Thursday, January 15, 2015

The Clearing Of Iraq’s Jurf Al-Sakhr, Babil And Its Impact

After twelve unsuccessful tries the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) and militias were finally able to clear Jurf al-Sakhr, a long time
Islamic State (IS) base in northeastern Babil in October 2014. Insurgents had
been operating out of that section of the province since 2003 when it was known
as the “Triangle of Death.” When IS was able to rebuild its networks after 2011
it began operating out of Jurf al-Sakhr. It became a center of car bombs and armed
attacks upon Baghdad and into the southern half of the country. Government
forces tried again and again to enter Jurf al-Sakhr throughout 2014, but were
finally able to push the insurgents out in October. The consequences of this
operation were far reaching. First, the entire population of the area was
displaced, and they have not been able to return since then. On the other hand,
security has dramatically improved not only in Babil, but in southern Iraq as
well, but at what cost.

Attacks In Babil 2014-2015

Month

Attacks

Jan

36

Feb

47

Mar

50

Apr

60

May

87

Jun

59

Jul

65

Aug

71

Sep

43

Oct

44

Nov

35

Dec

27

Jan 1-7

6

Security Operations In Northeast Babil 2014

1st January 6

2nd April 15

3rd April 20

4th May 11

5th End of May

6th June 18

7th July 8

8th July 28

9th July 29

10th August 1

11th September 13

12th September 20

13th October 21

Throughout 2014 the Iraqi Security Forces attempted to clear
Jurf al-Sakhr with little to show for it. The first try was made on January
6, but had no real effect. In the following weeks there were five attacks
from January 8-14, 7 from January 15-21, and six each from January 22-28 and
January 29-31. These incidents were spread throughout central and northern Babil
with 12 incidents in Jurf al-Sakhr, four in Musayib, and one in Iskandiriya in
the northeast, four in Latifiya and Mahmudiya each in the north, and one each
in Hillah and Mahawil in the center. IS used Jurf al-Sakhr to not only launch
operations in Babil, but into Baghdad and Anbar provinces and southern Iraq. It
was the major car bomb base in the south, and IS regularly moved forces back
and forth between Jurf al-Sakhr and Amiriya Fallujah in neighboring Anbar.

Insurgent operations picked up during the first third of the
year. There were a total of 36 attacks in January, which increased to 47 in
February, and 50 in March. The situation got so bad that the army withdrew
from the area in early April, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sacked the head of
the Babil Operations Command, and a new operation was immediately launched. A
third was started on April 20 as well. Attacks actually went down from the
start of the month with 20 from April 1-7 to 8 April 22-28, but there were
still 60 total, the most so far of the year.

In May there were two more security operations, with only
temporary effects. The first was started on May 11 after the Defense Ministry
set up a special committee for northern Babil, and then there was another at
the end of the month. Those appeared to decrease attacks with 31 from May 8-14,
but then going down to 15 from May 15-21, 14 May 22-28, and six from May 29-31.
During the security operations IS used its fighters to repel the government
forces rather than using them to carry out regular attacks, and probably
shifted forces into Anbar, which accounted for the decline. To show that IS was
still strong in the area it posted pictures that month of it taking down
security checkpoints using cranes and bulldozers.

In June attacks went down from 87 in May to 59. IS probably
moved some of its fighters into neighboring Anbar for operations there during
the summer offensive. June 18the government also launched its sixth
security operation in Jurf al-Sakhr, again to little affect as incidents went
from 8 from June 15-21 to 24 the next week.

The continued futility of government sweeps was seen in
July, August, and September During those months six more security operations
were begun on July 8, July 28, July 29, August 1, September 13, and September
20 in the Jurf al-Sakhr and Latifiya areas. On August 14 the army actually
withdrew from Fadiliya in Jurf al-Sakhr, only to come back the next month. As
usual attacks in the province remained high as well with 65 in July, 71 in
August, before a drop to 43 in September. That last month a parliamentarian said
that the ISF had actually avoided going into the main areas of Jurf al-Sakhr,
because it was impenetrable with IEDs and booby-traps. Another lawmaker later complain
that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki constantly interfered with the ISF by
appointing commanders over the objections of the provincial council.

October was when the final breakthrough was made in Jurf
al-Sakhr. The start of the month looked like it would be just like the previous
nine. The Babil Operations Command announced that the army and
militias were carrying out the second phase of its on going operation in Jurf
al-Sakhr, which started on September 20. That flowed right into the thirteenth
sweep that began on October
21. This involved
around 4,000-10,000
ISF and militiamen with Badr Organization head Hadi Ameri in charge. General
Qasim Suleimani the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds
Force was involved
in planning the operation as well. This force reached the center of Jurf
al-Sakhr in just three days. Prime Minister Haider Abadi praised
the victory, and visited the battle site on October
25. The success of the operation was due to the overwhelming numbers that
were massed in the area. IS probably only had a few hundred fighters in Jurf
al-Sakhr, which was no match for the thousands arrayed against it. After
thirteen tries, Baghdad had finally overcome this insurgent stronghold. The big
push was made in part to ensure the safety
of pilgrims travelling from northern and central Iraq to Karbala for an annual
pilgrimage.

