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MENS LEGISLATORIS[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]

was legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She is therefore his widow.As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance andthe plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.

CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA CERVANTES,

Defendant-Appellee.

DECISION

Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Saez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:

Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.

SYLLABUS1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE;DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATIONBETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAWRELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donationbetween the spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of the mostexigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the sameprohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appealsdecision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provisionof the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in thelanguage of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibitdonations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear ofundue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeplyrooted in our ancient law; porque no se engaen despojandose el uno al otro poramor que han de consuno, [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV),reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects(Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason toapply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wifewithout benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to suchirregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party overthe other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondinglyincreased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum,fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist lest the condition ofthose who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriageremains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand thatthe disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULEWHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. The lack of validity of thedonation made b~ the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does notnecessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Priorto the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant

A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are calledupon to decide whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during amarriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now appellantCornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that adonation made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage todefendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would upholdits validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a time beforedefendant was married to the donor, sustained the latters stand. Hence thisappeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character, this Court not having had asyet the opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals,Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who wasappointed to this Court later that year, is indicative of the appropriate responsethat should be given. The conclusion reached therein is that a donation betweencommon-law spouses falls within the prohibition and is "null and void as contraryto public policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. Thedecision must be reversed.In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that inplaintiffs complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question,she specifically raised the question that the donation made by Felix Matabuena todefendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid article of theCivil Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership preciselybecause such a donation was made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased didnot take place until 1962, noted that when the case was called for trial onNovember 19, 1965, there was stipulation of facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "Theplaintiff and the defendant assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree andstipulate: (1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question;(2) That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor ofDefendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by defendant; (3) That thedonation of the land to the defendant which took effect immediately was madeduring the common law relationship as husband and wife between the defendantdone and the now deceased donor and later said donor and done were marriedon March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate onSeptember 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of beingthe only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an

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affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land declared inher name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon" 5The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. Itreasoned out thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code isvoid if made between the spouses during the marriage. When the donation wasmade by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956,Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time theywere not spouses. They became spouses only when they married on March 28,1962, six years after the deed of donation had been executed." 6We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as voida "donation between the spouses during the marriage," policy considerations ofthe most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that thesame prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. We reverse.1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision,Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7 interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code 8speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion ofthe then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of theother consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improperpressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancientlaw; porque no se engaen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han deconsuno [according to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating therationale Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1,De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the sameprohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without thebenefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregularconnection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over theother, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondinglyincreased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum,fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the conditionof those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriageremains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand thatthe disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage." 92. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the abovepronouncement, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It wouldbe to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable rule to asituation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all tobe differentiated, the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion ofwhat is just and what is right would be nullified if such irregular relationshipinstead of being visited with disabilities would be attended with benefits.Certainly a legal norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. If there isever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what iswithin the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it.Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be

attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of

the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. Inthe language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz queha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacin de sus disposiciones. 103. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendantPetronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive rightto the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationshipbetween him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28,1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitledto one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the otherhalf. 11WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing thecomplaint with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is declared void, withthe rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property inquestion recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriatedisposition in accordance with the above opinion. Without pronouncement as tocosts.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo,Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.Teehankee, J, took no part.

ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

KAPUNAN, J.:

ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the RegionalTrial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, ina confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated herin a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignityand personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." 1

ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event

and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in theamount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardableat the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was basedwas culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. 2 Thetranscript reads as follows:

by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a

participant to the communication. 4From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review onCertiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court ofAppeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailedDecision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, andholding that:[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 ofR.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the factsalleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuseof discretion correctible by certiorari. 5Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsiderationwhich respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990.Hence, the instant petition.

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila,Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-namedaccused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to recordthe latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfullyand feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the saidconversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the saidrecording to other person.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that theapplicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a privateconversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that theprovision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by aparty other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this,petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must bealleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute aviolation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes thetaping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and thatconsequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondentwas not illegal under the said act. 10

Contrary to law.

We disagree.

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute.

Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is appliedaccording to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to onlywhere a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or wouldlead to an injustice. 12

The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of

Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:

MARIANO M. CUNETAAsst. City Fiscal

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash theInformation on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial courtgranted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts chargeddo not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tappingand Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,"provides:

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Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the partiesto any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or byusing any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or recordsuch communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as adictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, orhowever otherwise described.The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for anyperson, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretlyrecord such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes nodistinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought tobe a party other than or different from those involved in the privatecommunication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to makesuch recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, asrespondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to acommunication who records his private conversation with another without theknowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A.4200.A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports therespondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeedcontemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of privateconversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or bythird persons. Thus:xxx xxx xxxSenator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element ofsecrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, therecording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved notcriminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, forexample civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made notnecessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intentof the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous evensubsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention.Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intentionis to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution ofoffense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded

conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record theobservation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him . It is notfair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intentionof the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations arebeing recorded.Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the boardof directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all theparties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations arebeing made should know that the observations are being recorded.Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say:"Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." Thatis fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makesdamaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain anymore. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks ofa person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without himknowing that what is being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.xxx xxx xxx(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the billas now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalizedunder Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It isthe communication between one person and another person not between aspeaker and a public.xxx xxx xxx

