CHAPTER XXII

The Chinese Spring Offensive On the Central and Eastern Fronts

Attack on the Pendleton Line

As the 1st Marine Division drew back to
the curving Pendleton line at the right of the IX Corps sector on 23 April,
Marine aerial reconnaissance disclosed numerous enemy groups moving south through
the ground surrendered by the ROK 6th Division the night before. They appeared
to be van forces moving well ahead of main bodies, though the latter were not
sighted. The Marine intelligence staff concluded that the groups nearest the
marines were attempting to get into position for a strike against the division's
main supply route.1

If this was the case, the 120th Division, 40th Army, which had
missed the opportunity to enter the marines' open left flank the previous night,
also failed to find the open path to Ch'unch'on. In a shallower southeastward
swing out of the ground along the division boundary, begun about 2000, the division's
359th
and 360th Regiments
launched repeated frontal assaults behind mortar fire against two battalions
of the 1st Marines and a battalion of the 7th Marines now covering the division's
left. The Chinese made no earnest effort to move
through the gaps between battalions, a mistake that allowed the marines to concentrate
defensive fires; the supporting fire delivered by the 11th Marines and Army
artillery from Chich'on-ni was particularly effective. The Chinese kept heavy
pressure on the three battalions all night but could deliver no penetrating
blow. Frequent but far weaker attacks in other sectors of the Marine front by
forces of the 115th
and 116th Divisions
of the 39th Army
faded out at dawn.2

Starting the division's withdrawal
to line Kansas about daylight, General Smith held to three engaged battalions
and supporting artillery in position to contain the attack from the west and
cover the units to the east as they vacated their inactive sectors. The artillery
was to follow, with displacing units spaced to insure continuous support of
the three battalions bringing up the rear. Smith's air officer requested twelve
planes an hour to help cover the rearguard action.3

As the marines in the east dropped
off the line in the early light of the 24th, Chinese entered Hwach'on town and
the dam area but did not pursue the

399

withdrawal to the Kansas line. The
more persistent forces of the 120th Divi sion to the west began to lap around one of the
covering battalions located along the Chich'on-ni road shortly before dawn;
two hundred or more reached the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion behind
the marines as that unit was preparing to displace. A half dozen crews set up
machine guns in hills sloping to the battalion's position while riflemen and
grenadiers crept into a field and cemetery close to the artillery pieces. The
first "round" fired was a roll of toilet paper flung by a startled artilleryman
who discovered several Chinese crawling toward him when he walked into the cemetery.
Startled themselves by the unusual missile, the Chinese allowed the man to run
back to his battery; but minutes later, machine gunners and riflemen opened
fire while grenadiers tried to reach the nearest self-propelled howitzers.4

The commander of the 92d, Lt. Col.
Leon F. Lavoie, a stickler for setting up an elaborate defensive perimeter that
required two or three days to develop fully, had established the basic positions
by dark on the 23d. Most positions had been vacated just before daylight as
the battalion began to get into march order, but Lavoie's forces were able to
reoccupy them in time to take on the first line of Chinese. Enemy grenadiers
reaching a howitzer during the battalion's rush to battle stations were shot
down before they could damage it; direct howitzer fire blasted the Chinese machine
guns in the hills; and fire from the perimeter, which bristled with .30caliber
and .50-caliber machine guns on ground mounts
and armored personnel carriers, swept the field and cemetery with devastating
effect. Fire from tanks the marines sent to join the battle added to the enemy
toll. Within two hours the artillerymen destroyed the Chinese force and were
in march order for the artillery displacement. The battalion's losses in the
engagement were four killed and eleven wounded.5

The withdrawal of the rearguard battalions
was a costly running battle with 120th Division
forces who followed the marines the entire
distance to line Kansas. Ample artillery fire and numerous air strikes steadily
weakened the pursuit, although at a price in aircraft. Chinese fire downed three
Corsairs and one observation plane. Much reduced by the time the marines were
back in old positions on the Kansas line, the Chinese were unable to mount more
than mild assaults, all unsuccessful, and no reinforcements arrived to strengthen
them. As indicated when no major attack developed anywhere on the 1st Marine
Division front by daylight on 25 April, neither the 120th Division nor the divisions of the
39th Army,
whose operations had been minor from the start, would attempt further action
of any scale.6

