BREAKING THE HINDENBURG LINE
THE STORY OF THE
46TH (NORTH MIDLAND) DIVISION
BREAKING THE
HINDENBURG LINE
THE STORY OF THE
46TH (NORTH MIDLAND) DIVISION
B¥
MAJOR R. E. PRIESTLEY, M.C., R.E.
WlTH AN INTRODUCTION BY
MAJOR-GENERAL G. F. BOYD, C.B.,
C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.M.
WlTH TWO MAPS AND SEVENTEEN ILLUSTRATIONS
LONDON: T. FISHER UNWIN, LTD.
ADELPHI TERRACE
I«tvt #ublished in September 1919
Secod impression, November I9I 9
AIL R[GI-It$ 12.-ERVED
TO
OUR COMRADES WHO HAVE FALLEN IN
THE GREAT ADVENTURE
MAY WE PROVE WORHY Ot t HEM
IN THE DAYS TO COME
FOREWORD
IIAJOR PRIESTLEY'S book is not intended as an official
record; nevertheless it affords a graphic and accurate
account of what took place on a small but decisive
sector of the Western front during the " Battles of the
Hundred Days."
It was my good fortune to take over command of the
North Midland Division at a critical moment of its
career, and ust belote we marched south to join General
Sir H. Rawlinson's Fourth Army. To my predecessor,
Major-General W. Thwaites, must be ascribed the
credit of having organized and trained the Division into
a fighting machine in which every officer and man was
imbued with a real soldier's spirit.
Itis to this fixed determination to win through at all
costs, regardless of incidents on flank and in rear, that I
mainly attribute the successes won by the Division.
We joined the IX Corps, commanded by Lieut.-Gen.
Sir Walter Braithwaite, and consisting of three distin-
guished fighting units, but the 46th were determined
to make a naine for themselves second to none.
No man can say that they failed.
GERALD F. Boxro,
Major-General.
il
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER
OUTLINE OF THE PREVIOUS I-IISTORV OF TI-IE 46TI-I
(NORTH MIDLAND) DIVISION, 1914-1918. .
BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL T. C. NEWBOLD» D.S.O.»
T.D. (X/STH SHERWOODS), AND MAJOR E. A.
LEWIS, D.S.O. R.E.
17
PART II
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT
IV. THE VICTORY AT RAMICOURT o o  81
V. ENEMY COUNTER-ATTACKS REPULSED--THE
ADVANCE TO BOHAIN .... II0
I3
PART I
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE
(29th September, 1918)
I. PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS AND PREPARATIONS
FOR THE ATTACK ..... 22
II. THE STAFFORDS CROSS THE ST. QUENTIN CANAL
AND BREACH THE HINDENBURG LINE  44
III: SUCCESS EXPLOITED BY SHERWOODS, LINCOLNS,
AND LEICESTERS ..... 61
I4 CONTENTS
PART III
THE BATTLE OF ANDIGNY
CltAPTER
VI. THE CLEARING OF THE BOIS DE RIQUERVAL AND
THE BATTLE OF ANDIGNY LES FERMES .
132
PART IV
THE LAST PHASE: CATILLON TO SAINS
vII. THE ADVANCE TO SAINS DU NORD 158
APPENDICES
I. GERMAN DIVISIONS ENCOUNTERED AND DE-
FEATED BY THE 46TH DIVISION BETWEEN
THE 24TH SEPTEMBER AND THE IITH NOV-
EMBER, 1918
II. CASUALTIES BETWEEN THE 24TIa SEPTEMBER
AND THE IITH NOVEMBER, 1918
III. IMMEDIATE REWARDS GRANTED TO THE DIVI-
SION FROM 24TH SEPTEMBER TO IITH
NOVEMBER, 1918 .
IV. ORDER OF BATTLE, 28TH FEBRUARY, 1915
V. ORDER OF BATTLE, 29TH SEPTEMBER, 1918
INDEX .
174
175
176
177
18o
ILLUSTRATIONS
HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE V INSPECTING THE BATTLE-
FIELD OF BELLENGLISE Frontispiece
PAC/G PAGE
CAPTAIN J. C. GREEN, V.C., R.A.M.C. (T.), AND
CAPTAIN C. G. VICKERS, V.C., EARLY V.C HEROES
OF THE 4@H DIVISION . 18
LIEUTENANT J. C. BARRETT, V.Ç., I/STH LEICESTERS.
SEVERELY WOUNDED IN THE ATTACK ON PONTRUET,
AND AWARDED THE VICTORIA CROSS FOR HIS
BRAVERY AND LEADERSHIP DURING THE ACTION . 28
AIR PHOTOGRAPH OF THE ST. QUENTIN CANAL AT
BELLENGLISE, SHOWING THE DEFENCE SYSTEM TO
THE EAST OF THE CANAL AND THE GERMAN BRIDGES 32
ST. QUENTIN CANAL, SHOWING THE BRICK FACING OF
THE CANAL AND ITS STEEP BANKS. IN THE DISTANCE
THE REMAINS OF A GERMAN FOOTBRIDGE 34
BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. V. CAMPBELL, V.C.» C.M.G.,
D.S.O., BRIGADE COMMANDER I37Tt{ INFANTRY
BRIGADE . 44
AIR PHOTOGRAPH OF BELLENGLISE AND THE ST. QUENTIN
CANAL FROM ABOVE THE HINDENBURG DEFENCES
WEST OF THE CANAL *  56
ST. QUENTIN CANAL WITH REOUEVAL BRIDGE. FROM
THIS PICTURE THE VALUE OF CAPTAIN CHARLTON'S
WORK IN PRESERVING THE BRIDGE FROM DES-
TRUCTION IS WELL SEEN
I5
58
16 ILLUSTRATIONS
FACI'O pA(
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL B. W. VANN, V.C., M.C., I/6TH
SHERWOODS. KILLED IN ACTION AT THE BATTLE
OF RAMICOURT . 7 °
MAJOR-GENERAL G. F. BOYD, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
D.C.M., G.O.C. 46TIt DIVISION . 72
SERGEANT W. H. JOHNSON, V.C., I/5TH SHERWOODS.
THE HERO OF THE ATTACK ON THE BEAUREVOIR-
FONSOMME LINE 9 8
LANCE -CORPORAL W. H. COLTMAN, V.C., D.C.M., M.M.,
I/6TI NORTH STAFFORDS, WHOSE CONSTANT
BRAVERY IN ACTION HAS ADDED A GLORIOUS
PAGE TO THE HISTORY OF THE 46TI DIVISION
118
BRIGADIER-GENERAL F. G. M. ROWLEY, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., BRIGADE COMMANDER I38TH INFANTRY
BRIGADE
I26
BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR HILL CHILD, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
C.R.A. 46TIt DIVISION ..... 142
BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. HARINGTON, D.S.O., BRIGADE
COMMANDER I39TH INFANTRY BRIGADE I60
MEMORIAL CROSS ERECTED ON THE HIGH GROUND NEAR
BELLENGLISE IN MEMORY OF THE FALLEN OF THE
46Ttt DIVISION . .
172
BREAKING THE HINDENBURG
LINE
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER
OUTLINE OF THE PREVIOUS HISTORY OF THE 46TH (NORTH
MIDLAND) DIVISION IN THE WAR
IN writing this introductory chapter it should at once be
stated that it is not in any way intended to be a history
of the Division since its arrival in France, nor does it
attempt to do justice to the bravery and tenacity ex-
hibited at ail times during the years it was on the
Western front. It is just an attempt to outline its doings
and movements from the time of its mobilization until,
in September 1918, it joined the Fourth Army
The 46th Division, which was responsible for what was
described in the Press as the " Miracle of the War," and
whose exploits during the" Hundred Days" are described
in the following chapters, is one of the pre-war Territorial
Divisions.
In days of peace it was known as the North Midland
Division, and was composed of men from the counties of
Derby, Nottingham, Lincoln, Leicester, and Stafford. It
was then commanded by Major-General the Hon. E. J.
Montagu-Stuart-Wortley, C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., D.S.O.
On the outbreak of war the Division mobilized, its
9 X7
18 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
headquarters being first at Derby, and afterwards at
Luton and Bishop's Stortford. After less than seven
months' training in England it was ordered to France in
February 1915, enjoying the distinction of being the
first complete Territorial Division to arrive in any
theatre of war.
In less than two weeks after its arrival the Division
was placed in reserve for the Battle of Neuve-Chapelle,
I2th-I3th March, 1915, but was not used. It received
ifs baptism of tire at Ploegsteert, and later took over
the line in front of Kemmel and Neuve-Eglise, whence
its next move was to the Ypres salient. Here it settled
down for nearly four months, part of which was spent
in front of the notorious Hill 60.
Whilst in this area the first " Flammenwerfer " attack
ruade by the enemy was launched on the Division on
its left, which, stunned by the unexpectedness of the
new weapon, recoiled, leaving the left flank of the 46th
Division in the air. What might have been a serious
disaster was averted by the stubborn fighting of the
I39th Brigade.
The Division was next moved to the Bethune area,
and on the I3th October, 1915, it relieved the Guards
Division and ruade an attack on " The Quarries " and
"" Fosse 8." This was the first big attack the 46th Division
had been called upon to perform. The casualties were
very high, reducing its strength by nearly one-half.
In December 1915 the Division was selected to proceed
to Egypt, and two Brigades actually arrived there. The
orders were then countermanded, however, the Brigades
were recalled, and the whole Division returned to the
North of France in February 1916. Here they took over
the line belote the famous Vimy Ridge, which was at that
rime in the hands of the enemy. The unit relieved was
HISTORY OF THE 46Tri DIVISION 19
a famous French Division, and this was the first time
British troops had held this particular sector of the line.
The next big effort demanded of the 46th Division
was the attack on Gommecourt, a village which was the
apex of the most westerly portion of the enemy line at
that time. The attack, which was carried out on the
Ist July, 1916 , was the extreme left of the great Somme
offensive, and had been foreseen by the enemy and was
not successful. Very heavy casualties were again sus-
tained, and no gain of ground was made. It is pleasant
to record in parenthesis that in 1917 it was the privilege
of the 46th Division to chase the Germans out of the
village where so many of their comrades had fought their
last fight only a few months belote.
Whilst following up the retiring army in this area, there
was on March I3th, I917, some sharp fighting, as he took
up a position in a strongly-wired trench known as
Rettemoy Graben. This position, after being bombarded
for a day, was attacked by the 5th North Stafiords and
5th South Stafiords ; the 7th Division attacking on their
right, with Bucquoy as their objective.
The attack was made at ix p.m. on a very dark
night, but owing to the wire only being partially cut
(due to the limited rime at the disposal of the Artillery),
and the enemy fighting a very stubborn rearguard action,
the attack was unsuccessful, and the two battalions
mentioned suffered heavy casualties.
In March 19I 7 the Division relieved the 24th Division
in front of Lens in the Lievin sector, and it remained
thêre for four months. During this rime much hard
fighting took place, which culminated in the operations
of July Ist, I9I 7. From the rime the sector was taken
over the line was advanced an average of 2,çoo yards,
and the ground captured included Cité St. Edwazd, Cité
20 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
St. Theodore, Cité Jeanne d'Arc, Cité de Riaumont, the
I3ois de Lievin, the I3ois de Riaumont, and the important
tactical point Hill 65.
For the next fourteen months the Division was engaged
in trench warfare in various parts of the Cambrai-Lens
front, during which time the Canadian Corps on its im-
mediate right, assisted by the 46th Divisional Artillery,
made their successful attack on Hill 7 o. During this
action the Infantry of the Division broke up at least one
of the enemy's counter-attacks by enfilade tire, causing
many casualties. From this neighbourhood the next
move was to the Givenchy area, where a line was taken
over between the Lawe Canal and Givenchy, including the
famous Route "A " Keep, which had a few weeks earlier
been so gallantly defended by the 5 5 th Division when they
stemmed the German offensive in this part of the line.
During this long spell of trench warfare, " raiding "
became the order of the day. Major-General W. Thwaiteso
C.13., who had assumed command shortly after the 13attle
of Gommecourt, was a keen disciplinarian and a popular
leader. He encouraged, and indeed insisted upon, " raid-
ing" to the utmost, as being the type of warfare best
calculated to improve the offensive spirit of the men.
Many very clever coups were effected during the next
fifteen months. Numerous prisoners vere captured
in these raids, which materially assisted the process
of wearing down the enemy moral. This system of
training improved the fighting condition and capacity of
the Division to such an extent that former reverses
weie forgotten, or remembered only in the determination
to wipe them out by achieving decisive success in the
future. The 46th Division arrived at the scene of the
actions described in the following chapters as hard as
nails and fit for anything.
HISTORY OF THE 46"ri-I DIVISION 21
General Thwaites handed over fo his successor, Major-
General G. F. Boyd, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.M., a
fighting force which proved itself thoroughly efficient,
and whose deeds in the last and most decisive months
of the Great War will lire in history.
During the operations outlined in this chapter the
46th Division had served in the First, Second, Third, and
Fifth Armies, and in the I, II, III, V, VII, XI, XIII,
XIV, XVII, and XVIII Corps. Though called on fo
defend some of the most important parts of the Western
front, hot one inch of ground was ever lost.
The severity of the fighting in which the Division has
been engaged during the War is best seen from an ex-
amination of its casualty list. The total losses between
February 1915 and November Ilth, 1918, were:
Killed
Wounded .
Missing .
Total
Officers. Other Ianks.
275 3,475
i, lO4 21,285
 123 3,307
1,5o2 28,o67
Such figures do indeed speak for themselves.
THE
PART I
BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE
(.9th September, I918 )
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS AND PREPARATIONS
FOR THE ATTACK
" AT an hour and date to be notified later, the 46th
Division, as part of a maor operation, will cross the
St. Quentin Canal, capture the Hindenburg Line, and
advance to a position shown on the attached Map A."
Such was the opening paragraph of the preliminary
order issued by the General Staff on the 25th September,
notifying all concerned of the general scope of the opera-
tion which was fated to bring faine to the Division. Af
this period of the war the eyes of the whole of Europe
were focussed in the main on one thing and one thing
only. Would the Hindenburg Line suffice, as the Germans
hoped and believed, to hold up the (up to that rime)
irresistible ride of conquest sweeping back slowly but
steadily across France; or would that last bulwark of
German Imperialism be broken asunder like lesser ob-
stades, and trampled underfoot by the victorious Armiez
ot the Allies ? The answer fo that question was to be
given on the 29th September, and in the solving of the
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 23
problem the 46th Division was destined to play a glorious
and decisive part.
The General Staff, who, under instructions from the
IX Corps, had planned the attack, and who had better
means of estimating such doubtful features as the moral
of the forces opposed to us and the general disposition
of the enemy's forces, may have been confident of
success. Many, however, who could only judge from
direct observation of the enemy's positions, or from
aeroplane photographs, were of opinion that the Division
had been given an impossible task.
At the best it seemed likely that the efforts and sacri-
fices of the 46th Division might pin down the enemy
on the Bellenglise front, and attract his reserves, whilst
the Americans and Australians broke through on the left,
where they were faced with no natural obstacle.
If this northern attack succeeded, the resultant pressure
on-the enemy's front to the north might-then save the
situation on the Bellenglise front, and enable the 46th
Division fo get forward ata later period.
The sequel was to show which of these opinions was
j ustified, and incidentally to adroit for ever the daim
of the 46th Division tobe classed with what the Germans
would call " Sturmtruppen."
On the I2th September, 1918, after fifteen months of
almost continuous defensive warfare, the Division moved
from the Bethune area to the neighbourhood of Beau-
court sur l'Hallue and passed into G.H.Q. reserve for a
few days' rest and training before proceeding into action
near the southern limit of the British front.
On the 2Ist September, after one or two days in the
Tertry area, where the Division was still in reserve while
the various Commanders were reconnoitring their future
area and the various preparations for the hand-over were
24 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
made, the relief of part of the Ist and 4th Australian
Divisions by the 46th Division was carried out, and ail
ranks settled down fo learn the new area in which they
were to fight.
The new front line consisted of some 2,500 to 3,000
yards length of an old German trench system to the west
of the St. Quentin Canal which had been captured from the
Germans by our predecessors and reorganized by them to
suit defence in the opposite direction. It formed a splendid
defensive position and a very fait jumping-off ground for
any future projected operations against the Canal and
the immensely strong Hindenburg Line to the east of it.
At the rime the North Midland Division took over the
line the enemy still held a strong system of trenches,
with outposts in advance of them, on the west bank of
the Canal, which he held in considerable strength and
which prevented any near reconnaissance of the banks
and of the approaches to the Canal. This was, however,
in a measure counteracted by the fact that along the
greater part of out front out troops were on high ground
overlooking the German defences. The country to the-
east of the Canal was spread out belote their eyes like
a map, only the valleys being concealed from view by
the ridges between them and out line.
From vantage positions on our front line almost the
whole extent of the Canal opposite to us could be seen.
and the villages of Nauroy and Levergies, the latter of
which was to become intimately known to the Division
in the future fighting, were plainly visible. Into Bellen-
glise itself, immediately below out trenches, it appeared
possible to throw a cricket-ball, and every movement of
the GeÆmans in the neighbourhood of the Canal and the
village was plainly to be seen.
Behind out line the country was of a very open nature,
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 25
consisting of broad rolling downs intersected by long
and broad, rather shallow valleys, with very few out-
standing points or features. Such isolated features of
the landscape as did strike the eye were a few partially
destroyed woods and copses, sunken roads, and an occa-
sional artificial strong point of German origin, the latter
plainly marked out from the surrounding country by the
white scars left by the chalky soil thrown out from dug-
outs and trenches. All round such points, which had
naturally been favourite targets for out own and--after
they had passed into out hands--for the German artillery,
the ground was pock-marked by shell-holes. Their
neighbourhood was distinctly unhealthy except for the
inhabitants of the dug-outs, saps, and trenches, which
were the only shelters available in the vicinitv.
Perhaps the favourite target for the enemy's guns and
the most prominent feature of ail was the small conical-
shaped hill known as the "' Tumulus," which stood near
the fork of theVadencourt-Bellenglise and the Vadencourt-
Berthaucourt Roads. This little mound ,,vas a usual
registration point for the enemy Artillery, and had been
struck again and again until it stood out as a stark white
landmark stripped of all its original greenery by the
impact and blasting action of the shells. Here, especially,
was a spot near which it was dangerous to linger--trans-
port ruade their way by the hill at the trot, and no one
whose business took him in the neighbourhood of the
hill let the grass grow under his feet.
Certain of tF.e strong points, such as those at Collin's
Quarry and Hudson's Post, subsequently became impor-
tant nodal points in the divisional system of communica-
tions, while the shelter afforded by the groups of dug-outs,
in country where otherwise shelter was hot, caused them
to be chosen as sites for the headquarters of Brigades and
26 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
Artillery Groups during the forming up on the night
previous to the attack.
As usual in the case of an attack on prepared positions
of considerable strength, which involved the concentra-
tion of a large force of artillery and other units not
normally associated with a Division in the line, one of
the chier problems to be overcome was the question of
transportation to and frorn the line. In overcorning this
difficulty the weather, which rernained in the main dry
and fine both imrnediately before and during the battle,
was very helpful. In the sector of the attack the only
main approaches to the front line were the two metalled
roads which tan respectively through Le Verguier and
through Vadencourt ; the latter, which forked into two
roads just west of the Tumulus, being the main divisional
line of approach. These in thernselves were not nearly
sufficient to cope with the forward traffic, but the country
between them was seamed with " dry-weather tracks,"
which were passable for horse traffic under the weather
conditions then prevailing, while, in addition, the open
nature of the country made it unnecessary to keep to
tracks at all in dry weather.
Preparation for an attack of any magnitude was rnuch
hampered by the sharp bend back of the line upon our
right flank. A glance at the rnap showing the tactical
situation on the 23rd September betrays at once this
backward bend of the I3ritish line on the right of the
front held on that date by the Division. The enemy
held Pontruet in force, and even had strong posts well
up in and about the group of farm buildings known as
St. Helène and situated on the Vadencourt-Bellenglise
Road. On the 24th September a rninor operation was
undertaken by the Ist and 6th Divisions on our right,
having in view the capture of certain high ground in front
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 27
of their line to the south of Pontruet. As a part of
this operation the 46th Division was allotted the task
of capturing Pontruet and the medley of trenches and
strong-points which were based on this village.
The main attack was to be carried out by troops detailed
from the I38th Infantry Brigade, two companies of which
were ordered to advance from the forming-up line along the
Vadencourt-Bellenglise Road from St. Helène eastward for
50o yards; their object being to outflank the village of Pon-
truet and establish strong-posts due east of it. The advance
was to be covered by a creeping barrage fired by the rive
Brigades of Artillery covering the front of the Division.
Meanwhile, two other companies of the same battalion
were detailed to clear Pontruet itself, and the I39th
Infantry Brigade were ordered to provide a mopping-up
party to deal with certain trenches south-west of the
village. Ihe Artillery, in addition to the creeping barrage
covering the assault, were to concentrate on lontruet
village and strong points in its immediate neighbourhood
during the early part of the assault. It was thus hoped
to pin the enemy to his positions until the outflanking
party had succeeded in reaching their objective, when he
would be compelled to retreat under enfilade tire from these
companies. Tactically, the attack, although on a small
scale, was very prettily conceived ; and it was hoped that
the whole of the garrison of Pontruet and the trenches
round it, which were known to be held in force by the
enemy, would be either captured or killed.
Al1 preparations having been completed, zero was fixed
for 5 a.m. on the 24th. At that hour the barrage
opened and the two companies of the 5th Leicesters, to
whom was allotted the task of outflanldng the village,
advanced to the attack. At the same rime the 5th
Sherwood Foresters ruade an assault on Belx and Ledtc
28 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
Trenches, and, easily over-running these works and cap-
turing or killing the garrison of the trenches, endeavoared
fo enter the village from the south-east.
Almost af the outset of the attack two Stokes mortars,
which had been detailed fo assist in the attack from north
of the village, were knocked out by enemy artillery tire,
and this hampered the attack from that side materially.
For some rime the attack sped fairly well, and good
progress was ruade by out men, who penetrated into the
northern elements of Pontruet and captured the strongly
defended cemetery and the blockhouse. "[heir success
was short-lived, however, for the enemy, reacting strongly
with fresh reinforcements, bombed their way back down
the Forgan's Trench--an enemy work running south-
east and north-west right up the area attacked--and
drove out men back almost fo the forming-up line,
forcing us fo give up out hold on the part of Pontruet
which remained in out hands. Hard fighting continued
for several hours, but, according to statements of prisoners
captured from the garrison, the enemy had been expecting
an attack on Pontruet and was able to bring up strong
reserves. A second attack in the evening by the 5th
Leicesters, reinforced by a company of the 5th Sherwood
Foresters, was repulsed, without out obtaining a footing
in the village. At 1.4o a.m. on the 25th, the order was
therefore given fo withdraw from Pontruet, but fo hold on
fo the captured posts fo the north and west of the village.
The attack was thus in a great measure a tactical
failure, though if left out positions somewhat improved.
If had resulted, however, in the capture of one officer
and one hundred and thirty-six other ranks, and had given
the enemy a foretaste of the fighting quality of the
Division. The moral of the men throughout was ex-
cellent : they fought with great dash and initiative, and
LIEUTENANT J. C. BARRENT, ¥.C., I/sTH LEICESTERS. SEVERELY
VOUNDED IN THE ATTACK ON PONTRUET, AND AVARDED THE
VICTORIA CROSS FOR }llS BRAVERY AND LEADERSHIP DURING
THE .OECTION
Reproduced by courtey of Me=_srs. " hiteley, Ltd.
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 2 9
held on with tenacity to captured posts against superior
forces and under heavy shell tire. An instance of the
good work done is afforded by the behaviour of the crew
of one of the Stokes mortars knocked out early in the
fight. Although shaken by the shelling to which they
had been exposed and discouraged by the loss of their
gun, these men took to their rifles and fought gallantly
throughout the action, killing many of the enemy and
taking several prisoners.
The hero of the attack on Pontruet, however, was a
subaltern of the x/5th Leicesters, Lieutenant J. C. Barrett.
He was the leader of a party attacking the strong and
stoutly-defended work known as Forgan's Trench. In
spire of an intense tire from the machine guns and riflemen
defending the trench, he led a party of men against it,
and, although wounded in the advance to the attack, he
succeeded in reaching the trench and sprang into if,
himself disposing of two machine guns and inflicting
many casualties. During the mêlLe which followed he
was again severely wounded, but managed to climb out
of the trench with the object of finding out his own exact
position and locating the enemy. This he succeeded in
doing, and, despite loss of blood and the exhaustion con-
sequent on his wounds, gave detailed orders fo his men,
directing them to cut their way back fo their battalion,
from which they had become isolated. The party man-
aged fo rejoin their comrades, but during the retreat
Lieutenant Barrett, who had refused offers of help for
himself, was again wounded, this rime so seriously that
he could not more, and was then carried back by his men.
If was undoubtedly due fo Lieutenant Barrett's splendid
example and good leadership that any of the party man-
aged fo return alive, and he was subsequently awarded
the Victoria Cross for his bravery in this action.
3 ° THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
On the 25th of September the first Divisional Order for
the main attack on the St. Quentin Canal was issued,
and from that time forward all energies were devoted to
preparations for the assault. The general idea of the
operations was the breaking of the Hindenburg Line north
of St. Quentin, and to the 46th Division was assigned
the task of storming the Canal between the village of
Bellenglise and Riqueval Bridge, and capturing the
defences behind the Canal, with Iellenglise itsel,
which contained the entrance to the famous tunnel
whose existence was already well known flore state-
ments of captured prisoners. OEhe final objective of
the ï_)ivision was a line on the high ground beyond the
villages of Lehaucourt and Magny-la-Fosse. OEhe st
Division on out right were ordered to protect out fight
flank and to hold themselves in readiness to advance
eastwards south of the Canal and conform to the move-
ments of the enemy should he retire, occupying the
village of OEhofigny and the high ground around that
village. In the event, the enemy resistance proved too
stubborn on the day of the attack ; the xst Division did
not advance ; OEhorigny was hot taken until the following
day, and artillery and machine-gun tire from the high
ground on out right flank was the cause of much trouble
during the later stages of the battle.
On out left the 3oth American Division was ordered to
storm the ]ellicourt defences and cross the Canal where it
disappeared underground in the Iellicourt OEunnel. OEhen,
turning south, they were to ioin out own troops in the
neighbourhood of Etricourt. OEhe Americans, however,
also experienced considerable resistance and were delayed
in reaching their final objectives, thus leaving this flank
also in the air for some rime.
It was intended, fi nal]y, that when the final objective
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 31
were reached by ourselves and the 3oth American Division,
the 32nd British Division and the 2nd Australian Division
should pass through and exploit success, seizing if possible
the general line Le "fronquay-Levergies and to the
north.
In order to fully realize the magnitude of the task which
confronted the Division, a short description of the defences
opposed to us is necessary. Ihe front line occupied by
out troops on the date when the attack was first ordered
has already been described. Immediately in front of our
line the country dipped towards the St. Quentin Canal.
The main natural features were two steepish ravines
roughly at right angles to the Canal--one to the left of
out positions, down which tan the main Vadencourt Road
over Riqueval Bridge, the road known to us as Watling
Street ; and the other ravine facing towards Bellenglise.
Across the ridge between these two ravines tan the first
strong system of German defences--a continuous line of
trenches protected by a broad belt of wire and with
frequent strong-points and machine-gun posts.
Af either flank of the divisional sector the main cross-
ings of the Canal--Bellenglise and Riqueval Bridges--
were further protected by more belts of wire and by
well-sited posts of machine gunners and riflemen.
The St. Quentin Canal on the front fo be attacked by
the 46th Division was in itself an obstacle which might
easily have proved insuperable in the face of a determined
enemy. The mere sight of it from out front line trenches
inspired respect, and might well have caused fear of the
outcome of the attack in the hearts of any but the stoutest
soldiers. If divided naturally into two portions. The
northern half, whilst less strongly prepared for defence,
was much more of a natural obstacle than the southern.
From Riqueval Bridge to opposite La Baraque cross-
32 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
roads, the Canal runs between almost perpendicular
cliffs, which for the greater part of this distance vary
between fiffy and thirty feet high. South of this it runs
practically at ground level with, in places, a slight em-
bankment. Right throughout, the Canal wall formed a
perpendicular obstacle faced with brick, both west and
east banks being strongly wired. The southern portion
of the Canal was practically dry, but over considerably
more than hall of the front covered by the Division
a depth of from six to eight feet of water had to be
reckoned with.
In addition to the natural strength of the Canal as an
obstacle to advancing troops, no pains had been spared
to strengthen the whole length, which bfistled with well-
sited concrete and steel machine-gun emplacements, and
had been generally rendered as nearly as possible im-
pregnable. Indeed, we know from statements of German
prisoners that it was considered by them to be capable
of defence against any possible attack. It is probable
that this fact helped to lull the Germans into a false
state of security which may in a measure have been
responsible for the fact that all out preparations passed
unheeded and that the attack did not seem to ha-e been
suspected until it actually took place.
"l'he two weak points about the Canal which were
destined to have a decisive effect on the outcome of the
battle were" (x) the bridges which were necessary for the
supply of the enemy troops on the western bank, and
so could not be destroyed in good time; and (2) the
existence of certain concrete dams which had presumably
been built by the enemy to serve as locks to retain the
water. Where the Canal crosses the valley of the Omig-
non, south of tellenglise, it is banked up above the level
of the surrounding country ; and without these concrete
l
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 33
dams, there was risk of out guns breaching the banks,
allowing the water to drain away, and so diminishing the
value of the Canal as an obstacle.
These concrete dams would certainly have served their
purpose in such an event, but, although protected above
by strips of concertina wire and on their sides by "' crows:
feet " and other devices, they were a possible means of
out troops crossing. There were several of these stoutly
built dams along the divisional front, and some of
them were actually made use of by the Infantry in the
assault.
Beyond the Canal was an extremely strong system of
trenches, heavily protected by wire belts, and based upon
the village of Bellenglise, the farm of La Baraque, and
Harry and Nigger Copses. This line was continued
parallel with the Canal to Lehaucourt ; but the portion
south of Bellenglise was hot directly assaulted by out
troops, being attacked from the rear by the Brigade
detailed to advance on Lehaucourt itself. Between
Bellenglise and Magny-la-Fosse were two more continuous
lines of trenches protected by wire, while all over the
ground to be traversed were sited individual strong-points
and machine-gun emplacements disposed after the prin-
ciple of "defence in depth" much used by the Germans
in the last two years of the war.
Altogether, the defences of the Hindenburg Line at
this point were as thorough as the science of military
engineering, backed by unlimited time and labour,
could devise, and the defenders had every reason to
believe that no troops in the world could be expected to
storm them without colossal losses.
The effect of the battle of the 29th September must
be considered in the light of these facts. The confidence
of the Germans in both their troops and their defence
3
34 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
system was fated to be shattered in one mighty blow,
and the effect of this reverse on the moral of the German
Army and the German people must have been tremendous
indeed.
The fall of St. Quentin following on the breaching
of the Hindenburg Line was inevitable. Perhaps the
best tfibute to the work of the Division on this day of
days in their history is seen in the remark of a staff oflïc«r
of another formation, who, in reply to a question as to
who took the city of St. Quenfin, replied : "The French
walked into St. Quentin, but the 46th Division captured
it when the.y took Bellenglise.'"
On the evening of the 27th September the I38th ln-
fantry Brigade, then holding the northern portion of out
line, was ordered to attack the trenches on the ridge
between the two ravines west of Bellenglise and Riqueval.
This preliminary operation was quite local, and was un-
deÆtaken with the object of ensuring that out troops
should meet with little resistance west of the Canal on
the day of the main assault. All went well with the
attack. After a preliminary bombardment, the com-
panies of the 4th Leicesters detailed for the assault left
the formillg-up line in good order, and, following the
barrage clos,,ly, occupied the line of trenches which was
their obiective without diflïculty and with very little
fighting. The attack resulted in the capture of two
oflïcers and one hundred and forty-six other ranks, and
all concerned had good reason to be satisfied with the
xvork, and to trust that it was an omen of greater success
to follow shortly, when the preparations for the attack
on the Canal were completed.
Out new line was immediately consolidated, and com-
munication trenches leading towards the enemy were
blocked; and at the conclusion of this operation the
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 35
I37th Infantry Brigade relieved the I38th Infantry
Brigade, who retired to the area about Le Verguier for
a short rest.
The relief took place without trouble, though the enemy
subjected the captured positions to a desultory tire
throughout the night, but at 7 a.m. on the 28th September
bombing attacks were commenced on the outpost com-
pany of the 5th South Staffords, and at IO a.m. the enemy
counter-attacked heavily under a barrage on the whole
front which had been the scene of our attack of the
evening before.
The attack was accompanied by heavy artillery tire
on out support positions and on the main lines of com-
munication up which reinforcements and supplies for the
troops occupying the captured trenches would have to
pass. The infantry attack was pressed by the enemy
with unusual determination, bombing parties working up
the communication trenches leading from the enemy's
positions as well as across the open. Severe in-and-out
fighting continued for some hours, and the outpost com-
panies were very hard pressed and finally xvere forced to
yield ground owing to the impossibility of keeping the
troops supplied with S.A.A. and bombs. The attack was
particularly severe on the front held by the outpost
company of the I/5th South Staffords, and after an hour
and a half's fighting the enemy forced their way into
the trenches held by this company. A local counter-
attack was at once organized, however, and the Germans
were driven out.
Later in the morning this company was once more
driven back, fighting every step of the way, but gradually
running out of small-arm ammunition and bombs. By
this time 60 per cent. of the company had become
casualties, .and it was forced to withdraw to the trenches
36 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
south-west of Pike Wood, where it was reorganized and
held on until dark.
Similar fine work was done by the i/6th North Staffords
during the attack. The outpost company of this battalion
was for six hours completely cut off from communication
with Battalion Headquarters, all lines having been cut
by artillery tire. The company, however, held on toits
position against superior number, for the whole of this
time, although suffering very mu,-h from the prevailing
lack of ammunition. Casualties were very high, but the
men, inspired by the heroic example of their cfficers,
fought with an utter disregard of personal safety, inflict-
ing heavy losses on the attackers, who were only able
fo make very insignificant gains of ground. Where all
the men did so well it is diflïcult to draw distinctions,
but prominence should be given to the work of Private
B. Mountford, of the I/6th North Staffords, who during
the shortage of ammunition was mainly responsible for
saving the situation on the front occupied by his com-
pany. Finding a German machine gun and ammunition
in the captured trenches, he at once set to work, got the
gun into working order, brougbt it into action, and
caused many casualties to the enemy. For rive hours
under heavy tire irom German rifles and machine guns
he manned this gun, firing short bursts of tire when
enemy attacks appeared likely to develop with success,
thus assisting materially in slowing down his advance
and helping to repulse thrusts which were unusually
determined and long-sustained.
