The author is a Forbes contributor. The opinions expressed are those of the writer.

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Air power is about more than fighters and bombers. In the case of the U.S. Air Force, it is also about supporting the rest of the joint force with vital enablers such as aerial refueling, long-distance transport, and timely intelligence. This commentary is about the intelligence -- or to be more specific, what the military calls "intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance" (ISR). Piercing the fog of war is crucial to using combat forces effectively, and no military service in the world is better at generating the kind of detailed information warfighters need when they need it than the Air Force.

Among the various orbital and airborne ISR systems the Air Force operates, one of the most important is a fleet of radar planes called the E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System. JSTARS, as it is popularly known, has a ground-scanning radar installed along the base of its fuselage that can simultaneously track 600 moving and stationary ground targets at distances of up to 150 miles, identifying both enemy and friendly forces so that strike aircraft and surface warriors can use their weapons to maximum effect. The radar is what's called an electronically scanned array, meaning it shifts direction and function without mechanically moving (unlike the rotating antenna on some radar planes).

Using sophisticated software and skilled on-board operators, the JSTARS radar can provide wide-area surveillance, tracking of moving ground objects, and detailed imagery of potential targets -- not just on nice days, but in the dead of night, during monsoonal downpours, and in the midst of raging sandstorms. The information is so precise and timely that U.S. forces have repeatedly used it to destroy hostile armored units operating in close proximity to non-combatants without harming any civilians. The information the radar collects is quickly processed on board the plane into usable intelligence and then transmitted to warfighters via line-of-sight datalinks or satellite uplinks.

No other country in the world has a fleet of aircraft comparable to JSTARS. But generating and disseminating timely intelligence is not all that the planes do. They also coordinate the elements of a military operation so that all on-board and off-board capabilities can be used in discriminate but lethal fashion. The Air Force calls this facet of military operations "battle management/command & control," or BMC2, and having it available in the war zone from the early hours of a campaign can make the difference between life or death for America's warfighters. For instance, the specialists on a JSTARS plane can assure that strike aircraft are directed to the most threatening targets first, and that they do not attack friendly forces in the heat of battle.

The need to concentrate all the capability and authority required to run an air campaign in one plane is a core precept of Air Force doctrine. It assures that warfighters in the air and on the ground will not be dependent on far-away command centers that may lack the communications links, information or understanding to make wise decisions. This concept is sometimes called "decentralized" BMC2 to differentiate it from the old-fashioned approach to command and control of forces that required them to wait for responses from remote higher authority before acting. That traditional approach can quickly get you killed in the fast-paced environment of modern warfare.

An Air Force E-8C JSTARS displaying the plane's distinctive ground-tracking radar on its underside. (Image: Wikimedia)

To make this concept work, the JSTARS program had to use an aircraft with sufficient carrying capacity, power-generation capability, sensor resolution and communications connectivity to coordinate a fight that might involve thousands of U.S. and allied warfighters -- in the air, on the ground, off the coast, etc. That's why the plane has "joint" in its name, because elements of every service might need to be engaged in an operation that JSTARS is managing. The airframe chosen was the Boeing 707, specifically second-hand commercial jetliners that were available in large numbers at the end of the Cold War. Seventeen were refurbished and modified for the JSTARS mission (one of which was later damaged beyond repair, reducing the fleet to sixteen).

Which brings us to the question of what will replace JSTARS. When the program was first awarded to an antecedent of the Northrop Grumman Corporation in 1985, the 707 had already been flying for 30 years. Today, it has largely disappeared from commercial airline fleets -- production ceased in 1978 -- and the average age of the planes in the JSTARS fleet is approaching 50 years. The Air Force figured out long ago that a newer, more efficient airframe would be needed after 2020, but efforts to develop a successor faltered due to lack of money and philosophical differences about what warfare would look like in the future. Some policymakers wanted to track moving ground targets from space; others wanted to use unmanned aircraft (drones).

