I never really thought highly of him, until I saw some clips from The Atheist Experience where Johanan Raatz called in (you can check out Johanan's youtube channel).

Now I dislike him even more... :P

But anyways, what do you guys think of him?

"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."

I never really thought highly of him, until I saw some clips from The Atheist Experience where Johanan Raatz called in (you can check out Johanan's youtube channel).

Now I dislike him even more... :P

But anyways, what do you guys think of him?

One of the best atheists out there at explaining the subtle errors that common folk make when arguing for God or any supernatural being. He is very intelligent but gets pissed off easily, and it is easy to see why. He answers the same questions sometimes as little as 10 minutes after he answered it with a previous caller.

Matt Dilahunty is smart. He heavily invested in his religion, and since he's a no bullshirt kind of guy, he eventually realized his religion was false. He has an amazing insight into the fallacious thought process that allows irrational belief to continue and he is well equipped to deal with those people (not something I generally have the patience for) without for the most part flipping out on them. For the most part. You can only be patient with theists for so long, especially the special kind of crazy you get in Texas.He's articulate and intelligent and he has the necessary perspective to talk to these people.

I never really thought highly of him, until I saw some clips from The Atheist Experience where Johanan Raatz called in (you can check out Johanan's youtube channel).

Now I dislike him even more... :P

But anyways, what do you guys think of him?

One of the best atheists out there at explaining the subtle errors that common folk make when arguing for God or any supernatural being. He is very intelligent but gets pissed off easily, and it is easy to see why. He answers the same questions sometimes as little as 10 minutes after he answered it with a previous caller.

I was a bit annoyed that he simply shunned modal arguments (for anything) by simply saying something like: "I don't give a rats a$$ about possibility." I don't know, but to me this shows a bit of arrogance and stubbornness... not intellectual honesty. But then again, I guess that's why people like his show ;) Because of his aggressive personality i mean.

"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."

I never really thought highly of him, until I saw some clips from The Atheist Experience where Johanan Raatz called in (you can check out Johanan's youtube channel).

Now I dislike him even more... :P

But anyways, what do you guys think of him?

One of the best atheists out there at explaining the subtle errors that common folk make when arguing for God or any supernatural being. He is very intelligent but gets pissed off easily, and it is easy to see why. He answers the same questions sometimes as little as 10 minutes after he answered it with a previous caller.

I was a bit annoyed that he simply shunned modal arguments (for anything) by simply saying something like: "I don't give a rats a$$ about possibility." I don't know, but to me this shows a bit of arrogance and stubbornness... not intellectual honesty. But then again, I guess that's why people like his show ;) Because of his aggressive personality i mean.

I don't know if he always just says that about modal arguments. Usually he does justify better ways of debunking these arguments. I will try to find one where he explains his position on modal arguments more thoroughly. But yea your right, it seems a bit stubborn. He usually will take on any argument and show the core of the problem, I think this is why people like him though.

I've only seen some of Matt on youtube and he comes across as an intelligent man who is just sick to death of the idiots who think they'll beat him with a "if we come from monkeys, how come there are still monkeys" idiotic question.

We put up with the same ignorance on every religion forum I've ever seen.Evolution says this.........................no it doesn'tTherefore this.................................see aboveTherefore god....................................see aboveThe atheist religion defeated..........................it's not a religionAtheists worship science..................................atheists reject the claim of a godThe atheist worldview is this...........................atheists reject the claim of a godAtheists hate god.................................................atheists reject the claim of a godScience is evil.....................................................science doesn't exist as an entity.If we come from chemicals why do chemicals still exist....................................hahahahaha my funny.etc etc etc etc etc etc etc etc etc etc

I never really thought highly of him, until I saw some clips from The Atheist Experience where Johanan Raatz called in (you can check out Johanan's youtube channel).

Now I dislike him even more... :P

But anyways, what do you guys think of him?

Another topic should be, what do you think of Christopher Hitchens? The only person I can truly call to be an inspiration and a hero in my life.

