Let’s get one thing clear: President Barack Obama’s upcoming media blitz, to include interviews on six television networks and a primetime Oval Office address, is not going to rally the public behind U.S.-led airstrikes in Syria.

It’s hard to fault Obama for trying. The belief in the dominant president who moves the country and the government through strong leadership has deep roots in American political culture. We frequently attribute extraordinary persuasiveness to the chief executives Americans revere most — from George Washington and Abraham Lincoln to Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan. These past masters of the bully pulpit moved the public when they needed to do so. Or did they?

Actually, we know better. Even great communicators typically failed to move the public to support their initiatives. Bill Clinton, “the great explainer,” could not win public backing for his economic stimulus bill or his cornerstone proposal for reforming the health-care system. Nor did the public (or congressional Republicans) support his 1999 bombing in the Balkans.

The public moved against increased defense spending as soon as Reagan took the oath of office, and he never achieved even plurality support for his high-priority policy of aiding the Contras in Nicaragua. Nor could he convince the public to support limiting domestic policy expenditures or environmental regulations. Rescuing Americans in Grenada was an easier sell.

World War II posed the greatest crisis of the twentieth century. FDR, the century’s supreme politician, was continually frustrated in his efforts to convince Americans to rearm and aid their allies against Adolf Hitler’s onslaught. It took events in Europe and then Pearl Harbor, not a fireside chat, to change voters’ minds. The president’s plan to “pack” the Supreme Court split the Democratic Party, gave birth to the Conservative Coalition, and effectively ended the New Deal.

These presidents were not stymied in their efforts to persuade the public because they avoided engaging the public, framed their positions ineffectively, or articulated their views in unappealing terms. They failed because of the nature of public opinion and the president’s communication environment.

The president faces strong competition for the public’s attention, and most people are not attentive to him. Barely a tenth of the population watched Obama’s 2013 State of the Union address. Moreover, many people who do pay attention miss the president’s points, and the less people know, the more confidence they have in their pre-existing beliefs and resist factual information. A desire to avoid risk and distrust of government make people wary of policy initiatives, especially when they are complex and their consequences are uncertain, as is the case with virtually every proposal for a major shift in public policy and undoubtedly is the case of military action against Syria.

What’s more, the opposition gets to have its say. Committed, well-organized, and well-funded opponents can undermine the White House’s efforts to write its own narrative and place the president’s performance in a favorable light. Republicans are not accepting the White House view that attacking Syria will weaken Assad and deter his use of chemical weapons. Then there’s partisanship, which is especially likely to bias perceptions, interpretations, and responses to the president. Most people seek out information confirming their opinions and ignore or reject arguments that contradict their predispositions.

The deep polarization of today’s politics only exacerbates these tendencies. Why should we be surprised that Republicans are less likely than Democrats to support military actions against Syria? Partisanship trumps the party’s traditional hawkish outlook on world affairs. Meanwhile, the Internet, cable television, and talk radio amplify the strident differences among partisan elites and facilitate the public’s selective exposure to information through “narrowcasting” to particular audiences.

Is there any reason to think Syria is different? One might think that opinion about military action against Syria would be fluid because the issue is relatively new. The president would be wise to couch his presentation in terms of a unique situation posing a grave threat to the nation’s security rather than the general international responsibilities of a humane superpower. The latter frame activates opinions that counsel against taking action.

Nevertheless, the president is unlikely to change many opinions. Those least likely to change are Republicans, the core constituency of the House majority. Although one wing of the GOP favors a more aggressive foreign policy, few Republican voters trust the president. And even those inclined to hear his argument will note the relative lack of international support for U.S. action. Meanwhile, a range of partisan leaders they do trust is signaling that opposing a strike is the wiser course.

The president might have better luck with his fellow Democrats. Many will remain opposed to attacking Syria because of their deep opposition to violence in international relations. A few others, and it will be at most a few, may be moved by their general predisposition to support their party’s leader. This calculation explains why administration officials have fanned out to liberal outfits such as MSNBC and the Center for American Progress in recent days.

But barring dramatic events in Syria itself, the world will not change on Tuesday. Partisan politics will not stop at the water’s edge, and the president is unlikely to substantially increase public support for military action against Syria. It’s not because, as you’ll hear often in the days ahead, he’s a pale shadow of great presidents of yore; it’s just the way American politics really works.

George C. Edwards III is university distinguished professor of political science and Jordan chair at Texas A&M University. His most recent book is Overreach: Leadership in the Obama Presidency.