In the past decade China's growing military capability has
attracted a great deal of attention, but details about the current
and likely near-future state of China's military power have been
in short supply. While it is true that China is modernizing its
forces and increasing defense spending, the prospective improvements
in overall military capability need to be set against the very
low-technology starting point of China's armed forces.

The article begins by looking
at recent trends and likely future developments in China's nuclear
and conventional forces. It then discusses potential military
courses of action by China towards Taiwan, now and in the future.

CHINA'S NUCLEAR FORCES

According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and
the SIPRI Yearbook 1999, the size of the Chinese nuclear
arsenal is about 400 warheads. The Bulletin estimates that
20 nuclear-armed missiles are deployed in the intercontinental
role, and another 230 nuclear weapons on deployed (or can be deployed)
on aircraft, missiles, and submarines with regional capabilities.
The 150 remaining nuclear warheads are believed to be reserved
for "tactical" uses (short-range missiles, low yield
aircraft-dropped bombs, and possibly artillery shells or demolition
munitions).1

Nuclear weapons in China are
under the control of the Central Military Commission, which is
headed by the President. Other members of the commission are generals
from the People's Liberation Army (PLA), who may also serve on
the Politburo of the Communist Party.

Intercontinental Nuclear Forces

China currently maintains a minimal intercontinental nuclear
deterrent using land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs). The Dong Feng-5 (DF-5) liquid-fueled missile, first deployed
in 1981, has a range of 13,000 km and carries a single multi-megaton
warhead. Twenty are believed to be deployed in central China,
southwest of Beijing. Unlike China's earlier ballistic missiles,
which were stored in caves and moved out for launch, the DF-5
can be launched directly from vertical silosbut only after
a two-hour fueling process. In order to increase the survivability
of the DF-5s, dummy silos are placed near the real silos. The
DF-5's range gives it coverage of all of Asia and Europe, and
most of the United States. The south-eastern US states are at
the edge of the missile's range.

Two additional long-range ballistic
missiles are in the development stage, the 8,000 km DF-31 and
the 12,000 km DF-41. Both missiles are expected to be solid-fueled
and based on mobile launchers. It is not known how many missiles
China plans to deploy nor how many warheads the missiles may carry,
but it is believed that China is hoping to deploy multiple nuclear
warheads and penetration aids. These may be either multiple re-entry
vehicles (MRVs) or the more capable, but technically difficult
multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). First
deployment for the DF-31 could occur before 2005; the DF-41 is
likely to follow, possibly around 2010.2

China's nuclear-armed naval
forces are currently limited to one Xia Type 092 nuclear-powered
and nuclear ballistic missile-equipped submarine (SSBN), which
has a history of reactor and acoustic problems. The Xia can carry
12 Ju Lang-1 (JL-1) SLBMs with a single 200-300 kt warhead and
a range of 1,700 km. Due to its technical limits, the Type 092
is never deployed outside regional waters.

China is reported to be planning
to build four-to-six new Type 094 SSBNs. The Type 094 will introduce
a safer, quieter reactor and better overall performance. It is
expected to have 16 JL-2 missiles, capable of carrying up to six
warheads per missile (probably MRVs that are not independently
targetable). The initial launch date is supposed to be scheduled
for 2002; but development of the JL-2 missile may take considerably
longer because to date the land-based missile on which it based,
the DF-31, has been test launched only once. If China were to
employ a deployment rotation similar to that for US Navy SSBNs
(three submarines for each one in target range, with one on station,
one in transit, and one in refit), then six SSBNs would give China
the ability to keep two submarines on station in the Pacific at
all times, able to strike all of Asia, Europe, and North America.3
If the planned 6 submarines are built with the maximum number
of warheads per missile, the number of total deployable submarine-based
nuclear warheads will rise to 576. Even if the warheads were not
independently targetable, the minimum number likely to be on station
and capable of striking the United States would be 192that
is, enough to saturate the proposed light US national missile
defense, which is now driving the Chinese strategic nuclear modernization
and expansion program.

