Chapter 17: Establishment of the Eighth Air Force in the United Kingdom

Destined to become the major
instrument of American air power in the war against Germany, the Eighth Air Force from
its very inception was intended for action against the European Axis.
Originally, however, it had not been assigned the mission of strategic
bombardment. Its roots were embedded in the projects for the invasion of Northwest Africa
(GYMNAST and SUPER-GYMNAST)
considered by the ARCADIA and post-ARCADIA
conferences in December 1941 and early 1942. The decision to organize a task
force known as the Mobile Reserve Corps, under the command of Maj. Gen. Lloyd
R. Fredendall, to carry out GYMNAST in the event of a firm commitment to that
operation, made inevitable the planning and organization of its air element.
Accordingly, on 2 January 1942, General Arnold directed
that an air task force be established for the purpose under the command of Col.
Asa N. Duncan, then commanding the
III Air Support Command.1
First designated the Fifth Air Force, the new organization within a few days
received instead the designation of Eighth Air Force because of a plan to
authorize the activation of a Fifth Air Force* in
the Far East.2

As originally conceived, the Eighth Air
Force consisted of a headquarters, bomber and interceptor commands, and a wing
headquarters to be employed as a service command. Its constituent units were
one medium bombardment group, two pursuit groups, one observation group, three
air base groups, and one air depot group. Already selected

* First assigned to the Far East Air Force, the designation would not be identified with the
American elements of the Allied Air Forces in Australia and New Guinea
until 3 September 1942.

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by 8 January for assignment
to the new air force were the 17th Bombardment Group (M), the 48th Bombardment
Group (L), the 20th and 52d Pursuit Groups,* the 68th Observation Group, and
the 7th Photo Squadron. Additional units not then available were to be
activated by the commanding general of the Air Force Combat Command (AFCC),
under whose direction the organization and training of the Eighth Air Force was
placed.3
On 19 January, the War Department ordered that the AFCC activate the
headquarters and headquarters squadrons of the Eighth Air Force, VIII Air Force
Base Command, VIII Bomber Command, and
VIII Interceptor Command.4
Meanwhile, the Air Staff planned that the several units would move into a
concentration and training area within the United States on or about 1 February.
Task Force GYMNAST had been accorded a priority D rating by the AAF, with three
other air task forces scheduled ahead of it.**5

The AFCC delegated to the First and Third
Air Forces the actual task of establishing the major
headquarters units.6
The Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Eighth Air Force was activated by
the Third Air Force on 28 January at Savannah Army Air Base in Georgia. As in
the case of the commander, Colonel Duncan, most of the personnel was drawn from
the headquarters of the III Air Support Command. At the same time, the III Air
Force Base Command supplied the initial personnel for the VIII Air Force Base
Command.7
The VIII Bomber Command was activated at Langley Field, Virginia, by the First Air Force on
1 February, and on the same day the VIII Interceptor Command was activated at
Selfridge Field, Michigan. According to plan, the
VIII Bomber Command was promptly moved to Savannah and the VIII Interceptor
Command to Charleston, transfers which had been
effected by the middle of February.8
As these moves indicate, the southeastern states of North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Georgia had been selected as a
concentration and training area, where units initially were stationed on bases
and airports at Savannah, Charleston, Wilmington, Columbia, Florence, and Augusta.
The plan called for the
new air force to remain under the control of the commanding general, AFCC until the

date of embarkation or until
the beginning of training with the Mobile Reserve Corps. It was attached for
administration and supply to the Third Air Force,9
which continued to act as a parent to most of the units of the infant Eighth
until their departure for the United Kingdom several months later.

By 12 February it had become apparent to
Colonel Duncan that the 24,125 men and 621 aircraft planned for the Eighth
would not be adequate to carry out the mission intended for it under GYMNAST.
He recommended, therefore, that his force be augmented by the addition of three
heavy bombardment groups, one medium bombardment group, and three pursuit
groups.10
But such an augmentation of strength would have required the diversion of
combat units intended for other task forces. The Air War Plans Division (AWPD),
therefore, on 25 February recommended instead the elimination of GYMNAST from
current projects.11
The project had been periodically deferred during February, largely because of
the demands made by our hard pressed forces in the Pacific, and early in March
the Combined Chiefs took under consideration a recommendation
that SUPER-GYMNAST
be continued as an "academic study" only.12
Until it was revived some months later under the name of TORCH, the North
African venture ceased to affect the fortunes of the Eighth Air Force.

As though to indicate the trend of policy,
the Eighth already had sustained a practical reduction in strength. On 19
February it had been instructed to make available to Lt. Col. James H.
Doolittle twenty B-25's with combat crews from its 17th Bombardment Group
for the special mission to be led by him
against Tokyo.13
During March, intensive training of VIII Bomber Command units was interrupted
further by the imperative demands of the antisubmarine campaign in the
Atlantic; and while planes and crews of the 17th Group participated in the
defense of the southeast coast of the United States, an additional sixty-seven
pilots of the VIII Bomber Command were on special duty outside the continental
limits of the United States.14
Finally, at the end of March all combat groups then assigned to the Eighth Air
Force passed from its control to that of the Third Air Force in an
administrative shift preparatory to the assignment of a new mission and of new
units for its fulfillment.15

Abandonment of GYMNAST had left the Eighth
Air Force uncommitted to any operation. Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz, commanding

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general of the AFCC and
commanding general-designate of the contemplated Army Air Force in Great
Britain (AAFIB), had previously sought to have the Headquarters and
Headquarters Squadron of the AFCC transferred intact to the AAFIB, in the hope
of providing at least a head for that heretofore
incorporeal organization.16
A decision to assign the AFCC personnel to AAF Headquarters precluded this
move, but General Spaatz was quick to seize the opportunity presented by the
release of the Eighth Air Force from GYMNAST. On 31 March, he suggested that
the now "task-less" force be made available as a nucleus for the AAFIB,
and within the next few days the Eighth Air Force was committed to the
United Kingdom.17
Already in England since February on a mission
to prepare the way for the AAFIB were Brig. Gen. Ira C. Eaker and a small
bomber command staff, who by this new commitment were rewarded with the
definite knowledge that their plans and preparations would soon have practical
application.

