Editorial Note

This paper was originally delivered as the Presidential Address to the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, on December 12, 1992, and published in the 1992 Proceedings of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society [edited by Evelina Orteza y Miranda, Department of Educational Policy and Administrative Studies, The University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada], pp. 117-127.

by Harold Ravitch, Ph.D., Chairman, Department of Philosophy, Los Angeles Valley College, 1992 President of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society

I, because I am adjudged by some people supreme in man's greatest blessing--education--am being prosecuted by you on a capital charge.(1)

Agana belea, the sweet shafts of Apollo and Artemis, indicates a swift and painless death.(2) In the Phaedo Socrates describes himself as dedicated to the same god as the swans who belong to Apollo.(3) Artemis, sister of Apollo and the goddess of midwifery, is also referred to by Socrates in the Theaetetus. Here Socrates describes his art of helping the young "give birth" by aiding in the expression of their thoughts.(4) The divine mission of Socrates, as described in Plato's Apology, begins with a question posed to the Oracle of Apollo at Delphi. When Chairephon asks the Oracle if anyone is wiser than Socrates, the answer given--"No"--presents a puzzle. Socrates believes that wisdom is precisely what he lacks.(5) This leads to a futile search for a person who does have wisdom, an "investigation as the god bade me."(6) When he meets someone who thinks he is wise, Socrates comes "to the assistance of the god" and shows him that he is not.(7) This "occupation" consumes his leisure as well as his finances. Socrates tells the court: "I live in great poverty because of my service to the god."(8)

At the time of his trial, Socrates is seventy years old.(9) But his age is not emphasized until he receives the death penalty. Then Socrates berates his condemners, harshly reminding them that he is "advanced in years and close to death."(10) "If you had waited. but a little while, this would have happened of its own accord."(11) It is noteworthy that the Laws of Athens, in their attempt to persuade Socrates not to escape, ask him: "Will there be no one to say that you, likely to live but a short time more, were so greedy for life that you transgressed the most important laws?"(12) If in fact Socrates believes that his life is ending soon, it is reasonable for Socrates to view the death penalty as agana belea, a swift and painless death awarded for his service to Apollo.

Although this exact phrase does not occur in Xenophon's Apology, Socrates does state (twice) that the god gave him the opportunity of ending his life "in the way that is easiest."(13) Socrates then describes how the death penalty allows him to avoid the hardships of old age. Since the problems of old age are not emphasized by Plato in his Apology, John Burnet and Leo Strauss suggest that Plato's view of Socrates' acceptance of the death penalty (and hence his refusal to escape) must differ substantially from Xenophon's. Strauss, in particular, states, "The Platonic Socrates, as distinguished from the Xenophontic Socrates, does not explain his conduct at the trial by his view that in his advanced years it was good for him to die."(14)

Burnet analyzes Xenophon's vindication of Socrates' megalegoria, the proud tone of Socrates' defense. He concludes that Xenophon or Hermogenes (from whom Xenophon gets his information about the trial) "excogitated the theory that Socrates deliberately provoked his condemnation in order to escape the troubles of old age, such as blindness, deafness, and loss of memory" and dismisses Xenophon's focus on old age by insisting that Socrates is in good health at the time of the trial, indeed, good enough to allow "at least another ten years of activity...."(15) However plausible, this position cannot be made to square with the fact that Socrates, as noted above, tells the court that he is close to death in Plato's Apology; since the Laws of Athens stress this point in the Crito, it cannot be treated as Socratic irony or exaggeration.

