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Guest interviewer Tanvi Madan, fellow and director of the India Project in Foreign Policy, Ambassador Shivshankar Menon, distinguished fellow in Foreign Policy, and Dhruva Jaishankar, fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings India, examine India’s foreign policy, particularly toward the U.S. and China, as well as its counter-terrorism approach in the wake of a cross-border attack on an Indian military position in Kashmir.

“The Indian priority is certainly to transform India, not to score points or do the other many grand things that strategists and people will expect you to do,” says Ambassador Menon.

“I know the phrase ‘global war on terror’ has a certain baggage, but in some ways I think framing this as a global problem, rather than an India-Pakistan problem, has really been another element in that,” says Jaishankar.

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Guest interviewer Tanvi Madan, fellow and director of the India Project in Foreign Policy, Ambassador Shivshankar Menon, distinguished fellow in Foreign Policy, and Dhruva Jaishankar, fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings India, examine India's foreign policy, particularly toward the U.S. and China, as well as its counter-terrorism approach in the wake of a cross-border attack on an Indian military position in Kashmir.
“The Indian priority is certainly to transform India, not to score points or do the other many grand things that strategists and people will expect you to do,” says Ambassador Menon.
“I know the phrase ‘global war on terror’ has a certain baggage, but in some ways I think framing this as a global problem, rather than an India-Pakistan problem, has really been another element in that,” says Jaishankar.
Related Links:
After surgical strikes, what’s next for India-Pakistan relations?
Choices: Inside the making of India's foreign policy
Modi's speech to Congress: Bullish on India, bullish on the U.S.
Uncertainties and black swans in the U.S.-India relationship
What China's rise means for India
Why Hillary is a safe bet for India
With thanks to audio producer Gaston Reboredo, Vanessa Sauter, Basseem Maleki, Fred Dews, and Richard Fawal.
Questions? Comments? Email us at intersections@brookings.edu. Guest interviewer Tanvi Madan, fellow and director of the India Project in Foreign Policy, Ambassador Shivshankar Menon, distinguished fellow in Foreign Policy, and Dhruva Jaishankar, fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings India, ... https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/siachen-back-in-the-news-but-dont-look-for-peace-yet/Siachen back in the news—but don’t look for peace yethttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171794152/0/brookingsrss/topics/kashmir~Siachen-back-in-the-news%e2%80%94but-dont-look-for-peace-yet/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=83032&post_type=opinion&preview_id=83032Teresita and Howard Schaffer reflect on how India and Pakistan sometimes find it difficult to shift gears to solve problems, even when they would greatly benefit from doing so.

A deadly avalanche that killed ten Indian soldiers earlier this month on the disputed 20,000 foot high Siachen glacier in Kashmir received extensive coverage in the Indian and Pakistani media. The avalanche prompted some commentators in both countries to call for an early settlement of what seemed to them and to many others (including ourselves) a senseless dispute.

Their voices were largely drowned out in India by an outpouring of patriotic fervor that cast the dead soldiers as “Bravehearts” who had died for their country. The Indian Defense Minister publicly dismissed pleas that both sides pull back from the 47-mile long glacier where they have confronted one another since 1984. Possibilities for a settlement seem remote.

Siachen is one of several disputes between India and Pakistan that range in importance from the future status of Kashmir to the precise location of a small stretch of their international boundary near the Indian Ocean. The Siachen dispute arose because the Line of Control drawn between the contending armies in Kashmir terminates in the high Himalayas. India and Pakistan have different versions of where it should go from there as it makes its way toward the Chinese border. This made the glacier a no-man’s land.

Anticipating a Pakistani move in 1984 to seize Siachen, the Indian army struck first. Since then it has controlled most of the glacier, including the main range. Pakistan also deploys troops in the area. Published figures say that the two countries together maintain about 150 outposts. Published figures would put the numbers of troops somewhere around 1000-2000 for each side. These are small numbers for both armies, but there is a long and complicated logistical and support chain that goes with them. India’s formal reports to parliament put the numbers of soldiers killed from 1984 to date at just under 900; Pakistani losses are variously estimated at 1000-3000.

Some fighting took place in the earlier years, but a ceasefire was worked out in 2003 and remains in place. The real enemy is nature, in this high altitude freezing desert. There have been no deaths by enemy fire in recent years. At the post most recently struck by an avalanche, the oxygen is so thin that it cannot support fire for cooking. Over time, both sides learned to deal more effectively with the bitter cold and piercing winds. The mudslides and avalanches that have kept up a steady stream of death have been triggered both by climate change and by human activity that unsettled the packed snow on the glacier itself. The recent disaster was by no means the most deadly: in April 2012, 140 Pakistani soldiers were buried by another avalanche.

Sporadic efforts to resolve the dispute have included the idea of converting Siachen into an “international peace park.” Less idealistic approaches have focused on the demilitarization of the glacier, but only after both sides had reached an agreement delineating the areas they had occupied before withdrawing and pledging not to try to take them back. These efforts won some support within the government headed by Indian National Congress party leader Manmohan Singh in the 2000s. But they were stoutly opposed by the Indian Army, one of the few security issues on which the normally apolitical uniformed military has taken a public stand.

This was particularly evident in 2006, when India and Pakistan seemed to be coming close to an agreement on the issue. In a telegram later released by Wikileaks, the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi reported in May of that year that “Army Chief J.J. Singh appears on the front page of the Indian Express seemingly fortnightly to tell readers the Army cannot support a withdrawal from Siachen.” The embassy went on to note that “given India’s high degree of civilian control over the armed forces, it is improbable that Gen. Singh could repeatedly make such statements without Ministry of Defense civilians giving it at least tacit approval.” It concluded that “[w]hether or not this is the case, a Siachen deal is improbable while his – and the Army’s – opposition continues to circulate publicly.” After the most recent tragedy, LtGen D. S. Hooda, who heads the Northern Command of the Indian army, has maintained this position. He was quoted in a Kashmiri paper as saying that despite these tragic casualties, India must remain in its present positions. He specifically ruled out the mutual demilitarization suggested by Pakistan.

