Each Jiva has its own mind, although the Internal
nature of mind is one: mano laksanatvena sarvamanasam ekatvat" because the
essential nature of mind is the expression of the mental stales. In the
Sthananga we read, ege jivanam mane."[24] In this way and according to the
situation, the Gods, men and Asuras have each his own mind. In the
Tattvarthasutra, the classification of the souls, five sensed organisms
with minds is mentioned : sanjninah samanaskah [25]. In the five-sensed
organisms only some possess minds. Comparative psychologists like Kohler
and Alverdes have shown that mind in the developed form is possible in the
case o higher animal having insight. Naiyayikas also believe that each
organism possesses a mind and sensitive organs in order that it may be in
a position to cognize the objects and to experience self has one mind,
because a single mind of atomic magnitude cannot be shared by all. This
mind in each self can function only inside the organism with which the
self is connected.[26] If there was one common mind for all, there would
be simultaneity of cognition. A similar argument was presented by the
Jaina thinkers in favor of the Jiva being bhavamanorupa. If the Jiva was
sarvagata, there would be cognition of everything by everyone.[27] Their
arguments were metaphysical and epistemological than psychological. But
modern psychology as analyzed the same problem from the psychological
point of view. McDougall writes, "It seems probable that mind has the same
nature wherever and whenever it exists or manifests itself, whether in
animals, men or superhuman beings, whether in the new-born infant, the
fool other wise man. On the other hand, the structure of the mind seems to
be peculiar to each individual;" not only is it different in the various
species of animals (if they have minds) and in man; but eh structure of
the mind of one man at each stage of his career of life-history, it is not
quite the same as at any other stage. [28]

The ancient Indian philosophers were faced with
problems concerning the insumental nature of the mind. It was generally
believed that, like other sense organs, mind was also a sense organ, and
the instrument of the soul. In the Upanisads we find references to the
mind as one of the organs along with he other sense and motor organs (jnanendriyas
and karmendriyas)[29] Prasna Upanisad mentions manas as a central organ.
Reference to the manas as the driver of the ten organs in the Maitri
Upanisad may also be noted. Orthodox Hindu philosophy accepts mind as the
internal organ. Similarly, Vidyanandi maintains that buddhi and ahamkara
cannot be regarded as sense organs. The Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers who
make buddhi, ahamkara and manas together to constitute the internal organ
anthakarana. But Jayanta believes that mind is an internal organ.
Similarly, Vidyanandi maintains that buddhi and ahamkara cannot be
regarded as sense organs. The Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers regarded min as
the internal organ. But Gautama did not include it in the list of the
sense organs. Kanada is also silent. Vatsyayana includes manas under the
senses. He calls it the inner sense by which we apprehend the inner states
by the instrument of the manas. Vatsyayana believes that mind is as good a
sense organ as the eye and the like, though there are certain differences.
But the Jainas believed that the minds is a no-indriya in the sense that
it is different from the five sense organs. Its sense contents and
functions are not entirely identical with those of indriyas. The prefix no
here does not mean not, but is at times rendered as isad. it is a quasi
sense organ.

Still they accept the instumental function of the mind.
In the Gommatasara: Jivakanda, we get a description of mind as the no-indriya.
It is though the mind that mental knowledge and mental activity arise. But
in the case of the mind there is no external minifestation as in the case
of the other sense organs. The function of mind is assimilative.[30] The
Pramanamimansa describes mind as the thing which grasps everything. In the
vrtti of the same it is said, "mano'nindriyam iti no indriyam iti ca
ucyate''.[31] In the Tattvarthasutra, the function of mind, which is
anzndriya, is described as the sruta cognition. The second function is the
mati and its modifications.[32] It is called the organ of apprehension of
all objects because all sense experiences are apprehended by the mind. The
Jainas accepted the instrumental nature (karanatva) of the mind. But it
is said that the karana is of two types bafiya karana and antafikarana,
and even the dravya manas is described as the antahkaraba, the internal
organ. Being the internal organ, it is different from the other sense
organs.[33] However, such a description of mind need not be interpeted in
the sense that, according to the Jaina view, mind is not a sense organ; in
fact, it is more than a sense organ. Its function is not specific like
that of the other sense organs. It is sarvartha-grahanam, as it is stated
in the Pramanamimamsa.

