Opinion – EU Reporterhttps://www.eureporter.co
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1 https://wordpress.org/?v=5.2.3165163476Europeans ‘no longer trust US on security’ – #ECFR reporthttps://www.eureporter.co/frontpage/2019/09/11/europeans-no-longer-trust-us-on-security-ecfr-report/
Wed, 11 Sep 2019 16:40:52 +0000https://www.eureporter.co/?p=90064Three years into the Trump presidency, and just days after Mike Pompeo’s visit to Brussels, most Europeans believe they that they can no longer rely on the US to guarantee their security. New polling reveals that trust in the US has fallen away, and that Europeans are, now, increasingly looking to the EU to defend their foreign policy interests, according to a major report, published today (11 September), by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).

The report, entitled‘Give the People What They Want: Popular Demand for a Strong European Foreign Policy’and based on interviews with 60,000 people across 14 EU member states,also found that majorities of Europeans want the EU leadership to prevent further enlargement of the bloc, and demand a pan-European response to their security, and fears about climate change and migration. Above all, Europeans want a more self-sufficient EU that avoids fights that are not of its making, stands up to other continent-sized powers, and tackles crises that affect its interests.

The findings and analysis of this polling-backed report come at a crucial juncture for Europe, with European Commission President-elect Ursula von der Leyen set to present her political team later today,and a series of potentially disruptive national elections scheduled, in Austria and Poland, this autumn. The report’s release also comes against a backdrop of escalating trade disputes between China and the US; emerging evidence of Russian interference in western elections; and the potential unravelling of international agreements on global warming and nuclear disarmament. These are issues that are expected to dominate proceedings at this month’s United Nations General Assembly meeting, in New York.

The study argues that the view, shared among Europe’s leaders, that increasingly nationalistic voters will not tolerate collective EU foreign policy, is outdated. The ECFR’s polling suggests that voters in the bloc’s member states are receptive to the idea of “strategic sovereignty” – i.e. centralizing power in key areas – if the EU can show itself competent and efficient. The report suggests that, while there may not exist a qualified majority in the EU-27 across all areas of foreign policy, there are exceptions, and areas of unanimity – on issues such as defence and security, migration, and climate change – which the EU could harness and take forward in the coming years.

While the public support the idea of the EU becoming a cohesive global actor, there is also a growing divergence between the Europeans and their elected Governments on issues ranging from trade, Europe’s future relationship with the US, and the EU accession of countries of the Western Balkans. With such a chasm of opinion, there is a risk that voters could retract their support for European action, which they offered in recent European Parliament and national elections.

Europeans are yet to be convinced that the EU can change from its current course of inaction and prevarication, the report claims. The framework’s new team, comprising Joseph Borrell, as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Ursula von der Leyen, as President-elect of the European Commission, must accept this reality and use their offices to relaunch the EU’s foreign strategy, in line with public demand.

There is a risk, it warns, after the unexpected high turn-out in the European elections and the strong performance of nationalist parties, such as Marine Le Pen’s Front National in France and Matteo Salvini’s Lega party in Italy, leaders in Brussels will rest on their laurels. “They should remember that before the vote three quarters of Europeans felt either that their national political system, their European political system, or both, were broken” it says: “unless Europe creates emotionally resonant policies in the next five years, an electorate convinced that the political system is broken is unlikely to give the EU the benefit of the doubt a second time,” the report states.

In its analysis, the ECFR report finds:

Europeans want the EU to become a strong, independent, non-confrontational actor that is powerful enough to avoid taking sides or being at the mercy of outside powers. In potential conflicts between the US and Russia, a majority of voters in virtually every country would prefer for the EU to remain neutral, pursuing a middle way between these competing powers.

Europeans are wary of China and its growing influence in the world– with no more than 8% of voters in the polled member states thinking that the EU should side with Beijing rather than Washington in the event of a US-China conflict. The overwhelming desire of publics in every member state is to stay neutral – a position held by nearly three quarters (73%) of voters in Germany and over 80% of voters in Greece and Austria.

Europeans are generally cool on the idea of EU enlargement, with voters in countries such as Austria (44%), Denmark (37%),France (42%), Germany (46%),and the Netherlands (40%), hostile to Western Balkan countries joining the EU. Only in Romania, Poland and Spain is there support from more than 30% of the public for all of these countries to gain accession.

