Chapter 6
Pearl Harbor and Clark Field

At 1405 on 7 December the Japanese emissaries Nomura and Kurusu arrived
at the State
Department in Washington, By orders from Tokyo they had originally
arranged the appointment
for 1300 but had subsequently requested the postponement. Fifteen
minutes later they
presented the Secretary of State Cordell Hull a memorandum which
concluded with
the regret that the Japanese government considered it "impossible to
reach an agreement
through further negotiations." The hour's delay in the
meeting--explained by the Japanese as having been consumed in decoding
the Tokyo message--rendered that conclusion a masterpiece of
understatement. Half an hour earlier Japanese aircraft had attacked
naval
and military installations in Oahu.

The attack achieved perfect tactical surprise: neither the exact
day nor the location
of the initial Japanese blow had been correctly estimated. But that
Japan would strike
soon and probably without a previous declaration of war had for some
time been appreciated
both in Washington and in the Pacific. After the diplomatic impasse of
20-26 November,
war had seemed inevitable; Mr. Hull had told the President's War
Council that the
matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the
Army and the Navy.1
It was this estimate of the situation which had caused the Army, and
the Navy,
to send to commanders in Hawaii and the Philippines the warning
messages of
27 November described in the previous chapter. [See above, p. 190.]

Because of the overwhelming success of the Japanese attacks of 7
December and of the handicap imposed thereby upon American defense
forces, the events of that day and of
the preceding weeks

--194--

have been the subject of repeated official investigations.
The professional reputations
of the highest civil and military leaders have been at stake, and the
chief emphasis
of the investigations has been to fix responsibilities for our
defeat--and indeed, for the very war itself. Thus political
considerations have often transcended in
important a mere recital of the sequence of military events;
"ultimatums" and "magic"
and wind messages" and "war-warning messages" have loomed larger in the
reports than the desperate but futile efforts of Army and Navy
personnel in Hawaii, and our initial
defeat in the Philips has come in for little attention. For want of
sufficient precise
contemporary evidence and because of conflicting statements
subsequently furnished
by responsible officers, a few crucial points have never been
satisfactorily explained.

The general pattern of events in Oahu and Luzon can, however, be
established, and that is the purpose of this chapter. Happily, there is
no need here to attempt more.
The diplomatic and political issues which brought on the war are
clearly out of the ken
of the AAF historian. And because the chain of command in both Pacific
areas and in
Washington vested ultimate control of Army Air Forces in Army
commanding generals,
the graver responsibilities lay with the latter. Nothing in the record
indicates that the story would have been substantially better had
airmen been in full control
of their own forces, whatever minor differences that might have meant.
Wherever the
fault lay, the AAF in Hawaii, and the fleet whose defense was its chief
mission,
suffered an overwhelming defeat.

Defeat on Oahu

For more on developments in the Philippines, see the HyperWar
links to the attack -- including the official U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps histories and Action Reports.

On 26 November a Japanese task force sailed from Hitakappu Bay in
the
Kurils.
The force included, in addition to its train, six aircraft carriers,
two battleships,
two cruisers, nine destroyers, and three submarines. They reached
position
approximately 200 miles north of Oahu before dawn on 7 December
(Hawaiian time.)2

Plans for the strike had been initiated during the previous
summer, completed by
early November. In September picked crews--with pilots who averaged
better than
800 hours' flying time--from the Japanese First Air Fleet had begun a
period of
intensive training in horizontal and dive bombing and in the technique
of torpedo
attack in shallow waters. En route to the rendezvous above Oahu, with
the ships
under radio silence, the pilots were briefed on their coming

--195--

mission. The primary target was the naval base of Pearl
Harbor, the design to cripple
the Pacific Fleet. It was hoped that at least four aircraft carriers
and four
battleships could be sunk or rendered useless for a long period.
Postwar interrogations
of enemy personnel indicate a lack of precise information as to U.S.
naval vessels
then at Pearl Harbor, but each pilot received charts marking off
definite areas of
attack.3

Exactly on schedule, at 0600 on the 7th, orders for the take-off
were given.
Shortly thereafter the first wave--fifty fighters, fifty horizontal
bombers,
forty torpedo bombers, and fifty dive bombers--roared off the carriers
and headed
toward Oahu. Forty-five minutes later fifty horizontal bombers, eighty
dive bombers,
and forty fighters followed as the second and last wave
of attack.4

The arrival of the first wave over Oahu was not entirely
unheralded. About 0630 a small
submarine had been sighted in a restricted zone off Pearl Harbor. By
0650 it had been
sunk by the U.S. destroyer Ward,
whose commander had immediately reported the action to the

Map 1: Hawaiian Islands

--196--

watch officer at the naval base and had begun a methodical
search of the restricted area.
The six radar detector stations of the Hawaiian Interceptor Command had
been in operation
since 0400; at 0700 they reached the prescribed limit of their regular
morning alert.
on this occasion, however, the Opana station at Kahuku Point remained
open to provide
additional instruction for one of the operators. At 0702 the station
plotted a group of
airplanes at approximately 130 miles, bearing 0° to 3° east of
north.
This fact was reported by telephone to the information center about
fifteen minutes later.
Because of the expected arrival of B-17's from the mainland and the
probability of
search operations by U.S. naval aircraft, an Air Corps officer who was
on duty at this
time "solely for training and observation" did not consider it
necessary to take
any action.5
Meanwhile the Opana station had tracked the planes toward Oahu and had
lost them.
Two opportunities for an eleventh-hour reprieve had been forfeited.

At 0755 single-engine planes were observed southeast of the Hickam
Field hangar line
heading for Pearl Harbor. Almost simultaneously the naval base and
Hickam Field
came under attack.

For approximately thirty minutes units of the Pacific Fleet were
subjected to the savage
blows of wave after wave of enemy planes. It is impossible to determine
precisely the
sequence of the enemy's actions; they included eight attacks delivered
by some thirty
dive bombers, low-altitude attacks by more than twenty torpedo planes
sweeping across
the harbor in four waves, and level bombing from about 10,000 feet by
perhaps fifteen aircraft.
Then came a quarter-hour of comparative quiet. At 0840 horizontal and
dive bombers
renewed the attack. This action lasted about an
hour.6
At its end the Navy had suffered a crushing blow.

The battleship force had been most heavily hit. The Arizona,California,
and West Virginia had been sunk, the Oklahoma capsized,
the Nevada
severely damaged, and three others damaged. Three cruisers, three
destroyers, and
a seaplane tender had received damages of varying degrees of severity;
a mine layer
and a target ship had been sunk. Fortunately no carrier was in port.
Naval and
naval air installations had been seriously hurt. of the approximately
169 naval
aircraft in the Oahu area, 87 were destroyed. Tragically heavy to were
losses in
Navy and Marine Corps personnel, with 2,086 officers and men killed or
fatally wounded and
an additional 749 wounded.7

Although the primary purpose of the enemy had been to cripple

--197--

the American fleet, it was at the same time necessary for
the Japanese to eliminate the
danger of an effective reaction from the Hawaiian Air Force.
Accordingly, and simultaneously
with the initial attack on the fleet, twenty-eight bombers in three
waves escorted by
pursuits carried out a ten-minute raid on buildings of the Hawaiian Air
Depot and the
hangar line at Hickam Field. After a fifteen-minute lull, the attack
was renewed by five or six high-level bombers which fruitlessly bombed
the baseball diamond;
six to nine others dropped down to 150 feet for a more damaging attack
on the No. 1
Aqua System, the technical buildings immediately behind the hangar
lines, the
consolidated barracks, and on planes parked almost wing tip to wing tip
on the
warming-up apron. A third attack at approximately 0900 by from six to
nine planes
scored hits on technical buildings, dispersed planes, barracks, the
parade ground,
and the post exchange.8

At Wheeler Field, principal pursuit base, the first bombs fell
shortly after 0800.
Approximately twenty-five dive bombers approached the field at an
altitude of about 5,000 feet,
went into a dive, and released their bombs over the hangar line.
Withing a few minutes
the air seemed full of planes circling in a counterclockwise direction
but otherwise maneuvering according to no apparent pattern. Though this
attack lasted for no more than
fifteen minutes, other planes strafed the field shortly after 0900.
Bellows Field,
third of the major Air Corps installations, suffered less than did
either Hickam or Wheeler.
Only one plane out of the enemy's first wave of attack, and that a
fighter, directed
its attention to this field. But nine more fighters came over soon
after 0900 to give
the field a thorough strafing for about
fifteen minutes.9

In comparison with the havoc wrought by the planes that the
Japanese FIrst Air Fleet
threw against Hawaiian air and naval installations, the reaction of
defending air units
was pitiful. The enemy had achieved the crushing advantage of surprise.
Moreover,
under the alert in effect since 27 November AAF planes were
concentrated for protection
against sabotage, with an allowance of four hours' notice to make them
ready for flight,
instead of being dispersed in readiness for a prompt take-off. In the
circumstances,
it as virtually impossible to put up anything approaching an effective
air defense.
in spite of handicaps, four P-40's and two P-36's took off from Wheeler
Field
thirty-five minutes after the initial attack, and from 0830 until 0930
Army pursuit planes
flew a total of twenty-five sorties. Perhaps the

--198--

most successful interception was performed by six pilots of
the 47th Pursuit Squadron
based on the small field at Haleiwa, the only usable airfield not
subjected to
serious enemy attack. Though not at their base when the attack
commenced, Lts. Harry
M. Brown, Robert J. Rogers, Kenneth A. Taylor, John J. Webster, and
George S. Welch
succeeded in reaching Haleiwa by automobile and, acting without
information as to the
number and type of enemy planes, carried out a number of sorties in
P-40's and P-36's
between 0815 and 1000. Welch alone claimed four enemy planes shot down.
Lt. John L. Dains,
another pilot participating in the action, alternately used a P-36 and
a P-40
in three sorties, but on the third of these he was shot down over
Shofield Barracks,
apparently by antiaircraft fire. on learning of the attack on Wheeler,
crews of the 44th
Pursuit Squadron at Bellows Field began arming their P-40's and by 0855
three were ready.
But just as pilots Hans C. Christiansen, George A. Whiteman, and Samuel
W. Bishop
prepared to take off, Japanese pursuits swept over the field in a
strafing attack.
Christiansen was killed while getting into his plane; Whiteman was shot
down
immediately after his take-off; and the other P-40, severely damaged,
crashed into
the ocean. In spite of a wound in the leg, Bishop succeeded in swimming
ashore.
At about 0850 four P-36's of the 46th Pursuit Squadron had taken off
from Wheeler during
a temporary break under orders to proceed to the vicinity of Bellows
Field,
near which they attacked a formation of nine Japanese planes. In spite
of the fact
that the P-36's could not match their opponents in rate of climb, two
of the enemy
were shot down with the loss of one American plane piloted by Lt.
Gordon H. Sterling, Jr.10

Not until 1100 was it possible for Hawaii-based bombers to get off
the ground in a search
for the enemy's carriers. But the B-17's of the 38th and 88th
Reconnaissance Squadrons,
which had left Hamilton Field the preceding evening on the first leg of
a flight from
the United States to the Philippines,
[See above, p. 193.]
arrived over Oahu in the midst of the attack. Unfortunately, the planes
had been so
heavily loaded with gasoline that ammunition could not be carried, and
for purposes of
balance the armor plate in the rear had been shifted forward. As a
consequence, the pilots on reaching Hawaii could attempt no more than
to escape from enemy fire.
Of the first of two flights, Maj. Richard H. Carmichael, ranking
officer of the 88th Squadron, and

--199--

Lt. Harold N. Chaffin brought their planes down on the
1,200-foot runway at
Haleiwa; Lts. Harry N. Brandon, David G. Rawls, and Robert E. Thacker
flew through
antiaircraft and enemy machine-gun fire to land at Hickam; and Lt. Rank
P. Bostrom
played tag with the enemy almost all the way around the island before
landing on a
golf course. The second flight, led by Maj. Truman H. Landon of the
38th Squadron, fortunately arrived during an inactive period in the
attack, but one of the B-17's
was badly shot up and two of its crew members were seriously injured.
Considering
the fact that the planes were entirely unarmed, had just completed a
flight of more
than 2,000 miles, and were forced to land either on inadequate or
pock-marked fields, the bombers suffered surprisingly little damage. A
final accounting showed that of
the fourteen planes which left Hamilton Field, two had turned back
early in the flight,
and of the remaining twelve which reached Hawaii, one had been
destroyed and three
badly damaged.11

Throughout the remainder of the day, P-40's, P-36's, O-47's,
A-20's, B-17's, and B-18's
continued a fruitless search for the enemy's carriers, flying a total
of forty-eight
sorties between 0930 and 1520. The aircraft warning system had been put
back into
operation shortly after 0800, but could provide no assistance in this
effort.12
Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning
was not utilized
as a clue to the probable locations of
the carriers.13
The Japanese fleet had come and gone unseen by American patrol and
reconnaissance aircraft.

