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Wednesday, April 15, 2015

Report of the UN Secretary-General on Western Sahara

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western
Sahara

I. Introduction

1. The present reportis submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution
2152 (2014), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United
Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until
30 April 2015 and requested me to provide a report to it on the
situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate
period. It covers developments since my report dated 10 April
2014 (S/2014/258) and
describes the situation on the ground, the status and progress of the
negotiations on the future of Western Sahara, the implementation of
resolution 2152 (2014) and the existing challenges to the Mission’s
operations and steps taken to address them, as requested by the
Council in its resolution 2152 (2014).

II. Recent developments

2. The
situation in Western Sahara, as it presents itself to MINURSO, is
generally calm. The ceasefire continues to hold. Tensions between the
parties and periodic incidents and demonstrations did not have a
major effect on the overall environment during the period.

3. West of
the berm, public life proceeded peacefully and included large
gatherings at social events in urban areas without major incidents.
On the occasions MINURSO was able to witness, an extensive presence
of Moroccan security forces was noted. This part of Western Sahara
continued to receive significant Moroccan public infrastructure
investments, notably in roads and port facilities in Boujdour and
Dakhla.

4. Thirteen
foreign delegations from national legislatures, diplomatic missions
and governmental and non-governmental institutions, as well as
journalists and academic researchers, visited MINURSO headquarters
during the reporting period and were informed about the Mission’s
mandate and activities. According to local authorities, some 50
additional delegations conducted visits. Also according to local
authorities, 18 delegations and 8 individual travellers, mostly
European supporters of Western Saharan self-determination,
researchers and media workers alleged to have misrepresented their
purpose, disturbed public order or refused to coordinate with the
authorities, were excluded or expelled.

5. A level of
discontent was perceptible among the Western Saharan population west
of the berm, illustrated in intermittent demonstrations throughout
the reporting period in Laayoune and other towns. These events aimed
to draw attention to human rights concerns, socioeconomic issues and
political demands, including the right to self-determination, with
youth emphasizing the lack of employment opportunities and organizing
informal associations to press for redress. These protests were small
in scale and the Moroccan security forces dispersed them quickly. On
several occasions, credible reports were received about the
disproportionate use of force on the part of the security forces and
hostile actions on the part of the demonstrators in response.

6. On the 6
November 2014 anniversary of the 1975 “Green March”, King
Mohammed VI stated that “the Sahara will remain part of Morocco
until the end of time”. Regarding the negotiating process, he
declared that “[t]he fact that Morocco chose to cooperate in good
faith with all parties should not be interpreted as a sign of
weakness; nor should it be used as a means to ask for more
concessions”. He continued that “[t]he autonomy initiative is the
maximum Morocco can offer … to achieve a final solution to this
regional conflict”. He further stressed that “Morocco’s
sovereignty over its entire territory is effective, inalienable and
non-negotiable”. He also indicated that Morocco was “willing to
be more open to all international human rights bodies and
organizations that abide by the principles of neutrality and
objectivity in dealing with Moroccan issues”, while rejecting “any
attempt to reconsider the principles and criteria of the negotiating
process and any attempt to revise and expand the mandate of MINURSO
to include such matters as monitoring of the human rights situation”.
The King affirmed support for the October 2013 Moroccan Economic,
Social and Environmental Council’s proposed development plans for
the so-called “southern provinces”, which pertain to Western
Sahara and areas to the north. He noted the need to address
malfunctions in the governance of those areas and also announced the
implementation of “advanced regionalization”. Three government
bills submitted on 29 January 2015 propose to devolve more powers to
the local level and are pending parliamentary review. In its 8
November reaction, Frente Polisario strongly criticized the King’s
speech and called it a “clear announcement of rebellion against the
Charter of the United Nations and its resolutions, which define the
nature of the Western Sahara problem, the framework for a solution
and the basis of the negotiating process … and specify clearly and
unambiguously that the Western Sahara issue is an issue of
decolonization whose two parties are Frente Polisario and the Kingdom
of Morocco and whose solution resides in enabling this people to
exercise its inalienable right to self-determination and
independence”. It called on the international community “to
hasten in taking the positions and measures needed to confront this
dangerous intransigence and oblige the Kingdom of Morocco to obey the
requirements of international law and humanitarian law”. It also
called on the United Nations to apply the 1991 Settlement Plan of the
United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and stop the
plundering of Western Sahara’s resources.

7. From 12 to
14 March 2015, a Swiss non-governmental organization, the
Crans-Montana Forum, held an event in what it referred to as “Dakhla,
Morocco”. The Permanent Representative of Morocco informed me by
letter that the Forum’s focus had been Africa’s economic
development and South-South cooperation, that it had been attended by
delegates from 115 countries and that 38 young African entrepreneurs,
including 8 Saharans from Laayoune and Dakhla, had been nominated for
awards. Frente Polisario and the African Union contested the venue of
this Forum on the basis that the legal status of Dakhla and the rest
of Western Sahara had yet to be determined through negotiations.
Following press reports of a high-level United Nations presence, my
spokesperson issued a note to correspondents indicating that my
Special Advisor on Innovative Financing had attended exclusively in
his private capacity and that I had not delegated him or anyone else
to represent me or the United Nations. He further noted that the
definitive status of Western Sahara was the object of a negotiating
process being conducted under my auspices in accordance with the
relevant United Nations resolutions.

