Positivism may be thought of as the philosophical ally of natural science. The word was
coined by Auguste Comte (1798-1857) for his philosophy.

The word "positivism" is ambiguous, and helpfully so from the point of view
of understanding what the movement stands for. On the one hand, it connotes
"definiteness" or "confident certainty" or
"strictness"and this aptly expresses the task positivism in philosophy
sets for itself: it aims definitively to lay down what can be known and what cant,
what is in and what is out with regard to "proper" intellectual activity.

Thus positivism tended to lay down criteria for legitimacy of intellectual activity
fairly freely and is famous for its opposition to metaphysics.

Positivism developed a fierce critical, and skeptical, edge. After its late modern
development in Comte, Neo-positivism emerged as one of the most powerful and significant
movements in modern Western philosophy. The logical positivists, springing out of the
so-called Vienna Circle, were the most strident exponents of positivistic revisionism with
regard to human intellectual activity.

In 1931, the name "logical positivism" was given to the principal doctrines of
the Vienna Circle. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy furnishes some synonyms:
consistent empiricism, logical empiricism, scientific empiricism, and logical
neo-positivism.

J. Ayer is the most popularly well-known of the logical positivists, though he was
never associated with the Vienna Circle. His book, Language, Truth and Logic
systematically and colorfully attacks all "non-admissible" forms of intellectual
activity, including ethics, metaphysics, and theology.

On the other hand, it connotes "optimism" or "enthusiasm"and
this aptly picks up the driving motivation for much of positivism in philosophy. By taking
its inspiration from the astonishing, unprecedented success of the natural sciences after
roughly the time of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), and especially enthused by the burst of
science-inspired technological innovation in the industrial revolution, positivism was
almost boundlessly enthusiastic about the future. Humanity was on the up and up, in a
process of improvement. In the 19th century, this was explained in several ways.

Biological evolution was steadily turning humans from essentially nomadic primitives
without the ability to think or understand the world into self-reliant, self-directing
masters of the natural world.

Social forces were driving modern humanity in the direction of intellectual maturity,
and society properly ordered (according to the principles of science and technology) would
transform both quality and understanding of life.

Anthropologically (and having recourse to both the biological and social
interpretations), humans were moving steadily from a mythic and theological approach to
reality, through a metaphysical approach to reality, to a scientific approach to reality
(Comte).

2. Metaphysical skepticism

Positivism, besides being inspired by science, was motivated by a visceral allergy to
metaphysics.

This was the case for precisely the same reasons that Hume and Kant had been so
suspicious of metaphysics: metaphysics was simply a malange of conflicting opinions with
no possibility of resolving all of the obvious conflicts that existed.

Positivism, especially well represented by the logical positivism of Ayer, put the
objection in a particularly sharp way. It was common at times from Protagoras the sophist
to the enlightenment skeptics to say that metaphysics was empty or impossible or useless.
But Ayer and the positivists said that metaphysics was actually meaningless.

This was done on the basis of the verification principle, which was a rule for deciding
whether a statement was meaningful or not.

Thus, in the case of a metaphysical proposition such as "All is spirit," we
are able conclude that it is meaningless because there is no possible way to verify or
falsify it. That means that a conflict of this proposition with an opposed proposition
such as "All is matter" can be excluded as not a real intellectual problem, but
merely an apparent conflict between two forms of meaningless gibberish.

The verification principle asserts that a
purported statement is to be judged meaningful if and only if there is a method for
verifying it.

Note that there is a more generous principle that attempts to overcome the fact that
scientific generalizations based on the principle of induction cannot pass the test of the
verification principle as usually understood:

The falsification principle asserts that a
purported statement is to be judged meaningful if and only if there is a method for
falsifying it.

3. Logic

Another motivating force for positivism was logic.

After Aristotles treatment of the syllogism had reigned as the supreme (the only)
treatment of logic for well over two thousand years, the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century saw a massive rethinking of logic, and the creation of a powerful
discipline.

The power of this logic led to Russell and Whiteheads attempt to found mathematics
on the perfect foundation of logic (an attempt blocked by Gödels incompleteness
theorem).

