"^i
BOSTOTSl
PUBLIC
UBRAIVY
Deparltnvnt
u ^
buUenn
Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volunne 81 / Nunnber 2046
January 1981
Bicentennial
1781-1981
1
Dftpartment of Sinte
bulletin
Volume 81 / Number 2046 / January 1981
Cover art :
Reproduction of official poster
commemorating the Bicentennial
of the Department of State
The Department of State Bulletin ,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
the public, the Congress, and
government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service.
The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials;
special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press
releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.
EDMUND S. MUSKIE
Secretar\ of Slate
WILLIAM J. DYESS
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director,
Office of Public Communication
JOHN CLARK KIMBALL
Chief. Editorial Division
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
JUANITA ADAMS
Assistant Editor
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CONTENTS
SPECIAL (See Center Section)
A Short History of the U.S. Department of State, 1781-1981 (David F. Trask)
The Secretary
1 Africa and U.S. Policy
3 Securing a Safer Future
5 Refugees: The U.S. Response
Africa
8 Southern Africa: Four Years
Later {Richard M. Moose)
25
U.S. Hostage.s in
Iran
(Secretary Muskie)
28
Iran Chronology,
1980
November
Narcotics
29
International Narcotics Con-
trol in the 1980s (Mathea
Falco)
Department
11 Foreign Service Act, 1980
(President Carter)
East Asia
12 ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue (/oiMf
Press Statement)
13 U.S.-China Sign Grain Agree-
ment (White House State-
metit )
14 U.S. -.Japanese Relations in the
1980s (Richard C.
Holbrooke)
Europe
18 Strengthening the CSCE
Process (Griffin B. Bell)
20 Poland (President Carter,
White House Statement)
Human Rights
21 Human Rights and Interna-
tional Law (Patricia M.
Derian)
Middle East
24
United Nations
30
U.S.-Israel Oil Agreement
(President Carter, Yitzhak
Modai, Text of Agreement,
Memorandum of Agreement,
Department Fact Sheet)
Boston Public Lib
Superiulendezt of Do
General Assembly Votes on
Afghanistan Situation
(Donald F. McHenry. Text
of Resolution )
Western Hemisphere
33 10th General Assembly of the
OAS (President Carter,
Secretary Muskie)
Treaties
36 Current Actions
Chronology
40 November 1980
Press Releases
41 Department of State
41 U.S.U.N.
Publications
42 GPO Sales
Index
rary
cuments
FEB 12
DEPOSITORY
*>A^^S O^
Department of State Bicentennial
1781-1981
To commemorate our bicentennial, we are pleased
to present in this issue (center section) a short history
of the United States Department of State by David F.
Trask, the Historian.
This article also has been issued as a separate
pamphlet by the Bureau of Public Affairs; copies may
be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402.
The Editors
1
■HE SECRETARY
Africa and U.S. Policy
Address before the African-
icon Histoyical and Cidfiiral
■II and the World Affairs Council
Sniihcrn California in San Fran-
,'.. on December J,, 19S0.^
11 i:rateful for the opportunity to ad-
i>.- this distinguished gathering. As
' WW aware — as I am only too aware
. ai-e in a period of transition. I am
; , railed a "lame duck" Secretary of
uc. 1 don't feel lame. And my voice is
; \M irking just fine. I intend to keep
ij It— now, and also in the years to
II ■.
.W'Xt month we will have a new
■ Ml lent in Washington and a new Ad-
M,-t ration. They come to power in
i~ i)f extraordinary challenge, both at
n and abroad. They deserve the en-
raiifment and support of all who love
r cnuntry. They shall have mine.
It is in that spirit that I want to dis-
:is today a subject that will be vitally
nortant in the years ahead — Ameri-
piilicy toward the nations and the
|ili's of Africa. It is an appropriate
-I ject to discuss — indeed, a necessary
■ --in this time of transition. There
1 \\ II reasons why that is true.
i'he first is the record of President
tcr. I know the hazards involved in
me to select those current events that
Hi' historians will find to have been
. lul. But I want to take that chance
I . 1 suggest that the development of
V policy toward Africa — especially
steadfastness which helped make the
' iliabwe settlement possible — will
I ' day be recorded among President
trr's finest achievements and also
iiiti the most significant international
■ I liipments of this period.
What has been tested in our policy
tuard Africa might be called the prag-
ntic application of democratic ideals,
^d it has received a ringing vindication
- n an enduring peace in Zimbabwe and
ii'al improvement in our relations
I'lighout the continent. So the first
ison why I want to discuss Africa
II y now is that we need to understand
- lutside of the heat of a campaign when
V are beyond any motive either to belit-
iif to exaggerate — that something
itiiundly important is underway.
.My second reason for discussing this
iji'ct is that if Africa policy has been
aiea of achievement for President Car-
■, it can just as much a source of oppor-
nity for President Reagan.
We should not forget that the impe-
tus for a more activist southern African
policy, in assisting the independence pro-
cess, had its roots in a Republican Ad-
ministration. It was during the incum-
bency of President Ford that the United
States first considered seriously the issue
of Southern Rhodesia and judged that
our energies should best be devoted to
convincing an unrecognized, isolated re-
gime to adhere to the principles of free
elections.
As I will develop more fully in a few-
minutes, the new Administration has a
special capacity, and a rare chance, to ad-
vance the cause of justice in Africa and
build our relations there.
Before defining that opportunity, let
me describe some of the realities which
have been our guideposts in Africa, and
then outline the elements of the policy
now in place.
Current Realities
It is dangei-ous to generalize about
Africa. It is a complex of diverse cultures
and traditions, countries that are com-
paratively wealthy and countries that
are desperately poor. Experiences under
different colonial powers have left a vari-
ety of legacies — some bitter, some of
real value. But despite this diversity,
there are a number of central realities
which bear on our policy.
A first undeniable reality is that Af-
rican nations are deeply important to the
United States. We not only want, we
need good relations with them. African
nations are increasingly important to us
economically, both as markets and as
sources of critical materials. African ac-
tions are important politicall.v The 50 Af-
rican countries make up nearly one-third
of all the nations in the world. In the fu-
ture they will play a growing part in de-
termining whether humanity will be suc-
cessful in addressing central challenges
to our common future — to curb the
spread of nuclear weapons, to curtail
population growth, to ease hunger and
disease, to manage the world's finite re-
sources and guard them for generations
to come.
African nations have another impor-
tance for Americans — one that is under-
stood especially well by the African Cul-
tural Heritage Society. For millions of
our people, the tragedy of slavery sev-
ered the thread of personal history. As
those bonds are gradually restored —
and as long, proud traditions are redis-
covered — our own society, and all races,
are the richer. So let us be absolutely
clear on this point. Good relations with
Africa are not only desirable; they are
vital to our well-being.
A second reality that must concern
us is that the people of Africa endure far
more than their share of the world's
suffering.
• TWo-thirds of the world's most im-
poverished countries are in Africa.
• Africa has more refugees than any
other region — more than 3 million peo-
ple without homes, with little hope.
• Average nutritional standards in
Africa are the lowest in the world, and
they are getting worse.
• The natural resource base of
Africa is threatened, as thousands of
acres of farmland each year dry to
desert.
The implications for people are clear.
As they take a dreadful toll in human
terms, these same conditions can also
breed frustration and turmoil. And they
make African societies vulnerable to
pressures from outsiders seeking to
exploit the suffering of Africans for ends
of their own.
A third broad reality in Africa is a
fierce determination to remain free from
outside control. NationaKsm, more than
any ideology, shapes the dealings of Afri-
can countries with the rest of the world.
This reality has a number of results. It
means, for example, that while African
nations need and seek assistance from
outside, they are not likely to accept
domination — from either West or East.
Nationalism also means we will see Af-
rican societies evolving in their own
ways, developing institutions appropri-
ate to their own circumstances. They
draw from their own histories and cul-
tures, as well as from the experiences of
both the West and the East.
These, in very brief summary, are
some of the realities a sound policy to-
ward Africa must accommodate — our
own growing interests in Africa; the ter-
rible poverty in many parts of Africa and
the turmoil it can bring; the surpassing
importance of nationahsm in the policies
The Secretary
of African nations. How do we address
them?
Elements of U.S. Policy
I have described our policy as the prag-
matic application of democratic ideals, lb
some that might sound like a hopeless
contradiction in terms — references to
pragmatism and to idealism in a single
phra.se. But there is no inconsistency
here, for it is clearly the case in Africa
that we advance our interests by giving
concrete meaning and e.xpression to our
most basic values — the commitment to
human freedom and advancement we
share with the peoples of Africa. Our
policy has been firmly grounded in that
abiding commitment to freedom.
• Our policy strongly opposes racial
injustice. In southern Africa we have
given practical support to the evolution
to majority rule. In Rhodesia, now Zim-
babwe, that meant resisting a prema-
ture, unilateral American breach of inter-
national sanctions and continuing the
pressure for a true peace. In South
Africa, it has meant broadening our own
voluntary arms embargo and support for
a mandatory U.N. embargo. Beyond
that, it has meant a clear message to
South Africa that our relations depend
upon achieving racial justice — that
other issues will not dilute our commit-
ment on that fundamental cause.
• Our policy upholds the cause of
peace. In Zimbabwe, in Namibia, on the
Angola/ Zaire border and elsewhere, the
United States has been strongly identi-
fied with efforts to heal divisions and
achieve peaceful solutions.
• Our policy in Africa has promoted
respect for human rights. President Car-
ter's human rights policy has found a spe-
cial resonance in Africa. Human rights
dialogues have been initiated in Dar es
Salaam, Dakar, Sierra Leone, Cape
Tbwn, and Khartoum. Last year the Or-
ganization of African Unity adopted an
African Declaration of Human Rights. In
the broadest sense, the trend in Africa is
clearly in the direction of greater democ-
racy and freedom. Democracy is being
restored in Nigeria and (Jhana. Multi-
party elections have resumed in Senegal
and are e.xpected in Uganda. And in some
cases where there is only one party — as
in Tknzania and Ivory Coast — there are
numerous candidates for office, a grow-
ing acceptance of dis.sent, and expanded
protection of individual [lolitical rights.
• Our policy has also been to sup-
port economic development in Africa and
to forge new economic links. Since Presi-
dent Carter took office, American eco-
nomic assistance to Africa has doubled,
to more than $1 billion each year Of
course, it is still dwarfed by the need,
but our aid has helped. And it has been
concentrated on meeting the most urgent
requirements of people, on easing their
suffering, and on helping them become
self-sufficient.
• And finally our policy supports Af-
rican nationalism as the most dependable
foundation for stable development and
the strongest bulwark against outside
intervention. Through the infusion of
outside military means, the Soviets, the
Cubans, and others have exploited and
exacerbated a number of local and re-
gional African conflicts. We have been,
and must continue to be, responsive to
the legitimate defense needs of African
countries threatened by external pres-
sures. Our security assistance to African
nations has risen. But over the longer
term, we will most effectively counter
Soviet designs by holding to our own af-
firmative course — seizing the moral ini-
tiative on racial justice, working for the
settlement of conflicts others might
exploit, helping to build the strength and
confidence of African countries so they
can better resist external pressures. Be-
cause we have done so, the striking dif-
ference between American and Soviet
aims has become increasingly clear to the
governments and people of Africa.
The approach I have outlined — a
strategy grounded in principle as well as
in interest — is working. We have been
able to cement our ties with old friends,
such as Ghana. And we have found meas-
urable improvements in our relations
with a number of key African countries
— with Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea
and Uganda, with Somalia, Sudan, and
Guinea, with Mozambique. Congo-
Brazzaville, the Central African Repub-
lic, and others.
Opportunities for
the New Administration
With this foundation, let me return to
my earlier assertion that Africa policy is
an area of great opportunity for the new
Administration.
In Rhodesia, before 1979, it was pos-
sible for the Ian Smith government to
cling to the hope that a conservative gov-
ernment in Britain might lessen the pres-
sure for true majority rule. Instead, the
Thatcher government upheld that princi-
ple with renewed vigor It took the lead
in new negotiations. As a result, a
settlement was achieved.
There are a number of areas where
similar leadership by a Reagan Adminis-
tration could have similar effects. Let ni'
list some of them, not to second-guess
the new President's priorities, but as
illustrations.
In Zimbabwe, America has a strong
interest in seeing the settlement succeed
Thus it is sound policy to offer the assist
ance that is badly needed to assure last-
ing peace and stability.
After a long and bitter conflict, Zim
babwe faces a massive task of recon-
struction. Prime Minister Mugabe has
embarked on a course of national recon-
struction and reconciliation — to build a
permanent peace by bringing the eco-
nomic and social benefits of peace to the
lives of people, black and white. Yet the
strains in Zimbabwe are still severe. Ou
aid can help make a difference.
Elsewhere in southern Africa, the
conflict in Zimbabwe devastated the
economies of surrounding countries. Th(
nations of southern Africa are now com-
bining to restore economic health to the
region. They have asked the West to joii
them in this effort. The first meeting
among western and southern African na
tions on regional development took placi
last week in Mozambique.
American and Western interests
could be greatly furthered by strong an
active participation in southern African
regional development and by the expan-
sion of our trade and investment
throughout the region.
In Namibia, a peaceful set tlementf
a long and tragic conflict is now within
reach. A date of March 1 has been set fc
implementation of the agreed settlemer
plan. Next month, the parties will meet
to discuss final arrangements.
The hour of decision has come for
South Africa. If the Namibia settlement
is implemented, it will bring peace and
stability to South Africa's borders
where a needless conflict is now costing
South African lives and is providing eve
greater opportunities for outside
intervention.
A new Amei-ican Administration ca
argue with special force that it is in
South Africa's own interest to stay on
course and implement a settlement.
A Namibia settlement would funda-
mentally alter South African relations
with neighboring states and with the in-
ternational community. A settlement
would prove that outside nations can
work constructively with South Africa
toward peaceful change and multiracial
The Secretary
ation. On the other hand, if South
refuses to allow the settlement to
ward, its isolation in the world will
le more acute.
outh Africa has expressed concern
the impartiality of a U.N. settle-
,n Namibia. I would note, however,
outh Africa's own administrators,
ervants, and police will continue to
on in Namibia during the elections.
Tiportant to remember also the fair-
integrity, and understanding with
m U.N. representatives have con-
^ recent Namibian negotiations, as
Us the standards of fairness which
■ riited Nations has consistently fol-
( ill its peacekeeping around the
■ I'inally, we Western nations which
-1(1 the settlement are wholly com-
1 III fair elections. Our national
as well as our national interests
\ nlved.
.11(1 in South Africa itself, the ques-
•neniains whether change will come
rtg-h racial conflict or through negoti-
,]■• igress. But change will come. It
i, jine principally because mounting
.e lal pressures will become irre-
- (le.
; IS in the interest of the United
a s to encourage early, meaningful
t -e in South Africa. We cannot pro-
ll i timetable or blueprint. That is for
i 3ople of South Africa — all the peo-
!i .'orking together — to decide for
g selves. But the new American Ad-
I tration can be effective in encourag-
r rogress in those areas where South
i an blacks are appealing for early
i ',e. and where many South African
I 'S are receptive. We must find con-
» ways to support the efforts of those
I ing for peaceful change through
1 T Africa's churches, community or-
I :ations, newspapers, and courts. We
. i assist those South African efforts
. cially and through the activities of
I ompanies, churches, universities,
I inions.
These are but a few ideas, concen-
!'d on southern Africa. If our new
I inistration were to embrace the es-
lial thrust of these policies, a funda-
Ital continuity in our policy would be
I red, our credibility in Africa would
lahanced, and our bonds of friend-
thi'oughout Africa would be
ngthened.
In conclusion, let me stress a funda-
tal point. As it affects the fate of the
ons of Africa, American policy in the
re will be important, but it will not
ecisive. The major determinants will
Refugees: The U.S. Response
Address before a conference on
world hunger and refugees at the
University of Southern California in
Los Angeles on December 5, 1980.^
During my brief, but intensely rewarding
tenure as Secretary of State, I was con-
stantly reminded how the policymaking
process — not just in this Administration,
but in any Administration — inevitably
pulls one toward the short-term perspec-
tive.
How should the United States vote,
tomoiTow, on a critical resolution in the
United Nations? What is the appropriate
response to a sudden development in
Seoul, or in Tehran, or on Capitol Hill?
The natural tendency is to address to-
day's problem and to defer tomorrow's.
It's one I have struggled against over the
past 6 months. I find it difficult to know
where I'm headed if my eyes are fixed
solely on the ground immediately in front
of me.
Today, I want to pursue with you
that process of looking ahead — beyond
the immediate crises, beyond the immi-
nent transition of power.
What are some of the longer term so-
cial, economic, and technological forces at
work in our world that will help define
not just the next few years but the next
decade or more? What do they mean for
our own long-term security and well-
being? And how will they shape the polit-
ical choices we will face in the years
ahead? To engage in such a look ahead is
not to escape the present choices we face
but to help illuminate them.
Let me inject a cautionary note at
the outset. I suspect that most of you
were as enthralled as I by the photo-
graphs recently sent back from our Voy-
ager space satellite — by our abihty to
see, clearly and almost instantly, across
billions of miles of space.
Unfortunately, there is no similar
technology that enables us to project our-
selves across time — to see the future as
clearly as we can see the rings of Saturn.
National behavior, no less than the hu-
man behavior that drives it, remains un-
predictable — capable of unexpected new
breakthroughs or of dangerous miscalcu-
lations.
Nonetheless, there are some trends
we can identify — deeper, sometimes less
visible economic and social currents that
will shape the poHtical landscape over the
coming years.
Population Explosion
Each day, there are over 200,000 more
mouths to feed in the world, each year,
75 million. By the year 2000, if these
present patterns continue, the world will
have an additional 1.5 billion inhabitants
— an increase in the final quarter of this
century that would equal all of the
growth in the world's population from the
birth of Christ through 1950.
Most of that growth will take place
in the developing world. By the year
2000, developing nations will encompass
nearly 80% of the world's people. They
will be concentrated in increasingly
crowded urban areas. The population of
Mexico City will exceed 30 million, Cal-
cutta will approach 20 million, Cairo, 17
million. And nearly half of the citizens in
developing countries will be under the
age of 19.
Our current estimates are that, in
the aggregate, world food supplies will
continue to grow. But in some poorer
areas, the food available per person will
decline, and food will be more expensive.
Unless we reverse existing patterns,
important resources that are needed to
feed and sustain that burgeoning popula-
tion will continue to disappear. About 1
million acres of prime farmland are con-
verted to urban use each year in the
United States. Other farmland is drying
into desert — a quarter million acres
each year in northern Africa alone. And
critical forests — which provide the pri-
mary fuel for nearly 2 billion people —
are disappearing at the rate of 50 acres a
minute.
None of these trends is immutable or
be internal — the quality of leadership,
their economic choices, their political
will.
Where our policy will be decisive is
in determining the kind of relations
America can have with evolving African
societies. In short, it is our own interests
and our own future at stake in the qual-
ity of our approach to Africa.
As we change Administrations, I
think all Americans can agree on this
fundamental premise — that we want to
sustain constructive relations with the
countries of Africa; relations that uphold
our interests and theirs and the ideals
that draw us together
1 Press release 3.34.
uarv 1QR1
The Secretary
I
irreversible. But they loom on the not-
too-distant horizon, gathering clouds we
must seek to understand and move to ad-
dress.
Energy
In one essential aspect of reconciling hu-
man needs and global resources, we have
made a good beginning in recent years. I
speak of our energy future.
It is just a beginning, but it is
grounded in an emerging international
awareness that the end of the oil era is
pressing upon us. Here at home, both our
use and our imports of oil are finally
going down. Domestic energy production
is now going up. And the quest for new,
renewable fuels is underway.
But we are by no means out of the
woods. The trend is unmistakably in the
direction of declining world oil supplies
and increasing costs. The entire world
faces the difficult transition out of the era
of bountiful and ine.xpensive oil.
As we navigate this passage, the
strains on the international economy will
continue to be severe. Each time world
oil prices rise 10%, world inflation jumps
1%, and overall world growth falls by a
half percent. As world growth rates lag
— and that is the outlook at least in the
near term — the flow of world trade suf-
fers, and competition among trading na-
tions grows more intense.
The economic pressures on the less
developed nations during this period of
energy transition will be particularly dif-
ficult. Those developing nations that im-
port oil have seen their overall oil bill rise
1,500% in the 1970s. Many have had to
borrow heavily. Their debt now totals
$300 billion. .Just to service that debt and
pay for their oil imports now costs devel-
oping countries half of everything they
earn from their exports.
Thus even as we design and build a
new energy future — one less reliant on
petroleum — the international commu-
nity, oil exporting nations no less than
the importing nations, continue to face
the essential task of bringing greater sta-
bility to the pricing and the financing of
our energy needs.
Spread of Military Technology
With the gi-owing international access to
nuclear power has come a greater poten-
tial access to the technology of nuclear
weapons. Some half-dozen additional na-
tions have the capability to produce a nu-
clear weapon within 2 years of a decision
to do so. That is a chilling fact. Imagine
how much more dangerous would be any
of the smoldering regional disputes we
see in the world if one or both rivals had
nuclear weapons.
And the unmistakable direction is to-
ward gi-eater and greater sophistication
in the arsenals of the two nuclear super-
powers — the United States and the So-
viet Union. Greater accuracy and preci-
sion in our weapons, increased reliance
on mobility and concealment, new mili-
tary frontiers outside the atmosphere and
inside the atom — these new technologi-
cal vistas will be explored and conquered
in the years ahead.
Whether the results of these new de-
velopments will be gi-eater security for
our people or less, however, depends not
on the genius of our advanced scientists
but on the wisdom of our political lead-
ers.
International Cooperation
Individually and together, the develop-
ments I have mentioned raise a central
paradox for the next decade. For the na-
tions of the world to shape their own
national futures will require an unprece-
dented degree of international coopera-
tion. But the very challenges and strains
which make that cooperation essential
also make it intensely difficult.
None of the developments I have de-
scribed can be significantly affected un-
less nations act together to do so.
• Bringing population growth under
sensible and humane control will require
both international resources and national
policies.
• Striking a decent balance between
the growing demands of more people for
a better life and the single planet which
must sustain all life is, by definition, a
global enterprise.
• Managing national economies in
ways that strengthen the overall health
of the international economy rather than
undermine it, building a security environ-
ment and an enforceable regulatory re-
gime that restrain the spread of nuclear
weapons, bringing the strategic arms
race under sensible control — all of these
essential efforts require a commitment to
negotiation and to compromise.
Short-Term Advantages vs.
Long-Term Interests
But the same international factors that
command cooperation also conspire
against that cooperation. Hard times in-
evitably drive peoples and nations toward
preoccupations inward. The natural ten
dency is to invest attention and effort oi
protecting one's short-term advantage,
even at the expense of the longer term
future.
What choice does the subsistence
farmer have but to cut whatever fire-
wood is available to cook the family's fo
regardless of the long-term ecologicalin
pact? What incentive is there for parent
in an impovershed rural village to limit
the number of their children when a
larger family can be insurance against «
uncertain future?
The same principle applies to na-
tions. We have already seen the tempta
tion to gain short-term national advan-
tages when energy markets are tight,
even if it drives up the longer term pric
And when growth is slow and unemplo\
ment is high — in our nation or in others
— pressures mount to protect domestic
industries from outside competition, de
spite the longer term costs to all tradin
nations from a protectionist spiral.
By the same token, as growing de-
mands for visible improvement in stan-
dards of living press in on fragile new
governments, we could see the politics
of Third World nations become more
tumultuous.
As these internal frustrations are
turned outward, the potential for re-
gional rivalries and conflicts increases.
And unless a pattern of mutual restraii
is established on the part of outside po
ers, these internal and regional tensior
will be a source of growing tension and
danger in East-West relations.
In short, we face a period in whici
nationalistic impulses will be strong. T
gi-eat challenge — for us and for others
— will be to resist short-term expedien
that only mortgage oin- future security
and well-being, to take an enlightened,
longer term view of our national
interests.
Future Choices
What does this mean for our own futiu
and for the choices we face in the yeari
ahead?
Certainly, the next several years
must be a time for building America's
strength — for investing wisely in a mil
tary posture for the remainder of this
century that will assure the balance ar
the stability upon which world peace
rests, for regaining control of our enerj
future, for rejuvenating the productivi|
and competitiveness of the American j
economy. |
nonartmont nf Qtafo Rllllpl
The Secretary
ut in the process of building our
gth we, too, must resist the tenipta-
to turn inward, to see unilateral solu-
I to problems that can only be solved
igh common action, to place barri-
3 around our economy and ring our
macy with steel.
We must be deeply conscious, in the
s ahead, of the constant need to bal-
the determined pursuit of our safety
Drosperity in the short run with a
gness to cooperate and compromise
^irsuit of long-term interests we share
ii others.
There is no question that we face a
!i )d in which our own increased de-
r ' efforts are required. Soviet military
I' T has inci-eased steadily and signifi-
ii y over the past decade. It would be
g ly dangerous for us to permit the
il military balance to tilt in the So-
e ' favor.
But even as we modernize our own
iiary capabilities, even as we maintain
ij ;taunch opposition to Soviet militai-y
1 ntures in Afghanistan and else-
^ 'e. we must continue the quest for
Kal, achievable, equitable agree-
.(r ;s that restrain the arms spiral.
Military technology will not stand
i while we talk about ways to control
. will move ahead. Achieving bal-
I d and enforceable restraints will be-
)i ' more difficult.
If we are to keep a handle on this
h y and increasingly dangerous compe-
I I in strategic weaponry, we must
a I on the progress already achieved
ii press for further progress with a
j: e of urgency.
A balance between short-term needs
ti longer term interests must also be
li itained in the area of trade. We must
IS t that the rules of international trade
e lir for American workers and Ameri-
jt ndustries. There will be situations in
'1 h temporary assistance to distressed
M stries will be necessary and appropri-
ti And we must be constantly sensitive
) le immediate problems faced by
■( -cers and cwnmunities and companies
il apted by shifting patterns of world
": e.
But if our response to a generally
11 e competitive trading environment is
" •cet artificial barriers to an open
■ iiig system, we will only suffer in the
M run.
We are a nation that thrives on
■ Id trade. One out of seven jobs in
^ lufacturing alone depends on our ex-
< s. One acre of U.S. farmland of every
I 'e produces for exports.
If others cannot sell to us, it inevita-
>' becomes more difficult for us to sell to
others. Protectionist answers drive our
economy down and our inflation up. For
the sake of our future prosperity, we
must strive to make our own economy
more competitive while keeping the
international economy open to fair
competition.
The same balance between short-
and long-run interests vnW also be re-
quired in the pursuit of a more stable and
peaceful world.
• We must be prepared to defend
our vital interests if they are endan-
gered. We must be willing and able to
meet the legitimate defense needs of
friends threatened by external pressures.
And there will be security interests that
require our continued relationship with
governments that are unpopular with
their own people. But we must also rec-
ognize that our security over the longer
term is best assured if, working together
with others, we are effective in ad-
dressing the conditions that breed insta-
bility and conflict.
• We must continue to be an active
force for the peaceful resolution of poten-
tially explosive regional disputes — in
the Middle East, in southern Africa, in
Central America, and elsewhere.
• We must invest in the economic
progress of developing nations because it
will contribute to our own progress and
because hopelessness and frustration are
the combustible ingi-edients for violence
and extremism.
• We must continue to press for pro-
gi-ess on human rights, encouraging the
growth of political and economic institu-
tions that can accommodate to change
peacefully and that rest on the solid foun-
dation of popular consent.
Finally, there is one other balanc-
ing act implicit in all the others — recon-
ciling the need for a tightened national
budget with the need for greater re-
sources to advance our international in-
terests.
The United States now ranks 15th
among the 17 major industrial countries
in the amount we spend per capita on in-
ternational assistance. No programs have
a narrower constituency among the
American people and in Congress.
But we must come to recognize that
helping to plant new forests in Africa, as-
sisting small farmers in the Caribbean
grow more food, aiding postwar recon-
struction and reconciliation in Zimbabwe
and Nicaragua, contributing to the ability
of our friends in Southeast Asia to defend
themselves from outside threats — these
efforts are not "give-away" programs;
they are not international charity. They
are investments we make in our own fu-
ture no less than the futures of others.
All of the trends I have spoken of to-
day are real, whether we like them or
not. But all of them are the work of hu-
man beings. And all of them can be har-
nessed and controlled by human beings, if
we have the wall and the skill to blend
with our current preoccupations a deter-
mination to secure a safer future.
1 Press release 336.
Securing a Safe
Future
Address at Kansas State Univer-
sity in Manhattan, Kansas, on
December Jf. 1980.''
I'm grateful to Larry Berg and to the
Institute of PoHtics and Government for
inviting me to this conference and for
drawing attention to the related prob-
lems of refugees and hunger in the world.
And I want to express gratitude also to
this audience, so many of whom have
been in the forefront of efforts to help
refugees here in California.
America's history and its resources
— what we are and what we have — make
it impossible for us to ignore these is-
sues. Indeed, our historic values and our
unmatched wealth compel us not just to
play a role but to play a role of leadership
in deahng with them.
Tbday I want to focus upon the sub-
ject of refugees: on the moral and practi-
cal issues that come to us in the human
shape of up to 15 million refugees and dis-
placed persons worldwide. I want to
sketch for you the dimensions of the refu-
gee problem as it confronts the United
States and the world community. And I
want to discuss what will be required of
us — here at home and in our efforts
abroad — if we are to deal responsibly
with this issue.
If my remarks have any central
point, it is this: that the United States
and the world community must deal not
only with the pressing outward manifes-
tations of the refugee problem but with
its underlying causes — war, political per-
secution, and other oppressions of the hu-
man person.
Dimensions of the Problem
One picture, as the old saying puts it, is
worth a thousand words. And surely this
is true when we see the photographs of
The Secretary
suffering among the world's refugees. A
year ago our heails — and our consciences
— ^were touched by the picture of a Kam-
puehean refugee mother holding her dead
child. TVvo weeks ago, newspapers car-
ried a picture of a refugee woman in
Somalia, crouching with her nearly naked
child in a flimsy hut made of sticks and
rags.
In recent years, such tragic scenes
have become all too frequent as millions
have been driven from their homes by
wars, civil disturbances, religious or ra-
cial persecution, or repressive govern-
ment policies.
• In West Asia and Southeast Asia
there are 4-5 million refugees and dis-
placed persons, including those driven to
flight and near-starvation by Vietnam's
drive against Laos and Kampuchea. In
the past year alone, more than a million
Afghans have become refugees, victims
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
• About 4 million Africans have fled
their homes; there are 3 million refugees
as displaced persons in the Middle East;
tens of thousands of people flee Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union each year.
• In our own hemisphei'e, there are
now hundreds of thousands of refugees —
not to mention the 136,000 Cuban and
Haitian entrants who have come to the
United States over the past 7 months.
These figures represent a sharp up-
surge in the numbers of refugees woi-ld-
wide. Since last January, hundreds of
thousands of men, women, and children
have fled their homelands. This alarming
situation is graphically illustrated by re-
cent increases in the budget for the U.N.
High Commissioner for refugees. Last
year, the UNHCR spent $234 million for
refugee relief This year, the figure will
more than double, to .$568 million. And in
spite of this dramatic increase, the need
far outstrips the resources available for
helping refugees.
U.S. Position
Where does the United States stand in
its efforts to deal with the problem?
Generally, we can be proud of our re-
sponse. In the fiscal year that ended last
September 30, the United States pro-
vided more than $650 million for interna-
tional refugee relief and resettlement
programs. This includes our donations to
international organizations, P'ood for
Peace help to refugees, transportation
for refugees to the United States, and
placement aid to voluntary agencies here
at home. We admitted well over 200,000
refugees for resettlement in the United
States. We received, in addition, 125,000
Cubans and 11,000 Haitians who have
sought asylum in the United States but
have not been granted refugee status.
Here at home, the Department of
Health and Human Services provided
more than $600 million for refugee assist-
ance in FY 1980. And the generosity of
private citizens through churches and
other groups is beyond all counting.
This generous response by the Fed-
eral Government, by the States, by
churches, voluntary organizations, and
individuals suggests to me that the peo-
ple of the United States remain true to
their traditions of concern for human
rights and generosity to people in need.
We can be proud also that the Congress
has responded to the world refugee crisis
by passing an enlightened law — the Refu-
gee Act of 1980. This act has several im-
portant, even historic, provisions.
• It creates a uniform standard for
defining refugees.
• It sets at .50,000 yearly the "nor-
mal flow" of refugees and enables the
President, in consultation with Con-
gress, to adjust that number if refugee
emergencies require.
• It defines a fairer, more compre-
hensive system of Federal assistance for
refugee resettlement within the United
States. This is aimed at helping refugees
become — as soon as possible — self-
sufficient, contributing members of our
society.
Having said all this, however, let me
hasten to add: We are a long way from
solving all the domestic problems that
ensue from the world refugee crisis and
the heavy flow of refugees to the United
States. For the moment, let me touch on
some of the issues we face. They are
acute now; they will pose enormous chal-
lenges to those in the future who seek to
deal with refugee issues.
Issues to be Faced
The first problem is the problem of grow-
ing impatience, weariness, and even re-
sentment felt by our people about the
burdens created by the acceptance of ref-
ugees and emergency entrants. It will do
no good to deny or minimize this reality.
lb begin with, some citizens ques-
tion whether we can afford to spend so
much on refugees while other pressing
problems demand immediate attention
and resources. The practical burdens of
helping refugees establish new lives in
the United States are, as you know, enor
mous. The sheer numbers of recent year
and the unpredictability of recent refu-
gee waves have made careful jjlanning
difficult. They have given our national
refugee programs an air of permanent
emergency. The arrival of unorganized
boat flotillas from Cuba over a short spa
of weeks last spring made it necessary,
for example, to press widely scattered
military facilities into sudden service as
receiving centers.
Our social service programs — na-
tional. State, and local — have been hard
pressed by this sudden surge of refugee;
The State and local social service machii
ery of Florida has been severely tested
by the influ.x of Cuban and Haitian en-
trants — .just as California has extended
itself to accommodate the influx of Indo-
Chinese refugees.
You who have served in refugee
sponsorship programs know the chal-
lenge of finding jobs in stressful econom
times for refugees who may not speak
English; whose skills may not be readilj
transferable to our job market; who ma;
have trouble finding adequate housing
when such housing for the disadvantage
is already scarce. Perhaps because of
such problems, public opinion is not al-
ways recejjtive to large waves of refu-
gees and immigrants. How shall we dei
with this problem?
Tb begin with, I would suggest tha I
we put it in proper perspective. The i
United States — by virtue of its size, its \
wealth, and its humanitarian traditions i
is, to be sure, the largest contributor tf 1
international refugee relief We have n
ceived, in absolute figures, the largest
number of refugees in recent years.
But our contributions, I woukl su^'
gest, are by no means disproportionate
to our capacity. Our contribution to int
national refugee relief agencies last yea
for example, amounted to nearly $166
million — an impressive sum. Rut at
per American citizen, our contribution
ranks not fir.st but seventh in the worli
Sweden, Norway. Denmark, Switzer-
land, the Netherlands, and West Ger-
many all contributed more, based on
poinilations, than we. And some ntht
countries have resettled more refuge
as a proportion of their total populatioi
than we have.
The Secretary
eyond reminding ourselves of these
tant facts, it is essential that the
J'al Government generously cushion
ipact of refugee resettlement on
and local budgets, lb slash budgets
3 area would not only press States
pcalities toward — or beyond — their
limits, it would create new hard-
for refugees and for our citizens,
would aggravate the danger of so-
nsion between refugees and host
unities. That is a danger we can —
-lould — avoid.
lecond, how shall we cope with sud-
if luxes like that from Cuba last
•z,l lb ai'gue that we should be open
enerous is not to say that the
d States can accept — or should ac-
-unlimited numbers of entrants or
unlimited burdens.
"he arrival last spring of thousands
Dans in hastily organized boat flotil-
its this question and others into
relief: What limits should we set,
ow? What shall we do about the re-
problem of massive unlawful entry
c he United States? How can we as-
h;it our refugee and immigration
- are free of the taint of racial
i national commission on immigra-
T nd refugee policy, chaired by
' r Theodore Hesburgh of Notre
i iiiversity, is pondering these
e ions now. But these questions
J d also be the focus of a careful na-
il . debate.
^'hird, what shall we do about the
ing problem of "economic refugees?"
a aw, and the U.N. convention on ref-
t ;, define refugees as those fleeing
I' cal persecution, not poverty. But
n times the line between the two is
1 3 clear — as the plight of several
3 .and Haitians seeking asylum in the
! 'd States makes clear. Hunger, too,
'. es refugees. What should be our
1 >• I'egarding those who flee both au-
: tarian rule and harsh, unremitting
c )mic deprivation? There is no easy
s er to this question. But every boat-
k of hungry, miserable people sailing
E 'aribbean toward our shores sug-
.' : to me that we must find an answer
t is both humane and practical.
The problems I have discussed are
llems we Americans feel because of
j)wn experiences with refugees here
jime. We Americans must work to-
)er to solve them. But we must never
l;t — and other countries should re-
iber — that what America does takes
3 in a broader context. The refugee
; is a global issue; it requires a global
onse.
So let me turn now to the interna-
tional dimension of the problem. What
should the international community do to
help solve these pressing problems?
International Dimensions
lb begin with, all nations must respond
generously to help suffering people in
camps and holding centers around the
world. The funds must be provided.
When necessary, all countries should be
prepared to offer first-asylum — and many
to provide permanent resettlement. This
is an international obligation to be shared
by all.
f\irthermore, there must be an ef-
fort to establish clear, internationally ac-
ceptable principles governing the status
and welfare of refugees, as well as the
obligations of nations toward refugees.
The U. N. General Assembly is now con-
sidering several proposals to define such
principles. We believe that any such in-
ternational agreement must include cer-
tain points.
• Large-scale expulsions of persons
should be discouraged in the name of hu-
manity and international order. I can im-
agine no justification — political, social,
racial, or religious — for a government to
force large numbers of its citizens to flee
their homeland. Such expulsions are hos-
tile acts directed by sending countries to-
ward receiving ones and, thus, are dou-
bly unacceptable.
• Persons displaced from their
homelands should be allowed to return
home voluntarily as promptly as condi-
tions permit. The repatriation of persons
following the end of the fighting in Zim-
babwe and Nicaragua demonstrates that
there are effective and humane ways to
repatriate refugees.
• Nations guilty of mass expulsions
must be obliged to repatriate immedi-
ately all criminals they have forced
abroad, subject, of course, to the protec-
tion of rights extended to all displaced
persons. We can no longer tolerate any
country's attempt to rid itself of its crim-
inal elements by cynically exporting
them to neighboring nations.
• Our efforts must be focused on the
fundamental human issues involved — on
the human rights of refugees. Such an
emphasis should cover not only the rights
of refugees once they have left their na-
tive lands but also the obligations of the
governments of the nations they are
leaving — obligations to protect would-be
refugees pending their departure, rather
than to harass them as now often occurs.
Even if the community of nations can
agree on programs based on these princi-
ples, other questions will remain.
Can we, without scaling down our
other relief programs, increase interna-
tional aid to African refugees? A rela-
tively small fraction of the refugee relief
budget has gone to Aft-ica^-even though
refugees in Africa constitute almost one-
quarter of the world total.
And can we improve conditions for
refugees worldwide, without creating a
"pull" which actually induces people to
leave their homelands?
If by raising such questions I seem
to imply that the challenge is staggering
I make no apology: It is. But the chal-
lenge posed by the global tidal wave of
refugees is one we cannot — must not —
duck. The response of the United States
to refugee problems must go beyond refu-
gee relief It must include strong support
for human rights. It must include gener-
ous programs for foreign assistance — to
eliminate some of the hungei; disease,
and misery that create refugees.
Ultimately, we and the world can
deal with the human tragedy of refugee
migrations only by working to remove
their root causes — by overcoming pov-
erty, by working to alleviate hunger, by
ending abuses of human rights within na-
tions, by opposing military aggression,
and by encouraging peaceful settlements
of conflicts around the world.
We are, of course, unlikely to solve
these problems in a short time. We are a
long way from having a world that is so
just, so humane, so prosperous and stable
that no person is forced to flee from
home and country. But surely the effort
to build such a world deserves the work
of all people who cherish human dignity
and the sanctity of human life. And while
we seek to build such a world, let us take
every practical step we can to alleviate
human suffering — wherever we find
it.
1 Press release 333.
AFRICA
Southern Africa: Four Years Later
by Richard M. Moose
Statement before the African
Studies Symposium of the Black
Studies Program at FennsylMma
State University, University Park, on
October 13, 1080. Mr. Moose is As-
sistant Secretary for African Affairs.
rights, economic opportunity, and the
full political participation for all
people.s regardless of race. We con-
cluded that U.S. political and strategic
interests required progress on all three
southern African issues — Zimbabwe,
Namibia, and South Africa,
During the last 4 years Africa, and
southern Africa in particular, have
received increasing attention from
your government and from the Ameri-
can people. We recognized, at the
outset of the Carter Administration,
that American values and American
strategic and political interests dic-
tated an American role— a more active
American role— in southern Africa. 1
believe that we have good reason to be
satisfied that our Africa policy has
advanced these interests.
The pursuit of these three princi-
ple.^— human rights, racial equality,
and democratic rule— has been the^
centerpiece of this Administration's
Africa policy. Our forthright position
and the progress we have made in
southern Africa, based on these prin-
ciples, have been the key to strengthen-
ing our African relations.
Our Africa policy is defined by the
concentric relationships between South
Africa and southern Africa, between
southern Africa and the rest of Africa,
and Africa and the United States.
These relationships are substantively
different today from what they were in
1977. This evening, therefore, 1 would
like to review the southern African
situation as we found it in 1977, the
basic principles underlying this Ad-
minstration's policy, and the compo-
nents of the policy as it developed. I
would like to compare these to the
situation in southern Africa today and
to consider the implications for future
policy of the ongoing processes in
southern Africa.
A basic theme of this Administra-
tion has been consistency between
what we see as fundamental American
principles and the substance of our
foreign policy. We have acted in the
belief that American principles and
American interests should be mutually
reinforcing — ju.stice at home; justice
abroad. In southern Africa this meant
that our policies should be directed at
progress toward the respect for human
U.S. Policy
In the early months of President Car-
ter's Administration, a difficult course
was set. Vice President Mondale met in
Vienna with then South African Prime
Minister (.Johannes Balthazar] Vor-
ster. The Anglo-American eft'ort on
Rhodesia got underway, and the con-
tact group began negotiations on
Namibia.
Forty-six months later Zimbabwe
is independent, the Namibian negotia-
tions have been substantially advanced,
and white South Africa is engaged in
an agonizing reappraisal of the grand
design of apartheid. Meanwhile, the
United States has developed stronger
relations with African states through-
out the continent.
Our initial premise with regard to
South Africa was that the system of
apartheid is morally abhorrent and
that our own traditions and principles
required us, as a nation, to make clear
our opposition. In addition, it was our
judgment that apartheid, separate de-
velopment, and racial discrimination
undermined the pursuit of all of our
interests— strategic, political, and eco-
nomic. Our position was, therefore,
clearly established on the basis of both
moral principle and national interests.
On this basis we made the future
course of our relations with the South
African Government dependent upon
progress toward the elimination of
apartheid. And let me emphasize here
that while this statement of policy-
while it invoked .specific political prin-
ciples—it did not include explicit i.o-
litical prescriptions. Our actions and
our statements over the last 4 years
have been firmly based on the right
and the need for full political partici-
pation. Our position is that the best
political system for South Africa is one
agreed to by all South Africans but not
dictated by any one party. It is in this
light that our policy toward South
Africa over the past 4 years should]
interpreted.
Within the framework of our
policy, we have taken a series of ac-
tions which speak to the seriousnes
our intent:
• The United States fully sup-
ported the U.N. Security Council ma
datory arms embargo in November ^
1977;
• Suspended all nuclear coopen
tion with South Africa pending Sout
Africa's adherence to the NPT | Noii
Proliferation Treaty] and the adopti
of full scope safeguards ;
• Unilaterally expanded the U.
arms embargo to cut off any and all )
exports to South African military ar
police entities;
• Further curtailed all official
sp(n-ts contact ;
• Limited official military coopj
eration and representation;
• Restricted visas for high-rar
ing South African military and polii
officers ;
• Limited Eximbank and CCG
I Commodity Credit Corporation]
credit facilities;
• Supported U.N. resolutions c
demning political repression by the
South African Government;
• Publicly and privately we ar
protesting bannings, detentions, am
denials of passports of South Africa
leaders and citizens;
• Sent observers to political
trials; .
• Redrew our international vis
tors program to more accurately ref
the population balance in South
Africa;
• Endorsed and promoted the b
livaii code of fair labor practices;
• Gave technical support to bl
union leadership;
• Continued to recognize the s
called independent homelands of
Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana,
prospectively, the Ciskei; and
• At the same time, have sou?
to strengthen our official and nonofl
cial contacts with black organizatic
and leaders.
And here at home we have sou
to make the American public awar(
the moral, political, and strategic c
sequences of apartheid for the Uni
States. The change in attitude whi
artmonf nf ??t3tp Bl
Africa
e measures reflect represents a
r break with the policy of previous
linistrations.
As we anticipated these measures
^oked strong reactions from all
its — from those who say that what
been done is not enough to those
would argue that these measures
5 only served to stiffen the back of
ikaner resistance or that we have
■ demonstrated that the United
;es is irrelevant to South Africa.
re are elements of truth, antago-
1, and wishful thinking in these
ts of view.
What is clear is that the ongoing
ussions of Namibia independence,
hanged U.S. policy toward South
ica, and the fact Zimbabwean inde-
^ence have together produced an
nironment for South Africa which
ikedly different from that which
^ ir.l in 1977.
n riial Changes
li Africa underwent a period of
ri'llowing the Soweto riots of 1976
I ho murder of Steve Biko. By 1979
' u\v South African Prime Minis-
e P. W. I Pieter Willem | Botha
'luded. in his own words, that
1 th Africans must "adapt or die."
■] facts appear to justify the Prime
I ister's sense of urgency ; the pace
f vents continues to accelerate.
/k at what is occurring inside
■( th Africa:
• Black politics have taken on a
e dynamism. Several increasingly
c erful and articulate black groups,
lading particularly the ANC | Afri-
Bi National Congress], Inkatha, the
Sijimittee of Ten, Black Conscious-
fe;, AZAPO [Azanian People's Orga-
i{ tion], the PAC | Pan-African Con-
^is|, the Coloured Labour Party, the
ian Reform Party are all actively
noting black political rights. More-
"ir, these groups are searching for
3 mon ground between themselves.
'I haps more important, however, is
h rise of a new center of black politi-
Jower in the trade union movement.
• The increasing strength of the
■k trade union movement in South
ica is one of the major historical
alopments there since 1948. This de-
ipment, no doubt, reflects the larger
; of the black population in the
lanized industrial sector.
• The so-called colored community
has been an integral part of these de-
\elopments and has undergone a his-
toric shift of self-identification from
almost white to almost black. Students
have rejected Bantu education and the
racial status quo in their own name
and in the name of the entire black
population.
• This black political and social
evolution has been accompanied by in-
creasing white questioning of the
homelands premise — not that it was
ever valid. Numerous recent reports,
as unrealistic in today's world but un-
just, and even indefensible.
The business community is appre-
hensive that the perpetuation of apart-
heid not only limits prospects for
growth but actually invites revolution
and destruction. Changes within Afri-
kanerdom have, thus, been stimulated
by a complex of domestic economic,
political, and social developments.
These internal developments are cast
against an external backdrop where
South Africa's buffer states have dis-
appeared, leaving South Africa the
Increasingly, students, editors, uu-iteis, academics even. South Africa's
military — we are told — now speak of apartheid not only as unrealistic in
today's world, but inijust, and evoi indefensible.
some official, have documented the non-
viability of economic apartheid. In-
deed, it has even been suggested in
official quarters that separate economic
development be abandoned in favor of
regional economic cooperation. That is
to say, the white community is search-
ing for an economic alternative.
• Certainly, the desperate search
for political alternatives to the grand
design of Malan and Verwoerd, short
of one-man, one-vote, is clear from the
plethora of constitutional schemes now
being considered. In the process the
Westminster political model is being
abandoned, and a new white political
system is taking shape in the form of a
strong executive and cabinet decision-
making. The Senate was dispensed
with, with few notices or regrets, and
replaced by the President's Council,
wh(}se fate, in turn, is uncertain with-
out black participation.
The search for a new political dis-
pensation for a political alchemists'
formula has seized the white com-
munity. The most significant changes,
to date, within the white community
are in their expectations, in the search
by the ruling minority for new political
structures, its movement toward an
economic policy of unfettered economic
growth, as well as its increased use of
the language and style of reconcilia-
tion. These attitudinal changes reflect
an intellectual ferment within the
Afrikaner community. Increasingly,
students, editors, writers, academics
even. South Africa's military — we are
told — now speak of apartheid not only
world's only surviving white minority
regime.
In the face of this reality, the ])oli-
ticians and advisers around the Prime
Minister, including South Africa's
senior military officers, have come to
recognize that changes must be made
in an eflfort to control both domestic
discontent and international pressures.
However, it is not yet evident that the
white South African leadership under-
stands the nature and the depth of
black grievance nor is it prepared to
enter into meaningful consultations
with black South Africans.
The majority of black South Afri-
cans are clearly unwilling to accept
a solution dictated by whites alone.
They insist not on specific formulas
for sharing power but rather on a
national forum to discuss such formu-
las. Black political leaders, across the
spectrum, appeal for black political
rights, for serious negotiation on
pressing problems, and for cooperative
planning of the country's future. A few
— but too few — significant meetings
have been held. And frequently, those
who call for dialogue are detained, im-
prisoned, or banned. The voices of con-
ciliation and compromise across the
country warn that it soon will be too
late for talk.
We acknowledge that the situation
in South Africa has changed and is
changing, and it would be a mistake to
think that the South Africa of 1980 is
the South Africa of 1977. But it would
Africa
also be equally a mistake to interpret
the difference as evidence of progress.
Apartheid : Policy vs. Theory
In considering change in South Africa
in a historical perspective, we should
underscore the continuous historical
linkages in the policy of racial separa-
tion from the Tribal' Authority of 1924
to the 1980 "constellation of states."
Under whatever scheme, we are still
dealing with a government that is pur-
suing a policy of separate political
development, however described.
The contradictions between the
historical continuity of apartheid pol-
icy and the collapse of apartheid theory
render the immediate future of South
Africa highly uncertain. That future
rests on the question of leadershi]). If
the white leadership of South Africa
accepts the ultimate implications of the
multiracial character of that country, a
Tlie mujoritij of black Soiitli
AfriccDts arc clcarhj iiitwilliiui to
accept a solution dictated by wJiifcs
alone.
peaceful transition to the future is still
possible. However, if the leadership
cannot, or does not, rise to the occasion,
the tragic consequences which ensue
will be visited upon all South Africans.
It would be even more tragic if it
were believed that the existing system
could be preserved by force of arms. It
would be equally mistaken to believe,
as some are theorizing now, that the
problems of apartheid will be solved by
redefining South Africa's political ori-
entation in terms of "no permanent
alliances, only permanent interests."
What must be confronted is South
Africa's permanent identity as an
African country. South Africans can-
not ignore southern Africa any more
than the rest of Africa can ignore
South Africa. Indeed, South Africans
cannot detach themselves from the
West any more than the conscience of
the West can detach itself from apart-
heid. The concentric relationships are
the permanent reality which define
South Africa's [jcrmanent identity and
determine both its alliances and its
interests.
South Africa can no more ignore
the fact that it is in Africa than its
neighbors can ignore the various im-
plications of its presence. South
Africa's leadership has a choice in
dealing with its neighbors much like
that choice which it faces domestically.
Events in the surrounding states pro-
foundly affect the South Africans who
are, in turn, major players in the
future of their neighbors. The nature
of South Africa's domestic situation
will continue to be a key determinant
in its external relations.
External Relations
Similarly, South Africa is clearly
linked with Western civilization and
the industrialized world. Out of their
current anxiety and frustration and
their rejection of outside criticism,
some Afrikaners are casting about for
ways to deny the existence of links to
the West which they have worked —
and continue to work — so assiduously
to foster. Visitors are told that the
critics and their governments are ir-
i-elevant and that they do not matter to
South Africa. Certainly, South
Africa's trade statistics do not supjHirt
this view, and neither does the be-
havior of South Africans themselves.
The truth of the matter is that white
South Africans ai'e probably more at-
tentive and sensitive to what is said
about them than most people.
I had this bi'ought home to me in a
I'ather vivid way last January. I was
rei)eatedly told during a visit that
America had made itself irrelevant to
events in South Africa. A few months
later I noted in a press roundup, sent
by our Embassy in Pretoria, that sev-
eral South African papers had re-
Iiorted that the Legislature of
Nebraska had voted to require state
institutions to divest themselves of
holdings in South Africa. Since I had
not heard of this, I made further in-
quiry, and I found that it appears that
Nebraska's action was not accorded
immediate newsworthiness anyplace in
the American press and, yet, it made
headlines in several South African
newspapers.
The formula for our own relations
with South Africa and with southern
Africa must reflect the set of concen-
tric and interlocking relationships. We
must stick to the principles which have
guided our Africa policy during the
p 1st years. But we must adopt the
particulars of the last 3 or 4 years
api)roach to the new realities of the
South African and the southern Afr
can region.
U.S. Role
Our diplomacy and President Carter
determined stand on the Zimbabwe
sanctions question helped to make pi
sible Zimbabwe's independence. We
must now do our utmost again, in co
cert with others, to enable Prime Mi
ister I Robert] Mugabe to translate
independence into a better life for h
people. In this assessment, we find oi
selves in complete agreement not onl
with our European allies and Zim-
L'abwe's black neighbors but with
South Africa itself. What has and w
hajipen in Zimbabwe will continue t(
exert a powerful influence on black f
white attitudes in South Africa. Fui
ther assistance for Zimbabwe will b(
one of the important questions befoi
the Congress when it returns. Presi-
dent Carter has pledged increased
assistance to Zimbabwe on our part.
As Zimbabwe hopefully works c
its in-oblems, the nine Lusaka natioi
will be laying plans to develop South
African regional economic linkages
common benefit. We will attend the
forthcoming planning conference or
this subject at Maputo in November
and, the Congress willing, we will
suiiiiort its work.
Within a few days representati
of the U.N. Secretary General will
travel to South Africa to pursue
agreement on the implementation ot
Security Council Resolution 435 in
Namibia. South Africa's response tc
this mission will be a key indicator (
its willingness to live and work in
peace with its neighbors. .Just as eve
nation's interests are being served b
Zimbabwe's impressive and orderly
transition to democratic rule, so will
an end to the conflict in Namibia opt
new possibilities for economic progr
and political stability in southern
Afi-ica. It is, clearly, the intent and
within the ability of all those who \\i
supjiorted Resolution 4.'?5 to insure t
impartiality of an internationally su
pervised transition process. The cre(
bility of our commitment to that
endeavor is reinforced by ours and
everyone else's self-interest in an or-
derly and just outcome. South Afric!
will have an op])oi't unity to establish
its own good faith and credibility
beginning a week from now.
DEPARTMENT
Turning to South Africa's domes-
c scene, one hears fears expressed by
hite South Africans about something
ilk'd "momentum." In their anxiety
ifv worry that since Zimbabwe's in-
Itendence is a fact, if Namibia goes,
u-n South Africa will be next. But
, ents in South Africa will not wait
pun events in Zimbabwe or in
amibia. Events are moving at their
,vii pace, and, as we observed earlier,
lat i)ace is accelerating.
In this confusing and often am-
jruous situation, we must not fail to
'ciijfnize change which is real and
i.aiiinpful enough to merit our atten-
nii and our praise. We must also rec-
niize. however, that we have lost
■edibility with black South Africa's
creasingly diverse leadership ; there-
ire, it is essential that we search for.
id find, new and more meaningful
ays to express our commitment to the
;i)i rations of all South Africans,
Although some white South Afri-
us chai'ge that the United States
ils to recognize and to act on their
iicerns, we are acutely aware of
cm. We consider that responding
nstructively to their legitimate se-
lity concerns is one of the essential
et'irs in any peaceful dismantling of
e aiiartheid structure and the insti-
tidii of a system of full political
irticipation.
At the same time, we will not
li'w ourselves to be denied a mean-
yf ul relationship with the black
iuth African majority. Indeed, we
list, in any event, do more to insure
at our circle of contact with the
'\\iy emerging leaders continues to
;pand. The security and the welfare
the black majority is also an essen-
:il factor in the conduct of our
'lations.
iinclusioii
is neither our choice nor our wish
lat our relations with South Africa
■teriorate further. We would like for
lose relations to improve, but such
ii|irovement can only come on terms
hiih are consistent with our princi-
es and acceptable to all South Afri-
iiis. But, in any event, even at the
•.tremes of disassociation, there is no
ay in which our principles or our
iterests will ever permit us to be
isinterested or uninvolved in the fate
f South Africa.
We recognize that South Africa is
't a historical watershed: poised either
ij break out of self-inflicted shackles
or to i)ull back from necessary eco-
nomic, political, and social changes.
The future is there for South Africa's
leaders — both black and white — to
seize. The critical areas of change — in
citizenship and constitutional arrange-
ments — have been repeatedly enunci-
ated by prominent South African
leaders.
We are prepared to oppose, and to
oppose strongly, the preservation of
apartheid. But. we're equally willing
to take the steps necessary to support
a farsighted and courageous effort by
all South Africans to come to terms
with each other and with their
neighbors. ■
Foreign Service
Act, 1980
I'HKSIDENTS STATEMENT,
OCTOBER 17, 1980'
I am today approving H.R. 6790. the
Foreign Service Act of 1980. This bill
provides the first comprehensive revi-
sion of personnel legislation for the
U.S. Foreign Serice in .34 years. It is
an important step in the reform,
simplification, and improvement of
personnel administration in the
Government, a top priority of my
Administration.
Because of its special conditions
of employment, including the require-
ment of availability for worldwide
service, the Foreign Service was ex-
empted from most of the provisions of
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
I recognized then, however, that the
Foreign Service, operating under a
1946 act designed for a far diff'erent
world, was also in need of reform and
that many of the civil service reforms,
appropriately modified, would promote
greater productivity and improve per-
sonnel management in the Foreign
Service as well.
The Congress agreed, and we
worked together to frame legislation.
The Foreign Service Act of 1980 is
the product of our nonpartisan col-
laboration.
While this bill was being drafted,
events were occurring that brought
home, vividly to all of us, the extraor-
dinary demands placed on our Foreign
Service personnel. They play an essen-
tial role in the formulation and con-
duct of U.S. foreign policy, and their
service abroad often involves depriva-
tion and danger. They are exposed to
acts of terrorism and, in some places,
to open hostility toward the United
States and its representatives. We
owe them our fullest support.
The new Foreign Service Act
recognizes the professionalism and
dedication required by today's Foreign
Service. It sets high performance
standards, provides incentive awards
for outstanding service, and strength-
ens career development programs. It
permits the President to promulgate
a pay schedule that complies fully with
the requirements of the Federal Pay
Comparability Act. The Executive
order I will sign, shortly, will achieve
comparability between the Foreign
Service and General Schedule pay
systems.
When I signed the Civil Service
Reform Act just 2 years ago, on
October 13, i978, I said that it would
"bring eflSciency and accountability
and competence to the Federal Govern-
ment that exceed what we have known
in the past" and that it would put
"incentive and reward back into the
Federal system." Our experience since
that law went into effect indicates that
it is bringing real improvement to the
Civil Service — and that the American
taxpayers are getting a better return
on their tax dollar.
I take great pride in signing this
bill today. It is a modern charter, well
designed to meet the needs of the dedi-
cated, able men and women of the
Foreign Service in the decades ahead.
I congratulate all Members of Con-
gress and their staff's who devoted long
hours and months to preparing it and
who worked closely with my Adminis-
tration in bringing it successfully to
enactment.
' Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 27,
HI80. ■
EAST ASIA
ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue
The third Ministerial meeting of
the United States and the Association
of South East Asian Nations
I ASEAN) was held in Manila, Sep-
tember 10-12, 1980. Following is the
fidl text of the joint press statement.
The Third meeting of the ASEAN-
United States Dialogue was held in
Manila on September 10-12, 1980.
The Honorable Anthony C. Albrecht,
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Depart-
ment of State, led the United States dele-
gation which included representatives
from the Department of State, Com-
merce, Agriculture and Labor; from the
Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative; from the Agency for Interna-
tional Development; from the Interna-
tional Communication Agency; and from
the United States embassies in ASEAN.
The ASEAN spokesman was Ambas-
sador Sime D. Hidalgo, Director General
of ASEAN-Philippines. The ASEAN
delegations were led by Mr. Umarjadi
Njotowijono, Director General, ASEAN-
Indonesia; Mr. M. .lusof Hitam, Director
General. ASEAN-Malaysia ; Mr. Aziz
Mahmoud, Director General, ASEAN-
Singapore; and Mr. Vudhi Chuchoni, Act-
ing Director General, ASEAN-Thailand.
The Secretary General of the ASEAN
Secretariat, Honorable Narcisco G. Reyes,
was also in attendance.
The welcome remarks of Foreign
Minister Carlos P. Romulo as the chair-
man of the ASEAN Standing Committee,
were read by Mr. Hidalgo.
Minister Romulo noted that the
ASEAN-U.S. partnership has succeeded
in moving into a "commitment stage"
based upon "mutual respect and mutual
interest."
He stressed that ASEAN and the
United States share a long-range concern
for the continued stability and sustained
economic growth of the region. This is
manifested by their common position in
support of the UN Resolution which calls
for the withdrawal of all foreign forces
from Kampuchea.
General Romulo expressed optimism
that despite the political tension, ASEAN
has not veered from the course leading to
its goal of .self-reliance, economic
strength, political cohesivcness and mean-
ingful cooperation with third countries.
Noting the progress made in re-
gional, cultural, social, and agriculture
projects as well as in energy cooperation,
he urged the delegates to pursue the ac-
tivities in energy-related cooperation as
well as in small-scale industry and
shipping.
Finally, stressing that more needs to
be done in the face of a worsening world
economic crisis, he specifically endorsed
several of the strategies set forth by U.S.
Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, for
industrial nations to follow. He suggested
that these strategies might well serve as
guidelines in broadening the base of this
dialogue.
The two sides reviewed with satisfac-
tion the continuing growth of ASEAN-
U.S. cooperation which complements their
close bilateral relationships. During the
meeting, they reaffirmed the mutual value
of the ongoing ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue as
the forum for their consultation and col-
laboration in support of peace and stabil-
ity and economic development in South-
east Asia. The meeting examined all
aspects of ongoing economic, social, and
cultural cooperation between ASEAN and
the United States; and exchanged views
on ways to further develop these rela-
t'ons. A number of new project proposals
were introduced and discussed and they
will be further studied by ASE.^N and
the United States.
The discussion also covered a wide
range of economic areas of mutual inter-
est to ASEAN and the United States.
Both sides agreed on the need for more
intensive, cooperative eff'orts to counter
developments in the international eco-
nomic environment which posed a threat
to continuing economic growth. At the
same time, they recognized the opportuni-
ties for renewed growth associated with
expanded U.S. -ASEAN cooperation.
ASEAN and the United States ex-
pressed satisfaction that the ASEAN-
U.S. Dialogue has played a helpful role in
the successful Common Fund negotiations
completed in June of this year [1980].
The meeting also agreed to cooperate in
the work of the forthcoming preparatory
commission and particularly to elaborate
positively operational aspects which will
ensure a viable and efi"ective common
fund. ASEAN urged the United States to
support the Philippines' bid for the site of
the Common Fund headquarters. The
United States expressed appreciation for
being informed of the ASEAN position
and agreed to give it early consideration.
The meeting also discussed other meas-
ures to overcome international commodity
problems. These included the early estab-
lishment of international commodity
agreements covering commodities of
mutual interest. In noting the successful
conclusions of negotiations on the Inter-
national Rubber Agreement (INRA),
.'\SEAN expressed its appreciation to the
United States for its support for Kuala
Lumpur as the headquarters of INRA.
Both sides agreed on the need for effective
mechanisms to ameliorate the adverse
effects of export earnings in stability. Thi
meeting also exchanged views on tin with
a view to paving the way for successful
negotiations for a viable and effective
sixth international tin agreement.
The United States noted that bilat-
eral agreements reducing tariff and non-
tariff barriers have been concluded be-
tween the United States and each of the
ASEAN countries within the framework
of the multilateral trade negotiations.
The United States also urged the ASEA>
countries to accede to the MTN Codes ani
agreed to clarify the various questions
raised by ASEAN regarding the codes
and certain tariff' concessions made by th
United States in the MTN prior to the
ASEAN meeting on the MTN, scheduled
in Manila on September 24-26, 1980.
The United States also agreed to
consider ASEAN request for additional
product-specific tariff concessions, includ
ing some items previously discussed in th
tropical products segment of the MTN.
These discussions would take place in thi
context of bilateral trade negotiations
which the United States is willing to
undertake prior to January 3, 1982.
In response to the ASEAN request
for accelerated implementation of U.S.
MTN tariff concessions, the United Stati
reported that it had already made a max
mum effort in the MTN to accelerate
staging of its tariff concession to
ASEAN, but agreed to accept for reviev
ASEAN country lists of those items
which are not currentl.v receiving accele
ated implementation.
Both sides expressed concern about
growing protectionist pressures and the
potential adverse impact on world trade
and, in particular the trade of developin
countries. The United States reiterated
its resolve to resist self-defeating protec '
tionist pressures. It cited Secretary I
Muskie's speech at the UN Special Ses-
sion in which he committed the United
States to support a pledge by all countri
to restrain protectionism and facilitate
adjustment.
The United States reported that it
has made substantial improvements in
the U.S. Generalized Scheme of Prefer-
ence since the last Dialogue.
ASEAN expressed its appreciation
to the United States for the inclusion of ^
Indonesia as a beneficiary of the U.S.
(;SP and -the liberalization of the cumu-
lative rules or origin. ASEAN welcomec
this positive contribution to improve de-
veloping country access to the V.S. mar-
ket. ASEAN urged further improvemen
in cei'tain features of the program, spe-
cifically in product coverage, competitiv
need limitations, and rules of origin. Thi
United States suggested that the ASEA
countries submit requests during the
East Asia
lal product review to have additional
ucts included in the list of eligible
s. The United States also invited
;AN to seek designation as a recog-
d regional association so as to qualify
;r the liberalized cumulative rules of
in. The United States also noted that
AN's GSP benefits continue to grow
dly and indicated its willingness to
experts to the ASEAN countries to
ain the GSP program.
Both sides recognized the importance
16 private sector in expanding
;AN-U.S. economic relations and ex-
sed satisfaction with the formation
le ASEAN-U.S. Business Council.
The meeting expressed confidence
the Council's proposed program will
to closer cooperation between the
ate sectors in ASEAN ami the
;ed States.
The United States delegation reaf-
ed the deep interest of the Export-
Ort Bank of the United States in the
SAN countries, and its commitment to
expansion of economic and trade rela-
s in support of ASEAN objectives,
y indicated the bank would finance at
: $2 billion in transactions with the
;;AN countries over the next five
IS, including ASEAN industrial
!CtS.
Recognizing the important stimulus
f] -h the programs of the Overseas Pri-
3 Investment Corporation afi'ord to
h Sow of private American investment
} SEAN, the U.S. side noted OPIC's
idence and enthusiasm for assisting
.!;AN enterprises in locating appro-
r te U.S. partners and in supporting
V 1 in establishing and sustaining in-
e ments which will contribute to
.ijAN's development goals. The U.S.
c announced that a high-level delega-
c from OPIC would visit the region in
c ber, 1980.
Both sides reviewed the status of
L 2AN-U.S. development cooperation,
1 expressed satisfaction with the prog-
e since the last Dialogue. The United
■is reiterated its strong commitment
Ljii'iial development projects with
. ;.\N. In this connection, it announced
I- : U.S. review of the ASEAN plant
I rantine project has been completed
I the United States is now ready to
i 1 the formal project agreement. The
I ted States also expressed its comniit-
1 it to continue working with ASEAN
r hf ASEAN watershed conservation
I management research program, and
I "Unced the scheduled arrival of a U.S.
(isory team on September 14, 1980.
.■XSEAN and the United States noted
■ h satisfaction the signing of the proj-
a;.' leement on August 28, 1980, provid-
fnr U.S. assistance in the establish-
I nt of an ASEAN Agriculture Develop-
int and Planning center in Bangkok,
lailand.
The United States also responded
orably to a new proposal presented by
ASEAN for an ASEAN scholarship pro-
gram for applied tropical medicine and
public health.
Both sides noted that continued in-
creases in the world oil price call for
greater cooperation among industrial and
developing countries in accelerating the
transition to non-oil energy sources. Thus,
the recent tour of ASEAN energy experts
to U.S. energy facilities and organiza-
tions has served to stimulate ideas for
greater collaboration in energy matters
between ASEAN and the United States.
As a first step in energy cooperation,
ASEAN and the United States have
agreed on a program of technical assist-
ance, professional development, and for-
mal exchange. The United States looks
forward to working with ASEAN to de-
velop the next phase of energy coopera-
tion program over the next few months.
The United States also proposed estab-
lishment of an ASEAN-U.S. consultative
group on energy composed of senior offi-
cials and ASEAN agreed to look into this
proposal.
The meeting reviewed the useful
joint projects concerning drug control in
the fields of law enforcement, preventive
education and treatment and rehabilita-
tion undertaken since the exchange of
notes at the 1979 Ministerial meeting
between ASEAN and the United States
in Bali. They agreed to continue eff"orts to
expand and improve this cooperation.
In order to continue the efi'ective
dialogue on economic matters that has
characterized the ongoing ASEAN-U.S.
Dialogue, both sides agreed to establish
an Economic Coordination Committee as-
sociated with the ASEAN Washington
Committee, as a forum for discussing
economic issues of mutual interest.
Both sides were pleased that agree-
ment on the committee had been reached,
and considered its establishment a major
achievement of the Third ASEAN-U.S.
Dialogue and a positive step in the
strengthening of ASEAN-U.S.
consultations.
On shipping, both sides agreed that
ASEAN and the other non-Communist
developing countries' shipping lines be
exempted from the constraints of the
U.S. Ocean Shipping Act of 1980.
It was agreed that the Fourth
ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue would be held in
the United States next year on dates to
be mutually agreed upon.
The ASEAN and United States dele-
gations thanked the government and
people of the Philippines for the warm
hospitality extended to them during their
stay in the Philippines.
" The Third ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue
was concluded in an atmosphere of
mutual understanding and friendship. ■
U.S.-China Sign
Grain Agreement
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,
OCTOBER 22, 1980 1
Today, we .signed, in Beijing, a grain
agreement with the People's Republic
of China which accomplishes two im-
portant things. First, it will promote
the sale of U.S. grain to a large and
growing market. Second, it will fur-
ther the process of building a long-
term structure for U.S.-China rela-
tions.
Under the terms of this agree-
ment, China will purchase at least
6 million metric tons (MMT) of U.S.
wheat and corn annually for a 4-year
period beginning January 1, 1981.
The Chinese may purchase up to 9
MMT without prior notice.
Since the establishment of diplo-
matic relations in January 1979, U.S.
agricultural exports to China have
expanded rapidly and will reach a
record $2 billion in 1980. China is now
our most important customer for
cotton and one of the most important
for other farm products.
The agreement grew out of a
dialogue dating back to Secretary
I Bob I Bergland's'visit to the People's
Republic of China in 1978. It will pro-
vide important benefits for both U.S.
farmers and consumers. It will help
to moderate the wide swing in grain
prices that are often associated with
annual fluctuations in agricultural
exports. The agreement will also pro-
vide further stimulus to our dynamic
agricultural export sector and con-
tribute to our growing surplus in
agricultural trade, which will reach
$22 billion in 1980.
The President takes great per-
sonal pride in the fact that, in his
Administration, he was able to take
the difficult but enormously successful
step of establishing full diplomatic
relations with China, the largest
country in the world.
The establishment of diplomatic
relations with China almost 2 years
East Asia
ago made it possible for us to move
ahead to build a new relationship
which truly enriches us in knowledge,
trade, and culture.
• Trade more than doubled from
$1.1 billion in 1978 to $2.3 billion in
1979. This year we estimated it will
almost double again to $4 billion.
• About 25 cultural and sports
delegations from China visit our coun-
try every 6 months, and we are recip-
rocating with visits by orchestras
and other cultural groups as well as
our Olympic athletes.
• We have 13 separate working
agreements in science and technology,
which not only give us current and
future commercial benefits but make it
possible for our scientists and tech-
nicians to share in China's research
in medicine, earthquake prediction,
and agriculture.
Important as they are, there is
more to our relationship than trade
and cultural ties. We have also begun,
carefully and deliberately, to build a
consultative relationship which will
enable us to work together to identify
and cooperate on issues of common
interest, such as the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan.
This effort to construct a long-
term strategic relationship is still new
and, therefore, fragile. It is based on
carefully written and painstakingly
negotiated understandings set down in
the joint communique establishing dip-
lomatic relations between the United
States and China. This Administra-
tion has consistently made clear its
resolve to honor those understandings.
We have come a long way since
that day almost 2 years ago when the
President announced that we had
reached agreement with the Chinese
on the establishment of diplomatic
relations. Thirty years of mutual iso-
lation and hostility have been replaced
with a deepening consultative relation-
ship which is already contributing
significantly to American security and
to the peace and stability in Ea.st Asia
and the world beyond.
U.S.-Japanese Relations in the 1980s
' Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 27,
1080. ■
/»> Richard ('.. Holbrooke
Address before the Japan Sacict y
in Nem York on November 21, 1980.
Mr. Holbrooke is Assistant Secretary
for East A.iian and Pacific Affairs.
During the last few months, I have
given a number of speeches on strate-
gic issues in East Asia, the continuing
war in Indochina, and the development
of our new relationship with China.
Although .Japan has figured impor-
tantly in those speeches, as the corner-
stone of our strategic posture and our
strategic interests in the area, I have
not yet discussed, in any detail, how
I see the evolution of U.S.-Japanese
relations in the midst of these other
developments.
In less than 2 months I shall be
leaving my present position. I shall
leave with a sense of satisfaction that
our relations with .Japan have matured
into a full-fledged, more equal and
productive partnership. Nevertheless,
challenges remain before us in the
1980s, challenges that will test our
ability and creativity in adapting the
U.S.-Japanese alliance to an increas-
ingly uncertain environment.
Recent Developments
In the past 4 years, Japan's role in the
world has begun the transformation
from one of caution, with almost total
attention to pragmatically centered
economic activity, to political activism,
partnership, and leadership. This
change was first evident when Prime
Minister | Takeo] Fukuda traveled to
Southeast Asia in 1977, declared the
"Fukuda Doctrine." and opened a new
relationship for Japan with the
nations of ASEAN | Association of
Southeast Asian Nations]. Following
that, and with Foreign Ministers
ISunaol Sonoda, [Saburo] Okita, and
I Ma.sagoshi] Ito playing leading roles,
the sense of Japanese responsibility
grew, not only within the government
but in society at large. Under
Iformerl Prime Minister |Masayoshil
Ohira and now Prime Minister
[Zenko] Suzuki, the Government of
Japan has actively reassessed the
meaning of alliance and partnership,
and the results, particularly in the
last year, have been nothing short of
astounding.
• While hoping to improve rela-
tions with the Soviet Union, Japan
has, nonetheless, taken a forthright
stand in imposing sanctions on Mos-
cow, believing, as we do, that the
invasion of Afghanistan cannot go
unanswered. Japan has stood second
none in rejecting Soviet aggression,
joined the Olympic boycott — a difticu j
step for both the government and th(:
private parties involved. It has main-|
tained economic sanctions even in thil
face of less principled behavior by j
others who have moved in to pick up
contracts Japan might have had. It
has provided massive new aid to
Pakistan and Turkey not, as is so
often alleged, because this would ope
export markets, but as an instrumen
for strategic purposes.
• Japan accepted a cutoff" of ov(
10' ; in its crucial oil shipments whe
it refused to pay higher prices de-
manded by Iran, thus aiding signifi-
cantly in halting the .spiraling price
petroleum. And also with regard to
Iran, despite an unfortunate probler
early in the hostage crisis, since thei
Japan has been second to none in its
support for our efforts there, as well
• Jajian has greatly expanded i
policy-level contacts with Europe,
working closely with the European
Community, as well as with the Unit
States, not only on Iranian sanctions
but in developing a dialogue on a
broad rage of issues. This global ap-
proach is one of the striking feature
of the new Japanese policy.
• The relationship with ASEA
has deepened, and Japan has worked
very closely with those nations, pro-
viding massive refugee assistance —
second only to the United States — ar
playing a front-line role in the U.N.
vote on Kampuchean credentials. Pe:
haps partially in recognition of the
leadei-ship role Japan played on the
latter question, it was overwhelming
voted in to serve on the Security
Council recently. Only a year ago
Japan had to withdraw from a simili
effort.
• Again, in Southeast Asia, no
nation has been more eager or more
active in attempting to use its good
offices and diplomatic resources to
LA- ri..lll
East Asia
;ve a solution to the Kampuchean
lem.
And finally. Japan has adopted
jportive and constructive ap-
ch to the allied effort to limit the
ige of the Iran-Iraq war.
Speculation that these steps were
ly reactive and situational — that
did not obey any larger policy
ept — was dispelled by the remark-
language in the Foreign Minis-
annual policy report (the Blue
c) issued in August.
national relations are no longer con-
ed as a given condition for Japan,
ther something which Japan should
form. As a responsible member of the
national community, Japan must be
,red to make difficult choices, even
sacrifices. Such an attitude is to be
d up by a strong conviction that
,pn must defend its basic values, that
I'linm and democracy . . . and fur-
1 1 riigthen solidarity and cooperation
I free nations, such as the United
a ,< and the Western European
u ries.
Few countries in the world today
Mated their basic orientation so
I nightly.
Part of the motivation for this
■ approach is simply greater uncer-
' y about the international environ-
aiid a desire to seek safety in
1m i-s. But I think a careful reading
ijianese political, public, and press
\<'\\ also reveals a new positive
1 1'pt of Japanese interests and
;.Miiisibilities. No longer is it ade-
II e in Japanese minds to be econom-
:8 V strong and politically neutral.
e-e in the Middle East and Persian
i^ vital to Japan's interests.
it aggression anywhere is a po-
I lal threat to security everywhere.
\ idual willingness to accept unrea-
lile demands for high oil prices
p induce short-term supplies but
at the cost of long-term disloca-
ts that affect us all.
Thus, Japan has moved firmly in
miirection of an alliance involving
H'f the industrialized democracies —
0a military alliance, for that would
■ell beyond what is politically fea-
? or desirable for Japan, but a
tical-economic alliance in which we
vovk together to achieve our
|mon objective.
Productive Partnership""
I very real sense, I would argue,
represents the first stages of im-
nentation of the "productive part-
nership" for the 1980s to which Presi-
dent Carter and Prime Minister Ohira
dedicated their nations in May 1979.
You may recall that such partnership
was based on "shared political and
economic ideals" and reflected our re-
spective responsibilities in world
affairs.
One should not assume that this
has been an inevitable evolution or
that it will inevitably be sustained.
The Japanese Government has had to
work hard with all areas of its society
and body politic to garner the broad
support that the policy line now en-
joys. And the success is all the more
remarkable in light of the severe
strains within the Japanese domestic
political structure in recent times.
As Japanese leaders frequently
point out, the starting point for that
policy is the relationship with the
United States. It is, thus, incumbent
upon the Japanese — and upon us — to
assure that the relationship remains
dynamic and that its essence remains
unaffected by the specific trade prob-
lems that seem to plague us from time
to time.
Indeed, it is important to remem-
ber that the movement in Japanese
policy I have described, and the in-
creasing warmth in the relationship
with the United States, has taken place
during a time of considerable tension
and frequent confrontation on the
economic front. Given problems we
have had in the past such as the textile
issue, one hesitates to say that the
level of problems over the past few
years has been unprecedented. But I
think it wcuild be hard to find an
earlier time when such a broad range
of problems has existed on such basic
economic issues as steel, color tele-
visions, citrus trade, rice disposals,
tobacco products, government procure-
ment, nuclear reprocessing, and — most
particularly — automobiles. And yet,
as a recent poll by Potomac Associates
and the Gallup organization showed,
Americans continue to have an in-
creasingly favorable view of Japan
and of the Japanese people.
Let me cite some of the figures.
In that poll, 84 '"r of the people had a
favorable opinion of Japan — higher
than West Germany (81^; ) or Israel
(78', ) or 17 other countries listed in
the poll. Only 12'^'r had an unfavorable
view.
But the economic problems did
not escape those polled ; over three-
quarters (769^) saw Japanese imports
as a serious threat to American jobs
today, and almost two-thirds ( 62'7r )
saw such a serious threat 5 or 10 years
from now. The number of Americans
seeing Japan as an economic threat
over the longer term declines, while
those seeing China as an economic
threat increase.
Bilateral Relationship
Here I think the successes have also
been overwhelming, but I am con-
cerned about what I would term the
"pathology" of our trade disputes —
concerned that over time the tendency
both sides have to bring such disputes
to the edge of political calamity may
one day breach the firebreak we have
all worked so hard to create between
them and the underlying political,
economic, and security relationship.
What is that pathology ? The
typical scenario is for the United
States to identify a specific trade
problem and raise it with Japan. The
Japanese respond that it isn't much of
a problem or there isn't much to be
done about it or they'll try. Time
passes. Nothing happens. Egged on by
pressures from the Hill and from spe-
cial interests in our business com-
munity — and one must say, sometimes
at the urging of some Japanese — we
escalate it to the very brink of a
political breach. An agreement is
finally struck which the United States
views as inadequate and Japan views
as the result of totally unjustified
public bullying which has taken place
without due regard for its concerns
and its problems. The immediate crisis
passes, but scars have been left. The
cycle then repeats itself on some other
specific issue.
Some people have argued that
such pressures and confrontations are
necessary to move both sides from
extreme positions to more rational
stances. That may be so, but it is
precisely this pathology that I find
deeply troubling, indeed, destructive.
What can we do about it? I think
on the American side we must resist
more vigorously the temptation to
"hype" specific problems. We have not
done that in the case of automobiles,
however. We took our stand, of
course, because we judged it in our
best interest to do so. But the Japa-
nese must appreciate that in addition
East Asia
to concerns for inflation and energy,
part of our calculation has been one of
fair play, that blaming Japan — and
punishing it for something not en-
tirely of their making— was simply
wrong.
Accepting the political burdens of
this type of decision must be reci-
procal. Thus, when the United States
calls on Japan to take justifiable steps
to open its markets further — as we
are now doing on tobacco products and
government procurement for telecom-
munications — I believe it is incumbent
upon Japan to respond with imagina-
tive and serious proposals which re-
flect the totality of our relationship.
even if this means "taking the heat"
from some special interests. Quite
frankly, I think the Japanese Govern-
ment has done just that in many ca.ses.
So my appeal is not only to Japanese
officials but also to those .special
Japanese interests which may be in-
volved in one instance or another, and
to the Japanese press, which is ever
vigilant for examples of U.S. pressure,
to understand that we want to be rea-
sonable, but that reason is a two-way
street.
1 would also be less than frank if
1 did not say that the strength of
feeling which at least some Americans
have tor economic problems is, in part,
a function of percepiions that Japan
Has gotten a "tree ride" in the defense
area. 1 do not happen to share these
perceptions.
In fact, there is a growing myth
in the United States tfiat Japan
doesn't have armed forces, 'i his myth,
which the Japanese have helped to
perpetuate, creates a base ol misinfor-
mation from which the issue is falsely
debated. The question is not whether
Japan should rearm. Japan already has
a significant detense establishment.
Consider the following tacts: The
Japanese Navy includes 45 destroyers
and escorts and more than 35 mine-
sweepers ; Japanese air power counts
more than 370 combat aircraft. All of
these figures are larger than the
figures tor the same categories in the
7th l-leet and 5th Air Force. The real
question is how much and how fast
should Japan build its existing forces
and contribute to the common defense.
With a defense budget which has
increased at almo.st 7'.o annually in
real terms over the last decade and
which now exceeds $10 billion— includ-
ing about $1 billion for support of
U.S. forces in Japan, forbidden from
having off'ensive military forces by a
Constitution shaped with U.S. influ-
ence — that country now has the
seventh or eighth largest defense
budget in the world. But on a per
capita basis the burden ( $82 ) is about
one-seventh of what Americans pay
( $550 ) , and over half of the Ameri-
can public wants Japan to increase its
defense effort.
There is no question that the
quality of the so-called "defense
debate" in Japan has changed mark-
edly in the last 3 years, even in the
past 12 months. Not only is the
Japanese Government considering an
almost 10^' budget increase this year,
but the nature of the debate about
Japan's role has changed dramatically.
And I think, over time, the combina-
tion of increa.sed military spending
and other contributions to our com-
mon security such as economic assist-
ance will ease the concerns of most
Americans about any "fi-ee ride." In
our view, a change in the Japanese
Constitution is not necessary.
The Coming Decade and Beyond
Because we will continue to provide
the strategic umbrella in East Asia
and, indeed, throughout the world, we
will doubtless regain some elements of
the "senior-junior" relationship we
have had in the past. But true part-
nership, which is the only sustainable
model between two countries such as
ours, must mean — if not an end — at
least, a major change in the "unequal"
nature of our relations. Japan is now a
major global power, and both of us
must continue adju.sting to this fact.
It will not be easy. But we in the
United States must respect legitimate
Japanese concerns, must abandon the
idea that "consultation" means asking
what others think and then doing
what we want anyway, must be willing
to accept that parallel policies are
sometimes as good as — if not better
than — identical approaches, must be
willing to follow as well as lead.
And Japan must put into active
practice the notions with which it is
now seized — that while protection of
national interests is every nation's
first priority, the interests of the
major powers involve responsibilities
that go beyond immediate concerns,
that fairness and equity and partner
ship are concepts that must be broad 1
viewed. ,(
I
Economies. The course of U.S.-
Japanese relations over the next
decade will depend more on what we
do in the United States to strengths
our own economy than on any other
single factor. We must increase pro-
ductivity and stimulate efficient, con
petitive industries. At the same timt I
not only do real barriers to trade sti^ i
exist in Japan, but a perception re- >
mains from pa.st experience that Jaj I
is "unfair." I believe Japan has a f
responsibility to go beyond simply
eliminating the relatively few remai
ing barriers. They must change psy-
chological attitudes toward foreign
imports nurtured during the postwa
reconstruction period and actively
facilitate competition from abroad,
they are to maintain that kind of
access to the American market. And
they must take care that their dome:
tic and foreign economic policies do
not — and are perceived not to —
disrupt competitive markets abroad
Secnrity. We do not seek a rede
fined role for Japan. We recognize
and respect their constitutional con-
straints. But the challenges are gre:
and the resources increasingly .scare
We are augmenting our own eff'orts
to counter these trends, but I am on
stating the obvious when 1 say that
the Congress and the American
people will not understand — and wil
not tolerate — the staggering costs
they will be asked to bear without
significant action by our allies as we
As I have indicated, I think in both
the i)urely military field and in for-
eign aid. the trends are all in the rig
direction. I would only underscore t
importance that these trends contim
— and even accelerate — and that we
work together in the closest possible
way in support of oui- shared objec-
tives.
Energy. Twice in the last 4 yea
we have faced near crises with Japa
over energy-related issues. The first
was nuclear reprocessing; the secon
oil. Both of these problems are now
well understood and. indeed, we hav
moved to a new stage of cooperation*
in research and development of new
energy sources. But the eff'orts to da
are, in my personal view, grossly in
adequate to the real needs ; the poteil
tial for controversy is tremendous
East Asia
ink we can make the accommoda-
ns necessary to avoid the pitfalls
d, working together with other
tions, make historic contributions to
3 quality of life not only of our own
izens but of all mankind. But it will
luire patience and vision on both
les greater than at any time in the
St.
Global Perspective
ir fundamental challenge during the
80's will be to consolidate and inte-
ate our major alliances — with
ATO, with Japan, with ANZUS
Lustralia, New Zealand, United
ates pact]. This process is well
iderway in the Pacific, but there is
jrk yet to be done. Our strategic
terests in remaining a vital Asian
iwer are more apparent today than
er. But there cannot be a strong
nnerican policy in the Pacific if it
lesn't begin with a strong U.S.-
panese relationship.
This fact seems to be appreciated
day by the American public, as
ustrated by the Potomac Associates
)11 1 cited earlier. Although the poll
owed that the American public cor-
ctly identified Japan as the major
urce of threat to American jobs,
'lere was a very significant growth in
■ceptance of Japan as a major treaty
ly and a country to whom the
nited States should commit its own
itional prestige if Japan's security
threatened. Almost 70 '^r believe we
lould come to Japan's defense if at-
icked, up from only 37' ,' 6 years ago.
his suggests to me that the American
ublic is capable of making the seme-
mes difficult distinction between
rading rivals and strategic partners,
'hat distinction is essential if we are
3 continue to build U.S. Pacific policy
round an unbreakable Tokyo-Wash-
iigton alliance.
Over the next several years we
hall be facing a historic opportunity
10 draw Tokyo into an increasingly
ictive partnership with the United
itates and Western Europe. Japan's
■ecognition of a broader context for
ts own security concerns has been
harked over the past year and will
ncreasingly contribute to coordination
among the United States, Western
Europe, and the Pacific allies, particu-
larly Japan.
In doing this, however, we must
take care to balance the defense
aspect of our alliance with its political
and economic dimensions. The issue
of sharing the defense burden must be
addressed in the broader context of
economic, political, and security coop-
eration among the allies. This will
make it possible for Japan to find
alternate — perhaps unique — ways to
carry its "fair share" without feeling
pressured to assume an uncomfortably
high military profile. By the same
token, it can help reassure Japan's
neighbors that the development of
more impressive Japanese defense
capabilities — or a rising Japanese
defense budget — do not foreshadow
independent or militaristic policies.
Clearly, Japan is moving gradu-
ally, and in its own unique way, to-
ward a growing defense budget. They
will never move as fast as some
Americans want them to. But the
trend, it seems to me, is unmistak-
able. The Japanese, as you all know,
tend to do the opposite of what we do
with our defense budget. We try to
make our budget as big as possible for
domestic purposes. The Japanese try
to make theirs look as small as possi-
ble — in fact, smaller than it really i.s —
for domestic purposes. So there is a
wide misperception among Americans
— even many in the government —
about how much the Japanese are
already doing.
In this regard, we should also
keep our sights on what we want in-
creased defense spending to accom-
plish, and how the burden can be most
equitably and rationally shared. This
applies not only to Japan but to our
Western European allies, as well. To
the extent that we put all of the
emphasis on a single alliance issue —
defense spending — we could create an
exaggerated sense of disarray and
unnecessarily encourage domestic
political resistance among our allies.
Conclusion
Finally, we must take pains to insure
that our consultations with Japan
about strategic issues are fully de-
veloped. Japan's increasingly active
international role will affect our in-
terests and policies ; ours will affect
theirs. We shall both want to be
appropriately involved in each other's
decisions. For example, we must keep
Japan's concerns and views fully in
mind as we make decisions about our
future security relationship with
China. It is a strategic issue relating
significantly to our alliances.
This will require, above all, that
the President must personally commit
to maintaining the relationship and
prevent those people in the Congress
or in the domestic agencies who see
special reasons to put stress on the
relationship from letting that stress
destroy it. I do not take it for granted
that the lip service which we all pay to
U.S. -Japanese relations automatically
converts into a growing and improved
relationship. It takes real determina-
tion and skill at every level of the
U.S. Government.
Earlier this week I had breakfast
with Saburo Okita, the former Foreign
Minister of Japan. We reflected to-
gether on the last 4 years, and we
agreed that if it had not been for the
full personal commitment of three
Prime Ministers and four Foreign
Ministers, and for the efforts of Presi-
dent Carter, Vice President Mondale,
Secretary Vance, Ambassador Mans-
field, Bob Strauss, Henry Owen, Secre-
tary Muskie. and a handful of other
people, we might not have gotten
through these 4 years without a major
shock or a crisis. But I am proud to be
able to say that we did. We have been
particularly privileged to have Mike
Mansfield as our Ambassador in Tokyo.
He's the most extraordinary Ambassa-
dor I've ever worked with, and his con-
tribution to the strength of the U.S.-
Japan relationship today exceeds that
of anyone.
A firm foundation exists today for
the kind of relationship with Japan
that will best serve both our interests
and the interests of global stability in
the 1980s. It is essential that this
relationship be understood and
preserved. ■
EUROPE
Strengthening the CSCE Process
by Griffin B. Bell
Opening address delivered on
November 13, 1980. at the folloiriip
meeting of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE ),
which opened in Madrid on November
11, 1980. Ambassador Bell is chairman
of the U.S. delegation.
It is appropriate that this second re-
view meeting of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
should be held in Democratic Spain.
From the days of Queen Isabella,
Spain has played a major role in
Europe, and the explorations of Colum-
bus — sailing under the Spanish Crown
— established the link between the Old
World and the New, a link recognized
at our Conference. It is also appropri-
ate that the Spanish delegation should
be headed by Javier Ruperez, my dis-
tinguished colleague, for we well
remember the active and constructive
role he played in the negotiation of the
Helsinki Final Act. In expressing my
own delegation's view of that historic
document, I can do no better than to
quote the words of His Majesty Juan
Carlos, the King of Spain. He said:
"The main themes of international
comity are reflected in the basic docu-
ment of this Conference, the Helsinki
Act of 1975, with regard to security
as well as to cooperation, to humani-
tarian acts, to the right of free com-
munication, and to the overall main-
tenance of individual and social
rights."
The United States is fully com-
mitted to the process which began with
the signing of the Final Act by the
heads of state of our 35 nations. We
are committed to that process because
we believe it represents the soundest
basis on which we can develop and
strengthen our mutual relations. We
support that process, as well, because
it is founded on principles whose
validity and truth have been tested
and confirmed in our own experience
throughout our own history as an
independent nation. Let me cite a few
examples.
• The Final Act demands respect
for the sovereign equality of all
nations. This principle was a touch-
stone of our early history as a nation,
for we had to fight to establish and
then to maintain our sovereignty and
national identity.
• The Final Act proclaims the
principle of self-determination of peo-
ples, a principle which is basic to our
American Revolution. Indeed, it was
fitting that a visionary American
President, Woodrow Wilson, should
have championed that principle follow-
ing World War I and that his efforts
should have aided the emergence of
several of the nations represented at
this Conference. And it is fitting that,
today, my country should be in the
forefront of those calling for self-
determination where it is ignored or
denied.
• The Final Act embodies, at its
core, the great principle of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, a
principle born during the European
enlightenment, nurtured by such great
thinkers as Locke and Voltaire, and
given voice by Thomas Jefferson in
these words from our Declaration of
Independence: "We hold these Truths
to be self-evident, that all Men are
created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain inalien-
able Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happi-
ness."
Let no one doubt, therefore, the
fidelity of the United States to the
commitments we undertook at Hel-
sinki. We could no more turn our back
on those commitments than we could
turn our back on our own heritage as
a nation.
CSCE is more than a document.
It is a dynamic and positive proces.s —
• A process which is slowly but
surely breaking down the barriers
which grew up at the height of the
cold war.
• A process which is bringing
people together across the East-West
divide.
• A process which facilitiates the-
exchange of ideas and information and
the growth of economic contacts, and
• A process which calls on each of
us to carry out the obligations we
assumed at Helsinki and which calls on
all of us to examine how well those
obligations are being carried out.
This Madrid meeting is the sec-
ond major gathering since that his-
toric day in Helsinki. The Belgrade
meeting made clear that CSCE was a
continuing process because it con-
firmed that the nations which signed
the Final Act could come together
periodically to examine how their
commitments to one another had beer
honored and implemented. Such peri-
odic examinations of the record are
necessary. Without them, the great
undertaking of Helsinki might re-
main a static, not a dynamic, concept.
It was, therefore, encouraging for mj
government that, although the discus
sions at Belgrade were sometimes
dirticult and always frank, the Bel-
grade gathering provided — by con-
sensus — for the holding of a similar
meeting at Madrid as the next major
step in the Helsinki process. We can
hope that this process will continue a
all nations come to recognize the trut
that strong and confident governmen'
have nothing to fear from plain speal
ing, from whatever source it might
come.
Because of our conviction that
CSCE is a positive process, indispen-
sable to the advancement of security
and cooperation in Europe, my gover
ment will be second to none in workii
to insure that this Madrid meeting
further strengthens the CSCE proce:
We are not here to confront and to
polemicize; we are here to cooperate
and to construct.
Human Rights
Those gathered around this table wil
hear often over the next several weel
that the words of the Final Act on
human rights and human contacts mu
be interpreted in different ways whei
applied in different social systems.
This argument is untrue — and pro-
foundly harmful to the spirit of our
enterprise. The men and women who
are citizens of our countries do not
possess human rights because they
are members of this or that social
system. They [lossess human rights
because they are human beings. Tho
rights derive, in the words of the Fir
Act, from the "inherent dignity of th
human person and are essential for
his free and full development."
To put it another way, I would
like to cite a story involving the
Europe
it Russian writer Lev Tolstoy and
American President Abraham
:oln. Tolstoy was an admirer of
Eoln. and he liked to explain Lin-
's greatness to the simple people
lis estate. Lincoln, Tolstoy said.
a great man because his every act
rooted in humanity, truth, justice,
ity. That description, it seems to
suggests the principles on which
human rights in the Final Act are
;d.
The Final Act itself tells us what
se rights are. They include the
idom of thought, of conscience, and
eligion or belief. They include the
idem effectively to exeixise civil,
tical, economic, social, cultural,
other rights and freedoms. They
de the right not only to practice
also to profess religious belief ac-
iing to the dictates of one's own
science. And they are, taken to-
er, an essential factor f(_)r peace,
justice, and for friendly relations
cooperation among states. Govern-
ts can deny them — but they can
ther change, nor reduce, nor
roy them.
The principles I have just re-
:ed come from the Final Act, but
lonly from the Final Act. They are
nciples which summarize over 2.000
rs of our intellectual and political
■;ory, from Aristotle's charter for a
; state, to Tom Paine's fiery defense
lolitical freedom, to the eloquence
)ag Hanimarskjold in the cause of
an dignity. Tht)se principles speak
1 our common heritage. They speak
he voices of patriots revered by
ti of our nations. They speak to all
lis hei-e and to all of the citizens of
countries. The question which his-
y will ask about our endeavor is
well we lived up to those princi-
— whether we advanced or set
k the cause of human rights and of
nan freedom.
It is a question which, in the first
tance, each of us must ask himself
lerself. We in the United States
e done so and will continue to do so.
jlieve the U.S. record of imple-
ntation is something we can be
ud of. We are a free society — free
lugh to admit our shortcomings and
icerned enough to try to correct
m. The degree to which we have
filled our obligations under the
Isinki Final Act is an open book for
to read. We are willing to profit
m examination, suggestions, and
criticism. And this should come as no
surprise, for the very first document
of our republic — our Declaration of
Independence, signed on July 4, 1776
— states that we owe "a decent respect
to the opinions of mankind."
Violations in Other Countries
Just as the obligations undertaken
under the Final Act require each of us
to look carefully at our own implemen-
tation record, so they require each of
us to look carefully at the implementa-
tion record of others. The record
since our meeting in Belgrade has had
some bright spots, especially in the
area of freer movement across inter-
national frontiers.
• A number of countries — among
them Romania, the German Democrat-
ic Republic. Czechoslovakia, Poland,
and Bulgaria — have made important
efforts to resolve the outstanding cases
of their citizens who wish to be re-
united with their families elsewhere.
• In several countries — such as
Hungary, the German Democratic
Republic, and Poland — there have been
efforts to explore how church and state
can better live with each other, con-
sistent with the commitment in the
Final Act to expand religious freedom.
• In Eastern Europe, as a whole
in 1979, over 50,000 ethnic Germans
were granted permission to join their
relatives in the West.
• There has been encouraging
progress in some countries toward
creating more responsive and diverse
social and economic systems.
• Several countries have under-
taken studies of their own implementa-
tion records with a view to improving
the performance. We hope this trend
will continue.