Europeans want EU action on climate change and migration. More than half the public in each country surveyed – aside from the Netherlands – think climate change should be prioritised over most other issues. Meanwhile, European voters’ favour greater efforts to police the EU’s external borders, and at least half of voters in every member state favour increasing economic aid to developing countries to discourage migration. Europeans also agree, overwhelmingly, that conflict has been a major driver of the continent’s migration struggles – with voters in 12 of the 14 holding the view that the EU should have done more to address the Syria crisis from 2014.

Overall, Europeans place more trust in the EU than their national governments to protect their interests against other global powers– although, in numerous member states, many voters trust neither the US or the EU (in Italy, Germanyand Francethis was the view of around four in ten voters; in the Czech Republic and Greece, it was the view of more than half of them).Voters were most likely to trust the US over the EU in Poland – but even here this was the position of less than a fifth of voters.

Voters are sceptical of the EU’s current ability to protect their economic interests in trade wars. The largest proportion holding this view are in Austria (40%), the Czech Republic (46%), Denmark (34%), the Netherlands (36%), Slovakia (36%), and Sweden (40%). Less than 20 percent of voters in each member state feel that their country’s interests are well protected from aggressive Chinese competitive practices. Nonetheless, they have mixed views on whether the EU or their national government should address this problem.

On Iran, the majority of Europeans (57%) are supportive the EU’s efforts to maintain the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action(JCPOA) ‘nuclear deal’ with Iran. Support for the deal is strongest in Austria (67%)and weakest in France (47%).

Large proportions of voters believe that Russia is attempting to destabilize political structures in Europe, and that governments are inadequately protecting their country against foreign interference.The latter feeling is shared in Denmark, (44%), France (40%), Germany (38%),Italy (42%), Poland (48%), Romania (56%), Slovakia (46%), Spain (44%) and Sweden (50%).

On Russia, more than half of European voters in each country viewed the current EU sanctions policy as either justifiably “balanced”or not tough enough – apart from in Austria, Greece, Slovakia.Support for a tougher policy was strongest in Poland (55%) and weakest in Slovakia (19%).

Europe’s voters are split on whether their country should invest in NATO or EU defence capabilities. Among supporters of parties in Government,La République En Marche! voters in France have the strongest preference for defence investment through the EU (78%) rather than NATO (8%) while Law and Justice Party voters in Poland have the strongest preference for NATO (56%) compared to EU defence capacities (17%).

Voters believe that if the EU broke up tomorrow one of the key losses would be European states’ ability to co-operate on security and defence, and to act as a continent-sized power in contests with global players such as China, Russia, and the United States.This feeling is shared by 22% in France and 29% in Germany.

]]>90064Old ways linger – Can one do business in Europe the #Russia way?https://www.eureporter.co/frontpage/2019/09/09/can-one-do-business-in-europe-the-russia-way/
Mon, 09 Sep 2019 12:57:25 +0000https://www.eureporter.co/?p=89927

Late in 2018, bad news came in for DIA Group, a Spanish supermarket chain and Europe’s third largest food sector franchiser. As reported by the FT, by December the chairwoman and chief executive had resigned, the head of finance had been fired, the company’s shares fell 80% just over a year, and dividends plummeted.

In that dramatic context, a DIA’s shareholder and at the time owner of 29% of the company Russian magnate Mikhail Fridman made an generous offer of a €500m injection, and a buy out of a significant bulk of shares.

The voluntary tender offer was complemented with a ‘rescue plan to secure the future of DIA’. L1 Retail (the company that manages Fridman’s assets) announced that ‘under the right leadership and governance, DIA could re-establish its leading position in Spain to the benefit of the Spanish economy’. L1’s offer was supported by the majority of shareholders, so in May 2019, L1 got control of just under 70% of DIA’s capital, with the obvious plan of getting the total ownership in the end.

The L1 Retail rescue plan consists of three stages. With two of them behind (the injection and buy-out), the remaining part is a transformation, led by L1 Retail. ‘The idea is to save the company. It’s extremely badly managed and we think it could be a great company,’ Fridman told the FT.

The story looks like a positive scenario of saving a business in distress with an established businessman in the lead role, yet at the moment Fridman is probably the least popular person in Spain.