8. In the
refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria, public life and social
activities were conducted peacefully and in a relatively calm
atmosphere. However, the severe living conditions declined further as
a result of reductions in international humanitarian aid (see para.
77 below), and the camp inhabitants continued to suffer from chronic
unemployment, reduced remittances from limited employment
opportunities abroad and lower income from informal trade across the
border between Algeria and Mauritania. Sixteen international
delegations visited the MINURSO liaison office in Tindouf and were
informed about the Mission’s mandate and activities.

9.
Within parts of the refugee community, after 40 years in refugee
camps, increasingly difficult economic conditions and no visible
progress towards a politicalsolution,
frustration is coalescing. Individuals returning from higher
education studies abroad bring greater civic and political awareness
and compare the hardship in the camps with living standards
elsewhere, applying pressure on the Frente Polisario leadership to
secure better lives for camp inhabitants. Frente Polisario has also
alerted MINURSO to the “hundreds and hundreds of idle youths”
affected by an environment that includes proximity to smuggling
routes and extremist activity in the Sahel.

10. These
conditions present political, economic and security concerns. Two
demonstrations were held in the Laayoune camp and five in Rabouni
during the reporting period. On one occasion observed by a MINURSO
officer, Frente Polisario security forces intervened to prevent
demonstrators from entering the premises of the Secretary-General of
Frente Polisario. Frente Polisario authorities subsequently undertook
to address the demonstrators’ concerns through broader consultative
and inclusive governance processes.

11. Four
incidents of arson in public buildings occurred in the Smara, Dakhla,
Laayoune and Awsard camps in May and June. Frente Polisario
investigations revealed attempted sabotage. Also in June, a group of
young men engaged in an aggressive discussion with the Wali of
Laayoune camp, subsequently setting fire to his office and stoning
his vehicle. Several suspected perpetrators were detained and later
released.

12. East of
the berm, in the north-eastern part of Western Sahara, MINURSO
observed an increase in civilian activities and local infrastructure
construction in six villages, evidently reflecting the programme
approved by the “Sahrawi National Council” in April 2014 to
“consolidate the exercise of sovereignty in the liberated
territories”. Largely abandoned in 1976, several areas are now
seeing a return of original inhabitants from the refugee camps,
particularly during the milder climate of summer. However, several of
the areas witnessing initial development remain highly contaminated
by mines and explosive remnants of war, limiting any additional
growth, curtailing livelihoods and placing residents at risk.

13. During
the reporting period, the Secretary-General of Frente Polisario wrote
to me on 11 occasions, reiterating his concerns about anomalies in
the part of Western Sahara west of the berm. The letters raised
allegations of human rights violations, disproportionate use of force
and illicit exploitation of natural resources and called repeatedly
on the United Nations to implement appropriate remedies, arrange the
release of all Western Saharan political prisoners and institute a
human rights monitoring mechanism for Western Sahara.

III. Activities of my Personal Envoy

14.
Following the publication of my previous report on 10 April 2014
(S/2014/258), Morocco
expressed strong reservations regarding some elements of the report,
the contours of the negotiating process and the mandate of MINURSO.
It agreed in principle to the continuation of my Personal Envoy’s
bilateral consultations and shuttle diplomacy and to the deployment
of my new Special Representative for Western Sahara and head of
MINURSO, but asked to enter into a dialogue on the issues that
concerned it before re-engaging, stating that it sought clarification
for the purpose of ensuring that the negotiating process would
proceed smoothly, including with regard to the preparation of the
present report. On 22 January 2015, King Mohammed VI and I spoke
by telephone and agreed on the way forward. I confirmed that reports
to the Council would remain objective and reflect facts. In reply,
the King confirmed that Morocco welcomed the return of my Personal
Envoy and the deployment of my new Special Representative and head of
MINURSO to Laayoune.

15. After the
call, my Personal Envoy undertook the first set of consultations in
the region in almost a year to re-establish contact with
interlocutors old and new, strengthen confidence in the negotiating
process and clarify the way forward on the basis of the approach
identified in my previous report. From 11 to 23 February 2015, he
visited Rabat, Rabouni, Nouakchott and Algiers. During his meetings,
he highlighted the importance of negotiating without preconditions
and in good faith and urged the parties to move beyond their
respective proposals by seeking innovative approaches that could help
to achieve progress towards “a mutually acceptable political
solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people
of Western Sahara”.

16. In Rabat,
my Personal Envoy met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Salaheddine Mezouar, the Minister-Delegate, Mbarka Bouaida, and other
high-level officials. Mr. Mezouar welcomed the telephone call between
the King and myself, highlighting that it had provided the basis for
future interactions. He expressed hope that the negotiating process
would develop in a serene way and without surprises. He reiterated
the long-standing position of Morocco that the autonomy proposal it
had presented in 2007 should serve as the basis for negotiation,
arguing that the Security Council had recognized its pre-eminence. As
on previous occasions, the Minister stressed the role of Algeria in
the conflict and noted that Morocco, a State Member of the United
Nations, and Frente Polisario, a non-governmental movement, should
not be treated on an equal footing.

17. In
Rabouni, near Tindouf, my Personal Envoy met with the
Secretary-General of Frente Polisario, Mohammed Abdelaziz; the
Coordinator of Frente Polisario with MINURSO, M’hamed Khaddad; the
head of Frente Polisario’s negotiating delegation, Khatri Adduh,
and other representatives of the movement. His interlocutors
expressed disappointment at the lack of progress in the negotiating
process, voiced regret that I had provided assurances to Morocco
without consulting them as the other party and manifested their
unhappiness over the lack of attention that they perceived from the
United Nations. They stressed that, as one of the two parties to the
conflict, they should be treated on an equal basis. All interlocutors
expressed uneasiness regarding the growing frustration in the camps,
not only among Saharan youth, but increasingly within the military as
well. They warned that their appeals for patience in the face of
growing disillusionment with the negotiating process were becoming
ineffective owing to the lack of progress.

