Statement by the
Honorable Norman H. Davis, Chairman of the United States Delegation to the
General Disarmament Conference, at a Meeting of the General Commission of the
Conference, at Geneva, May 29, 1934

(1) Twenty-seven months and more have passed
since we met, in high hopes, to frame a general disarmament convention. No one
foresaw a short or easy negotiation; the difficulties were more apparent than
the solution; but the goal was so clear and the need for agreement so vital and
so pressing that we confidently expected success. Now we meet once again but
with hopes dimmed. One great power has chosen to withdraw from the Conference;
parallel and private conversations have not smoothed out the principal diffi-

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culties nor given the results we hoped for; certain powers are talking
not in terms of reduction of armaments but in terms of mere limitation, and
others of actual increase. In this confused situation, we can well ask
ourselves: "Whither are we going?"

(2) Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties
it is, I believe, the consensus of opinion of the delegates to this Conference
that disarmament is a problem susceptible of a practical solution if the
nations most vitally concerned will only cooperate in the proper spirit to that
end.

(3) As a result of thorough studies and
discussions here, a remarkable and considerable measure of accord has actually
been reached with respect to the technical aspects of armaments and the kind of
a disarmament convention that would be effective. Nevertheless, other questions
and considerations have intervened which have not only prevented a general
agreement but which now actually threaten the failure of the Conference.

(4) Every nation here has the same basic
thought, how to remove the menace and lighten the burden of competitive
armaments without reducing its security. It is somewhat difficult for anxious
public opinions of countries which have armed primarily because of fear to
realize that the apparent sacrifice of national defense involved in reduction of
armaments may be fully compensated for by an increase of security along other
lines. It is nevertheless the view of the American Government that such a
compensatory advantage would be in fact obtainable through a mutual reduction
and limitation of armaments in accordance with the revised draft convention
that was accepted a year ago as the basis of our negotiations.

(5) Reduced to its simplest terms, there are
two ways and only two conceivable ways to achieve security. The first is by
overwhelming superiority in armament, coupled perhaps with reinsurance in the
form of alliances; but this system has led first to a race in armaments and
then to a war, from which we have not yet recovered and from a repetition of
which we might never recover. Arms certainly did not prevent the World War, nor
did they save either victor or vanquished from the terrible consequences of
that that. The other way is to increase the power of defense and decrease the
power of attack—in other words, to reduce the chances of a successful campaign
of aggression—by a progressive abolition of those types of weapons peculiarly
suitable for invasion, namely, heavy mobile artillery, tanks, and bombing
planes. This method of disarmament, besides avoiding the complexities incident
to limitation and reduction, which is solely numerical, constitutes a realistic
aid to peace not only

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through reducing the sum total of means of war but more particularly by
doing away with the very instruments which are indispensable for successful
aggression and by giving supremacy to fortifications and other means of
defense. In fact, this method was accepted by the Conference in the resolution
of July 23, 1932.

(6) Such is the choice. For its part, the
American Government earnestly and sincerely believes that only by following the
second path—that of disarmament—can the peace and progress of the world and the
national security of each country be truly promoted. Unfortunately there is at
present a distinct tendency in Europe toward the old policy of political
alignments accompanied by an uncontrolled race in armaments which, if persisted
in, will recreate the conditions which preceded the World War. Those who are
today pursuing that policy, rather than one which promotes good will and increases
security through a reduction of armaments, are inviting a terrible risk for the
future.

(7) The United States has repeatedly stated
in unequivocal terms its belief in the value and efficacy of a drastic
reduction of armaments and its willingness to join with other powers in
bringing armaments down to a level to be determined by the needs of actual
self-defense. On May 22, 1933, in support of the draft convention which had
been submitted to the Conference by the British Delegation, I outlined, with the
approval of the President, the views of the United States Government on
disarmament, its willingness to join in a decisive and progressive reduction of
armaments through international agreement, and the extent to which it was
prepared to cooperate to that end. It was with a view of helping indirectly to
meet a given situation (in the event that the European powers should find it
necessary or desirable to supplement a general convention by special regional
agreements applicable to Europe) that I made on behalf of the United States
Government this very considered statement of what its policy in certain
circumstances would be. At that time it was our understanding that if the
United States would be willing to adopt, subject to the conditions indicated, a
policy that would not hamper the possible organization of European peace, it
would be possible to conclude an agreement for a reduction and limitation of
armaments along the lines of the draft convention then under consideration.