The Indian public has had ample opportunity to read about the terrible human cost of Siachen, but civilian public opinion is unlikely to force the issue. For Indians, the avalanche tragedy was heightened by the apparently miraculous survival of one of the soldiers, who was reportedly buried under twenty-five feet of snow for six days before being rescued. Medically evacuated to New Delhi, he was visited in the hospital by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and became an instant, highly publicized hero. His death a couple of days later made him a national martyr.

Siachen has been one of the issues discussed between India and Pakistan in the on-again, off-again dialogue they initiated in the late ‘90s. Plans to recommence these wide-ranging discussions in January were postponed following the attack on an Indian air base by Kashmiri dissidents whom the Indians were convinced had been directed from within Pakistan.

Progress on Siachen is unlikely when and if these talks actually begin. Although the Modi government was willing to exchange with Bangladesh a small number of enclaves along their border, abandoning territory in Kashmir would strike a much different nerve both in the ruling BJP, the army, and the country at large. (It would be easier for the Pakistanis to accept since their military, which calls the shots on these issues, could argue that Pakistan had got the better deal by forcing the Indians off the main glacier range.)

So the issue is likely to continue to perplex outsiders like ourselves. Retired Indian Army friends have told us how important Siachen is for Indian security. But we find it difficult to accept the assertion that Siachen is a potential invasion route. The difficulty both Pakistan and India have had sustaining small forces in that terrain would be magnified many-fold if one attempted a major military operation. By the same token, we wonder how important Siachen would be in India’s strategy against China. It has long struck us as a great waste of men and material which, were the two sides to act rationally, could be satisfactory resolved. Worse, the deaths suffered by both sides are only likely to increase as climate change increases the risk of avalanches and mudslides.

But Indians and Pakistanis are not the only people in the world who don’t always act rationally on emotionally-charged issues.

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Editor's Note : In this piece from South Asia Hand, Teresita Schaffer and her husband, Howard Schaffer, reflect on how India and Pakistan sometimes find it difficult to shift gears to solve problems, even when they would greatly benefit from doing so. The authors develop this theme more fully in their forthcoming book, “India at the Global High Table: The Quest for Regional Primacy and Strategic Autonomy.” The book will be published by Brookings Institution Press this spring.
A deadly avalanche that killed ten Indian soldiers earlier this month on the disputed 20,000 foot high Siachen glacier in Kashmir received extensive coverage in the Indian and Pakistani media. The avalanche prompted some commentators in both countries to call for an early settlement of what seemed to them and to many others (including ourselves) a senseless dispute.
Their voices were largely drowned out in India by an outpouring of patriotic fervor that cast the dead soldiers as “Bravehearts” who had died for their country. The Indian Defense Minister publicly dismissed pleas that both sides pull back from the 47-mile long glacier where they have confronted one another since 1984. Possibilities for a settlement seem remote.
Siachen is one of several disputes between India and Pakistan that range in importance from the future status of Kashmir to the precise location of a small stretch of their international boundary near the Indian Ocean. The Siachen dispute arose because the Line of Control drawn between the contending armies in Kashmir terminates in the high Himalayas. India and Pakistan have different versions of where it should go from there as it makes its way toward the Chinese border. This made the glacier a no-man’s land.
Anticipating a Pakistani move in 1984 to seize Siachen, the Indian army struck first. Since then it has controlled most of the glacier, including the main range. Pakistan also deploys troops in the area. Published figures say that the two countries together maintain about 150 outposts. Published figures would put the numbers of troops somewhere around 1000-2000 for each side. These are small numbers for both armies, but there is a long and complicated logistical and support chain that goes with them. India’s formal reports to parliament put the numbers of soldiers killed from 1984 to date at just under 900; Pakistani losses are variously estimated at 1000-3000.
Some fighting took place in the earlier years, but a ceasefire was worked out in 2003 and remains in place. The real enemy is nature, in this high altitude freezing desert. There have been no deaths by enemy fire in recent years. At the post most recently struck by an avalanche, the oxygen is so thin that it cannot support fire for cooking. Over time, both sides learned to deal more effectively with the bitter cold and piercing winds. The mudslides and avalanches that have kept up a steady stream of death have been triggered both by climate change and by human activity that unsettled the packed snow on the glacier itself. The recent disaster was by no means the most deadly: in April 2012, 140 Pakistani soldiers were buried by another avalanche.
Sporadic efforts to resolve the dispute have included the idea of converting Siachen into an “international peace park.” Less idealistic approaches have focused on the demilitarization of the glacier, but only after both sides had reached an agreement delineating the areas they had occupied before withdrawing and pledging not to try to take them back. These efforts won some support within the government headed by Indian National Congress party leader Manmohan Singh in the 2000s. But they were stoutly opposed by the Indian Army, one of the few security issues on which the normally apolitical uniformed military has taken a public stand.
This was particularly evident in 2006, when India and Pakistan seemed to be coming close to an agreement on the issue. In a ... Editor's Note : In this piece from South Asia Hand, Teresita Schaffer and her husband, Howard Schaffer, reflect on how India and Pakistan sometimes find it difficult to shift gears to solve problems, even when they would greatly benefit from doing ... https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/lessons-from-1963-for-india-pakistan-relations/Lessons from 1963 for India-Pakistan relationshttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171800622/0/brookingsrss/topics/kashmir~Lessons-from-for-IndiaPakistan-relations/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000http://www.brookings.edu?p=82780&post_type=opinion&preview_id=82780The good news that India and Pakistan will resume their “comprehensive bilateral dialogue” should be greeted with careful expectations about the road ahead, writes Bruce Riedel. The revival of the dialogue, which covers a multitude of issues, including counter-terrorism, economic and commercial cooperation, humanitarian issues, border arguments and the future of Kashmir, was made in Islamabad on December 9, after a two- year hiatus, Riedel explains.