Pretty much what Fr. Barron says... I think the same about Hitchens. He was just a pleasure to listen to. (even though I disagreed with almost everything he said, lol)

"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."

At 2/20/2014 4:48:18 AM, bulproof wrote:I've only seen some of Matt on youtube and he comes across as an intelligent man who is just sick to death of the idiots who think they'll beat him with a "if we come from monkeys, how come there are still monkeys" idiotic question.

Artist depictions of the ancestor of apes (of which man is a part) are monkeys, or at least monkey like.

We put up with the same ignorance on every religion forum I've ever seen.Evolution says this.........................no it doesn't

Except it does. Evolutionists tend to contradict themselves, attimes for reasons of politic. Evolution clearly undermines religion and the likes of Dennet, Dawkins, and Huxley have argued why: then you see NSCE (which has lots of atheists) saying otherwise.

The atheist religion defeated..........................it's not a religion

Agreed. But given certain definitions of religion it can be termed such. Or it can be used metaphorically, the way some folks say religion is a virus.

Atheists worship science..................................atheists reject the claim of a god

And emphasize science; especially since I hear scientists tend to have more atheists in their rank.

The atheist worldview is this...........................atheists reject the claim of a god

I have heard this silly talk of atheism not being a worldview. It is.

Atheists hate god.................................................atheists reject the claim of a god

Some add that they are anti-theists. I may hate an idea of God, though I know he doesn't exist. This applies to fictional characters, like the Joker.

Science is evil.....................................................science doesn't exist as an entity.

Science, like religion CAN be used for evil. Same for religion, or the human intellect from which they are derived. I may just as quickly correct a theist who says science is evil, and scorn an atheist who says religion is evil.

If we come from chemicals why do chemicals still exist....................................hahahahaha my funny.

I never really thought highly of him, until I saw some clips from The Atheist Experience where Johanan Raatz called in (you can check out Johanan's youtube channel).

Now I dislike him even more... :P

But anyways, what do you guys think of him?

I like him. Every once in a while he gets sloppy with his phrasing for one reason or another, but I think that's more of a function of his doing a live show most every week. In the end, even when he's sloppy, is ultimate point is one he either is willing to support if questioned, or has supported elsewhere (if he's not questioned on the sloppy statement at that time).

I agree with his stance on the modal argument, though.

Assistant moderator to airmax1227. PM me with any questions or concerns!

I never really thought highly of him, until I saw some clips from The Atheist Experience where Johanan Raatz called in (you can check out Johanan's youtube channel).

Now I dislike him even more... :P

But anyways, what do you guys think of him?

I like him. Every once in a while he gets sloppy with his phrasing for one reason or another, but I think that's more of a function of his doing a live show most every week. In the end, even when he's sloppy, is ultimate point is one he either is willing to support if questioned, or has supported elsewhere (if he's not questioned on the sloppy statement at that time).

I agree with his stance on the modal argument, though.

I was talking more about his whole view of modal logic in general. In Johanan Raatz's video, he was trying to show that since the mind has different modanic properties than the brain, they can't be the same thing, and Matt Dillahunty just pretty much dismissed the argument because it dealt with modal possibility.

"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."

I never really thought highly of him, until I saw some clips from The Atheist Experience where Johanan Raatz called in (you can check out Johanan's youtube channel).

Now I dislike him even more... :P

But anyways, what do you guys think of him?

I like him. Every once in a while he gets sloppy with his phrasing for one reason or another, but I think that's more of a function of his doing a live show most every week. In the end, even when he's sloppy, is ultimate point is one he either is willing to support if questioned, or has supported elsewhere (if he's not questioned on the sloppy statement at that time).

I agree with his stance on the modal argument, though.

I was talking more about his whole view of modal logic in general. In Johanan Raatz's video, he was trying to show that since the mind has different modanic properties than the brain, they can't be the same thing, and Matt Dillahunty just pretty much dismissed the argument because it dealt with modal possibility.

I remember that call. I've heard that sort of argument before.