Fighting continued well on into the day, but after his
initial success the enemy made very little progress along
any part of the front attacked. With few exceptions out
men were able to retain their positions until dark, but
the outpost companies were in a very unfavourable
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 37
position, being observed and enfiladed from both flanks.
It was therefore dec:ded to withdraw to out original
line under cover of darkness, not only because the
position of the men was unsatisfactory, but in order
that a straight barrage could be put down for the main
attack.
During the few days of preparation, every care was
taken to prevent the enemy from realizing the imminence
and magnitude of the attack. Reconnoitring parties
were warned to keep themselves scattered and as incon-
spicuous as possible when in view of the enemy. There
was to be no flourishing of maps in full view of enemy
airrnen or of direct observation from the enemy trenches.
All troops in the front line were instructed to keep their
heads down and to let as little movement as possible be
seen, while movement of transport behind the lines,
beyond the normal activity inseparable from the supply
and maintenance of a division in comparatively peaceful
times, was restricted to the hours of darkness.
The enemy airrnen at this time were very active and
daring, and frequently his reconnaissance machines would,
in spire of machine-g an and rifle tire, swoop down and
pass over out front and support trenches at a very low
altitude, watching for signs of unusual activity. With
their scarlet-painted bodies the machines presented a
striking appearance, looking for ail the world like huge
red birds diving down on the look-out for their prey on
the ground beneath. Very little could have escaped the
knowledge of the skilled observers in the planes, and the
result speaks well for the thoroughness of the precautions
taken against observation, and for the skill with which
officers and men carried out the orders given to them.
One of the first preparations to be made in all cases
of attack where modes of Headquarters are likely to
38 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
take place as a preliminary to the assault, is the choosing
of suitable sites for the Headquarters of the higher forma-
tions. On the 26th, therefore, a party of the General
Staff, with one representative from each Brigade and the
O.C. Signal Company, ruade a tour of the country behind
the front line and of the front line itself, and settled on
a joint Brigade Headquarters in a portion of the line
where three or four deep dug-outs, suflïcient to shelter
the Staffs from moderately heavy shell tire, existed. This
position, unnamed except by a map reference (G, 2I, c, 2.r),
subsequently became the headquarters of the I37th In-
fantry Brigade when this Brigade stormed the Canal, and
was later used as Divisional Headquarters by the 32nd
Division when it passed through the 46th Division after
the attack. At the same rime it was decided to move
forward Advanced Divisional Headquarters to Small Post
Wood, a small copse about a mile N.N.E. of Vendelles,
from which place communication forward could be main-
tained more satisfactorily.
The problem of communication in a battle such as the
one projected was a difiïcult one. Both out own troops
and the enemy were strongly entrenched, and a prelimin-
ary bombardment of exceptional intensity was necessary
before out assaulting columns could be hurled at the
enemy entrenchments with any chance of success, while
such a bombardment necessarily invited heavy retaliatory
tire. It was practically a trench warfare attack without
the buried cable system which alone had rendered com-
munication in trench warfare possible.
A strong system of overland cables was designed to
meet the case, but these lines were, as they were bound
to be, cut by shell tire again and again belote the attack
commenced. In fact, the party laying the forward lines
was out working during the whole of the night preceding
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISIL 39
the attack, and during the morning of the attack, without
succeeding in getting the lines through to the leading
Brigade, which was thus for some time, at a critical period
of the battle, cut off from communication with the
Division altogether. To add to the troubles ol the Signal
company, the very openness of the country, wh_le facili-
tating the laying of cables across country, was fatal
to their maintenance. Durin i the dark nights of the
27th/28th and 28th/29th September, transport ruade
little or no attempt to keep to the roads, but was driven
across country, intent only on reaching its destination
by the shortest route. Lines were cut hot once or twice,
but twenty or thirty rimes a rfight, and linemen were out
working practically continuously. Perhaps the most ex-
asperating incident occurred, however, when, on the night
before the battle, a cavalry unit which shall be nameless
settled down for the night midway between ]-dvisional
Headquarters and an important forward communication
post, and signalized its arrival by cutting out some
hundred yards or so of the three twin cables which formed
the main divisional route, in order to use them as a
picket line for their horses. After this " Signals " felt
that Fate could have no harder blows in store for them.
Communications had to be extended considerably and
lines laid to deal with the many extra units which were
attached to the Division for the battle. New signal
officers appeared every few minutes, bringin i vith them
N.C.O.s dragging new lines to be placed on the Divisional
Exchange. Tanks, Cavalry, Artillery, Cyclists--all were
represented--but the most numerous of all were the
attached Artillery Brigades. Between the arrival of the
Division in the area and the night of the 28th September,
the strength of the Division in artillery increased from
two Brigades of R.F.A. to eight Brigades of R.F.A. and
4 ° THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
one of R.H.A., all of them being placed under the com-
mand of Brigadier-General Sir Hill Child, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
C.R.A., 46th Division. In addition several Brigades of
the Corps tIeavy Artillery were firing on the front of the
Division.
Artillery preparation for the attack was commenced
on the night of the 26th/27th September, when a con-
centrated bombardment of the Bellenglise salient was
carried out with a mixture of high explosive and gas
shells. At the saine time the normal " harassing " tire
on the whole of the IX Corps front was considerably
increased in order to mask the guns engaged in pumping
gas into selected areas behind the front tobe attacked.
"fhis gas bombardment was carried out on a scale which
had not previously been attempted by any of the Allies,
but results were not commensurate with the expenditure
of ammunition. Prisoners stated that the only effect of
the bombardment, so far as gas was concerned, was to
cause them to retreat to the deep dug-outs and tunnels
with which this particular enemy area was so plentifully
provided, and thus very few gas casualties were caused.
Far otherwise, however, was the result of the destruc-
tive bombardment with high-explosive shells flore g-uns
of all calibres which commenced on the following day.
All evidence, whether that of air photographs taken during
the bombardment itself, the close examination of the
shelled area when the battle was over, or the reports of
the dazed and demoralized prisoners taken during the
action, goes to show that the effect of the whirlwind of
shells from out guns was absolutely devastating both to
the German positions and to their moral. For the two
days preceding the assault no rations or reinforcements
reached the unfortunate occupants of the defences on
either bank of the Canal.
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 41
This intensive artillery preparation was carried on
without pause until the morning selected for the
attack. In the meantime, careful barrage rime-tables
had been worked out for the attack itself, and every gun
of the Field Artillery had been assigned ifs task, either in
the barrage which should cover the advance of the in-
fantry, in the shelling of specially selected areas where
enemy concentrations might be expected, or in assisting
the Heavy Artillery in its task of neutralizing or annihi-
lating suspected enemy strong-points and machine-gun
emplacements.
In an attack on a position which is fronted by a water
obstacle of the size and depth of the St. Quentin Canal
t is naturally tobe expected that towards the overcoming
of that obstacle a large and even dominating part of the
preparation for the attack should be directed. The cross-
ing of the Canal was the task of the Infantry, but the
work of enabling the Infantry to cross was essentially
the rôle of the Engineers, and the preparations made by
the C.R.E., Lieutenant-Colonel H. T. Morshead, D.S.O.,
R.E., were extremely thorough.
Unfortunately the C.R.E. himself, while reconnoitring
forward routes for pontoon wagons in the vicinity of
Le Verguier on the 25th, was wounded in the leg by a
a piece of a shell which exploded near him, and Iris wound,
though hot serious, was sufficient fo incapacitate him
for some weeks.
In his absence, and until his successor, Lieutenant-
Colonel W. Garforth, D.S.O., M.C., R.E., joined the
Division, the R.E. preparation was carried out under the
direction of the Adjutant and Assistant Adjutant. These
preparations consisted mainly in the collection of material
for, and the construction of, various means of crossing
the Canal. Amongst the most successful of the means
42 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
devised were small piers built of a framework of wood
supported either by empty petrol tins or by bundles of
cork slabs : piers which were so devised that they could
be used either as rafts to carry a single man across the
Canal or as supports for foot-bridges for taking a con-
tinuous stream of men in single file. In addition collap-
sible boats had been provided, together with mud-mats
and scaling-ladders for negotiating stretches of mud and
the steep brick walls of the Canal banks. Finally, some
genius hit on the novel idea of making use of life-belts
on a considerable scale. The latter idea in particular
promised considerable prospects of success ; the authori-
ties at Boulogne were telegraphed for the life-belts from
some of the leave-boats, and over 3,ooo were collected and
were sent up and issued to the storming troops.
On the 27th September arrangements were ruade for
a dress rehearsal to take place, and men loaded with full
kit as for a storming party were detailed to test each
type of means for crossing the Canal. The first attempt
was ruade near Bihecourt, but enemy shelling of batteries
in the vicinity was so persistent and interfered so much
with the preparations for the trial that it was postponed
by order of General Campbell until the next day. On
the 28th, therefore, the party proceeded to the moat at
Brie Château on the Somme, where the practice was
carried out in front of the Divisional Commander in the
pouring rain, but with good results. It was discovered
by actual experience that the collapsible boats, which
required four men apiece to carry them, could be opened
and launched in twenty seconds, while men, weighted
with their storming kit but supported with life-belts fixed
high up on their bodies, were able to swiln across a stretch
of deep water, forty yards in breadth, and could not
drown. Similar experiments were ruade with a man who
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 43
could not swim, and he was able by means of a lire-line
to pull himself across hand over hand, being convinced,
and in a position to convince his companions, that there
was no danger of men thus equipped getting into difiï-
culties. These trials were actually carried out by men
of the Stafford Brigade, which was to have the honour
of leading the Division across the Canal and making
the initial breach in the Hindenburg Line beyond.
The trial having been successful, nothing now remained
but to continue the manufacture of the different devices
until the number required was completed and, during
the night of the 28th/29th, to collect all this material as
close as possible to the front line, ready to be carried
forward to the appointed places on the banks of the Canal
at the first opportunity after the attack had been launched.
This was successfully accomplished by the personnel of
the Divisional Field Companies, assisted by the x/xst
Monmouthshire Regiment, the Pioneer Battalion of the
Division. OEhe Enneers, including the whole of the
Engineers of the 32nd Division, were then divided up
according to the tasks allotted to them for the assault.
Some sections were sent with the Infantry to assist
mopping-up parties and to examine dug-outs, strong-
points, etc., for mines and demolition charges: others
were told off respectively as bridge-building parties or for
work on the roads leading to and forward of the horse-
transport bridges which were to be thrown across the
Canal as soon as possible after the assault had succeeded.
CHAPTER II
THE STAFFORDS CROSS THE ST. QUENTIN CANAL AND
BREACH THE HINDENBURG LINE
PREPARATIONS being suflïciently far advanced by that
date, the 29th September was chosen as "Z " day, or
the day of the attack, and the night of the 28th/29th
was spent by the General Staff and Headquarter Adminis-
trative Services in putting the final touches to the plans
to which I have already referred, and to arrangements
for the evacuation of the wounded, and for dealing with
the inrush of enemy prisoners which might be expected
if the attack was successful. During the saine time the
fighting troops were moving up to their assemb]y positions.
The I37th Infantry Brigade, composed entirely of Stafford-
shire troops, under Brigadier-General J. V. Campbell,
V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., had been chosen to lead the Division
in the assault on the Canal ; and the Headquarters of this
I3rigade was moved on this night to the dug-iuts in the
support line of trenches which had already been selected
for them. The troops themselves were disposed on the
forming-up line which had been taped out under the
direction of Engineer officers, the tapes being laid parallel
to, and two hundred yards behind, the starting-line for
the creeping barrage.
The troops of the supporting Brigade, the I38th In-
fantry Brigade of Leicesters and Lincolns, under Brigadier-
General F. G. M. Rowley, C.M.G., D.S.O., and the I39th
44
]3RIGA]31ER-GEIqERAL J. V. CAPSE--, V.C, C.II.G., D.S.O., BRIGADE
COIIIA1NDER I7"I'H "[NFAN'I'RY ]RIGADE
Rcprodccd by courtey of J. Ru-cll & -tons, 5x, Bakcr Strcct, I.oudon, W..
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 45
Infantry Brigade of Sherwood Foresters, under Brigadier-
General J. Harington, D.S.O., were also moved up into
their positions during the night. They were thus disposed
so that immediately the situation had cleared sufficiently,
they could move forward to the forming-up position at
which they were to take over from the I37th Infantry
Brigade and continue to press the attack until the final
objectives of the Division were reached and consolidated.
Similar positions for Brigade Headquarters had been
selected, and the troops of both Brigades were concen-
trated where as much shelter as possible frorn the enemy's
retaliatory tire was available, in order to avoid un-
necessary casualties. Casualties in all three Brigades
were caused during the night by enemy gas and high
explosive shells, and work was much interfered with
by this shelling, which, however, died away towards
morning, giving satisfactory proof that the enemy did
not anticipate any immediate attack on a large scale.
The general dispositions of the Division for the attack
were as follows :--
The area to be occupied had been divided into two
main objectives, each limited by a line rnning almost
due north and south. These were marked respectively
on the map issued by the General Staff before the action
by a red and a green line, and for convenience of
reference may be referred to as the Red and the Green
objectives.
These main objectives were again subdivided, the first
into two portions by a blue line, and the second into
three approximately equal portions by a green and a
dotted blue line. These subdivisions were ruade to enable
the assaulting troops fo rest and reorganize under a
protective barrage of a few minutes' duration, and each
line was chosen as being either a deaCinite element of the
46 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
enemy organization or a natural feature of the ground
over which the attack was taking place.
Their positions would, of course, also be indicated by
the halt of the artillery barrage behind which the troops
would organize. The intermediate objectives were ruade
use of to enable " leap-frog " tactics tobe utilized
within the attacking Brigades--one battalion passing
through another to the attack, the tired battalion mean-
while remaining behind to mop up and consolidate a
defensive line, while it was at the saine time available to
reinforce the fresh attacking battalion if necessary.
To the I37th Infantry Brigade, as already stated, was
allotted the task of leading the Division acÆoss the Canal.
This Brigade was detailed to overcome any enemy resist-
ance west of the Canal, to cross the Canal itself, break
through the main defences of the Hindenburg Line east
of the Canal, capture Bellenglise, and advance to the
Red objective, where a defensive position was to be
consolidated and the other Brigades would pass through
to continue the attack.
On this line the artillery barrage under which the troops
advanced was scheduled to halt for three hours, a dense
protective barrage being put down meanwhile to cover
the work of consolidation, to conceal the movements of
the advancing Brigades, and to prevent enemy cotmter-
attacks.
During this interval of three hours the troops told off
for the purpose were to complete the mopping-up of the
area occupied by the i37th Infantry Brigade, and the
remaining two Brigades, the I38th Infantry Brigade on
the left and the I39th Infantry Brigade on the right,
were to move up, deploy on the Red objective, and,
when the barrage lifted, to move forward to the capture
of the Green objective, where they in their turn were to
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 47
consolidate and allow the 32nd Division to pass through
them to a distant objective. As will be seen the
programme allotted was, so far as the 46th Division
was concerned, carded through according to plan. To
the storming Infantry was allotted a few sections of
Engineers for purposes as already outlined when describ-
ing Engineer preparations, while the remainder of the
Divisional Engineers and the Pioneer Battalion followed
close in the rear of the assaulting columns, bringing up
bridging and road-making material.
The artillery programme has already been referred to
above. The particular feature of both the creepin i
barrages was the inclusion of a proportion of "" smoke "
shell, this being intended to aid the concealment of
movement behind out lines, and also to emphasize the
«' lifts" of the barrage, thus enabling the Infantry to
judge more easily when a forward move was takivg place.
Certainly the first object of the " smoke " was achieved,
though how far the artificial smoke was aided by natural
fogis difficult to estimate. Owing to the fog, how-
ever, the second object was not so successful, and the
lifts were not so well defined as they would have been
in clear weather. In order to thicken the barrage in its
initial stages, a machine-gun barrage was arranged to be
super-imposed upon it. For this purpose the end Lire
Guards M.G. Battalion and the xooth M.G. Battalion
were attached to the Division, and placed under the
command of the O.C. 46th M.G. Battalion, Lieutenant-
Colonel D. Mathew Lannowe, D.S.O.
Two companies of tanks had been detailed by the
IX Corps to cross over the Bellicourt Tunnel as soon
as the Americans on the left of the Division had captured
their first objectives. They were then to move down
south on to the front of the 46th Division, when they
48 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
were to assist the I38th and I39th Infantry Brigades,
one company of tanks to each Brigade, in the advance
from the led line.
Forming-up was stccessfully carried out on the night
belote the attack, the I37th Infantry Brigade lining
up on the jumping-off tape on a three-battalion front;
while the I38th and I39th Infantry Brigades formed up
some distance in rear on a one-battalion front, with orders
that their leading battalions should occupy out old front
line as soon as the attacking Brigade had left. These
leading battalions were instructed to detail one company
each to follow the assaulting troops closely and assist
in mopping up the area west of the Canal. At the same
rime the battalion commanders were instructed to hold
themselves in readiness to reinforce the I37th Infantry
Brigade should this Brigade, having crossed the Canal,
be in danger of being outfought in the trench system
beyond it. The remainder of the supporting Brigades
were instructed not to move forward until orders were
received from Divisional Headquarters.
Zero hour was fixed for 5.50 a.m. on September ,9th.
Even without an intimate knowledge of the ground a
study of the trench-map of the Canal defences will show
the magnitude of the task which confronted the attacking
Brigade. Well might the enemy be of the opinion that
their positions were impregnable. As zero hour ap-
proached there was no thought of test for the Staff who
had planned the attack, and who realized how much
might hang on the result of the next few hours. If the
attack proceeded according to schedule, there was no end
to the possibilities opened up. Indeed, the end of the
war would be brought very appreciably nearer. A suc-
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 49
cessful attack on positions so strong as those opposed to
us would be proof positive that the enemy's hopes of
holding up the Allied ride of conquest by building a series
of such dams across Europe were founded on folly. On
the other hand, if the attack was vigorously pressed and
failed, the chances were that the rôle of the 46th Division
in the present war was played for good and all.
As the hours rolled on towards the fateful moment
when the barrage was due to open, a hush of expectancy
seemed to settle over the whole front of the Division.
The enemy tire was fitful--an occasional shell, only, falling
on such well-known targets as " The Tumulus," Hudson's
Post, or the roads and tracks through Ascension Valley,
the most shell-torn area behind out lines. Out own
artillery fired sporadically, guns having been told off to
simulate an appearance of normal activity. Suddenly,
to the minute agreed upon, the preliminary gun of the
barrage boomed forth and, in a second, flashes appeared
to spring from every square yard of the "' gun-lines,"
while a perfect tornado of furious sound, a hellish com-
pound of the voices of guns of all calibres, rent the air
and caused the very earth to shake. The enemy lines
were already hidden in thick mist, so that the grandest
sight of a modern battle---the striking of the steel storm
on his front--was hidden from the sight of the watchers
in out trenches, though the crash and roar of the explocling
shells was proof enough of what was happening in front
of us. As the barrage opened, officers and men of the
leading Brigade gave a sigh of relief from the intolerable
tension of the preparation ; the men sprang from their
forming-up positions and, led by their oflïcers, poured
down the slopes toward the nearest enemy trenches,
keeping close to the barrage. In these initial stages of
the attack, direction was maintained fairly well, in spite
4
5o THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
of the thickening of the mist due to the smoke from the
shells, which soon produced an impenetrable fog. Keep-
ing direction in an early-morning attack is a sign of
good leadership at the best of rimes, but on this foggy
day--when, even behind the lines so far back as
Divisional Headquarters, oflïcers and men were wandering
about in vain endeavour to find their way--it required
positive genius to succeed in leading straight to pre-
arranged objectives. A certain amount of confusion did
result from this fact, but fortunately the very nature of
the obstacles to be encountered helped the advancing
troops, and the Brigade fell upon the first-line trenches
in fair order and fleshed their bayonets, killing most of
the garrison, who, to do them justice, in spite of the
barrage and their surprise at the unexpected attack, put
up a stout enough resistance. Taking this first system
of trenches in their stride and leaving stray Germans and
individual strong-points to be dealt with by the mopping-
up parties of the supporting companies, the Staffordshire
men, with barely a pause to reorganize, swept on to the
banks of the Canal well up to rime, whilst the Ist Division,
in accordance with Corps orders for the battle, formed
a strong defensive right flank from our original trenches
along the spur towards Bellenglise.
The enemy barrage fell on our trenches rive minutes
after the troops had left, showing that, while his
batteries were on the alert, no particular attack had
been expected. By that rime, our troops were fight-
ing in the enemy outpost line, and suffered very few
casualties from his shells. His Artillery Command,
however, were quick to realize that their guns were
hot likely to do much to hinder our attack unless
the range was shortened, and, before our troops were
over the Canal, they took the risk of shooting down their
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 51
own men who would be intermingled with ours and, in
a last attempt to smother the attack on the Canal, laid
down a barrage just to the west of it. This was well-
directed and powerful, and caused many casualties to ail
three of the attacking battalions belote the Canal was
crossed.
The attack was carried out on a three-battalion front,
the i/6th South Staffords being on the right, the I/Sth
South Staffords in the centre, and the i/6th North
Staffords on the left. All three battalions reached the west
bank of the Canal without too much difficulty, though here
and there individual companies were held up by machine-
gun posts and opportunity was thus given for the display
of initiative by ofiïcers and N.C.O.s in overcoming these
obstacles. The experiences of the different battalions
at the Canal and beyond it, however, differ to such a
marked extent that a clearer view of the action can be
obtained if their adventures are considered separately
and in detail.
On the right the 6th South Staffords attacked in four
waves, each of one company, on a front of four hundred
yards. Few casualties were suffered in overrunning the
German outpost line, and on reaching the Canal it was
round to be dry, or nearly dry, on almost the whole
battalion front. What little water existed was on
the left, and here officers swam across, taking lines with
them, their men following without much difficulty on
rafts, or by pulling themselves along the lire-lines
already placed in position by the officers. In the centre
and on the right of the battalion front, the attacking
troops waded across, or crossed by means of rafts of cork
and petrol tins thrown down on the mud in front of them.
There was a little wire under the water--where water
existed- near the eastern bank of the Canal, but this did
52 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
hot give much trouble. The enemy defended the eastern
bank of the Canal with bombs, and with machine guns
which were sited in concrete emplacements so arranged
as to enfilade the Canal. The sting had been taken out
of the resistance, however, by the intensity of the barrage,
which had been so heavy, so well directed, and so closely
followed up by our Infantry, that in many cases garrisons
of enemy strong-points and trenches were unable to
emerge before the positions were rushed by the advancing
troops. For a few minutes some difficulty was experi-
enced in gaining a footing on the eastern bank, but,
owing to the fog, accurate machine-gun tire at anything
but point-blank range was impossible and considerable
parties of our men ruade good their positions. The enemy
then surrendered freely, prisoners being collected in
batches and sent back under the care of one or two slightly
wounded men.
As soon as the machine-gun nests and posts immediately
on the bank of the Canal had been cleared sufficiently to
enable our men to deploy, the oïacers sorted out their
commands as far as possible, and the leading companies
advanced to the attack of the t31ue line, a continuous line
of trenches with numerous and well-constructed strong-
points.
Great as the task had been, the crossing was accom-
plished up to time ; the reorganization of the companies
engaged took place under a protective barrage as arranged,
and the advance fo the Blue line was commenced as soon
as the barrage lifted, at zero plus one hour and forty
minutes.
Here again, the troops were faced with an obstacle that
might well have sufficed to hold them up for several
hours and the trench system was very stubbornly de-
fended, enemy machine gunners fighting well, many of
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 53
them being bayoneted at their guns. Nothing could
withstand the dash çf the troops, however, inspired as
they were by the splendid leading of their officers. In
small parties and protected by the fog, they worked
their way up to within a short distance of the enemy
trenches, then, rising with a shout, dashed in with the
bayonet, the enemy giving way in all directions and
many of them maki1:g good their escape through the fog,
in spite of considerable casualties inflicted by the artillery
as they retired.
At the Blue line, a slight pause was ruade while the
much disorganized c.,mpanies sorted themselves out as
far as possible---N.C.O.s collecting small parties of men,
and officers rearranging these parties into platoons and
companies, and explaining to the section leaders under
them their next objective in the attack on the Red
line, which was commenced immediately the barrage
lifted and permitted forward movement to be resumed.
A slight adjustment had to be made first, however,
and the first and third companies advanced behind the
creeping barrage, wL;le the second and fourth com-
panies turned aside, changing direction to the right
and entering Bellenglise.
The organized defences of this village had meanwhile
been dealt with as a p,ssible menace to the attack to fight
and left of them. Special groups of heavy artillery had
been told off to pay particular attention to them and,
dufing the initial stages of the assault, Bellenglise had
been so well pounded that the machine gunners and In-
fantry holding the village had had little opportunity to
assist in repulsing the general attack.
Now, in accordance with plan--a phrase common
enough in German communiqués but significant in the
present connection--the heavy guns switched on to the
54 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
villages of Lehaucourt and Magny-la-Fosse, which lay
within the objectives of the leap-frogging Brigades, and
the Infantry rushed in on the village of Bellenglise and
mopped it up, paying particular attention to the cellars
and the entrances to the famous Bellenglise tunnel. It
was from this tunnel that the I37th Infantry Brigade
drew the greater part of the prisoners captured by them,
nearly a thousand officers and men being discovered in
this retreat alone.
Having thus accomplished their task the battalion,
which had suffered surprisingly few casualties, proceeded
to organize the Red line, in which task they were much
hampered by enemy machine-gun tire from the eastern
end of Magny Valley, until this harassing tire was finally
silenced by some of out own Lewis gun detachments.
Runners were then despatched to the rear with the
news that the first objective had been taken, and the
men round what shelter they could and settled down
to rest, prepared to repulse a counter-attack should any
be made.
The centre battalion, the I/Sth South Staffords, who
were detailed to attack on a somewhat wider front than
the troops on their right, formed up with two companies
in line, each on a frontage of 50o yards.
Owing to the severe casualties this battalion had suffered
while repulsing the enemy counter-attacks on the 28th
September, the orders for the attack were altered at the
last moment, the third and fourth companies being com-
bined into one supporting company. When the battalion
advanced to the attack of the trenches west of the Canal,
the right company, owing to the fog and smoke, lost
direction and bore slightly too lai to the right. This
error of direction was detected in rime by the battalion
commander, however, and under Iris orders the gap be-
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 55
tween the two companies was filled by a section of the
I37th Trench Mortar Battery. Here again, little trouble
was experienced in overrunning the enemy trench system
west of the Canal, from which 16o prisoners were taken
and despatched to the rear under escort.
The Canal itself contained at this point deep water
and, no bridges being found intact, the men who, in
common with all the assaulting troops, were equipped
with life-belts in addition to their normal equipment,
crossed by swimming or were hauled over by means of
heaving lines and planks. If was in such a situation as
this that the fog proved so invaluable. The farther bank
of the Canal was strongly defended by the enemy with
rire tire and light machine guns fired from concrete
emplacements, but af this period of the day it was
impossible to see more than a few yards, and the enemy
could hot tell with any certainty where out troops were
until they were right upon them, when the latter lost no
time in charging, and quickly silenced the enemy machine
guns by the destruction of the guns' crews. So quickly
indeed was progress made, that comparatively few casual-
ries were suffered in this very difficult operation. This
was again in great measure due to the splendid leading
of both oftïcers and N.C.O.s. Any hesitation at this
juncture would have been fatal and might have resulted
in the total failure of the attack. It was absolutely
essential for success that the troops should keep up with
the barrage and make the utmost use of the fog. The
courage and determination of all ranks was beyond praise,
but, even at this high level, certain individual leaders did
so extraordinarily well and showed such resource and
initiative that their efforts had a marked effect in the
storming of the Canal.
Such an instance is that of Corporal A. E Ferguson,
56 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
who, after overcoming all resistance on the west side
of the Canal, collected together his own section and a.
party of men from different units who had become lost
in the fog, and personally led them across the Canal,
scaling the east bank against considerable opposition,
chasing the enemy down their own dug-outs, and clearing
the trench line opposed to him. In this way, this N.C.O.,
with a small party of about fifteen men, was responsible
for the capture of ninety-eight prisoners and ten machine
guns. Another name which will remain associated with
the capture of this portion of the Canal is that of Sergeant
W. Cahill who, although unable to swim, plunged into
the Canal and got across as best he could with a number
of men he had collected round him. These men he at
once led to the top of the eastern bank, where he found
an Offlcer and a small party of our men in diflïculties.
Without hesitation he attacked the enemy, captured
four machine guns, and held on to his position on the
Canal bank until the remainder of our men had crossed
and the enemy resistance was completely overcome.
The thickness of the fog had caused the companies at
this point to be very mixed up indeed, and other similar
cases occurred of parties composed of men of several
different units being collected by an oflïcer who had
lost his own men. Second Lieutenant W. B. ]3rown,
collecting a small party of twenty men in this manner,
plunged into the Canal at the head of thera and
obtained a footing on the right bank of the Canal,
capturing four machine guns and their crews. Having
secured this post, he returned into the water and
remained waist-deep for nearly an hour, hauling men
across, then finally reorganized thera and led them
forward in the next advance.
In spite of the greater difficulty caused by the water
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 57
in the Canal, this battalion also succeeded in keeping up
with the barrage on the east bank of the Canal, and re-
organized under the protective barrage, before advancing
to the capture of the system of trenches beyond. Here
the support company joined up with the advanced
companies, and the whole moved forward to the Red
objective, which was taken xvithout further trouble. One
of the companies of the battalion, at this rime under
Second Lieutenant C. Jones, who had taken over command
of the company when his company commander was
severely wounded, was detailed to assist the right battalion
by clearing the northern portion of the village of Bellen-
glise. This he did so successfully and speedily that he
vas able to take it almost in his stride, and advanced
with the remaining companies of the battalion to the
final objective, after capturing eight machine guns and
four field guns on his way. This enemy battery, like
many others met with during the day, remained in action
until the last moment, when they were surprised by our
troops and captured. Itis likely that the delay in
limbering up and falling back was due in this case to a
lack of knowledge of the exact situation owing to the
fog, but it is notexvorthy that, in this and in subsequent
actions in which the Division took part, the enemy
artillerymen, like his machine gunners, fought very well
indeed. The former manned their guns until the last
moment, firing over open sights at our advancing troops,
and often fought bravely with their rifles when no longer
able to use their guns with effect. Far different was their
action from that of the Infantry, who, with a few excep-
tions, were demoralized from the first, and seldom put up
a stiff resistance, surrendering freely, as they did on this
occasion, as soon as there was any reasonable excuse for
doing so. Had it not been for the machine gunners in
58 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
particular the Division could bave reached its objective
very much quicker and with much fewer casualties than
it did, though as it was the success of the attack was
phenomenal.
Perhaps the most dramatic scenes of the attack on the
Canal occurred on the front attacked by the left battalion,
the I/6th North Staffords. This battalion was given a
frontage of attack of 8o0 yards, and formed up with two
companies in line and two in support. It was known to
the staff that the Riqueval Bridge on the left of the
battalion objective was the main artery of supply for
the German troops on the west side of the Canal and
that this bridge had remained undestroyed up to the
previous evening. There was therefore a possible chance
of the bridge being seized intact, and Captain A. H.
Charlton with his company were detailed to attempt its
capture. This officer led his company by compass
bearing towards the bridge, but when descending the
ravine leading towards it was held up by machine-
gun tire from a trench defending the approach to the
bridge. Captain Charlton, realizing the urgency of the
situation, took forward a party of nine men, captured
the gun, killing all the crew with the bayonet, and then
rushed the bridge. The sentries on the bridge and the
pioneers who had been detailed to blow it up had been
forced to take shelter from out bombardment, but seeing
out men approaching rushed out to tire the charges. A
race ensued, which was won by the assaulting troops,
the nearest N.C.O. shooting all four of the Germans,
while the officer seized the leads, cut them, and threw
the charges into the Canal. Sentries were then posted
on the bridge, and the whole of the company stormed
across and mopped up the trenches and enemy posts on
the east side of the Canal.
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 59
In addition fo this bridge, on fo the repair of which
the 466th Field Company was immediately turned, the
battalion was fortunate enough fo find several foot-bridges
over the Canal, and use was also ruade of a concrete dam
of stout construction, from which the enêmy's wire was
quickly cleared. In conoequence of the presence of these
bridges little trouble was experienced by this battalion
crossing the Canal, and our troops poured over so quickly
that the enemy garrison was taken by surprise and was
unable to oppose our advance.
The company, first over the Riqueval Bridge itself
captured 13o prisoners in one trench, including a battalion
commander and his staff.
At the Blue line, when the slight pause for reorganiza-
tion took place, the supporting companies passed through
the advanced companies, who in their turn formed up
behind them. The whole battalion then swept forward
to the capture of their final objective, which was reached
by the leading companies immediately after the barrage
had passed over it and halted beyond. Here the battalion
consolidated, sent up success signals, and despatched
runners back to Brigade Headquarters to report.
Thus by 8.30 a.m., in the space of two hours and thirty
minutes, exactly according fo rime-table as laid down by
the Divisional Staff, the troops of the I37th Infantry
Brigade had overcome enemy opposition west of the
St. Quentin Canal, crosoed that obstacle, and stormed
through a line which the Germans believed fo be im-
pregnable, and which bai been strenithened with every
device that the Masters of modern fortifications coulE
invent. Well nfight the men of the Brigade, resting on
their objectives and awaiting relief by the supporting
troops, feel content with their morning's work. Already
some 2,ooo enemy prisoners were on their way back
60 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
towards the divisional cage, and a considerable number
of machine guns and field guns were among the captured
material. The casualties of the Brigade, including those
sustained during the counter-attack of the night of the
27th/28th September, amounted in all to some 25 officers
and 555 men. The majority of the wounds were due
to machine-gun tire and were comparatively slight, and
the total was amazingly small compared with the results
gained, being in all probability considerably less than
the total of enemy dead and wounded, exclusive of the
prisoners already referred to.
