The Tao of Anarchy: There is no God. There is no State. They are all superstitions that are established by the power-hunger psychopaths to divide, rule, and enslave us. It's only you and me, we are all true and real existence though in one short life. That is, We all are capable to freely interact with one another without coercion from anyone. We all are capable to take self-responsibility to find ways to live with one another in liberty, equality, harmony, and happiness before leaving this world forever. We all were born free and equal among all beings on this planet. We are not imprisoned in and by a place with a political name just because we were born there by bio-accident and social-chance. We are not chained to a set of indoctrinated beliefs that have been imposed upon us by so-called traditions. This Planet is home to all of us. No one owns it. We share the benefits from and responsibility to this Earth. We pledge no oath, no allegiance to no one; submit to no authority. We are all free and equal. The only obligation we all must undertake constantly with consistency is to respect the same freedoms and rights of others.

China no longer a copycat nation, they are the new Silicon Valley – ex-US govt adviser on Asia

PQC: As I commented on Ron Unz’s analysis on China & Us relations-retaliations concerning the China/USA trade war, China at the moment has neither the will nor the capability to stand up to the USA yet.

China’s elites, like the elites everywhere, do not want to undermine their own domestic power on which their privileges are based. Any disruption to the so-called current economic -technological development, which is just in the starting stage and still depends on much of foreign inputs particularly from the USA, will weaken their domestic power and the “political and social stability” of the whole China. China still has a long road to walk. And the length of this Road very much depends on the direction China is taking.

China problem is not about its people capabilities, but the system. For years the China political system has hold the Chinese back. What people have seen in China today is the result from Deng’s decision of loosening the grips on the Chinese people … just a little bit.

The late Lee Kwan Yew once commented that China needed hundred years to catch up with the USA. I dare say China will not need that much time if it is free from the central grip of the Communist Party. Potentially, China can become the true world market and the world central hub of activities much more than the USA once was. China has more potentials and much better natural conditions than Japan. Japan needed only two decades! Until then I do not hold my breath on anything the Chinese government says.

Published time: 17 Dec, 2018 07:41
Robert Manning – former US government adviser on Asia Robert Manning – former US government adviser on Asia

A
US-China trade war seems to have been averted for the time being. But
will the truce last? We asked Robert Manning, former US government
adviser on Asia, senior fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center on
International Security and its Strategic Foresight Initiative at the
Atlantic Council, and participant of the 2018 Emertech international
conference.

Sophie Shevardnadze: Robert Manning, great to have you with us on this programme.

Robert Manning: My pleasure.

SS:
Alright, so after the G20 summit President Trump said an “incredible
deal” with China has been made. Now, the Chinese – they announced
rolling back some tariffs, and they’re ready for another round of talks,
but they have not given any specific details out. Do you think the deal
is really that incredible as Trump says it is?

RM:
Well, despite the fact that Trump said it, it might be true. And I
think that… This was worked out before the G20 by various cabinet
officials. And I think we’re starting to see the Chinese announced
purchases of more agricultural goods, I suspect you will see them also
announce purchases of long-term natural gas, they’ve announced an
opening of a range of sectors to foreign investment, and I think the
whole set of issues around technology… We’re beginning to see things at
least being talked about. Most of the things that the US has demanded,
if you go back and read the speeches Xi Jinping has made going back to
the 90th Party Congress, if he actually did what he said, there wouldn’t
be much of a problem. And I think now he’s being tested. That’s not
just the United States, I think that China’s mercantilist policies have
been a source of concern in Europe, in Japan and elsewhere, that the
Chinese have just kind of overplayed their hand. Even, there’s a quiet
debate amongst the Chinese elite, where one’s worrying that Xi has
overplayed his hand, and I think we’re beginning to see him walking it
back a little bit.

SS: But let’s
bring this back into the realm of the US and China relations, because I
do agree with what you’re saying about Europe and Japan, but I want to
talk more about China and the US, because meanwhile, as the talks are in
progress, and the second round of the talks is somewhere close, but
meanwhile, the daughter of the founder of the tech giant Huawei, who is
also second in command there, has been arrested at an American request,
for violating US trade rules and anti-Iran sanctions. Huawei is linked
tightly with China’s government – and even though China says the arrest
won’t stop the trade talks with Washington, why the need to complicate
things? I mean, things were just getting better, you were just about to
hammer out a deal or so, won’t this arrest derail the year-long
negotiations?

