from the don't-try-too-hard dept

For years we've explored how the nation's phone companies don't really even want to be in the broadband business. They routinely refuse to upgrade their networks, yet often lobby to ensure nobody else can deliver broadband in these neglected footprints either. Telcos in particular have a bizarre disdain for their paying customers, delivering the bare minimum (slow DSL) at the highest rates they can possibly charge without a full-scale consumer revolt. It's not surprising then that many telco DSL customers are fleeing to cable, assuming they even have a second option for broadband.

This dynamic often results in some absurd dysfunction. Like in West Virginia, where incumbent telco Frontier has repeatedly been busted in a series of scandals involving substandard service and the misuse of taxpayer money. The graft and corruption in the state is so severe, state leaders have buried reports, and, until recently, a Frontier executive did double duty as a state representative without anybody in the state thinking that was a conflict of interest.

Things aren't going any better for Frontier in Minnesota, where the state AG just issued a scathing 133 page report accusing the company of all manner of dubious behavior, including letting outages go on for months on end without repairs. The report doesn't pull punches in accusing Frontier of violating at least 35 state laws and state guidelines, and routinely neglecting paying customers, putting some customers with medical conditions at risk:

The findings of this investigation detail an extraordinary situation, where customers have suffered with outages of months, or more, when the law requires telephone utilities to make all reasonable efforts to prevent interruptions of service. When interruptions occur, telephone utilities are to restore service “with the shortest possible delay.” Frontier customers with these outages include those with family members with urgent medical needs, such as pacemakers monitored by their medical teams via the customer’s landline.

This report, which was based on 1,000 customer complaints and seven different public hearings, paints a picture of a company that consistently let its networks fall apart, refused to upgrade or repair customer equipment on a timely basis, routinely and aggressively engaged in fraudulent billing practices, and repeatedly ignored customer complaints about all of it. The report includes photos showing Frontier's network gear in various states of neglect:

Or installs where company lines were draped casually through yards, over fences, and even over propane tanks:

Again, if you've followed similar stories focused on Verizon, this kind of behavior is the norm, not some errant exception for the nation's phone companies. And while some states actually hold telcos feet to the fire occasionally, there's a long roster of states (Tennessee and West Virginia quickly come to mind) where the "solution" to these problems has been to completely neuter local regulatory oversight at incumbent monopoly request. This kind of blind deregulation, as you may have noticed, doesn't actually fix anything when dealing with natural, apathetic monopolies.

Again, this kind of apathy hurts the customers of these companies, who've made it pretty clear they no longer really want to be in the residential broadband business. As apathetic telcos hang up on unwanted customers, it's creating a bigger monopoly for cable operators across huge swaths of the country. That, in turn, only ensures that prices remain high and customer service remains an afterthought. And again, the Ajit Pai FCC's tendency to rubber stamp every and all industry desires without holding anybody accountable for anything pretty clearly isn't helping.

from the transparency! dept

How many lawsuits does it take to get Comcast to back off of shady fees designed to falsely inflate the company's advertised prices? Good question.

For several years now cable and broadband providers have been using hidden fees to covertly jack up their advertised rates. These fees, which utilize a rotating crop of bullshit names, help these companies falsely advertise one rate, then sock the consumer with a significantly higher-rate post sale (often when locked into a long-term contract). The practice also allows the company to falsely claim they're not raising rates on consumers. They omit that they're talking about the above-the-line rate being charged, implying that anything below the line (where real fees like taxes are levied) is outside of their control.

Back in 2014, Comcast introduced a new $1.50 per month surcharge it called its "Broadcast TV Fee." Said fee was really just a portion of the cost of doing business for Comcast (programming), busted out of the full bill and hidden below the line -- again to help the company falsely advertise a lower price. Over the last four years Comcast has quietly but quickly pushed this fee skyward, this week informing customers that -- alongside numerous other rate hikes like its "Regional Sports Network" fees -- the company's Broadcast TV fee would now be up to $10 per month for some cable TV customers.

While the federal government (FTC, FCC) routinely turned a blind eye to this practice (regardless of which party was in control), Comcast and other cable ops have been hit by a rotating crop of investigations and lawsuits for the practice. Just before Christmas, Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson joined the festivities, announcing that her office had filed suit against Comcast for "charging customers more than it promised for cable television packages, charging for unordered equipment and services, and not delivering prepaid Visa cards promised in its promotions."

