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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
September 2013:
Department of Homeland Security:
Opportunities Exist to Enhance Visibility over Collaborative Field
Mechanisms:
GAO-13-734:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-13-734, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
DHS is the third-largest department in the federal government, with an
annual budget of about $60 billion, 200,000 staff, and a broad range
of missions. In 2002, DHS was created from 22 legacy agencies. The
geographic overlap of these agencies’ legacy field office structures
was extensive, underscoring the importance of collaboration among them
when conducting missions that crossed across boundaries. As a follow-
on to GAO’s September 2012 report on DHS’s efforts to integrate field
operations, GAO was asked to review DHS and key operational components’
use of collaborative mechanisms. This report (1) assesses DHS’s
visibility over collaborative field mechanisms established by
component agencies, and (2) describes factors that enhance or impede
collaboration within these mechanisms, and the extent to which DHS has
collected and disseminated successful collaborative practices.
GAO analyzed selected mechanisms’ guidance; conducted 10 mechanism
site visits based on their geographic diversity, among other factors;
and compared their practices with collaboration practices identified
in previous GAO work. GAO also interviewed DHS and component officials.
What GAO Found:
Opportunities exist for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
enhance its visibility over collaborative field mechanisms (i.e.,
multiagency groups such as task forces, committees, and teams that
enhance stakeholder collaboration to more effectively and efficiently
achieve their missions) established by component agencies. DHS, at the
departmental level, has limited visibility over the universe and
operation of these mechanisms and does not identify information from
them that could further enhance collaboration across DHS and inform
future DHS decisions. In the absence of a single DHS regional/field
structure, DHS components have created collaborative mechanisms to
better integrate field operations by better coordinating their
missions and sharing information. However, when GAO sought to identify
these mechanisms, in conjunction with DHS, senior DHS officials stated
that while they maintain regular visibility over component activities—
which may involve these collaborative mechanisms—DHS does not collect
information on the types of mechanisms and collaborative practices
these mechanisms employ because the mechanisms operate under the
components, and thus this information was not readily available at the
departmental level. DHS officials stated that primary oversight over
the mechanisms is the responsibility of the operational components or
mechanism participants. However, DHS’s own strategic goals emphasize
the importance of cross-departmental integration and coordination to
enhance DHS’s mission, and DHS could benefit-—on a strategic level—-
from greater awareness of these mechanisms and the collaborative
practices they employ. DHS is ultimately accountable for the resources
that support these mechanisms, and is responsible for decision making
about its overall field structure and for moving the department closer
to its goal of greater component unification and integration. By
collecting additional information on collaborative mechanisms, DHS
could achieve better visibility over the universe of existing
mechanisms, and thus be better positioned to analyze or implement any
future changes to DHS’s regional/field structure.
Participants from each of the collaborative mechanisms GAO reviewed
identified several common factors that enhanced their collaboration,
which DHS could benefit from collecting and disseminating on a broader
scale. For example, participants identified the value of sharing
resources, information, and recognition of successful missions as
examples of successful collaboration practices they employed.
Officials also cited collaboration challenges, including resource
constraints, rotation of key personnel, and lack of leadership
commitment. As GAO’s fieldwork indicated, similar collaboration issues
are relevant to multiple components, thus, DHS leadership could
benefit from undertaking a review of collaborative mechanisms to
solicit and identify promising practices, and then sharing this
information among all components. In addition, given DHS’s more
strategic perspective, a more centralized DHS clearinghouse of
collaborative practices information could be more efficient to collect
and more easily accessed by a wider range of DHS components than under
the current structure, where such information may not be readily
shared outside of individual components or mechanisms. Collecting and
disseminating information on collaborative practices would allow DHS
to inform components about promising practices and lessons learned
from which they could benefit.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DHS (1) collect information on existing
collaborative mechanisms for better visibility over them, and (2)
collect promising practices from the mechanisms and distribute them to
components. DHS concurred with the recommendations and identified
planned actions to address them.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-734]. For more
information, contact Joseph Kirschbaum at (202) 512-9971 or
kirschbaumj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Opportunities Exist for DHS to Enhance Its Visibility over
Collaborative Field Mechanisms of Its Key Operational Components:
Participants Identified Practices That Enhanced or Served as
Challenges to Collaboration; DHS Could Benefit from Collecting and
Disseminating Promising Practices:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Description of DHS Collaborative Field Mechanisms Selected
and Visited:
Appendix II: Description of DHS Collaborative Field Mechanisms
Identified, but Not Visited:
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix IV: Key Issues to Consider when Implementing Interagency
Collaborative Mechanisms:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Operational Component
Collaborative Field Mechanisms Selected for Our Site Visits:
Figures:
Figure 1: Geographic Overlap among FEMA, CBP, ICE, and USCG
Operational Boundaries in the Southwestern Region of the United States:
Figure 2: States and Territories That Include Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and Key Operational Component Collaborative Field
Mechanisms and Our Site Visit Locations:
Figure 3: Successful Collaborative Practices Most Frequently
Identified by Participants from Selected Field Mechanisms:
Figure 4: Challenges to Collaboration Identified Most Frequently by
Participants from Selected Field Mechanisms:
Abbreviations:
ACTT: Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats:
ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives:
BEST: Border Enforcement Security Task Force:
BUR: Bottom-Up Review Report:
CBIG: Caribbean Border Interagency Group:
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
COP: Common Operational Picture:
CTCEU/TTPG: Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit Terrorist
Tracking and Pursuit Group:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
DHS: U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: U.S. Department of Defense:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
FURA: Forces United for Rapid Action:
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act:
GPRAMA: GPRA Modernization Act of 2010:
HSI: Homeland Security Investigations:
HSTF-SE: Homeland Security Task Force Southeast:
I&A: Office of Intelligence and Analysis:
ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
IOC: Interagency Operations Center:
JFC: Joint Field Command:
JIATF-South: Joint Interagency Task Force-South:
JTT: Joint Targeting Team:
NBU: National BEST Unit:
NCTC: National Counterterrorism Center:
NSARC: National Search and Rescue Committee:
OAM: Office of Air and Marine:
OBIM: Office of Biometric Identity Management:
OIC: Operational Integration Center:
OPS: Office of Operations Coordination and Planning:
OVS: Operations Plan Vigilant Sentry:
PA&E: Program Analysis & Evaluation Division:
QHSR: Quadrennial Homeland Security Review:
RCT: Regional Concurrence Team:
ReCoM: Regional Coordinating Mechanism:
RISC: Regional Interagency Steering Committee:
SAFE: Security and Accountability for Every Port Act:
SEWG: Special Event Working Group:
STBIC: South Texas Border Intelligence Center:
STC: South Texas Campaign:
TCO: transnational criminal organization:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
USAO: U.S. Attorney's Office:
USCG: U.S. Coast Guard:
USCIS: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services:
USMS: U.S. Marshals Service:
USSS: U.S. Secret Service:
[End of section]
GAO:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
September 27, 2013:
Congressional Requesters:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the third-largest cabinet-
level department in the federal government, with an annual budget of
about $60 billion, 200,000 staff, and a broad range of missions,
including aviation, maritime, and border security, as well as
emergency management and infrastructure protection, among others. In
2002, when DHS was created from 22 separate agencies, among other
actions, it had to integrate many disparate agencies--some with long
histories of independent or autonomous operations, and all with
distinct operational cultures--while maintaining their unique
strengths and capabilities.[Footnote 1] This merger presented
significant public policy and management challenges for DHS. With its
establishment, DHS also inherited the legacy field office structures
and authorities of its component agencies, which resulted in an
environment where components were conducting their respective missions
in overlapping geographic regions.These overlapping component
boundaries were especially relevant to DHS's seven key operational
components--U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS)--and each component was accustomed
to carrying out its missions within its identified set of geographic
regions and system of field offices.[Footnote 2]
Further, in November 2010, we reported on the overlap in mission and
operational boundaries that exists among agencies at the northern and
southern borders--a condition that requires coordination and
collaboration for efficient and effective law enforcement.[Footnote 3]
In some cases, agencies have separate responsibility for investigating
crimes that are committed by the same criminals or organizations in
the same geographic region, making agency collaboration and
coordination important to their mission success. The overlap in
geographic and operational boundaries among DHS components that
continues to exist underscores the importance of collaboration and
coordination among these components when conducting their missions 10
years after beginning operations under DHS. Agencies not sharing
information or coordinating their operations can lead to competition,
interference, and operational inflexibility, as the DHS Inspector
General reported in 2005 and 2007.[Footnote 4] However, interagency
mechanisms or strategies to coordinate programs that address
crosscutting issues may reduce potentially duplicative, overlapping,
and fragmented efforts.[Footnote 5] Figure 1 provides an example of
the extent to which geographic boundaries overlap in the southwestern
United States for four of the seven DHS key operational components
discussed in this report--FEMA, CBP, ICE, and USCG.
Figure 1: Geographic Overlap among FEMA, CBP, ICE, and USCG
Operational Boundaries in the Southwestern Region of the United States:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated regional map]
FEMA operational boundaries:
DHS field office[A]: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA):
Denton, Texas.
CBP operational boundaries:
DHS field office[A]: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP):
Del Rio, Texas;
El Paso, Texas;
Laredo, Texas;
Marfa, Texas;
McAllen, Texas;
New Orleans, Louisiana.
ICE operational boundaries:
DHS field office[A]: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE):
Dallas, Texas;
El Paso, Texas;
Houston, Texas;
New Orleans, Louisiana;
San Antonio, Texas.
USCG operational boundaries:
DHS field office[A]: U.S. Coast Guard (USCG):
Corpus Christi, Texas;
Houston, Texas;
New Orleans, Louisiana.
Source: GAO; MapInfo (map).
[A] The map represents geographic and operational boundaries for FEMA
Region VI, CBP Office of Border Patrol sectors, ICE Homeland Security
Investigations special agent in charge field offices, and USCG sectors.
[End of figure]
Recognizing the overlapping geographic and operational boundaries of
its components and the potential coordination and other benefits to be
gained by better aligning its field organizational structure, DHS has
considered potential organizational changes to its field structure
twice since its inception in 2003. These efforts included a
recommendation in DHS's 2010 Bottom-Up Review Report (BUR) that the
department create a single unified field structure for its key
operational components to improve intra-agency coordination, among
other things.[Footnote 6] However, we reported in September 2012 that
creating a single unified field structure was no longer DHS's
preferred approach because of operational and budgetary constraints.
[Footnote 7] We also reported that DHS could have better documented
its examination of the potential costs and benefits of a single
unified field structure. The department agreed with our findings and
acknowledged that its efforts to assess regionalization, colocation,
consolidation, and operational integration options could have been
better documented.
Even without a single unified field structure, increasing regional
collaboration across DHS components may help facilitate more effective
and efficient mission execution. For example, increasing collaboration
across components could facilitate information sharing and allow
agencies to coordinate their patrols within a common geographic
region, allowing them to more effectively and efficiently conduct
their missions. Increasing collaboration within DHS also aligns with
both congressional and executive branch recognition of the need for
improved collaboration across the federal government as indicated by
the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010
(GPRAMA), which, among other things, establishes a new framework aimed
at taking a more crosscutting and integrated approach to focusing on
results and improving government performance.[Footnote 8] Moreover,
DHS reported in its fiscal years 2012-2016 strategic plan[Footnote 9]
that while effective mechanisms exist for interagency and
intradepartmental operational and intelligence coordination, the
department must learn from the successes of the Joint Interagency Task
Force-South (JIATF-South) and other similar constructs to further
integrate and enhance domain awareness across its efforts to secure
the border and expedite lawful travel and trade.[Footnote 10]
This report is a follow-on to our September 2012 report on DHS's
efforts to improve collaboration and integrate its field operations.