Inje Falls

In the X Corps sector to the east of
the marines, an attack opened near dawn on the 24th by the North Korean 12th Division
thoroughly disorganized the ROK 5th Division and carried the North Koreans through
Inje by mid

400

morning. (See Map 33.)
The North Korean 6th Division at the same time continued to push the left and center
units of the ROK III Corps away from Route 24. The two enemy divisions reduced
the pressure of their attacks only after their point units had driven two to
five miles below Inje. Given some respite, the South Korean forces were able
to organize defenses strong enough to hold off the two enemy divisions' continuing
but weaker attempts to deepen and widen their salient. To the northeast, the
North Korean 45th Division
again displayed its inexperience on the 24th in unsuccessful attacks on the
32d Infantry of the U.S. 7th Division at the immediate left of the ROK 5th Division
and against the 23d Infantry of the U.S. 2d Division
anchoring the X Corps' west flank above the eastern tip of the Hwach'on Reservoir.
Opposite the 23d Infantry, some four hundred troops of the 45th made the mistake of assembling in
a steep-sided draw near the village of Tokko-ri in full view of an artillery
forward observer with Company C. The observer brought down a battalion time
on target barrage of fifteen volleys using rounds tipped with variable time
fuses. Afterward the observer saw just two North Koreans come out of the draw.
The only ground gained by the 45th Division
during the day was a gift from the 32d Infantry
as the regiment pulled back to ridgetop positions that allowed it to tie in
with the ROK 5th Division below Inje and

401

thus contain the North Korean salient
along its southwestern shoulder.7

As a result of the 1st Marine Division's
withdrawal to line Kansas, General Almond late on the 24th ordered changes in
2d Division dispositions. On the morning of 25 April the 23d Infantry was to
drop back to positions just below the eastern tip of the Hwach'on Reservoir,
a move that would place the regiment on the exact trace of line Kansas; beginning
on the 25th General Ruffner was to make daily physical contact with the Marine
division's right flank located near the village of Yuch'on-ni at the western
tip of the reservoir. The latter step was a hedge against the possibility that
enemy forces might penetrate the right of the Marine line and make a flanking
or enveloping move against the X Corps through the otherwise unoccupied ground
below the reservoir. To screen this ground and maintain contact with the marines,
Ruffner organized Task Force Zebra under the commander of the division's 72d
Tank Battalion, Lt. Col. Elbridge L. Brubaker. Included in the task force were
a platoon of tanks from the 72d, the 2d Reconnaissance Company, the division's
attached Netherlands and French battalions, and, later, the 1st Ranger Company.8

General Almond on the morning of the
25th ordered an afternoon attack by the ROK 5th Division to retake Inje and
the high ground immediately above the town as a first step in regaining line
Kansas. As worked out by Almond with General
Yu, the leftmost units of the ROK III Corps were to join the advance. Yu's attackfor
reasons not clear-did not materialize, and although the ROK 5th Division recaptured
Inje, enemy pressure forced the unit to return to its original positions below
the town. Ever aggressive, General Almond planned to attack again on the 26th.
But, as he would soon learn, any attempt to retake line Kansas was for the time
being out of the question as a result of a second failing performance by the
ROK 6th Division in the left half of the IX Corps sector.9

Repeat Performance

The enemy formations approaching the
ROK 6th Division on the 23d were from the 60th
Division, 20th Army, and 118th Division, 40th Army. The 60th Division,
which had stampeded the South Koreans the night before, was on a southwesterly
course as the 20th Army
continued to guide on Route 3 in its advance toward Seoul. That direction would
take the division into the I Corps sector after no more than a glancing blow
at the ROK 19th Regiment at the left of the 6th Division's front. Forces of
the 118th Division
moved south through the right half of the South Korean sector on a line of march
that would carry them to the ROK 2d and 7th Regiments and, if maintained, to
the British 27th Brigade's blocking position above Kap'yong.10

When the leading enemy
forces

402

struck the
ROK line just after dark, the South Koreans bolted south almost immediately,
disordered columns of troops and trucks flooding the two valleys converging
at the British brigade's position. The New Zealand artillery, Middlesex battalion,
and 213th Field Artillery Battalion, which had gone up the valleys to support
the 6th Division, had scarcely deployed before South Koreans began passing through
their areas. The three battalions withdrew behind the Australians and Canadians,
negotiating the cluttered valley roads with no loss of men or equipment except
for a howitzer of the 213th Field Artillery Battalion which had to be run off
the road to avoid striking a group of milling South Koreans.11

