MUSINGS ON IRAQ

Tuesday, March 31, 2015

In March 2015 Al
Monitor published an interview with Sheikh Akram al-Kaabi the head of Hezbollah
al-Nujaba. Kaabi has a long history in Iraq with Shiite political parties and
armed groups. He was a student of Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr in the
1990s, a military commander with Moqtada al-Sadr after 2003, then a leader
within Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, before creating his own spin off group Hezbollah
al-Nujaba that went to fight in Syria and is now engaged in Iraq. Today, Kaabi
and his organization are one of many within the Hashd al-Shaabi, which are
close to Iran and taking part in its rivalry with the United States for
influence after the war is over.

Video featuring the clerical and military credentials of Sheikh Kaabi

In Sheikh Akram Al-Kaabi’s interview with Al Monitor he
expressed his close ties to Iran and his opposition to the United States’
involvement in Iraq. Kaabi said that his group Hezbollah al-Nujaba was assisted
by Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah advisers as well as receiving weapons from
Tehran. He went on to say that he believed in vilyat al-faqih and was following
the teachings of Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He
then condemned the United States, blaming it for Iraq’s problems from the 2003
invasion up to the present day. He repeated an often heard claim amongst Iraqis
today that the Americans were secretly supporting the Islamic State by dropping
it weapons and that its air strikes were useless. He blamed Baghdad for letting
them interfere in the war, and threated to attack U.S. aircraft. He repeated
that claim later on after Washington began air strikes on Tikrit on March 25. Kaabi’s
statements reflect many themes that other pro-Iranian armed groups have talked
about before. Like Badr Organization head Hadi
Ameri, many of these groups have publicly praised Tehran for all of the
assistance it has provided in the fight against IS, while attacking America’s
role. Since Hezbollah al-Nujaba is a spinoff of Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH) they
both claim to be the true heirs of Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr’s movement, while
also professing their adherence to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s form of rule
of the jurisprudent. That is a difficult balance since one of Sadr’s main
arguments was that Iraq’s Arabs and Najaf should be the leading the Shiite
religious establishment, not Iranians or Qom. That contradiction is at the
heart of Kaabi’s history.

Kaabi got involved in politics as a student of Ayatollah
Sadiq al-Sadr, which took him to the son Moqtada al-Sadr’s movement, then Asaib
Ahl Al-Haq and finally his own brand, which brought Kaabi closer to Tehran in
the process. In the 1990s, Kaabi was enrolled
in religious classes in Najaf under Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr. He was classmates
with Moqtada al-Sadr and Qais Khazali both of which would be influential in Kaabi’s
future. At the end of that decade Saddam Hussein had the ayatollah killed, and
Kaabi was probably part of Sadr’s core students that tried to maintain his
movement covertly in the following years. After the 2003 invasion, Moqtada Sadr
re-opened
his father’s office in Najaf and Kaabi was one of his top deputies. He would
eventually became the top
commander of the Mahdi Army, and participated
in the April and August 2004 battles for Najaf against the Americans. During
those confrontations, Sadr was receiving
advice from Iran and its Revolutionary Guards, but afterward, Tehran
offered its full support. Sadr did not want to be open about these ties so it
was agreed to create Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH), which would be run by Sadr’s top
lieutenant Qais Khazali and act as if it was an independent group, but would
actually still remain an arm of the Sadrists. When the Americans arrested Khazali
in March 2007 Kaabi took over the organization. The next year Tehran became
tired of working with Sadr who it considered too difficult and encouraged AAH
to split from his movement. It did, and Kaabi would become one of its main
leaders. As a way to try to establish its legitimacy AAH would claim that it
was the true inheritor of Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr’s legacy. Kaabi makes the
same types of statements since he was a student of the elder Sadr. Given the
fact that both AAH and Hezbollah al-Nujaba are funded, armed, and trained by
Iran and now call for vilyat al-faqih it’s clear that they have moved away from
Sadiq al-Sadr and are now firmly in Tehran’s camp.