• There has been some success in
the security area of CSCE, where con-
fidence-building measures have been
implemented. Progress in economic,
technical, and scientific cooperation
has also been achieved, notably by the
signature last year of the trans-
boundary air-pollution agreement. In
both the economic and security areas,
progress has been modest, yet the
Final Act has served as a catalyst
for imaginative thought which bodes
well for more ambitious steps when
circumstances permit.
• Finally, the situation in and
around the divided city of Berlin has
remained relatively calm. It is of fun-
damental importance to European
security and cooperation that Berlin
continues to receive the full benefits of
the Final Act and the quadripartite
agreement.
As encouraging as this evidence
of progress has been, there is a darker
side of the i-ecord of implementation
which must also be considered. In this
regard, I must mention, first of all, the
invasion of the independent nation of
Afghanistan by armed forces of the
Soviet Union, forces which remain in
that country even as our meeting con-
venes. I shall not recite all the pro-
visions of the Final Act — and indeed,
of the U.N. Charter and other solemn
agreements — which this invasion vio-
lated. Nor will I pause to refute the
transparent explanations which Soviet
leaders have offered for their action.
I will say only that the Soviet invasion
cast a dark shadow over East-West
relations which no meeting, no pro-
nouncement, nothing, in fact, but the
total withdrawal of Soviet troops, can
dispel.
Were this the only instance in
which the obligations of the Final Act
had been ignored since our last meet-
ing, our task here would be solemn
enough. But this is not the case. As I
have cited examples of progress, so
must I call attention to a lamentable
record of continued denial of human
rights written over the past 3 years by
the governments of some signatory
nations.
• In the Soviet Union, in direct
contravention of the Final Act, West-
ern radio broadcast-^ — including those
of BBC I British Broadcasting
Corporation], Deutsche Welle, the
Voice of America, Radio Free Europe,
and Radio Liberty — have been jammed.
• In the German Democratic Re-
public, a new and punitive increase in
required currency exchanges for
Western visitors has drastically re-
duced the ability of West Germans,
particularly, the elderly and the poor,
to visit family and friends in the East.
• In the Soviet Union the Jewish
emigration rate, which encouragingly
reached a record high in 1979, has
declined in 1980 by .50 '; , while at the
same time, harassment and denial of
exit permits continue as before.
• In Czechoslovakia, the courage-
ous members of the Charter 77 group,
created to monitor compliance with the
Helsinki Final Act, have suffered con-
tinued harassment and periodic impris-
onment. As I speak, Vaclav Havel, a
I'sn/ -tQDi
1Q
Europe
spokesman for this group, is serving
out his 4-year term under harsh condi-
tions of confinement, and
• In 1976 eleven men and women,
citizens of the Soviet Union and long-
time activists in the Soviet human
rights movement, formed the Moscow
Helsinki watch group to monitor the
implementation of human rights com-
mitments under Principle VII of the
Final Act and under Soviet law.
Similar groups appeared in the
Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia, and
Armenia. The reaction of the Soviet
authorities was to subject these brave
people to brutal repression. Of the 71
individuals who have belonged to the
Soviet Helsinki watch groups, 24 have
been tried and found guilty, and 19 of
them are currently serving a total of
156 years in forced-labor camps and
exile. Eleven more have been placed
under investigative arrest. Nine others
were already serving previous sen-
tences when they joined the Helsinki
watch. Seven have emigrated, two
were stripped of their citizenship
while traveling abroad, one was ex-
changed for a Soviet spy, and one has
died.
I will name only a few members of
this remarkable group, but they are
representative of all those in the
Soviet Union who strive for the rights
that are promised them in the Soviet
constitution and in the Helsinki Final
Act. All the world knows of Professor
Yuri Orlov, the physicist, a coura-
geous man always in the forefront,
founder of the Helsinki group. The
world also knows of Anatoly Shcharan-
skiy, falsely accused of espionage in an
attempt to intimidate the Jewish
emigration movement. Orlov was sen-
tenced on May 18, 1978, to 7 years of
strict-regimen camp and 5 years of
exile. Shcharanskiy was sentenced on
July 14, 1978, to 3 years in prison and
10 years of strict-regimen labor camp.
Members of the other groups I have
mentioned met similar fates. In the
Ukraine and Lithuania, Mykola
Rudenko and Viktoras Petkus were
also sentenced to long prison terms
because they sought fulfillment of
Final Act commitments. All those who
are free have the inescapable duty to
speak out on their behalf and on
behalf of the many others.
Finally, I speak now of a gentle
and compassionate humanist, a man
who has devoted his life to helping the
poor and the oppressed. Listen to his
words.
Despite all that has happened, I feel that
the questions of war and peace and dis-
armament are so crucial that they must
be given absolute priority even in the
most difficult circumstances. It is impera-
tive that all possible means be used to
solve these questions and to lay the
groundwork for further progress. Most
urgent of all are steps to avert a nuclear
war, which is the greatest peril confront-
ing the modern world.
Could anyone disagree with those
words? Can we not all unite around
the thought they express ? Do we not
all recognize that this thought goes
right to the heart of the deepest needs
and yearnings of mankind? On Janu-
ary 22 of this year | 19801, the author
of those words was exiled to the closed
city of Gorky in the Soviet Union.
When Andrei Sakharov was banished,
some of our best hopes for a spirit of
security and cooperation in Europe
were banished with him.
There are those who charge that
incidents such as these prove the
worthlessness of the Final Act. My
government strongly disagrees. The
fact that a principle has been violated
does not make that principle less valid,
or reduce our obligation to seek fuller
implementation of the Final Act. In
that spirit, the United States will
make every effort, within the context
of the Final Act, to help create a more
secure, a freer, and a better life for
the 1 billion people who live within
the borders of the states represented
here. But CSCE will provide the means
to this end only if its provisions are
taken seriously and are seen to be
taken seriously by our citizens. There-
fore, my country will continue to speak
out, in specific terms, against abuses
of human rights. We call on all of you
to do the same and to recognize that
we cannot expect our citizens to have
faith in future commitments if past
commitments are ignored.
Our expectations for the present
meeting are modest. The events I have
mentioned have created an interna-
tional climate which is not conducive
to ambitious steps in the areas covered
bv the Final Act. It would be idle to
pretend that CSCE can somehow be
insulated from the overall state of
East-West relations. Indeed, such a
pretense could only diminish the im-
portance of the commitments under-
taken at Helsinki.
But we do see some possibility of
progress. For example, we and our
allies have been doing intensive work
to develop confidence-building meas-
ures which will be militarily significan
verifiable, and applicable to the whole
of Europe. We hope that our consid-
eration of such measures at this meet
ing will point the way toward a more
secure future for us all. We are fully
prepared to join with you in seeking
to realize the full potential of con-
fidence-building measures — we ask
only that we concentrate on concrete
steps and avoid empty declarations.
(lonclusioii
President Carter has a.sked me to giv
you the following message — he extem
his warmest greetings to the delegats
to this historic review meeting. For
the President, CSCE is a unique and
valuable forum which unites all the
nations of Europe, the United States
and Canada, in a common effort to ri(
the world of artificial barriers to the
free exercise of human rights and to
the free movement of people and idea
across international boundaries. It is
his firm conviction that it must be ou
common goal to preserve and enhanci
the Helsinki process toward the day
when its provisions are fully imple-
mented and true security and cooper;
tion among our nations have finally
been achieved. ■
Poland
PRESIDENTS STATEMENT,
DEC. 3, 19801
The United States is watching with
growing concern the unprecedented
buildup of Soviet forces along the
Polish border and the closing of cer-
tain frontier regions along the horde
The United States has also taken not(
of Soviet references to alleged "anti-
Socialist" forces within Poland. We
nonartmpnt nf Rtatp Rulle'
SPECIAL
A Short History of the
U.S. Department of State,
1781-1981
The Early Years, 1781-1823
}avid F. Trask
the assistance of
rid M. Baehler
Evan M. Duncan
The United States Department of
State traces its origin to the "Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs" created by
Congress on January 10, 1781. Six
years had passed since the 13 seaboard
Colonies — now formed into the United
States — had begun their rebellion
against the authority of Great Britain.
Congress believed that they had earned
themselves "a place among the rising
potentates of Europe" and felt the
need to cultivate "a friendly cor-
respondence and connection with
foreign countries."
The need for diplomacy was ap-
parent from the start. Given the over-
whelming military strength of Great
Britain, the United States could hope
to gain independence only if it
attracted support of other countries,
especially France and Spain. In 1775
Congress established the Committee
of Secret Correspondence to com-
municate with prospective supporters
abroad and sent emissaries to other
governments. Benjamin Franklin
This unfinished sketch by Benjamin West of the signing of the Preliminary Articles of Peace
between the United States and Great Britain on November 30, 1782, in Paris ending the
American Revolution shows (left to right) John Jay, John Adams, Benjamin F'ranklin, Henry
Laurens, and W. Temple F'ranklin (grandson of Benjamin Franklin and Secretary of the
American Commission). The British Commissioner and his secretary never appeared at
West's studio. This sketch now hangs in the John^Quincy Admas State Drawing Room at the
Department of State. (I)eparlment of State photo)
SI
Special
The Livingston Brothers
13 South Sixth Street,
Philadelphia
Robert R. Livingston (Uepartmenl of State phnun
Robert R. Livingston was born in
New York City in 1746. He served on
several committees of the Continental
Congress, including the one that
drafted the Declaration of Independ-
ence. He was the first Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, serving from 1781 to
1783. In 1789 he administered the oath
of office to President George Washing-
ton. As Minister to France (1801-04),
he helped arrange the Louisiana
Purchase.
Edward Livingston, Robert's
brother, was born in 1764 at "Cler-
mont," New York. After serving as a
Edward Livingston (Department of State photol
Representative from New York and
as Mayor of New York City, Living-
ston moved to New Orleans in 1804.
He was a Representative from
Louisiana (1823-29) and a Senator
(1829-31) before serving as Secretary
of State under President Andrew
Jackson (1831-33). He then served
as Minister to France (1833-35).
His chief concern was with the French
spoliation claims, involving compensa-
tion for damages to American ship-
ping during the wars of the French
Revolution.
served briefly as chairman of the
committee, which in 1777 was renamed
the Committee for Foreign Affairs.
Unfortunately, this committee's
scope was strictly limited. As one
of its most active members, James
Lovell said : "There is really no such
thing as a Committee for Foreign
Affairs existing — no secretary or
clerk further than I presume to be one
and the other. The books and papers of
that distinguished body lay yet on the
table of Congress, or rather are locked
up in the Secretary's [Secretary of
Congressl private box." Franklin,
sent to France as a representative of
the United States, recognized the need
for improved administration of
foreign policy. Noting that Congress
had placed the finances of the country
in the hands of one person, he wrote:
"I wish they would do the same with
their [foreign! correspondence, by
appointing a single secretary for
foreign affairs." The first constitution
of the new nation, the Articles of
Confederation, permitted Congress to
select "such committees and civil
officers as may be necessary for
managing the general affairs of the
United States."
Shortly after the congressional
resolution of January 10, 1781,
Congress selected Robert R.
Livingston, a delegate from New York,
as the first Secretary for Foreign
Affairs. He took ofliice on October 20,
1781, and served until June 4, 1783.
Livingston experienced considerable
frustration in oflfice. One historian
notes that his duties were not
"clearlv defined and he was never
CopyriKht by Robert Sivard 19hit
Soon after taking office as Secreta
for Foreign Affairs, Robert R. Li^
ingston set up his offices in a smal
plain, brick house at 13 South Six
Street in Philadelphia. This build
was the first home of an office of
foreign affairs as an entity separa
from Congress.
The building had been erectex
1773. It consisted of three stories
an attic, with two rooms to each .^^
it had a gable roof which sloped t^
front and rear. A room on the sec^
floor overlooking the street servet
Livingston's oflTice. Various "grea
personages" of the time "frequen'
clambered up the dark and narrow
winding stairs" to transact businf
with the Secretary. Livingston's s
consisted of two Under Secretarie
translator of French, and a clerk,
two Under Secretaries shared a b;
room on the second floor and the
translator and the clerk occupied t
ground floor.
The building ceased to be the
home of the Department of Foreig
Affairs after Livingston resigned
1783. A succession of tenants then
occupied it, using it at different ti
as a residence, a shop, and a board
house.
^nt r\t CtotA Dl
Special
Mia free hand." Later he served
inister to France and in 1803
tiated the Louisiana Purchase.
John Jay, another New Yorker,
had helped Franklin negotiate the
ty of Paris (1783) that ended the
lutionary War, was appointed
itary for Foreign Affairs on May
'84, and he remained at this post
1790. Jay became a severe critic
■s own organization, whose powers
ill defined and whose leader was
r granted sufficient freedom of
m. During the national debate on
;her to adopt the new constitution
ted in 1787, Jay cogently sum-
zed his critique of congressional
ign policy under the Articles of
ederation :
rhey may make war, but are not
■wered to raise men or money to
r it on. They may make peace, but
/ithout power to see the terms of it
sed. . . . They may make alliances,
are] without ability to comply with
tipulations on their part. They may
into treaties of commerce, but
I without power to enforce them at
' or abroad.
In short. Jay concluded, Members
Dngress "may consult, and deliber-
and recommend, and make requi-
ns, and they who please may
rd them," that is, obey. He
ght that few would do so.
le Constitution put into effect in
obviated much of Jay's criticism,
cle n, section 2 makes the Presi-
"Commander in Chief of the
ly and Navy of the United States"
also gives the Chief Executive the
sr, "by and with the Advice and
5ent of the Senate, to make
ities, provided two thirds of the
itors present concur." Finally, the
)ident "shall nominate, and by and
1 the Advice and Consent of the
ite, shall appoint Ambassadors,
:r public Ministers and Con-
. . . ." These provisions placed the
luct of foreign affairs principally
le hands of the executive branch,
certain powers conferred upon the
slative branch — especially to
are war, appropriate funds, and
ise and consent on treaties and
ointments — gave Congress signifi-
t ability to influence foreign policy.
The Constitution did not specify
!xact division of responsibilities
A^een the President and Congress
the direction of foreign relations,
early precedents confirmed execu-
! predominance. Thomas Jefferson
irly delineated the reasons for this
development; he insisted that "the
President is the only channel of com-
munication between this country and
foreign nations, and it is from him
alone that foreign nations or their
agents are to learn what is or has been
the will of the nation." He concluded
that other countries should not be
given an opportunity to play off the
executive against any other branch.
Ever since the earliest days of the
Constitution, Presidents and Secre-
taries of State have adopted this view,
although they have recognized the
important role of Congress in the
foreign policy process.
On May 19, 1789, James Madison
of Virginia, then sitting in the House
of Representatives, began the process
that redefined the functions of the
Department of Foreign Affairs under
the new Constitution. He proposed the
creation of "an Executive Department
to be denominated the Department of
Foreign Affairs." At its head would be
"an officer, to be called the Secretary
to the Department of Foreign Affairs."
On July 27 Washington signed legisla-
tion to this effect. Soon, however, a
new law passed Congress giving cer-
tain domestic responsibilities to the
new Department as well as foreign
duties. On September 15, President
Washington approved this substitute,
which set up a Department of State
with a Secretary of State at its head.
The President immediately appointed
Thomas Jefferson of Virginia, then
Minister to France, to be the first
Cabinet member under the Constitu-
tion to hold the position of Secretary
of State. The author of the Declara-
tion of Independence took up his new
duties on March 22, 1790.
The small executive Department
did not grow rapidly during its early
years. Jefferson's initial staff con-
sisted of a chief clerk, three other
clerks, a translator, and a messenger.
(The title "clerk" refers to officers
charged with the composition of mes-
sages to overseas missions and other
correspondents.) The Department's
domestic budget for 1790, not count-
ing expenses of employees overseas,
amounted to a mere $7,961 — the cost
of salaries, rent, and supplies such as
firewood and stationery. The Secre-
tary of State's salary was $3,500. Total
expenditures in 1791, both domestic
and foreign, were $56,600. In 1807 the
Department's staff included only a
Domestic Duties of
the Department of State
On September 15, 1789, Congress
passed "An Act to provide for the safe
keeping of the Acts, Records, and Seal
of the United States, and for other
purposes." This legislation changed
the name of the Department of For-
eign Affairs to the Department of
State because certain domestic duties
were assigned to the agency. Among
these duties were:
• Receipt, publication, distribu-
tion, and preservation of the laws of
the United States;
• Preparation, sealing, and re-
cording of commissions given to
Presidential appointees.
• Preparation and authentication
of copies of records and authentica-
tion of copies under the Department's
seal;
• Custody of the Great Seal of the
United States; and
• Custody of books, records, and
papers of the former Secretary of the
Continental Congress, except those of
the Treasury and War Departments.
Many comparable functions were
added at various times since 1789,
among them issuance of patents on
inventions, publication of the census
returns, management of the mint,
controls of copyrights, and regulation
of immigration.
Most domestic functions have
been transferred to other agencies.
Among the few that remain in the
Department are: storage and use of
the Great Seal, performance of pro-
tocol functions at the White House,
drafting of certain Presidential proc-
lamations, and replies to public in-
quiries.
chief clerk, five other clerks, and some
part-time help, along with a few
retainers. The Secretary of State's
salary had been raised to $5,000 per
year. In 1818 a Presidential order
authorized a staff that included a chief
clerk, seven other clerks, and a few
others. In 1820 expenditures for
domestic operations reached $87,300;
overseas operations totaled $253,400.
The early overseas service of the
United States was as unpretentious as
Special
Thomas Jefferson, the first Secretary of
State, began the distinction between the
Diplomatic and Consular Services. He estab-
lished the policy of neutrality in European
conflicts. When he took office in 1790, the
Department included H domestic employees,
2 diplomatic missions, and 10 consular posts.
(Department i)t .State phi)ti»)
Treasury Department
Building, Washington, D.C.
The first home of the Department of
State in Washington, D.C, was in the
"Treasury Department Building"
which was shared with other govern-
ment offices. It was located to the east
of the White House, about where the
center wing of the present Treasury
Department building stands.
Completed in June 1800, the build-
ing was a plain two-story structure of
brick on a free-stone foundation, with
a basement and a dormer-windowed
attic. There were 14 rooms on the first
floor. 14 on the second floor, and 8 in
the attic. After approximately 3
months in the overcrowded Treasury
Department building, the Department
of State moved into one of a block of
houses on the north side of Pennsyl-
vania Avenue between 21st and 22nd
Streets Northwest.
the domestic establishment. Jefferson
immediately drew a troublesome dis-
tinction between a diplomatic service,
assigned the task of conducting politi-
cal relations with foreign countries,
and a consular service, which dealt
primarily with commercial matters
and the needs of American citizens
abroad.
Benjamin Franklin had become
the first American Minister to serve
overseas when, on March 23, 1779, he
presented his credentials to King
Louis XVI of France. Other leading
statesmen served as envoys during the
1780s — among them John Adams in
the Netherlands, John Jay in Spain,
and Thomas Jefferson in France. By
1791 diplomatic missions had been
established in five European countries
— England, Spain, France, Holland,
and Portugal. Ministers concentrated
mostly on two important responsi-
bilities; they reported on significant
activities in their countries of resi-
dence and executed formal diplomatic
instructions transmitted to them from
the Department of State.
Thomas Barclay of Pennsylvania
was the first American actually to
take up consular duties. He was ap-
pointed consul in France on October 2,
1781, replacing William Palfrey who
was lost at sea on his way to France.
By 1792, 16 consulates had been
created, most of them in Europe. In
1790 Secretary Jefferson asked consuls
to provide "such political and com-
mercial intelligence as you may think
interesting to the United States." He
mentioned particularly news of Ameri-
can ships and also "information of all
military preparations and other indi-
cations of war which may take place in
your ports."
A congressional act of April 14,
1792, first provided legislative pre-
scriptions for the Consular Service.
Although this law made no specific
mention of commercial reporting, con-
suls provided commercial information
and met the needs of American citizens
within their jurisdictions. Consuls
were expected to maintain themselves
largely by charging fees for their
services, not always a bountiful source
of income. Unlike their counterparts
of today, they did not receive salaries
or allowances for expenses. Because of
the uncertainty of adequate compensa-
tion, consuls frequently served for
First American Consuls
William Palfrey dlepanmentol state photol
William Palfrey of Massachusetts
not only the first American consul;
officer but was also the first memb
the diplomatic service to lose his li
in the line of duty. A lieutenant
colonel in the Continental Army a.
former Paymaster-General, Palfr«
was appointed consul to France oi
November 4, 1780. He was lost at
en route to his post. His name is t
first on the plaque in the lobby of
Department of State listing the
martyrs of the foreign service.
Thomas Barclay of Pennsylva
a merchant residing in France, wf
the first American consular officer
.serve abroad. He was commissione
"vice consul in France" on July 10
1781, and was commissioned as coi
on October 5 to replace Palfrey. Ir
addition to his consular duties, Ba
served as commissioner to settle f(
eign debts of the United States in
Europe and negotiated a treaty of
amity and commerce with Moroecc
1786. He was appointed consul in
Morocco in 1791 but died in Lisboi
1793 before he reached his post.
rt»»n^f^
^f c*^*^ C3.
Special
s '. First American Diplomat
imin Franklin, dressed in "the simple costume of an American agriculturalist."
I'ated Parisian society and laid the groundwork for French recognition of American
'Cndence. I Ut-panmem of State pholoj
amin Franklin was no stranger to
imacy when he was appointed on
' ember 26, 1776, to a three-man
nission charged with the critical
of gaining French support for
rican independence. He had al-
y served in Great Britain as an
t for Pennsylvania between 1757
1762 and again from 1764 to
. His scientific and literary en-
ors had made him the most
nguished American of the age.
French aristocrats and intellec-
5 saw Franklin as the Enlighten-
t personified. His picture soon
;ared on medallions, rings, watches,
snuff'boxes, while fashionable
2s adopted the coiffure a la
nkiin in imitation of the fur cap
:h he wore instead of a wig. His
ilarity prepared the way for
France to recognize American inde-
pendence and to conclude treaties of
alliance and commerce in 1778.
Franklin was appointed Minister
to France on September 14. 1778, and
presented his credentials on March 23,
1779, becoming the first American
Minister to be received by a foreign
government. His home in Passy be-
came the center of American diplo-
matic activity in Europe. Franklin
then served with John Adams and
.John Jay on the Plenipotentiary
Commission that negotiated the peace
treaty with Great Britain.
When Thomas Jefferson succeeded
Franklin in 1785, the French Foreign
Minister, Vergennes, said: "It is you.
Sir, who replace Dr. Franklin?"
Jefferson replied, "No one can replace
him. Sir ; I am only his successor."
many years in only one location, and
they were often inactive. In 1807 a
consul in La Guaira, Venezuela, was
relieved of his duties because "not a
single communication" had been re-
ceived from him since his appoint-
ment in 1800.
Besides working through the reg-
ular foreign services. Presidents asked
special agents to carry on particularly
important negotiations. The first such
agent was Gouverneur Morris of New
York, who made an unsuccessful
attempt in 1790 to arrange British
compliance with certain provisions in
the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783. The
use of special executive agents gave
the executive branch options that
otherwise might not have existed,
given the small size of the Diplomatic
Service.
Representatives of the United
States traditionally wore unpreten-
tious clothing and adopted simple
manners, a departure from the osten-
tatious practice at European courts.
(For a notable exception, see box on
"Consular Uniforms.") Americans
deemed this policy appropriate for
emissaries of a young republic that
had repudiated monarchical tyranny.
Thomas Jefferson, the most hospitable
of men, was particularly opposed to
undue ceremony and rigid protocol.
He refused to recognize formal social
distinctions at dinners held in the
White House during his Presidency,
especially the order of precedence —
seating by rank. This practice greatly
annoyed the foreign diplomatic corps.
Even if the democratic ideology of
the new nation had not imposed repub-
lican simplicity, the meager salaries
paid to American ministers would
have produced the same effect. In 1817
President James Monroe, a former
Minister to France and Secretary of
State, complained to a congressional
committee about the nation's failure
to provide suflicient salaries and allow-
ances for members of the Diplomatic
Service. He insisted that an American
diplomat could accomplish his duties
only by gaining access to the most
important social circles. "By taking
the proper [social] ground ... he will
become acquainted with all that passes
and from the highest and most
authentic sources. . . . Deprive him of
the necessary means to sustain this
ground, separate him from the circle
to which he belongs and he is reduced
to a cipher." Congress did not respond
to such importunings; ministers ap-
■ A... Ar\rn
Special
Diplomatic Dress
The United States took exception to
the prevailing custom that obliged
diplomats to wear elaborate costumes.
Secretary of State William L. Marcy
of New York, who served during the
Administration of President Franklin
Pierce, issued a dress circular order-
ing American diplomats to wear "the
simple dress of an American citizen."
This term meant a full-dress suit. The
difficulty was that American repre-
sentatives could easily be confused
with entertainers, undertakers, or
servants. James Buchanan, Minister
to Great Britain, avoided this problem
by requesting that the Department
allow him to wear "a very plain and
black-hilted dress sword" when he
appeared at court.
During the Civil War, Charles
Francis Adams reverted to a costume
that included breeches, buckles, and
silk stockings. Queen Victoria is said
to have i-emarked, "I am thankful we
shall have no more American fu-
nerals." In 1937 President Franklin D.
Roosevelt issued an Executive order
that provided : "No person in the
diplomatic service shall wear any uni-
form or official costume not previously
authorized by Congress."
pointed to the most important posts,
such as those in London and Paris,
were regularly forced to draw upon
private means. This circumstance
sometimes had the unfortunate effect
of foreclosing diplomatic service to
people without personal fortunes.
At the very beginning of the
Department's history, certain person-
nel practices were adopted that
adversely affected American foreign
relations for many years. Little or no
interchange took place between those
serving at home and those in overseas
posts. Moreover, no provision was made
to encourage transfers between the
Diplomatic Service and the Consular
Service. These circumstances limited
flexibility and interfered with the
development of professionalism; the
basis for a professional career in the
foreign service was not built until the
20th century. This situation reflected
the general suspicion of all things for-
eign that characterized the early
history of the United States. It also
mirrored the declining importance
attributed to foreign affairs after the
War of 1812. Thereafter most Ameri-
cans concentrated on the domestic
activities of their government rather
than on foreign operations.
The early Department of State and
its foreign missions were chronically
overworked, and so was the Secretary
of State. John Quincy Adams, one of
the most conscientious of men, com-
plained of excessive responsibilities
shortly after assuming his duties as
Secretary in 1817. "Business crowds
upon me from day to day requiring
instantaneous attention," he wrote to
his wife Louisa, "in such variety that
unless everything is disposed of just
as it occurs, it escapes from the
memory and runs into the account of
arrears." Despite the great prestige of
the Secretary of State in the early
days of the nation. Congress remained
extraordinarily penurious when allo-
cating funds to conduct foreign rela-
tions, a condition that endured
throughout the 19th century.
Only the most strenuous exertions
of those who served in the Department
or in the overseas missions insured
proper attention to the business at
hand. The unusual abilities of the early
Secretaries of State helped to counter
financial stress and to reinforce the
prestige of the Department. John
Quincy Adams summarized this cir-
cumstance. Because of "the superior
real and inherent importance of the
Department of State in the organiza-
tion of this Government, and . . . the
successive transfer of two Secretaries
of State to the Presidency [Madison
and Monroe], a general impression has
pervaded the Union of a higher con-
sideration due to that Department,
and that in the practice of the Gov-
ernment it is the natural introduction
to the head of the Executive."
Despite important constraints on
the Department of State, the United
States achieved a remarkable number
of triumphs in foreign affairs during
the early years. During the 1790s the
Jay treaty (1794) and the Pinckney
treaty (1795) regularized relations
Consular Uniforms
The early 19th century American
consul was a dashing fellow in go
trimmed uniform with cocked hat
a sword. This was on ceremonial
occasions when, it is just possible
liked to forget that he received n(
allowances for "house or office rei
books, stationery, or other ordina
expenses of office."
A 42-page booklet. General
Instructions to the Consuls and C
mercial Agents cf the Uvited Sta
1838 notes that: "The Consular u
form (as prescribed by the circul
from this department, dated Aug
1815, hereto annexed) must be W(
on all visits of ceremony to the au
ities of the place, and on all prope
occasions."
The uniform was described a.
follows :
"Single breast coat of blue cl
with standing cape or collar, and
navy buttons in front; one button
each side of the cape; four on eac
cuff; four under each pocket flap ;
one on each hip and in the folds ;
on each side in the centre; and on
each side of the same, at the lowe
extremity of the skirts.
"The font, (from the cape dc
to the lower extremity of the skir
cuffs, cape, and pocket flaps, to en
broidered in gold, representing a
composed of olive leaves, and the
button-holes to be worked with gi
thread ; the button-holes to corre?
with the width of the embroidery
which is not to exceed two inches
any part.
"Vest and small clothes of wl
and navy buttons ; the former to \
ten in front, and four under each
pocket flap. With this dress, a cocl
hat, small sword, and shoes and
buckles are to be worn. The hat to
furnished with gold loop, gold tas:
and black cockade, with gold eagU
the centre; added to which, it is t(
understood that the mountings of
sword, and shoe and knee buckles,
to be gold ; otherwise gilt."
S6
Department of State Bi
Special
Burning of Washington,
1814
The home of the Department of State
after 1801 was known merely as "the
public building west of the President's
house" and stood on the present site
of the Old Executive Office Building
at 17th Street and Pennsylvania Ave-
nue, N.W. When British forces invaded
Washington on August 24, 1814. this
building was burned, along with the
Capitol and the White House. While
the Department's library was lost.
Chief Clerk John Graham had already
seen to the removal of many important
records, including the originals of the
Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution. They were stored in a
deserted gristmill on the Virginia side
of the Potomac River, 2 miles above
Georgetown, and were later moved to
Leesburg, Virginia, until after the
emergency.
1 James .Monroe and Robert R. Livingston negotiated the purchase of the Louisiana
or> from France in 1803, they made the greatest real estate bargain of all time and set a
•dent for the acquisition of land. For $15 million, the United States gained 828,000
re miles, thus doubling its size. (Library of Congress photo)
John Quincy Adams became the youngest
American Chief of Mission when he was ap-
pointed Minister to the Netherlands in 1794,
at the age of 27. As Secretary of State (1817-
25), he negotiated a boundary settlement
with Great Britain, acquired Florida from
Spain, and helped formulate the Monroe
Doctrine. (Library of Congress pholo)
on, -IQO-1
S7
Special
with England and Spain. The purchase
of Louisiana in 1803 during President
Jefferson's first Administration guar-
anteed eventual control of the North
American Continent between Canada
and Mexico. Extreme dangers to the
nation materialized during the War of
1812, but they were surmounted dur-
ing the Administration of President
Madison. And finally President
Monroe's Administration arranged the
Adams-Onis treaty with Spain (1819),
which added Florida to the national
domain and settled the boundary with
Mexico on most advantageous terms.
However impressive, these accom-
plishments were not equal in impor-
tance to the formation of a general
foreign policy for the United States
that was to endure for over a hundred
years : the idea that the United States
should observe political isolation from
European powers during time of peace
and maintain strict neutrality during
periods of warfare in Europe. Franklin
anticipated this posture when he ob-
served that "a virgin state should
preserve its virgin character and not go
suitoring for alliances, but wait with
decent dignity for the application of
others." In 1796 President Washington
expressed this general outlook in
classic form, arguing in his Farewell
Address : "The great rule of conduct
for us in regard to foreign nations is
... to have with them as little political
[as distinct from commercial] connec-
tion as possible." Europe, he continued,
had its own set of interests, and these
interests were very different from
those of the United States. Fortu-
nately, the state of international rela-
tions tended to confer freedom of
action upon the nation. "Why forego
the advantages of so peculiar a situa-
tion? Why, by interweaving our des-
tiny with that of any part of Europe,
entangle our peace and prosperity in
the toils of European ambition, rival-
ship, interest, humor, or caprice?"
Therefore, concluded Washington, "it
is our true policy to steer clear of
permanent alliances with any portion
of the foreign world, so far, I mean,
as we are now at liberty to do it."
Thomas Jefferson, although of very
different political views from Wash-
ington, confirmed the national con-
sensus on the virtues of isolation and
neutrality, restating the principle
cogently in his First Inaugural Ad-
dress (1801) : ". . . peace, commerce
and honest friendship with all nations,
entangling alliances with none."
If it was appropriate for the
United States to avoid intervention in
European affairs, it seemed equally
logical that Europe should desist from
further interference in the affairs of
the Americas. Secretary of State John
Quincy Adams enunciated this prin-
ciple in 1823. He was the real auth;
of the Monroe Doctrine, which stat
simply: "We could not view any ini
position for oppressing [the natior
of Latin America], or controlling i
any other manner their destiny, by
any European power in any other 1
than as the manifestation of an un
friendly disposition toward the Un
States." Although the young count
lacked the means to enforce the
Monroe Doctrine, and other power:
did not fully accept it for many yes
to come, its presentation in 1823
marked the completion of the proje
that had begun in 1775 — ^the inde-
pendence of the United States.
The Monroe Doctrine extended the principles of neutrality and independence from Eui
conflicts to the entire Western Hemisphere. (Library of Congress photoi
<;ft
nr»m<-tn* ^f Ctiti-. Di
Special
The Expansionist Years, 1823-1867
During the 44 years between the birth
of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) and
the purchase of Alaska from Russia
(1867 ) , the Americans devoted their
national energies to extending their
dominion across North America and to
building a diversified economy. They
were permitted to concentrate on these
endeavors because no serious external
threats arose except during the Civil
War (1861-65). A stable balance of
power materialized in Europe after the
conclusion of the Napoleonic wars, the
maintenance of which deterred possi-
ble aggressors from interventions in
the New World. Any nation that at-
tempted to interfere in the affairs of
the Americas would have exposed itself
to considerable difficulty on the eastern
side of the Atlantic. Therefore, the
United States enjoyed a long period of
"free security," that is, an extended
moratorium on serious external chal-
lenges like those that had menaced it
before 1815.
It was now possible for the am-
bitious republic to practice a liberal
form of nationalism, one that stressed
good will toward other nations and
emphasized internal development
rather than active foreign policies.
John Quincy Adams set the tone for
nearly a century of foreign policy on
July 4, 1821, when, speaking of his
beloved country, he said: "Wherever
the standard of freedom has been or
shall be unfurled, there will her heart,
her benedictions, and her prayers be.
But she does not go abroad in search
of monsters to destroy." The republic
would influence the world by offering
an example rather than by exercising
force. Americans would be "well-
wishers to the freedom and independ-
ence of all" ; their government would
be "champion and vindicator only of
her own."
These sentiments prevailed in the
United States throughout the 19th
century. In 1850, for example. Presi-
dent Millard Fillmore restated the
fundamental premise of liberal nation-
alism when he insisted that the
United States must grant to others
what it deemed imperative for itself —
the right to establish "that form of
government which it may deem most
conducive to the happiness and pros-
perity of its own citizens." This prin-
ciple meant that "it becomes an im-
perative duty not to interfere in the
government or internal policy of other
nations." Although Americans might
"sympathize with the unfortunate or
the oppressed everywhere in their fight
for freedom, our principles forbid us
from taking any part in such foreign
contests."
The shift toward domestic con-
cerns and the practice of liberal
nationalism slowed the growth of the
Department of State throughout the
19th century. Secretaries of State
after 1823 dedicated themselves more
to preserving than expanding the
influence of the Department. Presi-
dents paid more attention to the
Treasury or the War Department than
to the guardians of foreign relations.
The low priority attached to for-
eign relations resulted in a tendency
to depreciate diplomacy and its practi-
tioners. Secretary of State Edward
Livingston sorrowfully summarized
this attitude as early as 1833. Ameri-
cans thought of their ministers as
privileged characters "selected to en-
joy the pleasures of foreign travel at
the expense of the people ; their places
as sinecures; and their residence
abroad as a continued scene of luxuri-
ous enjoyment." Congress frequently
adopted parallel views. In 1844 the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
proposed to assign ministers to a cir-
cuit of legations, for example, a minis-
ter resident to serve Bolivia, Chile,
and Peru. In 1859 Representative
Benjamin W. Stanton of Ohio said that
he knew of "no area of the public
. . ^/^n^
Special
A Most Undiplomatic Diplomat
Pierre Soule of Louisiana, a natural-
ized citizen of French extraction, was
sent to Spain as the American Min-
ister in 1853. The principal issue in
U.S.-Spanish relations at the time was
the future of Cuba. Soule sympathized
strongly with those who wished to
annex Cuba, a course of action that
would provide territory in which
slavery could prosper. Before Soule
went to Spain, he made a strong pro-
annexationist speech in New York, a
serious diplomatic indiscretion that
prejudiced his mission before it had
begun. To add insult to injury, upon
his arrival in Spain, he made an
impertinent speech to the throne. The
Spanish Government requested its
revision before accepting it.
Soule further compromised his
mission when, to avenge an alleged
insult to his wife, he fought a duel
with the French envoy in Madrid, the
Marquis de Turgot. A bullet from
Soule's weapon lamed the Marquis
for life.
When Spanish authorities seized
an American steamer, the Black
Warrior, in Cuban waters, Soule
immediately demanded that Spain pay
an indemnity of $.300,000 and dismiss
the responsible officials within 48
hours. The Spanish Government re-
buffed these demands, choosing to deal
with the ship's owners rather than
the U.S. Government.
Soule's most famous diplomatic
enterprise was the drafting of the
Ostend Manifesto. This document
stemmed from Soule's meeting with
the American Ministers to Britain
and France in October 1854. Soule's
despatch to Secretary of State William
L. Marcy recommended an attempt to
purchase Cuba from Spain for up to
$120 million. What if Spain refused
to sell? "Then," the message stated,
"by every law, human and divine, we
shall be justified in wresting it from
Spain if we possess the power."
When this bellicose message was
made public, it aroused great criticism
in Europe and the United States.
Opponents of slavery unequivocally
opposed acquiring Cuba under any
circumstances. Marcy then rejected
Soule's message and instructed him to
continue negotiations for the purchase
of Cuba. Soule, correctly assuming
that his usefulness in Spain was at an
end, submitted his resignation, bring-
ing to an end one of the stormiest
diplomatic tours in the annals of the
Department of State.
service that is more emphatically use-
less than the diplomatic service —
none in the world."
The practice of the "spoils sys-
tem" — the award of government
appointments in return for political
support — reinforced the proclivity to
undervalue the Department of State
and the foreign services. President
Andrew Jackson believed that "the
duties of public officers are ... so
plain and simple that men of intelli-
gence may readily qualify themselves
for their performance. . . . More is lost
by the long continuance of men in
office than is generally to be gained by
their experience." This view helped to
perpetuate amateurism in all aspects
of government. The egalitarian cele-
bration of the common man some-
times worked against efforts to im-
prove the quality and status of those
who conducted foreign relations.
The growth of the Departmer
and its overseas missions during tl
years from 1830 to 1860 roughly
paralleled the increase of the genei
population. The Department of St;
which moved to the District of Col
bia in 1800, was housed from 1819
1866 in the Northeast Executive
Building located near the White H
on Pennsylvania Avenue. Only fou
regular clerks were added to the D
partment between 1818 and 1845 t'
cope with an expanded workload. I
1856 the Department consisted of :
officers and 27 supporting personm
and in 1860 the foreign services en
ployed only 281 people. Congress d
not authorize the appointment of a
assistant secretary of state until 1
A second assistant secretary was p
mitted in 1866. The strains of offid
including domestic political critici
imposed great burdens on most Sei
taries of State. One of them, John
Clayton of Delaware, who served
President Zachary Taylor in 1849-
noted the consequences. "The situs
I have filled was . . . more difficult,
more thorny and more liable to mi;
representation and calumny than a
other in the world, as I verily belie
The difficulties of those who ci
ducted the nation's foreign relatio
led one of President Jackson's Seci
taries of State, Louis McLane of
Delaware, to undertake the first g{
eral reorganization of the Departn
since 1789. In 1833 McLane conver
the Chief Clerk into an administra
with broad responsibilities for the
everyday direction of the Departm
He also set up a bureau system to
permit orderly discharge of busine
Seven such units were established,
which the two most important wer
the Diplomatic Bureau and the Cor
ar Bureau. In the Diplomatic Bure
three clerks managed corresponder
with the overseas missions. One to(
responsibility for England, France
Russia, and the Netherlands. Anotl
dealt with the rest of Europe, the
Mediterranean, Asia, and Africa. /
third communicated with the Amei
cas. The five other bureaus covered
domestic affairs — translation; ar-
chives, laws, and commissions; par
dons, remissions, copyrights, and
library; disbursing; and superin-
tending.
The number of overseas missi(
increased from 15 in 1830 to 33 in
1860. Most were located in Europe
Latin America, although the begin
ncinortmont nf Qtato Rl
t) i U.S. Passport
ices G. Knight was Director of the Passport Office from 1955 to 1977. (Department of state photo
term "passport" derives from the
nch words passer, to enter or leave,
port, a port. It literally means a
nit to leave a country. Issuance of
iports and travel documents was
mentioned as a function of the
artment of Foreign Affairs in
I. The Department of State did not
ive exclusive authority to issue
;ports until 1856. Prior to that
!, governors, mayors, and even
tries public were known to issue
sports. During the 19th century,
U.S. Government only required
'elers to obtain passports in war-
e. They would not be required of
ravelers until 1914.
The earliest surviving U.S. pass-
port was issued in France by Benja-
min Franklin, Arthur Lee, and John
Adams to W. D. Cheevert, David
Sears, and their servants on Decem-
ber 27, 1778, for travel to Holland.
During the 1790s many passports
were issued collectively to merchant
ships and their crews.
An interesting variation of this
type was issued in 1796 to ships bound
for the Mediterranean. The top por-
tion was detachable in a scalloped
pattern and was forwarded to Algiers
for distribution to Algerian captains.
If an American ship was stopped, its
captain was supposed to produce the
lower section of the passport and
match it with the upper section. The
ship would then be allowed to proceed.
The passport function is the
activity of the Department that the
general public is most likely to en-
counter. There are passport agencies
in Washington and 13 other major
cities employing 649 persons. During
fiscal year 1980, 3,045,041 passports
were issued, and over 14.6 million
valid passports are in circulation
today.
Special
Marine Security Guards
During the 19th century, the U.S.
Navy was frequently called upon to
protect American lives and property
in remote parts of the world. Marine
detachments usually took part in these
operations and on occasion were
expected to protect diplomatic mis-
sions. The first such instance took
place in 1835, when four Marines from
the U.S.S. Brandywine were assigned
to protect the Consulate in Lima, Peru.
The next year, one Marine was de-
tailed to this task. Legation guard
detachments were stationed at various
times in Tokyo, Seoul, and Managua.
A Marine detachment helped defend
the Legation in Peking during the
Boxer Rebellion, and a Legation Guard
remained in China until World War IL
Civilian guards were unable to
maintain adequate security at overseas
missions, and the Department accord-
ingly turned to the Armed Forces. The
Secretary of State and the Secretary
of the Navy signed a memorandum of
agreement on December 15, 1948,
which established the present Marine
Security Guard program. The first
detachments left for Bangkok and
Tangier on January 2, 1949. Today
1,112 Marines are assigned to 119
Foreign Service posts throughout the
world. Their mission is the mainten-
ance of internal security. In an emer-
gency, their basic task is to gain time
for personnel to reach safety and for
the host government to fulfill its
obligations to protect diplomatic
missions.
Five Marine Security Guards
have been killed in the line of duty.
The most recent fatality was Corporal
Steven Crowley, who lost his life in
the attack on the U.S. Embassy in
Islamabad on November 21, 1979.
Nine other Marines are among the
hostages in Tehran.
'Ibwn.send Harris was the first .American
diplomat to be stationed in Japan. .As Consul
(General at Shimoda. he neKotiated a com-
mercial treaty opening Japanese ports to
American trade. He then served as Minister
Resident (lS5iMJ2). il.ibrao uf (■.iii),Ti>».s phDU.)
nings of American interest in the
Pacific Ocean and East Asia led to
modest representation there. Ministers
were sent to China in 1843 and Japan
in 1859, and a resident commission
was stationed in the Hawaiian Islands
in 1843.
By 1860, 45 people held appoint-
ments in the Diplomatic Service, a
remarkably small number for 33 mis-
sions. Their maintenance cost the
United States about $370,000, an in-
crease from about $200,000 in 1833.
Total expenditures overseas rose from
$294,000 in 1830 to $1.1 million in
1860. Some ministers supplemented
their staffs by appointing "unpaid
attaches," usually young men of pri-
vate means who performed certain
duties in return for admission into
local society and opportunities for
personal study and travel.
Similar growth occurred in the
Consular Service. The number of posts
increased from 141 in 1830 to 282 in
1860, reflecting the considerable ex-
pansion of foreign trade from 1840 to
1860. Consular functions enlarged, but
hardships bedeviled life in the service.
The American consul at Genoa during
the 1840s, C. Edwards Lester, sum-
marized the situation : "An American
consul is often a foreigner, almost
The Hiiisemann-Webster
Exchange
In 1850 the Austrian charge in Wai
ington, the Chevalier Hulsemann, '
strenuously objected to supposed
American interference in the dome
affairs of Hungary, communicated
insulting message to the Departmc
of State. His Government, he state
had "deemed it proper to preserve
conciliatory deportment making ar
allowance for the ignorance of the
Cabinet of Washington on the sub;
of Hungarian affairs and its dispo!
tion to give credence to the mendac
rumors which are propagated by til
American press."
To this statement Secretary o
State Daniel Webster replied in ki
"Nothing will deter either the Gov
ment or the people of the United
States from . . . forming and expre
ing their own opinions freely and ;
all times upon the great political
events which may transpire among
the civilized nations of the earth.
Their own institutions stand upon
the broadest principles of civil libt
and believing those principles . . . 1
be ... in fact the only principles ol
government which meet the demai
of the present enlightened age — tY
President has perceived v/ith grea
satisfaction that in the constitutio
recently introduced into the Austr
Empire many of these great princ
are recognized and applied."
always a merchant, can't live on hi
fees, nor even pay the necessary e>
penses of his office; [he] is scolded
cursed by everybody that has anytl
to do with him, and is expected to
entertain his countrymen, not only
with hospitality but with a consid-
erable degree of luxury."
However trying, Genoa was si
a more desirable post than the Bra
ian port of Pernambuco, now callet
Recife. In 1858 Consul Walter Staj
reported from Pernambuco that on
his predecessors had resigned befo
taking up his office because he had
r\Ar\'^rimnr>i .-.4 Otot^.. Diil
;il 'b Cushing, American commissioner to
la, negotiated the TVeaty of Wang-hsia in
, gaining most-favored-nation commer-
privileges and extraterritoriality for
'ricanS in China. (Librao- of Congress pholo)
;ived "such mournful accounts of
place as to disgust him in advance
is arrival." Moreover, he continued,
ur others have left their bones to
e in these fearfully hot sands, with-
a slab of stone or a stick of wood
)oint the stranger to their graves."
Beset by difficult climates and low
iries, consuls rarely received much
istance from their government. In
3 Secretary Edward Livingston
ed that officials in the domestic
vice of the nation were "surrounded
h the means of obtaining informa-
1 and advice" but that "abroad, an
er is entrusted with the most
jortant function, out of the reach
control or advice, and is left with,
nparatively speaking, no written
es for his guidance." A few consuls
)arently succumbed to temptation,
auditor reported in 1861 that the
isul in Liverpool had not reported
jenditures of public money for 3
irs, "contracting public and private
Dts, which . . . probably exceed
)0,000. It is perhaps some consola-
n to know that this plunderer no
B iger disgraces the Government
«i|road."
Congress delayed action to im-
3ve the situation of American rep-
sentatives abroad until 1856, when
enacted a reform of the Diplomatic
d Consular Services. The law con-
A 1 9th Century View
"Consul, n. In American politics, a
person who having failed to secure an
office from the people is given one by
the Administration on condition that
he leave the country."
Ambrose Bierce
The Devil's Dictionary
centrated on the most publicized prob-
lem — inadequate compensation. It
prescribed salaries for ministers that
ranged from $17,500 per year for
London and Paris to $10,000 per year
for most other places. (The ceiling of
$17,500 for heads of mission endured
90 years, until 1946.) In addition,
consuls were given regular salaries.
Fees collected at consulates were
henceforth to be sent to the Treasury.
Written regulations were developed to
improve the performance of the for-
eign services.
The act of 1856 represented a
step forward, but it fell short of
providing for truly professional for-
eign services. Most ministers and
consuls gained appointment because of
personal wealth, political services, or
social position. Many lacked qualifica-
tions — even the most elementary
knowledge of diplomatic etiquette. For
example, John Randolph of Virginia,
when presenting his credentials at
St. Petersburg, said to the Czar,
"Howya, Emperor? And how's the
madam?" One of the few talented
diplomats of the era who made a career
in the foreign service, Henry Wheaton,
argued in vain for a professional
service that recognized merit and
granted tenure to the deserving. Those
with necessary qualifications — linguis-
tic skill, awareness of diplomatic
forms, and appropriate experience —
.should, he thought, "be employed
where they can do most service, while
incapable men should be turned out
without fear or partiality. Those who
have served the country faithfully and
well ought to be encouraged and trans-
ferred from one court to another,
which is the only advancement that
our system permits of." Wheaton
joined others in complaints about in-
adequate compensation.
Special
Despite the U.S. failure to create
professional foreign services, many
were the accomplishments of the ex-
panding nation in foreign affairs, and
the Department of State made signifi-
cant contributions in almost every
instance. One striking achievement of
the period was the successful resolu-
tion of many disagreements with the
one nation — Great Britain — that
might have threatened the security of
the United States. Peaceful settle-
ments regularly resolved Anglo-
American controversies over bound-
aries, fisheries, and trade, notably
through the so-called friendly conven-
tions of 1817-18, the Webster-Ash-
burton treaty of 1842, the Oregon
treaty of 1846, and the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty of 1850. Of comparable
importance were successful negotia-
tions that furthered the march of the
United States across the continent,
especially the treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo that ended the Mexican war
with the annexation of New Mexico
and California in 1848 and the pur-
chase of Alaska from Russia in 1867.
In all these situations, the United
States took advantage of favorable
bargaining positions. Despite the
handicap of amateur diplomacy, no
Nicholas TVist, Chief Clerk of the Depart-
ment of State, followed General Winfield
Scott's army to Mexico City Ignoring an
order recalling him to the United States,
TVist negotiated the treaty of Guadalupe-
Hidalgo with Mexico in 1848, extending
American territory to the southwest from
the Nueces River to the Pacific Ocean.
(Library of Congress photo)
ei9
Special
Seward's Abortive
Intiative
At the beginning of President Lincoln's
Administration in April 1861, the new
Secretarj' of State, William H. Seward of
New York, proposed to end domestic
political strife over the all-consuming
question of slavery by pursuing an active
foreign policy, one that might lead to dec-
larations of war against France or Spain,
thus uniting domestic factions against a
foreign threat. Seward even volunteered
himself as the principal prosecutor of
such a policy The President tactfully re-
buffed this extraordinary proposal.
Thereafter, Seward, whom Henry Adams
described as having "a head like a wise
macaw; a beaked nose; shaggy eyebrow^s;
unorderly hair and clothes; hoarse voice;
off-hand manner-free talk; and perpetual
cigar," subordinated himself to the Presi-
dent and served him loyally and effec-
tively.
serious setbacks marred the nation's
foreign affairs between 1823 and 1867.
The most dangerous challenge to
the nation's security during the 19th
century occurred during the Civil War.
That tragic struggle between the
Union and the Confederacy created
excellent opportunities for European
nations to meddle in the Western
Hemisphere either by violating the
Monroe Doctrine or by extending aid
to the rebellious South. In this in-
stance the remarkably effective collab-
oration between President Abraham
Lincoln and his Secretary of State,
William H. Seward of New York,
proved equal to the situation. The
Secretary's success in fending off
serious trouble during the Civil War
proved that great achievements in
foreign relations almost always de-
pended on close relations between the
President and the Department of
State. The American Minister in
London, Charles Francis Adams, third
in a line of distinguished statesmen
from Massachusetts, established him-
self among the most successful diplo-
mats of his time, preserving the neu-
trality of Great Britain until the
Union Army finally prevailed over its
opponents. If the Confederacy had
received significant assistance from
European nations, especially Great
Britain, the war might have had a
much different outcome.
The triumph of the Union in
prepared the way for still another
of remarkable national progress,
finally ending the dispute over tht
relative merits of national supreni
and states' rights. The nation em(
from the Civil War more powerfu
secure than at any time in its hist
it would continue to enjoy virtual
immunity from international danj
— "free security" — for another 50
years.
n/^nortmcinl r*f Qtato Rl
Special
The Rise to World Power, 1867-1913
The purchase of Alaska from Russia on March 30, 1867, gave the United States its first
noncontiguous territory. lLibrar> of Congress photo)
The 30 years after the Civil War are
justly considered the least active in
the history of American foreign rela-
tions. Free security, that fortunate
byproduct of the generally stable in-
ternational balance of power, lingered
on, permitting Americans to devote
themselves to their prime preoccupa-
tion — internal development. During
these years, the westward movement
was completed, and the nation experi-
enced extensive industrialization and
urbanization.
The absence of foreign threats to
national security and the continuing
national stress on domestic concerns
during the latter years of the 19th
century explain why the conduct of
foreign relations did not deviate much
from earlier practice. As late as 1894,
an observer noted that the public was
"less familiar with the duties of our
diplomatic and consular agents than
any other branch of the public serv-
ice," a logical outcome because mem-
bers of the foreign services lived
abroad and could not be observed at
work. As before the Civil War, xeno-
phobic Americans regularly con-
demned their representatives abroad
as subversive. In 1885, for example.
Senator William E. Robinson of New
York insisted that "this diplomatic
service is working our ruin by creat-
ing a desire for foreign customs and
foreign follies. The disease is im-
ported by our returning diplomats and
by the foreign ambassadors sent here
by monarchs and despots to corrupt
and destroy our American ideals." The
Senator's solution was to quarantine
entering diplomats "as we quarantine
foreign rags through fear of cholera."
Another familiar pattern endured
beyond the Civil War — meddlesome
political interference with the Depart-
ment of State. In 1869, for example,
President Ulysses S. Grant made
Elihu B. Washburne, a friend from
Galena, Illinois, the Secretary of State
for a mere 12 days so that he could
enjoy the prestige of having held that
position when he took up his respon-
Special
sibilities as Minister to France. Fortu-
nately Washbiirne's successor, Hamil-
ton Fish of New York, established
close relations with President Grant
and managed to minimize unwise
appointments and policies.
Like previous Secretaries, Fish
recognized that he could not adminis-
ter the Department efficiently without
the President's strong support. When
General Orville Babcock, another one
of Grant's friends, attempted to inter-
fere in the affairs of the Department,
Fish bluntly informed the President
that he could not tolerate such activi-
ties. If the President showed lack of
confidence in him, he wrote, "or when
the influence of the head of the Depart-
ment in the administration of its
affairs, or the formation of its policy,
is overshadowed by others, a sensible
or sensitive man will appreciate that
the time for his retirement has
arrived."
Political appointments remained
the order of the day despite growing
public concern, manifested in support
for creation of the Civil Service
( 188.3 ) , which did not cover the for-
eign services. In 1885, when the Demo-
cratic Party gained control of the
executive branch for the first time in
24 years. Congressman Jonathan
Chace of Rhode Island contrasted
American and British practice on such
occasions. "Whenever a change of ad-
ministration occurs in Great Britain
. . . members of the diplomatic service
know that no change will take place in
regard to their positions, but all over
the world today every man in the dip-
lomatic and consular service of the
United States is packing his trunk and
engaging his passage preparatory to
returning home."
Nevertheless, certain members of
the foreign services developed special
competence and pursued careers in
diplomatic and consular assignments.
Prominent among them was Eugene
Schuyler, who first served as consul at
Moscow in 1867 and later held other
posts in Europe before ending his
service as the American representative
in Cairo in 1889. Another was William
Lindsay Scruggs, who began his career
as Minister to Colombia in 1873 and
moved on to several other positions,
including service as Minister to Vene-
zuela during the Administration of
Alvey A. Adee
Alvey A. Adee began his diplomati
career as a private secretary at the
Legation in Spain in 1869. He beca
a clerk in the Department in 1876
and Chief of the Diplomatic Burea
2 years later. Appointed Third Ass
ant Secretary of State in 1882 and
Second Assistant Secretary in 188t
he became First Assistant Secreta
of State just before his death in 19
Adee approved or drafted aim
all outgoing correspondence and w
a stickler for correct style and usai
In times of crisis he would install ;
cot in his office. Deaf, reclusive, an
unmarried, he dedicated his life to
operation of the Department, advii
Presidents and Secretaries of both
parties and briefing diplomatic an
consular officers. A longtime resid*'
of Washington is said to have re-
marked as Adee bicycled past him;
"There goes our State Department
now."
President Benjamin Harrison (1889-
93). Two men who developed impres-
sive reputations as regional specialists,
Henry White (Europe) and William
W. Rockhill (East Asia), extended
their activity well into the 20th
century.
Abuses in the Consular Service
persisted into the late 19th century
despite strenuous efforts to correct
them. In 1872 a representative of the
Treasury, DeB. Randolph Keim, re-
ported the results of an extensive
investigation of the Consular Service.
He uncovered many irregularities,
among them collection of illegal fees,
improper exercise of judicial powers,
fraudulent accounting, faulty admin-
istration of estates left by Americans
who died abroad, issuance of illegal
passports, and sale of the American
flag. Keim thought that the most im-
portant feature of his investigation
was the "ingenuity displayed by con-
sular officers, since the Act of 1856
particularly, in defrauding the Gov-
ernment and grasping gains from
various outside sources besides."
Few changes in basic foreign
policies can be detected during the
generation after the Civil War; the
Klihu B. Washburne had tht- shortest te
of office of any Secretary of State —
March .VIB. 18«9. .\s .Minister to France
(lSt>it-77), he witnessed the Franco-Pru;
War, the Paris Commune, and the fall o
empire and the birth of a republic.
(Di-parliiu-nt of StiU,- ph<nu)
<%1ft
narAartmcknt /-»f Qtatci Ri
»derick Douglass
Special
'The Yankee King of Spain"
derick Douglass was born into
ery in Maryland. After escaping
dage, he became a leading aboli-
list. Following the Civil War he
!ived two diplomatic assignments.
871 he served as secretary of a
imission sent to Santo Domingo to
lore the possibility of annexing
I i.'sland. More important, in 1889
)eeame Minister to Haiti and
rge d'affaires to Santo Domingo,
his capacity he became involved
n unsuccessful attempt to acquire
Mole St. Nicolas in Haiti as a
ling station. In 1891 Douglass re-
led his office after critics alleged
t he showed undue regard for the
tian point of view.
The appointment of Daniel E. Sickles
as Minister to Spain in 1869 was the
culmination of a flamboyant public
cai'eer. As Secretary of the Legation
in London (1853-55), Sickles had
helped to arrange the conference of
ministers that produced the Ostend
Manifesto. He also had his mistress
presented to Queen Victoria. As a
Democratic Congressman from New
York, Sickles gained notoriety for
shooting his wife's lover in Lafayette
Square, being acquitted of murder,
and then forgiving his wife.
At the outbreak of the Civil War,
Sickles raised a brigade of volunteers
in New York City and maintained
them at his own expense until they
were taken into the Army. He led the
"Excelsior Brigade" into battle and
rose to the rank of Major General and
to the command of the Third Corps of
the Army of the Potomac. At Gettys-
burg, he moved his corps to an exposed
position and lost most of his troops
and his right leg. (The bones of his
leg are on display in the Army Medical
Museum.) In the spring of 1865,
Sickles conducted a diplomatic mission
to Colombia to arrange the passage
of American troops through Panama.
Sickles was appointed Minister
to Spain as a reward for his early
support of Grant's campaign for the
Presidency. He was instructed to offer
help to Cuba in purchasing inde-
pendence from Spain, opening the way
to eventual annexation. Spanish
opinion was outraged, and General
Prim, the Spanish Prime Minister,
was assassinated before he could
reconsider. After King Amadeo I
declined the offer of purchase, Sickles
plotted with Spanish republicans in
the vain hope that they would be more
willing to sell after they came
to power.
Sickles lived lavishly in Madrid,
renting a box at the opera and having
his secretary, Alvey A. Adee, order fine
wines and luxury goods for him from
London and Paris. Sickles frequently
traveled to Paris, where he had an
affair with Isabella II. formerly the
Queen of Spain. Isabella herself was
notorious for her affairs, and there
had been much speculation about the
paternity of her children. Parisian
•society promptly dubbed Sickles "the
Yankee king of Spain." Sickles also
married Caroline de Creagh, lady-in-
waiting to the former Queen.
On October 21, 1873, the Spanish
warships captured the steamer
Virginius, as it carried arms to in-
surgents in Cuba. After Spanish au-
thorities executed the- captain and
most of the crew, many of whom were
American citizens, the United States
demanded the release of the ship and
the remaining prisoners. Sickles was
instructed to close the Legation and
return home if the Spanish Govern-
ment did not accept these demands
within 12 days. Sickles, however, was
ready to close the Legation after
5 days. The crisis was averted when
the Spanish Government offered to
negotiate in Washington rather than
Madrid, and Sickles then resigned.
Sickles left for Paris on March 27,
1874, and lived there for 5 years.
After his return to the United States,
he devoted the rest of his life to the
I)reservation of the Gettysburg battle-
field and to defending his conduct
during the battle.
inezer Don Carlos Bassett, -America's
t black diplomat, was Minister Resident
I Consul General in Haiti from 1869 to
i, (Department, of State photo)
Special
James Kussell Lowell, Minister to Spain (1877-8U) and to (jreat Britain (1880-85), was one of
many distinguished American authors who held diplomatic or consular posts.
(Library of Congress photo)
overarching principles of isolation and
neutrality remaineci firmly entrenche(i.
In 1894 Secretary of State Walter Q.
Gresham of Illinois reaffirmed Wash-
ington's "great rule of conduct" in
commenting on what he deemed a ques-
tionable departure from the policy of
"no entangling alliances" — an agree-
ment with Germany and Great Britain
to share control of the Samoan Islands.
"Every nation, and especially every
strong nation, must sometimes be con-
scious of an impulse to rush into diffi-
culties that do not concern it, except in
a highly imaginary way," he noted. To
contain this tendency Gresham offered
a traditional remedy: "To restrain the
indulgence of such a propensity is not
only the part of wisdom, but a duty we
owe to the world as an example of the
strength, the moderation, and the
beneficence of po])ular government."
Perhaps the most notable develop-
ment in foreign policy was the eleva-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine into an
unquestioned article of faith as the
nation gave increasing attention to
Latin America. Secretary of State
.lames G. Blaine of Maine responded to
this development; he inaugurated the
modern Pan American movement in
1889, although it did not prosper until
the early years of the 20th century.
George H. Butler, nephew of a prominent
Massachusetts Congressman, was appointed
Consul General in Alexandria, Kgypt, in
1870. He dismissed all consular agents,
auctioned off their commissions, and pur-
chased dancing girls. Shortly before his re-
call in 1872, he was involved in a brawl w ith
three former Confederate officers.
(Librar>' of Coiiki*»?ss pholo)
The limited importance assign.
to foreign relations after the Civil
War was reflected in the modest
growth of the Department of State
and the foreign services. In 1880 th
Department had only 80 employees
compared with 42 in 1860, and the
total declined to 76 in 1890. The nui
ber of diplomatic missions increase^
only 41 in 1890, up from 3.3 in 1860
while the number of consular posts
grew during the same period from
282 to 323. Diplomats numbered 45
1860 and 63 in 1890. The Consular
Service expanded much more, empl
ing 1,042 people in 1890 compared
with 236 in 1860.
Expenditures on domestic and
eign operations rose from $1.3 mill
in 1860 to only $1.8 million in 1890
These were limited increments, ind
when compared with the increase o
the general population, which appn
mately doublefd between 1860 and 1
In 1870 the Department under
went a significant reorganization a
the initiative of Secretary Fish. Th
principal change was a further elal
oration of the bureau system that
Secretary McLane had inauguratec
1833. To cope with the growth in o\
seas missions and consulates. Fish
established two diplomatic bureaus
and two consular bureaus with geo-
graphic responsibilities. The First
Diplomatic Bureau and the First Ci
sular Bureau dealt with Europe,
China, and Japan. The second pair
bureaus managed communications
with the rest of the world — Latin
America, the Mediterranean regior
Russia, Hawaii, and Liberia. Five
other bureaus were created — the C
Clerk's Bureau, the Law Bureau, tl
Bureau of Accounts, the Statistical
Bureau, and the Passport Bureau. '
reorganization of 1870 endured for
years, undergoing only minor adju:
ments during that period.
In 1888 the Department of Sta
moved into an imposing new home-
the State, War, and Navy Building
located at 17th Street and Pennsyl-
vania Avenue, N.W., and in 1893 th
United States finally upgraded env<
accredited to the most important fc
eign powers to the rank of ambassa
Previously all missions had been le;
tions headed by ministers. Embassi
were established in Great Britain,
Special
ate, War, and Navy Building
1869 Congress recognized that the
Iding housing the Department of
te (the Washington City Orphan
•him) was inadequate because of
high rent, shortage of space, and
severe fire hazard. Consequently a
imission was appointed to recom-
nd a site and submit plans for a new
cutive office building to house the
Dartment of State. By February
0, it was agreed to construct a
Iding on a site west of the White
use, a site which was then partially
upied by the buildings of the War
I Navy Departments.
The construction was to be done
;tages beginning with the south
ig in order to avoid interfering
h the business of the War and
vy Departments. This would allow
se two departments to remain in
ir buildings until later when those
Idings would have to be razed to
ke way for the other wings. Just
ore the south wing was completed
Tune 1875, the Department of State
an moving in. The War and Navy
partments moved into the east wing
Tiediately after it was ready for
upancy in April 1879. The north
ig was completed in late 1882 and
War Department moved into it in
bruary 1883. The west and center
■( igs were occupied in early 1888.
Upon completion it was reputed to
;aJthe largest and finest office building
e| the world. Exclusive of basement
i sub-basement, it has a total floor
Mji» _^vw*i:aL4ff"
area of about 10 acres and contains
nearly 1-% miles of corridors 12 feet
wide. These are paved with black slate
and white marble. The eight spiral
stairways with steps of gray granite
are unsupported by either beams or
arches. There is very little woodwork
in the entire building, the most note-
worthy being the doors.
The south wing had been planned
and built for the exclusive use of the
Department of State. The Secretary
had his office on the second floor at the
southwest corner and the diplomatic
reception room — the scene of the
signing of many historic documents —
adjoined the Secretary's office.
Because of the pressure of space,
the Department of State was forced to
move some of its office out of this
building and into rented quarters in
other parts of the city. In 1918 the
Navy Department moved to new
quarters and all State Department
offices were reunited in this building
where they remained until 1936.
In 1930, following the departure of
most of the War Department, the
name of the building was changed to
the Department of State Building.
Again, however, the structure grew
overcrowded and another exodus to
outlying buildings became necessary.
In 1947 the Department of State
moved to a new location at 320 21st
Street, Northwest. The old State, War,
and Navy Building now houses the
executive offices of the President.
France, Germany, and Italy after
those nations conferred ambassadorial
rank on their representatives in
Washington.
These changes did not mean that
the Department and the foreign serv-
ices had altered their traditional prac-
tices. One historian described the
Department of 1898 as "an antiquated
feeble organization, enslaved by prece-
dents and routine inherited from
another century, remote from the pub-
lic gaze and indifferent to it. The
typewriter was viewed as a necessary
evil and the telephone was an instru-
ment of last resort." Most of the old
problems endured into the 20th cen-
tury. The Department and the foreign
services were shorthanded ; employees
at home and abroad were seriously
underpaid. Appointments were still
subject to the spoils system, Congress
having failed to legislate a system of
selection and promotion by merit and
job protection through the award of
tenure to the deserving.
Suddenly, the general circum-
stances that had influenced the Depart-
ment of State since 1815 were vastly
altered as the result of a short but
important war. In 1898 the United
States became involved in a struggle
with Spain that stemmed from popular
support for the independence of Cuba.
The decision to free Cuba was a star-
tling departure from the practice of
traditional liberal nationalism, but as
a surprise it did not compare with the
results of the war. The Treaty of Paris
(1898) provided for Cuban independ-
ence and also for the cession of impor-
tant Spanish possessions to the United
States — notably the island of Puerto
Rico in the Caribbean Sea, the entire
Philippine archipelago in the western
Pacific Ocean, and the small island of
Guam in the central Pacific Ocean.
This assumption of colonial re-
sponsibilities overseas in two widely
separated regions, a stunning aberra-
tion from liberal nationalism, reflected
not only the temporary enthusiasms of
1898 but a basic change in the inter-
national posture of the United States.
The old foreign policies reflected the
circumstances of the earlier 19th cen-
tury, but by the 1890s the situation
had changed greatly. The nation had
acquired almost all the attributes of a
great power ; it stood ahead or nearly
ahead of almost all other countries in
the critical measures of power, such as
population, geographic size and loca-
tion, economic resources, and military
potential.
Special
This striking rise in international
status portended comparable shifts in
foreign policy. President William
McKinley drew attention to the new
situation in the instructions he gave
to the delegation of American states-
men who negotiated the Treaty of
Paris with Spain. "We cannot be
unmindful that without any desire or
design on our part the war has
brought us new duties and responsi-
bilities which we must meet and dis-
charge as becomes a great nation on
whose growth and career from the
beginning the Ruler of Nations has
plainly written the high command and
jjledge of civilization." Another con-
temporary observer, George L. Rives,
extended this interpretation. "Whether
we like it or not," he wrote, "it is plain
that the country is now entering into
a period in its history in which it will
necessarily be brought into far closer
and more complex relations with all
the other great Powers of the world,"
an outcome that would outmode estab-
lished foreign policy. "We shall now
and henceforth be looked upon as hav-
ing cast aside our traditional attitude
of isolation."
During the 16 years between the
brief war with Spain in 1898 and the
outbreak of the First World War in
1914, the United States greatly en-
larged its role in world politics. The
nation measurably altered its posture
toward the areas that it had pene-
trated in 1898 — the Caribbean-Latin
American and Pacific-East Asian re-
gions — and thereby added significantly
to the burdens of the Department of
State.
Latin American policy involved an
imposing revision of the Monroe Doc-
trine. Throughout the 19th century the
Monroe Doctrine was aimed primarily
at European powers, which were
warned to avoid further colonization
in the New World. It did not imply
the right to intervene in the affairs of
Latin American nations. President
Theodore Roosevelt, reacting to con-
cern that certain European nations
might be able to penetrate Latin
America by the device of collecting
debts that certain nations had repu
diated, asserted a policy in 1904 th;
became known as the Roosevelt Coi
lary to the Monroe Doctrine. No La
American nation that adhered to
acceptable international standards
behavior, he said, need fear interve
tion by the United States. But wha
about less scrupulous countries?
"Chronic wrongdoing, or an impote
which results in a general loosenin)
the ties of civilized society, may in
America, as elsewhere, require int«
vention by some civilized nation."
Moreover, he continued, "in the we
ern hemisphere the adherence of tl
United States to the Monroe Doctr
may force the United States, howe'
reluctantly, in flagrant cases of sue
wrongdoing or impotence, to the ex
cise of an international police powe
This pronouncement led to a series
interventions in the Caribbean-Lat
OIney's Fiat
In 1895 Secretary of State Richard
Olney addressed a diplomatic despatch
to London for communication to the
British Government concerning a
boundary dispute between Great
Britain and Venezuela. This message
gave early indication, even before the
war with Spain in 1898, that the
United States was moving toward a
new assertiveness in international
politics on the basis of its rise to great-
power status. OIney's note offered a
stirring defense of the Monroe Doc-
trine. "Today the United States is
practically sovereign on this continent,
and its fiat is law upon the subjects to
which it confines its interposition.
Why? It is not because of the pure
friendship or good will felt for it. It is
not simi)ly by reason of its high char-
acter as a civilized state, nor because
wisdom and justice and equity are the
invariable characteristics of the deal-
ings of the United States. It is be-
cause, in addition to all other grounds,
its infinite resources combined with
its isolated position render it master
of the situation and practically in-
vulnerable as against any or all other
powers."
Spanish and American delegates sign the TVeaty of Paris on December 1(1. 1H9.H. The Spai
Kmpire in the New World came to an end. and the United States acquired an overseas er
and took its place among the great powers, ii.ibrao oi Conures.s photo)
Deoartment of State Bu
Special
srican region that greatly enlarged
U.S. presence there and added to
Imj workload of the Department of
'tai ;e.
Itk Meanwhile, the acquisition of the
Coi lippines triggered the development
Li new American policy for East
u a. As the United States gained a
rili ;hold in the region, European
Tie irsions in China threatened to cut
ina iccess to that vast country, just
!n Americans hoped to create a
1 1( at trade in Chinese markets. Ac-
iingly. Secretary of State John
of Ohio proposed in 1899 that
nti ions interested in China should
joy perfect equality of treatment
navigation," that is, maintain the
tljiciple of free trade — the "open
!ri r." In 1900 Hay extended the open-
VH r policy to include respect for the
•itorial and administrative integ-
of China. This commitment to the
n-door policy led the United States
iegrees into much expanded par-
pation in the activities of East
a, another source of additional
ponsibilities for the Department of
te.
These extraordinary additions to
international political commit-
its of the United States ineluctably
tered many internal changes in the
lartment of State and its overseas
iblishments. The foreign policy
amunity grew at a rapid rate. The
lartment was thoroughly reorga-
ed to meet its new responsibilities,
important steps were taken
/ard the development of profes-
nal, democratic foreign services.
The Department of State ex-
ided considerably during the years
ween the war with Spain and the
I'st World War. When Hay became
:retary of State in 1898 the Depart-
■nt met a domestic payroll of 82
jple; by 1905, when Elihu Root of
:w York succeeded Hay, the number
d risen only to 119, but at the end
1910, during the Secretaryship of
lilander C. Knox of Pennsylvania,
6 payroll had advanced to 234. The
plomatic Service grew modestly
3m 93 people in 1900 to 121 in 1910.
Expansion required a considerable
crease in the annual budget. The
penditures of the Department at
ime and overseas increased from
;.4 million in 1900 to $4.9 million in
ilO. The Consular Service experi-
iced a particularly significant addi-
bn to its workload. The annual total
' fees collected rose from $533,000 in
1898 to 1.6 million in 1916. This three-
fold jump reflected an expansion in the
nation's foreign trade from $1.8 billion
to $3 billion during the same period.
The growing responsibilities of
the Department of State forced a thor-
ough reorganization in 1909. The re-
former. Assistant Secretary of State
Francis M. Huntington Wilson, suc-
ceeded in enlarging the number of
leadership positions so that thereafter
the Department had three Assistant
Secretaries cf State, a Counselor to
undertake special assignments, and a
Director to administer the Consular
Service. Lines of authority were clari-
fied, permitting senior managers to
make better use of personnel. Most
important, however, was the creation
of bureaus to deal with four distinct
geographic regions — Western Europe,
the Near East, the Far East, and
Latin America — a move that fostered
improved communication between the
Department and the overseas missions.
Several other bureaus and divisions
were created to deal with various new
responsibilities, notably a Bureau of
Trade Relations and a Division of
Information. A number of talented
foreign service officers were brought
to Washington to staff the new geo-
graphic bureaus, adding a much-
needed leaven of experience.
Although the expansion and reor-
ganization of the Department consti-
tuted striking departures, the most
distinctive feature of the early 20th
century was a strong movement
toward fully professionalized and
democratic foreign services. The
transformation in American foreign
relations that began at the end of the
19th century forced the nation to rec-
ognize that it paid dearly for amateur-
ism in the conduct of foreign policy.
One critic summed up the need for
expertise in an article published in
1897: "As we would not put a ship
into the hands of a commander igno-
rant of navigation, an army under the
control of a general without military
training, a suit at law into the hands
of a counsel who never opened a law
book ... so we should not put the for-
eign affairs of our government into
the hands of men without knowledge
of the various subjects which go to
make up the diplomatic science." Given
the changed circumstances. President
Theodore Roosevelt emphasized the
necessity to upgrade performance:
"The trouble with our ambassadors in
stations of real importance," he told a
"Father of the
Foreign Service"
Wilbur J. Carr (1870-1942) was born
in Ohio and entered the Department
of State as a clerk in 1892. He became
Chief of the Consular Bureau in 1902,
Chief Clerk in 1907, and served as
Director of the Consular Service from
1909 to 1924. A believer in scientific
management and administrative effi-
ciency, Carr took pride in having
brought Consular Service operations
"as near to perfection as possible."
He strove to extend professionalism
and merit to all aspects of the Depart-
ment, working for passage of the 1906
Consular Reorganization Act and
helping to draft the Rogers Act.
Carr served as Assistant Secre-
tary of State from 1924 to 1937. His
duties included those of Chairman of
the Board of Foreign Service Per-
sonnel and Budget Officer of the
Department, a combination which
allowed him to administer the transi-
tion from separate Diplomatic and
Consular Services to a unified profes-
sional Foreign Service. His last
assignment was Ambassador to
Czechoslovakia from 1937 until the
German occupation in 1939. "The
Father of the Foreign Service" then
retired from the Department, having
served for 45 years under 17 Secre-
taries of State.
anuary 1981
S21
Special
President Grover Cleveland signed an
Executive order on September 20, 1895, that
instituted examinations for consular appoin-
tees, a significant step toward professional i-
zation of the Consular Service.
( Ueparlinenl ut Stale photo)
Joining the Diplomatic Service in 19()S,
Joseph C. Grew served as Minister to Den-
mark (1920), Switzerland (1921-24), and as
Ambassador to TUrkey (1927-.32) and to
Japan 1932—11). He concluded his career as
Under Secretary of State (1944-45).
(Department of Slate phtdol
frienii, "i.s that they totally fail to give
us real help and real information, an(i
.seem to think that the life work of an
ambassador is a kind of glorified pink
tea party."
Various means of insuring profes-
sional and democratic foreign services
were available to the Department.
Among them were abandonment of the
spoils system in favor of guaranteed
tenure, adoption of the merit system
as the basis for award of pay increases
and promotions, selection of foreign
service officers by competitive exami-
nation, and adequate pay and allow-
ances. All of these practices had been
widely publicized earlier as part of the
campaign that culminated in the pas-
sage of the Civil Service Act in 1883,
applicable only to domestic servants of
the government. They were equally
appropriate for the Diplomatic and
Consular Services, and all of them re-
ceived attention during the first years
of the 20th century.
President Grover Cleveland antic-
ipated the reform movernent in 1895,
when he issued an Executive order
that made entrance into the Consular
Service contingent upon competitive
examination, but the most important
steps occurred during the Administra-
tions of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt
and William Howard Taft.
In November 1905, President
Roosevelt established the merit system
for all diplomatic and consular posi-
tions, except those of minister and
ambassador, along with competitive
entrance examinations. In 1906 Secre-
tary Root shepherded a law through
Congress that created a grade classifi-
cation system for consular positions
and also to conduct annual inspections
of consular establishments. However,
this statute did not mention President
Roosevelt's examination system or
merit promotion ; President Roose-
velt remedied these omissions by
means of another Executive order
issued in June 1906. A few years later,
in 1909, President Taft set up a board
of examiners to administer both oral
and written examinations to prospec-
tive diplomats.
In 1915 Congress passed the
Stone-Flood Act, which permitted ap-
pointment of certain diplomatic and
consular officers to functional posi-
tions, rather than to specific posts in
the field. This step permitted reassign-
ment by administrative transfer
rather than Presidential appointment.
This sequence of events vastly
encouraged the proponents of techn
competence in the Diplomatic and
Consular Services, although more r(
mained to be doi.e. The movement
owed something to the earlier agita-
tion for the creation of a civil servic
but even more to the spirit of progn
sivism that swept the nation during
the first two decades of the 20th
century. The Progressives emphasi2
administrative measures designed ti
enhance efficiency and minimize the
baneful influence of excessive parti-
sanship, especially in the form of
political appointments. They oppose
undue favoritism to the wealthy anc
privileged. President Roosevelt told
friend in 1908: "I am anxious to ha^
it understood that it is not necessari
to be a multimillionaire in order to
reach the highest positions in the
American diplomatic services."
This concern stimulated passag
of the Lowden Act ( 1911 1 ; it was th
first legislation to provide for the pu
chase of buildings to house overseas
establishments. The author of this
measure. Representative Frank O.
Lowden of Illinois, hoped to open ths
way to the most important diplomat
positions for deserving members of
foreign services regardless of their
economic circumstances. "It ought b
be possible," he said, "for the lowest
man in the foreign service to feel th.
it is within his power, if his service
justifies it, to reach the highest post
This sentiment faithfully reflected t.
Progressive conviction that compe-
tence should be the only basis for
advancement in the public service.
The new assertiveness of the
United States in world politics not
only reflected the nation's rise to
world power ; it also stemmed from
basic changes in the pattern of inter-
national relations. The stable inter-
national balance of power that had
endured since the downfall of Napo-
leon in 1815 — the source of so much
national advantage in the form of fr<
security during the 19th century —
showed definite signs of collapse dur-
ing the first years of the 20th centur^
Its final dissolution in 1914 precipi-
tated the first European general war
in a hundred years. Notable expansio
and improvement in the Department
State after 1898 helped to prepare it
for the unprecedented challenges thai
it encountered during the First Worl
War of 1914-18 and after.
S22
Department of State Buile
Special
The Test of Total War, 1913-1947
The First World War marked one of
the great turning points in modern
history. It signaled an end to the
century of general international
stability and extensive economic,
social, and political progress that had
underwritten the security of the
United States during its rise from a
small and struggling country to an
honored place among the great powers.
The conflict of 1914-18 inaugurated
an age of international disequilibrium
that endured to the latter decades of
the 20th century, generating political
turbulence and organized violence on
an hitherto unimaginable scale.
The First World War vastly af-
fected the position of the United States
in the international community be-
cause it destroyed the general stability
that had nurtured Washington's
"great rule of conduct" during more
than 100 years of extraordinary na-
tional accomplishment. It drew the
nation into any number of interna-
tional entanglements that would have
seemed inconceivable a few scant
years earlier. Political isolation, how-
ever appropriate during the 19th
century, no longer served the national
interest.
When genera] warfare began in
1914 between the Allied Powers
(Great Britain, France, Russia,
Japan, and later Italy) and the Central
Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary,
and Turkey) , the United States an-
nounced strict neutrality in keeping
with tradition, but this course ulti-
mately proved untenable. During the
period of neutrality (1914-17) two
prewar trends came rapidly to a tragic
conclusion. As the Americans experi-
mented with their newfound power in
world affairs after the war with Spain,
they decided that their national in-
terests and aspirations had become
complementary with those of the
ancient enemy, Great Britain, and com-
petitive with those of Germany,
another rising power. Developments
after 1914, which led to an ungovern-
able conflict with Germany over the
legality of unrestricted submarine war-
fare against neutral shipping, simply
accelerated a political process that had
begun some years earlier.
Nevertheless America's entrance
into the First World War in April
1917 as an associate of the Allies re-
flected the vision of President Wood-
row Wilson more than the outcome of
the controversy over submarine war-
fare. By 1917 the conflict had been
transformed into a quasi-global con-
flict that verged on total war. Wilson
came to believe that only the United
States could shape an eff'ective peace
settlement, given the political and
moral debility of the contending bellig-
erent coalitions. The fundamental rea-
son he decided on the intervention of
1917 was to insure that the United
States would play a decisive part in the
outcome of the war. Only by this
course could he hope to dominate the
postwar peace conference.
The President's plan for the
future, outlined in the 14 points of
January 1918 and augmented by later
pronouncements prior to the end of the
war in November 1918, envisioned
restoration of a stable, equitable, and
enduring international balance
through the workings of a beneficent
arrangement to provide collective
security — the League of Nations —
based on a consensus of the great
powers. Wilson's attempt to banish
warfare forever culminated the con-
version of the United States from
isolation to engagement in a mere
generation.
The many changes that accom-
panied World War I posed great chal-
lenges for the Department of State. As
the executive agency charged with
principal responsibility for the conduct
of foreign relations, it was forced to
assume duties undreamed of in earlier
years. Even before the United States
entered the war, the Department's
workload spurted dramatically. Both
the Diplomatic and Consular Services
expanded their reporting functions to
provide desperately needed informa-
tion. They also augmented their sup-
port activity abroad. American citi-
zens made demands for help, and
S23
Special
"None Is Swifter Than These"
The earliest American diplomatic
courier was Peter Parker, master of
the brig Dispatch, who was commis-
sioned by the Continental Congress on
July 10, 1776, to deliver messages to
J.H. and Samuel Delap in Bordeaux.
The letters, relating to obtaining mili-
tary supplies from France, were
weighted so that they could be thrown
overboard in the event of capture.
The Department did not begin to
hire couriers on a regular basis until
World War I. Outgoing despatches
would be entrusted to shipmasters,
junior naval officers, or private citizens
as necessary. "Bearers of despatches"
were entitled to $6 per diem plus a
travel allowance, payable by the De-
partment upon completion of their
mission. They also carried a special
passport to certify their official char-
acter. One of the first such special
couriers was a Post Office employee
named Nat Crane, who left Savannah
for London on May 24, 1819.
The Embassies in London and Paris
became the first American diplomatic
posts to hire full-time couriers in
December 1914. At the end of the First
World War, the American Commission
to Negotiate Peace asked Major Amos
J. Peaslee, who had organized a
courier system for the Army, to per-
form a similar service for the Depart-
ment. The Diplomatic Courier Service
began operations in Paris on Decem-
ber 2, 1918, using military personnel.
It was disbanded the next year when
the Peace Commission concluded its
activities, but 11 Marines and one
civilian were then designated as
couriei's.
The Courier Service was dis-
banded again on July 30, 1933, as an
economy measure. President Franklin
D. Roosevelt ordered its reestablish-
ment in 1934, while attending the
London economic conference. The s.
tem was still based in Paris and hat
three regular couriers. By 1941
established service had been institu
to China, Japan, and the Americas.
A regular system of worldwide schf
ules came into being after World
War n.
The Diplomatic Courier Servic"
reached its peak strength of 100 aft^
World War IL There are presently '
couriers. Despite the hazards of wat
revolutions, shipwrecks, and plane
crashes, only five couriers have lost
their lives in the line of duty. No
pouch or letter has ever been stolen
from a diplomatic courier. The emb
of the Diplomatic Courier Service i
golden eagle in flight. Its motto, "m
is swifter than these," is taken fror
Herodotus' description of Persian
couriers.
The TVeaty of Versaille.s was signed on .lune 2«, 1919. At the close of World War I, the United
States briefly abandoned isolation and attempted to establish not only a lasting peace but a
new international order, a.ji.iary (jrcmunss photo)
American missions located in bellig
erent countries often acted as care-
takers for enemy interests in these
countries. For example, the Americ
Embassy in Berlin represented Bri<
ish, Japanese, and Italian interests
Germany until the United States
abandoned neutrality.
The burgeoning responsibilitie
of the foreign services caused an in
crease in personnel and expenditure
Many temporary employees were as
signed to duties at home and overse
Resignations and retirements were
minimized to retain experienced offi
cers. Congress authorized a signific
number of new permanent positions
including 27 in the Dijilomatic Serv
a jump from 70 to 97. The domestic
payroll grew from 234 people in 191
to 708 in 1920. Expenditures jumpe
from $4.9 million in 1910 to $13.6
million in 1920.
For the first time since the ear-
liest years of the nation, the Americ
people gave sustained attention to
foreign affairs. The Department ac-
cordingly attracted considerable att
tion and even praise, a welcome cha
from the general apathy or distrust
that characterized the heyday of isc
S94
Department of State Bull
Special
Man Behind the Throne
a time Edward M. House of Texas
rcised much more influence on
sident Woodrow Wilson's foreign
cies than the Secretary of State,
lert Lansing of New York. He came
i^ilson's attention during the cam-
xn of 1912 and soon became the
ident's most intimate friend. A
it, self-effacing man, but one of
6 ambition, House established close
tions with important European
ers, particularly in Great Britain.
The President sent him to Europe
.•e during the period of neutrality
14-17) to explore the possibility
lediating the European conflict,
ise later served as a special execu-
agent during the period of Ameri-
belligerency (1917-18) repre.sent-
the United States at an important
r- Allied conference held in Paris
ing November 1917 and at the
irmistice negotiations in October-
ember 1918. During the war
ise also headed a group of experts
wn as the "Inquiry" who prepared
irmation to be used by the Ameri-
delegation to the postwar peace
ference.
President Wilson made House one
he American peace commissioners
919, and the Texan played a sig-
:ant role in the negotiations that
< place in Paris. Unfortunately for
I, he betrayed a tendency to com-
mise some of Wilson's positions,
bably the reason for a rapid cooling
heir friendship. When House re-
ned from Europe he was no longer
come at the White House.
n. The rise of the "new diplomacy"
I term used to describe statecraft
ponsive to the desires of popular
jorities — brought international
itics and its practitioners fully into
■ consciousness of people who had
jer before concerned themselves
th foreign relations.
And yet, despite its enlarged
operational responsibilities and re-
spectability, the Department of State
lost much of its influence on the mak-
ing of foreign policy. Almost all the
significant decisions of the conflict —
to pursue strict neutrality in 1914, to
intervene on behalf of the Allies in
1917, to champion the League of
Nations in 1918, and to negotiate a
peace treaty on American terms in
1919 — emanated from the White
House without decisive contributions
from the Secretary of State and his
subordinates.
Several factors helped displace
the Department of State as the prin-
cipal source of advice concerning the
most crucial questions of war and
peace. One important reason was that
President Wilson and his several Sec-
retaries of State did not establish
close and confidential relations with
each other, almost always a precondi-
tion for influential leadership from
the Department of State. Wilson re-
lied primarily on others for advice,
notably an intimate friend, Edward M.
House of Texas. A less obvious but
equally significant reason was that the
Department was poorly organized to
meet the requirements of wartime. It
tended to act slowly, and it lacked ex-
pertise in treating military issues.
Moreover, the exigencies of the na-
tional emergency dictated the partici-
pation of many agencies in decisions
about foreign relations — notably the
War Department, the Navy Depart-
ment, the Treasury, and temporary
organizations such as the War Indus-
tries Board — but the Department of
State was not prepared to take a lead-
ing role in coordinating this activity.
Finally, modern communications
rendered the President less dependent
on the Department for information
than in earlier periods.
The experience of modern war-
fare revealed that the Department of
State would have to undergo major
changes. In January 1920, Secretary
of State Robert Lansing of New York
put his finger squarely on the reason,
writing to a sympathetic Congress-
man, John Jacob Rogers of Massa-
chusetts : "The machinery of govern-
ment provided for dealing with our
foreign relations is in need of complete
repair and reorganization. As ade-
quate as it may have been when the
old order prevailed and the aff'airs of
the world were free from the present
perplexities it has ceased to be re-
sponsive to present needs." Three
Lucile Atcherson passed the examination for
the diplomatic service in 1922 and became
the first woman Foreign Service officer.
(Photo taken in 1978) (Department of state photo)
categories of reform were required
to revivify the Department. The for-
eign services must be fully profes-
sionalized and democratized ; the
structure of the Department must be
modernized to deal efl'ectively with a
whole new range of policy matters in
a transformed environment; and rela-
tions between the Department and
other participants in the foreign policy
process must be clarified and con-
ducted in a new institutional context.
Measurable improvement occurred
in the first of these dimensions after
the First World War, when Congress
completed the prewar movement to-
ward a fully professional and demo-
cratic foreign service. Representative
Rogers, who led the congressional
campaign, stated his objective in 1923 :
"Let us strive for a foreign service
which will be flexible and democratic ;
which will attract and retain the best
men we have; which will off'er reason-
able pay, reasonable prospects for pro-
motion, reasonable provision against
want when old age comes to a faithful
servant." Hugh Gibson, a respected
diplomat interested in reform, sup-
ported Rogers, arguing that improve-
ments in the Diplomatic and Consular
lllfarif iflO-1
Special
Services would attract the most quali-
fied candidates so that "we can choose
our men by the only good method —
that is, by keen competition." He
hoped for creation of "a real diplo-
matic career, which is open to any
American citizen who has the neces-
sai*y qualifications."
The Rogers Act, which became
law on May 24, 1924, codified the re-
form of the foreign services. It estab-
lished a career organization based on
competitive examination and merit
promotion. To eliminate invidious
distinctions between the Consular and
Diplomatic Services, the two groups
were amalgamated into a unified orga-
nization whose members were made
available for both types of activities.
Henceforth, members of what was
now called the "Foreign Service of the
United States of America" would be
commissioned in a given class with
specified salaries rather than to over-
seas missions or posts. Salaries would
range from .$3,000 for the lowest level.
Class 9, to .$9,000 for Class 1. Officers
would be placed in positions for 3
years with the presumption of regular
rotation to other assignments. The
Rogers Act granted regular home
leave and set up a good retirement
system. It also authorized representa-
tional expenses, although these allow-
ances were not granted until 1931. A
special reinstatement provision per-
mitted career officers who became
chiefs of mission to remain in the
Foreign Service after completing their
tours of duty. Earlier they had been
required to resign without assurance
of a future Presidential appointment
to other responsible duties, a sure way
of discarding the most experienced and
competent officers at the height of
their abilities.
Related actions helped support
the fundamental objectives of the
Rogers Act. In 1925 the Foreign Serv-
ice School was founded to provide
specialized training in languages and
other necessary skills — recognition
that modern complexities of function
required educational updating at all
stages of a career in the Foreign Serv-
ice. In 192C Congress passed the For-
eign Service Buildings Act, an im-
provement of the Lowden Act. It
permitted purchase or construction
of buildings overseas for the use of
missions and consulates. This measure
further lessened the need to possess
independent means in order to rise to
the highest levels of the Foreign
Service.
Foreign Relations
of the United States
In 1861 Secretary of State William H.
Seward decided to publish his im-
portant diplomatic despatches. This
decision established the policy of
jjublishing the record of American
diplomacy. The documentary publi-
cation entitled Foreign Relatione of
the United States is the oldest and
most extensive enterprise of its kind.
The editors of the Foreign
Relations series include in volumes
"all documents needed to give a
comprehensive record of the major
foreign policy decisions within the
range of the Dei)artment of State's
responsibilities, together with ap-
propriate materials concerning the
facts which contributed to the formu-
lation of policies." The editors are
enjoined to honor "the principles of
historical objectivit.y." They may not
omit information "for the purpose of
concealing or glossing over what might
be regai'ded by some as a defect of
policy."
In addition to annual volumes for
every year except 1869, certain special
sets have been prepared, covering
important topics such as the Paris
Peace Conference of 1919 and the
summit meetings of the Second World
War. To date 283 volumes have been
published. Volumes covering the 19.50s
are now beginning to appear.
Certain defects of the Rogers Act
became apparent after a few years,
especially inequities in the promotion
of people serving in consular assign-
ments, and Congress moved to correct
them in 1931. The Moses-Linthicum
Act reorganized the Board of Foreign
Service Personnel to insure impartial
promotion practices. Other sections
of the law improved salaries, author-
ized paid annual leave and sick leave,
set up an improved retirement system,
and confei'red career status on clerks
in the Foreign Service. Unfortunately
many of these gains proved transient.
Economies in government that ac-
companied the Great Depression led
to suspension of promotion, a reduc-
tion of IS^v in salaries, abolition of
representational and living allowanc
elimination of paid home leaves, and
suspension of recruiting for 4 years.
The result was a 10^ reduction in t
size of the service between July 193^
and December 1934.
The Department of State did nc
undergo a thorough structural reorg
nization after the First World War.
In 1924 the Secretary, who had final
responsibility for policy and admini:
tration, had relatively few senior of-
ficials to help him. The Under Secre-
tary provided support on policies of
special import. Three Assistant Seci
taries helped with certain matters —
the First Assistant Secretary with
economic and financial questions, th
Second Assistant Secretary with ini
national law and related questions, ;
the Third Assistant Secretary with
administration. The Chief Clerk su-
pervised the Department's clerks ai
looked after its property. The Direc
of the Consular Service served as
budget officer for the Department a;
well as the principal consular officia
The Solicitor handled legal business
and the Economic Adviser made
recommendations concerning interi
tional trade and finance. Five geo-
graphic bureaus maintained commi
cations between Washington and
missions abroad. Various other org
nizations, such as the Division of
Passport Control and the Bureau oi
Accounts, provided various types ti
support.
From time to time modificatioi
were made in the basic structure cr
ated in 1909. New divisions or burc
were created on occasion to managi
new functions or to improve estab-
lished ones. For example, a Divisioi'
of Publications was established in
1921 to centralize work on infornia
tional projects such as the documer
tary series Foreign Relations of tin
United States. In 1929 a Division o
International Conferences and Pro
tocol was formed to cope with a con
siderable increase in the number of
multilateral negotiations that oc-
curred during the postwar decade
after. In 1938 a Division of Cultun
Relations appeared that dealt with
new form of activity — cultural dipl
macy — and also a Division of Inter
national (^immunications that pro-
vided modern telecommunications.
S26
Deoartment of State Bu
Special
In the absence of an overall re-
nization, these changes, however
fill in themselves, did not make
'lent impact. The failure to mod-
le the Department of State re-
d the general decline in the
n's commitment to an energetic
ign policy after the Senate re-
ated the Treaty of Versailles,
ident Wilson was the first Ameri-
eader to develop an international
■n that cast the United States in
ole of global leader, but the nation
not yet prepared to accept perma-
international responsibilities
nensurate with its power. Charles
awes, who served as Ambassador
reat Britain during the Adminis-
on of President Herbert Hoover
;9-33) , could say only half hu-
>usly that being an ambassador
hard on the feet and easy on the
1.
During the 1920s Americans
tly resisted international com-
lents of a truly binding character,
rely because of leadership from
etary of State Charles Evans
hes, the Administration of Presi-
Warren G. Harding sponsored
'Vashington Naval Disarmament
'erence of 1921-22, and Secretary
;ate Frank Kellogg, who served
ident Calvin Coolidge, played a
ng role in the creation of the
s Peace Pact ( 1928 ) , a multi-
•al instrument that outlawed of-
ive warfare. But these accomplish-
ts did not alter the strongly iso-
nist cast of American foreign
■y — a reversion that stemmed not
from disillusionment after the
t World War but from the absence
Dparent challenges to national
rity. Clear and present dangers
srialized after 1929 during the
it Depression. These massive eco-
ic shocks reinforced the country's
itionist inclinations during the rise
)talitarianism.
The consequence of these develop-
ts for the Department of State and
Foreign Service was a tendency to
pt the relatively low priority at-
ed to international affairs during
"long armistice" from 1919 to
). In the 1920s the Department of
imerce rather than the Department
tate provided leadership in spon-
ng expanded international trade
investment. During the early
I's of President Franklin D.
sevelt's New Deal in the 1930s,
Secretary of State, Cordell Hull
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Despite rejection of the Versailles TVeaty and the League of Nations, the United States
hosted the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference in 1921-22. Representatives of nine
nations reached agreements to limit naval construction and to respect each other's interests
in the Far East. lUbrar>' "ft'onKress photo)
of Tennessee, strongly supported ef-
forts to reduce barriers to interna-
tional trade, but this enterprise was
not by itself sufficient to combat the
Depression or deter German aggres-
sion in Europe and Japanese e.xpan-
sion in East Asia.
The Department of State grew
slowly during the interwar years.
Between 1920 and 1930, the domestic
work force increased from 708 to only
714, the Foreign Service from 514 to
633, and annual expenditures from
$13.6 million to $14 million. The func-
tions of the Foreign Service did not
change materially. Its members de-
voted themselves to representation,
negotiation, reporting, protection of
American citizens and their interests,
trade promotion, and consular tasks.
One historian has described the gen-
erally backward state of the organiza-
tion when Secretary Hull assumed
control. "In 1933 the Department was
small, placid, comfortably adjusted to
the lethargic diplomacy of the pre-
ceding decade, and suffused with
Charles Evans Hughes served as Secretary
of State from 1921 to 1925. His opening
speech to the Washington conference on the
limitation of armaments proposed naval
restrictions that "sank" more ships in 15
minutes "than all the admirals of the world
have sunk in a cycle of centuries." He later
became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
(Deparlnient uf Stale photo)
S27
Special
Cartoonist Clifford K. Berry man views recognition of the Soviet Union. (Library mconKress photo
V^tciRi. it's a case or TOO Kany cooKS.
