HEARN, C.J.: Heyward Leon Rogers was convicted
of two counts of first degree criminal sexual conduct, assault and battery with
intent to kill, kidnapping, and strong arm robbery. On appeal, Rogers argues
the court erred by (1) allowing the solicitor to ask leading questions during
the deaf victim’s direct examination, (2) allowing the victim’s son to serve
as her interpreter during cross-examination, (3) failing to grant Rogers’ motion
for a mistrial after learning that six jurors were exposed to a newspaper article
about the trial, (4) admitting a purse into evidence before the victim identified
it, (5) admitting fingerprint results into evidence, and (6) sentencing him
to life without parole when his last conviction for a most serious crime was
nineteen years prior to this conviction. We affirm.

FACTS

On the evening of September 28,
2002, the victim left a fast food restaurant in West Columbia and was walking
toward a video poker parlor when a man pushed her to the ground and raped her.
The victim fought back and eventually caused her perpetrator to flee by throwing
sand in his eyes. When the perpetrator fled, he took with him the victim’s
purse and her newly purchased food. A police officer on patrol found the victim
shaking and crying on the side of the road, and he called an ambulance. The
victim was transported to the hospital where a rape protocol kit was prepared.
A week later, the victim helped the police draw a composite sketch of her assailant,
which was used to arrest Rogers.

The victim, who was fifty-seven years old at the time
of the attack, has been deaf since the age of eight. As a result, her speech
is difficult to understand, and she communicates through some vocalization combined
with gestures. Because of this unique system of communication, both the solicitor
and Rogers’ counsel had problems eliciting testimony from the victim at trial.
To cope with the problems, the trial court allowed the extensive use of leading
questions during the victim’s direct examination. During cross-examination,
however, leading questions alone did not facilitate communication between the
victim and defense counsel. Thus, the court found it necessary to allow the
victim’s son to serve as an interpreter.

Rogers was convicted on all charges and sentenced
concurrently to fifteen years for robbery and four sentences of life without
possibility of parole for the other charges. We affirm.

Rogers raises
six issues on appeal: (1) the failure to appoint an interpreter during the
victim’s direct-examination; (2) the use of the victim’s son as an interpreter
during the victim’s cross-examination; (3) the denial of a motion for new trial
after discovering jury misconduct; (4) the admission of the victim’s purse into
evidence; (5) the admission of fingerprint evidence; and (6) the propriety of
a life without parole sentence.

1. Victim’s direct examination.

Rogers first argues the trial
court erred in failing to supply an interpreter for the victim during direct
examination. We find this issue is not preserved for our review.

Because of the victim’s communication
problems, the trial court allowed the solicitor to use leading questions. Defense
counsel repeatedly objected to the use of leading questions; however, counsel
never objected to the court’s failure to appoint an interpreter, nor did counsel
recommend an interpreter be appointed. Now, Rogers asks this court to
find error in the trial court’s failure to do what was never asked of it.

“It is axiomatic that an issue
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to
and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review.” Wilder
Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998). “There are
four basic requirements to preserving issues at trial for appellate review.
The issue must have been (1) raised to and ruled upon by the trial court, (2)
raised by the appellant, (3) raised in a timely manner, and (4) raised to the
trial court with sufficient specificity.” Jean Hoefer Toal et al., Appellate
Practice in South Carolina 57 (2d ed. 2002).

Here, Rogers never raised
the issue of using an interpreter during direct examination to the trial court.
Therefore, this issue is not preserved for appellate review.

2. Victim’s cross-examination

Rogers also argues the
trial court erred by failing to supply the victim with a qualified interpreter
during cross-examination. Rogers contends the interpreter was not qualified
because he was the victim’s son. We disagree.

Soon
after Rogers’ counsel began cross-examining the victim, it became apparent that
the victim could not understand many of counsel’s questions. When the victim
did comprehend the questions, defense counsel could not understand her responses.
Because of these problems, the solicitor offered the victim’s sister and the
victim’s son as interpreters, as they were the only two people available who
could interpret the victim’s unique method of communication. Defense counsel
objected to the use of the sister because she was also a witness in the case.
Counsel also objected to the son because he was related to the victim. The
court appointed the victim’s son as interpreter, after finding that it was in
the best interest of the witness and in the best interest of justice. We
find no error in this decision.

