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Arguments against Christianity, for the ‘forgetful’

I see mocking of Christianity, what I don’t see are arguments that Christianity is false.

As the regulars here (including Mung) know, this is bollocks. There have been many such arguments, and Mung has fled from a number of them.

I replied:

You see plenty of them [arguments against Christianity], but you’re in denial.

Want to test that hypothesis? Start a thread asking for arguments against Christianity. You’ll get an earful.

He got cold feet, so I am starting the thread for him. I’ll provide some arguments in the comments. Feel free to add your own or to cross-post or link to old OPs and comments, if you can’t be arsed to reinvent the wheel for Mung’s trollish sake.

Mung’s fellow Christians are welcome to come to his aid. He’ll need all the help he can get.

Look, Mung, all this discussion is accomplishing is to establish that you are

a) incompetent; and
b) dishonest.

But everyone knew that already. The coffin lid has long since been nailed shut, and any further banging is superfluous.

The more interesting question is whether intelligent Christians can come up with a viable defense against the evidential problem of evil, not whether you can. Given your performance in this thread, you also can’t be trusted as an interpreter of intelligent Christians, such as van Inwagen and Plantinga — plus it wouldn’t be fair to saddle them with you.

I’ll think about whether it’s worth it to engage you further on this topic — I have to admit that it’s been amusing to see you fume at your continued failure — but I’m leaning toward removing the incompetent middleman and dealing with the arguments of van Inwagen, Plantinga, etc., directly.

If defeating the evidential problem of evil were as easy as saying “Look, they’re saying we must ignore the evidence for God’s existence!”, then don’t you think it would have occurred to, say, Plantinga, or van Inwagen, to make that objection? Do you really think we would have needed to wait decades for a special-needs commenter named ‘Mung’ to point that out?

It is also important to note that it is the notion of a “horrendous moral evil” that comports with the current, everyday use of “evil” by English speakers. When we ordinarily employ the word “evil” today we do not intend to pick out something that is merely bad or very wrong (for example, a burglary), nor do we intend to refer to the death and destruction brought about by purely natural processes (we do not, for example, think of the 2004 Asian tsunami disaster as something that was “evil”). Instead, the word “evil” is reserved in common usage for events and people that have an especially horrific moral quality or character.

Trakakis is overlooking an obvious point. If God is omniscient, he knew the tsunami was coming. If he is omnipotent, he could have prevented it or warned the victims.

Instead, he did nothing, watching passively as hundreds of thousands of people perished.

If that doesn’t exhibit a “horrific moral quality or character”, then what does?

Would Trakakis be so cavalier if a human presided passively over the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people that he could have easily prevented?

This position – sometimes labelled “skeptical theism” or “defensive skepticism” – has generated a great deal of discussion, leading some to conclude that “the inductive argument from evil is in no better shape than its late lamented deductive cousin” (Alston 1991: 61).

their argument appears to be that when you are traveling west, you’re actually following a circular path on a flat Earth that returns you to your starting point.

So the response is to claim that there is no such thing as due west?

I don’t think so (remember, I don’t subscribe to their brand of crazy). My understanding is that they think that the north pole is the center of the flat Earth (although some disagree). Traveling west in this model consists of moving in a circle around the north pole.

I don’t know how they address the fact that people have been to the south pole. Still, I don’t think you can demonstrate that they’re wrong purely through logic. They reject a lot of evidence as the product of a world wide conspiracy, so that’s an exercise in frustration as well.

In any case, I’m more interested in your operational definitions in your most recent thread.

If defeating the evidential problem of evil were as easy as saying “Look, they’re saying we must ignore the evidence for God’s existence!”, then don’t you think it would have occurred to, say, Plantinga, or van Inwagen, to make that objection? Do you really think we would have needed to wait decades for a special-needs commenter named ‘Mung’ to point that out?

keiths: Says Mung, who has been defending that very vision in the other thread.

I’ve been mocking the keiths “omnigod” idea. He takes that as evidence that I have been defending his “omnigod” vision.