ROK forces began streaming into the
27th Brigade's lines around 2000, the heavier flow coming down the northeast
valley into the position of the Australian battalion. After a chaotic and clamorous
passage through the blocking position, ROK leaders were able to slow the wild
flight-getting safely behind the 27th Brigade seemed to have a calming effectand
eventually assembled the forces just off Route 17 about five miles southwest
of Kap'yong town. On the morning of the 24th General Chang notified General
Hoge that he had collected and was reorganizing between four thousand and five
thousand men, about half the division's strength.12

The 60th Division, keeping to its southwesterly
course, had not pursued the ROK 19th Regiment after putting it to rout in the
Kap'yong valley. The 60th
next would be in contact with the 24th Division in the I Corps sector. The 118th Division
stayed on the heels of the South Koreans racing down the northeast valley, its
354th Regiment
reaching the Australian battalion about 2200 as the din of the South Korean
retreat through the 27th Brigade began to subside.13

Intent on pursuing the South Koreans
and probably unaware of the Australian position, the van forces of the 354th Regiment
kept to the valley, splitting as they approached a long, low north-south ridge
rising as an island in the valley's mouth. Company B of the Australians and
the 1st Platoon of Company A, 72d Tank Battalion, were atop the southern end
of the ridge overlooking the valley road passing by on the east. The remaining
three companies of the Australian battalion were east of the road on the crest
and upper slopes of Hill 504. To the north, the 4th Platoon of tanks was on
outpost, two tanks on the nose of the island ridge, three astride the road in
the flat ground just beyond. In the village of Chuktun-ni behind the island
ridge, the road ended in a junction with the Kap'yong valley road coming in
from northwest. Near Chuktun-ni, the Kap'yong road reached a ford across the
Kap'yong

403

River on the upper arm of the large
bend that turns the river's flow from southeast to southwest. The command group
and 2d Platoon of the tank company were deployed astride the road just below
the ford, whence the tanks could fire up both the Kap'yong and northeast valleys.
The Australian battalion's command post, protected by a small group of pioneer,
police, and signal troops, was located against some low hills not far to the
left rear of the tanks. With the leading Chinese confining their march to the
valley, one group following the road, the other swinging wide through the undefended
valley floor west of the island ridge and southeast along the Kap'yong, the
American tankers on outpost and at the ford were first to be engaged. The approaching
Chinese reached the two positions almost simultaneously.
14

Upon a Chinese approach, the 4th Platoon
had standing orders to withdraw from its outpost to a blocking position on the
road between the forces on the island ridge and those on Hill 504, but the tankers
were under fire before they realized that the oncoming troops were not more
retreating South Koreans. A brief exchange of fire in which the tank crews fought
with hatches open for better vision in the darkness cost the platoon four wounded
(two of them tank commanders), and the platoon leader was fatally shot as the
tanks turned to withdraw. The leaderless survivors pulled out in disorder toward
the 2d Platoon at the Kap'yong ford. The 1st Platoon leader, 1st. Lt. Wilfred
D. Miller, ran down to the road from his position
on the island ridge and stopped the tanks at the blocking position, but Chinese
appearing from the north forced him back up the ridge, and the 4th Platoon continued
toward the river crossing.15

The ragged withdrawal took the platoon
from one fire fight to another. Tank company commander 1st. Lt. Kenneth W. Koch,
afoot and under considerable fire, reorganized the platoon under the command
of a sergeant and deployed it alongside the 2d Platoon against the Chinese attacking
from the northwest. With the road open as far as the ford, Chinese entered the
battle from the north, and the two leading groups, now joined, widened their
assault to include the small force of Australians defending the battalion command
post. Numbers of Chinese infiltrating or skirting the ford area settled in the
high ground bordering the Kap'yong road on the west. Those moving deepest reached
and exchanged fire with the Middlesex battalion, which had taken a reserve position
athwart the road two miles behind the Australians. North of the ford, following
formations of the 354th Regiment spread out to attack the forces on the island ridge and
Hill 504.16

