A World Order without Europe?

Europe needs to become politically self-conscious in order to justify its role as a globally relevant political actor. Its function as a peace-keeping institution is laudable, but peace is no end in itself. By Mark Lilla

Mark Lilla, Professor of Humanities23.3.2015, 01:45 Uhr

The E.U. lacks the most fundamental political self-consciousness: a sense of what it is and what it wants. (Bild: Imago)

The last World Expo was held in Shanghai in 2010 and all the world's great powers were there. Most - like China, Russia, Britain, France, and Saudi Arabia - built impressive pavilions that linked each nation's history to its current achievements and future ambitions. The only exception was the United States, which let a coalition of multinational corporations build a pavilion to its own tastelessness. That was an embarrassment. But at least it gave the world an accurate picture of the real source of America's power.

And then there was the pavilion of the European Union. Or rather the small part of Belgium's pavilion that it had loaned to the E.U. The first room was empty but had some inspiring slogans painted on the wall: «Solidarity», «Peace», «Human rights». And some less inspiring ones, like «Social market economy», and, my favorite, «Article 3 of the Treaty on Europe». In the next room, titled «Open Europe», there were more slogans: «No barriers», «Single market», and «Common rules». These were accompanied by a video showing a gleaming Euro coin spinning on its axis. The following room was devoted to «Green Europe», and after that there was a video of Europeans going to work on bicycles. That was all. No mention of history, no mention of Europe's place in world affairs. At the exit I bought a little stuffed European mascot for my niece, a grinning golden star in blue overalls. She had no idea what it represented. Neither did I.

After I left the pavilion I found myself thinking about Robert Musil's «The Man Without Qualities». I remembered that early in the novel the hero Ulrich is made secretary to a committee whose task is to find a guiding concept for the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the coronation of Emperor Franz Joseph. Which it fails to do. The committee's deliberations are hilariously pointless. All it produces is a proposal to undertake an «Inquiry for the Drafting of a Guiding Resolution to Ascertain the Desires of the Concerned Sections of the Population».

I tried to imagine similar deliberations that took place in Brussels in a planning committee for the Shanghai Expo, and the care with which it must have considered the relative merits of slogans like «No barriers» and «Article 3 of the Treaty of Europe». I hope some new young Ulrich was there taking notes, and that one day we'll have an equally comic novel about the failed attempt to define the European Union's place in the world.

The comparison of the two empires, one very old and one very new, is worth pursuing. To begin with, unlike the Hapsburgs, the E.U. does have guiding principles - in fact it has so many of them that it takes many thick books to record them. But the Hapsburgs had something the E.U. lacks. It was not a shared ethnic identity, and it certainly was not constitutional patriotism. Nor was it even the Catholic faith. It had something more fundamental, which might be called political self-confidence or self-consciousness which Germans call «Selbstbewusstsein». Self-confidence and self-consciousness are necessary conditions of all successful human action. They form the capacity to recognize oneself as oneself, to posit ends, and to pursue them in a given environment. Three simple German phrases together capture the meaning of political self-confidence and self-consciousness better than any philosophical treatise can: «so bin ich» – that's how I am – «so will ich» – that's how I want it –, and «so ist es» – that's how it is.

Self-confidence is crucial in all politics but especially in international affairs. No nation can become a world power without it. China today sees itself as the heir of a great ancient civilization that will one day be great again. Saudi Arabia sees itself as the divinely ordained guardian of Islam's holiest sites and rightful leader of the Muslim world. Russia sees itself as the wounded Christ of nations, and the United States sees itself as the innocent Redeemer of nations (and the world's largest shopping mall). All such formulas are self-serving and historically questionable. But without them, a nation loses its bearings. What makes these countries world powers is not wealth or arms alone. It is the self-confidence and self-consciousness that directs their use of wealth and arms.

Note that I do not use the word «identity». This term is so charged in Europe - besetzt Freud would say - that it is hard to discuss rationally and impartially. Besides, the question of the E.U.'s «identity» has already been answered. At every opportunity Europeans have had to express themselves over the past two decades, they have made it very clear that they do not want an Identity with a capital I. They do not want to think of themselves in ethnic terms. They do not wish to associate themselves collectively with Europe's Christian legacy or its colonial past. And they want nothing to do with the historical catastrophe that was twentieth century Europe. Europeans do not even wish to lay claim to the principles of Enlightenment Europe, for fear of appearing parochial and intolerant. For them the view from Europe is and should be the view from nowhere.

All this is understandable. But in politics, and certainly in international politics, there is no view from nowhere. Every political entity - a nation, a federation, an empire - has needs and interests and must set aims in order to satisfy them. The Hapsburg empire lacked a definable identity, but for several centuries it was aware enough of itself and its interests to maintain a delicate ethnic balance within its borders, and to exercise power with and against its neighbors. One would think that if this strange hybrid empire was capable of shaping the world order from Vienna, certainly the European Union will eventually be able to do so from Brussels. But, in fact, nothing is less certain.

What is the aim of the E.U.?