William C. Bullitt sened as the first Am'
fan Ambassador to the Soviet Union (19.V
36); he was also Ambassador to France
(1936—40). (I)f{iartinent of State photo)
habits of thought that i-eached back
to a still earlier day." Overseas mis-
sions were in a comparable state.
"The Foreign Service — genteel, sloi
moving, and complacent — also cher-
ished its ties with the past." Althou
many highly qualified people served
home and abroad, their presence die
not in itself insure effective institu-
tional performance: "Individual coi'
petence is seldom proof against out-
moded procedures and relaxed stanc
ards of accomplishment." The Unit*
States still lacked an apparatus for
the conduct of foreign relations ap-
propriate to the modern era.
The neglect of foreign relation;
that characterized the interwar yea
dissipated rapidly with the onset of
the Second World War; the undenia
menace of Hitler's Germany and its
partners, Italy and Japan, forced thi
U.S. Government to increasingly int
ventionist policy, particularly given
the Axis victories of 19,39-41, when
the nation again adopted neutrality.
President Franklin Roosevelt took tl
initiative: He launched rearmament
authorized the sale of destroyers to
Great Britain in return for leases or
certain bases in the western Atlantii
and eventually provided wholesale
economic assistance to the anti-
A perennial problem in American foreign policy, ii-ibiary of Coiigrcs,s photo)
S28
Deoartment of State Bull
Special
1 Bryan Owen, daughter of William
lings Bryan, was America's first woman
•f of Mission. She served as Minister to
mark from 19.33 to 1936.
rtment of State photo)
man coalition of Great Britain and
Soviet Union by means of the
d-Lease Act { 1941) . Nevertheless,
United States did not enter the
until the Japanese air raid
inst Pearl Harbor on December 7,
1.
The American intervention of
1, like that of 1917, committed the
ted States to another period of
mse international activity, an
2ome that added greatly to the
<s of the Department of State. It
apted responsibility for evacuating
ericans from combat zones, repre-
ting the interests of belligerents
inemy countries, assisting prisoner-
var exchanges, maintaining liaison
h the International Red Cross, and
ling with refugees.
During the war the most notable
rease in business within the De-
tment occurred in the economic
i. Officials of the Department
ped coordinate the activities of
ious wartime agencies set up to
bilize the nation for total war and
issist in the reconstruction of
Mated territories. The Department
J created a complex system to pro-
vide efficient international communica-
tions, a vital aspect of waging global
war.
To perform its tasks, the foreign
policy community grew at an un-
equalled rate. In 1940 the Department
had 1,128 domestic employees, and it
survived on total expenditures of
$24 million, of which less than $3
million was spent at home. By 1945 the
staff had grown to 3,767 people, and
the budget for all operations had risen
to about $.50 million. Recruiting for
the career Foreign Service was sus-
pended during the war, but a Foreign
Service Auxiliary was created to pro-
vide additional assistance. It sought
experienced elders with necessary
qualifications and young people with
abilities comparable to those of
successful prewar candidates for the
Foreign Service. By January 1946,
the Auxiliary included 976 people.
To manage international tasks
that would not be taken on by the
Department, a number of wartime
agencies came into existence. Among
them were the Board of Economic
Warfare, the Office of War Informa-
tion, the Office of Strategic Services,
the Lend-Lease Administration, and
the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs.
And yet, as during the First
World War, the President largely
ignored the Secretary's advice on
policy ; the Department of State con-
fined itself mostly to day-to-day opera-
tions. Secretary Hull proved influential
only in one area — preparation of plans
for postwar international organiza-
tion. This situation stemmed from the
Department's failure to organize for
fully effective performance in war-
time. Wartime decisions required
coordination of political ends and
military means, but the Department
of State lacked the means — expertise
and institutions — to exert dominant
influence on the shaping of grand
strategy. Like President Wilson before
him. President Roosevelt turned to a
coterie of trusted advisers, among
them Harry Hopkins, Vice President
rienry A. Wallace, General George C.
Marshall, Under Secretary of State
Sumner Welles, and Secretary of the
Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
Although Secretary Hull was usually
informed of important decisions, he
rarely participated in the great war-
time conferences at which the leaders
of the grand alliance forged the
victory of 1945. His inability to gain
the President's full confidence kept
Another Man
Behind the Throne
Harry Hopkins spent his earlier career
as a social worker. He came to Wash-
ington in 1933 as one of the New
Dealers. His first assignment was to
administer employment relief; he
headed the Work Projects Administra-
tion. In 1938 he became President
Roosevelt's Secretary of Commerce.
As World War II approached.
President Roosevelt turned increas-
ingly to Hopkins for crucial assign-
ments. He first served as the administra-
tor of the Lend-Lease Act in 1941 and
then moved to the White House as
a special assistant. In this capacity he
was sent on secret missions to serve as
the President's eyes and ears. In July
1941 he went to Moscow to work out
cooperation with Stalin after Germany
attacked the Soviet Union. He attended
all of the great wartime .summit con-
ferences such as Casablanca (19431
:ind Yalta (1945) held to coordinate
the strategy and policy of the "grand
alliance" — the United States, Great
Britain, and the Soviet Union. Clo.sely
attuned to the needs and desires of
the President, he also gained the con-
fidence of Prime Minister Winston
Churchill and Premier Joseph Stalin.
His last public service, after the death
of President Roosevelt, was to visit
Moscow in a successful effort to obtain
Russian cooperation in creating the
United Nations.
the Department from a reasonable
part in many major decisions. It is
not surprising that Secretary Hull
should have commented bitterly to-
ward the end of his service: "When
I accepted this office, I knew that I
would be misrepresented, lied about,
let down, and that there would be
humiliations that no man in private
life could accept and keep his self-
respect. But I made up my mind in
advance that I would accept all these
things and just do my job."
In 1943 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
of Virginia became Under Secretary
of State and immediately began to
plan a major reorganization of the
Department of State, an enterprise
that stemmed directly from wartime
S29
Special
embarrassments. One journalist sum-
marized the situation aptly: "Not-
withstanding the personal prestige of
the Secretary of State [Hull], the
organization he heads has only to be
mentioned in almost any circle, Amer-
ican or foreign, to arouse either
doubt, despair, or derision." Stettinius'
reorganization marked the dividing
line between the old Department of
State and the present agency. He
began the process of making adjust-
ments to insure that the Department
would participate effectively in shap-
ing the nation's foreign relations
during the difficult postwar era that
lay ahead.
Stettinius concentrated on certain
key deficiencies of the Department,
particularly unsound division of re-
sponsibility for certain important
functions, inadequate means of ob-
taining and disseminating informa-
tion, and ineffective long-range
planning. On December 20, 1944,
shortly after Stettinius succeeded
Hull as Secretary of State, he issued
Department Order 1,301, which con-
centrated similar functions in the
same office and related offices under
a senior official, either the Under Sec-
retary or one of six Assistant
Secretaries.
To coordinate the work of the
Department, insure follow-through,
and conduct long-range planning.
Order 1301 created several new orga-
nizations. A Staff Committee consist-
ing of the Secretary and his principal
subordinates became the chief mana-
gerial group. The task of making
initial investigations of policy matters
and controlling interoffice projects was
given to a Coordinating Committee.
A Joint Secretariat was charged with
monitoring Department activity to
insure efficient action on decisions.
Finally a Policy Committee and a
Committee on Postwar Problems were
created to undertake long-range
planning.
Secretary Stettinius also recog-
nized the need to improve the manage-
ment of functions that overlapped the
jurisdictions of the traditional geo-
graphic bureaus. New bureaus were
set up to deal with trade relations,
cultural diplomacy, and public infor-
mation. Another important functional
organization came into being in
September 1945 — the Interim Re-
search and Intelligence Service, the
forerunner of the present-day Bureau
of Intelligence and Research. These
innovations minimized fragmentation
of jurisdiction that so frequently im-
mobilized the Department when quick
decisions were required in a crisis.
Certain other steps that continued
the modernization of the Department
were taken during the service of
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes
of South Carolina, who succeeded
Stettinius in July 1945, shortly after
Harry S. Truman became President.
The most important activity was to
gather several temporary wartime
organizations into the permanent
structure of the Department, espe-
cially those that dealt with interna-
tional economic affairs. In August
1946 the Department created an Under
Secretary for Economic Affairs. This
official teamed with an existing Assist-
ant Secretary for Economic Affairs to
supervise economic activities and to
establish effective relations with
certain international institutions such
as the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, the Inter-
national Monetary Tund, and the Food
and Agriculture Organization.
To modernize personnel practices.
Congress passed the Foreign Service
Act of 1946, which became law on
August 13, 1946. It was intended to
"improve, strengthen, and expand the
Foreign Service . . . and to consolidate
and revise the laws relating to its
administration." To improve the ad-
ministration of the Foreign Service,
the act of 1946 established a Director
General and a Board of the Foreign
Service, and to maintain the principl
of competitive entrance it set up a
Board of Examiners. It also providet
for improvements in assignments
policy, promotion procedures, allow-
ances and benefits, home leave, and
the retirement system. Recognizing
the growing importance of expertise
in certain critical areas, it created tl
Foreign Service Reserve for people
needed in specialist categories such }
lawyers, doctors, economists, and
intelligence analysts. Finally the act
converted the Foreign Service Schoc
into the modern Foreign Service
Institute to offer advanced training
for Foreign Service officers in subjec
of particular importance to the
Department.
The new Department of State
emerged from World War II better
prepared to play a leading role in the-
foreign policy process and fully awai
that the tasks ahead loomed more
difficult than any encountered in
earlier years. In July 1945, Secretar;
Byrnes recognized the extent of the
postwar challenge. "Today there is n
doubt that the people of this war-
ravaged Earth want to live in a free
and peaceful world. The supreme tas
of statesmanship in the world over i;
to help them understand that they
can have peace and freedom only if
they tolerate and respect the rights
of others to opinions, feelings, and
way of life which they do not and
cannot share."
.As President Harry S. IVunian watches. Secretary of State Kdward K. Stettinius, Jr., signs
the United Nations Charter in San Francisco on .liine 2H, 194.5. iDei.arim.-m of siai.phoioi
S30
Department of State Bulk
Special
The Age of Global Leadership,
1 947-Present
In April 1947 the Department of
State occupied new quarters located
in a section of Washington, D.C.,
known as Foggy Bottom. This move
coincided with one of the most
striking departures in the history of
American foreign relations. The
United States and the Soviet Union,
allies during the Second World War,
had emerged from that conflict as the
sole world powers. By 1947 efforts to
maintain cooperation had broken
down. President Harry S. Truman,
working closely with two Secretaries
of State, George C. Marshall of
Pennsylvania and Dean G. Acheson
of Maryland, took decisive steps to
preclude Soviet aggression against
regions in which the United States
had vital interests.
A leading expert on Soviet affairs
in the Department of State, George
F. Kennan ( soon to become head of
the Policy Planning Staff), developed
the intellectual basis for what became
known as the policy of "containment."
Kennan concluded that "the main
element of any United States policy
toward the Soviet Union must be
that of a long-term patient but firm
and vigilant containment of Russian
expansive tendencies." This concept
inspired a series of successful ini-
tiatives undertaken from 1947 to
1950 in which the Department of
State played a leading role.
The first step was the "Truman
Doctrine" of March 1947. Reacting
to fear that Greece and Turkey might
fall victim to subversion for lack of
support from friendly nations.
President Truman asked Congress to
authorize $400 million in emergency
assistance to the two nations. To
justify this course he stated: "I
believe we must assist free peoples
to work out their destinies in their
own way." The key to preventing
overthrow of free nations was to
attack the conditions of "misery and
want" that nurtured totalitarianism.
Very soon this general idea was
applied to Western Europe. In June
1947, Secretary Marshall proposed
the extension of massive economic
assistance to the devastated nations
of Europe, saying that the policy
Secretary of State George C. Marshall
(1947-49) proposed the European recovery
program, better known as the Marshall plan.
( Department of State photo)
of the United States was not directed
"against any country or doctrine but
again.st hunger, poverty, desperation,
and chaos. Its purpose should be the
revival of a working economy in
the world so as to permit the
existence of political and social con-
ditions in which free institutions
can exist." Congress later authorized
the European Recovery Program,
better known as the Marshall plan.
An investment of about $13 billion
in Europe during the next few years
resulted in an extraordinarily rapid
and durable reconstruction of
Western Europe.
It soon became apparent that
there must be a political-militai-y
dimension to the policy of contain-
ment. In June 1948, Senator Arthur
H. Vandenberg of Michigan, a strong
l^roponent of bipartisan foreign
policy, sponsored a resolution in the
Senate that set the nation's course.
It called for "progressive develop-
ment of regional and other collective
arrangements for individual and
Special
collective self-defense in accordance
with the purposes, principles, and
provisions of the | United Nations]
Charter." President Truman had
already applied this concept to Latin
America. The Rio pact, signed in
Septemlser 1947, provided that "an
armed attack by any State shall be
considered as an attack against all
the American States and, conse-
quently, each one of the said Con-
tracting Parties undertakes to assist
in meeting the attack." Collective
security was invoked once again in
the North Atlantic Treaty. Signed in
Washington in April 1949, it created
the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation ( NATO ) . The Rio pact and the
NATO pact ended the policy of no
entangling alliances. Economic assist-
ance to endangered regions and
collective defense agreements with
likeminded nations became the prin-
cipal means of insuring containment
of the Soviet bloc.
Dean .Ai-heson was the architect of postwar
collective security. While he was Secretary
of State (1949-,S:i), the United States negoti-
ated the North Atlantic TVeaty, signed
treaties of peace and mutual defense with
Japan, and committed its armed forces to
the defense of South Korea.
(Photo by Kabian Bat-hrat-h)
During the Presidency of Dwight
D. Eisenhower (1953-61), the United
States ratified a number of bilateral
and multilateral treaties designed to
extend the wall of containment around
the Soviet Union and its allies.
Among these arrangements were the
Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) ; the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) ; and bilateral
treaties with Japan, South Korea, the
Republic of China, and the Philip-
pine Republic.
At times the United States was
forced to counter unexpected probes
along the dividing line between the
free nations and their rivals. In 1948
the United States and its European
allies fended off a dangerous threat
to the western zones of occupied
Berlin. When the Soviet Union
interdicted land access, the city
received supplies by means of a
massive airlift. Eventually the Rus-
sians were forced to lift the blockade.
When North Korea invaded South
Korea in 1950, the United States
sponsored a "police action" under the
auspices of the United Nations to
curb the aggressor. After a long
struggle the United Nations Com-
mand preserved the independence
of South Korea. In 1954 the United
States took a strong stand in favor
of Taiwan when the Chinese People's
Republic bombarded certain islands
off the Chinese mainland. In 1955
assistance began to flow to the new-
nation of South Vietnam, created
after the withdrawal of France from
Indochina.
The evolution of containment had
remarkable effects on the agencies
most concerned with American foreign
relations. Soon after the Second
World War, Congress created a new
institutional structure to reach sound
decisions relating to national security
and to put those decisions into effect.
The National Security Act of 1947
recognized that the President must
have the ability to control national
security policy and that to achieve
this object there must be "a single,
toji-ranking body to form and cor-
relate national policy." The institution
founded to perform this function was
the National Security Council (NSC).
The creation of the NSC did not
displace the Secretary of State as
the President's senior adviser on
international questions; it simply
insured that all concerned agencies
would make cooperative contribution
to the decisionmaking process in
appropriate measure. The principal
participants in the NSC, acting at
the direction of the President, are
the Vice President and representativ
of the Department of State, the De-
partment of Defense, the Joint Chie:
of Staff, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and, on occasion, interde-
partmental groups ranging in natun
from small informal committees to
large, highly organized councils.
Proliferation of interagency organi-
zations reflected the fact that few
national-security issues could be dea^
with by only one agency.
The NSC structure for making
national security decisions provided
an institutional vehicle through whi
the Department of State could exert
a continuing influence on the nation'
"grand strategy," that is, the sys-
tematic design for insuring national
security that pulls together the basi
means of exercising national power-
political, economic, psychological, ar
military measures — something that
the Department had found difficult t
accomplish during the troubled yeai
between 1914 and 1945.
Nevertheless, the Department c
State realizes its full potential in th
new institutional context only if the
Secretary of State gains the confi-
dence of the President. The Depart-
ment's signal contributions to the
containment policy stemmed from
close associations between Presiden'
Truman and Secretaries Marshall ai
Acheson. Truman was always anxio
to complete action on important que
tions ; he wanted to make his de-
cision as soon as he had a sound basil
Secretary Acheson, notes his biog-
rapher, "could always provide an
adequate basis, or its appearance,
before any rival body. ... In the
race with time, which was the key
to influence over the President,
Acheson was unbeatable." Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles estab-
lished effective communication with
President Eisenhower after 1953,
thereby insuring that the Departme;
of State continued to receive a heari
at the White House.
S32
Deparfment of State Bull(
Special
1 Foster Uulles extended American al-
ces to Southeast Asia and the Middle
t. As Secretary of State (1953-59), he
leled half a million miles and visited KO
ntries. He coined such colorful de-
Dtions of his policies as "liberation."
ing to the brink," "agonizing reap-
sal," and "massive retaliation."
^rtment of State photo)
The revolution in American
foreign policy that occurred after the
Second World War greatly affected
the po.sition of the Secretary of State.
Before 1941 domestic political con-
siderations rather than the need for
expertise in foreign affairs usually
guided the President in his choice of
the senior foreign policy adviser, but
after 1945 most of the Secretaries
were selected because they possessed
broad experience and technical skills
deemed essential to effective per-
formance. Before 1941 Secretaries
usually remained in Washington,
depending on ambassadors or execu-
tive agents to conduct negotiations
overseas, but after 1945 Secretaries
traveled extensively. Before 1941
Secretaries did not usually concen-
trate on the management of the
Department of State, but after 1945
they had to give large amounts of
time to administration. The burdens
of office have greatly increased, but
there has been a significant com-
pensation. Secretaries have gained in
prestige, a consequence of the high
priority accorded to foreign relations
in recent years.
fw Department of State Building
e present home of the Department
State is at 2200 C Street. North-
st. On January 5. 1957, President
senhower joined with Secretary
illes in laying the cornerstone. The
esident used the same trowel that
.s used by George Washington to lay
i cornerstone of the U.S. Capitol in
93. A sealed metal box containing a
ection of historic documents was
posited in the cornerstone. The
building was completed in 1961.
This structure covers four square
blocks and has seven floors of oflice
space. An eighth floor is used for
official functions such as diplomatic
dinners and receptions. These rooms
are furnished largely with a growing
collection of antiques and art treasures
provided by the American people on
loan or as gifts.
Extensive international activity
after the Second World War led to
great changes in the Department of
State. Members of the Foreign Serv-
ice performed duties that went far
beyond the traditional missions of
political representation, negotiation,
and reporting. Knowledge of varied
scientific, economic, cultural, and
social issues became essential. In
1970 a Department publication,
Diplomacy for the 70' s, drew attention
to this development. It noted that the
agency now had to conduct "critically
important programs for promoting
our commercial exports, for con-
cessional sales of agricultural com-
modities, for narcotics control, for
military and development aid, for the
inspection and licensing of airline
routes, for cooperation in the peaceful
applications of atomic energy, for
scientific and technological exchange,
for coordinating international mone-
tary policy, and for communicating
directly with people of other countries
through the media of press, radio,
and television."
To provide an adequate institu-
tional framework for its varied
responsibilities, many of which could
not be accommodated in the existing
geographic bureaus, the Department
established many new functional
organizations. As of 1980 there were
14 such units, each headed by an
Assistant Secretary of State or an
official of comparable rank, as
against five geographic bureaus.
Functional bureaus created since the
Second World War cover such diverse
concerns as Intelligence and Research,
Congressional Relations, Politico-
Military Affairs, Oceans and Inter-
national Environmental and Scientific
Affairs, and Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs.
Certain other functions earlier
housed in the Department of State
are now the responsibility of other
organizations. The U.S. International
Communication Agency (USICA)
manages international informational
activities and cultural relations.
Foreign economic assistance is now
in the hands of the Agency for
International Development (AID).
Another vital enterprise — arms con-
trol negotiations — is the principal
task of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency (ACDA).
inuarv 1981
S33
Special
To assist the Secretary of State
the Department now has a large team
of central managers. The Deputy
Secretary of State serves when neces-
sary as the Acting Secretary and,
with the Counselor of the Department,
is available for special assignments.
Four Under Secretaries of State
oversee important functional areas —
political affairs; economic affairs;
management; and security assistance,
science, and technology. Special sup-
port for the Secretary comes from
the Executive Secretariat, a unit set
up to control information flow and to
follow up decisions, and from the
Policy Planning Staff.
Administrative problems also
materialized overseas when many
agencies of the U.S. Government
entered the foreign field. This influx
ultimately caused jurisdictional dis-
l)utes, disorderly management, and
widespread inefficiency. To restore
order President Eisenhower issued a
series of Executive orders that
established the Ambassador as the
supervisor for all operations within
his country. The chief of mission
became the leader of a "country team"
that included representatives of all
organizations with operational re-
sponsibilities, for example, the De-
partment of Defense, the U.S.
Information Service (the precedessor
agency of USICA ), the Department of
Agriculture, and the Peace Corps.
Further improvement occurred in
1966 when President Lyndon B.
.Johnson and Secretary of State Dean
Rusk arranged for "country directors"
in the geographic bureaus, who sup-
ported chiefs of mission ; they com-
municated policy guidance and
mobilized operational and adminis-
trative support for the country
team.
The revolution in foreign policy
pi-oduced much greater growth in
the Department of State than in any
previous period. A few statistics
graphically illustrate this pattern.
The domestic work force enlarged
from 1,128 in 1940 to a postwar high
of 8,609 in 1950. The total declined to
6.98;i in 1970, but ro.se to 8,4.33 in
1980, still below the level of 1950.
The Foreign Service expanded at a
similar rate. From a mere 840 in
1940 it jumped to a high of 7,710
in 1950. The total number in all
categories of the Foreign Service in
1980 was 5,861. The budget of the
Department also rose spectacularly,
even if inflation is taken into account.
In 1940 the total expenditure was
$24 million but by 1950 it reached
$350.9 million. After a decline to
$246.6 million in 1960, expenditures
climbed to $447.8 million in 1970
and to $2,354,139,275.69 in 1980.
Even so the Department of State has
the lowest budget of all Cabinet
departments.
After the accomplishments of
the immediate postwar years, the
Department of State suffered a
crippling blow when it became the
prime target of Senator Joseph
McCarthy's search for subversives
in the U.S. Government. In February
1950, shortly after the Soviet Union
acquired nuclear weapons and Mao
Zedong seized power in China, the
Wisconsin Senator launched his anti-
Communist crusade with a speech in
Wheeling, West Virginia. Depicting
the international position of the
United States in the most dire terms,
he insisted: "How can we account
for our present situation unless we
believe that men high in the govern-
ment are concerting to deliver us to
disaster? This must be the product
of a great conspiracy on a scale so
immense as to dwarf any previous
venture in the history of man." He
announced that he had a list of 205
subversives — "a list of names that
were made known to the Secretary
of State as being members of the
Communist Party and who never-
theless are still working and shapini
policy in the State Department."
Senator McCarthy never made publi
such a list. A number of the most
experienced Foreign Service officers
notably the Department's corps of
Far Eastern experts — were forced c
of the Department or their reputatii
were otherwise seriously damaged.
Senator McCarthy never proved anj
of his irresponsible allegations.
McCarthy's allegations had a
lasting effect on those who remainec
in the Department. John W. Ford, a
security officer at the time, has sinc«
noted that "few people who lived
through the McCarthy era in the
Department of State can ever forgel
the fear, intimidation, and sense of
outrage which permeated Foggy
Bottom." In 1978 the Under Secreta
of State for Political Affairs, David
D. Newsom, said: "I can recall the
Loy W. Henderson heKan his diplomatic career as Vice Consul in Duhlin in 1922. His 'M ye
of service included assignments as Minister to Iraq (194:$— 15), Ambassador to India (194K-5
and to Iran (1951-54), and Deputy Under Secretary for Administration (19.55). The
Department's international conference room was dedicated to him in 1976.
I Department uf State phutu)
npnartmpnt of State Bull«
Special
:k of the taunts and suspicions
led at the State Department and
;e who served in it. It must be
sfying-, but not full recompense,
those who suffered in that period
ave our nation now realize that
were substantially right."
The notion that the Department
ed the nation's enemies lingered
or many years. Senator Henry
lackson of Washington put his
er on one reason for the tendency
3vel unjustified criticism at the
lartment. "We know that the State
lartment has been a target for all
he problems of the cold war
luse it is called the State De-
tment — it is the Foreign Office. It
very popular target — and does not
e any constituents." The relative
ence of powerful and assertive
port from organized interest
ups, especially in comparison with
it other major agencies, renders
Department of State vulnerable to
fsponsible charges, especially in
iods of international stress. It
ally can be attacked without fear
lerious retaliation.
While the Department struggled
h McCarthyism, it also sought to
lernize its personnel practices,
twar growth produced what one
Mpiomatic and
Consular Posts
781-
-1980
Diplomatic
Consular
781
4
3
790
2
10
800
6
52
810
4
60
820
7
83
830
15
141
840
20
152
850
27
197
860
33
282
870
36
318
880
35
303
890
41
323
900
41
318
910
48
324
920
45
368
930
57
299
940
58
264
950
74
179
960
99
166
970
117
122
980
133
100
historian described as "inertia, inflex-
ibility, and loss of efficiency in the
use of personnel." Stanton Griffis, a
businessman who served as Ambas-
sador to several countries, later
satirized the confused situation.
Overseas missions constituted "a
fantastic network of men, women, and
typewriters, who report [on] . . .
political, economic, labor, and agri-
cultural conditions." These reports
then went to Washington, where they
were immediately filed away. Then
"the home team, having properly
disposed of the information from the
field, proceeds to write its own endless
reports to go forward to the same
ultimate fate in the embassies
throughout the world."
The personnel problems of the De-
partment of State attracted the
attention of a commission, headed by
former President Hoover, created to
investigate all aspects of government
organization after World War II.
In 1949 the commission called for
reforms to eliminate one important
source of difficulty — invidious distinc-
tions between the Foreign Service and
the civil servants who staffed the
Department's headquarters in
Washington.
Several years later, in 1954, Secre-
tary of State John Foster Dulles
asked Henry M. Wriston, the
President of Brown University, to
undertake a study of the Department's
personnel practices. Dulles drew
attention to a number of concerns,
among them poor morale because of
managerial shortcomings, low intake
into the Foreign Service, and inequi-
ties that stemmed from differences in
the treatment of different categories
of employees. After examining these
matters. President Wriston called for
integration of many Civil Service
employees into the Foreign Service.
There followed several years of
"Wristonization" ; by the end of
1957 the Foreign Service had more
than doubled in size to 3,436 officers.
By August 1959, 1,523 Foreign Service
officers held positions in the Depart-
ment, a device intended to improve
communications between Washington
and the missions overseas and to fulfill
the legal requirement that Foreign
Service officers spend a portion of
their careers at home.
Although the reforms of the
early postwar years served the De-
partment well, the march of events
during the 1950s and especially the
1960s posed new difficulties. The
innovative concept of containment
began to lose some of its utility as
a rough balance of power was estab-
lished in Europe and East Asia. As
East- West tensions subsided some-
what, new strains developed along a
North-South axis. After the Second
World War, which completed the
destruction of the great European
colonial powers, ancient peoples
everywhere in Africa and Asia
recaptured their sovereignty. A
"revolution in rising expectations"
throughout the Third World spawned
new international issues that greatly
complicated the task of statecraft.
The need to make significant
changes in the foreign policy of the
United States became fully apparent
during the war in South Vietnam.
The modest intervention that began
in 1955 after the departure of France
from Indochina turned into a major
enterprise during President Johnson's
Administration (1963-69). In 1968,
after 3 years of warfare that led to
the introduction of over 500,000
American troops into South Vietnam,
President Johnson decided to dis-
engage from a struggle that had lost
popular support at home.
The election of President Richard
M. Nixon in 1968 led to important
changes in direction. In February
1970. acting on the advice of Henry A.
Kissinger, the Assistant to the
President for National Security
Affairs, President Nixon presented
a report to Congress entitled
U.S. Foyeigu PoUcij for the 1970s,
in which he described certain basic
changes that had taken place in
the world since 1945. The world, he
believed, had largely recovered from
the damage of the Second World War ;
many new nations had come into
existence in Africa and Asia; the
monolithic structure of international
communism had been fractured
because of developments in China and
Eastern Europe; the United States no
longer possessed a monopoly of
nuclear weapons; and a significant
moderation had occurred in inter-
national ideological conflict. Given
these developments. President Nixon
continued, the United States in the
future should rely more heavily on
partnership with likeminded peoples;
it should maintain sufficient military
Special
President Carter
and Human Rights
President Carter made human rights
one of the cornerstones of his foreign
policy. In his Inaugural Address,
delivered on January 20, 1977, he set
the tone for his later activity in this
respect.
"To be true to ourselves, we must
be true to others. We will not behave
in foreign places so as to violate our
rules and standards here at home, for
we know that the trust which our
nation earns is essential to our
strength.
"The world itself is now domi-
nated by a new spirit. Peoples more
numerous and more politically aware
are craving, and now demanding, their
place in the sun — not just for the
benefit of their own physical condition
but for basic human rights.
"The passion for freedom is on
the rise. Tapping this new spirit, there
can be no nobler nor more ambitious
task for America to undertake on this
day of a new beginning than to help
shape a just and peaceful world that
is truly humane."
strength to support its foreign policy
while at the same time seeking arms
control and disarmament; and it
should constantly manifest "willing-
ness to negotiate," abandoning the
postwar tendency to reject the likeli-
hood of successful diplomatic contacts
with Communist nations.
President Nixon, acting on these
principles, pursued two important
enterprises that culminated in 1972.
In February he visited Peking, setting
in motion a long-term movement
toward normalization of relations
with the Chinese Peojile's Republic.
In May he traveled to the Soviet
Union and signed agreements that
contained the results of the first
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT I). New negotiations were
begun to e.xtend arms control and
disarmament measures (SALT II).
These developments inaugurated a
pei-iod of "detente" that accorded
with a general tendency among the
American people to favor a lowered
profile in world affairs after the
chastening experience in Vietnam
that ended in 1975 with the last
withdrawal of American personnel.
Improvements in relations with
the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peo-
ple's Republic, signaling a possible end
to the cold war, did not lead to general
improvement in the international
climate. The international economy
experienced considerable instability,
leading to a significant modification
of the international financial system
that had been set up at the end of
World War II. A keystone of that
system was a stable U.S. dollar, to
which other nations pegged their
currencies. The dollar eventually
came under severe attack, especially
after adverse developments in the
international balance of payments.
In 1971 the dollar was devalued, a
decision that inaugurated a period of
unstable currency exchange rates.
Two years later the international
economy suffered another blow when,
after Israel and Egypt fought a
fourth war. the Arab oil-producing
nations instituted a boycott of oil
shipments to important consumers,
particularly in Europe and East Asia.
Henry A. Kissinger, appointed Sec-
retary of State in October 1973,
became deeply involved in eff'orts to
resolve the longstanding dispute
between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
After President Jimmy Carter
took ofl^ce in 1977. he and his Secre-
taries of State, Cyrus R. Vance of
New York and Edmund S. Muskie
of Maine, continued the search for
further arms control agreements with
the Soviet Union and for restoration
of political stability in the turbulent
Middle East. President Carter's most
distinctive modification of general
foreign policy was his energetic pro-
motion of international human rights.
As the nation passed through the
1970s the Department of State came
to grips with certain new challenges
as it made adjustments to the
changing pattern of world politics.
Among these challenges four deserve
special mention. Continuing attempts
have been made to achieve eflfective
managerial and personnel arrange-
ments. The Congress has asserted
considerable influence in the foreign
policy process, a significant departure
from prior practice. Efl'orts have
been undertaken to meet the require-
ments of equal employment oppor-
tunity. Finally, an outburst of inter-
national terrorism has exposed the
Foreign Service to great danger in
many parts of the world.
Growing concern about the eflS
ciency of the Department of State
during the late 1960s ultimately led
to a major self-study conducted in
1970. Thirteen task forces of Forei;
Service and Department employees
thoroughly investigated all activitii
and produced the report, Diplomaci
for the 70' s, that made many
recommendations. The task forces
traced the difficulties of the Depart-
ment to "weakness in the area of
management capability." The agenc
still lacked the modern managerial
know-how required for eflRcient
operations in the complex environm
of the modern world. "Because of tl
diversity and complexity of our
overseas activities, effective coordi-^
nation calls for a wide range of
management skills and managemen
tools. The traditional reliance of
Foreign Service oflicers on experier
and tradition is no longer good
enough." What was required? "Th(
diplomacy of the seventies calls for
new breed of diplomat-manager, ju
as able as the best of the old school,
but equipped with up-to-date tech-
niques and backed by a Department
organized on modern management
principles."
Members of the Foreign Servi'
had been bombarded ever since the
Second World War with call after c
for change in their professional
attitudes and activities. For examp
Senator J. William Fulbright of
Arkansas, the Chairman of the
Senate's Committee on Foreign
Relations, noted in 1964 that a
contemporary Foreign Service ofiic'
"must not only know how to use the
traditional tools of diplomacy, but .
must also be expert in the new
instruments of foreign policy such ,
economic aid and cultural exchange
To maintain professional proficienc
the modern diplomat must constant
acquire additional education. "If
there is a continuous process of
improvement in the people involved
implementing foreign policy, the
procedures and techniques employee
will be improved as a natural by-
product."
Diplomacy for the 70's called fc
"a new spirit in the Department."
One of the task forces insisted that
the times required "a tremendous
eflfort ... to shake off old habits,
old ways of doing things, old ways o
dealing with each other. What we
are proposing is a change of outlook
ij method." The report concluded:
e traditional mode of reflection
detachment cultivated by diplo-
;s trained in the old school must
■einforced by a more dynamic and
ressive style if the Department
) play the role which the President
ects of it."
Not everyone welcomed such
vs. One historian notes that some
eign Service officers opposed
ical change, considering them-
es "an embattled and misunder-
)d elite who functioned as political
orters and policy planners."
her than retooling for changing
Donsibilities, these officers some-
es argued through their profes-
lal organization, the American
eign Service Association, that the
eign Service should be given
•eased political responsibility by
!ing career officers in high-level
itions at home and abroad.
The conflict between those who
ended the older model and those
wanted to modernize the Foreign
vice found expression in a long-
iding dispute over whether
eign Service officers should be
eralists or specialists. Those
osed to change argued that the
lomat should continue to rely
iiarily on general experience and
lition. Those interested in reform
med that the future belonged to
cialists with advanced training,
iry Wriston called for balance,
cialized skills were essential in
modern era, but it seemed evident
t specialists tended "to become so
row as to lose perspective ; then
h specialism conceives of its own
liwick as 'most vital.'" Wriston
eluded that "no rule of thumb can
iblish the proper balance" between
leral and special skills. He believed
t the best specialists would "broad-
rather than narrow their interests
h experience and on becoming
ior officers [would] prove to be
)d generalists."
This outlook is reflected in the
st recent attempt to resolve the
sonnel problems of the Department
State — the Foreign Service Act
1980. Its principal provisions
)resent a turn away from the
3rt to establish an integrated
reign Service; henceforth em-
yees of the Department of State
are not liable for overseas service,
hiding specialists formerly placed
the Foreign Service Reserve, will
Expenditures
1781-
-1980
1781
$57,309*
1791
57, 619.23
1800
294,894.31
1810
118,782.07
1820
340,698.03
1830
432,200.69
1840
890,273.22
1850
716,521.03
1860
1,264,946.22
1870
1,681,174.53
1880
1,343,241.80
1890
1,773,066.75
1900
3,356,173.87
1910
4,909,557.77
1920
13,590,288.51
1930
13,986,172.82
1940
24,003,329.49
19.50
350,855,773.75
1960
246,625,626.92
1970
447,753,719.37
1980
2,354,139,275.69
ontingencies."
* "E
xclusive of C
be members of the Civil Service.
When the act is put into effect, it will
produce a Foreign Service of 6,850
people and a domestic work force of
3,800 people, a total of approximately
10,650 employees. The act seeks to
encourage qualities in the Foreign
Service that are essential to the
modern practice of diplomacy. Under
Secretary of State David D. Newsom
summarized these qualities in 1978:
"An understanding of our own nation ;
a balanced sensitivity to other societies
and peoples ; a firm grasp of the sub-
ject matter of international relations;
and the skill to bring this knowledge
together in advancing both the
interests of our country and the
establishment of working under-
standings with others."
The principle of executive
predominance in the conduct of
foreign relations was not seriously
challenged until recent times, but the
need to finance economic assistance
and other important aspects of an
active foreign policy has upgraded the
role of Congress in the foreign policy
process. Recognizing this develop-
ment, the Department of State desig-
nated an Assistant Secretary for Con-
gressional Relations in 1949 to improve
Special
liaison with Capitol Hill. Bipartisan
approaches to foreign affairs mini-
mized executive-legislative tensions
during the earlier postwar years, but
burgeoning public opposition to the
war in Vietnam during the 1960s
caused Congress to question executive
behavior and even to sponsor inter-
national activities on its own.
The most significant initiative
of Congress has been in the field of
international human rights. Seeking
to stimulate more active support of
oppressed people. Congress enacted
a series of statutes during the 1970s
that placed legislative constraints on
various types of economic and military
assistance to governments that
consistently violated internationally
accepted human rights. Differences
of view between the legislative and
executive branches narrowed when
President Jimmy Carter expressed
strong support for an active human
rights policy.
In other respects, however,
President Carter encountered con-
gressional resistance. The Senate
manifested considerable reluctance
to accept a treaty providing for the
return of the Panama Canal Zone to
Panama before finally giving its
consent. Even greater Senatorial
doubts about the SALT II Treaty,
reinforced by the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in December 1979,
caused the President to postpone
further consideration of the
agreement.
During the 1960s the activities of
the civil rights movement in the
United States led to the passage of
legislation designed to insure equal
employment opportunity in the
Federal Government, and the Depart-
ment of State undertook to meet its
responsibilities in this re.spect. Much
needed to be done. Although women
and members of minorities had long
formed part of the Department of
State, they were seriously under-
represented, particularly in the higher
ranks.
The Department of State first
appointed women to full-time positions
in 1874, but they were deemed unquali-
fied for other than clerical duties.
In 1905, for example, A.ssistant Secre-
tary Frederick Van Dyne said : "The
greatest obstacle to the employment of
women as diplomatic agents is their
well known inability to keep a .secret."
The first woman to achieve super-
visory rank was Margaret Hanna, who
GIT
Special
entered the Department as a clerk in
1895 and became Chief of the Corre-
spondence Bureau in 1918. A few other
women rose to managerial positions
during the 1920s, including Ruth
Shipley, who assumed the leadership
of the Passport Division in 1921.
The first woman to enter the
Foreign Service, Lucile Atcherson,
was not appointed until 1922, after the
First World War. The first entrant
after the passage of the Rogers Act
was Pattie H. Field in 1925. Con-
tinuing doubts about the ability of
women to endure the trials of duty
overseas worked against acceptance
of women in the Foreign Service.
After Atcherson and Field were
appointed, a senior diplomat suggested
that "it would be a wise thing to
refrain from taking any more women
until we can form an idea of their
usefulness from observation of those
we have already taken in." To exclude
women who scored high on written
examinations, another oflicial observed
that examining boards might award
failing grades on oral examinations.
'W
EuKtnie .M. Anderson wa.s Ihe first woman
Ambassador (Denmark. 1919-.i;$) and the
first woman to sign a treaty on behalf of the
United States. (Depanmem of Suit- photo)
The first women given political
appointments to high-level diplomatic
positions occurred during the 1930s.
In 1933 President Roosevelt named
Ruth Bryan Owen, the daughter of
former Secretary of State William
Jennings Bryan, as Minister to Den-
mark, and in 1937 Florence Jaffray
Harriman was appointed Minister to
Norway. Career women did not attain
ambassadorial rank until after the
Second World War. The third woman
to enter the Foreign Service, Frances
E. Willis, was made Ambassador to
Switzerland (1953-57). She later
served in Norway and Ceylon. The first
woman career diplomat to become an
A.ssistant Secretary of State was
Ambassador Carol C. Laise, who be-
came head of the Bureau of Public
Affairs in 1973. She later served as
Director General of the Foreign
Service.
Blacks were similarly under-
represented in the work force of the
Department. As in the case of women,
blacks sometimes served in the lower
ranks but rarely became supervisors.
The first black appointed to the rank
of Minister was Ebenezer D. Bassett,
who went to Haiti in 1869. James
Milton Turner was made Minister to
Liberia in 1871. The best known black
abolitionist, Frederick Douglass,
became Minister to Haiti and Charge
d' Affaires to Santo Domingo in 1889.
It became common practice to assign
blacks to these countries, but few
were sent elsewhere.
The first black to enter the For-
eign Service was Clifford R. Wharton
( 1925 ) , and he was also the first
career diplomat of his race to serve
as chief of mission, becoming Minister
to Romania in 1958 and Ambassador
to Norway in 1961. Like the women
who entered the Foreign Service
during the 1920s, Wharton experienced
discrimination. When he decided to
take the competitive examination for
the Foreign Service, he discovered
that his prospective associates
"couldn't care less; they didn't want
me in the Department of State."
His early diplomatic career was spent
mostly in posts traditionally reserved
for blacks, especially Liberia. Wharton
remembers having commented smil-
ingly to a personnel officer after
receiving an undesirable assignment
in 1946: "You're not only discrimi-
nating against us fwithl in the
Service, but you're exporting dis-
crimination abroad. . . ."
Frances E. Willis was the first woman Fi
eign Ser>ice officer to be appointed a l!.S
.Ambassador (Switzerland, 1953-57), the f
to attain the rank of Career .'Vlinister, anc
the only one to be named Career .Ambas-
sador She served as .Ambassador to Norw"
(1957-61) and to Ceylon (l%l-64).
i 1 K'liarlmenl (.1 Slali- photo)
Clifton K. Wharton was a clerk in the Cor
sular Commercial Office when he took th«
first Foreign Service examination (1925). I
became Third Secretary at the U.S. Embai
in Liberia and later was .Minister to
Romania (195H) and .Ambassador to Norwa
(19»)ll. He was the first black Foreign Ser-
vice officer and the first to serve as Chief (
Mission to a European country.
(Department of Stale photo)
S38
Department of State Bulle
Special
T. Rowan, with his family, signs his
Tiission as Ambassador to Finland in
He also sened as Deputy Assistant
elary of State for Public Affairs (1961-
nd Director of the U.S. Information
icy (1964-65). (Department of State pholo)
Hispanics have served in the
artment of State since 1820, when
ph M. Espada of New York be-
e a consular agent in Mexico, but
women and blacks they have been
errepresented up to the present,
ion Leon Sanchez of Florida was
e U.S. consul at Cartagena, Co-
oia. in 1840. An Hispanic, James
3ca of California, and his son,
es Viosca, Jr., served successively
jnsuls at La Paz, Mexico, from
I to 1906.
The first Hispanic chief of mis-
was Romualdo Pacheco of Cali-
lia, who became Minister to a
ip of Central American states in
). No other Hispanic achieved
parable rank until William E.
zales of California became
ister to Cuba in 1913 and to Peru
919. Twenty others have since
'ed as chief of mission, four of
■m were career Foreign Service
ers. Horacio Rivero, Jr.. of Cali-
lia was the first Hispanic to be
led chief of mission to a European
ntry — Spain in 1972. Mari-Luci
amillo was the first Hispanic
nan to become chief of mission,
ig to Honduras as Ambassador
977.
Patterns of prejudice and dis-
nination, prevalent elsewhere as
I as in the Department of State,
Uy attracted extensive critical
intion during the 1960s, and im-
tant attempts have been made in
recent years to insure equal oppor-
tunity through the workings of
energetic aflSrmative action progralms.
During the 1970s Secretaries of State
William P. Rogers, Henry A.
Kissinger, and Cyrus R. Vance all
devoted considerable attention to
this effort.
One of Secretary Vance's earliest
acts was to issue a statement to the
Department in which he announced
his intention to "exercise personal
leadership in prohibiting discrimi-
nation because of race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, age, or handi-
cap . . . [and] in carrying out a con-
tinuing affirmative action program
designed to promote equal opportunity
for all applicants and all employees."
True to his pledge, Secretary
Vance appointed an executive-level
task force to spur affirmative action,
but much remains to be accomplished
before the Department achieves the
goals established by recent Secre-
taries. Presumably there should be a
reasonable relationship between the
incidence of racial and ethnic groups
in the general population and their
representation in the Department of
State. A look at the profile of the
Foreign Service reveals great dis-
parities. Women constitute slightly
more than half of the general popula-
tion but only 10.29^ of the Foreign
Service. About 12 ^'r of the population
is black, but blacks constitute only
3.5 "^f of the Foreign Service. His-
panics make up more than 5% of the
population, but they are a minuscule
1.5"^^ of the Foreign Service.
No development of recent years
has been more troubling than the rise
of terrorism as a political weapon
aimed at Americans representing their
country abroad. Numerous attacks on
American posts overseas and frequent
kidnappings and killings of Americans
have occurred in recent years, adding
a tragically large number of names to
the list of those who have given their
lives in the line of duty. In August
1968, Ambassador John Gordon Mein
was assassinated in Guatemala, the
first chief of mission to be murdered
in the line of duty. Since then other
Ambassadors have been killed in
Sudan, Cyprus, Lebanon, and Afghani-
stan. Kidnappings have occurred in
places as widely separated as Zaire,
Brazil, and Jordan.
The most serious of all such
episodes was the seizure of the Ameri-
can Embassy in Tehran on Novem-
ber 4, 1979, and the subsequent deten-
tion of more than 50 hostages. This
event brought home to the American
people once again the extreme dangers
that the Foreign Service must face in
many assignments outside the country.
The steadfast courage of the American
hostages in Tehran and their families
at home reflected the best traditions
of the Department of State and the
other agencies represented among the
hostages.
An aerial view of the U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran prior to its seizure and occupation
in November 1979. (Deiartmemof -StatephoUD
Special
In the Line of Duty
r-
LRECrED BY MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN FOKFll'.N
SERVICE ASSOCIATION IN HONOR OF DIPLOMATIC
AND CONSULAR OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES
W HO WHILE ON ACTIVE DUTY LOST THEIR IIVFS
UNDER HEROIC OR TRAGIC CIRCUMSTANCES ■
WILLIAM tIMrRtY
RfCHARD f ANDERSON
N\rMAMar.JN(;RAHAMj«
n\r» T\Mf» o Mimu 1SJ4
IIANRIS E rillX'.CR
.KMfJ A HUlllEN
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lOHN S MEIR( KEN
WILL KM iHAlfR
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DAVID T PUNI:ER
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Diplomatic service is not normally con-
sidered a hazardous profession.
Nevertheless over 100 Americans have
died or been killed while on active duty
with the Foreign Service. Some fell
victim to tropical disease, earthquakes,
or volcanic eruptions; many others
died a hero's death in the midst of
war, while saving lives, or at the hands
of assassins.
To honor those who lost their
lives "under heroic or tragic circum-
stances," the American Foreign Serv-
ice Association in 1933 dedicated a
plaque. Among the names . . .
William Palfrey, lost at sea, 1780
Abraham Hanson, African fever,
Liberia, 1866
John F. Flint, drowned saving life,
EI Salvador. 187.5
Victor F. W. Stanwood, murdered,
Madagascar, 1888
Maddin Summers, exhaustion,
Moscow, 1918
Dougla.ss MacKiernan, killed by gun-
fire, Tibet, 1950
Barbara A. Robbins, killed in bombing
of Embassy, Vietnam, 1965
That plaque, and a second one
unveiled in 1973, are in the diplomatic
lobby of the Department of State. In
recent years, the names of those who
have died of disease contracted at
tropical posts have not been added.
Yet the list continues to grow . . .
Ambassador John Gordon Mein, assas-
sinated, Guatemala. 1968
John Paul Vann, killed in a helicopter
in a night battle, Vietnam, 1972
Ambassador Cleo A. Noel, Jr., and
George Curtis Moore, murdered
while held hostage, Sudan, 1973
John S. Patterson, murdered while
held by kidnappers, Mexico, 1974
Ambassador Rodger P. Davies, killt
by sniper fire during mob attack •
Embas.sy, Cyprus, 1974
Ambassador Francis E. Meloy, Jr.,
and Counselor Robert O. Waring,
murdered en route to an appoint-
ment with the President-elect,
Lebanon, 1976
Ambassador Adolph Dubs, killed wl
being held hostage, Afghanistan,
1979
CWO Bryan L. Ellis (U.S. Army) a
Cpl. Stephen J. Crowley (USMC)
killed during an attempted mob
takeover of the Embassy, Pakista
1979.
Sdn
Deoartmenf of State Bull
Special
etary of State Cyrus R. Vance joins members of the Iran Working Group in the
irtment's Operations Center following the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tthran.
rlmeiu of Stale phulo)
After two centuries the Depart-
ment of State — its offices and its people
— comprises one of the world's nerve
centers of human affairs. During
the earliest days of the Republic, it
made indispensable contributions to
the preservation of our independence.
Throughout the 19th century, as the
United States changed gradually into
a great power, the Department loyally
supported the foreign policies associ-
ated with isolation, neutrality, and
expansion. Across the 20th century, as
Americans came to accept the respon-
sibilities of leadership, the Depart-
ment, like the nation it serves, has
experienced remarkable growth in
size, influence, and function.
Every era has its agenda of chal-
lenge, danger, and opportunity.
Entering its third century, the Depart-
ment of State must struggle with the
problems of nuclear weapons, popula-
tion explosion, depletion of natural
resources, and the seemingly unman-
ageable acceleration of technological,
social, and political change.
For two centuries the men and
women of the Department have chosen
this form of public service because
they are deeply committed to the
search for solutions to the problems
of tomorrow. Throughout the world
they daily face the threat of disease,
rge d'Affaires L. Bruce Laingen (right)
ents a valor award for "outstanding per-
nance and bravery ... in support of U.S.
rests and citizens, December 1978 to
ruary 1979" to Foreign Service officer
hael Metrinko in July 1979 in Tehran,
h Laingen and Metrinko are among the
imericans held hostage in Iran as of pub-
tion date. (Uepanment of State photo)
terrorism, war, kidnapping, and death.
Along with these hazards come the
normal demands of day-to-day
problemsolving, decisionmaking, and
coping with life at home or abroad.
All things considered the people of
the United States have been
well served.
David F. Trask was born in Erie,
Pennsylvania, in 1929. He received a B.A.
degree from Wesleyan University (1951)
and A.M. and Ph.D. degrees from Har-
vard in 1952 and 1958. He served in the
U.S. Army (1952-54) and from 1955 to
1966 was an instructor or assistant pro-
fessor at Boston University, Wesleyan
University, and the University of
Nebraska. Dr. Trask was professor of
history at the State University of New
York from 196G until May 1976, when he
became Historian of the Department of
State.
Dr. Trask is a member of the Ameri-
can Historical Association, the Organiza-
tion of American Historians, the Society
for Historians of American Foreign Rela-
tions, the National Council on Public His-
tory, and Phi Beta Kappa. He is also the
Department of State's representative on
the National Historical Publications and
Records Commission.
His major publications are The
United States in the Supreme War
Council: American War Aims and Inter-
Allied Strategy, 1!)17-191S (1961), Gen-
eral Tasker Howard Bliss and the "Ses-
sions of the World," 1919 (1966), Victory
Without Peace: Americayi Foreign Rela-
tions in the 20th Century (1968), World
War I at Home (1970) , Captains and
Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Rela-
tions, 1917-1918 (1972). He is the co-
author of The Ordeal of World Power
(1975) and the coeditor of A Bibliog-
raphy of United States-Latin American
Relations Since 1810 (1970).
iiiaru 1Qni
Special
Department
Personnel
1781-
-1980
Domestic
Overseas
Total
1781
4
10
14
1790
8
20
28
1800
10
62
72
1810
9
56
65
1820
16
95
111
1830
23
153
176
1840
38
170
208
1850
22
218
240
1860
42
281
323
1870
65
804
869
1880
80
977
1,057
1890
76
1,105
1,181
1900
91
1,137
1,228
1910
234
1,043
1,277
1920
708
514
1,222
1930
714
633
1,347
1940
1,128
840
1,968
1950
8,609
7,710
16,319
1960
7,116
6,178
13,294
1970
6,983
5,865
12,848
1980
Domestic
8,433
personnel includes
5,861
both Civil Service and Foreign
13,962
Service.
NOTES:
Overseas
personnel int
hides
Foreign Service only.
Note on Authorities
Thi.s hi.story depends heavily on ce
authorities who have written abou
the U.S. Department of State. The
best histories of the Department a
Gaillard Hunt, The Department of
State of the United States: Its Hit
and Fnncfioris (New Haven, 1914 :
and Graham H. Stuart, The Depar
ment of State: A History of Its
Organization, Procedure and Pers<
(New York, 1949) . The two best
works on the Foreign Service are
William Barnes and John Heath
Morgan, The Foreign Service of t)
United States: Origins, Developmi'
and Functions CWashington, 1961
and Warren F. Ilchman, Profession-
Diplomacy in the United States
1779-1939: A Study in Administn
History (Chicago, 1961).
For information about the Se^
taries of State consult the multi-
volume series edited by Samuel Fl;
Bemis and Robert F. Ferrell,
The American Secretaries of Sfat(
and Their Diplomacy (New York,
1927- ) ; Norman A. Graebner, e
An Uncertain Tradition: America
Secretaries of State in the Tu-enti<
Century (New York, 1961) ; Alex-
ander DeConde. The American Sec
tary of State: An Interpretation
(New York, 1962). For a useful
reference work see John E. Findlii
Dictionary of American Diplomati
History (Westport, 1980). For ex-
amples of recent specialized schola
ship see Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr.,
"Bureaucracy and Prcfessionalisrr
the Development of American Can
Diplomacy," in John Braeman et a
Twentieth-Century American Fori
Policy (Columbus, 1971) ; Richard
Werking, The Master Architects:
Building the United States Foreig.
Service 1S90-1913 (Lexington, 19'
Rachel West, The Department of S
on the Eve of the First World War
(Athens, 1978) ; Robert D. Schul-
zinger. The Making of the Diploma
Mind: The Training, Outlook, and
Style of United States Foreign Ser
Officers, 190S-1931 (Middletown,
1975).
Other references published by
Department of State are The Secre
taries of State: Portraits and Rio-
graphical Sketches, Homes of the
Department of State, 1774-1976, ai
United States Chiefs of Mission,
177S-1973 and its supplement for
1973-74. ■
nonartmont nf ^Ifatp Rll
retaries for
eign Affairs
Special
Robert R. Livingston
1781-83
John Jay
1784-90
(retaries
>tate
E : Daniel Webster and James
ipie Blaine were each appointed to
onconsecutive terms as Secretary of
. Therefore, they are counted twice
s list.
1. Thomas Jefferson
1790-93
Edmund Randolph
1794-95
Timothy Pickering
1795-1800
4.
John Marshall
1800-01
James Madison
1801-09
Special
6. Robert Smith
1809-11
7. James Monroe
1811-17
John Quincy Adams
1817-25
9. Henry Clay
1825-29
10. Martin Van Buren
1829-31
11. Edward Livingston
1831-33
H
"^
■1
^^M
^^H^-'^
^H
} '^<^'
H
K^
k.-J
■ff
^ "^ • ^^S^^
BH
1
^^^^^^^^^1
1
12. Louis McLane
1833-34
13. John Forsyth
1834-41
14. Daniel Webster
1841-43
nonartmont nf *^t;itp Ri ,
Abel Parker Upshur
1843-44
John Middleton Clayton
1849-50
William Learned Marcy
1853-57
16.
John Caldwell Calhoun
1844-45
19.
Daniel Webster
1850-52
22.
Lewis Cass
1857-60
Special
17.
James Buchanan
1845-49
20. Edward Everett
1852-53
23.
Jeremiah Sullivan Black
1860-61
S4S
Special
24. William Henry Seward
1861-69
25. Elihu Benjamin Washburne
1869
26.
Hamilton Fish
1869-77
27. William Maxwell Evarts
1877-81
28. James Gillespie Blaine
1881
29. Frederick Theodore
Frelinghuysen 1881-85
30. Thomas Francis Bayard
1885-89
31. James Gillespie Blaine
1889-92
32. John Watson Foster
1892-93
S46
Department of State Bui
special
William Jennings Bryan
1913-15
It'irxi inO'1
S47
Special
42. Robert Lansing
1915-20
43. Bainbridge Colby
1920-21
44. Charles Evans Hughes
1921-25
45. Frank Billings Kellogg
1925-29
Henry Lewis Stimson
1929-33
47. Cordell Hull
1933-44
Edward Reilly Stettinius, Jr
1944-45
49. James Francis Byrnes
1945-47
50.
George Catlett Marshall
1947-49
S48
DeDartment of State Bl
Special
Dean Gooderham Acheson
1949-53
52. John Foster Dulles
1953-59
53. Christian Archibald Herter
1959-61
Dean Rusk
1961-69
55. William Pierce Rogers
1969-73
56. Henry Alfred Kissinger
1973-77
Alexander Meigs Haig, Jr., was
designated Secretary of State on
December 16, 1980, by President-
elect Reagan.
Cyrus Roberts Vance
1977-80
58. Edmund Sixtus Muskie
1980-81
59. Alexander Meigs Haig, Jr.
1981
<SdQ
Special
Milestones of
American Diplomacy
1778
Treaty of alliance with France, en-
gineered by Benjamin Franklin, enabled
the fledgling republic to continue its
struggle for independence.
1783
Treaty of Paris — Great Britain recog-
nized American independence and con-
trol over western lands as far as the
Mississippi.
1783-86
First U.S. treaties of friendship and
commerce — with France, Great Britain,
Netherlands, Prussia, and Sweden — es-
tablished U.S. tradition of nondiscrimina-
tion in foreign trade.
1795
Jay's treaty required Great Britain to re-
move troops from northwestern frontier;
Pinckney's treaty with Spain opened
mouth of Mississippi River to Ij.S. navi-
gation.
1800
Treaty of Mortefontaine settled the
2-year undeclared naval war with France
and put an end to the alliance.
1801
Jefferson, in first inaugural address,
summarized U.S. policy as "peace, com-
merce, and honest friendship with all na-
tions, entangling alliances with none."
1803
Louisiana Purchase removed foreign con-
trol of Mississippi's mouth and doubled
U.S. territoiy.
1814
Ti'eaty of Ghent ending Wai- of 1812 pro-
vided means to settle remaining territo-
rial disputes with Great Britain.
1819
Adams-Onis treaty with Spain, transfer-
ring Florida, e.xtended the U.S. to pres-
ent boundaries in southeast.
1823
Monroe Doctrine established U.S. policy
of opposing European intervention or
new colonization in Western Hemisphere.
1842
Webster- Ashburton treaty with Grea
Britain delimited northeastern U.S.
(Maine) boundary.
1844
Treaty of Wang-hsia, first U.S.-Chin
agreement, granted U.S. commercia
privileges and extraterritorial jurisd
tion over Americans.
1846
Oregon treaty with Great Britain ex-
tended U.S. sole dominion to the Pac
1848
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, ending
1846-48 war with Mexico, confirmed
claim to Texas and completed U.S. e
pansion to Pacific.
1858
Harris treaty first opened Japan to i
supervised foreign commerce.
1867
Alaska purchase ended Russian terr
rial presence and completed U.S. ex
sion on North American mainland.
1889
P'irst International American Congr
initiated system of collaboration ami
Western Hemisphere republics.
1898
Treaty of Paris, at end of Spanish-
American War, gave United States
Puerto Rico, Guam, and Philippines
panding U.S. power into the Pacific.
1903
Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty conveyed
the U.S. the Panama Canal Zone.
1918
Allies and Germany accepted Wilsor
points as basis for just and lasting pt
ending World War I.
1920
U.S. Senate rejected Treaty of Vers;
with Germany, thus keeping the U.S
of the League of Nations.
Special
^ ? Agreements Act launched program
iprocal tariff reduction leading to
1 efforts for trade liberalization after
] War II.
"l itic Charter, joint declaration by
^ dent Roosevelt and Prime Minister
chill 4 months before U.S. entered
\ War II, laid down principles of
later adopted by United Nations —
letermination, economic cooperation,
'*' I progress, and disarmament.
"! and 50 other countries founded the
■'' ?d Nations.
and 22 other nations established the
ral Agi-eement on Tariffs and Trade
" T) and completed first round of talks
ing world trade barriers.
an Doctrine asserted U.S. policy of
''fining Soviet e.xpansion through eco-
; and military aid to threatened
■American Ti-eaty of Reciprocal As-
ice (Rio treaty) committed the U.S.
..atin American republics to aid one
ler to resist militaiy aggression.
hall plan of aid to Europe set foun-
n for economic cooperation among
trial democracies.
1 International Conference of Amer-
5tates created the Organization of
ican States (OAS) to intensify U.S.
atin American collaboration in all
P*;
1949
NATO, first U.S. alliance concluded in
peacetime, provided integi-ated force for
defense of Western Europe and North
America.
1950
U.N. General Assembly Uniting for
Peace Resolution, presented by the U.S.,
gave basis for common action against ag-
gressor in Korea.
1963
Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, first
major-power agreement regulating
atomic weapons testing, banned explo-
sions in the atmosphere, in outer space,
and under water.
1967
Non-Proliferation Ti-eaty, now signed by
110 governments, banned spread of
atomic weapons.
1972
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
agreements with U.S.S.R. prescribed
mutual limitations on defensive and of-
fensive weapons and established SALT as
a continuing process.
1972
President Nixon's February visit to
China followed Secretary Kissinger's ear-
lier negotiations in Peking, marking first
important step in process of normalizing
relations with the People's Republic of
China.
1973
Paris agi-eement provided for withdrawal
of U.S. troops from Vietnam.
1974-75
Middle East consultations by Secretary of
State Kissinger facilitated military disen-
gagement in Arab- Israeli conflict and
prepared ground for peace talks between
Israel and Egypt.
1979
U.S. established diplomatic relations with
the People's Republic of China ending 30
years of nonrecognition.
1979
Israel-Egypt peace treaty ended 30 years
of conflict between the two countries and
provided possible framework for com-
prehensive peace in Middle East.
1979
Panama Canal Act returned Canal Zone
to Panamanian jurisdiction, leaving canal
under U.S. operation through 1999.
1980
Consular convention and three economic
agreements completed process of nor-
malizing relations with the People's Re-
public China.
HUMAN RIGHTS
\v from postwar history that such
gations have sometimes preceded
itary intervention.
The United States continues to
eve that the Polish people and au-
rities should be free to work out
ir internal difficulties without out-
interference. The United States,
veil as some Western governments,
also the Soviet Union, have
iged economic assistance to Poland
rder to alleviate internal Polish
iculties. The United States has no
rest in exploiting, in any fashion,
Polish difficulties for its political
s.
Foreign military intervention in
and would have the most negative
sequences for East- West relations
reneral and U.S. -Soviet relations in
ticular. The Charter of the United
tions establishes the right of all
tes, both large and small, to exist
e of foreign interference, regard-
; of ideology, alliances, or geo-
phic location. I want all countries
enow that the attitude and future
icies of the United States toward
Soviet Union would be directly and
y adversely affected by any Soviet
of force in Poland.
' Text from White House press
.>ase. ■
UTE HOUSE STATEMENT,
;C. 7, 1980^
jparations for possible Soviet
ervention in Poland appear to have
n completed. It is our hope that no
h intervention will take place. The
5. Government reiterates its state-
nt of December 3 regarding the
■y adverse consequences for U.S.-
I'iet relations of Soviet military
ervention in Poland.
Human Rights and International Law
2 Text from Weekly Compilation of
c. 15. ■
by Patricia M. Derian
Statement based on an address
prepared for the National Association
of Women Judges in Washington, D.C.,
on October 3, 1980. Ms. Derian is
Assistant Secretary for Human Rights
and Hnmanitarian Affairs.
It is rare in government to find that
one's work immerses one in ideas and
concepts which, over time, can have a
profound and lasting impact on the
course of our country's future. But
that has been my lot for the past 3%
years as I and others have sought to
integrate the international concern for
human rights into our relations and
policies with other nations.
That effort — making human rights
a central part of U.S. foreign policy —
is perhaps the most innovative ap-
proach that the United States has ever
taken in this area. It is an attempt to
express our commitment to the protec-
tion and enhancement of human dig-
nity throughout the world. It is a
reflection of the values and traditions
that have long been the hallmark of
our country. With human rights as a
major component of our foreign policy,
the United States has made a sustained
commitment to a world free from gov-
ernmental violations of the integrity of
the person ; a world free from want of
food, shelter, health care, and educa-
tion ; a world free to enjoy civil and
political liberties.
While the philosophical content of
our human rights policy may seem
largely ethical, ideological, or political,
what is often poorly understood is the
major role that law has played in
establishing a framework in which
human rights and human decency can
be promoted and furthered.
I have noted with some curiosity
that, over the past few years, many
people who should know better have
been surprised to learn that there is an
emerging, growing, and, indeed, vigor-
ous body of international law of human
rights. This lack of awareness may well
be explained by the fact that there is
no formal international judicial system
in which human rights laws are regu-
larly adjudicated. The lack of such a
system has made difficult a general
apprehension that international human
rights law imposes substantial obliga-
tions on all governments.
Multilateral Treaties
While human rights law has not had
the advantage of such a judicial sys-
tem, which would aid in the develop-
ment of a cohesive and coherent body
of law, a law of human rights has,
nonetheless, developed. Broadly, it has
emerged as a result of international
treaties ; international customary law
and practice ; and domestic laws, regu-
lations, and court decisions evidencing
international custom or acceptance of
general principles.
Of these, among the most impor-
tant are the U.N. Charter and numer-
ous international treaties and other
instruments developed in an effort to
promote respect for human rights.
The U.N. Charter is probably the
first and certainly the most important
treaty to recognize human rights and
fundamental freedoms of individual
human beings as matters of legitimate
concern to the entire world community.
As set forth in Article 1 ( 3 ) of the
charter, the purpose of the United Na-
tions, among other things, is "to
achieve international co-operation in
solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humani-
tarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion." Article 55
states that the United Nations shall
promote "universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fun-
damental freedoms for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion," while under Article 56 "all
Members pledge themselves to take
joint and separate action in co-opera-
tion with the [United Nations] for the
achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55."
Shortly after the founding of the
United Nations, the idea of an inter-
national bill of human rights was ad-
vanced. The first step was taken on
December 10, 1948, when the U.N.
General Assembly adopted and pro-
claimed the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights
Human Rights. The purpose of the
dechiration is to be "... a common
.standard of achievement for all peoples
and all nations, to the end that every
individual and every organ of society,
keeping this Declaration constantly in
mind, shall strive by teaching and edu-
cation to promote respect for these
rights and freedoms. . . ."
While adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly, the declaration lacks the
binding force of a treaty. It has, none-
theless, proved to be a frequently in-
voked explanation of the scope of the
human rights and fundamental free-
doms recognized by treaty — that is, by
the U.N. Charter. It has also been con-
tributing year by year to the develop-
ment of a customary international law
of human rights.
After adopting the declaration,
the United Nations drafted, adopted,
and opened for signature two major
international covenants on human
rights — one covering civil and political
rights with an optional protocol ; the
other economic, social, and cultural
rights. These three instruments com-
plete the international bill of human
rights begun with the Universal Dec-
laration, providing legal as well as
moral force to international human
rights. All have now entered into force.
The two covenants have been signed
but not yet ratified by the United
States, inasmuch as the Senate is still
considering the President's recom-
mendation to the Senate for its advice
and consent.
It has been one of my greatest
personal frustrations that, despite the
Carter Administration's commitment,
the work of many nongovernmental
organizations and legal societies, and
my own efforts, the Senate has still not
voted in favor of ratifying either of
these extremely important instru-
ments. They are cornerstones of the
law of international human rights. Our
failure to ratify these treaties, obvi-
ously, makes it more difficult for us to
argue persuasively for the need to
adhere to universal standards of
human rights.
Because of their importance to
human rights law, I would urge you to
acquaint yourself with the two cove-
nants and other pertinent human
rights instruments. The State Depart-
ment has prepared a compendium of
selected human rights documents. Your
efforts to support and seek the ap-
proval of these two covenants would be
a major contribution in advancing the
law of human rights.
The charter and the two covenants
are by no means the only multilateral
effort at promoting human rights.
There are over 20 treaties now in place
and they include, inter alia : the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, the
International Conventi(^n on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, the Convention concerning the
Abolition of Forced Labor, the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, the
Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, the Covention on the Reduc-
tion of Statelessness, and numerous
treaties for the promotion and ad-
vancement of women. Of these there
are the Convention on the Political
Rights of Women, the Convention on
the Nationality of Married Women,
and the recent Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women, which the
United States signed in Copenhagen
this past summer. All of these conven-
tions create binding legal obligations
on the parties to them. Currently being
drafted at the United Nations is a
treaty to strengthen legal guarantees
against, and procedui'es to eliminate
torture, a practice already forbidden
by customary international law.
Ref»it>iial Arranfjenieiils
It is not only on the global level that
efforts to promote human rights take
place : by and large, some of the most
innovative attempts have occurred on
regional levels. Indeed, it may well be
that regional arrangements will most
rapidly advance the commitment to
human rights by all nations.
Perhaps the most highly developed
regional achievement is the European
Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms. The European convention estab-
lished a commission and a court for
handling both state and individual
c<imi)laints. The members of the Oi
nidation of American States have
promulgated the American Conven
on Human Rights, which also inclu
both a commission and a court. Thi
for the first time in our history, a
human rights court has been estab-
lished in the Americas, headquarte
in San Jose, Costa Rica. The Leagu
Arab States has set up a Permaner
Arab Commission on Human Right
The Organization of African Unit}
reviewing a draft on an African ch
ter on human rights and the possib
of establishing a commission on hu
rights for Africa. Under the Helsir
Final Act of 1975, Western Europe
United States, Canada, and Easter:!
Europe — 35 nations — agreed upon
set of principles to reduce tension i
political conflicts in Europe, includ
among them "respect for human riii
and fundamental freedoms." With
exception of the Helsinki Final Act
which was made expressly nonbind
each of these regional initiatives
creates or contemplates creating leji
obligations.
In some instances individuals .
able to assert their human rights ii
courts or other appropriate forums
For example, the European Conven
on Human Rights and the Optional
Protocol to the Covenant on Civil a
Political Rights establish specific p
cedures for the bringing of compla
by private individuals where the na
concerned has agreed to such a pro-
cedure. So, too, does the racial dis-
crimination convention and the Am
can Convention on Human Rights.
Holf (»f Domestic Courts
Again internationally recognized
human rights may be adjudicated b
domestic courts in some jurisdictioi
A case in point is the recent Pena c:
which was initially heard in the U.S
Eastern District Court of New Yorl
The case involved a tort claim brous
by the father and sister of a teenag-
Paraguayan who was allegedly tor-
tured to death in Asuncion by the d
fendant Pcna-Irala, a Paraguayan
22
Deoartment of State Bull
Human Rights
ce officer who was found and served
'^1 Tew York. The suit was brought
Hiant to a 1789 law, now codified as
''« J.S.C. section 1350. Section 1350
ivs an alien to sue in Federal Dis-
"t Courts for a tort in violation of
law of nations or treaties of the
ted States.
Thus a threshold question con-
f^jiting the court was whether torture
violation of the law of nations in
'"jsense of section 1350. If not, the
•t would lack jurisdiction to hear
case.
The district court considered
,f bound, by views in earlier cases
ded by the Second Circuit Court of
eals, to reject jurisdiction. Those
.'s appeared to exclude from the
h of the law of nations wrongs in-
ed by a state on its own nationals.
On appeal, the second circuit
ht an opinion from the State De-
ment. The State Department
'ted. and the Department of Justice
, a brief showing that the inter-
onal law of human rights today
extend to a wrong by a state
nst its own citizens and that tor-
is such a universally recognized
ng. The court of appeals adopted
view and remanded the case to
district court.
Some international treaties, such
a ne Genocide Convention, provide
the prosecution of individuals who
2 allegedly violated the human
i;i its of others.
Frequently, the provisions of a
icular human rights treaty are
rporated into the domestic law of a
e in such a manner that it can be
ked directly by individuals. In
e states, once a treaty is ratified, it
)matically becomes a part of the
estic law; in others, additional
lementing legislation is required,
dless to say, these are not merely
demic concerns. Domestic courts in
United States are, at times, faced
rlji the question of whether a human
ijits treaty is self-executing, thus
pnitting the benefits of the treaty to
pplied directly to a litigant. I
lid note that in transmitting four
lan rights treaties to the Senate in
ruary 1978, President Carter rec-
nended that the United States de-
e that they are not self-executing.
During the early 1970s numerous
suits were brought in domestic courts
in an effort to "prevent the U.S. Gov-
eriir.ient and other U.S. interests from
aiding the forces of racial repression
in southern Africa." While the suits
did not succeed, they were of the ut-
most importance in raising the con-
sciousness of lawyers, judges, govern-
ment officials, and the general public to
the existence of human rights law and
its potential application in domestic
courts.
While there is, in my view, a
clearly recognizable code of human
rights law binding on states and ap-
plicable to individuals, the major Haw
in the development of human rights
law is one of enforcement. The im-
l^lementation of human rights law
l-irgely depends on the consent of
nations. The competence of various
international courts to render a judg-
ment against a nation which has vio-
lated its human rights obligations
rests on that nation's consent to the
c jurt's jurisdiction. However, even if
that consent is forthcoming, an ad-
verse judgment against a consenting
nation may or may not be effectively
enforced. Where a court may, as is the
case of the International Court of Jus-
tice, render advisory opinions, those
opinions, while deserving great re-
spect, are, by definition, not binding,
unless by virtue of some special
agreement.
Currently, the implementation and
enforcement of human rights law are
largely dependent on voluntary compli-
ance, moral pressures, and other forms
of influence. Ideally, and perhaps with
time, there will emerge a viable court
system with the International Court of
Justice as the final court of appeal.
Already many of the regional arrange-
ments for the promotion and protec-
tion of human rights have established
Slime form of juridical mechanism for
lodging complaints.
What I have sought to do here
today is to show in a rather brief form
that human rights is something more
than a controversial, ideological, or
political concept. Human rights is law
and, as such, when a nation violates
individual human rights, it is violating
international law. The efforts of the
U.S. Government to make human
rights a central part of our foreign
policy is, in effect, an effort to incor-
porate within our foreign policy the
international law which establishes
standards of human decency and
human dignity. In that human rights
is something beyond an ethical, ideo-
logical, or political concept and is also
very much a legal concept.
The question I am often asked is:
"What is the future of the U.S. human
rights policy under a different Admin-
istration?" I say that if human rights
is international law, and I believe that
it is, there can be no other course for
the U.S. Government but to apply and
enforce that law.
What I have attempted to do here
today is to provide a better under-
standing of the role that the law plays
in enhancing human rights. The con-
cept of human rights is a concept of
world order. It is a proposal for struc-
turing the world so that every indi-
vidual's human worth is realized, every
individual's human dignity is pro-
tected. The purpose of laws is to create
a meaningful, rational, and just frame-
work in which the pursuit of personal
and societal enjoyment can take place.
This thought has never been expressed
better than in the preamble to the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights.
The drafters of the declaration clearly
understood the important role that law
must play if the goal of respect for
universal human rights is ever to be
realized. They wrote:
... it is essential, if man is not to
be compelled to have recourse, as a last
resort, to rebellion against tyranny
and oppression, that human rights
should be protected liy the rule of
law. ■
MIDDLE EAST
U.S.-lsrael Oil Agreement
In a crremnmj at the White House
on October 17. 1980. President Carter
and I.fraeli Minister Yitzhak Modai
.signed the Contingency Implementing
Arrangements for the June 22, 1979,
Memorandum of Agreement between
Israel and the United States.
Following are remarks made by
the President and Minister Modai on
that occasion, te.rts of the agreement
and the June 22. 1979. Memorandum of
Agreement, with annex, and a
Department fact sheet.
REMARKS AT SIGNING
CEREMONY!
President Carter
I'm very pleased to announce this
morning the completion of our con-
tingency arrangements for assuring
Israel's oil-supply security.
These arrangements further ful-
fill a promise that I made last year in
connection with Israel's withdrawal
from the Gulf of Suez oil fields and its
conclusion of the treaty of peace with
Egypt. In making peace, Israel com-
mitted itself to dependence solely on
imported oil — a very bold and courage-
ous and generous decision in this
troubled time. At the time of Israel's
withdrawal, in 1975, from a portion of
the Egyptian Sinai, the United States
gave assurance that Israel would count
on our help and could depend on us if
it could not attain oil during its own
efforts.
We renewed and e.xtended this
duration of the assurance in June of
1979, so that the establishment of
peace with Egypt would not lessen
Israel's long-range energy security.
Now we have spelled out the emergency
conditions under which the 1979 oil-
supply agreement may be activated.
This contingency plan is a carefully
defined understanding between friends,
designed to insure that all relevant con-
cerns are taken into account. Both our
nations hope this agreement will never
have to be activated, but if it should
become necessary, the United States
will be a steadfast and dependable
friend of Israel.
This agreement is one aspect of
what I hope will be a broad range of
cooperation in strengthening Israel's
energy security. We're exploring now
how we might work together further
on research and development and for
new energy technologies, especially
shale oil extraction and the use of
solar power for energy.
Our cooperation in energy and in
other fields is for the cause of peace.
It is against no nation. It is for the
people who yearn for a secure future.
It is in this spirit that I congratulate
the negotiators of the oil supply under-
standings and invite now Secretary
Muskie, representing the United States
of America, and Minister Modai, rep-
resenting the great nation of Israel, to
proceed with the signing of the
appropriate documents.
[At this point, Secretary of State Ed-
niniid S. Muskie and Israeli Minister of
Energy and Infrastructure Yitzhak
Modai signed the "Contingency Imple-
menting Arrangements for the Memoran-
dum of Agreement of June 22, 1!)79
Between Israel and the United States."]
Minister Modai
The peace agreement between Israel
and Egypt is probably the most im-
portant event, certainly in the Middle
East, but probably also in the entire
world in this generation.
It came about due to the leader-
ship of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion
( Begin ) -, President Sadat, and
through the devoted efforts and active
participation of yourself.
The State of Israel, in order to
achieve this peace agreement, has
made very large sacrifices. A major
sacrifice was the relinquishing of the
Alma oil field, which we discovered
and developed, and this, in addition to
giving up the Abu Rudeis oil field as
part of the interim agreement in 1975.
Now you and the Congress under-
stood the big risk taken by the State
of Israel in giving up its opportunity
for oil self-sufficiency and, therefore,
an agreement that guarantees oil sup-
ply to Israel was signed in .June of
1979. Now, that agreement did not
contain the specifications of the condi-
tions in which that agreement could
have been activated and, therefore, we
felt — we in Israel felt — that we need
to have a better definition of which are
the conditions in which your guaran-
tee will come into effect. After tedious,
long negotiations — over a year — v/e
are finally signing, here today, the
specifications under which that agr
ment will come into effect.
That is certainly the completio
of a promise, I may say, of an offer
made by you when you were in Israi
I believe in February of 1979.
Obviously, nobody can foresee
future developments in the next 15-^
now it's only 14 — years, but we are
very happy to have a document whii
is so clear, so detailed, and which
relates to such a vital and delicate
issue. I would like to thank you,
Mr. President, you Mr. Secretai-y, a
your staffs for a job so very well do
President Carter
I'd like to say to the press that folio
ing this ceremony, or perhaps airea
the details of the agreement will be
described. Has that been done yet?
It will be done. So, your questions
about the detailed agreement will bi
answered after this meeting.
I would like to say, informally
but sincerely, on behalf of the Amei
can people, that we are very proud t
have this agreement. The proposal ■>
made voluntarily by me, on my own
initiative, when I was in Jerusalem
the time when we were trying to br
to a conclusion the basic elements ol
the peace treaty between Israel and
Egypt. Israel has taken a courageoi
step in bringing peace to that entir(
area by voluntarily giving up contrc
of and the use of these oil wells, son
of which they, themselves, discovere
and developed.
We anticipate that Israel will c
tinue to receive their oil from presei
sources, but if those supplies should
interrupted or if exorbitant prices
should be imposed upon Israel, abov
and beyond normal marketing price:
as described in this detailed docume
then the United States will meet thi;
obligation to our friend, the Govern
ment of Israel.
I consider this to be not only an
investment iti the security of Israel
but also a very sound investment in
the security of the United States of
America. And it's a further demon-
stration of our unfaltering commit-
ment and steady progress toward th
Deoartment of State Bull
Middle East
prehensive peace in the Middle
t, which all of us so deeply desire,
;d upon the security of Israel, in
y sense and meaning of that word.
Mr. Minister, thank you very
h for your coming here to con-
,e this document. And I hope you'll
ind my best wishes to Prime Min-
r Begin and to all the officials of
lel who've made this progress
dble.
CT OF AGREEMENT'
3NTINGENCY IMPLEMENTING
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE
SMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
OF JUNE 22, 1979
BETWEEN
AEL AND THE UNITED STATES
'his agreement is to specify the eon-
)ns for the activation of the June 22,
), Memorandum of Agreement
3A) between the United States and
el on oil supply and the means by
;h the MOA would be implemented.
2. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of the
A, Israel may give notification to the
ted States Departmen', of State
ireau of Near Eastern and South
an Affairs). The notification is to
] ude the information Israel deems
jssary to substantiate its view that
; unable to secure its needs, or some
t thereof, through normal procedures,
iporting documentation is to be pro-
!d on request. Consultations between
United States and Israel would then
e place as soon as possible, and in no
in nt later than two weeks following
ification, to confirm that Israel is
.ble to supply its requirements by
mal procedures. Upon this confirma-
1, implementation would proceed,
ael's supply right and allocation right
aid be established and the United
.tes would make oil available to Israel
50on as practicable after notification,
e United States will make every effort
■nsure that this period is less than
days.
3. Absent a shortfall in the amount
oil physically available to Israel on the
rid market, the MOA could be acti-
ted when Israel:
(a) is paying for all its imported oil
average price higher than the average
it of the most expensive 20' ; of crude
imported into the United States; and
(b) has to buy at least 60 'y of its oil
rough short-term, indirect purchases.
16 time period for measurement of these
itors would be the 90 days preceding
tification.
4. If Israel were to lose one of its
two existing main sources of long-term
supply (or a replacement source pro-
viding 22' ; or more of Israel's oil
imports), notwithstanding Israel's
reasonable efforts to retain said sources
of supply, without immediately replac-
ing it with an equivalent source, the
MOA could be activated immediately.
Israel's allocation right during activa-
tion pursuant to this paragraph would be
equal to 120 days of supply from the lost
main source, following which the MOA
would be deactivated unless the con-
ditions of paragraph 3 have been met.
The United States and Israel would seek
to measure the factors for an activation
under paragraph 3 without including oil
which may be made available from the
United States pursuant to this para-
graph. If this paragraph is activated
under section 1(b) of the MOA, Israel's
allocation right would be adjusted in
accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7
hereof.
5. Israel's shortfall and supply right
under section 1(a) of the MOA would be
determined by comparing actual and ex-
pected deliveries of oil secured through
normal procedures with current normal
co.iicstic requirements. The allocation
right as determined pursuant to the above
should include such oil as may be neces-
sary to maintain its reserves at a level
of six months of consumption.
6. Under section 1 (b) , if the lEA
General Trigger emergency procedures
have not been activated, Israel would
sustain from its consumption a reduction
in its oil supplies up to a level of TA in
accordance with applicable lEA Selective
Trigger Rules. The United States would
thereafter meet any shortfall in Israel's
normal requirements. Should the TEA
General Trigger emergency procedures
be activated, the U.S. Government would
make oil available for purchase by Israel
in accordance with the lEA General Allo-
cation formula. The formula requires:
(a) demand restraint measures
which reduce consumption by 7',r or IC/o
depending on the loss of supplies in the
lEA area; and
( b ) a proportional drawdown of
stocks after imposition of the demand
restraint measures.
The United States will keep Israel
informed of any changes in the lEA
emergency measures and procedures
relevant to the MOA and any interpre-
tations thereof.
7. Once the Geneial Trigger is acti-
vated, demand restraint for Israel would
be calculated using the same base period
as that used by lEA countries. The
Emergency Reserve Drawdown Obliga-
tion (ERDO) for Israel would be calcu-
lated using the lEA formula as if Israel
has the same reserve obligation as a
member nation. The lEA currently
requires an emergency reserve commit-
ment for each country equivalent to 90
days of imports for domestic
consumption.
On this basis, an ERDO would be
calculated for Israel and, in turn, a
supply right derived. Israel's allocation
right would be calculated by subtracting
available supplies from its supply right.
The allocation right would determine the
amount of oil to be supplied to Israel
under the MOA. The initial supply
right would be calculated as of the date
of notification under the MOA.
8. After activation, United States
and 'sraeli experts would meet every
three months, or more often on request,
to review Israel's oil supply situation
and its attempts to obtain oil and to
adjust Israel's allocation right accord-
ingly. Israel's allocation right would be
adjusted to the extent oil is available to
Israel under normal procedures. Israel
would continue to make its best efforts to
secure oil independently in such manner
as to reduce or eliminate its dependency
on oil made available by the United
States under the MOA. When Israel's
allocation right is reduced or eliminated,
the United States would take appropriate
measures to adjust or end its arrange-
ments for oil supply to Israel in an
orderly fashion.
9. Although the actual sequence and
methods of supply would depend on the
conditions existing at the time, the
United States affirms that, in its current
judgment, the following options are the
most practical means of supplying oil to
Israel pursuant to sections 1(a) and
1(b) of the MOA:
(a) The United States would first
try to use its good offices with other
nations and with private companies to
arrange for alternative foreign sources
of supply for sales to Israel. Price and
other terms would be worked out between
the supplier and Israel.
(b) If option A is not sufficient, the
United States could attempt to buy oil on
the world market for resale to Israel at
cost. The United States would seek the
most reasonably priced oil available.
(c) If there is no other more suit-
able alternative, the United States cur-
rently foresees fulfilling its obligations
under the MOA by making oil available
to Israel through swaps or direct sale
of domestically produced oil.
10. In any of these arrangements the
United States will, to the extent possible,
take into account the types of crude oil
most suitable to meet Israel's require-
ment as well as commercial and logistic
considerations. It is recognized that the
API mix of the oil supplies could cause
slight variations in the total amount of
oil required.
11. Under the terms of the MOA,
Middle East
the price paid for oil supplied by the
United States shall be comparable to
world market prices current at the time
of transfer. Israel will, in any event,
reimburse the United States for the costs
incurred by the United States in provid-
injc oil to Israel hereunder.
If the United States provides
domestic oil to Israel, the price charged
would be acquisition cost or the replace-
ment cost, whichever is higher. Replace-
ment cost means the actual cost to the
U.S. refiners of replacing oil sold to
Israel ; if this cani.ot be precisely
determined, replacement cost will be con-
sidered to be equivalent to the average
cost (C.I.F.) to U.S. refiners of the most
expensive 10'/' of similar quality crude
oil imported into the United States.
12. The U.S. Government would
make all necessary arrangements with
appropriate U.S. agencies and relevant
suppliers to implement fully the U.S.
commitment to make oil available for
purchase by Israel.
13. The United States would keep
Israel informed of the progress toward
making oil available to Israel. The United
States would inform Israel of the
arrangements it has made as soon as
possible with the objective of enabling
Israel to have a ship or ships ready to
load when and where the oil becomes
available.
14. Arrangements would be made
for appropriate participation of United
States flag carriers in the transportation
of oil from the United States under para-
graph 9 (c) above. If Israel is unable
to secure the necessary means to trans-
port to Israel oil made available pursuant
to the MOA, the United States Govern-
ment would make every effoit to help
Israel secure the necessary means of
trar.sport.
15. In the event of war or damage to
Israel's refining capacity or storage
installations, to adjusu for variations of
API gravity crude oil, or for other rea-
sons, Israel may require refined petro-
leum products. In that event, the United
States and Israeli Governments would
promptly consult as to the means by
which Israel might acquire and transport
such products.
16. With regard to security arrange-
ments, the United States and Israel will
be prepared to take security precautions
normal in such circumstances in their
own ports for ships controlled by the
other. It is assumed that Israel will work
out security arrangements with third
country officials to the extent that third
country ports might be involved in the
Israeli supply line.
17. Quarterly or more f reciuently
upon United States request, Israel shall
inform the United States of the (luantity,
t|uality, price and other relevant condi-
tions of oil imports into Israel, Israel's
U.S. Hostages in Iran
SEC.RETARYS STATEMENT
NOV. 3, 1980'
We have seen, during the past 12
hour.s, several developments in the
hostage issue. These should be viewed
as initial steps in a process which will
require time, patience, and diplomacy.
Reports from Tehran .state that
the Ayatollah Khomeini has agreed
with the militants that the hostages
can be transferred to government
control. We believe, as we have said
previously, it i.s in our interest for the
government to assume direct responsi-
bility for the well-being and security
of the hostages.
We welcome reports that the
Algerian Government will be involved.
Deputy Secretary | Warren]
Christopher has met with the Algerian
ambassador and discussed their role
in connection with the actions of the
Iranian Parliament.
Finally, the reports from Tehran
that the Prime Minister's office has
established a working group in con-
nection with implementation of the
Parliament's decision are also welcome.
The President said yesterday that
we cannot predict when the hostages
will be home with us. We have affirmed
that any decisions we make will be
consistent with two fundamental
objectives stated by the President —
a solution must protect our national
honor and vital interests and insure
the safe return of the hostages.
There has been progress ; how-
ever, much remains to be done. We
will continue to pursue our goals with
patience, diligence, and determination.
Americans are united in their desire
to see their fellow citizens come home
safely with honor and with pride in
their nation.
' Copies made available to news
correspondents by Department spokes-
man John Trattner. ■
requirement for the preceding 3-month
period and its forecast for imports and
requirements for the next (Vmonth period.
18. United States and Israeli experts
will meet annually or more frequently at
the request of either party to review
Israel's oil situation in light of prevailing
market conditions and to review and, if
necessary, further develop or modify
these contingency implementing arran
ments by mutual agreement.
19. These arrangements shall be :
ject to and interpreted and applied in
accordance with the MOA, including
paragraph 4 thereof.
20. These arrangements shall api
for an initial period of five years and
shall continue to apply for additional
periods of three years for the duratior
of the MOA, unless suspended by eith(
party at the expiry of any period upor
written notice at least 6 months prior j
thereto. ,
.Suspension of these arrangement:'
r'lall in no way affect the continued
validity of the MOA. In the event of s
pension, both parties will make every
effort to reach renewed agreement on
contingency implementing arrangemei
DONE in duplicate, at Washingtu
this seventeenth day of October, 1980.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
ISRAEL:
Yitzhak Modai
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF Tt
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Edmund S. Muskie
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
TEXT OF MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THI
GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AN.
THE UNITED STATES,
JUNE 22, 1979
Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agr
ment between the Governments of the'
United States and Israel signed
March 2(!, 1979, Israel and the United
States have entered into the Oil Suppl
Arrangement set forth herein as
follows:
1. Israel will make its own inde-
pendent arrangements for oil supply t
meet its requirements through normal
procedures. In the event Israel is unat
to secure its needs in this way, the Un
States Government, upon notification ■
this fact by the Government of Israel
will act as follows:
(a) If the oil Israel needs to nieei
all its normal domestic requirements i:
unavailable for purchase in circum-
stances where no quantitative restric-
tions exist on the ability of the United
States to procure oil to meet its norma
requirements, the United States Govei
ment will promptly make oil available
purchase by Israel to meet the shortfa
in the aforementioned normal require-
ments of Israel. Oil will be made avail
able to Israel as soon as practicable a
Middle East
cation ; the United States will make
I' effort to ensure this period is less
(50 days,
(b) If the oil Israel needs to meet
' its normal requirements for
stic consumption is unavailable for
hase in circumstances where quanti-
e restrictions throuph embargo or
wise also prevent the United States
procuring oil to meet its normal
irements, the United States Govern-
, will promptly make oil available
urchase by Israel in accordance with
nternational Energy Agency con-
tion and allocation formula as
ied by the United States Government,
der to meet the shortfall in Israel's
itial requirements. Oil will be made
lable to Israel as soon as practicable
notification; the United States
make every effort to ensure this
)d is less than 60 days,
(c) If Israel is unable to secure the
sary means to transport to Israel oil
e available pursuant to this Agree-
, the United States Government will
'. every effort to help Israel secure
lecessary means of transport.
2. Prices paid by Israel for oil pro-
i by the United States hereunder
be comparable to world market
;s current at the time of transfer,
al will, in any event, reimburse the
ed States for the costs incurred by
Jnited States in providing oil to
el hereunder.
3. Israeli and United States experts
imeet annually or more frequently at
•equest of either party, to review
tel's continuing oil requirement and
!velop and review any necessary con-
lency implementing arrangements.
4. This Memorandum of Agreement
bject to applicable United States
The United States administration
seek additional statutory authoriza-
that may be necessary for full imple-
tation of this Memorandum of
Ieement.
5. This Memorandum of Agreement
I enter into force on November 25,
) and shall terminate on November 25,
1. The oil supply arrangement of
tember 1, 1975 between the Govern-
ts of Israel and the United States
II be in force during the period from
date of this Memorandum of Agree-
it to November 25, 1994 and shall be
formed and implemented in accord-
e with the provisions of this
iiorandum of Agreement.
ANNEX
onnection with the Memorandum of
reement being entered into on this date
ween the Government of Israel and the
/ernment of the United States, Israel
I the United States understand that:
Because of the unique security
situation of Israel its oil reserves are
and should be at the level equal to six
months of Israel's oil consumption; and
in this connection U.S. oil supplies
should be at such levels that U.S. ability
to meet its oil requirements will not be
adversely affected.
DEPARTMENT FACT SHEET^
The Memorandum of Agreement
( MOA ) on oil supply, concluded by the
U.S. and Lsrael on June 22, 1979, was
an integral part of the process result-
ing in the conclusion of the Treaty of
Peace between Egypt and Israel. As
part of that treaty, Israel agreed to
give back to Egypt oil fields in the
Gulf of Suez. The MOA contains a
commitment by the U.S. to make oil
available for purchase by Israel if
Lsrael could not find enough on its own,
through normal procedures, to meet its
domestic requirements. (This was
very similar to an agreement con-
cluded with Israel in 1975 when Israel
returned oil fields to Egypt as part of
a partial withdrawal from the Sinai.
That agreement was folded into the
1979 MOA.)
Section three of the Memorandum
of Agreement provided that the two
nations should meet to develop con-
tingency implementing arrangements.
There have been five meetings over the
course of the past year and an agree-
ment outlining such arrangements has
now been reached. These implementing
arrangements are entirely subject to
the parent MOA.
The implementing arrangements
provide for three ways in which the
MOA could be activated:
• The first occurs when Israel
simply cannot obtain enough oil to
meet its needs, no matter what price
or terms it offers. In this case, the
United States would provide Israel,
directly or indirectly, a sufficient
quantity of oil to make up the
shortfall.
• A much more comple.\ situation
arises when Israel can physically
obtain oil but only by paying an
excessive average price and by buying
under very insecure arrangements. In
the case of oil, as with any commodity,
if a country is willing to pay enough
it may be able to find modest amounts
even during times of severe world
shortage. This fact was taken into
account in the formula in paragraph 3
whereby the MOA would be activated
if Israel has to pay an average price
for its oil greater than the average
cost of the most expensive 20' r of
crude oil imported into the United
States and has to buy at least 60%
of its oil through short-term, indirect
purchases. This formula reflects the
basic purpose of the 1979 MOA as an
emergency supply commitment and,
at the same time, recognizes the
market reality that even though oil
may be available, it cannot be obtained
through normal procedures.
• Paragraph 4 provides for a
special emergency activation of the
commitment when Israel loses one of
its main sources of supply despite its
efforts to maintain that source. If
Israel cannot immediately replace it
with an equivalent source, the United
States would provide oil, directly or
indirectly, to make up the shortfall
for 120 days. If, after this period,
Israel was suffering a physical short-
fall or qualified under paragraph 3,
the United States would continue to
provide oil.
If the MOA is activated, the
United States would first try to find
foreign oil for Israel. If that proves
inadequate, the United States would
provide domestic oil. There would be
no subsidy involved. Israel would pay
the higher of the acquisition cost or
the cost to U.S. refiners of obtaining
replacement oil. If the actual replace-
ment cost could not be determined,
an imputed replacement cost equal to
the average of the most expensive
10'; of U.S. imports of similar quality
would be charged.
Whenever the United States pro-
vides oil to Israel, Israel would have
the obligation to continue to look for
oil on the world market, and if it finds
some, the U.S. obligation would be
reduced accordingly.
If the United States is suffering
a shortfall and the MOA were acti-
vated, Israel, under paragraphs 6 and
7 of the implem.enting arrangements,
would be treated as a hypothetical
participant in the emergency oil-
sharing system of the International
Energy Agency ( IE A ) . It would have
the same demand restraint and stock
drawdown obligations as an lEA
member. This means that Israel would
receive at most 93% of its normal
requirements for domestic consump-
tion and might receive less depending
on the shortfall among lEA nations.
Israel is not a member of the lEA
an, HnOH
Middle East
and would not receive an oil allocation
from the TEA.
The implementing arrangements
will apply for an initial period of 5
years and additional periods of 3
years for the duration of the MO A
(1994 unless extended i . Either party
could suspend the implementing
arrangements at the expiry of any
period. This would in no way affect,
however, the continued validity of the
MOA.
Israel's oil consumption is cur-
rently about 160,000 barrels per day,
less than 1';', of U.S. consumption.
Since the initial U.S. oil-supply com-
mitment was made in 1975, Israel has
been able to obtain sufficient oil
through its own efforts without re-
course to the United States, even
during periods of tight oil market
conditions. Israel is currently meeting
all its oil needs, and it is expected that
it will continue to be able to do so,
but under emergency circumstances,
Israel could turn to the United States
under the MOA and these implement-
ing arrangements.
1 Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Oct. 27, 1980.
^ White House correction.
•' Made available to news corre-
spondents by Department .spokesman
John Trattner. ■
Iran Chronology,
November 1980
November 1
In a newspaper editorial, hard-line
Islamic Republican Party announces it
favors release of the hostages before U.S.
elections because during this period, the
U.S. is "ready to give more concessions,"
and a new U.S. President "would see no
reason to submit to the rights of our
nation." The editorial goes on to warn,
however, that if conditions are not met,
the hostages would remain captive and
could possibly be tried for espionage.
November 2
Hostages' 365th day of captivity.
Iran's Parliament approves a report
by the seven-member commission endors-
ing the conditions laid down earlier by
Khomeini for freeing the hostages. The
commission's report also specifies that
the U.S. would not only have to accept the
conditions but also carry them out.
November 3
Military captors, with Khomeini's
approval, turn jurisdiction of hostages
over to the Iranian Government but not
the hostages themselves.
November 4
In a message conveyed to the Carter
Administration through the Algerian
Embassy, the Iranian Government calls
for a quick reply by the U.S. to its con-
ditions. U.S. declines the request.
Tens of thousands of Iranians
demonstrate in Tehran streets cele-
brating the 1-year anniversary of the
takeover of the U.S. Embassy and
capture of the hostages.
November 5
Militant captors state that the
hostage crisis is prolonged because of
Gov. Reagan's election, but there will be
no change in the terms for freeing them.
The government also states that the
election would have no effect.
Carter Administration officials
suggest that the President will agree to
conditions if Iranian authorities accept
a "narrow interpretation" of the Iranian
Parliament's "ambiguous demands."
November 7
Former Foreign Minister Ghotbza-
deh is arrested and imprisoned for
criticizing the Government's management
of the broadcasting system.
Hostages remain in Embassy; Iran
Government makes no move to take
custody despite earlier announcement.
