Thursday, August 29, 2013

The last barrier to Kurdish
parliamentary elections was recently removed. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) and some of the opposition parties were complaining about outdated voter
roles being used. The Election Commission said that they could go through the
lists, but that would delay the vote for two months. Instead, the lists decided
to hold the balloting on time, which will be in September. The parties
therefore decided to maintain the status quo rather than pushing through a much
needed reform.

The Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) is finally cleared to hold its parliamentary vote in September 2013. The
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Change List complained to the
Election Commission that thousands of names on the voter roles belonged to dead
people or were repeated. For example, they claimed that around 90,000 peopled
had died in Kurdistan since March 2009, but that only 440 names were struck from the voter rolls, while a PUK member told the press that 10,000 deceased people voted in the last regional elections in 2009. They were
worried that this could be used for ballot fraud. The Commission replied that
it could go through the lists, but that would mean that the voting would have
to be delayed until November 2013. Neither party was happy with that response,
but decided to hold the elections on time. That means the parliamentary vote
will occur on September 21. Holding up the event would have caused more
controversy in the region. In July, the PUK and Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) agreed to extend Kurdish President Massoud Barzani’s term two more years.
(1) The official reason was that his leadership was needed to ensure the
passage of the draft constitution through the parliament. The real reason was
that Kurdish laws states that he can only stay in office for two years, but he
did not want to go, so the ruling parties simply agreed that he could maintain
his position until the laws were changed, and he could get elected again. The
opposition parties were outraged by this seeming coup. Given that background
the parties did not want to be accused of standing in the way of democracy
anymore. They thought it was more important that the voting go ahead despite
whatever reservations they might have had.

Kurdistan is going to have
parliamentary elections as planned in September, but the process seems flawed.
There appears to be major problems with the voter rolls, which opens up the
possibility for cheating. The Election Commission said it could try to clear
the lists, but it would take time. Given the fact that the presidential
elections were delayed for two years in a backroom deal that violated the law,
the PUK and Change List decided to drop their objections, and go ahead with the
balloting next month. When they do happen the results will likely maintain the
status quo. The KDP faces no real challenges in its strongholds, while the PUK
and Change List will battle it out in Sulaymaniya. If there are reports of
ballot stuffing or other manipulations the flawed voter rolls might have played
a role. It’s rather shocking that some of the parties would agree to let this
issue go when there was a possible solution. Instead, it will be business as usual
in the KRG come September.

Wednesday, August 28, 2013

Since the results of the 2013
provincial elections were announced, the Sadr Trend has increased its rhetoric
against Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The Sadrists have played this double
game before attacking the premier off and on, while taking no substantive
measures against him, and holding onto the most ministries within the
government. Now it appears the party is increasing its criticism in preparation
for the 2014 national vote. Moqtada al-Sadr has always aspired to become the
preeminent Shiite leader in Iraq, and with his showing in the 2013 balloting,
and the deteriorating security situation he may feel like he has a real chance
to surpass Maliki and his State of Law list.

The 2013 governorate level
elections inspired the Sadr List to challenge Premier Maliki one more time. The
Sadrists gained seven seats in the vote going from 41 to 47 seats across 14 provinces. More importantly, they worked with other parties such as the
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) to shut the premier’s State of Law out
of power in places like Baghdad and Basra. That combined with the wave of
violence that has swept the country recently has opened cracks in Maliki’s
armor, which the Sadrists are now attempting to exploit.

Sadrist lawmaker Shirifi has been
one of the premier’s staunchest critics in the last few weeks (AIN)

Moqtada al-Sadr may finally be
gaining enough confidence to take on Maliki head on. In the past, Sadr has
attacked the prime minister to raise his status with the public, while working
behind the scenes to gain concessions for a larger role in the government. Now,
after the 2013 elections, the Sadrists worked with other parties to push the
State of Law out of a few very important provincial governments. The level and
intensity of rhetoric against the premier has increased since then as well. The
problem with the movement is that it has taken similar steps before only to
fall in line behind Maliki after a short period. Sadr definitely would like to
surpass Maliki, and obtain the premiership, but right now it appears that the
latest wave of criticism is just part of the back and forth that the two sides
have taken part in before.

Tuesday, August 27, 2013

July 2013 had its ups and downs
for Iraq’s oil industry. For the fourth month, overall exports were down. The
main reason was continued problems with leaks and maintenance on the northern
pipeline to Turkey. On the positive side, prices rebounded for crude due to
unrest and output decreases in the Middle East, helping Iraq to earn more than
June. Overall, Iraq’s exports are at a 17-month plateau, but that has not had
any negative consequences for the oil dependent country yet.

