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Afghanistan – reflections on the strategy in the light of
three more deaths.

by Gildas the Monk on July 14, 2010

I remember the lesson very well. As young potential officers, we had been told to assemble by the statute at 8.00 am sharp. We duly assembled on time, sitting around the base and on the adjacent wall, as they knew we would. Enter the immaculate Colour Sergeant Reece at the allotted hour, and a rollicking was duly administered.

“I said BY the statute, gentlemen, not ON the statue!” he barked. He added in quiet, calm, ice cold tones, up close:

“People like YOU, Sir, get people like ME killed.”

That was thirty years ago but I remember it like yesterday. Her Majesty’s Royal Marines are very good teachers. They have, after all, been turning out excellent fighting men for more than 300 years. The point of that little lesson was twofold. First, attention to detail in an order or a plan. Get it wrong, someone dies. Second, responsibility for the lives of others. People like me get people like him killed.

They are the words that echoed in my head every time I saw a beaming Tony Blair, a grimacing Gordon Brown, and baffled Bob Ainsworth pronouncing on Iraq or Afghanistan. How many of them, I wonder, had ever had the consequences of their actions in these lands brought home to them in such stark terms?

When heard of the intention to invade Afghanistan my first and instinctive reaction was fear. The persistence and cruelty and, yes, courage of the Afghan fighter is, or should be, well known to anyone who can pick up a history book, as is the visceral antithesis of the inhabitants of that region to all alien forces. Falling into enemy hands will result in an unpalatable end. Indeed, shortly after the intervention began, I read of two French Special Forces who had fallen into the hands of the Taliban. They met their death by evisceration.

Shortly after troops had been committed, Simon Jenkins wrote an insightful piece in The Times. He argued that we would be fighting unnecessarily. The stated purpose of the intervention was to disrupt Al-Qaeda bases and support in the south of the country. However, as he pointed out, it was wrong to identify the Taliban – an insular movement – with Al-Qaeda. In fact, he argued, the persons best placed to deal with Al-Qaeda, he argued, were the Taliban themselves. The Taliban were more than capable of doing that, should it become in their interests so to do (and to which I would merely add in quite nasty ways which Amnesty International would find most distasteful). The appropriate course of action was, he argued, a combination of threat, diplomacy and bribery with the Taliban who would do the job for us and maintain some sort of coherent rule and stability.

At the time, I was not completely convinced. It seemed to me that there was a sufficiently close connection between the two groups, and my albeit limited experience of Arab/Asian politics suggested to me that the common allegiance to Islam would probably trump any deal done with the what for the rest of this piece I shall call in crude shorthand “the West,” at least in terms of bringing the offenders to justice. I further considered that the terrible events of 9/11 warranted very robust response. However, even then one could see the force of Mr. Jenkins’ argument.

However, 9 years later on, it is clear there has been a colossal strategy failure in Afghanistan.

I did not go to Staff College, but even I have read Clausewitz. In the early nineteenth century with his own great insight he wrote this: “No one starts a war, or rather, no one in his right mind ought to do so, without being in clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to achieve it” (emphasis added. Somehow apposite).

Let us then consider the Afghanistan intervention by reference to Clausewitz’s dictum, nine years – yes nine, after this intervention began.

The only legitimate purpose of military intervention both in terms of international law and pragmatism was, and is, based on self-defence and strategic interest: the disruption of Al-Qaeda safe havens, and the unspoken more long term aim of the creation of a stable regime which would keep that area free from elements actively hostile to Western influence, and would deny support for wider militant Islamic factions in neighbouring Pakistan. Everything else was surplus to requirements.

The immediate aim of the disruption of Al-Qaeda bases and training camps was achieved pretty much straight away. One has to say that a deal with the Taliban, long range patrols and air and electronic surveillance would probably have done to the same extent as has been achieved, but there we are.

The much more difficult goal has been to establish a stable and “friendly” regime in the medium to long term. Has this been achieved after nine long years? No. Why not?

As Clausewitz knew, the question of the desired outcome and the means by which that outcome are to be delivered must always be considered together. They are interdependent.

The strategy was like the traditional three legged stool.

