tag:theconversation.com,2011:/institutions/polish-academy-of-sciences-2789/articles Polish Academy of Sciences2018-01-17T02:33:55Ztag:theconversation.com,2011:article/882392018-01-17T02:33:55Z2018-01-17T02:33:55ZIs Democracy Dead or Alive? Democracy has a future, if we rethink and remake it<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/198445/original/file-20171211-27719-ni5dcl.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">While some are declaring that democracy has had its day, others see this as a time to develop more truly democratic ways of living.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://www.leopoldmuseum.org/en/leopoldcollection/masterpieces/41">Gustav Klimt, Death and Life, 1910</a></span></figcaption></figure><p><em>These comments on the global fate of democracy, the first in a three-part series, <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/is-democracy-dead-or-alive-48686">Is Democracy Dead or Alive?</a>, are gathered by <a href="https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/democratic-theory/democratic-theory-overview.xml">Democratic Theory</a> and co-published by The Conversation with the <a href="http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/">Sydney Democracy Network</a>. Several of these comments will feature as full-length articles in a special issue of Democratic Theory.</em></p>
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<p>Consider Brexit, the election of US President Donald Trump, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s <a href="https://theconversation.com/turkey-on-the-verge-of-democide-as-referendum-looms-74621">referendum</a>, Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte’s policy of <a href="https://theconversation.com/philippines-cannot-build-a-nation-over-the-bodies-of-100-000-dead-in-dutertes-war-on-drugs-64053">state-sanctioned murder</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/hungary-cracks-down-on-foreign-funding-dealing-a-harsh-blow-to-ngos-and-to-european-democracy-77185">Hungary’s</a> drift towards a new authoritarianism.</p>
<p>“Democracy is dead,” say the disheartened. “It’s time to bury democracy,” <a href="http://www.arabnews.com/node/1085336/world">pounds</a> one Tunisian pro-Sharia party. “Democracy has fallen, we need a new game in town,” argue Vladimir Putin’s populist and Xi Jinping’s neo-authoritarian allies.</p>
<p>These mantras, circulated widely through social media, have ricocheted around the world and were felt perhaps most viscerally in 2017. It was a year full of political events that, in hindsight, look like a string of assaults against democratic ways of living.</p>
<p>Is democracy dying, or perhaps already dead? Is it really time to eulogise democracy, or are we rather on the cusp of a new phase in its long and varied life? <strong>– Jean-Paul Gagnon, University of Canberra</strong></p>
<h2>Anguish about democracy attests to its value</h2>
<p><strong>Alice el-Wakil, University of Zurich</strong></p>
<p>It has become common that under half of the citizenry votes in most Western democracies, that anti-democratic politicians get elected, and that elected authorities are accused of failing to protect citizens’ interests.</p>
<p>Corruption and nepotism are making comebacks and inequalities of all sorts are on the rise. At this time it is legitimate to ask whether democracy is breaking apart. </p>
<p>However, this worrisome situation should not transform us into sceptics about democracy. The outcry against the problems mentioned above shows that the public notices and criticises political shortcomings to realise democratic ideals – that there is something about democracy worth mobilising for.</p>
<p>Hence, as certain existing democratic regimes risk being perverted, we should use this critical moment to reinvent and expand democracy.</p>
<p>In most parts of the world, democracy has so far only taken the form of a specific kind of institutional arrangement, namely electoral representative democracy. It relies on a valuable but limited set of institutions, which preserves an <a href="http://www.the-college-reporter.com/2017/03/05/yale-theorist-helene-landemore-promotes-open-democracy-democratic-experimentation/">exclusionary bias</a> and a fundamental suspicion of citizens’ capacity to make political decisions. </p>
<p>The current challenges to this specific set of institutions should encourage us to acknowledge alternative, emerging practices of democratic participation and to create and experiment with complementary institutions. </p>
<p>Referendum procedures, new forms of representation, or assemblies of citizens are examples of the innovations we should consider to <a href="http://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/democratic-theory/4/1/dt040101.xml">revivify</a> democratic systems. Be it only because democracy enables us to publicly, legitimately and continuously question its value and to peacefully propose new ways of realising it.</p>
<h2>Don’t look to the powerful for answers</h2>
<p><strong>Anna Szolucha, University of Bergen</strong></p>
<p>The democratic impulse rarely originates in the corridors of power. Certain political elites may have a knack for exploiting right-wing populist and nationalist narratives to rewrite history and give a semblance of democratic legitimacy to the “corporate state”, but they are hardly effective when it comes to promoting popular concerns about freedom, justice, equality and social dialogue.</p>
<p>Normally, democracy is fought for and won by <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=VgkxDQAAQBAJ&amp;printsec=frontcover&amp;dq=%22anna+szolucha%22&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;redir_esc=y">ceaseless struggles and popular resistances</a>. </p>
<p>During the wave of pro-democratic protests that recently swept through the world, protesters in the West were critical of the liberal representative model of democracy, growing inequalities, and the influence of business on politics.</p>
<p>It’s clear there is a need to rethink democracy. The solution, however, is not to revamp the old model but to defend and simultaneously revisit the idea of democracy. We need to do so in such a way that it fosters equality, freedom and a sense that ordinary citizens have a greater influence on politics – virtues that the liberal representative version has failed to deliver.</p>
<p>The task of rethinking democracy is pressing because we are witnessing arrogant and aggressive attempts by political elites to appropriate democratic language to expand their own powers. </p>
<p>Despite massive protests and opposition to their policies, they call on “<a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/democracy-futures-populism-43503">The People</a>” to offer more undemocratic solutions to real or imagined problems. They curtail freedom, centralise control, divide society, destroy the climate and institutionalise their privilege in the process.</p>
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<figcaption><span class="caption">The more than 13.4 million files in the Paradise Papers revealed the workings of the tax haven industry.</span></figcaption>
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<p>The rethinking and remaking of democracy is going to take effort and perseverance, but the continuing resistance shows that now is definitely not the time to announce the death of democracy because it never belonged to those who seem to be killing it in the first place.</p>
<h2>Three keys to democratic values</h2>
<p><strong>Nancy Rosenblum, Harvard University</strong></p>
<p>Authoritarian power grabs – those grim assaults on constitutional democracy – demand political and legal resistance. Illiberal populism – those episodic rejections of the terms of political representation – demand the rehabilitation of hollowed-out parties.</p>
<p>Authoritarianism is the business of predators: the cynical exploitation of the democratic weaknesses of the moment. Populism is expressive anger: a reaction against conditions of the moment felt to be threatening and out of control. Both are caused by democracy’s own political demons.</p>
<p>We don’t need to relitigate democracy, but we do need a full-throated affirmation of its value, which comes in three different keys.</p>
<p>The aspirational key: democracy is a system of political representation rooted in the moral ground of the equal value of all the governed. No constitutional arrangement is democratic without aspirational commitment to civil and political equality in the form of civil and political rights. No bad faith “illiberal democracy” makes that commitment.</p>
<p>The outcome key: over time and in the face of vicissitudes and ineptitude, democracy aims at general wellbeing more consistently and competently than other forms of government. Democracy is the only self-correcting system. Democracies have recessions, depressions and fumbling responses to crises. They do not have famines.</p>
<p>The defence against tyranny key: civil society is the bulwark against arbitrary and total power. Only democracy cultivates freedom of association and its product: the <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=vnjqCgAAQBAJ&amp;printsec=frontcover&amp;dq=%22nancy+rosenblum%22&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;redir_esc=y">groups, associations, networks and political parties</a> that fuel unendingly contested democratic politics and that make trouble.</p>
<h2>Our best check on elite tyranny</h2>
<p><strong>David Teegarden, University at Buffalo – State University of New York</strong></p>
<p>Democratic governance provides the best practical check on elite domination. The citizenry has numerical superiority in every state. Unfortunately, elites (wealth, military, religious) know how to atomise and render them effectively powerless: thus the persistence of narrow oligarchy and autocracy throughout recorded history.</p>
<p>However, democratic institutions such as elections, the law and the free press, along with their ideals of political equality and individual freedom, can facilitate citizens’ efforts to co-ordinate their actions, draw upon their collective strength and force their elite competitors to agree to some sort of co-operative relationship. </p>
<p>In a functioning democracy, everybody – even billionaires, generals and bishops – must obey laws made by and enforced by all citizens.</p>
<p>It is certainly true that democratic governance often breeds contentious public discourse. It can lead to terrible, even disastrous outcomes from time to time. But it is far better to endure those things than to endure the horror of being forced to bow down publicly to <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=GY6GAAAAQBAJ&amp;printsec=frontcover&amp;dq=death+to+tyrants&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;redir_esc=y">an oppressive tyrant</a> with no realistic hope of betterment either for yourself or for your children.</p>
<h2>Solutions start with a constructive critique</h2>
<p><strong>Peter Wilkin, Brunel University</strong></p>
<p>Representative democracy has always been regarded as problematic by <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=RWLNDAAAQBAJ&amp;printsec=frontcover&amp;dq=%22peter+wilkin%22+AND+%22democracy%22&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;redir_esc=y">those who have sought to replace it</a> with authoritarian rule. Today many of these authoritarian trends have gained new voice and increasingly anti-democratic forces can be found.</p>
<p>But we can’t conflate all challenges to representative democracy as being the same. We can distinguish between those social forces that draw inspiration from the radical right – such as <a href="https://blogs.crikey.com.au/worldisnotenough/2017/03/03/macedonia-debates-country/">ethnonationalism</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/world/europe/europe-neo-fascist-revival-slovakia.html">neo-fascism</a>, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/henry-giroux-joan-pedro-cara-ana/henry-giroux-public-intellectual-on-menace-of-trump-and-new-authori">militarism</a> – and those that can be seen as a novel continuation of the libertarian socialist tradition – <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupy_Wall_Street">Occupy</a>, <a href="https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/08/economist-explains-15">Black Lives Matter</a>, <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/10/kurds-rojava-syria-isis-iraq-assad/505037/">Rojava</a>.</p>
<p>The radical right is intolerant, aggressive and wants to capture the state for authoritarian ends and to nationalise capitalism. </p>
<p>By contrast, the libertarian socialist tradition is an attempt to extend democracy into areas like the economy (for example the <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/new-zealand-plan-to-give-everyone-a-citizens-wage-and-scrap-benefits-a6932136.html">citizen’s wage</a>, <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/neweconomics/universal-basic-income-is-a-neoliberal-plot-to-make-you-poorer/">universal income</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_democracy">worker control of industry</a>). Libertarian socialists also attempt to reconfigure centralised state power and restore decision-making to communities.</p>
<p>Both movements are responding to the same conditions: the polarising impact of capitalism on social life (inequality, insecurity, poverty) and the failure of representative democracy to offer solutions to these problems. </p>
<p>Such solutions are simpler for the radical right, which has no commitment to democracy or civil liberties. The radical right wants to impose order upon society by any means, including violence and intimidation.</p>
<p>For movements inspired by the libertarian socialist aspiration to deepen, enrich and extend democracy, finding solutions is much harder. The means to be used are seen as fundamental to the society that will emerge. </p>
<p>As a result, violence, fear, propaganda and other powerful anti-democratic tools are eschewed in favour of education and organising communities through dialogue and negotiation.</p>
<h2>Overcome short-termism for democratic renewal</h2>
<p><strong>Graham Smith, University of Westminster</strong></p>
<p>In privileging the present over long-term sustainability, contemporary democracies have failed to deal effectively with climate change. But this does not mean, <a href="http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/whp/ev/2015/00000024/00000003/art00006">as some suggest</a>, that we require a more authoritarian solution. Rather, we need to understand the sources of short-termism and think more creatively about our democratic institutions and practices.</p>
<p>The sources of short-termism are multiple and mutually reinforcing. These include: short electoral cycles that incentivise limited party-political horizons; vested interests that benefit from current political and economic arrangements; our psychological preference for immediate gratification; an economic system that privileges carbon-based consumption; and unborn generations who are unable to defend their interests.</p>
<p>These examples could be seen as a litany of despair. Or they could be recognised as a new set of challenges on which to base democratic renewal. </p>
<p>The potential contours for a reinvigorated long-term democracy are beginning to emerge. <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?id=8FPFBQAAQBAJ&amp;pg=PT78&amp;dq=%22graham+smith%22+AND+%22future+generations%22&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;redir_esc=y">Imaginative and practical democratic innovation</a> already includes: institutional experimentation such as <a href="https://books.google.com.au/books?hl=en&amp;lr=&amp;id=YfW4DQAAQBAJ&amp;oi=fnd&amp;pg=PA117&amp;dq=%22future+generations%22+AND+%22democracy%22&amp;ots=snBzcUcH6_&amp;sig=a9thNf8CVzAx0cSjWdxcvDkrjkA">independent offices for future generations</a> that scrutinise the decision-making of other public bodies; new rights and forms of public participation designed to orientate citizens towards consideration of future generations; and co-operatives and other forms of collective corporate governance that prioritise sustainability over immediate economic return.</p>
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<span class="caption">Leading policymakers, business leaders and civil society activists gathered in 2017 for the first UN Global Festival of Ideas for Sustainable Development.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Global Festival of Action/flickr</span></span>
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<h2>Time to get serious about citizenship education</h2>
<p><strong>Ryusaku Yamada, Soka University</strong></p>