18. In
Nouakchott, President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and the new Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Vatma Vall Mint Soueina, reiterated Mauritania’s
long-standing position of “positive neutrality” in this conflict.
The President highlighted some of the negative spillover effects of
the dispute, in particular the considerable quantity of cannabis
resin arriving at the northern borders of his country for transit
into Mali and beyond. He underlined that this phenomenon posed a
serious security threat to all countries in the Sahel-Saharan region
in that it helped to finance criminal, extremist and terrorist
groups.

19. In
Algiers, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika received my Personal Envoy
after meetings with Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Ramtane Lamamra and the Minister-Delegate,
Abdelkader Messahel. The Algerian authorities reiterated their
long-standing position regarding the importance of holding a
referendum of self-determination to determine the future of Western
Sahara. In this regard, they insisted on the significance of a
balanced negotiating process under the auspices of the United
Nations. They also stated that Algeria was not a party to the
conflict. All interlocutors criticized the United Nations for having
overstepped its prerogatives in providing “unilateral and
counterproductive” assurances to Morocco, in particular regarding
the present report, without consulting the Security Council or the
other party. The Prime Minister expressed fear that support for
radical groups or a return to military hostilities would grow if the
refugee population lost hope that a political solution could be
found.

20. From 22
to 29 March, my Personal Envoy again travelled to the region to
consult on the next steps, including the preparation of the present
report, visiting successively Nouakchott, Rabouni, Rabat and Algiers.
At each stop, he emphasized the dangers of the situation in the
Sahel-Saharan region, the growing frustrations in the refugee camps
and the importance of an early solution to the Western Sahara
conflict. In Rabouni and Rabat, he sought useful information that
could assist in making the present report a contribution to the
negotiating process. With regard to the next steps, a consensus
emerged that a return to face-to-face discussions between the parties
was premature and that my Personal Envoy should continue his
programme of bilateral consultations and shuttle diplomacy for the
foreseeable future.

21. My
Personal Envoy also resumed his consultations with members of the
Group of Friends, visiting successively, Madrid, Paris, London,
Moscow and Washington, D.C. In the discussions, my Personal Envoy’s
interlocutors expressed satisfaction with the resumption of the
negotiating process and reiterated their full support for his
efforts. For his part, my Personal Envoy highlighted the need to
induce the parties to show flexibility in their long-standing
positions. He also drew attention to the growing security threats in
the Sahel-Saharan region, including a possible future nexus between
the frustrated refugee population and the expanded activities of
criminal, extremist and terrorist groups. He emphasized that such
threats further underscored the importance of an early solution to
the Western Sahara conflict. In Madrid, he also expressed his deep
appreciation for the continuing facilitation of his mission by the
Government of Spain through the provision of a Spanish Air Force
aircraft for his travels within the North African region.

IV. Activities of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara

22. The
period during which my Special Representative was unable to deploy to
MINURSO marked a decline in Mission engagement with the authorities
west of the berm. This included a decline in contacts with senior
officials, whose interlocutor in implementing the mandate of MINURSO
is normally the Special Representative.

A. Operational activities

23. As at 31
March 2015, the military component of MINURSO stood at 203 personnel,
3 of whom were female, against the authorized strength of 246. The
military component remains deployed at nine team sites and at liaison
offices in Tindouf, Algeria, and Dakhla, Western Sahara. The MINURSO
military observer strength has been increased by 15 to 218, with the
additional contributions arriving from existing and new troop
contributors. However, prolonged entry processes for a number of
incoming military personnel contributed to stretching operational
capacity and strained remaining observer assets for part of the
period. On 31 March, MINURSO was notified verbally that the pending
visa applications had been approved.

24. From 1
April 2014 to 31 March 2015, MINURSO conducted 9,502 ground patrols
and 493 aerial patrols to visit and monitor units of the Royal
Moroccan Army and the military forces of Frente Polisario for
adherence to the military agreements. In the course of the patrols,
MINURSO military observers regularly monitored 570 units, 29 training
areas and 316 observation posts, as well as 355 notified operational
activities by the Royal Moroccan Army west of the berm. East of the
berm, military observers regularly monitored 93 units, 8 training
areas and 38 observation posts, as well as 4 notified operational
activities by Frente Polisario military forces. MINURSO observed
eight demonstrations by Frente Polisario supporters near the berm to
verify their exclusively civilian nature and defuse or prevent
possible tensions. On rare occasions, MINURSO military observers
faced verbal aggression by demonstrators expressing dissatisfaction
with the lack of political progress and the failure of the United
Nations to achieve a resolution. In written communications with the
Force Commander, the Royal Moroccan Army complained that such
demonstrations constituted violations of military agreement No.1 and
increased the risk of escalation between the parties.

25.
MINURSO observed one new violation of freedom of movement by the
Royal Moroccan Army. Nine long-standing violations remained, as
indicated in my previous report (S/2014/258,
para. 35). The Royal Moroccan Army removed 123 of the 325 observation
posts comprising its second line of defence 15 kilometres from the
berm, a major long-standing violation since September 2008. As at 9
March 2015, 121 observation posts remained operational. Some 1,000 to
1,200 Moroccan soldiers were redeployed to reinforce strong points
already established on the berm. The Royal Moroccan Army continued to
contest notifications of long-standing violations of the ceasefire
regime, indicating that “situational necessities” unrelated to
the ceasefire were involved. East of the berm, MINURSO recorded two
new violations and two freedom-of-movement violations by Frente
Polisario forces. Three long-standing violations remained, as
indicated in my previous report (ibid.). In their discussions with
MINURSO, both parties reiterated their commitment to the ceasefire.