The first “leg” of this triumvirate was the creation of strong, legitimate and democratic national government. It has been a tenet of Western political and military strategy that the means by which that end could best be achieved was by establishing Afghanistan (or any other country in which “we” have been intervening) as a prosperous functioning democracy – what one might call the modern theory of Liberal Interventionism. This is in alleged sharp distinction to the American cold war philosophy: “I don’t care if he’s a sonofabitch, as long as he’s our sonofabitch.”

Crudely put, in the philosophy of Liberal Interventionism, democracy and human rights as perceived in the West are regarded as universal values and virtues which are, or would be, accepted by all peoples given the chance. A certain degree of military force is therefore legitimate in freeing the subjects of tyranny and ignorance and the recipients of the West’s enlightened beneficence. First in with the SAS, then in with the ballot box.

The assumption was that this would be attractive to the Afghan population and create the virtuous circle of a shared goal between the West and the Afghan people which would translate into military and political success. Peace, prosperity and liberal democracy established via the jump start of the judicious use of brute force. It is Liberal Interventionists’ wet dream. Who could doubt its inevitable success? Anyone who had half a brain as it happens.

This strategy depends upon the acceptance by the overwhelming majority of the Afghan people – and most specifically the young and not so young men with the Kalashnikovs and rocket propelled grenades – of both the concept of the legitimate state in some measure run according to these Western values, and of a loyalty to that state which overreaches the personal and local.

In Afghanistan, this cannot and will not happen at the moment. Afghanistan is not a country in the sense of a European nation state. There is no central authority which bases itself on the rule of law as recognised here. There have been interludes of stability with a central government in name (under Mohammed Zahir Shay, 1933 – 1973), but whether this was truly a period of stable government or better described as a period in which there was a truce between the powers that be in Kabul and the provinces, is a very debatable.

In any event, more than 30 years of war have swept away the last vestiges of central control. Beyond Kabul there is merely loyalty to the tribe, clan, warlord, drug dealer, cleric or sect or combination of the same which holds sway at any given time or place, or indeed any appropriate combination of these. And these loyalties are very strong. Despite what General Stanley McChrystal may have had to say, there is no genuine sense of Afghan identity above the common theme of the desire to expel the foreigner which temporarily overrides all other disputes.

Save for this one guiding unifying principle, it is, indeed, “Chaos-istan.” As the most recent and discredited Afghan elections show, the concept of a Western democratic system is alien at best and inimical at worst to large sections of Afghan society. This is not necessarily a criticism of the Afghan. The Liberal Interventionist should bear in mind that it is only perhaps over the last century, after about 2,500 years of various degrees of barbarity, war, absolutism, enlightenment and even genocide that a generally settled system of what we call consensual democracy has become the norm in the West. It is a criticism of the failure to consider, understand and come to terms with the culture in which “we” have intervened. The assumption that it is the only legitimate working model for a functioning society is arrogant.

Expecting to transplant western liberal democracy into Afghanistan in a few years is like trying to use a skin graft to fix a burst tyre. Ambitious, even imaginative, but not very practical.

Indeed, this concept of Liberal Interventionism has completely clouded what could, or should, be attempted. For much of the past eight years Tractor Stats have been wheeled from Whitehall on a regular basis about numbers of girls now at school (laudable, I agree), or the number of people voting, as if ISAF was in the business of recreating Islington Council, replete with crèches, equal opportunities committees, and a nice line in lesbian and gay awareness days. The number of dead ISAF troops – especially British troops – as result of attempts to protect voting in elections which were endemically and fundamentally corrupt is the result of the criminal folly of that view. Now that the situation is becoming more costly and more difficult, we are briefed to expect less realistic results upon exit. Nine years down the line.

Marks for this policy: 4/10.

Economic regeneration is the second leg of the stool. Since 2001, the United States alone has spent; according to the figures I can find, more than $38 billion in reconstruction in Afghanistan, although more than half of it has gone on training and equipping Afghan security forces, but whether the money has been spent wisely, or to good effect, is another matter. In simple terms there never was an Afghan economy, save perhaps in the production of opium, (which was in fact in decline under the strict rule of the Taliban – ponder the irony). And in that regard we have been busy offering grants to make farmers give up the lucrative poppy harvest as if we were offering EU subsidies to potato farmers in Lincolnshire (they take the money – they grow the poppies anyway), thus threatening and alienating both the drug and warlords who have real sway, and the farmers, who know which side their bread is buttered on. Infantile, politically correct nonsense.

