On the level of
overall social theory thinking, there have been only very few thinkers in the
past decades who have conceived a theory that contain detailed analysis in
terms of several social spheres. The French Pierre Bourdieu and the German
Niklas Luhmann are definitely two of the few, and their impact can be shown,
albeit the approach applied is different in each scientists’ community, all
over the world in social science analyses. Having dug himself into the works of
both sociologists, one will soon reveal that these two theories show similarities
in several respects, and also find points of departure totally different from
each other. This paper attempts to describe some of the differences and some of
the similarities between the theories of Luhmann and Bourdieu.

1. Society’s double structure

When we address the
more stable structures behind everyday social events and actions, that is, the
more stable connections and divisions determining such events and actions, then
we have two directions to follow. One such direction represents society being torn
to groups of people, classes, layers, nationalities, races, etc., and it is the
(cultural, political, etc.) distance, closeness between individual groups that
provide the stable social structure under which particular events and
actions take place, or in reply reproduce these structures themselves. With a
view to research more stable structures, we may set out also towards the
structure of the individual functional spheres of society, and here we shall
find the institutional mechanisms which build up, operate, separate from
or connect to one another the sphere of law, art, science, politics, education,
healthcare, economy in various degrees and ways. Accordingly, we may examine a
society in terms of what kind of stable patterns, norms the divisions of its
groups of people, their cultural etc. separation or co-operation rest on;
however, in many respects, it is independent of this that within the same
society what kind of institutional mechanisms individual functional activities
are organised by, and how they are separated or connected.

This double
viewpoint of society emerged in the 60’s in David Lockwood’s short article
analysing social integration (Lockwood 1979:124-140), who by and large
indicating the above breaking into two, separated social integration (the issue
of harmony between groups of people) from system integration (the issue of
co-operation between institutions). Lockwood’s above breaking into two has been
used by many in the past 30 years, but basically narrowed down to the issue of
social integration, however, the starting point itself, the idea of the double
structure of society has somewhere got lost. Although when we get away from
Lockwood’s more specific problem, the issue of social integration, and confront
the overall theories in the past decades with the double structure of society
itself, we shall find that the line of the functional system theory, which,
following Talcott Parsons’ initiative steps, has been fully expounded perhaps
in the works of Niklas Luhmann, has entirely pushed the issue of the structure
between groups of people out of the point of view, and the structures of
institutional mechanisms represent the stable building blocks of the social
world for it, while basically it is social division in terms of groups of people
that the various theories of neo-Marxism place in the centre, and should the
mechanisms of individual functional spheres emerge in their analyses, they
analyse them only from this point of view. (That is, in terms of class
struggles.) In other words, the entire construction of and most of the replies
given by various theories are determined by the version of the social structure
they take as a basis, and this far and away go beyond the differences of the
reply given to the social integration kept in view by Lockwood.

Looking at the two
theories examined in this paper from the above aspect, when first approaching
the problem, it can be stated that Luhmann, ignoring the effects arising from
the division between individual groups of people, examines the mechanisms and
operation of the functional subsystems of society, while Bourdieu basically
researches the minute details of the fine mechanisms of the separation of
individual groups of people, classes. To a certain extent, these two theories
stand in front of us confronted with each other as two half sides of a
theoretical trend, however, the fact that Bourdieu examines the separation of
and fights between social classes to the greatest extent in the framework of
individual social fields, and to a certain extent they correspond to Luhmann’s
social subsystem categories, allows us to compare the two theories and bring
them closer to one another.

2. Luhmann’s theoretical points of departure

So far it has been
ignored that from the end of the 70’s there has been a significant revolution
in Luhman’s theoretical development, and that he has rebuilt his theory
pursuant to the system concept of ‘autopoiesis’ already gaining ground in
general system theory. In the course of this, he has reviewed his earlier
analyses regarding social subsystems one after the other, and worked out a
basically new theory in new massive books and studies. There is no space here
to give reasons why this theoretical revolution seems to be a dead-end-road of
thought (see: Pokol 1990a, 1990b); nevertheless, it is necessary to note that
when below I am going to speak about Luhmann’s theory, then I shall always
refer to Luhmann’s early works completed prior to the theoretical revolution.

