Articles Posted inRetaliation

Delaware Gov. Jack Markell signed into law legislation that expands the protections provided to employee-whistleblowers. H.B. 300 extends whistleblower protections to employees who report noncompliance with the State’s campaign-contribution laws,who participate in an investigation or hearing regarding an alleged violation of the campaign-contribution laws, or who refuses to violate the campaign-contribution laws.

The practical effect of this new protection is limited, as it applies to a fairly narrow group of employees-those whose employer has some involvement in political fundraising. But it serves as an excellent reminder about the importance of preventing unlawful retaliation.

Retaliation claims continue to top the list of claims filed with the EEOC. Not only are they popular but they are some of the most successful for plaintiffs. The reason for its popularity and its success is the same-retaliation happens.

In United Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the Supreme Court ruled that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII requires “but-for” causation. In other words, an unlawful reason has to be the reason for the adverse employment action. The Supreme Court had previously ruled that this type of “but-for” causation also is required in cases alleging age discrimination.

It does not, however, apply to cases of discrimination brought pursuant to Title VII. In those cases, the unlawful reason need only be a reason. There may be other, lawful reasons, but if an unlawful reason plays a part in the decision, then the decision is unlawful.

Here’s how it plays out. Let’s say that I go to work for a new law firm. My new boss doesn’t think that women lawyers are worth much. He also really hates my nose ring (despite how lovely and not at all offensive it looks in person). Based on those two prejudices, he decides to not put me up for a promotion.

Readers may recall the case, Stewart v. CUS Nashville, LLC, which is one of the few opinions on the discoverability of a party’s social-media account. There were at least a couple of interesting issues in that decision but the most interesting part may be that the defendant is the entity that owns and operates Coyote Ugly Saloons. That’s right–the one from the movie, where hot bartenders dance on the bar.

The case was initiated by two of those (presumably hot) bartenders, Misty Blu Stewart and Samantha Thomas. They originally brought claims under the FLSA, alleging an unlawful tip-pooling policy. Those claims are quite interesting–so much so that I’m going to write a separate post about them later in the week. So stay tuned for the FLSA angle.

In the meantime, I have to write about the retaliation claims that the named plaintiffs added to their complaint.

Sexual harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. The trifecta of employment-discrimination claims. And all three were the subject of a recent decision from the 3d Circuit. The decision contains lots of interesting discussion points but I’ll limit myself to just one for the purposes of this post.

The plaintiff-employee contended that she resigned because her boss called her a “bitch” during a meeting. The court explained that, to establish a constructive discharge, the employee must show that “the employer knowingly permitted conditions of discrimination in employment so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign.” In determining whether the employee was forced to resign, the court looks to several factors, including whether she was threatened with discharge, encouraged to resign, demoted, subject to reduced pay, involuntarily transferred to a less desirable position, subject to a change in job responsibilities, or given poor performance evaluations.

So is being called a “bitch” at a meeting so bad that it could force an employee to quit?

In an all too rare unanimous ruling (save for Justice Kagan, who recused herself), the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII extends to employees who are in the “zone of interest” with an employee who has filed a charge of discrimination. The facts and findings follow.

A female employee filed a charge of sex discrimination against her employer. A few weeks later, the employer fired the complainant’s fiancee, who had also been a company employee. The fiance then filed a retaliation charge with the EEOC and a subsequent lawsuit.

Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that a reprisal against a third party such as the fiancee was covered retaliation under Title VII. The Supreme Court further held that the fiancee was an “aggrieved person,” who had standing to sue under Title VII. Justice Scalia pointed out that the text of the anti-retaliation provision is broader than the substantive provision and that any person who comes within the “zone of interest” that the statute seeks to protect can file suit. The Court leaves it to future cases to determine how far this “zone of interest” extends. The case is Thompson v. North American Stainless, No. 09-291.

The U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments on several important employment-law cases this term. Last week, we posted about the upcoming Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., in which the Court will address the requirements for an employee who claims retaliation based on the FLSA. And, on Monday, we posted about Staub v. Proctor Hospital, in which the Court will address the cat’s-paw theory in the USERRA context.

The third and final post in this series discusses Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP. In a 10-to-6 decision, the Sixth Circuit held that Title VII does not create a cause of action for third-party retaliation for persons who did not themselves engage in protected activity. In its decision, the Sixth Circuit joined the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal in holding that the authorized class of claimants is limited to persons who have personally engaged in a protected activity.

Thompson argued that he was fired because is fiancée, who worked for the same employer, filed an EEOC charge of discrimination. His employer argued that Thompson was discharged for performance-based reasons. Thompson filed his own charge of discrimination with the EEOC, and the administrative agency found reasonable cause that North American Stainless violated Title VII. The EEOC issued Thompson a right to sue notice, and Thompson filed a cause of action against his employer.

The U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral arguments on several important employment-law cases this term. Last week, we posted about the upcoming argument in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., in which the Court will address the requirements for an employee who claims retaliation based on the FLSA.

In this, the second part of this series, we look to an equally anticipated case, Staub v. Proctor Hospital. Staub, like Kasten, is on appeal from the Seventh Circuit. In Staub, the Supreme Court will examine under what circumstances may an employer be held liable based on the unlawful intent of officials who caused or influenced, but did not make, the ultimate employment decision.

Staub sued his employer, alleging that he was discharged in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). Staub prevailed after a jury trial. His employer appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed the trial decision.

The U.S. Supreme Court opened its new term earlier this week. For the first time, three of the justices are women, creating an historic moment for the Court. Employers anticipate several important decisions coming from the cases being heard this term, as well. In this first part in a series, we’ll post about three of the most interesting employment-law cases scheduled for oral argument this Fall.

Next week, the Court is scheduled to hear argument in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. Kasten sued his employer, alleging a retaliation claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Kasten’s employer had issued Kasten several disciplinary warnings because of his failure to properly clock-in and out of the company’s timekeeping system. Kasten claimed he made verbal complaints to his supervisors about the legality of the location of the timekeeping clock. Kasten claimed that the clock’s location prevented employees from being paid for donning and doffing their required protective gear. Kasten was eventually terminated for failing to follow the company’s policy with respect to clocking in and out. Kasten sued his employer for retaliation under the FLSA, alleging that he was terminated in retaliation for his verbal complaints.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, finding that intra-company complaints are protected activities under the FLSA, but unwritten complaints, like Kasten’s verbal complaints to his supervisors, are not included in the act as a protected activity.

Wage-and-hour lawsuits filed under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), are the hottest thing going for plaintiffs’ lawyers. And a worst-case scenario for an employer named as a defendant. FLSA cases can be very difficult to defend; the law imposes what is almost strict liability under most circumstances. So, when a court issues a decision in favor of an employer, it is worthy of notice. And when the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari of such a decision, it’s definitely worthy of notice.

In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance PlasticsCorp., a Wisconsin factory worker filed suit alleging that he was unlawfully terminated in retaliation of his FLSA-protected activity (i.e., an FLSA-retaliation claim). The protected activity, he alleged, was his oral complaint about the placement of time clocks. Specifically, he alleged that he complained that employees were not being properly compensated for “donning and doffing time” because of the location of the time clocks.

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