The
following table describes pending cases the Supreme Court has accepted on
petition for review, bypass, certification and original jurisdiction.

The
cases included for the first time (that is, the most recently accepted cases)
are marked with an * next to the case number.After the Supreme Court decides a case, the date of oral argument or
date of submission on briefs is replaced with the date of the Supreme Court
decision and abbreviated mandate.That
mandate will generally be listed in the table for two months and then the case
will be removed from the table.

·the date of oral argument or submission on
briefs; or the date of the Supreme Court decision and an abbreviated mandate;

·the Court of Appeals district from which the
case came, if applicable; the county;

·the date of the Court of Appeals decision, if applicable;

·whether the Court of Appeals decision is
published or unpublished, and, if it is published, the citations to the public
domain citation and the official reports for the Court of Appeals decision.

The
statement of the issue is cursory and does not purport to be an all-inclusive,
precise statement of the issues in the case.Readers interested in a case should determine the precise nature of the
issues from the record and briefs filed with the Supreme Court.

The
following table covers cases accepted and decisions issued through December 6, 2012.Please direct any
comments regarding this table to the Clerk of Supreme Court, P.O. Box 1688, Madison,
WI53701-1688,
telephone (608)266-1880.

Case No.

Caption/Issue(s)

SC Accepted

CA

Dist/

Cty

CA

Decision

2007AP221 &

2007AP1440

Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee
Metropolitan Sewerage District

Whether the plain
language of Wis. Stat. §§ 893.80(3) and (5) restricts the judiciary’s
equitable power to award injunctive relief.

Whether the
statute’s damage cap limits damages recoverable on a continuing nuisance
claim of an ongoing interference with use and enjoyment of property that is
abatable.

Whether the
statute’s damage cap violates the equal protection clause of the state
constitution on its face or as applied.

Whether the
government’s taking ground water contained within a claimant’s land without
just compensation gives rise to an inverse condemnation claim and, if so,
what would be the proper measure of damages.

Because the
District maintains and operates the Deep Tunnel pursuant to a DNR permit, is
the District deprived of immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) for its
discretionary design decision to line only certain portions of the Deep
Tunnel with concrete?

Did the plaintiffs comply with Wis. Stat. §
893.80(1)’s notice of claim requirements?

02/23/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

09/06/2012

1

Milwaukee

06/29/2011

Pub

2011 WI App 76

334 Wis. 2d 620

800 N.W.2d 518

2008AP1523

Rock-Koshkonong Lake District,
et al.v. DNR, et al.

Did the DNR
correctly apply Wis. Stat. § 31.02(1) when considering effects upon property
interests, such as residential values, business income, and public revenue?

Did the DNR exceed
the scope of its authority to protect “public rights in navigable waters”
under § 310.02(1), by considering the effects of the water level order on
private wetlands located above the ordinary high water mark?

Did the DNR exceed the scope of its authority
by applying Wis. Admin. Code § NR 103 to a water level proceeding under Wis.
Stat. Ch. 31?

02/23/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

09/05/2012

4

Rock

08/30/2011

Pub

2011 WI App 115

336 Wis. 2d 677

803 N.W.2d 853

2009AP2432

Acuityv. Society Insurance

If “faulty workmanship” is not an “occurrence” under a general
liability insurance policy, then may an occurrence be found from a negative
consequence caused by the faulty workmanship?

Is the exclusion precluding coverage for damage to property on which
the insured is performing operations limited solely to that specific property
on which work is being done at the time of the property damage, or does the
exclusion apply to all of the property within the insured’s control and
responsibility?

When a claim falls within the economic loss
doctrine, and therefore may only be brought as a breach of contract and not a
tort claim, is there insurance coverage under a standard general liability
policy for the breach of contract claim?

