In this series, we will finally collect what we have learned about the Ideal Org program and the strategy behind it in one place. Here, we’ll take our best guess about why Scientology is so focused on building lots of expensive new churches that nobody visits. There is a strategy behind it, and there are rational reasons why Scientology leader David Miscavige thinks this is a good use of cash, but the logic behind the strategy may surprise you.

Earlier this week, Scientology TV began broadcasting on the DirecTV network. Tony Ortega’s story the day before the launch, explaining the apps and channels involved is here, and Tony’s review of the first slug of programming the day after the premiere is here.

Here, we’ll look at the strategic imperative driving Scientology leader David Miscavige to begin to broadcast to generally accessible public, which we think is a case of doing the best job he can in playing a terrible hand. We suspect that some percentage of top donors are starting to wonder about the efficacy of the expensive Ideal Org strategy. In particular, they might be starting to wonder why there are so few new members in these opulent facilities, which was the justification for building them in the first place.

Earlier today, Tony Ortega posted an article about Scientology’s plans to air advertising in the Tampa market during the 2018 Winter Olympics. We do a quick back-of-the-envelope estimate of the amount that Scientology will spend and the size of the Scientologist audience that cult leader David Miscavige hopes to impress. Spoiler: unsurprisingly, it’s a costly boondoggle.

The city government of Clearwater, Florida, home of Scientology’s main global campus, voted in April 2016 to buy land from the Clearwater Aquarium, thwarting Scientology’s offer to acquire the property for substantially more than the city paid. More recently, Pastor Willie Rice of Calvary Baptist Church, the city’s oldest church, has gone into attack mode, rallying his congregation and trying to rally other pastors to oppose Scientology openly. Why is the power structure in Clearwater now opposing Scientology so openly?

We believe the city council and others now understand that Scientology is a paper tiger that can’t affect the outcome of elections, the political currency that matters most. They can only lobby ineffectually and skulk around and attempt to harass after the fact, a modus operandi that is increasingly often exposed, and which thus backfires on the cult.

I explore the reasons why Scientology opened a “mission” in Košice, the second-largest city in Slovkia, a small central European country, and what it might mean for the lucky Scientologist who paid so handsomely for the privilege of operating it. In this note, we estimate how many potential recruits there might be in Košice, how much money the cult makes, and what the strategic thinking might have been behind this decision. The reasons they did this are not what you might think.

We estimate the potential number of Scientologists that the Košice mission might serve and the money that the cult might generate from those customers, and then we come to a surprising conclusion about whether this was a good decision or not.

We dissect a press release from Scientology trumpeting the foot traffic at the Scientology Information Center at its Clearwater headquarters, putting the breathless stats against the backdrop of the tourist stats for Pinellas County.

Yesterday, Scientology published a press release trumpeting the visitor traffic they’ve received to the Scientology Information Center, a place that is supposed to help present the wonders of Scientology to the teeming public hungry to learn about the “world’s fastest growing religion.” I’ve copied the press release below, and will dissect it to see how epic the numbers really are.

I take a stab at my predictions for what will happen in the world of Scientology in 2018. I think we’re in for more of what happened in 2016-2017: no particularly shattering news, lots of stories of abuse, and a continuing erosion in the membership base as the cult slowly drifts into irrelevance, on a long journey to oblivion.

Here’s what I think we can look forward to from Scientology in 2018.

Happy new year, from all of us at Global Capitalism HQ, including the multitude of supermodels, jet pilots, summer interns from Harvard Business School, the yacht crews and the waterfront estate technicians.

I’m not officially reviving this blog with a commitment to publish regularly, but if I do post anything, I’ll notify interested parties via Twitter and via comments on Tony Ortega’s site.

Sea Org executives back in the good ol’ (or at least more numerous) days. Why do their hats look just a bit too large for their heads, in yet another parallel to the North Korean military?

In a video posted Sunday on Tony Ortega’s site, recently escaped Sea Org member Jillian Schlesinger talked about her time in the cult. Jillian related several data points that are of interest, including David Miscavige’s claim that RTC is reaping $75 million per year in revenue from Flag in Clearwater.

Here, we look at a few of the things Jillian said, and we look at what this might mean for the cult. Throughout, I share some analytical techniques I’m using to evaluate some of the things Jillian said when they either confirm or contradict my current best guesses. These thoughts may help you to do a better job in your own analysis.

Perhaps the most interesting quote from Jillian’s video was something Scientology leader David Miscavige said to the assembled Sea Org troops in LA:

There was an analysis done some months ago, probably about six months ago now. And he [David Miscavige] had revealed that in Florida, there’s about 2,000 Sea Org members, and they send up $1.5 million a week to him. Then, looking in all of LA, there’s about 2,000 Sea Org members, and they were not sending up that much to him every week. So, he wanted a huge rearrangement of staff, and then to make a, in-house, out-of-Sea-Org-member, construction unit, so that we could save money doing it ourselves, even though we have no training in construction, and then we don’t have to hire anyone. And then I was doing that for about the last six months.

How Many Sea Org Are There, Really?

This quote from COB is interesting in two respects. First, of course, Miscavige is saying that there are at least 4,000 Sea Org members in the US, approximately evenly distributed on both coasts. And he’s claiming that he’s getting $75 million per year from Flag and a lesser amount from the Western US. My estimates are that the real number from Flag is closer to $30 million per year these days, perhaps a bit less, and that they’re probably getting $10 million from the higher level orgs on the West Coast (it’s not an international destination for people coming in for advanced training like Flag is). And based on some correspondence late last year with a couple Anons in the Clearwater area, it appears that some of the cult-owned apartment buildings used to house Flag workers are sitting empty.

So how does a careful analyst think about the disparity between previous estimates and the new data point? This is one of the trickier analytical traps: it’s dangerous to discount new information when it doesn’t fit your biases, but it’s equally dangerous to believe implicitly that a newer data point means your prior thinking is wrong. If the new information is correct, it would mean that my estimates of about $180 million in cult revenue in 2013 were low by an integer multiple — the cult could have been raking in $400 or $500 million a year; that’s a major error. Intellectual honesty, essential for a good analyst, means we have to look at a surprising new data point with a willingness to consider honestly the possibility that we’re way off in our numbers.

