Pepper v. St. Charles County

Appeal
from the Circuit Court of St. Charles County Honorable Daniel
G. Pelikan

LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, JUDGE

Did
St. Charles County voters lawfully and effectively amend
their county charter to prohibit red-light cameras, even
within the County's incorporated municipalities? Yes,
they did.

We hold
that the county charter amendment is a valid exercise of St.
Charles County's broad authority to regulate municipal
services and functions under Missouri Constitution article
VI, section 18(c), and does not contravene a statewide
policy; that the amendment does not violate the county
charter; and that the amendment does not invade the province
of the judiciary. Furthermore, the proposition appearing on
the ballot contained no irregularities of sufficient
magnitude to cast doubt on the validity of the election.
Consequently, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Factual
and Procedural Background

The St.
Charles County Council adopted Ordinance No. 14-044,
submitting to voters a proposed amendment to the county
charter that would prohibit the use of "red-light
cameras" throughout the county, including within the
county's municipalities. In November 2014, St. Charles
County presented the following proposition to the
county's voters:

PROPOSITION RED LIGHT CAMERA

Shall the St. Charles County Charter be amended to add a
Section 10.130 reading:

"10.130. Automated Traffic Enforcement Systems.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this St. Charles
County Charter, red light cameras or similar photograph
devices or automated traffic enforcement systems may not be
used in enforcing traffic regulations adopted by St. Charles
County or by any municipality within St. Charles County that
prohibit drivers from entering intersections when controlled
by red traffic lights, and no such municipality may exercise
the legislative power to use such cameras or devices or
systems. This prohibition is the only limit imposed by this
Charter upon the County or any municipality within it in
performing their functions of regulating traffic and imposes
no additional costs that need to be financed."?

The St.
Charles County Election Authority certified the results of
the election. Registered voters approved the charter
amendment by a vote of 72.6% in favor and 27.4% opposed.

The
plaintiffs, taxpayers Jim Pepper and Pamela Fogarty, the
fourth-class cities of St. Peters and Lake St. Louis,
Missouri, and the constitutional charter city of
O'Fallon, Missouri (collectively "the Cities"),
filed suit against the defendants, St. Charles County and the
Director of Elections of St. Charles County. Two taxpayers
who supported the amendment-Carl Bearden and Dan Rakers-later
intervened as defendants. (We refer to all defendants
collectively as "the County").

In
three counts, the Cities sought a declaratory judgment
stating that the charter amendment violates the Missouri
Constitution and the St. Charles County Charter; sought
injunctive relief to prohibit enforcement of the charter
amendment; and contested the election, challenging the form
of the ballot proposition submitting the charter amendment to
the voters. An additional count alleged that the charter
amendment impaired the City of St. Peters's contract with
a third party.

The
parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court
upheld the amendment to the St. Charles County charter
prohibiting the use of "red light cameras or similar
photograph devices or automated traffic enforcement
systems" to enforce traffic regulations, and prohibiting
municipalities from "exercis[ing] the legislative power
to use such cameras or devices or systems." The trial
court granted summary judgment to the County on the three
counts of the Cities' petition seeking declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief and contesting the election.
The City of St. Peters voluntarily dismissed the
petition's remaining count.

The
trial court concluded that the "Charter Amendment does
not violate Article VI, sections 18(a), 18(b), and 18(c) of
the Missouri constitution and is, therefore, valid and
enforceable." The court also determined that the
proposition submitted to the voters complied with the
requirement of article VI, section 18(c) that the ballot
"contain a clear definition of the power, function or
service to be performed, " and that the proposition
language submitted to the voters adequately informed them of
the specific activities prohibited. The Cities appeal. The
Missouri Municipal League filed an amicus brief in
support of the Cities.