There are particular reasons for the Spanish authorities to doubt Fridman’s good intentions, based on a symptomatic precedent. Currently, the Spanish National court has Fridman under official investigation for corruption – he has been accused of having designed and arranged the bankruptcy of another Spanish company by running ‘a series of actions that led to the insolvency of ZED Worldwide SA… in order to buy it at a ridiculously low price, much lower than that of the market,’ the court document says.

The businessman was a shareholder and creditor for ZED, and according to the National Court had ‘a privileged position for any type of decision in the group’. He also controlled Vimpelcom, a huge mobile phone operator that by altering contracts with ZED caused a significant drop in its revenue, which in its turn made it impossible for ZED to handle a €140-million loan, in part provided by one of the banks that Fridman controls.

After ZED applied for bankruptcy in June 2016, Fridman’s people bought ZED for €20 million, ‘much less than its value when blockage maneuvers controlled by Mr. Fridman started,’ claim the Spanish prosecutors. When referring to L1’a actions they use the word ‘raiding’.

Could DIA be repeating ZED’s fate? Very likely, says the Spanish press.

After the Russian businessman got his 29% stake, he got the power to dictate terms. That’s when the chairwoman and chief executive left the company and were replaced by L1’s people. As reported by El Pais, it launched the worst period in DIA’s history – the sales and goods quality dropped, there appeared more and more flaws in the supply and logistics processes, while the suppliers couldn’t get their pay in time. The staff grew so worried about their future that they went on strikes, making the situation still worse.

As for the shares, at the moment of L1’s latest buyout they cost under €0.40 – a drastic change from the price of €4 they were trading at when Fridman bought the 29% stake.

In his interview to Radio Liberty DIA’s shareholder Rodrigo Fernando Perez said: “It seems that the company gets damaged intentionally in order to then buy all of its shares at a lower price. And there is just one person behind this, Mr. Mikhail Fridman. He has a lot of money; he is a very rich man. And he apparently wants to buy DIA very cheap. Does it border on fraud? Absolutely. Not to mention the fact that hundreds of people get ruined.”

Yet some people say they saw that coming. When L1 made the offer to buy DIA’s shares out, not all comments from the business community sounded optimistic. In particular, Fridman’s peers from back in Moscow said that in Spain the magnate seemed to be performing his signature trick of hostile takeover, the one he had perfected in the turbulent world of Russian business.

Hostile takeover, or as some mildly put it, ‘aggressive negotiations’ have long been considered Fridman’s trademark. His Russian A1 Group features in dozens of ‘aggressive acquisitions’ stories: food and beverage producing, pharmaceutical, metallurgical and mining enterprises, oil and gas companies would all go into the list of A1’s controversial business endeavours.

“Fridman and his partners… are all but the only Russian billionaires building big new businesses in the west — which is all the more interesting since their investment ideas and corporate wars are so reminiscent of Alfa’s Russian past,” wrote the Bell.

In 2013, after selling his most impressive asset (TNK-BP oil producer), Friedman moved to London, and started establishing his business in the West. The rumours say he wants to sell Alfa-Bank, his flagman business, and leave Russia for good, which he strongly denies. The magnate claims that he has moved the focus to Europe only to test his abilities in the new playground: ‘For me I think it’s a great interest, privilege, and challenge — to try to repeat our success that we made in Russia in a much more sophisticated and competitive market.’

Would he be able to? In the years of his formation as an oligarch in the chaotic post-Soviet Russia there was a lot one could get away with. Could these ‘old ways’ work to do business in Europe today? The answer is with the National court of Spain.

Emmanuel Macron and Vladimir Putin during a meeting at the Fort de Bregancon, a summer residence of the president of France. Photo by Alexei Druzhinin\TASS via Getty Images.

There is no world leader with a more contradictory attitude toward Russia than Emmanuel Macron.

The French president was ostensibly the ‘least apologist’ candidate of those running in the first round of the 2016 elections. Compared to the Russian-funded Marine Le Pen on one end of the spectrum, and the radical leftist Jean-Luc Mélenchon on the other, Macron seemed a model of moderation.

To the Kremlin, he must have been perceived as the least desirable candidate for its interests, which is why they hacked the servers of his party, En Marche, just prior to the vote in a last-ditch attempt to derail the campaign. Moscow need not have feared.

