In 1942 radar was still relatively limited in its capacity, it providing some advantages in darkness and bad weather. But the Japanese were excellent at night fighting, as they had proven. Somerville is likely to have gotten mauled had he committed to an aggressive stance during the timeframe mentioned. But that is the beauty about books. They drive us to ponder...

George

--Previous Message-- : This book by Andrew Boyd, (Seaforth 2017) : covers the Royal Navy in the Far East, : mainly Malaysia and the Indian Ocean between : 1935-1942. It is an exhaustive study of : policy, planning and strategy with very : little if any focus on ships or operations : or combat. These items are discussed only : in the context of planning and strategy. : The author does a thorough job, perhaps too : much so for even the most devoted of RN : fans. It seemed to me that some topics that : covered fifty pages could reasonably be : handled in half that. So it made for slow : going particularly in the first two thirds : of the book. The reader will find, for : instance, that while substantial time is : spent on Force Z and its loss, the battle : itself isn't actually covered except : obliquely. The focus here is entirely upon : what led up to it in terms of planning and : policy, and the strategic impact afterwards. : : After the loss of Force Z the book then : skips entirely over the period from December : 11, 1941 to the end of March, 1942, to : focus, in the last chapter, on Ceylon and : the Indian Ocean. This might seem odd, but : as the focus of the book is actually upon : Malaya and the Indian Ocean it seems natural : to the reader by that point. : : Throughout the book Boyd makes it clear that : the RN, had it been given the necessary : resources, was a match for the IJN, though : he repeatedly admits that the resources were : not there. Whether this is true is a matter : for speculation as the RN actually had only : very limited direct combat with the IJN. : But if the experience of the EXETER and her : companions at the Java Sea battle is any : indication, it seems clear that at that : point in time, despite the combat experience : of EXETER, JUPITER, ENCOUNTER and ELECTRA : they were no match for the less experienced : IJN forces arrayed against them. : : The most questionable (and to me astounding) : assertion comes in the final chapter, when : talking about the IJN's raid on Ceylon in : April 1942, which resulted in the losses of : HERMES, DORSETSHIRE and CORNWALL, and : others, Boyd writes: : : "Somerville ran reckless risks but : brought his 'rabble' to the edge of an : extraordinary victory." : : Boyd's thesis here is that Somerville had : certain advantages: radar, and the night : combat experience of his fleet, which if : employed against the Japanese could have : given him a victory nearly as great as : Midway. : : This seems odd since Boyd admits that : Somerville had only one modernized : battleship WARSPITE, plus the R Class, which : were ( he says) useless, two modern carriers : with only 57 strike aircraft and 37 : fighters, with inexperienced aircrews and : ships that had not trained together. : Against this was Nagumo's experienced force : of five fleet carriers, with 275 aircraft, : the four KONGOs, two heavy cruisers, and a : screen of modern destroyers. : : And yet Boyd speculates that with luck, : Somerville might have inflicted serious : damage upon the Japanese carriers if he had : gone forward with a planned night strike : against Nagumo with radar equiped Albacores, : or the radar equiped light cruisers : ENTERPRISE and EMERALD. While admitting : that these were long shots, he demolishes : any prospect of success by pointing out that : Somerville's aircrews were untrained in : night torpedo attacks, having never : performed one. At the same time Boyd is, : (as were many in the Admiralty) highly : critical of Somerville, not for withdrawing : to avoid contact, but for risking his fleet : to far superior enemy forces. : : The one point that Boyd does make of : significant value, in this chapter, is his : criticism of Nagumo, pointing out that : Nagumo lacked flexibility and the Japanese : demonstrated the same rigid thinking and : mistakes that would bring them disaster at : Midway two months later. But these were not : readily visible in April, since they : suffered only minor aircraft losses. : : This book has valuable information and : insights despite those few areas in which : one might disagree, and so I recommend it to : anyone interested in this often overlooked : subject. : : :