To prohibit the use of funds for training and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

July 23, 2007

Ms. WATERS (for herself, Ms. LEE, and Ms. WOOLSEY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To prohibit the use of funds for training and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Responsible Security in Iraq Act'.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR TRAINING AND EQUIPPING THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES.

(a) Findings- Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Over the past 4 years, the United States has invested more than $19,000,000,000 in the organization, training, and equipping of 346,500 personnel of the Iraqi Security Forces.

(2) As of October 28, 2006, $133,000,000 of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund has been used to purchase more than 370,000 weapons for personnel of the Iraqi Security Forces.

(3) According to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, only about 10,000 of the 370,000 small arms delivered to Iraq through United States assistance programs have had their serial numbers recorded.

(4) Despite making significant progress in generating a sizeable national security force, the Iraqi Security Forces have not developed as fast as Coalition countries had planned and, as a result, the Iraqi Security Forces are not yet ready to take responsibility for Iraq's security.

(5) As the number of personnel of the Iraqi Security Forces trained and equipped has increased, the overall violence in Iraq has not diminished, and the Iraqi Security Forces have not offset United States manpower to allow United States Armed Forces and other personnel in Iraq to be redeployed.

(6) Initial assumptions that the Iraqi Security Forces could be reformed and prepared to defend the Iraqi people from insurgents and warring factions were seriously flawed.

(7) Neither the Department of Defense nor the Government of Iraq can determine how many of the nearly 350,000 personnel of the Iraqi Security Forces who have been trained by Coalition forces are still serving in the Iraqi Security Forces and whether such personnel have been properly vetted or trained.

(8) Many elements of the Iraqi Security Forces remain loyal to local sectarian and militia interests.

(9) Involvement by the Iraqi Security Forces in extrajudicial killings and kidnappings throughout Iraq has been widely reported.

(10) According to a recent poll, 51 percent of Iraqis think attacks on United States Armed Forces are acceptable.

(11) The Government of Iraq seems ill equipped to deal with the problem of sectarian violence in Iraq.

(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that--

(1) without a strong central government to which Iraqis are loyal, the United States is arming different sides of a civil war in Iraq;

(2) training and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces risks arming different sides of a violent power struggle that may escalate in the coming years with an increase in the number of trained, armed fighters;

(3) training and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces also increases the danger that weapons provided to the personnel of the Iraqi Security Forces will one day be turned against the United States and its allies in the region; and

(4) the United States should halt the arming and training of the Iraqi Security Forces and thereby stop directly contributing to increasing strife in Iraq.

(c) Prohibition-

(1) IN GENERAL- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds available to the Department of Defense or any other department or agency of the Government of the United States may be used, directly or indirectly, to--

(A) provide training to the Iraqi Security Forces; or

(B) sell or otherwise transfer arms to the Iraqi Security Forces, unless such sale or transfer of arms is specifically authorized by an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE- Paragraph (1) takes effect beginning 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(d) Iraqi Security Forces Defined- In this section, the term `Iraqi Security Forces'--

(1) means all security and military personnel of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, including the Iraqi Army, Special Forces, Navy, Air Force, national and local police, and border security units; and