ETHICAL
ISSUES OF ONLINE
COMMUNICATION RESEARCH

The
paper addresses
several ethical issues in online communication research in light of
digital
ontology as well as the epistemological questions raised by the
blurring
boundary between fact and theory in this field. The concept of ontology
is used in a Heideggerian sense as related to the human capacity of
world
construction on the basis of the givenness of our being-in-the-world.
Ethical
dilemmas of Internet research thus arise from the tension between our
bodily
existence and the proper object of research, i.e. online existence. The
following issues are being considered: online identity, online
language,
online consent and confidentiality. We also arague that research ethics
in the US follows the utilitarian tradition, while European researchers
are deontologically oriented. A guideline of best practice in online
research
ethics is proposed.

Introduction

Being
human is becoming more and more a matter of being
online. Our lives, particularly our lives as researchers, and,
correspondingly,
our research objects and methods, are informed and thus transformed by
digital
devices and particularly by digital networks. We live in a digital
environment
in the sense that we look at reality within the framework of its
possibility of
being digital or of its digitability.
This ontological or, to put it in Thomas Kuhn's terminology (Kuhn
1970),
paradigmatic dimension does not just concern the fact that we create
digital
objects and processes or that we are able to create digital models of
non-digital objects and processes but the very possibility of a digital
casting
of the world or a digital ontology
(Capurro 2001, Floridi 2000).

We use
the concept of ontology in its
Heideggerian sense as related to the human capacity of world
construction on
the basis of the givenness of our being-in-the-world itself.
Heidegger's terminus technicus [technical term] for
this existential givenness is Dasein
(Heidegger 1977). The perception of the finite openness of our
existence allows
us to produce not just new things but new world ‘castings’ or projects [Entwurf]: within such castings, natural
things and processes as well as man-made ones can be understood,
discovered
and/or invented, and used. At the same time, to be able to perceive the
openness of our bodily existence in
its tension between birth and death makes us conscious of the
relativity of
human world constructions. There is a difference, to use the Kantian
terminology, between intellectus ectypus
or derivative intellect and intellectus
archetypus or original intellect (Kant 1974: B 351).

According
to Kant, the receptive character
of embodied knowledge makes the basis of this difference. That is:
while human
reason and understanding actively originate or “legislate” (to use a
later
Kantian term) the forms of our
knowledge (e.g., the frameworks of time and space, the categories of
causality,
etc.) – as
embodied beings, we also depend entirely upon the material world as
received through our senses for the content
of our knowledge. Hence, Kant's transcendental constructivism is a
finite one
because it is bodily oriented. Similarly, in Heidegger's existential
constructivism, Being itself is finite.

The
body is the primordial medium of our
being-in-the-world. We can take a distance from it only in a derivative
way and
make it an object within, for instance, the digital casting. The
digital
casting concerns our existence, i.e., the way we share the world with
others as
well as, more fundamentally, the way we cast Being itself. (There is a
difference between digital ontology and digital metaphysics. From a
metaphysical point of view, the real is the digital and vice versa. To
put it
in Berkeley's
formula: To be, is to be digital or Esse
est computari (Capurro 1999, Berkeley 1965, 62).)

Digital
ontology concerns our understanding of Being. We
believe that
we understand something in its being
when we are able to re-make digitally. Within the digital casting of
Being we
look at humans as they are online instead of embracing the digital
within the
"life-world" (Husserl). The online casting pervades our lives,
including our lives as researchers. Its predominance has lead to the
idea of
not only displacing, but even replacing bodily existence (Moravec 1988,
Kurzweil 1999). We may call this thinking cybergnosis,
i.e., the expectation that we will be able to redeem ourselves from our
mortal
condition through (digital) knowledge (Capurro 1999b).

The
origins of the digital casting can be
related to the Greek conception of numbers and points as separated or
abstracted (chorismos) from natural
beings (physei onta) (Heidegger
1992), and in-formed in the
electromagnetic medium (Capurro 2001, Eldred 2001).

What
are the characteristics of online
existence? First of all, online existence involves a bodily abstraction
which
implies abstraction from bodily identity and individuality. Secondly,
online
existence also entails abstraction from our situational orientation – an
orientation which includes sharing time and space with others. Thirdly,
online
existence is presence- as well as globally-oriented. Given the bodily
abstraction of online existence, we can also say that digital
being-with-others
tends to be ghostly-oriented (Capurro
1999a). These characteristics of online existence thus help sharpen the
point:
ethical dilemmas of Internet research arise from the tension
between the proper object of research, i.e. online
existence, and bodily existence. The borderline between these two
phenomena is interface communication itself.

