A Political Solution to the Afghan War

The U.S. wants a negotiated peace with the Taliban. Here are the issues we'll face, and how they might be resolved

Reuters

The
timeline for U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is now clear: 10,000
troops out by the end of this year and 23,000 more out by the end of
next summer. That will leave 67,000 troops, who, if all goes according
to plan, will be withdrawn before the end of 2014, with a possible
residual assistance force of unspecified size thereafter. That
solves the military equation. But what about the political formula? How
will Afghanistan be governed after we leave? Will it remain under its
current constitution? What role will there be for the Taliban? How will
power be shared between Kabul and the provinces? How about the most
troublesome neighbor, Pakistan? What will its role be? And what can the
United States do to make the answers these questions come out in a
direction that does as little harm to our interests as possible?

President Obama in his withdrawal announcement last month was
remarkably silent on these issues. While clear as usual that our primary
interest in Afghanistan is to defeat Al Qaeda, on governance in
Afghanistan he said only that it won't be "perfect." That is not much
guidance for our diplomats and aid workers, who are looking ahead to an
end-of-year international conference in Bonn expected to set the course
for our coalition partners as well as the Afghans for the three years
then remaining before completion of the withdrawal process.

The
governments of Europe and of other coalition partners want to see
political reconciliation, which has become a popular notion in the U.S.
as well. Retiring Defense Secretary Robert Gates suggested that the end
of this year is a reasonable timeframe for negotiations with the Taliban
to begin yielding results. What can we hope for by way of a political
settlement? What are the options? President Obama, in his June
announcement on Afghanistan, reiterated his goals for reconciliation
negotiations with the Taliban: they must break with Al Qaeda, foreswear
violence, and accept the Afghan constitution. The insurgent leaderships
-- most importantly the Haqqani network and Mullah Omar's Taliban Quetta
Shura -- show little sign of feeling compelled to comply. A few days
after the speech, and presumably in response, Taliban members attacked
the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul, targeting Afghan politicians
gathered to discuss the impending turnover of security responsibility
for Kabul and several provinces to the Afghan National Security Forces.
It's clear that at least some of the Taliban will fight on for a long
time, as insurgents in Iraq have done.

Some Taliban, however, may want a deal, and the German government has been hosting
talks aimed at one. What might the Taliban hope to get in return for
meeting something like the President's redlines? So far, the focus seems
to have been on confidence-building measures like freeing prisoners and
removing Taliban from terrorist lists. Washington does not like to
discuss it, but an overall political settlement will only be possible if
the Taliban get something more substantial in return for whatever we
get.

The options are few (and not mutually exclusive): a share
of political power in Kabul, control over territory, economic benefits,
and guarantees of U.S. withdrawal.

Sharing political power in
Kabul is not an easy fix. The Taliban fought a ferocious civil war
against Northern Alliance and other politicians who today govern in
Kabul, having thrown the Taliban out of Kabul with U.S. assistance in
2001. The Islamist Taliban would want to reintroduce their version of
strict religious practices, a move many in Kabul would resist. Northern
Alliance, many women, secularists, and others would not want to see the
Taliban back in power in Kabul. Former presidential candidate Abdullah
Abdullah and former intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh have become the
leaders of this rejectionist front. It won't be enough for the U.S. to
approve Taliban political involvement -- these Afghan groups would also
need to go along.

Another option would be sharing power at the
provincial level, especially in the more Pashtun provinces of the south
and east. Afghanistan has only rarely been effectively ruled from Kabul.
The Taliban could dominate politics in Helmand, Kandahar, and other
provinces along the border with Pakistan, thus allowing the group its
long-desired role in government without handing over all of Afghanistan.
This could, however, lead to a virtual partition of the country, with
the Taliban-dominated provinces becoming a de facto part of Pakistan.
Some might even say this is good: it would give Pakistan the strategic
depth it seeks in Afghanistan -- reducing its incentives to continue
meddling and promoting militancy -- and prevent New Delhi from
exploiting its relationship with Kabul to the detriment of Islamabad, at
least in the border provinces.

There are only three economic
assets of real value in Afghanistan: control over drug production and
trade, control over mineral resources, and control of border crossings
and transport. The Taliban already exercise a good deal of control over
all three in parts of the countryside where they are dominant. We are
not likely to gain enough control over drugs to interest the Taliban,
who know we would not want to return any control we do gain to them.
Mineral resources, to be effectively exploited, require a national
mining and export framework and guarantees to foreign investors that
only the government in Kabul can provide. If Afghanistan is to prosper,
border crossings and transport will also need to be mainly under
national control.

Finally, the Taliban have sought withdrawal of
foreign forces from Afghanistan. This is a problem. President Karzai
has made it clear that he would like one or more American bases to
remain in Afghanistan after 2014, and talks have begun on a strategic
framework that would enable American forces to stay, provided the Afghan
government asks them to do so. Washington wants such bases so that it
will have the capability to strike against Al Qaeda, either in
Afghanistan or Pakistan. The Taliban will fear that the Americans will
use any residual presence to strike them as well as to shore up Karzai's
government.

Bottom line: the Taliban may well feel that they
can get more by fighting on than by negotiating, but if they get serious
about negotiations they will likely seek a share of power in the south
and east, along with some representation in Kabul. Political power is
likely to bring some economic benefits as well, in particular control
over border crossings and transport. The Taliban would also continue to
control at least some drug production and trade where they are
politically dominant.

This is an unattractive proposition,
especially to Afghan women and the Northern Alliance. It would most
likely resemble Hizbollah's role in Lebanon, which has been a source of
regional instability in the Middle East for many years. Is there
anything that could be done that would amount to more than putting
lipstick on this pig?

The answer is "yes," but it requires the
United States to worry about something it has studiously ignored for
many years: the Durand line, which is the border between Afghanistan and
Pakistan that Afghanistan accepts but Pakistan has not.

I don't
know of any two countries without an agreed and demarcated border that
live happily side by side. When I called on a national security advisor
in Kabul years ago and asked why Afghanistan had not recognized the
Durand line, he responded: "I wouldn't want to foreclose options for
future generations." Pakistan is a country that lives with what it
considers an "existential" threat from India to the south and east. It
surely does not need another threat, however remote, on its western
border. Ethnic Pashtun irredentism -- the Pashtuns live on both sides of
the Durand line -- greatly complicates Islamabad's challenges.

Afghan
recognition of the Durand line as part of a broader deal with the
Taliban would provide Pakistan with an important benefit, without
depriving it of "strategic depth" inside Afghanistan. This would have to
be done in a way that allows a good deal of free movement across the
border, since otherwise the Taliban and other locals, who have enjoyed
relatively free movement for decades, would object. But agreeing to and
demarcating the Durand line would markedly improve relations between
Kabul and Islamabad, enabling them to collaborate on what really counts
for the United States: ensuring that their border area does not become a
haven for international terrorists.