Note: For practice concerning pillage of humanitarian relief objects, see Rule 32. For practice concerning pillage of cultural property, see Rule 40. For practice concerning protection of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked against pillage, see Rule 111. For practice concerning protection of the dead against despoliation, see Rule 113, Section B. For practice concerning pillage of the personal belongings of persons deprived of their liberty, see Rule 122.

Article 28 of the 1899 Hague Regulations provides: “The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault is prohibited.”

Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, Article 28.

Article 47 of the 1899 Hague Regulations, under the section entitled “On military authority over hostile territory”, provides: “Pillage is formally prohibited.”

Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, Article 47.

Hague Regulations (1907)

Article 28 of the 1907 Hague Regulations provides: “The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited.”

Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 28.

Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, under the section entitled “On military authority over the territory of the hostile State”, provides: “Pillage is formally forbidden.”

Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 47.

Hague Convention (IX)

Article 7 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IX) provides: “A town or place, even when taken by storm, may not be pillaged.”

Hague Convention (IX) concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 7.

Hague Convention (X)

According to Article 21 of the 1907 Hague Convention (X), its signatory parties “undertake to enact or to propose to their legislatures … the measures necessary for checking in time of war individual acts of pillage”.

Hague Convention (X) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 21.

IMT Charter (Nuremberg)

Article 6(b) of the 1945 IMT Charter (Nuremberg) includes “plunder of public or private property” in its list of war crimes, for which there must be individual responsibility.

Charter of the International Military Tribunal for Germany, concluded by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, acting in the interests of all the United Nations and by their representatives duly authorized thereto, annexed to the London Agreement, London, 8 August 1945, Article 6(b).

Geneva Convention IV

Article 33, second paragraph, of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV provides that “pillage is prohibited”.

Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, Article 33, second para.

Additional Protocol II

Article 4(2)(g) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II prohibits acts of pillage against “all persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities”.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva, 8 June 1977, Article 4(2)(g). Article 4 was adopted by consensus. CDDH, Official Records, Vol. VII, CDDH/SR.50, 3 June 1977, p. 90.

ICC Statute

Pursuant to Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) and (e)(v) of the 1998 ICC Statute, “[p]illaging a town or place, even when taken by assault” is a war crime in both international and non-international armed conflicts.

Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 17 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) and (e)(v).

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone

Article 3 of the 2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone gives the Court jurisdiction over serious violations of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, including pillage.

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, annexed to the 2002 Agreement on the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Freetown, 16 January 2002, annexed to Letter dated 6 March 2002 from the UN Secretary-General to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/2002/246, 8 March 2002, p. 29, Article 3.

Article 44 of the 1863 Lieber Code provides: “[A]ll robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a place by main force … are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense.”

Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Order No. 100 by President Abraham Lincoln, Washington D.C., 24 April 1863, Article 44.

Brussels Declaration

Article 18 of the 1874 Brussels Declaration states: “A town taken by assault ought not to be given over to pillage by the victorious troops.”

Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, 27 August 1874, Article 18.

Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, 27 August 1874, Article 39.

Oxford Manual

Article 32 of the 1880 Oxford Manual states: “It is forbidden … to pillage, even towns taken by assault.”

The Laws of War on Land, adopted by the Institute of International Law, Oxford, 9 September 1880, Article 32.

Oxford Manual of Naval War

Article 18 of the 1913 Oxford Manual of Naval War states: “Pillage and devastation are forbidden.”

The Laws of War on Land, adopted by the Institute of International Law, Oxford, 9 September 1880, Article 18.

Report of the Commission on Responsibility

Based on several documents supplying evidence of outrages committed during the First World War, the 1919 Report of the Commission on Responsibility lists violations of the laws and customs of war which should be subject to criminal prosecution, including “pillage”.

Report submitted to the Preliminary Conference of Versailles by the Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, Versailles, 29 March 1919.

Inter-Allied Declaration against Acts of Dispossession

The 1943 Inter-Allied Declaration against Acts of Dispossession affirms the determination of its authorsto combat and defeat the plundering by the enemy Powers of the territories which have been overrun or brought under enemy control. The systematic spoliation of occupied or controlled territory has followed immediately upon each fresh aggression. This has taken every sort of form, from open looting to the most cunningly camouflaged financial penetration, and it has extended to every sort of property – from works of art to stocks of commodities, from bullion and bank-notes to stocks and shares in business and financial undertakings. But the object is always the same – to seize everything of value that can be put to the aggressors’ profit and then to bring the whole economy of the subjugated countries under control so that they must slave to enrich and strengthen their oppressors …[T]hey intend to do their utmost to defeat the methods of dispossession practised by the Governments with which they are at war against the countries and peoples who have been so wantonly assaulted and despoiled …The wording of the Declaration … clearly covers all forms of looting to which the enemy has resorted. It applies, e.g. to the stealing or forced purchase of works of art just as much as to the theft or forced transfer of bearer bonds.

Inter-Allied Declaration against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories under Enemy Occupation or Control, as agreed between the Union of South Africa, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovak Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Greece, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the French National Committee, London, 5 January 1943, also known as the London Declaration.

Allied Control Council Law No. 10

Article II(1)(b) of the 1945 Allied Control Council Law No. 10 includes “plunder of public or private property” in its list of war crimes, for which there must be individual responsibility.

Allied Control Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and against Humanity, enacted by the Allied Control Council of Germany, composed of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Berlin, 20 December 1945, Article II(1)(b).

Nuremberg Principles

Principle VI(b) of the 1950 Nuremberg Principles adopted by the International Law Commission provides that “plunder of public or private property” is a war crime.

Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, adopted by the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/1316, New York, 5 June–29 July 1950, Principle VI(b).

UN Command Rules and Regulations

Under Rule 4 of the 1950 UN Command Rules and Regulations, Military Commissions of the UN Command had jurisdiction over offences such as plunder of public and private property.

Rules of Criminal Procedure for Military Commissions of the United Nations Command, Tokyo, 22 October 1950, Rule 4.

ICTY Statute

Article 3(e) of the 1993 ICTY Statute gives the Tribunal jurisdiction over violations of the laws and customs of war, expressly including “plunder of public and private property”.

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, adopted by the UN Security Council, Res. 827, 25 May 1993, as amended by Res. 1166, 13 May 1998 and by Res. 1329, 30 November 2000, Article 3(e).

Agreement on a Temporary Cease-fire on the Tajik-Afghan Border

In Article 2(c) of the 1994 Agreement on a Temporary Cease-fire on the Tajik-Afghan Border, the concept of “cessation of hostilities” was said to include the prevention of pillage of the civilian population and servicemen.

Agreement on a Temporary Cease-fire and the Cessation of Other Hostile Acts on the Tajik–Afghan Border and within the Country for the Duration of the Talks, Tehran, 17 September 1994, Article 2(c).

ICTR Statute

Article 4(f) of the 1994 ICTR Statute gives the Tribunal jurisdiction over, inter alia, violations of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, expressly including pillage.

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, adopted by the UN Security Council, Res. 955, 8 November 1994, as amended by Res. 1165, 30 April 1998, and by Res. 1329, 30 November 2000, Article 4(f).

ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996)

Pursuant to Article 20(e)(v) of the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, “[p]lunder of public or private property”, in violation of the laws and customs of war, is considered a war crime.

Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the International Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, 6 May–26 July 1996, UN Doc. A/51/10, 1996, Article 20(e)(v).

UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin

Under Section 7.1 and 7.2 of the 1999 UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin, pillage of civilians and persons hors de combat is prohibited “at any time and in any place”.

The UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15 establishes panels with exclusive jurisdiction over serious criminal offences, including war crimes. According to Section 6(1)(b)(xvi) and (e)(v), “[p]illaging a town or place, even when taken by assault” is a war crime in both international and non-international armed conflicts.

Pillage is prohibited. Pillage is the seizure or destruction of enemy private or public property or money by representatives of a belligerent, usually armed forces, for private purposes … A military personnel is not allowed to become a thief or a bandit merely because of involvement in a war. The rule against pillage is directed against all private acts of lawlessness committed against enemy property.

Australia’s LOAC Manual (2006) states: “Pillage, the violent acquisition of property for private purposes, is prohibited. In this regard the pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited.”

Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 7.46; see also §§ 9.24 and 9.58.

Pillage is prohibited. Pillage is the seizure or destruction of enemy private or public property or money by representatives of a belligerent, usually armed forces, for private purposes … A military person is not allowed to become a thief or a bandit merely because of involvement in a war. The rule against pillage is directed against all private acts of lawlessness committed against enemy property.

Australia, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Australian Defence Headquarters, 11 May 2006, § 12.47.

Belgium

Belgium’s Law of War Manual (1983) states: “It is prohibited to pillage a town or a locality, even taken by assault.”

Canada’s LOAC Manual (1999) provides: “Pillage, the violent acquisition of property for private purposes, is prohibited. Pillage is theft, and therefore is an offence under the Code of Service Discipline.”

Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, Glossary, p. GL-15 and p. 6-5, § 50.

Pillage is prohibited. Pillage is the seizure or destruction of enemy private or public property or money by representatives of a belligerent, usually soldiers, for private purposes … Soldiers are not allowed to become thieves or bandits on their own account merely because they are involved in an armed conflict. The rule against pillage is directed against all private acts of lawlessness committed against enemy property.

Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 1999, p. 12-8, § 67.

Canada’s Code of Conduct (2001) provides that “looting is prohibited”.

(1) A battlefield and destroyed civilian areas offer attractive objects for the curiosity seeker. No matter how tempting such objects may be, the taking of souvenirs is prohibited. Looting is theft; it is a serious offence and it may also have direct operational consequences.(2) The taking of personal war trophies is also prohibited. Not only is looting illegal, there is also a significant operational risk that such property may be booby-trapped. An isolated act of theft may impede your mission by turning the local population against you.(3) The Law of Armed Conflict does permit the seizure and use of property belonging to the opposing forces under certain circumstances. However, the taking and use of such property must only be done where properly authorized … Property may never be taken for the personal benefit of individual CF personnel.

Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001) states in its chapter on land warfare: “Pillage, the violent acquisition of property for private purposes, is prohibited. Pillage is theft, and therefore is an offence under the Code of Service Discipline.”

Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 624; see also Glossary, p. GL-3.

Pillage is prohibited. Pillage is the seizure or destruction of enemy private or public property or money by representatives of a belligerent, usually soldiers, for private purposes. Soldiers may, under certain circumstances seize enemy property but once such property has been seized it belongs to the state which the soldiers are serving. Soldiers are not allowed to become thieves or bandits on their own account merely because they are involved in an armed conflict. The rule against pillage is directed against all private acts of lawlessness committed against enemy property.

Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1236.

1. Although AP II [Additional Protocol II] contains no provisions relating to enforcement or punishment of breaches, it does contain a statement of fundamental guarantees prohibiting at any time and anywhere:

…

f. pillage; or

g. threats to commit any of the foregoing.

Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, § 1713.1.f–g.

1. A battlefield and destroyed civilian areas offer attractive objects for the curiosity seeker. No matter how tempting such objects may be, the taking of souvenirs is prohibited. Looting is theft; it is a serious offence and it may also have direct operational consequences.Looting and War Trophies2. The personal property of sick and wounded, detained persons and the dead shall not be taken. The taking of personal war trophies is also prohibited. Not only is looting illegal, there is also a significant operational risk that such property may be booby-trapped. An isolated act of theft may impede your mission by turning the local population against you.Property of Opposing Forces3. The Law of Armed Conflict does permit the seizure and use of property belonging to the opposing forces under certain circumstances. However, the taking and use of such property must only be done where properly authorized … Property may never be taken for the personal benefit of individual CF [Canadian Forces] personnel.

The Central African Republic’s Instructor’s Manual (1999) states in Volume 1 (Basic and team leader instruction): “Soldiers must … respect …[civilians’] property and prevent it from being damaged or stolen.”

China’s PLA Rules of Discipline (1947) instructs: “Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses – Turn in everything captured.”

China, Order on Re-promulgation of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention by the Headquarters of the PLA, 10 October 1947, in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4, The People’s Press, Beijing, p. 1241, Rules 2 and 3.

Colombia

Colombia’s Basic Military Manual (1995) provides that it is prohibited “to steal personal property” of non-combatants, as well as “to plunder the property and belongings” of the civilian population.

Côte d’Ivoire’s Teaching Manual (2007) provides in Book I (Basic instruction):Lesson 3. Rules of behaviour in combat…I.1 Basic rules…[Basic Rule No. 10]:Respect the possessions of others. Pillage is prohibited.[Observation]:Destruction, theft and pillage are acts of vandalism which dishonour the military institution.…I.2 Specific rules…Civilians…13. Respect their possessions

- Theft and pillage are prohibited.

…Lesson 4. Breaches and repression of violations of IHL…I. Grave violations…In Côte d’Ivoire, the Penal Code has provided for the repression of certain violations:

Lesson 2. Protection…Geneva Convention IV prohibits using the civilian population as a shield to protect certain regions or installations (militarily generally important) against attacks by the enemy … Pillage, hostage-taking and reprisal measures against civilians are equally prohibited.…Lesson 4. Violations and repression…I.3. War crimes…War crimes are equally violations of the laws and customs of war such as:

The Dominican Republic’s Military Manual (1980) states:When searching dwellings in enemy towns or villages, do not take non-military items. Theft is a violation of the laws of war … Stealing private property will make civilians more likely to fight you or to support the enemy forces. You do not want to have to fight both the enemy armed forces and civilians.

Germany’s Soldiers’ Manual (2006) states: “Reprisals against the civilian population are prohibited, likewise taking of hostages, collective penalties, pillage as well as measures of intimidation or terrorization.”

Ireland, Basic Guide to the Law of Armed Conflict, TP/TRG/01-2005, Director of Defence Forces Training, Department of Defence, July 2005, p. 13.

Israel

With reference to Israel’s Law of War Booklet (1986), the Report on the Practice of Israel states: “IDF [Israel Defense Force] regulations … strictly prohibit any act of pillage or looting.”

Report on the Practice of Israel, 1997, Chapter 2.3, referring to Conduct in the Battlefield in Accordance with the Law of War, Israel Defense Forces, 1986, p. 19.

Israel’s Manual on the Laws of War (1998) states:Looting is the theft of enemy property (private or public) by individual soldiers for private purposes …Today, at any rate, looting is absolutely prohibited. The Hague Conventions forbid looting in the course of battle as well as in occupied territory … Looting is regarded as a despicable act that tarnishes both the soldier and the IDF [Israel Defense Forces], leaving a serious moral blot … During the Galilee War, there were unfortunately cases of looting of civilians in Lebanon including a case where even officers – a major and captain – were demoted to the rank of private and [received] a long prison term.

Israel, Laws of War in the Battlefield, Manual, Military Advocate General Headquarters, Military School, 1998, pp. 62–63.

Israel’s Manual on the Rules of Warfare (2006) states: “The rules of military jurisdiction contain several provisions that define breaches of the rules of warfare as military offences that can be prosecuted in a court of law, such as the rule of pillage.”

Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 11.

Pillage is the theft of the enemy’s property (whether private or public) by individual soldiers for personal ends. In the Bible, pillage is depicted as a negative action, as for example in the incident of Achan, when Achan was put to death because he “took of the accursed thing” (Book of Joshua, Chapter VII). In other cultures, pillage was allowed, and the expectation of it was used by the conqueror as an incentive for its soldiers.Today, pillage is strictly forbidden. The Hague rules forbid pillage both in time of battle and in conquered territory. The Geneva Conventions contain directives prohibiting the pillage of the wounded and sick, survivors of shipwrecks, civilians and cultural property. Pillage is considered as a despicable act, and stains the soldier and the army with a serious moral stain. In clause 74 of the IDF’s [Israel Defense Forces’] Military Justice Law, pillage is prohibited and the sentence for it is up to ten years’ imprisonment. During operations in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip there were unfortunate incidents of pillage of its inhabitants, and in one of the incidents officers of the rank of Major and Captain were even sentenced to reduction to the rank of private and long terms of imprisonment. Even soldiers who stole weapons in the course of the “Defensive Shield” campaign in 2002 were tried and sentenced to terms of imprisonment.

Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 40.

The court-martialling of officers for pillage, in accordance with the Military Jurisdiction Law referred to [above], is a good example of the domestic enforcement of the ban on pillage under international law.

Israel, Rules of Warfare on the Battlefield, Military Advocate-General’s Corps Command, IDF School of Military Law, Second Edition, 2006, p. 41.

Italy

Italy’s IHL Manual (1991) provides: “It is prohibited … to pillage a locality, even when taken by assault.” It is also a duty of an occupying State “to prevent pillage”.

Pillage is prohibited. Pillage is the seizure or destruction of enemy private or public property or money by representatives of a belligerent, usually soldiers, for private purposes. A soldier may under certain circumstances seize enemy property but, once such property has been seized, it belongs to the State which he is serving. He is not allowed to become a thief or a bandit merely because he is involved in a war. The rule against pillage is directed against all private acts of lawlessness committed against enemy property.

Private property should be respected. It must not be … pillaged even if found in an occupied territory … Real property belonging to local government such as hospitals and buildings dedicated to public worship, charity, education, religion, science and art should be treated as private property.

The Manual of Pakistan Military Law (1987) states:“Plunder” means to take property from persons or places by open force. Due to military significance of the term the offence is related to acts on active service or when army is engaged in aid of civil power or other military operations.

Peru’s IHL Manual (2004) defines the term “pillage” as: “The systematic and violent appropriation by members of the armed forces of movable public or private property belonging to the enemy State, to wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons or to prisoners of war. Pillage is a war crime.

Peru’s IHL and Human Rights Manual (2010) defines “pillage” in its Glossary of Terms as: “The systematic and violent appropriation by members of the armed forces of movable public or private property belonging to the enemy State, to wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons or to prisoners of war. Pillage is a war crime.”

The Military Directive to Commanders (1988) of the Philippines tries “to protect troops from false charges of looting”, by requesting that civil relations groups immediately conduct a survey of the residents after a military operation, and make proper documentation, including witnesses’ statements, material and photographs.

Philippines, Protection and Rehabilitation of Innocent Civilians Affected by AFP Counterinsurgency Operations, Directive to Commanders of Major Services and Area Commands, Office of the Chief of Staff, General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Ministry of National Defense, 15 July 1988, p. 30, § 4(i).

The Soldier’s Rules (1989) of the Philippines instructs troops: “Respect other people’s property. Looting is prohibited.”

The Philippines’ AFP Standing Rules of Engagement (2005) states:8. General Rules for the Correct Use of Force towards Mission Accomplishment…k. Commanders will instruct their personnel on the nature of their mission to include proper actuations and decorum. This stresses the importance of proper conduct and regard for the local population and the need to respect private property and public facilities and sensitivity to local/ethnic cultures.

Philippines, AFP Standing Rules of Engagement, Armed Forces of the Philippines, General Headquarters, Office of the Chief of Staff, 1 December 2005, § 8(k).

The Philippine Army Soldier’s Handbook on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (2006) provides:During combat operation:…7. Bring your own provisions. It is better not to buy chicken or any other animals from the civilian populace for food. Sometimes, even if a chicken is being paid for, the soldiers are the ones going after the fowl. This is not a good scenario because it may be interpreted negatively as it may suggest looting and pillaging. If you’re left with no choice, pay fairly for what you buy.

The Republic of Korea’s Military Law Manual (1996) states that commanders are responsible for acts of pillage committed by soldiers.

Republic of Korea, Military Law Manual, 1996, p. 89.

Russian Federation

The Russian Federation’s Military Manual (1990) provides that allowing a town or an area to be pillaged is a prohibited method of warfare.

Russian Federation, Instructions on the Application of the Rules of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the USSR, Appendix to Order of the USSR Defence Minister No. 75, 1990, § 5(f).

The Russian Federation’s Regulations on the Application of IHL (2001) states: “The prohibited methods of warfare include … ordering to pillage a town or place.”

Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, § 7.

The commander of the military unit deployed in the occupied territory is obliged, respecting the laws of the occupied territory, to take all possible measures to … prevent pillage and illegal confiscation of property.

Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, § 74.

The following acts against [all persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities] are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever: … pillage [and] threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.

Russian Federation, Regulations on the Application of International Humanitarian Law by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8 August 2001, § 81.

Senegal

Senegal’s Disciplinary Regulations (1990) states that, under the laws and customs of war, pillage is forbidden.

South Africa’s LOAC Manual (1996) provides that pillage and stealing of civilian property are forbidden.

South Africa, Presentation on the South African Approach to International Humanitarian Law, Appendix A, Chapter 4: International Humanitarian Law (The Law of Armed Conflict), National Defence Force, 1996, § 28(f).

Spain’s LOAC Manual (2007) states: “Private property must be respected to the extent permitted by operational requirements. In particular, it is prohibited to plunder or loot localities that have been taken.”

Uganda, Operational Code of Conduct for the National Resistance Army (NRA), Legal Notice No. 1 of 1986 (Amendment), 23 August 1986, § 12(b).

The offence of personal interests endangering operational efficiency shall include … capturing from the enemy goods for personal use instead of capturing materials needed to help the war effort of the movement; failing to report and hand in goods captured from the enemy.

Uganda, Operational Code of Conduct for the National Resistance Army (NRA), Legal Notice No. 1 of 1986 (Amendment), 23 August 1986, § 18(c).

