Thursday, May 24, 2012

RUIN AND RENEWAL: THE STORY OF SOMALIALND

RUIN AND RENEWAL: THE STORY OF SOMALIALND

Report to THE WORLD
BANK

Prepared by

THE CENTER FOR CREATIVE SOLUTIONS

Hargeisa,
SomalilandMay 31, 2004

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose of the Report
This report combines findings of a desk study and a follow-up fieldwork. Its
aim is to review Somaliland history and current status in order to identify
causes and contributors to the escalation and de-escalation of conflict.
The desk study was carried out from September – November 2003. Bulhan wrote
the desk study when he was the Executive Director of the Academy for Peace and
Development – an organization he cofounded in 1999 and led from its inception to
January 31, 2004. The contributors to the desk study included the staff of the
Academy who in part drew from work they carried out in collaboration with WSP
International.
The fieldwork was carried out from March – May 2004 by the staff of the
Center for Creative Solutions. It used different methods of data collection
including observations, key informant interviews, focus groups, and informal
group discussions. The fieldwork was to reassess the desk study findings, the
relevant key variables, and conclusions. In addition, the fieldwork was to
amplify and deepen understanding of the current problems and future prospects of
Somaliland.
1.2 The Center for Creative Solutions
This report is prepared by the Center for Creative Solutions based in
Hargeisa Somaliland. The Center was established in 1995 and registered then as
Center for Health and Development. The Center changed its original name for two
reasons.
Firstly, the priorities of the Center expanded beyond its initial health
agenda to wider policy and systemic concerns in post-conflict situations.
Secondly, the Center builds on the observation that the mosaic of problems
prevalent in post-conflict situation force people to worry about and get stuck
with the pressing problems at hand, not on strategies and methods that solve
these problems.
In short, the Center encourages its staff and associates to think creatively
to contribute to political, economic, social, and technological solutions in
post-conflict situation.
1.3 Selection of Focus Issue for Fieldwork
The desk study examined the status and development of Somaliland since 1991
using the CAF.1 The fieldwork was carried in order to:
- Validate or replace desk study information; - Fill knowledge gaps on
specific issues; - Deepen knowledge (both information and views) on these
issues; and - Gauge views and concerns of informants from different groups;
- Identify solutions and offer recommendations for change.
Initially, twelve focus issues (out of the thirty CAF variables) were
selected for further research through fieldwork in Somaliland because:
- They seemed salient problems in the political, social and economic history
of Somaliland since 1991, following the collapse of the dictatorial regime;
- They appeared pertinent to the escalation or de-escalation of conflict in
Somaliland; - Some of them intensified or alleviated poverty in Somaliland.
1.4 Change in Focus Issues
In the middle of the fieldwork, we found the need to make changes in how we
approach the study and write up the report. Following the CAF categories
mechanically seemed counter-productive. Thus, we gave due attention to the
particular concerns of field study participants. In the end, we reduced the
twelve focus issues we initially selected to seven that seemed to us most
critical for the escalation and deescalation of conflict in Somaliland. They
are:
1. Clan Cleavages, 2. Inequity in Governance and Political
Institutions,3. Equity of Law and Judicial System,4. Human Rights (with
emphasis on Freedom of Speech and role of Civil society),5. Economic
Structure and Performance,6. Environment and Natural Resources, and 7.
External Factors (with emphasis on Regional Conflicts, and Role of Diaspora).
The chapters are organized along temporal and thematic divisions. Each
chapter first presents why we chose the focus issues after which it presents the
background and current status of the issue. Background discussion covers
relevant information prior to 1991 and current status covers issues from 1991 to
the present. Using 1991 as the temporal divide is justified by two critical
developments – the collapse of the military regime and the reclamation of
Somaliland independence. In addition, each chapter ends with highlight of
potential escalators and de-escalators of conflict and with summary of the
issues discussed.
The report is written by Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan who is most grateful to –
Iise Uragte Hussein, Bashir Barre Buh, and Jama Osman Ashur. These research
colleagues helped in gathering information during the fieldwork. We hope the
report contributes to better understanding of Somaliland as it experiments with
home-made solutions to its problems.
We hope this report is useful to the government and people of Somaliland as
well as to international actors helping Somaliland to:
- Further develop its home-bred, low cost methods of peacemaking to solve
armed conflicts; - Ameliorate problems of poverty endemic to its past and
still rampant in its post-conflict conditions; - Promote the struggle toward
democratic initiatives as shown by its local elections in 2002 and presidential
election in 2003; and - Ensure that those who seek to derail these
achievements on peace and democracy by provoking instability within Somaliland,
or by inciting armed conflict on its borders, do not succeed.
HIGHLIGHTS ON SOMALILAND
Area and Location
Comprising a total land mass of 137,600 km², the territory is bound by the
Gulf of Eden to the north, the Republic of Djibouti on the northwest, the
Federal Republic on the South and West, and Puntland (generally Somalia) on the
East. It lies between latitude 8º and 11º 27’ north and longitude 42º 35’ and
49º east.2
Climate: Situated 78º north of the equator, Somaliland is a semi-arid with an
average temperature range from 25º C to 35º C and the sun passes vertically
overhead twice a year – on March 22nd and September 23rd.
Humidity: Somaliland’s humidity varies from 63% in the dry season to 82% in
the wet season.
Topographic Zones
The country consists of three main zones – the Coastal Plain (Guban), the
Coastal Range (Ogo), and the Plateau (Hawd). Mountains located in the center and
the east rise to six and seven thousand feet. The Coastal Plain (Guban) has high
temperature and low rainfall, with summer temperatures easily averaging over
100º F. People and livestock concentrate in this zone during the winter. The
Coastal Range (Ogo), a high plateau to the south of Guban, has elevation ranging
between 6,000 feet in the north and 3,000 feet in the south. Rainfall is heavier
in this zone than in the Guban but varies significantly. The Plateau (Hawd),
lying to the south of the Ogo, is heavily populated during the rainy season and
used for grazing livestock.
It is estimated that only about 3% of the total land is cultivated, another
7% has potential for future agricultural development when rainfall, soil
fertility and depth, and topography are considered.3
Rainfall
Average rainfall is 14.5 inches in much of the country. Humidity varies from
63% in the dry season to 82% in the rainy season. There are four seasons – Gu’
and Haga in the summer period and Jilal and Deyr in the winter seasons.
The Gu’ season, the first part of the summer and the period of heaviest
rainfall in Ogo and Hawd, is generally in late March, April, and May. It is the
period of fresh grazing and breeding of livestock. Jilal and Deyr, the dry
season of scarcity, begin in October and continues until the end of March or
early April. The Ogo and the Hawd in particular are extremely dry during this
period, causing much hardship to people and livestock. There is some rainfall
(called Hays) in the Guban and occurs January to March, or between December and
January.
Population: The population of Somaliland is estimated to be 3 million of
which approximately 55% are nomadic and 45% are urban or rural inhabitants.4
Density: The population density is estimated at 22 persons per km².
Vital Statistics
Population growth is 3.1%, calculated from average crude birth rate of 4.46%
and crude death rate of 1.32%. Life expectancy at birth is between 45 and 50
years.
Religion: Islam
Language: Somali
State
By constitution, the state consists of an independent judiciary, a
bi-chameral parliament (House of Elders and House of Representatives), and the
executive led by the President, Vice President, and the cabinet.
Regions: Somaliland divides into six regions – namely, Awadal, Northwest,
Sahil, Togdheer, Sanaag, and Sool.
Capital: Hargeisa
Main Port: Berbera
Currency: Somaliland Shilling
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN SOMALILAND
1991- 2003
26/1/1991 President Mohamed Siyaad Barre and his forces fled Mogadishu and
the Somali State totally collapsed. 29/1 - 2/2/1991 The Somali National
Movement (SNM)5 captured the Northern Regions of former Somali Democratic
Republic 4/2 -6/2/1991 The SNM attacked Borama, aiming to capture government
installations but resulting in killing of some civilians in the process.
15/2-27/2/1991 SNM and traditional elders convened in Berbera for the first
reconciliation conference called “Shirka Walaalaynta Beelaha Waqooye”
(Rebuilding Brotherhood of Northern Clans). This conference paved the way the
subsequent Bur’o Conference. 27/4-18/5/1991 The conference known as
Shirweynaha Beelaha Woqooyi (The Grand Conference of Northern Clans) was held in
parallel with a meeting with the SNM Central Committee. 18/5/1991 The Bur’o
Conference concluded with a restoration of independence and sovereignty for the
former Somaliland British Protectorate. The conferees announced a transitional
administration, led by Abdirahman Ahmed Ali (Tuur), to govern the territory for
a two-year period. 11/1/1992 Clashes between Habar-Yonis and Habar-Je’lo
broke out in Bur’o. Among the triggers of this conflict was the Tuur
Administration’s attempt to disarm clan militia and form a national military
force. October 1992: Fighting broke out in Berbera, after a
government-supported militia moved into the city and provoked armed clan
opposition. The fighting continued sporadically for over six months. In October
1992, opposition clan militia expelled the pro-government militia.
28/10/1992 The conflict was brought to an end at Sheikh Conference called
“Tawfiiq Conference”. This conference also concluded with an agreement to hold
another conference in Borama to achieve broader and more durable peace in
Somaliland. 24/1/1993 The historic conference called the “Grand conference”
began in Boroma. 5/5/1993 Mohamed Ibrahim Egal was selected as President of
Somaliland and a National Charter was adopted. A year later, October 1994, a new
Somaliland currency was introduced. 17/10/1994 Somaliland forces under the
control of President Egal’ administration captured the Hargeisa Airport from
clan militia supporting Jama Mohamed Qaalib and other members of the so-called
“Federalist” opposition. 15/11/1994 Fighting broke out between the
Government and the ‘Iidagale opposition in Hargeysa over control of Hargeisa
Airport. In March, fighting also broke out in Bur’o between the Government and
the Habar Yonis opposition – the latter supporting the ‘Iidagale. 15/10
-22/1/1997 In Hargeysa, the Guurti Congress which re-elected President Egal for
a second term took place. This conference also put an end to hostilities between
the Egal administration and its clan opposition. 6/8//2000 Parliament passed
Law No. 14 (Xeerka Nidaamka Axsaabta) legalizing the formation of “political
organizations”. This law prepared the way for the formation of political parties
which subsequently competed in local and presidential elections. 31/5/2001:
Referendum for the Constitution was held in Somaliland. Over 97% endorsed the
Constitution and the reclamation of independence. 14/11/2001 Parliament
approved an Electoral Law establishing the legal basis for appointment a
National Election Commission. 18/12/2001 Parliament appointed most of the
seven-member National Election Commission. 3/5//2002 President Egal died in
South Africa. On the same day, Vice President Daahir Rayaal Kaahine was sworn to
succeed as President. Thrree days later, Egal was buried in Berbera.
15/12/2002 Local Government Council Elections took place. 14/4/2003: The
first Presidential Elections were held which President Daahir Rayaale Kaahin
won.
Chapter 3: CLAN CLEAVAGES 3.1 WHY WE SELECTED THIS ISSUE Clan
cleavage was selected as focus issue for study firstly because clan is critical
factor in Somali politics and social relations, secondly because the concept of
clan cleavage has special relevance to the form of identity Somalis adopt, how
Somalis relate and differentiate, they participate in the political process, and
even how engage in armed conflict. We will see later that clan cleavage
addresses only one aspect of the dual process of clan fission and clan fusion
which occur jointly when social and political conflicts take clan form and
dynamics. 3.2 BACKGROUND The population comprises primarily five major
clans – the Isaaq, the Gadabursi, the Harti (consisting of Dhubahante and the
Warsangeli), the Isse, and the Gabooye, the last consisting of several groups
segregated and despised by the others.6 Since no population is fixed, pure, or
insular, the composition of Somaliland population has changed overtime and
continues to change.7 Still, the population has not shifted drastically.
These five major clans constitute the predominant settlers of Somaliland and
share in common the following: 1. The same language, culture, and religion;
2. The same British colonial history; 3. A relatively homogenous
population;8 4. A predominantly pastoral tradition;95. Clans
distinguished by lineage have intermarried through the generations; and6. A
government, two-chamber parliament, a flag, and a national anthem giving them
shared national identity.
All the predominant five major clans in Somaliland spill over into Ethiopia,
Djibouti, or Puntland. Inhabitants also travel back and forth the porous border.
During the union from 1960-1991, the subcultural and dialectic differences
between Somaliland and Somalia were expressed in jokes and satire about how each
group speaks, dresses, and behaves.
The last decade of the military regime created cleavages and conflict between
the clans inhabiting Somaliland. However, since the 1993 Borama Conference,
these clan cleavages were mostly mended and the clan conflicts reconciled.10
Before illustrating actual clan cleavages and conflicts that emerged in
Somaliland, we will briefly discuss below a few key promoters of clan cleavage
and escalators of conflict. Depending on issues and parties involved, the same
promoters of clan cleavage and escalators of conflict can also serve as what
helps bind clans and de-escalates conflict.
3.1.2 Clan as Crucible of Identity
Social anthropologists defined kinship in Somaliland as segmentary because it
a system which differentiates people into groups. Not equally emphasized,
however, is social integrative role of the clan since it binds people into a
group with common identity while at the same time it distinguishes them from
others. This system of kinship is based on a chain of paternal ancestors
reaching back to a mythical founding ancestor (like Sheikh Isxaaq and Sheikh
Isma’iil) whose name all members of the clan assume as their collective
identity. It is a system that exclusively favors paternity and male dominance.
This kinship system is a remarkable adaptation to the harsh conditions of life
associated with the semidesert. Together, this elaborate kinship system and
difficult ecology have together shape the social, and economic and political
behavior of Somalis traditionally compete over limited resources, particularly
water and grazing in their predominantly pastoral way of life.
Traditionally, agnatic relations define social and political relations. Clan
is also the crucible of identity, social defense, and social security. The clan
bound by lineage is thus the foundation of all social relations. A child born is
considered a new addition not only to the nuclear family but also to the subclan
and clan. Marriage and divorce take place involving the clan or sub-clan. On the
one hand, the clan at once defends the individual from external attack and it
extends support to members in time of need. On the other, it provides social
control to avoid collective reprisal by or contribution of blood compensation to
an aggrieved group.
This is why the first thing the child learns to memorize is his or her
lineage – reckoning a chain of ancestors from one’s father to a distant and
perhaps mythical founder of the clan who lived as far as the 8th or 9th Century
– the time Islam came to Somali shores. Presumably, the chain of ancestors a
child memorizes could be much longer today if Islamization did not foster
disowning ancestors who held non-Islamic, indigenous beliefs.
The clan system is thus pre-existing, continuing, and pervasive. It is a
structure that permeates all social relations. In time of financial and social
problems, it is the clan and sub-clan that come to the assistance of the victim.
In birth and death, marriage and divorce, employment and joblessness, war and
peace, the clan pervades and influences social relations, for better or worse.11
Nothing – including successive governments – has so far shown to be a viable
alternative to the clan system. On the contrary, the political system itself has
become infused and shaped by the clan system. So long as a viable alternative
does not exist, social relations will remain bound to the clan system. The
elaborate remittance system of contemporary Somalis is in fact only a modern
adaptation to the preexisting system of reciprocal assistance. So too is the
warfare and internecine violence which often baffles the outsider. When the
person dies, it is mostly the clan and sub-clan who buries him/or her. They
arrange the burial, pay the expenses, and carry out the pertinent religious
rituals.
3.1.3 Clan Fusion and Clan Fission
By its nature, the clan system is both a binding and distinguishing factor.
On the one hand, it fosters cohesion among members sharing lineage. On the
other, it distinguishing and separates some members from others reckoning
different ancestors. The two concepts of fusion and fission refer respectively
to the integration of members sharing lineage reaching to a distant ancestor and
the distinction of clans into smaller sub-clans sharing a proximal ancestor or
no known ancestor.
Clan fusion and fission occur simultaneously, giving social relations a
ceaseless dialectic. Fusion and fission may unite “cousins” sharing a close or
distant ancestor. The same two groups locked in conflict may also form union
against others with whom they share no close or known ancestry. These twin
processes of fusion and fission, deeply rooted in Somali society and psyche,
render the Somali mind preoccupied and crowded. They also train the Somali mind
to remarkable complexity and agility, particularly in social and political
relations, while immersing it in a sea of confusion and contradictions.12
Historically, the causes of interpersonal and inter-clan conflict centered on
land, grazing and water. As clans fought with one another, cohesion among their
members increased. Old alliances broke and new ones were formed. Hence the
process of fusion and fission took place with dizzying frequency until a central
government emerged and public attention shifted to competition over power and
political representation.
Contemporary power politics – in particular competition over the resources
and privileges of the state – replaced disputes over land, grazing, and water
since independence in 1960. Traditional group distinctions and myths were
superimposed on new realities of urban life and politics. Following the collapse
of the state, disputes on land and territory re-emerged in both rural and urban
areas. These disputes often involved clans living in contiguous geographic and
rural areas or over plots of land in urban centers. Hence, the process of clan
fusion and fission remain relevant today, as they were in the past but with
greater complexity and dynamic.
3.1.4 Delusion of Clan Superiority
Myth-making is an essential feature in the identity and cohesion of
individuals and groups everywhere. Somalis are no different. However, their
myth-making centers on the clan and sub-clan. To underscore the problems that
such myth-making along clan lines creates, Bulhan has coined the term of
delusion of clan superiority whose psychology and social role he details
elsewhere.13
No clan, however large or small, accepts any degree of inferiority. Each clan
considers itself as the most cultured, generous, and courageous. All clans
valorize their warriors in the folktales, poems, and songs. In so doing, they
perceive themselves as heroic and they take pride no only in who they imagine
themselves to be but also who they convince themselves to be. Because of
delusion of clan superiority, each clan or sub-clan believes itself to be right
in dispute with others, however wild their claims or wishes may be from the
perspective of others. It also expects its members to follow the clan
perspective, right or wrong. There is no built-in check or control. Complicating
matters, this delusion of clan superiority and myth-making are harbored by every
clan. Hence, every conflict, however large or small, tends to be interpreted in
terms of clan.
The delusion of clan superiority serves an important function for the clan.
It fosters cohesion among members. It also gives unassailable grounds for the
identity and pride of member. But the delusion of clan superiority takes on
explosive and destructive features when conflict arises among clans who equally
are convinced of their superiority and infallibility. Often, it is weak parties
to conflict who take this approach. The delusion of clan readily invoked to
rally the clan, those who can not feel inadequacy resort to it, confirming
Alfred Adler’s thesis that deep in superiority complex lies inferiority complex.
Armed conflict is often preceded by strident expression of old and new myths
and re-assertion of clan superiority. In fact, these myths and delusion of clan
superiority are articulated not only in oral narratives and conversations but
also in poetry. Ironically, long after the conflict is resolved, the poems
remain in the consciousness and conversation of people, with the possibility
that they will serve as stimuli for future conflict.
Post-independence politics did not change the delusion of clan superiority.
It only re-directed it to new political landscape, to new forms of competition
and conflict. During the 1980s and 1990s, the delusion of clan superiority took
strident forms instigating and contributing to armed conflict involving
supporters of the regime.
After the collapse of the regime, it lost the controls and moderating
influence which the state, monopolizing power and violence, had imposed on it.
Hence, wars broke out even among clans like the Isaaq who fought in solidarity
against the regime of Mohamed Siyaad Barre. Armed conflicts deescalated after
the 1993 Borama conference which started inter-clan dialogue and reconciliation.
Following it, a government emerged to moderate the delusion of clan
superiority. Since then, dialogue and cooperation gradually replaced the
delusion of clan superiority and armed conflicts it fostered.
3.1.4 Clan Cleavage and Clan Conflict
Clan cleavage and clan conflict are critical topics for understanding war and
peace in Somaliland. However, a few caveats must be mentioned at the outset.
Firstly, clan cleavages always go hand in hand with clan alliance as integral
aspects of clan fission and clan fusion. Thus, where there is clan cleavage, so
too is clan alliance somewhere. The elaborate genealogy of Somalis gives rise to
many possibilities of clan cleavage and clan alliance wherever clan integration
at different levels of the genealogical tree.
Secondly, clan cleavages do not independently or necessarily lead to armed
clan conflict. Clan cleavages rarely erupt into clan conflict without antecedent
differences or conflict of interest first between individuals which evolve into
differences or conflicts between nuclear families, extended families, and then
larger clan conflicts. The lineage system offering different levels of group
identity and distinction, reinforced by the tradition of mutual defense,
canalizes these mundane differences or conflicts at the individual level into
complex clan conflicts. However, not all differences or conflicts evolve into
clan conflicts. Only those interpersonal conflicts that meet the criteria of
social traction evolve into larger group conflicts.14
Thirdly, Somalis tend to exaggerate conflicts among individuals and small
groups into clan conflicts involving all members of the clan. The ethical,
social, or legal violations of a political leader, a military officer, and even
a thief are readily identified with and condemned along with his clan. Although
good done by an individual is also generalized to the group, Somalis are more
likely to generalize individual misdeeds into clan misdeed. In addition, the
condemnation generalized to the clan goes hand in hand with collective
punishment.
Finally not all members of a clan participate equally in clan conflicts. In
every clan conflict, there are members who stay apart from the conflict or even
sympathize with their supposed “enemy clan”. But such individuals are forgotten
in time of clan conflict and punishment meted out for them in equal measure to
those in their clan who foment or actively participate in the conflict.
In short, then, Somali lineage system gives rise to many possibilities of
clan cleavages and alliances which remain latent and inactive until social,
political, or personal conditions reactive and give them new life. Conflicts
identified with clans are social constructions which evolved from individual
conflicts. These social constructions have power to the extent that the majority
of society takes them and treats them as reality. So long as the parties to
conflict accept these social constructions as reality, they become prisoners to
it and possibly shed blood.
3.1.6 Clan Cleavages and Conflict before 1991
The most tragic and ruinous clan cleavages and clan conflict in recent
decades is the armed conflict which pitted the supporters of Mohamed Siyaad
Barre’s regime and the Isaaq clan, led by the Somali National Movement from
1981-91. This protracted of war between citizens and their supposed government
had clearly shown the Isaaq that neither shared Somali identity nor Islamic
faith could moderate the scorched earth policy of the regime against them,
culminating in the destruction of cities and systematic mass murder.
From 1960, the Isaaq were disillusioned with the voluntary union with
Somalia. The attempted coup of Sandhurst-trained officers in 1962 was an early
indicator of this disillusionment. Popular songs and poems of the time also
underscored disillusionment with the union. That a majority of the Isaaq did not
vote for the referendum on the union in 1964 was another signal of
disillusionment with the union. But that signal was ignored.
Like most Somalis, the Isaaq welcomed the military coup of 1969 and its
promises of revolutionary change. However, by 1972, their elation turned into
despair. They found incontestable proof that the system of inequity in sharing
of power, development projects, and social services continued as in the past and
in some respects intensified after 1972. By the mid-1970s, the regime that
supposedly “buried tribalism” turned extremely clannish and nepotistic in its
civil services, the armed forces, and almost all public sectors.
The Siyaad Barre regime which came to power in 1969 with promises of
revolutionary change and Pan- Somali Unity had in a few years degenerated into a
tyrannical regime using clan division and clan conflict to sustain its hold on
power. The primary bulwark of the regime came from three Daarood clans – the
Mareexaan, the Ogaadeen, and the Dhulbahante, given the acronym of MOD Alliance
from abbreviation of their names. The Mareexaan to which the dictator belonged
were leaders of the pack. The Ogaadeen provided mostly the military officers and
foot-soldiers. The Dhulbahante, like other two clans, participated in different
aspects of the regime but they dominated the National Security Services headed
by a Dhulbahante who was also a son-in-law of the dictator.
The 1977-78 war with Ethiopia, ostensibly initiated to advance Pan-Somali
unity, degenerated into clan competition and conflict even within Somali armed
forces who supposedly were to liberate other Somalis . The 1978 coup attempt
after the war, the first of coup of its kind since the military regime took
power in 1969, was led and dominated by one clan. When it failed, the military
regime embraced clanism even more passionately and clearly, persecuting members
of other clans it deemed opponents, real or perceived.15
By 1981 the Isaaq, which constitutes the largest clan-family in Somaliland,
formed a political movement – the Somali National Movement (SNM) – to fight and
topple the military regime. The armed conflict between the SNM (the Isaaq) and
the military regime escalated in subsequent years, leading to destruction of
cities in the summer of 1988. In particular, Hargeisa was razed to the ground by
the heavy bombardment and its surviving residents were strafed all the way to
the Ethiopian border by government planes.16 Among the causes encouraging the
Isaaq to take up arms against the regime were:
- They found inequity in the parliamentary representation, ministerial
appointments, and key posts in the armed forces and the police. - They found
unequal representation in the civil administration and economic development of
their territory; - The flow of their civil servants, professionals, and
businessmen to Mogadishu undermined the development of their territory; -
They felt discriminated in employment and job promotion in the civil service
and, after 1975, they were systematically demoted or dismissed from the armed
forces, the police, and the civil service; - A disproportionate numbers of
Isaaq officers were sent in the most dangerous front of the 1977-78 war with
Ethiopia; some of them were taken out of prison a day before they were sent to
the front. Many of these officers concluded that they were being selectively
eliminated by the regime.
The heavy bombardment of Hargeisa in the summer of 1988 and the strafing of
surviving inhabitants all the way to the Ethiopian border remain etched in the
mind of the Isaaq. Persecution of Isaaq, torture of their intellectuals, and
indiscriminate murders (like the massacres at Maka Durduro and the incident at
Gazira Beach) had convinced them that they were target of clan cleansing.
The May 18, 1991 withdrawal from the failed union of July 1960 was thus a
product of thirty years disillusionment with the union and dream of pan-Somali
unity. Even then, the decision to withdraw from the union found near unanimous
support when citizens of Somaliland realized other Somalis neither understood
their grievances nor seemed prepared to give them due share in a newly
reconstituted state. Thirteen years of relative peace and self-rule demonstrated
that Somaliland can do better on its own, without union with Somalia and
acrimony with its ruling elite. These thirteen years and their results
consolidated the resolve and support for independence.
3.2 THE CURRENT SITUATION
Somaliland entered the 1990s with the clan as the pre-existing and
overarching structure. Following the collapse of the regime in January 1991,
Somaliland began the process of clan reconciliation and rebuilding the peace. On
May 18, 1991, it declared unilateral reclamation of independence. The processes
of clan reconciliation and of rebuilding peace took some years, with occasional
hiccups and a flare up of armed conflicts. Yet, despite successive wars, clan
settlements remained more or less the same. Although unity and peace prevail in
the western regions, inhabitants of Sool and Eastern Sanaag have not fully
participated in the new polity, even when the a significant number of their
elite partake in its administration.
The desk study underscored the central role and influence of clan in Somali
society. It affirmed that six major clans traditionally inhabit Somaliland - the
‘Isa, the Gadabursi, the Isaaq, the Dhulbahante, the Warsangali, and the
Gabooye. The Isaaq constitute the dominant clan in Somaliland. The Dhulbanhante
and the Warsangeli are branches of Harti - a subclan of the Darood. There are
other minority clans - like the Madigaan the Akisho - who inhabit Somaliland.
However, these are significant minorities whose number, political influence, and
presence is hardly noticed. The Gabooye also suffer similar invisibility and
inaudibility but their number is more significant and their participation in the
society more extensive, despite the traditional myths and social distance that
segregate, despise, and devalue them.
3.2.1 Clan Cleavages and Conflict After 1991
The armed conflict between the Isaaq and the regime of Mohamed Siyaad Barre
which started in 1981 exacerbated clan division in Somaliland and had immense
impact on the relations among clans particularly for the six years from
1991-1997. The ten years during which the regime carried out scorched earth
policy against the Isaaq had left bad blood not only between the Isaaq and the
regime’s key Daarood supporters also between the Isaaq and the other inhabitants
of Somaliland.
After ten years of guerrilla warfare, the SNM fighters were battle-tested and
hardened. They also inherited large caches of weapons, in some instances tanks
and heavy guns, left by the retreating forces of the regime. Thus, after the
collapse of the regime, prospects for bloody and intractable inter-clan wars
loomed large between the Isaaq and the Gadabursi in the west and between other
Isaaq and the Harti in the east. The Isaaq fighters from the battle zones and
the civilians from the refugee camps in Ethiopia returned to their traditional
areas of settlement with bitter feelings of revenge against the non- Isaaq whom
they considered sworn allies of the fallen regime.
One of the leaders of the SNM guerrillas explained the intensity of passion
for revenge among his fighters. Intoxicated with victory and delusion of clan
superiority, they wanted to unleash maximal violence against their “enemies”. On
the other hand, a Gadabursi peace activist who tirelessly worked for the cause
of reconciliation described similar sentiments among the Gadabursi, later
intensified by feeling of siege and occasional local skirmishes. Both guerrilla
leader and the peace activist described in graphic words the mutual feeling of
animosity that propelled each group to disaster if cool heads on both sides did
not prevail.
The main instigators of clan division and conflict in the 1980s were not only
political differences toward the Siyaad Barre regime. There were also other
instigators, most notably land disputes. The boundaries of clan settlements were
never fixed. They were always fuzzy and dynamic. Population expansion and
diminution often determined where the boundary of one clan or sub-clan began and
ended. Periodic inter-clan wars brought new occupants and implicit demarcation
once the victors grabbed more land and the vanquished move out.
Boundary disputes and grazing rights had always persisted among clans living
in contiguous areas. The regime of Mohamed Siyaad Barre had exacerbated these
land disputes and inter-clan conflicts. In its divide-and-rule program, the
regime had imposed new regions. It also demarcated new district boundaries.
These politically motivated changes rewarded some clans (those viewed as
supporters of the regime) and they angered others deemed hostile or a threat to
it. In addition, the hundreds of refugees from Ethiopia came to Somaliland in
droves after the debacle of the 1977-78 war. They too had served as
foot-soldiers and henchmen of the regime. Their passion for land grab was
matched by Isaaq fear of being dispossessed. This consuming apprehension,
reinforced by government decrees like Morgan’s “Letter of Death”, sent droves of
Isaaq (including students and bankers) to join the SNM in the fight against the
Barre regime.17
The SNM was identified as an Isaaq movement. Yet there were many Isaaq who
either served the regime to its last days in persecution of the perceived
enemies (including the Isaaq) or who simply stood on the fence at home or abroad
despite the oppression and even genocide of the regime. On the other hand, there
were non-Isaaqs within Somaliland who fought the regime tooth and nail, as did
some of the Isaaq.
Exemplar persons among the non-Isaaq opponents of the regime are Colonel
‘Abdiraxmaan Aw ‘Ali and Colonel (of the Gadabursi clan) Si’iid Ali Giir (of the
Dhulbahante sub-clan of the Daarood).18 On the other hand, there were many Isaaq
henchmen (even hangmen) of the regime who quickly found forgiveness from their
clansmen after the collapse of the regime. This fact later produced new ironies
which remain unresolved. The sight of these men in society and in the higher
echelons of power evokes seething anger among the survivors who sacrificed their
lives for freedom from injustice and tyranny.