Regional Nuclear Forces

China also deploys three weapons in the intermediate-range
ballistic missile (IRBM) and medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)
categories. These missiles are capable of posing strategic threats
to countries in Asia, such as India or Japan, but represent a
lesser threat to Russia, and are only a threat to the United States
through the vulnerability of US military bases in Japan and South
Korea.

The oldest nuclear missile
deployed by China is the semi-mobile 2,800 km-range DF-3A. The
estimated 40 liquid-fueled DF-3s still in service today are being
phased out in favor of the DF-15 (see below) and DF-21. They were
followed by the liquid-fueled DF-4, which has a maximum range
of 4,750 km. About 20 DF-4s remain in service in fixed launch
sights. Chinese regional ballistic missile capabilities advanced
greatly with the introduction of the DF-21, the first solid-fueled
medium-range missile. The solid-fuel design provides China with
a faster launch time, because the lengthy and potentially dangerous
fueling procedure of the earlier Dong Feng models has been eliminated.
First deployed in 1986, the 48 operational DF-21s have a range
of 1,800 km and are carried on mobile launchers. The DF-21 is
the basis for the JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

The older liquid-fuel missiles
carry single warheads with yields estimated at 3.3 MT. The newer
solid-fuel missiles have single warheads with maximum yields of
a few hundred kilotons each.

The Chinese bomber force is
based on locally produced versions of Soviet aircraft first deployed
in the 1950s. With the retirement of the H-5/Il-28 from the nuclear
role, the H-6/Tu-16 remains the only nuclear-capable bomber in
the Chinese inventory. First entering service with the Soviet
Air Force in 1955, the Tu-16 was produced in China in the 1960s.
The H-6/Tu-16 is capable of carrying one-to-three nuclear bombs
over a combat radius of 1,800 km to 3,100 km. About 120 People's
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) H-6/Tu-16s are believed to be
capable of nuclear missions. Another 20 H-6/Tu-16s are under the
control of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and do not
perform nuclear missions. There is no indication of a replacement
for the H-6/Tu-16 in the near future. The J-7/MiG-21 and the newer
Chinese-designed JH-7s and Russian-exported Su-27s are capable
of performing nuclear missions, but they are not believed to be
deployed in that role.

Short-Range, Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons

The PLAAF has 20-40 Q-5 Fantan attack aircraft that it uses
in the nuclear role. Initially deployed in China in 1970, the
Q-5 is a substantially upgraded version of the MiG-19, which was
initially deployed in the Soviet Union in 1954 and later produced
by China under the designation J-6. The Q-5 can carry a single
free-fall nuclear bomb over a combat radius of 400 km. The very
short range of the Q-5 limits its battlefield effectiveness, even
with conventional armament.

Two types of short-range ballistic
missile (SRBM) entered service with Chinas Second Artillery
forces around 1995: the DF-11/M-11, with a range of 300 km, and
the DF-15/M-9, with a range of 600 km. (The DF designation
is used by missiles in service with China, while the M
designation is used for export versions.). In theory both missiles
but could be fitted with small nuclear devices. As of 2000, a
few hundred DF-15s and DF-11s may be deployed; but most if not
all are believe to be equipped with conventional warheads.

CHINA'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES

China maintains one of the largest militaries in the world,
based on its inventory of major weapon systems. 4
However, the bulk of China's holdings are old in both physical
age and technology. Many weapon systems which came into service
in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s remain in the inventory today;
and all of those systems use 1950s-era technology originally imported
from the Soviet Union. While China is modernizing its conventional
forces, the new systems are entering are a low rate compared with
the overall size of the older forces. As a result over the next
decade, as the oldest weapon systems are fully retired, the size
of China's conventional forces will shrink dramatically.