Iraq’s exports dropped in July.
There was an average of 2.32 million barrels of day last month. That was
down from 2.33 million barrels in June, and was the lowest average since March
2011. The southern pipeline through Basra actually recovered in July going from
2.19 million barrels in May to 2.13 million barrels in June to 2.32 million in
July. That was the highest amount seen through the south in years. Exports were
affected by bad weather in the Persian Gulf for most of the summer. For all of
2013, Basra’s exports are up from 2.041 million barrels in 2012 to 2.191
million barrels this year. The main reason why Iraq’s exports have had problems
in recent months is the northern Kirkuk line to Turkey. It has witnessed a
five-month decline from 339,200 barrels a day in February 2013 to just 180,600
in July, a real low-mark. The major issue has been leaks and repair work. On
June 19, the line was shut down due to leaks, and not re-opened until July4. The maintenance was slowed due to an insurgent attack upon workers. The
line was immediately shut down however, and oil did not start flowing until July 16. There was another stoppage on July 21, and a bombing on July 28 that contributed to the Kirkuk line being down for almost the entire month
just like it was in June. That has led to the average flow through the pipeline
going from 373,300 barrels a day last year to 269,100 this year. The northern
line is very old, and really showed its age during the summer. Almost every
month for the last two years it has been bombed, but those usually do not have
a real affect upon exports. This recent wave of leaks and maintenance work
however has had a devastating effect upon the entire country’s output, and may
not be resolved anytime soon resulting in Iraq remaining at its present
plateau.

Iraq Oil Exports And Profits
2011-2013

Month

Avg.

Exports

(Mil/

Bar/

Day)

Avg. Price Per Barrel

Revenue (Bill)

Jan. 11

2.16

$90.78

$6.082

Feb.

2.20

$98.44

$6.064

Mar.

2.15

$107.13

$7.167

Apr.

2.14

$114.26

$7.342

May

2.22

$108

$7.45

Jun.

2.27

$105.17

$7.173

Jul.

2.16

$108.79

$7.311

Aug.

2.18

$104.91

$7.124

Sep.

2.10

$104.89

$6.619

Oct.

2.08

$104.04

$6.742

Nov.

2.13

$106.59

$6.833

Dec.

2.14

$106.18

$7.061

2011 Avg.

2.16

$105.00

$6.913

Jan. 12

2.10

$109.08

$7.123

Feb.

2.01

$112.92

$6.595

Mar.

2.31

$117.99

$8.472

Apr.

2.50

$116.79

$8.795

May

2.45

$103.03

$7.831

Jun.

2.40

$90.09

$6.487

Jul.

2.51

$97.14

$7.577

Aug.

2.56

$106.22

$8.445

Sep.

2.59

$107.59

$8.371

Oct.

2.62

$105.51

$8.578

Nov.

2.62

$104.32

$8.200

Dec.

2.34

$103.72

$7.551

2012

Avg.

2.41

$106.20

$7.835

Jan. 13

2.35

$104.92

$7.672

Feb.

2.53

$107.66

$7.644

Mar.

2.41

$103.76

$7.772

Apr.

2.62

$98.70

$7.764

May

2.48

$97.23

$7.477

Jun.

2.33

$97.41

$6.799

Jul.

2.32

$101.00

$7.272

2013 Avg.

2.45

$101.61

$7.521

Oil
Exports Through Basra 2012-2013
January 2012 1.711 mil/bar/day

February
1.639 mil/bar/day

March 1.917
mil/bar/day

April 2.115
mil/bar/day

May 2.086
mil/bar/day

June 2.085
mil/bar/day

July 2.216
mil/bar/day

August
2.252 mil/bar/day

September
2.178 mil/bar/day

October
2.172 mil/bar/day

November
2.122 mil/bar/day

December
2.022 mil/bar/day

2012 Avg. 2.042 mil/bar/day

January
2013 2.093 mil/bar/day

February
2.196 mil/bar/day

March 2.1
mil/bar/day

April 2.31
mil/bar/day

May 2.19
mil/bar/day

June 2.13
mil/bar/day

July 2.32
mil/bar/day

2013 Avg. 2.191 mil/bar/day

Oil Exports Through Kirkuk 2012-2013

January
2012 393,500 bar/day

February
375,800 bar/day

March
400,000 bar/day

April
393,300 bar/day

May 364,500
bar/day

June
316,600 bar/day

July
300,000 bar/day

August
312,900 bar/day

September
420,000 bar/day

October
451,600 bar/day

November
426,600 bar/day

December
325,800 bar/day

2012 Avg. 373,300 bar/day

January
2013 264,500 bar/day

February
339,200 bar/day

March
316,100 bar/day

April
306,600 bar/day

May 283,800
bar/day

June
193,300 bar/day

July 180,600
bar/day

2013 Avg. 269,100 bar/day

Iraq did benefit from a rebound in
prices in July. After prices being below $100 per barrel for the country’s oil
from April to June, it rose to $101.00 per barrel last month. That was largely due
to cuts in production from Libya and the unrest in Egypt. That led Iraq to earn
$7.272 billion in July. That was still the second lowest amount for the year.
Prices are still below their 2012 mark of $106.20 per barrel, currently
standing at $101.52 in 2013. Profits have declined as well from an average of
$7.835 billion in 2012 to $7.485 billion in 2013. Luckily for Iraq these prices
and revenues are still above those set in the 2013 budget, so the government,
which is dependent upon petroleum has not faced any real consequences from the
up and down nature of the industry this year.