The AG's office is quick to point out that Comcast enjoys falsely telling complaining customers that the bogus fees it uses to covertly raise rates are the fault of the federal government:

"Comcast/Xfinity falsely told some consumers who questioned these extra fees that the fees were out of the company’s control. For example, it told one customer that “those fees are actually local fees and correspond to the FCC and we don’t manage those okay? Those aren’t up to Comcast.” It told another customer that “we have no control over the fees.” Comcast is not, however, required by any state or federal law to collect such fees, and does so simply to generate revenue.

When criticized, Comcast has routinely tried to claim that adding these sneaky fees then lying about what they're for is just the company's way of being "transparent" with its customers. Denial appears to be the company's response to these allegations as well, despite the fact the practice has now been well illustrated by countless settlements and lawsuits.

In the streaming video wars to come, Comcast could differentiate itself by being clear with customers about how much its services actually cost, using "zero hidden fees" as a marketing point of pride. This being Comcast, the company is likely to instead move in the opposite direction, and just double down on the practice of misleading and confusing its customers in its relentless quest to nickel and dime the lion's share of America.

from the shove-the-shame-you-don't-have-into-a-ziploc-bag-and-GTFO-of-office-thx dept

In one of the more blatant attempts at censorship we've witnessed, a Minnesota politician tried to trademark the name of a politically-focused blog that often criticized her. Tax board member Carol Becker tried to take the name "Wedge LIVE!" away from its owner, John Edwards, who had been using the name for years to cover local politics. Becker first claimed she thought of the name herself, which she thought would be perfect for her yet-unrealized podcast covering… local politics.

After receiving a bit of heat from Tony Webster, John Edwards, and Edward's supporters, Becker finally admitted she was attempting to take the name away from her critic, who had built his unregistered brand over the past several years. After more backlash, she decided to withdraw her trademark applications but warned she would try again in six months if Edwards didn't register them first.

Four months later, it appears Edwards has prevailed. His post at Wedge LIVE! notes he has dropped his lawsuit against Becker seeking an injunction blocking her from filing for Wedge Live-related trademarks. Becker has agreed to drop her censorial pursuit of the name "Wedge LIVE," bringing an end to this ridiculous and particularly inept attempt to silence a critic.

The legal effort to defend Wedge LIVE from Carol Becker has ended in victory. In a settlement reached late Monday, and fully executed yesterday, Becker has acknowledged my ownership of the name “Wedge LIVE.” Additionally, Becker has agreed that she will “never assert any claim to these marks in the future.”

Perhaps this debacle will lead Becker to exit the public sector. Becker attempted to use the federal government's IP protections to undermine a critic -- one she also baselessly accused of being funded by "dark money" and called a tax fraud. She also denied being aware of Wedge LIVE!'s existence when first confronted by journalists, only belatedly admitting she knew exactly what she was doing when she filed the disingenuous trademark applications. She's proven she can't really be trusted to handle even the small part of government she's staked out.

from the horrific-behavior-by-all-involved dept

Something strange and disturbing is going on in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Cops have been instructing paramedics to use certain drugs to subdue arrestees, which is about as advisable as allowing paramedics to instruct officers on use of force. Cops don't know what's best for arrestees in terms of medical care. The fact that paramedics have been following their instructions is the most disturbing fact of all. As the Star Tribune reports, cops telling EMS personnel what to do has put people's lives in jeopardy.

Minneapolis police officers have repeatedly requested over the past three years that Hennepin County medical responders sedate people using the powerful tranquilizer ketamine, at times over the protests of those being drugged, and in some cases when no apparent crime was committed, a city report shows.

On multiple occasions, in the presence of police, Hennepin Healthcare EMS workers injected suspects of crimes and others who already appeared to be restrained, according to the report, and the ketamine caused heart or breathing failure, requiring them to be medically revived. Several people given ketamine had to be intubated.

The paramedics are fully complicit in this horror show. They're overriding their own knowledge and medical training with catastrophic results. This atrocious behavior was exposed by a report from the Office for Police Conduct Review. The report showed ketamine injections increased from three in 2012 to 62 in 2017. It wasn't until this report was delivered to police that anyone decided to do anything about it. The Minneapolis Police Commander has now forbidden officers from instructing EMS crews to sedate a subject.

Ketamine is a dangerous drug. The police know this. They classify it as a "date rape" drug, capable of putting people into deep sedation and altering their memories. Healthcare providers know this, too, which is why they're often hesitant to use it as a sedative if the subject has preexisting breathing problems. Ketamine can kill under these circumstances. When used as a first response in the sedation of detainees, medical histories aren't available and the outcome can be death.

