1. In reviewing a final order entered by a circuit court judge upon a
review of, or upon a refusal to review, a final order of a family court judge, we review the
findings of fact made by the family court judge under the clearly erroneous standard, and
the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion standard. We review
questions of law de novo. Syllabus, Carr v. Hancock, 216 W. Va. 474, 607 S.E.2d 803
(2004).

2. In the law concerning custody of minor children, no rule is more
firmly established than that the right of a natural parent to the custody of his or her infant
child is paramount to that of any other person; it is a fundamental personal liberty protected
and guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the West Virginia and United States
Constitutions. Syllabus point 1, In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973).

3. If a natural parent intends to voluntarily transfer temporary custody
of a child to a third person, then the document effecting the transfer should expressly
provide that it is the intention of the parent to temporarily transfer custody to the third
person. Syllabus point 5, Overfield v. Collins, 199 W. Va. 27, 483 S.E.2d 27 (1996).

4. If a natural parent intends to voluntarily transfer permanent custody
of a child to a third person, then the document effecting that transfer should expressly
provide that it is the intention of the parent to permanently transfer the custody of the child
to the third person. Syllabus point 4, Overfield v. Collins, 199 W. Va. 27, 483 S.E.2d 27
(1996).

6. A psychological parent is a person who, on a continuing day-to-day
basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills a child's
psychological and physical needs for a parent and provides for the child's emotional and
financial support. The psychological parent may be a biological, adoptive, or foster parent,
or any other person. The resulting relationship between the psychological parent and the
child must be of substantial, not temporary, duration and must have begun with the consent
and encouragement of the child's legal parent or guardian. To the extent that this holding
is inconsistent with our prior decision of In re Brandon L.E., 183 W. Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d
515 (1990), that case is expressly modified. Syllabus point 3, In re Clifford K., 217 W. Va.
625, 619 S.E.2d 138 (2005).

7. A parent has the natural right to the custody of his or her infant child,
unless the parent is an unfit person because of misconduct, neglect, immorality,
abandonment or other dereliction of duty, or has waived such right, or by agreement or
otherwise has transferred, relinquished or surrendered such custody, the right of the parent
to the custody of his or her infant child will be recognized and enforced by the courts.
Syllabus point 1, Whiteman v. Robinson, 145 W. Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691 (1960).

Per Curiam:

The appellant herein, Misty C.V. (See footnote 1) (hereinafter Misty), appeals from an
order entered October 30, 2006, by the Circuit Court of Cabell County. By that order, the
circuit court affirmed an earlier ruling by the Family Court of Cabell County, entered June
23, 2006, wherein the family court determined the appellees herein, Christopher and Tanya
F. (hereinafter Christopher and Tanya), to be the psychological co-parents of the
minor child involved in these proceedings, Senturi N.S.V. (hereinafter Senturi). The
circuit court also affirmed the family court's ruling that Christopher and Tanya had a
shared parenting arrangement with Misty vis-a-vis Senturi. On appeal to this Court,
Misty contends that Christopher and Tanya are not the psychological co-parents of Senturi
and that she did not enter into a shared parenting arrangement with them. Upon a review
of the parties' arguments, the pertinent authorities, and the record presented for our
consideration, we reverse the October 30, 2006, order of the Circuit Court of Cabell County
and restore Misty's full custodial rights to her daughter, Senturi.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The child at the center of the instant custody dispute, Senturi, was born on
March 2, 2004. Thereafter, on April 5, 2004, Senturi's mother, Misty, filed a pro se
Petition for Support/Allocation of Custodial Responsibility in the Family Court of Cabell
County against Senturi's father, Joshua. At the same time, Misty submitted a Parenting
Plan for the court's approval. By order of the family court entered June 8, 2004, custody
of Senturi was awarded to Misty and visitation on Wednesdays and at other agreeable
times was awarded to Joshua. This order was not appealed.

