Wednesday, 30 November 2016

The tactical debacle in Nagrota on Tuesday,
in which four militants stormed an army unit and killed seven soldiers, is the
latest example of militant fidayeen
(suicide attack) teams inflicting disproportionate casualties on army units. On
New Year Day, a four-militant team entered the Pathankot air base, killing seven
security personnel and injuring 20. On September 18, four militants struck an
army camp in Uri, killing 19 and injuring 30 army jawans. In Nagrota yesterday,
four fidayeen succeeded in killing
seven soldiers, including two officers, before being gunned down themselves.

This is anathema for an army that frowns on
a “kill ratio” poorer than four-to-six militants killed for the loss of each
soldier. This success rate was maintained even during the most violent years in
J&K. In 1999, 270 soldiers were killed while 1082 militants were eliminated
(1 : 4 ratio); in 2000, it was 311 killed against 1,520 militants dead (1 :
4.9) ; in 2001, a total of 408 army men laid down their lives while killing
2020 militants (1 : 4.9); in 2002, 362 soldiers died while the army gunned down
1707 militants (1 : 4.75); and in 2003, the price paid for eliminating 1,494
militants was 258 soldiers dead (1 : 5.7).

In the last three years, with militancy on
the ebb and the army operating more lightly, the ratio was two-to-four
militants killed for each dead soldier. In 2013, 32 soldiers died, while
killing 67 militants (1 : 2 ratio); in 2014, it was 31 soldiers dead, while
gunning down 110 militants (1 : 3.5); and last year, 28 soldiers laid down
their lives while killing 108 militants (1 : 3.8).

With army casualties on par with militant
casualties this year, there is pressure to establish what has gone wrong. Even
more worrying than casualty numbers is the jihadis’
success in Pathankot, Uri and Nagrota at breaching what should have been
tightly guarded perimeters, and gaining access to the lightly guarded interiors
of military establishments and camps. A brigade commander notes: “We were
fortunate that the jihadis could do serious damage only in Uri”.

A fidayeen
squad, which must attack from the open against sandbagged and protected sentry
posts on the perimeters of army camps, should suffer heavy casualties while
forcing an entry. That the militants entered unharmed in Pathankot, Uri and
Nagrota speaks of poor siting of sentry posts and careless sentries.

Even more worrisome is the tactical
sloppiness on the Line of Control (LoC) that allowed the bodies of several soldiers
to be mutilated by militants or Pakistani soldiers. When soldiers leave their
posts for patrolling or laying ambushes, they are at least a section, i.e. ten
men. While adversaries can sneak across the LoC and ambush such a patrol, even
cause casualties with an initial burst of fire, trained soldiers start fighting
back immediately, according to basic infantry drills.

“Only in one situation can a patrol justifiably
allow its dead or injured soldiers to fall into enemy hands --- and that is when
every single member of that patrol is dead or badly wounded. Good soldiers do
not leave comrades behind”, says a retired general.

In a vibrant military, the next level of
oversight comes from its veterans who, in military culture, are custodians of
tradition and professional standards. Unfortunately, veterans gloss over
declining professional standards, focusing instead on demands for better
pensions, salaries and status --- important issues, but secondary to professional
proficiency.

On television, on Tuesday, senior officers downplayed
the Nagrota fiasco. One general argued: “I think it is an admission on the part
of Pakistan that the surgical strikes [of November 29] were successful.” Said
another, on the question of lax perimeter security: “No matter how highly
secure you are, [with militants] who are determined to kill and prepared to
die, there is no hundred per cent defence against it… These attacks cannot be
stopped at the target end, they can only be stopped at the source end.”

In fact, the truth is quite the opposite.
India can do little to stop jihadis
at the “source end”, i.e. Pakistan. Where the military can stop them is at the
“target end” --- through better perimeter security, tactical drills and higher
standards of accountability.

