As I agreed this afternoon, I am
attaching the memoranda of the
conversations with Marshal Stalin on
military matters which took place during
the middle of October. You will see that
these conversations set out in more detail
the information contained in General
Deane's and my cables.

Sincerely,

[George Marshall]

Enclosures:

Notes of Meetings

October 14, 1944

October 15, 1944

October 17, 1944

General H. H. Arnold,

Commanding General,

Army Air Forces,

Room 3-E -- 1009

Pentagon Building.

COPY

Conversation, October
14, 1944

Present:

Marshal I. V. Stalin

Mr. V. M. Molotov, People's
Commissar for Foreign Affairs

General of Armies A. I.
Antonov

Lieutenant General Shevchenko

Mr. Pavlov, Soviet Interpreter

The British Prime Minister, Mr.
Churchill

Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke

General Sir Henry Hastings
Ismay

Major General Jacob

General Burrows

Major A. H. Birse, Second Secretary
of British Embassy

The American Ambassador, Mr.
Harriman

Major General John R. Deane

Mr. Edward Page, Second Secretary
of Embassy

Subject: The Military
Situation

I.

Field Marshal Brooke gave a detailed
explanation of the Allied military
operations in western Europe, Italy, and
Burma. A copy of his remarks as taken down
by General Jacob is attached hereto.

II.

General Deane gave a full account of
the Pacific operation of the Allies. A
copy of the statement made by him is
attached hereto.

III.

General Antonov gave the following
account of the Russian military
operations:

-2-

After successful operations in
liberating White Russia, in advancing to
the East Prussian frontier and to the
Vistula River, and in defeating the German
groupings in Rumania which resulted in the
withdrawal of Rumania from the war, the
Soviet armies started flanking operations
in the Baltic and in Rumania, the latter
continuing on into Hungary. It was decided
that before invading Germany the Baltic
must be entirely cleaned up of enemy
groupings which were still looming over
the Soviet forces, since it was believed
by the Soviet High Command that it would
be most difficult to invade Germany until
the Baltic had been completely liberated.
For this reason operations were conducted
from Siauliai westward to Memel and from
Valk westward to Riga. At the same tine
operations were carried on to liberate the
islands of Osel and Dago. Soviet forces
advancing from Siauliai have arrived on
the Baltic seacoast north and south of
Memel. Now all the German communications
from the Baltic leading into Germany have
been taken. In addition Riga was occupied
yesterday. The operations in the islands
of Osel and Dago have almost been
completed, There are small enemy groupings
in the southern part of Osel. As a result
of the Baltic operations about 30 German
divisions have been entrapped in the
coastal regions between Riga and Memel. As
these divisions are still intact, the
Baltic operations cannot be considered as
completed. These German groupings must be
liquidated.

In the south the Soviet armies have
reached the Tisza River on a broken front
reaching from Solnok to the junction of
the Tisza and the Danube. On October 14
Soviet forces were fighting southwest of
Debretsen where the main German groupings
are concentrated. Three German tank
divisions and numerous infantry divisions
are located in this locality. As a result
of the Soviet troops reaching Debretsen
and the Tisza, the enemy groupings
northeast and south of Kluj are in a
difficult position. They are forced to
retreat in order to avoid
encirclement.

In Yugoslavia Soviet forces fighting
with Tito have reached the outskirts of
Belgrade. (Earlier in the conversation
Marshal Stalin stated that the Red Army
would not advance farther west in
Yugoslavia after capture of Belgrade but
would concentrate on occupying Hungary and
on encircling as many as possible of the
German forces there. He explained that the
drive in this sector would be through
Austria to take Vienna. This would open up
a route into Germany to the west of
Czechoslovakia and then to the northwest
in the direction of the Oder at
Breslau.)

-3-

It may appear at first sight that the
enemy has freedom of movement on the
central front. This is not true in fact.
On this front, although there are no
operations with major objectives, the
enemy forces are tied down. They are being
contained by continuous battles. The
purpose of these operations is to sound
out the enemy defenses, especially on the
East Prussian frontier.