RM: Well, I think you’re
assuming more coherence within the US government than it might be
prudent. We have an independent judiciary, the Justice Department does…
In fact, Trump didn’t even know she was arrested at the time, he was
having dinner with Xi at the G20.

SS:
Yeah, I know, John Bolton said that he did not pass the news of the
imminent arrest to President Trump. I mean, I understand that, you know,
the President shouldn’t be looking into every single detail of
everything that’s going on, but this is a big deal. It’s like Bill
Gates’ daughter being arrested in China, or something like that.

RM:
Right, but I don’t think we have a similar situation. The Chinese have a
lot more control over all those sorts of things. I think, also the
Justice Department announced a whole range of sanctions against Chinese
hacking exercises and so on. This is part of a broader US attempt to
push back on Chinese technology, mercantilism, stealing IPR, and so on. I
think Trump is, obviously, using it as leverage in these trade talks,
but I do think that you have two very large, the two largest economies
in the world, very intertwined in ways, and you have some people in the
Trump administration that are very anti-China, that want an economic
divorce. I would note that, in a rare occasion, Trump has actually
appointed somebody to be in charge, the USTR Lighthizer, and, because
all of these advisors have different trade policies…

SS:
Yeah, absolutely, Lighthizer says he wants more tariffs against China,
and Mnuchin says that a trade war should be evaded, and then, you have
Peter Navarro, who is the trade adviser, he says: Trump, be careful,
don’t enter a hollow deal. So ultimately, who decides what to do?

RM:
Well, as I said, I think that’s why they appointed Lighthizer. I think,
for the Chinese it’s been very troubling, because historically, on our
China policy, there’s been somebody in charge, so that the Chinese know
who to go to. For example, in the Bush administration, it was Treasury
Secretary Paulsen, so, and we had a pretty good way of managing these
issues. In the Trump administration, no one’s in charge, and there’s
several different voices with different policies. And it’s been very
difficult for the Chinese, first they made the deal with Commerce
Secretary Ross, and then Trump vetoed it. Then they made a deal with our
Treasury Secretary, and Trump vetoed that. So from the Chinese
perspective, it’s like, what do we have to do, who do we talk to? And I
think Trump… Now, I think, we’re going to answer that question with the
appointment of Lighthizer.

SS: I
want to get back a little bit on the arrest of the daughter of the owner
of Huawei. Like I said, for me, it’s like an analogy as if Bill Gates’
daughter was arrested in China, for breaching Chinese trade rules.
Surely it wouldn’t make the US give even more concessions to China, if
that were to happen. I feel like… Why do the Americans think they can
strongarm Beijing like that?

RM: Well, she
wasn’t arrested the way the Chinese picked up Canadians in retaliation,
she was… She was taken into custody because of the sanctions violations,
in terms of the fraud Huawei conducted indoing business with Iran
through the subsidiary…

SS: Right,
but I can’t but just, like, stop for a second and notice that companies
like Ericsson or Samsung, who sell to Iran, aren’t being sanctioned,
people aren’t being arrested from them. I mean, this is hardly… It’s
only obvious that it’s a political thing because, you know, the
prosecution is very selective.

RM: I think we’ve sanctioned a lot of other countries.

SS: But I’m talking about companies. I just gave you 2 examples, Samsung and Ericsson, they’re selling to Iran.

RM:
I think Huawei has a problem not just with the United States, over the
past several months they’ve been rejected in the UK, in New Zealand,
Australia, Japan is now in the process of thinking of doing away with
Huawei as a 5G carrier. So I think there’s a lot of concern about
Chinese technology practices more broadly, and I think that’s one of the
reasons we’re beginning to see these trade talks kind of get traction,
because, I think, the Chinese… Chinese Big Tech is not that different
from American Big Tech. if you’re Alibaba or Baidu or Tencent, you want
access to global markets. China’s only 14% or so of the world market,
they want access to the other 86%. And I suspect that the fact that
they’re being shut out of markets, that their efforts to acquire RFID,
tech firms have been rejected in a number of countries… They’ve probably
gone to the leadership in China and said, maybe this isn’t working so
well.

