Information on the SPO was coded from 1746
pages of literature and 132 documents on party politics in
Austria. 1136 pages, or 65 percent, deal with the SPO. 5 of the
documents, 4 percent, are in French, and 21, 16 percent, are in
German. Raymond Duvall indexed the literature for retrieval.
Raymond Duvall coded the first two variable clusters. Kenneth
Janda coded the remainder from notes left by Duvall.

Institutionalization
Variables, 1.01-1.06

1.01 year of origin and 1.02 name
changes

1889, ac9

1, ac7

Essentially no one disagrees with the
assertion that the SPO emerged in 1945 as the result of a merger
between the first republicís Revolutionary Socialists and
the Social Democrats. The latter clearly predominated in the
merger, so theirs is the important date of origin. Many sources
cite the December 30, 1888-January 1, 1889 conference at Mainfeld
as the relevant date, with no real disagreements. The 1945 merger
was the occasion of a minor name change from Social Democrats to
Socialists. The party retained a sub-title identifying the two
component parties, but this was dropped later in 1945. Since that
time no further name changes have occurred.

1.03 organizational
discontinuity

9, ac6

Documentation of two events is good--1945
merger of social democrats with the relatively insignificant
revolutionary socialists, resulting in the SPO, and the 1948-49
expulsion and split of Erwin Scharf and his following (left
socialists) who later cooperated with the KPO. One source mentions
the 1959 expulsion of Truppe, who founded the League of Democratic
Socialists, which received 2,000 votes in the next election. The
low ac is due to the latter "split," documented only
once.

1.04 leadership competition

11, ac8

The only change in leadership (party
chairman) that occurred during our time period was in 1957. At
that time, Brund Pitterman succeeded Adolf Scharf, who had held
the position since 1945. Scharf became federal president,
following Renner and Koerner, both socialists. Pittermann remained
chairman beyond 1962. The party chairman is chosen by the central
directorate, consisting of 50 members chosen by the party
congress.

1.05 / 2.05 legislative instability and
strength

instability is .05, ac8

strength is .42 for 1st half, ac8 and .46
for 2nd half, ac9

The SPO never exceeded the representation
of the OVP in the Nationalrat (parliament). Its percentage of
seats lagged a few points behind, although the SPO tended to pick
up strength during our time period. It held 40 percent of the
seats in 1950 and 46 percent in 1962.

1.06 / 2.06 electoral instability and
strength

instability is .02, ac9

strength is .42 for 1st half, ac9 and .44
for 2nd half, ac9

Elections were held in 1953, 1956, 1959,
and 1962. The support given to the SPO varied from 42 to 45
percent.

Governmental Status Variables,
2.01-2.07

2.01 government discrimination

1, ac5

The SPO, together with the OVP, is clearly
favored by the government in the allotment of free radio time to
political parties. But an electoral practice of having parties
pass out ballot paper (maintained until 1959) discriminated
against the SPO in rural and alpine areas. Two bits of information
were excluded from the coding due to a lack of evidence of de
facto or intended discriminaion or discriminatory effect. The
first was the banning of a campaign poster by Soviet occupation
authorities in the 1953 election. The second was a sale of voting
stock in the nationalized banks only to the two coalition parties
in 1956.

2.02 governmental leadership

6 out of 6 for 1950-55, ac9

7 out of 7 for 1956-62, ac9

The great coalition system of party balance
is manifest at the governmental leadership level with the
existence of two federal "executive" offices--the directly elected
president and the chancellor, named by the president and the
Nationalrat. While the chancellor is formally head of government,
the president is apparently, at least, constitutionally powerful.
This relative comparability in official importance, plus the fact
that the OVP held the chancellorship throughout the time period,
while the SPO always held the presidency has led to the decision
to include both offices as a governmental unit for the purposes of
coding this variable. The SPO presidents were Renner, Koerner, and
Scharf.

2.03 cabinet participation

6 out of 6 for 1950-55, ac9

7 out of 7 for 1956-62, ac9

The story of Austrian politics from 1945-67
was the coalition between the SPO and the OVP, which filled
positions in all levels of government in proportion to the
percentage of votes each received in the last previous election.
At the cabinet level, seats were roughly equal between the two
parties, with the OVP generally holding one more ministry than the
SPO. Four ministries (justice, interior, social welfare, and
transportation and nationalized industries, or later,
transportation and electricity) were held by the SPO throughout
our time period. In addition, the ministry of foreign affairs came
into SPO hands after 1959.

