epa

As J.S. Mill noted in his book On Liberty, people generally do not limit liberty in a principled and consistent way. Rather, they impose or oppose restrictions based on unreasoned likes and dislikes. The political, moral and legal issues of abortion are, obviously enough, areas where this occurs.

Conservatives purport to oppose regulations and favor liberty; yet they tend to support imposing strict and even harsh restrictions on abortion. Liberals purport to favor regulations to protect people, yet also tend to accept abortion. This apparent inconsistency raises the interesting problem of working out a consistent moral position regarding liberty and regulation. I will begin with the generic conservative and then move on to the generic liberal while noting that I understand there are nuanced positions.

While it is a stereotype, conservatives are often cast as opposing many regulations aimed at protecting people from harm. For example, environmental regulations are generally supposed to be aimed at protecting people from toxins. As another example, safety regulations for products and business operations are supposed to be aimed at protecting consumers and workers. Naturally enough, few conservatives will say that they oppose protecting people; however, they argue against such regulations by claiming that they harm business and thus “kill jobs” and limit profits. Some will contend that the claims about the dangers of things like pollution are simply fabrications by liberals who are motivated by their hatred of capitalism.

Pushing aside the rhetoric, an objective look at the general conservative stance towards regulations of this sort is that they are willing to tolerate harms, such as the deaths of children from pollution, as part of the cost of economic advantages. This is a utilitarian/consequentialist approach: a certain amount of harm (pollution, safety issues, health problems, etc.) is an acceptable price to pay for the economic advantages. This is also a cost-shifting approach: the cost is moved from the business to those impacted by the weak or lack of regulations. For example, weak regulations on pollution and environmental damage allow businesses to make more profits because they do not need to pay the full costs of these harms. They are instead shifted on to the people impacted by then. To give a specific illustration, allowing toxins to go out of a factory saves the company money, but costs those exposed to the toxin in terms of their health and economically, if only from health care costs. The idea is, in general terms, that the interests of business outweigh the interests of those harmed—even when those harmed are the unborn and young children. This is a classic consequentialist approach for resolving competing interests.

In the case of abortion, the conservatives generally profess to be against it. This is generally presented in moral and religious terms of how life is sacred, that the unborn must be protected from harm, and so on. They do not, of course, present it as imposing on liberty. The obvious problem with this position on abortion is that it directly contradicts their professed position on regulations aimed at protecting people: they oppose such regulations by arguing in favor of economic interests. Obviously enough, if it is acceptable to allow harm to the unborn when doing so is in the interest of those doing the harm, this general principle must also be applied to abortion as well—it should be acceptable when the interests of the woman outweighs that of the unborn.

This line of reasoning can be countered on utilitarian grounds: allowing businesses to harm to the unborn for economic interests outweighs the harms; allowing women to have abortions when it is in their interest does not. This could also be argued by contending that women matter less (or not at all) in the calculation, unless they are in business and harming the unborn via business activity. This approach, while honest, does seem terrible: the unborn should not be harmed, unless doing so is profitable for the right economic interests. As noted above, liberals also run into a problem here.

While it is a stereotype, liberals are supposed to favor regulation that protects people—even when doing so imposes considerable economic costs. They are also supposed to be pro-choice and support the liberty of a woman to have an abortion.

When arguing for protective regulations, one approach is to do so on utilitarian grounds: protecting people from harm creates more good than bad, even when the economic harms are factored in. There is also the fairness argument: when businesses can shift the costs to the people being harmed by their activities, this is stealing from those people. And, of course, there is the more deontological approach (that actions are good or bad in themselves) that allowing people to be harmed is just wrong.

The utilitarian justification can, obviously enough, be used to justify abortion: the benefits gained outweigh the harm done. Obviously not for the unborn, though. This suggests that the same approach can also justify opposing protective regulations—if it is acceptable to kill the unborn when doing so is in one’s interest, then this would apply both to abortion and business.

The fairness argument, also quite obviously, also seems to tell against abortion: the cost is being imposed on the unborn—they are killed for the interests of another; which seems analogous to cost shifting in business. The deontological approach would also seem to tell against abortion: if regulation is needed to protect the unborn from the harm of pollution and such, then it would also be needed to protect them from abortion.

It is important to note that I am not addressing in this essay the matter of which position is correct. Rather, my objective has been to map up the conflict between views of protective regulations and abortion. Pro-life folks should be for protective regulation across the board, or have a reasonable argument why aborting the unborn is wrong but killing them through environmental pollution is acceptable. Pro-choice folks should be tolerant of the liberty to harm others when doing so is in one’s interest, or have a reasonable argument why aborting the unborn is acceptable but harming them with pollution is not. I am confident that wise thinkers can easily address these minor challenges.

Like this:

The environment continues to be a hot battleground for various groups. While the main theater of war has been climate change, there are also side battles involving other matters, such as the threat posed (or not posed) by mercury. Not surprisingly, many of the folks who argue against climate change and contend that health risks of things like mercury are exaggerated tend to be associated with companies that produce substances alleged to cause climate change and/or be a health threat.