<p>Civil society, voluntary associations, active citizenship, social capital – these were the rosy keywords often used in discussions of radical democracy at the end of the 20th century.</p>
<p>Now, nearly 20 years later, we are seeing that people’s active participation can be negative, driven by emotional populist movements. Social capital is not always strong enough to empower people who are alienated and excluded from decision-making. Civil society is often uncivil.</p>
<p>History tells us that the so-called democratic political system does not guarantee the improvement of democratic society. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Mannheim">Karl Mannheim</a>, for example, who analysed mass society in the <a href="https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/humaff.2016.26.issue-2/humaff-2016-0011/humaff-2016-0011.xml">age of fascism</a>, worried about an irrational democracy of emotions. </p>
<p>Mannheim was an advocate of social education (a concept similar to citizenship education today), which is meant to make the attitudes and behaviours of both common people and elites more democratic.</p>
<p>Although some might doubt the efficacy of such an education for the democratisation of society, it hasn’t in any serious way been tried before. As the old saying goes: we won’t know if it’ll work until we try. </p>
<p>For Mannheim and some of his contemporaries like <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Dewey">John Dewey</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T._S._Eliot">T.S. Eliot</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandie_Lindsay,_1st_Baron_Lindsay_of_Birker">A.D. Lindsay</a>, democracy is not only a political system but also a way of life. Citizenship education is not only a matter of school education but also of people’s social practice in their everyday lives. </p>
<p>Far from saying “democracy is dying”, we need to say that “now is the time for democracy to be lived”.</p>
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<p><em>Read parts 2 and 3 of the series <a href="https://theconversation.com/au/topics/is-democracy-dead-or-alive-48686">here</a>.</em></p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/88239/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Ryusaku Yamada receives funding from Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Alice el-Wakil, Anna Szolucha, David A. Teegarden, Graham Smith, Nancy L. Rosenblum, and Peter Wilkin do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Is it really time to eulogise democracy, or are we rather on the cusp of a new phase in its long and varied life?Alice el-Wakil, PhD Researcher, University of ZürichAnna Szolucha, Research Fellow, Polish Institute of Advanced Studies, Polish Academy of SciencesDavid A. Teegarden, Associate Professor, Director of Undergraduate Studies, Department of Classics, University at Buffalo, The State University of New YorkGraham Smith, Professor of Politics, University of WestminsterNancy L. Rosenblum, Senator Joseph Clark Research Professor on Ethics in Politics and Government, Harvard UniversityPeter Wilkin, Reader In Communications Media & Cultural Studies, Brunel University LondonRyusaku Yamada, Professor of Political Theory, Soka UniversityLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/841642017-09-28T12:29:13Z2017-09-28T12:29:13ZIn Central Europe, militarised societies are on the march<p>Russia recently held one of the largest “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/world/europe/russia-baltics-belarus.html">war games</a>” since the Cold War, on its Western borders. The drill exercised combat scenarios recently used in Ukraine and tested the compatibility of the Belarusian army with Russian forces. </p>
<p>Politicians from Poland, Ukraine and Baltic states viewed the exercise as aggressive as they mistrust the Kremlin and fear possible security threats in the region. They used the drill to justify the <a href="http://neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1862-the-rise-of-paramilitary-groups-in-central-and-eastern-europe">ongoing “social militarisation”</a> of their respective countries. </p>
<p>This is essentially a rise of state support or enthusiasm for voluntary defence organisations which are sometimes armed, committed to “national causes” and often have roots in right-wing political organisations.</p>
<p>Yet is the “Russian threat” the sole reason why right-wing politicians in the region want to militarise their societies?</p>
<h2>Training for war</h2>
<p>With the post-1989 transition to liberal democracy and NATO accession, Central Europe began a gradual process of social demilitarisation towards a Western model of civilian states. Slowly but steadily armies were reduced in size and professionalised. </p>
<p>In recent years, however, this model of statehood and citizenship has been seriously challenged in Central Europe. </p>
<p>The region has experienced a significant rise in the number and visibility of grassroots paramilitary actors ranging from <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35919068">anti-refugee vigilantes in Bulgaria and Hungary</a> through pro-Kremlin militias <a href="http://www.stopfake.org/en/is-pro-russian-propaganda-fueling-czech-and-slovak-paramilitary-groups/">in Slovakia and Czech Republic</a> to a civilian component cooperating with the armed forces in the Baltics and Poland. By 2019, Poland expects to have trained 53,000 people for its <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/poland-to-build-territorial-defense-force-by-2019/a-36386036">Territorial Defence Forces</a>, a new volunteer segment of the army built entirely of local citizens – many of them members of already existing paramilitary groups.</p>
<h2>Military picnics</h2>
<p>Normalisation of the paramilitary sector goes hand in hand with a diffusion of military values and practices to everyday life. For example, in Poland the teaching of history is increasingly centred around military events. WW2-themed clothing and <a href="http://wroclawuncut.com/2016/07/22/controversy-new-cursed-soldiers-energy-drink/">accessories</a> are growing popular too and families can be seen attending military-themed <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a0dd41e0-615b-11e7-91a7-502f7ee26895">picnics</a> featuring shooting ranges and weapons displays. The visibility of military uniforms in the public sphere has grown too. In Estonia, meanwhile, people are signing up for <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/01/18/world/estonians-join-paramilitary-forces-face-russia-fears/">weekend training</a> sessions with volunteer paramilitary groups.</p>
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<span class="caption">Army-themed amusement park in Russia. Military style is all the rage in neighbouring European countries too.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_Park#/media/File:Army-2015_2.png">Government.ru/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/">CC BY-ND</a></span>
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<p>This ideological shift became very clear when the Polish minister of defence Antoni Macierewicz made an appearance on a morning <a href="http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,114883,21455432,wreszcie-jest-teleranek-z-macierewiczem-szef-mon-niczym-dobry.html">television programme</a> for children. Sitting among a group of youngsters over bowls of army-style pea stew, he talked to the children about the importance of fighting for sovereignty.</p>
<p>Children are also being courted by the Hungarian governing party FIDESZ. Its officials are currently implementing a broad patriotic and national defence <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/hungary-pm-viktor-orban-aims-to-militarize-the-school-system/a-40088250">programme</a> beginning in kindergarten. They are contemplating including shooting classes and military training in schools. Following the path of his Estonian and Polish counterparts, the Hungarian minister of defence, István Simicskó, has praised volunteer territorial defence forces. He is also endorsing the idea to build state-owned <a href="https://budapestbeacon.com/hungary-to-invest-92-million-building-firing-ranges-with-clubhouses/">shooting ranges</a> in each county to popularise military skills.</p>
<h2>Towards militarised governance</h2>
<p>Central European leaders <a href="http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/250195,New-%E2%80%98territorial-defence%E2%80%99-force-for-Poland">claim</a> their societies need to be prepared to face challenges brought about by the refugee, terrorist and Ukrainian crises. Yet wide-scale societal militarisation has stirred concern among both military officials and civil society. </p>
<p>Many see it as part of the <a href="http://www.publicseminar.org/2016/09/thoughts-on-the-hungarian-and-polish-new-right-in-power/#.WcTot9FpGM8">illiberal political transformation</a> which is underway in the region and aims to popularise an alternative model of governance which combines democratic procedures such as multi-party system and general elections with a disregard for human rights and constitutional limits to power.</p>
<p>In Poland and Hungary, civil society activists <a href="http://www.hfhr.pl/en/polka-nie-podlegla-poster-case-trial-commences/">are portrayed as enemies</a> and national traitors. There are also extraordinary measures against perceived threats, such as activists and journalists increasingly <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur37/6567/2017/en/">face financial penalties</a> and even <a href="https://www.liberties.eu/en/news/reporter-working-in-bialowieza-forest-area-attacked">direct violence</a>.</p>
<h2>‘Remasculinisation’</h2>
<p>Right-wing ideologues also wish to regenerate the society that they consider broken and morally corrupt. In their <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/valerie-sperling/putin-female-fans-shirtless_b_6664240.html">narrative</a>, the journey towards liberal democracy and global governance is told as a story of emasculation of men and loss of their agency over their lives and their countries. </p>
<p>As argued by panelists of the <a href="http://dzienzycia.pl/kongres-rodziny/#panele">National Congress of Families</a> held in Warsaw in 2017, militarisation is the solution to a crisis of masculinity in Poland.</p>
<p><a href="http://prawy.pl/4201-marian-pilka-narod-wojownikow/">In the words</a> of former MP of the ruling Law and Justice party Marian Piłka – the militarised “New Man” has character traits which are needed to advance the country’s international standing as well as forge a “new form of Polishness” capable of overcoming “post-communist mediocrity”.</p>
<p>Members of Territorial Defence Forces are to receive <a href="http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/278447,Poland-wants-to-introduce-new-Territorial-Defence-forces-next-year">€125 monthly</a> along with additional financial rewards for completing all training. They also enjoy special protection of labour contracts preventing employers from firing them while in service. </p>
<p>Families benefiting from such programmes could contribute to the emergence of a substantial new patriotic middle class.</p>
<h2>Can the civilian state be saved?</h2>
<p>In 2012, hopes were raised of a future without military violence when the European Union received the Nobel Peace Prize for the <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/press.html">“advancement of peace and reconciliation”</a> on the continent. Yet today in Central Europe, the civilian state is trembling. </p>
<p>Objective security challenges such as the terrorist threat or the Kremlin’s superpower ambitions certainly play a role in boosting nationalist militarism. But the public attractiveness of the militarised model of governance and citizenship has as much to do with with severe social costs and unfulfilled promises of the post-1989 transition. </p>
<p>Therefore, to save European civilian states, advocates will need to take seriously the underlying causes fuelling militaristic sentiments. One of them is the unfulfilled need of individuals for security, well-being and upward mobility. Another is a sense of being left out and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-12/how-western-capital-colonized-eastern-europe">deprived of control over their economic future</a>. If these very real issues are not addressed in a progressive way, nationalist militarism will continue to seem like a legitimate answer.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/84164/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Weronika Grzebalska does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Politicians are promising to advance their countries' international positions through nationalist militarisation and celebration of virile men.Weronika Grzebalska, PhD researcher, Graduate School for Social Research, Polish Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/715752017-05-26T06:39:20Z2017-05-26T06:39:20ZIs China the potential driver of a new wave of globalisation?<p><strong><em>The final part of our series <a href="https://theconversation.com/global/topics/globalisation-under-pressure-38722">Globalisation Under Pressure</a> considers how China is trying to take a leading role in continued global integration with its Belt and Road Initiative, and the obstacles it faces.</em></strong></p>
<hr>
<p>Since the 2008 global financial crisis – and with a particular impetus after Xi Jinping <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/15/xi-jinping-communist-party-chinese">became president</a> in 2012 – China’s foreign policy has been characterised by a departure from a “keeping a low profile” approach to one of “<a href="https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/7/2/153/438673/From-Keeping-a-Low-Profile-to-Striving-for">striving for achievement</a>”. </p>
<p>Putting to use its economic, political and symbolic capital in global affairs, China has developed diplomatic thinking and practice that’s not just concerned with short-term economic benefit. Rather, it has focused on the long-term impact of its actions on both the outlook of the world system and the country’s position in it.</p>
<p>One of the ways China is seeking to achieve this is through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as the 21st-century Silk Road. </p>
<p>Formally announced in 2013, the BRI brings together a <a href="https://cpianalysis.org/2016/10/07/how-new-is-the-belt-and-road/">number of pre-existing</a> as well as novel elements to provide <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/chieco/v40y2016icp314-321.html">a strong link</a> between China’s domestic imperatives and its global orientation. It has thus become a focal point for the country’s resources, institutions and ideas. </p>
<p>The BRI is a concept with Chinese features; it is characterised by incrementalism, inductive thinking, and experimentation. It is not a uniform project, as different legs and sections of it differ from each other considerably – it includes a major <a href="http://cpec.gov.pk/">China-Pakistan Economic Corridor</a>, which has a notable developmental component, for instance, and buying and operating ports in developed countries such as <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/218666/article/ekathimerini/business/coscos-ambitious-plans-for-piraeus-port">Greece</a>.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://www.orfonline.org/expert-speaks/china-bri-forum-pursuing-change/">BRI Forum in Beijing</a> on May 14-15 gathered together dozens of heads of states and many more representatives of governments around the world. </p>
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<span class="caption">The BRI forum in Beijing hosted 29 head of states, including Vladimir Putin (left) and Recept Tayyep Erdogan (right).</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/54491/photos/48321">Kremlin Press Office</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
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<p>Although initially announced as having a specific geographic focus on <a href="http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/china-one-belt-one-road-initiative-what-we-know-thus-far">Asia, Europe and parts of Africa</a>, it is now clear that the BRI is a <a href="https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/wcm.files/upload/CMSydylyw/201705/201705110537027.pdf">truly global initiative</a>, as it aims also to involve the Americas and Oceania.</p>
<h2>Global growth</h2>
<p>In the last four decades, China has risen economically by <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/essays/21609649-china-becomes-again-worlds-largest-economy-it-wants-respect-it-enjoyed-centuries-past-it-does-not">integrating itself</a> in the global economy and gradually upgrading its position in the world. The country’s economic development would have not been possible without <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/app5.10/full">the growth of others</a>. </p>
