FLYING into Imphal from any direction you pass over mile after mile of
rolling green hills, along whose crests and wooded flanks brown pathways wind
like serpents. Hardly a village is seen. Then, suddenly, these hills fall away
steeply, "running down into the flat brown and yellow plain of paddy fields
and swampy lakes like cliffs into the sea."

At the end of March the encircling hills, having a colour of green and
terracotta, clashed sharply with the greys and buffs of the parched plain, where
the earth crumbled for want of rain. To dig gun-pits and trenches into the paddy
fields was like cutting into iron. But the monsoon was not far distant, and then
the dust of the tracks would be changed into mud, and the dry waterways into
coursing torrents.

Imphal looked a small town to the troops who, in lorries or on foot, hurried
through its blossomed avenues. The town, in reality a series of adjoining
villages, has its houses of stone and white plaster, and its wooden thatched
huts, surrounded or sub-divided by bamboo clumps. Further out, the small,
rectangular villages are enclosed in bamboo hedges, with dusty tracks running
through the middle.

The inhabitants of this capital of Manipur State, with its own maharajah,
presented a contrast to the people of Arakan, for they wore clean white shirts
instead of the coloured lonqyi, and could afford bicycles and wrist watches. As
the Japanese invaders drew nearer, the bullock carts that hitherto had creaked
slowly along the roads carrying loads of grain or wool were now turned to a
different work. Refugees from the outer villages came into the centre of the
plain. And their carts were piled high with household goods, with mattresses and
wooden bedsteads, with furniture and cooking pots.

Imphal-Northern Front

The 17th Indian Division was still fighting its way north up the road from
Tiddim, along which it had with great skill staved off the constant threat of
encirclement and total destruction. To help it reach our outer defence line a
few miles south of Imphal, part of the 23rd Indian Division was sent across, the
oncoming Japanese were stopped, and. our positions stabilized. This done, the
23rd Indian Division took up posts on the east and north-east of Imphal. And the
20th Indian Division, pulling back from Tamu, against which the enemy advanced
with the greater part of his tanks and artillery, held the south-eastern part of
the front, centred upon Palel.

When the Fifth Indian Division, less 161 Brigade, first arrived in Imphal, on
several different airfields, staff officers of Four Corps Headquarters quickly
assembled units company by company, and rushed them to the front. One Commanding
Officer, who arrived after two of his infantry companies, was astonished to find
that they were both on their way to the front up different roads.

The first main action in which troops of the Division were engaged about
Imphal occurred on March 22. Forward of a village named Litan, twenty-six miles
north-east from Imphal on the Ukhrul road, the Japanese were attacking the 50th
Gurkha Parachute Brigade, which had only two battalions and had been sent in as
reinforcement to Four Corps. To assist in the defence of this position, the
2/1st Punjab (Lieutenant- Colonel W. G. Smith) were sent from 123 Brigade.

As contact could not be made with the Parachute Brigade itself---the enemy
was fighting on all sides---Colonel Smith took command of the administration box
that had been formed a short way to the rear. During the night of March 24-25
one of his rifle companies holding a peak four thousand feet high had been
fiercely attacked. When ammunition was all but exhausted and the strength much
depleted by casualties, our men were withdrawn. Now Smith co-ordinated the
defences, and called down an airstrike upon this hill vacated by his troops.

The news from the 50th Parachute Brigade further forward was most serious.
The situation there had deteriorated. Litan could not be held, and the position
was now too far out from Imphal to prevent it from becoming isolated. The mauled
Parachute Brigade had to extricate itself and return to Imphal.

And when, on the 26th, Brigadier Evans arrived on the scene with his two
other battalion commanders, it was decided that all the troops of 123 Brigade
should be withdrawn by the next morning. The 2/1st Punjab covered the retiring
administration troops, from the slopes of a peak half a mile west of Litan. Here
only two of Colonel Smith's companies were properly dug in; the other companies
had been obliged to move after setting fire to such stores as could not be
evacuated. And at eight o'clock the enemy attacked.

Now began one of the most nerve-racking nights in the battalion's history.
'C' Company, on a small hill five hundred yards from Smith's headquarters, was
attacked by a battalion of Japanese troops. Without a. break the battle raged
through the night. Part of the company was overrun. Hand-to-hand fighting was of
the most ferocious. But the enemy was repulsed. The Company Commander, Major J.
Walker, was killed at midnight while directing a precarious defence, and Subadar
Walayat Khan took charge. Above the noise of battle his voice could be heard
encouraging the men as they drove off one assault after another. He urged them
on to kill the enemy troops, who rushed forward without regard for casualties.
And with their war cry he led them, until after three hours' stern fighting this
brave man, covered with wounds, was obliged to hand over command to another
V.C.O. Walayat Khan's gallantry during this critical night was as recognized by
the award of the Indian Order of Merit.

Though our men held out until daybreak, only six of the fifty who had started
the fight remained unwounded. Why the Japanese did not advance down the hill to
one side of 'C' Company is not known. Had they done so, Smith's battalion
headquarters could scarcely have avoided annihilation. For the men were not dug
in; they were dispersed on the slopes. It says much for the fire control of the
sepoys that not one shot was fired by headquarters company that night, for all
the intense provocation and imminent danger.

It was a tired and shaken battalion that withdrew in the morning through the
positions of the 2nd Suffolks and settled into a village eight miles out of
Imphal.

* * * * * * *

During the next two weeks the three battalions of 123 Brigade patrolled the
villages east and north-east of Imphal. Their efforts were directed towards
cutting the Japanese supply routes up and down the valleys that skirted the
Imphal plain, and daily our patrols fought engagements with groups of enemy
soldiers. When local villagers reported the presence of Japanese looting
parties, the Royal Air Force and Gunners bombarded the place. It was a battle
for the lines of communication, upon which the enemy depended so much for his
ability to hold out upon the hills which he captured and to maintain the impetus
of his invasion, the opening phases of which had been so abundantly successful.
Long reconnaissance patrols were sent out for several days at a time to search
for the enemy. Raiding parties attacked villages from which the enemy was known
to take food by night. Ammunition dumps were bombed and mule convoys strafed.

But although our men gained the upper hand in these small brushes with the
Japanese, and inflicted considerable losses upon them both in human lives and in
war material, the enemy continued to make progress towards Imphal. And to arrest
his advance meant full-scale battles that involved a battalion or more in
action. The first of these battles occurred on the Imphal-Kohima road, fifteen
miles north of the Manipur capital at a village named Kanglatongbi. By cutting
this road, the Japanese had encircled Imphal. The town set in its plain was now
besieged. All supplies had to be flown in to the airstrip, near which Four Corps
Headquarters had formed the 'Keep,' a defensive box based upon a group of
hillocks in the centre that stretched southwards into the plain to within a mile
of Imphal. In order to cut down the strength .of the garrison and, thereby, the
rations needed each day, 50,000 non-combatant troops had either been evacuated
before the road was cut, or were now sent out in returning aircraft.

At Kanglatongbi, spread over a considerable area, Four Corps had an Ordnance
Dump and Reinforcement Camp. On the night of April 4/5 the Japanese penetrated
the area. All the troops from our administration units had been withdrawn into
what was known as 'Lion' Box, a mile farther south. The occupants of this box
numbered some 12,000 men, of whom the only real fighting units were two Sapper
Field Companies and a company of the Assam Rifles.

When the Japanese first attacked astride this main road from the north,
Salomons' Nine Brigade was still in reserve. Its task had been to destroy any
Japanese who succeeded in penetrating through or round 123 Brigade. The 3/9th
Jats and 3/14th Punjab had patrolled with vigour to find out the routes of any
enemy enveloping moves, and to anticipate the enemy on any vital hill that
covered these routes. But to counter this new threat the 2nd West Yorkshires,
supported by one squadron of the 3rd Dragoon Guards with Lee tanks, were at once
ordered out to the village of Sengmai, a mile south of Lion Box. The battalion
formed a firm base here, and had orders to ensure that the box was not overrun
during daylight and that no enemy parties advanced any farther south. On April 5
and 6 West Yorkshire platoons, accompanied by tanks, patrolled forward to Lion
Box, dealt with any groups of Japanese troops who had penetrated our defences
during the previous night, and mopped up all resistance that remained, before
returning to Sengmai at dusk.