SS: So, the White House has
given Beijing 90 days to, as they put it, to actually make things right,
and that means reform their technology rules, open up to US services.
But, I mean, these are the demands that the US has been battling over
with China for decades. Isn’t it naive to think that in 90 days it’s
just going to all be good?

RM: Yeah, well, I
would be surprised if that happened in 90 days. I think the way at
least some people in the administration are looking at it, it’s more,
like, a trial period. They want to be able in 90 days to see if the
Chinese are serious this time about actually following through on
commitments. You know, they’ve made a number of commitments. Xi Pledged
to Obama to stop cyber hacking, didn’t happen, in fact, it’s just been
increasing in the recent months. So I think Xi has a credibility
problem, and not just with the United States. And so, I think, these 90
days will serve as a way for the US to make a judgement about whether
the Chinese are serious or not.

SS:
So the Americans, they’ve been actually complaining about China
pinching American technology for years, right? And maybe it helped
foster Chinese technological progress, but now they are investing more
and more in research, and they are producing more tech graduates than
America and Europe taken together. Will China even need to play loose
with foreign technology anymore?

RM: Well, I
think China’s no longer a copycat, I think they’re a leading… In fact,
I’ve done a major report on global innovation where I called China the
new Silicon Valley. And I think that we’re seeing in a number of areas,
in terms of… And as you can see, the metrics in terms of number of
patents, number of scientific papers and so on, and in some areas, in
artificial intelligence and others, they lead the world. And e-payments,
half the electronic payments in the world are currently in China.
Something like 42 million. So, you know, I think they’ve become a
serious actor on their own, and I think their attitudes on IPR are
changing because now they have their own IPR to protect.

SS:
So here’s the thing, you said the American and Chinese markets are so
intertwined, and their economies are so closely working together, they
need each other. They need each other’s markets, investors. How far can
the two even push each other until it gets to a point where they will be
shooting themselves in the foot?

RM:
Well, I think you’ll see a slightly diminished relationship, but I think
it’s more than a bilateral issue. The US and China account for about
45% of all world trade. If the two largest trading powers are playing by
different rules, what kind of international architecture and trade
regime, what’s the future of the WTO? So these are big global issues,
and I think that how this plays out will have a big impact both
regionally and globally on trade architecture around the world.

SS:
So in the beginning of 2018, you wrote that the current global trade
regime is at risk. You were referring to Trump’s protectionism,
unilateral attitude towards the WTO, pacts like the TPP and NAFTA. But,
you know, the year is coming to a close, and we actually see that the
US-China progress is here, and that they’re talking, and there’s NAFTA
talks, and, you know, people are selling, buying. Would you still say
that the world trade system is in danger?

RM:
Yes, I think it’s very much in danger. The crown jewel of the WTO, the
dispute mechanism, is at risk. The US has blocked new judges as a way to
leverage reform. And we have less than a year to go, if we don’t get
this fixed, that whole system may not be working. And then, we’re back
to, instead of rules-based trade, power-based trade.

SS:
Mr. Manning, this hawkish approach towards China – it’s not just in
terms of economy, but also hardware as well – we see this in the South
China Sea, there’s already too many bomber fly-bys and warships sailing
back and forth. Can the trade war thaw lead to an ease of tensions in
that region?

RM: I think, the old consensus
going back to the Nixon’s opening is gone. Up until Trump all the
previous American presidents felt that China’s success was good for the
United States. Trump is the first one having a different view on that. I
think, trade has been the foundation for the relationship. The
strongest advocates for US-China relations were the US business
community. If you go back over the last several years and read the US
Chamber of Commerce and Beijing or Shanghai’s reports, they find it
harder and harder to do business, and there’s more and more disconcerted
efforts and frustration, and so they are less supportive. If we get a
new trade arrangement with China that may build a new foundation for
more stable relations. I think, broadly the US has a problem in
accepting the rise of China no matter what they do. I think, a lot of
people in the US see the status quo as some eternal development…

SS: Right, so what’s America’s endgame in the South China Sea?