3.2.2 Examples of Clan Cleavage and Conflict
A month after the collapse of the Barre regime on January 26, 1991, the SNM
fighters captured most of the territory formerly called the British Protectorate
of Somaliland. The Isaaq-Daarood clan cleavage and conflict was replaced by
Isaaq-Gadabursi and Isaaq-Harti conflict which had festered during the 1980s but
now took the stage.
In early February 1991, the SNM fighters attacked Dila and Borama, aiming to
capture government installations.As the political difference over the authority
and future of Somaliland were resolved, the boundary disputes of contiguous
clans came to the fore. A case in point concerned the fuzzy boundary between
Baki and Gabiley districts which created serious dispute between the Reer Nuur
of the Gadabursi clan and the Jibriil Abokor of the Isaaq clan. The two
sub-clans disputed over control of the agricultural area known as Eel-Barde.
The two sub-clans historically settled in contiguous area. Generations from
the two sub-clans intermarried, linking most of them as in-laws and in maternal
kinship. However, the politics of the Barre regime had pushed the two sub-clans
into different political camps, causing bad blood among the two sub-clans. In
addition, the residues of the war against the dictator and its bitter
consequences diminished the traditional respect for marital bonds and
neighborliness which the two sub-clans shared. By early 1993, the simmering
conflict over control of Eel-Barde turned into fierce fighting between these two
sub-clans. Elders from the two sub-clans put every effort to stop the armed
conflict, but they failed. The clan conflict continued, threatening larger clan
conflagrations. Only when the newly elected and fledgling government of Mohamed
Ibrahim Egal sent armed forces to the disputed area did the conflict subside and
the conflicting sub-clans moderate their dispute.
Gadabursi and Isaaq live contiguously in other districts with ill-defined
boundaries. Disputes resulting from the demarcation of boundaries continue to be
source of clan cleavage and conflict friction. For instance, the boundary
between the newly established district of Dila and Gabiley remains undefined; so
too is the boundary of Lughaya district whose predominant (if not exclusive)
inhabitants are today Gadabursi. The dispute came to a head in the local
elections of 2002 and presidential elections of 2004. The Sa’ad Muse of the
Isaaq clan argued that the Gadabursi where extending their boundary to areas
should be disposed of their property (including their businesses and imported
goods at the seaport) and ultimately of their land.
Like other clans who were locked in conflict with clans settled in contiguous
area, the Gadabursi were also entangled with territorial disputes with the
‘Iise. A case in point is the land dispute which in mid- 1991 grew into open
conflict between the Gadabusi and the ‘Iise. The immediate cause of the conflict
was a dispute over Biyo Kulul Valley located in Dambel District in Region Five
of Ethiopia. The conflict spilled over into Somaliland. Again, the traditional
clan leaders of the two clans with the help of the Region Five authorities tried
to settle the problem. They succeeded to achieve only ceasefire among the
warring clans. Subsequently, the conflict continued for years with low-level
friction between the Gadabursi and the ‘Iise.19
Another example is the clan cleavage and conflict of 1991-2 in Sanaag. There,
the Muse Isma’iil of the Habar Yoonis subclan and the Bi’iido of the Habar Je’lo
subclan were poised for armed conflict with the Harti, mainly the Warsengli and
to a less extent the Dhulbahante sub-clans. The first group were Isaaq; the
second, Daarood. Although belonging to different clan-families tracing to
different original and perhaps mythical ancestors, the two groupings shared
settlement and intermarried for generations. However, politics of the Barre
regime created a widening chasm between them. The Isaaq subclans fought against
the Barre regime after it persecuted them and dispossessed their land. The Harti
subclans defended (at least sympathized with) the regime.
The conflict came to a head mainly around ‘Erigaabo, the regional capital,
after the collapse of the regime. This conflict, like others in the west, was
partly a continuation of different political stand the two camps took toward the
regime but it was largely a conflict over land and political dominance. The
Isaaq held fast to the view that the Harti inhabitants in the area took
advantage of the regime’s animosity and persecution of them, partaking in their
dispossession of land and property. The Harti insisted that the Isaaq subclans
were taking advantage of their new found victory and implementing an
expansionist policy.
The conflict would have devastating effect on the region, provoking wider
conflagration. However, a group of elders, politicians, and intellectuals from
Sanaag rallied to the cause of peace in the region. Dialogue and reconciliation
between the conflicting sub-clans of the Isaaq and the Daarood inhabiting the
region seemed impossible, given intense acrimony, grievance, and delusion of
clan superiority which festered for years. However, the long period of patient
and careful negotiation by the elders, politicians, and intellectuals bore fruit
in the end. As a result, the armed conflict which would have caused havoc and
bloodshed in the region was averted, although a few skirmishes took place in the
process. This peaceful intervention and clan agreement demonstrated that the
people of Somaliland can settle their dispute without external intervention.
As the Isaaq-Gadabursi and Isaaq-Harti conflicts susided, inter-Isaaq
conflicts erupted in 1992. For instance, clashes between Habar-Yonis and
Habar-Je’lo broke out in Bur’o in January 11, 1992. Among the ostensible
triggers of this conflict was the attempt by the administration of ‘Abdiraxmaan
Axmed ‘Ali to disarm clan militia and form a national military force. But the
Haber Je’lo interpreted this program differently. They understood the
demobilization program was intended to weaken them while empowering their
enemies.
The war that erupted between the Habar Je’lo and the government (read Habar
Yoonis) on January 11, 1992 had in fact its mundane precipitant and
justification. A vehicle owned by a member of the Habar Je’lo was commandeered
by some members of the Habar Yoonis. The Habar Je’lo set a deadline by which the
Harbar Yoonis were to return the commandeered vehicle. Before the deadline
elapsed, the Habar Yoonis requested for an extension. The Habar Je’lo accepted.
In the intervening period, the Habar Yoonis prepared for war. When the second
deadline elapsed, the Habar Je’lo fired a few rounds to the section of Bur’o
where the Habar Yoonis predominate. This gave the Habar Yoonis a pretext for
launching the all-out assault for which they prepared. From that point on, this
inter-clan war turned disastrous until clan negotiations settled it.
Nine months later, another war broke out in and around Berbera. This war too
was presented as a war between the government of Abdirahman Ahmed Ali (Tuur) and
a recalcitrant clan who hindered the government’s plan for peace and national
development. The central bone of contention was control of Berbera and its port
– the primary gateway for imports and exports of Somaliland. The Tuur
Administration wanted control of the port and perhaps beyond in order to
establish its authority and generate revenues it desperately needed. The ‘Iise
Muuse clan for whom Berbera and its environs are their traditional area of
settlement saw it differently. Firstly, they suspected other motives when, as
they were asked to hand over the port of Berbera, other strategic locations
(like the Hargeisa Airport) remain in the hands of clan militia. In short, they
interpreted the so-called government move as an invasion of their land and
rights by the Habar Yoonis or generally the Garxajis to which he belonged.
The ensuing war which broke up soon lost its lofty justifications of building
a national government into a nasty clan war pitting primarily the Habar Yoonis
and the ‘Iise Muuse. Fighting broke out in Berbera, after a government-supported
militia moved into the city and provoked armed clan opposition. The fighting
continued sporadically for over six months. In October 1992, opposition clan
militia expelled the pro-government militia. Fortunately, the war did not take
long before it was resolved in clan conference, called Tawfiiq Conference, which
began on October 28, 1992 in the town of historic of Sheikh. The conference
resolved not only the armed conflict but also agreed to plan another conference
in Borama in 1993 to achieve broader clan reconciliation and more durable peace
in Somaliland.
The eruption of armed conflict among the Isaaq first in Bur’o in 1992, then
in Berbera the same year, later in Hargeisa in 1994, then Bur’o in 1995, had
shown the failure of the SNM Isaaq to develop a coherent transitional program
and an equitable system of government. Worse, after victory, the SNM politicians
and fighters acted out their old personal differences and clan rivalries in
Ethiopia. As a result, they broke up into competing and warring camps, playing a
game of tit-for-tat. Abdirahman Ahmed Ali (Tuur), the last Chairman of the SNM
and elected President of the transitional government in May 1991, could not
bridge differences among the camps or consolidate power. Some say he even
intensified intensified the old rivalries and camps by carrying out decisions he
secretly or arbitrarily made. Ineffective authority and lack of consensus on
government also gave opportunity for clan militia, armed gangs called dayday
(the equivalents of mooryaan in Mogadishu or jirii elsewhere), and unethical
businessmen determined to make profit in conditions of desperation. Each of
these also aggravated the clan cleavages and conflict. For instance, each armed
clan militia encouraged other clan militia to remain vigilant and organized.
Crimes committed by individuals brought reprisals and collective punishment of
the criminal’s clan. The anarchic and violent behavior of the dayday, sometimes
resulting in murder, called forth the traditional blood-payment which, because
of their excessive number, bankrupted clans and made their members candidates of
reprisal.
Perhaps the only salutary effect of the clan cleavages and clan conflict that
erupted among the Isaaq during the early 1990s and subsequently in 1994-6 is
that the non-Isaaq population in Somaliland understood that the Isaaq are not a
permanently unified clan organized to their assault, oppression, or decimation.
Seeing that the Isaaq could viciously fight one another reduced their old myths,
insecurities, and fears. Some of them (like the Gadabursi elders and
intellectuals) were so moved and motivated by this understanding that they
joined the role of peacemakers among Isaaq clans locked in conflict.
The historic Borama Conference of 1993 was the result. Subsequently, the
Council of Elders (the Guurti), formed by the SNM during the war against the
Barre regime, was enlarged to include other members in its rank. It also found
new vigor and role when the SNM which created it had floundered soon after
victory. The selection of a new president, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, had also helped
because he was the most seasoned politician of the lot. A leader in the campaign
for independence in the late 1950s and a former Prime Minister, Egal knew the
fundamental requirements of building a government. An exceptionally articulate
man, his appeal for disarmament found ready ears and willing public. He also
knew not only the art of when to charm others when this suited his interest but
also how to browbeat and even demean his opponents.
Many to this day remember with fond memories the procession of clan militia
in the Hargeisa Stadium, marching with the guns (sometimes accompanied by tanks
and vehicles) with commitment to demobilize and hand over their weapons to the
new government.20 There are three significant aspects to this voluntary
demobilization program. Firstly, the armed clan militia did not simply hand over
their arms and disappear. They and their arms were integrated into the newly
established armed forces. Secondly, the public who watched them march in the
stadium were initiated and socialized to legitimacy of the new government.
Thirdly, the absence of clan militia (like the ‘Iidagale clan militia) who
promised to participate in the demobilization program but did not gave hint of
troubles to come. A year later, the reservation of the ‘Iidagale clan militia
had developed into an open challenge of the government.
The immediate precipitant of this war concerned control of the Hargeisa
Airport. The ‘Iidagale militia did not want to hand over the airport. This
denied the government symbolic and real control it desperately needed. In
reality, the causes of this conflict are many and controversial. Nonetheless,
the armed conflict pitted first between the ‘Iidagale and the government – the
latter recruiting difference clans, giving its forces the unflattering name of
marya-allool, a mat made of, multicolored rags. The armed conflict mushroomed
into a war between the government and the Garxajis when the Habar Yoonis joined
the war on the side of ‘Iidagale ancestral kin. Had the war been between the
Habar Awal (the President’s clan) and the Garxajis, the clan cleavages would
follow primordial path and degenerate into a purely clan war, as in Bur’o in
Janurary 1992 and Berbera in spring 1992. The difference here was that Egal
mobilize different clans into the war. The government forces included the
Gadabursi, the ‘Iise, the Habar Awal, the Arab, the Isxaaq, the Habar Je’lo and
others.
This array of forces– had tragic consequences but it also gave rise to new
national identity and unity. The armed conflict also gave Egal execuse to extend
his term which supposedly was to end in 1995, a few months after the armed
conflict with the ‘Iidagale erupted. This fact affirmed the suspicion that, if
war is not a royal road to power, it is a convenient justification of a leader
to hang on to power and to legitimize his authority. In fact, only after the
conflict subsided in 1996 did Mohamed Ibrahim Egal turn his attention to the
national constitution and his re-election for another term.
By 1997, his skillful orchestration of his supporters and concession to his
opponents won him the reelection. When his term was about to end in 2002, Egal
became embroiled in political conflict with the Habar Je’lo whom he would have
isolated and forced into submission, as he had done so with the Garxajis. Such
orchestrated war might would probably have postponed the schedule presidential
elections and automatically extend his term. But fate had a different design. He
died in May 2002.
3.2.3 Clan Cleavages Persist
Many politicians, intellectuals, and poets had preached the evil consequences
of the clan system. Criticism of clanism (mistakenly called “tribalism”) was in
vogue for years after independence. Clan and clanism were publicly denounced,
buried in public rituals, and condemned as the greatest barriers to development.
Yet the politicians and the intelligentsia who most denounced it had shown to
harbor clanism and clan cleavages in society.
Instead of denying its existence or attempting to root out, Somaliland chose
to hold the bull by its horns. It embraced clan as a critical factor in war and
peace and incorporated it into its political system (see Chapter 5). In
accepting clan as a fact of life, perhaps a permanent structure in Somali
society, Somaliland was able to solve most armed conflicts which broke out
following the collapse of the regime in 1991. However, although the public and
the politicians have so far accepts clan and its integration into politics,
there are regional imbalances and differential opportunities which once again
provoke social cleavages of which evoke clan grievance and resentment.
Take for instance the problems of regional imbalance and differential social
opportunity. Clan and settlement are often coterminous. Somaliland is mainly
divided into East-West. Easterners tend to be pastoral. Agriculture predominates
in the West, although residents there seldom describe themselves as
agriculturalists. They too describe themselves as xoollo-dhaqato which literally
means pastoralist. This is in part because pastoral values dominate the culture.
Because the capital city, Hargeisa, is located in the western part of the
country, clans in the eastern regions often complain about regional imbalance in
employment, business, and social services. Those who live in the Western Regions
argue that they pay taxes and carry inordinate burden to maintain the needs of
government serving all regions share in common. Such divergent views give
occasion to regional cleavages, sometime clan cleavages since settlement and
clan are coterminous.
But divergent views and clan cleavages do not take the east-west divide. They
are endemic throughout Somaliland. Cities are rapidly growing in Somaliland.
They have become centers of gravity for all clans, including refugees from
Somalia and Ethiopia. Residents of rural areas who previously produced food and
human resources for themselves and society are becoming more impoverished due to
low investment in their education, health, and economic development. They are
moving in droves.
Those clans who live in and around cities, particularly the capital city,
have had greater access to government, business, and international
organizations. Hargeisa is the capital, serves as the seat of the central
government and its bloated bureaucracy. It is also the venue for big hospitals,
schools, and businesses. For this reason, most clans settled near and distant,
have moved to Hargeisa, with hopes of improved income and quality of life.
Frustration with poor housing, crowding, and unemployment is intensifying as are
anomie, alienation, and anonymity of people who in the past were rooted in a
community, found social support from the clan, and had pride in their identity,
even if that pride hoisted on delusion of clan superiority.
The local and presidential elections of 2002 and 2003 respectively have shown
the persistent influence of clan on the political parties that were supposed to
replace clan politics. The selection of candidates by the political parties and
elections results have demonstrated that the politicians and the public alike
can not shed their clan calculations and preferences in reaching national
political decisions. How political parties and clan can work independently or
without causing social confusion are new challenges facing Somaliland. More
seriously, emerging concern on equity of government and political institutions
are raising questions if Somaliland has indeed solved the problems which brought
the military regime and the civilian administrations before it to their demise.
3.3 POTENTIAL ESCALATORS OF CLAN CONFLICT
The fieldwork shows the following key escalators of clan conflict in the
history of Somaliland after 1991:
- Differences of relationship and loyalty to the regime of Mohamed Siyaad
Barre. After the collapse of the regime, conflict emerged between the Isaaq who
fought against the regime and the non-Isaaq who supposedly defended or at least
sympathized with it. - Competing interests and groupings among the SNM
leaders who, although they risked their lives for liberty, seemed to understand
little of how to nurture and develop Somaliland when conditions for such were
ripe; - State of confusion and anarchy which engender armed gangs like the
dayday, lawlessness, and clan reprisals. - Weak leadership which knows
little how to forge alliance from different clans and interests, subduing
opponents by force when peaceful political means fail. - Profusion of arms
and failure of demobilization programs because they evoke old clan cleavages and
clan conflicts. - Premature attempts to demobilize clan militia without
building clan confidence and trust. - Greedy and unethical businessmen who
seek used clan cleavage to profit from lack of regulation and social despair.
- Elite united by their education, urban or western values, social
privilege, and class arrogance but readily rally their clan in time of conflict
among them. - Unemployment and poverty which reduces otherwise decent and
peaceful individuals into footsoldiers of others and fodders of clan conflict.
- International community that treats warlords and ineffectual leaders as
representative of “clan cleavages” and honors or rewards them in contrived
national conferences in plush, comfortable hotels abroad. (Somaliland was spared
this corrosive and corruptive act of charity.)
3.4 POTENTIAL DE-ESCLATORS OF CLAN CONFLICT
The fieldwork also indicated the following de-escalators of conflict in the
history of Somaliland since 1991.
- Public exhaustion from anarchy, war, and crime. - A tradition of
dialogue and reconciliation even as war rages on. - The practice of
forgiving enemies and forgetting old scores, preferring reconciliation opponents
over reprisal. - Use of religion and tradition to bridge clan cleavages and
mediate conflict. - A leader (like Mohamed Ibrahim Egal) who knows the basic
requirements of governance, with skills to make friends and influence people.
- Absence or limited interference from the international community,
particularly neighboring governments, whose interests derail the process of
Somali reconciliation. - A mixture of skillfully designed voluntary and
involuntary demobilization program. - Building confidence of protagonists by
small steps and setting aside old scores. - Local advocates of peace and
midwives of reconciliation - An external “enemy” that unifies the group or
nation with its threats, real or bluff.
3.5 SUMMARY
Clan cleavages and clan alliances in Somaliland have existed for centuries.
Therefore, they can not and will not be eliminated. They can be only canalized
toward constructive ends. Clan cleavages, land disputes, and clan conflict
pre-dated the Barre regime. However, the regime intensified these cleavages and
disputes for it to divide-and-rule tactic.
Somaliland comprises five major clans each of them conditioned to clan
socialization and myth-making. Clan is a crucible of identity, social defense,
mutual support, and social insurance. Clan cleavages in Somaliland are important
contributors to conflict. To understand these cleavages, the concepts of fusion
and fission are critical. These refer to the twin processes by which clan
differentiates and integrates groups. Both occur simultaneously. Where there is
cleavage, so too is alliance somewhere.
Somali culture also conditions members to delusion of superiority where each
member valorizes his clan and put down others. Clan identity and delusion of
clan superiority, rooted to Somali culture and tradition, have been superimposed
on urban life and politics, with deadly consequences. The regime of Mohamed
Siyaad Barre in particular had pushed clan cleavages and clan conflict to their
most destructive extremes. The Isaaq, disillusioned with union, were among those
victimized by that regime and those who challenged it with arms.
After the collapse of the state, clan cleavages that arose between supporters
and opponents of the regime reared their head. The SNM chose dialogue and
reconciliation instead of confrontation and reprisal. The other clans
reciprocated. As a result peace was on the mend.
The history of Somaliland and the participants underscore that Somaliland has
come a long way to grapple and solve its primordial clan cleavages and forge a
semblance of a nation. Clan cleavages exist to this day, and they will do so for
years to come because genealogy and identity of the inhabitants depend and
foster such cleavages. But these cleavages are dynamic and unpredictable, as the
clan alliances which are their twin component, one never occurring without the
other. This is Janus-faced character of Somali social relations and of human
relations generally.
The question is not therefore to seek the impossible goal of eliminating the
cleavages or their concurrent alliances, but to canalize clan cleavages and
alliances toward peaceful coexistence of people. Tyranny and injustice bring
forth the most violent forms of clan cleavages and clan conflict. A culture of
dialogue, leadership with a sense of mission, system of check and balance –
these give people the political space to bridge their different views and
interests so that clan cleavages do not mushroom into clan conflict.
Today, people show less confusion and hypocrisy than in the past when clan
was condemned and ritually buried in public as in the early 1970s, while it
continued as a matter of practice. Somalilanders have accepted clan as a fact of
life and included it as a criterion of constitutional power-sharing. The
experiment has only begun, and it has so far done some good, but more needs to
thought through and accomplished.
Chapter 4: EQUITY OF GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
4.1 WHY WE SELECTED THIS ISSUE?
This topic was selected as focus issue because the desire for equity and
justice were the primary motive of the armed struggle against the dictatorial
regime of Mohamed Siyaad Barre. The pursuit of equity and justice brought
greater suffering than anticipated. Targeted detention and torture of gave way
to indiscriminate persecution. Summary executions of specific individuals led to
mass murders and destruction of cities. The physical wounds and war trauma are
still visible among the survivors.
Since 1993, the people of Somaliland had restored peace and formed their own
government. We wanted to explore if the quest for equity and justice, in pursuit
of which much blood was shed, has been attained in Somaliland during the past
ten years. This exploration may show both the successes and failures of the
system and path the people of Somaliland had chosen.
4.2 BACKGROUND
In the early 1990s, following the collapse of the regime, concerns focused on
whether the people of Somaliland can find peace with one another and establish a
government to replace the rampant anarchy and violence rampant in 1991. When
peace was restored and central authority was established, the question of
whether the existing system of governance and political institutions are
equitable and just gained paramount significance for the people of Somaliland.
The successes and failures of governance in Somaliland must be evaluated in a
historical context.
Before colonial rule, Somalis governed themselves and evolved an egalitarian
system. An open meeting of all males over the age 15 held a council (shir) to
decide on critical issues including interpersonal and clan conflict. There were
also elaborate but unwritten legal system which had its record of precedents to
guide decisions, its lawyers and judges (called xeer beegti), its classification
of ways to resolve disputes (from gar-maslax, gar-dadban, gar shareeco, garta
guurti, and garta xeer beegti). It also had its proper way of presenting cases,
its ethics of adjudicating disputes, and its means of enforcing decisions
without use of prisons and established law enforcing agency. Among the
remarkable things in this system is that neither judges nor lawyers were paid
and that, in some instances (like Xeer ‘Iise) the system had twelve levels
disputants could appeal a decision.21
In the early decades when colonial, Somalis took the perspective, as one
British colonial officer observed in the 1930s, “If you must govern, then govern
us justly, and leave us alone.” As it turned out, Somalis were not governed
justly nor were left alone.
British colonial started with minimum of investment in the late 19th
Century.22 The British ruled Somaliland with minimum of investment until
independence in 1960. To reduce costs and it had strategic advantage, the
British used indirect rule, using traditional leaders and the local elite.
Italians in contrast had imported settlers, stationed large forces, and
developed banana plantations in Somalia. The difference of colonial past was not
the most critical in creating a wedge but it contributed to the misunderstanding
between the peoples of Somaliland and Somalia, at least in the 1960s.
Independence in 1960 was expected to reinstate the right to
self-determination and promote development. Unfortunately, it did neither. Nine
years after civilian rule, following a period of unprecedented corruption and
nepotism, the armed forces took power by force. The military regime also failed,
revealing similar corruption and nepotism to the civilian regimes. In fact, its
revolutionary promises and rhetoric brought greater mass disillusionment. As
pressure on the government increased, it became clan-oriented, using some as
bulwark and indiscriminately persecuting others.
By the early 1980s, clan wars emerged under the cover of armed political
movements. After the regime’s collapse, the constituting parts of society
engaged in clan and sub-clan conflict, aggravated by warlords and armed militia
determined to have their way by using the gun. In the 18 May, 1991 Burao
Conference, the people of Somaliland decided to secede from Somalia, or as
Somalilanders prefer, to reclaim their independence.
4.3 CURRENT SITUATION
Key to understanding developments in Somaliland since 1991 is its home-made
solution to armed conflict and anarchy that emerged after the collapse of the
military regime. This home-made solution is in stark contrast to the massive
resources deployed in restoring peace and governance in Somalia. Since 1991,
over 30,000 soldiers were deployed and 14 reconciliation conferences held in
foreign capital. Twelve years later, the results have been modest at best.
Perhaps some lessons can be learned from the home-made solutions of Somaliland
at minimum cost. As a result too, Somaliland may find the acknowledgement and
encouragement it deserves for the progress in peace and the march toward
democracy it has so far achieved.
4.3.1 Development of Beel System
The Provisional National Charter passed by the participants in the May 1991
conference stipulated a transitional period of two years during which the
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Somali National Movement (SNM), the archenemy
of the collapsed military regime, would respectively serve as President and Vice
President of the new “Republic of Somaliland.” However, this government did not
make significant strides in restoring peace or developing government
institutions.
Effective restoration of peace and development of government institutions
followed the historic 1993 Conference in Borama. That conference, involving
hundreds of representatives from various clans, and known as Guul Allah –
Allah’s Victory – lasted for nearly five months, set the foundation for a de
jure if not de facto State of Somaliland. The majority of the conferees selected
a seasoned politician, Mohamed Ibraahim Egal, to be the President of the new
government.23
One of the achievements of the Borama Conference is the introduction of a new
system of government formed of the Beel System (based on clan representation and
consensus) combined with a hybrid of Western political institutions. The
foundation of the new hybrid system is a two-chamber Parliament, comprising of
the Guurti (the House of Elders) and Wakiillo (House of Representative) each
with 82 members distributed by various clans. The latter serves as legislature,
the former is composed of traditional leaders and serves as the supreme
authority. It focuses its efforts on maintaining peace and mediating disputes
among clans and the various branches of government.
The Beel System was from the beginning viewed as a transitional system. Its
achievement is not that it was the first to use a hybrid system, as some
mistakenly claim. As we have seen before, the hybrid and confused system existed
in practice. Whereas in the past the traditional was scoffed at yet used behind
the scence, the Beel System openly advocated for an integration of the
traditional and western and, more importantly, incorporated it into the existing
political institutions.
The December 1996 Conference in Hargeisa supposedly changed from Shir
Beelleed (clan conference), like that of the 1993 Borama Conference, into Shir
Qaran (National Conference). Until then, the country was ruled using the
National Charter passed in the 1993 Borama Conference. In reality, the
difference between Shir Beelleed to Shir Qaran was more semantic than
substantive. For whatever it was called, the same actors would have played in
the political arena, with President Egal being who called the shots. At the
time, his opponents called for a new Shir Beelleed to elect the President – a
proposal which Egal disliked because the Habar Je’lo at the time were preparing
to put up their candidate with the claim that it was turn to take the helm, the
same way the Habar Awal took under Egal and the Habar Yoonis under Abdirahman
Ahmed ‘Ali. By calling it Shir Beelleed, President Egal was turning over the
table on the Habar Je’lo and set up a system of one-person-one vote by which he
would still call the shots and win.
Intense debates on a new Constitution started during and after the December
1996 conference. The referendum of 31 May 2001 showed national consensus (about
97% approval) for the new Constitution which provided the legal foundation of
Somaliland’s transition from the Beel System to multi-party democracy. Local and
presidential elections followed in December 2002 and May 2003 respectively.
Parliamentary elections that were to take place soon after have been postponed
for two years with the justification that critical and controversial laws
(including allocation of seats and demarcation of district boundaries) remain to
be passed.
In short, Somaliland’s hybrid political system of governance has maintained
peace and stability, although there have been periods in which armed conflicts
have erupted or come close to erupting. This hybrid system is an innovation from
which has Somaliland reaped significant benefits. Yet it is not a panacea, as
shown by its limitations to develop an efficient and merit-based system of
government. In particular, questions of clan and gender equity remain
persistent, although the key actors endeavour to maintain the peace. Complaints
of people being “hostages to peace” have surfaced in recent years because
solution to genuine clan, regional, or gender grievances tend to be postponed
for the sake of maintaining peace.
4.3.2 Ingredients of the Homemade Solution
In a nutshell, the lessons on how Somaliland restored peace in the Borama
Conference in 1993 and in Hargeisa in 1997 can be summarized thus:
- The conference was organized and owned by Somalis. Since no foreign
governments were involved, their conflicting interests (territory, power,
strategic pursuit, money, or prestige) were not confounding factors as they have
been in conferences organized for Somalia by the international community -
The locations were on the home turf. Most participants stayed with relatives,
friends, and coattendees. Hence, the cost of the conference was minimal. In
particular, there were no plush and expensive hotels, no planes or taxis, no
commission on these service, no fees for organizers of conference (as for
instance in Kenya). - The conference was not for warlords or politicians
committed to war if they do not get their aims or who used violence to keep
their power even if reconciliation was achieved. Through public organization and
pressure, Somaliland sidelined these elements. - Clan elders and religious
elders led the conference to use their moral and religious authority for
mediation and moderation. Military officer bent on resolving differences through
violence and and the Westernized elite whose vanity exceeds their competence
were included in the process but not given leading role. - Food and comfort
were minimal. In fact, the more uncomfortable the venue, the quicker
reconciliation work is completed; the more comfortable the venue (e.g. the
Hilton or the like) the longer time spent on reconciliation with little result.
- The conference used Somali time, not European time. There was no rash or
specific agenda to be completed in a specified time. The primary aim was
achieving durable solution even if that took months. For instance, the
conferences in Borama and Hargiesa took at least five months each. - The
conferences were inclusive. Great care was taken to include every group, hear
its concerns, and where possible accommodate its interests and views. - The
modus operandi was consensus, not majority vote. This meant that every effort
had to be made to find agreement among all clans, large or small. - The
language was Somali. This freed everyone to speak with oratory and personal
style they like. It also freed the participants from the misplace authority of a
foreigner who chairs meetings but really has no clue of Somalis and their way of
settling disputes .
4.2.3 Strengths and Limitations
Good governance has not been practised in Somalia either before or since
independence. It is for this reason that the Somali State born in 1960, lacking
equity and justice, had failed. After the state collapse in 1991, Somaliland
broke away from the union with Somalia and adopted a new approach to governance.
In1993 the Somaliland National Charter was approved in Borama by the
participants of the national peace conference, led by representatives of clan
leaders. Subsequent to the conference, the role of clan elders and the clan
system was institutionalized. Thus, from 1993 onwards, Somaliland practised a
hybrid political system of governance that combines the beel (clanbased) system
of government with modern western-style of government.
A government comprising a President, Vice President and a legislature was
constituted. The legislature consists of two councils, the Guurti (House of
Elders) and the Wakiilo (House of Representatives). Almost all clans are
represented in the two houses of parliament. Each clan and sub-clan has been
allocated a fixed number of seats in the legislature. This system gives wider
political clan representation than the political systems that existed in the
past, both during the military regime as well as during the civilian-led
government preceding it. It also permits wider public participation.
