hms iron duke

Tuesday, 28 March 2017

“Resolved
by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty,
and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in
their efforts.”

Preamble to the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, 25 March, 1957

Alphen, Netherlands. 28 March. What is the real story behind
the 1957 Treaty of Rome? Last Saturday in Rome there was a big EU bash to
celebrate sixty years since the signing of the treaty. As to be expected the
High Priests of High European Political Integration were out in force, speaking
of the ‘Founding Fathers’ who signed as the twelve Olympian Gods. This is
hardly surprising given that tomorrow British Prime Minister Theresa May will
trigger Article 50 and take one of the EU’s major powers out of it. Indeed, one
symmetry between Rome on Saturday and 1957 was the absence of a British prime
minister at either event. The reality of Rome was at one and the same time more
prosaic and more strategic than the vaguely elegiac Commission narrative.

‘Rome’ was not the first treaty setting Europe on the pot-holed
road towards some form of political union/super-state/empire depending on your
preference. The 1950 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was the real
foundation treaty of the EU forged in the belief that if French coal and German
steel were not separated by fifty kilometres and an international order war
between the two could be avoided. There was also more than one treaty signed at
Rome. The so-called Euratom Treaty, or Treaty to Establish the European Atomic
Energy Community, was designed to set the standards for the then burgeoning
European atomic industry at a European rather than a national level. Both
treaties had six signatories; Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and critically, the Federal Republic or West Germany.

For a proper
understanding of the political motivations that led to Rome one must consider
the strategic context of the treaties. In 1950 the ECSC was demanded by France,
which in the absence of Britain was at the time the leading European power (if
one excludes the 352 divisions of the Red Army just over the then inner-German
border). This was the price Paris, under intense American pressure at the time,
exacted on the Federal Republic to stop dismantling West German industry as a form
of war reparation. Washington wanted the three post-war occupation zones,
controlled respectively by Britain, the US and France, to return to some form
of economic, and in time political normalcy.

In 1991 at
the Treaty of Maastricht France demanded a similar price for the reunification
of Germany. Paris feared that a united Germany would come to dominate Europe
and that the German Bundesbank would be the main architect of that dominance.
Therefore, French President Francois Mitterand demanded the Euro as the price
for the New Berlin, with a European Central Bank that would both oversee the
currency, and ensure it was European, not German.

Mitterand was
right to be concerned; Germany IS now the dominant power in Europe, albeit a
very different Germany (which sort of makes it OK). And, by placing people in
key positions in Brussels Germany now effectively controls the EU. One reason
why Wolfgang Schauble, the German finance minister, is so keen to impose
reparations on Britain (now there’s an historical irony) for Brexit, is to
prevent Britain emerging for the third time in a century as the leader of a
counter-coalition to challenge German dominance of Europe, euphemistically
called ‘leadership’ these days.

Back in 1957
the key issue was the rearmament of Germany and its 1955 admittance to both NATO
and the Western European Union. Since 1952 the Americans had placed the French under
intense pressure to allow Germany to rearm to ease the pressure on US military
manpower. With echoes of today all too clear the 1952 Korean War (which is not
technically over) saw US forces split between defending its European Allies,
and defending a key ally, South Korea, in Asia-Pacific.

Initially
France resisted the very idea of German rearmament. After all, in 1952 it was
only a dozen years since the Wehrmacht had marched down the Champs Elysée. Then,
in 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman came up with the Schuman Plan
and called for the creation of a European Defence Community. The ‘EDC’ would
have seen all national forces forged into a form of European Army under a
command structure that would have looked not unlike today’s European
Commission, and probably have been just as popular and effective.

Two implacable
opponents killed the EDC. First, the French themselves were very uncomfortable
with the idea that the descendants of the ‘Grande Armée’ would have been lost
to the EDC. Second, the limits of the alleged Europhilia of the Grand Old Man
and Wellingtonian figure of British politics, Sir Winston Churchill, were
revealed by the EDC. In May 1953 he famously remarked when asked if Britain
would join the EDC, “we are with them, but not of them”. Little really has changed ever since, apart
from Britain is now far weaker as both a power and a polis.

