The
Political Culture of the Democratic
and Republican Partiesby Jo Freeman

Shorter
version published in the Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 101,
No. 3, Fall 1986, pp. 327-356.

Although
the Democratic and Republican Parties have similar aims and similar forms,
there are different in some very important ways. These can be seen not
so much in policy outcomes, which must pass through the filter of political
reality, as in the mode by which internal politics is conducted. The difference
is not one of politics, but of political culture.
Political culture is defined by the International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences as

...the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments which give order and
meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions
and rules that govern behavior in the political system. It encompasses
both the political ideals and operating norms of a polity. Political
culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological
and subjective dimensions of politics. A political culture is the product
of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories
of the members of the system and thus it is rooted equally in public
events and private experience.1

There are two fundamental differences between the parties in which all
others are rooted. The first one is structural: In the Democratic Party
power flows upward and in the Republican Party power flows downward.
The second is attitudinal: Republicans perceive themselves as insiders
even when they are out of power and Democrats perceive themselves as
outsiders even when they are in power.

I

Party Structure and the Flow of Power

In Ronald Reagan's acceptance speech at the 1984 Republican Convention
he declared that the Democrats' "government sees people only as a
members of groups. Ours serves all the people of America as individuals."
Although this characterization was intended as a stinging criticism of
the Democrats, and they would decry it as inaccurate, it does capture
an essential difference between the two parties (though not necessarily
their governments) which is a direct consequence of the direction of the
power flow. In a collectivity in which power flows downward separate and
distinct internal groups are potentially dangerous; they provide loci
for the development of competing loyalties and competing leadership. But
when power flows upward, it must do so through some mechanism. Unorganized
individuals without institutional authority or financial resources cannot
exercise power. They must organize into groups in order to develop an
agenda and act collectively in order to effect that agenda. Organization
is the creator of collective power; it is the means by which followers
influence leaders.
The Democratic Party is composed of constituencies. These constituencies
are ones which identify themselves as having a salient characteristic
creating a common agenda which they feel the party must respond to. Virtually
all of these groups exist in organized form independent of the Party and
seek to act on the elected officials of both parties. They are recognized
by Democratic Party officials as representing the interests of important
blocs of voters which the Party must respond to as a Party. Some groups
have been recognized parts of the Democratic coalition since the New Deal
(e.g. blacks and labor); others are relatively new (e.g. women and gays).
Still others which participated in State and local Democratic politics
when those were the only significant Party units have not been active
as organized groups in the Party on the national level (e.g. ethnics).

Some of the Party's current constituencies had staff members of the Democratic
National Committee identified as their liaisons. In 1983 there were seven
such caucuses, five representing demographic groups (women, blacks, hispanics,
asians and gays) and two ideational ones (liberals and business people).
In May 1985 the DNC Executive Committee revoked official recognition of
these caucuses, to deflect attacks on the party as being run by "special
interests".2 Instead, an informal
understanding developed that one of each of the three Vice-Chairs will be
a member of and represent women, blacks, and hispanics. The largest and
most important constituency -- labor -- does not have such a person as union
leaders feel they should deal directly with the party chair without benefit
of a liaison. Instead, a majority of the 25 at-large seats on the DNC, as
well as seats on the Executive Committee and the Rules and Credentials Committees
at the conventions are reserved for union representatives.
Party constituencies generally meet as separate caucuses at the National
Conventions. While caucuses are usually open to anyone, the people who attend
(not all of whom are delegates) are generally those for whom that constituency
is a primary reference group; i.e. a group with which they identify and
which gives them a sense of purpose. Thus it is the most committed or identified
constituency members who set the tone of the caucus. Not unexpectedly, most
of those attending the women's caucus are committed feminists. Virtually
all Black delegates attend the Black caucus but not all union members go
to the labor caucus. When forced to choose between conflicting meetings
of the Black and women's caucuses during the 1984 convention, Black women
went to the former. They also held their own separate caucus for the first
time, as did Asians and the handicapped.
Although the leaders of these caucuses are rarely chosen by the participants
they nonetheless feel compelled to have their decisions ratified by them.
With an occasional exception the power of group leaders derives from their
ability to accurately reflect the interests of constituency members to the
Party leaders. Ratification is the means by which their right to lead is
renewed. The fact that caucus attendees may not perfectly reflect the interests
of the constituency is usually overlooked. But when there is a conflict
between claimants to leadership those who do not have caucus support will
dismiss it as unrepresentative.
The Republican Party also has relevant components, but they are not as important
as the Democratic Party's constituent groups because they are not mechanisms
for exercising power and they are not primary reference groups. Frank Fahrenkopf,
RNC chairman from 1983 to 1989 described the GOP as "clearly the homogenous
political party" compared to the Democrats.3
The basic components of the Republican Party are geographic units and ideological
factions. Unlike the Democratic groups, these entities exist only as internal
party mechanisms. The geographic units -- state and local parties -- are
primarily channels for mobilizing support and distributing information on
what the Party leaders want. They are not separate and distinct levels of
operation. Ideological
factions are also not power centers independent of their relationship to
Party leaders. Unlike Democratic caucus leaders, Republican faction leaders
do not feel themselves accountable to their followers. Sometimes there are
no identifiable followers.4 Although
faction leaders hold press conferences they rarely have meetings and when
they do they too use them to mobilize support and distribute information,
not debate issues. The purpose of ideological factions -- at least those
that are organized -- is to generate new ideas and test their appeal. Initially
these new ideas are for internal consumption. Their concept of success is
not winning benefits, symbolic or otherwise, for their group, so much as
being able to provide overall direction to the Party. If successful in attracting
adherents these ideas will be adopted by the Party for external appeal.
The Republican Party does have several organized groups within it such as
the National Federation of Republican Women, National Black Republican Council
and the Jewish Coalition, but their purpose is not to represent the views
of these groups to the party. Their function is to recruit and organize
group members into the Republican Party as workers and contributors. They
carry the party's message outward, not the group's message inward. Democratic
constituency group members generally have a primary identification with
their group, and only a secondary one with the Party. The primary identification
of Republican activists is with the Republican Party. They view other strong
group attachments as disloyal and unnecessary.

Convention Activities

The difference in the flow of power can be seen in the operation of the
national conventions. When not in session, the time of delegates attending
the Democratic Convention is largely occupied with caucus meetings. In addition
to state caucus meetings there are caucus meetings for any group which wishes
to call one. Generally the DNC makes space available for these meetings,
but occasionally it declines when it feels the group making the request
is clearly operating contrary to the interest of an incumbent President.
Virtually all of these caucuses are open to whomever cares to attend, including
nonmembers. Competing candidates for the Presidential nominations acknowledge
the importance of the group by speaking to its caucus. Indeed the importance
of a particular group within the Democratic Party can be ascertained by
the number and status of the Party leaders who seek to address it.
Republicans do not attend caucuses apart from those of their states. They
go to receptions. These receptions are usually closed -- by invitation only.
Invitations may not always be hard to obtain, but they are required. Receptions
are privately sponsored, with each group responsible for getting its own
space. There may be some speeches, but they are perfunctory ones and no
debate is asked for or expected.
Republican receptions do have one major characteristic in common with Democratic
caucuses; they are both places for demonstrating the status of the group
and individuals within it. Status at caucuses is conveyed on those individuals
invited to sit at the speakers' platform as well as on the group by those
who agree to speak. Status at receptions is conveyed on those introduced
or acknowledged by the occasional speaker and on the sponsoring group by
those prominent people attending the reception who are not part of it.
The kind of interaction between delegates at caucuses is very different
from that at receptions. Caucuses have many speeches and frequently have
debates. Occasionally votes will be taken even if only to give the "sense
of the meeting." Caucus meetings are places for the groups' leadership
to listen as well as to speak, though some leaders listen better than others.
Discussion is public and it's quite permissible to be loud and demanding
in one's behavior -- as long as one doesn't interfere with others' ability
to listen to the speaker. Caucuses are supposed to be places where delegates
debate, discuss, and decide on the relevant issues before the Convention.
Thus even when the outcome of a particular question is forgone or there
are no decisions to make, the illusion of participatory decision making
is maintained. One exception to this are labor caucuses, which are less
frequent and less vocal. Participants come to get their marching orders
and find out who their floor leaders are, not to debate issues. Since the
leaders of this caucus are established union leaders, their right to lead
doesn't need to be ratified.
Despite the occasional speech at Republican receptions, discussionis largely
private. Consequently, people usually talk to those they already know and
who most likely agree with them. Even when participants of different views
encounter each other the exchange is expected to be very civil, in keeping
with the rules of polite society. Receptions are not places to exercise
group influence. They are places to network; to be seen and to get information.
If one wishes to exercise influence, it is best to arrange an introduction
to a recognized leader by a mutual friend.
Legitimacy

