One of the stranger episodes of Egypt-Israel relations in the
post-Mubarak era occurred Tuesday with the emergence of a letter--first
reported by Haaretz's Barak Ravid--ostensibly from the Egyptian
president to his Israeli counterpart. The letter
states, "I am looking forward to exerting our best efforts to get the
Middle east peace process back to its right track in order to achieve
security and stability for all peoples of the region, including that
Israeli people." This seems like routine and mundane for a
correspondence between the heads of state of Egypt and Israel, but we
are talking not about Mohamed Hosni Mubarak and Shimon Peres, but the
Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi and Peres. This is the same Muslim
Brotherhood that was the first to raise the alarms about the threat of
Zionism to Palestine in the 1930s. This is the same organization that
claims its members fought heroically--even though they really didn't do
much fighting--in the war of 1948-49, known throughout the Arab world
as al Nakba (the setback). These are the same Brothers who mobilized
against the 1979 peace treaty with Israel. This is the same group that
opposed Cairo's strategic alignment with Washington because the United
States maintains a "special relationship" with Israel. The same Muslim
Brotherhood, which has vowed not to normalize relations with the
Israelis until Israel fulfills the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, which from
the Brotherhood's perspective demands the establishment of a
Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.

The unambiguous willingness expressed in President Morsi's letter to
work with Israel to find peace that would benefit "that Israeli people"
is a departure for the Brotherhood, to say the least. Yet, this clear
and surprising shift in Morsi's position along with several seemingly
technical problems with the actual letter has left its authenticity open
to question:

Whoever wrote the letter, which was in English, spelled the Israeli
leader's last name "Perez" instead of "Peres." True, in Arabic Perez
can be spelled using the "zaay," or "zayn," thus it would make sense to
use a "z" in transliteration. The name has also been rendered in Arabic
using a "daad" and a "seen," which is closest to the English spelling.
Regardless, do the Egyptians really not know how to spell Peres's name
by now? How long have they been dealing with him?

President Morsi's signature does not appear on the letter and there
is no presidential seal or stamp on it. Anyone who has ever spent any
time in the Arab world understands the importance of stamps and seals
without which no document is actually official. Still, there may be an
explanation for the missing stamps and signature. I am told that since
the letter was communicated via fax, a signed original could have been
sent in a diplomatic pouch that is yet to reach Peres's office. In
addition, an Egyptian diplomatic contact told me that the cover letter
from the Egyptian Embassy in Tel Aviv had all the requisite stamps and
the language was correct, leading him to conclude that it "looked
authentic."

The Egyptians are denying that Morsi sent the letter. Presidential spokesman, Yasser Ali, told al Ahram Gateway that "President Morsi has not sent any letter to the Israeli president."

So what is going on here? Perhaps the Muslim Brotherhood has had a
change of heart about Israel. Hope springs eternal, but such a turnabout
is unlikely. Maybe the responsibilities of power have not necessarily
altered Morsi's worldview, but they have forced him to soften his
position on working and dealing with Israel's leaders on issues of
mutual concern. This would be that "pragmatism" thing we've all been
hearing about for many months. It is also entirely possible that Morsi
is saying one thing about Israel to his constituents, but doing the
opposite in private. If that is the case, he has certainly grown into
the office quickly given the penchant among Arab leaders to behave this
way. There is also the possibility that Morsi and his people are total
rookies who had no idea that the letter to Peres would find its way into
the Israeli press. Maybe Morsi sent the letter, but did so in a way to
maximize plausible deniability.

Finally, as one member of the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party
cryptically suggested, the Egyptian presidency did not send the letter,
but perhaps some other faction or group did in an effort to embarrass
the new president. Conspiratorial? Without a doubt, but one can actually
understand the logic train in this one, unlike most conspiracy
theories. President Morsi has recently taken over a state apparatus in
which large numbers of people are not necessarily predisposed toward
him. Some of those people--in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? General
Intelligence Service? Supreme Council of the Armed Forces?--could
conceivably use a sensitive issue like Israel to embarrass Morsi. The
question is: Are they competent enough to forge a letter that would get
passed to the Israelis?

I do not know what the answer is, but I'd like to discount the
conspiracy theory and lean toward errors borne of inexperience if only
because a former U.S. government official once told me that when it
comes to the government--any government--"Count on incompetence."

The whole episode speaks to the ambiguous nature of Egypt-Israel
relations at this moment in Egypt's transition. The letter comes after
three Israeli messages to Morsi (two from Peres and one from Prime
Minister Netanyahu) that went unanswered. If the note from Morsi is
authentic, it is a good sign because it seems to defy predictions
(including my own) that relations between the Egyptians and Israelis
were going to get tough. Still, Yasser Ali's denial is curious. Why
send a letter and then deny it? If Morsi and his team are not willing to
own up to even routine communications with Israel's leadership, it is
not a good sign. The bilateral relationship cannot possibly be in the
black forever. After all, this is the new, more democratic, transparent
Egypt.

In the end, the letter and the controversy surrounding it are likely
to cause friction in Egypt-Israel ties if only because Morsi and the
people around him may feel political pressure to burnish the
anti-Zionist street credibility more fitting for Egypt's first popularly
elected and Islamist leader.

This article originally appeared at CFR.org, an Atlantic partner site.