CHAPTER III
SUCCESS EXPLOITED BY THE SHERWOODS, LINCOLNS, AND
LEICESTERS
\VHILE the InIantry of the Division was thus engaged in
making history east of the Canal, the administrative
services behind were struggling manfully against adverse
circumstances. The fog, which had so materially assisted
in front, was here the cause oI endless trouble and con-
fusion. Elaborate arrangements had been made for the
evacuation of the wounded and prisoners, but the Iog,
which from the beginning of the action had been enough
to tender path-finding extremely difficult, was intensified
to such an extent by the smoke drifting Irom the scene
oI action that it was impossible to see more than a Iew
yards ahead. All landmarks were blotted out, and the
boundary between tracks ordinarily well enough defined
and the open country was indistinguishable. To make
confusion worse confounded, the country far and wide
was seamed with the occasional ruts made by transport
wagons, which in clear weather had been accustomed to
avoid tracks as being likely places for the enemy to shell,
and to make straight for the particular camp or bivouac
which was their destination. The result was that Ascen-
sion Valley and the whole region immediately behind
the old front line were soon filled with columns of pris-
oners, returning wounded, stragglers, reinIorcements and
a medley of orderlies and odds and ends of transport of
6x
62 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
every description, wandering about in all directions, and
with little hope of finding their way anyxvhere until the
mist cleared. From rime to time a slight clearing of the
mist would enable men with their wits about them to
sight some well-known landmark and fo make progress
in the right direction, so that gradually the whole mass
worked away from the sound of the guns and so drifted
back towards Le Verguier, Vadencourt and other posts,
where they were sorted out by the Traffic Control, placed
on their correct roads, and started off totheir destina-
tions. The stream continued, however, and until the
fog cleared shortly after noon there was little relief in
the situation behind the line. Much suffering must bave
been caused to the walking wounded through their in-
ability to find the aid-posts prepared for their reception.
The effect of the fog on the Divisional communications
was especially noticeable. A complete visual scheme, on
which a great deal of energy had been expended, was
rendered tiseless by the fog. Lines which were intact
belote the fog commenced were continually broken, more
by tratïïc than by shell tire, and, once broken, it was a
marrer of hours sometimes belote the far end of the line,
which might bave been dragged several hundred yards by
transport, could be discovered. Still more difficulty was
experienced in laying forward lines during the early stages
of the battle. Enemy shelling caused frequent breaks
in the lines as they were being laid, and the broken ends,
hurled outwards by the force of the explosion, could only
be collected and brought together with difficulty, by
which time a "test" would betray the fact that a similar
accident had occurred farther back, and the whole work
was "' fo do" over again. The remaining resource of
" Signais," a system of despatch riders and orderlies,
reinforced belote the commencement of the action by a
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 63
platoon of corps cyclists and a troop of Cavalry, was of
more use. But even here trouble was experienced. The
roads were badly cut up behind our lines and were non-
existent in front of them, so that motor-cycle despatch
riders were forced to work on foot. Here again the fog was
a serious obstacle ; Formation Headquarters were almost
indiscoverable, and orderly after orderly left Divisional
Headquarters not to return until well on in the afternoon.
In a similar manner, stretcher-bearers going out after
wounded cases were again and again lost, and were in
some cases several hours belote returning to their unit.
One such case fs worthy of particular mention as
typical of the initiative which was perhaps the most
characteristic feature of the behaviour of the tank and
file throughout the action, and which helped to make
the ]3attle of ]3ellenglise, which, like the ]3attle of Inker-
man in the Crimean War, was essentially a soldier's battle,
such a marked success.
Private H. Mosley, of the I/2nd North Midland Field
Ambulance, together with Private H. George of the same
unit, were attached to the I/sth Leicesters and followed
them up closely in their advance. They then round a
wounded infantryman, dressed him, and, having no
stretchers with them, they took waterproof sheets from
four German prisoners and ruade them carry the case,
intending to make for the Advanced Dressing Station at
Jeancourt.
On the way down, groans were heard from a dug-out,
so Mosley went down and round six wounded Germans,
who gave him to understand that our men had thrown
a bomb into the dug-out. The two men dressed the
Germans, and, taking waterproof sheets from a further
twelve prisoners, they made up rough stretchers and
forced these men to carry their wounded comrades.
64 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
They then carried on towards the A.D.S., but came
across a tank which had been knocked out and from
which they drew a wounded officer and two wounded
men, whose wounds they dressed, and then made pris-
oners carry them also.
Near the St. Quentin Canal, the party had to take cover
for some time owing to the intense shelling, and during
this time three more of the prisoners were wounded.
When again able to go forward, another party of twenty
Germans was requisitioned and made to take their turn
at carrying the patients.
On arrival at the Bellenglise Tunnel, Private lIosley
then round four of our own wounded men and six wounded
Germans. He therefore foraged around and discovered
a party of thirty more German prisoners, dressed the
wounded, improvised stretchers in the saine manner as
before and once more resumed the road to the dressing-
station, which was reached without incident and without
further addition to the convoy. This now consisted
of twenty stretcher cases and seventy-five unwounded
prisoners; quite a large enough command for two full
privates of the British Army, and one which proved a
source of some embarrassment to the British Field Am-
bulance attached to the Americans, to whom the command
was handed over. A rolling stone may not gather moss,
but on this occasion the wandering R.A.M.C. private
acted rather on the pfinciple of the snowball rolling down-
hill through fresh snow, and managed to collect as many
prisoners as are normally captured as the result of a
successful action of some size. The fact that no attempt
at escape was made is a significant comment on the
moral of the German prisoners generally, who in all cases
showed a marked desire to reach the British cages.
Meanwhile Divisional Headquarters were anxiously
THE BATIE OF BEIIEBIGIISE 65
awaiting some definite news of success, although ail
rumours pointed that vay. The G.O.C. was, however,
quite confident that once the Staffords crossed the Canal,
he could rely on ther being resolutely and closely sup-
ported by the Sherwood Foresters, Lincolns, and Leices-
ters. Every oflïcer and man knew the task ahead and
few orders were needed. There was no thought of failure,
and every battalion of the Division backed up closely
like the merbers of a trained football team.
Af about nine o'clock the welcome news ,vas received
from General Campbell that his left and centre battalions
had crossed the Canal, though there was no definite news
from the right battalion. Iater a message came in from
Lieutenant Reid, R.F.A., cormanding the Divisional
Mounted Detachment, that a wounded sergeant had
ported definitely that the 8th Sherwoods vere crossing
the Canal.
It was enough. Orders were instantly issued for the
whole Division to press forward to the barrage and to
advance straight on their obiectives.
The Divisional Cormander's confidence in his leaders
was fully iustified, and before the orders reached the
Brigades the troops were already in motion. A great
victory apleared to be in sight.
The whole Division was now definitely launched across
the Canal. On the south, the ist Division had gallantly
and quickly carried through its task of protecting our
flank. From the north reports ,vere at first favourable
but became more disquieting later.
This vas, however, no occasion for thinking about
flanks; a break-through was intended--and break
through we did, holding every yard gained and taking
every inch of our allotted obiectives.
Perhaps at no time durng the battle was better work
66 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
done than the feat performed by the officers and guides
who were responsible for bringing the I38th and I39th
Brigades into position on their forming-up line in time
for the final assault from the Red objective. Both
west and east of the Canal the roads were choked with
the human flotsam and jetsam from the battle, and with
transport and details moving towards the front line. The
fog was as thick as at any rime during the morning, and
on occasion it was difficult to see one's hand before one's
face, while a great portion of the march had to be ruade
over ill-defined tracks, which were difficult enough to
pick out even in moderately clear weather. The compass
had to be relied on almost entirely, and the only help
received was at the vafious bridges over the Canal. Here
Engineer officers with compasses were able to take bear-
ings and to assist such small companies of men as had
been separated from the main column, by giving them the
direction they would have to keep in order to reach their
correct positions in the line. Here again, as in other
phases of the battle, the fog afforded unlimited oppor-
tunities for the exercise of the qualities of leadership on
the part of subordinate commanders, and seldom indeed
did these rail to make the best of a difficult situation.
The new forward move entailed a certain rearrange-
ment of the Artillery, those batteries in position at a
distance from out old front line being now firing at ex-
treme range. To adjust matters, the Brigades moved
forward immediately the Red objective was reached
to positions already selected, where lines of tire had
been previously marked out. The forward more was
carried out most expeditiously, and the Brigades came
into action again and were able to take their part in the
creeping barrage when the advance from the Red line
was commenced after the three hours' halt. Finally v¢hen
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 67
the attack had recommenced, three more Brigades in rear-
ward positions ceased tire, limbered up, and moved across
No Man's Land, taking up positions between out old front
line and the Canal, from which they were able to take
their part in the final protective barrage. One of these
latter Brigades vas heavily shelled and suffered many
casualties, and the personnel was withdrawn from the
guns for a short rime until the worst of the shelling was
over.
During the pause between the two phases of the attack,
the Engineers of the Division were engaged mainly in
superintending the work on forward roads, both west
and east of the Canal, and in repairing existing bridges
over the Canal. In particular, it was discovered that the
stout concrete data, already mentioned as having been
utilized by the Infantry of the x37th Brigade in crossing
the Canal, might easily be repaired and adapted to take
horsed transport, so with praiseworthy initiative Lieu-
tenant T. H. Midgley, of the 466th Field Company, who
had already distinguished himself by his dash during the
attack on the Canal, at once set his men to this work.
The bridges were repaired or adapted by the eafly
afternoon, and, at 3 p.m., field guns and horsed transport
commenced to cross the Canal.
The sections attached to the I37th Infantry Brigade
had rendered the Riqueval Bridge serviceable very early in
the day, and had withdrawn the demolition charges from
several other bridges which had been mined by the enemy,
but left by him undestroyed. One N.C.O., Corporal
Openshaw of the 466th Field Company, R.E., was in the
forefront of the attack on one of the German bridges,
personally accounting for a machine-gun nest to the west
of the bridge, bayoneting two of the pioneers who were
guarding it, and receiving the surrender of the third;
68 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
who was able to point out the position of the demolition
charges.
In the meantime, the Engineers of the 32nd Division,
to whom had been handed over all the pontoons and
normal bridging matefial of out own field companies,
were building the pontoon bridges over which their own
transport and artillery was to pass that evening and the
following day.
During the reconnaissance of the Canal bank and the
strengthening of the bridges some 250 of the enemy were
discovered and surrendered to the various parties of the
field companies, and were sent back under escort.
Another piece of useful work carried out during the
afternoon and the following day was the clearing of the
Bellenglise Tunnel. In this tunnel many charges were
round and removed, and, by happy thought, the German
personnel who had been in charge of the electric-light
plant were searched for, discovered, and set to work. The
mechanics then readily divulged the fact that the German
dynamo was connected to a mine, so that the tunnel would
be blown up when the engine was started. From this
admission to the pointing-out of the mine was but a small
step, and the mine was removed and the electric-light
plant set working. This proved to be in perfect order,
so that the remainder of the search within the tunnel,
which incidentally brought to light a certain amount of
valuable and interesting signalling and other stores, was
carried out by the light of a German electric plant worked
by German soldiers.
At ii.2o a.m., the barrage commenced to move forward
from its protective position in front of the Red line,
and the troops of the I38th and I39th Infantry Brigades,
keeping close behind it, advanced towards the line of
trenches which formed the main obstacle on the way to
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 6 9
the next objective. The country over which the fresh
attack was fo take place was of a much more open
nature than that which had been the scene of the exploits
of the Staffords, and the enemy's defences were not
suitably sited for an attack from the direction from which
he was now threatened. Towards the southern limit of
the obiective of the Division the St. Quentin Canal
sweeps round at right angles and runs east and west for
several thousand yards before bending back again in
a south-easterly direction. It was along this portion
of the Canal that the assaulting troops would nov
advance, the Canal itself thus forming a strong defensive
flank. The principal support lines of the Hindenburg
trench system were disposed parallel to the Canal,
and thus ran more or less parallel with the direction of
our advance. They had therefore already been partially
turned, our troops advancing up them instead of in face
of them. The solitary exceptions, and they were excep-
tions which had tobe taken very much into consideration,
were the strong lines of trenches running in front of the
village of Magny-la-Fosse and the defences of the village
of Lehaucourt itself. These were both very strong trench
systems which mutually supported each other, though
both villages might be outflanked by an advance along
the ridge between them.
The advance to the next objective, the first Green line,
which was carried out in the saine fog as the earlier part of
the attack, was, on the left flank, almost without incident,
the Brigade meeting with little determined opposition
and not having to employ the tanks allotted to it.
On the right flank, however, very stout resistance was
experienced from strongly-posted enemy detachments on
the high ground to the north of Bellenglise. Here, the
whole attack was held up bv strong artillery tire from
7 ° THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
the front, while the attacking tr.oops were galled by heavy
machine-gun and rire tire from the right flank. It was
one of those moments when battles are won and lost,
but the man capable of dealing with the situation was
there to meet the emergency. Lieutenant-Colonel B. W.
Vann, I.C., of the x/6th Sherwood Foresters, seeing that
his men were held up and that the barrage was gradually
outstripping them, with a corresponding increase of
enemy resistance, rushed forward to the firing-line,
exposing himself without thought for his own safety.
Running from group to group of his men and encouraging
them with precept and example, he reorganized and led
the whole line forward. By his prompt action and abso-
lute contempt of danger the whole situation was changed,
the men were encouraged, and the line once more swept
forward, catching up with the barrage and proceeding
without further hitch to the Green line. In the final
assault on tbe village of Lehaucourt, this officer again
distinguished himself, rushing the team of a field gun
which was firing at point-blank range. He shot with
his revolver one of the gunners who was on the point
of firing and clubbed two others. The success of the
day, in fact, was in no small degree due to the splendid
gallantry and fine leadership displayed by him.
After passing the first Green objective, the fog com-
menced to clear considerably, and the whole right flank
of the attack was much troubled by the enemy occupying
the high ground fo the south of the Canal. Machine guns
from this direction swept our right flank continuously,
and enemy field guns firing over open sights qtfickly
put out of action all rive tanks allotted to the x39th
Infantry Brigade. This battery was in its turn, how-
ever, put out of action by a small party of our men,
who, with great gallantry and on their own initiative,
LIEUIEXANT-CoLONEL B. \V. VANN, %r.C., I.C., I,'6TH SHER%VOODS.
I'[ILLED IN 2CTION AT IHE I3ATTLE OF lïAMICOURT.
Reprcduced by courte-y of Langfier, Ltd., -"3, Old Bond Street, I, ondon,
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 71
recrossed the Canal and shot or bayoneted the gunners.
Little trouble from infantry was experienced from this
direction, though several feeble counter-attacks were
ruade, one mounted Gel-man otîïcer making three sepa-
rate attempts fo rally his men and continuing his
efforts until well-directed shots killed both himself and
his horse, whereupon the men whom he was trying to
rally immediately retired.
If would appear that here the enemy lost his great
chance to retrieve the fortunes of the day. The Ist
Division Artillery put down a heavy smoke barrage on
this flank, which was intended as a protection against
enemy action as well as cover from observation for
out own troops. In the event the barrage did not prove
thick enough to afford a screen for out movements,
though the fog at first proved an excellent substitute.
Certainly it placed an obstacle in the way of a counter-
attack, but a well-organized counter-offensive, supported
by plenty of reserves and carried through with as much
determination as our troops had shown in the attack,
might have placed the 46th Division in an awkward
position.
The most charitable explanation of the lack of reaction
which was so conspicuous a feature of the enemy's fighting
during the day is that he was pinned down fo his positions
by the demonstrations made by the Ist Division, and was
afraid to involve any considerable number of troops in
case of out attack extending farther fo the south.
The ultimate objective of out advance on the right flank
of the Division included the village of Lehaucourt, and,
in the attack on this village, individual action once more
played a conspicuous part. Lieutenant ]. N. Wightman,
of the I/6th Sherwoods, having reached lais own obiective
and taken several machine guns, two trench mortars
7 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
and two field guns at small cost, led his men forward and
pushed right through the village. In spite of opposition
he managed to secure the bridge across the Canal, and
succeeded in cutting off many prisoners and putting
several guns out of action. He then organized his com-
pany for defence and retained his hold on the village
until the arrival of the support companies, when the
whole body moved forward and occupied the line of
the final objective.
On the left of the attack the I38th Infantry Brigade,
advancing from the first Green line, was faced by the
strong trench system in front of the village of Magny-la-
Fosse, beyond which was a sunken road strongly organized
for defence with numerous machine-gun posts. In the
capture of this line the tanks of the Brigade played an
important part, cutting broad swathes through the wire
entanglements, which here had been very little damaged
by our artillery tire. Wheeling after their passage
through the wire, the tanks then proceeded northward
along the line of the trench and sunken road, enfilading
them and giving the crews of the machine guns such
a bad rime that they fell comparatively easy victims to
the Infantry pouring through the gaps in the wire. The
tanks, closely followed by the Infantry, then advanced
towards the village, and, after a little street fighting, the
resistance of the enemy garrison was overcome. At
I.I5 p.m. the battalion in question, the 5th Lincolns,
reached its objective and reorganized, throwing out a
screen of Lewis-gun posts, behind which the line was
quickly consolidated. In the meantime, the 5th Leicesters,
following the L.incolns, reached Knobkerry Ridge by
12 noon and halted there, while company commanders,
in consultation with the commanders of the tanks attached
to them, made their plans for the attack on the final
,-IAJOR-GENERAL G. F. ]3OYD, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.M.,
G.O.C. 46Ia DIVlSlOI
Reproduced by courtesy of H. X$ airer Burnett & Co.. Ltd., 12. Knightsbridge,
Hyde Park Crner, S.XV.
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 73
objective. At 12.35 p.m., the battalion halted immedi-
ately behind the Dotted Blue line, and at 1.4o p.m.,
passing through the Lincolns, moved steadily forward to
the capture of the second Green line, which was reached
about 2 p.m. The work of consolidation was commenced
at once, and at 3 p.m. touch was gained with the I39th
Infantry Brigade on the right flank.
At I p.m. the Divisional Commander rode to the
battlefield fo congratulate the Brigadiers. The mist
by then had completely cleared and the sight was one
for which every commander worth the naine had lived
during the long years of the war.
As far as the eye could see, our troops were pushing
forward; batteries were crossing the Canal and coming
into action ; Engineers everywhere were at work ; large
bodies of prisoners were coming in from all sides; and
the men of the 32nd Division were advancing fast. The
enemy were shelling the line of the Canal and Bellenglise,
but no one seemed to mind.
It was indeed a break-through.
Thus the battle ended early in the afternoon with the
complete attainment of all objectives, and, af 5.30 p.m.,
the advanced troops of the 32nd Division passed through
our front line in pursuit of the retreating enemy.
During the following night, however, the Division was
continuously in action, as both flanks were exposed to
the enemy. On the morning of the 3oth September, the
situation was eased through the capture of Thorigny and
Talana Hill by the Ist Division, while, during the day, the
2nd Australian Division on our left also moved forward.
Towards evening, both Divisions having established touch
with the 32nd Division in front of us, the 46th Division
was squeezed out of the line, and all three Brigades were
withdravn for a vell-earned rest.
74 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
The cause of the signal defeat of the enemy in the
Battle of Bellenglise was, first and foremost, undoubtedly
the fine bearing and splendid determination, of the
Infantry engaged. Superbly led, the troops at every
turn did justice to their leaders. Other conducing causes,
however, were the magnificent support given to the
assaulting troops by the Artillery, and the opportune
fog which completely shrouded all mo.vernent from
observation by the enerny, nullifying to a great extent
the preparations for defence, which were based on the
existence of a clear and cornparatively open field of tire
for his enfilading machine guns.
As regards the work of the Artillery, itis difficult to
find words to describe its excellence. To those of us
who had the opportunity of subsequently examining the
battlefield, the state of the enerny defences after the
preparatory work of the heavy guns was a revelation of
what heavy artillery could do. The Field Artillery, in
spire of the fact that most of the guns were in " silent "
positions and had not registered, fired a barrage which
was one of the finest under which troops have ever
advanced during the war. No cases of short shooting
were reported, and the Infantry throughout rnoved with
a confidence which was fully justified. During the action
the rnajority of the batteries moved forward into new
positions which had been selected in advance, but, so
expedifiously were the rnoves carried out and so well
had they been planned, that they ruade little appreciable
difference to the intensity of the barrage.
The enerny's footing on the west side of the Canal was
a feature which might have been invaluable to him had
he contemplated offensive action, yet proved in the event
to be very largely the cause of his downfall. He was
obliged to keep several of his bridges intact in order to
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE. 75
supply and reinforce his men on the west side of the
Canal, and it was over these bridges that the main body
of the x37th InIantry Brigade eventually poured to the
attack of the defences on the east bank.
If he had realized the magnitude of the pro]ected attack
and had retired over the Canal in good rime, destroying
his bridges behind him, there is little doubt that out
casualties would have been immensely greater. Indeed,
the attack might conceivably have failed, though in view of
the satisfactory weather conditions the latter is unlikely.
A feature of the German resistance was the com-
paratively small amount of artillery retaliation. A strong
barrage Iell on our old Iront line airer the troops had leIt
it, and the range was shortened in rime to cause us con-
siderable casualties beIore the leading Brigade had crossed
the Canal. Such obvious places as Ascension Valley and
other depressions behind our fine, where concentration
might bave been expected, were also heavily punished
throughout the morning, until the enemy was compelled
by our success to remove his guns in order to avoid their
capture, and had lost those guns he had Iailed to remove.
The Iailure of the enemy's artillery to give a good ac-
count of itselI must also be attributed to the Iog. Had
observation been possible, tire could have been directed
on our marching columns and transport, and the 38th
and I39th InIantry Brigades in particular must have
suffered heavy casualties while advancing to their Iorming-
up position on the Red line. The saine cause probably
accounted for the slight use ruade by the enemy of his
heavy artillery. All his firing in the early morning at
such targets as Bellenglise Bridge, Bellenglise itself, and
La Baraque had to be donc by the map. When the Iog
cleared later in the day, he must have been Ieeling
very doubtIul regarding the safety of his guns, and was
7 6 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
no doubt engaged in moving a large proportion of them
to positions Iurther back.
It is difficult to estimate how far the Iog which played
such a decisive part in the winning of the battle was due
to natural causes, and how far to the general effect of
the bombardment, and in particular to the proportion
of smoke shell fired in the barrage. Undoubtedlv the
latter tended to thicken the Iog considerably, but a heavy
and persistent mist in the early morning is one of the
features of the weather of Northern Europe in the neigh-
bourhood of open water at this particular period of the
year. It is likely that the possibility of the occurrence
of such a mist had been taken into consideration when
plans for the attack were ruade. In any case, conditions
could not have been more Iavourable.
The enemy had based his defence almost entirely on a
cunningly-devised system of machine-gun emplacements
arranged to enfilade the Canal and, where possible, the
ground west of the Canal. From concrete emplacements
approached from behind through winding entrances
and with roomy dug-outs beneath them, the '« Boche"
machine-gunners could sit in comfort with a good store
of ammunition, water, and food, and rake the Canal in
both directions without the slightest trouble and with
very little danger to themselves. Nothing short of a
direct hit from a heavy shell would have ruade an im-
pression on many of these small forts--for they were
nothing else--and, theoretically, in clear weather, the
passage of the Canal should have been pretty well an
impossibility. Nothing is more significant, therefore,
than the fact that as one strolls along the banks of the
St. Quentin Canal one can see emplacement after em-
placement, immensely strong, well-sited and undamaged
by our artillery tire. Yet the occupants of these
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 77
fortresses have long ago gone either to swell the death-
roll of Germany, or to add to the number of German
prisoners who are working behind out lines.
The extraordinary features of the defensive scheme on
out immediate front and on out left flank were un-
doubtedly the Bellenglise and Bellicourt Tunnels. The
latter was simply a cunningly-adapted tunnel of civilian
origin, where the Canal for some three toiles passes
through a subterranean cutting. The only local interest
this tunnel held was due to the reported discovery within
it of a series of cauldrons, one of which contained a dead
German, and which were said to be the outward and
visible sign of the presence of a plant for rendefing
down the bodies of German soldiers--a " Kadaver-
verwendungsanstalt " in fact. A close examination of
the cauldrons, however, shows nothing to uphold this
view, and it is much more likely--indeed practically
certain--that the cauldrons were used for disinfecting
soldiers' clothes or some equally legitimate purpose.
Far more interesting from a military point of view
is the Bellenglise Tunnel, which is probably the best
existing monument of that painstaking thoroughness
which is the chier facial characteristic of the " Boche."
This huge artificial dug-out, the spoil-heap of which
has hall buried the village of Bellenglise, and which
must have taken many months of effort and endless
labour to complete, is an excellent example of the futility
of a great part of the human effort the sum of which
goes to make up modern war. The pride of the German
Engineers' hearts, it was destined to serve merely as a
shelter for several hundred demoralized soldiers, who
remained safely ensconced within it until, on the arrival
of a small party of out men, they delivered themselves
up, glad to be finished with the war.
78 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
Both of these tunnels were capable of housing several
thousands of men, and were absolutely sale assembly-
places where the enemy could laugh at the worst efforts
of out artillery. For offensive operations they would
have been invaluable reservoirs, but for the defence of
the Canal they were too close to the front line to be ideal.
The fog and the indomitable perseverance with which
out men kept up with the barrage and so prevented
the egress of these reserves, caused the Bellenglise
Tunnel fo become simply a means of swelling the tale
of prisoners captured by out leading Brigade. Thus
was the work of two years neutralized and more than
neutralized in three or four hours. By the next day the
victors themselves were snugly housed in the tunnel,
lighted bfilliantly by a Boche electric plant tended by
Boche electficians, sale from the raids of German aero-
planes, and doubly safe from the shells from the Geïman
heavy guns which were at that time again making
Bellenglise and La Baraque their principal targets.
Four thousand two hundred prisoners and seventy
guns, at a cost of rather under 800 casualties--such was
the record the 46th Division had to its credit on the night
of the 29th September. The effect on the moral of the
enemy was to be displayed in the days that were to
corne. Never again would his Infantry fight confident
in the idea that, if the worst happened, they had behind
them an impregnable line on which fo fall back and re-
organize. They knew--and we knew--that, whatever the
German papers might say, there could be no line to corne
like the Hindenburg Line, which had taken two years fo
make and on which all the resources of German military
engineering and an immense amount of money and labour
had been expended.
The breaking of the Hindenburg Line marked a definite
THE BATTLE OF BELLENGLISE 79
stage in the history of the war, for it opened the way
to a war of movement which could only end in one way.
The 46th Division had done its share. Next day we were
to learn that, simultaneously, the line had been broken
along the whole front on which it had been attacked by
the First, Third, and Fourth British Armies; with it
was broken the backbone of German resistance and the
faith of the German people in the power of the German
Army. In this connection a quotation from the column
"' Through German Eyes" in The Times of December x x th
is significant, and emphasizes, as nothing else has done,
the importance of the action in which the 46th Division
played a conspicuous part. There Professor Hans
Delbriick--a German of the Germans--writes :--
" The turn in our fortunes began with the collapse
of our attack on Rheims and the successful advance
of the French north of the Marne. According to
certain observations which had been communicated
to me, Ludendorff had then already become very
uncertain at heart. Nevertheless he and Herr von
Hintze during the next nine weeks did nothing to
ease our position politically--until on September the
29th Ludendorff collapsed and completed our defeat
by the offer of an armistice."
The 46th Division, in spite of many changes since it
had arrived in France in 9 IS,was still essentially a" Terri-
torial " Division in the fullest and greatest sense of the
word. Nothing could exceed the wave of feeling and
pride which swept across the North Midland Counties on
the receipt of news of this--one of the greatest achieve-
ments of the war--for which their own Division was
responsible.
80 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
Dozens of congratulatory messages were received from
individuals and flore institutions personally interested
in the exploit of the men of their own counties, who were
engaged in making history and in creating traditions to up-
lift the hearts of those who should corne after them, while
setting a standard for future " Territorials '" to strive to
equal. Such messages, republished in Divisional Orders
and read by all the troops, could not rail to intensify an
ardour and raise a moral, already well above the average.
Perhaps the message which most touched the hearts and
steeled the nerves of men who not so long ago themselves
had thronged the playing-grounds and class-rooms of Mid-
land schools, was one from the Mayor of Buxton, worthy
of record in its intimate appeal :--
"Two thousand boys and girls from Buxton
schools, Derbyshire, assembled in the Market Place
to-day and saluted the Union Jack in honour of the
glorious deeds of the 46th Division. They thank
you for ail you have done for them, send their love,
and pray God to bless you all."
PART II
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT
CHAPTER IV
TItE VICTORY AT RAMICOURT
IF Bellenglise is the name which is destined to be for
ever remembered by ail ranks of the 46th Division in
connection with the most dramatic of the victories which
was placed to their credit during the glorious autumn
of 1918, still the Battle of Ramicourt, fought and won
on the 3rd October, vill take its place in the annals of
the Division as the action in which, beyond all others,
superior numbers of the enemy vere thoroughly beaten
in stout, straightforward fighting, on the part of the tank
and file of the Infantry, inspired by the gallant leading
of their officers.
On this occasion there was no such providential fog
as that to which in great measure was due the successful
breaching of the Hindenburg Line at its strongest point.
At Ramicourt the 46th Division met, on more equal
terms, and defeated in a pitched battle by stark and
straight fighting, the 24Ist, 22ISt, II9th, and 34th
Divisions of the German Army. True, some of these
Divisions had lately been withdrawn from other fronts
and were still worn out with their previous great ordeal,
but the 24Ist and 34th, at least, were fresh troops, and,
after all, the 46th Division also had just passed through
82 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
the strain of a most tremendous effort and, though flushed
with well-merited success, the troops were to a certain
extent iaded by their previous efforts.
The Battles of Bellenglise and Ramicourt may be con-
trasted in a single sentence: Bellenglise was a miracle;
Ramicourt was a victory: therein lies the essential
difference between them.
At 5.30 p.m. on the 3oth September the 32nd Division
passed through the 46th Division, who were resting on
their final objective beyond Magny and Lehaucourt, and
advanced, closely supported by British Cavalry, to what
it was trusted would be the last fight the Germans should
make in prepared positions this side of the Sambre-
Oise Canal. The Division, however, met with more
opposition than was expected, and was finally held
up on the general line running between Sequehart (ex-
clusive) and Joncourt (inclusive), while in front of
them the enemy held the ]3eaurevoir-Fonsomme line,
a partially completed but strongly wired system of
trenches. He had also strong forces in Sequehart and
strong posts thrown out everywhere in front of his main
line of resistance right across the front of the Division.
On the leff and right the Australians and Ist Division
were also held, and the waiting Cavalry were forced to
return west of the Canal and give up the attempt to
break through for the present.
It was quite clear that, if the original plan of a break-
through on a large scale was to be carried out, a further
attack would be necessary in order to overrun this last
organized defensive position, which, though much less
strong than the Hindenburg Line itself, was an insuperable
obstacle to Cavalry, and, bravely defended by stout troops,
was likely to give Infantry also a good deal of trouble.
At a Corps Conference held in the afternoon of the 2nd
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 83
October, the G.O.C. 46th Division was instructed to
attack and capture the line Sequehart (exclusive)--
Montbrehain, getting into touch with the 2nd Australian
Division to the north-west of the latter village. At the
same rime the 32nd Division, side-slipping to the right,
was to attack and capture Sequehart, thus protecti_n_g
out right flank.
Readers of this account will remember that the con-
clusion of the Battle of Bellenglise, on the night of the 29th
September, found the 46th Division relieved of pressure on
their front by the 32nd Division, but with both flanks
unprotected. Owing to the exposure of its flanks
the Division remained in action throughout the night,
and it was not until the early hours of the morning that
out right flank was cleared by the occupation of Talana
Hill andThorigny by the Ist Division. Still later the 2nd
Australian Division overcame the resistance of the troops
opposed to them, and, advancing through Etricourt,
joined up with the 32nd Division well to out left front.
This squeezed the 46th Division out of the line altogether,
Divisional Headquarteis iemaining at Small Post Wood,
while the Infantry Brigades concentrated, the 138th
Brigade to the west of the Canal, the 137th Brigade on
the eastern bank of the Canal, with Headquarters and one
battalion in the Bellenglise Tunnel, and the 139th Brigade
also east of the Canal with Headquarters in a dug-out in
the Canal bank. The latter Brigade acted as Divisional
Reserve to the 32nd Division and was placed temporarily
under the orders of the G.O.C. of that Division. Of the
Artillery, rive Brigades--the I6th Army Brigade R.H.A.,
the I4th Army Brigade R.F.A., the 23rd Army Brigade
R.F.A., the I6ISt Army Brigade R.H.A., and the ii8th
Army Brigade R.F.A.--remained in action covering the
84 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
advance of the 32nd Division, while the remaining four--
the 5th Army Brigade R.F.A., the 23Ist and 23oth
Brigades R.F.A., and the 232nd Army Brigade R.F.A.--
withdrew out of action and were placed in reserve to the
west of the Canal.
The Signal Company meanwhile received instructions
to establish a Forward Report Centre at La Baraque,
on the site of what had formerly been a small farm
at the cross-roads 500 yards north-east of Bellenglise.
Here were a number of deep dug-outs and one or two
strong cement shelters which had formerly been the
Headquarters of one of the German formations holding
the main Hindenburg Line east of the Canal. This
Report Centre with the necessary signal office and local
telephone lines to '" G," " Q," and other essential offices
sited in the neighbouring dug-outs, was completed during
the Ist and 2nd October, and communication success-
ftflly established v«ith Corps Headquarters; with all
three Infantry Brigades in their reserve positions; and
with 32nd Division Advanced Report Centre in a dug-
out a few yards distant from the new signal office. At
the saine rime three cable detachments were ordered
up to La Baraque, ready for a move forv«ard in the
event of a break-through, while all the cable which
could be got forward in the rime was also collected
here.
All possible preparations were thus completed to meet
any situation which might arise, either in the event of
the Division being required to pass through the 32nd
Division on a route match through the enemy country, or
to reinforce in the event of the battle going against our
troops. Subsequent events were to demonstrate that this
prevision was to have a decisive bearing on the readiness
of the Division to fight the battle, the plans for which
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 85
were already being conceived in the mind of the Higher
Command.