What's funny, to me, is that possible world semantics comes from Kripke, and Kripke argued that "every person necessarily has the parents they do have: anyone with different parents would not be the same person."

Of course, in the first place, I don't think anyone's arguing that they're truly "identical". One is a property of the other, just as the parents you have is a property of you. So if that's the only case being made, it doesn't even really support dualism in the way it's usually meant to mean, and I don't think it would be very contested. But it's not the only case being made.

It's a problem of identity--at what point is the thing no longer the "same thing", but something different? There are ideas of "partial identity" and so on, but I think in order to assert that the min is not merely an aspect of the brain, you'd have to actually demonstrate that, rather than trying to argue for it through the claim of "conceivability"--and if you've actually done that, then you've already shown dualism. I can conceive of "me" being: a different gender, a different race, in a different part of the world. But how would it mean anything to say I was still "me"?

Here is where the possible-world framework, to me, breaks down, since it leads you to forget that "possible" just means "not shown to be impossible/false", not "actually possible". There are things we can establish as actually possible. And there are things that we didn't used to know were impossible, such as squaring the circle.

In the first place, it might actually BE incoherent to try to conceive "that one's mind might exist without one's body". We can't merely assert a priori that that's a coherent thing, both in general (see the point about the necessity of your parents) and in terms of our lack of understanding. We can assert only that we can't prove it impossible. Similarly, time travel may well be incoherent, yet we can conceive of it. We have to explicitly define what we mean be "our mind"--and that definition has to be correct, and is distinct from merely "a mind". While it's trivially possible to support that "a mind" might be able to be separate and distinct, I don't think we can sufficiently show that our minds are not more-than-casually related to our brains.

Assistant moderator to airmax1227. PM me with any questions or concerns!

I never really thought highly of him, until I saw some clips from The Atheist Experience where Johanan Raatz called in (you can check out Johanan's youtube channel).

Now I dislike him even more... :P

But anyways, what do you guys think of him?

Another topic should be, what do you think of Christopher Hitchens? The only person I can truly call to be an inspiration and a hero in my life.

My least favorite famous atheist.He has some good rebuttals, and his "what is asserted without evidence..." quote is brilliant, but at the same time, he is far, far too aggresive towards religion.When he starts comparing religion to rats and vermin, he doesn't sound intelligent; he sounds like a bigot.

I never really thought highly of him, until I saw some clips from The Atheist Experience where Johanan Raatz called in (you can check out Johanan's youtube channel).

Now I dislike him even more... :P

But anyways, what do you guys think of him?

I like him. Every once in a while he gets sloppy with his phrasing for one reason or another, but I think that's more of a function of his doing a live show most every week. In the end, even when he's sloppy, is ultimate point is one he either is willing to support if questioned, or has supported elsewhere (if he's not questioned on the sloppy statement at that time).

I agree with his stance on the modal argument, though.

I was talking more about his whole view of modal logic in general. In Johanan Raatz's video, he was trying to show that since the mind has different modanic properties than the brain, they can't be the same thing, and Matt Dillahunty just pretty much dismissed the argument because it dealt with modal possibility.

I remember that call. I've heard that sort of argument before.

What's funny, to me, is that possible world semantics comes from Kripke, and Kripke argued that "every person necessarily has the parents they do have: anyone with different parents would not be the same person."

Of course, in the first place, I don't think anyone's arguing that they're truly "identical". One is a property of the other, just as the parents you have is a property of you. So if that's the only case being made, it doesn't even really support dualism in the way it's usually meant to mean, and I don't think it would be very contested. But it's not the only case being made.

Materialists argue that the brain and mind are identical. You seem to be more of a property dualist.

It's a problem of identity--at what point is the thing no longer the "same thing", but something different? There are ideas of "partial identity" and so on, but I think in order to assert that the min is not merely an aspect of the brain, you'd have to actually demonstrate that, rather than trying to argue for it through the claim of "conceivability"--and if you've actually done that, then you've already shown dualism. I can conceive of "me" being: a different gender, a different race, in a different part of the world. But how would it mean anything to say I was still "me"?