Subsequently, Misty filed a pro se Petition for Modification on April 29,
2005, to establish Joshua's child support obligation and to substitute Fridays for
Wednesdays as Joshua's established weekly visitation day. The West Virginia Department
of Health and Human Resources (hereinafter the DHHR) filed a corresponding action
against Joshua to collect child support, which action was consolidated with the modification
sought by Misty. By order entered August 17, 2005, the family court found Joshua to be
capable of paying child support at the rate of $197.00 per month and determined that he was
in arrears from April 1, 2004, to February 28, 2005. (See footnote 2) Accordingly, Joshua was ordered to
pay $1,728 in reimbursement child support; (See footnote 3) $212.39 in child support arrearages; (See footnote 4) and,
beginning August 1, 2005, $197 per month in child support for Senturi. In the above-
referenced order, the family court also ordered the parties to notify the Bureau for Child
Support Enforcement . . . in writing within seven (7) days of any change in any of the
following: . . . residential and mailing address[.] (See footnote 5) The family court continued custody of
Senturi with Misty.

On February 27, 2006, Misty filed a Notice of Relocation, pursuant to
Senturi's court-ordered parenting plan, in which Misty advised that she planned to move
to Corpus Christi, Texas, with Senturi, on or after March 17, 2006, in order to live closer
to her extended family, return to school, and pursue employment opportunities. In response
to this notice, Joshua filed, on March 7, 2006, a Motion for Ex Parte Order for Emergency
Temporary Custody[;] Respondent's and Intervening Petitioners' Verified Petition for
Custody[;] and Response to Notice of Relocation, whereby Joshua and the intervenors,
Christopher and Tanya, (See footnote 6) sought Senturi's exclusive custody. To support their request for
relief, Joshua, Christopher, and Tanya alleged that Senturi had been living with Christopher
and Tanya for the past fourteen months . . . with only limited visitation with the Petitioner
[Misty]; questioned Misty's fitness to retain Senturi's custody; and asserted that Senturi's
best interests necessitated transferring custody to Christopher and Tanya. By order entered
March 7, 2006, the family court granted the ex parte relief requested, awarding the
temporary custody of Senturi to Joshua, Christopher, and Tanya, and placing Senturi in the
care of Christopher and Tanya. There is no indication that the family court conducted an
inquiry as to Misty's fitness, and the family court, in its order, did not grant Misty any
visitation with Senturi.

On March 13, 2006, Misty responded to the ex parte petition, denying the
allegations that she was unfit and arguing that the intervenors, Christopher and Tanya,
lacked standing. Also on March 13, 2006, Misty filed a Motion for Ex Parte Order to Set
Aside March 7, 2006 Ex Parte Order wherein she stated that Tanya was Senturi's
babysitter and that Tanya had received payments for such services from the DHHR through
the Link Child Care Resource and Referral Agency. (See footnote 7) Following a hearing on Misty's
motion, the family court, by temporary order entered March 20, 2006, continued custody
of Senturi with the intervenors, but awarded Misty two hours of supervised visitation with
Senturi on Monday, Wednesday, Friday, and Saturday.

By final order entered June 22, 2006, (See footnote 8) the family court designated Misty as
Senturi's primary residential parent. However, the family court further ordered Misty to
share parenting time with Christopher and Tanya because, as found by the family court,
Christopher and Tanya have a shared parenting arrangement with Misty and are Senturi's
psychological co-parents. Misty appealed this order to the Circuit Court of Cabell
County. (See footnote 9) The circuit court affirmed the family court's decision by order entered October
30, 2006. From these rulings, Misty now appeals to this Court.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal to this Court, Misty challenges the correctness of the circuit court's
order. We have held that,

[i]n reviewing a final order entered by a circuit court
judge upon a review of, or upon a refusal to review, a final
order of a family court judge, we review the findings of fact
made by the family court judge under the clearly erroneous
standard, and the application of law to the facts under an abuse
of discretion standard. We review questions of law de novo.
Syl., Carr v. Hancock, 216 W. Va. 474, 607 S.E.2d 803 (2004). Guided by these standards,
we now consider the parties' arguments.

III.

DISCUSSION

This case comes before us on Misty's appeal from the circuit court's order
affirming the family court's findings that (1) Misty had entered a shared parenting
arrangement with Christopher and Tanya and (2) Christopher and Tanya are psychological
co-parents of Senturi. The family court made both of these determinations in order to find
that Christopher and Tanya had standing to participate in these proceedings. See generally W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004). This Court is gravely concerned,
however, by both the failure of the lower tribunal to follow the established procedure for
addressing custodial concerns in the context of a relocation notice and by the dangerous
precedent set by awarding relief to persons who did not have standing to intervene in these
proceedings in the first instance.

