July 28, 1998

Keeping Enemy Missiles at Bay

By RICHARD L. GARWIN

A JOLLA, Calif. -- As one of the nine members of
the bipartisan commission that assessed
the ballistic missile
threat to the United
States, I am alarmed
that some have interpreted our findings as providing support for a new
national missile defense system.

It is true that in our report to
Congress two weeks ago we warned
of possible near-term threats from
short-range, ship-launched ballistic
missiles, which could carry biological agents or nuclear weapons, as
well as from longer-range ballistic
missiles from North Korea, which
could strike some of the Hawaiian
islands and the Aleutian chain in
Alaska. We also saw a potential longer-term threat to some of the contiguous 48 states from biological and
nuclear payloads on intercontinental-range missiles launched from
North Korea or Iran.

Should Iran or North Korea embark on a well-financed program and
make good use of technology and
advice from Russia, China and from
each other, both these countries
could build a few ICBM's within five
years. In the case of Iraq, it might
take 10 years.

Since these nations operate secretively -- conducting their work underground, at night or under cloud cover
to avoid observation by our satellites
-- it is possible that we might not
learn of a long-range rocket until it
was tested. By then, the nation that
built it could be only a year or two
away from having a few missiles capable of reaching the United States.

Just last week, Iran successfully
tested a medium-range missile capable of hitting Israel and Saudi Arabia. All this is cause for concern.

While the commission did not
study defending the United States
against these missiles, I believe
there is no reason that the national
missile defense advocated by some
in Congress should be built now. No
defensive system under consideration can neutralize these threats. The
defense that is now being developed
would not even detect, let alone
counter, ship-launched short-range
missiles. Nor could the proposed defense work against ICBM's that employ simple countermeasures.

Missiles that carry biological
weapons can be divided into dozens
of small bombs, each equipped with
its own heat shield against the heat
of re-entry. These warheads would
be far too numerous to be intercepted by a missile defense.

A nuclear warhead could also escape destruction if it were concealed
in a large balloon that inflated once
the warhead separated from the
rocket; our interceptor would strike
a portion of the balloon but miss the
warhead. Any team of technicians
and engineers with the know-how to
build ICBM's could easily build these
countermeasures.

The best way to defend against
possible attack is to prevent countries like North Korea, Iran and Iraq
from getting these missiles in the
first place. If they obtain them anyway, they will be vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike. Above all, they can
be deterred from using these weapons by the threat of major destruction in return.

In our concern with these emerging powers, we must remember that
the only real threat to our survival
comes from Russia, which has thousands of long-range nuclear warheads. We should try to eliminate
this arsenal by proposing the third
stage in strategic arms reduction to
encourage Russia to ratify Start 2
and move on to Start 3.

American security, like that of all
other nations, depends on political
pressures and constructive diplomacy, imperfect though these tools are.
It would be foolhardy to base our
security on a 21st-century Maginot
Line.

Richard L. Garwin, a physicist and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, has advised the Government on nuclear issues since 1950.