The final level of oversight --- the political
leadership --- is the quickest to abdicate responsibility. Bharatiya Janata
Party spokesperson, BVL Narasimha Rao, declared on television after the Nagrota
attack: “I do believe that after a series of such attacks, we ought to do
everything possible to secure ourselves; at least secure our military
establishments. But this is not a political [responsibility]… It’s the army
themselves… I think they are in a position to take any decision that they need
to; they don’t require any government’s intervention in this.”

The government’s disinclination to get
involved is remarkable, with tactical debacles like Uri having strategic effects,
and creating an imperative for escalation that impacts India-Pakistan
relations. At Uri, incompetent management of a camp’s perimeter defence forced
the government to order “surgical strikes”. This had the potential for
dangerous escalation, while ultimately doing little to deter Pakistani
adventurism.

Ultimately, when the Indian Army enters
full crisis mode, there is no doubting its ability and resilience. Kargil was an
example when, in 1999, tactical and intelligence laxity were set aside and the situation
recovered, albeit bloodily. In Pathankot, Uri and Nagrota, examples of
individual competence partially retrieved situations that could have played out
more damagingly. Yet, the army cannot afford to gift success to militants again.
There remains the possibility that a windfall jihadi “success” --- such as the destruction of Pathankot’s fighter
aircraft; mass casualties in Uri, or wives and children taken hostage in
Nagrota --- could allow a four-man fidayeen
team to take India and Pakistan to war.

Saturday, 26 November 2016

The army has issued a Request for
Information (RFI), inviting Indian industry to respond to a proposal for manufacturing
ammunition in the country.

“The purpose of the RFI is to facilitate
preparation of Request for Proposal (RFP) and identify prospective
manufacturers for participating in the proposal for indigenous manufacture of
ammunition”, says the document, which is posted on the government’s Central
Public Procurement Portal.

The RFI, and the forthcoming RFP, highlights
the difficulties faced by the ministry of defence (MoD) in identifying “strategic
partners” (SPs) --- private firms designated as the preferred production
agencies for manufacturing various categories of defence equipment like
aircraft, warships, submarines, ammunition and others.

So contentious has been the formulation of
a MoD policy for identifying “strategic partners” that the Defence Procurement
Policy of 2016 (DPP-2016) was issued earlier this year without a Chapter 6 ---
which was to be the strategic partner policy. It remains a blank space in the
DPP to this day.

Private sector defence firms, which regard
being nominated as a strategic partner an essential first step to entering the
lucrative defence business, have competed fiercely to mould the policy to suit
their own candidatures. Adding to the difficulty has been bureaucratic reluctance
to nominate strategic partners --- because of concern over future allegations
of bias, and the possibility of getting embroiled in investigations.

Now, after discussions at the Prime
Minister’s Office (PMO), the MoD has chosen to bypass the issue of nominating
strategic partners for manufacturing ammunition. Instead there is the
appearance of competition, involving the issue of an RFI and RFP.

Yet, the RFI contains a strategic
partner-style, long-term component, that says: “The ammunition is proposed to
be procured under a long term contract over a period of first 10 years…
Subsequent extensions after 10 years will be decided, negotiated and contracted
based on requirement of the Army as determined after performance of the
supplier over the initial ten years of supplies.”

Further, “It is proposed that the
manufacturer should develop the infrastructure and absorb the complete [Transfer
of Technology] for manufacture of ammunition within two years from signing of
contract.” For this, there will be no government funding.

The RFI covers almost most type of
ammunition, except for small arms, from 23-millimetre rounds for air defence
guns to 155-millimetre artillery gun ammunition. India’s military faces a
serious shortage of ammunition, with stocks catering for just 20 days of
intense battle, only half of the 40 days of battle stock that planners have
mandated. The MoD has assessed that ammunition worth Rs 19,000 crore is needed
to make up this deficit.

The RFI clearly weighs in favour of large
private firms, with financial criteria that excludes many medium-scale private
companies that have manufactured and supplied ammunition, and its components,
for decades.

