By Yongnian Zheng

Asia’s Future: Become Another Middle East or Avoid South China Sea War

The South China Sea arbitration
case initiated by the Philippines and the recent ruling on the case by The
Hague court have raised a pertinent question: will Asia become another Middle
East? Besides the fact that the former Philippine president had gone against the
agreement with China to use bilateral negotiations to resolve disputes, another
worry is the significant role that external forces had played in this affair.

What does “becoming another Middle
East” mean? Countries in the Middle East and the region itself are currently in
a chaotic state. Ever since the 18th century, Western imperialism has intervened
in Middle Eastern affairs. After the Second World War, the US and its western
allies established the rules and regulations for that region. Since the end of
the Cold War, it was the US who single-handedly dictated the regional order. In
other words, the internal affairs and the regional order of the Middle East are
highly dependent on foreign influence. As the US starts to lose its shine as a
superpower, the Middle Eastern order is beginning to look shaky too. In today’s
state of affairs, although the US may have good political intentions for the
Middle East, it is handicapped by its weakening ability.

The US may have also done more harm
than good. After the September 11th attack, the US launched its War on Terror
and hoped that its “Roadmap to Peace” plan would bring US-style democracy to
the Middle East. However, the truth is that the US failed to secure the most
basic of things there — political and social order, and people’s livelihoods
and lives. Regimes broke down, anarchy swept across the region, and waves of
refugees swarmed into Europe. An even more serious consequence is religious extremism.
Islamic radicalism can be found in both failed regimes and in countries like
Turkey. For example, the present Turkish President permits and even encourages
radical groups. However, so long as the government is elected democratically,
the US will give its support. In the long term, the consequence of allowing
religious radicalism to grow will be devastating. It is impossible to imagine
that the Middle East will be able to build a new order in the foreseeable
future.

The Middle East saga demonstrates
that when an order is built by and is dependent on a foreign party, the
foundation is going to be unsteady. Once its interests in the region become
diminished, the foreign power will turn its back and leave. When the US was
reaping huge benefits from the Middle East, it threw itself into the affairs
there; now that its gains have become smaller than the costs, the US is packing
up and leaving. When the regional order loses its backing, a chaotic situation
ensues.

So, why do we ask whether Asia is
becoming another Middle East? External forces are manifested in two ways —
great power politics and internationalization. There are two great external
powers that are involved in the affairs of Asia — the US and Japan (or a
US-Japan alliance). These two countries have been actively meddling in Asian
affairs since the beginning. There is evidence showing that these two countries
are the manipulators behind the arbitration case. While the US and Japan have
some interests in this region, they are not direct stakeholders. Their position
in Asia in similar to the US’ stance in the Middle East — they stand to gain
immensely if they are deeply involved; but if Asia falls into a crisis, they will
not be fatally affected.

“Internationalization” refers to
the Philippines unilaterally initiating the case against China at the PCA. The
PCA smacked of commercialism, as it was employed by and served the Philippines.
Therefore, China was justified in questioning the PCA’s credibility. Internationalization
as exemplified by the Philippine case is problematic. First, as mentioned, the judgement
was clouded by the commercial undertaking. Second, the judges’ political and
ideological leanings easily influenced the ruling. Third, the court should have
obtained adequate knowledge about the case, and should not have depended solely
on information provided by the Philippines. It was no doubt a monumental task
for the judges working on this highly complex South China Sea case. From the
decidedly politicized ruling, we observe that the ideal rule of the law has
changed to rule of the lawyer or even rule of the judge. From the example of
Itu Aba (also known as Taiping Island) being downgraded from an island to a
rock, the judges had introduced some radical ideas which set the stage for the
collapse of the regional order.

The ruling has totally invalidated
China’s historical rights in the South China Sea. Since the start of the case,
China has adopted the principle of “non-participation and non-acceptance.”
Historically, China is not alone in choosing this posture; other great powers
have also ignored similar judgments. In other words, the ruling would not
change the current situation in the South China Sea in a practical manner. Nonetheless,
there are two potential directions that this dispute could go.

First, the dispute could continue
on the road of conflict. The US and Japan have repeatedly insisted that China accept
the ruling. Although claimant countries like the Philippines and Vietnam are
less direct in their demands, they too hope that China will accept. Non
claimant countries also wish for China’s acceptance of the ruling out of fear
of China’s rise. The next step taken by the claimant countries is going to be
important. If they think they can stand to gain, they will take the arbitration
route as demonstrated by the Philippines. Even if they are willing to return to
the bilateral negotiation table with China, the US and Japan will try every
possible means to persuade and encourage these countries to stir up trouble for
China. If this is the case, the South China Sea dispute will worsen and a
confrontation will erupt.

Second, the dispute could move
towards a positive direction — peace and cooperation. Now that the arbitration
case is over and done with, the countries involved have arrived at a new
vantage point, i.e. they realize that resorting to law is not an effective way to
solve disputes, and the solution will need to be sought by political and
diplomatic means.

All hands need to be on deck if we
want to achieve the positive development, although it may remain a pipe dream.
The South China Sea issue has become highly-internationalized and involves the
great powers, who will be relentless in their demand that China accept the PCA
ruling. Even the Philippines will want to reap the greatest benefit out of the ruling
which is in their favor. Therefore, the outcome will be quite bleak. Although
the Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has expressed his willingness to mend
ties with China, the US may pile pressure on the Philippines to prevent it from
being too close to China.