November 10
Deputy Secretary Christopher and
a small delegation depart Washing-
ton, D.C., for Algiers carrying the U.S.
response to the Iranian Parliament's
terms on release of the hostages. While
in Algiers, he meets with Algerian
Foreign Affairs Minister Benyahia. The
Algerian Government agrees to serve as
intermediary for the U.S. response and
agrees to transmit it to the Iranian
Government.
After Ghotbzadeh spends 3 days in
prison, Khomeini orders his release.
November 11
Deputy Secretary Christopher
departs Algiers for Washington, D.C.
November 13
Iranian official committee studies
U.S. reply to its terms but makes no
public comment.
November 16
Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani states
that the Parliament is "too busy" to
discuss the hostage issue further.
November 19
Rafsanjani states that the U.S. ha
accepted "in principle" Iran's conditio?
but release of the hostages will be dela
until the demands are actually met.
November 20
U.S. confirms it has accepted, in
principle, the four conditions Iran set
"as a Ijasis for resolution of the crisis.'
November 22
Iran states it wants a "yes or no"
answer from the U.S. on conditions set
Ahmad Azizi, public relations director
Prime Minister Rajai, reaffirms that Ii
"cannot accept the responses with roor
for compromise or negotiations or
anything like that."
November 23
Algerian delegation arrives in
Algiers carrying the Iranian response
on hostages.
November 24
Preoccupied with decisions on
whether to attend the Arab League
meeting in Amman, Algiers delays
informing U.S. of Iran's latest stand.
November 2.'>
Algerian intermediaries arrive in
Washington, D.C, carrying Iran's re-
action to U.S. proposals. Meanwhile,
Iranians remain adamant on condition
set.
November 26
At the State Department, Deputy
Secretary Christopher, along with son
of the members of the delegation who
accompanied him to Algiers, meets wi(
the Algerian representatives to transn
and explain the Iranian position and t
U.S. response for release of the hostap
While in Iran, the Algerian delegation
was assured that the hostages are in
good health.
November 27
Hostage discussions continue betw
Deputy Secretary Christopher and the
Algerian delegation.
Militant captors report that hosta
have been handed over to the govern-
ment, but a spokesman for the militant
refuses to say when or how the transff
had taken place.
November 28
The report that the hostages have
been handed over to the government is
denied by another militant captor. An
Iranian official states he cannot confirr
the report that the hostages have been
transferred.
November 29
Militants reassert that hostages h
been handed over. ■
/RCOTICS
vernational Narcotics Control
:he 1980s
^thea Falco
tatement before the House Select
\nittee on Narcotics on Septcm-
.?. 19S0. Ms. Falco is Assistant
tanj for International Narcotics
ej's.i
Role of Crop Destruction
joal of the international narcotics
ol program since its inception
een, to the extent possible, to
;nt illicit narcotics crops from
ing the United States. The ideal
mstances woidd be to eliminate
iwide production of illicit sub-
es, and in the absence of such
jntive measures, to secure the de-
tion of substances grown for the
: drug market. In our ongoing
ssions with other countries, the
of illicit crop destruction is
ys a factor. Most countries with
n the United States has narcotics-
ed bilateral programs have suc-
ully destroying crops to some
nt; notably Me.xico, but also
Ha, Thailand. Pakistan, and Peru.
The key questions for the Depart-
of State this decade will remain
tto convince more governments to
rtake crop destruction and how
ake such crop destruction more
five. Insofar as U.S. foreign policy
respect to marijuana is con-
ed, the key factor will be consist-
between our foreign policy and
flomestic policy. Foreign percep-
of internal indecision on this
tion, as on any foreign policy
i, makes effective representation
ad more difficult.
Approaches to International
cotics Control
rnational Financial Investi-
ons. While illicit crop destruction
lid remain a primary goal of our
rnational narcotics policy, we must
try, in the 1980s, to improve inter-
onal cooperation in interdiction
rts and drug trafficker judicial
3eedings. One promising area for
improving our ability to detect and
apijrehend major drug traffickers is
through narcotics related financial
investigations. International coopera-
tion on criminal money handling will
not only facilitate the apprehension
and prosecution of drug traffickers but
could also lead to legal changes which
would make criminal money handling
harder. This would increase the costs
and reduce the incentives to partici-
pate in drug trafficking.
As you know, taking advantage
of existing financial techniques has
become a major concern of the Depart-
ment of Justice in domestic narcotics-
related investigations. A priority for
the Department of State during the
1980s will be to expand international
cooperation in applying innovative
financial techniques to drug cases
where the money involved crosses
national borders.
In doing so, there will be several
issues underlying the international
discussion. The first will be the ques-
tion of access to foreign records,
whether corporate, banking, or tax
records. A second related issue for
domestic and international discussion
will be the question of privacy ; that is,
access by foreign investigators to
U.S. held records. A third area will be
increased cooperation in criminal pro-
ceedings, both on the question of
informant testimony and in the trans-
mission of evidence between countries.
Potential points of focus for dis-
cussion and cooperation in this area
are numerous.
First, there are bilateral mutual
assistance treaties, such as those we
have negotiated with the Government
of Colombia and other countries.
Second, we can work toward the
establishment of international guide-
lines or agreements, such as those
contemplated in the resolution on
financial transactions that the United
States proposed in the Commission
on Narcotics Drugs this year.
There are numerous other oppor-
tunities for constructive international
dialogue on improved investigative
and judicial cooperation in multi-
lateral fora.
Poppies in Tiiailand — a source
of heroin and other narcotic drugs.
Development Assistance. Devel-
opment assistance will continue to be
a critical dimension to international
narcotics control in the 1980s. Increas-
ingly, it is evident that a foreign
government's ability to undertake
effective crop destruction programs is
related to the availability of realistic
economic alternatives to growers.
This is especially the case where illicit
narcotics production makes a sub-
stantial contribution to the national
economy or where narcotics produc-
tion is a primary means of support for
geographically separated ethnic
minorities.
Assisted by the legislative efforts
of the members of this committee, we
have made significant progress in
focusing U.S. development assistance
in ill. .it narcotics growing regions.
In the future, multilateral lending
institutions as well as our own bilateral
development agencies must begin to
consider the deleterious effects of
illicit narcotics production. Lending
policies must take into account that the
problem is not only for consuming
countries but also for the developing,
producer countries. Public health and
sound economic development are both
uary 1981
UNITED NATIONS
disrupted in illicit producer countries.
Not only is there often a domestic
drug abuse problem, but illicit nar-
cotics production may interfere with
critical food production, as well as
siphoning away resources from the
legitimate economy. The United States
mu.'it continue to articulate these
problems in the international financial
community and insist to the greatest
extent possible that they be taken into
consideration in lending policies and
development projects.
Metlia((iialone and Oflior
Abused Drugs
While most abused drugs in pill form
are produced in the United States,
international traffic in methaqualone
is posing a severe i)roblem to our
country. During the next decade sub-
stances like methaqualone will have to
be the focus of increased international
dialogue. The main instrument for
international cooperation in this area
is the Psychotropic Substances Con-
vention. Issues to be worked out will
include the development of acceptable
imiKirt-export procedures to control
the movement of scheduled substances,
particularly where the United States
is seeking stricter controls for foreign
manufacturers.
Regulation of Licit
iVareotics Production
A very critical problem will continue
to be the regulation of the production
of licit narcotics derived from opium
poppies for the medicinal market. The
leadei-ship role of the United States in
l)reventing the proliferation of sup-
l)lies of licit raw materials must be
continued. Unless new suppliers are
efi'eetively discouraged from increas-
ing production, there will be a sub-
stantial oversupply situation, and
diversion of opiates to the heroin
market will undoubtedly occur. A
sei-ious oversupply situation has
already been predicted by the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board, and
this remains of grave concern to the
Department of State.
Increased Hesoiir«-es in
Drug-Related Foreign Programs
U.S. bilateral programs have proved
to be the most effective means of
General Assembly Votes on
Afghanistan Situation
FoUou'ing are Ambassadar Donald
F. McHenrt/s statement in the U.N.
General Assemhhj on November 19,
1980, and the resolution adopted by
the Assembly on November 20.
AMBASSADOR McHENRYi
Less than a year ago the conscience of
the world was shocked by the grim
events in Afghanistan: a massive invasion
by Soviet armed forces; the overthrow of
the [Hafizullah] Amin regime and the
killing of its leaders: and the launching of
a campaign of violence and terror against
the Afghan peo|)le by Soviet forces and
their Afghan surrogates.
There is nothing new in the Soviet
Union's use of force to maintain its
domination of other nations. The pattern
set in 1953, when Soviet troops put down
the East German workers' uprising, was
repeated in 195(i in the bloody sujipres-
sion of the Hungarian involution and, in
1968, in the destruction of Czechoslo-
vakia's experiment in liberalization.
Now, in 1980, the Soviet Union has gone
beyond Eastern Europe to assault the in-
dependence of a nonaligned and Islamic
nation — a nation intensely proud of its
culture and religion.
Their attack and cynical demand that
client states recognize the reality of mili-
tary occupation are in blatant violation of
the most important principles of interna-
tional law and the U.N. Charter:
• A state must not use force against
the territorial and political independence
of another state;
• A state must settle international
disputes by peaceful means;
• All states must respect the princi-
ple of self-determination; and
• Human rights must be respectf^
by all governments.
The Soviet intervention and occuj
tion was also — and remains today — a i
nous threat to the security and stabili
of an important and strategic region o
the world.
The United Nations responded
urgently to the Afghanistan crisis. We
joined in supporting a draft Security
Council resolution which called for Sc
withdrawal. But for a veto by the Sov
Union it would have been adopted. As-
result, an overwhelming majority of tl
members of this Assembly swiftly
adopted a resolution in an emergency
special session on January 14 which
called for immediate withdrawal of foi
eign troops and restoration of freedon
and sovereignty for the Afghan peoph
Since then, the invasion and occuj
tion have been condemned by virtuall;
major international bodies including tl
Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministe
on January 29 and again on May 21, tl
U.N. Human Rights Commission on
February 14, the Foreign Ministers oi
the European Common Market and th
Association of South East Asian Natii
on March 7, and the Interparliamenta
Union Council on April 12 and again o
September 24.
Deepening Crisis
Notwithstanding those urgent appeals
the crisis has deepened in Afghanistar
The Soviet Union has ignored the mar
date of January 14. It has pursued anc
intensified its policy of military interv^
tion and occupation in total disregard ■
world oi)inion.
In the face of this Assembly's de-
reducing the amount of illicit nar-
cotics available in the United States.
But effective bilateral programs
require a sustained commitment over
a period of years. For instance, the
United States has contributed approxi-
mately $90 million to our successful
opium eradication program with the
Government of Mexico, Similar levels
of effort will have to be maintained
elsewhere if we are to achieve a wor
wide reduction in illicit narcotic pre
duction. While we expect increasing
contributions from other countries i
narcotics control programs, a sub-
stantial U.S. eflfort is still required.
1 The complete transcript of the
hearing.s will be pul>lishcd by the coni-
niittoe aiul will bo available from the
Supoi'intondcnt of Uocuments, U.S.
Government Printing Oflice, Washingti
D.C. 20402. ■
nenartmpnt nf ^Itatp Rulf
United Nations
for withdrawal of Soviet troops,
ow has increased its force — which it
ibes as a "limited contingent" — from
lO in early January to 85,000 today.
more than 30,000 troops are massed
icross the border of the Soviet Un-
In defiance of this Assembly's appeal
le restoration of sovereignty and
letermination for Afghanistan, the
;t Union has sought to tighten its
cal and military grip on that country
igh a regime which is entirely de-
ent on Soviet armed might for its
val. It should be clear to all that this
ne does not and cannot represent the
le of Afghanistan.
In violation of the Assembly's appeal
frain from coercion and constraint,
Soviet Union and its Afghan agents
waged a brutal campaign of violence
error in an effort to subdue the
an people.
But the Soviet Union has failed to
ve its grim objective in Afghanistan.
Afghan people have resisted in a
gle for national liberation. And for
le Soviet Union's divisions, its so-
.icated weaponry, and its ruthless
lods, including arbitrary arrests and
isonment, it has failed to crush this
;gle. Soviet forces have failed en-
f to pacify the countryside. They are
ned to the towns and cities, which
irmed camps. And even there, guer-
lattacks on Soviet personnel and
tes and demonsti'ations against the
der are commonplace,
frhe struggle of the Afghan people to
iver their freedom and independence
inspiration to those who oppose
my. But the cost of their struggle
been high. Even as we meet today,
'3 Afghan freedom fighters are dying,
more fields and villages are being
waste as Soviet forces use the tactics
irror to impose a Soviet peace. Their
edy is unfolding in a country w^hich,
its independence in 1921, has con-
ntly followed a policy of neutrality
nonalignment.
In spite of the cloak of Soviet cen-
hip, these facts of Soviet aggi-ession
fghanistan speak for themselves. The
let Union stands condemned in the
of the world. Yet it persists in
ng to mask its aggression by casting
blame on others.
Moscow claims it intervened in
hanistan at the request of a former
me in response to some undefined ex-
lal threat to that country. This was, of
se, the same regime whose leader
was murdered when Soviet troops
assaulted and subdued the Afghan state
on December 29, last year. In the dec-
laration of May 14, issued by the Soviet-
controlled authorities in Kabul, Moscow
argued that peace can be restored only
through agreements between the Kabul
regime and the neighboring states of
Pakistan and Iran whei-eby these states
and others would, in effect, accept the
illegal military occupation and guarantee
an end to the Afghan resistance. While
continuing to support these unacceptable
proposals, the Soviets have shown no in-
terest in the initiative of the Islamic Con-
ference or other proposals for a just poli-
tical settlement that would restore
genuine freedom and independence to
Afghanistan.
Moscow's claims that some extei'nal
threat to Afghanistan justified its inva-
sion and that an independent government
requested its assistance are simply un-
acceptable. Moreover, I wish to empha-
size that the charges of the representa-
tive of the Soviet Union [Oleg A.
Ti-oyanovsky] and Mr. Dost [Shah
Mohammed Dost, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Democratic Republic of Afghan-
istan] during this debate that the Afghan
resistance is dependent on the United
States and other nations are cynical fab-
rications unworthy of further comment.
The world knows that the Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan to suppress an in-
digenous Islamic insurgency w^hich had
long been struggling against an unpopu-
lar regime. The world also knows that
this resistance movement is an expres-
sion of the powerful nationalism of the
Afghan people, and that the Kabul re-
gime is a fiction manufactured in Moscow
and marketed by force of Soviet arms.
The real threat to Afghanistan is the
presence of 85,000 Soviet troops who
have illegally invaded and occupied that
country in gross violation of international
law. The Soviet Union is locked in conflict
with the Afghan people. The cost of this
conflict is mounting, most of all for the
Afghan people, but for others as well.
F'or the Soviet Union, the cost is heavy —
international condemnation, increased
isolation, and the burden of a futile and
seemingly endless war. F^or the other na-
tions of Southwest Asia, security and
well being are endangered while Soviet
forces remain in Afghanistan. The use of
force by the Soviet Union against a non-
aligned neighbor with whom it has a
treaty of friendship means that every
nation is less secure.
Yet the will of Afghans to resist is
legendary. In the troubled times of 1941,
the Grand National Council or Loya Jir-
gah met to reaffirm Afghan neutrality.
The council adopted these concluding
words in their resolution of November 6,
1941:
The Afghan nation has at no time been
under any obligation to a foreigti government,
nor will she ever be. The nation has always
been free, and will also in the future maintain
its free and independent existence. By the
help of God, the people of Afghanistan are
unanimously prepared to live a life of honor by
defending their rights with all their material
and spiritual forces, even to the point of shed-
ding the last drop of blood.
These words ring even louder today than
then, for we are now witness to this same
stubborn defense of honor and national
rights.
Need For Just Settlement
Members of the United Nations have an
obligation to find a solution to this im-
passe in accordance with the principles of
the U.N. Charter. The draft resolution
we are now considering offers a construc-
tive approach. Yet some delegations have
attempted to characterize support for
this resolution as an "unfriendly act."
The real "unfriendly act" was the inva-
sion of Afghanistan. This i-esolution de-
serves the support of every member of
this body. It has three elements which
are essential for a solution, and the
United States is firmly committed to
them:
• The immediate withdrawal of for-
eign troops from Afghanistan;
• The right of the Afghans to self-
determination, free from outside inter-
vention; and
• The need for a peaceful solution of
the problem based on the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and the nonahgned
character of Afghanistan.
The resolution also addresses the
tragedy of the Afghan refugees with an
appeal for continued relief aid and a solu-
tion that w'ill enable them to return to
their homes. The flood of refugees — now
more than 1.2 million in Pakistan and
United Nations
several hundred thousand elsewhere —
represents one-tenth of the population of
Afghanistan. Their flight is further
dramatic evidence of the upheaval and
suffering the Soviet invasion has caused.
Finally, this draft resolution goes a
step beyond that of January 14 by ex-
pressing hope that the Seci-etary General
will appoint a special representative with
a view to pi-omoting a political solution in
accordance with the provisions of this re-
solution.
In the past, the Soviet Union has
shown no willingness to discuss a political
settlement except on the basis of formu-
las of its own which ignore the need for
prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops.
Such formulations which essentially seek
to preserve the present Kabul regime are
no solution to the plight of Afghanistan.
They offer neither peace nor freedom for
the Afghan people. Nor do they offer any
prospect for meeting the security in-
terests of that region or the rest of the
world, or indeed, of the Soviet Union.
In contrast, the approach of the
draft resolution we are now considering
offers a new opportunity for Moscow to
change its course and meet its interna-
tional obligations. It points the way to-
ward a genuinely independent nonaligned
and neutral Afghanistan, free of foreign
troops and foreign intervention and with
a government acceptable to the Afghan
people. Such an outcome would deliver
Afghanistan from its ordeal. And it
would pose no threat to the legitimate in-
terests of the Soviet Union in the secu-
rity of its border. The United States sup-
ports a political settlement based on
these principles.
None of us can rest until a just peace
in Afghanistan is achieved. The Afghan-
istan crisis must remain at the top of
this organization's agenda until this
gi'ave source of international tension is
removed. If all of us, including the Soviet
Union, can summon the necessary will
and courage, such a settlement for
Afghanistan can be accomplished on the
basis of the principles of the draft resolu-
tion we are now considering. We must —
all of us— commit ourselves to this goal.
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION 35/372
The General Assemblii.
Having considered the item entitled "The
."situation in Afghanistan and its implications
for international peace and security".
Recalling its resolution ES-6/2 of 14 Janu-
ary 1980 adopted at the si.xth emergency spe-
cial session.
Reaffirming the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations and the
obligation of all States to refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of
force against the sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity and political independence of any
State,"
Reaffirming further the inalienable right
of all peoples to determine their own form of
government and to choose their own economic,
political and social system free from outside in-
tervention, subversion, coercion or constraint
of any kind whatsoever.
Gravely concerned at the continuing for-
eign armed intervention in Afghanistan, in
contravention of the above principles, and its
serious implications for international peace and
security,
Deeply concerned at the increasing out-
flow of refugees from Afghanistan,
Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a
political solution of the gi-ave situation in re-
spect of Afghanistan,
Recognizing the importance of the con-
tinuing efforts and initiatives of the Organiza-
tion of the Islamic Conference for a political
solution of the situation in respect of Afghanis-
tan,
1. Reiterates that the preservation of the
sovereignty, territorial integi'ity. political in-
dependence and non-aligned character of
Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution
of the problem;
2. Reaffirms the right of the Afghan peo-
ple to determine their own form of govern-
ment and to choose their economic, political
and social system free from outside interven-
tion, subversion, coercion or constraint of any
kind whatsoever;
3. Calls for the immediate withdrawal of
the foreign troops from Afghanistan;
4. Also calls }ipon all parties concerned to
work for the urgent achievement of a political
solution and the creation of the necessary con-
ditions which would enable the Afghan ref-
ugees to return voluntarily to their homes in
safety and honour;
5. Appeals to all States and national and
international organizations to extend human-
itarian relief assistance, with a view to alle-
viating the hardship of the Afghan refugees, in
co-ordination with the United Nations Higl
Commissioner for Refugees;
6. Expresses its appreciation of the
efforts of the Secretary-General in the sear
f(ir a solution to the problem and hopes thai
will continue to extend assistance, includinj
the appointment of a special repre-sentative
with a view to promoting a political solutioi
accordance with the provisions of the prese
re.'iolution and the exploration of .securing
ajjpropriate guarantees for non-use of force
threat of use of force against the political in
pendence, sovereignty, territorial integi'ity
and security of all neighbouring States, on
basis of mutual guarantees and strict non-
interference in each other's internal affairs
with full regard for the principles of the Ch;
ter of the United Nations;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to
keep Member States and the Security Coui'i
concurrently informed on the progress to-
wards the implementation of the present re"
lution and to submit to Member States a
report on the situation at the earliest apprc<
ate opportunity;
8. Decides to include in the provi.s;iona
agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item t
tied "The situation in Afghanistan and its ii
plications for international peace and
securitv."
1 USUN press release 150.
2 Adopted on November 20 by a vt
of 111 to 22, with 12 abstentions. ■
^.STERN HEMISPHERE
th General Assembly of the OAS
Following are the President's and
'ecretary's addresses on Novem-
9. 19S0. before the 10th General
nibhj of the Organization of
rican States (OAS) held in
'lington, D.C., November 19-26.
SIDENT CARTER 1
ak to you today for the fifth time in
iportant forum in this hall and, de-
considerable efforts to the contrary,
fraid also for the last time as Presi-
of the United States. I want to say
grateful I am for the privilege of
ing with all of you and the leaders of
nations. And I want to take a few
tes to assess what we have done
ther and to describe my own hopes
16 future.
On my first visit to the Organization
nerican States, in April of 1977, I
that no single policy, no single slogan
1 encompass a region as diverse as
I spoke instead of certain princi-
a belief in nonintervention and in
lovei'eignty of nations, a determina-
to work for human rights and for
ocracy, a common commitment to
with global economic issues and to
Ive regional political disputes. These
:iples have helped the United States
B its contribution to the new and
5 balanced relationships that are
rging in our hemisphere.
After 4 years of practical experience,
more convinced than ever that the fu-
we desire lies in recognizing yearn-
that are common to individuals and
itions alike. As individuals the peo-
of the Americas yearn for basic hu-
rights. They desire personal liberty
e free from torture and arbitrary
st; to participate in making the basic
sions that shape their own future; to
adequate food, health care, and
nation. And as part of the global
munity, every nation of the Americas
a desire and a right to help shape the
re, not only of our own hemisphere
indeed, the entire world.
Some would ignore or resist these
isured rights — the rights of indi- .
lals and the rights of nations. But the
ire hes with those who cherish them
who are willing to defend them. Let
speak briefly of the last 4 years.
Many here assisted in the negotia-
and the ratification of the Panama
Canal treaties. These treaties and their
far-reaching impact will endure. They
will endure because they are based on
the mutual trust and the mutual respect
that have been carefully, and sometimes
painfully, forged by the people of a small
nation and the people of a large nation.
They will endure because they serve the
interests of all who rely on the Panama
Canal. They will endure because they
epitomize the broadest possible commit-
ment of my country to a new and a better
relationship with the developing nations
of the world. They will endure because
the treaties serve the cause of peace.
Last month El Salvador and Hon-
duras served the cause of harmony and
progress resolving their decades-old bor-
der dispute. These two countries, work-
ing with former President Bustamante of
Peru and with their own Secretary
General, have earned the admiration and
respect of all those who love peace.
The treaty of Tlatelolco, when com-
pleted, will foi'ever ban nuclear weapons
from Latin America. I'm proud to have
signed protocol one of this treaty on be-
half of the United States of America. It's
imperative that the remaining nations of
our hemisphere put aside their hesitation
and join in this vital commitment to ban
the spread of nuclear weapons and to set
an example for other nations in other re-
gions of the world.
In Nicaragua many of us have been
working together to help that country
heal its wounds. It's in the interest of all
who care about freedom to help the
Nicaraguan people chart a plurahstic
course that ends bloodshed, respects hu-
man rights, and furthers democracy.
El Salvador continues to struggle
against terrorists on the right who seek
to restore an old tyi'anny and terrorists
on the left who seek to create a new one.
That struggle of theirs is ours as well.
Their path, the peaceful path of stability
and moderation, is precarious, but it's
the only path that can lead to both liberty
and justice. We must insist upon a strict
policy of nonintervention as the people
of these two nations design their own
future.
For too long, the United States
seemed wedded to the status quo — even
when that meant a continuation of pov-
erty, social injustice, and even political
repression. That attitude betrayed my
nation's dynamism and our faith and con-
fidence in the future and that, thank God,
has now been changed. We understand
and support the necessity of peaceful and
moderate political progi-ess in Central
America and elsewhere in this hemis-
phere.
Your governments, thi'oughout the
hemisphere, have also lyorked to improve
the prospects for economic development.
We've strengthened the Inter-American
Development Bank and the World Bank.
We've reduced trade barriers by exjiand-
ing generalized tariff preferences and
eliminating the discriminatory provision
against Venezuela and Ecuador. We've
worked to stablize commodity prices by a
Common Fund and individual commodity
agreements on sugar and coffee and
cocoa. Regional cooperation has been in-
vigorated — in the Andean pact, with the
Caribbean group, and, most dramatically,
with Venezuelan-Mexican assistance for
the Caribbean basin. Through my own
personal participation, and through the
influence of my country, we have worked
to strengthen and to expand the benefi-
cial influence of this Organization of
American States.
Progress on Human Rights
As all of you know, the cause that has
been closest to my own heart is the cause
of human rights. I'm convinced that a
new conscience has been awakened. That
conscience serves a concept of human
rights that is not unique to any country,
nor even just to this hemisphere, but is
universal. In this hemisphere, since 1977,
13 countries have ratified the embodi-
ment of that concept — the American Con-
vention on Human Rights. This has
brought the convention into force and has
created an inter-American court to judge
human rights violations. In addition, the
Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights is more effective today than it
was 4 years ago. It deserves our
strongest continuing moral and financial
support.
Ibday, no government in this hemis-
phere can expect silent assent from its
neighbors if it tramples the rights of its
own citizens. The costs of repression
have increased but so have the benefits
of respecting human rights. I pray that
this progress will continue, although I
Western Hemisphere
know from experience that progress is
not always easy as we defend human
rights.
Some claim that Jimmy Carter ele-
vated human rights and democracy on
the inter- American agenda and that the
agenda will change when I leave my
office. They are wrong. Hemispheric sup-
port for human rights is a historic move-
ment — a movement that has been recog-
nized this year in the Nobel peace prize.
I take pride in being part of that move-
ment. The cause of human rights will be
all the stronger if it remains at the
service of humanity, rather than at the
service of ideological or partisan ends,
and if it condemns both terrorism and
repression.
In the phrase "human rights," the
"rights" are important. The "human" is
very important. As a citizen of the Amer-
icas, I'm deeply encouraged by the trend
toward greater democratization. I'm
heartened that in many countries,
thousands of people who were political
prisoners just 4 years ago are now free.
Those who see a contradiction between
our security and our humanitarian in-
terests forget that the basis for a secure
and a stable society is the bond of trust
between a government and its own
people.
The future of our hemisphere is not
to be found in authoritarianism that
wears the mask of common consent nor
totalitarianism that wears the mask of
justice. Instead, let us find our future in
the human face of democracy — the hu-
man voice of individual liberty and the
human hand of economic development. If
we build on the best of what we have be-
gun, we can see a better time at the end
of this decade. We can see a time when
longstanding disputes like Belize, Bo-
livian access to the sea, and the Beagle
Channel dispute between Argentina and
Chile have been settled in a spirit of
cooperation and justice. We can see a
time when-the treaty of Tlatelolco has
come into force and other regions have
followed the lead of Latin America in
banning nuclear weapons. We can see a
time when human rights are no longer
threatened by the violence of either gov-
ernments or terrorists and when every
government responds to the will of its
people, expressed through democratic in-
stitutions. We can see a time when na-
tions have cooperated, in the OAS and
elsewhere, to develop just and fair ways
of dealing with the migration of people, a
time when no nation disregards the im-
migration laws of its neighbor and many
nations offer a haven to the few who still
need such a place to dwell. And we can
see a time when today's aspirations for
greater economic development and coop-
eration have become living realities
through common action inspired by this
body and its experts.
Let me conclude on a personal note.
My interest in Latin America and the
Caribbean and in human rights and in
democracy did not begin 4 years ago.
And my interest will not end on .January
the 20th, next year. I will continue to
speak out for the universal ideals which
are embodied in our hearts and in the
American Convention on Human Rights.
I will continue to work with you — my
friends — to make this hemisphere and
the world more just, more secure, and
more free.
SECRETARY MUSKIE^
I'm delighted to join you in this historic
forum — the world's first and oldest con-
tinuing regional association — and to
underscore the remarks which President
Carter made this moi-ning. About one
fact, I have no illusions: My country's re-
cent election changes greatly the atmos-
phere in which you and I meet. We in the
United States have an unpleasant
metaphor for political officials who are on
their way out of office: We call them
"lame ducks." And I have observed, in
more than two decades of political life,
that people find it difficult to hear the call
of the lame duck.
I do not intend to let this deter me
today. Two decades in public life have
taught me another lesson as well: that
certain issues, certain realities, persist
no matter what Administration is in
office. The agenda that confronts you and
me and our fellow citizens in this hemis-
phere is chosen by us only in part; for the
most part, it is determined by a combina-
tion of long-term national interests and
pressing current events.
Taday I want to talk with you about
certain gi-eat issues that were with us be-
fore this Administration took office and
that will just as certainly shape the
course of our relations in the future. I
want to stress — as President Carter
stressed this morning — the essential con-
tinuing U.S. policy.
The Changed Environment
What is most obvious as we gather tod
is the profoundly changed environment
which our relations are conducted. Pre
dent Carter touched this morning upoi
many of the significant and welcome
changes which have marked the past 4
years: the Panama Canal treaties, the
Latin American nuclear-weapons-free
zone, the work of the Inter- American
Human Rights Commission. I would a(
to that list the emergence of independ(
states in the Caribbean, the vigorous
spread of industrialization, the rise of
several Spanish-speaking republics am
Brazil as major world forces.
All these developments have intrc
duced new balance into inter-Americai
affairs. They underscore that your cou
tries are gaining real power to contribi
to regional development and that we r
spect and welcome your contributions.
And these developments, taken togeth
can be the foundation for improved cot
eration among us all in the future. Sev
eral hopeful trends are already visible.
• Subregional integration has be-
come a key focus for both growth and
broader cooperation — from Central
America to the Andean group and fror
the Caribbean to the River Plate Basil
• Important initiatives have been
launched by Mexico and Venezuela joii
ly, and separately by Ti'inidad and
Tbbago, to supply energy to their neig
bors.
Yet this is only the beginning. Du
ing the next two decades — the last ye;
of the 20th century — our successors w
face changes even more sweeping thar
those we have witnessed over the past
years. The economic growth of Latin
America over the past two decades ha;
been impressive, and this is only the b
ginning. The potential for the rest of tl
century is ju.st as promising. In fact, tl
Global 2000 Repo)i to the Fresidetit. n
cently prepared under the auspices of <
government, projects that Latin Amer
will be the fastest growing part of the
world as we near the year 2000. This S'
gests that better regional approaches t
development will be particularly impor
tant to our future cooperation.
TV)day, I want to emphasize the
thought that better cooperation for de-
velopment will depend largely on our
ability to live by three fundamental pri
ciples that strongly infiuence the climai
for cooperation: the prinicples of suppo
Western Hemisphere
iman rights; of nonintervention and
tive security; and of peaceful settle-
of disputes.
an Rights
le emphasize, as strongly as I know
what President Carter said this
ing: Support for human rights — eco-
! and political, as well as individual,
i — is not a matter of transitory poli-
mphasis for the United States; it is
ined in our national life. The most
tent thread of belief in our history
belief that governments should be
eoples' servant, not their master,
lis simple but fundamental reason, I
it is safe to assert that the United
s will continue to work to strengthen
icrease respect for human rights as
damental norm of international
iration.
Ul of us can be justifiably proud of
emisphere's recent progress in this
Those who would ignore, deny, or
; individual rights are in retreat.
nter-American Human Rights Com-
on deserves our special salute. Its
nents and studies have begun to
de an invaluable and dispassionate
for our joint consideration.
The collective rededication of the
ricas to human I'ights is a major
in I look to the future of our region
optimism. Societies where basic hu-
rights are respected are more stable
nore productive, more confident and
creative. They make better friends
stronger allies. So I would assert
support for human rights is both a
Bquisite for future cooperation and
ress between us and a motive force
rd success in all our mutual efforts.
intervention
second fundamental principle for
eration in the hemisphere is the prin-
of nonintervention. Effective inter-
mal cooperation, particularly among
s as richly varied as those of this
sphere, is possible only if the rights
ates are recognized. The very exist-
of this organization is due to men
Baltasar Brum and Carlos Saavedra
as, jurists whose wisdom helped de-
p the principle of nonintervention by
state in the internal affairs of
her.
This principle is fundamental. As our
isphere has become more politically
rse, differences of outlook have
sometimes contributed to tensions among
states. But our growing acceptance of
political pluralism, both within and
among countries, has proved important
toward reducing such tensions.
We have explicitly committed ourselves
through the Rio treaty to undertake col-
lective action against the most blatant
form of intervention — armed aggression.
Other forms of intervention, however,
can be just as damaging to national inde-
pendence. The external provision of
weapons, mihtary training, or safehavens
to armed insurgents is an insidious form
of intervention — one all the more trou-
bling for its indirection. Our regional
organization needs to e.xamine this press-
ing problem and devise ways to help the
member states stop it.
Peaceful Settlement
Development has few enemies gi'eater
than fratricidal conflict. Peacemaking
efforts are the third key to the future de-
velopment of our countries. For our part,
the United States is irrevocably commit-
ted to the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes. Over the last 2 years, the Panama
Canal treaties have become a symbol of
that commitment. The United States has
made clear its willingness to deal with all
nations, large and small, on a basis of
mutual respect. Yesterday, in this hall,
we honored a similar contribution to
peace and development — the treaty of
peace between El Salvador and Hon-
duras. In both cases, this organization
deserves major credit for helping to
bring the concerned parties together in
negotiations.
But even as we celebrate these for-
ward steps, many other potentially dis-
ruptive territorial disputes remain unset-
tled in the hemisphere. Settling them
peacefully must be a high priority con-
cern for us all and for this organization in
particular.
The principle of peaceful settlement
of disputes could also be applied to cer-
tain other problems. President Carter
this morning reaffirmed our country's
commitment to the goal of the treaty of
Tlatelolco, which calls for Latin America
to be kept free of nuclear weapons. This
treaty could serve as a precedent for
similar arrangements to limit the dangers
of conventional military technology.
We are convinced that balanced re-
straints on conventional weapons,
whether negotiated regionally or
subregionally, could reduce tensions, en-
hance the security of nations, and reaf-
firm our mutual commitment to peaceful
development.
Cooperation for Development
Can we build a future of regional coop-
eration for economic development, based
on fidelity to these fundamental princi-
ples? Let us be candid: The only honest
answer possible is "perhaps." The dream
of cooperative economic development is
at once our hemisphere's brightest prom-
ise and the area of our greatest dis-
appointment.
The OAS has contributed signifi-
cantly to international law. to the
Western Hemisphere's unique record of
peacekeeping, and to our recent progi'ess
in strengthening support for human
rights. But the plain truth is that we
have done far too Kttle through the OAS
to capitahze on our joint potential for eco-
nomic progress.
The moral imperative for action is
clear, for ours is a hemisphere still
marked by major inequalities among and
within countries. Our basic principles
simply cannot be fulfilled without more
effective cooperation for economic de-
velopment. And the practical imperative
is as compelling as the moral one: Our
combined efforts could dramatically im-
prove the lives of all our citizens.
Yet too often, we have allowed our
economic debates to focus almost exclu-
sively on questions that divide us, losing
sight of those vast and equally vital areas
in which we are in agreement. The pro-
posed special general assembly on de-
velopment offers an opportunity to re-
direct regional thinking along construc-
tive Hues. This assembly should be held
as soon as adequate preparations can be
made. The "wise men's report," prepared
for the joint working group, identifies
many key areas where our cooperation
can be strengthened.
We believe it is a good starting point.
We are prepared to help wholeheartedly
in developing and pursuing specific pro-
grams for the good of all our peoples. We
TREATIES
also hope that, by concentrating on ques-
tions where early progress is possible,
the special general assembly will build a
foundation for cooperation on more diffi-
cult issues as well.
Conclusion
I would like to touch on a house-
keeping item which ties into my
opening remarks about the changed en-
vironment. I refer to the need to mod-
ernize the system of financing that was
developed for this organization more than
30 years ago. The system should reflect
the emerging new balances in the hemis-
phere. As a former legislator, I know the
difficulties of negotiating financing
aiTangements. I know all too well the
disputes and delays that can come with
the process. The differences that sepa-
rate on this issue are not so gi'eat. F"or
the good of our organization, I urge that
we delay no longer in reaching agree-
ment on this issue.
In a valedictory statement like this
one, I am not in a position to advance
concrete new proposals. But I am freer
to speak frankly. The days when one
counti-y could pretend to lead alone are
gone; no country is now so strong that it
can either dominate or ignore its neigh-
bors. But if dominance by one power is
undesirable, so is confusion among many.
We have learned, sometimes painfully,
how to coexist. Let us now learn how to
cooperate more broadly and
effectively.
1 Text from White House press
release of Nov. 19, 1980.
2 Press release 32.5 of Nov. 19,
1980. ■
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Aviation, Civil
Protocol relating to an amendment to the
Convention on International Civil Avi-
ation (TIAS 1591) [concerning lease,
charter and interchange]. Done at
Montreal Oct. G, 1980. Enters into force
on the date on which the 98th instrument
of ratification is deposited by a party
to ICAO.
Convention for the suppression of unlaw-
ful acts against the safety of civil avi-
ation. Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971.
Entered into force Jan. 2G, 1973.
TIAS 7570.
Accession deposited : Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, Aug. 13, 1980.1
Biological Weapons
Convention on the prohibition of the
development, production, and stockpiling
of bacteriological (biological) and toxin
weapons and on their destruction. Done
at Washington, London and Moscow
Apr. 10, 1972. Entered into force
Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 8062.
Accession deposited : Socialist Republic
of Vietnam, June 20, 1980.
Coffee
International coffee agreement 1976, with
annexes. Done at London Dec. 3, 1975.
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 1,
1976, definitively Aug. 1, 1977.
TIAS 8683.
Accession deposited : Philippines, Oct. 14,
T980:
Commodities — Common Fund
Agreement establishing the Common
Fund for Commodities, with schedule.
Done at Geneva June 27, 1980. Open for
signature at U.N. Headquarters in
New York Oct. 1, 1980, until 1 year after
the date of its entry into force. Enters
into force upon receipt by the depository
of instruments of ratification, accept-
ance or approval from at least 90 states,
providing certain requirements have
been fulfilled.
Signatures : Ecuador, Oct. 3, 1980; U.S.,
Nov. 5, 1980.
Conservation
Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3,
1973 on international trade in endangered
species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS
8249) . Done at Bonn June 22, 1979.2
Acceptance deposited : U.S., Oct. 23, 1980.
Containers
International convention for safe con-
tainers (CSC) , with annexes. Done at
Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into fore
Sept. 6, 1977; for the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979
TIAS 9037.
Accession deposited : China, Sept. 23,
imr.
Cultural Relation.s
Constitution of the U.N. Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization.
Concluded at London Nov. 16, 1945.
Entered into force Nov. 4, 1946.
TIAS 1580.
Signatures : Maldives, Mar. 23, 1979;
St. Lucia, Mar. 6, 1980; Tonga, Sept.!
1980; Zimbabwe, Sept. 22, 1980.
Acceptances deposited : Maldives, July
1980; St. Lucia, Mar. 6, 1980; Tonga,
Sept. 29, 1980; Zimbabwe, Sept. 22, 19
Agreement on the importation of edu-
cational, scientific, and cultural materi
with protocol. Done at Lake Success
Nov. 22, 1950; entered into force May
1952; for the U.S. Nov. 2, 1966.
TIAS 6129.
Ratification deposited : Syria, Sept. 16
1980.
Customs
Customs convention on the internation
transport of goods under cover of TIE
carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva
Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force Mar.
1978."
Accession deposited : Canada, Oct. 21,
1980.
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic rela-
tions. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961.
Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for 1
U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.
Accession deposited : Democratic Peop
Republic of Korea, Oct. 29, 1980.
Environmental Modification
Convention on the prohibition of militi
or any other hostile use of environmen
modification techniques, with annex. D
at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into
force Oct. 5, 1978.3
Accession deposited : Papua New Guin
Oct. 28, 1980.
Finance
Agreement establishing the Internatio
Fund for Agricultural Development.
Done at Rome June 13, 1976. Entered
into force Nov. 30, 1977. TIAS 8765.
Accession deposited : Saint Lucia, Oct.
1980
Human Rights
International covenant on economic,
social, and cultural rights. Adopted at
Treaties
fork Dec. 16, 196G. Entered into
Jan. 3, 1976.''
ture : Kampuchea. Oct. 17, 1980.
lational covenant on civil and
:al rights. Adopted at New York
6, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23,
ture : Kampuchea, Oct. 17, 1980.
al protocol to the international
nt on civil and political rights.
;ed at New York Dec. 16, 1966.
ed into force Mar. 23, 1976."
sion deposited : Trinidad and
:o, Nov' 14, 1980.
al Procedure
ntion on the taking of evidence
d in civil or commercial matters.
at The Hague Mar. 18, 1970.
ed into force Oct. 7, 1972. TIAS
ded to : Cayman Islands, Sept. 16,
II Lines
lidments to the international con-
! n nn load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331).
.■,1 at London Nov. 1.5, 1979.2
lances deposited : China, Aug. 1,
' Fiance, May 12, 1980; Denmark,
J, 1980: Morocco, Sept. 2.5, 1980;
■ .lies, Oct. 1, 1980; U.K., Sept. 22,
II dments to the international con-
ll.n on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331),
aig to amendments io the conven-
ft\dopted at London Nov. 12, 197.5.-
^ t a rices deposited : China, Aug. 1,
' S -ychelles, Oct. 1, 1980.
i»i dments to the international con-
[»im onload lines, 1966 (TIAS (;331).
flat London Oct. 12, 1971.2
c itances deposited : China, Aug. 1,
H Seychelles, Oct. 1, 1980.
II inie Matters
^ 'Inients to the convention on the
.1 rnmental Maritime Consultative
ation, as amended, (TIAS 4044,
' i:i0, 8606). Adopted at London
I ., 1979.2
'lances deposited : Australia, Nov.
Ml; Bulgaria, Oct. 21, 1980.
I'linents to the convention on the
j'vcrnmental Maritime Consultative
I, /ation, as amended, (TIAS 4044,
'i 190, 8606). Adopted at London
IT, 1977.2
lance deposited : Egypt, Nov. 18,
ntion on facilitation of inter-
nal maritime traffic, with annex.
at London Apr. 9, 1965. Entered
n,,e Mar. 5, 1967; for the U.S.
111. 1967. TIAS 6251.
plance deposited : Senegal, Oct. 17,
national convention on standards of
training, certification, and watchkeeping
for seafarers, 1978. Done at London
July 7, 1978.2
Accessions deposited : Egypt, Sept. 22,
1980; Spain, Oct. 21, 1980.
International convention on maritime
search and rescue, 1979, with annex.
Done at Hamburg Apr. 27, 1979.2
Signature : China, Sept. 11, 1980.''
Narcotic Drugs
Convention for limiting the manufacture
and regulating the distribution of nar-
cotic drugs, with protocol of signature.
Done at Geneva July 13, 1931. Entered
into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543.
Protocol amending the agreements, con-
ventions, and protocols on narcotic drugs
concluded at The Hague on Jan. 23, 1912,
at Geneva on Feb. 11, 1925, and Feb. 19,
1925, and July 13, 1931, at Bangkok on
Nov. 27, 1931, and at Geneva June 26,
1936, with annex. Done at Lake Success,
New York Dec. 11, 1946. Entered into
force Dec. 11, 1946; for the U.S. Aug. 12,
1947. TIAS 1671.
Protocol bringing under international
control drugs outside the scope of the
convention of July 13, 1931, for limiting
the manufacture and regulating the dis-
tribution of narcotic drugs, as amended
by the protocol signed at Lake Success
on Dec. 11, 1946. Done at Paris Nov. 19,
1948. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1949;
for the U.S. Sept. 11, 1950. TIAS 2308.
Protocol for limiting and regulating the
cultivation of the poppy plant, the pro-
duction of, international and wholesale
trade in, and use of opium. Done at
New York June 23, 1953. Entered into
force Mar. 8, 1963. TIAS 5273.
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961.
Done at New York Mar. 30, 1961.
Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964; for the
U.S. June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.
Notification of succession : Papua New
Guinea, Oct. 28, 1980.
Protocol amending the single convention
on narcotic drugs, 1961 (TIAS 6298).
Done at Geneva Mar. 25, 1972. Entered
into force Aug. 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.
Convention on psychotropic substances.
Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered
into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S.
July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725.
Accession deposited : Papua New Guinea,
Oct. 28, 1980.
Nuclear Material — Physical Protection
Convention on the physical protection of
nuclear material, with annexes. Done at
Vienna Oct. 26, 1979.2
Ratification deposited : Sweden, Aug. 1
1980
Signatures : Canada, Sept. 23, 1980;
Morocco, July 25, 1980; Poland, Aug. 6,
1980.
Patents, Microorganisms
Budapest treaty on the international
recognition of the deposit of micro-
organisms for the purposes of patent
procedure, with regulations. Done at
Budapest, Apr. 28, 1977. Entered into
force Aug. 19, 1980. TIAS 9768.
Ratifications deposited : F.R.G., Oct. 20,
1980; U.K., Sept. 29, 1980.
Pollution
Protocol of 1978 relating to the inter-
national convention for tlie prevention of
pollution from ships, 1973. Done at
London Feb. 17, 1978.2
Ratification deposited : Liberia, Oct. 28,
1980.
Accession deposited : Tunisia, Oct. 10,
1980.
Protocol relating to intervention on the
high seas in cases of pollution by sub-
stances other than oil. Done at London
Nov. 2, 1973.2
Ratification deposited : Netherlands,
Sept. 10, 1980.0
Convention on the prevention of marine
pollution by dumping of wastes and other
matter, with annexes. Done at London,
Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington
Dec. 29, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 30,
1975. TIAS 8165.
Accession deposited : Suriname, Nov. 12,
1980.
Amendments to the convention of Dec. 29,
1972 on the prevention of marine pollu-
tion by dumping of wastes and other
matter (TIAS 8165). Adopted at London
Oct. 12, 1978.2
Acceptances deposited : Japan, Oct. 15,
1980; Sweden, May 16, 1980; U.S.,
Oct. 24, 1980.
Oil Pollution
International convention on civil liability
for oil pollution damage. Done at Brus-
sels, Nov. 29, 1969. Entered into force
June 19, 1975.-
Ratification deposited : Finland, Oct. 1980.
International convention on the establish-
ment of an international fund for com-
pensation for oil pollution damage. Done
at Brussels Dec. 18, 1971. Entered into
force Oct. 16, 1978.-'
Ratification deposited : Finland, Oct. 10,
1980.
International convention for the preven-
tion of pollution of the sea by oil, with
annexes, as amended (TIAS 6109, 8505).
Done at London May 12, 1954. TIAS 4900.
Extended to : Bermuda as from Dec. 1,
1980.
Red Cross
Protocol additional to the Geneva conven-
tions of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the
protection of victims of international
Treaties
armed conflicts (Protocol I) , with an-
nexes. Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977.
Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978. •■
Ratification deposited : Finland, Aug. 7,
T9807
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, Sept. 8,
TWT.
Protocol additional to the Geneva conven-
tions of Aug. 12, 1949, and relating to the
protection of victims of noninternational
armed conflicts (Protocol II). Adopted at
Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force
Dec. 7, 1978.'>
Ratification de posited : Finland, Aug. 7,
TTJMj
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, Sept. 8,
TWT.
Refugees
Protocol relating to the status of refu-
gees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967.
Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the
U.S. Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.
Accession deposited : Jamaica, Oct. 30,
1980
Rubber
International natural rubber agreement,
1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979.
Entered into force provisionally Oct. 23,
1980.
Approval deposited : Czechoslovakia,
Sept. 17, 1980.
Notification of provisional application :
Belgium, Luxembourg, Oct. 3, 1980;
Brazil, Oct. 1, 1980; Canada, Nov. 7,
1980; EEC, Sept. 29, 1980; Finland,
Nov. 11, 1980; France, F.R.G., Nether-
lands, Norway, Sept. 30, 1980; U.S.S.R.,
Nov. 5, 1980; U.K., Sept. 26, 1980; U.S.,
Oct. 23, 1980.
Ratification deposited : China, .Sept. 15,
1980; Denmark, Sweden, Sept. 30, 1980;
Ireland, Sept 29, 1980.
Seabed Disarmament
Treaty on the prohibition of the emplace-
ment of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction on the
seabed and the ocean floor, and in the
subsoil thereof. Don3 at Washington, Lon-
don, and Moscow Feb. 11, 1971. Entered
into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337.
Accession deposited : Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, June 20, 1980.'
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activi-
ties of states in the exploration and use of
outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow Jan. 27, 1967. En-
tered into force Oct. 10, 19G7. TIAS 6347.
Accession deposited : Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, June 20, 1980.
Sugar
International sugar agreement, 1977,
with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7,
1977. Entered into force provisionally
Jan. 1, 1978; definitively Jan. 2, 1980.
TIAS 9664.
Accession deposited: Zimbabwe, Oct. 20,
TME
Telecommunications
Partial revision of the radio regulations
(Geneva, 1959), as revised, relating to the
aeronautical mobile (R) service, with
annexes and final protocol. Done at
Geneva Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force
Sept. 1, 1979; for the U.S. Oct. 22, 1980,
except for the frequency allotment plan
for the aeronautical mobile (R) service
which shall come into force on Feb. 1,
1983.
Approval deposited : Denmark, Sept. 1,
1980.
Terrorism
International convention against the tak-
ing of hostages. Adopted at New York
Dec. 17, 1979.2
Signatures : Finland, Oct. 29, 1980;
Uganda, Nov. 10, 1980.
Ratifications deposited : Lesotho, Nov. 5,
1980; Mauritius, Oct. 17, 1980.
Trade
Agreement on technical barriers to trade.
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered
into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9616.
Acceptances : Hungary, Apr. 23, 1980;
Japan Apr. 25, 1980; Republic of Korea,
Sept. 3, 1980; Singapore, June 3, 1980;
Spain, May 9, 1980 >*; Yugoslavia,
Sept. 16, 1980.-^
Ratification deposited : Austria, May 28,
1980.
Agreement on tiade in civil aircraft. Done
at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into
force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9620.
Acceptances : Japan, Apr. 25, 1980;
Romania, June 25, 1980.
Ratification deposited : Austria, June 23,
1980.
International dairy arrangement. Done at
(ieneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force
Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9623.
Acceptance : Uruguay, July 18, 1980.
Ratification deposited : Austria, May 28,
1980.
Arrangement regarding bovine meat.
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered
into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9701.
Acceptances : Romania, June 25, 1980;
Uruguay, June 16, 1980; Yugoslavia,
Sept. Ig", 1980.''
Ratification deposited : Austria, May 28,
1980.
Agreement on implementation of arti-
cle VII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (customs valuation)
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Enters
into force Jan. 1, 1981.
Acceptances: Austria, Dec. 17, 1979;
Canada, Dec. 17, 1979^ EEC, Dec. 17,
1979; Finland, Dec. 17, 1979''; Hungar
July 18, 1980; India, July 11, 1980'. i";
Japan, Dec. 17, 1979; Norway, Dec. 17,
1979-'; Romania, June 25, 1980; Spain,
May 9, 1980».i"; Sweden, Dec. 17, 1979
Switzerland, Dec. 17, 1979; U.K., Dec.
1979'!; U.S., Dec. 17, 1979».
Acceptance deposited: Japan, Apr. 25,
T9M
Protocol to the agreement on implemer
tion of article VII o' the General Agre
ment on Tarifl's and Trade. Done at
Geneva Nov. 1, 1979. Entered into fore
Jan. 1, 1981.
Acceptances : Austria, May 17, 1980";
EEC, July 29, 1980; Finland, Dec. 17,
1979"; Hungary, July 18, 1980; India,
July 11, 19807.1"; Japan, Apr. 25, 1980
Norway, Dec. 17, 1979''; Romania,
June 25, 1980; Spain, May 9, 1980'';
Sweden, Dec. 17, 1979'-'; Switzerland,
Dec. 17, 1979-'; U.K., Sept. 17, 1980ii.i
U.S., May 28, 19809.
Agreement on implementation of arti-
cle VI of the General Agreement on
Tariff's and Trade (antidumping code)
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entere(
into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9650.
Acceptances : Austria, Dec. 17, 1979'-'.
Brazil, Dec. 28, 1979; Canada, Dec. 17.
1979; Czechoslovakia, July 29, 1980;
EEC, Dec. 17, 1979; Finland, Dec. 17,
1979; Hungary, Apr. 23, 1980; India,
July 11, 19801"; Japan, Dec. 17, 1979;
Norway, Dec. 17, 1979; Romania, Juni
1980; Spain, May 9, 1980-'; Sweden,
Dec. 17, 1979; Switzerland, Dec. 17, 1£
U.K., Dec. 17, 1979111-; U.S., Dec. 17,
1979; Yugoslavia, Sept. 16, 1980.'-'
■Acceptances deposited : Brazil, May 5,
1980; Japan. Apr. 25, 1980; Norway,
Dec. 28, 1979.
Ratifications deposited : Austria, May
1980; Finland. Mar. 13, 1980; Sweden
Dec. 20, 1979.
Agreement on interpretation and appl
tion of articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of
General Agieement on Tariffs and Tri
(subsidies and countervailing duties).
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Enterei
into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9619.
Acceptances : Austria, Dec. 17, 1979;
Brazil, Dec. 28, 1979'"; Canada, Dec.
1979; Chile, Oct. 25, 1979"; EEC,
Dec. 17, 1979; Finland, Dec. 17, 1979;
India, July 11, 1980; Japan, Dec. 17,
1979; Republic of Korea, June 10, 198i
Norway, Dec. 17, 1979; Pakistan, Apr
1980; Sweden, Dec. 17, 1979; SwitzerlM
Dec. 17, 1979; U.K., Dec. 17, 1979 "13
U.S., Dec. 17, 1979; Uruguay, Dec. 31,
1979"; Yugoslavia, Sept. 16, 1980."
Acceptances deposited : Japan, Apr. 2^
1980; Norway, Dec. 28, 1979.
^< Otr^*^ D..II
Treaties
_ations deposited : Austria, May 28,
Finland, Mar. 13, 1980; Sweden,
), 1979.
nent on import licensing proce-
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979.
id into force Jan. 1, 1980.
9788.
;ances : Argentina, Dec. 17, 1979";
IiaTTeb. 25, 1980; Austria, Dec. 17,
lanada, Dec. 17, 1979; Chile, Oct. 25,
; EEC, Dec. 17, 1979; Finland,
, 1979; Hungary, Jan. 21, 1980;
July 11, 1980; Japan, Dec. 17,
New Zealand, Dec. 17, 1979; Nor-
>ec. 17, 1979 ; Romania, June 25,
Jouth Africa, Dec. 18, 1979; Swe-
ec. 17, 1979; Switzerland, Dec. 17,
U.K., Dec. 17, 1979111-!; U.S.,
;, 1979 ; Yugoslavia, Sept. 16, 1980''.
:ances deposited : Japan, Apr. 25,
Norway, Dec. 28, 1979.
:ations deposited : Austria, May 28,
Finland, Mar. 13, 1980; Sweden,
I, 1979.
I Nations
ntion on the privileges and immuni-
the U.N. Done at New York
i, 1946. Entered into force for the
.pr. 29, 1970. TIAS 6900.
iion deposited : F.R.G., Nov. 5, 1980.
O
iHtution of the U.N. Industrial Devel-
'Mganization, with annexes.
:,t Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.-
£: Iran, Nov. 12, 1980.
i.ns deposited : Bangladesh,
, r.i80; Indonesia, Nov. 10, 1980.
lid convention, 1980 (part of the
utional wheat agreement, 1971, as
\,;\ (TIAS 7144)). Done at Wash-
Mar. 11, 1980. Entered into force
loiially July 1, 1980; entered into
l.tinitively for the U.S. Nov. 11,
rut of ratification signed bv the
_-2it; Nov. 11, 1980.
I uin deposited: U.S., Nov. 11,
.1 modifying and further extending
Mat trade convention (part of the
ational wheat agreement) , 1971
^ 7144) . Done at Washington
'■1. 1979. Entered into force provi-
y for the U.S. with respect to cer-
ai ts June 23, 1979, with respect to
I 'arts July 1, 1979; entered into
■ l.tinitively for the U.S. Nov. 11,
inu-nt of ratification signed by the
' luiit : Nov. 11, 1980.
ration deposited: U.S., Nov. 11,
Women
Convention on the elimination of all
forms of discrimination against women.
Adopted at New York Dec. 18, 1979.2
Ratifications deposited : Barbados,
Oct. 16, 1980; China, Nov. 4, 1980.
Signatures : El Salvador, Nov. 14, 1980;
Kampuchea, Oct. 17, 1980.
Convention on the political rights of
v.-omen. Done at New York Mar. 31, 1953.
Entered into force July 7, 1954; for the
U.S. July 7, 1976. TIAS 8289.
Ratification deposited : Nigeria, Nov. 17,
WHO
Constitution of the World Health Organi-
zation. Done at New York July 22, 1946.
Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948; for the
U.S. June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808.
Acceptance deposited : Saint Lucia,
Nov. 11, 1980.
BILATERAL
Bangladesh
Convention for the avoidance of double
taxation and the prevention of fiscal eva-
sion with respect to taxes on income, with
exchange of notes. Signed at Dacca Oct. 6,
1980. Enters into force upon the exchange
of instruments of ratification.
Brazil
Agreement extending the agreement of
Nov. 17, 1977, relating to equal access to
ocean carriage of government-controlled
cargoes (TIAS 8981) , with agreed min-
utes. Effected by exchange of letters at
Washington and Rio de Janiero Oct. 30,
1980. Entered into force Oct. 30, 1980.
Canada
Agreement extending the agreement of
May 14, 1971, as amended and extended
(TIAS 7125, 8247) , regarding a joint
program in the field of experimental re-
mote sensing from satellites and aircraft.
Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington Oct. 20 and Nov. 6, 1980. Entered
into force Nov. 6, 1980; effective May 14,
1980.
Protocol amending the convention of
Mar. 2, 1953, for t!ie preservation of the
halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific
Ocean and Bering Sea (TIAS 2900).
Signed at Washington Mar. 29, 1979.
Entered into force Oct. 15, 1980.
TIAS 9855.
Proclaimed by the President : Nov. 11,
1980.
Protocol to amend the convention for the
protection, preservation, and extension of
the sockeye salmon fisheries in the Eraser
River System of May 26, 1930, as
amended (50 Stat. 1355, TIAS 3867).
Signed at Washington Feb. 24, 1977. En-
tared into force Oct. 15, 1980. TIAS 9854.
Proclaimed by the President : Nov. 11,
1980.
China
Agreement on grain trade, with ex-
changes of letters. Signed at Beijing
Oct. 22, 1980. Enters into force Jan. 1,
1981.
Parcel post agreement, with detailed
regulations. Signed at Washington, Oct. 9,
1980. Entered into force Nov. 8, 1980.
International express mail agreement,
with detailed regulations. Signed at
Washington Oct. 9, 1980. Entered into
force Oct. 9, 1980.
Denmark
Naturalization convention. Signed at
Copenhagen July 20, 1872. Entered into
force Mar. 14, 1873. 17 Stat. 941.
Notification of termination : U.S., Oct. 3,
1980; effective Oct. 3, 1981.
Finland
Protocol relating to the air transport
agreement of Mar. 29, 1949 (TIAS 1945),
with exchange of letters. Signed at Wash-
ington May 12, 1980.
Entered into force : Dec. 7, 1980.
Memorandum of understanding for the
development of a cooperative program in
the sciences, with annex. Signed at Hel-
sinki Aug. 27, 1980. Entered into force
Aug. 27, 1980. TIAS 9848.
France
Convention for the avoidance of double
t.^xation and the prevention of evasion in
the cases of taxes on estates, inheritances,
and income. Signed at Paris Oct. 18, 1946.
Entered into force Oct. 17, 1949. TIAS
1982.
Terminated: Oct. 1, 1980.
Protocol modifying the convention of
Oct. 18, 1946 (TIAS 1982), for the avoid-
ance of double taxation and the preven-
tion of evasion in the cases of taxes on
estates and inheritances. Signed at Wash-
ington May 17, 1948. TIAS 1982.
Terminated : Oct. 1, 1980.
Convention supplementing the convention
of July 25, 1939 (59 Stat. 893) and
Oct. 18, 1946 (TIAS 1982) , relating to the
avoidance of double taxation as modified
and supplemented by the protocol of
May 17, 1948 (TIAS 1982). Signed at
Washington June 22, 1956. Entered into
force June 13, 1957. TIAS 3844.
Terminated : Oct. 1, 1980.
Agreement relating to cooperation with
respect to research and development ac-
tivities in the field of civil aviation. Signed
Treaties
CHRONOLOGY
at Washington and Paris July 10, 1980.
Entered into force July 10, 1980.
(ieriiianj , Federal Republic of
Agreement relating: to the taking of evi-
dence. Effected by exchange of notes at
Bonn Oct. 17, 1979, and Feb. 1, 1980.
Entered into force Feb. 1, 1980.
Agreement on cooperation in coal lique-
faction using the SRC-II process. Signed
Oct. 5, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 5,
1979.
Protocol relating to the agreement of
Oct. 5, 1979, on cooperation in coal lique-
faction using the SRC-II process. Signed
at Washington July 31, 1980. Entered
into force July 31, 1980.
Indone.sia
Agreement extending certain provisions
of the agreement of June 8, 1960, as
amended and extended (TIAS 4.5.57, 0124,
7001) for cooperation concerning civil
uses of atomic energy, and requiring
IAEA safeguards with respect to all
peaceful nuclear activities in Indonesia.
Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta
Sept. 1C> and 19, 1980. Entered into force
Sept. 19, 1980.
International Hydrographic Bureau
Agreement relating to a procedure for
United States income tax reimbursement.
Effected by exchange of letters at Wash-
ington and Monaco Aug. 27 and Oct. 10,
1980. Entered into force Oct. 16, 1980.
.lapan
Agreement on cooperation in coal lique-
faction using the SRC-II process. Signed
at Washington July 31, 1980. Entered
into force July 31, 1980.
Memorandum of consultations on provi-
sional measures relating to air transport
services. Signed at Tokyo Sept. 20, 1980.
Entered into force Sept. 20, 1980.
Mexico
Cooperative agreement to assist the Gov-
ernment of Mexico in combating the Medi-
terranean fruit fly (MEDFLY). Signed
at Mexico and Washington Aug. 2() and
Sept. 17, 1980. Entered into force
Sept. 17, 1980.
Agreement amending the agreement of
Apr. 25, 1980 (TIAS 9772) relating to
additional cooperative arrangements to
curb the illegal tratTic in narcotics. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Mexico
Oct. 10, 1980, Entered into force Oct. 10,
1980.
Morocco
Agreement amending and extending the
agreement of July 17, 1979 (TIAS 9G18),
establishing a Provisional Conunission on
Educational and Cultural Exchange. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Rabat
Sept. 24, 1980. Entered into force
Sept. 24, 1980.
Nicaragua
Loan agreement for the reconstruction
program loan. Signed at Managua
Oct. 17, 1980. Entered into force Oct. 17,
1980.
Nigeria
Agreement for scientific and technological
cooperation. Signed at Lagos Sept. 22,
1980. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1980.
Memorandum of understanding on envi-
ronmental protection. Signed at Lagos
Sept. 22, 1980. Entered into force
Sept. 22, 1980.
Panama
Agreement relating to jurisdiction over
vessels utilizing the Louisiana Offshore
Oil Port. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington Mar. 21 and 24, 1980. En-
tered into force Mar. 24, 1980.
Superseded by agieement of Aug. 15 and
Oct. 10, 1980.
Senegal
Agreement for scientific and technical
cooperation. Signed at Dakar Sept. 30,
1980. Enters into force upon notification
of each government to the other that the
constitutional formalities in force in each
country have been accomplished.
Sweden
Naturalization convention and protocol.
Signed at Stockholm May 26, 1869. En-
tered into force June 14, 1871. 17 Stat.
809.
Notification of termination : United
States, Oct. 3, 1980; effective Oct. 3, 1981.
World Intellectual Property Organization
Agreement with the U.S. relating to coop-
eration in the promotion of industrial
property protection. Signed at Geneva
Sept. 26, 1980. Entered into force
Sept. 26, 1980.
Yugoslavia
Agreement relating to the reciprocal
granting of authorization to permit
licensed amateur radio operators who are
citizens of either country to operate their
stations in the other country. Effected by
exchange of notes at Belgrade Oct. 31 and
Nov. 11, 1980. Entered into force Nov. 11,
1980.
Zimbabwe
Memorandum of understanding on coo:
eration in the field of agricultural scit,
and technology. Signed at Salisbury
Sept. 25. 1980. Entered into force
Sept. 25, 1980.
Agreement for scientific and technical
cooperation. Signed at Salisbury Sept
1980. Entered into force Sept. 25, 1980
1 With statement.
2 Not in force.
■' Not in force for the U.S.
■• Effective in respect of Bermuda
Hong Kong.
•'■ Subject to approval.
'• Effective in respect of the Nethe
lands Antilles.
' With reservation (s).
■'' Subject to ratification or approv
•' Subject to ratification, acceptan
or approval.
'" With declaration (s).
' ' In respect of the territories for
which it has international responsibili
except for: Antigua, Bermuda, Brune
Cayman Islands, Montserrat, St. Kitti
Nevis, Sovereign Base Areas, Cyprus.
'-' Accepted in respect to Hong Ki
May 12, 1980.
'■' Exception extended to British
Virgin Islands.
' ' Ad referendum. ■
November 1980
Events pertaining to Iran may be
found on page 28.
November 4
U.S. holds national elections. Rep
lican Party candidate Ronald W. Rea(
wins the Presidential election, replacii
Jimmy Carter of the Democratic Part
November 5
U.S. contributes $250,000 to U.N.
World Assembly on the Elderly which
to be held August 1982.
Ambassador McHenry signs the C
mon Fund for Commodities Agreemen
behalf of the U.S.
November 11
The Madrid followup meeting of ti
Conference on Security and Cooperati i
in Europe (CSCE) opens in Madrid w.
former Attorney General (Jriflin B. Be
as chairman of the U.S. delegation anc
Max M. Kampelman as cochairnian.
November 14
Government of Guinea-Bissau is
overthrown in a coup d'etat led by its
Prime Minister Joao Bernardo Vieira.
Iran lifts restrictions on foreign r
PRESS RELEASES
5 who wish to cover the Iran-Iraq DGOdrtnTlGnt Of StdtG
■'326 11/21
iberlT
imiannual U.S. -European Coni-
(EC) hig-h-level consultations are
; Department of State Noveni-
18. Under Secretary for Economic
i Richard N. Cooper and Director
1 for External Relations of the
ission of the European Communi-
Roy Denman lead U.S. and EC
tions, respectively.
eposit of Honduras-El Salvador
Treaty in OAS ceremony.
iber 19
Ith General Assembly of the Orga-
in of American States (OAS) is
I Washington, D.C. Novem-
■26.
y a vote of 111 to 22, with 12 ab-
ins, U.N. General Assembly repeats
for the Soviet Union to withdraw
from Afghanistan.
iber23
iami Conference on Caribbean
.6 Investment, and Development is
■ ivember 23-2.5 in Florida. U.S.
I'^cnted by Assistant Secretary
1 r-.\merican Affairs, William G.
I r, and Counselor Rozanne L.
I? ay.
ijrh-level foreign participation is
ciited by Costa Rican President
; i; Prime Ministers Seaga, of
nca; Adams, of Barbados; Charles,
Dninica; Vice President Alfara, of
jt Rica; and a number of Minister-
el epresentatives from the Caribbean
-i
vnber 24
.S. -Venezuela exchange instru-
n of ratification of the Maritime
alary Treaty.
vnber 25
111.' Government of Upper Volta is
■ ir "wn in a military coup d'etat led
I. Saye Zerbo, a former foreign
111 and the commander of armed
in Ouagadougou.
i nber 29
ecretary Muskie makes official visit
\ xico, November 29-December 1 to
■i,v work of U.S. -Mexico Consultative
■canism.
unber 30
'ruguay holds plebiscite on new
itution proposed by ruling military.
i. -ised count was rejected by
jDximately 55 'a of voters. ■
Press releases may be obtained from
the Office of Press Relations, Depart-
ment of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
No. Date
310 11/1
*311 10/31
'312 10/31
313 11/2
*314 11/3
'315 11/3
*316 10/29
'317 11/5
"318 11/7
'319 11/17
*320 11/17
321 11/17
*322 11/17
*323 11/17
'-324 11/18
325 11/19
Subject
Muskie: news conference
U.S. -Gabon sign Inter-
country Agreement.
Oceans and Interna-
tional, Environmental
and Scientific Affairs
Advisory Committee,
Nov. 10.
Muskie: interview on
"Issues and Answers."
Shipping Coordinating
Committee (SCC),
Subcommittee on
Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), working
group on radioconi-
munication, Nov. 20.
SCC, SOLAS, working
group on ship design
and equipment,
Nov. 20.
Muskie: question-and-
answer session with
radio station WOR.
Thomas D. Boyatt sworn
in as Ambassador to
Colombia (biographic
data).
Muskie: interview for
National Public
Radio, Oct. 31.
Advisory Committee on
International Invest-
ment, Technology, and
Development, working
group on international
data flows, Dec. 3.
U.S. -Socialist Republic
of Romania sign tex-
tile agreement, Sept. 3
and Nov. 3.
U.S.-Micronesia initial a
compact of free asso-
ciation.
International Radio Con-
sultative Committee
(CCIR), study group
1, Dec. 10.
CCIR, study group 4,
Dec. 17.
U.S.-Socialist Republic
of Romania amend
bilateral textile
agreement.
Muskie: remarks before
the General Assembly
of the OAS.
*327 11/21
328
'329
11/25
11/25
330 11/25
t331 11/26
Jamaican Prime Minis-
ter Edward Seaga
gives keynote address
at the Miami Confer-
ence on Caribbean
Trade, Investment,
and Development, Key
Biscayne, Nov. 23-25.
U.S.-Venezuela exchange
instruments of ratifi-
cation of Maritime
Boundary Treaty.
CCIR, study group 2,
Dec. 12.
Advisory Committee on
International Invest-
ment, Technology, and
Development, working
group on accounting
standards and U.N./
OECD investment
undertakings, Dec. 15.
Advisory Committee on
International Invest-
ment, Technology, and
Developn.ent, working
group on transborder
data flows, Dec. 2.
Status of the World's
Nations , 1980 , Depart-
ment of State publica-
tion 8735, released.
■■' Not printed in the Bulletin.
t Held for a later issue. ■
U.S.U.N.
Press releases may be obtained from
the Public Aflfairs Office, U.S. Mission to
the United Nations, 799 United Nations
Plaza, New York N.Y. 10017.
No. Date
*87 8/12
*88 8/18
89 8/20
*90 8/25
*91 8/25
Subject
Ambassador McCall re-
turns from the Carib-
bean.
Statement on Puerto
Rico.
Muskie: Jerusalem. Secu-
rity Council.
U.S. delegation to 11th
Special Session on De-
velopment.
McHenry: Zimbabwe
mbership. General As-
sembly.
PUBLICATIONS
92 8/25
*93 9/8
94 9/9
*95 9/12
*96 9/15
*97 9/15
*98 9/16
*99 9/17
100 9/22
101 9/28
*102 10/3
*103 10/3
*104 10/8
*105 10/10
*106 10/10
Muskie: statement at 11th
special session.
McCall: statement at the
Crossroads Sym])()sium.
Honolulu.
McHenry: Namibia, U.S.
House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Subcommit-
tee on Africa.
McHenry: statement is-
sued following assassi-
nation of a member of
the Cuban mission to
the U.N.
McHenry: statement at
the commemoration
ceremony for the Ralph
Bunche memorial.
McHenry: statement at
the close of the 11th
special session.
McHenry: St. Vincent and
the Grenadines mem-
bership. General As-
sembly.
Petree: decolonization
resolution. General
Committee.
Muskie: statement to the
35th UNGA.
McHenry: Iran-Iraq con-
flict. Security Council.
McCall: foreign economic
interests. Committee
IV.
Newsom: foreign eco-
nomic interests. Com-
mittee IV.
Palmieri: refugees,
UNHCR, Geneva.
Atkins: apartheid. Com-
mittee III.
McHenry: apartheid. ■
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rt* f\4 Of'lin Qll,
SEX
Muary 1981
K 81, No. 2046
t nistan. General Assembly
.itis on Afghanistan Situation
M.llenrv, text of resolu-
nn) ..". 30
, and U.S. Policy (Muskie) . . 1
ul,,j;y, November 1980 40
N U.S. Dialogue (.joint press
:ati'nient) 12
apanese Relations in the
sos (Holbrooke) 14
U.S. -China Sign Grain
Liiiement (White House state-
rnt) 13
mdities. U.S. -China Sign Grain
mi'ement (White House state-
i-ntl 13
.;'ss. International Narcotics
(intiol in the 1980s (Falco) ... 29
I nicnt and ForeiKn Service
Ml Service Act, 1980 (Carter) 11
hrt History of the U.S. Depart-
lent of Stkte, 1781-1981 Si
1 nios
. and U.S. Policy (Muskie) .. 1
X U.S. Dialogue (joint press
itcnient) 12
I'j a Safer Future (Muskie). 3
ipane.se Relations in the
Mis (Holbrooke) 14
r •■
u ntr a Safer Future (Muskie) . 3
I ael Oil Agreement (Carter,
(iilai, text of agreement,
lenioranduni of agreement, De-
lirtment fact sheet) 24
.-•ipanese Relations in the 1980s
lolbrooke) 14
o?
-l-uv, November 1980 40
thening the CSCE Process
Jell) 18
mi Rights
and U.S. Policy (Mu.skie) .. 1
il Assembly Votes on Afghan-
an Situation ( McHenry, text
resolution ) 30
n Rights and International
iw (Derian) 21
res: The U.S. Response (Mus-
e) 5
t.rn Africa: Four Years Later
Moose) 8
Strengthening the CSCE Process
(Bell) 18
10th General As.seniblv of the OAS
(Carter, Muskie) 33
Indonesia. ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue
(ioint press statement) 12
International Organizations and
Conferences
Chronology, November 1980 40
Strengthening the CSCE Process
(Bell) 18
Iran
Iran Chronology, November 1980 . . 28
U.S. Hostages in Iran (Muskie) ... 2.5
Israel. U.S. -Israel Oil Agreement
(Carter, Modai, text of agree-
ment, memorandum of agree-
ment. Department fact sheet) . . 24
Japan. U.S. -Japanese Relations in
the 1980s (Holbrooke) 14
Latin America and the Caribbean
Chronology, November 1980 40
10th General Assembly of the OAS
(Carter, Muskie) 33
Madrid. Strengthening the CSCE
Process (Bell) 18
Malaysia. ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue
(joint press statement) 12
Middle East. Chronology, Novem-
ber 1980 ■ 40
Narcotics. International Narcotics
Control in the 1980s (Falco) ... 29
Namibia
Africa and U.S. Policy (Muskie) .. 1
Southern Africa: Four Years Later
(Moose) 8
Nuclear Policy. .Securing a Safer
Future ( Muskie ) 3
Organization of American States.
10th General Assembly of the
OAS (Carter, Mu,skie) 33
Petroleum. U.S. -Israel Oil Agreement
(Carter, Modai, text of agree-
ment, memorandum of agree-
ment. Department fact sheet).. 24
Philippines. ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue
(joint press statement) 12
Poland. Poland (Carter, White
House statement) 20
Population. Securing a Safer Future
(Muskie) 3
Presidential Documents
Foreign Service Act, 1980 11
Poland (Carter, White House state-
ment) 20
U.S. -China Sign Grain Agreement
(White House statement) .... 13
U.S. -Israel Oil Agreement (Carter,
Modai, text of agreement,
memorandum of agreement, De-
partment fact sheet) 24
Publications 42
Refugees. Refugees: The U.S. Re-
sponse (Muskie) 5
Security Assistance
Securing a Safer Future (Muskie) 3
U.S. -Japanese Relations in the
1980s (Holbrooke) 14
Singapore. ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue
(joint press statement) 12
South Africa. Southern Africa:
Foui- Years Later (Moose) .... 8
Thailand. ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue
(joint press statement) 12
Treaties
Current Actions 3(5
Human Rights and International
Law (Derian ) 21
U.S.-China Sign Grain Agreement
(White House statement) .... 13
U.S. -Israel Oil Agreement (Carter,
Modai, text of agreement,
memorandum of agreement. De-
partment fact sheet) 24
LInited Nations. General Assembly
Votes on Afghanistan Situation
(McHenry, text of resolution). 30
Zimbabwe
Africa and U.S. Policy (Muskie) .. 1
Southern Africa: Four Years Later
(Moose) 8
Name Index
Bell, Griffin B 18
Carter, President 11,20,24,33
Derian, Patricia M 21
Falco, Mathea 29
Holbrooke, Richard C 14
McHenry, Donald F 30
Modai, Yitzhak 24
Moose, Richard M 8
Muskie, Secretary 5. 13, 2.5, 33
Trask, David F SI
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Department
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/^Lo^y
V of State -m-m ^ ^
buUetm
Official Monmiy Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volunne 81 / Nunnber 2047
February 1981
T
Department of State
bulletin
Volume 81 / Number 2047 / February 1981
Cover Photo:
Ronald Wilson Reagan takes the oath
of office as the 40th President of
the United States on January 20, 1981.
Chief Justice Warren Burger (right)
administers the oath while
Mrs. Reagan and
Senator Mark Hatfield
witness the event.
(White House photo by Bill Fitz Patrick)
The Department of State Bulletin ,
published by the Office of Public
Communication in the Bureau of Public
Affairs, is the official record of U.S.
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide
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government agencies with information
on developments in U.S. foreign
relations and the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service.
The Bulletin's contents include major
addresses and news conferences of the
President and the Secretary of State;
statements made before congressional
committees by the Secretary and other
senior State Department officials;
special features and articles on
international affairs; selected press
releases issued by the White House,
the Department, and the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations; and treaties and
other agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party.
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
Secretary of State
WILLIAM J. DYESS
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs |
PAUL E. AUERSWALD
Director.
Office of Public Communication
NORMAN HOWARD
Acting Chief, Editorial Division
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG
Editor
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Assistant Editor
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CONTENTS
FEATURE
5
9
21
Agreement on the Release of the American Hostages IRemarks by U.S.
ficials. Documentation on the Commitments and the Settlement of
Claims}
Iran Chronology, December 1980
Iran Chronology, January 1981
List of American Hostages
Of-
\i President
I
President Carter's Farewell
Address to the Nation
h Secretary
■
Resources for a Credible For-
eign Policy (Secretary Muskiel
Secretary Muskie Interviewed
on "Meet the Press" (Ex-
cerpts)
Secretary Muskie Interviewed
on the "MacNeil/Lehrer
Report"
4iica
1 Proposed Chad-Libya Merger
(Department Statement)
Pineda
2 U.S. -Canada Technical Meeting
on Dioxin (Joint Statement)
3 Air Pollution Legislation
-3t Asia
Two Years of U.S.-China Rela-
tions (Chronology)
i Orderly Departure Program for
Vietnamese (Department
Statement)
ionomics
4 U.S. Trade and Foreign Policy in
the Western Hemisphere
(Ernest B. Johnston, Jr.)
5 Trade With the Soviet Union
(President Carter's Letter to
Senator Jackson)
-lergy
Energy: Continuing Crisis
(Deane R. Hinton)
Europe
50 North Atlantic Council Meets in
Brussels (Final Communique,
Declaration, Minutes Extracts)
52 22d Report on Cyprus (Message
to the Congress)
53 President Meets With Chan-
cellor Schmidt (White House
Statement)
Human Rights
53 Convention on Elimination of
Discrimination Against
Women Sent to Senate
(Message to the Senate)
54 Bill of Rights Day, Human
Rights Day and Week, 1980
(Proclamation)
IVIiddle East
54 Western Sahara Dispute (Harold
H. Saunders)
55 U.S., Israel Settle Claim on
U.S.S. Liberty (Department
Announcement)
Oceans
56 Law of the Sea (George H.
Aldrich)
South Asia
59 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
(President Carter)
United Nations
60 The United Nations and U.S.
Policy (Richard L. McCaW
62 U.S. Participation in the U.N.,
1979 (Message to the Con-
gress)
64 World Court Hears U.S. Argu-
ment on Transfer of WHO
Regional Office (Stephen M.
Schwebel)
Western Hemisphere
68 El Salvador (Department
Statements)
Treaties
70 Current Actions
Chronology
72 December 1980
Press Releases
72 Department of State
Index
SPECIAL (See Center Section)
The Inaugural Address of President Reagan
Secretary-Designate Haig Appears Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Secretary Haig's News Conference of January 28
BoBtm WH':? y^*>^^
fupetinterc':-
^CJw ^
06l»0>'
Botton Public Library
Superintendent of Documecto
APR 2 3 1981
DEPOSITORY
At a ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on January 27, 1981, President Reagan
officially welcomes 53 Americans who had been held hostage in Iran.
I
lATURE
Agreement on the Release
(if the American Hostages
Following are announcements by President Carter and Secretary Muskie on
release of the 52 American hostages from Iran; two declarations of the
erian Government initialed in Algiers by Deputy Secretary Christopher con-
ling the commitments made by the Governments of Iran and the United States
the settlement of claims; undertakings of the Governments of Iran and the
ed States with respect to the declaration^- the escrow agreement; two
ements of adherence by President Carter; ten Executive orders; President
er's message to the Congress; the technical arrangement between the Central
k of Algeria and the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank of New
k; a special briefing by former Secretary Muskie, former Treasury Secretary
. Villiam Miller, and former Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti; and remarks
^resident Reagan and L. Bruce Laingen.
SffiENT CARTER'S
OUNCEMENT,
19, 1981, 4:56 AM (EST),
WHITE HOUSE'
h President: I know you've been up all
t with me and I appreciate that very
We have now reached an agreement
i) Iran which will result, I believe, in
Kreedom of our American hostages,
hlast documents have now been signed
: .Igiers following the signing of the
o» ments in Iran which will result in
iiiagreement. We still have a few
o« ments to sign before the money is ac-
jjy transferred and the hostages are
ehsed.
The essence of the agreement is that
iLwing the release of our hostages then
enU unfreeze and transfer to the Ira-
ias a major part of the assets which
6' frozen by me when the Iranians
ii'd our embassy compound and took
uiiostages.
We have also reached complete
Element on the arbitration procedures
el'een ourselves and Iran with the help
fie Algerians which will resolve the
IS that exist between residents of our
)ii and Iran and vice-versa.
I particularly want to express my
ulic thanks, as I have already done pri-
ally, to the Algerians, to their Presi-
'?!, their Foreign Minister, Ben Yahia,
tn the three-man negotiating teams
i have done such a superb job in fair
mequitable arbitration between our-
?s and the officials of Iran. We don't
\now exactly how fast this procedure
heo. We are prepared to move as
rapidly as possible. All the preparations
have been completed pending the final
documents being signed.
I will have more to say to you when
our American hostages are actually free.
In the meantime, Jody Powell will stay in
close touch with developments, working
with the Secretary of State, the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, my legal counsel,
Lloyd Cutler; I'm talking frequently with
Warren Christopher in Algiers and Jody
Powell will keep you informed about de-
velopments. Thank you very much.
Q. How do you feel personally
about having the hostages out before
you leave office?
The President: I'll wait until the
hostages are released and then I'll have
another statement to make.
SECRETARY MUSKIE'S
ANNOUNCEMENT,
JAN. 19, 198P
Tb My Colleagues iyi the Foreign Service
The long and anguishing ordeal of our col-
leagues held captive in Iran is almost
over.
They will soon be free. They will
soon be home.
They will be released on terms en-
tirely consistent with our national honor.
But our celebration of their release is
muted by the suffering that has been so
bravely endured.
This has been a time of terrible trial
— not only for our people held captive and
their famiUes, but for their friends and
colleagues throughout this building and
government.
The unrelenting and selfless efforts
of so many of you have finally achieved
success. I congratulate and thank you for
these efforts. And I commend the For-
eign Service as a whole for its dedication
and discipline throughout this period.
Your caring, your efforts, your wise ad-
vice have once again demonstrated the
high standards of professionalism in a
Service the nation is so fortunate to have.
Edmund S. Muskie
DECLARATIONS,
JAN. 19, 198r
DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR
REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA
The Government of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria, having been re-
quested by the Governments of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and the United States of
America to serve as an intermediary in seek-
ing a mutually acceptable resolution of the
crisis in their relations arising out of the de-
tention of the 52 United States nationals in
Iran, has consulted extensively with the two
governments as to the commitments which
each is willing to make in order to resolve the
crisis within the framework of the four points
stated in the resolution of November 2, 1980,
of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran.
On the basis of formal adherences received
from Iran and the United States, the Govern-
ment of Algeria now declares that the follow-
ing interdependent commitments have been
made by the two governments:
1'
uary 1981
Feature
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The undertakings reflected in this Decla-
ration are based on the following general prin-
ciples:
A. Within the framework of and pursuant
to the provisions of the two Declarations of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria, the United States will
restore the financial position of Iran, in so far
as possible, to that which existed prior to
November 14, 1979. In this context, the United
States commits itself to ensure the mobility
and free transfer of all Iranian assets within its
jurisdiction, as set forth in Paragraphs 4-9.
B. It is the purpose of both parties,
within the framework of and pursuant to the
provisions of the two Declarations of the Gov-
ernment of the Democratic and Popular Re-
public of Algeria, to terminate all litigation as
between the Government of each party and
the nationals of the other, and to bring about
the settlement and termination of all such
claims through binding arbitration. Through
the procedures provided in the Declaration, re-
lating to the Claims Settlement Agreement,
the United States agrees to terminate all legal
proceedings in United States courts involving
claims of United States persons and insti-
tutions against Iran and its state enterprises,
to nullify all attachments and judgments ob-
tained therein, to prohibit all further litigation
based on such claims, and to bring about the
termination of such claims through binding
arbitration.
Point I: Non-intervention in Iranian Affairs
1. The United States pledges that it is and
from now on will be the policy of the United
States not to intervene, directly or indirectly,
politically or militarily, in Iran's internal af-
fairs.
Points II and III: Return of Iranian Assets
and Settlement^ of U.S. Claims
2. Iran and the United States (hereinafter
"the parties") will immediately select a mutu-
ally agreeable central bank (hereinafter "the
Central Bank") to act, under the instructions
of the Government of Algeria and the Central
Bank of Algeria (hereinafter "the Algerian
Central Bank") as depositary of the escrow and
security funds hereinafter prescribed and will
promptly enter into depositary arrangements
vdth the Central Bank in accordance with the
terms of this declaration. All funds placed in
escrow with the Central Bank pursuant to this
declaration shall be held in an account in the
name of the Algerian Central Bank. Certain
procedures for implementing the obligations
set forth in this Declaration and in the Decla-
ration of the Democratic and Popular Repubhc
of Algeria concerning the settlement of claims
by the Government of the United States and
the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran (hereinafter "the Claims Settlement
Agreement") are separately set forth in cei^
tain Undertakings of the Government of the
United States of America and the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to
the Declaration of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria.
3. The depositary arrangements shall
provide that, in the event that the Govern-
ment of Algeria certifies to the Algerian Cen-
tral Bank that the 52 U.S. nationals have
safely departed from Iran, the Algerian Cen-
tral Bank will thereupon instruct the Central
Bank to transfer immediately all monies or
other assets in escrow with the Central Bank
pursuant to this declaration, provided that at
any time prior to the making of such certifica-
tion by the Government of Algeria, each of the
two parties, Iran and the United States, shall
have the right on seventy-two hours notice to
terminate its commitments under this declara-
tion.
If such notice is given by the United
States and the foregoing certification is made
by the Government of Algeria within the
seventy- two hour period of notice, the Alge-
rian Central Bank will thereupon instruct the
Central Bank to transfer such monies and as-
sets. If the seventy-two hour period of notice
by the United States expires without such a
certification having been made, or if the notice
of termination is delivered by Iran, the Alge-
rian Central Bank will thereupon instruct the
Central Bank to return all such monies and as-
sets to the United States, and thereafter the
commitments reflected in this declaration shall
be of no further force and effect.
ASSETS IN THE FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK
4. Commencing upon completion of the
requisite escrow arrangements with the Cen-
tral Bank, the United States will bring about
the transfer to the Central Bank of all gold
bullion which is owned by Iran and which is in
the custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, together with all other Iranian as-
sets (or the cash equivalent thereof) in the
custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, to be held by the Central Bank in escrow
until such time as their transfer or return is
required by Paragraph 3 above.
ASSETS IN FOREIGN BRANCHES OF
U.S. BANKS
5. Commencing upon the completion of the
requisite escrow arrangements with the Cen-
tral Bank, the United States will bring about
the transfer to the Central Bank, to the ac-
count of the Algerian Central Bank, of all Ira-
nian deposits and securities which on or after
November 14, 1979, stood upon the books of
overseas banking offices of U.S. banks, to-
gether with interest thereon through Decem-
ber 31, 1980, to be held by the Central Bank, to
the account of the Algerian Central Bank, in
escrow until such time as their transfer or re-
turn is required in accordance with Paragraph
3 of this Declaration.
ASSETS IN U.S. BRANCHES OF U.S.
BANKS
6. Commencing with the adherence by
Iran and the United States to this declaratio
and the claims settlement agreement attache
hereto, and following the conclusion of ai^
rangements with the Central Bank for the es
tablishment of the interest-bearing security
account specified in that agreement and Par,
graph 7 below, which arrangements will be
concluded within 30 days from the date of th
Declaration, the United States will act to
bring about the transfer to the Central Banl
within six months from such date, of all Ira-
nian deposits and securities in U.S. banking
institutions in the United States, together
with interest thereon, to be held by the Cen
tral Bank in escrow until such time as their
transfer or return is required by Paragraph
7. As funds are received by the Central
Bank pursuant to Paragraph 6 above, the
Algerian Central Bank shall direct the Cent
Bank to (1) transfer one-half of each such re
ceipt to Iran and (2) place the other half in i
special interest-bearing security account in
Central Bank, until the balance in the secur
account has reached the level of $1 bilhon.
After the $1 billion balance has been achiev
the Algerian Central Bank shall direct all
funds received pursuant to Paragraph 6 to 1
transferred to Iran. All funds in the securit
account are to be used for the sole purpose
securing the payment of, and paying, claim
against Iran in accordance with the claims
settlement agreement. Whenever the Cent
Bank shall thereafter notify Iran that the l
ance in the security account has fallen belo
$500 million, Iran shall promptly make nev
deposits sufficient to maintain a minimum 1
ance of $500 million in the account. The ac-
count shall be so maintained until the Pres:
dent of the Arbitral Tribunal established p
suant to the claims settlement agreement 1
certified to the Central Bank of Algeria th.
all arbitral awards against Iran have been
satisfied in accordance with the claims sett
ment agreement, at which point any amoui
remaining in the security account shall be
transferred to Iran.
OTHER ASSETS IN THE U.S. AND
ABROAD
8. Commencing with the adherence of
and the United States to this declaration a
the attached claims settlement agreement
the conclusion of arrangements for the est;
Ushment of the security account, which ar-
rangements will be concluded within 30 da,
from the date of this Declaration, the Unit
States will act to bring about the transfer i
the Central Bank of all Iranian financial as
(meaning funds or securities) which are loc
in the United States and abroad, apart froi
those assets referred to in Paragraph 5 an(
above, to be held by the Central Bank in e;
crow until their transfer or return is requu
by Paragraph 3 above.
Department of State Bull
Feature
• rommencing with the adherence by
and the United States to this declaration
lu attached claims settlement agreement
hi making by the Government of Algeria
> fi-tification described in Paragraph 3
r. the United States will arrange, subject
e provisions of U.S. law applicable prior
ivi-mber 14, 1979, for the transfer to Iran
I ranian properties which are located in
lilted States and abroad and which are
> II hin the scope of the preceding para-
ILIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AND
IMS
[0. Upon the making by the Government
igeria of the certification described in
itn'aph 3 above, the United States vnll re-
aU trade sanctions which were directed
.i.^t Iran in the period November 4, 1979,
ite.
11. Upon the making by the Government
yueria of the certification described in
i_Taph 3 above, the United States will
I Illy withdraw all claims now pending
•it Iran before the International Court of
■I and will thereafter bar and preclude
. ru.-^ecution against Iran of any pending or
tie claim of the United States or a United
t « national arising out of events occurring
(' I he date of this declaration related to
1. .-seizure of the 52 United States nation-
1 November 4, 1979, (B) their subsequent
It inn, (C) injury to United States prop-
ii- |3roperty of the United States nationals
ii,ii the United States Embassy compound
Ihran after November 3, 1979, and (D) in-
-'(I the United States nationals or their
■1 1 y as a result of popular movements in
ur.se of the Islamic Revolution in Iran
1 were not an act of the Government of
The United States will also bar and pre-
' I he prosecution against Iran in the
J .-, I if the United States of any pending or
t- claim asserted by persons other than
- iiited States nationals arising out of the
f > specified in the preceding sentence.
)it IV: Return of the Assets of the Family
te Former Shah
2. Upon the making by the Government
igeria of the certification described in
■Trraph 3 above, the United States will
and prohibit any transfer of, property
.-,<t'ts in the United States within the con-
1 the estate of the former Shah or of any
Illative of the former Shah served as a
I'iaiit in U.S. litigation brought by Iran to
c er such property and assets as belonging
hn. As to any such defendant, including
"ftate of the former Shah, the freeze order
tinain in effect until such litigation is fi-
J; terminated. Violation of the freeze order
SI be subject to the civil and criminal penal-
"jrescribed by U.S. law.
lo. Upon the making by the Government
sreria of the certification described in
praph 3 above, the United Slates will
order all persons within U.S. jurisdiction to
report to the U.S. Treasury within 30 days, for
transmission to Iran, all information known to
them, as of November 3, 1979, and as of the
date of the order, with respect to the property
and assets referred to in Paragraph 12. Viola-
tion of the requirement will be subject to the
civil and criminal penalties prescribed by U.S.
law.
14. Upon the making by the Government
of Algeria of the certification described in
Paragraph 3 above, the United States will
make known, to all appropriate U.S. courts,
that in any litigation of the kind described in
Paragraph 12 above the claims of Iran should
not be considered legally barred either by
sovereign immunity principles or by the act of
state doctrine and that Iranian decrees and
judgments relating to such assets should be
enforced by such courts in accordance with
United States law.
15. As to any judgment of a U.S. court
which calls for the transfer of any property or
assets to Iran, the United States hereby
guarantees the enforcement of the final judg-
ment to the extent that the property or assets
exist within the United States.
16. If any dispute arises between the par-
ties as to whether the United States has ful-
filled any obligation imposed upon it by Para-
graphs 12-15, inclusive, Iran may submit the
dispute to binding arbitration by the tribunal
established by, and in accordance with the pro-
visions of, the claims settlement agreement. If
the tribunal determines that Iran has suffered
a loss as a result of a failure by the United
States to fulfill such obligation, it shall make
an appropriate award in favor of Iran which
may be enforced by Iran in the courts of any
nation in accordance with its laws.
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
17. If any other dispute arises between
the parties as to the interpretation or per-
formance of any provision of this declaration,
either party may submit the dispute to binding
arbitration by the tribunal established by, and
in accordance with the provisions of, the claims
settlement agreement. Any decision of the tri-
bunal with respect to such dispute, including
any award of damages to compensate for a loss
resulting from a breach of this declaration or
the claims settlement agreement, may be en-
forced by the prevailing party in the courts of
any nation in accordance with its laws.
Initialed on January 19, 1981
by Warren M. Christopher
Deputy Secretary of State
of the Government of the United States
By virtue of the powers vested in him by his
Government as deposited with the
Government of Algeria
DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR
REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA CONCERNING
THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS BY THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
The Government of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria, on the basis of
formal notice of adherence received from the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
and the Government of the United States of
America, now declares that Iran and the
United States have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
Iran and the United States will promote
the settlement of the claims described in Arti-
cle II by the parties directly concerned. Any
such claims not settled within six months from
the date of entry into force of this agreement
shall be submitted to binding third-party arbi-
tration in accordance with the terms of this
agreement. The aforementioned six months'
period may be extended once by three months
at the request of either party.
ARTICLE II
1. An International Arbitral Tribunal (the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal) is hereby
established for the purpose of deciding claims
of nationals of the United States against Iran
and claims of nationals of Iran against the
United States, and any counterclaim which
arises out of the same contract, transaction or
occurrence that constitutes the subject matter
of that national's claim, if such claims and
counterclaims are outstanding on the date of
this agreement, whether or not filed vdth any
court, and arise out of debts, contracts (includ-
ing transactions which are the subject of let-
ters of credit or bank guarantees), expropria-
tions or other measures affecting property
rights, excluding claims described in Para-
graph 11 of the Declaration of the Government
of Algeria of January 19, 1981, and claims aris-
ing out of the actions of the United States in
response to the conduct described in such
paragraph, and excluding claims arising under
a binding contract between the parties specifi-
cally providing that any disputes thereunder
shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the com-
petent Iranian courts in response to the Majhs
position.
2. The Tribunal shall also have jurisdic-
tion over official claims of the United States
and Iran against each other arising out of con-
tractual arrangements between them for the
purchase and sale of goods and services.
3. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction, as
specified in Paragraphs 16-17 of the Declara-
tion of the Government of Algeria of January
19, 1981 over any dispute as to the interpreta-
tion or performance of any provision of that
declaration.
Sruarv 1QR1
Feature
ARTICLE III
1. The Tribunal shall consist of nine mem-
bers or such larger multiple of three as Iran
and the United States may agree are neces-
sary to conduct its business expeditiously.
Within ninety days after the entry into force of
this agreement, each government shall appoint
one-third of the members. Within thirty days
after their appointment, the members so ap-
pointed shall by mutual agreement select the
remaining third of the members and appoint
one of the remaining third President of the
Tribunal. Claims may be decided by the full
Tribunal or by a panel of three members of the
Tribunal as the President shall determine.
Each such panel shall be composed by the
President and shall consist of one member ap-
pointed by each of the three methods set forth
above.
2. Members of the Tribunal shall be ap-
pointed and the Tribunal shall conduct its
business in accordance with the arbitration
rules of the United Nations Commission on In-
ternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL) e.xcept
to the extent modified by the parties or by the
Tribunal to ensure that this agreement can be
carried out. The UNCITRAL rules for ap-
pointing members of three-member Tribunals
shall apply mutatis mutandis to the appoint-
ment of the Tribunal.
3. Claims of nationals of the United
States and Iran that are within the scope of
this agreement shall be presented to the Tri-
bunal either by claimants themselves, or, in
the case of claims of less than $250,000, by the
Government of such national.
4. No claim may be filed with the Tribu-
nal more than one year after the entry into
force of this agreement or six months after the
date the President is appointed, whichever is
later These deadlines do not apply to the pro-
cedures contemplated by Paragraphs 16 and 17
of the Declaration of the Government of
Algeria of January 19, 1981.
ARTICLE IV
1. All decisions and awards of the Tribu-
nal shall be final and binding.
2. The President of the Tribunal shall cer-
tify, as prescribed in Paragraph 7 of the Decla-
ration of the Government of Algeria of January
19, 1981, when all arbitral awards under this
agreement have been satisfied.
3. Any award which the Tribunal may
render against either government shall be en-
forceable against such government in the
courts of any nation in accordance with its
laws.