Standard
of Review

Summary
judgment allows a trial court to enter judgment for the
moving party where the party demonstrates a right to judgment
as a matter of law based on facts about which there is no
genuine dispute. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am.
Marine Supply Corp.,854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc
1993). Our review is essentially de novo. Id. When
considering an appeal from summary judgment, we review the
record in the light most favorable to the party against whom
the court entered judgment. Id. We can affirm a
summary judgment by any appropriate theory supported by the
record. Missouri Bankers Assoc, Inc. v. St. Louis
County,448 S.W.3d 267, 270-71 (Mo. banc 2014).

Discussion

In
eight points on appeal, the Cities claim the trial court
erred in granting the County's motion for summary
judgment. They challenge the County's authority for the
charter amendment under numerous constitutional provisions
and the county charter itself; allege that the amendment
invades the province of the judiciary; and challenge the
validity of the election in which voters passed the
amendment. In a ninth point, the Cities appeal the trial
court's denial of their motion for summary judgment based
on the foregoing arguments.

The
County's Authority for the Charter Amendment

In six
points, the Cities challenge the County's authority for
the charter amendment under numerous Missouri constitutional
provisions-namely article VI, section 15, relating to
classification of cities; article VI, sections 18(a), 18(b),
and 18(c), relating to charter counties and their powers; and
section 19 of article VI, relating to charter cities such as
the City of O'Fallon. The Cities also contend that the
amendment violates the county charter itself.

The
rules of statutory construction apply to constitutional
provisions, and we give constitutional provisions a broad
construction because of their more permanent nature.
Chesterfield Fire Protection Dist. v. St. Louis
County,645 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Mo. banc 1983). "The
rules of construction are designed to give effect to the
intent and purpose of the provision." Id.

Section
18(a) permits a county to adopt a charter for its own
government. K-Mart, 672 S.W.2d at 131. Article VI,
section 18(a) provides:

Any county having more than 85, 000 inhabitants, according to
the census of the United States, may frame and adopt and
amend a charter for its own government as provided in this
article, and upon such adoption shall be a body corporate and
politic. In addition and as an alternative to the foregoing,
any county which attains first class county status and
maintains such status for at least two years shall be
authorized to frame and adopt and amend a charter for its own
government as provided by this article, and upon such
adoption by a vote of the qualified electors of such county
shall be a body corporate and politic. Counties which adopt
or which have adopted a charter or constitutional form of
government shall be a separate class of counties outside of
the classification system established under section 8 of this
article.

St. Charles County became a charter county in 1993.

Section
18(b) sets forth the specific provisions that a county
charter shall contain. It also provides "that a charter
county shall possess an implied grant of power 'for the
exercise of all powers and duties of counties and county
officers prescribed by the constitution and laws of the state
....'" Missouri Bankers, 448 S.W.3d at 271.
Section 18(b) states in full:

The charter shall provide for its amendment, for the form of
the county government, the number, kinds, manner of
selection, terms of office and salaries of the county
officers, and for the exercise of all powers and duties of
counties and county officers prescribed by the constitution
and laws of the state; however, such charter shall, except
for the charter of any county with a charter form of
government and with more than six hundred thousand but fewer
than seven hundred thousand inhabitants, require the assessor
of the county to be an elected officer.

The
power described in section 18(b) is limited in that a charter
or ordinance enacted under this section may not "invade
the province of general legislation involving the public
policy of the state as a whole." Id. (quoting
Flower Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. St. Louis
County,528 S.W.2d 749, 754 (Mo. banc 1975)). The
current dispute, however, does not involve the implied power
contained in section 18(b); rather, it involves the express
power granted to charter counties in section 18(c).

Article
VI, section 18(c) is key to resolution of this case. Section
18(c) sets forth the provisions authorized in county
charters, namely the county's participation in the
government of other local units. Hardy v. Fire Standards
Comm'n,992 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999).
Section 18(c) provides as follows.

The charter may provide for the vesting and exercise of
legislative power pertaining to any and all services and
functions of any municipality or political subdivision,
except school districts, in the part of the county outside
incorporated cities; and it may provide, or authorize its
governing body to provide, the terms upon which the county
may contract with any municipality or political subdivision
in the county and perform any of the services and functions
of any such municipality or political subdivision.