Then, on the morning of April 7, strong enemy parties were reported to have
entered the box. So Colonel Cree sent one platoon and tanks to evict the
Japanese. But, at nine o'clock, the evacuation of Lion Box was ordered. And the
task of Cree's West Yorkshires became that of covering this evacuation.
Accordingly, the battalion moved forward to positions inside the box. At noon
the withdrawal started. The troops marched back along the road into the centre
of Imphal, while convoys of lorries were sent up to Kanglatongbi to bring back
some of the more important stores from our dumps there. During this evacuation,
the enemy shelled the place with a 75 mm. gun. And it was during this
bombardment that the A/Q of the Division, Lieutenant- Colonel Norman Maclaurin,
was killed while trying to disentangle a traffic block near Kanglatongbi. He had
been: with the Division for eighteen months, since the days of Quetta Camp
outside Baghdad. He was a delightful personality, of varied talents, for besides
being a good caricaturist, he was an expert at Scottish dances, and a piper of
merit. In rest areas he could be seen walking up and down outside his tent,
playing his pipes. And, fittingly, a piper from the nearby Seaforth Highlanders
came over to pipe a lament at his funeral.

After much insistence on the part of General Briggs, the vacant post was
filled by Maclaurin's deputy, Major T. C. W. Roe, one of the most prominent and
veteran members of Divisional Headquarters.

* * * * * * *

The second main battle in which the Division was involved during April was on
the slopes and summit of Numshigum. This, one of the most vital hills north of
Imphal, was a sprawling feature that butted far into the plain. Its green ridge
extended over some seven thousand yards, its highest part rose to 3,800 feet
high, and the hill overtopped the surrounding paddy fields by more than a
thousand feet.

So committed were Colonel Gerty's 3/9th Jats already across part of our
northern front that the only troops available for holding Numshigum were a
platoon from his 'A' Company and the Jat guerilla platoon. Of these men a
number. were newly joined recruits, and of automatic weapons the force had but
three. To reach the summit meant a climb of an hour and a half up steep grassy
slopes, and when Lieutenant Sain and his men did arrive on top they had little
enough time to dig and wire a defence position before darkness fell upon the
plain and its encircling hills.

At three o'clock in the morning of April 7 the Japanese sent two companies to
attack Numshigum from the north. They chose a time when strong wind and a
rainstorm had reduced visibility to a few yards and when the sounds of
approaching troops would be covered by the weather's violence. The brunt of this
strong attack was borne by the platoon of 'B' Company. The havildar was killed
early in the engagement. By half past six the Jats had suffered twenty-four
casualties. The position on Numshigum was menaced from all sides by the enemy's
superior strength and fire power, and permission was given by Colonel Gerty for
the survivors of his two platoons to withdraw from the hilltop. Particular
gallantry in this night action was displayed by Havildar Munshi Ram, who, when
his platoon commander was killed, went forward to encourage his men. A grenade
shattered his hand. He was badly wounded in the foot. And in darkness he was
left for dead on the summit. Later that day Munshi Ram survived an airstrike
when Hurribombers bombed and strafed the Japanese on Numshigum, but even then
his misfortunes were not ended. The Japanese threw him down the hillside.
Nevertheless, though weak from loss of blood and shock, this havildar struggled
into Gerty's headquarters down beside the road. There he died from his wounds
soon afterwards. He was posthumously awarded the Indian Order of Merit.

That Numshigum be recaptured, and with all speed, was imperative, for there
was not one good defensive position between this hill and Imphal itself. Colonel
Gerty sent 'A' Company (Major Risal Singh) and the hill was taken, with
surprisingly light opposition. The enemy had found the cost of his night attacks
so high that he withdrew without offering his usual tenacious resistance. And
his counter-attacks that night were easily repulsed.

During April 8 and 9 the enemy made several half-hearted assaults against the
Jats, and on the night of the 9th his efforts, though most determined and
supported by five machine-guns, served him nothing. An entire battalion was used
in these attempts to oust the Jats. It later transpired from a captured diary
that the death of four Japanese officers in the early attacks had so incensed
the remaining officers that they had determined to avenge their deaths whatever
the cost.

The following night 'A' Company were harassed by machine-guns that worked
steadily nearer to our positions. When at first light a Japanese 75 mm. gun
fired a heavy concentration upon the Jat company, three of our Bren guns were
struck. This was a serious loss. And its gravity was felt when. taking advantage
of artillery fire, the enemy soldiers moved round the flanks with machineguns
and launched a fierce attack that was pressed forward regardless of casualties.
By seven o'clock our forward platoons had been overrun. Ammunition was down to
the last few rounds. The company had thirty casualties. And 'D' Company, then on
its way up the hillside to reinforce the position, was still some way from the
summit. Our men had neither strength nor weapons to keep back the pressure long
enough to give time for this hurrying relief to arrive. And so permission had to
be given for the mauled 'A' Company to retire from Numshigum, leaving this vital
hill a second time in enemy hands.

But the enemy could not be allowed to remain on this dominant ridge. No
effort to drive him back must be spared. The threat to our northern front of his
presence on this buttress was too grave to be tolerated. Accordingly, Colonel
Gerty sent in his 'B' and 'C' Companies, after an inaccurate airstrike and an
effective artillery concentration. The plan was for two platoons of 'A' Company
under Major G. R. Sell to form base some three hundred feet from the top, while
the third platoon secured a knob a short way farther south, in order to prevent
enemy flanking fire from that direction.

Then, as soon as 'B' Company was firmly established, Sell's men would pass
through to capture Numshigum itself.

There was no cover save a few foxholes. 'B' Company was soon pinned down by
heavy fire. The one platoon failed to capture the knob, its commander was
wounded, and our artillery could not reach the enemy machine-guns, so well sited
were they. Major Graham Sell was killed early on. So was his subadar. When, at
1.30 p.m., it became evident that both companies were losing men to no
advantage, and that our attack could not make progress, Gerty brought his men
back, after a morning of stern fighting and severe loss. During the withdrawal a
party of stretcher-bearers was left behind, trying to evacuate a wounded Jat.
For a time this was rendered impossible by Japanese machine-guns, but when,
later that afternoon, our aircraft bombed and strafed Numshigum---it was
believed that the hill was clear of our men---the naik in charge, Yakub, took
advantage of the noise and confusion. Seeing that the enemy had gone to ground,
he lifted the wounded soldier on to a stretcher, and had him carried down. He
buried two other Jats, and was not molested by the cowering Japanese. Naik Yakub
was decorated with the Military Medal for this coolness and presence of mind.

Another day had passed. The Japanese still held the commanding heights. Many
good men had been lost in a strong attempt to recapture the summit. The Jats
could do no more. The battalion had suffered heavily, and something more
powerful than an infantry battalion was evidently required to defeat the
Japanese. Accordingly, General Briggs ordered Evans' 123 Brigade to assault
Numshigum on April 13. Selected for this assault were the 1/17th Dogras,
commanded by Lieutenant- Colonel E. G. Woods, who had served as Brigade Major to
Messervy with Nine Brigade in Eritrea, three years before.

In the middle of the 13th morning three squadrons of Hurricanes swooped down
upon Numshigum. One by one each aircraft dropped its two bombs, rose again,
circled, and entered the smoking lists a second time to spray the Japanese
positions on the summit with fire. From the centre of Imphal plain came the
thudding of many guns, as the Divisional artillery, aided by a medium regiment,
pounded Numshigum with shells that landed amid the pall of buff smoke that
swathed the crest. Meanwhile, in the hot sunshine two Dogra companies, one up
each of the two main spurs that led to the summit from the east side, had set
off, supported by two squadrons of 30-ton Lee tanks from the 3rd Carabiniers. No
one knew whether the tanks would be able to climb the very steep gradients. This
had never been tried before.

