Paper given at the 11th Annual Computers and Philosophy
Conference in Pittsburgh (PA), Saturday, August 10, 10:00 - 10:50 a.m.

Mike Sandbothe

The Transversal Logic of the World Wide Web

A Philosophical Analysis

Introduction

Media forge our image of reality. This holds for media in the broad, in the
narrow, and in the narrowest sense. By media in the broad sense I understand
the forms of perception of space and time. They function as the fundamental
medium of our perception and cognition in making objects synthesizeable as objects,
i.e. as identifiable entities. This insight lies at the root of the "Copernican
revolution" with which Kant prepared the fundament of modern philosophy.
Post-Kantian philosophy, from Nietzsche, Hegel, Heidegger,
Dewey and the late Wittgenstein through to Derrida, Goodman and Rorty has demonstrated
that the strength of this fundament lies in its flexibility, openness and changeability.
Our spatio-temporal "ways of worldmaking"1 are
not a rigid, uniform and ahistorical apparatus. The media for human construction
of reality are forged far more by pictorial, linguistic and textual systems
of signs, which are historically contingent and culturally divergent.

Image, language and writing are what's meant when I talk of media in the
narrow sense. They have stood at the centre of many philosophical discussions
in the twentieth century. The concern has always been to identify one or several
of these media as being the transcendental basis of human understanding of reality
altogether, or, at least, of the world-picture characteristic of Western culture.
The spectrum reaches from analytic philosophy's
"linguistic turn"2 and the diverse misunderstandings
triggered by Derrida's early concept of a philosophical "grammatology",
through to contemporary proclamations of a "pictorial turn".3

It is currently becoming impossible to ignore the fact that neither media
in the broad sense, nor media in the narrow sense represent fixed, unchanging
structures which offer a firm footing for philosophical theory. The way we deal
with them depends far more on institutional and technological developments which
are taking place in the realm of media in the narrowest sense. This already holds for the influence which the printed media,
radio and above all television have attained over our understanding of space
and time as well as over our use of pictures, sounds and letters.4
Given the influence that interactive data networks such as the Internet have
on our perception and on our semiotic practice, the intertwined relationships
existing between media in the broad, narrow and narrowest sense are becoming
obvious. Space, time and identity are being inflected anew in the Internet.
The traditional demarcation between image, language and writing is beginning
to move in a radical way. With interactive data-networks the digital revolution
is becoming the driving force of a comprehensive transformation which is redefining
the practices by which we handle signs and, with this, the bedrock of our understanding
of reality. In the following I shall look into this transformation process in
three steps.

In the first step I shall expand upon the influence of the Internet on our
experience of space and time as well as our concept of personal identity. This
takes place, on the one hand, in the example of text-based Internet services
(IRC, MUDs, MOOs), and through the World Wide Web's (WWW) graphical user-interface
on the other. In the second part I will show how the World Wide Web's hypertextuality
in particular sets in motion the semiotic demarcations between image, language
and writing which had become usual in the Gutenberg Galaxy. In the third, and
final, part I will try to name some of the implications these changes have for
the philosophical concepts of rationality and reason.

Part 1: Space, Time and Identity in the Internet

The Net opens up a new world to us. And it does it in another way as for instance
a trip with the car or aeroplane. When we fly from Berlin to Pittsburgh we also
arrive in another world in which, partially, other laws dominate. But the basic
coordinates of our understanding of reality - space, time, identity - remain
unchanged. It is different when we leave 'real' life and proceed into the Net.
The world becomes 'virtual'. The constitution of reality becomes a different
one. 'Virtual reality' steps in taking the place of 'real life'.

The terms 'real' and 'virtual' are reflexive terms similar to the opposition
of natural and artificial. Things only ever appear 'real' or 'virtual' from
a particular perspective. If one considers the oberver's relativity then it's
no surprise that the on-line world already seems more real to many professional
Net-surfers than the 'real' world outside of the Net. I do not associate normative
implications of any kind with the real-virtual opposition. I use this only to
differentiate varying forms of construction of reality from one another on the
descriptive level.