We cannot rely on foreign
powers like the US and Japan to come to our help, so it is up regional actors
like China, ASEAN and other claimant countries to work things out.

If the dispute escalates into a
conflict, it is highly likely that the region will sink into a Middle Eastern
type of crisis. How can we prevent this from happening? As mentioned above, we
cannot rely on foreign powers like the US and Japan to come to our help, so it
is up regional actors like China, ASEAN and other claimant countries to work
things out.

China has the most significant role
in this quandary, as it is a great power in this region and also possesses the
greatest capability to ensure the regional order. It was the earliest country
to suggest the solution of “putting aside differences and seeking joint
development,” but the idea did not receive positive response from other
countries. Vietnam and the Philippines were constructing islands on the South
China Sea long before China started to do so. China was merely responding in
kind when it began to build islands; but the speed and quantity of the
construction activities leapfrogged the other countries as a result of its
immense capability. Now China has the opportunity to be an active leader in the
South China Sea. It could provide maritime services, such as building lighthouses
and harbors, and providing emergency search and rescue operations to other
countries. China could also revive the Deng Xiaoping-initiated “seeking joint
development” plan and engage other countries in co-development programs such as
negotiation of fishery agreements, protection of marine ecosystems and
resources, etc.

For ASEAN, its most important
action will be to adopt an independent foreign policy and remain neutral.
Should it choose sides, be it the US or China, ASEAN will head towards an
inevitable split. Till today the grouping is a loosely constructed entity; its
structure is both a strength and a weakness. The weakness is that it is not
robust enough to withstand a strong external force. Although China understands
ASEAN’s close strategic ties with the US, it will not put up with ASEAN
countries closing ranks against it. In other words, China will not tolerate an
ASEAN that side with the US and Japan to go against it. Either the US or China
has the ability to orchestrate an ASEAN “split.”

The “self-isolation” that the US
proclaims China is going through now is just wishful thinking of the US and
some ASEAN countries. If China really needs to depend on economic means to win
friends (just like how the US is relying on strategic trade groups to achieve
that), it will win as many friends as the US. Further, China is not asking
ASEAN to side with it; it is only asking ASEAN to remain neutral. If ASEAN
lacks independence and needs the US to help it become “stronger,” it does not
bode well for the long-term future of the grouping. As the Middle East saga has
shown, an order that is dependent on an external power will not have a strong
foundation. An independent ASEAN will ensure its sustainability.

It is equally important for other
claimant countries to have an independent foreign policy and to adopt a neutral
stand. The US “pivot to Asia” has caused some countries to have illusions about
the US, although some leaders of these countries may be pro-America themselves.
From the example of the Middle East, it is safe to say that the US will not
declare war on China for the interest of any ASEAN country. This situation is
determined by the current global order. Although there are some differences
between the US and China, the situation is still evolving. The relation between
the two countries is unlike the US-Soviet relation during the Cold War, which
was mainly based on nuclear rivalry. The US-China relation of today — in
economic terms at least — has become what some academics have termed “Chimerica.”
The two countries also have much for cooperation in the international arena,
ranging from the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to climate change. The
best interest for the US is — and has always been — not to lose China; if it
does, the US will only be the “overlord” of half the globe. If the claimant
counties are circumspect about this state of affairs, they will cast aside the
illusions they harbor about America. Even if the US does go to war for the
interests of some ASEAN countries, its capabilities might be over-rated too.
The chaos that the US has inflicted upon the Middle East and other regions is
proof of that.

More importantly, some of the
rhetoric used by the US, Japan and some ASEAN countries, like “Big nations
should not bully smaller ones,” “might makes right,” etc., are actually the
logic of the US and the west. It is not China’s logic. A case in point is that
China and Vietnam solved their land border dispute and Beibu Gulf maritime
boundary issue using political and diplomatic negotiations. Not only did China
not bully Vietnam, it also gave quite a few concessions to Vietnam. If
countries like the Philippines resort to using great power politics or
“internationalization” of the law to force China to concede, they will not get
any benefit out of it and their interests will be hurt too.

Since the announcement of the
ruling, all concerned parties are still mulling their next moves. The actions
they take will decide which direction Asia heads to: spiral into a Middle Eastern
type of crisis, or avoid war and head towards peace and stability.

(Translated by Chean Chian Cheong)

About The Author

Yongnian Zheng is Professor and Director of East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He is Editor of Series on Contemporary China (World Scientific Publishing) and Editor of China Policy Series (Routledge). He is also a co-editor of China: An International Journal. He has studied both China's transformation and its external relations. His papers have appeared in journals such as Comparative Political Studies, Political Science Quarterly, Third World Quarterly and China Quarterly. He is the author of 13 books, including Technological Empowerment, De Facto Federalism in China, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China and Globalization and State Transformation in China, and coeditor of 11 books on China's politics and society including the latest volume China and the New International Order (2008).
Besides his research work, Professor Zheng has also been an academic activist. He served as a consultant to United Nation Development Programme on China's rural development and democracy. In addition, he has been a columnist for Xinbao (Hong Kong) and Zaobao (Singapore) for many years, writing numerous commentaries on China's domestic and international affairs.
Professor Zheng received his B.A. and M.A. degrees from Beijing University, and his Ph.D. at Princeton University. He was a recipient of Social Science Research Council-MacArthur Foundation Fellowship (1995-1997) and John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Fellowship (2003-2004). He was Professor and founding Research Director of the China Policy Institute, the University of Nottingham, United Kingdom.