The assignment to the AAFIB involved a
drastic change in the nature of the Eighth. SUPER-GYMNAST had called for
a mobile tactical air force, whereas the principal air task in the United Kingdom had long
been conceived as strategic bombardment of Germany. To adapt the Eighth Air
Force to its new mission required a considerable reshuffling of its combat
organizations. It was this need which had brought about the release to the
Third Air Force at the end of March of all Air Corps and service units save the
headquarters of the Eighth Air Force and the VIII Bomber and
Interceptor Commands.18
In April, the VIII Air Force Base Command, the 12th Replacement Control Depot,
and the 7th Photo Squadron were reassigned from the
Third Air Force.19
The Eighth got, also, others of its original units, of which the most important
was the 2d Air Depot Group, and in April a large number of combat units
assigned to operational training units were earmarked for eventual assignment
to the Eighth Air Force and shipment to the United Kingdom. These units comprised
twenty-three heavy bombardment groups, four medium bombardment groups,
five light bombardment groups, four dive bomber groups, and thirteen
pursuit groups.20
Actually committed to the Eighth Air Force for the initial movement to the United Kingdom
were only the 1st and 31st Pursuit Groups, the 97th Bombardment Group (H),
and the 5th Photo Squadron.21
Before the Eighth Air Force could reach the combat strength envisaged for it

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at this time, it would see a large number of these forty-nine groups diverted to
other air forces all over the world.

In the reorganization of the Eighth Air
Force and the subsequent feverish efforts to prepare it for movement overseas,
the chief responsibility was borne by General Spaatz, though his formal
assumption of command did not come until
5 May.22
Brig. Gen. Asa N. Duncan and the headquarters
staff of the Eighth Air Force were made responsible to him, and in early April
the headquarters was split into two echelons. One remained in Savannah to care for the
administrative and operational needs of the several commands. The other, the
Bolling Field echelon, became the nerve center of the force itself. Located
near AAF Headquarters in Washington, this element of the
Eighth's staff worked in close conjunction with the Air Staff itself. At
Bolling Field, after numerous conferences and studies, details of the
organization, mission, and training began to be transformed into
functional terms.23
Major decisions taken in April and May provided the basis for concrete action
to facilitate the removal of the Eighth to the United Kingdom, and shaped the
organization that would be established during the spring and summer of 1942.
The VIII Ground Air Support Command was established on
28 April24
and the VIII Air Force Composite Command, which was intended as a training
organization, on 4 July.25
Redesignations of commands during this period and in subsequent months
transformed the Interceptor Command into the Fighter Command, the Base Command
into the Service Command, and the Ground Air Support Command into the Air
Support Command.26

To overcome the difficulty arising from a
general dearth of experienced officers for staff positions, it became necessary
to commission direct from civilian life large numbers of professional and
business men who volunteered their services. Most of these men were
commissioned for specific assignment to one of the staffs, a practice that was
especially important in staffing the service command, which had perhaps the
greatest immediate need for officer personnel.27
Many of the newly commissioned officers came from the southeastern part of the
United States, where the several headquarters were then located, and many of
them, having moved directly from civilian life to the assumption of their new
responsibilities, went overseas without any military training whatsoever, a
condition which was partially

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remedied in the theater.28
To increase the number of officers experienced in the ways of the Army,
commissions were also issued to noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army,
some of whom came to hold highly responsible staff positions in the Eighth.
Action taken during May and June also helped to fill shortages of enlisted
personnel, but many units were brought up to strength only at the port of
embarkation and on the very eve of departure. The story with reference to
shortages of equipment is similar. Substantial progress was made toward a
solution of the problem, but some units went overseas without full equipment ñ
a not unusual event in the hectic days of 1942.29

A major preoccupation at all levels of the
Eighth during the spring was training. In the operational training units (OTU)
of the Second and Third Air Forces, intensive effort marked the preparation of
planes and crews for projected movement across the Atlantic. Orders directed that
particular attention be paid the problems of rendezvous between bombers and
fighters, for Generals Arnold and Spaatz already had established the policy
that fighters of the Eighth Air Force would be used primarily for escort of its
bombers.30
Ground crews received their training on the job mainly, though some individuals
were sent to technical schools for special training.31

Preparations for the movement of the Eighth to Britain included an early dispatch
of advance echelons of the several headquarters. A total of 39 officers and 348
enlisted men, representing Eighth Air Force headquarters and the bomber,
fighter, and service commands, reached England early in May to join the so-called
Bomber Command Shadow Staff under General Eaker.32
Other officers, individually and in groups, followed during May and June to
undertake particular tasks connected with the establishment of the Eighth Air
Force in the United Kingdom. In the unavoidable haste
of these first days, confusion and embarrassment resulted from the occasional
failure of individuals to understand and follow newly established channels for
communication between the British and the Americans,33
but the emphasis belongs elsewhere. By the end of May, plans and preparations
in England and the United States had reached a point that
permitted a beginning to be made in the overseas movement of the Eighth.
Indeed, the first large body of its troops was already on the way.

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Preparations in the United Kingdom

The theater of operations in which the
Eighth Air Force soon would make its debut had been for two years the scene of
great air battles. By 1942 the Royal Air Force had become a battle-proved,
experience-wise organization, with by far the greater part of its
strength concentrated in the United Kingdom, whose defense was the cardinal
point in British war policy. The establishment of another great air force in a
country smaller than the state of Alabama (virtually all of the Eighth would be
stationed in England proper), and one that was already crowded with airdromes
and teeming with air traffic, would require all of the administrative skill,
experience, and patience with which both the RAF and the AAF were endowed.