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The good news that India and Pakistan will resume their “comprehensive bilateral dialogue” should be greeted with careful expectations about the road ahead. The revival of the dialogue, which covers a multitude of issues, including counter-terrorism, economic and commercial cooperation, humanitarian issues, border arguments and the future of Kashmir, was made in Islamabad on December 9, after a two- year hiatus. The announcement followed a series of quiet meetings between the leadership of the two countries in the last month.

The key to the breakthrough appears to be a Pakistani commitment to move forward with bringing to justice the perpetrators of the November 26, 2008 attack on Mumbai. Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had promised Washington during his visit last month that Pakistan would take action against the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the group responsible for the attack. Since the head of the LeT, Hafiz Saeed, operates openly in Pakistan and enjoys the strong support of Pakistani intelligence, many in India are understandably sceptical that Nawaz can deliver. Let us see if he can.

If Pakistan does take concrete and verifiable actions against the LeT, the burden will quickly move to trying to find some movement on the most contentious issue of them all, the future of Jammu and Kashmir. No one expects an early breakthrough on that score, but there are useful lessons to be learned by reviewing the one previous intensive effort to resolve the conflict.

That was in the wake of the 1962 Chinese invasion of India. In 1962, one of US President John F. Kennedy’s most serious challenges during the Sino-Indian war was to keep Pakistan from opening a second front against India. Then Pakistan President Ayub Khan told Kennedy that he wanted “compensation” from India in Kashmir for Pakistan’s neutrality during the war. Kennedy made clear to Ayub that no such compensation would be tolerated, and that Pakistani intervention in the war in the Himalayas would be seen by Washington as a hostile act. After the war ended in November, Kennedy did encourage India-Pakistan talks on Kashmir that went on for six rounds through 1963.

Kennedy’s ambassador in New Delhi, John Kenneth Galbraith, quietly advised the president that then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru would never accept a territorial settlement of Kashmir; at most, Nehru might allow Muslims in Kashmir some cultural autonomy within the Indian state. This arrangement would be similar to that in the Saar region in Germany, which is German sovereign territory, but where French is commonly spoken and French culture is evident. He predicted that a diplomatic effort to coax a settlement on Kashmir would not only fail but also erode the positive Indian image of the United States after the war due to the airlift of the military supplies Kennedy had ordered during the fighting. Galbraith warned that the Chinese were still the main danger to India.

Ignoring Galbraith’s recommendation and yielding to pressure from Britain, Kennedy decided to try to bring about a Kashmir settlement. This decision suited his preference for activism in foreign policy. American and British diplomats shuttled between Nehru and Ayub, and secured an agreement to start bilateral negotiations on December 27, 1962 in Rawalpindi. However, on the eve of the talks, Pakistan announced that it had reached a border agreement with China on their common border in Kashmir. Under the deal, Pakistan gained control of almost 2,000 square kilometres that China had been occupying since the late 1940s; in turn, China got formal accession and official title to a slightly larger amount of territory. By making a formal border treaty, Pakistan and China set the stage for their future infrastructure projects in the area, such as the Karakorum highway, which would bind the two countries closer together.

The Indians rightly cried foul: Pakistan was preparing to negotiate with India on the future of Kashmir, but then secretly made a deal with China on the borders of the same state. India claimed that the territory Pakistan was ceding to China was actually Indian land, not Pakistani or Chinese. It had just fought a war to keep China from gaining Kashmiri land, and now Pakistan had agreed to a deal that would give part of Kashmir to China. Galbraith noted to Kennedy that the prospects for the India-Pakistan talks were now even more hopeless.

Despite India’s sense of betrayal by the Pakistan deal with China, the Kashmir talks went on for a total of six sessions, alternating between Pakistan and India. The American president wrote to both leaders more than once to try to persuade them to reach a compromise. When Pakistan put on the table its demands for a territorial settlement, the process collapsed.

The lessons of this history are still relevant today. A territorial settlement between India and Pakistan remains a bridge too far. The focus should be on much more tangible achievements aimed at improving the life of Kashmiris on both sides of the border, and de-escalating tensions. Here again, tangible action by Pakistan against the LeT and other terrorists should be a priority.

A second lesson is that there are powerful forces in Pakistan who want to scuttle any dialogue. In 1962, this was manifest in the secret deal with China. In 1999, after the Lahore summit, it was manifested in the Kargil plot led by General Pervez Musharraf. In 2008, after another détente seemed in the works, it was manifested in the Mumbai attacks. In other words, prudent planners should expect that progress on the diplomatic front, even small steps, may provoke a counter reaction.

Nonetheless, the news of a resumed dialogue is very much welcome. Let us hope that action will follow.