It is now known from enemy sources that Japanese flyers of the
first attack wave
had returned to their carriers by noon, and that within two hours
thereafter all but twenty-nine of the planes sent out against Hawaii
had found their way back. But as the day advanced the sea had
roughened, and approximately fifty planes were smashed in
landing, with twenty or more representing a total
loss.14
This was a small price to pay for the damage done to the Americans. In
addition to
the losses suffered by the United States Navy, 64 of the 231 aircraft
assigned to the
hawaiian Air Force as of 7 December 1941 had been destroyed, and no
more than 79 of
the remaining planes were reported as usable.15
At Hickam Field some of the more important administrative and
engineering files, the base
parachute section, and the overhaul and assembly sections of the Engine
Repair Branch
had been wiped out. Test equipment, about 75 per cent of the equipment
of the

--200--

Japanese Photograph of Wheeler FIeld, 7 December 1941

Hangar No. 11, Hickam Field

Improvised Machine Gun Nest, Hickam Field

Aero Repair Branch, and more than half of the depot
property stocks were destroyed.
AAF casualties, especially at Hickam FIeld, were heavy, reaching a
total of 163 killed,
43 missing, and 336 wounded.16

A tentative plan to strike at Midway on the return voyage was
abandoned by the Japanese because of the unfavorable weather. Except
for two carriers dispatched for participation
in the attack on Wake, the enemy fleet returned to the Inland Sea of
Japan.17
Japanese officials interviewed after the war indicated that they had at
no time contemplated
a landing in Hawaii. Nor apparently was the capture of Midway included
in their
original plans. The major Japanese drive, as had been anticipated by
the associated
powers, would be directed against the Netherlands East Indies and the
Malay Peninsula,
and in its course would absorb the American-held Philippine Islands.
That drive would
not be impeded by the fleet based at Pearl Harbor, The enemy's victory
had been perfect
as few military operations are. Its early consequences were to follow
closely
enough Japanese hopes.

Defeat on Luzon

For more on developments in the Philippines, see the HyperWar
links to the campaign -- including the official U.S. Army histories.

According to the Japanese plan for the capture of the Philippine
Islands, naval air units
would assume the initial responsibility for destruction of defending
air and naval forces
and for cover of the landings. When beachheads had been established and
Philippine airfields
had been captured, army air units would move in for the purpose of
supporting the ground forces.
The first air assault was scheduled for early morning on the same day
of the attacks
in Hawaii.18

Preparations had been well under way by the opening of November.
During the first two
weeks of the month, land-based naval air units of the 11th Air Fleet
were transferred
to Formosa, where with approximately 300 planes they entered into
intensive training
in day and night bombing, long-range reconnaissance, air coverage, and
strafing attack.
As December came in, the Third Fleet was engaged in assembling its main
forces at Formosa
for the amphibious invasion of the Philippine; and to the naval air
strength deployed
at Formosan bases were added 150 to 175 planes of the Fifth Army air
force.
The main weight of army aviation was deployed in the south for support,
initially from
Indo-Chinese bases, of the conquest of Malaya.19

For defense of the Philippines, the Far East Air Force had in
commission thirty-three B-17's,
of which sixteen were at Del Monte and the rest at Clark Field, and
approximately ninety
pursuit aircraft.20

--201--

Map 2: Luzon

--202--

The 3e Pursuit Squadron at Iba and the 17th at Nichols each
had eighteen P-40E's;
the 20th at Clark was equipped with the same number of P-40B's. The
21st and 34th Squadrons,
respectively based on the Nichols and Del Carmen fields, had arrived in
the Philippines only in late November and did not receive their planes
until 7 December,
when the former was assigned approximately eighteen hastily assembled
P-40E's
and the latter took up its duties with P-35's, each of which had an
average flying time
close to 500 hours.l Also available were a miscellaneous assortment of
noncombat
aircraft and twelve P-26's flown from Batangas by pilots of the
Philippine
Air Force.21

Had the Japanese been able to keep to their schedule, the attack
on the Philippines
would have coincided much more closely than it did with that at Pearl
Harbor.
But inclement weather above Luzon delayed execution of the plan for an
early morning
attack, and gave the Americans advance notice of several
hours.22
In fact, the major attack on Clark Field, where virtually half of our
total bombing
force was destroyed on the ground, did not develop until after noon,
some nine
hours following the initial bombing of Oahu.

In the Philippines, which lie on the other side of the
international date line, it was Monday, 8 December, when shortly after
0300 (0830 in Hawaii) a commercial
radio station picked up a report of the Pearl Harbor
attack.23
Though no official confirmation was immediately available, base
commanders received prompt
notification and all units were placed on combat alert. Within thirty
minutes of this first warning, the radar set at Iba plotted a formation
of aircraft about seventy-five miles offshore headed toward Corregidor.
The 3d Pursuit Squadron
immediately sent out planes for interception. As the radar followed the
course of
the outgoing P-40's, it showed them making contact with the approaching
aircraft,
after which the latter swung off to the west and their plots
disappeared.
It was later learned that our pursuits actually had made no
interception. Apparently,
the P-40's in the darkness had passed underneath the enemy
planes.24
There were not other alarms prior to receipt of official confirmation
of the outbreak
of hostilities with Japan by 0500.

A plan of action which had been considered for this eventuality by
the Far East
Air Force was an American air attack against Formosa, the natural point
of concentration
for a Japanese invasion of the Philippines.25
Objective folders, although without calibrated bomb target maps or
aerial photographs,
had been prepared,26
and Col. Francis

--203--

M. Brady, chief of staff to General Brereton, promptly took
the initial step toward
mounting the operation by ordering the B-17's at Clark Field prepared
for the
mission.27
Brereton himself reported at about 0500 to General MacArthur's
headquarters at Fort Santiago,
where he requested permission of Brig. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland,
chief of staff,
to carry out offensive action as soon as possible after
daylight.28

That request, unhappily, has become a subject of controversy.
Conflicting statements
have been made and the historian is left to find his way without the
aid of a complete
record. Indeed, only a few fragments of the official records of the Far
East AiR force
survived the initial engagements and movements of the war, with the
result that chief
reliance must be placed on the recollections of its personnel. It would
appear that
the files of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, are also
incomplete.29

Since the question turns so largely on evidence drawn from the
memory that men carry
of the first hectic hours of war, it seems pertinent to observe here
that there can be little doubt that to the airmen of General
MacArthur's command the logical defensive use
of the long-range heavy bomber in the circumstances existing was to
strike at the
enemy's concentration of air and naval power on Formosa, and to strike
before the enemy
could attack.30
Not only would this have been in accord with standard AAF doctrine and
with the mission
in defense of our own shores for which the B-17 originally had been
designed, but Formosa
lay well within the range of the plane, which incidentally had been
built for missions
extending beyond the distance for which fighter escort could be
provided by current
models of pursuit aircraft. It is true that the number of planes
available was nowhere
near that required for a decisive striking force, but the defensive
value of the B-17
lay almost entirely in its offensive power and the alternative to its
use in that manner
was to save it for possible destruction on the ground. Moreover, the
mission presumably would serve useful purposes of reconnaissance, and
it would have been accordance with
the recent revision of RAINBOW No. 5. [See
above, pp. 184-85.]
If
General Brereton did not
propose an early undertaking of offensive action against the enemy on
Formosa, as both
officially and publicly he has stated he did, it would be surprising
indeed.

Following the publication in 1946 of The Brereton Diaries,
in which

--204--

for the first time General Brereton publicly stated the
facts as he recalled them,
General MacArthur announced that he had received no such recommendation
and that
prior to that publication he knew "nothing of such a recommendation
having been made."*
This statement lent special weight to the testimony of General
Sutherland, who during
the preceding year had stated in an interview that the responsibility
for holding
the bombers on the ground that morning was entirely Brereton's.¶
It was
Sutherland's recollection that the air commander agreed that there
would be no point in attempting a bomber mission without advance
reconnaissance. The interview
did not indicate whether the question of an immediate reconnaissance
mission
was considered, but General Brereton, in reply to a request for
information on that
point, has indicated that no authorization for reconnaissance was
received until later.
"At the first conference," he wrote, "General Sutherland approved my
plans for an attack immediately after daylight, instructed me to go
ahead with preparations and
that in the meantime, he would obtain General MacArthur's authority for
the
daylight attack."31

* The Brereton Diaries (New York, 1946); MacArthur's
statement of 27 Sept. 1946,
in New York Times, 28 Sept. 1946. In response to a request for
information, General
Brereton several months earlier had given the Historical Office a
statement of
developments on the first day of war that was substantially the same as
that
subsequently published. [1st ind., Brereton to Paul (ltr., Chief, AAF
Historical Office
to CG Third Air Force, sub.: Air Defense of the Philippine Islands in
December 1941,
30 Jan.. 1946.].)

¶ The record of an interview by Walter D. Edmons with Lt.
Gen. Richard K. Sutherland
in Manila on 4 June 1945 (copy supplied the author through the courtesy
of Mr. Edmonds)
reads on the question of "Why was Formosa not bombed?" as follows:

Gen. Sutherland began by saying that all the B-17s had
been ordered to Del Monte some
days before. On a check it was found that only half had been sent. GHQ
wanted the planes in Del Monte because they would there have been safe
from initial Jap
attacks--they could not have been reached at all--and they could
themselves have
staged out of Clark Field to bomb Formosa. This direct order had not
been obeyed.
And it must be remembered that GHQ gave out general orders and that the
AFHq were
supposed to execute them. As Sutherland recalls, there was some plan to
bomb Formosa,
but Brereton said that he had to have Photos first. That there was no
sense in going
up there to bomb without knowing what they were going after. There were
some 25 fields
on Formosa. On December 9th and 10th, photo missions were
dispatched--Carpenter going on the first and returning with generator
trouble; Connally going on the second but being
turned back by fighters. Holding the bombers at Clark Field that
first day was
entirely due to Brereton. (Italics mine, WDE.)

General Sutherland's statement that all B-17's had been ordered to
Del
Monte (subsequently confirmed in MacArthur's statement of September
1946) and General Brereton's
account of the move have been discussed above in Chap. 5, pp. 188-89. On the immediate question
of the employment
of the planes at Clark Field on 8 December, the question of a prior
order for their transfer
is a side issue.

