ABOUT DARA
Founded in 2003, DARA is an independent organisation committed
to improving the quality and effectiveness of aid for vulnerable
populations suffering from conﬂict, disasters and climate change.
DARA has recognised expertise in providing support in the ﬁeld
of humanitarian aid as well as climate change and disaster risk
reduction management. We have conducted evaluations of
humanitarian operations in over 40 countries across ﬁve continents
for a variety of government, United Nations and European Union
agencies, as well as other major international humanitarian
organisations, such as the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.
DARA is registered as an independent, non-proﬁt organisation in
Spain, has 501 (c)(3) status in the United States and is recognised
as an international organisation in Geneva, Switzerland.

COVER
Relief camp in Pakistan. UNHCR/S. Phelps
Copyright 2011 by DARA
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission
of this publication may be made without written permission.
ISBN: 978-84-615-7626-5
Copies of this report and more information
are available to download at www.daraint.org
Graphic design: Mariano Sarmiento Comunicación Gráﬁca.
Design collaborators: María Lasa and Ruth Otero.
Printed in Advantia Comunicación Gráﬁca.

DARA is grateful to Mr. Diego Hidalgo for his continued
support to the Humanitarian Response Index since 2007.
The Humanitarian Response Index 2011 was made
possible thanks to the generous support of:

HRI
2011

THE
HUMANITARIAN
RESPONSE
INDEX

ADDRESSING THE GENDER CHALLENGE

CONTENTS
Foreword

007

By Michelle Bachelet
Introduction

010

By Ross Mountain
Acknowledgements

013

Taking gender concerns seriously

015

By Valerie Amos

1

DONOR ASSESSMENTS

3

FOCUS ON

Australia

065

Introduction

237

Austria

073

Belgium

078

Chad - Old remedies
no longer effective

238

Canada

086

Colombia - Changes and expectations

248

Denmark

094
101

Democratic Republic of the Congo Leveraging donor support
for long-term impact

In the summer of 2011 one of the worst famines on record
hit the Horn of Africa. Watching images of women and
children fleeing the drought and conflict across the border
into neighbouring Kenya to reach the largest and most
overcrowded refugee camp in the world, it was hard to
imagine that things could get any worse for them. And yet,
things did get worse. On the way to the supposed safety
and security of the Dadaab camp, and even in its vicinity,
women were raped by bandits and gunmen. The plight of
Somali women is sadly familiar to anyone with experience in
large-scale emergencies. Apart from overcoming hunger and
disease, shouldering the added burden of caring for children
and the elderly, and coping with the loss of family members,
property, and livelihoods, women and girls in humanitarian
emergencies often face a range of gender-related human
rights abuses, including sexual violence.
Pre-existing political, social, and economic structures and
conditions determine who lives, who dies, and how populations
recover from natural disasters and armed conflict. Two-thirds
of mortalities in the 2006 Asian tsunami were female. In some
places, women or girls lacked crucial coping mechanisms,
mainly because they were never taught to swim or climb trees,
like boys, or because dress codes and cultural norms about
male consent hampered their mobility. Natural disasters and
their subsequent impact, on average, kill more women than
men and kill women at a younger age than men — more
so in stronger disasters. In camps for people displaced by
conflict or disasters, girls may be the last to be fed and the
first to go hungry in the face of food shortages, suffer from
lack of adequate sanitary conditions and supplies, especially
during menstruation and lactation, and from the absence
of reproductive and maternal health care. During violent
conflicts and natural disasters, the percentage of femaleheaded households — which are associated with poverty —
skyrockets. Early marriage of girls in exchange for dowries and
bride price becomes an acceptable survival mechanism.
Humanitarian actors have recognised that women and men,
girls and boys have gender and age-specific vulnerabilities and
needs. They have adapted approaches to channel food aid to
women, distributed rolling water containers and fuel-efficient
stoves to minimise workloads and insecurity for women, or built

safer latrines for women in camps, together with many other
crucial interventions. These are interventions that need to be
financed and implemented in a much more systematic way.
The gender-specific security threats women and girls face
during humanitarian emergencies also means that their
immediate and long-term survival is intimately linked to
protection from harm. At UN Women, however, we believe
that beyond gender-sensitive relief provision and genderresponsive protection, women’s empowerment is an often
neglected element of humanitarian response, which is key
to its effectiveness. The miseries endured by women in
humanitarian situations are inextricably connected to gender
inequality. Resolving these problems in the immediate
and longer term will require a greater commitment to
engaging women fully in managing humanitarian response
in everything from camp management, relief aid distribution
and protection to disaster preparedness and risk mitigation.
For this reason, at UN Women we are delighted that this
year’s Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) is shedding light
on these essential issues, and calling on humanitarian actors
and donor governments to live up to their commitments to
ensure humanitarian actions are adapted to address the
specific and different needs of women, girls, men and boys.
As the findings from this year’s Humanitarian Response
Index confirm, far too many people still wrongly assume that
the specific threats faced by women should be addressed
once broader security issues are solved; that their voices
should be heard once peace is consolidated; that their
needs will be considered once the emergency situation has
stabilised; that, for women and girls, addressing gender
equality in humanitarian response is not an urgent, life-ordeath matter and can be treated as a secondary priority.
The opposite is true. Without investing in gender equality
before, during and after crises, women will not be able to
build a protective environment for their communities. Without
security and coverage of basic needs, women and girls will
not engage in field-based farming or market activity, so crucial
for early recovery and basic food security. Girls will not enroll
in schools. Women will not engage in public life or contribute

DARA/HRI 2011/FOREWORD

to inclusive decision-making. Without access to livelihoods
and resources, such as the departed or deceased spouse’s
land or property, women are pushed into low-reward, high-risk
work like survival sex, slowing down community recovery and
deepening the immiseration and resentment of their children.
While women and girls are disproportionately affected during
crises, they are not just victims. Historically, the role of
women in anticipating crises, preventing conflict, and their
awareness of threats to themselves, their families and their
communities has been seen throughout the world. Their
resilience to crisis and contributions to conflict resolution,
peace building, disaster preparedness and contingency
planning have been demonstrated time and time again.
Donors in particular have an important role to play in
transforming political commitments to gender equality
into an agenda for action for the humanitarian sector,
working with their partners to ensure that aid efforts do
not discriminate against women and girls, men and boys,
and that gender equality is fully integrated into all aspects
of programme design, implementation, monitoring and
evaluation. The effectiveness of humanitarian responses
aimed at saving lives and preventing and alleviating suffering
will be partial at best until they do.

#008

in humanitarian operations, peacekeeping or post-conflict
recovery efforts and rehabilitation. The aim of UN Women’s
engagement in humanitarian action is to ensure consistency
and sustainability in addressing gender equality concerns
across the humanitarian-development continuum as well as to
improve awareness and commitment, enhance capacity and
strengthen partnerships with national entities, civil society,
regional institutions and the international humanitarian system.
Still, UN Women’s research shows that less than five
percent of money in Multi-Donor Trust Funds for post-conflict
countries, for example, is dedicated to supporting women’s
empowerment or advancing gender equality. This makes it
even more urgent that we fully support and implement any
mechanisms that help hold donors and partners accountable
to their commitments to gender equality or protecting
women and girls. UN entities need to meet or surpass the
Secretary-General’s call for the dedication of a minimum of
15 percent of their budgets to gender equality and women’s
empowerment in post-conflict peace-building. This minimum
threshold is not currently applied to the humanitarian arena.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has issued a challenge
to the UN and the international community to make the
empowerment of women and the funding of such efforts
a top priority. The creation of UN Women represents
an important new component of the UN’s institutional
provisions and actions related to humanitarian response,
peace, security and development. In all of these areas, UN
Women is mandated to support coherence, coordination
and accountability for meeting international commitments
on women’s rights. The General Assembly and UN Women’s
strategic plan have recognised the critical importance of
placing the issues of gender equality and women’s rights at
the centre of humanitarian efforts.

To do so, an analysis is first needed of how much financing
is currently targeting women’s needs, empowerment and
protection. Consistent application of a measuring tool is
needed to conduct this analysis and indeed the Inter-Agency
Standing Committee (IASC) has developed the valuable
Gender Marker that is currently required for use in projects
in the Consolidated Appeals Process and is being applied in
a number of Pooled Funds. However, as the HRI’s analysis of
humanitarian funding shows, in many crises, gender is still
largely absent in the design of many projects, and in donor
funding allocations. In line with the HRI’s conclusion, we believe
that the IASC’s Gender Marker should also be used consistently
and professionally to support more effective monitoring of
humanitarian action from a gender perspective. It must also be
supported with other measures to hold humanitarian actors at
all levels and in all sectors accountable for their responsibilities
to assess and respond to gender-specific needs.

UN Women is here to act on behalf of women everywhere. UN
Women is here to promote action on the widespread recognition
that the empowerment of women is not an afterthought

Over the past few months a number of ‘Open Days on Women
and Peace’ have been conducted around the world, in which
representatives of women’s organisations have met with the

DARA/HRI 2011/FOREWORD

leadership of the United Nations in countries with UN missions.
These meetings have become an annual practice, introduced
last year as part of the tenth anniversary of UN Security
Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. Not
surprisingly, many of the recommendations from women’s civil
society groups are related to humanitarian response, such as
the women and girls' need for information regarding protection
and resources in crises and disasters, the importance of
respecting privacy at relief camps, and the need to include
trained women in the distribution of food and non-food items in
camps and decision-making positions in camp or local disaster
management or preparedness committees to ensure gender
balance and voice in these structures. The message of these
women resonates with that of millions of women and girls
affected by emergencies all over the world.
My organisation, UN Women, is in its early days. It will
not be a supplier of humanitarian relief services. Its role
is to support coordination and accountability efforts and
humanitarian providers to make determined and consistent
responses to women’s needs in humanitarian emergencies.
As part of our plans, UN Women plans to develop the
capacity for assessment and coordination of gender-specific
needs in humanitarian responses. We will help concentrate
the collective synergies, skills and resources of our partners
to meet women’s immediate survival and safety needs and
to build women’s empowerment for the longer-term resilience
of communities and sustainability of humanitarian action.
As humanitarian disasters become more frequent and more
devastating, failure to put women’s safety and empowerment
at the centre of responses will undermine the effectiveness
of relief efforts. In this regard, the HRI 2011 provides
valuable analysis and recommendations on how we can
collectively move forward. I hope the findings can help us
all to better understand the challenges faced by women in
humanitarian crises, and find lasting means to build the
capacity and resilience of women to face and recover from
situations of disasters and conflicts.
MICHELLE BACHELET

#009

DARA/HRI 2011/INTRODUCTION

#010

INTRODUCTION
ROSS MOUNTAIN, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF DARA

This year marks the end of the first five-year phase of the
Humanitarian Response Index (HRI). Since the initiative
began, we have learned a great deal about the challenge
of effectively providing humanitarian assistance in an
increasingly complicated operating environment and the
strengths and limitations of the different actors involved in
the humanitarian sector. We have found that huge difficulties
exist in translating our collective commitment to increase
the impact and effectiveness of aid efforts into actual
changes in policy and practice.
When the first edition of the HRI was published in 2007,
no one was sure what the impact of the HRI would be, but
I think it is safe to say the HRI has earned its place among
the key initiatives in the sector to increase knowledge and
promote greater transparency, accountability and impact.
While the HRI has primarily focused on the role of donor
governments in humanitarian action, our scope and ambition
has always been to look beyond this to see how we can
collectively do better for those suffering from crises.
The context in which humanitarian action takes place
has evolved substantially over the past five years of the
HRI — the Arab Spring is evidence of just how quickly the
dynamics can shift. At the same time, too many crises,
like the Horn of Africa, remain sadly familiar to us despite
our pledges to avoid mistakes of the past. This reinforces
the need to constantly track trends and assess the
implications for the sector.
Through the HRI’s extensive research over the past five
years, we have been able to gather evidence on how the
humanitarian sector is functioning, and from this, raise
concerns about important issues that affect the quality and
effectiveness of humanitarian action. This ranges from the
importance of need-based approaches and the dangers
of aid politicisation, to the need for better prevention,
preparedness, and risk reduction, and support for
protection and access. All these issues are by no means
new for the sector, but as our research shows, much
more effort is required to address them in a lasting and
meaningful manner.

In this year’s report, we turn our attention to the challenge
of incorporating gender more effectively into programming,
and the role that donors can play to push the system to
improve in this area. For years, there has been a general
consensus that humanitarian actors must develop greater
sensitivity to gender issues, both in the emergency response
and in long term-recovery efforts. However, our HRI research
over the past five years in crises such as the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Somalia and Haiti, have
clearly demonstrated that advances have been too few and
too slow, despite important efforts to raise awareness of
these issues.
In the HRI 2011 report, we have gathered and analysed
data regarding the way in which donor governments address
gender in their policies and funding, and provide field actors’
perspectives of donor commitment to gender. We hope
the report makes a modest contribution to a growing body
of evidence on the critical importance of gender sensitive
approaches in all aspects of humanitarian action. This
includes the continuing work of the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee (IASC) Sub-Working Group on Gender in
Humanitarian Action to develop tools and raise awareness
of gender issues in the sector, a recent study from Tufts
University on the importance of sex and age disaggregated
data, and an ongoing evaluation sponsored by UN Women,
UNICEF and UN OCHA on gender outcomes in the responses
to different crises (which DARA is conducting).
This body of work, together with the findings from this
year’s HRI, point to the need to scale up efforts to ensure
gender sensitive approaches are integrated into all aspects
of humanitarian action. We have found that much more
needs to be done by humanitarian organisations and
donors alike to ensure gender is properly addressed in their
programmes in ways that meet the different needs of all
within the affected population.
From our perspective, the issue of gender in crises is simple:
we will never be able to achieve principled and effective
responses unless we can show that assistance is based on,
and in proportion to the needs and priorities of all parts of
the affected populations, and provided impartially. The only

DARA/HRI 2011/INTRODUCTION

way to achieve this is by ensuring needs assessments and
programme design adequately integrate gender analysis, and
by constantly monitoring and evaluating the results of our
actions to ensure gender concerns are addressed properly.
The chapters contributed by UN Emergency Relief Coordinator,
Valerie Amos, and UN Women Executive Director, Michelle
Bachelet, highlight just how difficult the challenge will be to
achieve this, but also the urgency of making this top priority
for all of us. We are extremely grateful for their thoughtful
insight and contribution to the debate.
This year’s report includes expanded analysis of individual
donors’ policies and practices, based on key elements of
the declaration of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD).
We have also expanded the donor classification into
groups to show which donors share similar characteristics,
strengths and weaknesses. This is based on statistical
analysis of donors’ humanitarian policies and funding,
and the perceptions and opinions of hundreds of senior
representatives of humanitarian organisations at both the
field and headquarters level.
The results show three distinct groups of donors, each
with its own strengths and weaknesses, but all making an
positive contribution to humanitarian actions.
Group 1 donors are referred to as "Principled Partners". They
are characterised by their generosity, strong commitment
to humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and
independence, and for flexible, funding arrangements with
partners.
Group 2, the "Learning Leaders" have often taken a
leadership role in terms of their capacity to respond, field
presence, and commitment to learning and improving
performance in the sector.
Group 3 donors are "Aspiring Actors". As a group of donors,
they are diverse in terms of their size and capacities, but
often have a focus on building strengths in specific “niche”
areas, such as geographic regions or thematic areas like
preparedness and prevention, and their aspirations to taking
on a greater role in the sector.

#011

The classification deserves some explanation. First, the
GHD attempts to provide a common framework to guide
donors’ action, and outlines a series of principles and
good practices that donors themselves believed important
in order for their aid to have the greatest impact in the
response to crises. Donor governments often claim that they
work in coordination and in compliance with the principles
and practices outlined in the GHD declaration. However, as
the HRI’s research shows, the reality is different. Donors
do not act as a unified collective, but often follow individual
priorities and interpretations of what they consider to be
the best approach to providing humanitarian assistance,
depending on the crisis, and, as we outlined in the HRI
2010, are often influenced by domestic or international
political objectives. The classification into groups helps
to show more precisely where donors converge and where
they diverge in their policies, practices, and how they are
perceived in the field.
Second, while the focus of the HRI is on the role of donor
governments, this does not mean it is an evaluation of
the performance of individual agencies responsible for
managing government humanitarian assistance. Over
the past five years, we have spoken to and interviewed
dozens of representatives of Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development/ Development Assistance
Committee (OECD/DAC) donor agencies in our field
research, and many others in donor headquarters. Our
overwhelming conclusion is that staff of donor governments’
humanitarian departments are fully committed to achieving
the aims of the GHD principles, and are actively engaged
in making the sector work more effectively. Unfortunately,
their work is often undermined by bureaucratic legislation
and procedures, a lack of resources and capacity, and by
political indifference or interference. The HRI’s analysis
attempts, to the extent possible, to highlight these issues
so that governments can work to improve the quality,
effectiveness and impact of their assistance, and respect
and support the work of their humanitarian departments and
partners to achieve these aims.
Third, no performance measurement system or index can
fully capture the complexities of reality, and the HRI is no

DARA/HRI 2011/INTRODUCTION

different. As we have pointed out in every edition of the
report, there are limitations to the data available, in the
indicators we have selected, and the depth of analysis
we can provide. The research process, for example, uses
financial data from 2010, which means, as is the case today,
that dramatic cuts to aid budgets by many donors, such as
Spain, Ireland and others, are not reflected in the analysis.
Equally, many of the recent positive moves taken by donors,
like the UK and Australia, to update and improve their
humanitarian assistance policy frameworks are not reflected
in the data. These changes, both positive and negative, will
take time to manifest at the field level, so any findings need
to be contextualised.
Finally, the HRI research process includes extensive interviews
and surveys to capture the views of senior field staff from
UN agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on the quality of
support provided by donors that fund their programmes.
The perspectives from the field are critically important to
understand how donors’ policies and practices are facilitating
or impeding effective crisis responses. This year, as part of the
research process, we also followed-up with interviews at the
headquarters level, and found that the perspectives from the
field were largely corroborated by their headquarter colleagues.
The HRI therefore offers a unique window for donors to get a
broader overview of how they are perceived and where they
could do better to support their partners.
In summary, it is critically important to consider the HRI’s
findings and analysis, not as absolute truths, but as
evidence of trends in donors’ practices that can help policy
makers and their partners reflect on what is working well and
what can be improved. Sometimes the HRI data and findings
may support and reinforce other research and evaluations
– as indeed is the case, for example, with many OECD/DAC
peer reviews. Sometimes, the findings may contradict other
research, or offer results that may be surprising to us, as
they run contrary to our own personal experiences or points
of views. The aim is that the HRI is a tool and an entry point
to promote more discussion and debate about how donors
can contribute positively to greater accountability and impact
for people in situations of crisis.

#012

As we look forward to the next phase of the HRI, it is clear
that both the new operational contexts and developments
in reforming the structure and tools of the humanitarian
sector, call for a period of reflection to redefine good
practice. The challenges posed by climate change, rapid
population growth and tighter financial budgets will require
the humanitarian sector to be prepared for even greater
challenges. The growing importance of new operational
actors and donors is a reality that “traditional” actors need
to acknowledge and embrace as part of the growing aid
community. We look forward to continuing to engage with
the whole donor community in the next phase of the HRI to
get as complete a picture as possible of what is needed to
ensure we build capacity and resilience to anticipate and
prepare for new challenges.
We need to make sure we get it right. The challenges that
lie ahead will require us to think outside the box. We should
encourage, and not fear, innovation. For starters, the current
crisis in the Horn of Africa shows just how crucial support
for preparedness and prevention is. We need to invest
significantly in building resilience to crises, as the effects
of climate change will make this increasingly important. We
also need to avoid gender blind approaches, which do not
account for the different needs of women, men, boys and
girls. Humanitarian responses that do not understand the
different ways in which they are affected cannot possibly be
effective in meeting their needs.
From the start, we have hoped that the Humanitarian
Response Index serves to inspire greater dialogue regarding
this and other best practices. As we move forward into the
next phase of the HRI, I sincerely hope you will join us in
widening the debate to include new actors and contexts,
consider the future challenges facing the sector, and look for
practical solutions on how we can maximise the resources
and support of donors and humanitarian organisations to
meet the needs of people affected by, or at risk of crises.

DARA/HRI 2011/ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

#013

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ROSS MOUNTAIN, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF DARA

I would like to acknowledge the contributions and support
of the hundreds of individuals and organisations that make
the HRI possible.
It is an honour for DARA to have the contributions of both
Valerie Amos and Michelle Bachelet in this year’s Humanitarian
Response Index (HRI). They have shared their thoughts on the
importance of gender in humanitarian crises, and ideas on
what we collectively must do to ensure the different needs and
concerns of all affected and vulnerable populations are met
in our responses to crises. We are highly appreciative of their
support and endorsement.
I also want to thank the hundreds of people from United
Nation (UN) agencies, NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent
Movement, and host and donor governments working in
humanitarian crises, who took time out of their heavy
workloads to share their first-hand perspectives with our field
research teams. The HRI would simply not exist without their
generous collaboration and valuable insights.
Our field research teams benefited from the administrative
and logistical support from the International Federation of
the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and UN
OCHA, who helped our teams find their way around safely
and efficiently. Our sincere thanks for this.
We are also grateful for the support from Development
Initiatives (DI), the International Council of Voluntary
Agencies (ICVA), Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation
in Emergencies (VOICE), and Bochum University who
collaborated with us on our field research in several crises,
and have provided feedback, advice and ideas on how to
ensure consistent approaches to achieve our common goal
of improved humanitarian action. Sincere thanks also to
Magda Ninaber for leading our field research in the occupied
Palestinian territories and sharing her expert advice with us.
Special thanks also go to dozens of headquarters staff
of humanitarian organisations in Geneva, New York and
Washington who shared their perspectives of good practice
and provided highly useful guidance to improve the quality
of our analysis. UN Women and Gen Cap and the IASC Sub-

Working Group on Gender in Humanitarian Action provided
essential insight to help us prepare our research on gender.
We also interviewed dozens of representatives of OECD/
DAC donor agencies in our field research, and many others
in donor headquarters. Understanding the perspectives of
donor agencies and the challenges they face in responding to
humanitarian crises has been essential to our analysis. We
want to reiterate once more our conclusion that staff of donor
governments’ humanitarian departments are fully committed
to achieving the aims of the Good Humanitarian Donorship
principles, and are actively engaged in making the sector work
more effectively. They deserve the full respect, understanding
and support of their governments to help them achieve these
aims, and we look forward to continuing to engage with the
donor community in the next phase of the HRI.
The Peer Review Committee has provided technical advice,
strategic guidance and moral support for the HRI. Our
sincere gratitude goes to Jock Baker, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein,
Veronique de Geoffroy, Randolph Kent, Sara Pantuliano,
David Roodman, Ed Schenkenberg and Hansjoerg Stromeyer.
We also want to thank former committee members Eva von
Oelreich and James Darcy for their inspirational support over
the past five years.
Our Advisory Board helps us connect the HRI to wider debate
on humanitarian and global affairs. We are truly grateful to
José María Figueres, António Guterres, Diego Hidalgo, Larry
Minear, Iqbal Riza, Mary Robinson and Pierre Schori for their
dedication to the HRI.
DARA’s Board of Trustees has been a source of
encouragement for us. I would like to thank all of them for
their enthusiasm and motivation, specifically Aldo Ajello,
Emma Bonino, Jan Eliasson, José María Figueres, Beatriz
Iraburu, José Manuel Romero and Juliet Pierce, with a
special thanks to the President of the Board, Diego Hidalgo,
for his extreme generosity and support for DARA and the HRI
over the years.
Sincere thanks go to AVINA STIFTUNG and the Dutch
Postcode Lottery (Nationale Postcode Loterji) for their
generous support of the HRI.

DARA/HRI 2011/ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to specifically express my gratitude to Silvia Hidalgo,
DARAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s founding Director, who had the vision and initiative
to create the HRI. It is because of her enthusiasm and
perseverance that the HRI came into being. Her recognition
that the sector needed a tool to assess the role of donors,
promote good donor practices, and encourage greater
accountability to those affected by crises remains as valid
today as it did when the HRI was created five years ago.
Thank you, Silvia.
Finally, I would like to recognise all of DARAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s staff for their
contributions to the HRI. Producing the HRI is a momentous
task, and it would not be possible without a team effort. I
would like thank Philip Tamminga for his leadership of the
initiative over the past four years and for contributing to its
increasing recognition in the sector, Fernando Espada for
managing the field missions and building stronger connections
to humanitarians in the field, Daniela Ruegenberg, Covadonga
Canteli and Beatriz Asensio for their remarkable work on the
HRI methodology and for carrying out the data analysis and
Marybeth Redheffer for her work in deepening our analysis
of donor policy frameworks. Eva Cervantes, Miguel Gonzalez,
Susana Vicario and Nacho Wilhemi provided logistical and
administrative support, without which the project would not
be possible. DARA also benefited from the support of several
interns, many from the Network on Humanitarian Action
(NOHA), whose enthusiasm and dedication was of great
assistance. Thanks to Daniel Barnes, Ana Bernthsen, Sophie
Broach, Ana del Toro, Caitlyn Hughes, Christina Jang, Ralph
Meyers, Rebecca Moy and Laura Schaack.

#014

DARA/HRI 2011/TAKING GENDER CONCERNS SERIOUSLY

#015

TAKING GENDER
CONCERNS SERIOUSLY

THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSIDERING THE DIFFERENT NEEDS
OF WOMEN, GIRLS, BOYS AND MEN IN HUMANITARIAN CRISES

When people talk about disasters, there is a tendency to think
of them as being the great equaliser. The devastating wave, the
debilitating drought, or the sudden earthquake, are seen as
unifying moments where societies suffer as one, and unite in
their response – rich and poor, young and old, men and women.

Unfortunately, many people do not understand this. This
is why DARA’s Humanitarian Response Index 2011 report
is an important contribution to increasing awareness and
understanding of the importance of addressing gender
concerns in emergency situations.

The reality, however, is often strikingly different.

The findings and conclusions from the Humanitarian
Response Index (HRI) field research to crises such as Haiti,
Somalia, Pakistan and Sudan, along with its analysis of
donor governments’ policies and funding practices related to
gender equality, show that there are still significant gaps in
understanding the importance of gender issues by all actors,
donors and humanitarian organisations alike. Much more
needs to be done to mainstream gender into all aspects of
humanitarian actions, not simply because we have made many
statements and commitments in this regard, but because it
is one of the most powerful and effective means to ensure
humanitarian actions are based on objective assessments of
needs, and provided in ways that do not discriminate against
any portion of a crisis affected population.

Consider the following facts.
In natural disasters, women tend to die in much larger
numbers than men. During the Asian tsunami, for example,
three times as many women lost their lives.
In conflict, by contrast, men tend to die in larger numbers as
a direct result of conflict – but women and girls die due to
indirect causes, as they are left extremely vulnerable, have
less access to health care, struggle to maintain households
alone, and find themselves prey to sexual violence (Plümper
and Neumayer 2006).
In crises that displace a large number of people, the burden
of care tends to overwhelmingly fall on women; although,
they often also find more opportunities to develop their
skills, and become leaders.
In refugee camps, young men and the children they look
after often find themselves increasingly malnourished, as
they fall through the gaps, without basic cooking skills or the
ration cards to receive food.
Women, girls, boys and men are affected very differently by
humanitarian crises and, as a result, need to be assisted in
different ways. This is what we mean when we talk about the
gender dimensions of a humanitarian emergency.

The HRI findings are not new, but they add new evidence
to back up what we already know. For example, a recent
study by the UN’s Office on Inspection Services found that
more than 50 percent of UN staff do not understand how to
implement gender-responsive programmes –many believe
it is purely about supporting women's programming (Muir,
Jogoo and Rieper 2010).
Paying attention to women’s needs is, of course, essential.
But gender is a broader concept. It looks at how society
works, who has the power and what roles different members
of the society have. It helps us to understand the profoundly
different ways in which men and women experience the same
events, and to identify the different responses needed to

DARA/HRI 2011/TAKING GENDER CONCERNS SERIOUSLY

keep them alive and healthy and to ensure their dignity in
crisis situations. Unfortunately, even where these differences
are recognised and understood, aid agencies too often
continue to deliver assistance as if one size fits all. In the
heat of the moment, humanitarian organisations often rush in
and begin to provide aid without differentiation - rather than
targeting specific items to people with specific needs.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), for example,
a 2010 study conducted in North Kivu found that women
did 75 percent of the work in producing food — but that the
assistance provided by agricultural aid agencies (such as
tools, seeds and training) went to the household – with no
indication of how the aid was distributed once it came into
the home. This meant that their aid was not always going
where it was most needed.
Similarly, after the 2004 Asian tsunami, most of the
humanitarian assistance initially went to men, who were
provided fishing boats and nets. No one asked what women
needed, or how to support them to get back to work. A more
gender-sensitive response would have meant rebuilding
market stalls and providing goods to restart trading.

GETTING THE DATA RIGHT
Tackling this gap between understanding and response
is one of the most important challenges affecting the aid
industry today. In her foreword to this report, Michelle
Bachelet, the head of UN Women, makes a compelling case
for a more concerted approach to gender equality.

#016

ASSESSING EVERYONE’S NEEDS
Getting the right data at the right time, however, may
require a fundamental rethink of how many aid agencies do
business. In the immediate aftermath of an emergency, the
first priority is to determine what people need. What is the
scale of the problem? Who has been affected?
We must make sure that women and men participate on
assessment teams, as men are unable to speak to women
or children in many places where we work. If women are not
heard, their voices are crowded out. It is men’s needs and
men’s voices that will be heard. We must do more to ensure
a balance of women and men on assessment teams and
train all those conducting needs assessments to understand
how to collect information from women and men.
Once needs have been assessed, and the aid starts flowing,
humanitarian responders must also do more to measure how
their interventions are affecting men and women differently.
There is an overwhelming tendency to report numbers in bulk
–latrines built, tons of food distributed, school rehabilitated
– without knowing who used those latrines, who ate the food
and who went to school.
If a health centre reports, for example, seeing 5,000 clients a
month, humanitarian responders cannot tell whether there are
more women than men accessing its services and whether there
are specific issues to be resolved around men’s or women’s
access to health care. This can have grave implications.

The most important starting point is for humanitarian
organisations to recognise the differing needs of men
and women in the data they collect at the beginning of a
disaster. Ideally before.

In Pakistan, in 2009, the health cluster was not initially
disaggregating data by sex for those using the clinics. Had
they done so, they would have found that women did not go
to male health care providers and had less social mobility
to be able to go to health centres. This was noticed by the
media and the gender team. As a result, action was taken
to provide female health care workers and mobile clinics.
In addition, sanitation facilities were improved by adding
purdah walls – protective barriers in front of the latrine so
that women would use them safely and with privacy.

A recent study by the Feinstein International Center at Tufts
University, supported by OCHA and CARE, provides powerful
examples of how early gathering of sex- and age-disaggregated
data can make a real difference (Mazurana, Benelli, et.al
2011). For example, in DRC in 2011, data on malnourished
children was initially not broken down by girls and boys. A
gender advisor urged a closer look and the new analysis
showed that more boys than girls were malnourished, - but
more girls than boys were coming to supplemental feeding
centres. Aid agencies working in the nutrition sector were
surprised at this finding and revised their plans accordingly.

Similarly, if a school states that it has 2,000 students, it is not
clear if there are more boys than girls attending that school, or if
more girls than boys are dropping out. In Somalia, for example,
data showed that fewer than 40 percent of children were
attending schools — girls slightly less than boys. But the aid
agencies dealing with education initially only focused on why girls
were not attending, and did not look into why boys were dropping
out. This caused a backlash in the community, as female
education was seen as a western concern. It was decided to
take a more balanced approach, by helping more boys, as well
as girls, attend school. This approach won more local support.

As Emergency Relief Coordinator, part of my job is to identify
practical and effective measures to help make this happen
— simple interventions which have been shown to have a
powerful impact on the way we help people.

DARA/HRI 2011/TAKING GENDER CONCERNS SERIOUSLY

Peter Walker, director of the Feinstein Centre, recently
said: ‘If I had to put my finger on one thing that will improve
programming, in terms of return for your dollar, euro or
yen, I would say it is collecting and analysing sex-and-age
disaggregated data.”
As the HRI report suggests, donors can help promote this
by requiring this kind of data regularly from their partners,
not just in the project design stage, but in monitoring and
following up. Here, a crucial question that all actors should
be asking is what does this data tell us about different
needs, and how are we using the data to guide and inform
our approaches to interventions so that we can adequately
address those needs.

IMPROVING THE WAY WE DO WORK
An important recent step in improving the way we think
about gender in emergencies was the introduction of
the IASC Gender Marker — a coding system attached to
project proposals which measures whether those proposals
take account of differences in needs. A simple ranking
of 0, 1 or 2 is attached to projects submitted as part
of the Consolidated Appeals Process or pooled funding
mechanism. The code is also recorded online, on OCHA’s
Financial Tracking System (FTS).
Analysis of the use of the Gender Marker in 20 countries
in 2012 indicated dramatic improvement in the number
of projects submitted to the CAPs and Pooled Funds
effectively addressing gender issues, and a commensurate
decrease in ‘gender-blind’ projects (i.e.: projects that
code 0 on the Gender Marker coding system). Out of over
2000 projects submitted to the 2012 CAP, only 10% of
projects were coded 0. Just under 50% were designed
to address gender equality. But, as the HRI analysis of
funding patterns show, there is still significant room for
improvement as it is imperative to implement gender
responsive programmes – not just strengthen project
design. The data shows that a significant proportion of
donor funding is not aligned to meeting gender criteria, and
in some crises, gender issues are largely absent in project
proposals and funding allocations.
Many donors have said that they find the Gender Marker a
useful tool to assess projects. The Swedish International
Development Agency, for example, recently announced that
it would use it when making its funding decisions. If, as the
HRI report recommends, more donors make it clear they will
only fund projects that address gender concerns, more aid
agencies will take gender seriously.

#017

LEADERSHIP ON GENDER COUNTS
Improving systems is only part of the process. Stronger
leadership, knowledge and expertise are also needed to
address gender gaps during emergency responses. Busy
programme managers and cluster coordinators often find
it difficult to juggle a long list of competing demands, and
gender can fall down or off the agenda, as many of the
examples from the HRI field research show.
To keep these issues at the centre of programming, a pool
of gender experts was created – known as the Gender
Standby Roster (GenCap). Since 2007, 57 GenCap Advisers
have been deployed to 30 crises to help emergency
response leaders design and implement services that
acknowledge the different challenges facing men and
women of all ages.
A special handbook and e-learning training course,
“Different Needs Equal Opportunities”, also offer a
number of practical suggestions about how to respond
to the distinct needs of women, girls, boys and men. The
recent establishment of UN Women offers even more
opportunities to strengthen understanding of gender
concerns during crises and to improve coordination.
A final and essential step to tackling gender in crises is
to do much more when preparing for future emergencies.
Women, for example, are often very active in communitybased disaster preparedness organisations. At higher
levels, however, men still dominate. National disaster
management authorities need to do more to engage with
women’s networks, which play such an important role in
crisis response.
In Tuvalu, when a drought threatened to leave thousands
of people stranded without water, the UN contacted the
government division responsible for women’s affairs and
discovered that they were eager to be involved in the
response, but had not been included in the government’s
disaster management planning processes.
Gender can also be more effectively addressed during
disaster simulations. An example of how this can work well
was seen this September, during a Pacific Humanitarian
Team simulation. During the exercise, Pacific Island women
provided essential information and suggestions to the
simulation managers, allowing them to embed gender and
social issues into the scenario.

DARA/HRI 2011/TAKING GENDER CONCERNS SERIOUSLY

TAKING GENDER SERIOUSLY
I want to encourage donors to take a more active stance,
placing gender concerns at the heart of humanitarian
action. Donors can play a crucial role by demanding that aid
agencies use a comprehensive gender analysis to inform
programming. The findings and recommendations from the
HRI report deserve thoughtful consideration.
Understanding the differing needs of women, girls, boys
and men is the responsibility of all humanitarian workers.
Without it, we will fail in our responsibility to the people
we are seeking to help. Identifying and addressing these
distinct needs enhances humanitarian programming and
puts participation of everyone in the affected population and
accountability by humanitarian actors for their actions to
women, girls, boys and men affected by crises centre stage.
We cannot wait any longer to get this right.
VALERIE AMOS

THE HUMANITARIAN
RESPONSE INDEX 2011
PROGRESS AND OBSTACLES IN APPLYING
GOOD DONOR PRACTICES

INTRODUCTION
In late 2011, the United Nations (UN) launched a record
appeal for US$7.7 billion to assist an estimated 51 million
people affected by humanitarian crises. The appeal launch
followed a familiar and predictable script: humanitarian
organisations issued dire warnings about the extent of
needs and urgently called on governments to scale up
their support for relief efforts. The response was equally
predictable: by the end of 2011, only 61% of appeal needs
were coveredâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;an average that remains largely unchanged
for the past five years, with some crises neglected and
severely underfunded (OCHA 2011).
Most of the crises included in the 2012 appeal were
also predictable. Of the 16 crises included in the appeal,
nine have been among the top humanitarian aid recipients
over the past decade (Development Initiatives 2011). This
underscores the continued inability of the international
community to address chronic vulnerability by strengthening
community resilience and increasing capacity for prevention
and preparedness at the local and international level.
As the principal funders of humanitarian actions, the
worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s main donor governments have a special role and
responsibility to ensure that aid money is used efficiently,
effectively and for the greatest impact for the millions of
people affected by crisis each year. Donors recognised this
when they jointly drafted in 2003 the declaration of Good
Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). The GHD set forth a set of
principles and good practices intended to make donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;
humanitarian aid more principled, predictable and reliable
(See www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org).
Since 2007, DARAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) has
monitored donor governmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; application of the GHD Principles
with the aim of contributing to efforts to improve the quality,
effectiveness, accountability and impact of humanitarian
aid. The HRI combines analysis of quantitative data on

donor funding and policies with field research in different
humanitarian crises to assess the quality of 23 Organisation
for Economic Co-Operation and Development /Development
Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) donor governmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;
humanitarian assistance in five pillars of practice:
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r1JMMBS-FBSOJOHBOEBDDPVOUBCJMJUZ
Field research for 2011 covered nine crises: Chad, Colombia,
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Kenya,
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4PNBMJB
and Sudan, which together received almost two thirds of
international humanitarian assistance funding in 2010 (OCHA
FTS 2011). This edition of the HRI also includes a special
focus on how donors address gender concerns in humanitarian
action (see the chapter Addressing the Gender Challenge).
After five years of tracking and monitoring donor performance
through the HRI, the reality seems that donors are far from
achieving the ideals expressed in the GHD Declaration.

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS
The wide scope of the research covering 23 of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s
main donor governments and nine major crises gives the
HRI a broad perspective of the trends and challenges facing
the humanitarian sector. Unfortunately, our findings for the
2011 edition confirm that the issues raised in previous
editions largely persist. The ability of the humanitarian
sector to deliver assistance has improved over time,
but progress in consolidating good donor practices and
reforming the sector has been limited. Based on the
experience and findings of five years of HRI research, our
conclusion is that most donors have not significantly altered

their approaches in order to apply good practices, and the
pace of reform efforts is too slow for the humanitarian
sector to be able to adequately meet current needs, much
less prepare for, anticipate, mitigate and respond to a trend
of increasingly complex crises in the coming decade. The
main gaps and challenges found through the HRI 2011
research are highlighted below.

GENDER A LOW PRIORITY FOR MANY DONORS
AND ACTORS, LEAVING GAPS IN RESPONSES
The HRI research shows that gender is far from being
mainstreamed into humanitarian action. Many actors
do not take the time to understand the different needs
of women, girls, men and boys in a crisis, and ensure
programming meets these needs equitably. This can result
in aid that is unsuitable, such as culturally inappropriate
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women and girls in danger, such as inadequate lighting
and security in camp latrines JO)BJUJ8IJMFUIFNBKPSJUZ
of donors include gender in their policies, their funding
is not always allocated towards projects that incorporate
adequate gender analysis, and few donors actually monitor
and follow up on how gender is addressed in programmes
they support. Donors have enormous potential to influence
the sector by requiring the humanitarian organisations they
support to prioritise gender in the design, implementation,
monitoring and evaluation of programmes, ensuring that
aid is not discriminatory and meets the different needs of
women, men, girls and boys equally.

POLITICISATION OF AID CONTINUES TO DENY
MILLIONS ACCESS TO AID
As in the 2010 report, the HRI 2011 research shows
that many governmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; political, economic and security
agendas continue to undermine the ability of humanitarian
organisations to access vulnerable populations and provide
aid without discrimination. Anti-terrorism legislation of some
governments has led to legal and procedural barriers to
access populations in need in crises such as in Somalia
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other donors and in other crises. At the same time, the
political interests and actions of other parties, such as
national authorities or armed groups, have impeded access
to and protection of civilians in need. Keeping humanitarian
assistance focused exclusively on meeting needs and
independent of other objectives is the only effective way to
ensure donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; contributions have maximum benefits and
impact in relieving human suffering. Donors also need to
step up their support for concrete measures to ensure all
actors comply with their responsibilities to protect, including
supporting prevention strategies and supporting appropriate
legal actions to address abuses of human rights and
international humanitarian law.

#023

PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RECOVERY
DISREGARDED IN AID EFFORTS
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1BLJTUBO
floods or drought and famine in the Horn of Africa show the
human consequences of a lack of sustained commitment
by donor governments for prevention, preparedness,
risk reduction and long-term recovery efforts. Too often,
these activities are not prioritised by governments in
their development or humanitarian assistance, resulting
in missed opportunities to strengthen local capacity and
resilience and undermining the ability of the humanitarian
sector to anticipate and prepare for and respond effectively
to future crises. Given that humanitarian needs will continue
to grow exponentially in coming years, reducing the human
and economic impacts of humanitarian crises is a critical
pending task for all donor governments.

THE CURRENT AID REFORM AGENDA IS INSUFFICIENT
TO TACKLE CURRENT AND FUTURE NEEDS
The HRI 2011 research suggests that efforts to reform
the humanitarian system, including the GHD initiative,
are generating slow but uneven progress in improving
the planning, coordination and delivery of assistance.
Nevertheless, after five years of HRI research, it is more
than evident that the gaps are essentially the same as
when the reform process began, and the pace of reforms
may not be quick enough to match increasing needs and a
rapidly changing aid context, much less respond adequately
to future challenges. Donors must continue to support
current reform efforts, but they also need to actively
work towards an ambitious programme to strengthen the
capacity of the sector to anticipate and adapt to future
needs and challenges.

DONOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IS WEAK
Donor governments are not as transparent and accountable
as they should be, especially towards the crisis-affected
populations. As the HRI research in Colombia, Haiti,
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aid allocations are not sufficiently transparent, nor guided
by humanitarian objectives, and donor governments in
general are still reporting their assistance inconsistently.
Accountability is still largely conceived as an exercise on
fiscal management and control of the partners they fund,
rather than on meeting the needs, priorities and aspirations
of affected populations as the primary stakeholder in any
aid efforts. By making aid transparency and accountability
towards affected populations the cornerstone of their
assistance, donors would have greater assurance that their
aid is effective in meeting needs.

As in the HRI 2010, a multidimensional statistical analysis
was undertaken to classify donors into groups. Donors are
scored against 35 quantiative and qualitiative indicators,
organised into five pillars of donor practices. Quantitative
indicators are based on published data on donors' policies,
funding and practices, while qualitative indicators are based
on a standard field-based survey on perceptions of donor
performance in different crises. The results are compiled
into scores and a classification, as visually illustrated below.
This classification by groups allows donor policy makers
and their humanitarian partners the opportunity to compare
performance against a smaller set of peers. The grouping
is not hierarchical: each group of donors has its own set
of strengths and weaknesses, but all have made positive
contributions to overall humanitarian aid efforts (See the
chapter HRI Research Process for more details).

This year, four donors were not included in the full HRI
assessment due to insufficient data from the field: Austria,
(SFFDF
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has been minimal compared to other donors (including new
and emerging donors) for several years. Additional aid cuts
brought on by the severe financial crisis have further limited
their engagement with the sector. Austria and New Zealand,
on the other hand, have made concerted efforts to review
and improve their aid policies, but the limited number of
partners at the field level made it impossible to assess them
against the qualitative components of the index.

THE GROUPING IS NOT HIERARCHICAL:
EACH GROUP OF DONORS HAS ITS OWN SET
OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES, BUT
ALL HAVE MADE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS
TO OVERALL HUMANITARIAN AID EFFORTS

DONOR
PERFORMANCE BY GROUP
Well perceived by ﬁeld
partners in terms of
capacity, commitment
to learning and evaluation
and support for coordination.

Group 2

Lower scores
in indicators for
coordination,
funding of
multilateral
humanitarian
organisations,
respect for
international
humanitarian
law, and in
ﬁeld perception
indicators on
commitment to
neutral, impartial,
independent aid
aligned to needs

EUROPEAN
COMMISSION

LEARNING
LEADERS

Group 1

UNITED
STATES

FRANCE

CANADA

NETHERLANDS

PRINCIPLED
PARTNERS

UNITED
KINGDOM

DENMARK

NORWAY

SWEDEN
ITALY
SWITZERLAND
JAPAN
BELGIUM

Higher scores
in indicators for
coordination, funding
of multilateral
humanitarian
organisations, respect
for international
humanitarian
law, and in ﬁeld
perception indicators
on commitment to
neutral, impartial
and independent aid
aligned to needs

GERMANY

SPAIN
FINLAND
AUSTRALIA

Group 3

ASPIRING
ACTORS

IRELAND

LUXEMBOURG

Poorly perceived by ﬁeld partners
in terms of capacity, commitment to
learning and evaluation,
and support or coordination

PRINCIPLED PARTNERS
The Principled Partners group includes Denmark, Finland,
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. The
group is characterised by their generosity, as measured by
the ratio of humanitarian assistance compared to Gross
National Income (GNI), a strong commitment to humanitarian
principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, and for
flexible funding arrangements with partners. A comment about
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the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s strengths: â&#x20AC;&#x153;Norway is good with flexible and
continuous funding and light reportingâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;agencies need certain
amount of flexibility to operate in this context.â&#x20AC;?
This group has consistently performed well in all the HRI
pillars and indicators over the past five years, in part due to
well-defined policies and a long-tradition of governmental and
public support for humanitarian assistance. At the international
level, these donors are strong advocates for humanitarian
principles and for a well-functioning, humanitarian system
coordinated mainly through the UN system.

PRINCIPLED PARTNERS ARE GENEROUS,
COMMITTED TO HUMANITARIAN
PRINCIPLES, AND ADVOCATE FOR A STRONG
MULTILATERAL HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM
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strong supporters of multilateral agencies (the UN and Red
Cross/Red Crescent Movement), un-earmarked funding
and pooled funding mechanisms, the group provides
less support to non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
than the overall average for OECD/DAC donors. In field
interviews, many UN and NGO respondents suggested that
these donors did not demand enough of their partners,
and had unrealistic or idealist expectations regarding the
capacity and leadership of the UN system to effectively
coordinate international aid efforts. As an example, the
majority of these donors are strong supporters of pooled
fund mechanisms, which many respondents considered a
means of disengaging from operational issues at the field
MFWFMi1PPMFEGVOEJOHJTOPXCFDPNJOHBOFBTJFSPQUJPOGPS
donors to shed their responsibilities to engage with more
demanding partners like international non-governmental
organisations (INGOs), or confront the issues,â&#x20AC;? reported one
respondent. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Donors are risk adverse, and are therefore
using pooled funds, but it doesnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t necessarily mean better
accountability,â&#x20AC;? said another.
8IJMFUIFTFEPOPSTIBWFBHPPESFQVUBUJPOGPSNBJOUBJOJOH
the neutrality, impartiality and independence of their
humanitarian aid, in several crises field interviewees

#026

suggested that their aid decisions were equally influenced
by political factors like any other donor. There was a sense
among many interviewees that while these donors are
good partners, some of the groupâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s impetus in leading and
consolidating principled approaches has been lost in recent
years. Many saw the lack of active advocacy to preserve the
integrity of neutral, impartial humanitarian action in the light
of increasing aid politicisation as an example of their decline
as â&#x20AC;&#x153;moral authoritiesâ&#x20AC;? in the sector.
Some respondents felt that there was a trend for donors
like Denmark, Finland and Switzerland to look for â&#x20AC;&#x153;easy
winsâ&#x20AC;? and non-controversial programmes, limiting their
engagement with the system, both in debates on where
the future of the humanitarian system and in the number
of crises supported. Norway, for example, was singled out
in Somalia for its unconditional support for the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG), at the expense sometimes of
a more independent stance for humanitarian assistance.
Unofficially, many donor representatives interviewed admitted
that domestic and foreign policy considerations were indeed
factors that influenced where aid was allocated and to which
organisations. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Our aid is neutral and impartial when we give
it to an organisation,â&#x20AC;? said one, â&#x20AC;&#x153;but of course, the decision
on which crisis to support is completely politicalâ&#x20AC;?.
At the individual donor level, compared to 2010, Norway
TIPXTTVCTUBOUJBMJNQSPWFNFOUTJOJUTTDPSFTJO1JMMBS
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and international law). The Netherlands also demonstrates
improvement compared to 2010, especially for its scores for
timely funding to complex emergencies, un-earmarked funding,
and funding towards prevention and accountability initiatives.
However, it could improve in aligning funding to gender criteria
and follow up at the field level on gender issues. Finland,
Sweden and Switzerland also show small improvements, while
Denmark drops slightly in comparison to 2010.

Group 2

LEARNING LEADERS
Canada, the European Commission (specifically the
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department, ECHO), France, the United Kingdom (UK)
and the United States (US) make up the group of Learning
Leaders. This group of donors is characterised by their
leading role and influence in the humanitarian sector in
terms of their capacity to respond, field presence and
commitment to learning and improving performance in the
sector. They tend to do poorer in areas such as prevention,
preparedness and risk reduction efforts, and in perceptions
around the neutrality, impartiality and independence of their
aid (ECHO is a notable exception, as it scores well above
most donors in this regard).