2.04 national participation

5 for 1st half, ac9

6 for 2nd half, ac9

In terms of electoral returns, the SPO is
was clearly a national party. By percentage of party support from
each of the four electoral districts, the range was greatest in
1949 when 34.8 percent came from Vienna, and 19.4 percent from
district 3 (upper Austria, Tyrol, Salzburg, Vorarlberg). Even that
amount of variation does not seem severe. By individual province,
Vorarlberg was consistently the area of least support, but the
party never received less than 23 percent of the votes cast there.
Vienna was always the strongest province, with a high in 1953 of
50 percent of the vote. In 1953, the SPO showed an average
deviation of 5.1 percentage points in source of support compared
to population distribution for the four districts. The average
deviation dropped to 3.6 for the three later
elections.

2.07 outside origin

8, ac7

The founding in 1888 of the social
democratic party occurred at a labor congress at Mainfd.
Predominant in the founding was Victor Adler, a labor leader and
publisher of a labor newspaper.

Issue Orientation Variables, 5.01-5.15

5.01 ownership of means of
production

5 for 1st half, ac9

3 for 2nd half, ac9

Nationalization of the basic industries was
a fundamental tenet of SPO policy in the early part of our period,
extending even to the election of 1956, which was contested in
part over the OVP plan to denationalize 49 percent of the oil
industry by allowing citizens to buy shares in it. Due to SPO
insistence on nationalization after the war, about 20 percent of
the industry was nationalized. But in 1958, the emphasis on
nationalization was toned down, with the pronouncement that small
and medium sized undertakings and property of working craftsmen
would not be socialized in any circumstance. Following 1958, the
SPO put more emphasis on economic planning as the key feature of
socialism.

5.02 government role in economic
planning

5 for 1st half, ac9

4 for 2nd half, ac7

The literature shows some disagreement over
SPO commitment to economic planning, particularly during the
latter part of the period. An overall economic plan was called for
early in the period. The 1958 program also asserted that free
development of human personality requires a planned economy and
called for a planning commission to work out the plans. But some
commentators believed that planning was, nevertheless, as slighted
after 1958, so the code is in dispute.

5.03 redistribution of wealth

3 for 1st half, ac9

1 for 2nd half, ac9

Originally, the socialists pushed for
confiscatory income and inheritance taxes and selected luxury
taxes. A graduated income tax was enacted, but it was not severely
progressive. The party acquiesced to four across-the-board
increases in the tax rate between 1954 and 1958. Progressive
taxation did not figure prominently as a campaign issue
thereafter.

5.04 social welfare

4, ac9

As early as 1951, the party announced the
goal of developing Austria into a welfare state. It backed a
national pension plan, a national health service, rent subsidies,
state housing, family assistance, and extended coverage of social
security programs. But it relied upon the insurance principle for
financing the security and pension plans, instead of straight
governmental support.

5.05 secularization of society

3 for 1st half, ac7

2 for 2nd half, ac7

Historically, the socialists were decidedly
anti-clerical. Following World War Two, the church ordered the
clergy not to participate in politics, which was a reversal of the
practice before 1933 in the first republic. The Socialist Party
thereby refrained from asserting its opposition to religion within
the state, although it did insist on a compulsory civil ceremony
for marriage. While it also accepted religious instruction in
state schools, the instruction was to be optional for the student.
While still basically opposed to state subsidies for parochial
schools, the position adopted by the OVP, the SPO dropped its
policy of anti-Catholicism in the 1958 platform, stating that
religion and socialism are not incompatible.

5.06 support of the military

0 for 1st half, ac5

1 for 2nd half, ac5

Before independence, the SPO feared the
creation of a federal army and stated its preference for a
militia-type organization instead. Upon achieving independence,
the socialists recognized the need for an army to help secure the
country's borders and execute the policy of armed neutrality. But
when creating the force, the party wanted a shorter period of
service than that favored by the OVP, and a nine month period was
accepted as a compromise.

5.07 alignment with east-west
blocs

0, ac9

By all accounts, the SPO adhered more
literally to the constitutional requirement of Austrian
neutrality. Even in the economic sphere, it sought to establish
links with both the East and West in execution of the policy of
neutrality.

5.08 anti-colonialism

3, ac9

Like the OVP, the SPO worked to achieve
independence from the occupying powers after World War Two. In the
case of the SPO, however, the melody lingered on, and the party
was more protective of Austrian independence afterwards,
particularly with regard to West German influence within the
economy. The party also went on record in 1958 as rejecting
colonialism throughout the world and welcoming movements for
freedom.

