My kids have a trick that I am sure is not unique to our household. Faced with some type of food they do not like, they have become quite creative and artistic in spreading the mass of food around their plate, in a (generally) vain attempt to fool mom and dad that some of the food has disappeared.

After reading the scathing WSJ article this morning on the BofA / Merril Lynch deal, one has to wonder whether the feds were attempting the same trick with risk.

Like Welch, I welcome the WSJ as late arrivers to the bailout-skeptics party.

Jeff Skilling of Enron essentially sits in jail for being too publicly optimistic about his company's prospects in the face of a liquidity crisis (despite popular perceptions, he was not convicted for accounting issues associated with off balance sheet entities).

I didn't follow the trial that closely, but my sense is that Skilling denied this charge. But even if he had admitted it, it strikes me that he would have had an interesting case in his favor. US securities law takes as an absolute core principle that relevant information must always be disclosed quickly and completely to both shareholders and potential shareholders alike. It presumes that total openness is the best way to serve shareholders.

But in a short-term liquidity crisis, openness is the kiss of death. As we have seen over the last 6 months, the merest hint that a liquidity crisis may exist at a company creates a real crisis, even if one did not exist before. Liquidity crises are crises of confidence among short-term lenders, and the only way to fight such a crisis is to build confidence. So what happens if the best way to serve shareholders is to keep silent about problems? What if the best way to fulfill one's fiduciary responsibility to maintaining shareholder value is to be overly rosy in one's pronouncements during difficult times?

As recently as March 12th, Alan Schwartz, the chief executive of Bear Stearns, issued a statement responding to rumours that it was in trouble, saying that "we don't see any pressure on our liquidity, let alone a liquidity crisis." Two days later, only an emergency credit line arranged by the Federal Reserve was keeping the investment bank alive. (Meanwhile, as its share price tumbled on rumours of trouble on March 17th, Lehman Brothers issued a statement confirming that its "liquidity is very strong.")

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and then-Treasury Department chief Henry Paulson pressured Bank of America Corp. to not discuss its increasingly troubled plan to buy Merrill Lynch & Co. -- a deal that later triggered a government bailout of BofA -- according to testimony by Kenneth Lewis, the bank's chief executive.

Mr. Lewis, testifying under oath before New York's attorney general in February, told prosecutors that he believed Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke were instructing him to keep silent about deepening financial difficulties at Merrill, the struggling brokerage giant. As part of his testimony, a transcript of which was reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Lewis said the government wanted him to keep quiet while the two sides negotiated government funding to help BofA absorb Merrill and its huge losses.

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and then-Treasury Department chief Henry Paulson pressured Bank of America Corp. to not discuss its increasingly troubled plan to buy Merrill Lynch & Co. -- a deal that later triggered a government bailout of BofA -- according to testimony by Kenneth Lewis, the bank's chief executive.

Mr. Lewis, testifying under oath before New York's attorney general in February, told prosecutors that he believed Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke were instructing him to keep silent about deepening financial difficulties at Merrill, the struggling brokerage giant. As part of his testimony, a transcript of which was reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Lewis said the government wanted him to keep quiet while the two sides negotiated government funding to help BofA absorb Merrill and its huge losses.

Many observers found it odd when Skilling was convicted of giving false information to shareholders but not for insider trading. The implication, then, was that Skilling was guilty of lying to shareholders but not for personal gain. Why then, people asked, did he do it? It is becoming increasingly clear that putting on a happy face during an impending liquidity crisis is the only responsible approach for a leader to take. Whether he goes to jail for it or gets rewarded by the Feds for it comes down to, what? PR?

Update: In fact, one can argue that the Enron situation is more honorable than the BofA situation. Enron management was trying to protect the value of Enron shareholders. In the case of BofA, the feds demanded that BofA management hide information in order to complete a transaction that BofA shareholders might rightly oppose.