In terms of volume of aid, this group has an enormous
impact on the ability of the humanitarian sector to respond
to needs. ECHO, the UK and the US are by far the three
largest donors to international humanitarian assistance
efforts, funding more than 50% of the total international
resources mobilised in 2010 (Development Initiatives

LEARNING LEADERS PLAY A LEAD ROLE
IN CRISIS RESPONSE AND IN EFFORTS TO
IMPROVE PERFORMANCE IN THE SECTOR
2011). Canada and France are among the top ten OECD/
DAC donors as well. A senior representative of a UN aid
agency, referring to the US, summarised the importance
of this group in the humanitarian sector: â&#x20AC;&#x153;A funding
cut from a smaller donor is a challenge, but a cut from
the US means millions of people would not receive the
humanitarian assistance they need to survive. No other
donor could pick up the slack.â&#x20AC;?
Another example of their leadership role is how these
donors contribute to coordination at the field level, and to
shaping debate on the direction of the sector overall. For
example, the UK recently undertook a major review of its
humanitarian programmes, and has transformed its overall
aid programme to make resilience and anticipation some
of the key focus areas for all programmes: the change in
policy direction is being closely watched by other donors.
Canadaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s strong leadership role in requiring gender-sensitive
approaches in humanitarian programmes it funds as well
as advocating for gender-sensitive approaches in the wider
humanitarian system is another example, as reflected in its
top scores in the HRIâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s gender indicators.
These donors have also shown a strong commitment
to learning and evaluation, and have been the drivers of
many of the initiatives to improve aid quality, effectiveness,
transparency and accountability. For example, the UK
and the US are strong supporters of the International
Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), and the US has recently
expanded efforts to map all aid projects in a publically
accessible dashboard8IJMFUIFDPNNJUNFOUUPMFBSOJOH
evaluations and transparency is positive, it has not
necessarily translated into substantial changes or
improvements in their own policies and practices, nor those
of their partners and the humanitarian system as a whole.
As a group, these donors tend to provide a balanced mix
of support to all components of the system â&#x20AC;&#x201C; with some
favouring certain aid channels over others. At the field
level, there is normally good coordination among these
donors, but at the global level, there are differences in their
visions of where the system should go and how it should
function. This is reflected in different approaches, tools and

#027

systems used to assess, allocate and report aid. The lack
of harmonisation has in many ways increased the burden
on humanitarian organisations, especially smaller ones. The
heavy reporting requirements of each of these donors often
require additional staff resources that are diverted away
from programming, according to many respondents. â&#x20AC;&#x153;I would
prefer the same reporting format for all donors because it is
currently time consuming and involves high costs. Standard
reporting would simplify the accountability framework,â&#x20AC;?
affirmed one respondent in Sudan.
The downside to this leadership role is that these donors
can often be interpreted as overstepping boundaries and
negatively influencing the sector. A widespread concern
among many stakeholders is that humanitarian assistance
from these donors is often dictated by other political or
security objectives, undermining neutral, impartial and
independent humanitarian action. The US is most often
mentioned for this, but all other donors in the group
received criticism about politicisation in field interviews.
Several interviewees expressed concern that this was
having a negative influence over other donors and how
they relate to their partners. However, the field survey
scores were significantly more positive than the comments
accompanying the responses, in part because humanitarian
organisations appeared to understand the difficulties donor
field representatives faced. This viewpoint is reflected by
the comments of an interviewee working in Somalia: â&#x20AC;&#x153;The
USâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; humanitarian funding is heavily influenced by domestic
political agendas and concerns with public opinion. US
aid officials are acutely aware of this inconsistency with
principles, and struggle with it constantly.â&#x20AC;?
Most field organisations appreciated the strong capacity
and resources that allow these donors to take on an active
role in the response to crises. â&#x20AC;&#x153;CIDA and ECHO have very
good technical follow up and field monitoring visits, which
in the longer term serves as a capacity building tool for
the NGO, making them more efficient and competitive,â&#x20AC;?
according to one respondent in Colombia. However, these
same donors are frequently criticised for intervening in
programming design and implementation.
Donors in this group are also criticised for imposing too
many administrative, reporting and procedural burdens
on their partners, and a lack of flexibility. The comments
from an interviewee in Sudan summarises the experience
of many: â&#x20AC;&#x153;OFDA [US], CIDA [Canada] and especially ECHO
arenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t flexible with funding: you canâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t move budget lines
and you have to do all the activities in the way you said in
the proposal that was approved, regardless of changing
TJUVBUJPOTu"OPUIFSSFTQPOEFOUJO1BLJTUBOTIBSFEBTJNJMBS
observation: â&#x20AC;&#x153;Often donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; micro-management was an
obstacle, such as the very excessive reporting requirements
of DFID [UK].â&#x20AC;? Others, however, praise these donors for their
flexibility in adapting to needs.

At the individual donor level, compared to 2010, France
has improved in terms of the perceptions of its partners
in the field. The US has made continued progress in the
perceptions of its partners in the field, partially explaining the
improvement in its overall scores. This may be a sign reform
efforts are beginning to show positive results at the field level.
In contrast, the UK received poorer scores in field, surveybased indicators, perhaps explained by the uncertainties
caused by a major review process of the UKâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s humanitarian
aid programme, which was underway at the time of the HRI
field research. ECHOâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s scores remain largely unchanged, while
Canada slipped somewhat in some scores, perhaps reflecting
changing political priorities for its aid programmes.

Group 3

ASPIRING ACTORS
Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg and Spain make up the group of Aspiring Actors.
This group is diverse in terms of their size and capacities,
but Aspiring Actors have specific strengths that could be
leveraged to take on a greater role in shaping thematic
approaches in the sector. As a group, they tend to have more
limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at
the field level and score below the OECD/DAC average in the
majority of the HRI pillars and indicators.
In contrast to other donor groups, many of the donors in
this group lack clearly defined strategies and sustained,
long-term financial commitments for their humanitarian
assistance. As a result, this has at times undermined efforts
to build their internal capacity and experience to engage
more fully with the humanitarian sector.
Spain and Ireland are two good examples of this. Both
countries made concerted efforts to scale up their

ASPIRING ACTORS HAVE SPECIFIC STRENGTHS
THAT COULD BE LEVERAGED TO TAKE ON
A GREATER ROLE IN SHAPING THEMATIC
APPROACHES IN THE SECTOR
contributions to humanitarian efforts in recent years
as part of their aspiration to play a larger role in the
humanitarian sector. Spain, for example, became the fifth
largest humanitarian donor in 2009. However, the increase
in funding was not matched by sufficient investments in
building their own capacity to monitor programmes, or

#028

building sustained public and political understanding and
support for humanitarian assistance. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Spain is good for
flexibility,â&#x20AC;? said one field interview respondent. â&#x20AC;&#x153;But they
never go to the field to monitor so they donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t understand the
context.â&#x20AC;? Similar comments were made for Ireland in other
crises. The economic crisis has since led to sharp cutbacks
to both countriesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; aid budgets, which will likely severely limit
their potential role and influence in the sector in the years to
come. By all accounts, Italy is facing similar challenges.
On the positive side, many of these donors have much
more flexibility to find a â&#x20AC;&#x153;nicheâ&#x20AC;? where they can develop
capacities and expertise to take on a leadership role
amongst donors. Australia, for example, recently revised its
humanitarian strategy giving it a clearer, more integrated
thematic focus on disaster risk reduction, and an ambition
to move beyond its traditional geographic focus of the
1BDJĂ DSFHJPOUPPUIFSQBSUTPGUIFXPSME(FSNBOZIBTBMTP
indicated it will prioritise disaster risk reduction, prevention
and preparedness as part of their humanitarian assistance
strategy. Indeed, most of the donors in this group are above
the overall OECD/DAC average in areas like prevention and
reconstruction, suggesting that this may be an emerging
area of expertise for the group as a whole. The challenge
for these donors will be to sustain these efforts over time
and build a critical mass of capacity and experience that will
allow them to take on a leadership role in the sector.
At the individual donor level, Belgium deserves mention for
its concerted efforts to address some of the deficiencies
identified in previous HRI assessments. Compared to 2010,
Belgiumâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s scores improved significantly in quantitative
indicators for the timeliness of funding, un-earmarked
funding, funding to NGOs, and for evaluations and support
for accountability initiatives. This demonstrates that it is
possible to make positive changes to donor practices in
a very short period of time if there is sufficient political
willingness and commitment. Australia, Germany and
Spain have also improved, while Japan remains largely
unchanged compared to 2010. Ireland dropped slightly in
indicators based on the perceptions of its field partners and
quantitative indicators, indicating that the deep cutbacks in
its humanitarian assistance are beginning to have negative
FGGFDUT-VYFNCPVSHTBXBTJHOJĂ DBOUEFDSFBTFJOJUT
overall scores compared to 2010 due mainly to the poor
perceptions from its partners in the field. The country is
one of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s most generous donors on a per capita
basis, but one with little capacity to monitor and engage with
its partners at the field level. The poor field-based survey
indicator scores suggest a need for further dialogue with
partners to understand and address these perceptions.

HRI 2011 DONOR PERFORMANCE:
MAIN FINDINGS
Similar to the findings from previous HRI reports, in general,
EPOPSTTDPSFEXFMMGPSUIFJOEJDBUPSTJO1JMMBS 3FTQPOEJOH
to needs), though the concern about politicisation of
aid featured prominently in many of the crises studied.
$PMMFDUJWFMZ
EPOPSTTDPSFEMPXFSJO1JMMBS 1SFWFOUJPO
SJTLSFEVDUJPOBOESFDPWFSZ
BOE1JMMBS -FBSOJOHBOE
accountability). Both pillars include indicators around greater
participation and ownership of affected populations in the
design and management of programmes, and longer-term
approaches to build capacity and resilience.

GENDER
A LOW PRIORITY FOR MANY DONORS
AND ACTORS, LEAVING GAPS IN RESPONSES
HRI research shows that gender is not integrated in
a meaningful way into the practices of donors and
humanitarian agencies. This has implications for donor
practices in all five pillars of the HRI.
'PSFYBNQMF
JO1JMMBS 3FTQPOEJOHUPOFFET
JOBEFRVBUF
attention to gender in the needs assessment, project
design and implementation phases of a response has
consequences in terms of being able to ensure that
different needs are being met fairly, equitably and without
discrimination. HRI research shows that gender is often
neglected in the emergency phase, and not prioritised
in the recovery phase, leading to gaps in the quality and
effectiveness of aid efforts.
*O1JMMBS 1SFWFOUJPO
SJTLSFEVDUJPOBOESFDPWFSZ
the importance of ensuring women, men, girls and boys
have equitable opportunities to participate and engage in
programmes is a critical element for downward accountability,

#029

but few donors actually monitor and follow-up how their partners
ensure adequate opportunities for affected populations in
general to participate in programme implementation, much
less promote this as part of a gender or accountability strategy.
Additionally, incorporating gender approaches into prevention,
preparedness, recovery and development is more likely to
generate sustainable results and impact.
*O1JMMBS 8PSLJOHXJUIIVNBOJUBSJBOQBSUOFST
EPOPST
could do much more to promote and support equal
opportunities for women to work in the humanitarian sector.
8JUIXPNFOSFQSFTFOUJOHPWFSIBMGUIFXPSMETQPQVMBUJPO
and with women and girls often disproportionately affected
by crises, it makes practical sense that women should be
fully engaged in the response to humanitarian challenges.
However, at the moment, women are underrepresented
in the sector as a whole, particularly in management and
leadership positions.
*O1JMMBS 1SPUFDUJPOBOEJOUFSOBUJPOBMMBX
UIF
consequences of a lack of protection and respect for human
rights in crisis situations are most often felt by women and
girls. Donors could work with their partners to promote and
support more gender-sensitive approaches to protection,
with an emphasis on prevention of sexual and gender based
violence (SGBV) and actions to end impunity for violations of
international humanitarian law and human rights law.
*O1JMMBS -FBSOJOHBOEBDDPVOUBCJMJUZ
EPOPSTDPVMEEP
more to ensure gender is better integrated into monitoring,
evaluation and learning. Systematically including an
assessment of how gender is integrated into humanitarian
actions, and monitoring whether their funding and support is
contributing to gender equality is an effective way to ensure
programme quality, effectiveness, accountability and impact.
For more detailed analysis, please see the chapter
Addressing the Gender Challenge.

SWEDEN

FRANCE

CANADA

P4

4.92

GERMANY

5.09

P3

BELGIUM

P2

P3

5.51

4.10

AUSTRALIA

4.64

7.2
7

7
4.1

P2

IRELAND

P3

5.61

P1

P5

7.4
2

8
4.6

5.07

5.04

P1

P5

P2

5.82

5.26

6.01

0
5.4

4.79

5.74

P1

6.8
4

7.40

P3

6.16

P3

P5

P2

6.54

P4

P3

P3

P4

5.72

5.65

5.09

P2

4
6.2

4.40

P1

8.1
9

5.47

5.78

EUROPEAN COMMISSION UNITED KINGDOM

P5

5.71

P1

6.8
1

3
4.4

P2

6.07

P5

7.6
1

3
4.6

4.33

P4

6
5.1

P1

P5

7.5
0

P2

6.22

P1

P5

6.9
3

P4

P1

5.53

7.89

DENMARK

P3

P4

P4

6.95

NORWAY

1
6.5

6.40

P4

P3

5.15

P4

P3

P2

P3

4.20

ASPIRING ACTORS
Diverse in terms of their size and capacities,
but characterised by their focus on building
strengths in speciﬁc “niche” areas, such as
geographic regions or thematic areas, and their
aspirations to take on a greater role in the sector

6.38

5.93

Group 3

ASPIRING
ACTORS

7.49

P2

LEARNING LEADERS
Characterised by their leading role and
inﬂuence in terms of capacity to respond,
ﬁeld presence, and commitment to learning
and improving performance in the sector

8.22

5.09

LEARNING
LEADERS

P5

7.02

6.26

Group 2

P2

PRINCIPLED PARTNERS
Characterised by their generosity, strong
commitment to humanitarian principles of
neutrality, impartiality and independence, and
ﬂexible funding arrangements with partners

7.12

7.8
7

2
6.3

5.35

7.13

P1

P5

7.9
0

2
7.6

P2

P4

1
5.6

P1

P5

7.6
9

5.61

PRINCIPLED
PARTNERS

DONOR
CLASSIFICATION

P1

P5

Group 1

P4

2011

8.09

HRI

THE
HUMANITARIAN
RESPONSE
INDEX

6.69

6.36

P4

6.18

5.70

5.27

P3

P3

P3

NETHERLANDS

SWITZERLAND

FINLAND

P2

6.20

6.03

5.33

P2

6.35

7.5
2

4
4.3

4.39

P2

6.43

P1

P5

7.9
8

3
6.5

6.12

P4

1
5.1

P1

P5

7.5
6

P4

P1

P5

AVERAGE DONOR PERFORMANCE
P1

5.98

Circle size is
proportional
to HRI score

UNITED STATES

5.83

P4

5.12

5.06

3.29

P3

P3

P3

JAPAN

LUXEMBOURG

ITALY

4.25

3.41

P3

SPAIN

P2

4.4 4

6.6
4

5.41

5.54

1
4.7

P2

5.36

4.16

P2

5.42

P1

P5

7.4
3

3
2.7

PILLAR 1
PILLAR 2
PILLAR 3
PILLAR 4
PILLAR 5

Responding to needs
Prevention, risk reduction and recovery
Working with humanitarian partners
Protection and international law
Learning and accountability

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10.
Colours represent performance compared to
OECD/DAC donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; average performance rating:
Good

RESPONDING TO NEEDS
POLITICISATION OF AID CONTINUES TO DENY MILLIONS
ACCESS TO AID
The HRI 2010 raised the issue of growing politicisation of
BJEJOUFOPGUIFDSJTFTTUVEJFE5IFJTTVFXBTTJNJMBSMZ
evident in the majority of the crises included in the HRI
2011 research and there is some speculation among many
PGUIFPSHBOJTBUJPOTJOUFSWJFXFEUIBUUIFi8BSPO5FSSPSu
discourse has forever altered the way donor governments
will assess and view humanitarian assistance as
subordinate to other interests. The most overt examples of
UIJTXFSFGPVOEJOP1U
1BLJTUBO
4PNBMJBBOE4VEBO
XIFSF
many believe that political, security and military interests
have driven donor responses, rather than actual needs.
In these cases, anti-terrorism legislation and political
objectives are seen by many as undermining humanitarian
action and placing civilians and humanitarians at risk.
1PMJUJDJTBUJPOPGBEJGGFSFOUTPSUXBTTFFOJO$IBE
Colombia, Haiti, and Kenya. In these crises, donor
governments were criticised by many actors for interposing
their own priorities, acquiescing to host governments by not
challenging them on issues of corruption, access to affected
populations or accepting at face value their assessments on
the extent of needs. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Donors shouldnÂ´t use political criteria
in their funding decisions, but should provide aid to all
affected populations, not only those in the East,â&#x20AC;? stated one
interview respondent in Chad; similar comments were made
for donors in other crises.
The generally high scores received by donors for the
survey-based indicators on neutrality, impartiality and
independence of aid is partially explained by the recognition
by many humanitarian organisations that their counterparts
in donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; humanitarian agencies attempt to respect the
need for keeping aid independent of other interests, but
that other parts of government sometimes undermine this
QSJODJQMFEBQQSPBDI"SFTQPOEFOUJOP1UTVNNBSJTFEUIF
experience of many: â&#x20AC;&#x153;For all donors, there are two levels. On
one hand, we have the field level, with the procedures, where
the donors are neutral. On the other hand, we have the
IFBERVBSUFSTMFWFMJO#SVTTFMT
3PNF
-POEPO
FUD
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they are not neutral at all. The political agenda determines
everything at donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; headquarters level.â&#x20AC;?
The most obvious sign that donors are not prioritising and
allocating their aid based on and in proportion to impartial

and objective assessments of needs, as called for in the
GHD Declaration, can be seen in the unequal coverage
levels of different appeals. The average appeal coverage
of the crises assessed in the HRI was only 65%, generally
considered as good. Yet, other crises in 2010 and 2011
such as the Central African Republic, Guatemala, Mongolia,
Uganda and Zimbabwe, received less than 50% of appeal
funds requested (OCHA FTS 2011).

ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION AND
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES ARE SEEN BY
MANY AS UNDERMINING HUMANITARIAN
ACTION AND PLACING CIVILIANS
AND HUMANITARIANS AT RISK
Humanitarian actors, with the support of some donors,
have made significant efforts to improve the quality of
needs assessments and develop tools to monitor and track
risks and vulnerabilities, such as the famine early warning
system in place in the Horn of Africa. However, better
quality information and analysis has done little to transform
donor funding and decision-making processes to be more
consistent, objective and transparent. The overwhelming
emphasis on emergency relief as opposed to meeting gaps
in prevention, risk reduction and recovery efforts is another
indicator that donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; GHD commitments are not being met
consistently. Clearly much more work needs to be done to
understand the motivations and incentives behind donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;
decision-making processes.
Still, there have been positive moves, as well. The
UK Governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s response to the recent Humanitarian
Emergency Response Review takes an unequivocal
stance that humanitarian assistance should be neutral,
impartial and independent, â&#x20AC;&#x153;based on need, and need
alone.â&#x20AC;? Australia has also undergone a review of its
aid programme and reaffirmed its commitment to this
fundamental humanitarian principle. Hopefully, these
donors will push other governments to make similar
commitments to apply principled approaches in all
situations of humanitarian crisis so that aid efforts can
meet their objectives in an effective manner.

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY
PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RECOVERY
DISREGARDED IN AID EFFORTS
1SFWJPVT)3*SFQPSUTSFWFBMBQFSTJTUFOUMBDLPGQPMJUJDBM
commitment and investment in capacity-building, conflict and
disaster prevention, preparedness and risk reduction. On
average, donor governments score 30% lower in indicators in
this pillar compared to other pillars. This is despite long-held
policy commitments to build local capacity and resilience to
prevent, prepare for and respond to crises, and widespread
agreement that such efforts are cost-effective means to
reduce the risks and impacts of crises, and thereby prevent
and alleviate human suffering.
The HRI 2011 findings confirm this trend. The inability of
donors to respond in a timely manner to the drought and
famine in Kenya and Somalia, despite ample early warnings,
shows the devastating effects of inaction. The response to
)BJUJ
$IBEBOE1BLJTUBOVOEFSMJOFPODFBHBJOUIFJNQPSUBODF
of building local capacity and resilience, and dedicating
resources for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction.
Yet, the overall scores in these areas, and the related issue of
ensuring adequate engagement and ownership of vulnerable
and crisis-affected populations in humanitarian action, show
that this is not a priority for the majority of donors.

RISK REDUCTION AND PREVENTION ARE
RELEGATED TO A GREY AREA WHERE
NO ONE TAKES OWNERSHIP OR LEADERSHIP
1BSUPGUIFQSPCMFNJTBOBSSPXWJTJPOBNPOHEPOPS
governments of humanitarian assistance as emergency
relief in the strictest sense, with everything else falling in
the development assistance remit. However, most official
development assistance programmes fail to see risk
reduction and prevention as part of their mandate. As a
result, these activities are relegated to a grey area where no

one takes ownership or leadership. This is seen in recent
studies of preparedness funding which estimates that less
than 1% of all official government aid â&#x20AC;&#x201C; development or
humanitarian assistance â&#x20AC;&#x201C; is allocated towards preparedness
activities (Kellet & Sweeney 2011). In the words of one
SFTQPOEFOUJO,FOZB
i8FUSJFEUPQSPQPTFTPNFUIJOHGPSFBSMZ
recovery but donors were not interested. They only want to
fund emergencies.â&#x20AC;? The comment was echoed in many other
crises, such as Haiti: â&#x20AC;&#x153;Most donors do not fund the transition
to recovery and development. It is difficult to find donors once
the emergency has passed over.â&#x20AC;?
Nevertheless, most representatives of donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;
humanitarian departments interviewed were convinced of
the need to scale up and integrate prevention, preparedness
and risk reduction strategies into donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; overall aid
frameworks. However, most donor agencies were reluctant to
actively seek further responsibilities in this area, partly due
to worries about their capacity to give adequate support and
attention to this area. One donor representative summarised
UIFQSPCMFNJOUIFGPMMPXJOHXBZi-PPL
XFDPVMEBSHVF
internally for this, and maybe even get more funding for
risk reduction. But letâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s be realistic. Our humanitarian team
is only four people. If the government decides to scale
up funding, it will fall on our shoulders, without any extra
staff, and huge expectations for us to deliver an impossible
agenda, when we canâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t even meet our other obligations to
monitor and follow up on the emergency response side the
way we would like too.â&#x20AC;?
There was also some scepticism among donors of the
operational capacity of humanitarian organisations to
take on an increased role and mandate in the prevention,
SJTLSFEVDUJPOBOESFDPWFSZi6/%1JTOPUNFFUJOHJUT
responsibilities in this area; itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s too focused on MDGâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s and
political processes. ISDR is not operational. And OCHA has its
hands full trying to manage coordination of the UN agencies,
so it canâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t take a leadership role in this. So where do we
turn?â&#x20AC;? asked one donor representative. â&#x20AC;&#x153;The problems and

1
2
3
G1 Group
G2 Group
G3 Group
average score
average score
average score

internal divisions we face are the same for organisations with
both development and humanitarian activities,” said another,
suggesting the problem was both structural and philosophical.
There are some exceptions. Australia and Germany are
becoming increasingly engaged in supporting disaster risk
reduction and preparedness efforts with a focus on building
capacities at the local level as an integrated part of their

8

9

10

75% of assessed
OECD DAC donors

Maximum
score

humanitarian assistance. The UK’s revised humanitarian
strategy is now centred on how any aid efforts, including
development aid, can contribute to building resilience and
anticipating future needs. If other donors were to follow these
donors’ lead, it could mean a turning point in transforming the
humanitarian system from a reactive, response-driven model,
to a proactive, preventive and anticipatory model.

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS
ONGOING AID REFORM EFFORTS ARE INADEQUATE TO
ADDRESS CURRENT AND FUTURE NEEDS
For several years now, the humanitarian sector has been
engaged in a reform process aimed at improving the efficiency
and effectiveness of responses to crises. Initiatives include
the creation of the role of Humanitarian Coordinators (HC)
and humanitarian country teams (HCT) to lead and coordinate
responses, pooled funding mechanisms, such as the Central
Emergency Response Fund (CERF), and clusters. The HRI
research findings show that while reform efforts have been
generally positive the results are uneven across crises and
efforts to date have been unsuccessful at resolving many
underlying issues affecting needs and vulnerabilities.
In some crises, such as Kenya and Somalia, clusters and
pooled funds seemed to work well to promote better planning and
greater coordination and connectedness. Nevertheless, in these
same crises, even with a reasonably well-functioning system,
humanitarian actors were able to anticipate and predict, but not
avert, the impact of the drought and famine for lack of decisive
actions and insufficient funding and support by donors. In other
DSJTFTMJLF$IBE
)BJUJPS1BLJTUBO
SFTVMUTXFSFMFTTQPTJUJWF
with many complaints that clusters were not effectively or
appropriately linked to national authorities, leading to duplication
of efforts and parallel and competiting coordination systems.
There was a certain degree of scepticism of the value and
utility of leadership and coordination and pooled funding
mechanisms, particularly among NGOs, who sometimes
complained that the system was biased towards benefiting
UN agencies. In all crises, complaints were frequent about the
quality of leadership of the HC (or Resident Coordinator), agency
heads, or cluster leads. Committed leadership in the field has
been the decisive factor in leveraging the reform agenda to
assure an effective and coordinated humanitarian response.
8IJMFEPOPSTPOUIFXIPMFTDPSFEQPTJUJWFMZGPSUIFJSTVQQPSU
for better coordination, many humanitarian organisations
clearly stated that they wanted and expected donors to be
more actively engaged in coordination efforts by monitoring

progress and holding the HC, cluster leads and pooled
funds more accountable. Another message to donors was
that they need to coordinate their efforts more closely to
avoid duplication or gaps in funding, and ensure alignment,
especially in terms of advocacy to local authorities, a surveybased indicator where donors generally scored poorly.
Neverthess, humanitarian organisations must also shoulder
some of the responsibility for this. In several crises, donor
representatives said it was the lack of consensus among
humantiarian organisations that impeded donors from
making consistent advocacy efforts. In other cases, donor
representatives complained that many of their advocacy

DONOR CAPACITY TO ENGAGE WITH
HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS IN THE
FIELD HAS SUFFERED DUE TO CUTS TO MANY
GOVERNMENT HUMANITARIAN DEPARTMENTS
efforts were through quiet behind the scenes diplomacy and
UIFSFGPSFVOOPUJDFECZIVNBOJUBSJBOQBSUOFSTi8FEPOUHFU
enough credit for the work we do to try to get the government
to address issues around access, or for trying to convene
donor meetings to set common strategiesâ&#x20AC;?, said one donor
representative interviewed. In some crises, donor coordination
groups were a good forum to share information, but in many
crises, participation was dominated to the â&#x20AC;&#x153;big threeâ&#x20AC;? donors,
ECHO, the US and the UK. In other cases, decision-making
was clearly at the capital level, limiting the effectiveness of
donor coordination in the field.
In many crises, concern was expresssed regarding the
capacity of donors to provide adequate support, monitoring and
follow-up to programmes. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Donors don't have qualified human
resources and don't focus on building their own capacities, so
they donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t undertand the context,â&#x20AC;? claimed one respondent
in Sudan. High staff turnover of some of the larger donors

1
2
3
G1 Group
G2 Group
G3 Group
average score
average score
average score

was cited as a factor limiting donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; ability to understand
UIFDPOUFYUBOEFOHBHFXJUIUIFJSQBSUOFSTi8FIBWFPOMZ
one contact person in DFID, so when the person changes,
everything changes. There is no continuity and we have to readapt programmes to new requirements,â&#x20AC;? said another. Haiti
was another crisis where high turnover of donor staff was a
limitation. Small and medium-sized donors also faced similar
capacity issues, but some of these donors were commended
for their frequent field visits from donor capitals â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a positive
example of how donors could overcome this limitation.
Concerns over donor capacity to engage with humanitarian
organisations at the field level are partly the consequence of
continued funding cuts on many governmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; humanitarian
assistance departments. The overwhelming majority of
donor governmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; humanitarian representatives are
firmly committed to applying humanitarian principles and
good donor practices in order to achieve greater impact of
aid efforts. However, most donor aid agencies are under
increasing pressure and scrutiny to deliver results with fewer
financial and human resources. Humanitarian assistance
budgets are still on average around 10-15% of official

8

9

10

75% of assessed
OECD DAC donors

Maximum
score

development assistance budgets, reflecting the relative lack
of importance given to humanitarian action, despite its high
public profile and obvious needs. At the same time, political
interference or indifference means that donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; humanitarian
departments are often placed in the impossible situation of
trying to support principled approaches while other parts of
governments pursue other incompatible aims.
All this suggests that if governments are truly committed
to ensuring aid is effective, they need to invest in building
the capacity of their own humanitarian agencies and their
partners to meet current needs, increase awareness and
political and public support for principled approaches to
humanitarian assistance, and adapt good donor practices
to respond to future humanitarian needs and challenges. If
anything, the financial crisis should be even more an incentive
to ensure adequate capacity to monitor the effectiveness of
every dollar spent. Donors must also work closely with other
actors to go beyond the limitations of the current reform
agenda to redefine and reshape the humanitarian sector to
become anticipatory and proactive, and capable of responding
effectively to increasing humanitarian needs in the future.

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
ACCESS TO AND PROTECTION OF CRISIS-AFFECTED
POPULATIONS IS A MAJOR CONCERN
One of the main consequences of the politicisation of aid
is the continued challenges of safe humanitarian access
to populations in need of assistance and protection. As
in the 2010 report, the research for the HRI 2011 found
that in many crises, civilian populations and humanitarian
organisations are often deliberately targeted by armed
actors, and as a result, people in need are denied
access to life-saving assistance. Governmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; policies
and practices can be a significant factor in provoking
this situation. Anti-terrorism legislation that requires
humanitarian organisations to guarantee that there is no
contact with listed terrorist groups, and complicated vetting
procedures on local staff and partners are a costly and
counterproductive measure that does little to ensure that aid
is actually reaching people in need.
*OP1U
GPSFYBNQMF
TVDIQPMJDJFTXFSFIJHIMJHIUFEBT
detrimental to aid efforts. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Counter-terrorism legislation
is closing down humanitarian space. Humanitarian
organisations need contact with Hamas in Gaza in order to
deliver aid,â&#x20AC;? commented one respondent. Similar concerns
were raised in Somalia by many respondents. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Funding in
Somalia is gravely conditioned by the US security agenda
in the region and its position regarding Al-Shabaab. Other
donors donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t want to take risks, so they follow the same
line,â&#x20AC;? said another. Donor government support for the TFG
in Somalia was seen as indirectly leading to the perception
that humanitarian organisations were an extension of donor
governmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; political agendas in the ongoing conflict there,
placing them and the populations they work with at risk.
Beyond politicisation of aid, donors were often criticised for

ADVOCACY EFFORTS NEED TO BE
CONTEXT-DRIVEN AND FOCUSED
ON FINDING THE BEST WAY TO MEET THE
NEEDS OF AFFECTED POPULATIONS WITHOUT
JEOPARDISING HUMANITARIAN SPACE

not funding and prioritising protection activities, especially
in natural disaster situations. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Donors only paid lip service
to protection of civilians. The two percent funding coverage
of the protection cluster is evidence enough of thisâ&#x20AC;? affirmed
POFSFTQPOEFOUJO1BLJTUBO*OPUIFSDSJTFTMJLF)BJUJ
issues of protection were largely ignored by donors, despite
widespread media reports of sexual and gender-based
violence in camps. In other crises, like Chad and DRC,
several humanitarian organisations felt that the presence
of multi-national peace-keeping forces, often financed and
supported by donor contributions, were seen as more of a
problem than a solution. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Security is much better now that
MINURCAT (United Nations Mission in CAR and Chad) is
goneâ&#x20AC;? claimed one respondent in Chad.
Donor governments are sometime criticised by
humanitarian partners for not taking a more active advocacy
stance on issues of access and protection. However, in
reality, in many of the crises researched, there were mixed
feelings about the appropriateness of donors engaging
in advocacy efforts. For some interview respondents,
it was impossible for donors to advocate for access
without jeopardising the neutrality and independence of
humanitarian actors. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Donors in general should stop trying
to facilitate safe access. If they do, it just contributes to the
politicisation of aid,â&#x20AC;? commented one respondent in Sudan.
*O$PMPNCJB
,FOZBBOE1BLJTUBO
TPNFPSHBOJTBUJPOTGFMU
that donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; strategic interests meant donors were not
assertive enough to advocate for access and protection.
â&#x20AC;&#x153;The donors did not stand up to the governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s pressure
and its decision to declare the emergency over. Therefore
they are somewhat responsible for the quality of the
SFTQPOTF
uTBJEPOFSFTQPOEFOUJO1BLJTUBO
From a donor perspective, this lack of clarity and consensus
on what humanitarian organisations expect in terms of donor
advocacy make it hard to act in a concerted manner with clear
advocacy messages to actors in the crisis. In all cases, any
advocacy efforts should be discussed and developed with
the specific crisis context in mind, and focused exclusively
on the objective of meeting the needs of the population while
protecting and preserving humanitarian space.

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
DONOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY WEAK
As in previous years, the HRI 2011 findings found that
donor governments are collectively failing to improve their
transparency and downward accountability towards affected
populations. Scores in these indicators are among the
lowest of the entire index, with no notable improvements
since the HRI began in 2007. In some regards, this is not
surprising. The responsibility for ensuring accountability
towards beneficiaries is primarily with the organisations
directly engaged with affected populations with programme
delivery. Donors are also part of the aid relationship,
however, and have responsibilities to ensure that their
support is transparent, effective, and appropriate to achieve
the best possible results for people affected by crises. This
is especially true in crises where donors mixed political,
economic or security interests with humanitarian actions,
at the expense of their accountability for ensuring aid
contributes to humanitarian objectives.
According to many respondents, most donors still
conceive accountability in terms of exercising fiscal
management and control, rather than the underlying
obligation to ensure aid efforts meet the needs, priorities
and aspirations of affected populations. “There is too
little focus on the beneficiaries, and too much emphasis
on documentation and assessments at the expense
of action,” in the words of one respondent in Kenya.
Another respondent in Sudan complained that “rules
and regulations are increasingly making us less effective
as we are spending all our time on audits. There is a
lack of accountability by donors.” Many respondents
suggested that donors’ policies around accountability
were adornments, with no real commitment towards
implementation. “They are breaking their own rules. Donors
do what they want and don't consider the beneficiaries
needs anymore,” claimed one respondent in Haiti.
One important element of accountability in humanitarian
action is engagement and ownership of the affected
population in the design and implementation of aid
programmes. However, as the poor overall scores for
JOEJDBUPSTGPSCFOFàDJBSZQBSUJDJQBUJPOJO1JMMBS 1SFWFOUJPO

risk reduction and recovery) and the indicators for gender
show, donors have not made this a priority. Beyond that,
supporting efforts to build and strengthen local capacity is
another key element of donor accountability, as expressed
in the GHD Declaration. However, for many interviewees,
donors avoided this responsibility, preferring to work with
established international partners as a way to minimise
their risks (financial or otherwise) and better control the
aid relationship. A respondent in Kenya summarised the
sentiment of many: “None of our donors really want us to
work with local partners. They see it as a risk, there is a
certain fear of working with local NGOs. They have no trust
or confidence in local capacities.”

GREATER TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY TOWARDS AFFECTED
POPULATIONS WOULD HELP ENSURE
AID IS EFFECTIVE IN MEETING NEEDS

The GHD Declaration also states donors also have a
responsibility for preventing human suffering as one of
the key objectives of humanitarian actions. However,
poor scores for donors in indicators around support for
prevention and preparedness, reinforce the widespread
feeling of many humanitarian actors that donors are not
fulfilling their accountability in this area. The slow donor
response to what was clearly an impending famine in
Kenya and Somalia is an example of this. Similarly, donors
must assume some of the responsibility for the collective
failure of the international community to apply lessons from
previous disasters in Haiti and other countries in terms of
prevention, recovery and risk reduction efforts.
Transparency of donors funding allocations and decisionmaking processes was also criticised by many humanitarian
organisations interviewed. Haiti is a case in point. It is
impossible to track much of the billions of aid promised for
relief and recovery efforts. In many other crises, even simple

1
2
3
G1 Group
G2 Group
G3 Group
average score
average score
average score

tools like UN OCHAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Financial Tracking System (FTS) are not
being utilised consistently by donors, and aid allocations are
often not reported in a timely manner. Still, donors in the
field were often commended for the transparency around
their decision-making processes â&#x20AC;&#x201C; to the extent that field
representatives exercised decision-making authority.
There are some positive signs, however, that donors
are improving in this area. In many crises, donors were
commended for their transparency around funding processes.
Reporting requirements are on the whole considered as
appropriate, though time consuming and too bureaucratic â&#x20AC;&#x201C;
suggesting that humanitarian organisations see the need and
value of reporting as part of their accountability to funders,
through the preference of many would be for harmonised
reporting. More and more donors are supporting project
evaluations as part of the regular procedures, though the
challenge remains in supporting implementation of findings.

8

9

10

75% of assessed
OECD DAC donors

Maximum
score

At the global level, several donor governments are
actively engaged in aid transparency initiatives, such
as the International Aid Transparency Initiative which
JTTVQQPSUFECZPGUIFEPOPSHPWFSONFOUT
assessed in the HRI. However, this is mostly limited to
official development assistance, and there are gaps in
humanitarian assistance reporting. Similarity, efforts to
align and harmonise several accountability initiatives
JOUIFTFDUPSMJLF4QIFSFBOE)"1*
XJMMIFMQSFEVDF
duplication and complexities for organisations in the
field, and renew the focus on making sure aid efforts
are focused on accountability and results for affected
populations (see www.sphereproject.org).
By making aid transparency and accountability towards
affected populations the cornerstone of their assistance, donors
would have greater assurance that their aid contributions and
the work of all actors are effective in meeting needs.

CONCLUSIONS
The HRI 2011 findings reinforce many of the same
conclusions reached in previous editions of the HRI, and
indeed, many other evaluations in the sector. After five years
of the HRI, some initial conclusions and lessons are clear.
FIRST, despite commitments to ensure their aid is
needs-based and based on humanitarian principles, donor
governments have shown repeatedly that there are other
factors that often determine decisions on aid allocations.
Increasing politicisation of aid is one of those factors, and
it is having serious consequences in determining whether
humanitarian actors can access crisis affected populations
and provide assistance and assure protection. Understanding
these factors from the perspective of donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; humanitarian
agencies is critical to determining how to best preserve and
protect the neutrality, independence and impartiality of aid
efforts in an increasingly complex environment.
SECOND, as the HRI findings on gender and beneficiary
participation in programming confirm, the humanitarian
sector is still far from working in ways that ensure aid
is equitable, contributes to empowering vulnerable
communities, and is focused on meeting the needs,
priorities and aspirations of people affected by crisis. If
humanitarian actors do not invest the time and effort to
understand the dynamics of a crisis from the perspective
of the people affected, aid efforts can never claim to be
effective or have lasting impact. Donors have a clear role in
insisting that their partners take the time to do so, and for
ensuring that their own support is respectful and aligned to
meeting those needs.
THIRD, the generalised disregard by donors for tackling
prevention, risk reduction and recovery in ways that build
capacity and resilience is inexcusable. Time and time again,
the humanitarian sectors announces that it will not repeat
the mistakes of the past, and will invest in prevention and
risk reduction as the most efficient and effective way to
address vulnerabilities and reduce the impact of crises. Yet,
as the sluggish response to famine in the Horn in Africa
and the fractured efforts to rebuild Haiti demonstrate, the
humanitarian sector has not systematically applied lessons
from the past. Donors have much of the responsibility for
creating this situation, and could be part of the solution by
re-shaping their humanitarian and development assistance
policies, procedures and practices in ways that foster better
integration of prevention, capacity building and resilience
into all the programmes they support.
FOURTH, the current aid reform agenda is unlikely to
address existing gaps and challenges facing the sector,
such as politicisation or prevention and risk reduction,
much less help the sector prepare for and anticipate
the challenges on the horizon. These include increasing
pressures and needs due to climate change, changing

#042

demographics, and the likelihood of a long-term global
FDPOPNJDEPXOUVSO8IBUJTOFFEFEJTBESBNBUJDTIJGUJO
direction for the sector, focused on building the necessary
capacities and competencies to anticipate, prepare for and
BEBQUUPDIBOHJOHDPOUFYUT1BSUPGUIFTIJGUXJMMSFRVJSF
traditional donors and humanitarian actors to reach out
to other players, ranging from local actors, new and nontraditional donors, or the private sector. It will also require
better understanding of the barriers that have so far
impeded efforts to adopt good practices, as well as carefully
considering the implications of new developments, such as
the outcomes of the Arab Spring for humanitarian actions.
FIFTH, improved transparency and accountability of all
actors, starting with donor governments, is essential to
ensuring aid efforts are principled, and have the maximum
impact for affected populations. By putting the focus back
where it belongs â&#x20AC;&#x201C; on the meeting the needs and respecting
the capacities and priorities of affected populations
â&#x20AC;&#x201C; humanitarian actors can ensure that their policies,
procedures and practices are aimed at achieving this end.

THE FUTURE OF GOOD
DONOR PRACTICES:
NEXT STEPS FOR THE HRI
All these issues have been part of an unresolved agenda
for the humanitarian sector for too long now. Rather than
continuing to expound on the problems, it is time to look
more closely at the reasons why this is such a challenge for
the humanitarian sector, and in particular, look for practical
solutions that will allow donors to maximise the value and
impact of their contribution to aid efforts.
Through our experience of the HRI over the past five years,
we have learned of the limitations of using the GHD Principles
as the basis for our assessment of donor performance. As a
non-binding political declaration, the GHD was, and continues
to be, an excellent statement of good intentions. However, the
reality of aid politics shows that many of the core concepts
of good practice remain difficult to achieve, despite the
strong commitment of donor governmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; humanitarian
aid departments. As our findings on politicisation show,
governments too often have competing priorities, relegating
principled approaches to a secondary level in aid efforts.

DONOR PRACTICES NEED TO BE REDEFINED
IN LINE WITH TODAY'S CONTEXT AND TO
BETTER ANTICIPATE AND RESPOND MORE
EFFECTIVELY TO FUTURE CHALLENGES
Since the HRI began in 2007, the GHD group of donors has
expanded in numbers, but along the way, the GHD group has
perhaps lost some of the impetus and urgency for transforming
the way donors act individually and collectively as envisioned
by the original group of enlightened donors that drafted the
declaration. At the time, political commitment to the GHD was
high, as seen in the number of senior representatives of donor
agencies involved in process. This should not be interpreted
to mean that the current GHD focal points are any less
committed, simply that the context has changed, and the GHD
no longer appears to be a priority for many donors.
Another disadvantage to the GHD is that the declaration
itself is vague and contradictory in many places, leaving it
open to interpretation by each donor. Additionally, reforms in
the humanitarian sector, such as clusters and pooled funds,
have made some of GHD declaration out-dated, and trends
such as have the emerging importance of new donors,
both government and private, have supplanted many of the
original GHD donors in terms of size and influence.
The GHDâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s lack of clear targets and solid indicators to
measure progress and hold donors accountable is a major
flaw that has limited its capacity to exert pressure on donors

#043

to act in a more consistent and principled manner. To some
extent, the HRI was an attempt to provide such indicators
and serve as a benchmark to track progress and promote
improvements in donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; policies and practices. However,
as we have learned, promoting changes and improvements
in donor policies and practices is proving just as difficult as
sustaining and extending reforms of the humanitarian system.
This is not to say that there have been no improvements
â&#x20AC;&#x201C; there have, and donors can take credit for many of these
QPTJUJWFDIBOHFT8JUIPVUBEPVCU
UIFJSDPODFSUFETVQQPSUBOE
efforts to push humanitarian actors to institute reforms have
been critical to the advances made so far. Nevertheless, as the
HRI findings suggest, the current humanitarian reform agenda
seems close to reaching the limits of effecting substantial
changes, and it is time to focus on preparing for the challenges
to come.
As we look forward to the next phase of the HRI, DARA
intends to investigate these issues in greater detail as part of
a renewed approach and orientation to the HRI, focused on
understanding the â&#x20AC;&#x153;why?â&#x20AC;? behind these issues and developing
practical guidance on what is needed to ensure all donors can
maximise the benefits, results and impact of their support for
IVNBOJUBSJBOBDUJPO8FTFFUIJTBTBOPQQPSUVOJUZUPSFĂĄFDU
on the lessons and experiences gained over the past five years,
and reshape the initiative to go beyond an exercise focused
on OECD/DAC donors to include other donors and funders. It
will allow the sector to review and , and redefine good donor
practices in line with the todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s context, and identify the
capacities needed for donors to better anticipate and respond
NPSFFGGFDUJWFMZUPGVUVSFDIBMMFOHFT8FMPPLGPSXBSEUP
engaging with all stakeholders in this process, and hope that
this makes a lasting contribution to improving the quality,
effectiveness, accountability and impact of aid efforts.

HRI DONOR
CLASSIFICATION
BY GROUPS
HRI 2011 donor classiﬁcation organises donors into three groups according
to their application of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles,
as measured by the HRI’s 35 indicators that make up the index. The
classiﬁcation is based on the application of a principal components analysis,
followed by a clustering technique, which places donors in the same group
when their indicator scores are statistically similar.

HRI PILLARS
AND FINAL
SCORES

HRI 2011
INDICATORS
C QUALITATIVE INDICATORS
Qualitative indicators are based on responses to the HRI
2011 ﬁeld questionnaire. The questionnaire consists of 25
closed-ended questions which ask OECD/DAC donors’
ﬁeld partners to give each of their donors a score from
1 to 5 on different aspects of their support based on the
HRI’s ﬁve pillars. Field scores are statistically analysed
and potential response biases are corrected before the
scores are converted into qualitative indicators (on a 0
to 10 scale). The questionnaire also includes a series of
open-ended questions to allow research teams to collect
additional information that can complement, contextualise
and validate scores given.

The HRI ﬁnal index score is the aggregate of the HRI indicators, organised in
ﬁve different pillars of donor performance. Each pillar is weighted according
to its importance in terms of the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles.

s4USFOHUIFOJOH
local capacity
s#FOFlDJBSZQBSUJDJQBUJPO
s-JOLJOHSFMJFGUPSFIBCJMJUBUJPO
and development
s1SFWFOUJPOBOESJTLSFEVDUJPO

C QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS
The HRIâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s quantitative indicators are drawn from a variety of
internationally-comparable, published data sources, including the
UN, World Bank and other international organisations. Data for
each donor government is collected, veriďŹ ed and then statistically
processed and analysed before it is converted into quantitative

indicators (on a 0 to 10 scale). Thresholds are set for some indicators
in order to establish maximum values and compensate for indicator
scores with very little variation among donors, or indicator scores
with extreme variation among donors.

of a donorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s humanitarian funding allocated to crises classiďŹ ed as
forgotten and with high degrees of vulnerability
s5 *.&-:'6/%*/(50$0.1-&9&.&3(&/$*&4 Percentage of a donorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s

humanitarian funding for complex emergencies provided within the
ďŹ rst three months following the launch of a humanitarian appeal
s5 *.&-:'6/%*/(5046%%&/0/4&5&.&3(&/$*&4Percentage

of a donorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s humanitarian funding for sudden onset emergencies
provided within the ďŹ rst six weeks following the crisis or the launch
of a ďŹ&#x201A;ash appeal
PILLAR 2

PREVENTION, RISK REDUCTION AND RECOVERY
s' 6/%*/(3&$0/4536$5*0/"/%13&7&/5*0/Percentage of a

in selected humanitarian initiatives for learning and accountability
s' 6/%*/("$$06/5"#*-*5:*/*5*"5*7&4 Percentage of a donorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s

humanitarian funding allocated to selected accountability initiatives
and projects on learning and accountability
s' 6/%*/("/%$0..*44*0/*/(&7"-6"5*0/4 Number of evaluations

commissioned and existence of evaluation guidelines

C GENDER
In 2011 a question on donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; commitment to promoting gender in
humanitarian assistance funding and programmes was included in the
ďŹ eld questionnaire. Additional indicators were developed to assess

donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; funding and policies related to gender issues in humanitarian
action, in order to allow for an additional analysis on donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;
performance in this area.

PLEASE VISIT WWW.DARAINT.ORG FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ON METHODOLOGY AND COMPLETE INDICATOR FORMULAS.

DARA/HRI 2011/THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE INDEX 2011/RESEARCH PROCESS

#048

HRI 2011 SURVEY SAMPLE
DONORS

NUMBER OF
QUESTIONNAIRES

CRISES

NUMBER OF
QUESTIONNAIRES

Questionnaires included in the construction of qualitative indicators

CHAD

145

AUSTRALIA

21

COLOMBIA

70

BELGIUM

17

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

197

CANADA

65

HAITI

133

DENMARK

28

KENYA

158

EC

159

OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

168

FINLAND

16

PAKISTAN

129

FRANCE

32

SOMALIA

112

GERMANY

41

SUDAN

247

IRELAND

18

TOTAL

1359

ITALY

22

JAPAN

32

LUXEMBOURG

17

NETHERLANDS

31

SEX

NUMBER OF
QUESTIONNAIRES*

NORWAY

41

Male

887

SPAIN

45

Female

472

SWEDEN

59

TOTAL

1359

SWITZERLAND

27

UK

64

US

142

SUB-TOTAL

877

Questionnaires not included in the construction of qualitative indicators

OECD/DAC DONORS*

51

OTHER DONOR COUNTRIES

24

UN/POOLED FUNDS/ MULTILATERAL AGENCIES

300

RED CROSS MOUVEMENT

36

PRIVATE ORGANISATIONS/FOUNDATIONS/NGOs

71

TOTAL

1359

* OECD/DAC donors not fully assessed in this edition of the HRI:
Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, Luxembourg, New Zealand,
Republic of Korea and descentralised aid.

* One interview can produce multiple
questionnaires, depending on the number
of donors supporting the organisation.

ADRESSING THE
GENDER CHALLENGE
For years, humanitarian actors have recognised the need for
greater sensitivity to gender issues in emergency response
and long term-recovery efforts. Mainstreaming gender is a
priority for the humanitarian sector, and a number of policy
guidelines and tools have been developed in support of
this, ranging from the policies of the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee (IASC) to cluster-specific guidelines, and the
internal policies and procedures of many international
humanitarian organisations and donor governments.
Nevertheless, there are persistent problems in moving from
policy commitments around gender to actually incorporating
gender sensitive approaches in operations and programmes.
Over the past five years, Humanitarian Response Index
(HRI) field research teams have visited dozens of crises and
repeatedly found examples of humanitarian actors failing
to consider the different needs of women, girls, men and
boys, causing gaps in responses, or worse, accentuating
suffering. The consequences of a lack of attention to
gender range from culturally inappropriate feminine hygiene
kits in Bangladesh and Pakistan to latrines for women in
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee camps with
insufficient lighting and security in Haiti or the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC). Itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s not just about programmes
to specifically target the needs of women and girls, however.
Men and boys also have specific needs, and programmes
which fail to address these needs can have equally negative
consequences. In DRC, for example, the needs of men and
boys, many of whom are themselves victims of rape and
sexual assault, are often overlooked in Sexual and GenderBased Violence (SGBV) programmes.
Thankfully, the humanitarian sector is beginning to pay
closer attention to the issue. A number of recent studies
and evaluations (including an ongoing study by DARA for
UNICEF, UN Women and OCHA on gender outcomes of
humanitarian responses) are beginning to build a solid
evidence base to show the importance of gender sensitive
approaches for effective crisis response. Initiatives like
the IASC Gender Marker (GM),1 which codes the extent to
which gender is incorporated into humanitarian projects
on a 0â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2 scale, are helping raise awareness among
humanitarian agencies of how good project designs
can ensure that women, girls, men and boys will benefit
equally from projects. The IASC Gender Standby Capacity

project (GenCap)2 and many humanitarian organisations
have deployed gender advisors to more and more crises
to help train humanitarian staff from all sectors to better
understand gender issues from a practical, programming
perspective. The HRI 2011 hopes to contribute to these
efforts by providing additional evidence on the role of donor
governments in ensuring gender is addressed adequately in
humanitarian assistance policies, funding and practices.

DARAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;S APPROACH
From DARAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s perspective, gender mainstreaming cannot
simply be a political statement of commitment; it is
essential to the quality, effectiveness and accountability
of aid efforts. Good gender analysis and gender sensitive
approaches in programme design and implementation are
essential to meet the fundamental humanitarian principle
that aid is impartial and based on needs. Any action, no
matter how well-intentioned, can fall short of meeting
humanitarian objectives if organisations do not know the
specific capacities and needs of all the different parts of the
population affected by a crisis, and fail to design, monitor
and assess the effectiveness of interventions in meeting
those needs. Donors can facilitate this by incorporating
gender more systematically into all aspects of their policies
and procedures, and monitoring their partners to ensure that
the aid efforts for which they provide funding and support
are gender sensitive, and therefore, more accountable to
affected populations.
In order to analyse donor support for gender in humanitarian
action, the HRI 2011 incorporated a new indicator into the
research methodology based on three components:
rQPMJDZSFWJFXTUPTFFXIFUIFSHFOEFSJTTQFDJĂ DBMMZ
incorporated into donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; humanitarian or development
policy frameworks;
rGVOEJOHBOBMZTJTUPTFFXIFUIFSEPOPSTBMJHOUIFJSGVOEJOH
and distribute aid according to gender sensitive criteria;
rTVSWFZRVFTUJPOTUPTFFIPXĂ FMECBTFEIVNBOJUBSJBO
staff perceive donorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; commitments to gender issues in
their funding and support.

