Monday, September 28, 2015

Analyzing the Islamic State’s Information Campaign, Interview With Australian National Univ's Haroro Ingram

In the west, the Islamic State (IS) is usually described as
a new type of insurgent group that is exploiting technological advances to
spread its message to create a new global brand of jihad that has attracted
followers from around the world. Haroro Ingram, a Research Fellow at the Coral
Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University,
Canberra argues that IS is actually following in the footsteps of previous
insurgent groups. What follows is an interview with Ingram, about IS’s information
campaign and how western governments have tried to counter it.

1. Many western
reporters and commentators have suggested that the Islamic State’s (IS) media
campaign, especially its use of social media and new technology, sets it apart
from previous jihadist and insurgent groups. You’ve argued that at its core IS
uses very similar communications strategies to those advocated by other
insurgency thinkers and revolutionary groups throughout history. Could you
explain how IS is following in the path of those older thinkers?

The core strategic mechanics of IS’s ‘information
operations’ (IO) campaign are not particularly unique. In fact, IS’s IO
strategy appears to share some really fundamental principles that can be found
in the writings of modern insurgency thinkers such as Mao, Guevara, Minh,
Muqrin and others. So let’s take a look at some of these core principles.

Firstly, like many other insurgency thinkers and
revolutionary groups, IS seems to understand that modern insurgencies are
characterized by two distinct but interconnected ‘competitions’. The first is
pretty obvious and broadly recognized in the field: the clash of what Bernard
Fall describes as ‘competitive systems of control’ i.e. the battle between
rival politico-military apparatuses. The other competition is characterized by
the clash of ‘competitive systems of meaning’ i.e. the battle for the perceived
credibility and legitimacy of each side’s ‘cause’.

Secondly, IS mirrors the thinking of other modern insurgency
movements by affording ‘information operations’ (some may prefer the terms
‘media’, ‘communications’ or ‘propaganda’) a central strategic role in its
politico-military campaign. The result is that IO is rarely used in a secondary
and largely reactive strategic role as an ‘information tool’ to let contested
populations know when and why a particular action was taken (probably the
dominant trait of counterinsurgency IO efforts). Rather, IS uses IO as a means
to ‘shape’ the human environment (contested populations, supporters and enemies
alike) for its politico-military activities and continues to use IO as a means
to sustain and compound those effects in the field. This is not the only way
modern insurgencies like IS tend to use IO but it underscores the broader
point.

Thirdly, like so many of their historical ‘predecessors’
(Islamist or otherwise), IS leverage both pragmatic (e.g. appeals to security,
stability and livelihood) and perceptual (e.g. appeals to the cause) factors in
its IO messaging as a means to shape the perceptions and polarize the support
of contested populations. What IS does so well in its IO campaign, perhaps
better than many of its Islamist predecessors (e.g. AQ), is weave pragmatic and
perceptual appeals together in its messaging as a means to align rational- and
identity-choice decision-making in its audiences. In doing so, its messaging
seeks to harness powerful psychosocial dynamics in its audiences.

Again, these three traits are not particularly unique to
IS’s IO campaign. Moreover, a lot of what IS does with its IO campaign isn’t
even particularly unique to the militant Islamist milieu. During a recent visit
to Kabul University I was exploring the Afghanistan Centre’s extraordinary
collection of primary source materials and found a collection of Al Jihad magazine issues which Abdullah
Azzam played a central role in producing and disseminating around three decades
ago. These issues of Al Jihad were
filled with a diverse array of articles – some focused on jurisprudential
themes while others promoted the mujahideen’s politico-military efforts or
eulogized martyrs – accompanied by eye-catching photos and graphics. The broad
similarities with AQAP’s Inspire or
IS’s Dabiq are clear.

Now, there is plenty that is unique about IS’s media
campaign but its core strategic mechanics aren’t.

2. Western
governments have tried to counter the Islamic State’s appeal by arguing that
moderate voices within the Muslim community should speak out against the group.
There were also the comments by President Obama that IS did not represent
‘real’ Islam. Is it an effective strategy to try to get into a religious debate
with IS?

Western governments need to fight the urge to launch a
counter-proselytizing campaign against IS (and other militant Islamist groups).
At best, such efforts are likely to fail. After all, why should the adherents
of a particular faith give any credibility to the ideological opinions of those
outside of their faith? At worst, such efforts may act as a catalyst of
radicalization by giving veracity to the claims of more radical fringes that
suggest Western governments are actively trying to change Islam.

