Appeal From the Appellate Panel
Of the Workers' Compensation Commission

Opinion No. 4895
Heard October 3, 2011 – Filed October 19,
2011

REVERSED

Stuart Wesley Snow, of Florence, for Appellant.

James H. Lichty, Weston Adams, III, and Helen F. Hiser, all of
Columbia, for Respondents.

CURETON, A.J.: After Ralph D. King, Jr., suffered
work-related injuries and filed a workers' compensation claim, the single
commissioner awarded him benefits. King's employer, International Knife and
Saw-Florence, and its insurance carrier, Peerless Insurance Company, (collectively
Employer) appealed to the Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation
Commission (Appellate Panel). The Appellate Panel reversed. King appeals,
arguing the Appellate Panel erred in: (1) concluding his repetitive trauma
injury was compensable at a time when King had missed no work because of the
condition, had sought no treatment for it, and had not been diagnosed as having
a repetitive trauma injury; (2) concluding the ninety-day notice period
commenced before King was diagnosed with a repetitive trauma injury; (3) finding
substantial evidence indicated King had "first noticed [a repetitive
trauma injury] a couple of years ago, . . . suspected his job was causing [a
repetitive trauma injury] when he first noticed it, and . . . discovered his
condition was compensable a couple of years ago"; (4) finding substantial
evidence that, even if King had not discovered his condition was compensable,
he could have done so years earlier through the exercise of reasonable
diligence; and (5) failing to address whether King had a reasonable excuse for
failing to give timely notice and whether Employer suffered undue prejudice as
a result. We reverse on the issue of compensability, reinstate the benefits
awarded by the single commissioner, and decline to address King's remaining
issues.

FACTS

From April 1995 to May 2008, King used six-, eight-, and ten-pound
hammers to hammer saw blades to customer specifications for his employer. On
April 17, 2008, the hammer King was using broke, and King experienced a sharp
pain in his shoulder. He continued working for nearly a month before notifying
his supervisor of his injury and seeking medical treatment. King stopped
working on May 15, 2008.

On August 7, 2008, King filed a claim for workers' compensation
benefits due to right shoulder and neck injuries. Employer denied his claim,
alleging his injuries were not work-related and he failed to give timely notice
of a repetitive trauma injury. King later amended his claim to include carpal
tunnel syndrome in his right arm, hand, and fingers. Both the original and the
amended claim indicated he sought benefits for "injury" as well as
"repetitive trauma."

On November 25, 2008, the parties appeared for a hearing before
the single commissioner on the issue of whether King gave Employer proper
notice. King testified he stopped working for Employer in May because of pain
in his "arm and shoulder and stuff." Although King denied having any
problems using his hands or arms prior to that day, he conceded his right arm
had hurt and ached for the past couple of years. Furthermore, he suspected the
ache in his arm was connected to his work: "After slinging a hammer all
day, . . . your arm's going to be tired."

King's medical records reflected that, from May to September 2008,
King sought and received medical treatment for pain on his right side, from his
neck to his hand, and numbness in his right hand. He received prescription
pain medications, and his doctors explored possible causes in his rotator cuff,
cervical spine, nervous system, and carpal tunnel. An MRI excluded King's
rotator cuff and spine as sources of the pain; however, one of his treating
physicians found a mild nerve impingement in his right shoulder. A steroid
injection to King's shoulder relieved some of his shoulder pain.

In addition, electrodiagnostic studies revealed King suffered from
moderate carpal tunnel syndrome on his right side. He underwent ETPS[1] and physical therapy. By August,
King reported his right hand was still numb. His doctor recommended carpal
tunnel release surgery to treat King's hand.

The single commissioner found King's report to Employer was timely
and awarded benefits for total disability and medical treatment. Employer
appealed, and the Appellate Panel reversed both the finding of timeliness and
the award of benefits. Specifically, the Appellate Panel found King
"first noticed this injury a couple of years ago," suspected his work
caused the injury, "knew well before he gave notice that he had a
work-related problem," and "discovered his condition was compensable
a couple of years ago." This appeal followed.

King
asserts the Appellate Panel erred in concluding his repetitive trauma injury
was compensable at a time when he had missed no work because of the condition,
had sought no treatment for it, and had not been diagnosed as having a
repetitive trauma injury. We agree.

The
South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act (Act) requires employers to compensate
employees who sustain injuries "arising out of and in the course of
employment." S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160(A) (Supp. 2010). The
compensation to which an injured employee is entitled is "the money
allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in . . .
Title [42] and includes funeral benefits." S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-100
(1985). Employers are obligated to provide medical treatment and supplies.
S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-60 (Supp. 2010). In addition, employers must pay
benefits to injured employees for their total or partial disability, according
to a statutory schedule. S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-10 to -30 (1985 & Supp.
2010). Our supreme court has observed the workers' compensation system does
not compensate an employee for his injury but, instead, "provid[es an] injured
employee with sufficient income and medical care to keep him from
destitution." Wigfall v. Tideland Utils., Inc., 354 S.C. 100, 116,
580 S.E.2d 100, 108 (2003).

When
an employee suffers a repetitive trauma injury:

[N]otice
must be given by the employee within ninety days of the date the employee
discovered, or could have discovered by exercising reasonable diligence, that
his condition is compensable, unless reasonable excuse is made to the
satisfaction of the [Workers' Compensation C]ommission for not giving timely
notice, and the commission is satisfied that the employer has not been unduly
prejudiced thereby.

