be explored. Armed with an analysis
of modal and amodal suppositions, the corresponding conditionals will be examined
further. Consequently, the syntax of conditionals in English will be uncovered
for the purpose of providing input for our semantics. And finally, compositional
semantics in generative grammar will be offered for modal and amodal conditionals.
The fifth and final chapter defends Modus Ponens from alleged counterexamples. In particular, the chapter offers a solution to McGee’s infamous counterexamples. First, several solutions offered to the counterexamples hitherto are all argued to
be inadequate. After a couple of observations on the counterexamples’ nature, a solution is offered and demonstrated. the solution suggests that the semantics of
embedded natural language conditionals is more sophisticated than their surface
syntax indicates. The heart of the solution is a translation function from the surface
form of natural language conditionals to their logical form.
Finally, the thesis ends with a conclusion that briefly summarises the main conclusions drawn in its preceding chapters.Autonomy and purity in Kant's moral theoryhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/937
Abstract: Kant believed that the moral law is a law that the rational will legislates. This thesis examines this claim and its broader implications for Kant’s moral theory.
Many are drawn to Kantian ethics because of its emphasis on the dignity and legislative authority of the rational being. The attractiveness of this emphasis on the special standing and capacities of the self grounds a recent tendency to interpret Kantian autonomy as a doctrine according to which individual agents create binding moral norms. Where this line is taken, however, its advocates face deep questions concerning the compatibility of autonomy and the conception of moral requirement to which Kant is also certainly committed – one which conceives of the moral law as a strictly universal and necessary imperative.
This thesis has two main aims. In the first half, I offer an interpretation of Kantian autonomy that both accommodates the universality and necessity of moral constraint and takes seriously the notion that the rational will is a legislator of moral law. As a means of developing and securing my preferred view, I argue that recent popular interpretations of Kantian autonomy fail to resolve the tensions that seem at first glance to plague the concept of self-legislation, where what is at stake is the legislation of a categorical imperative. In the second half of this thesis, I examine the connections between my preferred interpretation of self-legislation and Kant’s dichotomisation of reason and our sensuous nature. I argue that some of the more harsh and seemingly unreasonable aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy can be defended by bringing to light the ways in which they are connected to his commitment both to the autonomy of the will and to developing a genuinely normative ethics.2010-06-25T00:00:00ZBenson, Carolyn JaneKant believed that the moral law is a law that the rational will legislates. This thesis examines this claim and its broader implications for Kant’s moral theory.
Many are drawn to Kantian ethics because of its emphasis on the dignity and legislative authority of the rational being. The attractiveness of this emphasis on the special standing and capacities of the self grounds a recent tendency to interpret Kantian autonomy as a doctrine according to which individual agents create binding moral norms. Where this line is taken, however, its advocates face deep questions concerning the compatibility of autonomy and the conception of moral requirement to which Kant is also certainly committed – one which conceives of the moral law as a strictly universal and necessary imperative.
This thesis has two main aims. In the first half, I offer an interpretation of Kantian autonomy that both accommodates the universality and necessity of moral constraint and takes seriously the notion that the rational will is a legislator of moral law. As a means of developing and securing my preferred view, I argue that recent popular interpretations of Kantian autonomy fail to resolve the tensions that seem at first glance to plague the concept of self-legislation, where what is at stake is the legislation of a categorical imperative. In the second half of this thesis, I examine the connections between my preferred interpretation of self-legislation and Kant’s dichotomisation of reason and our sensuous nature. I argue that some of the more harsh and seemingly unreasonable aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy can be defended by bringing to light the ways in which they are connected to his commitment both to the autonomy of the will and to developing a genuinely normative ethics.Real impossible worlds : the bounds of possibilityhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/924
Abstract: Lewisian Genuine Realism (GR) about possible worlds is often deemed unable to accommodate impossible worlds and reap the benefits that these bestow to rival theories. This thesis explores two alternative extensions of GR into the terrain of impossible worlds.
It is divided in six chapters. Chapter I outlines Lewis’ theory, the motivations for
impossible worlds, and the central problem that such worlds present for GR: How can GR
even understand the notion of an impossible world, given Lewis’ reductive theoretical
framework? Since the desideratum is to incorporate impossible worlds into GR without
compromising Lewis’ reductive analysis of modality, Chapter II defends that analysis
against (old and new) objections. The rest of the thesis is devoted to incorporating
impossible worlds into GR. Chapter III explores GR-friendly impossible worlds in the
form of set-theoretic constructions out of genuine possibilia. Then, Chapters IV-VI
venture into concrete impossible worlds. Chapter IV addresses Lewis’ objection against
such worlds, to the effect that contradictions true at impossible worlds amount to true contradictions tout court. I argue that even if so, the relevant contradictions are only ever about the non-actual, and that Lewis’ argument relies on a premise that cannot be nonquestion-
beggingly upheld in the face of genuine impossible worlds in any case. Chapter
V proposes that Lewis’ reductive analysis can be preserved, even in the face of genuine
impossibilia, if we differentiate the impossible from the possible by means of accessibility relations, understood non-modally in terms of similarity. Finally, Chapter VI counters objections to the effect that there are certain impossibilities, formulated in Lewis’ theoretical language, which genuine impossibilia should, but cannot, represent. I conclude that Genuine Realism is still very much in the running when the discussion turns to impossible worlds.2010-06-25T00:00:00ZKiourti, Ira GeorgiaLewisian Genuine Realism (GR) about possible worlds is often deemed unable to accommodate impossible worlds and reap the benefits that these bestow to rival theories. This thesis explores two alternative extensions of GR into the terrain of impossible worlds.