ARTICLE V
The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the
basis of respect for law, applying such choice of
law rules and principles of commercial and in-
ternational law as the Tribunal determines to
be applicable, taking into account relevant
usages of the trade, contract provisions and
changed circumstances.
ARTICLE VI
1. The seat of the Tribunal shall be The
Hague, The Netherlands, or any other place
agreed by Iran and the United States.
2. Each government shall designate an
agent at the seat of the Tribunal to represent
it to the Tribunal and to receive notices or
other communications directed to it or to its
nationals, agencies, instrumentalities, or en-
tities in connection with proceedings before the
Tribunal.
3. The expenses of the Tribunal shall be
borne equally by the two governments.
4. Any question concerning the interpre-
tation or application of this agreement shall be
decided by the Tribunal upon the request of
either Iran or the United States.
ARTICLE VII
For the purposes of this agreement:
1. A "national" of Iran or of the United
States, as the case may be, means (a) a natural
person who is a citizen of Iran or the United
States; and (b) a corporation or other legal en-
tity which is organized under the laws of Iran
or the United States or any of its states or ter-
ritories, the District of Columbia or the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico, if, collectively, nat-
ural persons who are citizens of such country
hold, directly or indirectly, an interest in such
corporation or entity equivalent to fifty per
cent or more of its capital stock.
2. "Claims of nationals" of Iran or the
United States, as the case may be, means
claims owned continuously, from the date on
which the claim arose to the date on which this
agreement enters into force, by nationals of
that state, including claims that are owned in-
directly by such nationals through ownership
of capital stock or other proprietary interests
in juridical persons, provided that the owner-
ship interests of such nationals, collectively,
were sufficient at the time the claim arose to
control the corporation or other entity, and
provided, further, that the corporation or
other entity is not itself entitled to bring a
claim under the terms of this agreement.
Claims referred to the Arbitral Tribunal shall,
as of the date of filing of such claims with the
Tribunal, be considered excluded from the
jurisdiction of the courts of Iran, or of the
United States, or of any other court.
3. "Iran" means the Government of Iran,
any political subdivision of Iran, and any
agency, instrumentahty, or entity controlled by
the Government of Iran or any political sub-
division thereof
4. The "United States" means the Gov-
ernment of the United States, any political
subdivision of the United States, any agency,
instrumentality or entity controlled by the
Government of the United States or any politi-
cal subdivision thereof
ARTICLE VIII
This agreement shall enter into force
when the Government of Algeria has receivei
from both Iran and the United States a notifi
cation of adherence to the agreement.
Initialed on January 19, 1981
by Warren M. Christopher
Deputy Secretary of State
of the Government of the United States
By virtue of the powers vested in him by his
Government as deposited with the Govern-
ment of Algeria
UNDERTAKINGS
JAN. 19, 1981-'
UNDERTAKINGS OF THE GOVERNMEl
OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMEN
OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN WITH RESPECT!
THE
DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMEN
OF THE
DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR
REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA
1. At such time as the Algerian Central Ban
notifies the Governments of Algeria, Iran, a
the United States that it has been notified b;
the Central Bank that the Central Bank has
received for deposit in dollar, gold bullion, ai
securities accounts in the name of the Algeri
Central Bank, as escrow agent, cash and otb
funds, 1,632,917.779 ounces of gold (valued b
the parties for this purpose at $0.9397 billioi
and securities (at face value) in the aggregal
amount of $7,955 billion, Iran shall immedi-
ately bring about the safe departure of the S
U.S. nationals detained in Iran. Upon the m
ing by the Government of Algeria of the cer-
tification described in Paragraph 3 of the De ■
laration, the Algerian Central Bank will issu
the instructions required by the following
paragraph.
2. Iran having affirmed its intention to
pay all its debts and those of its controlled in
stitutions, the Algerian Central Bank acting
pursuant to Paragraph 1 above will issue the
following instructions to the Central Bank:
(A) To transfer $3,667 billion to the Fee
eral Reserve Bank of New York to pay the u
paid principal of and interest through Decern
ber 31, 1980 on (1) all loans and credits made
a syndicate of banking institutions, of which
U.S. banking institution is a member, to the ■
Government of Iran, its agencies, instrumen ,
talities or controlled entities, and (2) all loam
and credits made by such a syndicate which
are guaranteed by the Government of Iran o
any of its agencies, instrumentalities or con-
trolled entities.
Department of State Bulleti
Feature
;) To retain $1,418 billion in the escrow
t for the purpose of paying the unpaid
pal of the interest owing, if any, on the
and credits referred to in Paragi-aph (A)
.pplication of the $3,667 biUion and on all
indebtedness held by United States
ig institutions of. or guai-anteed by, the
nment of Iran, its agencies, instrumen-
s or controlled entities not previously
nd for the pui-pose of paying disputed
ts of deposits, assets, and interests, if
wing on Iranian deposits in U.S. banking
jtions. Bank Markazi and the appropriate
d States banking institutions shall
itly meet in an effort to agree upon the
its owing.
the event of such agreement, the Bank
m and the appropriate banking institu-
liall certify the amount owing to the Cen-
ank of Algeria which shall instruct the
Bank of England to credit such amount to the
account, as appropriate, of the Bank Markazi
or of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
in order to permit payment to the appropriate
banking institution. In the event that within 30
days any U.S. banking institution and the
Bank Markazi are unable to agi-ee upon the
amounts owed, either party may refer such
dispute to binding arbitration by such interna-
tional arbitration panel as the parties may
agi'ee, oi- failing such agreement within 30 ad-
ditional days after such reference, by the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. The pre-
siding officer of such panel or tribunal shall
certify to the Central Bank of Algeria the
amount, if any, determined by it to be owed,
whereupon the Central Bank of Algeria shall
instruct the Bank of England to credit such
amount to the account of the Bank Markazi or
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in
order to permit payment to the appropriate
banking institution. After all disputes are re-
solved either by agreement or by arbitration
award and appropriate payment has been
made, the balance of the funds referred to in
this Paragraph (B) shall be paid to Bank
Markazi.
(C) To transfer immediately to, or upon
the order of, the Bank Markazi all assets in the
escrow account in excess of the amounts re-
ferred to in Paragraphs (A) and (B).
Initialed on January 19, 1981
by Warren M. Christopher
Deputy Secretary of State
of the Government of the United States
By virtue of the powers vested in him by his
Government as deposited with the Govern-
ment of Algeria
n Chronology,
c;ember 1980
c- liber 1
)eputy Secretary Christopher, accom-
Bii by the same delegation that went to
grs with him on Nov. 10-11, departs for
grs to meet with Foreign Minister
turned Benyahia and to brief Algerian in-
t diaries thoroughly on the "clarifications"
if ran requested on the original U.S.
tnse to its conditions for release of
^i^es.
«iiber 2
I.S. reply to Iran clarifying U.S. posi-
in n release of the hostages is delivered
t jerian intermediaries.
■ctiber 4
'hrough Algerian intermediaries, U.S.
khran to speed up discussions on releas-
? jstages to avoid delays if the crisis is
t^solved before the inauguration. The
Silso emphasizes to Iranian officials that
e dent-elect Reagan supports the U.S.
■SI on, and the Iranians must understand
ai f the issue is not settled by January 20,
(M time will be needed to resolve the
is because the new Administration will
iV to select new negotiators and review
nt policy.
Imber 11
,a Beirut, a leftist newspaper, As Safir,
l^ts that the hostages would be released
iristmas day; however, the head of the
in hostage commission denies the
Kt.
e<mber 13
In Alexandria, Virginia, State Depart-
e officials brief hostages' families on
liations with Iran. Deputy Secretary
. ilopher informs them that negotiations,
iWgh the intermediaries, are hampered by
niage problems.
December 15
Bani-Sadr emphasizes that the fate of
the hostages rests on the U.S. unfreezing
Iranian assets held in U.S. banks.
December 16
Khomeini approves Iran's "final answer"
on conditions for releasing hostages. In
Washington, U.S. officials caution against ex-
pecting any quick solution to the problem.
December 18
Iran's new terms for release of hostages
are delivered to Algerian intermediaries.
December 19
In exchange for freeing the hostages
Iran's new terms demand that the U.S.:
• Deposit Iranian funds frozen by
President Carter in the Algerian Central
Bank; and
• Return property owned by the late
Shah and his family.
December 20
U.S. views Iran's conditions as unaccept-
able.
December 21
Iran demands $24 billion in "guarantees"
from the U.S. for recovery of its frozen
assets and the late Shah's wealth.
December 22
Speaker of Iran's Parliament states
hostages will be put on trial if the $24 billion
demand is not met.
December 25
For the second year, the hostages at-
tend makeshift Christmas services. Mon-
signor Annibale Bungnini, the Papal Nuncio
in Iran, helps officiate at the services.
Iranian TV broadcasts a brief film of the
services but plans to release a longer film to
distribute by satellite to American TV net-
works on which hostages are said to send
greetings to families and messages to U.S.
Government.
December 26
Algerian Ambassador to Tehran, Abdel-
karim Gheraieb, visits the 52 hostages and
finds them "all in good health and the condi-
tions of their present existence satisfactory."
CBS and Cable News Network televise
remarks of 20 of the 52 hostages made on
Christmas day in Iran.
Iranian authorities release film of 15
more hostages raising the number shown to
41. Iranian officials state that the remaining
11 not appearing chose not to do so.
Algerian delegation arrives in
Washington.
Secretary Muskie meets with Algerian
intermediaries to discuss keeping the in-
direct negotiations with Iran open. Inter-
mediaries encourage Carter Administration
to keep negotiations going.
December 28
After Iran publicizes portions of recent
exchanges, the U.S. publicizes formal pro-
posals sent to Iran over the last 2 months.
Proposals and supporting material contained
in three separate documents — one on
November 11 and two on December 3 — are
issued.
December 29
U.S. releases response to Iranian Nov. 2
resolution.
U.S. tells Iran that its "basic position"
will not change despite Iran's demand for
financial guarantees in advance of freeing
the hostages.
December 30
U.S. gives Algerians a "reformulation"
of proposals giving Iran an opportunity to
end the crisis during the Carter Administra-
tion.
December 31
Algerian intermediaries depart U.S. for
Algiers. ■
^ _. . .* rtnA
Feature
ESCROW AGREEMENT
JAN. 19, 1981'
This Escrow Agreement is among the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (the
"FED") acting as fiscal agent of the United
States, Bank Markazi Iran, as an interested
party, and the Banque Centrale d'Algerie act-
ing as Escrow Agent.
This Agreement is made to implement the
relevant provisions of the Declaration of the
Government of Algeria of January 19, 1981 (the
"Declaration"). These provisions concern the
establishment of escrow arrangements for Ira-
nian property tied to the release of United
States nationals being held in Iran.
1. In accordance with the obligations set
forth in paragraph 4 of the Declaration, and
commencing upon the entry into force of this
Agreement, the Government of the United
States vdll cause the FED to:
(A) Sell, at a price which is the average
for the middle of the market, bid and ask
prices for the three business days prior to the
sale, all U.S. Govemment securities in its
custody or control as of the date of sale, which
are owned by the Government of Iran, or its
agencies, instrumentalities or controlled en-
tities; and
(B) Transfer to the Bank of England as
depositary for credit to accounts on its books in
the name of the Banque Centrale d'Algerie, as
Escrow Agent under this Agreement, all secu-
rities (other than the aforementioned U.S.
Govemment securities), funds (including the
proceeds from the sale of the aforementioned
U.S. Government securities), and gold bullion
of not less than the same fineness and quality
as that originally deposited by the Govem-
ment of Iran, or its agencies, instrumentalities
or controlled entities, which are in the custody
or control of the FED and owned by the Gov-
emment of Iran, or its agencies, instrumen-
talities or controlled entities as of the date of
such transfer.
When the FED transfers the above Ira-
nian property to the Bank of England, the
FED will promptly send to the Banque Cen-
trale d'Algerie a document containing all in-
formation necessary to identify that Iranian
property (type, source, character as principal
or interest).
Specific details relating to securities,
funds and gold bullion to be transferred by the
FED under this paragraph 1 are attached as
Appendix A.
2. Pursuant to the obligations set forth in
paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 of the Declaration, the
Govemment of the United States will cause
Iranian deposits and securities in foreign
branches and offices of United States banks,
Iranian deposits and securities in domestic
branches and offices of United States banks,
and other Iranian assets (meaning funds or se-
curities) held by persons or institutions subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States, to be
transferred to the FED, as fiscal agent of the
United States, and then by the FED to the
Bank of England for credit to the account on
its books opened in the name of the Banque
Centrale d'Algerie as Escrow Agent under this
Agreement (the Iranian securities, funds and
gold bullion mentioned in paragraph 1 above
and deposits, securities and funds mentioned
in this paragi-aph 2 are referred to collectively
as "Iranian property").
3. Insofar as Iranian property is received
by the Bank of England from the FED in ac-
cordance with this Agreement, the Iranian
property will be held by the Bank of England
in the name of the Banque Centrale d'Algerie
as Escrow Agent as follows:
• The securities will be held in one or
more securities custody accounts at the Bank
of England in the name of the Banque Centrale
d'Algerie as Escrow Agent under this Agree-
ment.
• The deposits and funds will be held in
one or more dollar accounts opened at the
Bank of England in the name of Banque Cen-
trale d'Algerie as Escrow Agent under this
Agreement. These deposits and funds will bear
interest at rates prevailing in money markets
outside the United States.
• The gold bullion will be held in a gold
bullion custody account at the Bank of Eng-
land, in the name of the Banque Centrale
d'Algerie as Escrow Agent under this Agree-
ment.
• It will be understood that the Banque
Centrale d'Algerie shall have no liability for
any reduction in the value of the securities,
bullion, and monies held in its name as Escrow
Agent at the Bank of England under the pro-
visions of this Agreement.
4. (a) As soon as the Algerian Govem-
ment certifies in writing to the Banque Cen-
trale d'Algerie that all 52 United States na-
tionals identified in the list given by the
United States Government to the Algerian
Government in November, 1980, now being
held in Iran, have safely departed from Iran,
the Banque Centrale d'Algerie will immedi-
ately give the instructions to the Bank of Eng-
land specifically contemplated by the pro-
visions of the Declaration and the Undertak-
ings of the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran with respect to the Declara-
tion of the Government of the Democratic and
Popular Republic of Algeria, which are made
part of this Agreement. The contracting par-
ties resolve to work in good faith to resolve
any difficulty that could arise in the course of
implementing this Agreement.
(b) In the event that
(i) either the Government of Iran or
the Govemment of the United States notifies
the Government of Algeria in writing that it
has given notice to terminate its commitments
under the Declaration referred to above, and
(ii) a period of 72 hours eUqjses after
the receipt by the Govemment of Algeria of
such notice, during which period the Banque
Centrale d'Algerie has not given the Bank of
England the instruction described in subpara-
graph (a) above, the Banque Centrale
d'Algerie will immediately give the instruc
tions to the Bank of England specifically cc
templated by the provisions of the Declara!
and the Undertakings of the Govemment o
the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of the Islamic Republic of Iran wil
respect to the Declaration of the Governme
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria.
(c) If the certificate by the Governn
of Algeria referred to in subparagraph (a) 1
been given before the United States Cover
ment has effectively terminated its commit
ment under the Declaration, the Iranian pr
erty shall be transferred as provided in sub
paragraph (a) of this jjaragraph 4.
(d) The funds and deposits held by t
Bank of England under this Agreement wil
earn interest at rates prevailing in money
markets outside the United States after th(
transfer to the account of the Banque Cent;
d'Algerie, as Escrow Agent, with the Bank
England, and such interest will be included
pail of the Iranian property for the purposes
subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph 4.
5. On the date of the signing of this
Agreement by the four parties hereto, the
Banque Centrale d'Algerie and the FED wi
enter into a Technical Arrangement with tk
Bank of England to implement the provisio
of this Agreement.
Pursuant to that Technical Arrangeme
between the FED, the Bank of England am
the Banque Centrale d'Algerie, the FED si
reimburse the Bank of England for losses a
expenses as provided in paragraph 10 there
The FED will not charge the Banque Centi
d'Algerie for any expenses or disbursemeni
related to the implementation of this Agree
ment.
6. This Agreement will become effecti'
as soon as it has been signed by the four pa
ties to it and the Banque Centrale d'Algerii
and the FED have entered into the Technic
Arrangement with the Bank of England re-
ferred to in paragraph 5 of this Agreement.
7. Throughout its duration, this Agree
ment may be amended, canceled, or revoke^
only with the written concurrence of all foit
the signatoi-y parties.
8. Nothing in this Agreement shall be
considered as constituting, in whole or in pa
a waiver of any immunity to which the Bam
Centrale d'Algerie is entitled.
9. A French language version of this
Agreement will be prepared as soon as prac
ticable. The English and French versions w
be equally authentic and of equal value.
10. This Agreement may be executed il
counterparts, each of which con.stitutes an
original.
In Wit.ness Whereof, the parties here
have signed this Agreement on January 20,
1981.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Warren M. Christopher
Department of State Bulle
Feature
THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
?YORK
ISCAL AGENT OF THE UNITED
^ES
iSTT. Patrikis
THE BANK MARKAZI IRAN
THE BANQUE CENTRALE
,GERIE
iMED BeSSEKHOUAD
IDAR BENOUATAF
•ENDIX A
•ities, Gold Bullion, and Funds to be trans-
a by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
national Bank for Reconstruction and
lopment Securities $35 million (face value)
3\ Bullion 1,632,917.746 fine ounces of gold,
good delivery, London bars of a
fineness of 995 parts per 1,000 or
better
1 s Approximately $1.38 billion
r FEMENTS OF ADHERENCE,
11 19. 1981*
/ e authority vested in me as President
' e Constitution and laws of the United
il s, I hereby agree and adhere, on behalf
t ! United States of America, to the pro-
si IS of two Declarations that are being
}i d today by the Government of the
ei )cratie and Popular Republic of Algeria
1) ng to (1) the resolution of the current
is between the United States and Iran
■J! ig out of the detention of the fifty-two
n, d States nationals, and (2) the settle-
e: of claims between the United States
ic ran. The two Declarations shall consti-
it nternational agreements legally binding
K the United States and Iran upon the
ce ition of an equivalent statement of
^•ment and adherence by the Islamic
e) blic of Iran and the delivery of both
at ments to the Government of the Demo-
a: and Popular Republic of Algeria.
Jimmy Carter
ly the authority vested in me as Presi-
Iby the Constitution and laws of the
sd States, I hereby agree and adhere, on
If of the United States of America, to
irovisions of the Undertakings of the
irnment of the United States of America
;he Government of the Islamic Republic
an with respect to the Declaration of the
ttrnment of the Democratic and Popular
eliblic of Algeria. These Undertakings
m constitute an international agreement
legally binding upon the United States and
Iran upon the execution of an equivalent
statement of agreement and adherence by
the Islamic Republic of Iran and the delivery
of both statements to the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.
Jimmy Carter
EXECUTIVE ORDERS,
JAN. 19, 1981'
Direction Relating to Establishment of
Escrow Accounts
By the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and statutes of the
United States, including Section 203 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702). Section 301 of Title 3 of
the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title
22 of the United States Code, and Section
301 of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing unu-
sual and extraordinary threat to the national
security, foreign policy and economy of the
United States upon which I based my decla-
rations of national emergency in Executive
Order 12170, issued November 14, 1979, and
in Executive Order 12211, issued April 17,
1980, in order to implement agreements with
the Government of Iran, as reflected in
Declarations of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
dated January 19, 1981, relating to the
release of U.S. diplomats and nationals being
held as hostages and to the resolution of
claims of United States nationals against
Iran, and to begin the process of normaliza-
tion of relations between the United States
and Iran, it is hereby ordered that as of the
effective date of this Order:
1-101. The Secretary of the Treasury is
authorized to enter into, and to license,
authorize, direct, and compel any appro-
priate official and/or the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, as fiscal agent of the
United States, to enter into escrow or
related agreements with a foreign central
bank and with the Central Bank of Algeria
under which certain money and other assets,
as and when directed by the Secretary of the
Treasury, shall be credited by the foreign
central bank to an escrow account on its
books in the name of the Central Bank of
Algeria, for transfer to the Government of
Iran if and when the Central Bank of Algeria
receives from the Government of Algeria a
certification that the 52 U.S. diplomats and
nationals being held hostage in Iran have
safely departed from Iran. Such agreements
shall include other parties and terms as
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury
to be appropriate to carry out the purposes
of this Order.
1-102. The Secretary of the Treasury is
authorized to license, authorize, direct, and
compel the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, as fiscal agent of the United States, to
receive certain money and other assets in
which Iran or its agencies, instrumentalities,
or controlled entities have an interest and to
hold or transfer such money and other
assets, and any interest earned thereon, in
such a manner as he deems necessary to ful-
fill the rights and obligations of the United
States under the Declaration of the Govern-
ment of the Democratic and Popular Repub-
lic of Algeria dated January 19, 1981, and
the escrow and related agreements described
in paragraph 1-101 of this Order. Such
money and other assets may be held in inter-
est-bearing form and where possible shall be
invested with or through the entity holding
the money or asset on the effective date of
this Order.
1-103. Compliance with this Executive
Order, any other Executive Order licensing,
authorizing, directing or compelling the
transfer of the assets referred to in para-
graphs 1-101 and 1-102 of this Order, or any
regulations, instructions, or directions issued
thereunder shall to the extent thereof be a
full acquittance and discharge for all pur-
poses of the obligation of the person making
the same. No person shall be held liable in
any court for or with respect to anything
done or omitted in good faith in connection
with the administration of, or pursuant to
and in reliance on, such orders, regulations,
instructions, or directions.
1-104. The Attorney General shall seek
to intervene in any litigation within the
United States which arises out of this Order
and shall, among other things, defend the
legality of, and all actions taken pursuant to,
each of its provisions.
1-105. The Secretary of the Treasury is
delegated and authorized to exercise all func-
tions vested in the President by the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur-
poses of this Order.
1-106. This Order shall be effective
immediately.
Jimmy Carter
Direction to Transfer Iranian Government
Assets
By the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and statutes of the
United States, including Section 203 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of
the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title
22 of the United States Code, and Section
301 of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing unu-
sual and extraordinary threat to the national
security, foreign policy and economy of the
United States upon which I based by decla-
rations of national emergency in Executive
Order 12170, issued November 14, 1979, and
in Executive Order 12211, issued April 17,
1980, in order to implement agreements with
the Government of Iran, as reflected in
Declarations of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Feature
dated January 19, 1981, relating to the
release of U.S. diplomats and nationals being
held as hostages and to the resolution of
claims of United States nationals against
Iran, and to begin the process of normaliza-
tion of relations between the United States
and Iran and in which Iran and the United
States instruct and require that the assets
described in this order shall be transferred
as set forth below by the holders of such
assets, it is hereby ordered that as of the ef-
fective date of this Order:
1-101. The Federal Reserve Bank of
New York is licensed, authorized, directed,
and compelled to transfer to accounts at the
Bank of England, and subsequently to trans-
fer to accounts at the Bank of England estab-
lished pursuant to an escrow agreement ap-
proved by the Secretary of the Treasury, all
gold bullion, and other assets (or the equiva-
lent thereof) in its custody, of the Govern-
ment of Iran, or its agencies, instrumental-
ities or controlled entities. Such transfers
shall be executed when and in the manner
directed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
The Secretary of the Treasury is also author-
ized to license, authorize, direct, and compel
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to
engage in whatever further transactions he
deems appropriate and consistent with the
purposes of this Order, including any trans-
actions related to the return of such bullion
and other assets pursuant to the escrow
agreement.
1-102. (a) All licenses and authorizations
tor acquiring or exercising any right, power,
or privilege, by court order, attachment, or
otherwise, including the license contained in
Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations, with respect to the properties
described in Section 1-101 of this Order are
revoked and withdrawn.
(b) All rights, powers, and privileges
relating to the properties described in Sec-
tion 1-101 of this Order and which derive
from any attachment, injunction, other like
proceedings or process, or other action in
any litigation after November 14, 1979, at
8:10 a.m. EST, including those derived from
Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations, other than rights, powers, and
privileges of the Government of Iran and its
agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled
entities, whether acquired by court order or
otherwise, are nullified, and all persons
claiming any such right, power, or privilege
are hereafter barred from exercising the same.
(c) All persons subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States are prohibited from
acquiring or exercising any right, power, or
privilege, whether by court order or other-
wise, with respect to the properties (and any
income earned thereon) referred to in Sec-
tion 1-101 of this Order.
1-103. Compliance with this Order, any
other Executive Order licensing, authorizing,
directing, or compelling the transfer of the
assets described in section 1-101 of this
Order, or any regulations, instructions, or
directions issued thereunder shall to the ex
tent thereof be a full acquittance and dis-
charge for all purposes of the obligation of
the person making the same. No person shall
be held liable in any court for or with respect
to anything done or omitted in good faith in
connection with the administration of, or
pursuant to and in reliance on, such orders,
regulations, instructions, or directions.
1-104. The Attorney General shall seek
to intervene in any litigation within the
United States which arises out of this Order
and shall, among other things, defend the
legality of, and all actions taken pursuant to,
each of its provisions.
1-105. The Secretary of the Treasury is
delegated and authorized to exercise all func-
tions vested in the President by the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur-
poses of this Order.
1-106. This Order shall be effective
immediately.
Jimmy Carter
Direction to Transfer Iranian Government
Assets Overseas
By the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and statutes of the
United States, including Section 203 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of
the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title
22 of the United States Code, and Section
301 of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing unu-
sual and extraordinary threat to the national
security, foreign policy and economy of the
United States upon which I based my decla-
rations of national emergency in Executive
Order 12170, issued November 14, 1979, and
in Executive Order 12211, issued April 17,
1980, in order to implement agreements with
the Government of Iran, as reflected in
Declarations of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
dated January 19, 1981, relating to the
release of U.S. diplomats and nationals being
held as hostages and to the resolution of
claims of United States nationals against
Iran, and to begin the process of normaliza-
tion of relations between the United States
and Iran and in which Iran and the United
States instruct and require that the assets
described in this Order shall be transferred
as set forth below by the holders of such
assets, it is hereby ordered that as of the
effective date of this Order:
1-101. Any branch or office of a United
States bank or subsidiary thereof, which
branch or office is located outside the terri-
tory of the United States and which on or
after 8:10 a.m. E.S.T. on November 14, 1979
(a) has been or is in possession of funds or
securities legally or beneficially owned by
the Government of Iran or its agencies,
instrumentalities, or controlled entities, or
(b) has carried or is carrying on its books
deposits standing to the credit of or bene-
ficially owned by such Government, agen-
cies, instrumentalities, or controlled entit
is licensed, authorized, directed, and com-
pelled to transfer such funds, securities, ;
deposits, including interest from Novemb
14, 1979, at commercially reasonable rate
to the account of the Federal Reserve Ba
of New York at the Bank of England, to t
held or transferred as directed by the Sei
tary of the Treasury. The Secretary of th
Treasury shall determine when the trans
required by this section shall take place,
funds, securities and deposits described ii
this section shall be further transferred a
provided for in the Declaration of the Go'
ernment of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria and its Annex.
1-102. Any banking institution subje
to the jurisdiction of the United States tl
has executed a set-off on or after Noveml
14, 1979, at 8:10 a.m. E.S.T against Irania
funds, securities, or deposits referred to i
section 1-101 is hereby licensed, authoriz;
directed, and compelled to cancel such se
and to transfer all funds, securities, and
deposits which have been subject to such
set-off, including interest from November
1979, at commercially reasonable rates, p
suant to the provisions of section 1-101 o
this Order.
1-103. If the funds, securities, and
deposits described in section 1-101 are ni
promptly transferred to the control of thi
Government of Iran, such funds, securitif
and deposits shall be returned to the ban
ing institutions holding them on the effec
date of this Order and the set-offs descril
in section 1-102 shall be in force as if thi:
Order had not been issued and the status
all such funds, securities, deposits and se
offs shall be status quo ante.
1-104. (a) All licenses and authorizat
for acquiring or exercising any right, pov-
or privilege, by court order, attachment,
otherwise, including the license containet
Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Cor
Regulations, with respect to the properti
described in sections 1-101 and 1-102 of i
Order are revoked and withdrawn.
(b) All rights, powers, and privileges
relating to the properties described in se
tions 1-101 and 1-102 of this Order and
which derive from any attachment, injun(
tion, other like proceedings or process, oi
other action in any litigation after Noven-
14, 1979, at 8:10 a.m. E.S.T., including the
derived from Section 535.504 of the Irani!
Assets Control Regulations, other than
rights, powers, and privileges of the Govt
ment of Iran and its agencies, instrumen-
talities, and controlled entities, whether
acquired by court order or otherwise, are^
nullified, and all persons claiming any sue
right, power, or privilege are hereafter
barred from exercising the same.
(c) All persons subject to the jurisdic
of the United States are prohibited from i
quiring or exercising any right, power, or
privilege, whether by court order or othei
wise, with respect to the properties (and !
income earned thereon) referred to in sec
tions 1-101 and 1-102 of this Order.
Department of State Bulk
Feature
10"). Compliance with this Order, any
jtExocutive Order licensing, authorizing,
'^ng. or compelling the transfer of the
- described in sections 1-101 and 1-102
I irder, or any regulations, instruc-
■ directions issued thereunder shall
int thereof be a full acquittance
^rii.irge for all purposes of the obliga-
tlu- person making the same. No per-
il II he held liable in any court for or
i^iH'Ct to anything done or omitted in
iaiih in connection with the administra-
, or pursuant to and in reliance on,
irders, regulations, instructions, or
cons.
106. The Attorney General shall seek
-[ rvi-ne in any litigation within the
tl States which arises out of this Order
:dl, among other things, defend the
ly of, and all actions taken pursuant to,
1 f Its provisions.
107. The Secretary of the Treasury is
(ted and authorized to exercise all func-
s ested in the President by the Inter-
cil Emergency Economic Powers Act
' ^.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur-
if this Order.
108. This Order shall be effective
U lately.
Jimmy Carter
(in to Transfer Iranian Government
Held by Domestic Banks
authority vested in me as President
.1 Constitution and statutes of the
t States, including Section 203 of the
gitional Emergency Economic Powers
1 ) U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of
r.ited States Code, Section 1732 of Title
»)he United States Code, and Section
{ the National Emergencies Act (50
r.i 1631), in view of the continuing unusu-
B extraordinary threat to the national
J y, foreign policy and economy of the
t States upon which I based my decla-
c; of national emergency in Executive
12170, issued November 14, 1979, and
. lutive Order 12211, issued April 17,
ftn order to implement agreements with
(vernment of Iran, as reflected in
1 ations of the Government of the
n ratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
January 19, 1981, relating to the
. ■ iif U.S. diplomats and nationals
i:held as hostages and to the resolution
\;r\s of United States nationals against
nd to begin the process of normaliza-
iflations between the United States
an and in which Iran and the United
b instruct and require that the assets
c ^ed in this Order shall be transferred
f forth below by the holders of such
it is hereby ordered that as of the
ve date of this Order:
101. Any branch or office of a banking
ition subject to the jurisdiction of the
Iran Chronology,
January 1981
January 2
After 4 days of talks in Washington,
Algerians deliver latest U.S. proposals to
Iran.
January 3
In Tehran, Algerian delegation meets
with Iranian officials to discuss latest U.S.
proposal.
January 4
A report out of Tehran states that three
of the hostages — L. Bruce Laingen, Charge
d'Affaires, Victor L. Tomseth, a political of-
ficer, and Michael Howland, a State Depart-
ment security officer — have been transferred
from the Foreign Ministry in Tehran to a
secret location.
January 6
Khomeini gives approval of Algerian
assistance in efforts to release hostages.
January 7
Deputy Secretary Christopher departs
for Algiers to discuss the status of the nego-
tiations with the Algerian delegation.
January 8
President-elect Reagan states that he
could honor any agreement with Iran made
by President Carter but also says he
reserves the right to draw up new proposals
if the crisis is not settled by Jan. 20.
January 9
Deputy Secretary Christopher extends
his stay in Algeria because of questions
raised by Iranians about U.S. proposals.
January 12
Two bills are introduced by the Iranian
Parliament as "emergency" legislation to
speed up an agreement with the U.S. One
bill would authorize third-party arbitration
of claims against Iranian assets and the
other would "nationalize" the late Shah's
wealth.
January 13
Parliament postpones voting on two
bills.
January 14
Parliament approves the bill permitting
third-party arbitration of claims on Iranian
assets.
January 15
Chief Iranian negotiator, Behzad
Nabavi, Iran's Minister of State for Execu-
tive Affairs, warns the U.S. that if Iran's
"unencumbered frozen assets" are not
deposited in Algerian banks by Friday, close
of business, negotiations would stop.
January 16
In the event an agreement is made.
President Carter takes two major steps:
• He orders an exchange transaction
of over $900 millon worth of gold with Brit-
ain for eventual transfer to Iran; and
• He orders the sale of Iranian-owned
treasury securities in the New York Federal
Reserve Bank so that the money can be
transferred to Iran.
Nabavi withdraws his earlier statement
and declares that there is "no obstacle" to
concluding an agreement.
A team of legal and financial experts —
five Americans and three British — meet in
Algiers in an effort to resolve remaining
problems.
January 17
Twelve major U.S. banks reportedly
agree that if Tehran agrees to repay a por-
tion of the debts owed them immediately and
to settle the rest later, they would drop
lawsuits.
At Iran's request, Algeria sends a team
of physicians to visit hostages to confirm
their good health.
January 18
U.S. and Iran sign final documents
agreeing on central issues and issue a final
declaration for release of the hostages.
January 19
Freedom of hostages is delayed by
objections raised by Iranians over an "appen-
dix" that U.S. bankers reportedly added to
the hostage release agreement.
January 20
After 444 days in captivity, hostages are
freed!
Two Algerian airliners take them to
Algiers where they are met by Deputy
Secretary Christopher, Algerian Foreign
Minister Benyahia, and U.S. Ambassador to
Algeria Ulric Haynes, Jr. After a welcoming
ceremony, the hostages are transferred to
U.S. Air Force planes which take them to
Frankfurt, West Germany, where they board
busses which take them to a military
hospital in Weisbaden.
January 25
Air Force plane — "Freedom One" — ar-
rives at Stewart International Airport, New-
burgh, New York, carrying the 52 former
hostages. The Americans are greeted by
their families and, after a 70-minute bus ride,
arrive at West Point Military Academy.
January 27
The 53 former hostages, including
Richard Queen who was released by the Ira-
nian revolutionaries in July 1980, arrive in
Washington, D.C., where they are greeted,
in an official ceremony, by President Reagan,
other U.S. officials, and government em-
ployees on the South Lawn of the White
House. ■
tiiarv 1P81
Feature
United States, which branch or office is
located within the United States and is, on
the effective date, either (a) in possession of
funds or securities legally or beneficially
owned by the Government of Iran or its
agencies, instrumentalities, or controlled
entities, or (b) carrying on its books deposits
standing to the credit of or beneficially owned
by such Government, agencies, instrumental-
ities, or controlled entities, is licensed,
authorized, directed and compelled to
transfer such funds, securities, and deposits,
including interest from November 14, 1979,
at commercially reasonable rates, to the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to be
held or transferred as directed by the
Secretary of the Treasury.
1-102. (a) All licenses and authorizations
for acquiring or exercising any right, power,
or privilege, by court order, attachment, or
otherwise, including the license contained in
Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations, with respect to the properties
described in Section 1-101 of this Order are
revoked and withdrawn.
(b) All rights, powers, and privileges
relating to the properties described in Sec-
tion 1-101 of this Order and which derive
from any attachment, injunction, other like
proceedings or process, or other action in
any litigation after November 14, 1979, at
8:10 a.m. EST, including those derived from
Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations, other than rights, powers, and
privileges of the Government of Iran and its
agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled
entities, whether acquired by court order or
otherwise, are nullified, and all persons
claiming any such right, power, or privilege
are hereafter barred from exercising the same.
(c) All persons subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States are prohibited from
acquiring or exercising any right, power, or
privilege whether by court order or other-
wise, with respect to the properties (and any
income earned thereon) referred to in Sec-
tion 1-101 of this Order.
1-103. Compliance with this Order, any
other Executive Order licensing, authorizing,
directing or compelling the transfer of the
assets described in Section 1-101 of this
Order, or any regulations, instructions, or
directions issued thereunder shall to the ex-
tent thereof be a full acquittance and dis-
charge for all purposes of the obligation of
the person making the same. No person shall
be held liable in any court for or with
respect to anything done or omitted in good
faith in connection with the administration
of, or pursuant to and in reliance on, such
orders, regulations, instructions, or directions.
1-104. The Attorney General shall seek
to intervene in any litigation within the
United States which arises out of this Order
and shall, among other things, defend the
legality of, and all actions taken pursuant to,
each of its provisions.
1-105. The Secretary of the Treasury is
delegated and authorized to exercise all func-
tions vested in the President by the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur-
poses of this Order.
1-106. This Order shall be effective
immediately.
Jimmy Carter
Direction to Transfer Iranian Government
Financial Assets Held by Non-Banking
Institutions
By the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and statutes of the
United States, including Section 203 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of
the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title
22 of the United States Code, and Section
301 of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing
unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy and economy
of the United States upon which I based my
declarations of national emergency in Exec-
utive Order 12170, issued November 14,
1979, and in Executive Order 12211, issued
April 17, 1980, in order to implement
agreements with the Government of Iran, as
reflected in Declarations of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria dated January 19, 1981, relating to
the release of U.S. diplomats and nationals
being held as hostages and to the resolution
of claims of United States nationals against
Iran, and to begin the process of normaliza-
tion of relations between the United States
and Iran and in which Iran and the United
States instruct and require that the assets
described in this Order shall be transferred
as set forth below by the holders of such
assets, it is hereby ordered that as of the
effective date of this Order:
1-101. Any person subject to the juris-
diction of the United States which is not a
banking institution and is on the effective
date in possession or control of funds or
securities of Iran or its agencies, instrumen-
talities, or controlled entities is licensed,
authorized, directed and compelled to trans-
fer such funds or securities to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York to be held or
transferred as directed by the Secretary of
the Treasury.
1-102. (a) All licenses and authorizations
for acquiring or exercising any right, power,
or privilege, by court order, attachment, or
otherwise, including the license contained in
Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations, with respect to the properties
described in Section 1-101 of this Order are
revoked and withdrawn.
(b) All rights, powers, and privileges
relating to the properties described in sec-
tion 1-101 of this Order and which derive
from any attachment, injunction, other like
proceedings or process, or other action in
any litigation after November 14, 1979, at
8:10 a.m. EST, including those derived from
Section 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control
Regulations, other than rights, powers, and
privileges of the Government of Iran and its
agencies, instrumentalities, and controj
entities, whether acquired by court ore
otherwise, are nullified, and all person;
claiming any such right, power, or priv
are hereafter barred from exercising th
(c) All persons subject to the jurisi
of the United States are prohibited fro
acquiring or exercising any right, powe
privilege, whether by court order or ot
wise, with respect to the properties (ar
income earned thereon) referred to in '
tion 1-101 of this Order.
1-103. Compliance with this ExecL
Order, any other Executive Order licer
authorizing, directing or compelling tht
transfer of the assets described in para
1-101 of this Order, or any regulations,
instructions, or directions issued therei
shall to the extent thereof be a full acq
tance and discharge for all purposes of
obligation of the person making the sai
No person shall be held liable in any cc
for or with respect to anything done oi
omitted in good faith in connection wit
administration of, or pursuant to and ii
ance on, such orders, regulations, instr
tions, or directions.
1-104. The Attorney General shall
to intervene in any litigation within th'
United States which arises out of this i
and shall, among other things, defend t
legality of and all actions taken pursua
each of its provisions.
1-105. The Secretary of the Treas
delegated and authorized to exercise a
tions vested in the President by the In
national Emergency Economic Powers
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out thi
poses of this Order.
1-106. This Order shall be effectiv
immediately.
Jimmy Cai
Direction to Transfer Certain Iranian
Government Assets
By the authority vested in me as Presi>
by the Constitution and statutes of the
United States, including Section 203 of
International Emergency Economic Po'
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Tit
the United States Code, Section 1732 o
22 of the United States Code, and Sect
301 of the National Emergencies Act (£
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing
unusual and extraordinary threat to th
tional security, foreign policy and ecom
of the United States upon which I base
declarations of national emergency in E
utive Order 12170. issued November 14
1979, and in Executive Order 12211, iss
April 17, 1980. in order to implement a
ments with the Government of Iran, as
reflected in Declarations of the Govern
of the Democratic and Popular Republi'
Algeria dated January 19, 1981, relatin
the release of U.S. diplomats and natioi
being held as hostages and to the resol
of claims of United States nationals aga
Iran, and to begin the process of norma
tion of relations between the United St
and Iran and in which Iran and the Uni
Department of State Bu
instruct and require that the assets
bed in this Order shall be transferred
forth below by the holders of such
. it is hereby ordered that as of the
ve date of this Order:
-101. All persons subject to the juris-
n of the United States in possession or
ol of properties, not including funds and
ities, owned by Iran or its agencies,
imentalities, or controlled entities are
ed, authorized, directed and compelled
nsfer such properties, as directed after
tfective date of this Order by the Gov-
3nt of Iran, acting through its authorized
. Except where specifically stated, this
e, authorization, and direction does not
e persons subject to the jurisdiction of
nited States from existing legal require-
1 other than those based upon the Inter-
lal Emergency Economic Powers Act.
-102. (a) All licenses and authorizations
quiring or exercising any right, power,
vilege, by court order, attachment, or
wise, including the license contained in
>n 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control
ations, with respect to the properties
bed in Section 1-101 of this Order are
Jed and withdrawn.
I }) All rights, powers, and privileges
,1 ng to the properties described in sec-
J -101 of this Order and which derive
! iny attachment, injunction, other like
I,) sdings or process, or other action in
ji ligation after November 14, 1979, at
,j .m. EST, including those derived from
jl m 535.504 of the Iranian Assets Control
y ations, other than rights, powers, and
liges of the Government of Iran and its
,j ies, instrumentalities, and controlled
1 is, whether acquired by court order or
I f/ise, are nullified, and all persons
't ng any such right, power, or privilege
ireafter barred from exercising the same.
■ :) All persons subject to the jurisdiction
United States are prohibited from
ing or exercising any right, power, or
;ge, whether by court order or other-
with respect to the properties (and any
e earned thereon) referred to in Sec-
101 of this Order.
103. Compliance with this Executive
any other Executive Order licensing,
rizing, directing or compelling the
:'er of the assets described in paragraph
of this Order, or any regulations,
ctions, or directions issued thereunder
to the extent thereof be a full acquit-
and discharge for all purposes of the
ition of the person making the same,
irson shall be held liable in any court
with respect to anything done or
ed in good faith in connection with the
listration of, or pursuant to and in reli-
on, such orders, regulations, instruc-
or directions.
-104. The Attorney General shall seek
ervene in any litigation within the
d States which arises out of this Order
hall, among other things, defend the
ty of, and all actions taken pursuant to,
of its provisions.
1-105. The Secretary of the Treasury is
delegated and authorized to exercise all func-
tions vested in the President by the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur-
poses of this Order.
1-106. This Order shall be effective
immediately.
Jimmy Carter
Revocation of Prohibitions Against
Transactions Involving Iran
By the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and statutes of the
United States, including Section 203 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of
the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title
22 of the United States Code, and Section
301 of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing
unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy and economy
of the United States upon which I based my
declarations of national emergency in Exec-
utive Order 12170, issued November 14,
1979, and in Executive Order 12211, issued
April 17, 1980, in order to implement agree-
ments with the Government of Iran, as
reflected in Declarations of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria dated January 19, 1981, relating to
the release of U.S. diplomats and nationals
being held as hostages and to the resolution
of claims of United States nationals against
Iran, and to begin the process of normaliza-
tion of relations between the United States
and Iran, it is hereby ordered that as of the
effective date of this Order:
1-101. The prohibitions contained in
Executive Order 12205 of April 7, 1980, and
Executive Order 12211 of April 17, 1980, and
Proclamation 4702 of November 12, 1979, are
hereby revoked.
1-102. The Secretary of the Treasury is
delegated and authorized to exercise all func-
tions vested in the President by the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur-
pose of this Order.
1-103. This Order shall be effective
immediately.
Jimmy Carter
Non-Prosecution of Claims of Hostages
and for Actions at the United States Embassy
and Elsewhere
By the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and statutes of the
United States, including Section 203 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of
the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title
22 of the United States Code, and Section
301 of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing
unusual and extraordinary threat to the na-
tional security, foreign policy and economy
Feature
of the United States upon which I based my
declarations of national emergency in Ex-
ecutive Order 12170, issued November 14,
1979, and in Executive Order 12211, issued
April 17, 1980, in order to implement
agreements with the Government of Iran, as
reflected in Declarations of the Government
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria dated January 19, 1981, relating to
the release of U.S. diplomats and nationals
being held as hostages and to the resolution
of claims of United States nationals against
Iran, and to begin the process of normaliza-
tion of relations between the United States
and Iran, it is hereby ordered that as of the
effective date of this Order:
1-101. The Secretary of the Treasury
shall promulgate regulations: (a) prohibiting
any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction from
prosecuting in any court within the United
States or elsewhere any claim against the
Government of Iran arising out of events
occurring before the date of this Order
relating to (1) the seizure of the hostages on
November 4, 1979, (2) their subsequent
detention, (3) injury to United States prop-
erty or property of United States nationals
within the United States Embassy compound
in Tehran after November 3, 1979, or (4) in-
jury to United States nationals or their prop-
erty as a result of popular movements in the
course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran
which were not an act of the Government of
Iran; (b) prohibiting any person not a U.S.
national from prosecuting any such claim in
any court within the United States; (c) order-
ing the termination of any previously insti-
tuted judicial proceedings based upon such
claims; and (d) prohibiting the enforcement
of any judicial order issued in the course of
such proceedings.
1-102. The Attorney General of the
United States is authorized and directed,
immediately upon the issuance of regulations
in accordance with Section 1-101, to take all
appropriate measures to notify all appro-
priate courts of the existence of this Order
and implementing regulations and the result-
ing termination of litigation.
1-103. The Secretary of the Treasury is
delegated and authorized to exercise all func-
tions vested in the President by the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur-
pose of this Order.
1-104. This Order shall be effective
immediately.
Jimmy Carter
Restrictions on the Transfer of Property of
the Former Shah of Iran
By the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and statutes of the
United States, including Section 203 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of
the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title
22 of the United States Code, and Section
301 of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing unu-
Feature
sual and extraordinary threat to the national
security, foreign policy and economy of the
United States upon which I based my decla-
rations of national emergency in Executive
Order 12170, issued November 14, 1979, and
in Executive Order 12211, issued April 17,
1980, in order to implement agreements with
the Government of Iran, as reflected in
Declarations of the Government of Demo-
cratic and Popular Republic of Algeria dated
January 19, 1981, relating to the release of
U.S. diplomats and nationals being held as
hostages and to the resolution of claims of
United States nationals against Iran, and to
begin the process of normalization of rela-
tions between the United States and Iran, it
is hereby ordered that as of the effective
date of this Order-
1-101. For the purpose of protecting the
rights of litigants in courts within the United
States, all property and assets located in the
United States within the control of the es-
tate of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the former
Shah of Iran, or any close relative of the
former Shah served as a defendant in litiga-
tion in such courts brought by Iran seeking
the return of property alleged to belong to
Iran, is hereby blocked as to each such
estate or person until all such litigation
against such estate or person is finally
terminated.
1-102. The Secretary of the Treasury is
authorized and directed (a) to promulgate
regulations requiring all persons who are
subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and who, as of November 3, 1979, or
as of this date, have actual or constructive
possession of property of the kind described
in Section 1-101, or knowledge of such pos-
session by others, to report such possession
or knowledge thereof, to the Secretary of
the Treasury in accordance with such regula-
tions and (b) to make available to the Gov-
ernment of Iran or its designated agents all
identifying information derived from such
reports to the fullest extent permitted by
law. Such reports shall be required as to all
individuals described in 1-101 and shall be
required to be filed within 30 days after
publication of a notice in the Federal
Register.
1-103. The Secretary of the Treasury is
authorized and directed (a) to require all
agencies within the Executive Branch of the
United States Government to deliver to the
Secretary all official financial books and
records which serve to identify any property
of the kind described in Section 1-101 of this
Order, and (b) to make available to the Gov-
ernment of Iran or its designated agents all
identifying information derived from such
books and records to the fullest extent per-
mitted by law.
1-104. The Attorney General of the
United States having advised the President
of his opinion that no claim on behalf of the
Government of Iran for the recovery of prop-
erty of the kind described in Section 1-101
of this Order should be considered legally
barred either by sovereign immunity prin-
ciples or by the act of state doctrine, the
Attorney General is authorized and directed
to prepare, and upon the request of counsel
representing the Government of Iran to pre-
sent to the appropriate court or courts
within the United States, suggestions of
interest reflecting that such is the position
of the United States, and that it is also the
position of the United States that Iranian de-
crees and judgments relating to the assets of
the former Shah and the persons described
in Section 1-101 should be enforced by such
courts in accordance with United States law.
1-105. The Secretary of the Treasury is
delegated and authorized to exercise all func-
tions vested in the President by the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the pur-
poses of this Order.
1-106. This Order shall be effective
immediately.
Jimmy Carter
President's Commission on
Hostage Compensation
By the authority vested in me by the Consti-
tution and statutes of the United States of
America, and as President of the United
States of America, in accordance with the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, as
amended (5 U.S.C. App. I), it is hereby
ordered as follows:
1-1. Establishment.
1-101. There is established the Presi-
dent's Commission on Hostage Compensa-
tion, hereinafter referred to as the Commis-
sion, which shall be composed of not more
than nine members who shall be appointed
by the President.
1-102. The President shall designate a
Chairman from among the members.
1-2. Functions.
1-201. The Commission shall study and
analyze, and make recommendations to the
President on, the question whether the
United States should provide financial com-
pensation to United States nationals who
have been held in captivity outside the
United States, either (1) by or with the
approval of a foreign government, or (2) by
reason of their status as employees of the
United States Government or as dependents
of such employees.
1-202. The Commission shall submit a
report to the President ninety days after the
date of this Order. The report shall contain
the Commission's recommendations as to
whether legislation to deal with the fore-
going compensation issue is appropriate and,
if so, as to what such legislation should pro-
vide. The report shall specifically contain the
Commission's recommendations concerning
the compensation of United States nationals
held hostage in Iran on and after November
4, 1979.
1-203. In analyzing the foregoing issues
the Commission shall consider all factors
which it may consider relevant, including the
prior practice with respect to governmer
compensation, both by the United States
Government and by foreign government?
persons held in captivity abroad.
1-204. In the performance of its fun(
tions the Commission shall specifically ac
dress the following issues:
(a) whether any legislation authorizii
compensation should set forth specific lei
lative standards, or whether the standard
by which to award compensation should 1
administratively developed;
(b) whether any standards developec
either legislatively or administratively
should be applied uniformly to civilian ar
military government employees, dependt
of such employees, and private citizens, (
whether separate criteria should be deved
oped for these or other categories; i
(c) whether an existing administratis^
body should determine amounts of compi
tion, or whether a new body should be e:
lished for this purpose; and
(d) whether compensation should be
for injuries suffered by members of fami
of persons who have been held in captivi
1-3. Administrative Provisions.
1-301. In performing its functions tl
Commission shall conduct such studies,
reviews, and inquiries as may be necessi
In addition to conducting open meetings
accordance with the Federal Advisory C
mittee Act, the Commission shall conduc
public hearings to identify critical issues
possible solutions related to compensatic
1-302. The Commission is authorize^
request from any Executive agency such
information that may be deemed necesst
to carry out its functions under this Ord
Each Executive agency shall, to the extt
permitted by law, furnish such informati
to the Commission in the performance ol
functions under this Order.
1-303. Each member of the Commis
who is not otherwise employed in the Fe
eral Government may receive, to the exi
permitted by law. compensation for each
he or she is engaged in the work of the (
mission at a rate not to exceed the maxii
daily rate now or hereafter prescribed b
law for GS-18 of the General Schedule, i
may also receive transportation and trav
expenses, including per diem in lieu of si
sistance, as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. J
and 5703).
1-304. All necessary administrative
services, support, facilities, and expenses
the Commission shall, to the extent per-
mitted by law, be furnished by the Depa
ment of State.
1-4. General Provisions.
1-401. Notwithstanding the provisio
of any other Executive Order, the functi
of the President under the Federal Advi
Committee Act. as amended (5 U.S.C. Ap
except that of reporting annually to the
gress, which are applicable to the Comm
sion, shall be performed by the Secretar
Department of State Bui
I in accordance with guidelines and pro-
-es established by the Administrator of
ral Services.
1-402. The Commission shall terminate
ic y days after submitting its report.
Jimmy Carter
e$SAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
19. 1981'
uant to Section 204(b) of the Interna-
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50
. 1703, I hereby report to the Congress
I have today exercised the authority
ted by this Act to take certain measures
respect to property of the Government
an and its controlled entities and instru-
alities.
1. On November 14, 1979, I took the
of blocking certain property and inter-
in property of the Government of Iran
ts controlled entities and instrumental-
This action was taken in response to a
s of aggressive actions by Iran, includ-
he attack on the United States Embassy
hran, the holding of U.S. citizens and
mats as hostages, and threats to with-
assets from United States banks, and
pwise seek to harm the economic and
ical interests of the United States. Sub-
ently, on April 7. 1980, and April 17,
, I took further action restricting
)us kinds of transactions with Iran by
ons subject to the jurisdiction of the
ed States.
m 2. Agreement has now been reached
Iran concerning the release of the hos-
; and the settlement of claims of U.S.
i( mals against Iran. Among other things
agreement involves the payment by Iran
iproximately $3.67 billion to pay off prin-
and interest outstanding on syndicated
agreements in which a U.S. bank is a
lis y. This includes making all necessary
Ftjients to the foreign members of these
icates. An additional $1,418 billion shall
lin available to pay all other loans as
as any disputes as to the amounts in-
iiiijed are settled and to pay additional
est to banks upon agreement or arbitra-
with Iran. In addition, there will be
blished an international tribunal to
dicate various disputed claims by U.S.
mals against Iran; and the deposit of $1
)n by Iran from previously blocked
ts as released, which will be available
)ayments of awards against Iran. Iran
committed itself to replenish this fund as
pa ssary. This tribunal, among other things,
also hear certain disputes between
ian nationals and the United States Gov-
nent and contractual disputes between
and the United States.
In connection with this agreement, and
Ivis egin the process of normalization of rela-
between the two countries, I have
!,;( ed and will issue, a series of Orders.
3. First, I have signed an Executive
sr authorizing the Secretary of the
isury to enter into or to direct the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York to enter into
escrow and depositary agreements with the
Bank of England.
Under these agreements, assets in the
escrow account will be returned to the con-
trol of Iran upon the safe departure of the
United States hostages from Iran. I have
also by this Order instructed the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York, as fiscal agent of
the United States, to receive other blocked
Iranian assets, and, as further directed by
the Secretary of the Treasury, to transfer
these assets to the escrow account.
4. Second, I have signed an Executive
Order directing the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York to transfer to its account at the
Bank of England and then to the escrow ac-
count referred to in the preceding para-
graph, the assets of the Governm.ent of Iran,
both transfers to take place as and when
directed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
In order to assure that this transaction
can be executed, and having considered the
claims settlement agreement described above,
I have exercised my authority to nullify, and
barred the exercise of, all rights, powers or
privileges acquired by anyone; I have revoked
all licenses and authorizations for acquiring
any rights, powers, or privileges; and I have
prohibited anyone from acquiring or exercis-
ing any right, power, or privileges, all with
respect to these properties of Iran. These
prohibitions and nullifications apply to
rights, powers, or privileges whether ac-
quired by court order, attachment, or other-
wise. I have also prohibited any attachment
or other like proceeding or process affecting
these properties.
5. Third, I have signed an Executive
Order which directs branches and offices of
United States banks located outside the
United States to transfer all Iranian govern-
ment funds, deposits and securities held by
them on their books on or after November
14. 1979 at 8:10 a.m. EST to the account of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at
the Bank of England in London. These assets
will be transferred to the account of the Cen-
tral Bank of Algeria, as escrow agent. The
transfer is to include interest from the date
of the blocking order at commercially reason-
able rates. In addition, any banking institu-
tion that has executed a set-off subsequent to
the date of the blocking order against Iranian
deposits covered by this order is directed to
cancel the set-off and to transfer the funds
that had been subject to the set-off in the
same manner as the other overseas deposits.
This Order also provides for the revoca-
tion of licenses and the nullifications and
bars described in paragraph 4 of this report.
6. Fourth, I will have signed an Execu-
tive Order directing American banks located
within the United States which hold Iranian
deposits to transfer those deposits, including
interest from the date of entry of the block-
ing order at commercially reasonable rates,
to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
to be held or transferred as directed by the
Secretary of the Treasury. Half of these
funds will be transferred to Iran and the
other half (up to a maximum of $1 billion)
^,.. , nnoi
Feature
will be placed in a security account as pro-
vided in the Declaration and the Claims Set-
tlement Agreement that are part of the
agreement we have reached with Iran. This
fund will be maintained at a $500 million
level until the claims program is concluded.
While these transfers should take place as
soon as possible, I have been advised that
court actions may delay it. This Order also
provides for the revocation of licenses and
the nullifications and bars described in para-
graph 4 of this report.
7. Fifth, I have signed an Executive
Order directing the transfer to the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York by non-banking
institutions of funds and securities held by
them for the Government of Iran, to be held
or transferred as directed by the Secretary
of the Treasury. This transfer will be accom-
plished at approximately the same time as
that described in paragraph 6.
This Order also provides for the revoca-
tion of licenses and the nullifications and
bars described in paragraph 4 of this report.
8. Sixth, I will sign, upon release of the
hostages, an Executive Order directing any
person subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States who is in possession or control
of properties owned by Iran, not including
funds and securities, to transfer the prop-
erty as directed by the Government of Iran
acting through its authorized agent. The
Order recites that it does not relieve persons
subject to it from existing legal require-
ments other than those based on the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act. This
Order does not apply to contingent liabil-
ities. This Order also provides for the revo-
cation of licenses and the nullifications and
bars described in paragraph 4 of this report.
9. Seventh, I will sign, upon release of
the hostages, an Executive Order revoking
prohibitions previously imposed against
transactions involving Iran. The Executive
Order revokes prohibitions contained in
Executive Order No. 12205 of April 7, 1980;
and Executive Order No. 12211 of April 17,
1980; and the amendments contained in Proc-
lamation No. 4702 of November 12, 1979. The
two Executive Orders limited trade and
financial transactions involving Iran and
travel to Iran. The proclamation restricted
oil imports. In revoking these sanctions I
have no intention of superseding other exist-
ing controls relating to exports including the
Arms Export Control Act and the Export
Administration Act.
10. Eighth, I will sign, upon release of
the hostages, an Executive Order providing
for the waiver of certain claims against Iran.
The Order directs that the Secretary of the
Treasury shall promulgate regulations: (a)
prohibiting any person subject to U.S. juris-
diction from prosecuting in any court within
the United States or elsewhere any claim
against the Government of Iran arising out
of events occurring before the date of this
Order arising out: (1) the seizure of the hos-
tages on November 4, 1979; (2) their subse-
quent detention; (3) injury to the United
States property or property of United States
nationals within the United States Embassy
13
Feature
compound in Tehran after November 1979;
(4) or injury to United States nationals or
their property as a result of popular move-
ments in the course of the Islamic Revolu-
tion in Iran which were not an act of the
Government of Iran; (b) prohibiting any per-
son not a U.S. national from prosecuting any
such claim in any court within the United
States; (c) ordering the termination of any
previously instituted judicial proceedings
based upon such claims; and (d) prohibiting
the enforcement of any judicial order issued
in the course of such proceedings.
The Order also authorizes and directs
the Attorney General of the United States
immediately upon the issuance of such a
Treasury regulation to notify all appropriate
courts of the existence of the Executive
Order and implementing regulations and the
resulting termination of relevant litigation.
At the same time, I will create a commission
to make recommendations on the issue of
compensation for those who have been held
as hostages.
11. Finally, I will sign, upon release of
the hostages, an Executive Order invoking
the blocking powers of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act to prevent
the transfer of property located in the
United States and controlled by the estate of
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the former Shah
or Iran, or by any close relative of the
former Shah served as a defendant in litiga-
tion in the United States courts brought by
Iran seeking the return of property alleged
to belong to Iran. This Order will remain
effective as to each person until litigation
concerning such person or estate is termi-
nated. The Order also requires reports from
private citizens and Federal agencies con-
cerning this property so that information can
be made available to the Government of Iran
about this property.
The Order would further direct the At-
torney General to assert in appropriate courts
that claims of Iran for recovery of this prop-
erty are not barred by principles of sovereign
immunity or the act of state doctrine.
12. In addition to these actions taken
pursuant to the International Economic
Emergency Powers Act, other relevant stat-
utes, and my powers under the Constitution,
I will take the steps necessary to withdraw
all claims now pending against Iran before
the International Court of Justice. Copies of
the Executive Orders are attached.
Jimmy Carter
TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENT
JAN. 20, 1981^
TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENT
BETWEEN
BANQUE CENTRALE D'ALGERIE
AS ESCROW AGENT
AND
THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY
OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND
AND
THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF NEW YORK AS FISCAL
AGENT OF THE UNITED STATES
This Technical Arrangement is made between
the Banque Centrale d'Algerie (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the "Escrow Agent") as Escrow
Agent, the Governor and Company of the
Bank of England (hereinafter referred to as
the "Bank"), and the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York as fiscal agent of the United States
(hereinafter referred to as the"FED").
1. The Bank is hereby appointed to hold,
invest and distribute, in accordance with the
terms of this Technical Arrangement, such of
the funds and other property (as identified by
the FED on its sole responsibility at the time
of transfer) as may be transferred to them by
the FED and such other funds or property
representing such funds and other property as
may from time to time be held by the Bank on
such accounts or invested by the Bank pur-
suant to paragraph 4 hereof (all of which funds
and property are collectively referred to as the
"Escrow Fund"). The Bank shall act as a de-
positary and shall hold and invest the Escrow
Fund in accordance with the arrangements de-
scribed herein until such time as the Escrow
F'und shall have been distributed as provided
in paragraph 7 below.
2. The Bank will open in the name of the
Escrow Agent the following accounts:
(A) Two securities custody accounts,
Securities Custody Account No. 1 and Securi-
ties Custody Account No. 2 (the "Securities
Custody Accounts");
(B) Three accounts denominated in US
dollars, "Dollar Account No. 1", "Dollar Ac-
count No. 2" and "Dollar Account No. 3" (the
"Dollar Accounts");
(C) A gold bullion custody account (the
"Bullion Account") and shall credit the securi-
ties to Securities Custody Account No. 1, the
dollar deposits to Dollar Account No. 1 and the
gold bullion to the Bullion Account when trans-
ferred to the Bank by the FED for deposit on
such accounts, and shall provide the Escrow
Agent with a general description of the funds
and other property so transferred.
3. The Bank shall
(A) Hold the securities for the time
being in the Securities Custody Accounts in
accordance with the provisions of this Ar-
rangement;
(B) Hold the gold bullion for the tim.e
being in the Bullion Account in accordance
with the provisions of this Arrangement; and
(C) Hold the funds for the time bein
the Dollar Accounts on a call basis, so as tc
ensure the liquidity of those funds, and in ;
cordance with the provisions of this Arranj
ment.
4. (a) The Bank shall make a good fait
effort under the circumstances to invest an
reinvest outside the United States the func
on the Dollar Accounts at market rates wit
such banks and in such manner as the Ban!
may determine and will pay by way of inte
on the funds on those Dollar Accounts sum
equivalent to those received by them, subji
nevertheless to the deduction from Dollar ^
count No. 2 of sums equivalent to the amoi
of their reasonable costs, charges and expe
in respect to the maintenance and operation
Dollar Account No. 2.
(b) Any interest received on the seer
ties in the Securities Custody Account No.
shall be credited to Dollar Account No. 1 ar
any interest received on the Securities
Custody Account No. 2 shall be credited to
Dollar Account No. 3.
5. The Bank shall invest all monies repi
senting interest paid in respect of any part
the Escrow Fund in the same manner as ar
funds for the time being on deposit on the I
lar Accounts.
6. The Bank shall not have or incur an
liability by reason of any diminution in valu
the securities or gold bullion for the time bi-
held by them in the name of the Escrow Ag
on the Securities Custody Accounts and thi
BulHon Account, respectively.
Similarly, the Escrow Agent shall not
have or incur any liability by reason of any
minution in value of the securities or gold t
lion for the time being held in its name by t
Bank on the Securities Custody Accounts a
the Bullion Account respectively. Moreover
the Escrow Agent shall not have or incur a
liability for any loss arising from investmer
the funds held for the Escrow Agent on the
Dollar Accounts.
In addition, the Escrow Agent shall no
bear nor be liable for any expenses, charge:
costs or fees of any kind incurred by the Ba
or the FED in performance of their duties
under this Arrangement.
7. In the performance of their duties
under this Arrangement, the Bank shall no
exercise any discretion de.signed to favour c
of the parties to this Arrangement and shal
act only on the instructions of the Escrow
Agent.
(a) Provided that no previous instruc
tion has been received under subparagi'aph
below, upon receipt of instructions from the
Escrow Agent to do so, in the form provide
paragraph 8 below, the Bank shall immedial
transfer the funds then held on Dollar Acco
No. 1 as follows:
(i) U.S. Dollars 3,667,000,000 to th
FED, .subject to the FED's sole direction;
(ii) U.S. Dollars 1,418,000,000 to D
lar Account No. 2; and
(ill) the balance to an account of Bi
Markazi Iran opened at the Bank, subject ti
Bank Markazi Iran's sole direction
Department of State Bulle
"tnsfer the securities and bullion then
the Securities Custody Account No. 1
e Bullion Account respectively to the ac-
"^f Bank Markazi Iran at the Bank, sub-
Bank Markazi Iran's sole direction.
(b) Provided that no previous instruc-
III s been received under subparagraph (a)
upon receipt of instructions from the
V Agent to do so, in the form provided in
j| aph 8 below, the Bank shall immediately
fi !r the Escrow Fund to the account of the
t the Bank, subject to the FED's sole
on, and close all the Accounts opened
f'^ paragraph 2 of this Arrangement.
(c) Any funds or securities received by
nk from the FED for deposit on any of
ounts described in paragraph 2 of this
jement, other than Dollar Account No.
r receipt and execution by the Bank of
tructions referred to in subparagraph
ve, shall be credited in accordance with
4tructions of the Escrow Agent in the
rovided in paragraph 8 below, to the ac-
)f Bank Markazi Iran at the Bank, sub-
Bank Markazi Iran's sole direction, and
ar Account No. 3 and Securities
ly Account No. 2 at the Bank in the
if the Escrow Agent.
Not later than 30 days after the date
the Escrow Agent shall instruct the
transfer the funds and securities in
iccounts to such bank as the Escrow
shall direct, for the account of the Ban-
intrale d'Algerie.
(d) Upon receipt by the Bank of instruc-
rom the Escrow Agent to do so in the
rovided in paragraph 8 below, the Bank
as soon as practicable thereafter
(i) transfer such amount as may be
ed in the instructions from Dollar Ac-
No. 2 to the FED, subject to the FED's
•J rection, if sufficient funds then remain
liar Account No. 2 to make such transfer;
(ii) transfer the remaining funds on
Account No. 2 to the account of Bank
zi Iran at the Bank, subject to Bank
,zi Iran's sole direction, and close Dollar
nt No. 2.
(e) The Escrow Agent shall not be en-
,0 give the Bank any instiTiction other
escribed in this paragraph 7, and the
hall be entitled and bound to rely on any
ction falling within this paragi'aph 7
it further inquiry, and any transfer by
ink in accordance with any instructions
to them under this paragraph 7 shall
tute a good discharge to the Bank.
(a) The Bank and the Escrow Agent
ichange telegraphic keys which will per-
e reciprocal validation of messages and
mt and transfer orders; however, the in-
ions set forth in paragraphs 7(a) and 7(b)
)e in writing, shall be transmitted by
dther
(i) to the Bank or
(ii) to the Deputy Governor of the
for and on behalf of the Bank at the
h Embassy at Algiers
and shall be authenticated as provided in sub-
paragraph (b) below. In the event that a tele-
graphic test is challenged, the Bank and the
Escrow Agent agree to contact each other by
telex or other appropriate means as rapidly as
possible, in order to obtain confirmation of the
authenticity of the transmission.
(b) The Bank and the Escrow Agent
shall provide each other with a list, which will
be revised whenever necessary, of the names
of the persons authorised to execute any writ-
ten notice or instruction required or permitted
under this Arrangement and identify the
signatures of such designated persons; all such
notices or instructions to the Bank shall be ef-
fective on receipt by the Bank; the Bank shall
not be obliged to act on any such notice or in-
struction unless properly so authorised, au-
thenticated and delivered in the manner re-
quired by this paragraph.
9. Except as provided in paragi-aph 8 (a)
above, any advices, written notices, or in-
structions permitted or required by this Ar-
rangement shall be given to the parties hereto
at the respective addresses shown below:
(i) To the Bank at:
Threadneedle Street
London EC2R 8AH
ATTENTION: D.H.R Somerset
J.G. Drake
W.B. Moule
(ii) To the FED at;
33 Liberty Street
New-York, New-York 10045
ATTENTION: H. David Willey
George Ryan
(iii) To the Escrow Agent at:
8 Boulevard Zirout Youcef
Algiers, Algeria
ATTENTION: Mr. Mohamed
Bessekhouad
Mr Bachir Sail
Mr. Mohand Kirat
Mr. Lakhdar
Benouataf
10. The FED shall indemnify and hold the
Bank harmless against and shall reimburse the
Bank for any loss or expense that they may
incur by reason of their acts or omissions
under or in connection with this Arrangement,
except for
(A) Any loss or expense resulting from
their own negligence or wilful misconduct and
(B) Any loss arising from investment of
the funds held for the Escrow Agent on Dollar
Accounts No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3.
11. The Bank may rely and shall be pro-
tected in acting on any instrument, instruc-
tion, notice or direction given by the Escrow
Agent in accordance with paragraph 7 reason-
ably believed by them to be genuine and to
have been signed or dispatched by the appro-
priate person or persons.
Feature
12. The Bank shall not be liable for any act
or omission unless such act or omission in-
volves negligence or wilful misconduct on the
part of the Bank. This paragraph 12 does not
apply to any loss arising from investment of
the funds held for the Escrow Agent on the
Dollar Accounts.
13. (a) The Bank shall advise the Escrow
Agent by telex as soon as reasonably practica-
ble thereafter of all changes in balances, de-
posits, interest earned and withdrawals on the
six accounts opened and maintained by the
Bank for the Escrow Agent as provided in
paragraph 2 of this Arrangement.
(b) The Bank shall provide the FED by
telex with a list of all debits and credits to the
six accounts referred to in subparagraph (a)
above.
14. The Bank and the FED accept that the
Escrow Agent is a central bank, whose prop-
erty is normally entitled to the full immunities
of a central bank under the State Immunity
Act of 1978 of the United Kingdom. Nothing in
this Arrangement shall be considered as con-
stituting, in whole or in part, a waiver of any
immunity to which they are entitled.
15. Nothing herein shall require the Bank
to violate the laws of England or any court
order thereunder; the Bank confirms that none
of the provisions of this Arrangement is in vio-
lation of the laws of England.
16. The provisions hereof may not be
modified or changed except by an instrument
in writing duly executed by or on behalf of the
Escrow Agent, the Bank and the FED.
17. This Arrangement is written in Eng-
lish and French texts but, in the event of any
conflict between the two texts, the EngUsh
text shall prevail.
18. The arrangements described herein
shall be governed by and construed in accord-
ance with the laws of England.
Dated 20th of January 1981
BANQUE CENTRALE D'ALGERIE
by Mohamed Bessekhouad
Lakhdar Benouataf
THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF
THE BANK OF ENGLAND
by C. W. McMahon
D.H.F. Somerset
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
NEW YORK
AS FISCAL AGENT OF THE UNITED
STATES
by Ernest T. Patrikis
Feature
SPECIAL BRIEFING,
JAN. 20, 1981
Mr. Muskie. Now that the principal ob-
ject of the efforts that have been under-
way for the last 14 months has been
achieved and consummated, it is impor-
tant that you and, through you, the
American people understand the agree-
ments which have made that possible. I
know you've all been curious about the
facts that we hope we can make available
to you this afternoon. I have appreciated
your patience when I and others have re-
sisted giving you some of this informa-
tion, but now is the time for the Ameri-
can people to get the whole story and this
briefing this afternoon is designed to
move us toward that objective as well.
And so if I may, I will briefly outline
the nature of the agi-eements which led to
the release of the hostages today. We and
the Iranian Government have given the
Algerian Government interdependent
commitments for a resolution of the hos-
tage crisis. These commitments are in ac-
cord with the objectives we stated at the
outset of this crisis — the safe return of
our people on terms consistent with our
national honor and interests.
A guiding principle in negotiating
the agreement has been to return matters
insofar as possible to where they stood
before the hostages were seized — that is,
to return property owned by Iran at the
same time that our people are released,
while protecting legitimate U.S. claim-
ants.
Let me emphasize that the assets
that will be returned are Iranian property
in the custody of persons subject to U.S.
jurisdiction here and abroad. These as-
sets were blocked by the President on
November 14, 1979, shortly after the
takeover of our Embassy. After careful
and thorough evaluation of all relevant
factors, the terms of the arrangement
were determined to be fair and techni-
cally feasible.
The first step in the implementation
process called for a number of categories
of Iranian assets to be transferred to an
escrow account with the Bank of England
in the name of the Algerian Central
Bank.
The Government of Iran then had to
certify to the Algerian Central Bank that
the 52 hostages had safely departed Iran.
Only when it had been done so could the
Algerian Central Bank release a certain
portion of these assets to Iran. These
steps have now been taken.
One category of the assets of which I
am speaking included those Iranian secu-
rities in the custody of the Federal Re-
serve Bank in New York.
Another category of Iranian assets
comprised those assets in foreign
branches of U.S. banks. These funds with
interest, including more than 1.6 million
ounces of gold, total just under .$8 billion.
Of these funds, $3.7 billion will be
used to prepay the bank loans, and $1.4
billion will remain in escrow until any
disputed bank loans and interest are
sorted out. Most of the claims of these
American banks are thus immediately
settled, and other claims are 100% pro-
tected with the amounts in escrow.
Finally, Iranian assets in domestic
branches of U.S. banks and all other Ira-
nian assets located in the U.S. or abroad
in the custody of persons subject to U.S.
jurisdiction will be transferred to the se-
curity account.
Mr. Miller. Will be unblocked.
Mr. Muskie. Yes. They'll be un-
blocked.
Mr. Miller. They'll be unblocked and
used partially for Iran and partially for a
security account.
Mr. Muskie. There may be an addi-
tional $1 to $2 billion or so in other assets.
In the context of the release of these as-
sets, Iran is committed to resolve certain
claims by U.S. nationals under an agi'eed
claims settlement procedure involving an
international arbitration tribunal estab-
lished by the agreement.
By Executive order, the President
ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to
license the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York to effect the transfer of those assets
in the Fed's custody. That transfer had to
be completed before the hostages could
be released.
The United States will lift import
and export sanctions under the agree-
ment once the hostages are released.
These sanctions have imposed real costs
on Iran in terms of greatly curtailed eco-
nomic activity and substantial diplomatic
isolation. The sanctions weighed increas-
ingly heavily on Iran the longer the hos-
tages were held.
An additional aspect of the agree-
ment concerns the assets that may be lo-
cated here of the former Shah and his
family. The initial Iranian demand for the
immediate return of the Shah's property
was unacceptable as a matter of principle
and law, and we've consistently rejected
that demand.
We have, however, undertaken tr
block the transfer from the United St;
of any properties belonging to the Sh;
estate that may be located here, and t
inform the U.S. courts of the U.S. Go
ernment position that claims by Iran
seeking recovery of the Shah's assets
not legally barred here by sovereign i
munity or by the act of state doctrine
I would like to reiterate our deep
preciation for the assistance of the Al;
rian intermediaries throughout these
ficult weeks. They have carried out tl
responsibilities in a comprehensive an
thoroughly professional manner We a
in Algeria's debt, and its assistance w
be long remembered by those of us wl
have been associated with their effort
and by the American people.
I would like to go to Bill Miller m
and Ben Civiletti, both of whom, wit!
their people, have been of enormous i
sistance with the legal and technical a
pects of these agreements.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Secretai-j
Muskie. Let me just call attention ag;
to the principles that Secretary Musk
outlined. I won't repeat them, but th(
important to remember — not only th*
lease of the assets, but insofar as pos;
ble, getting back to the condition that
existed before the taking of hostages
the freezing of assets.
Now, with the principles in mind
would like to just explain a little mon
how this works so that you will have
little better understanding.
Secretary Muskie mentioned the
categories of assets that have been
blocked, and I will just call again to y
attention that there were three main
categories from our point of planning.
• One were the assets that were
in the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. That, of course, is the central b
of the United States and, therefore, t
assets really are under government c(
trol and have a different category of ii
portance than one held by private par
ties.
• The second category would be I
deposits held in branches of U.S. banl-
outside the United States. These fund
are held in the United Kingdom, Fran
and Germany and are subject to the la
and circumstances of those countries,
they again can be treated differently f
other assets.
• The third general category wou
be all the other assets held by or unde
the control of U.S. nationals or persor
the United States itself. This not only
16
Department of State Bull
ed bank deposits but it would also in-
li e other financial assets — other prop-
ii ;s — that were the properties of the
t ernment of Iran or its instrumen-
ies.
The two that we could deal with in
principle of ti-ying to unblock the as-
at the time the hostages were re-
;d, the two we could deal with most
ily were the first two — the assets
in the Federal Reserve and those lo-
d overseas. So, for that reason, we
itually arrived at the solution setting
n arrangement to transfer those as-
into escrow in the Bank of England
le account of the Central Bank of
;ria so that they would be marshaled
ready to be used and released for the
)oses intended at such time as the
ages were out of Iran.
If the hostages were not released,
those funds would be turned back to
re they came from and we'd be back
e we were, so no harm would have
1 done. We would not have, in any
gi lost control. We were protected in
ti regard. On the other hand, if the
iielages were certified to be free, then
ost control and the distribution of the
3w fund was agreed to. Of course,
happy event did in fact come about.
And so today, having marshaled the
ts in the escrow account last night,
vere able to have a certificate from
entral Bank of Algeria that the hos-
s were free, and so the funds were
iirsed.
Let me again run over the figures of
Funds going into escrow, and what
yi oens to them when they come out so
will understand that a little better
etary Muskie used the figure of about
illion. Let me be a little more precise,
escrow became effective only if it
d be certified that not less than
55 billion were in escrow. That was
lired for the transaction to work. Ac-
ly, this morning the Bank of England
able to certify that $7,977 billion of
ts were in the account, and so it ob-
sly met the condition.
The assets in the account consisted
Dout $5.5 billion of deposits and inter-
m deposits in U.S. bank branches
ad. Those were, in a very comph-
d transaction, moved into the Federal
(j erve Bank of New York account and
1 moved into an account of the Fed-
Reserve Bank of New York in the
k of England, and then moved into
ow.
In addition, the Federal Reserve it-
had held, as I mentioned, assets of
1. Those that were represented by se-
liilll riiaru 1Qft1
ink
■an
curities and cash items came to about $1.4
billion. In addition, the Federal Reserve
held gold that belonged to the Govern-
ment of Iran, and as Secretary Muskie
pointed out, that was something over 1.6
"lillion ounces of gold, which were valued
lur this purpose, on a fixed valuation
date, at about $940 million.
Then there were miscellaneous as-
sets coming from custody accounts and
securities that added up to the balance
and the total came to $7,977 billion. Once
that was certified and that certification
was passed in Algiers by the Deputy
Governor of the Bank of England to the
Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of
Algeria, the process started whereby all
of the governments involved were
notified of that, and the Iranian Govern-
ment undertook then to start the process
of releasing the hostages.
When the announcement was made
that the hostages had crossed the frontier
and were out of Iranian territory, then
the distribution of these assets began.
That is under way — I think is actually
substantially completed.
The first fund I mentioned, to re-
peat, is that about $3.7 billion was re-
turned to the Federal Reserve to be
applied to pay off syndicated loans in
which U.S. banks were participating, in-
cluding interest up to a settlement date.
That, we understand and we expect, will
pay off all those syndicated loans, so they
will be completely paid off.
The $1.4 biUion will remain in the es-
crow account, and it will be used, under
binding arbitration, first under opportu-
nities to negotiate bilaterally and to come
to settlement but, if not settled under
binding arbitration, to pay for any addi-
tional bank loans that are not syndicated,
or any disputes on the amounts of them,
or any disputes on the amount of interest
due. The balance in the fund, if you take
the $3.7 and $1.4 — whatever is left over
— has been transferred to Iran free and
clear. It is now in their hands.
Let's turn to the third category of
assets, those in the United States. These
will be unblocked, and in due course on a
much slower process, because they are
much more complicated to gain control
and transfer of those assets — at a much
slower pace — they, too, will be handled
under explicit instructions. As they are
made available, they will, through bank-
ing arrangements, end up in going 50% to
the Government of Iran and 50% into a
security account until that security ac-
count reaches $1 billion. Once it reaches
$1 billion, all other released assets go to
the Government of Iran.
Feature
Then there is an international claims
settlement agreement, which will provide
for binding arbitration under an interna-
tional tribunal, the settlement claims of
American interests against Iran, and that
$1 billion will be used to pay those claims.
And the Government of Iran has a com-
mitment to maintain that security ac-
count at a minimum balance of $500 mil-
lion, so as claims are paid, if a claim
should reduce the balance below $500 mil-
lion, the Government of Iran will re-
plenish it, so that there will be security
for those claims.
That, I think, gives you a little bet-
ter understanding of the mechanism by
which this works. Obviously, this was a
complicated transaction — perhaps the
largest transfer of funds of private inter-
ests ever accomplished — and therefore
did have its complications and its periods
of perilous exposure to the fragility of the
whole mechanism of marshaling and
transferring assets.
I would be happy, of course, to ex-
pand upon this and other aspects, but I
want merely, before I end my remarks, to
express my particular appreciation — not
only to Secretary Muskie and Warren
Christopher, who have done such a mag-
nificent job, the whole Department of
State, and all the other departments of
the government. But in my own Depart-
ment of the Treasuiy, I have to say that I
don't believe this transaction could have
been completed without the dedicated
work over endless time by Deputy Secre-
tary of the Treasury Robert Carswell and
by Assistant Secretary Richard Davis.
They have just worked so intensely on
this. I could name many others.
We also appreciate the tremendous
cooperation we have received from the
Federal Reserve Bank in New York and
the Federal Reserve system and from all
the banks and their attorneys and repre-
sentatives. You may have heard during
the process of this that there was per-
ceived to be some difficulty with U.S.
banks. Let me assure you that was not
true. We did not comment at the time be-
cause it was too delicate a matter for us
to try to intervene.
The banks have participated and
rendered full cooperation. They tried for
a long time to work out, in secret negoti-
ations, a settlement of their overseas de-
posits and claims with the Iranians
through the use of both U.S. attorneys
and European attorneys. We tried to
combine that negotiation at one time with
a program to release the hostages. That
did not succeed. We eventually came to
this scheme; and once we moved to this
scheme, their cooperation was absolute.
17
Feature
Not only in weeks and months be-
fore, but starting last Friday, there was
around-the-clock — and I mean continu-
ously around-the-clock — involvement
with banks and attorneys in Algiers, in
London, in New York, and in Washington
working this very complicated transac-
tion. The only people who benefited most
perhaps was AT&T [American Telephone
& Telegraph Co.] because we had open
telephone lines that ran up some bills.
I do want to say that it was a mag-
nificent performance by everyone on our
side, and I'm indeed very proud to have
been even a small part of it.
Mr. Muskie. Thank you. Bill. I
A^ould like to add my words of commen-
dation to all of those who participated,
not only everyone at this table but almost
countless others on both sides of the At-
lantic who contributed to this. It is an in-
credible picture of the stamina, determi-
nation, patience, and ingenuity that can
be applied to a problem of this complex-
ity. I've been proud to be part of it, and I
thank all of my colleagues.
Q. Mr. Muskie, you talk of the
basic principle of returning the situa-
tion to the status as it was when the
hostages were seized. At that time we
had diplomatic relations with Iran, we
had a limited military supply relation-
ship, we gave visas fairly freely, and
Americans were allowed to travel in
Iran. The President, under certain acts,
changed all that in the course of the
past 14 months. Are any of those ac-
tions going to be undone?
Mr. Muskie. I suspect that those
matters will have to be dealt with as time
unfolds. The principle to which I referred
applied to the release of the hostages and
restoring our financial arrangements to
what they were before the hostages were
seized, not to all of the aspects of diplo-
matic recognition and normal trade and
so on. Obviously, the nonintervention
agreement which the Iranian side insisted
upon will impact upon some of those
points that you raised. That's there wish,
and as far as we're concerned, we were
willing to sign that. Our relationship will
have to develop in the future as both
countries may see it in their interest to
pursue.
Mr. Miller. I hope you will note in
the Secretai-y's comments, though, that
the sanctions, the explicit sanctions were
raised.
Mr. Muskie. Yes.
Q. Mr. Civiletti, could you explain
how, legally, the United States goes
about blocking all claims like actions
and so forth against Iran, and how it
goes about freezing all the assets of the
Shah, his estate, and so forth, and
whether there are potential constitu-
tional problems to that?
Mr. Civiletti. There undoubtedly will
be litigation about those issues. We ex-
pect to file papers in some of the out-
standing cases either late tonight or to-
morrow morning indicating a statement
of interest, laying out before the court
the actions that have been taken and the
legal authorities under which those ac-
tions have been taken.
Essentially, the authority for all the
actions that have been taken arise both
from the Constitution and the President's
powers under the Constitution and from
statutory sources, particularly the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers
Act, the Hostage Act, and the President's
constitutional powers with regard to the
conduct of foreign affairs, with regard to
recognition of foreign powers, and with
regard to the exercise of these powers
under these statutes.
Each of the Executive orders that
have been issued — and there are about 10
of them altogether — are exercised under
these acts. It's the circumstance where
there is a confluence, where the Presi-
dent's powers are at their greatest when
he is exercising power under both the
Constitution and under specific statutes.
What we've done in effect is, in most in-
stances, with a few rare exceptions, pro-
vide by this settlement for an alternative
means by which the interests of claimants
have either been taken care of, as have
been indicated by some payments which
are already being made, or by the U.S.-
Iran claims tribunal procedure with
agreements with regard to the mainte-
nance of the fund of $500 million. I hope
that partially answers your question.
Q. Are you saying that under this
International Emergency Powers Act
the President has the power to block
any suits and so forth?
Mr. Civiletti. Yes. When he blocked
the assets, a subsequent Executive order
allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to
promulgate regulations permitting the fil-
ing of suits, reserving the power to with-
draw that authorization; and the statute
itself gives the President the power to
make null and void any interests in prop-
erty which are subject to the emergency
which gave rise to the exercise of the
power And, as I mentioned, the Presi-
dent has acted here under the confluence
of not only that statute but the Hostaj
Act, as well as his constitutional powe
with regard to the settlement of interi
tional claims and disputes.
Q. In the question of other asset
how much in military spares is left?
How much has been subsumed by th
U.S. military forces?
Mr. Muskie. I don't have an invei
tory available to me of that material. '
issue of military equipment and suppli
in the pipeline before November 4, 19'i
was not directly addressed in the negc
ations. You will not see it in any of the
documents, and so it is not a current
issue.
Q. Mr. Miller, can you tell us wh
the certain undertakings of the Gov-
ernments of the United States and Ii
are that are referred to in the declar
tion that was issued yesterday.
Mr. Miller. Those are mainly the
nancial aspects that I've described.
Mr. Muskie. Yes.
Mr. Miller. The undertakings to I
we accomplished all this in the financii
area.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us
how the shape of this deal emerged-
when, what were the initiatives? Wh
were the final points that had to be i
solved and when were they resolved?'
Mr. Muskie. Well, that's a long st
and I will try to give you a brief outliii:
It all started, I gather, when I ad*-
dressed a letter to the then newly
selected Prime Minister— Mr Rajai—
which I indicated the need from our p^
spective of undertaking in some way t
resolve our differences and, as I think
used the phrase, "mutually perceived
grievances." I think that was in late A
gust.
In September, Khomeini laid dowi
four points as a basis for settlement. I)
the same four points basically that this
agreement is built upon. We did not kn
how authoritative it was or whether it
was the totality, and those four points
eluded some points that Iranians had ii
sisted upon prior to that time. We wer
curious about that and we undertook t
pursue those questions through the va
ous channels that we were using at tha
time and since. And we began to addrt
ourselves to the possibilities of meetin]
the four points.
When one reads the four points lit
ally, they obviously called, in light of tl
facts we've given you here today, upon
to do things that we were not in a posi
tion to do.
Department of State Bulle
o we undertook, with the help of so
people, to shape any response that
be within the framework of the
oints laid down by him at that time,
irsued those through channels in-
g Iranians, and not those who were
itely the decision-makers in Iran
hers who were also, so far as we
see, in a position to evaluate the
jn of Iran in this situation. Secre-
liller has already indicated one of
•preaches to this problem that we
ed until, I think it was, last week,
•an's final proposal in the last week
lays changed the framework. We
most immediately that it was a bet-
e, and we proceeded to pick it up.
; not inconsistent with what we had
place in terms of the resources or
sets that we could transfer; it
i the method for handling it, and
how we came down.
.'s much more complicated than
couldn't possibly give you every
d like to pay some tributes to some
ic people who haven't been men-
, if I might. Lloyd Cutler, General
tel to the White House, who was
aperb in the quality of the legal ad-
nd the practical judgment which he
nt to this. Warren Christopher —
he whole country knows his abili-
iid his qualities of leadership in ne-
ion. He was the team leader and did
lendous job of putting all these
together.
Ihere are so many others — I know
aving out names. I'd like to attest
) Carswell's contribution and Rich
and everybody else here. It's been
iiendous effort.
nd when the full story is told — and
t know that you want it all at once
line was a pretty straight one from
mber down to today, pretty
ht. The framework was there. The
3 were difficult to put together —
I g ways of freeing assets, dealing
■laims, finding ways to put in Iran's
sufficient assets to make the
ment proposal attractive.
lU of the prospects for doing this
ved with the onset of the Iran-Iraq
or obvious reasons: the pressures
liat generated for Iran economically
II other ways. So, although we found
Iny obstacles along the way that
3een frustrating, including the last
hours, at the same time events and
ures of one kind or another also fell
•ay to enable us to move to this
Thank you all very much for your pa-
tience through this ordeal. I've been
amazed, may I say, at the quality and the
accuracy of the press coverage of the last
48 hours in terms of facts that we thought
• e had pretty much excluded you from.
[Laughter.] You have a way. Thank you.
WELCOMING CEREMONY,
THE WHITE HOUSE,
JAN. 27, 198P
President Reagan
Welcome to the Ambassadors of our
friends in neighboring countries who are
here today. And I can think of no better
way to let you know how Nancy and I
feel about your presence here today than
to say on behalf of us, of the Vice Presi-
dent and Barbara, the Senators, the
Members of Congress, the members of
the Cabinet, and all of our fellow citizens,
these simple words: Welcome home.
You are home, and believe me, you're
welcome. If my remarks were a sermon,
my text would be lines from the 126th
Psalm, "We were like those who dreamed.
Now our mouth is filled with laughter
and our tongue with shouts of joy. The
Lord has done great things for us. We are
glad." You've come home to a people who
for 444 days suffered the pain of your im-
prisonment, prayed for your safety, and
most importantly, shared your determina-
tion that the spirit of free men and
women is not a fit subject for barter
You've represented under great
stress the highest traditions of public
service. Your conduct is symbolic of the
millions of professional diplomats, mili-
tary personnel, and others who have ren-
dered service to their countiy
We're now aware of the conditions
under which you were imprisoned.
Though now is not the time to review
evei-y abhorrent detail of your cruel con-
finement, believe me, we know what
happened. Ti'uth may be a rare commod-
ity today in Iran; it's alive and well in
America.
By no choice of your own, you've en-
tered the ranks of those who throughout
our histoiy have undergone the ordeal of
imprisonment: the crew of the Pueblo,
the prisoners in two World Wars and in
Korea and Vietnam. And like those
others, you are special to us. You fulfilled
your duty as you saw it, and now like the
others, thank God you're home, and our
hearts are full of gratitude.
Feature
I'm told that Sergeant Lopez here
put up a sign in his cell, a sign that nor-
mally would have been torn down by
those guards. But this one was written in
Spanish, and his guards didn't know that
"Viva la roja, bianco, y azul" means
"Long hve the red, white, and blue."
They may not understand what that
means in Iran, but we do. Sergeant
Lopez, and you've filled our hearts with
pride. Muchas Gracias.
Two days ago, Nancy and I met with
your families here at the White House.
We know that you were lonely during
that dreadful period of captivity, but you
were never alone. Your wives and chil-
dren, your mothers and dads, your
brothers and sisters were so full of
prayers and love for you that whether
you were conscious of it or not, it must
have sustained you during some of the
worst times. No power on Earth could
prevent them from doing that. Their
courage, endurance, and strength were of
heroic measure, and they're admired by
all of us.
But to get down now to more mun-
dane things, in case you have a question
about your personal futures, you'll prob-
ably have less time to rest than you'd
like. While you were on your way to
Germany, I signed a hiring freeze in the
Federal Government. In other words, we
need you, your country needs you, and
your bosses are panting to have you back
on the job.
Now, I'll not be so fooUsh as to say
forget what you've been through; you
never will. But turn the page and look
ahead, and do so knowing that for all who
served their countiy, whether in the For-
eign Service, the military, or as private
citizens, freedom is indivisible. Your free-
dom and your individual dignity are much
cherished. Those henceforth in the repre-
sentation of this Nation will be accorded
evei-y means of protection that America
can offer.
Let terrorists be aware that when
the rules of international behavior are
violated, our policy will be one of swift
and effective retribution. We hear it said
that we live in an era of limit to our pow-
ers. Well, let it also be understood, there
are limits to our patience.
Now, I'm sure that you'll want to
know that with us here today are families
of the eight heroic men who gave their
lives in the attempt to effect your rescue.
"Greater glory hath no man than that he
lay down his life for another." And with
us also are Colonel Beckwith and some of
the men who did return from that mis-
Feature
sion. We ask God's special healing for
those who suffered wounds and His com-
fort to those who lost loved ones. To
them, to you, and to your families, again,
welcome from all America and thank you
for making us proud to be Americans.
And now, ladies and gentlemen, I call
on, to speak for this wonderful group of
returnees, Bruce Laingen, Charge d' Af-
faires in Tehran. Mr. Laingen.
Mr. Laingen
Mr. President, Mrs. Reagan, members of
the Cabinet, Vice President and Mrs.
Bush— I think I've got that out of order
of priority in protocol tenns— members
of the Diplomatic Corps who are here,
and all you beautiful people out there:
I'm not sure I'm capable of this after
that emotionally draining but beautiful
experience that all of us have just had on
the streets of this magnificent city, Mr.
President. I hope you were watching TV,
because I don't think any of us Americans
have ever seen anything quite like it,
quite so spontaneous, quite so beautiful in
terms of the best qualities of our people.
And we are deeply gi-ateful for it.
Mr President, our flight to freedom
is now complete: thanks to the prayers
and good-will of countless millions of
people, not just in this country but all
around the world; the assistance of those
many countries and governments who
understood the values and principles that
were at stake in this crisis; and the love
and affection of our countrymen from all
those tens of thousands out there on the
streets today, to that lady that we saw
standing on a hillside as we came in from
Andrews, all alone, with no sign, no one
around her, holding her hand to her heart
— the enveloping love and affection of
smalltown America of the kind we wit-
nessed in that wonderful 2-day stop in
New York State, West Point and its envi-
rons; and last, but not least, on this flight
to freedom, the United States Air Force
on Freedom I.
Mr. President, I give you now 52
Americans, supplemented by a 53d today,
Richard Queen sitting over here, over-
joyed in reunion with our families, the
real heroes in this crisis; 53 Americans,
proud to rejoin their professional col-
leagues who had made their flight to
freedom earlier — our 6 colleagues who
came here with the great cooperation and
friendship of our Canadian friends, and
our 13 who came earlier I give you now
53 Americans, proud, as I said earlier to-
day, to record their undying respect and
affection for the families of those brave
eight men who gave their lives so that we
L. Bruce Laingen, the senior U.S. diplomat released from Iran, is welcomed to the White H(
by Mrs. Reagan while President Reagan and Vice President Bush look on. Thomas L. Aherii
another released American, is behind Mr. Laingen.
might be free, 53 of us proud today, this
afternoon, and also to see and to meet
with some of those families and Colonel
Beckwith and some of those who came
back. Fifty-three Americans who will al-
ways have a love affair vdth this country
and who join with you in a prayer of
thanksgiving for the way in which this
crisis has strengthened the spirit and re-
silience and strength that is the mark of a
truly free society.
Mr. President, we've seen a lot of
signs along the road, here and up in New
York. They are marvelous signs, as is the
spirit and enthusiasm that accompanies
this, what we've been calling "a celebra-
tion of freedom." They are signs that
have not been ordered. They are spon-
taneous, sincere signs that reflect the
true feelings of the hearts of those who
hold them, even those, I suppose, like
"IRS welcomes you" [laughter] which we
saw today as we came into town, and an-
other one that said, "Government work-
ers welcome you back to woi-k." Well,
we're ready.
There was another sign that said,
and I think that says it as well as any as
far as we're concerned: "The best things
in life are free." But even better than
that was a sign that we saw as we left
West Point today along a superhighway
up there that someone had hastily put
out: "And the world will be better for
this." We pray, Mr. President, that thi
will be so.
Mr. President, in very simple wor
that come from the hearts of all of us;
good to be back. Thank you, America,
and God bless all of you. Thank you v««
much.
President Reagan
Thank you. This is a flag in this case
bearing your name, and it is a symbol
will give to you now, becau.se all the
others, you will each receive one when
we get inside the building. Each one o
you will have a flag symbolic of the 53
that are here in your honor.
And now — I think now a fit endin
for all of this would be for all of us to [:
ticipate in singing "God Bless America
[The audience sang "God Bless Ameri-
ca.']
' Text from White House press relea
of Jan. 19, 1981.
2 Made available to the press by Dep
ment spokesman John Trattner.
' Made available to the press by acti
Department spokesman William J. Dyess
Feb. 2.
' Text from White House press relea
of Jan. 20.
5 Remarks from White House press
release of Jan. 27. ■
20
Department of State Bulh
Feature
lerican Hostages in
ollowing is a list of the Americans
were held hostage in Iran. Fifty-
were held from November 4, 1979,
nuary 20, 1981 (U4 days); the
's were released as noted.
homas L. Ahern
olitical Section
lair Barnes
ommunications Section
'illiam F. Belk
ommunications Section
obert Blucker
ommercial Section
onald J. Cooke
onsular Section
'^illiam J. Daugherty
olitical Section
obert A. Engelmann
CDR. U.S. Navy
efense Liaison Office
'iUiam A. Gallegos
USMC
arine Security Guard
iruce W. German
dministrative Section
uane L. Gillette
01, U.S. Navy
efense Attache Office
Ian B. Golacinski
ecurity Section
jhn E. Graves
:a
athy J. Gross*
ecretary
aseph M. Hall
'01, U.S. Army
efense Attache Office
evin J. Hermening
gt., USMC
[arine Security Guard
onald R. Hohman
p. 6, U.S. Army
ledical Corpsman
eland J. Holland
OL, U.S. Army
lefense Attache Office
lichael H. Howland
ecurity Section
. ames 0. Hughes*
VSgt., U.S. Air Force
administrative Specialist
iillian Johnson*
iecretary
Iharles Jones, Jr.