Colonel Woods directed that whichever company with its tanks reached the
junction of the two spurs first would be given further orders on arrival. All
communication was by wireless. Both companies, commanded by Majors Hugh Alden
and L. H. Jones, reached the junction at almost the same time and unmolested by
the Japanese, who were momentarily stunned by the shattering weight of shell and
bomb brought down by our Gunners and the Royal Air Force. But from this moment
the attack became stiff. While the tanks, which had climbed up like big, slow,
black beetles, balanced themselves on knife-edge ridges and pumped bullets and
shells into every Japanese man and bunker that could be seen, the agile Dogras
protected the tanks from interference. And under the armoured cover they
assaulted the Japanese trenches and bunkers. The struggle flickered from bunker
to bunker. If the successful co-operation between tanks and infantry imbued the
Dogras with a sense of invincibility, yet their substantial gains were not won
except at a price. Every single officer in that attack was killed or wounded.
Jones was wounded, and then a second time in the chest. He was carried away all
but unconscious. Alden was also wounded in the chest while directing operations
beside a tank. And all Carabinier officers were killed by snipers, as they
looked from their turrets to direct the battle. They were unable to close down
because the ground was so incredibly difficult, and the position of the tanks so
perilous and unusual.

The last half-hour of the fight was ordered by C.S.M. Craddock of the
Carabiniers and Subadars Ranbir Singh and Tiru. Between these gallant men
language was allowed to present no problem. They continued the fight until no
enemy troops remained upon the main Numshigum feature. Craddock won the
Distinguished Conduct Medal, Subadar Tiru the I.O.M. Both company commanders
were awarded the Military Cross, and to Colonel Woods went a D.S.O.

By nightfall the two companies were dug and wired in. The tanks of the
Carabiniers rumbled down the hill again, taking the Dogra wounded. When that
night the Japanese counter-attacked in force, from Turtle farther north along
the ridge (so called because of its contour shape), our artillery brought down
such effective defensive fire upon our barbed wire that the disillusioned enemy
was mauled and repulsed. His attack was decisively trounced.

These Dogras come from the foothills of the Himalayas, from Kangra and Jammu.
Here, poor but industrious yeoman farmers that they are, they scrape a
livelihood from their terraced hillsides. Geographical remoteness has made their
education problematic and therefore backward, and they are conservative in their
nature. But across the centuries their position among the foothills kept them
isolated from the invasions and wars of the Punjab plains. It also kept them
from adopting the Moslem religion common to the inhabitants of the Punjab, and
in their beliefs they are Hindus. Of their Rajput origin they are intensely
proud, and in their own country, if asked, they say that they are Rajput, not
Dogra. To them this means membership of an untarnished military chivalry.

In their loyalty and reliability they have few equals. Though small of
stature, they are wiry and their stamina and powers of physical endurance
remarkable. Shy, in a childlike fashion, they respond at once to courteous
treatment, but are quick to resent any attempt at bullying. They are charming
little men, staunch, quiet, gallant fighters. And their natural good manners and
bearing led their British officers, in more emotional moments, to refer to the
"Gentlemen of the Dogra Regiment."

In their hills of the Kangra Valley, Dogras are accustomed to wear little
caps, woven by their women in complex patterns of coloured dicings on a white
background. When the 1st Battalion was sent to Arakan for the first campaign,
their ordinary forage caps could not be supplied. Having no pagris, and in need
of an alternative to the steel helmet, the Dogras had their Regimental Depot at
Jullundur produce these chesi topis in khaki. The men, and the officers
too, began to wear them and, when official disapproval was expressed, became
proud of their unauthorized headgear.

The 3/14th Punjab took over from the Dogras on Numshigum, and Nine Brigade
prepared a further assault to drive the enemy from Turtle and the rest of the
feature. But the Japanese withdrew. Had they not done so, another attack was to
have been made, this time by the 2nd West Yorkshires, from the west up two long
spurs that led up to Numshigum and Turtle. This operation was planned but never
executed. Instead, the battalion continued its patrolling across country, the
very openness of which made this a difficult task. But when our patrols found
that two important hills were unoccupied by the Japanese---Point 3938, and
Runaway Hill, a very steep little feature guarding the road that ran up the left
hand side of the Numshigum massif---both were occupied by the 3/9th Jats.

It was by Runaway Hill that the Division's third Victoria Cross was won.
Before dawn on April 6, during this original encircling movement, at a time when
we could not be sure when they would appear next, the Japanese attacked one of
Colonel Gerty's standing patrols. By driving the Jats off, they secured a
hillock that overlooked the main company position. Jemadar Abdul. Hafiz was
ordered to recapture the hill with two sections of his platoon. After an
artillery bombardment by Bastin's 4th Field Regiment, Abdul. Hafiz led his Jats
in to the attack. They charged up the hillside that was bare of cover, shouting
their war-cry as they neared the top. Then the waiting Japanese opened fire with
machine-guns. On the approaching Jats they threw down grenades. Jemadar Abdul
Hafiz was wounded at the outset. A bullet struck him in the leg. Yet he dashed
forward and seized the enemy machine-gun by the barrel, while another Jat killed
the Japanese gunner.

The jemadar then took up a Bren gun dropped by one of his men who had fallen
wounded, and notwithstanding the heavy fire from the enemy positions on this
hill and on a feature to the flank, he shot a number of the Japanese soldiers.
And so fiercely did he lead his men that the enemy ran away: hence the name
Runaway Hill. But Jemadar Abdul Hafiz was mortally wounded in the chest, still
grasping his Bren gun. To his men he shouted in his own language,
"Reorganize! I will give you covering fire." But he died,. without
having been able to pull the trigger. He was awarded the Victoria Cross,
posthumously, and was the first Muslim soldier to win this decoration in the
Second World War.

* * * * * * *

Already before his assault upon Numshigum, the enemy had been active in the
Iril Valley, that ran from north to south down the right-hand side of Imphal
town itself. He had occupied the principal massif north of the plain, a range
that was higher than Numshigum, though less dangerously close to Imphal. This
expansive range stretched, as far as the enemy's hold upon its peaks was
concerned, from the village of Mapao in the south, with its white-painted
American Baptist Mission church standing out as a distinctive landmark,
northwards to Molvom, by way of a series of humps and crests nicknamed Hump,
Twin Peaks, Foston, Penhill, and Buttertubs. Parts of this ridge soared to a
height of five thousand feet above the sea and half that altitude above the
plain itself.

It was at first thought that the Japanese had also seized a feature called
Wakan, lying between Molvom and Numshigum, but when a platoon of the West
Yorkshires, followed by two companies, moved up the long climb to the top, they
reported Wakan unoccupied. Cree's battalion established itself there.

On April 21 an operation order was issued from Divisional Headquarters,
instructing Nine Brigade to secure positions on the Mapao-Molvom ridge two days
later. On the left, the 3/9th Jats were to capture a saddle and a small hump
called Wood Point, both a short distance north of Mapao. On the right the West
Yorkshires were to take Foston and Penhill. Brigadier Salomons launched the
attack on April 23. After Hurricanes had bombed and strafed Mapao, and the guns
of the 4th Field Regiment had added to the pall of smoke and dust, the 3/14th
Punjab fought their way into Mapao, and the Jats wound their way up the steep
hillside to the saddle, and attacked south along the ridge towards Mapao
Village. The operation succeeded on that side, but the West Yorkshires were
unable to gain a footing on their higher and more precipitous range of hills.