It is divided in six chapters. Chapter I outlines Lewis’ theory, the motivations for
impossible worlds, and the central problem that such worlds present for GR: How can GR
even understand the notion of an impossible world, given Lewis’ reductive theoretical
framework? Since the desideratum is to incorporate impossible worlds into GR without
compromising Lewis’ reductive analysis of modality, Chapter II defends that analysis
against (old and new) objections. The rest of the thesis is devoted to incorporating
impossible worlds into GR. Chapter III explores GR-friendly impossible worlds in the
form of set-theoretic constructions out of genuine possibilia. Then, Chapters IV-VI
venture into concrete impossible worlds. Chapter IV addresses Lewis’ objection against
such worlds, to the effect that contradictions true at impossible worlds amount to true contradictions tout court. I argue that even if so, the relevant contradictions are only ever about the non-actual, and that Lewis’ argument relies on a premise that cannot be nonquestion-
beggingly upheld in the face of genuine impossible worlds in any case. Chapter
V proposes that Lewis’ reductive analysis can be preserved, even in the face of genuine
impossibilia, if we differentiate the impossible from the possible by means of accessibility relations, understood non-modally in terms of similarity. Finally, Chapter VI counters objections to the effect that there are certain impossibilities, formulated in Lewis’ theoretical language, which genuine impossibilia should, but cannot, represent. I conclude that Genuine Realism is still very much in the running when the discussion turns to impossible worlds.The structure of logical consequence : proof-theoretic conceptionshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/892
Abstract: The model-theoretic analysis of the concept of logical consequence has come under heavy criticism in the last couple of decades. The present work looks at an alternative approach to logical consequence where the notion of inference takes center stage. Formally, the model-theoretic framework is exchanged for a proof-theoretic framework. It is argued that contrary to the traditional view, proof-theoretic semantics is not revisionary, and should rather be seen as a formal semantics that can supplement model-theory. Specifically, there are formal resources to provide a proof-theoretic semantics for both intuitionistic and classical logic.
We develop a new perspective on proof-theoretic harmony for logical constants which incorporates elements from the substructural era of proof-theory. We show that there is a semantic lacuna in the traditional accounts of harmony. A new theory of how inference rules determine the semantic content of logical constants is developed. The theory weds proof-theoretic and model-theoretic semantics by showing how proof-theoretic rules can induce truth-conditional clauses in Boolean and many-valued settings. It is argued that such a new approach to how rules determine meaning will ultimately assist our understanding of the apriori nature of logic.2010-06-25T00:00:00ZHjortland, Ole T.The model-theoretic analysis of the concept of logical consequence has come under heavy criticism in the last couple of decades. The present work looks at an alternative approach to logical consequence where the notion of inference takes center stage. Formally, the model-theoretic framework is exchanged for a proof-theoretic framework. It is argued that contrary to the traditional view, proof-theoretic semantics is not revisionary, and should rather be seen as a formal semantics that can supplement model-theory. Specifically, there are formal resources to provide a proof-theoretic semantics for both intuitionistic and classical logic.
We develop a new perspective on proof-theoretic harmony for logical constants which incorporates elements from the substructural era of proof-theory. We show that there is a semantic lacuna in the traditional accounts of harmony. A new theory of how inference rules determine the semantic content of logical constants is developed. The theory weds proof-theoretic and model-theoretic semantics by showing how proof-theoretic rules can induce truth-conditional clauses in Boolean and many-valued settings. It is argued that such a new approach to how rules determine meaning will ultimately assist our understanding of the apriori nature of logic.Lewis, counterfactual analyses of causation, and pre-emption caseshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/822
Abstract: Over the past few decades analyses of causation have proliferated in almost immeasurable abundance, and with two things in common; firstly, they make much of counterfactual dependence, and secondly, none of them successfully handle all the pre-emption cases. In this thesis, I fore-mostly investigate David Lewis’ promising counterfactual analyses of causation (along with many others), and provide an extensive examination of pre-emption cases. I also offer my own counterfactual analysis of causation, which I argue can handle the problematic pre-emption cases, and therein succeed where so many other prominent analyses of causation have failed. I then conclude with some morals for the continuing debate.2009-10-16T00:00:00ZLandsberg, DavidOver the past few decades analyses of causation have proliferated in almost immeasurable abundance, and with two things in common; firstly, they make much of counterfactual dependence, and secondly, none of them successfully handle all the pre-emption cases. In this thesis, I fore-mostly investigate David Lewis’ promising counterfactual analyses of causation (along with many others), and provide an extensive examination of pre-emption cases. I also offer my own counterfactual analysis of causation, which I argue can handle the problematic pre-emption cases, and therein succeed where so many other prominent analyses of causation have failed. I then conclude with some morals for the continuing debate.Why death can be bad and immortality is worsehttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/724
Abstract: This thesis examines the moral implications of the metaphysical nature of
death. I begin with the Epicurean arguments which hold that death is morally
irrelevant for the one who dies, and that one should regard it accordingly. I
defend the Epicurean claim that death simpliciter can be neither good nor bad
from objections which purport to show that the negative features of death are
bad for the one who dies. I establish that existence is a necessary condition
for a person’s being morally benefited or wronged, and since death is the
privation of existence, death cannot be bad for the person who dies. To
account for the commonly-held belief that death is an evil, I explain that the
prospect of death can be morally relevant to persons while they are alive as
death is one of the many states of affairs that may prevent the satisfaction of
persons’ desires for the goods of life. I claim that categorical desires ground a
disutility by which death can rationally be regarded as an evil to be avoided
and feared. I then consider an infinite life as a possible attractive alternative
to a finite life. I argue that a life which is invulnerable to death cannot be a
desirable human existence, as many of our human values are inseparable from
the finite temporal structure of life. I conclude that death simpliciter can be
neither good nor bad, but the fact of death has two moral implications for
living persons: death as such is instrumentally good (it is a necessary
condition by which the value of life is recognized); and our own individual
deaths can rationally be regarded as an evil to be avoided.2009-01-01T00:00:00ZKalnow, CaraThis thesis examines the moral implications of the metaphysical nature of
death. I begin with the Epicurean arguments which hold that death is morally
irrelevant for the one who dies, and that one should regard it accordingly. I
defend the Epicurean claim that death simpliciter can be neither good nor bad
from objections which purport to show that the negative features of death are
bad for the one who dies. I establish that existence is a necessary condition
for a person’s being morally benefited or wronged, and since death is the
privation of existence, death cannot be bad for the person who dies. To
account for the commonly-held belief that death is an evil, I explain that the
prospect of death can be morally relevant to persons while they are alive as
death is one of the many states of affairs that may prevent the satisfaction of
persons’ desires for the goods of life. I claim that categorical desires ground a
disutility by which death can rationally be regarded as an evil to be avoided
and feared. I then consider an infinite life as a possible attractive alternative
to a finite life. I argue that a life which is invulnerable to death cannot be a
desirable human existence, as many of our human values are inseparable from
the finite temporal structure of life. I conclude that death simpliciter can be
neither good nor bad, but the fact of death has two moral implications for
living persons: death as such is instrumentally good (it is a necessary
condition by which the value of life is recognized); and our own individual
deaths can rationally be regarded as an evil to be avoided.Possible preferences and the harm of existencehttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/717
Abstract: How good or bad is a person’s life? How good or bad is a world? In this dissertation, I will attempt to answer these questions. Common-sense would dictate that if a person’s life would be extremely bad, then bringing her into existence is a bad thing. Not only is it bad for the person who lives it, but also, it is bad because it makes the world a worse place. A world populated only by individuals who have lives full of unrelenting misery and suffering is certainly worse than a world only populated by individuals who are extremely well off. If we can measure the value of a person’s life and the value of a world, then we can determine how good or bad our lives are and how good or bad the actual world is. Investigating these issues and providing satisfactory answers to these questions is immensely important.