(8) In fact, President Roosevelt has
authorized me to summarize the attitude and policy of the United States as
follows: We are prepared to cooperate in every practicable way in efforts to
secure a general disarmament agreement and thus to help promote the gen-

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eral peace and progress of the world. We are furthermore willing, in
connection with a general disarmament convention, to negotiate a universal pact
of non-aggression and to join with other nations in conferring on international
problems growing out of any treaties to which we are a party. The United States
will not, however, participate in European political negotiations and
settlements and will not make any commitment whatever to use its armed forces
for the settlement of any dispute anywhere. In effect, the policy of the United
States is to keep out of war, but to help in every possible way to discourage
war.

(9) We have no new cures to offer. We
suggested in the proposals of President Hoover in June 1932 a percentage cut
covering all types of armaments. We suggested at that time a method of
computing effectives to reach a basis of internal police requirements which was
regarded by nearly all the powers as the only proposal which promised a fair
and reasonable solution of this difficult question. A year later President
Roosevelt, in his message to the chiefs of state, suggested the abolition of
weapons of invasion and, to make this more effective, a pact of non-aggression,
and then the establishment of an effective system of supervision and control. We
are willing to go further and work out by international agreement an effective
system for the regulation of the manufacture of and traffic in arms and
munitions of war. Let me quote one paragraph from a recent message to Congress
by President Roosevelt on this subject:

"It is my earnest hope that the
representatives of the nations who will reassemble at Geneva on May 29 will be
able to agree upon a convention containing provisions for the supervision and
control of the traffic in arms even more far-reaching than those which were
embodied in the convention of 1925. Some suitable international organization
must and will take such action. The peoples of many countries are being taxed
to the point of poverty and starvation in order to enable governments to engage
in a mad race in armament which, if permitted to continue, may well result in
war. This grave menace to the peace of the world is due in no small measure to
the uncontrolled activities of the manufacturers and merchants of engines of
destruction, and it must be met by the concerted action of the peoples of all
nations."

The people of the United States are aroused
at the evils which are being revealed in the production and traffic of
munitions of war. The American people and Government are convinced that by some
means the production and traffic in engines of death, and the profits

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resulting therefrom, must be controlled or eliminated. Those who have a
sordid financial interest in fomenting international suspicion and discord, which
in turn increases the demand for what they have to sell, must be put in a
position in which they do not have the power or the incentive to do so much
evil. If we are to foment international good will and stability we must take
effective steps to control or suppress the forces which have a material
interest in fomenting mistrust and discord. My Government is ready to join in
measures for suppressing this evil, and is prepared to negotiate in connection
with disarmament a treaty that would deal drastically with this problem.

(10) We will stand ready to advance along any
constructive lines. Even where our arms are already limited, we are prepared to
agree upon further reductions. Thus, in the matter of naval armaments, although
we have felt it necessary to build up approximately to the treaty limits,
largely in replacement ships, we are none the less willing to join the other
interested powers in a substantial proportionate reduction of naval tonnage. In
fact, our efforts remain directed toward disarmament in all branches and not
toward either truce or rearmament.

(11) The Disarmament Conference recessed on
the 16th of October last in order that there might be given an opportunity to
carry on diplomatic negotiations with the view of reconciling the divergent
views which stood in the way of agreement. Unfortunately these negotiations did
not result in agreement, and they have now been terminated. On the other hand,
they have served a necessary and useful purpose in clarifying the fundamental
differences and issues. I feel, therefore, that in taking the initiative in
these negotiations the British Government has rendered a real service.
Nevertheless the termination of these parallel efforts brings us face to face
with an emergency situation demanding a grave decision. We must determine
whether our efforts shall result in a controlled disarmament, or in a mere
limitation of armaments at a level so high as to be of doubtful value and
effect, or in an uncontrolled race in armaments which would be disastrous. Surely
no nation represented here wishes to take the responsibility for a failure of
the Conference or to face the consequences of a failure. Let us therefore go
back to the last stage in our negotiations where a general agreement was sight,
namely, to June 8 last year, when the British draft convention was accepted by
all nations, including Germany, as the basis of the future convention. In doing
so we may of course have due regard for subsequent contributions that may have
been made toward agreement. If Germany desires a disarmament convention, which
surely

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must be the case, then I cannot easily believe that she would not be
willing to resume negotiations on the basis to which she previously agreed.

The negotiations of the past 6 months were
terminated by the demand that bilateral discussions be discontinued and that
the work be brought back to Geneva. Very good. We are back in Geneva. I for one
am glad to be here. I have stated the views of my Government, and I think every
one here would consider it timely if all would explain their positions. The
issue cannot be avoided. I am unshaken in my belief that with a real spirit of
cooperation we can still achieve success.