The most important
point of departure in Luhmann’s theory, which moves this theory away from the
structures between groups of people, is provided by the concept on the basis of
which he does not consider individual beings to be the parts of sociality,
but psychical systems, which are the precondition of sociality. Social
systems, i.e., social formations assume that psychical systems (people) exist,
however, sociality is generated only from the communication among them,
and people, together with their psychic and biological components, cannot be
considered the basic units of the social world. Luhmann notes that in social
theory development, instead of individual beings as the basic units of
sociality, it is the roles and actions dividing them that have come into focus,
which allows of getting to a more precise reconstruction of the social world
(Luhmann 1986: Intersubjektivität oder Kommunikation). However, Luhmann finds
this insufficient since activity, after all, also refers to the human being,
and, instead of that, he places communication into the position of the basic
unit of the social world which represents the processing of intelligence
between psychic systems, or, in other less explicate words, the transferring
and reception of intelligence. Sociality is created through communication
coming into being, which always rises above the level of the inner processes of
psychic systems (that is, the processes of the consciousness of an individual
being). Thus, the social world is built on the world of psychic systems.
Basically it comes from this point of departure that Luhmann is open in his
analyses not towards divisions and structures among groups of people but
towards various communications getting organised into systems.

Luhmann radicalises
the concept of system, and determines each social formation as a system. In
order to do that, he extends the concept of system, and as he views each social
formation as a system, he differentiates three system levels within the social
world (Luhmann 1971:9-21). He calls single communication, the elementary unit
of social world, a simple social system, or, in other terms, an interaction
system. On this system level, where under the current circumstances billions of
interactive systems come into being and cease, the system borders are built up
according to presence and absence. Absence excludes. The next system level is
the level of organisation systems, where communications are organised into more
stable connections, and here the existence or lack of members draws the borders
between organisation systems. Finally, the most overall system level is that of
society, where communication accessibility determines the act of individual
social systems delimiting themselves. As now communication intertwinement has
evolved all over the world, therefore, in Luhmann’s view, we can speak of only
one world society.

In this theory the
conception of the functional subsystems of society is an important element.
Individual functional subsystems, as it can be shown especially in the progress
of the European and its outgrowth, the North American civilisation, gradually
break away from the formerly intertwined fabric of sociality, and reproduction
of sociality takes place, instead of diffuse activities and institutions, in
functionally differentiated subsystems. It was Luhmann’s important departure
from Talcott Parsons’s views that he refused the concept of the analytic
system, which for Parsons represented a systematising hypothesis necessary only
for the scientist and not empirical/particular subsystem like delimitation in
the real world of society. Luhmann found that a single functional subsystem
can be separated also in reality if it can be organised around a binary code,
which controls the decision selections of the communications belonging to the
subsystem. E.g., communication orientates pursuant to the binary code of
true/false in science, lawful/unlawful in law, and government/opposition in the
political system. Thus, individual subsystems process pieces of reality cut out
in different segments, subsequently, they are able to fulfil specific social
functions on high level. The evolution of modern societies, starting from
Europe, has been followed by the separation of organisation subsystems, and
simultaneously, the multitudes of organisation systems on organisation system
level, and the billions of interactions on the level of simple social systems
allow of a more and more complex social world to come into being.

3. Bourdieu’s theoretical points of departure

In Bourdieu’s work
the option of wilfully choosing from various possible basic units does not
emerge as a preliminary question of theory technique in the make-up of the
social world; also Luhmann has happened to find this primarily ‘standing on
Parsons’s shoulder’, who made it the subject of analysis several times; and in
his analyses Bourdieu evidently sets out along the line of social formations
built from individual beings. And, in his view, separations between various
classes (groups of people) represent the basic divisions of society made up of
individual beings, and in the examination of various social formations from
making photos through various kinds of sport to the operation of the arts and
politics, he analyses the determinedness arising from the differences between
social classes.