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(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)xxx xxx xxxThe unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with theabove-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainlysupports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks topenalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makesno distinctions, one does not distinguish.Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of thestatute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in theinformation. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devicesenumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secretrecording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would sufficeto constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor Generalpointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the saidlaw) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of theconversation, as well as its communication to a third person should beprofessed." 14Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinarymeaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The wordcommunicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or toimpart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharingor imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing orimparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings orthoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols(as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to includeverbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings orthoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, onFebruary 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy ofthe latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase"private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms"conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by SenatorTaada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from theirconversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature ofconversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized peoplehave some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversationsare often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, andthe expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously.

The right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly beenassured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of ourConstitution must have recognized the nature of conversations betweenindividuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of hisintellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions oflife are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communicationbetween individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.17

In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issueof telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for thepurpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did notviolate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those"device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instantcase turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstancespointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statuteitself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communicationswith the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear andunambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is herebyDENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

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EJUSDEM GENERISWhen do we apply this rule?G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970AMELITO R.respondent.

MUTUC,

petitioner,

vs.COMMISSION

ON

ELECTIONS,

Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.

Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.FERNANDO, J.:The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then acandidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this special civil actionfor prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of respondent Commission onElections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes, was not invain. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence of any express powergranted to respondent by the Constitutional Convention Act to so require and thebar to any such implication arising from any provision found therein, if deferencebe paid to the principle that a statute is to be construed consistently with thefundamental law, which accords the utmost priority to freedom of expression,much more so when utilized for electoral purposes. On November 3, 1970, thevery same day the case was orally argued, five days after its filing, with theelection barely a week away, we issued a minute resolution granting the writ ofprohibition prayed for. This opinion is intended to explain more fully our decision.In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner,after setting forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacyfor the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention, alleged thatrespondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to him five dayspreviously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due coursebut prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with soundsystems and loud speakers, an order which, according to him, is "violative of[his] constitutional right ... to freedom of speech." 1 There being no plain, speedyand adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would seek a writ of prohibition,at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On the very next day, thisCourt adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on Elections to filean answer not later than November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the casefor hearing for Tuesday November 3, 1970. No preliminary injunction was issued.There was no denial in the answer filed by respondent on November 2, 1970, of

the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for theprohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act,2which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request ordistribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters,fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets,bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic orforeign origin." 3It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used bypetitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangiblepropaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It prayedthat the petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on November3, 1970, with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C.Felizmena arguing in behalf of respondent.This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, theelection being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, aminute resolution granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth the absence ofstatutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such a ban in the light ofthe doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle that the constructionplaced on the statute by respondent Commission on Elections would raise seriousdoubts about its validity, considering the infringement of the right of free speechof petitioner. Its concluding portion was worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for,respondent Commission on Elections is permanently restrained and prohibitedfrom enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid orderbanning the use of political jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediatelyexecutory." 41. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before uswas one of power. Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justifysuch a prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat, no such authority wasgranted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend, however, that oneof its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoralpropaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights,athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, andcigarettes, and concluding with the words "and the like." 5 For respondentCommission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view thematter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the wellknown principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumerationbeing applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specificallyreferred to. 6 It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was thedistribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtaina favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commissionwas its failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that astatute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather thanrepugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription. 7 Thus, certain

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Administrative Code provisions were given a "construction which should be morein harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." 8 The desirability of removingin that fashion the taint of constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments hasalways commended itself. The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning ofwords to avert any collision between what a statute provides and what theConstitution requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation rendering it freefrom constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, theconclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional, but also gravedoubts upon that score. 92. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favorobeisance to such a cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if the aboveprovision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to lend itself to the view thatthe use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then the challenge ofunconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language, theConstitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has beenour constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmostrespect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to makemore meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What respondent Commissiondid, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which thisconstitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its actionby the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would befree, either by himself or through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers.Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it toa speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him throughtape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondentCommission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previousrestraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what theConstitution in express terms assures. 103. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, settingforth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from thehighest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system ofgovernment. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded tothat which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The threedepartments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it isentrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whateverlimits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes mustever be on guard lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive orformal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannotignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts asfound in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what isdecreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass uponthe validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication isa logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. Itoverrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates.

Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.