5.09 supranational integration

5, ac9

Socialist platforms were consistent in
their pursuit of a path of political unity for Europe, urging a
United States of Europe. Entry into the EEC was seen as a means to
this end, and the party did not see the pledge of neutrality as an
obstacle to EEC participation, as the OVP claimed.

5.10 national integration

1, ac4

One source mentioned that the SPO was
inclined to argue for expression of Slovene customs and cultures
in Carinthia, although it did not argue for political autonomy for
the minority. On the other hand, the same source noted that some
officials in the party were known for their unfriendliness to
Slovenes.

5.11 electoral participation

5, ac4

There is no discussion about the SPO
position on eligibility for voting, but it is assumed that the
party supports the age requirement of 21 and the compulsory nature
of the act in some provinces.

5.12 protection of civil rights

ac1

It would seem that issues of civil rights
would arise in light of the many ethnic minorities in Austria, but
if they do, they do not surface in the context of SPO
policies.

5.13 interference with civil
liberties

3, ac8

The SPO platform addressed itself to civil
liberties on two occasions and clearly supported freedom of the
press and intellectual freedom.

5.14 / 5.15 US--Soviet experts left-right
ratings

US says 3, non-communist left

Soviets say 2, for many years the SPO has
conducted a politics of socialist partnership in making serious
concessions to the bourgeoisie on behalf of the workers. The party
program of 1958 was characterized by reformism and further
withdrawal from Marxism, rejection of class struggle, and support
of private enterprise.

Goal Orientation Variables, 6.01-6.55

6.00 open competition in the electoral
process

4, ac9

the socialists were consistent opponents of
the OVP in elections. While dedicated to the coalition government,
especially in the early part of our period, the socialists sought
to win as many votes as possible to earn them a favored position
in the allocation of ministries and governmental
influence.

6.10 restricting party
competition

0, ac9

There is no evidence that the SPO
approached the OVP to form electoral coalitions against the
communists or the FPO, the other two parties, in an effort to
cement the coalition and squeeze out the non-government
opposition.

6.20 subverting the political
system

0, ac9

The communists made an effort to disrupt
the political system in 1950, calling a general strike in response
to a wage-price agreement. Most observers claim that this was an
attempt at a putsch to overthrow the government. But the
socialists, who would have been needed allies in this effort,
openly and vigorously opposed the strike, as did the
OVP.

6.30 propagandizing ideas and
program

6.31--2, ac9. The SPO operated a major
publishing enterprise. The Arbeiter- Zeitung was its major paper,
but the party had numerous other daily and periodical
publications.

6.32--2, ac9. Education into party
principles and practice has been a major objective of the SPO,
which maintained party scols and a central education office.
Although the party was not as successful in its educational
program as expected, it certainly worked hard at the
activity.

6.33--2, ac9. The literature contains many
lengthy statements of party platforms and resolutions, the
enactment of which appeared to occupy much of the party's
energies.

6.34--2, ac9. The party's positions on
issues were disseminated widely through the various printed media
available to the SPO.

6.50 providing for welfare of party
members

6.51 0, ac3. The absence of any discussion
of the SPO providing food, clothing, or shelter for party members
is assumed to indicate that these activities are not engaged in at
all or are minor in importance.

6.52 0, ac3. The lack of discussion is
again taken as evidence of no sizable activity performed by the
party in running employment services.

6.53 2, ac9. The SPO, like the OVP, is
thoroughly entrenched in the government bureaucracy, and
governmental action can be obtained through political party pull.
For example, coveted housing assignments must be approved by SPO
officials.

6.54 0, ac3. It appears that the extensive
educational activities of the SPO are primarily oriented toward
political rather than general subjects, for there was no mention
of education being directed toward basic nonpolitical
topics.

6.55 2, ac9. The SPO was said to have more
than twenty sport and cultural organizations affiliated to the
party, providing its members with recreational opportunities
galore.

Autonomy Variables, 7.01-7.05

7.01 sources of funds

7, a

The proportion of SPO income attributable
to dues ranges from 80 to 90 percent. Moreover, the party operates
a number of enterprises that produce funds. Most important are its
printing plant and its publishing firms. The party also has stock
in the Austrian national bank and other concerns.