Ground Forces and Tanks

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is moving toward an overall
reduction and reorganization of personnel and equipment with the
goal of creating a more modern and mobile army. In 2000, the total
estimated personnel strength of the Chinese military is 2.5 million,
of which 1.8 million are in service with the PLA (ground forces).
The ground forces are divided into 7 military regions with 27
military districts. Within the 7 military regions lie 21 Group
Armies, each containing about 60,000 personnel. The Group Armies
contain among them 44 infantry divisions, 13 infantry brigades,
10 armored divisions, 12 armored brigades, 5 artillery divisions,
20 artillery brigades, and 7 helicopter regiments. In addition,
5 infantry divisions, 2 infantry brigades, 1 armored brigade,
1 artillery division, 3 artillery brigades, and 3 anti-aircraft
artillery (AAA) brigades are independent elements of the PLA not
assigned to any specific Group Army. There are also three airborne
divisions, which are manned by the PLAAF. 5

There are also numerous reserve
and paramilitary units, some of which do not fall under the direct
control of the PLA. The PLA reserve component has about 1.2 million
personnel divided into 50 infantry, artillery, and air-defense
divisions. In addition, approximately 1.1 million personnel serve
in the People's Armed Police, which includes internal security
and border defense forces under the control of the Ministry of
Defense. The People's Armed Police is organized into 45 divisions.
The reserve forces and the People's Armed Police are expected
to increase in size in the near future as active units are shifted
to reserve status under China's modernization and restructuring
plan. 6

China's tank inventory has
numbered around 10,000 for three decades. IDDS estimates the size
of China's tank force as of 1 January 2000 at 10,100. Over the past 30 years, most Soviet World War II-vintage
tanks (the T-34/85 and the IS-2) have been retired. Initially,
these were replaced with large numbers of Soviet T-54/-55s and
Chinese-produced versions of the T-54/-55 (Types 59/69/79). Of
these, the Type 59 was the most common, with over 8,000 built
for the PLA. Production of the Type 59 began in the late 1950s
and probably continued into the early 1980s. The subsequent models,
Type 69 and Type 79, made their first public appearances in 1982
and 1984, respectively; but despite being produced nearly 30 years
after the original Type 59, they were not much more capable than
their predecessor.

In 1988, the Type 80 was ready
for production. The Type 80 represented Chinas first major
break from the original T-54/-55 design. It features a computerized
fire-control system, a laser range-finder, a gun stabilizer, better
suspension and power plant, and night-fighting equipment. The
tank currently in production is the Type 85-II/III, which was
introduced in the early 1990s as a further development of the
Type 80. In addition to the Type 80s electronic and power
plant improvements, the Type 85 has an automatic loading system,
which reduces the crew to from 4 to 3. The most recent design
to come out of China is the Type 90-II, first revealed in late
1991, which resembles the Russian T-72 and is believed to be similar
in performance. The Type 90-II has yet to enter full production,
and it is not expected to do so in the near future for PLA service. 7

China also has a nearly 2,000
light tanks. Again, these tanks are copies of old Soviet models:
the Type 62 is a scaled down version of the Type 59, while the
Type 63 is based on the Soviet amphibious PT-76. Both entered
production in China in the early 1960s.

The active Chinese tank inventory
may be smaller than the 10,100 holdings estimated by IDDS. With
production having started before 1960, many of the 6,000 Type
59s still in service could be over 40 years old. Many are probably
not operational due to poor construction and maintenance. In fact,
China's history of poor maintenance may also put into question
the operational status of some of its newer equipment as well.
In any event, as a product of the new Chinese military strategy
and the higher tank cost per unit, China seems to be replacing
older systems on a less than one-for-one basis, moving slowly
towards a much smaller, and somewhat more modern force. China
may eventually mass produce the Type 90-II, instead of the Type
85-II/-III, for replacing the bulk of its older tanks. Alternatively,
China may be working on an even more advanced tank model, which
would further reduce the gap in technical capabilities compared
with Western tank designs.

Air Forces and Combat Aircraft

The People's Liberation Army Air Force, PLAAF, currently possesses
about 4,350 aircraft, of which the majority are combat aircraft.
IDDS estimates that the inventory of Chinese combat aircraft on
1 January 2000 includes the following: 1900 J-6/MiG-19 (all roles
and models: fighter, reconnaissance, trainer); 720 J-7/MiG-21
(all roles and models: fighter, reconnaissance, trainer); 222
J-8I/II/III; 55 J-11/Su-27SK; 440 Q-5 (modified MiG-19); 307 H-5/Il-28;
and 142 H-6/Tu-16. 8
Small numbers of JH-7s (fewer than 12) and K-8s (10-15) may also
be in service. Of these aircraft, the great majority (J-6 and
J-7) are of types which began to be deployed before 1972 (See
Chart 2.) With the exception of 10 Il-76s, the airlift capabilities
of the Chinese Airforce are limited to old Soviet tactical airlift
planes built under license or reversed-engineered in China, such
as the Y-5/An-2, Y-7/An-24, and Y-8/An-12.