The first thing to do in teasing apart this information is to consider the credibility of the source. It’s probably reasonable to believe that someone emerging from the Sea Org only a couple weeks ago and re-adjusting to reality is not going to have the spare time to fabricate a story like this out of whole cloth. It is thus reasonable to believe she’s recounting accurately what she heard. The question then becomes whether Miscavige’s numbers are credible.

First Cross-Check: Direct Observation

In looking at the claim of 4,000 Sea Org members, it’s important to cross-check this against other data that we have. In evaluating the number of Sea Org members in LA, let’s start with easily observable data points. One such is the level of foot traffic at L. Ron Hubbard Way in LA. A recent afternoon stroll down the sacred street showed only two people (one a security guard), in front of the building, and two RPF girls on the back side on Catalina St. No Sea Org was visible. The parking lot, which holds approximately 200 cars (I counted from the aerial Google Maps view) was only slightly more than half full; even assuming that few Sea Org have cars, that’s a pretty light occupancy load. These observations are enough to raise suspicions about Miscavige’s credibility, but they’re not conclusive: given the tight constraints on their work schedules, it’s reasonable to expect that one wouldn’t see too many of the Sea Org types out on the sidewalk during nose-to-the-grindstone hours.

Second Cross-Check: Independent Rules of Thumb

The next step is to cross check the claim against another independent metric, one that has nothing to do with the first set of observations. In other words, you want to look at an independent measure. It’s often useful to consider real estate square foot per staff member. I would estimate that the 11 floors (+/-) of the original Big Blue building total about 125,000 square feet, and the rest of the complex is similar sized — call it 250,000 feet total. While I haven’t done a complete count of the rest of the cult properties in the area, let’s assume another 100,000 square feet. Let’s then assume that the hypothetical 2,000 Sea Org members are joined by about 1,000 other staff.

If you do the math, that implies there are about 120 square feet of facilities per person, slightly larger than a 10 by 10 foot office. But that’s quite a bit lower than conventional estimates of office space per capita, which is currently typically about 250 square feet per employee. That’s including conference room facilities, restrooms, and all sorts of other stuff. Incidentally, various commercial real estate trade groups suggest this number is shrinking rapidly due to “hoteling” (unassigned cubicles shared by multiple workers) due to the rise of telecommuting, a trend that the cult is unlikely to embrace. I thus am sticking with the 250 square foot number for the foreseeable future even if the overall trend in real estate is expected to drop sharply.

It’s also worth noting that within the original Big Blue building, the floor plate of a 1930s edifice is substantially less efficient than a modern skyscraper, so the percentage of each floor plate devoted to “core” functions like elevators, plumbing, janitorial, restrooms, etc. is a much higher percentage of the space on a given floor in a building of that age than in something more modern. By the way, that explains why the Empire State Building in New York is a great landmark but a terrible office building — the ratio of rentable space on each floor is too low for it to compete against modern buildings. So in the case of the Big Blue complex, the 250 square foot per person number could actually be low when you measure the gross square footage of the complex (that’s what you measure when you measure the outside dimensions of the building).

Note that in these estimates, we’re not subtracting out square footage for delivering services, places where employees wouldn’t normally be stationed. So we’re not deducting square footage for course rooms at AOLA, for the L. Ron Hubbard life exhibit, for the Psychiatry: Industry of Death exhibit, etc. Again, we’re being “conservative” (using assumptions that are least favorable to our argument).

Using the 250 square feet per employee and dividing that into total square feet, we get about 1,300 employees in Hollywood. Adjusting for regular staff versus Sea Org, we get to about 600-800 Sea Org in Hollywood. So Miscavige is lying by a factor of about 2.5x to 3.5x what we believe is observable. That, too, is consistent (perhaps even on the low side) of the “Miscavige Reality Distortion Ratio” that we’ve often seen from the cult’s “fearless leader.”

And The Same General Principle Holds True in Clearwater…

To cross-check the 2,000 claimed Sea Org in Clearwater, we’ll use a similar process. Those of you who are denizens of the greater Tampa Bay area and who have better visibility into the real estate holdings of the cult at Flag could help list and then nail down the use of the various buildings, to help me develop an understanding of how much space is customer-related (i.e., non-office), how much is office-related, and how much is guest accommodations. Yes, that’s a pretty subtle, but definitely impassioned plea for any hard data points that you have.

The diversity of real estate holdings in Clearwater makes the process of getting credible staff counts a bit harder, though it is still ultimately possible to get accurate numbers. Until we’re able to list all the properties and figure out how much square footage is in each, then categorize them as office, hotel or customer spaces, we’ll try to use metrics other than the total square footage of all the downtown Clearwater buildings.

At this point, the most useful observation came from an e-mail conversation I had with a former member and current Anon in the area, who sent a preliminary listing of properties including apartments, and who pointed out that a number of the buildings are actually empty at this point. While I can’t find the exact notes at the moment (ah, the joys of restarting a blog after a hiatus), I am going to guess that staff levels are substantially below peak levels, with perhaps less than half the cult-owned units occupied by staff. Incidentally, it’s entirely possible that the cult over-bought apartment space a few years back, above even staffing levels at the time, so it’s not wise to try to estimate current staffing based on the number of total units.

Perhaps the best check of staff size at Flag will now boil down to the capacity of the staff dining room in the basement of the Super Power building. The total permitted floor space of the building is 377,000 on eight floors (including the basement), so we’ll assume a floor plate of 50,000 square feet. I have some feelers out for more data about the layout of the basement, but if you subtract out machinery spaces, storage, etc., then it is reasonably likely that no more than half of the basement floor plate will be devoted to the staff dining room. Typically, in a restaurant, about 40% to 50% of the square footage is devoted to the kitchen, and the rest to the dining room. One rule of thumb suggests allocating about 20 square feet per customer. If we thus assume that the total dining space is 25,000 square feet, then a dining room of 12,500 square feet will hold about 600 staff. Then if we further assume that they have two meal services per meal (easily done given the staff’s regimented lives), then we could believe there are about 1,200 staff at Flag. But I would not expect hotel staff to have to eat in the staff dining room, so we could add another 300 staff to that number and get about 1,500 total staff in Clearwater. That cross-checks reasonably well with a quick back-of-the-envelope estimate of the capacity of the occupied apartments. And again, assuming that at most 2/3 of staff in Clearwater are Sea Org, then we get to about 800 Sea Org at Flag.