<p>Today, China is not only the second-largest economy (poised to overtake the US in the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/the-world-s-top-economy-the-us-vs-china-in-five-charts/">near future</a>), but also the engine of the world economy. It is <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/09/why-china-is-central-to-global-growth">central</a> to global economic growth. </p>
<p>It is thus expected that China will assume a more significant role in shaping the future of the global economy. And the BRI is one way it will do this.</p>
<p>The BRI essentially promotes “<a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23792949.2016.1232598?journalCode=rard20">strategic international economic partnerships and multilateral credit to address investment, infrastructure, employment and economic development</a>”, with the goal of reinvigorating global economic growth. </p>
<p>One of the main concepts that defines China’s approach is <a href="http://english.gov.cn/premier/news/2015/03/28/content_281475079065086.htm">production capacity cooperation</a> – best described as the pooling together of resources to meet each other’s needs. The goal of this is to contribute to strengthening trade routes and supply chains, and to ensure sustainable flows of goods and services. </p>
<p>The initiative is a global plan that exceeds all previous such plans; it is <a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/the-one-belt-one-road-explained/news-story/d02f063add5ad39d0bddda1718d0d416">seven times</a> larger than the post-second world war US Marshall Plan.</p>
<h2>State and market</h2>
<p>In developing the BRI, Chinese policymakers have drawn on the country’s own experience of developing by <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/xiaolian.htm">“reform and opening up”</a> and the evolving ideology of the Communist Party of China (CPC).</p>
<p>Most significantly, the BRI invokes the central tenets of present-day <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/editorials/sinified-marxism/articleshow/2481741.cms">Sinified Marxism</a>: the state is the most responsible actor for bringing about prosperity, and the market is the main instrument through which this can be achieved. </p>
<p>To describe this complex state-market nexus in China, developmental sociologists <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Global-Rise-China-Today/dp/0745664741">Alvin Y. So and Yin-Wah Chu</a> propose the purposefully self-contradicting term “state neoliberalism” as opposed to the Western-style “market neoliberalism”. </p>
<p>It posits that the party-state needs to be powerful and politically stable in order to be able to act decisively in fine-tuning (both advancing and reversing) market flows, the scope and intensity of regulation, and to create exceptions (such as free economic zones). </p>
<p>The state is also in charge of <a href="http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1046925.shtml">stimulating innovation</a> (a key to economic growth), which is strongly emphasised in the BRI. This way of governance allows the state to integrate itself in global neoliberalism, while also developing a particular neoliberal governmentality or rather <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470670590.wbeog421/abstract">political technology</a> built into the web of laws, policies and official discourses. </p>
<p>In the debate on bringing the state back in the economy, the example of China (and the so-called <a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670561003666061">China Model</a>) is often cited as a challenge to the Western model. Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has called the rise of China a “<a href="http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/01/china-worlds-largest-economy">wake-up call</a>” in terms of how we think of the global economy. </p>
<p>Chinese policymakers have used this to <a href="https://books.google.it/books?hl=en&amp;lr=&amp;id=mIdzm1imHb0C&amp;oi=fnd&amp;pg=PA23&amp;dq=Neoliberal+Strategies,+Socialist+Legacies:+Communication+and+State+Transformation+in+China,&amp;ots=7srWv2wljH&amp;sig=5iQj554NRhQXMBeCbgSk3sWH6Fk#v=onepage&amp;q=Neoliberal%20Strategies%2C%20Socialist%20Legacies%3A%20Communication%20and%20State%20Transformation%20in%20China%2C&amp;f=false">acquire soft power</a> and boost their legitimacy.</p>
<p>Inevitably, the notion of a strong state that seeks political stability has opened debates on the effects of China’s BRI on <a href="http://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/democratic-theory/3/2/dt030207.xml">democracy</a> worldwide.</p>
<p>But in the same process, Chinese policymakers and scholars have argued against the promotion of universal blueprints, repeatedly <a href="http://acyd.org.au/acyd/understanding-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative">emphasising the impossibility of replicating China’s experience</a>. They have <a href="http://scholarworks.merrimack.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&amp;context=pol_facpub">called</a> for all nations to exercise their sovereignty in deciding on what model of development is most applicable to their own circumstances.</p>
<h2>Common destiny</h2>
<p>While not interfering in each other’s affairs is the core principle of China’s global involvement, its leaders do, however, frequently espouse a vision of how relations between nations should develop. Under Xi Jinping, this guiding concept has been the “<a href="http://iq.chineseembassy.org/eng/zygx/t1432869.htm">community of shared future for mankind</a>”, which emphasises mutual respect and cooperation. This has been built into all Chinese foreign initiatives, including the BRI.</p>
<p>This is why Chinese policymakers and scholars <a href="http://www.todayonline.com/commentary/lessons-asean-xis-belt-and-road-initiative">argue</a> that the BRI is not just a Chinese initiative, but is jointly “owned” by all participating countries. </p>
<p>The idea of a shared future, or “common destiny” as it is often called, is why the BRI is frequently called a blueprint for a different version of economic globalisation. Development scholars have also used the idea of “<a href="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23792949.2016.1232598?journalCode=rard20">inclusive globalisation</a>”, a term previously – less successfully – promoted by former UN secretary-general <a href="http://www.un.org/press/en/2002/SGSM8412.doc.htm">Kofi Annan</a>.</p>
<p>In essence, the BRI aims to address the need not only for a more equitable global economy – or, to cite from the official documents, it aims for “<a href="http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html">jointly creating an open, inclusive and balanced regional economic cooperation architecture that benefits all</a>”. This echoes the principle of solidarity and cooperation with developing countries, particularly in the Global South, which has been <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/whitepaper_665742/t856325.shtml">central</a> to China’s foreign policy since its foundation in 1949.</p>
<p>Today, there is an added dimension to this, inspired primarily by the rise of new protectionist and economic nationalist forces, best embodied by US President <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/29/donald-trump-is-an-economic-nationalist-whats-an-economic-nationalist/?utm_term=.f7d4674f165e">Donald Trump</a>. At a time of growing doubt about global capitalism, the BRI is a way for China and the world to ensure there are no major reversals.</p>
<h2>Looking ahead</h2>
<p>But the BRI rests on three defining contradictions. While it is an effort to capitalise on the four decades of growth and China’s newfound clout, it is also an attempt to provide the necessary impetus for a new round of reform and opening up, which the country desperately needs. </p>
<p>While it is an attempt to combat economic nationalism, it also works towards maintaining – and strengthening – the supremacy of the nation-state. And while it is bringing back the state in the economy, it aims to safeguard and advance global markets and free trade.</p>
<p>The outcome of the BRI as a vehicle of a new type of globalisation, therefore, cannot be framed in absolute terms. Nor it will be clear-cut. But it does have the potential to greatly affect the trajectory of the global order as a whole, as well as the trajectories of particular regions and countries, and the way we think about the world. </p>
<p>To properly gauge the potential of the BRI, we need to go back to one of the core statements made by Chinese policymakers – the BRI is intended to be a global, shared project, whose success will depend not only on China’s resolve, but also on the interest and <a href="https://euobserver.com/opinion/137970">response</a> of others.</p>
<p>And while China has so far secured the support of a number of governments around the world, the recent forum in Beijing also unveiled some obstacles to its future advancement.</p>
<p>First, the notable absence of China’s neighbour and partner within the BRICS grouping, <a href="http://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2017/may/13/india-boycotts-one-belt-one-road-summit-in-china-1604412--1.html">India</a>, showed that China has yet to overcome border conflicts with its neighbourhood.</p>
<p>Second, a sceptical <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2093859/were-still-figuring-out-chinas-belt-and-road-european">European Union</a> (EU) – a strategic partner of China – has <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/15/eu-china-summit-bejing-xi-jinping-belt-and-road">backed away from the statement on trade</a>. It has also restated its firm position on <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/26154/european-commission-vice-president-jyrki-katainen-speech-belt-and-road-forum-leaders-round_en">issues such as transparency and reciprocity</a> that have traditionally been a challenge for EU-China relations.</p>
<p>India and the EU are two actors that are particularly relevant for the BRI. Given how much China has invested so far in the initiative, and the extent to which the legacy of Xi Jinping – and the Communist Party – rests on the new global plan, making them more accepting of China’s vision is the new imperative for Beijing.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71575/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Anastas Vangeli is a Claussen-Simon PhD Fellow at the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius</span></em></p>While China has so far secured support from a number of governments for its Belt and Road Initiative, the recent forum in Beijing also highlighted some obstacles to its advancement.Anastas Vangeli, Doctoral Researcher, Polish Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/756792017-04-06T06:08:45Z2017-04-06T06:08:45ZWith crackdown on protests, Russia's new friend Belarus tightens its grip on power<p>Recent months have seen unprecedented social protest in Belarus. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/03/belarus-freedom-day-crackdown">According to Human Rights Watch</a>, citizen mobilisation has also resulted in mass and arbitrary arrests of demonstrators, human rights activists and journalists in this authoritarian nation. </p>
<p>On orders of <a href="http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.545628">President Aleksandr Lukashenko</a>, who has ruled the country since 1994, some <a href="http://spring96.org/be/news/86594">1,000 people were detained</a>, jailed or forced to pay hefty fines from February through the big March 25 Freedom Day protest commemorating the republic’s founding in 1918.</p>
<p>Notably, protests occurred not only in Minsk and regional capitals but also in <a href="http://east-center.org/map-protests-belarus-feb-mar-2017/">smaller towns</a> throughout Belarus for the first time. A proposition for a <a href="http://www.nv-online.info/by/572/opinions/101157/">new tax</a> targeting part-time workers catalysed existing discontent with the country’s economic situation. </p>
<p>Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin, who have had several disputes in the past <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/4eeeb5ca-ea1f-11e6-893c-082c54a7f539">including one about their shared border</a>, reconciled last week over the <a href="http://eng.belta.by/society/view/belarus-offers-help-to-russia-with-investigation-of-st-petersburg-terrorist-attack-100112-2017/">St Petersburg metro bombing</a>. </p>
<p>Their <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-belarus-say-energy-dispute-settled/28408509.html">discussions</a> might ease some of the economic tensions between the two countries. Since <a href="http://kef.research.by/webroot/delivery/files/dp2015r07.pdf">at least December 2014</a>, Belarus has been struggling with an economic crisis thanks to the plummet in oil prices and severe market contraction in neighbouring Russia. </p>
<p>But will that help the Belarusian people, who live under one of Eastern Europe’s last openly undemocratic regimes?</p>
<h2>An illogical tax on ‘social parasites’</h2>
<p>The origin of the protests can be traced back to <a href="http://president.gov.by/uploads/documents/3decree.pdf">April 2015 when the Belarusian government introduced</a> a tax on so-called “social parasites”. When it was <a href="https://people.onliner.by/2016/09/30/tuneyadcy-4">implemented in late 2016</a>, the Belarusian authorities claimed that the tax would allow them to tackle tax evasion. They stressed the fact that many Belarusians who work abroad, including in Russia, do not pay domestic taxes.</p>
<p>According to Belarusian official data, approximately <a href="http://naviny.by/rubrics/economic/2014/11/10/ic_articles_113_187506">400,000 residents</a> do not work but are not registered as unemployed and do not pay taxes. The government has argued that such people enjoy all the advantages of Belarus’s “socially-oriented” state, which offers free medicine, education and other social services, but are imposing the financial burden of the government’s largess on other citizens.</p>
<p>Data <a href="https://news.tut.by/economics/533281.html">from non-state resources</a>, including the <a href="http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS">International Labour Organization</a>, paints a different picture. Survey-based figures of real unemployment are several times higher than the <a href="http://www.belstat.gov.by/ofitsialnaya-statistika/publications/izdania/public_bulletin/index_7039/">officially reported 1%</a> unemployment rate. What’s more, Belarusian state enterprises <a href="https://finance.tut.by/news485935.html">practice hidden unemployment schemes</a> in which employees work from several days to several hours a week only. </p>
<h2>A shrinking economy</h2>
<p>Between July and December 2014, the global price of oil fell from <a href="http://www.nasdaq.com/markets/crude-oil.aspx?timeframe=18m">$US107 per barrel to $US50 per barrel</a>. The resulting economic problems of Russia, a major oil producer, were worsened by <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/">sanctions introduced March 2014 by the European Union</a> and the United States in response to its annexation of the Crimean peninsula and war in Eastern Ukraine.</p>
<p>In Belarus, where the economy is closely linked to the Russian market, this difficult economic situation was aggravated by an energy conflict with the Kremlin. In <a href="http://by.belapan.by/archive/2016/12/07/878245_123456/">July 2016, Russia reduced</a> delivery of crude oil to Belarus by 38%, demanding the payment of about <a href="http://blogs.platts.com/2016/07/19/russia-energy-weapon-belarus-gas-prices/">$US200 million in gas debts</a>. According to government sources, this Russian decision <a href="http://by.belapan.by/archive/2016/12/07/878245_123456/">cost Belarus up to 3% of its 2016 GDP</a>.</p>
<p>Unstable relations with Russia compelled Belarusian authorities to seek financial assistance from international lenders. In 2014, they <a href="http://nn.by/?c=ar&amp;i=155057">released political prisoners</a> and started talks <a href="http://eng.research.by/publications/dp/dp1504/">with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)</a>, which was demanding substantial economic reforms. </p>
<p>But reforms to liberalise Belarus’ economy and open up its market would have changed the authoritarian country’s social and economic foundation, threatening the very pillars of the government’s stability.</p>