Some western governments have tried to overcome these
problems by co-opting ‘moderates’ as the community advocates of such campaigns.
I suspect that may actually compound the problem because it tends to be
perceived by those most vulnerable to radicalization as the championing of a
government-sanctioned Islam by those moderate voices that are most important in
countering radical narratives. This is a lever militant Islamist narratives
regularly manipulate. For example, AQAP’s Inspire
and IS’s Dabiq magazines are
filled with articles that compel western audiences to be aware of how
governments are seeking to change Islam using ‘moderates’ as agents.

In the media battle against IS and similar groups, it is far
better to err on the side of strategies that are more likely to work than less
likely. A counter-proselytizing campaign epitomizes the type of strategy
that falls into the latter category. It’s very difficult to predict what types
of communication strategies will resonate in an audience but surely we can
start with working towards our strengths and avoiding our adversary’s
strengths.

3. The Islamic State
not only uses jihadist-Salafist thought in its information campaigns, but also
portrays itself as the champion and protector of Sunnis. What does the group
say about its latter role, which doesn’t get as much coverage in the west?

Coverage of IS’s media efforts has tended to
disproportionately focus on its extreme violence and proselytizing. While these
are important features of its IO efforts, I think it is important that the
field develops a greater appreciation for the breadth and diversity of IS’s
messaging, especially if better counter-narratives are to be developed.

The bulk of IS’s messaging appears to be devoted to showing
how IS are practically addressing the
needs of Sunnis via appeals to pragmatic factors like security, stability and
livelihood. This type of messaging is characterized by two aims. The first is
to promote IS’s system of control and synchronize its narrative and action
(what a colleague of mine describes as narrowing their say-do gap). The second
is to denigrate its enemy’s system of control and rupture the link between its
enemy’s narrative and action (exacerbate their enemy’s say-do gap). IS’s series
of mujatweet videos are excellent
examples of this dynamic (e.g. mujatweet 7and mujatweet 3).

The messaging produced and disseminated by IS’s wilayat-based ‘information offices’
tends to be dominated by these very pragmatic appeals. Strategically this makes
perfect sense. In order to maximize the appeal of IS’s system of control and
diminish the appeal of its enemy’s system of control, IS prioritizes
communications that are designed to leverage a population’s need for security,
stability and livelihoods in addition to coercing
them through violence. Having spent the last couple of years speaking with
Syrian opposition elements and Syrian and Iraqi refugees fleeing IS-controlled
areas, a common sentiment expressed by these interviewees is the ruthless
pragmatism of not just IS politico-military efforts but its communications too.

4. You’ve said that
what is unique about IS’s propaganda is its mix of identity- and
rational-choice appeals in its messaging. Can you explain what you meant by
that?

There is no single factor that explains the apparent
effectiveness of IS’s IO campaign nor singularly captures its uniqueness.
Rather, it is the cumulative impact of a range of subtle differences that is
most significant when trying to understand the appeal of IS’s messaging. And
yes, this is a dimension that distinguishes IS from many of its peers.

Appeals to pragmatic and perceptual factors in IS’s
messaging are designed to drive different types of decision-making processes in
its audiences, especially amongst supporters. Messages that appeal to pragmatic
factors, like those I just discussed, are designed to compel its audience to
engage in rational-choice decision-making (i.e. decisions based on cost-benefit
consideration of options).

In contrast, IS messaging that draws on perceptual factors
(IS’s ‘cause’) are designed to present IS as the champion and protector of the
in-group identity (Sunnis), IS’s enemies as Others responsible for
Sunni-crises, and thus IS as the bearer of solutions to that crises. This type
of messaging compels its audiences to engage in identity-choice decision-making
(i.e. decisions made in accordance with one’s identity).

While I wont bore you with any of the conceptual and
methodological details (instead see here),
I have compared the contents of thirteen issues of AQAP’s Inspire, five issues of the Taliban in Khurasan’s Azan and ten issues of Islamic State’s Dabiq and the differences are
potentially very significant. While Inspire’s
contents are dominated by narratives designed to empower the in-group
(Sunni Muslims) and provide operational advice and Azan focuses heavily on in- and out-group identity choice appeals, Dabiq is characterized by a pretty even fusion
of identity- and rational-choice appeals.