It all started so promisingly. Even though Vladimir Putin was a worryingly early visitor to France in Macron’s first weeks as president, the French leader seemed to possess some early backbone.

At the highly-symbolic venue of Château de Versailles, standing a metre away from his Russian counterpart at a press conference, hecalled outRussia Today and Sputnik as agents of influence and propaganda – an unusually bold stance considering heads of state are generally more inclined to diplomatic nicety over directness when meeting counterparts. It was also impressive considering the vast difference in experience between the two men.

The picture since then has, to be generous, been mixed. The French leader’s sizeable mandate, combined with the unwise aspiration of ‘winning Russia round’, has won out over principles – and over the evidence.

Macron’s recent meeting with Putin at Brégançon directly before the G7 summit, and the Biarritz summit itself, produced numerous assertions about Russia which, whether one agrees with them or not, simply contradicted each other.

Take a couple of Macron proclamations at G7: he lambasts Russia over its repression of protests in Moscow and calls for the Kremlin to ‘abide by fundamental democratic principles’. At the same time he makes overtures that ‘Russia and Europe [should be brought] back together’.

A country that is ramping up repressive actions against its own citizens who dare to stand up for themselves is, sadly – but logically – not fit to be ‘back’ with Europe (and it is not certain that they were ever together). The interesting question is whether Macron is aware that his statements are mutually exclusive.

To say, as Macron did, that ‘we’ are ‘pushing Russia away from Europe’ without elaborating on such an evidence-free statement (since it was Russia who was distancing itself through its own actions) is appealing to those who know a little about Russia and international relations. But it is factually wrong to anyone who simply takes the trouble to make a list of Russia’s recent transgressions of international law.

Dialogue for the sake of dialogue – without principles or concrete objectives – is a slippery slope to accommodating Russia’s interests. France was already instrumental in reinstating Russia at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in June 2019. And during the traditional discours aux ambassadeurson 27 August, Macron went further by effectively excusing Russia from any responsibility for the frozen conflicts around its periphery.

This might not matter had Macron not fallen into the role of first among European equals. With Angela Merkel in the twilight of her career and all recent UK prime ministers distracted by Brexit (except, perhaps, for two weeks following the assassination attempt on Sergei Skripal), fate and ambition have given Macron added heft.

In any case, the German and British positions on Russia have been compromised by Nordstream II and the City of London’s role in funnelling Russian criminal proceeds. The danger is that this French heft translates into policy which in turn translates into the lowering of defences and the sacrificing of allies, such as Ukraine and Georgia.

Macron’s contradictory stance towards Russia can be explained by French foreign policy tradition and by the president’s own hubris. It has long been commonplace for France to acknowledge Russia’s role in European security architecture from ‘Lisbon to Vladivostok’, and to respect its ‘great power’ status (even if self-proclaimed).

Macron himself is emblematic of a wider tendency in French politics and business – looking to build bridges with the Kremlin, regardless of how wide the chasm between them is.

The hubris comes with Macron’s personal dream that ‘France is back’, and in his belief that that can only succeed if Russia is back too – both in Europe and as a buffer against China. This was made abundantly clear in the discours aux ambassadeurs.

That olive branches have been extended to Vladimir Putin countless times over the past 20 years does not necessarily mean that no more should ever be forthcoming, should a future Kremlin leadership offer any meaningful concession. What it definitely does mean, however, is that the lessons need to be learned as to why they have been rebuffed hitherto: because ‘what Russia wants’ is incompatible with established Western conceptions of the European security order.

The French president’s assumption that he can find a way to bring Russia into the fold (or in from the cold…) is mistaken because Russia does not want to be brought in, even if it says it does. And certainly not on the EU’s terms. When G7 leaders such as Donald Trump blithely call for Russia’s return, insufficient consideration is given to Russia’s broader strategic aims. Instead, the overriding temptation is to take what what Putin says in press conferences alongside other heads of state at face value.

France pushing for dialogue with Moscow without self-discipline or preconditions means accommodating illegitimate Russian interests. Even if Macron is indifferent to that, he may not realize that in a world where great powers carve up spheres of influence once more, France stands to lose.

Since the Euromaidan revolution in the winter of 2013–14, the EU has adopted a significantly more strategic approach to reform in Ukraine, in order to address fundamental weaknesses within Ukrainian state institutions.