In reply to a question raised by the
Prime Minister, it was stated that the
total German strength on all fronts
numbered 180 divisions dispersed as
follows: in the Baltic, 30 divisions
(encircled); in Hungary, 22 to 23; in the
north, 8; in the center, 120.

In addition the Hungarians have 26
divisions at their disposal.

Opposing these enemy forces are 300
Soviet divisions.

With respect to the Hungarian forces,
the Hungarian Government was not carrying
out the preliminary armistice conditions
accepted several days ago. If they failed
to do so within two days, the Soviet
armies would advance. In any event, the
Hungarian divisions were almost
encircled.

At the present time the main task is
clear -- to clean up the Baltic and to
force Hungary to withdraw from the war .
When this was done, the Soviet armies
would be faced with their main objective -
the invasion of Germany. It is hard to say
in which direction this invasion will take
place. Much will depend on the result of
the operations now going on. In any case
it may be stated that the success of the
Soviet operations in Hungary opens up a
new route into Germany from the south.
Consequently invasion can come from both
the east and the south. It may possibly
turn out that the southern route will be
more feasible since the Germans have no
prepared defenses there.

In reply to a question raised by the
Prime Minister, General Antonov stated
that it was hard to give an indication of
the timing of the invasion. The strong
groupings in the Baltic must be wiped out.
It was now autumn in Hungary and weather
conditions were bad. The Soviets were
faced with the same communications
difficulties which Marshal Brook had
mentioned. Roads and railroads had been
destroyed and they must be repaired.

- 4 -

IV.

The Prime Minister inquired whether,
broadly speaking, it could be anticipated
that the Germans would be unable to move
their forces from the east to the
west.

Marshal Stalin now actively entered the
conversation. He said that he believed
that operations would proceed more rapidly
than General Antonov anticipated. The
Baltic divisions, which he said were 38 in
number, were out of commission and tied
down in the area between Memel and Riga.
It was very difficult to move them out and
embarrassing for the Germans to operate
without them. If the Soviets were to place
against these divisions 50 divisions,
which it was easy to do since the Soviet
Government had a superiority and "could
indulge in such a luxury", these German
divisions were doomed. In addition, the
Germans were obliged to disperse their
forces over the entire front which the
Soviet armies were keeping alive. The fact
that the Soviets had encircled these 38
divisions obviously assisted the Russians
elsewhere. At the present time large areas
were exposed to Soviet blows and it was
unlikely that the Germans could hold out.
This was also true in the south. The
Soviet High Command anticipated cutting
off another large German grouping and then
advancing on a line to Bratislava, Vienna,
and the Moravian Gate. All the German
groupings in this area would be encircled.
This of course would facilitate blows in
the north. But it was not thought by
Marshal Stalin that the Germans would be
finished off this year. The Soviet armies
would probably have a winter campaign
after a short breathing spell, and after
January it would be easier to say when
Germany would collapse. In any case the
two difficult German positions in the
north and south "testify to the fact that
they (the Germans) would not be able to
move any forces from the east to the
west". Since the Soviet High Command
expected to knock out Hungary by
persuasion or by force, the German
position would be very embarrassing.
Czechoslovakia would be exposed and the
Russians would be able to advance right up
to Breslau. If the British and Americans
as Allies requested the Russians to
release certain German divisions, the
Russians would refuse to do so.

Marshal Stalin then turned to the
Warsaw situation. He explained that
operations there resembled the operations
against Kiev. The Dniepr River, for
example, was 600 meters in width, whereas
the Vistula was 700 meters. Both Kiev and
Warsaw were situated on heights on the
eastern bank. If the Soviet forces
attempted to take Warsaw by a frontal
attack, they would be oblige to destroy
the city, This they did not wish to do, In
addition they were unable to make full use
of

-5-

their air forces because of their
reluctance to destroy Warsaw. They were
planning to outflank the city like
Stalingrad. The timing of the encirclement
of Warsaw and the attack on East Prussia
would of course depend upon the progress
of operations on the two flanks mentioned
by General Antonov.