In October
1954 the EDC collapsed, and in one of those moments of British diplomatic
fudgery for which London is renowned West Germany was permitted to join both
NATO and the Western European Union in return for the permanent stationing of
British forces in Germany (British Army of the Rhine).

Lessons for
today? The question of a European Germany or a German Europe remains pertinent,
particularly so now that Britain the Balancer is leaving the EU. And, for all
the EU-babble one hears on such occasions European state interests are still
the driving force in European politics on a continent where history never
sleeps. With a broke France and a broken Britain it is clear that Germany will
decide Europe’s course. German interests WILL come first. Thankfully, it is
today’s Germany not some other Germany.

That said, a word
of warning from history Germany…

Julian
Lindley-French

PS for a full
understanding of the history of all this buy my book “A Chronology of European
Security and Defence 1945-2007” (Oxford: Oxford University Press) which is, of
course, brilliant and very reasonably-priced.

Friday, 24 March 2017

“Heaven
wheels above you, displaying to you her eternal glories, and still your eyes
are on the ground”.

Dante
Alighieri

Alphen, Netherlands. 24
March. Budapest stands likes a sentinel either side of the majestic River
Danube as it flows through time on its stately course to the Black Sea. There
are two key issues NATO must deal with at present: how to make President Trump
if not like NATO, at least recognise its utility; and how to properly prepare
NATO for the future shocks coming our way. For the past two days I have been in
the Hotel Marriott in beautiful Budapest listening to NATO’s ‘best and brightest’
destroy NATO’s future. It was probably just as well I was barred from speaking
on a panel in the main meeting because as a NATO citizen I would have given the
assembled, dissembling ‘Permanent Representatives’ (NATO ambassadors) to the
North Atlantic Council (NAC) a firm piece of my Yorkshire mind. NATO’s
political elite is failing both the Alliance and me the citizen.

President Trump first. Much
was made at the conference about the need for effective strategic
communications – the use of information to generate influence and effect.
Clearly, NATO does not understand its own jargon. In May President Trump will
visit Brussels to open the new NATO HQ. Apparently, the President will be
invited to cut the ribbon at an empty, over-priced ($1.3bn), long overdue
building, for which the American taxpayer has stumped up too much. I can see
the Trump Tweets already: “At over-due, empty new NATO HQ listening to empty words from pompous Europeans. Burden-sharing?
We Americans paid how much? That’s a lotta guns we trashed for this Euro-butter. #getmeoutahere”.

The Allies must convince
President Trump that NATO really is a good thing for America. Here’s my idea.
The President is due to make a state visit to Britain in October. Last month
Trump made a speech from the hangar of the new 104,000 ton aircraft carrier the
USS Gerald R. Ford. Now, before I
make my suggestion, I know some pedant somewhere will say the new British ship
has not been commissioned yet, and that she is doing sea trials, and there is
this fault and that fault. Sod that! The bloody thing floats and looks great!
So, in October NATO should hold a meeting of the NAC at Heads of State and
Government level in the hangar of the new 75,000 ton, £3bn British aircraft-carrier
HMS Queen Elizabeth. President Trump
then tweets: “Standing on enormous, new, beautiful, aircraft-carrier. Guess
what? No Stars and Stripes. UK’s historic, majestic White Ensign. And Brits
have 2 of them. #burdensharinginaction”.

Future shocks. Yet again,
much of NATO’s political leadership seem hell-bent on sacrificing strategy and
the medium-to-long term for the sake of politics and the short-term…and doing
their eloquent damnedest to pretend otherwise. There was a lot of good sense
spoken by a lot of good people over the past two days, together with a lot of
crap about ‘eco-systems’ and NATO solving climate-change. Most of the real-thinking
came from NATO officials desperately trying to find ways to close a yawning and
ever-widening gap between NATO’s ends, ways and means, Europe’s other-planet
political class, and the people who speak for them. And, in between I had to listen
to a lot of academics who know an awful lot less about NATO than I do, although
some friends of mine were thankfully on hand
to breathe at least some good sense into proceedings.