Allowing police to "prescribe" sedatives is a horrible idea. The report shows Minneapolis cops nuked arrestees with a powerful sedative just because. In many of the cases examined, there appeared to be no reason to escalate to a dangerous sedative.

To evaluate how the sedative was being used, the Office of Police Conduct Review investigators looked for mentions of the word in police reports, and then reviewed body camera footage from those cases.

“Multiple videos showed individuals requiring intubation after being injected with ketamine, and [police] reports indicate that multiple individuals stopped breathing and/or their hearts stopped beating after being injected with ketamine,” the report said.

The police encounters that led to EMS using ketamine ranged from cases of obstruction of justice to jaywalking, according to the report. One man was dosed with ketamine while strapped to a stretcher and wearing a spit hood.

Unbelievably, the story gets worse. Those dosed with ketamine at the suggestion of police officers suffered rude awakenings at Minneapolis hospitals. Hennepin Healthcare went ahead and enrolled detainees in its ketamine study without their consent. Supposedly consent isn't actually required by law, which makes a sort of cosmic sense when you're studying the effects of a date rape drug. "Enrollees" could opt out afterward, but that offers little comfort when you've been sedated so heavily you need a machine to breathe for you.

This study exacerbated Hennepin Healthcare's ketamine problem. Ramping up dosings at the request of cops had already increased the number of life-threatening reactions to the drug. This incentive allowed this to carried over to day-to-day work, resulting in EMS personnel using ketamine whenever possible, even without verbal shoves from under-educated cops.

Body camera footage from one case showed a woman, after being Maced by police, asking for an asthma pump, the draft report said.

Instead, a paramedic gave her an injection of ketamine.

“If she was having an asthma attack, giving ketamine actually helps patients and we’re doing a study for agitation anyway so I had to give her ketamine,” the unnamed paramedic told a police officer, according to the report.

After receiving ketamine, the woman’s breathing stopped, and medical staff resuscitated her, according to the report.

Of course, there's an explanation for all of this. It comes courtesy of Hennepin Healthcare's top official. And it sounds like something written by police officers, rather than an expert in the medical field.

Dr. William Heegaard, chief medical officer for Hennepin Healthcare, said ketamine can be a lifesaving tool when paramedics encounter people showing signs of “excited delirium,” a condition when severe agitation can lead to death.

In the past, Taser has hosted seminars and sent out pamphlets on excited delirium to police and medical examiners’ groups across the country; sued medical examiners who listed their stun guns as a cause of death; and even gave law enforcement agencies a ready-made statement for when someone dies after police shock them with a stun gun: “We regret the unfortunate loss of life. There are many cases where excited delirium caused by various mental disorders or medical conditions, that may or may not include drug use, can lead to a fatal conclusion.”

Heegaard's hospital and staff engage in highly-questionable behavior and he's trying to pin it on a condition most of the medical community doesn't recognize as an actual syndrome. This whole debacle shows just how far cops have strayed from the "serve and protect" ideal. This is all about making things as easy as possible for officers accompanying detainees to medical care facilities. They want them knocked out, even if it raises the risk of killing them.

It also shows how easy it is for abusive behavior to spread when it's originating from law enforcement officers. Paramedics know better. They know they're the first line of defense against further injury or trauma. And they're willing to throw that all away just because a cop tells them to dope up compliant detainees.

On top of everything, there's the skewed incentives of Hennepin Healthcare, which has found a way to gather subjects for studies by sedating them so heavily they can't possibly object to anything. There should be a whole lot of people in both fields filing for unemployment. But that isn't how thing work when cops are involved. New policies will be put in place and everyone who fucked citizens with unneeded ketamine injections will just go back to work with a mental note in place reminding them to be a bit more careful when abusing the public's trust.

from the open-interpretations-and-random-enforcement-are-not-constitutional-bedfellows dept

Eight years after Minnesota's vague ban on "political" apparel at polling places was first challenged, the Supreme Court has finally struck the ordinance down as unconstitutional. The law allowed election judges to decide whether or not someone's t-shirt or button or whatever sent a "political" message that might somehow sway the vote.

The law covered far more than overt messages about political parties or specific candidates. According to the state's arguments, it could be read as covering anything possibly pertaining to referendum issues and/or issues any political candidate had expressed an opinion on. This lead to a spectacular bit of oral argument [PDF] when the state's lawyer tried to explain what may or may not be covered by the apparel ban.

