Chapter 18COMBAT CREW AND UNIT TRAINING

SPECIALIZED instruction for pilots and other flying personnel was only the
first step in a training program which had as its goal the provision of
efficient combat units. Thus individual training led toward unit training, or
what was commonly designated operational training in testimony to the emphasis
placed on the team-work so critical to the success of combat
operations.

When the Air Corps began its great expansion program in 1939, no provision
for operational training existed outside the combat groups themselves. Graduates
of the flying schools were assigned either to fill existing combat units or to
round out the cadre taken from an older unit to form a new one. Each unit was
responsible for training its own personnel in order to meet proficiency
standards set by training directives from the GHQ Air Force. The system was an
old one and one well enough suited to the original need, but by 1941 it was
becoming clear that some other plan would have to be adopted. By August of that
year the number of authorized groups had risen from twenty-five in April 1939 to
eighty-four. It would be some time yet before the groups actually organized
would reach that number, but already the level of experience in all groups had
declined sharply, with bad effect on operational training. Although there were
other causes for the inefficacy of training, including a shortage of planes and
of maintenance services, it was clear enough that the Air Corps could not plan
indefinitely upon having enough cadres sufficiently experienced to guarantee
prompt lifting of whole units to the desired level of proficiency.1 With the coming of
hostilities, not only were training objectives raised to new heights, but the
demands of combat threatened so serious a drain upon experienced personnel as to
cripple operational training under the existing system.

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The OTU-RTU System

As early as April 1941 an American military observer in Great Britain had
reported to the OCAC Training and Operations Division on the merits of the RAF
operational training system.2 Upon completion of individual instruction, British flying
students were assigned to an operational training unit (OTU), where they
received eight to twelve weeks of intensive instruction as a team on the type of
equipment they were to use in combat. This RAF system was the inspiration for
proposals made soon after the United States entered the war, among others by
Brig. Gen. Follett Bradley, then head of III Bomber Command. He suggested in
January 1942 that an OTU system be established as one way of guaranteeing a
proper division of experienced personnel between the requirements of training
and those of combat. He feared that under the existing system the demands of
combat theaters would be allowed to drain off so many of the older groups that a
critical shortage of experienced personnel for the development of new units
would arise. He therefore proposed, as an adaptation of the older system, that
certain groups be designated parent groups, with authorized overstrength, who
would provide cadres for newly activated or satellite groups and who would
assume responsibility for their training. Graduates of the training schools
would be used to bring the satellite groups to authorized strength and, in a
constantly recurring pattern, to restore the parent group to its overstrength.
His plan, in its essentials, was adopted in February 1942 to govern operational
training in the Second and Third Air Forces; in May the system was extended to
include the First and Fourth Air Forces.3

During 1942 it proved difficult to give this plan full effect. There were
unforeseen emergency demands from combat theaters, demands which at times had to
be met regardless of the cost to domestic programs, The supply of combat-type
aircraft for a while remained uncertain, the uneven flow of individual training
programs presented scheduling difficulties, and, withal, it took time and
experience to work the "bugs" out of the experiment. By early 1943, however, the
plan was in general operation, with results that justified the decision in its
favor.

Normally, six months were required after the formation of a cadre to complete
the organization and training of a new group. Operational training began
officially on the day that the cadre was dropped

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from the parent's overstrength to become the core of the new group. In 1942
the responsible air force provided such special instruction as might be
necessary to acquaint key members of the cadre with the special obligations they
were now to assume. Beginning in 1943, however, cadre leaders usually received
this training through a thirty-day course of instruction at Orlando, Florida, in
the AAF School of Applied Tactics (AAFSAT), which had been established partly
for this purpose in November 1942.* The course there was divided into

an academic and a practical phase, with roughly half the time devoted to
each. Cadres for medium and heavy bombardment units were enrolled in the
Bombardment Department; fighter cadres in the Air Defense Department; and light
bombardment cadres in the Air support Department. Through lectures and
conferences group leaders reviewed under expert guidance the problems of
command, intelligence, and operations in the context appropriate to the mission
of their group. After completing the academic part of the program, the cadre was
assigned to an AAFSAT base for operational exercises. With the assistance of
complements provided by the air base's squadrons, the cadre spent about fifty
hours flying simulated combat missions. This practical experience proved of
great value in preparing

* For a fuller discussion of this establishment, see below, pp. 684-93.

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the cadres for their new responsibilities, but close coordination of the
academic and practical phases was not always accomplished, and at times the
program suffered from lack of needed equipment.4 On returning to their assigned OTU stations,
the cadres began training with their units, which by this time had usually
reached regulation strength. The instruction for the group was divided in
varying proportions between individual and team activities; during the final
phase, both air and ground echelons functioned as nearly as possible as a
self-contained combat unit. In the early months of the war, when OTU schedules
were frequently interrupted, training was often less than satisfactory, but as
time went on, the system became increasingly effective in preparing combat
groups for action.

While the OTU system was evolving as the most suitable means of training new
groups for combat, a plan calling for the establishment of replacement training
units (RTU) as a regular means of providing replacement crews and crew members
was also being developed. Until May 1942, when the RTU system was ordered into
effect in the continental air forces, replacements for overseas units were
procured by withdrawing qualified personnel from regular units stationed in the
United States. This method, though simple, followed no orderly plan and
jeopardized effective unit training by removing experienced personnel from
U.S.-based groups. In order to establish a sounder method of providing combat
replacements, AAF Headquarters directed that certain additional groups be listed
as training organizations and maintained at an authorized overstrength to serve
as reservoirs from which trained individuals and crews could be withdrawn for
overseas shipment. In other instances, certain units were assigned a role
similar to that of a parent OTU group. They gave instruction to combat crews and
supervised their formation into provisional groups, which upon completion of
training were liquidated to make their individual leaders and crews available
for assignment as replacements to combat units. As was true of the OTU system,
many months were required to place the RTU plan into full operation. By the end
of 1943, however, when the formation of new groups (except for B-29 units) was
virtually completed, RTU operations had become the major activity of the
continental air forces. After 1943 the training organization was modified by the
merging of personnel from each

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fixed RTU group with its air base complement; the resultant unit was
designated a combat crew training school or station (CCTS).5

The RTU system was simpler than the OTU and necessitated few important
changes from the traditional organization and administration of combat units.
Men designated as replacements were sent to an RTU group (or CCTS), where they
received a similar though shorter course than that given in an OTU. Considerably
less time was given to integrated activities at the group level, because the
trainees of an RTU would not function as a group in combat. As they completed
the required phases of training, individuals and crews were drawn from the RTU
to serve in established outfits overseas.6