To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission wasaptly summed up by the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the branch of theexecutive department although independent of the President to which theConstitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement andadministration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power ofdecision of the Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.'" 11 Ithas been the constant holding of this Court, as it could not have been otherwise,that respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict with oroutside of the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution. 12 Ourdecisions which liberally construe its powers are precisely inspired by the thoughtthat only thus may its responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderlyand honest elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no justificationthen for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondentCommission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional rightas free speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stoodon solid footing.WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970, respondentCommission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing orimplementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the useof political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to costs.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo andVillamor, JJ., concur.Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.Separate OpinionsTEEHANKEE, J., concurring:In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer 1 on the unconstitutionality ofthe challenged provisions of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, I concurwith the views of Mr. Justice Fernando in the main opinion that "there could be nojustification .... for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing fromrespondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital aconstitutional right as free speech." I would only add the following observations:This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test ofreasonableness required by the due process clause of our Constitution. Originally,respondent Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily that the use by acandidate of a "mobile unit roaming around and announcing a meeting and the

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name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is used only for a certain place for ameeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting itself, there is noviolation." 2Acting upon petitioner's application, however, respondent Commissionruled that "the use of a sound system by anyone be he a candidate or notwhether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not prohibited by the 1971Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the condition "provided that thereare no jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a verballyrecorded form of election propaganda, is no different from the use of a 'streamer'or 'poster,' a printed form of election propaganda, and both forms of electionadvertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec. 12 of R.A. 6132," and"the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject ofconfiscation by the respondent Commission under par. (E) of sec. 12 of R.A.6132." In this modern day and age of the electronically recorded or taped voicewhich may be easily and inexpensively disseminated through a mobile soundsystem throughout the candidate's district, respondent Commission would outlaw"recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the candidate that he make use ofthe mobile sound system only by personal transmission and repeatedlypersonally sing his "jingle" or deliver his spoken message to the voters even if heloses his voice in the process or employ another person to do so personally evenif this should prove more expensive and less effective than using a recorded ortaped voice.Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's basicfreedom of speech and expression. They cannot pass the constitutional test ofreasonableness in that they go far beyond a reasonable relation to the propergovernmental object and are manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary.Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobileunit or carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's adverse ruling that thesame falls within the prohibition of section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has notbeen appealed by petitioner. I would note that respondent Commission's premisethat "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster'"in that these both represent forms of election advertisements to make thecandidate and the fact of his candidacy known to the voters is correct, but itsconclusion is not. The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' earswhile that of the "streamers" is through the voters' eyes. But if it be held that theCommission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably, oppressively and arbitrarilythe candidate's right of free expression, even though such "jingles" mayoccasionally offend some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers"being placed on the candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers" are lesslikely to offend the voters' sense of sight should likewise be held to be anunreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's sameconstitutional right.

The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent

Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of thecandidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his candidacy, but is tobe fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's limitation insection 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or byanother person with his knowledge and consent.# Separate OpinionsTEEHANKEE, J., concurring:In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer 1 on the unconstitutionality ofthe challenged provisions of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, I concurwith the views of Mr. Justice Fernando in the main opinion that "there could be nojustification .... for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing fromrespondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so vital aconstitutional right as free speech." I would only add the following observations:This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test ofreasonableness required by the due process clause of our Constitution. Originally,respondent Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily that the use by acandidate of a "mobile unit roaming around and announcing a meeting and thename of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is used only for a certain place for ameeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting itself, there is noviolation." 2Acting upon petitioner's application, however, respondent Commissionruled that "the use of a sound system by anyone be he a candidate or notwhether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not prohibited by the 1971Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the condition "provided that thereare no jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a verballyrecorded form of election propaganda, is no different from the use of a 'streamer'or 'poster,' a printed form of election propaganda, and both forms of electionadvertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec. 12 of R.A. 6132," and"the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject ofconfiscation by the respondent Commission under par. (E) of sec. 12 of R.A.6132." In this modern day and age of the electronically recorded or taped voicewhich may be easily and inexpensively disseminated through a mobile soundsystem throughout the candidate's district, respondent Commission would outlaw"recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the candidate that he make use ofthe mobile sound system only by personal transmission and repeatedlypersonally sing his "jingle" or deliver his spoken message to the voters even if heloses his voice in the process or employ another person to do so personally evenif this should prove more expensive and less effective than using a recorded ortaped voice.