The Other Guys are Sending Me $75 Million a Year; What’s Wrong With You Morons?

The second part of Miscavige’s assertion is that he’s pulling $75 million out of Flag per year. The quote is worded to say that “they send $1.5 million a week up to him.” In other words, that’s the contribution to Int Management and thus to the Sea Org reserves. Let’s assume that Flag is sending about 75% of their revenue uplines. That implies that the cult is pulling in $2 million a week in gross revenue, about $100 million per year. How credible is this?

First Cross-Check: No Decline in Flag Revenues in Ten Years? Seriously?

There are a couple of ways to cross-check this. First, there’s a common sense metric. Mat Pesch once commented, either in an article on Mike Rinder’s blog, Marty Rathbun’s blog or on Tony Ortega’s site, that when he was in ten years ago, Flag was pulling in about $2 million a week. Mat was a finance guy at Flag and has been credible in his description of life in the cult, so we’ll believe that the numbers he gave are accurate. Miscavige is thus claiming that revenue has remained consistent with the decade-ago level. Given all that has happened in the cult, this is ludicrous on its face. In other words, the bullshit alarm is ringing loudly. But simply sounding the bullshit alarm isn’t sufficient; we need to look at a couple of other metrics to try and understand what’s really going on in order to demolish this claim convincingly.

Second Cross-Check: Flag Revenue Per Potential Customer

Second, an upper bound of Flag revenue could come from an estimate of per-capita spending from each active member. My current estimate is that there are 20,000 active public Scientologists. I believe about 4,000 of those are from countries with relatively low per capita income (Russia, Taiwan, etc.) where travel to Flag on any sort of regular basis is not likely to be affordable. As a result, I believe the total market for Flag services is about 16,000 active cult members.

But it’s important to realize that likely overstates the actual addressable market for Flag services. An addressable market is one with proven potential, not just the theoretical upper maximum. The total market for cars is everyone who currently owns a car, plus the number of people who will get a driver’s license, minus those who will be too old to drive further. But the real addressable market for cars are some percentage of those whose leased cars whose leases are up, the number of people whose cars will be totaled in accidents, plus other populations — a far cry from the total number of drivers.

In considering the addressable market of Flag customers, I’m intrigued by the recent interviews I’ve had with ex members. Consistently, these folks said that they had done everything possible to avoid going to Flag, since they were quite clear that they would be hit up endlessly for donations, and that they would be trapped there for far longer than they intended to stay. They all pointed out that the pressure to donate when one stayed at Flag had consistently grown worse in their often decades-long experience in the Church. None had been to Flag in the last ten years before they walked away from the cult. In other words, they had all managed to avoid the clutches of the FSO reg’s.

Additionally, I believe Europeans are less likely to jump on a plane to come to Flag, partly because of the cost and hassles of much longer flights, but also because of the declasse nature of Clearwater — why go there when you can get many services at a stately English manor home (Saint Hill)?

It’s probably also necessary to cut out second generation members in their early 20s who are on their own, who don’t have the economic firepower to afford two weeks at the Fort Harrison Hotel and all the services.

Finally, one must estimate one of the most productive markets for Flag services: the customers “on the level” (i.e., doing OT VII), who are required to come in for sec checks every six months. At this point, there are probably less than 500 Scientologists actually on the level.

I thus believe that the actual addressable market for Flag services is no more than 7,000 people (excluding OT VII sec checkers). $100 million divided by 700 people gets you to about $15,000 per person per year, for every single person in the addressable market in every single year, whether or not all of those potential customers actually do come to Flag. That seems extremely high, though it is not inconceivable.

Importantly, it may have been possible to get $15,000 per Flag visit out of the average Flag visitor in years past if they were doing multiple intensives with Class XII auditors at $1,000 per hour. But that is probably more the exception than the rule these days: you have to take into effect the effects of the Golden Age of Tech Phase II (GAT 2) announcement. Remember that GAT 2 is requiring many people to redo lower-level course work, and that the promise of GAT 2 is that you’ll get through all that low-level nonsense so much faster than ever before. We’ll ignore the opportunity for assorted (and obvious) hilarity when contemplating the joy people will feel from screwing up their brains learning Study Tech in the “Student Hat” course for the fourth time. What’s important is that the per-hour revenue for getting people to come to Flag to do these low-level course is likely to be significantly smaller than the per-hour revenue from Class XII auditing intensives in the past. And that suggests strongly that the Flag business is off from levels a decade ago, where the cult had a much larger addressable market (perhaps 40,000 total public worldwide in 2000 versus the current 20,000, and almost all from high-GDP economies back then). The mix shift away from high-margin services and thus much higher per-hour revenue to lower margin low-level services must inevitably mean that revenue is down.

It’s possible that total Flag revenue is as high as $50 million, a little higher than I had previously been estimating. I had estimated that all services-related revenue including Flag was about $60 million, but the revenue from the Orgs may actually turn out, based on recent document dumps from Mike Rinder, to be less than the $20 million I had estimated.

Third Cross-Check: Revenue Per Employee at Flag

If we believe the overall cult revenue number of $180 million is reasonably close, and we believe that the cult has about 5,000 total staff, then we quickly compute an average revenue per employee of $36,000 per year. If we assume that the cult has efficiently distributed staff across the organization (a laughable assumption, but bear with me), then if we take cult-wide revenue per employee of $36,000 and divide our estimated $50 million per year in Flag revenue by that figure, we get about 1,400 employees who should be involved in generating that much revenue. That’s not terribly far off our estimate of about 1,600 total staff at Flag.