During the initial proceedings commenced below by Misty in order to obtain
child support from Senturi's father, Joshua, and a determination of the child's custody,
Joshua was ordered to pay child support, Misty was awarded custody of Senturi, and Joshua
was awarded visitation with Senturi. In accordance with this ruling, the family court
adopted a parenting plan that included a provision requiring the parties to notify each other
of changes to their residential or mailing addresses. (See footnote 10)See W. Va. Code § 48-9-205(d)
(2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) (providing that [a] parenting plan may, at the court's discretion,
contain provisions that address matters that are expected to arise in the event of a party's
relocation . . .). See also W. Va. Code § 48-1-235.4 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004)
('Permanent parenting plan' means a plan for parenting a child that is incorporated into
a final order or subsequent modification order in a domestic relations action. The plan
principally establishes, but is not limited to, the allocation of custodial responsibility and
significant decision-making responsibility and provisions for resolution of subsequent
disputes between the parents.). Consistent with this portion of the parenting plan, Misty
filed a Notice of Relocation to inform Joshua of her intent to relocate to Texas. Pursuant
to W. Va. Code § 48-9-403(b) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004), Misty was required to provide
such notice only to any other parent with responsibility under the same parenting plan;
here, that other parent is Joshua because only Misty and Joshua are parties to Senturi's
parenting plan. Insofar as Misty's move to Texas would have constituted a substantial
change in circumstances because it would have hindered Joshua's ability to maintain his
visitation with Senturi, W. Va. Code § 48-9-403(a), the family court was required to
modify the parenting plan in accordance with the child's best interests and in
consideration of whether such relocation is in good faith for a legitimate purpose and to
a location that is reasonable in light of the purpose, W. Va. Code § 48-9-403(d)(1). This,
however, is not the inquiry undertaken by the family court in the case sub judice.

Rather than evaluating the legitimacy and reasonableness of Misty's
contemplated move, the family court instead entertained a Motion for Ex Parte Order for
Emergency Temporary Custody[;] Respondent's and Intervening Petitioners' Verified
Petition for Custody[;] and Response to Notice of Relocation filed by Joshua, who was
joined by Christopher and Tanya as intervernors. While a change of custody to the other
parent is certainly not outside the realm of possible relief that may be granted in response
to a custodial parent's relocation, it clearly is not contemplated as the immediate knee-jerk
response given the Legislature's specific admonition that [t]he court shall attempt to
minimize impairment to a parent-child relationship caused by a parent's relocation, W. Va.
Code § 48-9-403(d)(4). More importantly, however, is the fact that the relief the family
court awarded in response to Misty's relocation notice did not attempt to minimize
impairment to a parent-child relationship, W. Va. Code § 48-9-403(d)(4); instead, the
family court's resolution completely, albeit temporarily, severed Misty's custodial
relationship with her child and awarded Senturi's temporary custody to persons other than
the child's other parent, her father Joshua. Finally, and most egregiously of all, those other
persons, Christopher and Tanya, did not have standing to seek Senturi's custody or to
intervene in such proceedings.

Persons who are accorded standing to participate in proceedings affecting the
custody of minor children in cases such as the instant appeal where the child's parents are
not married to each other are specifically enumerated by statute. W. Va. Code § 48-9-103
(2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) directs that

(a) Persons who have a right to be notified of and
participate as a party in an action filed by another are:

(1) A legal parent of the child, as defined in section 1-
232 [§ 48-1-232] of this chapter;

(2) An adult allocated custodial responsibility or
decision-making responsibility under a parenting plan
regarding the child that is then in effect; or

(3) Persons who were parties to a prior order
establishing custody and visitation, or who, under a parenting
plan, were allocated custodial responsibility or decision-making
responsibility.

(b) In exceptional cases the court may, in its discretion,
grant permission to intervene to other persons or public
agencies whose participation in the proceedings under this
article it determines is likely to serve the child's best interests.
The court may place limitations on participation by the
intervening party as the court determines to be appropriate.
Such persons or public agencies do not have standing to initiate
an action under this article.