The beginning of May found Nine Brigade doing its utmost to clear the
tenacious Japanese from the ridge between Mapao and Point 4364, a distance of
six miles by the flight of an aircraft, but infinitely farther when each hump
and crest is followed from one peak to the next. While the 2nd West Yorkshires
were to hold a firm base on Wakan hill and send out fighting patrols to assail
the precipitous heights of Penhill and Foston, Furney's 3/14th Punjab were, with
a company of the 15/11th Sikhs under command, to attack the enemy troops holding
Hump and Twin Peaks.

During this period 89 Brigade, which had recently arrived in Imphal and was
now under General Briggs' command, would hold Sengmai, and clear the area of
Kanglatongbi and Ekban Ekwan. And Evans' 123 Brigade would operate from a firm
base held by the Dogras far up the Iril Valley. The 3/2nd Punjab would patrol
north and west, and the 2nd Suffolks would send patrols to Nurathen and to
Modbung, always on the alert for any change in the enemy's dispositions,
constantly seeking to disrupt his lines of supply by ambushing a mule convoy or
destroying a stores dump or attacking a group of enemy soldiers. Villages where
the Japanese habitually obtained food were raided. A basha in which some
enemy soldiers were sleeping was shot up, and heavy casualties inflicted. In the
course of these small raids and pinprick tactics, our troops inflicted upon the
enemy more loss than we ourselves incurred.

But the main battles during the first part of May were carried out by the
battalions of Nine Brigade. And no obstacle was more difficult to overcome, no
hill was more fiercely defended by the Japanese, than Hump, which faced the
3/14th Punjab as it looked north from Mapao and Wood Point. Before the month was
out, this battalion had attacked Hump no less than seven times, and had sent
patrols to test the defences on many other occasions. It was a corner slope, and
refused to yield, for all the effort, bravery, and loss of life. Soon Hump stood
out as a landmark on account of its bare face. Every wisp of greenery was
churned and burnt away by the shells and bombs that landed on that small piece
of hillside day after day, and often at night, when our Gunners were shooting
harassing fire at the stubborn enemy.

On May 2 Hump was attacked by two platoons, but the enemy threw grenades and
opened fire as our sepoys approached the top. Colonel Furney withdrew the
platoons. Two days later repeated attacks were launched, but all in vain. One
platoon was counterattacked by the Japanese when only ten yards from the summit.
It was estimated that the enemy was holding this feature with at least three
platoons, armed with a high proportion of automatic weapons. And by the 5th,
when the 3/14th attacked yet again, the defenders of Hump had been reinforced,
for the opposition was stiffer than ever.

The situation was serious. Nine Brigade was making no progress, and whatever
the total of casualties inflicted upon the Japanese, our own casualties were
mounting. It was decided that on May 20 Furney's battalion should attack in
strength, and to assist the building up of supplies for this operation, Salomons
had a jeep track built by 20 Field Company up the face of the hill to just below
Mapao.

But the attack on the 20th was no more successful than its predecessors.
Though one platoon did reach the top, it was forced to withdraw by
grenade-charger fire from the reverse slopes. On May 22 four platoons reached
the crest of Hump, after killing the occupants of at least six pillboxes, and
our men remained on the top for twenty-five minutes, lobbing grenades into
Japanese trenches and bunker positions. But eventually we were forced off owing
to a strong fusillade and showers of grenades from entrenched positions, as
before on the reverse slopes. These were the slopes that our Gunners found all
but impossible to hit, and the bombing and strafing by Hurricanes was
disappointing in its results. On the 24th the ridge between Everest and Hump was
strafed five times by our aircraft, but when patrols toiled up next morning, the
enemy proved himself to be still in very resolute possession of his points of
vantage. Attempts to gain a footing on the ridge between Hump and Twin Peaks and
then to attack Hump downhill from the opposite direction, the east, also failed.

At the end of May the Japanese defenders were still on top, having endured a
tremendous weight of shell and bomb and mortar fire. A prisoner reported that
the company holding the ridge was reduced to seventy men, and that food and
ammunition were running low. Given almost no respite by our Gunners, constantly
harassed, almost isolated from their fellows, often swathed in damp clouds,
sometimes wet from the early rains, these fanatics hung on to their solidly
constructed bunkers, and kept at bay our every jab, pinprick, and full-scale
onslaught. The monsoon broke in earnest on the 27th, and rain fell almost
without a break for forty-eight hours, turning every track into a morass, making
slippery every hillside path, and flooding many of the paddy fields.

The 2nd West Yorkshires had, during the first week of May, made attempts to
gain a footing on the ridge between Twin Peaks and Molvom. Patrolling had
disclosed that the enemy held all spurs running down from the ridge. Two efforts
were made to secure a feature christened with the Yorkshire name of Buttertubs.

On the first occasion the British troops were forced off the summit by
machine-guns cleverly sited on reverse slopes and in the long grass. The second
attempt was made by two companies, the one attacking Buttertubs direct, the
other marching farther up the valley and climbing to attack from the north near
Molvom. The latter company was delayed by the extremely difficult nature of the
ground, and had to advance in daylight, instead of under the cloak of the hour
before daybreak. When nearing Molvom the men were engaged by machine-guns and
grenade dischargers both from Buttertubs and another Japanese position to the
north. All officers and the company sergeant-major were killed or wounded. And
Colonel Cree had to withdraw the company. Major C. O'Hara, soon to be awarded
the D.S.O. for his fine leadership throughout the campaigns in Arakan and
Imphal, was wounded in the jaw and evacuated to hospital.

On May 5 a third attempt was made, but although one platoon of 'D' Company
did reach its objective on top of Buttertubs, and beat off a small
counter-attack, its strength was by this time so reduced by casualties that it
was unable to consolidate the ground won.

Meanwhile, the 3/9th Jats had been sent up the Iril Valley with the purpose
of attacking the enemy's line of communication in the Nurathen area. But the
plan was changed, and the battalion ordered to capture Point 4364. As, on the
morning of April 30, this hill was captured without opposition, Colonel Gerty
was now instructed to capture the Molvom ridge from the north, and so to help
the 3/14th Punjab in their battle for Hump, and the West Yorkshires' efforts to
gain a foothold on Twin Peaks and the main ridge.

The Jats had two main objectives: first Murree, a hill named after the famous
leave station above Rawalpindi, and then Everest, 5,521 feet, the highest peak
attacked by troops of the Division since leaving Amba Alagi three years before.
In moonlight two companies of Jats moved into thick cover on the eastern slopes
of Murree. At 7 a.m. on May 4, after an artillery concentration, 'A' and 'D'
Companies attacked. The lower slopes were quickly taken. While 'A' Company
consolidated, 'D' Company climbed farther up towards the main crest. Japanese
snipers and medium machine-guns were outflanked, and the position taken. Then
Colonel Gerty sent forward Major S. Lambert's 'C' Company to take Everest, four
hundred feet higher than Murree, and lying nine hundred yards to the south-west.
After nightfall Lambert's men crept to within half that distance ready for the
morning's attack.

Early on May 5 the Company attacked by two routes. The leading section on the
left hand was held up very soon after starting. Machine-guns and grenades made
it seemingly impossible for any man to go forward alive. But the right-hand
platoon did climb to within twenty yards of the summit. The main opposition came
from grenades thrown from trenches ten yards away. Every time the Jats charged
up the slope they were driven back by these hand grenades and by flanking
machine-guns. Meanwhile, grenade-discharger shells had burst in Lambert's
headquarters, and the wireless set belonging to the Gunner F.O.O. had been blown
down the hill. The aerial was blown off the small company wireless set, but this
was repaired. Major Lambert now committed his reserve platoon on the right side,
where the Jats had made least progress. Here the jungle was extremely thick.

Lambert walked forward to examine the situation. As he neared one of his
forward platoons, a hand grenade burst directly on him. He was instantly killed.