[The official US Army
history,
published in 1952, gives greater weight to Brereton's version that the
Sutherland/MacArthur version! Note
particularly, the discrepancy in MacArthur's supposedly holding back
the bombing attack
in favor of a reconnaissance mission, then later the same day
authorizing the bombing mission in spite of the lack of reconnaissance.
Considering other events, and MacArthur's
non-appearance throughout the morning of that critical day, this
student believes that
a plausible explanation is the MacArthur suffered at least a mild
nervous breakdown upon
receiving the news of Pearl Harbor--and realizing his inevitable defeat
in the Philippines--and
that Sutherland's primary task that morning was to get the "boss" to
pull himself together
and assume effective command. After the efforts that MacArthur had
initiated to repudiate
the long-standing strategy of 'delay-and-defend until the fleet could
arrive to reinforce',
in favor of an aggressive forward defense relying largely on the
striking power of the
B-17s he demanded, it boggles the mind to discover another believable
explanation for
his failure to even meet face-to-face with his air force chief that
morning. Further
evidence of his tenuous response to events is the continued commitment
to a forward
defense of the beaches, until precipitously abandoning those plans in
favor of the
retreat to Bataan immediately after the Japanese landing at Lingayen
Gulf--too late to
move the mountains of material needed to feed and support his army. HyperWar]

--205--

It is difficult even to establish the chronology of events
for that morning or to give anything more than the approximate time of
those events on which agreement exists.
The most detailed general account is that of Brereton, and for much of
the detail given by him there exists independent corroboration.32
On the main points at issue, moreover, support for much of his account
is provided without
complete agreement by a file of the daily Summary of Activities of the
Headquarters, Far
East Air Force, extending from 8 December 1941 to 24 February 1942,
when General Brereton
relinquished command in Java on the even of his departure for India to
assume command of
American air operations in that area. These daily summaries leave
little if any question
that they represent a detailed record complied closer to the events
described than any
comprehensive account known to exist. in the following narrative they
have been weighted
according.*

After his early morning report to General Headquarters, General
Brereton states that he returned
to his own headquarters at Nielson

* These summaries acquire in the absence of other comparable
records such an importance
as to justify at this point an attempt to describe them and the way in
which they reached
the files of the Air Historical office. They were transmitted to that
office after the
termination of hostilities by AAF historical officers assigned to the
China-Burma-India
theater. Presumably,they represent a record carried to India by General
Brereton or by
other FEAF personnel who accompanied him to India, and presumably they
were left there
at the time of his hurried departure in June 9142 for the Middle East.
(See below, pp. 512-13.)
Similarly, records of early
activity in India reached the Air Historical Office through the efforts
of the historical
officer of the Ninth Air Force, which General Brereton later commanded
in ETO.
The FEAF summaries, which are typed out on loose sheets of two
different sizes and of
varying weight and texture, all of them carbon copies except for the
inserted notes
of a staff conference held on 19 December, are bound together by an
acco fastener within
an ordinary manila cover. on the cover has been written in ink,
possibly by historical
personnel in the theater, "Early History 10th AAF"; but that has been
struck out and in its
place appears "General Brereton's Headquarters diary 8 Dec 41-24 Feb
42," and below that
in pencil is written "Activity Report of FEAF." Other markings were
apparently made by the
filing personnel of the historical office. The historian is given some
pause by the fact
that the daily summaries from 8 December through 13 December give the
year as 1942
with corrections in ink for 8, 9, and 10 December. The year appears
without change as 1941
for 14 December at which point the weight of the paper changes, but
reverts thereafter to 1942
until the entries for 16 December. From that date forward the year is
rendered correctly
in the original typing. Since one often writes by mistake the preceding
year but rarely
if ever puts down the new year ahead of time, the likelihood that
entries for the earlier
dates were compiled at some later time must be considered. Perhaps they
represent a
compilation taken from available records for assistance in the
preparation of such a
report as is understood to have been made by General Brereton in late
January or early February
(see note 32); perhaps they are copies made from
the original by a
careless typist; perhaps there is some other explanation. Whatever the
case, the fullness
and exactness of detail given, together with the fact that at so many
points independent
corroboration can be had, lead to the conclusion that the document
represents a valuable
record compiled closer to the events described than any other known
source of
comparable scope.

--206--

Field under instruction to take no offensive action until
so
ordered.33
The Summary of Activities for that date has as its first entry the
following notation:
"07:15 General Brereton visited No. 1 Victoria and requested permission
of General
macArthur to take offensive action. He was informed that for the time
being our role
was defensive, but to stand by for orders." And at 0900 appears this
entry:
"In response to query from General Brereton a message received from
General Sutherland
advising planes not authorized to carry bombs at this time."

The second of these entries is probably to be interpreted in the
context of development
occasioned by an impending enemy attack. While air force officers
awaited orders,
the aircraft warning service had reported enemy aircraft proceeding
south over
Lingayen Gulf toward Manila.34
All B-17's at Clark Field were ordered into the air without bomb load
to avoid being
caught on the ground and were instructed to patrol the waters off
northern
Luzon.35
The 20th Pursuit Squadron, also based at Clark, was dispatched to
intercept the
approaching formation, and at Nichols Field the 17th, under command of
Lt. Boyd Wagner,
received orders to cover Clark. At 0910, Col. Harold H. George, chief
of staff,
V Interceptor Command, reported to headquarters, "that there are 54
airplanes in the air
and 36 airplanes in reserve and that no contact with hostile aircraft
has been made."
At 0923, he reported "approximately 24 bi-motored enemy bombers near
Tugeugarao and
17 near Baguio." Simultaneously,another report indicated that "Tarlac
and Tuguegarao
were being bombed." Planes of the 20th Pursuit had expected to make
contact with
the enemy north of Manila over Rosales, but the Japanese escaped
interception
by swinging east to direct their main effort against Baguio, summer
capital of the Philippines.36

Following this attack, Brereton by telephone renewed his request
for authority
to take offensive action. According to the Summary of Activities the
time was 1000, and the "Chief of Staff informed General Brereton that
all aircraft would be held in reserve and that the present attitude is
strictly defensive. General Brereton stated to General
Sutherland that if Clark Field was taken out we could not operate
offensively." To the same entry is appended: "Bomber command recommends
bombs not be loaded at this
time due to danger of extensive damage by enemy air action." At the
same hour but
under separate entry appears this brief notation: "24 enemy bombers
reported in
Cagayan Valley proceeding south in direction Manila."

--207--

It is General Brereton's recollection that shortly before
1010 he received authority
to undertake a reconnaissance mission to Formosa; that Lt. Col. Eugene
L. Eubank,
bomber commander, promptly took off from Neilson for Clark Field to
assume personal
direction of the preparations; that Colonel Eubank on his arrival at
Clark recalled
the bombers from patrol to prepare for the execution of orders which
called for three
planes to fly the reconnaissance mission "and the rest to be briefed
for an attack";
that, at about 1100, GHQ authorized bombing missions; that he then
instructed Eubank
to load all available B-17's with 100- and 3000-lb. bombs and to brief
the crews for
attack of airdromes in southwest Formosa; and that he ordered the two
squadrons of
bombers at Del Monte to move their B-17's at dusk to San Marcelino, a
pasture-like
emergency field lying near the coast of Luzon west of Clark, whence
they were to proceed
during the night to Clark Field as a staging point for a mission at
daybreak.37
It is with more than ordinary interest, therefore, that one reads the
following
entries in the daily summary:

10:10 Colonel Eubank left for Clark Field to take charge
of operations from Clark Field
with instructions to dispatch a photo reconnaissance mission in force
at once to
southern Taiwan area.

10:14 General Brereton received a telephone call from General
MacArthur. General
Brereton stated that since the attack was not made on Clark Field that
bombers will be held in readiness until receipt of reports from
reconnaissance missions. Lacking
report of reconnaissance, Taiwan would be attacked in late afternoon.
The decision
for offensive action was left to General Brereton. All bombers were
ordered to arm
and be on alert for immediate orders.

10:20 Report of planes coming south proved erroneous. Planes
reported coming south
from Cagayan Valley turned around and are now proceeding north. The
staff was called in and informed of General Brereton's telephone
conversation with General MacArthur. General Brereton
directed that a plan of employment of our Air Force against known
airdromes in Southern
Formosa be prepared.

10:45 Employment of Air Force directed by General Brereton as
follows: Two (2) heavy
bombardment squadrons to attack known airdromes in Southern Formosa at
the latest
daylight hour today that visibility will permit. Forces to be 2
squadrons of B-17's.
Two (2) squadrons of pursuit to be on the alert to cover operations of
bombardment.
Pursuit to be used to fullest extent to insure safety of bombardment.
Two (2) squadrons
of bombardment to San Mencilino [sic] at dusk. To Clark FIeld
after dark
prepared for operations at daybreak.

11:10 Report received from Clark Field that airdrome had not
been bombed.

11:20 Field Order No. One, confirming Colonel Embank's
instructions to 19th
Bombardment Group sent by teletype.

--208--

It required some time to bring in all of the bombers from
patrol, but shortly after 1130
all American aircraft in the Philippines, with the exception of one or
two planes,
were on the ground. Recently recalled B-17's at Clark were being made
ready for the
Formosa mission;38
planes of the 20th Pursuit Squadron at Clark and the 17th at Nichols
had returned
to their bases for refueling; those of the 3d at Iba, the 21st at
Nichols,
and the 34th at Del Carmen stood ready to take off upon receipt of
orders.39
And just about this time the plotting board at Nielson Field began to
receive reports of
a formation of enemy aircraft coming in over northern Luzon. Unlike
other flights
reported that morning, this one did not break up as it proceeded south.
Warning was
sent to Clark Field by normal teletype channels, and acco to Col. A.H.
Campbell,
then chief of Aircraft Warning Service, its receipt there was
confirmed.40
Back at Nielson, an entry in the Summary of Activities reads: "11:37
Operations Board
report flight of enemy planes, number unknown now located about 70
miles west of
Lingayen Gulf, headed south 11:27 A.M." As soon as the enemy force was
believed to be
within operating range of American pursuit planes, Colonel George of V
Interceptor
Command took necessary steps to provide protection for vital
points.41
For the approaches to Manila, the 17th Squadron was ordered to cover
Bataan peninsula,
the 21st to patrol the Manila area itself, and the 34th to provide a
cover for Clark Field,
where the 20th, just in from patrol, was being refueled. The 3d
Squadron, at Iba,
was dispatched on what proved to be a fruitless flight over the South
China Sea,
where an enemy formation had been reported.42

From this point on, a confused record reflects chiefly the g
confusion and bad luck
which attended the American air effort on that first day of hostilities
in the Philippines.
The Summary of Activities for Headquarters, Far East Air FOrce, notes:
"11:56 General
Brereton communicated with General Sutherland and complete report was
given General
Sutherland of the air situation at this time including fact that it was
planned to move
the B-17's now at Del Monte to San Marcelino and to bomb Taiwan fields
at late afternoon
today." Then the summary jumps to 1240 to record a report that "10
planes, 6,000 feet,
nationality unknown, headed for Manila. This information from the
Navy." Under 1255
appears another report that "large force of planes, about 25, heading
south reported in
vicinity of Tarlac at 12:25." Under 1257 one reads of a Japanese
propaganda mission

--209--

earlier in the day: "Said planes dropped leaflets which
read as follows: Way to permanent
peace causing this conflict between Japan and the U.S. Roosevelt
attempt curve our
independence stop we all know than unless the US has not oppressed
Japan, this war has
not been started stop Our mission is to end this war as fast as
possible and in order
to achieve this end we should cooperate with Japan fully unquote."
Then: "13:00 Reported
by G-2 that Fort Stotsenburg is being bombed"; and again--"13:00 Report
received from
Stotsenburg many bombers very high bombed Clark Field at 12:35 P.M."

It is not even certain that the record thus provided clears up the
much debated question
of just when the Japanese attack on Clark Field began, for there is
rather specific
evidence which argues for a time some fifteen minutes earlier. No
clarification, moreover,
is provided for the controversial question of why our bombers were
caught, apparently
without warning, on the ground.* There is reason to believe that a
warning message
had reached Clark Field, but the warning evidently was not received by
bomber personnel
there. In response to a specific question from the Air Historical
Office which indicated
the existence of information that a warning had been sent and
acknowledged by Clark Field,
General Eubank under date of 5 August 1947 made the following
statement:

Information of the Japanese formation which attacked
Clark Field about noon,
8 December 1941, was not received by the Bomber Command prior to the
attack.
The formation was almost directly overhead at the time the air raid
warning siren
was sounded and the bombs began exploding a few seconds thereafter. One
or two
false air raid warning messages had been received earlier
in the day.43

And there the question must be left. Colonel Campbell is emphatic
in
his recollection
that a prior warning was both sent and acknowledged; General Eubank is
equally emphatic
in stating that no information reached V Bomber Command. I is entirely
possible that
both officers are correct in their recollection, but in the absence of
further evidence
there would appear to be little advantage in attempts to speculate on
the probabilities
of misinterpretation or other human failure that might reconcile the
two accounts.