Af 4.3o p.m., as already stated, the Corps Commander
issued orders personally af a Corps Conference fo the
General Offiçers commanding the Divisions concerned.
These orders had to be considered by the Divisional
Staffs and detailed instructions issued fo the G.O's.C.,
Infantry Brigades, and the O's.C. Artillery Groups, before
any movements of formations, which were much scattered,
could be arranged. The attack was scheduled fo com-
mence af 6.5 a.m. the following morning, so if was
clear from the beginning that no rime must be lost either
in formulating plans, or in carrying them out vhen once
devised, while any hitch in the proceedings, however
small, was likely fo be disastrous. The scope of the
operations was such as fo demand every atom of the
strength of the Division, applied at the right time in
exactly the right place in order to achieve success.
Ramicourt was, in fact, to be that type of operation most
dangerous unless carried out under the orders of an
extremely efficient Staff by competent subordinates--an
impromptu battle. If to this is added the fact that
practically all preparation and movement had to be
carried out by night--and a moonless night too, as so
happened--and that the situation on the front held by
the 32nd Division was by no means clear, even to the
Staff of that Division, it will be seen that there was every
chance of the attack going wrong from the start should
any one senior officer prove unequal to the task allotted
him.
The country about the St. Quentin Canal had formed
a slight interruption to the rolling downs to the westward,
but here once again the landscape assumed the same
characteristics. As far as eye could see from the tops
86 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
of the low rounded ridges near the Canal there was no
change. Everywhere were the same gently undulating
features with occasional woods or copses, the whole
seamed by the sunken roads which throughout were
one of the salient characteristics of the country over
which the Division had fought. These sunken roads,
owing fo the shelter and security from observation
afforded by them and the facility with which they could
be organized for defence, were of the greatest importance
from the military point of view. If was along such
roads as tan approximately north and south that
the enemy, after having been pushed out of his last
prepared line, put up his most stubborn defence while
being pressed back over this open country. Other
features of the country which had a certain effect on
military dispositions were the little scarps which existed
along the edges of most of the valleys in the district.
At these points, where the ground rises fo form the
flat-contoured hills, the earth had usually been cut
away to form a little cliff anything from two fo six
or even more feet in height ; the resultant scarp, when
facing in the right direction with regard fo the enemy,
affording shelter from observation. These faces were
usually of sort earth, chalk, or crmbly sandstone, and
were used to a great extent by both combatants, who
burrowed into them and so obtained a certain measure
of security from shell tire af the cost of a minimum
amount of labour. The shelter thus afforded from the
weather conditions was also not to be despised as the
autumn crept on, the nights grew longer, and the tempera-
ture fell lower. Many hundreds ofmen of the 46th Division
will in future days look back with pleasure fo the nights
spent in these little, not uncomfortable, bivouacs after
a hard day's work either fighting or chasing the '" Boche."
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 87
Indeed, it may not be far from true that the best days
of many lives will be those of the autumn of 1918, when
to be alive and well was a thing to be grateful for, and
when the British Army vas at last obtaining a just reward
for ail its dogged and patient fighting.
Little was known of the country over which the coming
battle was to be fought, but, from aeroplane observation
and prisoners' statements, it had been possible to plot
on our maps the system of defence known as the
]3eaurevoir-Fonsomme line where the enemy had turned
at bay, and which the 46th Division was now asked to
breach. On the map, this line appears as a con-
tinuous double line of trenches heavily protected by
two strong barbed-wire entanglements. It was appar-
ently stronger at the western than at the eastern end of
the objective of the Division, where, however, it was
supported by the organized defences of the village of
Sequehart and was overlooked and enfiladed by the
machine guns and artillery on the high ground to the east.
Actually a close examination of the line after its capture
by our troops alters the values of the photographic
representation considerably. Aeroplane photographs will
show a line of trenches well and will betray the chief
strong-points, but the details of a carefully-prepared
system such as the one under present consideration are
not so easily seen. The Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line was
both stronger and weaker than it appeared.
The unexpected strength of the line lay in two prin-
cipal things. The first was the stout heart of the garrison
which held it, properly imbued, as the men were, with a
sense of its importance as the last of the German out-
-lying lines of defence. The second source of strength
was the presence at fifty-yard intervals of strong, well-
constructed concrete shelters, where machine-gun crews
88 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
could obtain immunity from our barrage, fo reappear
immediately it had passed and mow down out attack-
ing Infantry if they lagged behind it. Never had if
been more important for the success of out attack that
the Infantry should keep up with the guns if casualties
and perhaps repulse were to be avoided.
The weakness of the line, on the other hand, consisted
in the fact that its construction had never been com-
pleted. Out success on the 29th September had been
so wholly unexpected that work on the Fonsomme line
had been restricted to the building of the concrete strong-
points, the wiring of entanglements, and the tracing-out
of the lines of trenches to a spade-depth only. " Surely"
--the German Higher Command must have reflected--
"' the ]3ritish cannot take the Hindenburg Line in their
stride. They will attack, as on the Somme, after weeks
of preliminary bombardment, and in the meantime we
shall have plenty of rime to complete the preparation
of further lines behind."
On the contrary, the whir!wind attack on the Canal
proved irresistible and the assault on the Fonsomme
line round the enemy to a certain extent unprepared,
though the line as it was, with rifle pits three or
four feet deep dug by individual defenders, was a
sufficiently formidable obstacle fo tender the success of
an attack doubtful. One feature of the Fonsomme line
as it appears at present is the small extent to which if
has been damaged by artillery. Near the Canal the de-
fences had been smashed into chaos by out heavy artillery,
so that in places it was diflïcult to distinguish the original
plan on which they were built. The Fonsomme line is,
however, practically undamaged : there is not one single
concrete emplacement on the whole of the Divisional
front which has been damaged by artillery tire, while the
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 89
trenches themselves are nearly free from direct hits.
There was, in fact, very little preliminary artillery prepara-
tion for the Ramicourt Battle; what little work the
" heavies " did carry out being confined chiefly to the
villages and such dominant features as Doon Hill and
Copse, where enemy artillery was active during the later
stages of the battle.
Besides the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line, the main
obstacles to be overcome in the area scheduled for
attack by the 46th Division were the villages of
Ramicourt and Montbrehain, lesser obstacles being the
networks of sunken roads lying around Neville's Cross
and Ramicourt Station, together with the Beaurevoir-
Montbrehain railway-line which tan transversely across
the Divisional front, forming a strong convex outer defence
line fo Montbrehain.
The country between these strong-points was, as already
stated, open and undulating, but it was unfortunate
that the dominating features--hills slightly above the
average in height--were on the extreme right flank of
the Divisional objective. These ridges, Mannequin Hill
and Doon Hill, were to play a decisive part in the
enemy's resistance, particulafly in assisting his strong
counter-attacks towards the end of the day. Both
from Mannequin Hill and Doon Hill, artillery and
machine guns could tire with direct observation on the
greater part of the country attacked, so that the guns
on these hills caused considerable casualties long after
the Infantry resistance had been overcome. Our troops
were thus forced, for the sake of shelter, fo take up
positions with inferior opportunities for observation,
and the enemy in his counter-attacks was able to infiltrate
into out positions from one direction and another without
much opposition. Towards the end of the day, the
9 ° THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
position had become very obscure indeed, and had to be
cleared up, on one portion of our front at any rate, by a
retreat to positions well behind those held by us at the
conclusion of the morning's attack.
When the orders for attack were received from the
IX Corps, the situation on the front held by the 32nd
Division was anything but clear, and reliable information
could not be obtained as to the exact position of out own
front-line troops and those of the enemy. It was decided,
therefore, to attack from a line some distance behind
out reported front fine, in order to make certain that
the forming-up of out troops should not be interfered
with by contact with enemy patrols. The selection of a
forming-up line which could be located and on which
the troops could be disposed in the darkness of the early
morning might have been a matter of extreme difficulty.
The problem was in this instance solved, however, by
the presence of the Joncourt-Sequehart Road, a well-
marked feature running parallel to the whole front of
attack and, providentially, only a few hundred yards
in front of the line held by the enemy. Guides from
all units were therefore selected, shown the road and
the approaches toit, and sent back to lead their units to
their appointed places on this line. The actual forming-up
line was taped out some 200 yards in front of this road
and approximately parallel toit.
"fo allow latitude for any possible short shooting or
incorrect disposition of the attacking troops, the initial
barrage line was laid down some 200 yards in advance
of the forming-up line. Here it was to wait six minutes
before lifting, in order to permit the Infantry to redis-
tribute themselves under its shelter belote moving
forward against the first objective.
Perhaps the arm most affected by the shortness of
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 91
notice before the attack was the Artillëry. The C.R.A.
46th Division had under his command nine Brigades of
Horse and Field Artillery, and with this force he was
ordered fo cover the front of attack of both the 46th and
32nd Divisions. Of these Brigades, rive were already in
position, and the tire from these rive was arranged so as
to cover the whole frbnt of the attack, the tire from the
remaining four, which had to move forward, being super-
imposed upon the barrage laid down by the former.
Thus, in the event of the failure of these other Brigades
to corne into action in time, a failure which had to be
reckoned vith and which might, under adverse circum-
stances, have been unavoidable, there would be no gaps
in the barrage, and the troops, though insufiïciently
supported, could have advanced to rime with a fair
prospect of success.
Instructions were at once sent out to ail Brigade
Commanders to reconnojtre positions well east of the
Canal within 2,000 yards of the front line, and to
make the necessary arrangements to get their batteries
in line and their ammunition dumped ready to open tire
on the initial barrage line at zero hour if possible, or as
soon afterwards ,-t they could manage.
In this connection it may be interesting to the civilian
reader to have some account of the special difiïculties
of the Artillery under circumstances such as those we
are considering. To deal with a particular case, the
officer commanding any one of the nine Artillery groups
covering the Division in the Battle of Ramicourt
received his orders about one hour before dark. His
preparafions had fo be completed and his batteries
ready for action by 6.5 a.m. the following day.
Positions must be reconnoitred, horses must be brought
up from the wagon lines, guns must be got into posi-
9 - THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
tion, telephone lines must be laid from Brigade Head-
quarters to batteries, barrage tables must be prepared,
and ammunition brought up and dumped handy to the
guns.
The group commander, taking his battery com-
manders with him, proceeds direct to the area allotted to
him, and arrives with hall an hour of daylight remaining
in which to choose his headquarters and the battery
positions.
Battery positions must of course be chosen so that
they are not under direct observation of the enemy.
Precautions must also be taken to ensure that the guns
can clear the crest in front of them and have a clear line
of tire to engage the targets assigned to them.
The exact positions of the enemy are not known with
any certainty. A moment's thought will suflîce to show
that the diflïculties of choosing in such short rime suitable
positions for four batteries, in unknown country, with
the situation obscure and the light failing, are all but
insuperable. When, in spire of circumstances, battery
positions bave been selected and a Brigade Head-
quarters chosen, oflîcers are sent back to bring the guns
into position.
The oflîcers sent back bave had little chance of studying
the country, and if is by now a pitch-black night. "fhe
roads are crowded with traflïc, tracks are deep in mud
and broken-up every few yards by deep shell-craters.
Every yard of the way there is imminent danger of
gun or wagon falling headlong into a hole from which
it would take hours to retrieve them. When the posi-
tions are finally reached, the guns must be manoeuvred
over shell-torn ground into the precise sites selected for
them.
Meanwhile, the Brigade Staft, sitting in a hole in a
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 93
bank, must get out their orders, and the battery com-
manders sitting in shell-holes must work out, by fitful
candle-light, their barrage tables. A telephone exchange
must be established at Brigade Headquarters and some
mlles of telephone lines laid to batteries.
All this must take place in absolute darkness, working
every minute against rime, while the enemy is scattering
gas shells over the whole area. It needs little imagina-
tion, therefore, to realize the immense difficulties and the
thousand chances that fate may oppose to the achieve-
ment of the result aimed at.
The fact that good positions were selected and all
Brigades, except the 232nd Army Field Artillery Brigade,
were able to open tire up to rime reflects the greatest
credit on the energy and good leadership of the com-
manding officers, and on the zeal with which their orders
were carried out by all subordinate officers and by the
tank and file of the Brigades.
The Brigade above mentioned was ata considerable
distance from Divisional Headquarters and was not at
the rime in communication with the latter by telephone.
Orders did not, therefore, reach its commander until very
late, and at zero hour this Brigade was still moving,
though it came into action shortly afterwards.
The barrage tobe fired by the Field Artillery was
naturally of a somewhat impromptu nature, as no
rime was available for the issue of elaborate rime-tables
and barrage maps. Everything possible was done, how-
ever, to ensure accurate firing, and the precaution referred
to above, that of throwing the initial barrage some distance
in front of the Infantry, enabled the latter to conform
to any slight irregularities. The reports of all ranks who
advanced under it, indeed, show that, thouih there was
slightly more short shooting than usual, the barrage as
94 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
a whole was regular and adequate, so that the ïnfantry
were able to advance behind it with confidence.
The rôle of the Heavy ArtiLlery during the present
battle was a very subordinate one when compared with the
part played by if in the attack on Bellenglise. Good work
was, however, done, both by the 6-inch howitzers which
fired in front of the barrage, and by the 6o-pounders and
heavier guns which bombarded Sequehart, Ramicourt,
and Montbrehain, together with the main approaches to,
and commanding features in, the area attacked.
The problem of signal communications in such a battle
as that projected was no small one. Very fortunately,
the establishment of an Advanced Report Centre at La
Baraque provided the skeleton of a system, the details
of which might be, and were, fiLled in at short notice
under difficult circumstances. The O.C.R.A. Signals
was faced with the problem of discovering from Brigade
commanders the positions which they were selecting
for their new Headquarters, and anticipating their require-
ments by connecting these Headquarters by telephone
with Advanced Division. This had tobe done for nine
Brigades, and, in most cases, the lines tobe laid were two
or three mlles in length. It was fortunate, indeed, that
rive of these Brigades were already connected to the 32nd
Divisional Report Centre at La Baraque itself, so that a
short strip of poled cable 2oo or 30o yards in length was
sufficient to connect the two arteries together and to
assure temporary communication with the greater part
of the Artillery. For the test, cable detachments worked
all night despite darkness and a sporadic bombardment
by gas shells which was responsible for several slight
casualties. On more than one occasion lines were cut
as they were being laid and, in particular, the village of
Joncourt proved so unpleasant that the route to the
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 95
Divisional Observation Officer had finally fo avoid
that place. Both horses and men of the cable detach-
ment had worked ail the previous day and, during the
preparations for the Battle of Bellenglise, had had a
gruelling time. Nothing daunted, however, by previous
work or present danger, ai1 ranks persevered, and by
morning, when six o'clock brought us fo within rive
minutes of zero bout, the last line--that to the Australian
Division on out left flank--was through, and both Flank
Divisions, ail the Infantry Brigades (both front and rear
Headquarters), and eight Artiilery Brigades were in touch
with Divisional Headquarters by telephone. When the
Divisional Commander and C.R.A. arrived and the battle
began, they were able to control the whole situation from
a central point, where they could each consult the other
as Artillery support was needed or Infantry dispositions
were changed. Good communication is essential in
modern warfare where the opposing armies are far-flung
over many mlles of country, and at Ramicourt, under
circumstances as adverse as they well could be, the
46th Signal Company justified itself to the last man.
Day broke and showed a strong and easily-maintained
cable network, with both telegraph and telephone com-
munication to ail Headquarters, this being duplicated
by complete visual and wireless systems which, however,
were not used to any great extent because the lines held
up so well.
Cavalry, Engineers, and Artiilery, all play their essential
parts in modern war, and, to understand the battle, a
discussion of the necessary preparations which make in
so great measure for success or failure is essential. Yet,
when once the description of the battle itself is reached,
it is the Infantry (the P.B.I. as they delight to call them-
selves) who must perforce--and of right--take up the
96 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
greater proportion of out interest and attention. Battles
can be won---true, at tremendous cost--.with little or
no artillery preparation, and with little or no assistance
from Cavalry or Engineers. This was proved for ever
in the early days of the war on the Eastern front, where
the masses of ill-armed and ill-equipped Russian soldiery
were driven to their death, yes, and to victory, against
the best-equipped army in Europe. Without Infantry,
on the other hand, no amount of artillery or other prepara-
tion can lead to any capture of territory, or to the destruc-
tion of an opposing my. So, at Ramicourt, while the
Artillery and Signals played an important part in the
victory, itis to the Infantry we must turn to find the
driving-force which out-fought the German Divisions
opposed to us and registered another victory on the
already long list to the credit of the British Armies.
The match of the I nfantry to the forming-up positions
was carried out in the pitch blackness of a very dark
night and over unfamiliar countly. Despite this, how-
ever, no hesitation or trouble occurred, and the forming-
up line was reached in good rime. By this rime, the first
glimmer of dawn made it possible for officers to locate
their positions and forming-up was carried out without
difficulty by means of the taped line, or on compass
bearings, all front-line battalions deploying on the agreed
positions 200 yards behind the barrage line. Enemy
artillery was normally active during this period, paying
particular attention to Lehaucourt Valley, and, while
waiting for the barrage to open, the I/6th South Staffords
were unfortunate enough to lose an officer and six men
by a direct hit from a shell.
The Infantry of the Division were attacking on a two-
Brigade front with the I39th Infantry Brigade on the
left and the I37th Infantry Brigade on the right, the
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 97
I38th Infantry Brigade being in Divisional Reserve
round about Magny-la-Fosse and the St. Quentin Canal.
Attached to the latter Brigade were the I/xst Monmouths,
who were ordered to concentrate in and about Springbok
Valley.
Dawn broke with a heavy fog as on the day of the
Bellenglise Battle, but on this occasion the mist thinned
rapidly, and when the barrage opened and the men
sprang forward at 6.5 a.m., the fog was clearing with
every prospect of a fine day to follow. Flushed with
their previous success, otîïcers and men leaped to their
feet and thrust forward to conform to the barrage, which
stood before them, a thundering wall of smoke and
pulverized earth, interposing between them and the enemy
a friendly, if highly dangerous, veil of invisibility.
Before them, for six long minutes, the line of bursting
shells stood still, then, with the Infantry behind it, com-
menced to move steadily forward, and the conquest of
the last German main line of resistance was begun.
Behind the Infantry rumbled the tanks, of which one
company was again attached to each fighting Brigade,
and whose duties vere the destruction of the barbed-
wire entanglements which formed the chier physical
obstacle in the path of our advance.
The tasks of the two Brigades in the front line were
essentially different. The Left Brigade (I39th Infantry
Brigade) had a straightforvard if ditîïcult task allotted
to it-the task of advancing against the Fonsomme
line at its strongest point and then overrunning and
mopping up in succession the villages of Ramicourt and
Montbrehain. From the first, the attack met with strong
resistance, the German troops inthe Fonsomme line putting
up a very stout fight indeed. There had been no prelimin-
ary bombardment, and paths through the wire had to be
7
98 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
ploughed by the tanks. The Infantry, pouring through
these gaps, or making their way independently through
the wire belts, then rushed the trenches with the bayonet,
carrying all before them, and utterly destroying the
garrison, who, to do them justice, ruade no attempt to
escape their rate by flight. If is estimated that practically
the whole garrison of this line was wiped out, between
15o and 200 German bodies being round after the battle
in the trenches on the front attacked by the I39th Brigade
alone. Immediately in rear of the Fonsomme line, more
stiff fighting was experienced. Here enemy machine-gun
sections were dug in in isolated gun-pits which were very
difficult indeed to deal with.
If was in the attack on such posts that Sergeant W. H.
Johnson of the I/5th Sherwoods well earned the Victoria
Cross which was later bestowed upon him. This N.C.O.,
when his platoon was held up by such a nest of enemy
machine g-uns, worked his way forward single-handed
under very heavy rifle and machine-g-un tire and charged
the post, bayoneting several gunners, and capturing the
two machine guns which had been delaying the advance.
During the attack, he was severely wounded by a bomb,
but nevertheless continued fo lead his men forward until,
a similar situation occurring, he again rushed forward
alone and attacked the post. This time, taking a leaf
out of the enemy's book, he ruade his attack with bombs
and, putting both guns out of action, captured the crews,
thus again enabling the troops to advance and preventing
them from falling dangerously far behind the barrage.
Having cleared the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line with
comparatively few casualties to themselves, the Sherwoods
then advanced on the village of Ramicourt, where,
however, the two leading battalions--the 5th and 8th
Sherwood Foresters--apparently lost direction slightly,
SERGEANT W. l-[. JOHNSON, ¥.C., I/sTH SHERWOODS. EHE HERO
OF THE ATTACK ON THE BEAUREVOIR-17ONSOMME LINE
Rcproduced by courtcsy of E. Taylor & .on. 6, Bridge Place, XVorksop.
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 99
spreading out through the northern and southern out-
skirts of the village. Observing this, the O.C. 6th Sher-
wood Foresters, who was in reserve, acted on his own
initiative and pushed his reserve company and Battalion
Headquarters through the village, and commenced to
mop it up. In this task, he was later assisted by the
support companies of the leading battalions. The troops
in Ramicourt, however, in contrast with those encountered
in the line before the village, put up comparatively
little resistance, having been probably demoralized by
the attention paid to the village and its surroundings by
our heavy artillery. "l'he village yielded in ail some 400
prisoners. Shortly after crossing the Fonsomme line,
however, during the clearing of the outlying machine-gun
posts, the attacking battalions suffered severe losses, and
amongst those who fell were two battalion commanders
--Lieutenant-Colonel t3. kV. Vann, V.C., M.C., of the I/6th
Sherwoods, killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel A. Hacking,
M.C., wounded. The latter, however, remained with his
men until the situation had been cleared up and the
attack had passed well east of Ramicourt. Mention
has already been ruade of the extraordinary bravery
and initiative shown by Colonel Vann at the ]3attle of
Bellenglise, bravery which has since been recognized by
the award of a posthumous Victoria Cross, the highest
honour that can be bestowed upon a soldier, and the
greatest mark of respect that can be paid to his memory
should he have fallen in the execution of his duty. This
officer, during the Battle of Ramicourt, showed the same
fine spirit as in the previous action, and his death, while
leading his men forward among the enemy machine-
gun posts beyond the Fonsomme line, was a loss which
was felt throughout the Division in less degree only than
in the battalion he had led so well.
IOO THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
About this period of the action, it became evident
that the Division on the left of the 46th Division was
hot making progress according to rime-table, so, in
order to protect the left flank of the Brigade, the O.C.
8th Sherwood Foresters was directed to despatch two
companies through Wiancourt to form a defensive
flank. This was done and a few prisoners taken.
Thus, with its flank secure, the Brigade was once more
in a position to more forward against the strong bodies
of the enemy who had taken up their position in the
sunken roads and in the railway-cutting at Ramicourt
Station, and who were likely to delay the advance con-
siderably, unless the [nfantry fell upon them while their
resistance was smothered by our barrage, 
At about this period of the advance, the troops also
came under enfilade tire from high groundtothe north-west
of Montbrehain and slightly to the left front of the final
obj ective assigned to the Division. In order to avoid this
galling tire, hedges and sunken roads had to be resorted
to, and the advance in consequence now lost its ordered
nature, the men dribbling forward as occasion served
and taking advantage of every possible bit of shelter.
During the advance to Ramicourt, the tanks allotted
to the Brigade played a subordinate part, but they were
very useful in clearing out isolated machine-gun nests
and, especially, in mopping-up the western outskirts of
Ranficourt, where, however, ail but one were knocked
out. The remaining tank advanced with the Infantry
until immediately south of Montbrehain, when, just belote
reaching the first obiective, it advanced single-handed
against a nest of no less than sixteen machine guns,
killing the whole of the crews of these guns, but being
itself disabled during the fight. From this stage, the
Infantry advanced without further help from tanks.
THE BATTI.E OF RAMICOURT IOX
In spite of strong resistance and fairly heavy casualties,
the sunker, roads at Ramicourt Station were cleared of
the enemy without out men falling behind the barrage,
and, eventually, the whole line formed up on the first ob-
jective, a line running north-west and south-east througb
the southern outskirts of Montbrehain. Here, the barrage
halted for twenty minutes, and, while the fighting troops
were reorganized, success signals were fired, and news
sent back to Divisional Headquarters of the good progress
ruade by the attack. On receipt of this news, the sup-
porting troops under the command of the G.O.C. I38th
Infantry Brigade were ordered to occupy the I3eaurevoir-
Fonsomme line. At the same time, the C.R.A. 46th
Division ordered two batteries from each group to more
forward into the area west of Ramicourt ready to support
any further advance or to assist the Infantry to repulse
any counter-attack which might be launched after they
had reached their final obiective. Meanwhile, the absence
of any support on out left flank had entailed the north-
eastward extension of the defensive flank already pushed
out in the direction of Wiancourt. The greater part of
the 8th Battalion of Sherwood Foresters was therefore
now fully engaged in protecting this flank, and the driving-
power of the Brigade was by so much reduced.
Dufing the attack, as in the attack on Bellenglise, and
subsequent attacks in the more open warfare which was
to follow, the trench mortar batteries attached to each
Brigade, an arm of the Service which (as its naine sug-
gests) was developed dufing trench warfare, had proved
of great use, but were handicapped by their comparative
immobility. Sometimes, it was even round advisable to
use the personnel of the sections as riflemen, and good
value from the men was undoubtedly obtained in this way.
There were many occasions, however, when the guns did
Io2 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
excellent work, either in dealing with unusually stubborn
machine-gun nests, or in the protection of an exposed
flank by overhead tire, and, throughout this and other
actions, all officers, N.C.O.s, and men of these batteries
behaved superbly, whether employed as Infantry or
Artillery. In the attack on Ramicourt, especially, one
officer of the I39th Trench Mortar Battery--Second-
Lieutenant H. Edgson of the I/5th Sherwood Foresters--
greatly distinguished himself. Being determined that
his mortars should play as important a part as possible
in the battle, he showed the greatest perseverance and
gallantry, taking his section of guns up through the heavy
enemy barrage, and succeeding on three occasions in
bringing them into action against the retiring enemy,
causing many casualties amongst them. Later on, when
unable fo keep pace with the advance, he round a company
of Infantry whose officers had all become casualties, so,
taking command, he reorganized the company and led if
forward. During the subsequent advance, losing no
chance of turning his technical knowledge fo advantage,
he showed marked initiative, twice turning a hostile
trench mortar on the enemy--on one occasion, destroying
an enemy machine-gun nest and, on another, dispersing
a party of enemy who were collecting for a local counter-
attack.
The attack from the first objective was resumed by
the 6th Battalion of the Sherwood Foresters immediately
the protective barrage lifted, and, af the start, the fresh
attack met with strong enerny resistance, heavy street
fighting taking place in Montbrehain, particularly in the
area about the cemetery which had been strongly
organized for defence. This latter place was finally
rushed and cleared by a series of locally-organized small
attacks, but it proved impossible to consolidate and hold
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT lO3
the position owing to the heavy machine-gun tire from
the high ground to the north which was strongly held
by the enemy. The village itself also was held in force
and proved very difficult to clear, much sniping and
machine-gun tire being encountered. Officer casualties
in particular were very heavy during the street fighting
at this period of the battle. For some rime the battalion
was, indeed, held up altogether, and the situation was
not made any more easy by the presence of civilians. Of
these, some seventy were round in Ramicourt and Mont-
brehain, some of whom nshed out to give our men
greeting, as they passed to take their share in turning
out the German garrison.
The attack on the village of Montbrehain was carried
out under the command of Major J. A. Shedden, M.C.,
who had taken command of the i/6th Sherwood Foresters
after Colonel Vann had been killed in action, and if was
fo his personal example that the success of the attack
was very largely due, as it was on his battalion, up fo the
present, the brunt of the fighting had fallen. Now, how-
ever, the 5th and 8th Battalions, having achieved their
objectives and completed the formation of a defensive
flank, sent companies inward fo assist in the mopping-
up of the village. The enemy then, imagining himself
to be outnumbered, lost heart and surrendered freely,
with the result that in a short time the whole of the
village was in out hands, with over I,OOO prisoners in
addition.
One of the principal features of the enemy's defence,
and one which gave out troops most trouble to over-
come, was a battery of field guns snugly ensconced
just to the eastward of the northern outskirts of
the village. These were successfully dealt with by
a company of the I/5th Sherwoods, who, under the
lO 4 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
gallant leading of Lieutenant J. w. Porter, overcame
all opposition and rushed the teams, bayoneting or
shooting those of the gunners who did not either take to
flight or surrender, and capturing ail six guns. This
officer then endeavoured to lead his company eastward
against heavy machine-gun tire and two batteries of
field guns firing over open sights, but was unable to make
progress against the overwhelming oppositionencountered,
and was finally obliged to dig in and consolidate his
position in the eastern outskirts of the village.
The mopping-up of the village of Montbrehain was
completed by 11.3o a.m., and out troops, by that time,
rested practically on the objectives assigned to them in
the plans for the attack. Attempts were then ruade to
push out platoon posts to the high ground on the
north, east, and south-east of the village. The strength
of the Brigade had, however, been seriously depleted
during the advance, and the enemy were in great strength
and well supported by artillery, so that all attempts to
debouch from the village proved abortive. Another
thing which had, of course, led to great dispersion of
strength which otherwise might have suflïced to establish
out hold on the high ground beyond the village, was the
insecurity of both flanks and the consequent necessity
of providing troops to make them sale. The most
advanced post of the Australians lay due east of the
village of Wiancourt, so that the front held by the troops
of the I39th Brigade was twice the length originally
intended. On the left also, although the Sherwoods
were on the inter-brigade boundary, contact could not
be established with the Stafford Brigade, and parties
pushed out to gain touch had been, up to this rime,
unsuccessful. The Staffords, owing to similar trouble
with their right flank, had side-slipped considerably, and
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT lO5
the reserve troops pushed in fo fill the gap had not yet
reached their forward positions.
Thus, twelve noon found out Left Brigade somewhat
precariously established on their final objective, and,
before proceeding fo follow their fortunes further, it fs
necessary fo turn and consider what had happened in
the meantime fo the I37th Infantry Brigade, which was
entrusted with the attack on the right of out front.
While the attack of the I39th Brigade was a straight-
forward assault on a frontage of some 2,000 yards, and
the main difficulties consisted in the overcoming of
enemy resistance in the Fonsomrne line af one of ifs
strongest points and the capture, or envelopment, of the
villages of Ramicourt and Montbrehain, the task of the
I37th Brigade was essentially different.
This Brigade, while attacking on a somewhat narrower
frontage af first, was faced with the necessity of spread-
ing out fanwise, in order fo conform fo the lack of
movement of the 32nd Division on their right flank.
Throughout the action their most difficult problems
were :--(i) the filling-up of gaps due fo this fanwise
increase of their front; (2) their uncertainty about the
village of Sequehart; (3) the avoidance and neutralization
of machine-gun and artil!ery tire from the high ground
of Mannequin Hill, running as if did right across their
front.
Af zero hour, the Brigade moved forward on a two-
battalion front with the I/5th South Staffords in support.
The latter were ordered fo assemble in Lehaucourt Valley.
but, as the enemy barrage fell on the southern slopes of
this valley, they later moved forward fo the high ground
above if and so avoided further casualties.
The first obstacle in the way of the advance of the
I/6th North Staffords, moving on the left of the attack,
xo6 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
was Chataignies Wood, a small copse 300 or 400 yards
square in which all the trees had been cut down
and removed by the Germans, but where the brushwood
af-/orded good concealment for enemy machine gunners
and riflemen. The Staffords opened out on either side
of this wood, two companies going to the right and two
to the left, while a tank fired into it from the front and
engaged the attention of the enemy within it. Once past
it, the right and left halves of the battalion ]oined up
again and moved forward to the attack on the Fonsomme
line, while the support battalion--the I/sth South
Stafords--sent forward a platoon to mop up the wood
and the farm buildings at its north-eastern corner. The
latter proved to be honeycombed with dug-outs which
were subsequently used by us as a Brigade Head-
quarters.
Meanwhile, the right battalion--the I/6th South
Stafords--had met with no opposition until they ad-
vanced against the crest of the hill immediately south
of Chataignies Wood, where considerable resistance
was encountered and overcome, the enemy sufering
severely from our Lewis-gun tire as they retreated down
the valley to the eastward. Following up the retreating
enemy closely, the x/6th South Stafords were again held
up almost immediately by the defences of the south-
ward extension of the Fonsomme line, which runs south-
east towards Fontaine d'Uterte. Here, considerable
trouble was experienced from machine guns hidden in
concrete emplacements, and was not overcome until the
guns had been rushed and the crews bayoneted. The
battalion at this period of its advance sufered considerable
casualties, but pushed on and reached its final objective
on the slopes of Manneqtfin Hill by 8.o a.m. Strong
parfois were pushed forward at once over the top of
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT lO 7
Mannequin Hill; but here the enemy was holding the
crest in force, and the battalion, which had been obliged
to drop companies to its right flank owing to the uncer-
tainty as regards Sequehart, was not in suflïcient strength
to overcome this opposition. The men therefore withdrew
under orders and consolidated in the sunken road on
the near slopes of the hill, where much trouble was ex-
pefienced from enemy snipers and machine guns both
on the crest of the hill and on the high ground east of
Sequehart, which had been recaptured by the Germans
from the 32nd Division.
The necessity for securing the right flank of the Division
had, very naturally, caused the whole Brigade to move
much further fo the right than had been intended in the
original plans, and this caused the formation of a gap
I,ooo yards wide between the left battalion of the I37th
Brigade and the fight flank of the I39th Brigade. This
situation was at once remedied by the O.C. I/Sth South
Staffords, who threw the whole of his remaining forces
into the gap, attacking and carrying the Fonsomme line
on the left of the Brigade sector, and capturing a number
of pfisoners and machine guns. This, however, left the
Brigade entirely without support, until the arrival of
the 5th Leicesters from the Reserve Brigade.
The original left battalion of the Brigade, the I/6th
North Staffords, after enveloping Chataignies Wood,
encountered stiff opposition in the Fonsomme line, where
the bayonet was once more used with great effect. Here,
the men managed to keep up with the barrage, but at
the cross-roads south-east of Ramicourt they were again
held up by machine-gun tire and lost touch with the
Brigade on their left. Later, they gained touch beyond,
only to lose it once again at Neville's Cross, where two
field guns were encountered firing point-blank over open
lO8 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
sights at our advancing line. This obstacle was finally
dealt with by a party of Lewis gunners, who worked
round fo a tank and put the guns out of action. The
battalion, with the exception of a small composite party
of I/6th North Staffords and Sherwood Foresters, now
side-slipped fo the right considerably and, as mentioned
above, the support battalion was pushed in fo fill the
gap thus created.
