Most cultural pessimists assume that man cannot significantly
influence cultural evolution.They refer to the
complexity of biological and cultural systems and to the lack of conscious
decisions.

Type of Problem

-What is the exact meaning of free will?

- To what extent is the freedom of the will restricted by external
and internal conditions?

- What is the responsibility of man for his actions?

Freedom of Will

Libertariansspeak of freedom of will only if man is the
ultimate originator of his decisions, i.e. if he can break through the causal
chain of the physical brain processes.This
definition agrees with the intuition that we can decide against our own
preferences within a "causal gap".

Naturalistspostulate that all decisions are based on physical
brain processes, have a temporal extension and do not interrupt the causal
chains.The intuition of the "causal gap" would
therefore be a deception.

1. Naturalists, who insist on the ultimate origination, see no basis
for the existence of a free will (hard determinism)

2. Compatibilists consider the idea of an absolutely free will as a
linguistic aberration.They postulate that a correct concept of freedom of
will is compatible with the known natural laws (soft determinism )

3. The scope of the compatibilist freedom of will is a controversial
issue.The skepticism with regard to the freedom of will
has been reinforced by brain researchers, who postulate that consciousness is
only anepiphenomenon.

Restrictions by the outside world

This paper is not about the conscious and well-known cases of
political deprivation of liberty.As far as social
structures can be reflected, they are also open to criticism and resistance.The point here is that freedom of the will is already restricted by
the repression of wishes and possibilities.There
is a social production of unconscious thoughts and emotions, which serves the
control of instincts and the consolidation of the ruling power.

When structures serve the control of drives, they often have a dual
function: they limit freedom in one area, but enhance them in a
different area.Fort hat reason they resemble rather a monastery than a prison.The monastery restricts freedom, but also protects from the dangers
of the outside world and allows undisturbed meditation.Just as the pianist gains artistic freedom by anchoring the keyboard
technique in the unconscious, a culture gains freedom by curbing certain
agressions in the unconscious.

Restrictions by the inner world

The long-term established, only slowly in the course of life changing
zones of influence of the psychic
instances define the measure of inner
freedom. These zones of influence can be regarded as a basic limitation of
individual freedom, but also as a specific adaptation to the environment in
which individuality – and thus a piece of freedom – is expressed.

Despite the biochemical control of feelings and evaluations, there
is a certain freedom in the choice of aims in life, because the mental and
physical occupation with an aim also retroacts on the biochemistry.How great this freedom is and which role the individual constitution
(genetics) and the consciousness play is still hardly clarified.

Responsibility

One can only be held responsible for something one can decide about.
According to the currently most plausible hypothesis, responsibility must be
based on the compatibilist definition of free will.

In essence, it is assumed that the iceberg model applies, which
means that only a small proportion of the decisions is consciously controlled.
Whether and to what extent the unconscious proportion may be attributed to the
decision-maker is disputed.

Most cultural pessimists assume that man cannot significantly
influence the cultural evolution.They refer to the
complexity of biological and cultural systems and to the lack of conscious
decisions.

Type of Problem

-What is the exact meaning of free will?

- To what extent is the freedom of the will restricted by external
and internal conditions?

- What is the responsibility of man for his actions?

2. Basics

2.1 Will

Definition

The concept of will has the function of giving
contours to the idea of action and origination [Bieri, 43].

Will and desire

A desire must set us in motion in order to become a will [Bieri,
37].

Example: We can
desire to play the piano, but only if this desire drives us towards the piano,
it is also a will.

Will has two types of limits [Bieri, 38]

1.Boundaries are drawn by reality.Insofar
as we misjudge reality, we also deceive ourself with regard to these limits.

2.Boundaries are drawn by our abilities.The
self-image is decisive here: as long as this image says that we are capable of
something, we can also want it.The more doubts
arise, the more will turns into a mere wish.

Will and action

Can volition and action fall apart? The answer is yes for two
reasons:

▪Keeping still and granting can express a will [Bieri, 40]

▪A will is a desire that becomes effective if the circumstances allow
it and nothing intervenes [Bieri, 41]

Example:You would like to play the piano and the door to
the practice room is open.If the door were closed, one would still speak of a
will and not just of a desire.

Will and limits

Our will depends on the external circumstances.What you want to do or what you want to become depends on what
offers the world holds for you [Bieri, 49].Do
we feel restricted in our freedom for that purpose?It
disturbs us if there are only few options (e.g. in a dictatorship) but
it does not bother us that there are boundaries at all.In a completely open world, the will would have no function.

Example:Without hunger, there would be no desire to eat, without
freezing, no will to seek warmth, and without fatigue no will to go to sleep.

A will is formed by physical needs, feelings, a life history and the
resulting character [Bieri, 51].

-Anyone who made painful experiences by imposed changes
(and now anxiously holds habit)

will want in the same situation
something entirely different from

-the one who has suffered from outside constrictions
(and is now afraid of being fixed).

Does the fact that I am influenced and limited in the form of my
will, not only by external circumstances, but also by the circumstances within
myself, represent an impairment of my freedom?It
may bother us that in certain situations we always react in the same way and we
recognize an inner limitation.But it does not
bother us that there are boundaries at all.In a completely open inner world one could no longer speak of a personal
will [Bieri, 52-53].

2.2 Freedom of Action

Definition

The existence of a will is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for freedom of action.Freedom of action arises only when the will is not
prevented from entering into an act (or omission) [Bieri, 44].

A person is free in his/her actions, if he/she can and can do and
omit what he/she wants [Beckermann].

Types of freedom of action [Bieri, 46-47]

▪GelegenheitenOpportunities

▪The presence of the means to take advantage of a chance

▪The presence of skills to take advantage of a chance

The way from opportunities to means, and further to abilities, is a
path that approaches closer and closer a specific individual.The scope becomes more personal with each step.In the end there is the most intimate scope: my will.The opportunities are there, I have the means, I have the necessary
abilities, and now whether I am performing a specific action or something else
depends solely on what I want [Bieri, 48].

Limitations

For every type of freedom of action, there are corresponding
restrictions:

1)No options are available.

Example:A person wants to smoke, but no more cigarettes are
produced and no tobacco is delivered.

2)Options are available, but the funds are missing

Example:A person wants to smoke but has no money to buy
cigarettes.

3)Options exist, but the skills are lacking:

Example:A person wants to smoke but is prevented by an
illness

Enhancements

Imagination helps to discover options for action and thus increases
the freedom of action.

Is there a difference between objective and conscious freedom?Yes, the scope of objective freedom is generally greater than that
of conscious freedom.[Bieri, 48-49]

2.3 Freedom of Will from a Legal Perspective

There are two definitions of freedom of will:

▪The following definition is based on volutariness and refers to the
level of jurisdiction.

A person is free in his/her volition, if he/she has the ability to
determine which motives, desires and beliefs are to be effective for action
[Beckermann].

We can influence our will with our thoughts (...).Thus we exert power on the will and become its originator.The extent to which we succeed in doing this, is the extent to which
our will is free [Bieri, 54]

Example:A person who has recognized the harmfulness of smoking
compares the medium-term enjoyment of tobacco with the long-term risk of lung
cancer.After evaluating and weighing the chances and
risks, the person decides and manages to quit smoking.This person obviousy has the ability to determine which of the two
wishes (tobacco or health) should be effective.If
the same person does not manage to stop smoking, despite the decision to do so,
then he/she is restricted in his/her freedom of will.

Types of decisions

Instrumentaldecisions help an already established will to be
realized [Bieri, 54]

▪Example 1: The will to realize a point in a tennis game
leads to a spontaneous action. In this case there is no explicit process of
weighing.A special case is the demonstration of the freedom
of the will by a spontaneous action, e.g. by lighting or not lighting a
cigarette.

▪Example 2:Chess is like a miniature world,
in which both spontaneous and long-calculated actions are carried out.

In the case of substantive decisions, it is determined which
desires should become a will [Bieri, 61]

▪Wishes that are compatible with each other, but which one must be ordered
according to priority

▪Wishes which are incompatible, e.g. the choice between two
professions.

[Bieri, 55].

Closeness to reality

The freedom of will can be extended by imagination as well as the freedom
of action.Thereby it is important to make full use of the
reservoir of self-experience and self-knowledge. Psychotherapy, day dreams,
voyages and literature - everything can help to learn about other ways of
living [Bieri, 65-67]

Example:A smoker learns in psychotherapy that his/her smoking
compensates another addiction.Only when he/she has
liberated him/her from this other addiction he/she can quit smoking.

In a concrete decision-making situation, a person may be misled with
regard to the available options.

Is proximity to reality a prerequisite for freedom of will?No, the considered options for action need not actually exist.Their non-existence limits the freedom of action, but not the
freedom of the will.Even the will of a man who is spun into a delusion
can be a free will [Bieri, 283]

Openness

The openness of the future is necessary in order to make the
experience of free will.

1.Imagination and weighing have an influence on the will.

Es wäre furchtbar, wenn es anders eingerichtet
wäre: wenn das, was man denkt und sich vorstellt, keinerlei Einfluss auf den
Willen hätte, wenn es kraft- und wirkungslos durch einen hindurchzöge wie
Filmbilder, die auf der Leinwand keinerlei Spuren hinterlassen [Bieri, 76].It would be terrible if it were arranged differently: if what one
thinks and imagines would not have any influence on the will, if it were
powerless and ineffectual like the images of a film, which leaves no trace on
the screen [Bieri, 76].

2.As long as we think and imagine alternatives, the formation of the
will is not complete.The will is changeable and revocable.

It would be dreadful if it were otherwise, if we were to decide only
once, as far as a particular thing is concerned, or if only a limited number of
decisions would be granted to us that we have to spend sparingly over the whole
life, if there were long periods of time in which we could only helplessly
observe how the consequences of the last decisions inexorably unfold. It would
be hell [Bieri, 77]

3.It is impossible for us to know in advance and conclusively what we
want and will do.On the one hand because much of our will is in the
dark and can surprise us, but also because the reflection on our will and its
possible result can change it again.

If the will were suddenly frozen and withdrawn from our influence,
there would still be time in the sense of succession and change, but it would
be a time that passed us by [Bieri, 78]

What we experience as freedom is that the will obeys our own
judgment [Bieri, 81].

2.4Inner Unfreedom from a Legal Perspective

The goal of the following chapter is to delineate the term freedom
of will (chapter.2.3) by describing the antonym inner unfreedom.

Inner unfreedom results if the influence of reasoning on will is
hampered [Bieri, 193].There are different experiences of inner unfreedom.They are characterized by different ways of experiencingtime:

Being driven

We are driven by spontaneous inner desires and by influences of the
environment if we stop thinking about alternatives [Bieri, 84-89]

▪The driven man cannot experience the present as something for which
he has (freely!) decided

▪He/she does not occupy him-/herself with the past and therefore cannot
see the present in the light of his/her life story.

▪The driven man also cannot enter into a future that develops with a
certain logic from the past.

[Bieri, 127-132]

Subjection

Subjection means that others are involved in the formation of our
will, while we are not able to influence it, e.g in the case of hypnosis. In
contrast to a permanently driven man, the ability to control the will is only
temporarily switched off [Bieri, 91-92].

The time during which one follows a foreign will is in a certain
sense not one's own time, one is only a guest in the time of another person.Thereby the following stages of unfreedom can be distinguished

1)You fantasize your own life, but you cannot realize it.

2)You can not fantasize any more an alternative, but you are
emotionally delimited.

3)You follow even emotionally the life of the other, your own will is
dead.

The world of thought is filled with carefully chosen metaphors and
associations, to which strong emotions are attached.To
a certain extent, the family, a political party, or a group of regulars can also
play the role of a sect, if one becomes a follower and does not develop a
critical distance [Bieri, 93-95]

Since the follower always thinks and says the same, he/she must be
bored.As for the future, he will later think what he always
thought.Whatever he/she is confronted with, he/she will
always stick to the same convictions.It
is nothing less than the open future, which the follower loses by his/her
foolish bigotry, and his/her particular lack of freedom consists in not even
noticing the loss.Die Vergangenheit kann ihm
nicht als eine Zeit erscheinen, in der er sich entwickelt hat, sondern nur als
eine Spanne, in der er fest zu seinen Überzeugungen gestanden hat.The past can not appear to him/her as a time where he/she has developed,
but only as a span where he/she confirmed his/her convictions."I always said
that" is one of his/her most common phrases.The
origin of his/her thoughts lies in the darkness of childish parroting [Bieri,
139-141].

Addiction

Even people who think independently and are open to self-criticism
can become addicted.The insight is available, but they cannot follow
it.An addiction is not necessarily condemned; it can also – as in the
case of workaholism – be socially awarded.Addicts
are often described as weak-minded, but weakness does not concern the existing
(excessive) harmful will, but the ability to replace it by a new will, which is
recognized to be better. The compulsive will can not be taught by experience.The only chance is that someday this will is perceived as alien
[Bieri, 96-101].

Because the compulsive wills hurts, it appears as something menacing
or strange and one always waits for its disappearance.Because of this waiting for a better future the present slips away
from the addict.The performance-addict, for example, just wants to
finish the work he has started, and then allow him-/herself some pleasure.But, of course, a new challenge emerges, so that the pleasure has to
be shifted further into the future.Time passes by the
addict, without him/her being able to participate in it.In memory the past does not consists of activity, but of futile waiting.It is a time that the addict endured, but not lived.It was a vain battle with oneself [Bieri, 141-146].In the addiction, man loses his time freedom [Wittmann].

Lack of self-control

The uncontrolled is not lacking a will, but the control over it.

▪The uncontrolled differs from the compulsive by extinguishing and
sweeping away all reflection.A compulsive action,
in contrast, can be performed with a clear mind.