Here is where the possible-world framework, to me, breaks down, since it leads you to forget that "possible" just means "not shown to be impossible/false", not "actually possible". There are things we can establish as actually possible. And there are things that we didn't used to know were impossible, such as squaring the circle.

I'd say that whatever is metaphysically impossible is inconceivable. This isn't inconceivable, so it's not metaphysically impossible.

In the first place, it might actually BE incoherent to try to conceive "that one's mind might exist without one's body".

It might be, but I think you'd have that burden.

We can't merely assert a priori that that's a coherent thing, both in general (see the point about the necessity of your parents) and in terms of our lack of understanding. We can assert only that we can't prove it impossible. Similarly, time travel may well be incoherent, yet we can conceive of it.

If time travel is incoherent, then we aren't actually conceiving of it in the first place. To conceive of something is to grasp the essence of it. If there's no essence there to grasp in the first place, (such as a square triangle) then we can't conceive of it.

We have to explicitly define what we mean be "our mind"--and that definition has to be correct, and is distinct from merely "a mind". While it's trivially possible to support that "a mind" might be able to be separate and distinct, I don't think we can sufficiently show that our minds are not more-than-casually related to our brains.

If it's possible for "minds" to exist apart from matter, and "our mind" is a mind, then it's possible for our mind to exist apart from matter.

On the flip side, we could also use the p-zombie argument.

"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."

You should call in and talk to him. I think you might actually make a decent conversation, seriously. I'll cheer for you! =D

Heh. thanks... ;P

"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."

I never really thought highly of him, until I saw some clips from The Atheist Experience where Johanan Raatz called in (you can check out Johanan's youtube channel).

Now I dislike him even more... :P

But anyways, what do you guys think of him?

I like him. Every once in a while he gets sloppy with his phrasing for one reason or another, but I think that's more of a function of his doing a live show most every week. In the end, even when he's sloppy, is ultimate point is one he either is willing to support if questioned, or has supported elsewhere (if he's not questioned on the sloppy statement at that time).

I agree with his stance on the modal argument, though.

I was talking more about his whole view of modal logic in general. In Johanan Raatz's video, he was trying to show that since the mind has different modanic properties than the brain, they can't be the same thing, and Matt Dillahunty just pretty much dismissed the argument because it dealt with modal possibility.

I remember that call. I've heard that sort of argument before.

What's funny, to me, is that possible world semantics comes from Kripke, and Kripke argued that "every person necessarily has the parents they do have: anyone with different parents would not be the same person."

Of course, in the first place, I don't think anyone's arguing that they're truly "identical". One is a property of the other, just as the parents you have is a property of you. So if that's the only case being made, it doesn't even really support dualism in the way it's usually meant to mean, and I don't think it would be very contested. But it's not the only case being made.

It's a problem of identity--at what point is the thing no longer the "same thing", but something different? There are ideas of "partial identity" and so on, but I think in order to assert that the min is not merely an aspect of the brain, you'd have to actually demonstrate that, rather than trying to argue for it through the claim of "conceivability"--and if you've actually done that, then you've already shown dualism. I can conceive of "me" being: a different gender, a different race, in a different part of the world. But how would it mean anything to say I was still "me"?

Here is where the possible-world framework, to me, breaks down, since it leads you to forget that "possible" just means "not shown to be impossible/false", not "actually possible". There are things we can establish as actually possible. And there are things that we didn't used to know were impossible, such as squaring the circle.

In the first place, it might actually BE incoherent to try to conceive "that one's mind might exist without one's body". We can't merely assert a priori that that's a coherent thing, both in general (see the point about the necessity of your parents) and in terms of our lack of understanding. We can assert only that we can't prove it impossible. Similarly, time travel may well be incoherent, yet we can conceive of it. We have to explicitly define what we mean be "our mind"--and that definition has to be correct, and is distinct from merely "a mind". While it's trivially possible to support that "a mind" might be able to be separate and distinct, I don't think we can sufficiently show that our minds are not more-than-casually related to our brains.

