A
federal-provincial division of powers necessitated a written constitution
which circumscribed the powers of the new Dominion and Provinces of Canada.
Despite its federal structure, the new Dominion was to have "a Constitution
similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom" (Constitution Act, 1867,
preamble).

51 x 1

Although these underlying
principles are not explicitly made part of the Constitution by any written
provision, other than in some respects by the oblique reference in the
preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, it
would be impossible to conceive of our constitutional structure without
them.

53 x 2

However, we also observed in the
Provincial Judges Reference that the effect of the
preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 was to incorporate certain
constitutional principles by reference, a point made earlier in Fraser v.
Public Service Staff Relations Board, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455, at pp. 462-63.

In the Provincial Judges
Reference, at para. 104, we determined that the
preamble "invites the courts to turn those principles into the
premises of a constitutional argument that culminates in the filling of gaps
in the express terms of the constitutional text".

s.
91

47 x 1

It should be noted,
parenthetically, that the 1982 amendments did not alter the basic division
of powers in ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution
Act, 1867, which is the primary textual expression of the principle of
federalism in our Constitution, agreed upon at Confederation. [...]

s.
92

11 x 1

It is also argued that this
Court's original jurisdiction is unconstitutional because it conflicts with
the original jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts and usurps the
normal appellate process. However, Parliament's power to establish a general
court of appeal pursuant to s. 101 is plenary, and takes priority over the
province's power to control the administration of justice in s.
92(14). [...]

47 x 1

It should be noted,
parenthetically, that the 1982 amendments did not alter the basic division
of powers in ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution
Act, 1867, which is the primary textual expression of the principle of
federalism in our Constitution, agreed upon at Confederation. [...]

s.
92(14)

11 x 1

However, Parliament's power to
establish a general court of appeal pursuant to s. 101 is plenary, and takes
priority over the province's power to control the administration of justice
in s. 92(14).
[...]

s.
96

15 x 1

Parliament and the provincial
legislatures may properly confer other legal functions on the courts, and
may confer certain judicial functions on bodies that are not courts. The
exception to this rule relates only to s. 96
courts.

Section
101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 gives Parliament the authority to
grant this Court the reference jurisdiction provided for in s. 53 of the
Supreme Court Act.

The words "general court of
appeal" in s. 101 denote the status of the
Court within the national court structure and should not be taken as a
restrictive definition of the Court's functions.

4 x 1

The amicus curiae argued that s.
101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 does not give
Parliament the authority to grant this Court the jurisdiction provided for
in s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26.

7 x 3

These two roles reflect the two heads of
power enumerated in s. 101
of the Constitution Act, 1867.

However, the "laws of Canada" referred to in
s. 101
consist only of federal law and statute: see Quebec North Shore
Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054, at pp.
1065-66.

As a result, the phrase "additional courts"
contained in s. 101
is an insufficient basis upon which to ground the special jurisdiction
established in s. 53 of the Supreme Court Act, which clearly exceeds
a consideration of federal law alone (see, e.g., s. 53(2)).

8 x 1

Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act is
intra vires Parliament's power under s. 101 if, in "pith
and substance", it is legislation in relation to the constitution or
organization of a "general court of appeal".

9 x 1

The words "general court of appeal" in s.
101
denote the status of the Court within the national court structure and
should not be taken as a restrictive definition of the Court's functions.

10 x 1

Although these courts are not constituted
under a head of power similar to s. 101, they certainly provide examples which
suggest that there is nothing inherently self-contradictory about an
appellate court exercising original jurisdiction on an exceptional basis.

11 x 1

However, Parliament's power to establish a
general court of appeal pursuant to s. 101 is plenary,
and takes priority over the province's power to control the administration
of justice in s. 92(14). See Attorney-General for Ontario v.
Attorney-General for Canada, [1947] A.C. 127 (P.C.).

Constitution Act, 1982, ss.
25, 35,
52(1), (2).

s.
25

82 x 1

Consistent with this long tradition of
respect for minorities, which is at least as old as Canada itself, the
framers of the Constitution Act, 1982 included in s. 35
explicit protection for existing aboriginal and treaty rights, and in s.
25, a
non-derogation clause in favour of the rights of aboriginal peoples.

s.
35

82 x 2

Consistent with this long tradition of
respect for minorities, which is at least as old as Canada itself, the
framers of the Constitution Act, 1982 included in s. 35 explicit
protection for existing aboriginal and treaty rights, and in s. 25,
a non-derogation clause in favour of the rights of aboriginal peoples.