▪In the mind of the uncontrolled the affect is not necessarily
inappropriate, but only the action which follows the affect.In the case of compulsion, the affect is inadequate in the first
place

[Bieri, 107-109].

2.5 Freedom of Will from a Physical
Perspective

There are two definitions of free will:

▪One definition is based on volutariness and refers to the
level of jurisdiction (chapters 2.3 and 2.4)

1.A person’s will is free if he/she is the only cause for the action
and could also act differently [Willensfreiheit
, Wikipedia].The decision must not be based on circumstances
which the person him-/herself cannot control [Beckermann].

2.A person can only be the ultimate-originator of the event
"E" if he/she can also control the causes (or at least a decisive
part of the causes) which are responsible for the occurrence of "E"[Beckermann].

We cannot control the laws of nature.Can a will be free, which is determined by natural laws?

Incompatibilists
must either drop determinism or free will.There
are representatives for both options:

a.Weak incompatibilism

Naturalism-skeptics drop
determinism.They postulate that there is a metaphysical (dualistic) explanation for the
freedom of the will (chapter 3).

b.Hard incompatibilism

Naturalists
drop the freedom of the will (chapter 4) or become compatibilists:

2.Compatibilismconsiders
the rejection of free will as a linguistic aberration (chap.4.3) anddrops the demand for ultimate-origination.Compatibilists are naturalists as well.But
they provide a physical explanation of how a will – despite being determined by
the laws of nature – can be free (Chap.5).

Terminology

Currently there is no uniform terminology, but different terms for
different viewpoints.The following table shows how the terms are mostly
used, but it does not raise a claim on universal validity:

Libertarians are the group of incompatibilists who locate the will-freedom in an
immaterial world.

Libertarians assume
that the experience of free will presupposes a non-deterministic world.Some representatives of this view agree that there is a determinism
in the "physical" world, but postulate that there are no limits for
"spiritual" events (Compatibilism and Incompatibilism,
Wikipedia)

3.2 The unconditional will

Ultimate-origination is only possible if the will is an unmoved
mover.Only an unconditioned will is a free will
[Bieri, 199].

Is this a meaningful claim?

Not only the preferences, but also the reflections which lead to a
decision, have a history and thereby become something personal [Bieri, 175].The free will forms under the influence of reasons.By this influence we become its originator [Bieri, 165-166, 188].But all these conditions for the formation of a will do not limit
freedom.They merely define requirements inside and outside
the person for a specific will to exist at all.Without
this context the idea of free will could not even be described.The demand for an unconditioned (absolute) freedom of the will is a
conceptual aberration [Bieri, 251-253].

Libertarians accept these arguments only partially:

▪The free will may be inclined to follow reasons and reflections

▪But it can also deny every reason

To determine whether there should be a reason (and if yes, which one)
that is exercising true freedom [Bieri, 189-190].

An ultimate-originatormust be able to
terminate the decision-making process (the assessment and weighing of reasons)
at any time and act arbitrarily.This is called instantaneousagent causation.The decision is perceived as a spontaneous action without temporal
extension and without causality, i.e. as a "causal gap"[Bieri, 222-226].

Example:The smoker feels that he/she is free at any
given moment and independent of any consideration about health to light a
cigarette or not.

3.3 Mind-Body Dualism

Libertarians postulate that the perception of the causal gap is not
a deception, but that a mental sphere exists outside the hitherto known laws of
nature which acts on the physical system (mind-body dualism).Theymaintain among others that

▪most of the theses in brain research are based on correlations only

▪physical theories
do not have a secure foundation[Rothman]

The classical form of dualism is the interactionist substance dualism. It was essentially
formulated by René
Descartes and still has followers today. Karl Popper and John Eccles were the most famous interactionist dualists of the 20th century
(...). Some newer philosophers, for example the theoretical physicist and
relativist Roger Penrose assume an interaction through quantum effects (...). The big
advantage of interactionist dualism is that it coincides with people’s
everyday experience (philosophy of mind, Wikipedia)

The most important objection to a connection between quantum
mechanics and the freedom of the will is the contingency of quantum
mechanical processes.Interactionism escapes this objection by the thesis
that a hypothetical force acts on the brain in such a way that these processes
no longer happen randomly [Esfeld, 179].Eccles
assumes that

1.Intentions are not identical with states or processes in the brain

2.but
are relevant for certain physical processes in the brain

[Esfeld, 177]

Bieri 's trilemma also assumes that
non-physical phenomena are involved in mental processes [Falkenburg 2012].Approximately 10% of the brain researchers believe that qualia and / or self-reflection
belong to this non-physical sphere [GAD, Vollenweider].Sensory perceptions such as vision and hearing are
reduced in the brain to exactly the same biochemical processing processes and
differ only by their localization.But if the storage
and processing of the information takes place in the same way, how can we
perceive it as different qualities?

The belief in non-physical processes may be related to the fact that
the description of the microcosm is becoming increasingly abstract. As early as
1934, Werner Heisenberg noted that
quantum mechanics drifts away from the generally understandable language of
classical physics and uses mathematical objects which can no longer be
interpreted vividly (see The Quantum Theory and the Schism of Physics). The abstract is closer to the spiritual. And how do we know that
our measuring instruments are sensitive enough to grasp all phenomena?

What
is mind? – No matter.

What
is matter? – Never mind!

Author unknown

3.4 Criticism from the Perspective of Naturalism

Basics

From a naturalistic point of view,the mind and consciousness are part of the physical nature,
and thus subject to the laws of nature.A
non-physical force which acts on the brain and changes energy and impulse there
would violate the conservation law of physics [Esfeld, 180].Quantum mechanics would be incomplete in the domain of certain
neurophysiological processes [Esfeld, 184].This
price is too high in order to save the thesis of interactionism.

Ultimate Origination

John Searle , a representative of
biological naturalism, criticizes the metaphysical ultimate-origination as
follows [Searle]:

1.The libertarian theory of the "two
worlds" (mind-body dualism) assumes an instantaneous
actor causality. The two worlds arise from the assumption that

-on the one hand "the activity of the brain
is subject to the laws of nature and thus to causality" and

-on the other hand, "a person can decide
freely, i.e, without causal dependence."

Natural laws are conditional clauses, i.e. they have the form of an if-then
statement [Vollmer 2000, 211].

2.Naturalists assume that not only decision making, but also the
decision itself requires a certain amount of time and reflects a nomological
process involving the acquisition of habits and / or the weighing of reasons
[Hampe 2007, 173-174].In a spontaneous or consciously shortened decision,
the weighing of reasons is dropped, but the decision nevertheless requires a
certain temporal extension and cannot be instantaneous in a physical sense. This
thesis is supported by the fact that (with the exception of quantum
entanglement in quantum mechanics ) no
instantaneous effects are known.Nevertheless, we have
the feeling to be able to decide "freely" in a single moment.

How can we reconcile the experience "to decide freely"
with the knowledge that the processes in the brain are causally linked?Why can we not simply accept that free will is an illusion?

Searle suggests the following answer:

The reason for the insistence on the freedom of will is probably
that we perceive a "causal gap" between decision making and decision.But is this gap real or is it illusory?Compare
the following two opposing theses:

1.Freedom of will has about the same claim to reality as a rainbow

2.Freedom of will reflects a real mechanism in the brain; man is the
ultimate-originator of the decision

Let us consider the
consequences of the two theses:

1)According to thesis 1, it would be possible to construct a
machine which performs decision processes causally, but makes us believe in
free will.In this thesis the difficulty lies in explaining
the evolutionary advantage of "cheating".Without
such an advantage, it is unclear why the illusion could arise and prevail.Fabricating illusions consumes energy and is thus disadvantageous in
an evolutionary sense.

2)According to thesis 2, the decision-making process in the
machine ought not to be causal, i.e. it should be determined neither by the laws
of classical physics nor by the laws of quantum mechanics.Classical physics is deterministic, quantum mechanics knows random
events.Both are in contradiction to the idea of an
ultimate-originator.

According to the current state of knowledge, thesis 1 is more
realistic.The evolutionary advantage of the free-will
illusion could be that itstrengthens
self-esteem in situations where options for action exist and thus
motivates the individual to seek or bring about such situations.Concerning the evolutionary significance of consciousness, see
Chap.6.4.

4. Hard determinism

4.1 Prehistory

Hinduism

The oldest reflections on the freedom of will probably stem
from the monistic Hindu tradition (Advaita).A contemporary formulation can be found, for example, in Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902), a vedicist :

Therefore we see at once that there cannot be any such thing as
free-will; the very words are a contradiction, because will is what we know,
and everything that we know is within our universe, and everything within our
universe is molded by conditions of time, space and causality. ... To acquire
freedom we have to get beyond the limitations of this universe; it cannot be
found here (Free
Will in Theology, Wikipedia)

Predestination

Predestination is a theological concept according
to which God has predestined the fate of the universe and all human beings from
the beginning. The doctrine of predestination is associated in particular with Augustine of Hippo (354-430) and Calvinism
(1509-1564) (Predestination , Wikipedia)

A radical representative of predestination was also Gottschalk
von Orbais (803-869)

Gottschalk used the expression double predestination, which
is probably to be found for the first time by Isidore of Seville (560-636). Double predestiantion, expressed in short terms, holds
the view that God choses not only the redeemed (before their birth), but also
those who would not find mercy (Gottschalk von Orbais, Wikipedia)

Predestination avoids contradictions between

▪the idea of human freedom of will and

▪the conviction "that nothing happens without the will of
God".

In modern times, predestination was gradually replaced by the
concept of scientific determinism.From this perspective
the omnipotent God is not dead (as Nietzsche postulated) but continues to live
in the form of the natural laws.

Determinism (from Latin: determinare, delineate, determine)
is a philosophical concept and, together with its counterpart, indeterminism, essential for the formation of a consistent world view.It assumes that all events occur according to firm laws and that
they are completely determined by them.Determinists
thus maintain that – given the known natural laws
and the fully known state of a system – the further course of all events is in
principle predetermined, and that consequently neither a true contingency,
nor miracles or
similar nonphysical phenomena exist(Determinism, Wikipedia)

In classical mechanics theterm
determinism is closely linked to the concept of causality:

Causality (from Latin: causa =
cause) denotes the relationship between cause and effect, thus
affecting the sequence of related events or states. An event or stateA
is the cause of the effect B, if B is brought about by A (Causality, Wikipedia).

Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677)
postulated that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the ordering
and connection of things.Just as in the world of material bodies no effect
is possible without (compelling) cause, in the spiritual world no will is
possible without motive.Everything happens out cosmic necessity.Therewith
Spinoza excluded any freedom of will (Spinoza, Wikipedia).

The French enlightener Paul Henri D'Holbach (1723-1789) postulated
that everything is subject to a reciprocal dependency, like parts in a closed
system.He denied any transcendent intervention in this
system, especially by divine intervention or by an absolutely free will [Pépin,
7].

Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1829)
questioned whether the world could be calculated with complete knowledge:

The Laplacian demon is the illustration of the thesis according
to which it is possible – given the knowledge of all natural laws
and all initial conditions – to calculate every past and future state. On the
basis of this thesis, it would theoretically be possible to establish a
world
formula (Laplacian demon , Wikipedia).

In a certain sense, the determinism of Laplace stands in the
succession of the doctrine of predestination, and his demon undertakes the role
of the omniscient God.

In Schopenhauer, too, we find the notion that free decisions cannot
be subjected to the causal law:

For Schopenhauer (1788-1860) there was no freedom of action, but only a freedom of
being (...).Intentional willing is already clearly motivated
and determined.A genuine liberum arbitrium cannot be conceived
because it violates the principle of sufficient reason ,
Wikipedia.

4.2 Modern Determinism

Thermodynamics

Towards the end of the 19th century it became clear that
the apparently causal relationship between the pressure, volume and temperature
of gases (see Gas laws) is based on the probability distribution of the velocities of
molecules:

▪Temperature is a measure of the average
kinetic energy of the circulating molecules

▪Pressure is the impulse of the molecules (per unit of time) on the surface
unit of the surrounding wall

The gas law is, in reality, a statistical law [Vollmer 2000, p.229]

The kinetic gas theory usesstatistical methods because the investigated processes cannot be
calculated in detail, but is based, apart from that, on the laws of classical
mechanics.Whether the classical mechanics and the probability
calculus are sufficient to account for the increase in entropy, thereover Ernst Zermelo and Ludwig Boltzmann argued at the end of the 19th
century [Boltzmann].

1. Zermelo criticized that in a dynamic system of point masses the
states necessarily recur (Poincaré recurrence theorem). Consequently,
a function of point masses can not account for the constant increase in
entropy.

2. Boltzmann replied that the repetition of the states is not observed
because it requires an observation period of almost infinite duration. A
mixture of hydrogen and oxygen in an isolated container at room temperature can
theoretically produce water. But this has never been observed.

From the molecular-kinetic point of view, the second principle of thermodynamics is merely a theorem
of the probability theory. The fact that we never observe exceptions does not
prove that the statistical standpoint is false, since the theory predicts that
the probability for an exception (when the number of molecules is large) is
practically equal to zero [Boltzmann, 276].

3. At this point Zermelo extended his perspective from an isolated gas
container to the whole of nature. If the second principal is merely a theorem
of the probability theory, then the entropy in nature should decrease as often
as it increases. Boltzmann's thesis therefore can not explain the overall
increase in entropy.

4. Boltzmann finally had to concede that the universe is in an unlikely
state. Why this is so, is still a puzzle today (see Entropy Problem ). To save the
deterministic world-view, one must assume that the universe was initially in a
state of extremely low entropy, or that the fundamental laws of physics are
time-asymmetric [Smolin]. Boltzmann tried to explain the extremely low initial
entropy by an immeasurably rare fluctuation [Silk, 27].