The types of OTU and RTU activities conducted by each of the continental air
forces varied from time to time according to the needs of the war. In the
beginning, certain of those forces were directed to produce certain types of
units to the exclusion of other types, but eventually both bomber and fighter
training was assigned to each continental air force. This was done mainly
because the facilities of all air forces were needed to turn out the large
number of bombardment units required; it was done also to facilitate joint
fighter and bomber exercises in the later stages of unit training. Throughout
the war, however, the Second Air Force remained the principal center for
developing heavy and very heavy bombardment groups. The responsibility of the
First and Fourth Air Forces was chiefly the training of fighter units, while the
Third Air Force directed light and medium bombardment, reconnaissance, and air
support activities. The I Troop Carrier Command performed the special task of
training units for air movement of troops and equipment.7

During most of the war, OTU-RTU operations were governed by AAF Headquarters
through the domestic air forces and the I Troop Carrier Command. The principal
staff agency concerned, after the reorganization of March 1943, was the office
of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Training; its Unit Training Division had
immediate super-vision over OTU-RTU plans and operations. Under each of the air
forces various subordinate commands, wings, and groups issued instructional
directives and supervised OTU-RTU activities. Toward the end of the war, some
duplication of effort within each air force was eliminated by restricting to the
air force headquarters the issuance of training directives and by limiting the
funcrions of intermediate commands to supervision and inspection.8

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Bombardment and Fighter Training Programs

Since the heavy bomber was the backbone of the American air offensive, the
training of crews and units to man the big planes became the primary task of the
OTU-RTU system. The statistical record for the first year of the war is not
available, but approximately 27,000 heavy bombardment crews were trained in the
period from December 1942 to August 1945; slightly more than half of that number
flew B-24's, the others, B-17's. During the same period, about 6,000 crews were
trained for medium bombardment and only 1,600 for light bombardment. The B-29
program, which did not get under way until the fall of 1943, turned out
approximately 2,350 crews.9

The requirements of bombardment crew instruction, as in all other AAF
instructional programs, were laid down in published training standards. These
standards, issued from Washington, were successors to the training directives
which before the war had been published annually by the GHQ Air Force.
Throughout the war the standards were continually modified in accordance with
technical developments and combat experience, but the successive issues followed
a definite pattern. Each standard made a general statement of the purpose of the
particular instructional program referred to. The ideal of unit training, as
specified in these directives, was to create "a closely knit, well organized
team of highly trained specialists of both the air and ground echelons."
Detailed statements, serving as measures for achievement of the goal, composed
the largest portion of a directive; these details related to administrative and
technical as well as tactical matters. Bombardment units were required, for
example, to demonstrate ability to service and repair their aircraft under field
conditions, to provide defense against chemical attack, and to carry out proper
intelligence procedures.10

These training standards established requirements to be met at all levels of
performance. Detailed lists prescribed the particular duties which each man had
to be able to carry out, and if the individual was deficient in any respect,
additional instruction had to be given-a requirement that often forced attention
to a type of training not normally the function of the OTU or RTU. Crew members
were to understand their responsibilities not only for their particular jobs but
also to each other; they were to complete successful tests in sustained
high-altitude flights, evasion exercises, and precision bombing runs. Units had
to demonstrate their ability to take off, assemble, and land

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together; to operate in the air under radio silence and through overcast; to
fly all types of formations; and to execute simulated bombardment missions.

The Second Air Force, which conducted the major portion of heavy bombardment
training, divided it into three principal phases. Until the end of 1943 each of
the phases was usually given at a different base, but that arrangement was then
abandoned in favor of giving the entire program at one OTU station. During the
first phase, individual crew members received instruction in their specialties,
particular attention being given to instrument and night flying exercises for
pilots, cross-country tests for navigators, target runs for bombardiers, and
air-to-air firing for gunners. During the second phase, teamwork of the combat
crew was stressed: bombing, gunnery, and instrument flight missions were
performed by full crews. The third phase aimed at developing effective unit
operation, the goal of the entire program. It included extensive exercises in
high-altitude formation flying, long-range navigation, target identification,
and simulated combat missions. When heavy bombardment unit training was assigned
to the other continental air forces in 1943, they adopted the Second Air Force's
three-phase system of instruction. Medium and light bombardment training, which
was conducted almost exclusively by the Third Air Force, was similarly
divided.11

When the individual pilot, gunner, or other flying specialist arrived at the
OTU or RTU station, his main concern was the character of his crew. The crew was
the family circle of an air force; each member knew that long hours of work,
play, anxiety, and danger would be shared. Naturally, each man hoped to be
assigned to a crew in whose members he had confidence and with whom he would be
congenial. The assignment process was almost entirely a matter of checking names
from alphabetical rosters, but the men so assigned generally accepted each other
and adjusted gradually to the mixture of backgrounds and temperaments. If
trouble flared, reassignment of individuals could always be made. To each member
of the crew a vital part of the operational training period was learning about
the personalities, as well as the duties, of his crew mates.

Much OTU-RTU instruction was given on the ground--in class--rooms, hangars,
and on gunnery ranges. Air training was conducted chiefly through informal
supervision of flight operations. An experienced navigator, for instance, would
accompany a new team on a

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practice mission. During the course of the trip he would observe the recently
graduated navigator, check his techniques, and offer suggestions for
improvement. At the conclusion of each mission the "instructor" would file a
report on the progress of the "student." Informal teaching of this kind was the
rule for other crew positions, too. Tactics involving the coordinated use of
crews, or of larger elements, were often demonstrated by experienced crews
before the new units attempted them. Teaching methods in the operational
programs, both on the ground and in the air, were not strictly standardized.12

Although the organization and techniques of instruction were basically
similar in all types of bombardment training, certain features were unique to
the B-29 program. Since particular attention had to be given to the selection of
personnel, the usual policy of filling operational units with recent graduates
of AAF schools was set aside. Instead, pilots and other crew members were
selected from those who had had extensive experience in the operation of
multiengine aircraft. When procurement of men for the B-29 program started in
the middle of 1943, the Air Transport Command was expected to be the principal
source of pilots and navigators with the desired experience, but relatively few
men were transferred from ATC to B-29 training. Instead, instructors in the
four-engine schools of the Training Command were to constitute the chief
reservoir of experienced and available pilots. The earliest call for B-29 pilots
specified a minimum experience of 400 hours in flying four-engine airplanes, but
it was found advisable by 1944 to raise the standard to 1,000 hours, a level
that could not always be maintained. For the post of co-pilot recent graduates
of transition schools were used, but the remaining crew members were usually men
of considerable experience.13

Crew and unit training for the B-29 was a responsibility shared by AAF
Headquarters and the Second Air Force,* which in the fall of 1944 transferred
its obligation for pilot transition instruction to the Training Command in the
interest of accelerating the production of B-29 units. The specialized training
program began with a five-week curriculum, given prior to crew assignment, for
pilots, co-pilots, and flight engineers for the purpose of emphasizing the close
teamwork required of these three officers in the operation of a Superfortress.
Teams put through this special transition were then assigned to

Second Air Force units for integration into full crews. B-29 operational
training was divided into the customary phases but took slightly longer than
heavy bombardment training. It was governed by special AAF training standards,
which placed increasing emphasis on high-altitude, long-range navigation
missions and use of radar equipment.14

Operational training for fighter units followed the standard OTURTU pattern,
but naturally differed from that of bombardment units. Only in night fighter
planes did the combat crew consist of more than one member, and the overwhelming
proportion of fighter pilots served in the single-seater day fighters. From
December 1942 through August 1945 more than 35,000 day fighter pilots were
trained, as contrasted with only 485 night fighter crews.15 Since the problem of crew teamwork
did not exist in day fighter training, the program was directed toward maximum
individual proficiency and precise coordination among the pilots of each
squadron and group.

