Launching the Upper House elections campaign on June 22, 2016, Abe spoke to a crowd in Kumamoto, a southern city struck by earthquakes and landslides in April. He said, "This is an election to decide whether we will forge ahead strongly with economic policies, make Japan grow, the regions proper and everyone feel the benefits -- or return to a dark and stagnant era...Japan's economic is making steady progress and producing results.” The Prime Minister cited Japan’s increasing tax revenue and tight labour market as evidence.

Public opinion, the media and major world economic institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and OECD all question Abe's positive cast on Abenomics. According to the two recent polls conducted by the Kyodo News, over 60 percent of the Japanese public and the youth have lost confidence in the government's economic reform. In a nationwide telephone survey conducted on June 12th and 13th, “62.2 percent expressed doubt about the effectiveness of the ‘Abenomics’ policy mix, while 28.0 percent said the measures would improve the economy.” In an Internet survey result published on June 19th by the Kyodo News of 1,535 respondents from age 18-19, “62.5 percent expressed doubt about the effectiveness of the ‘Abenomics’ policy mix,” while 37.5 percent expected the measures to help improve the economy.

In May and June, the IMF, OECD, and the World Bank published reports examining the three arrows of Abenomics. They all forecast slower economic growth. The World Bank projected GDP growth at 0.7 percent in 2016 and 0.4 percent in 2017.” The IMF said that Japan would be the world's only shrinking advanced economy, projecting GDP growth of "0.5 percent in 2016 and –0.1 percent in 2017.” They note that consumption in Japan fell in “fiscal 2015, logging its second straight annual fall for the first time since comparable data began in fiscal 1994.” Price-adjusted real wages dropped for the fourth consecutive year in 2015. The average proportion of consumption spending in disposable income fell to 72.8 percent in January-March this year.

The World Bank assesses two arrows in Abenomics: monetary easing and fiscal stimulus in Global Economic Prospects: Divergences and Risks (174 pgs, June 7, 2016). It notes that negative interest rates, in contrast, “induced low inflation expectations and currency appreciation, raising concerns about the effectiveness of monetary policy.” On the fiscal side, “a supplementary budget with additional stimulus measures is expected to provide some support in 2016…but the rise of consumption tax to 10 percent, a 2 percent increase will balance out some of the growth effects.”

The IMF also reaches the conclusion that increasing the consumption tax in 2017 will affect growth in Japan, in World Economic Outlook, Too Slow for Too Long (230 pgs, April 12,2016). Commenting on the “third Arrow” of structural reform, the IMF suggests “the Japanese government to implement strategies to raise productivity, which are vital for tackling medium-term risks and raising potential output.” Income policies are needed to “bolster wage-price dynamics and increase monetary policy effectiveness.” Structural reforms should focus on “boosting the supply of labour (including of women), reforming labour markets to remove duality, further deregulating product and services markets, and supporting investment through corporate governance reform.”

Besides giving similar remarks on Abenomics, the OECD also doubts the positive results that mentioned by Abe. In the OECD Economic Outlook (316 pgs, June 1, 2016). The contraction of the labour market has only “a limited impact on nominal wage growth.” At the same time, low inflation expectations signal “inefficiency of the fiscal stimulus.”

In a June 22 editorial, "Abenomics and the Upper House election," the Japan Times questioned the success of Abenomics. The recovery that marked the first year of his new administration was short-lived. The nation’s gross domestic product, “which grew 2 percent in real terms in fiscal 2013, shrank 0.9 percent in fiscal 2014 and grew a sluggish 0.8 percent in fiscal 2015.” The underlying weakness in consumer spending — “particularly since the April 2014 consumption tax hike to 8 percent — dragged down growth, as the cost of living mostly rose faster than wage hikes” — which Abe boasts have been the sharpest since the turn of the century. And the reversal of the yen’s downtrend in recent months — “with the currency hitting 103-to-the-dollar range last week for the first time since August 2014 — threatens to pare the earnings of export-led major firms that had been inflated by the weak currency.” But the writer concludes:

Neither trumpeting Abenomics as if it’s a cure-all or denouncing it as a failure will be constructive. The Upper House election should let voters hand down their judgment.

