Abstract: Using a dyad in a homogeneous market, facing investment decisions, we investigate
simultaneous competition and cooperation behavior of firms under the effects of
(a) government policies that send signals regarding incentives for different levels of
competition and cooperation and (b) two different ”states of nature” for the market,
i.e., one that rewards firms for building on their existing strategic path and another
that rewards firms for exploring new strategies. We conceptualize the dyad and the
external environment as a complex adaptive system and formulate simultaneous competition and
cooperation as a dynamic duopoly game with variable demand and supply curves.
Employing a simulation-based methodology, we investigate the attractors of this
two-firm system. We find that in markets that reward firms for building on their
existing strategic path, coopetition (sustained simultaneous competition and cooperation)
is a common attractor and the system is not affected by imbalances in governmental policies.
On the other hand, in markets that reward firms for exploring new strategy, coopetition is rare;
rather, the system frequently exhibits hyper-competition, collusion or free-ridership.
Additionally, we find that the market share of firms as well as a firm”s initial disposition toward
competition and cooperation are important factors that affect the outcome.