We find
substantial evidence does not support the Appellate Panel's findings
characterizing King's long-term arm ache as an "injury," determining
King discovered or could have discovered "a couple of years ago" that
he had a compensable condition, and barring King from receiving benefits for
failing to satisfy the notice requirement. Therefore, we reverse the Appellate
Panel's decision and reinstate the single commissioner's award of benefits.

The
question before us is this: in the case of a repetitive trauma injury, what
event triggers an injured employee's obligation to report and commences the
ninety-day reporting period established in section 42-15-20(C)? By its nature,
a repetitive trauma injury lacks a definite time of injury because the damage "is
gradual in onset and caused by the cumulative effects of repetitive traumatic
events." S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-172(A) (Supp. 2010); see alsoSchurlknight
v. City of N. Charleston, 352 S.C. 175, 178, 574 S.E.2d 194, 195 (2002)
("Repetitive trauma injuries . . . have a gradual onset caused by the
cumulative effect of repetitive traumatic events or 'mini-accidents.' As noted
by other courts, it is difficult to determine the date an accident occurs in a
repetitive trauma case because there is no definite time of injury."). Employer
focuses its arguments on section 42-15-20(C)'s use of the word
"condition," contending any occurrence of pain, when coupled with the
employee's belief that the pain is work-related, triggers the employee's
reporting obligation under section 42-15-20(C). In short, Employer urges us to
equate pain with a compensable condition. We decline to do so. Nothing in the
Act suggests our legislature intended to compensate an employee for aches,
pains, or other conditions that do not interfere with his ability to do his
job, even if those conditions are work-related. Cf.Wigfall, 354
S.C. at 116, 580 S.E.2d at 108 (observing workers' compensation laws "are
not designed to compensate the employee for his injury, but merely to provide
him with the bare minimum of income and medical care to keep him from being a
burden to others").

An
employee's obligation to report a work-related repetitive trauma injury is not triggered
by the onset of pain but, rather, by the employee's diligent discovery that his
condition is compensable. § 42-15-20(C). We must determine, then, when a
repetitive trauma injury becomes compensable. Our supreme court has long
recognized that the Act entitles employees injured at work to compensation on
only two bases, lost earning capacity and specific, scheduled injuries. Wigfall,
354 S.C. at 104, 580 S.E.2d at 102 (citing Jewell v. R.B. Pond Co., 198
S.C. 86, 90-91, 15 S.E.2d 684, 686 (1941)); see also §§ 42-1-100,
42-9-10 to -30, & 42-15-60 (establishing and describing compensation for
(1) medical care or treatment for a work-related injury and/or (2) disability).
Accordingly, a work-related repetitive trauma injury does not become
compensable, and the ninety-day reporting clock does not start, until the
injured employee discovers or should discover he qualifies to receive benefits
for medical care, treatment, or disability due to his condition.

Here,
the Appellate Panel found King was obligated to give Employer notice of his
injury based upon his knowledge of pain "a couple of years" before he
either required medical care or was unable to perform his job. In doing so,
the Appellate Panel improperly required King to give notice of a condition that
he had no reason to believe was compensable. Under section 42-15-20(C) and the
sections addressing compensation, King had a duty to notify Employer of his
injury within ninety days of the date he discovered or should have discovered it
qualified him to receive benefits for medical care, treatment, or disability. The
record reflects King acknowledged to the single commissioner that his arm was
tired, sore, and achy for a couple of years before he became unable to work.
He further admitted that he believed his arm ached because he worked
"slinging a hammer all day." However, a mere work-related ache does not
constitute a compensable condition, regardless of whether the employee later
develops an injury. The Act requires an injured employee to be diligent, not
prescient. King's condition was not compensable until it either required medical
care or interfered with his ability to perform his job, whichever occurred
first.

The
record reflects King first missed work on May 15, 2008, and first saw a doctor
for his injuries within two weeks after that date. King testified that, until
May 2008, he neither required medical treatment nor experienced any condition
that affected his ability to perform his job as he had done for many years. Nonetheless,
his medical records reflect he reported to his physician that his pain suddenly
became "much worse" in April 2008. Even assuming King should have
discovered in April 2008 that his injury required medical treatment, his report
of his injury to Employer in May 2008 fell well within the ninety-day notice
period.

For
the foregoing reasons, the Appellate Panel erred in finding King knew or should
have known his injury was compensable "a couple of years" before he
became disabled. As a result, the Appellate Panel's denial of benefits was
error. Therefore, we reverse the Appellate Panel's decision and reinstate the single
commissioner's award of benefits.

We
decline to address King's remaining issues because reversal on the issue of
compensability disposes of this appeal. SeeFutch v. McAllister
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999)
(ruling an appellate court need not review remaining issues when its
determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).

CONCLUSION

We
find an injury does not become compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act
until the injured employee satisfies the statutory criteria entitling him to compensation.
We further find the evidence adduced in this case indicates King had no reason
to discover his injury was compensable before April 2008, and the factual
determinations supporting the Appellate Panel's denial of King's claim are
unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, we reverse the
decision of the Appellate Panel, reinstate the single commissioner's award of
benefits, and do not reach King's remaining issues on appeal.

REVERSED.

SHORT and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

[1] The record identifies this procedure only by its initials. It appears to be a
form of acupuncture accompanied by an electric current that may be used to
treat carpal tunnel syndrome.