(2) Wang said he had listened
with regret because he thought after more than month of consideration my
government would have reacted favorably to Chou's August 2 letter and to draft agreed announcement.
Said my statement showed once more we not sincerely interested
preventing nuclear war. Wang
said his government position clear and consistent, always standing for
general disarmament and complete ban nuclear weapons. Gave lengthy
review in most general terms of his government's “unremitting efforts
for general disarmament and destruction nuclear weapons”. Wang said his government convinced
mankind will destroy nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons will not
destroy mankind. Said his government had put forth both general
objectives and concrete measures to reach general disarmament and
destruction nuclear weapons. Said there was sharp contrast between his
proposal and tripartite treaty which “divorced discontinuance of nuclear
tests from total banning nuclear weapons”. Alleged only by adopting
Chinese proposal could real progress be made. Referred to ChiCom call
for conference heads of all nations of world and said facts have shown
that without participation China no major international question can be
settled. Era when handful of big powers take all in their hands is
passed. Said proposal for nuclear-free zone in accord with overwhelming
desire people of Asia. Enumerated various provisions called for in
Chou letter and draft
announcement. Said it was high time we took action extricate ourselves
from difficult situation posed by fact people of countries where we had
military bases opposed our presence. Wang said believed agreement on draft presented last
meeting would facilitate smooth settlement other disputes between China
and US. Said draft was only statement of principle not containing any
complicated technical questions and therefore agreement should be
reached in a relatively short time. Said once agreement in principle
reached, technical questions such as verification and control could be settled through
further negotiations between the two sides.

Said we had even got “Chiang clique” sign tripartite
treaty.5The Republic of China signed the
treaty on August 23. This showed hostility to his country and
was new plot to create two Chinas. Said nuclear fraud of USG could not succeed. Said he was calling
on me to “reconsider” their proposal but immediately started his
sentence over saying “give careful consideration” to proposal for it was
major question which we called on to discuss seriously in this meeting.
Invited constructive views on it.

(3) Wang said report by French
correspondent of fifth American allegedly imprisoned was complete
fabrication.

(4) I said disarmament was very complicated subject on which we have
negotiated in Geneva for very long time. This suggests Wang incorrect in saying we not
interested in elimination threat nuclear war. Fact we have been able
sign treaty with USSR and UK is step forward and at least 88 nations
have signed treaty. Said we had given detailed documents on our position
re disarmament while Chinese proposal was vague and certainly not clear
to us. Said his side had repeatedly talked of anxiety to reach general
disarmament and prohibition nuclear weapons—why then did they not sign
test ban treaty which is important step in that direction. Reminded him
he had said number of nations had expressed sympathy for his side's
proposals and inquired which these were. Said he had mentioned so-called
Vietnam Democratic Republic support. Considering blatant intervention
that regime in Laos and South Vietnam, I did not think this was good
endorsement for proposals. Said while we shared to considerable extent
basic objectives as he had described them in connection his side's
proposals, we were far from convinced deeds matched words his side and
certain care was essential in any scheme for disarmament to make sure
there was no cheating.

(6) Wang continued with long
dissertation peaceful intent his Government and USG obstruction to disarmament efforts. Listed testing and
other activities by USG which he thought
inconsistent with spirit recently signed treaty. Again asked for serious
consideration draft agreed
announcement and returned to theme of convocation of Heads of Nations
for conference on total disarmament. Said that proposal had been
endorsed by many countries including North Korea, North Vietnam,
Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Albania, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone.
Read at length endorsements by Prince Sihanouk, Emperor Haile Selassie,
and Bertrand Russell, and numerous editorials from newspapers (some of
which I recognized as being pro-Commie). Said fact so many countries had
signed tripartite treaty shows US authorities have abused innocent
peaceful wishes of people of these countries in order serve selfish
interest USG and was continuance policy of satellization. Quoted Time magazine saying, “effect of treaty
negligible.”

(7) I expressed regret Wang had
not spelled out more fully what was meant by his side's proposals and
recalled we had not received comments from their side on our explicit
and detailed positions re disarmament which earlier passed him.

Reminded Wang actions we had
taken since tripartite treaty had been in accord with that treaty and we
had no intention accept moratoria as we did before and find ourselves
surprised by nuclear testing. Asked Wang whether his side when able would test in air and
under sea, and whether reports true his side working hard as it could to
get nuclear power at same time talking nuclear disarmament.

(8) Wang simply replied by saying
mankind confronted with serious nuclear threat and specifically his
country now faced with nuclear threat coming from US. Therefore
necessary put forward draft agreed announcement which is not vague but
specific, practical and feasible and formed useful basis for
negotiations.

Next meeting November 13.

Before talk I told correspondents at entrance that no significance should
be read into presence of photographers who in view of precedents were
briefly admitted by mutual consent. After talk I said to correspondents
that no inference should be drawn from length of talk. This was because
there seemed to be impression among correspondents that something
important was impending. At end of talk one correspondent asked whether
atmosphere was cordial and I, knowing correspondent was well aware that
Wang and I are very blunt
with each other, said ironically that atmosphere was always cordial.

1Cabot commented and sent
recommendations for the next meeting in telegram 516, September 12.
He commented that in view of the Sino-Soviet rift, the Department
was presumably considering whether a “more conciliatory tone on our
part in talks might pay off.” He stated that he saw “no signs
whatever as yet it would”, but he thought the Department “should
study situation in light its overall knowledge to judge whether any
change in atmospherics of the talks would be worthwhile experiment.”
(Ibid.) He sent a detailed, apparently verbatim report of the
meeting in airgram A-235, September 14. (Ibid.)

2Telegram 390, September
4, provided guidance for the meeting. (Ibid.)

3Paragraph 1 concerned arrangements for the return
of six deportees. Paragraph 2 stated that discussions were to take
place in Hong Kong between the parties involved in one of the
shipping incidents raised at the previous meeting. Paragraph 3
instructed Cabot to request
information concerning Robert Howden, reported by a French
journalist to be an American in prison in China.

4Paragraph 4 instructed
Cabot to call attention
to discrepancies in Chinese statements on disarmament. Paragraph 5
instructed him to call attention to various U.S. statements and
suggested that he give Wang
a copy of Documents on Disarmament, 1961; it
stated that the Department did not intend to answer Chou's letter or comment further
on the agreed announcement Wang had proposed at the August 7 meeting (see Document 183), since it believed the
Chinese might be hoping for an outright U.S. rejection of their
proposals used to justify their own nuclear tests.

6Paragraph 9 instructed
Cabot that the United
States intended to maintain an attitude of firmness without
hostility and was prepared to “wait patiently until Wang's side is willing to
cooperate in lessening tensions.”

7Paragraph 5 (C) summarized U.S. criteria concerning
nuclear-free zones. For a statement of U.S. views on this subject as
set forth on October 29 in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly
by Charles C. Stelle, see Department of State Bulletin, November 18, 1963, pp. 797-798.