MR. ROGAN: Well, Your Honor, the political has a -- has a plain meaning in our statute based on that it -- it's influencing elections. What I -- all that I'm describing is that something that is political, for example, that is known to only a few people but is clearly political, is not going to be something that's going to be reasonably understood by voters in the polling place.

JUSTICE ALITO: How about a shirt with a rainbow flag? Would that be permitted?

MR. ROGAN: A shirt with a rainbow flag? No, it would -- yes, it would be -- it would be permitted unless there was -- unless there was an issue on the ballot that -- that related somehow to -- to gay rights.

JUSTICE ALITO: How about a shirt that says "Parkland Strong"?

MR. ROGAN: No, that would -- that would be -- that would be allowed. I think -­ I think, Your Honor -­

JUSTICE ALITO: Even though gun control would very likely be an issue?

MR. ROGAN: To the extent -­

JUSTICE ALITO: I bet some candidate would raise an issue about gun control.

MR. ROGAN: Your Honor, the -- the -­ the line that we're drawing is one that is -­ is related to electoral choices in a -­

JUSTICE ALITO: Well, what's the answer to this question? You're a polling official. You're the reasonable person. Would that be allowed or would it not be allowed? [...]

MR. ROGAN: I -- I think -- I think today that I -- that would be -- if -- if that was in Minnesota, and it was "Parkland Strong," I -- I would say that that would be allowed in, that there's not -­

JUSTICE ALITO: Okay. How about an NRA shirt?

MR. ROGAN: An NRA shirt? Today, in Minnesota, no, it would not, Your Honor. I think that that's a clear indication -- and I think what you're getting at, Your Honor -­

JUSTICE ALITO: How about a shirt with the text of the Second Amendment?

MR. ROGAN: Your Honor, I -- I -- I think that that could be viewed as political, that that -- that would be -- that would be -­

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No -- no what, that it would be covered or wouldn't be allowed?

MR. ROGAN: It would be allowed.

The point Alito makes is simple: a ban on policitized apparel, especially one written this broadly, is subject to the interpretation of the person making the judgment call, each of which will have their own definition of "political." The state can only argue that some things might always be permissible, but for everything else, it's likely cover up or get cut out of the democratic process.

This exchange is paraphrased in the Supreme Court's decision [PDF], which finds the law too vague and internally inconsistent to be considered constitutional.

The statute does not define the term “political,” a word that can broadly encompass anything “of or relating to government, a government, or the conduct of governmental affairs.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1755. The State argues that the apparel ban should be interpreted more narrowly to proscribe “only words and symbols that an objectively reasonable observer would perceive as conveying a message about the electoral choices at issue in [the] polling place.” At the same time, the State argues that the category of “political” apparel is not limited to campaign apparel.

The Court considers a State’s authoritative constructions in interpreting a state law. But far from clarifying the indeterminate scope of the provision, Minnesota’s “electoral choices” construction introduces confusing line-drawing problems. For specific examples of what messages are banned under that standard, the State points to the Election Day Policy. The first three categories of prohibited items in the Policy are clear. But the next category—“issue oriented material designed to influence or impact voting”—raises more questions than it answers. The State takes the position that any subject on which a political candidate or party has taken a stance qualifies as an “issue” within the meaning of that category. Such a rule—whose fair enforcement requires an election judge to maintain a mental index of the platforms and positions of every candidate and party on the ballot—is not reasonable.

On top of the that, the law could be read to encompass apparel not even considered remotely "political" until it's being worn by a person trying to vote in Minnesota.

Any number of associations, educational institutions, businesses, and religious organizations could have an opinion on an “issue[] confronting voters in a given election.” For instance, the American Civil Liberties Union, the AARP, the World Wildlife Fund, and Ben & Jerry’s all have stated positions on matters of public concern. If the views of those groups align or conflict with the position of a candidate or party on the ballot, does that mean that their insignia are banned? [...]

Take another example: In the run-up to the 2012 election, Presidential candidates of both major parties issued public statements regarding the then-existing policy of the Boy Scouts of America to exclude members on the basis of sexual orientation. Should a Scout leader in 2012 stopping to vote on his way to a troop meeting have been asked to cover up his uniform?

The state claimed it made clear delineations, all of which somehow were subject to the "reasonable" interpretation of magically-unbiased election judges. As the court points out, the law is capable of defeating the rationale of its own defenders, thanks to its lousy construction.