… 1.8.6. Serious violations directed against property include the following acts if they are not justified by military necessity:

- destruction or plunder of an enemy property;

- permitting pillaging of a town or place.

Ukraine, Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2004, §§ 1.3.2 and 1.8.6.

- persons taking no active part in the hostilities;- members of armed forces who have laid down their arms;- those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause.

Ukraine, Manual on the Application of IHL Rules, Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2004, § 1.4.10.

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The UK Military Manual (1958) states that pillage is prohibited whether in the territory of the parties to a conflict or in occupied territory.

United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 42.

Private property must be respected. It must not be … pillaged, even if found in a captured town or other place. This prohibition embodied in the Hague Rules [1907 Hague Regulations] did not constitute a new rule. However, it has for a long time past been embodied in the regulations of every civilised army, for nothing is more demoralising to troops or more subversive of discipline than plundering. Theft and robbery are as punishable in war as in peace, and the soldier in an enemy country must observe the same respect for property as in his garrison at home.

United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 589.

The UK LOAC Pamphlet (1981) provides: “It is forbidden … to commit pillage, even if the town or place concerned is taken by assault”.

United Kingdom, The Law of Armed Conflict, D/DAT/13/35/66, Army Code 71130 (Revised 1981), Ministry of Defence, prepared under the Direction of The Chief of the General Staff, 1981, Section 4, p. 14, § 5(d).

The UK LOAC Manual (2004) states: “Even if a town or place has been taken by assault, pillage is prohibited.”

United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, § 5.35.

15.23. Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault, is forbidden.15.23.1. Pillage, also known as plunder or looting, is the same as stealing, which is an offence in peace or war. It must be distinguished from the lawful requisitioning of property for military, rather than private, purposes.

United Kingdom,
The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, §§ 15.23–15.23.1.

United States of America

The US Field Manual (1956) provides: “The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited.”

United States, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, US Department of the Army, 18 July 1956, as modified by Change No. 1, 15 July 1976, § 47.

United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 14-4.

In addition to the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the following acts are representative of situations involving individual criminal responsibility:

…

(8) Plunder or pillage of public or private property.

United States, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, International Law – The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, US Department of the Air Force, 1976, § 15-3(c)(8).

The US Soldier’s Manual (1984) states:When searching dwellings in enemy towns or villages, do not take nonmilitary items. Theft is a violation of the laws of war and US law. Stealing private property will make civilians more likely to fight you or to support the enemy forces. You do not want to have to fight both the enemy armed forces and civilians.

United States, Your Conduct in Combat under the Law of War, Publication No. FM 27-2, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, November 1984, p. 23.

Under the US Instructor’s Guide (1985), pillage means “to loot, to deprive of money or property by violence”.

United States, Instructor’s Guide – The Law of War, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington, April 1985, p. 28.

The US Rules of Engagement for Operation Desert Storm (1991) prohibits looting.

United States, Desert Storm – Rules of Engagement, Pocket Card, US Central Command, January 1991, reprinted in Operational Law Handbook, International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General’s School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1995, pp. 8-7 and 8-8, § F.

The US Naval Handbook (1995) states: “The following acts are representative war crimes: … plunder and pillage of public or private property.”

United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-2.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, October 1995 (formerly NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10, October 1989), § 6.2.5(8).

The US Manual for Military Commissions (2007), Part IV, Crimes and Elements, includes in the list of crimes triable by military commissions:PILLAGING.a. Text. “Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally and in the absence of military necessity appropriates or seizes property for private or personal use, without the consent of a person with authority to permit such appropriation or seizure, shall be punished as a military commission under this chapter may direct.”b. Elements.(1) The accused appropriated or seized certain property; (2) The accused intended to appropriate or seize such property for private or personal use; (3) The appropriation or seizure was without the consent of the owner of the property or other person with authority to permit such appropriation or seizure; and (4) The appropriation or seizure took place in the context of and was associated with armed conflict.c. Maximum punishment. Confinement for 20 years.

United States, Manual forMilitary Commissions, published in implementation of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq., 18 January 2007, Part IV, § 6(5), p. IV-5.

The US Naval Handbook (2007) states that “[p]lunder and pillage of public or private property” are examples of acts that could be considered war crimes.

United States, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7, issued by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters, US Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security, US Coast Guard, July 2007, § 6.2.6.

The US Manual for Military Commissions (2010), Part IV, Crimes and Elements, includes in the list of crimes triable by military commissions: PILLAGING.a. Text. “Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally and in the absence of military necessity appropriates or seizes property for private or personal use, without the consent of a person with authority to permit such appropriation or seizure, shall be punished as a military commission under this chapter may direct.”b. Elements.

(1) The accused appropriated or seized certain property;

(2) The accused intended to appropriate or seize such property for private or personal use;

(3) The appropriation or seizure was without the consent of the owner of the property or other person with authority to permit such appropriation or seizure; and

(4) The appropriation or seizure took place in the context of and was associated with hostilities.

c. Maximum punishment. Confinement for 20 years.

United States, Manual for Military Commissions, published in implementation of Chapter 47A of Title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C, §§ 948a, etseq., 27 April 2010, § 5(5), p. IV-5.

Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of

Under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Military Manual (1988), “it is prohibited to pillage enemy property under any circumstances”. The manual considers any unlawful appropriation of private property as pillage.

Albania’s Military Penal Code (1995) punishes “stealing on the battlefield”.

Albania, Military Penal Code, 1995, Article 92.

Algeria

Algeria’s Code of Military Justice (1971) punishes pillage and damage to commodities, goods or belongings committed by soldiers as a group.

Algeria, Code of Military Justice, 1971, Article 286.

Australia

Australia’s War Crimes Act (1945) considers “any war crime within the meaning of the instrument of appointment of the Board of Inquiry [set up to investigate war crimes committed by enemy subjects]” as a war crime, including pillage and wholesale looting.

Australia, War Crimes Act, 1945, Section 3.

Australia’s Defence Force Discipline Act (1982), in an article on looting, punishes anyperson, being a defence member or a defence civilian, who, in the course of operations against the enemy, … takes any property left exposed or unprotected in consequence of such operations … or … takes any vehicle, equipment or stores captured from or abandoned by the enemy in those operations.

Australia, Defence Force Discipline Act, 1982, Section 48(1).

Australia

Australia’s Defence Force Discipline Act (1982), as amended to 2007, states:48 Looting(1) A person who is a defence member or a defence civilian is guilty of an offence if, in the course of operations against the enemy, or in the course of operations undertaken by the Defence Force for the preservation of law and order or otherwise in aid of the civil authorities, the person:

(a) takes any property that has been left exposed or unprotected; or

(b) takes any property from the body of a person who has been killed or from a person who has been wounded, injured or captured; or

(c) takes any vehicle, equipment or stores captured from or abandoned by the enemy.

Australia’s Criminal Code Act (1995), as amended to 2007, states with respect to serious war crimes that are committed in the course of an international armed conflict: 268.54 War crime – pillagingA person (the perpetrator) commits an offence if:

(a) the perpetrator appropriates certain property; and

(b) the perpetrator intends to deprive the owner of the property and to appropriate it for private or personal use; and

(c) the appropriation is without the consent of the owner; and

(d) the perpetrator’s conduct takes place in the context of, and is associated with, an international armed conflict.

Australia’s ICC (Consequential Amendments) Act (2002) incorporates in the Criminal Code the war crimes defined in the 1998 ICC Statute, including “pillaging” in international and non-international armed conflicts.

Bangladesh’s Army Act (1952), as amended to 2006, states:Any person subject to this Act who, on active service, commits any offence against the property … of any inhabitant of, or resident in, the country in which he is serving shall, on conviction by court martial, be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years, or with such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned.

Bangladesh, Army Act, 1952, as amended to 2006, Article 27.

Bangladesh’s Air Force Act (1953), as amended to 1978, states:Any person subject to this Act who commits … any offence against the property or person of any inhabitant of, or resident in, the country in which he is serving;shall, on conviction by court-martial, be liable to suffer short imprisonment.

Bangladesh, Air Force Act, 1953, as amended to 1978, Article 66(f).

Bangladesh

Bangladesh’s International Crimes (Tribunal) Act (1973) provides that “plunder of public and private property” is a war crime. It adds that the “violation of any humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts laid down in the Geneva Conventions of 1949” is a crime.

Belgium’s Penal Code (1867), as amended in 2003, provides:War crimes envisaged in the 1949 [Geneva] Conventions … and in the [1977 Additional Protocols I and II] … , as well as in Article 8(2)(f) of the [1998 ICC Statute], and listed below, … constitute crimes under international law and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the present title … :

Belgium’s Law relating to the Repression of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law (1993), as amended in 2003, provides:War crimes envisaged in the 1949 [Geneva] Conventions … and in the [1977 Additional Protocols I and II] … , as well as in Article 8(2)(f) of the [1998 ICC Statute], and listed below, … constitute crimes under international law and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the present title … :

…

14 bis pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault.

Belgium, Law relating to the Repression of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 1993, as amended on 23 April 2003, Article 1 ter, § 1(14 bis).

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Under the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Criminal Code (1998), pillage is a war crime.

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Criminal Code (2003) states that, in time of war, armed conflict or occupation, ordering or committing “pillaging” against civilians, in violation of international law, constitutes a war crime.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal Code, 2003, Article 173(1)(f).

(1) Whoever in time of war or armed conflict orders the violation of laws and practices of warfare, or whoever violates them, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years or long-term imprisonment. (2) Violations of laws and practices of warfare referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall include:

Under Brazil’s Military Penal Code (1969), pillage committed during military operations or in occupied territory is a crime.

Brazil, Military Penal Code, 1969, Article 406.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria’s Penal Code (1968), as amended, provides that any “person who robs, steals … property belonging to a population located in the region of military operations” commits a crime.

Bulgaria, Penal Code, 1968, as amended, Article 404.

Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso’s Code of Military Justice (1994) punishes pillage or damage to commodities, goods or belongings committed by soldiers as a group.

Burkina Faso, Code of Military Justice, 1994, Article 193.

Burundi

Burundi’s Military Penal Code (1980) states: “Any pillage or damage to food, commodities or effects committed in a group by soldiers … is punished with life imprisonment.”

Burundi, Military Penal Code, 1980, Article 47; see also Article 48.

Burundi’s Penal Code (1981) provides that a person who commits “[a]n attack whose aim it is to carry out … pillage is punished with death.”

Burundi, Penal Code, 1981, Article 417.

Burundi’s Law on Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes (2003) states:[The following are] considered as war crimes: …B. Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflicts, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:

…

p) pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;

…D. Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:

…

e) pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault.

Burundi, Law on Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, 2003, Article 4(B)(p) and (D)(e).

Burundi’s Penal Code (2009) states:“War crimes” means crimes which are committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes, in particular:

…

2. … [S]erious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:

…

5. … [S]erious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:

Cameroon

Cameroon’s Code of Military Justice (1928) punishes pillage and damage to commodities, goods or belongings committed by soldiers as a group.

Cameroon, Code of Military Justice, 1928, Article 221.

Canada

Canada’s National Defence Act (1985) punishesevery person who … breaks into any house or other place in search of plunder … steals any money or property that has been left exposed or unprotected in consequence of warlike operations, or … takes otherwise than for the public service any money or property abandoned by the enemy.

Canada, National Defence Act, 1985, Section 77(e), (h) and (i).

Canada’s Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000) provides that the war crimes defined in Article 8(2) of the 1998 ICC Statute are “crimes according to customary international law” and, as such, indictable offences under the Act.

Canada, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000, Section 4(1) and (4).

Chad

Chad’s Code of Military Justice (1962) punishes pillage and damage to commodities, goods or belongings committed by soldiers as a group.

Chad, Code of Military Justice, 1962, Article 67.

Chile

Chile’s Code of Military Justice (1925) provides for a prison sentence for “military personnel who, failing the obedience they owe to their superiors, … pillage the inhabitants of the territories where they are in service”.

Chile, Code of Military Justice, 1925, Article 262.

China

China’s Law Governing the Trial of War Criminals (1946) provides that “robbing” constitutes a war crime.

China, Law Governing the Trial of War Criminals, 1946, Article 3(24).

China’s Criminal Law (1979), as amended in 1997, states:Any serviceman who, during wartime, cruelly injures innocent residents in an area of military operation or plunders their money or property shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than five years; if the circumstances are serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years but not more than 10 years; if the circumstances are especially serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years, life imprisonment or death.

China, Criminal Law, 1979, as amended in 1997, Article 446.

Colombia

Colombia’s Military Penal Code (1999) provides for a prison sentence for “anyone who, in combat operation, appropriates movable property, without any justification, for his own profit or the profit of a third person”.

The Congo’s Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Act (1998) defines war crimes with reference to the categories of crimes defined in Article 8 of the 1998 ICC Statute.

Congo, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Act, 1998, Article 4; see also Article 8.

Côte d’Ivoire

Côte d’Ivoire’s Penal Code (1981), as amended in 1998, punishes pillage and damage to commodities, goods or belongings committed by soldiers as a group.

Côte d’Ivoire, Penal Code, 1981, as amended in 1998, Article 464.

Croatia

Croatia’s Criminal Code (1997) considers “the looting of the population’s property” as a war crime.

Croatia, Criminal Code, 1997, Article 158(1).

Croatia’s Criminal Code (1997), as amended to 2006, states that a war crime is committed by: “Whoever violates the rules of international law in time of war, armed conflict or occupation and orders … that the population’s property be plundered [or commits such an act]”.

Croatia, Criminal Code, 1997, as amended to 2006, Article 158(1).

Czech Republic

The Czech Republic’s Criminal Code (1961), as amended in 1999, punishes “whoever in a theatre of war, on the battlefield or in places affected by military operations … seizes another person’s belongings, taking advantage of such person’s distress”.

Under the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Code of Military Justice (1972), as amended in 1980, pillage committed in time of war is a punishable offence.

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Code of Military Justice, 1972, as amended in 1980, Article 436; see also Article 435.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Military Penal Code (2002) provides:Article 63Any pillage or damage to damage to commodities, goods or belongings committed by soldiers … as a group … [with violence] is punished with penal servitude for life.In all other cases, pillage is punished with 10 to 20 years of penal servitude.…Article 65If the pillage was committed in time of war, or in a region where a state of siege or of emergency has been proclaimed, or at the occasion of a police operation aimed at maintaining or re-establishing public order, the perpetrators are punished by death.

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Military Penal Code, 2002, Articles 63 and 65.

Denmark

Denmark’s Military Criminal Code (1973), as amended in 1978, provides:24. Any person who, for the purpose of obtaining for himself or for others an unlawful gain by taking advantage of fear of war, commits one of the acts mentioned in section 288(1)(1–3) of the civil criminal code shall be punishable for robbery.…25. … Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. a fine, lenient imprisonment or up to 12 years’ imprisonment].

Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 1973, as amended in 1978, §§ 24 and 25.

36. …2. Any person who deliberately uses war means [“krigsmiddel”] or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or international customary law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i.e. imprisonment up to life imprisonment].37. Punishment by imprisonment for up to six years for plundering shall be imposed on any person who for the purpose of obtaining for himself or for others an unlawful gain by taking advantage of fear of war or fear of the forces to which the person in question belongs, deliberately

1) takes or steals from anybody a movable object that is not his;

2) brings a stolen object to safety; or

3) forces anybody to an act or omission which will lead to loss of property for the person attacked or for anybody on whose behalf such a person is acting.

2. The punishment can be extended to ten years’ imprisonment when the plundering is of a particularly grave nature, mainly because of its particularly dangerous nature, the way it is committed, or the extent of the benefit gained or intended, or when a large number of crimes have been committed.

Denmark, Military Criminal Code, 2005, §§ 36(2) and 37.

Ecuador

Ecuador’s National Civil Police Penal Code (1960) punishes “members of the National Civil Police who … give a [surrendered] place … to plunder [or] pillage”.

Ecuador, National Civil Police Penal Code, 1960, Article 117(1).

Egypt

Under Egypt’s Military Criminal Code (1966), pillage of military property and attacks on a house for the purpose of pillaging it are prohibited.

Egypt, Military Criminal Code, 1966, Articles 140 and 141.

El Salvador

El Salvador’s Code of Military Justice (1934) punishes any “soldier who, in time of international or civil war, … pillages the inhabitants”.

El Salvador, Code of Military Justice, 1934, Article 68.

Under El Salvador’s Penal Code (1997), “plunder of private or public property” during an international or a civil war is a crime.

El Salvador, Penal Code, 1997, Article 362.

Estonia

Estonia’s Criminal Code (1992), as amended in 1994, provides for the punishment of pillage.

Estonia, Criminal Code, 1992, as amended in 1994, Section 61/2.

Ethiopia

Under Ethiopia’s Penal Code (1957), it is a punishable offence to organize, order or engage in “looting, … pillage, economic spoliation or the unlawful destruction or removal of property on pretext of military necessity”.

Ethiopia, Penal Code, 1957, Article 285.

Ethiopia’s Criminal Code (2004) states:Article 273.- Pillage, Piracy and Looting.Whoever organizes, orders or engages in looting [or] pillage, economic spoliation or the unlawful destruction or removal of property on the pretext of military necessity,is punishable in accordance with Article 270 [i.e., with rigorous imprisonment from five years to twenty-five years, or, in more serious cases, with life imprisonment or death].

Ethiopia, Criminal Code, 2004, Article 273.

Finland

Finland’s Criminal Code (1889), as amended in 2008, provides that any person who “in connection with an assault or otherwise plunders a town or another corresponding place” shall be “sentenced for a war crime to imprisonment for at least one year or for life”.

France’s Code of Military Justice (1982) punishes pillage and damage to commodities, goods or belongings committed by soldiers as a group.

France, Code of Military Justice, 1982, Article 427.

France

France’s Code of Military Justice (2006) states: Any pillage of or damage to food, commodities or effects committed in a group by soldiers … [with violence] is punished with life imprisonment.In all other cases, pillage and destruction committed in a group is punished with ten years’ imprisonment.

France, Code of Military Justice, 2006, Article L. 322-4.

France

France’s Penal Code (1994), as amended in 2010, states in its section on war crimes common to both international and non-international armed conflicts: “Pillaging, with or without weapons, a city or locality, even when taken by assault, is punishable by 15 years’ imprisonment.”

France, Penal Code, 1994, as amended in 2010, Article 461-15.

Gambia

The Gambia’s Armed Forces Act (1985) punishes:every person subject to this Act who … breaks into any house or other place in search of plunder; … steals any money or property that has been left exposed or unprotected in consequence of war-like operations; or … takes otherwise than for the service of The Gambia, any money or property abandoned by the enemy.

Gambia, Armed Forces Act, 1985, Section 40(e), (h) and (i).

Georgia

Under Georgia’s Criminal Code (1999), “pillage, i.e. seizure in a combat situation … of the private property of civilians left in the region of hostilities,” in an international or a non-international armed conflict, is a crime.

Georgia, Criminal Code, 1999, Article 413(a).

Germany

Germany’s Law Introducing the International Crimes Code (2002) punishes anyone who, in connection with an international or non-international armed conflict, “pillages … property of the adverse party”.

Ghana’s Armed Forces Act (1962) punishes:every person subject to the Code of Service Discipline who –

…

(e) breaks into any house or other place in search of plunder,

…

(h) steals any money or property that has been left exposed or unprotected in consequence of warlike operations, or

(i) takes otherwise than for the service of the Republic of Ghana any money or property abandoned by the enemy.

Ghana, Armed Forces Act, 1962, Section 18(e), (h) and (i).

Guinea

Guinea’s Criminal Code (1998) punishes pillage and damage to commodities, goods or belongings committed by soldiers as a group.

Guinea, Criminal Code, 1998, Article 569.

Guinea’s Code of Military Justice (2011) states:Pillage or damage to foodstuff, commodities or clothes committed by soldiers as a group … with weapons or open force, by breaking doors or fences, or by using violence against persons, shall be punished with 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment.

Guinea, Code of Military Justice, 2011, Article 148.

Hungary

Under Hungary’s Criminal Code (1978), as amended in 1998, “the person who loots civilian goods in an operational or occupied territory” is, upon conviction, guilty of a war crime.

Hungary, Criminal Code, 1978, as amended in 1998, Section 159(1).

India

Under India’s Army Act (1950), “any person subject to this Act who … breaks into any house or other place in search of plunder … shall, on conviction by court-martial, [be punished]”.

India, Army Act, 1950, Section 36.

India’s Assam Rifles Act (2006) provides that it is an offence to break “into any house or other place in search of plunder”.

India, Assam Rifles Act, 2006, Section 23(b).

India’s Sashastra Seema Bal Act (2007) states that it is an offence to break “into any house or other place in search of plunder”.

India, Sashastra Seema Bal Act, 2007, Section 18(b).

Indonesia

Under Indonesia’s Penal Code (1946), theft committed on the occasion of “riots, insurgencies or war” is a punishable offence.

Indonesia, Penal Code, 1946, § 363.

Indonesia’s Military Penal Code (1947) punishes:Anyone who commits theft by misusing his/her official position …Any military personnel who commits theft in the area under his/her authority …Any member of the armed forces who is being prepared for warfare and commits theft or threatens to abuse his/her authority or opportunity and official facilities …Any person subject to military court authority who is being prepared for warfare, or who accompanying with the approval of the military authority, commits theft by abusing his/her authority, opportunity or official facilities.