<p>Unable to address all the IMF’s demands, Lukashenko was forced to take several unpopular measures. The government <a href="http://www.belrynok.by/ru/page/society/4434/">increased the age of retirement and reduced government benefits</a>. It also <a href="http://journalby.com/news/novye-nalogi-tarify-i-ceny-chto-podorozhalo-v-belarusi-s-novogo-goda-545">raised taxes</a>, which many citizens resented as a transfer of the state’s burden onto the population.</p>
<h2>A fearful regime</h2>
<p>The resulting instability has got Belarus’ government nervous. Protesters taking to the streets for economic reasons is one thing, <a href="http://www.policyreview.eu/belarus-an-autocracy-quashing-all-opposition/">but the political opposition</a> joining in is quite another. </p>
<p>As the protests gained momentum <a href="http://nn.by/?c=ar&amp;i=185684">on social media</a> throughout February and March this year, authorities began their crackdown, combining soft and hard measures to suppress dissent. </p>
<p>To ease discontent, they suspended the deadline to pay the “parasite tax” and announced an intention to slightly change the law itself. Then, on March 9 President Lukashenko <a href="http://euroradio.fm/lukashenka-nam-treba-yak-razynki-z-bulki-pavykalupvac-pravakatarau">also announced</a> a plan to use coercive measures against initiators of the protests. </p>
<p>Operating with full impunity (in Belarus, <a href="http://belarusdigest.com/papers/belarusianidentity.pdf">rule of law does not exist</a>), authorities began to detain <a href="https://baj.by/be/content/zayava-ga-bazh-z-nagody-masavaga-perasledu-zhurnalistau">journalists and bloggers</a> around the country, and question <a href="http://spring96.org/be/news/86594">Belarusian opposition leaders</a>.</p>
<p>The government also launched a <a href="http://www.svaboda.org/a/navosta-ulady-reanimujuc-biely-liehijon/28386915.html">media campaign</a> using <a href="http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/2314-belarus-measured-repressions">propaganda movies</a> on primetime television. This is still going on.</p>
<p>Today, numerous Belarusian protesters remain in jail for alleged misdemeanours such as resisting arrest and hooliganism, or participating in unsanctioned protests. Many have seen their sentences extended <a href="http://belsat.eu/in-focus/tsisk-na-maksima-filipovicha-blogera-buduts-sudzits-chatsverty-raz/">with new accusations</a>. </p>
<p>The Kremlin <a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/1475-6765.12079/asset/ejpr12079.pdf;jsessionid=5B54A7B04DB9F6382D6693F83009B095.f04t03?v=1&amp;t=j154b58i&amp;s=c556ffc3290061abb5b280301b64d202ad1fb92a">is known to support authoritarian crackdowns</a> in post-Soviet neighbours in exchange for their continued loyalty to Russia. That may be good for Lukashenko but reconciliation with Putin is very unlikely to help Belarusian citizens.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/75679/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Veranika Laputska is affiliated with EAST Research Center.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Aliaksandr Papko is affiliated with EAST Research Center. </span></em></p>President Lukashenko's recent reconciliation with Putin is unlikely to help Belarusian citizens caught up in post-Soviet economic and social turmoil.Veranika Laputska, PhD Candidate in Sociology, Polish Academy of SciencesAliaksandr Papko, Political scientist specilized in the Post-Soviet countriesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/725372017-02-28T21:55:39Z2017-02-28T21:55:39ZPolish citizens turn their back on NGOs and embrace community activism<figure><img src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158604/original/image-20170227-26322-1ocv2xj.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;rect=9%2C45%2C2038%2C1134&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=496&amp;fit=clip" /><figcaption><span class="caption">Urban and social art at the first edition of &#39;Neighbours&#39; festival in Katowice, in 2014. </span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.facebook.com/pobudkakoszutka/photos/a.481569721926163.1073741827.481554075261061/730986090317857/?type=3&amp;theater">Sebastian Pypłacz/Pobudka Koszutka</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span></figcaption></figure><p>Poland amazed the world last year when mass protests against tightening restrictions on <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-hungary-and-poland-have-silenced-women-and-stifled-human-rights-66743">abortion rights</a> mushroomed across the country, forcing the government to change its position. </p>
<p>The <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-hungary-and-poland-have-silenced-women-and-stifled-human-rights-66743">Black Protest</a> that spread <a href="http://www.se.pl/wiadomosci/polska/czarny-poniedzialek-ogolnopolski-strajk-kobiet-gdzie-i-o-ktorej-protesty-harmonogram_897377.html">within</a> and <a href="http://warszawawpigulce.pl/zobaczcie-mape-czarnego-strajku-co-i-gdzie-bedzie-sie-dzialo-interaktywna-mapa/">outside</a> the country demonstrated the vitality of grassroots activism in Poland. It also reflected social and political changes in the country and the way Polish civil society has evolved.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158872/original/image-20170301-5538-1kqaom5.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Black Protest in Poland, Warsaw, October 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/70/Czarny_protest_pozna%C5%84.jpg">Michalkraw/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>In spite of repeated claims that <a href="http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/%7Ewright/Social%20Economy%20PDFs/GLOBAL%20CIVIL%20SOCIETY%20--%20Chapter1.pdf">post-socialist civil societies</a> are weak and still immature, this episode and many other recent domestic developments show otherwise. As a <a href="https://books.google.se/books?id=7nS1CwAAQBAJ&amp;printsec=frontcover&amp;dq=urban+grassroots+movements&amp;hl=sv&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwif7qnkze7RAhVoDJoKHeYfAIwQ6AEIHTAA#v=onepage&amp;q=urban%2520grassroots%2520movements&amp;f=false">recent study</a> demonstrated, urban movements are thriving in Poland. </p>
<h2>The NGO backlash</h2>
<p>During the Black Protest, organisations such as Gals to Gals (<a href="http://dziewuchydziewuchom.pl/"><em>Dziewuchy Dziewuchom</em></a>) and Save the Women (<a href="http://www.ratujmykobiety.pl/"><em>Ratujmy Kobiety</em></a> which are informal initiatives, took to the streets together with citizens, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and political parties, demonstrating activism has changed in Poland in recent years.</p>
<p>Unlike other women-centred public events, the Black Protest was joined not just by pro-choice activist but also by women with a conservative worldview. The protesters were only unanimous about the need not to further restrict the current abortion law; they did not necessarily agree that it should be liberalised.</p>
<figure class="align-right ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/158579/original/image-20170227-26309-1xltxro.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=237&amp;fit=clip">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A ‘Save the Women’ protest in Warsaw, October 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Czarny_protest_inicjatywy_Ratujmy_Kobiety_2016_10_01_w_Warszawie_00.jpg">Konto na chwilę/Wikimedia</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/">CC BY-NC</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Since the 1990s, the NGO sector has been considered the <a href="http://rcin.org.pl/Content/41658/WA004_59541_T6644_Domanski-Elementy-sp_oh.pdf">most developed pillar</a> of civil society in Poland. Yet Polish NGOs have recently come under <a href="http://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/1683226,1,organizacje-pozarzadowe-w-kryzysie.read">pressure</a>. </p>
<p>Division between NGOs has sprung up over access to funds and the <a href="http://opinie.ngo.pl/wiadomosc/1928659.html">perceived privilege of liberal NGOs</a> over conservative ones. In an increasingly <a href="http://polpan.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/POLPAN_Relationship_class_structure_social_stratification.pdf">stratified society</a>, this came as no surprise.</p>
<p>Many have been critical of what they considered to be an excessive “<a href="https://books.google.se/books?id=0h0GDAAAQBAJ&amp;pg=PT47&amp;lpg=PT47&amp;dq=NGOization+of+polish+civil+society&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=orKQlsL9bj&amp;sig=0jhBtpRjaBMvzWRrqw62gjZaDT0&amp;hl=sv&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiWoZf4zO7RAhUHb5oKHQNPBy8Q6AEIIzAA#v=onepage&amp;q=NGOization%2520of%2520polish%2520civil%2520society&amp;f=false">NGOisation</a>” of Polish civil society. This turn against institutions should also be understood as a reaction to the <a href="https://www.academia.edu/1481083/How_Individualists_Make_Solidarity_Work">individualism</a>, of the NGO-sector; social activists admit they are involved in NGOs to achieve self-actualisation or enhance their skills. </p>
<p>The “<a href="http://www.aspekt.sk/sites/default/files/Obalka_knihy.pdf#page=32">NGO-isation of resistance</a>” and NGO activism in general have justifiably been criticised for neutering the citizenry’s own potential for grassroots engagement by channelling it into project-based, grant-reliant activities. </p>
<p>And NGOs themselves have started to voice their concern that they might have become <a href="http://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-center/civicus-blog/2353-an-open-letter-to-our-fellow-activists-across-the-globe-building-from-below-and-beyond-borders">part of the problems</a>, including counteracting social inequalities, they were originally aiming to tackle. </p>
<p>Social activists now challenge the idea that you need to join NGOs in order to engage in public life, and researchers too are increasingly aware of the need to change their <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Beyond-NGO-ization-The-Development-of-Social-Movements-in-Central-and/Saxonberg-Jacobsson/p/book/9781409442226">NGO-centred focus</a> when studying civil society in the region.</p>
<h2>Acting together for the community</h2>
<p>As a reaction to the individualism characterising NGO activism and the political divide in the public sphere, we are seeing an emergence of informal movements, motivated by the wish to restore <a href="http://repozytorium.ceon.pl/bitstream/handle/123456789/8285/Krajobraz%2520spo%25C5%2582eczno%25C5%259Bciowy%2520-%2520Polska%25202014.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y">community feeling</a> in Polish cities and towns. </p>
<p>Social activism in Poland used to be the domain of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/657623?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">intelligentsia</a> and its long-standing <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=1&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=0ahUKEwisvLz-lKvSAhVN52MKHYzXDggQFggaMAA&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fjournals.lub.lu.se%2Findex.php%2Fsl%2Farticle%2FviewFile%2F10103%2F8518&amp;usg=AFQjCNGNaIXImucJA9xfiGb2wsT3AeFQeg&amp;sig2=XF7gmQDOorinAeRkn9kr8g&amp;bvm=bv.148073327,d.cGc">positivist</a> mission to serve the nation, especially during times of lack of state sovereignty. </p>
<p>However, the intelligentsia reinforced what sociologist Joanna Kurczewska has called the “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41274825?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">elitist model of local civil society</a>” in Poland. Unlike NGO activists, individuals involved in community building or civic engagement declare they do not aspire to lead or enlighten the nation. </p>
<p>Instead, they identify with, and work on behalf of, <a href="http://repozytorium.ceon.pl/bitstream/handle/123456789/8285/Krajobraz%2520spo%25C5%2582eczno%25C5%259Bciowy%2520-%2520Polska%25202014.pdf?sequence=1&amp;isAllowed=y">their local communities</a>, or claim to be citizens of the world. They are inspired by humanitarian values and understand civic engagement as activism. </p>
<p>We carried out research into non-institutionalised initiatives in Poland between 2014 and 2015. One activist we <a href="https://www.civitas.edu.pl/collegium/uczelnia/nauka-i-badania/projekty-badawcze-i-ekspertyzy-w-realizacji/nieodkryty-wymiar-iii-sektora-badania-niezinstytucjonalizowanych-przejawow-spolecznikowstwa">interviewed</a> told us:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Under various ideological slogans, we realise common social goals. Political orientation is not a criterion to exclude anyone from our community. We share a common goal, even if we explain those goals by our leftist views, while they justify it via their rightist views, but we do exactly the same things.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Acting together to make <a href="http://bibliofil.com.pl/aktywnosc-obywatelska-na-poziomie-lokalnym-formy-i-uwarunkowania-l-k-gilejko-b-blaszczyk-red-pultusk-2011-lokalizm-regionalizm-globalizm-t-vi-socjologia.html">improvements at the local level</a> seems to be the driving motivation of informal organising. </p>
<p>Informal activists’ focus on pragmatic, local issues could be seen as a short-term strategy that will bring about piecemeal change. But active citizens have proved to be concomitantly engaged in more than one type of grassroots organising. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.civitas.edu.pl/collegium/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Krajobraz-spo%25C5%2582eczno%25C5%259Bciowy-Polska-2014.pdf">Their initiatives</a> are diverse and include working to revitalise neighbourhoods and organising workshops for underprivileged children. Others practice hobbies related to their residential areas, like urban gardening, city biking, urban bee-hiving, running cashless exchanges, or non-commercial cafes. </p>
<p>There are also collectives that provide free assistance to homeless people or young people, feminist groups striving to change public opinion and groups striving to find alternatives to capitalism via food cooperatives or the <a href="https://postwzrost.wordpress.com/">de-growth</a> initiative. <a href="http://poland.pl/arts/lifestyle/history-reenacted/">History reenactors</a> and art collectives also represent examples of informal organising. </p>
<p>Activities like these are the playground of democracy. They often lead to the identification of common goals and strengthen community bonds.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/157719/original/image-20170221-18627-1d17omh.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">A 2016 historical reenactment of ‘cursed soldiers’ taking over the State Security prison in 1945.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://www.nowiny.pl/">Wojtek Żołneczko</a>, <span class="license">Author provided</span></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>It should be noted that these seemingly innocuous activities are not always devoid of an ideological stance. On the contrary, behind their pragmatic aims there is a strong conviction that citizens can have an impact on reality. This social change focuses on building common goals and a sense of community.</p>
<p>All forms of activism are <a href="http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/IJSSP-11-2015-0120">represented in Polish civil society</a>, and the variety and richness among them is inspiring.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/72537/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Dominika Polanska receives funding from the Foundation for Baltic
and East European Studies (grant no. 2185/311/2014). </span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Galia Chimiak and Dominika Polanska took part in a project “The undiscovered dimension of the Third sector: a study of un-institutionalized civic activism” funded by the then Polish Ministry of Labor and Social Policy and implemented by the Center for Local Activities Association in partnership with Collegium Civitas in Warsaw in 2014-2015.</span></em></p>As Poland faces more and more social divisions, citizen movements develop through informal activities to reinforce a sense of community and belonging.Dominika Polanska, Associate Professor of Sociology, Uppsala UniversityGalia Chimiak, Assistant professor of sociology of self-organisation and development studies, Polish Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/713632017-01-20T07:19:54Z2017-01-20T07:19:54ZWhat does the world expect of a Trump presidency?<p>Today, Donald J Trump, the New York City real estate mogul whose outsider campaign led to an upset electoral victory became the 45th President of the United States.</p>