The different direction in the flow of power also creates different conceptions
of legitimacy. In the Democratic Party, legitimacy is determined by who
you represent, and in the Republican Party by whom you know and who you
are. It is this difference which makes the Democratic Party so much more
responsive to demands for reform within it and the Republican Party so much
more responsive to changes in leadership.
Reform within the Democratic Party is usually traced to the 1968 Chicago
convention which was marked by external strife and turmoil. Although few
delegates and no leaders joined the demonstrators outside, reform Democrats
nonetheless used these demonstrations to argue that the nominating system
was closed to dissent and unrepresentative of popular opinion. The fact
that there were 17 credentials challenges involving 15 states, some of which
were successful, reinforced their claims. In the decade before the 1968
Convention many local Democratic Clubs had been taken over by reformers
who believed that "management of the affairs of the party ought to
be widespread and in accord with strictly democratic procedures."5
At the 1964 convention the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party had heightened
the contradiction between the national Party's claim to be the party of
civil rights and its traditional deference to State parties in the governance
of their affairs by challenging the right of the regular Mississippi Party
to seat an all-white delegation. Although the resulting compromise pleased
no one (two MFDP delegates were seated as at-large delegates and the regulars
were required to sign a loyalty oath) it opened pandora's box. The implicit
threat of numerous credentials challenges at future conventions added force
to the demands of reformers that the Party open up.

The Democratic Party is quiet conscious that it is a coalition party. The
groups which compose it have changed over time -- particularly in response
to the post-1968 reforms. But the fact that it is a coalition of groups
has not changed. Since party leaders are aware that the Democratic Party
must incorporate groups within it to remain the majority party, claims that
it is unrepresentative of a relevant bloc of voters is a serious challenge
to its legitimacy. This is why they agreed to a reform commission and responded
to the recommendations that it made to "open up the system" and
involve more groups in Party decision making. However, these changes did
not result in a consensus on the appropriate party structure. By the time
it made its report women had been added to minorities and youth as demographic
groups who felt unrepresented by geographic organization. Thus a key feature
of the reforms was an attempt to impose requirements for demographic representation
on the loose geographic structure of the Party. However, these changes did
not result in a consensus. Consequently, a new reform commission is appointed
after every convention.
Although the Republican Party has tinkered with reform, it is not very hospitable
to it.6 Whereas the Democrats are receptive
to changing the Party to make it more representative of the populace, Republicans
are more concerned with packaging what the Party represents to make it more
saleable to the populace. Those who successfully do so form the leadership
pool.
Legitimacy within the Republican Party is dependent on having a personal
connection to the leadership. Consequently, supporting the wrong candidate
can have disastrous effects on one's ability to influence decisions. Republican
Presidents exercise a monolithic power over their party that Democratic
Presidents do not have. With the nomination of Ronald Reagan, many life
long Republicans active on the national level who had supported Ford or
Bush had to quickly change their views to conform to those of the winner
or find themselves completely cut off. Mavericks, who do not have any personal
attachments to identified leaders, may be able to operate as gadflies, but
can rarely build an independent power base. Since legitimacy in the Democratic
Party is based on the existence of just such a power base, real or imagined,
one does not lose all of one's influence within the Party with a change
in leaders as long as one can credibly argue that one represents a legitimate
group. While the importance of personal connections works against those
Republicans who have the wrong connections it rewards those who spend years
toiling in the fields for the Party and its candidates. The longer one spends
in any organization the more personal connections one has an opportunity
to make. These aren't lost when one's Party or leaders are out of power,
and thus can be "banked" for future use. Occasionally a dedicated
party worker can develop sufficient ties even to competing leaders to assure
continued access, if not always influence, regardless of who's in power.
Those Democrats whose legitimacy derives from leadership of a coalition
group find it is quite transitory when they can no longer credibly represent
the group. The greater willingness of the Republican Party to reward loyalty
and dedication to the Party in preference to any other group makes it is
easier for the Party to discourage extra-Party attachments.
Leadership in both parties is more diffuse when the President is from the
other party, but there is a significant difference in degree. Leadership
in the Republican Party devolves onto a limited number of elected officials,
usually key Senators and Governors. The Democratic Party leadership pool
is broader, including a wider range of public officials and interest group
leaders.

Career Paths

The different structure of the Parties has different consequences for the
fate of activists within it. Since the Democratic Party is composed of groups,
the success of individuals whose group identification is highly salient
(e.g. blacks and women) is tied to that of the group as a whole. They succeed
as the group succeeds. When the group obtains more power, individuals within
that group get more positions. Thus social movements which promote members
of particular groups can have much more of an impact on the Democratic Party
than on the Republican Party. Since the party must legitimate itself by
being representative, it promotes group members who are active within it
to establish and retain that legitimacy. One consequence of this is that
group leaders within the party (and sometimes outside of it) acquire enormous
power over individuals that they may have no personal association with.
They can initiate or veto the rise of party activists who are also group
members because these activists will be assumed to represent the group even
when they don't want to.

That is not the case within the Republican Party. It officially ignores
group characteristics, though it is obvious that it does pay attention
to them when it feels the need to cater to the interest of the voting
public in a particular group. In 1984 women were showcased as they had
never been before, though both Black and Hispanic speakers addressed the
convention. Generally, individuals succeed insofar as the leaders with
whom they are connected succeed. If those leaders are biased against people
with a salient group identity, or such individuals cannot overcome the
many informal social controls which limit access to a leader, those individuals
will not be very powerful. If leaders consciously seek to favor people
with a salient group identity, they will be. If the leader is neutral,
structural biases against an individual who possesses salient group characteristics
can sometimes be offset by other factors. Consequently group members who
are like Party leaders and their primary retainers in other important
characteristics (e.g. class, education, occupation) will be favored over
those who aren't. Another means of getting access is through sponsorship.
If a person who is already accepted passes favorably on someone new it
is a lot easier for that person to obtain recognition than if they must
make it on their own. Group members who are sponsored by someone who is
a leader or connected to a leader will be favored over those who lack
such sponsorship. Many of the influential women within the Republican
Party are related to influential men. These men are their sponsors.

II

World View

New York Governor Mario Cuomo in his keynote address to the Democratic
convention accused the Republican Party of having policies which "divide
the nation -- into the lucky and the left-out, into the royalty and the
rabble." Whether the Party's policies are divisive is certainly debatable
but Cuomo did articulate a difference in perspective by the Parties that
shapes their way of dealing with the world. It has been argued that society
as a whole has a cultural and structural "center" about which
most members of the society are more or less peripheral."7
Republicans see themselves as representing the center while Democrats
view society from the periphery.
The Republican center does not include the State, i.e. the major organs
of the national government. Republicans have always felt a tension between
the State and society, and have viewed the former with suspicion even
when in power (at least the Presidency). Since Republicans (as individuals)
control most of the major private institutions, particularly economic
ones, a strong central government is seen as a threat to their power.
The Democratic periphery feels a strong government is necessary in order
to counterbalance private economic domination. Indeed they feel that the
State's primary function ought to be a check on private economic
power. Nonetheless, Democrats, like typical outsiders, are ambivalent
toward the State. Their ambivalence derives not from a suspicion of strength,
but from concern that the State will not act as they feel it should. Indeed,
until Reagan began to redirect the national government, most Democrats
did not appreciate how valuable the federal government was to them or
even how thoroughly they had captured its main components.
Although Republicans do not want to increase State power, they nonetheless
feel that what they are and their conception of the American dream is
inherently desirable. They are insiders who represent the core of American
society and are the carriers of its fundamental values. What they have
achieved in life, and wish to achieve, is what every true American wishes
to achieve. The traditions they represent are what has worked for America
and the policies they pursue are ones that ultimately will be best for
everyone. They argue that the Republican Party, and Republican policies,
represent the national interest, unlike the Democrats, who only serve
the "special interests" that are powerful within it.8
Their concept of representation is as a "trustee" who pursues
the long range best interests of the represented.
The Democrats have a very different world view and a different concept
of the meaning of representation. To them, representation means not the
articulation of a single coherent program for the betterment of the nation
but the inclusion of all relevant groups and viewpoints. Their concept
of representation is "delegatory," in which accurate reflection
of the parts is necessary to the welfare of the whole. Ironically, this
requires a "free market" view of the political arena as one
in which the most collective good comes from maximizing properly represented
individual goods. Because there is no common agenda there is no common
conception of a national interest independent of the total interests of
the parts. Instead groups seek to maximize what each gets through bargaining
and building coalitions on the assumption that everyone should get something.
This expectation lay behind Jesse Jackson's statement at the 1984 Democratic
convention that Blacks had received nothing from the Democrats, unlike
women and Southerners, who had. Thus Blacks had a legitimate reason to
be angry and Democrats should not expect their undivided loyalty without
giving them something in return.

