At the end of
September, Abkhazia celebrated the 20th anniversary of its victory
in the armed conflict with Georgia. In 1993, the former autonomous republic of
the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic began implementing its own nation-state
project beyond the framework of an independent Georgia.

Since then, Abkhazia
has made impressive progress. First of all, the country achieved international
recognition, albeit limited. It has been showing a slow yet steady recovery.
Its geopolitical choice is secured by Russia’s military, border and financial
support. However, Abkhazia’s political agenda has some peculiarities that often
remain outside the focus of attention.

First of all, the
Georgian factor no longer plays the defining role in the life of the partially
recognized territory. Russia is currently front-and-center, with all the
benefits, costs and discrepancies of its influence.

The patronage of the
Russian military spares Abkhazia the need to think about the direct military
threat from Georgia. For its part, Moscow is guided by the logic of its own
national interests, rather than by some abstract concepts.

Sergei Ivanov, the
chief of staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia, made this clear in
a recent interview with Gazeta.ru.
“It is no secret that we spend billions of rubles on backing Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.

These are our taxes, and we want to know how every ruble is spent and
why.” Therefore, Russia emphasizes control of Abkhazia’s strategic assets — its
railways and sea infrastructure (the latter being especially important given
the touchy nature of Russia’s relationship with Ukraine) — as well as
liberalization of the Abkhazian market, to pave the way for large and
medium-sized Russian businesses to come to that country.

However, Abkhazia
is somewhat intimidated by plans to explore the oil deposits of the Black Sea
and build roads connecting the western part of the Russian Caucasus with
Sukhumi. Even Russian investments make Abkhazia feel uneasy, despite their
potential for creating new jobs.

Abkhazian business cannot compete with Russian
capital, hence the concerns that more investments mean more dependence on
Russia. Further, unlike their counterparts in South Ossetia, politicians in the
partially recognized territory do not think they have a future in a union with
the powerful neighbor.

The result is a
serious conflict between the wish to promote the nation-state project and the
growing military, political and socioeconomic dependence on Russia. While the
Abkhazian authorities mostly share their concerns behind the scenes, the
opposition does not hesitate to speak openly.

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The pro-Russian geopolitical
choice is underpinned by the consensus of Abkhazian elites. However, it is far
more difficult to achieve consensus in the matter of the ownership rights of
Russian citizens in Abkhazia.

Local authorities have failed so far to come up
with a systemic solution to property disputes, and even court decisions on
repossession can be blocked by local officials and pressure groups.

Secondly, the
strategic link between Moscow and Sukhumi cannot but affect other aspects of
Abkhazian politics. Ahead of the Sochi Olympics, North Caucasian Islamist
groups have “taken an interest” in Abkhazia.

The assassination of Russian
diplomat Dmitry Vishernev in Sukhumi this September can be traced to North
Caucasian extremists, the Russian Investigative Committee has stated. Prime
suspect Yusup Lakayev, a Chechen national, has been included on the list of
persons who pose a threat to the Sochi Winter Olympics.

Radical Islamism
has not taken deep roots in Abkhazia. Opinion polls show that only 16 percent
of the population consider themselves to be Muslim. Most of the Abkhazian
Muslims have nothing to do with terrorism or radical Islam.

However, Islamists
have been trying to make their way into the country. Jamaat Abkhazia, which
considered itself to be a division of the “Caucasus Emirate,” was liquidated in
2011–2012; it was comprised of 20 members.

Prior to that, there had been a few
assassination attempts on representatives of the Spiritual Board of the Muslims
in Abkhazia: In August 2007, Imam Khamzat Gitsba was killed, and, in July 2010,
Emik Chakmach-ogly, head of the board in Gagry District and member of the
Public Chamber, was assassinated.

The victory in the
armed conflict with Georgia and subsequent recognition by Russia did not spell
the end of trouble for Abkhazia. Old challenges and contradictions were
replaced by new ones. The Russian-Abkhazian relationship is also marked by
contradictions and conflicts of interest.

In any case, history shows that it is
only normal for allies to build their relations through difficulties and
challenges. Both big Russia and small Abkhazia should work out a systemic, rational
approach to each other and understand that the situation is changing. What the
two countries really need is a robust bilateral agenda, rather than memories of
bygone days.

The author is a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington, D.C.