I have had a limited email conversation with Clark County Attorney Chris Horne, who told me this via email:
from Horne, Chris <Chris.Horne@clark.wa.gov>
date Thu, Mar 10, 2011 at 8:43 AM
"Any property owner who owns land may exclude weapons from their property. You can in you house, a business may on its premises. Similarly, the county can exclude firearms, to the extent we own property like any other property owner.
The key is that the county owns land in different capacities. In our governmental capacity we own property such as parks and may not restrict firearms. The county can also own land separate from its governmental role. It is in that context that the court has said that we may exclude as any other owner."

When I pressed him on this he stated:

from Horne, Chris <Chris.Horne@clark.wa.gov>
date Thu, Mar 24, 2011 at 11:47 AM
"The "Cherry" decision makes the distinction I discussed. If the county is acting not in its governmental capacity but as any other private land owner, it is entitled to restrict those from coming onsite. These restrictions would not be based on a police power ordinance."

I challenged him on the Cherry Decision cite and he responded below:

fromHorne, Chris <Chris.Horne@clark.wa.gov>
date Thu, Apr 7, 2011 at 3:47 PM
"This continuous e-mail is not about communication but a difference of opinion. There is nothing to be gained without a court making a determination. The Board has assigned me many tasks. This matter will not be resolved, you disagree with me which is your right; however, there is no reason to continue as we simply disagree what the legal effect is of the court's decision."

I also wrote the County Commisioners and have never heard back. I would have continued to press, but work has kept me busy.

"....neither Cherry nor Pacific Northwest Shooting Park support the view that cities may prohibit the general public from possessing firearms on city property."

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I don't think the use of that quote is fully within context, as it removes most of the relevant section (below). (emphasis added)
Although the language of RCW 9.41.290 is broad, it does not preempt all city authority with respect to firearms. The Supreme Court has considered RCW 9.41.290 on two occasions. In Cherry v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 116 Wn.2d 794, 808 P.2d 746 (1991), the Court considered whether the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle (Metro) could discharge an employee who violated Metro&#8217;s policy prohibiting employees from carrying concealed weapons. The Court held that &#8220;RCW 9.41.290 is intended to preempt regulatory city, town or county firearms laws and ordinances, but does not address internal employment rules limiting on-duty possession of firearms by public employees in the workplace.&#8221; Id. at 798 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that &#8220;RCW 9.41.290 was enacted to reform that situation in which counties, cities, and towns could each enact conflicting local criminal codes regulating the general public&#8217;s possession of firearms.&#8221; Id. at 801. Thus, the purpose of RCW 9.41.290 was &#8220;to eliminate a [Original Page 4] multiplicity of local laws relating to firearms and to advance uniformity in criminal firearms regulation.&#8221; Id.

The Supreme Court next considered RCW 9.41.290 in Pacific Northwest Shooting Park Association v. City of Sequim, 158 Wn.2d 342, 144 P.3d 276 (2006). In Pacific Northwest Shooting Park, the Association wanted to hold a gun show in the city convention center. The conditional use permit issued by the City of Sequim imposed three conditions on the ability of licensed and unlicensed gun dealers to sell or exchange firearms. The Association argued that these conditions were preempted by RCW 9.41.290. The Court disagreed. According to the Court, &#8220;Cherry supports the general proposition that when a municipality acts in a capacity that is comparable to that of a private party, the preemption clause does not apply.&#8221; Pacific Northwest Shooting Park, 158 Wn.2d at 357. The Court concluded that a &#8220;municipality acts in a proprietary capacity when it acts as the proprietor of a business enterprise for the private advantage of the municipality and it may exercise its business powers in much the same way as a private individual or corporation.&#8221; Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, &#8220;y issuing a temporary use permit, the city was leasing its property to PNSPA and acting in its private capacity as a property owner.&#8221; Id.
The Court held that RCW 9.41.290 does not prohibit a private property owner from imposing conditions on the sale of firearms on his or her property. RCW 9.41.290. Applying our reasoning in Cherry, it follows that a municipal property owner like a private property owner may impose conditions related to firearms for the use of its property in order to protect its property interests. For the same reason that a municipal employer may enact policies regarding possession of firearms in the workplace because a private employer may do so, a municipal property owner should be allowed to impose conditions related to sales of firearms on its property if a private property owner may impose them.

Pacific Northwest Shooting Park, 158 Wn.2d at 357. The Court explained that the &#8220;critical point is that the conditions the city imposed related to a permit for private use of its property. They were not laws or regulations of application to the general public.&#8221; Id.

Under Cherry and Pacific Northwest Shooting Park, RCW 9.41.290 does not preempt a city&#8217;s ability to impose conditions when it is acting in a private capacity. The question is whether this reasoning would apply if a city prohibited the general public from possessing firearms on city property. It is certainly true that RCW 9.41.290 would not preempt a private citizen from prohibiting possession of firearms on his or her property. This prohibition might be enforced by simply refusing to permit someone entry on to the private property with a firearm. However, in this respect, a city is not in the same position as a private citizen. Large parts of city property are generally open to the public. Indeed, citizens may be required to enter city property, for example, to apply for a building permit. For these reasons, neither Cherry nor Pacific Northwest Shooting Park support the view that cities may prohibit the general public from possessing firearms on city property.

Under Cherry and Pacific Northwest Shooting Park, RCW 9.41.290 does not preempt a city&#8217;s ability to impose conditions when it is acting in a private capacity. The question is whether this reasoning would apply if a city prohibited the general public from possessing firearms on city property.

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One other thing I requested from Ed Orcutt was a determination if that AG's opinion http://www.atg.wa.gov/AGOOpinions/Opinion.aspx?section=archive&id=21188 applied to Counties as well. An individual can't request an AG's opinion, a Legislator can. This was the same day I request the info on the Sheriff's office and I haven't received his reply to that yet.

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