Kurzfassung auf Englisch:

The failure of the West to bring democracy to Russia has become a daily lament. This
lament has also grown to be the main justification for policies keeping Russia at a
distance. Democratisation, as an aim of interference and conditionality, have been joined
in way that can, at best, be characterised as tense, and at worst, appears to be counterproductive.
The introduction of democratic systems and their promotion is a relatively new
international endeavour. In Germany, it is only since the early nineties that these
objectives have given rise to programmes and projects in official development assistance
and in the support of transformation processes in Eastern Europe. Moreover, such
experience is of little relevance to Russia, the “evil empire” that for seventy years fought
off democracy with military strength. Thus the experimental nature of current practise
might explain the mistakes that have been made. On the other hand, when considering
foreign policy, which makes democratisation a condition of cooperation, this excuse
cannot be made – Russia has been a leading European power for more than two hundred
years. It is obvious, however, that such policy must adapt to the changed international
rules that have emerged following the end of the Cold War, as characterised by the partial
substitution of the logic of the Cold War by the logic of the concert of power.
A coherent policy of democratic conditionality, which has the aim of democratising
Russia and, therefore, of creating internal conditions that could be the basis of a lasting
and stable cooperation, does not exist in the West. The example of Germany illustrates
how values and interests, idealism and realism fail to complement one another, as is called
for in the politics of Western democracy promotion. Rather, they get in each other’s way.
German foreign policy towards Russia oscillates between arrogance and respect:
Arrogance arising from their sense of cultural supremacy, fed by the potential for chaos
within Russia as by either its domestic instability or its authoritarianism; and a less clearly
defined respect for its still impressive political and military might. This indecisiveness
results from the dual asymmetry created by German superiority, in terms of culture, and
Russian superiority, in terms of military might, that has coloured the relationship between
the two countries for more than two centuries.
While Russia’s power base has been weakened to a point where it no longer dominates
Germany’s foreign policy agenda, the message that is so being sent remains clear: If Russia
wants to be accepted as serious partner, then it has to clean up its internal mess and
complete the transformation process. It is sometimes openly stated that Russia should
“civilise” itself. Compliance would not, however, automatically give access to those
exclusive associations that are the political manifestations of the Western community and
its values. Yet such access in itself, in particular membership of NATO, could be crucial,
on a symbolic as well as practical level, in creating an international environment that
would support the required internal democratisation process.
The direct promotion of democracy, through technical assistance, is as half-hearted as
democratic conditionality of foreign policy has proved questionable. That this is the case
has been justified by the idea that the introduction of democracy and of a market
economy must coincide, as one reinforces the other. Therefore, Western donors have
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needed no excuses for concentrating their material and intellectual support in a field
where direct economic gain can be expected – the promotion of market economy. These
contributions increased the contradiction between democratic inclusion and economic
exclusion, between formally demanded equality and growing material inequality.
There is no doubt that economic and social welfare is a basic precondition of stable
political systems. Therefore, cushioning the drastic consequences of the transformation
process on such welfare should have been an essential component of democracy
promotion in Russia. This did not happen. It turned out to be even more disastrous that
in conditions of lacking democratic control and appropriate institutions the forced
economic transformation lead to a redistribution of wealth such that new centres of
power were formed, which were unfavourable both for democratic participation and for
the development of the economy. Western advisers to the new Russian leadership bear
considerable responsibility for this situation.
In the ten years since the foundation of the Russian Federation, on 1st January 1992,
direct democracy promotion, by the US, Germany, and the European Union, amounted
to between 200 million and 1 billion US dollars, depending on the definition used. This
entails classical objectives of democracy promotion such as the formation of democratic
institutions, either through political advice or by organising and monitoring elections. An
additional aim is to strengthen civil society, by promoting independent media, political
parties and non-governmental organisations, and to strengthen the rule of law by
consolidating and modernising the judiciary. These are the fields in which Western
democratisers have been active in Russia.
Apart from isolated external and internal evaluations, a comprehensive analysis of
these activities has not yet been presented. As might be expected, the evaluations that have
been undertaken have reached varied conclusions regarding the record of the last ten
years: In terms of individual projects, the verdict is predominantly positive. This does not,
however, indicate that the major objective of a consolidation of democracy in Russia has
been advanced in any significant way. One explanation is that the funds available are
insufficient to have more than a token effect. Also, it is commonly complained that efforts
are met with a cool reception from the domestic audience. Besides which, some have
fundamental doubts.
Democracy promotion can be characterised by a direct intervention in established
political systems that contrasts with classic technical assistance. Evidently, Russia has
increasingly narrowed down the room of manoeuvre, so producing a variety of reactions
in the West. In particular American democracy promotion is being advised to move
towards supporting civil society, in order to win back ground from the new political elites.
This, however, reinforces the attempt at replacing the legitimate aim of establishing widely
accepted democratic procedures with the very problematic aim of trying to reach a certain
political goal, defined by one’s own criteria. In any case, the question arises as to whether
such an interventionist concept of democracy promotion is still appropriate in today’s
Russia. It should, rather, be replaced by broader financial support for exchange
programmes, including town twinnings and partnerships between organisations, and
encouragement of mutual study visits.