'ommunications Section
ilalcolm Kalp
economic/Commercial Section
Villiam Keough
ichool Superintendent
>loorhead Kennedy
economic Section
25. Steven W. Kirtley
Sgt.. USMC
Marine Security Guard
26. Kathryn L. Koob
ICA
27. Frederick Kupke
Communications Section
28. L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'Affaires
29. Steven M. Lauterbach
General Services Officer
30. Gary E. Lee
General Services Officer
31. Paul E. Lewis
Sgt., USMC
Marine Security Guard
32. John W. Limbert
Political Section
33. James M. Lopez
Sgt., USMC
Marine Security Guard
34. Ladell Maples*
Sgt., USMC
Marine Security Guard
35. John D. McKeel
Sgt., USMC
Marine Security Guard
36. Michael J. Metrinko
PoUtical Section
37. Jerry J. Miele
Communications Section
38. Michael E. Moeller
S/Sgt., USMC
NCO in charge of Marine Security
Detachment
39. Elisabeth Montagne*
Secretary
40. Bert C. Moore
Administrative Section
41. Richard H. Morefield
Consular Section
42. Paul M. Needham
CAPT, U.S. Air Force
Logistics Plans and Programs Officer
43. Robert Ode
Consular Section
44. Gregory A. Persinger
Sgt., USMC
Marine Security Guard
45. Jerry Plotkin
Businessman
46. William E. Quarles*
Sgt., USMC
Marine Security Guard
47. Richard I. Queen**
Consular Section
48. Regis Magan
MSG, U.S. Army
Military Liaison Office
49. Neal T. Robinson*
CAPT, U.S. Air Force
Plans Officer
50. David M. Roeder
LTC, U.S. Air Force
Defense Attache Office
51. Lloyd A. RoUins*
General Services Officer
52. Barry M. Rosen
ICA
53. William B. Royer, Jr.
ICA
54. Thomas E. Schaefer
COL, U.S. Air Force
Defense and Air Attache
55. Charles W. Scott
COL, U.S. Army
Chief, Military Liaison Office
56. Don A. Sharer
CDR, U.S. Navy
Defense Liaison Office
57. Rodney V. Sickman
Sgt., USMC
Marine Security Guard
58. Joseph Subic
SSG. U.S. Army
Defense Attache Office
59. Elizabeth A. Swift
Political Section
60. Terri L. Tedford*
Secretary
61. Victor L. Tomseth
Political Section
62. Joseph E. Vincent*
MSG, U.S. Air Force
U.S. Military Assistance Group
63. David R. Walker*
Sgt., USMC
Marine Security Guard
64. Joan Walsh*
Secretary
65. Philip R. Ward
Communications Section
66. Wesley Williams*
Cpl., USMC
Marine Security Guard
*Released Nov. 18 - 20, 1979.
**Released July 10, 1980.
Note: When Iranian militants took over the
U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4,
1979, six Americans managed to elude cap-
ture; they sought and were granted refuge in
the Canadian Embassy. They left Iran on
January 29, 1980, posing as Canadian diplo-
mats and carrying Canadian passports with
forged Iranian visas. Those Americans were
Robert G. Anders, Mark J. Lijek, Cora
Amburn Lijek, Joseph D. Stafford, and
Kathleen F. Stafford, all consular officers,
and H. Lee Schatz, an agricultural
specialist. ■
21
THE PRESIDENT
President Carter's Farewell
Address to the Nation
President Carter's farewell ad-
dress was broadcast live on January li,
1981.^
In a few days I will lay down my official
responsibilities in this office to take up
once more the only title in our democ-
racy superior to that of President — the
title of citizen. Of Vice President Mon-
dale, my Cabinet, and the hundreds of
others who have served with me during
the last 4 years, I wish to say now
publicly what I have said in private: I
thank them for the dedication and com-
petence they have brought to the serv-
ice of our country.
But I owe my deepest thanks to
you — to the American people — because
you gave me this extraordinary oppor-
tunity to serve. We've faced gjreat
challenges together, and we know that
future problems will also be difficult,
but I am now more convinced than ever
that the United States, better than any
other country, can meet successfully
whatever the future might bring. These
last 4 years have made me more certain
than ever of the inner strength of our
country, the unchanging value of our
principles and ideals, the stability of
our political system, the ingenuity and
the decency of our people.
Tonight I would like first to say a
few words about this most special of-
fice—the Presidency of the United
States. This is at once the most power-
ful office in the world and among the
most severely constrained by law and
custom. The President is given a broad
responsibility to lead but cannot do so
without the support and consent of the
people, expressed formally through the
Congress and informally in many ways
through a whole range of public and
private institutions. This is as it should
be.
Within our system of government
every American has a right and a duty
to help shape the future course of the
United States. Thoughtful criticism and
close scrutiny of all government offi-
cials by the press and the public are an
important part of our democratic soci-
ety. Now, as in the past, only the
understanding and involvement of the
people through full and open debate can
help to avoid serious mistakes and
assure the continued dignity and safety
of the nation.
Today we are asking our political
system to do things of which the Found-
ing Fathers never dreamed. The govern-
ment they designed for a few hundred
thousand people now serves a nation of
almost 230 million people. Their small
coastal republic now spans beyond a
continent, and we also now have the
responsibility to help lead much of the
world through difficult times to a
secure and prosperous future.
Today, as people have become ever
more doubtful of the ability of the
government to deal with our problems,
we are increasingly drawn to single-
issue groups and special interest orga-
nizations to insure that whatever else
happens, our own personal views and
our own private interests are pro-
tected. This is a disturbing factor in
American political life. It tends to
distort our purposes, because the na-
tional interest is not always the sum of
all our single or special interests. We
are all Americans together, and we
must not forget that the common good
is our common interest and our indi-
vidual responsibility.
Because of the fragmented pres-
sures of these special interests, it's
very important that the office of the
President be a strong one and that its
constitutional authority be preserved.
The President is the only elected of-
ficial charged with the primary respon
sibility of representing all the people.
In the moments of decision, after the
different and conflicting views have all
been aired, it's the President who then
must speak to the nation and for the
nation.
I understand after 4 years in this
office, as few others can, how formida-
ble is the task the new President-elect
is about to undertake, and to the very
limits of conscience and conviction, I
pledge to support him in that task. I
wish him success and Godspeed. I know
from experience that Presidents have
to face major issues that are controver-
sial, broad in scope, and which do not
arouse the natural support of a political
majority.
For a few minutes now, I want t< |
lay aside my role as leader of one na-
tion, and speak to you as a fellow
citizen of the world about three
issues — three difficult issues — the
threat of nuclear destruction, our
stewardship of the physical resources
our planet, and the preeminence of th
basic rights of human beings.
Threat of Nuclear Destruction
It's now been 35 years since the first
atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima. The
great majority of the world's people
cannot remember a time when the
nuclear shadow did not hang over the
Earth. Our minds have adjusted to it.
as after a time our eyes adjust to the
dark.
Yet the risk of a nuclear conflagi
tion has not lessened. It has not
happened yet, thank God, but that ca
give us little comfort for it only has t
happen once.
The danger is becoming greater.
As the arsenals of the superpowers
grow in size and sophistication and as
other governments — perhaps even in
the future dozens of governments —
acquire these weapons, it may only b«
matter of time before madness,
desperation, greed, or miscalculation
loose this terrible force.
In an all-out nuclear war, more
destructive power than in all of Worl
War II would be unleashed every
second during the long afternoon it
would take for all the bombs and
missiles to fall. A World War II ever
second — more people killed in the fir
few hours than in all the wars of
history together. The survivors, if an
would live in despair amid the poison
ruins of a civilization that had commi
ted suicide.
National weakness, real or per-
ceived, can tempt aggression and thu
cause war. That's why the United
States can never neglect its military
strength. We must and we will remai
strong. But with equal determination
the United States and all countries
must find ways to control and to redi
the horrifying danger that is posed b
the enormous world stockpiles of
nuclear arms.
This has been a concern of every
American president since the momen
we first saw what these weapons cou
do. Our leaders will require our unde
standing and our support as they gra
pie with this difficult but crucial
challenge. There is no disagreement i
the goals or the basic approach to coi
92
Department of State Bulle
The President
g this enormous force. The
r lies not just in the attitudes or
tions of world leaders but in the
jtn and the demands of all of us as
ftitinue our struggle to preserve
ace.
uclear weapons are an expression
side of our human character. But
is another side. The same rocket
)logy that delivers nuclear war-
has also taken us peacefully into
From that perspective, we see
irth as it really is — a small,
s, and beautiful blue globe, the
ome we have. We see no barriers
e or religion or country. We see
sential unity of our species and
anet. And with faith and common
that bright vision will ultimately
;ting the Earth's Resources
ler major challenge, therefore, is
tect the quality of this world
1 which we live. The shadows that
iross the future are cast not only
■! kinds of weapons we have built
' the kind of world we will either
h or neglect. There are real and
mg dangers to our simple and
precious possessions — the air we
he, the water we drink, and the
nfhich sustains us. The rapid deple-
(f irreplaceable minerals, the
n of topsoil, the destruction of
y, the blight of pollution, the
lads of increasing billions of peo-
lil combine to create problems
are easy to observe and predict
fficult to resolve. If we do not act,
lorld of the year 2000 will be much
Ible to sustain life than it is now.
Kut there is no reason for despair,
owledging the physical realities of
lanet does not mean a dismal
of endless sacrifice. In fact,
wledging these realities is the
;tep in dealing with them. We can
the resource problems of the
— water, food, minerals, farm-
forests, overpopulation, pollu-
if we tackle them with courage
jresight.
cting Basic Human Rights
ust been talking about forces of
tial destruction that mankind has
oped and how we might control
. It's equally important that we
mber the beneficial forces that we
evolved over the ages and how to
fast to them. One of those con-
tive forces is the enhancement of
individual human freedoms through the
strengthening of democracy and the
fight against deprivation, torture, ter-
rorism, and the persecution of people
throughout the world. The struggle for
human rights overrides all differences
of color or nation or language. Those
who hunger for freedom, who thirst for
human dignity, and who suffer for the
sake of justice, they are the patriots of
this cause.
I believe with all my heart that
America must always stand for these
basic human rights at home and abroad.
That is both our history and our
destiny.
America did not invent human
rights. In a very real sense, it's the
other way around. Human rights in-
vented America. Ours was the first na-
tion in the history of the world to be
founded explicitly on such an idea. Our
social and political progress has been
based on one fundamental principle —
the value and importance of the indi-
vidual. The fundamental force that
unites us is not kinship or place of
origin or religious preference. The love
of liberty is the common blood that
flows in our American veins.
The battle for human rights, at
home and abroad, is far from over. We
should never be surprised nor dis-
couraged because the impact of our ef-
forts has had and will always have
varied results. Rather we should take
pride that the ideals which gave birth
to our nation still inspire the hopes of
oppressed people around the world. We
have no cause for self-righteousness or
complacency, but we have every reason
to persevere, both within our own coun-
try and beyond our borders.
If we are to serve as a beacon for
human rights, we must continue to
perfect here at home the rights and the
values which we espouse around the
world — a decent education for our chil-
dren, adequate medical care for all
Americans, an end to discrimination
against minorities and women, a job for
all those able to work, and freedom
from injustice and religious intolerance.
We live in a time of transition, an
uneasy era which is likely to endure for
the rest of this century. It will be a
period of tensions, both within nations
and between nations; of competition for
scarce resources; of social, political, and
economic stresses and strains. During
this period we may be tempted to aban-
don some of the time-honored principles
and commitments which have been
proven during the difficult times of past
generations. We must never yield to
this temptation. Our American values
are not luxuries but necessities — not
the salt in our bread but the bread
itself. Our common vision of a free and
just society is our greatest source of
cohesion at home and strength abroad
— greater even than the bounty of our
material blessings.
Remember these words: "We hold
these truths to be self-evident; that all
men are created equal; that they are
endowed by their creator with certain
unalienable rights; that among these
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. . . ."
This vision still grips the imagina-
tion of the world. But we know that
democracy is always an unfinished crea-
tion. Each generation must renew its
foundations. Each generation must
rediscover the meaning of this hallowed
vision in the light of its own modern
challenges. For this generation — ours —
life is nuclear survival; liberty is human
rights; the pursuit of happiness is a
planet whose resources are devoted to
the physical and spiritual nourishment
of its inhabitants.
During the next few days I will
work hard to make sure that the transi-
tion from myself to the next President
is a good one, that the American people
are served well. And I will continue as
I have the last 14 months to work hard
and to pray for the lives and the well-
being of the American hostages held in
Iran. I can't predict yet what will
happen, but I hope you will join me in
my constant prayer for their freedom.
As I return home to the South
where I was born and raised, I look for-
ward to the opportunity to reflect and
further to assess, I hope with accuracy,
the circumstances of our times. I intend
to give our new President my support,
and I intend to work as a citizen, as I
have worked here in this office as
President, for the values this nation
was founded to secure. Again, from the
bottom of my heart, I want to express
to you the gratitude I feel. Thank you,
fellow citizens, and farewell.
^Text from White House press
release. ■
President Carter submitted his last
State of the Union message to the Con-
gress on January 16, 1981, the text of
which is printed in the Weekly Com-
pilation of Presidential Documents of
January 20, 1981.
23
THE SECRETARY
Resources for a Credible
Foreign Policy
Address before the American
Foreign Policy Association and the
World Affairs Council on January 15,
1980
I am departing an office I received with
surprise, held with satisfaction, and re-
hnquish with regret. I have been privi-
leged to serve a nation I love, under a
President for whom I have the deepest
respect. He has labored with extraordi-
nary effort and caring for our nation and
for our ideals. I think history will look
kindly upon his legacy and such
achievements as the Camp David ac-
cords, the normalization of relations with
China, peace in Zimbabwe, the
strengthening of American defenses.
And one of my central concerns is an
issue on which I worked as a member of
the Senate, but which has been with me
literally every single day, indeed every
hour, of my time as Secretary of State.
The issue is this: Will America sup-
port the foreign policy this country needs
with the resources a credible policy re-
quires? Will we provide the funds neces-
sai-y to support our diplomacy and our
vital interests in the world, or will we
shortchange them?
To people with an interest in foreign
policy this is a perennial problem. The
Department of State and the foreign as-
sistance agencies face special obstacles.
We can never match the domestic con-
stituencies of other parts of the govern-
ment in the competition for Federal
funds.
But I suggest that the foreign policy
resource problem is now passing beyond
that condition of routine annual struggle.
It is steadily worsening. It is, in my view,
a gathering crisis. And it is a threat not
only to the global influence of the United
States but to the security and well-being
of all the American people. The crisis
ahead lies at the intersection of several
critical trends .
Diffusion of Power
A first trend is the diffusion of authority
— of power — in the world. Principally as
a result of decolonialization, the Earth
now holds nearly three times as many
sovereign nations as it did at the end of
the Second World War. There are more
than 100 new countries.
As a statistic that is easy enough to
grasp. We have a much harder time
grasping the new realities it entails. For
example, in the United Nations, and in
many of its related bodies, the majority
of votes now are cast by countries that
didn't exist when the institution was
formed. The balance of power in global
institutions has shifted — not toward any
competing superpower but toward the
developing world.
For all of their diversity, nearly all of
those new nations share at least one pas-
sion — for their sovereignty and national
integrity. They are uniquely wary of out-
side manipulation or control. We have
seen the dark side of this reality in the
lawless behavior of Iran. But there are
also positive manifestations of the same
trend — the resistance of the nationalists
in Afghanistan, for example, and the
overwhelming vote in the United Nations
to condemn the Soviet invasion of that
country.
But whatever the effect in individual
cases, the broad international truth is
that power has been widely dispersed.
An American diplomacy that can effec-
tively protect and advance our interests
in such a world requires, more than ever
before, a diverse and skilled Foreign Ser-
vice as well as a fully funded foreign as-
sistance program.
U.S. Stake in Developing Countries
A second trend is our own growing stake
in those developing countries. Today they
are the fastest growing markets for
American exports. Already they buy
more from us than Japan and the Euro-
pean Common Market combined. Those
sales to developing countries account for
more than 2 million American jobs. They
supply us with materials we cannot do
without — not only oil but tin, bauxite,
rubber, and a long list of others.
We also need their cooperation.
World institutions control hundreds of
matters affecting our lives — from the al-
location of radio frequencies to proce-
dures for harvesting the seas and mining
their floors. Such global issues as popula-
tion growth and nuclear proliferation
touch our own daily lives in profound and
persistent ways. And we have growing
security interests in developing coun-
tries. For example, an effective response
to Soviet ambitions in the Indian Ocean/
Persian Gulf region requires access
military facilities on the scene.
So for all of these reasons — ecc
nomic, political, security — good rel;
with developing countries are not s(
thing we concede; they are somethii
need.
Soviet Ambition
A third trend is one I have alluded 1
ready — the ambition of the Soviet I
to extend its influence in the develo
world. It is, of course, no revelation
the Soviets believe their system she
be installed elsewhere and ultimatel
everywhere. That aspiration increas-
is backed up with a growing capacit.
project military power far beyond tl'
borders. A little over a year ago we
grim new step in Afghanistan — a di
Soviet invasion designed to transfor
nonaligned country into a new satell
state.
Obviously we must never negle
direct Soviet threat to the United S
and the other industrial democracies-
the Soviets' most promising opporti
lie in the developing world through •
ploitation of disorder. Our diplomacy
it is wise — and our resources — if the
generous — can promote order by he
other governments meet the aspirat
of their people for economic, politica
social justice.
Worsening Economy of Third Worl
Unfortunately, a fourth trend bright
Soviet prospects there — and that is
worsening economic plight of most T
World nations. The barriers to devel
ment have grown steadily higher in i
cent years. Populations have multipl
debts have swollen; energy prices ha
soared; available resources have dwii
died. And the future looks worse. In
past year a series of authoritative re
— by the World Bank, by the Brandt
Commission, by the President's worh
hunger commission, by agencies of oi
own government in the "Global 2000"
port — have all foreseen in the cominj
cades a world with huge concentratio
desperate people.
Right now by far the greatest di
ing factor is oil. It is a stunning fact t
oil prices have roughly tripled in just
years — from $12.80 per barrel at the
24
Department of State Bu
The Secretary
)78 to some $35 now. Those increases
e inflicted real pain here. Each round
igher costs further shocks our econ-
' and fuels our inflation.
But if they have harmed us, those
e hikes have ripped through Third
Id economies like a tornado, leaving
ss lomic devastation in their wake. Na-
al treasuries are draining di-y. In the
J r just past, the bills to be paid by
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum
;i( )orting Countries] developing coun-
iii] s for imported oil and interest and ex-
lal debt alone have been some three
3S what they received in aid.
The poorest lands are the hardest
Countries like Bangladesh, Liberia,
Sudan, and Uganda have little access
redit, so the trade-off is direct: Every
ar more paid for oil immediately
ms a dollar less to invest in productive
rprise. In the resulting economic
ich, funds reserved for investment
n must be diverted on a crisis basis
such necessities as food.
In any nation, these are precisely
conditions that invite turmoil. It is
only the lesson, it is the litany of his-
y that human misery is the enemy of
er. Driven by the energy emergency,
ay governments are forced toward
nomic decisions that could mean their
vnfall. As this process continues, the
2 of radicalism will become stronger;
h day those who preach violence and
red of the West will find more
lerents in the developing world.
The OPEC countries have yet to rec-
ize the profound dangers they create
themselves in pressing this trend. If
)Jir wealth is to have practical value,
y have a stake in the economic health
I stability of others. And obviously
y, too, depend upon a stable world.
'inkage in U.S. Response
ally, there is a fifth trend — not only a
gnation but a shrinkage in our af-
native response to these dangers,
jre are those who see these first four
nds and see only theu* military implica-
is. Certainly we need to help our
nds build their strength. And we must
sufficiently armed ourselves to help
er and defeat aggression. That is why
current Administration has sponsored
jor real increases in military outlays.
But arms alone are an insufficient
swer to the challenges I have de-
•ibed. In a world of crushing human
eds — among nations stirred by
tionalism with global problems deman-
ig cooperative answers — we need still
)re than a mighty arsenal.
And what has been our response? We
begin with a national indifference to our
diplomatic structure. The quality and ca-
pacity of our professional Foreign Service
is a decisive factor in our relations with
other countries. Evei-yone knows and
sympathizes with the plight of our hos-
tages in Tehran and most people have not
forgotten the other terrorist and mob at-
tacks to which our diplomats have been
subject in recent years. What is not so
well known is our failure to maintain and
sustain our essential diplomatic re-
sources.
As we move further into the 1980s, it
is clear that all elements of our national
security need full support, and diplomacy
is the front line of any lasting security.
We must be well prepared militarily, but
we must also do all we can to achieve our
national goals without resort to force, and
that, in a word, is the business of diplo-
macy.
Given the complexities of the world
of the 1980s and 1990s, it is also clear that
we need to understand still better the as-
pirations and interests of people in the
rest of the world and other people need to
understand still better our aspirations
and interests. The consequences of mis-
understanding are much greater than
they were in the past. Making sure gov-
ernments interpret each other's actions
and words correctly is also the essential
business of diplomacy.
If diplomacy is to be effective, then
we must continue to have individuals who
represent the best in America serving in
our professional Foreign Service. Yet, the
Department of State has the same
number of people as it had in 1960 when
we dealt with 66 fewer nations and prob-
lems that were significantly less complex.
Despite mounting needs to understand
this world still better, we have 18% fewer
political officer positions than in 1960.
That is not only a sorry picture, but a
scary one, in the light of our global re-
quirements.
The same short-sighted, stingy ap-
proach has limited also our foreign assist-
ance programs. These are the programs
that provide backing for our daily diplo-
macy even as they address the longer
term economic and social sources of
human suffering and political instability.
Foreign aid, and particularly economic
development aid, can be a favorite target
on Capitol Hill. Often, those who are
most vocal against aid programs are also
the loudest in declaring their opposition
to communism. They insist upon a goal
we share even as they dismantle the
means we need to pursue it.
The Congress has failed, for 2 years
straight, to even pass our foreign aid
legislation. We operate year to year on
continuing resolutions, with funding
based on levels of prior years. And in real
terms the amounts are shrinking. We
rank 14th among the world's major
donors of assistance. For assistance pro-
grams that are directly related to our
own security and prosperity, we provide
roughly one-fifth of 1% of our gi'oss na-
tional product. In real terms our eco-
nomic aid today is actually less than it
was 10 years ago. Our security assistance
is nearly one-fourth less than it was in
1960.
But all of this still is only prologue.
Budget trends suggest that a tighter
pinch could be coming. The relatively
"uncontrollable" parts of the Federal
budget — social security, trust funds, and
the like — are taking up even higher pro-
portions of government spending. The
remainder, now less than one-fourth of
the budget, must cover national defense,
all other international programs including
foreign aid, and all the discretionary
domestic programs as well.
Now if we project past trends into
the future — and factor in the increases in
defense already planned, let alone any
further growth the Reagan Administra-
tion might want — we find this: By 1985
the total of funds left for international af-
fairs and these domestic programs will be
slashed nearly in half. It takes little imag-
ination to forecast the resultant pressures
on the State Department and foreign as-
sistance budgets. That is why I say what
we know now as an annual struggle is, in
fact, a gathering crisis. If unmet, it could
dramatically alter our role in the world.
That crisis can be averted. But it will
require political will on the part of our
leaders and a new awareness on the part
of the American people. It must begin
with a recognition of this central reality:
We can no longer afford to act as if for-
eign aid were charity and as if diplomacy
were a diversion. They are as vital to our
long-run security as defense — as essen-
tial to the well-being of the American
people.
In short, we have a fundamental
choice we can no longer postpone. We
must either raise our investments signifi-
cantly or lower our expectations for the
future. We cannot produce the foreign
policy results our people expect with the
dwindling resources we seem prepared to
apply. If we continue to address surging
international challenges with a shrinking
commitment, then we ought to begin
planning for an ineffectual, defensive, and
perilous future.
ibruary 1981
25
The Secretary
America's Potential
I have great confidence in America's po-
tential. Our values are more relevant to
the world than ever before. Our military
strength is growing. Our dedication to
the sovereignty of nations is squarely in
line with the aspirations of developing
countries. Despite all the setbacks, our
economic system — our technology, the
miracle of our agriculture, our innovation
— remain a source of international
strength, in contrast to the faltering of
state-managed systems.
And I have confidence in the Ameri-
can people — in their capacity to grasp
what is at stake when they are told the
truth about what must be done to sup-
port forward-looking foreign policies.
The response of our people and our
political leadership to this challenge will
importantly determine the kind of world
our children wall inherit — whether it is
hospitable or hostile to our values;
whether we are fully engaged in the in-
ternational system or excluding our-
selves from it; whether Americans feel
secure or surrounded. In the next few
years, the choice must be made. For all of
our sakes, I hope we choose wisely.
^Press release 12.
Secretary Muskie
Interviewed on
''Meet the Press"
(Excerpts)
Secretary Muskie was interviewed
on NBC's "Meet the Press" on Decem-
ber 21, 1980, by Bill Monroe, NBC
News (moderator and executive pro-
ducer); Karen Elliot House, Wall Street
Journal; Carl Rowan, Chicago Sun
Times; and Marvin Kalb, NBC News.'
Q. What is your assessment of the latest
conditions trom Iran for the return of
the 32 American hostages and the options
they make available to this country?
A. We regard the response as
unreasonable and as requiring of us
actions beyond the power of the Presi-
dent to take.
Expecting, on the basis of this
morning's news, that I'd be asked to
react to what they have done, I would
like to make clear that what I say
about the subject on this program is
not an official response; it's an official
reaction to the extent that I'm in a
position to respond to your questions.
The second point I'd like to make is
that it is official in the sense that I've
discussed this subject with the Presi-
dent today, and what I have to say
represents the reaction of the Admin-
istration.
Finally, in order to put this whole
subject of negotiations between Iran
and the United States in the proper
context, what we are discussing is not
the usual kind of negotiation between
mutually agreed parties. What we are
talking about is negotiating the release
of hostages that were illegally taken
over a year ago, who are being illegally
held today — a taking that has been con-
demned by the World Court, condemned
by the United Nations, and condemned
by nations all over this planet. It's that
illegal holding that we are seeking to
correct. I think that these points are
important points to be reminded of as
we begin whatever discussions we may
have today.
Q. Are the difficulties now posed by
Iran so severe, in your judgment, that
the Administration would consider, in
effect, suspending negotiations at this
point and leaving the resolution of the
matter up to the incoming Reagan
Administration?
A. No, indeed. We continue to
work at what we think is a high-prior-
ity goal, and that is the release of the
hostages. The Iranians previously havi
made requests that we could not meet
Nevertheless, we continue to use the
private channel, through the Algerian
Government, in an attempt to persuad
them to our position.
What we have tried to do is makf
a goodwill effort, a good faith effort, t
examine what we can do to restore
their frozen assets within the legal
authority of the President of the Unit'
States. And we will continue to do th;
Q. Are you saying that the Admin
tration will present a detailed response
to Iran's latest terms?
A. The nature of the response is,
course, still under study. We've had
this response which, as you now know
from the public prints, is quite long,
extensive, and complicated, and which
also requires an understanding of the
Iranian use of concepts before we can
respond. So the nature of our respons
is not yet decided, but the nature of
this reaction is clear.
Q. You seem to be implying that
you will respond again in some fashion
whatever the details, and that you wom
simply say, "This is as tar as we can g-
You know what it is. Take it or leave i
If you don't like it, deal with the next
Administration." Is that what you mes
to imply?
A. What I mean to say is that a
part of this frustrating and, at times,
agonizing effort is to make clear to th
Iranians through a third party — whic
complicates the task — the limits beyo
which the President cannot legally go
It is not always clear whether that m
sage has gotten through or whether
they accept it.
This is not the first time that the
have suggested items that would re-
quire us to go beyond the President's
legal authority. This comes at a time
when we were under the impression
that they understood those limits.
Q. How do you expect them to re-
lease the hostages if they are not givei
something of a nature that they can p:
off politically to their own people? I
mean, we're saying we want the hosta;
back because they were illegally taken
and you can't have the money until thi
hostages are back.
26
Department of State Bulle
The Secretary
\. They have a responsibility for
!rship and accountability in their
political system just as I do in our
!m, and just as our President does
T system. The President cannot
ically, let alone legally, exceed his
powers in dealing with their re-
ts. They must understand that. So
have to decide first, are they go-
respond to world opinion, which
udged that they have taken an ille-
ct and which has had an impact
their own country economically in
s of isolation from the world com-
ity, in terms of denial of access to
:ets that they would find useful
in terms of impacting on an un-
e political situation in their own
try, and in terms of threats on
own borders.
They've paid a cost for this illegal
ig, and an increasing number of
1 have made it clear that they
Tstand that their own national
ests would be better served if the
age issue were behind them. They
said that publicly. So if it is in
country's interest to solve this
ilem, then they have an obligation,
aders in that country, to take the
ssary decision.
P'Q. But they have, for a year, thumbed
i' noses at world opinion. We have
ill o Tehran saying that, if you don't
U pt what you have called unreason-
:\ the Christmas trees here will be
i next year, meaning the hostages
^till be there. Would you give me
J candid assessment as to whether
I think there can be, ever, a nego-
a d settlement?
A. There will have to be a nego-
I'd settlement unless they take the
\ r step — which they have given no
« 'ation at all they are willing to take
release the hostages without condi-
.. That is what they ought to do,
•n the fact that they did an illegal
over a year ago.
With respect to their public rhet-
, I have found that, like politicians
rywhere, their public statements
le for domestic consumption may
necessarily disclose what may be
sible through appropriate negotia-
iS. It requires patience, it involves
itration, but you have to press it.
1 have to press it because I don't
eve that country or any other coun-
can persist in the kind of illegal
on they have taken and not pay a
alty as a member of the community
lations.
Q. A lot of us sitting on the outside
see a situation where it appears you've
done everything that you can possibly
do, and you're still left with a situation
where the United States has to accept
something close to abject capitulation to
kidnappers and that we may be at the
point where nothing is left but military
action. Are we close to that point?
A. No, I would not say so. We've
had a previous experience in the case of
North Korea, a hostage situation, in-
volving roughly the same number of
people. They were held for 11 months
and were eventually released. I think
that these hostages will eventually be
released. I don't believe that the Ira-
nians can escape the costs that they are
now paying for holding the hostages.
Inevitably, at some point, they will
make the decision that they must make.
Q. You are aware that there are
some mumblings out there in America
that the honor of the United States is
more important than the lives of 52 hos-
tages and that, at some time, this gov-
ernment is going to have to say, "The 52
don't matter that much. We're going to
have to do what we have to do." Do you
think, having given priority to saving the
hostages all these months, that the United
States can ever make that hard decision?
A. I don't think the two are that
separable. I think that to permit them
to jeopardize the safety and the lives of
the hostages would be counter to our
national interest and our national
honor. I don't think you can separate
the two. They are one problem.
Q. Are you ruling out the use of
American military force by this Adminis-
tration to resolve this problem?
A. We tried a form of that in the
rescue effort which failed. That effort
did not succeed and, in addition, making
the effort, I think, prolonged the agony
of the problem.
It is not easy, if one looks at a map
of Iran, to consider military options
unless one were to consider options
with consequences that need to be care-
fully weighed for our other national
interests before making it. An auto-
matic military response is not an easy
thing to devise or an easy thing to exe-
cute or one that one easily contem-
plates when one considers other national
interests that might be impacted. But
the President has made clear for a year
that we will hold Iran accountable for
the safety of the hostages, whatever
that implies in the circumstances that
may arise.
I don't think it is helpful to try to
hypothesize what circumstances may
arise. At this point, in our negotiations
with Iran, we are within reach, if they
could but see it, of a solution to the
problem which would eliminate any
such possibility, which would make pos-
sible the return of the hostages, and
which would make possible the begin-
nings of a meaningful process of bring-
ing Iran back into the community of na-
tions in a dignified, responsible way.
They've got to do that; they've got to
face it at some point.
Q. You just said "within reach." If you
had to project now "within reach" mean-
ing weeks, months, do we have to wait
for the next Administration to come in?
A. When I say "within reach," I
don't mean on the basis of the most re-
cent exchange between us that I see it
happening. It's certainly not going to
happen by Christmas, and it would be
very difficult to make it happen within
the time left to this Administration.
Q. Difficult?
A. Very difficult. It all depends on
the extent to which the Iranian reply is
a negotiating tactic or whether it is in
fact a "take-it-or-leave-it" proposal.
Q. Are you beginning to suspect
that it might be a case of old-fashioned
ransom being asked of the United States?
A. What they've asked for is unrea-
sonable, and it would require us to do
things that we cannot do legally. That
is the best way to describe it at this
point. You know, they do some of these
things that they are asking of us by
just a flick of their fingers.
Q. Would the United States consider
sending billions of dollars to Algeria —
one figure mentioned today is $23 or $24
billion — as a guarantee against the even-
tual return of the Iranian assets frozen
in this country and the Shah's wealth?
A. No. The President does not
have the power to do that or the
authority to do it. And let me put that
in perspective, if I may. Iran placed in
the hands of persons and institutions in
the United States and other countries
deposits totaling billions of dollars.
They did that long before the hostages
were taken. They took the risks attend-
ant upon that. The U.S. Government
had no responsibility with respect to
those deposits. We don't guarantee
those deposits. When they did that,
they assumed certain risks.
The Secretary
As a result of their taking of the
hostages, their business arrangements
with the various institutions involved in
those deposits were interrupted. The
result of all that was to produce a lot of
litigation, a lot of claims, a lot of suits;
but they took those risks. Now they ask
us to make cash guarantees for the pur-
pose of assuring them against loss
resulting from those risks, if they mate-
rialize in the form of losses. That's not
our responsibility.
May I say, also, that at the begin-
ning of these negotiations, we pursued,
apparently with their understanding
and their agreement, two principles:
One, that we would do everything we
could, insofar as we could legally, to
restore our financial arrangements to
their status prior to November 14, a
year ago. Two principles are involved:
the status quo as of that time and what
we could do legally. The status quo as
of that time was, with respect to these
frozen assets, that they had placed
these assets on deposit in Western
institutions and with persons in the
West and in the United States.
We are willing and have offered
ways to do that. There are some assets
that could be made available to them
almost immediately. Others are subject
to claims that have to be resolved in
one way or another. We have offered to
join with them in establishing an inter-
national claims settling procedure and
offered to pursue that procedure with
them in every way possible that we could
legally in order to resolve those claims.
It would require actions on their
part, reestablishing their banking rela-
tions, for example, and others. There
are precedents for this sort of approach
to it. Now, because that process couldn't
conceivably be completed before the
end of the President's term and before
the return of the hostages, they ask us
for these cash guarantees. Well, that is
asking for something different than the
status quo in November of 1979.
Q. Two weeks ago we were told that
a Soviet invasion of Poland was immi-
nent, or virtually imminent. Has that
problem eased up?
A. There has been a certain stabil-
ity, I think, which has developed as a
result of the ceremonial activities in
Gdansk and the other Baltic cities.
There was some fear that those might
produce instability, even violence, but
they were conducted with calm and
with dignity. The church, the unions,
and the government were all repre-
sented, and every effort was made by
those three institutions in the Polish
community to insure that those activ-
ities would be conducted in a way that
was dignified and calm.
Having passed that potential explo-
sive point, there has been a certain
stability. But the Polish situation is still
difficult; the economic situation is still
difficult and, to some extent, inhibits
the liberalization movement, or the "re-
newal process," as the Poles call it, that
has been taking place with respect to
the unions. So in those terms, the situa-
tion is somewhat easier than it seemed
to be a couple of weeks ago.
Q. But there is no sign that the
Soviets are withdrawing their troops or
are stepping down their readiness?
A. Their readiness is still there.
Q. The Peoples Republic of China
has issued a state-of-the-world review in
which they warn that the United States
and other nations had better get together
to halt Soviet military expansion or face
the choice of either abject surrender or
world war. Do you share this grim out-
look with regard to Soviet intentions?
A. The Soviet Union has posed
serious problems for us, for themselves,
for the West, including China. Never-
theless, I think the situation is not irre-
mediable. It all depends on where the
Soviets go from here to there. I put it
this way: One of the most serious chal-
lenges facing us is the continuing chal-
lenge of reading Soviet intentions.
With respect to Afghanistan, they
have paid some heavy costs, costs that
have, in visible ways, restrained them.
With respect to Poland, they have per-
mitted the situation there to go beyond
limits which they previously considered
tolerable so, obviously, they have exer-
cised restraint there.
Q. What about Iran, can you tell us
what Soviet behavior has been there?
Have they done anything to try to help
bring the Iranian leaders to their senses,
as you might put it?
A. With respect to the hostage
question?
Q. That's correct.
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Have you seen any evidence that
they've tried to keep this dispute going?
A. I don't think, recently. There
was a time when their propaganda broad-
casts, radio broadcasts, we thought, had
the effect of inflaming opinion in Iran
against the United States.
Q. You seemed to be suggesting
earlier that the hostages may not be
released until the Reagan Administra-
tion comes in. Would you recommend
that President Reagan continue to neg
tiate for the release of the hostages-
effect, two Administrations being held
hostage to the same problem?
A. What he does with respect to
the problem will depend upon, I sup-
pose, what the situation is on Januar;
20. We try to keep him and his advist
informed, and now that we have a Se
retary of State-designate, we are in a
better position to keep him informed.
We are trying to solve the probh
before he comes on so that he won't
have this on his plate with other
problems that will be on his plate. Bu
whatever he may find expedient to di
at that time will depend upon the
circumstances.
' Press release 352.
28
Department of State Bulle
The Secretary
terview on the
llacNeil/Lehrer
jport"
Secretary Muskie's interview for
'ublic Broadcasting System's
Neil/Lehrer Report" with Robert
Weil and Jim Lehrer on January 6.
■an's Prime Minister Mohammed Ali
i today consulted the AyatoUah
Tieini on the latest stage in the
ige negotiations, but what precisely
spired is unclear. Afterward Rajai
e to Iranian television, and there are
versions of what he said.
According to one, the Ayatollah said
fovernment could accept guarantees
le Algerian intermediaries to solve
lostage problem. The other version
the word "undertakings" instead of
antees. Before the Algerians return-
Iran last week with the latest
rican counterproposals, some Ira-
i said they would accept whatever
antees satisfied the Algerians.
Meanwhile, the whereabouts of the
,iges themselves are again in doubt.
i aturday. the three hostages held
J long at the Iranian Foreign Ministry
\ forced to move to an unknown
i nation. Today, an unidentified Ad-
jstration official in Washington said
j- of them may be in jail. Tonight,
(Vdministration view of the hostage
Jition and other matters. Secretary
!ate Edmund Muskie is with Jim
er in Washington.
Q. First, on the hostages them-
s. Do we know now that some of
I are in jail?
A. No, we do not. I don't know the
ce of the report to which Robert
referred. We don't know where the
e are. The Government of Iran
.fied the move on the grounds that
he hostages are now under govern-
t control; that they wanted to bring
n all together, wherever they are-
is, an appropriate place. This is the
explanation we have.
Q. There had even been state-
ts— oh, 10 days ago, I think— from
)artment of State spokesman] John
ttner about the possibility that
e of the hostages were now in jail,
re's no new development on it? We
e no new information about that,
jgh, is that correct?
-ruarv 1981
A. No. The latest information we
have about the other 49 is the news
that we were given by the Algerian
delegation. And that was all very posi-
tive. They saw all 52 hostages, spent
some 7V2 hours with them, talking to
groups of them in their rooms or
quarters; accepting letters from them
to the people back here, and to the
families back here, in the States; and
taking pictures of all of those who were
interested in having pictures taken. I
think there's only one who did not. So
they had that much time to observe the
hostages, and their impression was that
they were in good physical health.
Q. The explanation, you said, that
the Iranians had given for taking the
three out of the Foreign Ministry
was — do you buy that explanation —
that the government has now taken
control of the hostages?
A. In dealing with Iranians, I'm
always interested in as many facts as I
can get. One does not necessarily get a
consistent version of what has hap-
pened or why. Our access to informa-
tion is not perfect. The Swiss, of
course, are our protective government
in Tehran, representing our interests,
and they are in almost daily contact
with the Government of Iran. They give
us the best information they can, and
we rely on them to give us information.
And there are other governments that
are useful channels to information. But
at this point we don't know where the
three have been taken, but we are pur-
suing that question.
Q. Is there anything important in
these reported remarks of the Ayatollah
to the Prime Minister today that I just
quoted? Is there some significance that
you can read into that?
A. There is an additional report
that you ought to have. Ambassador
Gheraib, one of the Algerian delegation,
also had a press conference subsequent
to the ones to which you refer and
made it clear that Algeria's only role is
as intermediary. So whatever Khomeini
said, it was not an accurate description
of the Algerian role and certainly not a
description that satisfied the Algerians.
Q. So that speculation that the
Algerians might be performing some-
thing like the Camp David role of try-
ing to come up with a parcel, a
package, that brings both sides
together, they are not doing that.
A. I think the most accurate way
to describe their role — and I've used
this description before — is that of a
positive intermediary. Now, what do I
mean by the word "positive"?
When they come to the United
States to get our response, they do
more than accept the document. They
also ask questions about the document,
undertaking to anticipate the questions
that Iranians may put to them so that
they can deliver the document with a
rather full understanding on their own
part of the document's significance and
meaning. And they do that in reverse
when they receive the Iranian response
to our documents.
So they have been very helpful and
very impressive in that respect, but
they are no more than intermediaries.
Q. Last week, before they went
back, one of the spokesmen in Iran—
the man who's in charge of negotia-
tions, Mr. Nabavi— said that they were
prepared to hear a U.S. counter offer.
Are you hopeful that what you have
now sent back with the Algerians will
produce a positive response in Iran? Do
you have some hope of that?
A. Long ago I dismissed hope as a
useful emotion in these frustrating
talks. I don't even describe them as
"negotiations." But one never knows,
given the political power struggle that
is going on in Iran today — and it seems
to have developed into one of those
more abrasive kinds of struggles, more
public than it has been for some time —
one never knows when someone in Iran
is in a position to make a decision and
to make a decision favorable to our pro-
posals and to the hostages.
And the second point I would make
is that, notwithstanding the positive
role that the Algerians have played in
conveying not only our documents but
an explanation of them, it has been
very difficult to convey to the Iranians
precisely what the limitations are on
our authority, on the President's
authority, in a way that's credible to
them. They're suspicious of us anyway.
So we think that by patiently and per-
sistently making our points, our limita-
tions, reformulating our proposals in ac-
cordance with the questions that they
raise, that we might at some point
strike a formulation that gets a favor-
able response. Time is obviously run-
ning out; we're aware of that, and we
hope they are.
29
The Secretary
Q. Have you asked the Algerians
to emphasize that point to the Iranians,
that time is running out?
A. Oh, indeed, and it wasn't
necessary for us to emphasize it.
They're quite aware of it, too.
Q. They can look at the calendar
as well.
A. Yes.
Q. Is there any indication at this
point as to when this next Iranian
response to our counterproposals is go-
ing to be received here in the United
States?
A. No, there isn't. I think that Ra-
jai is scheduled to hold another press
conference tomorrow. He had one today
and gave us no response.
Q. It must be terribly frustrating
for you to have to get information from
a press conference every day or so.
A. Now it doesn't seem to me that
you take your profession seriously
enough. Aren't press conferences sup-
posed to be informative?
Q. [Laughing] All right. Yes, sir.
A. But you're absolutely right.
And, like so many politicians in this
country, as well as in Iran, they often
say things in public that are not neces-
sarily a clue to what their thinking is or
what they may be planning to do.
Q. Have the statements by Presi-
dent-elect Reagan, particularly those
characterizing the Iranians as bar-
barians, have they been helpful or hurt-
ful to the negotiations or the discus-
sions — whatever you want to call them?
A. That's hard to measure. Cer-
tainly it struck a chord over in Iran and
some very vigorous reactions. But he
has, of course, made it clear to them
that they can't expect a better deal in a
Reagan Administration than they can
get from the Carter Administration,
and to that extent perhaps it's useful.
Q. What do you make of all this
talk in the last several days — and it's
just talk, as I understand it— but the
suggestion that some people are going
to make to President-elect Reagan that
what he ought to do is ask the Con-
gress to declare war on Iran. Does that
sound like a good idea to you?
A. If we do that, we risk turning
away from one of our two objectives.
Our two objectives from the beginning
of this Administration have been, first.
the hostages' safety and speedy
return — the word "speedy" has to be
dropped now — and, secondly, to do so
consistent with national honor.
Once we go to these other alter-
natives, there is a risk. There are risks
even in our present strategy, so it may
be that another look at those options
would be in order. But the fact that one
looks at options doesn't necessarily
mean that one is looking seriously at
one option or another. And I think a
new administration would, as I think
Vice President-elect Bush put it, ex-
amine the problem from ground zero.
When you do that, you look at a lot
of options that you won't necessarily
consider seriously, and I don't think it
would be useful for me to prejudge
options that may not be considered
seriously.
Q. Why is it in the Iranian interest
to solve this before the Carter Adminis-
tration leaves?
A. It seems logical to me, even in
terms of their own interest, that they
should have solved it long ago. But our
logic doesn't seem to run parallel with
Iranian logic.
Q. You mentioned national honor a
moment ago. We've rejected the $24
billion deposit demand. We have of-
fered, as I understand, something like
$6 billion. Why is our offer of $6 billion
consistent with national honor and their
demand for $24 billion not acceptable as
consistent with national honor?
A. The principles on which we
have been negotiating— two important
principles; one, if they will undo what
they did — that is, seize the hostages —
we would do everything we can within
the limits of the President's authority
to undo what we did in retaliation. The
$6 billion figure, which doesn't come
from the State Department or any offi-
cial source — and I'm not going to use
any numbers— but the number that has
been used is that the assets frozen at
the time the hostages were seized
amounted to about $8 billion. Any sum
in excess of that would do more than
restore our financial relationship to the
status quo ante. That's the first princi-
ple.
The second principle is that if and
when this exchange of actions is taken,
they must be taken simultaneously —
that is, so that we are sure of getting
the hostages back for taking our action
and so that they are sure of getting
their assets back.
The complicating factor in all of
this is that subsequent to the freezinj
of the assets, a great number of suits
arising out of business and banking ai
rangements that the Iranians had
entered into before the seizure of the
hostages changed. Banks offset loans
against assets; people with claims
against Iran filed suit and made attac
ments. That's the complicating factor.
One cannot just arbitrarily wipe
out the rights of those people to a
judicial settlement of their claims.
That's the complicating factor; and it
the amount of those claims, which is
very hard to measure, that complicati
the net numbers to which you referre
There's nothing like $24 billion in Ira
nian assets involved in all of this.
Q. So is it wrong to think of this
as a negotiation like a labor negotiati(
where they start with a high demand
and then there's a lower offer and
gradually the two sides come together
monetarily?
A. I don't see it in that fashion ai
all. Recall that I said the principle is i
restore each other's position to what
was. Given the fact that a year irre-
vocably changes those positions to soi
extent, you can't give the hostages bi
that wasted year; and, in the case of
the assets, these attachments have cc
plicated the Iranians' claim to their
assets. So you can't put them back.
And so you're dealing with fixed
items. You can't negotiate down the
claims. What we've offered to do is t(
create an international claims settle-
ment procedure- which would substi-
tute for the judicial process — to make
judgments as to the validity of claims
and to arrange for their settlement.
In order to wipe the slate clean a
some point, Iran has said that it is wi!
ing to pay its just debts. But, beyond
that, it is not willing to concede again
its own assets. So the numbers are no
really that flexible.
Q. It sounds as though there's not
much more room for maneuver.
A. To answer that question ade-
quately would require that I go into t!
matter more extensively than I think
would be helpful.
Q. On a scale of 1 to 10, what do
you think the chances are of the
hostage situation being resolved by the
deadline, January 16?
A. That method of measuring is
useful in the United States but not in
Iran.
30
Department of State Bullet
ERICA
>ioposed Chad-
ibya Merger
VRTMENT STATEMENT,
: ;i. 1981'
aire very concerned about reports
r<ng from Tripoli that Libya and
I plan to work toward a merger of
two states. Without trying to in-
jne in Chad's internal affairs, we
note that it appears the entire
nal Union Transition Government
JT) has not been consulted about
proposal.
Our policy has been clear from the
gining. We support the provisions of
ftjagos accord and the Lagos com-
uique. The United States has also
mbeen attached to the principle of
interference by one state in the in-
ril affairs of another.
Most of Africa has expressed a
e; concern in recent days over
ba's blatant behavior. We share this
n;rn and want to work with the Af-
a states to assure Chad's national
V reign ty and territorial integrity.
Read to news correspondents by
3j -tment spokesman John Trattner. ■
Q. You won't play my game, then?
A. No.
Q. [Laughing] Okay. Moving on to
Mier major problem of Iran, which is
i ar with Iraq. Yesterday Iran an-
M ced that it had launched a major
)i teroffensive against Iraq. Is that
a as best you can tell?
A. I know what Iranian reports say
)( t it. What they claim to have been
V ved in is Iraqi casualties in the
jilreds. In terms of World War II,
la s not a major offensive, but in
■r s of this war, that is a sizable loss.
they claim this victory.
Reports out of Iraq these days, or
1 morning— and I've been caught up
her things all day — made no refer-
II to such an offensive. So all we
is the Iranian report, and Bani-
, who's in charge of the military
nation, made that report to Kho-
eii and received a note of congratu-
Jns. That's the evidence that there
I such an offensive.
IjThe war has bogged down — it's the
aly season there now — into sort of a
fl of attrition at a very low pace. At
V point neither country seems to be
in a position to achieve a quick victory
over the other. It looks like a long,
dragged out process which is taking its
toll on both countries economically.
They've lost a sizable portion of their
oil revenues.
In the case of Iran, the sanctions,
which were imposed as a result of the
hostage issue, are denying it access to
markets that otherwise would enable it
to improve its ability to sustain the war
effort. But Iraq, also, is suffering
economic damage. So it looks now as
though the war has settled down for
the long term.
Whether or not at some point both
parties will be receptive to the termina-
tion of hostilities, a cease-fire,
withdrawal from territories, negotia-
tions, I think that is the objective
toward which we ought to address our
efforts with other countries in the
Security Council.
Q. But it doesn't look like that's on
the immediate horizon, right?
A. No, it does not.
Q. Let me move on to another part
of the world — Poland. Is the immediate
threat of Soviet intervention there pretty
well subsided for now?
A. Let me describe it as accurately
as I can on the basis of the information
that we have. There has been some
reduction in Soviet military activity,
but their state of readiness is still at
the high level that it achieved in
December. So they're in a position,
militarily, to move on fairly short
notice.
Internally, the tension level seems
to have been reduced somewhat, but
there are some difficult points ahead of
us. There's the question of work-free
Saturdays, for example. There's the
question of the union for the farmers.
And down the road further there's a
scheduled congress of the party in
Poland.
There is a very difficult economic
situation which could trigger political
reactions and then counterreactions
from the government and maybe con-
ceivably from the Soviet Union. So it's
going to be a very delicate, sensitive,
and potentially volatile situation for
some time.
Q. In El Salvador as of last week,
six Americans have recently been killed
there — Americans who were working
there, privately or under government
auspices. Is there anything that requires
changing American policy or that can be
done to stop this loss of American life
there?
A. First of all, one must under-
stand the basic situation. We have two
forces contending for control in El Sal-
vador: the right, made up of those who
occupy the privileged position in the
economy of the country traditionally;
and the disadvantaged and dispossessed
who seek to achieve a government
that's more sensitive to their needs and
their aspirations. There are those in
both groups inclined to violence, and
they both succeeded to the extent that
last year there were 9,000 lives lost
altogether.
The government is made up of a
junta with military representation; a
president, who is a civilian and a
member of the Christian Democratic
Party which is seeking to establish a
moderate government and has pledged
itself to reforms, land reform, which is
perhaps the most important and signifi-
cant and key reform proposal and which
led to the deaths of the two Americans
who were just killed and a very signifi-
cant El Salvadoran political figure, Mr.
Viera [Jose Rodolfo Viera, President of
El Salvador's Institute for Agrarian
Transformation], who was sensitive to
the needs of the poor and the disad-
vantaged.
The land reform program is the ob-
ject of the displeasure of both the left
and the right. The privileged people
who have owned the land and, in effect,
dominated the economy see land reform
as a threat to their privileged position.
The left sees land reform as a reform
which frustrates the kind of change
that they would like to initiate through
violence and overthrow. So land reform
and reforms of this kind that are spon-
sored by the government are attacked
and resisted from both ends of the spec-
trum.
Mr. Hammer, who was one of the
Americans killed, regrettably, in this
recently was in charge of the land
reform program. He had enemies on
both sides. The question is, from which
side of the political spectrum did the at-
tack come? President Duarte and the
Defense Minister responded quickly to
protests of our charge [d'affaires], and
they're pressing for an investigation.
But the problem is how to get the
moderate center established and credi-
ble and how to build support for them,
given these pressures from the left and
the right. And people get caught in the
i
CANADA
middle, whether they're Americans or
anyone else, treading on dangerous
ground.
Q. Finally, to your favorite subject,
Zbigniew Brzezinski. As you know, in
the past week both U.N. Ambassador
Donald McHenry and former State
Department spokesman Hodding Carter
have gone after him. McHenry said, for
instance, that Brzezinski spoke out pub-
licly when he shouldn't have and has
been sending mixed signals around the
world on U.S. foreign policy. Is that
true?
A. Let me put it this way. This
subject has been discussed now in just
about every — well, I won't say every
but many interview programs which
I've been on.
Q. We're looking for something
fresh. [Laughter]
A. I have nothing fresh to say. I've
tackled the subject from the institu-
tional point of view — the respective
role of the National Security Council
and the State Department — and I've
made those views known and clear. I
don't think it's useful, nor am I inclined,
to get involved in a personality contest
with Zbig. Zbig and I are good friends,
we get along fine, I find him congenial,
and I see no reason at this point to
comment.
Q. But McHenry wasn't a personal-
ity thing. McHenry was talking about—
he's the U.N. Ambassador of the United
States— sending mixed signals on foreign
policy. He didn't attack him personally.
Hodding Carter's statement is a little dif-
ferent.
A. Let me put it in institutional
terms. What Don McHenry had to say
could have been said when Henry Kis-
singer was National Security Adviser;
it could have been said in previous Ad-
ministrations when the National Secu-
rity Adviser was given a public voice.
That's a problem. It's the President's
choice as to whether or not that's what
he wants.
Q. And President Carter clearly
made that choice.
A. He clearly did, and he saw ad-
vantages in it for him. Zbig says that
an activist President— that is, a foreign
policy activist President — will give his
National Security Adviser automati-
cally more visibility, which is a legiti-
mate point of view.
Q. David Broder, in a column in The
Washington Post recently said that you
offered your successor-designate, Alex-
ander Haig, four rules.
A. Don't call them rules; I don't.
Q. No press secretary for the Secu-
rity Adviser; no press briefings or TV ap-
pearances; no contacts with foreign
governments; and for him to do his job
and not the State Department's. Is that
an accurate reflection of what you think
the rules ought to be?
A. That wasn't put in the diplo-
matic way that I've learned to say
things, or tried to, in the last 6 months.
Q. But structurally you think that
would help.
A. I think that those four points
highlight the point that I made a mo-
ment ago. The President, under the
Constitution, makes foreign policy; he's
got greater powers there than he does
in domestic policy.
Secondly, he ought to have a
Secretary of State in whom he has con-
fidence as his delegated voice.
That's the arrangement, and that
should be the arrangement. To the ex-
tent that someone else — whether it's
the National Security Adviser or the
Secretary of Defense — articulates
foreign policy, then to that extent you
send mixed signals, or at least risk it.
^Press release 2 of Jan. 7, 1981.
U.S.-Canada
Technical Meetin<
on Dioxin
JOINT STATEMENT
DEC. 19, 1980'
At the invitation of the Department o
State, U.S. and Canadian officials and
health and environmental scientists m
in Washing^ton December 19, 1980, to
discuss recent findings regarding
2,3,7,8-TCDD (dioxin) in the Great
Lakes and to develop an effective re-
sponse to the problem. The Canadian
delegation was led by the Department
of External Affairs and included ex-
perts from the Ministries of Health an
Welfare, Environment Canada, Fisher
ies and Oceans, and the Province of
Ontario. The U.S. delegation, led by tl
Department of State, included experts
from the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Departments of Health ar
Human Services, Interior, and the Vet
erans Administration. Government spt
cialists from the States of New York
and Michigan also took part.
Canadian scientists presented the
results of a recent Environment Canac
study which revealed the presence of
2,3,7,8-TCDD in Great Lakes herring
gull eggs. The discovery of 2,3,7,8-
TCDD in the Great Lakes Basin,
through recent advances in analytical
technology, shows that the compound
has been present in declining quantitie
in the eggs over the past decade. Othe
scientific findings from both govern-
ments on 2,3,7,8-TCDD and concerns
related to health and environment wer
compared and discussed.
As a result, Canada and the Unite
States will be exchanging information
and cooperating in an effort to:
• Identify sources of 2,3,7,8-TCDE
in the Great Lakes, with particular
attention being paid to sources related
to 2,4,5-trichlorophenol production; it
was reported that this material is no
longer being produced in the Great
Lakes Basin;
• Review the presence of 2,3,7,8-
TCDD in fish, with emphasis on analyt-
ical methodology, human exposure, and
evaluation of potential health hazards,
and establish mechanisms to deal with
these issues;
• Investigate the way that 2,3,7,8-
TCDD is transported through and af-
fects the environment; and
32
Department of State Bulletin
EAST ASIA
Formulate plans for coordinated
I addition to these immediate ac-
he governments also plan to pre-
an international conference on
, tentatively scheduled in Wash-
in October 1981, the results of
)rk accomplished.
gencies of the governments will
ue to forward information on
TCDD to the International Joint
ission which, through its Great
Water Quality Board and Science
3ry Board, is already considering
sue.
ress release 351 of Dec. 19, 1980.
II Pollution
sjislation
. ederal agencies are examining
irms of recent Canadian legislation
lig with air pollution which may af-
; le United States. By unanimous
ic on December 16 the Canadian
J: of Commons adopted a measure
i« would enable the Canadian Fed-
i overnment to take action in in-
a s where there is reason to
Li e that Canadian emission sources
,t bute to air pollution in another
ir-y- The Canadian law is similar in
Tse to Section 115 of the U.S.
a Air Act. That section provides
jtion by the U.S. Federal Govern-
D to initiate revision of State imple-
n ition plans on air quality in those
e where there is reason to believe
itiollution from U.S. sources endan-
•! )ublic health or welfare in a for-
X country, so long as that country
)'des "essentially the same rights"
t ' United States.
n the coming period the U.S. Gov-
uent will consider whether the
alian legislation provides the reci-
iiiy required under Section 115.
■ da's action, taken in the context of
slemorandum of Intent on trans-
ulary air pollution signed by Secre-
■jMuskie and the Canadian Environ-
. Minister on August 5, 1980, is a
aive step toward closer cooperation
•aling with transboundary air poUu-
iissues.
release 355 of Dec. 4, 1980.
Two Years of
U.S. -China
Relations
The United States and the People's Re-
public of China established diplomatic
relations on January 1, 1979. Since then,
the U.S. and Chinese Governments have
cooperated in the rapid reconstruction of
normal relations in virtually every field.
The Office of Chinese Affairs in the
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Af-
fairs has compiled the folloumig chronol-
ogy for the benefit of students, scholars,
and the interested public.
1979
January 1
On the basis of the joint communique and
separate statements issued on December
15, 1978, the U.S. and the People's Re-
public of China (P.R.C.) extend mutual
recognition and establish diplomatic rela-
tions. U.S. simultaneously withdraws
recognition and breaks diplomatic rela-
tions with Taipei. U.S. gives notice to the
Taiwan authorities that it is exercising its
right under Article X of the March 3,
1955, "Mutual Defense Treaty between
the United States of America and the
Republic of China" to terminate that
treaty effective January 1, 1980. While
the treaty remains in force, the U.S. will
impose a 1-year moratorium on new
commitments for U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan, although previous commitments
for arms deliveries will be honored.
Chinese officials attending the third ses-
sion of the fifth National People's Con-
gress (NPC) declare that China will re-
spect the "status quo on Taiwan ... in
settling the question of reunification";
that "all military confrontation should be
ended" between the government of China
and the Taiwan authorities; that both
sides should reestablish postal and trans-
portation links and develop bilateral
trade.
January 2
Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping tells U.S.
congressional group, led by Representa-
tive Thomas L. Ashley (Ohio), that
reunification of Taiwan with the rest of
China will be peaceful.
January 3-14
Senator Sam Nunn (Georgia) leads a del-
egation of the Pacific Study Group of the
Senate Armed Services Committee to
China.
January 9
In conversation with Senator Nunn and
Senate group, Vice Premier Deng tells
delegation that Taiwan need not disarm
after reunification; calls for bigger U.S.
naval presence in Pacific and greater
Southeast Asian defense cooperation.
January 11
Chinese Government drops tariffs on im-
ports from Taiwan.
January 16
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) is
registered as a private, nonprofit corpo-
ration in the District of Columbia.
January 22-26
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
International Trade Affairs William Bar-
raclough, chief U.S. textile negotiator
Michael Smith, and chief of China Tex-
tiles Import-Export Corporation Han
Fangyu lead preliminary consultations on
textile trade in Washington.
January 26
President Carter formally transmits to
Congress a draft bill to implement the
U.S. -China joint communique and to em-
power the AIT to manage unofficial rela-
tions with the people on Taiwan.
January 28-
February 5
Vice Premier Deng, Vice Premier Fang
Yi, and Foreign Minister Huang Hua
visit the U.S. In Washington they meet
for talks with President Carter, Secretary
of State Cyrus R. Vance, and leading
members of the Senate and House of
Representatives. Vice Premier Deng and
entourage then visit Atlanta, where they
tour Ford Motor Company; Houston,
where they visit NASA facilities and
Hughes Tool Company; and Seattle,
where they tour Boeing's 747 plant.
January 31
Vice Premier Deng reiterates, in a U.S.
television interview, that China will make
all attempts to bring about reunification
with Taiwan by peaceful means.
President Carter and Vice Premier Deng
preside at a ceremony at which a series of
agreements are signed. These agree-
ments commit both sides to facilitate the
reunification of families and establish
luarv 19R1
33
East Asia
rules to govern problems of those who
claim dual nationality, establish a Joint
Commission on Scientific and Technologi-
cal Cooperation, promote collaboration in
the field of high energy physics, and en-
courage cultural exchange and coopera-
tion between the two countries. Sepa-
rately, the two sides agree to establish a
Joint Economic Committee.
February 1
"Joint press communique" issued in which
the U.S. and China agree to facilitate the
accreditation of resident journalists and
undertake to conclude trade, aviation,
and shipping agreements.
February 12-24
Representative Les AuCoin (Oregon)
leads State trade delegation to China.
February 15
Taiwan agrees to the establishment of a
nongovernmental organization, the Coor-
dination Council for North American Af-
fairs (CCNAA), to carry out unofficial re-
lations with the people of the U.S.
February 17
Representative AuCoin and his delega-
tion meet with Bank of China Deputy
Manager Jin Deqin and other Bank of
China officials; discuss the claims settle-
ment question and the possibility of
Export-Import Bank loans to China.
State Department responds to Chinese
intervention in Vietnam by calling for
"immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese
troops from Cambodia (Kampuchea) and
Chinese troops from Vietnam."
February 24-28
Governor Jay Hammond (Alaska) leads
trade mission to China; Hammond is the
first U.S. governor to visit China follow-
ing normalization.
February 24-
March 4
Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael
Blumenthal visits China and meets with
Premier Hua Guofeng, Vice Premier
Deng, and other senior Chinese officials.
February 26
Following hearings before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate
(82 to 9) confirms U.S. Liaison Office
chief Leonard Woodcock as the first U.S.
Ambassador to the P.R.C.
February 26-
March 2
Minister of Metallurgical Industries Tang
Ke visits U.S.; meets with Secretary of
Commerce Juanita Kreps.
February 28
Embassy of the formerly recognized
Chinese Government (Taipei) officially
closes in Washington, as does the Ameri-
can Embassy at Taipei.
March 1
U.S. and China formally establish diplo-
matic relations at the ambassadorial level
as Embassies open at Beijing and Wash-
ington. Chinese Ambassador Chai Zemin
presents his credentials to President
Carter in Washington.
March 2
Secretary Blumenthal and Minister of Fi-
nance Zhang Jingfu initial a claims
settlement agreement which provides for
payment by China of $80.5 million in
settlement of $196 million in property
claims of U.S. nationals and the release
by the U.S., by October 1, 1979, of ap-
proximately $80.5 million in Chinese as-
sets frozen during the Korean war.
March 7
Ambassador Woodcock presents his cre-
dentials to Ulanhu, Vice Chairman of the
Standing Committee of the NPC, in Bei-
jing, thus completing the establishment
of ambassadorial relations between the
U.S. and China.
March 8-18
Governor Richard Thornburg (Pennsyl-
vania) leads trade mission to China.
March 13
U.S. Senate and House of Representa-
tives pass separate bills on U.S. non-
governmental relations with Taiwan.
March 15-24
Deputy Secretary of Agriculture Dale
Hathaway leads a U.S. Department of
Agriculture delegation to China. Repre-
sentative Bill Alexander (Arkansas) ac-
companies the delegation.
March 16
Chinese Government formally protests
congressional amendments to the Taiwan
Relations Act, charging that the legisla-
tion contravenes the principles of nor-
malization recorded in the joint com-
munique.
March 24-31
House Ways and Means Committee de
gation, led by Representative Al Ullnr
(Oregon), visits China; meets with Vic
Premier Deng.
March 27
House backs Senate-House compromii
on the Taiwan Relations Act (339 to 5(
March 28
Senate approves Taiwan Relations Ac
(85 to 4).
April 3
China delays signing the "claims-asset
settlement in protest of legislative act
on Taiwan Relations Act.
April 10
President Carter signs the Taiwan Re
tions Act (Public Law 96-8), stating t
he will implement it in a manner consi
ent with U.S. commitments under the
joint communique.
AIT formally opens in Taipei.
April 12-20
Textile negotiator Smith, and chief of
China Textiles Import-Export Corpoi
tion Han Fangyu, lead the first round
textile negotiations in Beijing.
April 13-19
Representative Jack Brooks (Texas),
Chairman of the Committee on Gover
ment Operations, leads a congression,
delegation to China.
April 14-17
Representative William Nichols (Ala-
bama) visits Beijing in connection wit
U.S. -China textile negotiations.
April 14-21
Representative Melvin Price (Illinois]
Chairman of the House Armed Servic
Committee, leads congressional deleg
tion to China; meets with Vice Premi<
Deng and Deputy Chief of the Genera
Staff of the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) Wu Xiuquan.
April 15-20
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
egation, headed by Senators Frank
Church (Idaho) and Jacob Javits (Nev
York), visits China. A group of north-
western business representatives acc(
panies delegation.
April 16
Vice President of the Academy of Soc
Sciences Huan Xiang leads delegation
1A
Department of State Bull
^ing:ton for meetings with the U.S.
flnittee on Scholarly Communication
ilu'P.R.C.
1 17-28
Minister of Communications Peng
ng leads delegation to Seattle to at-
ceremonies marking the first call of
inese ship at a U.S. seaport.
118
esentative Brooks' delegation meets
Vice Premier Deng.
119
Premier Deng tells Senator Church
lis delegation that the Taiwan Rela-
Act undermines the normalization of
China relations and comes close to
ying it.
I 21-24
«sentative Augustus Hawkins (Cali-
a) leads delegation of the House
ation and Labor Committee to
KII22
') e.sentative Hawkins and his delega-
r neet with Vice Premier Li Xiannian;
:i sses China's major economic prob-
i: and the importance of good relations
Uig China, Japan, and the Western al-
r? in preventing world war.
(il2.3
•) t'sentative Hawkins and his delega-
! iK'tt with Deputy Director of the
I • Bureau of Labor Wang Jiong.
til 24-
19
rtor of the National Bureau of Stand-
:i International Affairs Division Ed-
i: Brady leads delegation to China.
HI 30
f'.S. forces and military installations
iihdrawn from Taiwan.
4-15
3tary of Commerce Kreps leads dele-
in to China; first round of U.S. -China
tiations on a maritime agreement is
in Beijing.
etary Kreps and Minister of Foreign
e Li Qiang attend ceremonies in Bei-
for the signing of four protocols
ring atmospheric sciences, marine
fisheries sciences metrology and
dards, and the management of scien-
and technological information.
May 7
Secretary Kreps and Minister of Finance
Zhang Jingfu formally sign the long-
sought "claims-assets" agreement ini-
tialed during Secretary Blumenthal's
March visit.
May 10
Secretary Kreps and Minister Li sign
agreement designed to facilitate trade
exhibitions for American and Chinese
goods.
May 14
Secretary Kreps and Minister Li initial
bilateral trade agreement.
May 19-
June 3
U.S. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) delegation, led
by Administrator Robert Frosch, arrives
in Beijing to implement the Sino-U.S.
scientific and technical cooperation
agreement.
May 21
NASA delegation meets Vice Premier Yu
Qiuli.
May 21-30
Textile negotiator Smith and chief of
China Textiles Import-Export Corpora-
tion Han Fangyu lead the second round
of U.S. -China textile negotiations in
Beijing.
May 22-29
U.S. postal delegation, led by Postmaster
General William Bolger, visits China.
May 25
U.S. postal delegation and Chinese
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica-
tions sign a memorandum of understand-
ing which provides for direct exchange of
letters and post items, establishment of
an express mail service between U.S. and
Chinese cities, exchange of information
on postal technology, and settlement of
outstanding postal accounts dating back
to 1949.
May 26-
June2
U.S. Special Trade Representative
Robert S. Strauss leads governmental
and business delegation to China; holds
textile negotiations with the Chinese in
attempt to reach a compromise agree-
ment; promotes U.S. -China business con-
tact.
East Asia
May 28-
June 10
Vice Premier in charge of the State Eco-
nomic Commission Kang Shien visits
U.S. and meets in Washington with Pres-
ident Carter, Secretary of Energy James
Schlesinger, and other senior U.S. offi-
cials to discuss energy cooperation and oil
exploration.
May 30
Special Trade Representative Strauss
ends textile talks with the Chinese with-
out agreement.
May 31
U.S. quotas are unilaterally imposed on
five categories of Chinese textile im-
ports.
June 1
Chinese officials accompanying Vice
Premier Kang in the U.S. announce the
beginning of negotiations with nine of the
largest U.S. -based oil companies for
seismic surveys in the South China Sea,
which could lead to major U.S. involve-
ment in Chinese offshore oil exploration.
June 3-7
Governor John Dalton (Virginia) leads
delegation to China.
June 4-
Julyl
Chief of the Office of Energy Resources
of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), C.
D. Masters, leads USGS petroleum (June
4-July 1) and remote sensing (June 4-28)
delegations to China; groups visit China's
Scientific Research Institute for Petro-
leum Exploration and Development.
June 5-6
M. J. Terman of the USGS Office of In-
ternational Geography and Director of
China's State Bureau "of Geology (SBG)
Sun Daguang meet in Beijing to discuss
future USGS-SBG scientific cooperation.
June 6
Senate passes a nonbinding resolution
that "approval of the U.S. Senate is re-
quired to terminate any Mutual Defense
"Treaty between the United States and
another nation." The resolution is related
to a Federal judge's decision earlier that
day to dismiss a suit brought by 25 mem-
bers of Congress against the President's
decision to terminate the U.S. Mutual
Defense Treaty with Taiwan.
June 6-9
Five American USGS remote sensing
delegation geologists visit the Chaidamu
35
East Asia
Basin in western China. They are the
first known foreigners to learn the cur-
rent status of geological research and
petroleum exploration in this area.
June 11-25
Office of Earthquake Studies chief
Robert Wesson leads USGS delegation to
China as part of the U.S. -China coopera-
tive earthquake program; group meets
with China's State Seismological Bureau
officials.
June 16-29
National Committee for U.S. -China Rela-
tions sponsors U.S. Conference of
Mayors delegation to China.
June 19
Mayoral delegation meets with Vice
Premier Li; discuss Sino-American eco-
nomic relations.
June 22-30
Secretary of Health, Education and Wel-
fare Joseph Califano visits China.
June 22
Secretary Califano and Chinese Minister
of Health Qian Xinzhong sign protocol on
Cooperation in the Science and Technol-
ogy of Medicine and Public Health.
Secretary Califano meets with Vice Pre-
miers Fang Yi and Chen Muhua.
June 23
Secretary Califano signs a memorandum
of understanding covering U.S. -China
educational exchange programs, provid-
ing for the exchange of about 50 persons
from both countries.
June 23-
July 13
Ambassador to the U.N. Conference on
Science and Technology for Development
(UNCSTD) Theodore Hesburgh leads
delegation to China; delegation studies
the role of traditional and modem science
and technology in China's development.
June 24
Secretary Califano discusses U.S. -China
educational exchange with Vice Premier
Li Xiannian.
June 25
UNCSTD delegation meets with Vice
Minister in Charge of the State Commis-
sion for Science and Technology Jiang
Ming and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Huang Hua.
June 26
UNCSTD delegation meets with State
Economic Commission Deputy Director
Guo Futao and Vice Premier Fang Yi.
June 28
Mayoral delegation meets with
Guangdong Revolutionary Committee
Chairman Yang Shangkun.
July 2-13
Ohio State trade delegation, headed by
Governor James Rhodes, visits China.
July 6
Governor Rhodes and delegation meet
with Vice Premier Yu Qiuli.
July?
Ambassador Woodcock and Minister of
Foreign Trade Li Qiang sign 3-year
U.S. -China trade agreement in Beijing,
by which the two countries accord each
other most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff
treatment and agree to other measures to
promote bilateral trade and economic in-
teraction.
July 10-24
Minister of Finance Zhang Jingfu visits
U.S.
July 11
Minister Zhang and Treasury Secretary
Blumenthal open talks in Washington.
August 7
Senator Henry Jackson (Washington) ar-
rives in China for 18-day visit.
August 10-28
Governor John Carlin (Kansas) leads
State trade mission to China.
Aug:ust 14
Chinese officials and Pan American World
Airways sign agreement concerning char-
ter flights between San Francisco and
Shanghai.
U.S. determines that China is a "friendly
country" for the purposes of Section 607a
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
thus permitting U.S. Government agen-
cies to furnish services and commodities
to China on a reimbursement basis.
August 15-22
Representative Harley 0. Staggers (West
Virginia) leads a House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee delegation
to China.
August 24
Senator Jackson tells the press in Beijing
that Chinese leaders told him further
delay in MFN status would adversely i
feet U.S. -China relations.
August 25-
September 1
Vice President Mondale leads delegatio
to China.
August 26
Vice President Mondale says U.S.-Chir
trade agreement will be submitted to
Congress by November 1.
August 27
In a nationally televised address to the
students and faculty of Beijing Univer-
sity, Vice President Mondale says the
U.S. is ready to grant China $2 billion i
Export-Import Bank trade credits over
the next 2-5 years and states that a
weakened or isolated China would not 1
in U.S. interest.
August 28
Vice President Mondale signs agreemer
with China to expand cultural relations
and promote cooperation in hydroelectr
power and related water resource man-
agement.
Augrust 31
Vice President Mondale formally opens
the American Consulate General at
Guangzhou, capital of Guangdong Prov-
ince.
Chinese Government agrees to negotiat
a civil aviation agreement with the U.S
Vice President Mondale indicates that t
Carter Administration will terminate ai
replace with an unofficial arrangement
the Nanking agreement of 1946, which
regulates civil air transport between thi
U.S. and Taiwan, but purports to grant
U.S. carriers landing rights on the Chir
mainland.
Treasury Department allows the first
U.S. Government checks to be sent to
China since 1949.
September 9-21
Governor of Anhui Province, Wan Li, vi
its U.S. as guest of (jovemor Harry
Hughes (Maryland).
September 15-
October 5
Minister of Agricultural Machinery Yang
Ligong leads delegation to U.S.
September 16-23
Governor Dixy Lee Ray (Washington)
leads delegation to China; meets with
Vice Premier Deng and other senior
Chinese officials.
36
Department of State Bullet
;rECIAL
re Inaugural Address
President Reagan
Ronald Reagan was sworn in as
'fOth President of the United States
ie west side of the Capitol on
ary 20, 1981. Following is the text
s inaugural address}
ievf of us here today, this is a
nn and most momentous occasion,
yet in the history of our nation, it
commonplace occurrence. The or-
i y transfer of authority, as called for
le Constitution, routinely takes
I e as it has for almost two centuries,
■few of us stop to think how unique
^'eally are. In the eyes of many in
liworld, this every-4-year ceremony
(jiccept as normal is nothing less
1^ a miracle. Mr. President, I want
afellow citizens to know how much
jjdid to carry on this tradition. By
jl' gracious cooperation in the transi-
(X process, you have shown a watch-
fAforld that we are a united people,
eged to maintaining a political sys-
!f which guarantees individual liberty
► greater degree than any other.
r I thank you and your people for all
I ■ help in maintaining the continuity
b.-.h is the bulwark of our republic.
The business of our nation goes
H'ard. These United States are con-
oted with an economic affliction of
Jit proportions. We suffer from the
r est, and one of the worst, sustained
if tions in our national history. It
isirts our economic decisions, penal-
B thrift, and crushes the struggling
■y ig and the fixed-income elderly
ii. It threatens to shatter the lives
lillions of our people. Idle industries
4 3 cast workers into unemployment,
u.an misery, and personal indignity.
^se who do work are denied a fair
rn for their labor by a tax system
t:h penalizes successful achievement
1 keeps us from maintaining full pro-
jjvity.
But great as our tax burden is, it
a not kept pace with public spending,
fl decades we have piled deficit upon
acit, mortgaging our future and our
tdren's future for the temporary con-
aience of the present. To continue
long trend is to guarantee tremend-
ous social, cultural, political, and
economic upheavals. You and I as indi-
viduals can, by following, live beyond
our means but for only a limited period
of time. Why then should we think that
collectively, as a nation, we're not
bound by that same limitation? We
must act today in order to preserve
tomorrow. And let there be no mis-
understanding—we're going to begin to
act beginning today.
The economic ills we suffer have
come upon us over several decades.
They will not go away in days, weeks,
or months, but they will go away. They
will go away because we, as Americans,
have the capacity now, as we've had in
the past, to do whatever needs to be
done to preserve this last and greatest
bastion of freedom. In this present
crisis, government is not the solution to
our problem; government is the prob-
lem.
From time to time we've been
tempted to believe that society has
become too complex to be managed by
self-rule, that government by an elite
we're sick; professionals, industrialists,
shopkeepers, clerks, cabbies, and truck
drivers. They are, in short, we the
people — this breed called Americans.
For this Administration's objective
will be a healthy, vigorous, growing
economy that provides equal opportuni-
ties for all Americans with no barriers
born of bigotry or discrimination. Put-
ting America back to work means put-
ting all Americans back to work; ending
inflation means freeing all Americans
from the terror of runaway living costs.
All must share in the productive work
of this new beginning, and all must
share in the bounty of a revived
economy. With the idealism and fair
play, which are the core of our system
and our strength, we can have a strong
and prosperous America at peace with
itself and the world.
So as we begin, let us take inven-
tory. We are a nation that has a
government, not the other way around.
And this makes us special among the
nations of the Earth. Our government
has no power except that granted it by
To those neighbors and allies who share our freedom, we will strengthen our
historic ties and assure them of our support and firm commitment. We will
match logalty with loyalty.
group is superior — the government for,
by, and of the people. But if no one
among us is capable of governing him-
self, then who among us has the capac-
ity to govern someone else? All of us
together, in and out of government,
must bear the burden. The solutions we
seek must be equitable with no one
group singled out to pay a higher price.
We hear much of special-interest
groups. But our concern must be for a
special-interest group that has been too
long neglected. It knows no sectional
boundaries or ethnic or racial divisions,
and it crosses political party lines. It is
made up of men and women who raise
our food, patrol our streets, man our
mines and factories, teach our children,
keep our homes, and heal us when
the people. It is time to check and
reverse the growth of government
which shows signs of having g^own
beyond the consent of the governed. It
is my intention to curb the size and in-
fluence of the Federal establishment
and to demand recognition of the dis-
tinction between the powers granted to
the Federal Government and those
reserved to the States or to the people.
All of us need to be reminded that the
Federal Government did not create the
States; the States created the Federal
Government.
Now so there will be no misunder-
standing, it's not my intention to do
away with government. It is, rather, to
make it work — work with us, not over
us; to stand by our side, not ride on our
iruary 1981
Special
backs. Government can and must pro-
vide opportunity, not smother it; foster
productivity, not stifle it. If we look to
the answer as to why, for so many
years, we achieved so much, prospered
as no other people on Earth, it was
because here, in this land, we unleashed
the energy and individual genius of
man to a greater extent than has ever
been done before. Freedom and the
dignity of the individual have been
more available and assured here than in
any other place on Earth. The price for
this freedom at times has been high,
but we have never been unwilling to
pay that price.
It is no coincidence that our
present troubles parallel, and are pro-
portionate to, the intervention and
intrusion in our lives that result from
unnecessary and excessive growth of
government. It is time for us to realize
that we are too great a nation to limit
land. Your dreams, your hopes, your
goals are going to be the dreams, the
hopes, and the goals of this Adminis-
tration, so help me God.
We shall reflect the compassion
that is so much a part of your makeup.
How can we love our country and not
love our countrymen? And loving them,
reach out a hand when they fall, heal
them when they're sick, and provide op-
portunity to make them self-sufficient
so they will be equal in fact and not
just in theory.
Can we solve the problems con-
fronting us? Well, the answer is an
unequivocal and emphatic yes. To para-
phrase Winston Churchill: I did not
take the oath I've just taken with the
intention of presiding over the dissolu-
tion of the world's strongest economy.
In the days ahead, I will propose
removing the roadblocks which have
slowed our economy and reduced pro-
. . . peace is the highest aspiration of the American people. We will negotiate
for it, sacrifice for it; ice will not surrender for it, now or ever.
ourselves to small dreams. We're not,
as some would have us believe, doomed
to an inevitable decline. I do not believe
in a fate that will fall on us no matter
what we do. I do believe in a fate that
will fall on us if we do nothing.
So with all the creative energy at
our command, let us begin an era of
national renewal. Let us renew our
determination, our courage, and our
strength, and let us renew our faith and
our hope. We have earned every right
to dream heroic dreams. Those who say
that we're in a time when there are no
heroes, they just don't know where to
look. You can see heroes every day go-
ing in and out of factory gates; others,
a handful in number, produce enough
food to feed all of us and then the world
beyond. You meet heroes across a
counter and on both sides of that
counter. They are entrepreneurs, with
faith in themselves and faith in an idea,
who create new jobs, new wealth, and
opportunity. They are individuals and
families who pay taxes, support the
government, and whose voluntary gifts
support church, charity, culture, art,
and education. Their patriotism is quiet
but deep; their values sustain our na-
tional life.
Now I have used the words "they"
and "their" in speaking of those heroes;
I could say "you" and "your" because
I'm addressing the heroes of whom I
speak — you, the citizens of this blessed
ductivity. Steps will be taken aimed at
restoring the balance between the
various levels of government. Progress
may be slow — measured in inches and
feet, not miles — but we will progress.
It is time to reawaken this industrial
giant, to get government back within
its means, and to lighten our punitive
tax burden. And these will be our first
priorities, and on these principles there
will be no compromise.
On the eve of our struggle for inde-
pendence, a man who might have been
one of the greatest among the Founding
Fathers, Dr. Joseph Warren, president
of the Massachusetts Congress, said to
his fellow Americans: "Our country is in
danger, but not to be despaired of. . . .
On you depend the fortunes of America.
You are to decide the important ques-
tions on which rest the happiness and
liberty of millions yet unborn. Act wor-
thy of yourselves." Well, I believe we,
the Americans of today, are ready to
act worthy of ourselves, ready to do
what must be done to insure happiness
and liberty for ourselves, our children,
and our children's children.
And as we renew ourselves, here
in our own land, we will be seen as hav-
ing greater strength throughout the
world. We will again be the exemplar of
freedom and the beacon of hope for
those who do not now have freedom. To
those neighbors and allies who share
our freedom, we will strengthen ou;
historic ties and assure them of our
support and firm commitment. We '
match loyalty with loyalty. We will
strive for mutually beneficial relati(
We will not use our friendship to in
pose on their sovereignty, for our o
sovereignty is not for sale.
As for the enemies of freedom,
those who are potential adversaries
they will be reminded that peace is
highest aspiration of the American |
pie. We will negotiate for it, sacrifie
for it; we will not surrender for it, r
or ever. Our forbearance should nev
be misunderstood. Our reluctance fc
conflict should not be misjudged as
failure of will. But if action is requir
to preserve our national security, w
will act. We will maintain sufficient
strength to prevail, if need be. Knov
that if we do so, we have the best
chance of never having to use that
strength. Above all, we must realize
that no arsenal or no weapon in the
arsenals of the world is so formidaU
as the will and moral courage of frei
men and women. It is a weapon our
adversaries in today's world do not
have. It is a weapon that we as Anii
cans do have. Let that be understoo
by those who practice terrorism and
prey upon their neighbors.
I'm told that tens of thousands
prayer meetings are being held on t
day. For that I'm deeply grateful. W
are a nation under God. And I belie-
God intended for us to be free. It wi
be fitting and good, I think, if on ea<
inaugural day in future years, it sho
be declared a day of prayer.
This is the first time in our hist
that this ceremony has been held, as
you've been told, on this west front
the Capitol. Standing here, one face;
magnificent vista, opening up on this
city's special beauty and history. At
end of this open mall, are those shrii
to the giants on whose shoulders we
stand. Directly in front of me, the
monument to a monumental man,
George Washington, father of our co
try, a man of humility who came to
greatness reluctantly. He led Ameri(
out of revolutionary victory into infa
nationhood. Off to one side, the state
memorial to Thomas Jefferson. The
Declaration of Independence flames
with his eloquence. And then, beyon^
the Reflecting Pool, the dignified col
umns of the Lincoln Memorial. Who-
ever would understand in his heart t
meaning of America will find it in th
life of Abraham Lincoln.
Department of State Bulli
'i
* Beyond those monuments to
■" )ism is the Potomac River and on
far shore, the sloping hills of
ng^on National Cemetery, with its
upon row of simple white markers
" -ing crosses or Stars of David. They
up to only a tiny fraction of the
e that has been paid for our
dom. Each one of those markers is
* snument to the kind of hero I spoke
irlier. Their lives ended in places
d Belleau Wood, the Argonne,
iha Beach, Salerno, and halfway
ind the world on Guadalcanal,
jwa. Pork Chop Hill, the Chosin
rvoir, and in 100 rice paddies and
;les of a place called Vietnam.
Under one such marker, lies a
ig man, Martin Treptow, who left
ob in a small-town barber shop in
to go to France with the famed
ibow Division. There on the west-
front, he was killed trying to carry
!ssage between battalions under
y artillery fire. We're told that on
"Ijody was found a diary. On the fly-
1 under the heading "My Pledge," he
J written these words: "America
' t win this war. Therefore, I will
"' c, I will save, I will sacrifice, I will
* ire, I will fight cheerfully and do
I itmost as if the issue of the whole
jggle depended on me alone."
' The crisis we are facing today does
! require of us the kind of sacrifice
Martin Treptow and so many thou-
■' is of others were called upon to
" e. It does require, however, our
effort and our willingness to
!ve in ourselves and to believe in
capacity to perform great deeds. To
!ve that together, with God's help,
:an and will resolve the problems
h now confront us. And after all,
shouldn't we believe that? We are
ricans. God bless you.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
idential Documents of Jan. 26, 1981.
Special
Secretary-Designate Haig
Appears Before
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Opening statement by Secretary-
designate Alexander M. Haig, Jr.,
before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on January 9, 1981.^
I am pleased to appear before this distin-
guished committee as the nominee of
President-elect Ronald Reagan to be Sec-
retary of State. I am prepared to answer
any questions you may have concerning
my qualifications for this office, my views
on foreign policy, and my service to my
country during the past three decades.
There could be no more critical time
at which to assume the post of Secretary
of State, and I am honored that the
President-elect has chosen me as his des-
ignate. Over the past 200 years, the
United States has stood as a beacon of
liberty for the world. We have demon-
strated that freedom and justice can
thrive in a democratic society. We have, in
this century, been often called to shed our
blood for the nations of the free world;
and in an ingenious and generous plan de-
signed by a great Army general and Sec-
retary of State, George C. Marshall, we
helped, after the most devastating war in
history, rebuild Europe and strengthen
civilization.
Our record in this century is not per-
fect, but it should be a source of great
pride. Our successes were founded on a
firm commitment to our ideals combined
with a sense of the realities of human na-
ture and international politics. It is that
combination that we must bring to bear
in the decade ahead. If we do, I believe
that America and its people will stand
once again as an example for the peoples
of the world and merit the highest judg-
ment of history.
Our ideals must be reconciled with
the reality we face. The United States
must pursue its vision of justice in an im-
perfect and constantly changing world —
full of peril but also full of opportunity.
The world does not stand still for our
elections, important as they are. Complex
issues already crowd our foreign policy
agenda. The earlier the Reagan Adminis-
tration articulates its approach to these
issues, the better served the nations of
the world and the people of our own na-
tion will be.
It would be premature here to set
forth definitive policies or offer detailed
programs. Both tasks require analysis
and thoughtful consideration by the
President-elect and his advisers. But
President-elect Reagan and I firmly be-
lieve that American foreign policy should
have some permanent bedrock. The
United States has been most effective in
the world arena when the solid founda-
tions of its foreign policy have been rec-
ognized and understood — by our own
people and by the nations with which we
must deal.
The Present Global Environment
Every generation views its own perils as
unprecedented. Even so, there is now
widespread agreement that the years
immediately ahead will be unusually
dangerous. Evidence of that danger is
everywhere.
• In Europe, still the fulcrum of the
East- West balance, Soviet military power
once again casts an ominous shadow over
the efforts of an East European people to
assert fundamental freedoms of associa-
tion and expression.
• In the Middle East, an uneasy
peace continues to be punctuated by raid
and reprisal, with each such sequence
threatening renewed and wider conflict.
• At the head of the Persian Gulf,
war between Iran and Iraq threatens the
very lifeblood of many national
economies. Iran itself, once a major force
for regional stability, lurches fi-om dem-
onstration to demonstration in a state of
near anarchy. Meanwhile, not far to the
east, 85,000 Soviet troops brutalize Af-
ghanistan in the first major post- World
War II employment of Soviet troops out-
side the area the Soviets have heretofore
considered their sphere of influence.
• In Asia, sworn enemies face one
another along a 5,000-mile arc from Thai-
land to the Manchurian frontier. On the
Korean Peninsula, only a fragile truce
persists nearly 30 years after the formal
cessation of Korean hostilities.
• In Africa, Southeast Asia, Central
America, and the Caribbean, turmoil and
violence stunt national development and
invite terrorism from within and adven-
turism from without, as millions of human
beings starve and thousands of new refu-
gees seek shelter each day.
Special
It is no wonder the 1980s have been
called a decade of crisis. Yet it is precisely
that sort of appraisal which I believe we
must reject. The very term "crisis" im-
plies that events are out of control and
that our nation can only react.
But the task of statesmanship is not
simply to react to events. Those I just
described are merely the current
symptoms of more fundamental world
problems. The task of statesmanship is to
master these problems and thus minimize
the necessity for ricocheting from crisis
to crisis.
Today we face a world in which
power in a variety of forms has become
diffused among over 150 nations. Adjust-
ment of relations with and among so
many separate governments would be dif-
ficult enough, even were all equally re-
sponsible and equally committed to stabil-
ity and peace. But many are willing to
foment instability and violence to achieve
their objectives. That reality alone should
argue for better coordination of policies
among the free nations. As I have under-
scored more than once to our allies in
Europe, artificial operating boundaries
self-imposed in a simpler era are increas-
ingly irrelevant to today's needs to formu-
late and pursue policies together.
But the diffusion of power and its re-
sulting instability are not the only argu-
ments for concerted allied action. Our col-
lective vulnerability to international un-
rest is matched by a socioeconomic chal-
lenge that we all share. The growing in-
terdependence of our economies and our
continued reliance on foreign sources for
energy and raw materials have stripped
the West of the independent and collec-
tive resilience which once allowed one na-
tion's economic strength to bolster an-
other's momentary weakness.
The significance of the economic chal-
lenges we face cannot be overempha-
sized. The potential for worldwide
boom-or-bust is not unrelated to the dif-
fusion of power among so many nations.
Indeed, the decline in world oil supplies
resulting from the war between Iran and
Iraq is stark testimony that instability
may be most likely precisely where its ef-
fect on world economies promises to be
most debilitating.
Much of the fragmentation of power
has occurred in the so-called Third World
— a misleading term if ever there was
one. If one thing has become abundantly
clear in the last decade or so, it is that
the commonality of condition, purpose —
and by extension, U.S. foreign policy —
implied by the term "Third World" is a
myth, and a dangerous one at that.
Recent American foreign policy has
suffered from the misperception which
lumps together nations as diverse as
Brazil and Libya, Indonesia and South
Yemen, Cuba and Kuwait; and which has
too frequently produced attempts to cut
the national pattern to fit the foreign pol-
icy cloth. This failure to tailor policy to
the individual circumstances of develop-
ing nations has frequently aggravated the
very internal stresses which Western pol-
icy should seek instead to diminish. Our
difficulties in this regard have hardly
been lessened by our propensity to apply
to these emerging states Western stand-
ards which resolutely ignore vast differ-
ences in their social cultures, political de-
velopment, economic vitality, and internal
and external security.
These fundamental problems — the
diffusion of power, the interdependence of
the allied community, and the failure to
recognize the variety among the so-called
Third World nations — are made the more
intractable by what is perhaps the central
strategic phenomenon of the post-World
War II era: the transformation of Soviet
military power from a continental and
largely defensive land army to a global of-
fensive army, navy, and air force fully ca-
pable of supporting an imperial foreign
policy. Considered in conjunction with the
episodic nature of the West's military re-
sponse, this tremendous accumulation of
armed might has produced perhaps the
most complete reversal of global power
relationships ever seen in a period of rel-
ative peace. Today the threat of Soviet
military intervention colors attempts to
achieve international civility. Unchecked,
the growth of Soviet military power must
eventually paralyze Western policy al-
together.
These, then, are fundamental prob-
lems which challenge American foreign
policy and the future of the democracies
generally. To say that is not to diminish
the importance of other Western goals —
the eradication of hunger, poverty, and
disease; the expansion of the free flow of
people, goods, and ideas; the spread of
social justice; and through these and simi-
lar efforts, the improvement of the
human condition. It is simply to recognize
that these desirable and critical objec-
tives are impossible to achieve in an in-
ternational environment dominated by
violence, terrorism, and threat.
The United States has a clear choice.
We can continue, if we wish, to react to
events as they occur — serially, unselec-
tively, and, increasingly in the final anal-
ysis, unilaterally One lesson of Afghani-
stan is certainly that few symptomatic
crises are capable of effectively rallying
the collective energies of the free wor!
We may wish it were otherwise, but w
ing will not make it so.
Alternatively, we can confront the
fundamental issues I have discussed. ''
can seek actively to shape events and,
the process, attempt to forge consensi
among like-minded peoples. Such a co
sensus will enable us to deal with the
more fundamental tasks I have outlim
— the management of Soviet power; tl
reestablishment of an orderly interna-
tional economic climate; the economic
political maturation of developing nati
to the benefit of their peoples; and th<
achievement of a reasonable standard
international civility. Acting alone, ea
of these tasks is beyond even our pow
acting together, all are within the cap:
ity of free nations.
I do not mean to belittle the diffi-
culties. They are formidable. But our
lective capacity to meet them is also f
midable. The challenge of American f
eign policy in the 1980s is to marshal 1
capacity.
America's Challenges for the 1980s
If we are to succeed in this effort, the
conduct of American foreign policy m
be characterized above all by three qi.
ities.
First, we must act with consistei
Specific issues may furnish the occasi
for action, but they cannot constitute
sole basis for policy. Once we accept t
the specific issues facing us today are
merely surface manifestations of mor
fundamental problems, it must also b
clear that effective policy cannot be
created anew daily, informed solely b
the immediate need. To do so risks m
perception by our adversaries, loss ol
confidence by our allies, and confusio
among our own people. U.S. policy h;
been most effective — in Europe and t
Middle East, for example — where coi
sistent U.S. interests have been cons
ently pursued.
Second, we must behave reliably.
American power and prestige should
be lightly committed; but once made,
commitment must be honored. Our
friends cannot be expected to share if
burdens and risks of collective action
they cannot count on the word of the
United States. Our adversaries canm
expected to exercise prudence if they
perceive our resolve to be hostage to
exigencies of the moment. Those who
posture toward us remains to be dete
mined cannot be expected to decide ii
favor of friendship if they cannot con)
dently assess the benefits of associati
Department of State Bui
Special
'1 1 us. To be perceived as unreliable is,
•efore, to become virtually irrelevant
n influence for stability and peace and
I! ;ave the international arena to the
I ■cy of those who do not share our
mitment to either.
Finally, and in some ways most im-
otant, American foreign policy must
lonstrate balance, both in our ap-
«f ich to individual issues and in the or-
II ;tration of policy generally. By bal-
, I mean recognizing that complex is-
c^ invariably require us to weigh, and
ehow reconcile, a variety of
nsjssures, often competing.
• I believe that equitable and verifi-
arms control contributes to security,
restraint in the growth and prolifera-
of armaments will not be achieved by
;ies which increase the very insecuri-
that promote arms competition.
• Domestic economic stability will
be enhanced by the establishment of
•t-sighted, economic barriers which
srmine the multilateral cooperation
ntial to the prosperity of all.
• The assurance of basic human
-ties will not be improved by replac-
^iendly governments which incom-
ely satisfy our standards of democ-
with hostile ones which are even less
gn.
• And our commitment to peace will
be furthered by abdicating the right
icercise military power to only the
t ruthless members of the intema-
al community.
Balance must also be struck in the
estration of policy generally: in our
etion of the issues we choose to ad-
s; in the priority we accord them; and
nderstanding the relationship of in-
iual issues, one to another, and each
or broad policy objectives. This form
ilance has become known as linkage,
the President-elect has publicly
ed his commitment to it.
No mystical profession of faith is in-
ed here. In a system ever more in-
ependent in every sense, issues and
policies which attempt to deal with
n are linked, whatever our prefer-
!S. That does not mean that every ne-
ation must be a prisoner of the daily
ilines; it does mean that specific rela-
ships cannot be established in isola-
from the climate in which they must
naintained.
Establishing a Foreign Policy
Consensus
Consistency, reliability, balance. These
three attributes are essential, not be-
cause they guarantee a successful foreign
policy — nothing can do that — but because
their absence guarantees an unsuccessful
one. Unfortunately, as De Tocqueville
pointed out long ago, these are precisely
the qualities which a democracy finds
most difficult to muster This inherent dif-
ficulty has been complicated in the past
decade by the breakdown of foreign pol-
icy bipartisanship and by the develop-
ment of unnecessary division between
Congress and the executive branch, and
among the executive departments
themselves.
Our urgent task is to reestablish an
effective foreign policy consensus. To do
so, I believe three conditions must be
met.
First, the constitutional and tradi-
tional responsibility of the President for
the conduct of foreign affairs must be
reaffirmed. The U.S. Government must
speak to other nations with a single voice.
To say that is in no sense to argue for
curtailing discussion or debate. On the
contrary, I believe both are essential. But
the authoritative voice must be the Pres-
ident's. The President needs a single in-
dividual to serve as the general manager
of American diplomacy. President-elect
Reagan believes that the Secretary of
State should play this role. As Secretary
of State, I would function as a member of
the President's team but one with clear
responsibility for formulating and con-
ducting foreign policy and for explaining
it to the Congress, the public, and the
world at large. The Assistant to the Pres-
ident for National Security Affairs would
fill a staff role for the President.
Second, an effective partnership
must be restored with the Congress. By
partnership, I do not mean occasional
retrospective reporting. I mean active
consultation, exchange of ideas and pro-
posals in a timely manner, in an atmos-
phere of mutual respect, trust, and confi-
dence, recognizing the special role of the
Senate. The Congress can hardly be ex-
pected to allow the President the discre-
tion he requires unless it is comfortable
with the purposes toward which, and lim-
its within which, that discretion will be
exercised. The Constitution demands it,
and good sense urges it. In turn. Con-
gress must do its part. In a partnership,
both sides must behave responsibly.
