Thursday, March 27, 2014

Ukraine Crisis: The Chinese Stand and Lessons for India

Monish Gulati

Introduction

As the conflict in Ukraine refuses to abate, it continues to raise
fears of triggering yet another confrontation between the Cold War era
adversaries – the US and Russia - in a geopolitical tussle for dominance
in Europe. There is also the possibility that Ukraine itself could
descend into civil war; analysts ponder to which past moment of history
will the country seek to repeat: the 1968 model, when Soviet troops
invaded former Czechoslovakia to put an end to the Prague Spring; or the
2008 scenario, when Russia intervened in Georgia on the issue of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Ukraine with its 45 million residents has deep geopolitical, ethnic and economic fautlines.1
While the economically weak regions in the west are bastions of
nationalists, Ukraine’s major companies, like its steel mills, ship and
turbine building are located in the east and are dependent on the
Russian market. One narrative on the protests in the independence square
in Kiev states that far-right nationalists and fascists have been at
the heart of the protests and attacks on government buildings. The most
active of the groups has been reported to be the rightwing Svoboda or
“Freedom” Party which in the 2012 election took 10.45 percent of the
vote and over 40 percent in parts of the western Ukraine. It currently
has 36 deputies in the 450-member Ukrainian parliament. The latest
source of tension in the region is the autonomous Crimean peninsula,
which was first transferred to Ukraine in 1954, and now its parliament
has just voted to be independent from Ukraine.

The Ukrainian crisis has turned out to be a severe test for global
governance norms and institutions on the issues of democracy, public
will and territorial sovereignty. India would draw several pointers for
its foreign policy as the US, EU, Russia play out the geopolitical
chess. As the situation unfolds in Ukraine, it is the Chinese position
and the dynamics of China-Russia relationship that would be keenly
watched by India to derive implications for its bilateral standoffs.

India’s Position

For months into the Ukraine crisis, India had remained noncommittal
and no statements were forthcoming from the government. The only
indication of India’s position came from a ‘tweet’ by the External
Affairs Ministry (MEA) spokesperson, which read “We are closely watching
fast evolving situation and hope for a peaceful resolution.” The
silence was broken on 6th March after statements from both the MEA and the National Security Advisor (NSA).

The statement by MEA expressed India’s concern at the escalation of
tension in Ukraine and called "for a legitimate democratic process to
find full expression through free and fair elections that provide for an
inclusive society."2 It added that India stood for sincere
and sustained diplomatic efforts to ensure that issues between Ukraine
and its neighbouring countries are resolved through constructive
dialogue. However, the response of the NSA, who said, "There are
legitimate Russian and other interests involved and we hope they are
discussed and resolved,” was more indicative of India’s tightrope walk
between deep historic ties with Russia and the Indian commitment to the
inviolability of national sovereignty.

Chinese Reaction

The Chinese position on Ukraine has been gleaned by China watchers
from two telephone calls, a newspaper editorial, and two foreign
ministry briefings. It has left the analysts divided and China’s
position declared as being of “studied ambiguity”.

Chinese President Xi Jinping was quoted on 4th March by
the official Chinese media as telling Putin during a telephone call that
the present situation in Ukraine was highly complicated and sensitive
and that China supports proposals and mediation efforts of the
international community that are conducive to reduction of tension.
Russia should work towards a political settlement of the issue so as to
safeguard regional and world peace and stability.3 Earlier on 3rd
March, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had discussed Ukraine on
telephone with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi and claimed they had
“broadly coinciding points of view” on the situation in Ukraine.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang said on 3rd
March that "China upholds its own diplomatic principles and the basic
codes for international relations, which have also been implied on the
Ukraine issue," Qin said China has taken the historical and contemporary
factors of the Ukraine issue into consideration and that there were
reasons for the situation in Ukraine.

China’s ‘fine balancing’ has been justified on the grounds that
denouncing Putin’s decision to send troops to Crimea would impact the
partnership between Beijing and Moscow. Worse, standing against Moscow
would mean China was supporting the position taken by the West—which
could be taken as implicit support for the Ukrainian protestors. China
is distrustful of “colour revolutions,” including Ukraine’s own “Orange
Revolution” of 2004 as it considers the “colour revolutions/springs” as
instigated by Western nations to oust unfriendly regimes. Given the
circumstances, China seems to have gone as far as it can, when it
abstained during the UN Security council resolution on Crimea; which not
surprisingly was vetoed by Russia. However, Chinese tacit support for
Russia has not come easy.

Principle of Non-Interference

The non-interference principle has served China well in diplomacy to
justify its inaction in many international crisis situations from Sudan
to Syria to North Korea and at the same time allowed it to take an
anti-West position. China expects that the principle in turn would apply
to its internal affairs, particularly the provinces and autonomous
regions with restive minorities along its periphery which associate more
ethnically/ culturally with China’s neighbours.4 However,
support to Russia would violate China’s principle of non-interference
and possibly set a precedent of China’s support for military
intervention outside a country’s recognised borders—which goes against
all China’s instincts, given its own issues with Tibet and Xinjiang
provinces. 5

China’s relationship with Russia also has an underlying sense of
competition, particularly for leadership in Central Asia, and a
historical lack of trust among many within the broader citizenry of each
country. Moreover, in 2008, during the Russo–Georgia conflict, Moscow
failed to obtain support from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), which includes most of the Central Asian republics. China then
had remained silent, not expressing support for either side.6 Letting Russia have its way appears to undermine China’s interests in Ukraine.