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Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's basicfreedom of speech and expression. They cannot pass the constitutional test ofreasonableness in that they go far beyond a reasonable relation to the propergovernmental object and are manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary.Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobileunit or carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's adverse ruling that thesame falls within the prohibition of section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has notbeen appealed by petitioner. I would note that respondent Commission's premisethat "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster'"in that these both represent forms of election advertisements to make thecandidate and the fact of his candidacy known to the voters is correct, but itsconclusion is not. The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' earswhile that of the "streamers" is through the voters' eyes. But if it be held that theCommission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably, oppressively and arbitrarilythe candidate's right of free expression, even though such "jingles" mayoccasionally offend some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers"being placed on the candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers" are lesslikely to offend the voters' sense of sight should likewise be held to be anunreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's sameconstitutional right.The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondentCommission, laudable as it may be, should not be sought at the cost of thecandidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his candidacy, but is tobe fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the Act's limitation insection 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or byanother person with his knowledge and consent.

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EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS

4273, Ormoc Cadastre be reopened, and that they be allowed to file theircadastral answer.

G.R. No. L-35376 September 11, 1980

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,petitioners, vs.HON. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, ETC., ET AL., respondents.DE CASTRO, J.:Petitioners Republic of the Philippines and The Director of Lands seek the reviewof the decision dated July 22, 1972 of the respondent Judge in Cad. Case No. 27,GLRO Rec. No. 1714, Lot No. 4273, Ormoc Cadastre entitled, "The Director ofLands, petitioner, versus Tiburcio, Florencia, Fabian and Gonzala, all surnamedAotes, claimants-movants", the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 28, 1940, declaring LotNo. 4273 Public Land is set aside and said Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre ishereby adjudicated in favor of herein movants in undivided interests and in equalshare of each to GONZALA AOTES, married to Victorino Gormanes; TIBURCIOAOTES, married to Epefania Maglasang; FLORENCIA AOTES, married to BasilioBarabad; and FABIAN AOTES, married to Dulcisima Barabad; all adjudicatees areFilipinos, of legal ages, the first named is residing in Can-adiong, Ormoc City,Philippines; and as soon as this decision shall have become final, let theCommissioner of Land Registration Commission, Quezon City, issue thecorresponding decree of aforesaid parcel of land in the names of hereinadjudicatees, subject to the liability and claims of creditors, Hens, or otherpersons for the full period of two (2) years after their distribution as imposed bySection 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. 1The following facts are undisputed in the instant case:In a decision dated September 28, 1940 by the Cadastral Court, Lot No. 4273 ofthe Ormoc Cadastre was declared public land.On February 23, 1972, private respondents Aotes filed with the Court of FirstInstance of Leyte, Branch V, Ormoc City, presided by the respondent Judge apetition to reopen the aforesaid decision dated September 28, 1940 under Rep.Act 931 as amended by Rep. Act 6236 claiming to be the owners and possessorsof Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre by virtue of hereditary succession but,due to their non-appearance on the date of the hearing of the Cadastral Casebecause of ignorance and excusable neglect, said land was declared public landand that they had been in adverse, peaceful and notorious possession of the saidparcel of land since the time immemorial, paying all the taxes, interests andpenalties. They pray that the decision of the Cadastral Court affecting Lot No.

On March 16, 1972, petitioners filed an opposition to the aforesaid petition on theground that such petition is barred by the expiration of the period for reopeningcadastral proceedings under Rep. Act 931 which expired on December 31, 1968and this period has not been extended under the provisions of Rep. Act 6236because the latter applies only to the extensions of time limit for the filing ofapplications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect orincomplete titles.Respondent Judge in its order dated May 9, 1972, denied the opposition for lackof sufficient merit and set the case for hearing on June 24, 1972.On July 22, 1972, respondent judge rendered decision setting aside the decisionof the cadastral court dated September 28, 1940 declaring Lot No. 4273 publicland and adjudicating said lot in favor of the private respondents in undividedinterest in equal share of one-fourth (1/4) each.Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, petitioners filed this instantpetition assigning only one error to writ: The trial court erred in assumingjurisdiction over the petition for reopening of Cadastral Proceedings.In the Brief, 2 petitioners argue that the lower court has no jurisdiction over theproceedings for reopening of the cadastral case because under the provision ofRep. Act 931, the period for reopening of cadastral proceedings expired onDecember 31, 1968, and that period has not been extended by Rep. Act 6236which applies only to the extension of the time limit for the filing of applicationsfor free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles andnot to reopening of cadastral proceedings. In the Manifestation and Motion, 3respondents Aotes claim that considering the time limit for firing applications forfree patents and for judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect titles hasbeen extended up to December 31, 1980, the reopening of cadastral casesshould also be extended until December 31, 1980 in fairness and justice to them.The sole issue to be resolved, considering the above facts, is whether or not Rep.Act 6236 which provides for the extension of the time limit to file applications forfree patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles toDecember 31, 1976 applies also to the reopening of cadastral proceedings oncertain lands which were declared public lands.There is merit in the petition.By way of background, Rep. Act 931, which was approved on June 20, 1953, is

