When negotiation processes fail,
third parties may be at a loss for how to proceed. As was the case for U.S.
Secretary of State John Kerry’s peace efforts in Israel/Palestine in 2013-2014,
they may dial back their goals and still find that parties cannot even agree to
a mere “document of principles” with reservations. The authors ask, first, why
did the Kerry Initiative fail? And, second, what can be done in such cases? The
authors propose what they call a “strategic negotiation” approach, which can
address situations where the parties are not even prepared to take the
prenegotiation steps necessary to bring them to the table in the first place—or
to make their attempts successful once there.

To address the first question, the
authors examine four negotiation theories to see what they tell us about why
Kerry’s peace efforts failed. First, Zartman’s ripeness theory argues
that parties will be ready to negotiate if they a) experience a “mutually
hurting stalemate” (a situation where both are hurting from the conflict and
neither sees a path to victory) and b) see a “way out” (through a negotiated
settlement, for which they think the other party is also ready). Second,
extending ripeness theory to explain why negotiations may succeed, Zartman’s push
and pull model highlights two necessary conditions: a “mutually hurting
stalemate” (again) and a “mutually enticing opportunity.” Whereas the former
means sustaining parties’ perceptions of the conflict’s “ripeness” in order to
keep them at the table, the latter means crafting an agreement formula that
will meet parties’ “needs and interests better than the status quo.”
Third, Pruitt’s central coalition theory suggests that parties will be
more likely to begin negotiations and reach an agreement if there is a
broad spectrum of political actors on each side constituting the “central
coalition” in support of negotiations. Finally, Fisher and Ury’s principled
negotiation theory identifies four elements for successful negotiation: 1)
separating the people from the problem, 2) focusing on interests instead of
positions, 3) inventing multiple options for mutual gain, and 4) using
objective criteria to assess these options and to come to agreement.

With regards to ripeness theory
and the push and pull model, the authors conclude that the Israelis and
Palestinians did not perceive a mutually hurting stalemate, as both had options
they preferred to the U.S.-led negotiation process (and proposed solution):
Palestinians preferred a different process (applying pressure on Israel through
international institutions), and Israel preferred a different outcome to the
proposed “two-state solution” (the status quo). Moreover, neither party
believed the other was serious about negotiation, so they didn’t see a “way
out” through the process; and the process and/or outcome alternatives preferred
by either party meant that no “mutually enticing opportunity” could be crafted
to bring them to a successful settlement. With regards to central coalition
theory, neither Abbas (of Palestine) nor Netanyahu (of Israel) enjoyed a
broad “central coalition” in support of negotiations. Abbas was politically
“weak” and “lacked legitimacy among the Palestinian public,” facing opposition
to negotiations within his government and a split between his Fatah party and
Hamas, while Netanyahu’s coalition government was vulnerable if he was
perceived to go too far in his concessions to Palestine. As for principled
negotiation theory, the conflict parties were not yet ready to separate the
people from the problem, focus on interests instead of positions, brainstorm
options for mutual gain, or judge these on the basis of objective criteria
(which were themselves under dispute). In addition, the mediator (Kerry) also
inadvertently hindered the peace process through his over-ambitious negotiation
schedule, parties’ impressions of his favoritism, and his team’s failure to
demonstrate comprehension of the conflict’s complexities.

Since the conditions for a
successful negotiation did not yet exist, the authors suggest that a “strategic
negotiation” approach would have been helpful to identify what was “block[ing]
the way” and therefore how to establish the conditions necessary for formal
negotiations to begin. Outlining the first of three “levels” of strategic
negotiation, the authors note that this approach “starts where the conflicting
parties are, not where third parties want them to be,” with collective
strategic thinking within each of the parties. This level entails “open and
inclusive” debate and strategizing among internal constituencies with regards
to what each party wants and how it can best get there, with a key dimension
being how each party weighs its “strategic alternatives.” The second level is strategic
engagement “across and between the conflicting parties,” which can serve to
build lines of communication between them and also to clarify new issues and/or
possible solutions. The third level is the involvement of third parties,
who, the authors argue, can never be completely neutral or disinterested since
they necessarily have their own agendas, even if those simply entail the desire
to influence the strategic calculations of the parties in favor of successful
negotiations.

In the end, the authors argue, what
the strategic negotiation approach contributes is a greater awareness of the
various parties’ strategic alternatives so that parties can more fully consider
and debate their implications—and so that third parties can use these to put
pressure on the parties to come to agreement.

Contemporary Relevance

With the Israeli/Palestinian peace
process currently stalled, the finding here—that there is an approach conflict
parties and third parties can adopt to make progress even when negotiations
themselves are out of reach—provides at least some hope. It is hope that is
sorely needed: protests in Gaza since March 2018, demanding the Palestinian
right of return and condemning the blockade of Gaza, have resulted in a
heavy-handed Israeli response that has killed at least 200 Palestinians, while a Palestinian sniper from Gaza has killed one
Israeli soldier and Hamas has fired rockets into Israel; the U.S. has
unilaterally moved its embassy to Jerusalem, preempting the parties’ own negotiations
over final-status issues; a new law in Israel solidifies the Jewish character
of the state and therefore the second-class status of non-Jewish Israelis; and,
more recently, Hamas has engaged in fatal attacks against Israeli soldiers and
settlers in the West Bank. And these are only some of the most reported
escalations of this intractable conflict. The focus of this research on the
crucial role of internal deliberation (or “collective strategic thinking”) as a
preliminary step to prepare parties for negotiation suggests the importance of
efforts within both Israeli and Palestinian communities at this juncture to
amplify dissenting voices—of which there are many—in order to clarify the
alternative paths the parties could be taking, as well as to highlight the
costs associated with the current path.