It also led to a collection of enormously powerful analytical tools for use in analyzing
language, which is one of the ways positivism gave rise to philosophy of language (see
below). This set of tools has created an entire philosophic language and approach called
"analytic philosophy," which needs to be distinguished from logical positivism
while the continuities should still be noted. The influence of this movement extends
through much of the Western worlds philosophy departments, though German philosophy
has been much less affected by it.

4. Philosophy of science

Positivism, because of its affinity to science, has sponsored a massive investigation
into the procedures and logical foundations of scientific activity.

This process of inquiry, somewhat ironically in view of positivisms antagonism
toward metaphysics and theology, has discovered that science is a vaguer process than had
been thought. Thomas Kuhns The Structure of Scientific Revolutions gives an
indication of that, as does Paul Feyerabends Against Method, and Imre
Lakatoss work in scientific research programs.

Working from the side of theology and metaphysics, scholars have noticed profound
similarities between scientific method thus reconstrued and the methods of metaphysics and
theology. Thus it appears that positivism may have saved theology and metaphysics in the
very process of seeking to silence them, making the original irony twice as comic.

Of course, the people who have given the best and the earliest account of the reasons
for the similarity between these methods were the pragmatists, to whom we shall come next
time.

The work began in 1826 as series of lectures. It was published in 6-volumes from
1830-42. In 1853, Harriet Martineau translated and condensed/abridged Comtes
6-volume work as Cours, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, 2 vols. She notes
it is more condensation than abridgment, but abridgement nonetheless. Comte
approves Martineaus work, so much so that he substitutes it for the 6-vol. version
in the "Positivist Library" (his list of books that should survive). [See Arline
Reilein Standley, Auguste Comte (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1981) 160, n. 1 (
ch.
3).] A new edition of the Martineau translation/aridgement has been published with an
introduction by Abraham S. Blumberg in the Language, Man and Society, Foundations of
Behavioral Sciences Series, ed. R. Rieber. New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1974.

John L. Austins conception of speech acts in How to Do Things with Words was
one of the formative impulses in linguistic philosophy. Ludwig Wittgenstein is another the
key figure for understanding linguistic philosophy. In its connection with Wittgenstein,
it is clear that linguistic philosophy owes a great deal to positivism.

Wittgensteins first book, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), was a
work at the junction of logical positivism and linguistic philosophy.

Wittgensteins project in that most unusual of philosophical works was to analyze
propositions, to determine what could be said, and what couldnt; everything that
could be said could be said clearly. The obvious consequence of this is that real
intellectual activity could be judged by whether it fitted Wittgensteins idea of
propositions. If it did fit, then we could talk about it, and do so with clarity and
precision, but if it didnt fit, then we should remain silent about it.

The basic point for our purposes here is that science fits the mold, but metaphysics and
ethics and theology do not. We should remain silent about those things, as a result.
Whereas some of the positivists sought to delete these aberrations from the mental history
of humanity, Wittgenstein had a much richer view, simply believing that they could not be
talked about sensibly.

2. Philosophical Investigations

Wittgenstein corrected his early work in his other breakthrough book, Philosophical
Investigations (1953). This is, from one point of view, the manifesto of linguistic
philosophy.

In that book he emphasized the vagueness and ambiguity of life and language against his
positivist obsessiveness about clarity in the Tractatus. There are no essential
definitions such as Socrates is famous for requiring of his interlocutors, according to
the later Wittgenstein. Rather we use words to talk about life according to conventional
and pragmatic rules, which he called "language games," and the vagueness of the
world is expressed in the fuzziness of language.

Is this fuzziness of ordinary language a problem? Well, we all participate in many, many
of these overlapping patterns of discourse, and inculcate our children into them as they
grow. We know when our language, and that of others, works and when it doesnt
according to the criteria of these language games. So ordinary language appears to do very
well. We get confused, according to Wittgenstein, when we get tricked by our own acuity,
and try to force the world to be less vague and interesting than it actually is. We think
up precise technical definitions (of the good, say, or of God or love or justice or
salvation or humanity or Trinity) because of an obsession with essences, and thereby
create "philosophical problems" because our essence-definitions do not fit the
vague world; clearly, our philosophical problems are pseudo-problems.