Indonesia, Military Penal Code, 1947, Articles 140–142(1).

Iraq

Iraq’s Military Penal Code (1940) states:Every person who, taking advantage of war panic or misusing military prestige, takes possession of other persons’ property without any justification, or seizes such property by force, collects money or goods without being duly authorized to do so, or misuses his official position in making military requisitions for his own benefit shall be considered looter and shall be punished.

Iraq, Military Penal Code, 1940, Article 112(1).

Iraq’s Law of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal (2005) identifies the following as a serious violation of the laws and customs of war applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts: “Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by force.”

Iraq, Law of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, 2005, Article 13(2)(Q) and (4)(E).

Ireland

Ireland’s Geneva Conventions Act (1962), as amended in 1998, provides that any “minor breach” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including violations of Article 33 of the Geneva Convention IV, as well as any “contravention” of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, including violations of Article 4(2)(g), are punishable offences.

Under Latvia’s Criminal Code (1998), “robbery … of civilians … of the occupied territory” is a war crime.

Latvia, Criminal Code, 1998, Section 74.

Luxembourg

Under Luxembourg’s Law on the Repression of War Crimes (1947), pillage committed in time of war is a war crime.

Luxembourg, Law on the Repression of War Crimes, 1947, Article 2(6).

Malaysia

Malaysia’s Armed Forces Act (1972) provides:Every person subject to service law under this Act who –

…

(b) breaks into any house or other place in search of plunder; or

…

(d) steals any property which has been left exposed or unprotected in consequence of warlike operations; or

(e) takes otherwise than for the public service any vehicle, equipment or stores abandoned by the enemy,

shall be guilty of looting and liable on conviction by court-martial to imprisonment or any less punishment provided by this Act.

Malaysia, Armed Forces Act, 1972, Section 46(b), (d) and (e).

Mali

Mali’s Code of Military Justice (1995) punishes pillage and damage to commodities, goods or belongings committed by soldiers as a group.

Mali, Code of Military Justice, 1995, Article 133.

Under Mali’s Penal Code (2001), “the pillage of a town or locality, even when taken by assault,” is a war crime in international armed conflicts.

Mali, Penal Code, 2001, Article 31(i)(16).

Mexico

Mexico’s Code of Military Justice (1933), as amended in 1996, punishes “anyone who, without being absolutely required by war operations, … plunders towns and villages”.

Mexico, Code of Military Justice, 1933, as amended in 1996, Article 209; see also Article 334.

Morocco

Morocco’s Code of Military Justice (1956) punishes pillage and damage to commodities, goods or belongings committed by soldiers as a group.

Morocco, Code of Military Justice, 1956, Article 169.

Mozambique

Mozambique’s Military Criminal Law (1987) provides that “anyone who, in time of war, pillages … goods or any other objects” commits a punishable offence.

Mozambique, Military Criminal Code, 1987, Article 88.

Myanmar

Myanmar’s Defence Service Act (1959) punishes any person who “breaks into any house or other place in search of plunder”.

Myanmar, Defence Service Act, 1959, Section 35(b).

Nepal

Nepal’s Army Act (2006) identifies “entering into any house or place with the intention of looting” as an offence.

Nepal, Army Act,2006, Section 41(b).

Netherlands

The Definition of War Crimes Decree (1946) of the Netherlands includes “pillage” in its list of war crimes.

Netherlands, Definition of War Crimes Decree, 1946, Article 1.

Under the Military Criminal Code (1964), as amended in 1990, of the Netherlands, the soldier “who abuses, in time of war, the power, opportunities or means given to him as a soldier for committing theft may be punished for pillage”.

Under the International Crimes Act (2003) of the Netherlands, “pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault” is a crime, whether committed in an international or a non-international armed conflict.

Under New Zealand’s International Crimes and ICC Act (2000), war crimes include the crimes defined in Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) and (e)(v) of the 1998 ICC Statute.

New Zealand, International Crimes andICC Act, 2000, Section 11(2).

Nicaragua

Nicaragua’s Military Penal Code (1996) punishes any “soldier who plunders the inhabitants of enemy towns and territories”.

Nicaragua, Military Penal Code, 1996, Article 59.

the soldier who, during an international or civil war, commits serious violations of international conventions ratified by Nicaragua concerning the use of warlike weapons, the conduct of hostilities, the protection of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, the treatment of prisoners and other norms of war.

Nicaragua, Military Penal Code, 1996, Article 47.

Nigeria

Nigeria’s Armed Forces Act (1993), as amended in 1994, states:51. LootingA person subject to service law under this Act who-

(a) steals from, or with intent to steal, searches the body of a person killed, wounded or captured in the course of war-like operations, or killed, injured or detained in the course of operation[s] undertaken by any service of the Armed Forces for the preservation of law and order or otherwise in aid of the civil authorities; or

(b) steals any property which has been left exposed or unprotected in consequence of the operations as are mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section; or

(c) takes, otherwise than for the public service, any vehicle, equipment or stores abandoned by the enemy,

is guilty of looting and liable, on conviction by a court-martial, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years or any less punishment provided by this Act.

Nigeria, Armed Forces Act, 1993, as amended in 1994, Article 51.

Norway

Norway’s Military Penal Code (1902), as amended in 1981, provides: Anyone who contravenes or is accessory to the contravention of provisions relating to the protection of persons or property laid down in … the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 … [and in] the two additional protocols to these Conventions … is liable to imprisonment.

Norway, Military Penal Code, 1902, as amended in 1981, § 108.

Norway’s Penal Code (1902), as amended in 2008, states: “Any person is liable to punishment for a war crime who in connection with an armed conflict … pillages.”

Norway, Penal Code, 1902, as amended in 2008, § 104(a).

Paraguay

Paraguay’s Military Penal Code (1980) punishes plunder in time of war. It further provides: “The person guilty of pillage shall be punished by a prison sentence.”

Paraguay, Military Penal Code, 1980, Articles 292 and 295.

Under Paraguay’s Penal Code (1997), “looting of private property”, in time of war, armed conflict or military occupation, is a war crime.

Paraguay, Penal Code, 1997, Article 320(7).

Peru

Under Peru’s Code (1980) of Military Justice, it is a punishable violation of international law “to plunder the inhabitants” in time of war.

Peru, Code of Military Justice, 1980, Article 95(4).

Peru’s Code of Military and Police Justice (2006) states:Any member of the military or police who in the context of an international or non-international armed conflict pillages or destroys, seizes or confiscates property belonging to the hostile party without a justification related to the armed conflict shall be imprisoned for a period of no less than five and no more than 12 years.

Peru, Code of Military and Police Justice, 2006, Article 97.

Peru’s Decree on the Use of Force by the Armed Forces (2010) states:With respect to the persons mentioned above [i.e. persons not directly participating in hostilities or who have laid down their arms as well as persons placed hors de combat by illness, wounds, detention or any other reason], the following actions are prohibited anytime and anywhere:

…

d. Pillage.

Peru, Decree on the Use of Force by the Armed Forces, 2010, Article 8.1.d.

Philippines

Under the Articles of War (1938) of the Philippines, it is an offence to abandon one’s post to plunder or pillage.

Philippines, Articles of War, 1938, Article 76.

Under the War Crimes Trial Executive Order (1947) of the Philippines, applicable to acts committed during the Second World War, “plunder of public and private property” is a war crime.

Philippines, War Crimes Trial Executive Order, 1947, § II(b)(2).

The Philippines’ Act No. 2711 (1917) states: “Any member of the Constabulary who … quits his post or command to plunder or pillage, shall be fined not exceeding six thousand pesos or imprisoned not exceeding three years or both.”

Philippines, Act No. 2711, 1917, Section 2686.

Republic of Korea

Under the Republic of Korea’s Military Criminal Code (1962), “a person who … takes the goods and effects of the inhabitants in the combat or occupied area” commits a punishable offence.

Republic of Korea, Military Criminal Code, 1962, Article 82.

Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea’s ICC Act (2007) provides for the punishment of anyone who commits the war crime of pillage in both international and non-international armed conflicts.

Republic of Korea, ICC Act, 2007, Article 11(1).

Republic of Moldova

The Republic of Moldova’s Penal Code (2002) punishes “robbery … committed against the population of the area of military operations”.

Republic of Moldova, Penal Code, 2002, Article 390.

Russian Federation

Under the Russian Federation’s Criminal Code (1996), “plunder of the national property in occupied territory” is a crime against the peace and security of mankind.

Russian Federation, Criminal Code, 1996, Article 356(1).

Rwanda

Rwanda’s Law Repressing the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes (2003) provides:Article: 10“War crime” shall also mean any of the following acts committed in armed conflicts:

…

2° plunder of public or private property;

…

Article: 11Anyone who commits one of the war crimes provided for in Article 10 of this law shall be punished by the following penalties:

…

3° imprisonment for five (5) to ten (10) years, where he has committed a crime provided for in point 2° or 7° of Article 10 of this law.

Rwanda, Law Repressing the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, 2003, Articles 10–11.

Senegal

Senegal’s Penal Code (1965), as amended, punishes pillage and damage to commodities, goods or belongings committed by soldiers as a group.

Senegal, Penal Code, 1965, as amended, Article 412.

The Penal Code, as amended in 2007, also states that the following constitute war crimes:b) [O]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:

…

14. pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;

…d) …Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:

Slovakia’s Criminal Code (1961), as amended, punishes “whoever in a theatre of war, on the battlefield or in places affected by military operations … seizes another person’s belongings, taking advantage of such person’s distress”.

Slovakia, Criminal Code, 1961, as amended, Article 264(a).

Slovenia

Under Slovenia’s Penal Code (1994), pillage of the civilian population is a war crime.

Slovenia, Penal Code, 1994, Article 374(1).

Somalia

Somalia’s Military Criminal Code (1963) states:370. Looting. – Anyone who commits an act designed to give rise to looting in a city or in other places, even if they have been taken by assault, shall be punished by death with demotion.…372. Unlawful appropriation of goods. – 1. A soldier or other person serving in or accompanying the armed forces of the State who takes possession, needlessly and without authorization, of food, clothing or equipment, or who has them handed over to him, shall be punished by military confinement for up to five years.

2. If the act is committed by two or more people in concert, the penalty shall be increased by one third to one half.

3. If violence is used, a penalty of military confinement for one to eight years shall be applied.

Somalia, Military Criminal Code, 1963, Articles 370 and 372.

South Africa

South Africa’s ICC Act (2002) reproduces the war crimes listed in the 1998 ICC Statute, including “pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault” in both international and non-international armed conflicts.

Spain’s Penal Code (1995), as amended in 2010, states:1. Anyone who in the event of an armed conflict commits or orders to be committed any of the following acts shall be punished with four to six years’ imprisonment:

…

g. … [C]arrying out any other act of pillage;

…

2. … In all other cases mentioned in the above article, the higher sentence can be imposed when extensive and important destructions are caused to the property, objects or installations or [the acts] are of extreme gravity.

Sri Lanka’s Army Act (1949), as amended in 1993, punishes “every person subject to military law who … leaves the ranks or his post without the orders of his commanding officer in order to go in search of plunder, or … breaks into any house or other place in search of plunder”.

Sri Lanka, Army Act, 1949, as amended in 1993, Section 97(2)(a) and (d).

Sri Lanka’s Air Force Act (1949), as amended in 1993, punishes “every person subject to this Act who … leaves the ranks or his post without the orders of his commanding officer in order to go in search of plunder, or … breaks into any house or other place in search of plunder”.

Sri Lanka’s Navy Act (1949), as amended in 1993, punishes “every person subject to naval law who strips off the clothes of, or in any way pillages, … any person on board a vessel taken as prize”.

Sri Lanka, Navy Act, 1950, as amended in 1993, Section 98.

Switzerland

Switzerland’s Military Criminal Code (1927), as amended, punishes “anyone who, in time of war or military service, commits an act of pillage”. It is also a punishable offence to allow subordinates to pillage or not to intervene to stop acts of pillage.

Switzerland’s Military Criminal Code (1927), as amended in 2007, states: Any person who, in times of war … , has committed an act of pillage, in particular any person who, profiting from the alarm caused by the war, has taken other people’s property, has compelled another person to hand such property over to him or her, or has committed acts of violence against other people’s property, is to be punished with imprisonment or with a monetary penalty.

(a) he takes any property from a person who has been killed, injured, captured or detained in the course of an action or operation of any of Her Majesty’s forces or of any force co-operating with them; or

(b) he searches such a person with the intention of taking property from him.

(2) A person within subsection (4) commits an offence if, without lawful excuse—

(a) he takes any property which has been left exposed or unprotected in consequence of—

(b) he searches any place or thing with the intention of taking property of a description mentioned in paragraph (a).

(3) A person within subsection (4) commits an offence if he takes otherwise than for the public service any vehicle, equipment or stores abandoned by an enemy.(4) A person is within this subsection if he is—

(a) a person subject to service law; or

(b) a civilian subject to service discipline.

United Kingdom, Armed Forces Act (2006), Section 4.

United States of America

The US Regulations Governing the Trials of Accused War Criminals in the Pacific Region I (1945) established military commissions which had jurisdiction over offences such as “plunder of public or private property”.

United States, Regulations Governing the Trials of Accused War Criminals in the Pacific Region I, 1945, Regulation 5.

The US Regulations Governing the Trials of Accused War Criminals in the Pacific Region II (1945) established military commissions which had jurisdiction over offences such as “plunder of public or private property”.

United States, Regulations Governing the Trials of Accused War Criminals in the Pacific RegionII, 1945, Regulation 2(b).

Under the US Uniform Code of Military Justice (1950), abandoning one’s place of duty to plunder or pillage and engaging in looting or pillaging are punishable offences.

United States, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 1950, Articles 99 and 103.

Under the US War Crimes Act (1996), violations of Article 28 of the 1907 Hague Regulations are war crimes.

United States, War Crimes Act, 1996, Section 2441(c)(2).

The US Military Commissions Act (2006), passed by Congress following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in 2006, amends Title 10 of the United States Code as follows: “§ 950v. Crimes triable by military commissions“ …“(b) OFFENSES.—The following offenses shall be triable by military commission under this chapter at any time without limitation:

“ …

“(5) PILLAGING.—Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally and in the absence of military necessity appropriates or seizes property for private or personal use, without the consent of a person with authority to permit such appropriation or seizure, shall be punished as a military commission under this chapter may direct.

United States, Military Commissions Act, 2006, Public Law 109-366, Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code, 17 October 2006, p. 120 Stat. 2626, § 950v(b)(5).

The US Military Commissions Act (2009) amends Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code as follows:“ § 950t. Crimes triable by military commission“The following offenses shall be triable by military commission under this chapter at any time without limitation:

“ …

“(5) PILLAGING.—Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally and in the absence of military necessity appropriates or seizes property for private or personal use, without the consent of a person with authority to permit such appropriation or seizure, shall be punished as a military commission under this chapter may direct.

United States, Military Commissions Act, 2009, § 950t(5).

Uruguay

Uruguay’s Law on Cooperation with the ICC (2006) states:26.2. Persons and objects affected by the war crimes set out in the present provision are persons and objects which international law protects in international or internal armed conflict.26.3. The following are war crimes:

…

24. Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault.

Uruguay, Law on Cooperation with the ICC, 2006, Article 26.2 and 26.3.24.

Venezuela’s Code of Military Justice (1998), as amended, punishes soldiers who “failing the obedience they owe to their superiors, … pillage the population of towns and villages”.

Venezuela, Code of Military Justice, 1998, as amended, Article 474(17); see also Article 474(2).

Viet Nam

Viet Nam’s Penal Code (1990) punishes “anyone who, during combat or while cleaning up a battlefield, steals or destroys war booty”. It also punishes “anyone who, in time of war, … has pillaged property”.

Viet Nam, Penal Code, 1990, Articles 272(1) and 279.

Viet Nam’s Penal Code (1999) provides for the punishment of those “who, while in combat or clearing the battlefields, appropriate or destroy war booty”. It also punishes those “who, in time of war, give the order for or directly undertake … the looting of property”.

Viet Nam, Penal Code, 1999, §§ 337.1 and 343.

Yemen

Under Yemen’s Military Criminal Code (1996), attacking houses or places with the intent to pillage is an offence. The provision is applicable at all times, whether during international or internal conflicts or in peacetime.

Yemen, Military Criminal Code, 1996, Article 25.

Under Yemen’s Military Criminal Code (1998), “looting … of property” is a war crime.

Yemen, Military Criminal Code, 1998, Article 21(6).

Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Criminal Offences against the Nation and State Act (1945) considers that, during war or enemy occupation, “any person who … ordered or committed … the looting of private or public property” committed a war crime.

In its judgment in the Military Junta case in 1985, Argentina’s National Court of Appeals applied the 1907 Hague Regulations to acts of pillage committed in the context of internal violence. It resorted to the provisions of the Penal Code relating to theft to determine the sanction.

Argentina, National Court of Appeals, Military Junta case, Judgment, 9 December 1985.

China

In the Takashi Sakai case in 1946, a Chinese Military Tribunal found the accused, a Japanese military commander in China during the Second World War, guilty, inter alia, of “inciting or permitting his subordinates to … plunder … civilians”, notably rice, poultry and other foods. The Tribunal said that, in so doing, “he had violated the [1907 Hague Regulations] … These offences are war crimes and crimes against humanity.” It found that Articles 28 and 47 of the 1907 Hague Regulations had been violated.

China, War Crimes Military Tribunal of the Ministry of National Defence at Nanking, Takashi Sakaicase, Judgment, 29 August 1946.

Colombia

In 2007, in the Constitutional Case No. C-291/07, the Plenary Chamber of Colombia’s Constitutional Court stated: Taking into account … the development of customary international humanitarian law applicable in internal armed conflicts, the Constitutional Court notes that the fundamental guarantees stemming from the principle of humanity, some of which have attained ius cogens status, … [include] the prohibition of pillage.

In March 2006, in the Bongi Massaba case, a case against a captain of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Military Garrison Court of Ituri at Bunia held:Considering the proceedings taken against the defendant described above, prosecuted for:1. Having committed a war crime;Namely, having pillaged, in the village of Tchekele, community of the Walendu Bindi, territory of Irumu, district of Ituri, in the Eastern province, in the DRC, on 20 October 2005, several objects of the civilian population, namely a motorcycle of the brand Senke, a motor-pump, two solar panels, a radio of the brand Sharp, two loudspeakers, during the confrontations of the armed forces of the DRC and the negative forces called FRPI, objects which he had transported by pupils to the mount Awi, acts provided for and punished by articles 8.2).b).XVI and 77 of the Rome Statute;…Judgement…IV. MeritsWhereas the prosecution, for its part, brings war crimes charges for pillage, article 8.[2).b)].xvi of the Rome Statute, and for wilful killing, article 8.2).a).i.Whereas, however, in its analysis of the constitutive elements of the war crime of pillage the prosecution, which upholds element d) [of the elements of crimes], namely “The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict”, contents itself with evoking the generalized attack between two internal armed entit
ies, the armed forces of the DRC and the FRPI, thus removing the international character of the said armed conflict;…Whereas these acts can be better prosecuted on the basis of:

1) Article 8.2)e).v [of the Rome Statute], providing for the war crime of pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault; the appropriation of objects not justified by military necessity executed on a large scale in an illegal and arbitrary manner;

…

Regarding the analysis of pillage as provided for by article 8.2)e)v [of the Rome Statute]. For its realization, that provision requires the following elements:

1) The perpetrator appropriated certain property; in the present case, captain Blaise Bongi Massaba appropriated a motorbike of the brand SENKE, a motor-pump, two big solar panels, a ten-battery SHARP radio, two loudspeakers, objects he moreover reclaimed by calling this property of civilian character “war booty”, in violation of the law of war;

2) The perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appropriate it for private or personal use …

3) The appropriation was without the consent of the owner …

4) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character; in the present case, the national army, the FARDC, fought against the armed groups of the Ituri resisting disarmament;

5) The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict; in the present case, Captain Blaise Bongi Massaba, commander of the third company engaged against these armed militias, qualified these victims as prisoners of war, in spite of the protection of that category by the international legal instruments duly ratified by the RDC.