Finally, the most consistent articula-
tion of policy is wasted if the profession-
als who must execute it are divorced from
its formulation and if their experience
and skill are usurped in the name of con-
fidentiality, haste, or political sensitivity.
The career personnel of the State De-
partment and the Foreign Service are an
unmatched intellectual resource, and they
will be around long after the President
and the Secretary of State are gone. If
the United States is to act consistently
and reliably in the world arena, it must
use its career professionals. Their effec-
tive participation in policymaking is
imperative.
I have outlined what I consider to be
the essential challenges, qualities, and
requirements of a sound American for-
eign policy. In closing, let me speak to our
resources, which are considerable.
Although we have economic prob-
lems, we still possess the largest and
strongest economy on Earth. It is within
our power to revitalize our productive
base, maintain and expand our agricul-
tural strength, regain commercial com-
petitiveness, and reduce our dependency
on foreign sources of energy and other
raw materials. No American foreign pol-
icy can succeed from a base of economic
weakness.
Our alliances enable us to draw on
the strengths and the wisdom of some of
the world's greatest nations. Yet our al-
liances must be tended and adapted to
new problems not visualized by their
creators. In the process, we must bear in
mind that the essence of any alliance is its
core of shared commitment and endeavor.
In the 1980s, we should not let ourselves
become preoccupied with debates over
who is doing more; the challenges we face
will require more from all of us.
We possess a full range of the in-
struments of effective statecraft: a diplo-
matic corps second to none; economic and
military assistance programs; a variety of
sophisticated cultural and informational
resources; and, of course, military power
which no potential adversary can afford
to ignore. These instruments provide the
United States with unrivaled capacity to
influence the course of international
events. Their maintenance or neglect will
declare American intentions far more
clearly than any rhetoric.
But I believe our greatest strength is
the strength of our values and political
institutions. These have been tested in
recent years. But they have survived. As
we survey the world, reflect on its prob-
lems, and recognize its dangers, we must
accept the fact that, Uke it or not, we are
a nation of trustees — trustees for the
values of freedom and justice that have
inspired mankind for thousands of years.
ruary 1981
Special
Alexander M. Haig. Jr., lakes the oath of of-
fice as Secretary of State on January 22,
1981, at the White House while Mrs. Haig
holds the Bible. Robert Linder (right), acting
director of White House operations and a
notary public, administers the oath.
The Secretary of
State
Following his election on November 4,
1980, President-elect Ronald Reagan
nominated Mr. Haig to be his Secretary
of State. He was subsequently con-
firmed by the Senate and was sworn in
as the 59th Secretary of State on
January 22, 1981.
Secretary Haig graduated from the
U.S. Military Academy in 1947, was
commissioned a second lieutenant in the
Army, and advanced through a variety
of military assignments, including ser-
The Secretary of State of the United
States has a responsibility second only to
that of the President himself to insure
that this trusteeship is managed wisely
and well. I approach this responsibility in
full recognition of the gravity of our task,
with confidence that we will succeed, and
with the knowledge that working closely
with this committee and the Congress is a
key to our success.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will be
available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
vice in Japan, Korea, Europe, and Viet-
nam. He pursued graduate studies in
business administration at Columbia
University (1954-55) and received a
Master's degree in international rela-
tions from Georgetown University
(1962).
He served in the Pentagon from
1962 to 1965, where his positions in-
cluded Military Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army and Deputy
Special Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense. He served in Vietnam in 1966
and 1967, receiving the Distinguished
Service Cross.
In January 1969, he was assigned
as senior military adviser to Dr. Henry
Kissinger, then Assistant to the Presi-
dent for National Security Affairs, and
18 months later he became the Deputy
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs. He was promoted to
full general in 1972. During his 4 years
in the White House ending in 1973, he
made 14 trips to Southeast Asia as the
personal emissary of the President, in-
cluding negotiating the Vietnam cease-
fire and the return of U.S. prisoners of
war. In addition, he coordinated prepa-
rations for President Nixon's historic
visit to China.
Mr. Haig was serving as Army
Vice Chief of Staff when President
Nixon appointed him in May 1973 to
rebuild the White House staff.
Although this was to be a temporary
position, the President subsequently
named him White House chief of staff,
and he retired from the military after
26 years of active service.
He served in the White House un-
til October 1974, when President Ford
recalled him to active duty as Com-
mander in Chief, U.S. European Com-
mand. Two months later, Mr. Haig wj
also appointed Supreme Military Com
mander in Europe. In that position, hi
was responsible for the integrated
military forces of the 13 member na-
tions of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). He resigned his
post effective June 30, 1979, and retir
from the Army.
Secretary Haig was elected presi
dent and chief operating officer of
United Technologies and a member of
its board of directors on December 21
1979, where he served until assuming
his present position.
He is a life member of the Navy
League and the Veterans of Foreign
Wars of the United States. Secretary
Haig is a recipient of an honorary law
degree from Niagara University and
honorary doctor of laws degrees from
Boston College, St. Anselm's College,
the University of Utah, Western Stat
School of Law, and Loyola College,
Baltimore.
He was born December 2, 1924, ii
Philadelphia, attended St. Joseph's
Preparatory School there, and gradu-
ated from Lower Merion High School
Ardmore, Pennsylvania.
Secretary Haig is the recipient o!
the following honors: Charles Evans
Hughes Gold Medal Award of the Na-
tional Conference of Christians and
Jews; Dwight D. Eisenhower Distin-
guished Service Award and Citation <
the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the
United States; Hap Arnold Award of
the U.S. Air Force Association; James
Forrestal Award of the National Secu
ty Industrial Association; David Sarm
Award of the Armed Forces Commun
cations and Electronics Association;
William Penn Award of the Penn Clul
of Philadelphia; Hall of Heroes Gold
Medallion of the Chapel of the Four
Chaplains; and the Bob Hope Four-Sta
Civilian Award from Valley Forge
Military Academy and Junior College.
Among his many military decora-
tions. Secretary Haig holds the Dis-
tinguished Service Cross; the Defense
Distinguished Service Medal with Oak
Leaf Cluster; the Silver Star with Oak
Leaf Cluster; the Distinguished Flying
Cross with Oak Leaf Clusters; and the
Purple Heart. He has received the
highest awards from the Governments
of Belgium, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, and Portugal.
Press release 28 of Feb. 1, 1981.
Department of State Bullet
^cretary Haig's News Conference
January 28
Special
ik it's the Judaeo-Christian Bible
says the universe was created in 7
and that even provided a day of
I tell you, it's been a very humbling
; for me, and I feel very, very human.
As you know, this is the end of our
week in this Administration. It's
an extremely busy one. It's involved
le those all-too-short confirmation
ings on the Hill [laughter]; it's in-
d efforts to put in place a number of
cey team players down through and
ding assistant-secretary level. I want
;o know I've done that in all but two
tant-secretary billets of about 30 in-
id, to say something or nothing
t my personal staff and the Secre-
t of the Department of State itself on
th floor.
It's been somewhat of an experience
scover firsthand the delays in bu-
cratie obstacles associated with the
■ance process, but I want you to
/ that I anticipate that each and
y one of my nominees — my nominees
111 ultimately be approved and hope-
confirmed in consultation with the
jress where appropriate.
It's also been a veiy busy week in a
aucratic sense and I think I leave the
?'s experience again with an even en-
ed appreciation for the role of the
issional in this Department, because
're the ones that have to carry the
en during periods of transition, our
ace pros. They're the ones who have
led me this week to establish inter-
rtmental working groups in every
m of departmental activity and in a
bar of key and urgent functional
s. I'm very pleased that this has been
mplished, primarily as a result of the
I that was in place, when I came
, of professionals, with the help of an
tional number of augmentees that I
ght with me from the transition
1.
It has been a busy week also be-
e, as you know, today we have our
official state visitor. Prime Minister
ja from Jamaica. We have meetings
duled next week with the President
orea, to be followed by King Juan
los of Spain, and, of course, the Prime
ister of Great Britain, Mrs. Thatcher
II be meeting Friday with the Cana-
dian Foreign Minister here in the De-
partment, and there are a number of
other meetings scheduled with European
foreign ministers. The first, of course, is
Foreign Minister Francois-Poncet of
France.
In addition to that, we found our-
selves engrossed immediately and instan-
taneously vidth the problem of the return
of our hostages, and I'm happy to say in
hindsight, reflecting upon the events of
this past weekend and this week and yes-
terday especially, that those events were
carried out vnth what I consider to be the
ultimate of appropriateness.
There has been some controversy
this week about the so-called "agree-
ments" which brought our hostages back
to our shores at long last. I think it's im-
portant that those who analyze and as-
sess the pros and cons of these agree-
ments, which were arrived at under the
most unprecedented and unusual condi-
tions in our history, be recognized to be
perhaps the most complex series of inter-
national agreements that I have been ex-
posed to: four agreements, ten Execu-
tive orders, all requiring a host and array
of regulations to implement.
I'm not an international lawyer, and
I'm not even a domestic lawyer — al-
though I've had a great deal of recent ex-
perience — and I can tell you that analyz-
ing and assessing the obligations of both
sides wdth respect to these accords,
agreements, Executive orders, is going
to take a great deal of time and effort by
the most experienced of legal minds.
I would anticipate, and I reiterate,
that the U.S. Government will fulfill its
obligations in accordance with both inter-
national law and the accepted norms of
domestic legal practice. The process is
underway and has been underway vrithin
the executive branch by those depart-
ments which are particularly expert in
reviewing all of these obligations. And
ultimately, of course, there will be
assessments made with respect to how
the other side also adheres to the
obligations it has incurred in these
accords.
I would like to get out front with re-
spect to one or two issues in these ac-
cords. There has been speculation as to
whether or not these accords provide for
the resumption of the provision of mili-
tary equipment to the Government of
Iran, either that equipment previously
purchased and contracted for, or perhaps
additional equipment. Let me state
categorically today, there will be no mili-
tary equipment provided to the Govern-
ment of Iran, either under earlier obliga-
tions and contractual arrangements or as
yet unstated requests. There were no
discussions about the provision of arma-
ments by the previous Administration as
it completed the accords in those anguish-
ing last hours.
Secondly, as you know, one of the
Executive orders signed by President
Carter relieved the obligation for the
sanctions in trade. We have, in that re-
gard, issued a warning or an advisory, if
you will, about the undesirability of
travel of American citizens to Iran; and,
until further deliberations are made with
respect to future commercial arrange-
ments, it's my view that the most careful
caution should be apphed by American
firms, large and small.
Having said all of these things, it's
your turn to have at me. I want to con-
clude by emphasizing that I hope in the
period ahead to meet regularly here with
this diplomatic press corps. It's a press
corps that enjoys the reputation of being
the sharpest and the meanest I know, and
I welcome that because I think the kind
of dialogue we will have here should be
both enlightened and specific and perti-
nent. I welcome your questions.
Q. Can you tell us whether the
Reagan Administration is considering
taking retaliation against Iran for tak-
ing of the hostages and its treatment of
them? And, if so, what measures are
being considered, such as the reimposi-
tion of the trade embargo?
A. First, let me, early on in our
dialogue, suggest that experience has
taught me that speculation about future
actions of that kind — contingency plan-
ning — in a public forum is frequently
self-defeating because it ends up creating
the kind of controversies that deprive one
of the ability to do anything in the second
place. So I'm going to avoid it.
I would emphasize again that the
period ahead is going to clearly demon-
strate the nature and character of the
Iranian regime's post-hostage return at-
iriior\/ 1QR1
special
titude, there are additional American
hostages in Iran — one with a clear citi-
zenship connotation — and a host of other
incurred obligations which make that
question a little premature in the context
of my answer.
Q. Along that same line, however,
but on a more general scale. Yesterday
the President, in welcoming the hos-
tages, talked of swift and effective
retribution in case of future incidents
involving terrorism. Can you supply us
with any idea of the guidelines on that
retribution? For example, will there be
retribution in cases which do not in-
volve another government? In other
words, a free-lance terrorist, if you
will.
A. I said, I think to somebody last
night, that was consciously ambiguous,
that statement. Consciously ambiguous in
the sense that any terrorist government
or terrorist movement that is contemplat-
ing such actions I think knows clearly
what we are speaking of.
As you parse it out in the context of
individuals or separatist movements or
independence movements, of course, the
problem is substantially different and the
restraints and the ability to apply re-
taliatory action is sometimes not only
constrained but uncertain. So I caveat it
that way.
Q. Could you give us your criteria
for resuming arms control negotiations
with the Soviet Union?
A. This is a question upon which
there's been a great deal of speculation
and some questions to me in my confir-
mation hearings. I think President Rea-
gan has stated repeatedly that the
United States cannot contemplate negoti-
ations or ratifications of arms control
agreements exclusive of consideration of
the conduct and the activities of the
Soviet Union outside the sphere of arms
control. That's the shorthand for linkage.
I don't think it would be appropriate
for me today, in the context of future
strategic arms limitations talks, to clarify
further precisely how that principle will
be applied. But clearly, that principle will
be applied.
Q. Perhaps in relation to that,
could you give us your judgment of de-
velopments within the past week or so
in Poland — whether Soviet forces re-
main in the state of readiness that were
described a month ago by the Carter
Administration — and what your sense
is at this point of the immediate future
and Soviet action perhaps?
A. First let me clarify one prospect
of your premised question. I think, fol-
lowing those early days in December
when the state of readiness was some-
what heightened, there has been some-
what of a decline. That is not to suggest
that Soviet forces and other Eastern
European forces are not postured in such
a way that they could react very, very
quickly in Poland.
As you know, in early December, the
North Atlantic Council of the NATO al-
liance suggested in very clear language
that any Soviet intervention in Poland
would have the gravest consequence in
the context of ongoing East-West rela-
tions and that those consequences would
be longstanding in time. I know of noth-
ing today that would cause this Adminis-
tration or this State Department to de-
part from the strong affirmation of that
view.
Q. On Poland. I understand that
the Polish Government has indicated,
at some level at least informally, that
they do still wish to request a massive
aid progrram from the United States.
What is your inclination in terms of
economic assistance?
A. As you know, substantial assist-
ance has already been provided in terms
of loans for foodstuffs. I think it's impor-
tant that we all recognize that the pro-
vision of either credits or cash or eco-
nomic assistance to Poland today is not
the answer to the problem.
We find a situation in which just debt
servicing alone consumes half of the
available assets. The problem involves
internal reform within the Polish State,
and it is up to the Polish Government and
Polish authorities to work this out. That
notwithstanding, we continue to feel a
very important and sensitive sympathy
for the people of Poland and their current
plight, and we are considering what fur-
ther steps could be taken.
Q. There has been a number of
press reports this week about steps, or
alleged steps, that you've taken to as-
sert your predominance over the for-
eign policy bureaucracy. Could you —
A. I was discussing that just the
other day as the President was taking his
first shower in the White House.
I Laughter]
Q. Could you give us your concept
or what the agreed concept is, between
yourself and the President of how the '
National Security Council [NSC] will
operate vis-a-vis the State Depart-
ment so there is some clear sense of
over what it is you are asserting
predominance?
A. I noticed there has been a
number of dope stories along the airways
on this subject. Let me assure you, most
of those I have read, including the most
recent, are totally without basis in fact.
Early on I brought some drafts which I
had discussed and coordinated with
Richard Allen to Mr. Meese [Richard V.
Allen, Assistant to the President for Na-
tional Security Affairs; Edwin Meese,
III, Counselor to the President], with Mr
Allen, with a view toward starting out
with a straw man. This is not an experi-
ence I haven't been through before, and
we have been in the process of coordinat-
ing this draft with the Secretary of De-
fense, who has a very keen interest, of
course, and I would anticipate very
shortly those drafts will be published in
the form of Presidential directives which
will implement a framework, if you will,
in general for the conduct of national se-
curity policymaking plus day-to-day op-
erational matters.
In that context, when I accepted this
position, I was assured by President
Reagan personally that I will be his chief
administrator, if you will, and I use the
term "vicar" — and those of you who want
to go back to the 1948 through 1951 Jack-
son subcommittee hearings on this sub-
ject will discover what that term "vicar"
meant — for the formulation, the conduct
and the articulation of American foreign
poHcy.
I intend that the President's mandatf
to me be carried out, and I am confident
that it will be.
Q. Let me just follow that up. Ho»
do you perceive the NSC, then, operat-
ing? As primarily resolving disputes be-
tween this building and the Pentagon?
A. I perceive that the inter-
departmental mechanisms will prepare
for the National Security Council, as con-
stituted by the act and the amendments
of 1949 and whatever changes President
Reagan may care to apply to that compo-
sition, to pre.sent options for decisions by
the President within the forum of the Na-
tional Security Council.
Department of State Bulletin
Special
a
Q. I wonder what your plans are
Dpening up contact, not only with
Soviet Union but with the key coun-
^ in the Middle East. Do you have
travel plans to go either to Moscow
) Israel or Egypt or to Saudi
, I think it's a little too soon for me
respect to East-West, the U.S.-
let, to predict when there will be
er meetings by myself or, more im-
antly, by President Reagan. There
number of issues extant on the hori-
today which I think need clarification
re a constructive high-level dialogue
Id be justified.
On the other hand, having said that,
issential that we maintain day-to-day
hourly communications with the
let Union. We're doing that through
regularly established diplomatic
inels, and I intend to continue to
■cise it. I've already on several key is-
With respect to the Middle East in
ral, I have no finite plans for my own
■9i\ there, but I do anticipate — as you
1»i', we have a spring round in Europe;
i ave a number of watch pots, not the
i of which was already touched upon
Poland, which could justify earlier
ji I look forward to visiting this hemis-
*e, Africa, the Middle East, and, of
ifie, Asia and Europe as well.
. Q. A few moments ago you talked
ijiit the President's statement yester-
a; at the White House, being framed
(M picuously ambiguous, and then you
eton to talk —
A. No. Consciously.
Q. Consciously ambiguous.
A. It was conspicuously appropriate.
A ghter]
Q. And you went on to say, so that,
n^ords you used "terrorist organiza-
flis or terrorist governments would
4 heed." The phrase "terrorist gov-
3nent" I don't think has any prece-
, does it? And my question is, has
"lie been discussion in the State De-
al ment and the top level of the Ad-
i^istration of being able to brand
"Tnments like Iran terrorist gov-
nents with both diplomatic and
lomic consequences that would flow
1 that branding?
j, A. Of course, there have been such
ilassions, and they go on right now.
Q. Could you amplify it?
A. I think that is the criteria for a
government that sponsors or undertakes
or participates in terrorist activities.
That is a nice handle to put on it — a ter-
rorist government. And, as you know,
there are public laws today passed by the
Congress which prohibit the provision of
armaments to terrorist governments.
So this is not a new term in Washing-
ton, and I think it's been applied some-
times in a very generous way and some-
times perhaps a less than generous way.
Q. In terms of your reference ear-
lier to your policy toward the shipment
of arms to Iran, my recollection is that
the earlier Administration had taken
the position that that which was in the
pipeline, that which Iran had bought
and paid for before the seizure of the
hostages, would be considered part of
the frozen assets; and, therefore, would
be released.
Now you seem to be deliberately
changing that policy. Do I understand
that correctly? How much do you
understand is involved?
A. The figures are not really quite
clear, if you're talking FMS [foreign mili-
tary sales] cases, and we're trying to dig
that out, and it's taking some work. But
it does not mean that the arms them-
selves have to be provided. If, in the ul-
timate conclusion of this thing, we feel
the obligations incurred should be ful-
filled, they will be fulfilled in my book by
selling those arms and providing the cash
to Iran. Selling them elsewhere. Some of
them have already been sold, incidentally.
Q. The Carter Administration had
the policy of abiding by the conditions
and terms of SALT II even though it
was not ratified and said — and he said
he hoped and expected the Soviet Union
would do the same thing. Is that the
policy of the Reagan Administration as
well?
A. We are in the process of review-
ing this obligation which President Car-
ter assumed in the context of our new re-
sponsibilities and ongoing Soviet ac-
tivities around the globe. We would cer-
tainly hope that, in the period between
now and the time a decision is made or a
policy is adopted — and this involves not
only Soviet conduct worldwide, it in-
volves the national security interests of
the American people as we look at SALT
II and SALT I and the potential future
defense needs of this country. But I
would hope that in the meantime, the
Soviets would do nothing to exacerbate
the kind of mutual restraint both sides
should pursue.
Q. Including SALT II?
A. The Soviets, I leave that up to
the Soviets to talk to, and they have re-
cently, as I think you know.
Q. As you know, there has been
talk this week about the Middle East
policy. First of all, how much can you
tell us about that? How do you recon-
cile the State Department's definition
of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization] with President Reagan's
definition? Do you expect to see the
time when the Reagan Administration
might talk to the PLO, and do you ex-
pect the Reagan Administration to ever
recognize Jerusalem as the capital of
Israel?
A. Let me take that mind-bogglingly
extensive sermon, which it would take,
and compress it into several responses.
First, President Reagan has stated —
every American President since 1975 has
stated — that we will neither recognize
nor negotiate with the PLO for so long as
they refuse to recognize the right of the
State of Israel to exist, for so long as
they refuse to accept the provisions of
242 and the other U.N. resolution. And
having said that, I think that's a suffi-
cient answer for a large portion of it.
With respect to Jerusalem as an en-
tity, for 30 years, I think, the United
States has felt that this is a matter that
has international implications, and it
should be a city that is not divided by
barbed wire or imposed unilateral
restraints. We don't welcome unilateral
action that would make this kind of an in-
ternational consensus impossible. It is the
seat, after all, of three of our world's
greatest religions — Islam, Christianity,
and Judaism — and we would hope that
ultimately, those hopes that we have had
for Jerusalem will be realized with pa-
tient participation by all the parties in-
volved.
Q. On Afghanistan, [French Presi-
dent] Giscard d'Estaing has suggested a
conference to discuss nonintervention
in Afghanistan as opposed to the status
of Afghanistan. Do you regard this as a
promising approach?
My second question concerns the
grain embargo. Mr. Block [John R.
Block, Secretary of Agriculture] today
said he urged and desired it be lifted
immediately. I wonder what your views
are on that.
Sruary 1981
Special
A. First, with respect to yesterday's
initiative by President Giseard, of course,
we welcome any proposal that would bear
fruit and result in the withdrawal of
Soviet forces in Afghanistan. We were in-
formed of the French initiative before the
fact. We have gone back with a number of
questions seeking broadening and en-
lightening information about how this
would be handled, especially in the con-
text of other intitiatives that are under
way under the auspices of the United Na-
tions. But in general, this is the kind of
thing that we do welcome, and we would
hope that it could proceed as a unifying,
allied effort, and would also, as President
Giseard suggested, include the views of
the Islamic countries, who have taken
some initiatives in this area.
Your second question was —
Q. — concerning the grain em-
bargo.
A. The grain embargo. That was
Freudian — I didn't want to answer. We
have an interdepartmental review under
way on this subject, the results of which
have not been arrived at. In general, I
would hope that in the future, we would
not adopt sanctions against the Soviet
Union or anyone else that would selec-
tively punish one segment of the Ameri-
can domestic economy. But we are there
today, and it's not so simple as it might
sound if you are a representative of our
agricultural sector.
Q. Would you please give us your
comment on the meeting between Pres-
ident Reagan and President Chun Doo
Hwan of South Korea, and also give us
your general policy toward North
Korea. I understand that the U.S. Gov-
ernment proposed three-way talks with
North Korea in 1979.
A. I have not proposed any talks. I
do not anticipate any until there has been
a thorough review of the desirability of
such talks, and they will be conducted
against a backdrop of North Korean per-
formance, conduct, and demeanor with
respect to the desirability of and the hope
for progress.
As you know, the Korean President
will be visiting Washington next week.
He has already, I believe, arrived on the
West Coast. Somebody suggested, "Was
this a deal for Mr Kim?" [Mr. Kim Da
Jung, political opposition leader] There
were no deals — no deals — despite again
some press speculation to the contrary.
But we are very pleased to have the Ko-
rean President visit the United States as
one of our first official visitors. It is not a
state visit, but it is an official visit.
Q. What is the significance of the
meeting?
A. I think it is vitally important. For
the period since the end of World War II,
with the enhanced rejuvenation in the
early 1950s, Korea has been a friend,
partner, and intimate participant in
Western security relationships. Because
of some static in a recent period, it's im-
portant that we clarify the air. I would
not want anyone to suggest, as some
have, that this is politically motivated be-
cause of upcoming elections in South
Korea. Not at all. The American tie, if
you will, is not an issue in these elections.
Q. TVaditionally, it has been con-
sidered that you. North America, and
the Soviet Union keep their own areas
of influence all over the world. How
can this be understood now that the
Soviet Union has extended its presence
to Latin America and Afghanistan?
What element would North America
consider to maintain the strategic
interests of your country in Latin
America?
A. I'm glad I asked you. I don't
think my own past expressions on this
subject need too much clarification before
this group. I think it's clear that we have
been witnessing an unprecedented — at
least in character and scope — risk-taking
mode on the part of the Soviet Union, not
just in this hemisphere but in Africa as
well. We have seen in that process the
exploitation of the Cuban proxy, and I can
assure you that this is the subject of ut-
most concern to this Administration, it is
a subject which will be high on the prior-
ity of our national security and foreign
policy agenda.
I would suggest also that an addi-
tional subject related intimately to this,
in the conduct of Soviet activity and in
terms of training, funding, and equip-
ping, is international terrorism. Interna-
tional terrorism will take the place of
human rights, our concern, because it is
the ultimate of abuse of human rights.
And it's time that it be addressed with
greater clarity and greater effectiveness
by Western nations and the United States
as well.
Q. May I follow that up? In that
context, we have just had the Libyans
move into Chad, and now apparently
beyond doubt, Cuban activity in El Sal-
vador. What does your Administration
intend to do about either of those?
A. We're looking very, very carefully
at the recent Libyan incursion into Chad
and the implications of that incursion, not
only to Chad and the people of Chad, bi*
to the surrounding states as well. We \
view it as a grave turn of events. I'll |
leave it there. j
Q. Can I follow that up? Did you
mean to say that you were not in-
terested in human rightsper.se in noa
Communist areas? I'm not sure what
you meant by terrorism by Communis!
countries should replace concern abou
human rights.
A. I'm talking about in functional,
priority areas. It's been my view that
human rights is an essential and funda-
mental aspect of American foreign polio;
and domestic policy, and as such, w'hen
you remove it from the main stream of
fundamental policymaking and give it ar
extraordinary role in organizational
terms, you fi-equently result in distor-
tions that probably put in jeopardy the
well-meaning objective you seek to
achieve. So I would like to see some or-
ganizational change in the period ahead-
no deemphasis, a change in priorities.
The greatest problem to me in the
human rights area today is the area of
rampant international terrorism — on
both sides of the Iron Curtain. And as
one looks at the menu of those who havi
been most disturbed by it, it's surprisin
that the Soviet Union itself has been vit
timized by it. But be that as it may, the;
today are involved in conscious policies,
in programs, if you will, which foster,
support, and expand this activity, whicl
is hemorrhaging in many respects
throughout the world today.
Q. Can I just follow my own qucs
tion? Does that mean organizationally
you will be trying to drop the kind of
human rights input that went into for
eign military sales?
A. I would anticipate that each and
every regional policy director in this De
partment will have human rights high o
his agenda in his across-the-board assini
lation and assessment of what is in the
vital interests of the American people
and this country.
Q. This country has just gone
through a great celebration of the re-
turn of the hostages from Iran. I reail
have two questions about it: First, do
you yourself have any lessons which
you have drawn from this 14-month-
long ordeal of this government and
people? And secondly, is it a proper in-
ference, as some have drawn, that the
swift and effective retribution would
necessarily mean some downgrading
for the concern of the personal safety
Department of State Bulleti
Special
those who may be involved in some
Jure hostage-taking episode?
A. No, not at all, to answer the last
t of your question first. Not at all —
cisely the opposite. And I would sug-
t that you talk to the hostages about
some of our former prisoners of war
have been, let's say, caught up in this
aate.
With respect to my own observa-
ns, I've been here a week. I, of course,
: as a private citizen in the private sec-
•, and anguished as I think all of us did
th this situation. I would have some
mediate observations of a general na-
•e, but I prefer to hold up on those,
i've got a number of people worried
out the issue. There is some congres-
nal interest in it. We're going to partic-
ite with them to the degree they wish
explore it. But I prefer to defer on that
this time.
Q. In view of your decision yester-
y to recall Ambassador White from
Salvador, can you tell us whether or
!" t you made a decision that he is to be
tained? And secondly, also in view of
ur commitment to human rights,
blether or not you will be considering
8 andoning aid to El Salvador?
A. You mean the aid that was re-
c'ltly just modified by the Carter Ad-
I iiistration?
Q. Yes.
A. No, I don't anticipate any termi-
1 tion in the aid to El Salvador based on
I e recommendations of our Ambassador
1 d our own assessement of the reforms
lat have been under way by the gov-
nirnent there. As a matter of fact, it
lay go just the other way.
I have asked Ambassador White
1 ck for consultation — and I don't make
i a habit of consulting with preconceived
nclusions.
Q. When and how do you intend to
•oceed with peace talks between Israel
id Egypt, and does the Administration
itend to invite to the United States
resident Sadat and Prime Minister
egin, and when?
A. I don't think I would want to in-
ct any sense of urgency in our view of
lis matter. We have and continue to sup-
art the Camp David accords and the
Bace process that was launched under
lose accords, and we vdll continue to
bide by that in consultation with the
arties, not only the signatories but those
— ith a direct interest in the outcome. And
think that's enough for now. We're in
the process of reviewing the situation. In
that process, we perhaps will come up
with a timetable that makes some sense,
but I need to have some discussions with
the parties concerned first.
Q. Returning to Latin America for
a moment, the Carter Administration
was talking to the Cubans pursuing an
idea whereby the Cubans would take
some of the criminal and mentally ill
people who came over on the boatlift
back in return for our agreement to ac-
cept 100,000 people over the next 3
years. Senator Childs has sent you a
letter opposing that. Could you com-
ment on that concept, on what you
think our relations with Cuba ought to
be and what we should talk to them
about on this issue?
A. I would not like to break any new
ground on that subject today other than
to remind you that the previous Adminis-
tration undertook some efforts to get
agreement with the Cuban Government
on this subject of the return of ill and
other kinds of refugees who came here.
Those talks collapsed; they were a total
failure due to the lack of cooperation of
the Cuban Government, and that's just
another issue that is going to be put into
the calculator which will ultimately lead
to a reassessment of our policies toward
Cuba.
Q. Could you comment on that
concept, on taking noncriminal and
nonmentally ill people in exchange for
their taking back people who are —
A. This is an extremely delicate sub-
ject, as you know, with strong views held
on both sides of that issue by well-
meaning people. And this is the kind of
an issue that before I break new ground
on it or express my views, I'd like to con-
sult with the appropriate committees of
the Senate and the House and to be sure
I am espousing the views of the new Ad-
ministration and President Reagan, and
that's not so today.
Q. How do you anticipate that the
severe spending constraints on this
Administration will play out on the for-
eign policy, and particularly the foreign
aid area?
A. I'm very concerned about it; I'm
concerned about it from two points of
view. First, I'm concerned about the eco-
nomic situation that has brought the
necessity for even greater austerity upon
us. And I leave that to other members of
the Administration and the President
himself to address, and I know he will;
but we are in a serious situation requiring
austerity.
Secondly, I've been concerned — and
we are in the process now of consulting
with Mr. Stockman in 0MB [David Alan
Stockman, Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget] on this subject, and
I'm talking about A.I.D. [Agency for In-
ternational Development], our own se-
curity assistance, and I hope that we are
going to be able to get a recognition that
both foreign assistance and foreign secu-
rity assistance is sometimes a very cost-
effective vehicle for insuring that the
ideals and interests of this country are
carried out effectively abroad.
Q. As a strategist and a politician,
how do you see the defense cooperation
between the United States and Europe,
especially from the viewpoint of bur-
densharing in the light of the increas-
ing threats in today's world?
A. Again, I have a long litany of
comments on this over 5 years, and I
don't like to depart from it, and that is
that I would like to see all of us do more.
But I would also like to see an en-
lightened appreciation here in the United
States and among our own people for the
great contribution that our effective par-
ticipation in the alliance brings to our se-
curity.
I think it was Jim Schlesinger some
years ago who had a study done that sug-
gested that if we did not have the NATO
alliance and the security assets it brings
to the American people, we would have
to double the gross allocation of our na-
tional product for defense to provide a
comparable security capability. I don't
know whether that's correct or wrong. I
suspect it is a very modest assessment.
I have also suggested that if you go
back to 1970 to date, cutting out last
year's increases, largely legislatively
mandated by the American Congress,
European contributions in the gross have
been going up about 22% since 1970;
American contributions for defense in
NATO have gone down by about 13%.
The point of departure in 1970 was very
bad. The United States was carrying far
more of the overall share, but that was a
legacy of the birth of the alliance itself. I
think sometimes we get too impatient and
get bludgeoning people who are doing the
best they can in very austere economic
circumstances, too. What we have to find
is a way for everyone to do more; and I
include Japan in that.
Press release 25.
sburary 1981
East Asia
;ember 18-
)ber 15
uty Director of Space Science and
inology division of the Chinese Acad-
of Sciences Ji Bo leads a delegation
le U.S. Delegation meets with NASA
ials in Washington to discuss future
Jtutional arrangements for the
^DSAT ground recieving station. The
ip also tours NASA's Goddard Space
ht Center in the Washington area,
L.B.J. Space Center in Houston, and
Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Los
eles.
tember 20-
ober 28
_ Minister of Metallurgical Industry
ng Fan leads a delegation to the U.S.
iie invitation of Reynolds Interna-
al Inc. ; group tours Reynolds plants
ted throughout the U.S.
i«tember 22-
)iober 6
. rnor Cliff Finch (Mississippi) leads
stry delegation to China.
M tember 30
iihua News Agency reports that the
Jl. and China have decided to postpone
h unblocking of Chinese assets to Janu-
?.l, 1980.
)<ober 1
''H installment of $30 million is paid to
hy China under U.S. -China
.• ims-assets" agreement.
)iober8-
iiember 9
'isident of the China International
List and Investment Corporation
CnC) Rong Yiren visits U.S. to en-
orage U.S. equity investment in China.
> ober 10
U(ir Jim Conway (St. Louis) announces
^ ihlishment of sister city ties with Nan-
I ober 15-27
icnal Committee for U.S.-China Rela-
is sponsors a gubernatorial delegation
hnia; George Ariyoshi (Hawaii),
mias Judge (Montana), Richard Lamm
(ilorado), William Milliken (Michigan),
^lert Quie (Minnesota), Robert Ray
■ a), and Richard Snelling (Vermont)
ticipate.
tober 16
hernatorial delegation meets with Vice
\ Ulster of Foreign Affairs Han Nian-
long, Vice Minister of Agriculture He
Rang, and President of the China Council
for the Promotion of International Trade
Wang Yaoting.
October 17
U.S. District Judge Oliver Gasch rules
that termination of the U.S.-Taiwan
Mutual Defense Treaty requires the ap-
proval of either two-thirds of the Senate
or a majority of both Houses of Congress.
Gubernatorial delegation meets with Vice
Premier Deng; they discuss the Kampu-
chean refugee problem and China's eco-
nomic modernization.
October 20-30
Governor Tom McCall (Oregon) leads an
Oregon State trade delegation to China.
October 22-
November 1
Minister of Foreign Trade Li Qiang visits
U.S. to discuss the U.S.-China trade
agreement and textile quotas. Minister Li
holds meetings with Secretary of Com-
merce Kreps, Secretary of the Treasury
William Miller, Secretary of Agriculture
Robert Bergland, Export-Import Bank
President John Moore, and leaders of the
House and Senate.
October 23
President Carter sends the U.S.-China
trade agreement to Congress and signs a
proclamation establishing China's qualifi-
cation for MFN treatment under the
Jackson- Vanik amendment to the Trade
Act of 1974.
October 31
U.S. announces expansion of the May 31
quotas to cover a total of seven catego-
ries of Chinese textile imports.
November 1-5
Governor James Hunt (North Carolina)
leads tobacco delegation to China.
November 1-6
Mayor Jim Conway (St. Louis) leads del-
egation to China.
November 2
Sister city relations formally established
between St. Louis and Nanjing.
November 5-
December 7
Vice Minister Yuan Baohua leads State
Economic Commission delegation to the
U.S.
November 6
Vice Minister Yuan meets with Treasury
Secretary Miller, Joint Economic Com-
mittee members, and Department of
Transportation officials.
November 7
Vice Minister Yuan meets with Com-
merce Department officials and members
of the Council of Economic Advisers.
November 8
Vice Minister Yuan meets with Deputy
Under Secretary of Energy Robert
Hanfling.
November 8-16
Assistant Secretary of State for Consular
Affairs Barbara Watson visits China; in-
spects U.S. consular operations in
Guangzhou and Beijing and discusses
progress on negotiations for a bilateral
consular convention.
November 14
Governor James Rhodes (Ohio) and Gov-
ernor Han Ningfu (Hubei Province) es-
tablish sister state relations in Hubei.
November 15
Testimony before the Senate Finance
Committee provokes disagreement
among Senators over the granting of
MFN status to China.
November 19-
December 19
Director of the Ministry of Geology's
Marine Division Tian Shao leads delega-
tion of marine geologists to U.S.; group
tours USGS facilities and visits east and
west coast universities.
November 20
Ceremonies mark the formal opening of
the Consulate General of the PR.C. at
Houston.
November 21-
December 3
Chief Economist of the Department of
Commerce Courtenay Slater leads U.S.
statistical delegation to China.
November 26-
December 9
Vice Minister of Textile Industry Hao
Jianxiu and All China Youth Federation
President Hu Qili lead delegation to U.S.;
group meets with Assistant Secretary of
State Richard Holbrooke, Congressman
Al UUman, and National Security Council
staff member Michel Oskenberg in Wash-
ington, and with U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N. Donald F McHenry in New York.
37
East Asia
November 26-28
U.S. statistical delegation holds talks
with the Chinese State Statistical Bureau
(SSB) on bilateral statistical cooperation
and Chinese statistical methodology.
November 28-
December 5
National Committee for U.S.-China Rela-
tions sponsors city planners' delegation to
China; meets with a broad range of
municipal officials in Beijing, Guangzhou,
Nanjing, Shanghai, and Suzhou.
November 29-
December 17
U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration marine sedimentation
delegation visits China; tours Chinese
State Bureau of Oceanography Insti-
tutions.
November 29-
December 30
Vice Minister of the Fourth Ministry of
Machine Building Li Rui heads telecom-
munications delegation to U.S. at the in-
vitation of Honeywell Information Sys-
tems.
November 30
U.S. Court of Appeals overturns the Dis-
trict Court decision of October 17 and
rules that President Carter is constitu-
tionally empowered to give notice of ter-
mination under the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual
Defense Treaty without congressional ac-
tion.
December 13
Ceremonies mark the formal opening of
the Consulate General of the RR.C. at
San Francisco.
December 14
U.S. Supreme Court upholds the
November 30 decision of the Court of
Appeals on the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual De-
fense Treaty.
December 29-
January 1
Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences
President Huang Jiasi leads delegation to
U.S.; group visits the California Acad-
emy of Sciences in San Francisco, the
University of California at Berkeley,
Stanford University, and Hewlett-
Packard Company.
December 31
U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan
expires.
1980
January 2
U.S. announces new arms sales to
Taiwan. Chinese Government immedi-
ately protests, arguing that such sales
and deliveries are contrary to the joint
communique on Sino-American normali-
zation.
January 5-13
Defense Secretary Harold Brown visits
China; meets with Premier Hua, Vice
Premier Deng, Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs Huang, Vice Premier Geng Biao,
and Minister of Defense Xu Xiangqian.
Secretary Brown affirms that "increased
cooperation between China and the U.S.
is a needed element in the maintenance of
global tranquility" Secretary Brown's
visit results in liberalization of controls on
exports of U.S. high technology items,
authorization on a case-by-case basis for
sales of nonlethal military support
equipment to China, and plans for regular
consultations between the U.S. and
China on Southwest Asian developments
and other broad international issues (in-
stitutionalized in spring 1980 so as to take
place several times yearly).
January 16-19
Representative Lester Wolff (New York),
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Asian-Pacific Affairs, leads congressional
delegation to China; meets with Vice
Premier Ji Pengfei.
January 17-23
Senator David Boren (Oklahoma) leads
delegation of the Senate Agriculture
Committee to China; meets with agricul-
ture and trade officials to discuss trade
possibilities.
January 19-
February 2
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Consular Affairs Hume Horan and Dep-
uty Director of the Consular Affairs Divi-
sion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Nie Gongcheng cochair negotiations on
the U.S.-China consular convention in
Beijing.
January 20-24
U.S. delegation, led by the President's
science adviser Frank Press, travels to
China to attend first meeting of the
Sino-U.S. Joint Commission on Coopera-
tion in Science and Technology (Jan. 22-
24); meeting is eochaired by Press and
Vice Premier Fang Yi. Press signs an ac-
cord providing for the establishment of a
LANDSAr satellite ground-receiving sta-
tion in China, as well as protocols for -
cooperation in earth sciences and earth-
quake studies, and concludes a memoraiii
dum of understanding for cooperation be-
tween the National Science Foundation
and the Chinese Academy of Science.
Both sides judge the meeting a "completi
success."
January 24
U.S. Department of Defense formally
announces that U.S. will consider issuin|
licenses for export to China of military
support equipment (but not weapons)
selected from the Munitions Control List
U.S.-China trade agreement, granting
MFN tariff status to China, passes by a
294 to 88 vote in the House and by 74 to:
in the Senate.
January 31
U.S. Treasury Department releases
Chinese assets frozen since the Korean
war (worth an estimated $80.5 million).
February 1
U.S.-China trade agreement takes effect
provides for MFN treatment for China;
the establishment of business and trade
offices; reciprocal and equivalent protec-
tion of patents, trademarks and
copyrights; and consultations on bilatera
trade problems.
February 2-6
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA
Administrator Douglas Costel leads dele
gation to China; meets with Director of
China's Office of Environmental Protec-
tion Li Chaobo to discuss cooperation in
the field of environmental protection.
February 4-9
U.S. Chamber of Commerce President
Richard Lesher leads delegation to
China; meets with Vice Premier Kang
Shien.
February 5
Sister city relations established between
San Francisco and Shanghai.
EPA and the Office of the Environments
Protection Leading Group of the State
Council of China sign protocol for cooper
ation in the field of environmental protec
tion.
February 8-
March 24
Deputy Director of the China Research
Institute of Aeronautics Liu Zhenghui
leads delegation to U.S.; group tours
38
Department of State Bullet
)oration in Fort Washington, and
sA's Lewis Research center in Cleve-
uary 23-
ch4
or Edward Koch (New York City)
delegation to China.
ruary 28
r city relations established between
I York and Beijing.
raary 29
.or officials from four U.S. Govem-
t hydroelectric power administrations
representatives from the Agency for
mational Development (AID) arrive
eijing to attend the first official meet-
Dn cooperation in hydroelectric power
related water resource management
veen the U.S. and China.
Dch 13-23
Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang
.;.jin visits U.S. for consultations; talks
liate a dialogue on foreign policy mat-
■ at the senior foreign ministry level.
: ^'ushington, Zhang consults with Sec-
e ry of State Vance, Deputy Secretary
if late Warren Christopher, Assistant
>6 -etary for East Asian and Pacific Af-
Xi Richard Holbrooke, and other senior
>f 'iais on the Afghanistan issue and
it T matters of international concern.
/i ; Minister Zhang also meets with
^ . Trade Representative Reubin As-
4rchl8
Minister Zhang calls on National Se-
. ty Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in
Aiihington.
Vlrch 19
■J e Minister Zhang meets with Vice
' sident Mondale to discuss U.S.-China
•eitions and international issues.
M rch 24
J 5. Department of Labor delegation
rets with Director of China's State
-lor Bureau Kang Yonghe.
V rch 25
Ji»artment of State issues Munitions
■ itrol Letter No. 81 specifying the
: t-uories of military support equipment
■ ,nl)le for sale to China.
tirch 31-
ril3
sistant Secretary of Commerce for
. iiitime Affairs Samuel Nemirow and
East Asia
Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of
the Ministry of Communications Dong
Huamin cochair second round of the
U.S.-China maritime negotiations in Beij-
ing. Substantial progress is made, but
final agreement is not achieved.
April 2
President Carter signs a determination
authorizing Export-Import Bank financ-
ing of exports to China.
April 2-
Mayl2
Vice Minister Mao Lin, Managing Di-
rector of Jiangxi Copper Company, leads
a company delegation to U.S.; group
meets with officers of Fluor Mining and
Metals, Inc. to review progress of phase I
of the Dexing copper project.
April 4-12
Representative Jonathan Bingham (New
York) leads delegation of the Interna-
tional Economic Policy and Trade Sub-
committee of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee to China.
April 4-25
Governor of Hubei Province Han Ningfu
leads economic study group to Ohio at the
invitation of Governor James Rhodes.
April 10
Representative Bingham and his delega-
tion meet with Vice Premier Gu Mu.
April 11
Representative Bingham and his delega-
tion meet with Director of the General
Bureau of Taxation Liu Zhicheng and
Foreign Investment Commission Vice
Chairman Wang Daohan on the issues of
taxation and joint ventures.
April 15-21
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Transportation and Telecommunications
Affairs Boyd Hight and Deputy Director
of the International Affairs division of the
Civil Aviation Administration of China
(CAAC) Li Shufan lead the first round of
civil aviation negotiations in Beijing; U.S.
and Chinese teams begin discussion wdth
fundamentally different positions.
April 17
Chinese Academy of Sciences delegation
leaves Beijing for the annual meeting of
the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in
Washington; discussions are to be held on
academic exchanges and cooperation pro-
grams.
April 20-
May 3
U.S. National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) dele-
gation, led by Director Henry Geller, vis-
its China; meets with Ministry of Posts
and Telecommunications officials.
April 24-
Mayl8
Minister of Forestry Luo Yuchuan visits
U.S.
April 25
U.S. Department of Commerce estab-
lishes a new category (category "P") for
China under the U.S. commodity control
export regulations.
April 28
U.S. Consulate General is officially inau-
gurated at Shanghai.
April 28-
May 14
Chief U.S. Textile Negotiator H. Reiter
Webb and General Manager of China Na-
tional Textiles Import-Export Corpora-
tion Wang Mingjun lead U.S.-China tex-
tile negotiations in Beijing; negotiations
conclude without agreement.
April 28-
May28
Bank of China President Li Baohua leads
delegation to U.S.; group meets with
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board
Paul Volker and Treasury Secretary Mil-
ler in Washington; tours New York,
Houston, and San Francisco.
May 5-
June 18
Deputy Chief of Staff of the People's Lib-
eration Army (PLA) Liu Huaqing leads
delegation to U.S. at the invitation of
Secretary of Defense Brown; group dis-
cusses technology transfers with De-
partment of Defense officials, tours IBM,
AM General, General Motors, and Hon-
eywell and visits several military installa-
tions, including NORAD.
May 10-
June 30
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Transportation and Telecommunications
Affairs Hight and Deputy Director of the
International Affairs division of the Civil
Aviation Administration of China
(CAAC) Li Shufan lead the second round
of civil aviation negotiations in Washing-
ton.
East Asia
May 14-15
Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus
and Secretary of Agriculture Bergland
meet with Minister of Forestry Luo Yu-
chuan and his delegation.
May 22-
June 22
Vice Minister of Water Conservancy Li
Huayi leads delegation to U.S., returning
Secretary Brown's January visit; group
meets with Department of Agriculture of-
ficials in Washington; tours water conser-
vatories, flood control facilities, and soil
erosion and irrigation projects around
U.S.
May 24-
June 8
Vice Premier Geng Biao and a high level
entourage from the PLA visit U.S. Visit
is marked by talks with President Carter,
Vice President Mondale, Secretary of
State Edmund S. Muskie, National Secu-
rity Adviser Brzezinski, and Secretary of
Defense Brown; tours U.S. military in-
stallations.
June 4-16
Governor Brendan Byrne (New Jersey)
leads delegation to China to explore
sister-state relations with Zhejiang Prov-
ince and to enhance cultural and educa-
tional exchanges between the two re-
gions' universities.
June 4-19
Governor Harry Hughes (Maryland)
leads delegation to China; meets with
Vice Premier Wan Li, Anhui Province
Governor Zhang Jingfu, and other Anhui
Province officials. Governor Hughes and
Governor Zhang agree to establish sister-
state relations.
June 4-20
Minister of Education Jiang Nanxiang
visits universities and meets with Secre-
tary of Education Shirley Hufstedler and
senior American education officials.
June 5-26
Minister of Public Health Qian Xinzhong
and his delegation visit U.S.; tour several
U.S. medical schools, meet with health
professionals, and study emergency pro-
cedures and primary health care.
June 6-
July 6
Chairman and President of the Bank of
China Bu Ming leads delegation to U.S.;
group visits the International Monetary
Fund, the Export-Import Bank, and the
World Bank in Washington, and several
banks in New York.
June 10-
July3
Vice Minister of Light Industry Han
Peixin leads delegation to U.S. at the in-
vitation of Bobbin Publications; group
discusses trade and joint venture possibil-
ities with several U.S. companies.
June 12
Senator Richard Stone (Florida) an-
nounces that the Department of State has
approved sales presentations for the FX
fighter aircraft to Taiwan. Chinese Gov-
ernment subsequently protests the deci-
sion.
June 14
In response to press reports that U.S.
Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan fa-
vored restoring official relations with
Taiwan, an authorative People's Daily
press commentary condemns the restora-
tion of such ties.
June 15
NASA delegation, led by Deputy Admin-
istrator Alan Lovelace, arrives in Bei-
jing; meets with Vice Premier Bo Yibo.
June 15-23
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board
Volker leads delegation to China to study
the structure and functions of China's fi-
nancial system, economic planning, and
external financial relations.
June 16
Minister Qian meets with Secretary of
Health and Human Services Patricia
Harris in Washington.
June 17
Minister Qian meets with National Insti-
tutes of Health Director Donald Fred-
rickson in Washington and tours NIH
clinical center.
June 19
Minister Qian meets with Presidential
science adviser Press in Washington.
June 23-
July2
Executive Secretary of the Department
of State Peter Tamoff and Assistant Sec-
retary of State for International Narco-
tics Matters Mathea Falco visit China.
June 25
Assistant Secretary Falco meets with
Vice Director of the Ministry of Public
Security Xie Heng to discuss drug abuse
problems and with Vice Minister of Pub-
lic Health Wu Zhaoheng to discuss narco-
tics matters.
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang jf
Wenjin hosts dinner for Assistant Secre-
tary Falco and Executive Secretary Tar- j
noff. I
Executive Secretary Tamoff speaks with
Director of the Political Department of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Lin
Zhong and other Foreign Ministry offi-
cials about the organization, personnel
structure, and training of the U.S. For-
eign Service.
June 30-
July3
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs Holbrooke holds series of
consultations in Beijing with Vice Minis-
ter Zhang Wenjin and other key Chinese
officials.
July 3-19
Senior Vice Minister of Culture, Liu
Fuzhi, leads delegation to U.S. at the in-
vitation of the International Communica
tion Agency; delegation visits several
cities and small towns for broad overview
of American society and culture.
July 5-
Aug. 5
Minister of Agriculture Huo Shilian visit
U.S.; meets with with Secretary of Ag-
riculture Bergland.
July 6-14
Senate Majority leader Robert Byrd
(West Virginia) visits China at the invita
tion of the Standing Committee of the
NPC; meets with Vice Chairman of the
Standing Committee Ulanhu, Premier
Hua, and Vice Premier Zhao Ziyang.
July 9
President Carter and Premier Hua meet
in Tokyo while there for the memorial
services for the late Japanese Prime Min
ister Ohira. Talks center on global issues
of mutual concern and on Indochina.
July 12-
Aug. 11
Vice Minister of China's State Construc-
tion Committee Lu Kebai leads a delega-
tion to U.S.; group meets with Commerce
Department and Housing and Urban De-
velopment Department officials and
makes a general survey of urban planning
and high rise construction in U.S.
July 17
U.S. Department of Commerce approves
and implements new, liberalized export
control guidelines for China.
40
Department of State Bulletin
East Asia
ler.
k 12-21
\ esentative Stephen J. Solarz (New
h leads delegation of the Asian and
i ic Affairs Subcommittee of the
•( e Foreign Affairs Committee to
;■'' 1-
20
esentative Solarz meets with Vice
ign Minister Zhang Wenjin in Beij-
liscusses Chinese views on North
an and Kampuchean matters.
31
Minister of Foreign Affairs He Ying
s in Washington with Under Secre-
of State David Newsom, Assistant
jtary of State for International Or-
ations Richard McCall, Assistant
stary of State for African Affairs
ard Moose, and other senior U.S. of-
s for consultations on multilateral
■egional diplomatic issues.
56 and Senate approve legislation au-
izing activation of Overseas Private
tstment Corporation (OPIC) pro-
is in China and send it to President
e,
uust 8
n ident Carter signs legislation au-
Ttizing the operation of OPIC programs
1 'hina and a Presidential determination
M OPIC programs are in the national
t'-est.
xust 16-21
•ictor of the Bureau of Politico-
[itary Affairs of the Department of
t e, Reginald Bartholomew, visits
;ha.
.i:ust 20-23
ioublican Vice Presidential candidate
rtrge Bush visits China and meets with
'h Premier Deng and other high-
a<ing Chinese officials.
Inese Government attacks the Taiwan
Nations Act following the emergence of
n Taiwan issue in the U.S. Presidential
I'tion campaign.
Lfust 25-
<)tember 7
,;t of three rounds of civil aviation ne-
(iations are held in Beijing. Deputy
distant Secretary of State for Trans-
lation and Telecommunications Affairs
?5ht and Deputy Director General of
ana's Civil Aviation Administration
i\AC) Lin Zheng cochair the talks.
August 30-
September 8
Governor Robert Ray (Iowa) leads a
State delegation to China.
August 31-
September 4
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Maritime Affairs Samuel Nemirow and
Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of
the Ministry of Communications Dong
Huamin cochair third and final round of
the U.S. -China maritime negotiations in
Beijing.
August 31-
September 28
Vice Premier Bo Yibo leads high-ranking
delegation, which includes seven minis-
terial level officials, on a tour of U.S.
September 4
Assistant Secretary Nemirow and Di-
rector Dong initial the proposed U.S.-
China maritime agreement in Beijing.
September 6-19
Under Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering William Perry visits
China to continue technology transfer
talks; meets with Vice Premier Li Xian-
nian and Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the
PLA Zhang Aiping and Liu Huaqing;
delegation tours Chinese defense re-
search institutes, factories, and other fa-
cilities.
September 8
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Transportation and Telecommunications
Affairs Hight and Deputy Director Gen-
eral of China's Civil Aviation Administra-
tion (CAAC) Lin Zheng initial U.S.-
China aviation agreement in Beijing.
September 9-
October 15
Vice Minister of Forestry Yong Wentao
leads delegation to U.S. at the invitation
of the Department of Agriculture; tours
forestry research laboratories and uni-
versity forestry facilities throughout U.S.
September 10
Director General of the State Bureau of
Labor Kang Yonghe meets with Secre-
tary of Labor Ray Marshall in Washing-
ton for discussion of the U.S. labor
movement.
September 13-28
China holds its first official trade ex-
hibition in the U.S. in San Francisco.
September 16-18
First annual meeting of the U.S. -China
Joint Economic Committee is held in
Washington; cochaired by Treasury Sec-
retary Miller and Chinese Vice Premier
Bo Yibo; committee predicts bilateral
trade in 1980 will total about $4 billion, up
about 75% from 1979.
September 17
President Carter and Vice Premier Bo
Yibo sign agreements covering civil avia-
tion and maritime links and regulating
bilateral trade in textiles. They also sign
a Consular Convention, the first formal
treaty concluded between the two gov-
ernments. China announces its decision to
open consulates in New York, Chicago,
and Honolulu, as U.S. announces its in-
tention to open three additional consu-
lates in China.
September 21-
October 6
PLA delegation visits U.S. to study the
U.S. military logistics management sys-
tem.
September 28-
October 23
Chinese Minister of Building Materials
Song Yangchu leaves Beijing for a visit to
U.S. at the invitation of the National
Council for U.S.-China Trade.
October 1
Second installment of $10.1 million paid to
the U.S. by China under the U.S.-China
"claims-assets" agreement.
Mayor Kevin White (Boston) and Mayor
Zhou Feng (Hangzhou) agree to establish
sister city relations.
October 2-18
Minister of Posts and Telecommunica-
tions Wang Zigang visits U.S.; meets
with U.S. Postal Service officials.
October 7
Agreement covering procedures for the
operation of OPIC in China initialed in
Beijing. OPIC will provide political risk
insurance to U.S. companies investing in
China.
October 9
Postmaster General Bolger and Minister
of Posts and Telecommunications Wang
Zigang sign agreements in Washington
covering parcel post and international
express mail services between U.S. and
China.
bruary 1981
41
East Asia
October 10
Los Angeles City Council proclaims Oc-
tober 10 "Republic of China Day." (Proc-
lamation formally approved by the City
Council October 13.)
October 11-28
Vice Minister of National Defense Xiao
Ke leads a delegation representing the
PL A military academies to U.S. to tour
military education facilities.
October 14
Chairman of the Guangzhou Revolution-
ary Committee Yang Shangkun notifies
Los Angeles Mayor Thomas Bradley of
the nullification of preliminary agree-
ments for establishing sister city ties in
protest of the October 10 proclamation.
October 15
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang
Wenjin formally protests October 2 unof-
ficial agreement on privileges and im-
munities between the AIT and Taiwan's
CCNAA.
October 16
Vice Minister Xiao meets with Secretary
of Defense Brown in Washington.
October 17-22
U.S. Trade Representative Askew
travels to China to consult with the
Chinese on U.S. trade policy and invest-
ment issues.
October 18-
November 7
PL A marksman team visits U.S. to com-
pete in bilateral and international shoot-
ing matches.
October 20
Trade Representative Askew meets with
Minister of Foreign Trade Li Qiang in
Beijing.
October 20-
November 6
A gubernatorial delegation, led by
Guangdong Governor Xi Zhongxun, visits
U.S.; delegation members include Gov-
ernors Lu Dadong (Sichuan Province),
Ma Xingyuan (Fujian Province), Chen
Puru (Liaoning Province), and Song Ping
(First Secretary of Gansu Provincial
Party Committee).
October 21
Trade Representative Askew meets with
Vice Premier Gu Mu in Beijing.
October 22
Ambassador Woodcock and Minister of
Foreign Trade Li Qiang sign long-term
U.S. -China grain trade agreement in Bei-
jing.
October 23
Governor Xi Zhongxun and delegation
meet with National Security Adviser
Brzezinski in Washington to discuss stra-
tegic issues and Asian regional questions;
group also meets with Assistant to the
President for Intergovernmental Affairs
Eugene Eidenburg.
October 24
Governor Xi Zhongxun and his delegation
meet with Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Hol-
brooke and Deputy Secretary of State
Christopher in Washington to discuss
U.S. -China relations.
October 25-
November 3
Senator Larry Pressler (South Dakota)
leads delegation of businessmen to China.
October 25-
November 9
China holds national trade exhibition in
Chicago.
October 27-
November 4
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury De-
partment Donald Lubick leads delegation
from the Departments of Treasury, En-
ergy, and Commerce to China.
October 30
Ambassador Woodcock and Chinese Vice
Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin sign
OPIC agreement in Beijing.
October 31
Assistant Secretary Lubick and his dele-
gation meet with Minister in Charge of
the State Energy Commission Yu Qiuli to
discuss Chinese energy situation.
November 5
Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues a
statement "on the occasion of Mr
Reagan's election as President of the
United States," saying "we hope and ex-
pect that the new United States Adminis-
tration will adhere to the principles set
forth in the Shanghai communique and
the communique on the establishment of
diplomatic relations between China and
the United States so that Sino- American
relations may continue to progress and
grow stronger."
November 8-27 ^
Deputy Director of Civil Aeronautics
Administration of China (CAAC) Li Shu,
fan leads delegation to U.S.; group meet-
with State Department, Federal Aviatidt
Administration, and Civil Aeronautics
Board officials to discuss administrative
and technical arrangements for im-
plementing the U.S. -China civil aviation
agreement. .
November 9-23 "
Commissioner of Patents and Trademart
of the Department of Commerce Sidney
Diamond leads a delegation to China to
study China's new patent law and to as-
sist in China's efforts to develop a new
patent system.
I
November 11-26
Director of the American and Oceania!
Affairs Department of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Han Xu visits U.S. to at
tend the Williamsburg X conference (No'
13-16), to consult with State Department
officials, and to meet with prominent
American public figures.
November 12-19
State trade mission, led by Governor
James Rhodes (Ohio), visits Guangzhoi
Shanghai, and Wiihan.
November 15-21
Under Secretary of Commerce Robert
Herzstein leads delegation to Beijing t
open U.S. National Trade Exhibition
(Nov. 17-28).
November 17
Director Han Xu holds discussions wit
Under Secretary of State Newsom, As
sistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs Holbrooke, Assistant Sec-
retary for Inter- American Afl'airs Williar
Bowdler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Near East and South Asian Affairs Petei
Constable, and other senior officials of
the Department of State.
November 21-
December 16
Minister of the Fifth Ministry of Machine
Building Zhang Zhen leads a China Ncrtl
Industries Corporation (NORINCO) del-
egation to U.S.; delegation tours major
U.S. cities and visits factories.
December 1-13
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Man-
power, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics
Robin Pirie leads Department of Defense
delegation to China, returning the visit o
the PLA logistics delegation.
42
Department of State Bulleti
.
East Asia
« mber6-28
I holds national trade exhibition in
York.
•fi mber 7
(3 American airways inaugural flight
in Beijing.
mber 9-20
nse Mapping Agency delegation,
;d by Deputy Director for Manage-
and Technology Owen Williams, vis-
,aftiina.
n mber 10
President of the Chinese Academy
iences Qian Sanqiang, Vice Presi-
of the Chinese Academy of Social
ices Mei Yi, and Assistant Director
ntemational Programs of the Na-
1 Science Foundation Harvey Averch
basic sciences protocol in Washing-
provides for cooperative research be-
in U.S. and China in several fields of
; science encompassing both natural
social sciences.
December 15-17
Chief Textile Negotiator H. Reiter Webb
and Deputy Director of the Export De-
partment of the Ministry of Foreign
Trade Dai Jie lead the first round of con-
sultations under the U.S. -China Textile
Agreement in Washington. Teams fail to
agree upon a level for Chinese wool swea-
ter exports to the U.S.
December 15-19
Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall leads a
delegation to China; meets with Director
General of the State Bureau of Labor
Kang Yonghe; Vice Premier J. Pengfei.
December 27-30
Representative Stephen J. Solarz (New
York) of the Asian and Pacific Subcom-
mittee of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee leads delegation to Beijing.
Representative Joel Pritchard (Washing-
ton) accompanies the delegation. ■
]rderly Departure Program
'or Vietnamese
E'ARTMENT STATEMENT,
E:. 8, 1980 '
a number of months, on behalf of
nU.S. Government, the U.N. High
oimissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
jibeen negotiating with S.R.V.
piialist Republic of Vietnam] authori-
« on an orderly departure program
athose persons in Vietnam who wish
oave Vietnam legally for the United
ttes and who meet the provisions of
J immigration and refugee law. Those
Botiations have resulted in an agree-
it, and departures are expected to
in December 11.
Under its provisions, the UNHCR's
. representative went to Ho Chi
ih City in early November to begin
;rviewing these persons. A consid-
ble amount of preprocessing by mail
jm people in Vietnam and their rela-
Es and sponsors in the United States
It already been carried out by the
flerly Departure Program Office of
\ American Embassy in Bangkok so
that we and the Vietnamese authorities
had agreed on a list of over 1,500 per-
sons to be interviewed in Ho Chi Minh
City. Following this interview and a
medical examination, and then a final
interview with an American consular
officer, we would expect most and pos-
sibly all these 1,500 persons to be
authorized entry into the United States.
The UNHCR is utilizing existing week-
ly international flights between Ho Chi
Minh City and Bangkok for their trans-
portation. Approximately 1,000 persons
could leave Vietnam each month under
this program, assuming the list of
names of those who are permitted to
leave Vietnam and meet our program
critera can be enlarged.
The U.S. views the Orderly Depar-
ture Program as a humanitarian issue
which is unrelated to the political ques-
tion of normalization of relations be-
tween our two countries.
^Read to news correspondents by
Department spokesman John Trattner.
bruary 1981
43
ECONOMICS
II
U.S. Trade and Foreign Policy in
the Western Hemisphere
by Ernest B. Johnston, Jr.
Address before the Southern
Governor's Conference in Williamsburg,
Virginia, on September 16, 1980. Mr.
Johnston is Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Economic and Business Affairs.
From well before the time any of us
were born, the Southern States have
been leaders in recognizing the impor-
tance of international trade to the coun-
try and to the region. Starting with
rice, indigo, naval supplies, tobacco, and
king cotton before the Civil War, the
South argued strongly for a policy of
trade. Senator [Oscar Wilder] Under-
wood of Alabama, then Chairman of the
Ways and Means Committee, put the
Underwood tariff act into effect in 1912
to take duties down to a level that had
not been seen after the war and were
not to be seen again until the end of
World War II. It was Cordell Hull [U.S.
Secretary of State, 1933-44] of Ten-
nessee who, in 1934, inaugurated the
radical U.S. policy of tariff-lowering in
trade through reciprocal trade agree-
ments. And it was Congressman [Wil-
bur D.] Mills of Arkansas who for years
was the guardian of an open U.S. trade
policy.
But this is not just history; this
relationship between the South and
trade is still true now. Forest products
and paper from Alabama, Georgia,
Florida, and Mississippi; tobacco from
North Carolina and Virginia; soybeans,
grains, and cotton throughout the whole
region; rice in Arkansas and Louisiana;
planes from Texas, Virginia, and
Georgia; electronics from Maryland and
Texas; coal from West Virginia, Ala-
bama, and Tennessee; textiles from
Georgia and the Carolinas; machinery
from Oklahoma, Missouri, Maryland,
South Carolina, and Texas; transport
equipment from Kentucky, Delaware,
Georgia, Missouri, and Mississippi; and
chemicals and plastics from Alabama,
Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Virginia, and West
Virginia all owe a large part of their
prosperity to foreign markets. The
basic interest of the South is still in
trade.
I think it is also appropriate to
recognize the particularly strong in-
terest by the South in the countries of
Latin America and the Caribbean. One
aspect of this is the bridge furnished by
Puerto Rico. Another manifestation in
the distant past was the interest, at
one point, in seeing Cuba join the
United States, the influence of south-
erners in the filibusters in Nicaragua
and Central American countries, par-
ticipation by southerners in the con-
struction of the Panama Canal, and an
interest in Mexico that finally relieved
it of half its territory. Needless to say,
this is not an interest that has always
been appreciated by its recipients, and
I do not mean to imply that the South
harbors, in its bosom, imperial designs
toward Latin America.
We are now in another century
that has, in many ways, transformed
the South more than the rest of the
country — in urbanization, race rela-
tions, industrialization, and making it
by far the major source of energy for
the United States. But the interest of
the South in Latin America remains
because the South is closer and more
affected by what goes on across the
Caribbean. Ask the Governors of Texas
and Florida who keep as keen an eye on
segments of Latin America as does the
Secretary of State.
Public Interest
Public interest has heightened in the
United States on trade as a result of re-
cent large trade deficits, economic
downturns, and rising unemployment.
There has been an increased demand
for return to high-tariff or new-tariff
barriers to shield domestic industries
from import competition. This height-
ened interest has often looked at trade
not as an opportunity but as a threat to
the American economy. There is no
doubt that the government has a re-
sponsibility to slow down excessively
rapid changes caused by bursts of im-
ports when domestic workers and capi-
talists are materially damaged, and we
have provisions in the law that allow
that. But the country does not benefit
from keeping people in jobs where the
United States is not most productive.
and, if we did, the consumers and our
own industry would suffer. The govern-
ment's job is to keep the economy
growing so that economic shifts can be
digested. After all, within our own
borders we have seen a shift of rice
production from South Carolina to
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. We
have seen much cotton production shift
from the old South to the Southwest;
textiles have moved from New England
to the Carolinas; petroleum production
has moved from Pennsylvania to Texas,
Oklahoma, and Louisiana. The true
vibrancy of the United States comes
from taking advantage of change
World Trade Growth
i
The facts on world trade are moving
faster, sometimes it appears, than our
realizations of them. During a long por
tion of our history in this country we
adapted ourselves to trade. But in the
period from 1930 to the Second World
War we had a policy of high tariffs, and
the U.S. interest in trade languished. It
was not the most vibrant of our eco-
nomic periods. By 1950 only 7% of our
production of goods was exported —
about half the figure of 1913. Not until
the late 1960s or early 1970s did we
reach the 1913 figure again. But con-
stantly since 1950, the trend, not only
in this country but throughout the
world, has been toward greater and
greater dependence on trade to such a
point that now one out of every five of
the goods that we produce is sent
abroad. This, of course, excludes serv-
ices. In most years the rate of growth
in world trade is twice the rate of fl
growth in world production. "
Over two-thirds of our imports are
of raw materials and fuels essential to
the economy. Petroleum, now about
35%, will cost about $90 billion this
year. To help pay for this bill we havei
surplus in trade of both manufactures
and agriculture. One thing to keep in
mind is that with the dramatic wrench
caused by spiraling oil prices, members
of the Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC) will have a
balance-of-payments surplus this year of
about $120 billion — a surplus equal to
10% of world trade. This surplus will
be mirrored by deficits for the rest of
the world. If that deficit was spread
around evenly it would account for a
U.S. deficit of about $20 billion, and '
other nonexporters of oil face the same ,
phenomenon. i
44
Dfinartmpnt nf .c;tatp Riilletini
Economics
!^s the President has emphasized,
lajor economic change facing the
;d States is to adapt to the change
ergy. We must both slow down our
energy consumption, and we must
lew sources and new methods,
it half of our merchandise imports
st of products which are non-
etitive with domestic products
r because they are not available
or not available in sufficient sup-
!]ompetitive products serve as a
to keep down the inflation rate in
lountry. Between 2 and 2V2 million
istic manufacturing jobs depend
tly on exports; one in nine U.S.
ifacturing jobs and one in three of
arm acres produce for sales
d.
i|)rtance of Trade to the South
iiimportance of trade to the
^ bers of the Southern Governors
■ ciation is clear. Total exports from
6.7 continental States this year
lold be about $60 billion and, in this
g)n alone, we are talking about well
t half a million jobs attributable to
:[rts. Texas will send about $14
llm in goods abroad, Missouri about
) llion, Louisiana close to $4 billion,
a h Carolina more than $5 billion. I
n to admit that some of these fig-
-« are "hip-pocket" estimates since
leatest accurate figures go back to
)1 and our trade has about doubled
Q! then. Between 1973 and 1980. our
cjrts and imports will have about
i)ed, a compound rate of growth of
il< a year.
Our trade with the Western
e isphere has grown even more, and
i:ludes two of our four largest
aing partners, Canada and Mexico.
U trade with the developing Western
Biisphere nations exceeds that of any
Ir block of developing nations in-
ling the Middle Eastern oil ex-
ers. In 1979 we sent over $26
I )n of goods to the Latin American
liblics, and we had a surplus of
Hit $4 billion. That same year we
}|j $33 billion to Canada and had a
eiMt of about $5 billion. Mexico takes
Ubillion of our exports, and
eezuela and Brazil each take about
4 illion.
lets of Foreign Policy on Trade
r«'ernor [of Virginia, John N.] Dalton
sed me to discuss how foreign policy
Acts our trade in the Western Hemi-
piere. The relationship is, in fact, a
circular one. These enormous figures
are of great importance to the U.S.
economy and to the economy of our
neighbors, thus an important element in
our foreign policy interest in this hemi-
sphere. After all, what is foreign policy
but a compilation of the important in-
terests that we have abroad? Pursuit of
our trade interest should ultimately
lead us in the same direction as pursuit
of our political interest — toward a close
relationship with the countries of North
and South America, in which all recog-
nize a shared interest in the security,
stability, and economic well-being of the
region.
The Caribbean and Central Amer-
ica are a case in point. Political
deterioration and economic decline in
this area are of great concern, though
we are trying, in a time of tight budg-
ets, to respond to these problems with
increased aid aimed especially at
strengthening the private sector in
these countries. Aid alone cannot han-
dle the job. Economic development de-
pends primarily on actions which coun-
tries themselves take to increase the
productivity of their people and, thus,
their standard of living. Despite aid to
this region, trade prospects have a
more important bearing on long-term
economic development of these coun-
tries.
Many are small and depend on min-
erals or farm crops for most of their ex-
ports. Some have unemployment rates
of 40%. Many that have begun to de-
velop have done so on the basis of an
economy geared to low priced energy.
Now they must reorient their econ-
omies to pay for oil which has multi-
plied its price by 10 times in less than a
decade.
The United States is their most im-
portant market. Our security interst
would be well served if the Caribbean
countries could take better advantage
of our market. All of Latin America,
with the obvious exception of Cuba,
benefits from duty-free treatment for
certain goods under our generalized
system of preferences, and some of
them among the poorest, such as Haiti,
are taking the most advantage of the
scheme.
Making our political and economic
interests mesh, however, is not always
a smooth process. The United States is
a global power with many objectives,
some of which conflict in particular sit-
uations. As a global power our reach is
far. The world looks to us for con-
stancy. Our concern with human rights
goes back to the Revolution and is an
old element in American policy, but it
is occasionally cited as a foreign policy
concern that interferes improperly with
our trade interest. Human rights is a
serious concern and, over the long haul
in many countries, has an intricate
bearing on political stability and eco-
nomic progress. But I would like to
point out that U.S. exports to Chile and
Argentina, two of the prime focuses of
our human rights efforts, increased in
1979 by over 60% in Chile and 125% in
Argentina. Governor [of Georgia,
George D.] Busbee, in his work with
you and in the President's Export
Council, has been doing valiant work to
keep these different aspects of our
policy in perspective.
The most typical case is one where
economic differences lead to political
problems. Sensitive imports from Mex-
ico have caused problems for U.S. pro-
ducers and spilled out into the political
relationship. The choice of actions in
such a situation is unattractive and in-
volves tradeoffs among different domes-
tic economic goals and with our exter-
nal trade relationships. Likewise,
energy imports, both gas and petro-
leum, which the United States seeks
from both Canada and Mexico at rea-
sonable prices, have from time to time
been sources of political contention.
Other Latin exports to the United
States are sensitive not because of low
prices but because producers are seek-
ing higher prices. I refer to primary
commodities such as coffee, tin, and
sugar. In the last 3 or 4 years, the
United States has sought commodity
agreements to dampen wild gyrations
in commodity prices for about five com-
modities. We wish, on the one hand, to
avoid excessive peaks in the pricing
that ratchet up the cost for our con-
sumers. It is also, however, in our in-
terest to avoid excessive valleys in
prices which would discourage invest-
ment in these commodities and, over
the long haul, diminish supplies and
thus exacerbate future price rises when
the supply-demand situation changes.
It is hard for us to realize how im-
portant single commodities are to some
of the Latin American countries. Over
half of Bolivia's exports consist of the
single commodity — tin; one-fifth of the
exports of Barbados and the Dominican
Republic are sugar; El Salvador and
Guatemala get half their export re-
ceipts from coffee, and Haiti, Honduras,
sruarv 1981
45
Economics
and Nicaragua get one-third. For Ja-
maica, alumina and bauxite represent
nearly three-fourths of the sales abroad.
Economic Development and Foreign Aid
The interaction between economic
development in Latin America and
foreign trade is complex. In the past,
some of these countries have adopted
highly protectionist strategies to en-
courage infant industry, but the policy
has most often been self-defeating. The
infant, without the winds of competi-
tion, could not seem to grow up. Chile
and Argentina followed this strategy
for many years. In the 1920s these
countries' per capita product was
equivalent to that of many European
states. But by following this strategy
their economies fell behind. The agri-
cultural sector suffered. They have now
abandoned these policies. Several other
Latin American countries have sought
to encourage new industry by requiring
foreign investors to meet minimum lo-
cal content and export criteria. The
motivation behind these rules is under-
standable, but if all countries followed
this pattern, the results would be frus-
trating. One country's local content re-
quirement could block another's export
requirements.
Markets would be fragmented not
only for the United States but for the
developing Latin American countries,
and the results would be self-defeating
for the countries that try these
methods since they would be encour-
aging industry that does not know the
discipline of competition.
U.S. and Canada
The intimate interaction between
Canada and the U.S. economy presents
different challenges. Most important,
Canada is usually our largest single
trading partner and the principal locus
of U.S. foreign investment. In 1979
total U.S.-Canadian trade was about 3%
of our gross national product but 27%
of Canada's. Canada took 20% of our
exports. Trade in both directions is es-
pecially heavy in machine and transpor-
tation equipment — about 27% of our
exports and 26% of our imports. Trade
in automobiles and parts is even more
concentrated because of the U.S.-Cana-
dian auto agreement.
The closeness of the two economies
inevitably leads to contentious issues in
the trade and investment fields. Canada
has a population one-tenth of ours,
though it is the second largest country
in the world. The majority of its popula-
tion lives within 60 miles of the U.S.
border. The Canadians worry about our
exports of fruits and vegetables, which
get ripe in the United States before
they do in Canada and which drive
down Canadian prices before the items
are picked. Canada is much concerned
that its economy not be dominated by
U.S. interests and, in 1974, instituted a
foreign investment revenue agency to
screen foreign investments and approve
them when they are of "significant
benefit" to Canada. We are concerned
about possible trade and investment
distortion resulting from the perfor-
mance requirements by that agency.
We make these concerns known to
Canada in an effort to continue the
favorable investment and trade climatf-
so important to both our economies.
The 1979 Trade Act suggests that
we take the links that bind our econ-
omy to that of our North American
neighbors one step further and explore
the prospect of setting up a North
American free trade area. The Adminis
tration will make that study, but we
should keep in mind that the prospect
of such a free trade area does not seen
the same from here as it does from the
viewpoint of Canada or Mexico. Both o:
these countries have expressed seriouj
reservations about the idea. Both are'
much smaller, they have a smaller in-
dustrial base and less rich agriculture.
They are concerned that their econ-
omies not be overwhelmed by the muc
Trade With the
Soviet Union
PRESIDENT'S LETTER
TO SENATOR JACKSON,
OCT. 25, 1980'
You wrote to ask my views about section 402
of the Trade Act of 1974, the Jackson-Vanik
amendment.
From the beginning of my Presidency I
emphasized our commitment as a nation to
human rights as a fundamental tenet on
which our foreign policy would be based.
That commitment of mine is as deep and as
important to me today as it was then.
You have always been a pioneer in the
area of human rights and your leadership
and support have been instrumental in our
success. I am sure that the record will show
that American words and actions in the last
period have left their mark on the rest of
the world. Because of our leadership the
defense of human rights has its rightful
place on the world agenda for everyone to
see.
The Jackson-Vanik amendment, which you
authored, represents an important statement
of our nation's commitment to the free
emigration of Soviet Jewry. As you well
know, I, along with you, have been specifi-
cally concerned about Jewish emigration
from the Soviet Union. The year before I
became President, Jewish emigration was
about 14,000. Last year it was up to
50,000 — the highest level in more than 10
years. The lower rate this year in the wake
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is of
great concern. We will continue to register
our strong concern about this low level of
emigration at the Review Conference on
Security and Cooperation which will meet il
Madrid next month. The Soviet Union hasii
obligation to honor its Helsinki commitment
After the Afghanistan invasion, I tooki
number of steps, including the suspension o(
grain sales and the restriction of high-
technology exports to the Soviet Union, to
make quite clear to the Soviets that we can-
not conduct business-as-usual with them
while their troops are occupying another
country.
With the Soviet troops still in Afghani-
stan and with unacceptable denials of free
emigration, it is totally inappropriate to con-
sider any changes to section 402 of the
Trade Act of 1974, and I have no intention »!
doing so. Furthermore, I can assure you thsl
the U.S. delegation under the leadership of
Ambassadors Griffin Bell and Max Kampel-
man at the CSCE Conference in Madrid will
take every opportunity to make clear to the
Soviet Union that their record of emigration
is a violation of the Helsinki accords.
I value your views on this subject and I
look forward to working closely with you on
these very vital issues.
Sincerely.
Jimmy Carter
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 3, 1980.
46
Department of State Bulletin
■ U.S. industrial and agricultural
ne. Both are eager to develop
energy resources to the maximum
their own development point of
They are reluctant to mortgage
energy supplies to one market,
feel that their energy en-
ents are among the most precious
mic assets they have. Though
recognize that proximity means
ve are likely to be the principal
aser of whatever they eventually
! to export, they wish full freedom
ide their production, price, and
t policy. They are both fiercely
of their political independence. In
circumstances, I am dubious that
'th American free trade area is
to become a reality in the near
I. We will continue to develop our
relations but probably by other
ENERGY
usion
site the problems I have mentioned,
? utlook for expanding trade rela-
n with other countries in this
nsphere is basically bright. We
;aly face a challenge in adjusting to
eiore complex and sophisticated
0))mies emerging in much of Latin
Ti'ica and in adapting to the great
"Jis of the new world energy situa-
iibut economic expansion in the
g n clearly presents opportunities
r merican exporters. In addition,
eiyproduct of greater economic
r< gth in the Latin American coun-
le should be a lessening of the
ilj cal sensitivity that now affects
ay economic issues. Finally, I believe
a our neighbors in this hemisphere
a? our view that trade and political
liions among us must be strength-
it in the interest of us all. ■
Energy:
Continuing Crisis
by Deane R. Hinton
Address before the Mid-America
Committee in Chicago on November 18,
1980. Mr. Hinton is Assistant Secretary
for Economic and Business Affairs.
Generals are said to study warfare and
often learn the wrong lessons. Politicians,
businessmen, and even bureaucrats may
also become adept at winning yesterday's
battles, not tomorrow's.
But history still instructs. Being
wedded to the past is a mistake, but the
past teaches us as well — if only to avoid
repeating errors. In this vein, I suggest
that lessons from the two oil crises of the
1970s— the 1973-74 embargo and the 1979
inten-uption of supplies from Iran — if
applied to the future, can prevent the
current oil supply inteiTuption from seri-
ously damaging our own and the rest of
the world's economies.
The current situation is serious, and
the longer term crisis continues. We need
to act in the short term due to the Iran-
Iraq war and in the longer term due to
the industrialized world's dependence on
imported oil to supply its energy needs.
Our efforts to combat these threats must
be vigorous and informed by experience,
often painfully acquired.
The Right Lessons
Our government, under both Democratic
and Republican administrations, has
learned the right lessons at times in the
past. The 1973 oil embargo and the ac-
companying cut in production were
shocks to the system. Both our economic
well-being and our security were put at
jeopardy. We analyzed the problem and
saw that there were two components — a
need to protect ourselves against short-
term supply interruptions and a realiza-
tion that energy price and supply had be-
come a long-term problem requiring on-
going, concerted action in order to avoid
continuing vulnerability.
The establishment of the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (lEA) in 1974 was
a response to both. This was an instru-
ment to protect us against future embar-
goes or other major supply interruptions
and to help nations work together to re-
duce our dependence on imported oil
through conservation and acceleration of
the development of alternative supplies.
We realized then that the energy problem
had the potential to divide us from our
principal economic partners and security
allies. Accordingly, we designed the lEA
as an energy collective security arrange-
ment. Its centerpiece is an emergency
oil-sharing system which can be triggered
when needed. The trigger mechanism can
be called into operation if the IE A, as a
whole, is suffering a shortfall greater
than 7%. In addition, any nation suffering
a 7% shortfall can activate the system
and call upon the other nations to make
up continuing additional shortfalls beyond
the 7% mark.
This sharing system has a number of
strengths. It is capable of being im-
plemented quickly and makes use of a
previously agreed mechanism and for-
mula. Ti'iggering the system would give
the United States and other lEA gov-
ernments legal authority to implement
strong domestic measures if necessary.
Also, sharing would make oil available to
hard-hit lEA countries and to oil-short
companies in such countries, reducing the
tendency to resort to the spot market
where small quantities of petroleum
products and crude oil are traded to clear
the market, which is overwhelmingly
dominated by long-term contracts. Price
rises in the thin spot market create a
psychology which encoui'ages hikes in of-
ficial prices — which consequently boost
the overall oil bill.
The long-term lesson from 1973 was
that the era of cheap and accessible en-
ergy had passed and that a continuing
energy crisis was in train. Recognizing
this, we embarked upon a vital journey,
which is far from finished — a journey de-
signed to improve our national approach
to energy and to stimulate other coun-
tries to do the same. We have made much
progress. At home, we are reducing our
dependence on imported oil. For exam-
ple, U.S. oil imports were below 7 million
b/d [barrels per day] in the first 6 months
of 1980 compared to 8.6 million b/d in
1977. In addition, increased energy effi-
ciency has enabled us partially to de-
couple GNP growth from gi'owth in oil
consumption so our economy can expand
without increasing our dependence on
imports.
I won't review here the evolution
and the vicissitudes of our national en-
ergy policy, but I think it can honestly be
said that we have more than begun on the
long road toward increasing our energy
suppUes and making better use of what
we have. While we must concentrate first
on putting our own house in order, we
ruarv 1981
47
Energy
also must continue to cooperate actively
in pursuit of these same goals with our
allies in the lEA and at the annual eco-
nomic summits of the industrial de-
mocracies.
The Second Crisis
After the shocks of 1973 and 1974, we
were making headway throughout the
mid- and late-1970s. lEA efforts and our
national policies were moving in the
same, positive direction, although we
were slower in starting than our lEA
counterparts.
Unfortunately, in 1979, Iranian
supplies were interrupted, and we wei'e
taught another lesson. This was a clear
example of vulnerability to attack from
an unexpected direction. The lEA system
was designed to meet a recurrence of the
1973 experience — a major shortfall
(above 7%) or an embargo. But histoiy
did not repeat itself. The interruption in
1979 was considerably less than 7%. We
did not have an lEA mechanism on the
shelf to deal with it.
We soon learned a painful lesson that
even a small interruption, under condi-
tions of uncertainty, could have devastat-
ing economic consequences. Although the
decline in Iranian production was only 4%
of world production, market dislocations
and price increases buffeted a world
economy which had still not fully recov-
ered from the 1973 oil price shock. These
blows helped push the United States into
recession and slowed economic growth in
the other industrial nations. In the
United States our total inflation grew to
double digits. For the industrialized na-
tions as a whole, it is estimated that the
price hikes of 1979 will ultimately cause a
loss of about $300 billion in GNP. And the
fragile economies of the developing na-
tions have been scarred even more se-
verely by these higher oil pj-ices.
The lEA developed a response to the
1979 crisis. Its members made a commit-
ment — albeit a loose one — to reduce the
group's demand for imported oil by 2 mil-
lion b/d. Each nation's share of the reduc-
tion, as well as the time within which
action had to be taken, was unspecified.
Although significant savings of about 1.5
million b/d, or 6% of 1978 IE A imports,
were achieved by the end of 1979, this
was too late to forestall sharp price in-
creases. lEA governments, focusing on
the modest quantity of the shortfall, had
underestimated the psychological impact
of the crisis on the market. Midway
through the year the United States came
to the conclusion that the lEA response
to the 1979 crisis was inadequate.
Another Lesson: The Need for Better
Tools
The United States, therefore, took the
lead in giving the IE A and the world
community better tools to meet a short-
fall. The most important of these is na-
tional ceilings on oil imports. At the
Tokyo summit in June 1979, the seven
largest industrial democracies adopted
1985 oil-import targets. The lEA subse-
quently refined and expanded these into
national import ceilings for 1980 and na-
tional import goals for 1985 for all its
members. This process has been insti-
tutionalized by the establishment of a
system within the IE A in which ceilings
would be imposed to counteract a market
shortfall. Each nation would be responsi-
ble for determining the measures neces-
saiy to achieve its ceiling.
Thus, we are not without I'esources
to face supply interruptions. In fact, our
experience in the IE A has expanded our
options beyond those which I have dis-
cussed. And we have established prac-
tices of consultation and cooperation
which will permit us to tailor our re-
sponses directly to any concrete situation.
Dimensions of the Present Situation
In this way, we have refined, through
chastening experience, our abilities to
deal with oil-supply interruptions. Now
we are faced with another novel and
threatening situation — the Iran-Ii-aq war.
The energy effects of war between the
two oil producers are serious, although
they have been manageable thus far. The
war has taken 3.8 milHon b/d of oil ex-
ports off the woi-ld market, over 8% of oil
produced in non-Communist countries.
Since world consumption has declined, we
can simply do without some of this oil —
about 1 million b/d of it. Another 1-1.5
million b/d can be made up thi'ough in-
creased production from the Saudis and
other OPEC [Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries] nations. This
leaves a shortfall of over 1 million b/d,
which is now being met by drawdowns of
above normal stocks in some nations and
by some belt tightening in nations with-
out adequate stocks.
The extent of any possible continuing
shortfall will depend on a number of fac-
tors, including how much additional sup-
ply is made available by other OPEC na-
tions, whethei- companies and individuals
begin to hoard oil supplies and whether
the war expands to other nations or inter-
feres with gulf shipping.
Since world stocks are at an all-tin; l
high, we should, in principle, be able t« I
manage the current shortfall for at leaj;
the next 6 months. However, there are I
complicating factors. The current short
fall is not distributed evenly among cou
tries and companies. The United State
lost a vei-y small percentage of its oil.
Some lEA members — Italy and Japan-
lost 15% and 8% respectively, while
others — Turkey and Portugal — were hi
more severely. France lost 30%, and
Brazil and India have been cut by more
than 40% each. In addition, many devel
oping nations depended on Iraq for mos
of their oil and received it at much
needed concessional terms.
Even in countries which have Idst
little overall, certain companies have su
fered substantial losses, "rhis means tha
even though world stocks are high, som
nations and companies are hurting now.
and others will be in the near futui-e. If
they are unable to secure adequate
supplies elsewhere, they may turn to th
spot market to make up their shortfall.
If they do so, spot market prices w
increase, perhaps rapidly. OPEC minis-
ters who meet in Bali on December 15
will be veiy attentive to price ti'ends on
the spot market. If histoi-y repeats itsel
official price increases would follow and
be reflected in long-term contracts for
1981 which will be negotiated next mont
Some producers, in response to rising
spot prices, may also impose surcharges
on their official prices. Because of this
price effect of a shortfall, all buyers
would suffer. Even countries which lost
few supplies — such as the United State:
— would bear a heavy burden.
In trying to plot our course of actioi
during the next months, we must begin
with a premise: It is unacceptable to
permit oil prices to skyi'ocket as they di(
in 1979. Several key elements in the 197S
price escalator must be attacked — the
leading role of spot prices, excess stock
building, and fear of uncertainty in oil
markets. If we focus on these factors am
have learned our lessons well, we can de
fend ourselves adequately against an-
other body blow to the world's economy.
Peace Efforts and TEA Cooperation
The first step is to reduce war-linked un-
certainty in the oil market by encourag-
ing those forces working for peace be-
tween Iraq and Iran.
• We are actively working through
the U.N. Security Council toward a reso-
lution of the conflict which does justice tc
48
Department of State Bulletin
-
Energy
legitimate concerns on both sides and
)ws the principles of international law.
• The U.S. position from the begin-
^ of this conflict has been clear. We are
artial but not uninterested. The polit-
economic, and human consequences
continuing conflict are of vital im-
tance to us and the rest of the world.
• We are concerned that the conflict
be expanded and have taken steps to
t vent that. We believe, strongly, that
re must be no infi'ingement of the in-
nationally recognized freedom and
ety of navigation in the Persian Gulf
1 welcome assurances given by both
n and Iraq in this regard.
• We believe, as well, that countries
luld be protected against interference
;heir internal affairs and that interna-
lal disputes should be settled by
iceful means rather than by force.
Beyond peace efforts, our principal
1 is to keep the world supplied with oil
way that reduces pressure on oil
ces. On the supply side, certain giilf
ntries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
the U.A.E. [United Arab Emirates]
e increased production to ti-y to make
some of the shortfall suffered by
Citomers of Iraq. Exports may also in-
case from nations such as Nigeria,
v.ich were producing at less than normal
li els due to slack demand. The most we
Ci hope for from these countries is an
etra 1-2 million b/d, wath the lower end
cthe range more likely.
On the demand side, we are cooper-
s ng wdth the 20 other industrialized na-
t ns which are members of the IE A and
■\th France to calm the market. There
£2 two related aspects to this effort.
Irst, we can ease spot market pressure
I using existing stocks. Second, we have
f reduce overall demand for imported oil
f compensate for reduced supply.
IE A nations agi'eed on October 1 to
: oid abnormal purchases on the spot
laiket and to meet any shortfall through
lock draws. This has had a useful effect
1 us far. The IE A policy is based on
nnsultation and persuasion, and we ai'e
'Pending in the last instance on the
'loperation of oil companies. We must
•cognize that companies may become re-
ctant to draw down stocks even at nor-
lal rates if they foresee a continuing
lortfall. If this proves to be the case,
16 buffer of high stocks, lacking in 1979,
it which has furnished a cushion for us
1 1980, will comfort us less and less in
le future.
What we do further depends on our
nd the market's continuing assessment
of prospects for resumption of something
approaching normal levels of production
from Iraq and Iran. This requii'es judg-
ments about the length of the war and
the likely pace at which their exports
could be restored to more normal levels.
Based on the limited information avail-
able, damage to oil production and export
facilities in both countries, to date, is not
excessive, and exports will be likely to
rise, to some extent, soon after hostilities
cease. It may be some months, however,
before exports would approach prewar
levels. Any new or, as yet, unreported
damage to oil facilities could extend this
period, as would any difficulties in or-
ganizing repair efforts.
What Should Be Done Now?
While we cannot foresee the outcome of
the conflict, we can act to mitigate its ef-
fect. We will be continuing discussions
with our friends and allies in the next few
weeks and will concert our responses to
the oil markets in light of the situation in
the Middle East. The adoption of import
ceilings, activation of the sharing system,
or other responses could require strong
domestic measures. To handle short-term
emergencies, nations have proposed
measures such as fuel switching,
emergency taxes or tariffs, temperatui'e
control standards, leaving cars home one
day a week, and others. In 1979, we re-
lied on fuel switching, temperature con-
trols, and inci'easing production, where
possible. We might need some additional
mechanisms in 1981.
Whether any of these actions is ever
used, the point remains: In order to re-
duce short-term price pressure, we need
to reduce demand for oil. The choice is
quite simple. We can cut back a bit now
or risk paying the price. In this case, the
price could be $30-$90 billion additional
per year for our oil, resulting in reduction
of growth, higher inflation, and diminu-
tion of our strength and international
position. This was the real choice facing
IE A countries in 1979, though we did not
know it at the time.
Better Mechanisms and Expanded
Supplies
We still need to learn, for the next time.
The public needs to understand that the
energy problem is not going to go away.
We need to act consciously to manage it.
We need to have popularly supported
mechanisms to minimize upward price
pressure during short-term interruptions
and, for the longer term, to reduce more
rapidly the dependence of the United
States and other nations on imported oil
and speed the transition to other energy
sources. We need to spur production.
Some of these mechanisms we can
adopt ourselves; others require coopera-
tion from other industrialized nations as
well as the producing nations. Short-term
demand restraint pos.sibilities have al-
ready been mentioned. Longer term
measures to increase available supply in-
clude increasing production from domes-
tic energy resources — coal, oil, gas, and
nuclear; hastening the development and
commercialization of new energy technol-
ogies — solar, biomass, shale oil, liquids,
and gas from coal; emphasizing conserva-
tion and efficiency; and expanding cogen-
eration of heat and power.
Considerable effort should be de-
voted to expanding secure energy
supplies. We are taking the lead ourselves
in coal. We are in the early stages of a
substantial long-term coal export strat-
egy by which we will increase our eco-
nomic strength and also help our
energy-deficient trading partners by pro-
viding them with reliable long-term en-
ergy supplies.
Other nations with abundant energy
resources should respond to the needs of
their friends and the world economy.
Under foreseeable circumstances, it pays
no nation to limit energy production for
short-term national interests. This pre-
scription applies across the board, since
the political and economic security of
every nation would be threatened by a
chaotic and crippled energy-short world
economy.
•In our relations ■with key OPEC na-
tions, we have emphasized their stake in
a sound world economy and the im-
portance of adequate, reasonably priced
oil supplies to world economic health.
Some nations, particularly those of the
Arabian Peninsula, see the merits of a
long-term perspective and are producing
at levels far above those required for
their domestic economies.
But the industrialized nations cannot
ask OPEC to produce energy to respond
to the needs of the world economy if they,
themselves, will not. In this regard,
Canada's recent announcement of a new
national energy policy, which appears
likely to result in limiting Canadian pro-
duction, seems to be out of step with the
rest of the world. We hope that, as details
of Canada's new program are worked out,
the Canadian Government will recognize
its more general responsibilities to create
incentives — including price increases —
rather than disincentives to energy pro-
■ebruary 1981
49
EUROPE
duction. We also hope that nations such
as the United Kingdom and Norway will
produce at maximum efficiency in order
to provide more secure sources of energy
supply.
We are doing our part. Energy
policies now in place are having an ap-
preciable effect on our energy balance
sheet. We have reduced our oil imports
by 25% since the peak year of 1977, and
we are well on the road to increased en-
ergy production. We can now exercise
greater leadership, internationally, in
confronting the world's energy problems
since we have turned from a nation with
one of the weakest energy programs into
a nation with one of the strongest.
Policies and legislation have been effec-
tive in reducing demand and increasing
supply, especially through gradual oil and
gas price decontrol, incentives for greater
energy efficiency in homes and busi-
nesses, fuel efficiency standards, building
temperature controls, the synfuels pro-
gram, and related measures.
But we cannot rest on our laurels.
We have a long way yet to go. The war
between Iraq and Iran is a telling re-
minder that the unpredictable and irra-
tional do occur. We must strengthen our
ability to react even to extreme cases.
Ultimately, we will have learned the right
lessons when the American people under-
stand that our well-being and security are
at stake in our response to the continuing
energy crisis. ■
North Atlantic Council
Meets in Brussels
Secretary Muskie departed
Washington, D.C., December 9, 1980, to
attend the regular semiannual session
of the North A tlantic Council minis-
terial meeting in Brussels December
11-12. Before returning to the United
States, he stopped in London December
12- H to consult with British officials.
Following are the texts of the final
communique, the declaration approved
by the 15 Foreign Ministers, and the
minutes extracts made available to the
press of December 12.
FINAL COMMUNIQUE,
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL'
The North Atlantic Council met in
ministerial session in Brussels on 11th and
12th December, 1980, against a background
of growing uncertainty and tension in inter-
national relations. Ministers agreed on the
following:
1. The continuing military buildup of
the Soviet Union, its clear willingness, as
seen in Afghanistan to use force in disregard
of the principles of the United Nations
Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and Interna-
tional Law and the Soviet menace which
hangs over Poland give cause for grave con-
cern to the members of the Alliance and to
the entire international community.
Allied strength and cohesion are thus
essential to the maintenance of stability and
peace. United in purpose, the Allies are
determined to meet any challenge to the
freedom and well-being of their peoples and
to make the efforts and sacrifices required
for deterrence and defense. In this way they
do their part to preserve the basis for
detente.
Genuine detente must be worldwide in
scope and indivisible. It can succeed only if
the Soviet Union strictly abides, in Europe
and elsewhere, by the Helsinki Final Act in
their entirety. Allied efforts to persuade the
Soviet Union to change its policy from one of
intervention in the affairs of other states to
one of respect for their sovereignty serve
the general interest of the international com-
munity. The Allies will keep open channels
of communication and be ready to respond
positively to concrete steps by the Soviet
Union to cease aggressive activities and to
restore the basis for constructive East-West
relations. In this connection, the Allies re-
main committed to the pursuit of effective,
balanced and verifiable measures of disarma-
ment and arms control.