Chinese Interests in Ukraine

There is another narrative on China’s balancing act on Ukraine; its
commercial and non-traditional security interest. As Voice of America
reports, China has strong business interests in Ukraine which would be
compromised by overt Chinese support for Russia.7 Ukraine is a
major source of arms and armament technology for China and a growing
partner in China’s global quest for resources. China recently inked a
deal to farm three million hectares of arable Ukrainian land over the
span of half a century. Under the initial agreement, worth $1.7 billion,
with KSG Agro, Ukraine's leading agricultural company, 100,000 hectares
will be leased to Xinjiang Production and Construction Corp (XPCC), a
Chinese quasi-military organization, also known as Bingtuan. The leased
farmland in the eastern Dnipropetrovsk region would be cultivated
principally for crops and raising pigs and the produce will be sold to
two Chinese state-owned grain conglomerates at preferential prices. The
project will eventually expand to three million hectares.

As part of the same deal, China’s Export-Import bank has given
Ukraine a $3 billion loan for agricultural development. XPCC also
intends to help build a highway in Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of
Crimea as well as a bridge across the Strait of Kerch. Ukraine is one of
the world’s leading exporters of grain, and is hoping to increase
production in coming years. Ukraine’s plans for its agricultural
industry, coupled with China’s need to increase grain imports, will make
Kiev an attractive target for increased economic cooperation with
Beijing.8

Assessment

Alyssa Ayres at the US-based Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) has
drawn out some lessons from the Ukraine crisis. First, she highlights
the importance of establishing strong “rules of the road” which are
effected through functional regional institutions to resolve differences
between countries. Referring to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), she says Russia’s approach on similar issues/ differences with
NATO member countries in the region has been more appropriate and
balanced unlike in the case of Ukraine, possibly because it is not a
member of the NATO. Yet the concept has its limitation as the thought of
the likely NATO reaction did not deter Russia from moving into Crimea.
Nor did fear of possible alienation from the G8, or condemnation from
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) appear
to have any restraining effect either.

Second, the Ukrainian events accentuate the shortcomings of the UN
Security Council (UNSC) and its vulnerability to use of veto power by
the permanent members. Consequently EU and US have been compelled to
explore other persuasive and punitive responses centred on national visa
policies, economic and trade sanctions etc.9

China, a permanent member of the UNSC, over the last few months has
increasingly pushed to test established global norms with regard to
resolving territorial disputes as well as demonstrated an inclination to
challenge the regional order. US in its pivot to Asia finds itself
balancing stable US-China relations on the one hand, and the imperative
to uphold the credibility of US deterrence in the face of rising
concern amongst its allies on China’s ‘creeping expansionism’, on the
other. Analysts warn that US will struggle to maintain this precarious
balance and Chinese interests may dominate Asia in the future.10

China would be mindful of the fact that it too at some point in
future could be the target of Western sanctions. Therefore, it would
watch closely the drama over Ukraine and Crimea and the West-Russia
confrontation to expand its portfolio of strategic options. China in
this regard would also value its strategic collaboration with Russia to
jointly counter Western interference.11

On 8th March on the sidelines of the National People's
Congress (NPC) session, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told media
persons, on the issue of territorial disputes that ”We will not take
anything that is not ours, but we will defend every inch of territory
that belongs to us".12 Referring to the strained
Sino-Japanese relations over the islands in the East China Sea, Wang
said, "On the two issues of principle, history and territory, there is
no room for compromise." This was the second time within few days (the
other being in case of Ukraine) that China had used “history and
territory” together to justify aggressive measures to resolve long
standing territorial disputes. It is this kind of posturing that would
give strategic analysts in India goose bumps, especially after the
recent stand-off on territorial issues.

While the Indian approach on China has been to engage, compete and
cooperate in the shared periphery and in the world, India would take
certain pointers from the Ukraine crisis with respect to its prospective
interactions with China. India would be conscious of the degree of
consensus and cooperation Russia and China have shared on ticklish
issues concerning Syria, Libya, Iran and now Ukraine. Also the fact that
this understanding has included deliberations at the UNSC and that
Russia may feel obliged to reciprocate Chinese support in the future.
This may compromise Russian support to India during a Sino-Indian
standoff. Also defence purchases which have been the mainstay of
Indo-Russian partnership has been on the decline while India’s purchase
of US weapons and equipment has seen a significant upswing.

India would watch the effectiveness of non-military coercive measures
being deployed by EU and the US against Russia and at the same time
being aware that similar measures if ever used against China would be
appreciably less effective, given China’s economic staying power. Also
despite the fact that Russia’s economic clout is relatively diminished
compared to that of China, US is struggling to find support for its
economic sanctions outside the EU. Even within the EU, dependence on
energy imports from Russia, is making the implementation of non-military
coercive measures that much more difficult.

India would also the seek greater and stronger partnerships on
China’s periphery and in regional cooperation frameworks such as the
ASEAN, BIMSTEC etc. Strategic partnerships with countries like Japan
which may walk the extra mile during a crisis assume importance.

The crisis in Ukraine is not likely to go away in a hurry. Its impact
on global security structures, the dynamics of US, EU, Russia and China
relations and the growing Russia-China strategic partnership are the
issues that India would be keenly watching.