As an introductory
general statement it can be said that as it is functional subsystems that stand
in the centre of Luhmann’s analyses, it is social fields that provide the
framework in Bourdieu’s theory for analysis, and social events and actions take
place within individual fields. However, here individual participants’ actions
are determined not by functional imperatives, but by the driving force to
attain higher and higher share in the special kind of capital available in each
social field. And sharing in the given capital will develop different kind of
groups of people within the fields, and conditions of subordination and
superordination between them, special relations of exploitation, on the one
hand, and subjection, on the other hand, will develop. Due to the stable
conflicts and struggles between groups of people organised around the special
kind of capital of a specific field, each field can be described to have
dynamism; furthermore, the inner class struggles and sub/superordination of
various fields will compose a more overall condition of sub/superordination,
and specific kinds of capital can be converted through the relation between
such fields. Let us look at Bourdieu’s position in more detail.

The first question
concerns Bourdieu’s relation to the problem of social evolution. To what extent
are his analyses imbued with paying attention to overall historic processes?
The answer to this can be nothing else but that it is not from the point of
view of social evolution that Bourdieu pursues his examinations, which have
branched off in the past decades. Thus, for example, when examining the Arab
tribes in Algeria, he underlines the high efficiency of their problem solving
mechanism, not even touching the issue of requirements arising from different
levels of social development (Bourdieu 1978:379-400). The same point is
underlined by the fact that while analysing various features of modern society,
he refers to the examples of his early researches in Algeria as a comparison
without any restraint. Therefore societies having reached different stages of
evolution do not seem to exist for him, and that is why the inner features of
various societies can be compared.

However, he
sometimes pushes this general attitude aside, and without drawing conclusions
on theoretical level, he reaches back to social evolution based explanations,
and occasionally uses them in some of his arguments. This can be seen in his
recent book where he argues with utilitarian social theories (Bourdieu
1994:157-161). In recent years, especially in the United States, the
utilitarian theory has gained ground in the form of ‘the theory of rational
choices’ in various social sciences. One of the points of departure for this is
that it explains actions in the widest range of social spheres on the grounds
of economic motifs (striving for utility measurable in terms of earnings). It
is against this that Bourdieu goes back to the analyses of Herbert Spencer and
Durkheim at the end of the last century, and in contrast to them focuses on the
functional differentiation of social actions taking place on a more developed
level. In addition to the economy, further ‘social fields’ become independent,
and here rewards different from economic factors motivate. Thus, he performs,
in the purest sense, an economist curtailment in the social analyses of ‘the
theory of rational choices’: ‘There is a statement regarding the bases of the
theory on social fields which one can find as early as in the works of Spencer,
Durkheim and Weber, and which asserts that a process of differentiation is
taking place in the social world…Durkheim repeatedly reminds us that in archaic
societies, and also in pre-capitalist societies, social spheres which have
become differentiated in our societies (such as religion, art and science) were
still undifferentiated, and human actions were multifunctional…, which could be
interpreted as being simultaneously religious, economic and aesthetic actions
(Bourdieu 1994:158-159). After that Bourdieu inserts the separation of various
social fields into the process of the above described functional
differentiation of social evolution: ‘The evolution of societies more and more
represents various spheres (which I call fields) that have their own logic’
(Bourdieu 1994:159). Thus it is the society divided into different spheres that
utilitarian theory (in this case the theory of rational choices) fails to grasp
when it assumes that human activity can be reduced to economic motivations, and
social institutions can be comprehended from the terms of economic calculation.