Definition: It follows that the task of philosophy is to protect us from being
outsmarted by our own linguistic intelligence, to dissolve philosophical problems by
diagnosing them in detail as pseudo problems. It is a kind of therapeutic activity,
therefore, and consists not in learning about books and ideas so much as paying attention
to the world as it is.

Religion and theology, on this view, can exist, because we can speak about God
and salvation, etc. The only problem is that our language is at its very vaguest at these
places because reality itself is so elusively vague. We must be careful, therefore, not to
take ourselves and our theologies too seriously, lest we become entrapped in all kinds of
theological pseudo-problems, even as philosophers have become ensnared in philosophical
pseudo-conundrums.

3. Influence on Theology

Linguistic philosophy, under the influence of Wittgenstein, has had two especially
important influences on theology.

One is the view of "theological traditions" as extended language games.
Theology is thus defined as the distinctive intellectual activity of particular religious
traditions, and adequacy of theological work is defined in terms of fidelity to that
tradition of discourse. This helpfully gives theology a role in the contemporary world.
But it also has the liability of removing theology to a considerable extent from the realm
of public discourse, so that it does not need to evaluate the intelligibility of its
assertions against any other standards than those of its specialized linguistic culture.

The other is the philosophical study of religious language.

It has been established that religious language is enormously complex; indeed, it is far
and away the most complex pattern of linguistic usage that we engage in. On the surface,
it has exhortative, expressive, performative and imperative elements along with the sort
theology uses: assertive (fact-asserting) language that is capable of being true or false.
And all of these apparent kinds of language are used in relation to a vast host of
practices, including rituals, education, worship, personal prayer, pronouncements, etc.

The problem is to give an account of religious language that can do justice to this
wealth of uses of it, and yet one that still has enough simplicity and coherence to yield
some insight into what we are doing when we are talking religiously (a task that requires
the leaving aside of Wittgensteins earlier advice that we should give up such
questions because they cannot be discussed clearly).

This problem has sometimes been approached by reducing all religious language to one
type, and either ignoring the other types, or saying that they are derivative from the
basic type. This doesnt work. In fact, the problem remains fairly sharp.

One of the sharpest aspects of this problem for theology is whether or not there can be
any fact-asserting language about God. At this point, the logical positivists
verification principle reenters the picture with a vengeance. Antony Flews
discussion of John Wisdoms parable of the two explorers and the forest garden makes
the point perfectly. But are we forced to accept the conclusion of Flews argument,
that theological language merely expresses a "preferred picture of things," and
doesnt after all have any fact-asserting content? If it were true, that would
certainly be the end of theology, in one sense (the sense of truth-seeking inquiry,
or the quest for true descriptive statements about God and religious matters); but perhaps
the beginning of theology in another sense (the sense of Wittgensteins language
games, perhaps, or the cultural-linguistic sense espeoused by George Lindbeck in which
doctrines are the grammar of a religious communitys language game).

His parents were not religious. His father was Jules Louis Cyprien Ayer, of French
Swiss background, gentile. He worked for Alfred Rothschild. Ayer was named after
Rothschild but he didnt like name so he was called by "Freddie" or by his
first two initials. His mother was Reine Citroen, born in Belgium, raised in England. She
converts to Christianity after marriage, but was "never clear on details." Her
maternal grandparents were Jewish, from Holland.

Soon after Ayers birth, his father went bankrupt after speculating and lost his
job. Ayers maternal grandfather (Citroen) rescued family. Ayers father was set
up by Citroen as a timber merchant. They lived modestly.

Ayer was apparently "high strung" as child, intelligent, fairly solitary,
loved to read but not good with his hands.

- There is considerable hostility at Oxford toward the Cambridge philosophers,
particularly Russell, but also Moore. But Ryle is more open-minded, interested, so Ayer
exposed to this thought and is encouraged to pursue philosophy.

