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Thursday, May 14, 2015

Did There Have to Be A Munich Conference?

by George T. Chronis

With the
ongoing tragedy now taking place in the Ukraine, the comparisons to the Sudeten
Crisis of 1938 have been many. Russia has been cast as Hitler's Germany,
bullying a neighbor to fulfill steep territorial ambitions, and the Ukraine as
Czechoslovakia, looking for Western backbone to help stave off the oppressor.
The events of 1938 are where the term appeasement entered the political lexicon
and the word has been getting ample play in the media during the last year.

While these
comparisons are apt, there are some very real differences between the two
crises. First, Czechoslovakia was a bona fide military power in Central Europe
with an extremely well equipped and well-trained army, strong defenses along
the frontier with Germany, and mountains ringing the border that favored the
defender. Second, the Czechoslovaks had a mutual defense treaty with France,
plus a side agreement with the Soviet Union where the Russians agreed to come
to Czechoslovakia's aid once the French exercised her treaty responsibilities.
The Ukraine has none of these assets.

When France,
Great Britain and Italy signed away Western Bohemia to Germany at the Munich
Conference on September 30, 1938 they did so without the participation or
consent of the Czechoslovak government. It was a monumental betrayal on Paris
and London's part of a steadfast ally. Czechoslovakia was left with a choice:
accede to the diktat presented to her, or fight. She chose the former out of fear
a conflict would destroy the nation if she fought alone. But what history and even
pundits today fail to acknowledge, is the Czechoslovaks had the means to fight.
What's more, if Nazi propaganda from the era, which still casts a persuasive
shadow 77 years later is put aside, the facts on the ground suggest it is not
certain Germany could have won the war Hitler so much wanted to wage. It's
difficult to win a conflict with an extreme shortage of ammunition, for
example.

It is
feasible that war between Germany and Czechoslovakia could have broken out
before British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had the opportunity for one
last overture for negotiation with Adolph Hitler. Chamberlain's cabinet was in
revolt after the German chancellor made extreme demands at the Godesberg
summit, and had independently notified the Czechs that there was no longer any
reason to advise against full mobilization of their army. The Soviets were
readying hundreds of modern military aircraft to fly from Czechoslovak airfields.
Lastly, pressure was mounting on the government of French premier Édouard
Daladier to dig in and support their treaty partner. In Prague, there were huge
demonstrations calling for defense of the republic and the military had
mobilized 1,250,000 men in less than 48 hours.

In hindsight
there was no more advantageous time to stand up to Hitler. So why was
Chamberlain so averse to standing up to an aggressor? At the time, all he could
see was his nation's complete lack of modern air power or armored ground
vehicles to equip men if mobilization was called. The Royal Navy was available
to blockade German commerce and bottle up the small but growing German navy,
but there was little to nothing to offer the French on the ground if France
went to war. Similarly, Daladier was convinced that France could not prosecute
a meaningful victory against Germany without British support. The more
Chamberlain ran away from the problem, the more Daladier vacillated. Under the
circumstances, both leaders believed assessments concluding Germany possessed
significant ground and air superiority despite many of those assessments being influenced
by German propaganda. They further ignored accurate intelligence that the
German armed forces suffered critical deficiencies in equipment, supplies and logistics.
And both leaders concluded Stalin was bluffing regarding treaty obligations to
aid Czechoslovakia despite intelligence that Soviets were massing military
aircraft in the east. France and Great Britain has their own significant deficiencies
to be sure, yet the truth is Germany did not have the military strength to
withstand a war with France, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

The policy
of appeasement was born in fear. In May of 1938, Czechoslovak Military
Intelligence, which had an extensive network of operatives inside Germany,
reported that Hitler was moving army divisions into place for a surprise
invasion. Daladier and Chamberlain responded as they should by standing firm
with Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš. Czechoslovak army units rushed to the
border in Bohemia as French and British diplomats made it clear to Berlin that
mobilization orders were at the ready. Hitler was enraged at the show of
fortitude but there was no war. History calls this event the May Crisis or the
May Surprise depending on which side does the telling. What is clear though is
having stood up to Berlin with positive results, France and London became
fearful that they had come too close to a war they were not ready to fight and
determined that they should not come so close again over 3.5 million Germans in
Western Czechoslovakia. Regardless of treaty obligations, a calculation was
made regarding what was worth fighting for, what was not worth fighting for,
and the best opportunity to stop Hitler was cast aside.

What would
be the calculation today should Russia decide to imperil Estonia? The Baltic
nation is a NATO member with a population that is 25% Russian. Regardless of
treaty obligations would London, Paris, Rome or Washington want to go to war with
Moscow over a small country with 1.3 million people? We would like to think the
answer is yes yet politicians often conclude doing the right thing is not worth
the cost.

Perceived
weakness is what led to the Munich Conference. Abandoned by her principal ally,
perceived weakness is what led the Czechoslovak government to surrender without
a fight. In the end, the Munich Conference was not intended to buy peace, but
to buy time. It was a shortsighted bargain that did not consider the
consequences of Germany absorbing first-class Czechoslovak weapons of war and the
industrial capacity to produce them. So bolstered, the German army was a much
more capable foe in 1939 during the invasion of Poland, and the Battle of
France in 1940.

George T. Chronis is a journalist, author
and market research analyst living in Southern California. His novel,
Sudetenland, explores the 1938 crisis in great detail. To learn more, please
visit www.sudetenland.georgetchronis.com or Amazon.com.

The Sudetenland. To Europe’s well-heeled in the Nineteenth Century, this was a place of world-renowned spa resorts nestled in the mountains ringing Western Bohemia. But bad blood and unfinished business from the First World War had taken their toll on the Sudetendeutsche – three million ethnic Germans unhappily living in the new nation of Czechoslovakia. In 1930 they were just one more ethnic complication among many in Central Europe. Eight years later, these people had found a champion in Adolph Hitler, and the smart money in Paris and London wagered the next World War would detonate in these storybook mountains and valleys.