Section
15-27-15 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2003) regulates the use of interpreters
in criminal proceedings. This section requires the use of qualified interpreters,
who are defined in part as not being family members of the deaf witness. S.C.
Code Ann. § 15-27-15(B)(1) (Supp. 2003). However, the requirement of a qualified
interpreter can be waived by the deaf person or by the judge in the fulfillment
of justice. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-27-15(A) (Supp. 2003). Specifically, the
statute states that “[i]f a person elects to use an interpreter other than a
qualified interpreter provided for in this section, the court must first make
a determination that this action is in the best interest of the individual and
is in the best interests of justice.” In this case, the trial court understood
the required findings and made the determination that the use of the victim’s
son as interpreter was in the best interest of the victim and of justice.

The trial court was confronted
with a difficult situation at trial and fashioned a solution that protected
the interests of the victim and justice (as the statute governing interpreters
requires) while also affording Rogers with a means to cross-examine his accuser.
Thus, we find no error.

3. Trial Publicity

Rogers next argues the
trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial after jury misconduct
was discovered. We disagree.

During the course of the
trial, it came to the court’s attention that a newspaper containing an article
about the ongoing trial was in the jury room. At the beginning of proceedings
on the day of the article’s publication, the trial court spent considerable
time questioning the jury if any members had either read, seen, or had the article
mentioned to them. Six jurors answered these questions in the affirmative.
These six jurors were then questioned individually by the court. Three of
them had not even seen the article, but had been apprised of its existence by
others. These three jurors stated that they did not read or discuss the article
because it would have been inappropriate. They further testified they had not
formed any opinion in this case as a result of this limited exposure to the
article’s existence.

The three other jurors
all stated they had looked at the article. One juror stated he saw the headline
of the article, but did not read it because of the court’s instructions. He
further said he did not see anyone in the jury room read the paper and nothing
had caused him to form an opinion in this case. Another juror admitted that
she was to blame for bringing the newspaper into the jury room. She explained
that when a fellow juror told her the newspaper contained an article on the
trial, she found the appropriate section of the newspaper, folded it, and placed
it in her purse. During this action, she said she was only exposed to the headline.
This juror also testified nothing caused her to form an opinion in this case.

Finally, the sixth juror
admitted she scanned the article though she did not remember any information
regarding Rogers. Importantly, she remembered having read details in a paragraph
following one referencing Rogers’ prior record. As a result, the judge excused
this juror.

“The granting or refusing of
a motion for a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court
whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion
amounting to an error of law.” State v. Wasson, 299 S.C. 508, 510, 386 S.E.2d 255, 256 (1989).
In evaluating news articles appearing during trial, the trial court must determine
if they are prejudicial and whether jurors read the articles. Id. at
511, 386 S.E.2d at 256. If such prejudicial exposure has occurred, the court
must craft an appropriate curative measure. Id. In Wasson, our
supreme court affirmed the denial of a mistrial where two jurors had read an
article discussing the defendant’s other pending charges because the jurors
had stated the article did not affect their decision to find the defendant guilty.
Id. at 511, 386 S.E.2d at 257.

In this case, five of the six
jurors had very limited exposure to the article, and all testified it had not
caused them to form any opinions. The final juror was dismissed because she
had read most of the article. We find the trial court thoroughly evaluated
each juror’s exposure to the news article and took the appropriate measures
to safeguard Rogers’ right to a fair trial. Therefore, we find no error.

4. Admission of victim’s purse

Rogers next argues that the
admission of the victim’s purse into evidence was error because it had not been
identified by the victim. We disagree.

The purse
was entered into evidence during the testimony of Mark Jones, the police officer
who retrieved the purse after a homeowner called and reported finding it in
his yard. The purse was admitted at trial after Jones testified that it was
the purse he retrieved, that the purse matched a description given by the victim,
and that it contained an item displaying the victim’s name. The victim’s description
of the missing purse and the discovery of items bearing her name within it link
the purse to the victim and the crime. Therefore, admission of the purse at
that time was not erroneous.

