[43] CAN ELECTIONS HELD IN CONFLICT AREAS BE VALID?
Tuesday, July 10, 2007 Volume 11 Number 124
Russia

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in Bishkek on July 10 that
the International Olympic Committee's (IOC) recent selection of Sochi
to host the 2014 Winter Olympics "will enhance the authority of Russia,
its friends, and its allies," Interfax reported (see "RFE/RL Newsline,"
July 9, 2007). At the Russian presidential residence in Zavidovo,
northwest of Moscow, President Vladimir Putin stressed on July 9 that
money earmarked for constructing facilities for the games must not be
embezzled, Interfax and RIA Novosti reported. He told the cabinet that
"the irrational use of money must not be permitted. The embezzlement of
state funds must not be permitted." He called on the
Prosecutor-General's Office "to form a working group, which will
provide security...and coordinate construction of the necessary
facilities so that the allocated finances will be spent rationally, and
any misappropriation of state funds will be prevented at all cost."
Putin noted that $12 billion has been budgeted for construction related
to the games, of which at least $5 billion will come from private
investment. He said that about one-third of the total will be spent on
sports facilities and the training of athletes, while roughly
two-thirds of the money will be spent on infrastructure in southern
Russia. "That includes the construction of roads, bridges, tunnels,
communication, water supply, and electricity, [in other words,]
everything that makes for a decent life for people," he added.
Britain's "Financial Times" noted on July 10 that Russia hired
top-flight Western public relations and communications consultants in
its effort to win the games in order to show that Russia "competes
and...can succeed by playing by Western rules." PM

The weekly "Itogi" noted on July 9 that, by selecting Sochi, the IOC
acknowledged that Russia "is a normal country." On July 9, the
mass-circulation daily "Moskovsky komsomolets" wrote that "our main
political objective for the 2014 Winter Olympics is to prove to the
whole world that stability and security have arrived in southern
Russia. The problem, however, is that when the [IOC] voted [recently]
in Guatemala, there was no stability or security in southern Russia."
The paper noted that the Russian authorities hope that by 2014 "a new
era will dawn in Russia. The civil war in the Caucasus, bloodshed, and
xenophobia will all fade away into history; grudges and territorial
claims will be forgotten; and new world-class resorts will be built
along Russia's Black Sea coast. Unless this happens, the whole Sochi
Olympics plan could become a dangerous gamble." The daily argued that
"the problems of the North Caucasus have become relevant again. Any act
of terror, even a minor bombing, anywhere near the site of the future
Olympics would make headlines all over the world. The danger is that
the guerrillas are well aware of this, and will certainly make every
effort to disrupt the Sochi Games." In "The Moscow Times" on July 10,
Aleksei Pankin wrote that the bragging by Russian officials over the
IOC's decision reveals a deeper inferiority complex. He pointed out
that, after the IOC's decision was announced, a Russian "Foreign
Ministry spokesman said that 'this is a testament to Russia's new
position of strength in the global arena.' I wondered to myself whether
Austria's Foreign Ministry would have reached a similar conclusion had
the [IOC] chosen Salzburg over Sochi. Probably not, I thought, but
Russians have a definite complex about their self-image." Russians,
Pankin continued, need to be reassured by foreigners of their status as
a "world leader," even though "Russia is a permanent member of the UN
Security Council, a nuclear superpower, and has the richest natural
resources of any nation on earth." Pankin suggested that the games pose
a huge challenge and that "this utopianism turned the Sochi Olympics
into a genuine national idea." He quoted 19th-century writer Fyodor
Dostoyevsky as saying that "Russians like to do everything big, but
they need to be brought down to earth a bit." PM

Outgoing Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber said at the conclusion
of a visit to Russia, his last major foreign trip before leaving
office, that "if the Americans go ahead and build a missile-defense
shield in Eastern Europe, Russia will feel threatened," the
"Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" reported from Berlin on July 9.
Stoiber added that Russia "will aim missiles at Europe" if Washington
goes ahead with its plans to station 10 interceptors in Poland and a
radar site in the Czech Republic (see "RFE/RL Newsline," June 28 and
July 9, 2007). Stoiber argued that Germany needs Russia's energy, and
the EU needs Russia to find solutions to problems in Kosova and the
Middle East. He said that "no significant decisions can be reached in
the international arena without Russia." The daily suggested that
Stoiber's remarks "sound like [former German Chancellor] Gerhard
Schroeder," who pursued close ties with Moscow while in office and now
has a close business relationship with Gazprom. The daily suggested
recently that Europe is more dependent on Russia as an energy supplier
than Russia is dependent on Europe as a customer. On February 21,
Stoiber said in Wildbad Kreuth that Putin's February 10 Munich speech
signaled Russia's legitimate return to the world stage (see "RFE/RL
Newsline," February 23, 2007). The Frankfurt daily noted at the time
that Putin flattered the embattled Stoiber, whose own Christian Social
Union (CSU) is forcing him from office, when the two men met in Munich
on February 10. PM

U.S. Ambassador to Russia William Burns said at a Moscow memorial
service for slain American journalist Paul Klebnikov on July 9 that the
Kremlin should "redouble its efforts" to resolve the case, "The New
York Times" reported on July 10. Klebnikov, who was editor of the
Russian edition of "Forbes" magazine, was gunned down in an apparent
contract killing on July 9, 2004, in one of at least two dozen
unresolved murders of journalists in Russia in recent years (see "CIS:
Behind An 'Information Curtain,'" rferl.org, May 2, 2007). In
Washington, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said in a
statement on July 10 that "the intimidation and murder of journalists
is an affront to free and independent media and all who respect
democratic values." PM