05/14/2012

REVW

Voluntary
Dismissal Granted

11/06/2012

4

Monroe

02/29/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 13

339 Wis. 2d 217

810 N.W.2d 812

*2009AP2916-CR

State v. Gregory M. Sahs

Whether a defendant’s
appeal can be dismissed on the basis that a statement made to a probation
agent in question was allegedly not in the record.

Whether a defendant’s statement to a
probation agent was coerced under the circumstances.

What are the pleading standards for
determining whether a defendant’s allegations of ineffective assistance of
postconviction counsel for failing to allege ineffective assistance of trial
counsel satisfy the “sufficient reason” requirement of Wis. Stat. §
974.06(4)?

08/02/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

01/09/2013

1

Milwaukee

Unpub.

2010AP1366-CR

State v. James G. Brereton

Whether the
defendant’s constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure
were violated when law enforcement seized his vehicle, moved it to a private
lot, obtained a warrant, and then installed a GPS tracking device, which
allowed law enforcement to monitor the location of his vehicle in real time
for several days? (cf. State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, 328 Wis. 2d 369,
757 N.W.2d 317 (Sveum II) and United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
___ (2012), slip op.).

03/15/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

09/06/2012

2

Walworth

09/28/2011

Pub.

2011 WI App 127

337 Wis. 2d 145

804 N.W.2d 243

2010AP1952

State v. Brian K. Avery

Whether it is
error under the circumstances to grant a new trial based upon newly
discovered evidence or on grounds that the real controversy was not fully
tried due to the absence of the proferred new evidence which consisted of new video enhancement and
photogrammetric analysis.

02/23/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

10/05/2012

1

Milwaukee

11/29/2011

Pub.

2011 WI App 148

337 Wis. 2d 560

807 N.W.2d 638

2010AP2003-CR

State v. Courtney C. Beamon

Is a jury
instruction which describes the factual theory alleged to satisfy an element
legally erroneous?

In a criminal case,
are the instructions given the jury the law of the case against which the
sufficiency of the evidence must be measured or is the evidence to be
measured against “the actual elements of the offense”?

Does the harmless
error rule of State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d
189, apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction?

Was State v. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 143, 153, 557 N.W.2d 813
(1997), which held a conviction may be upheld “only if there was sufficient
evidence to support guilt on the charge submitted to the jury in the
instructions” overruled by State v. Harvey, supra?

04/25/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

11/05/2012

(Justice On Wheels, Green County Justice Center)

2

Racine

09/28/2011

Pub.

2011 WI App 131

336 Wis. 2d 438

804 N.W.2d 706

2010AP2313

Juneau County Star-Times v.
Juneau County

Whether legal
bills are “records” or “contractor’s records” subject to disclosure under the
Open Records Law (Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31 et seq.).

Whether the
argument that the records sought were not subject to disclosure was waived.

Whether the
requestor had a right to receive the records based upon an attorney-client
relationship.

Whether the
records were “produced” under a contract between the county and an insurance
corporation.

02/23/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

09/05/2012

4

Juneau

11/29/2011

Pub.

2011 WI App 150

337 Wis. 2d 710

807 N.W.2d 655

2010AP2597-CR

State v. Dennis D. Lemoine

When the court
concludes or assumes that a defendant’s statement was involuntary and
improperly admitted at trial, can the court rely upon the defendant’s
testimony at trial to determine harmless error,
without examining whether that testimony was tainted by the
erroneously admitted statement? (See Harrison v. United States,
392 U.S. 219 (1968) and Wisconsin v. Anson, 2005 WI 96, 282 Wis. 2d
629, 698 N.W.2d 776, 784).

Can the court
conclude that an erroneously admitted statement was harmless by analyzing the
evidence, absent the error, without addressing the impact of the erroneously
admitted evidence?

Is a defendant’s
noncustodial statement involuntary if an officer makes promises, uses deceit,
and does not advise the defendant of his Miranda rights when
eliciting the statement?

01/25/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

10/04/2012

4

Sauk

Unpub.