[Footnote 11] It responds to your request that we review the extent to
which DHS and key operational components are using collaborative field
mechanisms--that is, multiagency groups such as task forces,
committees, and teams that enhance stakeholder collaboration across
the participating agencies in order to more effectively and
efficiently achieve their missions.[Footnote 12] This report (1)
assesses the extent to which DHS has identified the collaborative
field mechanisms of its key operational components, and (2) describes
factors that participants of selected mechanisms identified that
enhance or are challenges to their collaboration, and assesses the
extent to which DHS has collected and disseminated successful
collaborative practices.
To address the first objective, we contacted DHS officials to identify
a list of collaborative mechanisms that they deemed to be successful
examples of field component collaboration while we also independently
identified such mechanisms. Of the 13 mechanism types ultimately
identified, 11 mechanisms focused on law enforcement activities.
[Footnote 13] For these 13 mechanisms, we examined organizational
documents related to mechanism mission, objectives, stakeholder
composition, locations, and date organized, among other things. We
also interviewed officials from the DHS Office of Operations
Coordination and Planning about the establishment and operation of
these 13 mechanism types. We analyzed documentation (i.e., component
daily activity reports) obtained from senior DHS headquarters
officials to identify the extent to which the department has
visibility over the collaborative field mechanism activities--
including any plans to increase visibility over the mechanisms in the
future.
To address the second objective, we selected 4 types of collaborative
field mechanisms from the list of 13, including the Regional
Coordinating Mechanism (ReCoM), the Border Enforcement Security Task
Force (BEST), the South Texas Campaign Joint Targeting Team (JTT), and
the Regional Interagency Steering Committee (RISC). We based our
selection of these 4 types of mechanisms on the following factors:
geographic location, continuity of the mechanism (established for at
least 16 months), participation of multiple DHS component agencies,
and variation in the lead component agency. Except for JTT, we
selected mechanism types that existed in more than one location to
allow for geographic comparison--such as BEST, with 35 locations
throughout the United States. Appendix I describes each of the
selected mechanisms in detail. Among these 4 different mechanism
types, we then selected 10 individual mechanism sites--3 ReCoMs, 4
BESTs, 1 JTT, and 2 RISCs--for more in-depth review. For each of the
selected mechanisms, we interviewed senior headquarters officials to
discuss their views on the successes and challenges experienced with
collaboration, including how the successes are replicated and
communicated across the mechanisms and how challenges are addressed.
At each of the 10 mechanisms we visited, we gathered information from
participants on what they believed to be promising practices that
helped them to succeed as collaborative mechanisms, as well as the
factors they viewed as challenges to their collaboration. We also
discussed their efforts to establish performance measures to assess
mechanism effectiveness. We reviewed planning, operations, and
management integration documents such as strategic plans, annual
performance reports, and memorandums of understanding or agreements
among the participating agencies. We compared these documents and
their responses with the information-sharing and collaboration
practices identified in our past work on this subject.[Footnote 14] We
interviewed responsible senior DHS headquarters officials to determine
the extent to which the department has collected and reported on the
collaborative practices identified by the mechanisms. We also
interviewed component officials at the selected mechanisms to identify
the extent to which information, such as information about
performance, successes, challenges, and collaborative practices used
are provided to DHS headquarters officials who have departmental-level
oversight of these mechanisms. Appendix II provides a listing and
description of the remaining 9 mechanisms not selected for a more in-
depth review. For a more detailed discussion on our scope and
methodology, see appendix III.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September
2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Past DHS Efforts to Integrate Component Field Operations:
DHS's interest in better integrating its legacy agencies has been long-
standing, and on several occasions since 2004 the department has
identified an approach or vision for establishing a more unified field
structure to enhance mission coordination among its component agencies
but has not implemented such a structure. As we reported in September
2012, according to senior DHS officials, the fragmentation associated
with each operational component having different boundaries for its
area of responsibility prompted some in DHS and other stakeholders to
promote the idea of a single unified DHS field structure, sometimes
referred to as regionalization.[Footnote 15] Proponents believed that
a more unified structure of DHS regional offices could foster better
collaboration and integration of multiple components' operations,
making DHS as a whole more responsive and better prepared to counter
man-made or natural threats. In addition to improving operational
effectiveness, proponents of a single DHS field structure envisioned
opportunities for long-term cost savings through the sharing of
assets, including office space.
For example, in 2005 and 2006, DHS considered implementing an
overarching plan to unify its components under a single unified field
structure, but then opted not to pursue this vision because of
component resistance to the concept and significant up-front costs
associated with colocating components. Again, in 2010, DHS chose not
to realign its component regional configurations into a single DHS
regional structure, as recommended in its BUR. In 2012, DHS and
component officials stated that transforming the existing structure
into a single unified DHS system would be a huge undertaking, and
those not in favor of large-scale regionalization cited numerous
challenges, including budgetary constraints, and other drawbacks to
such a plan. As we reported in September 2012, while DHS's intention
of improving collaboration among its agencies is a sound goal--whether
through regionalization or other means--its approach has lacked the
systematic analyses and documentation needed to support its proposals
for change. The department agreed with our findings and acknowledged
that its efforts could have been better documented.[Footnote 16]
In lieu of a single unified field structure, DHS has proposed other
alternatives for enhancing collaboration among its components in the
field, but has not implemented these proposals. For example, the
department reported plans to harmonize operations and intelligence--
utilizing concepts and structures modeled after JIATF-South. In 2012,
DHS identified a new approach for enhancing regional collaboration
among its components through virtual integration--that is, by
improving component agencies' coordination of mission activities and
communication through the use of technology. According to a senior DHS
official, virtual integration would allow for coordination of
component functions without actually consolidating or merging the
functions. DHS's intention toward virtual integration was communicated
in its fiscal years 2012-2016 strategic plan and reported to us in
September 2012.[Footnote 17] However, in 2013, DHS officials stated
that the department was not specifically pursuing virtual approaches
to regional coordination. DHS officials also reported that although
DHS no longer planned to pursue virtual collaboration on a larger
scale, it was occurring on a more limited scale, within the department
and components, for certain efforts.[Footnote 18]
Component Efforts to Integrate Field Operations through Collaborative
Mechanisms:
In the absence of a unified field structure, DHS's operational
components have established and utilized collaborative mechanisms,
including virtual approaches, to better integrate their field
operations. Specifically, DHS field components have employed
collaborative mechanisms to coordinate their missions and share
information among multiple stakeholders in order to increase their
mission effectiveness and efficiencies. These mechanisms have both
similarities and differences in how they are structured, which
missions or threats they focus on, and which agencies participate in
them, among other things. All of the mechanisms identified in this
report involve multiple DHS components, as well as other federal,
state, and local agency participants, and their purpose is to improve
operational integration, coordination, and efficiency among DHS
components. These mechanisms focus on a range of missions and are
located throughout the United States. Figure 2 shows the states and
territories that contain 1 or more of the 13 collaborative field
mechanism types (including the 4 mechanism types we selected for
further study) involving DHS's key operational components that we
identified in conjunction with the department and these components.
Figure 2: States and Territories That Include Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and Key Operational Component Collaborative Field
Mechanisms and Our Site Visit Locations:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map]
Map depicts locations of the following components throughout the
United States:
Collaborative field mechanism:
1. Regional Coordinating Mechanism (ReCoM)[A];
2. Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST);
3. South Texas Campaign Joint Targeting Team (JTT);
4. Federal Emergency Management Agency Regional Interagency Steering
Committee (RISC)[B];
5. Counterterrorism & Criminal Exploitation Unit Terrorist Tracking
and Pursuit Group (CTCEU/TTP);
6. Homeland Security Task Force Southeast (HSTF-SE);
7. Caribbean Border Interagency Group (CBIG);
8. Operational Integration Center (OIC);
9. National Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC);
10. South Texas Border Intelligence Center (SBIC);
11. Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT);
12. Interagency Operations Centers (IOC)[C];
13. Special Events Working Group (SEWG)[D].
Visited:
1. Southern California; Central Texas; Southern Texas.
2. Southern California; Western Washington; Central Texas; Southern
Texas.
3. Southern Texas.
4. Northern Georgia.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS information; MapInfo (map).
Notes: The shaded areas reflect only the states and territories
containing the coordination mechanisms reviewed for this report. This
figure does not represent the locations of DHS mechanisms that were
not reviewed.
[A] An additional ReCoM not depicted on the map is located in the U.S.
territory of Guam.
[B] Each of the 10 FEMA regional offices manages a RISC. While the
geographic area covered by the RISC aligns with that covered by each
region, the RISC meetings are not necessarily located at a specific
geographic point and can occur throughout the region or be held
virtually.
[End of figure]
All 4 mechanism types we selected for a more in-depth review (ReCoM,
BEST, JTT, and RISC) had been established through formal organizing
documents (e.g., a charter or memorandum of understanding); involve
stakeholders from various federal, state, and local agencies; and have
an established lead agency to provide oversight and guidance to
participants. In addition, all 4 of these mechanism types are funded
by the participating agencies--no funding has been allocated or
budgeted specifically for these collaborative mechanisms.[Footnote 19]
* ReCoMs were officially established in 2011 through the Maritime
Operations Coordination Plan, which was signed by their Executive Team
of the Senior Guidance Team, composed of the Director of ICE Homeland
Security Investigations (HSI), the Commissioner of CBP, and the
Commandant of the Coast Guard. The Maritime Operations Coordination
Plan directs these agencies to utilize the fusion of intelligence,
planning, and operations to target the threat of transnational
terrorist and criminal acts along the coastal border. USCG serves as
the lead agency responsible for planning and coordinating among
components, and as of June 2013, 32 ReCoMs had been established
aligning with the USCG sectors' geographic areas of responsibility.
* In 2005, the first BEST unit was organized and led by ICE HSI, in
partnership with CBP, in Laredo, Texas, and as of June 2013, 35 BESTs
had been established throughout the United States. The BESTs have a
mission to identify, disrupt, and dismantle existing and emerging
threats at U.S. land, sea, and air borders.
* The first JTT was organized in November 2011 as a CBP-led
partnership among the U.S. Border Patrol, CBP Office of Field
Operations, ICE HSI, and the government of Mexico to support the South
Texas Campaign (STC). The purpose of the STC is to integrate
intelligence, pursue enhanced coordination with the government of
Mexico, and conduct targeted operations to disrupt and dismantle
transnational criminal organizations.[Footnote 20] As of June 2013,
JTTs had been established across four geographic boundary areas in Del
Rio, Laredo, McAllen, and Houston, Texas.
* The first RISC was organized in 2003 to provide a forum for senior
DHS officials to enhance emergency management and homeland security
for all hazards through a collaborative, regional approach involving
federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental organization and
private sector partners. As of June 2013, a RISC had been established
in each of the 10 FEMA regions.
The purpose of all of these selected mechanisms includes increasing
operational effectiveness through greater collaboration and leveraging
of resources and expertise. Our review identified commonalities within
the same type of mechanism across multiple locations, as well as
commonalities across the 4 types of mechanisms that we focused on for
our review. Table 1 provides a summary description of the 4 selected
collaborative field mechanism types that we reviewed and the locations
we visited for each of them.