Lt. Col. 1. B. Ferguson, the Australian
battalion commander, was hard pressed to direct the defense. South Koreans charging
through his position had torn out his wire from command post to companies, and
he could communicate with the forward units only inter-

404

mittently by radio. Losing all artillery support put the Australians at further
disadvantage as the Chinese enlarged their attack. After withdrawing down the
Kap'yong valley, the New Zealand unit and 213th Field Artillery Battalion had
established positions between the Middlesex and Australian battalions; but when
the enemy attack intensified, Brigadier Burke ordered the two units into safety
positions behind the Middlesex. Dawn came before they could again answer calls
for fire.17

Nor was support available from the
4.2s of Company B, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion. Communications had not yet
been established with the mortar position in the valley behind Hill 504 when
the Chinese spread out to assault the Australians, and the mortar company, in
any case, left its position shortly afterward. Fearful of being overrun, the
mortarmen abandoned thirty-five vehicles loaded with equipment and retreated
over a minor road ten miles east to Ch'unch'on.18

During a nightlong series of assaults,
the three Australian companies on Hill 504, in spite of their lack of artillery
and mortar support, lost only two platoon positions and later regained one of
these. Company B and the platoon of tanks on the island ridge had little trouble
holding their ground and took a high toll of Chinese crowded along the valley
road when they were exposed in the light of burning buildings set ablaze by
fire from the tanks. Enemy forces got among the tanks at the ford,
but the two platoons stayed in position, the tankers firing in all directions,
even at each other, to keep Chinese from getting on the tanks. A 3.5-inch rocket
fired from the hill above the Australian command post damaged a tank, killed
one man, and wounded two. Another tanker was wounded when two crews drove south
from the ford and eliminated a block on the Kap'yong road that aidmen had discovered
while transporting other casualties to the rear. In exchange for these losses,
the tankers killed more than a hundred Chinese before the attack faded out about
daylight.19

Well before dawn the Chinese attacking
the battalion headquarters area were threatening to overrun the command post.
In answer to Colonel Ferguson's request to Brigadier Burke for reinforcements,
a Middlesex company started forward but, on encountering resistance by Chinese
in the hills edging the Kap'yong road, inexplicably turned east and withdrew
over the route used earlier by the American 4.2-inch mortar company. Compelled
to withdraw, Ferguson started his headquarters vehicles and troops toward the
Middlesex position, using the two tanks that had cleared out the roadblock to
cover the move. Fire from the hills above the road forced sections of the column
to halt and take cover from time to time but caused no casualties and was easily
silenced by the tanks. The only loss during the withdrawal was Ferguson's own
jeep, which had a wheel blown off by a mortar round. The two American engineer
companies biv-

405

ouacked within sight of the road meanwhile
mistook the passing headquarters forces for the beginning of a general withdrawal
and themselves pulled out in haste and confusion, abandoning tentage, several
trucks, kitchens, and a water point they had installed.20

From the new battalion command post,
Colonel Ferguson shortly before dawn ordered Company B to leave its isolated
position on the island ridge and join forces with the companies on Hill 504.
The company remained engaged until after daylight, when the Chinese began withdrawing
to the north. Company B and the tank platoon whipped the withdrawing troops
with fire for over an hour. As a sort of finale to the engagement, a patrol
reconnoitering a route to 504 brought back about forty prisoners bagged near
the northern edge of Chuktun-ni. Moving roundabout to avoid Chinese still attacking
504, Company B, with prisoners in tow, occupied a rear position on the hill
about midmorning.21

In the continuing engagement on Hill
504, daylight and artillery support from the New Zealanders gave the Australians
the advantage. Although the Chinese attacked repeatedly, almost at half-hour
intervals, they were now fully visible, and each dash from cover to cover brought
down an assortment of telling Australian fire. Except for a
misdirected air strike in which Marine Corsairs dropped napalm on one Australian
company, killing two, injuring several, and destroying some weapons and equipment,
"the situation rather resembled sitting in the middle of a wheatfield at dawn
potting rabbits as they dashed hither and thither."22

The battalion nevertheless was potentially
in danger of encirclement. A three-mile gap between the Australians and the
Canadians to the west, whose position had not yet been seriously tested, and
a far greater expanse of open ground to the east gave the Chinese room to close
in. Evacuating Australian casualties and replenishing supplies also became a
problem with most of the road between Hill 504 and the Middlesex position kept
under Chinese guns from the bordering high ground.

