Considered and decided by
Stoneburner, Presiding Judge, Anderson, Judge, and Wright, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

G. BARRY ANDERSON, Judge

Appellant A.J.F. challenges the
district court’s order staying an adjudication of delinquency for a simulated
controlled substance crime on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. Because evidence that appellant brought a
container of crushed cold medicine to school and appellant’s actions prompted
other children to believe it to be a controlled substance and inhale it as if
it were a controlled substance was sufficient to support the district court’s
stay of appellant’s adjudication of delinquency, we affirm.

FACTS

Appellant was a twelve-year-old
seventh grader when she was charged by petition with two counts of a
controlled-substance crime. On October
8, 2001, appellant’s friend, N.J., crushed an over-the-counter cold tablet
medication into powder. Appellant and
N.J. put the powder into a small container normally used to hold refills of
lead for mechanical pencils. Neither
appellant nor N.J. explained why N.J. crushed the pills into powder form other
than to say that they thought it would be “fun.”

The next day, October 9, 2001,
appellant brought the container with the crushed powder to the Grand Rapids
Middle School. During the morning bus
ride to school, A.R. who was seated across the aisle diagonally from appellant,
saw appellant holding the container and overheard appellant say it was “a
little bit of cocaine.”[1] Other than A.R.’s testimony, the state
produced no evidence that appellant ever told another student what the powder
was or that the container held illegal drugs.

Appellant showed the container
filled with powder to R.N. and B.B. during math class. Appellant told R.N. that she and N.J. made
the substance at home and brought it to school. B.B. testified that appellant was secretive about the container.

During recess, R.N., B.B., N.J., and
appellant gathered outside the school.
Appellant testified that R.N. wanted to see the container. R.N. poured the powder on a book while another
student cut the powder into lines. R.N.
had a broken pen, which R.N. and N.J. took turns using to inhale the powder
through the empty tube. Although there
was conflicting testimony regarding who sniffed the powder, appellant denied
sniffing it. Appellant, however, was
present and aware of what R.N. was doing with the powder, but she did not
supply the pen or book, and she did not cut the powder into lines. Another student, R.E., observed the snorting
activities and testified that she overheard B.B. ask appellant how much of the
substance he could buy for five dollars.
When a teacher walked by, one of the children threw the book holding the
powder. Appellant retrieved the
container and put it in her pocket.

After lunch, assistant principal
Patrick Rendell and human resources officer Jacqueline Heinrich came to
appellant’s class to talk to her about drugs.
Appellant denied having any but later admitted that she had lied to the
assistant principal regarding her knowledge of the snorting activities stating:
“I didn’t want him to think that I had any sort of drug or anything in
school.” She then went to her next
class and discarded the container with the powder in the trash.

Later that same day, Rendell
summoned appellant to his office and questioned her. Although she initially denied involvement, appellant eventually
admitted having the powder. She led
Heinrich to the wastebasket in her classroom and retrieved the container.

Appellant was charged with two
counts of a simulated-controlled-substance crime. Appellant moved, at the close of evidence, for a directed verdict
and the district court dismissed a count charging appellant with a simulated
controlled substance crime in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.097, subd.
1(a) (2000). After completion of the
trial, the district court found appellant violated Minn. Stat. §§ 152.097,
subd. 1(c) and 152.01, subd. 15a (2000).
The district court stayed appellant’s delinquency adjudication pursuant
to Minn. R. Juv. P. 15.05, subd. 4(A), and continued the case for a period not
to exceed 90 days. See Minn.
Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7 (2000). The
district court placed appellant on probation on several conditions and this
appeal of the stay of adjudication followed, pursuant to Minn. R. Juv. P.
21.03, subd. 1(A)(2).

D E C I S I O N

On appeal from a determination that
each of the elements of a delinquency petition has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, we are “limited to ascertaining whether, given the facts and
legitimate inferences, a factfinder could reasonably make that determination.”
In re Welfare of S.M.J., 556 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Minn. App. 1996) (citing State
v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 111 (Minn. 1978)). When careful scrutiny of the record creates grave doubts as to
the guilt of a defendant convicted of a criminal offense, the interests of
justice and the rights of the accused require that an appellate court reverse
the conviction. State v. Formo,
416 N.W.2d 162, 165 (Minn. App. 1987), review granted (Minn. Feb. 17,
1988) and appeal dismissed (Minn. Jul. 28, 1988). We must apply the same standard of review
for cases decided by a court to those decided by a jury. State v. Cox, 278 N.W.2d 62, 65
(Minn. 1979)

[T]his court will uphold the
district court’s finding if, based on the evidence contained in the record, the
district court could reasonably have found defendant guilty of the crime
charged. Moreover, in making this
determination the court must view the evidence in a manner most favorable to
the state and assume that the district court disbelieved contradictory testimony.