Table 1: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Operational Component
Collaborative Field Mechanisms Selected for Our Site Visits:
Mechanism name: Regional Coordinating Mechanisms (ReCoM);
Description of the DHS operational component field mechanisms selected
for site visits:
Selected agencies[B]: Lead agencies: U.S. Coast Guard (USCG),
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security
Investigations (HSI), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP);
Stakeholders: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO), state, local, and
tribal law enforcement agencies, and foreign law enforcement agencies;
Sites we visited: San Diego, California; Houston, Texas; and Corpus
Christi, Texas;
Mechanism purpose/description: The purpose of the ReCoM is to plan and
conduct joint operations that target terrorist and criminal activity
along the coastal border. ReCoM participants work collaboratively to
share intelligence information and conduct homeland security
enforcement activities.
Mechanism name: Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST);
Description of the DHS operational component field mechanisms selected
for site visits:
Selected agencies[B]: Lead agency: ICE HSI
Stakeholders: CBP; DEA; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF); FBI; USCG; USAO; state, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies; and foreign law enforcement agencies;
Sites we visited: San Diego, California; Houston, Texas; Laredo, Texas;
and Blaine, Washington;
Mechanism purpose/description: The purpose of the BEST is to provide a
platform for coordination across all levels of government--both
domestic and international--to investigate border-related crimes, such
as narcotics smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, and the
illegal import/export of weapons.
Mechanism name: South Texas Campaign Joint Targeting Team (JTT);
Description of the DHS operational component field mechanisms selected
for site visits:
Selected agencies[B]: Lead agency: CBP;
Stakeholders: ICE HSI, DEA, FBI, ATF, Department of Defense (DOD),
USAO, USMS, Texas Department of Public Safety, state, local, and
tribal law enforcement agencies, and foreign law enforcement agencies;
Site we visited: Laredo, Texas;
Mechanism purpose/description: The primary purpose of the JTT is to
gather and deconflict intelligence information on South Texas Campaign
targets and initiate operations against those identified targets.
Mechanism name: Federal Emergency Management Agency Regional
Interagency Steering Committee (RISC);
Description of the DHS operational component field mechanisms selected
for site visits:
Selected agencies[B]: Lead agency: FEMA;
Stakeholders: CBP; ICE; Federal Protective Service; DHS Science and
Technology Directorate; DHS National Protection and Programs
Directorate; TSA; USCG; federal emergency support agencies; state,
local, and tribal agencies; voluntary organizations; educational
institutions; private sector entities; and nongovernmental
organizations;
Sites we visited: Atlanta, Georgia and Bothell, Washington;
Description of the DHS operational
Mechanism purpose/description: The purpose of the RISC is to provide
senior-level officials with a forum to share their expertise and
engage with other stakeholders on addressing issues related to
disaster planning and emergency preparedness.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS information.
[A] See appendix I for additional information (i.e., description and
locations) on the selected mechanisms.
[B] We included the lead agency (or agencies) for each mechanism, but
did not provide a comprehensive listing of stakeholders, which may
include other federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector
agencies.
[End of table]
Opportunities Exist for DHS to Enhance Its Visibility over
Collaborative Field Mechanisms of Its Key Operational Components:
DHS, at the departmental level, has limited awareness of the universe
of component field collaborative mechanisms and of the types and
quality of collaborative practices they employ to better coordinate
and integrate mission operations. As a result of its limited
visibility over these mechanisms, DHS headquarters is not well
positioned to routinely identify valuable information obtained from
the mechanisms that could inform decisions about DHS field structures
or further enhance collaboration across components.
According to senior DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning
(OPS) officials, DHS headquarters does not actively catalog or
routinely monitor the universe of collaborative field mechanisms
because they are organized and monitored by their respective lead
operational components or participants. However, although the
collaborative mechanisms may be monitored by individual components,
the components do not have the same high-level perspective--or
accountability--as the department as a whole, to look across all
components and assess the state of collaboration occurring in the
field. Moreover, according to senior OPS officials, their departmental-
level office is focused on the specific outcomes of operational
activities and not whether the activities are carried out by a certain
collaborative mechanism, as the collaborative mechanisms employed to
accomplish tasks are not as important as the end results. Therefore,
these DHS headquarters officials believe they have visibility--
primarily through the components--over activities carried out by
collaborative mechanisms, but stated that they have little or no
visibility over the nature of the collaboration itself, since they do
not collect this type of information. OPS officials also noted that
the Program Analysis & Evaluation Division (PA&E), within the Office
of the Chief Financial Officer, which is involved with performance
measurement, monitors whether the operational components are meeting
their performance requirements or goals, but does not track
performance or other information on cross-component field mechanisms.
PA&E officials stated that their division is responsible for strategic-
level management and oversight, not operational-level, and per various
laws and policy frameworks, their division measures performance of
higher-level DHS programs.
DHS's limited visibility at the departmental level of the number and
type of existing collaborative field mechanisms was demonstrated in
part by the challenges DHS headquarters experienced in providing us
with a list of mechanisms. Specifically, when we asked for a list of
formalized mechanisms that DHS headquarters considered to be
successful examples of field collaboration, this information was not
readily available at the departmental level, according to senior DHS
officials. After consulting with operational component officials, DHS
headquarters provided 6 of the 13 examples that constituted our final
list of mechanisms. We acknowledge that identifying a universe of
successful collaborative field mechanisms can be difficult, in part
because of the relatively large size of DHS and the breadth of
activities involving component agencies. However, systematically
collecting information (e.g., related to operational mission,
capabilities, performance, etc.) about the mechanisms from the
component agencies that sponsor them would yield important information
about which mechanisms are effective.
Senior DHS headquarters officials stated that although they have
limited visibility over the universe of collaborative mechanisms and
the specific collaborative practices utilized by the groups, the
department does obtain regular knowledge of component operational
activities and results. For example, senior OPS officials said that
they receive situation reports about daily operational actions broken
out by lead component, regardless of whether the operation is
affiliated with a particular collaborative mechanism. They also noted
their DHS Common Operational Picture (COP), which provides an
unclassified consolidated information hub for homeland security
partners to ensure critical terrorism-and disaster-related information
is available.[Footnote 21] However, senior DHS officials agreed that
having increased visibility and additional mechanism information at
the headquarters level could benefit departmental and component
efforts to improve collaboration in the field and better integrate
operations. For example, obtaining and analyzing this information,
which DHS has lacked in recent deliberations about revamping its field
structure, could provide DHS with a stronger basis for decision making
regarding the establishment of new mechanisms, the effective
allocation of scarce resources, or other changes to its field
structure. Having some access to this information gains importance
because the potential increase in mission effectiveness and
efficiencies that may have been realized from earlier regionalization
plans that were not adopted could be accomplished through other means--
including through collaborative field mechanisms.
DHS's limited ability to monitor the collaborative mechanisms
operating under the DHS umbrella is inconsistent with its own
departmental-level strategic goals. Specifically, several key DHS
initiatives and documents, including the Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review (QHSR), BUR, and the DHS fiscal years 2012-2016 strategic plan,
contain strategic goals aimed at greater unification and integration
of efforts across individual DHS components.[Footnote 22] In
particular, DHS's strategic plan specifically outlines objectives
related to the goals of "improving cross-departmental management,
policy, and functional integration," as well as "enhancing
intelligence, information sharing, and integrated operations." DHS's
limited departmental visibility over these mechanisms is also
inconsistent with elements of the Standards for Internal Control in
the Federal Government, which calls for the establishment of control
activities, such as a mechanism to identify and monitor the activities
of components within an organization, to help ensure achievement of
the organization's objectives.[Footnote 23] The internal control
objective pertaining to effectiveness and efficiency of operations is
of particular relevance to DHS's oversight of the collaborative
mechanisms and relates more to the assessment of the efficiency of the
mechanisms themselves in addition to the operational-level visibility
that we discuss above. Collecting information on the existing
collaborative mechanisms will enable the department to better monitor
these mechanisms. Doing so could also better position DHS to judge at
a more strategic level which mechanisms offer potential for
replication in other geographic or mission areas. Given current budget
constraints, it is important for DHS to identify and promote the most
effective and efficient collaborative field mechanisms as possible.
Participants Identified Practices That Enhanced or Served as
Challenges to Collaboration; DHS Could Benefit from Collecting and
Disseminating Promising Practices:
Participants Identified Common Practices That Enhanced Collaboration,
Which DHS Could Benefit from Collecting and Disseminating on a Broader
Scale:
Common Practices That Enhanced Collaboration:
During the course of our review, participants from the four selected
DHS collaborative mechanism types provided information on successful
practices that enhanced their collaboration that could be useful for
DHS to collect and disseminate on a broader scale. At each of our 10
site visits, we asked cognizant participants to identify and provide
examples of collaborative practices or other factors that they
considered particularly important to the success of their group's
collaboration and operations. We evaluated their responses and
summarized them into seven broad categories, as shown in figure 3,
based upon the practices that were reported most frequently. This
summary information provides valuable insights on approaches for
enhancing collaboration among the DHS component agencies--information
that could also be beneficial for DHS to collect from a larger group
of component mechanisms.
Figure 3: Successful Collaborative Practices Most Frequently
Identified by Participants from Selected Field Mechanisms:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Selected DHS collaborative field mechanism: Regional Coordination
Mechanism (ReCoM);
Selected successful collaborative practices most frequently identified
by participants from field mechanisms:
Positive working relationships/communication: 3 of 3 reported;
Selected examples (3 sites):
Monthly meetings ensure visibility of law enforcement and security
issues affecting the port;
Frequent meetings promote relationship building and provide an open
forum for communication.
Sharing resources: 3 of 3 reported;
Selected examples (3 sites):
Every agency brings resources or capabilities, making turf battles
less likely;
Participants routinely share land, air, and marine assets for joint
operations.
Sharing information: 3 of 3 reported;
Selected examples (3 sites):
USCG would be unable to identify vessel targets without intelligence
from another agency;
ReCoM compiles 20-40 monthly field intelligence reports--shared among
partners for operations planning.
Shared public recognition: 2 of 3 reported;
Selected examples (3 sites):
Joint press releases are typically issued to announce participants and
operation outcomes;
All joint operations and key successes are disseminated to
participants to highlight interagency successes.
Compatible technology: 1 of 3 reported;
Selected examples (3 sites):
Technology helps to coordinate resources with external participants
and overcome the lack of colocation.
Sharing a common mission: 2 of 3 reported;
Selected examples (3 sites):
Having a mutual goal ensures participation;
Sharing a common purpose promotes unity among participants.
Physical colocation of participants: 1 of 3 reported.
Selected examples (3 sites):
Colocation enables operations planning and database/information
sharing. It also helps build trust and overcome cultural barriers
among agency participants.
Selected DHS collaborative field mechanism: Border Enforcement
Security Task Force (BEST);
Selected successful collaborative practices most frequently identified
by participants from field mechanisms:
Positive working relationships/communication: 4 of 4 reported;
Selected examples (4 sites):
Developing trust and building relationships helps participants respond
quickly to a crisis;
Communicating frequently helps participants eliminate duplication of
efforts.
Sharing resources: 4 of 4 reported;
Selected examples (4 sites):
Multiple agencies' legal authorities are used to increase likelihood of
prosecution and longer sentences; Participants leverage all resources
and capabilities for more robust investigations.
Sharing information: 4 of 4 reported;
Selected examples (4 sites):
Sharing information avoids duplication of investigative efforts;
Sharing information allows participants to build complex,
multijurisdictional investigations.