The task of representing the AAF in the
initial stages of what was to prove an extraordinarily successful collaboration
had fallen to General Eaker. Although the Special Observer Group (SPOBS), even
before Pearl Harbor, had examined with leaders of the RAF some of the problems
that would be involved in the accommodation of an American air force, it
required the hard impact of actual warfare to lend urgency and certitude to
preparations for the participation of the AAF in the European war. The advance
echelon of the Bomber Command, Army Air Force in Great Britain under General Eaker was
charged by General Arnold on 31 January to prepare for the arrival,
accommodation, training, and operation of
a bomber command.34
Eaker and a party of six other officers reached England by air on 20 February and
reported to Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney, commanding general of United States Army
Forces British Isles (USAFBI).35

The first American air headquarters in
Europe, the United States Army Bomber Command, USAFBI, was established under
command of General Eaker by order of General Chaney on
22 February.36
Three days later Chaney directed Eaker and his small staff, in accordance with
previously made arrangements, to proceed to the headquarters of RAF Bomber
Command for the purpose of understudying its staff and drafting recommendations
for the training, equipment, and employment of American air units scheduled to
operate from the United Kingdom. Additional duties required
examination of British airfields intended for use by the Americans, submission
of a plan for the reception and assignment to stations of bomber units, and

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Eighth Air Force Installations, August 1942

--619--

preparation of a scheme for
the administration and supply of such units with particular attention to the
needs of two heavy bombardment groups then scheduled as the initial combat
echelon.37
To take appropriate steps toward a close co-ordination of effort with the
RAF, to select and make ready the fields from which the Americans would fly, to
prepare for the reception of an increasing flow of AAF units, and to provide
for their fundamental needs--these were the major tasks.

For several weeks thereafter, the American
officers, whose number was soon increased by arrival of eleven others sent from
the United States, shared offices and living
quarters with the staff of RAF Bomber Command. Even when on 15 April General
Eaker took over for his own headquarters a hurriedly evacuated girls' school at
High Wycombe in Buckinghamshire, about thirty miles west of London, he remained
virtually next door to RAF Bomber Command
headquarters.38
Already he had submitted to General Chaney on 20 March a comprehensive study of
the problems involved in the establishment of an American
air force.39
The Eaker plan, in accordance with Chaney's directive, made provision for the
accommodation, training, and initiation into combat of the two heavy
bombardment groups which Washington had earmarked for spring
delivery to the United Kingdom, and for other units which
were to follow. The subsequent assignment of the Eighth Air Force to the United Kingdom
would require revision of
some of the planning factors used, but in general the actual establishment of
the Eighth in England followed the pattern of the
Eaker plan. Sections dealing with logistical problems drew partly on previous
study by SPOBS and USAFBI.

The organizational scheme of the American air force in Britain, long a matter of dispute
between Washington and General Chaney's headquarters, was not
crystallized until after the arrival and establishment of Eighth Air Force
headquarters in June. Meanwhile, General Eaker shared with Col. Alfred J. Lyon,
air officer of USAFBI, the responsibility for making preparations to receive
the Eighth. As the advance echelons of the several headquarters arrived from
the United States to participate in the
preparatory effort, the variety and multiplicity of AAF activities in England led USAFBI to direct
General Eaker to establish some central control.40
In consequence, on 19 May the Detachment Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, under
command of General Eaker, assumed control of all U.S. Army air

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organizations in the British Isles.41
It remained the ranking AAF command until the opening of General Spaatz'
headquarters on 18 June.

The preparatory effort which meantime fell under Eaker's direction may be
conveniently divided into two broad categories--logistics and operations. In
either category much of the work consisted of planning, for the immediate
future or on a long-range basis. It was natural that actual
accomplishments were largely within the realm of logistics, for before the
bomber campaign could begin much had to be done in such important if
unspectacular fields as supply, maintenance, transportation, technical training,
and housekeeping. Operations in the narrowest sense could begin only with the
first attack on the enemy, but even when conceived in the usual fashion to
include operational training and the development of auxiliary operational
techniques, the Eighth was long handicapped by lack of combat planes and of
tactical experience.

It was possible to draw upon the rich
operational experience of the RAF, however, and during the spring and early
summer of 1942, basic decisions in the field of operational planning prepared
the way for a degree of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two great nations. The story provides
another significant chapter in the long history of Anglo-American
relations. If at times leaders of the RAF tended to view paternally the untried
theories of the AAF and displayed an understandable disposition to guide the
Americans along paths tested in the bitter experience of actual combat, they at
the same time understood and respected the organizational capacity and the
experimental temperament of the people with whom they were now allied. And if
the Americans were inclined to insist upon the establishment of a completely
independent air force, one that would be copartner and not junior partner in
the assault on Germany, they also represented an organization that for over two
years had sought helpful lessons in the experience of the RAF and had found
there proof of its own basic assumptions. Differences on certain matters would
persist throughout the war, as was only natural, but to the many ties which
joined the two peoples there was added in this instance the bond that makes all
airmen one.

The Eaker plan of 20 March assumed that in
the highly important field of target selection the work would be done in conference between

--621--

British and American commanders.42
On undertaking the establishment of a headquarters at High Wycombe (PINETREE
in code) that would serve for the immediate direction of American bomber operations, General
Eaker followed as far as was possible the organization of the near-by RAF
Bomber Command, thus achieving a measure of organizational similarity designed
to facilitate cooperation. By 18 May he was able to notify Spaatz that the
bomber headquarters should be ready to "control and supervise in bombardment
operations by the 1st of June."43
The tardy arrival of the first combat units obviated any test of that promise
in June, but plans for close co-ordination with the RAF proceeded along
lines that permitted the prompt adoption of formal agreements following the
arrival of General Spaatz. Early in July, the RAF invited the Eighth Air Force
to share membership on some of the more important RAF operational committees ñ
those dealing with targets, operational research, interception, and bomber
operations.44
Composed of senior staff officers for the study of operations data as a guide
to policy, these committees thus took an important step toward their
transformation into combined committees representative of the two air forces.
Close personal agreement having theretofore marked the relations between
General Eaker, who continued to command the VIII Bomber Command, and Air
Marshal Sir Arthur T. Harris, commanding the RAF Bomber Command, they further
agreed on the eve of the Eighth's entry into combat that Eaker, or his
representative, would attend the daily operations conference held by Harris and
that the two commands would co-ordinate action for the selection of
targets and the issuance of communiqués or other
press releases.45
The pattern of collaboration thus established for bomber operations was
promptly followed by the two fighter commands.