2010AP2809-CR

State v. Matthew A. Lonkoski

Does
a police officer cease interrogation as required by Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477 (1981), where, in response to the interrogated person’s
invocation of the right to counsel, the officer places the person under
arrest?

Does the right to invoke Miranda [Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966)] protections when custodial interrogation is “imminent or
impending” apply where interrogation is ongoing but custody is imminent?

10/17/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

02/25/2013

3

Oneida

Unpub.

2010AP3034-CR

State v. Kenneth M. Sobczak

May a temporary
houseguest consent to a police search of his or her host’s home and a
computer located inside the home that the houseguest was explicitly permitted
to use?

06/13/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

12/04/2012

2

Washington

01/25/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 6 338 Wis. 2d 410 808 N.W.2d
730

2010AP3153

Lynn Bethke v. Auto-Owners Insurance
Company

Does the definition of underinsured motor
vehicle in the insurer’s policy function as an impermissible reducing clause
when applied to the facts of this case, rendering the insurer’s refusal to
tender the underinsured motorist coverage to the policy holders a violation
of Wisconsin Stat. § 632.32(4m) and (5)(i)?

Was Auto-Owners’ refusal to tender the underinsured motorist policy
proceeds to the policy holders based on its policy definition of underinsured
motor vehicle contrary to public policy?

06/13/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

10/09/2012

2

Sheboygan

Unpub.

2010AP3158

Park Bank v. Roger E.
Westburg

Is a corporate
shareholder and guarantor barred from asserting a personal claim for damages
for breach of contract and fiduciary duties against a lender, if the
corporation also sustained injury as a result of the same alleged wrongful
conduct of the lender?

Does a default
foreclosure judgment in favor of a lender in a prior lawsuit solely between
the lender and a limited liability corporation borrower preclude
member-guarantors from personally asserting affirmative defenses and
counterclaims in a separate lawsuit brought by the lender against the
guarantors on their separate guaranty contracts?

Does the filing of a
Wisconsin Chapter 128 receivership proceeding by a corporation preclude
shareholder-guarantors from asserting affirmative defenses and counterclaims
in a subsequent lawsuit brought by one of the corporate entities’ lenders
against the shareholder-guarantors on their personal guaranties of the
corporation?

Can a plaintiff rely upon unpled allegations of loan defaults in a
Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine, without amending its
Complaint, and over repeated objections, Motion in Limine, and Motion to
Strike made by defendants?

09/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

01/10/2013

2

Walworth

Unpub.

2011AP203

Xcel Energy Services, Inc. v.
LIRC

Whether
the circuit court lacked competency due to counsel for Xcel and ACE American
Insurance Co. (ACE) failing to name ACE a party to the case.

Did
the court of appeals properly grant itself authority to review the circuit
court’s denial of the Labor and Industry Review Commission’s (LIRC’s) motion
to dismiss when LIRC did not file a notice of appeal or cross-appeal?

Should
LIRC’s modification of one Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ’s) order be set
aside because LIRC’s decision was inconsistent with another ALJ’s prior
unappealed holding that it was premature to assess permanent total disability
until respondent underwent additional treatment?

Should
LIRC’s modification of the ALJ’s order be set aside and remanded because
substantial and credible evidence does not support LIRC’s finding that the
respondent reasonably refused medical treatment?

09/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

01/11/2013

3

Chippewa

02/29/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 19

339 Wis. 2d 413

810
N.W.2d 865

*2011AP394-CR

State v. Demone Alexander

Does a criminal
defendant have a constitutional right to be present when the trial court
questions a sitting juror during the course of a jury trial and dismissing
that juror for cause, or may that right be waived by counsel without the
trial court conducting a colloquy with the defendant?

11/14/2012

REVW

1

Milwaukee

Unpub.

2011AP407/408/

409-CR

State v. Brent T. Novy

Was it
error to allow fingerprint evidence to be admitted in the state’s rebuttal
after the court had previously ruled the evidence was not admissible because
the state violated the discovery statute by not providing it to the defense?