…Therefore…The Military Garrison Tribunal of IturiHaving deliberated on the case in public session on Friday, 24 March 2006;HoldingOn the question whether the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba is guilty of the crimes with which he is charged, the Tribunal, by the majority of the votes of its members, responds: Yes.The TribunalHolds as established in fact and in law the offences the defendant captain Blaise Bongi Massaba is charged with and convicts him, consequently, without admitting mitigating circumstances:

- to penal servitude for life for war crimes of pillage of property (Article 8.2)e)v of the Rome Statute),

- to penal servitude for life for the war crime of murder (Article 8.2)c)i of the Rome Statute);

Whereas the Military Court of the Eastern Province is seized with the appeal of the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba, convicted by the Military Garrison Tribunal of Ituri on the basis of two offences under the competence of the International Criminal Court, namely war crimes …; …War crime of pillage…Whereas, by war crimes, one means, in the case of conflicts not of an international character, the grave violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949;Whereas in the present case it is the violation of pillaging a town or place taken by assault, in flagrant violation of the laws and customs applicable in conflicts between a regular army and an insurrectional group;Whereas, pillage means all acts of dispossession or plundering of commodities, goods or other belongings either or the State, or of other domestic or foreign legal persons, or of individuals, acts which are generally accompanied by violence or other attacks on the physical integrity of persons, and committed by soldiers, in a group or not, or by other individuals, embarked or nor, or by equivalents, in possession of weapons or not, but with open force;Whereas equated with pillaging is damaging, i.e. damage caused to the commodities, goods or other belongings, breaking of doors and exterior enclosures, committed by the actors mentioned above at all times on the national territory (Laurent Mutata, Congolese Military Penal Law, p. 134);Whereas, according to the same author, the material act of pillage must be a positive act, excluding any passive or negative attitude, any inaction or abstention, and consisting in violent or forced appropriation or simply in destruction;…The mental elementThe mental element is twofold:

- first, the fact of the belonging of the objects to other persons;

- and second, a criminal resolution arrived at jointly, implying a prior concertation, to take or to destroy the objects like true owners, while being aware of the fact that they belong to other persons, and independent of the will of those lawfully in possession;

Whereas, in the present case, the soldiers of the first platoon of the third company carrying out a pretended combat patrol under the command of Kabesa Kabesa, alias Werrason, and at the order of the defendant, captain Blaise Bongi Massaba, appropriated objects belonging to several villagers …, namely:

- a red motorbike of the brand SENKE,

- a motor-pump,

- two big solar panels,

- a radio of the brand Sharp,

- two loudspeakers,

- a 12 volt battery.

Whereas the defendant, Blaise Bongi Massaba, admits that his soldiers had pillaged in Tchekele and, in his defence, admits having received a single solar panel and a 12-volt battery given to him by his deputy Kabesa Kabesa, on his return from the combat patrol;…Whereas the prior concertation required for assessing the converging will is given inasmuch as Mr Bongi consigned his own bodyguard to Mr Werrason in order to ensure that things were carried out well; and he presents the objects as war booty, i.e. objects acquired by fact of a war, and he wants to get them back despite the action of the civil party …, this sufficiently establishes the intention of the defendant Bongi to despoil [the civil party], the real owner, and to appropriate these objects for personal purposes.…Whereas the behaviour took place in a context associated with a conflict not of an international character;…Whereas the appropriation was against the will, i.e. without the consent, of the owner…Whereas these pillages took place in the context of a non-international armed conflict; in this instance the confrontation between the armed groups of the Ituri resisting disarmament and the FARDC;Whereas captain Blaise Bongi Massaba, commander of the third company engaged against the armed militias, by qualifying the pupils brought to him as prisoners of war, was aware of the existence of an armed conflict;Whereas the [pillaged] objects were objects of a purely civilian character;Whereas the constitutive elements [of pillage] are fulfilled as regards the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba;Whereas the defence argues that the defendant Blaise Bongi was not present at the place of the pillaging, in Tchekele;Criminal responsibility of military commandersWhereas, independent of the hypothesis of criminal participation, in the area of criminal repression the responsibility of the perpetrator of a punishable act remains, in principle, individual;Whereas, however, this principle is under attack in international criminal law, where the guilt of a superior in the hierarchy for reprehensible acts of their subordinates can be upheld;Whereas jurisprudence has set out three conditions which establish that borrowed criminal responsibility (Bagalishema case, ICTR, Trial Chamber, 7 June 2001);… A link of subordination placing the perpetrator of the crime under the effective control of the accused;It follows from the examination of the case that the fact that the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba included his own bodyguard in the patrol platoon led by second lieutenant Kabesa and guided by his informers in the village of Tchekele sufficiently establishes the subordination required for establishing the violation;…Whereas the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba has a functional preeminence, i.e. the material capacity to prevent and punish violations of humanitarian law; (in this sense, ICTY, Mucić et al. case, cited by the ICTR in the Kayishema and Ruzindana case, Trial Chamber, 15 May 2003);Whereas the defendant Blaise Bongo Massaba, when the pillaged objects where brought in, instead of punishing the pillagers, on the contrary appropriated the objects by declaring to his wife and even in his complaint that they were war booty;Whereas the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba had reason not only to know but, above all, to make sure, that his soldiers went and, then, pillaged the locality of Tchekele;Whereas the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba failed to take all necessary or reasonable measures to prevent the said act from being committed;Whereas the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba failed to punish the original perpetrators;Whereas, therefore, the defendant Blaise Bongi Massa must share the responsibility with his soldiers, perpetrators of these pillages;Whereas article 28 of the Rome Treaty confirms that principle of co-responsibility in the following hypotheses:

- the defendant Blaise Bongo Massaba knew well that his troops would commit pillage, which is why his bodyguard Valaka and his informant had to be part of that patrol to make sure that the pillaged objects were brought;

Whereas, furthermore, he himself organized that pillage by taking into account information received from the [informant] from Tchekele, who had to take the members of the patrol to addresses already identified;

Whereas his co-responsibility, i.e. as co-perpetrator of the pillage in Tchekele, is therefore established;…Whereas the Court … allows the defendant the benefit of mitigating circumstances resulting:

- from the fact that he is a first-time delinquent;

- from the fact that he is father to a large family;

- from the fact of his inexperience as a commander.

Whereas the charges of the war crimes of pillage and violence to life and person are sufficiently established as required by the law;…Therefore…Finding on the public action…To the question whether the defendant Blaise Bongi Massaba is guilty of the war crimes of pillage and violence to life and persons he is charged with, the Military Court of the Eastern Province has replied, with the majority of the votes of is members: yes;To the question whether there are grounds for holding mitigating circumstances to the benefit of the defendant, the Military Court of the Eastern Province has replied, with the majority of the votes of its members: yes, for each of the charges of which the defendant has been found guilty;…In consequence, convicts him:

- to 20 years of penal servitude for crimes of war of pillage;

- to 20 years of penal servitude for crimes of war of violence to life …,

applying article 7 of the Military Penal Code, convicts him therefore to 20 years of penal servitude as single, highest penalty.

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Military Court of the Eastern Province, Bongi Massaba case, Judgment on Appeal, 4 November 2006.

France

During the First World War, France adopted a law to extend its jurisdiction to offences committed in invaded territory. On this basis, some German officers and soldiers were convicted by courts-martial of acts of pillage.

J. Rampon, La justice militaire en France et le droit international humanitaire, Mémoire de DEA, Faculté de Droit, Université de Montpellier I, 1997–1998, p. 30, referring to cases of the Conseil de Guerre de Rennes, 26 February 1915 and of the Conseil de Guerre de Toulouse, 16 July 1916.

In the Szabados case before a French Military Tribunal in 1946, the accused, a former German non-commissioned officer of the 19th Police Regiment stationed in occupied France, was charged with, and found guilty of, inter alia, the count of pillage in time of war. The Tribunal found the looting of personal belongings and other property of civilians evicted from their homes prior to their destruction to be a violation of Article 440 of the French Penal Code, which dealt with pillage.

In the Holstein case before a French Military Tribunal in 1947, some of the accused, members of various German units, were found guilty of war crimes for having committed acts of looting and pillage, prohibited under the French Code of Military Justice.

In the Bauer case before a French Military Tribunal in 1947, a German gendarme was found guilty of war crimes for having stolen a sewing machine and other objects, which he took to Germany during the retreat from France. He was also found guilty of war crimes for having received stolen goods, when removing and using furniture which his predecessor in the gendarmerie post had stolen from a French inhabitant to whom the accused knew it belonged.

In the Buch case before a French Military Tribunal in 1947, the accused, a paymaster during the occupation of France, was found guilty of a war crime for having received stolen goods. The German Kommandantur at Saint-Die had seized silverware which a French doctor had left behind in crates before leaving the locality. The goods were sold at an auction by the Kommandantur and part of it bought by the accused.

In the Jorgić case before Germany’s Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf in 1997, the accused was convicted of genocide committed in the context of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. In 1999, the Federal Court of Justice confirmed the judgment of first instance in most parts. Both courts referred to acts of plunder as part of the general background in which the genocide took place.

In 2010, in the DRC case, Germany’s Federal Court of Justice decided to remand in pre-trial custody a national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) who had been living in Germany. The court considered the definition of pillage as a war crime under Germany’s International Crimes Code and held: It is highly likely that … members of the FDLR [Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda] committed war crimes against property and other rights under § 9 para. 1 VStGB [Germany’s International Crimes Code] by taking food and other objects from the civilian population, thus committing pillage in the context of an international or non-international armed conflict. Pursuant to the description in § 125 a, sentence 2, no. 4 StGB [Germany’s Penal Code] … , pillage comprises the taking advantage of a general situation to steal movable objects or to extract movable objects from another person with the objective of appropriation … . As a result the term also comprises all forms of unlawful acquisition of property in an armed conflict. It can be committed in the form of isolated acts of individual fighters or as part of an organized appropriation and systematic exploitation of an occupied or militarily controlled area.

In its judgment in the Al-Anfal case in 2007, the Iraqi High Tribunal stated:The proof of looting any town or place, even if it occurred coercively as a crime of war, must be provisioned through many factors to prove such crime. These are as follows: a proof that looting had been perpetrated by soldiers for personal benefit, proof that it occurred as organized properties’ confiscation in a frame of systematic economic abuse of a given occupied sector, proof of stolen property’s monetary value, proof that military necessity does stand for such acts [does not legitimize the act], and proof of lack of content [coercively].

Iraq,Iraqi High Tribunal, Al-Anfal case, Judgment, 24 June 2007, p. 593, based on a translation available at http://law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/anfal/opinion.asp (last accessed on 1 April 2010).

Israel

The Report on the Practice of Israel states that any claim of looting would be immediately investigated and all necessary measures taken. The report refers to Israeli Defense Force military court-martial cases in which soldiers were convicted of looting.

In its judgment in the Ayalon case in 2003, Israel’s Military Court of Appeal stated:A combination of considerations – law, discipline, morality, and utility – illustrate the extent to which the offense of looting is bad for its perpetrators and for the entire IDF [Israel Defense Forces]. It violates the law, morality, military ethics, and impairs the operational capability and professionalism of the military organization as a combat body.…E.5 Universal combat ethicsThe absolute prohibition on looting – that is, “theft or robbery of enemy property (private or public) by individual soldiers for their private purposes” (Y. Dinstein, Laws of War [Tel Aviv, 1983], p. 156) – was adopted in international customary law and was later enshrined in the Hague Regulations (articles 28 and 47) and in article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 1949. In many countries, this prohibition has been set forth in statute. For example, in the United States, section 103 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice states:

(a) All persons subject to this chapter will secure all public property taken from the enemy for the service of the United States, and shall give notice and turn over to the proper authority without delay all captured or abandoned property in their possession, custody, or control.

(b) any person subject to this chapter who-

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

…An example of adoption in international law of the absolute prohibition on looting can be found in the judgment of the international criminal tribunal that was established in regard to war crimes in Yugoslavia (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia), which held that acts of looting, such as those that are motivated by greed, are war crimes for which the looter is to be held criminally liable:

[I]t is to be observed that the prohibition against the unjustified appropriation of public and private enemy property is general in scope, and extends both to acts of looting committed by individual soldiers for their private gain, and to the organized seizure of property undertaken within the framework of a systematic economic exploitation of occupied territory. Contrary to the submissions of the Defence, the fact that it was acts of the latter category which were made the subject of prosecutions before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg and in the subsequent proceedings before the Nurnberg Military Tribunals does not demonstrate the absence of individual criminal liability under international law for individual acts of pillage committed by perpetrators motivated by personal greed. In contrast, when seen in a historical perspective, it is clear that the prohibition against pillage was directed precisely against violations of the latter kind. Consistent with this view, isolated instances of theft of personal property of modest value were treated as war crimes in a number of trials before French Military Tribunals following the Second World War. Commenting upon this fact, the United Nations War Crimes Commission correctly described such offences as “war crimes of the more traditional type”. Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et al, ICTY Case no. IT-96-21-T (Celebici camp case) Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998 at par. 590.

In the Esau case in 1948, the Special Criminal Court at Hertogenbosch in the Netherlands acquitted the chief commissioner of Germany’s high frequency research council of charges of plunder of public and private property for ordering the removal of scientific instruments and gold from factories in the Netherlands. The Court held that the accused had only ordered the removal of property which he considered would be of assistance to the German war effort, in accordance with Article 53 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. On appeal by the prosecutor in 1949, the Special Court of Cassation of the Netherlands quashed the lower court’s decision, holding that the relevant law of the Netherlands adopted the same definition of war crimes as Article 6(b) of the 1945 IMT Charter (Nuremberg) and included “plunder of public and private property, wanton destruction of cities … or devastation not justified by military necessity”. According to the Court, the requirement that the acts not be justified by military necessity did not apply to plunder as this was prohibited by international law. Accordingly, the removal of the property in question was unlawful unless the property fell within one of the categories of goods which the occupant was exceptionally entitled to seize from private individuals by virtue of Article 53(2) of the 1907 Hague Regulations. Considering the property in question, the Court concluded that, with the exception of the short wave transmitter, none of the goods could be deemed to be excepted from the general inviolability of private property in war.

In the Fiebig case before the Special Criminal Court at The Hague in the Netherlands in 1949, the accused, a delegate of the Minister of the Reich for Armaments and Munitions, was found guilty of war crimes for participating in the economic spoliation of the Netherlands and the removal of stocks of food. As to the contention of state of necessity raised by the accused, the Court held that, even if there was a so-called “war necessity” for Germany to plunder occupied countries, this was no excuse for a method of plunder which was contrary to the laws of war, in the very circumstances envisaged by the treaty which prohibited it. It also stressed that the fact that spoliation of occupied territory was a systematic government policy of Germany made it a fortiori a prohibited act and a war crime.

Netherlands, Special Criminal Court at The Hague, Fiebigcase, Judgment, 28 June 1949.

Sweden

In its judgment in the Arklöf case in 2006, Sweden’s Stockholm District Court stated:Pillage is prohibited according to international law (Geneva Convention IV article 33, Additional Protocol II article 4).This prohibition has customary status, and [committing pillage] is a serious violation.

In the Pohl case before the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1947, the accused, top ranking officials of the SS, were charged with taking part in the commission of plunder of public and private property. They were found guilty, inter alia, of the looting of property of Jewish civilians in eastern occupied territories.

United States, Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Pohl case, Judgment, 3 November 1947.

In the Von Leeb case (The German High Command Trial) before the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1948, the accused, former high-ranking officers in the German army and navy, were charged, inter alia, with war crimes and crimes against humanity against civilians in that they participated in atrocities such as plunder of public and private property. The evidence showed that the looting and spoliation which had been carried out in the various occupied countries were not the acts of individuals, but were carried out by the German government and the Wehrmacht for the needs of both. It was carried out on a larger scale than was possible by the army, as shown by the evidence, and seemed to have been sometimes based upon the idea that in looting, the individual was not depriving the victim of the property, but was depriving the Reich and the Wehrmacht. However, the evidence failed to show any specific criminal responsibility on the part of the accused in connection with charges of plunder and spoliation. Furthermore, the Tribunal stated that “most of the prohibitions of both the Hague and Geneva Conventions, considered in substance, are clearly an expression of the accepted views of civilized nations”. It notably mentioned Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. The Tribunal added that military necessity “does [not] justify the seizure of property or goods beyond that which is necessary for the use of the army of occupation. Looting and spoliation are none the less
criminal in that they were conducted, not by individuals, but by the army and the State.”

United States, Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Von Leeb case (The German High Command Trial), Judgment, 28 October 1948.

In its judgment in the John Schultzcase in 1952, the US Court of Military Appeals listed robbery, larceny and burglary as crimes “universally recognized as properly punishable under the law of war”.

United States, Court of Military Appeals, John Schultzcase, Judgment, 5 August 1952.

In 1989, during a debate in the UN Security Council relating to alleged Pakistani aggression and interference in Afghanistan’s affairs, the representative of Afghanistan mentioned an article in the Wall Street Journal revealing, inter alia, “the looting … and other grave crimes”, which the representative alleged Pakistani officers had been involved in.

According to the Report on the Practice of Algeria, pillage is prohibited under Islamic law. It adds that the first combatants to fight against French occupation in the 19th century followed Islamic teachings on this point.

Report on the Practice of Algeria, 1997, Chapter 2.3.

Angola

The Report on the Practice of Angola mentions several instances of pillage during the war of independence and during the ensuing internal conflict, in particular between 1992 and 1994. The report does not specify, however, who the perpetrators were (civilians, rebel movements or government troops).

In 1990, during a debate in the UN Security Council relating to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Bahrain stated that it considered the pillage and plunder of private homes and businesses to be “completely at variance with the norms of international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” and “at odds with the principles and precepts of the Islamic Sharia”. In the eyes of the sharia, he said, the invasion was all the worse because it was accompanied, inter alia, by pillage and theft.

In 2010, during a debate in the UN Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Bangladesh stated: “My delegation urges all parties to conflicts to ensure protection of the … property of civilians.”

Bangladesh, Statement by the Counsellor of the Permanent Mission before the UN Security Council on protection of civilians in armed conflict, 7 July 2010.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

According to the Report on the Practice of the Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina), in the context of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, members of the Bosnian Serb Army were convicted of robbery by military courts. For example, four members of the Bosnian Serb Army were sentenced to imprisonment for breaking in and robbing non-Serb civilians by the Court of First Instance in Banja Luka in 1994. The report notes that the accused were charged with the offence of robbery, not looting, since looting was not a separate criminal offence under the applicable penal law.

Report on the Practice of the Republika Srpska, 1997, Chapter 2.3.

Burundi

In 2010, within the context of a Training Workshop on Military Criminal Law for Military Judges, the Ministry of National Defence and Former Combatants stated:The CPM [Military Penal Code (1980)] prohibits pillaging but does not define it. However, if we follow the … dictionary … , pillaging means to despoil a town or locality of its objects in a violent, disordered and destructive manner. To pillage means to devastate, ravage and sack … Pillaging supposes particular circumstances of insecurity and disruption of public order: war, riots, rebellion …Article 47 [of the CPM] punishes by penal servitude for life all pillaging or damaging of goods, merchandises or wares committed in [a] group by servicemen, either by using weapons or force, by breaking in through external doors or windows, or by resorting to violence against people. In all other cases, pillaging and damaging in [a] group are punished by 5 to 10 years[’ penal servitude] (article 48). Nevertheless, the servicemen with the highest ranks and the instigators are punished for life.The … [Penal Code (2009)] treats as [a] war crime the pillaging of a town or place, even when taken by assault (article 198(2°)(p) for international armed conflicts and (5°)(e) for non-international armed conflicts).

Burundi, Ministry of National Defence and Former Combatants, Training Workshop on Military Criminal Law for Military Judges, November 2010, p. 14.

China

In the context of the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), the Chinese Communist Party condemned looting by Japanese troops. According to the Report on the Practice of China, these acts of looting were considered as part of a deliberate “barbarous policy” of the Japanese authorities.

Report on the Practice of China, 1997, Chapter 2.3, referring to Mao Zedong talking with a journalist of the Xinhua News Agency on the new international situation, 1 September 1939, Selected Works by Mao Zedong, The People’s Press, Beijing, Vol. 2, p. 586; see also Chapter 4.1, referring to Deng Xiaoping, The Economic Construction of the Area of Taihang Mountain, 2 July 1943, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. I, The People’s Press, Beijing, p. 78, which describes the plunder by Japanese troops of basic necessities and foodstuffs.

Colombia

The Report on the Practice of Colombia refers to a draft internal working paper of the Colombian government which stated that pillage and plunder are prohibited by IHL.

Report on the Practice of Colombia, 1998, Chapter 4.1, referring to Presidential Council, Proposal of the Government to the Coordinator Guerrillerra Simón Bolívar to humanise war, Draft Internal Working Paper, Part entitled “El Derecho Internacional Humanitario”, § 2(m).

Djibouti

In 2011, in the History and Geography Textbook for 9th Grade, Djibouti’s Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training, under the heading “[O]ffences related to violations of humanitarian law”, listed “[p]illaging a town or place”.

Djibouti, Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training, History and Geography Textbook for 9th Grade, 2011, p. 210.

Finland

In 1990, during a debate in the UN Security Council relating to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Finland condemned acts of pillage committed by Iraq.

In 1999, during the conflict in Kosovo, the French President criticized acts of the Serbian authorities in Kosovo, including pillage, and demanded that these acts cease.

France, Speech by the President, AFP, Paris, 21 April 1999.

Germany

In 1991, the majority of political parties in the German parliament vigorously condemned violations of human rights and “other crimes” committed during the civil war in Sudan. Pillage was among the “crimes” mentioned.

In 1995, during a debate in the UN Security Council concerning the situation in the former Yugoslavia, the German representative expressed his concern about reports of looting in the Krajina region. He urged the Croatian government to do its utmost to stop these acts.

During the Iran–Iraq War, the Islamic Republic of Iran claimed that inhabitants of the cities captured by Iraq were robbed. According to the Report on the Practice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, only two Iraqi towns were taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran during the conflict and there were no reports of pillage.

Report on the Practice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1997, Chapter 2.3.

Israel

Israel’s IDF General Staff Order No. 50.0303 of 1977 states that all commanders must ensure that their subordinates “will not commit acts of looting”.