The instruction prescribed for the individual pilot varied considerably
during the war. Although the Training Command eventually gave some transition
experience to pilots on combat fighter types, it was generally necessary for
OTU's to give transition training on whatever aircraft might be available.
Following such familiarization, the pilot was required to fly the aircraft in
specified acrobatic, aerial bombing, and gunnery exercises, and in simulated
individual combat. Navigarion missions, instrument flying, and night flying were
also prescribed. Stress was placed, especially after 1943, on high-altitude
operations and on the development of combat vigilance and aggressiveness. Unit
as well as individual instruction was limited by the pressure of time during the
first part of the war. Within the hours available, the greatest attention was
paid to take-off and assembly procedures, precision landings in quick
succession, formation flying under varying conditions, and the execution of
offensive and defensive tactics against air and surface forces. Along with these
came instruction on how to maintain aircraft in the field, on procedures for
movement to a new base, and on necessary administrative and housekeeping
activities.

Night fighter training, though it had much in common with the standard
program, differed in certain important ways. Instrument flying, night formation
exercises, and night gunnery had to be stressed. Attention also had to be given
to crew teamwork since the night

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fighter was operated normally by a pilot, radio observer, and gunner. Unit
tactics were on a smaller scale than for day fighters but were more complex and
difficult. The basic operating unit was a squadron rather than a group; its
mission was the interception and destruction of enemy bombers raiding by night.16

Experience in overseas theaters showed that separate AAF training was not
fully satisfactory for operational needs. Since the AAF was frequently assigned
missions that required cooperation with ground, naval, and antiaircraft units,
it was obvious that training for such missions was necessary. Deficiencies in
air-ground teamwork were strikingly revealed in the North African campaign, and
steps were taken in 1943 to provide more effective combined training of air and
ground forces. The I and II Air Support Commands were specifically directed to
develop appropriate exercises in cooperation with surface units. Bombardment,
fighter, and observation units, after completing their regular training, were
assigned when possible to one of these commands for the desired combined
training. Relatively few air groups participated in the program, however,
because of the urgent demand for shipment overseas as soon as unit training was
finished.17 Joint
exercises between air and antiaircraft units took the form chiefly of defense
against simulated bombardment attacks, and involved the use of fighters,
searchlight units, antiaircraft artillery, and aircraft warning systems. By the
end of 1943 exercises of this kind were being conducted in the First, Third, and
Fourth Air Forces.18

But even more important to the AAF than its cooperation with other elements
of the armed forces was the success of its bombardment campaigns. It was not too
long after its commitment to battle that the Eighth Air Force found that
unescorted bombardment meant prohibitive losses. The need was for more training
in fighter-bomber cooperation. Such exercises had been carried on to a limited
degree before the war, but during the first year after Pearl Harbor they were
dropped because of the lack of time. Early in 1943 the Second and Fourth Air
Forces began to provide joint fighter-bomber training as part of defense
maneuvers on the Pacific coast. These maneuvers, in which the Navy participated,
were simulated attacks by carrier-launched aircraft on various coastal cities.
Bomber units with fighter escort sought out the vessels and on the return flight
provided targets for interception by fighter units.19 Since reports from combat theaters
continued to stress the need for better teamwork between

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fighters and bombers on cooperative missions, and for more effective
defensive action by bombers against hostile interceptors, the AAF undertook in
the fall of 1943 to increase the amount of fighter-bomber training and to
systematize the program in all the continental air forces. In order to provide a
necessary basis for combined training in all of the domestic air forces, heavy
bombardment OTU's were established in the First and Fourth Air Forces, which had
formerly been restricted to fighter units, while fighter OTU's were activated in
the Second Air Force, which had formerly been restricted to bombers. The Third
Air Force was already engaged in both types of training on a scale sufficient to
permit effective combined exercises.20

Basic proficiency requirements for combined training were outlined in an AAF
training standard; the individual air forces prescribed more detailed
requirements in the conduct of their respective programs. The Fourth Air Force,
for example, directed that fighter pilots participate in at least one supervised
interception and three attacks on bomber formations at an altitude of 20,000
feet or above. A minimum of one two-hour escort mission was called for, as well
as exercises in cover protection for bombers engaged in taking off and landing.
Each bombardment crew was to undergo at least six high-altitude fighter attacks
and to fly with escort as often as practicable. Camera guns were employed by
both fighters and bombers during these realistic maneuvers. Lack of sufficient
time for joint training was the principal handicap; not until 1944 was enough
time allowed for an effective program.21

Those charged with the administration of operational training programs faced
three major problems during the war. One was the relationship between AAF
Headquarters and the individual air forces responsible for execution of the
various programs. Another was personnel. This was, indeed, a two-fold problem:
how to overcome the inadequate preparation of trainees and how to hold a minimum
number of experienced instructors. The third problem, common to all training
activities until the closing months of the war, was an insufficient supply of
aircraft, equipment, and facilities.