Anyways, I think that arguments which deal with intentionality/meaning and thinking processes are better than conceivability arguments, although the former are more complex and not as easy and quick to present in debates as the latter.

"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."

This is an extension of the scope of S5 to infer that if something is possibly necessary in some possible world, then it's necessary in all possible worlds.

Or, more clearly, if X is possibly necessary, then it's true in all possible worlds.

Now, having said that, I fully admit that I'm not an expert, couldn't argue the case and wouldn't engage on this subject with anything more than "I don't accept that".

I have a fundamental problem with drawing any lines from "possible" to "true" that don't provide empirical justification. When we start taking 'possibly necessary' and calling it 'necessary in all possible', I'm convinced that we've made an error.

I'm just not the right guy to go into detail as to the specifics of the error. I'm not really a proponent of modal logic, being primarily an empiricist.

To step away from his opinion on it, and give my own:

I don't think universal necessity is sufficiently supported in the case of God.

Unlike, say, the law of identity, a world without a god can be conceived of, and is metaphysically possible, on its own. Thus, no matter what attempts at getting to god through definition alone happen, they fail to actually show a coherency to the definition.

In order to establish that he's "possibly necessary", you have to prove he exists in all possible worlds, including our actual. You can't point to one world, and say he's possibly necessary in that--because he isn't necessary in that world unless he's necessary in all worlds. You can't backdoor yourself into that by trying to assert that there's "One world in which he exists in all possible worlds". I feel it's incoherent (and, honestly, disingenuous) to try to sneak into transworld identity like that.

Proving his necessity would require showing each posited world without X, and demonstrating its incoherency without X. You don't just assert it, and you don't do it by appealing to another possible world. If I could conceive of a world where the logical absolutes didn't exist, and could show it to be not logically incoherent internally, then they wouldn't be necessary any more.

Since I can conceive of a world where God does not exist, and it's not internally incoherent, God cannot be necessary. Which, by the definition of the modal argument, means he cannot exist, since if he exists, he must be necessary.

Other conceptions of god which don't necessarily require transworld identity like that aren't similarly incoherent. Which means I can argue that any world where you're trying to assert you can conceive of him as being "possibly necessary", you're actually not conceiving of him as possibly necessary. You're conceiving him as necessary for that state of affairs (the state of affairs in which a god exists).

Assistant moderator to airmax1227. PM me with any questions or concerns!

This is an extension of the scope of S5 to infer that if something is possibly necessary in some possible world, then it's necessary in all possible worlds.

Or, more clearly, if X is possibly necessary, then it's true in all possible worlds.

Now, having said that, I fully admit that I'm not an expert, couldn't argue the case and wouldn't engage on this subject with anything more than "I don't accept that".

I have a fundamental problem with drawing any lines from "possible" to "true" that don't provide empirical justification. When we start taking 'possibly necessary' and calling it 'necessary in all possible', I'm convinced that we've made an error.

I'm just not the right guy to go into detail as to the specifics of the error. I'm not really a proponent of modal logic, being primarily an empiricist.

To step away from his opinion on it, and give my own:

I don't think universal necessity is sufficiently supported in the case of God.

Unlike, say, the law of identity, a world without a god can be conceived of, and is metaphysically possible, on its own. Thus, no matter what attempts at getting to god through definition alone happen, they fail to actually show a coherency to the definition.

In order to establish that he's "possibly necessary", you have to prove he exists in all possible worlds, including our actual. You can't point to one world, and say he's possibly necessary in that--because he isn't necessary in that world unless he's necessary in all worlds. You can't backdoor yourself into that by trying to assert that there's "One world in which he exists in all possible worlds". I feel it's incoherent (and, honestly, disingenuous) to try to sneak into transworld identity like that.

Proving his necessity would require showing each posited world without X, and demonstrating its incoherency without X. You don't just assert it, and you don't do it by appealing to another possible world. If I could conceive of a world where the logical absolutes didn't exist, and could show it to be not logically incoherent internally, then they wouldn't be necessary any more.