In this dissertation I argue that all actual human lives are so bad that it would have been better had all of us never come into existence. I also argue that our world is worse than an empty world. The nucleus of my view consists of the following two claims:
i. Each person has an interest in acquiring a new satisfied preference.
ii. Whenever a person is deprived of a new satisfied preference this violates an interest and is thus a harm with a finite disvalue.
If one holds both (i) and (ii), then one is a deprivationalist. Any deprivationalist will have to claim that existence is worse for all actual persons than non-existence. I also show that deprivationalism presents a clear strategy for escaping The Repugnant Conclusion and The Mere Addition Paradox. For a deprivationalist, the Non-Identity Problem is neutralized as well. Parfit’s challenge in Reasons and Persons was to devise a theory of beneficence that could escape these cases without leading to other unacceptable conclusions. Parfit failed to find a theory—“Theory X”—that would meet these requirements. If the conclusions in this dissertation are correct, then deprivationalism is a good candidate for Theory X.2009-06-20T00:00:00ZLarock, MarcHow good or bad is a person’s life? How good or bad is a world? In this dissertation, I will attempt to answer these questions. Common-sense would dictate that if a person’s life would be extremely bad, then bringing her into existence is a bad thing. Not only is it bad for the person who lives it, but also, it is bad because it makes the world a worse place. A world populated only by individuals who have lives full of unrelenting misery and suffering is certainly worse than a world only populated by individuals who are extremely well off. If we can measure the value of a person’s life and the value of a world, then we can determine how good or bad our lives are and how good or bad the actual world is. Investigating these issues and providing satisfactory answers to these questions is immensely important.
In this dissertation I argue that all actual human lives are so bad that it would have been better had all of us never come into existence. I also argue that our world is worse than an empty world. The nucleus of my view consists of the following two claims:
i. Each person has an interest in acquiring a new satisfied preference.
ii. Whenever a person is deprived of a new satisfied preference this violates an interest and is thus a harm with a finite disvalue.
If one holds both (i) and (ii), then one is a deprivationalist. Any deprivationalist will have to claim that existence is worse for all actual persons than non-existence. I also show that deprivationalism presents a clear strategy for escaping The Repugnant Conclusion and The Mere Addition Paradox. For a deprivationalist, the Non-Identity Problem is neutralized as well. Parfit’s challenge in Reasons and Persons was to devise a theory of beneficence that could escape these cases without leading to other unacceptable conclusions. Parfit failed to find a theory—“Theory X”—that would meet these requirements. If the conclusions in this dissertation are correct, then deprivationalism is a good candidate for Theory X.Inferences in context : contextualism, inferentialism and the concept of universal quantificationhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/688
Abstract: This Thesis addresses issues that lie at the intersection of two broad philosophical projects: inferentialism and contextualism.
It discusses and defends an account of the logical concepts based on the following two ideas: 1) that the logical concepts are constituted by our canonical inferential usages of them; 2) that to grasp, or possess, a logical concept is to undertake an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the concept when deploying it in a linguistic practice.
The account focuses on the concept of universal quantification, with respect to which it also defends the view that linguistic context contributes to an interpretation of instances of the concept by determining the scope of our commitments to the canonical consequences of the quantifier.
The model that I offer for the concept of universal quantification relies on, and develops, three main ideas: 1) our understanding of the concept’s inferential role is one according to which the concept expresses full inferential generality; 2) what I refer to as the ‘domain model’ (the view that the universal quantifier always ranges over a domain of quantification, and that the specification of such a domain contributes to determine the proposition expressed by sentences in which the quantifier figures) is subject to a series of crucial difficulties, and should be abandoned; 3) we should regard the undertaking of an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the universal quantifier as a stable and objective presupposition of a universally quantified sentence expressing a determinate proposition in context.
In the last chapter of the Thesis I sketch a proposal about how contextual quantifier restrictions should be understood, and articulate the main challenges that a commitment-theoretic story about the context-sensitivity of the universal quantifier faces.2008-11-27T00:00:00ZTabet, ChiaraThis Thesis addresses issues that lie at the intersection of two broad philosophical projects: inferentialism and contextualism.
It discusses and defends an account of the logical concepts based on the following two ideas: 1) that the logical concepts are constituted by our canonical inferential usages of them; 2) that to grasp, or possess, a logical concept is to undertake an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the concept when deploying it in a linguistic practice.
The account focuses on the concept of universal quantification, with respect to which it also defends the view that linguistic context contributes to an interpretation of instances of the concept by determining the scope of our commitments to the canonical consequences of the quantifier.
The model that I offer for the concept of universal quantification relies on, and develops, three main ideas: 1) our understanding of the concept’s inferential role is one according to which the concept expresses full inferential generality; 2) what I refer to as the ‘domain model’ (the view that the universal quantifier always ranges over a domain of quantification, and that the specification of such a domain contributes to determine the proposition expressed by sentences in which the quantifier figures) is subject to a series of crucial difficulties, and should be abandoned; 3) we should regard the undertaking of an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the universal quantifier as a stable and objective presupposition of a universally quantified sentence expressing a determinate proposition in context.
In the last chapter of the Thesis I sketch a proposal about how contextual quantifier restrictions should be understood, and articulate the main challenges that a commitment-theoretic story about the context-sensitivity of the universal quantifier faces.Truth and goodness : a minimalist studyhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/684
Abstract: Philosophers are often thought to be in the business of analysing concepts, in particular, concepts taken to be fundamental in human thought and practice: truth, goodness, beauty, knowledge, meaning, rightness, causation, to name just a few. But what can we expect from such analyses? Can we expect a comprehensive account of one concept in terms of one or more others? Can we expect to reduce these kinds of concepts to concepts which are taken to be more fundamental?
