European Disintegration: A Search for Explanation by Hans Vollard

The European Union (EU) stands proudly
as the longest and most advanced process of international/transnational
collaboration among different independent countries in an effort to pool sovereignty
to common policies for all members, the most important accomplishments being the
EU’s single market, the European Single Currency (known as the Euro), and
cross-border co-operation of the Schengen area. Moreover, it is the only
international organization to ever receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012.”[1] Beginning
as a small organization of six war-torn countries in 1957, the EU has enjoyed a
period of ever-expanding competences (deepening) and members (widening); it currently
stands after six decades of integration with twenty-eight members and more
wanting to join.

However, throughout the last two
decades, the EU has dealt with a seemingly never-ending string of crises, from
the failure to ratify the EU constitutional treaty in France and the
Netherlands, the Eurozone economic/debt crisis, which affected a number of
peripheral Eurozone countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus, but also
Spain and Italy),[2]
and in 2016, when Europe was shocked by the UK’s decision to leave the EU after
almost forty years of membership. More recently, a number of EU countries and
the EU itself have been facing the Syrian refugee crisis. For some, these crises
have put a serious dent in the EU’s popularity and prospects for longevity,
while others have started to wonder whether the ending of the whole European
integration process is near.

Against this backdrop, Hans Vollaard examines
whether the EU is disintegrating or has already disintegrated, how far in
advance one could tell if this was indeed happening, what this disintegration
would look like, what kind of indicators of disintegration one should look for,
and what factors can explain disintegration. Vollaard defines disintegration as
not just the mere exit of an EU member or the EU’s total collapse, but also as “partial
withdrawals” in the form of “withholding of resources, pulling out from
(certain) decision-making process, and decreasing compliance with EU law,
whether by member state governments, or businesses, individuals, and sub-state
authorities.”[3]
Vollard focuses on the political dimension of European disintegration
understood as the allocation of EU values, such as “the EU legislative output,
the scope of its policies, its competences, its institutions, the involvement
and sense of belonging among its members (states and citizens), and the size of
its territory.”[4]
Thus, the book does not consider other aspects of disintegration, notably the
economic dimension as discussed by the Optimal Currency Area theory regarding
the Eurozone. Vollard’s main argument is that most of the mainstream EU
theories either do not or cannot offer a comprehensive explanation or
prediction of EU disintegration; rather alternative theories used for
nation-state formation and representation of interests at the national level
are better suited to explain or predict disintegration. Indeed, one of the objectives
of the book is to expand on the framework suggested by Bartolini, which focuses
on theories of state formation in European countries.[5] In
addition, if one takes this argument to its logical end, one should not really expect
an “Armageddon” style of disintegration in the form of a collapse of the EU,
but rather partial withdrawals in policy areas or patchy implementation of some
EU legislation.

The book is just over 250 pages and is
neatly divided into ten chapters, discussing various theories of European
integration and how they can explain or not explain EU disintegration. The book
can be divided into two main parts. The first part consists thematically of chapters
2-5, presenting the mainstream theories of European integration, namely,
neo-functionalism; realism, intergovernmentalism, and liberal
intergovernmentalism; federalism; and comparative imperialism. In each case,
Vollaard argues that these theories do not apply, and if they did apply,they
would be inadequate to explain European disintegration. The second part
consists of chapters 6-10, where the author argues in favor of Bartolini’s
framework and aims to develop it further by introducing four propositions of
European disintegration. In particular, Vollaard puts forward in the sixth
chapter four propositions, which are as follows: Proposition 1 states that “the
unattractiveness of alternatives and limited voice allowed European integration
to take off;”[6] proposition 2 states that “the weak external consolidation
of the EU and its predecessors has restrained its internal construction;”[7] the
third proposition claims that the “external de-consolidation of the EU’s member
states has weakened their internal construction.”[8] The
fourth proposition is divided into two parts, with proposition 4a stating that
“the stronger the EU-directed dissatisfaction, the lower the EU loyalty, the
less (perceived) options to effective voice at the EU level, the less
compensation for EU-directed dissatisfaction, the lower the perceived costs to
leave the EU, and the better the perceived provision of values and goods by
national or international alternatives to the EU, the more likely the full
exist is.”[9] Proposition
4b states that “with high costs for leaving fully, and without high EU loyalty,
effective voice in the EU, compensation for EU-directed dissatisfaction and
attractive full exit options, EU-directed dissatisfaction induces partial exits
within the EU and voice for the exit and non-entry of others.”[10]
Each proposition is developed in a separate chapter from 7 to 10 chapters
respectively in a theoretical rather than empirical fashion.