The mandate of the Guurti includes initiating legislation relating to
religion, traditions, and security. The Guurti also reviews and votes on
legislation passed by the House of Representatives. Clan leaders that are not in
Guurti still continue their role in peace-making and peace-building, managing
conflicts, and mediating and handling disputes by using the customary law cases
that have had serious social and political importance.
The constitution that replaced the National Charter in 1997 signalled, in
theory at least, the transition from the Beel System to a multiparty electoral
system of government. However, the transition did not take place until 2002. In
December 2002 and May 2003, municipal and presidential elections took place. The
election of parliamentarians (firstly the House of Representatives then of the
House of Elders) was postponed to March 2005. Thus, the transition from the Beel
System is not yet complete and may not be so even after the parliamentary
elections in 2005.
The primary strengths of the Beel System are firstly that it gave
representation in government to different clans, and secondly that it maintained
the peace among different clans. Its primary limitations include its inability
to develop or maintain efficient, merit-based, and stable political
institutions. The rights of clans were not matched by commitment to merit. The
transition to multiparty democracy has not yet brought the anticipated results.
It seems to have been channelled the old grievance and debates through political
parties – a case of old milk in a new container. Somaliland’s hybrid political
system of governance is by many measures a success. Peace and stability has been
maintained mainly because of the successful utilisation of the Beel System
(institutionalisation of the clan in governance). Somaliland also achieved the
planned transition to a multiparty electoral system.
However, the system is inefficient. It does not provide the necessary checks
and balances. The members of the Guurti (mostly traditional leaders) are
uninformed about the development of effective and efficient government
institutions. The members of the Wakiillo (House of Representatives) are a mixed
lot, the majority of whom are unaware of their mandate and their
responsibilities. The judiciary, which is supposed to be independent and
impartial, is woefully short on both accounts. The executive enjoys many of the
powers not acceptable in a genuinely democratic system. Its responsibilities in
budgetary and fiscal accountability are weak. In fact, it seems the more things
change, the more they remain the same.
Herein lies the rub. Weak institutions, inadequate accountability, and low
transparency in governance could bring down the nascent government, yet
unrecognized by the international community. These factors can also break the
fragile peace in Somaliland.
4.3.4 Participants’ Definition of Equity
As soon as we referred to equity, interviewees and focus group discussants
asked what we meant by the concept. Left to explain what they understood by the
concept, interviewees or focus group discussant came up with the following
definitions:
- Equity as fairness in representation in parliament and the executive
branch; - Equity as just share in obtaining public resources, including
jobs, land, and salaries; - Equity as equal treatment before the law, law
enforcement, and the judicial system; - Equity in opportunities of
education, employment, and business contracts, etc.
In-depth discussion of the topic brought more abstract definitions of equity.
These included obtaining equal share in symbolic and subjective “resources” of
the state, such how frequently a member of the clan obtained visible posts, like
President, Vice President, or ministerial appointment which in reality did not
bring substantial material or actual power to his kinsmen but provided him
subjective and illusory gains in his private life or in the eyes of others.
Often, such symbolic or subjective illusions turned as important and sometimes
more important than the other definitions of equity.
The more obvious and accepted definitions referring, for instance,
representation in government or fair share of public resources, invoked three
key factors of inequity – gender, minority status, and regional distance from
Hargeisa, the capital city.
Informant interviewees and focus group participants accepted the right of
representation proportional according to group size in the population. However,
there is no census in the country; hence, expectations of equity and declaration
of rights tended to be fraught with confusion, controversy, and conflict. The
lack of census gave impetus to delusion of clan superiority in Somali psychology
and social relations.24 As a result, discussions quickly skidded into murky and
tense debates of who is most unduly rewarded or aggrieved.
With these different meanings of equity, the key informant interviewees, the
focus group discussants, and the informal group participants presented their
views of how inequity persists in the governance and political institutions of
Somaliland.
Our study shows that Somalis today have two contradictory attitudes toward
government and its institutions. On the one hand, they invest much hope and
interest; on the other, they take a jaundice view of government. Distrust, envy,
resentment, and fear combine to make government the proverbial object you can
not live with, yet you can not live without.
From our interviews we learn that people have invested much hope and interest
in government during the last forty three years because they believe that:
- Government would offer sorely needed protection from personal and property
attack; - Government would be the neutral body adjudicating disputes and
enforce its decisions; - Government run by their own leaders would be
compassionate and humane; - Government, the largest employer and the primary
“industry”, would provide jobs to citizens; - Government would provide
social services such as heath, education, and public works; - Government
would protect them from external enemies poised to oppress them Yet the history
since independence has shown that government led by Somalis could indeed be
worse than the colonial rule Somalis condemned, detested, and ejected forty four
years ago. As a result, they took a jaundiced view of government. The question
of equity evokes essential distrust of politics and political institutions. In
some instances, one gets the impression that government inevitably is a
veritable burden, a social curse, sometimes a violent monster.
Further exploration of the subject suggests that everyone has complaints of
inequity, but none of the participants argued that the current government must
be abolished altogether, or that the political system prevailing prior to 1993
should be re-established. In short, even while participants complained about one
or another form of inequity, they showed open pride in what Somaliland achieved
during the last ten years.
4.3.5 Forms and Patterns of Inequity
There was a near unanimity from the participants in the fieldwork that there
is better equity since 1991 in Somaliland than there was in the thirty years
since independence. However, most interviews affirmed that inequity in the
different senses described above exists in Somali governance and political
institutions.
A few of the participants stated that the search for “equity” predisposed the
President of Somaliland to form a large and costly coterie of ministers (over
twenty), their deputy ministers, and other superfluous ministers without
portfolio (e.g. Minister of State). They added that appointment to the cabinet
is one of his best ways of rewarding loyal persons and clans. Thus, his desire
to win and keep supporters undermines a merit-based system. Such a system
requires not only change in the way the President views his chief
responsibilities but also in the public demand and expectations imposed on him.
One form of inequity participants in the study stressed is inequity the
parliament. There is unanimity of views that the Beel System has proven to be
useful and innovative in Somaliland since 1993. The participants affirmed that
it secured peace and stability when armed clan conflict threatened to be
frequent and disastrous. As hybrid system, combing tradition and modernity, it
was no doubt innovative. Its consensus-based procedure to decide critical issues
also allowed all groups to be heard and consulted. In recent years, however, the
Beel System has been criticized because:
- It excluded women from representation in two houses of the parliament;
- Minority groups (particularly the Gabooye) have only symbolic
representation; - In the absence of census, clan representation has been
arbitrary; - The clan constituencies have system of control or
accountability on their representatives; - Representatives do not know well
their role or responsibility, having been selected neither on knowledge nor
experience in politics; - Whether representatives know or do not know their
role and responsibility, they tend to be to sell their vote to the executive
branch; - Current members in the House of Representatives do not push for
election, conveniently postponed to March 2005, because most them know that they
not be elected; - The Guurti is replete with aged traditionalists whose
contribution to peacemaking was critical but whose understanding of contemporary
government is limited; - The system of electing the Guurti remains
conveniently ambiguous and their term not clearly defined.
Inequity in the executive branch was also discussed, but facts seemed murky
and difficult to establish. In general, the participants in the fieldwork agreed
that
- Not all clans found equal representation in the executive branch; -
Most of the ministers and vice ministers appointed were not chosen on merit but
on dubious political calculations of the President; - Loyalty to the
President and the status quo, not competence or social commitment, gives one
advantage in joining and staying in the cabinet; - Because ministers from
the same clan tended to head certain ministries, the assumption took hold that
these ministries are the fiefdoms of certain clans;; - A few ministers
remain as fixtures in the cabinet, partaking in a game of musical chairs for
years; - Women and minorities were appointment to ministerial and vice
ministerial posts only in 2003; even then, there are only two women ministers
and one vice minister from the Gabooye.
Inequity in public resources brought heated debates among the participants,
particularly minorities, war veterans, the disabled, and persons coming from
eastern regions like Sanaag and Sool. The debates on equity in public resources
took for granted that government is the primary employer and industry in the
country, that every citizen had a right to a share of the public largesse, even
while the fledgling government was strapped for resources. Ironically, even
those who found jobs in government complained of inequity, thereby making the
topic of inequity as pervasive as a common flu in cold seasons.
Participants from minority groups described the caste-like system which
cordons them off into segregated neighborhoods, jobs, and social stigma. They
described how society needs their presence and work, yet reduces them to
invisibility and inaudibility. In particular, they complained about the
minuscule number of their members who have been given opportunity for education
and how the measly few working in government institutions are given low-level
jobs or only as token jobs. When asked how many of their members worked in the
civil service or the executive, they mentioned several including one Vice
Minister of Health – the first ever in the history of Somaliland. A new
complaint in the litany of Gabooye grievances is the increasing plunder of their
land as pressure of migration into the city intensifies and the failure of local
government, law enforcement, and the courts to protect their property.
Women argued that the system was exclusionary, unfair, and demeaning to women
who actually bear the greater burden in society than men. They stated that women
succor the children, nurse the sick, tend to the disabled, and today earn bread
for the families who male partners, parent and son, waste away in unemployment,
qat chewing, and tea-shop babble. Having characterized men as “parasites”, they
added that women were denied education and employment, that they carried ot
family chores while their brothers attended school, but that today they are
forced to provide for the children and even husbands.
The war veterans affirmed that, despite their sacrifices to freedom and
justice during the ten years of armed struggle, they have been forgotten by
society and left to suffer neglect and injustice far greater than they have
known in the past. They talked of bitter feelings in their observation of many
who defended the dictatorial regime, some of whom allegedly committed capital
crimes in its defense, today reaping the rewards of a good job or high office in
government while the veterans who sacrifice theirs lives are reduced to
systematic unemployment and abject poverty.
Participants from regions distant from the Hargeisa, the seat of the central
government, argued that the system rewards whoever is close to them, invoking
the provert: “Dheriga ninka u dhowbaa lafta la baxa” - He who is close to the
pot obtains from it the choice bone. They stated that, as in the past, their
regions have fewer schools, less health services, and lower investment in public
works than the capital city and its environs. Those in and around Hargeisa also
complained the burden on them brought on mostly by migration not from other
Somaliland regions but also refugees from Ethiopia and Somalia. The discussed
the high level of unemployment in their ranks, made most glaring by people in
other regions holding high jobs and running thriving business. v Those who found
government jobs complained that the rewards of which they are accused is
actually smoke-and-mirrors which disguises their own embarrassment and
frustrations. The explained that they stay in these jobs only because they hate
to hang around in tea-shops and rely on hand outs (shaxaad) of friends and
relatives. They discussed the lack of satisfaction in their jobs, absence of
health insurance, pension, even chances of promotion based on merit. They also
complained how the best job go to those who through clan or personal means have
political clout.
When other participants discussed the corruption pervading the system, they
answered that it is unrealistic to expect underpaid civil service to remain
clean and accountable, that it is also naïve to have a bloated bureaucracy,
driven not by merit but political aims, to set up efficient management or
inspire employees to do a good job.
One form of inequity the participants describe with chagrin is the political
(read clan) boundaries which the President and/or the Parliament demarcated to
win the loyalty of one group, inadvertently displeasing others. In fact, the old
and new district boundaries are products of political maneuvers of one regime or
another. The absence of census and fixed settlements makes the problem of
district and even regional boundaries intractable and intensely debated.
Feelings of inequity arising from this evoke clan cleavages which can contribute
to the cycle clan conflict.
4.3.6 Promise of Equity in Democracy
Somaliland has not only distinguished itself in the region by emerging from
the ruins of war and mending the peace on its own ingenuity and resources.
Somaliland has also taken the first footsteps toward democracy not by the
prodding of other countries by its own initiative. These are indeed significant
steps in a region where one-man rule has been the rule rather than the exception
and where power is often contested with force of arms.
It is always difficult to achieve equity to the degree and the form people
expect in Somaliland and elsewhere. Somaliland, like other countries has
embraced democracy - a government of the majority, a government in which supreme
power is vested in the people directly and/or in their representatives – is the
best means of achieving toward equity. But accepting democracy in principle is
one thing, putting it in practice another.
The first steps Somaliland put forward toward democracy is the National
Charter signed in the Borama Conference of 1993. This charter was not based on
one-person-vote principle because elections could not be held when the country
was in the brink of anarchy and violence. The inter-clan wars in Bur’o in 1991
and Berbera in 1992 did not did not provide the necessary conditions for
elections, nor did the weak and floundering government of Abdirahman Ahmed Ali
(Tuur) prepare the people for peaceful transition of power. The Borama
Conference was founded on clan dialogue and consensus and the National Charter
approved by the representatives stipulated a transition period in which a
national constitution would be prepared and elections would be held.
In fact, transitional period of the two years was extended by an inter-clan
war which some believe was conveniently instigated by the President and his
striding cabinet members. Whatever the reason for extending the transitional
period, a national constitution was drafted and debated in the parliament. The
opposition at first declared this draft constitution simply a paper ploy, a
legal window-dressing, for the President to continue his one-man rule. By May
2001, the national voted on the constitution with remarkable discipline and
peace. Over 96% of the registered voters and 97% of the approved voters had
voted “yes” for the Constitution.
After a majority of the voters approved the Constitution, the National
Election Commission proceeded to conduct local and presidential elections. After
some delays and controversy, the local elections were held in December 2002 and
in May 2003 respectively. Again, the elections proceeded peacefully and with
broad participation in at least five of the six regions of the country. Nine
political organizations contested in the local elections of which, as the
Constitution stipulates, only the three political organizations with the highest
votes could qualify for the designation of national “political parties” and
compete in the presidential election.
The three parties that so qualified were UDUB, KULMIYE, and UCID. UDUB won
the presidential election, even though its presidential candidate was from the
minority Gadabursi clan. Contrary to what strident critics suggest, this shows
that the Isaaq majority is not a monolithic clan united against their non-Isaaq
compatriots. This development, the first time when a Gadabursi President won
with the support of the Isaaq majority, shows that Somaliland has achieved a
historic milestone when clan was not the only factor in choosing a candidate or
reaching a national decision.
Despite their relative political immaturity and excessive feud, the political
parties carried out these elections with remarkable peace and dignity. When
KULMIYE lost the hotly contested presidential election by a small number of
votes, it heeded to the public demand that it accept the decision of the court
and give up its pursuit of power. This commitment to peace auger well for the
future stability of Somaliland and for the democratic experimentation it
started.
Still, the political parties must learn the difference between loyal
opposition and destructive opposition. On the other hand, the government should
not take, as it does today, winner-takes-all perspective. It must extend a hand
of collaboration and consultation to the political parties who, jointly or
separately, have their constituencies and public support. A government that gets
stuck with petty personal conflicts is as dangerous as political parties that
obsessively ferret for the failures and weakness of their political adversaries
in power.
4.3.7 Poverty of Ideology and Clan Perspective
The clan system, particularly people’s internationalization of it as
paradigmatic guide to life, constitutes the major impediments to the development
of political parties in Somaliland. The Constitution of Somaliland was designed
to limit the role of clan and clannism in politics. That is why a distinction
was made between political organizations that competed in the local elections of
December 2002 and political parties that competed for the presidential elections
of May 2003.
Before the local elections, any group could form a political organization if
they met basic requirements (e.g. registration, showing a specified list of
members, holding a public conference, and electing officials in that
conference). It was stipulated that only three political organizations that won
the highest number of votes in the local elections in at least four of the six
regions (hence demonstrated hence multi-clan and multi-regional membership)
could promote to the status of political parties and to compete in the
presidential elections.25
Despite ostensible attempts to reduce the influence of clan in the elections,
the political parties could not subjectively and objectively escape the power of
the clan system in the political process. Firstly, each political organization
and later political party was identified with the clan of its Chairman and
General Secretary, regardless of their political views. Secondly, the political
organizations themselves put forth candidates that satisfy the clan that
predominate each district. Thirdly, the voting followed along clan lines as did
later the election of mayors and other key posts. The one remarkable difference,
heralding a historic advance, is that a candidate from a minority clan was
elected President in May 2003.
What thus counts most in the Somali political process is the clan of the
individual, not his political outlook and commitment. Somalis assume that they
know your views and commitments if they know your clan. In addition, political
parties think in clan terms to in political campaigns. Candidates for political
office also rally their clan to win political office.
In short, clan is ideology, a creed, a weltanschauung. It is also an
organizing schema to life and to the political process. So far, the power of
ideas stand little chance in exceeding the power of the clan in shaping
identity, thought, and behavior of Somalis. It is a conclusion that
disappointments Somalis who prefer ideas over lineage, or who believe merit to
clan identification. But this conclusion, however unpopular or distasteful,
derives from observations in the field and perspectives of participants in the
fieldwork.
4.3.8 Lessons from the Elections
The local and presidential elections were not without their flaws, as
Somaliland officials claim. There were irregularities, most of it inevitable in
a country under dictatorship for over thirty years and without census or
well-developed voter registration. Some of the irregularities were carried out
by dishonest and over-zealous officials. Others were products of inexperience
combined with poor logistics, communication, and training. Still, the voting
proceeded peaceful and as well as can be expected under the circumstance.
Foreign observers, mainly from the United States and the Republic of South
Africa, gave high approval to the way the voting was conducted and to the
counting of results.
There are important lessons that could be learned from the local and
presidential elections in order to avoid repeating the same mistakes and to
build on the successes. Mistakes repeated in other elections will no doubt
undermine in public confidence with elections, intensify suspicion of foul play,
and aggravate trust in government.
The following are some of the limitations and problems noted by the local and
international observers:
- The registration process failed prior to and during the voting; hence no
data exist except the names of those who voted.
- No pre-election voter education combined with high level of voter
illiteracy resulting high errors in voting for the intended candidate. - Ink
did not always work well; evidence of double or multiple voting. - The
officials at the polling stations were of unequal in training, capacities, and
commitment. - Polling stations lacked uniform procedures; some of the
officials and representatives of political organizations did not know their job
and responsibilities well. - Some polling stations opened later or closed
earlier than scheduled; officials in some polling stations were slow and
inefficient; long queues forced some to wait for six hours. - Poor
distribution of polling stations in some areas; some polling stations had either
too many or too few voters. - The police did not have adequate training for
crowd control; a few were in polling stations with their guns, breaching the
election laws. - In some areas, underage youth were allowed to vote for lack
of proper documents. - There were no standard procedures for using the dye
and assisting the illiterate. - There were no first aid and no facilities to
eat, rest, pray, etc. - Unresolved problems related to boundaries influenced
the outcome; in some instance, ballot boxes were found missing.
The following are some of the successful aspects of the election noted by
local and international observers:
- The voters enthusiastic; they exercised self-discipline and maturity; they
were patient in long queues for many hours. - The process was remarkably
peaceful and orderly; no intimidation or harassment of voters. - High
turnout for voting; large number of women voters, especially in the afternoon.
- Officials in voting stations seemed committed, even while they worked long
hours, many without taking breaks. - The process of counting ballots in many
polling stations seemed transparent when representatives of political
organizations were present. - Weak, lame, or illiterate voters found
assistance as needed. - In general, both local and international observers
were welcomed in polling stations.
The question of whether these the first footsteps toward democracy ensure
equity is in fact arguable. Majority rule or one-person-one-vote is not the
royal road to equity. In fact, both can be tantamount to tyranny of the majority
or legalized inequity to minority groups. The Borama Conference has shown that
value of consensus in which even the smallest minority can be respectively heard
and given their due share of representation, sometimes more of it with spirit of
brotherhood and commitment to peace. Most participants warned that, while the
experiment on one-person-one-vote should be continued and honed, the value of
consensus and lessons of the Borama Conference should not be forgotten.
4.3.9 The Inflation of Sultaans
The Beel System encouraged traditional leaders to directly participate in the
political process. Because of it, they no longer were treated archaic,
illegitimate, or irrelevant while indirectly they were used by politicians when
it suited them. The establishment of the Guurti since 1993 represents a clear
admission to the importance and role of the traditional elders. However, the
Beel System has unleashed new campaigns of traditional leaders to expand their
power and role in society.
The most visible illustration of this is the spate of sultaans that in recent
years have emerged in Somaliland. Clans that in the past had one sultaan – a
traditional chief – are increasingly breaking up into sub-clans with their
separate sultaans. The ambition of some individuals is today channeled in
joining the surfeit of sultaans who had mushroomed in recent years, setting in
motion the process of clan fission and conflict.
For instance, the Habar Je’lo who had one sultaan in the past have now
several some of whom are not content with the title but call themselves boqor –
king.
The Dhulbahante who also had one garaad – another term for sultaan – had two
in mid-1800s, 13 in 1985, and 14 today – the last selected only a few weeks ago.
The Arab who had one now have three, the last selected calling himself boqor.
A dispute between the government and some sultaans got out of hand in 2002.
President Egal decided to imprison some of them and kept others in siege when
they came to Hargeisa. The incident almost provoked an armed conflict that could
have turned into clan conflict, particularly between the Habar Je’lo and the
supporters of the government. Fortunately, the dispute was settled by civil
society mediators including religious leaders, businessmen, and intellectuals.
Because of the inflation of sultaans, two new problems have emerged in
Somaliland. Firstly, the sultaans have come up with calls for a new and
exclusive house for them in the parliament. Arguments that the Guurti was
designated for traditional leaders including the sultaans do not satisfy them.
Because their call for such a house found no social traction, they temporarily
ceased their campaign but they did not give up.. The sultaans, old and new, are
simply bidding their time, waiting for opportune moment (like time of political
transition or armed conflict) when they will exert greater influence to achieve
their goal.
Secondly, the traditional system founded on egalitarianism is gradually
turning into hierarchical, divisive, and discordant social order. In some
instances, the government or the opposition encourages the emergence of a
sultaan for narrow political interest, only to find out later that they had
created a problem for themselves and for society. Because also traditional
titles today have currency (monetarily and socially), each new nominee is trying
to outdo the others by name - for instance by calling himself boqor (king)
instead of traditional titles like sultaan, garaad, or ugaas. Perhaps,
Somaliland will soon be entering a new era were leaders compete over who is
“king of kings” – recalling a period of Ethiopian history which ended when
Emperor Menelik II finally won the competition and the title Emperor.
The new spate of sultaans it is on the whole dangerous. Firstly, it
encourages clan fission which could promote clan conflict. Secondly, it is
indicative of weak leadership in government and propensity to fill some vacuum
in power. Thirdly, it trivializes a serious political process that started in
earnest in 1993, giving new and substantive role to traditional leaders. The
surfeit of sultaans may in the end reduce the respect, social value, and power
individuals with that title held in society. This too will eliminate key
contributors to peace and social harmony to the detriment of Somaliland.
Finally, political debates on shir beelleed (conference of clans) or shir
qaraan (national conference) set in motion by some politicians for personal
power politics confuse the public. So long as all clan attend, the conference is
indeed a national conference. And there can be no national conference in the
absence of clans comprising Somaliland. This debate is therefore mostly
semantic, not substantive. President Egal used this tactic to browbeat his
opponents. If the same debate is used again to exploit public opinion and divide
society, Somaliland may return to square one where confusion and confabulation
once again breed clan conflict.
4.3.10 Legacy of President Egal
The late President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal was in some respects a godsend for
Somaliland in the early 1990s when it was in the midst of anarchy and inter-clan
violence. A seasoned politician, he knew how to establish a government where
none existed in 1993 when he became President of Somaliland. His long political
experience – from the mid-1950s when he played a leading role in the campaign
for independence and later as Prime Minister of the Somali Republic – had given
him the political skill and savvy for rebuilding government and political
institutions in Somaliland. Also a highly articulate and intelligent man, he
knew how to rally public support for his ideas and win friends when he wanted to
do so. Thus, much credit goes to him for rebuilding Somaliland from the ruins in
the ten years of his reign (1993-2002).
On the other hand, President Egal was a man intensely obsessed with personal
power and with eliminating his opponents, real or imagined, mostly by political
means. Although a civilian leader who encouraged the private sector and
independent media, he was also a man with little scruple on amassing money from
any source or by any means. However, Egal did not use money for building
personal wealth but for buying friends and supporters to secure his way to power
and to remain installed in power.
In his early years in politics, he had used his inheritance for campaigns for
political office and few would accuse him as a man who had acquired money for
the mere accumulation of it. However, his habit of using public funds without
hesitation and compunction, as if were his own, had encouraged corruption in his
cabinet and in government. He also often looked the other way if his cronies
misused public funds so long as they remained loyal to him.
Egal was tolerant of the media so long as they did not attack him. When they
did, he had no compunction in turning into a village tyrant. When the media
exceeded his threshold of tolerance, he treated its agents in the same shabby
way he treated all his opponents. To the anguish of journalist and others, he
readily believed, without checking, a rumor he heard from a person close to him
or whom he considered loyal, even though the messenger might have invented the
rumor to advance a personal interest or relayed it to hurt a foe. In addition,
though a usually brilliant tactician, with capacity to forgive and forget, he
could be impulsive, vain, and uncompromising, particularly to persons he
considered opponents.
Equally significant, the late President manipulated clan politics and
developed cronies in ways that made merit and social commitment irrelevant
during his reign. Most of his cabinet and major appointments had to show loyalty
and compliance to him above competence or knowledge. In addition, Egal made
ministries as separate clan fiefdoms. Thus, when he expelled a minister or a
director general, he appointed to the same post another equally incapable man
from the clan of the one expelled. A succession of such appointments had
therefore given the impression that certain ministries or posts are the fiefdoms
for some clans.
Lastly, he maintained tight control on the drafting of the Constitution and
on the working of the parliament. As a result, certain articles of the
Constitution whose wording or ambiguity served his political interest are today
severe impediments to the development of democracy. Not a promoter of competence
and social commitment in his cabinet, he also encouraged incompetence and social
irresponsibility within the parliament. To this day, some of the appointments he
made in his cabinet and the parliament remain chronic problems continuing to
cause distress even after his death. In short, Egal’s legacy is both a blessing
and a curse. He was no doubt the kind of leaders Somaliland needed in its
difficult years. However, the clan cleavages, the clan conflicts, and the
corruption resulting from his policies, practices, and appointments constitute
challenges for years to come.
4.3.11 Rise of Religious Fundamentalism
Since the mid-1970s, Somalis have been experiencing increasing
disillusionment with authority, loss of faith in government, and erosion of the
moral order giving them existential anchor and social guidance. Islam and
prayers became both a shelter and a form of rebellion against the military
regime which persecuted citizens in the name of socialism and set out to subdue
conscience, religious or otherwise.
The succession of wars since 1977 and continuing to the 1990s had also
intensified misery and victimization, pushing people to seek for salvation from
faith instead of political leaders or movements continually betraying their
promises. In addition, the increasing polarization of Islam countries and the
West had brought a new group of religious fundamentalists who scoff at the
separation of state and religion and who seek power by any means possible.
On the whole, Somaliland has been spared the kind of religious wars and
terrorism flaring up in other parts of the world. Because government has kept
anarchy and despair at bay, most religious fundamentalists have focused their
efforts in controlling the financial sector, changing school curricula and
cultivating young minds, taking over mosques and religious debates, controlling
dress and social behavior, particularly of women. Although some of groups who
proselytize their brand of Islam (like Wahabism) with external financial
support, their role in society had not so far led into a confrontation with the
government.
An alarming development which erodes confidence in government both locally
and internationally is the systematic murder of foreign expatriates who have
come to help Somalilanders in health, education, and demobilization. The murder
of a Swiss businessman in Hargiesa two years ago, followed by the murder an
Italian lady treating the sick in Borama seven months ago, followed by the
killing of two Britons running the rehabilitated secondary couples in Shiekh in
November 2003, and in March 2004 the murder of a Kenyan and wounding of a
German, both employees of GTZ, had brought rude awareness to the people of
Somaliland. The incidents drove home that Somaliland is indeed vulnerable and
that its peace is fragile.
Only when five men were captured in the village of Doqoshey by the
inhabitants, following the murder of a Kenyan consultant to GTZ, was a solution
found for the puzzle which almost unraveled the fragile peace of Somaliland.
After the capture of the five men, it became clear that a conspiracy led by
religious fundamentalists has been at work and that Somaliland could no longer
rest assured that its hard-won peace would sustain without the government
beefing up its security measures. At the same time, government is historically
known to use such incidents as license to set up excessive security systems and
measures which in the end re-instate the cycle of oppression, armed opposition,
and disaster Somaliland has come through in the past decades.
In short, the incidents of terrorism occurring in Somaliland in recent months
give cause for alarm. So too are the emerging committees and practices of the
government which, in the name of ensuring security, violate basic rights of
citizens for due process, freedom of expression, and freedom of movement. In
particular, as we discuss in the next chapter, worries now center on the Guddiga
Nabad- Gelyadda (the Committee on Security) set up unconstitutionally and Public
Order No. 21/63 which gives authorities free hand to imprison suspects without
due process. Either way, Somaliland seems to be in trouble. When two elephants
fight or make love, the grass dies.
4.4 POTENTIAL ESCALATORS OF CONFLICT
- Inequity in clan and gender representation in parliament. - Inequity in
employment opportunities for clans and regions. - Unequal access to the
government, the capital city, and public resources. - Rampant corruption and
misappropriation of public funds. - Incompetence in the Executive Branch.
- Inequity in government employment. - Discrimination felt by veterans
(both SNM combatants and ex-soldiers). - Inequity in delineation of district
(read clan) boundaries. - The Proliferation of Sultaans and so-called kings
vying for power. - The emergence of religious radicals using Islam in
pursuit of power.
4.5 POTENTIAL DE-ESCALATORS OF CONFLICT

- People jealously guard the hard-won peace, when their frustration is
intense. - The government takes special care in assaulting the property and
person of citizens. - People have come to believe that government is
essentially a burden, a nuisance, not solver of life problems; therefore, they
do expect least from it so long as it does not directly bother them. - Since
trust and expectation of government is low, its failings are accepted as given.
- Complaints of inequity are a common and acceptable way of letting off
steam. - Since the tyranny and discrimination of the past are the accepted
benchmark of misery, present inequities are felt with less passion. - The
anarchy or statelessness of Somalia predisposes Somalilanders to use these as
standards on which to evaluate their blessing; but this negative comparison is
short-sighted. - Gradual progress (including the local elections of 2002 and
presidential election of 2003) buoying public hope for better things to come in
the future. Many Somalilanders identify themselves as “rajo ku-nool” - those who
live on hope.”
4.6 SUMMARY
After the collapse of the regime, the Isaaq returned to their destroyed
homes, cities, and land with sizzling anger and wish for revenge. Fortunately,
the feared conflicts pitting the Isaaq against the non- Isaaq did not take
place. Where they did, their scope was limited and their consequences not as
disastrous as feared.
When the Isaaq turned on themselves, due to the frustration of years and
lethal arms inherited from the war, the SNM leaders had no effective equitable
program of governance. During this period, the non- Isaaq (particularly the
Gadabursi) found new role in mediating among the Isaaq, in the process becoming
key actors and key midwives of a new Somaliland.
