Saturday, February 20, 2016

There is an excellent, if somewhat
accidental, section on Generalship in one of Tom Clancy’s earliest and best
books Red Strom Rising (from the Cold
War period he understood, not the post Cold War world he doesn’t have a clue
about).

His Soviet ‘hero’, Pavel Leonidovich
Alekseyev, the Deputy Commander of the Southwest Front is exhausting himself
preparing troops for battle, when his boss points out that in actual combat,
hard learned experience would ensure that senior officers get enough regular
rest to allow them to make good and clear decisions. Pavel admits the point,
and is fast asleep before his vehicle gets back to HQ.

The implication being
that this common sense approach by his superior is what leaves Pavel functional
at the critical point a few weeks later when everyone else’s responses are
lethargic and doctrinal.

It is an excellent point for short term
command decisions, but equally important for the long term durability of
generals.

Historically, generals can function in the
heat of battle successfully for months at a time… as long as they get
sufficient rest during proceedings, and then a significant break before taking
on the next major battle. But any general, no matter how good, will reach a
point of decline in health, morals, leadership and decisiveness, if he tries to
stay at peak performance for too long.

In his 20’s Alexander the Great made
himself function for months at a time over several years… but the decline
towards the end was very obvious. His men wanted out and his officers were
revolting (literally as well as figuratively).

Napoleon achieved similar results as a
younger man, but the sick old man who returned to power – lasting barely 100
days before spiraling out of control – was in no shape to command at Waterloo.

Worse is the list of previously great
generals who were far too old when thrust back into command. Petain, the great
hero of France of the Great War, was representative of too many old generals as
a washed out shell in World War Two. Kitchener and Cardigan are other samples,
and I am sure you can think of many more.

The number of generals, particularly junior
generals, who drove themselves to physical collapse, is also well recorded in
history. In World War Two, any numbers of generals were incapacitated at
crucial moments, from Germans on the Eastern front, to Australians in New
Guinea. In North Africa alone, physical or mental collapses by: Cunningham
(General not Admiral), Gott, Rommel, Stumme, Rommel again, Gort, and a number
of lesser generals, were reflective of overwork and exhaustion.

Admiral Pound and Genreal Dill both died in harness, and both were clearly performing far less than optimally towards the end of their service. And then there is Roosevelt...

Wavell too was
exhausted when he left the Middle East, and his lack of rest before being
thrown into the ABDA command was a large part of the cause of some of the
disasters there.

In the very short term, days, or at most
weeks: adrenaline can keep most people functioning way beyond normal timespans…
but the term is functioning. Performing it is not. Reactions slow, thought
processes slow, creativity craps out, reflexive action becomes default, deeper
reflection stops. Any sensible soldier would prefer a well-rested and
thoughtful general in charge, which is why even Communist armies eventually
learned to give up on idealistic claptrap and assign batmen and cooks and other
support staff to their officers if they wanted any success at all.

Montgomery’s practice of going to bed at a
reasonable hour and telling his staff not to wake him unless it was an
emergency… and probably not then if there was nothing useful he could do about
it: is an excellent example of a general maintaining his usefulness to his men
in combat . It is particularly relevant to a 3 or 4 star general that someone
commanding a Corps or Army – or even Army Group – should have distance and
perspective.

On the other hand Montgomery was clearly
emotionally exhausted by the time of the Battle of the Bulge, and in need of
rest at that point. His ever increasing isolation at his forward tactical
headquarters was starting to have a detrimental effect on his control of this
Army Group, and both the failure to concentrate on Antwerp and the inadequate
co-ordination of the Market-Garden operation were not up to the standards he
had set himself in North Africa, Sicily, or at D-Day.

This leads to the interesting point that
although Eisenhower was right to leave Montgomery in charge for the completion
of the D-Day/Normandy campaign, he may have been right to not leave him as
ground forces commander after the exhausting battle of Normandy was over. (In a
similar fashion, Lee had undoubtedly been right to believe that Slim needed a
rest after the conquest of Burma before preparing the next major operation… a
fact pretty much proved by Slim’s unusually emotional response to being
‘sacked’.)

Mind you Eisenhower was wrong to imagine he
could be his own Ground Forces commander at the same time as running the
theatre as a whole; dealing with international and inter-service rivalries; and
negotiating with difficult allies and collapsing enemies.

He was wrong for two reasons.

First, that no one man could do
Eisenhower’s real job and still be a useful ground forces commander (which is
why every single other theatre – even quite small and relatively simple ones
like Burma or New Guinea –separated the roles).

Second, Eisenhower was already a chain
smoking and exhausted wreck, who himself had failed to cope with the stresses
of the Normandy campaign, and desperately needed a rest.

When I raise with
people the idea that too much was being attempted by too few for too long, the
initial reaction is, far too often’ ‘there was no choice’!

Poppycock.