This study is concerned with a particular approach to conceptual analysis, minimalism, which, in general, offers very modest answers to these questions. Minimalist theories, by and large, hold that the strategy for analysing concepts ought not to go much further than the collection of some rather ordinary, ‘platitudinous’ thoughts about those concepts. Accordingly, minimalist theories do not often encourage ambitious pro jects of giving a comprehensive analysis of one concept in terms of another, where this process encourages the construction of such biconditional claims as ‘X falls under concept F iff
X falls under concept G’. Just how far we are to extend our analysis beyond the point of a collection of platitudinous principles is a point of contention between different types of minimalist theories.
This study has three main aims. Firstly, it aims to give a taxonomy of minimalist theories. Secondly, it aims to examine in detail the types of minimalist theories pertinent to the study of truth, and propose the best view
available. Thirdly, it aims to examine how the minimalist methodology may be extended to other normative concepts, taking the concept of goodness as
a case study.2008-11-27T00:00:00ZEdwards, Douglas O.Philosophers are often thought to be in the business of analysing concepts, in particular, concepts taken to be fundamental in human thought and practice: truth, goodness, beauty, knowledge, meaning, rightness, causation, to name just a few. But what can we expect from such analyses? Can we expect a comprehensive account of one concept in terms of one or more others? Can we expect to reduce these kinds of concepts to concepts which are taken to be more fundamental?
This study is concerned with a particular approach to conceptual analysis, minimalism, which, in general, offers very modest answers to these questions. Minimalist theories, by and large, hold that the strategy for analysing concepts ought not to go much further than the collection of some rather ordinary, ‘platitudinous’ thoughts about those concepts. Accordingly, minimalist theories do not often encourage ambitious pro jects of giving a comprehensive analysis of one concept in terms of another, where this process encourages the construction of such biconditional claims as ‘X falls under concept F iff
X falls under concept G’. Just how far we are to extend our analysis beyond the point of a collection of platitudinous principles is a point of contention between different types of minimalist theories.
This study has three main aims. Firstly, it aims to give a taxonomy of minimalist theories. Secondly, it aims to examine in detail the types of minimalist theories pertinent to the study of truth, and propose the best view
available. Thirdly, it aims to examine how the minimalist methodology may be extended to other normative concepts, taking the concept of goodness as
a case study.Liberal legitimacy : a study of the normative foundations of liberalismhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/563
Abstract: This thesis is a critique of the prominent strand of contemporary liberal political
theory which maintains that liberal political authority must, in some sense, rest
on the free consent of those subjected to it, and that such a consensus is
achieved if a polity’s basic structure can be publicly justified to its citizenry, or to
a relevant subset of it. Call that the liberal legitimacy view. I argue that the
liberal legitimacy view cannot provide viable normative foundations for political
authority, for the hypothetical consensus it envisages cannot be achieved and
sustained without either arbitrarily excluding conspicuous sectors of the citizenry
or commanding a consent that is less than free. That is because the liberal
legitimacy view’s structure is one that requires a form of consent that carries
free-standing normative force (i.e. normative force generated by voluntariness),
yet the particular form of hypothetical consent through public justification
envisaged by the view does not possess such force, because of its built-in bias in
favour of liberalism. I also argue that the liberal legitimacy view is the most
recent instantiation of one of two main strands of liberal theory, namely the
nowadays dominant contract-based liberalism, which seeks to ground liberal
political authority in a hypothetical agreement between the citizens. My case
against the liberal legitimacy view, then, contributes to the revitalisation of the
other main approach to the normative foundations of liberalism, namely the
substantivist one, which legitimates liberal political authority through an appeal
to the substantive values and virtues safeguarded and promoted by liberal
polities.2008-11-27T00:00:00ZRossi, EnzoThis thesis is a critique of the prominent strand of contemporary liberal political
theory which maintains that liberal political authority must, in some sense, rest
on the free consent of those subjected to it, and that such a consensus is
achieved if a polity’s basic structure can be publicly justified to its citizenry, or to
a relevant subset of it. Call that the liberal legitimacy view. I argue that the
liberal legitimacy view cannot provide viable normative foundations for political
authority, for the hypothetical consensus it envisages cannot be achieved and
sustained without either arbitrarily excluding conspicuous sectors of the citizenry
or commanding a consent that is less than free. That is because the liberal
legitimacy view’s structure is one that requires a form of consent that carries
free-standing normative force (i.e. normative force generated by voluntariness),
yet the particular form of hypothetical consent through public justification
envisaged by the view does not possess such force, because of its built-in bias in
favour of liberalism. I also argue that the liberal legitimacy view is the most
recent instantiation of one of two main strands of liberal theory, namely the
nowadays dominant contract-based liberalism, which seeks to ground liberal
political authority in a hypothetical agreement between the citizens. My case
against the liberal legitimacy view, then, contributes to the revitalisation of the
other main approach to the normative foundations of liberalism, namely the
substantivist one, which legitimates liberal political authority through an appeal
to the substantive values and virtues safeguarded and promoted by liberal
polities.McDowell, Gettier, and the bipartite account of perceptual knowledgehttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/511
Abstract: In his essay, “Knowledge and the Internal Revisited”, John McDowell claims that “seeing that p constitutes false-hood excluding justification for believing that p.” In this thesis I attempt to construct an account of perceptual knowledge that exploits McDowell’s notion of false-hood excluding justification. To this end, I limn a justified (strong) belief, or bipartite, account of perceptual knowledge in which justification is seen as factive. On this picture, the truth requirement of the traditional tripartite account is incorporated into the justification condition for knowledge. My account of perceptual knowledge is McDowellian in spirit, but not in detail. Specifically, I part ways with McDowell in my insistence that knowledge should be seen as a composite rather than primitive concept in which belief, understood as commitment to the truth of a proposition, and justification, understood as the possession of a factive reason, both figure.2008-06-27T00:00:00ZArcher, Adrian AveryIn his essay, “Knowledge and the Internal Revisited”, John McDowell claims that “seeing that p constitutes false-hood excluding justification for believing that p.” In this thesis I attempt to construct an account of perceptual knowledge that exploits McDowell’s notion of false-hood excluding justification. To this end, I limn a justified (strong) belief, or bipartite, account of perceptual knowledge in which justification is seen as factive. On this picture, the truth requirement of the traditional tripartite account is incorporated into the justification condition for knowledge. My account of perceptual knowledge is McDowellian in spirit, but not in detail. Specifically, I part ways with McDowell in my insistence that knowledge should be seen as a composite rather than primitive concept in which belief, understood as commitment to the truth of a proposition, and justification, understood as the possession of a factive reason, both figure.Living on the slippery slope : the nature, sources and logic of vaguenesshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/508