A desk review of OECD/DAC donors’ policies was
conducted to determine whether gender was included in
their humanitarian assistance policies, in their overall official
development assistance (ODA) framework, or not mentioned at
all. Donor governments were also asked to provide examples
of any specific requirements for their partner organisations to
include gender analysis and sex and age disaggregated data
(SADD) in project funding proposals, or as part of reporting
requirements; however, this could not be included as an
additional indicator due to the limited response.
The IASC GenCap Project and UN OCHA’s Financial Tracking
System (FTS) provided the data used for the funding analysis,
based on an assessment of funding alignment to the Gender
Marker tool. In 2011, the GM was used in nine CAPs (Chad,
Haiti, Kenya, Niger, occupied Palestinian territories [oPt],
Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen and Zimbabwe), two pooled
funds (DRC, Ethiopia) and the Pakistan flood appeal. The HRI
field research included seven of these countries, which made
it possible to collect perceptions of actors in the field about
gender issues and the utility of the GM. The initiative has
since been expanded to cover countries in 2012, allowing for
further comparative analysis of funding trends in the future
(IASC 2011; UN OCHA FTS 2011).
For the purposes of the HRI’s analysis, the funding
component of the HRI gender indicator is based on:
rUIFTIBSFPGFBDIEPOPSTGVOEJOHQSPWJEFEUPQSPKFDUT
classified as gender sensitive (code 2a or 2b) under
the GM compared to the donor’s total funding to crises
where the GM was applied; and
rUIFQFSDFOUBHFPGEPOPSGVOEJOHUPQSPKFDUTDMBTTJàFE
as gender blind (code 0) compared to the donor’s total
funding to crises where the GM was applied.
The third component of the HRI gender assessment is
based on field staff perceptions of donor commitment
to gender, and beneficiary engagement captured by the
following questions of the HRI field survey on donor
practices: “Does your donor require you to incorporate gender
sensitive approaches in your programmes?” and "Does your
donor require beneﬁciary participation in: progamme design;
implementation; monitoring and evaluation?". Respondents
were asked to use the following scale:
1 It’s not a requirement and not given
any importance by the donor
2 It’s not a requirement by the donor,
but they like to see it if we include it
3 It’s a requirement but not given much
importance by the donor
4 It’s an important requirement for the donor
5 It’s an important requirement and
the donor veriﬁes to make sure we do

#051

Over 870 survey responses on OECD/DAC donors’ gender
practices were collected from over 270 senior and mid-level
representatives of humanitarian agencies in nine crises.
In addition, over 150 responses to open-ended questions
on donors' gender approaches were collected, along with
supplementary questions regarding how the humanitarian
sector deals with gender issues and barriers to women’s
participation, either as staff or aid recipients.

TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF FEMALE AND MALE STAFF
INTERVIEWED IN THE HRI 2011 FIELD RESEARCH
POSITION HELD IN
THE ORGANISATION

FEMALE

%

MALE

%

TOTAL

SENIOR MANAGEMENT

74

32

156

68

230

100%

MID-LEVEL

21

43

28

57

49

100%

TOTAL

95

34

184

66

279

100%

Survey and interviews did not include questions about specific
programmes, though many comments mentioned examples of
the degree to which gender was being addressed, or ignored,
in different contexts. Nevertheless, it does offer interesting
insight on how the sector is dealing with the issue.
Using a statistical analysis of the scores against the HRI’s
set of 35 indicators of donor policies, funding practices
and field perceptions, donors have been classified into
three categories based on their shared characteristics. The
specific results for gender are outlined below.3

OVERVIEW OF DONOR
PERFORMANCE AROUND
GENDER ISSUES
On the whole, donors could do much better at integrating
gender into their policies, funding and support at the field
level, as illustrated in Tables 2 and 3. At the individual level,
Canada stands out for its consistent support for gender in
its humanitarian policies, funding and practices, and is a
model for other donors. Sweden, the European Commission
(ECHO), Norway and the United States complete the list of
top five donors for their support for gender.

POLICIES IN PLACE,
BUT INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION
TO MONITORING AND FOLLOW UP
OF PROGRAMMING
Most donors have gender policies, but very few have
specific procedures to monitor and follow up on gender in
the programmes they fund. The review of OECD/DAC donor
governments’ policies shows that the majority (61%) have
a gender policy for humanitarian aid, either as a standalone, separate policy or mentioned specifically in their
humanitarian policy. Some of the remaining donors include
gender in their overall ODA framework, although in some
cases this is simply a generic mention of the importance of
women in development programmes.
Group 1 donors, “Principled Partners”4 (Denmark, Finland,
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland), tend
to have the most comprehensive and progressive gender
policies for their humanitarian assistance, with clearly
defined guidelines, objectives and descriptions. Group 2
donors, “Learning Leaders”5 (Canada, ECHO, France, the
UK and the US), also generally have gender policies, though
sometimes not as clearly defined as Group 1 donors.
Canada in particular, stands out for its long-standing
commitment to mainstreaming gender in its humanitarian
and development assistance, while ECHO was criticised
by many organisations for delays in launching an updated
gender policy despite commitments to gender in the
European Consensus on Humanitarian Assistance.
As part of the overall donor policy review, DARA also asked
donors whether their funding, reporting and evaluation
criteria included specific requirements for SADD - generally
considered the first step towards ensuring gender-sensitive
programming. Of the donors that responded, most stated
that they encouraged and promoted gender in their dialogue
with partners, but only a few, such as Canada and Spain,
cited specific SADD reporting requirements. None of the
donors consulted provided specific examples of how they
went beyond SADD information to ask the critical question
of partners: what does that data mean for the approaches
taken, prioritisation of interventions, or monitoring that would
demonstrate how partners were addressing gender issues?

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:

SIZEABLE PORTION OF APPEAL
FUNDING STILL “GENDER BLIND”
According to data provided by the IASC for the 2011 appeal
cycle, 58.3% of funding to CAPs in which the GM was applied
was gender-sensitive (i.e. allocated to projects that either
significantly contribute to gender equality or whose main
purpose is to advance gender equality). Still, 15.4% of
project funding was found to be gender blind (in other words,
with no evident consideration of gender in the design). There
is significant variance, however, from one crisis to another.
Funding to CAPs in Kenya and Yemen was largely gender
sensitive, with 98.2% and 78.3% respectively allocated to
projects making some contribution to gender, while only
6.1% of funding to Zimbabwe and 2.4% of funding to Niger
contributed to gender equality.

Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Similar differences are seen among donors, as shown
in Table 4. On the whole, Group 1 donors, “Principled
Partners”, did not match their record for good gender
policies with corresponding funding. On average, over a
quarter of funding (26.3%) of the crises included in the 2011
GM was considered “gender blind” in this group. Within the
group, Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands performed
poorly in terms of funding allocations, although, as some
respondents pointed out, these donors also tend to support
pooled funding mechanisms, which did use gender as one of
the criteria for project funding allocations. Group 2 donors
“Learning Leaders”, on the other hand, tended to perform
best of all donors assessed in terms of allocating funding
based on GM scores, with Canada and France leading the
group. Of the Group 3 donors, “Aspiring Actors”,6 Germany
and Australia deserve mention for the high degree of funding

allocated to gender-sensitive programmes. Group 3 donors
performed similar to Group 1 donors, with an average of
27.2% of funding to gender blind programmes.
Some field respondents questioned whether funding
allocations based on GM scores represented a pro-active
position by donors, or were more an indication that
humanitarian organisations were simply becoming more
aware by including gender in their plans and appeals. “Do
donors require gender because agencies do, or is it the
other way around?” asked one respondent in oPt. There was
a certain amount of cynicism among many respondents,
with several commenting that “some organisations
use gender ‘to look nice’ for the donors so they will get
the funding, but the projects are no good.” “NGOs and
UN agencies are simply copying and pasting from past
proposals,” said another in Haiti.
Nevertheless, there were many respondents who felt
that initiatives like the GenCap and GM project were slowly
making a difference in improving the quality of project
proposals and using gender criteria for funding allocation.
“The Humanitarian Country Team has really accepted and
appropriated the Gender Marker. They're very serious about
it. It has really been adopted by people who hold leadership
in the humanitarian system: only gender sensitive projects
receive financial aid,” according to a respondent in DRC.
Even critics admitted that the GM, while perhaps a “blunt
tool for raising awareness,” as one respondent put it, was
profiling gender issues more systematically. However, like
the issue of quotas for women in programmes, several
respondents cautioned about the risk of converting the GM
into simply another procedural exercise for both donors and
agencies, limited to making “sure basic things are taken into
account in projects,” in the words of one respondent in DRC.
“It’s very basic. It's about minimal requirements. It's not
about making a qualitative analysis of the real situation.”

DONOR COMMITMENT TO GENDER
QUESTIONED IN THE FIELD
While donors performed reasonably well in the HRI indicators
for gender policy and funding, perceptions of donors’
commitment to gender at the field level is a concern. In
the HRI field survey question related to gender, OECD/DAC
donor governments were given an average score of 5.79
out of 10 by their field partners. This is below the overall
average survey score for OECD/DAC donors of 6.02, and
among the lowest of all HRI survey scores. Other questions
with similarly low average scores include donor support for
beneficiary participation (5.08) and accountability towards
beneficiaries (4.47), indicating that the issue of promoting
inclusive and participatory approaches to understand
and meet needs is a collective weakness for donors. One

#054

respondent in DRC summed it up this way: “We would have
to take affected populations into account to be able to take
affected women into account.”
Interview comments overwhelmingly confirmed the
generally poor perception of donors in the field, with most
viewing donor commitment to gender as “theoretical”
and largely limited to asking for some gender sensitivity
in project proposals. “There’s no real engagement,
donors look at gender in a very general way,” said one
respondent working in Somalia. “No donor has a real
interest and understanding of gender,” affirmed another
in Haiti. “Gender is definitely not an issue for donors.
They don’t even know what it means, and while some are
more sensitive, most just check on paper,” remarked one
respondent in Chad. “Donors have not indicated to their
partners that gender mainstreaming is non-negotiable
because it is at the root of understanding vulnerability,
exclusion and abuse in every single situation,” asserted
another respondent working in Somalia.
Several respondents equated the slow progress on gender
with a lack of accountability and push from donors, and
called for donors to “put your money where your mouth
is” by pushing for funding based on gender criteria and
requiring gender analysis in all stages of programme design,
implementation and monitoring. Many felt that there was “no
serious effort by donors to include gender in decision-making
and monitoring. Donors themselves are often the first to
ignore compliance with gender sensitivity requirements, if
any,” said one respondent in Pakistan.
The majority of humanitarian organisations interviewed
stated that their organisations had their own internal
requirements on gender-sensitive approaches and SADD
in programmes. When SADD was requested by donors, it
appeared to be due to individual donor representatives’
own initiatives rather than an institutional policy. According
to one respondent in DRC, “Gender is in vogue. But donors
like the US, UK, ECHO or Spain don’t even know what they
want in terms of gender. They don’t put in practice means for
verifying whether gender is actually taken into account.”
Even donors most often cited for their commitment to
gender issues, such as Sweden and Canada, were often
criticised for a lack of follow-up: “CIDA (Canada) is strong
at being gender sensitive in the project proposal stage
but not in implementation, monitoring and evaluation,”
said one respondent in Sudan. “Donors ask us for gender
approaches in our proposals, but they never verify it,”
commented another in Kenya. The US and ECHO were also
often cited as donors that follow up on gender policies in
their programming support, though this was not systematic
and depended on the crisis, such as appears from this
observation from Haiti: “OFDA (US) generally requires a
gender approach, but in this emergency case, they don’t
care that much about it.”

At the field level, several respondents complained about
donors like DFID (UK), ECHO or others imposing quotas
on the number of women beneficiaries or project staff.
Many regarded this as counterproductive to more nuanced
assessments of needs and better targeting of programmes.
One gender advisor interviewed gave a positive example
of how more consistent application of donor commitment to
gender could lead to changes in the behaviours and practices
of their partners: “I always wondered what would happen if
donors were the ones who pushed for gender sensitiveness. It
worked! I went to give trainings on the Gender Marker in a very
remote area and a lot of programme planners from national
NGOs showed up, coming from isolated villages. They came
because they were concerned about not getting any more
funding if they didn’t incorporate gender.”

MAIN FINDINGS:
THE HUMANITARIAN SECTOR IS STILL TOO
MALE-DOMINATED
Each year, the HRI interviews hundreds of field
representatives of humanitarian organisations in different
crisis contexts. This year, over two thirds of the senior
managers interviewed were men (68%) and one third women
(32%), a ratio that has remained largely unchanged since the
HRI began five years ago (see Table 1). Progress has been
made, but there are still structural and attitudinal barriers
to more effective engagement of women in the sector, as
our field research shows and is echoed by other studies,
such as the Active Learning Network for Accountability and
Performance’s (ALNAP) study on leadership (ALNAP 2010).
Several respondents - both male and female - felt that the
dominance of “Anglo-Saxon men” in key decision-making
positions in donor and UN agencies was an impediment to
effectively understanding gender problems in humanitarian
settings. Others acknowledged and appreciated the
important role that senior male staff can adopt in driving a
gender agenda in programming, but complained that female
staff attempting to do the same were often perceived as
pursuing personal or emotional agendas: “When men talk
about gender, it’s perceived as a professional issue, related
to effective responses. Women are seen as doing it for
more personal reasons.”
At the programming level, several respondents
mentioned the difficulties some male colleagues
encountered in applying a gender perspective to
interventions. “Men wouldn’t understand why it was
important to put locks on latrine doors. They thought it
was just so the wind wouldn’t open them,” stated one
respondent. “When we told men about the importance of
doing focus groups separated by sex, they didn’t believe
it. We had to use watches during meetings for them to

#055

realise how men talk much more than women when focus
groups are mixed,” said another working in DRC.
Many field respondents pointed to the difficulty of finding
and retaining international and local female staff at
the field level for projects. “Gender sensitive strategies
or programmes are written in an office, but there are
many practical constraints when in the field,” stated one
respondent in DRC. Social and cultural barriers, limited
access to education opportunities, poor health conditions,
and concerns around protection and security were factors
cited by many interviewees as impeding greater numbers
of women from working in the humanitarian sector. “Lots of
women don’t want to work in remote or dangerous areas,
especially if they have families,” said one. “It's hard to
hire qualified women. We had a vacancy. We did a first
round of applications and no women participated. Even
for international staff it's hard to find women candidates,”
commented another in Chad.
Few respondents could offer any concrete examples of how
organisations were finding ways to address these kinds of
barriers, suggesting there is much more work to be done to
resolve some of these structural issues impeding greater
numbers of women staff in crisis situations. There were
some positive signs, though. Some organisations are more
proactively and persistently trying to recruit women, while
others are investing in building capacities of female local
staff. As one woman working in DRC reflected, “As a woman,
it's now easier to work in the UN than it was before. The
atmosphere is better and better. There's respect towards
women. Plus they really try to recruit more women to have a
more gender balanced staff.”
Clearly, much more research needs to be conducted to
understand the potential bias that the predominance of
male humanitarian staff might create in the way needs are
understood, assessed and prioritised in the design and
implementation of humanitarian programmes. However,
it stands to reason that with women and girls making up
over half of the world’s population, and with clear evidence
that the effects of crises are different for women and
men, an increase in the number of women engaged in the
humanitarian sector and in decision-making processes could
only be a positive move.

GENDER IS OFTEN CONSIDERED A LOW PRIORITY
IN EMERGENCY RESPONSES
A recurring theme that emerged in all the crises assessed
was the opinion of a significant number of respondents
(including several donor representatives) that gender is not a
priority in humanitarian relief operations. Rather than seeing
gender as an opportunity to improve the quality, effectiveness
and efficiency of aid efforts, many respondents saw gender
as an “added luxury”- optional depending on timing and

resources. They subordinated gender to more important
objectives and activities, arguing that the urgency of a
situation requires immediate action, not analysis.
The HRI research teams frequently heard comments like:
“there was no time for that [gender analysis] in such an
emergency situation” in Haiti, or “gender is something that
comes later, in the recovery phase”. Similar comments were
made in other crises: “The donor does not go through the
gender score card with you because proposals have to be
accepted quickly in such an urgent situation,” despite the
reality that many of these same crises are now protracted
for years or even decades.
Donors themselves contribute to perpetuating such
attitudes, according to many respondents: “It is a donor
requirement, but they also understand that we are working
under very difficult constraints so gender is not pushed.”
“Normally, they do require a gender approach in other
projects but not in this case. This is a humanitarian crisis
targeting entire populations, big numbers. They aren’t
focused on women,” commented another in Haiti. In
essence, the message from donors seems to be that gender
is an important political commitment, but not a practical
priority in humanitarian crises. One donor representative
in Somalia summed up this line of thinking: “In truth, this
is not a priority; it’s more of a ‘tick the box’ approach. The
scale and complexities of the crisis mean there are more
important issues to address.”

GENDER IS STILL MAINLY EQUATED WITH WOMEN’S
ISSUES AND NOT AS A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC
APPROACH TO PROGRAMMING
While there is ample evidence that women are
disproportionately and differently affected by disasters
and effects of conflicts (such as sexual and gender-based
violence), this is not to say that gender is or should be limited
exclusively to programmes and interventions focused on
women. As a recent study sponsored by UN OCHA and CARE
demonstrates, a review of SADD in humanitarian programmes
shows that humanitarian organisations often make incorrect
assumptions about programming priorities, based largely
on incomplete or inaccurate information about the affected
populations and their needs (Mazurana, Benelli et al. 2011).
Similar conclusions were evident in many of the crises
covered by HRI field research. The perception among many
interviewed was that gender was often misunderstood to
include solely women and girls. “Many donors, like Canada,
the US, Sweden or Norway, are very sensitive to gender,
but their programmes mainly focus on women. They don’t
necessarily discriminate against men, but they mainly target
women,” commented one respondent in Sudan. Another
in DRC provided examples of how this can inadvertently
exclude men: “Males are not included in programme

#056

activities. It’s not a real gender strategy; they just focus
on providing special care for women. Sometimes they even
neglect men’s needs completely.”
One respondent in Sudan reflected the attitude of many
when he stated: “Focusing so much on women only
worsens the general situation; positive discrimination is
not the answer.” This type of attitude was frustrating for
other respondents: “Gender is not about underlining the
vulnerability of women or constantly showing them as victims!
We need less talk about gender and more about gender in
projects tackling the needs of all men, women, boys and girls.
There are some improvements in humanitarian action in this
regard but much more needs to be done.”

CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS:
CONCLUSIONS
Gender only constituted a small component of the overall
HRI research process. However, even the limited areas
assessed generated a great deal of information that
can help the humanitarian sector better understand the
constraints and challenges to integrating gender into
humanitarian action.
While the majority of OECD/DAC donors were reported to
have gender policies, very few actually monitor and follow up
with their partners in the field on how gender is integrated
into programming. Funding also appears to be mostly aligned
with gender criteria, but as the analysis of GM data for 2011
shows, there are huge discrepancies in the level of support
for gender sensitive projects in some crises compared to
others, and the level of priority given to gender by some
donors in their funding allocations.
It is clear from the field research that the majority of
humanitarian actors interviewed see donor commitment to
gender as limited to the most general and superficial levels,
not as an integral part of their strategy and approaches.
Even donors that have a reputation for championing
gender – and there are a few – were often seen as failing to
systematically use gender criteria to guide decision-making,
and not actively monitor and follow up to verify how gender
approaches were being applied in programming.
In the absence of clear directions and requirements from
donors, many humanitarian organisations have developed
their own internal policies on gender mainstreaming. Within
the sector, initiatives like the IASC GM and the work of
GenCap and other gender advisors in the field were generally
seen as positive moves to advance gender issues. However,
a significant number of the representatives in humanitarian
organisations expressed their scepticism about the utility
of gender sensitive approaches in emergency responses,
and many equated gender with a simplistic view that this

catered only to programmes specifically aimed at women.
Many of the donor and agency respondents saw gender
as a bureaucratic procedure (â&#x20AC;&#x153;ticking the boxesâ&#x20AC;?) and an
administrative burden rather than as a basic and essential
step in ensuring that humanitarian assistance is nondiscriminatory and allocated on the basis of need.
It seems evident that much more work needs to be done
to research, understand and address the continued negative
attitudes towards gender issues and to resolve some of
the more difficult structural barriers that impede greater
participation of women in the sector. To move forward and
truly live up to the collective commitment to mainstream
gender in humanitarian responses, donors can and must
take on a leadership role. In the opinion of many of those
interviewed, if donors show that gender is a priority for them,
and begin to actively promote gender, the sector is likely to
follow, at the very least, due to concerns about continued
access to funding.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are some recommendations for simple,
practical steps that donors can take to promote better
acceptance, awareness and understanding of the need for
enhanced gender sensitive approaches. The majority of
these recommendations have already been made before, but
they are worth repeating.

1. MAKE SURE GENDER IS FULLY INTEGRATED INTO
NEEDS ASSESSMENTS, DONOR FUNDING DECISIONS,
AND PROGRAMME DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles, donors
commit to ensure aid is non-discriminatory and in proportion
to needs. The only way to guarantee this is by ensuring that
needs are properly assessed from a gender perspective.
By aligning funding to projects that show how gender is
being addressed, donors can send a powerful message to
partners that gender analysis must be improved and applied
systematically to programmes. While many donors request
partners to include gender analysis and provide SADD in
proposals, very few actually follow up to see how this data is
being used in implementation or require partners to report
on how gender analysis is being used to improve quality and
effectiveness of interventions for all parts of the population.
To achieve this, donors should:
r4VQQPSUUIFSPMMPVUPGJOJUJBUJWFTMJLFUIF*"4$(FOEFS
Marker and align funding decisions to gender coding,
justifying when funding is allocated to gender-blind
programmes;
r3FRVJSFQBSUOFSTUPJODMVEFHFOEFSBOBMZTJT
PVUMJOJOH
what the different needs of women, girls, men and boys
are in the crisis, and how these will be addressed at
different stages of the response;

#057

r*OTJTUPOUIFDPMMFDUJPOBOEBOBMZTJTPGTFYBOEBHF
disaggregated data (SADD) in all project proposals and
reports, and ask partners to show how this data is being
used to adapt and improve the quality of responses.

2. INTEGRATE GENDER SPECIFICALLY INTO
PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY ACTIVITIES
Donors are consistently weak at supporting prevention,
preparedness and risk reduction in general. But their
efforts would likely have much greater and lasting impact
if gender was fully integrated into disaster and conflict
prevention programmes. As the recent report on the use of
SADD concludes, there are numerous steps humanitarian
organisations could take prior to an emergency to better
understand the different roles and social norms that apply to
women, girls, men and boys in crisis prone countries. Donors
can facilitate this by supporting their partners to take measures
beforehand to anticipate, plan and prepare themselves and
vulnerable communities to better address gender in prevention,
response and recovery efforts. And as pointed out by Michelle
Bachelet, the Executive Director of UN Women, women have a
vital role in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconciliation,
but are largely absent from these processes. Donors can help
rectify this. In order to minimise the possibility of gender gaps in
crisis responses donors should:
r3FRVJSFQBSUOFSTUPJODMVEFHFOEFSBOBMZTJTBOETUSBUFHJFT
in any prevention and risk reduction programmes,
preparedness and contingency planning they fund;
r*OTJTUUIBUUIFJSQBSUOFSTJOUFHSBUFTUSBUFHJFTUPJODSFBTF
the engagement with and build the capacity of beneficiary
communities to prevent and prepare for crises, with a specific
focus on ensuring participation of women in activities;
r&OTVSFHFOEFSJTBEFRVBUFMZJODPSQPSBUFEJOUPSFDPWFSZ
and transition programming, including in conflict and
post-conflict situations.

3. SUPPORT MEASURES TO INCREASE THE
PARTICIPATION AND ENGAGEMENT OF WOMEN
IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION
There is a large disparity in the number of men and
women working at the field level, especially at the senior
management level. The sector is still dominated by
men, raising questions about the ability of humanitarian
organisations to fully understand the needs of women
and men in different cultural and social contexts. At the
field level, while there are slow improvements, too many
programmes still do not fully integrate crisis-affected
populations as a whole, and women in particular, in the
design, implementation and decision-making processes of
aid interventions. Donors can work towards changing this
imbalance, and should:

r1SPNPUFHSFBUFSQBSUJDJQBUJPOPGXPNFOJONBOBHFNFOU
and leadership roles in the sector;
r4VQQPSUBOEGVOEJOJUJBUJWFTBOEUPPMTMJLFUIF(FOEFS
Marker, the GenCap project and the use of gender
advisors to help increase understanding of gender issues
and address gender gaps in humanitarian action;
r4VQQPSUIVNBOJUBSJBOQBSUOFSTUPJODSFBTFUIFJSDBQBDJUZ
for integrating women and gender into their human
resources strategies, programming policies, planning,
reporting and operational procedures, including SADD;
r4VQQPSUQBSUOFSTJOBEESFTTJOHTPNFPGUIFDVMUVSBM
social and other barriers to women’s and men’s
participation in humanitarian action, as part of an overall
strategy for increased accountability towards crisisaffected populations.

4. INCREASE EFFORTS TO ENSURE GENDER IS AN
INTEGRAL PART OF PROTECTION STRATEGIES
Women and girls are often extremely vulnerable in situations
of conflict, and are frequently the targets of sexual and
gender based violence (SGBV). In disaster situations like
Haiti, SGBV is often present as well, but does not receive
the same attention as it does in conflicts. At the same
time, men and boys are often themselves victims, or require
special focus in prevention efforts. Much progress has
been made, but there are still disturbing incidents where
the international community’s responsibility to protect
these vulnerable people has not been fulfilled, and where
perpetrators of SGBV act with impunity. In order to ensure
that the rights, dignity and physical integrity of all affected
populations are protected donors should:
r4VQQPSUCFUUFSUSBJOJOHPGIVNBOJUBSJBOBOEPUIFSBDUPST
(such as peacekeeping and military forces) on gender,
human rights and the responsibility to protect, and
monitor compliance;
r*OTJTUUIBUQBSUOFSTJODPSQPSBUFHFOEFSQFSTQFDUJWFT
into all protection activities, including an analysis of the
specific needs of men and boys;
r4VQQPSUJOUFSOBUJPOBMNFDIBOJTNTUPFOEJNQVOJUZGPS
acts of SGBV

5. MAKE GENDER AN EXPLICIT FOCUS OF
MONITORING, EVALUATION AND LEARNING
IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION
As HRI research indicates, donors do not consistently
monitor, follow up, or evaluate how gender issues are
being addressed in humanitarian action. Awareness and
understanding of gender are still limited in the sector,
and attitudes towards gender issues are often negative.
Progress is happening in many crisis contexts, thanks
in part to initiatives like the Gender Marker and gender
advisors, and recent and ongoing evaluations are adding

#058

new and compelling evidence that gender needs to be an
integral part of an overall strategy to improve the quality and
effectiveness of aid. In order to ensure that aid resources
are effectively meeting needs, donors and their partners
must monitor and report how interventions are contributing,
or not, to meeting gender needs at all points in the response
cycle, especially in the emergency response phase. Unless
donors and their partners make gender an integral part
of monitoring, evaluation and learning, there is a risk that
gender remains marginalised rather than mainstreamed in
humanitarian action. Donors have an important role to play
in this, and should:
r3FRVJSFBMMQBSUOFSTUPNPOJUPSBOESFQPSUPO4"%%
and demonstrate how gender is being addressed in all
phases of programming;
r*OUFHSBUFHFOEFSBTBDPNQPOFOUPGBMMNPOJUPSJOH
reporting and evaluation requirements for themselves
and their partners;
r4QPOTPSBOETVQQPSUNPSFFWBMVBUJPOTBOEMFBSOJOH
around gender issues for the sector;
r%FWFMPQBOEPSSFàOFUIFJSQPMJDJFTPOHFOEFSJO
humanitarian action, making clear links between
gender, beneficiary participation and inclusiveness, and
accountability towards affected populations;
r%FWFMPQBDPMMFDUJWFEPOPSQPMJDZTUBUFNFOUPOUIFJS
commitment to gender equality in humanitarian action.

The IASC Gender Marker is a tool that
codes, on a 0–2 scale, whether or not
a humanitarian project is designed well
enough to ensure that women/girls and
men/boys will benefit equally from it
or that it will advance gender equality
in another way. If the project has the
potential to contribute to gender equality,
the marker predicts whether the results
are likely to be limited or significant.
http://oneresponse.info/crosscutting/
gender/Pages/The%20IASC%20
Gender%20Marker.aspx
The IASC Gender Standby Capacity
(GenCap) project seeks to build capacity
of humanitarian actors at country level to
mainstream gender equality programming,
including prevention and response to
gender-based violence, in all sectors of
humanitarian response. GenCap’s goal is
to ensure that humanitarian action takes
into consideration the different needs
and capabilities of women, girls, boys and
men equally. For more information: InterAgency Standby Capacity Support Unit
http://gencap.oneresponse.info

3

For more information on the methodology
and the donor classification, please see:
www.daraint.org

4

Group 1 donors, “Principled Partners”, are
characterised by their generosity, strong
commitment to humanitarian principles of
neutrality, impartiality and independence,
and for flexible, funding arrangements
with partners.

5

Group 2 donors, “Learning Leaders”,
are characterised by their leading role
and influence in terms of capacity
to respond, field presence, and
commitment to learning and improving
performance in the sector.

6

Group 3 donors, “Aspiring Actors”,
are diverse in terms of their size and
capacities, but are characterised by their
focus on building strengths in specific
“niche” areas, such as geographic regions
or thematic areas like preparedness and
prevention, and their aspirations to take
on a greater role in the sector.

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Australia ranked 10th in the HRI 2011, improving three positions from
2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Australia is classified
as a Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to
have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system
at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the
sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such in the
area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific
geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Belgium,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and Spain.
Australia’s overall score was below the OECD/DAC average, yet above
the Group 3 average. Australia scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 3
average in most pillars, with the exception of Pillars 1 and 3 (Working with

humanitarian partners). In Pillar 1, Australia scored below both the OECD/
DAC and Group 3 averages and in Pillar 3, Australia received its lowest
score - below the OECD/DAC average, yet above the Group 3 average.
Australia did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on
Funding reconstruction and prevention, Participating in accountability
initiatives, Refugee law, and Funding protection of civilians. With the
exception of the latter, Australia’s relative strengths are concentrated
in quantitative indicators. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the
indicators on Advocacy towards local authorities, Implementing evaluation
recommendations, Adapting to changing needs, Funding vulnerable and
forgotten emergencies and Beneﬁciary participation – all qualitative
indicators except for Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/AUSTRALIA

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AID DISTRIBUTION
In 2010, Official Development Assistance (ODA)
represented 0.32% of Australia's Gross National Income
(GNI), with 10.59% of ODA allocated to humanitarian
aid, or 0.034% of its GNI. According to data reported
to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking
Service (FTS), in 2010, Australia channelled 67.2% of its
humanitarian assistance to UN agencies, 6.5% to the
Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 10.7% to NGOs
and 1.9% bilaterally to affected governments. In 2010,
the Australian Agency for International Development
(AusAID) provided humanitarian assistance to 21
emergencies in Asia, ten in Africa, four in the Americas

and two in Oceania (OCHA FTS 2011). The 2005
Humanitarian Action Policy affirmed Australia’s intention
to focus aid “primarily…on the Asia-Pacific region.” It
has also played a significant lead role in spearheading
humanitarian relief efforts with France and New Zealand
in the South Pacific. Recently, AusAID has begun to
increase its development and humanitarian assistance
to other regions of the developing world and has
announced its intention to scale up development and
humanitarian relief efforts in the Middle East and Africa,
particularly in Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Horn of Africa in the
coming years (AusAID 2011c).

POLICY FRAMEWORK
The Australian Agency for International Development
(AusAID), an autonomous body within the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), manages Australia’s
humanitarian aid. In 2010, AusAID was established as
an Executive Agency directly accountable to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs (Australian Government 2011).
AusAID’s Corporate, Humanitarian and International
Group now encompasses four divisions, including the
Africa, West Asia and Humanitarian Division (AusAID
2011a). AusAID has strengthened its base in Canberra,
while further expanding the role for its overseas
offices and offshore programme management (AusAID
2009a). AusAID also cooperates with other areas of the
government when mobilising responses to humanitarian
emergencies, in particular with the Australian Defence
Force. In 2011, Australia established the Australian
Civilian Corps for the deployment of Australian
specialists to countries affected by natural disaster
and conflict to facilitate recovery and longer-term
rehabilitation efforts (AusAID 2011c).
The 2005 Humanitarian Action Policy governs
Australia’s humanitarian assistance, blending

humanitarian action with development, conflict
prevention, peace-building and post-conflict
reconstruction goals and is complementary to
Australia’s 2002 Peace, Conﬂict and Development
Policy. The Humanitarian Action Policy is rooted in a
Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles and
explicitly references them multiple times. A new policy
is currently being developed and is due for release at
the end of 2011.
The 2011 Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness
called for the development of a comprehensive policy
statement and the articulation of multiple year strategies
(AusAID 2011c). AusAID responded to this review by
producing An Effective Aid Program for Australia: Making
a Real Difference—Delivering Real Results. In recent
years, AusAID has focused on incorporating disaster risk
reduction (DRR) efforts into its development programmes,
publishing Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate
Change and Environmental Considerations in AusAID
Programs (AusAID 2010b) and Investing in a Safer Future:
A Disaster Risk Reduction Policy for the Australian Aid
Program (AusAID 2009b).

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HOW DOES AUSTRALIA’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

AusAID’s 2005 Humanitarian Action Policy describes the need to
incorporate gender considerations into all stages of humanitarian action,
taking into account the different effects of crises on women, and to
ensure female participation in activities (AusAID 2005). AusAID has also
declared gender equality and female empowerment to be an overarching
goal of its aid programme at all levels of activities. The 2007 publication,
Gender Equality in Australia’s Aid Program, insists on preserving gender
perspectives, especially in crisis situations and DRR efforts, and seeks to
promote equal participation of women in decision-making roles in conflict
situations (AusAID 2010c). AusAID has also reaffirmed its commitment
to promoting gender equality in all programmes in An Effective Aid
Program for Australia, and has declared its intention to collaborate
with multilateral agencies and NGOs to implement gender sensitive
policies (AusAID 2011c and AusAID 2011f). In recognition of women’s
increased vulnerability in humanitarian crises, Australia helped fund the
production of the 2010 Inter-agency Field Manual on Reproductive Health
in Humanitarian Settings. Australia has supported programmes related
to maternal health care and protecting women from exploitation during
crises; for example, it supports SPRINT, a programme to provide sexual
and reproductive health services to women in crisis situations (AusAID
2011f). Furthermore, Australia has supported GenCap to support the
deployment of gender experts to humanitarian crises, as well as training
for peacekeepers on prevention and response to sexual violence.

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

AusAID’s 2005 Humanitarian Action Policy upholds the importance of
neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian aid and sets forth plans
to allocate funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs
assessments, according to the changing situations in humanitarian crises
(AusAID 2005). AusAID also pledges to provide support based on the
scale of the disaster and to mobilise resources rapidly (AusAID 2005).
Australia has standby funding arrangements with NGOs, in which funding
can be requested through simplified, fast-track procedures during crises
(AusAID 2011e). AusAID has also announced its intention to deliver
“faster, more effective responses” as the frequency and intensity of
humanitarian crises continue to increase (AusAID 2011c).

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PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Australia’s humanitarian action also includes capacity building,
vulnerability reduction and the promotion of disaster and emergency
prevention and preparedness measures (AusAID 2005). AusAID
articulated its commitment to supporting implementation of the Hyogo
Framework for Action in the 2009 document Investing in a Safer Future:
A Disaster Risk Reduction Policy for the Australian Aid Program to be
applied in conjunction with existing policies to integrate disaster risk
reduction (DRR) efforts into responses to crises and disease outbreaks
(AusAID 2009b). A progress report and the 2010 publication of
Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate Change and Environmental
Considerations in AusAID Programs have followed (AusAid 2010b). AusAID
also recognises the crucial nature of DRR and the importance of engaging
local communities (AusAID 2005). More recently in An Effective Aid
Program for Australia, AusAID declared its intention to increase its focus
on DRR and disaster preparedness, including measures to anticipate
natural disasters. The Peace, Conﬂict and Development Policy also
outlines AusAID’s commitment to conflict prevention and peace-building
(AusAID 2002). Australia’s 2005 Humanitarian Action Policy stresses
the importance of beneficiary participation in all programme stages and
describes its commitment to facilitate the transition between relief and
development (AusAID 2011). Australia recently established the Civilian
Corps with the Australian Civilian Corps Act 2011, and part of their mission
is to “provide a bridge between emergency response measures and longterm development programs,” (DFAT 2011).

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

AusAID stresses the importance of cooperation with humanitarian
partners in its Humanitarian Action Policy. The policy highlights the
usefulness of partnering with NGOs for rapid and flexible emergency
responses and plans to support both local and Australian NGOs.
Australia holds a leading role in a number of partnerships established
for coordinating responses to natural disasters in this region, e.g.
the France, Australia and New Zealand (FRANZ) agreement (AusAID
2005) and Talisman Sabre with the US (Department of Defence 2011).
AusAID also promotes flexible responses by establishing longer-term
funding arrangements with humanitarian agencies for better planning
and responsiveness to emergencies and recognises the importance of
untying aid to improving effectiveness and efficiency (AusAID 2006). In
An Effective Aid Program for Australia, AusAID asserts its commitment to
supporting partnerships with governments, NGOs, UN agencies and the
Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.

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PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Australia’s 2005 Humanitarian Action Policy expresses a clear commitment
to meeting the protection needs of vulnerable people and promoting
international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law. It
pledges to advocate for humanitarian agencies’ access to displaced
populations and outlines plans for meeting the safety requirements of
humanitarian workers. The policy affirms Australia’s support for the Good
Humanitarian Donorship Principles and commits to actively supporting the
development of international standards (AusAID 2005).

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

AusAID’s 2005 Humanitarian Action Policy provides for a robust
evaluation system and stresses the need to ensure transparency
and accountability of operations. AusAID publishes an evaluation
report each year that includes a review of its performance in
emergency, humanitarian and refugee programmes. Australia is
also an International Aid Transparency Initiative signatory with an
implementation plan set for July-October 2011 (IATI 2011). Following
the 2011 release of the Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness,
AusAID has announced that it will improve its ODA evaluations and
issue a Transparency Charter by the end of 2011 to make information
on funding and results more accessible (Australian Government 2011).

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

HOW IS AUSTRALIA PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

AusAid’s field partners provided mixed feedback regarding gender. One
organisation reported that AusAID “comes back with questions” about
its gender sensitive approaches in programmes, seeming to confirm
that Australia’s policy focus on gender issues is translated to the field.
However, others lumped Australia together with other donors for whom
“gender is not an issue”.

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PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

In Pillar 1, evidence from the field suggests that Australia is following
through with its promises to respond to needs. Some interviewees
situated Australia as part of a group of donors that links needs
assessments to project designs. Australia’s field partners held mixed
views of the independence and timeliness of Australia’s humanitarian
assistance. It received a significantly lower score for its efforts to verify
that programmes adapt to changing needs.

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Although Australia’s quantitative scores in Pillar 2 were above average,
field perceptions were significantly lower. Particularly poor was its score
for Beneﬁciary participation, where one interviewee stressed that “it’s
all just on paper,” and that there was “no follow up to see what’s really
happening.” Its scores for linking relief to rehabilitation and development
and support for prevention and risk reduction were also low. Feedback on
Australia’s support for local capacity was more positive.

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Although Australia received its lowest score in Pillar 3, its scores in
the qualitative indicators were comparatively higher. Pillar 3 is the only
pillar where Australia’s qualitative scores are better than its quantitative
scores. Most field organisations considered Australia supportive of
coordination, a flexible donor and felt it has sufficient capacity and
expertise to make appropriate decisions. For example, one interviewee
noted that Australia participated in cluster meetings, and another pointed
to AusAID’s strong capacity at the field level, noting that its staff is well
prepared. Feedback was not as positive regarding Australian support for
its partners’ organisational capacity in areas like preparedness, response
and contingency planning, though one respondent thought AusAID would
be willing to help strengthen its organisational capacity “if asked”.

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

In Pillar 4, Australia’s partners praised the country for its funding for the
protection of civilians. Its scores were much lower, however, in qualitative
indicators on advocacy – both for protection and toward local authorities.
Perceptions of Australia’s support for safe access and security of
humanitarian works was also poor.

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PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

In Pillar 5, field organisations seem fairly satisfied with Australia’s reporting
requirements and transparency. One organisation stated that Australia
took some steps towards promoting transparency of its funding and
decision-making by sending out its scoring sheet. Multiple organisations
suggested AusAID could work to improve the integration of accountability
towards affected populations into the programmes it supports and work
with partners to implement evaluation recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are
based on data from 2010, prior to
Australia’s aid review. It remains to be
seen how the new policy will influence
these issues.

<ENSURE CRISIS
SELECTION IS
BASED ON NEED
Australia performed well in the majority
of the quantitative indicators. Only
one quantitative indicator was found
to stand out as a weakness: Funding
vulnerable and forgotten emergencies,
which measures funding to forgotten
emergencies and those with the
greatest vulnerability. Australia is
supportive of forgotten emergencies,
but tends to prioritize crises in its
geographic region. As a result,
Australia provides less funding to
crises with high levels of vulnerability
when compared to other donors. In
2010, Australia designated 40.2%
of its humanitarian funding for these
crises, compared to the Group 3
average of 63.0% and the OECD/
DAC average of 63.9%. Australia
could review its funding criteria to
ensure it responds to crises with the
greatest need at the global level while
maintaining its niche in the Asia-Pacific.

<ENSURE
ACCOUNTABILITY
TOWARD
BENEFICIARIES
IS INTEGRATED IN
HUMANITARIAN
PROGRAMMES
Australia could improve its efforts to
ensure accountability toward affected
populations. Australia received one of
the lowest scores of the OECD/DAC
donors for this qualitative indicator, as
partners indicated minimal emphasis
and follow-up on downward accountability
from Australia. Australia should
engage in dialogue with its partners to
discuss practical measures to ensure
accountability towards beneficiaries is
integrated in humanitarian programmes.

<ENCOURAGE
LEARNING
FROM THE PAST
Australia’s partners indicate that
Australia could also enhance the use
and follow-up of evaluations and other
lesson-learning exercises to ensure
recommendations are integrated in
subsequent programming. Australia’s

recent announcement of a renewed
focus on evaluations is highly positive.
It would do well to also enhance its
efforts to work with its partners to use
the lessons learned.

<LOOK FOR
WAYS TO IMPROVE
MONITORING OF
PROGRAMMES
WITHOUT FIELD
PRESENCE
Australia also received low scores for
Adapting to changing needs, Beneﬁciary
participation and Gender. Partner
feedback was similar for all three
indicators: greater monitoring is needed
to transform them from requirements
on paper to meaningful components of
programmes. However, it is possible that
the crisis selection may have influenced
the lower scores and that Australia
does verify that these requirements
are fulfilled in crises where it has field
presence. Australia should consider
alternatives, such as partnerships
with other donors, greater dialogue or
field visits to monitor more closely the
programmes it funds beyond its region.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/AUSTRIA

#073

AUSTRIA

P1

P5

7.6
8

4.62

P2

4.44

3.45

P4

2
3.3

1.28

P3
OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

0.32%

HUMANITARIAN
AID

4.2%

of GNI

US $6

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
Haiti 17

Not speciﬁed 57

Coordination 12
UN 53

Pakistan 45

Red Cross /
Red Crescent 6

WASH 11

BY
CHANNEL

Governments 4
NGOs 2

BY
SECTOR

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

Un-earmarked 11

Food 6
oPt 7
Mine action 6
Agriculture 3
Other 6

Other 35

GENDER RATING

POLICY

5

Others 14

FUNDING

STRENGTHS
Pillar Type Indicator

Afghanistan 6

Score

FIELD PERCEPTION

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

Funding and commissioning evaluations

8.89

+114.7%

5

1

Timely funding to complex emergencies

9.57

+20.9%

1

Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies 9.61

+19.3%

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

Participating in accountability initiatives

0.00

-100.00%

3

Funding NGOs

0.76

-83.3%

5

Funding accountability initiatives

1.08

-73.6%

3

Un-earmarked funding

1.50

-71.1%

3

Funding UN and RC/RC appeals

1.58

-61.3%

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Austria is not included in the overall ranking, as insufficient survey
responses were obtained to calculate the qualitative indicators
that make up the index.
Austria’s overall scores in the HRI’s quantitative indicators were
below both the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages. Austria scored
below the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages in all pillars, with the
exception of Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), where the average of its
quantitative scores placed it above both the OECD/DAC and Group

2 averages. It received its lowest score by far in Pillar 3 (Working
with humanitarian partners).
Austria did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on
Funding and commissioning evaluations, Timely funding to complex
emergencies and Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies. Its
scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Participating
in accountability initiatives, Funding NGOs, Funding accountability
initiatives, Un-earmarked funding and Funding UN and RC/RC appeals.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/AUSTRIA

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AID DISTRIBUTION
Austria’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)
comprised 0.32% of its Gross National Income (GNI) in
2010, an increase from 0.30% in 2009, yet below its
2008 level of 0.43% of GNI. Humanitarian assistance
represented 4.09% of its 2010 ODA, or 0.013% of its GNI.
According to data reported to the United Nations (UN)
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA)
Financial Tracking Service (FTS), Austria channelled 53.4%

of its humanitarian funding to UN agencies in 2010,
5.5% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 4.0%
bilaterally to affected governments and 2.5% to nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). Austria supported a
total of 17 humanitarian crises in 2010: six in Asia, four in
Africa, four in Europe and three in the Americas. Pakistan,
Haiti and the occupied Palestinian territories received the
greatest amount of support in 2010.

POLICY FRAMEWORK
Within Austria, the Federal Ministry of the Interior (FMI),
the Federal Ministry for European and International
Affairs (FMEIA), the Federal Ministry of Defence (FMD),
and the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) coordinate
humanitarian affairs (ADC 2009a). The Federal Ministry
of European and International Affairs (FMEIA) is
responsible for the strategic orientation of humanitarian
aid. The Austrian Development Agency (ADA) is
the operational arm of the Austrian Development
Cooperation (ADC), created by the Federal Ministries
Act of 1986 and the Federal Act on Development
Cooperation of 2002 (ADC 2009). The Federal Ministry
of the Interior (FMI) can also establish crisis teams
to coordinate humanitarian action (ADC 2009a).
The Austrian Action Plan on Aid Effectiveness 2006-

2010/2011 (ADC 2008), the Three- Year Programme
on Development Policy (Federal Ministry for European
and International Affairs 2008) and the Austrian
Development Cooperation International humanitarian aid:
a policy document 2009 (ADC 2009a) guide Austria´s
humanitarian policy. ADC also refers to the policies of
the European Commission for its humanitarian aid (ADC
2009a). ADC’s humanitarian budget is intended mainly
for priority and partner countries, but can also be used
to respond to humanitarian crises in other places (ADC
2009a). The Austrian Council of Ministers can approve
additional federal government funds for the Foreign
Disaster Aid Fund if sufficient funds are not available
for humanitarian action in the budgets of the individual
federal departments (ADC 2009a, p.13).

HOW DOES AUSTRIA’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Women are listed as one of the particularly vulnerable groups Austria
targets in crisis situations. Gender is mentioned as a part of Austria’s
overall development policy including Focus: Women, Gender and Armed
Conﬂicts (ADC 2011b) and Focus: Gender Equality and Empowerment of
Women (ADC 2009), and Gender equality and empowerment of women: Policy
document (ADC, 2006). However, Austria’s policy regarding the integration of
gender-sensitive approaches in humanitarian action is not clear.

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PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Austria commits to providing aid based on the principles of neutrality,
impartiality and non-discrimination (ADC 2009a). ADC recognises the
need to provide aid based on need, especially to vulnerable groups
including women, children, sick and disabled persons, refugees and
internally displaced and homeless persons (ADC 2009a). Additionally,
“particular attention is paid to `forgotten crises´ in ADC partner
countries” (ADC 2009a, p.17). Austria also emphasises the need
for timely decision-making and provision of funds (ADC 2009a). ADC
only supports prequalified, ECHO-accredited NGOs to allow for a rapid
response to crises (ADC 2009a).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Austria addresses capacity building and beneficiary participation in
its humanitarian policy in multiple ways. Austrian Humanitarian Aid
Policy highlights that “the creation of greater prevention and self-help
capacities in the target country is enhanced by transferring know-how
and strengthening local structures,” (ADC 2009a, pp.18-19), and
includes building self-reliance as one of its goals (ADC 2009a). Austria
also recognises the need for rehabilitation, reconstruction and disaster
prevention to be integrated in humanitarian aid (ADC 2009a). Furthermore,
Austria encourages working with local partners in order to strengthen local
capacities; however, organisations must be accredited before they can
receive funding, as Austria considers that the accreditation process can
increase organisations’ capacity. Austria stresses the need to consider
the environment before and after crises (ADC 2009a).

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Austria’s humanitarian policy addresses coordination on many
fronts: nationally, within Austria, internationally, as well as with host
governments, civil society organisations and the affected population
(ADC 2009a). Internationally, Austria’s humanitarian policy highlights
the important role OCHA plays in coordination, and also notes its
participation in the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre
(EADRCC), the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the EU Monitoring and
Information Centre (MIC) (ADC 2009a). Austria’s humanitarian policy also
emphasizes the need to coordinate before a crisis occurs (ADC 2009a).
ADC uses initial UN needs assessments and reviews international
situation reports and funding appeals to inform its decisions (ADC
2009a). Austria provides un-earmarked funds to UN agencies, the EU,
and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (ADC 2009a).

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PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

International humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law are
addressed in Austria's development policy, but do not seem to be
given the same attention in Austria’s humanitarian aid policy, with the
exception of human rights, which is addressed in the Human Rights
Manual Guidelines for Implementing a Human Rights Based Approach in
ADC (ADA 2010). Austria recognizes that “impartiality is an essential
prerequisite for access to the affected civilian population on all sides of
a conflict and for the safety and security of humanitarian personnel in the
field," (ADC 2009a, p.14). Austria stresses that the military should be
used as a last resort, yet acknowledges its use to gain access in certain
situations: "The coordination of civil and military activities is vital and
should be designed to ensure and safeguard access by aid organizations
to the affected population," (ADC 2009a, p.19). Austria highlights the
need to protect refugees and the displaced (ADC 2009a).

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

ADA has a quality assurance and knowledge building unit, which can
evaluate the content and operational aspects of humanitarian projects
and programmes (ADC 2009a). Austria’s policy regarding accountability
and transparency is not clear.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/AUSTRIA

#077

RECOMMENDATIONS
<RENEW
COMMITMENT TO
ACCOUNTABILITY
Austria has significant room for
improvement in relation to its support
for and participation in learning and
accountability initiatives. Austria
does not participate in any of the
humanitarian accountability initiatives
included in the indicator1 and its
funding of accountability initiatives 2 is
also low: Austria allocated 0.1% of its
humanitarian funding to this, compared
to the OECD/DAC average of 0.4%.

<ENHANCE
SUPPORT
FOR UN AND
RC/RC APPEALS,
COORDINATION
AND SUPPORT
SERVICES AND
POOLED FUNDS
Austria received the fifth-lowest score
of the OECD/DAC donors for Funding UN
and RC/RC appeals, which measures
the extent to which donors provide their
fair share3 of funding to UN and Red
Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals,
coordination and support services and
pooled funds. Austria scores well below
average in all the components that
comprise this indicator.

<LOOK FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE
SOLUTIONS TO
CHANNEL MORE
FUNDING TO NGOS
Austria channelled little funding to
NGOs â&#x20AC;&#x201C; only 2.5% of its humanitarian
aid. This places Austria among the
donors that channel the least funding
to NGOs, well below the OECD/DAC
average of 15.3%. Austria could
consider flexible working models to
increase its funding to NGOs, such
as arranging shared management
agreements with other donors, or
supporting consortiums.