Id.(citations omitted).

The district court found appellant
guilty of a simulated-controlled-substance crime for violating Minn. Stat. §
152.097, subd. 1(c) (2000). In
pertinent part, that section states:

It is unlawful for any person knowingly
to manufacture, sell, transfer or deliver or attempt to sell, transfer or
deliver a noncontrolled substance upon:

*
* * *

(c)
Under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the
substance was a controlled substance.
Any of the following factors shall constitute relevant evidence:

(i) The noncontrolled substance was packaged in
a manner normally used for the illegal delivery of controlled substances; or

(ii) The delivery or attempted delivery included
an exchange of or demand for money or other valuable property as consideration
for delivery of the noncontrolled substance, and the amount of the
consideration was substantially in excess of the reasonable value of the
noncontrolled substance; or

(iii)
The physical appearance of the noncontrolled substance is substantially
identical to a specified controlled substance.

Minn.
Stat. § 152.097, subd. 1(c).

Grand Rapids police officer Brian
Johnson testified that the powder appellant brought to school possessed a color
and consistency similar to cocaine and methamphetamine. He further testified that snorting through
the nostrils is a common method to ingest controlled substances of this
type. The district court found
Johnson’s testimony credible, and there is no evidence in the record to
contradict this finding. The powdery
substance appellant brought to school satisfies the requirements of Minn. Stat.
§ 152.097, subd. 1(c)(iii): “[t]he physical appearance of the
noncontrolled substance is substantially identical to a specified controlled
substance.” See Minn. Stat. §
152.097, subd. 1(c)(iii).

In addition to concluding
appellant’s actions could lead a reasonable person to believe that the powder
was a controlled substance, we must also determine whether sufficient evidence
establishes appellant sold, transferred, delivered, or attempted to sell,
transfer, or deliver a noncontrolled substance. See Minn. Stat. § 152.097, subd. 1. There was contradictory testimony regarding
whether appellant handed the container to R.N. or whether R.N. acted
independently in grabbing the container from appellant. Regardless of how the parties characterized
this exchange, appellant’s knowing and consensual transfer of the substance was
sufficient to support an adjudication of delinquency.

Appellant argues, however, that
other children created the circumstances that led to the belief that the
container held a controlled substance.
Appellant argues that no evidence exists that she gave the powder to
other children or represented to them that it was an illegal drug. Appellant contends that because she did not
provide the book or the tube used to snort the powder, and did not cut the
powder into lines, she did nothing to create or support the belief that the powder
was a controlled substance.

Assuming, arguendo, that
A.R.’s testimony that appellant said she had a “little bit of cocaine” was not
credible, appellant never explicitly told anyone that she had a controlled
substance. However, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the state, there is enough evidence to
conclude that appellant actively participated in creating the belief that the
powder was in fact a controlled substance.
Although appellant did not actually crush the cold tablets, she did
assist in putting the powder in an easy-to-conceal container that would look
inconspicuous in a school setting.
Appellant consciously transported the substance to school in a small,
lead-pencil-refill container. Appellant
also acted secretively in showing the container to other classmates. In addition, although appellant did not
provide the book or pen tube, or cut the powder into lines, she did observe
that activity, and she was the one who provided the substance that the children
eventually snorted. Finally, appellant
concealed her actions by lying to assistant principal Rendell about her
knowledge of the substance and the snorting activities and later discarding the
container. Although appellant’s actions
are also consistent with lawful behavior, the district court justifiably
concluded that appellant knowingly provided a substance that a reasonable
person could have believed was an illegal drug.

Appellant knew her actions might
appear to others as a violation of the law; she acted as if she were breaking
the law and the children she shared the substance with interpreted appellant’s
actions to signify that they were snorting a controlled substance. Because the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the state, would support an adjudication of
delinquency, we affirm the district court.[2]

Affirmed.

[1] Defense counsel
subsequently impeached A.R. by showing that A.R. may have had trouble hearing
exactly what appellant said because approximately twenty children were on the
bus, appellant was not talking to A.R., and A.R. was seated diagonally across
the aisle from appellant.

[2]In
criminal jurisprudence, much of the discussion and commentary concerning the
use of stays of adjudication of guilt is associated with issues of
prosecutorial discretion or the perceived absence of lack of judgment in
exercising that discretion. See,
e.g., State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1993) (holding
absent abuse of prosecutorial discretion, judiciary is powerless to interfere
with the prosecutor’s charging authority).
In juvenile matters, of course, stays of adjudication are specifically
authorized by rule. Minn. R. Juv. P.
15.05, subd. 1(B), 4. Because of the
specific juvenile court rule, the prosecutorial discretion analysis is not
necessary and, in any event, the record is wholly silent concerning any reason
for the puzzling decision to prosecute this particular case.