The relationship between AAF Headquarters and the subordinate air forces was
based on the announced principle that Washington would tell the lower commands
what to do but not how to do it. While a good case could be made out for such a
theoretical differentiation, there was no way in practice to draw a hard line
between the "what" and the "how." The air forces frequently complained that
the

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principle was not being applied. In the summer of 1942, for example, the
Second Air Force protested against interference from Washington in the problem
of meeting unit-production requirements. It asserted that AAF Headquarters
should specify only the number and types of units required and leave to the air
force responsibility for determining which units would be trained and in what
order. The Third Air Force likewise opposed directives which were so strict as
to preclude the flexibility essential to an effective training program. The
dispute was a natural one, arising from Washington's desire to insure the
production of more or less standard units for overseas shipments, and from the
conflicting need of the individual air forces for some discretion in working out
their own special problems. The reorganization of AAF Headquarters in March 1943
clarified functions and helped to remove friction between Washington and the
continental commands.* As the war progressed, the air forces complained less and
less of interference with their prerogatives, and smoother command relationships
gradually evolved.22

A more serious difficulty arose from the fact that through 1943 and even
thereafter a majority of the individuals assigned to OTU's were short of the
desired proficiency in their particular specialties. The OTU's were therefore
compelled to give a disproportionate share of time to individual training at the
expense of their primary function of unit training. The continental air forces
pointed to this fact in numerous sharp reports to Washington, assigning the
blame to the Flying Training Command which was responsible for most of the
individual flight instruction in the AAF. The trouble was that the Flying
Training Command, while expanding by leaps and bounds, had to produce trained
specialists within impossible time limits. Higher authority repeatedly demanded
specialists in such numbers and on such schedules as to leave no choice but to
send forward men whose training was admittedly incomplete. Eventually, as
demands of overseas theaters became less desperately urgent, it was possible to
introduce more realistic schedules into the individual training program.
Meantime, consultation and exchange of officers between the two programs helped
gear individual instruction more closely to the requirements of OTU-RTU
operations.23

The OTU system had been established in part as a means of retaining necessary
staffs of experienced instructors for operational

training. Parent groups were supposed not only to provide cadres for their
satellites but to maintain a core of veteran instructors within the parent
units. Unfortunately if inevitably, the demands of the combat theaters continued
to conflict with the needs of a sound training program. This was true especially
during 1942 and 1943, when sudden calls upon all of the continental air forces
to supply qualified units or replacements over and above those graduating from
training left no choice but to raid the parent groups. In some instances
instruction of certain groups virtually came to a halt for the lack of teachers.
By 1944 the difficulty of maintaining a high level of experience in the domestic
air forces was greatly eased by the availability of substantial numbers of
combat returnees.24
The use of combat veterans as instructors, however, presented fresh problems,
for the battle-wise veteran had his own ideas and they did not always conform
with views shaped by a different outlook than his own.

Shortages of aircraft, equipment, and facilities handicapped training at
almost every step, from the beginning of the war until nearly the end. The most
vital shortage was of aircraft of the required type. In the competition for
airplanes the continental air forces had a lower priority than the combat air
forces and, in many instances, than the fighting allies of the United States. In
January 1943, for example, Washington diverted a shipment of P-39's from the
Fourth Air Force to the Russians. Although the move was undoubtedly justified by
over-all strategy, it seriously threatened the fighter unit program in the
Fourth Air Force.25
Combat forces enjoyed a natural preference in the assignment of the new and
latest types, with the result that the aircraft left to U.S.-based units tended
to grow old and worn. When replacements became necessary, "war wearies" were
often assigned. These tried but tired aircraft needed frequent repair, which
further reduced the number in operational condition at a given time. Lack of
experienced maintenance personnel aggravated the problem, but determined
efforts, aided by the work of mobile training units, eventually succeeded in
raising significantly the level of maintenance.26

Shortages of aircraft affected all types of fighter and bombardment
operational training until late 1944, and in the B-29 program the shortage
lasted to the very close of the war. The situation with reference to fighter
training on P-38's was comparable. As more and more P-38 units were equipped for
overseas movement and as the training program was expanded to provide still more
groups, the number of

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P-38's in the OTU's became less and less adequate. In order to receive the
necessary hours of training, it became necessary for student pilots to do part
of their flying in P-39's. At the end of 1943 students had to take up to sixty
hours of instruction on the P-39 before they could fly the plane which they were
to use in combat. The OTU's were unable to discard this expedient of mixed
training, with its obvious disadvantages, until March 1945, when an adequate
supply of P-38's was on hand.27

Less vital than the shortage of aircraft, though equally persistent, was the
lack of sufficient equipment and supplies. The deficiencies were in items
necessary for flying, such as oxygen equipment, and for ground training as well.
Production of high-octane fuel fell short of the over-all demand during part of
1943 and 1944, and this forced a sharp curtailment of flying hours, especially
at high altitude, in the continental air forces. The lack of adequate airfields
also seriously handicapped operational training, especially during the early
years of the war; both fighter and bomber groups often operated from airdromes
too few and too small, or poorly located for a particular type of training.
These problems, as well as a host of others which sprang from the unprecedented
demands of World War II, were not fully solved until the final year of the
conflict.28

The overseas air forces were quick to complain to Washington if the units
they received did not measure up to required standards of proficiency. These
complaints were natural enough, because the combat air forces desired to relieve
themselves of all unnecessary training of newly received units. In the early
period of the war the most common criticisms of fighter units were on their
gunnery and high-altitude flying. In September 1942 the VIII Fighter Command
reported from England that very few of the new pilots had received any
air-to-air gunnery practice against high-speed targets or any practice at
customary combat altitudes. Weaknesses were reported also in navigation, in the
assembling and maneuvering of large formations, and in instrument flying. A more
exceptional complaint came in from the Southwest Pacific, where the Fifth Air
Force asserted that in one fighter group the pilots had flown only advanced
trainers or obsolete pursuit types before shipment overseas--not one had flown
the airplane assigned to the combat group.29

Deficiencies in gunnery and high-altitude experience were found in
bombardment units also. A further criticism of bomber units was

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that the crews often lacked the smooth coordination needed for locating and
striking a target successfully. Additional complaints specified shortcomings in
instrument and formation flying, and a failure of pilots to understand their
command responsibilities with reference to other members of the crew. Such
reports from theater commanders were confirmed by answers to questionnaires
frequently given to crews when they arrived at their overseas destination. As
late as 1943 a substantial number of flyers declared that they had received
neither air-to-air gunnery practice nor high-altitude experience. Some stated
further that much of their flying in OTU's had no training purpose and had
served merely to build up a minimum total of hours in the air. When reports of
such deficiencies reached Headquarters, AAF from overseas, the responsible
continental air forces were directed to take immediate steps toward correcting
these faults. As the war progressed, criticisms of both bombardment and fighter
units became less severe. Although complaints persisted, they were generally
restricted to minor points of training. The achievement of the domestic air
forces is confirmed by the fact that after 1943 the period of preliminary
training in a combat theater could be substantially reduced.30

The improvement of fighter and bombardment operational training was achieved
by better teaching, by specialization according to the peculiar needs of the
several theaters, and by lengthening the period of instruction. Assignment of
combat returnees to parent groups, which began on a token scale late in 1942,
linked training more closely with the requirements of actual air fighting. Some
of these veterans were not suited to become instructors because of atritudes
growing out of their war service, the narrowness of their experience, or their
lack of teaching aptitude. But by 1944 satisfactory methods had been developed
for the selection of returnees best suited for teaching. After a course in the
appropriate Training Command instructor school, they brought to the training
program the dual advantage of combat experience and systematic preparation for
instruction.31