In fact, there is considerable hostility to the problems of old age in Plato's writing, specifically in the Republic. In his conversation about justice with the elderly Cephalus, for example, Socrates appears a bit overbearing. And when Socrates presses Cephatus for a definition of justice in a manner bordering on rudeness, Cephalus, lacking the stamina necessary for serious philosophical thought and discussion, extricates himself gracefully from the conversation; his son, Polemarchus, "inherits" the argument.(16) Perhaps this represents what Socrates means when he tells the court that he will continue to practice philosophy "as long as I draw breath and am able."(17) Later in the Republic, the proper function of medical doctors in the ideal city is discussed and it is evident that Plato's views are both Spartan and harsh: the goal of medicine is to preserve good health.(18) Herodicus (a gymnastics trainer) and the ill carpenter are Plato's examples. When Herodicus prolongs his incurable illness by following a strict regimen, he wins a "prize" for his efforts: old age. Plato emphasizes the fact that Herodicus had a "hard death."(19) The ill carpenter is simply unwilling to tolerate lengthy medical treatment and goes back to work. If his body is unable to withstand the stress: "he would die and escape from his troubles."(20) This point is similar to the conclusion reached in the Crito, that life is not worth living in a body that is "corrupted and in bad condition."(21)

It is significant that the phrase "escape from his troubles" also occurs in Plato's Apology. After he receives the death penalty, Socrates explains the "meaning of what has occurred" to those who voted for acquittal, his friends and true judges.(22) Socrates states, "What has happened to me now has not happened of itself, but it is clear to me that it was better for me to die now and escape from trouble."(23) This may be taken as an oversight on the part of Professor Strauss, as quoted above, but there may be a reason why it is not because Socrates does not make explicit precisely what trouble he intends. Burnet's note here is illustrative. By suggesting that the phrase apellaxthai pragmaton is colloquial and in this context means "to rest from my labours," Burnet can claim that it is Xenophon's understanding (and not Plato's) that makes pragmaton (troubles) into the troubles of old age.(24) Earlier in his speech, Socrates describes the divine mission (in Jowett's translation) as Herculean labors; the unpopularity he acquires as a result is a heavy burden.(25) Thus, the phrase "be released from trouble" can be understood to mean "be released from the divine mission."

Still, it is evident that Socrates concludes that it is better for him to die now, at the age of seventy. Whether he is referring to the troubles of old age or the divine mission or both, Socrates' willingness to end his life at this point is found in Plato's Apology as well as in Xenophon's Apology. The major difference between the two is found in the role of the divine sign.

Xenophon tells how Hermogenes asked Socrates if he is prepared to defend himself in court. Socrates indicates that opposition from the divine sign twice prevents him from preparing a defense. In response to Hermogenes' surprise, Socrates asks, "Do you think it surprising that even God holds it better for me to die now?"(26) Thus, opposition from the divine sign prevents Socrates from preparing a speech and thereby allows Socrates to infer that it is better to die now, before the trial ever takes place. Indeed, Socrates also concludes that he can avoid the hardships of old age and receive death in the way that is easiest before the trial as well. In Plato's Apology, it is the complete lack of opposition from the voice during the speech that allows Socrates to conclude that it is better to die now.(27) It also allows him to conclude that death is not an evil and that he, the better man, cannot be harmed by a worse, in life or in death.(28) These conclusions are crucial and Socrates' reasoning must be examined carefully.

According to Plato's Apology, the divine sign is a voice. Socrates tells the court that "whenever it speaks it turns me away from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me to do anything."(29) In essence, Socrates concedes that his speech and demeanor antagonize the jury and aggravate the prejudice against himself. Yet, the divine sign remains silent throughout the entire process of the trial. There is no opposition when Socrates leaves his home at dawn, when he enters the court, and none whatsoever during any part of his speech.(30) Thus, it is here (at Apology 40a-b-c) that Socrates anticipates the charge of megalegoria and answers it. Socrates cannot deny that to a large extent, he alone is responsible for the outcome of the trial. But he can answer the charge that he is entirely responsible by appealing to the complete absence of the voice. Indeed, in uncharacteristically strong epistemic language, Socrates asserts that "it is impossible that my customary sign did not oppose me if I was not about to do what was right."(31)

Socrates can easily judge how well he is being received by the responses of the jurors and spectators. Given the number of times he requests that they not make a disturbance, as well as those hostile outbursts not recorded by Plato, the speech is an irritant, perhaps the bitter medicine described in the Gorgias.(32) How then can Socrates conclude that death is not an evil and that the better man cannot be harmed by a worse from the silence of the voice?