2. Detente has brought appreciable
benefits in the field of East-West cooperation
and exchange. But it has been seriously
damaged by Soviet actions. It could not sur-
vive it the Soviet Union were again to vio-
late the basic rights of any state to ter-
ritorial integrity and independence. Poland
should be free to decide its own future. The
Allies will respect the principle of non-inter
vention and strongly urge others to do like-
wise. Any intervention would fundamentally
alter the entire international situation. The
Allies would be compelled to react in the
manner which the gravity of this devel-
opment would require. Therefore the Council
will keep the situation under close and con-
tinuous review. At the same time, genuine
Soviet efforts to restore the confidence
necessary for detente will meet with a ready
response from the Allies.
3. It is important, particularly in the
present circumstances, that the calm situa-
tion in and around Berlin should be main-
tained and that the positive effects of the
Quadripartite Agreement of 3rd September,
1971. should not be impaired by unilateral
measures. The international situation as a
whole cannot fail to be affected by the situa-
tion in Berlin.
Recent measures introduced by the Ger-
man Democratic Republic have substantially
reduced inner-German travel and visits of
Berliners. This development constitutes a
setback in the relationship between the two
German states. The Allies support the ef-
forts of the Federal Republic of Germany to
achieve the withdrawal of these measures so
that relations between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic could develop further in the in-
terest of stability and co-operation in Europe
and of those affected.
4. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
is unacceptable. One year after the Soviet in-
vasion, the Afghan people still suffer from
repression by foreign troops on their soil.
The use of military force by the Soviet
government to impose its will on the people ^
of a neutral and non-aligned country belies ,
its oft-repeated professions of friendship for
the nations of the Third World, creating I
distrust about its future intentions. An ove^ j
whelming majority of the United Nations
General Assembly has again called for the
immediate removal of the foreign troops
from Afghanistan. Despite the efforts of the
Islamic Conference, the quest for a political
settlement has made no progress because of
Soviet intransigence. Such a settlement must
provide for the total withdrawal of Soviet
troops and enable the Afghan people to exe^ L
cise fully their rights of independence and |
self-determination.
More than one million Afghans have
been forced by the Soviet occupation to flee
50
Department of State Bulletin
Europe
omeland, causing great human suffer-
d placing a heavy burden on neigh-
g countries. In the spirit of the United
IS Resolutions, Allied governments, in
in )n with a number of neutral and non-
ic d countries, are contributing to
ir litarian aid to alleviate the plight of
e refugees.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
ijor implications for the whole of
West Asia, an area of paramount in-
to the international community and
curity of the Allies. Members of the
ce are prepared to work for the reduc-
: tension in the area and, individually,
tribute to peace and stability for the
while protecting their vital economic
irategic interests.
he Allies deplore the war between
nd Iran, which causes further concern
5 stability of the affected region. In
mnection, they underline the impor-
of maintaining freedom of navigation,
lecalling positions previously taken by
)uncil, the Allies reaffirm the need for
rl; achievement of a just, lasting and com-
Hsive settlement of the Arab-Israeli
I.
The enormous growth over a number
IS of Warsaw Pact and in particular
military power gives rise to
ate concern in Europe and through-
I, e world. This build-up contradicts the
2q 'nt assurances by the Warsaw Pact
iii 'ies that their aim is not military
pi ority.
nder present circumstances there is
r1 ular need to look to deterrence and
U '.e. The Allies will therefore take, in-
n ally or collectively, the defensive
>^ ires to meet the growth of Warsaw
ic apabilities and to deter any aggres-
)n
. The strength of the Alliance lies not
ij n its defensive capability but also in its
hi on and the readiness of its members to
vi ine another political and economic sup-
■r [n particular they have greatly bene-
& from the practice of frank and timely
ni Itations on a broad range of issues.
i€ will vigorously pursue this practice
it he object of underscoring their
li rity on all matters affecting their com-
(H nterests. They will continue Allied pro-
a? to strengthen the economies of the
JS dvanced member countries, undertaken
t' spirit of article 2 of the North Atlantic
'e y, which have gained additional sig-
fi nee and urgency.
The deterioration of the situation in
>li-West Asia underlines the necessity
idirgency of enhancing the defence
"re of the South-Eastern flank and of
1 Uiining stability and a balance of power
■ Mediterranean region as a whole.
The cohesion of the South-Eastern flank
• leen strongly reinforced by recent
ivi- decisions regarding this area, and
itapability of the alliance for deterrence
Wiefence has thereby considerably im-
•I ed. These developments may, at the
same time, be considered as a welcome step
to the restoration of mutual confidence be-
tween Greece and Turkey, and they enhance
the prospects for success of the bilateral ef-
forts of the two governments.
8. The Allies attach importance to the
process initiated by the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)
as a valuable framework for improving
security and developing co-operation in
Europe on the basis of full implementation of
the commitments entered into at Helsinki.
They remain committed to the continuation
of the CSCE process beyond the present
follow-up meeting in Madrid. This meeting is
taking place in the shadow of the Soviet in-
vasion of Afghanistan and the continuing
suppression of human rights in the Soviet
Union proclaimed on the Helsinki Final Act.
In condemning these violations, as during
the thorough discussion of implementations,
the Allies are seeking to preserve the in-
tegrity of the Final Act, to which they re-
main dedicated.
In the same spirit, they are presenting
important new proposals in all areas covered
by the Final Act, including human rights,
human contacts and information. In the
security area the allies strongly support ex-
panding and strengthening confidence
building measures within a framework that
ensures they will be militarily significant,
verifiable and applicable to the entire conti-
nent of Europe, including all of the European
territory of the Soviet Union. In this regard,
recalling their previous declaration in
Ankara, the Allies took note that the pro-
posal of the Government of France concern-
ing a mandate for a conference on Disarma-
ment in Europe, under the aegis of the
CSCE, has been tabled in Madrid where it
has been welcomed by many delegations.
9. Sharing the widespread international
concern at the continuing increase in armed
forces and armaments throughout the world.
Allied governments have put forward pro-
posals in various form in which arms control
and disarmament are discussed. These ef-
forts are made more difficult if agreements
already in force are not fully observed. In
this connection, the Allies welcome all con-
structive efforts by the contracting parties
aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of ex-
isting accords. The negotiation of new agree-
ments must provide for adequate verifi-
cation. The Allies will continue to seek
agreements establishing greater security for
all nations at lower levels of forces and arm-
aments within the United Nations frame-
work and elsewhere.
10. The Allies engaged in the negotia-
tions on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduc-
tions remain determined to achieve a more
stable and equitable balance of forces in
Central Europe through reductions in two
phases leading to genuine parity in military
manpower in the form of a common collec-
tive ceiling, based on agreed data. The
Western proposal of December 1979 pro-
vides a realistic framework for a mutually
beneficial phase 1 agreement involving
United States and Soviet reductions and
associated measures. Although the Eastern
countries have recently made some limited
moves towards an interim phase 1 agree-
ment, as proposed by the West, they have
regrettably still not provided the informa-
tion necessary to reach agreement on the
size of the forces of the Soviet Union in Cen-
tral Europe, which is an essential prereq-
uisite to a phase 1 agreement. Nor have the
Eastern countries responded adequately to
Western proposals concerning associated
measures which are designed to ensure
verification of force reductions and limita-
tions and to enhance stability.
11. Assuring strategic balance between
the United States and the Soviet Union is
central to the security of the Alliance. The
Alliance supports further negotiations and
remains deeply committed to the SALT
process as a way of achieving meaningful
mutual limitations on United States and
Soviet strategic nuclear forces that will help
enhance Western security and preserve
East- West stability.
12. The Allies who participated in the
decision of 12th December, 1979 on Theatre
Nuclear Forces (TNF), having received a
second report from the Special Consultative
Group on Progress in Arms Control involv-
ing TNF, expressed their satisfaction with
the close and fruitful consultations which
have taken place within the Group. They
noted with satisfaction the serious and
substantive character of the recent discus-
sions between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Those Allies expressed their
support for the United States negotiating ap-
proach, elaborated in intensive consultations
among them on the basis of the December
1979 decision. A date for resumption of US-
Soviet exchanges next year will be set
through mutual consultations.
The continuing implementation of the
modernization element of the December 1979
decision was noted. The Soviet preponder-
ance in Long-Range TNF (LRTNF) deploy-
ments remains cause for serious concern.
The SS-20 bases already identified would
alone support more warheads than are plan-
ned for their entire modernization program.
Allied solidarity in support of both moderni-
zation and arms control involving TNF re-
mains key to achieving progress toward
agreed limitation. The scale of NATO'S
Long-Range TNF requirements will be ex-
amined in the light of concrete results
achieved through negotiations.
The withdrawal of 1,000 United States
nuclear warheads from Europe as an integral
part of the LRTNF modernization and arms
control decision has been completed.
DECLARATION
The Foreign Ministers and representatives
of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United King-
ruary 1981
51
Europe
dom and the United States of America
recalled previous declarations regarding acts
of violence and terrorism including those
committed against diplomats and diplomatic
missions. They noted with grave concern the
suffering inflicted on innocent people, as well
as the negative impact of the continuation
and spread of such acts on the social struc-
ture and democratic institutions of individual
countries and on international relations.
They vigorously condemned these terrorist
acts as particularly odious, regardless of
their causes or objectives. They ag^reed
unanimously on the necessity, in accordance
with the legislation of each country, for close
inter-governmental cooperation and effective
measures to prevent and combat terrorism.
With particular reference to Iran, they
expressed their continued deep concern over
the flagrantly illegal holding of United
States diplomatic personnel and property
and repeated their call upon the Iranian
authorities to release immediately and
unharmed the American hostages.
MINUTES EXTRACTS
Economic Cooperation and Assistance
Within the Alliance
Reaffirming their attachment to the spirit of
article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty,
Ministers reviewed the particular problems
faced by the economically less advanced
member countries in the light of the difficult
world conditions currently being experi-
enced. They noted a report by the Secretary
General on the progress so far achieved
through appropriate bilateral and multilateral
channels in improving the economic situation
in those member countries. Following the
political initiatives taken since 1978, sub-
stantial results have been obtained, but
Ministers underlined that continued political
support was essential for solving the longer
term economic problems of these countries,
which would contribute to the consolidation
of Alliance strength and sohdarity.
"Science for Stability"
Ministers noted that concrete proposals had
now been developed to implement the
"Science for Stability" programme, whose
establishment they endorsed last June, to
strengthen the scientific and technological
capabilities of the less developed member
countries, and that these proposals would re-
quire the provision of adequate funding over
the next five years.
The Situation in
the Mediterranean
Ministers noted the report on the situation
in the Mediterranean prepared on their in-
structions and underlined again the necessity
of maintaining the balance of forces in the
whole area. They requested the Council in
permanent session to continue to consult on
the question and submit a further report at
their next meeting.
Equipment Cooperation
Ministers examined a report by the Con-
ference of National Armaments Directors
and noted the encouraging progress being
made both in periodic armaments planning
and in cooperative projects for the develop-
ment and production of defence equipment.
They welcomed the efforts being undertaken
under the transatlantic dialogue to initiate
dual production projects and promote the
study and introduction of families of
weapons. Such a transatlantic dialogue pre-
supposes the development of cooperation
between European countries of the Alliance.
Emphasizing the important contribution
which standardization can make both to mili-
tary effectiveness and a better use of
resources, they welcomed the standardiza-
tion achieved in respect of the calibres for
infantry small arms.
Noting the emphasis being placed on us-
ing the technological potential of Alliance
members to the best advantage for the
development of defence equipment, Ministers
urged that continuing attention be paid to
assisting the less industrialized member na-
tions. In this context they welcomed the re-
cent leasing by the United States to Turkey
of military industrial equipment.
Recognizing the importance of a coor-
dinated air defence programme to the defen-
sive posture of the Alliance, Ministers
welcomed with satisfaction the establishm'
for this purpose of a NATO Air Defence
Committee under the Council.
Civil Emergency Planning — Commitment ■
of Merchant Ships and Civil Aircraft
by Memhir Countries
Ministers took note of progress made in tl
field and endorsed the action being taken
improve the state of contingency planning
Committee on the Challenges
of Modern Society
Ministers noted the annual progress repoi
by the Secretary General on the work of t
Committee on the Challenges of Modern
Society (CCMS). They received a report o
the high-level meeting held in Brussels on
24th November 1980 when seven Minister
of the Environment and other senior offic
exchanged views on the environment and
tional planning, the problems posed by th»
utilization of diversified energy sources ar
the environmental management of chemic
Ministers took note of the completior
a major pilot project concerned with redu
ing the scale of emissions of sulfur oxide
gases into the atmosphere. They under-
scored the necessity for wide diffusion of
Committee's project reports and expressi
the hope that recommendations be rapidi;
integrated into national environmental
policies. In addition, they noted with inte:
the decisions to hold symposia next fall o
technology assessment and hazardous wa
22d Report
on Cyprus
MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
NOV. 20, 19801
In accordance with the provisions of Public
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following
report on progress made during the past 60
days toward a negotiated settlement of the
Cyprus problem.
As was noted in my last report, inter-
communal talks between representatives of
the Greek and Turkish Cypriots resumed on
August 9 under the aegis of United Nations
Special Representative Ambassador Hugo
Gobbi. Systematic substantive examination
of the essential problems dividing the com-
munities began on September 16. The par-
ties have been examining the following
general subjects, on the basis of one topic
each meeting:
(Al Resettlement of Varosha under
United Nations auspices;
(B) Promotion of goodwill, mutual con-
fidence and normal conditions;
(C) Constitutional problems;
(D) Territorial divisions.
Meetings were held on September 24
October 1, 8, 15. and 31 and November 5 ■
12. We are encouraged by the fact that tV
negotiators at these sessions have engage
in serious examinations of their differenct
and are seeking mutually acceptable solu
tions. The negotiating atmosphere betwet^i
the parties has remained congenial.
I am hopeful that the good start
achieved by these meetings will develop i
sustained negotiations leading to a compr
hensive solution. Serious, sustained talks
provide the best opportunity for reaching
just and lasting settlement of the issues t
face Cyprus.
Sincerely,
Jimmy Carte
'Idential letters addressed to Thomas
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Repr
sentatives, and Frank Church, Chairman (
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(text from Weekly Compilation of Preside
tial Documents of Nov. 24, 1980). ■
52
Department of State Bulle
HUMAN RIGHTS
■11 as strengthening the CCMS fellow-
irogramme.
ilinisters noted that the recent plenary
n of the Committee in the context of a
al review of projects currently in prog-
li'voted particular attention to
nlogy and earthquake loss reduction.
UTS agreed that recent tragic events in
.1 ijave additional importance to this
Convention on Elimination
of Discrimination Against
Women Sent to Senate
IPress release 348 of Dec. 16, 1980.
'esident IVIeets
litli Cliancellor
K^hmidt
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the
e ral Republic of Germany visited
"nited States November 18-21,
Following is the text of a White
,( statement released at the conclu-
of the Chancellor's meeting with
ident Carter on November 20.^
T ident Carter and the Chancellor of
"ederal Republic of Germany,
lut Schmidt, held a thorough con-
e ation in Washington, November 20,
- u ng the Chancellor's visit to the
h ed States, November 18 through
1 The President hosted a White
I«se luncheon for the Chancellor and
~'c iign Minister Hans-Dietrich
j« scher on November 20 in which
>e etary of State Muskie, National
>« irity Adviser Brzezinski, and senior
£ ials also participated.
The conversation between the
ident and the Chancellor covered a
range of political, security, and
iimic issues of mutual interest to
ii' ,wo countries. The President and
hi Chancellor agreed on the necessity
' mtinuing these close consultations,
iding during the transition period,
a -der to assure continuing full coor-
lii tion of the policies followed by the
■» countries on major international
s^es.
In their conversation the President
tn the Chancellor agreed on the con-
-ii ed importance of improving NATO's
kmse posture and of efforts aimed at
"•fhing arms control agreements with
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact
s in order to insure a stable mili-
6 ' balance.
In their discussion of East-West
I tions, both sides welcomed the con-
'ation of the CSCE [Conference on
urity and Cooperation in Europe]
cess at the Madrid review con-
MESSAGE TO THE SENATE,
NOV. 12, 19801
With a view to receiving the advice and con-
sent of the Senate to ratification (subject to
certain qualifications and possibly to appro-
priate implementing legislation), I transmit
herewith a copy of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women. The Convention was
adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly on December 18, 1979 and signed
on behalf of the United States of America on
July 17, 1980. The report of the Department
of State with respect to the Convention is
also transmitted for the information of the
Senate.
Adoption of this Convention by the
General Assembly at the conclusion of its
34th Session in December, 1979, was the
culmination of a negotiating process that
lasted several years. Throughout this
process, the United States was an active par-
ticipant and a vigorous supporter of a
comprehensive and effective international
instrument to achieve the elimination of
discrimination against women. Although cer-
tain earUer human rights treaties relate to
the rights of women, none of these previous
instruments attempted to deal with women's
ference, to which both governments re-
main committed. In this context they
stressed the right of each country, ir-
respective of its political or social sys-
tem, to resolve its problems in free ex-
ercise of its sovereignty and without
intervention from any quarter. More-
over, they reiterated, with reference to
the resolution of the General Assembly
of the United Nations, their regret that
there is no evidence of Soviet readiness
to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan
and to seek a political solution of the
Afghanistan crisis.
The President and the Chancellor
discussed the latest developments in
the Middle East. They reviewed the
ongoing negotiations in the Camp David
framework and stressed the urgent
need for progress toward a comprehen-
sive peace settlement.
Secretary Muskie and Foreign
Minister Genscher also held a separate
meeting earlier in the day.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 24, 1980,
which also contains the President's and
Chancellor's remarks to reporters on the
South Lawn of the White House following
their meeting. ■
rights in as comprehensive a manner as this
Convention. The wide scope of the Conven-
tion is particularly noteworthy and
commendable in that it calls upon States
Parties to take "all appropriate measures" to
eliminate discrimination against women in
such diverse fields of human endeavor as
politics, law, employment, education, health
care, commercial transactions, and domestic
relations. Moreover, the Convention estab-
lishes a Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women to review
periodically the progress being made by
States Parties.
Ratification of the Convention on the
Political Rights of Women in 1976 was a re-
cent express affirmation by the Executive
and Legislative branches of the U.S. Govern-
ment that human rights in general and
women's rights in particular are matters of
legitimate concern to the international com-
munity and are not subjects with exclusively
domestic ramifications. U.S. ratification of
the Convention at hand, the newest of the
international human rights instruments,
would be consistent with this affirmation and
would make clear at home and abroad the
commitment of the United States to eliminte
discrimination against women.
The great majority of the substantive
provisions of the Convention are consistent
with the letter and spirit of the United
States Constitution and existing laws. How-
ever, certain provisions of the Convention
raise questions of conformity to current
United States law. Nevertheless, the Depart-
ments of State and Justice and other inter-
ested agencies of the Federal Government
concur in the judgment that, with the adop-
tion of certain qualifications and, possibly,
appropriate implementing legislation, there
are no constitutional or other legal obstacles
to United States ratification. The report of
the Department of State on the Convention
and an attached legal memorandum describe
the provisions of the Convention and identify
those areas of concern that will require fur-
ther discussion and treatment.
This Convention is a significant new ele-
ment in the development of the international
law of human rights. By giving its advice
and consent to ratification of the Convention,
the Senate will confirm our country's tradi-
tional commitment to the promotion and pro-
tection of human rights and will enhance our
nation's ability to achieve progress through-
out the world. I hope that all States will
become Parties to the Convention, and that
it will be applied universally. I recommend
that the Senate give early and favorable con-
sideration to this Convention.
Jimmy Carter
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Nov. 17, 1980.
F iruary 1981
53
MIDDLE EAST
I
Western Sahara Dispute
by Harold H. Saunders
Statement before the Subcommit-
tee on Africa of the House Foreign Af
fairs Committee on December 4, 1980.
Mr. Saunders is Assistant Secretary for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.^
There have been some modest develop-
ments in the western Sahara dispute
over the past 6 months which improve
prospects for the negotiating process
necessary to develop the terms of a
settlement.
As you are well aware, the Ameri-
can Government has sought to encour-
age all of the interested parties to turn
their energies from the battlefield to
the peace table. While we are neutral
on the final outcome, we are deeply
committed to bringing this war to an
end so that our friendly relations with
all of the countries of North Africa can
continue to develop unclouded by the
present distractions and complications
of the war in the Sahara.
In the deliberations of the Organi-
zation of African Unity (OAU) in the
past few months and the current U.N.
General Assembly, tentative steps have
been taken that may begin to lead the
protagonists out of their current im-
passe. Over the past 6 months, we have
seen a gradual change in attitudes on
all sides which has created an atmos-
phere and an opportunity increasingly
focusing the attention of the interested
parties on those successive steps that
must be taken if a compromise resolu-
tion of this conflict is to emerge.
I emphasize that the process is still
highly tenuous and requires careful nur-
turing. There is no quick and easy solu-
tion. The road toward peace — in the
western Sahara and elsewhere — will
take the parties over some rough ter-
rain as they maneuver to defend what
they perceive to be their vital interests.
U.S. Relations With the Parties
10
Our relations with the parties to the
dispute bear directly on our ability to
work with them toward a solution.
Today, partly as a result of our decisuj.
to sell certain types of arms to Morooli
our measure of influence with Morocci
is increased to the point where we cai
cooperate in constructive steps, most
recently the Moroccan-sponsored reso
lution at the United Nations.
At the same time, we have in-
creased the intensity of our contacts
with Algeria, especially on the questic
of our hostages in Iran. We believe
such cooperation in one field will mak'
it easier for us to work together in
others. Also, we have established con-
tacts with the Polisario, first in a mee
ing in Washington last spring, then bj
a visit to Polisario refugee camps in
Algeria within the past week.
Establishing a Negotiating Process
As you know, the OAU has played an
important role in trying to work out a
compromise solution. Arising out of a
decision taken by the OAU summit
Bill of Rights Day,
Human Rights
Day and Week,
1980
A PROCLAMATION'
On December 15. 1791, the Bill of Rights
became part of the Constitution of the
United States. On December 10. 1948, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted
the Universal Declaration of Human Bights.
Marking these anniversaries together gives
us an opportunity to renew our dedication
both to our own liberties and to the promo-
tion of human rights everywhere.
The Bill of Rights carries with it an im-
plied responsibility for the governed as well
as for the governing. No American citizen
can rest satisfied until the Bill of Rights is a
living reality for every person in the United
States, irrespective of race, religion, sex, na-
tional or ethnic origin. We cannot simply
rely on the decency of government or the
alertness of an active tree press. Each indi-
vidual must shoulder his or her share of the
responsibility for seeing that our freedoms
will survive.
The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is the cornerstone of a developing
international consensus on human rights.
Through it, the members of the United Na-
tions undertake to promote, respect and
observe human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all without discrimination. We must
continuously monitor the progress of this
effort and the records of governments
around the world.
The promise of the Declaration is
remote to all those who suffer summary
executions and torture, acts of genocide,
arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, banish-
ment, internal exile, forced labor and
confinement for political cause. It is remote
to the countless refugees who flee their
lands in response to the elimination of their
human rights. It is remote to those subjected
to armed invasions or to military coups that
destroy democratic processes. The Declara-
tion will ring hollow to that segment of a
population discriminated against by laws of
apartheid or by restrictions on religious
freedom. It will ring hollow to those threat-
ened by violations of freedom of assembly,
association, expression and movement, and
by the suppression of trade unions.
The Declaration must also ring hollow
to the members of the U.S. Embassy staff
who have been held captive for more than a
year by the Government of Iran.
The cause of human rights is embattled
throughout the world. Recent events make it
imperative that we, as Americans, stand
firm in our insistence that the values em-
bodied in the Bill of Rights, and contained in
the Universal Declaration, be enjoyed by all.
I urge all Americans to support ratifi(
tion of the Genocide Convention, the Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination, the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the American Convention on Human Righl
I renew my request to the Senate to give
advice and consent to these important
treaties.
Now. Therefore, I, Jimmy Carter.
President of the United States of America
do hereby proclaim December 10, 1980. as
Human Rights Day and December 15, 198(
as Bill of Rights Day. and call on all Amer
cans to observe Human Rights Week begii
ning December 10, 1980. It should be a tim
set apart for the study of our own rights, !
basic to the working of our society, and foi
renewal of our efforts on behalf of the
human rights of all peoples everywhere.
In Witness Whereof. I have hereunti
set my hand this fourteenth day of Noveui
ber, in the year of our Lord nineteen
hundred and eighty, and of the Independer
of the United States of America the two
hundred and fifth.
Jimmy Carter
'No. 4804 of Nov. 14, 1980 (text from
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments of Nov. 17). ■
54
Department of State Bulle*
Middle East
* g last July, the OAU's ad hoc
ion committee on the western
(more commonly referred to as
semen Committee) met in
liber and approved a peace plan
: for an immediate cease-fire by
her 15, return of the Moroccan
lisario forces to their base
a U.N. peacekeeping force to
-lise the cease-fire, and an OAU
nidum assisted by the United Na-
s n the issue of the future political
uof the western Sahara. For the
: Tie, all of the interested par-
- Algeria, Mauritania, Polisario,
rjresentatives of Saharan
ir -.ations in the western Sahara, in-
Morocco— attended this session
i( vVisemen Committee even though
iKotiations took place among
iisrested parties.
] jrocco, which regards itself as
a n"ieved party to Polisario attacks
iij Morocco proper, readily accepted
C U call for an immediate cease-
' 1 1 expressed reservations about
t erendum, while the Polisario sup-
'f a referendum but refused to ac-
eease-fire until Morocco agrees
m T into direct negotiations.
re I, for its part, maintained its
T that it was not a party to the
• even though the Polisario is
n; i assistance and asylum by the
re ins. It is widely anticipated that
tu urrent OAU initiative does not
d substantial progress toward a
ro ited settlement by next June —
ei he 1981 OAU summit will take
(X the Polisario will be admitted to
( U. This may lead to increased
te al assistance to the Polisario and
■-U her isolation of Morocco.
'. irther developments occurred
•n consideration of the western
'3 issue by the U.N. General
^ bly's Fourth Committee last
it The resolution supported by
e 1 passed easily, criticizing Moroc-
. c;upation of the western Sahara
i filing for direct negotiation
n the Polisario and Morocco
; to self-determination and "in-
36 lence." By referring to "independ-
» ind to the Polisario as "repre-
ive of the people of the western
i< I," it seemed to us that this
iOition prejudged the issue and to
iegree contradicted the Wisemen
mendation for a referendum
( would allow the inhabitants of
istern Sahara to express their
nireferences.
he Moroccans offered a resolution
supported the initiatives of the
U.S., Israel
Settle Claim on
U.S.S. Liberty
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT,
DEC. 17, 1980'
The U.S. Government has accepted the
proposal by the Government of Israel
to pay $6 million in three annual install-
ments of $2 million each, beginning on
January 15, 1981, as final settlement of
the U.S. claim for compensation for
damage to the U.S.S. Liberty as a
result of actions of the Israeli Armed
Forces on June 8, 1967.
The Government of Israel paid in
full in 1968 the U.S. claim for $3,323,500
on behalf of the families of the crew-
men who were killed in the incident,
and in 1969 the Government of Israel
paid in full the U.S. claim for $3,452,275
for injuries sustained by the members
of the Liberty's crew.
^Read to news correspondents by
Department spokesman John Trattner. ■
Wisemen Committee. We would have
liked to have seen specific reference to
the core elements of the Wisemen's rec-
ommendations. However, in a statement
the Moroccan delegate said: "Morocco is
cooperating and will continue to coop-
erate diligently with the ad hoc commit-
tee to implement its mandate of Free-
town, particularly as it relates to the
free choice of the population." We con-
sidered this statement a significant
step forward and, on the basis of it,
supported the Moroccan draft resolu-
tion.
Future Prospects for Negotiation
Although the Moroccan draft resolution
was defeated by one vote, we followed
up with bilateral discussions with both
the Moroccans and Algerians to explore
how the recommendations of the Wise-
men Committee could be implemented.
We have also sought to elicit from
various members of the OAU their sug-
gestions for maintaining the momentum
set in train by the September resolu-
tions of the OAU Wisemen Committee.
There are a number of questions which
might be usefully addressed in this
regard. How would a referendum be
carried out? How would one establish
voting eligibility? Which institutions
would be best equipped to carry out a
referendum? Would it be useful for the
OAU to establish a subcommittee of
experts to work out some of these
details?
We do not embrace any particular
solution to the conflict, although the
OAU call for a cease-fire and a referen-
dum does appear to us as a useful basis
upon which to move forward. As a
result of my discussions with interested
and concerned parties, I note a height-
ened interest in accelerating the peace
process. Compared with the situation a
year ago, I believe that we can take
some satisfaction in the progress that
has been made.
• The interested parties have
met with the OAU subcommittee.
• The complexities involved in
reaching a peaceful solution have been
brought out more clearly.
• The OAU has laid down general
principles which could serve as the
basis for a settlement.
• And most important, the inter-
ested parties seem to have come to an
awareness of the urgency of embarking
on negotiations as the only way out of a
stalemate on the battlefield.
Nevertheless, the principal parties
remain far apart on their demands. We
believe a process of peace is required to
bring about a convergence of views.
Military Situation
While the military situation in the past
year has improved for the Moroccans
and they appear able to hold their con-
trol of the principal towns in the west-
ern Sahara, Polisario attacks continue.
Thus the war of attrition continues
without any indication that either side
has reason to hope for a military vic-
tory.
We have been particularly con-
cerned about Polisario attacks deep into
Morocco's southern provinces which in
some instances could have shifted the
locus of the fighting toward the
Moroccan-Algerian border. In talks
with both Algeria and the Polisario, we
have attempted to discourage especially
attacks outside of the disputed terri-
tory. There are some indications that
our concern has been fruitful. Reports
of increased Polisario movement in
Mauritania and the role of Libya are
also of concern to us. We do not believe
that either Morocco or the Polisario has
won — or can win — a decisive advantage
on the battlefield. Therefore, our
iry 1981
55
OCEANS
original premise that the war is unwin-
able in any ultimate sense is still
valid. That fact, of course, should be an
added incentive for encouraging the
interested parties to reach a compro-
mise settlement.
Status of U.S. Arms Sales to Morocco
I would like to end my remarks with a
few comments on the status of U.S.
arms deliveries to Morocco. With
regard to the arms package which was
approved earlier this year, consisting of
6 OV-10 reconnaissance aircraft, 20
F5-E fighter aircraft, and 24 heli-
copters, none of these items has yet
been delivered to Morocco. There is
some question whether the Moroccans
are still interested in the purchase of
the helicopters, and a delivery schedule
is still pending. The first fighter air-
craft deliveries should commence in
mid-1982. Morocco has made a request
for the sale of 108 M-60 tanks, and it is
under review in the Department.
Conclusion
The western Sahara conflict is a com-
plex issue in which our North African
friends are themselves divided. It is our
hope that the United States will con-
tinue its role of encouraging the inter-
ested parties to concentrate on the
negotiating process itself and that out
of the give and take which such a proc-
ess involves, a compromise settlement
will emerge.
'The complete transcript of the hearings
will be published by the committee and will
be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■
Law of the Sea
by George H. Aldrich
Address before the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers in San Fran-
cisco on December 9, 1980. Mr. Aldrich
is Acting Special Representative of the
President for the Law of the Sea Con-
ference.
In the course of my present assignment,
I have met many Americans who are
involved in one way or another with our
mineral industry or are concerned
about our future access to minerals.
These have not all been the most
friendly of encounters, despite the fact
that I share many of these concerns.
Often I find myself facing questions as
to why we have permitted our future
access to the mineral resources of the
deep seabeds to become hostage to a
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea.
The clear implication of many of these
questions and the comments that often
accompany them is that our govern-
ment, either through naivete or duplic-
ity, is playing fast and loose with our
economic security in order to curry fa-
vor with the Third World. While I am
sure that none of you share any of
these delusions, the purpose of my re-
marks today is to explain why they are
delusions— just in case.
To understand the effort in which
we are engaged in the Law of the Sea
Conference and our goals with respect
to deep seabed mining, it is necessary
to review, at least briefly, both the his-
tory of the efforts since the Second
World War to codify and develop the
international law governing uses of the
oceans and the legal problems and re-
quirements of a pioneer industry facing
up to the task of exploiting the mineral
resources of one of the world's common
areas, the seabeds beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. In a very real
sense, it is the interaction of these two
lines of development and their not eas-
ily compatible imperatives that defines
our present struggle to obtain assured
access to seabed resources as part of a
comprehensive treaty on the law of the
sea.
Historical Background
Postwar efforts to develop and codify
the international law of the sea have
resulted in three U.N. conferences. The
first produced four conventions adopted
in 1958— one concerning the high sea8;|:i'
another the Continental Shelf; a third. f*
the territorial sea and contiguous zom::
and the fourth, fishing and the conser ,
vation of the living resources of the pi
high seas. The second U.N. conference C'
failed, in 1960, to reach agreement on
the major question before it — the ma):
imum permissible breadth of the terri
torial sea. The third conference is no»|ii(
in its eighth year and, if successful, wi in
establish a new and comprehensive le-fcli
gal regime for the oceans. u;
Let us pause a moment to conside
why the nations of the world have
needed three successive conferences ai •:
why, even after all this effort, success,
although likely, is still in the future.
The 1958 conventions were desigmjtj,
in part to bring an end to "creeping jt ftl
risdiction," the steady expansion of
claims by coastal states to exercise ju ;
risdiction off their coasts. To be sue- At
cessful, they would have to have been iifc|
generally accepted or at least complia i/t.
with by most, if not all, coastal states '-
and they would have to have imposed
limits on the breadth of the territoria
sea and on the extent of the jurisdicti
that could be exercised by coastal
states. Unfortunately, they failed on a
counts, and the years since 1958 have
seen a steady growth of coastal state
claims of sovereign rights, particular!
over offshore resources.
The High Seas Convention, which
was the most widely accepted of the
four 1958 conventions, has only 56
states party to it, whereas there are 1
states participating in the third U.N.
conference. Almost all of the major
maritime powers became party to tha
convention, but most of the coastal
states stayed out and led the fight for
expanded jurisdiction.
For the United States, maritime
freedoms have historically been more
important than offshore resources. In
the past 35 years, however, the United
States has become increasingly aware
of the importance of the natural re-
sources off its coasts: first, of the oil
and gas under the Continental Shelf
and, more recently, of the coastal
fisheries. Nevertheless, despite these ii
creasing concerns with our offshore
resources, the United States remained ,
very much aware of its dependence on j
the unimpeded passage of ocean com-
56
Department of State Bullet.
hI
Oceans
and of its security needs for free-
f naval navigation and overflight
jhout the oceans, including the
t of straits. Our increasing and
iunate dependence on imports of
a oil have reinforced these needs,
the late 1960s, the United States
with the Soviet Union and some
emajor maritime powers to pro-
■{•enewed efforts by the United Na-
is develop and codify the law of
J a in ways that would be univer-
'yiccepted and would effectively
to an end the rapid expansion of
_. 1 state jurisdiction. Simulta-
ou y, other voices in the United
)tiis were calling for international-
iti 1 of ocean space beyond national
siction. These separate efforts re-
( in the establishment, first, of a
.■J. leabed Committee and, subse-
er y, of the Third U.N. Conference
ti Law of the Sea.
lis third conference quickly de-
j& :hat the convention it hoped to
■jc ;e would be comprehensive —
eai ig all aspects of the law of the
ea I. Unlike the conventions of 1958,
^i< divided the subject into discrete
te ries, the new law was to be a
icige deal" dealing with navigation,
so ces, pollution, and international
.ej ons. While this made the nego-
iti ; task harder by requiring success
1 a fronts, it tended to insure that
e suits would be accepted univer-
.!1; The coastal states would agree to
le .vigational protections and the
Tii tion of territorial seas to 12 miles
b adth in return for the recognition
s other states of 200-mile economic
iw and all states would feel com-
?ll to become parties in order to
iri ipate in the new international or-
ini ition created to manage the re-
u] is of the deep seabeds, which were
^vi d the national jurisdiction and
' had been declared by the U.N.
al Assembly in December 1970, by
a mous resolution, to be "the com-
01 leritage of mankind." This is how
e larch began for the comprehensive
ai age deal."
-!a ;d Mining's Special Problems
let us turn our attention to the
i\ problems of resource recovery
-II an area beyond national jurisdic-
uind the alternatives available to us
( iling with such an area, which we
as refer to as a part of the commons
■ 1 ; world— that is, those areas be-
r the jurisdiction of any nation
i available for the use of all.
These commons are: first, the
oceans, including the bottom of the
oceans— that is the seabeds— beyond
the limit of national jurisdiction; sec-
ond, outer space, above the limits of na-
tional jurisdiction (wherever that may
be); and third, Antarctica, although one
must note that some states have still
preserved their territorial claims to
parts of Antarctica under the Antarctic
Treaty regime which has made it possi-
ble to continue scientific activity in
Antarctica without resolving disputes
over the legal status of that territory.
These common areas, particularly the
oceans and outer space, have been re-
ferred to as the "common
heritage of mankind," but there is
nothing magic in the name; it is their
location beyond the jurisdiction of any
nation that gives them their special
characteristics.
There are, in my judgment, only
two ways of treating these common ar-
eas for legal purposes: Either we can
consider them available for national ap-
propriation, like North and South
America in the 15th to 18th centuries,
and Africa in the 19th century, or we
must consider them not available for
national appropriation, like the high
seas since at least the days of Hugo
Grotius.
The United States, along with vir-
tually all other states, has given consis-
tent support to the second of these legal
approaches during all the years since
the end of the Second World War. We
have done this, it is fair to say, because
we were convinced that this was the
better approach in our own interests
and in the interests of world order and
the avoidance of unnecessary conflict.
Difficulties in the use of the world's
commons are likely to arise only when
some states want to exploit some of the
resources of these common areas. There
has been exploitation of the living re-
sources of the high seas for many years
without major difficulty, although it has
been found necessary to create a num-
ber of international organizations to co-
ordinate conservation efforts such as
the protection of marine mammals.
Significant problems, however, arise
wherever exclusivity of access to a par-
ticular site becomes necessary. By
definition, an area beyond national ju-
risdiction is one to which no national
authority can accord such exclusive
rights. With respect to the resources of
the seabeds, although in our view they
are available, like fish, to all states on a
first-come, first-served basis, as a prac-
tical, economic matter, that simply isn't
good enough for seabed miners. Miners
the world over and their bankers re-
quire an exclusive right to an ore body
before investing in the recovery and
processing of the ore. It seems clear
that considerations of this type would
force the deferral of mining activities
in these seabed areas until exclusive ac-
cess to particular sites could be ac-
corded. I think it is self-evident that
where exclusivity of access is essential
in areas beyond national jurisdiction it
can only be conferred by international
agreement among at least most of the
interested states.
This fundamental point may have
been somewhat obscured by the con-
gressional debates of recent years on
seabed mining legislation; and there
may be some, particularly in the Con-
gress, who really believe that the en-
actment of the legislation in June of
this year will result, without more, in a
rush of investment and the early ex-
ploitation of deep seabed resources.
Certainly the enactment of the legis-
lation gave an important psychological
boost to the fledgling industry, and we
are hopeful it will encourage the con-
tinuation of further necessary research
and development efforts. But I have
seen nothing to indicate that this
legislation — even when supplemented
by similar and reciprocal legislation by
other states with the greatest present
interest in seabed mining— would pro-
vide a sufficient legal framework to per-
mit the industry to move forward
quickly to commercial production. This
is not to suggest that commercial recov-
ery of deep seabed mineral resources
will never occur if an international re-
gime capable of granting exclusive li-
censes is not created. Never is a long
time. But it does seem almost certain to
me that the failure to create such an
international regime would long delay
seabed mining, perhaps by a quarter
century or more. If there is a substan-
tial risk that this judgment is correct,
then there should be no doubt about the
urgent need for an acceptable inter-
national legal regime for the ex-
ploitation of deep seabed minerals.
Seabeds and the "Package Deal"
Since 1970, a key part of the search for
the "package deal" in the Seabed Com-
mittee and in the conference itself has
been the terribly complex effort to cre-
ate a new international organization —
the International Seabed Authority— to
regulate access to seabed mineral re-
jary 1981
57
Oceans
sources and to provide the exclusive le-
gal right that prospective miners need.
In fact, this turned out to be the most
elusive of the necessary elements of an
acceptable "package deal." The vital
freedoms of navigation and overflight in
straits, exclusive economic zones, and
archipelagic waters have been agreed
for years. The final compromises on the
nature and limits of coastal state juris-
diction over the resources of the
200-mile economic zone and the Con-
tinental Shelf and the control of marine
pollution were hammered out sometime
ago. However, only last summer were
the last major issues settled with re-
spect to the seabed mining regime. Only
now is it possible to reach meaningful
conclusions about the emerging seabed
regime.
The time available today does not
permit me to summarize all of the ele-
ments of the seabed regime as found in
the new draft convention. I have de-
cided to concentrate on those provisions
dealing with access to seabed mineral
resources— the provisions that tell the
potential investor what steps he would
have to take, and the provisions he
must analyze to determine what risks
he would run and what are the chances
of something going wrong with his
access.
There is one point I must empha-
size at the outset of this summary. It is
patently impossible to negotiate at a
conference of some 150 countries and to
include in a treaty all the detailed rules
and regulations necessary to insure the
proper functioning of the International
Seabed Authority. The preparation of
these rules, regulations, and procedures
will be the task of a Preparatory Com-
mission, to be established soon after
the treaty is signed and to work full
time for several years. Industry will
have to be intimately involved in this
process, and the work done by industry
and the Department of Commerce dur-
ing the coming year under our recently
enacted Deep Seabed Hard Minerals
Act should give us a great advantage in
that Preparatory Commission. The
rules developed there can be changed by
the Authority later only if there is a
consensus in the 36-nation Council. Any
final judgments by the United States on
the acceptability and viability of the
treaty's mining regime must await
these rules.
Assured Access
To be assured of access to the oppor-
tunity to engage in deep seabed mining,
a prospective miner who has the neces-
sary capital and know-how must be as-
sured that the International Seabed
Authority's contract approval process is
fair, clear, and well-nigh automatic.
The criteria spelled out in Annex III of
the treaty satisfy this requirement. An
applicant has only to be sponsored by a
state party and to satisfy the financial
and technical qualifications spelled out
in the regulations. His plan of work
must fulfill the specifications with re-
spect to such matters as size of area,
diligence requirements, and mining
standards and practices, including those
relevant to protection of the marine en-
vironment, that will also be set forth in
the regulations. If these requirements
are met, his plan of work miist be ap-
proved; there is no discretionary basis
for its rejection.
The determination that the appli-
cant and his plan of work do in fact
comply with these criteria is the job of
the Legal and Technical Commission.
The Commission will have 15 members
elected to 5-year terms by a three-
fourths vote of the 36-member Council
from among candidates nominated by
states parties who meet the "highest
standard of competence and integrity
with qualifications in relevant fields."
The Commission is obligated to base its
recommendations solely on the pro-
visions of Annex III and to report fully
to the Council. The majority required
for decisions by the Commission is to
be established in the rules, regulations,
and procedures of the Authority, and
I expect our representatives on the
Preparatory Commission to insist that
this must be no more than a simple
majority.
Any plan of work which the Com-
mission finds consistent with the re-
quirements of Annex III will be deemed
approved by the Council within a fixed
time unless the Council decides— by
consensus— to disapprove it. While we
would have preferred the "deeming" de-
vice to apply regardless of the Commis-
sion's findings, the Conference—
understandably, I think— felt that some
organ of the Authority would have to
attest to conformity with the applicable
standards of Annex III. Doubtless this
would also have been true of the simple
licensing system originally advocated
by the industrial countries. The auto-
maticity of the system could only be
frustrated if three-fourths of the men
bers of the Council make a conscious
and determined effort to elect unsuit-
able Commission members who will i(
nore the requirements of the treaty.
The Production Ceiling
Although we were able to get agree-
ment in Geneva that approval of a pi
of work should no longer be tied to th
availability of a nickel production all(
ment, the timing of access still depen
on the authorization of production un
der the ceiling. Certainly from an eco
nomic point of view it makes no sens(
to limit arbitrarily production of a m
eral from one source and not from otl
ers. There is no reason to believe thai
seabed resources will be cheaper to re
cover and refine than land-based
resources— quite the opposite, at leasi
during the first several decades in
which the seabed minerals industry is*
developing. But even if they were
cheaper, why shouldn't we let them
take over markets from the more ex-
pensive competition? Consumers de-
serve a break; they seem to get few
enough these days.
Unfortunately, however, we are
trying to produce a universal treaty-
one that will be accepted by virtually
all coastal and maritime nations, and
that large group includes a number o;
countries that produce either nickel,
copper, cobalt, or manganese, and an
additional number that think they
might become producers in the not-to
distant future. Those countries must,
they are to accept the Law of the Sea
Convention, be able to show that thei:
producer interests are protected, at
least for an interim period. Moreover,
the interest of most developing coun-
tries as consumers is minimal, for the
do not yet have the industry to be ma
jor consumers. Most developing coun-
tries tend to sympathize with and be
protective of raw material producers,
tendency that has been encouraged ar
fully by Canada, the leading nickel pr
ducer. Thus, it has long been clear ths
there could not be a generally accepte
Law of the Sea Convention that does
not contain an interim production ceil
ing. As now formulated, the productio
ceiling is not likely to bar access for .
any qualified miner. The amount of pe
mitted production is substantial, a
"floor" has been added, and the con-
straint on seabed production is limitec
in duration.
58
Department of State Bullet
SOUTH ASIA
Because the formula in the text is
ad on a projection forward of past
lids, it is impossible to predict ex-
;r' what level of production will be
Ived during the 15 years the limit
in effect, apply. But on the basis of
Bureau of Mines' mid-range
action of the growth in nickel con-
ntion during the balance of this
•iry (3.4%) and the earliest prac-
ile start-up date for commercial
■fuction (1988), the first group of
i Ts to apply for production author-
lans could produce annually an ag-
nate of about 200,000 tons of nickel,
eafter, the limit for the industry as
ole would increase so that after 5
. in 1992, 320,000 tons could be
jced; after 10 years, 490,000 tons;
i ifter 15 years, 590,000.
n fact, the 15-year trend line
th rate for nickel consumption is
rntly about 3.9%, and if that rate
»: extended into the future, the ton-
i allowed to seabed mining would be
- derably higher. If future growth
d turn out to be lower than antici-
I, the full effect of the drop would
e felt because of the "floor" pro-
1 in the formula. This substitutes a
num 3% growth rate for any act-
i ite lower than 3%. Even if the
■ th rate fell as low as 2.2%, seabed
i !i rs could— if they thought they
u make money in the kind of eco-
r : climate implied by such a dis-
iU ging trend— still supply up to 18%
. t ; nickel market in the first year of
ii'o iction and up to 36% by the 15th
!> a Notwithstanding the share of
iction taken up by the Enterprise,
I alone or in joint ventures, there
iiHi still be sufficient tonnage under
iji easonable set of assumptions to
*i e that private miners would get
e authorizations when they need
e . It is thus probable that market
■I 3, not the production limitation
1 ala, will determine how much
:i 1 and, therefore, how much copper,
o:t, and manganese, will be produced
'e first generation of seabed mining
t eabed mining is a pioneering ven-
( «So too is the effort of the world
miunity to base the structure of a
" nternational seabed regime on the
sition that the global commons
u subject to the jurisdiction of
tate. It has been a difficult under-
i g, the building of this structure,
Soviet Invasion
of Afghanistan
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,
DEC. 24, 1980 '
One year has passed since the Soviet
Union launched its brutal assault on its
small, nonaligned neighbor, Afghani-
stan. On December 27, 1979, Soviet
paratroopers seized key Afghan institu-
tions in Kabul, including the Presiden-
tial Palace, where President Amin was
then killed. The Soviets installed a pup-
pet government under the nominal
leadership of Babrak Karmal, who was
in the Soviet Union at the time.
The tragedy that has continued to
unfold in Afghanistan over the past 12
months weighs heavily on all Ameri-
cans. We have watched the Soviet
Armed Forces employ massive fire-
power and increasingly brutal tactics.
We have seen the ranks of Afghan
refugees fleeing devastation and
political and religious oppression at
home swell to more than 1.2 million in
Pakistan alone. And amid this g^im
spectacle, we have been heartened to
witness the brave resistance of the
Afghan people, who have continued
their struggle for independence and the
right to determine their own political
future.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and attempted forceful occupation of
that fiercely independent, nonaligned,
Muslim nation has had a profoundly
negative impact on the international
community. An overwhelming majority
of member states of the United Nations
demanded the immediate withdrawal of
foreign troops from Afghanistan in a
special General Assembly session in
January 1980. An increased majority
reiterated this demand following care-
ful General Assembly consideration of
the Afghanistan issue last month. The
40-member Islamic conference has been
particularly forceful in condemning
Soviet actions and in seeking an appro-
priate political solution. If the Soviet
leaders expected that the world would
avert its eyes and quickly forget their
aggression in Afghanistan, they have
been disappointed.
We urge the Soviet Union to re-
spond to those nations urging with-
drawal of Soviet military forces and
inviting Soviet cooperation in the
search for a political solution to the
Afghan crisis. For our part, we have of-
fered to join in the effort to find a
political solution involving a Soviet
withdrawal, and we repeat that offer
today. The suffering of the Afghan peo-
ple must be brought to an end.
The Afghan people and their strug-
gle have not been forgotten and will
not be forgotten by the rest of the
world. We call on the Soviet Union to
work with us and others in finding a
way to bring peace to that tormented
nation.
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Dec. 29, 1980.
the most difficult I have ever been a
part of. But the same pioneering spirit
and the same confidence in the future
that have brought seabed mining and
the seabed mining regime so close to
reality can also assure a harmonious
relationship between the two. And we
must not forget that the recovery of
seabed mineral resources is not only
important as a potential source of min-
erals; it is also the remaining linchpin
in the whole Law of the Sea
Convention— the last major item in the
long sought "package deal." Given the
distance we have come and the inter-
ests at stake in the success of this vast
undertaking, we cannot fail to finish
the job. Pioneering ventures are
difficult enough in a stable legal order.
Without law— without this new compre-
hensive legal system for the oceans-
seabed mining will be only one of the
victims of the more chaotic and danger-
ous world that would result. This we
cannot permit. ■
Jary 1981
59
UNITED NATIONS
The United Nations and U.S. Policy
by Richard L. McCaU
Address before the Harvard Model
United Nations in Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts, on December i, 1980. Mr.
McCallis Assistant Secretary for Inter-
national Organization Affairs.
Pollsters have taken a pretty bad
shellacking lately — they, therefore,
may not be the most authoritative
source to establish my basic premise
for this discussion. The point is, how-
ever, that contrary to conventional
wisdom, public perception does support
the notion that there is room for the
United Nations in American foreign
policy. According to recent polls by
Gallup and Roper, Americans by a
two-to-one margin want to increase
U.S. participation in the U.N. system.
Nonetheless, the consumers of
conventional wisdom continue to pur-
port that American public support for
the United Nations is on the decline
and, accordingly, we ought to be
reducing our financial assistance to
the U.N. family. In dollars and cents
terms, these advocates of retrench-
ment have succeeded to a considerable
extent. Thirty years ago, the United
States contributed almost one-half
(47.5%) of the United Nations'
budget. Today, our share is only
25.6%, a little over $1 billion, about
$4 for each American — less than what
each of us spent to see the movie
"Apocalypse Now."
Along with this less than adequate
performance, outlays for programs,
such as foreign aid, which are critical
in creating a more harmonious inter-
national community, have also declined
over time and in comparison with
other countries. For example, in the
past 15 years, the net U.S. official
development assistance decreased
from 0.49% of our GNP to 0.17%. In
contrast, the total development as-
sistance effort of other traditional aid-
giving countries has increased five-
fold during the same period.
Why the discrepancy between our
professed beliefs and our willingness
to provide adequate financial resources
which would reinforce these beliefs?
There are probably lists of rea-
sons for it, none of them fully explana-
tory but each of them sufficient to
raise doubts. Perhaps in its genesis,
we have ascribed greater hopes to the
United Nations than it could possibly
fulfill in our lifetimes. Idealistic meas-
uring sticks are bad bases for judg-
ment.
The U.N.'8 Record
Almost 30 years ago when the United
Nations was created, it was seen as
the great global instrument that would
banish forever the scourge of war.
Since then, there have been at least
five major military conflicts on the
average every year. As we celebrate
the 35th anniversary of the United
Nations' founding, a war is going on
unabated between Iraq and Iran, vio-
lent conflicts continue in at least four
areas in Africa, direct Soviet, or
Soviet-backed, military interventions
violate the sovereignty of three coun-
tries in Asia, and civil strife has
taken 8,000 lives in El Salvador this
year alone. Annually, the woi-ld spends
over $400 billion on armaments and
as many as 35 countries (and even
terrorist groups) could have nuclear
weapons by the end of this century.
Thirty years ago nations pledged
to adhere to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. Today there are
some 16 million refugees, one-fourth
of this Earth's population is mal-
nourished, and millions face starva-
tion. Torture and imprisonment have
remained convenient tools of govern-
ance irrespective of race, religion, or
sex.
The United Nations has had a
checkered history in the peaceful
resolution of conflicts. It was either
impotent to act, as in the cases of re-
peated Soviet aggression in Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan, or
fearing impotency did not even get
involved, as in the case of recent
African wars. It has become bogged
down in negotiations on the global
economy, and its impact on global arms
control is more exhortatory than real.
For a country that has placed so
much faith in the imperatives of
world order, that has spent so much
effort and sacrificed so much for it —
these are indeed legitimate causes for
disappointment. It is not surprising
then that the majority of Americans
are critical of the United Nations —
53% according to the polls — for fall
short of their hopes and expectation
about resolving international
problems.
Falling short, however, is not tl
same as failure. As we acknowledge,!
shortcomings — serious shortcomin]
— let us also be mindful of certain
facts and salient achievements.
The United Nations has becomi
truly universal organization. Its me
bership, tripling since its founding,
now numbers 154 nations. Its budgi
has increased 16 times; its agenda \
grown by leaps and bounds to encoir
pass practically all aspects of inter-
national behavior. The General As-
sembly, which was once an annual
affair, has become for all practical
purposes — counting all the special ai
emergency sessions and full membei
ship conferences — a year-round
meeting. The Security Council, whic
had fallen into such disuse in the
1950s, meeting 5 or 10 times a year,
now meets on the average of 100 tiir^
a year.
The United Nations has become
the source of innovative measures tt
reduce international tensions. Peace
keeping forces — not even envisionec
the original charter — are in place in
Cyprus and the Middle East. These
forces have prevented local conflicts
from festering into major wars and
have been some of the United Natior
least heralded success stories.
The United Nations has had a
steady, calming, and steering presen-
in the greatest transformation of thi
political geography of this Earth —
aiding formerly colonialized people t
achieve independence without major
conflicts and in a relatively orderly
fashion.
The United Nations' purview ov
what constitutes threats to collective
security has expanded to include glob
economic security. At the present, al-
most 90% of its resources are devotei
to this task — to development, to
environmental protection, to interna-
tional trade, finance, investment, and
to other measures of economic, social,
cultural, and scientific cooperation.
Through its specialized agencies and
programs, the United Nations has in-
creased concessional assistance to
developing countries in the past decac
60
Department of State Bullet:
United Nations
t
fiii
less than $500 million to over
illion. Together with the multi-
al development banks (such as the
Id Bank and the regional banks)
s been the channel for the growth
it flow of resources to the Third
d from less than $1 billion to
Fillion annually in that same period.
The United Nations has had a
■ering role in setting standards
A ules that make the life of all of
ore secure, healthier and better —
iternational aviation; in communi-
tns; in the protection of the envi-
ent ; in the husbandry of our
rees in the deep seas and in
space; in the promotion of health
lards ; and in the entire range of
ction of civil, political, social,
: ral, and economic rights.
The list is almost endless, and
: ^uch selective illustrations I have
bly failed to mention some very
tant ones. There is little question
he United Nations has become
■ntral forum for diplomatic
tives of many small countries;
hrough its direct and joint over-
development efforts it has trans-
•d formerly "basket case" coun-
le into food sufficient states. It has
:ei I major facilitator for American
I ment and export, and its net-
'>f solidarity among labor
■ gave birth to concrete meas-
i2! make life better for the
">r Ts. And perhaps more than any
international institution it has
sf ully promoted women's rights,
uch is not a record of failure.
J ot, however, want to dwell too
? n what the United Nations has
ni )r failed to do in making my
ir about the challenges we must
mt today and in the future. The
I Nations will certainly remain
a !na of conflict between East and
^sas it has also come center stage
:1 continuing dialogue between
" and South. Yet it must also
I' a springboard for our collec-
I'orts to address the common
■ms which this entire planet
in the decades ahead. Permit me
II focus on the critical role of the
'1 Nations in the context of the
West rivalry, the North-South
inships, and in light of the
!'■ ects we hold for the future.
East-West Relations
The past year bore witness to porten-
tous events in world affairs, events that
have neither run their full course nor
are they as yet fully predictable in
their outcome. We see the flagrant
violation of the most elementary norms
of international diplomatic practice
and decency in Tehran; the naked
aggression against the people of
Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos;
the unceasing armed conflicts in the
Horn of Africa; war and renewed
threats to peace in the Middle East;
and the current crisis in Poland. Each
of these events has posed and will con-
tinue to pose major obstacles in the
path of reasoned relationships between
the Soviet Union and the United States.
Each event in direct or in subtle
ways affects or is affected by the state
of relationships between the two giant
nuclear powers. We need not be so
Pollyannaish as to presume that global
interests always coincide with ours,
but we need not be so simple-minded,
either, as to assert that every threat to
our interest is automatically a net gain
for the Soviets.
The recent Soviet globetrotting
from Angola to Grenada does not
exactly reveal great success for their
brand of adventurism. Nor does the
emergence of numerous and busy
Russian advisers in the area, now
called the are of crisis, suggest the tip
of the iceberg of some grand plan of
world domination. It does, however,
point to the Soviet propensity of
opportunism : to take advantage of the
opportunities created by the correla-
tion of forces and to extend their
sphere of influence.
In the coming years, I am sure,
there will be a lot of rethinking and
debate about the appropriate Ameri-
can foreign policy stance toward such
Soviet behavior. One thing is, how-
ever, certain; we will either have to
confront them at a point or place of
their own choosing — once they are
already on the move — or, alternately,
work for a world order in which the
correlation of forces does not favor
them.
Which appi'oach is more expen-
sive, more risky, I leave to your imag-
ination and common sense. Today we
spend about 5% of our GNP on de-
fense purposes and there are persua-
sive arguments to increase this to
7%. At the same time, we devote less
than 0.05% of our GNP to the United
Nations, and there are some who
consider even this little amount to be
too much. But the arguments about
the appropriate level of defense spend-
ing is not my issue here. My point is
that it is reasonable to assume that a
stronger United Nations would be
more capable of dealing with political
upheavals and tensions.
In several recent instances, the
United Nations has proven to be the
preferred instrument with sufficient
international support to lead the
search for political solutions to inter-
national problems. In each case, this
approach also closed the door on Soviet
mischief.
• The United Nations provided
the mechanism through which a peace-
ful resolution was found to the chal-
lenge of majority rule and independ-
ence for Zimbabwe.
• The Security Council resolu-
tions laid the basis for the successful
Camp David negotiations leading to-
ward greater peace between Egypt and
Israel.
• Continuing efforts for the
peaceful settlement of disputes in
southern Africa, specifically Namibia,
could not go forward without the
leading role of the United Nations.
I do not intend to suggest that the
United Nations can always act as a
great buffer against Soviet designs.
Realism dictates that we accept the
limits imposed on the United Nations'
ability to act in every case. But I do
suggest that the United Nations can
have a tempering influence on Soviet
behavior and can serve, as it has
served in the past, as a forum of
diplomatic initiative to avoid direct
East- West confrontations.
North-South Dialogue
In 1945, the United States emerged
indisputably as the most powerful and
influential nation on Earth. We shaped
the United Nations in our own image
and likeness and provided for it the
necessary economic muscle. Over time,
we were the principal architect of the
International Monetary Fund to in-
sure monetary order and stability; of
the World Bank to promote the recon-
struction of Europe and economic
growth all over the world ; and of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade to stimulate world trade.
Iiaru 1Qft1
United Nations
For a while these worked ideally.
We commanded the primary influence
because the United States accounted
for 60% of the world's industrial pro-
duction and 50% of its monetary
reserves. But this is no longer the
case. Only 30% of the world's indus-
trial production and less than 7% of
its monetary reserves are ours today.
Western Europe and Japan have
emerged as major and competitive
economic powers. Cartels, such as the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), drastically re-
wrote the rules of global economy.
And a new bloc of nations, the Third
World, emerged demanding a fairer
share and a greater voice in the world
economy.
It is this new bloc, comprised of
the developing countries, that com-
mands majorities in the United Na-
tions and demands attention to its
own priority — a new international
economic order. It wants systemic
changes in the world monetary sys-
tem, greater resource transfers from
the industrialized countries, better
access to technology, and a greater
voice in international economic deci-
sion making.
The developing countries' de-
mands do not always make economic
sense, but there is a ring of justice in
their call. After all, they comprise a
substantial majority of the world's
population but receive only 15% of
the global income. Yet they are vitally
important to the industrialized coun-
tries. The dependence of the North on
the oil supplies from the South only
dramatizes but does not complete the
picture of how mutually dependent —
indeed interdependent — we have be-
come. And the dynamics of this inter-
dependence also imply a condition of
mutual vulnerability which begs for
intensive search and drastic resolution
of the outstanding differences.
The welfare, progress, and eco-
nomic stability of these developing
countries have become critically im-
portant to the West and to the United
States. Our trade with the Third
World surpasses that with Western
Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union.
The United States sells one-third of
its exports to developing nations, and
they supply 42% of our imports.
Approximately 1 million American
jobs depend on U.S. exports to these
countries, as does one quarter of our
agricultural productivity. We have
more than $40 billion in investment
riding on the fortunes of the develop-
ing world.
This is why we press continu-
ously, in a spirit of compromise, for
agreement in the current round of glo-
bal negotiations. And this is again
why the United Nations has become an
indispensable forum for the rich as
well as the poor countries to fashion
international institutions that are
capable of responding to the growing
global economic crises.
Global 2000 Report
This year saw the publication of two
important studies dealing with our
future. These studies, the Brandt
Commission's Programme for Survival
and the Global 2000 Report to the
President of the United States, are
not for the faint-hearted. They both
diagnose the current state of global
economy and ecology as dismal. The
prognoses are identical — the worst i
yet to come.
I could cite dozens of other
studies. They all point to the same
conclusion, and they all urge unprec
edented global cooperation as the on
way to avoid global catastrophe. Yet
am struck by the fact of how the
glaringly obvious has failed to pene
trate our collective psyche, how obli
ous we continue to remain in the fac
of the clear and present danger that
world hunger and poverty present t
our countries, to our economic pros-
perity, and to our freedoms.
We are hurtling toward a futui
world population of 2^/2 billion mon
U.S. Participation
intheU.N., 1979
MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,
JAN. 7, 19811
I am pleased to transmit to the Congress
this report of the activities of the United
States Government in the United Nations
and its affiliated agencies during calendar
year 1979.
The international crisis created by the
seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran
and the taking of Americans hostage over-
shadowed much of the 34th General
Assembly. In this atmosphere, the United
States directed its efforts in the United
Nations toward supporting the work of the
Secretary General and the Security Council
to resolve this breach of international law.
The Secretary General brought the issue to
the Council which unanimously called upon
the Government of Iran to release the
hostages. Ironically, after three years of
negotiations, the Assembly adopted by con-
sensus the Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages. This Convention affirms that
there is no valid excuse for the taking of
hostages and that there are no circumstances
under which the seizure of hostages can be
condoned.
Both the Security Council and the
General Assembly focused international
attention on the continued military occupa-
tion of Kampuchea by Vietnam. Of particular
note during 1979 was the Security Council's
termination of sanctions against Southern
Rhodesia, a result of the agreement by the
Lancaster House Conference.
On economic issues, UN actions ranged
from highly technical meetings such as those
on commodities, to continuing the work ol
the International Monetary Fund and to
political discussions in the General Assem
on the future of international economy an
development.
These discussions, attended by almos
all UN members, saw a continuous, intern
and sometimes acrimonious series of ex- ^
changes between the developed and devem
ing countries on the organization of the '
international economic relations, and the
effects of both on economic development.
This resulted in the decision by the 34tb
General Assembly to hold further meetini ^
on these issues. We believe that negotiati
of this kind and at this level are importao
and necessary to relations between devel-
oped and developing countries. However,
whether the U.S. participates in these glo
negotiations will depend on how effective!
we use but do not intrude upon the agenc
of the UN and other international organiz
tions.
The United States continues to monit
closely UN expenditures and programs an
supports the Secretary General's efforts t
limit budget growth.
Our participation in the United Natio
and its related agencies and programs is »
integral part of our foreign policy. As this
report makes clear, the United Nations
system of organizations is important and
sometimes indispensable to the achieveme
of many of our central foreign policy objec
tives. This report should contribute to
American understanding of and support fo
the United Nations and to the continuing
active and constructive role of the United
States.
Jimmy Cabtis
'Text from Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents of Jan. 12, 1981. 1
62
Department of State Bullet|
United Nations
pie than inhabit the Earth today,
t of them destined to live in the
rest countries, with per capita in-
les hovering at a level of abject
erty, with arable land running out,
1 forests receding, fresh waters
lii.ppearing, and deserts expanding.
Today, one-third of humanity
its in the absence of adequate
hter or food, ill and idle, with no
liipse of a better future and enraged
■yhe injustice of it all. This creates
( ngerous global climate — a climate
•] re oceans of suffering breed hur-
i(nes of hate, lashing out with
le ructive force not only where they
r spawned but wherever they reach
s ell.
In this shrinking world of ours,
liiince no longer guarantees safety.
1" crises we face do not respect
;aonal boundaries or ideological
r( tiers. Let me select a few pertinent
r ections of the future.
• In the next 20 years there will
e '/•! billion more people.
• The food deficit for the Third
Vi Id alone will hover around 75 mil-
10 metric tons by the year 1990,
*ri nng down global food reserves and
38 ng to worldwide competition for
■K and to a rapid rise of price
• The search for alternative
i>\ :es of food will cause drastic de-
'l€ on of fishery resources.
• Increased fossil fuel consmp-
10 and the greater use of fluorocar-
01 for this growing population will
01 jspondingly raise atmospheric
ai on dioxide and will cause ozone
^e] ;tion, both of which entail serious
ii fitic changes — in turn affecting
i; ibility to produce food.
• The inability of the developing
tries to meet the growing de-
ls — for food and energy alone — of
growing populations will deplete
foreign exchange reserves, raise
' ■ debts, in turn lead to defaults
ni global monetary instability.
• Growing scarcities as well as
It growing demands of more and
iC3 people will place unacceptable
:rins on the stability of many devel-
g countries, leading to frequent
ical upheavals threatening every
i in's security.
In a world where billions are sub-
acid to the degradation of poverty —
b^ ct poverty — the struggle for sur-
vival will become the paramount
human endeavor. Abject poverty de-
humanizes because it subjects life to
the exigencies of mere existence. It is
a condition in which people exhaust
their energies at the grueling task of
just being, with never a chance of
becoming. It is a condition in which
people squander their energies in the
fight for mere physical survival, with
their talents unchallenged, their
human potential unfulfilled.
Where the basic human needs of
food, health, and shelter remain the
sole object of unfulfilled wants, no
desire can emerge for liberty and no
strength is left to protect rights.
Where the struggle for liberation
from daily necessities overwhelms
the necessity for freedom, neither
basic human needs nor human rights
will ever be satisfied. And in a world
where tyranny becomes the order of
things, no nation, however prosperous
and free, can long remain an island of
virtue.
To confront these growing threats
to global security, each nation, each
government must do its share. None of
the problems can be tackled by one
country alone, and no country alone
can long endure to carry the principal
burden.
It is clear that the followup to the
Global 2000 Report will require an ex-
tended program of cooperative inter-
action within the worldwide system of
international organizations. The
United Nations is the ideal focal point
for strategists in formulating an
agenda which could deflect projected
ecological, economic, and social catas-
trophes in the coming millennium. The
very nature of the entity that is the
United Nations lends it to the creative
long-range effort which could bring
to fruition the massive economic
development that the current world
environment demands. Yet we can no
longer attack problems in a piecemeal
fashion.
It will not be enough merely to
ask for increased funding from the
world's financial institutions. We must
evolve a precise strategy that will
coalesce hardware with human re-
sources, that points toward a conver-
gence of intellectual and technological
tools which concentrate our collective
efforts in problem solving for both
developed and developing nations.
The Challenges of Change
East and West, North and South, our
present and our future — they are
symbols of our concerns. Pitted
against each other in dynamic tension,
they reveal the promise and possibili-
ties of change.
Will we control this change or will
we permit events to control our lives?
Can we allow the prognoses of the
Global 2000 Report to come true? Can
we resign ourselves to an unbridled
East- West conflict and prepare to live
in a world where the structures of
global cooperation will have been re-
placed by the worst kind of inter-
national struggle for the survival of
the unfittest? I need not posit the
answer.
We Americans have never feared
change. To the contrary, I sincerely
feel that most of the change for the
better that is taking place today has
been prompted by our very presence
in the world, our ideals, our ways, and
our responses. We created the United
Nations not to put the brakes on
change but to design our future.
In a month jr so, I will be leaving
my post as Assistant Secretary of
State in charge of U.N. affairs. I am
proud to have been associated with an
American foreign policy that has
steadfastly supported the United Na-
tions. To be sure we saw changes
coming, yet we did not fear them. We
understood the changes taking place
in the United Nations, and we tried to
steer them in a direction consistent
with our values and beliefs. So as
I leave office, I am confident that the
seeds of our ideals that we planted
with the United Nations 35 years ago
will grow into a bountiful harvest — as
long as we have the will and foresight
to cultivate with care and compassion
this fragile structure of global
cooperation. ■
f uary 1981
63
United Nations
World Court Hears U.S. Argument on
Transfer of WHO Regional Office
In the 33d World Health assembly, held
in Geneva in May 1980, several Arab
states introduced a proposal to transfer
the World Health Organization's (WHO)
Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office
(EMROI from Alexandria, Egypt, to
Amman, Jordan. The reason given for
the proposal was that most of the coun-
tries in the region had decided to break
diplomatic relations with Egypt and did
not wish to conduct their WHO busi-
ness through the Alexandria office. The
motive for the move was acknowledged
to be political The United States and
maiiy other countries opposed transfer
as an improper and costly political
interference in the highly successful
workings of a technical and nonpolitical
specialized agency.
Apart from the merits and
demerits of moving the office, Egypt
and the United States maintained dur-
ing the assembly's discussion of the
resolution to transfer the office that the
WHO could not move EMRO from
Egypt without regard to the 2-year
notice provision in the WHO's host
agreement with Egypt regarding the
regional office. Some other states
argued that this notice provision ap-
plied only to negotiations over a change
in the privileges and immunities of
WHO officials in Egypt and that it
would not apply to a decision by the
WHO to move the regional office.
In order to resolve this dispute,
the United States introduced a resolu-
tion deferring any decision on removal
of the regional office until the Inter-
national Court of Justice IICJ) could
give an advisory opinion on the ques-
tion of the applicability of the host
agreement to removal of the office. On
May 20, 1980, the World Health Assem-
bly approved the U.S. resolution, which
referred the following questions to the
Court:
1. Are the negotiation and notice
provisions of section 37 of the agree-
ment of March 25, 1951, between the
World Health Organization and Egypt
applicable in the event that either
party to the agreement wishes to have
the regional office transferred from the
territory of Egypt?
2. If so, what would be the legal
responsibilities of both the World
Health Organization and Egypt, with
regard to the regional office in Alexan-
dria, during the 2-year period between
notice and termination of the agree-
ment?
The Court invited all states parties
to its statute that also belonged to the
WHO to submit written statements and
to participate in oral argument. Writ-
ten statements were filed by Bolivia,
Jordan, the United Arab Emirates,
Iraq, Kuwait, Egypt, Syria, and the
United States. On October 21, 22, and
23, 1980, the Court met in The Hague
to hear oral argument. Presentations
were made by the United Arab
Emirates, Tunisia, the United States,
Syria, Egypt, and the World Health
Organization.
Representing the United States in
the case were Stephen M. Schwebel
Deputy Legal Adviser of the Depart-
ment of State; Stephen R. Bond, Legal
Adviser to the U.S. Mission to Inter-
national Organizations, Geneva; Ralph
Drury Martin, Attorney-Adviser,
Department of State; and Lori Fisler
Damrosch, Special Assistant to the
Legal Adviser, Department of State.
Following are excerpts from the
U.S. oral argument made to the Court
by Mr. Schwebel
1. The argument that the host agree-
ment is not a headquarters agreement
but merely an agreement on privileges
and immunities.
. . . [L]et us consider what the signifi-
cance is of the contention that the host
agreement is no more than an agree-
ment on privileges and immunities. It
raises the complementary question of
the significance of the contrasting con-
tention of Egypt and the United States
that the host agreement is a head-
quarters agreement. The distinction
between a headquarters agreement and
an agreement on privileges and immuni-
ties is not semantic. We are concerned
with the fundamental question of the
role and the content of the host agree-
ment of 1951.
It is the contention of the United
States that the host agreement of 1951
provides the full and comprehensive
legal basis for the continuing presence
and operation of the regional office in
tlo
gilti
IB I
ill J
lllli
II
Alexandria. This is not a situation in
which the 1951 host agreement regu-
lates an ancillary aspect of a preexist
ing and independent legal relationshii
The function of the host agreement ii
to place on a proper and enduring leg
footing the establishment, maintenan
and operation of the regional office
Mutatis mutandis, the host agreemer
is the particular international conven
tion which, in the words of article 38
the statute of this Court, establishes
the "rules expressly recognized by th
Contesting States." When we speak (
the host agreement as a headquarter .
agreement, we use a kind of legal she ' !
hand which expresses the essence of
our argument. Similarly, when the
states that seek a negative answer fr
the Court speak of an agreement on
privileges and immunities, they use a
kind of legal shorthand which expresi
the essence of their argument.
Now, if the characterizations oft
host agreement as an agreement on
privileges and immunities were corre
there would have been no need for i\
host agreement. At the time the host
agreement was signed, the Conventic
on the Privileges and Immunities oft
Specialized Agencies of the United N
tions was in force. Egypt was asked I
the 2d World Health Assembly provi-
sionally to apply it and apparently dii
pending its accession [to the
convention]. Moreover, the Organizati
and Egypt had already entered into a
bilateral privileges and immunities
agreement in connection with the Orf
nization's provision of services in
Egypt. That agreement was conclude(
on 25 August 1950. Thus if the only
purpose of the 1951 host agreement
was to regulate privileges and immun
ties, it would have been superfluous. .
The host agreement is undeniably
concerned with privileges and immuni
ties, but clearly it goes beyond that
concern. The fact is that Egypt and th
Organization decided, before the estaf
lishment of the regional office, to con-
clude an agreement governing its estal
lishment and maintenance. That agre
ment is a headquarters agreement in
form and content. To be sure, the host
agreement of 1951 is not entitled "he;
quarters agreement." It does not ex-
pressly provide that the Organization's
64
Department of State Bulleti
United Nations
g|nal office "shall be established and
Mtained in Alexandria." Neverthe-
itiit is clear that the parties, in
oiLiding the host agreement, con-
nlated maintenance of a permanent
1 )f the Organization for and in its
rn Mediterranean region. They
>t have in mind a legal regime of
tges and immunities for officials
. • Organization passing through or
■nirarily assigned to Egypt. The
:riization and Egypt assumed,
stood, and expressed their mutual
i that this seat would be physi-
located in Egypt, specifically in
e: ndria.
'hus in the agpreement the parties
;'e to "the Regional Office in Alexan-
Ji (section 1, para. V), "the premises
tl Organization in Egypt" (section
ai "the seat of the Organization"
jon 30). These are references to a
y:;al location of the Eastern Medi-
Tiean Regional Office at its Alex-
1 headquarters. They are refer-
to a permanent location contained
a agreement of indefinite duration.
)r iver, under the host agreement,
8' 'ligations of the parties embrace
e tablishment, operation, and main-
na ;e of physical facilities in Alexan-
la ''or example, section 30 provides
<• I 'ctricity, gas and water supply,
removal, and police protection.
are the earmarks of a head-
;ai ;rs agreement, not a privileges
id imunities ag^reement. If this host
Tcnent is compared with other
ac uarters agreements, their essen-
il entity of content is manifest, as
■itten statements of the United
. and Egypt demonstrate.
he intentions of the parties ac-
d gly are clear from the terms of
e , Teement itself. But further
dice of the parties' intentions is
antly available. The negotiating
uiy of the agreement, including the
•v»ipment of the models on which it
IS ised, suggest that there was
^'( any doubt in the minds of
; gotiators that a permanent
ic uarters regime was being estab-
T' claim that the Alexandria office
tablished by an agreement other
nd anterior to the 1951 host
< nent.
^ tiere we differ with our distin-
s'id colleagues from the United
Emirates and Kuwait is in this:
) not agree that the governing
headquarters agreement is anything
else but the host agreement between
the Organization and Egypt of 25
March 1951.
We cannot agree that the 1949
decision of the Executive Board of the
Organization to locate EMRO in Alex-
andria and its acceptance by Egypt con-
stitute the governing international
headquarters agreement. If this be the
governing international agreement,
where is it to be found? It is not
printed in the United Nations Treaty
Series or in the publications of the
World Health Organization. It has not
been presented to the Court. There ap-
pears to be no written record of such
an agrreement anywhere, even in an ex-
change of letters between the Organiza-
tion and the Egyptian Government. The
terms of any such agreement are
unknown. And most importantly for
these proceedings and for this Court,
this alleged agreement has not been
registered with the Secretariat of the
United Nations pursuant to Article 102
of the U.N. Charter. Consequently, it
cannot be invoked before the Court by
any party to it, nor presumably, by a
third state on behalf of any such party.
It cannot be believed that any
government would permit the indefinite
establishment on its territory of a
regional headquarters of an interna-
tional organization on the basis of so
simple a simplified agreement. Still less
can it be believed that Egypt would so
agree. The sensitivity of Egypt to
several legal problems dealt with in the
negotiations between Egypt and the
Organization over the terms of the 1951
agreement demonstrates that Egypt
was not prepared lightly to agree to
the indefinite establishment and main-
tenance of an international organization
on its territory. The parliamentary
debates to which I have referred and
their preoccupation with capitulations,
as well as the history of the Alexandria
Sanitary Bureau and its predecessors,
graphically show that Egypt did not
ever treat the emplacement of an inter-
national organization on its territory
casually, as, for example, a matter to be
dealt with in a summary resolution of
an international organization to which
Egypt would manifest unwritten
consent.
On the contrary, beginning early in
1949, Egypt carefully considered the
host agreement and meticulously
negotiated it. And, for the reasons
which I have earlier described, both
Egypt and the Organization plainly
regarded the host agreement as the
governing headquarters ag^reement for
the Eastern Mediterranean Regional
Office at Alexandria. . . .
... To be sure, the regional office
was actually installed in 1949, before
the host agreement came into force in
1951. But the fact that the host agree-
ment was ratified in 1951 by no means
proves that the host agreement is not
the governing headquarters agrreement.
All it shows is that, in 1949, Egypt per-
mitted the conversion of the long-
established Alexandria Sanitary Bureau
into the regional office of the World
Health Organization in view of the con-
tinuing negotiation of a host agreement
based on the existing model host agree-
ment. That is to say, Egypt was
prepared to agree to the selection of
Alexandria as the site of the regional
office for the Eastern Mediteranean
area which the Executive Board had
conditionally approved, and to integrate
the functions of the Alexandria Sani-
tary Bureau into, and to transfer that
bureau's files to the regional office upon
the commencement of its operations.
But, both Egypt and the Organiza-
tion well knew that the preliminary
measure of agreement indicated by the
Organization's resolution and Egypt's
actions was reached in contemplation of
the parties completing negotiations for
a host agreement — as, in fact, they did.
And when they concluded that host
agreement, the preliminary understand-
ings evidenced by the Executive
Board's resolution and Egypt's acts
were merged and integrated into the
host agreement. That integration is
definitive. It alone, in the terms of the
host agreement, fully and adequately
expresses the intention of the parties
concerning the location and regulation
of the seat of the regional office. The
host agreement of 1951 is a complete
and formal headquarters agreement
which contains a denunciation clause.
Accordingly, that clause rather than a
nonexistent clause in a nonexistent
agpreement governs any disestablish-
ment of the Alexandria office. . . .
3. The alleged legal effect of the breach
of diplomatic relations with Egypt.
. . . [T]he political attitudes of some of
the Organization's members can have
no effect on the legal relationship
entered into between the Organization
and Egypt in the host agreement of
1951.
iry 1981
65
United Nations
It has and will often be the case
that the government acting as host to
an international organization will not
have diplomatic relations with some of
the members of the organization. It is a
commonplace that delegations of states
members of the United Nations that do
not enjoy diplomatic relations with the
United States take part in U.N. meet-
ings at its New York headquarters.
Some of the very states that now argue
against the applicability of section 37
chose to sever diplomatic relations with
the United States in 1967 but never for
a moment did they cease to send dele-
gations to U.N. headquarters in New
York.
Thus the severance of diplomatic
relations among a few, or even many, of
the members of an international organi-
zation cannot change the legal relation-
ship between the host government and
the organization. In fact, one of the
principal purposes of a host agreement,
such as that between Egypt and the
World Health Organization, is to insure
that the legal regime remains stable
regardless of political wi^.ds affecting
the character of intergovernmental
relations.
There is no reason to believe that
the Alexandria regional office cannot
function in the absence of diplomatic
relations between Egypt and most
states of the region. And it is these
states which have caused the very
situation which they now invoke as a
justification for removal of the office. If
there be any problem, it is caused by
their political decision to refrain from
performance of their own obligation to
the Organization, under article 50 of its
constitution, to "supervise the activities
of the regional office." But no legal or
practical obstacle prevents them from
sending delegations to Alexandria and
performing that supervisory task.
There is no legal or practical obstacle
to the regional committee meeting in
Alexandria or, as it frequently has, at
other cities in the region. Only the
political objectives of these states,
which are extraneous to those of the
Organization, stand in their way. In
fact, they have created this difficult
situation for reasons unrelated to any
limitations on their actual ability to
operate in Alexandria, or to any pur-
pose of the World Health Organization.
Moreover, it is established inter-
national law reflected in Article 63 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties that severance of diplomatic
relations does not affect treaty rela-
tions "except in so far as the existence
of diplomatic or consular relations is in-
dispensable for the application of the
treaty." The absence of diplomatic rela-
tions between some states and a host
government may make day-to-day deal-
ing more cumbersome, but it can hardly
be said that the existence of diplomatic
relations is "indispensable" to the ongo-
ing functioning of the Organization in
the territory of the host.
Nor is a changed circumstance ra-
tionale for invalidating the agreement's
notice provision applicable here. As our
written statement establishes in some
detail at pages 60 to 61, the doctrine of
rebus sic stantibus has little relevance
to treaties containing provision for ter-
mination upon relatively short notice,
such as 2 years. The purpose of the doc-
trine is to provide an implied escape
clause for treaties of indefinite or
lengthy duration that do not otherwise
establish a mechanism for revision or
termination as circumstances change.
Since section 37 of the 1951 host agree-
ment is exactly such a mechanism, it
must be followed if either party wants
the office to relocate.
Furthermore, the doctrine of
changed circumstances can only be in-
voked in the event of an unforeseeable
change that "radically" transforms
obligations under the treaty. For the
reasons discussed in our written state-
ment, these requirements cannot be
established in the present case. As the
Court well appreciates, the burden of
establishing invalidity of a treaty obli-
gation on these or any other grounds,
must be on the party seeking to be ex-
cused from performance under the
treaty. I respectfully suggest that it
has not been established that the Orga-
nization can carry this burden. . . .
Summary of the argument in favor of
the applicability of section 37.
I have concluded the presentation of
the substantive sections of the submis-
sions of the United States. I should now
like to recapitulate in the most sum-
mary terms the essential elements of
our position. . . .
First, the host agreement of 1951
between Egypt and the Organization is
not solely a privileges and immunities
agreement but is a typical headquarters
agreement, imposing mutual obligations
on the parties concerning the location,
maintenance, and operation of a specific
office in a specific place — that is, the
!«.■
it'.
Eastern Mediterranean Regional Of ffi
of the World Health Organization in
Alexandria.
Second, the host agreement is t
only international instrument definii^te
the obligations of the parties with
respect to that regional office. The
historical evidence submitted to theiEj
Court has shown that from the outs4
the Organization and Egypt viewed
host agreement as the definitive ex-
pression of the decision to locate theftii
office in Egypt. It has shown that,
although for reasons of convenience
office was actually installed before t
host agreement was concluded, the
ties intended to express their long-
rights and obligations in the host a]
ment and through the host agreeme:
alone.
Third, the host agreement does
make sense if it is interpreted as m;
colleagues from Syria, Kuwait, Tuni:
the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, anc
Jordan would wish, because its term .
would not be effective.
Article 31 of the Vienna Conver
tion on the Law of Treaties codifies
fundamental principle of general inti
national law that treaties shall be in
preted in good faith. This paramount
principle embraces the principle of e
fectiveness, which the Vienna conve
tion encompasses in the following
magisterial formula: "A treaty shall
interpreted in good faith in accordar
with the ordinary meaning to be giv
to the terms of the treaty in their cc
text and in light of its object and pu
pose."
In deciding this case, this Court
must choose between two conflicting
terpretations of the host agreement
between Egypt and the Organization
One of the those interpretations wou
allow the parties to terminate the ef
tiveness of virtually all provisions of
the agreement without observing tht
notice requirement of section 37. The
other would give full effect to that n
quirement. One interpretation would
allow either party to disrupt any
orderly transition during removal of
office; the other interpretation would
require that a prescribed transition
period remain in effect.
In such circumstances, the Inter
national Law Commission has forth-
rightly stated which is the choice to 1
made. "Where a treaty is open to tw(
interpretations, one of which does ami
the other does not enable the treaty I
have appropriate effects, good faith a
I
66
Department of State Bullet
United Nations
eibject and purpose of the treaty
■rind that the former interpretation
d be adopted."
t is incontestable that the object
' host agreement is the regional
in Alexandria. The purpose of
reaty is to set out the terms by
I Egypt and the Organization
il to establish, maintain, and
J ate the Office,
^ny interpretation of the agree-
I which would allow the object and
ise of the treaty to be vitiated
ut regard to the 2-year transition
I specified by section 37 renders
n 37 illusory. Since there is
!g in the language or history of
)St agreement to suggest that the
■ s intended such a result, it must
jesumed that they intended the
vary — that is, intended section 37
I treaty to be effective,
must be borne in mind that
rO' al of a major regional office of a
-g' international organization is not a
II matter. The cost of moving
s the millions of dollars. Removal
^. office would remove several addi-
)ni millions from the economy of the
ist tate. It simply does not make
IS to conclude that the parties to
e st agreement could have intended
at le same language which provides
r I l-year notice period to deal with
\n )lved differences over privileges
'd imunities would simultaneously
ioi the object of the agreement to be
nil ed, at a large cost, without notice
ai
iternational organizations and
st tates have generally undertaken,
a eement, to provide for the
': y disestablishment of any head-
I Ts which is removed from a host
!ti The terms of the host agreement
H'Aa.Tch 1951, its history, and the
ai ible principles of treaty inter-
■'■t ion all indicate that the host
-enent of 25 March 1951 is such an
"enent.
inally, I would like to make one
t )int. It is important to note that
"3ireting this agreement as its
,' ige and history indicate that it
I i be interpreted — to apply to
al of the office — imposes no ex-
inary burden on the parties to
reement.
imply as a practical matter,
al of an office is not something
an be successfully accomplished
I ight. It took a year for the Orga-
nization's working group merely to
study the question. It could easily take
as long or longer for the actual move to
be accomplished.
It is believed that the only legal
obligations imposed by section 37 are
those discussed in the written state-
ment of the United States. Namely, the
parties would have to keep the existing
legal regime in effect for 2 years; they
would have to negotiate in good faith
for the gradual disestablishment of the
office over the 2-year period. These are
not onerous burdens. They are, in fact,
probably nothing more than what
would, as a practical matter, in any
event be required in order to secure an
orderly removal of the office. This fact
apparently is recognized by our distin-
guished colleagues from the Syrian
Arab Republic, whose written state-
ment contains the following sentence
concerning transfer of the regional
office.
Of course, for reasons of expediency and
convenience and once the decision to trans-
fer the Office is taken, the provisions of the
Agreement . . . can continue to be applied un-
til a date to be agreed between the two par-
ties for its termination, (p. 69.)
Where, it is submitted, this state-
ment misses the mark is in its failure to
appreciate that the parties have already
arranged for these provisions to con-
tinue until an agreed date, and that
date is 2 years from the official notifica-
tion of the decision to move the office.
Why does it surprise our colleagues
from Syria that Egypt and the Organi-
zation could have perceived in 1951, as
Syria perceives in 1980, that when a
regional office is moved, expediency
and convenience require continuation of
the existing legal regime for a period of
time? It is not difficult to see that
Egypt and the Organization assumed, in
1951, that it was in the interest of both
to provide for binding legal obligations
which would assure an orderly removal
of the office, rather than to leave such
an important matter to whatever good-
will the parties might summon in the
midst of the tensions which undoubtedly
surround any unilateral removal.
There is no question that an abrupt
and arbitrary removal of the regional
office from Egypt would work hardship
on Egypt and, therefore, serve the
political purpose of those states which
press for removal. I submit, however,
that it has been demonstrated to the
Court that it was just this type of hard-
ship—the precipitous removal of an
office without time to prepare for
cushioning its effects — that the Organi-
MR. SCHWEBEL ELECTED
A JUDGE OF THE ICJ
On January 15, 1981, Stephen M.
Schwebel, Deputy Legal Adviser of the
Department of State, was elected a
judge of the International Court of
Justice by the U.N. General Assembly
and Security Council. He succeeds the
late Judge Richard R. Baxter.
Mr. Schwebel has served since
1977 as a member of the U.N. Inter-
national Law Commission, the U.N.'s
principal treaty drafting body on which
the large majority of the Court's cur-
rent judges sat prior to their election to
the Court. At 51 years of age, he is the
youngest U.S. national ever elected to
the Court.
Mr. Schwebel has been U.S.
counsel in two recent cases before the
ICJ. He played a leading role in the
U.S. decision to take the case of the
American hostages in Iran to the Court
and participated in the oral argument
of it. In October 1980, he presented the
U.S. argument to the Court in advisory
proceedings brought by the World
Health Organization in response to ef-
forts by anti-Camp David Arab states
to require WHO peremptorily to
remove its regional office from Alexan-
dria, Egypt.
Deputy Legal Adviser of the State
Department since 1974, Mr. Schwebel
has also served as the Department's
Counselor on International Law
(1973-74) and Assistant Legal Adviser
for United Nations Affairs (1961-66). He
was Executive Director of the
American Society of International Law
(1967-73). Since 1967 he has been pro-
fessor of international law at the School
of Advanced International Studies of
The Johns Hopkins University, serving
as Edward B. Burling Professor of
International Law and Organization
since 1973. Mr. Schwebel was assistant
professor of law at Harvard Law School
(1959-61) and has been a visiting faculty
member at Cambridge University, the
Australian National University, and
The Hague Academy of International
Law. He is the author of two books and
some 60 articles in the field of interna-
tional law.
»ary 1981
67
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
zation and Egypt agreed to avoid
almost 30 years ago.
For all these reasons, the Govern-
ment of the United States submits that
the answer to the primary question put
by the World Health Assembly to the
Court must be in the affirmative. . . .
WORLD COURT ISSUES
ADVISORY OPINION
An advisory opinion issued December
20, 1980, in The Hague by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice was hailed by
State Department Legal Adviser
Roberts Owen as "a victory for the rule
of law in the relations between states
and international organizations."
The opinion holds that, should the
World Health Organization decide to
remove its eastern Mediterranean
regional office from Alexandria, Egypt,
the WHO and Egypt will be legally
obliged "to consult together in good
faith as to the question under what con-
ditions and in accordance with what
modalities a transfer of the regional of-
fice from Egypt may be effected." The
Court held that the mutual obligations
of the WHO and Egypt "place a duty
upon the party which wishes to effect
the transfer to give a reasonable period
of notice to the other party for the ter-
mination of the existing situation. . . ."
Arab states opposed to the Camp
David agreements have sought to
ostracize Egypt by requiring interna-
tional organizations with offices in
Egypt to remove them. Attempts in the
World Health Assembly to require
removal of the WHO regional office
from Alexandria have been frustrated,
most lately by a resolution sponsored
by the United States which requested
the International Court of Justice to
give an advisory opinion on the legal
principles which would govern any such
move.
Egypt and the United States, both
of which oppose any move, argued to
the Court that, should the WHO decide
to remove the Alexandria office, 2
years' notice would have to be given
under the Egyptian-WHO host agree-
ment or that, in any event, reasonable
notice would have to be given. The
Court's opinion, by a vote of 12-1, sus-
tains the latter argument. Only the
member of the Court of Soviet na-
El Salvador
Following are a statement of
December 12, 1980, on the special
Presidential mission to El Salvador
(December 6-9, 1980, and Department
statements of January U and 17, 1981
on resumption of military assistance to
El Salvador.
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,
DEC. 12, 1980
William D. Rogers, former Under Sec-
retary of State for Economic Affairs
and Assistant Secretary of State under
President Ford, and Assistant Secre-
tary of State William G. Bowdler met
with the President yesterday to report
on their special mission to El Salvador.
Today they are briefing members of the
Congress on their mission. They are
also submitting a confidential written
report to the President.
During their December 6 through 9
stay in El Salvador, the special mission
members held a series of meetings with
Ambassador White and the Embassy
staff, the governing Junta, and Arch-
bishop, the Chief of Police, the special
Salvadoran Investigating Commission,
nuns from the same order as two of the
murdered women, and others. They told
those with whom they met that the
murder of the four American church-
women had shocked the conscience of
the American people. They expressed
our g^ave concern that the increased
incidence of violence in El Salvador
raised a fundamental question about
the ability of the government to main-
tain a minimal degree of civil order.
They urged prompt and effective action
not only to apprehend and punish the
murderers but also to control the vio-
lence and prevent such tragic incidents
from recurring.
The special mission reported that,
thus far, there was no direct evidence
of who committed the crime. Especially
because of circumstantial evidence of
possible security force involvement in
tionality. Judge Platon Morosov,
dissented.
Mr. Owen described the Court's
opinion as "the second excellent deci-
sion which it has issued this year." He
stated that it "more than satisfactorily
upholds" the U.S. position and "demon-
strates that international organizations,
no less than states, must adhere to the
rule of law in international
relations." ■
ill
ii
fi
n
iiif
u\
sri
M
fail
iili
ae
M
all
the case, the mission urged the autln
ties of El Salvador to conduct a comi
plete, thorough, and professional inv«
tigation of these murders so that the
questions can be answered and those
responsible be brought to justice
The governing Junta requested t
the mission communicate to the Pres
dent, the government, and people of
United States El Salvador's profouno
regret with respect to the crime. Th(
told our mission that the investigatic
would be pursued wherever it led, ai
where in the country, at any level.
To this end, the Junta has appoii
an official four-man ad hoc investigat
commission. The commission, which i
actively pursuing its task, has request
our technical and professional invest
tive support. Several agents of the F '"J
are already in El Salvador providing,
technical assistance to the commissio. ^^
We will continue to cooperate fully *
with this investigation. Jj
Our special emissaries also dis-
cussed the desirability of permitting' ™
outside observers of the investigatioHf"
The commission has welcomed this. \
expect that organizations such as the
Inter-American Human Rights Comnj(|*'
sion will be able to play such a role. ""
Our Embassy will also be closely moi
toring the prog:ress of the investigati
We consider the appointment of
the investigative commission, its effo
to date, its desire to have U.S. invest
gative experts assit in its work, and i
willingness to permit outside observe
to monitor the investigation as positi '
responses to our mission.
In the course of the mission's dis
cussions with the governing Junta an
others, it was pleased to note that
there appears to be a consensus on tl
need to act quickly and effectively to
investigate, thoroughly, the killings o
our citizens, to gain greater control
over the widespread violence, to unde
take a reform and restructuring of tbi
government and to make it more effei
tive, to make the military high comma
more responsive to duly constituted
authorities, to implement the reform
program, and to open a dialogue with
democratic leaders of the opposition t
end the terrible internal conflict that
costing so many lives.
Negotiations are going on in El
Salvador between the Christian Demo
crats and the military toward these
ends. Statements by Salvadoran offi-
cials involved indicate that some sigi
leant restructuring of the government
and shifts in military personnel are
68
Deoartment of State Bulleti
Western Hemisphere
iated. The United States is ready
lime its assistance to El Salvador
. ^uch progress.
^e will be following these develop-
- and carefully assessing the way
eh they improve the effectiveness
Ljovernment pursuing its reform
im, in controlling violence, and in
jiting human rights. Progress
ai these objectives is essential to
icfurther polarization, either to the
-ne right or to the radical left.
• {TMENT STATEMENT
I, 1981'
^ministration has decided to
ji! its Fiscal Year 1981 military
since to El Salvador, which was
ip-arily suspended on December 5.
Cically, we will continue with our
ift ing $420,000 international mili-
/ lucation and training (IMET) pro-
m nd proceed with implementation
iu55 million foreign military sales
!& credit program. Within the FMS
5)m we will proceed, immediately,
h le sale of approximately $2.3 mil-
a i nonlethal equipment. We will
o oceed with the loan of two
1 (Huey) transport helicopters, fi-
'XI ? related costs from the FMS
di This helicopter loan program has
^n nder consideration for several
It ■..
' hen we announced resumption of
• e inomic assistance to El Salvador
D( ember 17, we stated that our
iti y assistance would continue to be
np arily suspended. We indicated
' would be following develop-
n El Salvador with regard to
a areas of concern, especially con-
ue progress in the investigation of
n rders of the four American
fc vvomen.
e investigation of the murders
" Government of El Salvador's
investigation commission is pro-
i ',. The commission has questioned
yiersons in El Salvador and devel-
i )me leads. Our FBI has furnished
n al assistance to the commission
vil, this week, deliver to the com-
i 1 its assessment of the evidence
■d from the two autopsies per-
in the United States and from
it of FBI technicians to El Sal-
y The Salvadoran Attorney Gen-
proceeding with arrangements
opsies on the two women buried
alvador. The Salvadoran Em-
n Ottawa is to interview the
)f Canadian missionaries who
with the women at the airport.
The Government of El Salvador
has invited the Inter-American Human
Rights Commission to observe the work
of the investigating commission. We are
supporting this invitation.
Our decisions regarding military
assistance have also taken account of
the current military situation in El Sal-
vador. A major military offensive was
conducted by the leftist guerrillas over
the past weekend in which they demon-
strated that they are better armed and
constitute a military threat. Captured
documents and weapons confirmed that
the guerillas have received a substan-
tial supply of arms from abroad.
Although the government forces
contained the guerrilla offensive, they
expended considerable materiel and lost
their last transport helicopter. As a re-
sult, their need for military assistance
has become greater and more urgent.
Taking full account of the progress
in areas of concern to us, especially the
investigation of the murders of the four
American churchwomen, and considering
the overall military situation, the Admin-
istration has decided to resume its mod-
est military assistance to El Salvador.
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT
JAN. 17, 1981'
For the past 15 months, we have
assisted the moderate military/civilian
Government of El Salvador in its efforts:
• To implement its agrarian
reform and electoral program;
• To put a stop to the violence of
right-wing terrorists; and
• To defeat the Marxist guerrillas.
We are encouraged that there has
been progress in these areas.
To assist the government to imple-
ment the reforms which were so essen-
tial to give the underprivileged of El
Salvador a greater stake in that society,
we have provided approximately $82
million of economic aid. We have also
provided military aid, both as a means
of encouraging progress in areas of
common concern and of supporting such
steps when they occur. We believe that
continued progress with the agrarian
reform and electoral program and a
readiness to negotiate are just as
important to the long-term success of
the gove