On July 5, President Putin nominated Tver Oblast Governor Dmitry
Zelenin for a second term, which the regional parliament approved on
July 10, newsru.com reported. A former top executive for Norilsk
Nickel, Zelenin has been governor since 2004. Putin also nominated
Viktor Ishayev on July 5 to continue as governor of Khabarovsk Krai, a
post he has effectively held since 1991. On July 9, the Khabarovsk
regional legislature voted overwhelmingly to confirm the appointment,
gzt.ru reported. On July 6, Putin nominated Leningrad Oblast Governor
Valery Serdyukov for another term, which the regional parliament
approved on July 9, regnum.ru reported. Following the vote, Serdyukov,
who has been in office for nine years, said that the main problems he
intends to tackle are the low quality of health services, poor roads,
and growing rates of alcoholism and drug addiction. On July 6, Putin
also nominated Novosibirsk Governor Viktor Tolokonsky for another term.
He has held the post since 1999 and is expected to be confirmed in
office by the regional parliament on July 12, news.ngs.ru reported.
Governors officially serve for five-year terms. Some Russian media
reports suggested recently, however, that several governors asked for
fresh presidential confirmation in office before the 2007 legislative
and 2008 presidential elections, even though their terms have not
expired. Putin moved to consolidate his control over the regions in
late 2004, when he ruled that governors will henceforth be appointed by
him rather than elected (see "RFE/RL Newsline," March 14 and July 2,
2007). PM

The Federal Security Service (FSB), which is the successor to the KGB,
announced on July 8 the declassification of its Soviet-era archives for
1920-50, the so-called "period of mass repression," Russian and
international media reported. Vasily Khristoforov, who heads the
agency's archives and registers department, said that "any citizen" can
access files from those years pertaining to their relatives.
Khristoforov said such citizens need to first send a letter to the
FSB's central archive explaining what material they are seeking.
Stalin-era documents were first declassified in 1992, although some
restrictions were reinstated in the late 1990s. It is not clear exactly
which materials are affected by the latest FSB announcement. It appears
that journalists and historians still will not have direct access to
the archives but will require written permission of relatives of the
purge victims to examine them. PM

Three Russian Interior Ministry troops were killed and five more
injured on July 10 when their armored personnel carrier hit a land mine
near the village of Dyshne-Vedeno in southern Chechnya and then came
under fire from Chechen resistance fighters, regnum.ru and lenta.ru
reported. Dyshne-Vedeno was the home of radical Chechen field commander
Shamil Basayev, whose death in an explosion in Ingushetia was announced
exactly one year ago (see "RFE/RL Newsline," July 11, 2006). LF

Ramzan Kadyrov's annual address to the Chechen parliament was posted on
July 9 on the Chechen government website, chechnya.gov.ru. In that
missive, Kadyrov called on the parliament to work closely with the
government in preparation for next year's local elections. He noted
that the draft project for socioeconomic development in 2008-11
envisages doubling gross domestic product (GDP) and reducing
unemployment and poverty. He argued against relying primarily on
Chechnya's oil sector to generate economic growth, advocating instead
expanding into machine building for the oil and petrochemical sector
and resurrecting the agro-industrial sector. He further proposed
resolving the acute housing shortage by introducing a mortgage program,
but did not explain how that would benefit the estimated 75 percent of
the population that is unemployed and thus has no regular income.
Kadyrov advocated measures to expand the use of the Chechen language,
including switching to Chechen as the language of instruction in
primary education. Finally, he called for the "maximum transparency" in
the work of the government bureaucracy in order to preclude corruption.
LF

As of July 11, the Russian television channel ORT will no longer to
permitted to use a local frequency to broadcast to Azerbaijan, National
Television and Radio Broadcasting Council Chairman Nushirevan
Magerramli told journalists in Baku on July 9, day.az and zerkalo.az
reported on July 9 and 10, respectively. ORT's agreement on
rebroadcasting to Azerbaijan expired in January, and talks on renewing
it failed to yield an agreement on the terms whereby ORT would continue
rebroadcasting to Azerbaijan and the state-run AzTV would be broadcast
in Russia. Magerramli said talks will continue with a second Russian
television company, RTR-Planeta, and if no agreement is forthcoming
within the next month, it too will no longer be allowed to rebroadcast
to Azerbaijan. Similarly affected is the Turkish channel Samanyolu,
whose frequency will be offered for tender on July 17, and which will
have to cease broadcasting by September 17. Meanwhile, Azerbaijani
Minister of Communications and Information Technology Ali Abbasov told
day.az on July 9 that the technical problems involved in making Iranian
television broadcasts available to the population of Azerbaijan's
southernmost districts will be solved "very soon." LF

Rafiq Aliyev, former head of the Azerpetrol group of companies and
brother of former Economic Development Minister Farxad Aliyev, denied
on July 9 at their ongoing trial on charges of corruption that his
company deliberately evaded paying taxes, day.az and zerkalo.az
reported. On July 6, Rafiq Aliyev told the court he was arrested solely
because he was Farxad's brother, and he accused one of the witnesses
for the prosecution of perjury. Farxad Aliyev is also accused of having
plotted with exiled former parliament speaker Rasul Quliyev to
overthrow the Azerbaijani leadership. He has repeatedly rejected those
accusations as politically motivated, and affirmed his loyalty to
President Ilham Aliyev (to whom the brothers are not related). LF

In a statement addressed to foreign diplomatic representations in Baku,
Khilal Mamedov, who heads a committee to defend the right of Novruzali
Mamedov, the arrested editor of the Talysh-language newspaper "Tolyshi
sado," accused the Azerbaijani leadership of Turkic nationalism and of
seeking to suppress non-Turkic minorities, including the Talysh, an
Iranian ethnic group, day.az reported on July 10. He said the
Azerbaijani leadership seeks to minimize contacts between the Talysh
communities in Azerbaijan and Iran and to run Azerbaijan into a
monoethnic state. Novruzali Mamedov was arrested five months ago and
has been formally charged with spying for Iran (see "RFE/RL Newsline,"
February 20, 2007). LF

Aleksandr Ankvab was quoted by the Russian daily "Izvestia" on July 10
as saying that the failed attempt on his life the previous day was
undertaken by "forces that seek to split Abkhaz society." Abkhaz
President Sergei Bagapsh, who cut short a visit to Moscow and returned
to Sukhum(i) on July 9, indirectly accused neighboring Georgia of
masterminding the assassination attempt (see "RFE/RL Newsline," July 9,
2007). Speaking in Tbilisi on July 9, Kote Gabashvili, who chairs the
Georgian parliament's committee on foreign relations, rejected as
"absurd" the suggestion that Georgia may have been involved in the
attempt to kill Ankvab, Caucasus Press reported. Meanwhile, Abkhaz
police have found a burned-out automobile believed to have been used by
the attackers who opened fire on Ankvab's jeep, regnum.ru reported on
July 10. The car was stolen in Gudauta Raion on July 7. LF

