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Abstract:

An account of the successes and failures in the massive deployment of men and materiel from the zone of interior to the theaters.

Notes:

by
SiegfriedSchwertner (WorldCat user on 2007-10-25)

Note: < Operations Overseas treats the role of the corps in providing transportation for American forces and equip-ment overseas on a large scale, over invasion beaches, in ports, and on internal lines of communications by rail, highway, and waterway, since indigenous facilities were in most cases inadequate. Employment of local manpower and facilities was indispensable, and the authors describe the problems of language, labor relations, pilferage, safety, and military security that the corps had to meet under widely diverse conditions around the globe. Given a short-age of trained American transportation personnel, it had often to rely on untrained service and combat troops, while its problems were multiplied by the scarcity of base and storage facilities in the Pacific, North Africa, and the Aleutians; by the widespread destruction of ports and rail-roads in Europe; and by long and unsatisfactory lines of communications in North Africa and Iran and in the China-Burma-India Theater. Its operations were also ham-pered by the tendency of overseas commands to use oceangoing vessels as floating warehouses, which, for ex-ample, created massive shipping tie-ups off the coast of Normandy and in the Pacific. In Europe the corps had to meet the crisis that arose from inadequate provision of heavy motor transport equipment and drivers in planning for the invasion of the Continent in 1944, a deficiency that had grave effects after the breakout at St. Lo when the rap-idly advancing American armies outdistanced their supply. Key topics: 1. Railways as bulk carriers in support of military opera-tions in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy (Chs. IV, V); in northwestern Europe (Chs. VI, VII, VIII); in the Phil-ippines (Ch. X); in Iran (Ch. IX); in Alaska and west-ern Canada (Ch. II); and in India and Burma (Ch. XII). 2. Use of inland waterways to augment available means of transport (Chs. II, VIII, IX, XII). 3. Inter-Allied planning and coordination of movements in theaters, particularly in connection with the buildup of U.S. forces in Britain (Ch. III); the conduct of op-erations in the Mediterranean (Chs. IV, V); and the planning and execution of the cross-Channel invasion (Chs. X, XI). 4. Utilization of indigenous manpower and facilities, es-pecially in the United Kingdom (Ch. III); the Mediter-ranean (Chs. IV, V); northwestern Europe (Chs. VI, VII, VIII); Iran (Ch. IX); Australia (Ch. X); India and China (Ch. XII). 5. Control of shipping in unified commands (SWPA and POA) dependent primarily on water transportation (Chs. X, XI). 6. Over-the-beach operations of supply in the Aleutians (Ch. II); the Mediterra-nean (Chs. IV, V); France (Ch. VI); and the Pacific (Chs. X, XI). 7. The role of motor transport in providing flexible sup-port for advancing armies (Chs. II, IV-X, XII). 8. Animal transport in Sicily and Italy (Ch. V). > - Ana-lytical description from: US Army in WW II : Reader’s guide. – 1992. p. 127-128