Not until November 1942 was a definitive
understanding with the British reached on the most fundamental question arising
from the purpose to base American fighter planes in the United Kingdom. The RAF proposed that
American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually to
assign entire defensive sectors of the United Kingdom to
AAF operational control.46
The suggestion had obvious administrative advantages to recommend it, but it
would have involved the assumption of heavy responsibilities for defense of the British Isles.
The AAF preferred that all of its forces be concentrated in an offensive effort
against Germany, with the defensive

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mission, which of course
included protection of our own bases in Britain, continuing in the
experienced hands of the RAF Fighter Command. General Spaatz defined the
primary function of the AAF fighter planes as that of supporting "our bombers
in an effort to secure air Supremacy and not for the defense of England," but he agreed that they
should be so trained as to permit their assumption of defensive obligations in
the event of an emergency.47
On this basis the decision was finally made.48
The RAF would be responsible for aerial defense of the sectors in which
American airdromes were located, and AAF fighter forces would be committed
principally to the escort of bomber strikes against the continent. It had been
agreed between General Arnold and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief
of Air Staff, RAF, in May that the Americans, in line with an earlier decision
dividing production responsibilities between the aircraft industries of the two
countries, would assume a primary responsibility for the provision of air
transport, even for the training of British
airborne divisions.49
Thus in the great airborne operations that followed, American troop carrier
units would provide most of the lift.

The defensive responsibilities assumed by
the British included antiaircraft and other ground defense of American
airdromes. The AAF had assumed in the earliest planning for a bomber command
that such an arrangement could be effected,50
but as the number of our projected installations increased, it became apparent
that British forces would be unequal to the task. Steps had been taken as early
as August to set up an air defense organization within the
Eighth Air Force,51
but American antiaircraft and infantry units could not be made available even
in the number required to supplement those provided by the British, much less
in sufficient quantity to replace them.52
Our allies consequently continued to carry the main responsibility into the
early part of 1943, at which time the Eighth Air Force took over the job with
forces hardly- more adequate than those the British had been able to
provide.53
At no time during the war, fortunately, did the Germans undertake large-scale
attacks on American installations in the United Kingdom.

The heaviest indebtedness of the Eighth to
its British allies fell, perhaps, in the field of intelligence. When war began,
the AAF probably was more deficient in its provision for intelligence than in
any other phase of its activities-a deficiency brought home with increasing

--623--

force to General Eaker
and his staff during their study of the RAF Bomber Command in February and
March.54
Tables of organization for AAF tactical groups were weak in combat intelligence
categories, and since the AAF intelligence school at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,
did not open until March 1942, it proved impossible to fill even the limited
number of jobs authorized. General Eaker in his report of 20 March observed
that "Intelligence represents the section of activity in which we are weakest,"
and concluded "after studying their British intelligence work that we can do
no better initially than to model their establishment with but
slight change."55
Accordingly, Washington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence
officers for training by the RAF Bomber Command, and in May the first of these
arrived.56
In an intelligence school established at High Wycombe they received a week of
orientation before being sent on to the
British schools.57
The VIII Bomber Command requested an additional 165 intelligence officers in
July under a plan to reach the total of 198 by
1 September.58
General Eaker and Lt. Harris B. Hull, his intelligence officer, had recommended
in March 6 intelligence officers for each squadron, 7 for each group
headquarters, 7 at wing headquarters, and 32 for bomber command headquarters ñ
these to assume the normal responsibility for preparation of target data, photo
interpretation, prisoner of war interrogation, enemy order of battle, the
maintenance of intelligence libraries, preparation of summaries and reports,
and, in addition, for public relations.59
New tables of organization for the various echelons of the AAF published during
1942 did not provide for intelligence officers in these numbers, but they did
reflect an attempt to provide more adequately than theretofore for the
intelligence function.60

Reliance on the RAF and other British
agencies for intelligence would characterize the American air effort in Europe
throughout the war, and this was especially true of intelligence in its more
fundamental aspects. Possessed of long-established and well-organized
intelligence services, the British initially supplied the Eighth with most of
the information from which it prepared its target data. The Americans developed
in time increasingly helpful services of their own, but it was decided wisely
at the outset to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort by placing American
personnel in already existing British organizations. It was agreed, for
instance, that the RAF would train American officers in photo interpretation
for assignment to its own

--62--

Central Interpretation Unit.61
AAF officers in various categories continued to receive training in British
intelligence schools throughout the war.

Similarly, the Eighth Air Force long
remained dependent on the British for essential weather services. But in line
with AAF policy to make the American air force as independent of the RAF as was
practicable, General Eaker urged in March a prompt dispatch of weather officers
"to begin the study of this beastly weather." He emphasized the basic
importance of weather forecasts to the type of operations planned for the
American bombers, and in his appeal to General Spaatz observed that it was all
right "to say `get it from the British,' but we want to be self-supporting
as soon as possible and it takes weather people to get it from the British and
to transmit it."62
In response to this request, the 18th Weather Squadron was activated at Bolling
Field in May, and shipped to England in August. On its arrival, a weather
school conducted by American personnel at High Wycombe was established, and
liaison with RAF weather services was promptly
accomplished.63
No small part of the training required involved an introduction to the
organization, procedure, techniques, and terminology employed by the British,
for they continued to be the major source of weather information.