Allied Command
Transformation (ACT) is really trying very hard to breathe life into the latest
political mantras of adaptation, innovation, and transformation. There was some
really good stuff presented by senior NATO officials. And yet, when it came to
the last session I sat there with my head in my hands. It was clear that apart maybe
from the Germans, who are doing some really interesting work on adaptation, most
of the rest of ‘Their Excellencies’ were scraping around on the political floor
of pretence at the speed of irrelevance.

The bottom-line is this; NATO
must not end up trapped in a kind of persistent vegetative approach. The world
is getting dangerous out there, and in here, as this week’s tragic events in
London attest. Strategic unity of effort and purpose is what NATO is meant for –
to turn collective political action into collective defence. And it is here where
the Trump challenge and future shock come together. The longer the nations and
their diplomatic representatives ‘play NATO’, which is what is happening at
present, the more marginal NATO will become to reality and the less able it
will be to defend me.

Let me play out a brief
scenario; a desperate Russia led by an unstable, quixotic regime in Moscow actually
does what it is now threatening to do – attack the Baltic States. In the teeth
of such a crisis do ‘Their Excellencies’ really believe that NATO would be in
the front-line? Of course not. The West’s first response would be led by the
Americans, (assuming the Americans are not busy elsewhere) with strategic
command firmly in the White House, and main operational control run from US CENTCOM
in Tampa (with US EUCOM in support). The few close allies (UK, France, Germany,
Poland, Norway and the Balts, plus possibly Sweden and Finland) who could offer
something would be firmly under American command. NATO would only be brought in
when things had calmed down. If the Americans are busy elsewhere? Europe is
screwed, at least until the Germans have the heavier formations they are
developing in place. However, that will
not be until at least 2021 or 2022.

Which brings me to the
real paradox of these two days past. NATO is now only a deterrent. It is not a
credible warfighting alliance. The problem is that if NATO is not a war-fighting
alliance, it is not a credible deterrent.

Tuesday, 21 March 2017

“One
of the penalties for refusing to participate in politics is that you end up
being governed by your inferiors”.

Plato

Budapest, Hungary, 21
March. Plato’s Republic is in many ways a treatise against political extremism.
There is an argument to be made that the ‘extremist’ Great Revolt against the
Old West’s liberal, mainstream elite began here in Hungary. Long suspicious of
Brussels control-freakery the 2015 migration crisis saw a full-on revolt from
Viktor Orban’s government and much of the Hungarian population against EU fiat.
Since then the West has seen Brexit and the election of President Trump. And
yet, on the face of it at least, last week’s Dutch elections suggest that the ‘populist
wave’ (whatever that is) might just be on the wane. Think again. So, why is the
West at war with itself?

Sad bustard that I am I
spent much of yesterday afternoon glued to CNN watching the testimony of FBI
Director, James Coney and NSA Director, Admiral James Rogers. To be honest, I
had tuned in to hear about how Russia had allegedly conducted a sustained campaign
against the 2016 US presidential elections. Instead, I was treated to several
hours of absurdly partisan questioning that had little or nothing to do with
the purported mission of the House Intelligence Committee; to understand more
about the FBI’s investigation into alleged collusion between members of the
Trump campaign and President Putin’s Russia.

What was far more
illuminating was the commentary thereafter. Democrats tried to suggest that
President Trump is all but guilty of some form of treason. Republicans, by and
large, painted the testimony as an attempt to smear the President. A few commentators
suggested it was a good day for the American constitution because checks and balances
were being seen to work, whilst others said the only winner was Putin. All avoided
the real question; how on earth did America, and by extension, the Old West get
into this mess?

To answer that poser one
has to travel closer to home – the Netherlands. The Dutch campaign was
fascinating. You have to hand it to Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. He is the
ultimate bendy-rubber politician. To see off a challenge from the hard-right
Geert Wilders liberal Rutte tacked hard right in his campaign, at one point
telling Dutch Muslims effectively to ‘get normal or get out’, on another
occasion forcibly expelling one of President Erdogan’s ministers from the
Netherlands, a most un-Dutch act.

