The opinion of the court was delivered by: Robert D. Morgan, Chief Judge.

DECISION AND ORDER

In this action nine members of Local 1306 of the United
Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW) are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,
as well as compensatory and punitive damages, from UAW Local
1306 and ten individuals who are members or member-officials
of the Local. All plaintiffs and defendants have moved for
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, F.R.Civ.P. While
plaintiffs do not ask for summary judgment on the matter of
damages, based on this court's view that there exists no
genuine issue as to any material fact, the entire case may be,
and is, resolved through these motions.

FACTS

In October 1978, ten members of Local 1306 (the nine current
plaintiffs and an additional former plaintiff who has
dismissed his complaint as to all defendants) authored a
letter*fn1 which expressed "concern over the implementation
of the contract in relation to walk outs and wildcat strikes."
Specifically, the letter is critical of the fact that no
disciplinary action was taken by anybody against individuals
involved in the walkouts and wildcat strikes. The letter
states that this lack of discipline has resulted in dissension
between employees who have worked and those who have walked
out. The letter is addressed to and was sent to the president
of International Harvester Co., the employer of the members of
Local 1306. The ten individuals all signed their names to the
letter.

Subsequently, other members of Local 1306 became aware of
the letter and the identities of the ten members who had
signed it. Around November 10, 1978, plaintiffs received
notice that charges of conduct unbecoming a union member were
being brought against them. Defendants admit that the letter
was the basis for these charges. On December 19, 1978, a
proceeding was held before the trial committee of Local 1306.
The trial committee consisted of defendants DeSmet,
Nussberger, Gaul, Ransdell, and Gruber. The manner in which
the trial committee was selected and the procedure it followed
were established by the UAW International and Local
constitutions. Five of the current plaintiffs were present for
this proceeding, where defendants Tawney, Schibilla, and
Hakeman, members of Local 1306, testified that plaintiffs'
letter was against the UAW International and Local
constitutions and damaging to members of the union. Defendants
Hamilton and Sierra are, respectively, the president and
recording secretary of Local 1306.

On January 18, 1979, plaintiffs were notified that the trial
committee had found them guilty of violating the UAW Ethical
Practices Code and would recommend $100 fines at the Local's
next membership meeting, and that failure to pay the fines
would result in plaintiffs' expulsion from the union. Without
any of the plaintiffs appearing at the Local membership
meeting on January 27, 1979, the recommendation of the trial
committee was approved and adopted. Plaintiffs, under protest,
tendered their $100 fines to the Local on February 27, 1979.
Plaintiffs allege that, in accord with the International's
constitution, they appealed within the Local on February 21,
1979. No action was taken by the Local pursuant to this appeal
and the Local claims that no appeal was in fact taken.

This complaint was brought under provisions of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA),
29 U.S.C. § 411, 412, and 529. §§ 411 and 412 appear in
subchapter II of the LMRDA, which is titled the Bill of Rights
of Members of Labor Organizations. § 411 enumerates specific
rights which every member of any labor organization shall have,
including the rights to meet and assemble freely with other
members and to express any views, arguments, or opinions.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). § 412 provides for a civil action in
federal court by any person whose Bill of Rights of union
membership has been infringed. § 529 expressly prohibits
disciplinary action against union members for exercising any
right provided for in the LMRDA. The jurisdictional provisions
of § 412 are expressly made applicable to § 529.

The intent of Congress in establishing the Bill of Rights of
union members was to protect such members in their
relationships with their union. The statute attempts to insure
procedural due process to members subjected to union
discipline and generally provides for democratic processes in
the conduct of union affairs. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 175, 194, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 2013, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967).
However, it was not the intent of Congress, in passing the
LMRDA, to either weaken unions as collective bargaining agents
or unduly interfere in internal union affairs. Wirtz v. Bottle
Blowers Assn., 389 U.S. 463, 470, 88 S.Ct. 643, 647, 19 L.Ed.2d
705 (1968).

EXHAUSTION

Defendants assert that the court lacks jurisdiction over
this case by reason of plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their
intra-union remedies. § 411(a)(4), dealing with the protection
of the right of union members to sue, contains a proviso
requiring exhaustion of intra-union remedies before an action
is brought against the union or its officers. Express
limitations on this exhaustion requirement are that it only
applies to reasonable hearing procedures that do not exceed
four months in duration. Defendants argue that plaintiffs have
failed to appeal the decision of the Local to the International
in accord with the procedures in the UAW constitution. The
dispute in this regard concerns plaintiffs' refusal to supply
their home addresses to the International and the
International's refusal to process the appeal until the home
addresses are furnished.

The exhaustion requirement of § 411(a)(4) was considered at
length by the Second Circuit in 1961, after the passage of the
LMRDA in 1959. Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists,
286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929, 81 S.Ct.
1650, 6 L.Ed.2d 388 (1961). From the recent legislative
history, the court in Detroy determined that the inclusion of
the exhaustion requirement in § 411 was intended "to preserve
the exhaustion doctrine as it had developed and would continue
to develop in the courts," 286 F.2d at 78. Relying on existing
exhaustion principles, the Detroy court held that after the
institution of an action in the courts, it is discretionary
with the court whether or not to require exhaustion of
intra-union remedies. This interpretation reflects the plain
meaning of the words of the statute, i.e., "may be required to
exhaust." Other courts that have reached the issue have adopted
this view as to the discretionary nature of § 411(a)(4)
exhaustion. Buzzard v. Local Lodge 1040, 480 F.2d 35, 41 (9th
Cir. 1973); Semancik v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 144, 150
(3d Cir. 1972); Fulton Lodge No. 2 v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212, 216
(5th Cir. 1969); Simmons v. Avisco, 350 F.2d 1012, 1016
(4th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 426, 88
S.Ct. 1717, 1722, 20 L.Ed.2d 706 (dicta) (1968).

In determining the propriety of exercising its discretion to
not require exhaustion, courts should consider each case on
its own facts, Detroy, supra, and in light of the policies
underlying the exhaustion doctrine. The relevant policies were
stated in Detroy:

"The Congressionally approved policy of first
permitting unions to correct their own wrongs is
rooted in the desire to stimulate labor
organizations to take the initiative and
independently to establish honest and democratic
procedures. Other policies, as well, underlie the
exhaustion rule. The possibility that corrective
action within the union will render a member's
complaint moot suggests that, in the interest of
conserving judicial resources, no court step in
before the union is given its opportunity.
Moreover, courts may find valuable the assistance
provided by prior consideration of the issues by
appellate union tribunals." (citations omitted)
286 F.2d at 79.

Considering these policies, common law exhaustion principles,
and the factual circumstances of a particular case, courts
have developed exceptions to the exhaustion requirement.

"Voidness is an elastic concept. Because it is
tied up with the merits of the claim, its
indiscriminate application could reduce the
exhaustion requirement to the tautology that a
plaintiff can find present relief in the courts
only if his claim has legal merit. That this is a
danger, however, does not mean that it is an
inevitable result of applying the exception. When
conceded or easily determined facts show a
serious violation of the plaintiff's rights, the
reasons for requiring exhaustion are absent: the
commitment of judicial resources is not great;
the risk of misconstruing procedures unfamiliar
to the court is slight; a sufficient remedy given
by the union tribunal would have to approximate
that offered by the court. ...

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