Was defendant-appellant-petitioner deprived of the right
to an impartial jury and fair trial when defense counsel observed a juror
sleeping during his closing argument?

06/13/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

10/09/2012

2

Kenosha

01/25/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 10 338 Wis. 2d 439 809 N.W.2d
889

2011AP414

Cindy Horak v.
Building Services Industrial Sales

Company

What
is the appropriate legal standard for ascertaining whether documents (in this
case invoices) should be admitted under the ancient documents exception to
the hearsay rule (Wis. Stat. § 908.03(16)?

If the appellate court deems that records
are subject to the ancient documents exception, should the court remand the
matter for further fact finding on these issues or should it summarily
conclude that the documents are admissible at trial?

09/14/2012

REVW

1

Milwaukee

05/31/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 54

341 Wis. 2d 403

815 N.W.2d 400

2011AP450-CR

State v. Julius
C. Burton

Since the defendant had the right to
a jury trial to determine whether he was not responsible for the crimes by
reason of mental disease or defect, even if he had pled guilty to the crimes,
and since defense counsel had not indicated at the plea hearing that he had
been made aware of that right and intended to waive it, was the defendant
denied effective assistance of counsel and was he entitled to have his guilty
pleas withdrawn?

Since the circuit court failed to advise
the defendant that he had a right to plead guilty to the crimes charged and
still have a jury trial to determine whether he was not responsible for the
crimes by reason of mental disease or defect, had the defendant's pleas of
guilty not been knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made and, therefore,
was the defendant entitled to have his guilty pleas withdrawn?

09/27/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

01/11/2013

1

Milwaukee

Unpub.

2011AP557

Dale P. Veto v.
American Family Mutual Ins. Co.

Whether language
in an insurer’s personal liability umbrella policy that “uninsured . . .
motorists coverage under this policy will be no broader than the underlying
insurance,” unambiguously incorporates an uninsured motorist reducing clause
from the underlying family car policy.

09/14/2012

REVW

4

Dane

05/31/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 56 341 Wis. 2d 390 815 N.W.2d
713

2011AP564

Marshall Schinner v. Michael Gundrum, et
al.

Is the
act of giving alcoholic beverages to underage persons at a party leading to
an injury to a person at the party an “occurrence” or “accident” as that term
is used in a homeowner’s liability insurance policy?

Does
the act of hosting a party in a secluded shed on separate business property
have some connection with that real property where it happened so as to
constitute a “claim arising out” of a business location that was not the
insured home?

Does the storage of some personal property on undisputedly business
property that is not listed or defined as an insured location on a homeowner’s
insurance liability policy convert the business location to an insured
location under the homeowner’s insurance liability policy?

06/13/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

10/23/2012

2

Washington

03/28/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 31 340 Wis. 2d 195 811 N.W.2d
431

2011AP583

Marilyn M. Brown
v. Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Company

Is a volunteer
firefighter's decision, while responding to an emergency call in his personal
vehicle, to drive through a red light without sounding an audible signal a
discretionary decision entitled to governmental immunity?

Is a volunteer
firefighter acting within the scope of his employment for purposes of
governmental immunity while driving in his personal vehicle from his home to
the fire station in response to an emergency call?

10/17/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

02/12/2013

2

Waukesha

06/27/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 66

342 Wis. 2d 236

815 N.W.2d 719

2011AP593

Angelia Jamerson v. Department of Children
& Families

Does
a conviction of a public benefits offense pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 49.12(1)
and (6) (1989-90) constitute as a matter of law “[a]n offense involving
fraudulent activity as a participant” in certain public benefits programs for
purposes of the Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. Bar to childcare licensure?