Much confusion exists as to
the direction China will take in the future regarding combat aircraft
acquisition. The Chinese government has made a priority of the
development of a local aerospace industry capable of producing
technologically advanced aircraft. However, the results produced
by the Chinese aircraft industry to date have not been promising.
Despite decades of work, the only original combat aircraft to
be designed and produced in China are the J-8 and JH-7, both of
which took so long to develop that by the time they entered service,
they were already obsolete by Western standards. The newer J-10,
which has been in development for twenty years, probably won't
enter service for another five years.

China is by no means unique
in this respect. Except for the five largest industrial arms producers
(the USA, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany), other countries
that have attempted to produce indigenously designed combat aircraft,
such as Israel, South Africa, India, Taiwan, and South Korea,
have abandoned these efforts and returned to importing systems
from one of the five main producers. The basic reason is that
the economies of scale required to finance research, development,
and production of all the systems and sub-systems that make up
todays frontline combat aircraft are not available to smaller
industrial countries nor to large developing countries with smaller
GNPs and smaller industrial bases. (In fact, for this reason,
Russia is lagging increasingly behind the West in most areas of
military technology.) 9

As a result of the inability
of the Chinese aircraft industry to produce indigenously designed,
technologically advanced combat aircraft, the Chinese government
has partially reversed its policy of relying on domestic arms
production and has renewed imports of combat aircraft from Russiaspecifically,
Su-27s and Su-30sin small numbers. Over the next decade,
China will produce Su-27s, with the Chinese designation J-11,
under license from Russia. Up to 200 Su-27s may be built, but
the total may be curtailed if China obtains licensing rights to
the Su-30, which offers several technological advances over the
Su-27. China currently plans to buy 3060 Su-30MKs. 10
In addition, China will continue to pursue its own aviation projects.
Production of the latest model of the J-8 will continue in small
batches. The JH-7 may also be produced in greater numbers, if
PLAAF or PLAN can find a role for the aircraft in their inventories.
The J-10 is scheduled to enter service around 2005 with initial
reports of expected production up to 300 aircraft (depending in
part on the progress of the Su-27 program). In any case, the J-10
and the J-11/Su-27 are expected to form the mainstay of the Chinese
Air Force in the early 21st century.

Of great significance is China's
plan to buy one-to-four AWAC aircraft from Israel. 11
If China purchases just one copy of the aircraft, which is an
insufficient number for operational use, it will still provide
an opportunity for the PLAAF to experience the use of airborne
command and control. China is also making progress in in-flight
refueling, and several H-6/Tu-16 bombers and Y-8/An-12 transports
have been converted to tankers. As is the case for AWAC aircraft,
more acquisitions of tankers will be needed if China seeks to
obtain the capability to conduct combat aircraft operations at
any distance from its own territory.

Naval Vessels

Submarines: China embarked on a large submarine building
program in the 1960s, which tapered-off in the late 1980s, which
included many diesel-electric patrol submarines and some nuclear
powered submarines. Many of the diesel-electric submarines from
that construction period are now in reserve. Recently, construction
and acquisition of new submarines has begun to intensify. In the
near future, Chinas submarine fleet is expected to be smaller,
but more modern. (See
Chart 3.)

For most of its history, the
Peoples Army Liberation Navy (PLAN) submarine fleet has
consisted of small coastal patrol submarines and domestically
produced versions of the Soviet 'Romeo' class sub. Initially lacking
any real ASW capability, the Chinese 'Romeo' class (Type 033)
is now outclassed by nearly every ASW system deployed by China's
neighbors. In all, 73 Romeos were built for use by China between
1962 and 1987. 12
Of these about 38 remain in active duty, although they may only
go out to sea a few days per year. Another 30 are in varying conditions
of reserve status. One Romeo was modified to carry six YJ-1 (C-801)
anti-ship missiles, but it must surface to fire them.