The Prime Minister remarked that the
Germans had 7 or 8 divisions in Finland.
Marshal Stalin stated that at the present
time the Red Army was only two miles from
Petsamo and expected to take the area any
day now. There were remnants of three
German divisions in this area which might
attempt to withdraw through Sweden into
Norway. In addition there were five German
divisions in the Rovanarvi (?) area in the
north central part of Finland. An
offensive was planned also against these
divisions which were not up to full
strength but were well equipped. They also
might request the Swedes to let them
through. Marshal Stalin suggested the
possibility of a joint British and Russian
operation in Norway to cut off these
divisions. The Prime Minister explained
that the British had no more ground forces
available but were ready to discuss any
feasible manner of assisting the Russians
by naval cooperation. He requested the
Marshal to let him know what the British
could do. The Marshal said that be would
do so after Petsamo had been captured.

Marshal Stalin handed to the Prime
Minister and the American Ambassador a
note which was being transmitted to the
head of the Hungarian Mission in Moscow. A
copy of this note is attached. It was
agreed that the next meeting, at which
time Russian participation in the war
against Japan would be discussed, would
take place at six o'clock tomorrow.

EP: nn

Copy for General Deane

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR.
5200.0

TRANSLATION

SECRET

TO THE HEAD OF THE HUNGARIAN MISSION,
COLONEL-GENERAL FARAGO GABOR.

The Hungarian truce representative,
Colonel Utasi Lourend, who has arrived in
Szeged from Budapest, is an utterly
uninformed person, and, in virtue of this,
is unable to carry on negotiations with
the representatives of the Soviet Command
regarding the fulfilment by the Hungarian
Government of the preliminary armistice
conditions.

The Hungarian Government requested the
Soviet Government to discontinue the
offensive in the sector towards Budapest
in order that it might remove a part of
its troops from this sector and send them
to Budapest.

The Soviet Government granted this
request of the Hungarian Government, yet
the latter not only did not remove its
troops from the River Tisa in order to
send them to Budapest, but resumed
operations especially in the Szolnok
area.

The aforementioned circumstances show
that the Hungarian Government has
apparently started on the course of
non-fulfilment of the preliminary
armistice conditions undertaken by it.

With reference to the above, the High
Command of the Soviet forces requires that
the Hungarian Government, within 48 hours
of receipt of these present demands, shall
fulfil the obligations which it has
undertaken regarding the preliminary
armistice conditions and above all:

Break off any relations whatsoever
with the Germans and begin active
military operations against their
troops;

Set about the withdrawal of
Hungarian troops from the territories
of Roumania, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia;

Send in the same way as before, via
Szeged, by 0800 hours on the 16th
October, full information of the
dispositions of German and Hungarian
troops to the representatives of the
Soviet Command, and, at the same time,
report to the aforementioned Soviet
representatives on the progress that
has been made in carrying out the
preliminary armistice conditions.

14th October, l944.

By authority of the Supreme High
Command of the Soviet Forces: Deputy Chief
of the General Staff of the Red Army, army
General ANTONOV.

TOP SECRET

Detailed explanation of
the Allied military operations in western
Europe, Italy, and Burma, as given by
Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke at a meeting
held in the Kremlin on October 14, l944.
Referred to in paragraph I of memorandum
of conversation.

1. THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY.

(a) Western Front

Sir Alan Brooke explained, with the
help of a map, the present position of the
armies on the Western front. He pointed
out that the speed of the advance was now
dependent upon the organization of
supplies. The armies were still depending
largely on Cherbourg, and were served by a
road and rail system which had not yet
been properly restored. It was of very
great importance to get the use of Antwerp
as soon as possible. We had secured the
port intact, but had not yet got the sea
approaches, and operations were now in
progress directed to clearing the Germans
from the islands on the North of the
Scheldt, and from the bridgehead which
they still held on the South bank. At the
sane time, operations were in progress
Northward from Antwerp and Eastward from
the Corridor, in order to clear the
country West and South of the Meuse.
Meanwhile 15,000 Germans were invested in
Dunkirk, and other garrisons were in
Lorient, St. Nazaire, Bordeaux and the
Channel Islands.