How does the virtual reality of cyberspace affect our concept of identity?
To begin with, it seems, not at all. Since in the Net too I'm usually out and
about with my everyday or my academic identity. I procure myself bibliographical
information from the Library of Congress, make contributions to philosophical
mailing lists to which I've subscribed, or confer with colleagues around the
world via e-mail. At the same time, however, I also have the opportunity in
the Net to set off to the anonymous channels of IRC or the fantasy environment
of a MUD or MOO. There I can present myself with an invented identity X or Y
according to the context. Of course, I could also do this "in real life"
in some bar or other. But limits are imposed on me by my appearance, my gender,
my physical and my social identity. This is not the case in the Net. In the
Net, the hidden complexity which is today already characteristic for our everyday
concept of identity becomes explicit. In cyberspace we can consciously start
to live in a wickerwork of plural identities. Sherry Turkle in her book Life
on the Screen. Identity in the Age of the Internet (1995)
puts this in the following way: "The Internet has become a significant
social laboratory for experimenting with the constructions and reconstructions
of self that characterize postmodern life. In its virtual reality, we self-fashion
and self-create." 5

But it's not just the traditional concept of personal identity, but the ordinary
experience of space underlying this concept which is transformed by the virtual
Net-world. As a cursor-identity I move quite independently of the real world
and its geographical distances. I move in the Net's digital space and beam myself
from continent to continent without any role being played by real separation.
As such, even when I'm out and about in the Net under my normal academic's identity,
I still find myself in virtual mode. In cyberspace everything is present here
and now. This leads to change in our experience of time. On IRC, in the MUDs
and MOOs there is no night. It is always day. Somewhere in the world people
are always awake to populate the Net's countless meeting places. There is no
unitary, somehow natural time which partners in communication could presuppose
as self-evident. Rather they must inform one another about their respective
local times and adjust for the differences if they want to meet on the Net.
The horizons of time are in constant motion. But neither time nor space disappear
in the on-line world. Both are reinvented in the narrative worlds of the MUDs
and MOOs. In the communicative landscapes of the Internet people have the possibility
to construct the times and spaces in which they act. That means that in contrast
to TV and computer games produced for stand-alone computers the interactive
world of the Internet does not force people into given simulations of space
and time, but allows them to experience space and time as changeable and creative
constructions of their narrative and cooperative imagination. In MUDs and MOOs
an active theatralization of time and space is taking place. Every participant
with programming rights becomes the architect and the artistic director of a
virtual theatre on the stages of which the basic structures of our perception
themselves become the object of the production. One could even say: the Internet
makes the esoteric conception of time and spaces developed by Kant in the Transcendental
Aesthetics of the Critique of Pure Reason exoteric, i.e. an object
of shared everyday experience.

Whereas until now I have gone into the changes relevant not primarily to the
World Wide Web, but to text-based Internet services such as IRC, MUDs and MOOs,
I shall now concentrate on the specific features of the World Wide Web.

My Web page is a double of my self, in some cases even the creative invention
of a new self, of a new identity, which I had previously hidden from myself
and others, and which now mediatively interacts with other people in my absence.
The particularity in the World Wide Web's media structure lies not least in
this new dimension against telephone and television, that of a so to speak 'a-present'
interactivity independent of my real presence. Through this our identity is
pluralized in its rudiments. The images we have of ourselves and which others
have of us gain a life of their own independent of our presence. These plural
identities stand in intertwined relations to other real and virtual Net identities
which we act under in different contexts on the Net. Our Net personality is
composed of a mesh of varying roles, identities and functions, which we can
strictly isolate from, or consciously link with one another. Let me quote Sherry
Turkle again, she writes: "If we take the home page as a real estate metaphor for
the self, its decor is postmodern. Its different rooms with different styles
are located on computers all over the world. But through one's efforts, they
are brought together to be of a piece."6 So much
for my reflections on the philosophical aspects of identity, space and time
on the interactive Internet. In the second part I will analyse the semiotics
of hypertextuality.