26. The
Mission’s assessment is that both parties remain fully committed to
and respectful of the ceasefire and that their observed violations do
not jeopardize it in the medium term. Rather, as has been observed in
previous reports, they have resulted in a gradual shift in the
original military status quo over the years.

27. MINURSO
continues to advocate that any discrepancies vis-à-vis the
determination of ceasefire monitoring violations and potential
security concerns in that context be addressed in the framework of
military agreement No.1. The Mission revived dedicated working group
discussions with the parties that were initiated in November 2013 to
clarify understandings of the agreement, reconcile variations in
approach, address the concerns put forward by each party with regard
to application of the agreement in the current operational
environment and strengthen the MINURSO monitoring regime overall, in
particular with regard to access to military facilities and violation
definitions.

28. In March,
April and June 2014, three rounds of discussions were held with
representatives of the Royal Moroccan Army. In March, May, June and
September 2014, four rounds were held with representatives of the
Frente Polisario forces. MINURSO considered the parties’ initial
proposals for potential adjustments to military agreement No.1 and
identified respective areas of concern.

29. In
November 2014, heavy rains and massive flooding caused extensive
damage to Royal Moroccan Army and Frente Polisario facilities, and
the Royal Moroccan Army forwarded a number of requests for and
notifications of repairs to MINURSO. Team sites located east of the
berm were also affected by the storms, which temporarily disrupted
the Mission supply chain. Frente Polisario authorities provided
timely and significant support for MINURSO during the disruption.

30.
Contamination of Western Sahara by landmines and explosive remnants
of war continues to endanger the lives of local, nomadic and refugee
populations, as well as MINURSO military observers and logistical
teams. As at 31 March 2015,
57 cluster strike areas and 41
minefields remained to be addressed. Many are located in areas that
have recently seen increased civilian activity. East of the berm,
four accidents occurred, in which one civilian and one soldier were
killed and five civilians and five soldiers injured. West of the
berm, six incidents occurred in which two civilians and one soldier
were killed and three civilians and three soldiers injured.

31.
East of the berm, humanitarian clearance of landmines and explosive
remnants of war, route verification, risk education and capacity
development activities were undertaken by the MINURSO Mine Action
Coordination Centre, in partnership with the international
non-governmental organizations Action on Armed Violence and Norwegian
People’s Aid, the local non-governmental organization Sahrawi
Campaignto Ban Landmines, and commercial
contractors Mechem and Mine Tech International.Demining
teams cleared 4,608,423 m2
of land and verified 1,766,859 m2
of land along MINURSO patrol routes east of the berm; the Royal
Moroccan Army reported clearance of over 222,800,000 m2
of land west of the berm.

32. Morocco,
Frente Polisario and Algeria have primary responsibility for the
security of United Nations civilian and military staff in the
respective Mission locations. At the request of the Mission, Frente
Polisario also provides MINURSO patrols east of the berm with armed
escorts in the vicinity of the Mauritanian border. In addition, the
Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection of the
European Commission and the Spanish Agency for International
Development Cooperation have funded additional capacities, including
an international security officer integrated into the MINURSO
security management system, to increase security for humanitarian
activities and humanitarian personnel in the camps. Through its
liaison office in Tindouf, MINURSO supports the United Nations
agencies on the ground. The joint security coordination committee
continued to provide a mechanism for cooperation between the United
Nations, donors, humanitarian actors and Frente Polisario, enabling
stakeholders to exchange information and take mitigation measures. My
designated official for security held regular exchanges with the
United Nations humanitarian agencies in the refugee camps near
Tindouf.

33. While the
security environment in Western Sahara appears generally stable, the
longer-term effects of regional instability remain of concern for the
Mission, the parties and their neighbours, all of whom have taken
additional security measures to prevent infiltration by radical
groups. In November 2014, the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior
announced the arrest of four French nationals allegedly linked to
terrorist groups, three of whom were apprehended in Laayoune.
Algerian authorities alerted MINURSO to the suspected transport of
explosives into or via Tindouf province in mid-November 2014; the two
vehicles under surveillance were subsequently stopped in Mauritania.
On 4 December 2014, Frente Polisario security forces intercepted
approximately 120 pounds of cannabis resin from armed smugglers
operating through the east of the berm, the destruction of which
MINURSO was invited to witness in June. During the period, Frente
Polisario reinforced and maintained strengthened security around the
United Nations compound in Tifariti.

34. Given the
potential effects of increasing regional insecurity, MINURSO enhanced
attention to and assessment of security conditions in its area of
operation, requiring military observers to maintain a state of high
alert and to keep the Mission abreast of suspected illegal activities
that could affect their safety. My Special Representative and the
Department of Safety and Security have initiated a reassessment of
security precautions and procedures in cooperation with the parties
and with Algeria. Since April 2014, the Department has conducted two
comprehensive compliance evaluations of the Mission security system,
and its recommendations are now being implemented.