Companies eligible to participate must have
a consolidated turnover of at least Rs 200 crore for each of the last three
financial years; capital assets at gross book value of Rs 100 crore; revenue
growth of at least five per cent in at least three of the preceding five
financial years, and a minimum credit rating equivalent to CRISIL/ICRA “A”.

Small and medium sector company executives
have already protested their exclusion from the contract, with at least one
letter directly addressed to Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar.

Companies like Sandeep MetalCraft,
Indo-Swiss Time, Micron Instruments, Premier Explosives and Polar, which have decades-long
records of supplying high-technology components like electronic fuzes for
artillery shells, find themselves left out of even smaller contracts, which
could all flow to the selected large-scale vendors.

“Does the MoD realize that its policy
deliberately excludes small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs), while the
prime minister’s policy is to build up SMEs?” asks one chief executive officer
(CEO), speaking off the record.

“I could understand the MoD’s reluctance to
award a contract worth several thousand crore to a medium-scale industry. But
we have been winning smaller contracts of up to Rs 150 crore, and supplying
them reliably, even to international customers. Now, these guidelines will
render us ineligible”, another says.

These apprehensions will be voiced at an
“industry interaction” that the MoD has scheduled for December 9 in New Delhi.
Vendors are required to respond to the RFI by December 16.

The RFI stipulates tough conditions to
safeguard the supply of ammunition from subsequent technology denial, and to
allow for the “surge manufacture” needed in wartime. It mandates that “the
manufacturer will ensure continuous availability of minimum one year’s stock of
ex-import components during first two years after signing of contract or 100%
indigenisation, whichever is earlier. In case full indigenization is either not
possible or not proposed, the manufacturer from third year onwards will have to
hold two year’s stock of ex-import content at all times.”

Private firm CEOs point out that
maintaining one/two years of ex-import stock would be a heavy financial
liability, for which they assume the MoD would compensate them.

The proposal for nominating private sector
strategic partners was mooted by the MoD-constituted Dhirendra Singh Committee
in 2014-15. Subsequently, the VK Aatre Task Force recommended designating one
private sector strategic partner (SP) for each of seven technology areas ---
aircraft; helicopters; aero engines; submarines; warships; guns and artillery,
and armoured vehicles. It also recommended that three other technology areas
--- metallic material and alloys; non-metallic materials; and ammunition,
including smart munitions --- have two strategic partners each designated.

Friday, 25 November 2016

As India
and Pakistan expel each other’s diplomats and the two armies trade fire across
the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), the 2003 ceasefire
appears increasingly fragile. Yet, even through this disruption, trade across
the LoC continues, making it perhaps the most robust confidence building
measure (CBM) between the two sides.

On Friday,
Ram Madhav, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) General Secretary, and former J&K
chief minister Omar Abdullah, will release a report that examines how cross-LoC
trade through J&K can be enhanced and facilitated.

Since
October 2008, when New Delhi and Islamabad allowed the parts of J&K they
respectively control to start trading across the LoC, the two sides have traded
commodities worth more than US $700 million.

According
to a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) signed between India and Pakistan,
“barter trade” takes place on a mutually agreed list of 21 items (which
originate in Kashmir) through two designated routes --- Uri-Muzaffarabad route
at Salamabad; and Poonch-Rawalakot route at Chakkan-da-Bagh.

The
tariff-free trade takes place four times a week, with 100 vehicles (each under
9 tonnes) allowed to cross the LoC each day. They must have Jammu & Kashmir
(India) or Azad J&K (Pakistan) number plates.

Since New
Delhi and Islamabad do not accept the LoC as an international border, the terms
“trade out” and “trade in” goods are used instead of “exports” and “imports”.

The report,
which Business Standard has reviewed, proposes opening more trade routes across
the LoC to “enhance people-to-people contact and make trade and travel
geographically easier”.

Over the
years, the two sides have discussed opening a second land route in Punjab in
addition to the already functioning Atari-Wagah link; and also trade through a
rail link connecting Munabao in Rajasthan (India) with Khokrapar in Sindh
(Pakistan). This has not moved forward.