The EU Commission of 2014–19 launched a number of major innovations to support Ukraine, which represented a step-change in EU support for domestic reforms in a neighbouring country.

The most significant of these was the creation of the Support Group for Ukraine (SGUA), a special taskforce for delivering assistance and supporting Ukraine, which became operational during Jean-Claude Juncker presidency of the Commission. The SGUA, led by Peter Wagner since 2016, consists of 35-40 officials who have developed an in-depth knowledge of Ukraine and have experimented with new approaches in supporting reforms.

Ukraine is the only third country which has been allocated such a dedicated taskforce. Prior to 2014, support for Ukraine from international donors, including the EU, was mainly in the form of isolated, short-term technical projects conducted within weak domestic institutions which themselves lacked professional and motivated staff. As these projects did not engage with fundamental reform of state institutions, they, at best, had short term and non-sustainable impact.

The SGUA was an innovation at the heart of a series of initiatives designed to create strong institutions, recruit professional, capable and motivated personnel, and develop a comprehensive set of reform strategies which sequence the reform steps for decentralization, public administration, public finance management, the energy sector, transport and the environment.

As a result, the scale of assistance is now matched by its effectiveness. In coordination with other donors such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the EU has led the process of (re)building the Ukrainian state. By taking the lead on coordination, the EU has been able to more effectively deploy the resources available and avoid duplication and fragmentation. It has noticeably focused on public administration reform through the Ukraine Reform Architecture – a major multi-donor effort.

This kind of support is only possible thanks to a robust understanding of Ukraine’s needs by EU officials, who have gained a detailed insight into the workings of the Ukrainian government and the nature of the challenges and problems in each sector. It is this insight which has allowed them to devise specific and targeted support measures and, crucially, monitor mechanisms which look to long-term outcomes. The fact that these efforts are coordinated with other donors (a real achievement itself) magnifies the impact of their work.

Underpinning these efforts is an understanding that re-building the Ukrainian state will take time and requires patience and a readiness to avoid the lure of cosmetic changes that merely entrench vested interests. The in-depth knowledge of EU officials also allows them to sequence reform measures and support reformers within government, while putting pressure on laggards.

With new leadership both in Ukraine and the EU, it is particularly important to retain and sustain these innovations. Ironically, many in the EU institutions do not grasp the significance of those innovations. The prevailing lack of understanding and appreciation of their pivotal nature within the EU itself means that there is a growing risk that they may be abandoned, even if inadvertently.

It is important this does not happen. While rivalries within EU institutions could lead to a sense that Kyiv is being given special treatment, the state-building strategies that are working in Ukraine could also help in planned EU initiatives towards Georgia and Moldova.

The sustainability of the EU’s support is important because it takes time to develop expertise, establish links and gain credibility vis-à-vis national officials and experts. The recent presidential and parliamentary elections represent a complete renewal of political elites in Ukraine. This is highly desirableand overdue. During this transition, the support of the EU is vital, and through its work over the past five year, it could hardly be better positioned.

]]>89724Protests in #Russia show how political environment has changedhttps://www.eureporter.co/frontpage/2019/08/19/protests-in-russia-show-how-political-environment-has-changed/
Mon, 19 Aug 2019 04:15:25 +0000https://www.eureporter.co/?p=89341

Nikolai Petrov (below) speaks to Jason Naselli (below) about a new wave of protests against Vladimir Putin’s government and what it means for the future of the Russian system.

Protesters at a rally in central Moscow on 10 August. Photo: Getty Images.

The disqualification of opposition candidates ahead of an election to Moscow’s city duma on 8 September have spurred the largest protests seen in the city since 2011–12. Increasing waves of mass protests reached around 50,000 participants on 10 August, and there is no sign of them stopping. Nikolai Petrov explains the implications of these protests and the Kremlin’s response.

Why have these protests emerged now?

Since the announcement of pensions reform last year [when the government raised the retirement age without public discussion or explanation, to widespread outcry], there has been huge disappointment with the government in general and Putin in particular, which has led to a decline in Putin’s approval ratings.

This has created a new political environment, and against this background, any local reason can serve as a straw breaking a camel’s back, a trigger for serious unrest. There have been several cases like this in the Moscow region connected with the problem of rubbish collection, in the Arkhangelsk region over the storage of rubbish from Moscow, and in Yekaterinburg connected with constructing a cathedral in a local park.