This argumentation
of Bourdieu, however, as we have already noted, allows of drawing interesting
conclusions even with regard to his own theory. One of them is that it reveals
that Bourdieu’s theoretical orientation is defective. The proposition on the
functional differentiation of society has developed one of the most strikingly
marked trends of sociological theories in the past 40 years from Talcott
Parsons through numerous modernisation theories to Niklas Luhmann. For Bourdieu
these, apart from providing superficial knowledge, do not exist in effect, and
even today he finds this proposition without any problem in the observations of
Spencer and Durkheim made at the end of the last century. (The same way it is
in a short footnote in his large monograph ‘La noblesse d’état’ that Bourdieu
indicates that the concept of the differentiation of social fields goes back to
Spencer and Durkheim. See: Bourdieu 1989:376). The explanation for this
deficiency can be found presumably in the fact that the French sociological
scene is strongly embedded into a wider intellectual/political arena, through
which a dominant leftist-libertarian attitude makes all the theories that are
politically deemed ‘conservative’ negligible; and Parsons, the functionalism
and the system theory have been qualified like that in intellectual circles
both in America and Western Europe. Although Bourdieu’s intellectual
socialisation took place at a definite distance from the French new leftists
trends present at the time but a considerable part of the material of his
readings left the impact of various trends of Marxism in his theoretical
approach (see: Robbins: 1992, on Bourdieu’s position in today’s French theory
of sociology see: Ansart 1990; on placing him in a more overall intellectual
field, see: Rieffel 1993).

In another
approach, Bourdieu’s recent attachment to functionalism raises the point of
neglecting functional imperatives in the operation of social fields so far.
Until now in his theory Bourdeu has seen the wholeness of society not as an
entity existing as a functional whole, whose existence becomes possible subject
to meeting certain functional requirements, and he interprets individual social
fields as the terrain of fights between groups of people for special capitals
in specific fields, rather than as separated and functionally specialised
spheres. The operation of a single field depends on the status of the balance
of power of groups of people fighting in them, and it is well expressed by the
fact that Bourdieu usually refers to fields as ‘fields of various forces’ and
‘fields of battle’ (le champ des luttes), but only recently can we hear of them
as functional fields. Although if individual fields fulfil special functions also
for the wholeness of society, then, apart from the relation of groups of people
fighting for special favours, functional imperatives and requirements also
shape the internal structure of fields. To sum it up, Bourdieu’s airy
attachment to Spencer’s and Durkheim’s proposition on functional
differentiation would make it necessary to profoundly review his entire theory,
specifically his genuine confrontation with functionalist system theory.

Subsequently,
Luhmann and Bourdieu have thought over their theories in a diametrically
opposite direction from the point of view of the double social structure; and
while in Luhmann’s theory the operation of the social world is governed by the
institutional logic of functional subsystems and the imperatives set by them, in
Bourdeu’s theory, this world can be described as the struggles of groups of
people fighting for greater and greater share in the special kind of capital in
each social field.

On a general level,
these two theories are diametrically opposite. However, if we correct Luhmann’s
theory, taking his early writings as a basis and insisting on some of his
premises more determinedly than he himself, and in such fashion we compare it
to some of Bourdeu’s writings which analyse specific social fields in detail,
then it can be shown that they have numerous common features.

4. Possibilities for nearing the theories of Luhmann
and Bourdieu

If the examiner
accepts Luhmann’s proposition that in the historic progress of European
modernisation in the past centuries one can discern the separation of various
functional subsystems with a homogeneous assessment dimension in each (e.g.,
orientating according to true/false in science, or, lawful/unlawful in law),
then this is supported by the evidence that we are looking at the separation of
the lawyer, the artist, the politician, the scientist, etc. from one another in
the course of European history. Former multifunctional activities, roles and
institutions, which, e.g., characterised the operation of society in the Middle
Ages, have been functionally separated, and divided in a one-dimension
direction. This is extensively proven by the existing historic analyses, thus
Luhmann’s proposition on differentiation, which followed the early analyses of
Durkheim and Spencer, has become widely accepted in the past decades. This
acceptance that pays attention to historic trends, however, goes beyond
Luhmann’s theory because it sets out from the separation of the roles and
actions of professional actors, and, from the first, excludes laymen
from functional subsystems. On the contrary, the only thing Luhmann says is if
communication is controlled by a binary code, that is, selection in decision
making and processing of reality take place according to a value dual, then it
belongs to the functional subsystem whose binary code provides its core of
organisation. Luhmann, of course, did not raise the point in general terms that
the communication by professional participants and laymen should be separated.
It is only with regard to the legal subsystem that we can find passages in his
writings which touch on these issues; and because, in addition to professional
lawyers, the institution of actions at law by laymen is indispensable to ensure
the operation of law, he argued that laymen’s activities could not be excluded
(Luhmann 1986:178). Of course, if we keep it in view that Luhmann’s theoretical
point of departure is that a single person (a psychic system) does not
constitute a part of the social world, only a precondition of it, then we may
not include the prints of lasting socialisation of the personality which
separate the lawyer, the scientist, the artist from one another in the
discussion.

