Whether we have free-will and whether it matters

Abstract:

There is a concern that causal determinism might render free-will impossible. I compare some
different perspectives, namely Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Libertarianism, and Hard
Determinism, and conclude that Hard Determinism is correct—we lack free-will. To further
bolster the case, I consider the work of Libet, who has found neuropsychological evidence that
our brains non-consciously cause our actions, prior to our being aware of it. Thus we are also
not choosing consciously. I then consider Dennett’s work on the role of the conscious self. I
defend his model—of a fragmented self—which could not cause our actions. Finally I argue that
many things that free-will purportedly provides, eg., justification for the penal system and
reactive attitudes, can be reconstructed without free-will. I then end with some speculations about
why people still want free-will.

Description:

Student Number : 9112588A -
MA Dissertation -
School of Social Sciences -
Faculty of Humanities