<IMPROVE
FLEXIBILITY WHILE
STRENGTHENING
PROGRAMME
MONITORING
Austria provided the vast majority
of its funding with earmarking: only
9.0% of its humanitarian funding was
provided without earmarking, placing
it below the OECD/DAC average of
33.2% and the Group 2 average of
15.2%. This would seem to indicate
that Austria should review the
flexibility of its funding.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/BELGIUM

#078

BELGIUM

P5

HRI 2011
Ranking

P4

P2

5.51

P1

4.10

ASPIRING
ACTORS

5.74

13th

Group 3

OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

7.2
7

7
4.1

5.09

P3
HUMANITARIAN
AID

0.64%

7.8%

of GNI

US $22

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
DRC 15

Food 13
Protection 8

Sudan 8

Agriculture 13

UN 70
Coordination 5

NGOs 13

Pakistan 8

Infrastructure 5

BY
CHANNEL

BY
SECTOR

Shelter 4

Red Cross /
Red Crescent 11

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

Haiti 7

Health 3

Un-earmarked 33

Afghanistan 6

Other 4

oPt 4

Other 5
Not speciﬁed 44

POLICY

GENDER RATING

FUNDING

STRENGTHS
Pillar Type Indicator

Score

Others 19

FIELD PERCEPTION

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

4

Facilitating safe access

6.19

+21.4%

5

Funding and commissioning evaluations

1.00

-75.8%

5

Appropriate reporting requirements

8.35

+17.9%

5

Participating in accountability initiatives

1.81

-59.6%

1

Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies 8.11

+17.5%

2

Funding international risk mitigation

2.84

-40.6%

1

Independence of aid

+11.3%

5

Accountability towards beneﬁciaries

2.87

-33.6%

1

Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies 6.52

-19.0%

8.24

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Belgium ranked 13th in the HRI 2011, a major improvement from
its 18th place ranking in 2010, largely due to significantly higher
scores in the quantitative indicators compared to 2010. Based
on the patterns of its scores, Belgium is classified as a Group 3
donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to have more
limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system at the
field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the sector.
They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the area
of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific
geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and Spain.
Belgium’s overall score was below the OECD/DAC average, and also
slightly below the Group 3 average. Belgium scored below the OECD/

DAC and Group 3 averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 4
(Protection and international law), where it scored below the OECD/
DAC average, yet above the Group 3 average. Belgium received its
lowest overall score in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners).
Belgium did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators
on Facilitating safe access, Appropriate reporting requirements,
Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies and Independence
of aid. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on
Funding and commissioning evaluations, Participating in accountability
initiatives, Funding international risk mitigation, Accountability towards
beneﬁciaries and Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies. Overall,
Belgium scored significantly higher on the qualitative, survey-based
indicators than on the quantitative indicators.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/BELGIUM

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AID DISTRIBUTION
In 2010, Belgium’s Official Development Assistance
(ODA) comprised 0.64% of its Gross National Income
(GNI), up from 0.55% in 2009, yet slightly short of its
prior pledge of 0.7% by 2010. Humanitarian assistance
represented 7.8% of its ODA, or 0.049% of its GNI.
Belgium’s sector-specific funding focused on food,
agriculture and protection.
According to data reported to the United Nations (UN)
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’
(OCHA) Financial Tracking Service, Belgium channelled

70.0% of its 2010 humanitarian assistance to UN
agencies, 13.5% to non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), 11.0% the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement
and 1.6% to private organisations and foundations.
In 2010, Belgium provided humanitarian assistance
to 11 crises in Africa - especially the Great Lakes
region, which is prioritised in Belgium’s 2006 Strategy
Plan - six crises in Asia and three in the Americas. The
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pakistan and Sudan
received the greatest amount of funding in 2010.

POLICY FRAMEWORK
The Directorate-General for Development Cooperation
(DGDC), under the Department of Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, manages
Belgium’s humanitarian aid. Belgium has recently
undergone restructuring whereby most humanitarian
assistance now falls under the DGDC with the aim
of enhancing opportunities for cooperation with
development programmes (OECD/DAC 2010). The
1999 Law on Belgian International Cooperation limits
the number of partner countries to 25 (Government
of Belgium 2011b). With the exception of food aid,
which is governed by the 1999 London Food Aid
Convention, Belgium’s current policy is largely based
on a 1996 Royal Decree. All funding to NGOs is subject
to the decree and must be project-based, with limited
implementation periods, and undergo an extensive
approval process. Funding to UN agencies and the Red

Cross/Red Crescent Movement, however, generally
does not encounter the same restrictions. The 2006
Strategic Plan for Humanitarian Aid has been able to
overcome some of these obstacles. In addition, the
Royal Decree has been circumvented to a certain extent
by the creation of the Belgian First Aid and Support
Team (B-FAST) and increased funding to pooled funds,
such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)
(OECD/DAC 2010). Belgium is currently drafting a new
humanitarian aid strategy, which has the potential to
accelerate the positive changes already underway in its
humanitarian policy framework (Government of Belgium
2011a). Belgium currently has field presence in 18
partner countries where programmes are monitored by
relevant Belgian embassies' development cooperation
attachés and are often implemented by Belgian
Technical Cooperation (BTC).

HOW DOES BELGIUM’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Both Belgium’s 2006 Strategic Plan and its draft humanitarian strategy
contain a number of cross cutting issues, including gender (OECD/DAC
2010). The draft humanitarian strategy emphasises the importance of
mainstreaming gender and Belgium’s intention to financially support gendersensitive approaches in humanitarian situations. Belgium also prioritises
sexual reproductive health and rights and has developed a national action
plan to ensure implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on
women, peace and security (Government of Belgium 2009).

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PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Belgium recognises the importance of a principled, needs-based
approach to humanitarian assistance. Its draft humanitarian aid
strategy reaffirms Belgium’s commitment to humanitarian principles,
including the importance of needs-based humanitarian action, while also
acknowledging its limitations to do so due to its comparatively small size.
Therefore, Belgium intends to focus on geographic and thematic areas
such as the Great Lakes region, food security and protection (Government
of Belgium 2011a). Belgium acknowledges the importance of timeliness
but is hampered by the limitations of the Royal Decree (DBEO 2008,
DBEO 2009). Belgium endeavours to enhance the timeliness of its
support by maintaining B-FAST, its rapid response unit and by providing
flexible and core funding to multilateral organisations (DBEO 2008 and
Government of Belgium 2011a).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Belgium’s previous humanitarian policies have highlighted the need
to mainstream environmental issues, although this is absent from
its draft humanitarian strategy (OECD/DAC 2010 and Government of
Belgium 2011). The need for disaster risk reduction and linking relief,
rehabilitation and development are expressed in Belgium’s current
humanitarian policy, but do not form an integral part thereof as a
result of the Royal Decree. This is due to the fact that the decree limits
the funding of local capacity building and action by local NGOs. For
similar reasons, Belgium is also restrained from promoting disaster
preparedness (OECD/DAC 2010). However, the draft humanitarian
strategy could bring about significant progress in these issues, as
it emphasises the importance of beneficiary participation and local
capacity building (Government of Belgium 2011a).

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Flexibility and multi-year funding are limited by the Royal Decree, although
Belgium has been able to circumvent this to an extent by providing core
funding with limited earmarking for multilateral organisations and by
contributing to pooled funds, such as the Central Emergency Response
Fund (CERF) (OECD/DAC 2010 and DBEO 2008). The draft humanitarian
strategy continues this approach, in addition to narrowing the number
of NGO framework partnerships with the aim of increasing flexibility
and predictability. Belgium recognises the leading role of UN agencies,
particularly OCHA, for the coordination of the humanitarian system
(Government of Belgium 2008).

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/BELGIUM

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PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Belgium’s current humanitarian policy makes little mention of protection
and international law, although they are addressed to a greater extent
in the draft humanitarian strategy, which contains a thematic focus on
protection, particularly that of children. The same strategy mentions
the importance of international humanitarian law (IHL), refugee law and
human rights, in addition to specific UN resolutions, as establishing the
international legal framework for humanitarian aid. Belgium intends to
advocate against breaches of IHL, and for the security of aid workers and
increased humanitarian space (Government of Belgium 2011a).

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Belgium’s draft humanitarian strategy lays out plans to provide
additional funding to projects and international efforts that build
knowledge, particularly in relation to standards. It also affirms its
commitment to supporting initiatives such as the Sphere Project and
views international standards as an important means to increase
transparency (Government of Belgium 2011a). Belgium has its own
“Special Development Cooperation Evaluation Unit” (DBEO), which
conducts independent evaluations of Belgium as a donor. These
evaluations have previously called for an increase in transparency and
accountability, as well as a greater focus on evaluations (DBEO 2008
and DBEO 2009), which are reflected in the draft humanitarian strategy.
It stresses the importance of applying different methods of evaluation,
both internally and for partners (Government of Belgium 2011a), as well
as the need for upward and downward accountability.

Field organisations do not consider Belgium to be strong in ensuring
gender-sensitive approaches are integrated in programming. The country
received low marks in this regard; some asserted that gender did not
seem to be on its agenda.

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Belgium received some of its highest qualitative scores in Pillar 1. The
vast majority of Belgium’s field partners felt that its humanitarian aid
was neutral, impartial and independent, although a few considered
that “Belgium is very much influenced by their politics” and that
“Belgium places a high economic conditionality on aid”, but they were
in the minority. Organisations in the field held slightly more mixed
views regarding Belgium’s verification that programmes respond to
changing needs. For example, one organisation praised Belgium,
as its “director of cooperation visited Haiti for two weeks, traveling
everywhere in the country […] There was a will to understand the
needs and see what projects other donors were funding and learn
from their experience.” Another agency in a different country reported,
however, that Belgium “just checks reports”, while its other donors
engaged in monitoring visits.

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Belgium’s scores were relatively low in the qualitative indicators that
make up Pillar 2. Field perceptions in this pillar were lowest regarding
Belgium’s support for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction,
followed by beneficiary participation.

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

In Pillar 3, Belgium’s field partners were largely positive regarding
the flexibility of the country’s funding. One organisation noted that
Belgium is “generally accommodating for change”. Most partners also
considered that Belgium has sufficient capacity and expertise to make
appropriate decisions. They were more critical in relation to Belgium’s
support for partners’ organisational capacity and for coordination.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/BELGIUM

#084

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

In Pillar 4, Belgium’s partners found it to be somewhat weaker in
issues related to advocacy, both for protection of civilians and toward
governments and local authorities. Facilitating safe access and security of
humanitarian workers, on the other hand, was found to be a “top priority”.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

In Pillar 5, Belgium received one of its highest scores for the
appropriateness of its reporting requirements. One organisation
highlighted that Belgium was also “generally accommodating with
common reporting mechanisms.” Field organisations were much more
critical, however, regarding requirements to ensure accountability
toward affected populations and the transparency of Belgium’s funding
and decision-making.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/BELGIUM

#085

RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are
based on data from 2010. It remains
to be seen how Belgium's new policy
will influence these issues.

<RENEW
COMMITMENT TO
ACCOUNTABILITY
Belgium has room for improvement
in its commitment to accountability.
Although Belgium financially supports a
number of humanitarian accountability
initiatives, it received one of the lowest
scores of the OECD/DAC donors for
its participation in accountability
initiatives.1 Its partners also report
that Belgium could do more to ensure
accountability toward beneficiaries at
the field level, as Belgium received
the lowest score for this qualitative
indicator. It appears this will be
addressed in Belgium’s new strategy,
but Belgium would do well to followup with field partners to ensure
mechanisms for accountability are
properly integrated into programmes.

<ENHANCE USE
OF EVALUATIONS
Belgium received the third-lowest
score for Funding and commissioning
evaluation, which measures the number
of joint and individual evaluations
commissioned and the existence of an
evaluation policy. Belgium has not yet
formalised an evaluation policy and has
only commissioned one joint evaluation
and two individual evaluations (publicly
available) over the past five years.
This appears to support the findings
of Belgium’s DBEO, which called for a
greater focus on evaluations.

< CONTINUE
PROGRESS
UNDERWAY TO
IMPROVE TIMELINESS
Belgium has improved substantially the
timeliness of its funding to complex
emergencies. In 2009, it provided only
4.4% of its funding within the first three
months following a humanitarian appeal,
while in 2010 it provided 51.4% during
this time frame, compared to the OECD/
DAC average of 59.4%. It has also
improved significantly the speed of its
response to sudden onset emergencies,
but still has room for improvement. In
2009, Belgium provided 14.9% of its
funding within the first six weeks of
sudden onset disasters. In 2010, it
provided 65.2% of its funding within this
period, though it is still below the OECD/
DAC average of 80.5%.

<ENHANCE
SUPPORT FOR
PREVENTION,
PREPAREDNESS,
RISK REDUCTION AND
RECONSTRUCTION
Belgium’s support for prevention,
preparedness, risk reduction and
reconstruction is fairly weak. Its funding
for prevention and reconstruction
comprised 13.7% of its humanitarian
aid, while its OECD/DAC peers provided
an average of 18.6%. Similarly, its
funding for international risk mitigation
mechanisms represented only 0.55% of
its ODA, below the OECD/DAC average
of 0.77%. Belgium’s field partners seem
to confirm this, rating Belgium below
average for its support for prevention,
preparedness and risk reduction.

<ENSURE
AID MEETS THE
DIFFERENT NEEDS
OF WOMEN, MEN,
BOYS AND GIRLS
Although Belgium’s policy highlights
the importance of gender, its partners
indicate the need for greater emphasis on
gender-sensitive approaches and followup to ensure it is properly integrated into
humanitarian programmes.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

#086

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/CANADA

CANADA

P5

HRI 2011
Ranking

P4

P2

5.47

P1

4.40

LEARNING
LEADERS

6.16

14th

Group 2

OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

6.8
1

3
4.4

4.79

P3
HUMANITARIAN
AID

0.33%

12.2%

of GNI

US $18

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
Un-earmarked 21

Food 29

Health 6
UN 69

Pakistan 17

Coordination 5

Red Cross /
Red Crescent 17

WASH 3
Mine action 3
Agriculture 2

BY
CHANNEL

BY
SECTOR

Sudan 7

Others 7

NGOs 12

Not speciﬁed 44

POLICY

Pillar Type Indicator

oPt 4
Chad 2
DRC 2

FUNDING

STRENGTHS
Score

5

Implementing evaluation recommendations 5.26

2

Beneﬁciary participation

5.57

2

Strengthening local capacity

1

Timely funding

Haiti 30

Afghanistan 6

Other 1

GENDER RATING

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

FIELD PERCEPTION

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

Others 12

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

+22.7%

5

Funding accountability initiatives

0.45

-89.1%

+16.1%

2

Funding reconstruction and prevention

1.48

-66.9%

6.65

+15.1%

2

Reducing climate-related vulnerability

1.54

-61.8%

7.47

+6.8%

3

Un-earmarked funding

2.02

-61.1%

1

Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies 6.50

-19.3%

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Canada ranked 14th in the HRI 2011, improving one position from
2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Canada is classified
as a Group 2 donor, “Learning Leaders”. Donors in this group are
characterised by their leading role in support of emergency relief
efforts, strong capacity and field presence, and commitment to
learning and improvement. They tend to do less well in areas such
as prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction efforts. Other
Group 2 donors include the European Commission, France, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
Overall, Canada’s performance is below the OECD/DAC and Group
2 averages. Canada scored below the OECD/DAC average in all
pillars, with the exception of Pillar 4 (Protection and international
law), where it was above both the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages.

Canada was also slightly above its peer group average in Pillar
2 (Working with humanitarian partners), but below the Group 2
average in Pillars 1 (Responding to needs), 2 and 5.
Canada did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the
indicators on Implementing evaluation recommendations,
Beneﬁciary participation, Strengthening local capacity and
Timely funding to partners – all qualitative indicators. Its scores
were lowest in indicators on Funding accountability initiatives,
Funding reconstruction and prevention, Reducing climate-related
vulnerability, Un-earmarked funding and Timely funding to sudden
onset emergencies – all quantitative indicators. In fact, overall
Canada scored significantly higher on the qualitative, survey-based
indicators than on the quantitative indicators.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/CANADA

#087

AID DISTRIBUTION
Canada’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)
comprised 0.33% of its Gross National Income (GNI) in
2010. Humanitarian assistance represented 12.2% of
its ODA and 0.04% of its GNI (OECD 2010).
According to data reported to the United Nations (UN)
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’
(OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in 2010 Canada
channelled 69.1% of its humanitarian funding to the

UN system, 12.7% to non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), and 16.8% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent
Movement. Canada destined 7.0% of its humanitarian
aid to the Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF). In
2010, Haiti, Pakistan and Sudan received the greatest
amount of assistance. Canada responded to 39
emergencies in 2010: 15 in Africa 13 in Asia, eight in
the Americas and three in Europe (OCHA FTS 2010).

POLICY FRAMEWORK
The Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA), under the Minister of International Cooperation,
is responsible for managing Canada’s development
and humanitarian programming. The Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) develops
its humanitarian policy and coordinates the response
to natural disasters when a whole-of-government
response is required, while the International
Humanitarian Assistance Directorate (IHA), within
CIDA, manages Canada’s operational response to
humanitarian crises in developing countries (DFAIT
2011b). The Disaster Assistance Response Team
(DART) of the Canadian military may also be deployed
to provide emergency health and water services
for up to 40 days (National Defence 2005, DFAIT
2011b). Other government departments, such as the
Department of National Defence and the Privy Council
Office, may also participate in operational coordination

mechanisms when a whole-of-government approach is
required (CIDA 2011a).
Canada lacks a comprehensive humanitarian policy
document, but has been one of the leading members
of the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles
group, and has a GHD Domestic Implementation Plan.
This plan called for a humanitarian assistance policy,
which was drafted and consulted with Canadian
NGOs, but ultimately not formalised (CCIC 2009). CIDA
published the Guidelines for Emergency Humanitarian
Assistance Project Proposals and Reports, revised in
2006, and includes the main principles that guide its
humanitarian policy on its website (CIDA 2011b). CIDA
currently has 49 field offices to respond to development
and humanitarian needs in partner countries. Canada’s
Aid Effectiveness Action Plan 2009-2012 foresees
increasing its field presence and delegating greater
authority to field offices.

HOW DOES CANADA’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Canada expresses a firm commitment to gender-sensitive approaches
in humanitarian and development policies, and gender is a cross-cutting
theme in all programmes. CIDA’s revised Policy on Gender Equality (2010)
emphasises Canada’s commitment to gender equality and outlines how
to incorporate a gender-sensitive approach in all programmes (CIDA
2010). The Gender Equality Action Plan (2010-2013) lays out goals
for Canada’s gender-sensitive policies, and calls for an annual report

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regarding progress on gender equality measures in CIDA’s work (CIDA
2010). Partners must include sex and age disaggregated indicators in
funding proposals and reporting, and CIDA encourages the inclusion
of gender-sensitive policies (CIDA 2006). The integration of gender
into humanitarian aid is guided by CIDA’s toolkit, Gender Equality and
Humanitarian Assistance: A Guide to the issues (CIDA 2003), and the
results of gender equality institutional assessments CIDA has conducted
of its main multilateral partners. Its Framework for Assessing Gender
Equality Results also serves as a tool to measure partners' commitment
to gender equality, and was the first of its kind to be released by an OECD
country (CIDA 2010). Canada has supported the Gender Standby Capacity
(GenCap) project to mainstream gender into humanitarian response (CIDA
2011c). Most significantly, 2011 will see the start of Canada’s action
plan for the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions regarding
women, peace and security (CIDA 2011a).

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

CIDA expresses a firm commitment to timely, impartial, independent aid
that adapts to changing needs (CIDA 2011b). Canada relies on multiple
sources for needs assessments, including those of the UN Disaster
Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC), calling on its embassies
and offices abroad for additional information (DFAIT 2011a). Its
Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team (ISST) provides expert analysis
in humanitarian situations to support relief efforts (Parliament of Canada
2011). CIDA has expressed its commitment to provide funding to improve
needs assessment tools (CIDA 2011a). With the aim of providing timely
aid to crisis situations, Canada is a strong supporter of the CERF and has
vowed to increase its funding of pooled mechanisms (CIDA 2011b), and
accepts abridged proposals from pre-approved NGOs (CIDA 2006). The
2007 DAC Peer Review also states that Canada regularly contributes to
the Canadian Red Cross Emergency Disaster Assistance Fund, created to
provide a speedy response in times of crisis (OECD/DAC 2007).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Canada requires beneficiary participation in the design, implementation
and monitoring of humanitarian programmes; participation in evaluation,
however, is not mentioned in Canada’s humanitarian guidelines (CIDA
2006). Funding proposals must include an environmental impact
assessment, beneficiary participation assessment and strive to build
local capacity (CIDA 2006). Canada also places importance on disaster
risk reduction (DRR) and prevention and preparedness measures and
has signed the Hyogo Framework for Action (DFAIT 2011a). Canada has
supported preparedness initiatives to increase emergency response
capacity as well as capacity to monitor and prepare for hazards (CIDA
2011c). Furthermore, Canada has supported projects for training, capacitybuilding and policy support geared toward prevention, preparedness and
DRR (DFAIT 2011a). Canada also places importance on conflict prevention,
and DFAIT´s Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) manages

CIDA commits to provide flexible and predictable funding to humanitarian
organisations and to support the coordination and organisational capacities
of their partners (CIDA 2011b). Canada has recently taken a series of steps
to ensure its funding is more flexible and predictable. As part of its Aid
Effectiveness Action Plan, Canada untied 100% of its food aid budget in 2008
(CIDA 2009). Canada also provides multi-year funding to the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the CERF (CIDA 2011a). In addition,
Canada supported the Policy Action Group for Emergency Response (PAGER),
which is intended to enhance policy and operational dialogue among NGOs,
the Canadian Red Cross and the Canadian government.

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

CIDA asserts that protection of civilians, promotion of international
humanitarian law (IHL), facilitation of access to affected populations and
safety of humanitarian workers are priorities for Canada’s humanitarian
efforts (CIDA 2006). Apart from funding organisations with a protection
mandate, Canada has continuously supported the Protection Standby
Capacity (ProCap) project, which supports the strategic and operational
protection response of UN agencies (CIDA 2011c). CIDA’s Funding
Guidelines state that it will fund proposals that seek to improve the
protection and security of the affected population or the dissemination
of refugee law and IHL (CIDA 2006). Canada works with humanitarian
organisations to improve training and equipment with the aim of
supporting the safety of aid workers (DFAIT 2011c). Additionally, Canada
has endeavoured to secure extra funding to support security measures
in particularly unstable crises (DFAIT 2011c). The Ofﬁcial Developmental
Assistance Act (2008) requires all Canadian ODA to be provided in line
with international human rights standards.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

CIDA has recently taken steps to improve the accountability and
transparency of its funding (CIDA 2009). Canada requires all NGOs
to perform evaluations of their humanitarian assistance, and CIDA
manages the evaluation of programmes it implements directly. As part
of the Ofﬁcial Development Assistance Accountability Act (2008), CIDA
publishes a yearly report to Parliament on its programmes, budgets,
and progress on overarching policy goals. Furthermore, all humanitarian
projects funded by CIDA are published on an online database, “Project
Browser”. Canada commits to continue participating in initiatives like

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/CANADA

#090

the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP)
and to provide leadership in groups like the Multilateral Organizations
Performance Assessment Network. In 2011, CIDA announced its intention
to strengthen the independence of its evaluations by bringing in more
outside expertise and conducting more joint evaluations of country-level
programmes (CIDA 2011a). Following a disaster requiring a whole-ofgovernment response, DFAIT convenes an interdepartmental meeting to
identify actions to improve future responses (DFIAT 2011a).

FIELD PARTNERS’ PERCEPTIONS
CANADA'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 65
0 1 2

3

4

5

6

7

8

7.65

PILLAR 1

Neutrality and impartiality

6.55

Independence of aid

6.27

Adapting to changing needs

7.47
6.65

Strengthening local capacity

5.57
5.71

Beneﬁciary participation
Linking relief to rehabilitation and development

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

9 10

OECD/DAC average score 6.05

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/CANADA

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HOW IS CANADA PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?
PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Canada’s partners held mixed views regarding the neutrality, impartiality
and independence of its aid. Many organisations reported that Canadian
aid was “very dependent” on other political, economic or military
interests. In particular, multiple organisations reported that CIDA
frequently established “no-go” or “no-engagement” policies with certain
groups or regions which prevented aid from going where it was needed
most. Organisations interviewed held mixed views over Canada’s efforts
to ensure the programmes it supports adapt to changing needs. For
example, one interviewee asserted that “CIDA doesn't really care,” and
another noted that “CIDA is disengaged with us, they don't have a real
presence here” to be able to verify these details. On a more positive
note, organisations appreciated the timeliness of Canada’s funding.
Some lauded Canada’s quick reactivity in making more aid available
when the humanitarian situation worsened; another reported that
Canada was “very good” in terms of timeliness.

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

In the field, Canada’s partners provided mixed reviews of beneficiary
participation. Some pointed to improvement, stating: “This has become
more and more important in the last few years. Now it's a requirement,”
and reporting that, contrary to the other donors, “Canada promotes
this.” Partners were impressed with CIDA's engagement with this issue
in the field, reporting that CIDA “sent a consultant that went with us to
the field,” and that “CIDA came in for a monitoring mission and even
organised focus groups with beneficiaries.” On the other hand, others
reported that beneficiary participation in monitoring and evaluation was
“promoted, but not required,” and many considered that “It's all just on
paper,” and a “tick-off-the-box” requirement. In terms of linking relief
to rehabilitation and development, NGOs reported that Canada was
unhelpful in this regard because it had very strict definitions of what
constituted “humanitarian” versus “development” aid and was unwilling
to finance the transition to the latter. For example, one interviewee
reported that Canada does not allow construction, which “hinders
sustainability,” while another revealed that “Canada considers livelihoods
recovery so they don’t want to finance that.”

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/CANADA

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

#092

Many organisations in the field felt that Canada was fairly flexible in its
funding. Interviewees stated that “Canada is excellent for funding fouryear plans!” that there was “flexibility within the log frame of the project,”
and that CIDA was “generally accommodating for change.” Canada
received significantly less favourable reviews in regards to its support of
its partners' organisational capacities, as organisations reported that
Canada does not finance this. Many NGOs had positive views of Canada’s
capacity to make appropriate decisions, though a few dissented. One
organisation complained that CIDA’s field representatives did not
participate sufficiently in decisions made at headquarters. On the other
hand, another reported that “CIDA has the capacity and experience, and
their decisions are appropriate towards the government’s policies.”

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Similar to many other donors, Canada’s field partners felt the country
was stronger in funding protection of civilians than in advocating for it. Its
efforts in advocating toward local authorities to fulfill their responsibilities
in response to humanitarian needs was also somewhat weaker, according
to field partners, although some pointed to improvement in this area.
In one crisis, an NGO affirmed that CIDA “engages closely with the
humanitarian coordinator” and local authorities to this end. Partners
noted that Canada “requires an access strategy” of its partners, but
“does not facilitate it.”

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Canada’s partners were largely appreciative of its reporting
requirements, although one interviewee noted that “CIDA changes the
design and plans of their reporting forms too often.” Most interviewees
also praised the transparency of Canada’s funding, although a few
pointed to an interesting paradox. While CIDA is “extremely clear” about
who it funds, it is reportedly much less transparent about why it funds
them. An interviewee revealed they did not understand “why a specific
NGO is selected and another one isn´t...” and another stated that
“Canada at the capital level is completely inaccessible to us . . . we just
don't understand how decisions are taken and what goes on there.”
For other matters, however, several organisations lauded Canada’s
communication and transparency. Canada’s partners were much
more critical regarding accountability toward affected populations and
implementation of evaluation recommendations.

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RECOMMENDATIONS
<PROTECT
THE NEUTRALITY,
IMPARTIALITY AND
INDEPENDENCE OF
HUMANITARIAN AID
Canada should engage with its partners
to discuss practical measures to
ensure the neutrality, impartiality and
independence of its humanitarian aid.
This is especially important in crises
with counter-terrorism operations
underway and in crises where Canada
adopts integrated approaches. Canada’s
partners reported that no-contact
policies are inhibiting aid from reaching
those most in need. In particular,
partners considered Canada’s aid to be
less neutral, impartial and independent
in Somalia, the occupied Palestinian
territories (oPt) and Colombia.

<RENEW
COMMITMENT TO
ACCOUNTABILITY
Consistent with the HRI 2010, Canada
received its lowest score of the index
in Funding accountability initiatives,
an indicator which measures financial
support for humanitarian accountability
initiatives. 2 In 2009, Canada allocated
0.09% of its humanitarian aid to these
initiatives, and dropped to 0.04%
in 2010. Canada’s Group 2 peers
allocated an average of 0.2% to these
initiatives. Similarly, Canada received
its second-lowest qualitative score
for Accountability toward beneﬁciaries,
indicating that Canada should review
its practices related to accountability
toward beneficiaries and consider
increasing its support for humanitarian
accountability initiatives.

<ENHANCE
SUPPORT FOR
PREVENTION,
PREPAREDNESS,
RECONSTRUCTION
AND EFFORTS
TO REDUCE
VULNERABILITY
In Pillar 2, Canada scored slightly above
average for its support for international
risk mitigation mechanisms, but received
low scores for Funding reconstruction
and prevention and Reducing climaterelated vulnerability, indicating the
need to place greater importance on
preventing and preparing for future
crises. In 2009, Canada allocated 14.1%
of its humanitarian aid to prevention,
preparedness and reconstruction, but
dropped to 5.9% in 2010, placing it
well below the OECD/DAC average of
18.6%. Regarding climate vulnerability,
Canada provided only 36.3% of its fair
share3 to Fast Start Finance, which
supports climate change mitigation
and adaptation efforts, compared to
the OECD/DAC average of 102.4%.
Furthermore, Canada has fallen short on
its commitments to reduce emissions.

< CONSIDER
EXPANDING CURRENT
MEASURES TO
EXPEDITE FUNDING
Canada has improved significantly the
timeliness of its funding to complex
emergencies. In 2009, it provided
only 14.4% of its funding within the
first three months of a humanitarian
appeal. In 2010, it gave 49.3% within
this time frame. Canada’s funding to

sudden onset disasters has become
slower, however. Although Canada was
particularly strong in responding quickly
to sudden onset disasters in 2009, it
was below average in 2010, providing
65.0% of its funding within the first six
weeks of a disaster, compared to the
OECD/DAC average of 80.5%. Canada’s
partners seem to confirm this, rating
the country below average for the
timeliness of its funding. Canada’s
policy of accepting abridged proposals
from pre-approved organisations is
highly positive. Canada would do well
to consider engaging with a greater
number of organisations prior to
the onset of emergencies to enlarge
this programme.

<IMPROVE
FLEXIBILITY
BUT MAINTAIN
PROGRAMME
MONITORING
Canada received one of its lowest
scores in Un-earmarked funding.
Canada’s partners seem to confirm
this, rating Canada below average for
the flexibility of its funding. In 2009,
Canada provided 15.2% of its funding
without earmarking, but dropped to
12.1% in 2010. The OECD/DAC average
was 33.2%. Canada should review the
flexibility of its funding and consider
taking advantage of its Policy Action
Group for Emergency Response (PAGER)
to discuss this issue with its partners.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/DENMARK

#094

DENMARK

7.9
0

2
7.6

P4

P2

5.35

PRINCIPLED
PARTNERS

7.12

6.95

2nd

Group 1

OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

P1

P5

HRI 2011
Ranking

7.49

P3
HUMANITARIAN
AID

0.90%

6.2%

of GNI

US $32

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
Food 11

NGOs 28

Sudan 11

Un-earmarked 39

Not speciﬁed 49
Protection 9

Red Cross /
Red Crescent 11

BY
CHANNEL

Other 6

Haiti 11

BY
SECTOR

Coordination 6

Pakistan 9

Education 5

Private orgs 2
Govts &
inter-govt orgs 2

oPt 6

Infrastructure 5
UN 51

GENDER RATING

Health 4
Shelter 4
Other 7

POLICY

Pillar Type Indicator

Score

5

Funding accountability initiatives

5

Afghanistan 5
Somalia 4

FUNDING

STRENGTHS

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

FIELD PERCEPTION

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

Others 16

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

10.00

+143.1%

2

Funding reconstruction and prevention

3.01

-32.9%

Participating in accountability initiatives

9.44

+111.1%

1

Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies 7.64

-5.2%

3

Funding NGOs

8.40

+85.3%

4

Facilitating safe access

4.94

-3.0%

5

Funding and commissioning evaluations

7.59

+83.4%

1

Adapting to changing needs

6.12

-2.4%

3

Funding UN and RC/RC appeals

7.21

+77.3%

5

Appropriate reporting requirements

7.01

-1.1%

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Denmark ranked 2nd in the HRI 2011, dropping one position from
2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Denmark is classified as
a Group 1 donor, “Principled Partners”. This group is characterised
by its commitment to humanitarian principles and strong support
for multilateral partners, and generally good overall performance in
all areas. Other Group 1 donors include Finland, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.
Denmark’s overall score was above the OECD/DAC and Group
1 averages. Denmark scored above the OECD/DAC and Group
1 averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillars 2 and 3. In
Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery) Denmark scored
above the OECD/DAC average, yet below the Group 1 average.

Similarly, in Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners) Denmark
scored above the OECD/DAC and slightly below the Group 1
average. Denmark’s performance stands out in Pillar 5 (Learning
and accountability), where it scored well above both the OECD/
DAC and Group 1 average scores.
Denmark did best compared to its peers in the indicators on
Funding accountability initiatives, Participating in accountability
initiatives, Funding NGOs, Funding and commissioning evaluations and
Funding UN and RC/RC appeals - all quantitative indicators. Its scores
were relatively the lowest in Funding reconstruction and prevention,
Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies, Facilitating safe access,
Adapting to changing needs and Appropriate reporting requirements.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/DENMARK

#095

AID DISTRIBUTION
Danish Official Development Assistance (ODA)
increased from 0.88% of Gross National Income (GNI)
in 2009 to 0.90% in 2010. Humanitarian assistance
represented 6.2% of Denmark’s ODA in 2010, or
0.056% of its GNI.
According to data reported to the United Nations
(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011),
Denmark channelled 51.0%, of its 2010 humanitarian
aid to United Nations (UN) agencies (2011), 27.7% to
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 11.0% to the
Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 1.8% to private

organisations and foundations and 0.8% bilaterally to
affected governments. Denmark contributed 3.8% of
its total humanitarian aid to the Central Emergency
Response Fund (CERF), 3.2% to Common Humanitarian
Funds and 2.2% to Emergency Response Funds. In
2010, Denmark supported a total of 29 emergencies:
16 in Africa, 11 in Asia and two in the Americas. The
top three countries receiving Danish humanitarian aid
in 2010 were Sudan, Haiti and Pakistan. Sectorally,
Denmark concentrated its funding on food and
protection, human rights and rule of law initiatives
(OCHA FTS 2011).

POLICY FRAMEWORK
Denmark’s humanitarian aid is managed by the Danish
International Development Agency (Danida) and the
Department of Humanitarian Assistance and NGO
Co-operation, both of which fall under the umbrella of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Denmark’s 2002
Strategic Priorities for Humanitarian Assistance lays
out overarching guidelines for Denmark’s humanitarian
action and the Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action
2010-2015: Addressing Vulnerability, Climate Change, and

Protection Challenges sets forth specific objectives for
the coming years. The strategy intends to address current
challenges to humanitarian aid and outline Denmark’s
approach, key directions and priorities that will be used
to translate the strategy into action. Danish embassies
coordinate humanitarian aid, often for multiple crises in
the region. Embassies in Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan
and Namibia are especially involved in overseeing
humanitarian efforts in their regions (MFA 2011).

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HOW DOES DENMARK’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Danish humanitarian policy states that gender equality and the
empowerment of women are essential components of Denmark’s
efforts to reduce vulnerability in areas of conflict and disasters (MFA
2009). By working with a broad range of partners, the MFA attempts
to mainstream gender-based violence prevention into all humanitarian
action (MFA 2009). Its policy also actively supports the implementation
of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.
Furthermore, in October 2010, the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs
and the Danish Minister for Development Cooperation, in cooperation
with the American Embassy, hosted a high-level conference on the "Role
of Women in Global Security" (MFA 2011).

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Denmark’s humanitarian policy shows a strong commitment to
administering timely aid along the lines of neutrality and impartiality, with
a focus on the most vulnerable populations (MFA 2009). Denmark states
that funding will be provided to partners who can provide the fastest
relief in emergency situations. Furthermore, Denmark commits to engage
in dialogue with partners on how to strengthen focus on vulnerability,
including marginalised groups, displaced people and persons with
disabilities. A small reserve fund is made available annually through
Danish embassies for rapid response activities (MFA 2009).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Denmark’s policy, Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action 2010-2015:
Addressing Vulnerability, Climate Change and Protection Challenges, lays
out its commitment to prevention, risk reduction and recovery. The
2002 Strategic Priorities for Humanitarian Assistance also highlights the
importance of disaster and conflict prevention in humanitarian efforts.
Danida aims to implement the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015
into its humanitarian and development initiatives, while identifying,
assessing and monitoring disaster risks and enhancing early warning
(MFA 2009). Furthermore, Denmark developed Guidelines for Disaster Risk
Reduction in Danish Development and Humanitarian Assistance in 2007,
providing specific objectives and plans to integrate disaster risk reduction
through Denmark’s aid. Denmark considers beneficiary participation in
programming a priority when selecting humanitarian partners (MFA 2009).
A new development policy, Freedom from Poverty – Freedom to Change,
was put in place in 2010 and calls for greater integration between
humanitarian and development activities (MFA 2010).

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PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

In its 2010-2015 humanitarian strategy, the MFA recognises that it can
only achieve its humanitarian objectives by working closely with a range
of different partners. With the aim of increasing funding predictability and
operational flexibility, Denmark has entered into Partnership Framework
Agreements with UN agencies and a range of humanitarian NGOs with indepth knowledge and experience in specific areas (MFA 2009). Denmark
has also expressed its continued support for OCHA.

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Denmark’s humanitarian strategy states that protection of civilians should
be based on the global framework of international humanitarian law, human
rights law, refugee law and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
The MFA also pledges to strengthen its use of humanitarian diplomacy as
an active tool for humanitarian access to people at risk (MFA 2009). By
working with EU partners and other relevant forums, Denmark attempts
to improve access to vulnerable populations and increase the safety of
humanitarian aid workers, especially national staff (MFA 2009). In terms of
advocacy, Denmark seeks to increase its own efforts and encourage other
donors and organisations to do the same by engaging in dialogue with
international actors, governments, authorities and other parties.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

As a supporter of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP)
standards, Denmark’s humanitarian policy advocates for accountability
toward affected populations (MFA 2009). In an effort to enhance learning,
the MFA states that it will establish partnerships with research institutions
that can assist in promoting learning and innovation within the humanitarian
community (MFA 2009). Implementation of Denmark’s humanitarian strategy
will be subject to independent mid-term review in 2012 and evaluation in
2015 (MFA 2009). The MFA affirms that its funding for humanitarian partner
organisations is based on a set of transparent selection criteria (MFA 2009).

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

HOW IS DENMARK PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?
PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Field partners were largely positive regarding the neutrality, impartiality,
independence of Denmark’s humanitarian assistance. Most partners
reported that Denmark provides funding on time and that responding to
needs is a priority. “For Danida, the priority is the community and how the
project is addressing their needs,” stated one organisation.

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#099

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Pillar 2 encompasses many of Denmark’s lower scores when compared
to its overall qualitative average. In general, all donors scored lower on
the qualitative indicators on Strengthening local capacity, Beneﬁciary
participation, and Prevention and risk reduction, and Denmark is no
exception. Nevertheless, Denmark’s scores were better than most.
“Denmark scores the highest in my opinion,” stated one organisation,
after describing a Danida project that was implemented with a local
womens group. Other organisations reported that Denmark requires a
local capacity assessment before and after programme implementation.
Another stated that Denmark requires partners to show that
programmes do not contribute to the conflict and to take measures to
avoid putting beneficiaries in potentially harmful situations.

Field partners consider that Denmark is a flexible donor, supportive of
coordination and with the capacity and expertise to make appropriate
decisions. Perceptions were less positive regarding Denmark’s support
for organisational capacity in areas like preparedness, response and
contingency planning. While one interviewee criticized the lack of
support in this area, another reported that Denmark provides funding
for training and emergency stocks.

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

According to field partners, Denmark is highly supportive in relation to
providing funding for protection. Feedback was less positive, however,
regarding the country’s engagement in advocacy for protection, as well
as toward local authorities, perhaps because several organisations noted
that Denmark relies on the European Union to carry out this function.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Field interviews indicate that Denmark’s partners regard highly its
practices in terms of transparency and reporting. “Danida’s reporting
requirements are a little stricter and the design is better than
most,” responded one representative. Another organisation added
to this by stating that Denmark makes efforts to clearly explain
reporting procedures. In general, most donors received low scores for
Implementing evaluation recommendations and Accountability toward
beneﬁciaries. Denmark, in comparison, stood out for some field
partners. One noted, “Danida scores off the charts in this category,”
commenting on the country’s efforts to work with partners to implement
evaluation recommendations.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/DENMARK

#100

RECOMMENDATIONS
<ENHANCE
SUPPORT FOR
PREVENTION,
PREPAREDNESS,
RISK
REDUCTION AND
RECONSTRUCTION
Denmark’s partners rated the country
highly for its support for prevention,
preparedness and risk reduction.
It also received one of the best
scores of the OECD/DAC donors for
the quantitative indicator, Funding
international risk mitigation. However,
similar to most of its Group 1 peers,
Denmark received a low score for
the quantitative indicator, Funding
reconstruction and prevention. This was
also one of Denmark’s weaknesses
in 2009, when it allocated 12.8% of
its humanitarian aid to reconstruction
and prevention. In 2010, it dropped
to 12.0%, while OECD/DAC donors
allocated an average of 18.6% of
humanitarian aid to these issues.

<EXPLORE
OPTIONS TO
EXPEDITE FUNDING
TO SUDDEN ONSET
EMERGENCIES
Denmark is the second-fastest donor
to respond to complex emergencies,
but could improve the timeliness of its
funding to sudden onset emergencies.
This indicator measures the percentage
of funding provided within the first six
weeks following the disaster. Denmark
provided 76.4% of its funding within
this time frame, compared to the
OECD/DAC average of 80.5% and the
Group 1 average of 84.1%.

<LOOK FOR WAYS
TO IMPROVE
MONITORING
OF PROGRAMMES
Denmark scored slightly below average in
Adapting to changing needs, a qualitative,
survey-based indicator regarding
donor verification that programmes
adapt to changing needs. Its scores
were especially low in Kenya and
Somalia. It received a higher score in
Pakistan, where it has field presence
and is a member of the International
Humanitarian Partnership. Denmark also
received a fairly good score in Sudan,
despite not having field presence. It
should endeavor to improve monitoring to
ensure consistently that the programmes
it supports adapt to changing needs.

<ENHANCE
SUPPORT FOR
HUMANITARIAN
ACCESS AND
THE SAFETY OF
HUMANITARIAN
WORKERS
Despite Denmark’s strong policies
regarding humanitarian access and safety
of humanitarian workers, its partners
scored the country below average on
this indicator. Its score was substantially
lower in Pakistan and substantially higher
in the occupied Palestinian territories.
Denmark should engage in dialogue
with its partners to discuss the reasons
behind the variation and strive to support
humanitarian access and the safety of
humanitarian workers consistently.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/EUROPEAN COMMISSION

#101

6.40

6.22

P2

P4

7th

P1

6.9
3

1
6.5

5.09

EUROPEAN
COMMISSION

P5

HRI 2011
Ranking

5.93

P3

Group 2

LEARNING
LEADERS

HUMANITARIAN
AID

13.0%
of ODA

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
Coordination 14
UN 41

Sudan 13

WASH 9

Pakistan 14

Haiti 9

Health 16
Agriculture 6

Red Cross /
Red Crescent 11

BY
CHANNEL

Inter-govt orgs 5

Un-earmarked 7

BY
SECTOR

Shelter 6

DRC 4

Protection 5

Other 2

Infrastructure 3
Others 3
NGOs 41

Pillar Type Indicator
Funding NGOs

5

Other African
countries 25

FUNDING

STRENGTHS
Score

FIELD PERCEPTION

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

Others 20

oPt 4
Niger 4

Not speciﬁed 21

POLICY

GENDER RATING

3

Food 17

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

10.00

+120.5%

3

Un-earmarked funding

0.48

-90.7%

Participating in accountability initiatives

9.86

+120.4%

1

Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies 5.35

-33.5%

5

Funding accountability initiatives

6.78

+64.9%

1

Timely funding to complex emergencies

6.51

-17.7%

5

Implementing evaluation recommendations 5.81

+35.5%

3

Flexibility of funding

5.97

-13.9%

4

Facilitating safe access

+28.5%

5

Appropriate reporting requirements

6.60

-6.9%

6.55

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
The European Commission (EC) ranked 7th in the HRI 2011, dropping
one position from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, the EC
is classified as a Group 2 donor, “Learning Leaders”. Donors in this
group are characterised by their leading role in support of emergency
relief efforts, strong capacity and field presence, and commitment
to learning and improvement. They tend to do less well in areas
such as prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction efforts. Other
Group 2 donors include Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the
United States.
The EC’s overall score is above the OECD/DAC and Group 2
averages. The EC scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 2

averages on all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 1 (Responding to
needs), where it scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 2 averages.
In all pillars, the EC scores significantly higher in the qualitative,
survey-based indicators than in the quantitative indicators.
The EC did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators
on Funding NGOs, Participating in accountability initiatives, Funding
accountability initiatives, Implementing evaluation recommendations
and Facilitating safe access. Its scores were relatively the lowest in
indicators on Un-earmarked funding, Timely funding to sudden onset
emergencies, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Flexibility of
funding and Appropriate reporting requirements.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/EUROPEAN COMMISSION

#102

AID DISTRIBUTION
Humanitarian assistance represented 13% of the
European Commission’s (EC) Official Development
Assistance (ODA) in 2010.
According to data reported to the United Nations (UN)
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’
(OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), in
2010, the EC channelled 41.5% of its humanitarian aid
to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 41.1% to

UN agencies, 10.9% to the Red Crescent/Red Cross
Movement, 4.9% to intergovernmental organisations and
0.9% to private organisations and foundations. The EC
provided humanitarian assistance to a total of 76 crises
in 2010: 30 in Africa, 26 in Asia and 13 in the Americas,
five in Europe, and two in Oceania. Pakistan, Sudan and
Haiti received the largest amount of assistance in 2010.

POLICY FRAMEWORK
The EC’s humanitarian aid is managed by the DirectorateGeneral for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG
ECHO). ECHO is supported by contributions from 27 EU
member states and is complementary to the countries’
individual allocations for humanitarian assistance. The
European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid specifically
highlights the importance of gender-sensitive approaches,
and ECHO operates under a mandate laid out in European
Council Regulation No. 1257/96, through EC Budget Title
23. Additional humanitarian funding come from both the
budget line for emergency aid to African-Carribbean-Pacific
countries within the European Development Fund and
from an Emergency Aid Reserve, which allows funds to be
rapidly allocated to unanticipated crises. ECHO’s current

humanitarian policy is outlined in the 2007 European
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, its corresponding
Consensus Action Plan (2008) and Mid-term review of the
European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid Action Plan
(2010) and an annual strategy document. ECHO has also
developed sectoral policies for its humanitarian aid. The
EC places great importance on humanitarian aid, and to
this end, appointed a Commissioner solely for this purpose
(European Commission 2010a, p.3). ECHO maintains 50
field offices: 22 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 17 in Asia, five
in the Middle-East & North Africa, four in Latin America/
Caribbean, and two in Europe. Humanitarian assistance
represented 12.00% of the European Commission’s
Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2010.

HOW DOES DOES THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S
POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

The EC has committed to systematically consider gender and women’s
different needs and promote their active participation (European
Commission 2008). It also acknowledges, however, that “it has
supported specific projects on an ad hoc basis, without developing a
gender policy” (European Commission 2008). The European Consensus
on Humanitarian Aid specifically highlights the importance of gendersensitive approaches, and ECHO foresaw the creation of gender policy
for humanitarian aid at the end of 2010, but it has not been published
as of yet. ECHO conducted a Review of Gender Issues Including Strategies
Against Gender-Based Violence in Humanitarian Interventions in 2009.
Additionally, the European Commission stated, “DG ECHO will continue to
work on a systematic framework for dealing with gender issues in general
and sexual violence in particular. The issue will be mainstreamed in
regional response strategies where necessary,” (2010a, p.6).

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PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

ECHO has developed a Global Needs Assessment and Forgotten Crisis
Assessment as tools to allocate funding. The Global Needs Assessment
uses a vulnerability index to identify the most vulnerable countries and
a crisis index to identify countries experiencing humanitarian crises
(European Commission 2010b). Maintaining adequate funding especially
for protracted crises is considered a key challenge in the Mid-term
Review of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid Action Plan
(European Commission (2010c). The EC expresses a firm commitment to
humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, including for its civil
protection forces (European Council, European Parliament and European
Commission 2007). ECHO also affirms that military forces should only
be used as a last resort to maintain the neutrality and independence
of humanitarian action (European Council, European Parliament and
European Commission 2007). With regards to the timeliness of funding,
“ECHO uses ‘primary emergency decision’ which is a unique tool that
allows the Commission to provide funds of up to €3 million almost
immediately (a decision must be adopted within 72 hours of the event
that provoked the crisis),” (Europa 2007, p.5).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

ECHO supports disaster risk reduction (DRR) through the creation
of its Disaster Preparedness ECHO (DIPECHO) programme and the
development of a related policy, the EU Strategy for Supporting
Disaster Risk Reduction in Developing Countries 2009, which describes
its intention to support community-based preparedness activities,
mainstream DRR into humanitarian and development aid, engage in
advocacy and provide funding for this purpose (Commission of the
European Communities 2009). To address transitional activities, the
EC uses the Instrument for Stability, which allows for a rapid financial
response while linking short-term crisis response and long term
development assistance (European Council, European Parliament
and European Commission 2007, p.10). The Mid-term Review states
that participatory approaches increase local ownership, strengthen
local capacity, and increase the effectiveness and appropriateness of
humanitarian response (European Commission 2010c). This document
also acknowledges that "there remains scope for consolidating
collective EU efforts and strengthening individual donor commitment on
some key challenges including a stronger commitment to promoting the
role of local actors," (European Commission 2010c, pp. 5-6).

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PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

The EC underscores the need for flexible humanitarian funding.
ECHO has a Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement with
multiple UN agencies and Framework Partnership Agreements with
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC),
and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (European
Commission 2011). The EC highlights its responsibility to coordinate
on multiple fronts, and unique role in uniting European countries.
The EC also affirms its support for OCHA and encourages “broad
participation in and flexible use of ‘the Cluster Approach,’” (European
Council, European Parliament and European Commission 2007, p.6).
Additionally, ECHO highlights its permanent field presence as a means
of coordination (European Council, European Parliament and European
Commission 2007, pp.7-8).