What
level of deference should be applied to the Department of Children and Families’
determination that a conviction for public benefits fraud contrary to Wis.
Stat. § 49.12(1) and (6) (1989-90) constitutes as a matter of law “[a]n
offense involving fraudulent activity as a participant” in certain public
benefits programs for purposes of the Wis. Stat. § 48.685(5)(br)5. Bar to child
care licensure?

Did a Division of Hearings and Appeals administrative law judge
properly grant the motion to dismiss filed by the Department of Children and
Families in a child care provider’s chapter 227 child care license revocation
appeal without first conducting a contested case hearing?

06/13/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

10/09/2012

1

Milwaukee

03/28/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 32, 340 Wis. 2d 215, 813 N.W.2d
221

2011AP685-CR

State v. Lamont L. Travis

Whether a sentencing
court’s reliance on inaccurate information at sentencing, with the inaccuracy
consisting of a mistaken belief that the sentence required a minimum period
of five years of confinement, qualifies as a structural error requiring
automatic reversal and therefore precludes the State from proving harmless
error (cf., State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717
N.W.2d 1).

Whether, if
classifying the error as structural, the remedy of resentencing complies with
mandatory precedent requiring complete reversal of a structurally infected
prosecution.

Whether, assuming harmless-error analysis
applies to this error, the supreme court should decide the harmless-error
issue or should remand the issue to the court of appeals to decide.

09/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

01/10/2013

2

Kenosha

04/25/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 46

340
Wis. 2d 639

813
N.W.2d 702

2011AP691-CR

State v. Matthew R. Steffes

Whether
the elements of the theft by fraud statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.20 (1), require
a false promise or representation of payment that induces the victim to
provide or relinquish some tangible property to the defendant.

Whether
electricity used to power a telephone network can be considered tangible
property under the theft by fraud statute.

Whether the court correctly valued the stolen applied electricity by
the value of the telephone services used by the criminal conspiracy and not
paid for.

10/16/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

02/12/2013

1

Milwaukee

04/25/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 47

340 Wis. 2d 576

812 N.W.2d 529

2011AP788

Christopher T.
Beidel v. Sideline Software, Inc.

Had the employee been terminated within the meaning of
section 6 of the Stock Repurchase Agreement?

Was the employee required to prove a constructive
termination under the essential elements set out in Strozinsky v. School
Dist. of Brown Deer, 2000 WI 97, ¶83, 237 Wis. 2d 19, 614 N.W.2d 443, in
order to put his shares to Sideline Software, Inc. for the stipulated price?

Does the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing require a court to “assess competing equities” between the parties in
making a determination whether an unambiguous provision of a contract has
been breached?

When a breach of contract lawsuit has been pled as an
equitable action for specific performance, does a trial court have greater
latitude in reaching a conclusion that the contract has been breached by the
defendant than if the lawsuit has been pled as one for money damages?

Whether the concept of “constructive discharge” as used
in the context of wrongful termination claims has any applicability to the
claims asserted by plaintiff-appellant in this case.

If “constructive discharge” as that term is used in
wrongful termination claims is at issue in this case, whether the concept
should be modified in situations where the employer is claiming that the
employee remained employed (as opposed to situations where the employer is
claiming that the employee voluntarily resigned his or her employment),
including whether the requirement of the resignation of employment is appropriate
in such situations.

If the concept of
“constructive discharge” as used in wrongful termination claims either is not
at issue in this case and should not be modified, whether a new concept
should be adopted to address situations where a plaintiff employee asserts that
his/her employment was effectively terminated while the employer asserts that
the employee’s employment continued, as has occurred in this case.

09/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

01/09/2013

1

Milwaukee

03/28/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 36

340
Wis. 2d 433

811
N.W.2d 856

2011AP813-CR

& 2011AP814

State v. Juan J. Gracia

City of Menasha v. Juan J.
Gracia

Was the
warrantless police entry into Juan Gracia’s bedroom lawful under the
community caretaker doctrine and did the trial court properly deny Gracia’s motion
challenging his prior conviction on the grounds that he had not validly
waived his right to counsel?