The report
proposes replacing the current barter trading system with monetised trade to
reduce losses to the traders. The list of tradable items is proposed to be
expanded, with harmonized system (HS) codes introduced to prevent items being
misrepresented.

To mainstream
LoC trade, the report recommends including LoC traders in national business
chambers in India and Pakistan.

It
recommends that periodic “Border Haats” (rural markets) be organized at the LoC
to enhance the economic well being of communities living near the LoC, and to boost
informal trade.

To improve
trade infrastructure, the report proposes the installation of full body truck
scanners at check-posts or Trade Facilitation Centres (TFCs) to ease and
expedite inspection and minimise damage to goods. It proposes upgrading road
links to the LoC, and instituting communication channels between traders.

Recognising
the danger of disruption from Indo-Pakistan political downturns, the report
proposes that cross-LoC trade be contextualized in terms of South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) trade through innovative models
like “Intra-regional Cluster Trading”.

The report,
entitled “Cross-LoC trade through Jammu & Kashmir” has been prepared by the
market research organization, Bureau of Research on Industry & Economic
Fundamentals (BRIEF). The presence of Ram Madhav and Omar Abdullah at the
release is regarded as significant.

=======================

Recommendations on LoC trade

Open more
trade routes across the LoC to enhance people-to-people contact

Thursday, 24 November 2016

Since the National Democratic Alliance
(NDA) began governing in May 2014, two defence ministers, Arun Jaitley and
Manohar Parrikar, have promised --- the latter repeatedly --- a “blacklisting
policy” that penalises arms vendors for corruption; without reducing
procurement choices by narrowing down the field of vendors.

On Tuesday, the defence ministry finally
posted the new policy on its website, titled: “Guidelines of the Ministry of
Defence for Penalties in Business Dealings with Entities” (hereafter
Guidelines).

The Guidelines are notable mainly for their
conservatism. They detail various kinds of corruption and lesser procurement
offences; and describe two categories of penalties: suspension, and banning.
They briefly mention “financial penalties”, but then say nothing more about
them.

Serious differences within the ministry on
the principles and modalities of blacklisting have been evident, not least from
the delay in formulating Guidelines. Parrikar first promised a blacklisting
policy by January 2015. It has taken another 21 months to promulgate Guidelines.

Even after the MoD’s apex Defence
Acquisition Council (DAC) nominally cleared the Guidelines on November 7, hotly
debated changes remained to be made. Promulgation has taken another 15 days.

Eventually, the Guidelines have little
buy-in from the bureaucracy. All decisions relating to suspension or banning of
a vendor must be made by “the competent authority”, which is the defence
minister himself. There is no delegation of authority.

The
problem of subsidiaries

The prime driver for a new policy is the
February 2013 blacklisting of Italian defence conglomerate, Finmeccanica, by
the United Progressive Alliance (UPA). This was done after company chairman, Giuseppe
Orsi, was arrested in Italy for allegedly bribing Indian officials to win a
contract for twelve AgustaWestland AW-101 VVIP helicopters. Dealings were also
stopped with Finmeccanica’s 39 subsidiary companies, many of which are key
defence suppliers to India.

Soon after taking over as defence minister
in November 2014, Parrikar declared that companies that violated procurement
norms should face “heavy financial penalties”, not blacklisting. Citing
Finmeccanica, Parrikar asked: “Should we rule ourselves out of dealing with all
of its 39 subsidiaries? There has to be a clear policy on that.”

The new policy specifies that a ban or
suspension of an entity will not be automatically extended to its allied firms.
It would only be extended “by specific order of the competent authority”.

It seems likely now that the defence
ministry’s indefinite ban on Finmeccanica and all its allied firms could be
whittled down to a five-year ban on AgustaWestland alone.