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

The EC considers international humanitarian law (IHL) a priority and
provides funding to partner organisations with this mandate (European
Commission 2010a). The EC expresses its concern for the decreasing
respect for IHL, as it limits access to vulnerable populations and
increases security risks for humanitarian workers (European Council,
European Parliament and European Commission 2007, p.1). In 2009,
the European Commission published Humanitarian Protection: DG
ECHO’s funding guidelines regarding funding and monitoring protectionrelated humanitarian projects. Humanitarian aid and civil protection
are the responsibility of the same Commission department and
Commissioner but have separate strategy documents (European
Commission 2010a, p.3). The Mid-term Review points to progress
toward “ensuring full complementarity and maximum synergies
between traditional humanitarian aid approaches and the use of civil
protection expertise and assets,” (European Commission 2010c, p.4)
and lists the advantages of civil protection resources, while stating
the risk of compromising humanitarian principles through collaboration
with civil protection forces. Access is a defining criterion in selecting
implementing partners (European Council, European Parliament and
European Commission 2007, p.6). Refugee law is not specifically
highlighted in ECHO's humanitarian policy, and human rights are only
briefly addressed as a related policy field.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

The European Commission reports that it is required “to regularly
assess humanitarian aid operations financed by the Community in
order to establish whether they have achieved their objectives and
to produce guidelines for improving the effectiveness of subsequent
operations," (European Commission 2010d). ECHO conducts evaluations
of its operations, as well as evaluations on a thematic basis and of its

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partnerships. The European Commission states that “accountability and
transparency vis a vis the… ultimate beneficiary is ensured by the process
of setting priorities, providing humanitarian aid, reviewing and refocusing
areas for funding as necessary, and ceasing activities when appropriate,”
(2010a). Additionally, “accountability, including reporting transparently
on results” is listed as a defining criterion for selecting implementing
partners (European Council, European Parliament and European
Commission 2007, p.6). The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid
states that humanitarian aid should be based on minimum standards
of assistance and protection and that partners should adhere to the
same standards (European Council, European Parliament and European
Commission 2007). Additionally, ECHO reaffirms its commitment to
jointly assess the implementation of the Principles of Good Humanitarian
Donorship as well as Good Humanitarian Partnership (European Council,
European Parliament and European Commission 2007, p.24).

EC/ECHO's efforts to ensure programmes integrate gender-sensitive
approaches received mixed feedback from field partners. Some
organisations seem to consider it a requirement on paper that is not
taken as seriously as it should be. For example, one interview felt that
it “is not an imperative demand from ECHO at all.” Another noted that
they “ask us for gender approaches in our proposals, but they never
verify it. It's not a real gender policy, they just target women because of
their vulnerability, like the handicapped, but it’s not that important.”

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Similar to most donors, the European Commission’s field partners
gave high marks for its performance in Pillar 1. Field partners largely
consider its humanitarian aid neutral, impartial and independent. One
organisation stated, “ECHO is the least restrictive donor in contexts
dealing with non-state actors, like in oPt and Somalia,” a sentiment
many others shared. Another expressed appreciation for EC/ECHO
taking a stand to support humanitarian principles. Its partners are also
highly positive regarding EC/ECHO’s efforts to ensure the programmes
it funds adapt to changing needs, although a few felt it could be “too
interventionist” in internal decisions. Feedback was mostly positive
regarding the timeliness of funding, although there were a few reports
of delays: “ECHO funding is not on time. Even big NGOs are in trouble…
up to four months delay in implementation.”

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Compared to other donors, the EC/ECHO performed well in the
qualitative indicators that comprise Pillar 2. However, it encompasses
some of the EC’s lowest qualitative scores. Some of the EC/
ECHO’s field partners provided negative feedback of its support
for transitional activities: “ECHO has a very big barrier between
development and humanitarian,” and “[they] don't adapt the
response to actual needs now. It's time to assure transition to
development.” Feedback on beneficiary participation was mixed. On
the one hand, some organisations praised EC/ECHO for ensuring
beneficiary participation: “they [other donors] ask us for it but they
never verify it. ECHO, however, is more demanding on beneficiary
participation,” and “with the exception of ECHO, no donor prioritizes
beneficiary participation.” Another organisation, however, observed
that “ECHO's requirement on beneficiary participation is limited to the
implementation stage,” though partner organisations held differing
opinions in this regard. Others reported greater interest in beneficiary
participation in monitoring and evaluation.

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PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Partner organisations expressed appreciation for the EC/ECHO’s
capacity and expertise. “Their knowledge of the context is great,”
affirmed one interviewee. Another noted that EC/ECHO “comes
and speaks with you… and provides you with knowledge from other
contexts.” In fact, EC/ECHO received the highest score of all donors
for this, and also its second-highest qualitative score. Partners also
praised EC/ECHO’s support for coordination. One organisation indicated
that EC/ECHO “tries to go beyond its limits” and participates in “weekly
coordination meetings with all actors, information sharing and is involved
in the field's mechanisms.” Feedback was more critical regarding the
flexibility of funding and support for organisational capacity in areas like
preparedness, response and contingency planning: “ECHO does not
support strengthening of organisational skills.”

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Partners in the field were mostly positive regarding support for protection.
One organisation observed that it has changed over time: “ECHO has
evolved significantly the support they provide for protection of civilian
activities. Originally they refused to fund protection activities and now
they do.” In comparison, partner feedback was less positive for its
advocacy for protection – a trend common to many donors. Field partners
generally gave high marks for EC/ECHO’s efforts to obtain access: “they
support the UN access team which is very useful for NGOS,” although
several disagreed. One interviewee considered that “ECHO could do more
in terms of humanitarian space in buffer zone and Gaza restricted areas,”
and another added “ECHO does not support humanitarian access.”

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

EC/ECHO received some of its lowest scores for Accountability toward
beneﬁciaries and Implementing evaluation recommendations¸ although
it outperformed other donors in these indicators. When asked about
requirements for accountability toward beneficiaries, one interviewee
asserted that “ECHO is more dynamic, has more imagination to
include beneficiaries' voices in its programmes.” In Somalia, however,
one organisation reported that they “do not require accountability
to beneficiaries. They just audit the funds but do not go beyond.”
Perceptions of the appropriateness of reporting requirements were
mixed. Here, EC/ECHO scored below most donors on this indicator,
yet close to the average of its qualitative scores. Most organisations
agreed that EC/ECHO had highly meticulous reporting requirements. The
disagreement lied in whether this level of rigor was appropriate. Some
organisations complained of “onerous reporting requirements which lose
sight of the core humanitarian mandate,” while others considered that
“ECHO could simplify the reporting requirements, but they are right in
being so strict,” and “if all donors were like ECHO, the system would work
better, but we would need one person for reporting only.”

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RECOMMENDATIONS
<IMPROVE
FLEXIBILITY
AND REPORTING
EC/ECHO is considered a strong donor
with the best capacity and expertise
of the OECD/DAC donors. However,
feedback from partners and data in
the quantitative indicators suggest
that it could improve in the several
administrative areas, such as flexibility
of funding and reporting requirements.
For example, EC/ECHO’s partners
rated it poorly for the flexibility of
funding. The related quantitative
indicators seem to confirm this, as
EC/ECHO received the lowest score
of the OECD/DAC donors for Unearmarked funding, which measures
the percentage of humanitarian
funding provided without earmarking to
ICRC, UNHCR, WFP, OHCHR, UNICEF,
IFRC, OCHA and UNRWA. EC/ECHO
provided 2.9% of its humanitarian
funding without earmarking to
these organisations in 2010, less
than in 2009, when it gave 3.4%
without earmarking and well below
the OECD/DAC average of 33.2%.
Furthermore, partners consider EC/
ECHO’s reporting requirements to be
among the most rigorous. While they
disagreed over whether or not this was
appropriate, even those organisations
that appreciated the meticulousness
affirmed that at least one staff
member was required to dedicate
their time to comply with EC/ECHO’s
reporting requirements.

<ENSURE
COHERENCE
BETWEEN EC AND
ECHO TO SUPPORT
TRANSITIONAL
ACTIVITIES
Some partners indicated difficulty
linking relief to rehabilitation and
development, though it appears to
vary according to the crisis. EC/ECHO
obtained its lowest scores for this in
Somalia and Pakistan, where partners
reported that transitional activities fell
in a gap outside of ECHO’s mandate,
which did not facilitate a continuum of
funding with the EC to ensure these
activities were covered.

<EXPLORE
OPTIONS TO
EXPEDITE FUNDING
DISBURSEMENT
EC/ECHO could improve the timeliness
of its funding. It provided 53.5% of its
funding within the first six weeks of
sudden onset emergencies in 2010,
while the OECD/DAC average was
80.5%. Timely funding to sudden onset
emergencies was a former strength
of the EC/ECHO in the 2009, but its
funding for complex emergencies
has been slower in 2010. The EC/
ECHO provided 48.8% of its funding to
complex emergencies within the first
three months of a humanitarian appeal,
making it the slowest of its group
whose average is 64.0%.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Finland ranked 9th in the HRI 2011, improving two positions from
2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Finland is classified as a
Group 1 donor, “Principled Partners”. This group is characterised by
its commitment to humanitarian principles and strong support for
multilateral partners, and generally good overall performance in all
areas. Other Group 1 donors include Denmark, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.
Overall, Finland scored above the OECD/DAC average, yet below the
Group 1 average. Compared to OECD/DAC donors, Finland scored
above average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 3 (Working

with humanitarian partners) and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability).
It was below the Group 1 average in all pillars, except for Pillar 4
(Protection and international law), where it was above average.
Finland did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators
on Funding reconstruction and prevention, Refugee law, Accountability
towards beneﬁciaries, Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies
and Advocacy for protection of civilians. Its scores were relatively the
lowest in the indicators on Participating in accountability initiatives,
Prevention and risk reduction, Timely funding to complex emergencies,
Adapting to changing needs and Strengthening local capacity.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

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AID DISTRIBUTION
Finnish Official Development Assistance (ODA) increased
slightly from 2010 as a proportion of its Gross National
Income (GNI): rising from 0.54% in 2009 to 0.55% in
2010. Humanitarian assistance represented 19.6% of its
2010 ODA, or 0.061% of its GNI.
According to data reported to the United Nations (UN)
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’
(OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Finland
channelled 70.4% of its 2010 humanitarian aid to United

Nations (UN) agencies, 18.0% to the Red Cross/Red
Crescent Movement and 9.2% to non-governmental
organisations (NGOs). Finland also supported the
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and Common
Humanitarian Fund (CHF). In 2010, Finland supported
31 crises with humanitarian assistance: 15 in Africa,
12 in Asia and four in the Americas. Pakistan, Haiti and
Sudan received the largest percentages of Finland’s
humanitarian aid in 2010.

POLICY FRAMEWORK
The Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, within
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), manages
Finland’s humanitarian assistance. In April 2007,
the government published a revised humanitarian
policy based on the Principles of Good Humanitarian
Donorship (GHD). These Humanitarian Assistance
Guidelines strongly emphasize the need to focus on
the most vulnerable communities in both disasters and
armed conflicts (MFA 2007). Humanitarian assistance
falls within the development budget and is allocated

by the Department for Development Policy. Finland
intends to allocate 70% of its humanitarian funding
early in the year, and the remaining funds in the final
quarter to respond to humanitarian needs assessed
by field representatives or humanitarian agencies in
respective countries of crisis. Aid decisions are based
on individual proposals from partner organisations,
which state the target groups, plans and estimated
costs for providing aid. The MFA also retains a small
reserve to respond to sudden onset emergencies.

HOW DOES FINLAND’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Finland’s humanitarian policy recognizes the importance of a
comprehensive inclusion of gender awareness in all of its humanitarian
activities. It particularly points out that women’s special needs must
be addressed in crises situations and that women must be guaranteed
the right to participate actively in humanitarian decision-making.
Finland also supports the active implementation of UN Security Council
Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security in all humanitarian
operations, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently announced that
it will triple its funding to UN Women (MFA 2011).

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Finland’s humanitarian policy, Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines, states
that it will adhere to the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality,
neutrality and independence when administering humanitarian aid
(MFA 2007). It also emphasises the need to focus on least developed

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countries and the poorest and most vulnerable within these countries.
The policy also promotes ways in which Finnish NGOs and experts
can participate in programmes funded by the European Commission’s
Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) that
focus on forgotten and underfunded crises. Finland seeks to improve the
timeliness of its funding by supporting pooled funding mechanisms, such
as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

According to its humanitarian policy, Finland aims to promote disaster
prediction and preparedness by supporting international initiatives for
disaster risk reduction such as the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015.
Finland’s policy stresses that local communities have the right to participate
in every phase of humanitarian action, especially in sudden-onset disasters.
The Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines state that Finland will link relief to
rehabilitation and development (LRRD) within its humanitarian initiatives and
that beneficiary participation in programming will be essential to this process
(MFA 2007). Both Finnish humanitarian and development policies recognise
the dangers of climate change, especially in already vulnerable countries,
and call for greater international attention to the issue (MFA 2007).

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Finland’s Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines express support for
coordination among humanitarian actors (MFA 2007). Given Finland’s
relatively small field presence and limited capacities, the Finnish MFA
supports the UN’s central role in coordination efforts and strongly
encourages its partners to participate in sectors or clusters to avoid
gaps or duplication of efforts. Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines also
emphasise the importance of flexibility of humanitarian aid (MFA 2007).
Finland bases its decision making on recommendations from humanitarian
agencies in the field and states that it will enhance dialogue and exchange
of information with UN agencies and other donors, and increase visits to
headquarters and field offices to consult with workers in crisis areas.

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Finland bases the legal framework of its humanitarian policy on the
fundamentals of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.
It cites the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its protocols as the most
important source for international humanitarian law. The Humanitarian
Assistance Guidelines state that Finland is currently working to promote
coordination between European Union (EU) civil protection mechanism and
the UN in humanitarian operations in developing countries; however, no
specific steps are mentioned (MFA 2007). Finland also expresses its support
for OCHA’s approach in the use of military and civilian defence assets in
disaster relief, as well as the Oslo Guidelines for the use of military assets
in humanitarian action. It is not clear from Finland’s humanitarian policy if it
engages in advocacy toward local authorities, or delegates this to the EU.

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PILLAR 5
Finland’s The Humanitarian Assistance Guidelines highlight the need to
further develop its monitoring and evaluation capacities (MFA 2007).
Harmonising reporting requirements is also a stated objective for Finland,
and its policy mentions the need to increase the country’s research in
humanitarian aid. However, Finland’s official policy on transparency of
funding and accountability towards beneficiaries is not clear.

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

10

8.22
8.24

Neutrality and impartiality

SOURCE: DARA

9

OECD/DAC average score 6.05

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HOW IS FINLAND PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

Finland’s partners provided positive feedback regarding the country’s
support for gender-sensitive approaches. In fact, Finland received the
highest score of the OECD/DAC donors for this issue. An interviewee in
DRC praised Finland in particular for its support for gender.

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Finland’s field partners provided generally positive feedback regarding the
neutrality, impartiality and independence of the country’s humanitarian
assistance. “Given their relative small size they are more interested in
their humanitarian investment than other conditions,” observed one aid
worker. Organisations interviewed also praised the timeliness of Finland’s
funding: “Finland, especially, provides funding when most needed,”
stated one interviewee. Another reported that Finland responded rapidly
to the 2010 cholera outbreak in Haiti. Partners were more critical of
Finland’s efforts to ensure the programmes they support adapt to
changing needs, although a few pointed to occasional field visits from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and open dialogue as a means of monitoring.

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Similar to most donors, field perceptions were poor of Finland’s
support for local capacity, beneficiary participation and prevention,
preparedness and risk reduction. “Finland cannot verify beneficiary
participation because they are not in the field. They don’t require this in
their programming but they know we work with communities to identify
specific needs,” reported one organisation. Finland scored higher,
however, for its efforts to link relief with rehabilitation and development.

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

In Pillar 3, Finland stood out for the flexibility of its funding. “Finland is
totally flexible,” responded one organisation. Partners also appreciated
its support for coordination: “Finland stresses coordination, especially
through the cluster system,” stated another organisation. “They
distributed aqua tabs through the WASH [water, sanitation and hygiene]
cluster instead of giving them to a particular agency. This allowed them
to be distributed more efficiently.” Partners were more critical regarding
Finland’s capacity and expertise and its support for organisational
capacity in areas like preparedness, response and contingency planning.

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PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Finland’s field partners praised the country for its funding and advocacy
for protection, and advocacy toward local authorities. One organisation
reported that Finland is supportive of programmes with a strong
advocacy component. Feedback of Finland’s efforts to facilitate safe
access and security of humanitarian workers was more negative,
although one organisation noted that Finland requires an access
strategy in its project proposals.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

In Pillar 5, partner organisations largely seem to consider Finland’s
reporting requirements appropriate. Although it is one of Finland’s lower
scores, Finland is one of the better donors for ensuring accountability
toward affected populations. One partner described Finland’s
requirements to set-up accountability mechanisms in camps for the
displaced. Finland received one of its lowest scores on the qualitative
indicators on Implementing evaluation recommendations.

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RECOMMENDATIONS
<ACTIVELY
PARTICIPATE IN
HUMANITARIAN
ACCOUNTABILITY
INITIATIVES
Compared to other donors, Finland
does fairly well for ensuring
accountability toward beneficiaries in
the programmes it supports. It also
increased its funding of accountability
initiatives 2 from 0.07% in 2009 to 0.3%
in 2010. It could improve, however, its
participation in international initiatives
for humanitarian accountability. The
indicator Participating in accountability
initiatives measures the commitment
of OECD/DAC donors to six different
humanitarian accountability initiatives.1
Finland received the lowest score
of Group 1, as it is involved in only
one initiative, the International Aid
Transparency Initiative (IATI).

<CONTINUE
PROGRESS
UNDERWAY TO
IMPROVE TIMELINESS
Finland is the second-fastest donor to
respond to sudden onset disasters;
representing significant improvement
from 2009. It provided 55.1% of its
funding in the first six weeks following
sudden onset disasters in 2009 and
jumped to 94.3% in 2010. It received
the second-lowest score of its group,
however, for Timely funding to complex
emergencies, which measures the
percentage of funding that arrived within
the first three months after the launch
of an appeal. Finland provided 43.6% of
its funding within this time period, while
the OECD/DAC average was 59.4%.

<STRENGTHEN
SUPPORT FOR
PREVENTION,
PREPAREDNESS,
RISK REDUCTION,
BENEFICIARY
PARTICIPATION AND
CAPACITY BUILDING
With the exception of Linking relief
to rehabilitation and development,
Finland received low scores in the
qualitative, survey-based indicators
that comprise Pillar 2. Within this
pillar, Finland obtained its lowest
qualitative score for Prevention and
risk reduction. It is interesting to
note that Finland did fairly well in the
related quantitative indicators in this
pillar on Funding reconstruction and
prevention, Funding risk mitigation and
Reducing climate-related vulnerability,
perhaps because Finland’s policy
stresses support for initiatives aimed
at disaster risk reduction at the
international level. Partners seem to
indicate a lack of support in general
for prevention, preparedness and risk
reduction at the field level, however,
and minimal follow-up to verify
beneficiary participation and efforts
to strengthen local capacity. Finland
should engage in dialogue with its
partners to discuss their perceptions
of its support for these issues.

<ENSURE
PROGRAMMES
ADAPT TO
CHANGING NEEDS
Finland performed well in the
qualitative indicators of Pillar 1, with
the exception of Adapting to changing
needs. The survey question related
to this indicator refers to the donors’
efforts to verify that programmes
adapt to changing needs, which is
likely more difficult for Finland due to
its limited field presence. However,
a few partners highlighted Finland’s
efforts to compensate for this in Haiti
through field visits and open dialogue.
Finland should endeavour to replicate
this model in other crises and engage
in dialogue with its partners to discuss
their perceptions in this regard.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

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FRANCE

7.6
1

3
4.6

P4

P2

5.71

4.33

LEARNING
LEADERS

5.65

11th

Group 2

OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

P1

P5

HRI 2011
Ranking

5.09

P3
HUMANITARIAN
AID

0.50%

2.2%

of GNI

US $4

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
oPt 9

Food 29

NGOs 22

Health 6

UN 58

DRC 5

WASH 5

BY
CHANNEL

Pakistan 4

BY
SECTOR

Agriculture 4
Shelter 3

Governments 17

Not earmarked 19

Niger 6

Afghanistan 3

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

Others 6

Haiti 30
Not speciﬁed 48

Red Cross /
Red Crescent 4

Other African
countries 18
Others 5

POLICY

GENDER RATING

STRENGTHS
Pillar Type Indicator

FIELD PERCEPTION

FUNDING

Score

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

5

Funding and commissioning evaluations

9.97

+140.9%

3

Funding UN and RC/RC appeals

0.45

-88.9%

1

Timely funding to complex emergencies

9.84

+24.4%

5

Funding accountability initiatives

0.51

-87.7%

4

Facilitating safe access

6.15

+20.6%

2

Funding reconstruction and prevention

1.02

-77.1%

2

Strengthening local capacity

6.83

+18.2%

2

Funding international risk mitigation

2.91

-39.2%

2

Beneﬁciary participation

5.61

+16.9%

4

Refugee law

3.47

-38.3%

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
France ranked 11th in the HRI 2011, improving four positions from
2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, France is classified as
a Group 2 donor, “Learning Leaders”. Donors in this group are
characterised by their leading role in support of emergency relief
efforts, strong capacity and field presence, and commitment to
learning and improvement. They tend to do less well in areas such
as prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction efforts. Other
Group 2 donors include Canada, the European Commission, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
France’s overall score was below the OECD/DAC and Group 2
averages. Compared to OECD/DAC donors and its Group 2 peers,

France scored below average in all pillars, with the exception of
Pillar 1 (Responding to needs), where it scored above the OECD/
DAC and Group 2 averages.
France did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators
on Funding and commissioning evaluations, Timely funding to
complex emergencies, Facilitating safe access, Strengthening local
capacity and Beneﬁciary participation. Its scores were relatively the
lowest in indicators on Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, Funding
accountability initiatives, Funding reconstruction and prevention,
Funding international risk mitigation and Refugee law.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

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AID DISTRIBUTION
France’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a
proportion of its Gross National Income (GNI) rose to
0.50% in 2010, up from 0.46% in 2009. Humanitarian aid
represented 2.2% of its ODA in 2010, or 0.010% of its GNI.
According to data reported to the United Nations (UN)
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA)
Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in 2010 France channelled
57.2% of its aid to UN agencies, 21.4% to NGOs, 16.8%

to affected governments and 4.0% to the Red Cross /
Red Crescent Movement. France also contributed to the
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), representing
0.5% of its total assistance, and Emergency Response
Fund (ERF), with 5.0%. In 2010, France supported a total
of 38 emergencies: 17 in Africa, 17 in Asia, three in the
Americas and one in Europe (OCHA FTS 2011).

POLICY FRAMEWORK
France’s humanitarian assistance system has recently
undergone significant structural change. Three separate
agencies coordinate the French humanitarian effort,
all under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign and
European Affairs. The main agency is the Crisis Centre
(CDC), created in 2008, responsible for assessing
emergency situations and organising the initial response
and follow-up to humanitarian emergencies (MAEE
2011a). The CDC has access to the Humanitarian
Emergency Fund and the Aid Fund and provides
funding to French and international non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) (CDC 2011). It can also conduct
humanitarian action directly with its own 50-person
staff (CDC 2011). The United Nations and International
Organisations Department (UNIO) manages French
funding to UN agencies and to the Red Cross / Red
Crescent Movement. Finally, the General Directorate for
Globalization (DGM) coordinates contributions for food
aid (MAE 2011a). It is important to note that the French
Agency for Development (AFD) also has a Crisis and
Conflict Unit (CCC), which directs some prevention and
preparedness activities (AFD 2011). The coordination of
French humanitarian assistance is further complicated

by the fact that sub-national authorities in France can
also have their own aid programmes (OECD/DAC 2009).
France has humanitarian officials posted to some of
its embassies for field support and has a total of 55
country offices (OECD/DAC 2008, OECD/DAC 2009).
France does not have a comprehensive humanitarian
policy, but has endorsed the Principles of Good
Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). Several documents are
important for France’s general development policy; the
Development Policy: a French Vision Strategy (2011)
delineates France’s overarching goals (DGMDP 2011).
This document includes “crisis countries” as one of the
four possible partnerships for French aid; however, given
that the document does not provide a specific policy for
humanitarian action in these crisis countries, it is often
unclear if the general developmental policy outlined in
the document applies directly to crisis situations as
well (DGMDP 2011). The Cross-cutting Policy Document
(2011) presented to Parliament sets forth France’s aims
for its development policy for the next few years and in
a similar manner includes France’s activities in crisis
countries (Republic of France2011).

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HOW DOES FRANCE’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

France has a French strategy for gender equality (2010) with the aim
to “guarantee a cross-cutting approach to gender equality in all of the
policies, fields of intervention and instruments that characterize French
cooperation,” (DGMDP 2010). This action plan calls for the use of
OECD “gender markers” in France’s ODA, the use of gender-sensitive
indicators in evaluations, and the promotion and monitoring of gendersensitive programmes (DGMDP 2010). Though this document is mostly
limited to actions undertaken by the AFD, there are some measures
that overlap and apply to humanitarian assistance. Most notably,
France includes the appointment of “gender equality” correspondents
in embassies and specific training courses for MAEE officers concerning
gender equality (DGMDP 2010).

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Though there is no guiding humanitarian policy, the French Ministry’s
website declares that humanitarian aid should be guided by the principles
of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality. France has
adopted a leading role in dealing with fragile and highly vulnerable states.
In 2007, it revised its Fragile States and Situations of Fragility: France´s
Policy Paper (2007), which delineates special considerations to take in
regards to these states, including its “Fragilities Grid” - a tool to assess
vulnerability. In its Policy on Fragile States, France emphasizes the
importance of rapid response in sudden onset disasters and complex
emergencies (CICID 2007). To this end, France's Crisis Centre, on call day
and night, has access to the Emergency Humanitarian Fund. The Crisis
Centre can fund NGOs, multilateral organisations, or operations led by its
own group of experts and staff (CDC 2011).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

France has expressed a strong commitment to beneficiary participation
and building local capacity in its Aid Effectiveness Action Plan (MAEE
2006), although its application to humanitarian crises is not clear. Its
Policy on Fragile States emphasizes the importance of the transition
from relief to rehabilitation and calls for institutionalising links between
different players in the field to improve the transition to development
(CICID 2011). France’s Policy on Fragile States repeatedly underscores
the importance of conflict and disaster prevention, preparedness and
risk reduction (CICID 2007). This same policy declares that France
abides by the OECD/DAC Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile
States and guidelines on conflict prevention (CICID 2007). Finally,
France states that it will introduce a conflict prevention element into its
partnership frameworks (CICID 2007).

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PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

France’s Policy on Fragile States stresses the importance of flexible funding
for fragile states (CICID 2007). Special emphasis is given to the flexibility
of the Emergency Humanitarian Fund (EFH), now under the direct control
of the Crisis Centre (CICID 2007 and CDC 2011). The Interministerial
Commission for International Cooperation and Development (CICID)
is intended to coordinate development, security, peace-keeping and
humanitarian strategies (OECD/DAC 2009). The Crisis Centre also serves
to focus France’s emergency activities, and is attached to the Foreign
Ministry directly in order to better mobilise all actors (CDC 2011). France
states in its Fragile States Policy that its Fragility Grid is meant in large
part to increase coordination, as it provides French actors with the same
assessment of the field situation (CICID 2007). Additionally, the Centre
organises meetings with French NGOs to discuss security or cross-cutting
issues to further increase coordination among French actors (CDC 2011).
In terms of coordinating with non-French actors, the French Vision states
that in crisis management, “effective coordination between widely differing
public and private players” is key, and highlights France’s cooperation with
the European Union (DGMDP 2011).

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlights the importance of international
humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law in its humanitarian
action (MAEE 2011b). This includes access to affected populations and
the safety of humanitarian workers, as well as a clear commitment to
the protection of civilians (MAEE 2011b). The Crisis Centre states that it
“supports and coordinates the action of NGOs by organising meetings to
develop discussion on humanitarian issues and meetings that are more
theme-based or related to the security of teams in the field,” (CDC 2011).
France’s policy on advocacy toward local authorities is not clear.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

In the Aid Effectiveness Action Plan, France called for the creation of crosscutting evaluations of all instruments, countries, and sectors, and for the
analysis and assessment of the effectiveness of the Framework Partnership
Documents. The 2008 DAC Review confirms that evaluations of humanitarian
aid are conducted mid-term and at the end of the project, programme
or crisis response, and for cross-cutting themes (2008). The Ministry of
Foreign and European Affairs (MAEE) carries out evaluations of all bilateral
and multilateral aid, including humanitarian efforts, often hiring external
consultants to do so. To increase transparency, the 2006 Institutional Act
of Financial Legislation Law requires the Foreign Ministry submit a report to
Parliament detailing all budget costs and aid flows for each year. France is
also part of the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network
(MOPAN) which aims to monitor the performance of multilateral organisations
(OECD 2009). Accountability towards beneficiaries is included in France’s
Aid Effectiveness Plan for the implementation of the Paris Declaration (MAEE
2006), but the policy for humanitarian assistance is unclear.

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

HOW IS FRANCE PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

Partner organisations reported that France’s efforts regarding gender are
lacklustre and “all rhetoric”. Implementing partners stated that France
“doesn´t know what [it] wants in terms of gender,” and that that it does
not “have a real gender approach strategy,” or “a means for verifying
gender is actually been taken into account.” Another interviewee revealed
that the French gender strategy is developed far from the field without
taking into account field constraints; this results in systems like gender
quotas for staff, which can be difficult to implement in some crises.

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PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

France scored lower than most donors for the independence of its
humanitarian assistance. One organisation declared: “The CDC always
has a political interest . . . When they intervene, it is for political
reasons.” The timeliness of its funding was similar – again France
scored below most donors yet above its qualitative average score. One
interviewee called the French “proactive” in this respect, and another
mentioned that though France had a set calendar for funding it was
accessible to the staff of its partner organisations. Some implementing
partners would still like to see a quicker response time, reporting that the
funding process could take a long time.

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

In Pillar 2, field partners were particularly critical of France’s support
for Prevention and risk reduction. According to its partners, however,
incorporating the reinforcement of local capacity in programmes is one
of France’s strengths. Partner organisations praised France’s efforts
in cooperating with and building local authorities’ capacities, and
in asking for verification of this component through reports from its
partners. Feedback was somewhat less positive regarding beneficiary
participation, though France still outperformed its peers. Partner
organisations report that beneficiary participation in programme
design and implementation “has become more important over the
past two years,” though they also report there is more emphasis on
beneficiary participation in the implementation stage than in the design
stage. Some interviewees considered that beneficiary participation
in monitoring and evaluation is the weakest, where France reportedly
encourages participation but does not verify.

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

France’s partners generally praised its commitment to providing flexible
funding, stating: “They don't even ask for justification,” and that French
funding is “totally flexible”. However, France received significantly
lower scores than its peers on this indicator. In terms of coordination,
humanitarian organisations in the field pointed out several impressive
aspects of the French system. One revealed that there was “real
synergy” among France, European Commission’s Directorate-General
for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) and a pooled funding
mechanism, emphasising that France consulted ECHO for information
on its funding before making decisions on its own funding to avoid
duplication of efforts. Another interviewee stated that France “has a
steering committee that includes all of their partners to follow up on
the action.” Overall, it seems that interviewees appreciated France’s
knowledge of the crises, stating that it has “the right expertise and
experience to make good decisions at the right moment.” Partners were
more critical of France’s limited support for their organisational capacity.

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PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Partner organisations reported that France does fairly well in regards to
protection and international law in the field. One organisation confirmed that
France took measures to advocate for central governments to fulfill their
responsibilities in response to humanitarian needs. Interviewees stressed
the importance France places on protection, describing the protection of
civilians as “an entry point in the implementation and design of projects
for the CDC.” Regarding France’s efforts for the security of humanitarian
workers, some organisations underscored that France is cautious in terms
of security: one interviewee reported that France, “doesn’t want you to go
where there’s insecurity,” and that security “is a great priority... [France
wants] to go everywhere, but only if security is assured.”

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

According to its field partners, France does not do enough to ensure
accountability to affected populations. One organisation declared the
“CDC does not understand what accountability is. They try but there
is no translation of the word in French.”4 Partner organisations also
reported that the French system for implementing recommendations from
evaluations was “very weak”. Interviewees would also like to see greater
transparency of France’s funding. Many organisations complained that
France’s funding mechanisms are “impossible to understand,” or that
France is “not so transparent . . . for example they refused a project . .
. and then agreed to it [later].” On a more positive note, organisations
appreciated France’s reporting requirements, as it accepts the ECHO’s
report from its partners, considerably reducing their workload.

<ENHANCE
SUPPORT
FOR UN AND
RC/RC APPEALS,
COORDINATION AND
SUPPORT SERVICES
AND POOLED FUNDS

France would do well to create an
official humanitarian policy which
explains its commitment to Good
Humanitarian Donorship principles and
unites the information from various
web pages and documents into a
common humanitarian policy.

France received the third-lowest score
of the OECD/DAC donors for Funding UN
and RC/RC appeals, which measures
the extent to which donors provide their
fair share3 of funding to UN and Red
Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals,
coordination and support services and
pooled funds. France scores well below
average in all the components that
comprise this indicator.

<INVEST
ADEQUATELY
IN PREVENTION,
PREPAREDNESS AND
RISK REDUCTION
France could improve its support for
prevention, preparedness and risk
reduction, as it received some of
its lowest scores for indicators on
these issues. For example, funding
for reconstruction, prevention and
preparedness represented only 4.1% of
its humanitarian aid, while the OECD/
DAC donors allocated an average of
18.6%. France also received the secondlowest score for Funding international
risk mitigation and among the lowest in
the qualitative, survey-based indicator,
Prevention and risk reduction.

<PROTECT THE
INDEPENDENCE OF
HUMANITARIAN AID
Franceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s partners perceive that its
humanitarian aid is not independent
of other political, military, security or
economic objectives; France received
the fourth-lowest score of the OECD/
DAC donors for this indicator. Field
perceptions of its independence were
especially low in Somalia and Kenya.
France should put practical measures in
place to safeguard the independence of
its aid and engage with its partners to
discuss their perceptions.

<RENEW
COMMITMENT TO
ACCOUNTABILITY
France improved slightly its participation
in humanitarian accountability
initiatives1 compared to 2009, but
its funding of these initiatives 2
dropped from an already low 0.22%
(of Franceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s humanitarian aid) in 2009
to 0.04% in 2010. OECD/DAC donors
allocated an average of 0.43%. It also
received the third-lowest score for the
qualitative, survey-based indicators on
accountability towards beneficiaries,
indicating that France should renew its
commitment to accountability.

<REVIEW
SUPPORT
FOR REFUGEES
France does fairly well in the indicators
on International humanitarian law and
Human rights law, but received one of
the lowest scores for Refugee law, which
measures the number of treaties signed
and ratified, refugees accepted under
resettlement programmes and related
funding. France scored especially low
in the components related to refugee
resettlement and funding.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

#124

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/GERMANY

GERMANY

7.4
2

8
4.6

P4

P2

5.61

5.07

ASPIRING
ACTORS

4.92

12th

Group 3

OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

P1

P5

HRI 2011
Ranking

4.64

P3
HUMANITARIAN
AID

0.38%

4.5%

of GNI

US $7

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
NGOs 33

Pakistan 16

Food 17

Infrastructure 9

Un-earmarked 18

Health 8
Private orgs 15

BY
CHANNEL

Haiti 9

BY
SECTOR

Shelter 8

UN 39

Mine action 6

Govts &
inter-govt orgs 4

GENDER RATING

Others 18

Sudan 5

Coordination 7

Red Cross /
Red Crescent 9

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

Afghanistan 7

Not speciﬁed 39

DRC 4
Other African
countries 22

Others 7

POLICY

STRENGTHS
Pillar Type Indicator

Score

3

Funding NGOs

1

Timely funding to complex emergencies

FIELD PERCEPTION

FUNDING

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

10.00

+120.5%

3

Funding UN and RC/RC appeals

1.03

9.92

+25.4%

3

Un-earmarked funding

1.50

-71.1%

4

Funding protection of civilians

5.01

-26.3%

4

Advocacy for protection of civilians

4.32

-22.4%

4

Advocacy towards local authorities

4.39

-21.1%

-74.6%

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Germany ranked 12th in the HRI 2011, improving two positions from
2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Germany is classified
as a Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to
have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system
at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the
sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the
area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific
geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia,
Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and Spain.
Overall, Germany scored below the OECD/DAC average, and slightly
above the Group 3 average. It was below the OECD/DAC average in

all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and
recovery), where it scored above average. Compared to other Group 3
donors, Germany scored above average in all pillars, except for Pillar
3 (Working with humanitarian partners) and Pillar 4 (Protection and
international law), where it scored above average.
Germany did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators on
Funding NGOs and Timely funding to complex emergencies. Its scores
were lowest in indicators on Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, Unearmarked funding, Funding protection of civilians, Funding protection
of civilians and Advocacy towards local authorities.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

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AID DISTRIBUTION
Germany increased its Official Development Assistance
(ODA) in proportion to its Gross National Income (GNI)
from 0.35% in 2009 to 0.38% in 2010. Nevertheless,
significant progress still needs to be made to achieve
the target of 0.7% by 2015. Humanitarian assistance
represented 4.5% of its total ODA in 2010, and 0.017%
of its GNI – slightly higher than in 2009.
According to data reported to the United Nations (UN)
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’
(OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), Germany’s

2010 humanitarian funding was channelled as follows:
49.6% to UN agencies, 33.2% to non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), 14.5% to private organisations
and foundations, 9.2% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent
Movement, 2.1% to governments, and 1.5% to
intergovernmental organisations. Pakistan was the
country that received the highest percentage of German
funding, followed by Haiti and Afghanistan. In 2010,
Germany supported 28 countries in Africa, 25 in Asia,
12 in the Americas, six in Europe, and one in Oceania.

POLICY FRAMEWORK
Germany’s humanitarian assistance is principally
managed by the Federal Foreign Office’s Task Force
for Humanitarian Aid and the Commissioner for Human
Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid. The Federal
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
(BMZ) handles food aid and transitional assistance.
BMZ often commissions the work of the German
Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), a private
corporation which as of 1 January 2011 brings
together the German Development Service (DED),
the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and Inwent
– Capacity Building International. The Humanitarian

Aid Coordinating Committee brings together
humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
with government agencies to coordinate Germany’s
humanitarian assistance. Germany’s crisis response
centre seeks to expedite the response to sudden
onset crises. Germany’s humanitarian aid policy is
principally governed by the 2007 Federal Government’s
Humanitarian Aid, which includes the 12 Basic Rules
of Humanitarian Aid - written in 1993 and updated in
2000. Germany also expresses its commitment to the
European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.

HOW DOES GERMANY’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Germany’s humanitarian policy recognises the importance of meeting the
specific needs of women and girls in humanitarian emergencies. At the
same time, Germany reports that “no-one is favoured or disadvantaged
due to their sex” in the provision of humanitarian aid (Federal Foreign
Office 2007, p.4). Germany has further addressed gender in its
development policies, Development Policy Action Plan on Gender 20092012 and Taking account of gender issues in German development
cooperation: promoting gender equality and empowering women (Federal
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2009 and 2006),
although they do not specifically mention humanitarian aid.

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PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Germany’s humanitarian policy expresses a clear commitment to needbased aid, grounded on the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality,
and independence (Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany 2011).
Germany states that “Humanitarian assistance has no political strings
attached,” (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p.5). Germany prioritises rapid
response to the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons and
considers that the response to all humanitarian emergencies should
be “implemented within a matter of days and timeframes limited to the
period of extreme emergency,” (Federal Foreign Office 2011a).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Although not included in its humanitarian policy specifically, Germany
considers conflict prevention a cross-cutting issue and adopted an
action plan, Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conﬂict Resolution and Post-Conﬂict
Peace-Building, in 2004. To address disaster risk reduction within
Germany and internationally, Germany created a special committee - the
German Committee for Disaster Reduction (DKKV), which developed
specific funding guidelines for disaster risk reduction initiatives (German
Committee for Disaster Reduction 2011 and Federal Foreign Office 2008)
and affirms that five to ten percent of its humanitarian assistance is
set aside for this purpose (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p. 2). Rule 11
of Germany’s 12 Basic Rules of Humanitarian Aid mentions beneficiary
participation in the design and implementation of humanitarian
assistance, yet participation in monitoring and evaluation is not specified.
Rule 9 incorporates capacity building to some degree: “Humanitarian
assistance…shall help people to help themselves,” (Federal Foreign Office
2007, p. 11). Germany’s humanitarian aid policy does not specifically
address the environment, although the Federal Foreign Office highlights
climate and environmental protection as important global issues (2011b).
BMZ’s transitional aid is intended to bridge the gap between humanitarian
assistance and longer-term development (Federal Foreign Office 2007).

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Within Germany, the Humanitarian Aid Coordinating Committee brings
together German non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the Federal
Foreign Office and other German ministries and relevant institutions
to coordinate German humanitarian assistance (Federal Foreign
Office 2007). However the 2010 DAC Peer Review highlighted the
need for greater coordination among German government agencies.
Internationally, Germany expresses its strong support for the coordinating
role of OCHA, participates in UN supervisory board meetings, and
endorses the mechanisms created in the humanitarian reform (Federal
Foreign Office 2010). Along these lines, Germany has also progressively
increased its contributions to the Central Emergency Response Fund
(CERF). Germany provides un-earmarked funding to the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Relief and

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Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), OCHA,
and the World Food Programme (WFP) (OECD 2010, p.113). Apart from
these contributions, and those specified in the federal budget, Germany
does not “grant non-tied contributions” (The Federal Government’s
Humanitarian Aid 2007, p.4). Germany’s humanitarian funding is intended
for programmes with implementation periods lasting from one to six
months “at most” (Federal Foreign Office 2011a) although this normally
applies to NGOs: international organisations could be granted extensions
up to 14 months, and up to two years for disaster risk reduction projects.
Germany normally works in partnership with German humanitarian NGOs,
international NGOs and other international organisations, however, “via
Germany’s missions abroad, smaller projects can also be carried out
with local NGOs,” as implementing agencies of Germany’s direct project
partners (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p.4).

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Rule 2 of Germany’s 12 Basic Rules of Humanitarian Aid describes
Germany’s position on protection: “Everyone has the right to receive, and
must have the right to provide, humanitarian assistance and humanitarian
protection," (Federal Foreign Office 2007, p.2). Germany created a position
of Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid in 1998
and considers the promotion of human rights “a cornerstone of Germany’s
foreign policy,” (Federal Foreign Office 2011c). International humanitarian
law is given great importance, and in 2006, Germany published a
collection of international humanitarian law documents, including refugee
conventions. Germany stresses the need to work with local authorities
to obtain access, and notes that adherence to humanitarian principles is
essential (Federal Foreign Office 2007, pp. 8-9).

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Germany designates funding specifically for external evaluations of the
projects supported (Federal Foreign Office 2007). Germany mentions
upward and downward accountability in Rule 8 of its 12 Basic principles
of Humanitarian Aid: "Those providing aid shall be accountable to both
the recipients of the aid and those whose donations and supplies
they accept." Positively, Germany affirms its commitment to the
Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship in the Federal Government’s
Humanitarian Aid. Although Germany does not mention transparency in
its humanitarian policy, guidelines are publicly accessible and Germany
is currently preparing to implement the International Aid Transparency
Initiative at the end of 2011/ beginning of 2012. The 2010 DAC
Peer Review noted the strong distinction between development and
humanitarian aid within the German government’s aid architecture.
This translates into different funding proposals and reporting systems
for partners, which makes situations of protracted crises and overlap
among the sectors difficult to navigate, and increases transaction costs
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2010).

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

HOW IS GERMANY PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

One field partner reported the following in reference to Germany and
the other donors supporting its humanitarian programmes: “All donors
require us to incorporate the gender approach, but finally they do not
verify how it is been done.” Another organisation in Kenya, stated the
following regarding Germany, together with its other donors, “no one
looks at different gender issues and cultural issues. We have never been
given feedback on a proposal in this regard.”

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/GERMANY

#129

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Similar to most donors, Germany received some of its highest qualitative
scores in Pillar 1. However, compared to other donors, Germany’s scores
were relatively lower for the neutrality, impartiality, independence and
timeliness of its humanitarian assistance. Field partners reported: “I
think Germany has political and economic interests,” and, “the German
funding for Haiti is not independent of economic or political interests.
The funding for this crisis is really poor.” Some partners indicated that
Germany’s funding was, however, linked to needs assessments. One
interviewee affirmed, “with Germany we have a first needs assessment for
our proposal, then they pay for a second one, more accurate and in real
time, then we reformulate our project.” Germany was positively recognised
by some for carrying out field visits to ensure that programmes adapted to
changing needs. However, another interviewee disagreed, pointing to the
time required to make changes to programmes: “Germany isn't very open
to unexpected changes in programmes. They need too much time (several
months) to accept those changes.” Although Germany scored lower than
its peers for the timeliness of its funding, some partners were pleased
with the speed of disbursement. One interviewee in Pakistan noted that
Germany was quicker than any other donor in disbursing funds.

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

In field interviews, Germany was acknowledged for building the capacity
of the local population in general, but not the authorities. Regarding
beneficiary participation, one of Germany’s partner organisations
wondered: “The question is: would the Germans drop a proposal if it didn't
include beneficiary participation?” Another organisation reported: “It’s
all just on paper. Donors don't follow up to see what’s really happening,”
referring to Germany, as well as to the other donors supporting its
programmes. Germany’s partners were generally more critical regarding
the participation of affected populations in monitoring and evaluation,
compared to other programming stages. “Donors lose interest when it
comes to monitoring and evaluation,” commented one interviewee.

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Partner organisations provided mixed feedback on the flexibility of
Germany’s funding. One interviewee criticized Germany for agreeing to
finance a project at the end of the year, but requiring that the money
be spent before a tight deadline. Another interviewee pointed out that,
“Germany gives us funds every three months. It's difficult to live with
deadlines, but here it makes things much easier, especially when we work
with local NGOs. This helps them be more realistic on what can and can't
be done.” While most organisations felt that Germany did not do enough
to support their organisational capacity, one interviewee commended
Germany for allowing four percent of the budget to be invested in
organizational capacity. Many of Germany’s field partners praised its
support for coordination, reporting “Germany finances our attendance to
the coordination meetings, and asks us to actually attend them”.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/GERMANY

#130

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Although most interviewees considered that Germany did not actively
advocate for local authorities to fulfill their responsibilities, one field
organisation noted, “Germany is vocal at the federal level, not at the
district level…Germany is more silent and does this behind closed doors.”
Another felt that “the German government doesn’t have much influence.”
Most organisations pointed to a lack of support for humanitarian access
and safety of aid workers: “They are reluctant to fund security training. If
you include it in proposals you may not win because of that. They want
to say that the highest amount goes to the beneficiaries, probably for
publicity reasons.” However, some interviewees noted that Germany
“includes funding for security materials like radios” and “Germany has
been very good because they asked us to provide a realistic budget for
security, instead of a minimalistic budget.”

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Most of Germany’s field partners felt that Germany’s reporting
requirements were appropriate, although some complained that they
were requested to report every three months. Germany received mixed
feedback for integrating recommendations from past evaluations: one
organisation reported “Germany integrates some recommendations and
lessons learnt from evaluations.” Germany’s field partners indicated
that requirements to ensure accountability to affected populations were
generally lacking, although one interviewee noted that Germany proposed
a “suggestions mailbox” in a refugee camp but had yet to implement it.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/GERMANY

#131

RECOMMENDATIONS
<IMPROVE
FLEXIBILITY
OF FUNDING
Germany provided only 9.0% of its
funding without earmarking, while its
OECD/DAC peers provided an average
of 33.2% without earmarking. Germany
received the lowest score of the OECD/
DAC donors for the qualitative indicator
Flexibility of funding, pointing to the
need for improvement.

<ENHANCE
SUPPORT FOR UN
AND RC/RC APPEALS,
COORDINATION AND
SUPPORT SERVICES
AND POOLED FUNDS
Germany received the fourth-lowest
score of the OECD/DAC donors for
Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, which
measures the extent to which donors
provide their fair share3 of funding
to UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent
(RC/RC) appeals, coordination and
support services and pooled funds.
Germany scored well below average
in all components that comprise this
indicator. It provided only 7.7% of its
fair share to UN appeals, compared
to the OECD/DAC average of 41.0%;
15.4% of its fair share to coordination
and support services, compared to the
OECD/DAC average of 47.5%; 18.2%
of its fair share to Red Cross/Red
Crescent (RC/RC) appeals, compared
to the OECD/DAC average of 117.1%;
and 36.5% of its fair share to pooled
funds, compared to the OECD/DAC
average of 298.0%.

<ENSURE FIELD
KNOWLEDGE
INFORMS DECISIONMAKING IN CRISES
WITHOUT FIELD
OFFICES
Germany received low scores in all the
qualitative indicators that make up
Pillar 4: Funding protection of civilians,
Advocacy for protection of civilians,
Advocacy towards local authorities and
Facilitating safe access. It also received
the third-lowest score for Donor
capacity and expertise. It is interesting
to note that Germany tends to receive
the lowest scores in these indicators
in crises where it does not have a field
presence, indicating that Germanyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s
partners consider Germany to be more
supportive of these issues and to have
greater expertise when they have a field
office. Some partners also highlighted
the difference in capacity between
the field and headquarters, generally
considering the field offices to be better
placed to make appropriate decisions.
While Germany may not be able to open
additional field offices, it could consider
augmenting its efforts to integrate
knowledge from the field through
coordination with partner organisations
and other donors and field visits.

<IMPROVE
TRANSPARENCY
OF FUNDING AND
DECISION-MAKING
Germany is considered the least
transparent donor, though this may
improve with Germanyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s recent
commitment to the International Aid
Transparency Initiative. Germany should
engage in dialogue with its partners to
discuss how to improve its transparency.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

#132

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/GREECE

GREECE

P1

P5

8.1
0

4.37

P2

4.43

1.87

P4

0
0.0

4.84

P3
OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

HUMANITARIAN
AID

0.17%

5.8%

of GNI

US $3

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
Un-earmarked 22

Food 15

Governments 35

BY
CHANNEL
NGOs 17

Chile 12

Yemen 7

BY
SECTOR

Health 12

Pakistan 6

Coordination 7
UN 48
Not speciﬁed 55

Shelter 7
WASH 4

GENDER RATING

POLICY

Pillar Type Indicator

Central Europe 4
Ethiopia 4

FUNDING

STRENGTHS
Score

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY
Haiti 40

Others 6

FIELD PERCEPTION

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

3

Un-earmarked funding

9.05

+74.7%

5

Participating in accountability initiatives

0.00

1

Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies 9.37

+16.3%

5

Funding accountability initiatives

0.00

-100.00%

5

Funding and commissioning evaluations

0.00

-100.00%

2

Funding reconstruction and prevention

0.13

-97.1%

3

Funding UN and RC/RC appeals

0.17

-95.9%

-100.00%

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Greece is not included in the overall ranking, as insufficient survey
responses were obtained to calculate the qualitative indicators
that make up the index.
Greece’s overall scores in the HRI’s quantitative indicators
were below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages. Greece scored
below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 average in all pillars, with the
exception of Pillar 1, where it scored above the OECD/DAC and
Group 3 average, and Pillar 3, where it scored below the OECD/
DAC average, yet above the Group 3 average.

Compared to its OECD/DAC peers, Greece did best in the
indicators on Un-earmarked funding and Timely funding to sudden
onset emergencies. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators
on Participating in accountability initiatives, Funding accountability
initiatives, Funding and commissioning evaluations, Funding
reconstruction and prevention and Funding UN and RC/RC appeals.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/GREECE

#133

AID DISTRIBUTION
In 2010, Greece’s Official Development Assistance
(ODA) comprised 0.17% of its Gross National Income
(GNI), down from 0.19% in 2009. Humanitarian
assistance comprised 5.8% of its ODA in 2010
and 0.010% of its GNI. Greece had deferred the
intermediate European Union target of 0.51% ODA/GNI
ratio to 2012, but is unlikely to reach this target due to
the economic crisis (Hellenic Aid 2009).

According to data reported to the United Nations (UN)
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’
(OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in 2010, Greece
channelled 48.0% of its humanitarian assistance to UN
agencies, 34.5% in bilateral form to affected governments
and 17.5% to a variety of NGOs. Greece contributed to
nine crises in 2010, including four in the Americas, two in
Asia, two in Europe and one in Africa, with Haiti, Chile and
Yemen receiving the greatest amount.

