United States v. Lincoln

United States of America Plaintiff- Appelleev.Richard Lincoln Defendant-Appellant

Submitted: September 22, 2017

Appeal
from United States District Court for the Northern District
of Iowa - Cedar Rapids

Before
LOKEN, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Richard
Lincoln had his term of supervised release revoked. His
revocation sentence included a new term of supervised
release, which has the same special conditions as the
original revoked term. Lincoln now argues that the
re-imposition of one condition in particular-a condition that
he did not object to or appeal from when it was originally
imposed-is outside the bounds of the district
court's[1]discretion. We disagree and affirm the
district court.

I.

Lincoln
challenges the re-imposition of Special Condition #4, which
states in part that "[Lincoln] must participate in a
mental health evaluation and/or treatment program" that
"may include participation in a sex offender treatment
program." It was re-imposed after Lincoln's
supervised release was revoked, primarily because he used
marijuana on multiple occasions and lied to his probation
officer about it.[2] The district court's revocation
sentence was comprised of a six-month term of imprisonment
and a new three-year term of supervised release that
continued the special conditions-including Special Condition
#4-that were on his original term.[3]Lincoln specifically objected
to the re-imposition of Special Condition #4 at his
revocation hearing. He did not, however, object to or appeal
that condition when it was imposed as part of his original
term of supervised release.[4] Lincoln continues his challenge
here, and it is his sole claim on appeal.

II.

We
review the district court's imposition of Special
Condition #4 over Lincoln's objection for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Thompson, 653 F.3d 688,
691 (8th Cir. 2011). Conditions of supervised release are
governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), which mandates that
each condition "1) is reasonably related to the
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); 2)
involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary for the purposes set forth in § 3553(a); and
3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission." United States v.
Godfrey, 863 F.3d 1088, 1101 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (summarizing requirements of §
3583(d)). District courts have "broad discretion"
within this statutory framework and need only consider the
factors referenced by § 3583(d) (and spelled out in
§ 3553(a)) individually rather than collectively in
relation to each condition imposed. United States v.
Hart, 829 F.3d 606, 608-09 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Lincoln's
primary argument on appeal is that Special Condition #4 is
not "reasonably related" to the "nature and
circumstances of the offense"-here, the revocation of a
term of supervised release that he was serving for violating
federal drug laws-and his "history and
characteristics." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Our cases
have dealt with similar arguments regarding sex-offender
conditions imposed for crimes that are not sexual in nature.
Compare United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 632, 633
(8th Cir. 2001) (rejecting sex-offender condition imposed for
first time at second revocation hearing), with United
States v. Smart, 472 F.3d 556, 559 (8th Cir. 2006)
(finding no abuse of discretion because sex-offender
condition was "reasonably related to [defendant's]
history and characteristics and [public safety]").

Our
prior cases show that we need not engage in "precise
line-drawing" to assess Lincoln's argument; rather,
we look to his "history and characteristics" and
"rehabilitative needs"-as we always do-to evaluate
the condition. United States v. Fenner, 600 F.3d
1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming imposition of
sex-offender condition where underlying crime was
drug-related).

In this
case, the district court was well within its discretion to
impose Special Condition #4. To start, we note that the same
judge presided over both Lincoln's initial sentencing and
revocation sentencing-a factor that buttresses the district
court's decision because it shows that "the district
court was aware of [Lincoln's] history and
characteristics." United States v. Franklin,
397 F.3d 604, 607 (8th Cir. 2005); see also §
3553(a)(1).

The
record supports the decision as well. As noted in the
Pre-Sentence Report ("PSR") from Lincoln's
original sentencing, he was previously found guilty of
aggravated criminal sexual assault and failure to register as
a sex offender. Nonetheless, Lincoln argues that his sexual
misconduct occurred when he was 15, over 20 years ago, and
thus we should account for its remoteness and his capacity
for change.[5] Lincoln, however, never completed a
sex-offender treatment program. Cf. Fenner, 600 F.3d
at 1026-27 (noting lack of treatment supported imposition of
condition requiring "sex offender and/or mental health
treatment"). And the probation office noted at his
revocation hearing that Lincoln displayed "some moderate
risk dynamic factors" for "sexual offense
recidivism." Thus, the continued presence of risk
factors in Lincoln, coupled with his lack of prior treatment,
indicates that his "rehabilitative needs" counsel
in favor of Special Condition #4. Id. at 1027;
see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (stating
"sentence imposed" should "provide the
defendant with . . . medical care, or other correctional
treatment").[6]

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The
district court&#39;s decision was all the more warranted
because Lincoln had already begun complying with Special
Condition #4 at the time of his revocation hearing. Lincoln
had completed approximately three weeks of what the district
court described as a twenty-two-week "cognitive
behavioral program, " the treatment program he was
assigned to in relation to Special Condition #4, when his
supervised release was revoked. We have previously observed
that a "defendant should not benefit from supervised
release violations, where special conditions of supervised
release would have remained in effect at [the] time in
question if [the] defendant had not violated supervised
release." United States v. Big Boy, 583
Fed.Appx. 594, 595 (8th Cir. 2014) (unpublished per curiam)
(citing United States v. Lebeau, 490 Fed.Appx. 831,
832 (8th Cir. 2012) (unpublished per curiam)). It would be
paradoxical to allow Lincoln to forego a treatment program-a
program he did not initially object to and which the record
suggests he may benefit from-because he flagrantly ...

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