The "promise" of s. 35, as it was
termed in R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075,
at p. 1083, recognized not only the ancient occupation of land by aboriginal
peoples, but their contribution to the building of Canada, and the special
commitments made to them by successive governments.

s. 52(1)

32 x 1

The "Constitution of Canada" certainly
includes the constitutional texts enumerated in s. 52(2)
of the Constitution Act, 1982.

s, 52(2)

72 x 1

The essence of constitutionalism in Canada is
embodied in s. 52(1)
of the Constitution Act, 1982, which provides that "[t]he
Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of
the inconsistency, of no force or effect."

Moreover, it is to be remembered that s. 33,
the "notwithstanding clause", gives Parliament and the provincial
legislatures authority to legislate on matters within their jurisdiction in
derogation of the fundamental freedoms (s.
2), legal rights
(ss. 7 to 14) and equality rights (s. 15) provisions of the Charter.

s. 3

65 x 1

In individual terms, the right to vote in
elections to the House of Commons and the provincial legislatures, and to be
candidates in those elections, is guaranteed to "Every citizen of Canada" by
virtue of s. 3 of
the Charter.

s.
4

65 x 2

In addition, the effect of s.
4 of the
Charter is to oblige the House of Commons and the provincial
legislatures to hold regular elections and to permit citizens to elect
representatives to their political institutions.

The democratic principle is affirmed with
particular clarity in that s. 4 is not subject to the notwithstanding power contained in s.
33.

ss. 7 to 14

47 x 1

Moreover, it is to be remembered that s. 33,
the "notwithstanding clause", gives Parliament and the provincial
legislatures authority to legislate on matters within their jurisdiction in
derogation of the fundamental freedoms (s. 2), legal rights (ss.
7 to 14)
and equality rights (s. 15) provisions of the Charter.

s. 15

47 x 1

Moreover, it is to be remembered that s. 33,
the "notwithstanding clause", gives Parliament and the provincial
legislatures authority to legislate on matters within their jurisdiction in
derogation of the fundamental freedoms (s. 2), legal rights (ss. 7 to 14)
and equality rights (s. 15)
provisions of the Charter.

s. 25

82 x 1

Consistent with this long tradition of
respect for minorities, which is at least as old as Canada itself, the
framers of the Constitution Act, 1982 included in s. 35 explicit
protection for existing aboriginal and treaty rights, and in s.
25, a
non-derogation clause in favour of the rights of aboriginal peoples.

s. 33

47 x 1

Moreover, it is to be remembered that s.
33, the
"notwithstanding clause", gives Parliament and the provincial legislatures
authority to legislate on matters within their jurisdiction in derogation of
the fundamental freedoms (s. 2), legal rights (ss. 7 to 14) and equality
rights (s. 15) provisions of the Charter.

65 x 1

The democratic principle is affirmed with
particular clarity in that s. 4 is not subject to the notwithstanding power
contained in s. 33.

THE WORDS "DEMOCRATIC" AND "DEMOCRACY"
USED IN THE REFERENCE RE THE SECESSION OF QUEBEC

PROVISION OF TEXT

PARAGRAPH

CONTIGUOUS TEXT

democratic

Held x 7

The reference
questions are justiciable and should be answered. They do not ask the Court
to usurp any democratic decision that the
people of Quebec may be called upon to make.

The questions, as
interpreted by the Court, are strictly limited to aspects of the legal
framework in which that democratic decision is
to be taken.

A
democratic decision of Quebecers in favour of
secession would put those relationships at risk.

Our
democratic institutions necessarily accommodate
a continuous process of discussion and evolution, which is reflected in the
constitutional right of each participant in the federation to initiate
constitutional change.

A clear majority vote
in Quebec on a clear question in favour of secession would confer
democratic legitimacy on the secession
initiative which all of the other participants in Confederation would have
to recognize.

The
democratic vote, by however strong a majority,
would have no legal effect on its own and could not push aside the
principles of federalism and the rule of law, the rights of individuals and
minorities, or the operation of democracy in the other provinces or in
Canada as a whole.

Democratic rights under the Constitution cannot be
divorced from constitutional obligations.

26 x 2

In exercising its
discretion whether to determine a matter that is alleged to be non-justiciable,
the Court's primary concern is to retain its proper role within the
constitutional framework of our democratic form
of government. . . .

Thus the circumstances
in which the Court may decline to answer a reference question on the basis
of "non-justiciability" include:

(i) if to do so would take the
Court beyond its own assessment of its proper role in the constitutional
framework of our democratic form of government
or

The Court must be
guided by the values and principles essential to a free and
democratic society which I believe to embody,
to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the human person,
commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety
of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and
political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and
groups in society.