RM:
Well, you know, the Chinese are the ones who signed the Law of Sea
treaty and then decided to interpret it on an a la carte sort of basis.
They pledged to Obama that they wouldn’t militarise the South China Sea
and they built a whole series of military bases, building up the
disputed islands. I think, the US and China both have a problem. Neither
side has answered what I see as the two basic questions that will shape
the future. Chinese assumption is that US is an outlier and they’ll
eventually leave, and they are positioning themselves as the dominant
power in the region. The US seems to think that it’s a network of
alliances and its presence in the region which has only been there for
the last 70 years. If you think about the last five thousand years of
Asian history, there have been three different kinds of security
systems. For a long time it was the Chinese tributary system, then we
had imperialist system in the beginning of the 20th century, and after
World War II it’s been American dominance. And from an Asian perspective
that’s a short period of time. It’s not the norm, it’s the exception.
And I think, the question is – what type of Chinese presence and role is
acceptable to the US. And flip it around the other way for China: once
they understand the Americans aren’t leaving their Pacific power, what
type of American role and presence can China live with? Those are two
big strategic questions that neither side has answered.

SS:
Beijing is active in the South China Sea, it has an arsenal to counter
US carriers, we know that, and it’s building a blue-water navy. Do you
think China is being realistic, will its capabilities match its
ambitions?

RM: Well, I think, nobody talks
about this. But I think, PLA in China has been fairly uncomfortable
because they haven’t fought a war since 1953 really. And they’re taking a
number of aggressive actions that are putting them in proximity with
American forces, and the likelihood of an accidental escalating has been
going up, and so on. And I think, a lot of people in the Chinese
military leadership who’ve never fought a war and have always fancied
new toys and they’ve never actually tried to see if they all work
together, are a little uncomfortable being put in that position.

SS:
According to President Trump, China is also to blame for the apparent
lack of progress with US-North Korean relations. Do you agree?

RM:
No, that’s not true. I think frankly, the fact that China and Russia
both supported the UN sanctions created the kind of pressure that led to
developments we’ve seen since January 1. So I think China has done
actually more than… I think, Trump’s unrealistic expectations of what
China can do, our interests with China overlap over the Korean
peninsula, but they are not the same. China puts more value on stability
and the US puts more emphasis on denuclearisation. And I think the way
Trump has done this, has really given away the store… I think, Kim Jong
Un deserves ‘The Diplomatic Man of the Year’ for the way he has really
dictated the whole pace of diplomacy since his January the First speech,
the way he dealt with the Olympics and the way he manipulated Trump…
You know, for Trump the summit was the ultimate reality TV show.

SS:
But right now the second-round talks were abruptly cancelled by
Pyongyang, with no further dates given for the next summit. What will it
take to restart the process?

RM: Well, I think, they’ve made a number of mistakes.

SS: Who ‘they’?

RM:
The US. First, when Trump met with the leadership, I think, it was
taken as a signal in both Moscow and Beijing that it’s OK to normalise
relations with North Korea. And the US, by defining it as a bilateral
issue… Remember, we had six-party talks for a while that didn’t
ultimately achieve the objective, but they did show that major powers
could co-operate where their interests overlap, and Trump’s walked away
from that and dealt with it as a bilateral US-North Korea issue which, I
think, is a mistake because you can’t solve this without China and
Russia being involved, for example, on the nuclear issue. The IAEA can
only monitor fissile material and facilities. They can’t deal with
nuclear weapons. That’s something the Perm Five and three of the Perm
Five happen to be in the North East Asia – the US, China and Russia. We
ought to be talking to the other nuclear weapons states in North East
Asia about how do we go about moving fissile material out of North
Korea, how do we dismantle the nuclear weapons. That’s not going to
happen magically, and I think to the degree that… Even our ally Japan
has been cut out of the diplomacy. And even they are quietly trying to
meet with North Korea and so on because in order to solve this we have
to have a coordinated multilateral approach, and it’s not happening. And
I think even within the US government there’s a gap between Trump and
the whole career team under Secretary Pompeo who’s much more skeptical
about Kim’s intentions than President Trump who said he fell in love…

