Segregation in faith schools does not offend Equality Act: High Court

The principal issue in this application for judicial review was whether a mixed school unlawfully discriminated against its male and/or female pupils by making “parallel arrangements” for their education in the same building or by applying a regime of “complete segregation” for all lessons, breaks, school clubs and trips. There was no evidence that either girls or boys were treated unequally in terms of the quality of the education they received (in the sense of one sex receiving a lower quality of education than the other).

This case raises a point of general public importance as to the true construction and application of key provisions in the 2010 Equality Act. As the judge observed, it was a point which had not arisen before, and so should be answered on “a first principles basis, applying standard interpretative tools to the language, policy and objects of the statute.”

Background Facts

X School is a voluntary aided faith school for boys and girls aged between 4 and 16. It has an Islamic ethos and, specifically for religious reasons, believes that the separation of boys and girls at a certain point in their development is mandated (i.e. when children have reached 9 years of age). In 2014 the School went into special measures and an Interim Executive Board (the Claimant) was appointed.

The Claimant was the “responsible body” for the purposes of the relevant anti-discrimination provisions of the Equality Act 2010. For all practical purposes in this judgment the Claimant and the School were interchangeable.

The school was not unique in its segregation methods. As the judge observed

Of the three great Abrahamic religions, Islam is not alone in this respect because judicial notice may be taken of the fact that a number of Jewish schools with a particular Orthodox ethos do exactly the same (the majority of Orthodox schools do not). Indeed, there is evidence before me of a particular Jewish school, operating on what is described as two campuses, which at its last Ofsted inspection in 2012 was rated “outstanding” across the board. From brief internet research I have gathered that a number of Christian faith schools have similar practices.

However the question remained, whether segregation in the instant case fell foul of the Equality Act.

In June 2016 a report on the School was issued by the Defendant. It assessed the School as “inadequate” in three respects, namely (i) “effectiveness of leadership and management”, (ii) “personal development, behaviour and welfare”, and (iii) “early years’ provision”.
This judgement of inadequacy in relation to leadership and management had a number of aspects:

First, reference was made to the discovery in the school library of a number of books which “included derogatory comments about, and the incitement of violence towards, women”. … The books concerned were published between 1993 and 2009, and contain views which are completely inimical to fundamental British values, however precisely defined. For example, one of the books states that a wife is not allowed to refuse sex to her husband. Another opines that women are commanded to obey their husbands and fulfil their domestic duties. Two books made clear that a husband may in certain circumstances beat his wife, provided that this is not done “harshly”.

The inadequacy judgement was also made in respect of a list of other failings in the school’s management.

Arguments before the Court

The Claimant challenged the 2016 report on a number of grounds, most importantly, that it was irrational and/or based on no evidence. They alleged that the inspectors wrongly assumed that separation of pupils on the basis of sex meant or implied unequal treatment. As Jay J observed, the real point being made was that the inspector’s approach to the Equality Act 2010 was wrong in law because segregation, without more, is not discriminatory.

Under the Equality Act, the court should start from the proposition that ordinarily segregation by sex in a mixed school will constitute direct discrimination unless a section 158 or section 195 reason applies. That is, an educational justification means a rationale falling within section 158 or section 195 of the EqA 2010.

The Defendant contended that

the very fact of segregation constitutes less favourable treatment of girls because it cannot be separated from deep-seated cultural and historical perspectives as to the inferiority of the female sex and therefore serves to perpetuate a clear message of that status (see the US line of authority beginning with Brown v Board of Education [1954] 347 US 483).

The Claimant countered that denial of the opportunity to intermingle was “too subjective and elusive a concept” to be capable of falling within section 85(2) of the Equality Act (the part of the Act which deals specifically with schools). Given that many would say that single-sex streaming is advantageous in educational terms, and may reflect the religious preferences of parents, it would be wrong in principle to hold that either sex has been subjected to a relevant “detriment”.

The judge granted permission to the Claimant to apply for judicial review of the Defendant’s report. In his view, the Defendant had not established that the School (i) discriminated against its male and female pupils by denying them opportunities to interact with or learn from the opposite sex, and (ii) discriminated against its female pupils by treating them as inferior. The criticisms in the June 2016 report which were based on the proposition that the School did so discriminate, could not stand. Although he dismissed some of the Claimant’s arguments, on the essential issue he found that segregation in this School on the ground of sex did not constitute discrimination under the relevant provisions of the Equality Act.

Reasoning behind the Court’s decision

This was not a judgment on the social and educational merits of sex segregation in schools, whether effectuated for religious reasons or otherwise, and about whether Islam treats women as inferior. Jay J did consider that the denial of the choice to seek the society of and interaction with the opposite sex, and of the educational benefits which might flow from the exercise of that choice, was capable of amounting to the denial of a “benefit” or “facility” for the purposes of the Equality Act.