Integration with the British
communications system naturally presented one of the more fundamental problems
antecedent to operations--a problem that in its solution would leave a mark
upon the organizational as well as the operational history of the Eighth. The
RAF had developed an elaborate system, based on extensive radio and radar
installations, for the control of air traffic over the United Kingdom. It was
necessary, of course, that American and British forces operate subject to one
control; and every advantage lay in having the Americans, by such adjustment of
equipment and training as might be necessary, fitted into the already
established and highly efficient British system. The overriding importance of
this problem had brought AAF communications experts into close consultation
with their counterparts in the RAF as early as January 1942 in an effort to
determine the communications requirements of American aircraft to operate from
England and to translate their conclusions into practical terms of production
and modification.64
This prompt action made possible the provision of at least minimum equipment
for air-to-ground communication for flights during the summer of

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Eighth Air Force planes over
the North Atlantic route, the last leg of which, from Iceland to Prestwick,
fell under British control. Much of the equipment necessary to this movement
was supplied by the British, who provided for many of our planes, after arrival
in England, equipment which could not be made available in the
United States.65

The airdromes initially taken over by the
Americans were equipped with RAF communications facilities, which continued to
be staffed largely by RAF technical personnel.66
As the Americans developed their own installations, the British telephone and
teletype networks were extended to include them. All radar equipment and most
of the radio equipment used by the Eighth Air Force during 1942 and well into
1943 was of British design and manufacture; at the same time, maintenance for
radio equipment was provided by the Civilian Repair Organization, which
functioned under the control of the Ministry of
Aircraft Production.67
In the opinion of the signal officer of the VIII Bomber Command in November
1942, the "only reason that U.S. Groups have gotten along so well with regard
to communications until now is because the RAF have been very generous in
supplying Signal Officers and additional
personnel."68
That was hardly an overstatement, for in August 1942 the Eighth Air Force
remained almost completely dependent upon the British for both ground and
ground-to-air communications.

The necessity for integrated action with
the British, in this and other fields, naturally posed special problems of
training, a subject which consumed much time and effort during the spring and
summer of 1942. An American proposal in September 1941 that the RAF provide
equipment and personnel to familiarize AAF fighter squadrons with special RAF
methods indicates an early appreciation of the fundamental importance of
adjustment in the training program within the
United States.69
General Eaker's report of 20 March lent new emphasis to this necessity, and was
followed by helpful efforts to establish and maintain close liaison between the
theater and those charged with training in the United States. Preparation of
training data was the responsibility of the bomber command G-3 section,
which under the direction of Col. Frank A. Armstrong assembled materials for a
special training manual. Concerned chiefly with the problems of heavy bomber
units, it was sent on its completion in June to the United States for use by
operational training units there

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and served in England for the indoctrination of
newly arrived units.70

During the months following submission of
his report to General Chaney, General Eaker and his staff also formulated
detailed plans for the establishment of a training organization in the British
Isles. They planned that all training at first would be conducted under
direction of Bomber Command, and made arrangements for the acquisition from the
RAF of a nearly completed installation at Bovingdon in Hertfordshire, northwest
of London, and of its satellite field at Oakley. Eaker requested still another
site (the choice eventually fell on Cheddington, near Bovingdon) for use in the
training of fighter units. Necessary personnel and equipment were requested
from the United States, and training schedules adjusted to the requirements of
the initial groups expected in May were presented
to USAFBI.71
These schedules were revised upward in May upon receipt of information that the
build-up planned for the Eighth called for thirty combat groups, both
bomber and fighter, to reach the United Kingdom by
October 1942.72
Accordingly, the Americans now requested a total of eight airdromes for use in
training, three to be used for fighter pilots and five for bomber crews.
Because of the RAF's reluctance to use for training purposes badly needed
operational airdromes in England, the British recommended that the Eighth
consider the use of Ulster (Northern Ireland), where seven airdromes could be
made available for the purpose.73
Such was the arrangement agreed upon as through May and June plans for a
training establishment took shape.

Since it was intended that organized
tactical units on arrival would go directly to their permanent stations for
familiarization and final pre-combat training, the interest in special
training installations arose from concern for the problem
of replacement.74
General Eaker had calculated, on the basis of British experience which
admittedly was not entirely valid for daylight operations, that American bomber
losses would average 5 per cent per mission on the basis of ten missions a
month, and 3 per cent for twelve missions per month in the case
of fighters.75
To assure operation of each unit at maximum strength, the projected training
establishment would serve principally to provide combat crew replacement
centers (CCRC) from which fully trained crews could be supplied as combat
losses occurred. At the Arnold-Portal conference in London late in May,
it was agreed that the RAF would provide eight fields for CCRC's
by September 1942 and a total of sixteen by the
following April.76
In June 1942,

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when the Eighth Air Force
had been established in England, a more definite understanding called for the
transfer of a headquarters site and seven fields in Northern Ireland during the
course of 1942 in addition to Bovingdon and Cheddington, each of the last two
minus their satellite fields. Eaker planned that Bovingdon and Cheddington
would be assigned, respectively, to the bomber and fighter commands to serve as
"final advanced aircrew operational training and distributing centers in
England" for crews received from the combat crew replacement centers in
Ireland.77

General Eaker in May had recommended the
organization under the VIII Bomber Command of a training wing to be patterned
after a similar RAF headquarters, and of another for the
VIII Fighter Command.78
With the selection of Northern Ireland as the main center of training activity,
however, he advocated in June establishment of a training command in
that area.79
General Spaatz shared Eaker's deep concern for an adequate flow of replacement
crews,80
and accepted his formula for their proper training. Spaatz' request that the
War Department establish a training command for the Eighth Air Force was
granted, and on 4 July 1942 the VIII Air Force Composite Command was activated
at Bolling Field.81
As events proved, the composite command would have little to do for more than a
year after its activation; not until September 1943 would combat crews be sent
to Northern Ireland for training.82
After the decision to undertake an invasion of Northwest Africa there would be
few replacements for the Eighth, and their training was taken care of at
Bovingdon and Cheddington in England rather than in Northern Ireland. The early
history of the VIII Air Force Composite Command speaks chiefly of hopes
deferred by operation TORCH--the African invasion.