The point of this excercise is not that this calculation proves our estimates of either Flag revenue or of the number of staff at Flag. It does, however, show that there aren’t obvious contradictions in our model. If we had estimated 2,000 staff and $100 million in Flag revenue, that would imply revenue per employee of $50,000, substantially above the cult-wide estimate, and that’s particularly suspect in the case of Flag since many of those employees are in hotel and restaurant guest services, producing much lower-margin revenue than high per-hour revenue employees like auditors and reg’s. In other words, our current model sanity checks reasonably well.

If They’re So Rich, How Come They Have to Do Their Own Construction?

The second interesting aspect of this is that, despite the claim of taking $75 million per year out of Flag in Clearwater, and a lesser amount on the West Coast, the cult is still so expense-starved that they have to turn some appreciable fraction of Sea Org into a construction brigade to save money on construction.

There is no particular reason to disbelieve Jillian in this story, since there are plenty of accounts of waves of staff being demoted to the RPF when Big Blue needed renovations before, then mysteriously finding that they completed the RPF program soon after renovations were finished.

However, the fact that the cult is now using Sea Org staffers for construction duty suggests either low manpower utilization on useful tasks for the Sea Org, making it attractive to pull them to other tasks, or a cash crunch that would make deploying them on renovations important to avoid extra expenses.

Most businesses are somewhat rational in their decision-making process, deploying labor where it is best used either to generate revenue or to avoid costs (i.e., paying internal slave labor only a fraction of what outside experts would cost). But it seems unwise to believe that the cult would be rational in deciding to deploy slave labor to avoid expenses, given that David Miscavige seems to make many decisions to enjoy arbitrary control over the lives of staff, rather than from economically valid principles. The detail that Jillian was detailed along with another girl to remove Fiberglas insulation from ceiling crawl spaces in Las Vegas, rather than participating in a large-scale construction project at Big Blue suggests that the motivation for creating this construction brigade is unclear — a small project like might not necessarily have been undertaken for economic reasons, but just as a way for Miscavige to throw his organizational weight around.

When I started considering the apparent contradiction between Miscavige’s inflated claims of staff size and revenue at Flag versus the apparent need to save money on construction, I was hoping to be able to quantify this, but I’m not entirely certain about the financial aspects of this construction project. Anyone with any detailed perspective on recent construction efforts in Hollywood could help greatly in teasing out relevance, if any, of this detail.

The Russians Are Coming, The Russians Are Coming

Poster for the 1966 comedy classic

Jillian’s assertion that 80% of Sea Org at Flag are Russians is quite interesting. There had been numerous reports that employees are increasingly non-native English speakers, and Eastern European origin for many of the staff was frequently mentioned, though Latin Americans are also a large part of the mix. But the assertion that 80% of all Sea Org in Clearwater are Russians is a bit surprising.

Some discussions on WhyWeProtest suggest that these Russians are not all Russian nationals, but may be Moldovans and Russian speakers from Eastern European countries whose economies are in even worse shape than that of Mother Russia. Interestingly, the economic situation in Russia is not all that good; I’ve read surveys that suggest that almost half of young Russian citizens want to emigrate to the West. It’s not hard to believe that the situation is even worse in small satellite countries like Moldova or its breakaway Transdnistria region. That certainly suggests that the cult has access to a pool of desperate recruits.

While it certainly cross-checks with already known facts that many Eastern Europeans are being sucked into the cult’s slave labor pool, it’s not clear that the number has reached 80%. For that to have happened, there would have had to have been massive expansion of the size of the Sea Org. There’s no evidence that there has been any such expansion, either in anecdotal checks in the activity levels at Pac Base or Flag, or in other stories from recent defectors. Economically, given the low cost of Sea Org labor (I suggested the fully loaded cost of a Sea Org staffer is probably about $500 per month), the cult could potentially expand the size of the labor pool “just because” without wrecking finances. However, I am not sure the cult would do this just to feed Miscavige’s need to keep up appearances — adding 500 staff would cost at least $3 million per year, difficult to justify in a time where revenue is likely declining faster than the rate seen in previous years.

If massive expansion of the Sea Org was not the driver behind a sharp rise in the percentage of Russian-speakers in the mix, then the only other possible explanation is a significant wave of replacement of existing Sea Org members. Again, there’s not any real evidence that this is taking place.

I would thus treat the 80% number with some skepticism, as if it is a quick eyeball guess or a number relayed through a number of intermediaries before it got to Jillian. It may be that 80% of new Sea Org recruits literally are Russian speakers, though the total number of Russian speakers in the Sea Org remains quite a bit lower.

If 80% of new Sea Org are Russian speakers, that would speak to the increasing difficulty of using the kids of existing members as Sea Org recruits. That, in turn, suggests that the potential to use the threat of disconnection from a kid in the Sea Org to keep doubting parents in line is losing its impact. And remember, the parents of Sea Org members are presumably the more loyal of the older generation of Scientologists, and if a key retention tool to keep them enmeshed in the cult is losing its effectiveness, then further declines in membership in the short to medium term are inevitable.

Any further data points on the nationalities of arriving Sea Org members would be extremely helpful.

Emerging Trends to Watch

Eric Falkow joins staff… at age 79!

Given the struggles the cult has in retaining staff, we’re always interested in looking at emerging trends in where they’re finding new employees. This is why the influx of Russian speakers into Flag is important to monitor closely and to quantify more closely.

But in the last two weeks’ “Sunday Funnies” stories, Tony Ortega’s blog has featured older cult members going onto staff, the first time I can recall seeing something. Once is a curiosity, twice is a coincidence and three times might just be a trend worth considering.

Yesterday’s column featured the above ad, proudly announcing that Eric Falkow has joined the staff of the Pasadena Ideal Org. According to one database I use, there is a 79-year old named Eric Falkow living in Pasadena; it’s reasonable to conclude that they’re the same person.

If we see any more older members joining staff, that could be evidence of yet another desperation strategy in trying to fill the rolls. This and similar evidence of difficulty recruiting new staff leads to the scenario I’ll detail in a blog post later this week: can the cult continue to operate if the number of employees at local orgs shrinks beyond some minimal level?