It is an opportunity which reasonable people would value, and there is some evidence that pupils at this school do regret its absence. The concepts of “detriment” and “facility” are, as we have seen, extremely broad, and are apt in my view to accommodate opportunities and choices which are intangible. (Imagine a situation where, in a mixed school, a small group of girls are segregated from the remainder of the pupils who are not segregated inter se: this small group will suffer a “detriment” and be treated less favourably than the majority contingent).

However, it was incorrect to view this situation as one in which one sex was discriminated against differently to the other. In this school, sexes were being denied the opportunity to interact/socialise/learn with or from the opposite sex. It was also non-discriminatory:

it is artificial to say that the denial to the boys of the opportunity to mix with the girls (which the latter enjoy as between themselves) is somehow different from the opportunity being denied to the girls. It would only be different if there were some qualitative distinction for these purposes between male and female interaction (each looked at inter se), but in my judgment there is not. What we have here is the denial of interaction or concourse with the opposite sex which has equal value and impact, and is of the equivalent nature and character, in relation to both sexes.

It could not be said, in other words, that one sex was being treated less favourably than the other. The 2016 report provided no evidence that segregation in a mixed school, still less segregation in an Islamic school, has a greater impact on female pupils. The question of the books in the school library was not relevant to the issues before the court. Jay J had “little doubt” that educational experts would have much to say on this topic, but he had not heard it within the four corners of this litigation. He also remained to be persuaded that Brown and its jurisprudential progeny under the US Constitution were directly applicable to the present context. Unlike the previous US practice of race segregation, which was under attack in Brown,

segregation in mixed schools in this country is not the practice of government; it cannot be envisaged as any reflection of the mores and attitudes of wider society; it is only capable of being seen as a reflection of the mores, attitudes, cultures and practices of the faith groups who have been permitted to do it.

The judge would be “very slow to conclude that segregation in this Islamic school “generates a feeling of inferiority as to [the] status of [the female gender] in the community” (adapting the ratio of Brown to cover the present case).

Some might say that this is axiomatic, but to my mind that would be too broad and sweeping a judgment to make in a multi-cultural society, particularly in circumstances where the separation is not enforced but elected by the parents), it would follow that it could not be excused by recourse to faith-based rationales. But, if that is not established, segregation for religious reasons is not, without more, discriminatory. Put another way, the School’s rationale for this practice should be seen as neither a virtue nor a vice; it is entirely neutral.

The submission was squarely made by counsel for the Defendant that “religious conviction is not a solvent of legal obligation”, but that was not the same as saying that segregation for religious reasons was always discriminatory. If segregation is discriminatory for other reasons (or, more precisely, following R (E) v Governing Body of JFS[2010] 2 AC 728, on other grounds), it would follow that it could not be excused by recourse to faith-based rationales. But, if that is not established, segregation for religious reasons was not, without more, discriminatory. Put another way, the School’s rationale for this practice should be seen as neither a virtue nor a vice; it was, in the judge’s view, entirely neutral.

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9 thoughts on “Segregation in faith schools does not offend Equality Act: High Court”

I am definitely NOT in agreement with giving one religion preference over another in public funded schools or anywhere else for that matter. If the pupils and parents are resident in the UK, they MUST learn about OUR ways if they are ever to be integrated in our society. Like all other religions,they should be practiced in private and should have tolerance and respect for each other. If immigrants cannot tolerate each others presence as children,how are they to integrate in our society as adults? This is OUR country,giving protection to immigrants escaping from a country where neither religion nor authorities protect their inhabitants. You do not want to repeat the same mistake in the UK. I am also strongly against the wearing of hi jabs or other clothing covering up peoples faces. It prevents both pupils AND their teachers from getting to know each other. The old adage “When in Rome, do as the Romans do” still holds. Do not lend yourself to make so many concessions to immigrants,if they want to live here,be it by our custom and rules.

To me the case should have been brought under the Human Rights Act 1998 and a potential violation of Article 3 ECHR (prohibition of inhumane and degrading treatment). Like this, it was pretty easy to come up with this kind of decision by the Court, a decision which is legally speaking correct but wrong from a common sense and human rights point of view.

This decision dismays me as a veteran of the Civil Rights struggle in the USA, as a current member of a metropolitan commission on discrimination in France, and as a British citizen also. It utterly fails to apprehend the reach and power of the implicit, or the fullness of reality, in societal relations of this kind. Will you say that equal course content and exam results in the case of one group of sixty boys age 9 to 16 who are all oldest sons of sitting peers or ministers and another group of sixty boys of that age who are all the oldest sons of long-term unemployed Caribbean immigrants suffices to prove equality in educational opportunity between the two groups?

