The only current U.S. 787 operator, United, will return its Dreamliners to service after the planes have been retrofitted with the FAA-approved batteries which have been redesigned and fitted with new cases.

And Boeing announced that deliveries of the 787 will resume next month.

That's a lot of good news for a program that had been in danger of deteriorating from Boeing's high-tech success story into a cautionary tale of hubris and mismanagement.

But doubts linger as to the adequacy of the fixes for the beleaguered plane's battery system—even Boeing admits that the root cause of the lithium-ion batteries' overheating remains unknown. And more profoundly, the battery problems and the resulting grounding of the affected aircraft have called into question the process by which the FAA certified the batteries, both initially and the second time around.

If the FAA certification process is not as transparent, objective, and robust as it should be, how much faith can the traveling public have that the batteries are now, finally, safe?

In a weekend editorial in the New York Times, former NTSB chairman James Hall pointed out the disturbingly cozy relationship between the FAA and the industry it is tasked with overseeing and regulating. He points out that commercial aircraft like the 787 are now certified not by independent reviewers but by the manufacturer's own employees: "Essentially, aircraft makers persuaded the FAA to let them certify their own aircraft so they could save money." That's hardly the kind of independent oversight that inspires faith in the process or its outcome.

Last week, the NTSB held a two-day hearing on the design and certification of the 787's battery systems, with testimony from reps representing Boeing, the FAA, and the battery manufacturer.

Predictably, those testifying defended the FAA's oversight process, citing the unprecedented number of hours devoted to certifying the 787. But the post-certification incidents and subsequent grounding must call into question the legitimacy of the certification process. As does the very fact that the NTSB found it necessary to hold such hearings.

The NTSB's current chairman, Deborah Hersman, was diplomatic but pointed in her concluding remarks:

We must take a hard look at how best to oversee and approve emerging technology in the future. The U.S. aviation community is using the same approach to certification that was created to certify our grandparents' aircraft and by most accounts it has served us very well. But perhaps it is time to ask if any changes are needed to update the system that will be used to oversee the development of new and beneficial technologies on our children's and our grandchildren's aircraft.

Hersman's predecessor at the NTSB, James Hall, was less inclined to pull his punches:

Now the 787 has been grounded for months, the FAA has lost face, and Boeing has been losing $50 million a week on a plane that was supposed to demonstrate innovative aircraft design and help the United States recapture its onetime dominance of the world aircraft market.
Given all of that, the FAA's recent decision to approve Boeing's plans to fix the lithium-ion battery seems shortsighted and represents a complete failure of government oversight. It is puzzling that the agency was so quick on its feet to accommodate Boeing in recertifying the safety of the airplane, without even knowing the root cause of the battery problem.

On February 9 and 11, Boeing completed two test flights, using one of six 787 test planes specially fitted with electronic tools to monitor and diagnose battery-related issues. Both flights were "uneventful."