Financial
penalties

Parrikar has pushed hard, but
unsuccessfully, for financial penalties for corruption, in place of suspension
or bans. On December 12, 2014 he had proposed: “How much you (the vendor)
violated, pay the Indian government 4-5 times that, only then will you be
permitted to participate in defence tenders.”

The new policy, however, barely touches on
financial penalties. It starts out by mentioning “Levy of Financial Penalties
and/or Suspension/Banning of business dealings with entities” to punish
wrongdoing. However, the rest of the six-page policy mainly details conditions
and procedures for “suspension” and “banning” of vendors. There is no further mention
of procedures for levying “financial penalties”.

Ruled out, therefore, is the US-style option
of “deferred prosecution agreements” (DPAs), in which the ministry grants amnesty
to defaulting vendor companies in exchange for punitive cash penalties, an
explicit or implicit acceptance of guilt, and their full cooperation in further
investigations into the offence.

The CII had strongly urged the defence
ministry to adopt DPAs in dealing with corporate corruption. It pointed out
that corporations in the US paid $24.8 billion in fines during 2010-2014. Of
that, $3.87 billion was for violating anti-corruption laws.

On the other hand, legal experts in criminal
compliance warned against the practice of allowing companies to buy their way
out of trouble. Evidently, the defence ministry bureaucracy has prevented
Parrikar from having his way on this.

Suspension/banning

The Guidelines specify six offences that
could lead to suspension or banning of a vendor. The first four causes, which
involve corruption, would invoke bans of at least five years. These are (a)
violations of contractual integrity pacts; (b) adopting corrupt/unfair means to
win contracts; (c) misuse of agents or agency commissions, and (d) national
security considerations.

There are two lesser offences, which would
attract shorter bans: (a) non-performance or underperformance of contractual
provisions, and (b) any other ground that is the defence minister deems to be
in the public interest.

A key element of the new policy is the
distinction it makes between suspension and banning. Suspension may be ordered
“pending a full proceeding into allegations” against a company relating to
those six violations, or when referring a case for investigation.”

The policy places a one-year cap on
suspension of a company but, paradoxically, provides for extending the
suspension, six months at a time, up to the maximum period of banning (which
the Guidelines do not specify).

Banning, on the other hand, would be
imposed “at least five years” if an entity is found guilty in a competent court
of any of the first four offences involving corruption, or “on receipt of
information regarding filing of charge-sheet in the court of law by CBI
(Central Bureau of Investigation) or any other investigating agency.”

Sherbir Panag, a Mumbai-based compliance
expert, highlights the dichotomy between these two conditions --- one requiring
an actual conviction, and the other merely the filing of a charge-sheet.

“This contradiction could be challenged as
an absence of due process. After the defence ministry blacklisted Israel
Military Industries (IMI), it challenged the ban in court alleging an absence
of due process. The new policy could be similarly challenged as having
different benchmarks for banning --- one requiring conviction, and the other
only a charge-sheet”, says Panag.

Panag opines that the ministry would mostly
suspend, not ban, companies suspected of wrongdoing. “Obtaining a conviction in
court takes at least a decade. Even filing a charge-sheet takes years. Three
years after AgustaWestland was banned, CBI has not yet filed a charge-sheet”,
he points out.

Nor does the new policy recognise
corruption investigations by foreign enforcement agencies, even though
practically every alleged defence scam in India was unearthed abroad. A Swedish
Radio investigation unearthed the Bofors scam in 1987; an Italian investigation
revealed the AgustaWestland payoffs in 2013; a US Securities and Exchange
Commission investigation this year unearthed payoffs to Indian officials by
Embraer in the sale of three business jets to the Defence R&D Organisation.

“Corruption has two sides. For every vendor
who pays a bribe, there is someone in the defence ministry who pockets it. What
is needed is enforcement and investigation in our own country. Neither the
ministry, nor its blacklisting policy, deals with that”, says Panag.

