(DRAFT EPSA CEO FERC SLIDES) - The Electric Power Supply

Organized Wholesale Markets Require Meaningful
Reforms In Light Of Serious Challenges
Electric Power Supply Association
January 2014
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EPSA supports well-functioning competitive wholesale markets that are
economically sustainable to continue providing long-term benefits to consumers
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Reliability in competitive wholesale markets hinges on whether, when and how
private capital is invested in existing and new resources; such decisions are being
made today that will impact reliability later this decade and beyond
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Investment decisions in organized markets are in significant part made on the
basis of long term total cumulative revenue adequacy from energy, capacity and
ancillary services markets, which hinges on market design, tariffs and grid
operator practices for each RTO and ISO, often the result of past compromises
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Present market design and tariffs do not fully reflect significant structural changes
and market conditions that have occurred, are underway, or are expected since
present design and tariffs were approved; the impacts of this mismatch are
aggravated by certain grid operator practices that undermine market integrity
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Given structural changes, not merely cyclical fluctuations, FERC should focus on
long term reliability and therefore should pursue timely RTO market reforms
o
Capacity Markets – not only continue current FERC review of Eastern RTO/ISO
markets, but then develop best practices based on public input and require
RTOs/ISOs to demonstrate how they have or will satisfy them
o
Energy and Ancillary Services Markets – initiate a similar process leading to best
practices based on public input and require RTOs/ISOs to show they have or will
satisfy them given the role these markets play in investment decisions and acquisition
of necessary resources
2
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Low load growth has become the new normal going forward
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Natural gas prices result in lower energy market revenues
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Increased amount of resources participating in wholesale markets with
out of market revenues
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Increased role for variable and distributed resources impacts revenues
and costs for other resources needed for reliability
o Alters the dispatch mix, lowering capacity factors for many types of resources
o Squeezes energy and capacity revenues for generation needed to backstop variable resources
o Stresses many existing units through increased need for cycling and ramping
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Federal and state policies will continue to seek environmental
improvements
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Evolving effects of new technologies
o Level of impacts and timing remain key unknown variables
o FERC should remain technology neutral in developing market rules
o FERC has critical role in crafting market rules relating to integration of new technologies
consistent with competitive markets and system reliability
3
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Current and forward price signals are generally weak, the key question
for reliability is why
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If weak price signals reflect market fundamentals, then economically
unsustainable resources are not necessary for reliability; however, if, as
happens too often, weak price signals also reflect market design flaws
and grid operator interventions, resources needed for reliability in the
future are at risk

Retirements were originally driven by environmental costs impacting
older, smaller coal units dispatched infrequently; recent retirements
include nuclear and larger, newer or upgraded coal units; and some
natural gas plants that are needed to provide future system flexibility
face retirement sooner
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Early warning signs indicate that regulatory conditions should be
examined generically and appropriate RTO market reforms
implemented before the investment climate erodes further
4
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EPSA strongly supports competitive wholesale power markets,
which provide significant consumer benefits but require wellfunctioning updated market designs and tariffs properly
implemented through grid operator practices

As summarized in the attached appendix, RTO improvements
should be pursued in five policy areas: (1) energy and ancillary
services price formation; (2) capacity markets; (3) out of market
entry and uneconomic supply; (4) demand response; and (5)
transmission and seams

How best to pursue RTO/ISO improvements procedurally?
o FERC “best practices” policy statements based on public input combined with
RTO accountability to show how each RTO satisfies them or will change to
meet them could achieve timely reforms in a balanced manner
o Decisions in individual RTO dockets can be effective on discrete issues;
rulemakings may be required but the process is lengthy; and while
stakeholder processes are important, they can delay necessary reforms that
are critical to address given the challenges facing wholesale markets
5
APPENDIX ON MARKET REFORM ISSUES
AND SOLUTIONS

Competition shifts risks from consumers to investors, however resource
adequacy is not free under any regulatory model
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Investor risks should be accompanied by the opportunity to earn revenues
sufficient to recover fixed and variable costs plus a reasonable return on
invested capital; there are no guarantees in a competitive market, but nor
should there be unnecessary barriers created by market-distorting actions