In the 1970s, China embarked
on a program to domestically produce submarines of its own design.
The first of these was the 'Ming' class (Type 035), produced from
1971 to 1979, with production resuming again in 1987. The Mings
are not much better in capability than their Romeo predecessors,
although they are of newer construction. Submarines of the Song
(Type 039) follow-on class are slighter larger than the Ming and
incorporate streamlined hull for better submerged performance.
The first Song was commissioned in 1999, and two more are now
under construction. Later models may incorporate design features
from the Kilos. The Song class may be fitted with a version of
the C-801 or C-802 anti-ship missile that is capable of submerged
launch. In addition, China has purchased 4 Kilo class submarines
from Russia. Additional purchases of Kilos or the newer 'Amur'
class from Russia may depend on the progress of the Song class.

Like Chinas effort with
the Xia SSBN, China's first attempt to domestically produce a
nuclear-powered attack submarine produced disappointing results.
The 'Han' class (Type 091) first entered service in 1974. Again,
power plant problems plagued the class, and the next ship in the
class was not commissioned until 1980. The fifth and final ship
did not enter service until 1990. Despite their problems, which
may have been fixed, and the long delays in construction, China
seems committed to deploying the five subs built. The follow-on
Type 093 class is expected to build on the experience from the
Han class and on assistance from Russian submarine builders. The
class will be similar in capability to the Russian Victor III,
first deployed in 1978. The first Type 093 is scheduled to enter
service in 2004.

Surface Warships: Since the 1972, the number of ships
and overall tonnage of Chinas surface combatants has increased
at a steady rate. The increase is expected to continue for the
next five years, but may decline after that if no new construction
or acquisition programs are undertaken.(See
Chart 4.)The most recent additions to the Chinese Navy are
two Russian-built 'Sovremenny' class destroyers. These ships,
the first of which was delivered in February 2000, are the largest
and most powerful surface warships ever operated by the Chinese
Navy. Their most formidable weapon is the SS-N-22 Sunburn supersonic
sea-skimming ASM, of which eight are carried. The Sovremenny is
also armed with the SA-N-7 'Gadfly', which will give China a limited
naval air-defense capability. Up to now, China has possessed only
short-ranged SAMs of French or domestic design.

The newest Chinese-built destroyers
are two 6,000 ton 'Luhai' class. The first ship of the class entered
service in late 1999, and the second is expected to enter service
in 2000. Two more are planned with commissioning dates in 2002
and 2003. 13

China operates 18 other destroyers
of two principle classes. The 4,200 ton 'Luhu' class was the basis
for the 'Luhai' class. Two ships were built, with commissioning
dates in 1994 and 1996, respectively, although they were originally
ordered in 1985. (Construction was delayed to allow for completion
of a frigate order from the Thai Navy.) The Luhus are armed with
8 C-802 ASMs, a domestically built Crotale SAM launcher, which
France provided copies of in the 1980s, ASW torpedoes and mortars,
and many guns. They are also capable of carrying 2 Harbin Zhi-9A
helicopters, which are used for ASW and anti-ship missions.

The largest class of destroyers
is the 16 'Luda' I/II/III class (3,670-3,730 tons). These ships
are armed with 6 C-201 ASMs, ASW torpedoes and mortars, and a
heavy gun armament. The Luda II replaces the aft-most 130 mm and
37 mm gun turrets with a helicopter pad and hangar. The sole Luda
III carries the C-801 instead of the less capable C-201. Two of
the class have been fitted with a Crotale launcher. Others may
be fitted in due course, but priority is being given to the construction
of additional ships.

The remaining major surface
combatants comprise 37 frigates. As is the case for the destroyers,
the frigates are designed mainly for anti-surface warfare and
lack any significant self-defense (AAW or ASW) capabilities. The
newest and most capable frigates are the 6 'Jiangwei' class ships
(2,250 tons). Their armament is similar to the 'Luhu' class, but
with fewer guns and missiles. They are capable of carrying a single
Dauphin helicopter. The first of these ships was laid down in
1990. Three more are now under construction, with 2 more planned.