In 2013 Hezbollah al-Nujaba emerged
as a new armed faction doing battle in Syria. According to Kaabi he retired
from AAH in 2011 after the United States withdrew its forces from Iraq, and
went back to his religious studies. He claimed that the war in Syria brought
him back, and that he created Hezbollah al-Nujaba to fight there. Like other
Iraqi groups it said that it was defending
the Sayid Zainab shrine in the Damascus suburbs. By Kaabi’s own admission
though his fighters are operating throughout the country in places like Aleppo.
He said they were acting as shock troops against the rebels in cooperation with
the Syrian army and the National Defense Force also known as the Shabiha. Hezbollah
al-Nujaba also has ties with other militias operating in Syria including Liwa
Ammar Ibn Yasir, Liwa al-Hamad
and Liwa al-Imam al-Hasan al-Mojtaba. It’s been speculated that these are
all offshoots of Kaabi’s group rather than independent entities. Likewise,
Hezbollah al-Nujaba is still believed to be connected to Asaib Ahl al-Haq
rather than being a separate organization. This would be similar to how AAH was
originally created to look like a new group, but was still actually part of the
Sadrists when it was originally formed. Likewise Hezbollah al-Nujaba’s
involvement in Syria came after Iran put out the call for assistance to defend
the Assad government, which was eventually answered by most of the Iraqi
militias with ties to Tehran.

Akram al-Kaabi represents how Iran has spread its influence
within Iraq’s Shiite community since 2003 and is now attempting to use those
allies to gain the upper hand in the country. Kaabi grew up under the tutelage
of Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr who was an Iraqi nationalist, and was opposed to
Iranian influence. When the U.S. invaded however some Iraqis were open to
Iranian assistance to fight the occupation. That’s what led Kaabi under first
Moqtada al-Sadr and then Qais Khazali towards Tehran as a friendly patron.
Today, Kaabi is fighting in both Syria and Iraq for not only religious and
nationalist purposes, but in support of Iran as well. The Iranians want to
parlay their aid to Baghdad in the war against the Islamic State into becoming
the dominant foreign power in the country. Part of that plan involves
supporting militias like Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, and turning
them into major military forces in the country. In turn this has garnered them
more widespread support than they had before, and that political capital will
be exploited in the future. This closely follows Iran’s strategy
in Syria where it created irregular forces that eventually surpassed the
regular army in defending the government. Its main rival in this endeavor is
the United States, which is attempting to re-engage with Baghdad after putting
the country in the rear view mirror in 2012. That’s the reason why Kaabi and
others friendly to Iran routinely denigrate and threaten the American and
Coalition air strikes. Tehran has played the Iraq crisis masterfully so far, and
outplayed the U.S., which is criticized by many Iraqis with no connections to
Iran for taking so long to join the war. Whether Iran is able to maintain this
effort or over play its hand will be one of the major stories to follow in the
coming months and years. Tracking groups like Hezbollah al-Nujaba will give an
insight into how this all plays out.

Monday, March 30, 2015

Casualties continued their downward trend in Iraq during the
4th week of March 2015. The number of dead and wounded has gone down
each week of the month. That was despite a slight increase in attacks. On the
battlefront fighting remained stalemated in Anbar. Diyala saw a large jump in
violence, some of which might have been by the Hashd al-Shaabi forces. The
Kurds continued their push south into Kirkuk, and the Iranian-Hashd plan for
Tikrit failed as Baghdad asked for Coalition air strikes. The government forces
have regained the initiative in the war, but the fighting shows how hard it
will be to clear the insurgents out of their strongholds.

During the 4th week of March there were 170
reported attacks. That was up from 141 the week before. So far there have been
a total of 616 incidents, which means that March will likely end up with
roughly the same number as February when there were 655. Since there were fewer
days in March however, that means the average number of attacks per day will
likely be lower. So far there has been 22.0 attacks per day for March, down
from 23.3 in February.

As usual, almost all of the violence was concentrated in the
middle of the country. Baghdad led the way with 58 attacks. Then there were 34
in Anbar, 29 in Diyala, 24 in Ninewa, 16 in Salahaddin, 6 in Babil, two in
Kirkuk, and one in Basra.

Casualties have been decreasing each week of March. The
first week there were 372 deaths, followed by 348 the second, 299 the third,
and 235 the fourth. The number of wounded did not follow such a straight line
going from 587 the first week to 656 the next, before dropping to 503 the third
and 406 the fourth. Like attacks, casualties have been declining as well. There
have been 1,254 fatalities so far leading to an average of 44.7 per day, and
2,152 injured or 76.8 per day. In February there were 61.7 killed and 95.8
wounded. At the same time the real numbers are always higher than what gets reported in the press. There have been some very high figures mentioned for the fighting in Tikrit for example.

By province Baghdad led the way again with 86 fatalities.
There were 50 dead in Anbar, 39 in Salahaddin, 32 in Diyala, 19 in Ninewa, 4
each in Babil and Kirkuk, and one in Basra.