Marks for this policy: 2/10

Finally, security. There are brave and loyal Afghan fighters – on both “sides”. But the fact is that the overall state of the Afghan security forces is often poor, and in some cases little short of appalling. The Afghan National Police, in particular, are a by word for corruption and bitterly resented by the civilian population in areas where they operate – particularly if there is a clash between the tribal loyalties of the police and the local population, and particularly when they are brought in from the North to the Pashtun dominated areas in the South. The latest line is that we will build up the Afghan forces until they are in a position to deal with the Taliban on their own. David Cameron quotes figures of a further 400,00 new Afghan police and soldiers on the way, but one can reliably expect that these will not be well trained, and there is the real prospect that one is simply arming the insurgency. Once again the problem is also political. It does not matter how large the Afghan defence forces are – what matters is whether they are able to fight an aggressive and brutal and dedicated insurgency independently, effectively, and with the support of the majority of the regional population. But without a legitimate and functioning state to which the army and the population at large owe committed allegiance, the police and army will collapse.

Marks for this policy: 5/10

One is left with these abiding impressions. First, that actually very little thought was given to what would happen after the Taliban had been toppled. Indeed Blair and Bush have “form” for this. Indeed, no sooner had the Taliban apparently been toppled than “we” (I use the word loosely) were off and at it again, blundering around in Iraq, with – you guessed it – no adequate plan for reconstruction of the country. And at the same time, violating more military principles. Never leave a job half done, and never fight a war on two fronts.

The diversion of Iraq then seriously diverted men and resources from the stabilisation of Afghanistan. As former Chief of the Defence Staff General Sir Richard Dannatt admitted last week, this clearly left British forces undermanned when they began to move into the southern part of Afghanistan, with the result that they attracted a violent reaction but without the mass needed to react positively and hold ground. And one notes that British military involvement in Southern Afghanistan really began in 2006, with the deployment of 16 Air Assault Brigade. It was this deployment that was the occasion of former defence secretary John Reid’s complacent announcement that:

“We are in the South to help protect the Afghan people reconstruct their economy. We would be perfectly happy to leave in three years time without having fired a shot”.

And I have just heard the much respected Colonel Tootal saying that when his paratroopers entered Helmand in 2006, they only had a few Afghan soldiers in support. This begs another question. What in dear God’s good name was going on between since 2001 if there were no Afghan troops and nobody seemed to know what was going on in the South. Next to the critical Pakistan border!

Insanity!

Now, there is no doubt the Karsai regime faces the real long term threat of collapse in the face of a resurgent Taliban. Could things have been different if there had been a more concerted effort to establish a larger, stronger, security force at the outset, supported by far more significant numbers of ISAF troops, and in particular by moving much more speedily to establish control in the southern areas, and establishing the momentum of redevelopment which would have created the virtuous circle referred to above? Possibly, but perhaps not for two reasons. Because Afghanistan does not exist as a viable unitary semi-secular state, and because of the Elephant in The Room.

The Elephant in the Room is that the battleground is not contained. It is open ended because of Taliban control of the lawless tribal areas of Pakistan, allowing for respite, re-enforcement and re-supply – and because there can be no solution without taking into account the wider problem of radical groups in Pakistan.

Perhaps ultimately the only way in which stability could be reached in Afghanistan is the way in which it has always been reached. By accommodation with the local warlord, drug cartel or clan. By alliance with the controlling faction on such expedient terms as are necessary. You support AB against XB, provided he keeps his patch clean of trouble for you, and if his business is growing poppies, buy the bloody things off him. If he steps out of line, his rival gets your money and military support and he gets a visit from an Apache helicopter. It’s rough, it’s unpalatable, it’s imperfect and it’s probably the least worst scenario in the medium term. This is a variation on Mr. Jenkins argument.

Perhaps this is wrong. I just heard a former serving soldier being interviewed – a decent man – in his view the training of the Afghan army was coming on apace, and great strides have been made. I hope he is right, but one has to wonder. The fact that there will be an accommodation with some elements of “Taliban” seems now to be openly and realistically admitted by the military and government with a view to withdrawal. In the ghastly speech of the management consultant “expectations are being managed.”