Epistemological
Questions

From
the above, it’s obvious that online research faces some
serious epistemological and methodological questions. Although each
research
discipline has to address these issues on its own terms, and although
these
questions are ethical questions only in a derivative sense (in that we
share
values that have to do with truth, intersubjectivity, etc.), they
nevertheless
deserve being mentioned. In the abstract and a-topical space of online
communication, the questions of what exactly constitutes a) the subject
domain
of a research and b) what exactly constitutes a scientific fact are
becoming
radicalized. In the domain of online communication and online action or
behaviour, the wish to “objectify the mind” in a way that Lev Manovich
described (Manovich, 2001) so that the digital objects presumably
convey a less
distorted view or representation of what somebody has on his or her
mind
corresponds to a blurring of the boundary between fact and theory that
derives
from the use of software embodying the very theories one wishes to
verify. To
give an example: while ‘market’ once was a theoretical term used to
describe
and make sense of what happens ‘in the world,’ now it has become
impossible to
observe something that can’t be described in the parameters of the
latest stock
market software. While we may discuss the degree in which
‘theory-laden’
software already constitutes the respective field of research, it has
to be
noted that in the highly abstract and software-dependent world of
online
communication and behavior, such effects can’t be completely avoided.

Some
Key Ethical Issues of Online Communication Research

On
these premises we may be able to identify some key
ethical issues of online communication research (AOIR 2001, 2002). We
argue on
the basis of a tension, not a dichotomy, between face-to-face and
interface
communication. Face-to-face communication has not per se
a higher degree of moral authenticity. We may lie
face-to-face and tell the truth in a chat-room or vice
versa

a)
Online identity

We
consider the concept of identity from a twofold
perspective. As a metaphysical concept, it refers to what steadily
remains in
its appearance. Identity in this sense is granted, according to
Aristotle, by substance (ousia) i.e.
what is supporting (hypokeimenon)
changing qualities or accidents (symbebekota)
and, according to Plato, by
the divine model or exemplar (idea).
As an ontological concept,
identity means the possibility of projecting
or casting one's life within different
existential possibilities. The
second concept is a richer one since it allows us to relate
to different possibilities as such without leveling them
out.

We
conceive bodily identity as a
metaphysical concept when we relate it, for instance, to our genes, eye
structure or fingerprints - and as
far as these or other substantial and/or accidental characteristics,
including
all kinds of data about our life, hobbies, publications etc., may be
digitized.
With regard to identity as an ontological category, it refers to
different
kinds of life projects that are related but not identical. Within each
medium,
the body or the digital, these projects include different possibilities
– even
the case of a permanent change of
identity in a chat-room, for example. I may select different kinds of
identities in the digital medium that are not identical but remain
related to
my bodily existence and vice versa.

When
facing issues of identity, a
main challenge for the ethics of online communication research concerns
the
awareness of these differences between digital identities and their
bodily
source, and the possible individual and social harm
the researcher may cause when categorizing and reporting data
that may influence directly or indirectly the digital and/or bodily
life of
people with their different life projects.

A
solely metaphysical distinction
between bodily and digital identity would blur the richer view of
existential
identity.In particular, a simple
metaphysical dichotomy between offline and online identity may lead to unethical
consequences: if we ignore the multiple ways in which embodied persons
are
connected with and emotionally invested in their online identities as
part of
their existential choices and projects – we run the
risk of ignoring
the very
real harms that can follow when information about online identities is
revealed, say, in a research report that fails to anonymize the
pseudonyms used
in a chatroom by specific persons. The limits of a metaphysical
distinction are
clear when we consider the history of legal protection of personal data
for
instance in Germany and the problems faced by such a legislation when
related
(!) to digitized data collected by different private and/or political
bodies
with different purposes. Combinations of digitized online data can be a
threat
to privacy that allows not only governments but also private
entrepreneurs to
have a detailed view of individuals and groups, their interests,
desires,
occupations, etc. - thus giving rise to much more comprehensive kinds
of
manipulations and control than with conventional (particularly
paper-based)
media.

It is
also clear that after the events of September 11 the US will face
serious conflicts when applying methods of digital surveillance that
may interfere, for better or for worse, in the bodily and digital life
projects of people.

To
make this point another way, we
can ask: What are we doing when we do research on online identities? We
may say
that we are just exploring the
digital presence of human beings. But in fact we are dealing not only with them and not only with presence
as far as life projects are
related to past and future, thus creating different kinds of relations
according
also to the possibilities of each medium: in addition, the merging of
mass-media and the Internet into a complex digital network creates
further
tensions. Researchers may be able to study mass-media users’ identities
and to
provide the means to manipulate them for different purposes.