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The good news that India and Pakistan will resume their “comprehensive bilateral dialogue” should be greeted with careful expectations about the road ahead. The revival of the dialogue, which covers a multitude of issues, including counter-terrorism, economic and commercial cooperation, humanitarian issues, border arguments and the future of Kashmir, was made in Islamabad on December 9, after a two- year hiatus. The announcement followed a series of quiet meetings between the leadership of the two countries in the last month.
The key to the breakthrough appears to be a Pakistani commitment to move forward with bringing to justice the perpetrators of the November 26, 2008 attack on Mumbai. Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had promised Washington during his visit last month that Pakistan would take action against the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the group responsible for the attack. Since the head of the LeT, Hafiz Saeed, operates openly in Pakistan and enjoys the strong support of Pakistani intelligence, many in India are understandably sceptical that Nawaz can deliver. Let us see if he can.
If Pakistan does take concrete and verifiable actions against the LeT, the burden will quickly move to trying to find some movement on the most contentious issue of them all, the future of Jammu and Kashmir. No one expects an early breakthrough on that score, but there are useful lessons to be learned by reviewing the one previous intensive effort to resolve the conflict.
That was in the wake of the 1962 Chinese invasion of India. In 1962, one of US President John F. Kennedy’s most serious challenges during the Sino-Indian war was to keep Pakistan from opening a second front against India. Then Pakistan President Ayub Khan told Kennedy that he wanted “compensation” from India in Kashmir for Pakistan’s neutrality during the war. Kennedy made clear to Ayub that no such compensation would be tolerated, and that Pakistani intervention in the war in the Himalayas would be seen by Washington as a hostile act. After the war ended in November, Kennedy did encourage India-Pakistan talks on Kashmir that went on for six rounds through 1963.
Kennedy’s ambassador in New Delhi, John Kenneth Galbraith, quietly advised the president that then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru would never accept a territorial settlement of Kashmir; at most, Nehru might allow Muslims in Kashmir some cultural autonomy within the Indian state. This arrangement would be similar to that in the Saar region in Germany, which is German sovereign territory, but where French is commonly spoken and French culture is evident. He predicted that a diplomatic effort to coax a settlement on Kashmir would not only fail but also erode the positive Indian image of the United States after the war due to the airlift of the military supplies Kennedy had ordered during the fighting. Galbraith warned that the Chinese were still the main danger to India.
Ignoring Galbraith’s recommendation and yielding to pressure from Britain, Kennedy decided to try to bring about a Kashmir settlement. This decision suited his preference for activism in foreign policy. American and British diplomats shuttled between Nehru and Ayub, and secured an agreement to start bilateral negotiations on December 27, 1962 in Rawalpindi. However, on the eve of the talks, Pakistan announced that it had reached a border agreement with China on their common border in Kashmir. Under the deal, Pakistan gained control of almost 2,000 square kilometres that China had been occupying since the late 1940s; in turn, China got formal accession and official title to a slightly larger amount of territory. By making a formal border treaty, Pakistan and China set the stage for their future infrastructure projects in the area, such as the Karakorum highway, which would bind the two countries closer together.
The Indians rightly cried foul: Pakistan was preparing to negotiate with ... The good news that India and Pakistan will resume their “comprehensive bilateral dialogue” should be greeted with careful expectations about the road ahead. The revival of the dialogue, which covers a multitude of issues, including ... https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/nawaz-sharif-in-washington/Nawaz Sharif in Washingtonhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171800626/0/brookingsrss/topics/kashmir~Nawaz-Sharif-in-Washington/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/research/nawaz-sharif-in-washington/

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Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came to Washington on October 20-23 determined to create a new beginning, personally and politically, with the U.S. leadership. The U.S. government wanted to bring Pakistan into closer alignment with U.S. goals and strategies as the time for U.S. combat troops to leave Afghanistan approached. The two sides left some important matters unresolved or papered over, most significantly differences over future U.S. drone attacks on Pakistani territory. But they did develop a personal and political framework which may help them make further progress while managing remaining differences more effectively. It would be an exaggeration to claim that the summit solved the serious problems in U.S. – Pakistan relations, but its strong focus on the economic relationship did start to place attention on some aspects of the relationship where Pakistan is not treated simply as an extension of the Afghan problem.

It’s All Personal

Sharif’s visit came four months after the prime minister convincingly won a fair and free election and returned to power for a third time. In Washington, he successfully sought to project himself as a serious and competent leader with whom the United States could effectively do business. He brought a high powered civilian team, but deliberately excluded senior military representatives from his delegation. This was in all likelihood designed to show his hosts that although the Pakistan Army continues to play a key role in determining foreign and security policy, he as prime minister is the go-to person on these matters. Elected in important measure because of widespread popular anguish over the previous government’s failure to deal with Pakistan’s massive economic problems, in particular its worsening power shortages, he focused on these issues and sought U.S. government and private sector assistance in dealing with them.

President Obama and his senior administration colleagues gave Sharif the personal attention and respect which for the prime minister and other Pakistanis are key ingredients in developing a trusting relationship. The president afforded Sharif an unusual amount of “face time” at the White House and the chemistry between the two leaders was reportedly good. A string of other events deepened this personal, top-level engagement – breakfast with Vice President Biden for Sharif; tea and a poetry reading with Michelle Obama and Dr. Jill Biden for his wife; meetings with five other Cabinet-level officials; two dinners in their honor. The standard U.S. formula for official visits is often shorter on personal contact than Pakistanis are comfortable with. This was an exception.

Afghanistan

The U.S. side sought to convey to Sharif that Washington’s stake in strong bilateral relations goes well beyond a need for Pakistan’s help in achieving its goals in Afghanistan, the original reason for reviving close security and political relations after 9/11. The issue of U.S. reliability has been a sore point for the Pakistanis. Many of them bitterly recall the abrupt termination of similarly close relations when in their view Washington twice concluded it no longer needed Pakistan’s support to further its own policies in the broader South and Central Asian region. Pakistanis are also fearful that India’s growing political and economic strength will relegate them to a minor place in U.S. security calculations.

Afghanistan had pride of place in the White House discussions. The two sides have different postwar goals there. The United States wants an independent, stable Afghanistan that maintains good relations with its neighbors under a reasonably representative government. While Pakistanis share these objectives, their top priority is to limit Indian political influence in Afghanistan and avoid being caught in a pincer between two unfriendly neighbors.