Wary of losing the battalion if it
remained on 504 another night, Brigadier Burke at midmorning ordered Colonel
Ferguson to withdraw behind the Middlesex. The American tankers, who had used
the morning respite to refuel and rearm in the company bivouac area, came back
into action, one group under Lieutenant Miller initially carrying Ferguson and
staff members over the fireswept road to 504 to organize the withdrawal. Miller's
group also delivered ammunition and brought back casualties, making a second
trip to get all the Australian wounded out. Another group, under Lieutenant
Koch, the company commander, carried volunteers from Company B, 74th Engineer
Combat Battalion, to the vacated 4.2-inch mortar position and covered them while
they drove out the

406

vehicles abandoned by the mortar company.
On a final round trip, tankers protected the engineers while they retrieved
their own equipment left behind during their hurried morning withdrawal.23

After completing the evacuation of
casualties and equipment in midafternoon, the tankers moved north to the ford
area to ward off any Chinese moving down the Kap'yong valley while the Australians
were withdrawing from 504. The New Zealand artillery blinded the Chinese on
the slopes of 504 with smoke and trailed the Australian rearguard with high
explosive rounds as the four companies moved one at a time down a long ridge
sloping southeast to the Kap'yong River. Crossing the stream a mile and a half
behind the tanks, the Australians passed through the Middlesex battalion not
long after dark. The tanks dropped back after the rearguard company crossed
the river but stayed forward of the Middlesex until it was clear that no Chinese
had followed the withdrawal. The night and day of battle had cost the Australians
thirty-one killed, fifty-eight wounded, and three missing, the tank company
two killed, eleven wounded, and one missing.24

Instead of following the Australian
withdrawal, the 354th Regiment, much reduced after its attacks on Hill 504 but apparently
being reinforced by at least part of another regiment of the 118th Division, turned toward the Canadian
battalion on Hill 677. The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry commander,
Lt. Col. J. R. Stone, originally had deployed his four companies on the crest
and northern slopes of 677, but after Chinese began moving into the hills along
the Kap'yong road a step that placed them to the right and right rear of the
Canadians, Stone shifted Company B to a southeastern slope against the possibility
of an attack via the battalion's back door.25 Mortar and long range
machine gun fire struck the company at 2200, one of the machine guns firing
tracer ammunition to direct an assault by two hundred Chinese that followed.
A smaller group slipped up a gully from the southeast to attack the battalion's
command post and mortars located in rear of Company B. A larger force, clearly
visible to the Canadians in the moonlight, meanwhile began fording the Kap'yong
to the east. A heavy concentration of New Zealand artillery fire broke up the
force crossing the river, and, just as effectively, Canadian mortarmen and machine
gunners almost literally blew back the Chinese attacking up the ravine. Company
B beat off the first Chinese charge, lost a platoon position to the second,
then successfully weathered a succession of assaults lasting most of the night.26

A stronger attack about 0200, evidently
by fresh forces coming out of the Kap'yong valley, hit Company D defending the
Canadians' left flank from the 677 crest. The first assaults, launched across
a saddle from the west and up steep slopes from the south, carried Chinese into
the company's de-

407

fenses in such numbers that the Company
D commander was able to drive them out only by calling down artillery fire on
his own position. Following charges kept pressure on the company, nicking its
position here and there, but gradually wore down under the company's defensive
fire and heavy pounding by the New Zealand artillery.27

Under additional fire from two platoons
of Company A, 72d Tank Battalion, which maneuvered within range near dawn, the
Chinese gave up their attacks on the Canadian flanks about daylight but stayed
in contact with a heavy delivery of fire. Since the continuing Chinese control
of the Kap'yong road as far south as the Middlesex position kept the Canadians
from using it to bring up a resupply of ammunition and rations, Colonel Stone,
as the enemy assaults died out, requested an airdrop. In remarkable time given
the long route Stone's request had to take, C-119s from Japan delivered the
supplies six hours later. By that time, however, the Chinese fire had begun
to diminish, and at 1400 Company B patrols found the Kap'yong road open. By
late afternoon the 118th Division, bloodied at Hill 504 and again severely punished by the
Canadians in exchange for ten killed and twenty-three wounded, gave up the battle
and withdrew north.28