Sunday, June 26, 2016

AFTER BREXIT: A NEW WORLD ORDER? TELECONFERENCE. 6/27, 11:00am-Noon. Sponsor: Wilson Center. The results of the June 23 UK referendum, in which British citizens voted to leave the European Union by a margin of 52% to 48%, shocked the markets and political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. How long until economic and political stability returns? What kind of deal will Britain get as it forges new relationships with its European neighbors? Can the country retain its “special relationship” with the U.S.? Join BY PHONE as Wilson Center experts discuss the long-term global implications of this unprecedented vote.
Toll Free #: 800-369-1772
International #: +1-210-839-8631
Conference Passcode: 13304
Speakers: James Hollifield, Public Policy Fellow; Michael J. Geary, Global Fellow; Michelle Egan, Fellow; Jane Harman, Director, President and CEO, Wilson Center; Kent Hughes, Public Policy Fellow.

RESTORING NATO'S POWER AND PURPOSE. 6/27, 1:30-2:45pm. Sponsor: Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council. Speakers: Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns (Ret.), Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Former US Ambassador to NATO; General James L. Jones, Jr., USMC (Ret.), Chairman and Board Director, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council, Founder and President, Jones Group International, Former National Security Advisor and Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe; Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President, Programs and Strategy, Atlantic Council, Former Senior Director, European Affairs, National Security Council; Moderator: Dr. Evelyn Farkas, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia, US Department of Defense.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO IMPROVE THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT. 6/27, 3:30-5:00pm. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Tom Perriello, Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa; Victoria K. Holt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Deputy Executive Director, Human Rights Watch; Lise Grande, Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq.LEADERS SPEAK: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORS. 6/27, 5:30-7:00pm. Sponsor: National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. Speakers: Stephen J. Hadley, Principal, RiceHadleyGates LLC; Former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Robert “Bud” McFarlane, National Security Advisor to President Ronald Regan; Moderator: Steve Orlins, President, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.

PM
00:10 Leave seat during proceedings
00:12 Depart National Diet
00:13 Arrive at office
00:18 Meet with Chief Cabinet Secretary, Suga Yoshihide
00:26 End meeting with Mr. Suga
06:37 Interview to all media: when asked ‘Has the Security bills been approved by the Lower House Members of the Diet?’ Mr. Abe answers, ‘I would like to proceed in explaining this to our citizens including the discussion in the National Diet in an easy-to-understand manner.’
06:38 Depart office
06:44 Arrive at soba restaurant, ’Sampei’ in Akasaka, Tokyo. Dinner meeting with Yomiuri Newspaper group board member and Top Advisor, Oikawa Shouichi, and an artist of Western painting, Kinutani Kouji
08:36 Depart restaurant
08:56 Arrive at private residence

00:58 Depart room
00:59 Head towards Lower House Plenary Meeting Hall
01:02 Lower House Plenary Session opens
02:06 Meeting adjourns
02:07 Depart the hall
02:09 Depart National Diet
02:11 Arrive at office
02:12 Interview open to all media: when asked ‘the security bills that have been approved by the lower house of the Diet,’ Mr Abe answers, ‘for our national citizens to have a greater understanding, our whole party will be mobilized and will continue to work hard’.
02:14 Interview ends
02:30 Meeting with Special Advisor to the Prime Minister, Eto Seiichi
03:41 End meeting with Mr. Eto
03:45 Meet with Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, Mr. Nishi Masanori and Ministry of Defense, Director-General of Bureau of Local Cooperation, Nakajima Akihiko
03:56 End meeting with Mr. Nishi and Mr. Nakajima
04:19 Meeting of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy
05:13 Meeting ends