<p>The Conversation Global has invited a panel of international scholars – many of whom also shared their <a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-wins-us-election-scholars-from-around-the-world-react-68282">reactions to Trump’s win</a> – to reflect on his presidency and assess its significance for their region.</p><p></p>
<p>As a candidate, Trump’s campaign promises included <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-wall-and-the-beast-trumps-triumph-from-the-mexican-side-of-the-border-68559">building a border wall with Mexico</a> and <a href="https://theconversation.com/misunderstanding-confusion-and-relief-the-muslim-world-and-president-elect-donald-trump-69068">banning Muslims immigrants</a> from the US. As president-elect, he called NATO <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-nato-obsolete-idUSKBN14Z0YO">“obsolete”</a> and the European Union <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1f7c6746-db75-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce">“basically a vehicle for Germany”</a>, put the One China policy up for <a href="http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2017/01/14/489403/Trump-says.htm">negotiation</a>, and threatened to <a href="http://fortune.com/2016/11/09/donald-trump-u-s-trade-policy/">renegotiate most trade agreements</a>. </p>
<p>On inauguration day, all eyes are on Washington, with the world hoping to better understand the unpredictable leader now entering the White House – and determine what comes next. </p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Richard Maher: European leaders brace themselves</strong></p>
<p>While campaigning for president, Donald Trump <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/30/us/politics/unnerved-by-donald-trump-european-diplomats-seek-reassurance-from-democrats.html?_r=0">unnerved European leaders</a> by disparaging the NATO alliance, celebrating the British vote to exit the European Union, and praising Russian President Vladimir Putin.</p>
<p>Following his surprise victory last November, many European leaders hoped that, now elected and poised to assume the presidency, he would clarify his earlier remarks and adopt positions on NATO’s relevance and the value of a strong and united EU more in line with those of his predecessors over the past six decades.</p>
<p>But that was not to be, as <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/17/politics/donald-trump-nato-europe/">Trump’s interview last weekend with two European newspapers</a> confirmed. He again called NATO “obsolete,” proclaimed that the British vote to leave the EU would “end up being a great thing”, described the EU as “basically a vehicle for Germany,” and condemned German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to let in more than a million refugees fleeing violence and persecution as a “catastrophic mistake.” </p>
<p>He also <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-germany-autos-idUSKBN1500VJ">threatened</a> to impose duties of 35% on German and other foreign cars made in Mexico and imported into the United States, predicted that other countries would follow Britain’s lead and vote to leave the EU, and stated that he would start his presidency <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-avoids-trust-vladimir-putin-angela-merket-russia-president-germany-chancellor-interview-a7529271.html">trusting</a> Putin — who once led the FSB, the KGB’s successor organisation — just as he will Merkel, the leader of one of America’s closest allies.</p>
<p>European leaders still do not know how much — if any — of Trump’s comments will become official US policy. They are thus bracing themselves for perpetual
unpredictability and inconsistency regarding Trump’s intentions and beliefs, as well as his tendency to contradict himself and his cabinet. (In their senate confirmation hearings, for example, his nominees for secretary of state and defence <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/16/politics/trump-nato-cabinet/">affirmed</a> the vital role NATO and the EU continue to play in US foreign policy.)</p>
<p>Europe faces an inflection point. No American president in modern history has entered office with such ambivalence over the core institutions linking the United States and its European allies. Trump’s actions will unite or yet further divide Europeans. Or as Merkel <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/16/europes-fate-is-in-our-hands-angela-merkels-defiant-reply-to-trump">said</a> in response to his latest comments, “We Europeans have our fate in our own hands.”</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Andrea Peto and Weronika Grzebalska: Trump is good news for populist right-wing leaders in Europe</strong> </p>
<p>For right-wing populists in Central Europe, Trump’s presidency is a game changer. It signifies the steady decline both of the United States as a guarantor of military security in the region and of the dominant global paradigm of the connections between the free market, liberal democratic values and human rights. </p>
<p>In Hungary and Poland, Obama <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/25/remarks-president-obama-address-people-europe">criticised</a> the dismantling of the rule of law and attacks on civil liberties under the radical-right parties FIDESZ and PiS. Trump, on the other hand, has begun his presidency <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/donald-trump-hungarian-pm-viktor-orban-invited-washington-a7438291.html">by cordially inviting</a> Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán to Washington. </p>
<p>With Trump in power, these leaders are no longer the black sheep among Western political elites but rather partners in the building of a new <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-11-01/rise-illiberal-democracy">illiberal international order</a> that rejects liberal democratic values and freedoms.</p>
<p>Among the first victims of transnational illiberalism in Central Europe will surely be <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jon-van-til/whos-afraid-of-the-big-ba_5_b_7478806.html">progressive and human rights NGOs</a>, already struggling with cuts to government funding. That money has been redirected to faith-based and conservative organisations supporting the right-wing populist party agenda. </p>
<p>President Trump opens a window of opportunity to go even further toward de-globalisation, including – we predict – restricting the presence of international organisations like Amnesty International and expelling foreign-funded human rights donors like <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/george-soros-donald-trump-open-society-foundation-hungary-crackdown-a7521381.html">the Open Society Foundations</a>.</p>
<p>In the short run, restructuring the NGO sector will harm feminist and human rights causes in the region, and activists may face personal security risks. In the long run, though, losing their financial and institutional basis will force activists to reconceptualise their political strategy. That could be a good thing: the <a href="https://euroalter.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Civil-Society-in-Eastern-Europe.pdf">post-1989 NGO-isation of Central Europe’s civil society</a> has largely depoliticised resistance, turning it into a technocratic process. </p>
<p>By returning to older forms of political resistance, social activism might also regain grassroots support and find a new voice in the process. At least, that’s what we hope. </p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153297/original/image-20170118-26585-1pf2c7v.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán arrives at a European Union leaders summit in Brussels, December 15 2016.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="http://pictures.reuters.com/archive/EU-SUMMIT--RC1F9BA5D240.html">Francois Lenoir/Reuters</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p><strong>Jonathan Rynhold: Hope for Israel, concern over Iran and Syria</strong></p>
<p>We should see a generally positive tone toward Israel from Donald Trump, but there are very large questions about what the administration’s policies will be on the substantive issues affecting the country.</p>
<p>For example, his son-in-law Jared Kushner has been tapped <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-to-tap-kushner-to-broker-mideast-peace-deal/">to deal with the peace process</a>. He has no background whatsoever in this area, and we have no idea what his positions might be. </p>
<p>Regarding the settlement issue, my sense — in contrast to what the settlement movement believes — is that the administration is not necessarily pro-settlement. His nominee for the UN said that settlements could “<a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.765916">hinder peace</a>” and when the UN Security Council resolution condemning Israeli settlement was passed, Trump’s comment was that “<a href="http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.761134">this makes peace harder</a>” — not that it was wrong. </p>
<p>Israel may follow the line suggested by Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman, which is to try to reach an agreement with the US about stopping settlement building outside the blocs, but allowing it <a href="http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4880028,00.html">within them</a>. It would fit in with <a href="https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-3.html">George W Bush letter of 2004</a> and follows <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-27/obama-fulfills-his-prophecy-on-israeli-settlements">Obama’s statements</a> on different kinds of settlements. That would be a step forward, and relatively doable. The Obama administration wasn’t prepared to do that, perhaps Trump might be.</p>
<p>On a symbolic level, we will probably see something regarding the idea of <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21712098-death-knell-or-defibrillator-peace-process-moving-us-embassy">moving the American embassy to Jerusalem</a>, which may be that the ambassador will work from the consulate there; but I doubt we will see a shift America’s position on Jerusalem. </p>
<p>In any case, it is accepted that at least West Jerusalem will be formally recognised as the capital of Israel in any peace deal and the consulate is in West Jerusalem. In Israel everyone is <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-envoy-urges-trump-to-move-us-embassy-to-jerusalem/">in favor</a> of moving the embassy. But some would say it’s not necessarily the most important thing to deal with now, because it could possibly lead to an upsurge of violence.</p>
<p>The largest concerns for Israel is how the Trump administration will deal with Iran. On one hand, Trump seems to have a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-nuclear-deal-is-in-the-crosshairs-and-may-not-survive-a-trump-administration/2017/01/11/b56313d4-d744-11e6-9f9f-5cdb4b7f8dd7_story.html?utm_term=.e869c48d07f4">stronger stance</a> than the Obama administration, which Israel felt did not hold Iranians to account sufficiently. </p>
<p>But there’s also concern that Trump’s good relations with Russia may actually lead to a worsening of the situation in Syria from an Israeli point of view. If he gives <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-assad-iran-and-russia-are-the-only-partners-i-see-in-syria_us_57fb0087e4b0e655eab57d13">a free hand to Russia in Syria</a>, it could strengthen Iran there, which is the strongest force on the ground. The Russians would then give Tehran greater freedom to operate.</p>
<hr>
<p><strong>Miguel Angel Latouche: Latin America is seen as a problematic region</strong></p>
<p><a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37049855">Trump is an enigma</a>. For the first time in the contemporary history of the US, a genuine <a href="http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/306851-outsiders-take-power-in-trumps-washington">outsider has become president</a>. </p>
<p>We do know a few things about Trump, though. He is a strongman who <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-conversation-global/trumpus-andronicus-what-t_b_14232606.html">does not belong to the establishment and enjoys polemics</a>. He is intolerant of criticism and seems perfectly willing to use force, in the <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/12/donald-trump-has-a-coherent-realist-foreign-policy/">style of an old political realist</a>. But Trump’s vision on Latin America is uncertain. </p>
<p>What priorities will <a href="http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/12/30/latin-america-and-donald-trump/">guide foreign policy toward the region</a>? </p>
<p>We don’t know whether the Trump administration perceives Latin America as a potential partner or a threat. If it’s the former, there should be opportunities to do business and strengthen open markets. If it’s the latter, there is little good to come of it. Indeed, Trump is most likely to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/10/donald-trump-britain-greatest-fear-isolationist-president">promote an isolationist stance</a>. </p>
<p>Trump does appear to perceive Latin American as a problematic region. <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/riskmap/2016/11/16/what-will-the-trump-presidency-mean-for-latin-america/#b98a5d9d45cf">He has expressed concerns</a> about illegal immigration and US jobs lost as a consequence of trade agreements, open markets and industrial relocation.</p>
<p>Would Trump build a wall along the US-Mexican border? He certainly seems capable of it, and to want to do it. Regardless of whether he can make it happen, we must consider that he is <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-latin-america-policy-economy-violence-2016-11">disposed to impose an ideological barrier</a> on Latin America. </p>
<p>So far, all we know to expect is the reduction of concessions to Cuba, a strongman’s posture towards strongman-led Venezuela and a distancing from Mexico. For other countries in the region, there is a huge question mark.</p>
<figure class="align-center ">
<img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/153320/original/image-20170118-26577-ju7ia8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=754&amp;fit=clip">
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Cuban Caridad Hernandez celebrates the death of Fidel Castro in Miami.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Javier Galeano/Reuters</span></span>
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<p><strong>Salvador Vazquez del Mercado: Uncertainty for Mexico</strong></p>
<p>Donald Trump’s campaign was geared towards pushing the buttons of voters who, as the result of shifting economic opportunities, have seen their economic prospects decline in recent years: it was Mexico that took the jobs, and Mexico that sent the bad immigrants. </p>
<p>In a clear example of what Robert Shiller calls the power of <a href="http://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d20/d2069.pdf">narratives</a> to shift economic and social outcomes, Trump put Mexico in the centre of his attacks. He made economic and cultural insecurity the topics that would attract the attention of his voters, framed as the purported fight against fleeing employment and the assumed woes of immigration.</p>
<p>For Mexico, that’s quite a vulnerable position to be in. The <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-01-18/why-trump-s-tariff-threats-get-taken-so-seriously-quicktake-q-a">imposition of tariffs</a> has the potential to spark a trade war that Mexico, with its smaller share of goods exported to the US, will find difficult to win. The threatened renegotiation of NAFTA will, by itself, damage the Mexican economy by aggravating investment expectations. Then there’s the eventual results of the negotiation itself: imposing taxes on remittances or blocking their delivery will deprive many Mexican families of much needed resources. </p>
<p>In fact, Trump’s campaign has already damaged the Mexican economy: the peso continues to slide as Trump keeps making <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-peso-trump-idUSKBN14V20S">announcements</a> related to the transnational automobile industry. </p>
<p>It is to be expected, then, that it will fall further when he begins earnestly pursing his agenda. As a result, the International Monetary Fund has already <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-imf-growth-idUSKBN1501P9">downgraded</a> its forecast for the growth of the Mexican economy.</p>