During the summer of 1943 the experiment was tried of using part of a flight
echelon on leave in the United States from the South Pacific theater as the
nucleus of a new unit being trained for that theater. The experiment proved so
successful that it was decided to adopt the practice as an aid to greater
specialization in operational training. At regular intervals thereafter a
war-weary cadre was returned

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to the United States, where, after a leave, it became the core of a new group
destined for the same theater upon completion of training. By late 1944 the
policy of training for specific theaters was made standard for all air forces.
Certain basic phases of instruction were retained, but beyond that, each air
force modified its training program to suit the needs of a designated area.
Certain CCTS's of the Third Air Force, for example, were directed to prepare
their crews exclusively for operations against Japan. Subjects and tactics
related to the European theater were accordingly deleted, and full attention was
given to the conditions and problems of the air war in the Pacific.
Specialization on this basis made operational training more pointed and better
satisfied the desires of the individual theater air forces.32

While fighter pilots during 1942 had usually received only about 40 hours of
flying time in operational units, students in the same category received 60 to
80 hours by the end of 1943, and at the close of 1944 fighter replacements were
flying more than 100 hours. There was a comparable increase in the amount of
instructional time given to bombardment crews; this extension of training
permitted a substantial improvement in all-around proficiency. The increase in
hours was accompanied by a redistribution of emphasis among the various phases
of instruction and the addition of some new phases in response to combat
developments. Fighter units placed increasing stress on gunnery, instrument
flying, navigation, and formation flying. As the war progressed, special
attention was also given to offensive actions against surface targets, such as
strafing, rocket firing, and skip bombing. Other fighter crews concentrated on
long-range escort, while omitting the low-level offensive tactics. In the
bombardment program as a whole there was growing emphasis upon gunnery, long
navigation flights, high-altitude formation, and practice bombing. One of the
most important developments toward the end of the war was the increasing use of
radar equipment in heavy and very heavy bombardment training.33

Reconnaissance Training

In every theater of combat accurate and extensive aerial observation,
especially through photography, proved essential to the success of air and
surface forces. The advances in techniques were startling by comparison with the
methods of World War I, and these technical developments were accompanied by
radical changes in the concept

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and organization of reconnaissance functions. While fighter and bombardment
units were turned out during World War II according to patterns conceived in the
1930's, reconnaissance underwent a series of significant transformations. These
were largely the result of groping and experimentation, but they led ultimately
to a sound and workable plan for reconnaissance aviation.

Aerial reconnaissance in the First World War had been carried on chiefly by
nonpilot observers who were carried in aircraft specifically designed for
observation purposes. Since the principal function of observers was the control
of artillery fire, their training was centered at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, under the
general direction of the Field Artillery. After the war the Air Service took
over responsibility for this type of training and centered it at Kelly and
Brooks Fields in Texas. In 1940 a special school for observers (pilot and
nonpilot) was established at Brooks Field; at first the curriculum stressed
artillery missions, but general reconnaissance and aerial photography received
increasing attention. Graduates of the course were assigned to observation units
for operational training. Late in 1943, after the observation groups had been
disbanded, the course at Brooks Field was terminated. Appropriate individual
training was henceforth carried on within the various types of reconnaissance
units.34

Just before Pearl Harbor, Air Corps reconnaissance aviation strength
included, in addition to the old-type observation groups, several reconnaissance
squadrons and a single photographic group. The observation units, equipped with
light, slow aircraft, were used for short-range missions in cooperation with
ground forces and were assigned to the air support commands of each air force.
The reconnaissance squadrons, on the other hand, were each attached to a
bombardment group and equipped with aircraft of the type assigned to the group.
These squadrons were to serve primarily as the eyes of the unit and secondarily
as bombardment organizations, but in April 1942 all such units were redesignated
bombardment squadrons in anticipation of the assignment of photographic groups
to the theaters.* The 1st Photographic Group had been created in June 1941 to
expand photo-mapping activities in the AAF and to conduct long-range photo
reconnaissance after the pattern developed by the British. Each of the four
squadrons of the group was assigned to one of the continental air forces.35

Training activities in reconnaissance aviation were very limited during the
first year of American participation in the war. The 1st Photographic Group
found almost no opportunity for training because each of its squadrons was
busily engaged in carrying out mapping missions for hemisphere defense. It was
not until May 1942 that the 2d Photographic Group was established for the
purpose of instructing new photographic crews. The reconnaissance squadrons,
attached to bombardment groups, were soon absorbed by those units and could no
longer serve as training agencies. As a result, the reconnaissance training in
progress during 1942 was restricted almost entirely to the observation groups,
and their instructional program proved less than satisfactory. The main
difficulty was lack of appropriate aircraft. The old observation planes with
which the groups were equipped were in nearly all cases too few in number and,
more important, were obsolete. Not until the end of 1942 were the first combat
aircraft (P-51's and B-25's) assigned to observation groups.36

The general development of the reconnaissance training programs, as well as
the basic concept of reconnaissance functions, was strongly influenced by
overseas experience. The American observation unit in the North African campaign
of 1942 proved sadly ineffective. As a result of the manifest inadequacy of the
old-type observation organization, AAF Headquarters proceeded during 1943 to
reorganize observation activities on the lines of British tactical
reconnaissance units, which had operated effectively in Africa. In contrast to
the AAF observation group, comprising a mixture of medium or light bombers,
liaison craft, and fighters, the RAF unit was composed entirely of its speediest
fighters. After numerous conferences and deliberations, the British model of
organization and tactics was adopted. Appropriate OTU-RTU training for
production of the new tactical reconnaissance groups was instituted shortly
thereafter at Key Field, Mississippi. Photo reconnaissance instruction was
similarly affected by British experience. Although the AAF was familiar with the
techniques of aerial photography before the war, it learned a great deal from
British methods. The commanding officer at Peterson Field, Colorado, who was
responsible for initiating the first photo reconnaissance OTU training in 1942,
had spent several months in England studying RAF organization and procedures,
and his experience there had considerable influence upon the content of the AAF
instructional program. Plans and programs for weather reconnaissance units
were

--617--

almost wholly the result of American action overseas. Operations in North
Africa, as well as in the Pacific, had been hampered by inadequate reports of
meteorological conditions. The need for this new type of reconnaissance,
revealed by actual combat experience, brought forth a special weather program in
1944.37