PM
00:01 Meet with LDP Secretary-General, Tanigaki Sadakazu
00:40 End meeting with Mr. Tanigaki
01:55 Formal Prime Minister, Mori Yoshiro enters
02:00 Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Saiki Akitaka, Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Shimomura Hakubun and Minister in charge of Tokyo Olympic and Paralympics, Endo Toshiaki join
03:37 All members leave
03:38 Interview open to all media: when asked ‘What kind of decision has been reached for the new National Stadium plans?’ Mr. Abe answers, “I have decided that we will cancel the current plan for the New National Stadium that is to be the venue for the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games, and create a new plan from scratch.”
03:42 Interview ends
04:08 Meet with Director of Cabinet Intelligence, Kitamura Shigeru
04:35 End meeting with Mr. Kitamura
05:00 Speak with MOFA’s Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Ihara Junichi and Director-General of International Legal Affairs Bureau, Akiba Takeo
05:10 End speaking with Mr. Ihara and Mr. Akiba
05:30 Reception and commemorative photo with Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Xavier Bettel. Japan-Luxembourg Summit Meeting and Other Events
05.31Pay courtesy to honor guards

Saturday, June 25, 2016

Harry & Helen Gray Senior Fellow, Director of the Society, Culture & Politics Program at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) and APP member Dr. Lily Gardner Feldman discusses in this essay the current opportunities for reconciliation in East Asia in light of President Barack Obama's May visit to Hiroshima.

President Obama noted in an interview with the Asahi Shimbun before his visit to Hiroshima that his presence was an example of reconciliation: “I will point out that Prime Minister Abe and I coming to Hiroshima together shows the world the possibility of reconciliation—that even former adversaries can become the strongest of allies.” Six weeks earlier, in an interview with Asahi TV, Secretary of State John Kerry also referenced reconciliation to characterize Japanese-U.S. relations: “Well, no matter what people feel about [the dropping of the atomic bomb], we are now friends and allies. We have worked through a remarkable reconciliation.” The visits of Secretary of State Kerry and President Obama to Hiroshima in April and May 2016 came at the same time as Franco-German commemorations of the 100th anniversary of the battle of Verdun, providing an opportunity to reflect on reconciliation in Europe and in East Asia.

The current international salience of reconciliation has not been missed by foreign policy experts. For example, the former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in the State Department, Ambassador Wendy Sherman, recently identified the global need for reconciliation—what she calls “political forgiveness”—as a political priority.

This essay looks at the nature of the reconciliation suggested by President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima, and how it compares to the iconic reconciliation pursued by Germany over more than seventy years. The path of Germany’s foreign policy of reconciliation (with France, Israel, Poland, and Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic) can be described in terms of timing, motives, actors, mechanisms, opposition, and consequences. The argument here is that, while there are many similarities in the elements that make up reconciliation across the two cases, U.S.-Japanese reconciliation as exemplified at Hiroshima is more of a pragmatic kind, lacking the deep moral basis of the German and European experience.

Timing

Germany’s official policy of active reconciliation started early, in the 1950s with France and Israel, whereas Obama’s visit to Hiroshima took place a long 70 years after the dropping of the atomic bomb. Nonetheless, not all issues were settled speedily in the German case, as evidenced by the agreement on World War II slave and forced labor, which occurred only in 2000. And in the Japanese case, the framework for a new relationship was outlined soon after war, in the San Francisco Treaty of September 1951.

Motives

Germany was driven by both pragmatic motives (the return of considerable sovereignty in exchange for facing the past) and a moral imperative (compensation and contrition were the right thing to do). The dual motives were also present for Germany’s victims.

Obama’s motives for going to Hiroshima were pragmatic: to augment the U.S. relationship with Japan; to help stabilize East Asian security at a time of perceived growing threats from China, both economic and military. Obama also framed the visit in moral terms, but not like the morality in the European experience. By emphasizing the universal immorality of using nuclear weapons, Obama removed U.S. agency. He referred to a “shared responsibility to look directly into the eye of history and ask what we must do differently to curb such suffering again.” German officials from Adenauer to Merkel have accepted German responsibility for World War II and the Holocaust. In the Obama visit, there was no Japanese acceptance of responsibility, and no explicit American accusation.