7.02 source of members

5, ac8

Membership in the SPO is direct, despite
the party's close connections with trade unions. Industrial
workers appear to account for about 40 percent of the SPO
membership, with public and private white collar employees
providing another 20 to 25 percent.

7.03 sources of leaders

1 (sector 01), ac4

There is no discussion of the composition
of the SPO party in parliament, and information on SPO leadership
backgrounds is vague or limited mainly to top leadership
positions. The gist of the information appears to be that while
the leadership was once in the hands of intellectuals, trade
unionists now constitute the bulk of the leadership.

7.04 relations with domestic
parties

4, ac9

The SPO joined with the OVP and the
communists in a coalition of anti-fascist parties in the
provisional government following World War Two. The coalition
lasted after the communists left in 1947, following the 1945
election which won them only four seats. Originally a marriage of
necessity to free the country from foreign occupation, the
coalition continued after independence in 1955 out of convenience
and fear of the old divisions, in addition to the fact that
neither party had an absolute majority which would permit
governing alone. Four coalition pacts were negotiated during our
period. The parties distributed the ministries originally and then
tended to shift functions around following elections to reflect
the voting results. Occasionally, a ministry was shifted, but that
drastic step tended to disturb the careful distribution of
responsibility and patronage between the parties. The parties felt
free to criticize and attack ministries held by the other, but
they supported the broad policies decided in concert by the
partiesí coalition committees, which were composed of the
top leaders of each party. Decisions in this committee had to be
supported by each party before they were promulgated to the
national parliament for ratification.

7.05 relations with foreign
organizations

3, ac8

The SPO was one of the charter members of
the Socialist International. There is a reference to the party
working for close international liaison between all socialist
parties to pursue a common international policy independent of the
great powers and a declaration of adherence to the principles of
the Socialist International.

Organizational Complexity Variables,
8.01-8.07

8.01 structural articulation

10, ac9

National organs in the SPO include the
party congress, the party directorate, and a secretariat. There is
virtually no discussion of a parliamentary party organization. The
party directorate is further elaborated by a division of its fifty
members into an executive committee of 25 members and a matching
control committee. The function of the control committee is to
review the actions of the executive and constitute a check on its
abuses of power. But the control committee never reported
complaints from 1945 through the end of our time period, and the
distinction between the bodies is not important, for members of
the control committee can and do attend meetings of the executive
committee. The selection of delegates to the party congress is
well described, with elected representatives from district
organizations constituting less thand 2/3 of the total of about
500, and the rest composed of party officials in stated positions.
The congress selects the directorate, which then selects its own
officers who constitute the major national officers for the
party.

8.02 intensiveness of
organization

5, ac8

In the late 1940's and early 1950's the SPO
experimented with a workshop level of organization in the
factories, but this form of local organization was abandoned
officially in 1953. Traditionally, the SPO had been a
territorially based party, with the basic organization being the
section, of which there are approximately 3,000 in the country.
However, in Vienna, the section organization is broken into
sub-sections called Sprengel, and the code is based on these
units, which are taken to correspond to areas with 1,000 voters or
less.

8.03 extensiveness of
organization

3, ac6

Although the SPO has some 3,000 sections
scattered across the country, e smaller sub-section, (Sprengel)
organization appears to exist only in Vienna, which can claim just
less than 25 percent of Austria's population for our time
period.

8.04 frequency of local
meetings

6, ac6

Our file has no information on meetings of
local organizations, but our consultant states that Sprengel
groups meet weekly.

8.05 frequency of national
meetings

5, ac5

SPO statutes require the full 50 man
directorate to meet at least four times a year. The 25 man
executive committee, however, can and does meet by itself, with
attendance open to the remaining 25 members on the counterpart
control committee. Therefore, it is likely that meetings of the
directorate or an enlarged executive committee occur more than
four times a year, and it is inferred that such meetings occur at
least six times annually.

8.06 maintaining records

13, ac7

It is clear from all accounts that the
party engages in a considerable publishing program, responsible
for numerous daily, weekly, biweekly, and monthly newspapers and
periodicals. Also, it seems that, although the central secretariat
has no over-all file of party members and relies upon reports from
lower offices, the membership information produced by the SPO is
excellent. The party conducts extensive analyses of membership
composition and trends. What is not clear from the literature is
the character of any party archive. Surely the party must have
some facility for research, although one source indicates that the
chamber of labor acts as the research bureau for the SPO and
another states that the party does not have a statistical bureau.
It is concluded that the party probably does maintain some
archive, but that it is not an outstanding resource. Our
consultant reports, however, that it carried on research in the
late 1950s through polling organizations and counts several of the
more well known survey data analysts in Austria among its
officers.