Logistical Planning

Before the arrival of
General Eaker and his staff, General Chaney's air officer, Col. Alfred J. Lyon,
had carried forward logistical planning and preparation for an American air
force in Britain. Even after Eaker reached England, and with the aid during the
spring of an advance echelon of the VIII Air Force Service Command, Lyon
continued to perform those functions with vigor and foresight until the full
headquarters of the service command was established in July. His work had been
complemented by that of occasional AAF missions sent
from Washington,83
but the chief responsibility had been delegated

--628--

to him by General Chaney. Before Pearl Harbor, his activities had been conditioned largely by
deployment plans stipulated in the War Department strategic plan RAINBOW No. 5
and by the implications of air lend-lease. Preliminary and necessarily
tentative plans, made in consultation with British officials, had centered on
such questions as the accommodation of American air units, the training of AAF
technical personnel by the RAF, and the establishment of U.S.-managed
depots to service the RAF's American-built planes.

The progress made toward a common
understanding of some of the more fundamental problems greatly facilitated
collaboration between the air arms of the two nations after December 1941. As
early as February 1942, the British Air Ministry had prepared for its guidance
a comprehensive statement of policy and procedure which was circulated under
the title of Joint Organization and Maintenance (United States). This document
provided a sound foundation for Anglo-American co-operation in the
establishment of the Eighth Air Force, and was kept current through the ensuing
years by a series of amendments shaped in conferences between British and
American officials. Its constructive contribution to a solution of the problems
involved in receiving, accommodating, and servicing an American air force was
promptly supplemented by the practice of establishing special sections within
the major divisions of the Air Ministry for handling
American questions.84
Recognizing the tremendous importance of the effort to build a great American
air force in the United Kingdom, the Air Ministry prepared to play its part by
the most careful and detailed planning.

General Eaker's bomber command plan of 20
March contributed a further clarification of the problems to be faced. Setting
forth an "Ideal Method" that would have required the development of an
independent system of supply and maintenance, complete with base depots, before
the initiation of combat operations, the plan recognized that a consequent
postponement of our active participation in the European air war until the end
of 1942 could hardly be countenanced. The alternative, which called for
extensive use of British facilities and assistance at the outset, on the other
hand, would permit an earlier inauguration of operations against the enemy and
the building of an American logistical organization concurrently with their
development.85
There was of course little room for debate. Indeed,

--629--

the latter policy had in effect already been adopted, as General Eaker well understood.

It had been decided in December 1941 that American bomber units, at least
initially, would be based in the general area of Huntingdon and East Anglia, a
section of England lying above London and known to Americans chiefly as a
principal source of the Puritan emigration to New England in the seventeenth
century. Because of the time required for the construction of airdromes and
their fundamental importance to any plan for combined operations, the British
and American staffs had given the question consideration at an early date.
According to information used by the American Air Staff in August 1941, when it
was engaged in the drafting of AWPD/1, there would be available for American
use after the RAF had reached maximum strength 105 airdromes for bombers and 25
for pursuit planes.86
Told of the scale of operations contemplated by the Americans, the RAF notified
the AAF in the following December that airdrome accommodations for 2,300
American heavy bombers could be made ready by
June 1943.87
American officers had undertaken in October and November a survey of airfields
proposed for our use in the United Kingdom, where a total of 15 airdromes--8
in England, 2 in Scotland, and 5 in Northern Ireland--were earmarked for
American use by the RAF.88
In December, plans finally narrowed the selection of airdromes to be prepared
for the first American bomber units to 8 fields then under construction for No.
8 Group of RAF Bomber Command in the
Huntingdon area.89
Though not completed until well into 1942, they were ready to receive the American flyers in June.

While the construction of bases proceeded,
Generals Arnold and Eaker raised the question of the advisability of locating
the American forces in the more northerly region of Yorkshire. There the
bombers would be closer to projected supply and maintenance facilities in the
neighborhood of Liverpool. In addition to the saving on transportation, Arnold
and Eaker felt that the York area possibly offered greater room
for expansion.90
The suggestion received some support among responsible officers of the RAF, but
it would have involved readjustment of plans to which considerable commitments
already had been made and a sacrifice of advantages to be derived from the
close proximity of the American and British bomber commands. Accordingly, by
early May the question had been definitely decided in favor of the
Huntingdon area.91
In this area and adjacent parts of

--630--

East Anglia, the AAF heavies
remained throughout the war, and Grafton Underwood, Thurleigh, Little
Staughton, Molesworth, Kimbolton, Polebrook, Chelveston, and Podington became
famous as the Eighth's oldest bomber bases.*

A comprehensive agreement was reached late
in May in conference between General Arnold and Air Chief Marshal Portal. It
was agreed that a total of 127 airdromes,
some of them currently in use by the RAF and others to be constructed, would be
provided for the Eighth Air Force, 75 for
the use of the VIII Bomber Command in East Anglia and the remainder in southern
England and Northern Ireland. From Huntingdonshire, the American units would
expand eastward to take over additional group areas of RAF Bomber Command with
a view to achieving a distinct American bomber zone. The basis of allotment was
one airdrome for each heavy bombardment group, and three for every two fighter,
medium bombardment, or light bombardment groups.** The agreement included an
understanding that eleven fields would be prepared for fighters in Northern
Ireland, though as it actually developed no American fighter units were sent to
Ulster except for training. AAF insistence that its fighters be used for bomber
escort led to their being based in England, adjacent to or within the bomber
zone and in southern England. The total allotment included provision for
transport groups, air support units, and combat crew
replacement centers.92
Coincidentally with the opening of Eighth Air Force headquarters and the
arrival of the first combat group in June, the Air Ministry published a
tentative list of sixty-six airdromes to be made ready for VIII Bomber
Command by March

*For location of those occupied as early as August 1942, see
map, p. 619.

** Because British airdromes were normally constructed to accommodate either one or two
RAF squadrons, planning theretofore had proceeded on the assumption that one
American heavy bombardment group would occupy two airdromes: a parent field and
a satellite. A shortage of fields made this impossible, however, and eventually
all airdromes occupied by the Eighth would accommodate full groups. For
purposes of comparison, the following facts regarding the relative size of AAF
and RAF heavy bombardment units in 1942 should be noted:

AAF

RAF

Squadron

- 8 a/c

Squadron

- 16 a/c

Group

- 3 squadrons

Wing

- 3 squadrons

Combat Wing

- 2 or more groups

Group

- 6 or 7 wings

During the course of the war, the make-up of all of the organizations, both RAF and
AAF, varied frequently in terms of aircraft, personnel, and number of subordinate units.