Part 2: The Semiotics of Hypertextuality

Traditionally in philosophy (for instance for Plato or
Aristotle) language and writing, as abstract and arbitrary sign systems, are
contrasted with images, as a concrete and natural medium for representation7.
And even today several philosophers think that the difference between linguistic,
textual and pictorial signs is a difference which is founded in the semantic
or syntactical structure of the respective system of signs.8
These assumptions contrast with the thesis, which goes back to the late Wittgenstein,
that a sign is first defined through its usage as a image, as a sound or as
a letter.9 It is insisted by various authors however that
even in conditions of a usage-theory of signs there be a unitary and even universal
way of applying something as image, as language or as writing. At the base of
this view is the idea that certain features of the usage are to be named which
distinguish 'image games', 'language games' or 'writing games' as being image
games, language games or writing games. These general features are to permit the internally unitary definition
of the varying sign games and the clear division of the different sorts of sign
from one another through a usage theory of signs.10

One must object to this that a consistent execution of
a pragmatic usage theory of signs would indicate that we have to deal with complex
bundles of image, language and writing games which too will exhibit no unitary
feature common to all elements of the respective set. The metaphor of "family
resemblances" was introduced by Wittgenstein to describe complex entangled
relationships of this type.11 In addition to the internal
entanglement of image, language and writing comes the external entanglement
which determines the relation of the three sorts of sign to one another. Just
as a general essential feature cannot be identified to define image as image,
language as language, and writing as writing, no firm dividing lines can be
fixed between the different types of sign. Pictures, sounds and letters are
always intertwined or demarcated relative to and dependent on media in the narrowest
sense, which set out the framework of their use. The previous media system,
in which audiovisual and print media were clearly divided from one another suggested
strict demarcation between the sorts of sign. The World Wide Web's multimedia
mesh of signs does away with this separation and redefines the relations.

Before I analyse the hypertextual structure of the Web itself, I come back
to the text-based Chat programs like IRC, MUDs and MOOs which are increasingly
being integrated into the Web. In Chat programs writing functions as a medium
of direct synchronous communication between conversation partners who are physically
separated and who, as a rule, have never seen each other. The anonymity specific
to the textual medium of the book is connected in "Chat" with the
synchronous interactivity and immediate presence of the conversational partner
characteristic of spoken language in face to face communication. In Chat's "Computer
Mediated Communication" features which previously served as criteria for
the distinction between language and writing are becoming entangled. That means
that the use of written signs in the context of the new medium Internet leads
to a change in the system of signs as a whole. The transitions between language
and writing become fluid. Spoken language's traditional distinction as a medium
of presence becomes problematic. Writing experiences a rehabilitation.

The consequences for semiotics which result from these cultural practices
arising in the World Wide Web are more complex than the effects just described
in the realm of Chat programs. On the one hand, in that the World Wide Web incorporates
text-based Chat, it picks up the usage of text in analogy to spoken language
made possible through these services. On the other hand however writing is reorganized
in the hypertext documents which characterize the World Wide Web with images
as a guide. In the World Wide Web the scriptualization of spoken language taking
place in the text-based domains of the Internet is supplemented by a 'picturization'
of writing. This tendency becomes obvious both in the picture-like usage of
phonetic writing and in the rehabilitation of non-phonetic types of writing.

Both aspects of this picturalization tendency were anticipated
by Jay David Bolter. In his book Writing Space. The Computer, Hypertext,
and the History of Writing (1991) he states that the usage of outline processors
already has the effect of making "text itself graphic by representing its
structure graphically to the writer and the reader."12
My thesis is that the picturization tendency present in the basic structures
of "electronic writing" itself is realized in a more radical way through
the interlinked hypertext system of the WWW. In hypertextual conditions writing
and reading become pictorial operations. The writer develops a netlike framework,
a rhizomatic picture of her thoughts. This picture is multiform and complex.
It consists in a plurality of varying paths and references which the reader
forms into new thought images resulting from interplay between the text's open
structure and the reader's interests and perspectives. For this reason we can
describe the whole mesh of pictures, audio and video sequences, writing and
chatting constituting the World Wide Web as an image-like structure. Bolter
himself in his recent essay on The Internet in the History of Writing (1996)
however did not come to the conclusion which his 1991 book might have suggested.
Instead he points out: "Nevertheless, the distinction between word and image does
not entirely collapse in electronic writing. Or rather, the distinction collapses
only to reassert itself again and again."13 What Bolter
avoids accepting is the possibility of a radical transformation of our usage
of the terms 'word' and 'image'. Such a transformation would be something very
different from the simple and repetitive reasseration of the quasi-transcendental
opposition Bolter talks about.