In any case, the Japanese enjoyed a good fortune of catching the
two squadrons of
B-17's on the ground at Clark Field. this had been the enemy's hope
when he
originally scheduled an attack for the early morning, but after a
postponement
of several hours, he had no reason

--210--

to expect anything other than that the Americans would have
been completely alerted
by the news from Pearl Harbor.44
Actually, not only did he find all save one of the Clark Field bombers
on the ground,
but for the moment the field was almost unguarded by pursuits. A thick
haze of dust at Del Carmen had delayed execution of orders to the 34th
Squadron for cover of Clark Field, and at 1215 the 20th Pursuit, whose
planes had not yet completed their refueling,
was hastily ordered to cover its own base. Within five minutes the four
planes had
taken off, but just then, a V-shaped formation of twenty-seven Japanese
bombers
attacked the field with bombs varying in size from small fragmentation
to 100-pounders.
Following this formation came another of comparable size, which
continued the attack
for fifteen minutes. And, almost before the last bomb had been dropped,
Japanese
fighters swept in to pick out the grounded American planes in a
low-altitude
strafing attack that lasted more than an hour.45
Though every advantage lay with the attacking enemy, desperate attempts
were made by
the 20th Pursuit Squadron to get its P-40's into the air. Five were
smashed by bombs
while taking off; five more were destroyed in strafing attacks, but Lt.
Joseph H. Moore,
squadron commander, succeeded in leading three others into the air.
There Lt. Randall
B. Keator attacked a flight of three enemy pursuits and acquired the
distinction of shooting
down the first Japanese aircraft over the Philippines; Lieutenant Moore
in a series of
dogfights destroyed two others. At Del Carmen Field, some fifteen miles
away, pilots of
the 34th Squadron, on seeing great clouds of smoke and dust billowing
up from Clark,
immediately "took to the air" in their P-35's to engage other enemy
fighters.
The P-35's were consistently outmaneuvered and several of them were
seriously damaged,
but the pilots claimed on return three of the
enemy aircraft.46

Two B-17's were off the ground during these attacks. One, piloted
by Lt. John Carpenter,
was on reconnaissance and landed at Clark after the raiders had
disappeared.47
Another, commanded by Lt. Earl Tash, had arrived over Clark Field from
Del Monte during the height of the low-level strafing to be pounced
upon by three enemy pursuits,
but Tash managed to pilot the severely damaged B-17 back to
Del Monte.48

Meanwhile, the planes of the 3d Squadron returning from their
search over the
South China Sea, where they had found nothing, had run into the worst
possible luck.
With their fuel dangerously low, the

--211--

P-40's, which numbered perhaps twelve reached their base at
Iba just ahead of a heavy
enemy attack. The American planes, in fact, were slowly circling the
field preparatory
to landing when a number of Japanese bombers estimated at from
twenty-seven to thirty-four
and their fighter escort attacked. The American planes tried to ward
off the Japanese attack and succeeded in preventing the low-level
strafing which proved so destructive at Clark Field.
Lt. Jack Donalson probably destroyed two of the enemy planes, but five
P-40's were shot
down and three others crash-landed on near-by beaches when their fuel
gave out.49

On the ground, personnel of the Far East Air Force fought back as
best they could in a
hopelessly unequal struggle. Though some units almost completely
disintegrated during
nearly two hours of attack, there were countless examples of
outstanding leadership
and heroism. With few exceptions, antiaircraft gunners stood by their
guns in the face
of effective enemy strafing. Ground and combat crews turned the machine
guns of grounded
planes on low-flying Japanese aircraft, or undertook to rescue from
flaming buildings
such valuable equipment as they could. Among the many officers and men
subsequently cited
for their efforts were Lt. Fred Crimmins, who received severe wounds in
a vain attempt
to save a B-17; Chaplain Joseph F. LaFleur, who repeatedly ignored
low-flying strafers
to minister to the wounded and dying; and Pfc Greeley B. Williams, who
from a gunner's
post in one of the B-17's kept up a steady fire on Japanese planes
until he was killed.
Medical personnel of the four emergency first-aid dressing stations t
Clark Field maintained their greatly needed services throughout
the time.50

As the enemy planes returned to their Formosan bases, it was clear
that they had won
a tremendous victory. At Clark Field, high-level bombing had destroyed
hangars, shops, mess halls, barracks, and supply buildings. The
communications center had received
a direct hit which cut off the field from other points and prevented
any attempt to
control pursuit operations. As a result, planes of the 17th and 21st
Squadrons continued
their assigned patrols of the Bataan and la Bay areas, unaware of the
Japanese attack
being carried out no more than sixty miles away.51
The B-17's, in spite of being incompletely dispersed, suffered
relatively little damage
from bombs, but

--212--

enemy pursuit pilots had so systematically chosen their
targets that seventeen or
eighteen of the bombers were destroyed.52
Damage at Iba was, if anything, even more severe. Of the 3d Squadron's
P-40's,
apparently only two escaped destruction. Bombs crashed into barracks
and service
buildings. Much of the airplane maintenance equipment was lost, and
with it the
entire radar installation. Ground crews, who had thought the
approaching planes
friendly, suffered heavily.

A bombing attack on Nichols Field in the early morning of 9
December created still more havoc.
Bombs fell on a hangar, damaging several planes and destroying at least
one B-18.
Several pursuit planes had been ordered off the ground for night
patrol, but the
inadequacy of night-flying facilities and almost impenetrable dust at
the field
resulted in the loss of two or three of these planes and
one pilot.53

In less than one day of hostilities the strength of the Far East
Air Force had been
reduced by half. Of its thirty-five B-17's, not more than seventeen
remained in commission.
About fifty-five of the original P-40's had been lost either in combat
or on the ground.
Of the P-35's, no more than fifteen were operational, and perhaps
twenty-five
to thirty miscellaneous aircraft--B-10's, B-18's, and observation
planes--also had
been destroyed. Casualties were comparably heavy. At Clark Field alone,
55 officers
and men had been killed and more than 100 wounded, to which numbers
were added
approximately 25 killed and 50 wounded at
other points.54

The War Department had forwarded instructions to General MacArthur
to carry out the
tasks assigned under RAINBOW No. 5 and to
cooperate with the
British and Dutch insofar as it was possible without jeopardizing the
accomplishment
of his primary mission of defending the Philippines.55
Bomber losses, however, left little hope of effective offensive action,
and comparably
heavy losses of pursuit aircraft lent a new desperateness to prospects
for defense
against an expected enemy invasion. In a move of adjustment to the
losses sustained,
the remaining aircraft of the hard-hit 3d Pursuit Squadron were divided
between
Lieutenant Wagner's 17th Squadron, which now was transferred to Clark
Field,
and the 21st Squadron at Nichols Field. At the same time, personnel of
the ground
echelon were distributed among these and other units in order to bring
them nearer
up to strength.56
Every effort was made to strengthen antiaircraft defenses, which had
proved ineffective against both high-level bombing and low-altitude
attacks. The Manila
area seemed particularly

--213--

vulnerable, and in the early evening of 8 December a
machine-gun battery of the
60th Coast Artillery (AA) moved to Nichols Field and the port area of
Manila.
Additional if limited equipment was available in the Philippine
Ordnance Depot,
and 500 officers and men were transferred from the 200th Coast
Artillery Regiment
to man it. Working almost continuously for thirty-six hours, these men,
who had been hastily organized into the Provisional 200th CA (AA), put
together and installed
twelve 3-inch guns, "3 directors and height-finders, AA searchlight
units,"
and twelve 37-mm. AA guns. By 10 December new 3-inch batteries were
located at Paranaque,
at Paco, and east of Nielson Airport, and 37-mm. batteries had been
installed at
nichols Field, at Nielson Airport, and in the section of Manila known
at
the Walled City.57

While these defensive preparations continued and ground crews
worked frantically
to make every available aircraft ready for operation, the chief
responsibility of the
air arm was reconnaissance. Through principal reliance was placed in
AAF pursuits and
Navy patrol bombers, B-17's from Del Monte also participated in the
effort to gain
intelligence of the enemy's movements and intentions. At 0730 on 9
December,
six of the heavy bombers, commanded by Maj. Cecil Combs and loaded each
with 20 x 100-lb.
demolition bombs, took off from their Mindanao base. Having
reconnoitered the area
in the vicinity of Catanduanes without finding evidence of enemy
activity,
they proceeded to Clark Field, where they landed at 1430. In an action
which was representative of the desperate conditions now governing
operations from bases on Luzon,
the planes took off almost immediately and remained in the air until
after dark to avoid
attack on the ground. During the afternoon, seven additional B-17's
were dispatched from Del Monte to San Marcelino.58
A relatively respectable striking force had thus been brought into
position for resistance to such invasion attempts as might be made.
Through the first two days of hostilities,
however, reports both from the warning net and from patrol planes
revealed principally
the confused and nervous state into which our defenses had been thrown
by the enemy.
As Admiral Hart later reported, "an extraordinary crop of incorrect
enemy information"
came over the warning net, and there were reports of "enemy sightings
when nothing was
actually sighted and when a vessel was really seen she was usually
reported in one of two
categories: irrespective of size, she was either a Transport or a
Battleship."59
But during the

Units of the Japanese Third Fleet sortied from Formosa early on
the morning of 10 December.
Their missions were to effect a landing at Aparri in the extreme north
of Luzon and another at Vigan on the northwest coast in operations
preliminary to the main landing on
Lingayen Gulf. For the accomplishment of these objectives, the convoy
had been
divided into three task forces: one for each landing and a third, which
included
cruisers, to provide general support as required. Alerted by the
approach of these
forces, the Far East Air Force determined to oppose the enemy landings
as best it could
with heavy bombers supported by a strong pursuit escort. Accordingly,
five B-17's
and the P-40E's of the 17th Pursuit Squadron and the P-35's of the 34th
were prepared
for an early mission. At 0600 the B-17's, led by Major Combs, took off
from Clark Field and,
before reaching the target area in the neighborhood of Vigan, were
joined by planes of
the 17th Squadron. The B-17's, each loaded with 20 x 100-lb. demolition
bombs,
chose a number of transports already engaged in unloading troops and
supplies.
bomb runs were carried out by four bombers from an altitude of 12,000
and 12,500 feet,
respectively. The fifth B-17, piloted by Lt. Eliott Vandevanter, Jr.,
swept in first
at 10,000 and then at 7,000 feet. Though antiaircraft fire remained
fierce at the
completion of the bombing, the P-40's came down for a strafing attack
on the ships
and on the Japanese who had already reached shore. Meanwhile, the
slower P-35's of
the 34th Squadron had arrived in the scene of action. These almost
obsolete planes
had neither armor protection nor leak-proof tanks, but they too
"strafed and restrafed the invaders." As Lt.Samuel H. Marrett, squadron
commander, led his flight
in "one final and successful strafing dive," one of the transports
exploded,
destroying both Marrett and his plane. Another P-35 was lost but the
pilot escaped.61
Though the B-17's had succeeded in scoring a number of hits, this one
vessel apparently
represented the only major loss by the enemy.62

Another mission scheduled for Maj. Emmett O'Donnell's 14th
Squadron had been delayed
by the necessity of flying from San Marcelino to Clark for refueling
and bomb-loading,
and then had been further delayed by a warning of approaching Japanese
planes. Finally,
five B-17's, having been made ready, took off individually. Three of
them,
piloted by Major O'Donnell, Capt. E.L. Parsel, and Lt. G.R.