Moreover,
the victim eventually identified the purse as belonging to her. Thus, even
if the purse had been admitted without a proper foundation, the foundation was
ultimately provided, and there would be no prejudice to Rogers. SeeState v. Pollard, 261 S.C. 389, 200 S.E.2d 233 (1973) (finding no prejudice
where drugs were entered into evidence prior to testimony of a complete chain
of custody because the chain was eventually provided); see also Rule
104(b), SCRE (allowing admission of evidence subject to the introduction of
other supporting evidence). Therefore, we find no error in the trial court’s
admission of the purse into evidence.

5. Admission of fingerprint evidence

Rogers also argues the trial
court erred by allowing fingerprint results into evidence without a proper chain
of custody. We disagree.

Rogers’ fingerprint was found
on a slip of paper in the victim’s purse and these results were entered into
evidence through the testimony of a fingerprint analyst. Rogers contends the
evidence should be excluded because the purse’s chain of custody was defective.

Initially, we note that because
the purse is a non-fungible piece of evidence, chain of custody is not required
for its admission. State v. Glenn, 328 S.C. 300, 305, 492 S.E.2d 393,
395 (Ct. App. 1997) (“[W]here the issue is the admissibility of non-fungible
evidence – that is, evidence that is unique and identifiable – the establishment
of a strict chain of custody is not required . . . .”). However, even if a
chain needed to be established, it had been. At trial, every individual who
had possession of the purse, which contained the slip of paper, testified to
having it and denied tampering with it.

Rogers points to a period of
one week when law enforcement had returned the purse to the victim before retrieving
the purse again and performing fingerprint tests on its contents. Apparently,
Rogers’ concern is that some form of tampering might have occurred while it
was in the victim’s possession. However, the proof of chain of custody does
not have to negate all possibility of tampering. The State only needs to establish
a complete chain of evidence as far as practicable. Id. The period
of time during which the purse was returned to the victim is accounted for by
the testimony of the victim’s sister, who lives with the victim. The sister
testified that during the week the purse was in her home, the bag containing
the purse was never opened. Additionally, the officer who returned the purse
testified that when she went to retrieve it, the bag containing the purse was
where she had left it.

South Carolina law does not
require testimony as to the exclusion of any possibility of tampering. Rather,
“where the identity of persons handling the specimen is established, . . . evidence
regarding its care goes only to the weight of the specimen as credible evidence,”
not to the admissibility of the evidence. State v. Carter, 344 S.C.
419, 424, 544 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2001). Accordingly, we find no error in
the admission of the fingerprint results.

6. Life without parole

Finally, Rogers argues a sentence
of life without parole is cruel and unusual punishment under this set of facts.
We disagree.

Rogers was sentenced to life
without parole pursuant to section 17-25-45(A) of the South Carolina Code.
Section 17-25-45(A) requires that “upon a conviction for a most serious offense
. . . a person must be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life without
the possibility of parole if that person has one or more prior convictions for:
(1) a most serious offense.”

Nineteen years prior to the
convictions addressed in this opinion, Rogers was convicted of assault and battery
with intent to kill, which is a “most serious offense.” S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-45(C)(1)
(Supp. 2003). However, Rogers argues this prior offense was too remote in time
to be used to enhance his sentence for the current crime.

In State v. Burdette,
335 S.C. 34, 37-38, 515 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1999), the supreme court affirmed imposing
a life without parole sentence where the appellant’s prior offense occurred
seventeen years before the triggering offense, just two years less than the
span of time in our case. Furthermore, section 17-25-45(A) has withstood repeated
constitutional challenges, including assertions of cruel and unusual punishment.
See, e.g., State v. Jones, 344 S.C. 48, 56-59, 543 S.E.2d
541, 545-47 (2001) (holding “two-strikes” law constitutional under separation
of powers, cruel and unusual punishment, equal protection and ex post facto
challenges). Thus, we find no error in imposing a life without parole sentence
in this case.