POLICY FRAMEWORK
Greece’s humanitarian system is coordinated by two
main bodies under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the
Inter-Ministerial Committee (ESODOS) and Hellenic
Aid. EOSDOS decides whether and how to respond
to humanitarian emergencies and Hellenic Aid, the
international development cooperation department,
coordinates the operational response (OECD/DAC
2006). Within Hellenic Aid, the First Directorate
and Second Directorate (“Emergency humanitarian
and food aid directorate” and “Rehabilitation and
development directorate”) work closely together to
respond to humanitarian crises (OECD/DAC 2006).
According to the most recent DAC Peer Review, a wide
range of government actors are involved in the Greek
humanitarian system, and Hellenic Aid manages the
coordination among them, which may include the
Ministries of Defence, Health, and Agriculture and the
National Centre for Emergency Assistance (OECD/DAC
2006). Hellenic Aid is also in charge of relations with
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and multilateral
organisations (OECD/DAC 2006).

Standing Order 5-4/2009, Procedures of Humanitarian
Aid Provision Abroad provides the legal framework for
Greek humanitarian assistance (Hellenic Aid 2009).
Although no formal humanitarian aid strategy exists,
Greece includes the Good Humanitarian Donorship
(GHD) Principles in its guidelines for implementing
partners (OECD/DAC 2006). Greece also expresses its
commitment to the European Consensus on Humanitarian
Aid (Hellenic Aid 2011). The Strategic Framework for
Co-operation with the developing world and Hellenic Aid´s
2009 Annual Report both serve as guiding frameworks
for Greece’s overarching international cooperation
policy. Greece is in the process of adapting its foreign
assistance programmes to its new financial situation,
and the new plan will be presented in the 2011-2015
Development Co-operation and Assistance Program
(Hellenic Aid 2011). Greece has attached “Development
Officers” to some of its embassies as called for in the
Action Plan, which recognised the need to provide support
for humanitarian assistance and monitor implementation
(Hellenic Aid 2004 and OECD/DAC 2006).

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/GREECE

#134

HOW DOES GREECE’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Greece’s policy for gender in relation to humanitarian aid is unclear. However,
gender equality is included as a cross-cutting theme in its developmental
policy, the Strategic Framework of Cooperation (Hellenic Aid 2009). Greece
is also a signatory of both the GHD Principles and the European Consensus
on Humanitarian Assistance, which call for the inclusion of a gender-sensitive
approach in all parts of the humanitarian assistance process.

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Greece has expressed its commitment to the GHD Principles, and has
explicitly stated that it provides aid based on need and in adherence
to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence
(Hellenic Aid 2004, Hellenic Aid 2009). The Annual Report asserts that
EOSDOS uses information and needs assessments from the EuroAtlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), and the EU
Monitoring Information Centre (MIC) supplemented by information from
Greek organisations to decide which crises to support (Hellenic Aid
2009). Greece regularly donates to the Central Emergency Response
Fund (CERF) with the aim of providing timely funding, (OECD/DAC 2006).
Hellenic Aid has also expedited procedures to fund NGOs responding to
crises (OECD/DAC 2006).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

The latest DAC Peer Review notes that in order to facilitate a proper
transition from relief to development, “the Director General of Hellenic Aid
presides over a committee which meets monthly or on ad hoc basis in
case of crisis to discuss linking relief and development,” since this requires
the coordination of two separate directorates within Hellenic Aid (OECD/
DAC 2006). The Hellenic Aid website states that environment and climate
change are cross-cutting issues in the Greek development programme,
but it is unclear if these also apply to its humanitarian assistance (Hellenic
Aid 2011). Greece’s policy on beneficiary participation, local capacity,
prevention, preparedness and risk reduction is not clear.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/GREECE

#135

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

The Hellenic Aid Action Plan for Coordination and Harmonization declares
that Greece will convene more inter-ministerial meetings and increase
communication with Greek NGOs regarding requirements for funding and
other relevant information in order to better coordinate Greek assistance
(Hellenic Aid 2004). It is unclear, however, if these coordination
mechanisms will also apply to Greece’s humanitarian assistance.
Hellenic Aid funding to NGOs cannot represent more than 75% of its total
programme budget (Hellenic Aid 2011). The 2006 DAC Peer Review also
adds that NGO funding proposals may be submitted at any time, which
makes the funding system flexible (OECD/DAC 2006). The DAC Peer
Review reveals that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides a “flexible
budget envelope for humanitarian assistance” to account for “both
expected and unforeseen need,” (OECD/DAC 2006).

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Greece’s 2009 Annual Report devotes a section to human rights,
emphasizing that “a major area of activity of Greek humanitarian aid is
human rights protection and especially human security protection,” and this
is expressed formally in the annual call for NGO projects (Hellenic Aid 2009).
Greece’s policy on supporting international humanitarian law, refugee law,
or facilitating humanitarian access is not clear, though these are principles
included in documents Greece has endorsed, such as the GHD Principles
and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

The Hellenic Aid Action Plan for Coordination and Harmonization (Hellenic
Aid 2004) states: “It is in the immediate plans of Hellenic Aid to improve
extensively its monitoring, auditing and evaluating systems so as to
increase transparency [and] efficiency” regarding Greece’s developmental
policy, but it is unclear if this also applies to its humanitarian assistance.
According to this same document, the current monitoring system,
started in 2004, includes visits to project sites by experienced staff
who “complete record reports in which they evaluate competence,
effectiveness, development impact, suitability and expected sustainability
of projects and programmes in cooperation with local partners,” (Hellenic
Aid 2004). The country has had difficulty fully implementing these plans
due to financial troubles and the subsequent scaling down of its aid. The
DAC Peer Review does note, however, that “Hellenic Aid has tightened
the rules and set up an extensive ex-ante assessment process covering
the technical, management and financial capacity of the NGO…” (OECD
DAC 2006). In regards to its own transparency, Hellenic Aid currently
publishes an Annual Report on Development Cooperation to the Greek
Parliament that gives a comprehensive summary of its projects and the
budget allocated to each. Unfortunately, there is no mention of concrete
strategies for accountability measures toward affected populations.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/GREECE

#136

RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the severe economic crisis
Greece is currently facing, it may
need to postpone the following
recommendations until after it has
surpassed the crisis. Greeceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s
recovery will also present an
opportunity for the country to review
its position on humanitarian aid and
recommit itself to Good Humanitarian
Donorship Principles.

<FORMALISE
COMMITMENT TO
HUMANITARIAN
PRINCIPLES IN A
COMPREHENSIVE
HUMANITARIAN
POLICY
Greece would do well to create an
official humanitarian policy which
explains its commitment to Good
Humanitarian Donorship Principles and
unites the information from various
web pages and documents into a
common humanitarian policy.

<RENEW
COMMITMENT TO
LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
Greece has significant room for
improvement in its support for learning
and accountability. Greece has not
participated in any of the initiatives
for humanitarian accountability
included in the indicator Participating in
accountability initiatives.1 Greece also
did not provide financial support for
learning and accountability initiatives. 2
Furthermore, it does not have

evaluation guidelines and has not
commissioned any publicly-accessible
evaluations over the past five years.

<INVEST
ADEQUATELY IN
PREVENTION,
PREPAREDNESS
AND RISK
REDUCTION
Greece spent 0.52% of its
humanitarian aid in 2010 on
prevention, preparedness and
reconstruction, while the OECD/
DAC average is 18.6%. It could also
improve its support for international
risk mitigation mechanisms, having
allocated only 0.37 % of its ODA,
compared to the OECD/DAC average of
0.77%. This also makes sense from a
financial standpoint, as prevention has
been repeatedly demonstrated to cost
less than emergency response.

<ENHANCE
SUPPORT FOR
UN AND RC/RC
APPEALS,
COORDINATION AND
SUPPORT SERVICES
AND POOLED FUNDS
Greece received a low score for
Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, which
measures the extent to which donors
provide their fair share3 of funding to
UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/
RC) appeals, coordination and support
services and pooled funds. It scored
well below average in all components

that comprise this indicator. Greece
provided 0.52% of its fair share to UN
appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC
average of 41.0%; 3.2% of its fair share
to coordination and support services,
compared to the OECD/DAC average
of 47.5%; 2.0% of its fair share to Red
Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals,
compared to the OECD/DAC average
of 117.1%; and 9.1% of its fair share to
pooled funds, compared to the OECD/
DAC average of 298.0%.

<RENEW
COMMITMENT
TO REFUGEE LAW
Greece has room for improvement in
Refugee law, which measures signature
and ratification of international
treaties, participation in refugee
resettlement and related funding. Of
the six treaties, Greece has ratified
three and signed two. Greece could
also improve its participation in
refugee resettlement and funding.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/IRELAND

#137

IRELAND

8.1
9

4
6.2

P4

P2

6.54

4.20

ASPIRING
ACTORS

5.53

4th

Group 3

OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

P1

P5

HRI 2011
Ranking

7.40

P3
HUMANITARIAN
AID

0.53%

15.3%

of GNI

US $31

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
Red Cross /
Red Crescent 15

Coordination 10

Other 19

Haiti 9

Health 14
Liberia 8

Sudan 13

Food 6
Governments 6

Afghanistan 7

WASH 5

BY
CHANNEL

Inter-govt orgs 4
Private orgs 1

BY
SECTOR

Mine action 2
Protection 2

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

Sierra Leone 7

Others 5

Un-earmarked 22

Pakistan 5

UN 26
NGOs 29

GENDER RATING

Not speciﬁed 55

FUNDING

POLICY

STRENGTHS
Pillar Type Indicator

Score

Other African
countries 27

FIELD PERCEPTION

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

Others 3

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

5

Funding accountability initiatives

10.00

+143.1%

2

Funding international risk mitigation

2.61

-45.4%

3

Funding UN and RC/RC appeals

8.30

+104.0%

4

Advocacy towards local authorities

3.13

-43.8%
-40.7%

3

Funding NGOs

8.93

+97.0%

4

Advocacy for protection of civilians

3.30

3

Un-earmarked funding

9.49

+83.2%

3

Donor capacity and expertise

3.81

-39.1%

5

Participating in accountability initiatives

7.92

+76.9%

2

Strengthening local capacity

4.04

-30.1%

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Ireland ranked 4th in the HRI 2011, dropping two positions from
2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Ireland is classified as
a Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to
have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system
at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the
sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the
area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific
geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia,
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg and Spain.
Overall, Ireland scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 3
averages. Ireland scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 3

averages in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2, where it was
below both averages.
Ireland did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in indicators
on Funding accountability, initiatives, Funding UN and RC/RC
appeals, Funding NGOs, Un-earmarked funding and Participating in
accountability initiatives – all quantitative indicators. Its scores were
relatively the lowest in Funding international risk mitigation, Advocacy
towards local authorities, Advocacy for protection of civilians, Donor
capacity and expertise and Strengthening local capacity. Overall,
Ireland performed better in quantitative indicators than in the
qualitative, survey-based indicators.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/IRELAND

#138

AID DISTRIBUTION
In 2010, Ireland´s Official Development Assistance
(ODA) decreased substantially in absolute terms,
although similar drops in its Gross National Income
(GNI) left Ireland's ODA/GNI ratio relatively stable. In
2010, ODA comprised 0.53% of Ireland’s GNI compared
to 0.54% in 2009. Humanitarian assistance represented
15.3% of Ireland’s ODA in 2010, or 0.078% of its GNI.
According to data reported to the United Nations (UN)
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’
(OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Ireland

channelled 29.5% of its humanitarian assistance to
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 26.4% to
UN agencies, 14.5% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent
Movement and 5.9% bilaterally to affected governments.
In 2010, Ireland supported 28 crises: 16 in Africa, 10
in Asia, one in the Americas and one in Europe. The
top recipient countries of Irish humanitarian aid in
2010 were Sudan, Haiti and Liberia. In 2010, Irish Aid
focused its sector-specific funding primarily on health,
coordination and food sectors.

POLICY FRAMEWORK
Irish Aid, which falls under the Development
Cooperation Division of the Department of Foreign
Affairs, manages Ireland’s humanitarian assistance.
Ireland’s 2009 Humanitarian Relief Policy is its main
humanitarian policy, and is fully coherent with the
strategies for development cooperation outlined in
the 2006 White Paper. In June 2011, the Minister
of State for Trade and Development announced
an upcoming review of the White Paper, which will
set out clear priorities for the future direction of
the Irish Aid programme. Additionally, Irish Aid has
produced sector-specific strategies and policy papers,

particularly with regards to mainstreaming issues such
as gender and the environment.
Two important funding channels utilised by Irish
Aid are the Emergency Humanitarian Assistance
Fund (EHAF), and the Emergency Preparedness and
Post-Emergency Recovery Fund (EPPR). These are
complemented by the Rapid Response Initiative, which
partly functions to provide funding for emergency
capacity building. Irish Aid´s Multi-Annual Programme
Scheme (MAPS) provides multi-year funding to five
partner organisations. Irish Aid has a field presence in
16 core countries, primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa.

HOW DOES IRELAND’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Irish Aid developed a Gender Equality Policy in 2004, updating it in
2010 (Irish Aid 2004 and Irish Aid 2010). A large part of the policy
focuses on gender mainstreaming, which is also reflected in the 2009
Humanitarian Relief Policy. Ireland recognises that men and women
have different needs in crises (Irish Aid 2004). To this effect, Irish
Aid requires that partner organisations have a clear understanding
of gender specific needs in emergencies and that their programmes
are in line with the goal, objectives and strategy outlined in Irish Aid’s
Gender Equality Policy. Irish Aid also stresses its commitment to a
rights-based approach, and specifically pledges to address gender
based violence (GBV) (Irish Aid 2009).

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/IRELAND

#139

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Ireland’s Humanitarian Relief Policy (Irish Aid 2009) states that it respects
and promotes the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and
independence, and will provide assistance on the basis of need. It
further emphasises the importance that the scale of response should
be commensurate with the scale of need, with a special reference to
forgotten emergencies. In addition, Ireland recognises that vulnerable
groups within a society often have special needs, which is catered to
accordingly (Irish Aid 2009). Irish Aid prides itself in responding to various
disasters in a timely and appropriate manner (Irish Aid 2011a). It has
endeavoured to increase its ability to respond quickly to emergencies
through the creation of the Rapid Response Initiative and support for the
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Ireland’s various policy documents emphasise the importance of a
proper transition from relief to development, as well as support for local
capacity, prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction initiatives. In
relation to the environment for example, a mainstreaming strategy is set
out in the Environment Policy for Sustainable Development (Irish Aid 2007).
According to Ireland’s humanitarian policy, disaster risk reduction (DRR),
linking relief to rehabilitation and development (LRRD) and prevention/
preparedness are all part of a broader humanitarian effort which take
into account longer term objectives and address the core vulnerabilities
of communities which are affected or prone to acute crises. Ireland
considers that this can be achieved in part by building local capacities.
Finally, Ireland’s humanitarian policy mentions that relief assistance
should build on existing local capacities and ensure the participation of
the affected population (Irish Aid 2009).

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Ireland’s policy highlights the need to provide flexible, predictable
assistance and support the work of the organisations comprising the
humanitarian system (Irish Aid 2009). It does not appear to specifically
favour Irish NGOs over others, except for the long term funding scheme
available for Irish NGOs (Irish Aid 2011b). Ireland provides core funding
to UN agencies and contributes to multi-donor pooled funds with the aim
of providing flexible aid (Government of Ireland 2006). Ireland recognises
the lead role that the UN plays in coordination and expresses its
support for the reform of the humanitarian system, including the role of
Humanitarian Coordinators and the cluster approach (Irish Aid 2009). In
an effort to provide predictable funding, Ireland created the Multi-Annual
Programme Scheme (MAPS), which provides predictable, multi-year
funding to five partner organisations.

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PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Ireland’s policy in relation to protection, access and international law
is slightly less elaborated than other areas, although it does mention
the importance of these issues. With regards to protection, Ireland’s
Humanitarian Relief Policy recognises this as a humanitarian need,
specifically for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. This is
also true with regards to respecting and promoting the implementation
of international humanitarian law (IHL), refugee law and human
rights law. Furthermore, Ireland recognises the leading role of the
International Committee of the Red Cross to promote IHL (Irish Aid
2009). In relation to security and human rights, Ireland´s policy states
that the Department of Foreign Affairs will use appropriate channels
at the country level and inter-governmentally through the UN and other
bodies to inform programming and advocate as needed (Irish Aid 2009).

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Ireland’s policy stresses the importance of transparency, learning and
accountability. It specifically mentions promoting and supporting the
Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD), Sphere standards,
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee standards and guidelines and
the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (Irish Aid 2009). Issues of
transparency and accountability are mainly addressed through the
promotion of good governance. The White Paper includes public
ownership and transparency as one of its guiding principles. Ireland
states the importance of “accountability to both the Irish taxpayer
and aid recipients,” (Irish Aid 2009). Driven by the need to enhance
programme effectiveness through continued learning, Ireland focuses
on the evaluation of its performance as a donor, as well as that of its
partners. Ireland also refers to its GHD domestic implementation plan
to assess its own performance (Irish Aid 2009).

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FIELD PARTNERS’ PERCEPTIONS
IRELAND'S FIELD PERCEPTION SCORES

Collected questionnaires: 18
0 1 2 3

4

5

7

6

8

PILLAR 1

Independence of aid

5.81

Adapting to changing needs

8.02
4.04

Strengthening local capacity

5.00

Beneﬁciary participation

5.90
5.76

Linking relief to rehabilitation and development
Prevention and risk reduction

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

HOW IS IRELAND PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

Ireland's field partners seem to consider gender an important priority for
the country. According to one organisation, incorporating gender sensitive
approaches in programmes “is a must for Irish Aid.” Another organisation
commented that “Irish Aid requests gender disaggregated data,” adding
that Ireland supported a GBV programme.

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Organisations receiving funding from Irish Aid were generally positive in
relation to their commitment to Pillar 1. One agency described Ireland
as an “extremely good donor that isn´t interested in politics.” Partners
consider Ireland an engaged donor that is “interested in reviewing annual

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reports and regular communication with the field.” In terms of timeliness,
most organisations appreciated the speed of disbursement, although a
few dissented, stating that “Ireland always arrives a bit late, but at least
wants to cover gaps and answer our requests.”

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Ireland’s field partners were more critical regarding its support for local
capacity and beneficiary participation. One organsiation stated that
Irish Aid does not require it, as “they are more interested in delivering
humanitarian aid.” Similarly, in relation to beneficiary participation in
humanitarian aid, it was claimed that “they encourage it, but don’t
insist.” Feedback was much more positive regarding Ireland’s support for
prevention, preparedness and risk reduction: “Irish Aid is very strong in
this, while the others [other donors] do not care that much.”

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

In Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), partner organisations
praised Ireland for the flexibility of its funding. One organisation stated:
“We have a longstanding relation with them based on trust. They assume
what we do is right as the grants are not earmarked.” Another added: “We
have a long-term framework agreement with Irish Aid, so we can use the
money as we need it.” In relation to supporting the organisational capacity
of its partners, Ireland outperformed its peers, though one interviewee
claimed: “This is included in development, but not in humanitarian aid.”
The responses on Irish Aid´s focus on coordination differed depending
on the country. One organisation asserted that it was a firm requirement:
“We have to find out what other organisations are doing and participate
in clusters. Irish Aid headquarters coordinates with other donors.” In a
different country the response was decidedly more negative: “Coordination
about donors is a lot of talk, but not that much acting.”

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Ireland received some of its lowest qualitative scores in Pillar 4
(Protection and international law). Partner organisations rated Ireland
especially low for Advocacy towards local authorities and Advocacy for
protection of civilians. In comparison, Ireland did somewhat better for its
funding of protection, though it still received one of the lowest scores of
the OECD/DAC donors for this indicator.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

In Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), Ireland received two of its
lowest scores for Accountability towards beneﬁciaries and Implementing
evaluation recommendations. One interviewee affirmed that “downward
accountability is not a funding requirement or at best a weak one.”

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There were some organisations that were more positive regarding
lesson learning however: “they evaluate our projects and encourage
changes for the next time,” reported one organisation, and “very
involved and care about lessons learnt,” noted another. Ireland’s
partners seem to consider its reporting requirements appropriate.
Responses on its transparency were mixed however: “There is
transparency about funding but not about decision making.”

RECOMMENDATIONS
<MATCH SUPPORT
FOR PREVENTION,
PREPAREDNESS
AND RISK
REDUCTION WITH
CORRESPONDING
FUNDING
Ireland’s partners report that the
country is highly supportive of
integrating prevention, preparedness
and risk reduction measures in their
humanitarian programmes. In fact,
Ireland received the best score of the
OECD/DAC donors for this qualitative
indicator. However, its scores
were very low for the quantitative
indicators on funding for prevention,
preparedness and reconstruction,
and international risk mitigation
mechanisms. Ireland allocated 0.31%
of its ODA to fund international risk
mitigation mechanisms while its
OECD/DAC peers averaged 0.77%.
Ireland’s funding for prevention and
reconstruction is only 10.0% of its
humanitarian assistance, while overall
OECD/DAC donors dedicated an
average of 18.6%. The data seems to
indicate that Ireland places importance
on these issues with its field
partners, but is weaker in providing
corresponding financial support.

<EXPLORE OPTIONS
LIKE INFORMATIONSHARING
TO ENHANCE
DECISION-MAKING
Ireland’s partners were critical of
its capacity and expertise to make
appropriate decisions. In fact, Ireland
received the lowest score of the
OECD/DAC donors5 for this indicator, a
substantial drop from its score in the
HRI 2010. Cutbacks in Irish Aid seem
to have taken their toll on its capacity
and expertise, according to Irish Aid’s
partners. Given these circumstances,
Irish Aid should partner with other
donors and field organisations to share
information and ensure information
from the field is properly informing
decision-making.

<ENGAGE IN
DIALOGUE WITH
FIELD PARTNERS
TO PARTICIPATE
IN ADVOCACY AS
APPROPRIATE
Ireland could improve its advocacy
for protection and advocacy towards
local authorities. It will need to engage

closely with its field partners to discuss
the most appropriate way to do so in
each situation.

<REINFORCE
REQUIREMENT
FOR DOWNWARD
ACCOUNTABILITY
Ireland could reinforce more strongly
its requirement for accountability to aid
recipients, as field partners indicate
that Irish Aid does not place sufficient
emphasis on this.

<ENCOURAGE
LEARNING
FROM THE PAST
Ireland has substantial room for
improvement in Implementing
evaluation recommendations. It should
redouble its efforts to work with its
partners integrate lessons from the
past into future programmes.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/ITALY

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ITALY

1
4.7

P4

P2

5.41

ASPIRING
ACTORS

6.6
4

5.12

4.52

19th

Group 3

OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

P1

P5

HRI 2011
Ranking

3.29

P3
HUMANITARIAN
AID

0.15%

6.3%

of GNI

US $3

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
Health 9

Shelter 7

Governments 39

Haiti 10

WASH 6
Red Cross /
Red Crescent 3
NGOs 2
Other 4

Food 10

BY
SECTOR

Protection 5
Others 9

POLICY

Pillar Type Indicator

Kenya 4
Others 25

FUNDING

Score

Pakistan 15

Sudan 6
Not speciﬁed 40

STRENGTHS

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

Un-earmarked 9

UN 52

GENDER RATING

Somalia 13

Afghanistan 10

Agriculture 5

BY
CHANNEL

oPt 10

Coordination 10

FIELD PERCEPTION

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

5

Funding accountability initiatives

10.00

+143.1%

5

Participating in accountability initiatives

0.14

2

Funding reconstruction and prevention

10.00

+123.1%

3

Funding UN and RC/RC appeals

0.50

-87.8%

3

Funding NGOs

0.60

-86.7%

3

Un-earmarked funding

1.20

-76.8%

2

Reducing climate-related vulnerability

1.37

-65.9%

-96.9%

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Italy ranked 19 th in the HRI 2011, improving one position from
2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Italy is classified as a
Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to have
more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system
at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the
sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the
area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific
geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia,
Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg and Spain.

Italy scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages in all
pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2, where it scored above both
averages, and Pillar 5 (Learning and accountability), where it was
below the OECD/DAC average yet above the Group 3 average.
Italy did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators
on Funding accountability initiatives and Funding reconstruction
and prevention. Its scores were relatively the lowest in indicators
on Participating in accountability initiatives, Funding UN and RC/
RC appeals, Funding NGOs, Un-earmarked funding and Reducing
climate-related vulnerability.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

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AID DISTRIBUTION
In 2010, Official Development Assistance (ODA)
comprised 0.15% of Italy’s Gross National Income
(GNI), a drop from 0.16% in 2009. Humanitarian
assistance represented 6.3% of Italy’s ODA in 2010, or
0.009% of its GNI.
In 2010, according to data reported to the
United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service

(FTS), Italy channelled 51.6% of its humanitarian
assistance to UN agencies, 39.1% bilaterally to
affected governments, 3.5% to the Red Cross/Red
Crescent Movement and 2.0% to NGOs. In 2010, Italy
supported 41 crises: 17 in Asia, 14 in Africa, nine
in the Americas and four in Europe, with Pakistan,
Somalia and the occupied Palestinian territories
receiving the greatest amount (OCHA FTS 2011).

the effectiveness of Italy’s development and, to a
minor degree, humanitarian assistance, and the 20112013 Programming Guidelines and Directions chart plans
for aid policies and activities for the next three years.
A yearly parliamentary financial law determines the
quantity of Italy’s humanitarian assistance, but specific
laws can be issued in parliament to increase funding
for unexpected emergencies.
Italy uses its 20 Local Technical Units (LTUs) to
manage operations at the field level. However, Italy’s
2011-2013 Programming Guidelines and Directions
announce a scaling down of ODA. As part of this
downsizing, the number of countries where DGCS
operates will be reduced by 15% and the network of
Local Technical Units revised; indeed, six LTUs have
been made inactive in the past two years. Furthermore,
Italy has declared it will not commence operations in
new countries unless dire humanitarian needs arise
“consistent with available resources," (DGCS 2011).

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HOW DOES ITALY’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

DGCS has long recognised the importance of incorporating gender
equality and women’s empowerment within its programmes and in
1998 published The Guidelines for Empowerment of Women and the
Mainstreaming of a Gender Perspective in Development Co-operation. The
2011-2013 Programming Guidelines and Directions likewise state that
gender equality and empowerment of women will be prioritised within
individual sectors and country strategies, particularly in reconstruction
work in conflict affected countries. The DAC Peer Review 2009
Memorandum also mentions gender as a “key,” “cross-cutting” element
of Italy’s humanitarian action and describes Italy’s support for genderoriented programmes through earmarking multilateral aid contributions.

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Although Italy has no policy framework for ensuring its humanitarian
action responds to needs, in the DAC Peer Review 2009 Memorandum,
Italy stresses its commitment to GHD Principles and its intention to
respond to needs in an impartial, neutral and independent manner
(MFA 2009). In addition, DGCS strives to target the most vulnerable
populations, address the most urgent and severe needs and support
forgotten crises (MFA 2009). Italy has established funding mechanisms
to ensure timely funding for unanticipated emergencies, whereby specific
laws can be issued by the Parliament to finance humanitarian action.
Italy has also set up an “emergency bilateral fund” to provide financial
withdrawals for swift transfer to specific international organisations during
humanitarian crises (MFA 2009).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Italy strives to strengthen preparedness for both manmade crises and
natural disasters and supports a response depot of emergency supplies
in Brindisi (MFA 2009). The DAC Peer Review 2009 Memorandum explains
that though Italy does not specifically carry out risk reduction activities,
it recognises these as an important component of humanitarian action
and supports activities to reduce vulnerability through collaboration
with UN agencies and NGOs (MFA 2009). After approving The Hyogo
Framework for Action, Italy launched its National Platform for Disaster
Risk Reduction in 2008, led by the Civil Protection Department, to
support the integration of risk reduction activities into international
development policies and programmes (Protezione Civile 2011); however,
it is unclear whether this goal extends to humanitarian assistance as
well. DGCS has stressed the need to involve beneficiaries in disaster
risk reduction (DRR), promoting activities where local communities are
encouraged to identify strategies for vulnerability reduction. Beneficiary
participation is also encouraged in finding solutions to problems in the

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initial and rehabilitation phases of humanitarian action (MFA 2009), and
the DAC Peer Review 2009 Memorandum and Aid Effectiveness Action
Plan both highlight the value of capacity-building. Italy underscores the
importance of maintaining a “development perspective” in humanitarian
action and using emergency programmes as bridges toward longer-term
development programmes (MFA 2009).

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Italy stresses its commitment to collaborating with multilateral
organisations and recognises OCHA’s leadership in coordinating
humanitarian emergencies. Though 95% of Italy’s humanitarian aid is
earmarked (MFA 2009), Italy upholds the importance of pooled, multidonor emergency funds, and supported the Central Emergency Response
Fund (CERF) in 2010 (OCHA FTS 2011). Italy also established a revolving
DGCS-International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Emergency Trust
Fund in 2008 (MFA 2009). Italy emphasises the need for collaboration
with NGOs, especially for long-term projects, and the 2009 Action Plan on
Aid Effectiveness prioritises collaboration with NGOs. DGCS has signed a
partnership agreement with the Italian Agency for Emergency Response
(ACT), a coalition of 12 Italian NGOs, to improve the monitoring of
humanitarian emergencies and better coordinate responses (MFA 2009).

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Italy’s humanitarian assistance strives to save lives, alleviate
suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of
manmade crises and natural disasters (MFA 2009). Italy affirms that
it supports protection and international humanitarian law by funding
UN Flash and Consolidated Inter-Agency appeals and ICRC emergency
appeals (MFA 2009). It also calls for facilitating protection of civilians
and humanitarian workers (MFA 2009), and the DGCS 2011 – 2013
Programming Guidelines and Directions and DAC Peer Review 2009
Memorandum describe measures for collaboration with the Ministry
of Defence to ensure safety of aid workers in unstable contexts.
Italy insists security measures established by the United Nations
Department for Safety and Security are applied when Italian NGOs are
involved in UN emergency programmes (MFA 2009).

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Both the Aid Effectiveness Action Plan and the DGCS 2011 – 2013
Programming Guidelines and Directions announce plans to increase
transparency of DGCS activities. The DAC Peer Review 2009
Memorandum highlights Office VI’s press releases to OCHA and the
MFA as a means of informing the public on crisis management activities
and emphasises the importance of monitoring programmes through
sound evaluations and annual reports. The MFA has not yet joined the
International Aid Transparency Initiative. Italy’s position on accountability
toward affected populations is not clear.

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

HOW IS ITALY PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

Italy’s partners held varied opinions regarding its requirements for
gender-sensitive approaches. Some criticised Italy, among others, for
not verifying that the programmes it supports integrate gender-sensitive
approaches; one interviewee, for example claimed it was “all rhetoric.”

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Many organisations interviewed in the field felt that Italy’s humanitarian
aid was not sufficiently neutral, impartial and independent. One
interviewee mentioned Rome when underlining that “the political agenda
determines everything at headquarters level,” and commented that “Italy
is not always neutral.” On a more positive note, interviewees conveyed
that Italy’s humanitarian action does reflect a concern with properly
addressing needs. An organisation in the field mentioned Italy as a donor
that “follow[s] up with needs assessments” and expresses a desire to
“check” and “know” needs, while another explained that “Italy was very

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involved” with verifying that programmes adapted to meet changing
needs but also questioned the constructiveness of this involvement.
Several organisations, however, complained about the poor timeliness
of Italian funding. Interviewees also mentioned “a total lack of response
from the donor” and late funding “with unclear conditions.”

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Feedback from organisations in the field generally recognised Italy’s
support for local capacity. However, not all organisations held this positive
view regarding beneficiary participation, especially in the monitoring and
evaluation stages. One interviewee suggested Italy was “very far away from
beneficiaries, with many stages and processes between them and the
needs [of the affected population].” Another pointed to Italy’s “little concern
for beneficiary participation, both in design and evaluation of programmes.”
Though Italy’s policy upholds the use of a “development perspective” when
applying humanitarian aid, an organisation in the field criticised Italy as
“only focused on supporting service delivery for life-saving activities,” which
perhaps contributed to its low score for Prevention and risk reduction.

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Italy generally received positive feedback from its field partners
for its support for coordination among actors. Interviewees in
several crises also singled out Italy for its capacity and expertise,
especially at the field level. However, feedback on the flexibility of
Italy’s funding was varied. Some organisations criticised its inflexible
funding arrangements, which were described as “very attached” and
changeable only with “extensive administrative processes”.

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Italy received mixed reviews from organisations in the field for its
performance in advocating toward local authorities. One interviewee
criticised Italy for its tendency to “operate outside the usual networks and
‘break rank,’” suggesting that Italy’s “strong political interest” coloured
its advocacy to local authorities. Other interviewees were more positive
in this regard; one organisation commented that DGCS had “very well
prepared staff” for advocating for local governments and authorities to
fulfill their responsibilities in the response to humanitarian needs.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Similar to many donors, Italy could improve its efforts to ensure accountability
towards beneficiaries. While most organisations generally felt that Italy did
not do enough to ensure learning from evaluations, one interviewee did
highlight the importance Italy grants to evaluations: “independent evaluations
are compulsory, they are very strict on this.” Organisations also held
contrasting opinions regarding Italy’s reporting requirements. Although most
agreed that they are appropriate, several interviewees considered Italy’s
reporting requirements “excessive” and “not very reasonable”.

<ENHANCE
SUPPORT FOR
NGOS, UN AND
RC/RC APPEALS,
COORDINATION AND
SUPPORT SERVICES
AND POOLED FUNDS

Italy would do well to create an official
humanitarian policy which explains its
commitment to Good Humanitarian
Donorship Principles and unites the
information from various web pages
and documents into a common
humanitarian policy.

Italy channelled only 2.0% of its funding
through NGOs, compared to the OECD/
DAC average of 15.3%. Italy also
received the third-lowest score of the
OECD/DAC donors for Funding UN and
RC/RC appeals, which measures the
extent to which donors provide their
fair share3 of funding to UN and Red
Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals,
coordination and support services
and pooled funds. Italy scored well
below average in all components that
comprise this indicator. It provided only
6.8% of its fair share to UN appeals,
compared to the OECD/DAC average
of 41.0%; 5.6% of its fair share to
coordination and support services,
compared to the OECD/DAC average
of 47.5%; 8.3% of its fair share to Red
Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals,
compared to the OECD/DAC average of
117.1%; and 11.7% of its fair share to
pooled funds, compared to the OECD/
DAC average of 298.0%.

<PROTECT THE
NEUTRALITY,
IMPARTIALITY AND
INDEPENDENCE OF
HUMANITARIAN AID
Italy should engage with its partners
to discuss practical measures to
ensure the neutrality, impartiality and
independence of its humanitarian aid,
as it received the lowest score of the
OECD/DAC donors5 for these indicators.
Its scores were particularly low in the
occupied Palestinian territories and
Somalia, followed by Sudan.

<LOOK FOR
MEASURES TO
EXPEDITE FUNDING
TO COMPLEX
EMERGENCIES
Italy is fairly timely in its response to
sudden onset disasters, but provided
only 42.5% of its funding to complex
emergencies within the first three
months following a humanitarian
appeal, compared to the OECD/DAC
average of 59.4%. Although still low,
this is an improvement from 2009
when Italy provided only 26.5% of its
funding within this time frame. Italy’s
partners were critical of the delays in
Italy’s funding; it received the lowest
score on this qualitative indicator of the
OECD/DAC donors.5

<INCREASE
FLEXIBILITY WHILE
MAINTAINING
PROGRAMME
FOLLOW-UP
Italy received the fourth-lowest
score for Un-earmarked funding. Italy
provided only 7.2% of its funding
without earmarking to ICRC, UNHCR,
WFP, OHCHR, UNICEF, IFRC, OCHA
and UNRWA, compared to the OECD/
DAC average of 33.2%. Italy’s
partners seem to confirm this, as Italy
received the third-lowest score for the
qualitative, survey-based indicator on
funding flexibility.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/JAPAN

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JAPAN

7.4
4

2
3.8

P4

P2

5.42

6.34

ASPIRING
ACTORS

4.4 4

16th

Group 3

OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

P1

P5

HRI 2011
Ranking

3.41

P3
HUMANITARIAN
AID

0.20%

5.7%

of GNI

US $5

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
Infrastructure 10

Shelter 15

Health 5

Afghanistan 18

Pakistan 39

WASH 5
Red Cross /
Red Crescent 7
NGOs 2

Food 17

Multi-sector 5

BY
CHANNEL

BY
SECTOR

Coordination 3

Other 4

Un-earmarked 9

Haiti 8

Others 9

UN 87

Not speciﬁed 31

GENDER RATING

POLICY

Pillar Type Indicator

Sudan 5
Somalia 3
Myanmar 3

FUNDING

STRENGTHS
Score

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

FIELD PERCEPTION

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

Others 16

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

2

Funding reconstruction and prevention

10.00

+123.1%

3

Funding NGOs

0.51

-88.8%

2

Reducing climate-related vulnerability

8.47

+110.1%

3

Un-earmarked funding

0.91

-82.5%

2

Prevention and risk reduction

5.18

+14.9%

5

Funding accountability initiatives

0.93

-77.4%

1

Adapting to changing needs

6.97

+11.0%

4

Human rights law

1.78

-71.2%

4

Refugee law

2.67

-52.6%

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Japan ranked 16th in the HRI 2011, maintaining the same position
as 2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Japan is classified
as a Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to
have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system
at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the
sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the
area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific
geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia,
Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain.
Overall, Japan scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages.
Japan scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 scores in all pillars,

with the exception of Pillar 2, where it scored well above both
averages, and Pillar 1, where Japan fell slightly below the OECD/
DAC average and above the Group 3 average.
Japan did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the
quantitative indicators Funding reconstruction and prevention and
Reducing climate-related vulnerability and the qualitative indicators
Prevention and risk reduction and Adapting to changing needs. Its
scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Funding NGOs,
Un-earmarked funding, Funding accountability initiatives, and Human
rights law and Refugee law – all quantitative indicators.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/JAPAN

#152

AID DISTRIBUTION
In 2010, Japan’s Official Development Assistance
(ODA) comprised 0.20% of its Gross National
Income (GNI), up from 0.10% in 2009. Humanitarian
assistance represented 5.7% of its ODA in 2010, or
0.01% of GNI. The burden of responding to the TohokuPacific Ocean earthquake and tsunami has forced
Japan to cut international assistance in 2011: while
its bilateral assistance will remain at previous levels,
multilateral ODA will be cut drastically (JICA 2011a).

According to data reported to the United Nations
(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), Japan
channelled 87.4% of its 2010 humanitarian assistance
to UN agencies, 7.1% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent
Movement, 1.7% to non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and 1.0% bilaterally to affected governments. In
2010, Japan funded 20 crises in Asia, 16 in Africa and
six in the Americas, with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Haiti
receiving the greatest amount (OCHA FTS 2011).

POLICY FRAMEWORK
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) oversees Japan’s
humanitarian assistance in conjunction with the
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The
MFA directs emergency grant aid (MFA 2011a), and
the Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Relief
Division (HA & ER), created within the International
Cooperation Bureau of the MFA in 2009, manages
Japan’s humanitarian budget. The Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs Division of the MFA’s
Foreign Policy Bureau is also involved with planning
emergency responses. JICA directs bilateral ODA and
technical cooperation. It was restructured in 2008
when the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation
(JBIC) merged with JICA to improve coordination of
humanitarian and development activities as well as
technical and financial assistance.
Though Japan does not have an overarching
humanitarian policy, its actions are governed by a
series of laws and policies that generally distinguish

between humanitarian assistance for natural disasters
and conflict situations. The 1987 Japan Disaster
Relief Law governs the dispatch of the Disaster Relief
Team, while the 1991 International Peacekeeping
Law covers responses to conflict-related disasters,
allowing Japanese Self-Defense Forces to participate
in international peace-keeping efforts. The Ofﬁcial
Development Assistance Charter (2003), Medium Term
Policy on Ofﬁcial Development Assistance (2005) and
annual Official Development Assistance White Papers
also govern Japan’s approach to humanitarian action,
in addition to these three laws. Japan’s approaches
toward disaster risk reduction (DRR), prevention
and assistance in the aftermath of conflicts are well
integrated with larger development goals such as
poverty reduction and peace-building, emphasising
seamless assistance spanning prevention, emergency
aid, reconstruction and long-term development. JICA
has 72 field offices throughout the world (MFA 2010).

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/JAPAN

#153

HOW DOES JAPAN’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Japan has incorporated gender equality into its larger ODA policies,
and to a somewhat more limited degree in policies specifically
concerning humanitarian action. Japan’s ODA Charter declares the
importance of using a perspective of gender equality, and JICA has
a goal of “gender mainstreaming.” In Japan’s Gender Mainstreaming:
Inclusive and Dynamic Development, JICA emphasises the importance
of including gender in all of its activities, though it does not specifically
highlight gender involvement in humanitarian assistance. The Thematic
Guidelines on Peacebuilding do, however, highlight the importance of
accurately responding to the different needs of both men and women.
Japan’s taskforce for the development of the Thematic Guidelines on
Peacebuilding also included a group devoted to Gender Equality and
Peacebuilding. Likewise, The Initiative for Disaster Reduction through ODA
declares Japan’s intention to apply a gender perspective in regard to all
DRR activities (Government of Japan 2005).

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Japan’s 2003 ODA Charter declares that ODA should be tailored to the
“assistance needs” of developing countries, and the 2005 Medium
Term Policy on ODA further emphasises the importance of targeting
the most vulnerable people. In addition, Japan requires needs and
impact assessments to be completed at every stage of peace-building
operations (JICA 2011b). Though the principles of neutrality, impartiality
and independence are not specifically articulated in a humanitarian policy,
the HA & ER Division Director Setsuko Kawahara has outlined them
as basic tenets of humanitarian assistance (Kawahara 2011). JICA’s
policies regarding assistance in both disaster and conflict situations also
emphasise the importance of swift delivery. The 1987 Japan Disaster
Relief Law established a comprehensive disaster relief system including
a Disaster Relief Team comprised of rescue and medical specialists for
rapid deployment to overseas crises, and in 2005, JICA introduced a
Fast-Track System to speed the implementation process for post-disaster
reconstruction assistance and peace-building support. Japan has also
established special procedures to provide emergency grant aid for urgent
needs in response to requests from governments and organisations
working in countries affected by conflict or natural disasters; the MFA
decides the amount and details of this emergency grant aid (MFA 2011a).

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/JAPAN

#154

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

In 2005, Japan launched the Initiative for Disaster Risk Reduction to promote
the inclusion of disaster reduction in development assistance and provide
for implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (MFA 2011b). Through
this initiative, experts in DRR are deployed in the immediate aftermath
of a disaster to assist human capacity development that will enable an
emergency response, and DRR assistance is used to link reconstruction
to sustainable development (Government of Japan 2005). In 2007, JICA
published its Issue-speciﬁc Guidelines for Disaster Reduction, and in 2008,
it created the report Building Disaster Resilient Societies. It also stocks
four warehouses with emergency relief goods to be prepared for the quick
distribution of material aid (JICA 2010). The Medium Term Policy on ODA
advocates engaging with beneficiaries in all stages of programmes from
policy and project formulation through monitoring and evaluation. The
Initiative for Disaster Reduction and Thematic Guidelines on Peacebuilding also
highlight the need for supporting self-help efforts in developing countries and
using local manpower. In 2008, Japan published the Capacity Assessment
Handbook: Project Management for Realizing Capacity Development which
emphasises the importance of capacity-building in a development context,
though without specifically describing humanitarian assistance.

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Japan highlights the need for flexible coordination with UN Agencies, other
donors, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and NGOs, among other
entities (Kawahara 2011). Japan has developed methods for coordinating
with Japanese NGOs, notably through the Japan Platform, a collaboration
of NGOs that provide emergency aid focusing on refugees and victims of
natural disasters. In 2010, Japan also established an NGO Advisory Group
on the State of International Cooperation by Japan under the MFA to draw
on opinions of NGOs working in the field (MFA 2010). Japan’s 2003 ODA
Charter highlights the importance of flexibility in assistance for peacebuilding, and according to “A Guide to Japan’s Aid,” Japan’s emergency
disaster relief strategy particularly emphasises flexibility and has simplified
procedures for emergency relief funding (MFA 1998).

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Japan clearly upholds the importance of human security and protection in
the Medium Term Policy on ODA. JICA’s Handbook for Transition Assistance
explains the importance of upholding international humanitarian law and
human rights law in humanitarian assistance for societies transitioning
from war to peace (JICA 2006). Japan has strict regulations guiding the
security of its humanitarian workers and their involvement in areas with
limited humanitarian space. Before self-defence forces can be dispatched
to participate in peace-keeping operations, five conditions must be fulfilled,
including the existence of a cease-fire and the consent to the operation
of the parties involved in the conflict (MFA 1997). Such documents as
the ODA White Paper 2010 and the Thematic Guidelines on Peacebuilding
likewise emphasise the importance of guaranteeing the safety of
personnel, and the MFA maintains that “securing humanitarian space is
challenging but essential” (Kawahara 2011).

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/JAPAN

#155

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Japan has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to maintaining transparency
and promoting the public’s access to information on its activities. Japan’s
ODA White Paper 2010 expresses the intention to disclose information
about ODA activities and publish reader-friendly evaluation reports,
especially in light of faltering public confidence in ODA at the time of
publication (MFA 2010). Furthermore, both JICA and the MFA have
evaluation systems in place declared to foster accountability in operations.
JICA’s Guidelines for Project Evaluation (2004) emphasises the importance
of accountability to taxpayers as well as to beneficiary countries. These
guidelines also stress using evaluations to assess projects’ efficacy,
leaving the evaluations open to a public verdict and communicating with
both donor and recipient sides at every stage of evaluation.

Japan, along with many other donors, was criticised for its failure
to integrate gender issues into programming. Partner organisations
conveyed the general idea that all donors superficially address gender,
but in reality this is “not an issue.” One interviewee reported that
“Japan has no concern for gender at all;” similarly, another said, “Japan
is less concerned about gender.”

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Most of Japan’s partners considered its humanitarian assistance to
be neutral, impartial and independent, although several organisations
disagreed. One placed Japan in a group with other large donors whose
aid is “less neutral and affected by government policies.” Though some
respondents mentioned the economic and political interests underlying
Japanese support, another made sure to stress that “Japan respects
humanitarian objectives.” Others cited Japan’s heavy focus on funding
refugees and its “interest mainly in actions and outputs but not [the]
ground situation.” Japan did especially well compared to other donors
for ensuring the programmes it supports adapt to changing needs.
One interviewee praised Japan’s assistance as free from conditions
that impair the ability to deliver aid, and another commended Japan
for being “especially strong on tracking needs and adapting to them.”
One organisation complained that annual funding prevented funding
from being altered to reflect the current situation, however, and others
criticised Japan’s poor timeliness of funding, referring to nearly year-long
waits to secure approval for programming.

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Responses from interviewees reveal the need for Japan’s requirements
from partners to ensure beneficiary participation in the programmes
Japan supports. For example, one respondent noted that donors
generally require beneficiary participation in design and implementation
of programmes before claiming, “Japan is an exception, since they have
never expressed any interest.” Japan’s field partners held varying views
regarding Japan’s support for local capacity. One interviewee noted,
“Japan is pushing to build capacity for sustainability,” though another
organisation lumped Japan together with other donors, saying, “No
donor requires or supports local capacity building, they only look at
local capacity from a risk reduction point of view. Can local staff ensure
aid reaches beneficiaries? How much is diverted by mismanagement
in a remote control set up?” Field perceptions of Japan’s support for
prevention, preparedness and risk reduction were somewhat mixed,
though Japan outperformed many of its peers. One organisation
proclaimed Japan to be the best donor for these issues although others
considered the support insufficient.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/JAPAN

#157

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Several organisations commented that Japan was more flexible than
other donors, but one did mention the “extensive administrative
process” when flexibility was provided. One interviewee asserted
that Japan, among other donors, does “not support any sort of
organisational capacity building.” While one implementing partner
placed Japan in a group of donors “keen on supporting coordination
among actors” and following up with clusters, another claimed Japan
was “very government oriented” with an “upstream focus.”

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Japan’s field partners largely felt that Japan did not actively advocate for
local authorities to fulfill responsibilities in response to the humanitarian
needs, though one organisation mentioned Japan as one of a group of
donors who advocates indirectly through OCHA. On a similar note, one
organisation reported that Japan, together with other donors, does not
facilitate access, believing it to be the responsibility of OCHA. In terms
of the protection of civilians, interviewees were generally more positive
regarding Japan’s funding of protection than its advocacy for protection.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Feedback from the field suggested a need for Japan to improve
accountability towards beneficiaries, with interviewees claiming
Japan required only “limited accountability to beneficiaries.” Once
again, there was some disagreement, as one interviewee praised
Japan’s “strong exit strategy based on accountability towards affected
populations”. Others complained of Japan’s lack of support for
implementing recommendations from evaluations. One organisation
mentioned that Japan was honest about its true priorities, and another
said Japan was “not very heavy on reporting.”

<ENHANCE
SUPPORT FOR
NGOS, UN AND
RC/RC APPEALS,
COORDINATION AND
SUPPORT SERVICES
AND POOLED FUNDS

Japan would do well to create an
official humanitarian policy which
explains its commitment to Good
Humanitarian Donorship Principles and
unites the information from various
web pages and documents into a
common humanitarian policy.

Japan provides the majority of its funding
to UN agencies. As a result, Japan
received a low score for its funding
to NGOs - only 1.7% of its funding
compared to the OECD/DAC average of
15.3%. Although Japan channels most
of its funding through UN agencies, it
is short of providing its fair share to UN
appeals. Japan received a low score for
Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, which
measures the extent to which donors
provide their fair share3 of funding to
UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/
RC) appeals, coordination and support
services and pooled funds. Japan scored
well below average in all components
that comprise this indicator. Japan
provided 33.6% of its fair share to UN
appeals, compared to the OECD/DAC
average of 41.0%; 24.4% of its fair share
to coordination and support services,
compared to the OECD/DAC average
of 47.5%; 15.5% of its fair share to Red
Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) appeals,
compared to the OECD/DAC average
of 117.1%; and 2.0% of its fair share to
pooled funds, compared to the OECD/
DAC average of 298.0%.

<STRENGTHEN
SUPPORT FOR
CAPACITY
BUILDING, AND
BENEFICIARY
ACCOUNTABILITY
AND PARTICIPATION
Japan received low scores for the
qualitative indicators related to
its efforts to ensure beneficiary
participation, accountability towards
beneficiaries and local capacity
building. Its policy appears to take
these issues into account more
in development contexts, without
specifying their equal importance in
humanitarian crises. Field partners’
low scores seem to confirm that
greater emphasis is needed. Japan
received the third-lowest scores for
Strengthening local capacity and
Beneﬁciary participation and the
second-lowest score for Accountability
towards beneﬁciaries.

<RENEW
COMMITMENT TO
HUMAN RIGHTS
AND REFUGEE LAW
Japan has signed 19 of 36 human
rights treaties and has not established

a national human rights institution.
It could also improve its funding to
the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR), which
comprised 0.00001% of its Gross
Domestic Product, while the OECD/
DAC average was 0.00065%. It also
has room for improvement in Refugee
law, which measures signature and
ratification of international treaties,
participation in refugee resettlement
and related funding. Of the six treaties,
Japan has signed two treaties and
ratified others. It could also improve its
participation in refugee resettlement.

<RENEW
COMMITMENT TO
ACCOUNTABILITY
Japan received a fairly low score
for its participation in humanitarian
accountability initiatives.1 However,
its financial support of humanitarian
accountability initiatives 2 was
especially low – only 0.08% of its
humanitarian aid was allocated to
these initiatives, while the OECD/DAC
average was 0.43%.

<ENSURE AID
MEETS THE
DIFFERENT NEEDS
OF WOMEN, MEN,
BOYS AND GIRLS
Japan’s partners indicate the need
for greater emphasis on gendersensitive approaches and follow-up
to ensure it is properly integrated into
humanitarian programmes.

Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

#159

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/LUXEMBOURG

LUXEMBOURG

7.4
3

3
2.7

P4

P2

5.36

4.16

ASPIRING
ACTORS

5.83

18th

Group 3

OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

P1

P5

HRI 2011
Ranking

5.06

P3
HUMANITARIAN
AID

1.09%

16.2%

of GNI

US $130

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
Pakistan 11

Un-earmarked 39

Food 15
Niger 7
Red Cross /
Red Crescent 7

BY
CHANNEL

NGOs 2
Other 4

Afghanistan 4

Infrastructure 5
Coordination 5

UN 87

Others 4

GENDER RATING

POLICY

Pillar Type Indicator
3

Score

Funding UN and RC/RC appeals

Not speciﬁed 65

FUNDING

STRENGTHS

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

Haiti 5

BY
SECTOR

Health 6

Sudan 4
DRC 3
oPt 3
Others 23

FIELD PERCEPTION

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

% below
Score

7.60

+86.9%

5

Funding and commissioning evaluations

OECD/DAC

average

0.00

-100.0%
-100.0%

2

Funding international risk mitigation

8.00

+67.3%

5

Participating in accountability initiatives

0.00

1

Independence of aid

8.38

+13.1%

5

Funding accountability initiatives

0.74

-82.0%

1

Timely funding to partners

7.50

+7.2%

2

Reducing climate-related vulnerability

1.28

-68.3%

4

Advocacy towards local authorities

3.55

-36.2%

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Luxembourg ranked 18 th in the HRI 2011, dropping eight positions
from 2010, mainly due to lower scores from its field partners.
Based on the patterns of its scores, Luxembourg is classified as
a Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to
have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system
at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the
sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the
area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific
geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia,
Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan and Spain.
Luxembourg scored below the OECD/DAC average in all pillars.
Compared to other Group 3 donors, Luxembourg was above average

in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2 and Pillar 5 (Learning and
accountability), where it scored below average.
Luxembourg did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in
indicators on Funding UN and RC/RC, appeals, Funding international
risk mitigation, Independence of aid and Timely funding to partners.
Its scores were relatively the lowest in Funding and commissioning
evaluations, Participating in accountability initiatives, Funding
accountability initiatives, Reducing climate-related vulnerability
and Advocacy towards local authorities. In general, Luxembourg
ranked significantly better in the quantitative indicators than in the
qualitative, survey-based indicators, which may be due to its limited
capacity and field presence.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/LUXEMBOURG

#160

AID DISTRIBUTION
Luxembourg was one of the most generous OECD/
DAC donors; its Official Development Assistance
(ODA) comprised 1.09% of its Gross National Income
(GNI) in 2010, up from 1.01% in 2009. Humanitarian
assistance represented 16.2% of Luxembourg’s
ODA in 2010, or 0.167% of its GNI. Luxembourg’s
2009-2014 Stability and Growth Programme calls
for its ODA to remain at approximately 1% of its GNI
(Government of Luxembourg 2010).
According to data reported to the United Nations
(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS),
Luxembourg channelled 46.3% of its aid to UN

agencies in 2010, 34.0% to the Red Cross/Red
Crescent Movement and 16.2% to non-governmental
organisations (NGOs). Luxembourg also supported
the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)
and Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF). In 2010,
Luxembourg supported a total of 42 crises: 18
in Asia, 14 in Africa, seven in the Americas and
three in Europe, although a significant portion of
Luxembourg’s assistance was provided regionally.
The top recipient countries in 2010 were Pakistan,
Niger and Haiti. Luxembourg primarily allocated its
sector specific funding to food, followed by health and
economic recovery and infrastructure.

POLICY FRAMEWORK
Luxembourg’s humanitarian assistance is managed by
the Department of Humanitarian Aid, which is under the
umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Development
Cooperation Directorate (DCD). Its humanitarian action
is carried out under the authority of the Minister for
Cooperation and Humanitarian Affairs. Luxembourg’s
guiding strategy paper is titled Humanitarian Action:
Strategies and Orientations and focuses on the
importance of local capacity building, and funding for
transition, disaster prevention and preparedness (DCD
2010a). Luxembourg’s development and humanitarian

policy have their legal base in the 1996 Development
Cooperation Law. Its humanitarian action is further
guided by the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid,
the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)
and the Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military
and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (DCD 2010a).
Luxembourg has also developed sector-specific policies
on gender, the environment and water, sanitation
and hygiene, among others. Every year Parliament
must approve the humanitarian budget as part of the
government’s overall budget.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/LUXEMBOURG

#161

HOW DOES LUXEMBOURG’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

DCD published Gender: Strategies and Orientations in 2010 with the aim of
promoting gender mainstreaming and gender-specific activities, which is
echoed in the Humanitarian Action: Strategy and Orientation paper. Some
of the practical implications for gender mainstreaming include: integrating
the gender dimension into the DCD’s policy tools, educating DCD staff on
the issue of gender and developing systems of monitoring and evaluation
that integrate gender. The strategy paper highlights Luxembourg’s
support for relevant multilateral organisations and encourages partners to
development projects to promote gender equality.

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Luxembourg’s policy expresses a clear commitment to humanity,
impartiality, neutrality and independence (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg
works to support the primary needs of affected populations, placing
particular attention on addressing the needs of vulnerable groups,
such as women and children, the elderly, the handicapped, internally
displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, prisoners, orphans and
separated families (DCD 2010a). DCD also asserts the importance of
responding to forgotten crises (DCD 2010a). In its 2007 Annual Report,
Luxembourg states that it seeks to provide timely funding through its
cooperation with OCHA and contributions to the Central Emergency
Response Fund (CERF). In addition, Luxembourg has entered a joint
undertaking with several private companies to create a rapid response
communications system called “emergency.lu” (DCD 2011).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Luxembourg’s humanitarian policy states that within humanitarian action,
Luxembourg places a particular emphasis on issues of environmental
protection and climate change (DCD 2010a). With regards to disaster
risk reduction (DRR), Luxembourg strives to spend at least five percent
of its humanitarian budget on building local capacities, strengthening
national and regional risk prevention strategies, raising awareness and
preparing local population for disasters. Luxembourg recognises the
importance of linking relief to rehabilitation and development (LRRD)
in its Humanitarian Action: Strategies and Orientations paper (DCD
2010a). Participation of affected populations and national ownership are
mentioned as one of the guiding principles in Luxembourg’s humanitarian
policy (DCD 2010a). Accordingly, humanitarian action should, wherever
possible, promote the participation of beneficiaries in decision-making
of needs-assessments, programme design and implementation (DCD
2010a). Finally, DCD often adopts a strategy to prevent the resurgence
of violence after a period of calamity (DCD 2009).

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/LUXEMBOURG

#162

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Luxembourg recognises the UN, and particularly OCHA, as having a
central role in coordinating relief, both with partners and donors. It
also recognises the importance of efforts to reform the humanitarian
system and make it more coherent. It praises the cluster approach as
a means to making humanitarian action more efficient and requires
its partners to participate in and strengthen national and international
coordination mechanisms (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg has contributed to
a variety of pooled funding mechanisms, such as multi-donor funds and
CERF (DCD 2009). Its Humanitarian Action: Strategies and Orientations
sets out clear guidelines and duration periods for projects (one year for
emergency assistance and three years for transitional contexts); making
an exception for crisis prevention and risk reduction initiatives (DCD
2010a). Luxembourg’s policy does not seem to favour Luxembourgian
NGOs over those of other nationalities, and provides NGOs with
predefined annual funding allocations. It has also signed multi-annual
funding agreements with the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with the aim of providing
predictable and flexible funding.

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

DCD attaches particular importance to the protection of minorities
and vulnerable persons and purports to guarantee the protection and
physical security of populations in disaster affected areas by supporting
programmes for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, return
and reintegration of IDPs and refugees, demining and defusing of
unexploded devices, as well as policing bodies (DCD 2010a). In addition,
Luxembourg affirms its commitment to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
(DCD 2010a). Humanitarian Action: Strategies and Orientation expresses
support for international humanitarian law, human rights and the Geneva
Convention, but does not specifically highlight refugee law. Luxembourg’s
policy on the facilitation of safe humanitarian access and the safety of
humanitarian workers is not clear.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Luxembourg created an Evaluation and Audit Unit in 2001, which has
carried out a number of evaluations of Luxembourg’s development and
humanitarian assistance (DCD 2004). Humanitarian Action: Strategies
and Orientations notes that Luxembourg will reimburse partners for costs
associated with monitoring and evaluation (DCD 2010a). Luxembourg
requires its partners to abide by quality standards, including the Code of
Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and
NGOs in Disaster Relief, SPHERE standards, the technical guidance of
the World Health Organization and the principle of “Do No Harm” (DCD
2010a). Luxembourg’s position regarding transparency of funding and
accountability toward beneficiaries is not clear from its policy.

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

10

8.58
8.38

Neutrality and impartiality

Beneﬁciary participation

9

6.61

OECD/DAC average score 6.05

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/LUXEMBOURG

#164

HOW IS LUXEMBOURG PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

Field partners seem to indicate that Luxembourg could strengthen
its efforts to ensure gender-sensitive approaches. One organisation
commented, “Luxembourg is not very strict on this compared to other
donors though it does require sex and age disaggregated data.” Another
interviewee observed some improvement in this regard: “This wasn't
a requirement two years ago, but now is. They ask for this in every
project. I don't know if they will check it on it though.”

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Luxembourg’s field partners are appreciative of the neutrality, impartiality,
independence of its funding. However, a few organisations felt its aid
could be more closely aligned with need. One organisation pointed to
different approaches of the decentralized aid compared to the Ministry:
“Luxembourg communes may only be interested in funding certain
activities whereas the Luxembourg ministry funds the entire project from
A to Z.” Regarding Luxembourg’s efforts to ensure the programmes it
supports adapt to changing needs, field partners gave low scores. One
interviewee, for example, considered that “Luxembourg doesn’t have a
clue what the needs are.” Another reported the following: “usually we
have a contract for a certain period with Luxembourg and they want you
to do what you have said you would do. If there are changes you can
make them in the next period. Funding periods normally last one year.”
Partners largely considered Luxembourg’s funding timely, though one
interviewee noted that it depends on the availability of funding: “Yes and
no. When Luxembourg has the money, it's fine. They are quite fast. Once
you have a green light for funding, it's fast.”

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Feedback from Luxembourg’s field partners seems to point to a need
for improvement in Pillar 2 indicators. While some interviewees felt that
“Strengthening local capacity is one of the pillars for Luxembourg,” and
“they are big on working with local institutions,” others noted that they
are scared to work with local NGOs due to corruption issues.” Feedback
was regarding support for transitional activities and linking relief to
rehabilitation and development. One interviewee commended Luxembourg,
stating, “Compared to other donors, Luxembourg is very interested in
LRRD.” Others reported problems in this regard: “We have a problem with
Luxembourg with this because they want to keep them separate, probably
because they have separate funding schemes.” Feedback was generally
negative regarding beneficiary participation and support for prevention,
preparedness and risk reduction, though one organisation reported
receiving support for this: “with Luxembourg it used to be more for conflict
and disaster prevention and now it is a lot on preparedness and DRR.”

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/LUXEMBOURG

#165

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Luxembourg’s partner organisations seem to consider its funding
sufficiently flexible. When asked about the flexibility of its funding, one
interviewee noted, “For Luxembourg it depends how much funding they
have. If they have a lot, yes.” Another reported: “For the Luxembourg
Ministry, we can move money between budget lines, but if we do we
have to make a ledger.” Its scores for supporting the organisational
capacity of its partners were significantly lower. “For the Luxembourg
Ministry, if we need more staff they will support us. For the Luxembourg
communes, they don't support our contingency planning or support us
with more staff if we need it.”

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Partner organisations seem to find Luxembourg’s advocacy toward
local authorities weak, however one interviewee disagreed, stating:
“Luxembourg is a small country but with a very active diplomacy”.
Luxembourg’s partners seem to consider it a strong financial supporter
of the protection of civilians, rating it lower for advocacy for protection.
Luxembourg also received low marks for its efforts to facilitate
humanitarian access and the safety of aid workers.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Luxembourg’s partners generally consider its reporting requirements
appropriate. Though its scores for Implementing evaluation
recommendations were significantly lower, several organisations
reported positive experiences: “Luxembourg applies lessons learnt in
different programmes and different crises to others. There are bridges
between programmes and projects even about technical issues.”
Another interviewee noted that Luxembourg wants us to do evaluations
and have a management response on the recommendations.” Most
organisations felt that Luxembourg was transparent about its funding
and decision-making. “We are very happy,” stated one interviewee
when asked about Luxembourg’s transparency. Another organisation
disagreed, stating: “Luxembourg is not very transparent. You don't hear
much how they decide or how many organisations apply.”

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/LUXEMBOURG

#166

RECOMMENDATIONS
<RENEW
COMMITMENT TO
LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
Luxembourg has significant room
for improvement in its support for
learning and accountability. It has not
participated in any of the initiatives
for humanitarian accountability
included in the indicator Participating in
accountability initiatives.1 Luxembourg’s
financial support for learning and
accountability 2 was also low - only
0.06% of its humanitarian funding,
while the OECD/DAC average was
0.43%. Furthermore, it has not
published evaluation guidelines and
has not commissioned any publiclyaccessible evaluations over the past
five years.

<INVEST
ADEQUATELY
IN PREVENTION,
PREPAREDNESS,
RISK REDUCTION
AND TRANSITIONAL
ACTIVITIES
With the exception of its funding
international risk mitigation
mechanisms, Pillar 2 appears to
be a weakness for Luxembourg. In
particular, it could improve its efforts
to reduce climate-related vulnerability.
Luxembourg provided only 32.6% of its
fair share3 to Fast Start Finance, which
supports climate change mitigation
and adaptation efforts, compared to
the OECD/DAC average of 102.4%.
Furthermore, it has fallen short on its
commitments to reduce emissions.

Luxembourg’s partners seem to confirm
the need for greater investment in
prevention, preparedness and risk
reduction, as well as transitional
activities (LRRD), scoring well below
average in both of these qualitative,
survey-based indicators.

<ENHANCE
PROGRAMME
MONITORING
TO IMPROVE
BENEFICIARY
PARTICIPATION
AND STRENGTHEN
LOCAL CAPACITY
Also in Pillar 2, Luxembourg scored
below average in Beneﬁciary
participation and Strengthening local
capacity, both of which could be
influenced by Luxembourg’s limited
capacity. Luxembourg received the
second-lowest score for this indicator.
While Luxembourg may not be able to
increase in size and capacity, it should
strive to increase programme follow-up
through other means to ensure its
partners strengthen local capacity and
involve beneficiaries.

<ENGAGE IN
DIALOGUE WITH
PARTNERS TO
PARTICIPATE IN
ADVOCACY AS
APPROPRIATE
Luxembourg received a low score for
the qualitative indicator Advocacy
towards local authorities. Luxembourg
should engage in dialogue with
its partners to discuss the most
appropriate means to advocate
for local authorities to fulfill their
responsibilities in response to the
humanitarian needs in each crisis.

<ENSURE
AID MEETS THE
DIFFERENT NEEDS
OF WOMEN, MEN,
BOYS AND GIRLS
Luxembourg’s partners indicate the
need for greater emphasis on gendersensitive approaches and follow-up
to ensure it is properly integrated into
humanitarian programmes.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

#167

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NETHERLANDS

NETHERLANDS

7.5
6

1
5.1

P4

P2

PRINCIPLED
PARTNERS

6.43

6.12

6.20

5th

Group 1

OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

P1

P5

HRI 2011
Ranking

6.18

P3
HUMANITARIAN
AID

0.81%

6.8%

of GNI

US $26

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
Haiti 8
Sudan 8

Coordination 9

Red Cross /
Red Crescent 15

Afghanistan 6

Education 7

BY
CHANNEL

Other 13

Pakistan 10

BY
SECTOR

Food 6

DRC 6
oPt 3

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

Mine action 4
Health 3

UN 61

Private orgs 7

Others 6

NGOs 4

Not speciﬁed 64

Other African
countries 15

Un-earmarked 38
Others 5

GENDER RATING

POLICY

STRENGTHS
Pillar Type Indicator

FIELD PERCEPTION

FUNDING

Score

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

2

Funding reconstruction and prevention

10.00

+123.1%

3

Funding NGOs

1.22

-73.2%

3

Un-earmarked funding

10.00

+92.9%

4

International humanitarian law

4.72

-22.9%

2

Strengthening local capacity

6.95

+20.3%

5

Funding and commissioning evaluations

3.28

-20.8%

1

Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies 8.23

+19.2%

5

Funding accountability initiatives

3.59

-12.8%

2

Beneﬁciary participation

+17.1%

1

Timely funding to complex emergencies

7.20

-8.9%

5.62

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
The Netherlands ranked 5th in the HRI 2011, improving four
positions from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, the
Netherlands is classified as a Group 1 donor, “Principled Partners”.
This group is characterised by its commitment to humanitarian
principles and strong support for multilateral partners, and
generally good overall performance in all areas. Other Group 1
donors include Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.
The Netherlands' overall score was above the OECD/DAC average,
yet below the Group 1 average. The Netherlands scored above
the OECD/DAC average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 5
(Learning and accountability), where it was average. Compared to

Group 1 donors, the Netherlands was below average in all pillars,
except for Pillar 2 (Prevention, risk reduction and recovery), where it
scored above average.
The Netherlands did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the
indicators on Funding reconstruction and prevention, Un-earmarked
funding, Strengthening local capacity, Funding vulnerable and
forgotten emergencies and Beneﬁciary participation. Its scores were
relatively the lowest in the indicators on Funding NGOs, International
humanitarian law, Funding and commissioning evaluations, Funding
accountability initiatives and Timely funding to complex emergencies.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NETHERLANDS

#168

AID DISTRIBUTION
The Netherlands’ Official Development Assistance (ODA)
comprised 0.81% of its Gross National Income (GNI)
in 2010, a slight decrease from 2009. Humanitarian
assistance represented 6.8% of the Netherlands’ ODA
in 2010, or 0.062% of its GNI. Reforms proposed in
the Netherlands’ new development strategy foresee a
reduction of ODA/GNI to 0.7%, with an intermediary step
of 0.75% in 2011 (MinBuZa 2011a).
According to data reported to the United Nations (UN)
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’
(OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), the

Netherlands channelled 60.7% of its humanitarian
assistance to UN agencies, 15.2% to the Red Cross/
Red Crescent Movement 7.1% to private organisations
and foundations and 4.0% to non-governmental
organisations (NGOs). The Netherlands supported a
total of 26 crises in 2010: 12 in Africa, 10 in Asia and
four in the Americas. The top recipient countries in
2010 were Pakistan, Haiti and Sudan. In 2010, the
Netherlands focused its sector-specific funding primarily
on coordination, education and food.

POLICY FRAMEWORK
The Netherlands’ humanitarian assistance is managed
by the Humanitarian Aid Division (DMH/HH), which
is part of Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Human Rights,
Gender, Good Governance and Humanitarian Aid
Department. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’
2006 Grant Regulations, the Minister for Development
Cooperation, recently replaced by the Minister for
European Affairs and International Cooperation, has the
authority to award grants for emergency aid or conflict
management (Government of the Netherlands 2008a).
The Department for Fragile States and Peace-building
(EFV) manages early recovery assistance, although this
is not funded through the humanitarian budget, and the
Department for United Nations and Financial Institutes
(DVF) provides core funding to a number of United
Nations (UN) agencies.
The Netherlands has published a number of
documents on its humanitarian policy, such as the

A World of Difference (1990) and A World of Dispute
(1993). Further policy objectives are published in the
Grant Policy Frameworks for Humanitarian Aid, 2004 and
2005 and more recently, the 2008 Humanitarian Aid
Policy Rules (and annexes) (IOB 2006 and OECD DAC
2006). These policy rules also serve as guidelines
to organisations applying for funding. In 2011, the
Netherlands created a new overarching strategy
on foreign policy set out in the Focus Letter on
Development. It has identified the following priorities
for its humanitarian and development assistance until
2015: security and rule of law, sexual and reproductive
health, water and food security (MinBuZa 2011a). The
Netherlands' humanitarian aid division is expected to
publish a new humanitarian policy this year, in which
it will further specify the role for its humanitarian
assistance (MinBuZa 2011b).

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NETHERLANDS

#169

HOW DOES NETHERLAND’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

The 2008 Humanitarian Policy Rules require a focus on gender as one
of the general criteria for NGOs to apply for funding (Government of
the Netherlands 2008). Further specifics are not provided, however.
Previous evaluations have encouraged the Netherlands to consider
creating explicit gender-sensitive requirements for partner organisations
(IOB 2006).

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

The Netherlands seeks to provide humanitarian assistance on the
basis of needs while adhering to the principles of neutrality, impartiality
and independence (IOB 2006). Over the years, the Netherlands'
policy has become more explicit with regards to identifying vulnerable
groups, particularly women and children (IOB 2006 and OECD DAC
2006), and this is reiterated in its most recent policy document. The
Netherlands also places emphasis on timeliness, which it aims to
achieve by supporting the UN as the central coordinator of humanitarian
assistance and through the creation of Channel Financing Agreements
(Government of the Netherlands 2008a).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

The Netherlands' humanitarian policy takes a “humanitarian plus”
stance to humanitarian action in an effort to integrate relief with
development (IOB 2006). However, it is limited in doing so from a
funding perspective as humanitarian budgets are only meant for
the acute needs and early recovery phases. To overcome this, the
Netherlands established a Stability Fund in 2004 to facilitate the
transition to rehabilitation and reconstruction (IOB 2006). Other budget
lines, while not not part of humanitarian aid per se, also provide funding
for prevention and preparedness (IOB 2006 and OECD/DAC 2006). The
2008 Humanitarian Aid Policy Rules reaffirm the need to address the gap
between relief and development. It further mentions capacity building
and beneficiary participation as one of its main guiding principles
(Government of the Netherlands 2008a).

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NETHERLANDS

#170

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

The Netherlands' humanitarian policy stresses the importance of
coordination, and recognises the special role of the UN and its various
agencies in this regard. The Netherlands intends to strengthen and develop
a common, coordinated approach among donors and other relevant actors
(OECD DAC 2006). In order to be eligible to receive funding, NGOs must
participate in OCHA-led coordination mechanisms (Government of the
Netherlands 2008a). In recognition of the need for flexible funding, the
Netherlands signed the Channel Financing Agreements in 2003-2004 with
several UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), providing them with one large allocation per year, earmarked only
at the appeal level (IOB 2006). The 2008 Humanitarian Aid Policy Rules
relating to NGO funding appear considerably stricter in terms of flexibility
and extension (Government of the Netherlands 2008a).

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

The Netherlands affirms that its humanitarian assistance is guided by
both the humanitarian imperative and international humanitarian law.
In its previous humanitarian policy documents, the Netherlands has
vowed to actively promote these principles, along with human rights and
refugee law (IOB 2006). With regards to protection, the Netherlands
has commissioned evaluations on these issues in an effort to improve
their performance. The Netherlands' undertakes diplomatic action when
necessary to facilitate humanitarian access and the safety of aid workers
(IOB 2006 and OECD/DAC 2006). However, the 2008 Humanitarian Aid
Policy Rules declare that the responsibility of aid worker security lies with
the NGOs (Government of the Netherlands 2008a).

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

The use and implementation of quality and accountability standards
have been actively promoted by the Netherlands. It has financially
supported accountability initiatives such as the Active Learning
Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
(ALNAP), the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International and
Sphere. The ICRC and UN agencies benefit from more flexible reporting
requirements, as they are funding through the Channel Financing
Agreements, while reporting requirements for NGOs are relatively
stricter (IOB 2006 and OECD/DAC 2006).

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

HOW IS NETHERLANDS PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

The Netherlands' field partners seem to indicate the need for a greater focus
on gender. Some organisations reported that gender is “part of the proposal
design” for the Netherlands, but “they don’t emphasise it anymore.”

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Most of the Netherlands’ partners consider its aid neutral, impartial
and independent, although a few held dissenting opinions: “The
Netherlands pays lip service to humanitarian principles, but are beholden
to decisions in their capital driven by the domestic political agenda.”
Another organisation criticised that the Netherlands, “should be more
interested in meeting gaps [of needs] and saving lives. If they are not, you
wonder why they started funding in the first place.” On the other hand, an
organisation felt that “the Netherlands has a lot of field presence,” which
helped to ensure programmes adapt to changing needs.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NETHERLANDS

#172

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Compared to other donors, the Netherlands does well in Pillar 2
indicators, particularly for its support of local capacity. However,
partner organisations gave lower scores for Beneﬁciary participation,
Linking relief to rehabilitation and development and Prevention and risk
reduction. Regarding the latter, one organisation noted that they were
requirements “on paper, but there’s no follow-up.”

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Partner organisations were mostly positive regarding the flexibility
of Dutch funding. Some organisations praised the Netherlands,
stating that “the Dutch have very good flexibility and high capacity
to adapt to needs.” Similarly, another organisation affirmed: “the
Netherlands are more flexible on funding.” On the other hand, a few
organisations commented that “the Dutch have heavy procedures to
do cost extensions.” Most organisations felt that the Netherlands was
supportive of their organisational capacity, one noting that they “ask for
the training of national staff.”

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

The response from the field in relation to the Netherlands' government’s
commitment to protection and international law is particularly positive.
One organisation stated that “the Netherlands is the only one offering
funding for advocacy positions on protection of civilians”, while another
organisation, in relation to facilitating safe humanitarian access,
commented that “the Dutch government has been particularly engaged,
in fact, their engagement has been extraordinary.”

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Compared to its donor peers, the Netherlands’ received one of the highest
scores for Accountability towards beneﬁciaries, though notably below its
qualitative average, as this is a common weakness among donors. One
organisation reported that “they [the Netherlands] consider accountability
key and have the commitment to manage.” Regarding the implementation
of evaluation recommendations, an interviewee claimed that “the
Netherlands does not closely follow the implementation of the project.
Their participation is merely through funding.” In relation to transparency,
one of the recipient agencies commented that the “decision-making
process stays at the headquarters level in the case of the Dutch ministry
for foreign affairs, so we really do not get that much information.”

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NETHERLANDS

#173

RECOMMENDATIONS
<LOOK FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE
SOLUTIONS TO
CHANNEL MORE
FUNDING TO NGOS
The Netherlands provides a large
portion of its funding through
multilateral channels, but has one
of the lowest scores for its funding
to NGOs. In 2010, the Netherlands
channelled 4.0% to NGOs, while the
Group 1 average is 15.3%. Staff cutbacks will likely make it difficult for
the Netherlands to manage a large
number of grants to NGO partners, but
it may be able to increase its support
to NGOs and reduce somewhat the
administrative burden by creating
flexible working models, such as
shared management arrangements
with other donors, supporting NGO
umbrella organisations or consortia.

<FORMALISE
COMMITMENT TO
INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW
In Pillar 4, the Netherlands could
improve its commitment to
International humanitarian law, which
measures signature and ratification of
treaties, funding to the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
and establishment of a national
committee to ensure respect of ratified
treaties. The Netherlands has signed
49 of 50 treaties on international
humanitarian law. However, it provided
0.005% of its GDP to the ICRC,
below the Group 1 average of 0.01%.
Furthermore, the Netherlands is one of
only four OECD/DAC donor countries

without a national committee.
The Netherlands is encouraged to
establish a national committee to
ensure respect of ratified humanitarian
treaties and to consider increasing its
support of the ICRC.

<RENEW SUPPORT
OF LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
INITIATIVES
The Netherlandsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; partners consider it
one of the better donors for ensuring
accountability toward beneficiaries.
It could improve, however, its
funding for humanitarian learning
and accountability initiatives. The
Netherlands provided 0.31% of
its humanitarian funding for these
initiatives, 2 compared to the OECD/
DAC average of 0.43% and the Group 1
average of 0.69%.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NEW ZEALAND

#174

NEW ZEALAND

P1

P5

5.5
1

7.12

P2

4.97

5.16

P4

5
3.2

3.63

P3
OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

HUMANITARIAN
AID

0.26%

10.9%

of GNI

US $9

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
Pakistan 18

Haiti 10

Coordination 30

Food 20

Myanmar 5
Other 7
Fiji 5

BY
CHANNEL

Red Cross /
Red Crescent 6

Health 13

NGOs 3
Governments 2

WASH 2
Infrastructure 2
Shelter 2

UN 82

GENDER RATING

BY
SECTOR

POLICY

Pillar Type Indicator

Score

2

Funding reconstruction and prevention

3
4

African
countries 18
Not speciﬁed 31

FUNDING

STRENGTHS

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

Un-earmarked 37
Others 6

FIELD PERCEPTION

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

10.00

+123.2%

3

Funding NGOs

0.92

Un-earmarked funding

8.03

+55.0%

5

Funding accountability initiatives

1.16

-71.9%

Human rights law

8.99

+45.7%

1

Timely funding to complex emergencies

2.83

-64.3%

3

Funding UN and RC/RC appeals

1.92

-52.8%

2

Reducing climate-related vulnerability

2.38

-40.9%

-79.7%

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
New Zealand is not included in the overall ranking, as insufficient
survey responses were obtained to calculate the qualitative
indicators that make up the index.
New Zealand’s overall scores in the HRI’s quantitative indicators
were below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages. New Zealand
scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages in all pillars, with
the exception of Pillar 2 and Pillar 4 (Protection and international law),
where it scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 3 averages.

New Zealand did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the
indicators on Funding reconstruction and prevention, Un-earmarked
funding and Human rights law. Its scores were relatively the lowest
in indicators on Funding NGOs, Funding accountability initiatives,
Timely funding to complex emergencies, Funding UN and RC/RC
appeals and Reducing climate-related vulnerability.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NEW ZEALAND

#175

AID DISTRIBUTION
In 2010, Official Development Assistance (ODA)
comprised 0.26% of New Zealand’s Gross National
Income (GNI), and humanitarian assistance made up
10.9% of its ODA, constituting .026% of its total GNI.
According to data reported to the UN Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA)
Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in 2010, New

Zealand channelled 81.9% of its humanitarian aid to
UN agencies, 6.0% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent
Movement, 3.0% to NGOs and 2.4% bilaterally to
affected governments. In 2010, New Zealand funded
four emergencies in Africa, three in Asia, three in the
Americas and one in Oceania (OCHA FTS 2011).

POLICY FRAMEWORK
The International Development Group, a division
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT),
directs New Zealand’s humanitarian aid through
the New Zealand Aid Programme. The New Zealand
Aid Programme draws on the expertise gained
by its predecessor, the New Zealand Agency for
International Development (NZAID), which was
dissolved in April 2009 when its semi-autonomous
status was rescinded and it was reintegrated into
MFAT and renamed (New Zealand Aid Programme
2011a). This restructuring was intended to improve
effectiveness and efficiency and better situate the
programme to link development, trade and diplomacy
in New Zealand’s foreign policy (MFAT 2010a). During
this transition, the Humanitarian Action Fund was
discontinued, and the Humanitarian Response Fund
was created to provide disaster relief, recovery and
reconstruction assistance through non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) in the wake of disasters. The

New Zealand Aid Programme coordinates with New
Zealand's Emergency Task Force (ETF) to respond to
disasters and the New Zealand Defence Force and
the New Zealand Police to support peace-building
and conflict prevention efforts (New Zealand Aid
Programme 2011b). A new humanitarian action policy
is expected to be completed in late 2011.
New Zealand Aid Programme representatives
are stationed at four embassies in countries in
Southeast Asia and the Pacific (MFAT 2011). The New
Zealand Aid Programme often plays a leading role
in responding to humanitarian needs in the Pacific,
taking a “hands-on, whole of government approach”
to such crises (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d).
Responses beyond this region are generally part of a
larger international effort in collaboration with United
Nations (UN) agencies, the Red Cross/Red Crescent
Movement and local, international or New Zealand
NGOs (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d).

HOW DOES NEW ZEALAND’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

NZAID strives for “gender mainstreaming” and more recently, the 2011
International Development Policy Statement named gender as a crosscutting and thematic issue that will be taken into account in all New
Zealand Aid Programme activities. In 2007, NZAID published Achieving
Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment, which plans to reduce
gender-based violence and take into account women’s and men’s
differing needs, priorities and experiences, particularly in conflict and
post-conflict settings. Preventing Conﬂict and Building Peace further
emphasises gender sensitivity in peace-building and conflict prevention
work and recognises the specific roles for women in these efforts.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NEW ZEALAND

#176

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

New Zealand has affirmed its commitment to providing need-based
assistance; the scale and human impact of a crisis as well as requests
for assistance from the affected country's government guide New
Zealand’s humanitarian responses (New Zealand Aid Programme
2011d). MFAT also identifies needs in the wake of a disaster before
funding NGOs through the Humanitarian Response Fund (MFAT 2010b).
Through this mechanism, the New Zealand Aid Programme supports
timely humanitarian assistance funding by delivering "fast and effective
relief, recovery and reconstruction via non-government organisations
(NGOs),” (MFAT 2010b). NZAID’s 2005 publication Preventing Conﬂict and
Building Peace similarly mentions the need for targeting “at risk” sections
of society. This document also highlights the need for humanitarian
assistance to be neutral, impartial and independent although it remains
to be seen if efforts to link development more closely with diplomacy and
trade will affect the independence of humanitarian assistance.

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

The New Zealand Aid Programme has asserted its commitment to
providing humanitarian assistance in the Pacific, spanning from disaster
preparedness to response and recovery (New Zealand Aid Programme
2011d). It also emphasises the importance of disaster risk reduction
(2011d), and NZAID’s 2006 Environment in International Development
mentions the goal of enhancing preparation for natural disasters.
NZAID’s peace policy also highlights measures for conflict prevention
(NZAID 2005), and the Humanitarian Response Fund provides funding
to NGOs for disaster response preparation (MFAT 2010). In addition,
Preventing Conﬂict and Building Peace explains the importance of ensuring
a “seamless transition from humanitarian relief work to longer-term
development activities.” The New Zealand Aid Programme has articulated
its commitment to building local capacity and fostering beneficiary
participation for all its undertakings in the 2011 International Development
Policy Statement (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011e), while Preventing
Conﬂict and Building Peace stresses the importance of these principles in
conflict prevention and management activities.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NEW ZEALAND

#177

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

New Zealand plays a particularly important role in the coordination of
international and local resources for humanitarian responses in the Pacific.
As a member of the France, Australia and New Zealand (FRANZ) agreement,
it may engage in joint crisis responses in conjunction with France and
Australia (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d). The New Zealand Aid
Programme provides annual core funding to multilateral partners and
also supports the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, UN agencies and
civil society organisations (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d). The
Humanitarian Response Fund allocates funding for disaster preparedness,
relief, recovery and reconstruction to accredited New Zealand NGOs, and
the 2011 International Development Policy Statement asserts New Zealand’s
intention to channel more aid through New Zealand NGOs for humanitarian
emergency and disaster relief. The 2011 International Development Policy
Statement also mentions increasing responsiveness and flexibility as a
goal, though not specifically in the context of humanitarian assistance.

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

New Zealand’s humanitarian engagements prioritise the safety of civilians
(New Zealand Aid Programme 2011d), and NZAID asserted a strong
commitment to human rights in its 2002 Human Rights Policy Statement.
NZAID also upheld its support for international humanitarian law in peacebuilding activities and followed the principle ‘Do No Harm’ and Inter-Agency
Standing Committee (IASC) guidelines for the delivery of humanitarian
assistance (NZAID 2005). New Zealand’s formal policy on safe
humanitarian access and advocacy toward local authorities is not clear.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

The 2011 International Development Policy Statement explains that the
New Zealand Aid Programme carries out reviews and evaluations to
assess programme performance and effectiveness and to foster learning
and accountability. MFAT also publishes an annual report to this effect.
The New Zealand Aid Programme has an Evaluation and Research
Committee to oversee evaluative activities and ensure that their findings
inform future programme planning. It also stresses the need to share
knowledge within the Aid Programme and with development partners and
other donors (New Zealand Aid Programme 2011f). The former NZAID
published the 2007 NZAID Evaluation Policy Statement which highlights
fairness and accountability towards beneficiaries.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NEW ZEALAND

#178

RECOMMENDATIONS
<ENSURE CRISIS
SELECTION IS
BASED ON NEED
New Zealand received a low score for
the indicator Funding vulnerable and
forgotten emergencies, which measures
funding to forgotten emergencies and
those with the greatest vulnerability.
New Zealand was slightly below average
for its support of forgotten emergencies
â&#x20AC;&#x201C; 25.9% of its funding, compared to
the OECD/DAC average of 32.1%. New
Zealand tends to prioritise crises in
its geographic region. As a result, it
provides less funding to crises with high
levels of vulnerability when compared to
other donors. New Zealand designated
41.6% of its humanitarian funding for
these crises, compared to the Group
3 average of 63.0% and the OECD/
DAC average of 63.9%. New Zealand
could review its funding criteria to
ensure it responds to crises with the
greatest need at the global level while
maintaining its niche in the Asia-Pacific.

<EXPLORE
OPTIONS TO
EXPEDITE FUNDING
TO COMPLEX
EMERGENCIES
New Zealand does fairly well in
responding in a timely manner to
sudden onset emergencies, but could
improve the timeliness of its funding
to complex emergencies. New Zealand
provided 21.2% of its funding for
complex emergencies within the first
three months of a humanitarian appeal.
The OECD/DAC average was 59.4%.

<LOOK FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE
SOLUTIONS TO
CHANNEL MORE
FUNDING TO NGOS
New Zealand channelled only 3.0%
of its humanitarian funding to NGOs,
compared to the OECD/DAC average
of 15.3%. As New Zealand may not
be able to handle a large number of
smaller contracts to NGOs, it could
explore flexible working models, such
as shared management arrangements
with other donors and supporting NGO
umbrella organisations or NGOs of
other nationalities.

<ENHANCE
SUPPORT FOR UN
AND RC/RC APPEALS,
COORDINATION AND
SUPPORT SERVICES
AND POOLED FUNDS
New Zealand received a low score for
Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, which
measures the extent to which donors
provide their fair share3 of funding to UN
and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC)
appeals, coordination and support services
and pooled funds. It scored well below
average in all components that comprise
this indicator, with the exception of its
funding for pooled funds, where it is close
to average. New Zealand provided 12.6%
of its fair share to UN appeals, compared
to the OECD/DAC average of 41.0%;
0.0% of its fair share to coordination and
support services, compared to the OECD/
DAC average of 47.5%; and 71.8% of its
fair share to Red Cross/Red Crescent
(RC/RC) appeals, compared to the
OECD/DAC average of 117.1%.

<RENEW SUPPORT
FOR LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
New Zealand could improve its
support for learning and accountability
initiatives. 2 In 2010, New Zealand
dedicated 0.10% of its humanitarian
aid for these initiatives; the OECD/DAC
average was 0.43%.

<STRENGTHEN
SUPPORT
TO REDUCE
CLIMATE-RELATED
VULNERABILITY
New Zealand provided only 62.5% of its
fair share3 to Fast Start Finance, which
supports climate change mitigation
and adaptation efforts, compared to
the OECD/DAC average of 102.4%.
Furthermore, New Zealand has fallen
short on its commitments to reduce
emissions, which seems to indicate that
New Zealand could augment its support
to reduce climate-related vulnerability.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

#179

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NORWAY

NORWAY

7.6
9

1
5.6

P4

P2

7.13

5.61

PRINCIPLED
PARTNERS

8.09

1st

Group 1

OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

P1

P5

HRI 2011
Ranking

8.22

P3
HUMANITARIAN
AID

1.10%

12.2%

of GNI

US $113

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
Pakistan 11

Protection 12
Red Cross /
Red Crescent 15

NGOs 30

Sudan 6
Coordination 12

Private orgs 3

BY
CHANNEL

Other 7

Haiti 6

BY
SECTOR

Health 8

Afghanistan 4
Somalia 3

Mine action 7

UN 46

Others 11

GENDER RATING

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

oPt 4

FUNDING

POLICY

STRENGTHS
Pillar Type Indicator

Score

3

Funding UN and RC/RC appeals

2

Not speciﬁed 51

Others 17

FIELD PERCEPTION

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

Un-earmarked 49

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

10.00

+145.8%

2

Funding reconstruction and prevention

Reducing climate-related vulnerability

8.40

+108.4%

1

Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies 6.36

-7.9%

3

Funding NGOs

8.98

+98.0%

1

Timely funding to complex emergencies

-3.1%

3

Un-earmarked funding

10.00

+92.9%

5

Implementing evaluation recommendations 4.22

4

Refugee law

10.00

+77.8%

2

Prevention and risk reduction

3.21
7.67
4.50

-28.4%

-1.5%
-0.2%

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Norway ranked 1st in the HRI 2011, improving three positions from
2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Norway is classified as
a Group 1 donor, “Principled Partners”. This group is characterised
by its commitment to humanitarian principles and strong support
for multilateral partners, and generally good overall performance
in all areas. Other Group 1 donors include Denmark, Finland, the
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.
Overall, Norway scored above the OECD/DAC and Group 1
averages. Norway scored above the OECD/DAC average in all
pillars. It was above the Group 1 average in all pillars, with the

exception of Pillar 1 (Responding to needs) and Pillar 5 (Learning
and accountability), where it scored below average.
Norway did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the
indicators on Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, Reducing climaterelated vulnerability, Funding NGOs, Un-earmarked funding and
Refugee law. Its scores were relatively lower in indicators on Funding
reconstruction and prevention, Funding vulnerable and forgotten
emergencies, Timely funding to complex emergencies, Implementing
evaluation recommendations and Prevention and risk reduction.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NORWAY

#180

AID DISTRIBUTION
Norway’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) has
consistently risen since 2008 and currently represents
1.10% of its Gross National Income (GNI). Humanitarian
assistance represented 12.2% of Norway’s ODA in
2010, or 0.14% of its GNI.
According to data reported to the United Nations (UN)
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’
(OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Norway
channelled 45.6% of its 2010 humanitarian aid to UN

agencies, 29.6% to non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and 14.5% to the Red Cross/Red Crescent
Movement. Norway supported 14 crises in Africa, ten
in Asia and eight in the Americas. Of the humanitarian
aid allocated to specific countries, Pakistan, Haiti and
Sudan received the greatest amount in 2010. Sectorally,
Norway concentrated its funding on coordination and
support services; and protection, human rights and rule
of law initiatives (OCHA FTS 2011).

POLICY FRAMEWORK
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
manages Norway’s humanitarian aid, with the
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
(Norad) operating as a technical directorate. The
Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian
Affairs and the Department of Regional Affairs and
Development are the two main departments involved
in overseeing humanitarian action. Norway continues
to base its humanitarian policy on the MFA’s 2008
Humanitarian Policy, which aims to make the country
a world leader in the humanitarian field. The MFA has
also developed sector-specific humanitarian policies,
such as the Norwegian policy on the prevention of

humanitarian crises and the 2011-13 Strategic Plan for
Women, Peace and Security (MFA 2011). To meet the
challenges of an increasingly complex international
system, Norway sees its humanitarian engagement as
part of a coherent foreign and development policy that
aims to promote peace and sustainable development
(MFA 2008). The Norwegian Emergency Preparedness
System (NOREPS), a partnership among the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate for Civil Protection
and Emergency Planning (DSB), was established to
strengthen the response capacity of humanitarian
organisations, especially in the critical first phase of a
humanitarian crisis (MFA 2008).

HOW DOES NORWAY’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Norway’s Humanitarian Policy aims to set new standards in women’s
rights and gender equality. This commitment is highlighted by the
MFA’s 2011 publication of the 2011-13 Strategic Plan for Women,
Peace and Security which intends to enhance women’s influence and
participation and strengthen the protection of women during armed
conflicts. Norway supports the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on
women, peace and security and contributed to the Gender Handbook
for Humanitarian Action (MFA 2008). Its humanitarian policy states
that all partners must ensure that the needs of girls and women are
taken into account in all humanitarian activities, on par with the needs
of boys and men (MFA 2008).

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NORWAY

#181

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Norway bases its humanitarian aid on the principles of neutrality and
impartiality and attempts to ensure effective responses to changing
humanitarian needs in both sudden and protracted crises (MFA 2008).
Special priority is also given to promoting more balanced, needs-based
activities where all affected groups are consulted, especially women and
children. It pledges to allocate sufficient reserves to respond quickly,
with substantial funding, to at least two new humanitarian crises per year
(MFA 2008). Norway’s Humanitarian Policy also mentions that the MFA is
increasing multi-year cooperation agreements with selected partners.

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Norway’s humanitarian policy expresses a strong commitment to
prevention, risk reduction and recovery (MFA 2008). In 2007, the
Norwegian MFA published the Norwegian policy on the prevention of
humanitarian crises, highlighting the need to strengthen the participation
of affected parties at the local level, especially women and children
and in prevention and preparedness activities. Norway’s Humanitarian
Policy also states that the international community should focus more on
capacity building in countries prone to humanitarian disasters.

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Norway’s Humanitarian Policy emphasises the need to support coordination
activities and flexible funding for humanitarian crises. Un-earmarked funds
are dispersed early in the year to UN and International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) appeals. The MFA has set forth a strategic plan to work with
and fund Norwegian humanitarian organisations while holding them to high
standards. Since its inception, NOREPS has worked to improve coordination
and responsiveness in providing immediate relief goods and personnel for
humanitarian relief operations worldwide. Moreover, the MFA states that
more resources will be invested in humanitarian assistance and that a strong
humanitarian research capacity will be established in Norway (MFA 2008).

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Protection and international law is a centrepiece in Norwegian humanitarian
efforts (MFA 2008). Norway’s Humanitarian Policy dedicates a section to
the protection of civilians in complex emergencies, highlighting the need for
greater international focus on protection measures for displaced persons,
women and children. Oslo has spearheaded the effort to promote the 2008
Convention on Cluster Munitions and the 1997 Mine Ban Convention, as
well as other disarmament initiatives. Norway’s humanitarian policy also
regards the Geneva Conventions as the pillars of international humanitarian
law and advocates for greater implementation of refugee law in protecting
displaced populations (MFA 2008). The MFA recognises that humanitarian
crises often call for political solutions and therefore promotes advocacy
towards local authorities when appropriate (MFA 2008).

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NORWAY

#182

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Norway’s Humanitarian Policy expresses a clear commitment to
improving learning and accountability within humanitarian aid. Norway
is making an effort to improve administrative capacities, simplify the
reporting system and increase the use of evaluations and reviews
(MFA 2008). The MFA (2008) has also adopted a zero tolerance policy
regarding fraud and corruption for recipients. Furthermore, it is stated
that in countries where Norway has a diplomatic presence, embassies
will increase the use of evaluations and reviews, in cooperation
with Norad, in order to facilitate learning. It is not clear from
Norway’s humanitarian policy whether there are measures promoting
accountability towards beneficiaries.

Field partners largely held positive views of Norway’s support for gendersensitive approaches in humanitarian action. One interviewee affirmed
that Norway “requires a strong commitment to women, generally women
in conflict zones and this always features as a point in grant letters.”
Another added to this by stating that most Norwegian projects target
women. When NGOs were expelled from one country, another organisation
reported that Norway took the lead in coordinating a gender task force.

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

The majority of partner organisations interviewed describe Norwegian
aid as neutral, impartial, independent and based on need. A few
organisations observed political influence in Norway’s aid, but felt that
it was not a hindrance: “Norway's humanitarian action is influenced by
its political interests, but not in a bad sense.” Partner organisations
also generally seemed to consider Norway’s funding timely and to take
into account changing needs, however, an interviewee in a crisis where
Norway does not have field presence asserted that “Norway is not on
the ground so they can't verify changing needs.”

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Although below Norway’s qualitative average, Norway outperformed
its peers on Strengthening local capacity. One interviewee highlighted
Norway’s capacity building efforts in strengthening local institutions by
training local staff and empowering women. In relation to Linking relief to
rehabilitation and development, partner organisations gave slightly lower
marks, though an interviewee noted that Norway was supporting recovery
and developmental activities. Similar to most donors, Norway’s partner
organisations seem to indicate that there is room for improvement.
One interviewee included Norway, together with other donors when
commenting “it's not done so much because they’re humanitarian
programmes.” On the other hand, another interviewee reported that
beneficiary participation is required in every contract and final report.
Partner organisations reported that Norway has supported measures
to reduce risks in areas vulnerable to natural disasters; however, some
would like to see a broader risk reduction and recovery plan.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NORWAY

#184

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Norway’s partners seem highly appreciative of the flexibility of its
funding. “Norway still gives a portion of funds that is completely unearmarked, which greatly assists flexibility,” described one recipient.
However, it is worth noting that one recipient organisation stated that
the funding is too flexible and that there should be greater oversight
mechanisms in place. Norway’s partners also praised its support
for coordination: “After the NGOs were expelled, Norway encouraged
increased coordination.” Several commented on Norway’s active field
participation allowing for informed decision making. “Norwegian staff
go out into the field, meet with partners and encourage consultation,”
stated one interviewee. Though Norway outperformed its peers, support
for partners’ organisational capacity has room for improvement. One of
Norway’s partners stated that Norway, together with their other donors,
“have been reluctant to fund this.” However, another organisation
reported that Norway offered to provide support to train national staff.

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Similar to most donors, partner organisations considered Norway
stronger in funding the protection of civilians than in advocating
for protection. However, Norway still outperformed its peers in this
indicator. Norway received its lowest qualitative score in Pillar 4 in the
indicator on Facilitating safe access. One organisation stated, “They try
to implement safe humanitarian access but rarely succeed.” Another
criticised Norway, together with other donors, for not responding
adequately to threats of abduction of humanitarian workers.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

In Pillar 5, Norway stands out for its strong performance in Donor
transparency and Appropriate reporting requirements. While most
partner organisations have praised its reporting requirements, others
thought that partners should be held more accountable. It received
two of its lowest scores in Accountability towards beneﬁciaries and
Implementing evaluation recommendations. In relation to the former,
while most organisations were not very positive regarding accountability
toward beneficiaries, one organisation stated that Norway is always
interested in getting feedback from beneficiaries. Referring to the
implementation of evaluation recommendations, one organisation
stated, “Norway is very involved,” while another felt that “they don’t
really do qualitative follow-up.”

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/NORWAY

#185

RECOMMENDATIONS
< CONTINUE
PROGRESS
UNDERWAY
TO IMPROVE
TIMELINESS
TO COMPLEX
EMERGENCIES
Norway has improved the timeliness
of its funding substantially. In 2009,
Norway provided 69.3% of its funding
in the first six weeks following a
sudden onset emergency. In 2010,
Norway provided 88.4% of its funding
within this time frame, surpassing the
OECD/DAC and Group 1 average. For
complex emergencies, Norway provided
only 11.2% of its funding in 2009
within the first three months following
the launch of a humanitarian appeal.
In 2010, this percentage jumped to
57.5%, though it still fell short of the
OECD/DAC average of 59.4%.

<INVEST
ADEQUATELY
IN PREVENTION,
PREPAREDNESS AND
RISK REDUCTION
In 2010, Norway allocated 12.8% of
its humanitarian aid to prevention,
preparedness and reconstruction,
while the OECD/DAC average is 18.6%.
Norway’s partners seem to confirm
the need for greater support for these
issues, giving Norway its second-lowest
qualitative score.

<ENCOURAGE
LEARNING
FROM THE PAST
Norway’s partners would like to see
greater engagement from Norway
in the way it works with partners to
incorporate lessons learnt from the
past and evaluation recommendations.
Norway should engage in dialogue with
its partners to discuss their perceptions
regarding the implementation of
evaluation recommendations.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/PORTUGAL

#186

PORTUGAL

P1

P5

7.0
7

3.74

P2

4.05

2.45

P4

9
0.7

3.78

P3
OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

HUMANITARIAN
AID

0.29%

2.8%

of GNI

US $2

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
Un-earmarked 18

UN 18
Health 6

NGOs 4

BY
CHANNEL

Private orgs 2

BY
SECTOR

Coordination 3

POLICY

FUNDING

STRENGTHS
Pillar Type Indicator

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

Not speciﬁed 92

Governments 76

GENDER RATING

Haiti 82

Score

FIELD PERCEPTION

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

3

Un-earmarked funding

10.00

+92.9%

3

Funding accountability initiatives

1

Timely funding to sudden onset emergencies 9.28

+79.1%

5

Funding UN and RC/RC appeals

0.07

-98.2%

5

Participating in accountability initiatives

0.14

-96.9%

3

Funding NGOs

1.28

-71.8%

2

Funding international risk mitigation

1.37

-71.4%

0.00

-100.00%

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Portugal is not included in the overall ranking as insufficient survey
responses were obtained to calculate the qualitative indicators that
make up the index.
Portugal’s overall score was below the OECD/DAC and Group 3
averages. Portugal also scored below both averages in all pillars.