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an act to authorize the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, ofcertain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, byvirtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding theapproval of this act. Under this aforesaid act, all persons claiming title to parcelsof land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings, who at the time of thesurvey were in actual possession of the same but for some justifiable reason hadbeen unable to file their claim in the proper court during the time limitestablished by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to filesuch claims, have been, or are about to be declared land of the public domain, byvirtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding theapproval of this act, are granted the right within five years after the date onwhich this act shall take effect, to petition for a reopening of the judicialproceedings under the provisions of Act 2259. Rep. Act 2061, which took effecton June 13, 1958, refers to an act setting a new time limit for the filing ofapplications for free patents, for the judicial confirmation of imperfect orincomplete titles, and for the reopening of judicial proceedings on certain landswhich were declared public lands. Under this act the time for filing applicationsshall not extend beyond December 31, 1968. Rep. Act 6236, approved on June19, 1971, however, extended the time limit for the filing of applications for freepatents and for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles not toextend beyond December 31, 1976. In resume, Rep. Act 931 granted a rightwithin 5 years from June 20, 1953 to petition for a reopening of cadastralproceedings. Rep. Act 2061 fixed a new time limit which is up to December 31,1968 to file applications for free patents, for the judicial confirmation of imperfector incomplete titles and for the reopening of judicial proceedings on certain landswhich were declared public land. Rep. Act 6236 extended the time limit which isup to December 31, 1976 for the filing of applications for free patents and for thejudicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.Respondent Aotes filed on February 23, 1972 a petition to reopen the decision ofthe Cadastral Court under Rep. Act 931 as amended by Rep. Act 6236.Respondents Aotes claim that since the time limit for filing applications for freepatents and applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfecttitles have been extended up to December 31, 1980, the reopening of cadastralcases is also extended until December 31, 1980. Rep. Act 6236, the very law onwhich respondents Aotes bases his petition to reopen the cadastral proceedingsfails to supply any basis for respondents' contention. It will be noted that whileRep. Act 2061 fixed the time to reopen cadastral cases which shall not extendbeyond December 31, 1968, no similar provision is found in Rep. Act 6236expressly 'extending the time limit for the reopening of cadastral proceedings onparcels of land declared public land. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, theextension as provided for by the Rep. Act 6236 makes no reference to reopeningof cadastral cases as the earlier law, Rep. Act 2061, expressly did. Under thelegal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius(Express Mention is Implied Exclusion), the express mention of one thing in alaw, as a general rule, means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned.This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic

and the natural workings of the human mind. 4 If Rep. Act 6236 had intendedthat the extension it provided for applies also to reopening of cadastral cases, itwould have so provided in the same way that it provided the extension of time tofile applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect orincomplete title. The intention to exclude the reopening of cadastral proceedingsor certain lands which were declared public land in Rep. Act 6236 is made clearerby reference to Rep. Act 2061 which includes the reopening of cadastral cases,but not so included in Rep. Act 6236.We hold, therefore, that the extension provided for by Rep. Act 6236 which is thesole basis for filing the respondents Aotes' petition to reopen the cadastralproceedings applies only to the filing of applications for free patent and forjudicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening ofcadastral proceedings like the instant case, a proceeding entirely different from"filing an application for a free patent or for judicial confirmation of imperfect orincomplete titles."Parenthetically, in setting aside the decision dated September 28, 1940, therespondent Judge has concluded that Rep. Act 6236 is applicable also toreopening of cadastral proceedings, thereby, altering Rep. Act 6236. That cannotbe done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly pertains to thelegislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga vs. Court of Appeals: 5 "It hasbeen repeated time and again that where the statutory norm speaksunequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law,leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed. Our decisionshave consistently been to that effect. 6 Likewise, it is a cardinal rule of statutoryconstruction that where the terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous, nointerpretation is called for, and the law is applied as written, 7 for application isthe first duty of courts, and interpretation, only were literal application isimpossible or inadequate. 8More importantly, the lower court has no longer jurisdiction to entertain thepetition filed by respondents for reopening the cadastral proceedings because thelatter, as we have noted, did not file the aforesaid petition within the period fixedby the applicable laws to wit: Rep. Act 931 and 2061. Consequently, the decisiondated September 30, 1940 of the Cadastral Court declaring the land in question apublic land has become final and conclusive. It has also acquired the status of resjudicata. It must be remembered that generally, the fundamental principle of resjudicata applies to all cases and proceedings, including land registration orcadastral proceedings. 9 The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties fromrelitigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment.It is well-settled that a prior judgment is conclusive in a subsequent suit betweenthe same parties on the subject matter, and on the same cause of action, notonly as to matters which were decided in the first action, but also as to everyother matter which the parties could have properly set up in the prior suit. 10Indeed, settled is the rule that a cadastral case is a judicial proceeding in rem,