On the main front of the armies there
were some 60 German Divisions, though
these were not up to full strength. The
Allies now had 60, and would have 78 by
the end of the year -thanks to the flow of
American Divisions.

Mr. Churchill remarked that the Allied
Divisions were strong Divisions. If
allowance was made for Corps troops, Army
troops, and the appropriate proportion of
line of communication troops, the overall
strength of a British Division worked out
at about 40,000, and an American Division
at about 50,000 men.

Marshal Stalin enquired what we thought
was the equivalent strength of the German
Divisions.

Sir Alan Brooke said that if they were
up to strength, they could be reckoned at
more than 25,000. We were not being held
back by lack of men, but purely by
maintenance facilities. A large quantity
of ammunition would be required for the
forcing of the Siegfried. Line, and this
had not yet been accumulated the front.
The Allied plan

- 2 -

was first to reach the Rhine, then to
force a crossing North and South of the
Ruhr, with the object of encircling the
industrial area. The main axis of the
Allied advance would then be directed on
Berlin. Simultaneously there would be an
advance on the Southern front towards
Frankfurt, and then North Eastward towards
Leipzig. The advance would, however,
depend upon the progress of the main
thrust in the North. On the extreme right
of the line, the American and French
Armies which had advanced from Marseilles
would operate through the Belfort Gap,
seize crossings over the Rhine, and move
East. This, however, was more in the
nature of a feint. We expected
difficulties in forcing the crossing of
the Rhine, but hoped to achieve it with
the help of airborne divisions. At the
present moment Aachen was surrounded, and
fighting was proceeding in the
streets.

Mr. Churchill emphasised that the
Allies in the West had a large superiority
of force once the communications could be
developed to the pitch of enabling this
force to be deployed and supplied. We
hoped to be able to cut off about 150,000
Germans in Holland, and would then

drive steadily towards Berlin. All
this, however, depended upon the Russian
Armies on the Eastern front holding great
German forces now deployed there. Any
large switch of German Divisions from East
to West would alter the position.

Marshal Stalin enquired whether the
operations which had been described scald
take place in the near future.

Sir Alan Brooke said that they would be
continuous.

Marshal Stalin said that the Germans
would not be to switch Divisions from East
to West, as they would not be able to
switch Divisions from East to West, as
they would be fully engaged. The Russians
had had the same kind of difficulties when
approaching Warsaw as the Allies had had
on the Western front. They had not found
it possible to get into Warsaw on the
heels of the Germans. The Ger-mans had had
time to strengthen the defences of the
approaches. The Russians well knew what it
was to have to operate over communications
which had been well destroyed.

(b) Southern Front

Sir Alan Brooke said that General
Alexander's advance had now carried him
beyond the Gothic Line along almost the
whole front. His forces were now moving
down into the Po Valley towards Bologna,
the 8th Army on the Adriatic Flank and the
5th Army through the center. We hoped to
drive the Germans across the Po.
Kesselring would then have to withdraw his
divisions from northwest Italy. These
would have to move northeast as they could
not go north except into Switzerland.

Mr. Churchill said that if the Germans
did withdraw into Switzerland, we should,
of course, follow them.

Sir Alan Brooke said that Kesselring
would probably hold the line of the Adige
which covered both his lines of retreat
through the Brenner and Ljubljana Passes.
Kesselring had 28 divisions now on the
Italian Front and if he went back to the
Adige he might be able to send 6 or 8 away
to other fronts. In view of the general
shortage of forces, the Germans might well
be tempted to withdraw, in order to
shorten the line and release divisions. On
the other shore of the Adriatic, the
German intentions were not yet clear. One
defence line had been selected in front of
Vienna, which ran along the Austrian
Frontier and the foot of the Alps. The
Germans might, however, hold a more
forward line in Yugoslavia, while holding
the Adige in Italy so as to deny us the
use of the ports of Trieste and Fiume. The
Germans in Yugoslavia and Greece might get
back, but many would be cut off.

Mr. Churchill said that they were
certainly trying to escape and the Russian
Westward advance was thus of great
value.