In a statement in Astana on July 9, Kazakhstan's Central Election
Commission confirmed that the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights (ODIHR) observer delegation will begin its monitoring
mission for elections to the Mazhilis, the lower house of the Kazakh
parliament, on July 12, Interfax-Kazakhstan reported. RG

The Kazakh opposition party Ak Zhol (Bright Way) announced on July 8
that it has united with the nominally pro-government Adilet (Justice)
party in the run-up to August parliamentary elections,
Interfax-Kazakhstan reported. According to the terms of the agreement
on unification, Alikhan Baimenov will retain his post as leader of the
enlarged Ak Zhol party, while former Adilet leader Maksut Narikbaev
agreed to join Lyudmila Zhulanova and Burikhan Nurmukhamedov of Ak Zhol
as Baimenov's deputies. Ak Zhol recently formed another opposition
electoral bloc with the social-democratic parties in order to present a
broader unified bloc in the parliamentary elections (see "RFE/RL
Newsline," June 12, 2007). Baimenov's earlier efforts to cooperate with
the Adilet party in forging a broad coalition have repeatedly failed
(see "RFE/RL Newsline," October 15, 2004, and December 27, 2006). RG

Unnamed officials of Kazakhstan's state-owned nuclear company,
Kazatomprom, confirmed on July 9 that it is currently engaged in
negotiations with Japan's Toshiba Corporation on the purchase of a 10
percent stake in U.S. nuclear-reactor manufacturer Westinghouse,
according to AP and Interfax-Kazakhstan. The $487 million deal is
linked to a broader partnership between Toshiba and Kazatomprom to
secure long-term supplies of uranium from Kazakhstan to fuel
Toshiba-run nuclear power plants worldwide. Toshiba and Westinghouse
are also expected to transfer uranium-processing technology to
Kazatomprom as part of the deal. Toshiba official Atsutoshi Nishida
visited Kazakhstan in April, accompanied by Japanese Minister of
Economy, Trade, and Industry Akira Amari, and signed a bilateral
agreement on uranium-processing technology and trade cooperation (see
"RFE/RL Newsline," May 2, 2007). RG

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE)
Parliamentary Assembly on July 9 adopted a resolution calling on the
Belarusian government to take advantage of the EU's Neighborhood
Initiative, Belapan reported. The document, adopted at the
Parliamentary Assembly's meeting in Kyiv, also urges Belarus to abide
by its international commitments, bring its Electoral Code into line
with OSCE standards, respect the right to freedom of expression and
access to independent media, and "respect the rights of nongovernmental
organizations as a vital part of a healthy democracy by no longer
hindering their legal existence, harassing and prosecuting members of
NGOs, and allowing them to receive international assistance." The
resolution calls on the Belarusian authorities to release all political
prisoners and investigate the disappearances of four opponents of
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Belarusian delegates to the OSCE
described the resolution as wrong and unfair, claiming that all
participating states have "problems" with abiding by their OSCE
commitments, and that democratization is an "evolutionary process." AM

The Ukraine-NATO Commission on July 9 issued an ambassador-level
statement confirming Ukraine's desire for accession to NATO, Interfax
reported. "Ukraine is to join NATO and this decision has no
alternative, this is an unavoidable process," Kostyantyn Morozov, the
head of Ukraine's mission to NATO, told RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service. In
the statement, NATO ambassadors praised "Ukraine's contribution in the
maintenance of international security, including its active support to
all current operations and missions of NATO, and its efforts in the
consolidation of regional cooperation." But the ambassadors also
stipulated that the speed of the development of Ukraine-NATO relations
should depend on decisions by Ukrainian authorities and political
forces, and not NATO's support for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
AM

President Viktor Yushchenko on July 8 said he will nominate Viktor
Yanukovych as prime minister if Yanukovych's Party of Regions forms a
coalition after the early parliamentary elections scheduled for
September 30, Interfax reported on July 9. Yushchenko also said he
would like to see in the prime minister's post "a person who
understands national priorities, who is not afraid to say that he is a
patriot and not afraid to speak the Ukrainian language, and whose key
goal is to protect national interests, and that is why Ukraine's policy
is formed in Kyiv, not other capitals." Yushchenko said he would also
welcome the coalition created by Yulia Tymoshenko -- Yushchenko's ally
in Ukraine's Orange Revolution -- in a new parliament, but added, "if
she fails, another coalition will be formed." AM

Faik Fazliu, the leader of an association grouping veterans of the
Kosova Liberation Army (UCK), on July 9 told RFE/RL's South Slavic and
Albanian Service that his men may resort to force should the UN fail to
grant independence to Kosova. "If there is no independence for Kosova,
we will be forced to act as UCK soldiers," he said. "We have fought for
our freedom and for an independent Kosova." The veterans have said
several times in recent weeks that they are ready to fight. The daily
"Epoka e Re" on June 28 quoted Fazliu as saying that "the gun of the
UCK decided the final status of Kosova" during the 1998-99 conflict and
that "all options are possible" if Kosova is denied independence. In a
press release issued on July 8, the Association of War Veterans urged
the negotiating team not to approve any delay for the Kosova
final-status resolution "because such delays might bring new risks,"
Kosovar Albanian media reported on July 9. Fazliu has also pushed for a
meeting with the members of the team representing Kosovar Albanians in
talks on the future of Kosova. AG