There are 31 units of the one
other type of frigate in service, the 1,702 ton 'Jianghu' class.
The class has four sub-groups: the Jianghu I (27 in service) carry
4 C-201 ASMs, 2-4 100 mm guns, plus varying numbers of lighter
caliber guns; the sole Jianghu II replaces aft armament with a
helicopter hanger; and the 3 Jianghu III/IVs replace the C-201
with 8 C-801 or C-802 ASMs.

Amphibious Assault Ships: China's amphibious assault
capabilities are very limited. As of 1 January 2000, China has
only 49 amphibious assault ships with full displacements of 1,000
tons or more (with three more ships under construction). (See
Chart 5.) Of these, 42 are under 2,000 tons, and none is larger
than 4,800 tons. Many are quite old, including 3 ex-US Navy LSTs
built between 1942 and 1945.

This small fleet size excludes
any possibility of China attempting to seize control of Taiwan
by means of an amphibious assault. Moreover, there is no sign
that China is building or planning to build the larger troop and
cargo ships which would be necessary for a large-scale attack.
Similarly, China's small force of marines (about 5,000) indicates
that an expansion of amphibious assault capabilities is not expected.

Overall, the Navy is gaining
the most from recent increases in Chinese military spending. Potentially
the most ambitious naval program is the possible purchase or construction
of aircraft carriers. If and when China acquires an aircraft carrier
for active deployment, it will probably be a conventional take-off
and landing (CTOL) type, since China does not have access to vertical
and short take-off and landing (V/STOL) aircraft, such as the
British Sea Harrier. The smallest CTOL carrier currently in service
is the Brazilian Minas Gerais, at 20,000 tons. However,
China would probably want to use its new Su-27/J-11 and possibly
J-10 fighters on any carrier, which would require a flight-deck
longer than that on the Brazilian ships. Current estimates place
the size of the needed ship at 45,000 to 50,000 tons, which would
put it in the same category as the Russian Kuznetsov or
the French Charles de Gaulle. 14
Russian design assistance has been sought for the Chinese carrier
program and China has studied the ex-Australian carrier Melbourne,
which it was towed to China for scrap. 15
China also purchased the ex-Soviet carrier Kiev in May
2000. China is expected to deploy a carrier capable of carrying
24 fighter planes plus helicopters in the support role. The ship
is likely to be conventionally powered, since China has limited
experience with nuclear power in submarines only. According to
press reports, the first Chinese carrier could be in service by
2005, with a second in service by 2009. Additional carriers could
follow every three years. 16

China also plans to strengthen
its surface fleet through the purchase of additional destroyer
from Russia: In addition to the two "off the shelf"
Sovremennys already bought, China plans to acquire two more Sovremenny
DDGs with modifications. The delivery dates are unknown. 17

POTENTIAL CHINESE USES OF ARMED FORCE AGAINST TAIWAN

The Wests concern about China's military capability is
focused mainly on potential military action against Taiwan. China
has threatened to take military action if Taiwan declares independence
from the mainland or indefinitely prolongs the unification process.
While the modernization of Chinas military forces currently
under way may facilitate a potential attack on Taiwan, it does
not make success a forgone conclusion for the foreseeable future.
Reviewing potential uses of armed force by China, this section
concludes not only that Chinese capabilities are limited now,
but also that given the slow pace of modernization, China's capabilities
for attack on Taiwan are likely to remain limited for the next
10-15 years.

