Compassionate Resources Organization Society

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We hold to the conviction that the Terry Parker Judgment and the Krieger Judgment both point to one thing; that the Government of Canada has failed to deal adequately with the Parker decision of July 2000. In the strongest of language the presiding justices rendered a judgment in favor of ALL ADULT Canadians who wish to make use of the "Common Law" doctrine of "Informed Consent" in making the decision to use cannabis as medicine regardless of whether the doctor, the government, the judiciary, or anyone considers it foolish or unwise to do so.

Please read the following excerpts from the Terry Parker v Regina case July 2000.

On appeal against the stay of proceedings granted to the respondent by The Honourable Judge Patrick Sheppard on December10, 1997

[39] Consumption of marihuana is relatively harmless compared to the so-called hard drugs and including tobacco and alcohol and there is no “hard evidence” that even long-term use can lead to irreversible physical or psychological damage. Marihuana use is not criminogenic (i.e. there is no causal relationship between marihuana use and criminality) and it does not make people more aggressive or violent. There have been no recorded deaths from consumption of marihuana. Marihuana does have an intoxicating effect and it would not be prudent to drive while intoxicated. As with tobacco smoking, marihuana smoking can cause bronchial pulmonary damage, especially in heavy users. There may be other side effects from the use of marihuana and its effects are probably not as benign as was thought some years ago. However, these other effects are not acute except in very narrow circumstances, for example, people with schizophrenia. I will return to the question of the harmful effects of marihuana when discussing the objectives of the marihuana prohibition in the legal analysis.

[104] In view of my conclusion with respect to Parker’s liberty rights, it is not strictly necessary to consider the situation of other persons seeking to use marihuana to alleviate their symptoms from other serious, even terminal, disease. Suffice it to say that Parker presented sufficient evidence that marihuana is a reasonable choice for those persons that I would have found that their liberty interests are infringed by the marihuana prohibition

[11]......need to hold it unconstitutional. If necessary, I would have found that Parker was entitled to a personal exemption from the cultivation offence for his medical needs.

[135] We were not directed to any common law history of entitlement to drug therapy. The closest analogue is the doctrine of informed consent, which makes it a civil wrong to impose treatment without the consent of the patient. The patient may also demand that treatment, once commenced, be withdrawn or discontinued. See Rodriguez at pp. 598-99. While there is obviously a difference between a right to refuse treatment and a right to demand treatment, they can also be seen as two points on a continuum rooted in the common-law right to self-determination with respect to medical care. This includes the right to choose to select among alternative forms of treatment. Robins J.A. summarized the common law in Malette v. Shulman (1990), 67 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (Ont. C.A.) at 328:

The right of self-determination which underlies the doctrine of informed consent also obviously encompasses the right to refuse medical treatment. A competent adult is generally entitled to reject a specific treatment or all treatment, or to select an alternate form of treatment, even if the decision may entail risks as serious as death and may appear mistaken in the eyes of the medical profession or of the community. Regardless of the doctor's opinion, it is the patient who has the final say on whether to undergo the treatment. The patient is free to decide, for instance, not to be operated on or not to undergo therapy or, by the same token, not to have a blood transfusion. If a doctor were to proceed in the face of a decision to reject the treatment, he would be civilly liable for his unauthorized conduct notwithstanding his justifiable belief that what he did was necessary to preserve the patient's life or health. The doctrine of informed consent is plainly intended to ensure the freedom of individuals to make choices concerning their medical care. For this freedom to be meaningful, people must have the right to make choices that accord with their own values regardless of how unwise or foolish those choices may appear to others … [Emphasis added.]

190] To conclude, in my view, Parker has established that the prohibition on possession of marihuana in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act has deprived Parker of his right to security of the person and right to liberty in a manner that does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice. Since Parker was not charged with the cultivation offence, that offence is not expressly before this court. However, it is apparent from these reasons and the reasons dealing with the cultivation offence under the Narcotic Control Act that if the cultivation provision had been before this court, I would hold that it too infringes Parker’s s. 7 rights. Since there is no legal source of supply of marihuana, Parker’s only practical way of obtaining marihuana for his medical needs is to cultivate it. In this way, he avoids having to interact with the illicit market and can provide some quality control

IT REMAINS THE INDIVIDUAL'S CHOICE TO ACCEPT TREATMENT, TO REFUSE TREATMENT, OR TO CHOSE ALTERNATE FORM OF TREATMENT.