On a recent trip, I met with a number of ex-Scientologists as well as some familiar faces in our community. One question in my discussions always came up:

What is the endgame for Scientology, where the cult closes its doors for good and becomes a minor footnote in the pages of history?

One of the main goals on this blog, as outlined in the original post back in November, is to try to develop and maintain a full scenario for the collapse of the cult. A full scenario would have several different alternatives along with an assessment of the relative likelihood of each of those alternatives actually coming to pass. This is not that document. Over time, I would hope to be able to assemble from different individual scenarios such as this one, the complete assessment of the likely futures that may befall the church, and a series of guideposts that would help us tell which one of those scenarios is coming true.

This is simply one potential scenario, and it is one that had been on my mind, so I shared it with the people I was speaking with.

I think it safe to say that there are so many things going wrong both inside and outside the cult that it is beyond saving. But I also caution that it will be difficult to predict exactly how and when corporate Scientology is brought low. It is important to understand that it will probably take far longer than most people expect for the end game to play out, even if we are confident that the organization is doomed. Parallels to attempts to predict the end of the Soviet Union are telling; though nobody got the “time, place form and event” (in cult-speak) exactly right, the act of trying to predict the unknowable was in fact useful.

Common Assumptions

No matter which scenario you believe will come to pass, there are several common assumptions that I believe will be common to all scenarios:

The cult will fail utterly at attracting newmembers. The damage to the Scientology brand resulting from press coverage of the cult’s bad behavior is irreparable. The Internet has made too much bad news too easily available to those seeking information about Scientology, and virtually all those who come in contact with the cult will easily discover that information. As a result, the battle will be solely about retention of existing members and the pool of new recruits will be substantially restricted to children or grandchildren of existing members. And, of course, the rich donor pool is aging, increasingly broke, and starting to die off.

Miscavige’s replacement (if and when) will be (at best) no more competent than he is. Because Miscavige has so ruthlessly declared and purged anyone who could possibly pose a threat to usurp his role, there is no bench of internal candidates who could step into his shoes if there were a vacancy at the top, for whatever reason. Companies with outstanding management like General Electric have a deep bench of management talent that is actively and constantly groomed for promotion to greater responsibility. And GE’s Board of Directors ensures that the CEO does not spend his time exterminating potential claimants to the throne, but instead continues to keep high-quality management within the company. Needless to say, the board structure to provide checks and balances on David Miscavige’s power does not exist, as he has purged all of the board members.

“AdminTech” will continue to act as a destructive force on the organization.Even if we posit the unlikely, that competent new management takes over and somehow manages to reverse the trend and attract new members, arbitrary decisions that Hubbard made a half-century ago will sabotage the organization and keep it from succeeding. Among many other seeds of disaster planted by Hubbard are the insane use of statistics, financial metrics that measure the wrong goals and inevitably lead to bad behavior, and so much pressure on the staff that it is impossible to build any long-term viability into the organization.

What the End of the Road Looks like

For Scientology to go bankrupt, three things would need to happen:

Lose money from current operations, so that a realistic assessment of forward prospects concludes that there is little chance that the company would be able to turn around its fortunes and resume profitability.

Have cash reserves depleted so that the cult is no longer able to cover operating losses. The cult could lose money for a long time because it has access to cash, whether that is in the form of profits accumulated in past years (“retained earnings” in accounting parlance) or in access to bank loans, that would enable it to withstand ongoing losses.

Lose the ability to conduct operations due to loss of corporate facilities. In other words, if the cult has no cash and also loses control of its real estate portfolio and has no place to conduct business, then it cannot continue to operate.

If the cult runs out of cash, it could sell real estate to raise cash to continue operations, even if those operations are losing money; that is where paying cash for buildings comes in handy because the lack of debt means they cannot be foreclosed, and credit would be available, even if it is a fraction of the purchase price of the building.And if something happened to seize the cult’s real estate operation while it still had significant cash, they could always replace the real estate fairly quickly by throwing cash around.

So it is important to understand that in this scenario, for the cult to go completely bankrupt, it must lose both the cash reserves and the real estate portfolio. It can survive the loss of only one of these two things.

This scenario, then, deals with the circumstances under which the cult could lose both the cash balance and the real estate portfolio and thus have the doors forcibly shuttered.

A History of Operating Losses

My best current estimate is that Scientology remains profitable. According to my best estimates, I believe the cult pulled in around $180 million in 2013 from all sources (services, IAS, Narconon, etc.), and reaped an operating profit of approximately $30 million, excluding one-time legal settlements or reserves to allow for legal settlements in the future. I believe both revenue and profits are down from prior years. But this is hardly a disaster: many businesses of that size would kill to have profit margins like Scientology.

Despite the seeming health of the organization based on one year’s financial results, all is not well. I believe that revenue has declined steadily in the last five years, and that profits have actually declined by an even greater amount.

If the cult sees the revenue decline accelerate due to defections in the wake of disappointment over GAT 2, a drop in IAS donations, the failure of new real estate scams, the shuttering of Narconon centers due to lawsuits and license revocations, or a host of other looming problems, the cult could swing to operating losses. I believe that once it begins losing money, it will be difficult for the cult to restructure in a way that’s needed to return to profitability.

Fixed Cost Business Models Are Great Until They’re Not

Economically, at this point, Scientology resembles a software company rather than a manufacturing enterprise. Software companies are interesting because virtually all of their expenses are fixed in the short term. There are almost zero raw materials used in each unit of product shipped, especially in the Internet era where software formerly shipped on CDs with paper manuals has now been completely shifted to Internet downloads.

In a fixed cost-only organization, any incremental revenue above your forecast turns into nearly pure profit. Suppose Microsoft budgets to sell $15 billion worth of software in a given quarter and plans to spend $10 billion, leaving $5 billion in pre-tax profits. But business is booming and they sell $16 billion instead. About 90% of the incremental $1 billion in sales will drop directly to the bottom line. A revenue surplus of just 6% bumps profits up by almost 20%, and a revenue surplus of 12% boosts profits by an astronomical 40%. That’s a pretty amazing business model, and it is one that propels Microsoft to being one of the most valuable companies in the world, even though its sales are quite a bit smaller than other extremely valuable companies.