Montgomery or
Slim were no more ‘the vital and irreplaceable man’ than Eisenhower or
MacArthur. There were certainly many choices.

Bradley spent the
first part of the Normandy campaign as an Army Commander, and was then promoted
to Army Group Commander. See, simple choice. He could just as easily, and
probably more sensibly, have been left as an Army commander, under Devers or
Patton as Army Group Commander. (He probably would have been better if not
promoted too far too fast).

Or, the invasion
army – 1st – could have been rested while 3rd and 9th
armies did the pursuit, and brought up – reinforced and refreshed – when
the advance ran out of steam a few months later.

Patton's 'sulk' during the Metz stalemate, Hodges apparent physical collapse at the Bulge, and Bradley's increasingly irrational responses there and later: show how even a few months in unrelieved combat can have straining effects. Similarly Crerar's enforced 'rest' allowing Simpkin to excel.

Meanwhile after
the breakout Alexander could have taken over as Ground Forces commander for the
pursuit phase, leaving Montgomery a few months of recuperation to tackle the breakthrough
fighting on the German frontier. Perhaps General Bernard Paget (the commander
of the British Home Army who had trained the units for the invasion) could
have taken over 21st Army Group for the pursuit. Or perhaps he could
have been brought in for Ground Forces if Alexander was too vital in Italy? (Or
Wilson, or Wavell, or Lavarack, or Devers, or Slim, or Eichelberger, or….
Plenty of choices.)

The simple fact
is that Ike and Monty were tired, and both were working at less than peak
performance. As Pavel Alekseyev’s superior would have noted, both needed a
break.

It is an
unfortunate truth that Western Democracies are terrible at giving generals a
break to refresh. The Germans and Soviets and even Japanese rotated Army and
Army Group commanders around all over the place, regularly pulling them back to
‘reserve’, and regularly re-assigning them to a new position a few months
later. The British and Americans however, usually tried to persevere with the
same leader until he failed… and I do mean ‘until’, because even the best ones
– Wavell comes to mind – slowly lose ground over repeated years of stress,
and eventually have to be sacked.

Alan Brooke, on
the brink of being appointed British CIGS, was not opposed to the replacement
of Wavell in 1941, but felt it ridiculous to ‘sack’ him. Brooke wanted him
bought home for a few months rest and recuperation before re-assignment. But
Churchill didn’t want him in London where he might cause trouble, and banished
him to India… Unfortunately there he was thrown straight back into a role as
CIC India, and was barely getting on top of that when he was dragged back into
service against the Japanese WITHOUT the benefit of having had a few months
rest.

There is no doubt
that if Brooke had given him 6 months off, Wavell would have been in much
better shape for another active role later in the war. Wavell as either Supreme
or Land Forces commander of the invasion of North Africa (or Italy) is by no
means unrealistic. Wavell as Churchill’s representative to Stalin (he spoke
superb Russian) would have been fascinating. Wavell on the Combined Chiefs of
Staff is harder to imagine, but not impossible. But Wavell – unscarred by ‘sacking’
– taking over as CIGS if Brooke had been released for field command in 1944 –
in France or Italy or Asia – was also possible.

Which leads us to
Brooke and Churchill.

Brooke had
carried the can for Allied strategy from November 1941 to the invasion of Italy
in 1943, and both needed and deserved a break. There is no doubt that he had
achieved his greatest impact on the war by steering Allied strategy
successfully to the point where the surrender of Italy and clearing of the
Mediterranean had finally made an invasion of France possible. His strategic
impact was already in decline by that point (partly because most of the
strategy to see out the was already set, and partly because Marshall and and
others just didn’t want to be steered by him anymore): but it is arguable that
this decline in influence was at least as much because of increasing tiredness
as anything else.

Brooke needed a
break, and to be re-assigned to a fresh job where he could do most good.
Preferably six months off before taking over as Supreme Allied Commander for
the Invasion of France; but also possibly as SAC Med if Alexander continued to
serve as Ike’s Land Forces Commander; or as SAC South East Asia to deal with
Burma, Malaya and the East Indies.

Either way
Brooke’s impact on the war might have been increased, and his replacement as
CIGS might have brought in renewed perspectives and energy.

The same applies,
I am afraid, to Churchill. He too needed a break for a few months between the
surrender of Italy and the invasion of France. This would of course have been
much harder for a politician than for a military man, but it ids nonetheless
true. One of the reasons Churchill was so shattered by his loss of the 1945
general election was his exhaustion… and in fact one of the reasons for that
loss was his exhaustion. Had he been able to take a few months off in late 1943
or early 1944, he would have faced the end of the war with renewed energy. (And
faced the almost inevitable loss of the following election with far more
realism and stoicism.)