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which, as such binds thedeemed to have settledthereon, like those of thejudicata. 12 In the case of

whole world. 11 The final judgment rendered therein is

the status of the land subject thereof, if not notedpetitioner, are deemed barred under the principle of resCano vs. De Camacho, this Court held:

Although the title of Jesus Vao over said Lot 1-B is not as yet indefeasible, nodecree having been issued in his favor, all rights, interests or claims existingbefore said date are deemed barred by said decision, under the principle of resjudicata, once the decision become final, upon expiration of the thirty-day periodto appeal therefrom. 13By reiterating its ruling, this Court once more stresses and emphasizes that Rep.Act 6236 does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings and as aconsequence, the respondent Judge has no jurisdiction over the petition of therespondents Aotes to reopen the cadastral proceedings.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the decisions dated July22, 1972 of the respondent Judge and reiterating that of the Cadastral Courtdated September 28, 1940. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

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CASUS OMISSUS

No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or

employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal orrural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid anycandidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein,except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peaceofficer.

Casus ominus pro omisso habendus est (Restrictive rule)

G.R. No. 14129

July 31, 1962

PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.

plaintiff-appellant,

vs.GUILLERMO

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.Padilla Law Office for

defendant-appellee.REGALA, J.:This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of FirstInstance of Pangasinan dismissing the information against the defendant.The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in thebrief of plaintiff-appellant, is complete and accurate. The same is, consequently,here adopted, to wit:In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of FirstInstance of that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with aviolation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigationconducted by said court resulted in the finding a probable cause that the crimecharged as committed by defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upondefendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information onthe ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officersenumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court deniedthe motion to dismiss holding that a justice of the peace is within the purviewSection 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in supportthereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No.15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the peaceis excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the replyof the defense, and the opposition of the prosecution, the lower court dismissedthe information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the casecited by the defense.Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this singlequestion of law: Is a justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 ofthe Revised Election Code?Section 54 of the said Code reads:

Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended

among the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Hesubmits the aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the RevisedAdministrative Code, which provided the following:SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the FirstInstance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province andno officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employeeof the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in anymanner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right tovote.When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words"justice of the peace," the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature toexclude justices of the peace from its operation.The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that underSection 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modifiedor qualified by the phrase "of First instance", while under Section 54 of theRevised Election Code, no such modification exists. In other words, justices of thepeace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Codebecause the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the FirstInstance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessitytherefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because thelegislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge." Itwas a term not modified by any word or phrase and was intended to comprehendall kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, Judges of thecourts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, andjustices of the peace.It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as"judge" in this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge.A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicialauthority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According to Bouvier LawDictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigatedquestions according to law. In its most extensive sense the term includes allofficers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity,including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of

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facts."A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarifythe above conclusion.The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the PhilippineCommission in 1907, and which was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709,1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however, only Act No. 1709 has arelation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be shown later.) Act No.1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later on incorporated Chapter 18of the Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature, several amendmentswere made through the passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, ofthese last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinent to the case at bar asshall be seen later.) During the time of the Commonwealth, the NationalAssembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on enacted CommonwealthAct No. 357, which was the law enforced until June 1947, when the RevisedElection Code was approved. Included as its basic provisions are the provisions ofCommonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666, 657. The present Code was furtheramended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session ofCongress in 1960, amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history ofour election law, the following should be noted:Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he beeligible during the time that he holds said public office to election at anymunicipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for reelection to the positionwhich he may be holding, and no judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace,provincial fiscal, or officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of theBureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or takepart in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty of beingdeprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office whatsoeverfor a term of 5 year: Provide, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not beconstrue to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote it anyelection." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took effect on January 15, 1907.)Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or officeror employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aidany candidate or influence in any manner to take part in any municipal provincialor Assembly election. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall bedeprived of his office or employment and shall be disqualified to hold any publicoffice or employment whatever for a term of 5 years, Provided, however, that the

foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise

qualified of the right to vote at any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Tookeffect on September 15, 1907.)Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the AdministrativeCode on March 10, 1917, the provisions in question read:SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the FirstInstance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province andno officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or any Bureau or employeeof the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in anymanner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right tovote. (Emphasis supplied)After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387.This Act reads:SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. Any judge ofthe First Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of anyprovince, any officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the policeof any municipality, or any officer or employee of any Bureau of the classified civilservice, who aids any candidate or violated in any manner the provisions of thissection or takes part in any election otherwise by exercising the right to vote,shall be punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00, orby imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more than 2 years, and in allcases by disqualification from public office and deprivation of the right of suffragefor a period of 5 years. (Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22,1938. This law provided in Section 48:SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. No justice,judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of theArmy, the Constabulary of the national, provincial, municipal or rural police, andno classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, nor exertinfluence in any manner in any election nor take part therein, except to vote, ifentitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised ElectionCode was taken.It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislativedevelopment or history of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the firstomission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of