Talking Points

The Israeli/Palestinian peace process
facilitated by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in 2013-2014 failed for
various reasons, including the following:

both parties had options they preferred over the
U.S.-led negotiations and/or proposed solution,

both parties lacked sufficient domestic support
for negotiations,

neither party believed the other was serious
about negotiations or was ready to employ key elements of principled
negotiation.

When conditions for a successful negotiation
process do not yet exist, a “strategic negotiation” approach can be helpful in
identifying obstacles and therefore also the conditions necessary for formal
negotiations to begin.

The three levels of a strategic negotiation
approach—1) collective strategic thinking, 2) strategic engagement, and 3)
involvement of third parties—encourage greater awareness of the parties’
strategic alternatives so that parties can more fully consider and debate their
implications and so that third parties can then use these implications to put
pressure on the parties to come to agreement.

Practical Implications

Although third parties may be
understandably single-minded about getting the parties to come together for
negotiations, this research suggests that doing so too soon can be
counterproductive—and that more energy should be devoted, when negotiations are
premature, to fleshing out alternative scenarios both within and across
parties. For third parties, the trick is to carefully note the range of options
identified on each side, along with their various negative and positive
implications, and use this information to their strategic advantage by putting
pressure on parties in the direction of an outcome that will be mutually
acceptable. Third parties can also clarify how the current situation hurts—and
is costly for—both sides. Finally, third parties should do what they can to
make a negotiated solution enticing for a broad range of constituents on each
side, so that the negotiating team—when it emerges and embarks on the peace
process—has substantial backing.

Popular Posts

01

02

03

Social

Testimonials

Erica Chenoweth, Ph.D.

The field of peace science has long suffered from a needless disconnect between current scholarship and relevant practice. The Peace Science Digest serves as a vital bridge. By regularly communicating cutting-edge peace research to a general audience, this publication promises to advance contemporary practice of peace and nonviolent action. I don’t know of any other outlet that has developed such an efficient forum for distilling the key insights from the latest scholarly innovations for anyone who wants to know more about this crucial subject. I won’t miss an issue.

-Erica Chenoweth: Professor, Associate Dean for Research at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver

David Cortright, Ph.D.

The Peace Science Digest is a valuable tool for translating scholarly research into practical conclusions in support of evidence-based approaches to preventing armed conflict.

-David Cortright: Director of Policy Studies at the Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame

Ambassador John W. McDonald, ret.

This Magazine is where the academic field and the practitioners meet. It is the ideal source for the Talkers, the Writers and the Doers who need to inform and educate themselves about the fast growing field of Peace Science for War Prevention Initiatives!

Kelly Cambell

As a longtime peace activist, I’ve grown weary of the mainstream perception that peace is for dreamers. That’s why the Peace Science Digest is such as useful tool; it gives me easy access to the data and the science to make the case for peacebuilding and war prevention as both practical and possible. This is a wonderful new resource for all who seek peaceful solutions in the real world.

Michael Nagler

We must welcome the expansion of peace awareness into any and every area of our lives, in most of which it must supplant the domination of war and violence long established there. The long-overdue and much appreciated Digest is filling an important niche in that peace invasion. No longer will anyone be able to deny that peace is a science that can be studied and practiced.

-Michael Nagler: Founder and President, Metta Center for Nonviolence

Aubrey Fox

The Peace Science Digest is the right approach to an ever-present challenge: how do you get cutting-edge peace research that is often hidden in hard-to-access academic journals into the hands of a broader audience? With its attractive on-line format, easy to digest graphics and useful short summaries, the Peace Science Digest is a critically important tool for anyone who cares about peace as well as a delight to read.

Joseph Bock, Ph.D.

How many times are we asked about the effectiveness of alternatives to violent conflict? Reading Peace Science Digest offers a quick read on some of the best research focused on that important question. It offers talking points and summarizes practical implications. Readers are provided with clear, accessible explanations of theories and key concepts. It is a valuable resource for policy-makers, activists and scholars. It is a major step in filling the gap between research findings and application.

-Joseph Bock: International Conflict Management Program Associate Professor of International Conflict Management, Kennesaw State University

Eric Stoner

The distillation of the latest academic studies offered by the Peace Science Digest is not only an invaluable time-saving resource for scholars and policymakers concerned with preventing the next war, but for journalists and organizers on the front lines, who can put their findings to good use as they struggle to hold the powerful accountable and to build a more just and peaceful world.

-Eric Stoner: Co-founder and Editor, Waging Nonviolence

Mark Freeman

The Peace Science Digest is a major contribution to the peace and security field. It makes complex issues more understandable, enabling professional outfits like ours to be more effective in our global work. The Digest underscores that preventing war is about more than good intentions or power; it is also about transferable knowledge and science.

Maria J. Stephan, Ph.D.

The Digest is smartly organized, engaging, and provides a nice synthesis of key research on conflict, war, and peace with practical and policy relevance. The journal’s emphasis on “contemporary relevance”, “talking points” and “practical implications” is a breath of fresh air for those of us trying to bridge the academic-policy-practitioner divides. Highly recommended reading.

-Maria J. Stephan: Senior Advisor, United States Institute of Peace

David Swanson

Peace Science Digest is an invaluable tool for advocates for peace, as much as for educators. In it one quickly finds the talking points needed to persuade others, and the research to back those points up.