Rutte is nothing if not smart.
He realised a fundamental truism (tortology?); if the mainstream do not deal
with the legitimate concerns of vast numbers of perfectly reasonable citizens who
fear the big change they are living at some point out of desperation they will look
to the had right and hard left of the political spectrum. In other words, the
reason there is a crisis in the centre of Old West politics is because for too
long the centre has been incompetent. The good news is that the moment a
mainstream politician such as Rutte, or Theresa May in the UK, appears (and I
stress appears) to deal with the big issues voters stream back to the centre.

Let me be Euro-parochial
for a moment. The three main political issues in Europe are mass immigration,
money, and who actually holds power. For years the mainstream has hidden behind
the Blairite myth that globalisation is an unstoppable force and that people
must embrace it or be engulfed by it. This is nonsense. The Great Revolt
happened for three reasons: the mainstream liberal elite failed to understand
just how deep national identity runs; they also failed to grasp just how strong
the simple idea that in a democracy one should not only know who decides policy,
but actually have the chance to vote directly for them; and because the elite
itself in Europe became a caste apart from the people.

The Old West is the home
of the old democracies. Democracies need effective centrists to preserve effective
democracy. Whatever the short-term allure of the political fringes at times of
stress, such as now, the sheer complexity of the world today is that simple
prescriptions are as unlikely to succeed, as the pie-in-the-sky theorists who
have driven the centre to political self-destruction.

It is not centrism per se
that is needed, but effective centrism that meets the concerns of a majority of
people whilst helping them at the same time prepare them for the future. That
means in turn politicians willing to re-embrace patriotism (dirty word amongst
much of the elite), globalism, and realism at one and the same time, and strike
a politically acceptable balance between them. In practice that means recognition
of the importance of immigration for economic progress, but clear, demonstrable,
and effective limits on it. It means fiscal and monetary policies that enriches
people, not impoverishes them. The Euro has been an unmitigated disaster
precisely because it is an elite political project that defies economic logic
and which can only survive at the expense of the very people it is meant to
support. It means recognition that for most people the nation-state remains the
core of identity, and that they expect it to be the focus of democracy, security,
and defence. Finally, it means serving the needs of the majority as well as protecting
minorities.

The inference from
yesterday’s testimony on the Hill was that President Putin is waging a successful
war against the Old democracies. That is wrong. The Old West and an out of
touch mainstream elite simply make it too easy for him to cause mischief. Plato
would certainly have understood that. After all, the Old West is Athens, whilst
Putin is Sparta. That begs a further question. Where is the next Rome?

Friday, 17 March 2017

“No
matter how enmeshed a commander [or
politician] becomes in the elaboration of his [or her] own thoughts, it is sometimes necessary to take the enemy
into account”.

Winston
Spencer Churchill

Alphen, Netherlands. 17
March. London is sinking the Royal Navy! Now, before I get into British defence
pretence I must admit I was going to write this morning about the strategic
implications of this week’s Dutch elections. The problem is there aren’t any.
As my Dutch wife said to me before the election, “Whoever I vote for we will
end up with Mark Rutte as prime minister. Whatever he has promised to do during
the campaign he will not be able to do in practice”. Wise woman, my wife. Back
to the Royal Navy.

Britain’s armed forces
are in a mess because the ends and means of Britain’s defence policy do not add
up. This mess has been caused by politicians trying to get both a strategic nuclear
deterrent AND a power-projection force on the cheap, and pretending otherwise.
For some years I have been warning about the consequences of Britain’s
underfunded ‘little bit of everything, not much of anything’ force, so why do
Britain’s political leaders play defence pretence?

Let me give you an
example to better illustrate my case. Yesterday, a report was issued by
London’s National Audit Office which warned that the planned move of the first
of two new 72,500 ton large aircraft-carriers HMS Queen Elizabeth from Rosyth, Scotland, where she was put
together, to the Royal Navy base in Portsmouth, from where she will conduct sea
trials, has been delayed by some three months. The report goes into a raft of
technical and financial challenges faced by the ship and the F-35 Lightning II and Merlin aircraft she will fly.