In
general, we may say that
especially ethical considerations will not be free of metaphors - quite
the
contrary: They can help us understand what’s at stake. Michael Froomkin
(1995),
in an essay on “Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution,”
described the tension between the metaphors of transportation and free
speech
in the debate about cryptography, arguing that to stress the
transportation
metaphor would ultimately lead to rising regularization of the Net
(because
cars have to be in a certain condition to be allowed on the street)
while the
free speech metaphor may lead us to a more liberal policy making. As
upcoming
technologies, especially when they have far-reaching social
implications, are
usually described and grasped in terms of the metaphors we find for
them, and
because metaphors can be (partially) misleading, it
becomes an ethical question which metaphors we emphasize.

b) Online language

Human
beings are, according to Aristotle, bearers of
language (zoon logon echon). The
question of language as stated by Plato in the Cratylus
concerns the dichotomy between nature and convention (physei/thesei).
Aristotle represents a
moderate conventionalism as far as his thinking is based on an analysis
of
different uses of words; at the same he develops a theory of definition
that is
concept- rather than word-oriented. The conventionalist view of
language builds
the basis for viewing it as an instrument that can be used for
communication. A
further step is the conception of artificial language and the idea of a
universal code based on mathematical symbols as suggested, for
instance, by
Leibniz. Computer programs belong, on the one hand, to this tradition.
But, as
my existential orientation emphasizes, we are able, on the other hand,
to view
online language as a medium in which we project our existence.

Given
these possible understandings
or language, it is thus clear that online communication research may
aim at an
objective and/or existential analysis of online language. It is
important to
see that this distinction does not coincide with the one
between online
and face-to-face communication. We may indeed use language as an
instrument in
a bodily-mediated dialogue and we may communicate online on the basis
of all language
potentialities that are characteristic of the existential perspective.

These
characteristics were analyzed
in the 20th Century particularly in the hermeneutic
tradition with
regard to printed text and oral speech. Online communication is not
just a
mixture of both but a specific phenomenon that requires what can be
called an artificial hermeneutics (Capurro 1995,
1986, 2000).

From a
hermeneutical standpoint, a
main ethical challenge faced by online communication research is the
awareness
of the role played by pre-understanding
and implicit knowledge– for
instance, when studying recorded postings in forums, newsgroups,
chat-rooms,
e-mails etc. Such pre-understanding cannot be dissociated from bodily
existence. But it is in the meantime also true that our bodily
existence is
pervaded by digital communication devices of all kinds. Not only
natural
language but particularly online communication are the bearers of human
existence. This digital reversal of the Aristotelian definition means
that when
doing instrument-oriented analysis of online communication, we should
make sure
that our research recognizes the limits of this approach - and bear in
mind the
necessity of its unmasking, in case it does not explicitly reflect on
its
limits. The global and intercultural online dialogue makes this kind of
analysis particularly risky: Given the almost instant access to others’
utterances, the possibility of misunderstanding due to different
pre-understandings and cultural backgrounds becomes all the more likely
since
there is no spatio-temporal gap hinting to a possible distance. On a
more
general note, it might be said that instrument-oriented analysis of
language
tends to emphasize a kind of mentalism that regards minds as
‘containers’ that
exchange their ‘contents’ via language. This form of mentalism can be
particularly misleading in the case of an encounter with a culture that
doesn’t
value the containment metaphor of mind at all (cf. Peters, 1999)

c)
Online consent and confidentiality

The
"Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology
and
Medicine" approved by the Council of Europe in Oviedo 1997 states in
Article 5 as a "general rule" that

An
intervention in the health field
may only be carried out after the person concerned has given free and
informed
consent to it.

This
person shall beforehand be
given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the
intervention
as well as on its consequences and risks.

The
person concerned may freely
withdraw consent at any time. (Council of Europe 1997)

The
principle of informed
consent is thus related not only to the human body as research
object but
also to the kind of consent to be obtained, namely "free and
informed". There is no specification concerning the medium
of this consent - but it is implicitly related to a
face-to-face situation. Of course, genetic tests are not immediately
comparable
to online research on human subjects, but it is obvious that the
results of
such tests may be digitized and analyzed within different contexts and
with
different purposes as the ones included in the informed
consent. At the same time, we should be aware that a
written informed request remains in many cases, particularly if done in
developing countries, a pure formality - and we can expect that abuses
will be
sanctioned either in the country itself or in the original country
where the
company using the tests is located. This gives rise to double morality.
In
other words, an international forum as well as international standards
are
needed together with local control.