The Air Force conducted an "analysis of alternatives" in 2011 and concluded a smaller manned aircraft was the answer. Drones might serve as a useful adjunct to the manned aircraft in collecting reconnaissance, but their size would constrain sensor dimensions and thus limit resolution, while pushing the battle-management function to some off-board site -- probably far away. Drones also rely on links to their remote pilots that make them vulnerable to jamming or cyber attacks, particularly when fighting advanced adversaries like China. The analysis of alternatives concluded that what the Air Force needed was a high-end business jet that could accommodate a 13-20 foot radar and a dozen work stations while costing much less to operate than the aging, four-engine 707.

(Disclosure: Several of the companies likely to compete for the contract to develop a JSTARS replacement contribute to my think tank; some are consulting clients.)

This finding was driven in large part by concerns about affordability, because by the time the analysis wrapped up in early 2012 the Air Force had already embarked on development of a new tanker, fighter and bomber. With thousands of Cold War planes needing to be replaced and legislatively-mandated spending caps looking increasingly likely, planners on the Air Staff knew they had to come up with a low-cost solution to the JSTARS puzzle. Money was so scarce that the service couldn't even afford to replace aging engines on the sixteen E-8C planes, even though that would have bolstered mission availability and reduced fuel costs.

Many observers assumed at the time that the Air Force would opt for a Gulfstream business jet, either the G550 or the newer G650. Both planes have very long ranges, can accommodate the dozen workstations the Air Force says it needs (down from 18 on JSTARS thanks to automation), and can land at thousands of airports around the world. The planes don't currently have an aerial refueling capability, but Gulfstream (a unit of defense contractor General Dynamics) says installation of aerial refueling equipment is a straightforward engineering task that can be accomplished fairly easily. Gulfstream planes also are domestically manufactured and certified by the Federal Aviation Administration -- features that are probably important to the Air Force.

The principal alternative to a Gulfstream aircraft appears to be the Boeing Business Jet, a larger twin-engine plane derived from the smallest version of the 737 jetliner currently in production. The 737 is the most popular jetliner in history, with 12,000 delivered or on order. Its global logistics and support network is unsurpassed, and it would offer substantial margins of on-board space, carrying capacity and power-generation potential for future growth. Boeing has sold an air defense version of the plane with a top-mounted radar to Australia, South Korea and Turkey. The company's larger ambition is to replace all of the Air Force's aging radar and eavesdropping planes with variants of the 737, providing significant economies in life-cycle support.

Both the Boeing and Gulfstream planes are world-class airframes, and with necessary modifications their acquisition cost might not be much different. So the key discriminator in any competition to develop a JSTARS replacement might well end up being performance, specifically performance of the battle management/command & control function. The Air Force can't compromise on questions like the size of the radar aperture or the amount of power-generating capacity, because if these fall below key thresholds whole classes or targets become hard to track. That's especially true of targets with smaller "signatures," slower speeds, transient operational profiles or cluttered environments. But deciding what BMC2 features are needed is driven as much by warfighting philosophy as physics.

With regard to the physics, any solution that pushes functions off-board due to size, weight or power considerations might cause operational problems in highly stressed warfighting environments. Communication with remote assets necessarily entails heightened vulnerability to jamming, interception, delays and other phenomena that degrade the value of information. Precision might be lost through the compressive effects of transmission, or as a result of electromagnetic interference. And then there is the separate issue of degraded situational awareness among actors located far from the battle space. These considerations argue for concentrating as much capability as possible on the successor plane, consistent with affordability.

With regard to philosophy, Air Force planners need to think through how much they can depend on in-theater infrastructure and command elements to carry out quick-reaction campaigns in the future. It isn't hard to fly a Boeing or Gulfstream jet to the Persian Gulf on short notice, but once it's there the question is what else will be available to mount a successful military operation. There may be no nearby command centers on the ground, and satellite coverage for communications or reconnaissance could be spotty. Surveillance drones might be unavailable to assist manned ISR operations. Relying on various off-board assets to reduce the cost of what each JSTARS replacement must carry to the war zone might not look so attractive once the price of those additional assets is added up.