If I have been defending the idea that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent in this thread I’d sure like to know where I have said that God is any of those. I almost certainly have not said that God is “omnibenevolent” in this thread or any other here at TSZ.

Is keiths jumping to conclusions based on his mind-reading skills again?

keiths: If defeating the evidential problem of evil were as easy as saying “Look, they’re saying we must ignore the evidence for God’s existence!”, then don’t you think it would have occurred to, say, Plantinga, or van Inwagen, to make that objection?

William Rowe is a philosopher, as are Plantinga and Inwagen. In the spirit of philosophy they address the actual arguments rather than dismissing them out of hand. Me, I’m just “a special-needs commenter.”

See how simple and obvious that is keiths?

Now let’s look further to see if we can find anything at all logical in keiths’s claim.

From that fact that Plantinga and Inwagen take the evidential argument seriously, it cannot be concluded that the argument does not in fact ask us to set aside positive reasons for the existence of God.

… to see if we can find anything at logical in keiths’s claim. Nope. Just another logic flail.

I’ll carry on because I think it’s important to show how wrong keiths is (not that he’ll ever admit it).

As Plantinga notes, this shows how crucial it is to have all the relevant evidence before making a probability judgment.

…Plantinga argues, we might know on the basis of various evidences that God exists (or at least that the probability is very high). In that case, evil in our world may be evidence against God’s existence, but that wouldn’t amount to much in itself.

Those are basically the same arguments I’ve been making.

On the next page Feinberg diagrams the evidential argument and writes:

Note that the only kind of evidence included in this argument is appeal to instances of evil.

A further problem with this inductive argument’s conclusiveness arises in regard to premise 2. That premise appeals to evidence, but it cites only one kind of evidence. Before making a judgment on the probability of of theism and atheism, one must have all the evidence for both. (p. 212)

That’s precisely the same thing I was saying. It’s the exact same objection I raised. I honestly don’t think keiths knows what he’s talking about.

So the atheologian must show that G is improbable with respect to the total body of evidence, whatever exactly that is. To do this he would be obliged to consider all the sorts of reasons natural theologians have invoked in favor of theistic belief… This would be a substantial and difficult project – one no atheologian has undertaken so far.

Plantinga obviously noticed the same flaw in the argument which I spotted. The argument fails to take into account evidence “in favor of theistic belief.” It’s flawed because it appeals only to instances of evil.

I pointed out above how keiths was misled by his skimming of the IEP article, and I shall take up that theme again in this post.

The article presents the argument as follows:

There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.

(Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. (Rowe 1979: 336)

Let’s suppose that Rowe’s evidential argument from evil succeeds in providing strong evidence in support of the claim that there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. What follows from this? In particular, would a theist who finds its impossible to fault Rowe’s argument be obliged to give up her theism? Not necessarily, for at least two further options would be available to such a theist.

Firstly, the theist may agree that Rowe’s argument provides some evidence against theism, but she may go on to argue that there is independent evidence in support of theism which outweighs the evidence against theism.

keiths needs to explain why the theist would need to make such an argument if the evidence for God had already been taken into account in the evidential argument itself.

So the IEP article must be wrong, Plantinga must be wrong, Feinberg must be wrong, I must be wrong, fifth must be wrong, and only keiths is right.

keiths: If defeating the evidential problem of evil were as easy as saying “Look, they’re saying we must ignore the evidence for God’s existence!”, then don’t you think it would have occurred to, say, Plantinga, or van Inwagen, to make that objection?

Whether or not defeating the evidential problem of evil is easy or not is rather beside the point. The point is that Plantinga (among others) makes that exact objection. The argument fails to take into account “the total body of evidence.”

Now if you want to back off your claim that you’re employing the evidential argument don’t let me stop you. But that is in fact one of it’s defects, as I said and as you denied. So you were wrong. Will you admit it?

So the atheologian must show that G is improbable with respect to the total body of evidence, whatever exactly that is. To do this he would be obliged to consider all the sorts of reasons natural theologians have invoked in favor of theistic belief… This would be a substantial and difficult project – one no atheologian has undertaken so far.