<p>It is difficult to know what Trump will do in power because of the lack of clarity in his policy proposals. This uncertainty will be aggravated as his cabinet picks continue to sort out whether to follow <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-cabinet-nominees-keep-contradicting-him/2017/01/12/dec8cccc-d8f3-11e6-9a36-1d296534b31e_story.html?utm_term=.dab0bf4e0d7f">their policies</a> or his. </p>
<p>Some of this uncertainty may benefit Mexico: while the Republican love affair with free trade seems to have <a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/gop-senators-trade-228403">ended</a> during the campaign, the passion could be rekindled once the president is sworn in and trade negotiations start.</p>
<p>A weaker peso will also benefit Mexican exports, and Mexican <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-will-mexico-deal-with-the-donald-71067">diplomatic efforts</a> and public relations should profit from the rifts that will open between Trump, his cabinet and the Republican-led congress. </p>
<p>These benefits are not minimal, if the country plays them right, which only serves to underscore the many challenges that Mexico will face starting January 20 2016.</p>
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<p><strong>Subarno Chattarji: a welcome change, but points of conflict in India</strong></p>
<p>Donald Trump’s election was welcomed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Rajnath Singh, who said that India could take some credit for Trump’s victory since he used <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-ad-indian-american-vote-2016-10">a version of Modi’s election slogan</a> to appeal to Indian American voters (“<em>Ab ki Baar, Trump Sarkar</em>” – “Next time, a Trump government”). </p>
<p>The welcome message reveals the ideological and political affinities between Modi and Trump, particularly regarding attitudes toward Muslims, terrorism, political correctness, liberal elites and minorities.</p>
<p>Policy outlooks, however, are mixed. For instance, Trump’s call with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif whom he described as “<a href="http://time.com/4586503/donald-trump-pakistan-prime-minister-readout-nawaz-sharif/">a terrific guy</a>” didn’t go down well in India. Trump has also said <a href="http://www.dawn.com/news/1300758">he can solve the Kashmir crisis</a> – again a touchy subject, since India’s official position is that all Kashmir is an integral part of India and any dispute must be resolved bilaterally. </p>
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<span class="caption">A member of Hindu Sena, a right wing Hindu group, holds a placard of Donald Trump during a protest in New Delhi.</span>
<span class="attribution"><span class="source">Adnan Abidi/Reuters</span></span>
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<p>Another area of contention and anxiety is the lottery of H1-B Visas given for workers in technology and computing industries, which are largely corralled by Indians. Trump has promised <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/17/us/politics/donald-trump-wants-to-cut-visa-program-he-used-for-his-own-models.html?_r=0">to reduce these visas</a>. In keeping with his promise to “Make America Great Again”, he also plans to push back against the outsourcing of jobs – an additional potential point of conflict.</p>
<p>While ideologically distinct from Modi, president Obama forged <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/06/world/asia/india-narendra-modi-obama.html">a close connection with India</a>, part of his administrations’ broader pivot toward Asia. That pivot may or may not be sustained by the Trump administration. Trump’s nominee for Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has made no public statements on India. </p>
<p>Notwithstanding these misgivings, Trump will receive a warm welcome from the Indian government (and members of the Hindu Sena) should he visit the country.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/71363/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Salvador Vázquez del Mercado is a director of public opinion in the office of the President of Mexico. All opinions and errors herewithin are his own.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Peto, Jonathan Rynhold, Miguel Angel Latouche, Richard Maher, Subarno Chattarji, and Weronika Grzebalska do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The world is on edge as Donald Trump enters the White House.Richard Maher, Research Fellow, Global Governance Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University InstituteAndrea Peto, Professor of Gender Studies, Central European UniversityJonathan Rynhold, Director, Argov Center for the Study of Israel and the Jewish People, Bar-Ilan UniversityMiguel Angel Latouche, Associate professor, Universidad Central de VenezuelaSalvador Vázquez del Mercado, Lecturer on Public Opinion and Research Methodology, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)Subarno Chattarji, Associate Professor, University of DelhiWeronika Grzebalska, PhD researcher, Graduate School for Social Research, Polish Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/682822016-11-09T08:28:07Z2016-11-09T08:28:07ZDonald Trump wins US election: scholars from around the world react<p>Donald J Trump has <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/08/politics/election-day-2016-highlights/index.html">declared victory</a> in the US presidential election. The candidate took the stage in New York just before 3am local time to announce that his rival, Hillary Clinton, had called him to concede the race.</p>
<p>“The forgotten men and women of our country will be forgotten no longer,” the president-elect told a packed room of supporters at the Hilton hotel.</p>
<p>“We will get along with all nations willing to get along with us,” he added. </p>
<p>What does this stunning turnaround mean for the rest of the world? The Conversation Global asked a panel of international scholars to reflect on Trump’s election and assess its significance for their region. </p>
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<p><strong>Salvador Vazquez del Mercado: Mexico will face hardships under Trump</strong></p>
<p>Donald Trump has won the election against all expectations – except for those of his supporters. The Brexit-like failure to predict his victory will surely haunt pollsters and hurt public confidence in polls for a long time. </p>
<p>The consequences of his victory will, of course, be much graver than the crisis of prediction. Even if Trump comes through with only a fraction of his campaign promises – which seems more likely now that both chambers of Congress will be controlled by Republicans – <a href="https://theconversation.com/the-markets-tell-us-president-trump-is-worse-than-brexit-68501">markets will react quite negatively</a>, the Mexico peso, which has <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/USDMXN:CUR">already suffered a significant depreciation</a>, may fall further. And these are only the short-term consequences of Trump’s victory. </p>
<p>The wall along the US-Mexico border may well be <a href="http://europe.newsweek.com/trump-wall-impractical-impolitic-impossible-459802?rm=eu">impossible to build</a> and the millions of undocumented immigrants in the US may not be immediately deported. And, hopefully Trump will not use the nuclear codes at all. But his victory still spells severe trouble ahead for Mexicans, and many other minorities living in the US, who were continually vilified during his campaign. </p>
<p>For Mexico, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/upshot/donald-trump-trashes-nafta-but-unwinding-it-would-come-at-a-huge-cost.html">the end of NAFTA</a> would lead to a severe restriction of trade with the US, which, added to an expected increase in interest rates south of the border and a reduction in the remittances sent by Mexicans up north, will quite probably lead to a severe economic crisis. </p>
<p>In the longer term, the relationship between Mexico and the United States will undergo a severe reconfiguration because, come January, Trump will probably take a very aggressive stance against the country. The future is uncharted and, in the short term, quite complicated. </p>
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<p><strong>Janjira Sombatpoonsiri: the end of the liberal democracy project?</strong></p>
<p>Trump’s rise to power may put an end to liberal democracy as propagated by the US and its western allies in the post-Cold War era. Thailand is a good place to contemplate the trajectory and consequences of the end of this project.</p>
<p>Having been dominated by military governments, Thailand underwent democratisation in the early 1990s. It joined other countries in Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe in the “<a href="http://www.ned.org/docs/Samuel-P-Huntington-Democracy-Third-Wave.pdf">third wave of democracy</a>”. This period saw the proliferation of civil society groups and institutionalisation of progressive ideas, particularly rights and justice. Unfortunately, elected governments faced allegations of corruption and inefficiency. And Bangkok’s middle class eventually lost patience, demanding a return to strong military rule.</p>
<p>Trump’s presidency potentially hints to authoritarian governments in Thailand and other societies that certain norms attached to liberal democracies can now be suspended. It’s likely that the coming Trump administration could be more silent than previous administrations about the crackdown on rights groups and dissidents in Thailand, and elsewhere. American pressure on the incumbent Thai junta to hold an election soon could also lessen.</p>
<p>In the age of anti-liberal democracy, fighting for retaining its norms will be harder in Thailand and elsewhere. If liberal democracy is no longer defensible and authoritarianism is not an option, progressive forces around the world need to gather pace and create a new political alternative that goes beyond this dead-end street.</p>
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<p><strong>Jonathan Rynhold: for Israel, less tension but less security</strong></p>
<p>Under Donald Trump, relations between US and Israel are likely to be smoother than under Obama. However, in an underlying sense Israel will be less secure.</p>
<p>There are three reasons for this: first, Trump’s erratic temperament, second his extensive <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/donald-trump-gop-israel/418737/">flip-flopping</a> on <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/11/election-affect-middle-east-policy-161105125945727.html">Middle East policy</a>, and third, and most importantly, his isolationist instincts.</p>
<p>Although Trump has said contradictory things about Israeli-Palestinian relations, he is likely to pay less attention to the issue and thus allow Israel’s right-wing government greater leeway on issues of contention such as settlements. Paradoxically, this will encourage Obama to promote a UN Security Council resolution on the issue, the prospect of which very much concerns Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.</p>
<p>Israel benefits hugely from an internationalist America. When the US takes a step back, <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/">as it did under Obama</a>, the vacuum is filled by greater instability and hostile forces. Trump is more isolationist than Obama and he has openly questioned whether the US would stand behind its alliance commitments. This may embolden Israel’s enemies. Still, Israel can look after itself, and fears of American unreliability may push Egypt and Saudi Arabia to deepen their strategic co-operation with Israel. </p>
<p>Finally, Israel views Iran as the major strategic threat. Trump has said he would take a harder line on Iran, but in the interim his disengaged approach would allow Iran to increase its power, thereby multiplying the costs of confronting Iran in the future.</p>
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<p><strong>Rut Diamint: Trump doesn’t care about human rights</strong></p>
<p>Before Barack Obama’s election in 2008, largely due to the policies of George W Bush, some sectors of the American inteligentsia were suggesting that the US had abdicated world leadership. The Council on Foreign Relations specifically wrote on the <a href="http://www.cfr.org/mexico/us-latin-america-relations/p16279">loss of American relevance for Latin America and the Caribbean</a>. </p>
<p>In truth, though, the US is and continues to be the single most determining nation for Latin America. Trump’s election will have particular impact in four areas.</p>
<p>First, the economy. Between January and August of 2016, the US-Mexico trade balance ran a deficit on the US side <a href="https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2010.html">of US$ -41,568.1 million</a>. With Central and South America, on the other hand, the US shows a <a href="https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0009.html">positive trade balance</a> of US$20,199.0 million. Note that commercial exchange between Mexico and the US is four times that of the rest of the region. Trump’s promise to separate the two nations by building a wall, even if it never happens, will be profoundly damaging economically and politically.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/insight-crime-homicide-round-up-2015-latin-america-caribbean">High levels of violence</a>, organised crime and drug trafficking are top concerns for Latin America. Under Trump, Congress will continue to be influenced by the defence industry and invest heavily in a militarised drug war. And Trump has the <a href="http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/nra-endorse-donald-trump-president/story?id=39253893">support of the powerful NRA gun lobby</a>. </p>
<p>Trump has promised to undo recent advances in US policy toward Cuba, which under Obama had <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cuba">transitioned from isolation to diplomacy</a>. Where negotiation and economic bonds had begun to strengthen, he will reimpose the embargo and counterintelligence efforts. This will divide the region.</p>
<p>Finally, Trump’s <a href="https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/immigration/?/positions/immigration-reform">proposed “task force”</a> to deport immigrants already in the US, block others from coming in and build a Mexico border wall (paid for by Mexico) is xenophobic, discriminatory and alienating. </p>
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<p><strong>Andrea Peto and Weronika Grzebalska: Trump a boost for illiberial regimes in Europe</strong></p>
<p>For Central Eastern Europe, Trump’s victory is a green light for the consolidation of <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-hungary-and-poland-have-silenced-women-and-stifled-human-rights-66743">illiberal majoritarian regimes</a> which promise people a sense of existential security at the cost of individual freedoms, minority rights and checks and balances. </p>
<p>Trump’s election will definitely strengthen the neo-conservative, fundamentalist networks and shift the global political balance in the direction of familialism, nationalism and further away from human rights and an open society. Weak states such as Poland and Hungary in which democratic transition privileged free market measures over social and cultural ones are all the more vulnerable to the loss of a strong, democratic, pro-human rights voice. </p>
<p>Clinton’s defeat might also serve as a wake up call to the last of the hard-headed supporters of the neoliberal status quo in Central and Eastern Europe. Those who still believe illiberal turns in Poland and Hungary are just a local, provisional backlash, who think it is still possible to go back to the political solutions from the pre-illiberal era will have to rethink their position. </p>
<p>With the victory of Trump, human rights supporters are pushed into a doubly difficult situation. Not only do they have to protect the little provisions there are left and create a space of resistance but also at the same time reformulate their message. This message should be different from going back to the pre-Trump era, which has been the prison of technocratic, quasi-rational policy discourse for way too long. Instead it should revive great ideologies and offer an equally captivating political vision capable of re-enchanting voters.</p>
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<p><strong>Subarno Chattarji: Trump and India</strong></p>
<p>It is in some ways too early to think about the impact of a Donald Trump presidency on India-US relations. Some patterns between the 2014 elections in India and the current one in the US are, however, discernible.</p>