For the second aspect of the picturization tendency too
- the rehabilitation of non-phonetic types of writing - hints can be found in
Bolter's book from 1991. With regard to the Apple Macintosh Desktop he shows
that icons are used as "symbolic elements in a true picture writing"14: "Electronic icons realize what magic signs in the past
could only suggest, for electronic icons are functioning representations in
computer writing."15 And in summary Bolter states:
"Electronic writing is a continuum in which many systems
of representation can happily coexist."16 A similiar
result was presented by George P. Landow in his book Hypertext. The Convergence
of Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology (1992): "Because hypertext systems link passages of verbal text
with images as easily as they link two or more passages of text, hypertext includes
hypermedia."17 Modifying this result, one developed
in reference to stand-alone computers, I would like to accentuate the fact that
the alleged coexistence of different semiotic systems becomes problematic in
the World Wide Web. Bolter himself has touched on this point in another recent
article. In his as yet unprinted on-line article Degrees of Freedom (1996)
he writes: "If the World Wide Web system began as an exercise in hypertextual
thinking, it is now a combination of the hypertextual and the virtual. But the
hypertextual and the virtual do not always combine easily. Usually the graphics
and photographs tend to muscle the words out of the way."18

The problematic distinction between the hypertextual and the virtual introduced
by Bolter in this article indicates that Bolter is not willing to take into
consideration the possibility of a radical transformation of the traditional
oppositions word versus image and phonetic versus non-phonetic writing, a transformation
that would blur the old oppositions and produce a new situation of complex interwinement.
Instead of accepting this situation Bolter has changed his former coexistence
thesis into a new theory in which the different systems of signs remain unchanged
and compete with one another. On the one hand Bolter considers that "the difference between
hypertextual and the virtual representation is not simply the difference between
words and images." But on the other hand however he insists that even in
cases when images "serve as (...) icons in a multimedia presentation (...)
the sign remains iconic."19 But what can the word
'iconic' mean here if the term is meant to be used independently of the de facto
usage of the sign in question? Bolter tries to describe a transition of usage
without being willing to give up the old meaning of words like 'image' and 'writing'.
What I try to do in contrast to Bolter is to describe the new, until now metaphorical
but in future probably more literal meaning of these terms.

The blurring and metaphorical redefinition of the old distinctions becomes
obvious if we take a look at the third transformation which is becoming a normal
experience in our usage of signs in the World Wide Web. What I am talking about
is a characteristic scriptualization of the image. Digital images might well
often function in the World Wide Web according to the traditional model, namely
as a kind of quasi-reference. They interrupt the flow of references and represent
artificial end points of menus, i.e. impasses in hyperspace. But at the same
time there are more skilled forms of image presentation on the Net which are
more appropriate to the hypertext medium. This involves furnishing different
areas of the image with "source anchors" which respectively refer
to various "destination anchors". The image itself then functions
as a hypertext. If I activate a link within an image I am refered to other images
or texts. The image no longer appears as the referent and termination of a menu,
but becomes a sign itself with references to other signs. In the same way as
textual hypertexts, hypertextual images serve as semiotic intersections in the
unending referential framework of the "docuverse".

If you consider not only the external relatedness but also the internal data
structure of digital images then it becomes clear that the images composed of
pixels have textual character in themselves. With the corresponding editor programs
the elements which comprise the digital image can be exchanged, moved and altered
just as the characters within a text. In this way images become flexibly editable
scripts. In the digital mode the image loses its distinguished
status as a representation of reality. It proves itself to be an aesthetic construction,
a technological work of art whose semiotics result internally from the relations
of pixels and externally through the hypertextual references to other documents.20

The Net navigator, or cybernaut, has learned to find her way around in the
rhizomatic flood of hypertext links. She knows that there's no original text,
no 'actual' document to which all other documents are to be related. She's figured
out that on the Net it's primarily a matter of forming small machines, creative
text designs and sensible images out of the manifold and dispersed text segments.
These machines, designs and images, which didn't exist previously in this way
and won't continue to exist in the future, are ontologically transitional in
type. The logic of transition is a logic of transversality. Thinking and acting
in a way which does this justice is determined by transversal reason.

Part 3: The Transversal Logic of the World Wide Web

The philosophical concept of transversality has long been
familiar within mathematics and geology.21
It was first used in a philosophical context by Jean-Paul Sartre. It was first
coined as a philosophical term by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.
The application to the theory of reason and the systematic extension into an
edifice of thought was performed by the German philosopher Wolfgang Welsch.
What are the basic ideas of Welsch's theory of transversal reason, and how can
they be related to the media transformations of our understanding of reality
described in the first two parts of the current essay?