35. The
Department of Peacekeeping Operations conducted a military capability
study of the MINURSO military component in March 2015. The study
reviewed the current configuration and operational capacities
relative to mandated tasks, existing challenges and projected risks
to mandate implementation and personnel, factoring in regional
security dynamics. The effect of the additional 15 observers could
not yet be fully assessed as it was offset by delays in other
incoming observer deployments. Preliminary findings suggest that,
while adequately positioned at the authorized strength to execute
mandate requirements with the cooperation with the parties,
adjustments in patrol route variations, team site rotations and
site-specific security assessments could enhance operational delivery
and the safety of observers. The conclusions and recommendations from
the capability study will be finalized in the coming month and
presented to MINURSO troop contributors.

B. Substantive civilian activities

36. During
the early part of the reporting period, my outgoing Special
Representative maintained constructive contacts with the parties on
all issues related to the Mission mandate, primarily through the
respective coordination offices and directly with Frente Polisario
leadership. During the remainder of the period, the acting head of
Mission, as well as the Political Affairs Office and the liaison
office in Tindouf, continued interactions to the extent possible
pending the arrival of my new Special Representative. Political
affairs officers regularly visited Rabat from May to July 2014,
resuming the visits after the deployment of my new Special
Representative, to inform the diplomatic community about developments
in the area of operations and Mission activities. As noted in
paragraph 4 above, visitors to Laayoune and Tindouf were provided
with briefings and assessments to better understand the local
situation and the work of MINURSO.

37. My new
Special Representative, Kim Bolduc, arrived in the Mission on 6
February 2015, following the conclusion of her predecessor’s
assignment on 31 July 2014. Beginning on 15 November 2014, the
MINURSO leadership function was performed by Ms. Bolduc from
Headquarters in New York. Upon deployment, she was assured by the
Moroccan authorities of their intention to cooperate fully with
MINURSO in all matters concerning implementation of the Mission’s
mandate as defined by the Security Council. They indicated that prior
agreements and procedures would be maintained.

38. The
Frente Polisario leadership renewed its commitment to full support
for and cooperation with my Special Representative in implementing
the Mission’s mandate. East of the berm and in the refugee camps,
access by MINURSO and United Nations agencies to interlocutors
remained unhindered, enabling free interaction with Frente Polisario
representatives and refugees, as well as local and international
civil society organizations. The liaison office in Tindouf maintained
constructive cooperation with the civilian and military components of
Frente Polisario on all matters related to Mission mandate
implementation.

39. Both
parties continue to diverge significantly in their interpretation of
the MINURSO mandate. Morocco considers the mandate to be limited to
ceasefire and military matters, demining and logistical support for
confidence-building measures. Frente Polisario considers that the
organization of a referendum for self-determination remains its
central element. These opposing views have a direct impact on the
credibility of the Mission vis-à-vis the parties, affecting its
ability to fully implement its mandate and exercise standard
peacekeeping functions. For the United Nations, the successive
Security Council resolutions define the mandate of the United Nations
Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. The standard
peacekeeping functions performed by United Nations operations
throughout the world underpin effective mandate implementation,
including assessments of and reporting on local conditions that may
affect their operations and the political processes.

40. The
perception of MINURSO and United Nations impartiality continues to be
affected by the fact that MINURSO vehicles operate with Moroccan
licence plates west of the berm. Logistical and administrative
complications also arise, since Moroccan licence plates must be
removed and replaced by United Nations plates when MINURSO vehicles
cross east of the berm and travel outside the area of operations.
Implementation of the March 2014 verbal agreement of the Moroccan
authorities to gradually replace Moroccan licence plates with United
Nations licence plates for MINURSO vehicles, as agreed with my
previous Special Representative (see S/2014/258,
para. 50), has not begun. The Minister for Foreign Affairs reiterated
this commitment to my new Special Representative in February 2015.

V. Humanitarian activities and human rights

A.
Persons unaccounted for in the conflict

41. The
International Committee of the Red Cross, playing a role as neutral
intermediary, continued to work with the parties and families
concerned in treating the cases of persons still unaccounted for in
relation to the past conflict.

B.
Assistance to and protection of Western Saharan refugees

42. In
accordance with its mandate, the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continued to provide international
protection and, together with its partners, basic life-saving
assistance to refugees in the camps near Tindouf. This included the
implementation of multisectoral activities in the areas of water,
sanitation, health, nutrition, shelter and distribution of non-food
items. UNHCR continued to carry out its mandated responsibilities in
protection and community services through regular field visits and a
network of community refugee outreach workers in all camps. Pending
the registration of the refugees in the camps near Tindouf, the
humanitarian assistance provided by UNHCR and the World Food
Programme (WFP) continued to be based on a population planning figure
of 90,000 vulnerable refugees, with WFP furnishing an additional
35,000 food rations to persons with poor nutritional status in the
camps.

43. In the
health sector, UNHCR and its partners continued to cover up to 60 per
cent of the needs in the refugee camps. Chronic conditions such as
diabetes, high blood pressure, anaemia, heart disease and hepatitis B
remained the main health concerns. The key gaps faced in providing
basic health care were related to the maintenance and development of
the health infrastructure. UNHCR supported multidisciplinary medical
commissions to provide specialized consultations to refugees in the
camps on a quarterly basis. The preventive health programme aimed at
reducing chronic malnutrition and anaemia in the camps targeted more
than 22,000 persons of concern in 2014, including children under 5
years of age and pregnant and lactating women.

44. Working
through its partner organization, UNHCR provided financial support to
1,719 primary, intermediate and secondary school teachers in five
camps, ensuring that all children between the ages of 6 and 11 were
enrolled in primary education and that all children between the ages
of 12 and 14 were enrolled in intermediate school. UNHCR partners
also facilitated capacity-building training focusing on better
teaching and school management. For its part, WFP continued to
support the school feeding programme. Altogether, 450 young refugees
were enrolled in vocational training courses in the camps.