SS: Well, John Bolton that Trump
surely listens to, says that another North Korean summit needs to be
held, as Pyongyang is failing to deliver on its promises to
denuclearise. The June summit was purely for the show…

RM:
No, it was worse than that. If you read the statement that they put
out, it was so vague that it didn’t provide any guidance for how to put
together the diplomatic process to actually realise any other goals…

SS: So what’s the guarantee that the next summit will bring any tangible results?

RM: I think it’s a mistake.

SS: To have a summit at all?

RM:
The North Koreans have boycotted two meetings with Secretary Pompeo.
They were invited to Geneva by our North Korea special representative
who spent two days in Vienna waiting and they never showed up. So, I
think, they’re playing Trump against his own government.

SS:
Do you think that’s smart? I think, the root of the problem is maybe
somewhere in a different place. On paper, Pyongyang wants to normalise
relations with the US, promising to denuclearise in return. But for
Washington denuclearisation comes first – could that be the root of the
problem?

RM: No, that policy is not going
to work. The North Koreans, whatever you think of their view, have been
consistent from day one. They said: we want a phased synchronous
process, which is the only way it can happen because there’s so much
deep distress on both sides. When we had these six-party talks which I
was somewhat involved in, it was called ‘Action-for-action’ because the
only way you can build trust is if we do something and they do
something. And that’s the only way I can see it working. If the US
thinks North Korea is going to give up all its nukes and trust us after
we pocket all the concessions, that’s just not going to happen.

SS:
And also, Pyongyang sees nukes as the only real deterrent against an
American invasion. I mean, giving them up is like demanding them for a
leap of faith. Why would they do that?

RM: I
can understand, if I was North Korean, I might want to view nukes as a
deterrent. However, I think you have a young leader who is 33 years old,
unlike his father, he wants to be around for a few decades. And he
knows that in order to do that, he has to modernize his economy. And if
he has to trade some of his weapons of mass destruction, or all of them,
to get that, I think there… There’s been a lot of progress in the
North-South Korean reconciliation, and I think… I can see a solution,
but I’m not sure how you get there, because of the deep distrust on both
sides. And when the White House says we want a front-loaded solution,
and when you ask them, well, do you have front-loaded benefits for North
Korea if they give you all these things, they give you a blank stare.
And so I think… I’m not sure they’ve really thought through how this
kind of diplomacy works.

SS: You
said earlier that neither China nor America have answered the main
questions of why they are in the situation that they are. So, for me…
For China, North Korea is arguably a buffer against US troops right on
its border and a point of leverage with the US and, actually, with the
rest of the world, to a degree. For the United States, this is a pretext
to keep troops in Asia and also project more power in Asia. So the way
it looks to me, I mean, the prospect of war maybe is there, but it’s
very unlikely. It seems that the status-quo is actually working for both
powers at this point. Is there any will to change things?

RM:
I think it’s not just the United States that’s uncomfortable with the
North Korean nuclear weapon state. I think that the Chinese would prefer
to see a denuclearized Korean peninsula as well, and so would every
other… Japan, and I think Russia as well doesn’t look forward to more
nuclear powers in the world. So… But you have a point that in the near
term, the status quo… It’s particularly because they’ve, as the
diplomacy has started, the things that were provoking the US, testing of
long-range ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, has stopped. So the
tensions are lower, and there’s less pressure. And so that’s why, I
think, the US… Ironically, Trump has adopted the same policy as Obama,
of so-called strategic patience, although they don’t call it that. But
that’s… if you listen to what Trump and Pompeo are saying, we’re in no
rush, it’s ok, we’re doing well. I think that’s going to change. The
Democrats taking over the House next month, and they’re gonna get hauled
up to hearings to explain what they mean by all this great progress
when in fact nothing has happened.

SS:
Alright, Robert Manning, thank you very much for this interview. It’s
interesting to see what’s going to happen in the first months to come.