The political leaders know well that if clan balance and dialogue cease, the
society will regress to conflict and chaos. That is why, for instance, the
President makes sure that his cabinet includes as many clans as possible. The
downside of this is that the cabinet becomes too large and unwieldy, creating
other problems of inefficiency and financial burden. It is a difficult choice –
one that requires further thought and experience.
In general, the people of Somaliland are proud of what they have been able to
achieve during the past ten years with little international assistance. They
restored peace and formed a government that by African standards is exemplar.
Lessons can be learned from the Somaliland experience by those who seek to find
problems to Somalia.
The Beel system, a hybrid of tradition and modernity, is a major step forward
in experimentation and inventiveness that have been undermined by local elite
that, soon after independence, wanted to develop a replica of Western Europe but
could not. The military regime, aping socialist countries, adopted the rhetoric
of revolution but had shown its poverty in substance and practice.
Following its collapse, society had to either save itself or to perish. On
the precipice of disaster, it chose to fall back on its local resources and
creativity. The result was the Beel system which saved it from impending
disaster.
However, the Beel system is not a panacea. It has its limitations. For
instance, it is cumbersome and inefficient. It values inclusiveness over merit
and competence. In addition, the traditional leaders who have come to the
limelight of politics know little about the demands of a contemporary state.
They are as much valuable to society as they are a burden to it.
The Beel system was supposed to be a transitional structure. The emergence of
political parties was supposed to reduce the criterion of clan and to build a
government based on diversity, peaceful competition, and merit. Yet the
political parties have shown that they too are unable to free themselves from
the clutches and crutches of clan.
Lastly, the problems of inequity and injustice that pushed society to war
have not been adequately resolved. Complaints are rife in different sectors.
Those who live outside Hargeisa feel neglected and discriminated against. So do
former ex-combatants, rural communities, women, and minorities. In short, though
Somaliland has come a long way from the tyranny of the military regime and the
anarchy following its collapse, it still has a long way to go to build an
enduring system of government, credible to its people and the international
community. Governance and political institutions of Somaliland are a mixture of
the good and the bad because its leaders particularly and the society generally
present both in high quotient.
The bad aspects can not be eliminated, any more than the good alone
cultivated. Peace and development have come from a careful balance of the two
tendencies. In a nascent and fragile society like Somaliland, increment of one
over the other could either push society forward toward democracy and
development, or thrust it to yet another disaster. The quality of leaders is
thus as critical as patience of the public.
Chapter 5: EQUITY OF LAW AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM
5.1 WHY WE SELECTED THIS ISSUE?
We selected this issue because firstly the perception and reality of inequity
in society has been a primary cause for armed conflict. Secondly, the majority
of people in Somaliland took up arms against the regime of Mohamed Siyaad Barre
because equity of law and the judicial system had been severely violated and
peaceful methods of redress to their grievance had failed. We wanted to see how
far law enforcement and justice systems have come since 1991 when Somaliland
reclaimed its independence.
5.2 BACKGROUND
After the collapse of the military regime in 1991, different regions of
Somalia reverted to varying traditions of law enforcement and legal systems. In
Somaliland, the police and the judiciary had to be recreated from scratch. Since
1993 there has been steady progress in re-establishing the foundation of law
enforcement and the judicial system including the development of legal codes,
courts, and jails. The history of how law enforcement and the judicial system
were re-established in Somaliland sets a context for understanding the problems
of inequity in the law and the judicial system.
5.2.1 The Police Before 1991
When the occupation of Somaliland coast by Britain started in earnest in
1884, shortly after the Egyptians had evacuated Berbera, Langton P. Walsh had
established a police force comprising of 100 men whom he trained in drills and
marksmanship. This miniscule force operated effectively because firstly the
population took seriously agreements of “protection” their elders had signed
with the British and secondly because the British used effectively the policy of
divide-and-rule.26
The war of the Dervishes led by Mohamed Abdulle Hassan intensified the
decision of Britain to hold on to the Protectorate and increase its forces.
Following pacification, Britain invested little in Somaliland and continued
indirect rule using elders and minimum external force. When in1959 the
Somaliland Police Force established, it comprised 24 gazetted officers of whom
only 10 were Somalilanders. Soon after, the police training school at Mandhera
was constructed to train new recruits.
In 1960, the police in Somaliland and Somalia were integrated. The police
traditions and procedures each force inherited from its colonial rulers – one
British, the other Italian – did not conform and hence confusion followed until
the National Police Force found technical assistance from the former West
Germany. From 1960-169, the civilian administrations politicized the police and
infected it with its clan competition and cleavages. When the police interfered
in elections marred by rigged ballots, the respect and confidence it enjoyed had
diminished.
After the military coup of 1969, the National Police Force found technical
and financial assistance from the former East Germany. The politicization of the
police intensified as it became the bulwark of the regime using arbitrary
detention and torture against persons considered “anti-revolutionary” and hence
opponent of the regime. Growing into a formidable force, the police did its part
in holding the lid on citizens until the regime fell on January 26, 1991.
5.2.2 The Judicial System Before 1992
In pre-colonial Somaliland, customary law (xeer) was used alongside Islamic
Shari’a (of the Shafi’i school). Clan elders and experts in Shari’a law (the
qaadis and sheikhs) applied the laws in an informal manner. In matters concening
marriage, divorce and inheritance rights, Shari’a was usually disregarded in
favour of xeer.27
The British colonial administration introduced an additional body of codified
law and a judicial system based on British Common and Statute Law and the Indian
Penal Code. In addition, the British established traditional (Akil’s) courts
and, subsequently, the Qaadi’s courts to apply customary law, while Shari’a law
continued to be applied in domestic matters.
At independence in 1960, when British Somaliland and Italian Somalia were
united, four distinct legal traditions – British Common Law, Italian
(Continental) law, Islamic Shari’a, and Somali customary law – were in
simultaneous operation. These four legal systems were partially integrated by
the passage of a “Law on the Organization of the Judiciary” by the National
Assembly of Somalia in 1962. According to this legislation, the civil and penal
codes and commercial law were to be based on Italian law, whereas the criminal
procedure code was to be based on Anglo-Indian law. In Somaliland, however, the
lower courts continued to practice British law until 1977 because judges were
most conversant with this system. At the same time, Islamic Shari’a continued to
apply in family and civil matters, while customary law (sanctioned by civil
courts) was retained for optional application in such matters as land tenure,
water and grazing rights, and the payment of diya. In parts of the country,
particularly rural areas, where state law did not reach, customary law was
predominant.
The military regime that seized power in 1969 suspended the Constitution of
1961, assigning all legislative, executive, and judicial powers to the Supreme
Revolutionary Council. In 1973, the regime introduced a unified civil code. Its
provisions pertaining to inheritance, personal contracts and water grazing
rights sharply curtailed both the Shari’a and Somali customary law.
In particular, the new civil code altered the customary system diya payment
as compensation for death or injury, in which responsibility was collectively
borne by the clan. The offence was made punishable by death and compensation
payable only to close relatives. The Socialist regime’s determination to limit
the role of Shari’a in domestic matters was further reflected in the Family Act
of 1975, which gave equal inheritance rights to women.
The military government did not change the basic structure of the court
system, but it limited the powers of the courts. At the outset the Supreme Court
and the Constitutional Court were abolished and the authorities of the Court of
Appeals and District Courts were reduced. Although the Supreme Court was later
restored, the regime introduced a major new institution, the National Security
Courts (NSCs), which operated outside the ordinary legal system and under the
direct control of the executive. These Courts, which were situated in Mugadisho
and the regional capitals, had jurisdiction over offences that the regime deemed
a threat to state security.
5.2.3 Prisons before 1991
There were three main prisons before the military coup and all three were
built during colonial rule. The Central Prison in Mogadishu was designed for a
maximum of 5,000 prisoners. The other major prisons were in the former British
Protectorate. The Hargeisa Central Prison was built in the 1940s to accommodate
only a maximum of 120 prisoners. The Mandheera Prison, located between Hargeisa
and Berbera, was built in the 1950s, also able to accommodate about 250
prisoners.
After the military coup, hundreds of prisons had mushroomed throughout the
country. Most infamous of these were the Laanta Buur Prison, the Buurweyn
Prison, and Labaatan Jirow Prison. Laanta Buur Prison was located in an area 40
km away from Mogadishu. It was designed to occupy prisoners in agricultural
production but the prison only became a place of incarceration. The Buurweyn
Prison was located in an area 20 km south of a small town called Buulaburde. In
distance and by design, it was intended for prisoners whose whereabouts and
conditions the regime wanted to conceal. The Labaatan Jirow Prison was located
in an area 20 km north-east of Baydhabo that in 1990s came to be internationally
known as the place of death.28
Labaatan Jirow was developed with the financial and technical assistance of
East Germany. It had especially designed underground cells. It prisoners were
political detainees held in solitary confinement and incommunicado for
undetermined length of time. Only Maxamed Siyaad Barre.had the power to decide
the detention as well as release of prisoners at Labaatan Jirow Prison. If a
prisoner was released from this prison, it occurred late at night without
warning. The prisoner was snatched out of his cell and taken by heavily armed
soldiers. The practice was so designed to make the prisoner conclude that the
moment of his execution had arrived. To his relief, he was taken to the
President’s Palace in Mogadishu. There, he heard offer of clemency from the
President. He also heard lame excuses for why he was detained in the first
place, or why he was forgotten in prison. The unexpected way the ordeal ended,
just after one had prepared for execution, left the unjustly imprisoned most
delighted, even grateful to the President.
The old and new prisons were filled to maximum capacity by the 1980s.
Overcrowding and poor hygiene were common. Torture was also frequent. In fact,
getting into prison was easy, but get out was quite difficult. Many were
forgotten in prison because those agents who left them there had left no record
of charges against them and never came back to release them. Other agents would
never dare to release them for fear of being held responsible. As a result, such
prisoners languished in prison for years with an open-ended commitment and the
anxiety of not knowing if or when they will be released.
Tyranny is therefore not an insufferable burden to the victims but also to
the perpetrators. It creates situations of ambiguity, vulnerability, and
apprehension for everyone. For the perpetrator today could easily become the
victim, and vice versa. Under these circumstances, the safest course is to take
a minimalist action on behalf of victims and, when in doubt, to err in favor of
the status quo of oppression. The number of prisons and prisoners increased
rapidly; Somalia itself became a prison.
5.3 THE CURRENT SITUATION
The history of the police and the courts before 1991 had immense influence on
Somaliland law and judicial system in subsequent years. The politicization of
the police and the courts had compromised its professional ethics and behavior.
They began as alien institutions imposed by an occupying force. After
independence, their politicization continued and intensified under the military
regime. It collapse had brought the need to re-establish law and order, with
equity and justice as its foundation, but institutions and habits of the past
persisted.
5.3.1 The Police After 1991
Law enforcement and the rule of law were among the paramount tasks facing
Somaliland after the fall of the military regime. Following the 1991 Burao
Conference, a newly elected transitional government gave priority to the
management of security matters. The transitional government drew list of
recruits from the SNM fighters. It entrusted the task of rebuilding the
Somaliland Police to a committee composed from the SNM Veterans’ Association
(SOOYAAL), the Hargeysa Mayor’s office, and a selected number of ex-police
officers. 29
The process of planning for the new police force and selecting personnel took
almost six months. In principle, the team agreed to establish the first police
unit comprising 200 men, of whom 120 were SNM veterans and 80 were members of
the ex-police force. This combination fit well with the ongoing process of
reconciliation and peacemaking among the warring factions. The combination was
also in harmony with the demobilization and re-integration program that was
drawn up to facilitate the re-engagement of the veterans to ordinary civil life.
Of the 120 recruited from the SNM ranks, 80 were allocated to those who
jointed the SNM before 1988 while 40 were those who joined SNM after 1988.30 In
collaboration with officers from the Ministry of Education, the new recruits
were required to sit for a written examination in Somali. Ironically, the
recruits came for the examination with their guns, misunderstanding the
examination to be on marksmanship.
By December 1992, the newly formed police unit started its activities at the
Hargeysa Central Police Station. Subsequently, units were distributed to the
district police stations in Hargeysa. In 1993 a presidential decree formally
established the Somaliland Police Force. The demobilization of clan militia
later facilitated the establishment of the police force throughout the country.
Former SNM combatants, ex-police servicemen, and members of the clan militia
were integrated into the police force. In addition, many police stations were
either rehabilitated or built all over the country.
Today, police units are functioning throughout the regions and districts of
Somaliland, communicating with their central command in Hargeysa through
long-range radios. In fact, a great deal more needs to be done in raising the
effectiveness, efficiency, and professionalism of the police fore. The main
obstacles include the lack of facilities like vehicles to transport the police.
Police officers are often illiterate and lack proper training in criminal
procedures. Office equipment and logistics are insufficient.
Public and informed sources identify limited budgetary resources and low
salaries to be the main cause of corruption, dishonesty and inefficiency in the
ranks of the police force. As in the military and custodial corps, there is no
ranking system in the police force. None of the officers wear a uniform that
shows his rank. Low salaries and the absence of a ranking system underscore that
the system is not based on merit and professionalism. The lack of promotion and
demotion breeds a sense of irresponsibility and inefficiency among the ranks of
the police force.
In addition, interventions from various circles disrupt the smooth running of
police activities. Higher ranking government officials, members of the
parliament, traditional elders, businessmen and the general the public interfere
with the work of the police, and often seek to influence disputes through
political pressure and monetary rewards. For this reason, the police force is
either reluctant to enforce the law or it inappropriately interferes with the
due process of law.
5.3.2 The Judicial System After 1991
The judiciary also continues to face similar problems as the police. The key
problems hampering the effective performance of the judicial system are due to
too few qualified people and no refresher courses or training; a lack of basic
equipment and facilities; the absence of legal libraries, texts, journals, and
other legal resources; a poor working relationship between the actors within the
system; and the lack of legislative controls, professional associations or
regulatory judges and lawyers.
When the judiciary was re-established in Somaliland the court system began
with the initiative of the people. Judges and others in the court worked on a
voluntary basis – without salaries, appropriate offices, and a coherent legal
system. The judicial system also started from ground zero. As government
institutions grew, the judges were given nominal stipends, making them dependent
upon money they received from the disputants. To this day, the salaries of
judges remain quite low and they continue to depend on monetary gifts of
disputants out of necessity and out of habit. Inevitably, then, their ruling is
influenced by whoever pays them the most. In addition to low salaries,
corruption, and lack of professionalism, the courts suffer from inappropriate
interference from the executive or legislative. Unlike the police force, which
by law comes under the Ministry of Interior, hence under the executive branch of
the government, the judiciary is by constitution supposed to be independent and
impartial. But it is not so in practice. The Executive controls and influences.
In addition, the judiciary is overstaffed with under-qualified judges and
unqualified support staff.
Even if a fair verdict is reached by the judges, itself a rare event, there
is no guarantee that the verdict will actually be enforced by the police. A
majority of the problems the court deals with involves land dispute provoked by
land speculations and land grab. Family disputes involving marital problems
ranks second. In most of these cases, the court is at the best of those who can
pay. Often, judges bilk both disputants until they almost kill the goose that
lay the golden eggs. Both land and marital disputes can escalate clan conflict
once they attain social traction. Incidents of armed conflict involving land is
occasional heard or reported in the papers. A party of the dispute takes up arms
out of frustration or feeling betrayed by the court. A few relatives join him.
Either the opposing camp comes to the scene. If the police arrived earlier or
after, a clash often follows with potential of others joining the fray.
Aside from the obvious problems of limited salaries, training and
professionalism in police, courts, and custodial corps, the legal system guiding
the behaviour of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary is contradictory and
confusing. After the collapse of the central government in 1991, public
sentiment favoured the implementation of Shari’a law as a means for
re-establishing order and justice, but this hope proved unrealistic as most of
the available jurists were returnees from the South and educated in an Italian
language and legal system. Inevitably, they became the foundation of
Somaliland’s judicial system. Thus, in practice, judges continued to apply the
civil code and procedures enacted in the mid-seventies.
The constitution adopted in 1997 in the Hargeysa Conference and ratified by
public referendum in May 2001 stipulated that the applicable laws in Somaliland
are only those that do not contradict the Islamic Shari’a. For instance, Article
5.2 of the constitution stipulates that the laws of the nation shall be based on
the Islamic Shari’a and they shall not be valid if they contradict it. It also
states that the pre-1991 laws are valid if they do not conflict with Islamic
Shari’a. Yet, judges are unfamiliar with interpretation and application of the
Shari’a legal code. Because the Shari’a outlines primarily basic principles of
justice it lacks a detailed procedural or administrative system to adjudicate
cases.
Therefore, law enforcement agencies and the courts resort to the laws adopted
from Italy and Britain – two countries whose legal history and practice are
quite different.
Complicating matters, customary law founded on Somali tradition is also
pervasive. In fact, the public rely on traditional customary laws in rural areas
as well as in cases involving homicide and injury. Often, customary laws are
applied outside of the court system. Often settlements reached through customary
law release the offender from jail when in fact other laws assume the offender
should be kept in jail because he broke a law not only against a clan but
against the state. These three legal systems cause much confusion and aggravate,
symbolize, and daily reaffirm the lack of equity, efficiency, and justice in
Somaliland.
5.3.4 Inequity in the judiciary
Complaints about injustice and bureaucratic red tape of the courts have been
common since 1993 but today they have reached dangerous proportion, as
demonstrated by the murder of a traffic policeman in broad daylight, in a busy
street, in full view of pedestrians. The murder in cold blood was carried by a
man who, according to reports, felt unjustly treated by the police and the
courts after his vehicle collided with another. The murder had nearly brought
into a cycle of revenge killing and clan conflagration.
Every day, there are throngs of citizens milling in and out of court, most of
them stuck for months, even years, to settle a dispute involving land, marriage,
business partnership, rape, physical altercation, or murder. The courts are
overwhelmed because the lack the number and quality of personnel as well as
judges to efficiently adjudicate the disputes. In addition, most of the judges
are believed to be corrupt, unqualified by training or experience, and simply
callous. Those best informed about the problems of courts (for instance,
lawyers, judges, and legislators) explain that there are:
- Too few qualified people appointed by the executive; - No adequate
salaries for judges and support staff of the courts, hence the corruption; -
No basic equipment and facilities to properly carry out the duties of courts;
- No refresher courses or training; - No legal libraries, texts,
journals, and other legal resources; - No proper working relationship
between the courts and the executive which undermines their constitutionally
stated independence; - No legislative oversight and controls; - No
professional associations to regulate the behavior of judges and lawyers. -
The combination of different legal systems (Common Laws, Roman/Germanic Laws,
and Shari’a) has made the courts bedlam of legal confusion and raw injustice.
People fought against the injustice of Mohamed Siyaad Barre’s regime.
Following victory, they expected not only better life in society but equity and
justice before the law. Soon after the collapse of the regime, they held
realistic view of what to expect from the courts whose judges and clerks were
given nominal stipends, making them dependent upon money they received from the
disputants.
In recent years, the anger against the inefficiency and injustice of the
courts have come under public scrutiny and criticism because complainants write
in the media about their encounter with the horrors in the court and more people
have experienced their raw injustice or protracted delays to adjudicated even
the simplest of cases.
Illustrative of the complaints we heard about the courts is the experience of
a young lady, in her midtwenties, who had been embroiled in a protracted and
convoluted dispute with her husband. The lady whom we shall give the fictional
name, Asha, has never been in court before 2002. Illiterate, she always avoided
when she could any institution or relationship which requires documents and
exposes her inability to read or write.
Until her dispute with her husband took her to the courts, Asha avoided all
government institutions. She married a cousin at age seventeen. Soon after, she
started her business, selling food in a stall at the market place. After two
years of hard work, Asha managed to help her unemployed husband to purchase a
truck. After he mistreated her in different ways, she demanded divorce.
Relatives and traditional elders of their clan could not help solve the problems
between her and her husband, or end the marriage properly.
Frustrated, she went to the court. What she found shocked her. Two years
later, she learned much that about how system of injustice works and how the
poor are their primary victims. Her story offers a remarkable testimony for the
need of fundamental change in thought and practice, even if the institutions of
the former dictator have been ostensibly demolished, after much bloodshed and
destruction.
She concluded her story thus: “I learned that the courts are not for the
poor. Justice is bought and sold. Only those who have money get justice; those
who don’t have money get only raw injustice. I had no lawyer because I could not
afford one. I found that none would listen to an aggrieved poor girl.” The
failure of law enforcement and the justice system is often compensated for by
the intervention of traditional elders and religious leaders in disputes. It is
then that one realizes the existence of two systems of government – one formal
and based on European models, the other informal and based on tradition. The
latter kicks in where the former fails. The traditional elders and religious
leaders use existing traditions of payment of blood compensation for injury and
death. They also rally the clans of disputants to assist in moderating
animosities and payment for compensation. In fact, religious leaders are known
to have settled disputes involving, for instance, owners of telecommunications
companies like Aerolite in which one owner was locked in an intractable dispute
with his father-in-law. The courts would have only botched up this case, as they
have done others like it.
5.3.5 Inequity in the penal system
The penal system in Somaliland presents inequity in most intense and crude
forms. For instance, the law requires that the detained could not be held
without court order for more than seven days, that even the guilty have rights
for basic amenities and care. However, many accused are detained for months,
even years, on flimsy pretext. They are kept in crowed cells and prisons. They
are held in crowded cells with inmates suffering from all sort of communicable
diseases like TB and HIV/AIDS. Since also there is no age or criminal
distinction of prisoners, the young and old live in the same cells as do the
innocent and the hardened criminals.
Illustrative of the disturbing conditions of prisons is the Hargeisa Central
Prison, right in the center of capital city and only less than a mile from the
Presidential palace. A legislative Committee has recently lamented its horrible
state, as did officials we interviewed. This prison was built by the colonial
administration in 1940. It was designed to house a maximum of 120 inmates.
Today, it is crowded with over 600 prisoners living with in dilapidated
buildings, filth, and in crowded cells. The latrines are full and fill the
prison with foul smell. The prisoners do not get adequate food or healthcare.
In general, conditions in the prisons of Somaliland are most distressing for
women and children. Although a study conducted by one member of our team in
situation of women inmates shows that incidents of sexual or physical abuse is
low in prisons, women and children bear the brunt of a penal system in disarray,
in dilapidated buildings, and extremely overcrowded.
In short, the conclusion one derives is that the law enforcement, the
judicial system, and the penal system have a long way to go in protecting and
promoting justice and human dignity. People do not want their hard-won peace
undermined either by them or outsiders. They have shown remarkable patience
toward incompetence and corruption of those who were supposed to enforce the law
and adjudicate disputes. However, their patience can not be taken for granted.
If problems in the system are not corrected, things can quickly unravel in a
population that is armed to teeth and had been hardened by years of rebellion.
5.3 POTENTIAL ESCALATORS OF CONFLICT
- Disputes on land and divorce predominate the conflicts dealt by law
enforcement and the judicial system - Poor training of police officers and
judges distort the law and abort justice; - Limited understanding of the
law, due process of the law, and human rights erode trust in government and
judicial process; - Lack of training in proper investigation techniques and
tools (such as finger print techniques and lie detectors) lead to failure to
apprehend criminals or condemn the innocent; - Lack of requisite equipment
and tools (such as vehicles, communication equipment Lack of training of
conflict management escalate conflict; - Law salaries encourage corruption
and undermine the law and the judicial system; - Law salaries engender low
pride, low morale, and therefore low self-discipline and least investment in
carrying out one’s job properly; - Lack of coherent organization in law
enforcement and the judicial system result inefficiency, legal muddle,
escalation of conflict, and delayed or failed enforcement of decisions by the
police and the court.
5.4 POTENTIAL DE-ESCALATORS OF CONFLICT
- Traditional elders intervene in disputes involving marital discord, land
dispute, and other interpersonal conflicts; - Blood compensation
(dia-payment) for physical injury and murder reduces incidents of clan revenge;
- Religious leaders have informal courts when parties in conflict agree on
mediation and accept their moral authority; - Using threat of legal action,
including imprisonment, the police, the courts, and the penal system have
deterrent value on less hardened criminals who otherwise would provoke disputes
escalating to clan or sub-clan conflict; - The system of government, even if
often flawed and unjust, reduces the dangers of power vacuum and therefore of
anarchy; - History of citizens’ self-restraint and desire for peace which,
despite a society awash with arms, bears injustice with remarkable endurance and
undiminished (some say unrealistic) hope that things will somehow work well.
They call themselves rajo-ku-nool – survivors on hope.
5.5 SUMMARY
The institutions for law enforcement and courts actually exist in Somaliland.
However, they are woefully inadequate, indeed dysfunctional. Political
institutions rebuilt from the ruins will naturally take time. People in
Somaliland have waited for more than ten years for equity and justice to be
restored, at least improved. But the institutions of rule of law enforcement and
justice are too slow and frustrating for the public. Human rights organizations
advocating reform also exist but they too are nascent, undeveloped,
under-funded, and ineffective. The political parties also tend to complain about
real problems of inequity and injustice, but they too have little to propose by
way of solution. There is unanimity of public opinion (indeed conviction) that
the judicial is the weakest of the three Somaliland government branches. It does
not function properly; corruption is high; public confidence in court decisions
lack; legal reform is yet to take place. Diverse and contradictory legal systems
render interpretation and application of the law ad hoc, non-uniform, and highly
subjective. Such disputes or conflicts often concern land issues in the urban
centers and farm communities. These too do not find efficient and just ruling or
enforcement.
In short, peoples’ perception of injustice and corruption in law enforcement
and the judiciary is quite high. It is little wonder that law enforcement and
the judiciary are the most unpopular institutions and the weakest links in the
nascent system of government in Somaliland.
Post-conflict countries experience formidable challenges. They include
rebuilding the peace, homes, businesses, the infrastructure, the political
system, trust in government, etc. Of these, highest priority is given to
building political structures, homes, businesses, and roads. Often neglected are
less tangible but no less important concerns. They include freedom of
expression, human rights, trust in government, constant sense of peril among
civilians even in time of peace, and the trauma of war. Dictatorship and war
leave lasting damages on these aspects of life. Because they are neglected,
habits learned under tyranny and systems of control continue to undermine the
foundations of peace, democracy, and freedom. As a result, tyranny lurks around
the corner. Vigilance against the return of tyranny by the back door is
essential.
Chapter 6: HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY
6.1 WHY WE SELECTED THIS ISSUE
We selected these two focus issues because human rights (including freedom of
expression) are fundamental to freedom and their violation had been the primary
causes for why people in Somaliland had taken up arms against the regime of
Mohamed Siyaad Barre. We wanted to explore to what extent post-reconstruction
Somaliland has reinstated and practiced these fundamental freedoms and what
actual threats to them exist today, presenting potential for conflict
escalation. In particular, we will review the status of free expression and
association in Somaliland.
Moreover, we wanted to explore further the role of civil society in
Somaliland and in particular its role in the rebuilding of peace. Although one
finds passing comment on the contributions of traditional elders to peacemaking,
the literature on Somaliland neglects the contribution of civil society in
diverse areas. We thought it may be useful to bring to the foreground the
contributions of civil society which indirectly have been broached in the
previous chapters on clan cleavage, governance, law enforcement, the judicial
system, and the media.
6.2 BACKGROUND
The crudest forms of violation on human rights had ended with the regime of
Mohamed Siyaad Barre whose indiscriminate persecution, torture, and massacres
have been unprecedented in Somali history. Today, Somaliland is in a state of
peace. It has a constitution which built-in check and balance of power. Freedom
of movement, expression, and association are unhampered constitutionally and in
practice. However, past tyranny and fear of unchecked state power, both deeply
rooted in the public psyche and habits of officials, presenting covert but
constant threats to human rights with potential for escalation of conflict.
6.2.1 Human Rights Before 1991
The history of human rights in Somaliland is grim. Colonial rule was designed
to advance human rights. That much is understood for certain. However,
independence was supposed to advance human rights of which protecting the bodily
and psychological integrity of people from state abuse, freedom of expression,
and freedom of association are fundamental principles.
Soon after the 1969 coup, the military regime passed a series of draconian
laws curtailing basic freedoms.31 For instance, on 10th January 1970, it issued
a decree giving full authority to the ruling Supreme Revolutionary Council and
its agents to imprison, without due process, anyone suspected of subversive
acts. The law was so sweeping and ambiguous that anyone could be detained
without evidence and limitation in time.
On 26th January 1970, the SRC also issued Law No. 8 which amended the Code of
Criminal Procedures and gave authorities free hand in getting evidence or
confession by any means on crimes related to national security. As a result of
this law, torture became a chief and common method of interrogation. On 2nd
February 1970, the National Security Services (NSS) was established to gather
intelligence on internal and external threats against the regime. The job of the
NSS soon became to vigorously monitor the actions and words of suspected
“anti-revolutionaries.”
On 10th February 1970, a special court called the National Security Court was
established to punish by death or long-term imprisonment those accused of being
a threat to the regime. Judges for this court were appointed by Maxamed Siyaad
Barre who was closely involved in all major trials from the time the NSC was
established to the collapse of the regime. Making the court and its punishment
pervasive throughout the country, it had sections in every district and region.
These lower courts were also controlled and managed by members of the armed
forces.
On 15 February 1970, the SRC issued Law No. 14 that gave authorities –
particularly the NSS – the power to search the person, property, or home of
anyone suspected of being “anti-revolutionary”. It also gave authorities the
power to confiscate his belonging and property if found guilty. Soon, simply a
charge of endangering “national security” or of being “anti-revolutionary”
became grounds for longterm imprisonment and even death by a firing squad.
On 26th of February 1970, the constitution that had governed the nation since
independence was abolished. Four days later, on 2nd March, all political parties
were abolished and new political parties were prohibited.
In January 1971, the SRC issued a decree prohibiting writers and journalists
as well as composers of poetry and songs from disseminating their work without
screening by the Censorship Board (Guddiga Faaf Reebka).
On 4th March 1971, the SRC issued a law enabling the National Security Court
to sentence to death by firing squad anyone who pillages, destroys, misuses, or
misappropriates public property. On 4th March 1971, a special decree gave full
authority to the National Security Court to condemn to death by a firing squad
anyone who destroys, plunders, or misappropriates government property or who
accepts bribes from the public or otherwise mismanagement public funds. The
decree metes similar fate to anyone engaged in propaganda or works with
foreigners, thereby compromising the integrity of the government. On 6th March
1971, the regime entered into a comprehensive political, economic, and military
agreement with the former Soviet Union.
By January 1972, the campaign to proliferate socialism was undertaken and the
number of NSS agents was increased. In April 1972, the SRC issued Law No. 38
which placed Maxamed Siyaad Barre as the sole supreme authority who could revise
judgement of the National Security Court, who could listen to appeals, and who
could give clemency if he so desired.