<p>Trump’s election represents the victory of a strong man – “<a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/trump-rnc-speech-alone-fix-it/492557/">I alone can fix it</a>” – railing against media, political, and intellectual elites in whose favour the system is “<a href="https://theconversation.com/dear-donald-trump-this-is-what-a-rigged-election-looks-like-67757">rigged</a>”. His victory is indicative of the insecurities and resentments of the majority and the desire to return to a purer, better, “original” America, which was largely white and where everyone knew their place.</p>
<p>While American isolationism, exceptionalism, and xenophobia are not new, they find unique expression in Trump. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was similarly elected on premises and promises of better days and the idea of a charismatic strong man leading the nation out of the morass of poverty, unemployment, secular politics, elites, minority appeasement etc.</p>
<p>Like Trump, the current political leadership in India is emblematic of an us-versus-them mentality, intolerant of dissent, critical thinking, or inconvenient institutions. Unsurprisingly, Trump has <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-donald-trump-is-winning-over-many-american-hindus-67518">many fans in India and among Indian immigrants</a> in the US. </p>
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<p><strong>Richard Maher: the view from Europe</strong></p>
<p>In a stunning electoral upset, Donald Trump has defeated Hillary Clinton to become the 45th President of the United States. Virtually every <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/08/a-comprehensive-average-of-election-forecasts-points-to-a-decisive-clinton-victory/">pre-election forecast</a> suggested a comfortable or even decisive Clinton victory. Instead, Trump – a man that many European leaders and citizens view as <a href="https://theconversation.com/european-leaders-would-see-a-donald-trump-victory-as-total-calamity-67619">manifestly unqualified</a> and unprepared for the position – will become president of the world’s sole superpower in January.</p>
<p>Trump’s victory is almost certainly being met across European capitals this morning with alarm, shock, and dread. Trump has called the NATO alliance “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0f397616-f9b8-11e5-8e04-8600cef2ca75">obsolete</a>”, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37303057">spoken admiringly</a> of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and said the British vote in June 2016 to exit the European Union was “<a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-36606184">a great thing</a>”.</p>
<p>Unlike in the United States, the European public was solidly against the idea of a Trump presidency. In a poll published by the Economist on November 8 showing how other countries would vote in the US election, huge majorities <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/11/daily-chart-4">favoured Clinton</a>. According to a <a href="http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/29/2-obamas-international-image-remains-strong-in-europe-and-asia/">Pew Research survey</a> published in June, overwhelming majorities of Europeans polled said they had “no confidence” that Trump “would do the right thing regarding world affairs”.</p>
<p>Now European leaders must anticipate how a Trump administration will affect transatlantic relations and the many common challenges the United States and Europe face, from an increasingly assertive Russia, a relentless migration crisis that threatens to tear Europe apart, and Britain’s future in the EU.</p>
<p>More broadly, Trump’s election questions the future of US global leadership. Since the end of World War II, the United States, along with key European partners, built and then sustained an open, rules-based international order defined by free trade, military alliances, and international institutions such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. With Trump’s victory, the very future of this liberal international order is in peril.</p>
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<p><strong>William Case: what Trump’s victory means for Southeast Asia</strong> </p>
<p>With so many countries in the region already leaning toward China, does Donald Trump’s election to the US presidency matter for Southeast Asia? It does, at least a little. </p>
<p>To see understand how, imagine what the impact would have been if Hillary Clinton had won. She maintained a strong interest in trade, even if forced by voters during the election campaign to backtrack on the Trans Pacific Partnership. She vigorously denounced China’s takeover of the South China Sea, even as claimants in Southeast Asia have begun to cave in. And she might have retained some of the good will in Indonesia — and in Myanmar — that Barack Obama was able to generate. So Clinton might have slowed, though not reversed, China’s suffocating embrace of Southeast Asia.</p>
<p>After all, Southeast Asia is not a topmost concern for the US. But for China, it is. And China offers leaders in the region irresistible inducements, namely, near bottomless investment and lending for high speed railways, ports, and energy grids. To be sure, as the bills come due and exclusive economic zones are lost, citizens may rue the terms into which their leaders have entered. But by then, Hillary Clinton’s presidency would have passed.</p>
<p>By contrast, with Donald Trump in the White House, Southeast Asia’s entry into China’s orbit will quicken. Indeed, his repudiation of trading relations and security commitments seems to leave countries in the region with no alternative. And his anti-Muslim vitriol will add steam, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. </p>
<p>Trump’s presidency, then, will accelerate Southeast Asia’s progress along China’s new Silk Road. But interestingly, by doing so, the costs for Southeast Asia may grow apparent much sooner. </p>
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<p><strong>Jay Batongbacal: issues in the South China Sea will go on the back-burner</strong></p>
<p>Donald Trump taking the reins of the US presidency could mark the sunset on Pax Americana in the Asia Pacific, and clear away any remaining resistance to China’s rise to regional preeminence. </p>
<p>A relatively isolationist and localised focus on the part of his administration as he attempts to fulfil his electoral promises would likely leave issues such as the South China Sea on the back-burner. ASEAN hedging patterns will cause member states to gravitate towards China even more. </p>
<p>The US rebalancing in Asia under President Barack Obama, and the country’s alliance commitments in the region could also be severely undermined given Trump’s lack of appreciation for the role played by America’s security relationships in US global political and economic leadership. The only hindrance to this lies in the fact that US geostrategic policy for the Asia-Pacific has been a largely bipartisan matter in the US Congress.</p>
<p>But Trump’s tenuous links to the Republican Party, lack of real leadership thereof, and non-attachment to Republican ideals, puts into question the responsiveness and effectiveness of that policy in the face of more solid and coordinated leadership within regional powers such as China and Russia, which will have an unparalleled opportunity to fill in any voids the US may leave. </p>
<p>For the Philippines and its President Rodrigo Duterte, this is a fortunate coincidence as it accommodates his oft-stated aversion to US influence and commentary on his domestic policy, and distrust of the US.</p>
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<p><strong>Miguel Angel Latouche: the triumph of anti-politics</strong></p>
<p>Donald Trump has proved something that we Venezuelans have known since the 1998 election that <a href="http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9812/06/venezuela.results/index.html">catapulted Hugo Chávez to the presidency</a> of our country: when people perceive problems and feel politicians don’t represent society’s broad interests; when the demands of certain sectors are not satisfied, leading to a sense of exclusion; when people want change – then a “strong man” figure becomes really electorally attractive. </p>
<p>With Trump, we saw an aggressive campaign by a man who said what he thought without ever thinking it over much, who called things as he saw them and who proposed simple solutions to complex problems (whether they’re feasible responses or not). For the first time in a long time, the US has a president who genuinely does not belong to Washington, nor to the party logic of his country. It’s a triumph of anti-politics.</p>
<p>Beyond Trump’s business endeavours, television experience and some of his scandals, we know little about the new US president. Who is Donald Trump, really? What are his political ideas and proposals? </p>
<p>It’s interesting to observe, for example, the profound contradiction between the aggressive tone of his campaign and the conciliatory style he adopted for his <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/11/09/trump-declares-victory-thanks-clinton-for-hard-fought-battle.html">3 am acceptance speech</a>. But one can’t act against one’s own nature, and fundamentally Trump has shown himself to be a charismatic populist.</p>
<p>For Latin America, he’s promised to harden relations with Cuba and Venezuela, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-37243269">build a wall</a> along the Mexico border, and <a href="http://www.vox.com/2016/11/9/13572030/donald-trump-immigration">tighten immigrant policies</a>. We’re looking at a strong presidency here, perhaps too strong, with <a href="http://www.npr.org/2016/11/09/500711970/republicans-keep-control-of-the-senate-as-democrats-largely-falter">Congress on his side</a>, and a leader who has espoused conservative positions but is also changeable when it comes to tough topics. This makes him hard to predict and susceptible to shifting with public opinion. </p>
<p>It’s quite possible that Trump will return the US to a modified version of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097396">Cold War power politics</a>. Only time will tell if Trump is leading us to a more orderly and secure world or on a march toward insanity.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/68282/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>Jay Batongbacal holds a Fulbright Visiting Fellowship.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Salvador Vázquez del Mercado is a director of public opinion in the office of the President of Mexico. All opinions and errors herewithin are his own.</span></em></p><p class="fine-print"><em><span>Andrea Peto, Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, Jonathan Rynhold, Miguel Angel Latouche, Richard Maher, Rut Diamint, Subarno Chattarji, Weronika Grzebalska, and William Case do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>Donald J Trump has emerged victorious in the historic, and historically acerbic, 2016 American presidential election. What does this outcome mean for the world?William Case, Professor of Comparative Politics, City University of Hong KongAndrea Peto, Professor of Gender Studies, Central European UniversityJanjira Sombatpoonsiri, Assistant Professor, Thammasat UniversityJay Batongbacal, Associate Professor of Law, University of the PhilippinesJonathan Rynhold, Director, Argov Center for the Study of Israel and the Jewish People, Bar-Ilan UniversityMiguel Angel Latouche, Associate professor, Universidad Central de VenezuelaRichard Maher, Research Fellow, Global Governance Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University InstituteRut Diamint, Profesora, Torcuato di Tella UniversitySalvador Vázquez del Mercado, Lecturer on Public Opinion and Research Methodology, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)Subarno Chattarji, Associate Professor, University of DelhiWeronika Grzebalska, PhD researcher, Graduate School for Social Research, Polish Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/671952016-10-19T20:00:01Z2016-10-19T20:00:01ZEn Pologne et en Hongrie, les droits des femmes en péril<p>En Pologne, grâce à un vaste mouvement de protestation, les femmes ont réussi à éviter l’<a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37573938">interdiction totale de l’avortement</a> qui faisait l’objet d’une proposition de loi : rares sont les victoires des mouvements féministes en Europe centrale, mais celle-ci est de taille.</p>
<p>Dans tout le pays, des femmes ont fait la grève et se sont vêtues de noir, en signe de deuil pour leurs droits menacés. Il y a lieu de se réjouir que ce <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/poland-women-abortion-strike-protests-black-monday-polish-protestors-industrial-action-a7343136.html">« lundi noir »</a> ait porté ses fruits. Cependant, une question troublante reste en suspens.</p>
<p>Comment est-il possible qu’un pays membre de l’UE puisse songer à forcer des femmes à porter des enfants malformés ou à emprisonner les médecins qui pratiquent l’avortement ?</p>
<p>En guise de réponse, l’opposition polonaise clame que le parti au pouvoir, PiS, <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21708179-catholic-backed-bill-puts-conservative-government-tough-spot-polish-women-skip-work">veut revenir au Moyen Age</a>. Une théorie populaire mais peu satisfaisante, qui repose sur le mythe d’une histoire de la libération des femmes faite de contrecoups politiques, où les progrès constants vers l’égalité des sexes seraient interrompus par des embûches qu’il faudrait surmonter par l’action commune.</p>
<p>Par chance, l’action commune a fonctionné dans le cas de cette proposition de loi. Mais si les groupes progressistes ne sont pas capables de comprendre les nouveaux défis qui s’imposent en matière de droits des femmes dans les États peu libéraux d’Europe centrale, les progrès de ces droits pourraient être sérieusement compromis.</p>
<h2>L’État polypore</h2>
<p>Ces dernières années, la Hongrie et la Pologne ont vécu une série de changements institutionnels et vécu une seconde transition, de l’État libéral vers une « démocratie antilibérale ».</p>
<p>Car les régimes émergents de Viktor Orbán en Hongrie et de Beata Szydło en Pologne ne représentent pas une résurgence de l’autoritarisme, mais bien une nouvelle forme de gouvernance. Ce nouveau système prend racine dans les échecs de la globalisation et du néolibéralisme, qui ont créé des États faibles pour les plus forts et forts pour les plus faibles.</p>
<p>Pour décrire le <em>modus operandi</em> de ces régimes d’un nouveau genre, nous avons inventé une expression : l’État « polypore ».</p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=237&amp;fit=clip"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Les polypores en pleine action.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polypore#/media/File:Fungi_in_Borneo.jpg">Cayce</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>Un polypore est un champignon parasite des arbres, qui se nourrit en détruisant le bois.</p>
<p>A l’image des polypores, les gouvernements de Pologne et de Hongrie se nourrissent des ressources vitales de leurs prédécesseurs libéraux pour produire une structure étatique totalement dépendante de ces ressources. Ce type de gouvernement implique le phagocytage des institutions, des mécanismes et des sources de financements du projet démocratique libéral européen.</p>
<p>La Hongrie a offert un exemple flagrant de ce fonctionnement en 2011, avec une <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-funds-used-for-hungarian-anti-abortion-campaign/">campagne d’affichage anti-avortement</a>. Une campagne lancée sous la houlette d’un programme gouvernemental voué à l’équilibre entre vie professionnelle et vie privée et qui a été, à ce titre, financé par le programme pour l’emploi et l’innovation sociale de l’UE, ironiquement nommé… <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&amp;catId=327">PROGRESS</a>.</p>
<p>L’État polypore prive la société civile séculaire et moderne préexistante de ses ressources, au profit de sa base antilibérale, afin de la renforcer et de l’élargir. Cette année, en Pologne, le ministre de la Justice a refusé de financer plusieurs ONG dédiées à la défense des droits des femmes et des enfants. Ces fonds ont été attribués à des <a href="https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/dlaczego-niektore-organizacje-pozarzadowe-nie-moga-liczyc-na-dotacje-minister-sprawiedliwosci">organisations catholiques comme Caritas</a>.</p>
<p>Comme le champignon polypore qui s’en prend à des arbres en mauvaise santé, les régimes antilibéraux accèdent au pouvoir dans des contextes d’affaiblissement des normes démocratiques, endommagées par les crises financières, sécuritaires et migratoires.</p>