65 x 1

The
democratic principle is affirmed with
particular clarity in that s. 4 is not subject to the notwithstanding power
contained in s. 33.

They couldn't resist any longer, look what
they've done: "democraticvote":
And in a referendum to destroy the country. In case the
hypnosis of "democratic" and "democracy" and "elected representatives"
didn't take hold, they have spit it out. A 100% unlawful judicial
constitutional amendment from the Haig case [1993], which is spun
around and overturned again in the Sauvé [2002] case. The sole
purpose of the Reference re the Secession of Quebec is to sucker everyone
into voting to destroy the country they already planned to take down and
have been taking down for decades to attach it to the USA and Mexico under a
military perimeter called NORTHCOM to control us with martial law when we
find we have had our country and our "democracy" stolen out
from under from us.

A superficial reading of selected provisions
of the written constitutional enactment, without more, may be misleading. It
is necessary to make a more profound investigation of the underlying
principles animating the whole of the Constitution, including the principles
of federalism, democracy,
constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities.

Arguments in support of the existence of such
a right were primarily based on the principle of
democracy.

Democracy,
however, means more than simple majority rule. Constitutional jurisprudence
shows that democracy exists in the larger context of other constitutional
values.

The democratic
vote, by however strong a majority, would have no legal effect on its own
and could not push aside the principles of federalism and the rule of law,
the rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of democracy in
the other provinces or in Canada as a whole. Democratic rights under the
Constitution cannot be divorced from constitutional obligations.

Authors cited x 1

MacLauchlan, H. Wade. "Accounting for Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Quebec
Secession Reference" (1997), 76 Can. Bar Rev. 155.

You think they want us to think about "democracy"? This isn't law; it's
an exercise in mass hypnosis by a Supreme Court largely appointed by Mulroney,
Mr. Free Trade and NAFTA, and this Court is helping to dissolve this country in
order to annex it to the USA and Mexico.

Try this: The "caught you in the act" principle.

Supreme Court in
Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 : "Held (Lamer C.J. and Iacobucci J.
dissenting): The appeal should be dismissed. The federal Referendum Act
and the Canada Elections Act are constitutional. The appellant's
exclusion from the federal referendum did not violate his rights under ss. 2(b),
3 and 15(1) of the Charter."

Supreme Court in
Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer)
[2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, [Gonthier J.]: "[...] it is clear that there was no breach
of s. 3 of the Charter in that case since s. 3 does not apply to
referenda [...]" [Section 3 being the "democratic vote"]

If the vote in a referendum is NOT a constitutional
section 3 democratic vote and "decision" or "sovereign will" of
the people in Haig [1993]and then later in Sauvé [2002],
then how and why does it temporarily become one in the
intervening case of the Reference re the Secession of Quebec in 1998?
Haig was a constitutional case, the decision is part of the rock-solid
immoveable content of the Constitution. It would take Parliament
to amend the Constitution to change the fact that the vote in a referendum is not the democratic section 3 vote of the Charter; and then it
would take another amendment to change it back again
for the Sauvé case 5 years after the Reference re
the Secession of Quebec. Which, moreover, has been "given effect" in the
Clarity Act, a so-called federal law compelling Parliament to negotiate the end
of the country based on a bogus vote in a referendum. In other words, judicial
and Parliamentary treason.

The Supreme Court of Mulroney in 1998, by repeatedly, incessantly
juxtaposing the words "democratic" and "will", "democratic" and "sovereign
will" of the people, "democratic" and "decision" with
"democratically elected" representatives, the Secession
Reference is a blatant exercise in deep hypnosis to facilitate
deep integration of Canada into the USA and Mexico.

It's an exercise in mesmerisation to convince the legal community
and the general public that a vote in a referendum is a democratic section 3
vote under the Constitution.

This is a cheap marketing trick, it isn't law or
legal reasoning.

There is a huge deal of difference between a "democratic" process
or form used to conduct affairs under the Constitution, and a "democratic
decision" of Quebecers or anyone else in a referendum --
because the Haig case so decided.

But in the Secession Reference, the Court is hell-bent on making the
referendum vote INTO a section 3 "democratic vote" and "decision" of the
"sovereign will" of the people as a pretext to trigger the bogus
negotiations by compelling Parliament to commit treason, for in fact
there are no negotiations, there is a plan, the plan is being implemented
clearly and systematically despite the No in 1980 and the No in 1995. The plan
is to destroy Canada and make the citizens look like the suckers who did it.

The Reference re the Secession of Quebec is judicial fraud, quackery and
treason.