Taking the above
analysis as a basis, we may say that the acceptance of the proposition on
functional differentiation by wide ranges of scientists has been possible only
with leaving Luhmann’s overall theory in the background. On the contrary, if we
insist on Luhmann’s theory, and push single persons (and the
socialised/motivated personality) out of the make-up of social structures, then
the evidence of the differentiation of functional subsystems will be lost.
These expositions, and the act of bringing this problem to the surface,
however, might also turn the analyser’s attention to the direction where he
considers Luhmann’s point of departure itself, i.e., the pushing of man as a
psychic system outside the social world, an abortive attempt. Because if he does
not do that, then the lasting structures of the social world, which socialise
the personality, and thereafter continuously reward it or apply sanctions
against it, will fall out of the point of view, and only the phenomena that
appear in the course of point like/momentary communications may enter the
analysis. Thus the structures addressing the personality of the participants
in the communication will need to disappear from the analysis. E.g., the
differences between the personalities of the professional scientist and the
layman need to be referred to here in the communications controlled by the
true/false dual, and in the first place it is necessary to call the attention
to the assessing/rewarding mechanisms, which orientate the scientist, but which
do not even emerge in the event of laymen.

Subsequently, we
may correct Luhmann, it is necessary to bring man back into the explanation of
the social world, while recognising that the functionally differentiated
mechanisms enforce that the whole personality is orderly pushed into the
background regarding many activities, and they allow of actions, assessment no
other than those determined by defined roles. That is, I take man into
consideration as a personality divided into differentiated roles in the composition
of the social world, and not as an undividable unit (See: Pokol 1991). Now it
becomes possible, by making a theoretical decision against Luhmann, to narrow
down the organisation of functional subsystems to the communication of
professional participants, and laymen’s occasional orientation according to the
binary code, any caretaker can argue with glowing eyes to defend his truth,
should be excluded from here.

When in such
fashion reshaping the proposition on functional differentiation, however, we
need to pay attention, in addition to professional subsystems being separated
from one another, also to laymen’s separation from the communication maintained
in everyday life. Consequently, the concept of everyday life needs to be
included in this theory with a regular place-value, and then it is necessary to
divide the system level of society into everyday life and professional
subsystems, in the first place.

With this
correction Luhmann’s analyses regarding functional (professional) subsystems
become more easily comparable to Bourdieu’s writings, which analyse certain
social fields. This comparison can be well made in the event of the academic
field (subsystem), where both the differences and similarities between the
theories of Luhmann and Bourdieu can be clearly seen.

Luhmann wrote the
first systematic analysis about the organisation of science as a social
subsystem in 1968 (Luhmann 1971:232-252), and at this early stage he did not
apply his point of departure, i.e., the exclusion of man and his personality
from the explanation of the formations of society, in his analyses as
consistently as it can be seen in his writings from the 80’s. In this study
Luhmann keeps the scientist orientating according to the binary code of
true/false in view, and, exhaustively leaning on the empirical materials
addressed by Merton’s science sociology school, emphasises the phenomenon that
scientific results become firmly rooted in reputation and the hierarchy of such
results as well as the elements that make them appear on the surface in order
to comprehend the organisation of science as a social subsystem. With the
extension of the complexity of this subsystem, when ten thousands of scientists
constitute communities of scientists in various fields of science, without the
hierarchy of scientific reputation and the elements that make them appear on
the surface, chaos and disorganisation would ensue. Whose book or study should
be read by the profession, and especially by the growing, new generation of
scientists, in the fist place, if every two week thousands of papers and
volumes come out in the various fields of science? Who should be appointed
professor at a noted university, and who at a sixth-rate university in the
provinces? Without reliable hierarchy of reputation actual scientific
accomplishments would be unable to reach wider communities of scientists, and
the rewarding of great scientific results could not be separated from
sixth-rate scientific performances. Scientific reputation and its hierarchy
appear here as the key mechanisms of the self-organisation of science. And,
especially, if to Luhmann’s shorter study we add the analysis of the monograph
entitled ‘The scientific community’ by the American sociologist, Warren O.
Hagstrom, whom was taken also by Luhmann as a basis, the assessing/rewarding
mechanism of science will emerge, which organises the self-control of the
complex scientific subsystem in the dimension of processing reality according
to the binary code of true/false.

