This
appeal by special leave arises from the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
in Writ Petition No.2677/93, dated November 4, 1993. The admitted facts are that the
site bearing No. 187-B, Industrial area, Chandigarh was alloted to his. Johnson Paints & Varnish Co. For industrial
use. The allottee was Kulraj Singh Paul, S/o Sardar Gurbax Singh. The allotment
came to be made in the year 1965 at a concessional rate of Rs.10/- per sq.yd.
Default was committed in payment of the instalments. Consequently, the site was
resumed on April 26,
1967. On with penal
amounts prescribed under the Rules the property was handed over again to the
respondent. Thereafter, since it was not constructed, the property was again
resumed in the year 1981. The respondent filed the writ petition, which was
dismissed. LPA was also dismissed and when the SLP was filed, this Court
confirmed the order of dismissal. Thus the entitlement to the allotment became
final and the controversy became quiteous.

Subsequently,
the respondent filed an application under Rule 11-D of the Chandigarh (Sale of Sites and Building) Rules
1960 (For short, the 'Rules'). Rule ll-D {i) envisages that where a site has
been resumed under Section 8-A of Act 27 of 1952 for any reason, the Estate
Officer may, on an application, retransfer the site to the out-going transferee
on payment of an amount equal to 10 per cent of the premium originally payable
for such property or 1/3rd of the difference between the price originally paid
and its value at the time when the application for retransfer is made,
whichever is more. The other clauses are not relevant for the purpose of this
case including the proviso which bears relevance provided sub-clause (l) of
Rule 11-D is satisfied.

Hence
they are omitted. The Estate Officer had refused to make retransfer of
allotment and the petition was rejected.

Consequently,
the respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court which was allowed
directing the appellant to allot the site to the respondent. Thus this appeal
by special leave.

Shri Arun
Jaitley, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that it
would appear from the circumstances in this case that the respondent Kulraj
Singh Paul is only acting for the benefit of Tejpal Singh Brar, Narindra Brar
and Gurinder Brar, ss/o Sardar Gursewak Singh Brar r/o 5997, Sector 18, Chandigarh.
Therefore, the respondent is not a transferee. The Estate Officer is not
obliged to order retransfer to the allottee Kulraj Singh Paul. In support
thereof, he read out the recitals in the general power of attorney, the
conditions of allotment and also the recitals in the Will purported to have
been executed by Kulraj singh Paul in favour of the aforesaid three
individuals. Shri M.L. Verma, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondent contended that the condition precedent for rejection of the claim is
that the third party right is created by Kulraj Singh Paul in favour of third
parties. There is no evidence to establish that any third party rights have
been effected by Kulraj Singh paul. The original order of rejection does not
contain any reasons.

The
High Court has given valid reasons in directing re-allotment under Rule ll-D of
the Rules. Therefore, it is not a case warranting interference.

The
only question is: whether the High Court was justified in directing
re-allotment of the industrial site to the respondent? After looking into the
facts and circumstances and the material before us, we are of the considered
view that the High Court was not justified in giving the direction. It would
appear that Kulraj Singh Paul is not acting for himself as a transferee. He
appears to be acting for and on behalf of Shri Tej Paul Brar, Narinder Brar and
Gurinder Brar, ss/o Shri Gursewak Singh Brar. It is an submitted fact that Kulraj
Singh Paul is now staying with Gurusewak Singh Brar. If he really is staying as
such, there is no need for him to mention in his rejoinder affidavit filed in
this Court his factory number instead of his residential number as residence.
In the Power of Attorney, one would generally come across giving the power to
specified individual to act for and on behalf of the principal. It would be
redundant to give power of attorney in favour of three persons instead of a
single individual to deal with a single industrial site which is a the subject
matter of the proceedings. Unless there is a right created in him, there would
be no need to execute a power of attorney of the very self-same property. We
can understand if there is any allotment made and he became the owner; then he
may legitimately be entitled to entrust its management to any of his agents in
whom he has confidence. It is not the situation available under the record. It
would further be clear that a Will is purported to be created in favour of three
parties, namely, the self-same three persons. When the Will and the General
Power of Attorney are read together, it would be clear that he is purporting to
act not for himself, but on behalf of the aforesaid three persons mentioned in
the General Power of Attorney who do not appear to have a confidence in each
another to obtain the property from Kulraj Singh. The entitlement appears to be
on behalf of their joint family. Although it was to pre-empt possible claim by
any one as his individual property, the power of attorney was executed in their
favour, the question is:

whether
the appellant is required to regrant the industrial site to the said person? It
is seen that once the original allotment stands cancelled and the resumption
became final, the allottee was no right in the allotted site. Rule ll-D deals
with only discretionary power given to the Estate Officer. The only right the
erstwhile outgoing transferee had was to make an application. On making the
application, he has to satisfy the criteria laid down under the Rule. We doubt
the very bona fides in introducing Rule ll-D to provide a back door entry from
the lost rights. But on the facts in this case, it is not necessary to go into
the wisdom of introducing Rule ll-D. Suffice it to state that it does not
clothe him with any right to the allotment as of right. It being a
discretionary benefit sought to be given to the outgoing transferee in the
language of the rule, the outgoing transferee must, in fact and in reality, be
the real, genuine and bona fide transferee and for him alone the benefit may be
given for consideration under Rule 11.

On the
facts in this case and for the circumstances narrated above, it is clear that
he is not a transferee. But he is acting for an on behalf of the aforesaid
three person.

Under
those circumstances, the High Court was wholly wrong in giving the direction to
the appellant to exercise the power under Rule ll-D and to reallot the site.

The
appeal is accordingly allowed with costs quantified at Rs.10,000/-.