One expects so, and the present recruitment drive is a last minute drive to salvage something. Which means that opportunities have been lost and lives unnecessarily wasted.

No thought to the realism of the goal. No thought to the mechanism by which they would be achieved.

So, Mr Blair, and Mr Bush, Mr Reid and Mr Ainsworth, and you too now Doctor Fox. Just remember. People like YOU have got an awful lot of people like THESE YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN killed.

You know why the army is there. Same reason they were stationed in the Khyber Pass in the days of the British Raj

To make sure that the supply of Opium is not interfered with.

Where does the Opium go? It goes to Hong Kong and thence to China ( in the days of the British Empire.cf Opium wars between Britain and China in the 1800sHow do the Afghanis get paid? They get paid in gold

Is the price of gold related to the price of opium? Yes

Check the gold records for 1977, before I was born, in Hong Long

The Chinese flooded the market with Gold that year and depressed the price.

What did the Taliban do? They interfered with the production of Opium

Its on record that Opium growing came down when the Taliban were in power.

So the boys are out there protecting Crown property.

Hence Royal Wootton Basset

Guthrum is right in asking for a republic. It would stop the war in Afghanistan immediately

Old SlaughterJuly 15, 2010 at 19:51

So 911 was a coincidence? Or are we about to hear how Dick Cheney flee the planes in to control the smack market?

Old SlaughterJuly 15, 2010 at 19:52

Flee? Flew. iPhone pad is not for the fat fingered.

English VikingJuly 16, 2010 at 12:28

Or headed.

Old SlaughterJuly 17, 2010 at 14:14

Lol. Not bad.

I guess you have a Blackberry then.

English VikingJuly 17, 2010 at 15:48

Neither. I’m too old for all these gadgets and new-fangled gizmos. My phone has a wire attached which disappears into the living room wall.

GildasJuly 17, 2010 at 17:05

Dear Old Slaughter and E. VikingSince you guys are technically minded, please can you tell me how you upload my avatar in the little square box?Would be grateful for the helpGildas

I love it – somebody has just googled ‘things to do in Rochdale’ and ended up on my post about the new Muslim toilets installed there……..I do hope they discover something more interesting to do than having a ….

GildasJuly 17, 2010 at 19:54

Well, knowing Rochdale a little (my father had an office there) I have to say the toilets would be one of the main attractions.That and HomebaseGildas the Monk

I notice that you managed to upload your avatar; so much better than that geometric thing.

Spiral ArchitectJuly 15, 2010 at 04:14

Excellent piece.

Hubris, arrogance and hubris plus the total ignorance of history are responsible for this utter calamity.

I remember well picking up the Sunday Times one morning in 1979-80 and read an article – by a forgotten author, I wonder if it was Max Hastings – proclaiming that the Russians were going to win in Afghanistan because of the Mil Mi-24 ‘Hind’ helicopter. This ruthless killing machine was going to make mincemeat of the Mujahideen.

What happened? Well first of all the Mujahideen simply disappeared, only to emerge later with CIA-supplied Stinger missiles. Between 1979-89 when the Russkies pulled out they had lost dozens of ‘Hinds’ – and about 15-20,000 personnel, not counting those maimed and sent mad.

After success of the initial invasion/incursion it rapidly went downhill for the Soviets and their troops spent years taking and losing the same ground and getting nowhere with the local population – despite killing lots of them. The US supplied the Mujahideen using routes through Pakistan that Al Qaeda and the Taliban use today. The administration of the country went to ratshit and the country remained constrained by tribal stone-age politics – bu at least the people knew where they were.

Other things the present conflict has in common with the 1979-89 war; one, the soldiers had/have absolutely no idea what they were/are fighting for………massive amounts of treasure were wasted when ‘black ops’ would’ve no doubt achieved as much, if not more……..and lastly, whenever it occurs the end-game will be the same, the larger, more sophisticated forces will leave with their tails between their legs.

Gildas, Thank you very much for another excellently written piece. You and you rcommenters have presented many interesting and well considered points that can only help to develop this debate for the better.