Abstract: According to the dominant approach in the theory of vagueness, the nature of the vagueness of an expression ‘F’ consists in its presenting borderline cases in an appropriately ordered series: objects which are neither definitely F nor definitely not F (where the notion of definiteness can be semantic, ontic, epistemic, psychological or primitive). In view of the various problems faced by theories of vagueness adopting the dominant approach, the thesis proposes to reconsider the naive theory of vagueness, according to which the nature of the vagueness of an expression consists in its not drawing boundaries between any neighbouring objects in an appropriately ordered series. It is argued that expressions and concepts which do present this feature play an essential role in our cognitive and practical life, allowing us to conceptualize—in a way which would otherwise be impossible—the typically coarse-grained distinctions we encounter in reality. Despite its strong initial plausibility and ability to explain many phenomena of vagueness, the naive theory is widely rejected because thought to be shown inconsistent by the sorites paradox. In reply, it is first argued that accounts of vagueness based on the dominant approach are themselves subject to higher-order sorites paradoxes. The paradox is then
solved on behalf of the naive theory by rejecting the unrestricted transitivity of the consequence relation on a vague language; a family of logics apt for reasoning with vague expressions is proposed and studied (using models
with partially ordered values). The characteristic philosophical and logical consequences of this novel solution are developed and defended in detail. In particular, it is shown how the analysis of what happens in the attempt of surveying a sorites series and deciding each case allows the naive theory to recover a "thin" notion of a borderline case.2008-06-25T00:00:00ZZardini, EliaAccording to the dominant approach in the theory of vagueness, the nature of the vagueness of an expression ‘F’ consists in its presenting borderline cases in an appropriately ordered series: objects which are neither definitely F nor definitely not F (where the notion of definiteness can be semantic, ontic, epistemic, psychological or primitive). In view of the various problems faced by theories of vagueness adopting the dominant approach, the thesis proposes to reconsider the naive theory of vagueness, according to which the nature of the vagueness of an expression consists in its not drawing boundaries between any neighbouring objects in an appropriately ordered series. It is argued that expressions and concepts which do present this feature play an essential role in our cognitive and practical life, allowing us to conceptualize—in a way which would otherwise be impossible—the typically coarse-grained distinctions we encounter in reality. Despite its strong initial plausibility and ability to explain many phenomena of vagueness, the naive theory is widely rejected because thought to be shown inconsistent by the sorites paradox. In reply, it is first argued that accounts of vagueness based on the dominant approach are themselves subject to higher-order sorites paradoxes. The paradox is then
solved on behalf of the naive theory by rejecting the unrestricted transitivity of the consequence relation on a vague language; a family of logics apt for reasoning with vague expressions is proposed and studied (using models
with partially ordered values). The characteristic philosophical and logical consequences of this novel solution are developed and defended in detail. In particular, it is shown how the analysis of what happens in the attempt of surveying a sorites series and deciding each case allows the naive theory to recover a "thin" notion of a borderline case.The role of emotion-arousal in Aristotle’s Rhetorichttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/501
Abstract: The principal claim defended in this thesis is that for Aristotle arousing the emotions of others can amount to giving them proper grounds for conviction, and hence a skill in doing so is properly part of an expertise in rhetoric. We set out Aristotle’s view of rhetoric as exercised solely in the provision of proper grounds for conviction (pisteis) and show how he defends this controversial view by appeal to a more widely shared and plausible view of rhetoric’s role in the proper functioning of the state. We then explore in more detail what normative standards must be met for something to qualify as “proper grounds for conviction”, applying this to all three of Aristotle’s kinds of “technical proofs” (entechnoi pisteis). In the case of emotion, meeting these standards is a matter of arousing emotions that constitute the reasonable acceptance of premises in arguments that count in favour of the speaker’s conclusion. We then seek to show that Aristotle’s view of the emotions is compatible with this role. This involves opposing the view that in Rhetoric I.1 Aristotle rejects any role for emotion-arousal in rhetoric (a view that famously generates a contradiction with the rest of the treatise). It also requires rejecting the view of Rhetoric II.2-11 on which, for Aristotle, the distinctive outlook involved in emotions is merely how things “appear” to the subject.2008-06-25T00:00:00ZDow, Jamie P.G.The principal claim defended in this thesis is that for Aristotle arousing the emotions of others can amount to giving them proper grounds for conviction, and hence a skill in doing so is properly part of an expertise in rhetoric. We set out Aristotle’s view of rhetoric as exercised solely in the provision of proper grounds for conviction (pisteis) and show how he defends this controversial view by appeal to a more widely shared and plausible view of rhetoric’s role in the proper functioning of the state. We then explore in more detail what normative standards must be met for something to qualify as “proper grounds for conviction”, applying this to all three of Aristotle’s kinds of “technical proofs” (entechnoi pisteis). In the case of emotion, meeting these standards is a matter of arousing emotions that constitute the reasonable acceptance of premises in arguments that count in favour of the speaker’s conclusion. We then seek to show that Aristotle’s view of the emotions is compatible with this role. This involves opposing the view that in Rhetoric I.1 Aristotle rejects any role for emotion-arousal in rhetoric (a view that famously generates a contradiction with the rest of the treatise). It also requires rejecting the view of Rhetoric II.2-11 on which, for Aristotle, the distinctive outlook involved in emotions is merely how things “appear” to the subject.A critical discussion of Jonathan Dancy's moral particularismhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/363
Abstract: 'Moral Particularism' is a view that questions the role of
principles in ethics. Jonathan Dancy, the most eminent particularist, argues
that principles which claim that it is right or wrong to do a certain thing in
all situations cannot adequately account for the role context plays in moral deliberation.