With the abandonment of the old-type observation groups in 1943, a clearer
and more encouraging picture of reconnaissance aviation emerged. The new-type
tactical reconnaissance squadrons, equipped with modified fighter-type aircraft,
carried out short-range missions for the purpose of adjusting artillery fire and
of securing tactical information by visual or photographic means. Supplementing
the work of the tactical reconnaissance squadrons were smaller liaison units,
generally assigned to ground force elements, which conducted limited
observation, transport, and miscellaneous air tasks. These liaison units were
equipped with small, low-speed aircraft of the "grasshopper" type. Photo
reconnaissance units, tracing their origin to the 1st Photographic Group, became
increasingly important by 1943. Their mission was to provide the necessary
photographs for planning, location of targets, combat mapping, and assessment of
bomb damage. Various converted combat types were assigned to photo units,
depending upon the nature of their missions; the airplane most generally used
was the F-5, a modified P-38. The smallest of the important wartime
reconnaissance programs, and the latest to develop, was weather reconnaissance.
Training to provide units capable of long-range flights for the purpose of
obtaining meteorological data began in the summer of 1944. Weather crews were
trained on F-5's, as well as modified versions of the B-24 and B-25. The total
number of reconnaissance crews of all kinds, trained from the beginning of 1943
until V-J Day, was approximately 2,000. More than half of the total consisted of
photo reconnaissance crews, trained chiefly on the F-5, while some 800 pilots
were trained for tactical reconnaissance on the F-6, a converted P-51. In
addition to the total number of reconnaissance crews, over 500 liaison pilots
were prepared for action during the same period.38

From 1943 until the close of the war reconnaissance operational training was
concentrated in the Third Air Force. The OTU-RTU system was followed, as in the
case of fighter and bombardment unit training, though it hardly became effective
before the program was reduced to production of replacement crews. Individual
and unit proficiency requirements were established in the usual manner by
AAF

--618--

training standards. At war's end there were fourteen of these standards
governing as many specialized forms of reconnaissance instruction.

Tactical reconnaissance pilots were required by the training standards to
demonstrate navigational skill over land and water, as well as ability to fly on
instruments and in all types of formations. They were called upon to perform
nearly every defensive and offensive maneuver expected of fighter pilots and
were required in addition to master the techniques of artillery adjustment and
aerial photography. A specific training standard likewise prescribed the
requirements for the related liaison units. The liaison pilot held an aviation
rating restricting him to the operation of small, low-powered aircraft; he was
usually the graduate of a special Training Command course, briefer than that for
a standard pilot. As members of a unit, liaison pilots had to fly formations and
execute desired missions in support of ground forces. These included such
activities as limited reconnaissance, courier service, aerial wire laying,
artillery adjustment, and air evacuation. Photo reconnaissance units, like
tactical reconnaissance units, had to meet most of the standards for fighter or
bombardment crews and were required in addition to perform all types of aerial
photography. Weather reconnaissance crews were not expected to engage in combat,
but they were required to show proficiency in all aspects of unit flying as well
as in their technical specialties.39

The greatest single handicap to the reconnaissance program as a whole was the
absence of a clearly formulated, stable concept of the function of
reconnaissance aviation. The particular problems encountered, such as shortage
of aircraft and personnel, stemmed largely from the fact that the program had
not been properly planned and organized from the beginning. In the early months
of the war the observation groups were considerably under authorized strength,
and little improvement in the situation was brought about during 1942. This fact
probably reflected the lack of confidence in observation aviation as organized
at the time; at any rate the bombardment and fighter units were given higher
priority in the assignment of graduates from the Flying Training Command.
Specific examples illustrate the crippling and demoralizing effect of personnel
shortages on the observation units. Inspection of the 68th Observation Group in
April 1942 revealed that it had received no additional pilots since the summer
of 1941 and, therefore, that no program of trainee indoctrination

--619--

was being conducted. Only 45 per cent of the authorized enlisted strength was
assigned to the group at the time of the inspection. In October 1942
Headquarters, AAF reduced the strength of four observation groups of the II Air
Support Command to half of their authorized allowance, so that personnel could
be transferred to heavy bombardment OTU's and tow-target squadrons. Similar
reductions in strength were made in other air support commands, in order to
release crews for tasks carrying higher priorities.40

As a revitalized reconnaissance program developed after 1943, it gained
increasing confidence and respect. With only a few exceptions, the newly
organized units received their authorized personnel on schedule and began also
to obtain a more satisfactory allocation of combat aircraft. Recognition of the
importance of reconnaissance was underlined in June 1943 when AAF Headquarters
assigned to the program an aircraft priority second only to that of heavy
bombardment. As a result, instruction proceeded in the desired combat types with
little interference from aircraft shortages.41

The duration of training in each of the various types of reconnaissance
depended, as with the fighter and bombardment programs, upon the urgency of the
demand for crews overseas and the amount of equipment available for instruction.
In the early years the demand for personnel was exceedingly heavy, and supplies
of aircraft, as already noted, were hopelessly deficient. The year 1943 proved
to be the turning point. By early 1944 tactical and photo reconnaissance crews
were receiving two months of operational training, and by September of that year
it had become possible to extend the period to three months.42

The specific content of training courses, after being determined in
accordance with the view of reconnaissance functions which evolved during 1942
and 1943, was continually modified in light of criticisms from overseas.
Reconnaissance training enjoyed a special advantage over the fighter and
bombardment programs, since close liaison, made possible by the relatively small
numbers involved in each type of reconnaissance aviation, existed between
overseas units and the domestic training establishments. This association became
increasingly effective during the last two years of the war as veterans from the
over-seas units were returned as instructors to the home training bases.43

Photo reconnaissance training, while not radically changed as a result of
overseas reports, was altered to meet important criticisms

--620--

during 1942 and 1943. Reported shortcomings of the photographic units
included weakness in gunnery and instrument flying, insufficient training in
photography and mapping, and inadequate knowledge of the mechanism and
maintenance of reconnaissance aircraft. In response to these criticisms, the
training units gave increased attention to the corresponding phases of the
curriculum. In 1944 the number of instructional hours allotted to instrument
flying and photography was substantially increased, each crew was for the first
rime required to complete a mapping mission at an altitude of over 20,000 feet,
and an extended course in engineering was provided for pilots so that they would
develop greater familiarity with the structure and maintenance of their planes.44

The tactical reconnaissance program, initiated after the abandonment of the
observation groups in 1943, came under criticism as soon as the new units went
into action. Deficiencies were reported in the same subjects as with the early
photo reconnaissance groups: gunnery and instrument flying, photography, and
knowledge of aircraft and maintenance. The tactical reconnaissance units were
also criricized for their poor adjustment of artillery fire. In an effort to
correct the principal weaknesses, the training organizations greatly extended
the hours given to gunnery instruction and instrument flying. Increased time was
likewise given to ground and air training in the direction of artillery fire.
General readiness for combat was substantially improved during 1944 by the
practice of sending RTU graduates to the 1st or 2d Tactical Air Division for
additional training in combined maneuvers with ground force units in the United
States. The three or four weeks of field experience was possible because the
tactical reconnaissance program was producing pilots in excess of commitments;
the proportion engaging in combined exercises grew steadily in the closing
months of the war.45

Troop Carrier Training

Perhaps the most dramatic innovation in military tactics during World War II
was the landing of airborne troops behind enemy lines. The American public was
deeply impressed by the sight, in newsreels and photos, of skies filled with
billowing parachutes as men fell earthward to encircle the enemy. The hardened
paratrooper, with his peculiar gear, became a special kind of fighting hero, and
his jumping cry, "Geronimo," became almost a byword. Airborne operations

--621--

were not unknown before the war. Experiments had been conducted during the
1930's by American forces, and striking demonstrations had been made by the
Russians. It was the Germans who first introduced the technique effectively in
World War II, but before the end of the conflict the United States was making
the largest use of airborne troops. These comprised not only parachutists, but
troops dropped in gliders or brought in by transports after landing fields had
been secured.

