The U.S. Owes No Apology To the Chinese

Commentary

Thursday, April 5, 2001

By James Lilley and Arthur Waldron . Mr. Lilley is former
ambassador to China and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise
Institute. Mr. Waldron is a professor of international relations at
the University of Pennsylvania and director of Asian Studies at the
American Enterprise Institute.

If a risk-taking Chinese pilot
caused the collision that began the current face-off -- and the U.S.
has evidence that is the case -- then the Chinese make a real mistake
if they insist that America accept blame and apologize.

Indeed, the official Chinese story, upon which President Jiang Zemin
has based his demand for an apology, appears in fact to be part of a
Chinese military coverup, designed to conceal their own mistakes not
only from the outside world, but from the Chinese leadership in
Beijing as well.

Credence was always stretched by any scenario in which the
lumbering, propeller-driven EP-3 veered suddenly, and crashed into the
much faster, and relatively more nimble, Chinese F-8 fighter.
Aerodynamics alone suggest that the Chinese plane is far more likely
to have made the contact. Furthermore, the lost pilot, Wang Wei, was,
according to some sources, a "hot dog" -- a pilot who
constantly pushed the envelope and didn't always fly by the book.

If established to the satisfaction of Beijing, this fact offers a
(slim) possibility for bringing this confrontation to a speedy
conclusion. We need to demonstrate to the Chinese leaders involved in
resolving the dispute that the information coming up their line of
command is, in fact, not accurate, and that they are being pushed into
an unnecessary confrontation with the U.S. by lower-level military and
political officers who are trying to cover up their own errors.

What should be routine and symbolic Chinese "interceptions"
of unarmed American aircraft in international air space have, in
recent months, become more and more reckless -- that according to the
U.S. Pacific forces commander, Adm. Dennis Blair. Now a barnstorming
pilot has made a mistake that has cost him his life -- but which is
also, wrongly, threatening to undermine the whole U.S.-China
relationship. Wang's death is regrettable and America's condolences
have already been conveyed to his family. But remember: The U.S.
almost lost a crew of 24.

The attack on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, with which this
incident is constantly compared, was an American error -- as we
acknowledged, and for which we apologized and compensated China. This
time we are not at fault, so no apology should be forthcoming. Nor
should Washington insist that China apologize. Simply shifting the
rhetorical gears from blame to regret will be enough.

Quiet negotiations are under way to reconcile the different versions
of a possible statement of closure, based on mutually acceptable
language. Secretary of State Colin Powell's statement yesterday was
perfectly pitched: "We regret the Chinese pilot did not get down
safely, and we regret the loss of life of that Chinese pilot, but now
we need to move on and we need to bring this to a resolution."
This is the way forward.

This compromise over language may be a trifle challenging for
China's face-conscious leaders. Even before the true circumstances of
the accident have been determined by investigation, the issue has
become a political football in China. Attitudes toward the accident
have already been defined there, quite mistakenly, as a test of
patriotism and national pride. But the U.S. was evidently not at fault
in this accident, and protracting the blame game will only threaten
China's deeply-held aspirations to join the World Trade Organization,
host the Olympics, and welcome President Bush to Beijing, among other
things.

The bar for resolution is fairly low, however. All China needs to do
is to stop hammering on the issue of blame and return the plane and
the crew immediately. The incident will then be closed. We can then
move on to serious issues, such as economic cooperation and
development.

Some in Beijing will no doubt disagree. They will calculate that
increasing the pressure on the U.S. -- not just by demanding an
apology but also, perhaps, by threatening espionage charges -- will
tilt the balance in Washington in favor of yielding. Certainly, some
in Washington will argue, as they always do in such cases, that the
huge and important U.S.-Chinese relationship is simply not worth
risking over a "minor" incident. To them, a pro forma
apology is a small price to pay for keeping it on track.

But here, one suspects, they have misjudged the Bush administration.
It is true that President Clinton tended to give China what it wanted
when Beijing put pressure on him, and even the senior Bush and
President Reagan found themselves outmaneuvered on occasion. But when
Messrs. Reagan and Bush drew the line, and when Mr. Clinton sent
aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Straits in 1996 in response to Chinese
missile firings, Beijing got the message.

Precisely because credibility is so important, and because so much
has already been lost, the present Bush administration is unlikely to
respond positively to Chinese intimidation and demands. Americans will
do what is fair and apologize when an apology is in order -- as the
sorry story of Belgrade shows. But when the U.S. is not to blame,
Beijing should understand that nailing the Chinese flag to a
self-serving Chinese military coverup will cut no ice in Washington,
and only undermine important Chinese and U.S. long-term interests.