The Panel reduced the amount of costs sought by the respondent
by a further 50 per cent.

[179] The quantum of costs to be awarded by a tribunal is also amatter of discretion. As Sharpe J.A. said in Rowan, at para. 92:Costs orders are entitled to deference on appeal. Where the tribunal mak-ing the order has expressly taken into account the very point advanced onappeal, an appellate court will rarely interfere.

[180] There is simply no basis for this court to interfere with
the costs award.

( ii) Azeff and Bobrow

[181] Azeff was found to have violated the Act five times.
Bobrow was found to have violated the Act twice. Azeff was
assessed an administrative penalty of $750,000 and Bobrow an
administrative penalty of $300,000. Again, these penalties would
reflect an amount of $150,000 per violation. Both Azeff and
Bobrow were ordered to disgorge the profits that they personally
made. Azeff was ordered to pay costs in the amount of $175,000
and Bobrow was ordered to pay costs in the amount of $125,000.

[182] Azeff and Bobrow repeat the arguments made by Finkelstein regarding the administrative penalties. I make the same
response to those arguments that I have made above.

[183] Azeff and Bobrow also complain that the administrative
penalties represent multiples of the profits that they earned that
are out of line with other cases. Applying a multiplier to the profit
earned is only one of the ways in which an administrative penalty
can be tested as to its appropriateness. As the Panel noted, applying a multiplier to the profit earned does not account for the situation, such as Finkelstein’s, where no profit is earned. Further, the
fact that a violator of the insider trading/tipping section of the Act
does not earn a profit, or a large profit, does not diminish the seriousness of the conduct. It also does not account for the fact, as was
the case here, that friends, family and clients of the violators
may earn substantial profits. On that latter point, the administrative penalty levied against Azeff represents 37.5 per cent of the
$2 million in profit said to have been gained by others. In the case
of Bobrow, it represents only 15 per cent.

[184] For these reasons, the application of a multiplier to profits is, in my view, one of the weaker mechanisms by which to
determine the appropriate administrative penalty. It may provide a useful cross-check, but it ought not to be the starting
point or the determining factor. The severity of the conduct, the
number of violations, the personal circumstances of the violator,