Shared public recognition: 4 of 4 reported;
Selected examples (4 sites):
Shared public recognition: All BEST investigations are attributed to
the BEST--not the participating law enforcement agencies; Shared
public recognition promotes goodwill and participation.
Compatible technology: 3 of 4 reported;
Selected examples (4 sites):
Compatible technology: Key participants use a shared communications
system to conduct investigations; Having compatible technology helps
facilitate information sharing in real-time.
Sharing a common mission: 2 of 4 reported;
Selected examples (4 sites):
Having a common goal creates an incentive for participation; Having a
BEST unit often leads to a decrease in organized crime in a particular
region, which is mutually beneficial to all participants.
Physical colocation of participants: 4 of 4 reported.
Selected examples (4 sites):
Colocation builds mutual trust and helps ensure that information will
not be compromised by participants; Colocation enables real-time
participant collaboration on cases.
Selected DHS collaborative field mechanism: South Texas Campaign Joint
Targeting Team (JTT);
Selected successful collaborative practices most frequently identified
by participants from field mechanisms:
Positive working relationships/communication: 1 of 1 reported;
Selected example (1 site):
Establishing good working relationships allows participants to conduct
more effective real-time investigations.
Sharing resources: 1 of 1 reported;
Selected example (1 site):
JTT would not be able to pursue or expand certain cases without the
assistance of key participants.
Sharing information: 1 of 1 reported;
Selected example (1 site):
Participants deconflict intelligence information, eliminating
redundancy.
Shared public recognition: 1 of 1 reported;
Selected example (1 site):
Participants are given equal recognition for their contributions to an
investigation.
Compatible technology: 1 of 1 reported;
Selected example (1 site):
Key participants use a shared communication system for investigations.
Sharing a common mission: 1 of 1 reported;
Selected example (1 site):
JTT success is partly due to providing surveillance and deconflicting
intelligence on common targets in the South Texas region.
Physical colocation of participants: 1 of 1 reported.
Selected example (1 site):
Colocation promotes unity and allows participants to focus solely on
JTT priorities.
Selected DHS collaborative field mechanism: Regional Interagency
Steering Committee (RISC);
Selected successful collaborative practices most frequently identified
by participants from field mechanisms:
Positive working relationships/communication: 2 of 2 reported;
Selected examples (2 sites):
RISC forums foster positive relationships and build trust across all
levels of government and the private sector; Participants utilize
existing relationships to help facilitate a coordinated disaster
response.
Sharing resources: 2 of 2 reported;
Selected examples (2 sites):
Participants identify their resources and capabilities and develop
integrated actions for disaster response; Meetings involve discussions
on how DHS resources can support the whole emergency management
community.
Sharing information: 2 of 2 reported;
Selected examples (2 sites):
Participants routinely share lessons learned and best practices on
emergency management; During one RISC meeting, participants held a
training and exercise planning workshop to share information and
review regional capability priorities.
Shared public recognition: None identified;
Selected examples (2 sites):
Officials did not identify this as important to the success of the
RISC.
Compatible technology: 2 of 2 reported;
Selected examples (2 sites):
RISC forum organizers attempt to utilize technology to ensure maximum
participation. (e.g., videoconferences and webinars); Compatible
technology helps to ensure quarterly meetings occur.
Sharing a common mission: 2 of 2 reported;
Selected examples (2 sites):
RISC forums enable participants to develop a common understanding of
emergency management activities in the region; RISC participants
benefit from working groups and training centered on common
preparedness issues.
Physical colocation of participants: None identified.
Selected examples (2 sites):
Officials did not identify this as important to the success of the
RISC.
Selected DHS collaborative field mechanism: Summary of successful
collaborative practices reported by the 10 mechanisms;
Positive working relationships/communication: 10 of 10 reported;
Sharing resources: 10 of 10 reported;
Sharing information: 10 of 10 reported;
Shared public recognition: 7 of 10 reported;
Compatible technology: 7 of 10 reported;
Sharing a common mission: 7 of 10 reported;
Physical colocation of participants: 6 of 10 reported.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS information.
[End of figure]
Among participants that we interviewed, there was consensus that
certain practices facilitated more effective collaboration, which,
according to participants, contributed to the groups' overall
successes. In many cases, the same or similar successful collaborative
practices were reported by participants of different mechanism types
as well as by participants of the same mechanism type in different
geographic regions. For example, despite having a different mission
focus or operating in different geographic regions, participants we
interviewed from all three ReCoMs, all four BESTs, the JTT, and both
RISCs--the total sample population that we met with--identified three
of the seven categories of practices as keys to success: (1) positive
working relationships/communication, (2) sharing resources, and (3)
sharing information.
Furthermore, participants from most mechanisms also drew connections
among the successful collaborative factors. For example, participants
from all 10 mechanisms stated that forming positive working
relationships was tied to better information sharing among them.
Specifically, in our interviews, BEST mechanism officials stated that
developing trust and building relationships helps participants respond
quickly to a crisis, and communicating frequently helps participants
eliminate duplication of efforts. Participants from the ReCoMs, BESTs,
and JTT also reported that having positive working relationships built
on strong trust among participants was a key factor in their law
enforcement partnerships because of the sensitive nature of law
enforcement information, and the risks posed if it is not protected
appropriately. In turn, building positive working relationships was
facilitated by another collaborative factor identified as important by
6 of the 10 mechanisms: physical colocation of participants.
Specifically, participants from the mechanisms focused on law
enforcement investigations, such as the BESTs and JTT, reported that
being physically colocated with members from other agencies was
important for increasing the groups' effectiveness. Participants from
one of the three ReCoMs we visited also stated that colocation enables
operations planning and database/information sharing. It also helps
build trust and overcome cultural barriers among agency participants.
DHS Could Benefit from Collecting and Disseminating Information on
Successful Collaboration:
Successful collaboration practices can help the participating
components mitigate a variety of challenges, and they are generally
consistent with the seven key issues to consider when implementing
collaborative mechanisms that we identified in our 2012 report on
interagency collaboration.[Footnote 24] DHS leadership could benefit
from engaging the mechanisms--soliciting promising collaboration
practices information and organizing it through the lens of our seven
key collaborative issues. As noted earlier in this report, DHS does
not collect this type of information at the departmental level
primarily because the mechanisms operate under the components.
However, collecting promising practices information from the
collaborative mechanisms at the departmental level and disseminating
it to components throughout DHS would inform components about specific
practices from which they could also benefit. Senior DHS officials
agreed with this assessment. In addition, it may be more efficient for
a single DHS departmental-level office to collect and disseminate this
type of information than all the components individually, especially
given DHS's higher-level, strategic perspective across the department.
Also, given that our fieldwork indicated similar collaboration issues
are relevant to multiple components, a more centralized DHS
clearinghouse of collaborative promising practices information could
be more easily accessed by a wide range of DHS component stakeholders
than under the current structure, where such information is now
stovepiped and may not be readily shared outside of individual
components or mechanisms.
Key features of interagency collaboration include agencies
establishing or clarifying guidelines, agreements, or procedures for
sharing information. Among other things, these guidelines, agreements,
and procedures should identify and disseminate practices to facilitate
more effective communication and collaboration among federal, state,
and local agencies.[Footnote 25] The benefit of sharing promising
practices includes the ability to replicate positive program outcomes
by leveraging the experiences of different stakeholders with the same
or similar goals.[Footnote 26] Key features of interagency
collaboration also identify the sharing of promising practices as an
example of government agencies building capacity for improved
efficiency.[Footnote 27] Accordingly, DHS component agencies could
benefit from better access to collaborative promising practices, as
this would help them in their own efforts to leverage the experiences
of many collaborative mechanisms.
Officials Identified Common Barriers to Successful Collaboration:
Participants from the 10 collaborative field mechanisms we visited
also identified challenges or barriers that affected their
collaboration across components and made it more difficult. Using the
same approach as that for eliciting successful collaborative
practices, at each of the 10 locations we visited, we asked cognizant
participants to identify challenges to collaboration that they
believed had impeded their groups' operations or effectiveness. We
evaluated their responses and created three broad categories, as shown
in figure 4, based on the challenges that they reported most
frequently.
Figure 4: Challenges to Collaboration Identified Most Frequently by
Participants from Selected Field Mechanisms:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Resource constraints: 2 of 3 reported;
Selected examples (3 sites):
The participating agencies fund ReCoM positions out of their respective
operating budgets--no dedicated ReCoM funding has been provided. As a
result, some agencies are not able to participate (such as state and
local law enforcement) because of resource constraints; The inability
to acquire additional radar capabilities and certain assets makes it
difficult to achieve their goal of persistent presence.
Rotation of key personnel: 2 of 3 reported;
Selected examples (3 sites):
Prior to the development of a ReCoM operational plan, the rotation of
key personnel made it difficult to share information. Adopting a ReCoM
operational plan has helped to facilitate information sharing; As key
personnel rotate, it is sometimes challenging to make sure new
participants understand their roles, responsibilities, and functions.
Lack of leadership buy-in: 3 of 3 reported;
Selected examples (3 sites):
ReCoM participants stated that it would be helpful for DHS leadership
to provide feedback on the effectiveness of certain ReCoM initiatives,
such as ReCoM monthly conference calls; ReCoM participants told us
that it would also be helpful for DHS leadership to discuss what
infrastructure, at a national level, would be necessary to support the
ReCoM--such as whether to build new facilities.
Selected DHS collaborative field mechanisms: Border Enforcement
Security Task Force (BEST);
Selected challenges to collaboration most frequently identified by
participants from field mechanisms:
Resource constraints: 4 of 4 reported;
Selected examples (4 sites):
The participating agencies fund BEST positions out of their operating
budgets--no dedicated BEST funding has been provided. Because of these
resource constraints, additional law enforcement personnel and
surveillance equipment are limited; Some state and local law
enforcement agencies cannot afford to allow their participants to
remain with a BEST unit for extended periods of time because of
budgetary constraints.
Rotation of key personnel: 4 of 4 reported;
Selected examples (4 sites):
BEST participants receive a majority of law enforcement training
through on-the-job experiences, making it difficult to maintain this
expertise when key personnel rotate; Obtaining new personnel and
providing on-the-job training can be difficult given the complexity of
certain investigative cases that may require participants to
understand extensive legal authorities.
Lack of leadership buy-in: 4 of 4 reported;
Selected examples (4 sites):
All of the BEST participants we interviewed stated that it is
difficult for multiple agencies to allocate resources to a BEST
priority that may be different from their own agency leadership
priority.
Selected DHS collaborative field mechanism: South Texas Campaign Joint
Targeting Team (JTT);
Selected challenges to collaboration most frequently identified by
participants from field mechanisms:
Resource constraints: 1 of 1 reported;
Selected example (1 site):
The participating agencies fund JTT positions out of their respective
operating budgets--no dedicated JTT funding has been provided. JTT
participants told us that staffing is limited and that, in some
instances, they can become easily overwhelmed with investigations and
administrative duties.
Rotation of key personnel: 1 of 1 reported;
Selected example (1 site):
The rotation of key personnel hinders the JTT's ability to develop and
retain more seasoned personnel with expertise in investigations and
surveillance techniques.
Lack of leadership buy-in: None identified;
Selected example (1 site):
JTT officials did not identify this as a challenge.
Selected DHS collaborative field mechanisms: Regional Interagency
Steering Committee (RISC);
Selected challenges to collaboration most frequently identified by
participants from field mechanisms:
Resource constraints: 2 of 2 reported;
Selected examples (2 sites):
Operating costs for the RISC meetings are limited to travel costs for
critical FEMA personnel located outside of the immediate meeting
location. There is no dedicated funding to support RISC meetings, and
all other-agency members' costs for participation, if any, are funded
by their respective agencies; To mitigate resource constraints, RISC
officials have begun hosting virtual RISCs to reduce travel expenses.
