Virtue ethics and care ethics

Virtue ethics

The virtue ethics approach in moral philosophy defends the view that when deciding how to live, we should consider not what would make the world a better place or what norms we should obey, but rather what kind of moral agents we want to be. Virtue ethics focuses on moral character. It defends the notion that ethics is about the kind of person we are, more than about what we do.

Due to this, virtue ethics, unlike other perspectives in ethics, doesn’t give us guidance regarding what to do. It doesn’t tell us that we should increase happiness in the world, or defend equality, or avoid murdering. Rather, it simply tells us to develop a sound, moral character. According to virtue ethicists, when we have a virtuous character, we will act correctly.

Because of the way virtue ethics conceives of ethical thinking, it is difficult to see how one could defend a speciesist viewpoint in line with it. Nevertheless, some may think that it would be possible to assume a virtue ethics approach that is in line with speciesism. In considering this, we must first note that in our relationship with nonhuman animals, we are already in an advantageous position. We have more power than they do. This power relation may drive us to benefit from a situation in which animals are harmed, or to simply be indifferent to the harm they suffer, whether caused by ourselves, by others, or as a consequence of natural occurrences. However, such attitudes, which can be aptly described as abusive or insensitive, can hardly be considered features that would identify someone as having a virtuous character.

When discussing ethics, it may be argued that because most people accept speciesism, it is very hard to assume an antispeciesist viewpoint. However, those who defend a virtue ethics approach can reject this claim, as Daniel Dombrowski1 and Nathan Nobis2 have done, because acting virtuously is something we should do regardless of whether the context we are in is favorable or disfavorable towards virtuous action.

Some virtue ethicists have claimed that to be virtuous is to fulfill our potential to become full moral agents. But we can only fulfill such potential by letting others satisfy their own interests as well, as theorists such as Stephen Clark,3 Bernard Rollin,4 Rosalind Hursthouse,5 and Martha Nussbaum6 have claimed. Since sentient beings are harmed when they cannot satisfy their own best interests, the virtue ethics approach would imply respecting the interests that others have. Moreover, because insensitivity is not considered virtuous, we could also claim that the most virtuous action would not be just to do no harm, but actually to do good, and to try to help animals whenever possible.

Care ethics

Care ethicists claim that the basis for our ethical concerns should be our emotional responses to them. In line with this, they defend that special relationships generate special moral duties, something that other theories (basically, those that defend impartial concerns in ethics) reject.

It may be thought that because of this, care ethics could provide a basis for an anthropocentric viewpoint that excluded nonhuman animals. The alleged reason for this would be that, because we usually have stronger relationships with humans, we should give priority to their interests and pay less attention to the interests of nonhuman animals.7 This argument has been rejected by those who have defended the consideration of nonhuman animals from a care ethics viewpoint, such as Josephine Donovan and Carol J. Adams.8 Donovan has argued that we cannot be considered caring agents if we fail to care for the interests of beings whom we know are suffering.9 Being a caring agent would entail having a caring response to that suffering. Therefore, we should be concerned with the interests of all those who can feel suffering and wellbeing. Accordingly, some care ethicists have actually addressed not only the duties we may have towards those nonhuman animals we are related to, but also towards others whom we are not related to, such as animals living in the wild.10

If we only had to care for the people with whom we have strong relationships, we would care for very few individuals. We would not care for the overwhelming majority of humanity since we have no relationships with them. In fact, many people have a close relationship with some nonhuman animals. If we were to make relationships the basis of caring, then we would have to accept the neglect of the majority of humanity as ethical, and that some nonhuman animals deserve more consideration than many humans. An alternative to this is, of course, to reject the relevance of relationships to the assignation of moral consideration, even though this means rejecting part of what care ethicists defend.