--215--

Montgomery, proceeded toward the enemy beachhead at Vigan.
O'Donnell, first to arrive
over the target area, made several runs at 25,000 feet against what was
mistakenly thought to be an aircraft carrier. Mechanical trouble with
the bomb racks as well as antiaircraft fire
interfered with the bombing, and it took approximately forty-five
minutes to drop
eight 600-lb. bombs. No hits were observed. Parsel had better success.
He made two
bomb runs from 12,500 feet. On the first, four 300-lb. bombs were
directed against a cruiser or destroyer without effect, but of the
three bombs dropped during the second run,
at least one direct hit on a transport was claimed. Montgomery had been
allowed time to
load only one 600-lb. bomb when he was ordered off Clark Field for the
security of his plane.
He proceeded to Vigan, however, and dropped his bomb in the water near
the
transports.63
The two remaining B-17's took off from Clark Field at approximately
0930 to attack
Japanese landing craft, transports, and their naval escort near Aparri.
Lt. G.E. Schaetzel,
pilot of one of the planes, in making a run over several transports at
25,000 feet,
apparently scored a hit. The B-17, pounded by antiaircraft fire and
under attack by enemy pursuit, was severely damaged, but no one in the
bomber was injured and Schaetzel
succeeded in reaching San Marcelino.64

Capt. Colin Kelly in the fifth bomber had been directed to locate
and if possible sink
an aircraft carrier previously reported along the northern Luzon coast.
After a search
of the target area he found on sign of a carrier, but Lt. Joe M. Bean,
his navigator,
had spotted a large Japanese warship which the aircrew took for a
battleship.65
Indeed, early reports of the ensuing action placed the ship in either
the Haruna
or the Yamishiro class.66
Actually, it is now known that no Japanese battleship participated in
the initial invasion
of the Philippines, and that the Haruna, the favored choice in
subsequent reports,
was engaged until 18 December in support of the Malayan campaign. Since
training in
identification of naval craft was imperfect and many Japanese cruisers
were as long or
longer than some American battleships, it is not surprising that such
mistakes of
identification were made, even by the presumably better-trained Navy
air personnel.
At any rate, Navy PBY's claimed on the following day to have hit a ship
of the Haruna
class in this same general area. Japanese sources indicate that the
ship picked out by Lieutenant Bean was in fact the heavy cruiser Ashigara,
flagship of the Third Fleet
in its current operation.67
As it moved slowly on the outskirts of the enemy convoy it made a

--216--

Damage to Barracks, Wheeler Field

Damage at Wheeler Field

Cavite Navy Yards, Philippine Islands, 10 December 1941

Port Area, Manila, 24 December 1941

good target, and the bombardier, Sgt. Meyer S. Levin,
released in train the entire load
of three 600-lb. bombs from 22,000 feet. Although the Japanese assert
that no hits were made, the bombs scored near misses and to Kelly's
crew it appeared that one of them had
struck squarely amidship. When the B-17 turned back toward its base,
the warship
appeared to been stopped with black smoke pouring from it. All gunners
held their stations
during the return flight except the radio operator, who served also as
lower-turret
gunner, and who left that post to receive landing instructions from
Clark Field.
Suddenly, as the plane neared the field, two enemy fighters attacked
from the rear of and below the plane in a approach which probably would
have been observed sooner had
the lower turret been manned. Bullets riddled the big bomber. "The
commander's dome flew off," the instrument panel seemed to
disintegrate, a machine-gun burst penetrated
the left rear gunner's post killing T/Sgt. William J. Delehanty, the
low-pressure
oxygen tanks in the radio compartment exploded, and the empty bomb bay
burst into flames.
When the flames spread, Kelly ordered the crew to bail out. S/Sgt.
James E. Hokyard,
Pfc Robert A. Altman, and Pfc Williard L. Money dropped out of the rear
compartment;
Bean and Levin tumbled out of the escape hatch; and Kelly and co-pilot
Lt. Donal D. Robins
prepared to follow. The latter succeeded in pulling the rip cord of his
parachute after being
thrown clear of the plane by a tremendous explosion, and all those who
previously had
bailed out of the plane reached ground safely. But Kelly's body was
later found near
the wreckage of his plane.68

The employment of heavy bombers on 10 December bore little
resemblance to prescribed
AAF practice, which called for their use against shipping targets in
flight of
sufficient size to assure a pattern of bombing large enough to cover
any possible
move of the target in the interval between release and impact of
the bombs.69
Not only was there an inadequate number of planes available, but
unsatisfactory communications with outlying fields, insufficient
protection of airfields, and the
consequent necessity of putting planes into the air for their security
added to the
difficulty of maintaining anything approaching standard operations. No
experience
could have emphasized more forcefully the fundamental importance to an
air force of
its ability to assert and maintain control of the air over its own
bases.
And with the rapid depletion of our interceptor fores and with Japanese
landings
promising the early establishment on Luzon of

--217--

enemy land-based aviation, it was already apparent that
American bomber operations
would be still further restricted. Even before the completion of these
missions of
the 10th it had become apparent that Clark Field was no longer suited
for service even
as a staging point for bomber operations. By the close of the next day
all of the B-17's but one, which came in from Cebu on the 13th, had
fallen back on the
Mindanao base.70

If any doubt persisted as to the necessity for this move, that
doubt had been removed
by a heavy Japanese attack on Nichols Field and the naval base at
Cavite just after
midday on the 10th. At 1115, interceptor headquarters received specific
warning of
enemy aircraft approaching from the north, and for their interception
dispatched
planes of the 17th Squadron to Manila Bay, of the 21st to the port area
of the city,
and of the 34th to Bataan. A large number of enemy bombers escorted by
an estimated
100 fighters roared over Nichols Field and Cavite, systematically
bombing and strafing
air installations, docks, and supply centers. American pursuits were
overwhelmed in their
attempts to break up the enemy's bomber formations. The experience of
the 17th Squadron,
whose ten P-40's found themselves confronted by a force of some fifty
bombers and
forty fighters, was typical of the action. When the Americans undertook
to engage the
bombers, enemy fighters thwarted almost every effort, and after some
minutes the P-40's
were forced to break away because of a shortage of fuel. One pilot, Lt.
William M. Rowe,
shook off pursuing enemy fighters by taking "a long dive at the
ground," and made
for Del Carmen Field north of Manila only to find the field under a
strafing attack. Turning back toward Clark Field, he landed there
safely with no more than two gallons
of fuel left. In the engagement, the Americans had lost three planes
with no apparent
damage to the enemy.71
At Cavite the power plant, industrial facilities, and supply depots had
been
"completely ruined." The submarine Sea Lion had been sunk and
other naval
craft damaged.72
The Interceptor Command, now left with only thirty pursuit aircraft,
including eight
outmoded P-35's and not counting one or two virtually useless P-26's,
could no longer promise
for either air or naval installations even a semblance of adequate
protection.73
It was immediately decided to conserve the few planes remaining by
using them chiefly
for purposes of reconnaissance--a decision which meant that our bases
on Luzon would
be even more vulnerable to enemy air attack
than before.74

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With American pursuits held for reconnaissance and American
bombers withdrawn to
the Del Monte field on Mindanao, General MacArthur's care to avoid a
premature
commitment of his forces left the enemy to continue his landing
operations almost
unopposed. While strengthening their beachheads at Aparri and Vigan,
the Japanese made
threatening gestures off the coast of southern Luzon and increased the
tempo of their
air offensive. On 12 December, more than 100 enemy aircraft were over
southern Luzon picking targets at Clark Field, Batangas, and Olongapo.
The same points
were hit again on the following day, with the addition of destructive
attacks on Nielson and Nichols fields. In spite of orders to avoid
battle, American and Filipino pilots at
times attempted interception. Thus on the 13th, Capt. Jesus Villamor
led six ancient P-26's in interception of some fifty-four attacking
bombers; the harassing tactics of
the Filipino flyers minimized damage to their Batangas
field.75
But such sporadic efforts proved of only momentary and local
significance.

Planned combat missions during the period from 10 to 18 December
were few.
On the 12th Major Combs carried out a single-plane mission against
enemy transports
at Vigan. No hits were scored. On 14 December six B-17's were scheduled
for a bombing
attack on a Japanese bridgehead near Legaspi in southern Luzon, but
only three of the
bombers, piloted by Lieutenants Wheless, Adams, and Vandevanter,
reached the target.
of these, Wheless' plane became separated from the others in
low-hanging clouds
over Mindanao and made the attack alone from 9.500 feet. Before the
results of the
bombing could be observed, eighteen enemy pursuits swarmed around the
plane.
All four gunners were wounded, Pfc Killin fatally, but four enemy
planes were
apparently destroyed. Wheless in an extraordinary display of airmanship
nursed his riddled bomber back toward Del Monte, but was forced to
crash-land on a small
barricaded field at Cagayan (Mindanao) in a drizzling rain. Of the
other two planes
to reach the target, Vandevanter's escaped without being attacked, but
Adams' B-17
was continuously attacked from the time it reached the target area.
Machine-gun bullets
cut through the plane, wounding several of the personnel and knocking
out two engines.
After a forced landing n the island of Masbate, just across the strait
from Legaspi,
the crew ran for cover while persistent enemy fighters completely
destroyed the plane
by strafing.76
On 16 December, Lieutenants Wagner, Church,

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and Strauss were allowed to break the routine of
reconnaissance by undertaking
the hazardous mission of dive bombing the enemy-held airfield at Vigan.
When they had
reached the target area, Wagner signaled Strauss to remain on patrol,
while he and
Church proceeded to bomb the airfield. As they went into a dive,
Church's plane
was hit and set afire by AA, but he continued the attack, released his
bombs, and crashed.
Wagner meanwhile had dropped six fragmentation bombs and had strafed a
fuel dump and
approximately twenty planes parked on the runway. other combat activity
by pursuit pilots was incidental to scheduled reconnaissance missions,
as when on 13 December Lieutenant
Wagner in approaching Aparri shot down four enemy fighters and went on
to strafe others
on the field.77

The FIrst Withdrawal to Australia

Such isolated victories could not conceal the fact that the Japanese
held unchallengeable
control of the air over Luzon and, helped by the possession of such
fields a those at
Aparri and Vigan, were in a position to extend this control over all of
the Philippines.
Though the heavy bombers had already been forced to move back almost
600 miles from
Clark Field to Del Monte, it was now planned to withdraw them another
1,500 miles
to Darwin, Australia. in addition to the growing danger that Del Monte
would soon be
subjected to constant air attack, there was a general lack of
maintenance facilities there
which seriously limited the operations that could be undertaken. War
had come at a time
when little more than a beginning had been made in the effort to
convert Del Monte
into a major heavy bomber base. (See above, pp. 187-89.) Since
then personnel of
the 5th Air Base Group had worked day and night to strengthen defenses
and to improve
the facilities. Underground shelters had been constructed instead of
barracks,
and for purposes of dispersal four outlying fields within a
fifteen-miles radius had
been selected. But there was no radar set on Mindanao; non pursuit
planes were
available for defensive cover; nor did the base enjoy the protection of
any large-caliber
antiaircraft guns. Antiaircraft defenses were limited to water-cooled
.50-cal. machine
guns and a few additional ai-cooled .50's removed from B-17's. The air
warning system
consisted of lookouts posted on hills north and south of the field with
a telephone line
to operations headquarters. Until the Del Monte base could be greatly
strengthened and
its facilities improved, it seemed advisable

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Map 3: The Philippines and Northern Australia

--221--

to withdraw the bombers to a base that would afford an
opportunity for a thorough overhaul
of the already badly battered planes.78

The decision had been made none too soon. On 16 December,
mechanics began to service the
bombers for the 1,500-miles flight to Darwin. Three days later, Del
Monte experienced
its first serious air attack. As dusk fell that day, three B-18's had
just landed, one of them bringing General Clagett from Manila, and
before they could be dispersed and
camouflaged with coconut leaves, twelve enemy fighters skimmed the
field to destroy the
bombers by strafing. Several camouflaged B-17's, loading for their trip
to Australia, were overlooked and took off that night as scheduled to
join others which had reached Australia during the preceding two days.
Within another two days the last of the B-17's,
making a total of fourteen, arrived at Batchelor Field
near Darwin.79

In spite of the decision to transfer all heavy bombers to
Australia, there was no intention
of abandoning the defense of the Philippines. The morale of officers
and men on Luzon
remained high, in part at least because they constantly expected the
arrival of reinforcements.
According to one writer, the Army at this time traveled as much on
rumors as on its stomach.
One day there was news that the Navy was coming to the rescue,
"sweeping everything
before it." Again "someone" heard that Dewey Boulevard was lined with
A-20's. On another
occasion, 27th Group headquarters was falsely informed by telephone
that its A-24's were
being unloaded at the dock. A rush to the docks revealed nothing
except, as the group
historian recorded, "that there was probably a Fifth Columnist or two
on Luzon and they
had our number."80