Guided by a more unitary conception of representation as meaning the correct
articulation of the national interest, Republicans feel the needs of minorities
will be met best by improving the economy. They believe that that which
most benefits the whole will most benefit each part. Although the Party
sometimes does offer discrete programs or benefits to discrete groups,
it does so reluctantly and only because it must meet Democratic criticisms
that it is ignoring the needs of such groups. Complaints such as Jackson's
might be voiced privately, but never publicly. To do so would be disloyal
as it would call into question the universal desirability of the Republican
program.
Democrats do not have an integrated conception of a national interest
in part because they do not view themselves as the center of society.
The Party's components think of themselves as outsiders pounding on the
door who seek programs which will facilitate entry into the mainstream.
Thus the Party is very responsive to any group, including such social
pariahs as gays and lesbians, that claims it is left out. As is typical
of outsiders, Democrats are predisposed toward "change" and
"experimentation" in the belief that what is is not inherently
desirable, and something new might lead to something better. At the extreme,
this attitude results in the assumption that anything new is inherently
better. Since the Party feels it should respond to group desires for representation
and the articulation of group interests it does not find the label "special
interest" to be particularly galling except insofar as it is effective
electoral propaganda. Indeed Democrats would claim that the Republicans
confuse the "national interest" with the special interests of
the upper and upper middle classes which its policies would favor. Nonetheless,
after the 1984 election saw the Democrats wounded by the accusation that
it was a "captive of the special interests" several Democratic
Governors and Senators set up an independent Democratic Leadership Council
with the goal of capturing the loyalty of Democrats who supposedly left
the Party because of this capture.9
Insofar as the Republican idea of a national interest can be summed up
in a single phrase, it would be the promotion of individual success.
Insiders generally view their achievements as due to their own merit and
efforts rather than to aspects of the social structure or plain luck.
Success is its own justification. Thus what's worked for them, or what
they acknowledge as having worked for them, should work for everyone.
For government to interfere, other than to remove barriers to individual
action, is undesirable.
The word that would most aptly characterize what Democrats want is fairness.10
This is a common goal of outsiders who do not accept their fate as caused
by their own failure. They are rather skeptical that there is a linear
relationship between individual effort, ability and reward and feel that
a major function of government is to make life more fair. Exactly what
is fair, however is rarely debated. Thus potential conflicts between groups
which might have contradictory goals are avoided. Although Democrats are
outsiders seeking to get in, they do not acknowledge the values and life
style typical of Republicans as the mainstream they are trying to enter.
Pluralism, or the right of each group to maintain a distinct identity
while still being accepted as part of the whole, is more the Democratic
ideal. Democratic outsiders for whom a group identity is important are
quite ambivalent about exactly what they do want. In its own way, each
different group experiences a great deal of tension between a desire for
self-affirmation and one for assimilation. This ambivalence is typical
of immigrants -- classic outsiders -- and fades after a couple generations.
However, most immigrants at least know what assimilation means even if
they are not certain that they want all -- the bad as well as the good
-- that it offers, whereas groups active within the Democratic Party aren't
so sure.

III

Organizational Style

It has often been noted that Democratic Party politics are open, loud
and confrontational while those of the Republican Party are closed, quiet
and consensual. These contrasting characteristics are consequences of
the structural and attitudinal differences discussed earlier. They result
in different styles of party organization even though there is a superficial
similarity in the formal structure of both parties and they have the same
ultimate goal of winning elections.

These contrasting styles were exemplified by a description of the battles
over replacing the Massachusetts State Party Chairs in 1956.

...In the Democratic party the affair could best be called a brawl all
the way -- at least as the press reported it, no doubt with some gleeful
exaggeration. Statements and counter-statements to the press, accusations
of falsehood mutually tossed back and forth, gave the dispute most of
the elements of an Irish donnybrook, minus only the swinging of fists.
There were threats of that too. While the Democrats were having their
fracas, the heir apparent for the Republican nomination was carrying
on a quiet war against the incumbent Republican chairman, but with a
very different tone and with very different procedures. A dispatch to
the New York Times illustrated the differences of approach. It
noted that the Democrats had allowed the reporters in to hear their
showdown on replacing their chairman; it then went on to describe the
Republican methods: "Following a brief exchange of statements in
the newspapers, a characteristic hush fell over the Republican headquarters.
It has been the experience of political reporters in Massachusetts for
years that the Republicans promote publicity, and hire press agents
to carry out the program so long as it is favorable. Anything unfavorable
is carefully thrashed out behind the closed doors of private social
and dining clubs. The participants then walk out smiling at each other,
each trying to ignore political knife handles protruding from their
backs. So it was Tuesday night. ... Reporters were barred from the meeting
until after the balloting was finished. They were admitted in time to
hear [the defeated chairman] make his valedictory."11

