Do human identity representations (human identity, natural/artificial distinction) still make sense in the context of the development of humanoid robotics (humanizing the robot) and human enhancement (automation of the human)? The problem is that critical philosophers, like Lin and Allhoff who founded the journal NanoEthics, challenge these representations of human identity, as if the discussion of the ethical evaluation of these representations was exhausted with regards to the two issues that they raise in 2009 in Ethics of Human Enhancement: 25 Questions and Answers, i.e.: “Does the notion of human dignity suffer with human enhancements?” and “Is the natural-artificial distinction morally significant in this debate?” The purpose of this article is to show – in light of various texts that constitute our framework for analyzing moral arguments – the limits of the scope and insufficiency of the critical arguments that Lin and Allhoff use to answer these two questions. But in applying our framework to these authors, we will also show how the question of human identity or the natural/artificial distinction still makes sense in the ethical evaluation.