Sir Alan Brooke said than an amphibious
operation against the Istrian Peninsula
was being prepared. Mean-while, we should
continue the offensive in Italy, though
weather would make progress difficult.

Mr. Churchill said that although we
were now nearly through the mountains we
would find fresh difficulties confronting
us in the Valley of the Po, which was much
intersected by water courses. The ground
in winter would be waterlogged.

Marshal Stalin enquired whether the
defences of Pisa had been taken yet. Sir
Alan Brooke said that the 5th Army were
now well beyond Pisa. General Wilson would
soon require to be able to coordinate the
action of his forces with those of the
Russians advancing in Hungary and
Yugoslavia. Marshal Stalin said that the
Russians did not propose to advance
Westward in Yugoslavia. They would prefer
to join hands with General Alexander's
forces in Austria.

Mr. Churchill said that he agreed with
this idea. The Russians would soon be n
Budapest, but he could no tell how soon
General Alexander would be in Vienna,
though he would push forward as quickly as
he could. If the Western Front broke, the
Italian Front would break too. Marshal
Stalin said that a break in the West would
decide the war.

- 4 -

Mr. Churchill said that he could assure
Marshal Stalin that the fighting on the
Western and Southern Fronts would be
continuous. There were 28 German divisions
in Italy and about 20 in various parts of
the Balkans. Unless there was some change
in plan due to weather, British forces
would be landing in Athens the following
morning. Small British detachments had
been introduced into the Pelopponese where
some sections of the population had been
very friendly.

Marshal Stalin enquired about the
situation in Crete. Sir Alan Brooke said
that the Germans now had one division left
there. Mr. Churchill said that the Germans
were trying to escape from all the islands
in the Aegean and those that could not
escape would be left to rot.

The landing on Athens would be first
with airborne troops, followed closely by
a seaborne expedition. About l5,000 men
would be taking part and we might possibly
add a division and a Greek brigade from
Italy later on. The Germans had announced
that Athens was being left an open
city.

Marshal Stalin enquired whether there
were any sub-marines in the Mediterranean.
The Prime Minister said that he believed
that only one was left. We had complete
command of sea and air in the
Mediterranean. He had spent three or four
days on the Italian Front and had not seen
a single German aircraft He attached great
importance to the Istrian operation, but
it would be necessary first to get further
forward in Italy. The landing craft too
would have to be brought round from the
South of France. Marshal Stalin enquired
whether the Germans had many U-Boats
operating elsewhere. Mr. Churchill said
that their U-Boats had been driven from
the Biscay and were not* operating from
Norway. They certainly had more than 250
operational. We were no longer afraid of
the U-Boat menace owing to the great
improvements in our anti U-Boat technique.
We had hardly had any losses in the
previous month. The U-Boats might get more
dangerous again, but events on the Western
Front should put an end to the menace.

2. THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN.

(a) Burma

Mr. Churchill said that before asking
Sir Alan Brooke to deal with the campaign
in Burma, he desired to give Marshal
Stalin a picture of the lay-out of the
British forces in the various theatres of
war. There were now

* sic. Should probably read "now".

- 5 -

the equivalent of 20 British divisions
in France, totaling some 900,000 men. The
Americans had about 1,400,000 men in
France and their strength would grow
rapidly as between 200,000 and 300,000 men
monthly were conveyed without loss or
interference across the Atlantic. There
were 16 British or British-controlled
divisions in Italy. There were 15 or 16
British, British-Indian and African
divisions totaling some 300,000 men on the
Burma front. Six Australian and one New
Zealand division were a operating in the
South West Pacific. There was thus a total
of a nearly 60 divisions engaged with the
enemy on the various fronts. In addition,
there were the forces in Britain, the
garrisons of the overseas bases, the
forces in the Middle East, in Persia and
Iraq, on the North West Frontier of India
and in India itself. The grand total was
about the equivalent of 90 divisions, of
which 60 were actively engaged. We had
between 800,000 and 900,000 men in the
Navy and about a million in the Royal Air
Force. These figures showed that we were
strained to the utmost and were putting
our whole effort into the war.