The Republican party sees itself as an organic whole whose parts are interdependent.
Republican activists are expected to be "good soldiers" who
respect leadership and whose only important political commitment is to
the Republican Party. Since direction comes from the top, the manner by
which one effects policy is by quietly building a consensus among key
individuals, and then pleading one's case to the leadership as furthering
the basic values of the party. Maneuvering is OK. Challenging is not.
This approach acknowledges the leadership's right to make final decisions
and reassures them that those preferring different policies do not have
competing allegiances. On the other hand, open challenges or admissions
of fundamental disagreements indicates that one might be too independent
to be a reliable soldier who will always put the interests of the Party
first. This cuts off access to the leadership and thus is quite risky
-- unless the leadership changes to people more amenable to the challengers.
While not risky like an open challenge, quietly building an internal consensus
is nonetheless costly of one's political resources. Activists learn early
to conserve their resources by only contesting issues of great importance
to them.
Liberals in the Republican Party (former supporters of Rockefeller and
Scranton) who repeatedly challenged the Reagan Administration have been
virtually read out of the party. On the right, Rep. Newt Gingrich's (Ga.)
attack on David Stockman for betraying the supply side "revolution"
(not a Republican word) incurred very angry responses from the Republican
leadership who dismissed his arguments as "ego-gratification."12
However, Gingrich has been more successful at being listened to than the
liberals (who no longer even use the word "liberal", having
retreated to "moderate" after Reagan came to power). His success
and that of other vocal challengers from the right is based on their ability
to demonstrate a public following. If Gingrich can translate this following
into winning campaigns, whether for himself or people who support him,
he will continue to be listened to and eventually join the leadership.
If not, he not only won't join the leadership, he won't even have access
to it. Reagan was not accepted by the Republican establishment until his
electoral successes gave them no choice.
Liberal Republicans have largely failed to demonstrate a following and
thus have lost power as their leaders have ceased to occupy major roles
within the Party. They argue that the "yuppies" who voted for
Hart ought to look favorably upon Republicans like them who have liberal
social agendas and conservative economic policies. Unfortunately, as demonstrated
by the Ripon Society and more recently the Mainstream Republican Committee,
they know how to talk but don't know how to organize. Thus their potential
following is not really aware that they exist. Apart from the unlikely
event of a spontaneous public uprising in their favor their position within
the Party will continue to atrophy as individuals learn that the price
of access to conservative leadership is keeping quiet.
In the Democratic Party, keeping quiet is the cause of atrophy
and speaking out is a means of access. Although the Party continues to
be one of multiple power centers with multiple access points, both the
type and importance of powerful groups within it has changed over time.
State and local parties have weakened in the last few decades and the
influence of national constituency groups has grown. The process of change
has resulted in a great deal of conflict as former participants resist
declining influence (e.g. the South, Chicago's Mayor Daley) while newer
ones jocky for position (women and blacks). Successfully picking fights
is the primary way by which groups acquire clout within the Party.
Since the purpose of most of the conflict is to achieve acceptance and
eventually power it does not matter whether the issues that are fought
over are substantive or only symbolic. In the 1950s and 1960s these fights
were usually over credentials as southern delegations were challenged
because of their refusal to declare their loyalty to the national ticket
and their inadequate representation of blacks. In the 1970s and 1980s,
the fights have usually been over platform planks but some have concerned
rules changes or designations of status. In 1976 Women's groups fought
over the "equal division" rule to require that half of all delegates
be women. Although they lost, they had to find another issue in 1980 because
the DNC decided to adopt it 1978. Instead they focused on minority planks
on abortion and denying Party support to opponents of the ERA. In 1984
the issue would have been a woman Vice Presidential candidate, but this
was preempted by Walter Mondale's selection of Geraldine Ferraro as his
running mate so there was nothing to fight over.
Jesse Jackson's entire campaign was a way for a new generation of Black
leaders to establish clout both within the Party and within the Black
community. The means by which Blacks have exercised power in the Party
has been less through organizations than through elected officials and
their individual followings. As there is no internal mechanism for selecting
leaders among the many contenders, those Blacks who have exercised power
within the Party have usually been those whom White party leaders chose
to listen to. Jackson's candidacy challenged both the current Black political
leadership and the right of Whites to decide which Blacks were legitimate
leaders. By showing that Black voters would unite behind his candidacy
in the primaries he established his legitimacy as a national Black spokesperson,
independent of White approval. This gave him a claim to dictate the Black
agenda in the Party, even though he had not previously been a Party activist
and there were many competent Black leaders within the Party who were
not supportive of this upstart.
Prior to the convention the issues on which the fight took place were
the "second primary" and "expanding the base" of the
Democratic Party through voter registration. However established local
leaders have no reason to expand the base because newcomers may not support
them, thus these efforts received only lip service.13
At the convention Blacks who supported Jesse Jackson had several minority
platform planks over which to fight, but primarily directed their energies
at status indicators, such as who was interviewed for Vice President and
how many blacks had positions in the Mondale campaign. Because Jackson
represented a generational split within the Black community, his demands
for recognition presented the Mondale campaign with problems not presented
by feminists. Among feminists, elected officials and organizational leaders
were united on wanting a women Vice Presidential candidate, and even agreed
on a particular individual. Since Blacks were not united, any recognition
of Jackson and his followers threatened the position of established Black
elected officials to speak for the Black community. If Jackson had subsequently
refused to campaign for Mondale, his legitimacy as a Party leader,
though not as a Black leader, would have been seriously undermined.
Since he chose to play by the rules, he's still a contender.

Fights do not have to be won in order for those picking them to be successful.
They are opportunities for demonstrating political skills and establishing
territory. Feminist leaders didn't win the equal division fight in 1976,
and everyone knew that had it gone to a floor vote, they would have lost.
What they won was recognition. The Carter campaign negotiated with them
because they showed that there were a substantial number of women willing
and able to fight on the issue. This established the right of women to
be recognized as an important group within the Party. However, Carter
refused to negotiate with feminists in 1980, largely because he perceived
them as surrogates for his rival, Ted Kennedy, and not important in and
of themselves. This was changed by their success in getting the Convention
to adopt two minority planks that the Carter administration opposed. By
showing that they were both politically skilled and persistent feminists
successfully claimed the right to represent women within the Party. The
Jackson campaign did for a new generation of Black leaders what the equal
division fight did for feminists. They are now recognized as contenders,
but are not yet players. Many Party leaders, both Black and White, still
hope they will go away. Thus Jackson and his followers cannot take any
concessions for granted. It will be necessary to organize for 1988 in
order to demonstrate continuity.
The open confrontations that occur in the Democratic Party do not take
place within the Republican Party because it is a very different kind
of organization. The many different forms of collectivities can be placed
on a spectrum. At one end would be groups exhibiting a great deal of spontaneity
which are easy to join and have minimal structure, such as fads and crowds.
At the other are organizations which have well developed divisions of
labor, hierarchical layers of authority, are selective in their membership
and relatively impervious to spontaneous impulses, such as corporations
or at the extreme end, military bodies. In the middle are most social
movements, which, however diverse they may be, exhibit both noticeable
spontaneity and a describable structure. Parties and campaigns lie on
the more organized end of the spectrum, but because they must mobilize
voters, raise money from contributors rather than by selling a product,
and recruit volunteers to accomplish their goals they exhibit many properties
of social movements.
The national Republican Party has more characteristics of the corporate
style and fewer typical of social movements than does the national Democratic
Party.
This has been a continuing attribute; the semi-organized chaos seen in
the Democratic Party today is not a consequence of contemporary reforms.
Cotter and Hennessy wrote in their book on the national party committees
in the early 1960s that the

...Democrats are relatively undisturbed by -- and often seem to thrive
on -- the ad hocness of politics. Republicans embrace order;
they try to impress it on the anarchy of politics. Democrats resist
order or accept it only as a last resort. This difference may be, in
part, no more than the prodigality of the majority party willing and
able to waste some of its margin, and the frugality of the minority
party aware that organization may compensate for numbers. Or it may
be, as some have suggested, a psychological and temperamental difference
between those who are attracted to one party and those attracted to
the other.14

Lockard found a similar distinction in the two Massachusetts parties in
the late 1950s, when the Republican Party was dominant in that state.
He wrote that the Parties responded very differently to challenges by
ethnics to advance within them.

The Republicans lay down the line in the pre-primary convention to assert
some control over those who would disrupt the party organization in
a primary. In the Democratic party the non-Irish, non-Boston candidate
comes to the fore by using the free-for-all tactics of the primary;
in the Republican party the leadership arranges to put some ethnic representative
on the ticket.15

The difference in styles is partially a consequence of different resources.
Like corporations, or well-established interest groups, the Republican
Party relies heavily on money and professional expertise. Like social
movements and volunteer organizations, the Democratic Party relies more
on donations of time and commitment. The Republican Party raises and spends
several times the amount of money that the Democrats do, and has had a
larger permanent staff for decades. It approaches "the problem of
national party financing with businesslike matter-of-factness .... The
Democratic national finance machinery is decentralized, with each committee
doing what it damned well pleases .... In general, money-raising procedures
at the Democratic National Committee remain informal and largely oral."16
The Democratic Party relies heavily on volunteers in its national office,
and on the ability of its component constituency groups to recruit volunteers
for local campaigns. Like a corporation, the Republican Party seeks to
allocate its resources so as to maximize its success. Like social movements,
the Democratic Party puts great emphasis on expanding the number of participants.
Indeed it often views success and expansion as synonymous.
This resource analysis was used by Wilson to explain some of the differences
he found between amateur Democratic and Republican clubs in the 1950s.
He found that Democratic clubs were mass based and stressed intra-party
democracy and participation while Republican groups were "leadership-oriented
organizations." While he found some explanation for this in the different
political philosophies and professions of the typical Republican and Democratic
amateur activist he also noted that

the chief resource the conservative brings to civic -- or to political
-- action is economic: money, corporate power, and the personal contacts
flowing from business position. The liberal, lacking money, brings numbers
and personal contributions of time and effort. The conservative organization,
to the extent that it is successful in mobilizing money and prestige,
incapacitates itself for direct political action insofar as the people
it recruits are successful in business or their careers; personal success
leaves them little time for or interest in personal participation. The
contributors are at a point where political action can offer little
in status or recognition -- indeed such action is more likely to be
considered harmful. This lack of personal involvement may produce an
indifference to organizational forms and procedures and an emphasis
on organizational goals. To say the same thing another way, whatever
incentives a conservative club can offer will derive from its stated
goals; direct participation itself is not an important reward to the
member, and internal democracy is therefore not of crucial significance
to him.17