The State’s “electoral choices” standard, considered together with the nonexclusive examples in the Election Day Policy, poses riddles that even the State’s top lawyers struggle to solve.

It's not impossible to keep a polling place free of overt political messages, but the state legislature's attempt is particularly terrible, expanding the definition of "political" until it can be read to cover almost anything other than a blank t-shirt. The law -- standing since the late 19th century -- is now effectively dead, determined to be too unconstitutional to serve the public as it attends to its democratic duties.

from the @-me-for-felony-charges dept

A tough case dealing with some horrendous behavior and a pretty broad reading of Minnesota's harassment/stalking laws has resulted in a sustained conviction on felony charges against a minor. The state appeals court summarizes the events in its decision [PDF]:

In March 2016, high school students, W.K., B.L., and appellant A.J.B., discussed that M.B., a fellow student who had been diagnosed with autism and ADHD, had recently posted some tweets discussing girls at school. B.L. and A.J.B. told W.K. that they wanted to post materials on M.B.’s Twitter page to elicit a “negative response.” A.J.B. created a Twitter account with no identifying information called “Jeb Bush’s Guac Bowl.” A.J.B. then began tweeting messages tagging M.B.’s account over two to three hours, with several referring to autism. One post contained a sign saying “Autistic Children Play Here” with a caption reading “Meanwhile at [M.B.]’s Daycare.” Another post contained a checkerboard of images with M.B.’s face and a caption reading “Click the Autistic Child.” Another post encouraged M.B. to “try a new cologne called ‘Anthrax.’” One post encouraged M.B. to “consider suicide,” while another contained an image stating “Consider the following” with a picture of a person holding a Clorox Bleach bottle. A.J.B. also posted an image of Pepe the Frog, “a known hate symbol,” hanging by the neck on a rope.

Another fine example of man's inhumanity to man: high school edition. Trash rando A.J.B. ended up with two misdemeanor charges and one felony stalking charge -- the latter predicated on the victim's disabilities. There are a few concerns with the resulting ruling, not to mention the events leading up to the criminal charges.

To begin with, the victim was not even aware of the tweets until a school administrator brought them to his attention. The administrator had presumably been tipped off by other students. This led to the victim expressing suicidal thoughts and an extreme reluctance to return to school.

This dovetails into the court's weird interpretation of Twitter mechanics. This confusion over how Twitter operates may have played a part in upholding the charges and finding A.J.B.'s speech unprotected by the Constitution. Eric Goldman points out this misapprehension allows the court to bypass the student's free speech defenses, one of which compared tweeting unpleasant messages was no different than "posting flyers on walls."

The court’s technological description of @tweeting is... garbled. It recounts evidence that “the act of tagging someone means that the messages are ‘on their wall. Anyone can see it but [the poster is] just making sure that the [tagged] person sees it.'” The reference to “their wall” in this passage is confusing. I cannot appear in someone else’s Twitter timeline unless they retweet me, whereas in Facebook and LinkedIn, my posts can show up on other people’s walls (at least in some cases) just by including their name in my post. Furthermore, AJB’s barrage of @tweets would NOT appear in AJB’s main newsfeed (as opposed to the “tweets and replies” option), and and would not seen by most readers, if the @ reference was the tweet’s first character; and none of MB’s followers would have seen AJB’s tweets unless they were also followers of AJB. Plus, MB would see the @tweets only if MB hadn’t blocked AJB and only if MB looks in the notifications area (which not everyone does). There’s a lot of technological complexity about how content appears on Twitter that the court glossed over.

As Goldman notes, blocking accounts is one remedy that doesn't involve law enforcement. It's of limited utility, considering new accounts can be created in a manner of minutes, but Twitter does give users some tools to deal with harassment and other unwanted interactions.

Second, this could have been handled by the school, rather than turning it into a criminal case. The school was the entity that brought the tweets to the attention of the student and a case could be made the harassment interfered with M.B.'s ability to continue attending school. While this education interference would have engaged school policies and discipline, this would not be without its own problems. Doing so would effectively punish someone for acts committed off-campus, which would raise its own Constitutional concerns.

The law itself is no help. It's written broadly enough the court finds it easy to criminalize otherwise-protected speech.

Per this court’s interpretation, it’s criminal stalking in Minnesota to send two or more @tweets to a person knowing they would cause the person to “feel frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated.” The Minnesota criminal harassment statute is equally dubious, applying when a person sends two or more @tweets “with the intent to abuse, disturb, or cause distress.”