By the end of 1972, the legal justification and machinery for repression was
fully in place. The subsequent years carried out the full measure of these laws.
It took Somalis more than a decade to organize themselves to regain the basic
freedoms they lost. We have intimated earlier the brutal and indiscriminate
measures the regime took to suppress opposition in Somaliland. The
indiscriminate persecution and massacres of the Mohamed Siyaad Barre’s regime
are today remembered with intense anger and hatred by the majority of
Somalilanders.
A study on psychological trauma in Hargeisa has shown that even children who
did not live in the city when the military regime raised it to the ground in the
summer of 1988, and their families were strafed all the way to the Ethiopian
border, had suffered terror nightmares and disturbed behavior a decade later.
Presumably, psychological trauma is transmitted to young generations through the
accounts, anxiety, and actions of surviving generations, in the same way that
family violence is transmitted transgenerationally.
Many who are unfamiliar with that history political violence can not
understand the bitter memories of survivors and the actions of the state they
considered their own. More incomprehensible to the survivors of that brutal era
are Somalis who for clan hatred or political reasons minimize the abuses of that
brutal era or wish bury the past for their own comfort. Neither can therefore
understand the depth of resolve for independence among the majority of
Somalilanders.
Staying apart from Somalia is in part self-protective, a refuge from abuses
of the past. The decision to go it alone, even in the absence of international
recognition, is also comes from a commitment to fashion a society of equity and
justice which the union failed to present.
The question today is this: Did Somaliland achieve improved standard of human
rights during the past twelve years since its reclamation of independence?
6.3 THE CURRENT SITUATION
The fieldwork focused on the status of human rights in Somaliland in recent
years. Despite painful memories of the past, participants often avoided in-depth
discussion of state abuse in the past in order to advance the spirit of
reconciliation which brought peace to different clans, some fighting the
military regime, others supporting it. The desire for mutual accommodation and
respect to the different clans comprising Somaliland has gradually made
unpopular the old obsession with old injuries and wars. Moreover, people seem
inclined to leave the past buried, at least unspoken about, and to focus on
pressing issues of today.
6.3.1 Basic Human Rights After 1991
Firstly, participants have indicated that no longer are citizens subjected to
the kind of abuses they have known under the military dictatorship. Citizens are
not persecuted or killed as in the past. Nor are their freedom of association
and movement controlled as in the past. However, they suggested that certain
habits of the past can not be readily dislodged.
For instance, the Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland affirms in
Article 25, Item 3 that “It is not permitted to apprehend a person to search or
detention unless he/she is engaged, at the time, in commitment of a crime, or
unless a warrant for arrest or for search has been issued by a court.” Key
informants and focus group discussants affirm that this law is violated either
by illegal search or detention without a warrant of arrest. Such a breach may be
carried out by any law enforcement and prison wardens.
In some cases, an officer may call a superior or the Governor by phone and
arrest someone without warrant for arrest. However, complaints center around an
extra-legal Security Committee (Guddiga Nabadda) consisting of the Interior
Minister, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Defense, the Commander of the
Police, the Commander of the Armed Forces, the Governor, and the Mayor. This
committee, with its regional replication, can and does arrest citizens without
order of court and by breaching the constitutional rights of citizens. In fact,
both in name and function, this committee is a residue of the dictatorial era.33
For instance, the Committee arrested over 150 youth on May 18, 2004 after
President had spoken in public in Hargeisa to commemorate the day Somaliland
broke away the union and reclaimed its independence. The youth complained about
festering problems of corruption, administrative incompetence, and water crisis.
Those who witnessed the response of the police affirmed that the police
over-reacted and used heavy handed measures. The Committee soon after
apprehended the youth apparently in random in the streets during the day and in
their homes at night. Breaching the constitution and rule of law, it sentenced
them to at least six months of imprisonment in Mandheera Prison, located between
Hargeisa and Berbera. The Committee felt no need for due process, no court
hearing, and no right of the accused to be defended by a lawyer. Such incidents
are reminders of the infamous past and could bring society back to square one.
Secondly, participants complained about another violation of the constitution
by law enforcement, the courts, and prison officials. Article 27, Item 2 states:
“A person deprived of his freedom because of an accusation of a crime he may
have committed has the right to appear before a court within 48 (fortyeight)
hours from the time of his arrest.” In fact, this constitutional right is often
violated. Many prisoners are arrested for weeks, sometimes for years, without
due process and exceeding the hours of arrest stipulated by the Constitution.
Healthy and sick prisoners are kept in crowded cells.
Thirdly, participants underscored the increasing rate of crimes like gangs
and rape in urban centers which in some cases have provoke a cycle of violence
if the state did not intervene or the perpetrator’s clan failed to pay the
expected compensation. One of the most shocking stories we heard include that of
a 16-years old female epileptic who got lost in Hargeisa to which she was a
stranger. Someone found her and took her to the Radio Station which in turn
broadcast the plight of this girl in the hope that relatives may fetch her. When
the relatives did not come by the evening, a policeman took her from the Radio
Station and raped her. We were told that the policeman was not apprehended and
given full measure of the law. This illustrates the “culture of impunity” bred
by an era of dictatorship and lackadaisical officialdom.
6.3.2 Freedom of Expression
It is generally agreed that Somali Somaliland today enjoys freedom of
expression to a degree that stands in market contrast to its past and to all
three of its neighbors – Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Puntland. However, the struggle
to restore freedom of expression in Somaliland did not come easy. Nor is its
maintaining without challenges. Our fieldwork expanded the desk study and
illuminated new aspects. Discussion on defining freedom of expression brought
heated controversy on the rights expression of opinion and the rights for
personal privacy and integrity of character. The participants endorsed both
rights but disputed where one right ended and the other began.
One journalist stated that freedom of expression is about citizens finding
political space for their opinion. Another defined freedom of expression with a
metaphor. He said it is your right to stretch your arms in space as far as you
wish so long as you do not hit (hurt) someone else.
On the whole, our interviewees acknowledges that individuals (including
politicians) must be protected against unfair charges, that ethics (even laws)
must control excesses of the media. However, they affirmed that freedom of
expression is fundamental to freedom and any undue curbing of it is tantamount
to tyranny. They added that risk be taken to promoting freedom of expression
instead of risking the dictatorial gag and self-censorship of the past.
Discussing the difference between formal and informal media had shown that
formal media (as in newspapers, radio, and TV) is of limited scope in influence
and clientele. Firstly, the formal media is concentrated in urban centers.
Secondly, the majority of the population is illiterate. Newspapers are not their
source of information and opinion. Thirdly, given the high unemployment in the
country, a minority of the literate or urbanized can afford the daily cost of
newspapers and the monthly fees for TV service. Radio which is least costly of
all is not yet privatized (unlike the other media). It is controlled by the
government – a throwback to the dictatorial era when operating radio station was
the exclusive right of the government.
In contrast, informal media which all-pervasive in Somaliland is deeply
ingrained in the culture and it costs nothing. For this reason, it is available
to rich and poor, young and old, powerful and powerless. In fact, the informal
media always operates in the marketplace, buses, teashops, and mefreshes (venues
for chewing qat). The Somali penchant for news and quick transmission had been
commented by outsiders and affirmed by participants in the fieldwork. For this
reason, government has difficulty controlling freedom of expression or hiding
secrets.
Three problems of the informal media in Somali society were in particular
mentioned. Firstly, the actual author of the pervasive informal news is often
anonymous or lost in the process of retelling. Secondly, it operates without
written record and without institutional memory. Thirdly, it tends to
sensational and based on rumor. Although the participants in the fieldwork
affirmed that informal media plays a critical role in information exchange,
entertainment, and social relations, they gave priority in advancing the formal
media.
6.3.3 Challenges of Independent Media
The Editor of Jamhuuriya, Hassan Sa’iid, best summarized the history and
challenges of the formal media. The formal media started in 1991, following the
collapse of the formal media. It began with the publication of Codka Hargeisa,
followed Xuriya and Jamhuuriya. Soon, the number of newspapers rose, reaching a
total of eight. All of them were rudimentary newsletters, using stencils. The
editors and writers were also beginners, although there were a few of among the
pioneers who were professional journalists.
The pioneering journalists of that era faced a number of problems besides
deficiency in equipment and experience. Among them was the volatile state of
affairs in 1991 when everyone was armed and government was nascent, thus weak. A
journalist run the risk of being shot by someone who did not like what he
reported. Hassan gave examples of politicians he interviewed on tape only to be
hounded by his supporters who did not like what they read in the newspaper.
Instead of discussing the matter with the politician, the reporter became their
scapegoat.34
The internecine war of 1994-96 interrupted the development of newspapers. It
was a highly difficult period for all, including journalists. Reporting news of
the armed conflict was also dangerous because the veracity of news was contested
and people were extremely emotional. Small newspapers continued to report, but
the major ones temporarily ceased work. They resumed work after 1997, following
the cessation of hostilities and re-election of President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal.
The newspapers found new impetus when Mohamoud Abdi Shidde, the owner of
Jamhuuriya, brought the first offset printing machine to Hargiesa. The
government later brought offset machines, as did other private companies. These
new printing machines did not only improve the quality of the papers on which
news reported but also they helped improved the quality of the reporters as well
as the standard they measured quality. The knowledge, interest, and expectation
of the public also rose. No longer were they content with shoddy work or
rudimentary journalism.
34 In one instance, Hassan had to escape through the window of his house when
some supporters of a politician came to shoot him with a pistol because he wrote
what their leader said on tape. In another, the head of the newly formed armed
forces ordered in 1992 the imprisonment of all the active journalists in town
(eleven of them), the invasion of their offices, and the confiscation of their
equipment.
But the right of free expression continued to be under attack by government
officials. President was in fact liberal toward the media. He believed in the
importance and role of free press. In 1993, after his election, Egal invited
journalists and made clear his view on the role media in society. He described
the history of the media in other countries and when he was a Prime Minister. To
make known his passion for free expression, he stated that the media has to
report on his behavior even when he entered the bathroom. He added that he would
leave what journalists report to their ethics and conscience.
However, Egal’s liberal views on freedom of expression were often compromised
by his ministers and other representatives who remain stuck in the anti-press
hysteria of the dictatorial era. They often came to him with alarm on reports
they read in a newspaper, exaggerating their content or attributing malicious
content to them. In many instance, they imprisoned journalists without informing
him in advance. In other instances, they won him over to their anti-media
impulse.
The reaction of these officials frequently reached absurd levels. For
instance, they expected journalist to seek approval on the sectors for which
their ministry was supposed responsible. They assumed that these sectors (e.g.
agriculture, foreign affairs, or commerce) were their domain, their fiefdoms,
and any report on them without prior approval was illegal. As a result,
journalists were imprisoned capriciously and without due process of law. Hassan
Sa’iid has the highest and unenviable record of being so imprisoned for fourteen
times since 1992. This means that he was on the average imprisoned at least once
a year since 1992. Only two of these arrests brought charges in court. Neither
court trials found him guilty.
Egal’s views on the media and freedom of expression took a drastic turn for
the worse in 1998 when Egal and his erstwhile ally, Mohamoud Abdi Shidde, the
owner of Jamhuuriya, had a fall out. The latter used the media for his personal
war; Egal turned bitter and suspicious against the media. In one instance,
Mohamoud, a short and frail man, but with iron-will and exceptional stamina, was
physically assaulted in front of the court by several men allegedly sent by
Egal. The rumor that Egal was behind the assault was given credence when the
police quickly and without charge released the attackers.
The physical assault on Mohamoud was preceded by other economic and political
reprisals. For instance, Mohamoud’s printing company used a space owned by the
government. Using the Minister of Public Works, Egal evicted Shidde’s company.
No prior notice was given to him. The Chairman of the Supreme Court, Hashi
Sheikh Muse, intervened. He asked Egal that Mohamoud be given sufficient time
(say three months) to take apart his equipment and find an alternate space. Egal
refused and allegedly insulted the Chairman of the Supreme Court. Hashi
immediately resigned and left Somaliland for Britain soon after.35
The war between the two men continued until the untimely death of Mohamoud.
Still, Egal continued his antagonism or at least suspicion of the media. His
cronies exploited his antagonism to the limit. For instance, Hassan was
imprisoned when his paper reported on Rift Valley Disease which afflicted
livestock in the region and eventually led to the export ban of Somali
livestock. Hassan was accused of fabricated the news, although the BBC and
others reported on this diseases days earlier.
Following the death of President Egal, the official suspicion of the media
continues. It is as if the era of dictatorial antagonism toward freedom of
expression remain a fixture in the subconscious mind of officials, even though
they consciously seek (or claim) to promote freedom of expression. Most
remarkable of all, a civilian views toward free expression changes drastically
and turns antagonistic. Fired from government job, the same man becomes a
champion of free speech. It seems that some thing in government and power in
general, at least in the Somali case, lures officials toward a society when
citizens are gagged or without voice. But the Somali cultural penchant for free
speech and the human quest for freedom stand on the way to that wish.
6.3.4 Civil Society and Government
There are different definitions of civil society. The definition presented by
the late Dr. Ahmed Farah will suffice for our purpose. He defined civil society
as “volitional, organized, and collective participation in the public space
between individuals and the state.”36 We agree with the authors of Mapping
Somali Civil Society that civil society in the Somali context must defined
broadly to include:
- Community-based organizations of which traditional elders, religious
leaders, and other community groups organized for a social purpose are examples;
- Local non-governmental organizations which in Somaliland are registered to
achieve stated nonprofit- oriented service for the community; - Professional
association comprising journalists, doctors, lawyers, teachers, and the like. In
Somaliland, these organizations operate under different legal requirements and
registration. Local NGO’s are registered and monitored by the Ministry of
Planning and Coordination. The Professional associations are registered and
monitored by the Office of the Attorney General. Some CBOs are registered with
the Ministry of Planning and Coordination if they are in urban centers,
particularly Hargeisa, but most are not registered at all.
The relationship between the citizen and the state has been a fundamental
topic discussed in the literature and different countries. The Somali case
presents in sharp relief the contradictory and converging interest of the
citizen and the state. This is because the state was in the very beginning
colonial, succeeded by an independent, fledgling government that started with
failed democratic experiment, replaced by a military regime affirming its
socialist and revolutionary credentials only to turn tyrannical and regressive.
Each of these stages in Somali history had viewed and treated the citizens
differently.
The colonial rule was above all motivated by pursuit of material gain and
geo-political dominance. The Somali, a defeated subject of an occupying superior
power, had no status of citizen. In addition, the colonial structured
centralized power, replacing the egalitarian politics of pre-colonial society.
Consent and consultation of the Somali were superfluous.
After 1960, the Somali emerged as a citizen whose rights and privileges were
written in the constitution but these rights and privileges barely existed in
practice. The military regime took power by force, as did the colonial power,
and it raised notches up in the rhetoric of revolution and progress. By 1978,
the state became the most formidable and cruel adversary the Somali ever faced.
After 1991, civil society emerged in Somaliland to fill the vacuum left by
the state it helped bring down by providing the wiil (figher) and wan (food) to
the Somali National Movement which took arms against it. Without the young
fighter and food civil society provided, with significant contribution from
rural communities and the Diaspora, the SNM would not have gone far in its armed
rebellion. Civil society also cared for the wounded, the sick, the homeless, and
generally the needy in society. After the collapse of the regime, it played a
critical role in mending the peace and serve as midwife to the birth of a new
government.
Several basic misconceptions need to be clear here. The name civil society
may be new and this notion, in the form discussed in the literature, may have
western roots. In reality, civil society in Somaliland did not begin after 1991,
following the collapse of the state, nor did it have western roots. The
organization and function of civil society predated colonialism. In fact, civil
society operated best in traditional society in the absence of a state usurping
and centralizing power. Through colonial rule and independence, civil society
operated to provide social, religious, and health services to the community. Its
contributions diminished as the state usurped and centralized these services.
When the state collapsed, civil society once again resumed its essential work
for the community. It also brought into existence a new government where none
existed. The story of how the first government was formed in Bur’o in 1991 and
again re-invented in Borama in 1993 is in fact the story of civil society doing
its traditional work, although not registered in a Ministry of Planning, Office
of Attorney General, or international agencies – all of which did not exist or
operate in Somalialnd.
6.3.5 Contribution of the Guurti to Peace and Security
The best example of civil society at work prior to and after 1991 is the
Guurti (traditional elders). It also shows the contradictions emerging when
civil society is inducted into membership of the government it created. The
Guurti started in the pitch of SNM war against the regime of Mohamed Siyaad
Barre. Its primary role was to recruit fighters and material assistance for the
war effort. It was in fact a creation of the SNM and its supporters. After 1991,
when the new Government of Abdirahman Ahmed Ali (Tuur) became embroiled in clan
wars, the Guurti expanded its membership to include non- Isaaq members and
played a critical role in mediating the conflicts which emerged in succession.
In 1993, it persuaded Abdirahman Tuur to reluctantly accept the holding of
Borama Conference at the end of his term. He did not want such a conference to
be held because he knew that he could lose his presidency and power as a result.
The Guurti’s ostensible mission was clan reconciliation, but its coded and
underlying aim was aya-ka-talin (self-determination) which meant restructuring
of leadership and the state. Tuur heard the ostensible goal, but not the second.
Thus, he left the conference angry to when Egal was selected as the new
President.
The Guurti were not the western-educated elite who had learned theories from
books. They were mostly traditional elders carrying out their traditional duties
of mediating conflict and in the 1980s organizing people for war and peace. The
SNM’s failure to exploit their victory for the betterment of society had placed
the Guurti in the limelight. Instead of the Guurti being used by the SNM and
politicians as in the past, they used these groups to their mission of
aya-ka-talin. As a result, even the critics of the Guurti acknowledge it helped
Somaliland to come through the difficult period, from 1991-93, when anarchy and
violence threatened to sweep away Somaliland.
The Guurti also demonstrates how civil society, once co-opted into the
government it created, becomes its junior partner, its agent, even its
appendage. This is not unique to the Guurti. Every decent and socially committed
member of the civil society or politician becomes compromised or otherwise
derailed from the commitment to equity and service once he enters government. We
have seen too often a person doing stellar work as a civil society actor only to
abandon the original commitment to equity and justice once he assumes power as
an agent of the state. The meeting of journalists with Mohamed Ibrahim Egal in
his first days as President, affirming his commitment to freedom of expression,
inviting them to report even on his behavior in the bathroom, stands in stark
contrast to his later days of guarded approach to journalist and even outright
abuse.
The participants stressed that government officials have incurable suspicion,
in some instance of visceral hatred, of civil society. They forget that
government is to serve the people, not the reverse. Given power or role in
government, the person who not long ago spoke about equity and justice, extended
hand to the poor and powerless, suddenly takes on airs, looks down on civilians,
and defends all policies and practices of the state. The participants in the
fieldwork gave numerous instances of politicians and civil society members who,
known for their vocal criticism of government policies and practice, turn into
the most irrational defenders of the same policies and practices once they
become government officials. Ironically, the same person taken on remarkable
modesty and social concern once ejected from government and returns to the fold
of civil society.
Is it because government, as Somalis know it, has shady past and role in
society, that therefore it inevitably deforms conscience and erodes decency, or
because power by its nature is corrupting? This question remains to be answered
by Somalis before they can fashion solutions suitable to their society.
Participants in the fieldwork discussed in depth the history and role of civil
society but they did not provide a convincing answer to that question.
On its part, civil society knows that governments can come and go but civil
society will remain even in time of state collapse and anarchy. This knowledge
predisposes it to some arrogance and holier-thanthou attitude. Secondly, civil
society is envious of the power, influence, and resources of the government they
had brought into existence. They act like a parent whose child has outdone in
securing the limelight and honored place in society. Thirdly, civil society is
often harsh on government and government officials. It judges government and its
officials on high standards of ethics, integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness
which civil society itself is unable to meet.
A great deal would indeed be achieved if both government and civil society
come down from the high pedestal and work as partners. Contradictions and
tension will no doubt exist in their relationship, but these need not be
antagonistic or negative. Government can not exist without civil society. Civil
society too, dispersed and uncoordinated, can not achieve the level of
organization, power, and influence inherent in government. The more they work
together collaborative, listening and correcting one another, the more society
benefits.
6.3.6 Emergence of Local NGOs
Local non-governmental organizations, in the form and organization we find
them today, in Somaliland are of recent origin. They have proliferated after
1991, mostly as one-person organization with folded files under the arm and a
mobile office in his/her person. It is not only the major demand of services
that attracted NGOs, at least by name, to proliferate. Lack of employment in
government and private sector had also prompted many to make a living from work
as NGO.
In recent years, the members and work of local NGO’s elaborated in
organization sophistication, skill, and product. There are today surfeit of
local NGO throughout Somalialnd. There are also several umbrella organizations
subsuming them. There is, for instance, NAGAAD which serves as an umbrella for
over 26 organizations, mostly female-governed and run. There is also COSONG,
another umbrella organization; HAVOYOKO, a nation-wide youth organization;
Candlelight, an enterprising pioneer in several enterprises; CCS which assists
the poor through micro-lending; and the Somaliland Civic Forum for Peace,
another umbrella organization bringing together local NGOs and professional
associations like the Journalist Association and the Lawyers Association.
It is not only civil society organizations that grew in number and
sophistication. The government too has found and honed leverages of control on
NGOs. It continues its suspicion of them, yet realizes that it can not wish them
away. The official resentment to NGOs has three chief sources. Firstly,
government officials maintain the same suspicion and antipathy they show to all
branches of civil society. Secondly, officials and ministries think that NGO’s
invade their turf. They fear that NGOs may make their role superfluous and force
them back to the civil society from which they rose to heights of power and
influence. Thirdly, competition for funds from external sources and the
desperate of resources pits officials against NGOs.
One problem of NGO’s is their divided loyalty to their local clients or
nation and to their external funding source. Another is that the power of purse
often overcomes the power of social commitment. Complicating matters is that the
immediate founding sources, often with a regional office in Nairobi, is caught
in a maze of organizational and financial arrangement creating a large chasm
between their declared mission and their practice. Many otherwise decent
individuals, with known commitment to do good, transform in due course to
colonial officers and shift from humanitarian to self-serving tactics and
projects.
As a result, the local NGO’s are confused by their double loyalty and
complicated financial bind to external funding source. The tragedy is that these
local NGOs work in society that can not fund their work and the NGOs have yet to
find creative ways of sustaining their work independently of external funding.
The double loyalty at times brings the local NGOs in conflict with the
government because, for instance, the government finds offense with an external
funding source or its agent. The local NGO takes the matter personally because a
source of it livelihood is endangered or its work is interrupted. It is then
that the NGO acts like the opposition political party and takes on the
government. Such criticism and confrontation could enlarge to wider conflict in
society.
On the other hand, government officials are unduly touchy and suspicious of
local NGOs. Firstly, they think that the NGOs have usurped their right as
interlocutor between society and the international community. Secondly, they
believe that they serve as agents of the international community, providing
information deemed secret. Thirdly, they are uncomfortable to find locals who
can earn more salary than ministers. Fourthly, they readily consider the local
NGOs as an extension of the opposition, their logic being: ‘If you are not with
me, you’re against me.”37
6.3.7 Civil Society and Political Parties
Strictly speaking, political parties are not considered part of civil society
because their exclusive focus is attaining and keeping power. They are either an
ally or opponent of the government. If ally, they serve as an extension of the
government. If opponent, they want to replace it. Often, the latter intensify
the differences between them and the incumbent officials whom they identify as
their adversaries. In some instance, they provoke conflict, even armed conflict,
to inherit the seat and power of their adversaries. Civil society works of
peace, mediation, and forsakes pursuit of power, at least directly and in
self-serving ways.
On the hand, civil society and political parties are not unrelated. Both
state their mission their mission of making difference for the public. Often,
the two work jointly for change when the incumbent government becomes
tyrannical, corrupt, or insuperable. One also finds that a member of civil
society today becomes a party activist in time of elections, or the latter
reverts to civil society to pursue his/her social commitment. This link between
civil society and political parties tends to intensify the suspicion of
government toward both. Hence, it wishes both civil society and political
parties to cease or at least to be silenced – a wish that will remain
frustrated.
6.3.8 Small Arms and Security
The largest small arms survey conducted in Somaliland involved a sample of
710 males in four of the six regions.38 The study showed that small arms are
pervasive in Somaliland, that ex-combatants as well as civilians own them, and
that the small arms market is active. In addition, the study had shown that
business own the largest number of small arms, that regions vary on the age they
think should carry arms, and that the reason for owning arms range from
self-protection, protecting property, and “just in case” society returns to the
anarchy and violence of the past.
In reality, a person who can afford less than $100 can obtain small arms.
Nonetheless, demobilization has been quite effective in Somaliland, although
disarmament of civilians has yet to take place. Most of those interviewed
explained that they would disarm if the government can guarantee security. A
smaller percent were willing to turn in their guns in return for cash.
One of the key conclusions of the study is that firstly a population so armed
yet so peaceful is remarkable, secondly that peace could unravel quickly if the
government fails to meet minimum expectation of equity and justice, or if the
economic distress and despair are not alleviated.
6.3 POTENTIAL ESCALATORS OF CONFLICT
Concerning human rights and the media:
- Limited training and equipment of journalist; - Limited income of
journalists and tendency to sell news and loyalty to those who can pay; -
Unreliability and rumors of informal media; - Denying or diminishing freedom
of expression causes pent anger and conflict; - Denying or diminishing
freedom of expression encourages rumor and misinformation; - Denying or
diminishing freedom of expression goes against the cultural grain of Somalis;
such action invites revolt; - Denying or diminishing freedom of expression
and human rights perpetuates the terrible past of dictatorship and armed
conflict; - Pervasive small arms and active arms market. - Denying or
diminishing freedom of expression and human rights alienates the government from
the people; - Denying or diminishing freedom of expression and human rights
fosters authority without accountability and transparency.
Concerning civil society

- Civil society is by its nature activist even if its declared mission is
not advocacy. This often creates tension between it and government, contributing
to flare up conflict. - Work of civil society, even the pursuit of peace,
brings it in conflict with government which by its nature is suspicious and
monopolistic. - Government officials think that power confers on them a
right to treat civil society and citizens in general as servants of the
government, not the reverse. - Civil society takes a holier-than-thou
attitude with respect to ethics, integrity, efficiency, or effectiveness of
government; the government resists and resents this, sometimes showing off
authority and force, contributing to building up of anger. - Competition for
scarce resources and for external funding creates tension and conflict between
government and civil society. - Local NGOs are rendered suspect by their
close association with external funding sources and by the relatively high
salaries they draw; this suspicion can degenerate into a conflict.
6.4 POTENTIAL DE-ESCALATORS OF CONFLICT
Concerning human rights and the media
- Somalis by culture and tradition tolerate freedom of expression; - The
individuals is part of a community, a clan, a collective which affords him
protection; - Except with archaic traditions like FGM, one still finds
residues of Somali culture’s respect for some basic human rights. -
Establishment of journalist association have developed rules and ethics for
their members which will reduce conflict with officials; - Development of
local human rights organizations (so far totally 63 in different parts of the
country will make human rights violations known and curbed. Concerning civil
society - Civil society in general is committed to peace and mediation of
conflict, as best illustrated by the role of the Guurti. - Civil society in
its best form abjures political power and profit, realizing that it is neither a
political party nor a private business enterprise. - Government can not do
without the role and contributions of civil society; all goes well when it
accommodates and consults civil society.
6.5 SUMMARY
Human rights have been violated since colonial rule. Independence brought
some advance but soon the military regime dashed hopes. In a series of decrees
it place strict controls of basic freedoms which continued until its collapse.
Somaliland has made significant progress in human rights and freedom of
expression but much remain to be done on this score. The tension between civil
society and the government are inevitable but it requires wise leaders on both
sides to manage (use) the tension constructively.
Official resistance to freedom of expression and human rights will be
challenged more in coming years for two reasons. Firstly, women are becoming
vocal in removing the cultural and political fetters that limited their full
participation in society with rights equal to those of men. Secondly, the
emerging political parties will increasingly challenge officialdom and exercise
their right of free speech and association. These challenges by women and
political parties may either break the peace by provoking conflict or
consolidate it by advancing human rights and democracy. The pervasiveness of
small arms should give reason for caution on all sides concerned.
The role of civil society is less noticeable when government is strong and
effective. Its contributions come in sharp relief when government collapses,
leaving a vacuum of power and central authority, as in 1991 Somaliland, or when
government is weak and ineffective, resulting in diminution of social services.
The government must create alliance with civil service because it can not
provide all the services the public expect. On the hand, civil society must
endeavor to nurture collaborative relationship with government because it cannot
do with the centralized and organized authority inherent in government. Only
with collaboration and mutual accommodation can both best serve their people.
The most worrisome is the behavior of Guddiga Nabad-gelyada (Security
Committee) involving the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Justice, the
Commander of the Armed Forces, the Commander of the Police, the Commander of the
Prisons, the Governor of Northwest, and the Mayor of Hargeisa. Its exercise of
power exceeds the constitution. It has power of detention and, as became clear
on May 18, 2004, power of sentencing to citizens to prison without due process
of law. At least about 150 youth who demonstrated on that day were beaten and
sentence to imprisonment at Mandheera Prison for six months or one year.
This action of the so-called Security Committee had sent shock waves
throughout Somaliland. Many remembered the arbitrary arrests, the beatings, and
stiff sentences imposed without due process of law. One former SNM combatant and
a former military colonel said he was among many parents who almost took up arms
against a government that seems to become tyrannical as the fallen regime. Such
committees provoke armed conflict instead of preventing them.
Many of our participants argued that a lean and clean government is the
solution. But how that could come about is not fully spelled out. In fact, the
complaint of inequity is often what one wishes to gain personally or for his
group than a genuine commitment to change the system. In addition, they would
not mind a bloated and corrupt system so long as they are among its
beneficiaries. The ruling politicians on their part remain addicted to extending
favors in cash or kind to stay in power. Thus, neither the rulers nor the ruled
have found a way of getting out of the vicious cycle of inequity, corruption,
and despair. Neither demands of the other what would bring about fundamental
change in the system.
Lastly, despite these complaints of inequity, the participants in the study
were steadfast in their commitment to Somaliland’s reclamation of independence.
None stated a desire to return to the failed union with Somalia because, they
affirmed, the inequities prior to 1991 were far worse than those of today. At
least today, the state assaults neither their property nor their person
Chapter 7: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PERFORMANCE
7.1 WHY WE SELECTED THIS ISSUE?
We selected this focus issue because economic conditions determines much of
life in Somaliland and changes in this domain set in motion changes in other
domains of life. We therefore wanted to highlight the economic history of
Somaliland and current economic challenges of Somaliland.