Violence
In Iraq By Week Jun. 2014-2015

Date

Incidents

Dead

Wounded

Jun 1-7

228

612

1,020

Jun 8-14

234

1,889

890

Jun 15-21

177

804

755

Jun 22-28

207

740

800

Jun 29-30

59

127

236

JUN

905

4,172

3,701

Jul 1-7

203

526

651

Jul 8-14

214

577

628

Jul 15-21

230

444

1,009

Jul 22-28

224

589

801

Jul 29-31

66

163

230

JUL

937

2,299

3,319

Aug 1-8

270

1,122

885

Aug 9-14

180

710

1,152

Aug 15-21

150

731

499

Aug 22-28

156

523

798

Aug 29-31

59

125

289

AUG

815

3,211

3,623

Sep 1-7

169

616

751

Sep 8-14

168

467

731

Sep 15-21

170

625

794

Sep 22-28

157

396

576

Sep 29-30

49

126

287

SEP

713

2,230

3,139

Oct 1-7

175

456

687

Oct 8-14

189

560

880

Oct 15-21

159

499

780

Oct 22-28

160

346

596
+ 1,230

Oct 29-31

72

574

227

OCT

755

2,434

3,170 + 1,230

Nov 1-7

154

611

828

Nov 8-14

134

470

607

Nov 15-21

139

323

479

Nov 22-28

139

321

640

Nov 29-30

40

206

535

NOV

606

1,931

3,089

Dec 1-7

148

581

482

Dec 8-14

156

233
+ 166

444
+ 1,113

Dec 15-21

133

377

340

Dec 22-28

161

558

494

Dec 29-31

91

117

233

DEC

689

2,032

3,106

Jan 1-7

184

434

464

Jan 8-14

170

730

493

Jan 15-21

182

390

515

Jan 22-28

189

466

894

Jan 29-31

90

288

529

JAN

815

2,308

2,895

Feb 1-7

155

380

688

Feb 8-14

170

406

559

Feb 15-21

165

573

364

Feb 22-28

165

371

687
+ 386

FEB

655

1,730

2,683

Mar 1-7

172

372

587

Mar 8-14

133

348

656

Mar 15-21

141

299

503

Mar 22-28

170

235

406

Violence
By Province In Iraq March 2015

Province

Mar 1-7

Mar 8-14

Anbar

24 Incidents

71 Killed: 22 ISF, 31 Sahwa, 18
Civilians

77 Wounded: 31 ISF, 46 Civilians

14 Shootings

1 IED

1 Suicide Car Bomb

3 Mortars

1 Rocket

23 Incidents

58 Killed: 34 ISF, 1 Sahwa, 23
Civilians

147 Wounded: 26 ISF, 8 Sahwa, 113
Civilians

7 Shootings

1 IED

24 Suicide Car Bombs

1 Rocket

3 Mortars

Babil

5 Incidents

8 Killed: 1 Hashd, 7 Civilians

13 Wounded: 2 Hashd, 11 Civilians

1 Shooting

3 IEDs

1 Sticky Bomb

4 Incidents

8 Killed: 1 ISF, 7 Civilians

33 Wounded: 4 ISF, 29 Civilians

4 IEDs

1 Car Bomb

Baghdad

56 Incidents

75 Killed: 7 ISF, 4 Hashd, 5
Sahwa, 59 Civilians

229 Wounded: 16 ISF, 13 Sahwa, 16
Hashd, 184 Civilians

15 Shootings

30 IEDs

6 Sticky Bombs

1 Car Bomb

3 Mortars

2 Rockets

47 Incidents

88 Killed: 5 ISF, 83 Civilians

245 Wounded: 10 ISF, 1 US Soldier,
234 Civilians

15 Shootings

25 IEDs

4 Sticky Bombs

2 Car Bombs

1 Mortar

Basra

5 Incidents

4 Killed: 4 Civilians

3 Shootings

1 Sticky Bomb

-

Diyala

13 Incidents

17 Killed: 3 Hashd, 14 Civilians

23 Wounded: 3 ISF, 4 Hashd, 16
Civilians

6 Shootings

3 IEDs

3 Sticky Bombs

1 Car Bomb

2 Incidents

3 Killed: 2 ISF, 1 Civilian

3 Wounded: 3 ISF

1 Shooting

1 IED

Kirkuk

1 Incident

1 Killed: 1 ISF

1 Shooting

12 Incidents

103 Killed: 1 ISF, 23 Hashd, 26
Peshmerga, 53 Civilians

105 Wounded: 10 ISF, 5 Hashd, 87
Peshmerga, 3 Civilians

8 Shootings

1 IED

1 Suicide Bomber

4 Car Bombs

1 Mine

Ninewa

31 Incidents

120 Killed: 2 ISF, 118 Civilians

12 Wounded: 12 Civilians

17 Shootings

11 IEDs

20 Incidents

18 Killed: 1 ISF, 17 Civilians

10 Wounded: 1 Peshmerga, 9
Civilians

12 Shootings

5 IEDs

Salahaddin

37 Incidents

76 Killed: 24 ISF, 28 Hashd, 24
Civilians

233 Wounded: 54 ISF, 122 Hashd, 57
Civilians

18 Shootings

14 IEDs

1 Suicide Bomber

6 Suicide Car Bombs

1 Car Bomb

3 Mortars

25 Incidents

70 Killed: 61 ISF, 3 Hashd, 6
Civilians

113 Wounded: 98 ISF, 6 Hashd, 9