IS have demonstrated an adeptness for weaving together rational-
and identity-choice appeals in their messaging in a manner that is perhaps more
nuanced than many other groups. The implications are noteworthy: by weaving
together pragmatic and perceptual appeals, IS messaging is designed to align
rational- and identity-choice decision-making processes in its supporters. This
approach is not only designed to ensure IS messaging appeals to the broadest
spectrum of potential supporter motivations but may help to explain the
seemingly rapid radicalization of IS supporters from the sidelines to action
(whether as foreign fighters or ‘lone wolves’).

5. Finally, what ways
can both Arab and Western governments counter IS’s appeal particularly in the
‘media theatre’?

Western counter-narrative efforts against IS have generally
been pretty poor. Like many, I thought the State Department’s sarcastic ‘Welcome to the “Islamic
State” land’ video is a baffling example of counter-narrative messaging.
Indeed, a lot of the messaging that has been released as part of the State
Department’s ‘Think Again Turn Away’ strategy appears to be pretty ad hoc and not
driven by a coherent overarching strategy. Other western governments have
struggled too. For example, the Australian
Defense Department’s counter-IS twitter campaign has stumbled through its
first few weeks with basic errors that have left their efforts looking very amateurish.

I suspect there are two issues at the heart of many flawed
counter-narrative efforts. The first is an intellectual one. Counter-narrative
strategies need to be based on a nuanced understanding of an adversary’s IO strategy.
This analysis should then inform the overarching counter-narrative strategy.
Only then can an effective and coherent messaging campaign be developed and
implemented. I suspect this regularly hasn’t happened or, if it has, then the
process has not been adequately comprehensive.

I have spoken to Syrian opposition groups who are involved
in a daily battle against IS propaganda and, despite many of them engaging in
in-depth analysis of IS messaging with the expertise one would expect from
locals, they remain very cautious with the messaging they disseminate for fear
of counter-productive consequences. Many western efforts have not demonstrated
such a nuanced awareness of the ramifications of ill-conceived messaging and
continue to forge crudely ahead.

The second is an issue of personnel. More often than not the
architects of anti-IS messaging campaigns are the same COIN IO specialists who
are broadly recognized to have lost the IO war against the Taliban in
Afghanistan and AQI in Iraq or the CT strategic communications experts who have
been overwhelmed by AQ propaganda for over a decade. New ideas are desperately
needed in the ‘media theatre’ and this may often mean bringing in new people.

More specifically, the approach of Western (more broadly
non-Muslim) and Arab (more broadly Muslim) governments should have some
fundamental differences. For example, governments of Muslim majority countries
should make some attempt, if a light-footed and careful one, to actively engage
in debates about pertinent religious issues.

Broadly speaking though, the core principles of an anti-IS
counter-narrative campaign should be based on similar strategic principles to
those applied by our adversaries. This would involve developing and
disseminating messaging that attaches IS to perceptions of crisis, links
solutions to ourselves (i.e. government efforts), highlights the synchronicity
of our narrative and action while disrupting the connect between IS’s narrative
and action. From a western perspective, this would ideally be pursued while
avoiding the minefield of engaging in a counter-proselytizing campaign. Having
a broad strategic framework as a driver would help to ensure a coherence to the
messaging that is produced in the short, medium and long terms whilst
facilitating the flexibility necessary to leverage situational factors.

While this may seem a very rational-choice heavy
counter-narrative approach, it is designed to take advantage of what has thus
far been a strength of IS’s IO campaign: the interweaving of its rational- and
identity-choice appeals. By demonstrating how IS in fact isn’t providing solutions, is
causing perceptions of crisis and regularly disseminates hypocritical
messaging, its identity-choice appeals that declare that it is the provider and
protector for Sunnis weakens considerably. However, a communications strategy
that isn’t synchronized with effective politico-military efforts in the field
will be susceptible to IS’s highly effective counter-narrative efforts. These
points may seem simple or even obvious to many but they have rarely been
applied effectively against IS (or AQ for that matter).

In short, without considerable and frankly very unlikely
changes to the way that COIN IO and CT strategic communications campaigns are
developed, I suspect IS and others will continue to enjoy a strategic advantage
in the ‘media theatre’.

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the politics, economics, security, culture and history of Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com