The charter may provide for the vesting and exercise of
legislative power pertaining to any and all services and
functions of any municipality or political subdivision,
except school districts, throughout the entire county within
as well as outside incorporated municipalities', any
such charter provision shall set forth the limits within
which the municipalities may exercise the same power
collaterally and coextensively. When such a proposition is
submitted to the voters of the county the ballot shall
contain a clear definition of the power, function or service
to be performed and the method by which it will be financed.

(Emphasis added).

As
amended in 1970, article VI, section 18(c) of the Missouri
Constitution grants the County broad "legislative power
pertaining to any and all services and functions of any
municipality or political subdivision, except school
districts, throughout the entire county within as well as
outside incorporated municipalities." Mo. Const, art.
VI, sec. 18(c); Missouri Bankers, 448 S.W.3d at 272.
A "function" is all of the activity appropriate to
the nature of political subdivisions or municipalities that
combine to produce services, which are those acts performed
by political subdivisions or municipalities for the benefit
of the general public. Chesterfield Fire Protection
Dist., 645 S.W.2d at 371.

The
police power is one of the powers delegated to charter
counties by the state pursuant to article VI, section 18(c).
Missouri Bankers, 448 S.W.3d at 272. Our Courts have
held that generally the function of the police power is to
promote the welfare, health, and safety of the people by
regulating all tin-eats either to the comfort, safety, and
welfare of the citizenry or harmful to the public interest.
Id. A charter county's exercise of the police
power delegated by the state under article VI, section 18(c)
is a governmental function. Id.

Several
Missouri decisions support the proposition that "the
police powers delegated to a charter county are
constitutional grants of authority that are not subject to,
but take precedence over, the legislative power."
Id. Nonetheless, the County remains a legal
subdivision of the state, and consequently, it can control
only matters of distinctly local concern, and at the same
time must act in harmony with the general law when it touches
upon matters of state policy. Id.

The
Cities argue that state law delegates exclusive authority to
control traffic on city streets to the cities, and likewise
limits counties' legislative power regarding traffic
control to unincorporated areas of the counties. Further, the
Cities argue, no state law authorizes a county to regulate
traffic within the boundaries of any incorporated
municipality.

The
Cities cite the unhelpful case of State ex rel Audrain
County v. City of Mexico,197 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. 1946), for
the proposition that state law grants exclusive authority
over city streets to the cities. Although decided the year
after adoption of the Constitution of 1945, Audrain
County makes no reference to section 18 of article VI.
Furthermore, our Supreme Court decided Audrain
County decades before the amendment of section 18(c) in
1970, which added the second paragraph, which expressly
provides that "[t]he charter may provide for the vesting
and exercise of legislative power pertaining to any and all
services and functions of any municipality or political
subdivision, except school districts, throughout the entire
county within as well as outside incorporated municipalities
...." Mo. Const, art. VI, sec. 18(c). Referring to the
"wholly new" section 18, our Supreme Court stated
that "[b]ecause of the novel provisions of the section,
prior decisions are of little help." Shepley,
280 S.W.2d at 659. We agree with our Supreme Court's
assessment of the caselaw. We place no reliance on
Audrain County.

The
Cities also rely on sections 304.120 RSMo. (Supp. 2013),
82.190 RSMo. (2000), [1] and 88.670 RSMo. (2000) to argue that they
have exclusive control over traffic on their streets. Section
304.120 RSMo. (Supp. 2013) provides that
"[municipalities, by ordinance, may" establish
traffic regulations that, inter alia, set speed
limits, establish one-way streets, require traffic to stop
before crossing intersections, limit use of designated
streets to passenger vehicles, regulate parking on the
street, require the use of signaling devices, prohibit
sound-producing warning devices other than forward-directed
horns, and establish additional traffic regulations to meet
municipal needs and traffic conditions. Nowhere does section
304.120 RSMo. (Supp. 2013) say that cities have exclusive
control over all traffic regulation on city streets.