II. In the Dravyasamgraha, Nemicandra says that soul in
its pure form has the quality of consciousness. Brahma-deva, in his
commentary, writes that from the ultimate point of view, Jiva is
distinguished by its quality of consciousness.[34] It is the most direct
and nearest reality of which any one who has introspected is most
immediately aware.

Consciousness has been the most important of discussion
for philosophers, psychologists as well as scientists. Attempts have been
made to solve the problem from various angles. In the Aitareya Aranyaka,
an effort is made to understand the different stages of the development of
consciousness in the universe. In the evolution of herbs, trees and all
that is animal, the dtman is gradually developing. In the herbs, only sap
is seen; in the animated beings, citta is seen, in man, there is gradual
development of atman, for he is now endowed with prajna.[35] Similarly, in
the Chandogyopanisad, Prajapati describes the progressive identification
of atman with body consciousness. The psycho-physiological method is
adopted in the Taittiriya. [36] Finally, the atman as Jnanamaya and
anandamaya is emphasized. The Jaina classification of the Jivas places
the problem of the evolution of consciousness on a scientific basis. Jivas
have been classified into one, two, three, four and five-sensed according
to the number of the sense organs possesed by them. Jivas possessing the
five senses are divided into those having mind and those without mind. It
is now realized that the rise of consciousness is late in the evolution of
life from physical evolution to the evolution of life, mind and
consciousness .

Cetana as a fundamental quality of the soul is pure
consciousness, a kind of flame without smoke. This consciousness is
eternal although it gets manifested in the course of the evolutionary
process of life in the empirical sense. This empirical consciousness
arises from the contact of the sense organs with the objects. Cetana in
its pure form gets embodied with the Atrnan and comes into contact with
the empirical life, with the sense organs and objects. It manifests itself
in the form of jnana and darsana. Jnana and Darsana are, therefore,
aspects of cetana and cetana is the spring-board from which they arise. It
is like the flood of light in which objects are illuminated. It is the
psychic background and the psychic halo of cognition in its two aspects,
jnana and darsana. Cetana, therefore, is the light of consciousness that
the soul possesses and through this light the cognition of objects arises.

The anaiysis of the states of consciousness has been
important problem for philosophers as well as the psychologists.
Consciousness has three aspects the cognitive, the effective and the
conative. They are modes of consciousness In perceiving, believing or
otherwise apprehending that such and such a thing exists and has
characteristics, one's attitude is cognitive. In the effective attitude
one is either please or displeased about it. But one is also active about
it, tries to know more about it, and tries to alter it in some respect.
This attitude is conative.[37] But Stout says that though these three
modes of consciousness are abstractly and analytically distinct phases in
a concrete psychosis, they are not separable. They do not occur in
isolation from each other. Mind is an organic unity and its activities
have the closest degree of organic inter action. However, in every
psychosis one of the aspects may be predominant. In the pleasure of
pursuit, feeling presupposes conation. Sometimes, feeling is dependent on
certain conative attitudes involved in the Ferceptual process. Similar
reciprocity is found in conation and cognition .