Unfortunatelty, Frere Gildas, I feel the combination of the following influences will keep this country in a state of warfare, ignorance, brutality and medievalism for many decades:– Tribal loyalties– Afghan bloody mindedness and cruelty– Jihadism,– Drug revenues– Irresponsible interference from Pakistan’s security arm– American incompetence– NATO/West/British incompetence (not our soldiers though)– Misplaced aid that finds its way to the criminals– Wishy washy deluded liberal “projects” that breed contempt in the Afghans– Blair’s, Brown’s Reid’s, Ainsworth’s balls-ups– etc

I do sympathise with the sentiments you express and I do understand your logic. However, as you said, our (western) kind of logic does not seem to achieve much in this terrible land.

I suspect that any subsidies/forced purchasing of heroin crops will be used to finance more opium fields in remote Afghan areas or Pakistan and these will still find themselves having th edual effects of being transported to our streets and enriching the bad Afghans. Also, these funds could well be diverted for tribal/religious reasons to finance more armed insurgency at the cost of the lives of our NATO troops.

This is a ghastly situation, much worse even than Vietnam. It needs the wisdom of Solomon, the civil leadership of Pericles, the military leadership of Wellington and the political balls of Maggie to resolve. Unfortunately our western leaders posesss none of these.

GildasJuly 15, 2010 at 17:39

I agree with a great deal of that Mr D the PGildas the Monk

SaulJuly 14, 2010 at 22:29

I would like to hear the views of an average Afghan. At least they would be talking from the point of actually knowing what is going on as opposed to pure conjecture.

English VikingJuly 14, 2010 at 23:34

You could ask an average Serb for his point of view on previous events while your at it.

SaulJuly 14, 2010 at 23:39

Exactly. We know nothing, just conjecture. Unless you were there of course.

English VikingJuly 14, 2010 at 23:52

Never been to Serbia. I’ve never been to North Pole in Winter either, but I have adequate reason to believe that it is cold.

Solipsism is faulty. If I can only believe that which I have personally experienced, and not be able to dissect and study history from another man’s recorded experiences, I’d be a very shallow man.

20 Muslims attack America, so Britain enacts ‘hate’ laws making it a criminal offense to tell the truth about Islam.

Go figure.

PS That filthy desert is not worth one drop of British blood. Get the troops out, now.

Old SlaughterJuly 15, 2010 at 16:25

’19 Saudi Arabians’. Really, are you sure about that? I mean, being that pedantry is your thing and all.

I really wouldn’t have bothered except for the fact that you piled in arguing me for no reason other than you wanted to argue.(you conceded the point almost as quickly as you made it)

I should probably start my own idiot list.

English VikingJuly 15, 2010 at 16:37

I don’t believe I have conceded any points. Wishful thinking?

Yes, I am sure that 19 of the 20 involved in the 9/11 attacks were of Saudi origin. The other was Kuwaiti.

I am happy to retract if you have better info.

PS ‘arguing me’? Are you Northern?

Old SlaughterJuly 15, 2010 at 18:57

So there were 20 ‘involved’. Nice try.

So where was Atta from?

English VikingJuly 16, 2010 at 12:28

Read my original post and you will see that I have always claimed that 20 were involved. Nice try.

It is difficult to say exactly what Atta’s nationality was, as he himself claimed, at differing times in his life, to be an Egyptian, a German, a Saudi Arabian, a US citizen and also to have UAE nationality.

Even if you can find one or two who are not Saudis, (which, so far, you have signally failed to do), you will not undermine my point, which was; why should Britain invade Iraq or Afghanistan when America is attacked, by persons who came from Saudi and Kuwait, and none of whom came from Iraq or ‘stan?

Why not invade Japan while were at it?

Old SlaughterJuly 16, 2010 at 23:27

I made no attempt to undermine your original point although a monkey surely could.

It really is nowhere near as difficult as you suggest to determine his nationality. But he was no Saudi.

Out of interest. Who was the 20th? If not the hijakers but merely involved I would like to know what you mean by ‘involved’ before continuing.

I would suggest 15 Saudis and 4 others.I wasn’t there but for these purposes the 911 commission will suffice for me.

English VikingJuly 17, 2010 at 15:44

The ’20th’ man involved was the principle architect of the attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a Kuwaiti. He is currently in US custody.