It is unlikely that the two sides explored these fundamental differences in strategic objectives in the Washington talks. But they did agree on the most desirable end state for Afghanistan: a stable state achieved through an “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation process.” The Americans welcomed Pakistani assurances that they favored some post-2014 U.S. non-combat military presence in the country, opposed the return of the Taliban to power, had no political ambitions there themselves, and wanted Afghanistan’s neighbors (i.e. India) to similarly desist from interfering in the country. The U.S. decision just before the visit to move forward on some $1.6 billion in security assistance that had been blocked since the Osama bin Laden raid undoubtedly made the U.S. messages more welcome to the Pakistanis.

Kashmir and India

Nawaz Sharif’s last official visit to Washington came on July 4, 1999, when he arrived uninvited to seek President Clinton’s support in an armed conflict with India in Kashmir that Pakistan had started and was on the verge of losing. Clinton told Sharif sternly to get his troops back into Pakistan-administered territory. Only then would he be willing to “take an interest” in Kashmir. (In the event the president did nothing much.) This experience did not deter Sharif from once again seeking U.S. help in moving forward to resolve the Kashmir issue during his current visit. He could not have been surprised when he received no encouragement from the Obama administration, which continued to offer the longstanding U.S. policy of urging the two sides to resolve the issue peacefully and bilaterally, while limiting America’s role in Kashmir to crisis management. Sharif’s raising the Kashmir issue annoyed the Indians, especially as armed activity in the disputed area has recently risen. On the other hand, he placed considerable stress on his government’s commitment to improving Pakistan’s troubled ties with India, albeit without giving any specific undertakings about issues like trade.

Big Economic Push

Most U.S.-Pakistan summits have had a heavy political and security focus. This one was unusual in the level of emphasis the Pakistanis put on the economic relationship. Nawaz Sharif stressed this in both public speeches and private discussions. Although he did not say so, these ties could emerge as the centerpiece of the elusive “new beginning” in U.S.-Pakistan ties. Building up business and economic links would give the two countries something they urgently need: an agenda and a source of dynamism that have nothing to do with Afghanistan.

In making his pitch, Sharif highlighted his big plans for the Pakistani economy and his equally big hopes for U.S.-Pakistan business and energy ties. He urged the United States to fund new dams to help end Pakistan’s energy crisis. His first public speech was to the U.S.-Pakistan Business Council, where he called for a major increase in private foreign investment but also acknowledged that Pakistan would need to improve the security environment for such business ventures. He made a major appeal for help with Pakistan’s overburdened and obsolescent infrastructure. There and elsewhere in Washington, he also revived Pakistan’s longtime request for greater access for its textile exports to the U.S. market. As he must have been advised, this is a uniquely difficult request for Washington since it requires legislation that American domestic politics almost certainly rule out. But the U.S. side was prepared to discuss ways to provide tariff relief to potential Pakistani non-textile exports.

Reflecting Sharif’s interest, the joint statement he issued with President Obama included no fewer than five substantial paragraphs on economic issues. These included an undertaking to direct U.S. and Pakistani senior officials to develop a joint action plan to expand bilateral trade and investment flows over the next five years.

Not surprisingly, Pakistani calls for U.S. assistance in the construction, rehabilitation, and modernization of dams and power plants loomed large in the joint statement and elsewhere. Reflecting this interest, Sartaj Aziz, a veteran political leader and former finance minister who serves as the prime minister’s foreign policy adviser and accompanied him to Washington, told a group of American South Asia specialists that he would personally like to see all remaining funds authorized by the five-year U.S.-Pakistan assistance program devoted to a single large-scale hydroelectric dam. He argued that such a high-visibility project would benefit both Pakistan and the United States, whose economic assistance efforts would win greater public recognition than they do now.

The Missing Ingredient

From Nawaz Sharif’s point of view, the most conspicuous omission was any agreement to end U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan. The Amnesty International report criticizing the U.S. drone campaign came out just as Sharif was about to reach Washington. The U.S. response stressed that in practice, attacks have diminished. The absence of a promise to stop probably did not surprise the Pakistanis. The Washington Post front-paged the story about the depth of Pakistani involvement in the drone program just as Sharif was leaving; this will probably add to the political challenge he faces at home in dealing with that neuralgic issue.

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Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came to Washington on October 20-23 determined to create a new beginning, personally and politically, with the U.S. leadership. The U.S. government wanted to bring Pakistan into closer alignment with U.S. goals and strategies as the time for U.S. combat troops to leave Afghanistan approached. The two sides left some important matters unresolved or papered over, most significantly differences over future U.S. drone attacks on Pakistani territory. But they did develop a personal and political framework which may help them make further progress while managing remaining differences more effectively. It would be an exaggeration to claim that the summit solved the serious problems in U.S. – Pakistan relations, but its strong focus on the economic relationship did start to place attention on some aspects of the relationship where Pakistan is not treated simply as an extension of the Afghan problem.
It's All Personal
Sharif's visit came four months after the prime minister convincingly won a fair and free election and returned to power for a third time. In Washington, he successfully sought to project himself as a serious and competent leader with whom the United States could effectively do business. He brought a high powered civilian team, but deliberately excluded senior military representatives from his delegation. This was in all likelihood designed to show his hosts that although the Pakistan Army continues to play a key role in determining foreign and security policy, he as prime minister is the go-to person on these matters. Elected in important measure because of widespread popular anguish over the previous government's failure to deal with Pakistan's massive economic problems, in particular its worsening power shortages, he focused on these issues and sought U.S. government and private sector assistance in dealing with them.
President Obama and his senior administration colleagues gave Sharif the personal attention and respect which for the prime minister and other Pakistanis are key ingredients in developing a trusting relationship. The president afforded Sharif an unusual amount of “face time” at the White House and the chemistry between the two leaders was reportedly good. A string of other events deepened this personal, top-level engagement – breakfast with Vice President Biden for Sharif; tea and a poetry reading with Michelle Obama and Dr. Jill Biden for his wife; meetings with five other Cabinet-level officials; two dinners in their honor. The standard U.S. formula for official visits is often shorter on personal contact than Pakistanis are comfortable with. This was an exception.
Afghanistan
The U.S. side sought to convey to Sharif that Washington's stake in strong bilateral relations goes well beyond a need for Pakistan's help in achieving its goals in Afghanistan, the original reason for reviving close security and political relations after 9/11. The issue of U.S. reliability has been a sore point for the Pakistanis. Many of them bitterly recall the abrupt termination of similarly close relations when in their view Washington twice concluded it no longer needed Pakistan's support to further its own policies in the broader South and Central Asian region. Pakistanis are also fearful that India's growing political and economic strength will relegate them to a minor place in U.S. security calculations.
Afghanistan had pride of place in the White House discussions. The two sides have different postwar goals there. The United States wants an independent, stable Afghanistan that maintains good relations with its neighbors under a reasonably representative government. While Pakistanis share these objectives, their top priority is to limit Indian political influence in Afghanistan and avoid being caught in a pincer between two unfriendly neighbors.
It is unlikely that the two sides explored these fundamental differences in strategic objectives ... Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came to Washington on October 20-23 determined to create a new beginning, personally and politically, with the U.S. leadership. The U.S. government wanted to bring Pakistan into closer alignment with U.https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-india-pakistan-conundrum-shooting-for-a-century/The India-Pakistan Conundrum: Shooting for a Centuryhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171800628/0/brookingsrss/topics/kashmir~The-IndiaPakistan-Conundrum-Shooting-for-a-Century/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-india-pakistan-conundrum-shooting-for-a-century/

