Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana

Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana

William M. LeoGrande

Language: English

Pages: 584

ISBN: 1469626608

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub

History is being made in U.S.-Cuban relations. Now in paperback and updated to tell the real story behind the stunning December 17, 2014, announcement by President Obama and President Castro of their move to restore full diplomatic relations, this powerful book is essential to understanding ongoing efforts toward normalization in a new era of engagement. Challenging the conventional wisdom of perpetual conflict and aggression between the United States and Cuba since 1959, Back Channel to Cuba chronicles a surprising, untold history of bilateral efforts toward rapprochement and reconciliation. William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh here present a remarkably new and relevant account, describing how, despite the intense political clamor surrounding efforts to improve relations with Havana, negotiations have been conducted by every presidential administration since Eisenhower's through secret, back-channel diplomacy. From John F. Kennedy's offering of an olive branch to Fidel Castro after the missile crisis, to Henry Kissinger's top secret quest for normalization, to Barack Obama's promise of a new approach, LeoGrande and Kornbluh uncovered hundreds of formerly secret U.S. documents and conducted interviews with dozens of negotiators, intermediaries, and policy makers, including Fidel Castro and Jimmy Carter. They reveal a fifty-year record of dialogue and negotiations, both open and furtive, that provides the historical foundation for the dramatic breakthrough in U.S.-Cuba ties.

Eisenhower.”)45 The State Department had higher hopes for Castro’s trip. His entourage included many of his government’s most prominent pro-American moderates. The presence of National Bank president Felipe Pazos, Minister of the Treasury Rufo López-Fresquet, and Minister of Economy Regino Boti suggested that Castro wanted to open serious discussions about economic cooperation—a conclusion reinforced by the fact that Pazos submitted in advance a memorandum outlining an agenda for “talks regarding

for more serious conversation.” And Che made a final point that would become a fixture of Cuba’s negotiating position in all future talks: Cuba “could discuss no formula that would mean giving up the type of society to which they were dedicated.”13 kennedy 45 “Any negotiation between the two countries was likely to be impossible given the irreconcilable differences that exist between the two,” Goodwin told Che, according to a summary of the meeting by the Brazilian ambassador.14 Goodwin

understanding with the United States,” Goodwin surmised, because it was “undergoing severe economic stress” and because “the Soviet Union is not prepared to undertake the large effort necessary to get them on their feet.” Since Guevara was one of the most committed communists in Cuba, in Goodwin’s analysis, there were probably “others in the Cuban government even more dedicated to an accommodation with the United States.” Although he recommended that the United States avoid “the impression we are

containment”—an effort to create a more “relaxed atmosphere” through threat reduction, diplomatic engagement, and various carrots to persuade Fidel to modify his bad behaviors and meet U.S. interests. Under the “positive containment” scenario, the United States would maintain the trade embargo as a bargaining chip and continue efforts to stem Cuban subversion in the region. But to those sticks would be added “the controlled relaxation of U.S. pressures” and other carrots with the goal of

guerrillas in Angola, to pin down the Cubans and bleed them. (Despite the 1976 Clark Amendment prohibiting such aid, Washington had been secretly channeling it through other countries in violation of the spirit if not the letter of the law).75 Vance believed that Washington had let the superpower rivalry distort its relations with the Third World, to the detriment of the national interest. Aiding Somali was a losing proposition, both politically and militarily, carter 171 because it was the