Combined Arms Attack and Invasion

In theory, China could launch a combined arms amphibious and
airborne assault on Taiwan. Chinas current forces do not
include enough transport assets to accomplish such a task, however;
and there is no evidence that China is building up larger numbers
of amphibious assault ships or large cargo aircraft. Current military
doctrine calls for a 5-to-1 attacker to defender ratio for amphibious
assaults. Today China can only transport 1 armored or 3 infantry
brigades with its amphibious ships, which would be completely
inadequate for an attack on Taiwan. The use of commercial and
fishing vessels (for example, splitting a company of troops among
4 fishing trawlers) could not substitute effectively due to communication
problems and the resulting inability to coordinate units. An amphibious
assault would only be conducted with control the skies over the
Strait, which the Chinese Air Force probably cannot accomplish.
The weather and terrain of Taiwan favors the defender, with high
waves and wind in the Taiwan Strait, combined with cliffs on the
eastern part of Taiwan and expansive mudflats on the western coast.
Finally, Taiwan and the United States could see an invasion coming
many months before the event, because it would take that long
to prepare if China did have the forces to attempt the effort.

Missile Attack

China could attack Taiwan with a few hundred DF-15 and DF-11
conventionally armed missiles; but history suggests that such
an attack would probably not force Taipei to capitulate (compare,
for example, Britain in 1944-45, or Serbia in 1999). These missiles
are not accurate enough to be precision weapons against airfields,
radar, transport nodes, etc. They would have to be used more as
a terror weapon, against cities and town. if only conventional
warheads were used, damage would not be any more significant than
that from a large natural disaster, such as the one Taiwan survived
in 1999 (a major earthquake near Taipei). Since China only has
a limited number of DF-15 and DF-11 missiles, a long-lasting missile
siege would be difficult.

Blockade

China's navy could attempt to blockade Taiwan, forcing ships
to dock at Chinese ports before proceeding on to the island. If
the number of Chinas large surface ships (frigates and destroyers)
continues to increase, such a blockade would be easier. China
currently has more ships than Taiwan, and could attempt to enforce
a blockade with a combination of naval vessels and mines. And
despite the lack of sophistication of China's submarines, Taiwan
has limited ASW assets to counter China's large submarine fleet.
As with a missile attack, a blockade would bring international
condemnation and, as a result, hurt China's economy, even if it
were technically legal under international law (with Taiwan recognized
as part of China).

CONCLUSIONS

China's military is modernizing, but there are distinct limits
to the modernization program. First, the current force structure
is so old that the rate of retirement will exceed the rate of
acquisition in all major weapons categories, with the possible
exception of major surface combatants. This means that the size
of Chinas armed forces will continue a recent pattern of
decline, and to drop quite steeply in some cases, such as combat
aircraft. The only exception may be China's surface combat ships.
(See
China versus Region charts.)

Second, the modernization is
proceeding slowly and in a piecemeal manner. All military forces
take a significant amount of time to integrate new weapon systems
into its forces; for China the process seems to take longer than
most.

Third, China is adding only
a handful of modern systems to its inventory. New systems are
purchased in small batches or singly, which is cannot dramatically
change the balance of power. Moreover, while "modern"
relative to existing Chinese systems, current acquisitions from
Russia are not as capable as the comparable systems fielded by
the United States or even Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan (in some
areas).

Finally, China's military modernization
plan has highlighted the inability of the indigenous arms industry
in China to produce the advanced technology weapon systems that
the military wants. The recent return to dependence on foreign
assistance (specifically, aircraft and naval vessels from Russia,
and technical assistance from Israel) runs contrary to the Chinese
governments desire to fully control its own military destiny.

China may eventually change
its policies and invest more financial resources in military modernization;
but for the foreseeable future, China's potential for military
action in Taiwan and other areas will remain limited. China may
take a more active military role in its region, but the overall
balance of power in East Asia will remain unchanged.

4. IDDS estimates a continued high level
of holdings for China's tanks and combat aircraft due to the continued
presence of those systems in China's inventory. IDDS holdings
estimates do not reflect the readiness status or maintenance of
the weapon systems; they indicate the total number of systems
at military bases around the country. Some Chinese weapon systems
may not have been used in years, having been placed in storage
areas. For example some J-6s (MiG-19) sit on airfield tarmacs
for months at a time; many of these aircraft may not be in flying
condition.

11. While the Israeli AWAC aircraft is
based on the Il-76, the United States is trying to block the sale
of the plane to China on the grounds that the radar contains restricted
U. S. components. (Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1999-2000,
p. 354).