Putting young girls apart on the pretext of modesty in a sexual sense is probably the oldest and most systematic privation of female access to autonomy, power, and self-determination. The reasons that such segregation fails any true test of equality lies in the real relationships in our wider society.

Accepted that the difficulty might lie in wording of the act, not mere dimness of mind, but difficulty there is, and one compounded, it seems, by the reasoning chosen for this decision, which reasoning is, in my opinion, worse than just troublesome.

This decision dismays me as a veteran of the Civil Rights struggle in
the USA, as a current member of a metropolitan commission on
discrimination in France, and as a British citizen also. It utterly
fails to apprehend the reach and power of the implicit, or the fullness
of reality, in societal relations of this kind. Will you say that equal
course content and exam results in the case of one group of sixty boys
age 9 to 16 who are all oldest sons of sitting peers or ministers and
another group of sixty boys of that age who are all the oldest sons of
long-term unemployed Caribbean immigrants suffices to prove equality in
educational opportunity between the two groups?

Putting young girls apart on the pretext of modesty in a sexual sense is
probably the oldest and most systematic privation of female access to
autonomy, power, and self-determination. The reasons that such
segregation fails any true test of equality lies in the real
relationships in our wider society.

Accepted that the difficulty might lie in wording of the act, not mere
dimness of mind, but difficulty there is, and one compounded, it seems,
by the reasoning chosen for this decision, which reasoning is, in my
opinion, worse than just troublesome.

“Segregation in faith schools does not offend Equality Act”. This is the legal verdict from The Human Right´s Court – UK.

Whilst it may not offend the law on Equality, it certainly does NOT contribute towards integration,which is far more important in order not to create isolationism and religious ghettos in the future.. It is their right to maintain and practice their own religion in private,and pupils may be excused from taking part in classes of religion,otherwise part taking in our normal educational classes. If my understanding is right, the segregated pupils are receiving DIFFERENT levels of education,depending on their sexes. As I further understand this is a privately donated,predominately Muslim oriented,private school,there will be NO equality between Muslim men and woman or their curriculum,which I am TOTALLY against.

I therefore hold that segregation in this particular school DOES offend Equality Act.

I would be interested to know whether this school is one of the 1043 world-wide schools of US based Fethullah Gülen´s “Hizmet” movement intentending to ´sneak-Islamize´ the world´s youth?

Whilst it may not offend the law on Equality, it certainly does NOT contribute towards integration,which is far more important in order not to create isolationism and religious ghettos in the future.. It is their right to maintain and practice their own religion in private,and pupils may be excused from taking part in classes of religion,otherwise part taking in our normal educational classes. The segregation will also mean that boys and girls receive a different curriculum,depending upon their sexes. This, in itself is breach of equality.

Turkish, US based Fethullah Gulen has a privately funded network of more than a 1.000 schools throughout the world,open to children of ALL RELIGIONS, under the name of “Hizmet” with Muslim leanings. I hope THIS school is not one of them.

Its interesting to me that on this blog there is another case – lets call it “Gay Cake”. Both this, and the case above essentially revolve around religious beliefs but within an HR context. In both cases the judicial logic is severely flawed and in both cases they have come to the wrong judgement in my opinion (and probably that of most sensible thinkers). In this case they seem to have turned a blind eye to the empirical evidence we see within society.

I have lived and worked in the Middle East and I know what Islam means for many girls and women and its lifelong consequences.

All I can conclude is that this is yet another PC sop by a liberal left judicial establishment who seem intent on usurping the values of the country in which it is supposed to protect and serve.

I am not persuaded the court was right: in addition to the very strong reasons against segregation (as in Brown), the judge appeared to err by considering whether the group of girls, in aggregate, was treated less favourably than the aggregate group of boys. This is incorrect in that s.13 requires consideration of whether a ‘person’ is treated less favourably than another. in this case, a particular girl is denied to mix with a group of boys of her choosing, unlike a boy in the same school. the fact that a particular boy is subjected to a similar less favourable treatment does not negate the effect on the girl. And vice versa.

D. Johnson poses a particular and shrewd objection to this decision, rightly focusing on what really happens to a single (real) person, a girl. This reminds us to imaginatively test HR decisions by their consequence upon an individual, and think out that test in contexts not immediately suggested by those salient in the case. Thanks then to him.
Agreed that the statutory language in this case isn’t the same as in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896 USA), nevertheless I insist that the ultimate reasoning returns to that same issue: are you really willing to say that segregation can be deemed ‘equal treatment’?
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