45. During
the reporting period, UNHCR also continued to ensure the supply of
potable water to all refugees living in the five camps. Preventive
plans for the regular maintenance and rehabilitation of water
facilities were implemented to optimize the use of the existing water
infrastructure. Efforts and resources continue to be focused on the
extension of the water distribution network in all camps.

46. Hygiene
kits were distributed to 38,450 women and girls of reproductive age.
Through its partners, UNHCR has also procured raw materials for the
production of bleach and soap, which were distributed to health,
water and education facilities.

47. UNHCR has
been working in close collaboration with relevant basic service
providers for cases of sexual and gender-based violence to ensure
that referral mechanisms and quality response services are available
in terms of legal, medical and psychosocial support.

C.
Confidence-building measures

48. In
conformity with its mandate and principles, and with the cooperation
of both the Government of Morocco and Frente Polisario, UNHCR
implemented the confidence-building measures programme from April to
June 2014, striving to facilitate contact and communication between
refugees in the camps near Tindouf and their families west of the
berm. Family visits, cultural seminars and coordination meetings in
Geneva between the two parties, with the two neighbouring States,
Algeria and Mauritania as observers, remained the three fundamental
components of the updated January 2012 plan of action for the
confidence-building measures programme. MINURSO supported the
programme by providing medical staff and police officers to
facilitate preparations and escort beneficiaries to their
destinations.

49. A total
of 20,699 individuals have benefited from the family visits programme
since 2004. Of that total, 997 persons participated in the family
visits from January to June 2014, including 641 from the Saharan
refugee camps near Tindouf and
356 from west of the berm. Flights
for the family visits have been suspended since June 2014 because of
disagreements between the two parties over the list of candidates for
family visits. Since then, no coordination meeting has taken place.
UNHCR remains ready to facilitate the dialogue required for prompt
resumption of the programme through the existing coordination
mechanism.

D.
Human rights

50.
As jointly agreed, a technical team from the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) visited Laayoune
and Dakhla in Western Sahara from 28 April to 2 May 2014 to help
prepare the visit of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights to Morocco.

51. At the
invitation of King Mohamed VI, the then High Commissioner, Navi
Pillay, visited Morocco from 27 to 29 May 2014 and met with the King,
high-level officials and representatives of the National Human Rights
Council, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council and
representatives of civil society. The High Commissioner noted the
great strides made by Morocco towards better promotion and protection
of human rights. At the same time, she raised human rights concerns,
including in Western Sahara. She encouraged the Government of Morocco
to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms were equally
protected in Morocco and Western Sahara. She stressed that, for the
National Human Rights Council to be able to effectively promote and
protect human rights in Western Sahara, local and national
authorities needed to cooperate fully with the institution, including
by promptly replying to complaints. The High Commissioner expressed
the readiness of OHCHR to provide technical assistance for the two
regional offices of the National Human Rights Council.

52. The
offices of the National Human Rights Council in Laayoune and Dakhla
continued to carry out a range of activities, including monitoring
demonstrations, visiting prisons and medical centres and organizing
capacity-building activities for various stakeholders. The Council
continued to monitor the implementation of the recommendations of the
Equity and Reconciliation Commission for former victims of human
rights violations. In 2014, the offices of the Council received 415
complaints of alleged violations of civil, political, economic and
social rights in Western Sahara and carried out 20 fact-finding
missions in follow up to some of the complaints.

53. During
the reporting period, the Government of Morocco extended invitations
to 10 special procedures mandate holders of the Human Rights Council.
Nevertheless, no visits of special procedures mandate holders were
undertaken west of the berm, for the most part owing to scheduling
issues. Similarly, no special procedures mandate holders visited the
refugee camps near Tindouf.

54. In March
2015, the Government of Morocco invited United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, to visit to
Morocco in the course of the year. In addition, as jointly agreed,
OHCHR would carry out a mission to Morocco and Western Sahara from 12
to 18 April 2015. OHCHR also agreed with the Government of Algeria,
as the host country, and Frente Polisario regarding a mission to
visit the refugee camps near Tindouf from 4 to 10 May 2015.

55. During
the reporting period, some Saharan human rights organizations
continued to face difficulties operating west of the berm, including
their access to official premises, convocation of public events and
holding of demonstrations. One of these organizations, l’Association
sahraouie des victimes des violations graves des droits de l’homme,
had applied for legal status. In March 2015, pursuant to a
recommendation by the National Human Rights Council, the Moroccan
authorities announced its registration. Another organization,
l’Association el Ghad pour les droits de l’homme, was also
registered.

56. According
to some human rights organizations, the Moroccan authorities did not
permit demonstrations in Western Sahara west of the berm during the
reporting period, notably preventing demonstrations calling for
self-determination, defending prisoners’ rights or raising
socioeconomic issues. Such gatherings continued to be forcibly
dispersed, with allegations that Moroccan law enforcement officials
used excessive force in suppressing demonstrations, including towards
women and children. In some cases, protesters and activists were
reportedly subjected to arbitrary arrest, torture, ill treatment and
prosecution. Furthermore, reports indicate that very few injured
protesters, including those detained, had access to a doctor. As a
result, most were unable to obtain a medical certificate to formally
document the violence to which they stated they had been subjected.

57. In
its September 2014 presentation to the Human Rights Council
concerning its visit to Morocco and Laayoune in Western Sahara in
December 2013, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention reported a
number of concerns related to its area of competence, including the
continued detention of the 21 Saharans belonging to the Gdeim Izik
camp group, with some serving life sentences, following a decision of
a military tribunal in 2013 (A/HRC/27/48/Add.5).