In Burma our Army was employed in
shielding India and protecting the
American air transport route to China. The
Japanese had 10 divisions in Burma and
this year had tried to invade India. There
had been continuous fighting all the year
in one of the most unhealthy countries in
the world. The British battle casualties
had been about 40,000 but 288,000 in
addition had fallen victims to the various
diseases of the jungle. The great bulk of
these returned to the Army within a few
months, but the figure indicated the
terrible drain that was caused by sickness
in the Burma Army.

Sir Alan Brooke explained the general
features of the theatre of operations in
Burma.. The front on which the 14th Army
was operating extended for about 850
kilometers, all of which was heavy forest,
jungle and swamp. The American 'hump'
route passed over the high mountains to
Chungking. The average monthly tonnage
conveyed by this route during the year had
been 14,000 tons, but this figure had
risen to 23,000 tons in August. During
their offensive early this year, The
Japanese had penetrated to Kohima and
Imphal. We had driven them back and were
continuing to advance southward. What we
were very anxious to do was to make an air
and seaborne landing near Rangoon and thus
cut the communications of all the Japanese
Armies

In Burma. We could not find the
resources for this operation, however,
until Germany had been beaten.

- 6 -

Sir Alan Brooke explained "The
situation in China, where the American
14th Air Force had established air bases
near Kweilin from which to attack Japanese
shipping off the

China Coast and from which to give air
support for the westward advance across
the Pacific. The Japanese were now
attacking the Kweilin area from the North
and South. The Japanese Armies had not yet
effected a junction and the Chinese had
said that they thought that they could
hold them apart. We were doubtful of this,
however, as the Chinese Army were short of
equipment and food.

Mr. Churchill said that the Chungking
Government had been disinclined to equip a
large army for fear part of it might be
used against them. They had therefore
preferred to concentrate on the build-up
of the American Air Force.

Sir Alan Brooke then gave the British
estimate of the distribution of Japanese
forces in the south as follows:

Burma 10 divisions

Malaya and Sumatra 2-3
divisions

Indo-China l division

South West Pacific 10
divisions

General Deane's account
of Pacific operations of the Allies
referred to in paragraph II of memorandum
of conversation Oct. 14, 1944.

TOP SECRE T

THE PACIFIC SITUATION

During the six months' period following
the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the
Allies in the Pacific paid a full price
for the unpreparedness which Marshal
Stalin has so aptly described as the
natural law of peace loving nations.

In early 1942, strategic control of the
combined Anglo-American operations were
centered in the newly formed combined
Anglo American Chiefs of Staff under the
direction of the Prime Minister and the
President. They at once divided the
Pacific into several theaters of
operations. The Central and Northern
Pacific Theaters were recognized as
spheres of American operations, whereas
the Southwest and South Pacific were areas
in which the operations of Australian, New
Zealand, Dutch, and American forces were
to be of a combined nature. All these
areas have since been placed under
American commanders who carry on the
Pacific operations under the strategic
direction of the Combined Anglo-American
Chiefs of Staff. Each of the Allies in the
Pacific has exerted its maximum efforts
towards the speedy defeat of Japan,
consistent with the overall strategy of
the war.

At each of their successive meetings,
the British-American Chiefs of Staff, with
the approval of the Prime Minister and the
President, have expressed the Pacific
strategy as follows: First, while bringing
about at the earliest possible date the
unconditional surrender of Germany, to
maintain and extend unremitting pressure
against Japan for the purpose of
continually reducing her military power
and attaining positions from which her
ultimate surrender can be forced; and
secondly, upon the defeat of Germany, in
cooperation with other Pacific powers and
with Russia, to direct the full resources
of the United States and Great Britain to
bring about at the earliest possible date
the unconditional surrender of Japan.

In the period immediately following
Pearl Harbor, Japanese forces dominated
both the sea and the air in the Western
Pacific and were in complete possession of
the initiative. At the high-point of her
aggression in May 1942, Japan stood along
a four-thousand-mile frontier ex ending
from the Malay Peninsula. through the
Dutch East Indies along the north coast of
New Guinea, into the Solomon Islands, and
north through the Pacific islands toward
Pearl Harbor. Her forces were in position
to threaten the remaining Dutch
possessions, Australia, and the islands to
its north and east.