Rotation of key personnel: None identified;
Selected examples (2 sites):
RISC officials did not identify this as a challenge.
Lack of leadership buy-in: None identified;
Selected examples (2 sites):
RISC officials did not identify this as a challenge.
Selected DHS collaborative field mechanisms: Summary of challenges
identified by the 10 mechanisms;
Selected challenges to collaboration most frequently identified by
participants from field mechanisms:
Resource constraints: 9 of 10 reported;
Rotation of key personnel: 7 of 10 reported;
Lack of leadership buy-in: 7 of 10 reported.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS information.
[End of figure]
Our discussions with participants representing the 10 mechanisms
identified three barriers that participants most frequently believed
hindered effective collaboration within their mechanisms: (1) resource
constraints, (2) rotation of key personnel, and (3) lack of leadership
buy-in. For example, when discussing resource issues, participants
from 9 of the 10 collaborative mechanisms said that funding for their
group's operation was critical and identified resource constraints as
a challenge to sustaining their collaborative efforts. These
participants also reported that since none of the mechanisms receive
dedicated funding, the participating federal agencies provide support
for their respective representatives assigned to the selected
mechanisms. This support included such things as funding for employee
salaries, office space, and law enforcement equipment (e.g., night
vision capability and surveillance vehicles), among other things. A
lack of resources also affected state and local law enforcement
participation in some of these collaborative mechanisms, and mechanism
participants explained that ensuring state and local participation has
been challenging because of resource constraints, which, in some
cases, have led to a mechanism missing key participants. For example,
participating agencies fund ReCoM positions out of their respective
operating budgets--no dedicated ReCoM funding has been provided. As a
result, some agencies are not able to participate (such as state and
local law enforcement) because of resource constraints. Also, there
was a majority opinion among mechanism participants we visited that
rotation of key personnel and lack of leadership buy-in hindered
effective collaboration within their mechanisms. For example, JTT
participants stated that the rotation of key personnel hinders the
JTT's ability to develop and retain more seasoned personnel with
expertise in investigations and surveillance techniques. In addition
to collecting promising practices information from the collaborative
mechanisms and disseminating it to components throughout DHS,
collecting and disseminating information on any ways to address
identified challenges or barriers to collaboration would similarly
help leverage the experiences of other collaborative mechanisms.
Collaborative field mechanism participants could also benefit from DHS
sharing information related to performance measurement. While sharing
such information is not a challenge to collaboration itself, officials
from all mechanisms agreed that establishing metrics that could
measure the impact of their collaboration, including whether the
benefits of the collaborative mechanisms outweigh the costs, were
difficult to establish or did not yet exist. Nonetheless, officials
reported that the ReCoMs, BESTs, and JTT have all undertaken efforts
to develop output or outcome performance measures to track the
accomplishments of their collaborative mechanisms.[Footnote 28] For
example, the fiscal years 2012-2016 BEST Strategic Plan states that
BESTs are to be evaluated annually on their overall performance, which
is quantified by output enforcement metrics (e.g., number of arrests,
indictments, convictions, and seizures). The JTT's efforts to develop
performance measures include identifying emerging threats, risks, and
vulnerabilities in the South Texas corridor where it operates.
Developing output and outcome measures can provide insight into the
performance of each mechanism; however, ReCoM, BEST, JTT, and RISC
officials all stated that is very difficult to develop a metric that
isolates the benefits of their collaboration from the benefits that
they may have achieved operating separately under their respective
agencies. Despite these measurement challenges, ReCoM, BEST, JTT, and
RISC officials were able to provide anecdotal examples of the positive
benefits of their collaboration and coordination. For example, ReCoM
officials in one location told us that they were able to make
significant progress toward meeting their goal of "persistent
presence" along a coastal ship channel because they had coordinated
the schedules of the USCG and CBP Office of Air and Marine resources
that conducted these patrols.[Footnote 29] BEST and JTT officials
stressed the value of leveraging their participating agencies' legal
authorities to develop more robust cases, which increased the
likelihood that their cases would be successfully prosecuted, and that
convicted criminals would receive longer sentences. RISC participants
in both locations cited their collaborative mechanisms as important to
identifying emergency response capability gaps across different levels
of government and integrating courses of action to take in response to
disasters. Leveraging mechanism participants' experiences and insights
regarding the development of performance metrics to quantify their
accomplishments and the impacts of their collaboration, and
disseminating promising practices that they have identified could
provide benefits to other DHS collaborative efforts.
Conclusions:
Effective collaboration within and among federal agencies is important
for improving operational success, especially in a resource-
constrained environment. DHS component agencies have made progress in
developing and evolving collaborative field mechanisms that have
allowed them to better coordinate mission activities in the field, and
these collaborative efforts are even more important in light of DHS's
decision in 2012 to not pursue a single unified field structure to
integrate component field operations. Given the overlapping geographic
areas of responsibility and authorities, and the many operational
activities that DHS components are conducting, component efforts to
collaborate are important. However, DHS's limited visibility over the
universe of collaborative field mechanisms operating under its purview
reduces its ability to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of
these mechanisms to enhance cross-departmental management and
integrated operations. DHS senior officials believe the components,
not the department, are responsible for the mechanisms' oversight
because the department is more focused on strategic rather than
operational-level management activities. We agree that the components
are capable of operating and monitoring their collaborative field
mechanisms. However, consistent with its own departmental-level
strategic goals, we believe that DHS could benefit from greater
awareness of the mechanisms themselves and the collaborative practices
that they employ. Not only is the department ultimately accountable
for the resources that support these mechanisms, it is also
responsible for making important decisions about the overall field
structure of its components, and for moving the department closer to
its goal of greater component integration. By collecting information
about the universe of collaborative mechanisms and developing a fuller
understanding of them and the promising practices they employ, DHS
could be in a better position to utilize these practices across
components to help move the department toward its strategic goal of
increased operational integration.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that any future efforts to analyze or implement changes
to DHS's regional field office structure, including the establishment
of collaborative field mechanisms, are informed by current
collaborative practices, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct the appropriate department official to take the
following two actions: (1) collect information on the existing
collaborative mechanisms to have better visibility of them, and (2)
collect information on promising practices, including such things as
potential ways to address any identified challenges or barriers to
collaboration as well as any identified performance metrics, from the
collaborative mechanisms and disseminate them to components.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft copy of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security for review and comments. DHS provided official written
comments, which are reprinted in appendix V. In response to our first
recommendation, DHS concurred and stated that the Office of Operations
Coordination and Planning (OPS), in coordination with other DHS
components, as appropriate, will develop a method to enhance the
collection of information on collaborative field coordination and
integration mechanisms. OPS will schedule appropriate data calls to
collect the information and leverage the Homeland Security Information
Network as a means for sharing information among the components. DHS
also concurred with our second recommendation and stated that OPS, in
coordination with other DHS components, as appropriate, will develop
and implement a method of collecting and disseminating information to
the components regarding promising practices, including challenges or
barriers to collaboration, from various field coordination and
integration mechanisms. DHS estimated completion of actions related to
both recommendations by September 30, 2014. DHS provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We also changed some
specific descriptions of DHS component operations and removed others
because DHS identified them as sensitive.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. We are sending copies of this report to the
Secretary of Homeland Security and interested congressional committees
as appropriate. In addition, this report will be available at no
charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov.] If you
or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me
at (202) 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to
this report are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Joseph Kirschbaum:
Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Thomas Carper:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Susan Collins:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Candice Miller:
Chairman:
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Henry Cuellar:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Description of DHS Collaborative Field Mechanisms Selected
and Visited:
Regional Coordinating Mechanism (ReCoM):
The Maritime Operations Coordination Plan was signed in June 2011 by
the senior leadership of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE)[Footnote 30], U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), directing these agencies to form ReCoMs for
maritime homeland security enforcement and intelligence integration.
[Footnote 31] USCG, ICE HSI, and CBP serve as the lead agencies
responsible for planning and coordinating among stakeholders, and as
of June 2013, 32 ReCoMs have been established aligning with the USCG
sectors' geographic areas of responsibility.[Footnote 32] In addition
to ICE HSI, CBP, and USCG, ReCoM stakeholders include other federal,
state, local, tribal, and international agencies including, but not
limited to, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO), state
agencies, local police departments, and foreign law enforcement
partners.
According to the Maritime Operations Coordination Plan, the ReCoM was
established for each region to coordinate component maritime
operational activities. All ReCoM members are responsible for
participating in integrated planning efforts with a goal to maintain
active patrol and targeted monitoring. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Senior Guidance Teams (composed of senior USCG, ICE
HSI, and CBP officials) are to assign a working group to monitor ReCoM
operational performance, coordination efforts, and information
sharing.[Footnote 33] Accordingly, the components must measure the
performance of the ReCoMs to ensure the most effective use of
resources.
Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST):
In 2005, the first BEST unit was organized and led by ICE HSI, in
partnership with CBP, in Laredo, Texas, and as of June 2013, 35 BESTs
have been established throughout the United States.[Footnote 34] BEST
stakeholders include CBP; DEA; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF); FBI; USCG; USAO; and other key state,
local, tribal, and international law enforcement and intelligence
resources, which partner with one another to identify, disrupt, and
dismantle existing and emerging threats at U.S. land, sea, and air
borders. The BEST concept is built upon the guiding principles of
colocation and cross-designation.[Footnote 35]
According to the 2012-2016 BEST Strategic Plan, ICE HSI serves as the
"executive agent" for BEST and provides a standardized platform of
policy and procedure for BEST units, as well as primary resourcing.
[Footnote 36] The BEST units use qualitative and quantitative risk
assessment methods to efficiently allocate resources. The National
BEST unit (NBU) serves as the programmatic lead on establishment,
deployment, and oversight of the BEST units nationwide, including
overseeing policy and implementation of the BEST program. As stated in
the 2012-2016 BEST Strategic Plan, BEST units are also evaluated
annually on their overall performance, including their effectiveness
and efficiency of operations based on established criteria. The
overall success of the BEST program is measured by its impact on
border-related criminal activity levels. The 2012-2016 BEST Strategic
Plan also states that the NBU is required to provide a written
evaluation to the ICE HSI Executive Associate Director and Executive
Steering Committee within 90 days following the end of each fiscal
year. These reports, which are to continue through fiscal year 2016,
are to include an evaluation of the field metrics, as well as the
implementation of the strategic plan by headquarters, the field
offices, and their BEST units.
South Texas Campaign Joint Targeting Team (JTT):
The JTT originated in November 2011 as a CBP-led partnership among the
Del Rio area U.S. Border Patrol, CBP Office of Field Operations, and
ICE HSI, and was expanded to support the South Texas Campaign (STC).
[Footnote 37] The purpose of the STC is to disrupt and dismantle
transnational criminal organizations (TCO).[Footnote 38] As of August
2013, JTTs had been established across four geographic boundary areas
in Del Rio, Laredo, McAllen, and Houston, Texas. In addition to ICE
HSI, JTT stakeholders include DEA; FBI; ATF; USAO; U.S. Marshals
Service; and state, local, tribal, and international law enforcement
agencies. To the greatest extent practicable, each participating
agency within the JTT is structured to be colocated and function as a
unified team to ensure deconfliction of intelligence information while
focusing on STC targets.