Applying this statute to the parties presently before the Court, it is undisputed
that Misty and Joshua are the legal parents of Senturi. See W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(a)(1). See also Syl. pt. 1, In re Clifford K., 217 W. Va. 625, 619 S.E.2d 138 (2005) (Pursuant to
W. Va. Code § 48-1-232 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004), a 'legal parent' is 'an individual defined
as a parent, by law, on the basis of biological relationship, presumed biological relationship,
legal adoption or other recognized grounds.' The phrase 'other recognized grounds' refers
to those individuals or entities who have been formally accorded parental status or the
functional equivalent thereof by way of statute or judicial decree. Such parental status is
comparable to the rights and responsibilities of a biological or adoptive parent and includes,
but is not limited to, the right to care, control, and custody of the minor child; the right to
consent or object to the child's adoption by another person; and the duty to support the
child.).

Moreover, it is apparent from the record in this case that the only person who
was allocated custodial responsibility or decision-making responsibility of Senturi under
a parenting plan regarding the child that is then in effect is Misty. See W. Va. Code § 48-
9-103(a)(2); W. Va. Code § 48-1-235.4. Likewise, only Misty and Joshua are [p]ersons
who were parties to a prior order establishing custody and visitation, or who, under a
parenting plan, were allocated custodial responsibility or decision-making responsibility.
W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(a)(3). Thus, the only way in which Christopher and Tanya could
have been accorded standing to participate in the proceedings below is to find that the
instant matter constitutes an exceptional case[] as contemplated by W. Va. Code § 48-9-
103(b).

Ostensibly, the family court determined both that Christopher and Tanya had
a shared parenting arrangement with Misty and that they were Senturi's psychological co-
parents in order to accord them standing pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(a)(2) and
W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b). Although the family court determined that Christopher and
Tanya had standing on these grounds, and the circuit court affirmed this ruling, such a
determination was erroneous. First, as we observed above, there was in effect a parenting
plan regarding Senturi that had been entered by the family court in the course of Misty's
initial action seeking custodial allocation and child support. Only Misty and Joshua are
parties to this parenting plan; Christopher and Tanya are not. See W. Va. Code § 48-1-
235.4. Moreover, Christopher and Tanya contend that Misty entrusted Senturi to their care,
frequently for visits spanning several days, and that they provided the child with food,
clothing, and shelter while they were caring for her. Thus, Christopher and Tanya claim
that these facts demonstrate that they had a shared parenting arrangement with Misty
although they concede that Misty never executed any written documents transferring
permanent or temporary custody of Senturi to them. Misty denies that she ever entered into
a shared parenting arrangement with Christopher and Tanya and characterizes their care of
Senturi as that typically provided by babysitters. As for Senturi's extended visits with
Christopher and Tanya, Misty claims that because Christopher and Tanya are part of
Joshua's extended family, she wanted to allow her child to develop a relationship with that
part of her family by visiting with them for extended periods of time.

While we appreciate that Christopher and Tanya have provided significant
care for Senturi and have attended to her needs during these periods of time, the record
evidence before us simply does not support the family court's conclusion that Misty had
entered into a shared parenting arrangement with Christopher and Tanya. The right of a
parent to his/her child's custody is scrupulously protected.

In the law concerning custody of minor children, no rule
is more firmly established than that the right of a natural parent
to the custody of his or her infant child is paramount to that of
any other person; it is a fundamental personal liberty protected
and guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the West
Virginia and United States Constitutions.
Syl. pt. 1, In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973).

In recognition of the importance of a parent's right to the custody of his/her
child, we held in Overfield v. Collins, 199 W. Va. 27, 483 S.E.2d 27 (1996), that a parent
wishing to transfer the custody of his/her child to a third-party must execute a written
document memorializing this intent. Such a writing is imperative whether the custodial
transfer is contemplated as being temporary or permanent in nature. Thus, [i]f a natural
parent intends to voluntarily transfer temporary custody of a child to a third person, then
the document effecting the transfer should expressly provide that it is the intention of the
parent to temporarily transfer custody to the third person. Syl. pt. 5, Overfield v. Collins,
199 W. Va. 27, 483 S.E.2d 27. Likewise, [i]f a natural parent intends to voluntarily
transfer permanent custody of a child to a third person, then the document effecting that
transfer should expressly provide that it is the intention of the parent to permanently transfer
the custody of the child to the third person. Syl. pt. 4, Overfield, 199 W. Va. 27, 483
S.E.2d 27.