2.Finally, all processes which lead to a so-called (un-)happy chain
of events are deterministic; see for example Murphy's Laws.

The term randomness is sometimes used in the context of mathematical singularities, e.g
in bifurcations. But since in these
cases the system can be described by mathematical equations, the term pseudo-randomness is more
appropriate.

In practice, pseudo-randomness has the same effect as genuine
randomness.

Singularities or unstable points in the calculation models of deterministic classical mechanics can
bring about that arbitrarily small differences in the initial state lead
to maximal deviations of the results after a sufficiently long time.The result is determined by "inestimable small fluctuations and
is therefore impossible to predict."Together
with fundamental limitations of precise measurability, this implies "the existence
of objectively indeterminate processes also in the range of
macrophysics" (Indeterminism, Wikipedia)

It would be more appropriate to speak of practical
indeterminism here, in contrast to theoretical indeterminism.The former is based on pseudo-randomness, the latter on genuine
randomness.

Quantum mechanics

Quantum mechanics has induced a discussion about whether the world obeys fundamentally deterministic or random principles (...). In the case of radioactive decay, it is known that half of the radioactive atoms will disintegrate after
the lapse of the half-life. Which individual atoms will be decomposed, however, cannot be
predicted. The fact that the disintegration at the macroscopic level is
absolutely deterministic left doubt about the "randomness". While the
photons in a double-slit
experiment form a pattern on the two spatial
dimensions of the screen, the radioactive decay events form a pattern on the
time axis.

Einstein suggested that the laws
of quantum mechanics could be determined by hidden variables on an even
more fundamental level, just as the gas laws are determined by the
deterministic (kinetic) laws of molecules. There is a distinction between
theories with local and non-local hidden variables.

1. Theories with local hidden variables always satisfy Bell's inequality. Quantum mechanics, however, violates the Bell inequality so that
these theories seem to be refuted (Hidden Variable, Wikipedia)

2. The competing theory with non- local hidden variables is
still disputed.

Erwin Schrödinger, in contrast to
Einstein, hypothesized that the quantum mechanic type of probability (propensities) is more fundamental
than the one of thermodynamics.

Since
Einstein, we know that causality can only spread with the speed of light. The instantaneous propagation of information
would thus be a non-causal event. The theory of general relativity is often classified as clearly deterministic, but the singularities this
theory (e.g, the ominous black holes)
are difficult to reconcile with the causality of classical mechanics [Schulte].According to Einstein's theory, it is
also possible for an observer to see an event A before B ,and another
observer B before A ,depending on the relative velocity of the two
observers [Brooks, 23].

3. The probabilistic causality of quantum mechanics.

Although quantum mechanics is not deterministic, it
is nevertheless causal, which can be seen in particular from the fact
that quantum mechanics does not allow events to be altered in the past (Causality, Wikipedia ).

Probabilities for quantum events are
caused by previous quantum events [Esfeld, 183]. A possible Creatio ex nihilo would also be a non-causal event from the perspective of quantum
mechanics.

In the following diagram, the term determinism is
subordinated to the extended notion of causality.

CConclusion

▪In the context of the brain processes (and
thus freedom of will) the Einstein causality is not relevant.

▪Most physicists also assume that the genuine (quantum mechanic)
randomness does not interfere with brain processes.

According to the present state of knowledge it is plausible to
assume that the brain processes run deterministically, but in this concept the
deterministic chaos (pseudo-randomness) is included. The prominent brain
researcher Wolf Singer compares the human brain with a computer
in which the hardware is as flexible as software and is continually adapted to
external influences.The
architecture and the respective state of the system "brain" are determinant
for the subsequent state (in combination with the external influences).

Consequently, on the physical level, there
is therefore no freedom of will.Also the participation of a genuine randomness
would not change this judgment.Only a
metaphysical intervention in the brain processes would allow a free will
(Chap.3).

4.3Criticism from the Perspective of Language Analysis

Intelligibility argument

Some compatibilists regard determinism even as a necessary precondition for the existence of
free will.Since free actions and decisions are free only if they
are based on reasons, freedom of will requires determinism, namely, determinism
by reason.According to this argument, paradoxically, it is determinism
that supports the freedom of the will and not indeterminism .This argument is called intelligibilityargument
and commented by Daniel C. Dennett as follows:"Determinism is the friend, not the foe, of those
who dislike inevitability" (Compatibility and
Incompatibility, Wikipedia).

Hard determinists point out that the reasons for decisions
are also based on deterministic brain processes and are therefore not free (Chap.5.6).
This claim for the ultimate-origin, on the other hand, is contested by language
analysts.

Ultimate originUltimate-origin
of preferences

The maximum claim is the following:

We are only free, if we are the source of all our goals and intentionsDoes this claim make sense?

1. The decisions I make depend on my preferences and ultimately on my
character – on what kind of person I am. But my decisions can only be free if
my preferences trace back to me and not to circumstances I have no influence
on. The question now is whether it is really reasonable to assume that persons can
actually be the ultimate source and origin – in the above sense – of all their
goals and intentions.

The wording at least is irritating. People are not born as beings
without desires and intentions and then choose the preferences they would like
to have. Ein Wesen ohne Wünsche und Absichten hätte
gar kein Motiv, sich überhaupt Ziele und Absichten zuzulegen, und es hätte auch
keine Kriterien, nach denen es auswählen könnte (…) A being without
desires and intentions would have no motive at all to target something, nor
would it have any criteria to choose something (...)

It is obvious that we are born with a considerable number of natural
desires – the desire for food, security, care, etc. (which are subordinate to the biological
utility function). It is not particularly meaningful to say that nature
manipulates us by doing this, or that it makes us unfree by giving us these
desires. Rather, our freedom is based on the fact that humans have developed – over
time – the ability to become conscious of their desires and reflect them
[Beckermann]

2. Preferences emerge through a certain constitution and life story and
characterize a person. Freedom is not arbitrariness. Arbitrary
preferences are impersonal preferences. The fact that someone wants somethingdefinite can only be understood if we know the history of this willing
[Bieri, 230-239].

3. The ability to build an inner distance to oneself and to liberate
oneselffrom desires is often cited as a characteristic of free will
[e.g. Bieri, 226-228]. Das temporäre Loslösen
bedeutet aber nicht, dass man in der Folge die Wünsche frei wählen kann.
However, a temporary detachment does not mean that subsequently one can freely
choose preferences. A complete liberation from desires is probably only
possible in the context of (Buddhist) meditation . Ein solcher Zustand ist durch die Abwesenheit eines
Willens gekennzeichnet und eignet sich deshalb schlecht zur Illustration
der Willensfreiheit. Such a state is characterized by the absence of
a will, and is therefore unsuitable to illustrate the freedom of will.

Conclusion:
The entitlement to the ultimate origin of
preferences overstretches the concept of free will (just as the entitlement
to self-determination about one's own existence):

If the concept of freedom is used that way, then people are
unfree by the mere fact that they are human beings.

It seems that existentialist authors have represented such a notion
of freedom.In this concept of complete autonomy, people also
determine their very nature, they are not only the originators of their
actions, but also create themselves[Hampe 2007, 173].

Somewhat more difficult is the question whether we lose a part of
our freedom through culturally shaped preferences. Culturally induced neurotic
developments can often be cured by an extension of consciousness (e.g. in a
psychotherapy). Does the Freudian program “aus ES soll ICH werden" (ID shall become EGO) lead to
inner freedom? The answer is not clear. Unconscious restrictions in one
area of the psyche can increase freedom in a different area.

Examples:

1)Self-control and repression of aggressive thoughts (death wishes in
particular) eliminate the latent danger of violating the state's monopoly of violence
and ending up in prison.If everybody controls his/her aggression,
then the free movement in the community is greatly increased.

2)A pianist gains spontaneity in artistic expression, by first anchoring
the technique of key control in the subconscious through a hard learning
process [GAD, Hampe].

The educated pianist (and, in a sense, any disciplined average
citizen) is not the ultimate-originator of his/her preferences because his/her
interests have been shaped by an educational program.Should we deny that educated people can have inner freedom?

Completeness of the information

The maximum claim is the following:

We are only free if we have complete knowledge about the
alternatives.

Example:

Our evolutionary-evolved brain potential to generate multiple action
plans is constrained by what is stored in memory and by what is present in the
environment.Thus the feeling of a
free will is an illusion, as there is probably no unlimited (= completely free)
amount of representations generated, due to the inherent constraints [De
Ridder].

Here, too, the concept of freedom is overstretched.Human freedom always ranges within a framework of imperfect
knowledge.

The coercion of natural laws

The imagination that freedom is impossible in a world governed by natural
laws arises from the thought that laws exercise coercion [Hampe 2007, 171].

But the coercion which the laws of nature exercise, does not concern
the actions of natural beings, but rather the human procedures of explanation
and conclusion (...).It is the tendency to project compulsion and guidance
by mathematical argumentation into the area described by these formulas.But the planets, which follow the laws of motion, do not feel
resistance and effort.They do notwant to break out
of their path and are not prevented by the laws in the realization of their
will [Hampe 2007, 173].

We can even call such relations (such as gasoline ignitizing under
fire) compulsive.But it must not happen that, in the course of such
reflections, we imperceptibly enter into the sphere of interpersonal
relations, where the term compulsion means lack of freedom.If we do that, then we merge two completely different categories [Bieri,
254]

Powerlessness in the face of causality

Our will, including the deliberate and firm will, is at the mercy of
causal events beyond our influence.Indeed we often
attempt to change a will through reflections.But
we should not deceive ourselves: whether we succeed is not within our control.If we trace back the history of the formation of a will and divide
it into fragments, then we recognize that this history was inevitable,
unchangeable, and inescapable [Bieri, 255-256].

Is above description realistic?

The experience of powerlessness can be characterized as follows:

1.In order for someone to be powerless in the face of a process (e.g. the
formation of a will), this process must be differentfrom him.

2.The threatening process, which makes someone defenseless, cannot
be influenced by the victim.

1.In contrast, for example, to an addict, the free person identifies
with his/her will.

2.We cannot experience the formation of our will as something that
passes in front of us uninfluenceable.

3.Because we can influence the formation of our will, it also makes no
sense to assume that we would want to stop this process

[Bieri, 259-264]

Comment:

Obviously a (possible)
determinism is not experienced as such from the internal perspective.This is no argument, however, against determinism from the external
perspective.

Unfreedom from the external perspective

▪If a person hits somebody, then this is a deliberate act.

▪If a person topples, then this is an (unwanted) physical event.

Now let us assume that we describe the brain processes of the person
(which lead to the action) as physical processes.These
processes cannot be both, a deliberate action and an event without originator.In order for the causal chains to be interrupted, there would have
to be a subject inside the person, who is absolutely free, and who examines
each of the individual brain processes.But
such a subject does not exist [Bieri, 265-266]

We must apply the concept of origin to the whole person and
not to the individual physical processes in the brain.

All terms apply only under certain conditions and cannot be applied
outside of these contexts without producing nonsensical questions.This is particularly true with regard to the concept of origination
and the distinction between intentional actions and mere events.These terms are useful to talk about whole persons and they lose
their meaning if applied to phenomena inside a person [Bieri, 267].

Why are we succumbing to the fiction of inner unfreedom when
thinking of causal chains?The external perspective describes man as
clockwork.This provokes an intuitive resistance.What is the characteristic of the internal perspective?

We are not only a subject of reflection, will, and action, but also
a subject of emotions.It is indeed possible
to describe and understand emotions from the external perspective, but never in
the same quality as from the internal perspective.Is this lack of quality crucial for the rejection of the external
perspective?Can freedom only be understood from the internal perspective?No, inwardness is not a specific property of freedom.Unfreedom (e.g. addiction) has
the same inwardness as freedom.Both
(freedom and unfreedom) can only be experienced from the internal perspective
and can only be fully explained from the external perspective [Bieri,
295-300].

Comment:

For most people the idea of causal chains is associated with the
same feeling of lacking freedom as a ride on rails compared to a bird's
flight.That is where the resistance comes from.In the case of addiction, the association with a ride on rails
is better accepted, because addiction is often described as a stressful ride
in circles.Not the lack of realism is the reason for the
rejection of the external perspective, but the fact that the description is
associated with negative feelings.Realistic or not, the
perspective which creates the better feeling is preferred.Example: There are people who suffer from
a multitude of options and cannot bear responsibility.These people prefer the external perspective, because it points to
unfreedom and relieves them from responsibility.

The idea of causal chains, by the way, was not always associated
with negative feelings.The adherents of the doctrine of predestination and the famous
philosopher Spinoza, for example, were convinced that causal chains are intended
by God and that they must therefore be associated with positive feelings.

Fatalismus –Fatalism
– a fatal error

▪The past, together with the natural laws, determines the future.According to d'Holbach, there is exactly one
line for each of us on the surface of earth that we can draw with our lives.This line is our fate, our destiny.Fatalists like d'Holbach describe life as if we were sitting on the
bank of a powerful stream of life, and have to observe resignedly what it does.But that is not true.Wir
sind als Wollende, Entscheidende und Handelnde nicht Zuschauer.We are not spectators, we are persons who want, decide and act.We are within the stream - we are the stream.Why can a fatalist not see that?The
reason is that he/she imagines an abstract subject sitting on the bank of the
river.This subject, however, does not exist (see previous
section).

▪The fatalist associates his/her life with the trajectory of a golf
ball.The line of our life is influenced by external
circumstances, of course, but it runs within us and through us.It is indeed a definite line, but also an extremely flexible and
interacting line.The determinateness of this line does not disturbe
us, because the sensitivity of our reactions and the freedom of our decisions
is expressed in it [Bieri, 307-314].