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried on July 9 struck a
cautious note during a visit to Kosova, with local and international
media suggesting that he hinted at a delay in a decision on the future
of Kosova and at a more cautious approach toward independence. Fried
reiterated that Kosova will ultimately be an independent state, but
said that "a limited period of negotiations" is necessary for
negotiators from Serbia and Kosova. On July 7, Fried said that he is
unable to give a "precise date" for Kosova to gain independence, "but I
suspect it will be a number of months before the Bucharest summit" to
be held by NATO in April, "The New York Times" reported on July 8.
Speaking on July 9, Fried said, "I don't think unilateral
declarations...will help the cause of Kosovo's independence." In
mid-April, U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said that
Washington would support a unilateral declaration of independence by
Kosova, a position from which other officials, including Fried, have
pulled back (see "RFE/RL Newsline," April 18 and May 17, 2007). In his
weekly national radio address on July 9, Kosovar Prime Minister Agim
Ceku called for an "exact calendar, an exact date, and a clear way
forward" in the process of resolving Kosova's future. Ceku also
mentioned comments made by U.S. President George W. Bush on June 10 in
which he said that "sooner rather than later, you've got to say
enough's enough: Kosovo's independent," a statement that fueled Kosovar
Albanian hopes of a quick decision on the region's future status (see
"RFE/RL Newsline," June 11, 2007). Ceku indicated that he sees little
chance of the old UN-based approach working, saying that "because of
Russian resistance, the UN Security Council is unable to take a
decision on Kosovo's status." Ceku and other Kosovar leaders have
repeated frequently in recent weeks that Kosova will not declare
independence without the backing of the EU and the United States. AG

The leader of the Union of Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Branislav Svonja, was hospitalized on July 4 after being attacked in
Novi Sad by several men wielding baseball bats, the Croatian news
agency Hina reported on July 7. Svonja said after his release from
hospital on July 6 that he recognized some of his assailants as Serbian
refugees from Croatia who had "threatened Serbs who went to Croatia to
vote two or three years ago." Svonja described the attack as "a
politically motivated attempted murder" linked to his efforts to
achieve "reconciliation among Serbs and Croats in Croatia." Svonja
dismissed speculation that the attack was connected to a business
dispute. Hina wrote that the Union of Serbs from Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina has over 170,000 members in Serbia, Montenegro, and
Bosnia. A Croatian Serb leader was attacked and hospitalized in the
Serbian province of Vojvodina in June (see "RFE/RL Newsline," June 21,
2007). AG

Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Bozidar Djelic met with Montenegrin
officials on July 9 in talks that appear to have focused on issues such
as pensions, benefits, and investment. This was the second visit by a
senior Serbian minister in four days: on July 6, Foreign Minister Vuk
Jeremic met for talks on the issue of Kosova's future (see "RFE/RL
Newsline," July 9, 2007). "Separation does not mean divorce," Djelic
said, Radio Montenegro reported on July 9. "Far from it. We must secure
a system for the sake of our citizens, a system that would demonstrate
that political decisions do not have to have direct impact on their
everyday lives." AG

The trial of the former head of the Bosnian Muslim army, Rasim Delic,
for failing to prevent his soldiers from committing atrocities opened
on July 9 at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), local and international media reported. Delic, who
surrendered to the ICTY in February 2005, denied the charges, which
relate to killings, torture, and rape committed by foreign fighters
whom he commanded during the 1992-95 war. His predecessor as head of
the Bosnian Muslim army, Sefer Halilovic, was acquitted of war crimes
in 2005. The foreign fighters are accused, among other crimes, of
killing 24 Bosnian Croat prisoners, beheading a Serbian soldier, and
abusing prisoners. AG

Carla Del Ponte, the chief prosecutor of the ICTY, visited Montenegro
on July 9 in a visit seemingly intended to build on the breakthrough
achieved when Montenegrin forces arrested war crimes indictee Vlastimir
Djordjevic in June (see "RFE/RL Newsline," June 19 and 22, 2007). Local
media reported that Del Ponte and Montenegrin President Filip Vujanovic
agreed that Montenegro's cooperation with the ICTY is good, while the
news service Balkan Insight quoted Vujanovic as saying that Del Ponte
"welcomed" a Montenegrin request for more evidence of war crimes
committed in Montenegro. According to Radio Montenegro, Del Ponte said
that "we will discuss further cooperation because [of] the fact that
Djordjevic was able to hide here for a long time without being
detected, and under the false name of Karadzic." She said she planned
to discuss later in the meeting "how to find out how many Karadzics
live in Montenegro and maybe we can find the real one," a reference to
Bosnian Serb wartime leader Radovan Karadzic, one of the two men most
wanted by the ICTY. Del Ponte reiterated that she has "no idea" where
Karadzic is hiding (see "RFE/RL Newsline," June 28, 2007). He has in
the past been thought to have found refuge in monasteries in
Montenegro. AG

Albania's parliament on July 9 failed to choose a new president,
raising the possibility of early parliamentary elections, local and
international media reported on July 10. The governing coalition's
candidate, Bamir Topi, secured 75 of the 140 votes available, nine
short of the three-fifths majority required and five fewer than the
seats it holds in parliament. The decision of the largest ruling party,
the Democrats, to choose as its candidate its deputy head, Topi,
incurred criticism from the opposition, and Topi temporarily withdrew
his candidacy on July 3 as efforts to find a consensus candidate
gathered pace. After several more days of talks and mutual
recriminations, the government and opposition appeared to have agreed
that the country's military representative to NATO, Brigadier General
Arjan Zaimi, should be president. However, that agreement fell through
when the government made its consent conditional on a package of
reforms, including one that would shorten the mandate of the chief
prosecutor, Theodhori Sollaku, whom Prime Minister Sali Berisha said on
July 9 is blocking the fight against corruption (see "RFE/RL Newsline,"
July 25, 2006). Topi's opponent in the vote, Fatos Nano, a former prime
minister and longtime leader of the Socialist Party, gathered just
three votes. However, Nano's decision to run for the presidency was
controversial, and the rest of the Socialist Party boycotted the vote
(see "RFE/RL Newsline," April 11 and May 14, 2007). The parliament
failed in two previous rounds to hold a vote (see "RFE/RL Newsline,"
June 20, 2006). Failure to choose a president after five rounds or by
July 24 would trigger parliamentary elections. The Socialists' leader,
Edi Rama, said after the vote that "the Socialists were switching on
their engines for early elections." Albanians last went to the polls in
a general election in July 2005. Albania's parliamentary system
relegates the president to a largely symbolic role, except in periods
of crisis. AG