Indian thinkers were aware of the distinction of states
in consciousness. The Jainas recognize three forms of consciousness. They
make a distinction between consciousness as knowing, as feeling and as
experiencing the fruits of Karma (karma-phala-cetana), and willing.[38]
Conation and feeling are closely allied. As a rule we have first feeling,
next conation and then knowledge.[39] McDougall has emphasized that
feeling is the core of all instinctive activity. In fact, in all
experience there is a core of feeling, while the cognitive and conative
aspects are varying factors. In the Aitareya Upanisad there is mention of
different modes of experience. Sensation, perception and ideation are
different modes of intellection. It recognizes feeling and volition as the
other two forms of experience. The seers of Upanisads give a
classification of seven mental functions.[40] At the basii is
intellection. The Chandogyopanisad emphasizes the primacy of the will. The
Buddhists also recognized such a distinction. We have perception and
conception, feeling and affection, and conation or will. In the Buddhist
theory, will is the most dominant aspect of conscious experience, the
basal element of human life. RADHAKRISHNAN in his lndian Philosophy
suggests that vijnana, vedana and samskdra roughly correspond to
knowledge, feeling and will.[41] Childers in his dictionary brings the
concept of conation under samskara. Mrs. Rhys Davids believes that,
although there is no clear distinction between conation in the
psychological sense and will in the ethical sense, still in the Pitakas
there is consistent discrimination between psychological importance and
ethical implication.[42] Professor Stout has given up old tripartite
classification of mental states and reverts to the ancient bipartite
analysis of mind bringing the effective and conative elements together
under the name of interest. RADHAKRISHNANsays that, if we discard the
separation of cognition and make it the theoretical aspect of conation, we
get to the Buddhist emphasis on conation as the central fact of mental
life.

In the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory also there is a
description of the manifestation of the three aspects of self as
knowledge, desire and volition. We have to know a thing before we feel the
want of it. In order to satisfy the want, we act. Thus, as HIRNANNA says,
feeling mediates between cognition and conation. Thus, the modes of
consciousness have been the problem of philosophers and psychologists.
There is a general agreement regarding the division of consciousness into
three modes, although different philosophers have emphasized different
aspects in the concrete psychosis. Buddhists have emphasized conation. In
the Upanisads all the aspects have received their due prominence, The
primacy of the intellect is emphasized in the Chandogya and Maitri
Upanzsads.[43] In the Chdndogya, again, we get a description of the
primacy of the will. But this has reference to the cosmic will rather than
to its psychological aspect. The Jainas emphasize the close relation
between conation and feeling. The Nyaya theory describes the function of
feeling as a mediating factor between cognition and conation.

III. Self-consciousness: The term self-consciousness is
very ambiguous. It may mean consciousness of the self as an object given
in introspection. In this sense, the self, the empirical ego, becomes both
an aspect of experience an also an object of experience.
Self-consciousness may mean transcendental and pure self consciousness. It
is not a object of knowledge. It is the ultimate subject presupposed in
acts of knowledge. Again, consciousness may mean the ultimate eternal
consciousness, which is a metaphysical concept. It is also used in the
empirical sense as consciousness which is changing-' Some of the earlier
philosophers have not made a clear distinction between the metaphysical
and the psychological sense of consciousness. In the Upanisads, the atman
is described as the basis and the ultimate presupposltion in all
knowledge. It is the absolute knower, and how can the knower itself be
known?[48] It cannot be comprehended by intellect. It is the serr and the
knower.[49] Yet, the atman can be known by higher intutition. It is
knowable as the pratyagatmanam apprehended by adjyatmayoga.[50] The
Buddhists recognize the distinction between subject and object within the
consciousness. They do not believe in the transcendental self. Their view
of consciousness is like the stream of consciousness of William James.
Yogacaras believe that self is a series of cognition or ideas. There is no
self apart from cognition. They reveal neither the self nor the non-self.

Some Nyaya philosophers, specially the Neonaiyayikas,
believed that the self is an object of internal perception manasapratyaksa.
The Vaisesikas also maintain that, although the self is not an object of
perception but of inference, it can be apprehended by Yogic intuition. The
Samkhya philosophers maintain that consciousness is the essence of self.
It is self-intuition. Self is inferred through its reflection in buddhi.
But Patanjali accepts the supernormal intuition of the self through the
power of concentration. The self can know itself through its reflection in
its pure sattva and also -when mixed with rajas and tamas by supernormal
intuition (Pratibha-jnana). So, the pure self can know the empirical self,
but the empirical self cannot know the pure self. There is the
contradiction involved in the self being both subject and object and the
reflection theory does not much improve the situation. Vacaspati tries to
avoid the contradiction by saying that transcendental self is the subject,
and the empirical self the object, of self-apprehension.