8.07 pervasiveness of
organization

18, ac9

Unlike the OVP, for which membership comes
through three affiliated occupational leagues, the SPO is a party
of direct membership. Nevertheless, the SPO penetration of social
and economic groupings is extensive. Every member is obligated to
join his trade union or occupational association SPOnsored by the
party, and the state chamber of labor is dominated by Socialist
Party members. Tables published in 1956 and 1960 listed more than
20 organizations affiliated to the party, including special
associations for various age groups and interests, shopkeepers,
pensioners, motorists, stamp collectors, war veterans, and so on.
In some cases, the secretariats of these organizations are
attached to the party, and the organizations receive
representation on party organs.

Organizational Power Variables, 9.01-9.08

9.01 nationalization of
structure

5, ac9

The SPO features a distinct and classical
form of hierarchical structure. The local sections are grouped
into districts (bezirk), the districts into one of nine provinces,
and the provinces are topped by a national organization. Elected
delegates to the national congress from the districts constitute
about 2/3 of the total. Representatives of the provincial
organizations (land directorates) enjoy strong reprentation on the
central directorate of the party.

9.02 selecting the national
leader

7, ac9

It is said that the main function of the
SPO congress is to select the party leaders, and the congress does
elect a central directorate of 50 members. Although the vote is by
secret ballot, only one list of candidates is proposed to the
delegates by the election committee, and expression of choice is
limited to striking names and writing in alternatives. Once the
directorate is chosen, it selects a chairman and other officers
from among its own membership. The directorate chairman becomes in
effect the party chairman. He is directly elected by the
directorate and only indirectly elected by the
congress.

9.03 selecting parliamentary
candidates

5, ac6

Only one source discusses the selection of
candidates within the SPO at any length. The district
organizations in a constituency propose candidates, but agreement
on the candidacies is required by the central directorate. There
is a special parteirat to resolve disagreement between the
district and national organizations. Considerable bargaining
sometimes occurs, and it seems that each level holds a virtual
veto over the final decision concerning candidates that are
sufficiently unacceptable to either

9.04 allocating funds

2, ac8

The greatest source of SPO revenue is party
dues, which is collected by local party stewards, who keep a
stated amount fo r local operations and forward the rest to the
central secretariat. About 40 percent of this amount is kept by
the central office and the remainder redistributed among the
provincial, district, and local organizations. SPO members in
public or party posts are also subject to an income tax, the money
from which goes to the provincial rather than the central
organs.

9.05 formulating policy

6, ac7

Although it seems clear that the SPO party
congress enjoys more authority and autonomy in the deliberation of
governmental issues and party policy than the ovp congress, no
writer claims any real continuing significance for the SPO
congress in formulating party policy. The 1958 conference, which
adopted a new revisionist party program shifting from more
orthodox Marxism, stands as an exception to the general pattern,
which finds the congress under the control of the leadership on
policy matters. A committee on policy resolutions reviews the
resolutions proposed from local organizations and makes
recommendations concerning them which are virtually always
adopted. Within the national leadership level itself, the
executive committee of the directorate engages in policy making,
but its role is often short-circuited by the five SPO
representatives on the ten member coalition committee, where
bargaining occurs between the SPO and the OVP.

9.06 controlling communications

7, ac9

the SPO press is considered to be one of
the most active and influential among the socialist parties. The
executive committee is in a position to control the press, because
it appoints the editor in chief of the Arbeiter Zeitung, the main
party paper, who also supervises the publication of many other
periodicals.

9.07 administering discipline

4, ac9

The literature is consistent in describing
a situation of tight discipline within the SPO. Signed, undated
resignations are required of every parliamentary candidate. These
pledges are simply redeemed by the party secretaries upon evidence
of disloyal behavior. At the extreme, the party has taken to
expulsion of members for cardinal sins, the most tantalizing being
pressing for adoption of pro-Soviet or pro-communist
policies.