While this fixed cost model is a wonderful thing when sales come in ahead of plan, it is equally painful when things go wrong. Suppose now that Microsoft planned to make $15 billion in sales, spending $10 billion to generate sales. But now suppose that, due to a bad economy, sales come in at only $13 billion, 12% below forecast. There are no variable costs in the manufacture of its products, so the entire $2 billion shortfall in sales will drop through to the bottom line, and profits will be only $3 billion instead of the expected $5 billion. That is a deficit of 40%. If that happened, the stock would be demolished, and we in Global Capitalism HQ would be at the head of the pack of investors brandishing torches and pitchforks, demanding that management institute changes to ensure that that screw-up does not occur again.

Manufacturing companies, where the cost to produce each automobile, iPad or cheap plastic doodad are a substantial portion of sales, can manufacture fewer units if they feel sales slipping, and thus cut manufacturing costs quickly. Profits will still decline if sales slump, but the ability to control spending on raw materials and labor cushions the blow so that profits to not fall as far in difficult times as that of a fixed-cost enterprise like a software company.

Scientology Is a Fixed Cost Business

Scientology works exactly like a software company: costs are fixed in the short and medium term, and there is little opportunity to cut labor costs when business turns bad. Unlike a consulting firm, Scientology has benefited for years from the sleeve labor wages it pays its employees, allowing it great profits when it has been in expansion mode. As a result, the cult has no incentive to manage its labor force efficiently. Furthermore, many of the job positions in existence are decreed by “Scripture” as laid down by Hubbard a half-century ago. So even if they wanted to cut costs by laying off staff to gain efficiency, they are prohibited by “religious” requirements.

It is important to understand that staff costs are not zero, even if individual paychecks are close to it. Sea Org staff need to be fed, need to be housed, and need to be shuttled from their apartment prisons such as the Hacienda Gardens facility in Clearwater where Debbie Cook was imprisoned before she exited the cult. I would estimate that total employee costs for the cult are approximately $6,000 per person per year. If my estimate of 5,000 worldwide staff is correct, then labor costs are actually significant, totalling $30 million per year, or about 15% of what I believe the cult’s current annual revenue is.

That 15% of revenue figure sounds pretty cheap, until you realize that a highly profitable software company like Microsoft or Oracle typically spends about 30% of sales on employee compensation and benefits. In other words, while the low staff salaries are a disgrace and are horribly abusive on an individual basis, in aggregate, they do not confer a dramatic cost advantage to the cult. The cost savings from low individual salaries are offset significantly by dramatically more employees that are necessary to generate a certain amount of revenue. Microsoft, for example, did $77.85 billion in revenue in its June 2013 fiscal year with 99,000 employees, or approximately $786,400 per employee (an extremely high number even for the highly profitable software industry). Oracle, another software titan, did about $310,000 per employee. By comparison, using my numbers, Scientology does a paltry $36,000 per employee, disastrous for any regular business.

Equally importantly, the low labor costs lead management to avoid making many decisions about how to manage costs effectively. There’s an enormous amount of inefficiency baked into Scientology’s management practices, and the longer the cult has been able to get away with insane inefficiencies, the harder it will be to fix them.

… So Further Sales Declines Can Quickly Lead to Recurring Operating Losses

While Scientology is probably profitable and generating cash today, results can quickly move from profits to losses. Let’s suppose that the cult loses 15% of members in 2014 due to disappointment with GAT 2, disconnection, death, and a host of other causes, a modest acceleration of the 5% to 10% decline I think we have seen in the last few years. And, as we would expect, the cult at best does not undertake any significant cost reduction efforts.

In that case, we’d see revenue dropping by 15%, from $180 million to about $150 million. Without aggressive cost reductions, profit would go from $30 million to just above break even, perhaps $5 million. The following year, assuming a return to a modest 5% decline in membership, the cult would go into the red for what I believe would be the first time in many years.

I believe that the downside risk in the next two years is actually greater than a proportional decline in revenue. There are unique pressures building on the cult’s revenue and expense lines including:

Death or defections among the whales. A handful of top donors like Bob Duggan are probably contributing $10 million or more per year, a significant portion of current operating profit. Losing the income stream from of any of these individuals would have a rapid negative effect on profits.

Collapse of Narconon. I believe Narconon contributes less than $10 million of profits. But that empire has come under immense pressure lately in the wake of multiple lawsuits, and suits are being filed at an accelerating rate. I believe that there are multiple insurance fraud investigations under way in the wake of discovery that perhaps 20% of Narconon Georgia’s billings (if I recall correctly; don’t have time to check the numbers) were from fraudulent claims.

Aging of the Freewinds: Some data points including GPS data of the ship’s location suggest that the Freewinds business has basically collapsed. At the same time, the ship is nearly 50 years old, long past the normal lifetime of a commercial vessel. Unexpected repair expenses to hull plating or to engine room equipment are likely to be expensive, driving this minimally profitable operation deeply into the red.

But while the risk of going into the red and staying there for a long time is increasing, the reserves presumably mean that David Miscavige is not at this point particularly concerned about the future viability of the organization.

Losing the Reserves

If the cult starts losing money, reserves can sustain it without requiring significant retreat from its current operating posture. This naturally sparks the question as to how those reserves might be decreased and that cushion eliminated.

How Much Money, Exactly?

I believe that the total cash position of the cult is made up of three different figures:

Sea Org reserves:this figure represents the profit from operations for most of the cult, particularly courses delivered at Flag. I recall an interview with Mat Pesch, a longtime staffer, where he said that the Sea Org reserves were essentially depleted in the early 1990s. Given a reasonable estimate of profitability from delivering services over the last 20 years, I estimate that these reserves are about $400 million.

IAS “war chest:” this amount represents the donations to unrestricted IAS funds over the last 15 to 20 years. Some of these donations were used to build the Superpower building and for some other projects, plus used for legal settlements, I believe that the net balance currently is about $250 million, a bit less than the aggregate donation amount that I estimate at around $400 million.