<p>En Europe centrale, après 1989, les gouvernements ont favorisé les <a href="http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/374/1/SzB_TA_foreign_aid_CEE2.pdf">réformes économiques</a> et délaissé les réformes civiques et sociales. Les normes et les pratiques libérales n’ont pas pu s’enraciner dans ces sociétés. D’où une situation paradoxale : les forces antilibérales s’épanouissent à la faveur d’une révolution libérale inachevée.</p>
<p>Pour comprendre le succès de ces formes de gouvernement, il faut intégrer trois de leurs préceptes clés : la société civile parallèle, le récit sécuritaire et la famille.</p>
<h2>Une société civile parallèle</h2>
<p>Les régimes antilibéraux d’Europe cherchent à transformer l’infrastructure post-communiste au profit de la nouvelle élite au pouvoir et des ses électeurs.</p>
<p>La clé de cette transformation consiste à remplacer les organisations dédiées aux droits de l’homme et à la société civile par des ONG pro-gouvernementales qui soutiennent l’agenda étatique. Tandis que ces nouvelles infrastructures ressemblent à s’y méprendre aux précédentes, leur cadre d’intervention – religieux et antimoderniste – est totalement différent.</p>
<p>En Hongrie par exemple, il existe deux ONG importantes qui se consacrent au rôle des pères dans les familles et à l’équilibre entre vie privée et vie professionnelle : d’un côté, <a href="http://jol-let.com/">Jol-let</a>, une ONG libérale qui existe depuis longtemps, et de l’autre, une ONG récente et conservatrice, <a href="http://haromkiralyfi.hu/">Harom Kiralyfi</a>. Ces derniers temps, seule cette dernière a reçu des financements pour <a href="http://www.haromkiralyfi.hu/apa_is_csak_egy_van">mener à bien ses projets</a>.</p>
<p>C’est ainsi que le secteur des ONG se transforme peu à peu, par la distribution de financements européens et nationaux à des groupes qui partagent l’idéologie gouvernementale au détriment des organisations progressistes qui dépendent de dons – très insuffisants – venus de l’étranger, et sont désormais incapables d’influencer la politique nationale.</p>
<h2>Récit sécuritaire</h2>
<p>Afin de légitimer leur rejet d’une société civile plurielle, les gouvernements antilibéraux utilisent le langage de la sécurité. Les organisations dédiées aux droits de l’homme sont décrites comme dangereuses pour la souveraineté nationale et on les dit <a href="http://www.liberties.eu/en/news/hungary-ngo-war">pilotées depuis l’étranger</a>.</p>
<p>Égalité des genres, société ouverte et droits des minorités sont vus comme une menace existentielle à la survie de la nation. En 2013, Orbán a <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/international/21616969-more-and-more-autocrats-are-stifling-criticism-barring-non-governmental-organisations">commandé une enquête</a> sur certaines ONG financées par la Norvège, dont le Roma Press Centre et Women for Women against Violence, accusées d’être des organisations d’activistes politiques « payées pour soutenir des intérêts étrangers ».</p>
<p>L’enquête est désormais <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/orban-backs-down-in-battle-with-norwegian-ngos/">close</a>, mais elle a fait beaucoup de dégâts dans les ONG concernées.</p>
<p>Dans ce contexte, les problématiques liées aux droits de l’homme sont dépolitisées, et les groupes de plaidoyer en faveur de ces droits sont désignés comme des ennemis d’État et non plus comme des adversaires démocratiques.</p>
<h2>Privilégier la famille plutôt que les droits des femmes</h2>
<p>La Hongrie et la Pologne attaquent les droits de l’homme en utilisant des concepts nationalistes sur le thème de la famille, mettant en avant les droits et les intérêts des familles « traditionnelles » plutôt que celui des individus et des minorités.</p>
<p>Les partis au pouvoir en Hongrie et en Pologne, le Fidesz et le PiS, ont tous deux mis le concept de « family mainstreaming » au cœur de leurs politiques. Dans la <a href="http://www.genderkompetenz.info/eng/gender-competence-2003-2010/Gender%20Mainstreaming/Strategy/Family%20Policy/family_mainstreaming.html">littérature politique de L’UE et des Nations unies</a>, le « family mainstreaming » se définit comme un outil d’identification de l’impact des politiques familiales et de renforcement des fonctions familiales. Dans les mains des acteurs antilibéraux, il est devenu une alternative aux droits des femmes et un instrument de promotion des valeurs « traditionnelles ».</p>
<p>Les problématiques liées aux femmes sont progressivement remplacées par des problématiques familiales, et les instituions responsables de l’égalité des genres sont remplacées par des institutions en charge de la famille et de la démographie. En Hongrie, le Conseil pour des Chances Égales entre Hommes et Femmes – la plus haute instance en matière d’égalité des genres – <a href="http://eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming/structures/hungary/council-gender-equality">n’a pas tenu d’assemblée depuis 2010</a>, et son portefeuille a été délégué à une institution en charge de la démographie (Demographic Roundtable).</p>
<h2>Pas un simple accident de l’histoire</h2>
<p>S’ils ne sont pas identifiés comme tels, les États antilibéraux peuvent entraîner des conséquences désastreuses pour les droits des femmes et des minorités. Quand l’État s’approprie les structures démocratiques préexistantes, cela éteint toute velléité de résistance.</p>
<p>Sous financées, diabolisées, travaillant dans un contexte où l’équilibre des pouvoirs a disparu, les ONG féministes et progressistes ne sont plus en mesure d’utiliser le plaidoyer, la concertation, ou les médias - les ressorts classiques qui étaient les leurs. </p>
<p>Il ne faut pas voir les démocraties antilibérales comme un accident de parcours après lequel tout va rentrer dans l’ordre, mais bien comme une nouvelle forme de gouvernance. À ce titre, la récente victoire des femmes polonaises ne sera peut-être pas durable.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/67195/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>En Europe centrale, les régimes en place utilisent les ressources de leurs prédécesseurs libéraux pour financer des programmes qui compromettent l’égalité hommes-femmes.Andrea Peto, Professor of Gender Studies, Central European UniversityWeronika Grzebalska, PhD researcher, Graduate School for Social Research, Polish Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.tag:theconversation.com,2011:article/667432016-10-14T06:19:32Z2016-10-14T06:19:32ZHow Hungary and Poland have silenced women and stifled human rights<p>In the women’s movement in Central Europe, there are few moments to celebrate. Polish women <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37573938">successfully preventing</a> a total ban on abortion from coming into law recently was one of them. </p>
<p>While we may praise the success of Polish women’s “<a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/poland-women-abortion-strike-protests-black-monday-polish-protestors-industrial-action-a7343136.html">black protest</a>” – where women across the country went on strike and dressed in black to mourn the loss of their reproductive rights – one troubling question remains unanswered. </p>
<p>Why did an EU member state even consider forcing women to carry deformed fetuses and imprisoning doctors for terminating pregnancies? </p>
<p>The popular view voiced by the Polish opposition – that the governing Law and Justice Party (PiS) wants to <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21708179-catholic-backed-bill-puts-conservative-government-tough-spot-polish-women-skip-work">bring back the Middle Ages</a> – is insufficient. It relies on the “backlash” narrative of women’s emancipation, which sees nations making linear progress towards equality, interrupted by setbacks that can be overcome by joint action. </p>
<p>Luckily, joint action worked in this case. But if progressive groups do not understand the new challenges posed to women’s rights by the illiberal states of Central Europe, future progress may be elusive.</p>
<h2>The polypore state</h2>
<p>In recent years, Hungary and Poland have experienced a series of radical institutional changes aimed at a second transition from liberal to illiberal democracy. </p>
<p>The emergent regimes of Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Beata Szydło in Poland do not represent a revival of authoritarianism, but a new form of governance. This new system stems from the failures of globalisation and neoliberalism, which created states that are weak for the strong, and strong for the weak. </p>
<p>To describe the <em>modus operandi</em> of these new regimes, we have coined a new term: the “polypore” state. </p>
<figure class="align-right zoomable">
<a href="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=1000&amp;fit=clip"><img alt="" src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/141499/original/image-20161012-16253-jqm2x8.jpg?ixlib=rb-1.1.0&amp;q=45&amp;auto=format&amp;w=237&amp;fit=clip"></a>
<figcaption>
<span class="caption">Polypores at work.</span>
<span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polypore#/media/File:Fungi_in_Borneo.jpg">Cayce</a>, <a class="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/">CC BY</a></span>
</figcaption>
</figure>
<p>A polypore is a parasitic fungus that feeds on rotting trees, contributing to their decay. </p>
<p>In the same way, the governments of Poland and Hungary feed on the vital resources of their liberal predecessors, and produce a fully dependent state structure in return.</p>
<p>This style of government involves appropriating the institutions, mechanisms and funding channels of the European liberal democratic project. </p>
<p>One widely publicised example in Hungary was a controversial <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-funds-used-for-hungarian-anti-abortion-campaign/">2011 anti-abortion poster campaign</a>. The campaign was launched as part of a government work-life balance project and as such was funded from the EU employment and social solidarity program, ironically called <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&amp;catId=327">PROGRESS</a>.</p>
<p>The “polypore state” divests resources from the already existing secular and modernist civil society sector towards the illiberal base, to secure and enlarge it. This year in Poland, the Ministry of Justice denied funding to several progressive women’s and children’s rights NGOs. As noted by the <a href="https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/dlaczego-niektore-organizacje-pozarzadowe-nie-moga-liczyc-na-dotacje-minister-sprawiedliwosci">Commissioner for Human Rights</a>, the funds were instead granted to Catholic organisations such as Caritas.</p>
<p>Just as the polypore fungus usually attacks already damaged trees, illiberal regimes rise to power in the context of democratic standards weakened by the financial, security and migration crises. </p>
<p>In Central Europe, post-1989 regime transformation <a href="http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/374/1/SzB_TA_foreign_aid_CEE2.pdf">gave preference to economic reform measures</a> over civic and social ones. Liberal norms and practices have never been fully embedded in these societies. This creates a paradoxical situation where illiberal forces have flourished amid an unfinished liberal revolution.</p>
<p>There are three key tenets of this type of government that need to be understood to account for its success: parallel civil society, security narratives, and the family.</p>
<h2>Parallel civil society</h2>
<p>The goal of illiberal regimes in Central Europe is to transform post-communist infrastructure to benefit the new ruling elite and its voter base. </p>
<p>The key aspect of this transformation is replacing previous civil society and human rights organisations with pro-government NGOs, which support the state’s agenda. While the new groups seemingly have the same profile and target group as the previous ones, they operate within a blatantly different framework that is predominantly religious and anti-modernist.</p>
<p>For instance, there are two key women’s NGOs in Hungary that deal with the role of fathers in families and work-life balance: the long-established, liberal <a href="http://jol-let.com/">Jol-let</a> and the newly founded, conservative <a href="http://haromkiralyfi.hu/">Harom Kiralyfi</a>. Recently only the latter has received signficant state funding for its <a href="http://www.haromkiralyfi.hu/apa_is_csak_egy_van">projects</a>. </p>
<p>Thus the NGO sector is transformed by the distribution of EU and state funding to groups that share the governments’ ideology, leaving progressive organisations reliant on increasingly scarce foreign donations and largely unable to influence domestic policy.</p>
<h2>Security narratives</h2>
<p>To legitimise their disregard for a plural civil society, illiberal governments use the language of security. Human rights groups are framed as foreign-steered and potentially <a href="http://www.liberties.eu/en/news/hungary-ngo-war">dangerous for national sovereignty</a>.</p>
<p>Gender equality, open society and minority rights are portrayed as an existential threat to the survival of the nation. In 2013, Orbán ordered an <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/international/21616969-more-and-more-autocrats-are-stifling-criticism-barring-non-governmental-organisations">investigation</a> into certain Norwegian-funded NGOs, including the Roma Press Centre and Women for Women against Violence, which were accused of being “paid political activists who are trying to help foreign interests”. </p>
<p>The investigation has <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/orban-backs-down-in-battle-with-norwegian-ngos/">since been resolved</a>, but not without <a href="http://politicalcritique.org/cee/hungary/2016/kretakor-ngo-in-hungary/">significant damage</a> being inflicted on many NGOs. </p>
<p>In this context, human rights issues become depoliticised – and advocacy groups are presented as state enemies rather than democratic adversaries. </p>
<h2>Privileging family over women’s rights</h2>
<p>Hungary and Poland use nationalist ideas about the family to attack human rights, emphasising the rights and interests of “traditional” families over those of individuals and minorities. </p>
<p>Fidesz and PiS, the Hungarian and Polish ruling parties respectively, have both introduced the concept of “family mainstreaming” as central to their policy making. In EU and UN <a href="http://www.genderkompetenz.info/eng/gender-competence-2003-2010/Gender%20Mainstreaming/Strategy/Family%20Policy/family_mainstreaming.html">policy literature</a>, family mainstreaming is presented as a tool to identify the impact of policies on families and strengthen the functions of the family. In the hands of illiberal actors, it’s become an alternative to women’s rights and an instrument for promoting “traditional” values.</p>
<p>Women’s issues are gradually substituted with family issues, and institutions responsible for gender equality are replaced with ones dealing with family and demography. In Hungary, the highest coordinating government body for gender equality, the Council of Equal Opportunity of Men and Women, <a href="http://eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming/structures/hungary/council-gender-equality">has not convened</a> since 2010, and its portfolio has been delegated to the Demographic Roundtable.</p>
<h2>This is not a backlash</h2>
<p>If not properly recognised, illiberal states can have seriously detrimental consequences for the rights of women and minorities. When the state appropriates previously existing democratic structures, it shuts down opportunities for resistance. </p>
<p>Underfunded, demonised, and operating outside a system of liberal checks and balances, feminists and progressive NGOs are unable to influence government policy through previously existing channels – advocacy, consultations or media.</p>
<p>Illiberalism is not a backlash, after which one can go back to business as usual, but a new form of governance. Sadly, this means the recent success of the women’s protests in Poland might be impossible to sustain.</p><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/66743/count.gif" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" />
<p class="fine-print"><em><span>The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.</span></em></p>The war on reproductive rights in Central Europe is not a backlash but a key tenet of a new illiberal form of governance.Andrea Peto, Professor of Gender Studies, Central European UniversityWeronika Grzebalska, PhD researcher, Graduate School for Social Research, Polish Academy of SciencesLicensed as Creative Commons – attribution, no derivatives.