Because there is no writing in the case sub judice reflecting Misty's intent to
transfer either the temporary or the permanent custody of Senturi to Christopher and Tanya,
we find no basis for upholding the family court's finding of the existence of a shared
parenting arrangement (See footnote 11) or according standing to Christopher and Tanya on this basis. See
W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(a)(2). Were we to allow the lower court's ruling to stand, it goes
without saying that the potential ramifications would be crippling to the parents of children
in this State. Virtually any parent who must rely upon child care, whether to allow the
parent to work, attend school, care for elderly parents, visit the doctor, or for any other
reason, could potentially face a challenge from the child's care giver asserting the existence
of a shared parenting arrangement despite the absence of any writing evincing such an
intent by the parent. We simply cannot condone a ruling that would permit such pervasive
interference with parents' custodial rights. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's
ruling upholding the family court's decision in this regard.

Additionally, the family court accorded standing to Christopher and Tanya
because it determined that they are Senturi's psychological co-parents, and, as such,
exceptional circumstances require their participation in these proceedings. See W. Va.
Code § 48-9-103(b). See also Syl. pt. 4, In re Clifford K., 217 W. Va. 625, 619 S.E.2d 138
(In exceptional cases and subject to the court's discretion, a psychological parent may
intervene in a custody proceeding brought pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48-9-103 (2001)
(Repl. Vol. 2004) when such intervention is likely to serve the best interests of the
child(ren) whose custody is under adjudication.). In Syllabus point 2 of In re Clifford K.,
217 W. Va. 625, 619 S.E.2d 138, we explained that

[t]he reference to exceptional cases contained in
W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b) (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004) signifies
unusual or extraordinary cases, and, accordingly, a court should
exercise its discretion to permit intervention in such unusual or
extraordinary cases only when intervention is likely to serve
the best interests of the subject child(ren).

This case, however, is not an exceptional case within the contemplation of
this holding. In the Clifford K. case, we were faced with a situation in which a child's
biological mother had died, the child's biological father played an insignificant role in the
child's upbringing, and the mother's partner lived with the mother and the child as the
child's second parent. That case presented unique circumstances under which according
intervenor status to the mother's partner was quite reasonable and, in fact, was warranted
by the facts of the case insofar as the child regarded the mother's partner as his second
parent. The instant matter, however, does not present unique or extraordinary
circumstances such that intervention was warranted. Senturi has two parents, Misty and
Joshua; she resides with Misty and has visitation privileges with Joshua. Although Senturi
also spends time with Christopher and Tanya, there have been no allegations that either of
her biological parents are unfit to care for her or that there exist other circumstances to
require the presence of intervenors to protect her best interests. Simply stated, this case is
not an exceptional case[] as contemplated by W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b), and the family
court erred by ruling to the contrary.

Be that as it may, the family court proceeded to find that Christopher and
Tanya are Senturi's psychological co-parents and accorded them intervenor status on this
basis. See W. Va. Code § 48-9-103(b); Syl. pt. 4, In re Clifford K., 217 W. Va. 625, 619
S.E.2d 138. Again, however, the family court erred in applying the relevant law to the facts
of this case because Christopher and Tanya do not meet the definition of a psychological
parent.

A psychological parent is a person who, on a continuing
day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship,
interplay, and mutuality, fulfills a child's psychological and
physical needs for a parent and provides for the child's
emotional and financial support. The psychological parent may
be a biological, adoptive, or foster parent, or any other person.
The resulting relationship between the psychological parent
and the child must be of substantial, not temporary, duration
and must have begun with the consent and encouragement of
the child's legal parent or guardian. To the extent that this
holding is inconsistent with our prior decision of In re Brandon
L.E., 183 W. Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515 (1990), that case is
expressly modified.
Syl. pt. 3, In re Clifford K., 217 W. Va. 625, 619 S.E.2d 138. In the cases in which this
Court has determined a person to be a psychological parent to a child, that person typically
has resided in the child's household and interacted with the child on a daily basis. See, e.g., In re Clifford K., id.; In re Jonathan G., 198 W. Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d 893 (1996); Simmons
v. Comer, 190 W. Va. 350, 438 S.E.2d 530 (1993); Honaker v. Burnside, 182 W. Va. 448,
388 S.E.2d 322 (1989). Moreover, a psychological parent is one who essentially serves as
a second parent to a child and is a relationship to which the child's parent has consented. See generallyIn re Clifford K., 217 W. Va. 625, 619 S.E.2d 138; Simmons, 190 W. Va. 350,
438 S.E.2d 530; Honaker, 182 W. Va. 448, 388 S.E.2d 322.