The
nature of the Democratic resource base requires it to devote more time
and energy to organizational maintenance -- keeping the troops satisfied.
Thus it has less available for external programs. This places a greater
burden on the staff of the Democratic National Committee compared to
the RNC. Senior staff of both, especially the chairs, must be good managers
but DNC officials in addition bear responsibility for creating and keeping
a consensus among the party's many constituencies.
This pattern is not necessarily repeated on the local level where party
organizations are much more diverse. Indeed of all party organizations,
past and present, few have been more hierarchical, exclusive and hostile
to spontaneity than the big city Democratic machines. However, these
machines relied on patronage, not volunteers. Where state Civil Service
Acts undermined the material basis of their power they became vulnerable
to challenge by reformist volunteers whose political commitment was
greater than theirs.
Even where staff and the money to pay them are plentiful, many party
functions are accessible to or require volunteers, and groups which
can mobilize volunteers can be very influential. These groups are often
dedicated to specific causes, and like social movements, rely on the
time and commitment of their members to attain their goals. In particular
the delegate selection processes of both parties are vulnerable to adherents
of specific causes (sometimes called special interests) who can engage
in intensive short-term efforts. This is especially true in caucus states
because so few people are willing to attend and participate for the
hours or even days necessary to elect delegates. However, even in primary
states the voters usually only determine how many delegates a given
candidate will get. Other mechanisms determine who these delegates are.
Ideological groups whose members see being a delegate as a way to pursue
their issue concerns can frequently have an impact far greater than
their proportion of the voters would warrant. Observers of the last
three Republican conventions have noted that the delegates are disproportionately
to the right of typical Republican activists. As one disgruntled Ford
supporter explained his near loss at the 1976 Convention, "They're
willing to get up at 6:00 am and go to caucus meetings and we're not."
Groups operating on the social movement model can also be very effective
in campaigns, at least those for which heavy media attention is not
key. If group members are geographically concentrated and willing to
contribute large amounts of time and energy to a particular campaign
they can be very important to its success and consequently very influential.
Right wing organizations have found this approach more appealing than
those on the left who are usually either poorly organized on the local
level or disdainful of electoral politics. An exception to this are
Gay Democratic Clubs who have used heavy campaign activity to win support
from many public officials who might not otherwise favor their causes.

Both parties have been strengthening their national organizations in the
last ten years and neither has completed this task. But they have gone
about it very differently. The Republican Party has focused outwardly.
After Watergate the Republican Party was very concerned both with rebuilding
the Party and with restoring its image. Thus it has placed considerable
emphasis on winning elections and on marketing itself. It's response to
any public distaste toward its programs is to change their image so as
to better sell the Party to the public rather than to change the programs
themselves. For example, the Party officially opposes the Equal Rights
Amendment, but argues that it is still for equal rights for women. It
encourages its candidates to present themselves to the voters as people
who care, in order to counter the Republican stereotype as a party of
people who only care about themselves.
The RNC has drawn upon modern technology to create a highly sophisticated
direct mail operation and used the money raised to implement candidate
recruitment and training programs and provide resources to their campaigns.
It also channeled money and staff to the state party organizations to
develop voter registration efforts, a solid financial base and a permanent
staff. These resources have enabled the RNC to build up the state parties
and solidify their loyalty while the Democrats are still wrestling with
a collection of independent and diverse entities.
It is not just the resources the national Republican Party has to offer
that make the state parties willing to listen. In most states the Republican
Party is a minority party. Thus the state parties have nothing to lose
by accepting national guidance, and when it works, everything to gain.
Democratic state parties in states in which they control the executive
and/or the legislature would most likely not have been as receptive to
national guidance even if it had come sweetcoated with cash and consultation.
Why give up the right to determine your own affairs if you've been successful
so far?
The Democratic Party's drive toward nationalization has focused inwardly.
It has been less concerned with what the Party looks like than with what
it is. Although it has developed some support programs for local parties
and candidates, much of its energy, and money, has gone into reform commissions
to rewrite the party rules. This wasn't totally by choice. The Republican
Party had a head start in nationalization and centralization. The RNC
established a permanent headquarters in 1919 and made its chair a full-time
paid position in 1936. The Democrats didn't do so until 1928 and 1944
respectively. The Republicans established the authority of the national
Party over the State and local parties in the two decades after the Bull
Moose faction split off in 1912 and threw the Presidential election to
the Democrats. The Democrats remained decentralized, with State and local
organizations relatively independent of the national party. This precipitated
a crisis in 1948 when four Southern states refused to put Truman's name
on the ballot and almost caused his defeat. Subsequently, delegates to
the national conventions and members of the DNC were asked to declare
their loyalty to the national ticket as a precondition to being seated,
which they did not always do.
The crisis reemerged in 1964 when the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party
challenged the right of the regular delegation to represent Mississippi
Democrats, and in 1968 when the Mississippi delegation was replaced by
the insurgents and the Georgia delegation was forced to share its votes.
The question of local autonomy versus party loyalty was not resolved until
1975 when the Supreme Court held in Cousins v. Wigoda that national
party rules prevailed over state law. Even with this decision and a subsequent
one which reaffirmed this ruling, Democratic Party v. LaFollette,
many state and local party organizations remain recalcitrant. They feel
that the national party has nothing to offer them but rules on how to
conduct their activities.
The Republican Party offers its state parties a lot more than rules. In
turn, it gets much more central control than the Democratic Party has
ever contemplated. A spin off of its efforts has been the creation of
a community of professional political managers who rotate among state
party staff positions, national party staff positions, campaigns and other
political jobs. People in this community generally know each other and
rely on their mutual connections through the national party to promote
their careers. They have developed a cosmopolitan attitude and a loyalty
to the national Republican Party greater than to any state organization.
This in turn makes those in this community who are in state staff jobs
more amenable to national party direction. As this community becomes self
sustaining the strings the national party attaches to its state aid become
less important because the state staff in effect become agents of the
national party.
Although the Democrats also have many professional political organizers,
they aren't part of a self-identified community and don't look to national
party networks for job assistance. Each state has its own cadre of political
activists and there is very little exchange between them, except during
Presidential campaigns (which are separate from party work). Campaign
and party work is less likely to be a career than an occasional diversion.
Those for whom it is a career often work their way up to a position in
Washington, but once no longer employed by a national party or campaign
organization, return to their own states or, occasionally, become political
directors of interest groups. The consequence is a more parochial attitude
in which staff are the agents of their employers and not the national
party.
The Democrats are trying to strengthen the national party, particularly
its financial base, and one day may have the same material resources as
the Republicans. But even with the same resources it will still be a very
different party with a different organizational style. Any organization,
regardless of whether it's major resources are money and expertise or
personal time and commitment, which has multiple power centers, is composed
of groups whose interests are not always congruent, and in which power
flows upward, will require greater attention to internal matters and be
more contentious than one which is hierarchical, unitary and in which
power flows downward. The latter will be able to use more of its resources
for attaining its goals and direct them more efficiently.
Nonetheless, it does not follow that the Democratic style lacks any advantages
over that of the Republicans. In the short run it appears disruptive,
but in the long run it is more stable. Once a consensus develops about
the desirability of a particular course of action, whether it be programmatic
or procedural, it is accepted as right and proper and is not easily thwarted
by party leaders, even when one of them is the President. Except for its
core values, the Republican Party is more likely to change directions
when it changes leaders. If it were to change directions too drastically,
it could undermine both its credibility and its programs. Thus the contest
for the 1988 Republican nomination for President may send reverberations
throughout the party, while that for the Democratic nomination will reflect
in part what has happened in the Party.

