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FRANCE:
Mitterrand, the Triumph of appearances?

Franco-Arab relations over the past five years have been marked
by three phases. “At first we were afraid that France’s
policy would change, due to Mitterrand’s known ties with
Israel. Then there was a second period marked by a restoration of
confidence. And finally, during the third period, there were renewed
fears of a change”. This comment by an Arab ambassador in
Paris summarises, simplistically perhaps, the curious relationship
between France and the Middle East since the French Socialists came
to power in May 1981.

For the Gulf states, François Mitterrand’s regime
was an incarnation of two devils -- the communists (who had four
ministers in the government of Pierre Mauroy) and the Zionists.
“There was a kind of panic in the Arab world”, recalls
Jean-Pierre Filliu, who worked as an analyst for the international
secretariat of the French Socialist Party.

“So many emissaries were sent to Paris from the Arab capitals
that Claude Cheysson, the foreign minister, spoke of a “flight
of storks”. Some Arab states -- like Qatar -- even went as
far as withdrawing money deposited in French banks, a move which
could have provoked a financial crisis.

But President Mitterrand reacted quickly and cleverly. On 26 May
he sent to Riyadh his brother, General Mitterrand, chairman of the
leading French aerospace company SNIAS. On 11 June, King Fahd of
Saudi Arabia made an official visit to France, and was given the
necessary guarantees -- guarantees which were reiterated during
Mitterrand’s visit to Riyadh in September.

François Mitterrand had a magic word: “France’s
signature is inviolable (sacrée). And the Saudis were touched
by the fact that he treated them as world statesmen, speaking of
the Russian presence in Afghanistan and of the North-South dialogue.
But their discussions were not without ambiguity: when Mitterrand
talked of Jerusalem, the Saudis spoke of the “holy places”.

By early 1982, personal contacts and financial and military relations
had been restored. But as for the “great Arab issues”,
it was more difficult. A turning-point was François Mitterrand’s
speech to the Israeli Knesset, in which he delineated what amounted
to the French doctrine on the settlement of the Middle East conflict.

Was the Israeli Knesset the best place to do it? In his recently-published
book Réflexions sur la politique extérieure de la
France (Reflections on French foreign policy), Mitterrand is proud
of using “one and the same language” with Arabs and
Israelis -- and for a while he was able to sell the idea that his
good relations with Israel could help the Arabs to reach a settlement.

But, as an Arab ambassador puts it, “While France had been
the prime mover in the EEC towards a settlement of the Palestinian
problem -- France had been behind the Venice declaration (June 1980),
which stated that the PLO must be a party to negotiations and reaffirmed
the Palestinians’ right to self-determination -- it was all
over after Mitterrand came to power”.

In a vitriolic book on “Mitterrand’s diplomacy, or
the triumph of appearances”, Gabriel Robin, former diplomatic
adviser to Presidents Pompidou and Giscard d’Estaing, denounces
the “burial” of the Venice declaration. “From
now on, French policy is not to have a policy”, writes Gabriel
Robin, “and to act in such a way that Europe also has no policy”.

“A European initiative is something serious”, counters
a French expert who justifies his government’s diplomacy.
“France’s scope for pressure on the US is limited...
If a European initiative had been possible, another country would
have launched it”. This somewhat isolated supporter of Mitterrand’s
diplomacy concludes, “What can Europe do, when the only aim
of the Palestinians is to establish a direct dialogue with the Americans”?

In fact it is difficult to characterise the policies of the last
five years. If relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the PLO and Iraq
have been fairly good, there was a time (1983) when France was almost
at war with three Middle East states -- with Syria over Lebanon,
with Iran over the delivery of Super-Etendards to Iraq, and with
Libya over Chad.

In the Maghreb, after a good start with Algeria, with which a natural
gas agreement was signed, relations cooled after Presidnt Mitterrand’s
meeting with King Hassan of Morocco at Ifrane. The Algerians thought
they were being cheated, and that Mitterrand was siding with Morocco
over the Western Sahara conflict.

But it is clear that, overall, relations with the Arabs deteriorated
again after Laurent Fabius took over from Pierre Mauroy as prime
minister (july 1984) and especially after Claude Cheysson left the
French foreign ministry in December 1984.

“Cheysson, who lived in Algeria immediately after independence,
was fascinated by the Arabs and had a warm comprehension of their
problems”, says Jean-Pierre Filliu. When visiting Syria, Cheysson
would speak of the occupation of Golan; in Amman, he would raise
the question of Jerusalem; without Cheysson, the natural gas deal
with Algeria would never have been signed.

It is true, adds Filliu, that Roland Dumas, the new French foreign
minister, can be considered as even more pro-Arab. But Dumas scarcely
exists: his great talent is to guess the Elysées’ intentions,
and to stand aside at the last moment.

Cheysson, in contrast, did not hesitate to threaten to resign if
he did not like something. “With the disappearance of this
buffer at the Quai d’Orsay (the French foreign ministry) and
with the nomination of François Mitterrand’s old friend,
Shimon Peres, as Israeli prime minister, the lobbies were free to
interfere. France no longer has an Arab policy”, concludes
Jean-Pierre Filliu, who explains in a forthcoming book (written
with Lebanese journalist Samir Douaihy) that President Mitterrand’s
“tainted vision” of the Middle East is due to the fact
that until he reached the age of 60, he viewed it only throughh
pro-Israeli spectacles.

The left-wing Jean-Pierre Filliu ends up agreeing with the right-wing
Gabriel Robin. “Mitterrand’s skill is eyewash... His
diplomacy is nothing but the vain triumph of appearances”,
concludes gabriel Robin.

Although Arab ambassadors in Paris declined to be quoted prior
to the 16 March elections, they had already taken sides. The Saudis
had welcomed Raymond Barre in Riyadh as if he were already prime
minister, and the Iraqis had displayed their old friendship for
Jacques Chirac. They were a little hasty in the way they resquested
delivery of 69 Mirage jets, so that the mild-mannered Roland Dumas
had to remind them: “Until 16 March the planes are a matter
for us...”

After the ambiguous election result, what now for Mitterrand’s
Middle East?