In 2010, in a position paper submitted to the Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010 (the Turkel Commission), established by the Israeli government to examine the Gaza flotilla incident, Israel’s Military Advocate General stated:The paradigmatic example of that [a “prima facie breach of an absolute prohibition in the law of armed conflict”] is the taking of private property (which is not battle equipment, which can be taken as booty) – such as money or personal belongings of various types. In such a case, the very taking constitutes a prima facie breach of the law of armed conflict and raises suspicion of the crime of plundering, and thus the duty to investigate arises immediately.

Israel, position paper by the Military Advocate General on investigating allegations of violations of IHL, submitted to the Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010 (the Turkel Commission), 19 December 2010, Part B.

[emphasis in original]

Kuwait

In 1990, in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, Kuwait denounced “practices which are an affront to mankind and which violate all the values of Islam and of civilization, the principles of human rights and the relevant Geneva Conventions … [including] looting of all public and private facilities … [and] theft of public and private vehicles and their removal to Iraq”.

In 1990, in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, Kuwait mentioned violations “of all international laws” by Iraq:We wish to draw attention to a phenomenon which has no precedent in history, namely, the Iraqi occupation authorities’ organized operation for the purpose of looting and plundering Kuwait. It is impossible to compare this operation to any similar incidents or to provide an exact account thereof because it is in effect an operation designed to achieve nothing less than the complete removal of all Kuwait’s assets, including property belonging to the State, to public and private institutions and to individuals, as well as the contents of houses, factories, stores, hospitals, academic institutions and to universities.

In 1996, a newspaper reported the investigation by the Nigerian authorities of officers serving with ECOMOG who had allegedly brought back cars and building materials from Liberia. Preliminary investigation did not reveal the looting of property but the “authorities were concerned about the moral aspects of personnel buying items that might have been offered at very cheap prices by persons rattled or distressed by the effects of war”.

In response to a report by the Memorial Human Rights Center documenting the Russian Federation’s operation in the Chechen village of Samashki in April 1995, which alleged that the Russian forces had looted homes and taken television sets, cattle and other private property from the village, members of the Russian forces who testified in open hearings before a Russian Parliamentary Committee in May 1995 “vigorously denied” these allegations.

Memorial Human Rights Center, By All Available Means: the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs Operation in the Village of Samashki: April 7–8, 1995, Moscow, 1996, § 13, reprinted in Marco Sassòli and Antoine A. Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War?, ICRC, Geneva, 1999, p. 1416.

In 1995, during a debate in the UN Security Council concerning the situation in the former Yugoslavia, the Russian Federation declared that “the continuing large-scale violations of the rights of the Serbian population in the former Sectors West, North and South – including … the looting of homes … – are causing serious concern”.

In 1993, reacting to the report of pillage of civilian property by combatants of the Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR), the Rwandan government asked the FPR to refrain from acts of pillage of civilian property.

In 1992, in a note verbale addressed to the UN Secretary-General, Slovenia expressed its readiness to provide information concerning violations of IHL committed by members of the Yugoslav army during the 10-day conflict with Slovenia, including “looting”.

In 1998, an ICRC publication entitled “Spared from the Spear” recorded traditional Somali practice in warfare as follows:The leader … gave out the following instructions which were to be strictly followed:

…

13. The sanctity of private homes should not be violated, and their contents should not be touched, except for the purpose of getting a drink of water.

Somalia, Spared from the Spear, 1998, p. 25; see also p. 49.

In the case of intra-Rahanwein wars, the Malaaqs and the Garaads forbade [their men] to loot any livestock whatsoever, or to plunder any other private property. The looting of animals was, however, permitted during wars with non-Rahanwein clans who were first to engage in such a practice.

Somalia, Spared from the Spear, 1998, p. 27.

In times of hostilities, the Biri-Ma-Geydo (Spared from the Spear), i.e. Somalia’s own “Geneva Conventions”[,] which existed long before the adoption of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, mitigated and regulated the conduct of clan hostilities and the treatment of immune groups.

Somalia, Comments by the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia on the concluding observations of the Human Rights Council concerning the report of Somalia, submitted 21 September 2011, § 4.

In 2011, in its report to the Human Rights Council, Somalia stated:75. Somalia has not ratified [the 1977] AP [Additional Protocol] II and it is therefore not directly applicable to Somalia as a matter of treaty law. The Government is aware that many provisions of AP II represent customary IHL rules and therefore apply to the situation in Somalia. Such provisions include Article 4 providing guarantees to persons taking no active part in hostilities … due to the fact that these norms are reflected in Common Article 3 of the [1949] Geneva Conventions.76. The Government forces are also bound to respect customary IHL rules relating to the prohibited methods and means of warfare including … pillage.

In 1993, during a debate in the UN Security Council concerning the situation in Croatia, Spain referred to the conclusions of the Provisional Report of the Security Council’s Commission of Experts, according to which grave offences and other violations of IHL had been committed in the former Yugoslavia, including looting of civilian property.

The Report on UK Practice refers to a letter from a UK army lawyer which noted:The current view seems to be that units may lawfully seize enemy property on the battlefield and retain it as booty, but individuals doing the same run the risk of being charged with looting. Retention by units and formations of booty is subject to approval by Government whereas appropriation of property by individuals on the battlefield is strictly illegal.

Report on UK Practice, 1997, Letter from an army lawyer, 24 February 1998, Answers to additional questions on Chapter 2.3.

[emphasis in original]

United States of America

In 1992, in its final report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War, the US Department of Defense condemned the following Iraqi war crimes: “looting of civilian property in violation of [the 1907 Hague Regulations]”, “pillage, in violation of Article 47 [of the 1907 Hague Regulations]” and “pillage of Kuwaiti civilian hospitals, in violation of Articles 55, 56, 57, and 147 [of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV]”.

United States, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 10 April 1992, Appendix O, The Role of the Law of War, ILM, Vol. 31, 1992, pp. 632 and 635.

Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of

Order No. 579 issued in 1991 by the Chief of the Staff of the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) states that YPA units must “apply all means to prevent any attempt of pillage”.

Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of, Chief of General Staff of the YPA, Political Department, Order No. 579, 14 October 1991, § 2.

Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of

According to the Report on the Practice of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the context of the conflict in Croatia, the local press regularly reported pillage of private property, which allegedly occurred on a massive scale and was perpetrated by regular and paramilitary forces of both sides – Croatian troops and the Yugoslav People’s Army.

Report on the Practice of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1997, Chapter 2.3, referring to newspaper articles in Politika and Borba.

In a resolution adopted in 1995 on violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, the UN Security Council stated that it was “deeply concerned at reports … of serious violations of international humanitarian law … including … looting of property”.

In a resolution adopted in 1995 on violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the UN Security Council: Condemns the widespread looting and destruction of houses and other property, in particular by the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) forces in the area of Mrkonjic Grad and Šipovo, and demands that all sides immediately stop such action, investigate them and make sure that those who violated the law be held individually responsible in respect of such acts.

In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Security Council:2. Strongly condemns the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;3. Notes with concern that the plundering of the natural resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues and is one of the main elements fuelling the conflict in the region, and in this regard, demands that all States concerned take immediate steps to end these illegal activities, which are perpetuating the conflict, impeding the economic
development of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and exacerbating the suffering of its people.

In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Security Council:Categorically condemns the illegal exploitation of the natural resources and other sources of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and expresses its intention to consider means that could be used to end it, awaits with interest the report to be submitted shortly by the group of experts on such illegal exploitation and on the link that exists between it and the continuation of hostilities, and demands that all parties and interested States offer full cooperation to the group of experts.

In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Security Council:Noting with great concern that the plundering of natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues, … 2. Reiterates its demand that all States concerned take immediate steps to end the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Security Council:Reiterates its condemnation of the continuing illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, especially in the eastern part of the country, which contributes to the perpetuation of the conflict, and reaffirms the importance of bringing an end to these illegal activities, including by applying the necessary pressure on the armed groups, traffickers and all other actors involved.

In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Security Council:Recalls the link between the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources in certain regions and the fuelling of armed conflicts and, in line with its resolutions 1493 (2003), 1533 (2004) and 1552 (2004), condemns categorically the illegal exploitation of the natural resources and other sources of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, urges all States, especially those in the region including the Democratic Republic of the Congo itself, to take appropriate steps in order to end these illegal activities, including if necessary through judicial means, and to report to the Council as appropriate, and exhorts the international financial institutions to assist the Government of National Unity and Transition in establishing efficient and transparent control of the exploitation of natural resources.

In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Security Council:Recalling the link between the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources in certain regions and the fuelling of armed conflicts, condemning categorically the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other sources of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and urging all States, especially those in the region including the Democratic Republic of the Congo itself, to take appropriate steps in order to end these illegal activities,…10. Further urges all States neighbouring the Democratic Republic of the Congo to impede any kind of support to the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources, particularly by preventing the flow of such resources through their respective territories.

In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Security Council recognized“the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade in such resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as one of the factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa”.

In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Security Council:Recognizes the link between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, the illicit trade in such resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as one of the factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa, and in particular in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Security Council:Aware that the link between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, the illicit trade in those resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms is one of the factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, and especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,…16. Demands further that all States neighbouring the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as the Government of National Unity and Transition, impede any kind of support to the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources, particularly by preventing the flow of such resources through their respective territories.

In a resolution adopted in 2006 on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Security Council recognized“the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade in such resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as one of the factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa”.

In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Security Council:Recognizing the link between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, the illicit trade in such resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as one of the factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa, and in particular in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and urging all States, especially those in the region, to take appropriate steps to end these illegal activities,…7. Urges the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to strengthen its efforts, with the support of the international community, including specialized international organizations, with a view to effectively extending the State’s authority throughout its territory, establishing its control over the exploitation and export of natural resources, and improving the transparency of the management of the revenues from the exploitation of those natural resources;…15. Urges all States, especially those in the region, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo itself, to take appropriate steps to end the illicit trade in natural resources, including if necessary through judicial means, and, where necessary, to report to the Council, and calls upon the international financial institutions to assist the Government of the DRC in establishing effective and transparent control over the exploitation of natural resources.

In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Security Council:Condemning the continuing illicit flow of weapons within and into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, declaring its determination to continue close monitoring of the implementation of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 1493 (2003) and expanded by resolution 1596 (2005), and to enforce the measures provided for in resolution 1596 against persons and entities acting in violation of this embargo, as amended and expanded by resolutions 1649 (2005) and resolution 1698, and recognizing the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade in such resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as one of the factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa.

In a resolution adopted in 2007 on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Security Council urged all States, especially those in the region, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo itself, “to take the appropriate steps to end the illegal trade in natural resources”.

In 1995, in a statement by its President on the situation in Croatia, the UN Security Council stated that it was “concerned by the reports of human rights violations including … looting of property” and demanded that the government of Croatia “immediately investigate all such reports and take appropriate measures to put an end to such acts”.

In January 1996, in a statement by its President on the situation in Croatia, the UN Security Council strongly condemned “the violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in the former sectors North and South in the Republic of Croatia … including systematic and widespread looting”. It stated that measures must be taken by the government of Croatia to stop all such acts and bring the perpetrators to trial.

In 2003, in a statement by its President on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Security Council:Takes note of the final report (S/2003/1027) of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the Panel), which concludes its work, and emphasizes the connection, in the context of the continuing conflict, between the illegal exploitation of natural resources and trafficking in raw materials and arms, which the Panel has highlighted;Condemns the continuing illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, especially in the eastern part of the country, recalls that it has always categorically condemned these activities, which are one of the main elements perpetuating the conflict, and reaffirms the importance of stopping them by exerting, if need be, the necessary pressure on the armed groups, traffickers and all other actors involved;…Emphasizes that the prompt re-establishment, by the Government of National Unity and Transition, of State authority throughout the territory, and the establishment of competent administrations to protect and control exploitation activities will constitute decisive elements for ending the plundering of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;…Encourages States, trade-sector organizations and specialized bodies to monitor the trade in raw materials from the region in order to put an end to the plundering of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly within the framework of the Kimberley process.

In a resolution adopted in 1995 on the situation of human rights in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the UN General Assembly condemned “violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including … the … looting of houses”.

In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN General Assembly condemned “the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in view of the link between that exploitation and the continuation of the conflict”.

In a resolution adopted in 2004 on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN General Assembly:6. Calls upon the Government of National Unity and Transition to take specific measures:

…

(i) To put an end to the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in view of the link between that exploitation and the continuation of the conflict.

In a resolution adopted in 2005 on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN General Assembly:4. Condemns …(d) The continued illegal exploitation of natural resources in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and killings and other serious crimes against civilians committed by groups linked to the mining and trading of those resources, as well as the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade in such resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as one of the factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;…7. Calls upon the Governments of countries in the region, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo:(a) To contribute to preventing armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo from perpetrating killings and other serious crimes by tackling the illicit trade by those armed groups in illegally extracted natural resources as well as the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade in such resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms, including by preventing support for such armed groups, while fully respecting the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In a resolution adopted in 1996 on the situation of human rights in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the UN Commission on Human Rights:Condemns in the strongest terms all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law during the conflict, in particular in areas which were under the control of the self-proclaimed Bosnian and Croatian Serb authorities, in particular massive and systematic violations, including, inter alia, … looting of houses, … and reaffirms that all persons who plan, commit or authorize such acts will be held personally responsible and accountable.

In a resolution adopted in 1997 on the situation of human rights in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the UN Commission on Human Rights called upon the Government of Croatia “to prevent … looting … against Croatian Serbs”.

In a resolution adopted in 2003 on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Commission on Human Rights condemned “the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in view of the link between that exploitation and the continuation of the conflict”.

In a resolution adopted in 2004 on technical cooperation and advisory services in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Commission on Human Rights condemned “the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has established a link between that exploitation and the continuation of armed clashes”.

In a resolution adopted in 2005 on technical cooperation and advisory services in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN Commission on Human Rights condemned:The illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is linked to the continuation of armed clashes, thereby putting the population groups in the areas concerned at great risk of a deterioration in their health and economic situation.

In 1995, in a report on the former Yugoslavia, the UN Secretary-General reported that UNCRO continued to document serious violations of the human rights of the Croatian Serbs who had remained in the sectors reconquered by the Croatian army, including looting of property.

In 1995, in a report on the situation in Tajikistan, the UN Secretary-General reported that, following the 1994 Agreement on a Temporary Cease-fire on the Tajik-Afghan Border, “UNMOT received reports that armed groups were robbing villagers of their food and livestock. UNMOT has not been able to determine who carried out these acts, which are banned by the Tehran Agreement.”

In 1996, in a report on UNAVEM III in Angola, the UN Secretary-General reported that “UNAVEM III CIVPOL teams and United Nations human rights experts, who are now deployed to all six regions, indicate that … looting, extortion … and other criminal acts continue unabated in many parts of the country”.

In 1996, in a report on the situation of human rights in Croatia, the UN Secretary-General reported that:Since the end of November 1995, the incidence of human rights violations, including acts of … looting, committed in the former Sectors West, North and South has continued to decline … The vast scale of looting observed last summer and autumn has depleted the area of valuable personal property and thus the incidence of theft has greatly diminished … The Government of Croatia eventually responded with a series of measures intended to protect its citizens’ human rights, and these initiatives seem to have begun to have a positive effect.

In 1998, in a report on the situation in Sierra Leone, the UN Secretary-General stated:From all parts of the country there are reports of … the looting … of residential and commercial premises and property. It will remain important to document these actions with a view to tackling issues of impunity and as an element in the process of promoting reconciliation and healing of society.

In 1992, in a report on the situation of human rights in Kuwait under Iraqi occupation, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights noted, in a section entitled “Prohibition of the destruction, dismantling and pillaging of infrastructure and private property”, numerous cases of pillage of private property by Iraqi occupation forces. The legal framework which the Rapporteur considered applicable was Articles 16(2), 33(2) and (3) and 53 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV. He concluded that these acts “violated the guarantees of the Fourth Geneva Convention because they were not necessitated by military considerations nor were they otherwise admissible under international law”.

In 1993, in a report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights reported that he “was told … that looting is still taking place on a massive scale”, especially in some areas of Kabul.

UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, Final report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/42, 18 February 1993, §§ 19 and 27.

In 1993, in a report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights regarded the routine looting of the homes of Muslim families by Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb forces as violations of human rights.

UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Fifth periodic report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47, 17 November 1993, §§ 56, 82 and 147.

In 1994, in a report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights reported that “the money market located in the Saray Shah Zada area of the city [Kabul] … was … looted and set on fire”.

UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, Final report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/53, 14 February 1994, § 17.

In 1994, in a report on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights reported that he had received numerous complaints of looting by members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). He considered that the applicable legal framework was common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocols and the customary law principle of civilian immunity expressly recognized by General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968.

UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, Interim report, UN Doc. A/49/539, 19 October 1994, §§ 43 and 59-60.

In 1995, in a report on the situation of human rights in the region of Banja Luka in northern Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights described the systematic pillage of the Muslim population, as part of the policy of “ethnic cleansing”. The Special Rapporteur pointed out that many elements showed that de facto authorities were personally and directly responsible for the massive violations of human rights, for example, by the fact that the authorities had not taken the most elementary measures to protect the population.

UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Periodic report on the situation in the region of Banja Luka, northern Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/3, 21 April 1995, §§ 7–9 and 31.

In 1995, in a report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights reported that many acts of pillage had occurred while the Croatian army was advancing in western Slavonia. He concluded that the Croatian authorities were responsible for violations of human rights and IHL during and after the military operations.

UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Periodic report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/6, 5 July 1995, §§ 17 and 51.

UN Commission on Human Rights (Independent Expert)

In 1996, in a report on the situation of human rights in Somalia, the Independent Expert of the UN Commission on Human Rights described, in a section entitled “Civil war and violations of human rights”, the practices of the different Somali factions, including the fact that the winning faction would engage in looting.

UN Commission on Human Rights, Independent Expert on Assistance to Somalia in the Field of Human Rights, Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/14/Add.1, 10 April 1996, § 10.

UN Commission on Human Rights (Special Rapporteur)

In 1997, in a report on the situation of human rights in Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo), the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights reported that before abandoning a town to the rebels, the Zairean Armed Forces engaged in looting. He noted that the new authorities in certain towns had punished abuses committed by members of the rebel forces against civilians.

UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)

In 1994, in its final report on grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other violations of IHL committed in the former Yugoslavia, the UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) placed “looting, theft and robbery of personal property” within the practices of “ethnic cleansing”, as part of a systematic and planned general policy. It noted that acts of looting were committed by persons from all segments of the Serb population: soldiers, militias, special forces, police and civilians. These acts were described as violations of IHL and crimes against humanity.

In 1995, in a statement concerning Chechnya delivered before the OSCE Permanent Council on behalf of the EU, France stated: “Everything must be done to preserve houses in localities evacuated so that inhabitants would be in a position to return in safety when they wished to do so.”

EU, Statement by France on behalf of the EU on the situation in Chechnya before the OSCE Permanent Council, 6 June 1995, Politique étrangère de la France, June 1995, p. 103.

GCC Ministerial Council

In the Final Communiqué of its 13th Extraordinary Session in 1990, the GCC Ministerial Council stated that it “respectfully salutes the steadfast people of Kuwait who, in confronting the Iraqi occupation, defy all manner of … plundering of their property”.

In 1996, in a report submitted to the UN Security Council on the activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee stated with respect to the remaining Serb population in the Krajina that “human rights violations, including … looting of abandoned property … were brought to the attention of the Croatian Government at the highest levels on a number of occasions, together with the serious criticism from the international community”.

International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee, Final biannual report, UN Doc. S/1996/4, 2 January 1996, Annex, § 10.

International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (1999)

The Plan of Action for the years 2000–2003 adopted in 1999 by the 27th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent proposed that all the parties to an armed conflict take effective measures to ensure that “strict orders are given to prevent all serious violations of international humanitarian law, including … looting … and threats to carry out such actions”.

27th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 31 October–6 November 1999, Res. I, Annex 2, Plan of Action for the years 2000–2003, Actions proposed for final goal 1.1, § 1(b).

In its judgment in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case (DRC v. Uganda) in 2005, the ICJ stated:245. … [T]he acts and omissions of members of Uganda’s military forces in the DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo] engage Uganda’s international responsibility in all circumstances, whether it was an occupying Power in particular regions or not. Thus, whenever members of the UPDF [Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces] were involved in the looting, plundering and exploitation of natural resources in the territory of the DRC, they acted in violation of the jus in bello, which prohibits the commission of such acts by a foreign army in the territory where it is present. The Court notes in this regard that both Article 47 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 prohibit pillage.… 248. The Court further observes that the fact that Uganda was the occupying Power in Ituri district … extends Uganda’s obligation to take appropriate measures to prevent the looting, plundering and exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory to cover private persons in this district and not only members of Ugandan military forces… … 250. The Court concludes that it is in possession of sufficient credible evidence to find that Uganda is internationally responsible for acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources committed by members of the UPDF in the territory of the DRC, for violating its obligation of vigilance in regard to these acts and for failing to comply with its obligations under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 as an occupying Power in Ituri in respect of all acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory.

by acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese natural resources committed by members of the Ugandan armed forces in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and by its failure to comply with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri district to prevent acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese natural resources.