To be honest, technical
problems never really bother me because they are entirely usual for such a big
and complex project that will serve the nation for fifty years, and possibly
beyond. Nor am I that bothered by cost overruns. Neither politicians nor
defence chiefs ever tell the truth at the beginning about the eventual cost of
big defence projects. As a matter of course I always double the planned cost and
time such a project will take to be delivered by the British government. My ‘model’
seems to work.

However, there is a
deeper problem with the new aircraft carriers that is indicative of the yawning
gulf between ends and means that stretches across the British armed forces; the
amount of money invested in defence bears no relation to the cost of the force
London says it wants. Worse, the very politicians who tend to talk big about
Britain’s armed forces also view defence as a cost not a value, which in turn
suggest they do not in reality place much political value on security and
defence. They might have gotten away with such strategic illiteracy in a
previous age, but not this one.

And yet, and I am bloody
good at this, my analysis of Britain’s strategic and political interests
clearly shows the need for Britain to invest in a balanced, deep-joint, properly-funded
and powerful core or command military force able to support an over-stretched
US or, if needs be, act as a leader of coalitions of other powers. Why? NATO is
at the core of British defence strategy and if Britain does not step up to the
NATO plate then no-one else will. Consequence? Sooner or later post-Brexit
Britain could be lost somewhere in mid-Atlantic between a hasta la vista
America, and a Franco-German led Europe, unable to influence either.

Unfortunately, London has
played defence pretence for so long now I think it must be a habit. Whenever
Prime Minister May, Chancellor Hammond, or Defence Secretary Fallon are
challenged about the ends-means gap they trot out the same old nonsense;
Britain is investing £178bn in new equipment over ten years in our beloved
armed forces (which are, of course, always “the finest in the world”), or Britain
is one of only five NATO members that maintain 2% GDP on defence.

Take the £178bn. Much of
that investment is being made on a lot of new kit needed to rebuild a force
effectively broken over thirteen years of campaigning in Iraq and Afghanistan
that went way beyond the so-called defence planning assumptions. The NATO 2%? Pure political artifice, as I proved in my
November 2015 evidence to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee. 2% can
only be achieved by including the cost (since 2015) of British intelligence (MI5,
MI6 and GCHQ) in the defence budget (c £2bn per annum), together with (since 2009)
the cost of the strategic nuclear deterrent (£2-2.4bn per annum), not to
mention a whole of so-called ‘administrative costs’ that prior to 2015 were not
seen as part of the defence budget.

The problem with NATO’s so-called
Defence Investment Pledge is that it is designed to give a bunch of
recalcitrant European allies the easiest path to be seen to spend 2% GDP on
defence. Britain has simply exploited to the full a very slack set of slack
defence criteria. Critically, China, India, Russia, and the US would not
dream of including many of the items NATO does as ‘defence expenditure’.

So yes, Britain may well
be building (some) new and ‘exquisite’ kit, but the way the defence funding
model has been constructed means the only way to pay for them is to cut the
very people who will man the stuff, and hollow out the very services and
systems needed to keep them running and fighting. The stress this unworkable
imbalance places on the British military is clear to me every time I support
them, something I regard as my patriotic duty. Or to use military-speak, the
politicians are dumping crap from on-high on Britain’s fighting men and women!

Defence pretence also
reveals the political cluelessness of the British Establishment. Now, I am a
Briton first, and an Englishman second, who like many millions of others is
desperate to believe in my country after the shocks of recent years. With Brexit looming, and the Scottish nationalist-fanatic Nicola Sturgeon hell-bent on tearing the UK apart, that
means for me a Britain and its leaders who re-embrace patriotism, globalism and
realism – the three are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, that challenge will be the
real test of Prime Minister May.

It is against that strategic
and political backdrop HMS Queen
Elizabeth must be seen. Indeed, she is far more than a ship. She is a
national strategic asset, a metaphor for Britain as a leading power, and a
symbol of Britain itself. In other words, London has an enormous opportunity to
show Britain and the world just what Prime Minister May’s “strong,
self-governing, global Britain’ could actually look like.