The upgraded Jaguar, along with the HAL team that developed the DARIN-III "navigation-attack" system

By Ajai
Shukla

Business Standard, 24th Nov 16

The Indian
Air Force (IAF) took a vital step on Wednesday towards boosting its dwindling
fleet of combat aircraft. As MiG-21s and MiG-27s retire, forcing the IAF to
close down squadrons, a new avionics upgrade for the nuclear-capable Jaguar
strike fighter will let it fly for another two decades.

This is Hindustan
Aeronautics Ltd’s (HAL’s) new DARIN-III (Darin Three) “navigation-attack”
system that allows the Jaguar to do pinpoint bombing. The DARIN-III allows a
pilot to feed in the coordinates of targets deep inside enemy territory. Once
airborne, the computer’s inertial navigation system directs the pilot to the
target, telling him when to releases his weapons precisely.

The IAF’s
deputy chief, Air Marshal RKS Bhadauria, flew a Jaguar equipped with DARIN-III
in HAL Bengaluru, after which he accorded “initial operational clearance” of
the upgraded system.

The IAF’s
six Jaguar squadrons (20 fighters in each) are deployed in Ambala, Jamnagar and
Gorakhpur. Termed “deep penetration strike aircraft”, the Jaguar destroys surface
targets like terrorist camps, air bases and warships with its on-board
weaponry, including “new generation laser guided bombs” (NGLGBs); and the lethal
Textron CBU-105 “sensor fuzed weapons”, bought in 2010 from America. This
effective tank-buster breaks up into many “smart bomblets” that guide
themselves to the tanks and penetrate their turrets from above.

The 120
twin-engine Jaguars will also get new engines supplied by US major, Honeywell,
for an estimated $3 billion. Each Honeywell F-125N engine delivers 43.8
KiloNewtons (kN) of thrust, significantly higher than the 32.5 kN of the
Jaguar’s current Rolls-Royce engines.

Powerful
engines are essential for swift ingress into enemy territory and a quick escape
after a strike. Enemy radars that pick up the Jaguars would scramble fighters
to intercept them.

To deal
with these, the Jaguar will be fitted with the EL/M-2052 radar, supplied by
Israeli company, Elta. This “active electronically scanned array” (AESA) radar
allows pilots to simultaneously track enemy fighters, guide missiles towards
them, while also jamming enemy communications and radar. While the Jaguar is primarily
a strike fighter, its new AESA radar, coupled with a good air-to-air missile,
would provide it a formidable capability against attacking enemy fighters.

Currently,
60 Jaguars --- half the fleet --- will be equipped with DARIN-III and the
EL/M-2052 AESA radar.

The Jaguar
provides a remarkable story of how indigenous upgrades are cheaply modernising,
and extending the life of, a foreign-origin aircraft. In 1978, India signed a
$1 billion deal for 160 Jaguars, manufactured by Anglo-French company, SEPECAT.
The first 40 aircraft, which were supplied in flyaway condition, came with an
out-dated “navigation and weapon-aiming sub-system” (NAVWASS).

As HAL began manufacturing the Jaguar, an Indo-French
co-development team began upgrading the avionics to DARIN. From 1982, all Jaguars
built at HAL had DARIN systems.

Buoyed by that achievement, the IAF and HAL decided in the
1990s to upgrade the DARIN. The result was the superb, entirely indigenous,
DARIN-II, which guides the Jaguar blind, literally to the touchdown point on
the runway.

“Even in Ambala’s infamous winter fogs, when you couldn’t
see your hand if you extended your arm in front of you, the Jaguars were
landing and taking off easily”, says a new retired Jaguar pilot.

The 60-odd Jaguars with DARIN-II will continue to operate
that system, while the other 60, which still have the original DARIN, will now
be upgraded to DARIN-III.

The IAF is currently the world’s only Jaguar operator. IAF
boss, Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, stated in October that the upgraded Jaguars
would remain in service for the next 15-20 years.