In Hagstrom’s book,
as later in the studies of Storer, Glaser, Ben-David and Merton, it becomes
apparent that distortions cannot be held under the level of a threshold in the
assessing mechanisms of a scientific subsystem unless a scientific community is
dispersed into plenty of organisations (at universities, institutions, etc.),
and thus the relations among the members of scientific communities are
characterised by acting side by side rather than union in one community, or
subordination/superordination in them. Taking this proposition as a basis,
Joseph Ben-David demonstrated in his university history researches that the
focal point of scientific life was placed where the competing university model
and the community of scientists were active side by side to the greatest extent
in an age, and which in time was considered to be the leading centre of science
all over the world. Thus, the universities of the culturally decentralised
Germany in the 19th century, the American universities after the
first decades in the 20th century driving competition to extremes
could be referred to in this respect (see: Ben-David: 1971).

To sum up the point
of view taken by Luhmann and that of Merton’s science sociology school that
served for him as empirical background: in the social organisation of
science, after having passed a stage of complexity, the key role of reputation
hierarchies, scientists’ orientation pursuant to these and the striving for
higher level of reputation need to be stressed as the basis for the neutral
self-control of science. Or, again it should be noted that in the event of
monopolistic structures these might be distorted.

After completing
the analysis in several minor studies, Pierre Bourdieu systematically examined
the academic-scientific field in his book ‘Homo academicus’ (Bourdieu 1994). It
is important to note right at the point of departure that Bourdieu performed
the analysis of this field leaning on an earlier empirical survey of French
society, and this society, as a counterpoint to the competition/market
mechanisms prevalent in the society of the United States, developed in each of
its social sphere centralised mechanisms that rested on central authorisation
and assessment. This refers as much to the structure of public administration
and the legal system as to the sphere of education or academic activity. If we
keep the possibility of distortions described under the Luhmann-Hagstrom
scientific subsystem model in view, then it can be stated that the French
academic/university field with its central authorisation, doctoral committee system
and other central decision making bodies represents the case that is mostly
inclined to turn into an oligarchy, where the mechanisms of reputation make the
differences in the position of power whether being subordinated or
superodinated rather than the differences in scientific results rooted in the
hierarchies of reputation, and, thus, it realises a science authority
sub/superordination and vassal-patron system rather than neutral self-control.

Consequently,
Bourdieu’s point of departure, the struggle for a special kind of capital in
each social field among groups of people involved in each field, under the
distorted French conditions corresponds in many respects to the facts. (And the
same way this is the case in Hungary and other centralised Eastern European
countries!) What for Luhmann is a functional necessity in the scientific
reputation and the hierarchies of reputation built of these, which make
scientific accomplishments rooted and appear on the surface just as it is done
by money in connection with economic accomplishments, for Bourdieu becomes
scientific capital, which allows of sub- and superordination of power and
special exploitation and domination.

Well, then, in this
social field (or, to use Luhmann’s terminology, subsystem) the half-sidedness
of the two theories becomes clearly visible. The sub- and superordination of
power explored by Bourdieu and its organising force must be considered by all
means existing within the social subsystem of science, even if within various
scientific communities strong dispersion ensues as it can be seen in the United
States. With monopolistic structures and centralised organisation of science
this may also become dominant. This point of view is definitely not applied by
Luhmann, and Bourdieu pushes the neutral/functional role of scientific ‘capital
of reputation’ out of the point of view, and thus does not analyse the
mechanisms that may reduce the extent science is organised on the grounds of
power/domination, and harder enforce the setting up, operation of hierarchies
of reputation in compliance with actual scientific accomplishments and the
organisation of science in the assessment dimension of true/false.