Ultimately, it is the gap
between ends and means of Prime Minister May’s rhetoric that is in danger of
screwing up Britain’s armed forces. The strategy-free, micro-financing
fingerprints of Chancellor Philip ‘Spreadsheet
Phil’ Hammond and his Treasury ‘Minderins’ are about to make an almighty
mess of Britain and its armed forces because the only big picture they see
concerns debt and deficit. Don’t get me wrong, sound public finances are
important. However, there are moments in politics and history when it is
necessary to invest and things upon which proper investment must be made. This
is one such moment and defence one of those issues if May is to create a new
narrative for a new post-Brexit Britain. And yet, one can almost guarantee,
that the Westminster-Whitehall political sausage machine will make a complete
Horlicks of the launch of this ship, because that is what they do.

London wants to give the
impression of power and influence without properly paying for it. So, London either
fund Britain’s armed forces properly at a time of growing danger, or come clean
and stop telling we Britons just how powerful Britain is if you do not
believe that to be the case. Do not impose on a small force a job that is far too big for them.

History is littered with
examples of just how horribly wrong such defence pretence can go when reality
finally sticks its large jack-nailed boot in the face of the pretenders!

Monday, 13 March 2017

“Is
your plan as cunning as a fox who’s just been appointed Professor of Cunning at
Oxford University?”

Blackadder

Alphen, Netherlands. 13 March. I
have a cunning plan. Bear with me. Last week I was in Reykjavik, you know the
one in Iceland, and attended the fascinating NATO Resource Conference 2017 (well,
it was for me). There I gave a brilliant and very reasonably-priced speech
entitled “The Global Cost of Adaptation”. At the centre of the debate were
three issues: the habit NATO Europeans have acquired of relying on the US Bank
of Mom and Dad when they cannot be bothered to spend enough on their own
security and defence; will aforesaid NATO Europeans ever discover the Holy
Grail of Alliance, aka the 2014 Wales Summit Defence Investment Pledge (the
DIP), of 2% GDP on defence of which 20% must be invested in new defence
equipment; and upon just what should NATO and the Allies spend any additional
moneys?

The goodish news first.
Apparently, the decline in NATO Europe’s defence spending stopped in 2015, and
even increased a bit (3.8% or some $10 bn) in 2016. And, if NATO Europe ever
does honour the DIP, the biggest ‘if’ since ‘if’ was introduced into the
English language by King Ethelred the Literately Uncertain, NATO (or someone)
would suddenly have an additional $100 bn to spend.

On the European side the
message was clear as mud…hurry up and wait! Yes, NATO Europeans are fully
committed to spending 2% GDP on defence…but. Why the ‘but’? Europe is still
driven by the assumption that sooner or later the US Bank of Mom and Dad will
come out late on a dark, stormy night to pick up their siblings who not only forgot
to save the bus fare home, but got hammered on a toxic brew called ‘Welfare’ and
thus completely missed the last bus. The trouble is that Mom and Dad might not
always be there. First, there is growing irritation in some parts of the
Administration why Euro-Junior refuses to get off its fat ass and get a job.
Second, Mom and Dad are not as flush as they used to be. Third, Mom and Dad now
have to deal with noisy neighbours at the other end of the street.

Throughout the gathering rafts
of judgement shot down upon the throng from high in the rafters like the latter
day Gods in a Viking saga of old. One bolt in particular struck home; even if
the DIP’s fabled $100 bn was ever to see the light of political day what would
it actually be spent on? One group, for sake of argument the Easterners, wanted
it spent on high-end, expensive, big bang stuff that would render the NATO
Defence and Deterrence Posture credible not just in the eyes of the Brigade of
Budgeteers, but also Russia. Another group, for sake of argument the Southerners,
think this is nonsense and want the bulk of the money spent on
counter-terrorism and counter-criminal activities, most notably human
trafficking. Very few want NATO to have the money and most would prefer to
spend it on themselves.