Hope was not confined to the rank and file. General MacArthur
throughout December thought
that the Philippines could be reinforced, mentioning in his
communications to Washington
the possibility of early air counterattacks against Formosa. It was his
feeling, however,
that first priority in allocations to his theater should consist of
pursuit planes and
bombs to be brought in by aircraft carrier. "High-flying bombardment
aircraft" and
ground troops were rated by him as of secondary
importance.81
General Brereton also believed that hope need not be abandoned. On 14
December he listed
for MacArthur ten squadrons of pursuit aircraft as an immediate
requirement, indicating
that in addition to the 52 A-24's and 18 pursuit planes expected in
Australia before
the end of the month, it would be "advantageous"

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to have 200 pursuit and 50 dive bombers delivered to the
Philippines by aircraft carrier.
Fields for these planes he felt could be maintained satisfcatorily, and
he pointed out
that airdrome construction following the outbreak of war had been
accelerated.
His engineers had reported that Clark, Nichols, San Marcelino, and Del
Carmen fields
on Luzon could be maintained i operating condition, and that some eight
or ten additional strips would be ready by the last of December.82
Nor had Washington abandoned plans for support of the Philippines.
President Roosevelt
specifically directed that reinforcements should be sent there with all
speed,
and MacArthur was informed on 15 December not only that the strategic
importance of
the Philippines was fully recognized but that there would be no
wavering in the determination to provide support. In partial
fulfillment of the promise, the dispatch
of sixty-five new heavy bombers had been authorized in addition to
fifteen LB-30's
repossessed from the British, a transfer to completed by 21 February
1942, and
MacArthur was further informed on 23 December that these planes, to be
ferried via
the South Atlantic and India, (see below, pp. 331-33)
would come under his control at Bangalore.83

It soon became evident, however, that the time factor outweighed
all others.
The Japanese were pressing down from their northern landings; in the
south the city of Davao,
with its fifth column of some 30,000 Japanese, was easily overrun on 20
December;
and by that date the heavy elements of the Japanese Second Fleet had
moved north to
cover the main enemy landing on 20-21 December at Lingayen Gulf.
MacArthur's strategy
against this assault was based upon a plan which "had been on the
books" for many years.
It consisted of delaying actions in central Luzon and a retreat to
Bataan where,
it was hoped, the limited forces available would serve as a buffer
for Corregidor.84

Except for reconnaissance missions carried out by pursuit pilots,
the air force
could offer little support to the hard pressed infantry in this
withdrawal.
From its distant base at Darwin the 19th Group undertook on 22 December
to mount
a mission of nine B-17's in accordance with a plan to use Del Monte as
a staging point
for refueling and rearming. Having taken off from Batchelor Field, they
swept over
Davao Gulf at sunset and dropped 30 x 500-lb. bombs on a cluster of
seven ships.
No pursuit or AA interfered with the attack, but visibility was poor
and results
were negligible. The B-17's landed

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after dark at the now much-bombed Del Monte field, from
which four of them took off
again shortly after midnight for Lingayen Gulf, almost 600 miles away.
Again visibility
was poor and although transports were bombed, no hits were observed.
The Japanese put up a
barrage of antiaircraft fire which did no damage, but enemy fighters
pursued with such persistence that the bombers could not land at San
Marcelino as had been planned.
Instead, they headed for Australia. One of the planes came down for
refueling at an
emergency field at San Jose in Mindoro; the other three reached the
Dutch base at
Amboina before landing. By 24 December all nine aircraft, five
proceeding directly from
Del Mont, had returned to Batchelor Field.85
Meanwhile, another flight from Australia, this time of three heavy
bombers, had arrived
at Del Monte. There on 24 December the aircraft were loaded each with
2,100 gallons of
gasoline and 7 x 30-lb. bombs in preparation for a mission against
Davao harbor.
All three planes returned to Darwin, though two of them had sustained
considerable
damage.86

The pursuit planes in their daily reconnaissance missions
continued to report the steady
advance of the enemy from the north and additional landings along the
Luzon coast.
Against one of these landings, in San Miguel Bay on the southeast
coast, the Interceptor
Command decided on 23 December to throw virtually all its remaining
aircraft.
Attrition had cut down the 24th Group's striking power to a total of
twelve P-40's and six P-35's,
but they proved sufficient to create a gratifying confusion among enemy
personnel in landing barges and around supply dumps ashore. The
Japanese put up a heavy screen of
antiaircraft fire. On P-35 was forced into a crash landing, and an
explosive bullet,
shattering the windscreen of Lieutenant Wagner's P-40, well-nigh
blinded him.87
The American effort was in effect a last gesture of defiance, for
following this mission
all air force units received instruction to evacuate currently held
Luzon bases as a part
of the general withdrawal to Bataan. The evacuation began on 24
December.

Typical of the confusion which naturally reached its climax in
this withdrawal was the
experience of the 27th Group, whose personnel had suffered the
particularly galling
experience of being caught in the front line of war without their
planes. On 18 December
the group had been deprived of its commander when Maj. John H. Davies,
together

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with a dozen other pilots, had been flown to Australia for
the purpose of ferrying back
the first of the group's long-awaited A-24's. Three days later,
remaining personnel
had been ordered to prepare against the arrival of the planes three new
fields to be located
at Lipa below Manila and at San Marcelino and San Fernando to the
northwest.
on the 24th, the move from Manila to these points had just been
completed when another
order directed all personnel to proceed to the Manila docks. From there
by truck and boat
they made their way to Bataan, where on Christmas day they celebrated
with a dinner of bread and hot coffee, topped off in a few cases by a
nip of "grog."88
For all practical purposes, the 27th Group now became a part of General
MacArthur's infantry,
with which it would fight to the bitter end.

The same fate awaited personnel of the 24th Group, but for a time
the tentative plan
and organization reflected a continuing hope of reinforcement. Both
General Clagett and
General Brereton had left the Philippines, the latter of 24 December
with members
of his staff in two PBY's to establish a new headquarters
in Australia.89
By the 29th of December, 650 officers and men of the 19th Group had
embarked in a hazardous movement by bout from Luzon to Del Monte, which
the Australia-based bombers still hoped to use as a forward staging
point for bombing
operations.90
On Luzon, which for all practical purposes now meant Bataan, there
remained the
Interceptor Command under the capable and energetic Col. Harold H.
George, who as
senior air officer proceeded to bring some order out of the confusion
accompanying
the move to Bataan. His handful of pursuit planes were distributed
among three newly constructed
fields at the head of the peninsula under a plan to fall back as
required to the Mariveles,
Cabcaben, and Bataan fields nearer Corregidor. Except for the few
pilots required to fly
these planes and the men necessary for their maintenance, the 24th
Group was posted
as infantry reserved, an action, as events proved, merely preliminary
to its
redesignation n 10 January as the 2d Infantry Regiment (Provisional)
with assignment
to the 71st Division. Colonel George had only a skeleton staff, but one
which could
be expanded in the event hoped-for reinforcements arrived before the
tired American
troops had been overwhelmed.9

Chief hope of immediate relief rode with the convoy of eight
transports and freighters
which had left Honolulu for the Philippines on 29 November under escort
by the U.S.
cruiser Pensacola. As already

--225--

noted, this convoy carried the ground echelon of the 7th
Bombardment Group (H),
other air combat and service personnel to a total of approximately
2,500 officers and men,
18 P-40's, and the unassembled 52 A-24's of the 27th Bombardment Group,
in addition to large supplies of aviation fuel and ammunition. When
after crossing the equator word
came of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, protective measures were
taken, and as
many guns as could be found were set up in improvised mounts; but five
of the vessels were
left entirely without armament. Even after picking up additional guns
at Suva in the
Fiji Islands, the convoy remained ill prepared to defend itself. On 12
December,
the convoy being still intact, it was decided to organize the troops
aboard into a task
force under command of Brig. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, senior officer
present; and the
following day General Barnes received orders to proceed with the convoy
to Australia,
where he would assume command of all U.S. troops in that country. There
the aircraft,
ground crews, and other necessary equipment would be landed, the
aircraft to bed assembled
for immediate ferrying to Luzon, while the convoy itself would proceed,
conditions
permitting, to the Philippines. General Barnes announced on 19 December
that his command
would be known as United States Forces in Australia, a designation
altered on 5 January to United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA).92

Meanwhile, preparations were under way in Australia for receiving
the convoy and
forwarding reinforcements to our beleaguered forces on Luzon. The U.S.
military
attaché, Col. Van S. Merle-Smith, acting under instructions from
Washington
made preliminary arrangements for assembly of aircraft and disposition
of the vessels.
General Barnes received notice on 21 December that Maj. Gen. George H.
Brett would
soon reach Australia to organize and command all American units. But
General Brett,
who had served in almost every administrative post in the Air Corps,
was at the time
completing an official tour of the middle East, India, and China and
did not leave
Chungking for Australia until the 24th.93
En route to his new post he conferred with British officials in India
and Dutch authorities
in Java, so that his arrival in Australia to take up the mission of
establishing a
supply system for reinforcement of the Philippines was delayed until
the end of December.
Pending the arrival of General Brett, General Clagett, who had left
Luzon of the 18th, assumed command when on 22 December he reached
Brisbane. There on the same day the convoy

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arrived and on the following day began its debarkation.
Arrangements had been made
for quartering the American troops on the grounds of the local Ascot
and Doomben
race tracks, with tenting and messing facilities provided by the
Australian army,
and for the use of the near-by Archerfield and Amberley airdromes for
assembly
of the aircraft.94

Several factors interfered with a speedy execution of plans. The
convoy had been loaded
on a peacetime basis, with little attention to the advantage of placing
equipment
on the same vessel with its designated unit. In order to find the
organization equipment
of the troops who were to remain in Australia and the parts for
aircraft to be assembled
there, it proved necessary to unload practically the entire cargo, sort
it, and reload
such of it as was destined for shipment north to the Philippines. Even
then vital parts
of the A-24's--trigger motors, solenoids, and gun mounts--were never
found. After many
hours of fruitless search for missing parts, it was decided to reload
equipment
scheduled for water transport on the two fastest ships, the Holbrook
and the Bloemfontein. With Australian dockworkers assisting in
the
effort through
twenty-four hours of the day, the reloading was completed by 28
December. The Holbrook
sailed immediately; the Bloemfontein, delayed until its captain
received
clarification of orders from Dutch authorities, left the
next day.95

Through the initial steps toward reinforcement of the philippines
had thus been taken,
further delays would frustrate the effort. Assembly of the planes was
accomplished in short order, but the missing parts of the A-24'ss were
never found; and since they were not available in Australia, it was
necessary to await their shipment from the United States,
whence they were dispatched by air early in January. Moreover, it had
been discovered
that there was no Prestone for the P-40's, and through some was
eventually rounded up
in Australia, this entailed still another delay.96
And immediate difficulties of this sort, despite the urgent need for
planes on Bataan, were incidental to the more important task of
establishing a base in Australia that could
maintain a continuing flow of reinforcements to Luzon. The war had
caught the United States
midway in a program for air reinforcement of the Philippines--planes,
personnel, and
equipment had already been allocated for the purpose and their movement
in many instances
had been started. If the problems involved in channeling their movement
through
an Australian base could be promptly solved, there was a real

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prospect of getting substantial, even though limited,
reinforcements to MacArthur.
There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on
Darwin might increase the weight of their operations against Philippine
targets. The Japanese by landing on
Wake Island on 23 December had cut the only tested air route for
movement of that type of plane, but progress on construction of a ferry
route through the South Pacific offered grounds
for hope that the inaugural flight could be made even in advance of the
scheduled date
of 15 January. Both the Army and the Navy were working feverishly to
provide at least
minimum facilities on CHristmas, Canton, Samoa, the Fijis, and New
Caledonia.97
At the same time, steps were being taken to extend the ferry route
across the South Atlantic
beyond Africa to India and the Netherlands East Indies. (See below, pp.
329-31. But
again, the weight of
the bombing effort that could be made would depend in no small part on
the resources
of an Australian base, and the task of developing such a base was
tremendous.