While the EPA has often been accused of being a mere lap-dog to corporate interests, it recently issued 946 pages of new rules governing the emission of mercury and other pollutants by power plants. The main argument for these laws is utilitarian. According to the EPA’s Lisa Jackson, while the rules will cost companies $10.9 billion a year, they will save 17,000 lives and provide as much as $140 billion in health benefits. Even if the lives are left out of the equation, this seems like a rather good idea. After all, getting $140 billion in benefits certainly seems to be worth the $10.9 billion. Naturally, it is worth noting that the cost will be paid by the companies and the benefits will be reaped by the people who will avoid the harm done by the pollutants. However, this seems morally acceptable and it would seem hard to argue that the companies have a right to save $10.9 billion by costing other people their lives or health.

Obviously enough, this argument has merit only if the numbers involved are accurate. Not surprisingly, there are those who are questioning their accuracy. There are, of course, always grounds for questioning such numbers. The first is, of course, the inherent problem of induction: whenever engaged in inductive reasoning, the conclusion can always turn out to be false even if the premises are true. Of course, this is a fairly weak method of challenging since it applies to all inductive reasoning. What is, of course, needed is something more substantial.

Willie Soon and Paul Driessen recently wrote an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal raising a substantial criticism, To be specific, they claim “the EPA systematically ignored evidence and clinical studies that contradict its regulatory agenda, which is to punish hydrocarbon use.”

In critical thinking terms, they are accusing the EPA of trying to make the public a victim of the fallacy of incomplete/suppressed evidence and they are also accusing the EPA of bias. If the first charge is correct, then this would be a serious problem. After all, when drawing a conclusion there is a logical (and ethical) requirement to consider all the reasonably available significant evidence. Also, if the EPA officials are biased, then this impacts their credibility in a negative manner. Obviously enough, the same standards apply to Soon and Driessen.

One concern about Soon is that while he is at Harvard, he is an astrophysicist. This raises some questions about his expertise in assessing the impact of mercury on the population. While any competent scientist (or critical thinking professor) can engage in legitimate criticism of methodology, assessing the actual causal impact of mercury falls under the domain of other areas of expertise. There is also some concerns raised by the Soon and Baliunas controversy. A general concern about Driessen and Soon is the same one they leveled against the EPA: the possibility of bias. While the EPA might have an agenda, Soon and Driessen can also be regarded as having an agenda of their own. As such, it is well worth considering their claims in the light of potential bias.

Since I am not an expert on mercury, I will not enter the fray other than to point out the obvious: mercury is well established as a toxin and it seems like a good idea to reduce the amount of the substance being released into the environment. However, I am willing to consider all the available evidence and arguments in terms of what level of pollution would meet an ethically acceptable balance between the costs to reduce the levels and the harms inflicted by this pollutant.

A giant oil spill now menaces the coast of the United States, lurking like a monster under the waves. This shapeless mass of oil has served to help shape the debate over extending access to offshore drilling.

There are numerous reasons to expand offshore drilling. First, the American economy is still rather dependent on oil. Despite all the talk about green being the new black (as in oil), black is still the new black. Since the oil is so important, it can be argued that it is worth the risk. Second, such oil operations would not provide money to countries that are hostile to the United States (at least not directly). Third, these oil wells would not require military operations in foreign lands.

There are also excellent reasons not to expand offshore drilling. The most obvious one is the threat to the environment and the economy. While we do not yet know how much damage the current oil spill will do, the odds are that it will be massive.

Those in favor of drilling do point out that such massive disasters are incredibly rare and the odds against another one are exceptionally low. This is a good point. After all, we regularly tolerate risk in order to make a gain (or at least to avoid the effort or cost needed to reduce or eliminate the risk). This is a matter of weighing the possible costs and the possible gains, factoring in the chances of each. For example, all commercial flights could be checked with the rigor that Air Force One undergoes before it flies. This would make flying even safer. However, we tolerate the risk of crashing (which is very low) because the cost would be rather high. As another example, people can dramatically increase their health and well being by eating better and exercising. Yet most people do not do this, even though they put themselves at significant risk for illness. While this approach is not a good idea, people do this because the effort needed to reduce the risk is not worth it to them. So, in the case of off shore drilling, perhaps the benefits outweigh the risks. Or at least enough (or the right) people might be wiling to accept (or ignore) the risks of drilling.

Another factor worth considering here is the matter of alternative energy. While the risk of drilling might be acceptable (or at least accepted) it is also important to consider whether or not we actually need to take that risk in order to get the energy we want. To use an analogy, suppose a person wants to lose weight. One option is to undergo surgery and risk complications or even death. Another option is to exercise and eat sensibly. While the second option takes more effort, the fact that the risks are so much lower (and the benefits greater) than the surgery marks it is the better choice. To use another analogy, if a person wants to get drunk, they could drain Sterno or denatured alcohol through bread and drink that (the bread doesn’t help, by the way). Or they could buy alcohol that is intended for drinking. The second option is obviously the better choice.

In the case of oil, we do have some clear alternatives. However, oil is still cheaper than the alternatives (assuming that the environmental and economic damage is not factored in). Also, the oil companies have considerable influence over Washington. So, it seems likely that we will be drinking that Sterno for a while longer.