9.08 leadership concentration

4 for 1st half, ac6

3 for 2nd half, ac6

Until the defeat of the SPO in the 1956
elections, Adolf Scharf was named as the strong leader of the
executive committee. Three others are named with Scharf to have
constituted the inner core of the executive--Oscar Helmer, Karl
Waldbrunner, and Bruno Pitterman. At the 1956 party congress, a
subcommittee of ten within the executive committee wasreated to
transfer authority for policy making from the SPO cabinet and
Scharf, still party chairman, to a group headed by Pitterman, who
became party chairman in 1957 when Scharf was elected to the
presidency. The committee of ten continued and Pitterman
apparently did not recapture all of Scharf's old powers. So the
leadership circle is judged to have been enlarged in the second
part of our time period

Coherence Variables, 10.01-10.06

10.01 legislative
cohesion

1.0, ac7

Cohesion within the SPO appears to be
greater after world war two than before, according to one source.
The party's deputies support the party unanimously on almost every
issue. In the isolated instances of deviation, expulsion from the
party was said to be the consequence. The OVP was more in favor of
allowing free votes on certain issues than was the
SPO.

10.02 ideological factionalism

4 for 1st half, ac7

5 for 2nd half, ac6

in the early part of our time period, the
Marxist character of the party was asserted by the socialist youth
group, and there was a tension within the party between moderates
and more orthodox leftists. By the 1958 congress, this tension
erupted into fairly clear factional groupings fighting over the
direction of the party program. The moderates won out and a
revisionist program was enacted, downplaying the Marxist
orientation of the SPO.

10.03 issue factionalism

2, ac9

A number of issues served to divide the
party on several occasions, but they did not produce lasting
factions. Examples of such ad hoc divisive issues were deficit
financing versus increased socialization and productivity versus
consumer needs. Another issue of longer standing dealt with the
relationship between the SPO and the Catholic church, but this
fell somewhat short of producing clear factions.

10.04 leadership factionalism

0 for 1st half, ac9

2 for 2nd half, ac7

Several writers comment on the stability of
members on the central directorate, which has little turnover.
From 1945 to 1957, Dr. Scharf's chairmanship seemed to occasion no
challenge. However, he was forced out of the post following the
1956 elections. Pittermann became chairman, and one source
reported that a trade unionist faction was against Pittermann and
in support of Olah. But this was not given confirmation in the
literature. Our consultant agrees, however, that Olah seems to
havbeen the first and only union chief in Austria to use that
position to challenge the party leadership.

10.05 strategic or tactical
factionalism

3 for 1st half, ac9

5 for 2nd half, ac9

Until Austrian independence in 1955,
coalition with the OVP was accepted by most of the party, with
only a small minority in opposition from the standpoint of
strategy and principle. Beginning with the 1956 elections,
opposition to the coalition intensified among the left wing of the
party.

10.06 party purges

0, ac9

There is no evidence of a purge of party
members or leaders during our period.

Involvement Variables, 11.01-11.06

11.01 membership requirements

3, ac8

The SPO abandoned all efforts at screening
applicants for membership in 1949. All of its 700,000 members are
direct. Each signs a declaration to support the party, and over 90
percent of the members pay dues.

11.02 membership participation

3, ac5

Of the approximately 700,000 members of the
party, approximately 50 to 60 thousand are identified as party
functionaries, holding some party position. Although the
literature comments that most members are not significantly
active, it would seem that most may have attended an occasional
meeting or performed some activity on behalf of the party. Our
consultant advises a code of 3.

11.03 material incentives

2, ac5

Due to the principle of proporz, which
entrusts filling government positions under a ministry to the
party holding that portfolio, party connections are important to
landing government employment, so it can be expected that some
activists are motivated by material considerations. However, most
of the 50 to 60 thousand party positions are unpaid, so material
rewards must be limited.

11.04 purposive incentives

2 for 1st half, ac4

1 for 2nd half, ac4

Many of the regular party workers were
staunch leftist militants whose commitment to socialism in
opposition to capitalism undoubtedly spurred their work in the
field. But it appears that this source of motivation began to be
drained as the party departed more and more from orthodox leftist
principles, especially after the 1958 party congress.

11.05 doctrinism

2 for 1st half, ac7

1 for 2nd half, ac5

Clearly, socialist thought and Marxist
writings were more important in the first part of our period than
in the second. Some writers contend that the party completely
abandoned Marxism as political doctrine following the Salzburg
party congress, but the SPO quite clearly still regarded itself as
a socialist party and played a prominent role in the Socialist
International. Marxism was no doubt downplayed, but socialist
thought was still invoked by some in formulating party
policy.

11.06 personalism

0, ac9

Despite the importance of scharf in the
party during the first part of our time period, there was no
suggestion that he may have been a source of motivation and
inspiration to party militants through the force of his own
personality.