As Goldman notes, many of us are subjected to "criminal" behavior every day on the platform. Perhaps some of us even engage in it, as "causing distress" may mean little more than vehemently disagreeing with someone's statements, views, political/religious preferences, etc.

There are a lot of free speech implications in play. The court threads the needle, but not in a helpful way. In order to find A.J.B.'s speech unprotected, it seizes on A.J.B.'s "targeting" of the autistic student by "tagging" him in the tweets.

The law is bad and the court is reading the law as the legislators wrote it. This could also be the way the legislators intended it to be read, rationalizing that no prosecutor would move forward with questionable charges predicated on a broadly-written law with an absurdly low bar for engagement (two tweets). Legislators either don't know or don't care that prosecutorial discretion means pursuing ridiculous prosecutions and overcharging defendants. It almost never means refusing to move forward with questionable cases. If the ruling is bad, it's because the law invites bad rulings. The fact that the court doesn't understand how Twitter works only makes it worse.

from the non-testimonial-act-of-producing-evidence-against-yourself dept

When it comes to the Fifth Amendment, you're better off with a password or PIN securing your device, rather than your fingerprint. Cellphone manufacturers introduced fingerprint readers in an effort to protect users from thieves or other unauthorized access. But it does nothing at all to prevent law enforcement from using their fingerprints to unlock seized devices.

The US Supreme Court hasn't seen a case involving compelled production of fingerprints land on its desk yet and there's very little in the way of federal court decisions to provide guidance. What we have to work with is scattered state court decisions and the implicit understanding that no matter how judges rule, a refusal to turn over a fingerprint or a password is little more than a way to add years to an eventual sentence.

The Minnesota Supreme Court has issued the final word on fingerprints and the Fifth Amendment for state residents. In upholding the appeals court ruling, the Supreme Court says a fingerprint isn't testimonial, even if it results in the production of evidence used against the defendant. (h/t FourthAmendment.com)

Although the Supreme Court’s distinction between the testimonial act of producing documents as evidence and the nontestimonial act of producing the body as evidence is helpful to our analysis, the act here—providing the police a fingerprint to unlock a cellphone—does not fit neatly into either category. Unlike the acts of standing in a lineup or providing a blood, voice, or handwriting sample, providing a fingerprint to unlock a cellphone both exhibits the body (the fingerprint) and produces documents (the contents of the cellphone). Providing a fingerprint gives the government access to the phone’s contents that it did not already have, and the act of unlocking the cellphone communicates some degree of possession, control, and authentication of the cellphone’s contents. See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36. But producing a fingerprint to unlock a phone, unlike the act of producing documents, is a display of the physical characteristics of the body, not of the mind, to the police. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763.

Because we conclude that producing a fingerprint is more like exhibiting the body than producing documents, we hold that providing a fingerprint to unlock a cellphone is not a testimonial communication under the Fifth Amendment.

The ruling notes the defendant did try to holdout on this, sticking to his Fifth Amendment arguments. But when the trial court gives you only unpalatable options, defendants tend to give prosecutors what they want.

The district court concluded that compelling Diamond’s fingerprint would not violate his Fifth Amendment privilege because “[c]ompelling the production of [Diamond’s] fingerprint or thumbprint would not call upon the use of [his] mind. It is more akin to providing a key to a lockbox.” Accordingly, it ordered Diamond to “provide a fingerprint or thumbprint as deemed necessary by the Chaska Police Department to unlock his seized cell phone.”

Diamond continued to object to providing the necessary fingerprint for unlocking the phone. Nevertheless, he finally unlocked the cellphone with his fingerprint in court after being held in civil contempt and warned of the possibility and consequences of criminal contempt.

This is an aspect never discussed by the FBI and others engaged in the war on encryption. Many, many people can be motivated to unlock devices when faced with the prospect of indefinite imprisonment on contempt charges. It's something that should work in all but the most extreme criminal cases where the potential imprisonment might be as close to indefinite as humanly possible.

[court]LAWYER: Did u kill him?ME: NoL: You know what the punishment is for committing perjury?ME [lips on the mic] Much less than murder

Using the law to set an example and shame some teenagers undermines the seriousness and intent of child pornography laws.

Minnesota statute 617.247 clearly states that its intent is to “protect minors from the physical and psychological damage caused by their being used in pornographic work depicting sexual conduct which involves minors.” Yet it is the state, not Jane that is doing the victimizing.