To answer this question I shall concentrate on the systematic account developed
by Welsch in the second part of his book Vernunft. Die zeigenössische
Vernunftkritik und das Konzept der transversalen Vernunft under the title
Transversal Reason. The central ideas of Welsch's concept of transversal reason
can be summarized through three basic theses. Firstly, the constitution of rationality
is characterized by an ineluctable disorderliness. Secondly, reason is in principle
capable of reconstructing and precisely describing this disorderliness. Thirdly,
it's only when reason productively analyses the subconscious entanglements of
rationalities that it will be suitably equipped to solve contemporary problems.
The first thesis is directed against the idea dominating from Kant through to
Habermas and Lyotard that reason is concerned with an orderly framework of rationality
types clearly divided from one another. The second thesis opposes the danger
of diffusion which has led, especially in the setting of posthistorical thinking
but also with some postmodern philosophers, to a position of arbitrariness and
of 'anything goes'. The third thesis makes it clear that applied and problem-oriented
philosophy must in no way amount to a simple application of abstract philosophical
models to reality. In its pragmatic and transversal version it is capable of
reflexion about those constellations of rationalities in effect practically,
which are already determined in their inner by contingent realities.

All three theses can be illustrated with the aid of the interactive hypertextuality
of the World Wide Web. In doing this I allow myself to be guided by the assumption
that the World Wide Web is a medium in which the subconscious disorderliness
hidden by the book culture and which was taken by Welsch as his subject, comes
explicitly to light. First of all however it's important to append a distinction
which is central to the understanding of Welsch's basic theses. I mean the distinction
between rationality and reason. In recourse to the Kantian distinction between
understanding and reason Welsch defines reason as that faculty whose task it
is to reflect upon the relationship between different types of rationality.

The first of the three basic theses relates to the relationship
between rationalities. To begin with it leaves aside the issue of reason in
the sense of a faculty of reflexion which goes beyond these. The
relationship between rationalities is defined by Welsch as "rational disorderliness".22Whereas, from Kant through to Habermas and Lyotard, the framework
of rationalities has been conceived of guided by the book, namely as a relational
framework of separate, in themselves autonomous chapters (Kant, Habermas) or
aphorisms (Lyotard), Welsch in recourse to Derrida and Deleuze compares "the
real consitution of rationalities"23 with "moving
and changing, net and web-like architectures".24
Welsch shows in detail that the classically ordered framework of cognitive,
aesthetic and moral-practical rationalities is a superficial phenomenon. A contingent
network of "family resemblances"25 between different
paradigms and alliances of paradigms form the fundament for this. The
maxim for rationality theory resulting from this states that "the whole
traffic system of both the horizontal and the vertical connections [is] to uncover".26 It will be thus be demonstrated, Welsch continues, "that
the [...] interparadigmatic [...] entanglements are mostly not hierarchically,
but laterally organized. The connection has more the structure of a network
than of stratification."27

Against this background the World Wide Web can be interpreted
as an eminent medium of transversal reason. The entanglements and transitions
analysed in detail by Welsch become media reality in the World Wide Web as electronic
links. Welsch's reinterpretation of the classical triad of rationalities as
an "effect of family resemblances"28 can be illustrated
directly with the World Wide Web. In the World Wide Web the classical distinction
between the varying types of rationality plays an important role. Thus three
different highways can be differentiated on the theoretical level: the (cognitively
accented) Information and Commerce Highway, the Education Highway (serving moral-practical
aims), and the (aesthetically founded) Entertainment Highway. However, in our
practical dealings with the Net - other than outside of the Net - we are aware
at all times that these distinctions are introduced by us into a complex framework
of hyperlinks whose internal family resemblances constantly shift, and which
produce different configurations according to different perspectives. Whereas
the medium of the book and thinking schooled thereby conceals rather than clarifies
these relations, the World Wide Web makes them explicit.