Now it has come to Moscow and the trigger was the campaign for the Moscow city duma elections. It is important to understand that the city duma does not have any real power, so these protests are really about the relationship between society and the government.

The political machine which Putin has built and which has worked in the past has not taken into account this new relationship. So it made a mistake.

In order to be registered as a candidate for the city duma, you need to gather around 5,000 signatures, which is a fairly significant number, especially in the summer when people are on holiday. This was designed in order to prevent unwanted candidates from participating in the elections.

But this time it worked against them, because opposition candidates were very active and managed to gather enough signatures, while the government’s candidates – which had already dropped the affiliation with the increasingly unpopular ruling party, United Russia – mostly did not gather signatures at all. This is fairly clear for local people to see; Moscow is divided into 45 constituencies, so you can see who is canvassing in your neighbourhood and who is not.

When the electoral commission decided to invalidate many of the opposition’s signatures to prevent them from registering as candidates, this set off the anger of people who had already been politically mobilized to participate in the election.

The general attitude in Moscow is in favour of the protestors. A new pollshows that more approve than disapprove of the protests and that nearly 1 in 10 would consider participating.

Who are the type of people who are protesting?

It’s interesting – in many cases the way that you describe events means more than what has happened. The government is trying to describe participants as those who are not Muscovites, who have been brought there from outside. But in fact, there are many young Muscovites there, which is important to note, because while these protests have reached the scale of 2011–12, those who are participating today are younger and are different from those who participated almost 10 years ago.

This means there is a new generation of protestors – but not just young people. At the numbers we are seeing, it is a good spread of average Muscovites who are involved.

And to you, the key moment that has led to this was the furore over the pensions reform last year.

Yes, absolutely.

In 2011, there was general disappointment about Putin’s announcement that he would try to move back into the presidency, and elections in December 2011 served the role of a trigger for the protests that followed. What went wrong for the authorities in 2011 was the fact that thousands of Muscovites were election observers and were confronted first hand by cheating and negligence.

This time is similar, in that there were thousands of Muscovites gathering and giving signatures who now feel personally humiliated by the actions of the government.

How does this situation play out in the run-up to the elections on 8 September and beyond?

If it’s right to say that this is not about the Moscow city duma elections but is a more important trend, then 8 September will not be the end of the story. To say nothing of the fact that in September, there will be elections in almost half of Russia’s regions, including 16 gubernatorial elections. Moscow was not considered to be the most important battlefield – the city duma does not play any real role. In St Petersburg, there is a gubernatorial election that is much more important.

I think the biggest problem is that the government did not learn lessons from its failures in elections last year. In 2018, for the first time under Putin, Kremlin-backed candidates failed in several regions. This should have pushed the Kremlin into changing their attitude towards elections. This didn’t happen, and what is going on now in Moscow is just one sign of this. We will see many more serious problems in other regions, as government losses on 8 September have the potential to create again a new political atmosphere. Meanwhile, the Kremlin is blaming the West.

This is not about any particular politicians coming to power. This is about the government failing to keep its system afloat. It could be similar to a certain extent to the recent Ukrainian presidential elections, where somebody from outside could come and change the political system, step by step. And the Kremlin, being aware of this, is tightening the screws.

Spouses of Dutch fighter pilots deployed in the Baltic states reportedly received harassing phone calls from callers with Russian accents. This should come as no surprise, but the evident reticence to publicize these incidents is inexplicable.

Celebrations in March marking Poland’s 20 years as a NATO member. Photo: Getty Images.

Under NATO’s ‘enhanced forward presence’ programme, small additional contingents from other NATO allies join the host nation’s troops in Poland and the Baltic states to bolster deterrence against any further Russian military adventurism.

These contingents have inevitably become the targets for malign Russian information activities. But so have their communities and families at home.

In the Russian view of information warfare, there is no front line and rear areas, and no non-combatants. According to Russia’s Chief of General Staff General Valeriy Gerasimov, a key feature of modern warfare in the information domain is ‘simultaneous effects to the entire depth of enemy territory’.

Recent incidents in the Netherlandsconfirm that adversaries have collected information on the families and homes of individuals deployed in the Baltic states for the purpose of delivering highly personalized disinformation or intimidation.

