Belief, philosophy: attitude of considering a sentence to be true. Unlike religious faith belief is linked to the assessment of probabilities. A belief is an attitude of a thinking person which can usually be formulated in a sentence, whereby the person must be able to integrate the sentence into a set of further sentences. A further condition is that the bearer of beliefs is able to reformulate the corresponding sentences and negate them, that is, to grasp their meaning. See also religious belief, propositional attitudes, intensions, probability, belief degrees, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

I 122
Concept/Instantiation/Davidson: a concept can be instantiated. (Realize, E.g. swimming) without having the concept. - Davidson: but not with convictions.
I 122f
Conviction/Belief/Davidson: Condition. Awareness of the distinction subjective/objective (because of the necessary ability to be surprised).
I 123
Bennett/AvramidesVsDavidson: in animals also learning ability (= distinction subjective/objective) instead of language ability. - DavidsonVsVs: this is about properties of concepts, not beings. - Davidson: pro conceptual symmetry between the semantic and the psychological. - Therefore, no thinking without language.
I125
Reductionism/Antireductionism/Avramides: both are not separated by the dispute over ontological asymmetry, both could accept ontological symmetry like asymmetry - it is really about deep epistemic asymmetry._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals
indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate
the page number. The corresponding books
are indicated on the right hand side.
((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.