And at this point, when Lambert's company had already had forty-seven
casualties, Brigadier Salomons stopped all further attacks, and 'C' Company was
withdrawn from the slopes of Everest.

Nor was this line of attack pursued. Instead, two of Gerty's companies
remained to hold Murree and Point 4364, while the rest of the battalion moved
across to Nine Brigade's firm base on Wakan, and here relieved the West
Yorkshires, who moved into reserve by Runaway Hill. The Jats remained here three
weeks, operating against the enemy in the Everest-Penhill area, and patrolling
Japanese cookhouses, water points, rest areas, and all approaches to the Molvom
ridge. One notable exploit was the destruction by a platoon of sixty maunds of
rice, a serious loss to the rice-eating Japanese troops, who were already hard
put to it to slip food and ammunition through our screen and carry it up to the
hilltops. As 123 Brigade was now switched across to the main road by Sengmai and
Kanglatongbi, to join 89 Brigade, General Briggs entrusted to Nine Brigade the
task of denying to the enemy all use of the Iril River as an L. of C., and of
holding the ground vacated by 123 Brigade.

This Imphal battle was a prolonged fight against an enemy who approached from
every side. The green plain must be held. The Japanese must be driven from the
hills that had been lost or never defended during the initial onslaught. No hill
that dominated the plain, no ridge or crest from which the enemy could threaten
still further our very existence in Imphal, could left in his hands. One hill
after another was attacked by our aircraft, guns, and infantry. Time and again
our leading platoons were forced back from the summit by withering machine-gun
fire from well-concealed bunkers. The Japanese troops endured the bombardments
and constant harassing fire with a fortitude born of fanaticism. When our men
lost a hilltop, this had to be recaptured without delay. And patrols and columns
were sent up and down the valleys that ran round the foot of these hills, in
order to cut the Japanese supply routes and so to starve out the defenders on
high.

These were weeks of failure and success, of slogging effort, often severe
casualties. and infectious disappointment. But slowly the tide turned against
the enemy. Gradually his grip upon the framework to the plain was broken, for
all his tenacity and aggression. All this time the 17th, 20th, and 23rd Indian
Divisions were fighting south and east of Imphal. Their battles were of the
fiercest and most bloody nature. Brigades and battalions were switched from one
part of the front to another, depending on any new Japanese threat that had to
be smothered, or on a counter-offensive planned by our own commanders.

Every section, company, and battery within the Division was working at full
stretch. The Gunners, under the C.R.A., Brigadier Mansergh, dug their gunpits
out in the open paddy fields, or in small re-entrants among the hills. And they
fired day and night on targets that varied frequently, but were most often on
summits. At night the flash of the guns slashed the darkness that lay across the
Imphal plain. The thumping and the more distant explosions echoed round the
hillsides.

The Divisional Sappers, now commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. R.
Stileman, were hard pressed with the varied tasks laid upon them. Greatest of
these was the construction of jeep tracks up the sides of certain hills. These
tracks were needed to take supplies and ammunition to the fighting troops---on a
scale impracticable with mules at one---and to bring back on stretchers men who
had been wounded in battle. The building of such tracks was a formidable task,
involving rock blasting and the most skilful use of bulldozers. Culverts and
drainage systems were required, and places where two jeeps could pass. Water
storage cisterns, tarpaulin water tanks, water points and pumping equipment,
bridges, tank routes---all these had to be built, strengthened, improved. There
were mines and booby traps to render harmless and remove. Many of the tracks
used by the mules were inadequate and needed constant repair. The resources of
the three Field Companies and 44 Field Park Company (Major M. Keating) were
taxed to their limit even in dry weather. But when the monsoon came the work was
delayed and became far more difficult to achieve.

For Divisional Signals it was much the same. Problems faced their commander,
Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. C. Harrison, and had always to be overcome. The fact
that so many battles were fought on the hilltops meant telephone lines of
unusual length, and supplies of cable almost unprecedented in the Division's
past campaigns. Mile upon mile of cable that in dry weather crossed the paddy
fields on the ground had to be raised on poles when the rains flooded the
fields. To lay cables up hillsides while keeping clear of mule and jeep tracks
taxed the ingenuity of the Indian linemen---Madrassis, Punjabi Mussulmen, and
Sikhs. The dispatch-riders taking messages and official letters between brigade
and battalion headquarters had long distances to cover, and often when they
reached the foot of a hill no track existed for a motor-cycle. The hill had to
be climbed on foot, and this lengthened the twice-daily delivery round by
several hours.

For mule-drivers the Imphal siege was a nightmare, so great were the
distances they had to trudge, tugging their strings of mules from the valley up
to the summit, from the crest of one hill along a wooded ridge to the top of
another, and then down again to the valley and across the paddy fields on a
rough track that was deep in dust when not surfaced with soft mud. To keep the
far-scattered units of the Division supplied each day was a problem admirably
tackled by Lieutenant- Colonel R. A. Willis and the companies of the Royal
Indian Army Service Corps, which had to collect stores, rations, ammunition,
clothing and boots, saddles and straps for mules, and a thousand other items of
infinite variety and necessity.

* * * * * * *

It is necessary at this point to interrupt the narrative and to turn aside
from Imphal in order to return to Kohima and follow the final battles among the
Naga Hills, and the sequence of events that resulted.

By May 23 Brigadier Warren had collected his three battalions together once
more, and 161 Brigade was resting for a short period in Dimapur. On the 11th ,
after already severe fighting and several vain assaults, the 6th Brigade of the
2nd British Division and the 33rd Brigade of Messervy's Seventh Indian Division,
which was arriving at Dimapur from Arakan, had started a full-scale attack
against the main positions in Kohima still held by the Japanese: Kuki Picket,
F.S.D., D.I.S., and Jail Hills. More than half of these objectives were taken,
though at severe cost in killed and wounded. The 2nd Queens captured Jail Hill,
and the 4/15th Punjab took F.S.D. So confused did the fighting become that the
artillery were ordered to smoke the entire battleground, to allow our troops to
dig in. Such a rare smoke screen was a nightmare experience for the infantry.
Two days later, and after a day when fighting was prevented by the weather, the
ruins of the District Commissioner's Bungalow were recaptured. By the end of the
day, the whole of Kohima had been wrested from the enemy. So ended one of the
bloodiest periods of fighting known on any front. In this bitter struggle,
companies of the 1/1st Punjab and 4/7th Rajputs took over ground that had been
regained from the enemy. And the batteries of the 24th Mountain Regiment fired
thousands of rounds in support of those attacks.

A description has been preserved of Kohima at the end of the battle.

"There was not a tree standing that was not blasted and
littered; the more primitive houses were knocked flat, and others were holed and
battered beyond recognition. The place stank. The earth everywhere was ploughed
up with shell fire, and human remains lay rotting as the battle raged over them.
Flies swarmed everywhere, and multiplied with incredible speed. Men retched as
they dug in, and a priority task was to clear up as far as possible. But even
then the stink hung in the air and permeated one's clothes and hair. It made one
realize once again how sub-human the Japs were. A bunker was found in which
about twenty men had fought and lived for several days---a bunker littered with
their dead companions and their own excreta. These are memories one would like
to forget, but they are inevitably linked with the name 'Kohima' "(8).

Now 161 Brigade was placed under the command of the Seventh Indian Division,
which had completed its move from Arakan. Warren's troops took the place of 89
Brigade, which was now fighting under General Briggs in Imphal. The Division's
final objective was to capture Tuphema, some twenty-two miles south of Kohima,
thus guarding the 2nd Division's left flank. But its first task was to open the
track eastwards from Kohima to Jessami and, by operating in the hills north of
Kohima, to clear such villages as Cheswema and Nerhema, thereby protecting the
traffic using the main road between Dimapur and Kohima.