--631--

1943 and of twenty-one
others which by the same date would become available for other Eighth Air Force
commands.93
This estimate was subsequently proved to have been somewhat optimistic, but it
served as a useful indication for planning purposes of what could be counted
upon in advance of ROUNDUP-the plan for the invasion of France in the
spring of 1943

It already had been agreed that
construction costs in the development of bases for American occupancy would not
be charged to the United States. Ownership of all installations in the United
Kingdom would remain with the British, AAF units being considered as tenants,
and the financial considerations involved were handled under the reciprocal aid
provisions of the lend-lease agreements.94
Under the arrangement, the Americans accepted RAF standards of accommodation,
though as time passed, modification in individual instances would be made.
During April, an air section of the office of the chief engineer, USAFBI, had
been set up with responsibility for dealing with the Air Ministry in all
matters pertaining to construction for the Eighth Air Force. The new section
established liaison with the Air Ministry and with the Ministry of Aircraft
Production, which had been made responsible for the construction of base air
depots.95
When the European Theater of Operations under Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower
succeeded USAFBI in June, responsibility for problems of construction for
American units passed to the chief engineer, ETO, where it remained throughout
the war.

Conversion of Great Britain into a
gigantic aircraft carrier had been undertaken by the RAF as early as 1940, but
American participation in the war required an upward revision in its building
program that ultimately added almost a hundred large airfields to the total
already built and projected. It was a difficult task. The pinch of inadequate
space, labor, and construction equipment made necessary the most careful and
precise planning, and since this in turn depended upon exact information
concerning the size and composition of the air forces to be disposed in the
United Kingdom, the task became the more difficult because of frequent changes
during the first two years of plans for the commitment of U.S. units to the
United Kingdom.96
Yet, though the building program repeatedly fell behind schedule, there would
be no instance of a combat group kept out of operation for the lack of an
operating base.

--632--

The AAF Officially Takes Over RAF Airdrome, December 1942

Burtonwood As It Appeared At the Close of the War

By no means the least
significant of the influences growing out of arrangements with the British for
the occupation of airdromes was the effect on the organization of the Eighth
Air Force. In taking over British fields, the unit of transfer was normally an
RAF group area, which, in the case of No. 8 Group, was to have twenty-one
fields, divided into seven "clutches" of three fields each. One of the three
fields in each clutch acted as a wing or station headquarters and it alone had
direct communication with group headquarters, which, in turn, was the only
station in the group area having direct communication with RAF Bomber Command
headquarters. Since without extensive modification of the communications
network it would be impossible for VIII Bomber Command headquarters to exercise
direct control of the operations of all bombardment groups, General Eaker
planned the establishment, originally on a provisional basis, of combat wings,
each of which was to exercise operational control of three groups. Although
much larger in numbers of aircraft and personnel, the combat wing would parallel
the RAF wing in the communications network, and would be, at the same time, a
desirable operational echelon of the VIII Bomber Command. The combat wings were
to be grouped in threes or fours under bombardment wings which, in turn, were
directly responsible to VIII Bomber Command headquarters. The bombardment
wings, which developed into the great air divisions of 1943-45, resembled
the RAF groups in that their headquarters were the only installations having
direct communications with VIII Bomber Command headquarters. This pattern of
organization, dictated by both communications and operational considerations,
would be in existence in the Eighth Air Force by the spring
of 1943.97

No part of the problem of establishing an
American air force in Britain was more fundamental, or entailed more
difficulties, than that of providing adequate supply and maintenance. A modern
air force operating on the scale planned for the Eighth consumes almost
unbelievable quantities of fuel and lubricants; requires in addition to the
normal supplies of any military organization vast stores of spare parts and
tools; and depends for its continuing operation upon facilities for repair and
maintenance ranging all the way from the relatively simple equipment used by
the ground crew to elaborate and extensive base depots. These speak more
forcefully than does anything else, unless it be the aircraft factory itself,
of the simple fact that the airplane is a product of the machine age and
remains dependent on its technical

--633--

devices. Leaders of the AAF
were fortunate in the opportunity to base their major effort in one of the
highly industrialized countries of the world, for the British were in a
position to render a variety of substantial services that would hasten greatly the
Eighth's entry into operations. Fortunately, too, there had been opportunities
before Pearl Harbor to consider with British leaders some of the particular
problems to be faced, and to agree tentatively on an approach to their
solution.

The RAF had operated with American-built
aircraft long before America's entrance into the war. American-built
Catalinas had played a prominent part in the North Atlantic search for the
battleship Bismarck in May 1941; P-40's had fought against the Italians
and Germans in Africa; and RAF Turbinlite night fighter squadrons and some
bomber squadrons had been equipped with the American A-20 during 1941.
Subsequent to the adoption of lend-lease in March of 1941, the RAF pool
of American-built aircraft had been increased to such proportions that
maintenance of the aircraft became a problem of special concern to the British.
To render assistance in this matter, and at the same time to extract valuable
information from the experience of the RAF in the use of our equipment, a small
number of American maintenance personnel was present in the United Kingdom as
early as June 1941.98
The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry
Hopkins and Averell Harriman requested that this assistance be
greatly expanded.99

In accordance with War Department
instructions, the AAF in August sent Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, Chief of the
Air Corps, to England for study of the problem. Specifically, he was instructed
to study British needs and to recommend such action as the Americans might take
under a general plan to provide civilian personnel who could be spared without
serious interference with
American production.100
The scope of his inquiries was broadened in September to include British needs
in the Middle East;101
and was still further extended by a request from SPOBS that in any
consideration of facilities to be provided he bear in mind the needs of an
American force much larger than that specified in RAINBOW No. 5. Through Brig.
Gen. Joseph T. McNarney it was indicated that SPOBS already had under
consideration the establishment of a depot for the repair of American-built
aircraft at Langford Lodge in
Northern Ireland.102

