I'm not sure what was the occasion, but the Rocket Forces confirmed the plan to deploy four silo-based Topol-M missiles in Tatishchevo by the end of 2011. But no actual deployment has happened yet - traditionally it happens in December (old habits of the Soviet planned economy die really hard).

So far everything goes according to the plan first outlined in December 2010 - four silo-based Topol-Ms in 2011 and four more - in 2012. All missiles are expected to carry a single warhead.

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Pavel, does this mean the installation of the silo based Topol-M missiles in Tatishchevo will be complete with a total of 60 ICBMs? Looks like by the article, production of the single mobile warhead RS-12M2 will end and be replaced by the RS-24 Yars. Or, is that only for Tatishchevo? Given that, I’m assuming the total inventory of the single warhead road-mobile Topol M will be the 18 currently deployed, right? Does Russia plan more silo deployments of Topol-M (SS-27) at other bases? Kremlin and media information on Russian ICBM deployments are contradictory at best. Appreciate your thoughts.

As far as I remember, the plan was to stop deployment of silo-based Topol-Ms at 60 (with an option to resume it at some unspecified point in the future) and to switch to MIRVed mobile Topol-Ms, aka RS-24, from single-warhead ones. I haven't checked this against the most recent statements, though.

Both "Topol-M" variants have the designation SS-27 Mod 1 "Stalin". The correct Russian designations or GRAU indices of the SS-27 Mod 2 are not published today. But the following designations are possible:

the designation SS-27 "Stalin" was published by Russian sources (en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20090610/155218930.html). The RS-12M "Topol" has the designation SS-25 "Sickle". "Sickle B" is only one additional but not official designation, but of course it is possible to use this term for the "Topol-M".

The first silo SS-27 achieved operational status in December 1997. It was stated by the SRF that the service life of the Topol-M would be 20 years. The SS-25 Topol first achieved operational status in 1988 and its service life has been extended to 25 years by extensive testing and some 170 remain in service today (2011) but are being retired; to be replaced by the solid fueled RS-24 multi-warhead mobile ICBM. Both the SS-18s and 19s have been extensively updated with new components and tested to beyond a 30 year life; or even greater. The Project 941 (Typhoon) class, and its R-39 solid fueled missile system (NATO named SS-N-20) was discarded for the Delta IV fleet and the R-29RM (SS-N-23) missile. The Sineva project has updated the basic SS-N-23 missile with new components and warhead packages providing even greater value and utility to the SS-N-23 system and the Delta IV fleet. The solid fueled Bulava missile for the Project 955 submarine has struggled to achieve operational status and still seems mired in controversy. Does Russia just do a better job building liquid fueled missile systems? Historically, it would be hard to argue that the liquid fueled design bureaus have provided a better system for Russia’s needs. Will the proposed new “heavy liquid fueled” ICBM being discussed by the Kremlin replace not only the SS-18s and SS-19s, but also the Topol-M as the SS-27 reaches its “end of service life”?

Frank, in my own opinion, the "liquid" lobby (KBHA, Energomash, Makeyev, Krasmash) would certainly like to dislodge the "solid" lobby (NPO Iskra, MIT, Votkinsk), but the chances of that happening are slim. The Russian government seems to have made a conscious choice to move the Navy to solid-fuel missiles both for their safety and ease of maintenance. The liquid-fuel missiles are getting updated to maintain an essential technological competence as well as from an apprehension (some would say irrational) that Russian security would suffer from the drastic numerical fall following R-36M and UR-100N draw-down.

While there both lobbies are doing plenty of PR to push their product to the forefront, I feel that the Russian government is taking a middle-of-the-road approach to things.

Bulava is "troubled", but does anyone seriously think that Energomash/Khimavtomatika/Makeyev will be able to produce a completely new design after a 20 year break without difficulty? It's one thing to update Sineva payload/electronics, it's another thing to develop a completely new successor to R-36M. I foresee them having the same QA issues MIT had with Bulava.

Frank, I think the contract has been given to Makeyev State Missile Center. Given their historical competency, I don't see how the missile can be solid-fueled.

Whether the project will be successful remains to be seen, given the expected difficulties (lack of experience with ICBMs, a fairly large gap in new designs, uncertain QA infrastructure). I would personally not count any chickens until they roost, but at least we have a general direction of development:

- liquid propellant engines, which implies participation by NPO Energomash and KBKhA, premier Russian makers of such engines (they made engines for SS-18, SS-19 and a score of major civilian SLVs)

- throw-weight of at least 4000 kg.