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Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred bydefendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in the two instances when thewords "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No.180), the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not carry thequalification "of the First Instance." In other words, whenever the word "judge"was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the words "justice of thepeace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justiceof the peace" were omitted.The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justifythe conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace"in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from itsoperation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended inthe broader term "judge".It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyedcongressional records which might have offered some explanation of thediscussion of Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as indicated above, haseliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace." Having beencompletely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications fromthese records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from thehistorical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by reason hidequity.Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officersenumerated in Section 54 inasmuch as under that said section, the word "judge"is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any province." The last mentionedphrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the peace since thelatter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase"of any province" necessarily removes justices of the peace from the enumerationfor the reason that they are municipal and not provincial officials, then the samething may be said of the Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court ofAppeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there be any doubt that Justices ofthe Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals are not included in theprohibition? The more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is thatit qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are generally known asprovincial officers.The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by thedefendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted froman enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule isapplicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to havebeen intentionally and deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of

the Revised Election Code.

The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" canoperate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. Inthe case under consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature didnot exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officersprecluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merelycalled by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised ElectionCode, justices of the peace were just called "judges."In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case,defendant-appellee cites authorities to the effect that the said rule, beingrestrictive in nature, has more particular application to statutes that should bestrictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly construedagainst the government since proceedings under it are criminal in nature and thejurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted againstthe state.Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penalstatutes, defendant asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process demandsuch strict construction in order to give "fair warning of what the law intends todo, if a certain line is passed, in language that the common world willunderstand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere factthat a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that aparticular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislativeenumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there hasbeen no such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms.The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factorcontrolling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as anadditional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning ofpenal laws. This has been recognized time and again by decisions of variouscourts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases will frequentlybe found enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature will govern(U.S. vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction shouldnot be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co.v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute,as in this particular instance, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers(Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in theU.S. has well said:

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The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of itas to deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in thesense which best harmonizes with their intent and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language ofcriminal statutes, frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includessituations inconsistent with the legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; Seealso Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915) 25 Yale L.J. 129.)Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that thepurpose of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of theSupreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges ofthe Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc.,who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within itsencompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the legislature intend toeliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fullyexplained in the brief of the Solicitor General, to wit:On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of FirstInstance" and justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the RevisedAdministrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention wasto include in the scope of the term not just one class of judges but all judges,whether of first Instance justices of the peace or special courts, such as judges ofthe Court of Industrial Relations. . . . .The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to soconstrue the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan politicalactivities would weaken rather than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand,there are cogent reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself why justices ofthe peace should be prohibited from electioneering. Along with Justices of theappellate courts and judges of the Court of First Instance, they are givenauthority and jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117123). Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and decided inclusion andexclusion cases, and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for anelective office the impartiality of their decisions in election cases would be opento serious doubt. We do not believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of theRevised Election Code, intended to create such an unfortunate situation. (pp.708, Appellant's Brief.)Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that theadministrative or executive department has regarded justices of the peace withinthe purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice,

etc. (G.R. No. L-12601), this Court did not give due course to the petition forcertiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the respondents, fornot setting aside, among others, Administrative Order No. 237, dated March 31,1957, of the President of the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as justice ofthe peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note that one of the causes of theseparation of the petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty in engaging inelectioneering, contrary to the provisions of the Election Code.Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, whichwas filed on January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section 56,justices of the peace are already expressly included among the officers enjoinedfrom active political participation. The argument is that with the filing of the saidHouse Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that existing laws do not prohibitjustices of the peace from partisan political activities.The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was aproposed amendment to Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to section54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposedre-codification of the existing election laws at the time that it was filed. Besides,the proposed amendment, until it has become a law, cannot be considered tocontain or manifest any legislative intent. If the motives, opinions, and thereasons expressed by the individual members of the legislature even in debates,cannot be properly taken into consideration in ascertaining the meaning of astatute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376), a fortiori whatweight can We give to a mere draft of a bill.On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices ofthe peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. Toaccept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down bythe legislature.Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace fromparticipating in partisan politics. They were prohibited under the old Election Lawsince 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined bythe Revised Administrative Code. Another which expressed the prohibition tothem was Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No. 357.Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied therule of "expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion thatjustices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals:"Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known as expressio unius estexclusion alterius, it would not be beyond reason to infer that there was anintention of omitting the term "justice of the peace from Section 54 of theRevised Election Code. . . ."

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The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice ofthe peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court ofAppeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reasonfor the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alteriushas been erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions toparticular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists whyother persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included, andmanifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio uniusest exclusion alterius, should not be invoked. (Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22Cal. App. 519.) .FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial courtshould be set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.