Every politician, business leader, and intellectual I've ever spoken with has given me a different answer. There are as many rationales for the E.U. as there are proofs of the existence of God, perhaps more. In fact, the «choice for Europe» has always struck me as a kind of Pascal's wager. We don't know what Europe is, but we know that the risks of denying its existence are greater than the risks of presuming it, and so we choose to believe in it. Europe is a proleptic polity. Which makes it very hard to determine just what its interests and needs are. For the past two decades, the focus has been almost entirely on creating an economic unit that can negotiate as an equal partner with other large economic powers like the U.S. and China, and soon India and Brazil. This can be considered a collective success, though with disastrous consequences for some core members. And because of it, more nations have wanted to join and they have been welcomed.

But no world power can live by economics and trade alone. That is because there will always be other powers that think of economic strength, not as an end in itself but as a means to reach other, non-economic ends. Since the creation of the E.U., Europeans have had great trouble recognizing when this is happening, sometimes willfully so. There is a great scramble for regional hegemony taking place in many regions of the world today. China has become much more aggressive in the North, South, and East China Seas and clearly wants to be feared. Saudi Arabia wants to limit the influence of Iran and Shiite movements throughout the Middle East, not to mention ISIS. And Russia under Vladimir Putin clearly wants to turn the countries on its border into little Finlands. European commentators were quick to assume an economic motive to his take-over of the Crimea, since it gives Russia access to the Mediterranean. But his guerrilla war in Ukraine, carried out in the face of crippling economic sanctions, reveals that for the old Communist, money isn't everything. Pride and grandeur and a place in history are worth suffering for.

Although Europe succeeded collectively in establishing sanctions, I see no evidence that it is yet capable of setting long-term strategic objectives. In large part this is because the rhetoric of economic union serves as an excuse for leaders not to confront the political nature of the E.U., and to decide what political ends it should pursue. There are far too many excuses to put off this reckoning. France and Britain are willing to use military force internationally if necessary, and can draw on their democratic institutions and colonial histories to do so. Germany has shown again in Ukraine that it can be a major diplomatic power if the task is to avoid war rather than wage it. And in more complicated situations, NATO and the United States are sure to step in. Indeed given the current E.U. leadership, its institutions, and the current way of thinking, it is difficult to imagine how Europe as Europe could develop a strategy and execute it autonomously. Peace-keeping does not count: it is a means to an end in international politics, not an end in itself.

The issue is not simply that Europeans are from Venus and Americans are from Mars. (Though you are, and we are.) It also has to do with the unusual way in which E.U. institutions have developed and function. We know that authoritarian regimes can wield effective power in foreign affairs because their leaders are free to do so. We know that democratic regimes can do it by mobilizing public support. We also know that small coalitions of relatively equal partners can, for a limited time, engage in diplomatic negotiations, regulate trade, and wage short wars. But the E.U. fits into none of these categories. We do even know how to classify it; it is more than a minimal federation, less than a nation or empire. It is committed to democratic principles, but its institutions are not structured to give the European public the opportunity to approve a foreign policy, or change governments if it disapproves.

Nor are its institutions authoritarian enough for its leaders to act decisively without endless consultation. And now that the E.U. has grown so large, not all the member states face the same dangers, making agreement even more difficult. Ireland and Poland cannot be expected to see the Ukraine crisis in the same light.

The European Union may be unique in the history of the world's political institutions. Not because it is a federated system, of which there have been many. It is hard to think of another polity that has willed itself into being as an economic power, but has not willed the diplomatic and especially military means to exploit and defend that power. The E.U. lacks the most fundamental political self-consciousness: a sense of what it is and what it wants. Its strongest members - Britain, France, and German - are aware of themselves as autonomous national actors and have institutions for legitimizing use of power. The European Union lacks both awareness and institutions. And so it appears that the world order, if there is such a thing, will be established without it.

So what role can Europe play?

Consider Canada. Canada understands itself very well. It knows that it has no grand historical past or manifest historical destiny. It understands that its power depends entirely on that of its neighbor, the United States. It knows that the most it can do for native Canadians and immigrants is provide a safe environment for them to improve their economic condition, which it does remarkably well. And it knows that as a member of the international community it occasionally must join other nations in diplomatic and military actions. Canada does not make a fetish of military force, as Americans do; nor does it make a fetish of international law, as Europeans do. Free of the burden of national identity or historical catastrophe, Canada is that rare thing: a small, smart, self-aware international citizen.

In the early 1970s a Canadian radio station ran a brilliant contest. It was at a time when the American states to the south were choosing slogans to put on the license plates of cars. For example, «I Love New York», or «Virginia is for Lovers». The host of the radio show wanted to find an appropriate slogan for his country, too. So he asked his listeners to complete the following phrase: «It's as Canadian as?» He received thousands of entries, but to this day Canadians will tell you that the winning one was the best. It ran: «It is as Canadian as possible under the circumstances». Perhaps that's all we can and should expect from Brussels, too: to be as European as possible under the circumstances. That is at least something. A small something, but something.