▪Predestination is an evil only if it concernes a misfortune.Predetermined happiness is welcome.Predestination
in itself is neither good nor bad.But is it

not depressing to know that everything is predictable?Depressing for whom?

-For an omniscient being?A depressed God is not a topic in any religion, and for atheists the
question does not arise.

-For ourselves?If
we could foresee mistakes, we would not make them.The
idea to predict your own mistakes presupposes that you cannot use your
knowledge to avoid these mistakes.But that does not
make sense.

[Bieri 315-318]

Comment:

Predetermination is not the same as predictability.It is therefore recommendable to distinguish between the following
two questions:

1.Is it not depressing to know that everything is predetermined and unpredictable?

Predestination
would not be an evil, indeed, if we were guaranteed a happy life and a peaceful
death. But this not so.People who believe in predestination are depressed
if they cannot bear the imposed risks.

2.Is it not depressing to know that everything is predetermined and predictable?

-It is certainly depressing to know, that one is
destined to lead an unfortunate life (this can be seen from people, who suffer
from an incurable hereditary disease which is getting worse and worse).

-It is motivating, conversely, to know that one
is destined to lead a happy life.

It seems, incidentally, that Bieri's arguments refer to classical
mechanics (Section 4.1).According to modern determinism (chap. 4.2), nature
does not function like a clockwork. Case (2) can therefore be excluded.

5. Compatibilism

5.1 Definition

Compatibility is the thesis that determinism and freedom of will
are compatible, that is, there is a naturalistic explanation for
freedom of will.This is only possible if the claim for the
ultimate-origination (see chapter 2.5) is dropped.The
claim for the ultimate-origination can be questioned on two grounds:

1.One can criticize it on the basis of language analysis (chapter 4.3)

2.One can criticize it as a reductionist concept (chapters 5.1 to 5.4)

Compatibilists postulate that natural
laws are not in contradiction to freedom, but that, in the course of
evolution, freedom was created by natural laws.What
is that supposed to mean?

▪Hard determinists
focus on the natural laws on the micro level and neglect the complex higher
level structures which result from the interaction of individual components.They think reductionistic.

From
the perspective of the compatibilists, the reduction of complex phenomena to simple
structural forms of nature is by no means acceptable.They believe that the interaction of the individual components
creates new phenomena (such as the freedom of the will) which cannot be
explained by the terms of the micro level [Haken, 27]

▪Synergeticshas shown how order
is spontaneously formed out of chaotic systems (Chap.5.3).

▪The evolution of freedom can be understood as the emergence
of a new order (Chap.5.4)

a)It extends the special relativity theory
(1905) and transitions into it for sufficiently small regions of space-time .

b)It containsclassical mechanics(18-19thc)
as a border case for sufficiently small mass densities and velocities.

3)Cosmology (since 1917),
responsible for the structure and development of the world as a whole, possible
as an empirical discipline since Newton, successful since Einstein.

Since
the discovery of the background radiation, the Big
Bang theory is considered to be the most
plausible explanation for the structure and development of the universe as a
whole.The Big Bang theory follows from the description of
the universe by the general theory of relativity.

This picture was taken from the Internet
(author unknown)

4)The quantum theory (since 1925),
indispensable for microsystems, but with a claim on validity for all
real systems.

a)In quantum mechanics, attempts were
first made to formulate a quantized equation of motion.The Schrödinger equation (so-called first quantization ) was thus
formed from the classical Hamiltonian function.Quantum mechanics approaches classical physics(18-19thc)when the quantum numbers increase accordingly (correspondence principle, Wikipedia).

b)Quantum field theoriesexpand quantum mechanics
as follows:

▪They use a uniform description of
waves, particles and fields (so-called second quantization).

▪They are multi-particle theories and are
therefore suitable for applications in statistical mechanics (e.g in solid
state physics).

▪In the collision of elementary
particles, very high energies can occur, so that the special relativity theory must
be taken into account.

b)Today's knowledge of the elementary particles and their interactions
is summarized in the standard model.The standard model allows a consistent description of the basic
forces (except gravity) in the form of quantum field theories (particle physics , Wikipedia).

Quantum field theories are not compatible with the general
relativity theory (quantum geometry, Wikipedia):

▪ The general relativity theory considers the space-time as dynamic,
depending on the gravitational field. It cannot describe the Big Bang and the phenomenon of the black holes, because there the
curvature of space-time becomes infinite (so-called singularity).

▪ Conversely, quantum field theories neglect the effect of gravitation
on space-time.They are investigating, however,
structures in the realm of the Planck scale, which could replace the singularities of the general theory of
relativity.

The notion of a world which is ordered by natural laws is not widespread
historically and culturally."Nature" as an all-encompassing
phenomenon is a speciality of the Western philosophical tradition [Hampe 2000,
241-242].

Candidates for natural laws can relatively easy be enumerated, but
what natural laws are and why they apply is difficult to explain [Vollmer 2000,
205] [Mittelstaedt]:

▪We can never deduce the future from our previous observations (induction problem).Since natural laws cannot be verified by induction (they can only possibly
be falsified) the laws of our empirical sciences have the status of hypotheses.

▪Also unclarified is the question how far the descriptions of nature
are influenced by our brain structures.At
the latest for quantum theory, the thesis of an observer-independent reality is
untenable [Lyre, 442]

▪Possibly the physical cosmology as the theory of evolution of the
cosmos finally comes up with principles which explain the development of
physical laws, much the same as Darwin's theory of evolution has succeeded in
explaining the natural species.The standard justification
of laws is their explanation by more general laws, whereby the old law
has always proved to be contingent within the new and more general law.This process is not completed [Hampe 2000, 250-251].The following is an illustration from Weltformel, Wikipedia:

The basic laws are usually very abstract, and it is not easy to
understand them.Deshalb werden in
wissenschaftstheoretischen Diskussionen eher klassische Gesetze als Beispiele
herangezogen[Vollmer 2000,
193].For that reason – in discussions about the theory
of science – classical laws are preferred as examples[Vollmer 2000, 193].One of these classic
laws is the law of gravitation .It is suited to illustrate the difference between the concepts of natural
necessity and natural law:

Natural necessity and natural law

The concept of natural law is linked to a series of different
world views that have developed over the
centuries [Hampe 2007][Hoyningen-Huene].Each
of these world views includes a symbolic system.Symbolic
systems are historically grown, cultural products.The
falling of an object, for example, has been described very differently by
various scientists in the course of history.The
most important authors of such descriptions are (in historical order):

The historical view clarifies that one has to distinguish between
natural necessities (laws of nature) and their
descriptions, the laws of
science[GAD, Hampe]:

1.A natural law is formulated in a specific symbolic system, which can
be chosen freely.

2.A natural necessity, in contrast, is unchangeable.

Einstein's description of gravitation, for example, allows for more
precise predictions and thus opens up new options for action, even though the
natural necessities have not changed.

The way nature is described has a big
influence on the concept of free will, as illustrated by the following two
world views:

1.The mechanistic world view of Newton can be compared with a
clock, which runs according to the rules of an eternal law (ordained by God).Man is subject to this law, and each of his/her actions can be
precalculated.From this point of view, the freedom of will is a
deception.

2.Compatibilism, in contrast, is based on the world view of synergetics and evolution, according to which
laws emerge autonomously (through self-organization).If man is not subject to laws, but creates laws him-/herself, then he/she
is free.

5.3 Synergetics

Definition

Synergetics is an
interdisciplinary theory between reductionism and holism [Haken, 21].Within the classification of individual sciences it can be
considered as an extension (20thc) of classical thermodynamics (18-19thc).It concentrates on the general laws of self-organization, structure
formation, and coevolution in complex systems and therefore has a philosophical
dimension [Haken, 22].The paradigm of synergetics is non-linearity .

Nonlinear equations establish a connection between concepts of
synergetics and evolution.

Die Menge der Lösungen einer nichtlinearen
Gleichung entspricht der Menge der evolutionären Wege des Systems, das von
dieser Gleichung beschrieben wird.The set of solutions
of a non-linear equation corresponds to the set of evolutionary paths of the
system, which is described by this equation.

1.Insignificant fluctuations can increase and grow up to macroscopic
differences.

2.There are thresholds of sensitivity below which everything blurs and
leaves no traces.

3.There is something like a "quantum effect", i.e. there is only
a discrete and not a continuous spectrum of the evolutionary paths.

4.Processes change in an unpredictable manner.Forecasts on the basis of the hitherto known are insufficient.Due to the randomness of a chosen path at the bifurcation point, a path becomes
unique.

For Prigogine laws are local, singular, historical relations, which emerge
from random developments and will disappear by them [Hampe 2007, 123].

If laws do not last forever, then the structures they create cannot
last forever.The validity period of the physical and chemical laws, however, is often much
longer than the history of the people, who try to understand these laws.In some areas, therefore, the reality appears to be steady and unchanging:

The dissipative structures are just as important in nature as
conservative structures. They differ from conservative structures as follows:

1.The cooperative
force in the conservative pattern corresponds to the autocatalytic reactivity in the
dissipative model.

2.In the dissipative
model, a stationary pattern develops without the matter particles being
fixed in space

3. The dissipative form is not only determined by the interactions, but
also by the boundary conditions of the system

4. The maintenance of the structures requires a constant dissipation
of energy, which is equivalent to a stationary generation of entropy. The system thus disposes
of a metabolism, i.e. material-bound
energy is continuously converted.

5. Conservative structures are more stable, reversible and more
easily combinable because they do not depend on boundary conditions.

3. Biochemistry: Periodic patterns produced during the decomposition of
sugar.

4. Biology: As if driven by invisible forces, slime fungi come together
to form a Plasmodium, which behaves like an
organism

[Eigen, 116-120]

Dissipative structures are something between chaos and order
insofar, as they can arise or disappear by accidental changes of the
boundary conditions.In the above-mentioned example of the Bénard cells,
for example, this happens as follows:

Smallest disturbances (for example the random simultaneous rising of
some liquid molecules at certain points) are sufficient in order to induce
macroscopic movements which ultimately cover the entire liquid layer and fill
it with convection cells. Like on command, a coherent, collective behavior
emerges from the microscopic chaos of thermodynamic equilibrium. The liquid
particles, which previously function individually and independently of one
another, suddenly pursue a common cause. As long as the external conditions do
not change (constant energy flow) this cell pattern – which was created by
chance – survives. Chance is quasi conserved and determines the individual form
of the dissipative structure. Randomness can therefore be regarded as the
creative element of structural formation [From dissipation to dissipative structure, H.J.Schlichting]

The formation of
structures in living beings can only be understood from the co-operation
of the conservative and dissipative principle:

1.In morphogenesis, the dissipative
structures provide the spatial organization of the conservative structures (the
latter defined by the genetic program of the cell)

2.Concerning the brain: As stimulus pattern in the network of nerve
cells, the dissipative structures superimpose the partial information and thus
represent the material correlate to form/shape (Gestalt).

The interrelationships, which are necessary for the formation of
dissipative structures are based on conservative forces.The permanent spatial fixation of dissipative patterns also requires
the stabilizing conservative forces [Eigen, 118]

The order of life is based on the conservative as well as the
dissipative principle. The form of living creatures, the gestalt of the ideas, they both have their origin in the interplay of (pseudo-)randomness
and law [Hampe 2007, 126].

Nature as an aleatory process, as a play, is neither a world machine
planned by God, nor a world organism, and has no corresponding form of
totality. It becomes an infinite story. Denn das
Spiel ist nicht durch Spielregeln bestimmt, sondern aus dem Zufall entwickeln
sich immer wieder neue Regeln und durch ihn gehen alte Regeln unter. Because
the game is not determined by fixed rules, but (pseudo-)randomness constantly creates
and destroys rules. This process has no end and no tendency to perfection
[Hampe 2007, 127].

The following characteristics of synergetics are of prime importance
for the evolution of free will:

1. The ability to create systems that are not predictable

2. The ability to create order out of chaos and maintain it through a
steering mechanism.

If the world could be described by a clockwork metaphor, then the
existence of a free will would be implausible.Chaos
research, however, has shown that the future (and the behavior of people in
particular) is not predictable.

If chaotic behavior occurs, then even the slightest changes in the
initial values – after a certain time – lead to a completely different behavior
(sensitive dependence on the initial conditions). Thus, an unpredictable
behavior appears which seems to develop irregularly in time (...).In order to
calculate the behavior of the system for a certain time in the future, the
initial conditions must therefore be known and calculated with infinite precision,
which is practically impossible. Although in theory such systems are deterministic, in practice predictions are only possible for more or less
short periods of time (Chaos research, Wikipedia).

Non-predictability

The initial conditions of a macroscopic system are never exactly
known. Nevertheless, we can represent the system by an ensemble of points in
the phase space corresponding to the
dynamic states (...). Instead of separate points, it is more convenient to
introduce a continuous density of points in the phase space. This density
measures the probability of a dynamic system to arrive at a certain
point in the phase space. One could regard the density function as an
idealization, as an artificial construction, while the trajectory directly describes the
behavior. In fact, however, the trajectory, and not the density, is an
idealization. We never know an initial state with the infinite precision that
would reduce it to a single point in the phase space [Haken, 212].

The fact that the mathematical equations are idealizations can be
seen in the so-called singularities.

In mathematics, singularity refers to a point at which a
mathematical object is not defined or where an otherwise appropriate
characteristic is not present ( singularity ).

Singularities lead, for example, to the phenomenon of bifurcation:

Nonlinear systems whose behavior depends on a parameter can suddenly
change their behavior when the parameter changes. For example, a system that
previously moved toward a limit, can now jump back
and forth between two values, that is, two limit points. This is called a bifurcation (Bifurkation, Wikipedia).