“I’m not a criminal for taking a selfie,” stated Jane Doe. “Sexting is common among teens at my school, and we shouldn’t face charges for doing it. I don’t want anyone else to go through what I’m going through.”

This is clearly a ridiculous reading of Minnesota's law. The law can't "protect" Jane Doe from taking sexually explicit photos of herself -- not unless this is the prosecutor's idea of "protection." If anyone else had taken the photos, Jane Doe would be the victim of child pornography production.

Minnesota statutory rape law is violated when a person has consensual sexual intercourse with an individual under age 16, although it is raised to 18 when the offender is an authority figure. If the younger party is 13-15, their partners must be no more than 2 years older, and children under 13 may only consent to those less than 36 months older.

Although it is possible this prosecutor may have decided to wield this law just as badly.

Because there is no such "Romeo and Juliet law" in Minnesota, it is possible for two individuals both under the age of 16 who willingly engage in intercourse to both be prosecuted for statutory rape, although this is rare.

As the ACLU points out in its brief [PDF], the prosecution of Doe serves no conceivable definition of "justice." It doesn't take a child predator off the street and it requires Doe to register as a sex offender even if she pleads to a lesser charge. It robs the term "production" of any meaning by stripping it of context, treating the willing production of explicit material BY a minor as equivalent to the non-consensual production of child pornography by an adult pedophile. The lack of an exploited victim means the prosecutor shouldn't have a legal basis for the prosecution.

But here we are, watching the state of Minnesota attempt to turn someone who took pictures of herself into a criminal. The National District Attorneys Association has suggested prosecutors limit pursuit of teen sexting cases and to deploy a "light touch" in those they do choose to pursue. But the prosecutor isn't interested in following the NDAA's suggestions. As Scott Greenfield points out, leaving sensitive issues like this up to prosecutors rarely works out well for the public.

The problem with relying on prosecutorial discretion to clean up bad laws, to not use the bludgeon in ways that no one really wanted, is that it’s prosecutorial discretion. The prosecutor can choose to use a “light hand,” or come down hard. We might disagree with his choice, but the choice is his, not ours. That’s what discretion means. If the prosecutor, for whatever reason, chooses to beat a teen into submission, he can. If the elements of the crime cover her conduct, then it’s a crime and she’s a criminal. That it’s stupid isn’t the point. This is law.

The law may be stupid but we can apparently always count on some prosecutors to be even stupider. There are a wealth of options available to deter Does from sexting in the future -- none of which involve criminal charges or sex offender registration. Parents, family members, schools, community groups… all of these can provide guidance for teens without having to involve law enforcement or a prosecutor's lack of discretion.

A Minnesota bank received a call in January from who they thought was Douglas, their customer, asking to wire transfer $28,500 from a line of credit to another bank. To verify the transaction, the bank relied on a faxed copy of his passport. But it wasn’t him, the passport was fake, and the transfer request was fraudulent.

The Edina Police Department figured out that while searching Google Images for the victim’s name, they found the photo used on the fake passport, and investigators couldn’t find it on Yahoo or Bing. So, they theorized the suspect must have searched Google for the victim’s name while making the fake passport.

Edina Police Detective David Lindman detailed this theory in an application for a search warrant filed in early February, asking the Court to authorize a search warrant for names, email addresses, account information, and IP addresses of anyone who searched variations of the victim’s name over a five-week period of time.

Supposedly, the warrant [PDF] limits Google's search for searches to the Edina area, but that puts Google in the position of determining who was located where when these searches were made. Not that Google is likely to fulfill this request, warrant or not. There's nothing approaching probable cause in the warrant -- just the minimum of "detective" work that failed to uncover similar images in response to search terms at Yahoo and Bing.

Incredibly, this isn't the Edina PD's first attempt to obtain search results and the identifying information associated with them. In the warrant, Detective David Lindman notes he'd already served Google with an administrative subpoena, which Google rejected because it demanded content rather than transaction records.

Detective Lindman apparently feels Google's rejection was BS.

Though Google Inc.'s rejection of this administrative subpoena is arguable, your affiant is applying for this search warrant so that the investigation of this case does not stall.

I'm guessing Google's not going to be sending anything in response to this warrant, either. This is likely to be challenged by the company. If it isn't, anything turned over to the Edina PD will be highly suspect in terms of admissible evidence. There's no probable cause contained in the warrant application -- only the theory that any information obtained might help the investigation move forward.