The aim of this dissertation is to critically evaluate the theory of Moral
Particularism. The first section discusses various positions opposed to
particularism. It considers the emergence of particularism as a response to
Hare's Theory of Universalizability and Ross's Theory of Prima Facie Duty.
The dissertation then moves on to examine the view that context-sensitivity
does not support particularism. The second part of this dissertation analyses
Dancy's theory in closer detail. It begins with a clarification of Dancy's
conception of principles and is followed by a consideration of the evolution
of particularism over time. The plausibility of the various versions of
this theory are then compared. The third part of the dissertation looks
at criticism of particularism by others apart from Dancy. It argues that
context-sensitivity can only ground particularism as an epistemic, and not
as a metaphysical theory. Furthermore, it discusses whether thick ethical
concepts can ground principles. The dissertation concludes by asserting
that whilst the claims of particularism are true, they are no serious threat to
traditional moral theories.2007-01-01T00:00:00ZSchwind, Philipp'Moral Particularism' is a view that questions the role of
principles in ethics. Jonathan Dancy, the most eminent particularist, argues
that principles which claim that it is right or wrong to do a certain thing in
all situations cannot adequately account for the role context plays in moral deliberation.
The aim of this dissertation is to critically evaluate the theory of Moral
Particularism. The first section discusses various positions opposed to
particularism. It considers the emergence of particularism as a response to
Hare's Theory of Universalizability and Ross's Theory of Prima Facie Duty.
The dissertation then moves on to examine the view that context-sensitivity
does not support particularism. The second part of this dissertation analyses
Dancy's theory in closer detail. It begins with a clarification of Dancy's
conception of principles and is followed by a consideration of the evolution
of particularism over time. The plausibility of the various versions of
this theory are then compared. The third part of the dissertation looks
at criticism of particularism by others apart from Dancy. It argues that
context-sensitivity can only ground particularism as an epistemic, and not
as a metaphysical theory. Furthermore, it discusses whether thick ethical
concepts can ground principles. The dissertation concludes by asserting
that whilst the claims of particularism are true, they are no serious threat to
traditional moral theories.Conceptual room for ontic vaguenesshttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/348
Abstract: This thesis is a systematic investigation of whether there might be conceptual room for the idea that the world itself might be vague, independently of how we describe it. This idea – the existence of so-called ontic vagueness – has generally been extremely unpopular in the literature; my thesis thus seeks to evaluate whether this ‘negative press’ is justified. I start by giving a working definition and semantics for ontic vagueness, and then attempt to show that there are no conclusive arguments that rule out vagueness of this kind. I subsequently establish what type of arguments I think would be most effective in establishing ontic vagueness and provide some arguments of this form. I then highlight a potential worry for this type of argument, but argue that it can be circumvented. Finally, I consider the main ways that the opponent of ontic vagueness would be likely resist the arguments I have offered, and argue that these strategies of response are methodologically problematic. I conclude by claiming that ontic vagueness is a perfectly plausible ontological commitment.2007-06-20T00:00:00ZBarnes, ElizabethThis thesis is a systematic investigation of whether there might be conceptual room for the idea that the world itself might be vague, independently of how we describe it. This idea – the existence of so-called ontic vagueness – has generally been extremely unpopular in the literature; my thesis thus seeks to evaluate whether this ‘negative press’ is justified. I start by giving a working definition and semantics for ontic vagueness, and then attempt to show that there are no conclusive arguments that rule out vagueness of this kind. I subsequently establish what type of arguments I think would be most effective in establishing ontic vagueness and provide some arguments of this form. I then highlight a potential worry for this type of argument, but argue that it can be circumvented. Finally, I consider the main ways that the opponent of ontic vagueness would be likely resist the arguments I have offered, and argue that these strategies of response are methodologically problematic. I conclude by claiming that ontic vagueness is a perfectly plausible ontological commitment."Why should I be moral?" : a critical assessment of three contemporary attempts to give an extra-moral justification of moral conducthttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/346
Abstract: In this dissertation I consider three distinct attempts to answer the normative question “Why should I be moral?”, all of which assume that a successful answer must be capable of arguing someone who is currently not motivated by moral considerations at all into becoming moral. I outline an argument against the possibility of doing so which relies on the distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality, and which states that since morality essentially involves agent-neutrality and since failure to recognize the reason-giving force of agent-neutral considerations is not necessarily irrational, one cannot be argued into being moral. I then show how the approaches of Christine Korsgaard, as encountered in her "The Sources of Normativity", Joseph Raz, as he puts it forth in “The Amoralist”, and lastly, David Brink as he puts it forth in “Self-Love and Altruism”, each in their different ways, fail in their attempts to argue someone into becoming moral.2007-06-20T00:00:00ZPedersen, Johnnie R. R.In this dissertation I consider three distinct attempts to answer the normative question “Why should I be moral?”, all of which assume that a successful answer must be capable of arguing someone who is currently not motivated by moral considerations at all into becoming moral. I outline an argument against the possibility of doing so which relies on the distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality, and which states that since morality essentially involves agent-neutrality and since failure to recognize the reason-giving force of agent-neutral considerations is not necessarily irrational, one cannot be argued into being moral. I then show how the approaches of Christine Korsgaard, as encountered in her "The Sources of Normativity", Joseph Raz, as he puts it forth in “The Amoralist”, and lastly, David Brink as he puts it forth in “Self-Love and Altruism”, each in their different ways, fail in their attempts to argue someone into becoming moral.Global distributive justicehttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/216
Abstract: This dissertation is concerned with the moral-philosophical dimensions of global poverty and inequality. The first chapter argues in favour of justice-based – contrasted with beneficence-based – obligations asking the wealthy to actively do something about severe poverty abroad. The distinguishing property of justice-based obligations is that they derive their high level of moral stringency from the fact that they ask the obligation-bearer to rectify for past and/or present violations of negative obligations, such as the obligation not to harm anybody (regardless of geographical distance). Partly in following and partly in reinterpreting Thomas Pogge the first chapter concludes that the current economic and political order harms the global poor by making it difficult or impossible for them to satisfy their basic needs. To the extent that better-off states (citizens and their democratically accountable governments) uphold such an unjust global order and contribute to the poor’s enduring dire straits they have obligations of justice to secure the basic needs of the poor. This is why the approach introduced and defended in this essay is called “basic needs cosmopolitanism”.