It is conceivable that the non-predictability of a free decision
corresponds to the non-predictability of a neural network. The perception of
the "causal gap" (chap.3.2) would then be, so to speak, the internal
perspective of a process which can not be predicted from the external
perspective:

Far from thermodynamic equilibrium, order can emerge spontaneously from
chaos. In the context of a laser , this can be described as
follows:

A laser illustrates that even inanimate matter can organize itself
in order to bring out meaningful phenomena. Here we shall encounter strange
laws which occur in all phenomena of self-organization. We will recognize that
the individual parts are arranged as if they were driven by an invisible hand,
but conversely the individual parts, by their co-operation, create this
invisible hand. We will call this invisible hand the "organizer"
[Haken, 19]

In the terminology of synergetics, the organizer enslaves the
individual parts. The organizer is like a puppeteer, who lets the marionettes
dance, but who is, conversely, influenced by the marionettes (...). The
creation of order out of chaos is largely independent of the material substrate
within which the processes take place. A laser can behave like a cell cluster
[Haken, 20-21]

A chaotic system can function reliably and reproducibly if the temporal
means of the components depend only little on the initial
conditions. For example, the state of a gas is determined by the magnitudes of
pressure, volume and temperature, although the individual molecules behave
randomly [Berry, 62]. From the random behavior on the micro level, it does not
necessarily follow that the dynamics on a higher level is random as well.

▪ Certain chaotic systems oscillate between attractors. The olfactory
perception was explained, for example, by a mechanism in which an attractor is assigned to each specific odor [Berry, 66].

▪ In technical applications, system theorists have shown that chaotic
systems can be stabilized by means of a control circuit or a synchronization
[Letellier, 28-31].

Such mechanisms may explain why a brain can steer and control,
although it is subject to chaotic dynamics on every level, starting from the molecules
up to whole neural networks [Berry, 62].

Chaotic systems obviously fulfill two important requirements for the
existence of a freed will:

2)An extended ability to reflect.Reflection
is a necessary prerequisite for freedom of will.

Reflection can improve the ability to survive (the Darwinian fitness) but it does
not necessarily lead to superiority over other creatures.Bacteria are extremely survivable even without "higher
intelligence", because – thanks to their flexible genotype – they
constantly create new forms (and thus new options for action). Zwischen der Überlebensstrategie der Gestaltenbildung und
der Reflexion entwickelt sich ein Wettkampf dessen Ausgang offen ist:Between the survival strategy of creating individuality and creatingreflection there is a competition with unknown outcome:

▪Bacteria always find trickeries to outwit the defensive strategies
of the human body and medical drugs

▪Medical research constantly expands its knowledge in order to figure
out these trickeries

In the definition of free will (chapter 2.3) it was not explicitly
stated but assumed, that the decision-making processes is conscious. Bacteria
do not have a free will, because they have no consciousness and their behavior
is programmed. The transition from fixed programs to complex decision-making
processes, however, is gradual and consciousness is not an all-or-nothing
phenomenon as well. In addition, consciousness is not an uniform phenomenon;
it has different aspects:

▪Higher-order reflection, in particular the knowledge of one's own
existence

[Metzinger,
36].

Because there are different levels of individuality and reflection,
there are also different levels of free will.

Following a few examples illustrating how free will can emerge out
of individuality and reflection:

Action options through individuality

The gradable and increasable individuality is a gauge for action
options.It corresponds to a specific regularity,
whereas the chaos acts like an equalizer [Hampe 1996, 67].Elementary biological needs produce elementary action options.Complex cultural preferences, on the other hand, produce a multitude
of new action options.

Example:

Roles such as goalkeepers, strikers, defenders, referees, and
linesmen are only generated by the laws (rules) of a game.These rules structure a range of new actions, which the physical and
biological laws of humans do not prescribe [Hampe 1996, 70].

The relation of natural and cultural laws can be illustrated by the
metaphor of superimposed nets with different mesh sizes.

2)If
we superimpose the finer net of the biological laws over the rough net of the
physical laws, then the biological net fills some gaps, which the physical net
left open.

3)But the biological laws also do not include everything; they do not
completely determine people.The laws of a game, of a moral code, or of a legal
system can further determine the behavior of humans beyond the physical and
biological rules.

[Hampe 1996, 71].

The rules of the second level do not contradict the rules of the
first level. On the contrary, they are based upon them.

A bird that flies does not override the physical laws for inert
masses. Its movements, unlike those of falling apples or tossed stones, are determined
by additional laws, but they lie entirely within the framework of the
physical laws (...). Through these further determinations, the bird has possibilities
(action options) which the falling apple and the tossed stone do not have [Hampe
1996, 72-73].

The principle of stratified laws also applies to the second law of
thermodynamics.Living beings are subject to the tendency to increase
entropy, indeed, but not exclusively.There
are further determinations which counteract the increasing entropy.

We are both natural beings subject to unalterable laws, as well as
ingenious beings who create rules and laws (...). Our creativity is
itself a natural fact (...). We are not caught in a mechanistic natural context,
which completely determines our actions (...). Nature must not be conceived as
a system of rigid laws, but as a place of creativity and destruction, of
arising and vanishing laws.We ourselves are involved in this natural process as
producers and destroyers of (social) laws [Hampe 1996, 197].

Action options through reflection[Hampe
1996, 73]

Reflection presupposes distance.

Only in cases where a person goes on distance to a regularity, the
action options no longer coincide with this regularity [Hampe 1996, 74].

One of the two fishing brothers, who had fallen into a sea-swath
with their boat, recognized – a after his deathpan had vanished and he was able
to observe things from a distance – a lawfulness in the vortex: small
cylindrical bodies are drawn down more slowly than large angular ones.The fisherman took advantage of this insight: By tying himself to a
barrel and jumping from the ship, he survived.

The relationship between the shape of an object and its attraction
by the Mahlstrom corresponds to a natural law and thus to a kind of description
which is available for selection.The scientific
description discloses a possibility of salvation, while magical or religious
descriptions (such as describing the Mahlstrom as hell-mouth, punishment of God
etc.) lead to death.Loss of control and superstition do not have to be
fatal indeed, but self-control and reflection enhance the action options, while
irrational fears restrict freedom.

Example:Stories about magnetic mountains which attract
and smash ships caused certain areas of the sea to be less frequented.The scientific description of the geomagnetic field, in contrast,
increased freedom.The magnetic compass is still used fornavigation.

The novel of Edgar Allan Poe illustrates that action options can
also be enhanced without breaking the law, namely, when gaps are
detected in the pattern of determination:

The fisherman did not survive despite, but because of
the laws of the vortex.A bird or a plane does not fly despite, but because
of the laws that apply to heavy masses [Hampe 1996, 74].

Living beings have many more degrees of freedom than solid
bodies.A stone and a bird are both subject to gravity, but
the bird has system properties which allow to steer the direction of movement.The bird overcomes the power of gravity or uses it to its advantage
(for example, if it slumps).In this sense the bird is freer than the
stone.People can not free themselves from natural laws, but
they can (like the bird) try to use them to their advantage.

Distancing can be illustrated with the relation between figure and
background [Hampe 1996, 76]:

1)The inanimate forms the background, in front of which the laws of
the living being take shape.

2) Self-determination by
a moral law is like a figure in front of the background of a merely
biologically determined existence.

The degree of detachment that an individual has reached (...) can
also be "measured" from outside as it were.The measure is the frequency with which the prognosis of the behavior
of an individual is successful, when a certain law is applied[Hampe 1996, 77].

The higher level determines the open areas of the lower level and
thus exercises a certain control [Hampe 1996, 80-81].

Example:Hierarchy of human speech:

1.Spelling of vocal sounds.This
level leaves the combination of the sounds into words largely open

2.Combination of the sounds into a vocabulary: On this level it remains
open how the words are linked to sentences.

3.Grammar: On this level, it remains open, which thoughts are to be
communicated.

An ascent in the hierarchy corresponds to an increase in order. Arbitrary
structures, however, are not possible.There
are restrictions in the construction of living organisms, and one cannot infer
the species and the physiology of organisms from the physical laws.

The idea that individuality can be increased and that this increase
is accompanied by a multiplication of possibilities, relativizes the self-image
of man, who is at the mercy of a lawful nature [Hampe 1996, 86].

Freedom of will

The capacity for freedom and knowledge are interrelated [Hampe 1996,
86].

Freedom of will emerges only if one's own preferences
(motives, desires and convictions) can be reflected and become action options.Thereflection of one's own preferences is the basis of
morality.Humans have a certain ability to free themselves
from their biological determination and to redirect their energies to
culturally recognized behaviors (so-called sublimation ).The typical human freedom is that these behaviors can (but
need not) be realized.

5.6 Criticism from the Perspective of Hard
Determinism

Ultimate origin

Compatibilitsts maintain that the demand for the ultimate-origin of
decisions is exaggerated (see chapter 4.3).

If one uses the concept of freedom as hard determinists do,
then people are unfree by the mere fact that they are human beings.

Well, hard determinists maintain indeed that people are unfree by
the mere fact that they are human beings.

They consider humans as a kind of robots with biotechnically
implemented intelligence.

The coercion by natural laws

From the perspective of incompatibilism, the reproach that human
emotions are projected on nature (see chapter 4.2) is unwarranted.

1. A projection would be, for example, the statement "The planets
are forced into their orbit by the laws of mechanics". Such a claim,
however, is not raised by incompatibilists. Planets do not want to break out of
their path because they have no preferences. Will and preferences are qualities
of living beings. In contrast to planets, creatures feel the force of
gravitation.

2. The processes on the micro level are not part of our experience
because the awareness of these processes is not useful for survival and
(accordingly) wastes energy. But the lack of awareness does not change their
inevitability.

The compatibilistic thesis on the illusion of coercion can
therefore be reversed as follows:

The imagination that freedom is possible in a world which is
controlled by natural laws arises from the idea that the imperceptible
coercion can be ignored.

Predictability

Examples, which show how freedom is increased by the discovery of
natural laws (chap. 5:5) discard the micro level. This can be illustrated, for
example, by Edgar Allan Poe's novel A Descent into the Mahlstrom:

A description of the brain processes of the fisherman
would have called into question the message of the novel (increase of freedom
by self-control and reflection).At the time of Edgar
Allan Poe nature was described by Newtonian mechanics, and man was
regarded as a cogwheel in a large world machine.From
this perspective, self- control and reflection would have been predictable
processes.

The Newtonian world view has been overtaken in the meantime, indeed,
and synergetics has delivered arguments in favor of the compatibilists, but a
number of other sciences have sown doubt within compatibilism.This is the topic of the following chapters.

6. Skepticism

Among the compatibilists, there are doubts about the existence of a
free will as well, because it is largely unclear

1.whether the preferences stored in the unconscious are
"wanted" by the individual(Chapters
6.1 to 6.4)

2.whether consciousness exercises a steering function at all (Chap.6.5).

A person is only the originator of his/her will if all forms of
inner unfreedom are dissolved [Bieri, 226]

6.1 Sociology

Imprisonment in the ideal and liberation

The pursuit of the divine model and the attempt to satisfy its
demands is diametrically opposed to a free way of living. Augustine, for example,
completely discourages self-realization by saying:

If you build yourself, you will build a ruin.

Idealizing humanism has a similar function to religion. The fixation
on an idealized or superior nature of man makes it impossible to develop
an individual sense in life and to reconcile oneself with the human weaknesses.
The humanistic ideal replaces the religious ideal. A first step towards the liberation
from a fixed ideal and more tolerance was done by Erasmus of Rotterdam in the 16th
century:

A counter-movement to idealizing humanism in the 20th
century was existential philosophy. It was founded by Kierkegaard, philosophically
analyzed by Heidegger and Jaspers and literarily formulated
by Camus and Sartre.

Existentialism is a special form
of the French philosophy of existence.At
the core of existentialism are the writings of Sartre, which are based on the
ideas of Hegel , Heidegger, and Husserl [GAD, Strassberg].Sartre defends life’s practice against the determination of man by
theories and considers the individual existential experiences as
decisive.Man is not defined by forms, but creates
(life-)forms with his example (L'être et le néant). But what are
existential experiences?

What is really important, man usually only discovers when he/she is
confronted with a critical situation, thrown back upon him-/herself by death,
struggle, suffering, guilt.The things that are still important in such a
situation are existential; the rest is obsolete (from Philosophy ... what is that?)

According to Sartre metaphysical humanism and every fixation to an
idealized or superior nature of man, leads to anti-humanism (...) It is
necessary to defend a comprehensive, critical position, which challenges
simplified and fixed views of man and the world, and which also sincerely
considers the inhuman. The era of (only) positive humanism, of the Renaissance
and the (optimistic) Enlightenment comes to an end (from Jean Paul).

While the philosophy of existence called for the liberation of
metaphysical ideals, a group of linguists, psychologists, sociologists and
anthropologists (later called structuralists) discovered that metaphysical
ideals are only a special case of a more general form of captivity.

Structuralism

Structuralism emerged from the
attempt to apply scientific methods to language.The
relationships between speech phenomena should be studied in the same sense as
the relationships between natural phenomena.Main
principle is the finding of substitution and replacement rules, i.e. a kind of
reductionism.Later, this experiment was also extended to other
areas of the humanities.

Levi-Strauss argued that
culture functions like a language: only an outsider can understand the
underlying rules.

The fact that human thinking is limited by language is obvious.We think in given terms and sentence structures."Man behaves as if he were the creator and lord of language,
but it is, on the contrary, the language which is and remains his/her master"
( Heidegger ).If there is an analogy between language and culture, then action is
limited in the same sense as thinking.

The structuralist worldview was influenced by the following
philosophers, among others: [GAD, Strassberg]:

1.Marx, who analyzed the power of the
economic constraints „Das Sein bestimmt das Bewusstsein“ ("The way of
living determines consciousness")

2.Freud, who analyzed the power of
the superego (social norms are anchored in the unconscious).