History and memory, often the expressions of moral composure, were general but key terms for Obama: “[T]he memory of the morning of August 6, 1945 must never fade. That memory allows us to fight complacency. It fuels our moral imagination. It allows us to change.” Yet, specifics were lacking.

There is a danger in this treatment of history that it will become a footnote in Japanese-U.S. relations rather than a touchstone for constant dialogue. Obama’s view of history fits with Prime Minister Abe’s. Abe insisted, in the recent “comfort women” agreement with South Korea, that there be no more discussion of the issue. For Germany, commemoration has taken place repeatedly at the same sites for 70 years. It is unclear with Hiroshima whether this visit by a head of state will be the first and only such visit, or the beginning of symbolic gestures by heads of state and government and cabinet members at sites where the war in the Pacific can be remembered with regularity. In the European context, these visits often have been additionally powerful when the German representative has been accompanied by a representative of the other country. Joint visits (as with Obama and Abe in Hiroshima) both confirm and contribute to reconciliation.

Actors

In the German and European example, civil society actors were catalysts for reconciliation, beginning soon after the war and even before the Federal Republic was founded. U.S.-Japanese postwar relations similarly have been shaped by non-governmental relations in many societal arenas from economics to culture, from town twinning to educational and academic exchange. The European societal activities typically have been coordinated with official initiatives. At first, in the planning for the Hiroshima visit, American POWs were led to believe an American POW would accompany the President, but in the end this amplification of the visit did not materialize.

Another aspect of the nature of actors in these bilateral relations is the distinction, and common experience, of being both victims and perpetrators. While carefully avoiding the idea of an apology or reexamination of the decision to drop the bomb, Obama’s presence and words at Hiroshima importantly validated Japan as victim, albeit not singularly but as part of a universe of victims: “We come to mourn the dead, including over 100,000 Japanese men, women, and children, thousands of Koreans, a dozen Americans held prisoner.” Yet, Americans were Japan’s victims at Pearl Harbor and thereafter, which went unrecognized in the Hiroshima visit.

Germany recognized early on its role as perpetrator of World War II and the Holocaust, but Germany and its victims have underscored in the last 25 years that Germans—those expelled from Poland and Czechoslovakia—were also victims, without suggesting a moral equivalence between Germans and other victims. Obama carefully avoided a victimhood vocabulary, but Abe said nothing to dispel the impression.

Mechanisms

In addition to symbolic gestures and civil society initiatives mentioned above, in a variety of policy arenas bilateral institutions have expressed policy preferences between the two sides in the European example. So, too, economics (constructing interdependence as an antidote to past conflict and as a bulwark against new conflicts) and defense (making war between the two impossible) have been prominent in the U.S.-Japanese case.

The key mechanism shaping European reconciliation has been the moral practice of acknowledgement of grievances, including but not limited to apologies, statements of regret, treaty language. The moral nature of acknowledgement is seen in its early and repeated use. Seventy years after World War II, Germans have no pragmatic need to acknowledge their conduct in the war and the Holocaust, but they continue to do so for reasons of moral compunction. Apology, or a variant thereof, has three basic requirements: a recognition of the suffering of the victims; the assumption of full responsibility by the perpetrator for his/her acts; an indication of the material or spiritual compensation for the loss. Only the first, a recognition of suffering, was present at Hiroshima, distinguishing morally the U.S.-Japan case as practiced at Hiroshima from Germany. Obama wanted to avoid the appearance of delivering an apology.

Opposition

European reconciliation teaches us that there is often opposition to the process, usually from domestic forces. Obama’s caution at Hiroshima was prompted by veterans’ rejection of the need for an apology. They felt it would call into question the decision to use the atomic bomb and would upend Truman’s reasoning that the bombing brought a speedy end to the war and avoided a massive loss of life. According to a 2015 Pew Research Center poll, 56 percent of Americans believed the use of the bombing was appropriate. Among those over 65, the figure for acceptance was 70 percent.