Meanwhile, this small party of thirty-two men--twenty
of the Staffords and twelve Sherwoods--pressed on to-
wards Doon Mill, which the enemy held in force and from
which he poured a galling tire on the left of the I37th
Brigade and the right of the I39th Brigade. They were,
however, unable to reach their objective, and, finding
themselves out of touch with ail other British troops, they
were obliged fo return fo Neville's Cross and the road
running south from this point. Here, they maintained
their positions for two hours under enfilade machine-gun
tire from Mannequin Hill, which finally forced a retire-
ment fo a line running approximately north and south,
about I,OOO yards south-east of Ramicourt.
Thus, the I37th Infantry Brigade also gained ifs main
objectives fo rime, but, in order fo do so, had absorbed
ail reserve troops into the fighting lit., and was
subsequently obliged to fall back considerably, owing to
heavy enemy tire from the dominating ridges along ifs
front. There appears fo bave been no organized counter-
attack on this portion of the front until late in the day,
but the enemy fought stoutly and isolated posts, strongly
held, prevented our line being established on the crest
of Mannequin Hill and af Doon Mill as was intended, those
parties of our Infantry who did get forward being sub-
jected fo enfilade tire and exposed fo the danger of being
cut off. The open nature of the country, in fact, enabled
THE BA'rTLE OF RAMICOURT
lO 9
the enemy to dominate the situation from the high
ground on which he was able to maintain himself, and
out troops had to be withdrawn into positions where
they could be sheltered from this enfilade tire.
CHAPTER V
ENEMY COUNTER-ATTACKS REPULSEDTHE ADVANCE
TO BOHAIN
ONCE the attack on the St. Quentin Canal and the
Hindenburg Line was an assured success, it became
evident that the front attacked by the 46th and 32nd
Divisions was a likely place for a possible through-break,
in which the conditions of really open warfare might
quickly be established and Cavalry might corne into
their own again. One of the most picturesque features
behind the line, during these days, was undoubtedly
this concentration of Cavalry in our immediate rear.
For some days, every dry-weather track was one long
line of horsemen moving up two by two; all the
roads were crowded with Cavalry transport, and the whole
countryside was covered with their calnps and bivouacs.
Cavalry Corps Headquarters was established at " the
Tumulus," and every preparation for a possible advance
was ruade, the only flaw in the dispositions being that
success would have been more probable had the fore-
most Brigades been camped well to the east instead of to
the west of the Canal.
It was originally intended to push the Cavalry through
after the attack ruade by the 32nd Division on the 3oth
September and Ist October, but, owing to the successful
resistance of the enemy on the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme
line, this idea had to be abandoned, and the advanced
I IO
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT III
Brigade, which had been pushed forward in readiness,
retired again to the west of the St. Quentin Canal.
Now that the Fonsomme line had been breached and it
was known that no organized system of defence |ay in front
of our troops, it seemed that another favourable oppor-
tunity had corne, and word was immediately sent back to
the 5th Cavalry Brigade to advance and exploit our
success. This Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General
N. Haig, C.M.G., and composed of the Scots Greys, i2th
Lancers, and 2oth Hussars, were, however, a considerable
distance behind the line, and some time elapsed befOre
they were able to corne into action, by which rime the
enemy had recovered from their surprise and their
resistance had considerably stiffened. It was then clear
that Cavalry would be unable to dislodge the machine-
gun posts on the high ground beyond out front, and the
Brigade was withdrawn into Divisional Reserve and later
dismounted and used to reinforce the i37th Brigade,
taking up position, together with the 9th Corps Cyclists,
in the Fonsomme line.
At noon, the situation appears to have been as follows:--
The 139th Brigade were holding Montbrehain and their
final objective generally, with a long defensive flank
thrown back in the direction of Wiancourt, and with their
right flank in the air altogether, since touch could not be
obtained with the Stafford Brigade. The latter Brigade,
which had reached its objective early in the morning,
had been forced to fall back and now occupied a line con-
siderably in rear of that held by the 139th Brigade. Of
the supporting Brigade---the 138th Infantry Bfigade---one
battalion (the 4th Leicesters) was now ordered up to
strengthen the left flank of the 139th Brigade, and the
5th Lincolns moved up to take the place of this battalion
in the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line. The remaining battalion
xxz THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
--the 5th Leicesters--was held in reserve to reinforce the
x37th Infantry Brigade should their presence be required.
The first counter-attack of any magnitude took place
on the front held by the x39th Brigade. At xz.3o p.m.,
enemy scouts were observed moving through Champignons
Copse, and these men were followed by troops in artillery
formation. Word of this movement was at once sent
back to the Artillery, but communication between battalion
and brigade was intermittent only, the lines being fre-
quently broken by enemy shells, so that the news did
not reach the Artillery until the counter-attack had
commenced.
Our barrage thus fell behind the Germans, who con-
tinued to advance in waves until they reached the road
running due south from Neville's Cross. From here, the
enemy in small bodies moved on down the sunken road
running south-west from the Cross, and managed to make
their way along this road for some 5o0 yards before
coming under heavy Lewis-gun and rire tire from our
troops east of Ramicourt. Foiled in their advance in
this direction, they next worked up towards iIontbrehain,
and, taking advantage of the cover afforded bythe quarries
south of that village, filtered into the south-west corner
of the village, where they were lost to sight.
In view of this situation and of a report received at
this rime at Brigade Headquarters to the effect that the
enemy was massing for a counter-attack north of Mont-
brehain, the G.O.C. I39th Brigade decided to withdraw
his men from the village itself. Orders were therefore
given for a line to be consolidated south of lIontbrehain,
utilizing the Beaurevoir-lIontbrehain Railway from the
Divisional boundary to 25o yards south of Ramicourt
Station, and thence due south to the line already held by
the x37th Brigade.
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 113
It was only through the energy displayed by both
officers and N.C.O.s that the withdrawal from the bottle-
neck of Montbrehain was carried out without loss, but
the troops were finally extricated from their dangerous
position and took up the line marked out for them,
being reinforced by the 4th Leicesters and the Monmouths,
who were sent up from the Fonsomme line for the
purpose.
This line was held as strongly as possible, and all avail-
able reserves were concentrated in the sunken roads to
the north and south of Ramicourt. The enemy soon
reoccupied Montbrehain and placed Inachine guns on
the western outskirts of the village, but ail his atteinpts
to debouch from the village were stopped by our tire.
During the attack, one section of out own Inachine
guns did very good service with indirect tire against the
advancing enemy. Throughout the day, the coinpanies
of the Machine-Gun t3attalion attached to the attacking
Brigades had been of iininense help, engaging the eneiny's
field guns and his enfilading Inachine g-uns whenever possi-
ble and inflicting numerous casualties. Great initiative
was shown on many occasions by officers colnlnanding
machine-gun sections, and Lieutenant W. H. Hoff, of the
46th Machine-Gun t3attalion, particularly distinguished
himself during a counter-attack, instructing his men to
take up position on a vantage-point behind the retiring
Infantry while himself collecting the Infantry and
leading thein forward to the attack. He thus gained
rime for his men to establish themselves in a command-
ing position, with the result that the counter-attack was
held up.
The enemy's retaliatory tire was much heavier dufing
the counter-attack just described and for the test of the
day. Ramicourt itself, and Montbrehain belote its re-
S
114 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
occupation, were both heavily shelled and all civilians
were evacuated from both villages. As Ramicourt had
become a death-trap, our reserves were distributed round
about it, instead of in the town itself.
The line as now held was maintained intact until the
night of the 3rd/4th October, when, on the extreme left,
out troops were withdrawn from the railway north of
the Montbrehain-Wiancourt Road and disposed along
that road facing northwards in order to deal with a
possible flank attack.
No further counter-attack was marie on the left Brigade,
but, at 6.30 p.m., the enemy appeared fo have advanced
and made a gap in out line on the front held by the
I37th Brigade and to be filtering through this gap.
The advance, however, was not successful. Orders were
sent to the C.R.A., and a barrage put down in front of out
line by both field and heavy artillery. This was main-
tained until the situation was cleared up, out line being
reorganized behind the protection afforded by the guns.
Thus on the evening of the 3rd October the Division held
a line extending from the north-western slopes of Manne-
quin Hill to where the Montbrehain-Sequehart Road
crosses the German light railway between Joncourt
and Montbrehain. From there the line tan to Rami-
court Station, thence along the Beaurevoir Railway to
where the latter crosses the Montbrehain-Wiancourt
Road, and thence along that road to the Divisional
boundary, west of Wiancourt.
On the night of the 3rd/4th October that portion of
the line held by the I39th Brigade was taken over in its
entirety by the I38th Brigade and the Monmouths, and
the former Brigade was withdrawn into Divisional Re-
serve.
During the whole of the 4th October the line was held
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 115
by the Division under continuous pressure from the
enemy, who occupied the high ground all around and
made full use of the opportunities for direct observation
and enfilade fire thus afforded to him.
On the night of the 4th/5th October, however, the
2nd Australian Division took over the left Brigade sector,
and the 3rd Brigade of the st Division was placed at
the disposal of the G.O.C. 46th Division. This Brigade
was used to relieve the I37th Brigade on the right of the
sector, and thus the part played by the troops of the
46th Division in this action was completed.
The fighting throughout the action was of the heaviest
nature and our casualties, particularly in the retreat
from Mannequin Hill and the fighting in and around
Montbrehain, were very high, especially in Offlcers, of
whom over a hundred fell, including rive battalion
commanders. Against this cost, however, has to be set
the breaching of the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line and the
capture of Ramicourt, with, in all, over 2,00o prisoners
and several g-uns, and machine guns too numerous to
count.
The loss of Montbrehain and the slight general with-
drawal towards the close of the day were certainly a set-
back, which cost the Division many officers and men who
could ill be spared, but, considered as a whole, there can
be no question of the decisive nature of the victory
achieved, and this was to be clearly seen in the days
which immediately followed.
As on the occasion of the Battle of Bellenglise, the most
striking feature of both attack and counter-attack was
undoubtedly the high level of moral shown by ail the
tank and file of the Division. Evidence of this moral is
to be seen in all reports. The attacking troops used the
cold steel even more than during the previous assault,
 6 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
and it is estimated that at least 25 per cent. of
the men engaged in the fighting actually fleshed their
bayonets. Certainly, the percentage of enemy dead to
wounded was very high, and in places, as in the ]3eaure-
voir-Fonsomme line and the machine-gun nests behind
it, practically the whole garrison were slain where they
stood. This splendid moral was well reflected in the
behaviour of our wounded, the maiority of whom asked
tobe patched up and to be allowed to return to the
fifing-line.
The moral of the enemy, too, was very much better
in the Battle of Ramicourt than at ]3ellenglise. Not only
did the machine gunners and the artillerymen--who
have always fought stoutly--put up a good fight, but the
Infantry also showed very great determination, especially
in the counter-attacks. These were pressed energetically
and with considerable initiative, small parties steadily
making their way along hedges and sunken roads under
very heavy tire from our men. AI1 the enemy troops
must have been impressed with the importance of the line
they were holding and with the dire results which would
inevitably follow a break-through at this iuncture. His
obiect was to hold on here at any cost, and thus to
ensure a steady retreat to the next river-line. This
object, as the sequel was to show, was in great measure
achieved, though he was compelled to leave behind
much valuable material.
No account of the battle could be considered complete
were reference not ruade to the fine work carried out by
the R.A.M.C. in the attention to and evacuation of the
wounded. An advanced dressing station was estab-
lished in Magny-la-Fosse, and the wounded from the
aid-posts on the geater part of the front were
dealt with expeditiously at that station. The road
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 117
from Levergies to Magny was, however, hopelessly blocked
by a derelict tank, and cases that would normally have
been brought from the left sector of the attack by this
road were, instead, taken direct to the IX Corps main
dressing-station at Vadencourt.
Throughout the action, there was an entire absence o
confusion in the medical arrangements, and evacuation
proceeded smoothly and quickly, over I,OOO men being
dealt with during the fighting. The doctors and staff
worked unremittingly from early in the morning until
late at night. The drivers of the motor-ambulances are
also entitled to a special meed of praise, many of them
working continuously for twenty-four hours on end,
driving at the risk of their lives through areas which
were heavily shelled both with gas and high explosive.
Many casualties occurred in the R.A.M.C. during the
day, and, on the early morning of the 4th October, after
all patients had been evacuated, a high-explosive gas
shell burst at the door of the A.D.S. at Magny and three
oflcers and twenty other ranks were badly gassed. Major
S. S. B. Harrison, in command, continued to perform his
duties, though badly gassed, and visited all posts before
he would permit himself to be evacuated. This very
gallant ofiïcer died of his wound and gas poisoning in the
casualty clearing-station on the Ioth October.
During the attack on Mannequin Hill, Lance-Corporal
Coltman, of the I/6th North Staffords, being in charge of
the stretcher-bearers attached to his unit, earned the
Victoria Cross by conspicuous bravery in the rescue of
badly wounded men. Already the proud possessor of
the Distinguished Conduct Medal and the Military
Medal, in each case with the coveted bar which indicates
that the decoration has been twice won, this N.C.O. has
himsel contributed a brilliant page to the history of the
118 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
Division. During the heavy fighting about Mannequin
Hill, word was brought fo him that three of out men, too
severely wounded fo move, had been left behind when
the battalion retired on account of the overwhelming
enfilade fire from the summit of the hill. On his own
initiative, Lance-Corporal Coltman then went forward
into the valley in which the men had been left and,
under concentrated enemy artillery and machine-gun
tire, succeeded in locating them, dressed their wounds,
and carried each one fo his stretcher squad in rear of
out line, thus saving their lives. Without pause or test,
he assisted in dressing and carrying wounded for forty-
eight hours, his efforts continuing until the last man had
been attended to.
The fotavard work of the oflïcers and stretcher-bearers
of the Field Ambulances was also beyond praise, many
individuals distinguishing themselves by their efforts.
Major H. D. Lane, M.C., of the I/ISt North Midland Field
Ambulance, during the attack on the Beaurevoir-Fon-
somme line west of Ramicourt, pushed forward through
the enemy's barrage and, although wounded, continued
to search for and withdraw wounded under very heavy
shell tire and aimed machine-gun tire from the left
flank, from which the enemy could not at that time be
dislodged. Later, being informed that civilians had been
released in Ramicourt, he went forward to that village
and collected them together. He then placed them in
safety, supplied them with food, and took the utmost
care of them until they could be removed out of danger.
The presence of civilians in Ramicourt and Mont-
brehain was a good sign. It showed quite clearly
that we were getting past the devastated area and
into the back areas which formerly were occupied by
the Headquarters of the German higher formations.
LC.-ÇORPL. V%'. tl. COLTMAN, %,'.C., D.C.M., M.M., I,OTH
STAFFORDS, X%'IIOSE CONSISTENT BRAVERY IN ACTION HAS
ADDED A GLORIOUS PAGE TO THE HISTORY OF THE 4OTH
]ï}IVISl ON.
,8]
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 119
From now on, as we penetrated farther into enemy-occu-
pied territory, more and more of the civilian inhabitants
were released. 'he movement of the armies began fo
partake more of the nature of a triumphal match, the
advanced troops being everywhere received with open
arms by the familles released by them from a slavery
which, if sometimes tempered with uncouth attempts
af ingratiation, was still in the highest degree distasteful
to the people of the occupied districts. One of the most
drarnatic sights during the advance was undoubtedly
the scene when, in the midst of the fighting at Mont-
brehain, before even the Germans were completely driven
from the town, the few remaining inhabitants, regardless
of their safety in their joy at their newly regained freedom,
rushed from their houses with mugs of steaming hot
coffee, the only tribute an impoverished population could
offer to their liberators.
Soon, the ride of battle was fo sweep on beyond the
ruin of their homes, and they were tobe left in peace fo
make the best attempt they could af repairing their shell-
torn houses and to eke out a slender existence on rations
spared by out men, or issued by the French Mission. Of
means of local subsistence there were left practically none.
The German occupation and the subsequent ride of war
had left the area bare of everything except a few fields
of sugar-beet, and such food as isolated individuals
had managed to hide away during the last few days,
when the thunder of the British guns was heard
approaching nearer and nearer, and the possibility of
the upsetting of the German usurpers became more of
a reality and less of a dream.
During the evening of October 3rd, the Division
received a very large amount of attention from enemy
aeroplanes. Those carried out repeated bombing attacks
12o THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
on the bivouacs of the troops in the field, on transport
lines, on transport and columns of troops on roads, on
all villages within our lines and on other places likely
tobe used by us as Headquarters, or as assembly-places
for troops. The nights were dark, but the airmen were
unusually bold and flew verv low, while the use of para-
chute lights of extraordinary brilliance and of considerable
duration annulled, in great measure, the disadvantage
(from the airman's point of view) of the dark night.
Any member of the Division whose duties took him
on to the main roads around La Baraque, Bellenglise,
and Magny-la-Fosse during this and the succeeding
nights, will vividly recall the disagreeable sensations
which passed up and down his spine as he sat
in his car, or on the driver's seat of his transport-
wagon, or stood in the road in one of the many blocks
of traffic. The steady double throb of the "" Boche "'
tdn-engined planes was sufficient advertisement of the
presence of enemy aircraft in the immediate neighbour-
hood without the ear-splitting blasts of the warning
whistles, barking out their three long blasts from every
direction. These latter ruade many a man whose nerves
were not in the best condition long to seize the whistler
and screw his neck until he swore never to put lips to
whistle again. Suddenly, in one direction or another, a
parachute-light would tiare out, illuminating the whole
countryside, while every man gazed towards the spot
where the light was floating slowly downwards, or, if the
parachute was overhead, sat still in a state of e-'pectancy,
wondering where the fateful bomb was going to drop.
There is something very devastating to the nerves about
a bomb. It seems so inevitable. There are many men
whose nerves are proof against shell tire of any descrip-
tion, though few like it or go out of their way to meet it.
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 121
The man, however, who does not dislike bombs intensely
has yet tobe found, and there are few moments so un-
pleasant as those spent waiting to see who is going to
get the benefit of the next one.
If the light is distant and the plane far off, the
watchers hear a dull boom or series of crashes--absolutely
unmistakable, and ,lever tobe confounded with shell
explosions. Relief then makes itself fclt in various ways,
but mainly by an unloosening of tongues, which takes the
form amongst the waiting Infantry of an outburst of
talking and chalîïng, and usually in the case of transport
drivers of a torrent of objurgation, directed impartially
at their mules, or horses, or (carefully modulated to avoid
danger of overhearing) at the Traffic Control, to whom
always the vhole credit of a traffic block is given.
If, on the other hand, the plane is almost overhead,
the next act in the drama is a sibilant rushing sound
rapidly increasing in volume, when all in a position to do
so throw themselves prone on the ground, or rush for the
nearest shelter, however meagre. Then follows an ear-
splitting crashing roar, and a furious tornado of air, with
or without splinters of bomb, hurls to the ground every-
thing in its immediate neighbourhood. One bomb has
dropped, and every one waits anxiously for the next,
which may or may not corne. If the bomb has expended
its force harmlessly in a clear space, men then lise and
feel themselves over, surplised to find they are still " all
correct " and whole. If, on the other hand, such a bomb
has landed in the midst of transport or men, the scene
beggars description, fragments of men, wood, iron, and
animals being hurled in all directions and to an incredible
distance.
Such an instance of the blind fury of war in its very
worst form occurred at the Headquarters of the Division
122 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
at La Baraque. "G" Office was here snugly harboured at
the bottom of a large and roomy "Boche" dug-out, and
on the night of October 3rd a party of seventy or eighty
German prisoners from the Battle of Ramicourt were
waiting outside in the dusk for their turn for examination
by the Staff Intelligence officer. Suddenly, the three
whistles were heard and the drone of a German plane
became audible, increasing in loudness as the plane ap-
proached and swooped towards the ground. There must
still have been sufficient light for the airman, who was
himself plainly visible to the watchers below, to see the
body of men beneath him, though it was certainly far too
dark for him to have been able fo distinguish the field-
grey uniform.
Just before he reached the group, he must have moved
the lever controlling his bomb-dropping apparatus, and
two bombs dropped almost simttltaneously, both of
which e¢ploded in or near the unfortunate group of
prisoners.
The scene that followed was indescribable. With
the explosion, there arose a wail of anguish from the
victims of the bomb, and, for a few seconds after-
wards, there was a soft sickening tain of blood, frag-
ments of flesh, and limbs, over the whole of the
immediate neighbourhood. Some forty or fifty of the
unfortunate prisoners, with some half-dozen of out
own men who were passing the spot at the time, were
literally blown to pieces, while another three or four dozen
were lying strewn about the mouth of the dug-out with
fearful wounds, nearly all of them about the legs and
lower part of the body. There was a rush of the survivors
for the steps of the dug-out itself, and the staff, endeavour-
ing to make their way out to discover what really had
happened, round their egress completely blocked by
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 123
cowering and moaning prisoners crouching among a
débris of human bodies. The place smelt like a shambles,
and the most hardened campaigners sickened before the
sights which were brought to light when officers with
flash-liihts arrived to ascertain the extent of the damage
and tender first-aid to the wounded.
A strong party was at once turned on to clearing up
the mess, but La Baraque smelt of blood until the day
,.ve left it, and every one was heartily glad when, on the
6th October, the Division handed over to the 6th Division,
who were taking over the sector, and Headquarters moved
back into test at Vendelles. For days afterwards, traces
of the effects of the explosion were visible, and one neatly
divided half of a face, found near the Visual Station many
yards away, will long be indelibly fixed in the mind and
imagination of the finder.
On the 6th October, the command of the sector on a
general line east of Wiancourt and Ramicourt passed to
the G.O.C. 6th Division, who, however, retained the
i39th Infantry Brigade and the Monmouths under his
command. The same day, information was received that
the IX Corps would attack, with the XV French Corps,
on the right and the American Corps on the left, on a
date which would be notified shortly. In the IX Corps,
the 6th Division were to be in the line, with the 46th
Division and the 3rd Infantry Brigade in Corps Reserve,
the 46th Division being held in readiness to pass through
the 6th Division should the attack ruade by the latter
be successful.
Headquarters of the Division remained at Vendelles
during this rime, but an advanced report centre was
opened at Magny-la-Fosse on the 7th October, and a
system of signal communication with a main poled cable
route of three pairs was led well forward of this, in anticipa-
124 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
tion of the Division going into action during the next few
days. On the 8th Octeber, the G.O.C. Division and "G "
Staff moved forward to Magny, although on that date the
6th Division was fighting and the 46th Division troops
(except the Divisional Artillery, who were assisting the
6th Division) remained in reserve.
On the 7th, the I38th Infantry Brigade was in-
structed to move forward to its assembly position west of
Preselles Farm, and the dispositions of the troops of the
46th Division on the 8th October were as follows :--I37th
Infantry Brigade in the Bellenglise Tunnel, I38th Infantry
Brigade as above, and I39th Infantry Brigade at or
around Magny-la-Fosse.
In order fo keep Divisional Headquarters informed
as completely as possible of the course of events, the
Divisional Observation Officer, with one wireless set and
with his observers, was instructed to move forward
and observe the result of the attack on Beauregard,
Mericourt, and Fresnoy, which was being carried out by
the 6th Division. By means of news sent back by him,
the G.O.C. 46th Division was kept in close touch with
a situation which was at times very obscure.
Following on the attack on Ramicourt on the 3rd
October, the enemy had evidently become convinced
that his position, without prepared defences as it was,
was untenable, and he retreated steadily, closely followed
by the British troops who were in action continually with
his rearguards.
The 46th Division played no great part in the fighting
at this time, the General Staff in the main contenting
themselves with holding a watching brief ; the Infantry
being kept in positions where they could reinforce the
attacking Division if necessary.
The Pioneer Battalion--the Monrnouths--however,
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 125
were ordered on the 7th October to attack and capture
two machine-gun nests on the Sequehart-Mericourt Road,
and the battalion suffered very heavily in the attempt.
The assault was ruade as part of a converging attack
carried out by the 6th Division and the I26th French
Division on our left and right. These Divisions were to
advance inwards and so cut the I39th Brigade. to which
the Monmouths were attached, and which was acting
under the orders of the G.O.C. 6th Division, out of the
line.
At zero, plus ten minutes, " B " Company of the Mon-
mouths, led by Captain W. P. Abbott and supported by
a heavy trench-mortar bombardment0 advanced to the
attack of the machine-gun posts, but was met by an
annihilating tire, the two platoons that led the attack
being practically wiped out. Lieutenant-Colonel J.
Jenkins, M.C., commanding the battalion, personally
organized another attack and led forward four more
platoons to the assault, but this attempt also was beaten
off with heavy loss, Colonel Jenkins and his Adjurant
being both amongst the killed.
The attack was then abandoned, having cost the
battalion eight oflïcers and seventy men killed and
wounded, but it had served its purpose by engaging
the attention of the defenders of the trench while the
men of the 6th Division worked round from the rear.
The garrison of these posts was thus cut off completely
from succour, and later in the day surrendered, over
25o men with twenty machine guns and two trench
mortars being captured in this work alone.
On the night of the 8th October, the I38th Infantry
Brigade relieved the I6th Infantry Brigade of the
6th Division, and were instructed to get into touch
with the French, who were believed to be in Fontaine
x26 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
d'Uterte, out own line running through Beauregard Farm
and Meficourt. The 6th Division, remaining in the line
on a one-brigade front, were to attack Jonnecourt Farm
early on the 9th October, while their artillery bombarded
Fresnoy-le-Grand.
On completion of the relief by the x38th Brigade, the
command of the sector passed to the G.O.C. 46th Division,
the x37th Brigade being ordered to the Preselles area
and the x39th Brigade to Levergies. On the morning
of the 9th, when the bombardment of Fresnoy by the
6th Divisional Artillery ceased, the x38th Brigade,
according to orders, sent forward patrols into Fresnov
and round the town unoccupied, out men being received
with every demonstration of extreme ioy by the xSo to
200 inhabitants who had remained in the town when it
was evacuated by the Germans.
Some machine-gun tire was encountered from the rail-
way-line east of the village, but, after a little local
fighting, this opposition was overcome and the Brigade
occupied the railway-line.
On the xoth October, Divisional Headquarters opened
at Fresnoy-le-Grand, finding there the best billets the
troops had occupied since leaving the Bethune area.
Although the village had been damaged to some extent
by out bombardment and was for some days after out
occupation sub iected to intermittent attention from enemy
high-velocity guns, yet it was comparatively undamaged,
many houses being quite untouched.
From the time of the first advance of the 46th Division
into the area beyond the destroyed zone, the policy of
restficting the bombardment of towns and villages to
shrapnel only was carefully followed. From this time
on, very little damage was done to any buildings by our
artillery, unless they were known to be occupied as enemy
BRIGADIER-GENERAL F. G. M. IOWLEY, C.M.G., D.S.O., BRIGADE
COMMANDER I3STH INFANTRY BRIGADE
Reproduced by courtesy oP El!iott &'_Fry, 55, Baker Street, London, W.r.
26]
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 12 7
strong-points. Every effort was made everywhere to
avoid unnecessary damage; stringent regulations against
pillaging and pilfering were made (although, to do the
troops justice, these were to a great extent superfluous) ;
and, whenever they vere out of the line, the Divisional
Engineers were so far as possible employed in carrying
out temporary repairs to dil-apidated houses in civilian
occupation. The inhabitants who were thus helped
were intensely grateful, and, generally, the population of
the towns and villages were eager to velcome their
deliverers into their houses and to do the little that lay
in their power to make them comfortable. The relations
between French civilians and British soldiers remained
excellent throughout, and the progress of the troops
through the country was hailed with rejoicings every-
where.
The German retreat, thanks to the stand made by his
rearguard on the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme line and the
villages on which this line was pivoted, was at this period
comparatively unhurried. He had managed to remove
most of his munitions of war and the booty captured
by the advancing British troops consistç-d mainly of
ammunition, both S.A.A. and shells, with occasional
small dumps of signal stores, and salvaged material he
had collected, but had not managed to get away. Char-
acteristic features of the evacuated country, however---
and this was even more the case in the days which
followed--were the small heaps of brass, copper, and iron
utensils of all descfiptions. These "spoil-heaps"- from
Frencli homes were a most eloquent vitness to the
systematic way in wliich the country had been plundered
to help towards the production of the very guns and
projectiles which were laying waste huge districts of
France and taking the lives of thousands of her best men.
"z8 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
Nothing had been too small or insignificant to escape
the plunderers. In these heaps, children's toys lay side
by side with old machine guns and rifles, machinery with
kitchen utensi|s, the iron heads of tools with old shell
cases salved from former battlefields ; the whole mixed
up in inextricable tangle with copper and galvanized iron
wire from the old French telegraph routes and fences.
Never before, since civilization became more than a name,
cana captured country have been robbed so systematically
and so thoroughly by a ruthless conqueror.
The enemy's comparatively unmolested retreat was
secured principally bv the efficient manner in which his
Engineers had performed their task of demolition. As
he retired, he blew up both the roads and railways behind
him, and out advancing transport was again and again
held up by yawning craters across their path. In the
open country around Fresnoy and Bohain, the consequent
delay was hot, however, as serious as he must have
anticipated. Dry-weather tracks existed nearly every-
where, and even these could be ignored by horsed transport
on fine days when the surface of the ground was fairly
hard. From time to time, therefore, our troops could
press forward close on his heels, sure of the necessary
supplies of rations and ammunition, while on occasion
he was hustled very unpleasantly indeed. The rapid
advance of a modern army, however, is not possible
without the aid of railways, or at least of mechanical
transport, and the system of delay-action mines used
by the Germans was well calculated to hold up our
progress. At every cross-roads mines had been buried
nsome of them timed to explode a few hours after the
enemy had left, others a few days, some even after a
delay of several weeks.
No rule of modern war is more true than that which
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT i29
limits the speed of advance of an army by the rate at
which the railhead on which it is based can be moved
forward. Throughout the whole of the present advance
and the greater one which was to follow, the movement
of out railhead proved to be the decisive factor. So
thoroughly had the German Engineers done their work,
that the position of railhead was never certain for two
or three days together. Our own Railway Engineers
would work night and day repairing the permanent way,
the rails of which had becn blown up with small gun-
cotton charges af intervals of ten or twenty yards, and
would successfully get the line completed as far as Bohain
or Vaux Andigny. A delay-action mine would then go
up between Fresnoy and Bohain or between Bohain and
Vaux Andigny, and back would go the railhead again
for some days, while the gap was being filled by gangs of
Chinese coolies, or German prisoners. Once more the
line would be put through and trains xvould arrive with
rations and supplies for a few days, when again a mine
would throw the railhead back several toiles. Thus, the
question of supplies was a very difficult one indeed, and
one which deflnitely limited the progress ruade by the
Division.
In its broader aspect, OEherefore, from the viexv of the
pursuing troops, the chier disadvantage of the delav-
action mine was undoubtedly its effect on the transport
of the Army. The Divisional troops, however, pressing
on in the van after the retreating Germans, were more
intimately concerned with the mines placed at the cross-
roads, or at irregular intervals along main roads, and
timed to explode within a few hours of the German retreat.
A party of our men would be scouting carefully along the
road when, without warning, several of these mines would
explode with a roar, throwing a column of débris and
9
13o THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
smoke some hundreds of feet into the air. Discretion
came with experience, however ; main roads and cross-
roads were usually given a wide berth by the troops of the
advanced guard, and, if mines there were, these had either
been blown or their positions betrayed by the evidences
of fresh-turned earth, before the arrival of the main body
of the leading Brigade. Casualties were therefore few,
though progress was considerably delayed.
Three or four mlles to the north-west of Fresnoy lay
the town of Bohain, which was entered by out troops on
the ioth October. Here, over 2,000 French civilians had
been left behind by the retreating Germans, and wild scenes
of enthusiasm greeted the advancing troops. The officers
and men first into the town were mobbed by an hysterical
crowd of men, women, and children, almost delirious in
their joy at being once more free to live their norpaal
lives. Here for the first time, signs of business lire were
seen. Shops were fairly numerous though ill-stocked,
and many of the inhabitants were still working in their
houses at the silk-looms for which the town was famous
before the war.
The town had been evacuated after the issue of the
famous manifesto instructing officers and men to pay all
consideration possible to the cïvilian inhabitants of the
occupied distficts and to avoid wanton damage, and
latterly this instruction had been liberally interpreted by
the enemy. Little wilful destruction had been done,
though bere, above all other places, the genius of the
German Engineers had been given full play. At every
cross-roads, the road had been blown away so thoroughly
that only a deep crater remained, stretching right across
from side to side of the street, while the houses on either
side had collapsed as though built of cards, in hopeless
ruin. With these exceptions, however, the town was little
THE BATTLE OF RAMICOURT 13I
damaged, our own bombardment having been restricted
mainly to shrapnel which, while it had shattered tiles
and slates in every direction, had done little structural
damage. After out occupation of the town, the Germans
shelled it intermittently for two or three weeks with a
high-velocity gun firing I I-inch armour-piercing shell,
but surprisingly little damage was done and few people
were injured.
Of all the enthusiastic scenes which the Division was
privileged to see during the last weeks of the \Var,
there were few which equalled the reception given
by the inhabitants of Bohain to the first troops
which passed through the town. The oflïcial entry was
made later by the 32nd Division, and those who were
at the Thanksgiving Service held in Bohain Church on
that day will not forger the simple grandeur of the
service and the heart-felt j oy of the congregation
assembled to thank God for their regained freedom.
In years fo corne, hot the least striking tribute fo the
work of the British Armies in France will be the Masses
which will be sung in Bohain Church at the hours when
the advanced guard and the main body of our troops
entered that town, and the pilgrimage to Lourdes which
the Vicar of Bohain has vowed to make each year, on the
anniversary of the day of the town's release from bondage.
PART II1
THE BATTLE OF ANDIGNY
CHAPTER VI
THE CLEARING OF THE BOIS DE RIQUERVAL AND THE
BATTLE OF ANDIGNY LES FERMES
WItlLE Divisional Headquarters were establishing them-
selves in Fresnoy, the leading troops of the Division--
the I38th Infantry Brigadepushing forward from
Bohain, encountered strong enemy resistance on the
edge of the Bois de Riquerval. This wood, an outlier
of the larger Forest of Andigny, stretched north and
south right across the Divisional front of 3,oo yards.
