I must not devote any more chapters here to a description of the
further progress of khadi. It would be outside the scope of these
chapters to give a history of my various activities after they came
before the public eye, and I must not attempt it, if only because to
do so would require a treatise on the subject. My object in writing
these chapters is simply to describe how certain things, as it were
spontaneously, presented themselves to me in the course of my
experiments with truth.
To resume, then, the story of the non-co-operation movement. Whilst
the powerful Khilafat agitation set up by the Ali Brothers was in
full progress, I had long discussions on the subject with the late
Maulana Abdul Bari and the other Ulema,
especially, with regard to the extent to which a Musalman could
observe the rule of non-violence. In the end they all agreed that
Islam did not forbid its followers from following non-violence as a
policy, and further, that, while they were pledged to that policy,
they were bound faithfully to carry it out. At last the
non-co-operation resolution was moved in the Khilafat conference,
and carried after prolonged deliberations. I have a vivid
recollection how once at Allahabad a committee sat all night
deliberating upon the subject. In the beginning the late Hakim Saheb
was sceptical as to the practicability of non-violent non-co-
operation. But after his scepticism was overcome he threw himself
into it heart and soul, and his help proved invaluable to the
movement.
Next, the non-co-operation resolution was moved by me at the Gujarat
political conference that was held shortly afterwards. The
preliminary contention raised by the opposition was that it was not
competent to a provincial conference to adopt a resolution in
advance of the Congress. As against this, I suggested that the
restriction could apply only to a backward movement; but as for
going forward, the subordinate organizations were not only fully
competent, but were in duty bound to do so, if they had in them the
necessary girt and confidence. No permission, I argued, was needed to
try to enhance the prestige of the parent institution, provided one
did it at one's own risk. The proposition was then discussed on its
merits, the debate being marked by its keenness no less than the
atmosphere of 'sweet reasonableness' in which it was conducted. On
the ballot being taken the resolution was declared carried by an
overwhelming majority. The successful passage of the resolution was
due not a little to the personality of Sjt. Vallabhbhai and Abbas
Tyabji. The latter was the president, and his leanings were all in
favour of the non-co-operation resolution.
The All-India Congress Committee resolved to hold a special session
of the Congress in September 1920 at Calcutta to deliberate on this
question. Preparations were made for it on a large scale. Lala Lajpat
Rai was elected President . Congress and Khilafat specials were run
to Calcutta from Bombay. At Calcutta there was a mammoth gathering
of delegates and visitors.
At the request of Maulana Shaukat Ali I prepared a draft of the non-
co-operation resolution in the train. Up to this time I had more or
less avoided the use of the word non-violent in my drafts. I
invariably made use of this word in my speeches. My vocabulary on
the subject was still in process of formation. I found that I could
not bring home my meaning to purely Moslem audiences with the help of the Samskrit equivalent for non-violent. I
therefore asked Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad to give me some other
equivalent for it. He suggested the word ba-aman;
similarly for non-co-operation he suggested the phrase tark-i-mavalat.
Thus, while I was still busy devising suitable Hindi, Gujarati and
Urdu phraseology for non-co-operation, I was called upon to frame
the non-co-operation resolution for that eventful Congress. In the
original draft the word 'non-violent' had been left out by me. I had
handed over the draft to Maulana Shaukat Ali who was travelling in
the same compartment, without noticing the omission. During the
night I discovered the error. In the morning I sent Mahadev with the
message that the omission should be made good before the draft was
sent to the press. But I have an impression that the draft was
printed before the insertion could be made. The Subjects Committee
was to have met the same evening. I had therefore to make the necessary
correction in the printed copies of the draft. I afterwards saw that
there would have been great difficulty, had I not been ready with my
draft.
None the less my plight was pitiable indeed. I was absolutely at sea
as to who would support the resolution and who would oppose it. Nor
had I any idea as to the attitude that Lalaji would adopt. I only
saw an imposing phalanx of veteran warriors assembled for the fray
at Calcutta. Dr. Besant, Pandit Malaviyaji, Sjt. Vijayaraghavachari,
Pandit Motilalji and the Deshabandhu being some of them.
In my resolution non-co-operation was postulated only with a view to
obtaining redress of the Punjab and the Khilafat wrongs. That,
however, did not appeal to Sjt. Vijayaraghavachari. 'If non-co-operation was to be declared, why should it be with reference to
particular wrongs? The absence of Swaraj was the biggest wrong that
the country was labouring under; it should be against that that non-co-operation should be directed', he argued. Pandit
Motilalji also wanted the demand for Swaraj to be included in the
resolution. I readily accepted the suggestion and incorporated the
demand for Swaraj in my resolution, which was passed after an
exhaustive, serious and somewhat stormy discussion.
Motilalji was the first to join the movement. I still remember the
sweet discussion that I had with him on the resolution. He suggested
some changes in its phraseology which I adopted. He undertook to win
the Deshabandhu for the movement. The Deshbandhu's heart was
inclined towards it, but he felt sceptical as to the
capacity of the people to carry out the programme. It was only at
the Nagpur Congress that he and Lalaji accepted it whole heartedly.
I felt the loss of the late Lokamanya very deeply at the special
session. It has been my firm faith to this day that, had the
Lokamanya been then alive, he would have given his benedictions to
me on that occasion. But even if it had been otherwise, and he had
opposed the movement, I should still have esteemed his opposition as
a privilege and an education for myself. We had our differences of
opinion always, but they never led to bitterness. He always allowed
me to believe that the ties between us were of the closest. Even as
I write these lines, the circumstances of his death stand forth
vividly before my mind's eye. It was about the hour of midnight,
when Patwardhan, who was then working with me, conveyed over the
telephone the news of his death. I was at that time surrounded by my
companions. Spontaneously the exclamation escaped my lips, 'My
strongest bulwark is gone.' The non-co-operation movement was then
in full swing, and I was eagerly looking forward to encouragement
and inspiration from him. What his attitude would have been with
regard to the final phase of non-cooperation will always be a matter
of speculation, and an idle one at that. But this much is certain
– that the deep void left by his death weighed heavily upon everyone
present at Calcutta. Everyone felt the absence of his counsels in
that hour of crisis in the nation's history.