Despite Obama’s conviction that his visit to Hiroshima might advance his most profound commitment to a world without nuclear weapons, making victims but not contrition important, he inevitably has received the political criticism he anticipated. Supporters of the presumptive Republican presidential nominee called Obama “weak” and the visit unnecessary because Japan was the undisputed aggressor. For Obama’s nuclear agenda, and for his policy of making Japan the Asian leader against a rising China, this first act of reconciliation was essential. The test now is whether it will hold and be reciprocated.

Consequences

Bilateral reconciliation in Europe contributed in the postwar world to the stability of Western Europe as a whole. A new round of reconciliation after 1989 contributed to stability and solidarity in Eastern Europe, although Putin’s hyper-nationalism and nostalgia for the Soviet era have put both in question. Greater stability in East Asia could be a consequence of Obama’s trip if the President were to move vigorously on three fronts:

insist on a visit by Abe to Pearl Harbor (both sides need to acknowledge history). The Japanese defence minister visited in November 2015, but an equivalent to the President’s Hiroshima gesture is necessary;

increase the number and intensity of civil society connections between Japan and the U.S. and include China and South Korea. There are many disparate non-governmental initiatives, but increasing, consolidating, and profiling them would provide a critical mass for a new push to reconciliation;

be willing to mediate between Japan and China and between Japan and South Korea over history issues.

Before the Hiroshima visit, the U.S. did not have the moral authority to push Japan toward regional reconciliation because of the use of the atomic bomb. Japan perceived and presented itself as victim. Now that its victimhood has been validated, both sides are liberated to look at reconciliation with fresh eyes. Such a willingness would assume that the Hiroshima visit was a demonstration of strength and courage, not the weakness the President’s critics are intent to claim.

AM
08:00 At private residence in Tomigaya, Tokyo (no morning visitors)
08:32 Depart private residence
08:48 Arrive at office. Interview to all media: when asked “thoughts on the registering of Japan’s Meiji Industrial Revolution as [UNESCO] World Heritage site,” Mr. Abe answers, “I am immensely delighted that the origin of ‘Monozukuri Japan’ being registered as a World Heritage site. I would like to express my respect including to the locals and each and every business who have strived to protect these sites.”
09:41 Meet with Ministry of Finance Generals Vice-Minister, Kagawa Shunsuke, Senior Deputy Director-General of International Bureau, Yamasaki Tatsuo, Deputy Vice-Minister, Fukuda Junichi and Director-General of International Bureau, Asakawa Masatsugu
10:11 End meeting with Mr. Kagawa, Mr. Yamasaki, Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Asakawa
11:03 Meet with Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare, Shiozaki Yasuhisa. The University of Tokyo lecturer, Shibuya Kenji also attends.
11:43 End meeting with Mr. Shiozaki and Mr. Shibuya

Thursday, June 23, 2016

The Khmer Legacy® Museum will hold a series of opening events June 23-25 at its new space in St Paul, Minnesota. The Museum hopes to express 2500 years of Cambodian history and culture through video, art, and text.

The idea for the museum originated in April 2012 after the Khmer people and Khmer veterans received recognition via resolutions MN Senate File 2314 and MN House File 2629 “memorializing Congress and the President of the United States, and legislatures from others states to formally recognize the Khmer Freedom Fighters of Cambodia for supporting and defending the United States military forces during the conflict in Southeast Asian and their continued support and defense of the United States of America and all other free nations of the world.” The Resolution urged all state legislatures to also recognize the Khmer Freedom Fighters and Cambodians “for their support and defense of the United States military forces, freedom, and democracy in Southeast Asia.” The passage of these bills inspired the same group to advocate in 2014 for S. Res 462 in the U.S. Senate, which included the Hmong, Lao, and Mongtaignard people. Florida Senator Marco Rubio was the resolution's sponsor.

The International Khmer Assembly ( IKARE ) felt that the unique journey of heroes of the Khmer peoples needed to be told and preserved. It is important for the younger generation to know that there is more to Cambodia than the genocide of the killing fields so that they will understand their true cultural roots.