Regional Interagency Steering Committee (RISC):
According to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials,
FEMA established the first RISC in 2003 to provide a forum for senior
DHS officials to enhance emergency management and homeland security
for all hazards through a collaborative, regional approach involving
federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental organization, and
private sector partners.[Footnote 39] According to FEMA officials, the
majority of RISCs include representatives of the following DHS
components: FEMA, CBP, ICE, Federal Protective Service, Science and
Technology Directorate, National Protection and Programs Directorate,
Transportation Security Administration, and USCG, among
others.[Footnote 40] In addition, other federal agencies representing
the emergency support community participate in RISCs, such as the
Department of Transportation, Department of Defense, and the
Department of Agriculture. The authority to establish RISCs derives
from the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, which
provides the FEMA regional administrators with the responsibility to
ensure effective, coordinated, and integrated regional preparedness,
protection, response, recovery, and mitigation activities and programs
for natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters
(including planning, training, exercises, and professional
development) and perform such other duties relating to such
responsibilities as the Administrator may require.[Footnote 41]
According to FEMA officials, representatives from the FEMA regions
developed a draft RISC charter in 2010, and several regions
subsequently used this document as a basis for developing their own
charters. For example, a FEMA RISC charter may contain (1) objectives
and scope of RISC activities, (2) membership requirements, (3) annual
operating costs, and (4) executive committee governance.[Footnote 42]
According to FEMA officials, in general, most FEMA regions convene
RISC meetings on a quarterly or semiannual basis to discuss various
topics, such as making preparedness, protection, response, recovery,
or mitigation more easily accomplished and increasing regional
capability. RISC meetings typically include presentations, workgroups,
training workshops, and panel discussions led by DHS components.
During these RISC meetings, DHS components are able to share lessons
learned and best practices with members, as well as develop plans that
identify resource capabilities and integrated courses of action to
take in response to disasters. One FEMA official explained that FEMA
has not developed any specific performance-reporting requirements
regarding the content or output from RISC meetings; however, the value
of the coordination and communication gained through these meetings
supports various planning, response, and recovery activities.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Description of DHS Collaborative Field Mechanisms
Identified, but Not Visited:
Mechanism name, number of mechanisms, and year established:
Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit Terrorist Tracking and
Pursuit Group (CTCEU/TTPG);
Total number of CTCEU/TTPGs: 1;
The first CTCEU/TTPG was established in 2003[C];
Description of DHS collaborative field mechanisms[A]:
Lead agency: ICE, HSI;
Stakeholders: CBP, DOD; The Office of Biometric Identity Management
(OBIM); National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); DHS Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A);
Mechanism purpose/description: The CTCEU/TTPG leverages ICE HSI
expertise across partnering agencies dedicated to promoting national
security. The group leads the DHS National Security Overstay Initiative
in cooperation with CBP, OBIM, and NCTC to identify and apprehend non-
immigrants who have overstayed or violated the terms of their admission
and pose a potential risk to the national security of the United
States, as well as to prevent terrorists and other criminals from
exploiting the nation's immigration system. In addition, the CTCEU/TTPG
expands resource equities within various law enforcement agencies and
intelligence communities;
Location: Rosslyn, Virginia.
Mechanism name, number of mechanisms, and year established: Homeland
Security Task Force Southeast (HSTF-SE);
Total number of HSTF-SEs: 1;
The first HSTF-SE was established in 2003;
Description of DHS collaborative field mechanisms[A]:
Lead agency: USCG;
Stakeholders: CBP; ICE; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS); U.S. Department of Justice; State and local law enforcement
agencies;
Mechanism purpose/description: HSTF-SE is a joint task force that
provides the framework for coordination of a unified response command
and control organization for all DHS agencies. HSTF-SE is responsible
for the development and execution of Operations Plan Vigilant Sentry
(OVS), which includes interdiction, detention, screening, processing,
and repatriation during a mass migration from a Caribbean nation. HSTF-
SE is a standing task force that is in effect at all times, although
full activation of the task force does not occur until a mass
migration plan is implemented;
Location: Miami, Florida.
Mechanism name, number of mechanisms, and year established: Caribbean
Border Interagency Group (CBIG);
Total number of CBIGs: 1;
The first CBIG was established in 2006;
Description of DHS collaborative field mechanisms[A]:
Lead agency: USCG;
Stakeholders: CBP; ICE; USAO; Puerto Rican Police Department's Forces
United for Rapid Action (FURA);
Mechanism purpose/description: CBIG serves to coordinate the
operations of USCG, CBP, ICE, and USAO, targeting illegal migration
and narcotics trafficking near Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands. CBIG also increases maritime domain awareness and sharing of
intelligence between agencies. The Regional Concurrent Team (RCT) is
one of the mechanisms that CBIG uses to coordinate specific responses
and develop courses of action to a maritime threat[D];
Location: San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Mechanism name, number of mechanisms, and year established:
Operational Integration Center (OIC);
Total number of OICs: 1;
The first OIC was established in 2011;
Description of DHS collaborative field mechanisms[A]:
Lead agency: CBP;
Stakeholders: USCG; Michigan State Police; Royal Canadian Mounted
Police; Ontario Provincial Police;
Mechanism purpose/description: OIC provides a centralized location for
CBP, along with federal, state, local, and international partners, to
gather, analyze, and disseminate operational and strategic data in the
Great Lakes region of the northern border for use by frontline agents
and officers. OIC compiles information collected from radar and camera
feeds, remote sensor inputs, and video from various ports of entry;
Location: Detroit, Michigan.
Mechanism name, number of mechanisms, and year established: National
Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC);
Total number of NSARCs: 1;
The first NSARC was established in 1973;
Description of DHS collaborative field mechanisms[A]:
Lead agency: USCG;
Stakeholders: DOD; Department of Interior; Department of Commerce;
Department of Transportation; Federal Communication Commission;
National Aeronautics and Space Administration; State and local search
and rescue authorities;
Mechanism purpose/description: The purpose of NSARC is to coordinate
interagency search and rescue matters. NSARC works with other state
and local search and rescue authorities to coordinate implementation
of the national search and rescue system;
Location: Washington, D.C.
Mechanism name, number of mechanisms, and year established: South
Texas Border Intelligence Center (STBIC);
Total number of STBICs: 1;
The first STBIC was established in 2012;
Description of DHS collaborative field mechanisms[A]:
Lead agency: CBP;
Stakeholders: ICE HSI; FBI; DEA; Texas Department of Public Safety;
Webb County Sherriff's Office; Laredo Police Department;
Mechanism purpose/description: STBIC is a facility designed to
intensify and integrate intelligence gathering and sharing activity
among law enforcement agencies across South Texas;
Location: Laredo, Texas.
Mechanism name, number of mechanisms, and year established: The
Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT);
Total number of ACTTs: 1;
The first ACTT was established in 2009;
Description of DHS collaborative field mechanisms[A]:
Lead agency: DHS;
Stakeholders: CBP; ICE HSI; USAO; Bureau of Land Management; U.S.
Forest Service; TSA; State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies;
Mechanism purpose/description: The ACTT was established to counter the
threats posed by transnational criminal organizations operating in the
Arizona corridor. Specifically, the ACTT leverages the capabilities
and resources of more than 60 federal, state, local and tribal
agencies in Arizona and the Government of Mexico to combat individuals
and criminal organizations that pose a threat to communities on both
sides of the border;
Location: Tucson, Arizona.
Mechanism name, number of mechanisms, and year established:
Interagency Operations Centers (IOCs);
Total number of IOCs: 35;
The first IOC was established in 2006[E];
Description of DHS collaborative field mechanisms[A]:
Lead agency: DHS; delegated to USCG;
Stakeholders: CBP; ICE; State and local law enforcement agencies;
Mechanism purpose/description: Mandated by the Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act), IOCs were
established to improve multiagency maritime security operations and
enhance cooperation among partner agencies at 35 U.S. ports.
Specifically, IOCs transformed the Coast Guard sector command centers
by upgrading their information management tools; integrating existing
sensor capabilities; and, in some locations, providing shared facility
capacity. IOCs also help port agencies to collaborate on first
response, law enforcement, and homeland security operations;
Locations: Mobile, Alabama; Anchorage, Alaska; Juneau, Alaska; San
Diego, California; San Francisco, California; San Pedro, California;
New Haven, Connecticut; Atlantic Beach, Florida; Key West, Florida;
Miami Beach, Florida; St. Petersburg, Florida; Honolulu, Hawaii;
Louisville, Kentucky; New Orleans, Louisiana; South Portland, Maine;
Baltimore, Maryland; Boston, Massachusetts; Woods Hole, Massachusetts;
Detroit, Michigan; Sault Ste Marie, Michigan; St. Louis, Missouri;
Buffalo, New York; Staten Island, New York; Wilmington, North Carolina;
Warrenton, Oregon; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Charleston, South
Carolina; Memphis, Tennessee; Corpus Christi, Texas; Houston, Texas;
Portsmouth, Virginia; Seattle, Washington; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; San
Juan, Puerto Rico; U.S. territory of Guam.
Special Events Working Group (SEWG);
Total number of SEWGs: 1;
The first SEWG was established in 2004;
Description of DHS collaborative field mechanisms[A]:
Lead agency: DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS);
Stakeholders:
DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate; U.S. Secret Service;
FEMA; FBI;
Mechanism purpose/description: SEWG is an interagency forum that
ensures comprehensive, coordinated interagency awareness of, and
federal support to, special events. This working group facilitates
special event information sharing and provides the network through
which resources can be identified to satisfy shortfalls in
capabilities regarding major special events;
Location: Washington, D.C.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS information.
[A] Although DHS provided two additional examples of collaborative
field mechanisms for our consideration, we eliminated them from our
sample because they did not meet our criteria for a collaborative
mechanism. These two examples were (1) USCG's area, district, and
sector offices and (2) the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) federal security directors. We eliminated them because they are
part of the organizational structures of the components rather than
mechanisms established for the purpose of enhancing collaboration
across components.
[B] We included the lead agency (or agencies) for each mechanism, but
did not provide a comprehensive listing of stakeholders, which may
include other federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector
agencies.
[C] In June 2003, ICE established the Compliance Enforcement Unit
(CEU) as the first national program dedicated to the enforcement of
nonimmigrant visa violations. In September 2010, ICE HSI redesignated
the unit as the Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit
(CTCEU) because of the changing landscape of the national security
arena and the expanded responsibilities and mission of CEU.
[D] The Regional Concurrence Team (RCT) is one of the mechanisms the
CBIG uses to coordinate specific responses and develop courses of
action to a maritime threat. The purpose of RCT is to rapidly and
effectively coordinate interagency decision making and, as authorized,
resolve maritime threats associated with people, cargo, or vessels
(e.g., migrant smuggling).
[E] The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE
Port Act) mandated the establishment of IOCs in all high-priority
ports. Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884, 1892-93 (codified as
amended at 46 U.S.C. § 70107A). High-priority ports have been defined
as those ports with a designated captain of the port, which currently
correlate to all 35 USCG sectors, except Humboldt Bay and North Bend.
However, because of their virtual operation, IOCs are not necessarily
located at specific geographic points.
[End of table]
Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
We were asked to continue our work on DHS's efforts to improve
collaboration and integrate its field operations.[Footnote 43] This
report (1) assesses the extent to which DHS has identified the
collaborative field mechanisms--that is, multiagency groups such as
task forces, committees, and teams that enhance stakeholder
collaboration across the participating agencies in order to more
effectively and efficiently achieve their mission--of its key
operational components, and (2) describes factors that participants of
selected mechanisms identified that enhance or are challenges to their
collaboration, and assesses the extent to which DHS has collected and
disseminated successful collaborative practices.