05/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

10/23/2012

2

Winnebago

Unpub.

2011AP825

& 2011 AP826

Dane County Dept. of Human
Services v. Mable K.

When a trial
court grants partial relief on remand in a termination of parental rights
(TPR) appeal, is further appeal precluded by the ordinary rules of civil
procedure?

Where the trial
court determines that it denied the right to counsel during a TPR trial, must
the court grant an entirely new hearing before a different judge or may the
court remedy the violation by returning the parent to that point of the
proceedings where the deprivation occurred and permitting the parent’s
counsel to present evidence for determination as to whether to order default?

Did the trial
court misuse its discretion when it did not vacate a 10 minute-old default
judgment when the cognitively challenged parent arrived in court?

05/03/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

09/07/2012

4

Dane

Unpub.

*2011AP902

Isaac Sawyer v. West Bend
Mutual Insurance Company

Is a one-page
faxed advertisement sent by one business to another in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) considered a publication of material
violating a person’s right to privacy thereby entitling the violator to
liability coverage under the specifically defined personal and advertising
injury insurance coverage?

Does the Knowing Violation of Rights of
Another exclusion clause exclude coverage under the personal and advertising
injury coverage for the sending of a one page facsimile advertisement that is
in violation of the TCPA?

Whether the trial
court properly employed the harmless error doctrine to deny the defendant’s
plea withdrawal motion without a hearing where the court had misinformed the
defendant about the maximum sentence he faced with a repeater
allegation.(See State v. Bangert,
131 Wis.2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986)).

What is the scope
of the prayer treatment exception under Wis. Stat. § 948.03(6) where
defendants are charged with second-degree reckless homicide under Wis. Stat.
§ 940.06 (1) and what are the appropriate jury instructions when that
exception is raised in a reckless homicide case?

06/13/2012

CERT

Oral Arg

12/04/2012

3

Marathon

--

2011AP1113

Prent Corporation v. LIRC

Whether
an employer had a reasonable basis for not paying the original bad faith
award for failing to rehire an employee.

Whether
there was sufficient evidence to support a bad faith award. (See Wis.
Stat. § 102.35).

Whether the Labor & Industry Review Commission acted in excess of
its powers when it concluded that the employer's offset of $5,857 in
temporary disability wage payments it made to the employee
from the award of maximum damages permitted for
unreasonable refusal to rehire pursuant to Wis. Stat.
s. 102.35 (3) constituted bad faith pursuant to Wis. Stat. s.
102.18(1)(bp), thereby permitting an additional $30,000 penalty against the
employer.

10/16/2012

REVW

4

Rock

Unpub.

*2011AP1158

Showers Appraisals, LLC v.
Musson Bros., Inc.

Is a private governmental contractor entitled to sovereign immunity
under Estate of Lyons v. CNA Insurance Company, 207 Wis. 2d 446, 558
N.W.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1996) for its efforts to maintain water drainage on
a construction site so as to protect an adjacent private property from water
damage?

11/14/2012

REVW

2

Winnebago

07/27/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 80

343 Wis. 2d 623

819 N.W.2d 316

2011AP1176/

2011AP1177

Joseph McLeod v. Patricia
Mudlaff, et al.

Does a court have
the authority to entertain an action to declare a marriage void after one of
the spouses has died?

10/17/2012

CERT

Oral Arg

02/12/2013

2

Washington

--

2011AP1240

Patricia A. Johnson v. Michael R.
Masters

Is it an “action” barred
by the statute of repose, Wis. Stat. § 893.40, when a wife seeks to obtain a
pension award by submitting a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) as
required by the divorce judgment, and the submission is approximately one
year after the former husband retires, but more than twenty years after the
divorce judgment?