Restructuring did not result in “deregulation” as was done elsewhere
o Wholesale markets have prices heavily shaped by FERC-jurisdictional market designs, tariffs,
and operator practices, plus market monitor intervention
o More uplifted/socialized charges distort accurate price discovery
o Services are being provided without proper compensation (e.g., reserves, reactive
power/voltage support)
o Bias is toward over-mitigation resulting in high-priced peaks being shaved while downside
remains
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Just and reasonable outcomes require improved energy, capacity and
ancillary services markets as outlined in detail in subsequent slides
A-1
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Energy Market and Ancillary Services Price Formation
Capacity Market and Resource Adequacy Rules
Out of Market Entry and Uneconomic Supply
Proper Role for Demand Response
Transmission and Seams
A-2
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LMPs must be allowed to fully reflect market conditions
o RTOs/ISOs fail to price “reliability” commitments (dynamic markets are disrupting former
regime of baseload, mid-merit and peaking plants with increasing use of reliability and other
non-priced dispatches)
o MWs put onto grid for reliability need to be factored into LMPS, un-hedgeable uplift should be
minimized, and all constraints need to be modeled in the market
o All operator actions taken to meet marginal demand should be reflected in LMPs regardless of
min/max output levels, etc. (Too often multiple units are dispatched at minimum load)
o After-the-fact review of dispatch actions would better coordinate operations and markets
functions
o Greater transparency regarding dispatch actions and grid conditions
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Many administratively mitigated prices skew true market prices
o
o
o
o
o
Bids must be allowed to reflect real time costs
Reassessment of components of short run marginal costs
Additional intra-power day reoffer or bidding opportunities
Reliability commitments should be scheduled day ahead and reflected in day ahead LMPs
Proper real time prices will lead load to bid more in day ahead and not only real time
A-3
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Capacity market is for physical not financial resources
Sloped demand curve to better reflect price and reliability
Forward procurement period should better align with transmission planning time
horizon
Forward commitment should be at least one year (with careful review of pros
and cons of non-discriminatory options for longer pricing periods for a portion of
capacity)
Locational value to signal investment in constrained areas
Seller-side mitigation must allow long-term fixed costs
Buyer-side mitigation must prevent undue price suppression
Transparency and tradability should be enhanced
Capacity imports into RTOs and ISOs should respect physical and operational
reliability limits
More predictable future capacity market prices are desirable
A-4
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RMR resources should be held out of energy and capacity market price
calculations to avoid artificially suppressing market prices

Careful review required to determine the nature, extent and impacts out of
market revenues have on accurate price formation
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Strong MOPR and other buyer-side market power rules will continue to be
key market design elements

Edgar-like guidelines for utility self-builds may help ensure fair consideration
of market options or else rate-based generation within RTOs distort market
outcomes
A-5
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Demand response has an appropriate role in electricity markets; given the increased
level of demand response that is now participating in RTO markets, the issues going
forward revolve around comparable regulation if demand response is to receive
comparable compensation
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Ideally demand response should be an energy market, not capacity market, product

If a capacity market product, demand response should have comparable “must offer”
obligations and when called in energy markets be factored into LMPs
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Energy market compensation should reflect savings from foregone retail
consumption
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If demand response is allowed in the capacity markets:
o Comparable basis as a single, annual unlimited physical product
o Behind-the-meter resources should participate as generation, not masquerading as DR
o No hold-back percentage from base auctions for later ones
A-6
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Greater coordination and transparency between neighboring RTOs/nonRTOs are necessary

Problems largely stem from historically different approaches to
assumptions, modeling, and outage coordination as opposed to technical
rationales
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Balancing areas should better align transmission and generation outage
scheduling across seams
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Operational and physical constraints must be respected
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Interconnection and transmission service queues should be studied at the
same calendar intervals
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Basic modeling elements and assumptions should be consistent across
RTOs and non-RTO areas
A-7