Censure

That two battalions and a tank company
had withstood attacks no weaker, and perhaps stronger, than those that twice
had routed the ROK 6th Division underscored how completely control had broken
down in the division. The huge tally of equipment lost as a result of the division's
successive debacles emphasized the breakdown further. Major items lost by the
South Koreans included 2,363 small arms, 168 machine guns and Browning automatic
rifles, 66 rocket launchers, 2 antitank guns, 42 mortars, 13 artillery pieces,
and 87 trucks. The three American fire support units-987th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion; 2d Rocket Field Artillery Battery; and Company C, 2d Chemical Mortar
Battalion-stymied by overturned South Korean vehicles and other abandoned equipment
on their withdrawal route during the night of the 22d, lost 15 105mm. howitzers,
13 4.2-inch mortars, and 73 vehicles. Hundreds of other items- 242 radios alone-
lengthened the list.29

General Hoge used no euphemisms in
rebuking General Chang for the conduct of the division, summing it up as "disgraceful
in all its aspects."30
Hoge nevertheless considered Chang one of the better ROK commanders- and the
6th Division representative of all ROK divisions- and did not seek his relief.
To place blame solely on Chang, in any case, would be to make him a scapegoat.
Lack of leadership and control on the part of all grades of officers and non-

408

commissioned officers had caused the
division's disintegration. With exceptions that only proved the rule, deficient
leadership indeed continued to be the major weakness of the ROK Army.31

The ROK Army chief of staff, General
Chung, attempted to explain to General Van Fleet that the 6th Division's breakdown
and the wider leadership problem came from a lack of training. He was right
to the extent that ROK troops and leaders at every level and in every unit suffered
from sketchy military schooling. But Van Fleet refused the explanation, pointing
out to Chung that the 6th Division had conducted itself creditably in past operations
and that the making of officers could not be confined to the mastery of military
skills. A high sense of responsibility, devotion to duty, physical and moral
courage, and the will to fight for homes and families were fundamental to competent
military leadership; these were the attributes, he emphasized, that, along with
training in military science, had to be developed among South Korean officers
and noncommissioned officers if the ROK Army was to be a capable and dependable
force.32

The rout of the ROK 6th Division could
not have happened at a worse time for President Rhee's attempt to put more men
under arms. On 18 April the ROK representative to the United Nations, Col. Ben
C. Limb, had asked the joint Chiefs of Staff for arms and equipment for ten
additional divisions, and on the 23d, following
the 6th Division's first collapse and preceding its second by only hours, Rhee
had submitted a personal request for the same. The request had some appeal in
Washington by raising the prospect of eventually using additional South Korean
formations to replace American units. General Ridgway and General Van Fleet,
however, argued successfully against any immediate increase in ROK divisions.
There was no way, they insisted, that American personnel and other resources
could be spared to provide the supervision and training for an expansion as
long as heavy fighting continued. In any case, a need to develop competent leadership,
not a need for more men, was the primary problem of the ROK Army and certainly
was prerequisite to its enlargement. The ROK 6th Division's dissolution illustrated
the point. Creating new divisions without able leaders, Van Fleet said, would
be "a criminal waste of badly needed equipment."33

Ridgway, Van Fleet, and Ambassador
Muccio personally delivered the refusal to President Rhee. Their message was
blunt: from the minister of defense to the lowest level of command in the ROK
Army, leadership was inadequate, and under this serious weakness was eliminated
there would be no more talk about the United States arming and equipping additional
divisions. Rhee nevertheless continued to lobby for support of a larger army,
but he would get no substantial help until improved pro

409

grams began to produce the professional
talent needed to lead existing and additional forces.34

25 American
tankers making one of their runs on the Kap'yong road as the Canadian company
took position mistakenly opened fire on it and wounded one man.

26 Wood,
Strange Battleground, pp. 76-77.

27 Ibid.,
pp. 77-78; Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division, p. 69.

28 IX
Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Wood, Strange Battleground, p. 78; Barclay,
The First Commonwealth Division, p.70. For their stand above
Kap'yong, the Australian and Canadian battalions and Company A, 72d Tank Battalion,
were awarded the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation. For personal efforts in support
of the Australians, 1st Lt. Kenneth W. Koch and 1st Lt. Wilfred D. Miller of
the tank company each received the Distinguished Service Cross.