Since I can conceive of a world where God does not exist, and it's not internally incoherent, God cannot be necessary. Which, by the definition of the modal argument, means he cannot exist, since if he exists, he must be necessary.

Other conceptions of god which don't necessarily require transworld identity like that aren't similarly incoherent. Which means I can argue that any world where you're trying to assert you can conceive of him as being "possibly necessary", you're actually not conceiving of him as possibly necessary. You're conceiving him as necessary for that state of affairs (the state of affairs in which a god exists).

But that's a misunderstanding of S5 in the first place. S5 doesn't say "Possibly necessary, therefore necessary." S5 says:

The modal ontological argument rests upon the other premise:Necessarily(G -----> Necessarily G)

Which seems to be what you're disputing.

"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."

This is an extension of the scope of S5 to infer that if something is possibly necessary in some possible world, then it's necessary in all possible worlds.

Or, more clearly, if X is possibly necessary, then it's true in all possible worlds.

Now, having said that, I fully admit that I'm not an expert, couldn't argue the case and wouldn't engage on this subject with anything more than "I don't accept that".

I have a fundamental problem with drawing any lines from "possible" to "true" that don't provide empirical justification. When we start taking 'possibly necessary' and calling it 'necessary in all possible', I'm convinced that we've made an error.

I'm just not the right guy to go into detail as to the specifics of the error. I'm not really a proponent of modal logic, being primarily an empiricist.

To step away from his opinion on it, and give my own:

I don't think universal necessity is sufficiently supported in the case of God.

Unlike, say, the law of identity, a world without a god can be conceived of, and is metaphysically possible, on its own. Thus, no matter what attempts at getting to god through definition alone happen, they fail to actually show a coherency to the definition.

In order to establish that he's "possibly necessary", you have to prove he exists in all possible worlds, including our actual. You can't point to one world, and say he's possibly necessary in that--because he isn't necessary in that world unless he's necessary in all worlds. You can't backdoor yourself into that by trying to assert that there's "One world in which he exists in all possible worlds". I feel it's incoherent (and, honestly, disingenuous) to try to sneak into transworld identity like that.

Proving his necessity would require showing each posited world without X, and demonstrating its incoherency without X. You don't just assert it, and you don't do it by appealing to another possible world. If I could conceive of a world where the logical absolutes didn't exist, and could show it to be not logically incoherent internally, then they wouldn't be necessary any more.

Since I can conceive of a world where God does not exist, and it's not internally incoherent, God cannot be necessary. Which, by the definition of the modal argument, means he cannot exist, since if he exists, he must be necessary.

Other conceptions of god which don't necessarily require transworld identity like that aren't similarly incoherent. Which means I can argue that any world where you're trying to assert you can conceive of him as being "possibly necessary", you're actually not conceiving of him as possibly necessary. You're conceiving him as necessary for that state of affairs (the state of affairs in which a god exists).

Also thanks for emailing them... :) I was thinking of doing that myself, but you beat me to it. :P

From what I understand, they're not disputing S5, but rather the premise that if God exists, then he necessarily exists.

"Delete your fvcking sig" -1hard

"primal man had the habit, when he came into contact with fire, of satisfying the infantile desire connected with it, by putting it out with a stream of his urine... Putting out the fire by micturating was therefore a kind of sexual act with a male, an enjoyment of sexual potency in a homosexual competition."

Also thanks for emailing them... :) I was thinking of doing that myself, but you beat me to it. :P

I tried to use the googles...but when I couldn't find it I was like "screw this, why don't I just ask them?"

From what I understand, they're not disputing S5, but rather the premise that if God exists, then he necessarily exists.

Well, I think Plantinga's MOA is the one that relies on "S5" in the way being objected to:

"The conclusion relies on a form of modal axiom S5, which states that if something is possibly true, then its possibility is necessary (it is possibly true in all worlds). Plantinga's S5 also states that if something is possibly necessarily true, then it is necessarily true (it is true in all worlds)."