To address the first objective, we contacted DHS officials to identify
a list of collaborative mechanisms that they deemed to be successful
examples of field component collaboration while we also independently
identified such mechanisms.[Footnote 44] Upon receiving DHS's list of
mechanisms, we combined this list with our own and sought input from
DHS and the seven key operational component agencies to create a
master list of agreed-upon collaborative field mechanisms. Our final
list included 13 collaborative mechanisms that DHS and operational
component officials agreed were models of collaboration among
component agencies in the field.[Footnote 45] The 13 collaborative
mechanisms we identified are used by federal agencies to implement
interagency collaborative efforts, such as agencies colocating within
one facility or establishing interagency task forces.[Footnote 46] In
addition, all of the identified mechanisms involved multiple DHS
component agencies, as well as other federal, state, and local agency
participants, and their purpose was to improve operational
integration, coordination, and efficiencies among DHS agencies. Of
those we identified, 11 of the 13 mechanisms focused on law
enforcement activities.[Footnote 47] For these 13 mechanisms, we
examined organizational documents related to mechanism mission,
objectives, stakeholder composition, locations, and date organized,
among other things. We also interviewed officials from DHS's Office of
Operations Coordination and Planning about the establishment and
operation of these 13 mechanism types. We also interviewed DHS
officials and analyzed documentation (i.e., components daily activity
reports) obtained from responsible senior DHS headquarters officials
to identify the extent to which the department has visibility over the
collaborative field mechanisms activities--including any plans to
increase visibility over the mechanisms in the future. We compared
DHS's efforts to identify and collect information on the collaborative
field mechanism with criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, which call for the establishment of control
activities, such as a mechanism to identify and monitor the activities
of components within an organization, to help achieve the
organization's objectives.[Footnote 48]
To address the second objective, we selected 4 types of collaborative
mechanisms in 10 locations from the list of 13--ReCoM, BEST, JTT, and
RISC.[Footnote 49] We based our selection of these 4 types of
mechanisms on the following factors: geographic location, continuity
of the mechanism (established for at least 16 months), participation
of multiple DHS component agencies, and variation in the lead
component agency. Except for the JTT, we selected mechanism types that
existed in more than one location to allow for geographic comparisons--
such as BEST, with 35 locations throughout the United States. To
describe the factors that participants of the selected collaborative
mechanisms identified that enhance or are challenges to collaboration,
we conducted site visits to interview operational component officials
directly participating in each of the 4 types of mechanisms, and in
total we met with over 55 participants from 10 mechanisms--including
officials from three ReCoMs, four BESTs, one JTT, and two RISCs. The
BEST, ReCoM, and JTT are law enforcement-focused, while the RISC
focuses on emergency management activities and exercises. For each of
the selected mechanisms, we also interviewed senior headquarters
officials to discuss their views on the successes and challenges
experienced with collaboration, including how the successes are
replicated and communicated across the mechanisms and challenges are
addressed. At each of the 10 mechanisms we visited, we gathered
information from participants on what they believed to be promising
practices that helped them to succeed as collaborative mechanisms, as
well as the factors they viewed as challenges to their collaboration.
We also discussed their efforts to establish performance measures to
assess mechanism effectiveness. While we cannot generalize our work
from visits to these collaborative mechanisms, we chose these
locations to provide examples of the way in which the mechanisms
identify, communicate with others, and address the successes and
challenges experienced with collaboration.
We also reviewed planning, operations, and management integration
documents such as strategic plans, annual performance reports, and
memorandums of understanding or agreements among the participating
agencies. We compared these documents and their responses with the
information-sharing and collaboration practices identified in our past
work on this subject.[Footnote 50] Our past work on interagency
collaboration has highlighted the importance of agencies establishing
or clarifying guidelines, agreements, or procedures for sharing
information. These guidelines, agreements, and procedures should
identify and disseminate practices to facilitate more effective
communication and collaboration among federal, state, and local
agencies.[Footnote 51] In addition, our prior work has demonstrated
the benefits of sharing promising practices as a means to replicate
positive program outcomes by leveraging the experiences of different
stakeholders with the same or similar goals.[Footnote 52] We have also
identified the sharing of promising practices as an example of
government agencies building capacity for improved efficiency.
[Footnote 53] At each of the 10 mechanisms we visited, we noted any
alignment or divergence from the mechanisms' reported successes and
challenges with key features identified in our 2012 report on
interagency collaboration.[Footnote 54] These key features include
seven categories, (1) outcomes and accountability, (2) bridging
organizational cultures, (3) leadership, (4) clarity of roles and
responsibilities, (5) participants, (6) resources, and (7) written
guidance and agreements. We interviewed component officials
responsible for managing the selected mechanisms and determined that
our work and past recommendations related to information sharing and
collaborative practices are still valid and were deemed reasonable by
the respective officials. We then assessed the extent to which the
mechanism participants' responses regarding integration, coordination,
and collaboration practices utilized by their mechanisms aligned with
those identified in our 2012 report. See appendix IV for a list of key
issues to consider when implementing interagency collaborative
mechanisms that were identified in our 2012 report. We interviewed
responsible senior DHS headquarters officials to determine the extent
to which the department has collected and reported on the
collaborative practices identified by the mechanisms. We also
interviewed component officials at the selected 4 mechanisms to
identify the extent to which information, such as information sharing
and collaborative practices are provided to DHS headquarters officials
who are responsible for oversight of the collaborative field
mechanisms.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September
2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Key Issues to Consider when Implementing Interagency
Collaborative Mechanisms:
In September 2012, we identified 12 mechanisms that the federal
government uses to lead and implement interagency collaboration.
[Footnote 55] Although these mechanisms differ in complexity and
scope, our September 2012 report notes that these mechanisms all
benefit from the seven features below. Key issues to consider when
implementing collaborative mechanisms are listed under each feature.
1. Outcomes and accountability:
* Have short-term and long-term outcomes been clearly defined?
* Is there a way to track and monitor progress toward the short-term
and long-term outcomes?
* Do participating agencies have collaboration-related competencies or
performance standards against which individual performance can be
evaluated?
* Do participating agencies have the means to recognize and reward
accomplishments related to collaboration?
2. Bridging organizational cultures:
* What are the missions and organizational cultures of the
participating agencies?
* What are the commonalities between the participating agencies'
missions and cultures and what are some potential challenges?
* Have participating agencies developed ways for operating across
agency boundaries? How did they develop these ways?
* Have participating agencies agreed on common terminology and
definitions?
3. Leadership:
* Has a lead agency or individual been identified?
* If leadership will be shared between one or more agencies, have
roles and responsibilities been clearly identified and agreed upon?
* How will leadership be sustained over the short term? How will it be
sustained over the long term?
4. Clarity of roles and responsibilities:
* Have participating agencies clarified the roles and responsibilities
of the participants?
* Have participating agencies articulated and agreed to a process for
making and enforcing decisions?
5. Participants:
* Have all relevant participants been included?
* Do the participants have:
* full knowledge of the relevant resources in their agency;
* the ability to commit these resources;
* the ability to regularly attend activities of the collaborative
mechanism; and:
* the appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities to contribute?
6. Resources:
* How will the collaborative mechanism be funded? If interagency
funding is needed, is it permitted?
* If interagency funding is needed and permitted, is there a means to
track funds in a standardized manner?
* How will the collaborative mechanism be staffed?
* Are there incentives available to encourage staff or agencies to
participate?
* If relevant, do agencies have compatible technological systems?
* Have participating agencies developed online tools or other
resources that facilitate joint interactions?
7. Written guidance and agreements:
* If appropriate, have the participating agencies documented their
agreement regarding how they will be collaborating? A written document
can incorporate agreements reached in any or all of the following
areas:
* leadership,
* accountability,
* roles and responsibilities, and:
* resources.
* Have participating agencies developed ways to continually update or
monitor written agreements?
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
September 6, 2013:
Joseph Kirschbaum:
Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Re: Draft Report GAO-13-734, "Department of Homeland Security:
Opportunities Exist to Enhance Visibility over Collaborative Field
Mechanisms"
Dear Mr. Kirschbaum:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) work in conducting its
review and issuing this report.
DHS is pleased to note GAO's recognition of progress made in
developing and evolving collaborative field mechanisms to better
integrate field operations by better coordinating missions and sharing
information. These efforts are critical to the Department's "One-DHS"
principle of cross~component collaboration and its success in building
and strengthening a homeland security enterprise to better mitigate
and defend against dynamic threats, minimize risks, and maximize the
ability to respond to and recover from attacks and disasters of all
kinds.
DHS agrees that collecting additional information on existing
collaborative field mechanisms may be beneficial. However, it is
important to note that day-to-day management of operational
collaborative field mechanisms is best accomplished through the
Components acting within their authority with DHS Headquarters'
oversight for situational awareness. For example, field activities are
reported daily through Component operations centers to the DHS National
Operations Center, in accordance with established reporting protocols.
The Department also coordinates with its Components and prepares a
Future Operations Week-Ahead reports highlighting, on average, more
than 100 ongoing and planned operations of the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, National Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S.
Secret Service, Transportation Security Administration, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, and U.S. Coast Guard, that
provide visibility of multi-component operations across the
Department.
The draft report contained two recommendations with which the
Department concurs. Specifically, GAO recommended that the Secretary
of Homeland Security direct the appropriate Departmental official to:
Recommendation 1: Collect information on the existing collaborative
mechanisms to have better visibility of them.
Response: Concur. DHS's Office of Operations Coordination and Planning
(OPS), in coordination with other DHS Components, as appropriate, will
develop a method to enhance the collection of information on
collaborative field coordination and integration mechanisms. DHS
OPS will schedule appropriate data calls to collect the information
and leverage the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) as a
means for sharing the information among the Components. Estimated
Completion Date (ECD): September 30, 2014.
Recommendation 2: Collect information on promising practices,
including such things as potential ways to address any identified
challenges or barriers to collaboration as well as any identified
performance metrics, from the collaborative mechanisms and disseminate
them to Components.
Response: Concur. DHS OPS, in coordination with other DHS Components,
as appropriate, will develop and implement a method of collecting and
disseminating information to the Components regarding promising
practices, including challenges or barriers to collaboration,
from various field coordination and integration mechanisms. DHS OPS
anticipates using HSIN as a means to share information with the
Components. EC: September 30,2014.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the
draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jim H. Crumpacker:
Director:
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Joseph Kirschbaum, (202) 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Stephen L. Caldwell, Director,
Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director, and Frederick Lyles, Jr., Analyst-in-
Charge, managed this engagement. Chuck Bausell, Eric Hauswirth, Tracey
King, David Lutter, Jess Orr, Janay Sam, and Cynthia Saunders made
significant contributions to the report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established DHS, which began
operations in March 2003. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
[2] DHS officials identified the seven listed agencies as the key DHS
operational components. GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Efforts
to Assess Realignment of Its Field Office Structure, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-185R] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28,
2012).
[3] GAO, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a
Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-177] (Washington, D.C.:
Nov. 18, 2010).
[4] DHS, Office of Inspector General, An Assessment of the Proposal to
Merge Customs and Border Protection with Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, OIG-06-04 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 2005), and DHS'
Progress in Addressing Coordination Challenges Between Customs and
Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, OIG-07-38
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2007).
[5] GAO, Managing for Results: GPRA Modernization Act Implementation
Provides Important Opportunities to Address Government Challenges,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-617T] (Washington,
D.C.: May 10, 2011).