It is hard to
imagine how such a break could have been managed under a system where it was
not understoof that generals needed breaks. But it is interesting to imagine
how it might have worked had that principle been understood. If the CIC of the
British military – King George VIII – had been in the habit of accepting rest
periods for his generals, it is easier to imagine him suggesting (or even
ordering) rest periods for his Prime Ministers! An amusing side thought, but
certainly not beyond the realms of possibility in the Westminster system…

Eisenhower is
another person who desperately needed a rest. He went from running the invasion
of North Africa, and the resulting political settlements there (while others
largely dealt with the military issues); to running the invasion of Sicily and
then Italy, and the resulting political settlements there (while others largely
dealt with the military issues); straight to running the invasion of France, and the resulting political settlements there (while imagining he could
simultaneously deal with the military issues): without much of a break. This
was extremely foolish, and arguably had a very negative effect on Allied
operations in France, and on the political outcome in Europe (which saw much of
central Europe unnecessarily fall to the Soviets).

In fact it is
hard to imagine that anything except exhaustion affecting his judgement could
have led him to imagine he could suddenly combine both the political and
military roles effectively, when his previous history had seen such poor
outcomes when he tried to concentrate on a single job. It is possible that he
had such an outbreak of overwhelming hubris and arrogance that he might have
tried to do the same thing even if rested… but lets be kind and suggest that his
decision sounds more like exhaustion overcoming common sense.

Again, he needed
a good few months break – preferably at home resting in the US – before being
re-assigned to D-Day: rather than being thrown straight back in. He was clearly
approaching an exhausted nervous wreck by the time the invasion began, and his testy
and emotional responses to any delays, countered by his delirious over
confidence when things seemed to be going well: give a poor impression of
someone at their best performance.

Paget should have
been left to plan the invasion while Ike rested. If Ike was to command, he
should have taken over fresh a few weeks before operations began, to have a
chance to make it to the end of the war. As it was, he may have been right to
think Monty needed less responsibility after the Normandy breakout, but he was
clearly wrong to imagine he could handle everything thereafter. The
directionless wandering of his broad front ‘strategy’ was only exceeded by his
failures to grasp that the end goal of the war was a stable political
settlement in Europe.

In that of course
he reflected his boss, Marshall, who was one of the old fashioned ‘just win and
go home’ generals. He clearly had no comprehension that ‘just going home’ might
mean you had to come back again later… He clearly never understood that his
‘political’ solutions would just mean that the US had to ‘come back’ in NATO,
or to in Korea, or Vietnam, or… well you get the idea. (This lack of
understanding was in fact a terrible misreading of his own nations history in
such matters. A 19th century British diplomat had once questioned an
American ambassador on the US’s habit of repeatedly invading Central American
countries, demanding open elections, and going home. “What do you do when the
election gets a result you don’t like?”. “Oh, we just invade again.”)

It is hard to say
whether Marshall’s failings at the crucial ‘make a balanced peace’ part of the
war were just his limited understanding of how international relations worked,
or a sign of him being exhausted too. Charitably, it would be nice to suggest
that it was at least partially caused by overtiredness and irritability.
Certainly his far wiser approach to the Marshall Plan indicates that he could
do better on international understanding… though perhaps that was a hard
learned lesson. But the problem with ‘resting’ Marshall at any point was that his CIC – Roosevelt – was by that time so sick that he wouldn’t have felt
secure to take the risk of a change even if he had had the insight to believe it
might be useful.

The real pity of
this is that the Allies did have quite excellent samples of how it could work. On
a small scale, Wavell had lasted as long as he did in the Middle East by making
a couple of trips to London, and leaving another general (Blamey) to run things
while he was gone. It worked fine.

For the invasion
of Sicily various generals – including Patton – were pulled out of front line
roles to prepare for the next operation.

Montgomery himself twice – North Africa and France – pulled Horrocks out of the line for a rest in preparation for future operations... If only he'd accepted the same applied to himself!

In Macarthur’s
command (partly accidentally given the Australian vs American confusion) this
became a regular practice of a new general overseeing each operation, and the
rested general having a break before preparing the next operation.

MacArthur sort of
continued this pattern even with just American generals like Eichelberger and
Krueger swapping with 6th and 8th armies respectively
from Buna to the Philippines.

More
significantly, 3rdand 5th
Fleets perfected the idea of one Admiral running an operation while the other
takes a break and then prepares the next operation.

That’s the way to
do it!

The general lack
of imagination by the Allied command systems in deciding who needed a rest
when, is responsible for two significant issues.

1)Good generals being sacked and
discarded for being overtired, when a little R&R would see them back fresh,
experienced, and continuing to develop. And

2)Tired generals making mistakes
that increased casualties and lengthened the war.

It is simply not
possible to estimate the damage done to the Allies and to the world, by the
unwillingness to give good leaders desperately needed breaks.

About Me

A professional historian and educator challenges some assumptions.
(A sometimes tongue-in-cheek polemic, with a Socratic emphasis on challenging people to argue back. Please do so... I make some of it outrageous largely to encourage a debate).