A NATO study on Russian information warfarepublished in 2016 concluded that ‘it is not just NATO servicemen that will be the targets; but their families, their communities, their societies and their homelands, no matter how safely far away from Russia they may presently consider themselves to be’. But in this case, as inothers, there has been no official comment from national or NATO authorities on the extent of the hostile Russian campaign.

The calls to the families of Dutch F-16 pilots are reported to have started after pilots themselves phoned home from the Baltic states using their own mobile phones. Detailed guidance on use of social media and avoiding presenting vulnerabilities through indiscreet posting should be the norm for NATO service personnel as well as their immediate families.

But in addition, even bringing smartphones and other connected devices within reach of Russian interception tools invites hostile intervention. As a result, troops from several nations are banned from taking their own phones on ‘enhanced forward presence’ deployments at all. Those that do report a range of unpleasant consequences indicating overt Russian interference with the content on their phones. More covert attacks on their devices, meanwhile, may go unnoticed.

Russian practice

Again, this is entirely expected: specific Russian systems designed for intercepting, jamming or spoofing civilian mobile phone communications have been in widespread use inUkraine and Syria, as well as across the borders of the Baltic states.

And Russia does use the information gathered. Attempts to demoralize Ukrainian frontline troops via their phones have included personalized references to their families and children. Campaigns have been observed targeting NATO military personnel directly through LinkedIn, as well as targeting military spouses through online harassment, intimidation, and targeted cyber attacks.

The implication has been plain for some time: that not only service personnel deployed in countries neighbouring Russia, but also their links to their home countries should be considered targets.

NATO forces should by now be training and exercising with the assumption that they will be under not only electronic and cyberattack, but also individual and personalized information attack, including exploitation of personal data harvested from any connected device brought into an operational area.

The very personal impact of hostile Russian interest is illustrated by incidents like unsubstantiated allegations of child rape in Russian-backed media against specific named US Army officers visiting Ukraine. The potential effect of interventions like this not only on military units, but also on families and communities at home is immediate and obvious.

The effect could be most pronounced when targeting aircrew, as with the case in the Netherlands. For all the advanced capabilities of NATO’s combat aircraft, the pilots remain human, and in common with other military personnel, susceptible to human vulnerabilities.

The relatively tiny numbers of trained fast jet pilots in the smaller NATO nations must make them a particularly high value target for interference by adversary intelligence services. This need not even be targeting them for espionage in the traditional style; anything that prevents them from doing their job effectively at a critical moment, be it interventions against themselves or their homes or families, would represent a high return on investment for the adversary.

In addition, Russia has practised the capability to message targeted individuals on a mass scale, with information that appears to them to be coming from a trusted source, whether by SMS, social media posting or email.

When this capability first became apparent, the concern was that the potential to sow confusion could be a critical disabling factor for front-line states in the crucial and decisive first few hours that might decide a conflict with Russia. The countries most at risk have taken steps to mitigate this vulnerability, but this depends in part on having not only armed forces but also a civil population that is well informed as to the potential threat.

No comment

Nevertheless, the Netherlands’ military intelligence service has declined to comment on media reports of harassment of pilots’ families. This fits the pattern of silence on Russian activity from both the Alliance and its individual member states.

The result is that information on instances of Russian intimidation against service personnel and their families remains fragmentary and anecdotal. The situation is similar with incidents at sea and in the air, where the limited information publicly available on Russian activities leads to a distorted – and potentially far too benign – picture of what Russia is practising for, and how. As with the incidentinvolving Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu’s aircraft and a Spanish fighter this week, NATO’s reticence allows Moscow to push forward its narrative of innocent victimhood unchallenged.

There is a strong public interest in this information being more widely available, in order better to inform not only those service personnel and families most immediately at risk, but also the general public, in order that they can better gauge the real level of hostility involved in day-to-day interaction with Russia. NATO and national governments may have a clear rationale for remaining silent; but at present that rationale remains unstated.