7.2 BACKGROUND
During the union from 1960-91, Somaliland’s economy was linked directly to
that of Somalia. Since the coup of 1969, the military regime rigidly controlled
the economy to match its socialist rhetoric. Between 1970 and 1972, the SRC
issued a series of decrees nationalizing burgeoning industries, wholesale
companies, banks, and insurance companies. Farmers could not sell their produce
in the market. They sold it to a government agency at arbitrary prices. Hence,
agricultural produce declined and the country became ever more dependent on food
imports and food aid.
The 1977-978 War aggravate the economy. In addition to droughts in 1979-80,
the war brought over 500,000 Ethiopian refugees into Somaliland. The large flow
of refugees was a burden not only on the economy but also in the carrying
capacity of the land and their civilian hosts. The original settlers found that
the regime provided aid in food and health services from the government and
international agencies. Many of them sought food and medical aid refugee camps
and clinics as food became scarce and conditions in hospital degenerated. But
resentment grew to anger and hostility when the original settlers of the land
learned that the refugees were given arms to serve as foot-soldiers of the
regime and to persecute the Isaaq.
In addition, the franco valuta system on which Isaaq businessmen thrived was
abolished, then partially restored in 1984. The import and sale of qat was
banned, although qat smuggling continued. These two decisions further alienated
the Isaaq and intensified the resentment provoked by the burden of Ethiopian
refugees and their service as foot-soldiers of the regime.
During the 1980s, the regime received a steady flow of foreign aid from the
West, after it broke relations with the former USSR in 1978.40 Yet this level of
assistance could not keep afloat the regime racked by war with insurgents,
corruption, and mismanagement. The GDP increasing fell, external debt soared,
and, by May 1988 when the heavy bombardment of Hargiesa began, the aid on which
the regime depended tapered off.
The war against the regime of Mohamed Siyaad Barre from 1981-90 had caused
immense destruction of the economy and social life. The basic economic structure
and social services of Somaliland were destroyed. The collapse of the state
entailed also the collapse of centrally planned and control economy. In
consequence, new opportunities arose for the emergence of deregulated, free
market economy.
President Egal’s laissez faire policy had also encouraged businesses to
thrive, sometimes by illegal means. The collapse of the regime brought was
followed by two years (1991-93) of anarchy which had adverse impact on livestock
export, trade, and agriculture in Somaliland. After peace was restored from 1993
onward, three problems in particular slowed the rebuilding of the economy.
Firstly, the majority of Somalilanders who fled to Ethiopia from the persecution
of the regime returned without capital to rebuild their businesses, homes, and
lives. Secondly, the country’s infrastructure was severely destroyed.
Thirdly, many who had proven entrepreneurial or management skills had fled
abroad. Lastly, though peace was on the mend after 1993, the conditions for
security did not take root in a society at war for more than ten years.
7.3 CURRENT CONDITIONS
The collapse of the military regime in January 1991 open the way for return
from refugee camps in Ethiopia to cities, small towns, and villages the Isaaq
most of whom had fled persecution and indiscriminate killing. This population
returned to their ruined homes and communities with the barest of possessions or
empty-handed. The Gadabursi, ‘Iise, Dhulbahante, Warsangeli, Gabooye, and others
have also suffered before and after collapse of the regime. Many were internally
displaced or they fled to refugee camps. Thus, one way or another, each clan and
community faced daunting challenge in rebuilding from the ruins.
The Isaaq had a history of entrepreneurial skill and initiative. The military
regime and its centrally planned economy had frustrated this skill and
initiative. Further, with emergence of the SNM, the regime targeted the Isaaq
for discrimination in business and government jobs. In addition, it sought to
dispossess them of their property and land, as illustrated by the secret “Letter
of Death” written by the son-in-law of Mohamed Siyaad Barre who, as the ruling
military general of Somaliland, targeted the Isaaq for focused persecution and
confiscation of their property.
The SNM fighters and Isaaq refugees returning from Ethiopia had come in rags
but with determination to rebuild their homes, cities, and lives with the
entrepreneurial skills and initiative for which they were historically known.
But the process of rebuilding the economy could not find a miracle or a power
foreign power offering assistance like the Marshall plan. It had to start from
ground zero with human resources and initiative of the people. Their non-Isaaq
compatriots followed suit (except in parts of Sool which, as we shall discuss in
the next chapter, continued to riven by internal feud and indecision.) In
addition, they made historic contributions in mending the peace and promoting
reconciliation in Somaliland.
The story of how Somalilanders mended the peace and rebuilt their country
illustrates people’s will to survive against the odds. Here, we shall only
sketch what we learned from our participants in the fieldwork and available
documents. We will also highlight the problems and challenges Somalilanders
currently face with regard to the economy and natural resources.
To obtain information on this focus issue, the team interviewed key
informants in business, government, and local representatives of international
agencies assisting Somaliland. Focus group discussions also generated some
useful information. In addition, the team examined relevant documents on
household surveys and strategic recovery plans presented by the Ministry of
Planning and Coordination. Where possible, we also interviewed petty traders
(like charcoal dealers) and the unemployed. Report on what we learned from the
fieldwork and materials available on the economy and the environment would take
us far beyond the intent of this exercise. Therefore, we will sketch below a few
key points on the economy and the environment.
7.3.1 Rebuilding the Economy
Rebuilding the peace went hand in hand with rebuilding the economy. As
mentioned above, the majority of Somalilanders, most of them refugees or
displaced persons during the war, had little capital to work with. The refugees
returned empty handed; the pastoralist lost much of their livestock in the war;
few of the agro-pastoralists could till their land.
There were some missed opportunities arising from the lack of SNM program to
rebuild the peace and the economy after the collapse of the military regime. For
instance, the cement factory in the outskirt of Hargiesa was intact and
functional when the SNM took control of the territory. However, the factory was
looted, components taken by pieces, and sold abroad. Twelve years later,
Somaliland continues to import huge quantities of cement from the gulf countries
to supply the booming construction industry. Similarly, government offices were
looted and valuable documents (including liens, school records, and historic
documents) were destroyed (some used in restaurants as napkin). At least,
disputes on land which today inundate the judiciary system and contribute to
conflict in society could have been averted if government institutions and the
official documents were preserved.
After the Borama Conference of 1993, security improved in most parts of the
country. People gradually gained confidence that they could rebuild their homes,
lives, and businesses without the looting and pillage they knew in the past.
Subsequently, the cities grew in population and physical size. Large villas and
five-story buildings never seen before in the history of Somaliland are emerging
in cities like Hargeisa and Bur’o. The country now boasts of at least four
private telecommunication companies providing mobile and landline services at a
highly competitive price. Car imports increase in phenomenal rate, causing
congestion and accidents never observed before.
The primary source of capital with which Somalilanders rebuilt businesses and
the economy was remittance sent by relatives living abroad. Food aid from
international relief agencies had helped in the war years and in the
transitional period from 1991-6. In this section, we highlight the key
contributors to rebuilding of Somaliland economy and the problems that today
undermine the growth of the economy.
7.3.2 Trade and the Private Sector
The overthrow of the Barre regime has led to the ending of two decades of
state controlled economy and to the beginning of deregulated one. The return of
peace in Somaliland and dissolution of state monopolies and repressive economic
control allowed normal patterns of trade and other economic activity to resume.
The resumption of livestock export to Saudi Arabia together with the private
sector expansion, has considerably contributed to the growth of Somaliland’s
economy in aftermath the war.
Much of Somaliland’s post-war economic growth has been attributed, directly
or indirectly, to livestock export. Livestock production has been the main
source of income for nomadic households, and government revenue and employment
for urban dwellers. Between 1991 and 1997, livestock export on the hoof grew
considerably, exceeding pre-war level when Somaliland export about three million
heads of livestock in 1997, mostly to Saudi Arabia (UNDP, 1998). The value of
livestock exports in 1997 was estimated to be US$ 176.6 million (Ministry of
Planning 1998-99), yielding as much as 80% of the total hard currency income for
Somaliland (UNDP, 1998).
Between 1993 and 1998, the volume of trade in Somaliland increased
dramatically, surpassing prewar levels. This increase has been based on the
growth in livestock exports and the opening of Ethiopia-Somaliland border, which
has created a vast new market for Somaliland. Through the years of 1996-1999
some 65% of the trade through Berbera port was reportedly destined for Ethiopia
(Bradbury 1997; UNDP & UNHCR, 1999)41. In the absence of formal economic
institutions and regulations, traders respond flexibly to local demand,
importing a range of basic goods, including food (sugar, rice, flour, pasta),
building materials, bagaash (bundles of consumer goods such as sandals,
cigarettes, clothes), spare parts, fuel, tyres, and electronic items and
vehicles (UNDP, 1998). Somaliland’s service sector has experienced rapid growth
in the post-war period. The construction sector has been swelled by the massive
need for rebuilding and repair of dwellings.
Telecommunication, airlines business and financial transfer companies have
emerged to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the former government. And
small enterprises like bakeries, laundries, office supplies, and convenience
stores are also emerging again. The expansion of these services has created a
new labour market42 requiring skilled professionals, as well as semi-skilled and
unskilled workers.
All these activities are taking place in an adverse economic environment. The
little infrastructure Somaliland possesses is in a state of disrepair and is
deteriorating year after year. The growth of the private sector has been
constrained by the absence of commercial banks, insurances and credit
institutions. The organisations that normally support this sector (World Bank,
International Monetary Fund) are not present in Somaliland and will not provide
financial services in the absence of a recognized government.
7.3.3 The Livestock Trade
The collapse of the Somali government ended state monopoly on resources and
employment opportunities. Thus, from 1991 onwards, the private sector
flourished, although corruption in government continued. Before the ban imposed
by Saudi Arabia on livestock imports, livestock exports constituted the primary
stimulus and backbone of Somaliland economy. The booming business in
construction, the emergence of telecommunication companies, the vigorous trade
on imports mainly from Dubai – these and other aspects of the Somaliland economy
rested chiefly on the livestock trade and remittances from abroad.
Livestock trade contributes 60-65% of the economy.43 Also about 60% of
Somaliland population depends for daily sustenance mainly on the products and
by-products of livestock. Until the Saudi Ban, livestock export has been the
primary source of income for both urban and rural communities on exports. In
discussion with key informants in the livestock trade, we found a string of at
least 30 beneficiaries stretching from the rural areas (in Somaliland and across
the border) to the port of Berbera. In addition, the government benefited from
the livestock export in three ways – firstly, it obtained taxes and gifts for
each animal exported; secondly, the major livestock exporters feed a standing
army, mostly demobilized clan militia; thirdly, the government generated tax
revenues from other businesses stimulated by the livestock trade.
In February 1998, Saudi Arabia imposed a ban on the import of livestock from
Somaliland because of alleged outbreak of Rift Valley Fever (RVF) disease. This
ban lasted until May 1999. Many traders circumvented this ban by exporting
livestock to Yemen where traders there re-exported the livestock to Saudi
Arabia. Hence, the impact of this ban was limited, although Somali traders found
their income reduced or in some instance lost because of unfair dealings with
Yemeni traders who maximally exploited their desperation.
The ban on imports was imposed again in September 2000. This time, the ban
was not confined to Saudi Arabia. It included 8 other countries in the Arabian
Peninsula. Hence, the effect was most devastating for Somaliland and other areas
across the border. It forced many livestock exporters to bankruptcy.
Pastoralists turned destitute. Severe drought in much of the country during the
past four years, have also destroyed their livestock. Fleeing to the cities,
they now add to the ranks of the unemployed and homeless. Even the major traders
who readily fed the armed forces, the police, and prison workers have ceased the
food they supplied in return for tax exemption or as loans to the government,
putting in additional financial strain.
The following changes have taken place since the livestock ban of 1998:44
- Shirnkage of the Hargeisa livestock market, particularly for shoats; -
Shortened marketing chain of shoats, thus reducing the number of middlemen and
their incomes; - Displacement of the previously prominent large export
dealers by dozens of junior sheep and goat export dealers capable of dispatching
shipments of 2,000 – 2,500 head each during the peack export periods; -
Monopoly of camel export sub-sectors by one or two Egyptian/Sudanese nationals;
- Drastic fall of the number of middle level brokers: approximately 4 out of
every 100 have deserted the marketplace; - The number of brokers and
assistant brokers has remained more or less the same but they have seen a
reduction in their income levels; - Finally, the number of people dependent
on the live animals market in Hargeis remains only about 50-60% of the estimated
figure during 1998 (approximately 2,255 versus an estimated 2-5,000 in 1998).
What is true for Hargeisa is more so for Bur’o, the most important livestock
market in Somaliland and Somalia. In short, the livestock ban has slowed
economic growth. The ban affected all sectors of society, both urban and rural,
and all economic activities. Herders, service providers, petty traders, and the
local and central government all lost income. The availability of hard currency
and food imports declined. There was a drop in employment opportunities for poor
urban and rural groups and a devaluation of the Somaliland Shilling against the
US dollar.
The public believe that economic growth is crucial for maintaining the
prevailing peace in the country. The current economic trends will continue
unless the ban is lifted and help if offered from outside. To them, remittances
and Somali Landers’ kinship system are largely averting an economic disaster.
7.3.4 Agriculture
The backbone of the Somaliland economy has been livestock. However, there are
agro-pastoral communities that contribute significantly, although estimates are
that about 3% of the total area of Somaliland is under cultivation and only
about 7% has potential for future agricultural development.45
Farmers in Somaliland use rain-fed farming and irrigation. Most farms are
situated along the bank of rivers (tog) or other water sources close to the
riverbanks. Equipment and know-how is rudimentary but these farms cereals,
sorghum, maize, cowpeas, millet, groundnuts, beans, barley, vegetable, and
fruits.
The succession of wars had destroyed the farms and other assets of
agricultural communities. Many had fled to refugee camps during the war and
returned destitute. In some instance, their farms were burned down or trees
uprooted by the armed forces of the regime as reprisal or while they retreated
after the collapse of the regime. The droughts of recent years have also reduced
the yield of farmers and increased the lure for the city, already overcrowded
and zones of distress.
7.3.5 Fishing
The Somaliland coastline covers 850 kms, extending from Loya-addo in the west
to Elayo in the east. It is characterized by sandy beaches interspersed by rocky
cliffs. The continental shelf is relatively narrow, mostly 15 km, except near
the Djibouti border where it averages 100 kms.
Using rudimentary tools and small boats, fisherman catch and sell a variety
of fish including tuna, snappers, groupers, grunts, trevally, emperors,
barracudas, goat fish, parrot fish, Spanish mackerels, horse mackerels, sea
breams, and mullets. However, catching sharks is favored by fisherman because
export of shark fins brings more income. 46
A number of studies have suggested that fisheries in Somaliland are an
untapped source of food and income. For instance, FAO estimated over 200,000
tones in the national waters and that 40,000 tons a year could be harvested
without endangering the stocks. However, the ranged of fish production at the
present is only from 1,000 to 1,500 a year.
Only one fish cannery exists in Somaliland. Located at Laskhoreh in Sanag,
this cannery, built with Soviet assistance in 1968, has been rehabilitated in
2002 by a group of local businessmen in addition to installing new canning
machines. It started production at a capacity of 1 to 2.5 tones per day used for
local consumption and export.
In about 10 fishing communities scattered along the coast of Somaliland,
local artisan carry out fishing activity with small boats and rudimentary tools.
Because Somaliland lacks the capacity to monitor its coast, foreign fishing
boats and ships fish at will without legal license or without regard to
conservation.
7.3.6 Unemployment and Poverty
No reliable data exist on percent of unemployment in Somaliland. However,
estimates range from 60-70% unemployment among persons of working age. In
addition to post-conflict conditions, drought, the Saudi ban on livestock
export, and flood of refugees aggravate unemployment in the cities particularly
and in Somaliland generally.
Pastoralists have lost their livestock during the recent droughts flocked to
the cities, adding to the large number that had stayed in urban centers after
the collapse of the regime. The decline in the value of livestock following the
ban on exports also made life in rural areas less sustainable or bearable. The
lure of the city for young men and women has also added to the migration from
rural areas. In addition, the fold of refugees from Ethiopia and Somalia has
intensified unemployment, poverty, and despair.
A household economic assessment carried out in Hargeis in 2003 by several
collaborating agencies has show that the capital city, whose population it
estimates to 375,000, is indeed a center of poverty and distress at the same
time as its economy is vibrant, with construction and businesses booming. 47
Actually, population estimates of Hargeisa vary widely, one giving an estimate
of 700,000.48 The household economic assessment divided the population into four
income categories. Those whom it identified as ‘very poor’ earn less than SlSh
15,000 (roughly $2.25) per day. This group includes the destitute relying on
begging and those depending on combination low paying jobs and gifts. The “poor”
have access to a maximum of SlSh 25,000 ($3.75) per day while the “middle”
constituting about 40-60% of households earn SlSh 25-80,000 ($3.75-$12) per day.
The ‘better off’ group, representing 10-15% of households, earn more than SlSh
80,000 ($12) per day.
The household economic assessment has also indicated that very poor and poor
households spend much of their income on food at a higher rate than the middle
or well off households because they buy in retail. In addition, they send their
children to beg or work in the city. Not sent to school, they are condemned to
life of poverty in the future.
Not sufficiently studied by this household economic assessment or others is
the number of men who in the past had a good job in the civil service, in the
armed forces, in law enforcement, or in the private sector but today remain
unemployed. Included in this group are ex-combatants who demobilized but have no
job to keep them occupied. Many of these rely on remittance sent by a relative
abroad or by shaxaad (gift) given by a relative, a friend, or an acquaintance.
Not discussed in the literature is the degeneration of work ethic by war,
refugee life of the past, and unemployment. Many who used to work in the past
with vigor and commitment have been reduced to life of ennui and aimlessness, to
relying on the support of others through remittance or shaxaad, or simply to
babbling in teashops while their wives brave the elements in the marketplace to
feed them and their children.
7.3.7 Remittances
The only source of income comparable with livestock earnings is remittances.
The economic importance of remittances has been increasing since the oil boom in
the Gulf States in 1970s and became more significant in the post war period as
the main source of income and foreign exchange earnings, when thousands of
refugees migrated to Europe and North America.
The actual size of remittance is not known for sure because the remittance
companies keep the information a secret. We heard estimates of remittance sent
to Hargeisa residents alone to be about $50 million per year. One study reports
that Hargeisa inhabitants alone receive about $5 million monthly which would $60
million annually.49
Estimates of total remittance received by Somalilanders from relatives abroad
range from $250-500 million annually. Obtained accurate figures is made
difficulst by the secrecy maintained by remittance companies and the surfeit of
them involved in the business of transferring remittances. Those involved in the
business of remittances (xawaaladaha) in Somaliland report an increase in the
volume of remittances received during the livestock ban, although there is no
reliable estimate of the size of that increment. The growth in the service
sector continues.
A significant portion of portion of the remittance goes to feed families, to
start or maintain business, to invest in the booming construction sector, or to
purchase of qat, otherwise known as chat.
7.3.8 The Scourge of Qat
Inhabitants of East Africa and Southern Arabia customarily chew fresh leaves
of qat (catha edulis Forssk) in order to attain a state of euphoria and
stimulation. Because frequent qat produces mild to moderate psychic dependence,
the World Health Organization has classified qat as a substance of abuse. In
some countries, its import and use have been prohibited. Researchers attribute
the pharmacological effects of chewing khat leaves to mainly its cathinone
content whose chemical structure and biological action are similar to those of
amphetamine.50
Qat used in Somaliland is imported from Ethiopia, mostly from the environs of
Harar, particularly in Hawaday and Dadar areas. Accurate figures for qat imports
to Somaliland are unavailable because firstly no comprehensive study has yet
been carried out and secondly the companies involved in the business keep tight
lip on the size of their imports and their business. Officials report that the
Somaliland Government obtains at least $10,000 daily from taxing imports of qat.
This figure does not include many qat dealers who evade taxes.
One preliminary investigation, inquiring custom officials at Kalabaydh,
reported that 21,000 kg was registered daily in the summer of 2003 bringing to
government coffers estimated tax revenues of $9,375-10,938. 51 It is most likely
that the above figures for tax revenue and income are underestimates in a
business not known for strict adherence to the law, that enters Somaliland from
different point in the porous border, and lenience of underpaid custom officials
is easily bought. Analyzing the above researchers raw data, we found that
Hargeisa alone spends on qat $161,703 daily and Bur’o $131,695 daily. Together,
the two cities spend $275,398 daily, $8,261,953 monthly, and staggering
$99,143,438 annually. Judging from these figures, who would think that such
money is wasted on qat in the cash-strapped population of Somaliland? These
figures do not include the amount spent on qat by other cities like Borama,
Berbera, Erigabo, Las Anood, and others. Even these low estimates show that a
huge flow of hard currency only for the purchase of qat takes place, with
Somaliland as the loser and Ethiopia its beneficiary. Little wonder farmers in
Ethiopia, having found qat most lucrative, are abandoning coffee and fruits
which in the past they grew in abundance. Added to the financial drain on the
Somaliland economy is the health and social effects of qat use on the
population, particularly men. Studies on the effects of qat have shown its
adverse health effects including digestive, dental, sexual, and psychiatric
disorders. Not so well studied is the person-years lost in preparing for,
engaging in, and recovering from qat use daily by at least 60 percent of young
and middle-aged males in the urban centers and increasingly in rural areas. That
more women are taking up the habit only intensifies the alarm.
A study on 425 randomly selected ex-combatants in four of the six regions in
Somaliland has shown about 70% males chew qat of whom 45% chew qat at least
three times a week.52 About 43% of those who chew qat report to feel sad when
they chew qat, 35% experience sleeping difficulties, 36% report loss of
appetite, 27% complain about loss of sexual drive. Because of these experiences
added to the daily cost of qat, most of qat users (58%) ruminate about or decide
in vain to quit altogether (42%) or reduce (16%) chewing at the end of chewing
sessions. Only a 6% of the qat users remain determined to continue chewing after
each qat session. In addition, Bulhan sees in his clinical practice many men,
particularly in the ages of 18-25, who suffer from psychiatric disorders
precipitated or aggravated by qat use.
Typically, males who are the preponderant users of qat spend on the average
about six hours daily in purchasing, preparing for, and chewing qat. Often, they
are away from their families, coming home late when their children and wives are
sleep. Difficulties the user experience in sleeping directly or indirectly
causes distress or at minimum disturbance to the family. Reduction of sexual
drive aggravates marital relationship which could be already on the rocks
because of pervasive
unemployment which reduces the financial wherewithal of men to support their
family, often leaving mothers to fend for their children. If their children
attend school, they leave while their father is sleep. When they come from
school, he is chewing qat most likely outside the home and thus has no time for
the children. Thus, while pervasive unemployment diminished the role of men as
breadwinners, qat use also erodes the role and contribution of men as positive
models and partners in the household.
In short, qat use in Somaliland is a major financial drain on the economy.
Sorely needed resources for economic development and social services are wasted
in satisfying a habit which has adverse effects on health, therefore contributes
to morbidity and mortality, and wastes both time and energy of working-age males
needed for economic and social development.
7.3.9 Corruption in Government
Since independence in 1960, corruption and misuse of public funds have been
endemic in government. The military regime came to power with promises to end
corruption, as it promised to root out the clan system. In the first two years,
it had taken draconian measures to eliminate corruption including imprisonment
and execution of some individuals accused of corruption.
Such measures and the propaganda associated with them did little to reduce
corruption in part because corruption became pervasive in high levels of
government. When later the immediate relatives of the dictator became leading
actors in misuse of public funds, stashing away huge sums of money in foreign
banks, corruption seeped into every level of government and people accepted it
as an inevitable feature of government and the political process generally.
Because corruption has been accepted as the givens of government, the
political system set up after 1991 in Somaliland had never given reduction of
corruption high priority or concern. The first President, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali
(Tuur) did not set up even the rudiments of government. His transitional
government from 1991-1993 was in disarray and caught in a succession of armed
conflicts. President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal who succeeded him in 1993 was, despite
giving lip-service to clean government, a man who never differentiated his
private funds from public funds. For him, the two were synonymous.
President Egal even kept wads of cash at his office readily dispensing them
to win friends, assist cronies, and mollify traditional elders. Businessmen
showered him with gifts and “loans” to gain a favor, such as obtain tax
exemption, acquire a government contract, or carry out a business deal with a
foreign business concern. Revenues from the port came directly to him as did tax
revenues from Hargeisa, the capital and largest city of Somaliland. Until the
election of local counselors, the President appointed mayors of cities and towns
as he did the head of the Berbera port, the Chairman of the Somaliland National
Bank, and the Chamber of Commerce. Each of these men somehow advanced the
self-interest of the President in monetary and/or political terms.
Following the death of President Egal, the system of corruption and misuse of
public funds continued. President Dahir Rayaale Kahin introduced no reforms.
Even past promises of eliminating or reducing corruption ceased altogether.
Indeed, talk of corruption and misused of public funds inspire little public
interest because these have been taken for granted, regardless of who leads or
misuses funds. Only recently has the topic been widely publicized in the media
when the former Minister of Commerce, Mohamed Hashi Elmi, had a fallout with the
Minister of Finance and then with the President, following disagreements on the
2004 budget to presented to the parliament five months later.
The conflict came to a head in a cabinet meeting on May 2, 2004 when the
Minister of Finance was scheduled to discuss with his colleagues a draft
national budget before it was presented to the parliament for oversight and
approval. There are conflicting versions of what happened in the cabinet
meeting. Some accuse Mohamed Hashi Elmi to have acted quite inappropriately
prior to and during the cabinet meeting chaired by the President.53 Mohamed on
his part explained that he had tried to change the corrupt system from inside as
a minister, having been in the opposition for years, but that the Minister of
Finance, the President, and the Vice President had ignored his gnawing worries
about corruption and misuse of public funds in a society too poor and too
desperate for funds.54
Whatever had happened behind the scene during the cabinet meeting of April 2,
2004, the President had fired Mohamed Hashi Elmi soon after its conclusion and
the ugly charges of corruption came to public attention. In a press release, the
former Minister of Commerce presented a series of charges of which the most
relevant here is his claim that more than $17 million was lost to corruption and
misuse of public funds during the two years in which Dahir Rayaale Kahin serves
as President.55
This allegation of corruption and the amount claimed to have lost should have
alarmed the public and prompted the parliament to investigate the charges, but
it did neither because:
- Corruption and misuse of public funds have accepted as the givens of
government since independence, regardless of who led the government. - The
parliament among whose duties include oversight, monitoring, and approval of
budget the executive presents has consistently failed (as it does today) in
fulfilling its responsibilities; - All opponents of the government make
frivolous charges of corruption or misuse of public funds, thereby inoculating
the public to actual corruption like the boy who cried wolf. - Low pay in
all sectors of the government breeds corruption and misuse of public funds.
- Officers occupying high posts in government are often the main offenders,
regardless of the government in power.
Unless the problem of corruption and misuse of public funds are taken to be
serious problems and curbed, Somaliland will:
- Not achieve economic growth; - Drive away investment from local and
international sources; - Discourage international assistance; - Obtain
lower revenue to finance roads, schools, hospitals, and sorely needed services;
- Discourage development of efficient utilization of public resources; -
Encourage cronyism and illegal practices in both public and private sectors.
- Intensify clan cleavages and armed conflict.
7.4 POTENTIAL ESCALATORS OF CONFLICT

- Ex-combatants not integrated into society; - Unemployment and
public frustration; - Loss of livestock and farms in the rural areas; -
Increase in population of cities and build up frustration; - The Saudi
livestock ban continuing to impoverish families and society; - Disputes over
land and enclosures motivated by get-quick-rich schemes - Economic recession
and inflation; - Low paid soldiers, policemen, and civil servants -
Corruption and misuse of public funds. - Continual influx of refugees and
internally displaced persons 7.5 POTENTIAL DE-ESCALATORS OF CONFLICT -
Remittances from abroad; - The construction boom; - International
assistance for humanitarian and social services - Clan and traditional
support system; - The tradition of shaxaad (gifts) which keeps daily
frustration at bay;
7.6 SUMMARY
After 1991, the people of Somaliland started economic life from scratch. They
returned to ruined cities and homes. Those who did not flee to refugee camps
were also under the strains of war. Successive drought and the livestock ban had
major shocks to the economy and life of Somaliland. The lack of economic growth
means less government revenue. The military and police forces, drawn mainly from
demobilized ex-combatants, take minimal salaries, which could lead to
destabilization of Somaliland in the future.
Economic recession decreases job opportunities or may increase inflation,
which means a reduction of household purchasing power. People have changed their
consumption patterns by switching to cheaper cereals, reducing the amount they
eat or may not eat.
The dependence on single market (KSA) and single primary product (livestock)
renders the Somaliland economy extremely vulnerable to external forces and
influences. The closing of the Ethiopian border has curtailed transit goods
movement to Ethiopia.
Additionally, the lack of formal international recognition has its cost.
Without it Somaliland does not qualify for bilateral aid or the assistance of
international financial institutions for reconstruction. It has discouraged
foreign investment and constricts trading practices.
Chapter 8: ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
8.1 WHY WE SELECTED THIS ISSUE
We selected this issue because the environment and natural resources are
among the most neglected yet most important sectors in Somaliland. The
socio-economic well being of the Somaliland is intrinsically linked to the
status and wise use of is natural resources. We wanted to briefly explore this
issue in order at least to bring it to the forefront of discussion and debate.
8.2 BACKGROUND
The Somali Government, with substantial assistance form the international
community, had in the past managed the natural resources of the country. Work on
the environment included externally funded projects on, water, soil and
desertification. However, the break down in government structures in 1991 and
the lack of effective alternatives has contributed to the inability of
developing policies, regulations and approaches to environmental conservation
use of natural resources.
Consequently, natural resource management fell into the hands of the people
in the past ten years. This worsened the already debilitating situation of
resource management, including marine resources. Compared to other African
nations, Somaliland has relatively few natural resources. This is all the more
reason that it must conserve and utilize well the little it has.
8.3 CURRENT SITUATION
Historically, many regulations for governing the use and protection of
natural resources have not been enforced effectively. Some groups are overusing
resources out of economic necessity while others exploit for profit and gain.
There has not been a comprehensive study of significant environmental changes
over the past decade. However, first hand observations by community leaders and
concerned professionals point to the problem of rangeland degradation,
deforestation, and depletion of marine resources from excessive fishing as
primary concerns throughout the country.
Factors that have contributed to rangeland degradation and deforestation
include cyclical drought, increased water points, human settlement, and
transport, charcoal production, illegal private enclosures and an increase in
livestock and population. These developments, particularly illegal private
enclosures, have curtailed nomadic movements and denied access to areas rich in
pasture. These changes have placed tremendous pressure on traditional grazing
patterns, coping mechanisms and has weakened the social structure. It has also
promoted out-migration from rural areas specially the young nomads (male and
female) to the urban centers seeking employment opportunities. In the process,
men often leave behind women and children to attend the animals.