As you appear sure you can debunk my original point, why not do so?

Just to be clear, my point is: Why does the UK need to invade Afghanistan and Iraq in response to an attack on the US by Saudis and a Kuwaiti?

English VikingJuly 18, 2010 at 21:55

Principal. Doh.

GildasJuly 14, 2010 at 21:48

So many good points in all of these posts. Thank you all for reading and your responses.Gildas the Monk

BrianJuly 14, 2010 at 21:38

It reminds me of the old joke about the best way to Dublin which ends with the punchline “But I wouldn’t start from here.” Remember Charlie Wilson’s War when the Mujihadeen (our Taliban) were supplied with weapons and training to boot the Russians out? (btw, we could learn valuable lessons from their faultless withdrawal) Suddenly, the money stopped, the political interest stopped and the suddenlynaughty Taliban began to take over a dog’s breakfast of a wartorn “country” made worse by endemic poverty and under-development, no government (libertarian Utopia!), tribal rivalries and changing alliances/intra-tribal vendettas, land grabs from refugees who went to Pakistan, India and Pakistan both seeking to prevent the other extending its sphere of influence into Afghanistan. Then, after successes in former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone and a justified need to retaliate after 9/11 (but ignoring Lebanon, Rwanda and Somalia), the Neo- Con-Nulabs thought they could not only launch a punitive expedition (as done by Britain on three prior occasions) to kill Al-Quaeda and Taliban but stay there to establish a modern democratic, welfare multicultural state with diversity etc. Simples. Except that it takes at least a century in even the best (eg Japan) circumstances. And Japan required a massive defeat to create a tabula rasa. Afghanistan is not a suitable “country”, merely a collection of incomprehensible “qowms” (things to which people feel affinity). The ONLY solution is to get out, cede the Pushtun border provinces of Pakistan, and rely on local trade to open up the area. What’s wrong with letting the Afghans work their problems out themselves? If Afghanistan exported oil and bought Western goods and services like Saudi, governments would pragmatically ignore differences. As Kipling wrote “East is East and West is West.” Isn’t it just stupid to expect everything suit us?

English VikingJuly 14, 2010 at 22:02

Yugoslavia was not a ‘success’, it was an outrageous betrayal of a proven, loyal ally, namely Serbia.

SaulJuly 14, 2010 at 22:33

For goodness sake. Charlie Wilson

English VikingJuly 14, 2010 at 23:27

Never seen it. I have just assessed the facts, as put out by organisations other than the BBC and the Guardian. Sprinkle in a bit Blair’s desperation to play with his tanks and Nato forces bombing civilians and you get the multi-cultural paradise that is Kosovo.

Don’t tell me you believe the MSM!

SaulJuly 14, 2010 at 23:33

As opposed to what you know?

English VikingJuly 14, 2010 at 23:38

Don’t want to argue, just saying.

PS I don’t have a tin-foil hat, just a stubborn refusal to believe what politicians and their media mouthpieces pump out when it is plainly untrue.

Ed PJuly 14, 2010 at 20:55

The USSR threw huge numbers of troops at Afghanistan but did not succeed. Something about ignoring the lessons of history applies…It would save money to withdraw all troops and pay top price for ALL the opium produced every year, keeping as much as necessary for medical use and destroying the rest – that way many lives are saved, both soldiers and heroin addicts; the tribal groups receive financial support and fight less, as it’s hard to care about your neighbour’s incursion into your territory if you are well off; the Taliban might even be encouraged to keep Alky Ida at bay.

ivanJuly 14, 2010 at 23:25

I would agree with you but add one thing – give the farmers fertilizer and grain. Then sit back and wait for results.

Joe PublicJuly 14, 2010 at 19:16

We are wasting our soldiers, our time & our money in Afghanistan.

There is absolutely no hope of ‘success’ (however that may be measured).

We should replace our troops stationed there, with all those past & present MPs who voted for the war. Every single one of them.

Blair should be exiled there. Without his legion of bodyguards.

PericlesJuly 14, 2010 at 19:14

Almost certainly right, Fra. Gildas : we could have concluded with the Taaliban and agreement that would have suited our purposes.