"Up 'til now the world only knows Cambodia as home of the Killing Fields. We want the world to know that while Cambodia had lost 41 years of leaping development, the Khmer people had 2500 years of greatness," said Kosol Sek, Chairman of the International Khmer Assembly. "We created the Khmer Legacy Museum to tell stories of the Khmer people's greatness."

The museum is a first step to enhance public understanding of the full story of the Cambodian people.

The International Khmer Assembly (IKARE) is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization with a mission to protect, preserve, and promote stories and contributions of the Khmer people to the world. Khmer Legacy® is a registered mark of the International Khmer Assembly.

On June 9th, The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation* held its now annual public forum on Capitol Hill featuring members of its U.S.-Japan Network for the Future (The Network).

This program, initiated in 2009, introduced its fourth two-year co-hort group in April 2016. The Network identifies American, emerging Japan scholars and provides them with tools to make their work policy relevant. Five of the 14 from the last “co-hort” group (III) were selected to present publicly papers on the challenges facing Japanese society. The Japanese government's Japan Foundation Center For Global Partnership underwrites this effort. Harvard Professor Emeritus Ezra F. Vogel* was the moderator. The topics discussed were: religion in politics, immigration, the new secrecy law, work culture, and Japan’s opposition party. A bound publication included 3-page essays by all 14 members of Co-hort III (2014-2016) on a greater range of political issues in Japan.

The five presentations portrayed Japan as a “normal” industrial democracy troubled by an ageing population and uncomfortable with change. Accommodating immigrants and women into its rapidly shrinking workforce are challenges both politically and socially. Internationally, the U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to evolve with mainstream political parities preferring low-budget structural reforms and reassurances to the U.S. over active participation in regional disputes.

The central point of the each presentation is as follows:

Conflicts between LDP and the Democratic Party can not be understood without a knowledge of each party's religious affiliation: Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – Shintoism and Komeito Party – Buddhism.

The Special Designated Secrets Law that passed in 2013 although initially controversial will not threaten Japan’s democracy.

Japanese government could change the long-hours work culture by sending “change ambassadors” to companies to advocate for institutional reform.

Japan’s political parties need to begin the discussion of immigration reform to address the growing demographic problem of low birth rates and ageing population.

For the July 10th Upper House elections, the opposition Democratic Party could capitalize on the Abe Administration’s failing economic policies and the unpopularity of the security legislation.

Conflict between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner the Komeito must be understood as a clash of religious commitments. Although a 2008 and 2010 World Values Survey by the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun suggests that only 26% of Japanese believe in any religion, two religious forces, Shintoism and Buddhism, do “play important roles in shaping policy and electioneering within the governing coalition of the LDP (Shintoism) and Komeito Party (Buddhism).” Religious parties and positions maintained by LDP politicians and the Soka Gakkai campaigners ensured electoral success for Komeito. Paper: Japan’s Ruling Coalition Gets Religion

2. Japan’s Specially Designated Secrets Law and 21st Century SecurityEmer O’Dwyer, associate professor of Japanese History at Oberlin College.

Japan’s Specially Designated Secrets Protection Law (SDS), passed by the Diet on December 6, 2013 (and coming into force December 10, 2014) provoked massive demonstrations that clogged the streets surrounding the Diet Building. These demonstrations have since died down. The law allows government agencies broad powers to designate secret information regarding defense, diplomacy, terrorism counter-measures, and espionage. In addition, government entitites are allowed to conduct background checks and seek prosecution for criminal use of state secrets. O’Dwyer concludes that the law is reasonable and that “democracy is safe in Japan” because the law is a natural response to strengthening the U.S.-Japan military alliance and to potential security threats from China. Paper: SPECTRE in Japan

3. Changing Japan’s Long Working Hours: “Cool Japan” Meets KeidanrenLiv Coleman, associate professor of political science at the University of Tampa.

