THIS
CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Sheriff Mark
Hunter's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint for Failure to State a Claim (“Hunter
Motion”) (Doc. 17), Defendant Deputy Sheriff Juan
Cruz's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint for Failure to State a Claim (“Cruz
Motion”) (Doc. 18), and Plaintiff's Responses
thereto (Docs. 25 & 26). The Motions were referred to the
undersigned for a report and recommendation regarding an
appropriate resolution. (Doc. 23.) For the reasons set forth
herein, the undersigned respectfully
RECOMMENDS that the Cruz Motion be
GRANTED, Count II of the Amended Complaint
(Doc. 16) be DISMISSED with prejudice, Count
I of the Amended Complaint be DISMISSED without
prejudice to refiling in state court, and the Hunter
Motion be DENIED as moot.

I.
Background

The
Amended Complaint alleges in substance that following two
interviews with Defendant Cruz regarding gang-related thefts
that occurred when Plaintiff was a minor, Plaintiff was
arrested based on “‘probable cause' of a
violation.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff was
“booked, ordered to change clothing, informed she would
be given a bond amount, . . . placed in a cell, ” and
“confined in the jail until she was bonded.”
(Id.) She was subjected to her bond restrictions
thereafter, and she now “has an inappropriate adult
arrest record.” (Id. at 4-5.)

Plaintiff
asserts a state law claim for false imprisonment against
Defendant Hunter, and a deprivation of rights claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Cruz, based on their
alleged failure to treat her as a juvenile following her
arrest. (Id. at 5-7.) Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that although she subsequently obtained the age of
majority, she should have been processed and released as a
juvenile pursuant to Florida law because she was a minor at
the time the alleged offenses occurred. (Id. at
3-7.) Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims with
prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). (Docs. 17 & 18.)

II.
Standard

Under
Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must determine whether the Amended
Complaint sets forth sufficient factual allegations to
establish a claim upon which relief can be granted. In
evaluating whether Plaintiff has stated a claim, the Court
must determine whether the Amended Complaint satisfies Rule
8(a)(2), which requires that a pleading contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). To satisfy this standard, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).

III.
Analysis

Plaintiff
argues that, after being lawfully arrested based on probable
cause, she should have been processed and released as a
juvenile because the alleged offenses occurred when she was a
minor. Section 985.03(7), Florida Statutes, states:
“‘Child' or ‘juvenile' or
‘youth' means any person under the age of 18 or any
person who is alleged to have committed a violation of law
occurring prior to the time that person reached the age of 18
years.” Section 985.115 states in part: “A child
taken into custody shall be released from custody as soon as
is reasonably possible, ” and that “a law
enforcement officer may deliver the child, for temporary
custody not to exceed 6 hours, to a secure booking area of a
jail . . . .” Fla. Stat. §§ 985.115(1) &
(3). Both of Plaintiff's claims are based on
Defendants' alleged violation of Chapter 985, Florida
Statutes.

A.
Section 1983 Claim

“Section
1983 . . . provides a remedy for deprivations of
federal statutory and constitutional rights.”
Almand v. DeKalb Cty., Ga., 103 F.3d 1510, 1512
(11th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). Thus, “[a]
successful section 1983 action requires that the plaintiff
show she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting
under color of state law.” Id. at 1513.
“The Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable . . . seizures.'” Manuel v. City
of Joliet, 137 S.Ct. 911, 917 (2017). Specifically, it
“prohibits government officials from detaining a person
in the absence of probable cause, ” and it
“governs a claim for unlawful pretrial detention . . .
.” Id. at 918, 920.

Plaintiff
argues that she “has alleged a specific violation of
her Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizure
in the form of unlawful pre-trial detention in the County
Jail.” (Doc. 25 at 4.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends
that she was “illegally detained” because she
“should have been released within six hours [as a
juvenile]; not jailed.” (Id.) Additionally,
Plaintiff argues that “[t]he fact that the Defendant
had probable cause to take her into custody does not cancel
her right to be free of illegal pretrial detention in the
jail.” (Id. at 3.)

As
noted above, Plaintiff's allegations that her seizure was
unreasonable are based solely on Defendant Cruz's alleged
failure to treat her as a juvenile following her arrest in
violation of Florida law. Specifically, the Amended Complaint
alleges that “[t]he arrest, booking, and incarceration
of Ms. Swartzel in the Columbia County Jail, when she should
have been released [as a juvenile], constituted a seizure,
” and that “[t]he seizure of Ms. Swartzel was
unreasonable in that the Florida Legislature expressly
prohibited the seizure.” (Doc. 16 at 7.) Plaintiff does
not allege that her detention was unreasonable in any other
respect. Moreover, Plaintiff concedes that at the time she
was arrested, “the Detectives had ‘probable
cause' of a violation” and that “she was
lawfully taken into custody.” (Id. at 4; Doc.
25 at 4.) Plaintiff does not, and cannot plausibly, allege
that her post-arrest detention was not based on probable
cause. Rather, Plaintiff alleges only that her detention was
unreasonable because it violated Florida law.

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Both
the U.S. Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have rejected
similar arguments in holding that an arrest based on probable
cause, which otherwise violates state law, does not give rise
to a Fourth Amendment violation. See Virginia v.
Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 166 (2008) (rejecting argument that
&ldquo;a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment by
making an arrest based on probable cause but prohibited by
state law&rdquo;); Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d
1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002) (rejecting &ldquo;the proposition
that an arrest supported by probable cause in circumstances
where arrest is not permitted under state law violates the
Fourth Amendment&rdquo;). Although neither side cites a case
directly on point, it appears that the same would be true for
post-arrest detentions. See Manuel, 137 S.Ct. at 918
(stating that the Fourth Amendment &ldquo;prohibits
government officials from detaining a person in the absence
of probable cause&rdquo;); Moore, 553 U.S. at 173,
178 (stating that “when States go ...

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