Wednesday, 23 November 2016

The P-8I interior, where five crew members monitor the aircraft's sensors for enemy contacts during each mission

By Ajai
Shukla

Seattle,
USA

Business Standard, 23rd Nov 16

In 2012,
the Indian Navy became the first non-US military to field the Boeing P-8
Poseidon, paying $2.1 billion for eight of these cutting-edge multi-mission
maritime aircraft that patrol vast stretches of ocean to detect and destroy
enemy submarines and warships.

Yet, India
has lost the advantage of being first-mover. Australia’s new P-8 aircraft,
which arrived in that country last Wednesday, is significantly more capable
than the Indian version. So too will be the British version of the P-8.

The reason:
poor contracting by New Delhi. The Australian and British contracts with Boeing
provide for automatic upgrade of their P-8s, in tandem with each new upgrade of
the US Navy P-8s, a process that continues round the year through the
aircraft’s service life. India’s contract for the P-8I has no such provision.

Australia’s
and the UK’s automatic upgrades are embedded in what is termed a “spiral upgrade
programme”. Without the upgrades this provides for, India’s P-8Is are steadily lagging
behind the technology curve.

A
follow-on Indian contract signed in July 2016 for four more P-8I aircraft, which
are to be delivered by 2020, will belatedly make up some of this technology lag.
Mark Jordan, chief engineer of the P-8 project, said in Seattle last Monday
that the Indian Navy had provided “a long list of upgrades” for the new aircraft.
Some of those upgrades would also be fitted retrospectively into the first
eight P-8Is.

But
subsequent upgrades and improvements would not be passed automatically to
India’s P-8Is, while Australia and the UK will continue to benefit.

With no
contractual provision for even informing India about new upgrades developed by
the American vendors, the navy would only learn about upgrades from open
sources, such as the internet, and information shared during joint exercises.

From the
start, the navy’s P-8Is were handicapped by Delhi’s refusal to sign up for an
Indo-US communications security agreement called the “Communications and
Information Security Memorandum of Agreement” (CISMOA). Without this the US
cannot legally part with any “CISMOA-controlled equipment”.

Instead,
the navy opted for commercially available equipment that does not permit such secure
networking.

Of all
the weaponry that India has contracted from the US in the last decade --- including
the C-130J Special Operations transporter, C-17 Globemaster III heavy lift
transporter, P-8Is, CH-47F Chinook heavy lift helicopter and AH-64E Apache
attack helicopter --- the P-8I has arguably contributed the most towards strengthening
India’s defence.

With naval
pilots flying long, eight-to-ten hour surveillance missions in the Bay of
Bengal, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, India knows exactly what is happening in
these waters. To deal with enemy warships and submarines the P-8I detects, it
has seven tonnes of weaponry on board, including the Harpoon missile and
heavyweight torpedoes.

Even so,
there may be a cost to keeping the P-8I fleet lagging in technology.

The root of
the problem is New Delhi’s out-dated approach to buying weaponry, which acquires
equipment separately from upgrades. Currently, several Indian platforms are
undergoing exorbitantly expensive “upgrade” programmes that cost several times
more than the original purchase. These include Kilo-class submarines; and the Mirage
2000 and MiG-29 fighters.

In
contrast, buyers like Australia and the UK incorporate continuous upgrade programmes
into the procurement contract, keeping the equipment current rather than paying
for “upgrading” several decades down the line. This involves sharing the cost
of upgrade development with the vendors. In return real-time upgrades translate
into a continuous technology edge.

For
example, Australia’s 24 F/A-18 Super Hornets, which began delivery in 2010,
have been kept at the same cutting edge as the US Navy’s Super Hornets through
a “spiral upgrade programme” included in the contract.

The P-8I, which
is engineered on a Boeing 737-800/900 airliner, is built to cater for continuous
upgrades through its service life. Boeing engineers point to its 60 per cent
power reserve, 25 per cent cooling reserve and 200 cubic feet of unutilised space.
Its software has “advanced modular architecture that allows for quick expansion
and affordable growth of capabilities.”

Says
Jordan: “As threats evolve, you can modify and upgrade the mission systems and
stay in front of the threat for a very long time.”