United States v. Amadio

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,v.ANTHONY G. "AMOS" AMADIO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Author: Schnackenberg

Before MAJOR, Chief Judge, and LINDLEY and SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judges.

SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of the District Court, based upon a jury's verdict, adjudging him guilty of violating §§ 2421, 2422, title 18 U.S.C.A., commonly referred to as the White Slave Act.

1. He contends that the District Court erred in overruling his motion, which was seasonably made, to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute an offense against the United States.

The jury found the defendant guilty on counts I and IV and not guilty on counts II, III and V.

Do counts I and IV set forth federal criminal offenses?

The gist of count I is a charge that defendant induced Frieda West to travel in interstate commerce for an immoral purpose, and the gist of count IV is that he and one Craig transported Mary Katherine Hamilton in interstate commerce for an immoral purpose.*fn1

Count I reads as follows:

"That on or about August 30, 1952, Anthony G. ("Amos") Amadio did unlawfully and knowingly induce Frieda West to travel in interstate commerce from Evansville, State of Indiana, in the Evansville Division of the Southern District of Indiana, to Chicago Heights, State of Illinois, for an immoral purpose, to wit, to place her in employment and environment in Calumet City, Illinois, which would tend to cause her to give herself up to a condition of debauchery which would eventually and naturally lead to a course of sexual immorality. Anthony G. ("Amos") Amadio thereby caused the said Frieda West to go and to be transported as a passenger from Evansville, Indiana, to Chicago Heights, Illinois, upon the lines of the Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad, a common carrier."

§ 2422 reads as follows:

"Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any woman or girl to go from one place to another in interstate or foreign commerce, or in the District of Columbia or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose on the part of such person that such woman or girl shall engage in the practice of prostitution or debauchery, or any other immoral practice, whether with or without her consent, and thereby knowingly causes such woman or girl to go and to be carried or transported as a passenger upon the line or route of any common carrier or carriers in interstate or foreign commerce, or in the District of Columbia, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

Count I charges in the language of the statute that defendant knowingly induced Frieda West to travel in interstate commerce for an immoral purpose and thereby caused her to go and to be transported as a passenger upon the lines of the Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad from Indiana to Illinois. It charges a criminal offense under § 2422.

The term "immoral purpose", by reason of association with the term "prostitution", is restricted in meaning to immorality consisting of sexual debauchery, U.S. v. Lewis, 7 Cir., 110 F.2d 460, 462; Burgess v. U.S., 54 App.D.C. 71, 294 F. 1002, 1004, and, as thus limited, the language of the statute furnishes a sufficiently definite description of the condemned conduct.U.S. v. Lewis, supra, 110 F.2d 462. Furthermore, there is transportation for an immoral purpose if there is transportation of a female for the purpose of having her "engage in acts which tend ultimately to lead to that form of debauchery or immoral conduct which consists in 'sexual actions'". Burgess v. U.S., supra, 294 F. 1004. Count I goes further and sets forth what the specific immoral purpose of the defendant was. This purpose is stated to be "to place her in employment and environment in Calumet City, Illinois, which would tend to cause her to give herself up to a condition of debauchery which would eventually and naturally lead to a course of sexual immorality". Whether or not it was necessary to thus specifically state the immoral purpose, it is unnecessary for us to decide. Having stated it in such detail, the question arises as to whether such purpose as thus stated in detail is likewise within the condemnation of the statute. We hold that if the purpose of the defendant was, as alleged, to place the transported girl in employment surrounded by influences which would tend to induce her to give herself up to a condition of debauchery which eventually and naturally would lead to a course of sexual immorality, then an offense was charged under § 2422. Athanasaw v. U.S., 227 U.S. 326, 33 S. Ct. 285, 57 L. Ed. 528, 530.

There was therefore no error committed by the District Court in denying the motion to dismiss as to count I.

Count IV reads as follows:

"That on or about August 16, 1952, Anthony G. ("Amos") Amadio and Grover C. Craig did unlawfully and knowingly transport Mary Katherine Hamilton in interstate commerce from Evansville, State of Indiana, in the Evansville Division of the Southern District of Indiana, to Calumet City, State of Illinois, for an immoral purpose, to wit, to place her in employment and environment in Calumet City, Illinois, which would tend to cause her to give herself up to a condition of debauchery which would eventually and naturally lead to a course of sexual immorality."

The pertinent parts of § 2421, title 18 U.S.C.A., read as follows:

"Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, or in the District of Columbia or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice;

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

Count IV charges an offense under § 2421 in the language of the statute and states in detail, as does Count I, what the immoral purpose of the defendant was.

No error was committed by the District Court in denying the motion to dismiss count IV.

2. On the same day that defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment he also filed a motion for a written bill of particulars calling for details of the government's case against him. The motion for a bill of particulars was denied and it is urged by the defendant that this was error. The details called for by this motion are many and constitute eleven pages of the printed transcript of record herein.

In view of the clear language of counts I and IV of the indictment, including the detailed definition of the term "an immoral purpose", we think that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a bill of particulars. Nothing in the record before us indicates that defendant was prejudiced thereby. In Wong Tai v. United ...

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