Perhaps it is not
useless to refer to the fact that the medium theory of Luhmann’s ‘master’,
Talcott Parsons differs from Bourdieu’s extended capital theory in a way
similar to the above. Parsons set out from money as a medium of exchange
containing neutral exchange relations in a generalised form, and asserted that
if such a symbolic generalised medium of exchange was indispensable in economy
as one of the social subsystems, then such medium of exchange should exist,
even if organised in another kind of specific form, in the other subsystems
too. He considered, e.g., the medium of ‘power’ in the political subsystem, the
medium of ‘influence’ in the societal community (or, in other terms,
integration subsystems) to be such medium. The point of departure of Bourdieu’s
capital analyses was also money, in line with Marx’s analyses, but here money
became the point of departure not as a neutral means of exchange but as a means
that allows of sub- and superordination among groups of people and
exploitation. Thus, the extension of the concept of money capital and research
for other special kinds of capital in social fields beyond the economy was
attained with a kind of logic similar to the one applied in Parsons’ research
for special media. Regarding science this similarity can be grasped in the fact
that while the hierarchies of reputation referred to in Luhmann’s study from
1968, which further developed Parsons’ medium theory, were addressed as the
elements making the medium of science appear on the surface, in Bourdieu’s book
‘Homo academicus’ they were made part of the analysis in terms of the
distribution of and the struggle for scientific capital.

After the above
analysis, the half-sided approach of the two theories is perhaps much more
apparent: the same way as money is both a functionally indispensable
generalised means of exchange in the economy and a means that produces
exploitation and power/subordination relations, scientific hierarchies of
reputation also fulfil both functions/exert both effects, and the dominance of
either of the two effects in the scientific subsystem of a given country
depends on to what extent the scientific community is scattered/competitive,
or, if, on the contrary, a centralised/monopolistic kind of construction is
prevalent.

The possibilities
of nearing the theories of Luhmann and Bourdieu are exemplified by the analysis
of the telecommunication sphere too. In his study in 1994 Bourdieu examined
this sphere (see Bourdieu 1994b), and, although Luhmann did not specifically
touch upon the matter, on the grounds of the instructions set forth in his
analyses developed regarding numerous other subsystems it was easy to
reconstruct Luhmann’s theory regarding this sphere (see Pokol 1991b). A social
subsystem is established when a larger sphere of activity becomes organised
round a binary code, thus detaching it from other subsystems which orientate
according to other codes; and with regard to modern telecommunication this can
be demonstrated pursuant to the existence or lack of newsworthiness.
This value dual enforces professional journalists, reporters, editors, etc. to
apply a uniform aspect of selection in the course of processing reality. It is
not lawfulness, truth, as great rehabilitation as possible or aesthetic value
that a journalist strives for but to find, or possibly create the most
newsworthy event, and to show more and more new aspects of that event. This
binary code, of course, cannot become dominant and cannot subordinate all the
other aspects of selection to itself in this sphere unless there is a severe
competition among various newspapers, channels and programs, and by that the
biased journals, radio programs will lose the attention of their public the
same way as dull, clumsy newspapers, programs that produce newsworthiness only
on a low level. The rationality of the market, the orientation according to the
code of profitable/non-profitable thus ‘holds’ the act of striving for
newsworthiness ‘tight’, but this impact of the market can be demonstrated by
how the inner logic of the sports sphere (to win/to lose) or the
university-scientific sphere is held tight (on sport see: Bette 1984, on the
latter: Ben-David 1971). In his aforesaid study from 1994 Bourdieu analyses
this sphere as the ‘field of journalism’. In the entire article he concentrates
on professional journalists and their motivations in his analyses, and this
again proves the righteousness of the statement that by limiting Luhmann’s
social subsystem category to professional components these two theories have
become definitely close to each other.