58.
Information received from some human rights organizations indicates
acute overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, malnutrition and limited
or no access to medical care in places of deprivation of liberty.
During the reporting period, local human rights organizations
reported that at least three Western Saharans died while in custody
in Western Sahara, including as a result of medical neglect.
According to the Moroccan authorities, two of the deaths were
suicides and one was the result of a prison brawl. On different
occasions during the reporting period, Western Saharan prisoners and
detainees went on hunger strikes in protest against their treatment
and prison conditions. This led in a deterioration of the health of
several persons deprived of their liberty.

59. One major
positive development was Morocco’s accession to the Optional
Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on 24 November 2014. According
to the Optional Protocol, the Government should establish or
designate, within one year of accession, a national preventive
mechanism with a mandate to monitor all places of detention and make
recommendations to the authorities on preventing torture and
ill-treatment, among other things. Accession to the Optional Protocol
and the establishment of a national preventive mechanism should
enhance prevention of torture and ill-treatment, including in Western
Sahara.

60. Another
positive development was the adoption by the Parliament of the new
Code on Military Justice (No.108-13), which was published in the
Official Gazette in January 2015 and is to enter into force
six months after publication. The law excludes civilians from the
jurisdiction of military tribunals, which are competent to deal
solely with military crimes and offences committed in wartime. The
law also provides for the creation of a military court of appeals.
According to the new law, ongoing cases concerning civilians in
military tribunals will be transferred to regular courts.

61. In
its most recent concluding observations concerning Morocco, published
at the end of 2014, the Committee on the Rights of the Child welcomed
the Government’s efforts in Western Sahara, including major
demining efforts, and urged them to respect and protect the rights of
all children living in Western Sahara and to take all necessary
measures to prevent violations of their rights (CRC/C/MAR/CO/3-4,
CRC/C/OPAC/MAR/CO/1).

62.
During the reporting period, investments in the territorial waters
adjacent to Western Sahara continued to be a subject of contention
between the Government of Morocco and Frente Polisario, given the
long-standing status of Western Sahara. Some foreign oil companies,
including Kosmos Energy, carried out oil exploration and exploratory
drilling in Western Saharan territorial waters. In a letter dated 19
March 2015 addressed to me, the Permanent Representative of Morocco
to the United Nations stated that “Kosmos Energy’s exploration
activities were preceded by wide consultations” with the local
population, and “are governed by applicable international
principles and standards … in particular those deriving from the
Charter of the United Nations and recalled in the letter S/2002/161
dated 29 January 2002 addressed to the President of the Security
Council ... by [the] Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs”.
Frente Polisario and Western Saharan organizations spoke out against
these activities repeatedly, pointing out that they had not been
consulted and that any exploitation of resources, if found, would
violate the legal opinion provided in the letter cited above. The
Secretary-General of Frente Polisario, in a letter to me dated 26
January 2015, referred to the activities as a violation of
international law.

63.
Information concerning the human rights of refugees in the camps near
Tindouf remains limited. A report by Human Rights Watch published in
October 2014 stated that it had found no evidence of organized
restrictions on freedom of movement or any pattern of serious abuse,
but had found several areas of concern. These included the
persistence of isolated claims of torture or mistreatment by Frente
Polisario security forces, the use of military courts in
investigating and trying civilians, the persistence of the remnants
of slavery and Frente Polisario’s monopolization of political
speech. The report also highlighted the responsibility of Algeria, as
the host country, for ensuring the protection of the human rights of
all persons on its territory.

64. On
several occasions during the reporting period, Frente Polisario sent
letters to me reiterating its call for the creation of a permanent
United Nations mechanism for the protection and monitoring of human
rights in Western Sahara. In a letter sent to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights dated 4 November 2014, Frente Polisario
offered to facilitate the establishment of a OHCHR presence in the
Tindouf camps, as well as in that part of Western Sahara east of the
berm. Morocco insisted repeatedly that international human rights and
refugee law required OHCHR to work with Algeria, the host country, in
dealing with human rights in the refugee camps.

VI. African Union

65. MINURSO
continued its cooperation with the observer delegation of the African
Union in Laayoune, led by Yilma Tadesse (Ethiopia), as well as its
support for the delegation with logistical and administrative
assistance drawn from its existing resources.

66. In June
2014, the Special Envoy of the African Union for Western Sahara,
former President Joaquim Chissano, met with my Deputy, my Personal
Envoy and other United Nations officials in New York to convey the
concern of the African Union over the lack of progress in the ongoing
negotiations. Mr. Chissano indicated that he sought to play a helpful
role in raising awareness of the need to advance towards a settlement
of the dispute.

67. In a
letter dated 9 June 2014, the Permanent Representative of Morocco
reiterated his Government’s firm opposition to any involvement of
the African Union in the question of Western Sahara, stating that the
organization had lost any legitimacy to play a role in the settlement
of the dispute by taking a position in favour of one party. In a
second letter dated 1 July 2014, he rejected the appointment of Mr.
Chissano as null and void.

68. In
a letter to me dated 30 March 2015, the Chair of the African Union
Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, transmitted the communiqué of
the 496th meeting of the Peace and Security Council, as well as her
report on the Western Sahara negotiations and related issues, and
asked that they be distributed to the Security Council and the
General Assembly (A/69/861-S/2015/240).
In a letter to me dated 5 April 2015, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Morocco reiterated “the categorical opposition of the
Kingdom of Morocco to any role for or involvement by the African
Union, in whatever form, in the issue of the Moroccan Sahara” for a
number of reasons explained in the letter addressed to me by His
Majesty King Mohammed VI in June 2013 and reiterated in subsequent
letters by Moroccan high officials. It was requested that the letter
be circulated as a document of the Security Council and the General
Assembly.