At this point it is necessary to address the question of whether the speech is a parody of rhetoric, as observed by Riddell, Burnet, R.E. Allen, and others.(33) Suppose instead that the speech is factually correct, i.e., for Socrates the ultimate parody of forensic rhetoric is achieved by simply telling the truth.(34) Suppose further that when Socrates says "let the matter proceed as the god may wish" he intends exactly the opposite of a debater's trick in that he genuinely believes that the outcome of the trial is in fact the god's decision.(35) Here it is useful to recall that, according to Xenophon's Apology, the sign of the god (twice) prevents him from preparing a defense and that the conclusion that the god holds that it is better for him to die now is reached before he enters the court or delivers the speech recorded in Plato's Apology. Thus, the autobiographical account of Socrates' life given by Plato may well be the kind of account Socrates insists is unavoidable.(36) Socrates concludes his account of his life by affirming that he believes in the gods ("as none of my accusers do") and then states: "I leave it to you and the god to judge me in the way that will be best for me and for you."(37) If in fact Socrates believes that his speech is an accurate description of his life and if he also believes that his fulfillment of the divine mission is satisfactory, then suppose further that he also believes that he is innocent.(38) Then the verdict of guilty and subsequent penalty of death signal his release from the divine mission.(39) In addition, the death penalty itself represents a fitting reward for his service to Apollo--agana belea. But there are two additional conclusions found in Plato's Apology that are not found in Xenophon's. First, there is the conclusion that death is not an evil.(40) Worded carefully, this conclusion does not entail that death is good, or that it is better than life.(41) It only eliminates the "bad" from "good, bad, or indifferent."(42) Xenophon, apparently, is primarily concerned with the fact that Socrates' death is easy and to some extent advantageous. Although he emphasizes Socrates' nobility in the face of death, Xenophon does not consider what death is or is not; how it happens is more important than what it is. Plato, by way of contrast, does not focus on the question of how easily Socrates dies; perhaps it is assumed that it is common knowledge that death by hemlock is painless.(43)

The first conclusion, that death is not an evil, is stated in explicit, forceful language. It is more difficult to establish that the second conclusion is actually a knowledge claim to which Socrates gains entitlement by the silence of the voice. Before the verdict, Socrates insists that by killing him the Athenians will harm themselves more than they can harm him. In fact "I do not think it is permitted that a better man be harmed by a worse," Socrates urges; but then concedes, perhaps by pointing the accusing finger at Meletus or Anytus, that "certainly he might kill me, or perhaps banish or disfranchise me, which he and maybe others think to be great harm, but I do not think so."(44) It is evident that at this point in the trial, Socrates is not certain. He hedges with "I do not think," or in some translations, "I do not believe."(45) After the verdict, and after receiving the death penalty without opposition from the divine sign, Socrates strengthens the assertion by stating: "Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about death, and know of a certainty, that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death."(46) Thus, in Jowett's translation, the fact that Socrates is making a knowledge claim is immediate. But in other translations that statement may be weakened somewhat. Treddenick has "certain."(47) Grube has "truth," as does Woodhead.(48) A.M. Adam observes that the occurrence of alethes in this sentence is "emphatic" and this may be taken as decisive.(49)

Because of the precise wording of these conclusions, neither is a logical consequence of the other. Socrates does not delimit the first conclusion to the death of a good or better man. Rather, it is death, the death of anyone, that is not an evil. The second conclusion does entail that for Socrates, the better man, death at the hands of his inferiors is not a harm. If the better man cannot be harmed by the worse man, but the better man can be put to death by the worse man, it follows that for the better man, death is not a harm.(50)