Deposits: this represents money paid in for services not yet rendered. In cult accounting jargon, these referred to as “advance payments” (AP). I will use the term “deposits” since “AP” has a specific meaning in finance in the rest of the world (“accounts payable”). Recently, when I’ve been interviewing former members for background information, I have asked how much money they have on deposit with the cult. Anecdotally, the average seems to be about $20,000-$25,000, but my sample is not terribly broad, consisting mainly of people who were “in” for decades. I think it reasonable to believe that the average balance from people who put money on deposit and then walked away might be closer to $15,000, but over the last 20 years, I think it reasonable to believe that 40,000 members walked away from money that they should have been repaid rather than risk the wrath of the cult. Total balance here I believe to be approximately $600 million.

When you add that up, the total cash balance in the cult appears to be in the neighborhood of $1.25 billion. I don’t think some estimates that have ranged as high as $5 or $6 billion are credible because I don’t think there are that many members over the last 20-25 years with enough disposable income to support that kind of accumulated profits.

I believe that most of this money is immediately routed offshore into non-interest-bearing bank accounts. Hubbard was fearful that the government would step in and seize cult funds without warning, and Miscavage has certainly continued that sort of paranoia. While the reserves may seem unassailable, beyond the long arm of Uncle Sam, things may not be as safe as they seem.

How Could the Cult Lose That Money?

A $1.25 billion fortune is hard to squander, even if the cult is losing money at an increasing rate. Suppose the cult swings from a $30 million per year profit to an ongoing series of losses a similar amount. Those reserves would allow the cult to sustain operations without making any significant changes for almost 40 years. Clearly, then, the cult is not going to go bankrupt from operating losses alone.

An unanticipated external force would need to come in and reduce those cash balances significantly. Only if the reserves were decimated due to an unforeseen event would ongoing operating losses imperil the cult’s ability to operate. So what could possibly put this enormous cash hoard at risk?

I believe the Garcia lawsuit is the beginning of a wave of lawsuits that could significantly deplete cash reserves as claims are settled. Of the suit is about fraud in fund raising for Super Power, the argument revolves around something that, if allowed to stand as precedent, will be a shining beacon to guide attorneys in similar suits in the future: that the repayment mechanism is unconscionable, because it is inherently rigged against anyone seeking a repayment of funds.

Tony Ortega’s coverage of the Garcia lawsuit has mentioned in several places that the Garcia’s attorney, Ted Babbitt, has also been recruiting other plaintiffs to pursue similar actions against the cult in the future. Interestingly, one of the details that arose in the failed motion on the part of the cult to disqualify attorney Babbitt as counsel was the revelation that he was using a former cult attorney, who worked for the cult many years ago, to help recruit future plaintiffs.

I therefore believe that there is a “cottage industry” waiting in the wings made up of a network of law firms coordinating their efforts who will sue the cult for either fraud in IAS donations or for repayments, once the arbitration scheme is exposed as a sham. As I have said before on Tony’s blog, since Miscavage micro-manages all legal affairs, a wave of individual lawsuits on this front will overwhelm him and leave him unable to function in other capacities. This will likely lead to rapid settlements including punitive damages.

I believe that, if this prediction of an avalanche of individual lawsuits comes to pass, the next step would be a class-action suit for all persons who have monies on deposit with the cult. In many class-action suits, damages are estimated, and by the time attorneys fees are deducted from the settlement, class members see recovery of only a few pennies on the dollar of what they believed their damages to be. That is a function of the difficulty in calculating damages, and of the incentive for companies to settle the damages are difficult to prove. Price-fixing cases, such as charges of fraud and diamond pricing or other similar actions, are examples of this sort.

I have talked to many ex-members, virtually all of whom have walked away from deposits, some in the six figure range, who are not interested in the expense and potential risks involved in suing the cult individually, but every single person I have talked to would happily sign up for a class action suit.

Unlike most class actions, damages incurred by each class member suing Scientology for refund of advance payments are trivial to determine: people have statements showing the amount on deposit, and the church should have tons of relevant records that would easily be discoverable. In other words, it is reasonable to believe that a class-action suit, if successful, would recover 100% of damages, rather than pennies on the dollar. An appropriately aggressive class-action attorney would insist that legal fees be added on top of the damages recovered for class members rather than deducted from them.

If my estimate of the deposit amount is correct, and if you add on legal fees at a typical 30% contingency rate, it is conceivable that a successful class-action lawsuit could deplete the majority of the cult’s reserves. Once those reserves are depleted, then operating losses are increasingly dangerous. But since operations are prescribed by “scripture,” the cult has little flexibility to cut costs.

But Could Plaintiffs Collect?

The corporate restructuring in the early 1980s, as documented by Denise Brennan and others involved, was clearly intended to shield the organization from liability for bad behavior and from asset seizures, using an impenetrably intertwined maze of onshore corporations, offshore shells and mysterious trusts.

Plaintiffs in a suit for refund of deposits would have to convince a judge to pierce all of these corporate structures in order to lay hold of assets to recover something for the victims of this fraud. When that corporate structure was laid down a third of a century ago, it was extremely difficult for courts to order that complex corporate structures be collapsed to get at the money.

The world is very different today as a result of changes to the international financial system made in the wake of September 11 terrorist attacks. The PATRIOT act and extensive behind-the-scenes diplomacy on the part of the US government has dramatically reduced the ability of enterprises to hide money in complex international corporate structures, and has made it much easier for the government to collapse networks of shell corporations and to seize funds held in offshore accounts ostensibly beyond the reach of justice. It is still not easy to do this, but it is far easier than it ever has been.

At the very least, it is reasonable to believe that the government would be able to sequester those funds and prevent them from being imported back into the US for use in daily operations of the cult. In other words, while it could not seize cult funds that remain outside the US, it could seize funds that are repatriated to fund operation. That’s why the move to operating losses is critical: that’s the circumstance in which the cult would be forced to repatriate cash, where it then becomes vulnerable. Losing money erases the benefit of the complex corporate shield.