Civilians

9 Shootings

12 IEDs

3 Suicide Bombers

3 Suicide Car Bombs

Province

Mar
15-21

Mar
22-28

Anbar

20 Incidents

50 Killed: 5 ISF, 45 Civilians

80 Wounded: 8 ISF, 72 Civilians

9 Shootings

2 Suicide Bombers

3 Suicide Car Bombs

4 Mortars

2 Rockets

34 Incidents

50 Killed: 6 ISF, 44 Civilians

74 Wounded: 14 ISF, 60 Civilians

21 Shootings

3 Suicide Bombers

7 Suicide Car Bombs

5 Mortars

1 Rockets

Babil

5 Incidents

4 Killed: 2 ISF, 2 Civilians

10 Wounded: 6 ISF, 2 Hashd, 2
Civilians

3 Shootings

1 IED

1 Sticky Bomb

6 Incidents

4 Killed: 4 Civilians

17 Wounded: 3 ISF, 2 Hashd, 12
Civilians

1 Shooting

4 IEDs

1 Sound Bomb

Baghdad

51 Incidents

74 Killed: 6 ISF, 1 Sahwa, 1
Hashd, 66 Civilians

254 Wounded: 21 ISF, 5 Sahwa, 228
Civilians

13 Shootings

34 IEDs

4 Sticky Bombs

58 Incidents

86 Killed: 4 ISF, 1 Sahwa, 1
Hashd, 80 Civilians

241 Wounded: 17 ISF, 3 Sahwa, 221
Civilians

15 Shootings

27 IEDs

6 Sticky Bombs

1 Suicide Bomber

3 Car Bombs

1 Mortar

3 Rockets

Basra

1 Incident

12 Killed: 12 Civilians

30 Wounded: 30 Civilians

1 Truck Bomb

1 Incident

1 Killed: 1 Civilian

1 Shooting

Diyala

7 Incidents

5 Killed: 5 Civilians

4 Shootings

3 IEDs

29 Incidents

32 Killed: 1 ISF, 31 Civilians

7 Wounded: 4 ISF, 3 Civilians

14 Shootings

11 IEDs

1 Sticky Bomb

Irbil

1 Incident

1 Rocket

-

Kirkuk

8 Incidents

24 Killed: 20 Peshmerga, 1 Hashd,
3 Civilians

59 Wounded: 50 Peshmerga, 8 Hashd,
1 Civilian

6 Shootings

2 IEDs

2 Incidents

4 Killed: 4 Civilians

2 Shootings

Maysan

1 Incident

1 Killed: 1 ISF

1 Shooting

-

Ninewa

19 Incidents

37 Killed: 12 Peshmerga, 25
Civilians

9 Shootings

4 IEDs

24 Incidents

19 Killed: 7 ISF, 12 Civilians

14 Shootings

19 IEDs

1 Mortar

1 Rockets

Salahaddin

28 Incidents

92 Killed: 48 ISF, 6 Hashd, 38
Civilians

70 Wounded: 23 ISF, 26 Hashd, 21
Civilians

15 Shootings

6 IEDs

3 Suicide Bombers

2 Suicide Car Bombs

1 Mortar

1 Rocket

16 Incidents

39 Killed: 4 ISF, 1 Peshmerga, 6
Hashd, 28 Civilians

67 Wounded: 13 ISF, 1 Peshmerga,
29 Hashd, 24 Civilians

9 Shootings

7 IEDs

Car
Bombs In Iraq March 2015

Date

Location

Dead

Wounded

Mar 1

Mar 2

East
of Samarra, Salahaddin

4

Mar 3

South
of Tikrit, Salahaddin

4

12

Mar 4

Mar 5

Abu
Dishir, Baghdad

Alam
& Tal Ksaiba x3, Salahaddin

7

37

Mar 6

Mar 7

Bastan,
Anbar

Bani
Saad, Diyala

Tuz
Kharmato, Salahaddin

13

47

Total

10

28

96

Mar 8

Zoba,
Anbar

Mahmudiya,
Babil

Jamila,
Baghdad

10

32

Mar 9

Mullah
Ali x3, Kirkuk

5

30

Mar 10

Mullah
Abdullah, Kirkuk

Baiji,
Salahaddin

2

16

Mar 11

Ramadi
x17, Anbar

Hurriya,
Baghdad

Diom,
Salahaddin

29

79

Mar 12

Saqlawiya,
Anbar

3

5

Mar 13

Diom,
Salahaddin

6

11

Mar 14

Ramadi
x5, Anbar

11

14

Total

34

66

187

Mar 15

Ramadi,
Anbar

5

7

Mar 16

Mar 17

Ramadi,
Anbar

Mar 18

Um
Qasr, Basra

12

30

Mar 19

Mar 20

Huiysh,
Salahaddin

6

Mar 21

Ramadi,
Anbar

Thar
Thar, Salahaddin

2

8

Total

6

19

51

Mar 22

Mar 23

Husseiniya,
Madain, Sadr City, Baghdad

12

31

Mar 24

Garma,
Japanese Bridge, Khalidiya, Anbar x7

1

14

Mar 25

Mar 26

Mar 27

Mar 28

Total

10

13

45

After a huge surge in Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive
Devices (VBIEDs) the second week of March the number has evened out. There were
ten the first week, six the third week, and ten the fourth. From March 22-28
all the car bombs occurred on just two days the 23 and 24. On the former there were
three in Baghdad hitting Husseiniya, Madain, and Sadr City, and seven the next