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The rivalry between India and Pakistan has proven to be one of the world’s most intractable international conflicts. In his new book, Shooting for a Century (Brookings Press, 2013), Brookings Senior Fellow Stephen P. Cohen explores the origins and costs of India-Pakistan hostility, various explanations of why the dispute endures, past and current efforts to normalize the relationship, as well as the consequences of nuclearization. He argues that the prospects for normalization are poor, but because of the stakes and urgency, it is a process deserving of bilateral effort and greater world attention. Cohen also outlines suggestions as to how the rivalry might end, as well as the approach he believes the United States should take vis-à-vis the rivalry.

On June 14, the India Project at Brookings hosted the launch of Shooting for a Century with a discussion on present and past ties between India and Pakistan, prospects for normalization, as well as what role, if any, the U.S. should play. Brookings Distinguished Fellow Thomas Pickering and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate Ashley J. Tellis joined Cohen for the discussion. Strobe Talbott, president of Brookings, introduced the session. Tanvi Madan, director of the India Project, moderated the discussion.

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The rivalry between India and Pakistan has proven to be one of the world’s most intractable international conflicts. In his new book,
Shooting for a Century
(Brookings Press, 2013), Brookings Senior Fellow Stephen P. Cohen explores the origins and costs of India-Pakistan hostility, various explanations of why the dispute endures, past and current efforts to normalize the relationship, as well as the consequences of nuclearization. He argues that the prospects for normalization are poor, but because of the stakes and urgency, it is a process deserving of bilateral effort and greater world attention. Cohen also outlines suggestions as to how the rivalry might end, as well as the approach he believes the United States should take vis-à-vis the rivalry.
On June 14, the India Project at Brookings hosted the launch of Shooting for a Century with a discussion on present and past ties between India and Pakistan, prospects for normalization, as well as what role, if any, the U.S. should play. Brookings Distinguished Fellow Thomas Pickering and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate Ashley J. Tellis joined Cohen for the discussion. Strobe Talbott, president of Brookings, introduced the session. Tanvi Madan, director of the India Project, moderated the discussion. The rivalry between India and Pakistan has proven to be one of the world’s most intractable international conflicts. In his new book,
Shooting for a Century
(Brookings Press, 2013), Brookings Senior Fellow Stephen P.https://www.brookings.edu/book/the-idea-of-pakistan-2/The Idea of Pakistanhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171800634/0/brookingsrss/topics/kashmir~The-Idea-of-Pakistan/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/book/the-idea-of-pakistan-2/

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Stephen Cohen updates his critically acclaimed book with a discerning view of significant recent events in the region, particularly the devastating earthquake in Kashmir and its after affects. The quake killed over 70,000 people and left another 3 million homeless in one of the most remote, inhospitable parts of the world. Cohen observes how the catastrophic event has affected Pakistan’s political, military, and economic structures, as well as its relationships with other countries. Praise for the previous edition: “A lucid, penetrating and brilliantly constructed book on the state and nation of Pakistan. Cohen, an old South Asia hand, brings to the fore all his knowledge and expertise of one of America’s most important allies in the war against terror.”—Choice “Cohen’s facts are indisputable, his logic cold and clear, and his omissions deliberate and meaningful.”—Foreign Affairs “A singularly successful effort to explain Pakistan…. The intellectual power and rare insight with which the book breaks through the complexity of the subject rivals that of classics that have explained other societies posing a comparable challenge to understanding.”—Middle East Journal “Cohen knows Pakistan well and his analysis is very perceptive.”—Newsline (Karachi, Pakistan) “A personal, perceptive, and policy-oriented study of Pakistan. This is an important work, by a leading expert of South Asia.”—Economic and Political Weekly (India) Book Review “[Cohen’s] survey of how the country has developed and why it is at the crossroads it is now is most insightful and useful. A first class primer and more as I commence my work.”—David B. Collins, high commissioner of Canada, Islamabad