Beyond
this borderline situation
between bodily data and their digital manipulation, we are confronted
with the
basic phenomenon of the fragility of human existence. What does it mean
to give
a free and informed consent? It presupposes a situation in which
another person
is doing something on my behalf that may have existential and, in this
case,
bodily consequences. Online communication researchers may
consider the specific situation in which they should submit their
research to
the principle of informed consent not only in cases where this may
concern
bodily data – in these cases the principle should be applied – but also
in
cases in which their analysis may infringe upon the bodily and/or
digital
existential projects of other people.

d) Online confidentiality

One of
the main problems of online communication is the
question of confidentiality. The concept of trust
is deeply rooted in Western metaphysics as the question concerning the
grounds
of knowledge, starting with the search for archai
or prima principia. Descartes looked
for a solution to modern empirical uncertainty in subjectivity
as a fundamentum
inconcussum, an unquestionable and solid foundation. Modern
digital
technology partly bears this heritage, particularly when it is seen
from a
mathematical perspective. That is, as digital technology ultimately
rests on
pure and simple binary code, it thereby grounds itself on the mathematical– i.e.,
what for Descartes
was the sole source of certain knowledge beyond the bare certainty of
self-existence. But, as we have seen, as online communication
researchers we
are dealing with a borderline phenomenon that is situated at the
interface of
mathematics, the electromagnetic medium and – human existence.

We are
aware that trust in oral societies
was supported by different kinds of institutions, rites, exclusions,
formulas
etc. This was also the case as writing became a leading medium of human
communication, particularly since the invention of printing. Online
communication has been mainly a written phenomenon, but this situation
is
changing dramatically with regard multimedia. In more general terms,
online
communication has brought about a renaissance of oral culture, although
the
Internet in its early years has been a written medium. E-mail, forums,
and
chats have clearly oral dimensions, independently of its (until now)
written
form. The examples of Internet-TV, Internet-Radio, Internet-Telephone,
Mobile-Internet, etc., make the orality of Internet culture
unmistakable.

But
what, then, about online trust? The
basic ethical challenge concerns the tension between freedom and
surveillance.
As in the case of censorship in the printing epoch, the state aims at protecting citizens from what is supposed
to be harmful to them. Netizens are aware of new kinds of state
control. While
cryptography is a main instrument for protecting online freedom in that
it
enforces privacy where no convention or legal means can guarantee it,
the
typical ‘netiquette’ attitude also contains elements of openness,
sharing, and
helpfulness towards the ‘newbies’. Online communication researchers may
consider one of their greatest ethical challenges to be the creation of
an
atmosphere of collaboration and mutual support as propagated, for
example, by
the open source movement, which quite naturally implies sharing some of
the
results with the people who were subjected to the research.

Prospects: US
vs European Ethics of Research Approaches?

Europe,
and particularly Germany,
has a long tradition of
protecting personal data. At the same time, it has a tradition in which
the
power of the state is supposed to play an important role as guarantor
and
provider of social equity. Both aspects have an impact in the present
and
future of a European approach to an ethics of Internet research.
Researchers
may be constrained by data protection laws, while at the same time the
State
may ask them, particularly in critical situations, to do research that
may
collide with their views of privacy and individual freedom. This may be
also
the case in the US
where the Freedom of Information Act plays an important role when, as
in the
case of Communication Decency Act, censorship is supposed to be better
than
freedom.

In
general terms, we may state that prima facie, research
ethics in the US
follows the
utilitarian tradition, while European researchers are rooted in a
deontological, particularly Kantian, paradigm. This view may be, on the
one
hand, at least partially questioned particularly with regard to the
bioethics
debate. On the other hand, there is a long and strong tradition of
computer
ethics in the US– but
nothing comparable to it in Europe.
CEPE and
our new international society INSEIT
are a platform for starting to think about common ethical standards
based on
best practices.

In
order to create an atmosphere of open
international cooperation in our field the tension between these two
ethical
poles that arise within the Western
philosophical tradition should be superseded or, at least, weakened,
allowing
other groups and societies to express not only their views of what they
think
is useful for them but also concerning their own values on what is
supposed to
be (morally) unacceptable.

The
study of human actors and their actions
within a global digitized network raises
similar, but
not simply the same kind of questions for social researchers as
in the
case of traditional empirical methodologies in general, as well as from
the
standards developed by biomedical research in particular. The reason
for this
is that the online medium transforms basic aspects of human existence,
such as
identity, language, confidentiality, that are at the core of any
society and
that are protected in most countries by local law. Besides the question
of
creating international legal agreements in this field, online research
should
seek for making explicit some basic standards of best
practice. These should include:

– the
respect for
bodily identity as affected by research on digital identity,

– the
respect for
the interests and values of the people subject to online research,
giving them
the opportunity of an active and free cooperation

,– the unmasking of
abuses with regard to the misuse of instrument-oriented analysis by
political
and/or private bodies,– the creation of
an atmosphere of social responsibility of online researchers as well as
of
their patrons with regard to the utility and usability of their
research,
particularly with regard to the weakest members of society, including
whole
societies as weakest members or non-members of the online world,– online
researchers should be aware of their own gender biases within their own
culture
as well as with regard to the cultures that are the object of their
research.

In
other words, online communication research should be
guided more by an ethics of care and
less by utilitarian and/or deontological
premises that may lead
either to a purely instrumental or moralist view.