The second chapter examines the idea of “basic needs” more detailed. Basic needs cosmopolitanism employs a specific notion of basic needs that is derived from Martha Nussbaum’s list of ten central human functional capabilities. These capabilities are of universal appeal, i.e. they are concerned with activities and states of being that are indispensable features of every human life. After discussing Nussbaum’s justification for the universal applicability of her list and after examining in more detail the list itself the argument distinguishes between basic needs for the material (financial, resource-related, etc.) and basic needs for the non-material (political, social, etc.) prerequisites for possessing these central capabilities. Both groups of basic needs have to be satisfied by a sufficient quality and quantity in order for a society to count as being able to meet its citizens basic needs and as being able to secure all its citizens’ central capabilities. The crucial idea is that if Nussbaum’s central capabilities are presented as having universal appeal, the related basic needs are of global applicability as well. The standard of material and non-material prerequisites is applied to a) the question of whether and to what extent the global order harms the poor and b) the question of what and how much material transfers from the wealthy to the poor are required on grounds of justice.
Since this dissertation’s topic is global distributive justice the primary focus of this argument lies on the material pre-requisites that have to be available in order to secure central capabilities for all. This does not imply that the non-material basic needs for living in a society ruled by just and stable political and social institutions are less important. A complete version of basic needs cosmopolitanism will have to dedicate equal consideration to obligations of justice related to the global order’s responsibility for poor countries’ lack of the non-material prerequisites. The notion of “potential functionings”, introduced in concluding this essay, is supposed to underline the importance of securing central capabilities for all members of poor societies and expresses again basic needs cosmopolitanism’s commitment to identifying universal minimal standards of social and economic global justice.2007-06-22T00:00:00ZHanisch, ChristophThis dissertation is concerned with the moral-philosophical dimensions of global poverty and inequality. The first chapter argues in favour of justice-based – contrasted with beneficence-based – obligations asking the wealthy to actively do something about severe poverty abroad. The distinguishing property of justice-based obligations is that they derive their high level of moral stringency from the fact that they ask the obligation-bearer to rectify for past and/or present violations of negative obligations, such as the obligation not to harm anybody (regardless of geographical distance). Partly in following and partly in reinterpreting Thomas Pogge the first chapter concludes that the current economic and political order harms the global poor by making it difficult or impossible for them to satisfy their basic needs. To the extent that better-off states (citizens and their democratically accountable governments) uphold such an unjust global order and contribute to the poor’s enduring dire straits they have obligations of justice to secure the basic needs of the poor. This is why the approach introduced and defended in this essay is called “basic needs cosmopolitanism”.
The second chapter examines the idea of “basic needs” more detailed. Basic needs cosmopolitanism employs a specific notion of basic needs that is derived from Martha Nussbaum’s list of ten central human functional capabilities. These capabilities are of universal appeal, i.e. they are concerned with activities and states of being that are indispensable features of every human life. After discussing Nussbaum’s justification for the universal applicability of her list and after examining in more detail the list itself the argument distinguishes between basic needs for the material (financial, resource-related, etc.) and basic needs for the non-material (political, social, etc.) prerequisites for possessing these central capabilities. Both groups of basic needs have to be satisfied by a sufficient quality and quantity in order for a society to count as being able to meet its citizens basic needs and as being able to secure all its citizens’ central capabilities. The crucial idea is that if Nussbaum’s central capabilities are presented as having universal appeal, the related basic needs are of global applicability as well. The standard of material and non-material prerequisites is applied to a) the question of whether and to what extent the global order harms the poor and b) the question of what and how much material transfers from the wealthy to the poor are required on grounds of justice.
Since this dissertation’s topic is global distributive justice the primary focus of this argument lies on the material pre-requisites that have to be available in order to secure central capabilities for all. This does not imply that the non-material basic needs for living in a society ruled by just and stable political and social institutions are less important. A complete version of basic needs cosmopolitanism will have to dedicate equal consideration to obligations of justice related to the global order’s responsibility for poor countries’ lack of the non-material prerequisites. The notion of “potential functionings”, introduced in concluding this essay, is supposed to underline the importance of securing central capabilities for all members of poor societies and expresses again basic needs cosmopolitanism’s commitment to identifying universal minimal standards of social and economic global justice.Being art - a study in ontologyhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/213
Abstract: I present and defend a two-category ontology of art. The basic idea of it is that
singular artworks are physical objects, whereas multiple artworks are types of
which there can be tokens in the form of performances, copies, or other kinds
of realisations.
I argue that multiple artworks, despite being abstract objects, have a temporal
extension, thus they are created at a certain point of time and can also drop out
of existence again under certain conditions. They can, however, not be
perceived by the senses and cannot enter into causal relations.
The identity of an artwork is determined by its structural properties, but also
by the context in which it was made. The essential contextual properties of an
artwork are those that are relevant to the meaning of the work.
A realisation of a multiple artwork has to comply with the structure of the
work and has to stand in the correct intentional and/or causal-historical relation
to the work. Realisations that diverge too much from the structure of the work,
like translations of literary works, are what I call “derivative artworks”.
I argue against the thesis that all artworks are multiple. I claim that there are
singular artworks, and some of them are even necessarily singular. I show why
certain standard arguments against the idea that all artworks can be realised
multiple times are flawed, and present my own theory about what decides
whether a work is singular or multiple, namely that successful intentions of the
artist determine which category an artwork belongs to.
Concerning singular artworks, I also investigate what the relation between the
work and the matter it is made of is, and how a work can survive a change in
its parts and still remain the same work.2007-06-01T00:00:00ZWeh, MichaelI present and defend a two-category ontology of art. The basic idea of it is that
singular artworks are physical objects, whereas multiple artworks are types of
which there can be tokens in the form of performances, copies, or other kinds
of realisations.
I argue that multiple artworks, despite being abstract objects, have a temporal
extension, thus they are created at a certain point of time and can also drop out
of existence again under certain conditions. They can, however, not be
perceived by the senses and cannot enter into causal relations.
The identity of an artwork is determined by its structural properties, but also
by the context in which it was made. The essential contextual properties of an
artwork are those that are relevant to the meaning of the work.
A realisation of a multiple artwork has to comply with the structure of the
work and has to stand in the correct intentional and/or causal-historical relation
to the work. Realisations that diverge too much from the structure of the work,
like translations of literary works, are what I call “derivative artworks”.