Its establishment depended almost entirely upon the arrival of
personnel, supplies,
and equipment from the United States. General Marshall had suggested
that Australian
resources be utilized as much as possible in order to relieve the
burden on American
transport, but the industrial facilities of Australia were limited at
best and,
moreover, the nation was already hard pressed to supply the needs of
its own armed forces.
Of more immediate concern were the handicaps imposed by Australia's
transportation system.
Military necessity gave the greatest strategic importance to that
section of the country
which had been least developed; the main centers of population, wealth,
and
transportation were in the southeast, whereas the north and northeast
now held the
position of key military importance. The difficulty of transporting
goods overland
from Brisbane to Darwin was as great as from Darwin to the Philippines,
if not so
dangerous. No railroad connected the two cities, which were 2,500 miles
apart by the
most expeditious land route. For over a quarter of this distance only a
rough motor road
cut through the central desert, and this road ended approximately 300
miles from Darwin
to connect with a railway capable of carrying no more than 300 tons of
freight per day.
Repair facilities were inadequate for maintenance of either road or
railway,
and some of the rolling stock literally buckled under the weight of
heavy American
equipment.98
The problem of storage facilities was

--228--

solved when the Australian made several wool warehouses
temporarily available. But the
question of an adequate labor supply was not so readily
resolved.99
Not only did Australia have a small population of about 8,000,000, but
her manpower
was already heavily committed to her own war effort and the greatest
need for
assistance fell in area of relatively sparse settlement.

Fortunately, preliminary steps had been taken prior to the war for
coordination
of defensive efforts between American and Australian authorities as
occasion might require.
General Brereton had visited Australia in November, and plans for the
South Pacific
air route had required arrangements for use of airfields and other
facilities within
Australian territory. It was against this background, then, that the

Map 4: Northeastern Australia

--229--

first of several Allied conferences met on 28 December at
Amberley Field to consider
common problems and opportunities for mutual assistance. It was agreed
that American
officers would assume actual responsibility for the erection of their
planes, but that to
assure proper coordination of the effort with plans for movement of the
assembled
planes an Australian officer would be put in general charge. Since the
aircraft would
have to be ferried overland for a distance of over 2,000 miles before
they reached a
jumping-off place at Darwin, it was decided to establish refueling
depots at Charleville,
Cloncurry, Daly Waters, and Darwin. THough 100-octane gasoline could be
procured from
the Netherlands East Indies, this fuel was of so high an aromatic
content that it
destroyed the leakproof lining of fuel tanks, and consequently forced
consideration of
the problems of importing American fuel. In addition to limited stocks
built up before
the war, the steamship Mauna Loa was on the way to Brisbane
with a load of
400,000 gallons, but even so the supply would fall far short of the
prewar goal of
10,000,000 gallons.100

The Amberley conferences also gave attention to a problem of
training.
Not only was the air route from Brisbane to Darwin a difficult one for
those who
lacked experience in the area, but the over-waters hops from Darwin to
the Philippines
presented their own navigational and combat hazards. On 28 December
General Clagett
and Sir Charles Burnett, chief of the Australian air staff, agreed to
inaugurate a training program for -24 crews at Archerfield and for P-40
pilots at Amberley.
Details of the two programs were worked out the following day at a
meeting of
American and Australian officers. The Australian were given general
oversight of the
program, while Maj. John H. Davies, commanding officer of the 27th
Group, received
responsibility for the standard of training. The prescribed course
consisted of practice
in night flying, dive bombing, and aerial
gunnery.101
Thus was the foundation laid for a close collaboration between
personnel of the Royal
Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the AAF that would continue through
almost four years
of war.

The American command charged with these and other preparations in
Australia was not
technically an air organization. But for the time being at least, its
responsibilities
called principally for support of air operations, a consideration that
probably had
affected the decision to assign General Brett to the command of United
States Army Forces
in Australia. On 29 December, two days before Brett's arrival in
Australia,

--230--

General Brereton had reached Darwin after conferences in
route from the Philippines
with American naval commanders and Dutch air and army officials at
Soerabaja and Batavia.
It was his mission under instructions from General MacArthur to
organize "advanced
operating bases from which, with the Far East Air Force, you can
protect the lines of
communications, secure bases in Mindanao, and support the defense of
the Philippines
by the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East." He was to establish liaison
with the
Commanding General, U.S. Forces in Australia, who was "charged with the
organization of bases
in Australia," and from those bases to direct "the operation of the Far
East Air Force . . .
and the disposition of Air Corps troops in advance thereof in order to
accomplish
your assigned mission."102
General Brereton established a temporary headquarters at Darwin.

Though the aim of all operations still remained officially the
reinforcement of the
Philippines, there was not little justification for the hope that
substantial
reinforcements and supplies could reach MacArthur's forces in time to
save them.
In addition to the difficulties, delays, and frustrations already
noted, it was daily
becoming more unlikely that pursuit aircraft, the first requirement in
air reinforcements,
could be ferried into the Philippines. The Japanese, who recently had
captured Davao
and as a result were using airfields on Mindanao by the last week in
December, threatened
soon to be astride all possible air routes from Australia to the
Philippines.
Under these circumstances both the A-24 and the P-40, their range
limited to little more
than 500 miles, could be intercepted with relative ease. Moreover, it
was evident
enough that the Allies would soon be hard put to hold even the key
points in the
Netherlands East Indies against the continuing advance of
Japanese forces.103

General Brett, who reached Australia on 31 December, found little
immediate hope of
an effective reinforcement of the Philippines. On 2 January he radioed
General Marshall
that it would be impossible to carry out much in the way of tactical
operations until
an "establishment" in Australia, including a large air base at Darwin
and a major supply
and repair base at Townsville, had been developed. in a recent
conference with
Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell, who had been transferred from the Middle
East to India the
preceding July, Brett had found agreement on general principles of
strategy,
and on 3 January he presented their conclusions to a conference with
Australian chiefs
of staff and other military and governmental officials. In considering

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the possibilities in the situation confronting the
associated powers, he emphasized the
necessity for a defensive strategy until such time as sufficient forces
had been brought together for offensive operations (a) by working from
Burma into China towards
Shanghai to acquire advanced bases; (b) by exerting slow pressure
through the Netherlands
East Indies and Malaya; and (c) by exerting similar pressure from
Australia into the islands to the North." On the following day he
ordered the Holbrook and Bloemfontein,
the only vessels so far dispatched to Macarthur put in at Darwin and to
discharge their
cargo and all troops at that port.104

By this time the War Department, too, held grave doubts as to the
feasibility of sending substantial reinforcements to the Philippines. I
was clear that ta reservoir of supply
could not be built up Australia except over a period of many months.
Hope of ferrying
short-range planes to the Philippines declined with each report of the
progress of
Japanese forces, and the prospect of breaking through the sea blockade
with a naval escort
for convoys was even less promising. President Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Churchill
with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had considered
such an operation.
But the U.S. navy had been hard hit at Pearl Harbor, the balance of
naval power in the
Pacific had been further upset in Japan's favor by loss of the British Prince
of Wales,
and the Repulse to enemy bombers on 10 December, and forces
already committed
to the Atlantic and Middle East theaters could not be released within
the time
available. (See below, pp. 239-43.)
A memorandum of 3 January for the Chief of Staff signed by Brig. Gen.
Leonard T. Gerow,
Assistant Chief of Staff, outlined the operations that would be
required to restore
the American position in the Philippines. The first requirement would
be to gain air
and naval superiority south of the line Malaya-Borneo-Celebes and to
make preparations
for extending this control northward. With air supremacy established in
the Netherlands
East Indies, it would be necessary to extend this supremacy from NEI
bases northward
to cover Mindanao, and then with the support of strong naval and air
forces to land large ground forces on Mindanao preparatory to a drive
into Luzon. The associated powers
commanded of course neither the time nor the means for such an
operation as this,
and on the basis of an unavoidable conclusion that "the forces required
for the relief
of the Philippines cannot be placed in the Far East area

--232--

within the time available," it was recommended that for the
present Allied efforts
in the Far East be limited to holding the Malay barrier, Burma, and
Australia and to operations projected northward "to provide maximum
defense
in depth."105

Of the soundness of this conclusion events would soon offer more
than ample proof.
On Bataan the American forces would continue their heroic struggle, but
a skillful and
swift-moving enemy had already engulfed them.

4. Report . . . Pearl Harbor
Attack,p. 57,
which apparently regards an earlier reconnaissance flight as a separate
wave,
describes the attack as having been made in three waves rather than
two. The operations
order and interrogation of participating personnel indicate that the
actual attack was
launched in two waves. (See Hearings . . . Pearl Harbor Attack,
Pt. 13, Exh. 8-B, 4420-22
and Exh. 8-C, 426-27; USSBS Interrogations 113 and 603.)
The Report . . . Pearl Harbor Attack,p. 58,
gives a slightly different breakdown of the number of planes employed,
with the following totals:
81 fighters, 135 dive bombers, 104 horizontal bombers, and 40 torpedo
planes.

7. Report . . . Pearl Harbor
Attack, pp. 64, 69.
See also Battle Report, pp. 93-96 and Plate XV.
The additional loss of five incoming planes from the carrier Enterprise
brought
the total loss of naval aircraft to ninety-two, and to this figure were
added at least
thirty planes badly damaged.

15.
Memo for Roberts Commission by Hq. Hawaiian Air Force, 26 Dec. 1941, in
AAFHS-41, App. 2. See also p. 6. Report . . . Pearl Harbor Attack,p. 65,
states:
"A total of 96 Army planes were lost as a result of enemy action, this
figure including
aircraft destroyed in depots and those damaged planes which were
subsequently stripped for part."

22.
USSBS Intr. 601, 28 Nov. 1945, Comdr. Ryosuke Nomura, who during the
invasion of the Celebes was air operations officer of the 23d Air
Flotilla;
Operations of the Japanese Navy in the Invasion of the Philippines, 15
May 1946, ATIS Doc. 19692.

26.
Ind, Bataan pp. 92-93.
Colonel Ind, in December 1941 a captain and an intelligence officer
with the Far East Air Force, states that the objective folders were
complete enough to make the mission "a very far cry from the blink stab
it would have had to be otherwise." The American policy had been to
avoid any "overt act," and thus, while regular reconnaissance missions
had on occasion taken our flyers to within three miles of the Formosan
coast, no photographic mission over Formosa itself had been flown.
(Interview with Col. W.P. Fisher by author, 17 June 1947;
History, 19th Bomb. Gp., App. A.)

28. Ibid.;
1st ind., Brereton to Paul;
but see entry from Summary of Activities, Hq. Far East Air Force,
quoted on p. 207.

29.
A request of 27 May 1944 from the Fifth Air Force initiated by the
historian of that organization, to General Headquarters, Southwest
Pacific Area for information from personnel holding key positions under
General MacArthur at the outbreak of war undertook to supplement the
record available in AAF files. Among other things, information was
sought regarding prewar plans for the employment of the Far East Air
Force, the possible effect of the political status of the Philippines
on decisions not to assume the initiative against the Japanese after
official confirmation of the Pearl Harbor attack had been received, and
an indication of such orders as may have been issued to the air force
on the morning of 8 December relating to the use of bombers based on
Clark Field. The request was returned, however, with indorsement of 7
June 1944 as follows: "There is no official information in this
headquarters bearing upon the questions propounded in basic
communication." (See Doc. 20 in History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. 1, App.
II.)

30.
1st ind., Brereton to Paul;
Eubank and Brady interviews;
talk by Colonel Fisher, as cited in n. 25;
Ind, Bataan, pp. 89-94;
ltr., Lt. Don Mitchell to Bayrd Still, 30 Nov. 1941.
It is interesting to note that the Japanese apparently expected an
early attack on Formosa by the B-17's. In an interrogation of 28
November 1945 (USSBS 601) Comdr. Ryosuke Nomura recalled that because
of the delay in launching the Japanese attack it was greatly feared
that American aircraft would initiate the first attack. That fear, he
declared, had been greatly increased at 0800 when in intercepted
American broadcast indicated that such an attack was being considered
and that the B-17's would arrive over Formosa at 1010.