]]>89329In #Kuwait, the rule of law is under American assaulthttps://www.eureporter.co/frontpage/2019/08/14/in-kuwait-the-rule-of-law-is-under-american-assault/
Wed, 14 Aug 2019 13:53:13 +0000https://www.eureporter.co/?p=89278

This month marks the anniversary of the start of Operation Desert Shield, in which US President George H.W. Bush brought together a coalition of 35 countries to liberate my country, Kuwait, from the clutches of Saddam Hussein. At the end of that struggle, the late President Bush declared from the Oval Office that “Kuwait is once more in the hands of Kuwaitis, in control of their own destiny. We share in their joy, a joy tempered only by our compassion for their ordeal.” – writes Omar al-Essa, the former President of the Kuwait Lawyers’ Association

I recall those words and my feeling of pride in being a Kuwaiti citizen, deeply appreciative of President Bush’s efforts to free our country from the rule of tyrant and the arbitrary authoritarianism he represented.

Unfortunately, those warm feelings are not reciprocated by all members of the Bush family. Indeed, one of the late President Bush’s own sons has recently lent his name to an international campaign designed not only to denigrate our country’s international standing, but also to undermine the independence of our judiciary.

Over the past several months, Neil Bush – who is also the younger brother of former President George W. Bush and Governor Jeb Bush – has seemingly decided to monetize his father’s legacy by accepting work as a paid spokesperson for a multimillion dollar public relations blitz to exonerate logistics executive Marsha Lazareva, a Russian national currently on trial for embezzling Kuwaiti public funds.

Paid for by Ms. Lazareva’s company, Kuwait and Gulf Link Transport (KGL), this campaign has brought together a team of lobbyists and advisors that includes former American officials, prominent members of the British establishment, and high-ranking representatives of the Russian government.

What does this “who’s who” of lobbyists hope to gain by attacking Kuwait and its legal system? It appears their ultimate objective is to descredit the serious charges facing Ms. Lazareva and Saeed Dashti, two executives of KGL and an associated firm, KGL Investment.

In a recent opinion piece published by the Washington Times, Neil Bush claims to have joined a team of prominent officials from the United States and United Kingdom to fight injustice and human rights abuses in Kuwait. Since then, Mr. Bush has used a spate of media appearances to portray Kuwait’s legal system as illegitimate and ultimately pervert the course of justice in the service of his client.

In his piece, Bush implied Lazareva’s conviction betrays his father’s memory, writing that “this is the country my father helped liberate and, to his last day, he was proud that Kuwait remained an honorable and respected member of the international community.” Just a few lines further down, he calls for sanctions against the public officials of one of America’s closest and most reliable allies.

In reality, both KGL and its executives have placed themselves in serious legal jeopardy. Last year, Foreign Policy reported that KGL faces “allegations of sanctions busting” stemming from its dealings with a U.S.-sanctioned Iranian joint venture partner. Ms. Lazareva and Mr. Dashti were previously convicted of embezzlement and are separately charged with siphoning from the Port Fund, a private equity fund they controlled and which managed more than $100 million of Kuwaiti public money. American lawmakers including Senator Marco Rubio have previously called on their own government to investigate KGL and its alleged wrongdoings, especially because the company holds hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of US government contracts.

And yet, rather than let the judicial process in Kuwait work independently and without prejudice, Ms. Lazareva and Mr. Dashti’s advocates have twisted the case against Marsha Lazareva and Saeed Dashti into that of a kangaroo court subjecting a “Christian businesswoman” to “arbitrary detention.” Motivated by this false narrative, several members of Congress in the United States are even pushing for the US government to apply the Global Magnitsky Act, a legal tool designed to punish human rights abuses by authoritarian governments, against judicial officials in Kuwait.

As a life-long legal practitioner in Kuwait, including as the former Vice Chairman of the Kuwait Lawyers Association and a founder of the Kuwait Transparency Society, these sweeping and unfounded criticisms of our judicial system are nothing short of offensive and represent an incredible hubris unbecoming of the individuals involved. While Neil Bush and his fellow lobbyists make baseless allegations against the Kuwaiti judicial system, the fact remains that Marsha Lazareva, Saeed Dashti, and their associates have yet to answer serious questions about their use of Kuwaiti public monies.

As in any country where the rule of law reigns paramount, it is the Kuwaiti judiciary’s job to make sure those questions are answered. It is essential Kuwait’s public prosecutors are permitted to investigate thoroughly and independently without outside interference, intimidation, or threats – even if those threats come from the son of one of the most respected figures in our country’s history.