I argue against the thesis that all artworks are multiple. I claim that there are
singular artworks, and some of them are even necessarily singular. I show why
certain standard arguments against the idea that all artworks can be realised
multiple times are flawed, and present my own theory about what decides
whether a work is singular or multiple, namely that successful intentions of the
artist determine which category an artwork belongs to.
Concerning singular artworks, I also investigate what the relation between the
work and the matter it is made of is, and how a work can survive a change in
its parts and still remain the same work.Making sense of response-dependencehttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/211
Abstract: This thesis investigates the distinction, or distinctions, between response-dependent and response-independent concepts or subject matters. I present and discuss the three most influential versions of the distinction: Crispin Wright’s, Mark Johnston’s, and Philip Pettit’s. I argue that the versions do not compete for a single job, but that they can supplement each other, and that a system of different distinctions is more useful than a single distinction. I distinguish two main paradigms of response-dependence: response-dependence of subject matter (Johnston and Wright), and response-dependence of concepts only (Pettit). I develop Pettit’s ‘ethocentric’ story of concept acquisition into an account of concept evolution that suggests answers to a range of hard questions about language, reality, and the relation between them. I argue that while response-dependence theses of subject matter can be motivated in very different ways, the resulting theses are less different than they might seem. I suggest that the traditional ways of distinguishing response-dependent subject matters from response-independent ones – in terms of a priori biconditionals connecting facts of the disputed class with responses in subjects in favourable conditions, and fulfilling some further conditions such as non-triviality and sometimes necessity – may not be the best approach. I also discuss two general problems for response-dependence theses: the problem of ‘finkish’ counterexamples, and the problem of specifying the ‘favourable conditions’ a priori, yet in a non-trivial way. The discussion of response-dependence is informed by a framework based on the idea that some realism disputes can be viewed as location disputes: disputes over the correct location of the disputed properties among several levels of candidate properties. The approach taken in this work is a charitable one: I try to make sense of response-dependence. The conclusion is the correspondingly optimistic one that the idea(s) of response-dependence makes sense.2007-06-01T00:00:00ZBusck Gundersen, ElineThis thesis investigates the distinction, or distinctions, between response-dependent and response-independent concepts or subject matters. I present and discuss the three most influential versions of the distinction: Crispin Wright’s, Mark Johnston’s, and Philip Pettit’s. I argue that the versions do not compete for a single job, but that they can supplement each other, and that a system of different distinctions is more useful than a single distinction. I distinguish two main paradigms of response-dependence: response-dependence of subject matter (Johnston and Wright), and response-dependence of concepts only (Pettit). I develop Pettit’s ‘ethocentric’ story of concept acquisition into an account of concept evolution that suggests answers to a range of hard questions about language, reality, and the relation between them. I argue that while response-dependence theses of subject matter can be motivated in very different ways, the resulting theses are less different than they might seem. I suggest that the traditional ways of distinguishing response-dependent subject matters from response-independent ones – in terms of a priori biconditionals connecting facts of the disputed class with responses in subjects in favourable conditions, and fulfilling some further conditions such as non-triviality and sometimes necessity – may not be the best approach. I also discuss two general problems for response-dependence theses: the problem of ‘finkish’ counterexamples, and the problem of specifying the ‘favourable conditions’ a priori, yet in a non-trivial way. The discussion of response-dependence is informed by a framework based on the idea that some realism disputes can be viewed as location disputes: disputes over the correct location of the disputed properties among several levels of candidate properties. The approach taken in this work is a charitable one: I try to make sense of response-dependence. The conclusion is the correspondingly optimistic one that the idea(s) of response-dependence makes sense.The metaphysics of agencyhttp://hdl.handle.net/10023/163
Abstract: Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms of causal processes that lead from agent-involving mental states to action. Actions are construed as events, which are actions in virtue of being caused by the right mental antecedents in the right way. Opponents of this standard event-causal approach have criticised the view on various grounds; they argue that it does not account for free will and moral responsibility, that it does not account for action done in the light of reasons, or, even, that it cannot capture the very phenomenon of agency. The thesis defends the standard event-causal approach against challenges of that kind.
In the first chapter I consider theories that stipulate an irreducible metaphysical relation between the agent (or the self) and the action. I argue that such theories do not add anything to our understanding of human agency, and that we have, therefore, no reason to share the metaphysically problematic assumptions on which those alternative models are based. In the second chapter I argue for the claim that reason-explanations of actions are causal explanations, and I argue against non-causal alternatives. My main point is that the causal approach is to be preferred, because it provides an integrated account of agency by providing an account of the relation between the causes of movements and reasons for actions. In the third chapter I defend non-reductive physicalism as the most plausible version of the standard event-causal theory. In the fourth and last chapter I argue against the charge that the standard approach cannot account for the agent’s role in the performance of action. Further, I propose the following stance with respect to the problem of free will: we do not have free will, but we have the related ability to govern ourselves—and the best account of self-determination presupposes causation, but not causal determinism.2007-01-01T00:00:00ZSchlosser, Markus E.Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms of causal processes that lead from agent-involving mental states to action. Actions are construed as events, which are actions in virtue of being caused by the right mental antecedents in the right way. Opponents of this standard event-causal approach have criticised the view on various grounds; they argue that it does not account for free will and moral responsibility, that it does not account for action done in the light of reasons, or, even, that it cannot capture the very phenomenon of agency. The thesis defends the standard event-causal approach against challenges of that kind.
In the first chapter I consider theories that stipulate an irreducible metaphysical relation between the agent (or the self) and the action. I argue that such theories do not add anything to our understanding of human agency, and that we have, therefore, no reason to share the metaphysically problematic assumptions on which those alternative models are based. In the second chapter I argue for the claim that reason-explanations of actions are causal explanations, and I argue against non-causal alternatives. My main point is that the causal approach is to be preferred, because it provides an integrated account of agency by providing an account of the relation between the causes of movements and reasons for actions. In the third chapter I defend non-reductive physicalism as the most plausible version of the standard event-causal theory. In the fourth and last chapter I argue against the charge that the standard approach cannot account for the agent’s role in the performance of action. Further, I propose the following stance with respect to the problem of free will: we do not have free will, but we have the related ability to govern ourselves—and the best account of self-determination presupposes causation, but not causal determinism.