IV
Dissent and Disloyalty

One of the most common observations of the Democratic Party is how much
more fractious it is than the Republican Party. Although there are bounds
on dissent, one can say things about the Party's leaders and candidates,
publicly, that in the Republican Party would be deemed disloyal. Only
the Republican Party has an Eleventh Commandment -- thou shalt not criticize
a fellow Republican. Thus during the 1984 Conventions, such Republican
adversaries as liberal Sen. Lowell Weicker (Conn.) and conservative Rep.
Trent Lott (Miss.) curbed their criticism of each other in public while
leading figures in the Democratic Party whose mutual disagreements were
comparatively minor let their complaints be constantly quoted in the press.
Republicans do fight, sometimes viciously, but by and large their fights
are not public, and even in private take place on more limited terrain.
When they do occur the ill feelings they create last a lot longer. Democratic
sparring partners are more willing to kiss and make up.
The difference in the bounds of dissent can be seen in the different ways
the Parties have treated those who had fundamental disagreements with
their Party's Presidential candidates. In 1980 NOW voted not to endorse
Jimmy Carter and at the convention led a floor fight for a minority plank
strongly disliked by the candidate. Despite this opposition in an election
year and the fact that no one thought NOW would possibly defect to the
Republicans, NOW President Ellie Smeal was invited to meet with President
Carter that fall, and was subsequently (after Carter's defeat) hired as
a consultant to the DNC. Indeed, the refusal to toe the line and leadership
of a successful floor fight strengthened NOW within the Party because
it had demonstrated clout. Similarly, Jesse Jackson's thinly veiled threats
not to support the 1984 ticket appear to have strengthened his hand.
In the Republican Party many, though certainly not all, prominent Ford
supporters, found themselves eased out after Reagan was elected, including
ones who professed loyalty to the President but disagreed with some aspects
of his program. Feminists who criticized Reagan for his opposition to
the ERA have been virtually read out of the Republican Party. Although
George Bush was selected to be Reagan's running mate despite many well
known disagreements it was a practical decision which was not completely
accepted by Reagan's own supporters. The opposition to Bush was much greater
and runs much deeper than that of Democrats to Johnson as Kennedy's running
mate or to Humphrey as Johnson's. This exclusionary attitude is not restricted
to the Reagan Administration. After Goldwater's devastating defeat in
1964 his supporters were blamed and found themselves ostracized by the
then influential liberal wing of the Party. In contrast, although McGovern's
supporters were blamed for the Democrats' 1972 loss, and there was some
retrenchment in the delegate selection rules which made his nomination
possible, they were not cut out.
Another illustration is the attitude toward delegates in 1984 who voted
for someone other than the expected victors for President and Vice President.
The delegate who refused to vote for Reagan and the two who refused to
vote for Bush were treated by their own delegations as apostates even
though there was no crisis mandating a loyalty test. Illinois Delegate
Susan Catania, a former State Representative, was asked by liberal Gov.
Jim Thompson, to give up her vote to an alternate rather than vote an
abstention in the nomination tally. In contrast, the Democrats don't expect
all their delegates to vote for the expected winner, as long as it doesn't
deprive the candidate of a first ballot victory. Even Jesse Jackson's
appeal to his supporters to deny Mondale a first ballot victory was tolerated,
if not appreciated. Nor is the Vice Presidential vote the loyalty test
it is for the Republicans; rather it is an opportunity for delegates to
express themselves. At the 1972 Democratic Convention over 70 people,
six of whom were formally nominated, received Vice Presidential votes
(including three for Mao Zedong).
The extensive contentiousness of the Democrats can be traced to their
different structure. Coalitions are inevitably more conflict ridden than
unitary organizations because group leaders are accountable to their members
as much or even more than to the coalition. Furthermore, the more people
who can legitimately claim consideration of their views, the more legitimate
viewpoints there are. This in turn legitimates expression of different
views even by participants who are not powerful enough to merit consideration
on their own. This situation is exacerbated for the Democrats because
they tend to value change and experimentation in and of themselves. Thus
each new idea has to be discussed and fought out on every level and in
every power center of the party until a consensus is finally achieved.
As a party more enamored of tradition than change, the Republican Party
would have fewer issues to fight over even if it had as many places in
which to fight them. The self perception of the Democrats' constituency
groups as perennial outsiders adds another twist. Winners are expected
to concern themselves with the welfare of the losers. Republicans have
more of a "winner take all" attitude. If you support the wrong
candidate, you have no claim on the spoils. Access to the leaders, appointments
or other indicia of inclusion, are commodities whose value is increased
through scarcity. The Democrats view access as much more of a right which
everyone, including the losers, are entitled to. Leaders should represent,
and listen to, all the people in the Party, not just those who supported
them.
This attitude makes it more difficult for party leaders to punish those
who disagree. Since coalitions generally involve shifting alliances, the
relatively powerless may combine with others to become relatively powerful
at some future date. Thus it is unwise to completely shut anyone off,
or out. Even Party leaders who would like to ignore those whose opinions
they find obnoxious rarely find it worthwhile to do so. Since legitimate
power flows upward, personal connections with and access to the leadership
don't have the same value they have in the Republican Party. Severing
access doesn't so much punish dissidents as it portrays the leaders who
do so as unwilling to listen. Those subunits of the Democratic Party which
have had bosses, e.g. the Chicago Democratic Party under Mayor Daley,
have not been noted for their tolerant attitude toward dissidents. Local
Democratic Party leaders who are powerful enough to command obedience,
generally do so.

Another consequence of the coalition structure is that multiple loyalties
are normal. While many Democrats are party people first and foremost,
many others are not. The idea that one should juggle competing loyalties
is unexceptional as is the possibility that one might seek to resolve
conflicting agendas by getting the Party to adopt the positions of non-party
groups. The Republican Party frowns on multiple loyalties. Indeed it looks
with great suspicion on anyone susceptible to having conflicting agendas
as potentially disloyal. A major reason Republican feminists have had
so much more trouble rehabilitating themselves into the Reagan Party than
others who did not initially support him is because they are assumed to
have a major or even primary loyalty to feminism and feminist organizations.
As feminism is not supported by the current leadership, and feminist organizations
are viewed as Democratic Party front groups, it is virtually impossible
to be both an accepted Republican activist and an outspoken supporter
of feminist goals. Since the Party discourages people from identifying
themselves as members of a group with a group agenda, it minimizes the
possibility of multiple loyalties. But should it succeed in recruiting
substantial numbers of potential party activists from other groups which
do have specific agendas (e.g. Jews), both will experience some discomfort.
The Republican Party's concern with exclusive loyalty is partially a consequence
of its having been a minority party for so long. To a limited extent it
exhibits the "siege mentality" typical of minority factions
or groups engaged in constant struggle (e.g. labor unions). Groups which
have an analysis of the world's ills whose fundamental premises are not
widely accepted are reluctant to allow doubts to be expressed externally,
and sometimes internally. If partisans appear to have doubts, why should
others be convinced? Groups which view themselves as the underdog in a
crucial ongoing struggle are similarly reluctant to expose any vulnerabilities.
Serious dissent is portrayed as a luxury which should not be allowed to
destroy the unity necessary for victory. This siege mentality was exacerbated
by the Watergate scandal which put Party members in the uncomfortable
position of having to justify their retention of the Republican label.
The commitment to the Party which this required raised their expectations
of the loyalty others should exhibit.
The Party's emphasis on being a team player does not mean that there can
be no debate. When the Party is out of power, different factions or different
candidates with different visions to sell will back them vigorously. Even
when it is in power not all issues are decided by the President and his
staff. But he, and other party leaders, have the power to decide them
if he chooses. When the leadership puts its stamp of approval on a particular
position, public criticism must cease.
Conversely, room for disagreement in the Democratic Party is not unlimited.
Indeed, there are certain issues and attitudes which constitute a "party
line." These "protected issues" are ones which are important
to powerful groups within the party. Once a group has been accepted as
a legitimate player it acquires a certain amount of sovereignty over a
policy territory and can usually designate those issues and positions
within it which are to be part of the party line. If there is disagreement
within a group, or there is no recognized group representing a particular
issue, it can be debated within the party. But otherwise a recognized
group has sovereignty over issues within its territory.
This does not give it sovereignty over issues outside its territory. For
example, women's organizations would not be able to dictate the party's
position on the nuclear freeze; establishing a party line on this issue
would require a consensus of all concerned groups. Sometimes there are
disputes between groups over territory. Disagreements between Blacks and
Jews over the party's positions on affirmative action and the Mideast
are in this category. The argument is as much over which group has the
right to determine Party policy on these issues as it is over what that
policy should be.

V

Cohesion and Commitment

Since dissent does exist in both parties, albeit to a different extent,
there must also be some glue which holds them together. Obviously one
source of cohesion is the desire to win, but this by itself is not sufficient
to hold either party together between campaigns or after divisive primaries.
Although the desire to win is mutual, the primary sources of cohesion
are peculiar to each party.
Different factions of the Republican Party are held together by their
common ideology, but this is not what holds the party as a whole together.
The fact that the Party is not ideologically homogenous is a potential
source of fragmentation. Instead the Party is held together by social
homogeneity.18 Party activists share
membership in common social strata, with common rules of behavior and
a common definition of who is acceptable. These rules of behavior or acceptability
create an informal language and style which is hard for outsiders to learn
and thus operates as a barrier to their assimilation. Some aspects of
this homogeneity are easily visible. A crowd of traditional Republicans
can be identified by their common dress and their unspoken understanding
that someone who dresses differently is not one of them. A crowd of Democrats
cannot be identified by a common appearance; indeed they are so diverse
that a few Republicans in their midst would not even be noticed.