Noting that the
field of journalism has a logic of its own just as the literary field, or the
field of the arts, Bourdieu finds the core of this organisation in striving
for the latest news: ‘The specific logic of this field addresses ephemeral
things such as news, and as a result of competition for customers this striving
places the most recent news in the centre (Bourdieu 1994b:5). When first
approaching the problem, it seems that by a minor correction of Luhmann’s
theory it is possible to develop a theoretical framework regarding this sphere
almost perfectly identical with Bourdieu’s theory, but apart from the identity
regarding the core element, there are two major differences that need to be
emphasised though. Firstly, Bourdieu speaks about striving for ‘the most recent
news’, while, on the contrary, the concept of ‘striving for newsworthy events’
is wider than that (see Erbing 1989). Secondly, and this is more important,
Bourdieu analyses how the field of journalism is intertwined with other fields
of cultural nature in a specific way. He defines the French situation special
in the Western world, where the sphere of journalism and the other cultural and
political activities have been only incompletely separated, that through this
intertwining the market mechanisms that dominate the field of journalism settle
on the other cultural fields, and here, forcing the inner logic of these into
the background, mass-produced products are put in the foreground. That is,
the intrusion of the field of journalism into the other cultural fields cause
these fields to turn into markets: ‘The strengthening of the intrusion of
the field of journalism more and more subjects the other fields to commercial
logic, and this threatens the autonomy of such fields…’ (Bourdieu 1994b:6).
Without refusing that this impact does exist, we deem there is a more important
connection not specified by Bourdieu that the field of journalism, whose
separation from politics can be in any way ensured more or less clearly subject
to meeting several preconditions, may become dominated by the interests and
political opinion of various social groups, and then by intruding into other
cultural fields is able to help the given social group to obtain
intellectual hegemony over the whole society. In this structure only those
can become great writers, musicians, philosophers, sociologists and political
theorists, etc. who are helped by mass media through presenting them in
cultural supplements, TV panel discussions, etc., to make a reputation for
themselves. Thus, it is the minor problem that instead of ‘pure’ artistic,
literary values mass-produced works and authors are rewarded in the cultural
fields organised by the field of journalism. It constitutes a greater
distortion that through that those authors and their works are highlighted that
come from the given social group or, at least, does not risk voicing their
opposition to the views of the opinion leaders in this group. By this means
the social group that is able to dominate the field of journalism will be able
to obtain dominance in matters of spiritual issues, language policy, taste,
etc. over an entire society. In the centralised French intellectual life
centred in Paris these tendencies can be fairly palpable, and it may be deemed
quite odd that this aspect is left unnoticed by Bourdieu, who is otherwise, as
we have seen, quite sensitive of exploring mechanisms that refer to dominance
and subjection.

I close this paper
by pointing out that the issue of converting capital between various
fields/subsystems of society emerges in both theories. In Luhmann’s theory,
regarding functionally differentiated modern societies, this opportunity enters
the analysis only as a distortion, and fundamentally he places
unexchangeability at the centre. Because functionally separated subsystems have
their own mechanisms for processing reality and their own aspects of selection,
and for each subsystem the rest of the subsystems will degenerate into
environment. The fact that accomplishments produced by different binary codes
can be exchanged for rewards and positions in other subsystems implies nothing
else but that functional differentiation has been completed improperly. On the
contrary, in Bourdieu’s theory the capital and accomplishments of various
fields of society are convertible into other types of capital, and among them
regular connections, established ways of conversion can be shown in terms of
the wholeness of society. Through that Bourdieu is able to demonstrate, beyond
exploitations and subordination within each field of society, division into
various classes in the entire society. In Luhmann’s theory this does not even
emerge, and for him the wholeness of society represents merely the totality of
functionally differentiated subsystems, which are harmonised through
spontaneous co-ordination, but no subsystem is able to control the entire
society. Subsequently, concentration on the different branches of the double
social structure referred to in the initial expositions apparently enforces
diametrically opposite solutions in the two theories.

Literature

Ben-David, Joseph (1971): The
Scientist' Role in Society. A ComparativeStudy.