The Abe Administration has tried, with little success, “a mixture of soft regulation, financial incentives, and moral suasion” to reduce working hours and to promote family-friendly work places. Sixty percent of Japanese women quit their jobs by the time they have their first child. Work cultures have not changed due to “too much work, face to face meetings, and unawareness of directors on this problem.” Coleman encourages the government to introduce “‘change ambassadors’ to coach managers into a new way of thinking and asking questions about work productivity while taking a profoundly personal approach.” Institutional reforms needs to accompany individualistic guidance for altering the work culture.Paper: Changing Japan’s Long Working Hours: “Cool Japan” Meets KeidanrenYukatsu’ program to let civil servants leave early for second summer, Jiji 6/5/16

4. Immigration and the Upcoming Upper House ElectionMichael Strausz, associate professor of political science at Texas Christian University.

Japan has the largest aging population (33%) in the OED, but an extremely limited immigration system. Japan’s Prime Minister and Diet have been reluctant to make significant changes to both the legal and cultural barriers. As the 2016 Upper House elections approach, Strausz observes that “it would be good for Japan if some political parties advocate an immigration policy.” In order to keep the work force of 87.2 million at the 1995 level, Japan “would need 33.5 million immigrants from 1995 through 2050.”Paper: Immigration and the Upcoming Upper House Election

5. Japan’s Democratic Party and the July Upper House ElectionDaniel M. Smith, assistant professor of comparative politics at Harvard University.

Prime Minster Shinzo Abe and his LDP hope to secure a large enough victory to move ahead with their goal of constitutional revision, which includes “loosening restrictions on the use of the Self-Defense Forces, a change many decry as unconstitutional.” The opposition Democratic Party has an opportunity to reverse recent electoral setbacks in the upcoming election if it manages to “simultaneously avoid competition with the remaining opposition parties in single-seat districts and convince disaffected voters to show up at the polls.” The previous success of the LDP has not been due to their policies, but rather the failure of any anti-Abe coalition, including the recently formed Democratic Party, Japan Restoration Party (later re-branded as JIP), and Tomorrow Party of Japan . If the opposition combined and focused on the weaknesses of Abe economic and security policy, the LDP could lose 156 seats in the House of Councilors (Upper House) this July.Paper: The Challenge for Japan’s Democratic Party in 2016: Simultaneously Increase Coordination and Turnout*APP members

PM
00:03 Meet with Chief Representative of New Komeito, Yamaguchi Natsuo
01:01 End meeting with Mr. Yamaguchi
01:53 Depart office
02:14 Visit to Tokyo Child Guidance Office and Futaba Regional Childrearing Support Center. Exchange views with members of staff and observing telephone calls
02:40 Depart support center
03:00 Arrive at Futaba Regional Childrearing Support Center in Minamimotomachi, Tokyo. Exchange views with users.
03:11 Interview open to all media: ‘How is the government dealing with current and future child abuse that is worsening?’ Mr. Abe answers, ‘There are plans to compile a policy package by the end of year that aims to ensure thoroughness in our response by strengthen the system and emergency response.’
03:14 Interview ends
03:16 Depart support center
03:25 Arrive at office
03:53 Courtesy call to attendees at the European Ambassador Meeting including Japanese ambassador to the UK, Hayashi Keiichi and others
04:17 Courtesy call ends
04:29 Meet with Cabinet Advisor, Hamada Koichi
04:34 End meeting with Mr. Hamada
04:43 Depart office
05:05 Visit to the National Museum of Western Art- Part of an Initiative to Transform People’s Lifestyles (“Yu-katsu”)
05:37 Interview to all media: when asked ‘What are you anticipating from the Yu-katsu policy?’ Mr. Abe answers, ‘Though the policy has just started, to feel that life is more fulfilling. I would like everyone to enjoy themselves.’
05:38 Interview ends
05:39 Depart museum
05:47 Arrive at Tanakashoudou, restaurant in Tokyo. Dinner meeting with secretaries
07:23 Depart restaurant
07:49 Arrive at private residence

About Us

APP is a Washington research center studying the U.S. policy relationship with Northeast Asia. We provide factual context and informed insight on Asian science, finance, politics, security, history, and public policy.