Section
82.190 states that "[s]uch [constitutional charter] city
shall have exclusive control over its public highways,
streets, avenues, alleys and public places, and shall have
exclusive power, by ordinance, to vacate or abandon any
public highway, street, avenue, alley or public place . . .
." Section 88.670 relates to the powers of fourth-class
cities to make public improvements. This section grants
fourth-class cities the power to enact ordinances to: (1)
levy and collect property taxes; and (2) open and improve
streets, make sidewalks, and build bridges, culverts, drains,
and sewers. Sec. 88.670.1. It grants fourth-class cities
"exclusive control over all streets, alleys, avenues and
public highways within the limits of such city." Sec.
88.670.3. The language of sections 82.190 and 88.670 pertain
to a municipality's exclusive authority over the physical
property that comprises city streets.

Even
were we to construe the cited statutes to grant cities
exclusive authority over regulation of traffic on
city streets, the referenced statutes do not grant exclusive
control over all matters related to regulation of
traffic-enforcement mechanisms on city streets, which is
a critical distinction. Traffic-enforcement mechanisms that
are not necessarily traffic regulations-for example, laws
governing the use of DWI checkpoints or radar and laser
units-do not regulate traffic, but rather govern how traffic
regulation may be enforced. Similarly, the charter amendment
here does not seek to regulate traffic on city streets, but
addresses how the regulations may be enforced. Specifically,
it provides that "red light cameras or similar
photograph devices or automated traffic enforcement
systems may not be used in enforcing traffic
regulations." (Emphases added.) The charter
amendment does not purport to regulate traffic directly. It
does not seek to tell cities how to set speed limits, where
to place traffic signals and signs, where to establish
one-way streets, how to restrict certain kinds of traffic,
how to control parking, and the like.

The
Cities also maintain that the charter amendment violates the
limits of article VI, section 18(c) because it addresses a
matter of statewide concern-rather than a matter of purely
local concern-and is out of harmony with the general laws of
the state on this matter of statewide public policy. Missouri
cases provide little clarity about what constitutes a matter
of purely local concern and what constitutes a matter of
statewide policy. What this general rule arguably seeks to
promote, however, is uniformity throughout the state by
distinguishing between uniquely local concerns and matters
that merit a uniform approach statewide. We recognize that
sometimes a charter county's power under article VI,
section 18(c) must yield to statewide policy. With regard to
red-light cameras and similar automated traffic-control
devices, however, we find no statewide policy exists.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Missouri
has no state statute pertaining to red-light cameras or
similar devices. Slate Laws, States, Missouri,
Governors Highway Safety Ass&#39;n, available at
http://www.ghsa.org/ state-laws/states/missouri (last
visited Jan. 4, 2017).[2] Our research reveals that between 2000 and
2016, the Missouri legislature introduced some 47 bills
pertaining to red-light cameras, which are set forth in the
appendix. The bills variously allowed ten cities to be
designated for installation of red-light cameras, prohibited
red-light cameras, required revenue generated from red-light
camera enforcement to go to local school districts, set
limits on the amount of fines allowed for violations,
required red-light cameras to photograph the driver from the
front, prohibited photographs of the driver's face,
prohibited photographs of the vehicle's front license
plate, required criminal prosecution and the assessment of
points against the operator's driver's license for
violations, and exempted red-light camera violations from the
point-assessment system. None of these bills has become law.
In addition, as of this writing, one bill is pending in the
Missouri legislature to submit to voters a measure
prohibiting the use of ...

Our website includes the first part of the main text of the court's opinion.
To read the entire case, you must purchase the decision for download. With purchase,
you also receive any available docket numbers, case citations or footnotes, dissents
and concurrences that accompany the decision.
Docket numbers and/or citations allow you to research a case further or to use a case in a
legal proceeding. Footnotes (if any) include details of the court's decision. If the document contains a simple affirmation or denial without discussion,
there may not be additional text.

Buy This Entire Record For
$7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.