Filled as it was with machine-gun nests and strongly
organized networks of trenches and strong-points, it
pposed a serious obstacle in the path of out advance.
A considerable portion of the wood had been cleared by
the Germans, trees having been cut down and converted
into tituber for the lining of dug-outs and other military
works. These recently cleared areas, however, while
affording better observation both for ourselves and for
the enemy, were still choked with thick undergrowth and
were sown with strongly organized defences hidden by
the scrub. From well-concealed emplacements, enemy
machine gunners were able to command all approaches
to the wood.
Thus, on October Ioth, strong patrols of the i/4th
THE BATTLE OF ANDIGNY 133
Battalion, Leicestershire Regiment, advancing cautiously
along the Bohain-Aisonville Road and over the country
fo the north of this road, were met by heavy machine-
gun tire from the edge of the wood. Attempts to enter
the wood all along its front were repulsed, the battalion
suffering a considerable number of casualties. Later in
the day, the I/5th Battalion Leicestershire Regiment,
who had relieved their sister-battalion, ruade determined
attempts fo penetrate into the wood. This attack, which
was pressed with determination and carried out with
skill, af first met with some success, and the leading
patrols of the battalion pushed some distance into the
outer fringes of the wood. The principal success was
achieved by the Headquarters of the battalion, who
established themselves in a house on the western edge
of the southern lobe of the wood. The companies on
either side, however, were driven back by the enemy,
and the Battalion Headquarters Staff round itself isolated,
enemy forces holding the wood on either side. Aided by
nine or ten Frenchmen, who had become separated from
the main body of their comrades and who had with them
two mitrailleuses, the Battalion Staff put up a very stout
fight and managed to hold on to the outskirts of the wood
and fo the captured house for some hours.
On the ilth October, while this fighting vas actually
in progress, instructions were issued for the I37th Infantry
Brigade to relieve the I38th Infantry Brigade. The
I/5th Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment was ordered
fo move forward and take over from the I/5th Battalion
Leicestershire Rement when and where possible. This
was easier said than done. A stiff fight vas in progress,
and the situation as regards the disposition of our own
and the enemy's forces was extremely obscure. The
C.O. of the Staffords, with his Adutant and Company
134 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
Commanders, rode forward to get into touch with the
Headquarters of the battalion they were to relieve.
After riding about for several hours, during which
they had frequently to go to ground to avoid hostile
machine-g-un tire, they were reluctantly obliged to give
up their quest and ride back to obtain more exact in-
formation. Battalion Headquarters, situated as described
above, was then located, touch was gained with it, and
provisional arrangements for the relief were ruade. The
actual handing over, however, was not carried out for
some hours, owing to the rough-and-tumble fighting on
the outskirts of the wood, the Leîcesters being pinned to
their positions and unable either to advance or to retreat.
Communication between the companies of the relieving
battalions was established by means of the Lucas lamp
and, at 9.30 a.m., the Staffordshire men advanced with
two companies in the line, one in support and one in
reserve. The right company in the line was ordered to
move to the south-west edge of the wood and the left
company was given orders to advance towards Fontaine
de Colombier, on the Bohain-Andigny Road. Both
companies deployed and advanced and, at lO.3O a.m.,
touch was established with the enemy. The attack was
held up by machine-g-un tire from all along the edge of
the wood, the support company at the saine rime
coming under machine-g-un tire from Retheuil Farm, to
the south of the wood. By this rime the relief of the
platoons of the left company of the I/5th Leicesters
had been carried out and touch established with the
6th Division on our left flank, but the Headquarters
and the right company of the Leicesters were still
isolated in the south-west outskirts of the wood and
hard pressed by the enemy. At 2.25 p.m., therefore,
th¢ Staffords were ordered to attack the trench system
THE BATTLE OF AND IGNY x35
in the clearing east of Riquerval Farm, with the aid of a
tank which was to work south and assist in extricating
the Battalion Headquarters flore the wood. The tank,
however, broke down and was unable to move, and the
attack, which was launched at 4 p.m., failed.
Oideis weie then given for a bombardment of the
trench system, and this was carried out by the g-uns of
the x6th Army Brigade, R.H.A., which was supporting
the x37th Infantry Brigade. Another attack was then
launched, but this also was repulsed belote it was well
started, the enemy putting down a barrage on the
company detailed for the attack, at the moment of its
assembly. At the same rime, a further attempt was
made to relieve the right company of the Leicesters, but
this also failed. The enemy, counter-attacking heavily,
then solved the problem by driving the Leicesters, Batta-
lion Headquarters and all, out of the wood and down
on to the Bohain-Aisonville Road. Here, the relief took
place without further incident.
In view of the extremely stubborn resistance of the
enemy concealed in the wood, the Divisional Commander
now decided to withdraw all his troops to a line conforming
roughly to the outline of the western outskirts of the wood
and about two hundred yards from it. All available g-uns
were then turned on the wood and a concentrated bom-
bardment carried out, particular attention being paid to
the trench systems and strong-points in the clearings, and
to the few existing buildings which had been organized
for defence, as, for example, the house in the south-
western outskirts already won and lost by our troops.
It was now quite plain that the enemy's rearguard
intended to make as prolonged a stand as possible on this
line. Favoured as they were by the freedom from
observation and the facilities for machine-gun defence
136 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
afforded by the trees and thick undergrowth of the
wood, the obstacle was one which promised tobe very
diflïcult indeed to overcome. At the saine rime also,
the i26th French Division on out right, though not
confronted bv closely wooded country, had experienced
much diflïculty in making progress against well-organized
defences based on a series of strongly built farm-houses,
all of which had been converted by the enemy's en-
gineering genius into miniature forts.
On the I2th October, therefore, a joint attack by the
French and ourselves was arranged, with the object of
storming these defences and once more starting the enemy
on the run. The ultimate objective of the French
Division was the village of Mennevret, while that of the
I37th Brigade was a line running approximately along
the eastern edge of the Bois de Riquerval and the western
edge of the Forêt Dominale d'Andigny.
The attack was arranged to commence at noon, but,
through somemiscalculation,theFrench barrage descended
quite rive minutes before our own. The enemy on our
front, warned by the thunder of the guns on their left,
were ready and waiting for our men. The 6th South
Staffords, advancing behind out barrage, were met by
heavy machine-gun tire, while the enemy barrage fell
right upon them and caused them to become much dis-
organized before the wood was reached. In spire of
this harassing tire, however, the battalion pressed for-
ward and, on the left, one company managed to penetrate
into the trench system in the clearing which had been
the object of the previous day's attack. At the
same time, "D " Company, under Captain G. H. Ball,
forced its way into the south-west outskirts of the wood,
but the enemy artillery, trench-mortar and machine-gun
barrage was so heavy and caused so many casualties that
THE BATTLE OF AND IGNY 137
the company was compelled to fall back from the wood.
Here, however, Captain ]3all rallied his men and, rein-
forced by " ]3 " Company of the r/6th South Staffords,
coolly reorganized his company and again advanced into
the wood at its head. Much opposition was encountered
from enemy machine guns, in particular from the bouse
at the edge of the wood and from a derelict British tank
which had been abandoned in the previous attack. In face
of this, however, the men managed to make their way for-
ward amidst a hurricane of bullets. The two companies
penetrated into the wood some 2o0 yards without coming
across any sign of German occupation except the barrage,
but, on this line, dira shadowy figures were seen moving
amongst the dense underirowth and the already galling
tire was redoubled, while for the first time rifle tire was
added to the ]ittle inferno already raging.
As it was obvious that further progress was impossible
unless the attackers were strongly reinforced, an attempt
was ruade to consolidate the line already held. Oflïcers
and men proceeded hastily to dig themselves in and
obtain what shelter they could, but the enemy opened
trench-mortar tire with disconcerting accuracy, and
orders had tobe given to withdrav to the edge of the
wood. The enemy, vho must have been exceptionally
well served by his scouts, now dropped a heavy barrage
along the edge of the wood, and Captain ]Ball decided to
order a retirement to the high ground west of the wood.
Here the original line held belote the attack was once
more taken over.
Many casualties had been suffered during this little
operation and the men engaged were much shaken by
their experiences. The enemy was so well hidden in the
undergrowth, and so well supplied with machine guns,
that he possessed an overwhelming advantage, and this,
138 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
to do him justice, he utilized fo the utmost extent. There
is no more unnerving type of battle than such hole-and-
corner fighting as is necessary fo oust a well-organized
defending force from a wood which they are determined
fo hold. The enemy's rearguards were formed of picked
troops, who fought stoutly and with more individuality
than was usually shown by the Germans during these
last months of the war. In the circumstances, the
men of the South Staffords had been set an impossible
task and had acquitted themselves well. Let us give
honour when honour is due. If may be honestly said
that never during the German retreat did their machine
gunners fight better, or more stubbornly, than in those
days when Riquerval Wood held up the Division.
Day after day for several days in succession, out troops
advanced fo the attack, only fo be denied by a devoted
band of men who were willing to sacrifice themselves,
in order fo permit the demoralized remainder to walk
away in comparative immunity. So, the actions of the
Ioth, Ilth and I2th October, and the skirmishing on
the following days, left the Germans on the Divisional
front masters of the field, while on out right also, the
French were unable fo capture Retheuil Farm. For the
space of a week the pursuit was checked, while some way
of circumventing this obstacle and the Forest of Andigny,
of which if was an outlier, exercised the ingenuity of the
General Staff. The solution of this problem gave fise
fo the tactical triumph known as the Battle of Andigny,
which we will now consider in so far as if affected the
46th Division.
Ail frontal attacks on Riquerval Wood and the Forest
of Andigny having thus been repulsed by the enemy
rearguards, orders were issued on the Isth October for a
THE BATTLE OF AND IGNY 139
general action on the part of the IX Corps, in con-
iunction with the XV French Corps on its right and
the II American Corps on its left. The obiect of the
battle was to reach the line of the Sambre-Oise Canal.
"Fo the 46th Division were allotted the tasks of turning
Riquerval Wood and the capture and retention of the
Andigny-les-Fermes Ridge. The success of the Division
was of extreme importance to the IX Corps as a whole,
for not only did this ridge dominate and protect the
whole right flank of the advance, but its possession in
British hands also gave room to, and ensured the safety
of, the passage of the Ist Division, when they advanced
through the 6th Division towards their final obiective.
If the general assault proved successful, the French,
advancing up the southern side of the wood and capturing
the village of Mennevret, would then press on round the
Forest of Andigny and ioin hands with the ist Division
about Wassigny.
The general scheme, necessitating as it did an attack
from the flank instead of from the front, involved, of
course, a drastic rearrangement of the forces of the
Division. A glance at the map will show that, instead
of driving due east as heretofore, the new attack, in
order to be successful in its objects, must be made from
almost due north, necessitating a forming-up line in the
territory occupied by the Division on out left flank.
The obvious line for a flank attack on Riquerval Wood
was the Bohain-Vaux Andigny Road, and it was along
this road that, on the morning of the I7th October, the
day selected for the attack, the I38th and I39th Infantry
Brigades took up position for the assault.
The objective allotted to the 46th Division was the
]3ohain-Wassigny Road, from the north-east corner of
Riquerval Wood to the village of Andigny les Fermes,
14o THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
and included that village and the hamlet of Regnicourt.
It was arranged that the Division should not take over
the line held by the 6th Division, but that our Infantry
should take up position on the line of deployment,
shortly before zero. By this hour, all troops of the 6th
Division were to be withdrawn west of this line, to avoid
the artillery barrage which would cover the attack.
As in the case of former battles on a major scale, the
approach to the day of conflict was heralded by the
arrival of vafious free-lance units which had been assigned
to the Division by the Corps, for the purpose of assisting
out own Artillery and Infantry. On this occasion, a troop
of Scots Greys was attached for reconnoitfing purposes,
and a section of three tanks to assist in mopping up
various strong-points whose existence was known or sus-
pected. Two companies of the Lire Guards M.G. Batta-
lion and one company of the 6th M.G. Battalion were also
allotted to the Division. These were detailed to tire in
the machine-gun barrage which would cover the advance
of the Infantry, or were given definite tasks in the pro-
tection of the flanks of the Division, or in the consolidation
of the objectives once they had been gained. Last but
hot least, the Divisional Artillery was reinforced by the
addition of four Brigades of R.H.A. and R.F.A., who
were, as before, placed under the orders of the C.R.A.,
46th Division.
Owing to the nature and direction of the projected
attack, the Artillery, in particular, were faced with a very
intficate problem. Similar concentrations of artillery
had been arranged to cover the advance of the 6th
Division and the American Divisions, and the guns of
the Brigades covering the former occupied every available
gun-position which existed within range of the 6th Divi»ion
front. It was, therefore, impossible to site the batteries
THE BATTLE OF AND IGNY 141
covering the advance of the 46th Division in such a
position that a normal frontal barrage could be fired,
and it was decided to try the novel experiment of an
oblique or "' enfilade" barrage. With this object in
view, all the guns were arranged as nearly as possible in
enfilade of the front on which the attacking Brigades
would advance, and time-tables for a creeping enfilade
barrage were made out, the necessary lifts being made
on the leap-frog principle.
In discussing this, the last barrage of great intensity
under which the troops of the Division were fated to
advance in the prescrit war, it may be permissible to
enter into a little more detail. The reader of this accourir
who is not conversant with modern artillery may thus
be given some idea of the uses of an artillery barrage,
a factor which has played so important a part in this
war and which has been developed to a very high state
of perfection. The idea of the barrage is first and fore-
most to afford the attacking troops a certain measure
of protection, by forcing the enemy to take refuge in his
dug-outs, saps and trenches. Intense, well-directed
covering artillery tire will so plaster the ground over
which the assault is being made, that troops exposed in
the open stand very little chance indeed of survival.
They are, therefore, constrained to take shelter, and a
determined attacking force keeping well up to the line
of bursting shells can overrun the strongest defences
without much trouble. On the other hand, should the
barrage, through badly worked-out rime-tables, or
through the Infantry being delayed by some unforeseen
accident, get ahead of the latter, itis of little use. The
defending troops can lie snugly hidden in their shelters
until the rain of shells has passed and then, emerging from
their dug-outs, can man their machine guns and shoot
I42 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
down the approaching enemy riflemen af their leisure.
Were if hot for the artillery barrage, hot one attack in a
hundred ruade against strong works held by determined
machine gunners could achieve success, while the losses
of the attacking Infantry would outnumber those of the
defenders fo a colossal extent.
"Vhile, however, the artillery tire is mainly directed
towards the protection of the advancing Infantry, it has
other rôles to play as well. By the inclusion of rounds
of smoke shell, a dense wall of fog can be formed which
hot only hides the advancing Infantry from sight, but
which, under favourable circumstances, may shroud the
whole battlefield. It may thus entirely obscure the
intentions of the attacker, rendering if very difficult
indeed for the defender fo counter his moves. Such a
fog may, and probably will, exercise a definite influence
in favour of the attacking side, which possesses the
initiative and is able fo make the greatest use of the
power and moral effect of unexpected action.
Again, a well-thought-out barrage bas a very decisive
effect in enabling the assaulting Infantrv fo rest and
reorganize at intermediate objectives selected by the
staff as suitable places for pauses in the operations.
A normal barrage will also assist the attacking troops
in maintaining direction under adverse weather conditions
and in the confusion and smoke of a battle. In an attack
which involves an advance of several thousand yards fo
particular objectives, this function of the barrage is most
important. The effect of the frontal barrage, or rather
the effect of its absence, was fo be well seen in the present
battle. The men, accustomed to hear the guns behind
them and the scream of the shells passing over their
heads, were bewildered by the transverse tire of the
enfilade barrage and lost direction very badly. Much
]3RIGADIER-GEIqERAL SIR HILL CILD, C.M.G., D.S.O., C.R A.
4(0IH DIVSIOI
Reprcduced by courtesy of Elliott & Fry. 55. Baker Street, London,
x42]
THE
confusion resulted from
caused by the crews of
left undestroyed and so
BATTLE OF ANDIGNY I43
this, and manv casualties were
machine-gun nests which were
were in a position to tire from
the rear upon our men, when the latter were sweeping
forward to the attack of positions beyond them.
One other use of the guns which should be mentioned
is the retaliatory barrage fired by the defender's Artillery.
The plans for this barrage are carefully worked out be-
forehand in the event of an attack. As soon as news of
the assault can be got back to the guns by S.O.S. signais,
by the noise of the enemy's barrage, or by line or runner,
ail available gnns are brought into action. These tire on
pre-arranged objectives, with the idea of isolating the
attacking troops, preventing supplies and reinforce-
ments from reaching them, and inflicting as many casual-
ties as possible during the earlier stages of their advance.
A fair example of the number of shells which are fired
in a normal barrage is afforded from consideration of
the barrage at the Battle of t3ellenglise. Here on a
5oo-yard front, fifty-four I8-pounders and eighteen 4"5
hovitzers were engaged in forming the barrage. Of these
guns, the I8-pounders fired two rounds per minute and the
howitzers one round per minute. The shells were fired
to spread the bursts evenly along the barrage line, so
that, in ail, a total of 126 shells fell on a line 500 yards
long within the minute, giving a total of one shell per
four yards per minute. This barrage was kept up for
eight hours and, allowing for slowing down of the rate
of tire during the intervals when a stationary protective
barrage was being fired, there cannot have been less than
some 50,000 shells fired on this short frontage during the
battle.
While rive of the six Artillery Brigades attached to the
Division fired in the enfilade barrage covering thi main
144 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LNE
attack from the north, the remaining Brigade, the
I4th Army Brigade R.F.A., was detailed to assist the
I37th Infantry Brigade, whose ordrs were to hold the
original line on which the fighting had taken place
a few days previous, and to act as the "' pivot " of the
attack.
In order to distract the enemy's attention from the
main attack, arrangements were made for a ,i Chinese "
attack to be carried out by this Brigade, every effort
being directed towards giving to this the appearance
of reality. With this idea, all the visible and audible
signs of a frontal attack on the wood flore out old
front line were simulated in detail. In the preparation
of this attack, the Engineers were once more given oppor-
tunity to display the genius for construction which is
essentially their strong point and, once more, this work
had to be carried through against rime. At four hours'
notice, apparatus for elevating ninety dummies was ruade
by three carpenters ; in addition, the work was carried out
to a new design, so that the whole range of ninety men
could be packed in one lorry. These dummies were laid out
during the night in front of convenient shell holes, in which
the men operating them could lie concealed. One man
could operate nine dummies and, at zero hour when the
barrage opened, the dummies were pulled up, thus giving
the appearance of men springing forward to the attack.
The men controlling them then fastened the raising-line
around some convenient stump and ruade the best of
their way back to avoid the retaliatory barrage.
In addition to the dummy figures, three dummy tanks
had been provided, and these also were taken up during
the night to positions where they would be likely to
attract the enemy's attention. Of these dummy tanks,
one was a full--sized replica of the largest and most
THE BATTLE OF AND IGNY 145
modern type of tank. Most of the Division will remember
this as a legacy left by the Australians near Vendelles,
when we first took over the sector. The other two were
profiles only, and were drawn from Corps Stores for the
occasion. These latter two were erected during the
night sideways on to the enemy. AI1 three were sighted
by the enemy and received considerable attention from
his guns during the following morning.
To complete the thorough simulation of the false
attack, a special rolling barrage was arranged and. in
this barrage, the machine-gun company attached to the
Brigade took part. "fhis barrage was arranged to corne
down at zero hour on a line at safety distance in front
of out most advanced posts. It was then to move
through the Bois de Riquerval in an easterly direction,
by jumps of one hundred yards every four minutes.
Thus no pains were spared to deceive the enemy as to
the rem intentions of the Division, and events showed
that the trouble taken in these elaborate preparations
and the ammunition expended in the barrage were hot
thrown away. Ten minutes after zero, a heavy barrage
was put down by the enemy on the front of the I37th
Brigade, thus materially decreasing the weight of enemy
gunfire available for the main front of the attack. The
attention paid to the tanks has already been referred to,
and whole ranges of the dummy figures were torn to
pieces, or overset, by the German artillery tire.
During the period of preparation for the battle,
Divisional Headquarters remained at Fresnoy. As this
village, however, was several toiles from the scene of
action, an advanced report centre was opened in Bohain.
This report centre was connected with Divisional Head-
quarters by a strong poled route of three pairs of cable
and, during the two or three days immediately preceding
IO
146 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
the action, this route was extcnded up the Bohain-Vaux
Andigny Road to the farm which had been selected as a
joint Brigade Headquarters for the two fighting Brigades.
For this extension, the poles of a German permanent
route were employed, one cable being slung on the poles
at a height of 15 feet above the ground, and the other
run along the ground. The latter was fastened to each
pole of the permanent route in order to localize breaks
caused by shell tire. This route was reinforced by both
wireless and visual, but the cable held so well, in spite
of heavy shelling, that the latter systems were only
employed to a limited extent. The Headquarters of
the I37th Brigade was in Bohain itself and was con-
nected with the Headquarters of the Battalion holding
the front to the west of the wood by both cable and
wireless. The latter proved very useful during the early
hours of the attack, when the German barrage made
it impossible for some hours to maintain lines to this
unit.
Aeroplane photographs had supplied material for very
complete maps of the German defences in all the more
open portions of the area to be attacked and, during the
I6th October, a heavy preliminary bombardment was
carried out. Special attention was paid to wire-cutting,
and destructive tire was directed for some hours on the
hamlets of Regnicourt and Andigny les Fermes and on
all known strong-points.
Zero hour was finally fixed for 5.2o a.m. on the ITth
October and, well before that time, the attacking Brigades
had formed up, with a front of 2,ooo yards, on a line one
hundred yards south-east of the Bohain-Vaux Andigny
Road, the inter-brigade boundary being about Vallée
Hasard. The I39th Infantry Brigade advanced on the
right of the Divisional Sector and the 138th Infantry
THE BATTLE OF AND IGNY I47
Brigade on the left. One battalion of the I37th Infantry
Brigade held out front to the west of the Bois de Riquerval,
the other two battalions being held in Divisional Reserve
to the west of Bohain and on the Bohain-Seboncourt Road,
The country over which the attack was to be ruade
was very open, the only patch of woodland being situated
]ust to the west of the village of Regnicourt. In clear
weather, the task of the flank guides of the different units
would have been very simple and little trouble would
have been experienced in keeping direction, especially as
the objective throughout its length was a well-marked
main road. Dawn broke, however, to show the whole
line shrouded in a dense fog, which was quite as thick as
any of the mists which, during the last weeks of the war,
ruade direction-keeping in early-morning attacks no mean
problem. OEhe waiting troops could sec nothing of the
country over which they were fo attackl
Punctually to the minute the barrage opened, and the
Sherwoods on the right and the Lincolns and Leicesters
on the left moved forward to the attack. The 46th
Division was advancing to the last general action in
which it was to take part.
On the right of the attack, the 8th Battalion Sherwood
Foresters moved forward on a three-company front,
" D " Company following in close reserve. Immediately
behind the attacking battalion, two companies of the
5th Sherwoods were held in support. The remainder
of this battalion were dug in under a bank in shelter
of the small wood near the joint Brigade Headquarters.
About this spot also was grouped the remaining battalion
of the Brigade, the 6th Sherwoods, in Brigade Reserve.
From the commencement of the advance, difficulty
was experienced in keeping direction. A gently rising
slope led up to the road which was the final obiective o5
I48 THROUGH TtIE HINDENBURG LINE
the Brigade, while down the centre of the battalion front
tan a slight fidge which divided the area of attack into
two nearly equal halves. It was impossible to see more
than rive yards ahead and the centre company, losing
direction, gravitated down the slope of the fidge towards
the east and so |eft the summit practically untouched.
The first obstacle to the advance---machine-gun nests on
some high ground where a little copse gave shelter to
the machine gunners--was overrun without difficulty
and, on the extreme right and left of the attack, good
progress was ruade. The fight company, in particular,
experienced little opposition, reached its final obiective
without trouble, and commenced to dig in. A sudden
lightening of the mist, however, betrayed the presence of
this company to some enemy machine gunners who were
strongly posted in a cleafing on the Regnicourt Ridge
which overlooked the position. Promptly seizing their
opportunity, the enemy turned a concentrated machine-
gun tire on this company and inflicted heavy casualties,
the survivors expefiencing the greaest difficulty in hang-
ing on to their exposed position.
The cleafing of the fog, however, had also given the
officers of the attacking battalion their first chance to
obtain a general idea of the situation, and the centre
company, who had found themselves somewhere immedi-
ately west of Andigny les Fermes when the fog lifted,
commenced to work their way back across the front
towards the scene of the setback, being ioined on their
way by the Reserve Company. At the saine time,
Lieutenant M. E. Thomas, R.E., of the 465th Field
Company, who was attached to the 8th Sherwoods for
the attack, gallantly collected a party of N.C.O.s and
men from various units who had become mixed up in
the attack and led these men, together with the sappers
THE BATTLE OF ANDIGNY 149
of his own section, to the assistance of the right
company. All officcrs on this flank having become
casualties, he assumed command and reorganized th0
firing-line under the heavy tire which was still being
poured in from the clearing. At the same time, Colonel
Curran, of the 8th Sherwoods, collected a party of one
hundred men, reorganized them, and sent them forward
under Major Robinson, his second-in-command, to attack
the ridge from the north. Seeing themselves thus out-
manoeuvred, the enemy in the clearing surrendered, and
14o prisoners and twenty-seven machine guns were col-
lected from this small area, which had been the main
bastion of the German forward defences. The enemy
in this small action showed very good spirit indeed, and
the casualties suffered by the Sherwoods were severe.
The German machine gunners fought very stoutly,
although many of them were under the impression that
an armistice was to have been signed on the day of the
attack. One stalwart German protested vehemently at
out lack of taste in attacking on the day of " peace," his
last remark, hurled through the mist as he departed cage-
wards, being "Noch nicht Friede ! Noch nicht Friede ! "
The enemy, having been driven from his forward
defences, now took up his position on the main Bohain-
Regnicourt Road, but the 8th Sherwoods, reinforced
first by the support companies and later by the re-
mainder of the 6th Battalion, were not to be gainsaid.
The line swept forward, swamping all further resistance
and capturing the road which was our final objective.
The enemy were thus forced to retreat to the woods
beyond, and our advanced troops dug themselves in
well south of the road, the Engineers, meanwhile,
setting to work on the formation of a strong-point in
Regnicourt.
15o THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
The capture of the Brigade objectives was thus complete
by 9.45 a.m. All enemy resistance now ceased, though,
throughout the morning, desultory machine-gun tire
from Hennechies Wood, and a field gun fifing at 1,4oo
yards range from near the Borne des Trois Evêchés, forced
our men to lie low.
On the left of the attack, the I38th Brigade advanced
on a two-battalion front, the 4th Leicesters being on the
right and the 5th Lincolns on the left, the 5th Leicesters
being held in Brigade Reserve. When forming-up, a few
casualties were caused through the enemy shelling the
Brigade assembly-area with high-explosive and gas
shells, but at zero minus one bout, forming-up was com-
plete and, when the barrage opened, all were ready to
advance.
Here also the fog caused trouble and, at 7 a.m., the
O.C. 4th Leicesters reported that he had under his com-
mand elements of the Cameron Highlanders, Black Watch
and Loyal North Lancashires--all from the 1st Division
on out left--also men from both Sherwoods and Lincolns,
besides remnants of his own companies. This being so,
it was inevitable that machine-gun nests should have
been oveflooked dufing the advance and, here also, these
"unscotched scorpions "' caused many casualties. No
particular hitch occurred on the Divisional front, how-
ever, but machine-gun tire from the high ground about
Les Gobelets and Belle Vue proved very harassing. These
strong-points were cleared in the face of great opposition
by the Ist Battalion Loyal North Lancashires. This
same battalion was later on of the greatest assistance in
clearing the left edge of Andigny les Fermes, in which
village the enemy put up a very stiff fight.
Instructions were issued from Divisional Headquarters
that, immediately Andigny was occupied, strong patrols
THE BATTLE OF ANDIGNY 151
were to be pushed out in the direction of Mennevret, in
order, if possible, to obtain touch with the French.
These patrols encountered stiff resistance, however, and
until 7 p.m., the company of 5th Leicesters detailed for
this purpose were held up by machine-gun tire from the
north of the village. Later on, touch was obtained with
a French patrol at La Nation cross-roads, but the position
could not be held. It was, indeed, not until 5.3 ° a.m.
on the I8th that out line was definitely established in
continuation with that of the French.
Throughout the action, the supporting artillery tire
had been, as it was in all the battles and skirmishes of
the advance, extraordinarily accurate, the initial pro-
gramme being modified accurately and in good time as
the situation developed. Especially good was the work of
certain "forward guns," selected from different batteries
and placed directly under the orders of battalion com-
manders. Kept well advanced and man-handled by their
crews into good positions as close as possible behind the
advancing Infantry, these guns were fought with great
reolution, and were markedly successful in dealing with
isolated rnachine-gun emplacements and strong-points
where the enemy were making a successful stand against
out riflemen, bornbers and rnachine gunners. Firing
over open sights and from behind hedges, brushwood,
or any slight cover which could be made use of, the guns'
crews necessarily took great risks and suffered com-
paratively severe casualties. These forward guns indeed
proved invaluable and well repaid the audacity with
which they were handled, while the moral of our own
Infantry was by no rneans lessened by the realization
that, as ever, their Artillery was close behind them and
sharing both their triurnphs and their dangers in the
fullest degree.
152 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
On the ri'ont held by the I38th Brigade after the
attack, no counter-attack was attempted by the enemy,
but, af II a.m., he was reported by the Sherwoods to be
massing for a counter-attack in front of Hennechies Wood.
By this rime, he must have realized the perilous position
in which he stood, and the counter-attack was his last
attempt to restore the situation. The eort, however,
was not successful. His assembling troops were caught
by out artillery tire, and the few men who survived the
barrage were shot down by Lewis-gun tire, only one man
reaching our trenches alive.
On this front also, much diflïculty was experienced in
obtaining touch with the French, who were to have joined
up with us af the northern edge of the strip of woodland
where Hennechies Wood merges into Andigny Forest.
Patrols were sent out fo get into touch and eventually
located our Allies holding a post about one hundred yards
so:th of Forester's House.
Meanwhile, at 7.3o a.m., when the main attack was
well launched, the 6th North Staffords moved back to
the original line along the western edge of the wood,
from which they had withdrawn slightly fo avoid our
barrage and the enemy reply. Strong fighting patrols
were at once sent out and the Bois de Riquerval was
cleared without difficulty, touch being obtained with
the French north-west of Retheuil Farm.
This task accomplished early in the day, the battalion
then pushed forward, clearing Hennechies Wood as they
went and securing a few prisoners and machine guns.
At 2.3o p.m., the wood was completely free of the enemy,
and contact was established with the Sherwoods on the left
and the French on the right. Night fell with the Brigade
established on the line Mennevret-Andigny and, af
dawn on the I8th, the I38th Brigade took over the front
THE BATTLE OF ANDIGNY x53
held by the st Brigade of the 1st Division, from Andigny
northwards.
Later in the day, the whole front was taken over by
the I37th Infantry Brigade, who were able to side-slip
to the left, to a certain extent, as the French worked their
way up and completed the capture of the outskirts of
lIennevret. The relieved Brigades then withdrew into
Divisional Reserve about Regnicourt, Guyot Farm, and
Vallée Hasard.
The Battle of Andigny, complete success as it was,
bears no comparison to Bellenglise and Ramicourt as
regards the toll of prisoners taken rom the enemy.
Some hundreds were captured, it fs truc, but owing to
the thick mist that prevailed, the greater portion of the
two battalions who formed the garrison of Riquerval
Wood managed to slip through our fingers and rejoin
the main body of their comrades on the new line they had
taken up. The Division was thus robbed of the visible
reward of its labours, but, as against this, the men
rested on their final objectives and the enemy, especially
in the abortive counter-attack towards the end of the
day, had left a heavy toll of dead behind him. It was
no small feat to have driven him out of such strong
positions, and all ranks went into reserve for a well-
earned rest, feeling that the enemy had been repaid
in good measure for the trouble he had caused during
the frontal assault on the Riquerval Wood.
On the following day, the 37th Brigade were ordered
to keep touch with the ee6th French Division on their
right and the st Division on their left. For this purpose,
one troop of Scots Greys and one platoon of Cyclists were
placed at the disposal of the Brigadier. The function of
these troops was to scout forward through the forest,
teeling their way eautiously and mopping up as they
154 TI-IROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
went. No great amount of resistance was expected from
the retiring enemy and none was encountered, but, to
guard against the possibility of a counter-attack, these
mobile troops were closely supported by Infantry and
forward sections of Artillery.
The advance continued without check during the day
and, at 11.5o p.m., the ISt Division and the i26th French
Division succeeded in effecting a junction at Wassigny,
squeezing the 46th Division out of the line.
In all the delicate and anxious work of clearing these
forest obstacles, a main feature of the operations was the
close liaison maintained under difficult circumstances
between the French and the 46th Division. Again and
again, in order to envelop some more than ordinarily
difficult obstacle, French and British troops were com-
pelled to separate with the intention of meeting again
on the farther side of the strong-point or wood in question.
Continually during the fighting out flank troops, or the
French, were extricated from serious situations by their
Allies, and throughout the troops worked together with
the greatest camaraderie. The only visible effect of their
fighting alongside one another was an obvious desire to
excel in gallantry and in courtesy. Considerable difiïculty
was experienced in gaining touch, and unfortunate contre-
temps occurred, as when, at Forester's House, a French
ofiïcer, advancing through the open under the impression
that the post was already in our possession, was shot down
at point-blank range by German machine gunners. On
the saine occasion, further fighting resulted in a junction
being effected about 200 yards south of the post, and
here perhaps the "Entente Cordiale" reached its highest
pitch. French " poilus," themselves exhausted by a
day's hard fighting, insisted on emptying al] their water-
bottles and presented out men with the last drops of liquid
THE BATTLE OF ANDIGNY 155
they possessed. If is such incidents as these that, long
after the troubles of war are forgotten, will stand out in
the memories of the men who shared these trials and
passed through tragic days together. Memories of such
deeds of comradeship should go far indeed fo smooth
over the pin-pricks of petty international squabbles.
should such recttr in the halcyon days of peace.