The Republican strata are those of the upper and upwardly mobile classes.
Many Republicans felt that the "yuppies" who voted for Hart
should be "Ruppies". The polls which showed that Reagan was
their second choice only confirmed this view. While members of these strata
have much in common, their style and the rules of social acceptability
vary somewhat by geography. An "Eastern Establishment" Republican
is not the same as a "Midwestern Mainstreet" or "Western
conservative" Republican. Thus an active Republican in one part of
the country who relocates can have trouble being accepted as an active
Republican in another, as illustrated by George Bush's constant battle
to be viewed as a Texan rather than a scion of Connecticut.
Similarly, entire groups seeking to become Republican activists who do
not share the common style find acceptance difficult because their presence
threatens the social homogeneity that holds the Party together. A frequent
reaction by traditional Republicans to the New Right supporters of Reagan
is to assert that they are "not real Republicans" and thus do
not deserve to exercise power within the Party. This claim was first made
at the 1976 convention. When Reagan delegates dominated the 1980 convention
it was muted, but still there. Reagan's political success curbed the expression
of this sentiment, but not its existence. The 1984 Convention saw many
traditional Republicans present as Reagan delegates, but in eight years
their opinion of the newcomers there with them had not really changed.
Molly Ivins described the women delegates as coming "in two main
flavors: Ultrasuede and polyester."

The ultrasuedes...look down on the polyesters.... Some Ultrasuedes are
feeling outnumbered by the polyesters this year as though their party
has been taken over by people they would never allow to join the country
club. Not the right sort.... As though someone had let some tacky girls
into a Kappa chapter.

I guess it is a simple class distinction, but along with having more
money, the Ultrasuedes tend to be more sophisticated and also more liberal
on social issues than the polyesters. They are frankly embarrassed,
if not mortified, by the party's Jerry Falwell connection, but only
in a social sense.19

Democrats would not seriously accuse someone of not being a real Democrat.
Mondale tried it during the 1984 primary in an attack on Hart, but reaction
to this charge was so negative it was quickly dropped. A Democrat is anyone
who claims to be one. As a party with neither a common ideology nor a
common social base, there is no real basis for erecting standards. Indeed,
an essential characteristic of the Democratic Party is its heterogeneity.
The greater sense of boundaries that Republicans have, of knowing who's
acceptable and who's not, serves an important social function. It facilitates
trust. People normally trust those who are like them to think like them
and do what they would do. People understand others who are like
themselves. Organizations or communities whose members trust each other
function more smoothly and take direction more willingly than those where
trust is more limited. Republicans trust their party, and their leaders,
to do what they think is right more than Democrats do because they are
socially homogenous.
Heterogeneity facilitates misunderstanding. People with different backgrounds,
different values, different styles and different modes of expression,
interpret the world differently and often misinterpret each other. A great
deal of communication, clarification, and reassurance is necessary to
maintain working relationships among diverse allies. In a highly heterogeneous
organization people with one group identity are reluctant to trust those
with another to act as their leaders or adequately represent their interests.
Instead they demand consultation, representation and participation. The
heterogenous nature of the Democratic Party requires that time and energy
be devoted to intraparty relationships and that identifiable groups feel
they have as much say as that want.
The glue which holds the Democratic Party together is pluralism. The fundamental
principles of pluralist theory were spelled out by James Madison in Federalist
No. 10. He argued that a large and diverse republic would best check
majority passions and "factious combinations." Although Madison
was more concerned with curbing power than with creating unity, diversity
is the secret to cohesion under certain conditions. These conditions occur
when individuals are members of many groups, no combination of which encompasses
all of their members' primary interests. When there are many cross-cutting
memberships, each of which have a claim on individual loyalties, the urge
to put one issue or group ahead of all others at any cost is restrained.
Face to face discussions and the need to ally with different people in
one group or on one issue tempers the tendency to view them as "enemies"
because there is disagreement on another.
The caucus structure of the Democratic Party facilitates pluralism. A
delegate to the Conventions will attend numerous state caucuses, candidate
caucuses, and often one or more group caucuses. The biennial miniconvention
has increased the opportunities for these kind of contacts. The opportunity
to both listen to and talk with different people from different parts
of the country, who are members of different groups increases awareness
and understanding of diverse positions. The need to work with other people
to achieve common goals increases receptivity toward their particular
concerns. Some political commentators have often marveled that a party
so fractious, heterogeneous and seemingly disorganized can remain intact.
As long as a particular group does not become insular, with its members
having no participation in or concern for other caucuses, the diversity
of the Democratic Party is its strength, not its weakness.