In the case sub judice, the record reflects that Christopher and Tanya have
provided some level of care for Senturi since Christmas, 2004, and that some of the periods
of care have lasted for more than one day. There is no indication, however, that
Christopher and Tanya reside in the same household as Misty and Senturi or that they have
daily interactions with the child such that they routinely serve as additional parents to
Senturi. Furthermore, although Misty has consented to the formation of a relationship
between Senturi and Christopher and Tanya, it is not apparent from the record that the
relationship is so pervasive as to accord Christopher and Tanya the status of psychological
co-parents as that concept is defined in Clifford K. Obviously, a child will hold in high
esteem any person who looks after him/her, attends to his/her needs, and lavishes him/her
with love, attention, and affection. However, simply caring for a child is not enough to
bestow upon a care giver psychological parent status. Were this the law of the State, any
person, from day care providers and babysitters to school teachers and family friends, who
cares for a child on a regular basis and with whom the child has developed a relationship
of trust could claim to be the child's psychological parent and seek an award of the child's
custody to the exclusion of the child's parent. Clearly, this is not the result contemplated
by this Court's prior holding, and the family court's extension of the concept of
psychological parent to accord standing to Christopher and Tanya in this case was
improper. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the circuit court affirming this ruling by
the family court.

In closing, we would be remiss if we did not address the convoluted
conflagration of events that has culminated in the instant appeal. From our first review of
this case, we have been deeply troubled by the utter disregard for Misty's rights to
the custody of her child. Misty first was deprived of her parental rights to her child when
she followed the court-approved parenting plan to notify Joshua of her intent to relocate
with Senturi to Texas. Upon complying with the notification requirement, Misty lost both
the custody of her child and her right to visit with her child not to the child's father, but to
Christopher and Tanya. No finding was made that Misty was unfit to have the custody of
her daughter (See footnote 12) as generally is required to effectuate a change in a child's custody. See, e.g.,
Syl. pt. 2, Cloud v. Cloud, 161 W. Va. 45, 239 S.E.2d 669 (1977) (per curiam) (To justify
a change of child custody, in addition to a change in circumstances of the parties, it must
be shown that such change would materially promote the welfare of the child.). See also W. Va. Code §§ 48-9-401 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004), 48-9-402 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2004)
(discussing methods for modifying parenting plan).

This unsupported usurpation of Misty's custodial rights was compounded
when the family court entered its temporary order to award Misty not the custody of her
child but rather minimal visitation with her pending the court's issuance of its final order.
By final order, the family court finally restored custody of Senturi to Misty, (See footnote 13) although it
required her to share parenting time with Christopher and Tanya, who the court found to
be Senturi's psychological co-parents. Even under the parties' present arrangement, Misty
does not have the exclusive care, custody, and control of her daughter. As a result of the
'significant' parenting time ordered by the family court and affirmed by the circuit court,
Misty represents in her brief to this Court that

[Christopher and Tanya] spend time with Senturi from
approximately 8:30 a.m. Friday until 6:00 p.m. on Monday.
Misty . . . spends time with her daughter from Monday evening
until Wednesday morning when [Christopher and Tanya] have
the child. They then return the child on Wednesday evenings
and Misty spends time with the child until Friday morning. Under this schedule, Misty may be designated as Senturi's primary residential parent, but
Senturi appears to actually be spending more time per week with Christopher and Tanya,
with whom she was not ordered to reside. Moreover, requiring Misty to acquiesce to
visitations between Senturi and third-persons with whom her relationship has substantially
deteriorated as a result of the instant litigation does not afford her the freedom to make
decisions for her child inherent in the rights accorded to a custodial parent.

