Wednesday August 13, 2014

Ed. note: When we heard that Temple Law
student Alex Dutton's law review article on juvenile sentencing was
cited in a landmark decision by the Iowa Supreme Court, we wanted
to know more. So, we asked Alex to explain the issue he explored in
his scholarship, the question before the Court, and the
contribution he made to the outcome. Here's what he had to
say.

TL: What's the problem that your scholarship
addresses?

AD: In June 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States
struck down mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles
convicted of homicide offenses. This ruling, announced by the
Court in Miller v. Alabama, applied a fresh constitutional
principle: that children, in light of neurological research
explaining that the adolescent brain is undeveloped in critical
areas that impact decision-making, are unique in terms of criminal
sentencing. Specifically, children lack the decision-making
capacities of adults, and thus, are categorically less culpable
offenders, even when they commit violent crimes. Thus, the
Court held that courts must consider mitigating circumstances,
including the characteristics of youth, before sentencing a
juvenile to life without parole. To do so, the Court
applied a strand of constitutional law that requires individualized
sentencing prior to the imposition of the death penalty.
Across the country, many states employ mandatory minimum sentences
to punish violent criminals. Mandatory minimums remove
discretion from the sentencing judge to tailor a sentence that
reflects the specific level of culpability displayed in a
particular criminal instance. Mandatory minimums are common
for drug- and gang-related violent crimes and range from year- to
decades-long prison sentences. No matter their length,
mandatory sentences strip judges of the ability to apply a more
individualized sentence that would address the unique culpability
of a youthful offender.

TL: What was the issue in the Iowa case?

AD: In State v. Lyle, the Supreme Court of Iowa
struck down all mandatory minimum sentences applied to youth and
ordered re-sentencing hearings for the approximately one-hundred
young people currently serving mandatory prison terms in
Iowa. In Lyle, the defendant was sentenced to a
seven-year mandatory minimum sentence following his conviction for
a schoolyard assault (over a five-dollar bag of marijuana).
The defendant had a troubled childhood: his father was in prison
and he was raised by his grandmother after his mother threatened
him with a knife. However, because of the mandatory minimum
that attached to the crime, the sentencing judge could not consider
how the defendant's childhood, life circumstances, and undeveloped
decision-making skills influenced his behavior in this
instance. Lyle challenged his sentence, arguing that
Miller required the sentencing court to consider the
attendant circumstances of youth before sentencing him. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa reasoned that Miller's
principle that children are different for the purposes of
sentencing applied not only to life terms of incarceration, but to
any term of incarceration.

TL: How did the Court use your scholarship?

AD: The Supreme Court of Iowa cited my article for two
general propositions, providing context for the growth of mandatory
sentencing practices in the United States and the current state of
the practice across jurisdictions. However, the opinion
reflects my article's general premise: that the reasoning in
Miller applies to all mandatory sentences, not just life
without parole. Needless to say, the decision is very
progressive and happened sooner-let alone at all-than I
anticipated.