31.
Memo for Col. W.J. Paul from Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, 6 Aug. 1947,
in reply to memo for Brereton from Paul, 22 July 1947. While General
Brereton was consulting with General Sutherland, a meeting of the air
force staff was held at Headquarters, Far East Air Force. On 6 April
1944, Maj. John C. Ankeny, Fifth Air Force historian, put the following
question to Col. Harold Eads, who had attended that meeting on the
morning of 8 December 1941:

"1. Who held the following points of view (8 December
1941): (a) Strike at the Japs in Formosa with everything we had without
delay? (b) Wait for an overt act before hitting? (c) Send out a
reconnaissance to Formosa and hit targets of opportunity? (dO Send out
one or two planes (B-17's) for reconnaissance only?

2. What took place in the meeting with Colonel Brady before
General Brereton arrived on the morning of 8 December 1941?

3. What took place after General Brereton arrived?"

Colonel Eads answered these questions as follows: "Everyone
attending the meeting on the morning of 8 December held the view
porpounded in paragraph 'a.' We were getting ready to proceed on that
basis. No one held views 'b,' 'c,' and 'd.' . . . As I recall it, when
General Brereton arrived at the meeting, he said we could not carry out
the plan we had decided upon; the orders were we couldn't attack until
we were attacked; that we could go out on photo reccos in force (loaded
with bombs) but were not to use them unless attacked." (doc. 10, in
History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. 1, App. II.)

32.
Other than General Brereton's accounts as given in answer to letter
from Colonel Paul, Chief, AF Historical Office, 30 Jan. 1946, and The
Brereton Diaries, pp. 36 ff., the most detailed narrative is the
history of the 24th Pursuit Group. In an unrecorded interview of some
two hours' duration with the author on 7 December 1944, General Brady
in answer to specific questions growing out of the author's own
research gave further corroboration to the essential details. Among
other information supplied, he called attention to a report which he
and Brereton had prepared and forwarded to Washington, as he recalled
it, late in January or early in February 1942. Unfortunately, an
extended and intensive search through AAF and War Department files
failed to locate a copy. In rep a question regarding this report,
General Brereton (see memo for Paul, 6 Aug. 1947) stated: "I do not
have a copy of the paper referred to. I was informed that this paper
was in General Arnold's own secret files, presumably it had been shown
to the Chief of Staff. Whether it is still in existence, I do not
know." (See also Eubank interview; Fisher Report on Philippine and Java
Operations received in spring of 1942; History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. 1,
ff.)

33.
1st ind., Brereton to Paul, where the general recalls, as in his
published Diaries, that at this time he instructed Eugene L.
Eubank, bomber commander who had flown down from Clark Field, to
prepare for an operation against Takao harbor with target priority for
enemy transports and warships and at the same time to make ready three
planes for reconnaissance of airfields on Formosa.

37.
1st ind., Brereton to Paul; The Brereton Diaries, pp. 40-41.
General Brereton's memo of 6 Aug. 1947 (cited in note 31 above)
indicates that authorization for the reconnaissance mission to Formosa
may have been received as early as 0800. With reference to a "second
conference" by telephone with Sutherland at "approximately 8 a.m.,"
Brereton states that "reconnaissance missions were authorized in this
conversation," but his recollection in the same place that the order to
Eubank for a specific mission of reconnaissance over Formosa was not
given until after 1000 tallies with his previously given account in The
Brereton Diaries, p. 40, and in 1st inds., Brereton to Paul.

43.
1st ind. (ltr., Chief, Air Historical Office to CG Thirteenth AF, 17
July 1945), Maj. Gen. E.L. Eubank to CG AAF, 5 Aug. 1947.
See also, in support of General Eubank's statement, Fisher report and
talk, confirmed in an interview with author, 17 June 1947;
1st ind., Brereton to Paul;
History, 24th Pursuit Gp.;
ltr., Col. A.W. Marriner, Dir. of Communications to CG USAFIA, 2 Apr.
1942;
Ind, Bataan, p. 00.
Most of the sources attribute the failure to a breakdown of
communications. Thus the history of the 24th Pursuit Group states that
"approximately 11:45 an unidentified report was received of a
bombardment formation over Lingayen Gulf, headed south," but it adds
"that communications breakdown prevented proper identification." This
view is not borne out by the testimony of Colonel Campbell. (See n.
40.)

44.
USSBS Intrs. 424 and 601;
Operations of the Japanese Navy in the Invasion of the Philippines.

45.
History, 24th Pursuit Gp.;
Fisher report.
According to Japanese sources, fifty-four "land attack planes" and
thirty-four fighters participated in the attack on Clark, while an
equal number of bombers and fifty fighters struck at Iba. (See
Operations of the Japanese Navy in the Invasion of the Philippines.)

47.
History, 19th Bomb. Gp., App. B (19th Gp. Operations Record). It will
be recalled that the B-17's for several days had been flying regular
reconnaissance missions which had on occasion taken them to within
three miles of the coast of Formosa. On this morning Carpenter was
patrolling the waters east of Luzon. (Fisher interview, 17 June 1947;
History, 19th Bomb. Gp., App. A.)

48.
19th Gp. Operations Record; 16, Hq.FEAF, Bandeong, 12 Feb. 1942.
On 18 April 1944, Col. R.L. Fry, who was executive officer of the 5th
Air Base Group at Del Monte in December 1941, made the following
statement: "In response to orders from Clark Field at 0400 hours 8th
December, one B-17 under Lieutenant Tash took off from Del Monte at
0945 for Clark Field to have a camera installed so that a photographic
mission could be flown over Formosa." (Doc. 8, in History, Fifth Air
Force, Pt. 1, App. II.) This indicates that the order from Clark Field
was sent to Del Monte immediately after word was received that Pearl
Harbor had been attacked. But it should be pointed out that Maj. E.H.
Heald, who in December 1941 had helped to set up communications for the
5th Air Base Group, stated in May 1944 that "at the time of the attack
upon the Philippines" he received the "first message radioed to Del
Monte from General Headquarters" at approximately 0630, and that five
minutes later another arrived from Colonel Eubank. The first message
read: "Hostilities have begun. All Airdromes alert." (Doc. 17, same
history.) It should be noted that both Colonel Fry's and Major Heald's
statements were made more than two years after the events being
described. A possible explanation for the differences in time stated is
that Tash's B-17 was sent to Clark Field merely to have certain repairs
made on his plane as is stated in the 19th Group Operations Record, and
that the order received from Clark Field was not related in any way to
the outbreak of hostilities.

52.
Available records of the two squadrons, the 28th and 30th, which were
at Clark on 8 December, state that the B-17's were "dispersed" at the
time of the attack. Col. W.P. Fisher, commander of the 28th Squadron in
December 1941, has stated that it was standard operational procedure
for his aircraft to go to their assigned positions as soon as they
landed, and that they were dispersed on this occasion. On the other
hand, dispersal facilities had not been completed, and it was
impossible to provide complete security from air attack. (History, 30th
BOmb. Sq.; Fisher talk and Fisher report, confirmed in statement to the
author in interview of 17 June 1947; Combs interview.)
There is some evidence that several planes had been left in an
unusually exposed position. (Ind, Bataan, p. 101.) It should be
emphasized, however, that the bombing did little damage, and that the
low-flying enemy pursuits picked out the B-17's wherever they were and
riddled them. Although this fact does not excuse a lack of precaution,
it is nevertheless true that unless the B-17's could have been
completely hidden, the widest possible dispersal would have made little
difference.
[The HyperWar editor has to scream at this point: "What the
hell were they all doing
on the ground at the same time?" They had been ordered into the air in
the first place as a
precaution against an expected Japanese attack. Any 12-year old should
have been able to figure out that refueling and servicing should be
done in stages: land a refuel a few of
the B-17's, then land and refuel the next batch as the previous ones
took off. Kimmel and
Short barely escaped courts martial and saw their careers ruined for
merely failing to anticipate a surprise attack; but MacArthur and
Brereton went untouched for this inexplicable dereliction!]

53.
See sources in n. 51 and Summary of Activities, 9 Dec. 1941, 0954,
where "Nichols Field reports 12 casualties--4 serious, 3 killed." The
enemy had planned a full-scale attack on the fields near Manila, but
weather restricted their effort to an attack by seven planes on
Nichols. (Operations of the Japanese Navy in the Invasion of the
Philippines.)

58.
19th Gp. Operations Record.
But see Summary of Activities, 9 Dec. 1941, 1100, where "C.O. Del Monte
reported that 16 B-17's on way to Clark Field" and in a garbled message
indicated one or more had turned back"with wounded crew members." The
original plan for a mission at dawn under Field Order No. 2 (see
Summary, 8 Dec. 1941, 1550) seems to have been changed by Field Order
No. 3, transmitted to "C.O. Bomber Command, Clark Field" a 2356, 8
December.

60.
Sheppard and Gilmore statement;
GO 48, Hq. USAFFE, 21 Dec. 1941;
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941, where under 0220 appears this
entry: "P-40 off 02:10 should be in between 03:00-03:30. Lt. Mahoney
pilot"; and there follows under 0513: "Mahoney to Brady--six transports
off Vigan Bay--11 Naval vessels off Vigan."

61.
History, 24th Pursuit Gp.;
19th Gp. Operations Record;
Robb statement;
GO 48, Hq. USAFFE, 21 Dec. 1941;
USSBS Intr. 90, Capt. Kawakita Ishihara, n.d.;
USSBS Intr. 331, Capt. Mitsugo Ihara, 10 Nov. 1945.
According to the officer who took Marett's place as commanding officer
of the 34th Squadron, a Japanese air raid resulted in the destruction
of twelve P-36's shortly after they landed from the Vigan mission.
(Brown statement, as cited in n. 46.) See also Summary of Activities,
10 Dec. 1941, 0530, 0625 which notes that "8 B-17's loaded, left Clark
for attack on vessels, priority transports and landing parties," and
1211 where "Grover reports 2nd Observation Sqdn. (P-35) reports attack
on 7 transports at Vigan with .50 cal. 3 P-35's were lost in the
encounter including sqdn commander at 09:15. One transport blew up."

62.
This is the only loss which has been confirmed by the Joint Army-Navy
Assessment Commission. (Japanese Naval and Merchant Losses during World
War II, Feb. 1947, prepared by the Joint Army-Navy Assessment
Commission [JANAC].)

70.
History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. 1, p. 17;
19th Gp. Operations Record;
Summary of Activities, 10 Dec. 1941, 1430 which records "Discussion of
situation by Staff: In view of the fact that Paratroops have been
landed in many places in the islands, General Brereton is of the
opinion that it is highly dangerous to allow Bombardment to remain in
this vicinity after dark." Under 11 Dec. 1941, 0030, appears
"Telephonic orders to move all B-17's southward prior to daybreak and
execute dawn attack on targets in Lingayen Port." (See also 11 Dec.
1941, 1009.)

71.
History, 24th Pursuit Gp.;
Obert statement;
Sheppard and Gilmore statement;
combat reports of Capt. William M.Rowe, in A-2 Library.
Operations of the Japanese Navy in the Invasion of the Philippines
indicates that thirty-four fighters and twenty-seven bombers were sent
against Nielson, Nichols, and Camp Murphy, twenty-seven bombers against
Cavite and the same number against shipping at Manila, and eighteen
fighters against Del Carmen. Japanese pilots claimed fifty planes shot
down and fifty-three heavily damaged or burned.

73.
It should be added that prior to the attack on Cavite, American
pursuits had intercepted another formation of Jap planes over central
Luzon and shot two down, and that later on Filipino pilots flew their
obsolete P-26's against an enemy formation. (Sheppard and Gilmore
statement; GO 48 and 27, Hq. USAFFE, 21 Dec. 1941 and 16 Feb. 1942.)

78.
History, Fifth Air Force, Pt. 1, p. 20, and statement of Col. Ray
Elsmore, Doc. 30 a, App. II. A few days after the war began, one P-40
was dispatched to Mindanao to serve as a personal reconnaissance plane
for General Sharp, in command on that island. On 4 January, nine )40's
left Bataan for Del Mont. Five of these planes arrived; and about a
week later two P-35's arrived. (Obert statement; History,24th Pursuit
Gp.)