23 Alkarama Foundation, “JORDAN Shadow report, Report submitted to the Human Rights Committee in the context of the review of the fifth periodic report of Jordan”, September 18, 2017. Link: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/JOR/INT_CCPR_NGO_JOR_28931_E.pdf

November 9, 2005 Amman hotels’ attack represents the worst terrorist strike to date received by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Soon after, the King activated an ad hoc apparatus in charge of creating a specific legislation to counter terrorism. In 2014, due to the close threats embodied by IS and al-Qa‘ida this law was harshly reinforced.

The Anti-Terrorism Law in Jordan: an overview

The 2005 Amman hotel attack is the most memorable in the whole Jordanian history of terrorist attacks and the first completely successful despite the many previous attempts. It consisted in a coordinated suicide bombings at three luxury hotel usually packed with foreigners. The casualties were mostly Jordanians, failing in targeting “westerns”, since also a wedding party was involved in one of the explosions. Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq claimed the responsibility, while the government declared a day of mourning. The attacks triggered shock in Jordan, one of the most stable Arab countries and a key US ally, where the government had pledged to launch a “preventive war against terrorism”. Al-Zarqawi1 was already sentenced to death in Jordan over the 2002 murder of a US diplomat and was the most wanted man in Iraq, where there was a $25 million bounty for his death or capture.2 He was released from jail in 1999 as part of a royal pardon when the monarch took office after the death of his father King Hussein. In November 2005 in the aftermath, the Jordanian Government proposed very strict and pervasive counterterrorism legislation comprehending economic, detention and hard labour penalties for anyone who condones or supports acts or doesn’t report information related to any terroristic plot. The Anti-Terrorism Law no. 55 of 2006 created a lot of disappointment among the civil society and many critics were advanced by human rights NGOs and groups in general. The broad definition of terrorism used, has allowed the authorities to violate the rights of individuals prosecuted for “disturbing public order”, including those who have exercised their right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.3

On June the 1st 2014 an amendment to the law was implemented but it only further broaden the definition of terrorist act, and also stated that the usage of media or publication of material that “facilitate the commission and promotion of terrorist acts” can be characterised as an act of terrorism.4 The vagueness of the Article unfortunately allowed the authorities to repress journalists and students pursuing peaceful campaign of protests and information concerning broaden issues not related to real terrorist attacks.5The government spokesman, Mohammed al-Momani, stated that the amendments are necessary to help authorities cope with an influx of Jordanian fighters returning from the war in Syria.6

Without any doubts IS and al-Qa‘ida remain a top-concern for Jordan‘s counterterrorism professionals.7 While Jordanian military officials believe that “there is no framework for external terrorist cells to operate in Jordan,”8 they remain troubled by the group’s long-term capacity to spread its ideology and inspire attacks, especially among youth. One interlocutor shared the popular view that “Daesh [IS] is out of Mosul but left its ideas with this generation.”9 The main concern among U.S. security officials on Jordanian soil is especially addressed to IS-aligned groups such as Khalid ibn al-Walid Army, active in southern Syria close to the Jordanian borders. While IS has taken centre stage since 2014, Jordanian security officials have recently refocused on renewed threats from al-Qai‘da. One senior Jordanian military official opined that, in the future, AQ: “will be more lethal than the Islamic State. They have survived, have experience and capabilities and key commanders. Some of them will melt into the Syrian community and rebrand under local groups. They will benefit from defeating IS and will carry out new operations to prove itself and its leadership.”10

Following security parameters, the work done by the government and the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) is (almost) irreproachable. If on the intelligence and military level Jordan is positioned as one, if not the best, country in region able to tackle challenging tasks, this could not be completely asserted for the prevention and recovery of extremists and terrorists. However the main point is: what’s the price the civil society is paying in the name of security?

Security or freedom of speech?