In the Kony case before the ICC in 2005, the Pre-Trial Chamber II issued an arrest warrant for Joseph Kony, the alleged founder, chairman and commander-in-chief of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an armed group carrying out an insurgency against the Government of Uganda. He was charged, inter alia, with five counts of pillage for “ordering the commission of war crimes which in fact occurred, namely the pillaging of … IDP Camp[s] in … Uganda” (punishable under Articles 8(2)(e)(v) and 25(3)(b) of the 1998 ICC Statute).

a cycle of violence and established a pattern of “brutalization of civilians” by acts including murder, abduction, sexual enslavement, mutilation, as well as mass burnings of houses and looting of camp settlements; that abducted civilians, including children, are said to have been forcibly “recruited” as fighters, porters and sex slaves to serve the LRA and to contribute to attacks against the Ugandan army and civilian communities.

In the Odhiambo case before the ICC in 2005, the Pre-Trial Chamber II issued an arrest warrant for Okot Odhiambo, an alleged senior commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, for his role in the commission of war crimes (murder, enlisting children, attacks against the civilian population, and pillage, punishable under Article 8(2)(c)(i), (e)(i), (e)(v) and (e)(vii) of the 1998 ICC Statute) and crimes against humanity (murder and enslavement, punishable under Article 7(1)(a) and (c) of the 1998 ICC Statute).

In the Otti case before the ICC in 2005, the Pre-Trial Chamber II issued an arrest warrant for Vincent Otti, the alleged Vice-Chairman and Second-in-Command of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), an armed group carrying out an insurgency against the Government of Uganda. He was charged,
inter alia, with five counts of pillage for “ordering the commission of war crimes which in fact occurred, namely the pillaging of … IDP Camp[s] in … Uganda” (Articles 8(2)(e)(v) and 25(3)(b) of the 1998 ICC Statute).

a cycle of violence and established a pattern of “brutalization of civilians” by acts including murder, abduction, sexual enslavement, mutilation, as well as mass burnings of houses and looting of camp settlements; that abducted civilians, including children, are said to have been forcibly “recruited” as fighters, porters and sex slaves to serve the LRA and to contribute to attacks against the Ugandan army and civilian communities.

ICC, Otti case, Warrant of arrest, 8 July 2005, § 5.

In the Ongwen case before the ICC in 2005, the Pre-Trial Chamber II, dealing with the situation in Uganda, issued an arrest warrant for Dominic Ongwen, allegedly a brigade commander in the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The decision was based, inter alia, on a charge of pillage as a war crime, punishable under Article 8(2)(e)(v) of the 1998 ICC Statute. The charge related to allegations of “ordering the commission of a war crime which in fact occurred, namely, the pillaging of [an] IDP Camp [in] Uganda”.

ICC, Ongwen case, Warrant of Arrest, 8 July 2005, Count 33.

In the Katanga case before the ICC in 2007, the Pre-Trial Chamber I issued an arrest warrant for Germain Katanga, the alleged former commander of an armed group known as the Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri(FRPI), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He was charged, inter alia, with “pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault as a war crime”, punishable under Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) or (e)(v) of the 1998 ICC Statute.

ICC, Katanga case, Warrant of arrest, 2 July 2007, p. 6.

(i) the murder of about 200 civilians; (ii) causing serious bodily harm to civilians; (iii) arresting, threatening with weapons and imprisoning civilians in a room filled with corpses; (iv) pillaging; and (v) the sexual enslavement of several women and girls.

ICC, Katanga case, Warrant of arrest, 2 July 2007, p. 4.

In the Harun case before the ICC in 2007, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, dealing with the situation in Darfur, Sudan, issued an arrest warrant for Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”), minister of state for the interior of the Government of Sudan from in or about April 2003 until in or about September 2005 and minister of state for Humanitarian Affairs of the Government of Sudan since 2006. The decision was based, inter alia, on counts of pillaging as war crimes. The Pre-Trial Chamber considered that there were reasonable grounds to believe that:On or about 15 August 2003, Ahmad Harun, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the pillaging of property belonging to the primarily Fur population of Bindisi town and surrounding areas, including the pillaging of household property (articles 8(2)(e)(v) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);…Between August 2003 and March 2004, Ahmad Harun, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the pillaging of property belonging to the primarily Fur population of Mukjar town and surrounding areas including the pillaging of shops, houses and livestock (articles 8(2)(e)(v) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);…Between on or about 3 August 2003 and 10 August 2003, Ahmad Harun induced the commission of the pillaging of property belonging to the primarily Fur population of Mukjar town and surrounding areas including the pillaging of shops, houses and livestock (articles 8(2)(c)(v) and 25(3)(b) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);…In or around December 2003, Ahmad Harun, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the pillaging of property belonging to the primarily Fur population of Arawala town and surrounding areas, including the pillaging of stores, houses and livestock (articles 8(2)(e)(v) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute).

In the Kushayb case before the ICC in 2007, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, dealing with the situation in Darfur, Sudan, issued an arrest warrant for Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”), a member of the Popular Defence Force (PDF) and a senior leader of the Militia/Janjaweed. The decision was based, inter alia, on counts of pillaging as war crimes. The Pre-Trial Chamber considered that there were reasonable grounds to believe that:On or about 15 August 2003, Ali Kushayb, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the pillaging of property belonging to the primarily Fur population of Bindisi town and surrounding areas, including the pillaging of household property (articles 8(2)(e)(v) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);…Between August 2003 and March 2004, Ali Kushayb, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the pillaging of property belonging to the primarily Fur population of Mukjar town and surrounding areas including the pillaging of shops, houses and livestock (articles 8(2)(e)(v) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute);…In or around December 2003, Ali Kushayb, as part of a group of persons acting with a common purpose, contributed to the pillaging of property belonging to the primarily Fur population of Arawala town and surrounding areas, including the pillaging of stores, houses and livestock (articles 8(2)(e)(v) and 25(3)(d) of the [1998 ICC] Statute).

In the Ngudjolo Chuicase before the ICC in 2007, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I issued an arrest warrant for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, a Congolese national and alleged former leader of an armed group known as the Front des nationalistes et intégrationnistes (FNI). At the time his arrest warrant was issued, he was a colonel in the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He was charged, inter alia, with “pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault, as a war crime” (Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) or (e)(v) of the 1998 ICC Statute).

ICC, Ngudjolo Chui case, Warrant of arrest, 6 July 2007, p. 6.

(i) the murder of about 200 civilians; (ii) causing serious bodily harm to civilians; (iii) arresting, threatening with weapons and imprisoning civilians in a room filled with corpses; (iv) pillaging; and (v) the sexual enslavement of several women and girls.

ICC, Ngudjolo Chui case, Warrant of arrest, 6 July 2007, p. 4.

In the Katanga and Chui case before the ICC, the accused, respectively the alleged commander of the Front for Patriotic Resistance of Ituri(FRPI) and the alleged former leader of the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, were charged with jointly committing through other persons various crimes against humanity and war crimes under Articles 7 and 8 of the 1998 ICC Statute. In its decision on the confirmation of charges in 2008, the Pre-Trial Chamber considered the war crime of pillage under Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the 1998 ICC Statute, stating:328. The war crime provided for in article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the [1998 ICC] Statute is defined as “pillaging a town or place, even when it is taken by assault”. According to [the 2000 ICC] Elements of Crimes, in addition to establishing a nexus between the crime and an international armed conflict and the perpetrator’s awareness of the factual circumstances that established the existence of such a conflict, the war crime of pillaging requires the following three elements: (i) “the perpetrator appropriated certain property”; (ii) “the perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appropriate it for private or personal use”; and (iii) “the appropriation was without the consent of the owner”.329. Like the war crime of destruction of property under article 8(2)(b)(xiii), the war crime of pillaging under article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the Statute requires that the property subject to the offence belongs to an “enemy” or “hostile” party to the conflict. Therefore, the pillaged property – whether moveable or immoveable, private or public – must belong to individuals or entities who are aligned with or whose allegiance is to a party to the conflict who is adverse or hostile to the perpetrator.330. Whereas the war crime of destruction of property under article 8(2)(b)(xiii) of the Statute can take place before the destroyed property has fallen into the hands of the party to the conflict to which the perpetrator belongs, the war crime of pillaging occurs when the enemy’s property has come under the control of the perpetrator. Only then is the perpetrator in a position to “appropriate” such property.331. The intent and knowledge requirement of article 30 of the Statute applies to the war crime of pillaging under article 8(2)(b)(xvi). This offence encompasses, first and foremost, cases of dolus directus of the first degree. It may also include dolus directus of the second degree.332. However, this offence additionally requires two elements, or dolus specialis. First, the act of physical appropriation must be carried out with the intent to deprive the owner of his property. Second, the act of physical appropriation must also be carried with the intent to utilise the appropriated property for private or personal use.333. Finally, the Elements of Crimes expressly provide for the exculpation of the perpetrator’s unlawful conduct where the perpetrator appropriated property with the owner’s consent. As neither Defence team invoked this ground for justification, the Chamber finds that it is not necessary to elaborate further on the scope of this justification for the purposes of the present Decision.

ICC, Katanga and Chui case, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 30 September 2008, §§ 328–333.

[footnotes in original omitted]

In the Bemba case before the ICC, the accused, the alleged President and Commander-in-chief of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), was charged, inter alia, with murder, rape and torture as war crimes and as crimes against humanity, pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 of the 1998 ICC Statute. In its decision on the confirmation of charges in 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber set out the definition of the war crime of pillage, stating:316. With regard to article 8(2)(e)(v) of the [1998 ICC] Statute, the [2000 ICC] Elements of Crimes require that:

(1) The perpetrator appropriated certain property;

(2) The appropriation was without the consent of the owner.

317. The Chamber observes that pillaging a town or place pursuant to article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute entails a somewhat large-scale appropriation of all types of property, such as public or private, movable or immovable property, which goes beyond mere sporadic acts of violation of property rights. Further, noting the wording of the Elements of Crimes, the Chamber observes that the Elements of Crimes do not require the property to be of a certain monetary value. However, bearing in mind the mandate of the Court as set out in article 1 of the Statute, the Chamber recalls that article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute is introduced as “[another serious [violation] of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflict not of an international character”. In the opinion of the Chamber, this means that cases of petty property expropriation may not fall under the scope of article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute. A determination on the seriousness of the violation is made by the Chamber in light of the particular circumstances of the case.318. Lastly, the Chamber finds that, to the extent possible, a description of the “expropriated” property is required in order to ascertain whether indeed “certain property” was appropriated without the consent of the rightful owner.bb) Mens rea319. With regard to the mental element the perpetrator must have removed certain property from the possession of another rightful owner without his or her consent with intent and knowledge pursuant to article 30 of the Statute.320. The Chamber highlights that in addition to the intent pursuant to article 30 of the Statute, the perpetrator must have specifically intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appropriate it for private or personal use.

In the Bisengimana case before the ICTR in 2000, the accused, a former mayor of the Gikoro commune, was initially charged, inter alia, with:pillage, … thereby committ[ing] serious violations of Article 3 common to the GENEVA CONVENTIONS of 12 August 1949 for the protection of victims in times of war, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977, pursuant to Article 4(f) [of the 1994 ICTR Statute].

ICTR, Bisengimana case, Indictment, 1 July 2000, Count 12.

[emphasis in original]

In the Setako case before the ICTR in 2004, the accused, a former colonel in the Rwandan armed forces, was, inter alia, charged with pillage as a serious violation of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, pursuant to Article 4(f) of the 1994 ICTR Statute.

ICTR, Setako case, Indictment, 22 March 2004, Count 6.

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

In the Nikolić case before the ICTY in 1994, the accused was charged, inter alia, with violations of the laws and customs of war for having participated “during a period of armed conflict in the plunder of private property of persons detained at Sušica Camp”.

ICTY, Nikolić case, Initial Indictment, 4 November 1994, § 21.2.

In the Jelisić case before the ICTY in 1995, the accused was charged, inter alia, with violations of the laws and customs of war (plunder of private property) for having “participated in the plunder of money, watches and other valuable property belonging to persons detained at Luka camp”.

ICTY, Jelisić case, Initial Indictment, 21 July 1995, § 42.

In the Karadžić and Mladićcase before the ICTY in 1995, the accused were charged, inter alia, with violations of the laws or customs of war, for plunder of public or private property, in violation of Article 3(e) of the 1993 ICTY Statute. Allegedly, Bosnian Serb military and police personnel and other agents of the Bosnian Serb administration, under the direction and control of the accused “systematically … looted the real and personal property of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians”.

In the Mucić case before the ICTY in 1996, the accused were charged, inter alia, with violations of the laws and customs of war (plunder of private property) for having “participated in the plunder of money, watches and other valuable property belonging to persons detained at Čelebići camp”.

ICTY, Mucić case, Initial Indictment, 21 March 1996, § 37.

590. The prohibition against the unjustified appropriation of public and private enemy property is general in scope, and extends both to acts of looting committed by individual soldiers for their private gain, and to the organized seizure of property undertaken within the framework of a systematic economic exploitation of occupied territory. Contrary to the submissions of the Defence, the fact that it was acts of the latter category which were made the subject of prosecutions before the International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg and in the subsequent proceedings before the Nürnberg Military Tribunals does not demonstrate the absence of individual criminal liability under international law for individual acts of pillage committed by perpetrators motivated by personal greed. In contrast, when seen in a historical perspective, it is clear that the prohibition against pillage was directed precisely against violations of the latter kind. Consistent with this view, isolated instances of theft of personal property of modest value were treated as war crimes in a number of trials before French Military Tribunals following the Second World War.591. In this context, it must be observed that the offence of the unlawful appropriation of public and private property in armed conflict has varyingly been termed “pillage”, “plunder” and “spoliation” … [Plunder] should be understood to embrace all forms of unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflict for which individual criminal responsibility attaches under international law, including those acts traditionally described as “pillage”.

ICTY, Mucićcase, Judgment, 16 November 1998, §§ 590 and 591.

In the Blaškić case before the ICTY in 1997, the accused was charged, inter alia, on the count of violations of the laws and customs of war (plunder of public or private property) for having “planned, instigated, ordered or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of the … plunder of Bosnian Muslim dwellings, buildings, businesses, civilian personal property and livestock”.

ICTY, Blaškić case, Second Amended Indictment, 25 April 1997, § 10.

He was convicted by the Tribunal on this count.

ICTY, Blaškićcase, Judgment, 3 March 2000, Part VI (Disposition).

The prohibition on the wanton appropriation of enemy public or private property extends to both isolated acts of plunder for private interest and to the “organized seizure of property undertaken within the framework of a systematic economic exploitation of occupied territory”. Plunder “should be understood to embrace all forms of unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflict for which individual criminal responsibility attaches under international law, including those acts traditionally described as ‘pillage’”.

ICTY, Blaškićcase, Judgment, 3 March 2000, § 184.

In the Kordić and Čerkezcase before the ICTY in 1998, the accused were charged, inter alia, on the count of violation of the laws or customs of war for having “caused, planned, instigated, ordered or committed, or aided and abetted the planning, preparation or execution of, the … plunder of Bosnian Muslim dwellings, buildings, businesses, civilian personal property and livestock”.

ICTY, Kordić and Čerkezcase, First Amended Indictment, 30 September 1998, §§ 55 and 56; see also §§ 34, 37 and 39 (count of persecution as a crime against humanity, inter alia, through the plundering of Bosnian Muslim civilian property); see further Kordić and Čerkezcase, Initial Indictment, 10 November 1995, § 23 (count of persecution as a crime against humanity, inter alia, through the plundering of homes and personal property).

In its judgment on appeal in 2004, the ICTY Appeals Chamber affirmed the sentence handed down by the Trial Chamber for Dario Kordić of 25 years’ imprisonment and resentenced Mario Čerkez to six years’ imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber found that the crime of plunder is committed when private or public property is appropriated intentionally and unlawfully. Furthermore, the general requirements of Article 3 of the [1993 ICTY] Statute in conjunction with Article 1 of the Statute relating to the seriousness of the crime must be fulfilled.

The Naletilićand Martinović case before the ICTY in 2001 dealt with crimes surrounding the military offensive launched in May 1993 by the Army of the Republic of Croatia (HV) and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) against the Bosnian Muslim population of Mostar (south-western Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH). The accused were charged, inter alia, with violations of the laws or customs of war (plunder of public or private property, punishable under Article 3(e) of the 1993 ICTY Statute) for having been in command of the HV and HVO forces that systematically plundered Bosnian Muslim houses and properties in Mostar following the attack on that town by those forces.

This crime has been defined as “wilful and unlawful appropriation of property”, and, as enshrined in Article 3(e) of the [1993 ICTY] Statute, it may affect both private and public property. The term is general in scope, comprising not only large-scale seizures of property within the framework of systematic economic exploitations of occupied territory but also acts of appropriation committed by individual soldiers for their private gain. In fact, under international law, plunder does not require the appropriation to be extensive or to involve a large economic value.

ICTY, Naletilićand Martinović case, Judgment, 31 March 2003, § 612.

In the Slobodan Milošević case before the ICTY in 2002, the accused, a former president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was charged, inter alia, with three counts of plunder of public or private property as violations of the laws or customs of war (Article 3(e) of the 1993 ICTY Statute).

In the Hadžihasanović case before the ICTY in 2003, the accused, Hadžihasanović and Kubura, senior officers in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH), were charged, inter alia, with violations of the laws or customs of war (plunder of public or private property, punishable under Article 3(e) of the 1993 ICTY Statute) for their alleged omissions as commanders. It was alleged that ABiH forces under their command and effective control:[i]n the course of their combat activities with the HVO [Croatian Defence Council] and the HV [Army of the Republic of Croatia] in central Bosnia in 1993 … either plundered or plundered and unlawfully destroyed Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb dwellings, buildings and civilian personal property … not justified by military necessity.

As stated earlier, the Tribunal can try only offences that come under international customary law at the time of their commission. In respect of international armed conflicts, the Chamber notes that the Tribunal’s case-law has demonstrated the customary character of the crime of plunder of public or private property set out in Article 3(e) of the [1993 ICTY] Statute within the framework of cases in the period from 1992 to 1994. The competence of the Chamber to try the crime of plunder in international armed conflicts is therefore established.

ICTY, Hadžihasanović case, Decision on Motions for Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98 bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 27 September 2004, § 124.

125. With respect to non-international armed conflicts, the Appeals Chamber has established the general principle that “It cannot be denied that customary rules have developed to govern internal strife. These rules […] cover such areas as [the] protection of civilian objects”. The Appeals Chamber recently dealt more specifically with the question of plunder in a case containing offences committed prior to those covered by the present Indictment [ICTY Appeals Chamber’s Judgement in the Blaškić case, 2004]. It explained that the act of plunder contravenes several norms of international humanitarian law including those applicable to non-international conflicts under Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and that such norms come under international customary law. Referring to non-international conflicts, on the basis of this case-law, the Chamber concludes that the offence of plunder of public or private property came under int
ernational customary law at the time the facts alleged in the Indictment occurred …126. It remains to be determined whether the prohibition of plunder of public or private property could entail the individual criminal responsibility of a person within the framework of a non-international armed conflict throughout the period relevant to the Indictment. In view of the Appeals Chamber’s general observations on this subject, this Chamber concludes that the response must be affirmative.

ICTY, Hadžihasanović case, Decision on Motions for Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98 bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 27 September 2004, §§ 125–126.

49. The Chamber considers that the elements of the offence of plunder exist when public or private property is acquired illegally and deliberately. This crime covers “all forms of unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflict for which individual criminal responsibility attaches under international law, including those acts traditionally described as ‘pillage’” and extends to “both widespread and systematised acts of dispossession and acquisition of property in violation of the rights of the owners and isolated acts of theft or plunder by individuals for their private gain.”50. The mens rea element of the offence of plunder of public or private property is established when the perpetrator of the offence acts with the knowledge and intent to acquire property unlawfully, or when the consequences of his actions are foreseeable.51. Treaty and customary law does, however, provide for exceptions to the principle of protection of public and private property enshrined in Article 3(e) of the Statute. In the context of international armed conflicts, the taking of war booty and the requisition of property for military use may constitute limitations to that principle. As early as 1863, the Lieber Code laid down the principle that war booty belongs to the party who seized it. According to national practices, war booty includes enemy property or military equipment captured on the battlefield. Personal effects belonging to prisoners of war are an exception. In the case of an occupation, the Hague Regulations leave open, in some cases, the possibility for the occupying power to requisition property “for the needs of the occupation army”.52. The Chamber notes, however, that in non-international conflicts such regulations authorising or prohibiting war booty and requisitions have not been identified. In such cases, national law must settle those issues. In its submissions, the Defence for Hadžihasanović refers to “authorised war booty, [and] confiscation of items where a receipt is given.” The regulations governing war booty, as defined by the Supreme Command Staff of the ABiH, specify which property may be considered war booty and spell out the procedures for registering it. Those regulations authorise the ABiH to seize enemy public property captured on the battlefield. Property which may be considered war booty includes weapons, ammunition, equipment, or any other materials with military applications, communications equipment, vehicles, and other means of transportation. The personal effects of prisoners of war, however, may not be considered war booty. Those regulations also provide that weapons, ammunition, and any other materials which have direct military applications, even if they are private property, may be seized as war booty. Such property must be handed over to the competent authorities and may not be appropriated by individuals. The property must be registered. This Chamber is of the opinion that the property mentioned above, which has military applications and has been registered, may be considered war booty. In fact, those regulations seek to implement customary international law and treaty law in those areas. According to international law, the regulations do not allow arbitrary and unjustified plunder for army purposes or for the individual use of army members, even if the property seized can be used collectively or individually. This is explicitly acknowledged in documents from the 3rd Corps Command which prohibit the plunder of movable property belonging to the civilian population.53. The Chamber is of the view that, in the context of an actual or looming famine, a state of necessity may be an exception to the prohibition on the appropriation of public or private property. Property that can be appropriated in a state of necessity includes mostly food, which may be eaten in situ, but also livestock. To plead a defence of necessity and for it to succeed, the following conditions must be met: (i) there must be a real and imminent threat of severe and irreparable harm to life existence; (ii) the acts of plunder must have been the only means to avoid the aforesaid harm; (iii) the acts of plunder were not disproportionate and, (iv) the situation was not voluntarily brought about by the perpetrator himself.54. The Chamber considers that to constitute an offence punishable by Article 3 of the Statute, the plunder of public or private property need not be carried out in the context of military action. It suffices for the offence stipulated in Article 3(e) of the Statute to be closely linked to the hostilities.55. The Chamber recalls that the crime of plunder of public or private property must satisfy the conditions for applying Article 3 of the Statute, particularly the condition regarding the gravity of the offence. That last condition is met when the plundered property is of sufficient value that its unlawful appropriation involves grave consequences for the victims. In Tadić, the Appeals Chamber illustrated the concept of gravity by explaining that although the fact that a combatant’s appropriation of a loaf of bread in an occupied village might fall under the principle laid down in Article 46 of the Hague Regulations whereby private property must be respected by any army occupying an enemy territory, that act would not amount to a serious violation of international humanitarian law. The Chamber agrees with the opinion expressed in Naletilić that the crime of plunder can result not only from the fact the “victim suffers severe economic consequences,” but also from “the reiteration of the acts and from their overall impact”. The seriousness of the violation must be ascertained on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the circumstances of the crime.56. The Chamber finds that the offence of plunder of public or private property is constituted when property has been unlawfully and deliberately appropriated. The property must be sufficiently valuable to entail grave consequences for the victim. Property seized as war booty, requisitioned, or whose seizure is justified by necessity are exceptions to the principle of protection of public and private property.