3.Nietzsche, who analyzed the will
to power “Wahrheit ist die Lüge, die gesiegt hat” ("Truth is the victorious
lie").

Not only the actions, but also the reflections which stand behind
these actions and even the ability to reflect are determined by culture.Why, for example, is one of the two brothers in Poe's novel A Descent into the Maelstromable
to reflect the phenomena in a scientific manner and the other not? A
structuralist would say that the two brothers were assigned different roles in
society.

An analysis is structural, if it is not based on isolated phenomena,
but on relationships.A single element has no significance; the relations
are decisive [GAD, Strassberg]:

1.The starting point of this view was Freud's suggestionthat the individualelements of a dream do not have an isolated
meaning, but begin to speak only in relation with one another.AccordingtoLacan, the unconscious is structured as a language.

2.Every cultural object is related to a structure.Only the catalog makes the library, the neighborhood of a
book defines its properties.The term meaning corresponds to the place
within the map of neighborhoods.The world becomes
accessible only if we move within a symbolic system (analogous to the library
catalog), i.e. within a language.Rules and laws (i.e.
symbolic structures) characterize the perception of reality.The ego with its emotions, results from a network of
obligations.From this follows Foucault's thesis death of the
subject as presented in his book The Order of Things

3.One could also reverse the Lacanian point of view and say that the language
is structured like the unconscious: "It" speaks (What Remains of the Night).From an evolutionary point of view the unconscious precedes the development
of language. The relationships exist initially in the unconscious and are
gradually translated into a symbolic system.The
world is now accessible in a different way.

Imprisonment in the structure and liberation[GAD, Strassberg]

1)What makes culture different from nature? According toLevi-Strauss man
leaves nature, when he/she starts exchanging beyond the family (in particular exchange
of women and goods combined with incest-prohibition).At this point laws, roles and functions within society begin to
develop.The societal law determines the (correct) emotions
and not vice-versa.The law determines what is human, but it is
not created by man.Laws define relationships which emerge with
necessity from the nature of things.The
subject can only occupy the role, which is assigned to him/her by the
structure.The position within the structure determines
his/her preferences (emotions, inclinations, interests)

2)Why are there structures in the first place?Structures must bind the impulsive and strengthen the ruling powers [Erdheim].For this purpose, historical events are reinterpreted as a kind of
natural law, for example in the form of myths.The
illusion that we act autonomously obstructs the view that our drives are tied
in the structure.The illusion of the ego makes people
submissive.Those who – by means of reflection – are able to fully
integrate themselves into the structure can recognize how the ego is
composed of cultural relations.The structure becomes
transparent and the illusion of the ego breaks down.Only from this position a resistance is conceivable.But how could such a resistance look like?What is outside the structure cannot be described with
structure-internal means.In this sense a deliberate exit is not possible.

3)Nevertheless there is a longing to go beyond the structure.Diese Sehnsucht wurde von gewissen Strukturalisten
mit der Schizophrenie oder mit einer angestrebten Herrschaft des Unbewussten in
Verbindung gebracht.This longing was, by certain structuralists,
associated with schizophrenia or with an intended rule of the unconscious.Lacan suggested (in an allusion to Freud) “Where Id was, Id shall be again”. According
to Lacan, structures are unstable; there is always a threat that the
unconscious breaks through, respectively – in the terminology of Lacan – that “reality”
breaks through

a) An attempt to escape the suffering which is produced by the
structure consists in accepting the non-existence of the ego and thus a
heteronomous role.Dies wurde von einigen
Strukturalisten als mystischen Aufgehen in der Struktur bezeichnet und
erinnert an das hinduistische Dharma .This has been called as mystical merge into thestructure by some structuralists and is reminiscent of the Hindu Dharma .

b) A different attempt would be the creation of an individual language
(e.g. in psychoanalysis) or the immersion into a foreign culture.A structuralist would, however, also consider psychoanalysis as part
of the system and postulate that a foreign culture can only be seen with the
eyes of one's own culture.In addition, the truly alternative cultures are
becoming extinct.The life of hunters and gatherers, for example,
cannot be reproduced in the foreseeable future.In contrast to the existential philosophy, structuralism takes
predominantly a descriptive standpoint.

c)From a normative point of view, one can try to define individual
freedom as the goal of the structure.In
a liberal society it is easier to accept the imprisonment in the structure.But freedom is usually not a gift; it has to be won in a struggle
and then defended.

6.2 Sociobiology

The biological utility function

Since man is a biological being, the biological utility function must
also be represented prominently in the psyche.The
pursuit of individuality, self-realization and self-assertion are driven by a
biological program.This statement has an epistemic status that is
close to a natural law.We are born with a considerable number of natural desires (as Beckermann says), but these
desires are ultimately subordinated to the biological goal (the replication of
the DNA).

In humans, the biological goal can be superimposed by cultural norms
in such a way that it only acts in the unconscious.Whether or not we are manipulated by the biological utility function
is a question of identification.Those who fully
identify with their biological nature do not feel manipulated by biological
needs.In a culture that requires sublimation, however, the
biological goal may turn into an obstacle in the pursuit of cultural goals.

The biological strategies for the propagation of genes are manifold
and partly indirect [Gräff] [Voland, 143].This
means that a person's psyche is not necessarily characterized by the biological
goal of having many children.

Even where we believe that we are altruistic and morally superior, it
often turns out that the egoism of genes is at work. The fact that we benefit
others and perhaps even harm ourselves is – as sociobiology has shown – not a
contradiction to Darwin's doctrine, but under certain conditions an inevitable
consequence [Vollmer 1994].

There are even attempts to derive the phenomenon of
"conscience" from an evolutionary basis. Certain genes would
encourage educators to intervene in the development of their pupils in a way
that benefits the genetic interests of the educators and harms the genetic
interests of the pupils. The conscience of the pupil could then be interpreted
as a parasitic function of the extended phenotype of the
educator [Mittwollen, 156-160].

Traditional behaviorism was already convinced that
"altruistic" behavior could and should have biological respectively genetic
reasons. It assumed, however, that altruism could only be explained by means of
group selection. Animals were thought to behave species-preserving (...).Sociobiology
contradicts. Group selection does not exist or only in exceptional cases. A natural
need to care for the preservation of mankind is also not to be expected in
humans (...). It is therefore not at all surprising that appeals, asking us to do
something for the whole of mankind, are so little fruitful [Vollmer, 1994].

Ecological behavior, for example, is in the interests of the whole
of humanity, but it is thwarted by unconscious biological/ evolutionary
mechanisms.

▪ Biological evolution is not only short-sighted, but
absolutely blind with regard to the future: the design of the organisms is
adapted to a "race in the here and now".

▪ Genetic reproductive success – the ultimate biological measure – is
based to a large extent on efficient resource utilization.

Both mechanisms stamped our psyche and created the mentality of
depletion [Voland, 145].

Marx was right in many ways, but
he overrated the forces of social consciousness and underestimated the forces
of evolution. His misapprehension did not only concern competition, but also
the relationship between his comrades and nature. The latter can be illustrated
by the pollution in the former Soviet
Union.

Acting against one’s own interests

The mechanism of the selfish genes does not only work against the
interests of the public, but also against one’s own interests.

Although we know that smoking, salt- and fat-rich food, lack of
exercise, etc. lead to health risks; it is difficult to change appropriate
habits.Health apostles are usually fall on deaf ears.Whereof does the willingness of an organism depend, to pay low costs
now, in order to avoid higher costs later?The
answer is amazingly trivial: it depends on the probability that the organism
actually experiences the later periods of time.The
pleiotropic effect may serve as
an example.Genes with beneficial effects in young years can spread
in the population, even if they are tied to significant disadvantages in old
age.In evolution, the young body is optimized at the
expense of the old one. It is worth – in the average – to buy early advantages
with late disadvantages.The debt mentality, which is expressed in credit
cards and mortgages, corresponds precisely to this logic.There is a cross-generational interest, indeed, but it is dynastic
and not of a general kind [Voland, 146-148].

6.3 Behavioral Psychology

Genetic determination

▪ The best method to investigate the genetic
determination of behavior, and thus the degree of internal constraints, is twin
research. Heredity is often misunderstood as the proportion of the genes that
are responsible for a trait in a given person. In fact, however, genes
determine the proportion of differences. People differ because they
carry different gene variants and because they live in different environments. An
inheritance of 88% for the body mass index means that 88% of the differences in the body mass index in
the population are due to genetic differences. It does not mean that a
single person is responsible in the amount of 12% for his/her weight (Zwillingsforschung, Wikipedia).

▪According to Strelau, the temperament is determinded predominantly
genetic, but a distinction must be made between

-temperament and

-the behavior in which the temperament is
expressed

In contrast to the temperament the behavior is much better changeable.

Interaction behavior

Various analyzes attempted to reduce the personal characteristics of
interactions to a few main features ( Berkowitz ).Two dimensions and their combination proved to be especially
clarifying for the description of relationship styles[DTV, 213]:"

2.The tendency to dominate is associated with the steroidhormone testosterone.

The restriction of personal freedom by biochemical mechanisms is
considered by staff consultants, career planners and marketing experts (see,
for example, Brain Script by H.Häusel).

Despite the biochemical control of emotions and evaluations, there
is a certain freedom of choice:

▪because a system, which is based in the prefrontal cortex enables us
to slow down impulses, pause, weigh up and consider what we want to do in the
long run [Bauer]:

▪because the long-term mental and physical occupation with a goal
also retroacts on the biochemistry.

A little Indian boy was talking to his grandfather:

"How do you think about the situation in the world?" he asked.

The grandfather answered:

"I have a feeling as if wolves were fighting in my heart.”
“One is full of rage and hatred, the other full of love, forgiveness and
peace. "

"Who is going to win?" the boy asked.

Hereon his grandfather answered:

"The one I feed."

(Author unknown)

Behavioral disorders

1.Many behavioral disorders in youths and adults are associated with
genetic, prenatal, or early-stage disorders of the so-called
neuromodulatory systems in the brain. These systems are the origin of neuronal
messengers, such as serotonin , dopamine and noradrenaline, which are
distributed over countless nervous fibers in a wide range of brain areas and
influence our mental condition [Roth, 11].

2.Also the
criminal behavior is genetically influenced, although usually it is not a
specific behavior, but a behavior style which is inherited. Even in the
case of concretely defined disorders, genes do not act deterministically, but
only increase the probability of the occurrence [Nedoptil] [Rowe].

The accordance of willing and doing is achieved more easily if there
are action options.Sales psychology, for example,
teaches to always offer alternatives to the potential buyer, so that he/she
feels that he/she can decide him-/herself.The
fact that the offered alternatives are already pre-selected by the seller is
usually not noticed by the customer.For
customers who are "never satisfied" one has to prepare a strategy
where the customer can reject all proposals and then find a solution
him-/herself.

Obviously, freedom has something to do with power, unfreedom with
powerlessness. Power can refer to others or to oneself.

1. Those who do not master themselves are at the mercy of their
passions and become unfree.

2. Those who are under the influence of other people also become unfree
unless they identify with these other people.

The action options need not necessarily be conscious:

1. The feeling of free will arises if one perceives oneself as
the agent of the thought processes which harmonize will and action.

2. However, a sense of freedom also arises when willing and doing are unconsciously
brought into harmony (and at the same time freedom of action exists). Example:
Apparently many people experience a liberating feeling in warehouses, although
they are unconsciously manipulated. The sales psychologists and marketing
specialists explore, guess and direct the unconscious wishes of their
customers.

1)Psychoanalysis was first characterized by the interpretation of dreams, i.e. by
a hermeneutic method.In free association, the patients try to break away
from causal thinking and to accept „accidental“ thoughts, thoughts that have no
„basis“, appear illogical, and are (seemingly) unreasonable.

2)The theory of drives was an attempt
to put psychoanalysis on a scientific basis, whereby we have to keep in mind that,
in Freud's times, scientific theories were always deterministic
theories.Freud, however, was not consistent in the pursuit
of this goal.Within the theory of drives one finds the concept
of the drive destiny, which emphasizes the hazard and thus undermines
determinism.

3)Freud’s structural model roughly divides
the psyche into three instances: Ego, Id, and Superego.At the end of the development of theory there is the metaphor of the
rider (Ego), whose horse (Id) sometimes refuses obedience, i.e. a
mixture of freedom of action and unconscious coercion.

Freedom as a feeling

Psychoanalysis has played a major role in a better understanding of
the feeling of freedom.It is namely quite
possible to carry out precisely the same activity with a feeling of freedom and
with a feeling of determination by others.The
feeling of freedom arises from the consistency of willing and doing.It can also arise when an activity is commanded from outside,
provided that one identifies with the commanding authority, or provided that
the commanded activity meets one’s (unconscious) desires.This suggests that the perception of the activity is crucial
and not the activity itself [Hampe 2006, 2].

Example:

1.Many musicians give concerts in order to make money and feel unfree
because of the commitments

2.Famous musicians often feel free despite of such commitments,
because they like to give concerts.

Psychoanalysis deals, among other things, with the question under
which conditions the heteronomous (e.g. music lessons) can be perceived as
something autonomous.In our example, emotional liberation can take two
entirely different forms:

1.The person leaves the world of music, because
he/she perceives music as coercion.

2.The person discovers the liberating potential of music.

For possible musiciansfreedom of willmeans to reflect motives such as "trying to please a
teacher/audience", "being afraid of a teacher/audience", and
then decide whether these motives are realistic and whether one wants to follow
them.