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

During this period of Japanese
aggression, the United States was
collecting and concentrating its forces
towards preserving the island line of
communications between the United States
and Australia which was considered vital
to all future planned operations. In May
1942, the Japanese naval thrust into the
Coral Sea resulted in the first costly
defeat to Japan. In June, Japanese attempt
to penetrate towards Midway resulted in
Japan's second costly defeat. These two
battles broke Japan's carrier and naval
air supremacy and somewhat restored the
balance of sea power in the Pacific to the
United States.

In June 1942 and coincident with the
battle of Midway, the Japanese dispatched
a task force against our Aleutian Islands.
She was successful in occupying the
islands of Kiska, Attu, and Agattu.
Strategically the occupation of these
barren islands was unimportant at the
time, but had we permitted the
infiltration to be extended, the
consequences might have. been serious.
Further infiltration along the island
chain might have eventually permitted the
enemy to operate against our sea routes
along the southwestern coast of Alaska and
would have endangered the delivery of
supplies to the Soviet Union. Our
successes at the battle of Midway enabled
us to divert forces in sufficient strength
to successfully accomplish the recapture
of our Aleutian possessions. Kiska was the
last of these islands to be retaken, and
this occurred in August of 1942. Since
that date there have been no operations in
the Alaskan-Aleutian area.

The Allies' offensive plan was first to
proceed through the Solomon Islands and
New Guinea toward the Philippines. The
first step in this plan was the capture of
Guadalcanal in August 1942. While the
advance through the Solomons and New
Guinea was in progress, it became apparent
that a second line of approach through the
central Pacific could be logistically
supported. As a result, a more direct
route to the Philippines was started
through the central Pacific islands which
eventually led to the capture of the
Gilbert Islands, the Marshalls, the
Carolines, the Marianas and finally the
Palau Islands on 15 September of this
year. The southern line of advance has
meanwhile reached the northern island of
Halmahera.

At the last meeting of the
Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff in Quebec,
they reiterated the general strategic
policy with regard to the war with Japan,
but they were able to express the overall
objective in two phases somewhat more
concisely as follows: First phase -- to
force the unconditiona1 surrender

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of Japan by first lowering Japanese
ability and will to resist by establishing
a sea and air blockade, conducting
extensive air bombardment, and destroying
Japanese air and naval strength; second
phase -by invading and seizing objectives
in the industrial heart of Japan.

The general plan for the accomplishment
of the above objectives is as follows:
After seizing a position in the central
Philippines in the near future, we intend
to occupy Luzon late this year. Subsequent
operations will be directed toward seizure
of more advance positions in the
furtherance of the first phase of the
overall objectives as stated above. Our
operations on the China coast are intended
to he those which will contribute to the
blockade and air bombardment phase and
limited to those objectives which can be
attained without commitment to major land
campaigns. We intend that the operations
conducted in the furtherance of Phase l of
the overall objective shall include
severance or interdiction of sea
communications and the mainland of
Asia.

The operations for the fulfillment of
Phase 2 of the overall objective are
tentatively planned for the latter part of
1945. They are, of course, dependent upon
the development of the overall strategic
situation and upon the release of forces
and resources incident to the end of the
war in Europe.

The most important factor in the
development of the overall strategic
situation will be in the part which the
Soviet Union is to play. Plans have been
developed for all possible lines of
approach against Japan from the east,
south and west. However, the United States
Chiefs of Staff, and I feel certain that
the British Chiefs of Staff will agree,
consider that these plans can be most
effectively selected and applied if they
are thoroughly concerted with plans to be
developed for operations against Japan
from the north.