ICTY, Hadžihasanović case, Judgment, 15 March 2006, §§ 49–56.

In its judgment in the Simićcase in 2003, the ICTY Trial Chamber stated:The Trial Chamber notes that the question of whether the acts of looting constitute the specific offence of plunder is largely a terminological one. Linguistic and comparative legal sources indicate that the two terms are generally used synonymously. http://www.un.org/icty/simic/trialc3/judgement/foot1.htm - 176The Trial Chamber also refers to the Celebići Trial Judgement finding that the terms “pillage”, “plunder”, and “spoliation” varyingly have been used to describe the unlawful appropriation of public and private property during armed conflicts and that “plunder” should be understood as encompassing acts traditionally described as “pillage”.

ICTY, Simić case, Judgment, 17 October 2003, § 98.

It has been held that plunder within the meaning of the [1993 ICTY] Statute encompasses “all forms of unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflicts for which individual criminal responsibility attaches under international law” and extends to both cases of “organized” and “systematic” seizure of property from protected persons in occupied territories, as well as to “acts of looting committed by individual soldiers for their private gain”.

ICTY, Simić case, Judgment, 17 October 2003, § 99.

In the Ademi and Norac case before the ICTY in 2004, the accused were charged, inter alia, with the plunder of property as a violation of the laws or customs of war under Article 3 of the 1993 ICTY Statute. The Consolidated Indictment of 27 May 2004 stated:32. From 9 September to on or about 17 September 1993, property of Serb civilians living in the Medak Pocket was plundered. Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac, acting individually and/or in concert with others including Janko Bobetko, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of the plunder of property of Serb civilians of the Medak Pocket … 33. Alternatively, Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac knew, or had reason to know, that Croatian forces under their command, direction and/or control, or subordinated to them, were committing the acts described in paragraph 32 above, or had done so. Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the commission of such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

In the Hadžić case before the ICTY in 2004, the accused was charged, inter alia, with violations of the laws or customs of war under Article 3(e) of the 1993 ICTY Statute (plunder of public or private property) for having:Planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation, or execution of the wanton destruction and plunder of the public and private property of the Croat and other non-Serb population, within the territory of the SAO SBWS [Serbian Autonomous District/Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem], although these actions were not justified by military necessity. This intentional and wanton destruction and plunder included the plunder and destruction of homes and religious and cultural buildings.

ICTY, Hadžić case, Initial Indictment, 4 June 2004, § 40, Count 14.

In the Čermak and Markač case before the ICTY in 2005, the accused were charged, inter alia, with violations of the laws or customs of war (plunder of private or public property, punishable under Article 3(e) of the 1993 ICTY Statute), for their alleged role in a campaign to permanently remove the Serb population from the Krajina region of Croatia.

From at least July 1995 to about 15 November 1995, Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac, acting individually and/or in concert with other members of the joint criminal enterprise, and various subordinates over whom the accused possessed effective control, planned, instigated, ordered, committed, and/or aided and abetted the planning, preparation and/or execution of the systematic plunder of the property of the Krajina Serbs, including their homes, outbuildings, barns and/or livestock.

In the Gotovina case before the ICTY in 2007, the accused were charged, inter alia,with violations of the laws or customs of war (plunder of public or private property punishable under Article 3(e) of the 1993 ICTY Statute), for havingplanned, instigated, ordered, committed, and/or aided and abetted the planning, preparation and/or execution of the systematic plunder of the property owned or inhabited by the Krajina Serbs, including their homes, outbuildings, barns and/or livestock.

ICTY, Gotovina case, Joinder Indictment, 6 March 2007, § 51, Count 4.

In the Martić case before the ICTY in 2007, the accused was charged, inter alia, with the plunder of public or private property as a violation of the laws or customs of war pursuant to Article 3(e) of the 1993 ICTY Statute.

ICTY, Martić case, Amended Indictment, 14 July 2003, § 48, Count 14.

101. Plunder of public or private property under Article 3(e) of the [1993 ICTY] Statute is committed “when private or public property is appropriated intentionally and unlawfully”. [Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 84] The prohibition of plunder includes “all forms of unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflict for which individual criminal responsibility attaches under international law, including those acts traditionally described as ‘pillage’”. [Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 79] There is no difference between public and private property under the Statute.102. For the crime of plunder to be established, the appropriation of private or public property must be done without lawful basis or legal justification. Belligerent occupants may, in certain instances, lawfully use private or public property in the occupied territory for their military needs. A party to the conflict is also allowed to seize enemy military equipment captured or found on the battlefield as war booty, with the exception that the personal belongings of the prisoners of war may not be taken away. According to the Hague Regulations, forcible contribution of money, requisition for the needs of the occupying army, and seizure of material obviously related to the conduct of military o
perations, though restricted, are lawful in principle.103. It is required that the property unlawfully appropriated be of “sufficient monetary value” for its appropriation to involve grave consequences for the victim. The assessment of whether a piece of property holds the required value “can only be made on a case-by-case basis and only in conjunction with the general circumstances of the crime”. [Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 82] This requirement could be met in cases where appropriations take place vis-à-vis a large number of people, even though they do not lead to grave consequences for each individual. What needs to be considered here is “the overall effect on the civilian population and the multitude of offences committed”. [Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 83]104. With respect to the mens rea of this crime, the unlawful appropriation of property must have been perpetrated with either direct or indirect intent.

ICTY, Martić case, Judgment, 12 June 2007, §§ 101–104.

In the Vojislav Šešelj case before the ICTY in 2007, the accused, a prominent political figure in the former Yugoslavia, was charged, inter alia, with the plunder of public or private property as a violation of the laws or customs of war pursuant to Article 3(e) of the 1993 ICTY Statute, for his role in the plunder of property of Croat, Muslim and other non-Serb populations in areas of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the Bockarie case before the SCSL in 2003, the accused, a senior member of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Junta and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)/RUF, was charged, inter alia, with “[p]illage, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II, punishable under Article 3.f. of the [2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone]”.

SCSL, Bockarie case, Indictment, 7 March 2003, §§ 56–60, Count 13.

(emphasis in original)

In the Koroma case before the SCSL in 2003, the accused, the leader of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), a senior leader of the AFRC/Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a senior member of the Junta regime, and exercising the powers of the president of the Republic of Sierra Leone from May 1997 to February 1998, was charged, inter alia, with “[p]illage, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II, punishable under Article 3.f. of the [2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone]”.

SCSL, Koroma case, Indictment, 7 March 2003, §§ 54–58, Count 13.

(emphasis in original)

In the Sankoh case before the SCSL in 2003, the accused, the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a senior leader in the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)/RUF, and a senior member of the Junta regime, was charged, inter alia, with “[p]illage, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II, punishable under Article 3.f. of the [2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone]”.

SCSL, Sankoh case, Indictment, 7 March 2003, §§ 57–61, Count 13.

(emphasis in original)

In the Fofana and Kondewacase before the SCSL in 2004, the accused, senior members of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), were charged, inter alia, with pillage as a violation of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the 1977 Additional Protocol II, pursuant to Article 3(f), of the 2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

157. The Chamber notes that the Indictment under Count 5 charges the Accused with pillage as a serious violation of Common Article 3 and of Additional Protocol II pursuant to Article 3(f) of the [2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone]. This Count relates to the Accused’s alleged responsibility for the unlawful taking and destruction by burning of civilian owned property between about 1 November 1997 and 1 April 1998 at a series of locations in Kenema District, Bo District, Moyamba District and Bonthe District.158. As previously observed by the Chamber, the terms “pillage”, “plunder” and “spoliation” have been varyingly used to describe the unlawful appropriation of private or public property during armed conflict. The Chamber notes that the ICTR and SCSL Statutes include the crime of pillage, while the ICTY Statute lists the crime of plunder. 159. The Chamber is satisfied that Article 3(f) of the Statute contains a general prohibition against pillage which covers both organised pillage and isolated acts of individuals. Further, the prohibition extends to all types of property, including State-owned and private property.160. The Chamber notes that the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Celebici case found that this prohibition “extends both to acts of looting committed by individual soldiers for their private gain, and to the organized seizure of property undertaken within the framework of a systematic economic exploitation of occupied territory”. In light of the foregoing, the Chamber is of the view that the inclusion of the requirement that the appropriation be for private or personal use is an unwarranted restriction on the application of the offence of pillage. 161. In addition, under international law, pillage does not require the appropriation to be extensive or to involve a large economic value. Whether pillage committed on a small scale fulfils the jurisdictional requirement of the Special Court that the violation be serious, is, however a different question. 162. The seriousness of the violation must be ascertained on a case by case basis, taking into consideration the specific circumstances in each instance. Thus, the Chamber concurs with the ICTY Trial Chamber in Naletilic and Martinovic that pillage:

may be a serious violation not only when one victim suffers severe economic consequences because of the appropriation, but also, for example, when property is appropriated from a large number of people. In the latter case, the gravity of the crime stems from the reiteration of the acts and from their overall impact.

163. The mens rea for pillage is satisfied where it is established that the Accused intended to appropriate the property by depriving the owner of it. 164. The Chamber has already noted that the offence of pillage is provided for in Article 4(2) of Additional Protocol II.165. The Chamber finds that the elements of pillage are as follows:

(i) The Accused unlawfully appropriated the property;

(ii) The appropriation was without the consent of the owner; and

(iii) The Accused intended to unlawfully appropriate the property.

166. Although Count 5 of the Indictment is entitled: “Looting and burning,” the offence charged under this count is pillage, a violation of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, punishable under Article 3(f) of the Statute. The acts of burning, as charged in some paragraphs in Count 5 of the Indictment, will not be considered for the purposes of the offence of pillage as charged under Count 5. According to the definition of pillage as stated above, an essential element of pillage is the unlawful appropriation of property. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the appropriation as “the exercise of control over property; a taking or possession.” In the act of looting, the offender unlawfully appropriates the property. Destruction of property by burning, however, does not, by itself, necessarily involve any unlawful appropriation. Thus, while both looting and burning deprive the owner of their property, the two actions are distinct since the latter crime may be committed without appropriation per se. As a result, the Chamber is of the view that the destruction by burning of property does not constitute pillage. The Chamber will not, therefore, take into account acts of destruction by burning for the purposes of determining individual criminal responsibility of the Accused under Count 5.

SCSL, Fofana and Kondewa case, Judgment, 2 August 2007, §§ 157–166.

[emphasis in original]

In its judgment in 2008, the Appeals Chamber, in considering whether acts of burning came within the crime of pillage, stated:389. The Appeals Chamber notes that the relevant question in this ground of appeal is whether the crime of pillage, a violation of Article 3 common to the [1949] Geneva Conventions and of [the 1977] Additional Protocol II, punishable under Article 3.f. of the [2002] Statute [of the Special Court for Sierra Leone] can, as a matter of law, include acts of burning. For the purpose of this discussion, the Appeals Chamber considers the acts of burning relevant to this case to be acts of destruction not justified by military necessity. Therefore, the question here is whether the prohibition against pillage in common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II and as reflected in customary international law can include a prohibition against destruction not justified by military necessity.390. The prohibition against pillage and the prohibition against destruction not justified by military necessity are long-standing rules in international humanitarian law. Both prohibitions exist in customary international law applicable to non-international armed conflict at the times relevant to this case. However, they have been more substantially elaborated upon in the conventional international law applicable to international armed conflict and occupied territories, specifically.391. An analysis of conventional international law and State practice indicates that the prohibition against pillage and the prohibition against destruction not justified by military necessity have been maintained as separate prohibitions. For example, the Lieber Code of 1863 qualifies the prohibition against “destruction of property” as conduct “not commanded by the authorized officer” whereas the prohibition against “pillage and sacking” is absolute. The distinction is more pronounced in the contemporaneous Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, 27 August 1874, which provided for protections against pillage and destruction or seizure in separate articles. Similarly, Article 32 of the Laws of War on Land, Oxford, 9 September 1880, separately forbids combatants “(a) To pillage, even towns taken by assault; [and] (b) To destroy public or private property, if this destruction is not demanded by an imperative necessity of war …”392. The 1907 Hague Regulations and 1949 Geneva Conventions similarly provide separate prohibitions against pillage and destruction not justified by military necessity. Article 28 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 prohibits “pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault” and Article 47 provides that “pillage is formally prohibited.” Article 23(g) forbids a State “[t]o destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.”393. Geneva Convention IV provides that “[p]illage is prohibited” in Article 33, paragraph 2 and that “extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly” are grave breaches in Article 147. Geneva Convention IV, Article 53 states:

Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.

394. Additional Protocol II expressly prohibits pillage whereas there are no provisions explicitly prohibiting destruction not justified by military necessity or unlawful attack on civilian property.395. Article 13, paragraph 1, of Additional Protocol II states that the civilian population and individual civilians enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations. The ICRC Commentary on Article 13 states that securing general protection of the civilian population in conformity with this Article is “based on the general principles relating to the protection of the civilian population which apply irrespective of whether the conflict is an international or an internal one.” In particular, the principles of distinction and proportionality indicate that attacks against dwellings, schools and other buildings occupied by civilians are prohibited unless the buildings have become legitimate military objectives.396. Although the prohibition against pillage and the prohibition against destruction of property not justified by military necessity are distinct in the principal conventional international law instruments, an examination of relevant ICRC Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions suggests that the prohibitions are related. According to the ICRC Commentary, the prohibition against pillage in Article 4(2)(g) of the Additional Protocol II:

is based on Article 33, paragraph 2 of [the 1949 Geneva Convention IV]. It covers both organized pillage and pillage resulting from isolated acts of indiscipline. It is prohibited to issue order whereby pillage is authorized. The prohibition has a general tenor and applies to all categories of property, both State-owned and private.

The purpose of this Convention is to protect human beings, but it also contains certain provisions concerning property, designed to spare people the suffering resulting from the destruction of their real and personal property (houses, deeds, bonds, etc., furniture, clothing, provisions, tools, etc.).

This prohibition is an old principle of international law, already stated in the Hague Regulations in two provisions: Article 28, which says: ‘The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited’, and Article 47, which reads: ‘Pillage is formally forbidden’. The Geneva Convention of 1949 omitted the Word ‘formally’ in order not to risk reducing, through a comparison of the texts, the scope of other provisions which embody prohibitions, and which, while they contain no adverb, are nevertheless just as absolute in character. This prohibition is general in scope. It concerns not only pillage through individual acts without the consent of the military authorities, but also organized pillage, the effects of which are recounted in the histories of former wars, when the booty allocated to each soldier was considered as part of his pay. Paragraph 2 of Article 33 is extremely concise and clear; it leaves no loophole. The High Contracting Parties prohibit the ordering as well as the authorization of pillage. They pledge themselves furthermore to prevent or, if it has commenced, to stop individual pillage. Consequently, they must take all the necessary legislative steps. The prohibition of pillage is applicable to the territory of a Party to the conflict as well as to occupied territories. It guarantees all types of property, whether they belong to private persons or to communities or the State. On the other hand, it leaves intact the right of requisition or seizure.

398. Thus, this commentary notably suggests that the Geneva Convention IV is “designed to spare people the suffering resulting from the destruction of their real and personal property” and appears to relate the prohibition against pillage to that objective.399. Nonetheless, the absolute prohibition against pillage distinguishes it from the prohibition against destruction or seizure of civilian property, as the latter allows for such conduct in conditions of military necessity. This distinction has the consequence that an express absolute prohibition against pillage logically does not implicitly include the qualified prohibition against destruction of property.400. The preceding discussion demonstrates that the prohibitions against pillage and wanton destruction have been considered distinct in the conventional law prior to time relevant to this case. The Appeals Chamber notes that the interpretation of pillage at other international courts and State practice also demonstrate that pillage relates specifically to unlawful appropriation and therefore could not include acts of destruction.401. The ICTY’s interpretation and application of the prohibitions against pillage and wanton destruction is consistent with the distinction between the two crimes. Only one case at the ad hoc tribunals listed acts of destruction as pillage, and there it was said obiter dicta and has not been followed in any subsequent cases. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Kordić and Čerkez defined the “crime of plunder” as:

all forms of unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflict for which individual criminal responsibility attaches under international criminal law, including those acts traditionally described as ‘pillage’. [ICTY, Kordić and Čerkez case, Judgement on Appeal, § 79]

402. ICTY chambers consider the terms “pillage,” “plunder” and “spoliation” to describe the unlawful appropriation of public and private property during armed conflicts, and that “plunder” should be understood as encompassing acts traditionally described as “pillage.”403. The Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court defined the elements of the “war crime of pillage” as including the requirement that the “perpetrator appropriated certain property,” “for private or personal use,” “without the consent of the owner.” International tribunals give consideration to the work done in producing the Rome Statute on the establishment of an international criminal court, and, specifically, the finalized draft text of the elements of crimes completed by the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court in July 2000. Although that document post-dates the acts involved here, it is nonetheless helpful in assessing the state of customary international law. In this regard, it should be noted that all the States attending the conference, whether signatories of the Rome Statute or not, were eligible to be represented on the Preparatory Commission. From this perspective, the document is a useful indication of the opinio juris of States.404. The ICRC compendium on Customary International Humanitarian Law, published in 2005, surveyed State practice and concluded that pillage is the “specific application of the general principle of law prohibiting theft” thereby involving the “appropriation” of property “for private or personal use.”405. The Prosecution’s argument that Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom consider pillage to include the destruction of property is unavailing. The Prosecution appears to suggest that these three military manuals demonstrate State practice and therefore are indicative of the rule in customary international law. In determining customary international law with reference to State practice, the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases stated that the “State practice … [should be] both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.” Here, no such uniform practice is indicated by an isolated examination of the military manuals of three States. Notably, the Prosecution provides no submissions regarding the practice of the remaining States.406. Further, the “practice” evidenced by the military manuals of Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom is not uniform. While Australia’s Defence Force Manual appears to consider that “[p]illage is the seizure or destruction of enemy private or public property … for private purposes,” Australia’s Commanders’ guide appears to define pillage as “the violent acquisition of property for private purposes.” A similar apparent disagreement exists in the Canada’s military manuals. Further, the United Kingdom military manual relates pillage to theft. Moreover, the military manuals of Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom each provide separate prohibitions against wanton destruction and pillage, indicating that those States do not consider the prohibition against pillage to encompass the prohibition against destruction.407. Finally, evidence that the prohibition against pillage does not include the prohibition against destruction or seizure of property can be found in the drafting history of the Statute of the Special Court. Article 3 of the Statute provides jurisdiction over serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, including “pillage.” According to the Report of the [UN] Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, the drafters had recourse to Sierra Leonean law:

in cases where a specific situation or an aspect of it was considered to be either unregulated or inadequately regulated under international law. The crimes considered to be relevant for this purpose and included in the Statute are: offences relating to … wanton destruction of property, and in particular arson, under the 1861 Malicious Damage Act.

408. If pillage included wanton destruction, there would have been no reason to include the provision of the 1861 Malicious Damage Act.4. Disposition409. Taking into consideration the definition of pillage applied by the ICTY and ICTR which logically excludes acts of destruction, the distinction between the prohibitions against pillage and destruction not justified by military necessity, which is preserved throughout applicable conventional international law and the drafting history of the Statute of the Special Court, the Appeals Chamber finds that a necessary element of the crime of pillage is the unlawful appropriation of property. Consequently, burning and other acts of destruction of property not amounting to appropriation as a matter of law, cannot constitute pillage under international criminal law.