VII. Financial aspects

69. The
General Assembly, by its resolution 68/296, appropriated the amount
of $53.9 million for the maintenance of MINURSO for the period from 1
July 2014 to 30 June 2015. Should the Security Council decide to
extend the mandate of MINURSO beyond 30 April 2015, the cost of
maintaining the Mission until 30 June 2015 would be limited to the
amounts approved by the General Assembly.

70. The
proposed budget for MINURSO for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30
June 2016 in the amount of $53.3 million (exclusive of budgeted
voluntary contributions in kind) has been submitted to the General
Assembly for consideration during the second part of its resumed
sixty-ninth session (A/69/730).

71. As at 25
March 2015, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for
MINURSO amounted to $40.5 million. As at 28 February 2015, amounts
owed to troop contributors totalled $181,200. MINURSO also owed
$114,000 for contingent-owned equipment as of 31 December 2014.
Reimbursement of troop and contingent-owned equipment costs has been
made for the period up to July 2014 and June 2014, respectively,
owing to the insufficiency of cash in the special account of the
Mission.

VIII. Observations and recommendations

72. Given the
lack of progress towards a resolution of the dispute over the status
of Western Sahara, which has not changed since my last report, the
efforts of the United Nations through the work of my Personal Envoy
and of MINURSO remain highly relevant.

73. Growing
frustrations among Western Saharans, coupled with the geographic
expansion of criminal and extremist networks in the Sahel-Sahara
zone, present increased risks for the stability and security of the
region. A settlement of the Western Sahara conflict would mitigate
these potential risks. I reiterate my call on the parties to
seriously engage with the Personal Envoy and to sustain and intensify
their efforts to negotiate a “mutually acceptable political
solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people
of Western Sahara” (see Security Council resolution 2152 (2014),
para. 7). The members of the international community can,
collectively and individually, play a critical role in this regard by
encouraging the parties and the neighbouring States to remain engaged
with my Personal Envoy.

74. In the
light of last year’s protracted period of clarifications at the
request of Morocco, it is too early to provide an indication of
whether or not the new approach of bilateral consultations and
shuttle diplomacy launched by my Personal Envoy will prove fruitful.
However, I expect that he will enjoy the effective support of the
members of the Security Council and the full cooperation of the
parties and neighbouring States as he moves forward, keeping me and
the Security Council informed on the progress for which we all hope.
Forty years after the beginning of this conflict and eight years
after presentation of the parties’ proposals, there can be no
justification for continuing to maintain the status quo and failing
to engage constructively and imaginatively in the search for a
solution.

75. I welcome
the parties’ discussion of military agreement No.1 governing the
ceasefire monitoring regime, and I call for continued and
constructive cooperation with the Mission to move forward on the
issues involved. MINURSO carries out a number of important duties
that derive from Security Council resolutions and normal peacekeeping
functions. I therefore seek the assistance of the Council in
supporting the mandated role of MINURSO, upholding peacekeeping
standards and the impartiality of the United Nations and ensuring
that the conditions for successful operation of the Mission are met.
The Mission’s presence is relevant to ensure the parties’
observation of the ceasefire and as a visible representation of the
international community’s commitment to achieving a resolution to
the conflict. As broad engagement across sectors and communities is
essential for any peacekeeping mission, I hope in particular that the
remaining limitations on its “free interaction with all
interlocutors”, as cited in Security Council resolutions 2044
(2012), 2099 (2013) and 2152 (2014), will be removed. In this
context, and in light of the continuing efforts of my Personal Envoy,
and the continuing importance of MINURSO, I recommend that the
Security Council extend the mandate of MINURSO for a further 12
months, until 30 April 2016.

76. I am
concerned by the suspension of family visits and seminars under the
confidence-building measures programme. I therefore encourage the
parties to re engage in dialogue and resolve any outstanding
issues with the aim of resuming these important humanitarian
programmes for the benefit of the entire Western Saharan population.

77. I urge
the international community to provide urgent additional funding for
the UNHCR mandate programme in the refugee camps near Tindouf, given
the existing gaps in key areas of assistance such as protection,
health, nutrition, food security, shelter, water and sanitation. At
the same time, I note continuing questions about the number of
refugees requiring assistance. These highlight the need to address
registration of the refugee population.

78. I commend
the positive steps that Morocco has taken on the protection of human
rights during the reporting period. These include the adoption of the
new Code on Military Justice and accession to the Optional Protocol
to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. However, while welcoming these
developments, I call on the parties to continue and further enhance
their cooperation with United Nations human rights mechanisms and
OHCHR, including by facilitating OHCHR missions to Western Sahara and
the refugee camps near Tindouf, with unrestricted access to all
relevant stakeholders.

79.
These missions and other future forms of cooperation between the
parties and OHCHR and other United Nations human rights mechanisms
should contribute to an independent and impartial understanding of
the human rights situation in both Western Sahara and the camps, with
the goal of ensuring protection of all, as well as to comprehensive
and sustained implementation of international human rights standards
by the parties. Human rights do not have borders; all stakeholders
are thus obliged to uphold the fundamental freedoms and human rights
of all people. It is vital that all human rights protection gaps and
underlying human rights issues in situations of protracted conflict
be addressed. This would also contribute to creating an environment
conducive to the negotiating process.