Abstract: The problem of on-line prediction is try to predict an arbitrary sequence of numbers about as well as can be done if you had seen all the data ahead of time. Of course, to make this a "fair" problem, we will have to restrict the possible after-the-fact forecasts. This talk will use the easiest possible loss function--namely least squares. I will focus on some new spin-offs of this theory. In particular, it is easy to show that a weakly calibrated forecast exists.

Abstract: Israel's Supreme Court recognized the existence of a formal Israeli Constitution in the form of Basic Laws in 1995 in the Hamizrachi Bank Decision. This decision, viewed as the climax of Israel's constitutional revolution, has provoked harsh criticism. Nonetheless, many support finalizing this constitutional revolution by the enactment of Basic Law: Legislation. This Basic Law would decide the constitutional status of all Basic Laws, as well as the process for constitutional amendment. The most prevalent current proposal for this Basic Law is that of the Ne'eman Commission.

Abstract: A mediator can help non-cooperative agents obtain an equilibrium that may otherwise not be possible. We give matching upper and lower bounds on the ability of rational agents to obtain the same equilibrium without a mediator, simply by engaging in non-binding pre-play communication, known as ``cheap talk''. Our upper bounds are based on k-resilient Nash equilibria for the secret sharing game, joint strategies where no member of a coalition of size up to k can do better, even if the whole coalition defects.

Abstract: In the Ellsberg paradox decision makers who are only partially informed about the actualprobability distribution violate the expected utility paradigm. The paper takes an axiomatic approach using Anscombe-Aumann's setting, and introduces a theory of decision making with a partially specified probabilities. Partially-specified decision making is then extended to games in order to introduce partially-specified equilibrium and partially-specified correlated equilibrium.

Abstract: Psychology and economics have successfully demonstrated that human behavior is not endlessly variable, but can be captured and quantified by testable laws. Modern neuroscience techniques can identify and link individual differences in decision-making behavior to differences in brain anatomy, brain responses, genetics, and so on. In particular, modern neuroimaging techniques provide the means by which human brain responses can be monitored while subjects are engaged in behavioral tasks.

The basic theoretical differentiation between Oriental and Occidental cities was first made by Max Weber as a part of his wider interest in the rise and development of rational capitalism, a question to which he dedicated four of his most important studies.

Abstract: The prediction of action profiles played in Bayesian Equilibrium (BE) in a game is not well defined over belief hierarchies. Equivalently, by observing the BE action profiles in all games, one can recover more than just standard belief hierarchies. Our main result is to show that extending beliefs to payoff irrelevant facts, signals, brings them to a harmony with BE in the following sense: First, if two type spaces give rise to the same rich hierarchy of beliefs then for every game same action profiles are played in any BE.