Those who live against their own character (e.g. by studying music
without a genuine conviction) are punished with a feeling of senselessness in
the long run. The reflection of motives creates a piece of intellectual
freedom, which, however, cannot immediately or permanently be converted into
actions.On the intellectual level, action options
can be explored playfully– a music pupil may i.e. realize that he/she makes
music to please his/her parents, respectively out of fear to disappoint them –
butemotionalliberation is a tedious, protracted, and often
painful process.A patient must first enforce
his/her desires within the protected framework of psychoanalysis (against his/her
own emotional resistances respectively super-ego) and can then still
fail in life’s practice, where this protected framework ceases to exist.

Freedom as mental balance

Psychoanalysis has shown that there are not only risks of
passion, but also risks of suppressed drives. The effort to subject all actions
to reason goes with the danger that emotions are suppressed as indicators for
meaningful actions. But “acting reasonably” also means “leaving room for
spontaneity”. A strong insistence on ethical ideals can lead to psychological
and psychosomatic illnesses and thus undermine the intention of these ideals.
The danger of excessive ethical demands was aldready recognized by the ancient
ethicists:

1.Hinduism strives for a
certain balance of the life goals, which respects the biological needs of people.
Starting from the desirable (ideal), practice forms the possible. Also in Buddhism
(which emerged out of Hinduism), the so-called middle way strives for a mental balance and deliberately
avoids destructive asceticism.

2.The Aristotelian
(overweighted) striving for rational action – particularly in the realm of
science – requires a special constitution. In Aristotle, the problem of an
excessive ethical demand is addressed by the catharsis, which is a kind of mental cleansing process.

The ethical ideal of a mental balance aims at an
equilibrium between cultural and biological interests, in which both parties
critically oppose each other. There is no freedom without a diversity of
opinions, neither in the political nor in the individual thinking. If we
compare the psyche with a democratic parliament then there must be a strong
opposition that discloses the interests (lobbying) behind the arguments and
reveals rationalizations.

1.For people who are socialized
in a culturally homogenous environment, it is difficult to spot
rationalizations. The available knowledge and the language are already designed
in a way that excludes alternatives. We must first recognize that there are
alternatives and that they are repressed. Philosophical therapy, which analyses
the oppression by social norms, stands in the tradition of Nietzsche and Freud.
From the perspective of the oppressed, there are good arguments to consider self-realization
as a kind of ethical ideal, as e.g. the moral perfectionism of Stanley Cavell does. Experience has shown
that psychoanalyses contribute to an expansion of desires and claims of
validity, and transform internal conflicts into external ones. Neurotically
bound energy is liberated and the inner aggression is steered to the outside.
Passivity tendentially turns into activity and adaptation into rebellion.
Psychoanalysis creates the prerequisites for effectively opposing encrusted or
totalitarian social systems (and is consequently prohibited in such systems).

2.The liberation of the
biological forces from their neurotic distortion also has a downside. Freedom
of thought is now no longer threatened by a totalitarian (belief-)system, but
by the biological forces. Those who live spontaneously and passionately neglect
reflection. Whoever creates the laws him-/herself threatens the freedom of
others. If finally reason itself is perceived as an oppressive force, then the
path to a rational cooperation is closed. The conflict between self-realization
and justice (see Competing Life Goals)
is now evident. The biological forces act like a totalitarian system, which
does not tolerate any alternatives. In cultures that suffer from high ethical
standards, it is often forgotten that the absence of moral laws leads to a
tyranny of the strongest or a chaos of conflicts. It is the experience of
tyranny and chaos that reveals the upside of morality. Philosophical therapies
in the Hellenistic
tradition have shown that
correspoding reflections lead to more self-control and renunciation.

Conclusion: Inner freedom is linked to emotional freedom. It is a
fragile balance between the demands of the outside world (partly in an
internalized form) and the demands of one's own (biological) nature.

6.5 Brain Research

In the definition of freedom in chapters.2.2 and 2.3, it is not explicitly
stated, but assumed, that the decisions processes are conscious processes. But
what is consciousness?

Theory of consciousness

Physical basis:

1)Neural correlates are known for specific contents of consciousness.It is, unclear, however, to what extent the discovery of such
correlates can explain the phenomenon of consciousness.[Metzinger, 37]

2)Studies show that the conscious perception of sensory
impressions (stimuli) goes with exactly
synchronized high-frequency oscillations in widely distributed regions of the cerebral cortex.If the stimuli are not consciously perceived, high-frequency
oscillations can also be detected, but they are not linked to synchronized
patterns [Metzinger, 105].

1.Human consciousness is filtered information.It is only the shadow of something (physically) much richer and
larger and has no independent existence [Metzinger, 41]

2.From a computer science point of view, consciousness probably has
the function of a working memory.It is the partial
quantity of the information that is currently active in the brain, which
requires constant monitoring, because it could be needed soon.This thesis is supported by the observation that we are conscious of
an activity whenever we learn it for the first time (e.g. fasten one’s shoes or
cycling).As soon as we fully master the activity, however, we
forget everything that has to do with the learning process [Metzinger, 89].

3.A main function of consciousness is to create a fixed frame of
reference for the organism, i.e. to define what is real [Metzinger, 95].However, the representations of reality in the brain are perceived
as reality rather than representations [Metzinger, 72].

A secure theory of consciousness does not exist yet. Such a theory
would have to solve the following problems:

1. The one-world problem: Why is consciousness seen as a unity
and not as a collection of different conscious components?

2. The Now Problem: How can the impression of a moment arise
when time is always in flux?

What we call the present and perceive as a continuum is the result
of neural reconstructions. The brain does not
experience time in the Newtonian continuum, says the psychologist Ernst Pöppel,
but jerkily. "Every thirty milliseconds it asks what happened in the
world." Incoming stimuli below this period of time can no longer be
identified. Conversely, the brain is also unable to group information into a
single perception for more than three seconds [Büttner]

3. The reality-problem: Why can we not recognize that we perceive
reality only indirectly? Why are we born as naive realists ?

4. The ineffability-problem: Why can we perceive things about
which we cannot talk?

5. The who-problem: Who is this "ego" to whom the
conscious experiences are assigned?

6. The evolution-problem: What is the evolutionary purpose of
consciousness?

[Metzinger, 45]

Concerning the issue of free will, questions 5 and 6 are of prime
importance. We start with some findings in the context of the who-problem
and then proceed to the evolution problem.

The who-problem

Traditionally, the term consciousness refers to a person. To
decide consciously means to use (moral) evaluations for a decision. But who is
this conscious "ego"?

Buddha said, "Actions exist and also
their consequences, but the agent does not exist (...).There is no individual,
there is only a conventional name that is given (a set of) elements "[Metzinger, 351].

The ego-feeling always goes with a physical feeling. This
physical-feeling consists of several components:

1)It integrates elements of the consciousness
contents into what is experienced as one's own self.

Examples:

a)A blind person can develop a tactile sensation at the end of the
cane [Metzinger, 113].

b)Repeated exercise can transform a tool (or a sports device) into a
part of one‘s hand [Metzinger, 117]

Agentivity is not necessary as the example of meditation shows.The feeling of the ego is probably created when the knowledge of
one's own existence emerges from spatial orientation, body perceptions and
self-ascription (respectively self-demarcation. This process can, for example,
be understood when one wakes up in the morning and comes to oneself
[Metzinger, 151].Wenn man sich jedoch als denkendes
Subjekt erleben will und nicht einfach (wie in der Meditation) die Gedanken
vorbeiziehen lässt, dann braucht es eine kognitive Agentivität, dh
innerliches Handeln beim Denken, verbunden mit dem Gefühl die eigenen Gedanken
zu verursachen [Metzinger, 177].If, however, one
wants to experience oneself as a thinking subject and not simply
(as in meditation) as an instance allowing the thoughts to pass through, then a
cognitive agentivity is needed, combined with the feeling of creating
one's own thoughts [Metzinger, 177].

Is there consciousness without ego-feeling?This question must be answered in the affirmative because there are selfless
forms of conscious experience.In certain
psychiatric disorders, such as the Cotard's syndrome, patients
sometimes stop using the first person's pronoun, and, even more surprisingly, claim
that they do not actually exist [Metzinger, 99-100].

According to Antonio Damasio, the aspects of
consciousness are embedded in a hierarchical structure:

1)On the lowest level is the meta-presentation of the body (the
proto-self), which is already present in primitive animals.This also includes the perception of the state of alertness.There is a continuous transition from alertness to inattentiveness,
to sleep, to coma, and finally to death.

2)The next higher level is the so-called core-consciousness, the
feeling for what happens, respectively the feeling that the proto-self is
moving through the world and interacts with the world.Damasio describes the case of a patient who, for a period of 6
years, lived only with the core consciousness, i.e. in a world with no past and
no future.The core-consciousness is also present in
intelligent animals.

3)On the highest level is the extended consciousness, the link of the
core-consciousness with autobiographical data, with a life story and its
projection into the future.The extended consciousness exists only in humans and
possibly in certain primates.

a)In contrast to the long-standing thesis that language is at the
center of the extended consciousness, it seems to be the feelings, respectively
the knowledge about having feelings.In
strokes, patients may lose their speech.In
the case of a cure, such patients say that their consciousness was completely
intact, but that they simply could not communicate their condition.

b)An important role is also played by the connection of the brain’s left
and the right hemisphere.If this connection is destroyed, then two
consciousness-instances arise: one describes the world verbally, the other
spatially. There is no communication between these two instances, but they are
nevertheless represented by the same "ego-feeling".

If Damasio's thesis is true, i.e. if consciousness presupposes a
biological body, respectively a body-feeling, then it is impossible to create
consciousness within a computer.

Decision-making processes

1. Let us first look at the etymology of the term consciousness.
The Latin term conscientia is the root from which all later
terminologies in the English and Romance languages have developed. It derives on the one hand from cum (with,
together) and scire (knowledge). In antiquity, as in the scholastic
philosophy of the Middle Ages, conscientia related primarily to moral
knowledge, i.e. knowledge of values. Interestingly, "true"
consciousness was thus linked with moral insight [Metzinger, 45]. Moral insight
is the result of reflections which question, evaluate, and weigh preferences,
i.e. the result of higher order reflections. The possibility that the weighing
of preferences could take place without insight (consciousness) has
traditionally not been considered.

2. With the increasing acceptance of psychoanalysis this view changed.
The existence of unconscious decision-making processes was now at least
regarded as a defensible thesis. The simultaneous existence of conscious decision-making
processes, however, seemed obvious and was not contested by anyone.

3. Only in the aftermath of the Libet experiment the idea emerged
that all decision-making processes could occur unconsciously, and that
awareness is only a somewhat delayed accompanying phenomenon. The specific
brain activity, which correlates with a movement, can precede the conscious
decision (to move) up to 10 seconds (The Unconscious Will).

Alvaro Pascual-Leone conducted an experiment in 1992, in which the subjects were asked
to move the right or the left hand by chance. He found that by the stimulation
of the different brain hemispheres by means of magnetic fields the choice of
the person could be strongly influenced. Normally, right-handers select the
right hand in about 60% of all cases. However, if the right hemisphere was
stimulated, the left hand was selected in 80% of all cases (the right
hemisphere of the brain is essentially responsible for the left half of the
body and vice-versa).

Despite of this demonstrable influence from outside, the subjects
continued to report that they were convinced that they had made the choice
freely (Free will , Wikipedia).

Wolf Singer points to the following experiment: If the non-verbal
hemisphere of an experimentee is given a command by electrically stimulating
the motoric cortex areas, then this person executes the command without being
aware of the causation.

If one then asks for the reason of the action, one obtains an explanation,
which has nothing to do with the true cause(Philosophy
and brain research, Patrick Albertini).

Whatever the consciousness of one's own will (in this case) may be,
it seems to be something that can be turned on and off by means of a weak
electric current and an electrode in the brain [Metzinger, 181].

According to Wegner and Wheatley , the phenomenal
experience of will or mental causation is governed by the following three
principles [Wegner]:

1.Exclusivity: the thought of the experimentee is the only
possible and introspectively available cause of the action

2.Consistency:the subjective intention must be compatible with
the action

3.Priority:theconsciousthought must precede the action within a reasonable period of time.

[Metzinger, 183]

In the experiments cited, the freedom of the will is obviously a
double illusion because the decision-making process is not only deterministic,
but also unconscious. The conscious perception does not have a
controlling function; it is only a (more or less accurate and delayed) image of
the unconscious process. But can this finding be generalized?

The question of whether the movement of a hand expresses something
about the free will of a person must be cautiously discussed. The skills
required for the hand movement are contained in the procedural part of the long-term memory. But if we make
a free and morally
well-founded decision, then we use the experiences and the knowledge of the episodic part of the long-term
memory. Libet's experiment can therefore only say something about decisions
which – like the movements of the hand – need not be evaluated morally. Prof.
Benedikt Grothe and Prof. Martin Korte provide a detailed and detailed analysis
of this problem in their lectures at the LMU Munich resepectively the University of
Tübingen, which are accessible as video
recordings (Free Will, Wikipedia).

Recent experiments have also shown that the specific brain activity,
which correlates with a movement and precedes the conscious decision (to move),
does not mean that the brain predicts the movement. In one
of these experiments, the participants were free to press a key (or not) when
they heard a sound. It turned out that the specific brain activity existed independent
of the decision and that it corresponded to an outward directed attention. In
the Libet experiment, attention is directed inward. It is assumed that
the decision (to execute the movement) is triggered, if (permanently existing) random
fluctuations in the relevant brain area exceed a certain value
[Ananthaswamy].

Disorders

In the case of the so-called alien-hand syndrome, one of the
two hands is no longer subjected to volitional control, but nevertheless performs
purposeful actions (such as moving a piece in the checkers game ). The concerned
persons still experience the uncontrolled hand as their own hand. Missing is
the perception of an act of will. There seem to be unconscious mechanisms which
determine when a movement appears to us as an act of will [Metzinger, 172].