- Wittgensteins ideas were hardly known at Oxford, but Ryle suggested Ayer read
the work. Made a huge impression on Ayer. Read a paper on the Tractatus at the
Jowett Society, which was probably the first discussion at Oxford on Wittgenstein (Part,
119).

- Ayer returns to Cambridge 2-3 times during 30s to give papers at the Moral
Science Club, where he first meets Keynes, Moore.

Marriage (11/32) to Renée Lees

Though neither he nor Renée were believers, they agreed to a R. Catholic wedding for
her parents sake. He signed that he will raise his children in the Catholic faith,
knowing his wife will not enforce this, but mutters "the tongue has sworn but the
mind has not sworn" (Euripides) under his breath. (Part 127). Their 2
children, Valerie and Julian, were never baptized and never embraced Christianity, though
Ayer was open to their learning about it.

Vienna (1932-3)

Ryle encouraged Ayer to go to the University of Vienna, to learn more about work of
Vienna Circle (very little was known about them in England). Schlick arranged for him to
attend meetings once each week. [Part includes sketches on VC members like Carnap,
Neurath, Waismann.]

Oxford (1933-39): Lecturer, Research Fellow

1933: Begins Lectureship at Christ Church.

- lectures on Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap

- Joins Mind Association/Aristotelian Society - opportunity to discuss philosophy with
Moore during these. Ayer startles some by his "vehement onslaught on
metaphysics" and makes some enemies (Part 150).

- Ayer comments that most thoughts in it were not original, but a blend of "the
positivism of the Vienna Circle [which Ayer at that time also ascribed to Wittgenstein],
reductive empiricism from Hume and Russell, the analytic approach of Moore... and a dash
of pragmatism...." (Part 154).

- Also felt in his struggle to make his meaning clear, sacrifices depth to
clarity. In his autobiography, Ayer critiques mistakes and problems of the book, but says
he is broadly"still in sympathy with spirit of book" and with the verificatory
approach. (156)

By the mid-30s, logical positivism and the Cambridge "School" were
gaining ground in England.

Whitehead read typescripts for couple of chapters of LTL. He called him a
beginner in mathematical logic, but had a good opinion of book. Said though he himself not
a positivist and feels its claims "overstated," the Oxford logical positivists
are good for the philosophical scene, make for a balance and for more open-mindedness
about questions, will "rescue the philosophy of the 20th century from repeating its
complete failure in the 19th, when history and science overwhelmed it." (Ayer cites
from a letter from Whitehead, Part 162-3).

1934: 5-yr appointment as Research Student

Ayer wanted to research symbolic logic, philosophy of science, but because of lack of
skill in mathematics, and of scientific training, decides to pursue epistemology.

- He and Renée decide to work for Labour Party: step-ladder speeches on street
corner, canvassing, writes pamphlet. Runs for City Council (lost).

- Growing interest in political theory, lectures at Oxford on topic. Says these
were too abstract. Gives an example: he raised the question of whether we should take into
account the effects of our actions on human beings only, or also on animals. A
working-class listener, former miner, complains to another that "that man, Ayer,
supposed to be one of the best lecturers. Talks about the sensations of pit-ponies.
Id like to see him ride one." (Part, 184)

Friendship with E.E. Cummings, Family problems, B. Russell

1937: begins lasting friendship with Cummings and his wife Marion Morehouse when they
visit Oxford. Ayer tells anecdote about showing them around Christ Church, translates the
Latin inscription over one of the quads, doesnt realize Cummings was a classics
scholar at Harvard. Cummings only mentions this long afterward. Cummings jokingly calls
Ayer the "stainless steel mind."

- Ayer and Renée begin to have marital problems, Ayer has affairs with other women,
Renée has one with a friend of Ayers.

- Russell comes to Oxford to lecture (will give lectures again as W. James lectures at
Harvard in 1940, published as Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth). Ayer and Russell
become acquainted, though not really friends until late 1940s.

1939: Involved in a failed attempt to laicize Christ Church College.

January 1939: Birth of son, Julian David.