While specially trained ground soldiers did the fighting after the landings,
it was the responsibility of the AAF to make the deliveries of men and supplies.
To carry out this responsibility was the mission of AAF troop carrier units,
serving under theater or task force commanders in cooperation with ground force
elements. The training of these units, which had to be able to perform all
phases of airborne operations, was the function of I Troop Carrier Command. It
was originally activated in April 1942, with the designation of Air Transport
Command. Troop carrier headquarters was located throughout the war at Stout
Field, Indianapolis, Indiana.46

The OTU-RTU system of operational training, used in the fighter and
bombardment programs, was also adopted for troop carrier instruction. In the
supervision of training I Troop Carrier Command was in a position coordinate
with the four continental air forces; it was responsible directly to AAF
Headquarters for meeting the training standards and requirements for troop
carrier units. In April 1945 I Troop Carrier Command became one of the
subordinate headquarters of the newly constituted Continental Air Forces.47

The task performed by I Troop Carrier Command, while quantitatively smaller
than that of other domestic air forces, was nevertheless substantial. From
December 1942 until August 1945 it produced more than 4,500 troop carrier crews;
most of these were trained on the C-47 although in the last year of war a
considerable number flew the larger C-46. In addition to the transport crews,
which normally consisted of pilot, co-pilot, navigator, radio operator, and
aerial engineer, some 5,000 glider pilots were prepared for their special
function.48

The nature of troop carrier operational training is indicated by the
successive training standards which were issued to govern the program.
Individual crew members were expected to show proficiency in skills normally
exercised by the corresponding specialists of bombardment

--622--

crews; proficiency in aerial gunnery was not required, however, because the
troop transports carried no armament. Members of troop carrier crews, on the
other hand, had special duties not required in other types of combat units. The
pilot, for example, had to be capable of glider towing and to be familiar with
the flight characteristics of gliders, while the aerial engineer had to know how
to attach glider tow ropes and operate and maintain glider pickup equipment. The
crew as a team was required to make accurate drops of aerial delivery
containers, both free and parachuted, into small clearings surrounded by natural
obstacles. Troop carrier squadrons and groups had to demonstrate skill in unit
operations, including the transportation of paratroops, and the towing and
releasing of loaded gliders in mass flights. Special curricula for the meeting
of these standards were developed by I Troop Carrier Command.49

Following the period of operational training, or during the final portion of
it, troop carrier units engaged in combined exercises with elements of the
Airborne Command (Army Ground Forces). These realistic maneuvers, which lasted
for about two months, were divided into three phases. The first consisted of
small-scale operations in which a company of ground soldiers was transported.
The scale of movement was increased in the second period, and during the final
phase whole divisions were moved as units over distances up to 300 miles. In
each stage of combined training the troop carrier groups placed emphasis upon
single- and double-tow of gliders under combat conditions and upon night
operations. Attention was given to all types of airborne assignments, including
resupply and evacuation by air.50

Problems encountered in the development of the troop carrier program
generally paralleled those in other types of operational training. These
included personnel shortages, especially in the early part of the war, and
inadequate preparation of many individuals assigned to the units. Securing
qualified instructors was especially difficult, because before 1942 only a
handful of men had had experience with troop carrier activities. Since the
aircraft used were transports, experienced airline pilots were frequently
employed as teachers during the early stages; their background, however, was
obviously unequal to the demands of the curriculum. Qualified instructors were
eventually assigned from AAFSAT, and these individuals were supplemented in 1944
by selected returnees from troop carrier units overseas. The principal equipment
shortage was aircraft: as late as November 1943

--623--

the number of available C-47's was a limiting factor in the desired expansion
of the program. By the middle of 1944, however, this supply bottleneck had been
broken.51

One of the most difficult problems, unique to the troop carrier program, was
that of training glider pilots. The principal trouble occurred in the individual
training phase, which was the responsibility of the Flying Training Command, but
the consequences were naturally felt by I Troop Carrier Command. Tentative
planning for the production of glider pilots had been started as early as June
1941, but during the two following years the program was marred by hazy concepts
of the training objective, conflicting ideas on instructional methods, and the
lack of coordination between training quotas and the production of equipment. By
1943 a sound program had been worked out, but in the meantime there had been
considerable waste of manpower, materiel, and morale. It was necessary in 1943
to reclassify 7,000 of some 10,000 trainees in pools awaiting glider
instruction. Those students remaining in the program, many of whom were
eliminees from other types of flying training, were given a one-month course of
air and ground instruction on the standard CG-4A glider. Later the course was
increased to eight weeks, with growing emphasis upon landing techniques.

By the end of 1944 it was decided to restrict glider instruction to rated
power pilots, because they were available in sufficient numbers and could serve
a dual purpose in troop carrier units. The former policy of glider-pilot
selection had required, during most of the war period, a maximum amount of power
flying experience, but the earlier trainees did not hold ratings which would
qualify them to fly transport aircraft. Shortly after the decision to limit
selection to power pilots, an experiment was conducted to test the necessity of
the individual glider course for power pilots. When it was found that pilots not
having the course adjusted easily to regular operational unit training, glider
instruction in the Training Command was dropped. By 1945 the curriculum for
glider pilots in troop carrier units included a transition phase on the CG-4A
and an advanced phase requiring forty landings under full-load conditions.
Pickup exercises were also required, as well as indoctrination in the important
after-landing procedures.52

As with other operational training programs, instruction of troop carrier
units was influenced by overseas criticisms. Most of the adverse