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Stephen Cohen updates his critically acclaimed book with a discerning view of significant recent events in the region, particularly the devastating earthquake in Kashmir and its after affects. The quake killed over 70,000 people and left another 3 million homeless in one of the most remote, inhospitable parts of the world. Cohen observes how the catastrophic event has affected Pakistan's political, military, and economic structures, as well as its relationships with other countries. Praise for the previous edition: “A lucid, penetrating and brilliantly constructed book on the state and nation of Pakistan. Cohen, an old South Asia hand, brings to the fore all his knowledge and expertise of one of America's most important allies in the war against terror.”—Choice “Cohen's facts are indisputable, his logic cold and clear, and his omissions deliberate and meaningful.”—Foreign Affairs “A singularly successful effort to explain Pakistan…. The intellectual power and rare insight with which the book breaks through the complexity of the subject rivals that of classics that have explained other societies posing a comparable challenge to understanding.”—Middle East Journal “Cohen knows Pakistan well and his analysis is very perceptive.”—Newsline (Karachi, Pakistan) “A personal, perceptive, and policy-oriented study of Pakistan. This is an important work, by a leading expert of South Asia.”—Economic and Political Weekly (India) Book Review “[Cohen's] survey of how the country has developed and why it is at the crossroads it is now is most insightful and useful. A first class primer and more as I commence my work.”—David B. Collins, high commissioner of Canada, Islamabad Stephen Cohen updates his critically acclaimed book with a discerning view of significant recent events in the region, particularly the devastating earthquake in Kashmir and its after affects. The quake killed over 70,000 people and left another 3 ... https://www.brookings.edu/book/four-crises-and-a-peace-process/Four Crises and a Peace Processhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171800636/0/brookingsrss/topics/kashmir~Four-Crises-and-a-Peace-Process/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/book/four-crises-and-a-peace-process/

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India and Pakistan, nuclear neighbors and rivals, fought the last of three major wars in 1971. Far from peaceful, however, the period since then has been “one long crisis, punctuated by periods of peace.” The long-disputed Kashmir issue continues to be both a cause and consequence of India-Pakistan hostility. Four Crises and a Peace Process focuses on four contained conflicts on the subcontinent: the Brasstacks Crisis of 1986–1987, the Compound Crisis of 1990, the Kargil Conflict of 1999, and the Border Confrontation of 2001–2002. Authors P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Brookings senior fellow Stephen P. Cohen explain the underlying causes of these crises, their consequences, the lessons that can be learned, and the American role in each. The four crises are notable because any one of them could have escalated to a large-scale conflict, or even all-out war, and three took place after India and Pakistan had gone nuclear. Looking for larger trends of peace and conflict in the region, the authors consider these incidents as cases of attempted conflict resolution, as instances of limited war by nuclear-armed nations, and as examples of intervention and engagement by the United States and China. They analyze the reactions of Indian, Pakistani, and international media and assess the two countries’ decision-making processes. Fo ur Crises and a Peace Process explains how these crises have affected regional and international policy and evaluates the prospects for lasting peace in South Asia.

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India and Pakistan, nuclear neighbors and rivals, fought the last of three major wars in 1971. Far from peaceful, however, the period since then has been “one long crisis, punctuated by periods of peace.” The long-disputed Kashmir issue continues to be both a cause and consequence of India-Pakistan hostility. Four Crises and a Peace Process focuses on four contained conflicts on the subcontinent: the Brasstacks Crisis of 1986–1987, the Compound Crisis of 1990, the Kargil Conflict of 1999, and the Border Confrontation of 2001–2002. Authors P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Brookings senior fellow Stephen P. Cohen explain the underlying causes of these crises, their consequences, the lessons that can be learned, and the American role in each. The four crises are notable because any one of them could have escalated to a large-scale conflict, or even all-out war, and three took place after India and Pakistan had gone nuclear. Looking for larger trends of peace and conflict in the region, the authors consider these incidents as cases of attempted conflict resolution, as instances of limited war by nuclear-armed nations, and as examples of intervention and engagement by the United States and China. They analyze the reactions of Indian, Pakistani, and international media and assess the two countries' decision-making processes. Fo ur Crises and a Peace Process explains how these crises have affected regional and international policy and evaluates the prospects for lasting peace in South Asia. India and Pakistan, nuclear neighbors and rivals, fought the last of three major wars in 1971. Far from peaceful, however, the period since then has been “one long crisis, punctuated by periods of peace.” The long-disputed Kashmir issue ... https://www.brookings.edu/book/children-at-war/Children at Warhttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171800638/0/brookingsrss/topics/kashmir~Children-at-War/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/book/children-at-war/

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Children at War is the first comprehensive book to examine the growing and global use of children as soldiers.

P. W. Singer, an internationally recognized expert on twenty-first-century warfare, explores how a new strategy of war, utilized by armies and warlords alike, has targeted children, seeking to turn them into soldiers and terrorists.

Singer writes about how the first American serviceman killed by hostile fire in Afghanistan-a Green Beret-was shot by a fourteen-year-old Afghan boy; how an American Special Forces medic was killed by a grenade thrown by a fifteen-year-old al Qaeda recruit; how suspected militants detained by U.S. forces in Iraq included more than one hundred children under the age of seventeen, and how hundreds who were taken hostage in Thailand were held captive by the rebel “God’s Army,” led by twelve-year-old twins.

Interweaving the voices of child soldiers throughout the book, Singer looks at the ways these children are recruited, abducted, trained, and finally sent off to fight in war-torn hot spots, from Colombia and the Sudan to Kashmir and Sierra Leone. He writes abut children who have been indoctrinated to fight U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan; of Iraqi boys between the ages of ten and fifteen who had been trained in military arms and tactics to become Saddam Hussein’s Ashbal Saddam (Lion Cubs); of young refugees from Pakistani madrassahs who were recruited to help bring the Taliban to power in the Afghan civil war.