[6] The BUR report recommended the realignment of component regional
configurations into a single DHS regional structure. The report also
identified priority initiatives, such as strengthening aviation
security and enhancing the department's risk management capability, to
strengthen DHS's mission performance, improve departmental management,
and increase accountability. DHS, Bottom-Up Review Report,
(Washington, D.C.: July 2010).
[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-185R].
[8] Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011). GPRAMA amends the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62,
107 Stat. 285.
[9] DHS, Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years
2012-2016, (Washington, D.C.: February 2012).
[10] JIATF-South, located in Key West, Florida, serves as the catalyst
for integrated and synchronized interagency counterdrug operations and
is responsible for the detection and monitoring of suspected air and
maritime drug activity in the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and
the eastern Pacific. In efforts to reduce the drug threat, JIATF-South
works with partner nations; the Department of Defense; U.S. law
enforcement agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration,
CBP, and USCG; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the National
Security Agency. Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National
Strategic Studies, National University, Strategic Perspectives 5:
Joint Interagency Task Force-South: The Best Known, Least Understood
Interagency Success, (Washington, D.C.: June 2011).
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-185R].
[12] For the purpose of this review collaboration is defined as any
joint activity by two or more organizations that is intended to
produce more public value than could be produced when the
organizations act alone. Collaboration can involve federal and
nonfederal governmental organizations as well as nongovernmental
organizations. In 2012, we reported on collaboration mechanisms and
the subject matter specialists interviewed defined an interagency
mechanism for collaboration as any arrangement or application that can
facilitate collaboration between agencies. GAO, Managing for Results:
Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency Collaborative
Mechanisms, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012).
[13] Each collaborative field mechanism type may have units or
entities in multiple locations throughout the United States; however,
for the purposes of this review, we are considering mechanisms that
have the same title and mission as one general type of mechanism.
[14] See, for example, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022], and Interagency
Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National
Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information
Sharing, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2009).Key collaboration practices were
identified from literature reviews, government agency and research
institution studies, interviews with academics and practitioner
experts, as well as a detailed analysis of prior GAO reports and
testimonies on collaboration.
[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-185R].
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-185R].
[17] DHS, Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years
2012-2016.
[18] For example, according to senior DHS officials, one virtual
collaboration effort is DHS's Common Operational Picture (COP), which
provides an unclassified consolidated information "hub" for homeland
security partners to ensure critical terrorism-and disaster-related
information is available. According these officials, there are
currently over 3,500 partners and users in the COP.
[19] The Jaime Zapata Border Enforcement Security Task Force Act
provided that the Secretary of Homeland Security may provide financial
assistance, as appropriate, for the operational, administrative, and
technological costs associated with the participation of BEST
participants (e.g., federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement
agencies). Pub. L. No. 112-205, § 3(a), 126 Stat. 1487, 1488 (2012)
(codified at 6 U.S.C. § 240). As of June 2013, no funding has been
appropriated for this purpose.
[20] Transnational criminal organization refers to crime coordinated
across national borders, involving groups or networks of individuals
working in more than one country to plan and execute illegal business
ventures. In order to achieve their goals, these criminal groups
utilize systematic violence and corruption.
[21] DHS officials stated that the COP allows for a greater
understanding and geospatial awareness of actual and emerging homeland
security events and enables senior leadership to identify more
effective courses of action, and make informed decisions before,
during, and after an event.
[22] DHS, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic
Framework for a Secure Homeland (Washington, D.C.: February 2010);
Bottom-Up Review Report; and Department of Homeland Security Strategic
Plan, Fiscal Years 2012-2016.
[23] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022]. See
appendix IV for the key issues to consider when implementing
interagency collaborative mechanisms.
[25] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP].
[26] See, for example: GAO, VA Education Benefits: VA Needs to Improve
Program Management and Provide More Timely Information to Students,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-338] (Washington, D.C.:
May 22, 2013), and School Meal Programs: Sharing Information on Best
Practices May Improve Programs' Operations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-97-126] (Washington, D.C.: May
21, 1997). Findings from these reports demonstrate the benefits of
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating promising practices
information.
[27] GAO, Streamlining Government: Key Practices from Select
Efficiency Initiatives Should Be Shared Governmentwide, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-908] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30,
2011).
[28] An output measure describes the level of activity to be provided
over a period of time, including a description of the characteristics
(e.g., timeliness) established as standards for the activity. Outcome
measures describe the intended results of carrying out a program or
activity. They define an event or condition that is external to the
program or activity and that is of direct importance to the intended
beneficiaries or the public.
[29] The Office of Air and Marine (OAM) is a subcomponent of CBP that
has primary responsibility for the management, control, and protection
of U.S. borders. OAM performs various missions in response to requests
for air and marine support from other DHS components--primarily Border
Patrol, within CBP, and ICE, as well as other federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies.
[30] ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is the directorate
within ICE that participates in the ReCoM.
[31] The Maritime Operations Coordination Plan states that ReCoMs are
required to reside in a physical or virtual location.
[32] A USCG sector is a shore-based operational unit that is
responsible for the execution of all USCG missions within its area of
responsibility. As of June 2013, 32 ReCoMs have been established in
each of the following states and territories: (1) Alabama, (2) Alaska,
(3) California, (4) Connecticut, (5) Florida, (6) Hawaii, (7)
Louisiana, (8) Maine, (9) Maryland, (10) Massachusetts, (11) Michigan,
(12) New York, (13) North Carolina, (14) Oregon, (15) Pennsylvania,
(16) South Carolina, (17) Texas, (18) Virginia, (19) Washington, (20)
Wisconsin, and (21) the U.S. territories of Guam and Puerto Rico.
[33] DHS Senior Guidance Teams are established for each ReCoM area of
responsibility.
[34] As of June 2013, there are 35 BEST units in 16 states and one
territory: (1) Arizona (Phoenix, Tucson, Nogales, Yuma, and Casa
Grande), (2) California (Imperial Valley, Los Angeles Seaport, San
Diego Seaport, San Ysidro, San Francisco Seaport), (3) Florida (Miami
Seaport, Fort Lauderdale Seaport), (4) Michigan (Detroit), (5) New
Mexico (Albuquerque, Deming, Las Cruces), (6) New York (Buffalo,
Massena, New York Seaport), (7) New Jersey (Newark Seaport), (8) Texas
(El Paso, Laredo, Rio Grande Valley, Houston Seaport, Big Bend), (9)
Washington (Blaine, Seattle Seaport), (10) Louisiana (New Orleans
Seaport), (11) Alabama (Mobile Seaport), (12) Mississippi (Gulfport
Seaport), (13) South Carolina (Charleston Seaport), (14) Georgia
(Savannah Seaport), (15) Virginia (Hampton Roads), (16) Hawaii
(Honolulu Seaport), and (17) Puerto Rico (San Juan Seaport).
[35] ICE HSI is authorized under 19 U.S.C. § 1401 to cross-designate
other federal, state, and local law enforcement officers to
investigate and enforce customs laws. Customs cross-designation
authority can also be extended to foreign law enforcement partners for
cases that cross international boundaries. This authority enhances ICE
HSI's ability to work more closely with these counterparts and foster
cooperation between the United States and other countries.
[36] Through the Jaime Zapata Border Enforcement Security Task Force
Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security may provide financial
assistance to the BESTs. Jaime Zapata Border Enforcement Security Task
Force Act, Pub. L. No. 112-205, § 3(a), 126 Stat. 1487, 1488 (2012)
(codified at 6 U.S.C. § 240).
[37] CBP developed and implemented the STC to identify and address
current and emerging threats along the border in South Texas. The STC
conducts targeted operations to disrupt and degrade the ability of
transnational criminal organizations to operate throughout the South
Texas corridor while it simultaneously facilitates legitimate trade
and travel.
[38] TCO refers to self-perpetuating associations of individuals who
operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, or
monetary or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means. In
order to achieve their goals, these criminal groups utilize systemic
violence and corruption.
[39] As of June 2013, a RISC had been established for each of the 10
FEMA regions.
[40] The FEMA RISCs also include other DHS components, including the
Office of Emergency Communications, the Office of the Inspector
General, the U.S. Secret Service, and the Intelligence and Analysis
Office.
[41] 6 U.S.C. § 317. The law requires the regional administrators to
work in partnership with federal, state, local, and tribal
governments; emergency managers; emergency response providers; medical
providers; the private sector; nongovernmental organizations;
multijurisdictional councils of governments; and regional planning
commissions and organizations in geographical areas served by the
regional office.
[42] Although annual operating costs for each RISC vary by region,
FEMA officials stated that many FEMA regions have begun hosting
virtual RISCs via teleconference and video-teleconference to reduce
expenses associated with the RISCs.
[43] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-185R].
[44] Subject matter specialists have defined an interagency mechanism
for collaboration as any arrangement or application that can
facilitate collaboration among agencies.
[45] For purposes of this report, these mechanisms refer to those that
are organized through a charter, directive, memorandum of
understanding, or other such agreement.
[46] GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing
Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27,
2012). For example, geographically based offices or colocated offices
are places where one office maintains responsibility for collaborating
with federal agencies or departments that are located in the same
geographic region. Also, in some cases, more than one program office
from different federal agencies can be located in a facility with the
intention of personnel from the agencies collaborating with one
another. Interagency groups, whether led by agency and department
heads or component-and program-level staff, are sometimes referred to
as task forces, working groups, councils, and committees.
[47] Although DHS provided 2 additional examples of collaborative
mechanisms for our consideration, we eliminated them from our sample
because they did not meet our criteria for a collaborative mechanism.
These two examples were (1) USCG's area, district, and sector offices
and (2) TSA's federal security director regions. We eliminated these
examples because they are part of the organizational structures of the
components rather than mechanisms established for the purpose of
enhancing collaboration across components.
[48] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[49] The 10 locations we visited included: BEST and RECoM in San
Diego, California; FEMA in Atlanta, Georgia; ReCoM in Corpus Christi,
Texas; BEST and ReCoM in Houston, Texas; and BEST and JTT in Laredo,
Texas; BEST in Blaine, Washington; and FEMA in Bothell, Washington.
[50] See, for example, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP]. These practices were
identified from a literature review, government agency and research
institution studies, and an analysis of prior GAO reports and
testimonies on collaboration.
[51] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005). Prior to our site visits, we provided the respective mechanisms
with a listing of the identified promising practices for review and to
obtain comments on their applicability and relevance to the
mechanism(s).
[52] See, for example: GAO, VA Education Benefits: VA Needs to Improve
Program Management and Provide More Timely Information to Students,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-338] (Washington, D.C.:
May 22, 2013), and School Meal Programs: Sharing Information on Best
Practices May Improve Programs' Operations, RCED-97-126 (Washington,
D.C.: May 21, 1997). Findings from these reports demonstrate the
benefits of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating promising
practices information.
[53] GAO, Streamlining Government: Key Practices from Select
Efficiency Initiatives Should Be Shared Governmentwide, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-908] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30,
2011).
[54] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022].
[55] GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing
Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27,
2012). Identified mechanisms for interagency collaboration are (1)
presidential assistants and advisors, (2) collaboration structures
within the Executive Office of the President, (3) national strategies
and initiatives, (4) interagency groups, (5) designation of
leadership, (6) geographically based offices/colocation, (7) positions
and details, (8) specially created interagency offices, (9)
interagency agreements and memorandums of understanding, (10) joint
program efforts, (11) conferences and communities of practice, and
(12) collaboration technologies.
[End of section]
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