A Moldovan appeals court on July 9 freed Valeriu Pasat, a former
defense minister jailed for alleged abuse of his position in the sale
of 21 fighter planes to the United States, local media reported the
same day. An explanation of the decision is expected within a month.
Pasat was arrested in March 2005 and sentenced to 10 years in prison in
January 2006 (see "RFE/RL Newsline," January 19, 2006). Pasat's alleged
crime was a decision in 1997 to accept a $40 million offer from the
United States for 21 MiG-29 fighters, even though Iran was offering $90
million. This is the second time that an appeals court has overturned a
conviction against Pasat. Pasat was jailed in 2006 for selling grenade
launchers to a Slovak company at a discount in 1998, a ruling that was
subsequently overturned (see "RFE/RL Newsline," October 18, 2006). AP
reported that a U.S. government representative testified in Pasat's
latest trial that Moldova could have faced economic sanctions had it
sold the planes to a hostile country such as Iran. Pasat served as
defense minister from 1997 to 1999 and as the head of Moldova's
intelligence service from 2000 to 2002. Pasat was also indicted in
February 2006 for plotting both a coup and the murder of a senior
politician (see "RFE/RL Newsline," February 16, 2006). Pasat has argued
that the cases against him were politically motivated. AG

Incessant violence against schools and schoolgirls in particular is
forcing Afghan parents to make the difficult decision to keep their
daughters out of school, the "International Herald Tribune" reported on
July 9. Even with armed guards at the gate of the Qalai Sayedan School
in Afghanistan's Logar province, where six girls were shot, two
fatally, on June 12 as they walked home, only one-quarter of the 1,600
students have taken the risk of returning (see "RFE/RL Newsline," June
13, 2007). The newspaper quoted one parent, Sayed Rasul, as saying
parents would rather keep their children safe at home, "even if it
means they must be illiterate." Education Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar
has laid out an aggressive five-year plan for improving education, and
one-third of the children currently enrolled in school are girls, a
great achievement in a country where girls' education has been
historically undervalued and was forbidden under Taliban rule. Yet most
schools have no proper facilities, employ unqualified teachers, and
face sporadic attacks, the newspaper reported. JC

Afghanistan's counternarcotics minister, Habibullah Qaderi, has
resigned, just weeks after laborers finished cultivating an opium-poppy
crop expected to exceed last year's record production, AP reported on
July 8. Deputy Minister General Khodaidad on July 8 confirmed the
minister's resignation, which was submitted to President Hamid Karzai
around July 3. Qaderi's resignation was voluntary and made partly due
to health problems, although he is now slated to become Afghanistan's
consul-general in Canada. Karzai has not named a replacement for the
minister. Qaderi, who became the counternarcotics minister in December
2004, failed to prevent soaring poppy production in Afghanistan's
south, where the Taliban insurgency maintains a stronghold.
Afghanistan's opium-poppy production in 2006 accounted for more than 90
percent of the world's heroin, and UN officials expect this year's
harvest to be even larger (see "RFE/RL Newsline," June 26, 2007).
Afghanistan's $3.1 billion drug trade is believed to fund the Taliban's
violent campaign against the government. JC

The top NATO commander in Afghanistan, U.S. General Dan McNeill, said
on July 8 that the number of foreign extremists battling in Afghanistan
has risen, and that they use more extreme tactics than the Taliban, AFP
reported on July 9. General McNeill, leader of NATO's International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), told AFP that there is an increased
number of foreign fighters on the battlefield, although there is no
evidence to link the inflow of foreign "jihadists" to groups in Iran or
Iraq. Insurgents have demonstrated improved tactics and often appear
more organized than before in the presence of foreign fighters, McNeil
said. The shift in fighting in Afghanistan from conventional methods to
insurgent tactics, such as suicide bombings, has led to claims that
fighters who gained experience in Iraq are influencing the Taliban-led
insurgency. JC

Afghan and coalition forces killed a senior Taliban leader on July 9
during a raid on a home and a subsequent gun battle in Paktia Province,
UPI reported. There are unconfirmed reports that two children were also
killed and a woman was injured during the operation, Afgha News
reported on July 9. The Taliban commander was identified only as
"Commander Saleem," a common alias among Taliban fighters, according to
Afgha. U.S. military spokesman Major Chris Belcher said Commander
Saleem conducted several attacks on security forces and used propaganda
to "terrorize" citizens in his role as a Taliban communications
officer, UPI reported. Belcher said "it is in the best interest of the
community to remove the terrorists and extremists who endanger their
families," implying that the house targeted in the raid belonged to
Commander Saleem and his family. JC

Iranian police and security agents arrested six or seven students at
the entrance to Amir Kabir University on July 9, Radio Farda reported.
The students were members of the central council of the Office to
Consolidate Unity (Daftar-i Tahkim-i Vahdat, or DTV), Iran's main
umbrella student grouping, and an affiliated group, the Islamic Iran
Graduates Organization, which includes former DTV members. The
activists reportedly gathered to mark the anniversary of protests in
Tehran in 1999 that began with a police raid on a Tehran University
dormitory. The detainees reportedly include prominent activists
Abdullah Momeni, Mohammad Hashemi, and Ali Nikunesbati. Hours before
his arrest, Momeni told Radio Farda that students were also planning to
protest against the continued detention of eight students of Tehran's
Amir Kabir University, arrested weeks ago for their alleged involvement
in the publication of impious university pamphlets (see "RFE/RL
Newsline," June 12, 13, and 18, 2007). VS

Ahmad Khatami, a Tehran cleric and a member of the Assembly of Experts,
the body of clerics that ostensibly oversees the supreme leader's
office, on July 8 condemned the 1999 riots as the work of "the
counterrevolution" and "enemies" hoping to topple Iran's regime, IRNA
reported. The riots that began in downtown Tehran on July 9, 1999, with
the participation of students and apparently members of the public,
were the worst unrest in Iran since the 1979 revolution. Khatami told
IRNA that security and judicial officials should now inform the public,
"if appropriate," of the identities of the "domestic and hidden
backers" of several days of street riots. He said "American authorities
and all counterrevolutionaries" expressed joy at the time over an
"uprising" that ended in the "misery and embarrassment of the
counterrevolution" and the "glorious and epic support" of Iranians for
the Velayat-i Faqih, the clerical government in Iran. Khatami said,
however, that he accepts as a "separate issue" student unrest in July
1999 over the closure of a reformist daily. VS