It was stressed by Fourteenth Army Headquarters that no effort must be spared
either by the 2nd or 7th Division to open the road to Imphal, for with the
monsoon rains falling it was becoming increasingly difficult to supply the
garrison by air. It was precisely with the object of delaying the opening of
this road to Imphal that the Japanese 31st Division was deployed north-east and
south of Kohima. The enemy planned to deny us the Jessami track as a base for
any outflanking move round his positions. For the first time on the Kohima front
the enemy was, on his own admission, on the defensive, and he was preparing for
stubborn if not desperate resistance. The hill country was formidable in its
nature, for the height ranged from 3,000 feet in the valleys to 8,000 feet on
the ridges, and any operations that aimed at speed were bound to be restricted
to the few roads and tracks. And the track to Tuphema would not be passable even
to jeeps, once the monsoon rains fell in their full deluge.

But problems of supply and movement also faced the Japanese troops, whose
lines of communication were long and tedious. Rice and meat they might find
where they did battle, but not ammunition, which had to be carried through the
wild hills from the distant Chindwin River. The lengths of the enemy's two main
supply routes both exceeded a hundred miles.

On the southern front of Kohima, Grover's 2nd British Division was to attack
along the Aradura Spur towards Phesema. Having captured these, the advance would
be pressed south along the road to Imphal. On May 27-28 Grover's battalions
attacked the Aradura Spur and, although not all objectives were attained,
considerable ground was gained in the face of the most tenacious resistance. The
Japanese found themselves obliged to counterattack, but to no abiding effect.

During the first fortnight of June the 2nd Division made strenuous efforts to
dislodge the Japanese from the line they were defending between Viswema, Kidima,
and Kekrima. Here was encountered fierce opposition. Here were fought most
bloody engagements, and the British battalions made several vain and costly
assaults against the enemy's positions before they achieved success. But once
the Japanese main defence line had been broken, the Division's advance became
more rapid, for the enemy offered but intermittent and temporary resistance from
hastily prepared positions at various points along the Imphal road.

Meantime, 114 Brigade advanced along the Jessami track, and 161 Brigade under
General Messervy's direction had begun to pursue the enemy northwards along the
Bokajan track, and to drive him from the villages north and north-east of
Kohima, centred upon Merema and Chedema. On June 6 the news of the invasion of
France coincided happily with the successful opening of the Brigade's drive
along the jeep track. But the monsoon weather appalled all who fought beneath
its teeming fury. It barely ceased to rain, and the mules of the battalions and
of the 24th Mountain Regiment in support were generally walking hock deep in
mud. The mule drivers performed an outstanding service in ferrying stores and
ammunition to the forward troops, an achievement only equalled by the young
Indian jeep drivers who drove their loaded jeeps and trailers along the
treacherous tracks, bringing ammunition to the guns without fail, but living
through nightmare journeys to do so.

At this period a special jeep supply column was formed from a London
Territorial Regiment. In its ranks were numbered many London taxi-drivers.
General Messervy tells a story of one of these jeep crews. "All races
produce tough, brave soldiers, but only the British soldier really has that
sense of decency and kindly humanity which nothing can upset.

"A Jap was seen skulking in a bush near Jessami, by the
side of the track. Out leapt the Gunners and seized him.

" 'Shall we
kill the little bastard ? It's what he and his like deserve.'

"A mile
farther on they had a puncture, and it was 'Come on, Tojo, give us a hand:'

"By the time Kohima was reached, 'Tojo' was a mascot, if not a
friend."

By June 10 the Brigade were nineteen miles along the Jessami track, with the
4/7th Rajputs in Kekrima, and the Royal West Kents at Chakabama. For two days
the Rajputs were blocked by the Japanese on a hill named Charlie, but when the
1/1st Punjab made an outflanking march to skirt Kekrima to the north-east and
occupied three hills aptly named Faith, Hope, and Charity, the enemy withdrew.
The '5th saw 161 Brigade in Pfutse-Ro, but faced with ever-increasing problems
of supply and maintenance, problems raised by the monsoon and by the extended
line of communication.

On June 17 the two Indian battalions cut the Tuphema-Kharasom track, along
which the Japanese had left ample evidence of their recent flight: dead mules,
discarded boots, clothing, recently opened fish and meat tins, ashes of camp
fires-some still smoking ---and fresh footprints. The 1/1st Punjab reached
Milestone 78 on this track next day, but beyond this point 161 Brigade's advance
farther west was blocked by heavy landslides. Accordingly, the Brigade was
brought back to the Imphal road, while the 1/1st Punjab remained to guard the
Kharasom track until relieved by the Bombay Grenadiers of 268 Brigade, which
arrived to take over the positions of Brigadier Warren's three battalions.

So soon as the road to Imphal was opened, 161 Brigade moved into Imphal, and
33 Brigade of Messervy's Seventh Division was sent across country to eject the
enemy from Ukhrul, operating with columns from the 20th and 23rd Indian
Divisions.

But the sequence of events has been forestalled, and we must return to the
battlefront of Imphal, to follow the hard-fought advance of the Fifth Indian
Division northwards up the road to Kohima, to meet the 2nd Division and to crush
the fast losing Japanese like nuts in a nutcracker.

* * * * * * *

During the second half of May Evans' 123 Brigade battled north from Sengmai
to gain ground along the Kohima road. The ground was difficult, the jungle
thick, and the site of our dumps in Kanglatongbi wired and mined. Astride the
road the three battalions took their turn in hammering at the Japanese. The guns
of the 28th Field Regiment supported our attacks, and Hurricanes of the Royal
Air Force bombed and strafed enemy-held positions when called upon to do so.
Road-blocks had to be cleared, enemy troops driven from bends in the road, from
hillocks that overlooked this road, from stream beds and patches of jungle on
the right of the road.

89 Brigade was also fighting up the road. But for a week almost no progress
was made. Then the Japanese did quit a low hill named Pyramid, on the left of
the road, that had delayed our advance, and 123 Brigade moved forward to the
northern outskirts of Kanglatongbi, sixteen miles north of Imphal itself. Then
General Briggs changed his plans, for it was now of the first importance that
the road towards Kohima be opened. The Japanese on Hump and Twin Peaks and
Molvom must stay where they were, prevented from taking the offensive against
our flank, and perhaps a successful drive up the road below them would force
them to leave their sternly defended hilltops.

Accordingly, at the beginning of June Nine Brigade was brought across to the
road, to reinforce Brigadier Evans' three battalions, the 2nd Suffolks, 3/2nd
Punjab, and 1/17th Dogras.

While 89 Brigade took over our positions on Wakan, Mapao, and Runaway Hill,
and Nine Brigade settled into Sengmai and Kanglatongbi, Evans' 123 Brigade,
which had been fighting up this road for some weeks, continued to battle its way
forward along the line of foothills that ran parallel with the road on the
eastern side below Molvom.

Such a move was no easy one. Space had to be found to house each battalion,
Brigade Headquarters, and the Gunner Regiment attached (in this case 4th Field
Regiment commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel George Bastin). There was no direct
route across, and vehicles, men, and mules had either to go right back into
Imphal and out again along the main road to Kohima, or find their way by a
series of rough tracks made by cutting down the earth bunds that cut the paddy
fields into rectangles. And when the rains came many of these tracks became at
once unusable.

On the 6th it was Nine Brigade's turn to take the lead. While Furney's 3/14th
Punjab set out on a left hook to cut the road behind the enemy at a culvert
nicknamed London Bridge, the West Yorkshires prepared to assault a low hill on
the left-hand side of the road called Zebra. After an airstrike on the 6th and
an artillery concentration upon Zebra early on the morning of the 7th, 'C'
Company under Major J. B. Miller, supported by tanks of the 7th Cavalry, moved
forward to attack. 'B' Company guarded the L. of C. of the 3/14th Punjab, while
'D' Company and another troop of Stuart tanks took up positions to guard the
flat, open ground on the right of the road, by the Imphal Turel. Before the
attack began, 'A' Company had moved round behind Zebra.