Given the two conclusions discussed above as well as the observation that Socrates holds that it is better for him to die now, it is possible to consider a major objection to the claims advanced herein. Stated simply, if these are in fact the conclusions Socrates infers from the outcome of the trial, then it is necessary to explain why Socrates does not state them in response to Crito's demand for his escape. Although Crito makes a number of outlandish claims, including the fact that by accepting the death penalty, Socrates will orphan his children, there are three specific points that Socrates can address directly. When Crito observes that "your trial came to court when it need not have done so," Socrates can answer that the divine sign "has not opposed me either when I left home at dawn or when I came into court." When Crito complains about "the handling of the trial itself," Socrates can point out that the divine sign "has opposed no word or deed of mine" and "it is impossible that my customary sign did not oppose me if I was not about to do what was right." And, when Crito refers to the death penalty as "this absurd ending," Socrates can state: "What has happened to me now has not happened of itself, but it is clear to me that it was better for me to die now and to escape from trouble. That is why my divine sign did not oppose me at any point."(51) Indeed, given the principal claims of this paper, Socrates can add: "The god's decision is not a penalty but a reward, agana belea, a swift and painless death for my completion of the divine mission." Instead, Plato includes the dialogue with the Laws of Athens and emphasizes Socrates' obligation to obey the law.

That the outcome of the trial is the will of the god is a point which seems to be avoided by most commentators, perhaps because the statements leaving the event to the god are treated as rhetorical flourishes, part of the parody.(52) Still, Socrates does state that the verdict of guilty "was not unexpected" and then, after the death sentence: "this perhaps had to happen, and I think it is as it should be."(53) But if Socrates' mind is made up, as Xenophon observes, before the trial begins, the outcome is indeed expected. Expecting the outcome from the overwhelming amount of prejudice against him makes sense, but Socrates cannot believe that "it is as it should be" unless he either believes that he is guilty and deserves to be punished or believes that the outcome is the will of the god, i.e., an oracular response from the god that signals the end of the divine mission, in which case it is as it should be--the way the god wants it to be. He does not believe that he is guilty.(54)

Still, it may be objected that if the above conclusions were in fact the case, they constitute Socrates' principal reasons for not escaping and, consequently, can be stated by Plato in the Crito. This is not done. It is only at the conclusion of the Crito that Socrates speaks of the god influencing his decision.(55) It is crucial that in the Crito no mention of the divine sign is made at all.

It is not until the discussion of suicide in thePhaedo that Socrates states that the death penalty, understood as self-inflicted, is the will of the god. Socrates observes that "one should not kill oneself before a god had indicated some necessity to do so, like the necessity now put upon us."(56) By tracing the role of the god and the divine sign from Xenophon's Apology to Plato's Apology, and then to the Phaedo, it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that the death penalty for Socrates is in fact agana belea. That the Crito does not fit neatly into this pattern is less damaging than perplexing.

A certain island, Syriê by name/ you may have heard the name--lies off Ortýgia/ due west, and holds the sunsets of the year./ Not very populous, but good for grazing/ sheep and kine; rich too in wine and grain./ No dearth is ever known there, no disease/ wars on the folk, of ills that plague mankind;/ but when the townsmen reach old age, Apollo/ with his longbow of silver comes, and Artemis,/ showering arrows of mild death.

See James Riddell, ed., The Apology of Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1877; reprint ed., New York: Arno Press, 1973) pp. xx-xxv. (Abbr: Riddell.) In his criticism of Riddell, Burnet calls the exordium a "parody." See Burnet, EAC, p. 147. This theme is explored further by R.E. Allen in the chapter "Irony and Rhetoric in Plato's Apology." See R.E. Allen, Socrates and Legal Obligation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), pp. 3-16. (Abbr: Allen.)

Ap. 19a. Cf. Riddell, p. xxii. However common this invocation may be in the "Orators," there is no prima facie reason to disregard it in the speech of Socrates, especially when Socrates insists that he is telling the truth and completely avoiding the use of rhetoric.

Ap. 30d. "...attempting to have a man executed unjustly." Xenophon's Apology makes a joke out of this. In response to Apollodoros' complaint that he is being put to death unjustly, Socrates asks if he would rather see Socrates put to death justly. (Xen. Ap. 28.)

