Accelerated Afghanistan withdrawal a mistake

Michael O'Hanlon, Special to the Washington Post

Updated 4:09 pm, Monday, July 15, 2013

Photo: Noorullah Shirzada, AFP / Getty Images

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Afghanistan National Army soldiers walk with an arrested Taliban fighter on the outskirts of Jalalabad. Afghan troops are carrying more of the load but are far from ready to defend the nation without U.S. help. less

Afghanistan National Army soldiers walk with an arrested Taliban fighter on the outskirts of Jalalabad. Afghan troops are carrying more of the load but are far from ready to ... more

Photo: Noorullah Shirzada, AFP / Getty Images

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Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Photo: Scott Eells, Bloomberg

Accelerated Afghanistan withdrawal a mistake

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The Obama administration is reportedly considering an accelerated pullout of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, followed by a “zero option” — the complete elimination of an American and, presumably, international military presence in Afghanistan after 2014. This is an understandable but unwise idea. Even raising it as a bargaining device is a mistake in our ongoing mission in Afghanistan — a place that President Barack Obama clearly considers crucial to U.S. security, given that more than 60,000 U.S. troops are still there.

The zero-option idea has appeal not only because the war has been long and frustrating, but also because Afghan President Hamid Karzai has been so difficult to work with. Beyond all the past brouhahas over corruption and tainted elections, there is the burst of invective Karzai recently leveled against the United States over what he described as a duplicitous approach to negotiating with the Taliban. Karzai has criticized Washington and broken off negotiations about the long-term U.S. presence because, when the Taliban opened an office for exploratory peace talks in Doha, Qatar, last month, it again called itself the Government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and otherwise sought to portray the new facility as a quasi-embassy for a government in waiting. Karzai decided that Washington was complicit because the Obama administration failed to prevent that outcome.

Karzai worries that U.S. officials will secretly cut a deal with the Taliban at his expense to hasten the U.S. troop departure from Afghanistan. Karzai has also accused the United States of instigating radical extremism on his territory, and he suspects that our real desire in having bases in Afghanistan after next year is quasi-imperialist.

These actions and this attitude toward Washington are indeed regrettable. But they are no reason for the United States to threaten to pull the plug on all it has invested in Afghanistan.

Karzai's recent outbursts, although excessive, are partly understandable. He had warned the Obama administration in private and public that the Taliban would seek to use its new political office in Doha as a virtual embassy.

The bigger point, however, is this: Karzai is not Afghanistan, nor does he represent all Afghans. He won two presidential elections — and the United States should do a better job of acknowledging that he earned a mandate from his own people, despite election irregularities. But Karzai's frustrations with the war and the international community should not be conflated with any desire by most Afghans for U.S. troops to leave. Virtually all other Afghan political leaders I know very much want the international community to stay. They remember all too well what happened a quarter-century ago, when the United States abruptly terminated its role in their country.

Leaving too soon, and withdrawing all U.S. and international forces, would greatly increase the risk of mission failure for the international community.

An accelerated departure and a zero option are inconsistent with the fact that Afghan security forces, although much improved, still need support and guidance and will continue to need them even after the NATO mission ends next year.

Afghan security forces are holding their own on the battlefield and are in the lead nationwide. U.S. force numbers are down by one-third from their peak in 2011, and our rate of casualties has declined by an even higher percentage since then. Afghan army and police casualties are way up, indicating a commitment to the fight that we should admire and want to support. Yet the Afghan forces aren't strong enough to win or even guarantee continued containment of the Taliban on their own.

Beyond the military effects, if the international community totally withdrew, Afghan reformers and all those interested in building a new Afghanistan would suffer a huge psychological blow.

The United States would be much better served by declaring its desire to help Afghanistan, provided that Afghans do their part and have a serious election next year and that Karzai then step down as required by his country's constitution (and as he has pledged to do).