- Though relationship between Renée and Ayer still tense, decide to try to keep
together. Ayer tries to lead more "domesticated life."

- Begins work on Foundations of Empirical Knowledge

- Moore comes to Oxford (Wittgenstein succeeds him in chair at Cambridge)

WORLD WAR II

Enlists as officer in Welsh Guards. Assigned to intelligence work for Special
Operations Executive (SOE) first in London, then in New York, London, Africa. Gathers
information on political situations, assists French Resistance movement. Throughout wishes
there is more for him to do, frequently feels not doing much to help war effort. For
example: he was sent on mission to Algiers, but his superior there unwelcoming,
tells him there is nothing for him to do in Algiers. Takes Ayer to Italy and leaves him at
villa there, telling him to stay till end of war. Ayer reads Whiteheads Process
and Reality there, finds it "obscure." Ayer finds "intolerable" to
stay in Salerno, makes way back to Algiers, and then talks an officer there into giving
him a pass into southern France toward front because his "spirit of
adventure" was up. There is assigned by local SOE to tour liberated areas and assess
political situation. At one point he wires London to get advice -- they havent known
his whereabouts since he left for Algiers, and tell local SOEs to detain Ayer and return
him to London. There he receives a "mild rebuke." (Part 275)

- Children evacuated to USA (1940-3) with a wealthy family in Rye, NY.

- shares a cab with Myrna Loy while visiting Washington D.C. but doesnt
have courage to speak with her.

- works briefly as film critic for The Nation under pseudonymn "P.H.
Rye" ("P" "Rye" from Gk panta rei (felt this applied to
films), reference to Heraclitus  thus "H", and Rye also referring to where
children lived).

- dates Betty (later Lauren) Bacall several times, before her film fame. Thirty
years later she only vaguely remembers having met him.

- While in Paris meets and becomes friends with Camus, Merleau-Ponty, and also George
Orwell then a foreign correspondent for the Observer.

Return to Oxford: Tutor at Wadham

Fall 1945: Tutorial Fellowship at Wadham, Oxford. Also appointed Dean.

- notes change in atmosphere, new trends in philosophy. Ayers ideas, once
revolutionary, now "old fashioned." John Austins linguistic philosophy
dominant, becomes the "school" with which Oxford principally associated at that
period by 50s. Austin antagonistic toward Ayer, who is skeptical about Austins
work. But overall, Ayer notes that the analytic movement "in one form or
another" now has taken control of English scene (Part, 296).

- Ryles Concept of Mind (1949) now strong influence on Ayer.

- Becomes close friends with Russell.

1946: Inadvertently insults Wittgenstein by statement made during a broadcast on
contemporary British philosophy. Their relationship never recovers, though Ayer tries to
apologize.

- when arrives, finds department of philosophy occupying 2 rooms in a section of the
University that had been bombed during war. About 6 undergraduates, no graduate students,
2 teachers (one of whom was the secretary who had been made a temporary teacher), no
telephone.

- Ayer (Chair) builds up department: brings in S. Hampshire, R. Wollheim, increases
numbers of students, including graduate, eventually acquires own building. Calls his 13
yrs. there the happiest in his professional life (Part 311).

1947: Publication of Thinking and Meaning.

1949: Founds Metalogical Society

- brings together philosophers, and physical and biological scientists. Includes
Russell and Karl Popper.

Dominant Philosophical Trends

- Russellduring this period feels his (Russells) work undervalued
relative to that of Wittgenstein and Moore. Though opposed to logical positivism, he
shares Ayers interest in epistemology which at the time is "in eclipse."
Ayer notes that dominant instead were Wittgensteins "language games
approach," ideas like those of Ryle who attacked traditional notions of mind as
"ghost in the machine," and Austin who treated philosophy as an investigation of
ordinary language usage. (More, 51-2).

1952: Elected to British Academy.

1953: Reads Philosophical Investigations.

- Thinks brilliant work, but finds disappointing re questions Ayer is pursuing.
Disagrees with its understanding of role of philosophy (should only describe, not
explain), its approach to philosophical problems through recognition of the working of
language, and its view that philosophy is a battle against "the bewitchment of our
intellect by means of language." Ayer feels his own work challenges this claim (More,
92-4).