In addition, Ap. 35d contains a suppressed argument in reference to Socrates' innocence, roughly: If my accusers truly believed in the gods, they would expect divine retribution for attempting to have "the god's gift" executed unjustly. Socrates' refusal to propose a genuine penalty--and this includes exile--is also based on this point. If it is wrong for anyone to punish anyone unjustly, then it is wrong for Socrates to punish himself ("to say that I deserve some evil" at Ap. 37b).

Burnet (EAC, p. 146) cites Phd. 62c in support of this conclusion. But if Socrates does believe that he is innocent and also believes that the verdict of guilty and subsequent death penalty are the will of the god (Ap. 41 b), he must infer from this unjust conviction that the death penalty is the conclusion of the divine mission: "It is better to die now and be released...... at Ap. 41 d. (Cf. Kaplan, p. 39.)

Still, it may be observed that not all commentators hold that Socrates is innocent. Thomas West claims, "Socrates knew that he was guilty of the specific charge and therefore silently agreed with the judgment of guilty." See Thomas West, Plato's Apology of Socrates (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 224-225. (Abbr: West.)

Ap. 40b. Since the translations quoted in this paper do not distinguish sharply between harm and evil, the question is considered beyond its scope. C.C,W. Taylor, for example, places kakos, poneros, phaulos, and aischros under the heading "bad." See C.C.W. Taylor, Plato: Protagoras (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 226.

R. Hackfarth states, "it is implied that Socrates's drinking of the hemlock was a self-inflicted death, despite the compulsion." See R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1955), n. 4, p. 36. Also cf. Robert J. Bonner, "The use of hemlock for capital punishment" in Athenian Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940; reprint ed., New York: Arno Press, 1973), pp. 299-302. Although Bonner does not cite Xenophon's Apology, Aristophanes' Frogs is discussed. In addition, Bonner notes that hemlock is used in executions by the Thirty. Consequently, it is fair to assume that Plato believes that soon after the rule of the Thirty, it is common knowledge in Athens that execution by hemlock is an "easy death."

Ap. 30d. Tredennick calls this "the law of God," thereby emphasizing that themiton means a kind of divine law. See Hugh Tredennick, Plato: The Last Days of Socrates (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1954), p. 62. (Abbr: Tredennick.)

As Burnet (EAC, p. 205, 3Oc9) observes: "It is that the only real injury that can be done to any one is to make him a worse man. That is because the only real injury is an injury to the soul." Not everyone agrees. West (p. 175) reasons that Socrates "admits that he can be killed or banished or dishonored, but denies that these things are great evils. (He does not deny that they are evils: death, therefore, is an evil, even if not the greatest evil.)" A distinction between harm and evil cannot repair West's argument if the observation of G.X. Santas is correct. Santas claims that "kaka always harm (blabtein) the possessor of them." Hence, if death is an evil for the good (better) man, then death is a harm for the good (better) man. But death is not a harm for the good (better) man; therefore, death is not an evil for the good (better) man. In addition, if West were correct, then Socrates either changes his mind at Ap. 40c and Ap. 41d or, worse, simply contradicts himself. But this point is not made by Professor West (see pp. 222-232). See Gerasimos Xenophon Santas, Socrates (London: Routiedge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 184.

I.F. Stone, in the chapter "How Socrates antagonized the jury," discusses Xenophon's Apology and the problem of megalegoria. Although Stone points out that the voice opposed preparation of a speech twice and that Socrates receives an easy death, Stone unaccountably omits the passage (below) indicating that the god holds that it is better for Socrates to die now. In addition, there is no reference to Ap. 41 d. See I.F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1988), pp. 181-196. Stone does discuss Phd. 62c (pp. 194-196) as does A.D. Woozley, Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato's Crito (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979), p. 9, p. 58, and p. 70. Neither author takes seriously Xen. Ap. 7: "God in his kindness is taking my part and securing me the opportunity of ending my life not only in season but also in the way that is easiest." (Todd, p. 645.) Similar criticisms apply to the works cited above of West, Allen, Bloom, and Strauss. A notable exception is Adam (p. 100) who interprets beltion en at Ap. 41d "'it was better,' sc. in the minds of the gods, when they made their decision about my fate."