The Commission as European Government

Fischer's proposals offer two possible ways of forming a European
government. It should either develop out of the European Council, and
consequently be formed by the national governments; or, on the basis of the
existing commission structure, a President with far-reaching executive powers
should be directly elected. Both options have serious disadvantages. The first
option favours a return to nationalization with an intergovernmental model of
EU governance, in which national governments play a crucial role in both
preparing, formulating, and implementing European policies. Beyond this, given
the work load of the national experts, it is questionable if and to what extent
they would be able to manage the work in the EU. The second option evades these
problems, but it is not realistic. The direct election of a Commission
President requires both a developed European party system and the corresponding
competition between parties that are actively engaged throughout Europe. Yet
neither of these prerequisites is in view. These are also valid reasons not to
appoint the Commission President from the centre of the European
Parliament.

Against this background, everything speaks in favour of maintaining the
existing practices of appointment and political control in the Commission,
which incorporate both the Council and the Parliament. In line with this, the
members of the Commission (including the Commission President) will continue to
be appointed by the European Council. The Parliament has to confirm the Council
decisions. Moreover, referring to the already existing procedure for a vote of
no confidence, it can demand the dissolution of the Commission by absolute
majority.

The question of the structure of the executive branch is considerably
more urgent than the regulation and appointment issues. And Fischer's views do
not entail any concrete proposals about this. Gerhard Schröder's proposal
does not appear to be particularly sensible either; he has suggested that every
member state be represented by a Commissioner. Yet a European government
consisting of 30 Commissioners, with their respective General Directorates,
would unnecessarily inflate the European bureaucracy. There are other ways to
create a lean and efficient and democratically composed European executive
branch in an expanded European Union. The playing field for national
representation can be expanded if, besides the maximal 20 Commissioners, the
respective General Directors are also included in the political positions that
are to be allocated. Because the EU will be enlarged one step at a time, it
would be possible to gradually switch to politically-appointed General
Directors.