Here it comes with the “hot topics” concerning the anti-terrorism law in Jordan. The broaden definition of terrorism, is widely threatening freedom of expression by considering as terroristic acts the ones “disturbing [Jordan‘s] relations with a foreign state.”11While that offense is already in Jordan‘s penal code and is regularly used to punish peaceful criticism of foreign countries or their rulers, the amendments would stiffen penalties.12Just to be unambiguous, this is not to debate the necessity for a legal framework under which acts of terrorism should be prosecuted, a fortiori in a state that is making a great effort to prevent any side effect from neighbouring countries. However, in the name of security, the state has been good at stifling freedoms that will also curtail any oppositional voices.13

The first main problem of the Jordan’s Anti-Terrorism Law No. 55 of 2006 – also called the Prevention of Terrorism Act – consists in the broad definition of terrorism becoming further inclusive with the 2014’s amendment. The law did not just enlarge the definition of terrorism but specifically: Article 2 considers a terrorist act as, among other things, any act that would “cause disorder by disturbing the public order”; article 3, criminalises acts under the Penal Code including “disturbing relations with a foreign country”. These measures leave room for interpretation which do not address precise threats and specific kinds of violent behaviour or attacks. The amended text additionally includes media usage or publishing material aimed at “facilitating the commission and promotion of terrorist acts” which can be characterised as acts of terrorism.14 Such wording is vague enough for the authorities to consider that media outlets reporting on terrorist attacks are themselves promoting terrorism.15

Finally, the law penalises through the usage of despicable practices such as hard labour to life in prison and the death penalty in cases of violent acts.16 The punishment delineated in art. 2 (“disturbing public order”) states a “minimum of five years of hard labour”,17 for other crimes such as “disturbing relations with a foreign country” or using the media to promote terrorist acts, a mere reference to “temporary hard labour” is made.18 In other words, individuals are generally sentenced to one to five years imprisonment.19

The response to the hotel bombings in 2005 saw many violations committed by different authorities under the pretext of counterterrorism. These violations have been perpetrated primarily by the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), the country’s intelligence agency that is controlled directly by the king, and by the State Security Court, an exceptional jurisdiction whose members are appointed by the executive.20 This body is altered from its roots, since it is directly subordinated to the executive branch, and its members are appointed by the prime minister and can be replaced anytime by executive decision, lacking of the fundamental characteristics of a Court: impartiality and independence.21In addition, despite the recurring warnings by the Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture, the Jordanian authorities have not shown any willingness to abolish torture in the procedures.22Jordan’s State Security Court was often criticized by Human Rights organizations for violating basic guarantees of fair trial for civilians.23

Alkarama Foundation has received testimonies of victims in great number which illustrate quite well the dynamic between the GID and the State Security Court (SSC). The cases submitted by Alkarama before the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) largely follow the same pattern: victims were arrested by the GID without any warrant, brought to their headquarters where they were detained incommunicado24 for several weeks, and severely tortured in order to extract confessions. Self-incriminating statements were then used by the SSC Prosecutor to charge the victims and were later admitted as the sole source of evidence during heavily flawed trials.25 The GID has been torturing mainly through the following practices: beatings – including with cables, plastic pipes and whips – all over the body including the soles of the feet, stress positions, sleep and food deprivation, injections that cause states of extreme anxiety, humiliation, threats of rape against the victim and members of his family, and electric shocks.26 In addition, the GID systematically places detainees in solitary confinement for prolonged periods of time, a practice that amounts to torture per se.27

What seems to be evident is that the usage of the ant-terrorism law has been inappropriate and aimed at limiting public criticism disguised in a broader “terroristic behaviour”. As Joe Stork from Human Rights Watch stated: “Jordan’s responsibilities to safeguard its citizens and their rights are not in conflict […]Jordan does not need to curtail speech in order to stop terrorism.”

Note

1 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, (October 30,1966, al-Zarqa Jordan – June 7, 2006, Hibhib, Iraq) thought to be one of the main authors of terroristic plots in Jordan, his homeland, and the founder of the movement known as Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq (AQI). Initially following the directions of Al-Zawahiri he later detached posing the basis for the split in between al-Qa‘ida and Daesh.

3Alkarama Foundation, “Jordan Shadow report. Report submitted to the Human Rights Committee in the context of the review of the fifth periodic report of Jordan”, September 18 2017, Geneva.

4Article 3(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Law. In its State report, the authorities affirm: “it is now an offence to use information systems, the Internet and websites to facilitate the commission and promotion of terrorist acts.” (p. 4). In Alkarama Foundation, “Jordan Shadow report. Report submitted to the Human Rights Committee in the context of the review of the fifth periodic report of Jordan”, September 18 2017, Geneva