05/14/2012

CERT

Oral Arg

09/07/2012

2

Waukesha

--

*2011AP1770-CR/

2011AP1771-CR

State v. Brandon M. Melton

Whether a circuit
court has inherent authority to destroy an extra presentence investigation
(PSI) report after entry of judgment for purposes not related to the original
sentencing proceeding.

11/14/2012

REVW

2

Waukesha

08/29/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 95

343
Wis. 2d 784

820
N.W.2d 487

2011AP2067

Mary E. Marlowe v. IDS Property Casualty
Ins. Co.

Because there is no
statutory authority specifying discovery in arbitration (outside of
depositions under § 788.07), after Borst v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2006 WI
70, 291 Wis. 2d 361, 717 N.W.2d 42, do arbitrators have the inherent
authority to determine the necessity and scope of allowable discovery in the
absence of an express agreement by the parties?

In light of Borst,
does an arbitration panel have exclusive authority to interpret an
arbitration agreement to determine discovery procedures that apply to an
arbitration absent an express agreement by the parties?

When arbitration is
an alternative to litigation and formal court proceedings, should an
arbitration panel, absent an explicit clause in an arbitration contract,
order the parties to participate in formal discovery proceedings that would
generally only be available to litigants in the circuit court process?

After Borst,
in the absence of an express agreement by the parties as to the scope of
discovery, does a party have a right to request declaratory relief from the
trial court on the interpretation of an arbitration clause in an automobile
insurance policy?

If the court determines that the plaintiffs were seeking an
intermediate review of an arbitration panel decision, can intermediate
rulings by an arbitration panel be challenged in the circuit court before a
final award is made on the grounds that an arbitration panel did not have
authority to act in the first place?

06/13/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

10/04/2012

3

Brown

04/25/2012

Pub.

2012 WI App 51
340 Wis. 2d 594 811 N.W.2d 894

2011AP2166

David J. Rosecky v. Monica M.
Schissel

Is the
surrogacy parentage agreement valid and enforceable?

Is any
portion of the surrogacy parentage agreement, in the event found void and
unenforceable by the court, severable from the remaining terms of the agreement?

Is it
in the child's best interest to have no placement with the biological mother?

Was the trial court's decision granting placement rights to the
biological mother based on the evidence presented or was it arbitrary,
constituting an abuse of discretion?

09/27/2012

CERT

Oral Arg

01/09/2013

4

Columbia

--

*2011AP2864-CRAC

State v. Samuel Curtis Johnson,
III

Do defendants have a constitutional right to disclosure of
privately-held privileged medical records?If so, what is the basis for the constitutional right?How should the constitutional right be
defined and what are its parameters?

If defendants have a constitutional right to disclosure of
privately-held privileged records, does the constitutional right trump
privilege statutes?May a circuit
court protect the constitutional right by ordering privately-held privileged
records for in camera review and then reviewing records in camera to
determine what, if any, should be disclosed to the defendant?

Does a court have competence to hold a refusal hearing if the defendant
does not meet the Wis. Stat. § 343.305 pre-condition of requesting a hearing
within ten days?

11/14/2012

REVW

2

Waukesha

Unpub.

*2012AP99

Outagamie County v. Melanie L.

Did the county
fail to prove that an individual was incompetent to refuse medication and
treatment for psychiatric disorders within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 51.61
(1) (g) 4.b. where evidence tended to show that the individual recognized the
need for medication and treatment for mental illness?

11/14/2012

REVW

Oral Arg

02/26/2013

3

Outagamie

Unpub.

2012AP544-W

Office of the State Public Defender v. Court of Appeals,

District IV

Is defense postconviction counsel in a merit appeal
required to first seek circuit court permission to “access, cite to, and
quote from a PSI [presentence investigation] report” before litigating a
PSI-related sentencing issue?

Does the decision in State v. Parent, 2006 WI 132,
298 Wis. 2d 63, 725 N.W.2d 915, which related to a no-merit appeal, also
require such circuit court permission in a merit appeal?