It should be noted here that the Divisional artillery, under Brigadier
Mansergh, was restricted to six rounds per day per gun. This had to include
defensive and harassing fire, and was only relaxed when a regiment was shooting
in support of a set-piece attack.

The attack succeeded, and Miller's men took Zebra, though the ground had to
be fought for yard by yard. The Japanese from their bunkers defended stubbornly,
and had to be driven out from one position after the other. The objective was
not finally taken until six o'clock that evening, and the West Yorkshire company
was heavily mortared during the night. And next day a Japanese light machine-gun
suddenly started firing in the middle of our positions. It was quickly silenced.
The tanks were held up on the road by mines, and Lieutenant Yearsley in charge
of the Sapper mine-detecting party that went forward with the leading infantry
platoon was wounded.

Our own casualties were twenty, mostly wounded, and twenty-six Japanese
bodies were recovered after the battle. Further advance up the main road was for
the time being prevented by a road-block three hundred yards north of Zebra.
This block was covered by a 75 mm. gun and a platoon of Japanese. When 'D'
Company and a troop of the 3rd Dragoon Guards tried to clear the obstacle, they
were forced to withdraw.

Meanwhile, the 3/14th had been engaged in heavy fighting in the enemy's rear.
They had come on to the road a little farther south than intended, and were
attacked throughout the night of June 8/9. 'C' Company under Major Anthony
crossed the road and secured one of the line of hills east of the road. It was
named Squeak, the centre of three, the others being Pip and Wilfred. The latter
was held by the enemy, who attacked Anthony's men three times during the night
of their arrival. When the Punjabis tried to evict the Japanese from Wilfred
they were unable to do so. Colonel Furney had brought the rest of his battalion
up to London Bridge, distinctive by its white railings on either side of the
road, and on the night of the 9th/10th a large force of fifty Japanese soldiers
bumped into the Punjabi positions and were scattered and mauled by firing.
Fourteen bodies were counted next morning, and much wireless and other equipment
was collected. But time was pressing. The road could not be opened until the
road-block was cleared. The 3/14th Punjab had taken three days' rations on their
march, and had now to be supplied by parachute drop, but this was difficult in
the area involved, and certain important items could not be dropped without
considerable warning being given. Anthony's company on Squeak was alone and
surrounded, with the enemy sending jitter parties, even though they did not
launch a serious attack.

But in the meantime 123 Brigade had made good progress along the ridge of
foothills east of the road. Led by the 2nd Suffolks (now commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel K. C. Menneer), they had attacked two features named Isaac
and James, by Modbung village, throughout the first nine days of June. The
fighting had been severe, and when the Sappers built a track up to the summit
and the tanks climbed up to assist the infantry, they got into difficulty. One
tank slid over the edge of a spur and had to be abandoned. The monsoon rains had
made the slopes slippery, and the tanks needed winches to enable them to reach
the crest of the hill. The country was thickly wooded; the hills were surrounded
by waterways that made any advance still more difficult than it would otherwise
have been against a determined enemy.

All day long on June 7 the Suffolks attacked Isaac, but were held up by enemy
troops on the reverse slopes. In the day's fighting we lost nine killed and
twenty-eight wounded. On the 8th a strike by Hurricanes produced little result,
and one of the tanks was hit and blew up; the crew escaped.

Next day Isaac was cleared, and the 3/9th Jats climbed up to Modbung to
resume the advance. This was on the 11th, and the attack was successful.. Three
tanks had roared up to the top, and waited in the cover of thick trees to help
the Jat companies forward along the line of hills. But there was no need, for
when the infantry went forward that afternoon they found that the enemy had
vanished into the valleys. We secured all the hills, and the Jats linked up with
the 3/14th Punjab company on Squeak.

That same morning tanks and the West Yorkshires cleared the road-block, after
an intense concentration by mortars. The enemy left sixteen dead. Meanwhile the
3/14th had pushed up the road as far as the ruined village of Safarmaina, and
the road was clear to that point by the evening of June 12.

On June 13 the Jats advanced northwards from Squeak to Wilfred. They had
orders to brush aside slight enemy opposition and, when the main Japanese
defences were encountered, to consolidate their ground. Three days' rain had
made the very steep slopes of this ridge slippery. It was impossible to supply
the leading companies by mule. Trees grew thickly on the hills, and even where
the jungle had clearings, these were covered in high elephant grass that impeded
our progress. The leading Jat company under Major Sanson drove some enemy
outposts off a knob called Eye. And when 'C' Company passed through to occupy
Button, another thousand yards farther north along the ridge, the enemy offered
no resistance.

Jat patrols now crept through the jungle to probe the defences of the main
hill along this ridge, Liver. There seemed to be little opposition. But this
supposition proved to be false, when an attack was made at half-past two by
Captain Muskett's guerilla platoon and a platoon of Rowling's 'A' Company, led
by a newly joined officer named Armstrong. The Japanese on Liver threw down
scores of grenades. Their four machine-guns took a saddening toll. Armstrong and
his jemadar were killed, Muskett was wounded by a grenade, and the 'B' Company
platoon suffered in all twenty-four wounded and two killed out of a strength of
twenty-seven.

The Jat, probably the best farmer in Northern India, comes from the Eastern
Punjab, Delhi Province, the Rajputana States and the United Provinces. In the
Hindu hierarchy he occupies a position below that of the Rajput, who is of the
warrior class that for so long strongly opposed the Muslim invasion of India.
But the Jat has also a long and memorable history as a fighting man. He is a
great lover of animals and all living creatures, and venerates the cow as a
sacred animal almost more than does even the Brahmin. Possibly this explains his
inordinate love of milk and of foods made from milk. Some Jats, especially those
from the Eastern Punjab, never touch meat in any form, and dislike any dish
prepared from animals, birds or fish.

The Jat is of independent character, somewhat intolerant of those he does not
know, but his sense of humour is marked. And he loves a party round a communal
huqqa, which he produces and lights on every possible, and sometimes
impossible, occasion.

On the cross-roads below Eye, in the ruins of what had been Safarmaina
village, the West Yorkshires had established their headquarters, and on the road
thronged men and mules, jeeps and the tanks of Major Dimsdale's squadron of the
3rd Carabiniers, now supporting Nine Brigade. All day and all night the rain
poured down. The Jats on the ridge, having neither bedding nor waterproof
sheets, remained soaking wet for hours on end. Even those more fortunate
soldiers who had tents or tarpaulins, or members of Brigade Headquarters who
lived in derelict lorries that had been towed from a nearby dump, found it hard
to keep dry. Puddles grew wider and deeper. Water rushed down the hillsides,
flooded the streams that already were foaming brown torrents, and tore down
plank bridges. The river, which had been fordable at knee-depth, was now
swirling branches along at great speed. And men who undressed and tried to ford
the torrent were, soon out of their depth. Soldiers squelched through inches of
water in the fields, and hoisted themselves up slippery paths by means of
branches and telephone cables. The mules laden with supplies for the Jats
struggled and kicked and floundered up the muddy hillside. Over the dark green
peaks to the west of the road hung a white mist, and the whole valley became
more depressing and sombre as the hours passed. Even the sun when it broke
through the low clouds did little to relieve the gloom that prevailed.

The date was now June 15. After an early strafe by Hurricanes, Liver was
attacked by Major Risal Singh's 'A' Company of Jats. When two platoons reached
within a hundred yards of the top, fierce fire from bunkers on neighbouring
hills held up the climbing infantry, whose sole line of approach was a bare
spur. As had occurred before, our shells and bombs, far from ousting the enemy,
had effectually diminished what cover grew on the upper slopes. Risal Singh
withdrew his men to allow the tanks and guns to fire a concentration, but this
failed to silence the Japanese machine-guns, which, as usual, were placed where
artillery fire could not reach them. Then a platoon from 'C' Company pushed up
from Button by way of Carter to within twenty yards of the crest of Liver, only
to be driven back by showers of grenades.