GildasJuly 14, 2010 at 20:16

With that I have great sympathy, dear Sir, especially on the wider issue of relations with Saudi Arabia, oil, and so forth. One is constrained by time and I feel I went on too long as it was.But your point in respect of the “difficulty, perhaps impossibility” of solving the problem is very well made. I hope this piece is not interpreted as meaning I do.

Can I add a special thanks to Anna for her help in editing and correcting my spelling.

If we are looking with hindsight, we should have supported the Lion with arms in his fight against the Taliban. He was perhaps the only man capable of controlling the country in a way acceptable to the Afghan and the leftie Westerner.

English VikingJuly 14, 2010 at 21:54

Begging the question; ever heard of a ‘living language’?

Do you keep apostrophes under your pillow, just in case you might need one while you’re asleep?

But that begs the question of what form of words we are to use in place of ‘begging the question’ in this new ‘living language’ of yours (which sounds much more like a ‘decaying language’ to me).

I can’t speak for Old Slaughter, but, yes, I do keep a few packets of apostrophes under the pillow. You can get them in packets of twenty these days. Back when he wrote regular editorials on F2C, I used to send Captain Ranty a packet or two quite regularly, since he was forever running out of them, or misplacing them. He knew me then as:

The Apostrophe-Finder General

English VikingJuly 14, 2010 at 23:44

I accept your point on the living/decaying thing (and it a sad thing, IMHO), but the purpose of language is to communicate, and if an expression has become so frequently misused that a majority of people take it to mean something it was never meant to mean, it does in fact mean both things.

Old Slaughter is on my idiot list, so I’m afraid I struggle not to poke him with stick once in a while. He pokes back, too.

Off topic, I know, but, if you accept errors simply because of the frequency of their repetition, you will eventually lose the meaning of your entire language. To-day, for example, the ignorant refer to a victory in a single major tennis tournament as a grand slam ; why ? Because the erroneous usage has been made so many times by those that ought to know (sc. those within the game such as Sue of Chiddingfold, the commentators and the many former players that act as colour men).

??

Old SlaughterJuly 15, 2010 at 14:01

Surely ‘a stick’. Or are you Northern?

Old SlaughterJuly 15, 2010 at 14:00

Yes I have heard of a ‘living language’. Which is why one should try to keep it as healthy as possible.The problem with this particular example is that if I correctly use ‘begging the question’ fewer and fewer people understand what it means. If there were an alternative description of the logical fallacy available I would not be so protective of the one we have. This is not ‘living’ so much as killing a perfectly good concept.

Generally I would like to think I am fairly relaxed about it as my English is not good enough to be too pedantic. This is however a particular pet hate for the reason expressed.

Oh dear, I am still on your idiot list. This will certainly affect my sleep.

English VikingJuly 15, 2010 at 16:31

I am Northern, but I admit it was a typo.

BTW If you take the apostrophes out from underneath your pillow, you might sleep more soundly.

Gloria SmuddJuly 15, 2010 at 19:21

4 English Viking July 14, 2010 at 21:54Begging the question; ever heard of a

PericlesJuly 16, 2010 at 10:00

Oh, we already have

English VikingJuly 16, 2010 at 12:16

I don’t defend the deterioration of standards in English, merely recognise them. I am able to communicate with those on the same level as myself, as well as those who are not as adept in English. This is a necessary life-skill, being able to communicate and being sure that the other person has understood what I meant and vice versa.

Language means what society at large interprets it to mean. Thats why Oxford University publish a new dictionary every year. If language were a static thing, Samuel Johnson’s would suffice. You would even be still speaking Old Norsk, Saxon, Celtic, French or Saxon.

Nice try with attempt to show that I would like to confuse pliable language with the immutable laws of mathematics.

For those of us who have read some of the history the Afghanisatan imbroglio beggars belief. Almost literally we have used up our Army, inflicted irreparable damage on our foreign policy and created the conditions for terrorist reprisals in the UK. Quite what benefit the Afghans will have is unknown, if anything our actions may have reinforced the authority and capability of the most extreme elements.

Nicely argued, but I believe the REAL reason for the Afghan war is much more simple. To state it simply: Georgie W. wanted to go down in history as the conqueror of Afghanistan. To have succeeded where his old man had (wisely) retreated,