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26 February, 1945

. - It was now clear that the division wasconfronting the hostile main battle position which apparentlyextended generally northwest to southeast across the island alongthe high ground to the front. The high ground commanded theentire southern end of the island as far south as Mt SURIBACHI,including Airfield No. 1. As long as the enemy held this ridge,he would be able to place observed fires on our reserve areas andrear installations. This he had been doing, though not in thevolume of which he was capable, doubtless due to the fear of hisguns and mortars being picked up by aviation and taken under fireby artillery and naval guns. The heavily organized enemyposition clearly indicated the massing of all available artilleryfire directly in front of the infantry and moving it ahead ofthe advance by successive concentrations. On 25 February,however, only Batteries A, C, and F of the 12th Marines wereashore and ready to fire. These were formed into a provisionalbattalion. The 1st Bn, 14th Marines was released to the 5thMarine Division in accordance with Corps order. the 9th Marineswith previous attachments, plus the 3d Bn, 21st Marines, launchedits attack at 0800 in conjunction with the 4th and 5th MarineDivisions. The 1st and 2d Bns were again abreast, 1st on theright, with the 1st making the main effort. Corps artillery(155mm How) fired a 600 round preparation from 0715 to 0800. Theprovisional battalion of the 12th Marines, in direct support ofthe 9th Marines, and the 4th Bn, 13th Marines, reinforcing thefires of the 12th Marines, delivered fires as requested by the9th Marines. The 9th Marines again received heavy mortar,artillery, and small arms fire in its attempt to cross AirfieldNo. 2 and seize the high ground to the north of it, and progressmade during the day was negligible. Tanks were again employed asassault guns and eleven were knocked out. The 3d Bn, 9th Marinesremained in position in regimental reserve after the attackjumped off and occupied a defensive position just north of theEast-West runway. The 3d Bn, 21st Marines remained in 9thMarines reserve in its assembly area south of Airfield No. 2.Naval gunfire was again employed on deep targets spotted byaircraft, and on suspected gun and mortar positions as called forby infantry units. Eight bombers and eight fighters were onstation throughout the day and executed four missions for groundtroops, none of them in close support. This line-up of aircraftprevailed throughout the operation and was entirely inadequate tomeet the requirements of the situation. A much larger number ofaircraft employed in mass against targets holding up the advanceof the infantry was clearly indicated. The situation at 1700 wasas shown in Enclosure B (3), Situation at 1700, 26 February. CoL, 9th Marines, was attached to the 1st Bn to close the gapbetween the 1st Bn and the 4th Marine Division. this attachmentwas effected at the conclusion of the attack about 1600.