Later, as a result of a two minutes' concentration on Liver and its
neighbouring hilltops, and of a prolonged burst of firing from two troops of
tanks at all the re-entrants separating these features, 'C' Company (Major J.
Campbell) was able to secure Carter. Here the Jats spent a terrible night in
pouring rain, overlooked by the Japanese on Liver at a range of one hundred
yards. Next day Colonel Gerty had to withdraw the company.

In the meantime Cree's West Yorkshires had been ordered to capture an enemy
road-block that was level with Liver but divided from the hills by the flooded,
swirling Imphal Turel. The three buildings shown on the map had been nicknamed
Driffield, and the nullahs through the jungle there were known as Swale, Ouse,
and Avon. One company was to infiltrate round the flank and cut the road behind
Driffield at a low ridge called Octopus. When this had been reached, a second
company supported by tanks would advance along the road, with a 'scissors'
bridge to enable the broken bridge to be crossed.

While moving across a nullah, the leading 'D' Company, commanded by Major
Brian Sellars, were suddenly fired at from two directions out of the close
jungle. Sellars and his second-in-command, Mallinson, being mortally wounded,
refused to be carried back, for this would have endangered other men's lives.
But Sellars ordered his company, who had in these brief and alarming moments
suffered many casualties, to make their way back. They should try to cross the
road and rejoin the battalion by way of the more open strip of country near the
Imphal Turel. This was done, and small parties of West Yorkshires did succeed in
getting back in the course of that disastrous day. But of a total of three
officers and seventy-four other ranks who set out, only the Company
Sergeant-Major and forty-seven men returned. And of these, twenty had been
wounded. The remainder of the operation was cancelled.

The Division was not making progress. Something new must be tried, for
neither the West Yorkshires nor the Jats could make headway against resolute and
well-prepared enemy resistance. General Slim had ordered that the limit of our
northward advance from Imphal should be Kangpokpi, a village another seven miles
ahead. But it seemed that even this would be reached first by the hurrying 2nd
British Division, which had by now reached Milestone 78, thirty miles south of
Kohima.

General Briggs conferred with Salomons at Nine Brigade Headquarters. It was
decided that the 3/14th Punjab, now commanded by Lieutenant- Colonel H. C. A.
Baker, who had been second-in-command for a long period, were to make a left
hook through the jungle. The road was to be cut behind the Japanese, and the low
feature called Octopus seized. Possession of this would give our troops a
dominating position by the road. The object would be to force the enemy holding
Liver and Driffield to retire, for fear of being cut off and destroyed

The battalion set off on June 19, and by eight o'clock next morning had
reached their assembly point on the left Rank. When the guerilla platoon
reported that the bend in the road by Octopus was clear of enemy troops, Baker
sent his companies forward to occupy the hill. This was achieved without mishap,
but during the afternoon the two leading companies were attacked three times by
the Japanese, who realized the danger of Indian troops in their rear, and made
fierce efforts to oust them before they could establish firm positions. But
every attack was repulsed.

Meanwhile, a still wider left hook had been ordered, this time for 123
Brigade. The 3/2nd Punjab and 11/7th Dogras had been sent through the jungle on
the left flank with the object of cutting the road in two places near to
Keithelnambi, three miles south of Kangpokpi. It had been intended that the
Dogras should cross the road at Milestone 109 (from Dimapur) and establish two
companies on hills near Heinoupok on the east of the road, behind Liver; but
progress through the jungle was seriously delayed by heavy rain, which impeded
both porters and mules, who were hard pressed enough making their way without
tracks to follow.

On the morning of June 21, a day on which the 2nd Division advanced sixteen
miles as far as Milestone 103, three squadrons of Hurribombers bombed and
strafed Liver for half an hour. Then 'A' and 'C' Companies of Gerty's Jats, who
had lain in cover on the bank of the Imphal Turel, advanced up to capture a
lower knob called Pill, just above the road and to the west below Liver. Its
possession would give our troops a much needed alternative axis of advance on
the summit. Twenty minutes later the artillery fired a concentration so close to
Risal Singh's men that three sepoys were wounded by our own shells, but this was
worth it, for Pill was taken. The enemy had left their trenches when the
shelling began, and had not time to reoccupy their defences before the Jats
rushed in and drove the Japanese off the hillock.

At one o'clock a second airstrike was delivered, this time not on Liver
itself but on Milk Loaf, a feature that overlooked it from the north, five
hundred yards away. During this, bombardment Risal Singh and two platoons had
climbed up from Pill, Major J. Campbell had brought his 'C' Company up towards
Liver from the south-west, and was lying up in thick cover two hundred yards
from the top, and Sanson's 'D' Company had worked forward from Button towards
Carter. Another platoon was to get astride the spur joining Liver and Milk Loaf,
and so take the enemy in the rear. The Jats would in this way approach from four
different directions.

Then, at half past one, the 4th and 28th Field Regiments, aided by a troop of
8th Medium Regiment, fired a concentration that lasted three minutes and
provided spectators with an awe-inspiring spectacle as the shells tore into the
hillsides, ripped off branches, splintered trees, flung up earth, and covered
Liver in smoke and dust. The three Jat companies climbed up as far as was safe,
and Risal Singh took one bump below Liver and above Pill. But while
reconnoitring for a further advance, this fine officer, who had won a Military
Cross on Numshigum, was killed by a burst of machine-gun fire from a Japanese
bunker. This was a severe loss to the battalion. Major Campbell left Risal
Singh's company where it was, and went on with two platoons to attack Liver. He,
in his turn, was held up by savage fire that crackled down the bare slope.
Meanwhile, the platoon trying to force itself on to the spur behind Liver had
lost many men in the attempt, and Sanson's men had only been able to gain a
footing on the slopes of Liver. Though a few Jats did get on the summit, they
were beaten off by grenades and fire from Milk Loaf.

In view of the many casualties suffered, Colonel Gerty ordered his companies
to consolidate where they were for the night. At dawn next day Jat patrols found
Liver and Milk Loaf abandoned. The Japanese, having had enough, had slipped away
by night. The 3/9th Jats had lost thirty-three officers and men killed, and 111
wounded in the fighting that week.

On June 22 men of the 1/17th. Dogras met troops of the 2nd British Division
at Milestone 109 on the Kohima-Imphal road. At two o'clock that afternoon a
formal meeting by the roadside took place between Lieutenant- General Stopford,
commanding Thirty-Three Corps, and Major-General Grover, commander of the 2nd
Division, on the one hand, and, on the other, Brigadier Salomons of Nine
Brigade. The road had been opened after prolonged efforts and severe loss of
life. And that night the first convoy drove into Imphal from the north, the
headlights shining into the darkness like a beacon of victory.

Nine Brigade was now withdrawn into reserve in hospital buildings north-west
of Imphal, while 123 Brigade stayed for a few days in the area of Keithelmanbi,
before moving to the south of Imphal, towards Bishenpur and Buri Bazaar.

The decisive battle had ended. Imphal had been relieved. The Japanese forces
had received a severe mauling on the plain and surrounding hills. Indeed, the
flower of their army had been destroyed. They had attacked long after such
attacks could achieve any result. And the enemy was now faced with no
alternative but to retreat south and west through the hills towards the
Chindwin, at the height of the monsoon.

General Briggs asked for a rest. He had been told by General Scoones that
operations would stop for the monsoon, and that we should not advance beyond the
34th milestone south of Imphal. The plan for this had already been made, and now
Briggs told Scoones that he felt stale, having had no break since the beginning
of the war. General Auchinleck had asked for either Messervy or Briggs to
command Ranchi area, the training ground for Burma. The two events coincided.
Briggs accepted the new post, and General Slim agreed. If ever a man deserved a
rest it was Briggs, but for the Division he had led for two years in Desert and
jungle his departure was a tragedy.