In the Brima case before the SCSL in 2005, the three accused, all former non-commissioned officers in the Sierra Leone Army who became senior members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) which seized power from the elected Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone in May 1997, were charged, inter alia, with “[p]illage, a Violation of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, punishable under Article 3.f. of the [2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone]”.

751. The prohibition of the unlawful appropriation of public and private property in armed conflict is well-established in customary international law where it has been variously referred to as “pillage”, “plunder” and “looting”. It was charged both as a war crime and as a crime against humanity in many of the trials based on the Nuremberg Charter and Control Council Law No. 10, including the trial of the major war criminals in Nuremberg. Pillage has been adjudicated in a number of cases before the ICTY. [see Čelebići Trial Judgement, § 591; Kordić Trial Judgement, § 352; Naletilić Trial Judgement”, § 612](a) Elements of the Crime752. Trial Chamber I was of the opinion that the crime of pillage included the following constitutive elements in addition to the chapeau requirements of Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II pursuant to Article 3 of the [2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone]:

(1) The perpetrator appropriated private or public property;

(2) The perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property and to

appropriate it for private or personal use;

(3) The appropriation was without the consent of the owner.

753. That definition of the crime of pillage is apparently based on the Rome Statute, Elements of Crimes, Article 8(2)(b)(xvi). The inclusion of the words “private or personal use” excludes the possibility that appropriations justified by military necessity might fall within the definition. Nevertheless, the definition is framed to apply to a broad range of situations. As was stated by Trial Chamber I, “the ICTY in the case of Čelebići noted that ‘plunder’ should be understood as encompassing acts traditionally described as ‘pillage’, and that pillage extends to cases of ‘organised’ and ‘systematic’ seizure of property from protected persons as well as to ‘acts of looting committed by individual soldiers for their private gain’”.754. Inclusion of the element of “private or personal use” in the definition appears to be at variance with Čelebići, since it may not include “organized” and “systematic” seizure of property. The Trial Chamber is therefore of the view that the requirement of “private or personal use” is unduly restrictive and ought not to be an element of the crime of pillage.755. Accordingly and in addition to the chapeau requirements of Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II pursuant to Article 3 of the Statute, the Trial Chamber concludes that the crime of pillage within the meaning of Article 3(f) of the Statute is comprised of the following specific elements:

1. The perpetrator appropriated property.

2. The appropriation was without the consent of the owner.

3. The perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property.

(b) Submissions756. The Prosecution submits that “destroying property by burning, as part of a series of acts involving ruthless plundering to remove anything of value followed by the total removal of the value of the buildings themselves, falls within the concept of ‘wilful and unlawful appropriation of property’.” All three Accused contend that “burning” does not fall under the definition of “pillage”.(c) Findings757. In its Rule 98 Decision, the Trial Chamber deferred a final decision on this issue until the end of the trial. Having carefully examined all relevant sources, the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that the inclusion of “burning” in the crime of “pillage”, as suggested by the Prosecution, is untenable. First, a review of military manuals shows that most countries do not regard the destruction of enemy property as pillage. Second, the jurisprudence is unambiguous in requiring that the property be appropriated, an element which is not satisfied in the event that property is burned and destroyed. The Rome Statute also makes a distinction between appropriation and destruction of property.758. Moreover, the destruction of civilian property may be brought and adjudged under a number of other provisions, which the Prosecution has not done in this case.

SCSL, Brima case, Judgment, 20 June 2007, §§ 751–758.

In the Sesay case before the SCSL in 2006, the accused Sesay and Kallon, senior commanders in the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Junta and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)/RUF, and the accused Gbao, senior commander in the RUF and AFRC/RUF forces, were charged, inter alia, with “[p]illage, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II, punishable under Article 3.f. of the [2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone]”.

In its judgment in the case in 2009, the Trial Chamber set out the elements of the crime of pillage, stating:207. The Chamber considers that the elements of pillage are as follows:

(i) The Accused unlawfully appropriated the property;

(ii) The appropriation was without the consent of the owner; and

(iii) The Accused intended to unlawfully appropriate the property.

208. The Chamber notes that the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Celebici case found that this prohibition “extends both to acts of looting committed by individual soldiers for their private gain, and to the organised seizure of property undertaken within the framework of a systematic economic exploitation of occupied territory.” [ICTY, Čelebići case, Judgement, § 590] In light of the foregoing, the Chamber confirms that “the inclusion of the requirement that the appropriation be for private or personal use is an unwarranted restriction on the application of the offence of pillage.” [SCSL, Fofana and Kondewa case, Judgement, § 160]209. Furthermore, under international law, pillage “does not require the appropriation to be extensive or to involve a large economic value.” [ICTY, Naletilić and Martinović case, Judgement, § 612] Whether pillage committed on a small scale fulfils the jurisdictional requirement of the Special Court that the violation be serious, is, however, a different question.210. This Chamber has emphasised that the seriousness of the violation must be ascertained on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the specific circumstances in each instance. Pillage “may be a serious violation not only when one victim suffers severe economic consequences because of the appropriation, but also, for example, when property is appropriated from a large number of people.” [ICTY, Naletilić and Martinović case, Judgement, § 614] The Chamber concurs with the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Kordic and Cerkez that:

[A] serious violation could be assumed in circumstances where appropriations take place vis-à-vis a large number of people, even though there are no grave consequences for each individual. In this case it would be the overall effect on the civilian population and the multitude of offences committed that would make the violation serious. [ICTY, Kordić and Čerkez case, Judgement on Appeal, § 83]

211. The mens rea for pillage is satisfied where it is established that the Accused intended to appropriate the property by depriving the owner of it.212. The Appeals Chamber has ruled that a necessary element of the crime of pillage is the unlawful appropriation of property. As a result, acts of destruction such as burning cannot constitute pillage under international criminal law.

SCSL, Sesay case, Judgment, 2 March 2009, §§ 207–212.

[footnotes in original omitted]

In the Taylor case before the SCSL in 2007, the accused, former president of the Republic of Liberia, was charged, inter alia, with “[p]illage, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II, punishable under Article 3.f. of the [2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone]”.

Between about 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002, members of RUF [Revolutionary United Front], AFRC [Armed Forces Revolutionary Council], AFRC/RUF Junta or alliance, and/or Liberian fighters, assisted and encouraged by, acting in concert with, under the direction and/or control of, and/or subordinate to the ACCUSED, engaged in widespread unlawful taking of civilian property.

SCSL, Taylor case, Second Amended Indictment, 29 May 2007, § 28.

[emphasis in original]

Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission

In its Central Front (Eritrea’s Claim) partial award in 2004, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, in considering the responsibilities of an occupying power to prevent pillage, stated that “the Occupying Power … was responsible … for preventing pillage. Consequently, [it] is liable for permitting the unlawful looting and stripping of buildings in the town during the period of its occupation”.

In 1989, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported cases of looting and burning of rural communities in El Salvador. The Salvadoran government was found responsible for the violation of the provisions on the right to life and the right to humane treatment of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported the pillage and burning of all the homes of a village perpetrated in 1993 in Peru by forces of the Sendero Luminoso (“Shining Path”) rebel movement. The Commission described these acts as “assaults and criminal activities”.

To fulfil its task of disseminating IHL, the ICRC has delegates around the world teaching armed and security forces that: “Pillage is prohibited.”

Frédéric de Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces, ICRC, Geneva, 1987, § 205.

In a working paper on war crimes submitted in 1997 to the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, the ICRC included pillage, when committed in an international or non-international armed conflict, in its list of war crimes to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.

ICRC, Working paper on war crimes submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, New York, 14 February 1997, §§ 2(viii) and 3(xvi).

The Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, adopted by an expert meeting convened by the Institute for Human Rights of Åbo Akademi University in Turku/Åbo, Finland in 1990, states: “The following acts are and shall remain prohibited: … e) pillage; … g) threats and incitement to commit any of the foregoing acts.”

In 1992, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Abkhazia denounced marauding and robbery by Georgian troops and considered Georgian leaders responsible for it. It further considered that Georgia was obliged to compensate the Republic of Abkhazia and each citizen in particular for the damage.

Appeal of the Press-Service of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Abkhazia to the International Organizations of Red Cross, International Organizations of Public Health Service and to the Medical Community of the States of CIS, No. 10-81, 19 August 1992; Supreme Council of Abkhazia, Statement of the Press-Service of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia, No. 10-86, August 1992.

International Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda

In 1993, the International Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda, mandated by four non-governmental organizations, reported the pillage of civilian property by combatants of the Front Patriotique Rwandais.

Looting by members of the armed forces was reported by fact-finding missions undertaken by non-governmental organizations in the Philippines.

Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates, Report on Human Rights in the Philippines to the 52nd Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 1996, p. 19; Aurora A. Parong, Total War: A Threat to People’s Health and Lives, Report of the Medical Action Group (MAG), 1989, pp. 2–3; E. Monde-Cruz, The Human Cost of Armed Conflict: an account of international fact finding mission on internal refugees, Justice and Peace Review, Special issue, 1990, p. 28.

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)

The SPLM Human Rights Charter states: “All persons have the right to have property respected. Looted property shall be returned to its owners or compensation determined by a competent court shall be paid.”

SPLM, Human Rights Charter, May 1996, § 7.

New People’s Army (NPA)

According to the Report on the Practice of the Philippines, the NPA (a Philippine insurgent group) adopted China’s PLA Rules of Discipline as its own rules. These state: “Do not take even a single needle or thread from the masses. Turn in everything captured.”

Report on the Practice of the Philippines, 1997, Chapter 1.1, referring to Basic Rules of the New People’s Army, Principle 4, Point 3.

Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)

Pillage following attacks on villages by RENAMO in Mozambique was described by one author as systematic.

Robert Gersony, Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique, Consultant to the Bureau for Refugee Programs, US Department of State, Washington D.C., April 1988, pp. 29–32.

DRC Pledge of Commitment

In 2008, the armed groups party to the DRC Pledge of Commitment, “deeply deploring the insecurity that has prevailed for a long time in the province of North Kivu, causing massive displacements of populations and enormous suffering of civilians as well as massive violations of human rights”, undertook to strictly observe “rules of international humanitarian law and human rights law, notably … [to] return property to their owners, be they individuals or corporate entities.”

Uganda’s Operational Code of Conduct (1986) provides that “stealing civilian property or food” is an “offence undermining relationship with the civilian population”. According to the manual, although this offence may be committed by soldiers, “any civilian aiding and abetting any National Resistance Army member to commit any of the above offences [including stealing] will be charged with the same offences”.

Uganda, Operational Code of Conduct for the National Resistance Army (NRA), Legal Notice No. 1 of 1986 (Amendment), 23 August 1986, § 12(b) and (g).

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The UK Military Manual (1958) states:A special class of war crime is that sometimes known as “marauding”. This consists of ranging over battlefields and following advancing or retreating armies in quest of loot, robbing … stragglers and wounded and plundering the dead – all acts done not as a means of carrying on the war but for private gain. Nevertheless, such acts are treated as violations of the law of war. Those who commit them, whether civilians who have never been lawful combatants, or persons who have belonged to a military unit, an organised resistance movement or a levée en masse, and have deserted and so ceased to be lawful combatants, are liable to be punished as war criminals. They may be tried and sentenced by the courts of either belligerent.

United Kingdom, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, The War Office, HMSO, 1958, § 636.

Under Algeria’s Code of Military Justice (1971), it is a punishable offence for a military or civilian person to steal from wounded, sick, shipwrecked or dead persons in the area of operation.

Algeria, Code of Military Justice, 1971, Article 287.

Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso’s Code (1994) of Military Justice provides that plunder of a wounded, sick, shipwrecked or dead person, in the area of military operations of military units, is a punishable offence that can be committed by “any individual, whether military or not”.

Burkina Faso, Code of Military Justice, 1994, Article 194.

Chile

Chile’s Code of Military Justice (1925) punishes any “civilian … who plunders dead soldiers or auxiliary personnel on the battlefield of their money, jewellery or other objects, in order to appropriate them”.

Chile, Code of Military Justice, 1925, Article 365.

Czech Republic

The Czech Republic’s Criminal Code (1961), as amended in 1999, in an article entitled “Plunder in a Theatre of War”, punishes:Whoever in a theatre of war, on the battlefield or in places affected by military operations:

(b) arbitrarily destroys another person’s property or takes it under the pretext of military necessity; or

(c) robs the fallen.

Czech Republic, Criminal Code, 1961, as amended in 1999, Article 264.

[emphasis added]

France

Under France’s Ordinance on Repression of War Crimes (1944), “the removal or export by any means from French territory of goods of any nature, including movable property and money” is likened to pillage. It is applicable to any perpetrator of the offence.

France, Ordinance on Repression of War Crimes, 1944, Article 2(8).

Germany

Under Germany’s Penal Code (1998), pillage by civilians would be covered under the provisions relative to theft.

Germany, Penal Code, 1998, Articles 242, 243 and 246.

Indonesia

Under Indonesia’s Penal Code (1946), theft committed on the occasion of “riots, insurgencies or war” is a punishable offence.

Indonesia, Penal Code, 1946, § 363.

Israel

Israel’s Military Justice Law (1955), which prohibits looting, applies to soldiers but also to “a person employed in the service of the Army, or a person employed in an undertaking which serves the Army and which the Minister of Defence has defined, by order, as a military service, … a person employed on a mission on behalf of the Army”, “even though they may not be soldiers”.

Israel, Military Justice Law, 1955, Articles 8 and 74.

Netherlands

Under the International Crimes Act (2003) of the Netherlands, “anyone” who pillages a town or place, even when taken by assault, commits a crime, whether in time of international or non-international armed conflict.

Any person who, in times of war … , has committed an act of pillage, in particular any person who, profiting from the alarm caused by the war, has taken other people’s property, has compelled another person to hand such property over to him or her, or has committed acts of violence against other people’s property, is to be punished with deprivation of liberty or a monetary penalty.

8. Foreign civilians … for acts mentioned in Articles 115 to 179a [that includes the previously cited provision] which they commit while employed by the armed forces or the military administration or as delegates while working with the troops.

The commentary on the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Penal Code (1976), as amended in 2001, states that the act of unlawfully seizing belongings from the killed or the wounded in a theatre of war “can be committed … by any … person”.

In the Bommer case before a French Military Tribunal in 1947, the parents of a German family were charged with, and convicted of, theft and receiving stolen goods belonging to French citizens. Two of the daughters were charged with, and convicted of, the second count of the indictment only. The Tribunal considered the offences of theft under Article 379 of the French Penal Code – referred to therein as “fraudulent removal of property” – and receiving stolen goods under Article 460 of the Code – referred to as “knowingly receiving things taken, misappropriated or obtained by means of a crime or delict” – as war crimes.

In the Lingenfelder case before a French Military Tribunal in 1947, the accused, a German settler in France, was charged with pillage for the removal of horses and vehicles belonging to the owner of a French farm. Without giving reasons for such finding, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that it did not amount to pillage.

In the Baus case before a French Military Tribunal in 1947, the accused, a land superintendent in occupied France, was found guilty of a war crime for theft under the terms of the French Penal Code and for pillage under the 1944 Ordinance on Repression of War Crimes. He took with him during the retreat to Germany the property of the owners of the farms that he was managing.

In the Benz case before a French Military Tribunal in 1947, the accused, a couple of German settlers, were found guilty of theft and receiving stolen goods, which the Tribunal considered to be war crimes. On their return to Germany at the end of the Second World War, they took with them movable property belonging to French inhabitants.

In the Neber case before a French Military Tribunal in 1948, the accused, a German settler in France (Lorraine), was found guilty of a war crime for having received crockery stolen by her nephew from a French woman, which she took with her when returning to Germany towards the end of the war.

In its judgment in the Roechling case in 1948, the General Tribunal at Rastadt of the Military Government for the French Zone of Occupation in Germany held that the accused, the proprietor of a German industrial trust and Reich Commissioner for the iron industry of the departments of Moselle and Meurthe-et-Moselle, was guilty of war crimes, inter alia, for participation in the economic pillage of occupied countries.

France, General Tribunal at Rastadt of the Military Government for the French Zone of Occupation in Germany, Roechling case, Judgment, 30 June 1948.

Poland

In the Greiser case before Poland’s Supreme National Tribunal in 1946, the accused, a governor and gauleiter of the Nazi party for provinces incorporated in the German Reich, was charged with war crimes for having taken part in “widespread robberies and thefts … of the movables of Polish citizens, and of all public property”.

In the Flickcase before the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1947, the accused, the principal proprietor of a large group of German industrial enterprises (and four officials of the same group), which included coal and iron mines and steel producing plants, was charged with war crimes, inter alia, for the plunder of public and private property, and spoliation, in the countries and territories occupied by Germany. Flick was found guilty of this count of indictment. The Tribunal stated that “no defendant is shown by the evidence to have been responsible for any act of pillage as that word is commonly understood”, but it, however, quoted Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Regulations as one of the articles relevant in casu.

United States, Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Flick case, Judgment, 22 December 1947.

In the Krupp case before the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1948, six of the accused, officials of the Krupp industrial enterprises occupying high positions in political, financial, industrial and economic circles in Germany, were found guilty of war crimes for, inter alia, the plunder and spoliation of public and private property in the territories occupied by Germany. The Tribunal quoted Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Regulations as pertinent in casu. It also stated that it “fully concurs with the Judgement of the I.M.T. that the [1907 Hague Convention (IV)], to which Germany was a party, had by 1939 become customary law and was, therefore, binding on Germany not only as Treaty Law but also as Customary Law”. The Tribunal further stated:Spoliation of private property … is forbidden under two aspects; firstly, the individual private owner of property must not be deprived of it; secondly, the economic subsistence of the belligerently occupied territory must not be taken over by the occupant or put to the service of his war effort – always with the proviso that there are exemptions from this rule which are strictly limited to the needs of the army of occupation in so far as such needs do not exceed the economic strength of the occupied territory.

United States, Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Krupp case, Judgment, 30 June 1948.

In the Krauch case (The I.G. Farben Trial) before the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1948, the accused, officials of I.G. Farben Industrie A.G., were charged, inter alia, with war crimes for unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly ordering, abetting and taking a consenting part in the plunder of public and private property, exploitation and spoliation of property in countries and territories which came under the belligerent occupation of Germany. The charges were regarded as violations of Articles 46 to 56 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. Some of the accused were convicted on this count. The Tribunal held that “the offence of plunder of public and private property must be considered a well-recognised crime under international law”. It added:The Hague Regulations do not specifically employ the term “spoliation”, but we do not consider this matter to be one of legal significance. As employed in the Indictment, the term is used interchangeably with the words “plunder” and “exploitation”. It may therefore be properly considered that the term “spoliation”, which has been admittedly adopted as a term of convenience by the Prosecution, applies to the widespread and systematised acts of dispossession and acquisition of property in violation of the rights of the owners which took place in territories under the belligerent occupation or control of Nazi Germany during World War II. We consider that “spoliation” is synonymous with the word “plunder” as employed in Control Council Law No. 10, and that it embraces offences against property in violation of the laws and customs of war of the general type charged in the Indictment.…[I]t is illustrative of the view that offences against property of the character described in the [1943 Inter-Allied Declaration against Acts of Dispossession] were considered by the signatory powers to constitute action in violation of existing international law.…In our view, the offences against property defined in the Hague Regulations are broad in their phraseology and do not admit of any distinction between “plunder” in the restricted sense of acquisition of physical properties, which are the subject matter of the crime, the plunder or spoliation resulting from acquisition of intangible property such as is involved in the acquisition of stock ownership, or of acquisition of ownership or control through any other means, even though apparently legal in form.

United States, Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, Krauch case (The I.G. Farben Trial), Judgment, 29 July 1948.

According to the Report on the Practice of India, acts of pillage committed by a civilian in relation to a foreign national may amount to extortion or robbery and are, as such, “punishable under the law of the land”.

Report on the Practice of India, 1997, Answers to additional questions on Chapter 2.3.

Jordan

According to the Report on the Practice of Jordan, the prohibition of pillage is also applicable to civilians.

In 1992, in a report on the situation of human rights in Kuwait under Iraqi occupation, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, in a section entitled “Prohibition of the destruction, dismantling and pillaging of infrastructure and private property”, reported cases of pillage of private property by the civilian population residing in Kuwait. The legal framework considered applicable by the Rapporteur included Article 33 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV.

In 1995, in a report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights noted that, after the fall and evacuation of Srebrenica, “there were a number of reports of widespread looting of Muslim homes by Bosnian Serb forces and Serb civilians following the evacuation. People reportedly came from nearby towns and villages to take goods and livestock.”

UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Final periodic report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/9, 22 August 1995, § 9.

UN Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)

In 1994, in its final report on grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other violations of IHL committed in the former Yugoslavia, the UN Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) placed “looting, theft and robbery of personal property” within the practices of “ethnic cleansing” and as part of a systematic and planned general policy. It noted that acts of pillage were committed by persons from all segments of the Serb population, including civilians.

UN Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), Final report, UN Doc. S/1994/674, 27 May 1994, Annex, §§ 134 and 142; see also § 180.

International Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda

In 1993, the International Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda, mandated by four non-governmental organizations, reported that the Rwandan authorities had encouraged civilians to commit acts of pillage.