Sept. 1954: Invited to China as cultural representative for celebration of 5th
anniversary of revolution.

1956: publication of Problem of Knowledge. Ayer feels a better work than LTL,
less derivative, though never as popular (More, 122).

Private Life: since divorce, Ayer has many affairs, including several serious,
long-term, and also remains on good terms with wife. Seems to have been a social and
fairly uninhibited person. In 1956 he meets the American journalist Dee Wells, whom he
will eventually marry.

The Brains Trust (1956-61)

A BBC television program. Involved a "question master" and 4 panelists who
changed weekly, though many, like Ayer, were "regulars." Asked questions
generated by audience, often on moral issues, sometimes politics, religion.

c1957-67: Ayer chair of the Society for Homosexual Law Reform. Apparently not a
homosexual himself, felt it was a justice issue.

Oxford (1959-78)

Wykeham Professor of Logic, New College, Oxford

- Ayer tells a story about an exchange with Austin soon after he comes to Oxford:
Austin inquires about the subject of his first course. Ayer replies: "Propositions
and Facts." Austin, "a shade derisively," says "Here you will find us
all talking about speech-acts." (More, 181-2)

- Austin died the next year, and the Oxford "school" connected with his work
soon after.

- returns to active involvement in Labour politics

1960: Dee and Ayer marry.

Story - Ayer and After-life

Once when Ayer visited his friend Somerset Maugham (c.1960), Lord Beaverbrook also
called. They all talked about after after-life (both Maugham and Beaverbrook were
elderly). Ayer says he saw no good reason to think there would be an after-life. Maugham
shows that this is the answer hed hoped for, but Beaverbrook not comforted. Ayer,
searching for something reassuring to say, comments that although he could find no good
reason to accept any form of theism, if one were to be Christian, it would be most
logical to embrace Calvinism/predestination. This seems to appease Beaverbrook somewhat,
he appears certain that hell be among the saved, though resents Ayers atheism.
(More, 196).

Story about Ayer in Washington, with Kennedys

Invited to lecture at Schlesingers house while visiting professor at City College
(1961-2), for one of President Kennedys series on the social sciences. Though the
President couldnt attend, Robert and other Kennedies there. Ayer summarizes the
analytic tradition, gets fairly "silent" reception. Then Eunice Shriver
whispers: "Is it possible this man doesnt believe in God?" Ethel asks Ayer
why he didnt talk about Aquinas, and Ayer replies he doesnt know much about
him. Ethel seems triumphant at this, but Ayer then suggests that she probably hasnt
read much Aquinas either, but rather knows of the neo-Thomist tradition, which he, Ayer, did
know something about. They then discuss Maritain, Ethel gets confused at one point, and
Robert is heard to say quietly from the back of the room, "Drop it, Ethel." (More,
208-9).

1962: "Philosophy and Science," published in Voprossi Filosofii, at
their request. 1st time a philosopher unsympathetic to Marxism invited to do so.

1963: Publication of The Concept of a Person. Well-received.

April, 1963: Birth of his and Dees son, Nicholas Hugh. The last sentence of his
memoirs: "My love for this child has been a dominating factor in the remainder of my
life." (More, 219).

- Also regularly attended philosophical meetings, congresses around the world,
including those of the Aristotelian Society/Mind Association, Association des Societés
Philosophiques de Langue Française, Institution Internationale de Philosophie,
the World Congress of Philosophy.

- 1950-63: Series editor for Penguin Series on Historical Philosophy

- 1960-65: Series ed. for International Library of Philosophy and Scientific
Method. Ayer first publishes the Pears/McGuinness edition of Tractatus, and then
works representative of various philosophical approaches.

Sources for this Report

1) Ayer, A.J. Part of My Life: the Memoirs of a Philosopher by A. J. Ayer. New
York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1977.

2) Ayer, A.J. More of My Life. London: Collins, 1984. Ayer notes he relies
largely on memory for both volumes, though uses some documentary evidence.