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Trial court did not err by granting a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) where the motion was uncontested below and appellants, in fact, requested that the trial court grant the Civ.R. 60(B) motion.

Trial court did not violate a defendant's due process and equal protection rights in imposing a six-year prison term on the defendant where the record reflects that the defendant's inability to repay $2.2 million to victims in the two-year time period between the guilty plea being entered and sentence being imposed was not a sentencing consideration by the trial court. Further, the defendant failed to establish that an actual conflict of interest existed by defense counsel's joint representation of the defendant and another co-defendant who were both involved in the sale of an unregistered security and the fraudulent act or practice in the sale of securities.

Appellant could not challenge the juvenile court's decision adjudicating her three children neglected and granting temporary custody of the children to a children services agency since the determination that a child is abused, neglected or dependent that is followed by an award of temporary custody to a children services agency cannot be raised on appeal from a juvenile court's decision to grant permanent custody. In addition, the juvenile court's decision to grant permanent custody of appellant's children to a children services agency was supported by sufficient evidence and otherwise not against the manifest weight of the evidence where appellant was homeless and admitted to taking drugs during the pregnancy of her most recent child, had unresolved issues regarding her mental health, housing, and employment, and exhibited limited cognitive ability, whereas the children had since bonded with their respective foster parents and referred to their foster parents as their mothers and fathers.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting appellant's Civ.R. 56(F) motion wherein it provided appellant with an additional 52 days to conduct discovery and respond to appellees' motions for summary judgment where appellant had over three years from the time of her fall giving rise to her claims to investigate, prepare her case, conduct discovery, and file a response by the trial court's imposed deadline. The trial court also did not err by granting appellees' motions for summary judgment on appellant's claims alleging negligence per se and common law negligence where the evidence properly before the court did not establish a genuine issue of material fact so as to support appellant's claims against appellees for the injuries she sustained after she slipped and fell on water and ice outside of her apartment building.

Father appeals juvenile court decisions awarding permanent custody of children to a children's services agency. Father's as-applied challenge to Ohio statute on the interstate compact on the placement of children, R.C. 5103.20, failed where he argued that the statute denied him the ability to appeal an out-of-state adverse decision on a home study concerning the suitability of placement with the children's grandmother. The court could not have granted grandmother legal custody as she did not move for legal custody herself or otherwise sign a statement of understanding as required by statute. Sufficient credible evidence supported the juvenile court's determination that a grant of permanent custody to the agency was in children's best interest.

Trial court did not err by granting DVCPO in favor of appellant's ex-girlfriend, her fiancé, her fiancé's children, and her parents where the evidence showed that appellant threatened to harm her and her family or household members.

Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight because his fingerprints were found on the materials used in the manufacturing process, as well as on the finished methamphetamine. However, the trial court could not sentence appellant on a second-degree felony where the jury verdict form did not state the degree designation, the jury made no finding as to what drug appellant manufactured, and where the statute provided for a third-degree felony option.