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DURA LEX SED LEXG.R. No. L-22301

August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MARIO MAPA Y

MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.Office of the Solicitor GeneralArturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C.Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.FERNANDO, J.:The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower courtis whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agentto the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecutionfor the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that itdoes not.The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an informationdated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPAY MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of theRevised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and asfurther amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or aboutthe 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accuseddid then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under hiscustody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serialnumber, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured thenecessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contraryto law."When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court atthe outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that theaccused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he hasneither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit the sameon a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearmwithout a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel soughtfrom the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of hisexhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be submittedfor decision, he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secretagent is not required to get a license for his firearm."Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so thathe could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does

the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunitionmentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, inthe City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permitthereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant,answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made astatement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirmsthat the accused admits."Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same fordecision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibitsconsisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," thenGovernor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued byGov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila,Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission; 2 the oath of office of theaccused as such secret agent, 3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effectthat the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste. 4 Counsel for the accusedthen stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing tosubmit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointedand qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirementof having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties weregiven time to file their respective memoranda.1wph1.tThereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convictingthe accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to anindeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay thecosts. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor ofthe Government."The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. Thedecision must be affirmed.The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall beunlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms orammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to beused in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." 5 The nextsection provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued toofficers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], thePhilippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincialtreasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincialprisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession ofsuch officials and public servants for use in the performance of their officialduties."6The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such

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he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty ofcourts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it hasbeen demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." 7The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agentwas acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accusedas a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns anddetection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer"equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to setaside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extenttherefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v.Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

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G.R. No. L-22291 November 15, 1976PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JESUS SANTAYANA YESCUDERO, defendant-appellant.Ernesto C. Hidalgo and Enrique Jocson for appellant.Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castroand Trial Attorney Josefina Domingo de Leon for appellee.CONCEPCION, JR., J:Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the crime of illegalpossesion of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1)year and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay the costs.The essential facts are not in dispute. On February 19, 1962, accused JesusSantayana, was appointed as "Special Agent" 1 by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela,Chief of the CIS. On March 9, 1962, a Memorandum Receipt 2 for equipment wasissued in the name of the accused regarding one pistol Melior SN-122137 withone (1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela likewise issued an undated certification 3 tothe effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistoldescribed in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of hisappointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possessthe same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection.On October 29, 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession ofthe above-described pistol with four rounds of ammunition, cal. 25, without alicense to possess them. An investigation was conducted and thereupon, acorresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case underwent trialafter which the accused was convicted of the crime charged with itscorresponding penalty. Hence, the case was appealed to US and the accusedassigned three errors allegedly committed by the trial court in disposing of thiscase.Of these assigned errors, the two main issued posed are whether or not thepresent subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipalcourt pursuant to Republic Act No. 2613; and whether or not the appointment ofthe appellant as special agent of the CIS which apparently authorizes him tocarry and posses firearms exempts him from securing a license or permitcorresponding thereto.Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt that under Section 87 ofRepublic Act No. 286, as amended by Republic Act No. 2613, the justice overcases of illegal possession of firearms. But equally the Court of First Instance of

Manila, which took cognizance of this case had jurisdiction over the offensecharged because under Section 44 of Republic Act No. 296, Court of FirstInstance have original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the penaltyprovided by law is imprisonment for more than six (6) months, or a fine of morethan two hundred pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense charged in the informationis punishable by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year and one(1) day nor more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of notless than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or more than five thousand pesos(P5,000.00).From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts overCriminal Cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not morethan six (6) months or fine of not more than two hundred (P200.00) pesos orboth such imprisonment and fine is exclusive and original to said courts. Butconsidering that the offense of illegal possession of firearms with which theappellant was charged is penalized by imprisonment for a period of not less thanone (1) year and one (1) day or more than five (5) years, or both suchimprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos ormore than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos (Republic Act No. 4), the offense,therefore, does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MunicipalCourt. The Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction over the same.As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no question that appellant wasappointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. 4Indeed, appellant was issued a firearm in the performance of his official dutiesand for his personal protection. 5 It also appears that appellant was informed byCol. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to apply for a license or toregister the said firearm because it was government property and therefore couldnot legally be registered or licensed in appellant's name. 6 Capt. Adolfo M.Bringas from whom appellant received the firearm also informed the latter thatno permit to carry the pistol was necessary "because you are already appointedas CIS agent."At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing isenunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang 7 wherein We held that theappointment of a civilian as "secret agent to assist in the maintenace of peaceand order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within thecategory of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member of the municipal policeexpressly covered by Section 879." The case of People vs. Mapa 8 revoked thedoctrine in the Macarandang case only on August 30, 1967. Under theMacarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant's appointment assecret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol inquestion.Wherefore, and conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General,

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the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus Santayana yEscudero is hereby acquitted. The bond for his provisional release is cancelled.Costs de oficio.