Iran's automotive industry is to stop producing cars that run only on
gasoline, and will as of July 23 begin manufacturing cars that run on
gasoline and liquefied gas, "Etemad-i Melli" reported on July 8, citing
remarks made the previous day by Industry Minister Alireza Tahmasebi.
The minister was quoted as saying that recently produced cars will
gradually be adapted to run on both fuels. The move is part of Iran's
efforts to drastically cut gasoline consumption. A former secretary of
the Carmakers Association (Anjoman-i khodrosazan), Davud
Mirkhani-Rashti, told ISNA on July 7 that the cost of the changes could
bankrupt some car manufacturers. He said carmakers will either have to
pass the extra costs on to buyers, causing a sudden increase in car
prices, or cut their profits. VS

Iranian police and agents have killed 50 drug dealers in the past three
months in gun fights, and seized more than 110 tons of drugs, Radio
Farda reported on July 5, citing Iranian state television. The drug
seizures include 85 tons of opium and 5 tons of heroin, the report
stated. It added that Iran seized 429 tons of drugs last year, 24
percent more than the previous year. It was not clear from the report
if the time period was 2006, or the Persian year to March 20, 2007.
Iran is fighting drug abuse and trafficking by various means, including
a crackdown along Iran's eastern borders -- the principal entry zone
for drugs -- and obligatory treatment for detained addicts. VS

Iranian media report that conservatives or fundamentalists are looking
to forge a electoral front with the help of a coordinating committee of
prominent conservatives, who may be able to persuade various right-wing
factions to work together in parliamentary polls set for next March.
There are conflicting reports about the names and number of members.
The daily "Etemad" reported on July 8 that five prominent
conservatives, including Asadollah Badamchian, Sadeq Mahsuli and
Hussein Fadai, are members of a central council of the United Front of
Fundamentalists (Jebhe-yi mottahed-i osulgarayan), though six more
members may join. Parliament speaker Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel has
rejected reports that he is a member, and "Etemad" speculated that the
membership of the council may change before the elections, or it may
disband. It noted the failure of conservatives' last attempt, in the
2005 presidential elections, to have a coordinating council impose a
consensual right-wing candidate. "Aftab-i Yazd," citing the Fars news
agency, on July 9 also reported the formation of a conservative
committee, although it was unclear if it was referring to the same
committee but with a different list of members, or a different group.
It stated that a five-man committee, including a former foreign
minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, has been chosen from among elements
approved by various pro-government, "progressive," and traditionalist
right-wing groups. VS

The Foreign Ministry has appointed Hussein Amirabdullahian as Iran's
new ambassador to Bahrain, replacing Mohammad Farazmand, "Etemad-i
Melli" reported on July 9. Amirabdullahian is currently the head of the
special Iraq headquarters at the Foreign Ministry, and previously
worked as a deputy ambassador in Baghdad and as a deputy to the Iranian
foreign minister's special representative for Iraqi affairs, the daily
stated. VS

Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi on July 9 denied recent reports that he
is spearheading a movement calling for a no-confidence vote against
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, KUNA reported. He also denied a
purported meeting with U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney in May to
discuss a no-confidence vote, and described those reports as
"baseless." During an interview with Radio Sawa the same day,
al-Hashimi reaffirmed his support for al-Maliki. "When we decide that
the al-Maliki government no longer has our trust, we shall declare this
publicly and without hesitation.... We realize our standing within the
state of Iraq and are still loyal to the leadership, and we would not
stand for any interference in our political affairs, including our
relationship with colleagues and future changes in government,"
al-Hashimi said. On July 8, CBS News reported that the Sunni-led Iraqi
Accordance Front was preparing to call a no-confidence vote against
al-Maliki on July 15. CBS also said al-Hashimi and Cheney discussed the
formation of a new broad-based political front called the "Iraq
Project" during a meeting in Baghdad on May 9 (see "RFE/RL Newsline,"
July 9, 2007). SS

Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari issued a statement on July 9 expressing
deep concern over what he called a massive buildup of Turkish forces
along the border with Iraq, international media reported. Zebari said
that according to intelligence assessments, Turkey has amassed as many
as 140,000 troops along the border, and he urged restraint on the part
of Ankara. The Turkish government has repeatedly accused the U.S. and
Iraqi governments of not doing enough to combat militants of the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) who are using northern Iraq as a base to
carry out attacks in Turkey. Since 2004, Turkey has warned that if
nothing is done against the rebel group, Ankara will launch unilateral
military operations in northern Iraq. On June 30, Turkish Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gul said a plan has been finalized for a military
incursion into Iraq to pursue the PKK (see "RFE/RL Newsline," July 2,
2007). "We are trying to defuse this tension," Zebari said. "We think
the best thing is to revive the security working group [and address]
all legitimate Turkish concerns about the PKK, the security issue, and
cross-border incursions." SS

Foreign Minister Zebari warned during a July 9 press conference that a
quick U.S. troop pullout from Iraq would lead to civil war and the
collapse of the Iraqi state, international media reported. He added
that the United States has a responsibility to build up the Iraqi
forces so that they can fully take over security operations. Zebari
made the statement in response to a July 9 "New York Times" report
which indicated that some U.S. officials, fearing the loss of more
Republican support, are considering a gradual pullout of U.S. troops
from "high-casualty areas." "We have held discussions with members of
Congress and explained to them the dangers of a quick pullout and
leaving a security vacuum," Zebari said. "The dangers could be a civil
war, dividing the country, regional wars, and the collapse of the
state. In our estimation, until Iraqi forces are ready, there is a
responsibility on the United States, which is to stand with the [Iraqi
government] as the forces are being built," he added. SS