8.3.1 Land Ownership
Since colonial rule in the late 19th Century, land theoretically belonged to
the government. After independence, the same assumption that government owns the
land continued, although in practice use and ownership of land followed
tradition. But this assumption or declaration by fiat had created problems for
citizens because the government intervened in land when it wished, often
aggravating conflicts and applying favoritism induced by bribe. In addition,
government became an absentee landlord without minimum of responsibility to care
or protect the land against misuse and degradation. Traditionally, all land
(except that part of it on which one lived or worked) belonged to the clan and
subclan. Each clan had well respected boundary with its neighboring clans. In
turn, each sub-clan had its own territory within the boundary of its clan. Thus
land of pastoralists, traditionally constituting the bulk of the population,
belonged to the clan and sub-clan. Even then, other clans had rights to migrated
to that land in time of drought when they could not find pasture and water in
their territory. Reciprocal accommodation existed between neighboring and even
distant clans particularly in times of drought.
Land for agro-pastoralists had different meaning and use. In agro-pastoral
communities, land was communally protected but that part of it tilled or used
for fodder belonged to households. The boundaries of the privately owned was
demarcated and passed on to successive generations of males. Generally, females
were traditionally excluded from land inheritance for fear that land owned by
one clan could be transferred to another clan by marriage. In addition, a male
owner could only sell land to his close clan to ensure that land does not pass
on to other clans or sub-clans, although one was free to temporarily lease or
offer use gratis (with at leas two witnesses present) to anyone, regardless of
his clan.
8.3.2 Environmental Degradation
Environmental degradation refers to reduction or destruction mostly in the
capacity and resources of the land, although such degradation can take place in
the air we breathe and the water we drink. In degraded environment, soil is
impoverished and productive land loses par or all of its potential resources or
capacity for production. For instance, water may diminish in quantity due or
become undrinkable by humans and animals because misuse or lack of conservation.
The environment in Somaliland is increasingly placed under severe strain by
the interaction of several factors. Population growth is intensifying pressure
on the environment and causing environmental degradation. For instance, people
are moving from rural to urban areas at an alarming rate. UN HABITAT reports
that Somaliland has, in comparison to other African countries, the highest rate
of migration from rural to urban areas.56 It calculated that eight persons
migrated to Hargiesa per day. Not only are the poor and the unemployed
increasing in cities but also garbage and risk of communicable disease like TB
and HIV/AIDS are increasing.
Dumping sites for garbage are filling up quickly and disputes on the next
site create conflict. In addition, there are not enough public latrines
available. Lack of drainage is public health, as plastic bags replete in the
environment are a soar to the eye and a threat to health of animals and plants.
In the rural areas, excessive grazing is degrading the land. Although
livestock is the backbone of the economy of Somaliland, overgrazing and trample
of animals which compacts the soil deteriorate the rangeland. These two problems
have been degrading the rangeland for decades as the growth of livestock and
demand for their export increased. In heavily trampled areas, erosion and
drought are often the result because the soil is less able to retain water.
Overgrazing also destroys native palatable grass, replacing them with less
palatable or poison weeds with deeper roots. Due to the livestock ban, it is
believed that overstocking livestock in the rangeland is increasing with further
deterioration of the environment. In addition, pastoralist who raise livestock
continuously migrate in search for good pastures and water cut bushes for
fencing their huts and pens for their livestock.
Further, agro-pastoralists inhabiting mostly in Northwest and Awdal regions
depend on a combination of crop production and livestock. They develop
integrated strategies to improve their food security to ensure that if one
production system fails the other survives. Agro-pastoralists have also
detrimental effect on the environment. In appropriate farming practices,
inappropriate clearing of bushes and uncontrolled burning destroy the native
vegetation and reduce suitable habitat for native animals. In fact, there is an
urgent need to help agro-pastoralists to develop sustainable system which
conserves natural resources of their environment.
Land speculation has also reached pitch fever in urban and rural areas.
Enclosures that have no reason or rhyme except that in some distant future they
bring profit are denying free movement of livestock and use of pasture. Further,
as the population grows and tillable land reduces, agro-pastoralists are
expanding the size of their land holding, thereby appropriating valuable grazing
areas and water points. A conflict is a result intensifying between on the one
hand pastoralists on the other land speculators and agro-pastoralists fencing
off enclosures and valuable lands. This conflict on occasion erupts in armed
conflagrations which contribute to social alienation and political instability.
Deforestation is also increasing because of the demand for charcoal and
construction materials. More economically desperate communities are clearing
forests and causing irreparable damage to the environment. Lack of government
intervention, encouraging other ways of earning livelihood, and developing
alternative sources of energy are aggravating the problem.
8.3.3 Drought and Water Crisis
Today, the glaring failure of government is its inability to provide
adequate, reliable, and safe water for the Hargeisa particularly and other
cities generally This problem has become most alarming and frustrating because,
even in more difficult times, people have learned to expect as a “right”
sufficient supply of water every day. The relative peace of Somaliland, its
economic revival, and its unobtrusive (some say lackadaisical) government
encouraged refugees from Ethiopia and Somalia to come in droves. In addition,
according to UN Habitat, Somaliland’s rate of migration from rural communities
is said to be the highest in Africa. Add to this steady flow of citizens
returning from the diaspora, contributing to the building boom quickly changing
the landscape and life of cities, particularly Hargeisa.
The water crisis is a potential threat to peace and stability in Somaliland.
The drought that devastated much of Somaliland, particularly the eastern
regions, had left immense poverty and suffering that will take years to
overcome. This places inordinate burden on the government, the economy, and the
population. Still, the public understands drought to have natural causes, even
when the government has responsibility for its mitigation, development of
warning systems, and prevention of effects on livestock and people. But water
crisis in the cities is different. The responsibility and blame for it falls
squarely on the shoulder of the government.
Thus far, the government has not alleviated the water crisis in the cities,
nor has it demonstrated vigorous effort in solving it. Part of the problem is
the rapid migration to cities by rural communities and refugees, putting
impossible burden on their public utilities, housing, and public health. For
instance, the city of Hargiesa has grown at least three fold during the past
decade but development public utilities have not kept pace. The government,
strapped for resources, can not rehabilitate wells or pipelines, or purchase the
machinery needed. In addition, it does not have the technical capacity to plan
or manage these services. Nor does it have access for the foreign assistance or
loans (like the Chinese help which rebuilt and expanded the water system for
Hargeisa two decades ago.)
Whatever the causes or contributors, the water crisis in the cities
(particularly Hargeisa) may be the last straw for a population that remarkably
borne with remarkable patience many perceived or real inequities. Most families
today spend inordinate amount of their time and income on water, either
purchasing donkey-driven sales, or lugging containers of water by hand. Making
the problem most frustrating and dangerous, the poor spend more money on water
for each barrel of water than the wellto- do. They therefore feel the pinch and
the class inequity more than the pains and inequity in other aspects of life.
8.3.2 Charcoal Trade
Traditionally, the Somaliland urban society has been depending for cooking
and heating on biomass as their main source of energy in the form of charcoal
and firewood. Almost all urban households use charcoal while bakeries use
firewood. The two main sources of bio-fuels are the private enclosures and
communally owned land. The proportion of the fuel obtained in the communally
owned land is the largest because this land belongs to no particular household.
The government which would have protected it is not engaged in land
conservation. These rural communities and urban intermediaries depend on the two
sources of fuel as income generating, having discovered that their livestock has
either perished or lost value in the marketplace due to the Saudi livestock ban
on export.
Destruction of forest trees canopy reduce the soil cover and hence increases
the opportunity of the top fertile soil to be easily eroded by winds and water.
Sheet erosion caused by the run-off develops into rile erosion and then into
gullies. Continuous heat of the sun on bare ground also destroys the soil
nutrient and its structure. This process of forest and woodland destruction for
the purpose of charcoal and fuel wood has severely reduced the biodiversity and
rangeland productivity. If not checked, desertification which is irreversible
will soon be the next stage.
A study on charcoal in rural environs of Hargeisa has shown that the city
alone used 516,990 sacks of charcoal for the last six months of 2003. To produce
this quantity of charcoal, about 323,118 trees had to be cut, of which 161,559
were live trees.57 This means that destruction of forest and woodland in the
semi-desert of Somaliland proceeds at a pace far greater than it can regenerate
itself. In addition, the study reports estimates that 65% of the charcoal used
in Hargeisa and Berbera is prepared from live trees compared to 25% in Bur’o.
Further, the study found that most charcoal producers that 95% of the rural
charcoal producers are aged 17-30 years and that these producers engage in
charcoal production principally to obtain money of which between 50-80 percent
go to purchase of qat and less than 30% spent on their household needs. In
short, the environment and natural resources of Somaliland are fast depleted by
men who spend most the income they earn from charcoal production on qat, thereby
compromise their health and social wellbeing. Charcoal production is thus a
double disaster which is irreversible.
8.4 POTENTIAL ESCALATORS OF CONFLICT
- Land speculation and pursuit of material gain, regardless - Disputes
over land ownership - Enclosures denying livestock access to grazing and
therefore creating conflict - Lack of water in both urban and rural
communities, thereby starting old conflicts - Refugee flow from Ethiopia and
Somalia
8.5 POTENTIAL DE-ESCALALTORS OF CONFLICT

- Remittance - Livestock export when possible - Traditional means
of resolving land dispute - Traditional mutual assistance
8.6 SUMMARY
The Somaliland government and people do not give the environment and natural
resources the attention they deserve. To protect the environment and the coast,
the government owns no boats to guard the coast. Consequently, there has been
illegal fishing going on along Somaliland coasts, particularly in the years 1992
and 1998.
Pastoralist communities in Somaliland are in critical situation. In addition,
there is broad public concern for the dire consequences of the proliferation of
private enclosures, settlements, and water points on rich pastoral areas. In
rural areas where enclosures are practiced intensively, there is a continuous
source of conflict and insecurity, and land disputes remain one of the most
contentious issues in both rural and urban areas.
In short, the future of the environment in Somaliland and its neighbors looks
gloomy. Urgent attention must be given to the environment by the government and
international community.
Chapter 9: REGIONAL CONFLICTS
9.1 WHY WE SELECTED THIS ISSUE?
We selected this topic because Somaliland is in a region embroiled in
different conflict and these conflicts profound affect the peace and stability
of Somaliland. For this reasons, we explore the relationship of Somaliland with
its three neighbors, giving priority to the relationship of Somaliland and
Puntland whose forces were poised in armed conflict in recent months over Sool.
9.2 BACKGROUND
The pursuit of pan-Somali unity began after World War II had brought all
Somalis, including those in Somaliland, on a path collision and conflict with
Ethiopia. Thus, from 1960 to 1991, the Somali Republic (representing the union
of Somalia and Somaliland) and later the military regime had troubled relations
with Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti (when it was a French colony).58
In particular, the relationship with Ethiopia was most antagonistic and
tumultuous, culminating in the 1977-78 war. The military regime which wrested
power in 1969 dropped the détente Mohamed Ibrahim Egal had signed and revived
the call for Somali unity. The pursuit of pan- Somali unity culminated in a
full-scale war with Ethiopia in 1977-78.
The war ended in a bitter defeat of Somali armed forces. With massive
assistance from Cuba and the former Soviet Union, Ethiopians regained the Somali
territory which Menilik and Haile Selassie secured first through negotiations
with European colonial powers and later in practice. This defeat of Somali
forces struck a death blow to the Pan-Somali Nationalism which, since at least
1960, passionately united Somalis but later lost steam by years in the years of
military tyranny at home. The defeat had also sown the seeds of internal
conflict among Somalis. The formation of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front
(SSDF) in 1980 and the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981 started an era of
armed opposition against the military regime of Mohamed Siyaad Barre. By 1989,
much of the territories of the Somali Democratic Republic, ablaze with fire and
fury, had become a battleground for supporters of the regime and its opponents.
9.3 Current Situation
The people-to-people relationship changed significantly when the Somali
Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and later the Somali National Movement set up
bases in Ethiopia to fight the regime of Mohamed Siyaad Barre. The Somali armed
opponents against the regime and the flood of refugees fleeing to Ethiopia
during the 1980s had come to know more of Ethiopia and its people, gradually
casting away old myths and animosity they held against Ethiopians.
After the collapse of the military regime in January 1991, Somaliland
declared UDI and formed its first transitional government in May 18, 1991. Since
then, Somaliland’s relation with Ethiopia improved steadily. Ethiopia which has
been embroiled with periodic armed conflict and mostly diplomatic row with
leaders of the TNG formed in ‘Arta in 2002 and with some warlords in
south-central Somalia.
9.3.1 Somaliland and Ethiopia
Somaliland’s relation with Ethiopia has improved steadily since the 1991 when
the SNM took control of Somaliland and particularly after 1993 when President
Mohamed Ibraahim Egal was selected as President in the Borama Conference. In
addition, the report stated that since 2002 the relationship between Somaliland
and Ethiopia has been the best in living memory, that, as a result, Ethiopia,
for the first time in history, allows its airlines, Ethiopian Airlines, to fly
four times a week from Addis Ababa to Hargeisa, linking passengers to other
destinations in Europe and North America. In addition, Ethiopia also opened a
liaison office in Hargeisa, allowing the Republic of Somaliland in Addis Ababa.
Ethiopia is most concerned about the emergence of Pan-Somali Nationalism and
Islamic fundamentalism on its eastern flank. Pan-Somali Nationalism would rally
Somalis under its control under the banner of pan-Somali unity, turning human
and material resources it desperately needs to war with Somalis, as has been the
cases from 1960 to 1978. It also fears that the growth of Islamic fundamentalism
on Somali soil may rally its substantial Muslim population and create conditions
for religious wars in midst, loosening the grip Christina Highlanders had on the
huge empire Menelik crafted and Haile Selassie consolidated.
Good relations with Somaliland prevents the later from become a staging
ground for either Somali irredentism or Islamic fundamentalism. Somaliland on
its part is committed for peace on its borders and with its powerful neighbor.
It is also desperate for good relations with a government like Ethiopia that has
significant influence in the politics of the Horn Africa and beyond. Hence good
relations between Somaliland and Ethiopia offers mutual benefit for both
countries, although some Somalilanders think that the relationship is tilted
heavily to the advantage of Ethiopia. They argue that Somaliland has made
concessions but gets too little from Ethiopia. According to them, Ethiopia has
not been a good advocate for Somaliland, as Djibouti has been for the TNG in
Mogadishu 59.
Nonetheless, good relations and informal alliance between the Somaliland and
the Ethiopian governments continue to grow. However, Ethiopia has not come
forward to recognize Somaliland, although Somali officials say that it promised
to be the second country to recognize Somaliland if another country to break the
taboo first. Somaliland officials seem content with this promise, sympathizing
with the explanation that Ethiopia does not want to appear as spoiler of Somali
unity. However, some critics consider the promise a clever diplomatic maneuver
that kills two birds with one stone. On the one hand, the promise, if true,
satisfies naïve Somaliland officials; on the other, it keeps Ethiopia in line
with the proscription the international community imposed on recognition of
Somaliland.
The good relations between the two countries continue not only in the
diplomatic domain or making their borders secure from armed conflict. In
addition, land-locked needs access to the sea if Djibouti port either becomes
too congested or, as happened with Eritrea, its good relations with Ethiopia
changes. In fact, Ethiopia has periodically used the port of Berbera for
unloading and transshipment of food aid extended by the EC as assistance to its
droughtstricken population in the eastern regions. In addition, trade between
the Ethiopian and Somaliland proceeds at a significant pace, although
restrictions Ethiopia imposed on border trade in October 2002, supposed to
control smuggling, had raised doubts on the intentions of Ethiopian officials.
In fact, Somalis on both sides of the border had managed to circumvent the
trade restrictions rendering them less devastating that initially feared by
officials and the public of Somaliland. The problem that today raises concern is
the conflict brewing between the Somaliland Government and the Ogaden National
Liberation Front (OLNF), clan-based armed opposition against Ethiopian control
and rule of the territory today known as Somali Region of Ethiopia.
On April 25, 2004, two trucks carrying goods from Somaliland to the Somali
Region of Ethiopia were stopped by OLNF forces near Dhagax Madow set ablaze the
two trucks and their goods. The incident provoked acts reprisal against Ogaden
traders in Hargeisa and Bur’o which could have gone out of control if the
Somaliland Police did not intervene. The OLNF presumably took this drastic
action against citizens of Somaliland out of anger against the imprisonment of
their members whom Somaliland had captured back in December 2003, allegedly for
smuggling arms from Eritrea through Djibouti. In a BBC interview, the leader of
the ONLF, Mohamed Omar Osman, denied that his forces burned the trucks but
accused the Somaliland for mistreating the Ogaden prisoners.
Such incidents and counter-accusations are likely to escalate in coming
months because Somaliland does not want to become a staging ground or transit
route for armed opponents of its important and powerful ally on its western,
porous border in the west. If the conflict between the ONLF and Somaliland
intensifies, dangerous war clouds hang on the western flank of Somaliland.
9.3.2 Somaliland and Djibouti
Somaliland’s relationship with Republic of Djibouti, its neighbor on the
north, had waxed and waned since the reclamation of independence in 1991, that
Somaliland was not pleased with Djibouti’s persistent effort to reconstitute the
defunct unity with Somalia and the old Somali state. In particular, the desk
study stressed that Djibouti’s sponsorship of the ‘Arta Conference in 2001 and
subsequently its support to the Transitional National Government based in
Mogadishu had strained relations between the two countries.
Before securing independence for Djibouti in 1977, a substantial portion of
the Somali population in the Republic of Djibouti was committed to Pan-Somali
Nationalism, as were Somalis elsewhere. In addition, ‘Iise and Isaaq activists
for independence had found sympathy and support from Somalis across the border.
The story of Mohamoud Harbi and other advocates for Djibouti independence are
still remembered as some of pantheons of Pan-Somali Nationalism. Fighters from
Djibouti have also been given training, arms, and haven by Somalis across the
border.
After independence, good relations between Djibouti and Somalis across the
border continued. However, the Djibouti leaders were concerned about the
migration of ‘Iise population from Ethiopia and Somaliland. Each traditional
settlement they left was occupied by neighboring groups. Their fear was in fact
justified, as shown by depletion of ‘Iise from Dire Dawa (Ethiopia) and its
environs which today hardly looks like the predominantly Somali city it had been
in the 1960s and before. Similarly, the ‘Iise who traditionally inhabited
Somaliland migrated in droves to Djibouti in search of work, life, and largesse
in the newly republic. The vacuum they left was filled by the Gadabursi who
historically had been their traditional kin and adversary. The armed conflict
between the SNM and the regime of Mohamed Siyaad Barre had brought two
contradictory responses from Djibouti leaders. On the one hand, the war and
Mohamed Siyaad Barre’s need for ally (which Djibouti offered) prompted thoughts
of returning ‘Iise population to their traditional area of settlement.
On the other hand, some Djibouti officials (notably Ismaa’iil Omar Ghelle,
the current President) who at the time served as the security chief of Djibouti
was considered a key ally and supporter of the SNM and generally of the Isaaq.
His assistance and position were critical to the SNM and to the Isaaq who had a
substantial business interests in Djibouti and used Djibouti as a transit point
in their destinations abroad.
After the fall of the Barre regime, the clan cleavage and dispute over
territory which reached pitch fever had brought the ‘Iise and Gadabursi, later
the ‘Iise and the SNM, into armed conflict. The fall of the regime and the chaos
in Somaliland encouraged ‘Iise return to their traditional areas of settlement
or, as some bluntly put, Djibouti authorities’ policy of expansion into
Somaliland. In 1994, ‘Iise fighters under the banner of United Somali Front
(USF), no doubt backed by the Djibouti Government, launched attacks and capture
Zeila. They also advanced and occupied ‘Abdulqaadir, Jidhi, and Geerisa hamlets.
These attacks took the Gadabursi and the Isaaq by surprise. The Gadabursi had
their hands full with conflicts within Somaliland and with the peace initiatives
they spearheaded. Nonetheless, the Gadabursi rallied support and organized their
clan militia. When the first reprisals started at Geerisa, the Government of
Somaliland reinforced the Gadabursi militia with 300 soldiers. The joint forces
pushed the ‘Iise invaders. Again in 1995, the Iise fighters attacked again.
Later that year, a reconciliation meeting called Mubaarik was organized between
the Gadabursi and ‘Iise at Geerisa. The meeting took three months but failed to
resolve the conflict. Nonetheless, the conflict subsided and an easy truce
continued.
Not surprisingly, the Isaaq and the Gadabursi who possessed documents for
Djibouti citizenship rallied to the support of Ismaa’iil Omar Ghelle, the
presidential candidate whom they consider an ally of the Isaaq and the
Gadabursi. The Gadabursi and Isaaq in Djibouti gave material and moral backing
to Ghelle while their counter parts in Somaliland who had had legal documents
traveled to Djibouti in droves to vote Ghelle.
When Ghelle became the president, hope soared in Somaliland. Many thought
that a new era of alliance and collaboration would start. But these hopes were
dashed when the two presidents, Egal and Ghelle, had a fall out over the nature,
organization, and outcome of the ‘Arte Conference. The conflict between the two
men not only concerned difference of political interest and tactics but also
aggravated by clash of egos and one-upmanship which neither moderated for the
common good.
After the conclusion of ‘Arta Conference and Djibouti support of the TNG, led
by Abdiqaasim Salad Hassan, an ineffective leader and a vociferous opponent of
Somaliland independence, the relations between Djibouti and Somaliland reached
its lowest point in the media and public perception. But armed conflict did not
follow. Djibouti elders, politicians, and intellectuals who had come to Hargeisa
for reconciliation were rebuffed at the airport and forced to fly back to
Djibouti. Egal was adamant and strident as was Ghelle.
The death of Egal and the failure of the TNG to realize minimal expectations
thawed the diplomatic ice between Djibouti and Somaliland. When Dahir Rayaal
Kahin became the President of Somaliland, the chasm existing between the two
countries narrowed. This was in part because, although President Kahin is
Gadabursi, the traditional adversaries of the ‘Iise, the latter are his maternal
kin.
More importantly, President Kahin does not possess the inflated ego which
brought Egal and Ghelle at logger heads. As a result, relations between Djibouti
and Somaliland is at its best today, although critics of President Kahin allege
that behind-the-scene dealings of the two presidents have placed Somaliland at a
disadvantage.
9.3.3 Somaliland and Puntland
If the relation between Ethiopia and Djibouti is generally congenial, that
between Somaliland and Puntland had aggravated in recent months. Since January
2004, armed forces of the two governments have been poised for war over dispute
on Sool. Relations between the two governments were never good since 1998 when
Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf took power in Puntland.
A lynchpin of the colonel’s politics in Puntland has been to shore up and
consolidate Harti alliance firstly to outmaneuver and beat his Mejerteen
opponents, which he did with flare and force, secondly to enhance his prestige
as a Daarood leader and to secure for himself political concessions in a newly
reconstituted Somalia.
The Harti subclan of the Daarood consists primarily of the Mejerteen, the
Dhulbante, and the Warsangeli. The latter two were under British colonial rule.
By history and tradition, they are considered part of Somaliland. However, in
the clan cleavages and conflict that became the rule rather than exception in
Somali society since the collapse of the regime in 1991, Harti alliance had
found the emotional and political grounds for conflict between Somaliland and
Puntland. Key to this conflict is the history and conditions of the Dhulbahante,
the second most powerful subclan of the Harti after the Mejerteen. Understanding
the history and dilemma of the Dhulbahante sheds much light on the sources of
the political conflict and its potential danger if armed clashes erupt.
The relationship between Somaliland and Puntland has never been good since
Colonel Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed became the President of Puntland and that a
territorial dispute on Harti-settled areas of Somaliland (specifically Sool and
Eastern Sanaag) has become the obvious bone of contention. From the perspective
of Somaliland, the colonel:
- Uses outdated clan irredentism to expand the territory under his control in
order promote his prestige as a Darood leader, thereby for instance gain greater
leverage in the reconciliation conference in Kenya ; - Employees Dhulbahante
officers and soldiers to hold on to power in Puntland and to oppress his own
clan, the Majeerteen; - Attempts to undermine the democracy emerging in
Somaliland which presents a contrast to his one-man-rule and indirectly
undermines his style of dictatorial rule.
9.3.4 The Conflict on Sool
The conflict which threatens wider conflagrations between Somaliland and
Puntland has indeed long past, rooted in conflict between two leading families
since the 19th Century complicated by the vagaries of Somali politics,
particularly since the military coup of 1969 and the rise to power of Colonel
Abdullahi Yusuf in 1998.
Since time immemorial, the Dhulbante had only one garaad (called elsewhere
sultaan, ugaas, even boqor). The subclan entrusted to hold this position of
leadership for the Dhulbante was historically the Ba Hararsame. This changed in
1835 after Garaad Mohamoud (nicknamed Korre Baas Sitte) abused his power,
allegedly with the ill-counsel of a man among his inner circle who sought to
undermine his power.
The conflict that started in 1835 over right of separation and dominance
waxed and waned with changed political conditions. The conflict took on covert
form under the Dervish and subsequently under British rule. It took political
form in urban centers after independence. Thus, for instance, the Dhulbahante
had five representatives in the second parliament of Somaliland in 1960 of which
two (‘Ali Garaad and Osman Garaad) represented the traditional adversaries – the
Mohamoud Garaad and the Faarax Garaad respectively.60
In the election of 1964, Osman Garaad did not return to the parliament
whereas ‘Ali Garaad did. In his term as a parliamentarian, ‘Ali Garaad flexed
his muscle on his traditional clan adversaries. In 1969 he also bulldozed his
election, using used arms and arm-twisting to regain his seat in the parliament.
The military coup of 1969 changed the fate of the two traditional
adversaries. On the other hand, the Faarax Garaad were amply represented in the
Supreme Revolutionary Council while the Mohamoud Garaad had no representation in
the SRC. Key in Dhulbhante representatives in the SRC were Ahmed Saleeban
‘Abdalle (Dafle) and Mohamed ‘Ali Shire – both members of the Faarax Garaad. In
addition, Ahmed Saleeban was a son-law of Mohamed Siyaad Barre and head of the
powerful National Security Services. In addition, the first cabinet formed
included Mohamed Buraale Ismaa’iil, also from the Faarax Garaad. This imbalance
of representation would have been less important in the history of Somali
politics if Ahmed Saleeban Abdalle did not go out of his way to flex his muscle
against the Mohamoud Garaad whose resentment intensified as a result.
Aggravating matters, the military regime imprisoned ‘Ali Garaad. His camp was
convinced that Ahmed Saleeban was behind it. Their resentment grew to outrage.
When ‘Ali Garaad died, they selected ‘Abdi Qani, his brother, to take his place.
The Ba Harsame in fact selected ‘Abdi Qani because they knew he was a sworn
enemy of Ahmed Saleeban.
Garaad ‘Abdi Qani returned to Mogadishu after his accession in Laas ‘Aanood.
Ahmed Saleeban made sure that none officially or personally welcomed the new
Garaad – a treatment which only inflamed the old animosity. Not longer after,
Garaad Saleeban emerged, having been chosen as leader in the environs of
Sarmaanyo. When he arrived in Mogadishu, Ahmed Saleeban gave him grand reception
to Garaad Saleeban and cajoled other Dhulbahante to do the same. They did.
The alienation of Garaad ‘Abdi Qani eventually led him to form alliance with
the SNM, which he met in Baligubadle in 1990, and agreed that the regime should
be destroyed through armed struggle. After the collapse of the regime, the SNM
continued its alliance with Garaad ‘Abdi Qani and his supporters. It rejected
and alienated Garaad Saleeban in the same way the regime earlier rejected and
alienated Garaad ‘Abdi Qani. In particular, the SNM refused Garaad Saleeban to
attend the Bur’o Conference of 1991. After some deliberation, they allowed his
attendance as an observer.
This mistreatment of Garaad Saleeban left bitter feelings, energizing his
unswerving commitment to Puntland and anger against Somaliland which to this day
continues. Hence, we see the tit-for-tat of the two traditional adversaries and
thoughtless officials supporting one garaad, but alienating the other, had
profound influence in creating division into camps among the Dhulbahante and
fostering divided loyalties among them. Most important, the conflict between two
garaads and their supporters had set in motion a process of clan fission. By
1985, the Dhulhante had three garaads. By 1991, they had four. Today, they have
13 garaads, the 14th is being selected in ‘Eerigaabo in a conference of subclan
as we write this story.
The SNM leadership and Egal did little to help the Dhulbahante resolve their
divided loyalties and bury the hatchet. They also did understand the dilemma of
the Dhulbhante generally and, if they did, neither acted on that understanding.
If they have looked carefully, they would have understood that the Dhulbahante
saw the emergence of Somaliland as only the political emergence of the Isaaq.
This perception of the Dhulbahante prompted understandable reservation and doubt
in a clan that had been a primary bulwark of the military regime which the Isaaq
fought and defeated.
The death of Egal in 2002 brought new hopes that his successor, President
Daahir Rayaale Kaahin, would open a new era of reconciliation with the
Dhulbahante. This was not simply a pipe dream. The new President was himself a
non-Isaaq. It was thought that perhaps a non- Isaaq leader build confidence
among the Dhulbahante toward Somaliland which until then they saw as Isaaq
fiefdom. Further, the new President had worked in Sool for several years. It was
hoped that his knowledge of the territory, the clan, and its key personality
would ease the way toward reconciliation.
On the contrary, relations between Somaliland and the Dhulbahante reached
their lowest and most dangerous point since Daahir Rayaale Kaahin became
President. The first and only visit he made to Sool in 2003 had turned a total
failure and embarrassment. It was also under his watch that Laas ‘Anood had been
invaded and captured by Puntland force in January 2004. Instead of speedy
response, military or diplomatic, the President had shown himself to be
indecisive and ineffectual.
That a majority of the Dhulbahante would emotionally lean toward their
genealogical kin, the Mejerteen, over the Isaaq is not surprising in a period of
Somali history when clan conflict was rife, when clan cleavages and alliance
informed political calculations, when moreover the support the Dhulbahant threw
with abandon behind the military regime prompted understandable fear of
reprisal. What is in fact surprising is that some intellectuals, politicians,
and traditional elders still choose Somaliland over Puntland. The size of that
support is disputed as is the political conflict over Sool.
What is most important in any case is that the Dhulbahante be extended the
right of self-determination. They should have the right to choose either
Somaliland or Puntland without use force as did the Colonel and his cronies in
Las ‘Anood. Further, the President of Somaliland should use traditional elders
and civil society generally to resolve the conflict peacefully with the
Dhulbahante themselves. Dialogue with a man who knows and uses only violence is
of little use.
9.3.5 Somaliland Diaspora
The pastoral Somali tradition of trekking to distant lands in search for
pasture and water had long ago had motivated Somalis to venture into other
countries and continents. The adventures of Somaliland “seamen” abroad have
become part of the folklore. They hid in ships, traveled into unknown
destinations, and landed illegally in countries whose language they did not
know, with no relatives or friends to host them. Decades later, they came back
to their old villages, bought camels, and re-adapted to their pastoral life,
appearing as they never left.