In tfter-days, when our minds hark back to these
never-to-be-forgotten rimes, the men of the " cent-vingt-
sixième " will be among the best-remembered by their
comrades of the 46th Division, while, amongst the most
pleasant memories of the Staff, will be the recollection of
the courtesy which throughout was the hall-mark of the
French Command.
The part played by the 46th Division in the clearing
of Andigny Forest and ifs outlying woods came fo an
end on October i8th, when the Division retired for a few
well-earned days' rest. During the last ten days of
battling through wooded and enclosed country, checks
were frequent and casualties severe. The calibre of the
resistance encountered may be gauged from the fact that,
in the ]3attle of Andigny alone, prisoners were captured
from seventeen different regiments of six separate
I)ivisions. They were undoubtedly picked men chosen
fo fight in carefully selected positions as rearguards, while
the main German Armies made good their retreat fo the
line of the Sambre-Oise Canal.
13y the devoted work of his rearguards the enemy's
withdrawal fo this line was successfully effected, in spite
of the utmost our troops could do. A pause in the
operations then took place, vbile the Allied Armies dug
themselves in in their new positions, and drew breath for
the greater effort which was to break, once and for all,
the new canal and river line. The 46th Division, in the
156 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
meantime, in comfortable billets in Fresnoy and Bohain,
settled down to systematic training for its next leap
forward. These few days when the Division rested,
flushed with a series of successes which, they felt, equalled
the record of the best of the fighting troops of a fighting
Army, will not soon be forgotten. The records of the
past three weeks were written with blood and iron across
a stretch of twenty mlles of captured country. Over
7,000 prisoners, seventy guns, and machine guns too
numerous to count, had been sent back to swell the tale
of captures taken by the victorious t3ritish Armies in
this, the zenith of their career. Exhausted by the recent
heavy fighting, ail ranks were in a condition thoroughly
to enjoy the test that had been merited so well.
Yet, while the enemy still stood at bay, test could not
be allowed, even for a week, to monopolize out minds and
bodies. A carçfully prepared training programme pro-
vided both organized recreation and the more serious
preparation for future operations which was essential
if the Division was to maintain its high level of effort.
Each morning, the rolling downs round about Fresnoy
and Bohain were crowded with officers and men engaged
in tactical training. The afternoon saw dozens of foot-
ball teams engaged in mimic battle, while, evening after
evening, the crowded houses at the cinema and " Whizz-
bangs" * were sufficient witness that the lighter side of
life was being catered for so far as open warfare conditions
would permit.
Meanwhile, the news from all points was such as must
cheer the least sanguine heart amongst us. Bulgaria and
Turkey were down and out, and Austria was on her last
legs. In France, the chier enemy was being slowly but
inexorably beaten back ; the roar of the conflict receded,
 The 46th Divisional concert-troupe.
THE BATTLE OF ANDIGNY 157
slowly but surely, from the great cities he had threatened
and those he had held in iron grip so long. Thousands of
rejoicing citizens were being restored to France each
day and thousands more were streaming back along the
roads to homes denied to them for years. No wonder
the soldiers of the Allies walked like Kings. No thought
of possible reverse clouded their horizon near or far.
Germany. sullen but hopeless, was being beaten to her
knees and, already, rumours of an incredibly early break-
up were being bandied from lip to lip. Fatigue of body
and weariness of soul were alike forgotten. When,
on November 3rd, the call came for the Division to
move up in close support of the Ist Division, every man
was ready and eager to try conclusions with the enemy
once more.
PART IV
THE LAST PHASE : CATILLON TO SAINS
CHAPTER Vil
THE ADVANCE TO SAINS DU NORD
ON November Ist, after a slight pause for the advance
of railhead and for the bringing-up of the necessary
heavy artillery, a general assult was once more ordered.
The attack was to be on a greater scale than ever before,
the battle-front stretching from well north of Valenciennes
to west of Guise. The whole weight of the First, Third,
and Fourth British Armies and of the French Army on
out right was to be thrown against the new German line
in one huge sledge-hammer blow.
On out own small section of the front, the IX Corps,
facing the line of the Sambre-Oise Canal, was opposed by
a formidable obstacle, but, such was the enthusiasm of
the men, that no one felt the slightest doubt regarding
the outcome of the attack.
On the 3rd November, the Ist Division on the right
and the 32nd Division on the left of the Corps front
attacked and breached the line of the Canal, the 46th
Division Artillery assisting in the barrage fired to cover the
advance. The 46th Division, who had during the pre-
ceding days moved forward in readiness to exploit any
success, passed through the Ist Division and advanced, via
the Catillon-Mezières Road, fo take up the pursuit of the
158
THE LAST PHASE: CATILLON TO SAINS 159
retreating enemy. Here, at last, was really open warfare.
Never was the difference in moral between the British and
German Armies at this period of the war better shown
than on that day, when, their improvised defences once
more broken, the enemy Armies fled pell-mell towards
the Belgian frontier. Along the main roads leading from
the battlefields streamed columns of prisoners, the dirt
and stains of the battlefield yet on their persons, de-
moralized by their defeat and with open expressions
of joy at their capture. Here or there among them
strode an occasional officer or man who still held up his
head and looked the whole world in the face, refusing to
adroit his own or his country's defeat. Such men were
scarce, however, and those outbursts of defiance which
did occur were mostly contradicted by the circumstances
of the surrender of the men themselves.
The German rearguards fought well and with de-
votion, but signs were many that the main mass of the
tank and file were beaten to a finish. Visions of a
triumphal match to the Rhine were beginning to colour
the day-dreams of our men as the battalions swung
by singing and whistling, to try conclusions for the
last time with an enemy who was already morally de-
feated. So they marched steadily forward with well-
bronzed faces, neat uniforms, and workmanlike packs,
no mean sample of the irresistible human tide which
had burst the data constructed by the greatest military
Pover of out day across the face of Europe. Now the
column of German prisoners is past, and a very different
sight greets the eye of the advancing troops. It is the
Ist Division returning from its victory, and never before
had troops marched back from the battlefield more spick
and span, as though fron a review. Nota strap was
out of place, hot a button dull. Four by four the men
6o THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
swung past, exchanging a fusillade of chaff with their
comrades who marched forward to carry on the good work
they had so well begun. In their one night of leisure, ail
traces of conflict had disappeared, and the premier
Division of the British Army marched toits well-earned
rest as to a Ceremonial Parade. Well might the German
prisoners straggling along, fifty or sixty in charge of one
nonchalant guard, feel that Nemesis was at hand and
the day of their triumph passed for ever.
At the end of October, the Headquarters of the 46th
Division had been moved to Bohain and, after a few
days' test, the whole Division commenced to match to
their positions immediately in rear of the Ist Division.
Headquarters moved successively to Molain and l'Arbre
de Guise, where the General Staff remained, closely con-
nected by telephone with the Staff of the Ist Division
in their advanced Headquarters at Bellevue Farm.
Here after the battle, the G.O.C. 46th Division took over
command of the sector, and orders were issued to the
I38th Brigade to relieve the Ist Brigade and endeavour
to locate the position of the retiring enemy.
Active patrol work was carried out on the night of the
4th/sth November and, in the eafly hours of the 5th,
out Infantry had pushed forward as far as Zobeau and
Grand Toaillon Farm. During the advance, little resist-
ance was encountered, and four 77-millimetre and three
Io'5-centimetre guns were captured.
On November 5th, the I39th Brigade from their new
billets at Carillon, and the I37th Brigade from Bois de
l'Abbaye and the district round La Louvière Farm, were
instructed to pass through the I4th Infantry Brigade and
the I38th Infantry Brigade and to take up the pursuit,
keeping the enemy on the run so far as possible. Both
Brigades met with little opposition and, by the evening
]RIG&DIER GEIERAL J. HARIIGTOI» ]ï).S.O., ]RIGADE COItlIAINDER
I39TH INFAITIY ]IIGADE
l¢,cproduccd 10y comtcsy of E]]iott & Fry, 55, Baker Street Londou X" L
THE LAST PHASE: CATILLON TO SAINS 161
of the 5th, an outpost line was established on the line
Barzy-Prisches and to the north, touch being obtained
with the French at Barzy. Here some opposition wa
encountered from the enemy posted on high ground
north and east of Prisches, and the advance of the i39th
Brigade was supported by a barrage of I8-pounders and
4"5 howitzers.
For the advance, one R.G.A. Brigade and two additional
R.F.A. Brigades had been allotted to the Division. Of
these, one Brigade R.F.A. vas attached to each of the
fighting Brigades, the other three Artillery Brigades being
held in reserve under the orders oI the C.R.A. 46th
Division.
The enemy having very thoroughly destroyed the
bridge over the Canal at Carillon, all the Divisional
transport and the Field Artillery were compelled to cross
the Canal by a pontoon bridge thrown across by the
Divisional Engineers west of Bois de l'Abbaye. Transport
difficulties were thus considerable. The pontoon bridges
were in themselves barely sufficient to take the traffic,
and the approach to the bridges from both banks was
across open fields. "[hese were soon churned into a sea
of mud in which limbers and guns more often than not
stuck fast, in their attempts to pass over. Traces and
harness were broken again and again and,finally, transport
had tobe lined up in a queue some distance from the
bridge and each separate vehicle rushed over at the gallop.
It was quite clear that, unless the situation was quickly
taken in hand and the approaches improved, the Divisional
transport might be held up for an indefinite period. The
465th Field Company, who were working on the bridge,
rose to the occasion, however, and a corduroy road was
constructed, the bridges were improved, and the transport
finally flowed across in a steady stream. So was the first
II
x62 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
of the river-obstacles surmounted without too much delay,
and the Artillery enabled to dash forward, make up for
lost rime, and cover the advance of their respective
Infantry Brigades.
In the meantime, the site of the old bridge at Carillon
had been reconnoitred, and the gap partially filled with
fascines, sandbags, and débris. The Canal was thus ruade
passable for Infantry, who could cross with no further in-
convenience than wet feet. Motor-cyclist despatch riders
were also able to cross, volunteers carrying their machines
over, but all other transport had to be directed via Bois
de l'Abbaye until the 6th, by which date the Corps
Engineers had completed a bridge for lorry traflîc.
On the morning of the 6th November, the I39th Brigade
advanced under a comparatively light barrage and, when
an advance of I,ooo yards had been ruade, the enemy
abandoned his positions and little more resistance was
experienced during the day. Both Brigades reached
their objectives without difficulty, the speed of their
advance being limited only by the necessity of keeping
them in signal touch with Division and supplied with
rations and ammunition.
The leading battalion of tle x39th Brigade, the 5th
Sherwoods, had spread outwards on either side to envelop
Prisches, w/file one company of the 8th Sherwoods was
detailed to mop up the village itself. This battle was in
marked contrast to everything that had gone before it.
To the initiated, who knew that in a few minutes a barrage
would open up, it was an extraordinary sensation to see
the old men and women of the village and the farmhouses
about, moving their household effects peacefully in wheel-
barrows and odds and ends of carts up and down the road
between Battalion Headquarters and the gun-positions.
As the barrage opened, civilians appeared in crowds from
THE LAST PHASE: CATILLON TO SAINS 163
every direction, laughing and gesticulating as if the battl,
were being fought for their amusement alone. Fortunately,
the "Boche" had withdrawn his guns and there was no
reply, or many lires would have been lost in the streets of
Prisches. As if was, the battle passed off like a parade.
The Sherwoods advanced cautiously, but with few
casualties, and the enemy machine gunners melted away
before the tire of out guns, tobe seen no more until
Cartigny was approached.
While the battle was still in progress, the 8th Sher-
woods in support were making a triumphal entry into
Prisches.
Nowhere had the khaki uniform been received with
greater demonstration. The inhabitants greeted the
" point " of the leading company with flowers and fruit
and with a strange concoction--a liquor ruade from a
species of prune. It was impossible fo keep formation.
The advance into the town soon resolved itself into a
procession in single file; oflîcers and men pushed their
way gently but firmly along, surrounded by crowds of
civilians giving vent to their feelings as only French
people can do. A lad of eighteen, who had been hidden
for four months in a room behind a German oflîcers'
mess, climbed up the church steeple with the tricolour in
his hand, while German snipers were taking shots at
him from posts beyond the town. Little cared he as
he climbed until he achieved his ambition, and im-
mortalized himself by nailing the colours triumphantly
to the very top of the steeple. Here, as everywhere else,
the rescued inhabitants set themselves to do the little
they could, both to increase the comfort of the men to
whom they owed relief, and to assist them to the utmost
of their ability in the task of speeding the "Boche" back
to the home he should never bave left. Leadingcitizens
164 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
of the town at once organized gangs of the more able-
bodied members of the population. Soon, willing hands
were hard at work filling up the craters left in all the
principal roads by mines fired by the enemy as he retreated.
Not all of these had exploded, however. Delay-action
mines were numerous, but few of these had escaped the
notice of eyes eager to serve their country and her Allies.
Mine after mine was pointed out and labelled, and it
was in no small degree due to this gratuitous help that
casualties from mines were to a great extent avoided.
During the day the advance was continued to Cartignies,
which was entered by the 5th Sherwoods and troops
of the I37th Brigade, in spite of some opposition from
enemy machine gunners. The weather had been bad,
tain pouring down steadily all day, but nothing served to
damp the enthusiasm, either of the troops, or of the
inhabitants who turned out in great numbers to greet
them.
Here was seen the extraordinary sight of a battalion
marching in fours into a town the outskirts of which wre
still held by enemy machine gunners, a continuous stream
of bullets from across the River Petite Helpe striking the
houses. A billeting party, undeterred by this too warm
reception, continued its work and the battalion, tired
after its day's match, settled down in billets in the outpost
line. Many were the amusing contretemps due to this
proximity to an irritated enemy, who had had to leave
his comfortable quarters for wet and windy bivouacs on
the safe side of the river. Two officers of the Sherwoods,
having round a complete German officer's kit abandoned
by its owner, inadvertently settled down on the exposed
side of a house to examine the booty. Wrapped in
their congenial task, they failed to notice the attention
they were receiving, until a spatter of machine-gun bullets
THE LAST PHASE: CATILLON TO SAINS 165
on the walls above reminded them that the owner of the
kit might not be so very far away after all, and that
it was indiscreet as well as impolite to open it under his
observation.
The night passed in quietness, disturbed only by
occasional angry bursts of tire from across the river,
where the enemy retained his positions until daylight.
On the following day, November 7th, the I38th Brigade
relieved the I37th and I39th Brigades and continued the
advance across the Petite Helpe. Here a momentary
check was experienced, for the tains had been heavy and
the little river was in flood. All bridges had been
destroyed by the enemv and, once more, the Engineers
were called upon to provide the means of crossing. The
men of the 468th Field Company were at once set to work
and, before the daylight had fled, no less than three bridges
spanned the stream. Later in the day, the 465th Field
Company, who had been en_aged in filling mine-craters
on the main Prisches-Cartignies Road, reached the bank
of the river farther to the south and commenced work
on a bridge for motor transport, vhich vas completed
by 4.30 p.m. on November 9th.
On November 8th, also, the 466th Field Company were
ordered to construct a bridge across the river suflïcient
to carry 6o-pounder guns. 1 he site of the old bridge was
reserved for a motor-transport bridge, which was to be
built at a later date by the Corps, but a place was chosen
near by to give the maximum of road approach. A
bridge of 75 feet span was constructed, but could
only be reported fit for horse transport by nightfall. The
enemy vas retiring quickly, however, and the passage of
the heavy guns was a matter of urgency in order that the
whole Division might continue the pursuit. The recon-
struction of the bridge to a stronger design was therefore
166 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
commenced at lO.3O p.m., fresh material having been
received from Prisches. Af 12.3o a.m. on the 9th, the
bridge was certified fit for the guns, was examined and
approved by the Artillery officer in charge of them, and
the "heavies" limbered up and crossed.
It is estimated that 3,000 guns and other vehicles
crossed the bridge within twenty-four hours of ifs com-
pletion, comprising the heavy transport of our own
Division, part of the transport of the French Corps on our
right, and the whole of the transport of the 32nd Division
on our left. From these figures, some idea can be gleaned
of the impedimenta of a Division on the march. Keeping
touch with the enemy by means of mounted troops
and scouting Infantry is the least part of the task involved,
and these days, when three British Armies chased the
Germans across a country devoid of food and forage,
were not the least severe test on the organization which
had to ensure the arrival and distribution of the supplies
and ammunition, without which pursuit would bave been
futile and dangerous.
Busy days indeed for both " G " and " Q." Divisional
Headquarters moved every two or three days, and, the
higher the formation, the more difficult is the movement
of ifs Headquarters. A company packs up its tin box
of papers and the balance of ifs imprest account and is
ready fo move af a moment's notice, with or without
transport. The move of Battalion Headquarters is a
little less simple, and Adjutants have been known fo look
worried when moves were frequent and unexpected.
Brigade is the first formation with a tendency to split into
advanced and rear headquarters. Brigade Headquarters
transport is of respectable dimensions, though still horse-
drawn, and so able to tackle pontoon bridges and the
viler roads which lead thereto. Moves of Divisional
THE LAST PHASE: CATILLON TO SAINS 16 7
Headquarters, however, require some thought and
preparation and, of even more importance under present
circumstances, two-way roads for lorry transport. The
enemy's thorough demolition of roads and bridges was.
therefore, a serious obtacle to the advance of the Division.
Divisional Headquarters as a whole could not move in
advance of the main motor-traffic roads, so lines of
communication forward of the Division increased in length
and problems of supply became more and more acute.
In a similar manner, the enemy's systematic destruction
of the railways delayed the advance of railhead and
made the supply of Division and Corps a much more
complicated and difficult problem. The railway lines,
as far back as St. Quentin and Le Cateau, were full
of delay-action mines, cunningly hidden and, even if
found, impossible of extrication without the chance of
an explosion. Day after day, fresh mines went up, when
all work forward of the new gap would be rendered
useless. So railhead wavered backwards and forwards,
and the lorry transport of the Armies was overtaxed and
unable to cope with the situation. At this time, it became
evident to the Higher Command that a pause would
soon have tobe called in the pursuit. Large numbers of
liberated civilians had to be fed out of the British soldiers'
ration and this, while the necessity was met ungrudgingly,
still further complicated the food question.
On the 8th November, Divisional Headquarters moved
to Prisches and, on the following day, a warning was
received from the Corps that further forward movement
would be impossible for several days.
The lengthening of the Divisional lines of communica-
tion threw heavy work on the Signal Company. At the
commencement of the advance, a forward party consisting
of three cable detachments and a complete Signal Office
I68 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
Staff was ruade up and placed under the command of one
of the subalterns of the company. He was given in-
structions to keep in close touch with the leading Brigade
advancing along the main Divisional route, fo find out
from the Brigadier each evening his probable moves for
the following day, and to anticipate these moves as far
as possible. In this way, at least one cable pair was laid
along the road hedges or poled over open spaces and kept
well ahead of Brigade Headquarters, ready for use when
a new headquarters was established for the night. This
pair was reinforced as soon as possible by a second pair,
and the lines made as secure as possible. A Corps cable
detachment then followed up at its leisure, making the
cables quite safe and improving the route. Whenever
possible, old German permanent routes were used,
stretches several miles long being sometimes round so
little destroyed that it was possible to make them good.
In this way, good speaking was obtained between Brigade
and Division--far better indeed than between Division
and Corps, where lines were even longer. Visual signalling
was impossible in the close country through which we were
advancing, but, by means of leapfrog tactics, continu-
ous wireless communication was maintained. Wireless
proved very useful also for the collection and dissemina-
tion of news of general interest.
The ether was overcharged with epoch-making items
of news in these stirring days, and the crowds of English
and French round the Wireless Press notices, where the
English and French communiqués were displayed side by
side, were quite one of the features of the street-scenes in
Prisches, Cartignies, and later in Sains du Nord.
The bridging of the Petite Helpe having been completed
suf-ficiently to allow horsed transport to pass, the pursuit
was once more pressed with vigour. The I38th Brigade
THE LAST PHASE: CATILLON TO SAINS x6 9
were instructed to make towards Avesnes, and pushed
forward to establish themselves on the high ground to
the south-east of that town.
Considerable resistance was next encountered in the
country south-west of Avesnes and along the Avesnes-
Etroeungt Road. Late in the day, the 5th Leicesters
overcame the enemy's resistance along this road and
established themselves astride of it, capturing a four-gun
battery and sixteen prisoners. The French on out right,
however, were counter-attacked and forced to retire,
thus exposing the flank of the Brigade, and, until the
situation was restored, a defensive flank had to be thrown
back. On out left, we were in touch with the 32nd
Division near Avesnelles and little resistance was en-
countered in this direction.
The check was only momentary, however, though atone
time the enemy's shelling reached an intensity remotely
resembling that of former days. For a few hours during
the day, the neighbourhood of Grand Maison Farm, where
some of our artillery was in position, was heavily punished,
but this was the last occasion the enemy's guns were to
trouble us at all. The rapid advance of the Infantry and
of the screen of Cavalry forced the retirement of such
guns as escaped capture.
On the 8th November, this last organized attempt at
resistance was overcome with the assistance of concentra-
tions of our own heavy and light artillery. After several
hours fighting, the enemy gave way in all directions
and the Brigade marched unhindered to their final
objectives for the day. On the 9th November, the
advance was resumed, but halted according to orders on
a general line Sains du Nord-Semeries, inclusive. At
the former place, one of those unfortunate occurrences
happened, of which the wonder is that they are not more
I7o THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
frequent in modern warfare, fought as it is in three
dimensions. While our troops were pressing onwards
towards Semeries, leaving Sains on their left flank, French
Infantry and Cavalry were pouring along the roads to the
south of that town and into the country beyond. The
streets of Sains were full of rejoicing civilians clustering
round the few Signal and R.A.M.C. officers who had yet
round their way into the town, and to whose presence they
were not yet accustomed. A party of English officers
guided by the Curé were making an examination of the
wrecked railway-bridge lying across the main road and of
the abandoned stores in and about the railway-station
Suddenly, the air seemed full of the drone of aeroplane
engines and, looking up, the sky was seen dotted with
British planes circling round the town and evidently
trying to make out the identity of the crowd collected in
the streets. The conclusion arrived at was soon pointed
in a most unpleasant manner.
Bullets sprayed into the town from the machine guns
of the planes, while a little farther to the south and
east, dull crash after dull crash announced the fact that
our planes were bombing the roads near by. For some
minutes the bombardment continued, until one plane,
sweeping nearer earthwards than the rest, must have
picked up the message of the frantically-waving handker-
chiefs and hands.
The firing ceased, but hot before several casualties
had been caused, almost the last cases treated by the
medical officers of the Division being some of our French
Allies wounded by splinters from the bombs, or by
machine-gun tire.
No further fighting took place, though scouting-parties
were pushed out through Ramousies and Liessies without
gaining touch with the enemy. On the Ioth November..
THE LAST PHASE: CATILLON TO SAINS I7I
orders were received for the Cavalry and Corps Cyclists
attached to the Division tobe transferred to Major-
General Bethell's mobile force. The I38th Brigade
received orders to stand fast on the outpost line held by
them, and the part played by the 46th Division in the
war had corne to an end.
The Ilth November, Armistice Day, while it was
received with quiet thankfulness and pride, was marked
by no such rejoicings as at home. The Division rested on
its arms, thoroughly exhausted after the strenuous work
of the last two months. A consciousness of work well
done was in the mind of every man, but the main feeling
was one of release from strain. "[he \Var was won. Time
enough for rejoicings in the future; now was the rime
for utter relaxation of effort. Rest was needed--physical,
mental, and moral--and for two or three days the mini-
mure of effort only was asked from the men. Many a quiet
toast was drunk at mess that evening, but there was no
"' mafiïcking," and the streets of Sains were quiet as on a
normal night.
It was a fitting end to a mighty effort. Here, on
Armistice night, the Division lay in the town where Kaiser
Wilhelm II had his home during the strenuous months
of the German spring and summer offensive. Hard by,
and well within our lines, was Avesnes, where the Great
General Staff had planned and executed their mightiest
blows at the Allied Armies. Just ahead of us was the
]3elgian frontier, already abandoned by the fleeing German
Armies, and the crossing of which would pretty well
complete the liberation of France from the yoke of the
invader. Considering the Division as an entity, as it.is
to all who have the honour to belong toit, in what better
place could its history end ?
In future wars the North Midland Division may play a
172 THROUGH THE HINDENBURG LINE
part as great as in the past, but never will its members
have reason to be ashamed of the example set in the
autumn of 1918.
The work of clearing up the battlefields proceeds apace,
but the Scars of War are deep and will not easily be hidden
or erased.
To-day, walking along a country road, the author of
thîs account came acr6gs a shell hole filled with bloody
water. Hard by, the hoof of a horse protruded from a
hasty grave. Again, not many yards away, a British
soldier's shrapnel-drilled steel helmet lay asprawl upon the
ground.
Blood, hoof, and helmet--all three mute witnesses to
one small incident in the greatest tragedy the world has
ever seen.
To the living are the Fruits of Victory, but let us not
forget our glorious Dead. There cannot be a single
officer or man of the 46th Division but has cause to mourn
the loss of a brother, a comrade, or a friend of more
peaceful days. Let us endeavour to make the England
in whose defence they fell a better place for ourselves
and for our and their descendants. So may we dedicate
our lires, as this short history of the exploits of the 46th
Division is dedicated, to those who gave their lires for
an ideal.
So shall the men who fell at Hohenzollern Redoubt, at
Gornmecourt, at Bellenglise, at Ramicourt and Andigny,
or a thousand other unnamed places, feel that after all
their great sacrifice was hot ruade in vain.
Thus we may leave them lying in their oft-times name-
less graves in France, but with their memories enshrined
lçEMoRIAL CROSS ERECTED ON TH] -IIGH GROUND NEAR
BELLENGLISE IN I[EMORY OF TI-1E FALLEN OF THE
DVSON.
THE LAST PHASE: CATILLON TO SAINS 173
in the Souls of their Comrades and their names engraved
on a grateful country's Honour Roll.
Shall we prove worthy of the heritage they leave us ?
This is the question vhich faces each man of the Allied
Armies to-day, and on out ansver hangs the Fate, not only
of ourselves, but of the World.
APPENDIX I
GERMAN DIVISIONS ENCOUNTERED AND DE-
FEATED BY THE 46TH (NORTH MIDLAND)
DIVISION BETWEEN THE PERIOD 4TH
SEPTEMBER TO IITH NOVEMBER, 98
2nd Division.
5th Reserve Division.
xsth Reserve Division.
22nd Reserve Division.
4th Division.
25th Reserve Division
9th Division.
34th Division.
75th leserve Division.
79th Reserve Division.
8xst leserve Division.
84th Reserve Division.
xxgth Division.
x97th Division.
22'st Division.
4st Division.
APPENDIX II
CASUALTIES BETWEEN 24TH SEPTEMBER AND
IITH NOVEMBER, 1918
Officers. Other Ranks.
Killed . . 5 ° 541
Wounded .  158 2,938
Missing - 5 417
Gassed  4 85
Total 2I 7 Total. 3,98I _
APPENDIX III
IMMEDIA TE REWARDS GRANTED TO 46TH (NORTH
MIDLAND) DIVISION FROM 24TH SEPTEMBER
TO IITH NOVEMBER, 1918
OjCg,¥S :
Other Ran, ks :
V.C. 2
Bar to'D.S.0. 3
D.S.O.. II
2nd Bar to I.C.. 3
Bar to M.C. . I6
M.C. . . 92
V.C. . 2
M.C. I
Bar to'D.C.I. 4
D.C.M. 54
2nd Bar to M.M.. 2
Bar to M.M. . 26
M.M .... 366
582
Officers. Other Rs.nks.
FRENCH CROIX DE GUEmE . - 13
CHEVALIER DE L'ORDRE LEOPOLD I 9
]EL6IAN DECORATION MILITAIRE . -- 2
x76
APPENDIX IV
ORDER OF BATTLE, FEBRUARY 28TH, 1915
G.O.C.
A.D.C.s
G.S.O.I.
G.S.O. 2.
G.S.O. 3-
A.A. & Q.M.G
D.A.A. & Q.M.G.
D.A.Q.M.G.
A.D.M.S.
Major-General the Hon. E. J. M.
Stuart-Wortley, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
M.V.O.
f2nd Lieutenant R. Stuart-Wortley,
j Hants Yeomanry.
"|Lieutenant J. H. M. Marquis of
I. Granby, 4th Leicesters.
Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel)
W. H. F. Weber, R.A.
Major Armitage, R. of O.
Captain D. D. Wilson, Indian Cavalry.
Lieutenant-Colonel E. Allen, R. of O.
Captain F. H. Dansey, Wilts Regiment.
Major S. F. Legge, Royal Fusiliers.
Lieutenant-Colonel (temporary Colo-
nel) W. C. Beevor, C.M.G., R.A.M.C.
Captain W. McC. Wanklyn, R.A.M.C.
Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel)
W. A. McDougall, A.V.C. (T.F.).
Major R. H. V. Kelly, R.A.
Major T. C. Newbold, 5th Sherwood
Foresters.
O.C. Divisional Signal
Eompany
C.R.E.
C.R.A.
Brigade Major, R.A.
I2
Major E. A. Lewis.
Brigadier-General C. V.
Stratford, R.E.
Brigadier-General H. M.
R.A.
Major P. P. Budge, R.A.
x77
Wingfield-
Campbell,
178
Stafî Captain
A.D.C.
Ist Nort'h M]dland
Brigade, R.F.A. .
2nd North Midland
Brigade, R.F.A.
3rd North Midland
APPEND iX IV
Captain W. J. Bedow:-;.
Lieutenant Erquhart.
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Tonge, T.D.
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir S. Hill Child,
M.V.O.
Lieutenant-Colonel C. C. Leveson-
Brigade, R.F.A. . Gower.
4th North Midland
Brigade, R.F.A. How. Lieutenant-Colonel L. G. Gisborne.
North Midland D.A.C. Lieutenant-Colonel R. P. Leach.
North Midland Heavy
Battery Lieutenant-Colonel W. Hînd.
Colonel
Brigade Major
Staff Captain
!
5th Sherwood Foresters
6th Sherwood Foresters
SHERWOOD FORESTERS BRIGADE
(temporary Brigadier-General) C. T. Shipley, late
Royal Fusiliers.
Major E. M. Morris, Devon Regiment.
Captain R. Wordsworth, 8th Sher-
wood Foresters.
Lieutenant-Colonel G. Mosley, T.D.
Lieutenant-Çolonel G. D. Goodman,
V.D.
*TthSherwoodForesters Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Birkin.
8th Sherwood Foresters Lieutenant-Colonel G. Fowler.
LINCOLN AND LEICESTER BRIGADE
Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) Clifford, late Middlesex
Regiment.
Brigade Major Major R. L. Adlercron,Cameron High-
landers.
Staff Captain . Captain J. E. Vicars, 4th Leicesters.
Lieutenant-Colonel R. E. Martin.
Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. Jones, T.D.
Lieutenant-Colonel J. w. Jessop, T.D.
Lieutenant-Colonel T. E. Sandall.
* These units were transferred fo the 59th Division on the 29th
January, 1918. on Brigades being reduced from four to three bittalions.
4th Leicesters.
5th Leicesters.
*4th Lincolns .
5th Lincolns
APPEND IX IV x79
GTAFFORD BRIGADE
Colonel (Temporary Brigadier-General) W. Bromilow.
Brigade Major Major R. Abadie, K.R.R.
Staff Captain Captain G. E. Elwell, 6th South
Staffords.
*5th North Staffords Lieutenant-Colonel J. Knight.
6th North Staffords. Lieutenant-Colonel J. Gretton.
5th South Staffords . Lieutenant-Colonel R. R. Raymer.
6th South Staffords . Lieutenant-Colonel T. F. Waterhouse,
T.D.
O.C. Divisional Train Lieutenant-Colonel E. L. Mears.
S.S.O. Lieutenant (temporary Major) F. J.
\Vilde.
O.C. North Midland
Div. Cyclist Co. Captain T. S. Black.
Ist N.M.F.A. Lieutenant-Colonel E. A. Wraith,
R.A.M.C. (T.).
2nd N.M.F.A.. Major R. M. \\'est, R.A.M.C. (T.).
3rd N.M.F.A.. Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. C. Dent,
R.A.M.C. (T.).
N.M. Div. San. Sec. Lieutenant W. K. Parbury, R.A.M.C.
(T.).
N.M. Mob. Vet. Sec.. Captain C. Hartley, A.Y.C. (T.F.).
* This unit was transferred fo the 59th Division on the 29th
January, I918, on Brigades being reduced from four fo thre battalion,.
APPENDIX V
ORDER OF BATTLE, SEPTEMBER 29TH, x9x8
G.O.C.
A.A. and Q.M.G.
D.A.A.G.
D.A.Q.M.G.
A.D.M.S.
D.A.D.M.S.
D.A.D.O.S.
D.A.P.M.
D.A.D.V.S.
O.C. Divisional Train .
S.S.O.
Divisional ]uria1 Officer
Divisional Gas Officer.
Divisional Salvage Ofiïcer .
Divisional Interpretation
Officer.
Senior Chaplain .
Ammunition Ofiïcer
Camp Commandant . .
Forward Observation Ofiïcer
46TH DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS
Major-General G. F. Boyd,
C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.M. (F).
Lieutenant C. R. R. Romer.
 [Captain A. S. Neale, M.C.
Lieutenant-Colonel C. F. Jer-
ram, D.S.O.
Major S. Hay, D.S.O.
Captain M. H. J. Burns-Lin-
dowo
Lieutenant-Colonel R. Duck-
worth, D.S.O.
Major H. N. Forbes, M.C.,
D.C.M.
Major K. G. Williams
Colonel T. Kay, D.S.O.
Major S. R. Foster, M.C. (F.).
Major G. M. Manuelle, M.C.
Major C. L. Veal.
Major C. Hartley.
Lieutenant-Colonel E. L.
Mears, D.S.O.
Major F. J. Wilde, M.C.
Lieutenant R. K. Ewan.
Captain K. J. S. Ferrall.
Lieutenant B. W. Dale.
Lieutenant S. Read.
Rev. G. S. Willimott.
Lieutenant E. V. Grimston.
Captain W. B. T. Rees.
