William McKinley - War with spain

The report from the commission investigating the
Maine
disaster was in the president's hands by 25 March. It concluded
that the cause of the explosion was external, and most Americans
immediately assumed that Spanish agents had been responsible for it. With
war sentiment building up throughout the country and in Congress, McKinley
continued to urge caution, still hoping that negotiations might bring an
end to problems in Cuba. On 27 March, Secretary Day cabled Woodford
outlining the administration's last plan. The final ultimatum
called for an immediate armistice and reiterated McKinley's offer
of arbitration. Shortly thereafter, Day warned that unless Spain
capitulated immediately, public pressure would compel the president to ask
for a declaration of war. McKinley feared that if he did not respond to
the pressure, his supporters would desert him. Congress might then take
matters into its own hands and declare war without McKinley's
requesting it.

The Spanish reply to McKinley's ultimatum arrived at the White
House on 1 April. It assented to arbitration of the
Maine
affair, abandonment of re-concentration in the western provinces,
acceptance of American financial assistance, and a relief program for
Cuba. Yet Spain agreed neither to suspend hostilities nor to approve
American mediation. In Madrid, Woodford thought that the Spanish ministry
knew it had lost Cuba but preferred war to mediation. Nevertheless, he
pleaded for more time to work out a solution.

For McKinley, time had run out, and he began drafting a message to
Congress asking for a declaration of war. At the last minute, on 10 April,
he received a communiqué from Woodford indicating that the queen
regent had consented to suspend hostilities and move toward autonomy for
Cuba. Given the state of public and congressional opinion, it was too
late. McKinley asked for intervention on 19 April, and Congress granted
his request the next day, adding only the Teller Amendment, which
renounced any intention to annex Cuba. A formal declaration of war
followed within a week.

Americans greeted the coming of war with celebration. Patriotic fervor
stilled the criticism of McKinley, and as commander in chief he found
himself enormously popular throughout the land. Men from all walks of life
were eager to share in the expected American triumphs, and enlistments
soared. Yet it was with good reason that McKinley had questioned the
fighting readiness of the armed forces. Despite a year's warning,
they remained unprepared.

Numbering only 28,000 men and officers, the army had watched as the navy,
the nation's first line of defense, received most of the $50
million appropriated in March. Now, suddenly increasing to more than
250,000 troops, land forces faced immense if not insurmountable problems
in supply and logistics. Half of the volunteers never left training camps
during the war, and many of those who did were issued winter woolen
uniforms for warfare in the tropics. If all the troops mobilized had seen
combat, some of them would have seen it without ammunition, for there was
not enough to go around. Selected as the point of embarkation, the Port of
Tampa proved an unfortunate choice. Only one railroad connected the city
with its inadequate piers. Boxcars backed up for miles, cargoes
disappeared in the confusion, and troops found themselves compelled to
take matters into their own hands, relying on their wits for survival.

The navy fared better than the army, in part because it escaped the
pressures of rapid expansion, and in part because for fifteen years it had
kept abreast of innovations in maritime technology. Beyond that, McKinley
and his secretary of the navy could rely on commanders who had given much
thought to strategy should hostilities begin. It is not surprising, then,
that the navy won the first great American victory. In the fall of 1897,
Commodore George Dewey had received command of the Asiatic squadron, and
with the declaration of war, he was ordered to proceed from Hong Kong to
the Philippines. By 30 April the squadron was at the entrance to Manila
Bay, where Admiral Montojo had anchored the sizable but decrepit Spanish
fleet. The following day, the American force sailed into the bay and
annihilated Montojo's fleet without sustaining a loss.

Attributing the
Maine
explosion of the previous February to Spanish treachery may have led many
Americans to overestimate enemy strength. At Manila the Spanish were
actually incapable of effectively returning fire from their ancient hulks,
and mines planted in the channel had no fuses. Yet participants could
celebrate the victory as a convincing demonstration of American naval
power. When the American people learned of it a week later, they were
ecstatic, and they immediately gave Dewey an honored place in their
pantheon of heroes. McKinley, more concerned with pursuing the war to a
successful conclusion, authorized an expedition to capture and occupy the
Philippines. Though the Americans did not take Manila until after Spain
had signed a peace protocol, it was clear that the United States had
become a power in the Far East. The ramifications of that development were
many, and American foreign policy was to undergo momentous changes in the
postwar period.

After Dewey's victory, attention turned to the Caribbean theater
and to plans for an invasion of Cuba. Actually carrying out the attack was
complicated by the confusion in Tampa, by lack of agreement among
high-ranking officers in the army, and by Secretary Alger's failure
to provide either leadership or coordination. Alger's vanity led
him to promise more than was possible, and his arrogance led him to blame
others for his inability to meet commitments. In the army itself,
supervision of all operations, at least theoretically, rested with Major
General Nelson Appleton Miles. The appointment he held provided very
little real power, he disliked McKinley personally, and he nurtured hopes
of using his military reputation to gain high political office. More
important for the moment, Miles opposed rushing off helterskelter to
invade Cuba. He favored postponing the assault until fall, when cooler
weather and better training of troops would assure success. A third
principal in the military drama that was taking on some of the
characteristics of comic opera was General William R. Shafter, who by
reason of seniority took command in the field. Cautious and corpulent, he
was a prototypical product of the army's bureaucracy. Yet he showed
good sense, and while he did not inspire the troops to heroic achievement,
his caution reduced casualties.

Although McKinley might have recognized the merit in arguments for
postponing an invasion until fall, he was acutely conscious of political
pressures that called for immediate action. Furthermore, the navy was to
share in the operation, and Secretary Long strongly urged that it get
under way. McKinley's patience with Alger and the army was wearing
thin, and he finally decided to move. The fleet of Admiral William T.
Sampson and Commodore Winfield Scott Schley blockaded Santiago on 6 June,
and the following day McKinley ordered Shafter to transport his troops to
Cuba. The operation was scarcely a model of military efficiency, but by 29
June it had come within a mile and a half of Santiago.

The Battle of San Juan Hill, which took place on the city's
outskirts during the first two days of July, was bloody but inconclusive.
Shafter grew despondent and thought of retreat, but then the navy saved
the day. Contained in Santiago Bay, the Spanish squadron of Admiral
Pascual Cervera y Topete began sailing out of the harbor on 3 July to
challenge the ships of Sampson and Schley. Within hours the destruction of
Spanish sea power was complete. "The fleet under my command offers
the nation as a Fourth of July present the whole of Cervera's
fleet," read the cable from Sampson.

The victory at Santiago Bay signaled an early conclusion of hostilities.
Rather than attack the city itself, Shafter negotiated its surrender on 17
July. With that surrender the fighting in Cuba petered out, and only
Puerto Rico remained as the last vestige of Spanish empire in the western
hemisphere. McKinley had already authorized operations to take the island,
and an American expedition quickly accomplished that objective a few days
before Spain sued for peace. After meeting with the cabinet, McKinley laid
down the American terms: Spanish evacuation of Cuba; cession of Puerto
Rico to the United States as an indemnity; and American occupation of
Manila, pending final treaty agreement. Spain balked at the last
provision, but McKinley would not budge. The Spanish finally capitulated
on 10 August, and the war came to an end.

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User Contributions:

My grandfather purchased three parcels of land in Cuba around the turn of the 20th cenury.
One was ten acres of land in isla de Pino`, and the other two were city lots in what was then called the city of McKinley. We have the deeds and the surveyed lot plots to all three. Where was the city of McKinley located and what is it called now?
jim eddy

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