While Iraq has not had any
negative consequences from the present export plateau, it does bring into
question its development plans for the future. Iraq is hoping to become one of
the largest oil producers in the world in the near future. Each year it claims
that it will witness a large jump in production and exports, which have rarely
been met. In December 2012 for instance, the Oil Ministry said at an OPEC
meeting that it would reach 3.7 million barrels a day in production by the end
of 2013, which was then revised down to 3.4 million barrels. In July, production
was at 3.25 million. Because the country lacks adequate storage facilities,
when exports are reduced the output at the fields has to be reduced as well.
This is a major complaint of the international oil companies operating in Iraq.
Their contracts with the government set production levels they have to reach. This has led to all of the businesses to begin negotiations with the
central government to revise their deals. It also highlights the country’s lack
of infrastructure to sustain any large increases right now. The Oil Ministry
has plans to address that issue, but its work is very slow due to red tape and
lack of trained staff. The result is that the current constraints on
development will remain in place for the foreseeable future.

Monday, August 26, 2013

In August 2013, Iraq’s mercurial
Moqtada al-Sadr said that he was quitting politics. His movement at first
claimed that this was a distortion by the media, and that their leader was
simply taking a break after Ramadan. That story quickly changed as hundreds of
his followers and militiamen pledged their allegiance, and begged that he
return. This appears to just be a ploy by Sadr to rally his forces, and deal
with factions that might have been considering breaking away.

Letter to Sadr signed by his
militia commanders pledging their support with their bloody thumbprints (Al-Mada)

Sadr’s movement seemed unsure of
their leaders’ status at first, but then turned it into a rallying point. At
the beginning of August, it was announced that Sadr was withdrawing from politics. That story was then denied. It was said that Moqtada was simply
upset with the security situation, and his conflict with the League of the Righteous,
a rival Shiite party, and taking a break as a result. Then it was revealed that
Sadr was in Qom, Iran where his followers visited him with a letter signed in blood by his militia leaders pledging their allegiance. A few days later
hundreds of Sadrists rallied in Najaf to renew their support for Moqtada as
well. They called for him to reverse his decision, and return to the
national stage. Before this, Sadr was complaining that people were tarnishing his
group’s image, and collecting money for their own benefit. This was a theme
that he had been pushing for several months, and resulted in him creating a
special committee led by Hazim Araji to reform his militia. In July, Sadr
warned that the name of the Mahdi Army was being exploited, and that factions
might be contemplating breaking away. Then in just a few days, he froze the commission with little explanation. The Sadr Trend has always been a
fractious group. His militia especially was never under central control rather
comprising local armed groups with little coordination. Pats of his political
movement have also broken off throughout the years. Apparently, Sadr was facing
another such situation, and felt frustrated at his inability to deal with it;
hence the formation and quick suspension of the Araji led commission. This might
have then led him to claim that he was pulling out of politics, and retiring to
Iran as a way to rally his supporters, and find out who was truly with him.
Some have also speculated that Sadr might have bowed out due to clashes with the League of the Righteous, which is vying for the mantle of being the
true legacy of Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, Moqtada’s father. However,
there have been shootouts, assassinations, and confrontations between the
groups for months now, and there didn’t appear to be any large escalation
before Sadr’s announcement. Internal problems within the Trend appear to be a
more plausible explanation for his course of action.

Moqtada al-Sadr is coming off a
high point after the 2013 provincial elections, and now may want to enforce
some order throughout his large and fractious movement. His party was not only
able to gain seats in local governments this year, but posed a serious challenge
to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law. Since then his followers have
become more and more confrontational and critical of the premier. Then it was
announced that Sadr was withdrawing from politics, which at first was denied,
but then became a huge issue within the organization. With a national vote
pending next year, perhaps Sadr thought this was the time to get his house in
order, and deal with whatever groups were not following his orders. His tactic
has succeeded in getting his forces riled up with their acts of devotion
towards him. This will probably lead to a staged return where Sadr will assure
everyone that he is now back, but more importantly, he is reassured of his
command over his movement.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Moqtada As Sader quits Iraqi politics and closes
down his office,” 8/5/13

About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via NRT, AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News all in Iraq. I was interviewed on BBC Radio 5, Radio Sputnik, CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, Rudaw, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com