In light of the facts and circumstances presently before us, and the lower
courts' complete and utter disregard of Misty's parental rights, we are compelled to
reiterate the preeminent importance of a parent's right to the custody of his/her child. As
we held in Syllabus point one of Whiteman v. Robinson, 145 W. Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691
(1960):

A parent has the natural right to the custody of his or her
infant child, unless the parent is an unfit person because of
misconduct, neglect, immorality, abandonment or other
dereliction of duty, or has waived such right, or by agreement
or otherwise has transferred, relinquished or surrendered such
custody, the right of the parent to the custody of his or her
infant child will be recognized and enforced by the courts.

Therefore, we urge family and circuit courts to be ever vigilant when issuing rulings to
protect the best interests of children to ensure that the rights of those children's parents are
not unnecessarily trammeled in the process of administering justice.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the October 30, 2006, order of the Circuit Court
of Cabell County is hereby reversed and Misty's full custodial rights to her daughter,
Senturi, are hereby restored. The Clerk of this Court is directed to issue the mandate in this
case forthwith.

Due to the sensitive nature of the facts involved in this case, we will adhere
to our usual practice in such matters and refer to the parties by their first names and last
initials only. SeeIn re Clifford K., 217 W. Va. 625, 630 n.1, 619 S.E.2d 138, 143 n.1
(2005), and cases cited therein.
Footnote: 2

In its order, the family court referenced an earlier order it had entered on
April 7, 2004, in which it directed Joshua to pay child support of $188.00 per month. The
family court found Joshua to be in arrears in the principal amount of One Hundred
Seventy-Two and 11/100 ($172.11) and interest amount of Forty and 28/100 ($40.28) from
April 1, 2004 to February 28, 2005 for child support.
Footnote: 3

The period covered by the award of reimbursement child support was from
November 1, 2004 to July 31, 2005.
Footnote: 4

A similar notification provision was contained in the Parenting Plan Misty
filed on April 5, 2004, which required [t]he parents will always let each other know their
current residence addresses [and] mailing addresses . . . and will notify each other within 24 hours of any changes in these matters.
Footnote: 6

Christopher and Tanya are married to each other, and Tanya is a cousin of
Senturi's father, Joshua. Beginning on Christmas Day, 2004, Christopher and Tanya have
provided care for Senturi for various periods of time. Misty characterizes Christopher and
Tanya as Senturi's babysitters.
Footnote: 7

Although they admit that they received payments through Link in the amount
of $2,936.50 for the care giving services they provided to Senturi, Christopher and Tanya
aver that they have since reimbursed the DHHR for the entire amount of such payments.
Footnote: 8

The family court subsequently entered a corrected order on June 28, 2006,
to correct the spelling of Christopher's first name.
Footnote: 9

During the pendency of Misty's appeal to the Circuit Court of Cabell County,
she also sought extraordinary relief from this Court to regain custody of her daughter. We
denied, without prejudice, Misty's request for extraordinary relief by order entered August
31, 2006.
Footnote: 10

Our conclusion that Misty did not intend to transfer Senturi's custody to
Christopher and Tanya is also consistent with her retention of custody of her two older
children during this period of time.
Footnote: 12

Prior to the ex parte petition for temporary emergency custody filed by
Joshua, and joined by Christopher and Tanya, the only allegation that Misty was not fit to
retain custody of Senturi was a referral to the child protective services division of the
DHHR in October, 2005, accusing Misty of neglecting Senturi. These allegations charged
child neglect, lack of supervision, lack of adequate physical care, and risk of neglect due
to drug use. Although the DHHR conducted an investigation of these charges, the
allegations could not be substantiated. Ultimately, the DHHR determined that Misty's
continued care of Senturi posed a minimal to low risk of harm to the child, and, thus,
continued Misty's custody of Senturi.
Footnote: 13

The family court did not address Misty's fitness to have the custody of her
daughter in its final order, although it did note that Misty tested positive when she took a
voluntary drug test. Moreover, no allegations have been made that Misty is unfit to retain
custody of her two older children, and neither Joshua nor Christopher and Tanya have
sought their custody or an award of visitation therewith in these proceedings.