Kuwait

Like all the little monarchies scattered along the coast of the Gulf, Kuwait used to be a sleepy little backwater, getting by on pearl fishing and trade. Like all the others, it was founded by a tribal chieftain in the 18th century, paid tribute to the Ottoman Empire but was paid little attention by it, and came eventually under the umbrella of British imperial protection in the late 19th century. By the time of independence in June 1961 (some 10 years before its Gulf counterparts) Kuwait had begun to exploit its oil reserves, the mainstay of its economy. In very marked contrast to the other Gulf statelets, however, in August 1990 Kuwait effectively ceased to exist.

The invasion and rapid conquest of the emirate by 100,000 Iraqi troops was the defining moment in the state’s short history. From a little-known land of legendary opulence, it was transformed in much of the world’s conscience into a cause célèbre, a tiny, defenceless innocent party savaged by the forces of a brutal, expansionist dictator.

Kuwait’s demotion in status to a province of Iraq was famously traumatic and short-lived – the Iraqis had been driven out by the end of the following February and the emirate restored by US-led forces. But what is most remarkable about the invasion and the war that followed it is perhaps just how little changed Kuwait is.

Physically, the place even looks the same. What the Iraqis destroyed has been largely rebuilt as near as possible to its pre-invasion state. Demographically, some of the numbers may be different – spectacularly so in the case of the Palestinians, whose number has declined from 400,000 to around 80,000 – but the overall balance is very similar. A minority (45 per cent) of the country’s 2.25 million inhabitants are Kuwaiti nationals; most of the rest come from other Arab countries and from the Indian subcontinent. And the politics is pretty much the same as well.

The ruler – Shaykh Jaber, who is over 80 and has been the Emir since 1977 – is in charge. The Emir designates a successor, the Crown Prince, who is also the prime minister and selects the government. Ministers are answerable to (and may be members of) the Majlis al-Umma, the National Assembly, whose 50 members are elected for four-year terms.

This may look on paper a lot like the set-up elsewhere in the Gulf. But in Kuwait politics is a rather more interesting affair. The Majlis actually has power. The Emir rules by decree but MPs must debate all decrees and frequently do overturn them. They can also legislate, although the Emir can overrule their bills. Of course the Emir can also dissolve the Majlis. But perhaps the biggest change since the invasion is that he has not done so, except to call elections.

Political life centres on the relationship between the Majlis and the ruling family, the al-Sabah, members of which can be summoned to explain their conduct. While this often focuses on issues such as corruption and mismanagement, the tone is not always so healthy.

When Kuwaitis went to the polls in early July to elect a new Majlis, only 15 per cent of citizens were actually able to cast a vote. Women are excluded: in 1999 the Majlis overturned a decree from the Emir which would have allowed female suffrage. Members of the police and armed forces are also excluded. And there are no political parties, although many MPs are members of informal blocs, of which various Islamist groups are best represented.

And then there are the 55 per cent of inhabitants who have no political rights at all. While many are short-term foreign workers, many others have lived in Kuwait all their lives. Some, the 120,000 or so Kuwaitis labelled Bidoon (from the Arabic word for ‘without’), have no other nationality to claim, yet the state denies them citizenship rights on the grounds that neither they nor their ancestors were registered in the 1965 census.

The country is mostly flat desert, with the population concentrated in the few oases. The effects of oil spills on the Gulf waters have long been a major concern, exacerbated by the results of deliberate damage to oil installations done by departing Iraqi forces in 1991.

Culture

Mainly Arab, since in addition to the 45% who are Kuwaiti citizens a further third of the population have come from other Arab countries to work. About 10% are migrant workers from the Indian subcontinent.

Religion

Muslim 85%, of whom most are Sunni; other, mainly Christian and Hindu 15%.

Language

Arabic

Sources

World Guide 2003/2004; State of the World’s Children 2003.

Kuwait ratings in detail

Income distribution

Kuwaiti nationals are generally well-to-do and well looked after by the state (education and health services are largely free, housing subsidized). While many foreign workers also enjoy a decent standard of living, others, especially the unskilled and domestic workers, are poorly paid and often poorly treated.

Self Reliance

Self-sufficient in oil. Everything else is imported.

Position of women

Despite not having the vote, women fare much better in Kuwait than in other Gulf monarchies. They can drive, travel abroad fairly freely and some occupy senior posts in the civil service.

Literacy

82%. The literacy gap between men (84%) and women (80%) has narrowed. Equal proportions of men and women enrol in secondary school (65%)

Freedom

For most male citizens over 21 there is suffrage and a relatively unrestrained political process. No political parties but there are trade unions. The press tends to apply self-censorship.

Life expectancy

76 years (Saudi Arabia 72, New Zealand/Aotearoa 78)

NI Assessment (Politics)

While the Emir and the Crown Prince have the power respectively to dissolve the Majlis and appoint the Government, there is a much more meaningful political scene here than in other Gulf monarchies. But some three-quarters of the population are excluded from taking part in this. Kuwait may have been rescued from the clutches of Saddam Hussein in 1991 but the majority of those living in the country were certainly not delivered to democracy.

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