Now, here’s the cruncher
as the Yanks would say; if NATO is to remain Valhalla’s insurance company on earth,
then NATO must both deter and defend at the high-end of conflict, i.e. prepare
to fight and if needs be win a war, and play a full role in protecting its home
base from penetration and attack by terrorists and globally-capable criminals.

Whatever way one looks at
this challenge any new money should be spent on reinforcing the NATO Command
Structure to cope with a complex and potentially vast array of risks, threats and
challenges, AND a modernised NATO Force Structure able to get the right type and
mix of national forces in both coalition and alliance to the right place at the
right time. Cunning? It is not even rocket science.

Which brings me back to
the DIP and the need for outcomes not inputs. Yes, I am the first to say that
2% GDP spent on defence is better than 1%, however ‘brilliantly’ that 1% is
spent. Canada, are you listening? What concerns me is the growing obsession amongst
the NATO Europeans with inputs as a way to avoid seriously looking at outcomes,
which at the end of the day is what security and defence must be about. Worse,
I am not at all sure any NATO nation really knows what it is really spending its
defence budget on these days, let alone how it can get from say 1% GDP to 2%
GDP. Other, that is, than fiddling the figures. Britain, are you listening?

There is one other issue;
should all NATO states spend 2% GDP on defence? This week Chancellor Merkel
will meet President Trump. High on the agenda will be German defence spending,
or as the Americans see it, the lack of it. Last Friday the 2018 German defence
budget was released at 1.2% GDP, way below the 2% target (albeit set for 2024).
In 2017 it is estimated that the German economy will be worth $3.62 trillion of
which $43.4 bn is planned to be spent on defence. Whilst this figure is
significantly smaller than the planned defence expenditures of both Britain and
France, it is still a significant sum.

Which brings me back to
my cunning plan. Whilst I personally have no problem with Germany spending 2%
GDP on defence, history is still powerfully eloquent in Europe and the fact of
German power is already an issue. Therefore, to my mind it might instead make
more sense for Germany to spend the gap of between 1.2% GDP and 2% GDP by
investing an additional $30 bn on some form of debt forgiveness for
heavily-indebted Eurozone states. Now, I would not offset such investment
against the DIP target, because 2% GDP on defence is already an historic low
and at some point (2024?) Germany should meet that target. However, right now it would make sense to permit
Berlin a ‘defence holiday’ if Germany in return was prepared to make a security
investment in the financial stability of Europe.

As for NATO it must be
far more rigorous about what the nations currently spend on defence, what they
should spend on defence, and how best to spend it. Until political leaders in
NATO capitals stop sacrificing sound, long-term strategy for the sake of facile,
short-term politics, which is the real reason why hard truths are hidden, then
I fear the artifice of input will continue to exercise tyranny over the
strategy of outcomes.

Friday, 3 March 2017

“Freedom
is the sure possession of those alone who have the courage to defend it”.

Pericles

Alphen, Netherlands. 3
March. It was fascinating watching President Trump on TV speak last night
aboard the brand new, and mighty $13bn, 104,000 ton aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford. The ship looks
almost as good as Britain’s new carrier HMS
Queen Elizabeth, albeit with a far less sexy name. President Trump returned
to a theme he has been exploring for some time; can America win again?

What is ‘war’? To my mind
there is no question that the United States and its armed forces would prevail
in a major shooting war with another major state if (and it is a big if) that
war did not go nuclear. In a war with Russia that went beyond a Russian
land grab in Eastern Europe, the nuclear button would almost certainly be pressed and quickly, in
which case everyone would lose. Even a limited war with Russia (if there could
be such a thing) would be tinged by the threat of Armageddon. This is made clear by
the Russian Chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov and his so-called Gerasimov Doctrine.

The USS Gerald R. Ford is clearly a vital platform for maintaining the ability
of the US military to project power world-wide and thus deter ‘bad hombres’ from
embarking on military adventurism, particularly against America’s NATO Allies
or its allies in Asia-Pacific. The problem is that wily old Gerasimov has also
been working on perfecting a new form of warfare specifically designed to keep the
carrier’s strike force bedecked.

