William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States 57--59 1829 (2d ed.)

It must however be acknowledged that in no respect have
the enlarged and profound views of those who framed the
constitution, nor the expectations of the public when they
adopted it, been so completely frustrated as in the practical
operation of the system so far as relates to the independence
of the electors.

It was supposed that the election of these two high officers
would be committed to men not likely to be swayed
by party or personal bias, who would act under no combination
with others, and be subject neither to intimidation
or corruption. It was asserted that the choice of several
persons to form an intermediate body of electors, would
be much less apt to convulse the community with extraordinary
movements, than the choice of one who was himself
to be the final object of their wishes.

Whether ferments and commotions would accompany a
general election by the whole body of the people, and
whether such a mode of election could be conveniently
practised in reference to the ratio of representatives prescribed
in the constitution, is yet to be ascertained; but experience
has fully convinced us, that the electors do not
assemble in their several states for a free exercise of their
own judgments, but for the purpose of electing the particular
candidate who happens to be preferred by the predominant
political party which has chosen those electors.
In some instances the principles on which they are chosen
are so far forgotten, that the electors publicly pledge
themselves to vote for a particular individual, and thus the
whole foundation of this elaborate system is destroyed.

Another innovation has also been introduced. Members
of congress, entrusted only with the power of ordinary
legislation, have frequently formed themselves into a regular
body at the seat of government, and undertaken to
point out to the people certain persons as proper objects
of their choice. Although the mild and plausible garb of
recommendation is alone assumed, yet its effect is known
and felt to have been often great and sometimes irresistible.

If the Constitution, as originally proposed, had contained
a direct provision that the president and vice president
should be chosen by a majority of the two houses of
congress, it is not probable that this part of it would have
been adopted.

That the chief executive magistrate should be the creature
of the legislature; that he should view in them the
source from which he sprung, and by which he was to be
continued, would at once destroy the dignity and independence
of his station, and render him no longer what the
Constitution intended,--an impartial and inflexible administrator
of the public interests. To the people alone he
would no longer consider himself responsible, but he
would be led to respect, and would be fearful to offend, a
power higher than the people.

Such principles cannot be found in the Constitution;
and it is wholly inconsistent with its spirit and its essence,
to effectuate indirectly, that which directly is not avowed
or intended. These instances fully prove that the safety of
the people greatly depends on a close adherence to the
letter and spirit of their excellent Constitution; but it is
probable that a late failure will prevent a renewal of the
last mentioned attempt. And in reference to the election
of 1828, it has not been renewed, but, with a strict adherence
to the forms prescribed, the voice of a great majority
of the people has decided the choice.

Before we close the subject, it is proper to add that, in
one respect, the caution of the Constitution cannot be violated--no
senator or representative or person holding an
office of trust or profit under the United States can be an
elector, and therefore the vote of every such person would
be void.