The impact of finally defeating IS in Jurf al-Sakhr was seen
in the following weeks. First, attacks in Babil dropped from 44 in October to
35 in November, and 27 in December. The location of IS activity also shifted to
the northern section of the province where the militants had fled to. In
October there were 18 attacks in Jurf al-Sakhr and four in neighboring
Iskandiriya, and nine in Mahmudiya, six in Yusifiya, and five in Latifiya to
the north by the Baghdad border. By November the fighting had shifted to that
latter area with 9 incidents in Yusifiya, 8 in Mahmudiya, and 7 in Latifiya
compared to 6 in Jurf al-Sakhr, 4 in Iskandiriya, and one in Musayib. Similarly
in December there were 9 attacks in Yusifiya, 6 in Mahmudiya, and 4 in Latifiya
with just seven between Jurf al-Sakhr and Iskandiriya.

The loss of Jurf al-Sakhr also improved security throughout
southern Iraq. The town was the major car bomb factory of the Islamic State in
the area. Without it IS was not able to launch anymore vehicle borne improvised
explosive devices (VBIEDs) into the region. On October
24 Najaf was hit, but there has not been a similar bombing since then. Instead
IS has concentrated upon hitting civilian and military targets in Babil with 4
VBIEDs in November and December each. Before that a VBIED had gone off almost
every month in southern Iraq in 2014. In February Wasit was bombed, followed by
Karbala and Wasit in March, Maysan, Muthanna, and Wasit in April, Basra, Dhi
Qar, Karbala, Najaf, and Wasit in June, Basra in July, Karbala and Wasit in
August, Basra, Karbala, Najaf, and Qadisiyah in September, and Karbala and
Najaf in October. In fact, the total number of car bombs has gone down since
October with 74 that month, 59 in November and 21 in December. Jurf al-Sakhr
cannot account for all of that, but it has definitely had an impact.

Car Bombings In Southern Iraq 2014-2015

Date

Location

Feb 3

Wasit

Mar 6

Wasit

Mar 18

Karbala

Wasit

Apr 9

Maysan

Wasit

Apr 20

Muthanna

Apr 21

Wasit

Jun 2

Dhi Qar

Najaf

Jun 11

Basra

Karbala

Wasit

Jul 5

Basra

Aug 11

Wasit

Aug 25

Karbala

Sep 11

Karbala

Najaf

Qadisiyah

Sep 18

Karbala

Sep 30

Basra

Karbala

Oct 20

Karbala

Oct 24

Najaf

The success of the October operation in northeast Babil came
at a price. The entire population of some 70,000-80,000
was forced out due to the fighting. Local officials and government forces would
not let them return afterward. A parliamentarian from Babil said
that people would not be able to go back to their homes until the area had been
cleared of thousands of explosives. He estimated that would take up to six
months. Other reports said it would be 8-10
months before anyone would be let back into Jurf al-Sakhr. Until then the
region was being converted into a military
base for further operations in eastern Anbar and northern Babil. Militiamen
were also seen burning
down homes in the town after it was taken. These tactics have been used in
parts of Salahaddin and Diyala. There militias emptied entire towns as well,
burned and blew up homes, and banned residents from coming back. This was based
upon the belief that local Sunnis were pro-Islamic State and seen as the
support base for the insurgents. To ensure that the areas would remain clear
the militias were carrying out sectarian cleansings.

For most of 2014 it appeared that Jurf al-Sakhr would be an
exercise in futility for the Iraqi Security Forces, but that finally changed in
October. A huge force of several thousand soldiers and militiamen was amassed
with Iranian advisers to finally clear the area. Security in Babil and southern
Iraq has dramatically improved since then. Who didn’t benefit were the local residents
who were all displaced and are now in refugee camps due to the militias and
government. They are being collectively punished for staying in Jurf al-Sakhr
when it was under IS control. Unfortunately the current war is slowly but
surely repeating the same destructive tactics that were used in the last civil
war. That resulted in the expulsion of Sunnis from most of Baghdad and 2
million people who were never able to return to their homes. This conflict is
heading in the same direction.

SOURCES

Buratha News, “Babylon operations: start of the second phase
of the liberation of Jurf al-Sakhr after cutting the supply lines to Anbar,”
10/4/14

IRAQ HISTORY TIMELINE

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com