The author, National Security Fellow at the Brookings Institution and director of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World, explores how this phenomenon has come about, and how social disruptions and failures of development in modern Third World nations have led to greater global conflict and an instability that has spawned a new pool of recruits. He writes about how technology has made today’s weapons smaller and lighter and therefore easier for children to carry and handle; how one billion people in the world live in developing countries where civil war is part of everyday life; and how some children-without food, clothing, or family-have volunteered as soldiers as their only way to survive.

Finally, Singer makes clear how the U.S. government and the international community must face this new reality of modern warfare, how those who benefit from the recruitment of children as soldiers must be held accountable, how Western militaries must be prepared to face children in battle, and how rehabilitation programs can undo this horrific phenomenon and turn child soldiers back into children.

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Children at War is the first comprehensive book to examine the growing and global use of children as soldiers.
P. W. Singer, an internationally recognized expert on twenty-first-century warfare, explores how a new strategy of war, utilized by armies and warlords alike, has targeted children, seeking to turn them into soldiers and terrorists.
Singer writes about how the first American serviceman killed by hostile fire in Afghanistan-a Green Beret-was shot by a fourteen-year-old Afghan boy; how an American Special Forces medic was killed by a grenade thrown by a fifteen-year-old al Qaeda recruit; how suspected militants detained by U.S. forces in Iraq included more than one hundred children under the age of seventeen, and how hundreds who were taken hostage in Thailand were held captive by the rebel “God's Army,” led by twelve-year-old twins.
Interweaving the voices of child soldiers throughout the book, Singer looks at the ways these children are recruited, abducted, trained, and finally sent off to fight in war-torn hot spots, from Colombia and the Sudan to Kashmir and Sierra Leone. He writes abut children who have been indoctrinated to fight U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan; of Iraqi boys between the ages of ten and fifteen who had been trained in military arms and tactics to become Saddam Hussein's Ashbal Saddam (Lion Cubs); of young refugees from Pakistani madrassahs who were recruited to help bring the Taliban to power in the Afghan civil war.
The author, National Security Fellow at the Brookings Institution and director of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World, explores how this phenomenon has come about, and how social disruptions and failures of development in modern Third World nations have led to greater global conflict and an instability that has spawned a new pool of recruits. He writes about how technology has made today's weapons smaller and lighter and therefore easier for children to carry and handle; how one billion people in the world live in developing countries where civil war is part of everyday life; and how some children-without food, clothing, or family-have volunteered as soldiers as their only way to survive.
Finally, Singer makes clear how the U.S. government and the international community must face this new reality of modern warfare, how those who benefit from the recruitment of children as soldiers must be held accountable, how Western militaries must be prepared to face children in battle, and how rehabilitation programs can undo this horrific phenomenon and turn child soldiers back into children. Children at War is the first comprehensive book to examine the growing and global use of children as soldiers.
P. W. Singer, an internationally recognized expert on twenty-first-century warfare, explores how a new strategy of war, utilized by ... https://www.brookings.edu/events/india-pakistan-the-next-critical-steps/India-Pakistan: The Next Critical Stepshttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171800642/0/brookingsrss/topics/kashmir~IndiaPakistan-The-Next-Critical-Steps/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/events/india-pakistan-the-next-critical-steps/

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In his first major address on the Administration’s on-going efforts to end nuclear proliferation in South Asia, Deputy Secretary Talbott will give an on-the-record report on the status of the negotiations with India and Pakistan as well as outline U.S. government goals for the next critical steps.

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In his first major address on the Administration's on-going efforts to end nuclear proliferation in South Asia, Deputy Secretary Talbott will give an on-the-record report on the status of the negotiations with India and Pakistan as well as outline U.S. government goals for the next critical steps. In his first major address on the Administration's on-going efforts to end nuclear proliferation in South Asia, Deputy Secretary Talbott will give an on-the-record report on the status of the negotiations with India and Pakistan as well as outline U.https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-vajpayee-visit-defining-the-u-s-indian-relationship/The Vajpayee Visit: Defining the U.S.-Indian Relationshiphttp://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/171800646/0/brookingsrss/topics/kashmir~The-Vajpayee-Visit-Defining-the-USIndian-Relationship/
Mon, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-vajpayee-visit-defining-the-u-s-indian-relationship/

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Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee will arrive in Washington on September 14, as part of a lengthy visit to the United States. This trip reciprocates President Clinton’s visit to India last March. This will be the first visit by an Indian prime minister to the United States in six years. Vajpayee will address a joint session of Congress and will meet with corporate officials, scholars, and members of the large and thriving Indian-American community.

The visit provides an opportunity to discuss several critical developments. These include:

U.S.-Indian relations in the post-Cold War world.

New Delhi’s conflict with Islamabad over Kashmir, which flared into a war in Kargil in mid-1999 (and led President Clinton to characterize South Asia as “the most dangerous place on earth”).

India’s growing status as a major economic player, and its emergence as a software superpower.

The continuing India-China rivalry, and Delhi’s quest for a seat on the United Nations Security Council.

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Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee will arrive in Washington on September 14, as part of a lengthy visit to the United States. This trip reciprocates President Clinton's visit to India last March. This will be the first visit by an Indian prime minister to the United States in six years. Vajpayee will address a joint session of Congress and will meet with corporate officials, scholars, and members of the large and thriving Indian-American community.
The visit provides an opportunity to discuss several critical developments. These include:
- U.S.-Indian relations in the post-Cold War world. - New Delhi's conflict with Islamabad over Kashmir, which flared into a war in Kargil in mid-1999 (and led President Clinton to characterize South Asia as “the most dangerous place on earth”). - India's growing status as a major economic player, and its emergence as a software superpower. - The continuing India-China rivalry, and Delhi's quest for a seat on the United Nations Security Council.
Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee will arrive in Washington on September 14, as part of a lengthy visit to the United States. This trip reciprocates President Clinton's visit to India last March. This will be the first visit by an Indian ...