In this connection, Marshal Stalin has
recently asked Mr. Harriman for the
opinion of the United States military
authorities as to ho-the armed forces of
the Soviet Union could best be utilized in
the war against Japan. The United States
Chiefs of Staff have replied that based on
the information available to them at this
time they are only prepared to recommend a
broad strategic concept of Russian
participation. They feel that this concept
should be aimed at the following
objectives in order of priority:

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First, securing the Trans-Siberian
Railroad and the Vladivostock Peninsula,
secondly, setting up American and Soviet
strategic air forces for operation against
Japan from the Maritime Provinces and the
Kamchatka Peninsula; third, interdiction
of lines of communication between Japan
proper and the Asiatic mainland; fourth,
the destruction of Japanese ground and air
forces in Manchuria; and fifth, securing
the Pacific supply route in which Soviet
participation would include: First, making
available for United States use
Petropavlovsk as a naval support and
supply base, and areas on the Kamchatka
Peninsula for airbases; secondly,
neutralization by air of southern Sakhalin
and Hokkaido; third, improvement of port
facilities and inland transportation at
Nikolaevsk, Magadan, Petropavlovsk, and
Sovietskaya Gavan; fourth, military
occupation of southern Sakhalin; and
fifth, Soviet naval cooperation with the
United States Navy as the situation
dictates.

Naturally, from the military viewpoint,
the United States Chiefs of Staff hope for
Russia's entry into the war against Japan
at the earliest possible date. They
consider it a matter of the most urgent
importance that planning for the combined
operations should be undertaken at once.
They feel that whatever preparatory
measures are practicable should be started
now . These might include build-up of
supply stock levels, selection and
construction of airdromes, improvement of
port facilities, improvement of inland
transportation, and other matters in all
of which the United States is prepared to
render all possible assistance consistent
with her commitments in the war against
Germany. As for the operations themselves,
the United States Chiefs of Staff consider
it as important for planning to be
undertaken in which there would be a free
interchange of available information to
each other.

In order to round out all plans and
with a view to concerting them with the
Russians, the United States Chiefs of
Staff feel it is essential to have answers
to the following questions as soon as they
may be obtained:

How long aster the defeat of
Germany may we expect Soviet-Japanese
hostilities to commence?

How much time will be required to
build up Soviet forces in the Par East
to enable Soviet forces to take the
offensive?

How much of the capacity of the
Trans-Siberian Railroad can be devoted
to building up and support of strategic
air forces?

Is the Soviet Government prepared
to start immediately on the build up of
a strategic air force and to initiate a
program for its training? In this
connection, the United States is ready
to assign four-engine bombers as soon
as an answer to this question is
received.

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I have given a very hasty review of the
Pacific situation in general terms. I
think it is apparent that the strategy as
now envisaged is leading toward the
strangulation of the Japanese islands by
sea and air blockade. The successful
capture of the Philippines or Formosa
obviously cuts of all of the Japanese area
of conquest from her main islands. The
strategy also prepares for air bases from
which the main islands of Japan can be
heavily bombed. Through this strangulation
and by the efforts of aerial bombardment,
it is hoped to create conditions whereby
the complete subjugation of Japan proper
can be effected at the earliest possible
date.

Marshal Stalin enquired how many
Divisions the Japanese had altogether.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the Japanese
forces were believed to consist of:

88 Divisions

10 Depot Divisions

54 Brigades

19 Garrison Units

2 Cavalry Brigades

14 Independent Tank Regiments

Mr. Churchill said that we hoped next
year to destroy the Japanese in Burma. We
should continue to act on a large scale in
the South East Asia Command with the
object of diverting forces from the main
operations in the Pacific. Meanwhile, the
Australian troops would be operating under
General MacArthur, and the best part of
the British Fleet would go to the Pacific
and take part in the main operations under
the United States Command.

Marshal Stalin said that all the
Japanese lines of communication were
exposed. If the route to the Southwest and
South was cut, the Japanese garrisons
would be isolated and would run short of
ammunition, and the places they were
occupying would fall of their own accord.
Mr. Churchill agreed and said that the
capture of the Philippines would go a long
way to sever all the communications of the
Japanese to the Southwest .

Website note: The above texts are
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The
above material has been researched by
David Irving for the third volume of his
Churchill biography, "Churchill's War",
vol. iii: "The Sundered Dream."