In other words, it does not matter whether the government is actually able to seize cult funds held overseas. Instead, if the government is merely able to freeze those funds to prevent the cult from being able to make use of them itself, then the cult is essentially denied the money to backstop its operating losses, and the effect on operations is essentially the same as if the reserves were seized for lawsuit settlements: the cult can no longer use them to continue to operate once it starts losing money.

From Ideal Orgs to the Auction Block

In addition to being unable to use the reserves to sustain losses, the cult needs to be denied the use of its facilities. No company selling to the public can exist without bricks and mortar buildings.

In the case of Scientology, since the cult does not finance real estate purchases, instead paying cash for everything, it would seem as if real estate portfolio is a bulwark of strength against the “wog” world wishing it harm. While that is certainly true on the surface, there are several circumstances under which the cult could actually lose control of the real estate portfolio.

Many people wonder whether the Ideal Org strategy is a secret investment vehicle for the cult. As I have said on many occasions, I do not believe this is the case. I believe it is a pure marketing vehicle to attract new members (though one that is doomed to fail) and an opportunity to scam parishioners out of savings by collecting more in donations in the cult actually spends on purchase and renovation of these properties.

Let’s presume that over the next 3 to 5 years, the cult is successfully sued on a broad scale for repayment of deposits and further malfeasance. But it’s further assume that, despite the best efforts of attorneys to unlock the doors to the cash vaults, that the reserves are not available for use of settlements. Attorneys may then move for seizure of the buildings in lieu of offshore cash to satisfy judgments.

If I am correct in believing that the aggregate value of settlements for repayment of outstanding deposits is at least $500 million, I believe that that exceeds the market value of the cult’s real estate portfolio.

The real estate portfolio divides naturally into three categories:

Headquarters facilities, like “Big Blue” in Hollywood, Superpower and Flag in Clearwater, and Int Base in Hemet. While the oldest of these facilities were purchased for nominal sums and are undoubtedly worth far more than the cult paid decades ago, they are not in particularly desirable locations and, more importantly, the custom designs and improvements that the cult has ordered are of little value to future tenant, depressing the market value of these properties significantly. Anyone who purchases the buildings out of an asset sale would have to make significant modifications to make it useful for almost any other purpose. If we estimate that the cult has invested $300 million in new construction at Int Base, it would realize very little of that if it sold that facility.

Local orgs, including both older facilities and Ideal Orgs, are typically located in out-of-the-way areas without much potential for conversion to retail or high-quality office space. The cult does a good job picking older, historic buildings and doing quality renovations, but I do not believe that its strategy will maximize resale value. The odd locations and the extremely specialized renovations (small auditing rooms without windows, large “Chapel” rooms too big for most corporations to use as conference rooms) will depress resale prices. In most cases, as evidenced by resale of facilities that the cult purchased for Ideal Org use and later resold, including Portland and Budapest among many others, it is unlikely that the cult will recapture the initial purchase price of the building, much less the high cost to pay for renovations.

Specialized facilities, including some of the CST sites with the storage vaults, are even more over-improved relative to their locations than the other types of buildings. It is unlikely in the extreme that a buyer would pay a premium relative to surrounding ranch properties for the paved airstrip and the expensive vault buildings at the New Mexico CST facility, to cite just one example.

Some anti-Scientology activists believe that the IRS may take action to revoke the cult’s tax exemption in the near to medium term future. If the IRS does take action, it is entirely possible they may seek to seize the real estate in the event that the cult enters into a significant settlement for violation of the 1993 agreements. One of the key provisions of the 1993 agreement is prompt repayment of deposits and refunds for dissatisfied customers, something that the cult has clearly willfully ignored over the last 20 years.

Of particular interest in considering whether the IRS might begin to reconsider the cult’s tax-exempt status is the idea that the government may be able to prove that the 1993 agreement was entered into fraudulently by the cult. If the government were able to obtain evidence that the cult committed fraud in negotiating that agreement, then it would be able to pursue damages not only for civil enforcement actions over the last few years, but potentially going back much further, and even re-opening the cases that were pending in the late 80s and early 90s, where the amounts being litigated were substantial.

I have said repeatedly that it is unwise to presume that the government can move aggressively against the cult, even if it wants to. The arcane details of the federal budgeting process means that individual portions of the government are restricted in the funding they can bring to bear for enforcement actions against the cult. In other words, IRS enforcement attorneys have a limited budget, even if potential recoveries are substantial. It is possible that the government could decide not to pursue the cult in order to maximize its “bang for the buck” particularly in maximizing deterrent effect by chasing after a large number of smaller scale tax dodgers.

It is thus difficult to assess the probability that the IRS will begin enforcement action. But if it does, it is reasonable to suspect that the IRS may move to seize real estate since it is likely to be easier to grab than cash held offshore. If the IRS were to do so, and if through either litigation or through IRS action, the church is essentially denied use of reserves, then we get to scenario where bankruptcy could happen within a relatively short period of time. Note, however, that this “relatively short period of time” would begin only after the cash reserves are taken out of the equation through several years of litigation, and after the IRS places liens on or seizes facilities. Thus, the clock on that prediction would only start running at least 3-5 years from now, and possibly longer.

Conclusions

Again, I stress that this is not necessarily the scenario for the collapse of the cult. It is merely a possible scenario, one of several. I’ll detail others in future blog posts, until we have a range of possible outcomes.

This scenario is not going to happen overnight. I believe that litigation for repayment of deposits would take a minimum of three years and more likely five years to wind its way through the courts, either to resolution or to a point where we can predict confidently that the cult will lose. The dénouement from there could take another couple of years. It is thus unwise to get one’s hopes up that the cult will collapse soon, even if the best case articulated here comes to pass. I believe it will happen in our lifetimes, but I would advocate against holding out hope that it will be in the next year or two.

This scenario is one in which the cult’s ability to operate is extinguished due to external circumstances that bring about its end. Other scenarios would have the cult somehow able to operate as a shadow of its former self, which leaves the potential for it to continue to do evil in the world, diminished but not extinguished.