Will this lead to Edina officers raiding homes because someone searched for the name "Douglas [REDACTED]" during the specified time period? Quite possibly. It obviously won't take much effort to get those warrants signed, not if judges are willing to turn law enforcement wishes into reality, without asking for anything (like actual probable cause) in return.

from the giving-The-Man-the-finger-no-longer-subversive;-actually-helpful dept

As was hinted heavily three years ago, you might be better off securing your phone with a passcode than your fingerprint. While a fingerprint is definitely unique and (theoretically...) a better way to keep thieves and snoopers from breaking into your phone, it's not much help when it comes to your Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination.

The Minnesota Appeals Court has ruled [PDF] that unlocking a phone with a fingerprint is no more "testimonial" than a blood draw, police lineup appearance, or even matching the description of a suspected criminal. (h/t Orin Kerr)

Diamond relies on In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 670 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012), to support his argument that supplying his fingerprint was testimonial. In In re Grand Jury, the court reasoned that requiring the defendant to decrypt and produce the contents of a computer’s hard drive, when it was unknown whether any documents were even on the encrypted drive, “would be tantamount to testimony by [the defendant] of his knowledge of the existence and location of potentially incriminating files; of his possession, control, and access to the encrypted portions of the drives; and of his capability to decrypt the files.” Id. at 1346. The court concluded that such a requirement is analogous to requiring production of a combination and that such a production involves implied factual statements that could potentially incriminate. Id.

By being ordered to produce his fingerprint, however, Diamond was not required to disclose any knowledge he might have or to speak his guilt. See Doe, 487 U.S. at 211, 108 S. Ct. at 2348. The district court’s order is therefore distinguishable from requiring a defendant to decrypt a hard drive or produce a combination. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 670 F.3d at 1346; United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (holding that requiring a defendant to provide computer password violates the Fifth Amendment). Those requirements involve a level of knowledge and mental capacity that is not present in ordering Diamond to place his fingerprint on his cellphone. Instead, the task that Diamond was compelled to perform—to provide his fingerprint—is no more testimonial than furnishing a blood sample, providing handwriting or voice exemplars, standing in a lineup, or wearing particular clothing.

Of course, it's what's contained in the now-unlocked device that might be incriminating, which is why Diamond pointed to In re Grand Jury as being analogous to the forced provision of a fingerprint. The court's rebuttal of this argument, however, doesn't make a lot of sense. It says the process that unlocked the device requires no knowledge or mental capacity -- which is certainly true -- but that the end result, despite being the same (the production of evidence against themselves) is somehow different because of the part of the body used to obtain access (finger v. brain).

In recounting the obtaining of the print, the court shows that some knowledge is imparted by this effort -- information not possessed by law enforcement or prosecutors.

Diamond also argues that he “was required to identify for the police which of his fingerprints would open the phone” and that this requirement compelled a testimonial communication. This argument, however, mischaracterizes the district court’s order. The district court’s February 11 order compelled Diamond to “provide a fingerprint or thumbprint as deemed necessary by the Chaska Police Department to unlock his seized cell phone.” At the April 3 contempt hearing, the district court referred to Diamond providing his “thumbprint.” The prosecutor noted that they were “not sure if it’s an index finger or a thumb.” The district court answered, “Take whatever samples you need.” Diamond then asked the detectives which finger they wanted, and they answered, “The one that unlocks it.”

This is something only Diamond would know, and by unlocking the phone, he would be demonstrating some form of control of the device as well as responsibility for its contents. So, it is still a testimonial act, even if it doesn't rise to the mental level of retaining a password or combination. (And, if so, would four-digit passcodes be less "testimonial" than a nine-digit alphanumeric password, if the bright line comes down to mental effort?)

Given the reasoning of the court, it almost appears as though Diamond may have succeeded in this constitutional challenge if he had chosen to do so at the point he was ordered to produce the correct finger.

It is clear that the district court permitted the state to take samples of all of Diamond’s fingerprints and thumbprints. The district court did not ask Diamond whether his prints would unlock the cellphone or which print would unlock it, nor did the district court compel Diamond to disclose that information. There is no indication that Diamond would have been asked to do more had none of his fingerprints unlocked the cellphone. Diamond himself asked which finger the detectives wanted when he was ready to comply with the order, and the detectives answered his question. Diamond did not object then, nor did he bring an additional motion to suppress the evidence based on the exchange that he initiated.

And so, in first decision of its kind for this Appeals Court, the precedent established is that fingerprints are less protective of defendants' Fifth Amendment rights than passwords.