The desire for personal advancement through education and employment had in
recent decades sent abroad a steady stream of Somalilanders, particularly after
the military regime of Mohamed Siyaad Barre had intensified its tyranny. The
succession of wars to topple the regime after 1981 and its subsequent collapse
in 1991 had sent a swarm of Somaliland refugees to almost all countries, far and
near. However, Somalilanders in the diaspora remain linked to their people and
land. The remittance they send, roughly estimated to about 250-500 million
annually, provides the primary inflow of cash to the country. The various
associations among the Somaliland living in the diaspora (like the Somaliland
Forum) also provide political support not only financially but also to the quest
for international recognition.
The contribution of Somalilanders who live in the Diaspora has been immense
during the armed resistance against the dictatorial regime and subsequently.
Today, they continue their contributions in ideas and remittance. This will
continue for a few years but will change as their children become integrated in
the host countries.
9.2 POTENTIAL ESCALATORS OF CONFLICT
- The guerilla war waged by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
against Ethiopia may spill over into Somaliland and instigate conflict between
the ONLF and Somaliland. - The chronic competition and conflict between the
‘Iise and the Gadabursi over territory may intensify in the coming years if
reconciliation and equitable solution is not found. - The conflict over Sool
can escalate into a wide and disaster armed conflict if solution involving the
Dhulbahante is not found. - Invasion like that carried out by Puntland on
Sool harden feelings and close down avenues for peaceful resolution of problems.
9.5 POTENTIAL DE-ESCALATORS OF CONFLICT

- Except with Puntland, Somaliland has open official communication and
dialogue. - Economic interdependence allows cool heads in the neighboring
counties to prevail on the cause of peace. - Collaboration on trade
contributes to peace between Somaliland and its neighbors. - Civil society
plays a moderating and mediating role when conflicts emerge. - The people
over whom Somaliland and Puntland dispute want to be left alone because armed
conflict could have the most destructive consequences for them.
9.6 SUMMARY
Except with Puntland, Somaliland has good relation with its two other
neighbors – Ethiopia and Djibouti. Even then, there are problems which could
threaten the peace in the region. These include the conflict between the ONLF
and Ethiopia – a conflict that could spill over into Somaliland. Another is the
territorial dispute between the ‘Iise and the Gadabursi which long past and clan
acrimony. The good news is that the governments of the Somaliland and Djibouti
have open communication and dialogue to solve problems that may emerge.
The conflict between Somaliland and Puntland is more worrisome because
Abdullahi Yusuf, the President of Puntland, is known to solve problems only by
force. The invasion of Sool a few months ago demonstrate his propensity for
armed conflict. Fortunately, the Somaliland government did not respond in kind.
This dispute is best solved through dialogue and with active participation of
civil society from all sides.
The Somalilanders in the Diaspora are critical contributors to the economy
and politics. Their absence from the scene reduces the impact of their
contributions, although more of them come to visit the homeland in recent years.
Without the remittance they send, Somaliland would be poorer and in dire
straits. Hopefully, they will direct their contributions toward the development
of small industry and income-generating businesses instead of temporarily
feeding their relatives.
Chapter 10: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Rebuilding from the ruins of war is always an awesome challenge. Not only
should the broken peace be mended but also political institutions must be
re-established, the destroyed infrastructure rehabilitated, business re-started,
often from scratch, homes and family relations reconstructed, the past with its
crushing tragedies and pains placed in its proper place.
The ruins of civil war are even more daunting. In addition to rebuilding
material resources and social institutions, post-conflict reconstruction after a
civil war requires restoring most fundamental aspects less obvious or tangible
than material resources and social institutions. The enemy in this case being
one’s government and compatriots, the ruins and injuries of war go deeper and
their memories last longer.
To overcome the effects of civil war, healing must take place simultaneously
within and without because the enemy has invaded the self, the identity, the
home, appearing perhaps in the person of an in-law, a childhood friend, a
classmate, a colleague at work. Only then can rebuilding from material ruin have
meaning and genuine renewal of society become possible. The people of Somaliland
have gone through a succession of civil wars, leaving not only material ruin but
also profound ruptures in identity and social relations. The healing within and
without has yet to complete, though it started in earnest eleven years ago at
the 1993 historic Borama Conference. Since then, the healing and reconstruction
progressed with periodic hiccups and spurts.
The civil war began in reaction to a military regime which trampled on basic
human rights and, when people resisted, carried out scorch-earth policy and
systematically brutalized people who until then identified with the nation and
flag entrusted to the military regime. The war with the regime was fought alone
for nearly ten years while other Somalis stood on the sidelines or partook in
the clan cleansing or at least in looting the homes and property of the victims.
The belief in common identity and destiny died as a result.
Thus, the declaration of independence twelve years go must be seen not only
in light of the ruin and injuries experienced in a bitter civil war but also as
quest for a secure, firm, and safe ground for healing, for rebuilding confidence
in the self and others, and for experimenting with new models of government and
new political relationships when others they knew repeatedly failed them.
But the decision on unilateral declaration of independence did not bring the
quick fix sought in desperation. The political institutions, homes and lives had
to be built from ground up. But the first step toward that goal – restoring
peace - proved difficult among a people traumatized by war, armed to the teeth,
little prepared by the political leadership that organized them for war. Yet
peace could not be restored unless clan cleavages which intensified during the
war and exploited by the military regime were mended through dialogue and
commitment to forgive on all side.
Somaliland indeed restored the peace broken and mended the clan cleavages
with little assistance from the international community. It built a government
on its own steam, using its limited resources. It experimented with a model of
government incorporating the clan system and contemporary ideas like parliament,
executive, and judiciary. Further, it took the first steps toward democracy by
electing local and national political leaders peacefully and by means of
one-person-one vote. In so doing, it also took a critical step toward
ameliorating gender inequity since subsequent elections will no doubt force
candidate to woo the substantial votes of women and hence address their
grievances in a society that for too long denied them rights and participation
equal to those of men.
These are not minor achievements. Those who poured substantial funds in 14
reconciliation conferences for Somalia or who sent over 30,000 soldiers to
restore peace there but failed should know better. Somalilanders are proud of
these achievements but they also worry about the difficult road ahead if they
can continue to tolerate the misery around.
There are today three main impediments toward further progress in healing
from past injuries and in rebuilding from the ruins in Somaliland. The first
impediment resides in the government and people of Somaliland, the second in the
international community, the third in Somalis who are determined to push
Somaliland back to the ideas, systems, and practices that failed them.
The impediment in the government and people of Somaliland is the most
difficult yet the most urgent to overcome. Somaliland has been saved by the will
for peace and by homemade solutions discovered in the midst of disaster. The
credit goes to the generation that has come to understand that no society or
civilization can exist without peace and that peace can not sustain without
dialogue with others, most of all with those considered enemy. But the movement
forward, no doubt uncertain and clumsy all along, has slackened in recent years
Old demons of the past – in particular the systems, practices, and habits of
tyranny - are rearing there heads once again. Corruption and misuse of public
funds, the bane of leadership without accountability or transparency, are eating
away the gains and sacrifices made. Disillusionment and despair are therefore
setting in at a frightening pace. The signs and symptoms of trouble ahead can be
detected in the cacophony of teashop debates and qat-chewing sessions as they
can be sensed in the inchoate actions of the youth and quiet musing of the aged.
Perhaps the recommendations we offer later may postpone or hopefully prevent
armed conflict and disaster in the making.
The impediment coming from the international community has a long past. It
was firmly in place when the military regime ran roughshod on innocent citizens,
later escalating its tyranny to massacres and destruction of cities, while
generous assistance and loans to it continued flowing to the end of its
collapse, despite repeated calls to no longer arm and embolden the regime. After
the state collapse came the international stampede to assist the starving in
Somalia. Because the stampede was founded on little or no understanding of
Somalis, it ended as quickly as it started because force and money are not
substitute to understanding.
Somaliland was saved from the hasty campaign of compassion and charity.
However, it suffered neglect, indifference, or trivializing its achievements.
Its demand for international recognition is not evaluated on legal or historical
grounds but on preconceived and biased judgments of what is best for Somalis as
if Somalis and in particular Somalilanders do not know what is best for them.
Following the failure of active intervention by military means, the rage has
been reconciliation conferences that interminably consume resources and exhaust
goodwill. Such efforts should continue if they are producing results or even if
they constitute new and subtle versions of Operation Restore Hope.
But the neglect of Somaliland means neglect of models that can work and
ignoring of an example that can be emulated. The time has come for Somaliland to
but not at the cost of neglecting Somaliland and its noble struggles toward
peace and democracy. Hope can be initiated and sustained by what works, what
people achieve by their own, not by what addicts to conferences in plush hotels
promise or conjure up.
Political recognition opens for Somaliland access to international relations
and assistance it desperately needs. It communicates appreciation of achievement
made and approval for the path toward democracy taken in a region where tyranny
has been the rule. Political recognition also reward encouraging the successful
sojourner to proceed and prompting others to catch up. If for some reason or
other political recognition is hard to come by, the international community can
help Somaliland in other ways, as stated in the recommendations below.
The third impediment toward healing and progress in Somaliland comes from
others Somalis who misunderstand the path Somaliland has taken and why. They
suffer from fixation with lofty ideas (like unity and brotherhood) without
delving into the true meaning of these ideas. Unity and brotherhood under
conditions of inequality and oppression had existed in the past and they failed.
There is no point in returning to the same.
Neither unity nor brotherhood comes as result of threats or harangues of
self-anointed prophet for Somalis. Both also find condition for realization when
the parties have solved their own problems and gain confidence in the sincerity
of the other. The crimes of the past must be put in their proper legal and
social place so that at least such will not be condoned again. Unity and
brotherhood come not in sharing hollow names, corrupt government, or a piece of
cloth flattering in the air. It comes from mutual trust, respect, and
understanding which are never forced but earned.
Recommendations for the Government and People of Somaliland
- International recognition is good but it is not a panacea. Work toward
achieving it, but do not minimize the importance of self-recognition which is
more fundamental than recognition by others. - If you get what you pray for
– in this case international recognition – you better know in advance problems
inherent in it from lessons of the past – for instance living on charity,
accumulating debts, strings attached on aid, flow of lethal arms, and
conflicting dictates of more powerful governments. - Meanwhile, exploit to
the maximum the advantages of staying unrecognized – for instance experimenting
with your own models of government, negotiating with companies (e.g. oil
companies) unencumbered by agreements signed by the previous regime, etc. -
The clan system must be understood for what is and for its distortion in urban
politics. It can be both a blessing and a curse – the former if understood and
guided, the latter if approached with the hypocrisy of the past or left to
politicians and the elite. - Avoid (if they exist disband) all institutions,
programs, and practice (like Guddiga Nabadgelyadda – Security Committee) that
mimic the military regime and remind people of their injuries. Aside from their
being a violation of the Constitution, people have a short fuse to these and the
explosion could take place suddenly. - Engage in dialogue any group of
Somalis, even they want “unity” which for reasons we know too well has been made
a dirty word when in fact it need not be so if understood correctly and
conditions for it obtain. Confidence to engage your adversaries in dialogue is
strength, not a weakness. - Take protection of human rights more seriously
in word and action. Otherwise, all the sacrifices and pain will be in vain.
- Insist on lean and clean government. A large cabinet and a bloated
bureaucracy foster inefficiency, corruption, and misuse of public funds. -
Ensure that the parliamentary elections schedule for March 2005 takes place on
schedule and with lessons learned from the previous elections. - Encourage
the private sector which is the engine of the economy. Government is best when
it is a fair referee and a creator of enabling environment. - Turn attention
to the environment for there is no chance of survival, leave development, if we
continue in the current pace of its degradation and abuse. - We indeed have
the capacity to finance our social services and development needs if only we can
turn to constructive ends the staggering resources used for the purchase of qat
daily, monthly, and annually. For the International Community: - Extent
political recognition to Somaliland because it deserves it on legal grounds and
by its demonstration of success over a decade. - While deliberation and
discussion on international recognition is proceeding, extend to Somaliland
other means by which it can participate in international conferences, enter into
negotiations with governments, and attain technical and financial assistance.
- Help Somaliland with its crushing unemployment by providing financial and
technical assistance to develop small industries and to exploit its natural
resources. - Provide assistance to its developing private sector and higher
institutions of learning. - Provide assistance that advance Somaliland’s
experiment with democracy and with elections.
For other Somalis:
- A successful Somaliland is good for Somalis; its failure will only add to
Somali despair and regional conflicts. - Somalis need many examples of
success; Somaliland may be such an example in some respects. Use what you learn
from it and extend goodwill and lessons you think can be useful. - A
peaceful, stable, and democratic Somaliland is indeed a gain for Somalis
everywhere and for the region, not a threat or burden, as some advocates with
narrow political fixations. - If you are not part of the solution, do not be
part of the problem. Heal thyself. In reality, peace is indivisible.
Somaliland can not sustain its hard-won peace while its neighbors are caught
in armed conflict or they are poised to instigate war with it. Democracy too can
not grow and mature in the presence of citizens whose fundamentalist religious
diktat in time desperation, or of leaders of neighboring countries, using force
and dictatorship, hold the lid on their people. We must build on past successes
of Somaliland, whatever our ideology on union or our jaundiced outlook on
Somaliland independence.
Appendix A. Omitted
Appendix B
METHOD AND GUIDING QUESTIONS
THE RESEARCH TEAM
The team carrying out the fieldwork consisted of the four persons – Hussein
A. Bulhan, Iise Mohamed Hussein (Uragte), Bashir Barre, and Jama O. Ashur. Each
member brought to the fieldwork special knowledge, skills, and experience. The
four team members came from by different clans and from four regions of
Somaliland – namely, Awdal, Northwest, Togdheer, and Sool. A brief description
of their background suggests their diverse experience.
Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan is a graduate of Wesleyan University, Boston
University, and Harvard University. After he resigned from his Boston University
post as tenured Associate Professor, Dr. Bulhan co-founded two successful
organizations in the United States. The Center for Health and Development for
which he was the founding Executive Director is this day a major mental health
service provider in Massachusetts. He was also President of BHM International, a
private consulting firm headquartered in Washington, D.C.
Bulhan decided to get involved in Somaliland as a mediator of an armed
conflict in 1995. Since then, he remained involved in Somaliland, starting the
first mobile telephone in Hargeisa and a trauma treatment center. In 1999, he
co-founded the Academy for Peace and Development which he directed until January
31, 2004. Currently, Bulhan is the founder and Executive Director for the Center
for Creative Solutions and the chief clinician for Maan-Dhaye, providing
treatment for trauma and other problems in living.
Essa Mohamed Hussein (Uragte) was trained in Russia as a military engineer
and obtained Masters Degree from the Military Academy at Amour. Upon his return
to the Somali armed forces, Hussein worked in various capacities including
Director of Technologies for the Somali Armed Forces and Director for the
Technical Department of Fanole Hyro-Electric and Irrigation Project. In 1982,
Hussein left the Somali Armed Forces and joined the Somali National Movement, an
armed opposition to the regime of Mohamed Siyaad Barre. As an SNM combatant,
Hussein learned much about the land, its topography and strategic possibilities.
More importantly, he gained intimate familiarity with the life and behavior of
Somalis in urban and rural areas, particularly in time of conflict and distress.
Bashir Barre (Buh) was trained at the Somali National University in Mogadishu
and at University of Aberdeen in Scotland. As a specialist in agriculture and
animal production, Barre has traveled extensively in the Horn of Africa and
worked. In Somalia, Barre worked as an expert for a major multi-donor rangeland
development project and as Field Director of a wildlife Project. In the
Somali Region of Ethiopia, Bashir served, for instance, as Field Director of a
rangeland project, senior agronomist and expert range ecologist, and coordinator
of several refugee camps. In Somaliland, Barre served as researcher and
community developer for the Academy for Peace and Development. In short, Barre
has extensive knowledge of the problems Somalis face in different regions, both
in agricultural and pastoral communities.
Jama Osman Ashur studied chemistry at the College of Education at Lafole. He
served as teacher of secondary school for years. Subsequently, he worked in the
Somali Region of Ethiopia as an education officer in the refugee camps. In
addition, he has been engaged in conflict mediation on the border areas. In the
last few years, he served as a researcher and officer of adult education in the
refugee camps in Rabaso, Daroor, Kaam Abookor, Harta-sheick, Qabri Bayax, and
Aysha.
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
After the team reviewed the methods most pertinent to the fieldwork, the team
decided to use the following key informant interviews of persons with
specialized expertise, focus groups to explore attitudes and opinions, and
observation and team discussion. Using one or more of these methods, the team
separately or jointly interviewed clan elders, parliamentarians, intellectuals,
and ordinary persons. The formal and informal interviews continued throughout
the period of the fieldwork. The researchers interviewed individuals in offices
during morning working-hours, qat-chewing sessions in the afternoons, tea-shops
both in the morning and evenings, even in the streets when possible.
We found that most of the focus issues were quite sensitive and that the
structured interviews hampered free-flow of information and exchange. The
structured questionnaires tended to make the interviewees suspicious and
guarded. Tape recorders, which at the beginning of the fieldwork the researchers
carried with them, intensified the suspicion and discomfort. We therefore
abandoned the attempt to tape individual interviews, although a few individuals
who trusted the researcher had taped their views after assurance of
confidentiality. When not resisted and logistically possible, the research team
tape recorded focus group discussions which, unlike individual interviews, gave
a certain degree of anonymity to participants.
Outside of Hargeisa, the team found participants particularly guarded and
suspicious. One team member holding an informal focus group discussion was
reported later reported to the Governor who warned him to cease his seemingly
subversive work. Another was nearly physically attacked by people who thought
that his inquiries were too intrusive and suspicious. The team concluded that
the more one moved from the city, the more people seemed guarded. Apparently,
people outside the capital city has yet to attain the open atmosphere of
Hargeisa where political parties vigorously debate issues and individuals freely
air their opinion.
PARTICIPANTS AND VENUES
The process of selecting key informants began with a comprehensive list
developed by the team firstly individually and then the list was winnowed down
collectively into the most known and credible. The key informant interviews were
subsequently conducted in private, often at the office or home of the
interviewee.
The focus groups involved 15-20 persons strategically selected using clan,
regional, and gender criteria as required by the topic. Key informant interviews
and focus group discussions were conducted in Borama, Dila, Hargeisa, Abaarso,
Berbera, Sheikh, Bur’o, and Buhoodle. In total, 184 individuals participated in
the fieldwork.
GUIDING QUESTIONS
Key guiding questions were sent with the letter of invitation to give
participants advance notice of the issues to be discussed and time for them to
prepare for the focus group discussions. This allowed the focus group discussion
to proceed effectively and efficiently. Since also none of the participants knew
the list of invitees in advance, the combination and chemistry of the group
often produced lively and informative discussions.
The guiding questions sent in advance to the participants were followed up
with more detailed questions once the researcher(s) met key informant and focus
group participants. Since these questions were open ended, the researchers
improvised in how they phrased the questions or pursued more lines of inquiry
that seemed most pertinent in the exchange.
The team worked collaboratively in gathering information for the fieldwork.
In focus group discussions, one member served as the facilitating chair,
assisted by another member. One member wrote notes of the issues discussed. The
fourth team member assisted in tape recording the session or or in other tasks,
as needed. The team regularly reviewed its observations of the key informant
interviews and focus group discussion. The observations and team discussions
complemented other procedures and methods.
In short, then, the fieldwork proceeded as planned and the researchers were
pleased with information they obtained. The following pages discuss why we
selected the focus issues, the relevant background to the issues, and the
factors that escalate or de-escalate conflict. Although we will provide case
illustrations when possible and selectively quote participants, we will mostly
describe the gist of information participants provided us and interpret their
meaning.
The guiding questions for each focus issue are listed below.
CLAN CLEAVAGES
Are there conflicts between or within your clan or other you know well?
Who were the key actors and interests in this/these clan conflict(s)?
How did these conflicts initiate and develop? What social, cultural,
historical, or other factors caused or contributed to these conflicts? How
did these conflicts escalate and what factors contributed to their escalation?
What social, cultural, historical, or other factors enabled or contributed to
their resolution? What are the political, social, economic, and human
consequences of these conflicts? What de-escalated the conflicts? How were these
conflict resolved? Discuss key actors in the conflict and its resolution. Also
discuss the strategies and tactics used. What warning signals can be
identified in retrospect which could have prevented the conflict if understood
then? What lessons can we learn from these conflicts and how they were
resolved?
EQUITY IN GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
In your opinion, is there equity of governance and in benefiting from
political institutions in Somaliland? Please explain. If there is inequity,
who or which group benefits from the inequity of governance? Who or which
group suffers this inequity of governance? Who or what systemic arrangement
maintains this inequity? In you opinion, how can the inequity of governance
be changed or reformed?
EQUITY OF LAW AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM
In your opinion, is there inequity of law and judicial system in Somaliland?
? If yes or no, please explain. If there is no equity, what are the causes
of the inequity in the system? Who or which group benefits from this
inequity of law and judicial system? Who or which group suffers from this
inequity? What systemic arrangement maintains this inequity of law and
judicial system in Somaliland? In your opinion, how can the inequity of law
and judicial system be changed?
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
How do you define freedom of speech and human rights? What are the
advantages and disadvantages of formal and informal media? In your opinion,
is there freedom of speech and human rights in Somaliland? What promotes or
impedes freedom of speach and human rights in Somaliland? Can you give
specific examples of violations on freedom of speech or human rights? What
recommendations can you make for promoting freedom of speech and human rights in
Somaliland?
NOTES
1 Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) is a method and process of analyzing
factors affecting conflict in order to understand their causes, ameliorate their
ravages, and prevent their onset. CAF is composed of six categories of variables
relevant to conflict. In total, there are thirty variables found pertinent to
analysis of conflict. 2 Somaliland in Figures, document issued by the
Somaliland Ministry of Planning and Coordination, 2004. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.
5 The Somali National Movement (SNM) was the armed political movement of the
Isaaq that fought against the regime of Mohamed Siyaad Barre. 6 The Gobooye
is a general term referring the Tuumaal, the Madhibaan, the Muuse Dheriyo, the
Yibir, etc. Recently politicised, these oppressed groups prefer this name to
encourage cohesion among the different clans comprising it. There are other
minority clans who traditionally inhabit Somaliland but do not suffer the
segregation and despise reserved for the Gabooye. They include the Akisho and
the Madigaan. In addition, there have been for decades some individuals and
families had settled in Somaliland and integrated themselves into the population
through marriage and social adaptation. 7. In particular, the migration from
Ethiopia and Somalia has brought other clans who sought refuge from wars in
neighboring territories or who have moved to Somaliland in search for work and
opportunity. 8 Inhabitants of this territory do not have the ethnic mixture
of Somalia with components of so-called Bantu, Arab, or other extracts 9 In
contrast, the pastoral and agricultural ways of living co-exist in almost equal
proportion in Somalia. 10 For an overview of political and social
developments in Somaliland since 1991, see Self-Portrait of Somaliland -
Rebuilding from the Ruins - an extensive report by the Academy for Peace &
Development, 2001, Hargeisa, Somaliland. 11 A classic work on Somali clan
system and colonial history, see I.M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, London,,
Oxford. For an overview on colonial and post-independence history, see also by
the same author, A Modern History of Somaliland: From Nation to State, London,
Weindenfeld and Nicolson, 1965 12 For detail on how the twin process of
fusion and fission shapes the Somali mind and character, see Bulhan’s
forthcoming book on Kinship and Conflict - the Ecology of the Somali Mind.
13 See Kinship and Conflict - the Ecology of the Somali Mind. 14 For an
interpersonal conflict to have social traction - that is to escalate to clan
conflict - there are a number of conditions including history of clan conflict,
failure of the clan to pay customary blood compensation in case of homicide, the
extent the interpersonal conflict has clear implications or symbolic meaning to
clan interests, and the how the elite rally clans in times of political campaign
or conflict. For details on these conditions, see Kinship and Conflict - the
Ecology of the Somali Mind. 15 For a detailed review on the political
history of Somalis since the imposition of colonial rule to the collapse of the
military regime in 1991, see by the same author. Politics of Cain - the
Malfeasance and Misrule of an African elite. 16 For a detailed report on
persecution of the Isaaq, see A Government at War with Its Own People, an Africa
Watch Report, January 1991. 17 The letter known as “The Letter of Death” was
a secret government document written by General Mohamed Si’iid Hersi, nicknamed
Morgan, who was son-in-law of Mohamed Siyaad Barre and the man who led the
regime’s armed forces in Somaliland and administered the territory during the
1980s. 18 Such men had shown that clan is not the most critical or even
reasonable grounds for adopting a political stance toward an unjust regime.
Without their contributions, Somaliland would probably sink to the mayhem and
anarchy of Somalia. By joining the SNM, they stood firm for their commitment to
justice even when most members of their clan took the opposite and despised
them. 19 Another conflict emerged between the Gadabursi and ‘Iise in 1994.
This time, the conflict concerned who owned the Zeila district and its environs.
This conflict enlarged into a potentially more dangerous conflagration when the
government of Djibouti and the SNM joined the fray. For discussion of this
conflict and its fallout for the relationship of Djibouti and Somaliland, see
Section 10.4. 20 The Arab militia must to be noted especially because they
were the first clan militia to respond to the President’s appeal. The Jibriil
Abokor, the Xusseen Abokor, the Iise Muuse, and the Isxaaq followed on different
days, each with great pomp and obvious pride. In fact, the demobilization
ceremony had both symbolic and substantive import in the building of a new
government. It also had many moments of humor, as for instance when the ‘Iise
Muuse armed militia, the President’s clan, marched into the stadium with a
monkey hoisted on one of their tanks, thereby turning to good amusing effect
their traditional clan characterization as monkeys. 21 See Kinship and
Conflict - the Ecology of the Somali Mind. 22 See L. P. Walsh, Under the
Flag and I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bones. 23 Mohamed Ibraahim Egal was one of
the leaders of pro-independence political movements in the late 1950s. He was
also the Prime Minister of the last civilian government that the military
toppled in 1969. 24 see Kinship and Conflict, the Ecology of the Somali
Mind. 25 It was further thought that this process would: 1) reduce the
number of parties to manageable size only three in contrast of the over sixty
so-called political parties that competed for office in 1969) and 2) ensure that
no political party would comprise of one clan exclusive (as in political parties
of the past and armed political movements in recent years. 26 Illustrating
this policy is how Walsh, a pioneer of British occupation of the Somali Coast
disarmed Somalis who came to Berbera with spears, shields, and daggers. If two
were found fighting, they were arrested. An armed escort took the two men
outside town. They were made to dig a grave after their spears were returned and
ordered to fight, with the understanding that the victor would bury the corpse
of his adversary. Invariably, the two men saw the absurdity of the arrangement
and chose to hand their arms. But the ridicule continued when the town crier
announced the reason why the two men chose confiscation of their arms. 27
This section builds on a study which Bulhan supervised for a project funded by
the Swiss Embassy in Nairobi and carried out with the assistance of the staff at
the Academy for Peace and Development, Hargeisa, Somaliland. 28 For details,
see Politics of Cain which is the source of the information presented in this
section. 29 This section builds on the study Bulhan supervised at the
Academy for Peace and Development and funded by UNDP. 30 1988 is considered
a historical landmark because it was in the summer of that year that the regime
of Mohamed Siyaad Barre razed the city of Hargeisa to the ground by using heavy
artillery and planes. 31 for details, January 1991 report of Africa Watch, a
Country At War With Itself, and Bulhan’s forthcoming book on Politics of Cain.
32 See H.A. Bulhan’s forthcoming book on Injuries of A Generation: 35 A
year earlier, Hassan Ahmed Adan, one of the most honest and capable Attorney
Generals Somaliland heading this key office, left the Egal Administration
because of disputes over his unwillingness to suppress the media 36 Quoted
in “Mapping Somali Civil Society”, a document published by n(o)vib 37 This
outlook was recently expressed when a civil society umbrella, the Somaliland
Civic Forum for Peace, tried to legally register. The officials concerned evaded
with flimsy excuses this organization’s right to register. In the end, it became
clear that the underlying reason was unfounded suspicion which only served to
alienat the organization and its national membership. 38 The study was
designed, supervised, and analyzed by H.A. Bulhan. 39 See “Survey on Small
Arms in Somaliland” - a report Bulhan for UNDP on March 15, 2004 40 Between
1979 and 1991, for instance, the United States provide more $800 million in
economic and material aid, amounting to 16.8 percent of the total aid the regime
received in the same period. See Humanitarian Aid in Somalia, report of the
Refugee Policy Group, Washington, D.C., 1994, pp. 6-7. 41 Berbera port
statistics cannot yet differentiate what is in transit and what is for
Somaliland. 42 Though non-of these is labour intensive, theses companies
particularly Dahab Shiil money transfer have branches at village level employing
one or two people. 43 Somaliland in Figures, a document issues by the
Somaliland Ministry of Planning and Coordination, 2004 45 Somaliland in
Figures, Ministry of Planning and Coordination, 2004. 46 Ibid, p. 14 47
Hargeisa Urban Household Economy Assessment carried by FEWS Net and
collaborating agencies in February - March 2003 48 The UN estimates it as
300,000; the Ministry of Planning as 350,00; the Water development Agency as
600,000- 700,000; and the Electoral Commission as 700,000. 49 Hargeisa Urban
Household Economy Assessment carried by FEWS Net and collaborating agencies in
February - March 2003 50 For review on the literature and psycho-social
effects of qat use, see Bulhan’s unpublished report on a study carried out in
Somaliland in 2003. 51 Boobe Yusuf Du’aale, personal communication. 52
The study was designed and supervised by H.A. Bulhan and Jane Mosselin.. Bulhan
coded and analyzed the data. 53 In a personal communication with the author,
the Minister of Finance explained, for instance, that Mohamed prepared his own
national budget which was not the responsibility of his ministry, that he made
his views unnecessarily accusatory and confrontational, that he distributed his
own budget before giving Minister of Finance chance to present the national
budget he had prepared. 55 Ibid. 54 Mohamed Hashi Elmi explained his
views and allegations in Haatuf, a daily newspaper, Issue 590, Volume 3, May 26,
2004. 56 Personal communication by the representative of UN-Habitat in
Hargeisa. 57 Case Study - Impact of Charcoal Production on Environment and
On the Social Economic of the Pastoral Communities of Somaliland , a documented
presented by the Somaliland Ministry of Pastoral Development and Environment.
58 The conflict continued except for a short period when Prime Minister
Mohamed Ibrahim Egal signed a in 1967 and thereby removed war clouds in the
region. 59 For instance, they argue that Ethiopia has not been as vigorous
advocate of Somaliland in international venues as Djibouti has been for the TNG.
Further, they point out that Ethiopia has extended least in assistance of trade
to Somaliland, even if its unwillingness to recognize Somaliland could be
ignored. 60 Osman Garaad is today in Hargeisa.

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