Karl discusses what he calls a moral version of Moore's Paradox: the assertion, "P, but I (morally) must not believe that P." (It's not too clear where the paradox comes in, since it seems consistent to believe P whilst thinking oneself immoral for doing so. One might also question whether it's really the holding of a belief that's immoral per se, or whether certain beliefs are instead merely symptomatic of some other moral shortcoming. But the post raises some interesting issues, in any case.)

Gualtiero Piccinini argues for the possibility of Self-Knowledge without Introspection, pointing out that we ordinarily act on our mental states without need for introspection, and self-ascribing attitudes is just another form of behaviour, so why must this case be any different?

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