The rest, I think, is anyone's guess at least until 2018. Given that SS-18 can comfortably remain operational until early 2020s (R-36M2 were commissioned in 1989), there is no particular rush to a new missile.

I'm more than a little curious as to the current path for development of new nuclear warheads, particularly given the projected SS-18 replacement. I would think with the precipitous drop in the number of launch vehicles that Russia would draw upon its considerable experience with higher yield's. The greater probability of successful terminal phase intercept necessitates the use of very high yields to ensure adequate effectiveness at higher altitudes. This line of thought is precisely what was behind the Livermore Research Laboratory's development during Operation Dominic of a maximum-yield warhead (35-40 megatons was achievable at the maximum 4000kg re-entry vehicle mass) for the Titan II in 1962. A fractional orbit rv would also be helpful and again, past experience could be drawn upon. I still believe that Russia could maintain an adequate deterrent with as little as 300 total launch vehicles given the incorporation of these concepts. It would, in the long run I think, be far more affordable than the current force which is spread far too thin.

I’ve always been interested in your “big bang theory” and your focus on the Fractional Orbit (FOB) System with very high yield nuclear weapons. I’m assuming this mini-FOB system would be launched on demand from ground based ICBMs and not pre-orbited in space vehicles. How exactly would you envision that working?

I’d caution us to any conclusions regarding the old 1962 Titan IIs. The mega-warheads developed for the Titan’s were never operationally deployed or really tested with the Mark 6 RV. The W53 warhead, largest nuclear missile warhead ever deployed by the United States, for the Titan II had a yield of 9 megatons. The Titan II liquid fueled missile was replaced by the Minuteman I solid fueled system and the far more accurate W56 warhead of 1.2 megatons. Bigger is not always better.

Yes, I would envision launch on demand, with the re-entry vehicle being able to approach from any desired direction (over the south pole, for example). That would make re-positioning ships with mid-course ABM systems very difficult on short notice, and could bypass fixed GBMD completely because of their northern hemisphere orientation. It's essentially an ICBM that has global range and can approach from any conceivable direction.

Interestingly enough, by 1962 Los Alamos was far behind Livermore in terms of high yield weapon development and the W-53 was a very conventional design. By the mid-sixties The "clean" W-71 had twice the yield of the clean version of the W-53 for half the weight. In fact, the one test of the W-53's clean version failed, and that was LASL's last attempt at a high yield device. According to the Kennedy tapes, Livermore's tests in 1962 put them very close to a weaponized 30-40 MT warhead that was also "clean" for the Titan II. (I'm doing my Masters thesis on this subject)

From the standpoint of fallout, single high yield weapons are vastly superior to multiple w-88's or what-have-you. Not only can they be exceedingly clean, but they can be detonated high enough that irradiation of surface debris is not a factor. Furthermore, with yields of 5 megatons or more, prompt ionizing radiation is not a factor as blast and thermal effects cause it to be a non-issue. For nuclear weapons, small is dirty and also highly in-efficient from a yield to weight ratio standpoint. Trying to make clean kiloton sized weapons proved to be pointless. If there ever was a nuclear conflict, millions upon millions of lives would be spared from death by radiation poisoning if high yield, ultra-low fission (clean) weapons were used.

On merit, such a nuclear system would certainly have advantages. It would seem to me, this approach would provide a retaliatory nuclear deterrence without any real ability to serve as a first strike weapon. Assuming again that 80% of Russian silos would survive any nuclear first strike, your 300 ICBM fleet could have 240 weapon to respond to any attack. I seem to remember the old Soviet FOB system was dismantled as terms of SALTII. Are there any treaties that would limit such a system today?

While a certain advantage of your FOB system is its “all aspect” attack profile, I suspect the American response would be to arm some kind of a Space Base Interceptor System (perhaps a new version of the X-37B?) to catch the Russian ICBMs launching the FOB RVs in mid-orbit. Sounds like a big arms race that in the end wouldn’t change the strategic balance between the Kremlin and Pentagon. If the purpose of ICBMs is to provide a nuclear deterrent, no nation on earth is going to launch a first strike on Russia and face the retaliation of the before mentioned 240 ICBMs; regardless of the type, delivery, or tonnage of its nuclear payload. I just don’t see it happening.