The second basic thesis of Welsch's theory can also be
fruitfully deployed for the philosophical analysis of the World Wide Web. Unlike
the first, this thesis does not relate solely to the mesh of rationalities,
but focuses on the faculty of reflecting reason which operates within this mesh.
It is this faculty's task to correct "the insufficient self-comprehension
and the excessive self-confidence of paradigms"29
from which the net of rationality types is composed. Paradigms tend to ignore
their position within a net of nets and the relativity resulting from this.
They are transfixed by their objects and self-forgetfully obscure the stuctural
conditions of their abilities. If they do perceive of their own surroundings,
the conditions of their own possibility, and their competitors then it's mostly
in the mode of denial or reprimand. They declare themselves to be the sole true
and valid paradigm, make false claims to exclusivity, and tend to an implied
absolutism. It is the task of transversal reason to inform
the rationalities arising from paradigms of this twofold self-misunderstanding:
"Where this twofold explanation is successful, reason's interventions transform
the singular paradigms from their merely rational to their reasonable form."30

The World Wide Web confronts us with similar problems. This is already demonstrated
by the resistance with which the establishment of a consistently hypertextual
symbolic practice meets. Every text, every image, every Web page tends to proclaim
itself the centre of the Net. The problem recurs on the technical level: every
Web browser, every provider of access to the Net implicitly or explicitly claims
to be offering the only true and authentic access to the medium. Even taking
a glance at the definition of the whole, the battle over the 'true' World Wide
Web dominates. There are firstly those proclaiming this to be the Commerce Net,
secondly those for the Education Net, and still others for the Entertainment
Highway. Each party of course considers itself the exclusive and sole binding
govenor of the Net.

But it's not only the initial problems of radical plurality to which transversal
reason reacts, rather the operation of this reason itself can be illustrated
with the help of the World Wide Web. On the level of texts, images and Web pages, search robots,
bookmarks and hotlists function as instantiations of transversal reason in software.
Just as transversal reason, these are characterized by "purity, emptiness
and superiority".31 The Net tools named
are independent of content, purely formal structures for the generation of relations.
They supply the user with the means required to break through the excessive
self-estimation of the subsystems and to cast light on the Net's hyperlandscape,
i.e. the intertwined connections between the Web pages. On the level of browser
programs, the free availability of shareware versions of various Net browsers
and on-line discussion of their advantages and disadvantages contribute to preventing
the establishment of a browser-monopoly. Traits of transversal reason can be
recognized in this too. The same applies on the level of providers of Internet
access: Transversal gateways, through which the various providers are linked
to the World Wide Web, relativize the view of the Net given by a particular
provider. It should be emphasized in this that, on all
three levels (Web pages, browsers, providers), it's not a matter of just a media
realization of a theoretical faculty, but rather of practical demands and concrete
tasks which mark the way for future media policies.32

Thus I come to the third basic thesis of Welsch's book on reason. Philosophy
which operates guided by transversal reason is already practice in its core.
Transversal reason has no need for a belated application to concrete problems
but is already eminently politic in itself. This last aspect of transversal
reason also comes into its own in the World Wide Web. Writing and thinking in
the Net are of themselves already practical operations. That means first of
all at a completely fundamental level: they are artisan in character. Writing
and thinking in the Net cannot be separated from the creative installation of
hyperlinks, from the aesthetic design of Web pages, from the formative work
with graphical editor programs and skilled programming with HTML. These are
all practical, i.e. artistic-artisinal, operations through which the writer
is torn out of the position of the pure observer and bound within concrete interactional
contexts. Something similar can be said of the way we deal with Net tools. Work
with these tools, but also the hypertextual structure itself lead to the user
being refered, from the supposedly pure theoretical investigation which he strives
for, to institutional entanglements, to seemingly remote connections and political
contexts. This differentiates open work in the World Wide Web from the closed
world of the book.

The results of my considerations can be summarized in three points. Firstly,
the World Wide Web proves itself to be a genuine medium of transversal reason.
Secondly, the concept of transversal reason establishes itself as a basis for
a pragmatic media philosophy. Thirdly, the task for this is to demonstrate that
most of the semiotic concepts philosophers considered to be ahistoric and transcultural
are contingent effects of the media we use. On this basis the media transformations
of our understanding of reality which are taking place in the age of digital
network technology can be philosophically analysed and pragmatically implemented
without speculative bombast.

A position of this type is advocated (taking up Goodman's argument) by Oliver
R. Scholz in his book Bild-Darstellung-Zeichen. Philosophische Theorien
bildhafter Darstellung (Freiburg/Munich: Alber-Verlag 1991), esp. Chapter
4, 82-110. [back]