Followers of radical Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr on July 9 denied
reports that he went to Iran after a war of words erupted between his
supporters and Prime Minister al-Maliki, the independent Voices of Iraq
news agency reported. Falah Shanshal, a member of the al-Sadr movement
in parliament, said that al-Sadr has not left Iraq and is currently in
the Shi'ite holy city of Al-Najaf. Reuters on July 8 quoted a U.S.
military source as saying al-Sadr left for Iran to avoid a crackdown by
U.S. forces. Another lawmaker loyal to al-Sadr, Abd al-Razzaq
al-Nidawi, told Al-Arabiyah satellite television that the report was
"another of the American lies that seek to tear down the al-Sadr trend
and its grass roots." On July 7, al-Maliki called on al-Sadr's militia,
the Imam Al-Mahdi Army, to completely disarm, and said the militia has
been infiltrated by terrorists and ex-Ba'athists. Al-Sadr's followers
then accused al-Maliki of giving U.S. forces a green light to attack
the militia (see "RFE/RL Newsline," July 9, 2007). SS

An audio recording purportedly of a former Iraqi vice president and
current Iraqi Ba'ath Party leader, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, says U.S.
troops are facing defeat in Iraq and that his group will continue to
fight foreign forces, AP reported on July 8. The news agency has
acquired a copy of the recording, but its authenticity could not be
verified. On the recording, al-Duri lists several conditions for an end
to the "resistance," including foreign forces' unconditional
withdrawal, their agreement to take responsibility "for all the crimes
they committed against the Iraqi people," and compensation for "all the
losses that resulted from the occupation." "My dear comrades, your
enemy is collapsing and is being defeated, and so are its followers,
agents, and spies as a result of your giant jihadi march," the speaker
says. He also criticizes the Shi'ite-led Iraqi government's
de-Ba'athification process, which has purged thousands of former Ba'ath
party members from their government positions. Al-Duri was named Ba'ath
Party leader on January 1, replacing former President Saddam Hussein,
who was executed on December 30 (see "RFE/RL Newsline," January 3,
2007). SS

Interior Ministry spokesman Lieutenant General Abd al-Karim al-Khalaf
said that more than 11,000 personnel, including several high-ranking
officers, have been dismissed from the ministry for corruption and
links to sectarian factions, "Al-Zaman" reported on July 9. "The
firings were made when it was found that the officers were implicated
in undermining law and order and involvement in sectarian leanings, as
well as disloyalty," al-Khalaf said. He also estimated that the purge,
coupled with joint U.S.-Iraqi security operations, has led to an almost
80 percent reduction in sectarian killings. SS

RFE/RL recently spoke with Jarrett Blanc, a Council on Foreign
Relations international affairs fellow and a visiting scholar at the
U.S. Institute of Peace, where he is researching elections conducted
amid civil conflict, about the challenges of conducting elections in
conflict zones like Afghanistan and Iraq or in postconflict
environments like Kosovo.

RFE/RL: Is it possible to have free and fair elections in conflict
zones like Iraq and Afghanistan?

Jarrett Blanc: No. The idea is almost necessarily paradoxical for a few
reasons. One is that elections are necessarily dependent on the rule of
law. They are legal institutions. And so, where the law does not exist
or the law is not enforceable, then elections are quite limited in what
they can achieve. And from a security perspective, you have to expect
that if a government is unable to protect its citizens on the average
day, it is going to be unable to protect its citizens on the especially
tense election day.

RFE/RL: If it's not possible to have free and fair elections in
conflict zones, this suggests that the very nature of the election
would be empowering one or another faction that is involved in the
conflict. So does this mean that elections in conflict zones contribute
more to the conflict than to conflict resolution?

Blanc: I'm not sure that it necessarily contributes more to conflict as
opposed to conflict resolution. I think, though, that your question is
leading in exactly the right direction -- which is that you have to
think about the election within the broader context of the conflict and
not imagine that you can recreate the political dynamics of a country
simply because you're going to have an election. The people who are
armed -- who are fighting the war -- are still going to be there. And
if you haven't strategized about how the election is going to either
contribute to terminating or contribute to worsening the conflict,
you're probably not going to have a particularly good strategic
outcome.

RFE/RL: Let's take a step back and look at sources of insecurity in
elections within conflict areas. Perhaps we can divide them into three
different categories. There are ongoing conflicts -- that is, combat
situations. There are postconflict situations. And then there is
insecurity that comes from the failure of the rule of law. How does
each of these different sources of insecurity hamper the goal of
fostering democracy through the ballot box?

Blanc: If we start with your first category of ongoing conflict, we
need to remember that civil war and elections are essentially political
activities with the same aim -- which is control of state power. And
so, the way that an ongoing conflict hampers the objective of an
election in a broad sense is that it is trying to achieve the same
thing. The armed combatants are trying to take control of state power.
And chances are they are not going to respect the results of the
election. They are going to respect the results of the conflict.

RFE/RL: Would you define Afghanistan as an ongoing conflict or as a
postconflict situation? How does that threaten future elections and the
establishment of democracy there?

Blanc: Afghanistan is complicated partially because the different
regions of the country are so different. But I would say that
altogether it is still a conflictive situation. I think that in terms
of the number of battle deaths per year, it meets most academic
definitions of a civil war. And there hasn't been a recognized
termination of the war. In other words, the majority of the combatants
have not agreed to end the war on certain terms. And so I think that,
for that reason, it is probably still a conflict situation or an
ongoing civil war.

RFE/RL: In the case of Iraq, there have been elections which were
hailed as a success because of a large voter turnout. But in the
aftermath of those elections, there hasn't been any breakthrough on
power sharing. What are your thoughts about the possibility of those
elected officials in Iraq coming together on some kind of a
power-sharing agreement?

Blanc: It's possible, but I don't think it is particularly likely. I
think that if you look at the dynamics of the civil war in Iraq, the
bad news is that, comparing it to other similar conflicts, the chances
are that we are going to see a civil war that escalates -- gets worse
and probably increases its regional component -- before you see the
level of exhaustion that would be necessary to come to a negotiated
solution. In theory, could the elected members of the [Iraqi]
parliament, representing their communities [and] representing the armed
factions to which they are close, come to some kind of an agreement and
then hope that the armed factions will abide by and enforce that
agreement? It is possible. But I don't think it is particularly
likely.

RFE/RL: What criticisms do you have about the U.S. approach to
democratic transition in Iraq?

