October 20, 2013

NIST should publish Suite A

We now have a crisis of confidence in the world of cryptography. The Snowden revelations have thrown the deck in the air, and while we have not seen all the cardsland as yet, we can draw some points of agreement.

One point of agreement is that public key and Elliptic Curve Cryptography now has a cloud over it. Just as one example, seen on OpenPGP list (archived therefore open for reposting) is discussion about using 1024 bit curves:

>> Why ever would you want a 1Kbit curve?
>> Sure, arguably, but please make the argument.
>> As it is, Curve3617 is more than one really needs.
>> I'm genuinely interested.

> The fastest method for solving the discrete log problem in finite
> fields is index calculus. It is not known to be applicable to the
> elliptic curves we use for cryptography (or obviously we wouldn't be
> using them), modifications of the technique are applicable to
> super-singular curves / extension fields and where applicable they
> have sub-exponential scaling similar to the number field sieve for
> factoring. While it's not believed that there can exist a
> straightforward adaptation currently-believed strong curves, if one
> were to be discovered it would render any of the common sizes
> practically insecure.

> It would be terrible indeed to migrate to ECC only to end up with keys
> no more secure than 512 bit RSA.

> But by comparison to performance in other groups a of size to around
> 1024 bits but leave the crypto system secure in practice even if index
> calculus could be directly applied.

> (Sorry for delay in responding, but I spent a little while googling
> around to see if I was the only person thinking like this. I found a
> number of things, the most amusing an old post of Bruce Schneier's:
> "Realize, though, that someday -- next year, in ten years, in a
> century -- someone may figure out how to define smoothness, or
> something even more useful, in elliptic curves. If that happens, you
> will have to use the same key lengths as you would with conventional
> discrete logarithm algorithms, and there will be no reason to ever use
> elliptic curves. "
> https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9911.html#EllipticCurvePublic-KeyCryptography )

The point here is not that the above argumentation is valid or otherwise, but that *the suspicion runs deep*. How deep does the EC rabbit hole go?

The best I've seen so far is as found on this site http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/ which seems to say (my reading only) that the prior standards work on curves is suspect, but we can do a good job ourselves if we recalculate to best of ability (us meaning not me).

Android is using the combination of horribly broken RC4 and MD5 as the first default cipher on all SSL connections . This impacts all apps that did not care enough to change the list of enabled ciphers (i.e. almost all existing apps). This post investigates why RC4-MD5 is the default cipher, and why it replaced better ciphers which were in use prior to the Android 2.3 release in December 2010.

If you're into Java or Android, and you love the JCE, this will leave a sinking pit in your stomach. A herd of rabbits were stampeded deep down that hole...

I would suggest -- point of agreement? -- that we now have *a crisis of confidence in standards and crypto* .

If I was a standards organisation, or a player who was invested deeply in industry in some sense or other, I'd be also thinking about how to increase confidence.

Consider this as a thought experiment. If we knew what Suite A used for PK work, being the NSA's private cryptography of choice, we would then be able to triangulate. Although this is a claim based on experience rather than evidence, I predict that we'd be able to triangulate the question of ECC and settle the question of confidence. If Suite A algorithms specify ECC, then we would then know that ECC is good in some circumstances. We can further look at their curves and figure out what those circumstances are.

We all win? Treason or revelation? You pick.

This revelation may even be so useful to industry (billion dollar losses?) that it might be a dominating interest over the normal unquestioning patriotic duty of following the say-so of those previously wiser heads in Fort Meade. If American crypto suppliers could show that they were now using techniques that were previously jealously guarded for own-protection, they might actually repair some of their lost reputation.

It might be cost-effective. We would hear the teeth gnashing in Fort Meade from here, but it might even be a 'fair cop'. They can always sit down and build some replacements; and it is not as if American security players have lots of options here.