VI

The Future

In order to survive and flourish, both parties must constantly renew themselves.
They must recruit new supporters while retaining the loyalty of old ones.
Society does not remain static. Different groups reflecting different
interests constantly appear, while old ones decline. New issues emerge,
along with new social realities. How the parties respond to these determines
their future. Both parties seek to build their base of reliable supporters
through attractive candidates. The Democrats strengthened themselves considerably
with Franklin Delano Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy. The Republicans are
doing the same with Ronald Reagan. But it takes more than just an attractive
candidate to retain party loyalty. Personal charisma rarely outlives the
person.
In the last few decades the political landscape has changed considerably.
The role of local political parties in selecting candidates, mobilizing
voters and articulating sentiments has declined. Instead, media bring
the message of parties and candidates directly to the voters and organized
interest groups bring the message of the voters to public officials. Campaign
finance laws have also altered the relationships between political bodies,
candidates and voters, usually in ways not predicted by their proponents.
These changes are still in process and neither party has fully adjusted
but their approaches have been very different.
The Democratic and Republican parties have different recruiting styles.
By and large the Democratic approach is pragmatic; it looks at the country
as it really is -- composed of diverse, self-interested groups each of
whom has its own agenda and all of whom want a piece of the political
pie. Republicans are more idealistic and ideological. They base their
appeal on what Americans ought to want -- a coherent program enhancing
the national interest.
In the last twenty years neither of these strategies have been strikingly
successful, though success is hard to define. Party registration and identification
have been declining for over a decade, but until the most recent election
Republican decline was greater than that for the Democrats. The 1984 Reagan
landslide brought many voters into the Republican fold, but the extent
of ticket splitting confounded expectations of permanent party realignment.
It is often noted that the Republican candidate has won four of the last
five Presidential elections, but that really doesn't say anything meaningful
about either party. There have been 17 Republican Presidents since the
first one was elected in 1860, but only seven Democratic Presidents. The
national party committees were originally created to run the party's presidential
campaign, but they are now quite independent of it. Many things affect
the outcome of Presidential elections, but the activities of national
party bodies are not among the more important ones.
Party institutions are more important in the election of other candidates,
even though most campaigns are run by the candidates and not by the parties.
There are no readily available measures of party impact, but some trends
can be noted. The Democrats have been the majority party in Congress and
most states for the last thirty years. They lost control of the Senate
in 1984 and their numbers in other legislative bodies have been declining,
albeit slowly. This has coincided with a decline in local Party machines,
most of which were Democratic, and an increase in the role of national
party bodies, mostly those of the Republicans. Only the national Republican
committees, the RNC and those for each house of Congress, have developed
extensive financing and support mechanisms for their federal and state
candidates. Democratic efforts are still embryonic.
Along with the decline of local party organisms it appears that party
activism has declined, though measures are quite inadequate and don't
separate party activists from those who only work in occasional campaigns.
Since political activism has not declined, indeed has increased significantly
in the last two decades, the implication is that people no longer find
the parties to be appropriate vehicles for pursuing their political concerns.
One reason for this is increased mobility of precisely those people who
are most likely to be politically active -- the educated middle-class.
Party political clubs are based on geographic units whose primary concern
is the election of local candidates. Moving out of a club's territory
usually requires that one leave the organization and start anew someplace
else. Since political clubs generally favor those who have "paid
their dues" through many years of work, activists lose their seniority
when they leave. Their other assets, local contacts and knowledge of local
politics, are also not transferable. Thus the incentives to participate
in a political club decline as ones mobility or potential mobility increases.
This is less true in those areas where there have been major demographic
changes or which do not have established party machinery or clubs. Newcomers
can always have a greater impact in virgin territory. Since the Republican
Party is weaker in or absent from more localities than the Democratic
Party, its potential party activists find fewer barriers to participation.
The opposite is true for local chapters of interest group organizations.
Because these groups are focused on changing state and national policies,
not on electing candidates, seniority, contacts and political knowledge
are geographically transferable. Indeed mobility enhances participation
by increasing one's network of political activists. Thus people who are
politically concerned, especially those moving into areas with established
Democratic Party organizations, find it more rational to be issue activists
than Party activists. This may be one reason why legislative bodies find
themselves barraged by proliferating interest groups. Local parties can
no longer serve as mediating institutions between citizens and their government
because politically concerned people find them personally inaccessible.
The Democratic style of party building is congruent with these changes
on the national level but not on the local level. The Democratic Party
co-opts groups. It has done this partially through reform efforts to change
the delegate selection rules, and partially by supporting programs geared
to the interests of identifiable groups. The party has changed the rules
to make it more "open", has formally recognized seven caucuses,
set up advisory bodies in which constituent groups can participate, and
consults their leaders on its programs. In turn it expects these groups'
leaders to support Democratic candidates and the programs of other groups
active in the Party, and not to be unreasonable in their demands. Obviously,
no explicit bargain is made. Instead there is an understanding about the
trade-offs necessary to build a winning coalition. Everyone gets something.
No one gets everything. Understanding and playing by the rules is the
price of admission.
If the national Democratic Party is successful in creating an effective
coalition it may become the mediating institution that local party bodies
were supposed to be. Major party components would bargain among themselves
to establish a joint legislative agenda and relieve Congress from the
need to cope with multiple pressures from competing (though not opposing)
groups. However, they would still have to elect sufficient Democrats to
have legislators to hear their agenda. Since the coalition developing
on the national level is not really replicated on the state and local
level, and of all the coalition partners only labor unions have much local
campaign experience, it remains to be see whether nationally organized
interest groups can raise money and mobilize volunteers for local campaigns
adequate to compete with the Republican Party.
Although the Republican Party relies heavily on raising money to pay for
media and professional expertise it still needs to recruit volunteers.
It seeks to do this on a one-to-one basis rather than through groups,
and primarily by the force of their ideas rather than by supporting programs
with specific benefits. As students of social movements know, individual
recruiting is more difficult than bloc recruiting. The latter can utilize
pre-existing networks of likeminded people, who reinforce each others
changing beliefs. Individual recruiting requires a heavy expenditure of
time and energy for each recruit. Furthermore, Americans are pragmatic,
not ideological. Ideas by themselves are usually not effective recruiting
devices except in certain limited sectors of the population, who, until
recently, have not found Republican philosophy attractive.
These difficulties can be partially overcome through heavy use of the
media and direct mail. Most incipient social movements don't have the
money to do this, but the Republican Party does. Impersonal media recruitment
is most effective when what is wanted is not actual participation but
superficial indicia of support (voting), and monetary donations. That's
exactly what the party wants from its followers. As long as the party
can recruit and market attractive candidates, it should increase its base.
However, the Party will face problems should its new recruits want to
do more than contribute money and vote. The social homogeneity of the
party's primary base has served as a barrier to full participation by
people from other social strata. The we/they attitude of traditional Republicans
toward the New Right reflects a tension in the Party that may seriously
divide it in 1988. Since social homogeneity is the basis for cohesion,
it is extremely difficult for the Party to absorb a large group of newcomers
sufficiently different from the traditional Party activists such that
they threaten this homogeneity. The newcomers in turn pick up this hostility
and reflect it back. The Republican Party by and large is not receptive
to new groups. It may work with them, albeit uncomfortably, and it may
even assimilate them. But the price of assimilation is similarity, and
that is hard to achieve.
Should the Republican Party strengthen itself to the point of becoming
the majority party it will attract many newcomers, including organized
groups, who have not previously thought it worth their time to join. It
will discover that the price of success is that everyone wants a share
even when they have not made a contribution. Coping with increased demands,
rapid expansion and inadequate assimilation have destroyed many developing
organizations. Styles and approaches to problems that are compatible with
being a minority faction or underdog are not appropriate to being a majority
party. Whether the Party can anticipate and prepare for these problems
sufficiently to preclude them, remains to be seen.
As the majority party the Democrats face different prospects. The reformation
of the coalition from one of independent state and local parties each
with its own ethnic balance to a national coalition of constituency groups
has created constant turmoil and diverted resources from technological
modernization. Furthermore, party activists who do not clearly fit into
one of those groups feel left out. Jews are forming a Hillel caucus so
they can play the caucus game. Black women have formed their own political
association and may apply to be an official Party caucus. White males
are complaining that they no longer feel they belong in the party even
though over 90 percent of all Democratic candidates are white men and
white men dominate two important constituency groups with special set-asides:
labor and elected officials. Some want to abolish all official
caucuses to avoid the appearance of balkanization even though that would
not effect the Party's coalition structure. The Democrats could well learn
from the Republicans that they can create and project a positive image
without necessarily changing their essential characteristics. They can
remain a coalition party without being labeled the party of the special
interests.
Nonetheless, there is not just one route to political success. Each party,
for reasons peculiar to its own tradition and the social base from which
is draws, has a different organizational style uniquely adapted to its
particular circumstances. While each party must bend with the political
winds, particularly in times of rapid change, an attempt to deny their
differences will deprive them of the opportunity to recognize and build
upon their strengths.

Information
in this articles is primarily based on interviews with these activists
and observations made at the 1976, 1980 and 1984 national conventions
of the Republican Party, and every national nominating convention of the
Democratic Party since 1964. I also briefly attended the 1960 Democratic
and 1964 Republican national conventions, but my observations and memories
of those are very sketchy. In addition I conducted numerous interviews
with insightful participants of both parties on the national level in
the fall of 1984 and read newspaper accounts, party platforms, speeches
and other key documents. It is well established in the literature that
party elites and party masses (i.e. the voters) do not always think alike.
State parties may also differ from the national party in significant ways.
If the ideas posited in this paper are accurate they should be generally
applicable on the state level, but not necessarily on the mass level.

4When conservatives sought to start a Third Party after Reagan wasn't
nominated in 1976 they held meetings among themselves at the convention
but make no effort to contact delegates. Jeffrey Pressman, "Group
and Group Caucuses", Political Science Quarterly, 92:4 Winter
1977-78, p. 680.

7Edward Shils, "Center and Periphery," Selected Essays
(Chicago: Center for Social Organization Studies, Department of Sociology,
University of Chicago, 1970).

8Fahrenkopf, 1984, p. 174, states "[w]here we seek to build
coalitions, we build them on a commonality of interests which is greater
than a belief in special benefits legislated for special interests. Whether
we talk to white collar workers, Blacks, Hispanics, bank presidents, spot
welders or astronauts ... we concentrate on points in common rather than
why they, as a distinct group, should feel different and in need
of different treatment.

9Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 43:10, March 9 1985,
pp. 457-59. However there is no evidence that the Party intends to institute
a major revolution in its structure or outlook and the main Democratic
"special interest", organized labor, is not among those groups
whose supposed influence is under internal attack.

10See "The Democratic Party Credo" in Section 17, Article
11 of the Charter of the Democratic Party. "At the heart of our party
lies a fundamental conviction, that Americans must not only be free, but
they must live in a fair society."

11New York Times May 27, 1956. Quoted in Duane Lockard, New
England State Politics, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1959, pp. 138-139.

18Analyses of convention delegates and party officials have shown
that the Republican Party elite is heavily white, Protestant and of English
or Northern European stock. See Charles W. Wiggins and William L. Turk,
"State Party Chairman: A Profile," Western Political Quarterly
23 (1970), p. 332. Jeane Kirkpatrick, The New Presidential Elite: Men
and Women in National Politics, New York: The Russell Sage Foundation
and the Twentieth Century Fund, 1976, Chapter 3.

19Molly Ivins, "The Fabrics that Define Republican Women",
San Francisco Chronicle, 27 August 1984. Ivins was a columnist
for the Dallas Times Herald.