--624--

reports were received in the early years of the war before training started
to function smoothly; I Troop Carrier Command used these reports as a guide for
improving the preparation of units and crews. One of the most comprehensive
criticisms was submitted in 1943 by the 374th Troop Carrier Group, engaged in
operations in the Southwest Pacific. This overseas unit reported that new crews
needed additional instruction in strange field landings, because landing strips
in the island area were narrow and short and usually obstructed by trees or
ridges. It was observed further that troop carrier crews were generally
deficient in navigation by pilotage and dead reckoning, low-altitude flying,
proper timing of drops, and mechanical knowledge of their aircraft. Early
criticisms from the European theater pointed to similar weaknesses and stressed
the lack of adequate training in night operations; glider pilots were reported
as generally unsatisfactory. In response to criticisms of this nature, I Troop
Carrier Command made continual changes in curricular emphasis, and in 1944 it
took the broader step of introducing specialized theater training for its units.
Since the theaters varied greatly in their demands upon airborne forces, this
change made for greater efficiency in training. By late 1944 two of the troop
carrier CCTS's were giving a generalized course while the other two gave
specialized instruction for particular theaters.53

The foregoing description of operational training--fighter, bombardment,
reconnaissance, and troop carrier--has been limited to air personnel. The flying
combat crews could not have functioned, however, without the cooperation of
ground crews within the units and of supporting maintenance and service
organizations. The individual instruction of the host of mechanics and
technicians and the molding of those individuals into effective crews and units
will be described in the next chapter. It is convenient to describe here,
however, one process that was common to air and ground personnel alike-the final
preparation for deployment to a combat theater.

Preparation for Overseas Movement

The procedures for moving an air unit overseas were so complex that by 1943
more than four months were needed to ready it for shipment. The steps by which a
unit reached its overseas station began in the Operations Division (OPD) of the
War Department General Staff. On the basis of information provided by the AAF on
units that

--625--

would be ready for shipment within a six-month period, OPD would request the
AAF to prepare a specific type of organization for over-seas assignment. At AAF
Headquarters the Theater Commitments and Implementation Branch of AC/AS,
Operations, Commitments, and Requirements was responsible for monitoring these
requests. Normally it took approximately 120 days and 17 separate actions by
Headquarters offices to move the unit to a port of embarkation (POE). The final
movement orders came from The Adjutant General (TAG). These orders alerted the
unit to await a call from the commander of the appropriate POE, who scheduled
the shipment in accordance with a directive from the Deputy Chief of Staff and
the availability of shipping. The call from the port commander might occur at
any time within one to three weeks after receipt of the alerting orders.54

The Army's Transportation Corps, established on 31 July 1942, operated eight
water POE's.55 55
New York, the Army's largest POE, used two staging areas, Fort Dix and Camp
Kilmer, both in New Jersey; the San Francisco and the Los Angeles POE's were
served by staging areas at Camp Stoneman and Camp Anza, in California.* Many AAF
units, including practically all ground and service personnel, underwent their
final processing in these staging areas. Each of the POE's was a military
command, with jurisdiction over the troops in its staging areas, and the port
commander was made responsible for correcting any deficiencies in personnel,
equipment, or training discovered during the staging process. In 1942 port
commanders complained that AAF units were arriving undermanned and without
having completed their basic military training. In response, AAF Headquarters
directed in September 1942 that all units be completely manned before leaving
their home stations, even if it was necessary to take experienced personnel from
other units.56 But
training deficiencies continued until late in 1943.

In addition to the water POE's, the AAF used aerial POE's for those flying
personnel who flew their own planes to combat theaters. Aircraft bound for the
European theater via the northern route departed from La Guardia, Grenier, or
Presque Isle Fields; when flying the southern route, from Morrison Field,
Florida; and if flying to a Pacific theater, from either Hamilton or
Fairfield-Suisun Fields, California.57

* Other POE's were located at Boston, Hampton Roads, Charleston, New Orleans,
and Seattle.

--626--

General Arnold parried all attempts by the Chief of Transportation to assume
the direction of aerial POE's (they had been assigned to the AAF on 1 July 1942)
on the ground that the AAF had been charged with command and control over all
air stations not assigned either to theaters of operations or to defense
commands.58 Control
of the aerial POE's by the AAF, moreover, facilitated the final training and
staging of air echelons.59

From mid-July to 5 December 1942 the AAF used the Foreign Service
Concentration Command to deal with the special problems of overseas movement,
but in December the final preparation of units for foreign service was restored
to the four continental air forces. This action was accompanied by instructions
that all units destined for overseas duty be carefully checked in accordance
with a new inspection system, called Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM),
which was under the supervision of the Air Inspector.60 To prepare units for POM inspection, the
AAF established by the fall of 1943 overseas replacement depots (ORD) at
Greensboro, North Carolina, and at Kearns, Utah; in December 1944 a third ORD
was opened at Santa Ana, California. It was anticipated that these ORD's would
receive, process, and ship an average of 12,000 military personnel to POE's each
month. They provided outbound personnel with final indoctrination, training and
instruction, special clothing and equipment, and transportation to POE's. All
basic training not previously completed by enlisted men had to be accomplished
before shipment. The training program at ORD's, a continuation of instruction
already received, included a refresher course in firing, and such "must"
subjects as malaria control, first aid, censorship, sanitation, and chemical
warfare. In addition, medical and dental checkups and inoculations were given.61 Training
schedules were planned for twenty-four days, though most essentials were
completed in the first twelve, after which enlisted men were classified as ready
for shipment.62
Because there was a shortage of assigned instructors at the ORD's, it was
necessary to train them from among available personnel. ORD's even got
permission to use attached personnel as instructors, but this proved
unsatisfactory.63

Officer processing at ORD's was less carefully supervised than that of
enlisted men. At first an officer was made responsible for filling out a series
of forms and visiting the various departments concerned with each phase of
processing. Since this practice frequently resulted in

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confusion, after 1 May 1944 ORD's instituted an assembly-line processing
system whereby officers could complete the operation in one building.64

The multiplicity of training organizations and the consequent difficulties of
standardizing procedures made the job of the staging agencies a hectic one.
After July 1943 more and more of their responsibilities were shifted to the
Training Command, which was made responsible for checking on the training,
medical and physical condition of the men, the briefing on the theater of
combat, and the issuance of equipment and completion of the records of all
personnel.65 In
January 1944 Lincoln Army Air Field, Nebraska, was made an AAF staging area. In
August the Training Command set up a liaison staff and sent officers to the four
continental air forces and to the Personnel Distribution Command to assist them
in all matters concerning records, training, equipment, physical condition, and
qualifications of personnel transferred between commands for combat training,
overseas shipment, or other duty. Still later, in March 1945, the Training
Command was directed to establish a Combat Crew Processing and Distribution
Center at Lincoln Army Air Field. Weekly shipments were to be made to Lincoln in
such volume that the total inflow from all five training commands would maintain
a sufficient reserve for supplying indicated requirements to combat crew
training stations (COTS). The function of the center thus was to assemble and
distribute combat crews to the appropriate COTS, and to make a final review of
both personnel and records.66 The establishment of such an installation as that at
Lincoln, since it gave the Training Command a double check on personnel being
processed for combat crew assignments, eliminated much of the criticism
previously voiced by other commands.