The book is definitely a welcome
contribution to the field of study by discussing the key premises behind the
process of European disintegration that any student of European integration
should read and reflect about the state of the EU and its future. One could
argue, however, that the book has some limitations. First, it adopts a rather
generous definition of disintegration where opt-outs from EU policies or poor
implementation of the EU acquis can be seen as signs of disintegration. This is
arguably problematic given that, in some cases, poor implementation of EU
policy may be down to low capability of member states and not resistance to
integration.[11]
Moreover, it is questionable whether opt-outs can be understood as examples of
disintegration or examples of flexible integration, which actually prevents
disintegration. The Danish opt-out from the Eurozone not only alleviated Danish
fears of social dumping but also kept Denmark in the EU without any further
resentment.

Secondly, readers may feel a bit
disappointed that the book suggests propositions and not hypotheses. More
importantly, some of the propositions seem either obvious or axiomatic, while
others may be problematic to test empirically. For instance, proposition 1 does
not take into account the historical context behind European integration,
namely the aim to prevent another inter-European war by intertwining nation
states with common policies overseen by an outside authority. Arguing that the
lack of alternatives and limited voice was the main reason behind the take-off
of European integration seems to be missing the “elephant in the room” of WWI
and WWII, the European nationalism, war atrocities, and inter-European
animosity of the previous century.[12] Propositions
2 and 3 seem a bit contradictory and somewhat problematic: the EU has a
relatively strong external and internal construction without any problems (for
instance the external common tariff of the customs union; the single market;
the common voice in WTO) while at the same time traditional
intergovernmentalists would argue that a stronger EU is not linked to a weaker
nation state in Europe: on the contrary, the EU strengthens EU states by giving
them economic, political and geo-strategic benefits that without the EU would
not be available.[13]

Proposition 4, which really is two related
but still separate propositions, is quite long and has a plethora of variables
that are making difficult to empirically test their significance. For instance,
proposition 4 seems unable to explain Brexit. Following figure 10.1, the full
exit scenario is the result of a number of conditions that satisfy propositions
4a and 4b, but are not really applicable in the case of Brexit. In particular,
when the UK expressed dissatisfaction with EU projects and policies, they were
allowed to opt-out from undesirable policies like the Euro and Schengen. The UK
also notoriously received a special rebate as compensation from the EU.
Moreover, the UK has a considerable influence and voice in the EU being one of
the most powerful and influential member state.[14] Britain
will also suffer a very high cost from leaving the EU in the form of losing single
market access and its voting rights/influence in the various EU institutions.
In addition, it seems that there is no better alternative to EU membership.
Despite all these conditions not being present that the author states are
essential for a full exit, the UK voted and decided to fully leave the EU in
2016, a decision that it remains to be seen how if at all will be implemented.
Thus, one wonders how useful these propositions are in explaining European
disintegration.

Third, the book does not compare the EU
with other integration efforts and claims that there have not been any large
scale disintegration cases in Europe. One remains to wonder therefore why the
book does not discuss at all the relatively promising alternative to the EU but
ultimately failed effort of European integration: the European Free Trade Area
(EFTA). The EFTA was set up as a rival to the EU, but its members gradually gave
up the project and ended up members of the then EEC. It would have been quite a
useful comparison to test integration vs disintegration with two real life
examples and apply the book’s key arguments. For instance, the author gives
great importance to satisfaction/dissatisfaction and loyalty. The EFTA, however,
was hardly an issue of satisfaction or loyalty in terms of public opinion,
parties and voting behaviour.

One final point that readers of the book
should reflect upon is how seriously we should take the aforementioned crises
as signs of EU disintegration. For instance, Brexit seems to have instigated a
wave of pro-EU feeling among European nations,[15]
while the UK seems to be in dire straits over managing the whole kerfuffle of
leaving the EU. Similarly, the Eurozone remained intact and there is no crisis
on the horizon for the Euro and most Eurozone members. Moreover, public opinion
in Europe is increasingly becoming nationalistic but this is not so much about
the EU per se but more about outside immigration/refugee crisis as seen in the
case of Alternative for Deutschland in Germany.

In sum, the book is a timely addition to
the field of European studies and tries to contribute to the discussion about
the current state and future of the EU. It remains to be seen whether it
provides more answers or questions but this is arguably one of the strongest aspects
of the book’s appeal.

Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for
Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Cornell
University Press.

Papadimitriou, D. , Pegasiou, A. And
Zartaloudis, S. (2019), European elites and the narrative of the Greek crisis:
A discursive institutionalist analysis. European Journal of Political Research.
doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12287

[2] See Papadimitriou, D. , Pegasiou, A. And Zartaloudis, S. (2019),
European elites and the narrative of the Greek crisis: A discursive
institutionalist analysis. European Journal of Political Research.
doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12287

[12] See inter alia, Mazower, M. (1999) Dark Continent: Europe’s
Twentieth Century, Penguin, for an excellent historical analysis of how
nationalism and socialism as anti-liberal ideologies almost destroyed Europe
before during and after WWII.