Portugal did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the
indicators on Un-earmarked funding and Timely funding to sudden
onset emergencies. Its scores were relatively the lowest in the
indicators on Funding accountability initiatives, Funding UN and RC/
RC appeals, Participating in accountability initiatives, Funding NGOs
and Funding international risk mitigation.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/PORTUGAL

#187

AID DISTRIBUTION
In 2010, Portugal’s Official Development Assistance
(ODA) comprised 0.29% of its Gross National
Income (GNI), up from 0.23% in 2009. Humanitarian
assistance represented 2.8% of Portugal’s ODA in
2010, or 0.008% of its GNI.
According to data reported to United Nations (UN)
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’
(OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), in

2010, Portugal channelled 76.4% of its humanitarian
aid bilaterally to affected governments, 17.8% to UN
agencies, and 4.2% to non-governmental organisations
(NGOs). Portugal also provided 15.1% of its total
humanitarian aid to the Central Emergency Response
Fund (CERF) (OCHA FTS 2011). In 2010 Portugal
contributed to one crisis: Haiti.

POLICY FRAMEWORK
The Portuguese Institute for Development Support
(IPAD) is responsible for coordinating Portugal’s
humanitarian assistance. The Portuguese aid system is
fairly decentralised, and IPAD coordinates the work of
approximately 20 ministries and 300 municipalities that
also play a role in international cooperation (OECD/DAC
2009). The National Civil Protection Authority is often the
mechanism by which Portugal manages the operational
delivery of humanitarian aid (OECD/DAC 2010). According
to the 2010 DAC Peer Review, “The unit responsible for
humanitarian assistance [in IPAD] has been closed and
operational responsibility now rests with the head of the
Civil Society Unit,” (OECD/DAC 2010).
Decree Law 5/2003 provides the legal framework for
Portuguese foreign assistance (OECD/DAC 2009). The
Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation
(2006a) serves as a general guiding framework for
Portugal´s development policy; including a brief section
on humanitarian action and key guiding principles.
Though the Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development

Cooperation declares that “humanitarian actions must
be viewed, planned and executed within the framework
of, and in coordination with, the other instruments
that integrate the concept of Official Development
Assistance” (IPAD 2006a), it does not provide many
details regarding Portugal’s strategy for humanitarian
action. The Action Plan for the Portuguese Strategic Vision
calls for the creation of a humanitarian assistance policy,
but this has not yet been developed (IPAD 2006b). IPAD
includes both the European Consensus on Humanitarian
Assistance and the Good Humanitarian Donorship
(GHD) Principles for reference under the humanitarian
aid section of its website, asserting their importance
as guiding frameworks for humanitarian action (IPAD
2011). IPAD has no staff members fully dedicated to
humanitarian assistance, though it has tried to increase
its field presence, adding several “Technical officers”
or “Cooperation attachés” to embassies to work on
development projects that can be co-opted as support in
times of humanitarian crises (OECD/DAC 2010).

HOW DOES NEW PORTUGAL’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Portugal's Cooperation Strategy for Gender Equality (2011) serves as the
main policy document regarding the incorporation of a gender-sensitive
approach to its aid. This framework calls for the incorporation of a
gender-sensitive approach in all of Portugal's long-term projects for each
of the six Portuguese-speaking countries as well in its humanitarian
aid programmes (IPAD 2011a). Since there is no overarching policy for
humanitarian aid, however, it is unclear if or how a gender-sensitive
approach is incorporated into Portugal’s humanitarian assistance.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/PORTUGAL

#188

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Portugal affirms that “humanity, independence, impartiality, universality
and neutrality” guide its humanitarian assistance (IPAD 2006a). Since
the Portuguese Civil Authority is sometimes deployed to deliver assigned
humanitarian aid, Portugal notes that it will ensure its aid remains
neutral, impartial and independent. However, there is no concrete
policy on how this is done; the latest DAC Peer Review states that
there is no way of knowing if “funding levels are based on an objective
determination of the severity of a particular crisis,” (OECD/DAC 2010).
In its Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation, Portugal
states that “although traditionally . . . [humanitarian] assistance
has predominantly been sent to partner countries of Portuguese
development cooperation, humanitarian aid has also been distributed in
other areas when the dimension of the disaster has entailed particularly
devastating consequences,” (IPAD 2006a). Portugal seems to be
increasingly willing to respond to emergency needs in countries outside
of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries. Portugal regularly
contributes to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in an effort
to provide timely funding to sudden-onset emergencies.

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

The Developmental Strategic Vision affirms that beneficiary participation
in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programming
is key to Portugal’s cooperation efforts (IPAD 2006a). It is not clear,
however, how beneficiary participation is incorporated into Portugal’s
humanitarian aid. The same document also stresses that “the transition
to the development phase must be taken into account at the earliest
possible moment in [humanitarian] aid operations, by building bridges
with rehabilitation and sustainable development actions,” (IPAD 2006a).
Disaster risk reduction, for example, is not integrated into partner country
programmes (OECD/DAC 2010). Portugal’s policy on prevention and
preparedness is also unclear. The same report, however, adds that the
Ministry of Interior’s civil protection unit is “strengthening existing national
disaster response mechanisms in some partner countries,” though this
has not been mainstreamed into an official policy (OECD/DAC 2010).

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

The Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation emphasises
Portugal’s wish to move towards multi-year financing for all of its
international cooperation programmes, but the 2010 DAC Peer Review
asserts that this is still not a reality (IPAD 2006a and OECD/DAC 2010).
The Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation also called
for the “creation of a specific budget line under the responsibility of IPAD,
sufficiently flexible to respond to the specificities of Humanitarian Aid,”
(IPAD 2006a). Since most of its humanitarian assistance is “projectspecific,” however, the 2010 DAC Peer Review concludes that Portugal “is
an unpredictable source of financing for humanitarian agencies,” (OECD/
DAC 2010). It also adds that “Portugal does not provide funds to the

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/PORTUGAL

#189

international Red Cross [Red Crescent] movement, or provide core funding
for multilateral agencies or NGOs, or fund Common Humanitarian Funds
(pooled funds) or Emergency Rapid Response Funds (ERRFs),” (OECD/DAC
2010). Even for project-specific financing, the 2010 DAC Peer Review noted
that “disbursement of funds can sometimes be rapid, but can also take
over 12 months, especially funds for NGOs” (OECD/DAC 2010).
In terms of fostering cooperation with other national and international
actors, the Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation calls
for the coordination both of “the various state and civil society actors” as
well as “the international community´s efforts, namely the coordination
mechanisms existing within the European Union, as well as at the
United Nations level,” (IPAD 2006a). IPAD identifies inter-institutional
coordination within Portugal as the most important challenge for the
Portuguese humanitarian system (2006a). The 2010 DAC Peer Review
echoes these concerns, noting that without a humanitarian strategy
and guidelines for NGOs, it is difficult to coordinate across the different
ministries involved in humanitarian aid (OECD/DAC 2010).

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

The Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation emphasises
that humanitarian aid must be “governed by respect for human rights
and international law...namely the right to protect victims and defend
humanitarian principles,” (IPAD 2006a). The 2010 DAC Peer Review
notes that Portugal has begun to “upgrade the civil-military coordination
(CIVMIL)” in an effort to ensure “compliance with the Oslo Guidelines and
respect for International Humanitarian Law,” and has created dialogue with
Portuguese NGOs regarding the issue (OECD/DAC 2010).
In terms of protection, the Portuguese National Strategy for Security
and Development emphasises Portugal’s commitment to human security
and protection defined as “support for civilian victims of violent conflict”
through “political, military, humanitarian and development-related
approaches” and outlines a general set of aims regarding this purpose
(IPAD 2009). These measures include the creation of a unit in IPAD to
coordinate safety issues, the training of Portuguese staff to consider
safety in plans and the encouragement of communication with other actors
to increase awareness of this issue (IPAD 2009). The Strategic Vision for
Portuguese Development Cooperation adds that “it is especially important
to pay attention to the situation of refugees and internally displaced
persons and to support the work of international organisations which
protect and promote their rights,” though there is no more information
in terms of how this will be incorporated into its humanitarian activities
specifically (IPAD 2006a). Portugal’s position on advocacy for local
governments and for the facilitation of humanitarian access is not clear.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/PORTUGAL

#190

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

The Strategic Vision for Portuguese Development Cooperation calls for
the implementation of comprehensive monitoring and mainstreamed
evaluations, both of financed projects and IPAD’s overall and country
strategies (IPAD 2006a). The assessment of the Strategic Vision in
2009 reports that IPAD has released the evaluation guidelines titled
Evaluation Policy, as well as the Evaluation Guide (IPAD 2009). The
agency also attempts to monitor field implementation “through visits
to the locations where the programmes are being implemented and
through joint action by Headquarters and by the Embassy co-operation
services,” but this is often difficult due to IPAD’s limited staff. IPAD’s
Evaluation Unit (GAII) has recently expanded its scope, also responsible
now for internal audits of IPAD. Overall, the latest DAC Peer Review
concludes that Portugal's efforts in this regard are lacklustre. It states
that “Portugal has not yet participated in joint evaluations of multilateral
partners,” instead relying on audited accounts from its implementing
NGOs, though it does conduct lesson learning exercises after civil
protection units return from carrying out relief activities (OECD/DAC
2010). In regards to transparency of funding decisions, the 2010 DAC
Peer Review reports that the lack of guidelines for humanitarian action
means that, “NGOs are not sure what format to use for proposals,
what their funding limits will be, or who should act as their focal point
within IPAD,” (OECD/DAC 2010). The 2010 DAC Peer Review also notes
that “the humanitarian budget is not transparently available in any
form during the budget year, even within IPAD, which further hinders
accountability and transparency,” (OECD/DAC 2010). Portugal’s position
on accountability towards affected populations is not clear.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/PORTUGAL

#191

RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the severe economic crisis
Portugal is currently facing, it may
need to postpone the following
recommendations until after it has
surpassed the crisis. Portugal’s recovery
will also present an opportunity for
the country to review its position on
humanitarian aid and recommit itself to
Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles.

<FORMALIZE
COMMITMENT TO
HUMANITARIAN
PRINCIPLES IN A
COMPREHENSIVE
HUMANITARIAN
POLICY
Portugal would do well to create an
official humanitarian policy which
explains its commitment to Good
Humanitarian Donorship Principles and
unites the information from various web
pages and documents into a common
humanitarian policy.

<ENHANCE SUPPORT
FOR UN AND
RC/RC APPEALS,
COORDINATION AND
SUPPORT SERVICES
AND POOLED FUNDS
Portugal received a low score for
Funding UN and RC/RC appeals, which
measures the extent to which donors
provide their fair share3 of funding to
UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/
RC) appeals, coordination and support
services and pooled funds. It scored
well below average in all components
that comprise this indicator.

< CONSIDER
CHANNELLING MORE
FUNDING TO NGOS
Portugal channelled only 4.2% of its
humanitarian funding to NGOs, compared
to the OECD/DAC average of 15.3%.
As Portugal may not be able to handle
a large number of smaller contracts to
NGOs, it could explore flexible working
models, such as shared management
arrangements with other donors,
supporting NGO umbrella organisations
or NGOs of other nationalities.

<INVEST
ADEQUATELY
IN RISK REDUCTION
Portugal allocated 0.26% of its ODA to
international risk mitigation mechanisms
– the lowest of the OECD/DAC donors.
The OECD/DAC average was 0.77% and
the Group 3 average was 0.72%.

<RENEW
COMMITMENT TO
LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
Portugal could improve its support of
learning and accountability initiatives.
Portugal is participating solely in Active
Learning Network for Accountability
and Performance in Humanitarian
Action (ALNAP) meetings, but in none
of the other initiatives included in the
indicator Participating in accountability
initiatives.1 In addition, Portugal did not
provide financial support for learning
and accountability initiatives. 2
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

#192

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/SPAIN

SPAIN

P5

HRI 2011
Ranking

P4

P2

5.46

P1

4.14

ASPIRING
ACTORS

5.54

15th

Group 3

OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

7.7
1

4
4.2

4.25

P3
HUMANITARIAN
AID

0.43%

8.9%

of GNI

US $11

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
Kenya 7

Not speciﬁed 31

Somalia 10

Pakistan 6

UN 75

Un-earmarked 11

oPt 4
Coordination 9

BY
CHANNEL

Governments 11

Health 5

Red Cross /
Red Crescent 4

STRENGTHS
Pillar Type Indicator

Food 42
Others 4

FUNDING

POLICY

Score

Haiti 23

FIELD PERCEPTION

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

Ethiopia 12

Other African
countries 21

WASH 5
Protection 3
Others 5

Other 10

GENDER RATING

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

BY
SECTOR

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

1

Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies 8.20

+18.7%

3

Funding NGOs

0.36

-92.0%

1

Timely funding to complex emergencies

+17.5%

2

Reducing climate-related vulnerability

2.01

-50.1%

2

Funding international risk mitigation

2.86

-40.1%

5

Implementing evaluation recommendations 3.40

-20.7%

3

Donor capacity and expertise

-14.8%

9.29

5.33

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Spain ranked 15th in the HRI 2011, improving two positions from
2010. Based on the patterns of its scores, Spain is classified as
a Group 3 donor, “Aspiring Actors”. Donors in this group tend to
have more limited capacity to engage with the humanitarian system
at the field level, but often aspire to take on a greater role in the
sector. They generally focus on a few core strengths, such as in the
area of prevention, preparedness and risk reduction, or on specific
geographic regions. Other donors in the group include Australia,
Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan and Luxembourg.
Spain’s overall score fell below the OECD/DAC and Group 3
averages. Spain scored below the OECD/DAC and Group 3 average

in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 1, where it was above both
averages, and Pillar 4 (Protection and international law), where Spain
scored below the OECD/DAC average, but above the Group 3 average.
Spain did best compared to its OECD/DAC peers in the indicators
on Funding vulnerable and forgotten emergencies and Timely funding
to complex emergencies. Its scores were relatively the lowest in
indicators on Funding NGOs, Reducing climate-related vulnerability,
Funding international risk mitigation, Implementing evaluation
recommendations and Donor capacity and expertise.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/SPAIN

#193

AID DISTRIBUTION
Spain was formerly one of the largest donors to the
World Food Programme and the Central Emergency
Response Fund (CERF), but the financial crisis has
led to budget cutbacks. In 2010, Spain’s Official
Development Assistance (ODA) comprised 0.43% of
its Gross National Income (GNI), down from 0.46% in
2009. Humanitarian assistance accounted for 8.9% of
its ODA, and 0.040% of its GNI.
According to data reported to the United Nations (UN)
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’

(OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011), Spain
channelled 74.6% of its funding to the UN system,
11.5% bilaterally to affected governments, 3.9% to the
Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and 1.2% nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). Spain contributed
10.9% of its humanitarian assistance to the Central
Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and 8.2% to
Common Humanitarian Funds. Spain supported 30
emergencies in 2010: 14 in Africa, seven in the
Americas and nine in Asia.

POLICY FRAMEWORK
The Humanitarian Aid Office of the Spanish Agency
for International Development Cooperation (AECID),
under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation,
oversees Spain’s humanitarian assistance. An important
characteristic of the Spanish humanitarian system is that
some of the autonomous communities in the country
provide humanitarian assistance using separate funds
and strategies. Over the past few years, Spain has
attempted to focus and coordinate these efforts through
the Humanitarian Aid Office of the AECID. The General
Directorate for Planning and Evaluation (DGPOLDE) is in
charge of evaluating all of Spain’s cooperation efforts,
including its humanitarian aid. Law 23/1998 serves as
the legal framework for Spanish foreign cooperation,
establishing AECID as the main organ in the Spanish body
for coordinating Spanish assistance; the Royal Decree
1403/2007 formally established the Humanitarian Aid
Office and its mandate (AECID 2011b). Spain is in the
process of passing a new law to replace Law 23/1998,
which will substantially modernise its international aid
system, mostly to improve coordination among the

Spanish actors (ECD Política 2010). The Humanitarian
Action Strategy (2007) guides Spanish humanitarian
action and explains the principles governing Spanish
humanitarian efforts. Spain endorsed the Principles
of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) in 2004.
Though it is in the process of developing its domestic
implementation plan, it has already incorporated the GHD
Principles into its humanitarian framework. The 20092012 Cooperation Master Plan (2009) is the main policy
document for Spanish aid and maps out cooperation
activities until 2012. This document includes a section
addressing humanitarian programmes specifically and
echoes the commitments expressed in the Humanitarian
Strategy. Every year, AECID also publishes the Annual
Plan for International Cooperation (PACI) document,
which delineates how the agency will carry out the goals
of the Cooperation Master Plan during the year and
provides a brief overview of the progress accomplished
the previous year. AECID has a total of fifty “Offices for
Technical Cooperation” or “Offices for Policy Formation”
in beneficiary countries (AECID 2011a).

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/SPAIN

#194

HOW DOES SPAIN’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Spain’s Gender in Development Strategy (2007) is the main framework
that outlines Spain's policy for gender equality measures in
development and humanitarian aid. The Humanitarian Action Strategy
incorporates the principles outlined in this document and calls for
a gender sensitive approach to humanitarian aid. This includes a
gender analysis in all humanitarian activities, the representation and
participation of women in the implementation phase, special attention
to the security concerns of women, and the compilation of genderdisaggregated indicators (MAEC 2007).

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Spain’s policy expresses a clear commitment to providing timely
humanitarian assistance based on the principles of humanity,
impartiality, neutrality and independence. The Humanitarian Action
Strategy asserts that Spain uses the European Commission's
Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO)
Global Needs Assessment (GNA) and the Forgotten Crisis Assessment
(FCA) to determine its priority countries for humanitarian aid (MAEC
2007). For disaster operations, Spain uses the analysis of the United
Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDACT) and is
currently in the process of elaborating an official protocol of its own for
emergency activities (MAEC 2007).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

The Humanitarian Action Strategy and the Cooperation Master Plan
emphasise Spain’s pledge to engage beneficiaries at all levels of
humanitarian action and to link relief to rehabilitation and development
along with prevention and preparedness (MAEC 2007). The Humanitarian
Aid Strategy calls for the inclusion of beneficiaries in the design and
implementation of a project, and requires an evaluation of beneficiary
participation (MAEC 2007). The Humanitarian Action Strategy declares
that Spanish aid shall be provided “in line with local capacity,” in an
effort to strengthen and support it (MAEC 2007). The Cooperation
Master Plan emphasises the importance of risk reduction and disaster
prevention, in line with the Hyogo principles (MAEC 2009).

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#195

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

The Humanitarian Action Strategy and the Cooperation Master Plan
recognise the importance of predictable, multi-annual and flexible funding
for humanitarian assistance. The Cooperation Master Plan calls for a
review and reform of the current financing rules for NGOs to provide
“more efficacy, efficiency and relevance” in responding to humanitarian
crises (MAEC 2009). Spain has tried to make its funding more consistent
through a permanent appeals process for implementing partners, and
has called for an increase of multi-annual funding mechanisms for its
biggest implementing partners (MAEC 2007). The Annual Plan, however,
reports that multi-annual partnerships have not been implemented
“in a massive way” with Spanish implementing partners yet (MAEC
2010). Spain has also vowed to continue supporting the Consolidated
Appeals Process (CAP) and the CERF, along with providing longer-term
contracts to its more important and preferential partners, especially
UN agencies (MAEC 2009). Both the Humanitarian Action Strategy and
the Cooperation Master Plan emphasise the importance of coordinating
Spanish humanitarian assistance, especially within its own system and
in regards to the aid provided by the Autonomous Communities of Spain
(MAEC 2007). There is less concrete discussion, however, about how to
coordinate with other international actors.

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Spain states its policy of providing access to civilians and promoting
international humanitarian law, including human rights and refugee law,
in the Humanitarian Action Strategy, and echoes these commitments in
the Cooperation Master Plan (AECID 2009). Spain also strongly affirms
in both documents that it will facilitate safe humanitarian access and
help guarantee the security of humanitarian workers (MAEC 2009).
The Humanitarian Action Strategy mentions that Spain is committed
to advocacy in the form of increasing public awareness and sensitivity
to humanitarian issues, but Spain’s policy regarding advocacy to local
governments is unclear (MAEC 2007).

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

The Humanitarian Action Strategy specifies that DGPOLDE has adapted
the Evaluation Methodology for Spanish Cooperation to evaluate the
national humanitarian assistance programme (MAEC 2007). Both the
Humanitarian Action Strategy and the Master Cooperation Plan state
that Spain aims to improve the publication of its funding information
to the public, and is a signatory of the International Aid Transparency
Initiative (MAEC 2007). In regards to the accountability of funded NGOs,
Spain has reporting and evaluation policies that are guided by Spain’s
System for Results-oriented Development Management, which include
accountability towards affected populations (MAEC 2007).

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

HOW IS SPAIN PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

Spain’s partners provided mixed feedback regarding gender. Several
highlight Spain’s interest in gender-sensitive approaches, but point
to problems in the follow-up. One interviewee reported, “AECID does
not use well-defined gender markers in the needs assessment, so
later it is not easy to have a good gender approach.” Others reveal
that though AECID has a formal gender analysis requirement, “there
is no monitoring for its implementation,” or that they get a sense it is
important to Spain “because of the gender marker in the CAP, but not
because of any real commitment.”

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/SPAIN

#197

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Similar to most donors, Spain performed fairly well in the qualitative
indicators that comprise Pillar 1. While most organisations deemed
Spain’s aid to be sufficiently neutral, impartial and independent,
several organisations questioned whether Spain endeavoured to ensure
programmes adapt to changing needs. Some partners complained that
funding decisions are taken far from the field and seem to be poorly
informed of real needs: one interviewee reported that “decisions take
place at headquarters” and do not always make sense given the ground
situation. Several organisations felt that AECID could not monitor
to ensure programmes adapt to changing needs due to limited field
presence and that it “does not even try to get there.” Opinions about
the timeliness of Spain’s funding are highly mixed. In some crises,
interviewees praised Spain for providing funding ahead of time. In others,
however, timeliness was the biggest issue: organisations in the field
explained that “AECID has the same tools for applying for developmental
and humanitarian aid funding, which doesn’t make any sense,” since the
latter often requires a more timely response.

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Most organisations in the field considered that the AECID did not seem
sufficiently concerned with beneficiary participation, although a few
interviewees noted that participation in implementation and design was
somewhat better: “AECID pays more attention to the design part of the
process ...than in implementation or evaluation.” Another interviewee
maintained that AECID’s follow-up on a project was minimal, and
provided “no requirements, recommendations, [or] questions about
the project.” Feedback regarding Linking relief to rehabilitation and
development was fairly mixed. One interviewee stated that “AECID has a
formal standard… but [has not] implemented a process at all for that.”
As for prevention, preparedness and risk reduction initiatives, field
organisations were largely critical. One interviewee affirmed that “AECID
has the idea but… it is a reactive process, and there is no proactivity.”

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

In terms of coordination, some organisations claimed that while
Spain encourages coordination among its own partners, Spanish
field representatives “do not even think about attending any cluster
meetings.” Regarding the flexibility of Spain’s funding, interviewees were
largely positive. One organisation stated that they are “excellent donors
in terms of flexibility.” However, others revealed that it was only possible
to apply to the permanent appeal fund three times a year, which was
somewhat limiting and inflexible.

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#198

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Most of Spain’s partners appreciated the country’s funding for
protection programmes, though one interviewee added that these
had to be “purely protection programmes. They do not want to mix
protection with, for example, human rights programmes.” Spain’s
field partners were more critical concerning advocacy to ensure the
protection of civilians. One interviewee named Spain, together with
other donors, for being “silent” on these issues. In terms of the
facilitating humanitarian access and the safety of humanitarian workers,
humanitarian organisations in the field agree that current efforts are
simply not enough: one organisation revealed that while AECID tried
to provide some assistance – for example, giving humanitarian staff
an unofficial identification – it was ineffective. That said, when one of
Spain’s partners took the initiative to take measures on their own to
obtain access, “AECID didn’t push for it, but when we proposed it, they
were ready to fund because they were overlooked areas.”

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Organisations in the field asserted that AECID was strict in the funding
proposal but was lacking in its monitoring and evaluation. One aid
worker reported that AECID is “focusing too much in the bureaucratic
process . . . it seems it is more important for the proposal to be
perfect in a formal way than the impact the project has.” Another
stated that AECID has a good reporting framework, but project tracking
is lacking. Spain’s partners also indicate that there is room for
improvement in relation to accountability towards beneficiaries.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/SPAIN

#199

RECOMMENDATIONS
<LOOK FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE
SOLUTIONS TO
CHANNEL MORE
FUNDING TO NGOS
Spain provided only 1.2% of its
humanitarian funding to NGOs,
compared to the OECD/DAC average
of 15.3%. Spain provided the bulk of
its funding to UN agencies, but should
consider allocating a larger portion to
NGOs. To reduce the administrative
burden, it could explore flexible working
models, such as shared management
arrangements with other donors, or
supporting NGO umbrella organisations.

<BOOSTER
THE CAPACITY
OF THE AECID
Spain received one of the lowest
scores for the qualitative, surveybased indicator, Donor capacity and
expertise. In several of the crises
covered by the HRI, field-staff were
also tasked with non-humanitarian
tasks, limiting their ability to follow up
with supported programmes. Spain
should consider investing in its
capacity at the field and headquarters
level to ensure aid is used effectively.

<ENCOURAGE
LEARNING
FROM THE PAST
Spain received the third-lowest score
for the qualitative, survey-based
indicator Implementing evaluation
recommendations, which measures
the extent to which donors work with
partners to integrate lessons learnt
in programming. Spain would do well
to strengthen its efforts to follow up
with partners to utilise lessons learnt
and evaluation recommendations in
programming.

<STRENGTHEN
SUPPORT TO
REDUCE RISK AND
CLIMATE-RELATED
VULNERABILITY
Spain could improve its support
to reduce risk and climate-related
vulnerability. Spain designated
0.36% of its ODA to international risk
mitigation mechanisms â&#x20AC;&#x201C; well below
the OECD/DAC average of 0.77%.
Spain provided only 52.5% of its fair
share3 to Fast Start Finance, which
supports climate change mitigation
and adaptation efforts, compared to
the OECD/DAC average of 102.4%.
Furthermore, it has fallen short on its
commitments to reduce emissions,
indicating that Spain could augment its
efforts to support these issues.
Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/SWEDEN

#200

SWEDEN

7.8
7

2
6.3

P4

P2

7.02

6.26

PRINCIPLED
PARTNERS

7.89

3rd

Group 1

OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

P1

P5

HRI 2011
Ranking

6.38

P3
HUMANITARIAN
AID

0.97%

12.7%

of GNI

US $61

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
Coordination 12

Red Cross /
Red Crescent 14

UN 60

DRC 7

Not speciﬁed 63

Health 4

Haiti 6

WASH 4
Shelter 4

BY
CHANNEL

NGOs 13

Un-earmarked 54

Pakistan 7

BY
SECTOR

Agriculture 3

Sudan 5
Afghanistan 3

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

Others 9

Governments 3

Others 19

Other 9

GENDER RATING

POLICY

FUNDING

STRENGTHS
Pillar Type Indicator

Score

2

Reducing climate-related vulnerability

3

FIELD PERCEPTION

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

9.91

+146.0%

2

Funding reconstruction and prevention

1.79

-60.2%

Funding UN and RC/RC appeals

10.00

+145.9%

3

Funding NGOs

3.98

-12.2%

5

Funding accountability initiatives

8.25

+100.6%

1

Timely funding to complex emergencies

7.18

-9.2%

2

Funding international risk mitigation

9.00

+88.2%

3

Un-earmarked funding

4.75

-8.5%

4

Refugee law

10.00

+77.8%

5

Appropriate reporting requirements

6.82

-3.7%

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Sweden ranked 3rd in the HRI 2011, improving two positions from
2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Sweden is classified as
a Group 1 donor, “Principled Partners”. This group is characterised
by its commitment to humanitarian principles and strong support
for multilateral partners, and generally good overall performance
in all areas. Other Group 1 donors include Denmark, Finland, the
Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland.
Sweden’s overall score was above the OECD/DAC and Group
1 averages. It scored above both average in all pillars, with the

exception of Pillar 3 (Working with humanitarian partners), where it
scored above the OECD/DAC average, but below the Group 1 average.
Compared to its OECD/DAC peers, Sweden did best in the
indicators on Reducing climate-related vulnerability, Funding UN
and RC/RC appeals, Funding accountability initiatives, Funding
international risk mitigation and Refugee law. Its scores were
relatively lower in indicators on Funding reconstruction and
prevention, Funding NGOs, Timely funding to complex emergencies,
Un-earmarked funding and Appropriate reporting requirements.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/SWEDEN

#201

AID DISTRIBUTION
After rising from 0.98% in 2008 to 1.12% in 2009,
Sweden’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) dropped
in 2010 to 0.97% as a percentage of its Gross National
Income (GNI). Humanitarian assistance represented
12.7% of its ODA in 2010, or 0.12% of its GNI.
According to data reported to the United Nations
(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) (2011),
Sweden channelled 60.6% of its 2010 humanitarian
aid to UN agencies, 13.7% to the Red Cross/Red
Crescent Movement, 13.1% to non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), 3.2% bilaterally to affected

governments and 1.6% to private organisations and
foundations. Sweden allocated 10.9% of its total
humanitarian aid to the Central Emergency Response
Fund (CERF), 6.0% to Common Humanitarian Funds,
and 1.6% to Emergency Response Funds. In 2010,
Sweden committed humanitarian aid to 53 different
countries: 25 in Africa, 17 in Asia, 11 in the Americas
and one in Europe. The Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Haiti and Pakistan were the top recipients of
Sweden’s 2010 humanitarian aid. Sectorally, Sweden
concentrated its funding on coordination and support
services and health initiatives.

POLICY FRAMEWORK
The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and
the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida)
manage the country’s humanitarian affairs. Swedish
humanitarian policy is based on The Government’s
Humanitarian Aid Policy (2004) and has been enhanced
with Sida’s 2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian
Work. In order to better meet today’s demands, Sida's
restructuring process was completed in 2010. The new
structure became effective on 1 January 2011 with nine

departments directly under the Director General. The
series of reforms include reducing staff at headquarters
and increasing staff abroad. The 2009 DAC Peer Review
has lauded Sweden for being proactive in responding to
past recommendations and urges Stockholm to continue
to overhaul, rationalise and clarify its policy framework
(OECD/DAC 2009). Sida currently has field presence in
44 Swedish embassies worldwide (Sida 2011), though it
is not clear if this will change the current restructuring.

HOW DOES SWEDEN’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

Both The Government’s Humanitarian Policy and Sida’s 2008-2010
Strategy for Humanitarian Work emphasise the need for a gendersensitive approach in humanitarian operations. Sweden calls for
appropriate measures to protect and meet the needs of women in
armed conflict and pledges to pay particular attention to the special
situation of the women in both disaster and conflict situations in its
funding decisions (MFA 2004).

DARA/HRI 2011/DONOR ASSESSMENTS/SWEDEN

#202

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Sweden’s humanitarian policy expresses a strong commitment to needbased humanitarian responses. In The Government’s Humanitarian Aid Policy,
Sweden pledges to adhere to the humanitarian principles of humanity,
impartiality, neutrality and independence and to provide timely humanitarian
assistance that focuses on the most vulnerable groups (MFA 2004). In its
2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work, Sida states that it will inform
partner organisations of the funding levels they expect to provide early in the
financial year, placing special importance on forgotten crises (Sida 2007).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

The 2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work recognises the importance
of supporting the transition from relief to rehabilitation and development. It
also states that Sida prefers to support organisations with local partners
in order support the capacity of local structures to handle crisis situations
(Sida 2007). In order to reduce vulnerability, the Swedish government
asserts that it will allocate funds to promote disaster preparedness
and prevention, and for initial reconstruction programmes following a
humanitarian crisis (MFA 2004). Sweden, however, does not seem to place
the same emphasis on conflict prevention and preparedness.

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

The Swedish MFA expresses its commitment to making humanitarian aid as
flexible and predictable as possible. For long-term crises, the government can
commit itself to grants that extend beyond the current fiscal year, provided
Parliament approves the government’s budget proposals (MFA 2004). In
the 2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work Sweden recognises the
importance of multilateralism, affirming its support for the coordination efforts
of the UN and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (IFRC), as well as for the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals Process
and the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (Sida 2007). Sweden supports
both national and international NGOs and specifically states that “conditions
to the effect that organisations must employ Swedish staff or material in
connection with aid must not be attached to the grants,” (MFA 2004).

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Sweden’s humanitarian policy is rooted in international law, especially those
derived from the 1949 Geneva Conventions and subsequent protocols.
The Government’s Humanitarian Aid Policy states that Sweden “constantly”
advocates for improving the protection of civilians in conflict situations when
Sweden engages in international dialogue in multilateral arenas. Sweden
recognises the need to adhere to international standards when participating
in complex emergencies; these include the Guidelines on the Use of Civil
and Military Defence Assets and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s
reference paper Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies. Sweden’s
formal policy regarding advocacy toward local authorities is not clear.

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PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Sida’s 2008-2010 Strategy for Humanitarian Work expresses its support for
the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles regarding learning and
accountability. The agency is required to annually assess whether or not
goals in its humanitarian policy are being met (Sida 2007). Sweden also
participates in several accountability initiatives such as the Humanitarian
Accountability Partnership International (HAP-I), Sphere and the Active
Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
(ALNAP). Sida’s humanitarian policy calls for increased support for qualified
research and methods development in the humanitarian field (Sida 2007).

Organisations interviewed in the field responded positively to Sweden’s
approach to gender issues in its humanitarian work. “Sweden is
especially keen on incorporating gender initiatives,” reported one
interviewee. Another responded that many of Sida’s programmes pay
special attention to women’s needs.

PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Field organisations were largely positive regarding Sweden’s Pillar 1
practices. Several organisations commented that Swedish aid was timely,
impartial and need-based. “Sweden is keen on being informed and
knowing the situation on the ground but they are never intrusive,” noted
one organisation. Most partner organisations appreciated Sweden’s
follow-up through field visits and meetings to ensure programmes adapt
to changing needs, though a few noted that this was not possible:
“Funding is completely unearmarked so you can't expect them to do
verification” stated one organisation. Partners consider its funding
very timely. One interviewee felt that Sweden was an example of best
practice: “they do only one installment and transfer the whole amount at
the beginning of the programme.”

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Similar to most donors, Sweden received some of its lowest scores in
Pillar 2 indicators with the exception of Strengthening local capacity, where
it was stronger. One organisation reported that Sida requires a local
capacity assessment before and after each project. One organisation
stated that Sida always requests participatory approaches to be included
in all programmes, though another noted that “it is in their proposal
template, but it’s easier to just say you do it.” Regarding the indicator
Linking relief to rehabilitation and development, one organisation reported
the following: “Sweden has the same country team for humanitarian
and development, so we are able to discuss better both recovery and
development approaches in funding, but they are always sending mixed
signals with little clarity.” One interviewee attributed the lack of clarity
to recent changes within Sida: “Sida has split its funding streams,
which makes it hard to know who to deal with. Also, policy changes in
Sweden are affecting the work of the donor agency and humanitarian
organisations. We are tearing our hair out because no one knows for
sure which direction to go.” Regarding prevention and risk reduction,
one interviewee highlighted Sida for requesting partners “show that
programmes do not contribute to the conflict, and prevent situations that
might place beneficiaries in harm, but this is not very explicit.” Another
stressed the need for greater focus on prevention: “Sida likes to see
how you mitigate risks associated to your programme in your project
formulation. Prevention is not as strong as it should be, though.”

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PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

In Pillar 3, Sweden received one of its highest qualitative scores for
the flexibility of its funding, several highlighted the no-cost extensions
Sweden made available to partners. There was greater concern,
however, related to recent internal changes affecting Sweden’s
capacity. While one interviewee was fairly positive: “They came to the
field, listened to our needs, asked for detailed information and have
followed up on the crisis very closely,” others felt that the restructuring
process appears to be having negative side effects on Sweden’s
work in the field. “Sida is overwhelmed. It has strong expertise but
insufficient capacity as their funding has been severely cut due to
political decisions,” noted one representative. “Sida's staff here is only
one person, that's why they can't be too good,” commented another.
Partners see Sweden as a fairly strong supporter of coordination.

PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

While partner organisations state that Sweden is a strong financial
supporter of protection, several report that advocacy is less of a
priority. However, some interviewees noted that Sweden did engage in
advocacy somewhat. One stated that Sweden “engages very closely
with the humanitarian coordinator and is very keen to raise the issues.”
Various organisations stated that Sida mainly relies on the UN to carry
out access and safety initiatives.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Many organisations reported that Sweden does not prioritise accountability
toward beneficiaries. “Sweden takes a very orthodox humanitarian position,
and does not really think it is important or feel the need for beneficiary
accountability,” stated one organisation. Another reported that Sweden
“only demands limited accountability to beneficiaries.” Sweden received
its lowest qualitative score for Implementing evaluation recommendations.
On a more positive note, Sweden is considered to be the most transparent
donor in its funding and decision-making. Partners held mixed views of
the appropriateness of Sweden’s reporting requirements, although one
organisation applauded Sweden’s initiative in harmonising reporting
requirements with another donor.

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RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are
based on data from 2010. It remains to
be seen how the restructuring of Sida
will influence these issues.

<INVEST
ADEQUATELY IN
PREVENTION,
PREPAREDNESS,
RISK REDUCTION AND
RECONSTRUCTION
Sweden received one of the lowest
scores of the OECD/DAC donors for
Funding reconstruction and prevention,
giving only 7.1% of its humanitarian
aid for these issues, compared to
the OECD/DAC average of 18.6%.
Sweden’s field partners also report
the need for greater support, as
Sweden received one of its lowest
qualitative scores for Prevention and
risk reduction. Sweden should look into
ways to ensure it is supporting these
issues sufficiently.

<LOOK FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE
SOLUTIONS TO
CHANNEL MORE
FUNDING TO NGOS
Sweden channelled 13.1% of its
funding through NGOs in 2010, slightly
below the OECD/DAC average of 15.3%
and a significant drop from 2009 when
it allocated 21.2% to NGOs. This is
somewhat compensated by Sweden’s
support for Emergency Response
Funds, which normally provides
emergency funding to NGOs. Staff
cut-backs will likely make it difficult for

Sweden to manage a large number of
grants, but it may be able to increase
its support to NGOs and reduce
somewhat the administrative burden by
creating flexible working models, such
as shared management arrangements
with other donors, or supporting NGO
umbrella organisations.

<KEEP INTERNAL
REFORMS FOCUSED
ON IMPROVING
EFFECTIVENESS
Field interviews with some of Sweden’s
long-standing partners warned
of the risk of Sweden becoming
excessively bureaucratic, asserting
that internal restructuring and more
exhaustive funding procedures could
reduce Sweden’s capacity to engage
strategically at the field level as well as
the flexibility of its funding. This year,
Sweden was among the lowest group
of donors for Appropriate reporting
requirements. It could also improve the
flexibility of its funding: in 2010, 28.5%
of Sweden’s humanitarian aid to the
International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food
Programme (WFP), the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR), the UN Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), International Federation
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies (IFRC), the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA) and the UN Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA) was un-earmarked,
while the Group 1 average was 47.8%.

Please see www.daraint.org
for a complete list of references.

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SWITZERLAND

7.9
8

3
6.5

P4

P2

6.35

4.39

PRINCIPLED
PARTNERS

6.36

6th

Group 1

OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE

P1

P5

HRI 2011
Ranking

5.70

P3
HUMANITARIAN
AID

0.41%

12.6%

of GNI

US $37

of ODA

Per person

HUMANITARIAN AID DISTRIBUTION (%)
Food 14

UN 35

Haiti 5
oPt 5

Not speciﬁed 61

Un-earmarked 52

Pakistan 5
Sudan 4

Coordination 10

BY
CHANNEL

Governments 14

NGOs 8
Other 3

BY
SECTOR

Health 3
Education 3
Infrastructure 3

Somalia 3
Zimbabwe 3

Others 7

Others 20

Red Cross /
Red Crescent 40

GENDER RATING

FUNDING

POLICY

STRENGTHS
Pillar Type Indicator

Score

BY
RECIPIENT
COUNTRY

Myanmar 4

FIELD PERCEPTION

% above

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

average

Pillar Type Indicator

OECD/DAC

% below
Score

OECD/DAC

average

5

Participating in accountability initiatives

9.58

+114.2%

2

Funding reconstruction and prevention

1.92

5

Funding accountability initiatives

8.02

+95.0%

3

Funding NGOs

2.36

-47.9%

4

International humanitarian law

9.95

+62.6%

2

Reducing climate-related vulnerability

3.02

-25.0%

2

Funding international risk mitigation

6.51

+36.2%

2

Prevention and risk reduction

3.58

-20.7%

4

Advocacy towards local authorities

7.13

+28.1%

4

Human rights law

4.93

-20.1%

-57.1%

OVERALL PERFORMANCE
Switzerland ranked 6th in the HRI 2011, improving one position
from 2010. Based on the pattern of its scores, Switzerland is
classified as a Group 1 donor, “Principled Partners”. This group is
characterised by its commitment to humanitarian principles and
strong support for multilateral partners, and generally good overall
performance in all areas. Other Group 1 donors include Denmark,
Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.
Switzerland’s global score was above the OECD/DAC average,
but below the Group 1 average. Similarly, Switzerland scored above
the OECD/DAC average in all pillars, with the exception of Pillar 2

(Prevention, risk reduction and recovery). It scored below the Group
1 average in all pillars, except for Pillar 1 (Responding to needs),
where it scored above average.
Compared to its OECD/DAC peers, Switzerland did best in the
indicators on Participating in accountability initiatives, Funding
accountability initiatives, International humanitarian law, Funding
international risk mitigation and Advocacy towards local authorities.
Its scores were relatively the lowest in the indicators on Funding
reconstruction and prevention, Funding NGOs, Reducing climate-related
vulnerability, Prevention and risk reduction and Human rights law.

All scores are on a scale of 0 to 10. Colours represent performance compared to OECD/DAC donors’ average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

Non applicable

Quantitative Indicator

Qualitative Indicator

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AID DISTRIBUTION
In 2010, Switzerland reduced its Official Development
Assistance (ODA) from 0.45% of Gross National
Income (GNI) in 2009 to 0.41% of GNI. Humanitarian
assistance represented 12.6% of its ODA in 2010,
or 0.051% of its GNI.
According to data reported to the United Nations
(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), in
2010, 40.2% of Switzerland´s humanitarian funding

was channelled to UN agencies, 27.1% to the Red
Cross/Red Crescent Movement, 18.7% bilaterally to
affected governments, 10.5% to non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), and 1.3% to private
organisations/foundations. Over half of Switzerland´s
funding was not designated for a particular region or
country. In 2010, Switzerland supported 24 crises
in Africa, 18 in Asia, seven in the Americas, three in
Europe, and one in Oceania.

POLICY FRAMEWORK
Switzerland’s humanitarian aid is provided by the
Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit of the Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation (SDC) – which is part
of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The
1976 Swiss Federal Law on International Development
Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid clearly separates
the objectives of humanitarian aid and development in
their budgets (SDC 1988). Switzerland’s humanitarian
policy, outlined in the humanitarian strategy, Concept of
Commitment of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid (HA) and the
Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA) from 2009 to 2014, is
grounded in both international humanitarian law and the

Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) (SDC
2010a). The Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation:
Strategy 2010 regards Swiss humanitarian action as an
investment in sustainable development and emphasises
support for humanitarian principles and coordination
as strategic priorities (SDC 2010b). SDC has also
published specific policies on gender, human rights,
corruption, climate change, and disaster risk reduction.
Switzerland’s Humanitarian Aid Unit, Swiss Rescue
Team and Rapid Response Team are available for rapid
deployment to humanitarian emergencies.

HOW DOES SWITZERLAND’S POLICY ADDRESS GHD CONCEPTS?

GENDER

SDC has a comprehensive policy regarding gender, including its relation
to humanitarian aid, a specific Gender Unit and a toolkit to help
collaborators implement gender mainstreaming in planning (2011b).
Most notably, SDC published Gender & Humanitarian Aid: Why and how
should SDC integrate gender into Humanitarian Aid? in 2008. Gender
is also addressed in Gender Equality: A key for poverty alleviation
and sustainable development, especially in terms of capacity building
(SDC 2003). In its Guidelines for Disaster Risk Reduction, Switzerland
recognises that disasters can provide opportunities for societal change
in power structures including gender (SDC 2008b).

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PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Switzerland’s policy expresses a strong commitment to the principles of
neutrality, impartiality, independence, adding that it also “unwaveringly
promotes respect for these same principles by other players,” (SDC 2010b,
p. 6). Swiss humanitarian aid policies state that decisions are based on the
greatest need, level of fragility and vulnerability and pay special attention to
vulnerable groups including women, children, sick, elderly, poor and disabled
persons. Switzerland’s humanitarian policy also recognises the importance
of timeliness in the provision of humanitarian assistance (SDC 2010b).

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

Prevention and preparedness are highlighted as strategic fields of activity
in the Swiss Confederation Humanitarian Aid Strategy 2010. This includes
the early anticipation, identification and reduction of disaster risks and
damage. The 2008 SDC Guidelines on Disaster Risk Reduction is intended
to instruct SDC staff on the best way to ensure disaster risk reduction is
integrated into programming. These guidelines, together with the 20092014 humanitarian strategy, stress the importance of capacity building
(SDC 2008a and SDC 2010a). Switzerland also acknowledges the need
for affected populations to participate in the humanitarian programmes
it supports, and considers them partners with important decision-making
capabilities. Reconstruction and rehabilitation are underscored as strategic
fields of activity, and in 2010, Switzerland published Reconstruction and
Rehabilitation Concept of the Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation
and the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit to guide implementation (SDC 2010c).

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

According to the Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss Confederation Strategy
2010, Switzerland coordinates with public institutions, the private sector,
governments and state actors, UN agencies, regional organisations,
the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement (especially the International
Committee of the Red Cross), Swiss NGOs, as well as international
and local NGOs (SDC 2010b). Despite earmarking 10% of its budget
for food supplies, Switzerland acknowledges the need for flexibility in
its humanitarian policies. Additionally, Switzerland considers that “new
kinds of crises and complex emergencies require flexible and adaptable
measures as well as innovative solutions,” (SDC 2010b, p.9).

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PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

SDC does not have any publicly accessible policy documents specific
to human rights, international humanitarian law and refugee law
in humanitarian aid, but did publish two related documents for its
development work: SDC´s Human Rights Policy: Towards a Life in Dignity,
Realising rights for poor people (SDC 2006a) and Promoting Human Rights
in Development Cooperation (SDC 1998). The Humanitarian Aid of the
Swiss Confederation Strategy 2010 lists advocacy as one of Switzerland’s
strategic fields of activity, which further specifies the importance of
protection “through presence and testimony,” (SDC 2010b, p.10).
Switzerland commits to increasing security training for its employees
including behavioral exercises and continuing education (SDC 2010a,
p.11). A new group of experts dedicated to security was created to
improve self-protection for Swiss mission personnel (SDC 2010a).

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Although Switzerland’s humanitarian policy does not specifically
mention accountability, Fighting Corruption: SDC Strategy, one of its
development policies, addresses transparency and accountability
(SDC 2006b). The Active Learning Network for Accountability and
Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) is also listed as one of
the partners of SDC (SDC 2011a). SDC states that it is committed to
transparent planning, implementation, and reporting, and considers the
transparent delegation of decision-making powers and responsibilities a
way to maintain efficiency and reduce bureaucracy. Transparency is also
seen as a means of raising awareness of humanitarian activities among
Swiss and global citizens. Furthermore, Switzerland acknowledges
the need for evaluation and quality control. In 2002, SDC published
Guidelines Evaluation & Controlling, which details programme cycle
management and independent evaluation. Humanitarian Aid of the Swiss
Confederation Strategy 2010 expresses a commitment to the Good
Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles and Swiss Humanitarian Aid’s
Rapid Response Teams have received ISO 9001:2000 certification to
ensure conformity with international standards.

Colours represent performance compared to donor's average performance rating:
Good

Mid-range

Could improve

HOW IS SWITZERLAND PERCEIVED BY ITS PARTNERS?

GENDER

In relation to gender, one interviewee reported, “No one looks at
different gender issues, and cultural issues. I’ve never been given
feedback on a proposal in this regard.” Another noted, “We mainstream
gender in our programmes, and donors are not requesting this from us
at all,” referring to Switzerland, as well as the other donors supporting
their programmes. Some report that while gender is a requirement, it
may be reduced to “just check[ing] on paper. That's all.”

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PILLAR 1

RESPONDING
TO NEEDS

Switzerland’s partners seem to consider its humanitarian funding
neutral, impartial, independent and timely. Interviewees also praised
SDC for funding based on need, including “things that are not only life
saving” and in areas where other donors decided to withdraw. Another
interviewee described Switzerland as a “fantastic donor in all senses.”
In relation to Adapting to changing needs, one of Switzerland’s partners
reported the following: “The Swiss cooperation does field visits. They
invite us to elaborate annual plans with them. They discuss with us
and get involved in the response. They organise meetings for all NGOs
working with them, local and international, and we exchange opinions
and good practices.” Another interviewee indicated that Sweden was
more reactive than proactive in this regard: “We tell them the needs
have changed. They trust our capacity.”

PILLAR 2

PREVENTION,
RISK REDUCTION
AND RECOVERY

With the exception of Strengthening local capacity, where it received
somewhat higher scores, Switzerland’s partners were critical of the
country’s support for the other indicators that comprise Pillar 2.
Switzerland received its lowest qualitative score for its support of
prevention, preparedness and risk reduction. Partner organisations
held mixed views of Switzerland’s support for Linking relief to
rehabilitation and development (LRRD). While one organisation
recognised SDC for supporting a multiyear early recovery programme
based on an LRRD approach another interviewee commented,
“Our donors could do more. Recovery is not funded.” On a more
positive note, Switzerland’s partners stated that SDC is known for
strengthening local capacity, with programmes driven by community
knowledge and supporting community rehabilitation.

PILLAR 3

WORKING WITH
HUMANITARIAN
PARTNERS

Partner organisations’ perception of Switzerland’s support for
coordination was somewhat mixed, although the organisations were
appreciative of Switzerland’s efforts in this regard and spoke of a “true
partnership” with Switzerland because “they get involved and discuss
annual plans.” Another interviewee said that Switzerland regularly
asks for information from another humanitarian organisation which
communicated with a party of the conflict. Switzerland was praised for
its support and use of the cluster system, pooled funding mechanisms,
communication with other organisations, engaging with the humanitarian
coordinator and other coordination procedures. However, one interviewee
noted a difference in acceptance between the local and headquarters
levels of a pooled funding mechanism. Field organisations’ feedback on
the flexibility of Switzerland’s funding was largely positive.

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PILLAR 4

PROTECTION AND
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

According to one interviewee, Switzerland advocated by slowly pushing
authorities to fulfill their responsibilities. Another noted that “the Swiss
cooperation does advocacy on technical issues. They are totally neutral
for everything else.” Partner organisations praised Switzerland’s funding
for protection, though seemed to be more critical regarding the facilitation
of humanitarian access and security of humanitarian workers. One
organisation complained that “they don’t do anything, even with threats
of abduction,” in reference to Switzerland, as well as their other donors.

PILLAR 5

LEARNING AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

Many field organisations reported that Switzerland did not do enough
to ensure accountability to affected populations. According to one
interviewee, Switzerland “does not require accountability to beneficiaries;
they just audit the funds, but do not go beyond that.” Regarding the
implementation of recommendations from past evaluations, Switzerland’s
partners would like to see some improvement. One organisation
reported, “Donors give you funding and almost forget about you. There
is no follow-up,” referring to Switzerland, as well as its other donors.
Switzerland’s partners provided much more positive feedback regarding
its transparency and reporting requirements.