In this example, too, one can argue that these are not moral
decision-making processes and that the meaningfulness for the problem of free
will is accordingly limited.There are, however, disorders which are not
restricted to the movement of a hand and where the semantic memory (a part of
the declarative long-term memory) may be involved [Metzinger, 173].

2.Conversely, certain schizophrenics have the feeling that their own
body and their own thoughts are remote-controlled.

In these cases the perception of the will is much less consistent
with the real situation (as compared to healthy persons).In the former case an excess of impact is pretended in the latter
case (in a kind of reversal situation) a complete helplessness.These findingssuggestthat
the perception of the will is an independent function, which is more
or less correctly linked to the real situation.It
is therefore theoretically conceivable that this function is evoked with some
delay in all decision processes and that it creates an illusion.

In the case of akinetic mutism, the patient does
notmake any decisions [Metzinger, 179].There is accordingly no reason to activate the function
"perception of will".The perception of
"not wanting anything" accords with the real situation.

The evolution problem

Does consciousness provide an evolutionary advantage?

Evolution is driven largely by random events and has no objective.
It is wrong to assume that evolution necessarily lead to consciousness.
Other paths of evolution were possible and are still possible [Metzinger, 87].
However, once the phenomenon of consciousness had arisen (possibly accidentally),
it proved to be valuable in the survival struggle. A function that does not
provide an evolutionary advantage disappears in the course of time because it unnecessarily
consumes energy.

Die Frage, welchen Überlebensvorteil das
Bewusstsein konkret bietet, ist noch weitgehend ungeklärt. The question which advantage consciousness could have for
survival is still largely unresolved. There are a number of qualities that
could have given its carriers an advantage, e.g.

1)The understanding of mental states of fellow members of the species
and the prediction of their behavior in social interactions [Halligan].

One of these survival advantages is likely to have dominated. The
others then are more a kind of "creative misappropriation" [Metzinger,
122]. It cannot be ruled out that the higher-order reflections represent such
an misappropriation.

The thesis, according to which consciousness improves the
decision-making processes, however, is disputed.If
consciousness is only an epiphenomenon – as most brain
researchers suspect – we must reject all the theses where the evolutionary advantage
is explained in terms of improved decisions.

In order to improve decision-making processes, consciousness would
have to represent the reality unadulterated.However,
the traditional assumption that we receive the content of our phenomenal consciousness
directly is wrong:

1)There is, for example, a neurological disorder that makes it
impossible to recognize objects by touching them (Astereognosia).In this case the sense organ (the skin) is intact, but the
connection to consciousness is disturbed [Metzinger, 48].

2)Conversely, there can be a consciousness of sensory impressions,
even though the concerned sense organs are damaged:

a)This is especially evident in a certain group of disorders, which is
called anosognosia neuropsychology.In these disorders the patient can no longer experience an existing
consciousness-deficit as such.A particularly
impressive example is Antons Syndrome.Patients who are afflicted with sudden blindness by a visual cortex injury stubbornly insist
in some cases, that they still see.They
bump into pieces of furniture and other obstacles; they show all signs of
functional blindness. Nevertheless, they behave as if they were not aware of
the subjective disappearance of the visual world. For example, they produce
false but consistent confabulations on questions about
their environment: They tell stories
about non-existent phenomenal worlds that they themselves seem to believe, and
deny any functional deficit with regard to their vision [Thomas Metzinger, The problem of consciousness ].

In
this case consciousness is coupled with a dream-world, which makes it
difficult to cope with reality .It
strengthens the feeling to be intact, but at the same time worsens the
adaptive abilities of the organism.

b)In dreams blind people are sometimes capable
to see [Metzinger, 199].

In intact persons as well, consciousness
refers to representations and not to reality itself, so that the reality can be
faked.

Examples:

1.The simulation of virtual realities (e.g. in a 3D-film ) creates a sense of
presence and full immersion.As in a dream, the creation of real physical
behavior is prevented.If in a dream this motoric inhibition fails – as in
the REM-Sleep Behavior Disorder – then
the patient is forced to act out even dramatic and violent dreams.

2.The phenomenon of false awakening shows that the feeling
to be in the reality can be turned on and off. The dreamer is like an asognostic patient, who, after brain injury,
lacks insight into mental deficits.Evidently, the
vitality, clarity, and conciseness of a conscious experience is not a
sufficient proof that one is actually in reality.

3.The dream is a good example of the tendency of our brain to
construct meaning.During REM sleep, chaotic internal
signals are generated by PGO waves.The brain tries to interpret these signals and constructs for this
purpose a fairy tale in which the ego of the dream state plays the leading
role.The system does not recognize that the signals,
which are transformed into an inner narrative, are produced by itself.

[Metzinger, 197-202].

This raises the question of whether the evolutionary advantage of
consciousness is not to be found generally on the emotional level.It is conceivable that consciousness offers a survival advantage
only in the form of self- awareness, i.e. through intrinsic motivation or emotional
strengthening [Metzinger, 88].The conscious
information is given a higher priority (by emotional strengthening) and then possibly
stored more permanently.This can be compared with producing documentation about decisions.Only important decisions are documented and always retroactive,
i.e. the documentation does not contribute to the process of decision-making.It may improve, however, the quality of future decisions.Dreams are often forgotten very quickly after awakening.In our analogy, this means that documents (which are recognized as
deceptions) are subsequently depreciated or disposed of.

John-Dylan Haynes compares
consciousness with a spotlight. The unconscious
decides whether the light is switched on and whereupon the light beam is directed
[Douglas, 32].The illuminated scene is documented and receives a certain
priority in the memory, the rest remains in the dark.

7. Responsibility

7.1 Definition

Freedom as a condition

One can only be held responsible for something that one can freely
choose. Freedom is the prerequisite for responsibility. According to the
different definitions of freedom, there are different definitions of responsibility.

1. For incompatibilists, who do not believe in a mind-body dualism,
there is no responsibility at all.

2. For all others, the main problem is to correctly assess the
moral weight of unconscious motifs:

Responsibility, which includes unconscious motifs

The unconscious contains personal experiences and evaluations, and can
therefore be considered as part of the self. It is not disputed that one can
credit positive achievements of the unconscious (e.g. the ability to solve
problems while sleeping) to one's own person. Why should this not also apply to
negative performances? Both the delimitation between ego and id as
well as the delimitation between decision-making and decision-ending are
blurred. There are no punctual decisions. In general, a mixture of conscious,
up-to-date reflection and unconscious, long-term motifs is used. One is determined
to a certain extent by one’s history, but one is also responsible for this
story [GAD, Hampe].

Example: During a penalty, a football goalkeeper
must decide whether to stand still or dive into a corner. Because of the
scarcity of time, the decision is essentially made in the unconscious. Thereby
a lot of information (movement of the shooter, experiences, tips, etc.) is
considered in an individual decision-making process. The goalkeeper is responsible
for his decision, although a large part of the evaluations are made in the
unconscious. The responsibility is accepted because the unconscious evaluations
are the result of a long, personal story. This history includes in particular
the training of football-specific reflexes.

Responsibility, which excludes unconscious motifs

In a narrower sense, responsibility only exists if the decision is
made by consciously weighing up preferences. The decision-maker is not
responsible for unconscious motifs which influence the weighing process. In
this case it matters how far the influence of the unconscious reaches.

1. Sociological, sociobiological and psychological research suggests
that the importance of the subconscious is underestimated (Chapters 6.1 to 6.4).

2. An almost unlimited power of the unconscious is postulated by brain
research (Chap.6.5). Most brain researchers assume that consciousness is only
an epiphenomenon, and all
evaluations are caused by unconscious processes. The feeling of being free to
decide and not being determined by physical processes is possibly a function of
the brain, which can be switched on or off depending on the situation. If the
conscious weighing of preferences is a deception, however, then there
can be no question of responsibility at all.

Example: The decision of a goalkeeper to
exercise and to adopt football-specific reflexes would not (in accordance with
perception) be decided by conscious reflection, but (contrary to perception)
unconsciously. The reflection would only be documented (more or less
precisely) in the consciousness. Possibly the documentation is even produced according
to Freud's criteria, i.e. facts are distorted or withhold to meet unconscious
wishes. The steering role of consciousness in decision-making is the subject of
a controversial discussion (see Epiphenomenon, Wikipedia).

7.2
Semantics

Tradition

Even if the brain researchers were right, we still need – in
everyday life and jurisprudence – the concept of responsibility, which includes
unconscious motifs.

1) If a person says that he/she has freely and consciously decided,
then we should accept this way of speaking, because we know what it means. Consciousness
in this sense is an intuition, which we all know [Bieri, 222-226]

2) According to current legal practice, a (fully sane) person is
responsible for his/her unconscious decision-making processes.

The question whether we explain human actions in the light of reasons
and justifications, or in the light of natural laws is fundamental (...). The
question here is whether we allow a language at all, where something
like (responsible) actions exist. As soon as we explain actions with natural
laws, they become natural events [Hampe 2007, 177].

It would be difficult to organize a society without the concept of responsibility
and without taking into account the reasons and justifications arising from the
inner perspective. [Singer] [Pauen]. The
concept of guilt will perhaps disappear from the language of the courts,
but not from everyday language [Singer] [Pauen].

Interests

The fear that only scientific languages will be accepted is nurtured
by the increasing societal relevance of scientific descriptions. On the other
hand there is a fear that scientists, who deny the existence of a free will,
are attacked by religious fundamentalists. From the perspective of societal
interests the freedom-skeptics are ill-equipped. The interest of society that there
is a freedom of will and a responsibility is overwhelming:

▪ The belief in free will strengthens self-consciousness and the belief
in the influenceabiliy of personal and social development. It obviously acts as
a positive feedback and provides an evolutionary advantage.

▪ Conversely, the message of the freedom-skeptics is unpleasant to
such a degree, that the transferees are often confused with the message. They
are not burned (yet) on the pyre as certain representatives of predestination
in the Middle Ages, but the result of their research is not welcome in many
circles.

Amongst the secular promoters of the concept of free will, those
which use a formal language are of special interest. John
Searle weist darauf hin dass – wenn man die Bedingung der Letzt-Urheberschaft
fallen lässt – theoretisch auch Roboter mit einem freien Willen konstruiert
werden könnten. John Searle points out that – if the condition of ultimate-origination is dropped – then it is theoretically possible to construct robots
with a free will. This argument does not seem to trouble computer scientists,
for example. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence prefer a
language rule according to which they will create beings who have an ego-consciousness
and a free will [Metzinger, 279-282].

Obviously, in the interpretation of the term free will, there
is not only competition between the internal and external perspective, but also
a competition between individual sciences. While brain researchers eliminate
the concept of free will by describing the brain processes with natural
laws, it is reintroduced by AI researchers using programming
languages. Rather too much free will than too little.

8. Conclusions

Most cultural pessimists assume that man can not significantly
influence evolution (in particular the evolution of suffering).They refer to the complexity of biological and cultural systems and
to the lack of conscious decisions.

Type of Problem

-What is the exact meaning of free will?

- To what extent is the freedom of the will restricted by external
and internal conditions?

- What is the responsibility of man for his actions?

Freedom of Will

Libertariansspeak of freedom of will only if man is the
ultimate originator of his decisions, i.e. if he can break through the causal
chain of the physical brain processes.This
definition agrees with the intuition that we can decide against our own
preferences within a "causal gap".

Naturalistspostulate that all decisions are based on physical
brain processes, have a temporal extension and do not interrupt the causal
chains.The intuition of the "causal gap" would
therefore be a deception.

1. Naturalists, who insist on the ultimate origination, see no basis
for the existence of a free will (hard determinism)

2. Compatibilists consider the idea of an absolutely free will as a
linguistic aberration.They postulate that a correct concept of freedom of
will is compatible with the known natural laws (soft determinism )

3. The scope of the compatibilist freedom of will is a controversial
issue.The skepticism with regard to the freedom of will
has been reinforced by brain researchers, who postulate that consciousness is
only anepiphenomenon.

Restrictions by the outside world

This paper is not about the conscious and well-known cases of
political deprivation of liberty.As far as social structures
can be reflected, they are also open to criticism and resistance.The point here is that freedom of the will is already restricted by
the repression of wishes and possibilities.There
is a social production of unconscious thoughts and emotions, which serves the
control of instincts and the consolidation of the ruling power.

When structures serve the control of drives, they often have a dual
function: they limit freedom in one area, but enhance them in a
different area.Fort hat reason they resemble rather a monastery than a prison.The monastery restricts freedom, but also protects from the dangers
of the outside world and allows undisturbed meditation.Just as the pianist gains artistic freedom by anchoring the keyboard
technique in the unconscious, a culture gains freedom by curbing certain
agressions in the unconscious.

Restrictions by the inner world

The long-term established, only slowly in the course of life
changing zones of influence of the psychic
instances define the measure of inner
freedom. These zones of influence can be regarded as a basic limitation of
individual freedom, but also as a specific adaptation to the environment in
which individuality – and thus a piece of freedom – is expressed.

Despite the biochemical control of feelings and evaluations, there
is a certain freedom in the choice of aims in life, because the mental and
physical occupation with an aim also retroacts on the biochemistry.How great this freedom is and which role the individual constitution
(genetics) and the consciousness play is still hardly clarified.

Responsibility

One can only be held responsible for something one can decide about.
According to the currently most plausible hypothesis, responsibility must be
based on the compatibilist definition of free will.

In essence, it is assumed that the iceberg model applies, which
means that only a small proportion of the decisions is consciously controlled.
Whether and to what extent the unconscious proportion may be attributed to the
decision-maker is disputed.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Michael Hampe for the valuable
comments and suggestions in the context of this paper.