Hybrid war is war that is
short of war. In hybrid war disinformation, destabilisation, and disruption, as
well as the possible use of unconventional force and economic coercion are
employed as part of strategy to undermine, intimidate and coerce adversaries.
The use of what conventional force and, heaven forbid nuclear force, would only come as a last
resort. Other states, most notably China, are also looking to blind-side
American military power by employing such strategies against the many open
seams of Western society. This is most notably via cyber-attacks, but also through the
use of new technologies such as artificial intelligence. As yet neither the US
nor NATO have a credible defence against such warfare, as evidenced by the deep concerns in Washington over alleged Russian efforts to interfere with the US presidential elections.

For all that the focus of
President Trump has thus far been on another kind of ‘war’ against the likes of Al Qaeda and Islamic
State. In such a war an ‘asset’ such as the USS
Gerald R. Ford is extremely useful. A carrier that can launch up to
seventy aircraft from a neutral sea-base offers
political leaders real power, flexibility, but above all political discretion.
Any planned attack can be cancelled at the last minute if the intelligence
changes with very few needing to know, not even the 4000 strong crew of the ship.

The problem is one of
strategy. The US ‘defeats’ President Trump has been implying in his various
speeches took place in Iraq and Afghanistan against forces (Al Qaeda, Taliban)
that take far more than even a fleet of mighty aircraft carriers to ‘defeat’.
Indeed, progress against such enemies takes years of consistent, effective
political strategy, leverage over allies, the development of tailored
intelligence, and the nuanced use of diplomacy, policing and military force, as
well as a sustained campaign of intelligent strategic communications and public
diplomacy. ‘Progress’, for there is unlikely to be clear cut victory or even overt
success during such a campaign, also takes oodles of bucks. That is, after all,
why there are still some 8400 US troops in Afghanistan.

Two things come out of
the imagery of President Trump making such a speech on the USS Gerald R. Ford. First, it signals to adversaries that the US
will again re-assert both the right, the will, and the capacity to act if it believes its interests
and those of its friends are threatened. Second, the commitment to ending
sequestration and hiking the US defence budget to over $650bn a year also suggests
the US is going to reinvest in the forces needed to enforce Pax Americana the world over, although I
doubt America will see a return to the 600 ship Navy the President implied.

However, and this is
where I part company with President Trump, for US strategy to work America must
exert influence across the entirety of the security and defence spectrum, and
by extension the civil and military security-space. That means the 4 ‘D’s:
defence, deterrence, diplomacy and dialogue. These are the four essential and
balanced pillars upon which US security and defence policy must be built. Cutting
the State Department or USAID to further fund an expanded US military would be
self-defeating if not carefully considered; the security equivalent of disrobing Peter to beef-up Paul.

President Trump is right
that uniquely strong American armed forces are the hard power that underpin and
guarantee all other forms of American, and indeed Allied, power. And, given that the US is the
world’s only global power, the US needs armed forces that are far more capable
than all the other regional powers it may have to engage. However, if President
Trump increases American hard power at the expense of American soft power and influence the result will certainly be the retreat of American influence, and quite possibly the retreat of America itself.

President Trump needs to
strike a better balance between US hard and soft power. If he does that there
is every chance America will again ‘win’ by making America and the world more
secure. Oh, and
convince its mangy European cousins to stop being such wusses and to get their collective
strategic mojo back. After all, the US needs effective allies because in historical terms the US is only the West’s
third most successful Pax after Pax Romana and, of course, Pax Britannica!

About Me

Julian Lindley-French is Senior Fellow of the Institute of Statecraft, Director of Europa Analytica & Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow, National Defense University, Washington DC. An internationally-recognised strategic analyst, advisor and author he was formerly Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy,and Special Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of Leiden. He is a Fellow of Respublica in London, and a member of the Strategic Advisory Group of the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington.
Latest books: The Oxford Handbook on War 2014 (Paperback) (2014; 709 pages). (Oxford: Oxford University Press) & "Little Britain? Twenty-First Strategy for a Middling European Power". (www.amazon.com)
The Friendly-Clinch Health Warning: The views contained herein are entirely my own and do not necessarily reflect those of any institution.