Blanc: The U.S. strategy of benchmarks is misguided. And it is
misguided because the benchmarks describe a political settlement that
seems just and equitable to us. But we don't have direct contact with
virtually any of the combatant forces in Iraq. We don't talk to
Ayatollah [Ali] al-Sistani. We don't talk to the military leaders of
[radical Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-]Sadr's armies. We don't even know
who the Sunni military leaders are, let alone talk directly to them.
The idea that a solution that seems equitable to us necessarily
addresses the red lines of the combatants, I think, is very naive.

RFE/RL: How does the security situation on the ground in a postconflict
environment like Kosovo impact the goal of establishing democracy?

Blanc: It really varies a great deal on what was the conflict and how
was the conflict ended. For example, in Kosovo, where the conflict
ended with both a fairly general agreement and with an overwhelming
international peacekeeping force, you are able to conduct reasonably
good elections where the outcome of the election is not necessarily
determined by the military strength of the combatants. Where the
postconflict situation, or the postconflict settlement, is more tenuous
-- and I'm thinking here, perhaps, of Lebanon -- then the best you
could hope for is probably some kind of power-sharing arrangement that
is sealed by the election as opposed to a genuine expression of popular
sovereignty.

RFE/RL: How does the failure of the rule of law impact democratic
transformation in countries that are recovering from recent conflicts?
And what impact can the election laws themselves have?

Blanc: In a way, we're mixing two problems. One is the failure of the
rule of law from a perspective of election security -- and whether
elections can be genuine expressions of popular sovereignty. There are
instances here -- for example, a number of instances in Africa, in
Nigeria, in South America, in Guyana -- where the state simply doesn't
have good control over the security situation. And so, party-based
violence or election-based violence can end up corrupting the result of
the election. That's one set of problems. Another set of problems are
the specifics of an election law and whether an election law is
designed in order to produce a genuinely representative result.

RFE/RL: If we look at Afghanistan in this same way, the language of the
electoral laws -- particularly with the parliamentary elections -- what
we see happening in the Afghan parliament is that some members of
parliament who are alleged to be war criminals have been declaring
amnesty for themselves. There is a lot of frustration among ordinary
Afghans about the idea that people who should be put on trial for war
crimes are now lawmakers who are giving themselves immunity from
prosecution. There also are questions about tribal voting blocs in
Afghanistan that support strongmen of their ethnicity, or even from
different clans within ethnic groups. What are the lessons that
Afghanistan and the international community can learn from the way the
Afghan elections have been conducted?

Blanc: You've identified a couple of very interesting problems with the
Afghan process. Some of them probably could not have been addressed.
And some of them could have been addressed a little better than they
were. The one that I think could not have been addressed is this issue
of the failure to disqualify people who are warlords or have committed
war crimes. The international community and the government of
Afghanistan simply do not have the kind of security control, military
control of the territory, that would make those kinds of
disqualifications possible. We could do that in Bosnia[-Herzegovina].
We could do that in Kosovo because there was an overwhelming
international military force to enforce the decision and make sure that
protests didn't get out of hand. If you tried to disqualify these
actors in Afghanistan, you simply would have thrown the entire
political process off-track. So if you want to have that kind of
control -- if you want to be able to completely reshape who are the
leaders of the country -- you need to invest the sort of military force
that makes that possible. And that is something that has never happened
in Afghanistan.

RFE/RL: What problems do you see with the way Afghanistan's election
laws have been written?

Blanc: The Afghans chose a fairly unusual system of representation
called a "single nontransferable vote." Suffice it to say that it is
not particularly widely used in the world. And one of the reasons that
it is not particularly widely used is that it has a strange paradoxical
effect. On the one hand, it makes party formation difficult. And on the
other hand, it very strongly rewards parties that do manage to organize
themselves and get a little bit better organized than their
competitors. And I think that you are seeing that now in the assembly.
They simply do not have the level of party discipline. Each individual
member is an independent actor. That makes it very difficult to get
policy through. And it makes it very difficult for the voters to hold
individual representatives ideologically accountable -- have you done
what the party platform said you were going to do? One very unfortunate
result of the system of representation that they chose is that about 70
percent of the votes cast in the parliamentary election went to
candidates who didn't win. So only 30 percent of the votes went to
winning candidates. And it is not hard to understand why people might
be frustrated, or feel unrepresented by a parliament that is made up of
winners with only 30 percent of the popular vote.

RFE/RL: Your criticisms about Afghanistan's election laws and the way
they were implemented suggest that rather than contributing to conflict
resolution, Afghanistan's elections could be enhancing conflict between
paramilitary factions or militia groups.

Blanc: In principle, I don't necessarily agree with the idea that
simply because the leaders or people who are linked to armed groups are
in the assembly, that the assembly or the election cannot contribute to
some sort of pacification process. In a way, I think it is the
opposite. So long as you don't have the military force to address the
militia problem, it might be -- at least in some situations -- better
to have people inside the tent than outside of the tent. If you don't
have the leaders of the militia in the assembly, it is quite possible
that the assembly just doesn't mean anything.

RFE/RL: Any final thoughts about the lessons of the elections in Iraq
and what impact the democratic process can have on the future of the
conflict there?

Blanc: For the people of Iraq, the only thing that we can all have is
the greatest of respect at the repeated courage they have shown in
going out to vote in the face of tremendous threats -- and great
sympathy and regret for the fact that the elections were not, to my
mind, better designed strategically to contribute to a termination of
the conflict. At this point in the conflict, I'm not convinced that a
political process like an election can mean very much. Probably, it is
going to take a little bit of time -- either some sort of negotiated
solution or, unfortunately, an exhaustion of the civil war, before we
can meaningfully start talking about what elections can contribute
again.

RFE/RL: What final advice would you give to Afghanistan about the way
the next elections are conducted there?

Blanc: In Afghanistan, I think the situation is more ambiguous. Over
time, we might see that Afghan governments -- including [those
empowered as] a result of the [last] elections and the result of future
elections -- might be able to slowly negotiate improved conditions and
a reduction in conflict. I think you've seen that in parts of the
country already. I hope that the Afghans will consider whether some of
the technical decisions they made in the first set of elections should
be revised before the second set. This issue that I mentioned earlier
about the system of representation would be one of them.