day in Garma, the Japanese Bridge, and Khalidiya all in Anbar.

Anbar remains the only province where the Islamic State
continues to mass its forces and carry out major attacks. During the fourth
week of March there was fighting throughout central and southern Ramadi as
there has been for over a year now. Howaz was the main district under dispute,
but the downtown area has also seen heavy fighting. The government forces have
been focused upon re-taking Garma since March 5. Since then the center of the
town has been surrounded but no move has been made to take it for several days
now. Like Tikrit, it appears that either the ISF and tribes lack the manpower
to take the downtown or will maintain or cordon and wait for the insurgents to
be degraded over time. The struggle there and in Ramadi show the back and forth
nature of the conflict in Anbar. Many of these areas have changed hands several
times in the fifteen months since open fighting began there, and will continue
to do so until the central government commits more forces there.

Diyala saw a large jump in incidents from 7 from March 15-21
to 29 from March 22-28. Most of these attacks occurred in the center of the
province from Baquba to Muqtadiya. The town of Zagnah saw violence four out of
the seven days. While the insurgents were responsible for the vast majority of
the casualties, Iraq
Oil Report found that Hashd al-Shaabi groups might have been carrying out
attacks as well. For instance, Hashd forces were blamed for blowing up a house
and executing four people on March 25, and then blowing up two houses in
Jazeera on March 27. The Hashd claimed that the Islamic State did some of these
attacks, some were done by rogue elements, and some were against supporters of
the insurgents. Since Badr Organization head Hadi Ameri is in charge of
security in the province, nothing will likely be done about these claims.

The Kurds continued their offensive in southern Kirkuk
during the week. Twelve
villages were cleared as a result. The ultimate goal is to free Hawija,
which is the IS stronghold in the province. Otherwise there has been hardly any
violence in the province throughout the month with only two reported incidents
during the week.

In Ninewa IS continued it rule by fear, while carrying out
harassing attacks upon the peshmerga. During the week 19 people were executed
in Mosul, Qayara and Shura including five soldiers, two police and a reporter.
IS also attacked Kurdish positions in Sinjar three times, Khazar twice, and
then smaller towns in the Makhmour area as well. Otherwise the battlefield has
not much changed in the governorate in the last few months.

The big news in Iraq during the week was that the stall in
the Tikrit operation led the government of Haider Abadi to request
U.S. air strikes. The Hashd and Iran planned the taking of Tikrit as a sign
that they could take a major Iraqi city without American assistance. While there
was steady progress initially, when the center of the city was reached, the
advance halted for several days due to the defenses arrayed by the insurgents
and mounting casualties. The ISF are now in the lead, which was part of the
agreement to begin Coalition missions, while several Hashd forces said they
would no longer participate as long as the Americans were involved. They does
not mean they have withdrawn, but rather they are holding their positions
around the city. Taking Tikrit may take many more days, but it is only a matter
of time since there is only a small force of IS fighters defending it.