Lieutenant J. Walker, M.C.
i8o
APPENDIX V rSx
TRAFFIC OFFICERS
O.C. 24cth Employment
Company
O.C. Additional Stetche;
Bearers
Attached
O.C. 46th M.T. Company
Captain H. M. M. Smyth.
Lieutenant W. J. Lyness.
Lieutenant F. T. Evans.
Lieutenant H. J. Winfield.
Captain D. G. Wells.
Lieutenant H. Booth.
fCaptain F. M. A. Plant, M.C
.Lieutenant B. C. Newbold.
Major R. E. Maude.
HEADQUARTERS, 46TH DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY
Brigadier-General Sir Hill Child, Bart., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O
Major G. S. Cooper, D.S.O.
Captain H. W. L. Kearns.
Lieutenant H. R. Mather.
230TH BRIGADE, R.F.A., HEADQUARTERS
Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. W. Tapp, D.S.O.
Captain A. S. Beardsley.
Captain G. E. Bourne, C.F.
Captain T. Thomson, A.V.C.
Lieutenant R. C. Davidson.
Lieutenant T. L. Doyle, M.C., U.S.A.
A /e3 o Battery
Major J. J. Read, D.S.O. (Battery Commander).
Lieutenant S. Turner.
znd Lieutenant W. H. J. Hooton.
2nd Lieutenant C. E. Sykes.
B/e3 o Battery
Captain R. G. Lyttelton (Battery Commander).
Lieutenant V. A. Prichard, M.C.
Lieutenant L. W. Webb.
Lieutenant C. H. Wlfittingham.
8z APPENDIX V
C]23o Battery
Major V. B. Rowe, M.C. (Battery Commander).
Lieutenant A. L. Graham, M.C
2nd Lieutenant H. Maclean.
znd Lieutenant W. Emery.
D/23 o Battery
Major S. C. Wright, D.S.O. (Battery Commander).
Lieutenant D. Gray.
Lieutenant R. W. T. Jones.
2nd Lieutenant C. P. Burges.
23IST BRIGADE, R.F.A.
Lieutenant-Colonel N. G. M. Jervis, D.S.O.
2nd Lieutenant K. D. Abrahams, M.M.
Captain W. G. Thomson, A.V.C.
Captain J. Lang, R.A.M.C.
A/23I Batlery
Major G. L. Wright, M.C. (Battery Commander).
Lieutenant A. V. Maddock, M.C.
2nd Lieutenant W. E. Date.
2nd Lieutenant M. G. Jones.
B/23I Battery
Major G. Campbell, M.C. (Battery Commander).
Lieutenant S. J. Smith.
Lieutenant J. S. Allport.
2nd Lieutenant R. S. L. \Vhite.
C/23I Battery
Major C. R. Morris-Eyton, M.C. (Battery Commander).
Lieutenant H. E. Boucher.
2nd Lieutenant J. Lee.
2nd Lieutenant J. C. Binns.
D/23I Battery
Major A. G. Hewson, M.C. (Battery Commander).
Lieutenant D. A. Carr.
2nd Lieutenant S. W. ]3ridgwater.
2nd Lieutenant N. A. Bramwell.
APPENDIX V x83
46TH I)IVISIONAL AMMUNITION ÇOLUMN HEADQUARTERS
Major J. R. Wilson.
çaptain W. Savory, M.C.
Captain W. T. \Vood (R.A.M.C.).
Section I
çaptain J. B. Murphy.
Section II
Captain J. H. Thursfield.
S.A.A. Section
Captain H. Payne.
D.T.M.O.
Captain C. A. Paulden, M.C.
COMMANDING X/46 T.M. BATTFRY
Captain E. Porter.
CMMANDING Y/46 T.M. BATTER¥
Captain R. L. Hunter, M.C., IE.
ROYAL ENGINEERS, HEADQUARTERS
Lieutenant-Colonel H. T. Morshead, D.S.O. (wounded at duty),
C.R.E.
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Garforth, D.S.O., M.C., Acting C.R.E.
Captain H. J. C. Marshall, Adjutant R.E.
Lieutenant A. R. Page, Assistant Adjutant R.E.
465Ttt FIELD COMPANY, R E
Major W. H. Hardman, M.C., Commanding Officer.
Captain G. H. Jones, M.C., 2nd-in-Cornmand.
Lieutenant A. E. Rome, Section Oflïcer.
Lieutenant M. E. Thomas, M.C.. Section Officer.
end Lieutenant J. Ainscouth, Section Oflïcer.
end Lieutenant L. Blacklock, Section Oflïcer.
I84 APPENDIX V
466TH FIELD COMPANY, R.E.
Major H. M. Fordham, M.C., Commanding Officer.
Captain H. C. Laly, 2nd-in-Command.
Lieutenant A. Fox, Section Officer.
Lieutenant A. E. Hubbard, Section Officer.
Lieutenant F. "1". James, M.C., Section Officer.
2nd Lieutenant T. H. Midgley, Section Oflïcer.
468TH FIELD COMVANY, R.E.
Major G. C. Lowbridge, Commanding Officer.
Captain McGregor, M.C., 2nd-in-Command.
Lieutenant W. Young, M.C., Section Officer.
Lieutenant F. ]3. Nay]or, Section Officer.
Lieuetnant M. R. Boyce, Section Oflïcer.
Lieutenant R. D. T. Collier, Section Officer.
46TIt DIVlSIONAL SIGNAL COMPANY, R.E.
Major E. A. Lewis, D.S.O., Officer Commanding.
Captain R. E. Priestley, M.C., 2nd-in-Command.
Captain S. W. Kirby, M.C., O.C.R.A. Signals.
Lieutenant W. H. Aldrich, O.C. Signais, 137th Brigade.
Lieutenant M. V. Jones, O.C. Signals, 138th Brigade.
Lieutenant F. H. Steggall, M.Ç., O.C. Signais, I39th Brigade.
Lieutenant G. A. Knapp, M.C., O.C. Signais, 231st Brigade,
R.F.A.
Lieutenant S. A. Moore, O.C. No. I Section.
Lieutenant H. S. Walker, Wireless Oflïcer.
Lieutenant A. C. Cowe, Section Officer.
2nd Lieutenant R. G. Wills, M.C., M.M., O.C. Signals, 23oth
Brigade, R.F.A.
2nd Lieutenant R. S. Lowe.
2nd Lieutenant W. E. Thomas.
2nd Lieutenant R. V. Jenner, O.C. Signais, Machine Gun
Battalion.
2nd Lieutenant A. P. Boone, Wireless Officer.
x37TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
Brigadier-General J. V. Campbell, V.C., C.M.G.,
Brigade Commander.
Captain A. C. T. White, V.C., M.C., Brigade Major.
D.S.O.,
APPENDIX V 185
Captain I. Jackson, M.C., Staff Captain.
Lieutenant C. R. Krell, Intelligence Ofiïcer.
Lieutenant S. B. Bridgwood, M.C., Brigade Bombing Officer.
Captain J. D. Luc "khoff, "G " Learner.
end Lieutenant R. Briars, "" Q '" Learner.
I/STH BATTALION SOUTtI STAFFORDSHIRE REGIMENT
Lieutenant-Colonel A. \Vhite, D.S.O., Commanding Offices.
Maior C. C. Dowding, D.S.O., M.C., 2nd-in-Command.
Captain A. E. Machin, Adiutant.
2nd Lieutenant W. J. Bond, Intelligence Oflïcer.
nd Lieutenant C. H. \Valton, Lewis Gun Oflïcer.
Captain G. H. Ball, D.S.O., M.C.
2nd Lieutenant L. F. Burton, M.C., M.M.
2nd Lieutenant C. S. Embrey, M.C.
Captain W. C. Duflïeld, Quartermaster.
Lieutenant E. Wigzell, Transport Oflïcer.
Company Commaluiers
Captain L. L. Tyler.
Lieutenant R. H. Gillender, M.C.
Captain E. J. H. Meynell, M.C.
Platoon Commanders
2nd Lieutenant C. Jones, M.C.
H. Howell.
W. B. Brown.
.... J.B. Bushby.
.... W. Payne.
.... A.C. Moore, M.M
A. C. Bull.
.... J.V. Blunt.
L. Pearson.
.... H. Hooper.
.... A.J. Musgrove.
.... J.N. Whittaker.
H. G. Waters.
A. W. Vizer, M.M.
186 APPENDIX V
I]6TH BATTALION SOUTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGIMENT
Lieutenant-Colonel C. Lister, D.S.O., M.C., Cmmanding
Officer.
Maior J. M. Frew, M.C., 2nd-in-Command.
Captain J. P. Wood, Adjutant.
2nd Lieutenant T. L. Freeman, Signal Officer.
Company Commanders
Captain G. S. Harris, M.C.
Major E. Lewis.
Captain P. R. Teeton, M.C.
Captain A. P. Buswell, M.C.
Platoon Commanders
2nd Lieutenant F. C. Beech.
.... G. Evans.
.... C.W. Briand.
.... J. Baker, M.C.
.... P.W. Burgess, M.C., M.M.
.... F.A. Morgan, M.C.
Lieutenant M. E. Williams, M.C.
2nd Lieutenant H. Watts, D.Ç.M.
.... J. Robinson.
.... S. \Valters, M.C.
.... C.P.H. Sylvester.
.... L.J. Knight.
.... R. Smith.
H. W. Wooton.
Lieutenant J. A. Armstrong, M.C.
,, H.C. Marriott, M.C.
I/6TH BATTALION NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGIMENT
Lieutenant-Colonel T. R. Evans, Commanding.
Captain V. E. Green, Adjutant.
Lieutenant F. E. Burt, Assistant Adjutant.
Captain G. Maher, Quartermaster.
Captain M. Radcliffe, Transport Officer.
Lieutenant J. R. Wicks, Signal Officer.
Lieutenant T. Beale, Lewis Gun Officer.
APPENDIX V 187
Company CommaMers
2nd Lieutenant H. N. Thompson.
Captain A. H. çharlton, D.S.O., M.C.
2nd Lieutenant F. L. May.
Captain F. J. Newton, M.C.
Platoon Coîtmauters
2nd Lieutenant W. S. Angus.
.... F.E. Brindley.
.... E.W. Par'kinson.
.... A.E. Chambers.
.... W. Woodward.
.... W.J.A. Ensor.
.... C.B.E. King.
.... L. Roberts.
.... J. Beelingham, M.C.
.... R.H. Sennett.
.... R. Barron.
Captain P. H. Bellanger, M.C., Medical Oflïcer
Captain F. W. Cleveland, M.C., Chaplain.
I37TH TRENCH MORTAR BATTERY
Captain B. D. Hatchett, M.C., Commandtng.
Lieutenant H. Gregory.
Lieutenant J. Oulton.
2nd Lieutenant T. R. D. Davies.
I38TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
Brigadier-General F. G. M. Rowley, C.M.G., D.S.O., Brigade
Commander.
Captain D. Hill, M.C., Brigade Major.
Captain E. A. Huskinson, Staff Captain.
Lieutenant H. N. Salter, Intelligence Oflïcer.
Captain C. Schiller, M.C., " Q" Learner.
I88
APPEND IX V
i/5-rll BATTALION, LINCOLNSIIIRE REGIMENT
Lieutenant-Colonel H. G. Wilson, D.S.O., Commanding.
Captain IL White, Adjurant.
Captain J. C. Urquhart, M.C.
Lieutenant F. C. King, Signal Officer.
Captain J. H. Lloyd Williams, M.C., Medical Officer.
Company Commanders
Lieutenant G. H. Quantrill, M.C.
Captain R. G. Dunn.
Lieutenant W. Cheer.
Captain W. H. G. Smyth.
Platoon Commanders
Lieutenant H. Bamber.
,, E.A. Dennis.
,, C. IL Madden, M.C.
,, H.F. Hawkeswood.
,, R.D. Lepine.
2nd Lieutenant A. C. Fisher.
R. S. Lord.
Lieutenant J. W. Mansfield.
2nd Lieutenant W. A. Giles.
.... F.S. Skinner.
A. G. 131ack, M.C.
Lieutenant R. 13. Harris.
2nd Lieutenant F. W. L. Few.
.... J.H. Hopkins.
.... W. Whapples.
41424 Sergeant N. Smith.
i/4rH BATTALION, LEICHSTERSHIRE REGIMENT
Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Foster, M.C., Commanding.
Major G. R. A. Beckett, M.Ç., 2nd-in-Command.
Captain D. W. Howarth, Adjutant.
2nd Lieutenant W. L. Bass, Intelligence Officer.
.... A.F. Castle, Signal Oflïcer.
W. K. Fox.
Captain G. S. Brown, Medical Officer.
Lieutenant J. A. Tyler, Transport Officer.
,, M.F. Shepherd, D.C.M., Quartermaster.
APPENDIX V
Company Commanders
Lieutenant A. 13. Pick.
Captain J. C. Ledward.
,, G.L. Lea.
,, H.F. Papprill.
Platoon Commamters
znd Lieutenant J. H. Watson.
.... C. Morbey.
.... H.N. Lacey.
.... H.J. Partridge.
.... M. Lamont.
.... J. Turton.
.... F.H. Wills.
.... W.L. 13arber.
.... R.C. Quayle.
.... E. Cashmore.
.... C.H. Wood.
.... H.E. Schoffield.
D. J. Brewin.
Lieutenant T. R. Flynn.
3638r Sergeant H. Dobson.
11o8 7 ,, C.W. Bugden.
I89
I]STH BATTALION LEICESTERSHIRE REGIMENT
Major J. L. Griffiths, D.S.O., Commanding.
Captain G. E. Banwell, M.C., Acting 2nd-in-Command
Captain J. D. Hills, M.C., Adjurant.
Lieutenant K. Ashdowne, M.C., Intelligence Officer.
Captain W. A. Nicholson, Quartermaster.
2nd Lieutenant W. R. Todd, Transport Officer.
Captain W. B. Jack, M.C., Medical Officer.
Captain the Rev. C. B. W. 13uck, M.C., Chaplain.
Company Commanders
Lieutenant A. E. Brodribb, M.C.
Çaptain J. W. Tomson.
,, A.E. Hawley, M.C.
,, J.R. Brooke, M.C.
19o
APPENDIX V
Platoon Commamters
2nd Lieutenant A. Asher.
.... H.J. Quint.
.... S.H. Dennis.
.... J.W. Lewin.
E. Cosgrove.
Lieutenant S. G. H. Steel, M.C.
J. C. 13arrett, V.C.
2nd Lieutenant A. Johnson.
W. W. Parsons.
Lieutenant S. Corah.
D. T. Sloper.
2nd Lieutenant J. G. E. 13uckley.
240467 Sergeant P. 13owler.
240919 Lance-Sergeant G. Fowkes.
240118 Corporal 13. Mead.
242599 Sergeant R. 13. Hayne.
I38TH TRENCH MORTAR 13ATTERY
Captain A. N. 131oor, Commanding.
Lieutenant A. Ramsden.
,, A.C. De 13risay.
I39"FH INFANTRY 13RIGADE
13rigadier-General J. Harington, D.S.O., 13rigade Commander.
Captain E. J. Grinling, M.C., 13rigade Major.
Captain W. C. C. Weetman, M.C., Staff Captain.
Lieutenant A. G. T. Lomer, Intelligence Officer.
Lieutenant W. A. Lytle, M.C.
Lieutenant F. Clay, Transport Officer.
I]STH 13ATTALION GHERWOOD FORESTERS
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Hacking, D.S.O., M.C., Commanding.
Captain R. S. Pratt, M.C., 2nd-in-Command.
Lieutenant (Acting Captain) J. I3. Raymond, M.C., Adjurant.
Lieutenant G. H. Williamson, Intelligence Officer.
Lieutenant S. G. Faire, M.C., Signal Officer.
2nd Lieutenant E. H. Kirkby, Lewis Gun Officer.
Lieutenant D. Mackenzie, Quartermaster.
APPENDIX V
Lieutenant C. S. Blackwood, Transport Officer.
Lieutenant J. Charnley, Medical Officer.
Rev. E. H. Hines, Chaplain.
191
Company Commanders
Lieutenant (Acting Captain) D. Smith, M.C.
2nd Lieutenant J. N. Jacques, M.C.
Captain C. N. Littleboy, M.C.
Lieutenant (Acting Captain) H. V. Howard, M.C.
Plaloon Command «rs
Lieutenant J. F. Crellin, M.C.
R. G. \Vhittaker, M.C.
2nd Lieutenant J. C. Wheatley.
.... A.H.T. Gent.
.... M. I). Barrows.
R. N. Lakeman.
Lieutenant E. F. Ann.
2nd Lieutenant F. R. Hartshorne.
.... T. Moulton.
.... C. \V. Holmes.
.... J.R. I)ench, M.C.
.... F.T. Metcalfe, M.C.
I/6TH BATTAIION SHERWOOD FORESTERS
Lieutenant-Colonel B. W. Vann, M.C., Commanding.
Major J. A. Shedden, D.S.O., M.C., 2nd-in-Command.
Captain E. F. Winser, M.C., Acting 2nd-in-Command.
Captain E. Kershaw, M.C., Adjutant.
Captain W. T. Stephens, Signal Officer.
2nd Lieutenant A. Mackintosh, M.C., Scout Officer.
2nd Lieutenant R. E. H. Stott.
Captain S. B. Boulton, Quartermaster.
Lieutenant H. D. Vaughan, Transport Officer.
Major A. W. Shea, D.S.O., Medical Officer.
Company Commanders
Lieutenant J. N. \Vightman, M.C.
Captain H. 5. Pink, M.C.
Lieutenant (Acting Captain) J. F. Dennis, M.C.
Captain F. '6: Hipkins, M.C.
I92
APPENDIX V
Platoon Commanders
2nd Lieutenant C. B. Newell, M.C.
.... F. Touch, M.C., D.C.M.
.... H.A. Payne.
.... R.A. Frith, M.C.
.... C.E. Wardle.
.... W. Bavin.
.... P.A. Tompkinson.
.... A.J. Tyrell.
.... A. Jephson.
.... C. Bimrose, M.C.
.... W. Meakin.
.... E. Scarrott.
I/8TH BATTALION SHERWOOD FORESTERS
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Finlay Dempster, D.S.O., Commanding
Officer.
Captain C. P. Elliott, M.C., Acting 2nd-in-Command.
Captain C. H. Powell, Acting Adjutant.
Lieutenant S. A. Tebbutt, Signal Officer.
2nd Lieutenant W. J. Winter, M.C.
2nd Lieutenant R. S. Plant.
Lieutenant H. M. Toyne, Acting Transport Officer.
Captain St. G. M. L. Homan, M.C., Medical Officer.
Captain Rev. D. E. Sturt, M.C., Chaplain.
Company CommaMers
Captain G. Thomas, M.C.
2nd Lieutenant J. Bloor, M.C., M.M.
Lieutenant S. E. Cairns, M.C.
Captain J. B. White, M.C.
Plaloon Commanders
2nd Lieutenant S. Bradwell, M.C., D.C.M.
.... J.F. Shackleton, M.C.
.... R.M. Barker.
.... F.T.W. Saunders.
.... P.A. Turner.
APPENDIX V
end Lieutenant C. M. Bedford.
.... A.D.H. Dunkin.
.... F.L. Harrap, M.C.
.... A.N. Davis.
.... James H. Smith, M.C.
.... T.F. Mitchell, M.C.
.... John H. Smith.
I39TH TRENCH MORTAR BATTERY
Captain J. L. Percival, M.C., Commanding.
Lieutenant S. Sanders.
,, R.H. Wood.
H. Edson, M.C.
2nd Lieutenant V. L. Morris.
I/IST BATTALION MONMOUTHSHIRE REGIMENT
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Jenkins, M.C., Commanding Officer.
Major F. G. Phillips, 2nd-in-Command.
Captain W. M. James, Adjurant.
Lieutenant G. H. T. Cochrane, Signal Officer.
Lieutenant F. L. Moore, M.C., Lewis Gun Officer.
Captain W. P. Abbott, Quartermaster.
Lieutenant S. G. Blow, M.C., Transport Officer.
Captain K. McAlpine, Medical Officer.
Company Commanders
Captain E. G. St. C. Tisdall.
W. M. B. Burnyeat, M.C.
Lieutenant A. W. Goldsworthy.
Platoon Commanders
2nd Lieutenant C. T. BlackwalL
Lieutenant H. E. Sharpe.
2nd Lieutenant A. S. Hixon.
228o24 Sergeant G. Howes.
2nd Lieutenant H. C. Archer.
Lieutenant J. R. Evans.
G. P. PeacheLl.
227751 Lance-Sergeant F. J. Leonard.
2nd Lieutenant H. R. Rowland.
13
194 APPENDIX V
2nd Lieutenant A. T. Williams.
225785 Sergeant C. Borchert.
Lieutenant H. J. C. Haines.
I/Ist North Midland Field Ambulance, Lieutenant-Colonel
T. A. Barron, D.S.O., R.A.M.C., Commanding.
I/2nd North Midland Field Ambulance, Maior G. H. H.
Manfield, M.C., R.A.M.C., Commanding.
I/3rd North Midland Field Ambulance, Lieutenant-Colonel
A. C. F. Turner, D.S.O., R.A.M.C., Commanding.
46TH BATTALION MACIIINE GUN CORPS
Lieutenant-Colonel B. Mathew-Lannowe, D.S.O.,
manding.
Major G. A. Wade, M.C., 2nd-in-Command.
Captain R. Dickens, Adjutant.
2nd Lieutenant A. C. Park, Intelligence Officer.
Captain M. J. Somerfield, Quartermaster.
Coin-
Company Commanders
Major H. S. Windeler, M.C.
,, H. Witty.
,, W.T. Boughey, M.C.
,, M. Douglas.
Second-in-Command oJ Companies
Captain R. Page.
,, T.A.N. Walker.
A. R. M. Darby, M.C.
Lieutenant N. MacVie.
Company Transport O.ffco's
Captain G. Woody.
Lieutenant W. Harris, M.C.
,, H.A. Spendlove.
Section O.ïcers
Lieutenant W. H. Hoff, M.C.
,, H.L.C. Guthrie.
S. A. Parkes.
2nd Lieutenant H. Johnson.
APPENDIX V
Lieutenant A. E. Cowley.
,, A. V. Briggs.
2nd Lieutenant W. G. Oncken.
J. R. Wilson.
Lieutenant C. G. Larking.
,, CJ. Highwood.
znd Lieutenant S. A. Earl.
.... R.R. Willing.
Lieutenant H. W. Rudland.
,, F.A.K. Park.
W. Ackland.
2nd Lieutenant B. A. Lane.
Sub-Section Commanders
Lieutenant J. M. Kitching.
,, J.W.E. Warren
INDEX
A
Abbott, Cap. W. P., i25
Aisonville, i33, I35
Andigny, Forê Dominale d', x32 ,
I36, x38, x52, x55
Andignyles Fermes, i32 , x39, x46,
150, I5], 173
Army, xst, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 2I, 79
Army, 4th, Int., 79
Ascension Valley, 49, 6i, 75
Avesnelles, 169
Aveanes, I69, 171
B
Ball, Captaln S. H., 136, 137
Barrett, Lieut. J. C., V.C., 29
Barzy, 161
Beaucourt sur l'Hallue, 23
Beauregard Farm, 126
Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line, 82,
87,88,97,98, xo 5, xo6, iio, 11,
I13, I15, 116, IIS, 12 7
BeIlenglise, 22, 23, 24, 3 o, 3, 32,
33, 34, 4 o, 46, 5 o, 53, 54, 57, 63,
69, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 81, 82, 83,
84, 94, 97, 115, tzo, z4, 43,
53, I73
]3ellenglise Tunnel, 64, 68, 77, 78
Belle Vue, 15 o
Belle Vue Farm, 6o
Bellicourt, 3o, 47, 77
Berthaucourt, 25
Bethell, Major-Gen.,
Bethune, 18, 23
Beux Trench, 27
Bihecourt, 4 2
Bishops Sorttord, 8
Black Watch, 15o
Bohai, IiO, 128, t29, 13 o, 3 I,
I45, I46, 156, 16o
Bois de l'Abbaye, i6o, 161, i62
Borne des Trois Evêchés, 15o
Boulogne, 42
Boyd, Major-Gen. G. F., C.B
C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.M., Int.,2I
Brie Chftteau, 42
Brown, Second-Lieut. W. B., 56
Bucquoy, 19
Buxton, Mayor of, 8o
C
Cahill, Sergt. W., 56
Cambrin, 20
Cameron Highlanders, 15 o
Campbell, Brig.-Gen. J. V., V.C.,
C.M.G., 19.S.0., 42, 45, 65
Cartignie, i64, I69
Carillon, 158 , I6o, x6i,
Cavalry, 39, 63, 82, 1Io, 69, ITI
Champignons Copse, 1
Charlton, Capt. A. H., D.S.O., 58
Child, Brig.-Gen. Sir Hill, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., 4 °
Chataignies Wood, m6, lO 7
Cité de Riaumont, 2o
Cité Jeanne d'Arc, 2o
Cité St. Edward, 19
Cité St. Theodore, 9, 2o
Collins Quatry,
Coltman, Lance-C pl., V.C., D.C.M.,
M.M., x 17,  I8
Corps I, II, III, V. Vil, XI, XIII,
XIV, XVII, XVIII,
Corps IX, 23, 4 o, 47, 9 o, f23, I39,
I58
Curran, Lieut[-Col., 49
Cyclists, 39, 63, lX, 53, 7
D
Delbrfick, Prof. Hans, 79
Derby, 17, 18
Division, 1st, 26, 3o, 5o, 65, 7 o,
73, 82, 115, I53, I57, I58, I59
I97
I98
Division, 2nd (Australian), 31, 73,
8% 83, xo4, x x 5
Division, 6th, a6, xa3, xeeS0 143,
14o, 15o
Division, 3oth (American), 3 o, 31,
14o
Division, 3and, 31, 38, 43, 68, 73,
83 , 84 , 85, 1o5, 1o7, lO9, i IO,
Division. 551h. ao
Division, lz6th (French), le 5, 136,
I53
Doon Hill, 89
Doon Mill, lO8
E
Edgson, Second-Lieut. H., io2
Egypt, I8
Engineers, 41, 43, 44, 46, 66, 67,
68. 127' I44, 149, I6I
Etricourt, 3 o, 83
F
Ferguson, Cpl. A. E., 55
Field Ambulance, I/ISt N.M., II8
Field Ambulance. i/2nd N.M., 63
Field Company R.E., 4651h, i48,
161, I65
Field Company R.E., 4661h. 59,
66. 165
Field Company R.E.. 4681h. I65
Flammenwer/er. 18
Fontaine de Colombier, 134
Fontaiue d'Uterte, lO6,
Forester's House, 154
Forgan's Trench, 29
Fosse Eight, 18
Fresnoy le Grand, I24, 126, 128,
129, 13o, 132, I45, I56
G
Gai ca.t, 38
Garforth, Lieut.-Col. W., D.S.O.,
M.C., R.E., 41
George, lte. H., R.A.M.C., 63
Givenchy, 2o
Gommecourt, 19, 3 O, i73
Grand Maison Farm, 169
Grand Toaillon Farm, i6o
Guaxds Division, x8
INDEX
Guise. I58
Guyot Farm,
H
Hacking, Lieut.-Col. A., M.C., 99
Haig, Brig.-Gen. BI., C.M.G.,
Harringon, Brig.-Gen. J., D.S.O.
45
Harrison, Major S. S. B.,
Harry Copse, 33
Hennechies Wood, 15o, I52
Hindenburg Line, 22. 24. 3 °
34, 43, 46 , 69, 79, 8I, 84, 88
Hill 6o, 18
Hill 63, 2o
Hill 7 o, 2o
Hintze. Herr von, 79
Hofl, Lieut. W. H., I 13
Hohenzollern Redoubt, 173
Hudson's Post, 25, 49
Hussars, 2oth, 11 I
I
Inkerman, 63
J
Jeancour, 63
Jenkins, Lieut.-Col. J., M.C., 25
Johnson. Sergt. W. IL, V.C., 98
Joncourt, 82, I14
Jones. Second-Lieut. C., 57
Jonnecourt Farm. i .6
K
Kadaververwendungsanstalt. 77
Kemmel, 18
Knobkerry Ridge, 72
L
La Baraque, 3 I, 32 . 76 , 78 . 84,
120, I22, 123
La Louvière Faxm, i6o
La Nation Cross Roads, 15
Lancers, 12 th. i 1 I
Lane, Major H. D.. M.C., I-8
L'Arbre de Guise, I6o
Lawe Canal, 20
Le Cateau, i67
Leduc Trench, 27
Lehaucour, 3 o, 33, 54, 69. 7 o, 7
82, 1o 5
INDEX
Leicesters, 4th, 34, ii, 113, I33,
I5o
Leieesters. 5th, 7» 28, 29, 63, 72,
lO 7, 112, I33, 134. 1.5o, 151, 169
Lens, 19, 2o
Les Gobelets, 15o
Le Tronquay, 3I
Levergies, 24, 117, 126
Le Verguier, 26, 35. 4I, 62
Liessies, I71
Lién, 19
Lincolns, 5th, 72, , 150
1 Noh noe. 15o
Ludendor, 79
Luron, 8
M
Machine Gun Battalion, Lire
Guards, 47, I4O
Machine Gun ]3attalion, 6th.
Machine Gun Battalion, 46th, 47,
Machine Gun Battalion, iooth, 47
Magny la Fosse, 30, 33, 54, 69, 72,
82, 97, 116, 117, I2o, i23, 124
Mannequin Hill, 89, lO5, 1o6, io7,
io15, ii4, I15, 1i 7
Marne, 79
Mathew Lannowe, Lieut.-Col. D.,
D.S.O., 47
Mennevret, 136 , 139, 151, 153
Mericourt, I24, 126
Midgley, Lieut. T. H., R.E., 67
Molaia, I6o
Monmouthshire Regt., I/ISt, 43,
46, II3, 114, 124, I2
Montagu-Stuart-Wortley, Major-
Gen. the Hon. E. J., C.B.,
C.M.G., M.V.O., D.S.O.,
Montbrehain, 83, 89, 94, 97, io%
IOI, 102, IO3, I04, 105, III, 112,
I13, 114, I15, 118, 119
Morshead, Lieut.-Col. H. T.,
D.S.O., R.E., 4
Mosley, Pte. H., R.A.M.C., 63, 64
Mounttord, Pte. B., 36
N
Nauroy, 24
Neuve-Chapelle,
Neuve-Eglise, i8
I99
Neville's Cross, 89, 1o 7, 108, I I2
Nigger Copse, 33
O
Omignon, River, 32
Openshaw, Cpl., 67
P
Petite Helpe, River, 164,165, 169
Ploegsteert, 18
Pontruet, 26, 27, 28
Porter, Lieut. J. W., Io 4
Preselles Farm, 124
Priestley, Major R. E., M.C., Int.
Prisches, 161, I62, 163, 164, I66,
168, 169
R
R.A.M.C., 116, 170
Ramicourt. 81, 82, 85, 89, 91, 94,
96, 97-1oo, io2, lO3, lO5, io7,
Io8, ii2,ii3-6, i8, i22-4,153,
173
Ramousies, iTi
Rawlinson, Gen. Sir H., Int.
Regnicourt, i46 , i47 , i48 , i49 ,
Reid, Lieut., R.F.A., 65
/etheuil Farm, 134, i38 , i52
Rheims, 79
Riquerval, Bois de, 132, 136, I38 ,
I39, 147, 152, I53
Riquerval Farm, I35
Riqueval Bridge, 3 o, 3 I, 34, 58,
59, 67
lqobinson, Majbr, 149
Route " A " Keep, 20
Rowley, Brig.-Gen. F. G. M.,
C.M.G., D.S.O., 44
S
Sains du Nord, i58, 169, 17I
Sambre-Oise Canal, 82, 155, i58
Scots Greys, 11I, 14o, 153
Seboncourt, 147
Semeries, 17o
Sequehart, 82, 83, 87, 94, lO5, lO7,
lO9
Shedden, Major J. A., M.C., lO 3
Sherwood Foresters, 5th, 27, 28,
98 , lO2, lO3, I47 , 162, 164
2O0
INDEX
Sherwood Foresters, 6th, 7 o, 71,
99, lO2, io3, 147
Sherwood Foresters, 8th, 65, 98,
too, ioi, lO3, 147, 148, 149, 162
Signal Company, 38, 39, i68, I7o
Small Post Wood, 38, 83
Somme, 19, 42 , 88
St. Helène, 26, 27
St. Quentin. 34, 4 I, I67
St. Quentin Canal, 22, 24, 30,
59, 64, 69, 77, 85. 97, i i i
Statïords, 5th North, 19
Staflords, 6th lqorth, 36, 51, 58,
io5, lO7, lO8, 117 , 152
Staflords, 5th South, I9, 35, 5 I.
54, io6, lO7, 133
Staffords, 6th South, 51, Io6, I36 ,
137
T
Talana Hill, 73, 83
Tanks, 39, 47, 7 °, 14°, 144, 145
Tertry. 23
The Quarries, 18
The Tumulus, 25, 26, 49, IlO
Thomas, Lieut. M. E., N.E., I48
Thorigny, 3 o, 73, 83
Thwaites, Major-Gen. W., C.B.,
Int., 20, 2 i
Times, TJw, 79
Trench Mortar Battery, x 37th, 55
V
Vadencourt. 25. 26, 27, 31, 62, 1I 7
Valenciennes, 158
Vallée Hasard. i44 , 153
Vamp, Lieut.-Col. B.
2tI.C., 7 o, 99, I°3
Vaux Andigny, I29
Vendelles, 38, 123, I45
Vimy Ridge, 18
W
Wassigny, I39, I54
" Watling Street," 3I
Wiancourt, ioo, 1oi, Io4, 11 I, i I.|
123
Wightman, Lieut. J. lxl., 7 I
Y
Ypres Salient, 18
Z
Zobeau, 16o
F»inted in Great Britain by Hotell, Watson " Viney, Ld., Lendon and Aylesbu F
Th
200
INDEX
Sherwood Foresters, 6th, 7 o, 7 ,
99, lO2, lO3, 147
Shervood Foresters, 8th, 65, 98,
ioo, IOI, I0], 147, 148 , 149 , I62
Signal Company, 38, 39, 168, 17o
Small Post Wood, 38, 83
Thwaites, Maor-Gen. W., C.B.,
Int., 20, 21
Times, Ttw, 79
Trench Mortar Battery, 137th, 55
V