At the end of October, General Brett submitted his report to

--634--

General Arnold. He proposed
that: (1) the AAF set up mobile repair depots manned by civilians to service
American aircraft operated by the RAF in the United Kingdom; (2) the AAF
ultimately take over the management of existing British facilities for repair
of American built equipment and provide for their expansion as required, using
initially civilian personnel; (3) specifically, and as quickly as possible,
Langford Lodge be established as a depot for third echelon maintenance;* and
(4) if American air units should operate from bases in the United Kingdom, the
United States assume responsibility for third echelon repair facilities for all
U.S.-built planes operated by the RAF and AAF, and for the supply of
spare parts.103

Because of the current shortage of U.S.
personnel and equipment, General Arnold refused to assume responsibility for
the maintenance of all RAF-operated American planes, but he approved, as
a useful step toward the development of an American service organization in the
United Kingdom, negotiations for the establishment of a depot at Langford
Lodge. It was anticipated that, after the President's approval had been
obtained, at least six months would be required to provide necessary equipment
and trained personnel, for it would be unwise to rob newly expanding depot
facilities in the United States and, in addition, prior commitments to the
Philippines and other points would have to be fulfilled first. Meanwhile,
General Arnold desired that as far as possible American civilian personnel
already in the United Kingdom be used to
man the depot.104

Plans for development of a depot at
Langford Lodge proceeded on the assumption that it could best be operated under
contract with an American aircraft company. The Lockheed Corporation for some
time had operated an assembly plant for the British near Liverpool, and it was
evidently felt that this company because of its experience would be especially
well equipped to undertake the project.105
And so, shortly after our entry into war the War Department requested Lockheed
to provide a maintenance depot for the AAF at Langford Lodge. The actual
contract with the Lockheed Overseas Corporation,

*In AAF usage, maintenance falls into four classifications, as follows: first echelon
maintenance covers repair and service that can be provided by the crew of the
plane; second echelon maintenance describes that provided by the ground crew
forming an integral part of the unit using the equipment; third echelon
maintenance covers work beyond the capacities of the using unit and is normally
provided by more or less mobile maintenance organizations; fourth echelon
maintenance provides general overhaul and reclamation involving the use of
heavy tools and machinery in more or less fixed installations.

--635--

a subsidiary designated for
operation of the depot, was not signed until 1 May 1942. But Lockheed
representatives began to survey the site and to draft detailed plans from late
December, and the Ministry of Aircraft Production promptly began construction
under the provision of a letter of intent furnished by the Materiel Command in
the United States in January.106

General Brett during the preceding October
had inspected other areas of the United Kingdom with a view to the probable
need of the AAF for another depot. He finally settled on Warton, about
twenty-five miles north of Liverpool and close to the excellent industrial and
transportation facilities of Lancashire, a selection concurred in by Col.
Donald Davison, engineer officer of SPOBS.107
Brett's recommendations for the establishment of base depots in the United
Kingdom became the basis of action in January, when General Arnold directed
that they be given effect "insofar as the present
situation permits."108
By March, detailed agreement had been reached between USAFBI and British authorities
for the development of Warton as a base air depot for the AAF.
But even with the substantial aid to an early
completion provided by the surveys and consultations of 1941, it would be 1944
before all of the base air depots were prepared to assume fully the roles
envisioned for them.

Meanwhile, the third of the great depots
that would form the bedrock on which the structure of AAF operations from the
United Kingdom would rest had come into the picture through the necessity to
provide some interim establishment. In keeping with principles laid down in the
Air Ministry document, Joint Organization and Maintenance (United States), and
with recommendations by General Eaker in March,109
a search was undertaken for existing facilities that could be put almost
immediately into use. The choice fell on the British repair depot at
Burtonwood, which, as events proved, was destined to become the greatest of
American overseas depots and to serve as the very heart of AAF supply and
maintenance in the European Theater of Operations. Located midway between
Liverpool and Manchester in the heart of Lancashire and served by good
transportation, Burtonwood already was engaged in the repair of American-built
airframes and engines. Both General Eaker and Colonel Lyon inspected the
installation in April, and acting on strong recommendations forwarded by
General Chaney, General Arnold immediately initiated action to secure its
transfer for American use.110

--636--

The plan under which the
transfer was sought called for the existing British technical staff to continue
in service there until American technicians became available, and for
centralization at Burtonwood of the supply and repair of U.S.-built
aircraft in use by the RAF. This would be a step toward inauguration of a policy
already agreed upon that would leave to the AAF responsibility for the supply
and maintenance (including modification) of all American-built planes
operated from the United Kingdom.111
The urgent need behind the request received emphasis from Arnold's revelation
that current plans proposed to place 1,000 American planes for operation in the
United Kingdom by 15 August 1942 and 3,500 by April 1943. Until Langford Lodge
and Warton were ready for operation--target dates then stood at October 1942
and January 1943, respectively--Burtonwood would have to serve instead.

During May, consultations in England and
in Washington moved toward a prompt understanding with the Ministry of Aircraft
Production. By the 23d of the month, General Chaney and the ministry had
reached a detailed agreement on a plan to transfer Burtonwood to the exclusive
control of the Americans following an interval of
joint operation.112
This joint control began at the end of June, with the VIII Air Force Service
Command acting as the American agent.113
The technical staff of the British was largely civilian; and in the absence of
an adequate number of skilled American military personnel, General Arnold had
directed that civilian technicians be drawn from AAF depots in the United
States for service as the Civil Service Detachment
at Burtonwood.114
Lockheed, also, was preparing in June to send some 1,500 civilians to man
Langford Lodge.115
Thus at the beginning the first two base air depots in Britain were staffed
almost entirely by civilian workers. This arrangement was regarded, however, as
a temporary measure, and General Spaatz intended that eventually all depots
would be operated exclusively by
military personnel.116

Although the distance between the base
depot area around Liverpool and the sector to be occupied by combat units was
not great by American standards, there nevertheless were considerations which
dictated the placing of advance depots nearer the combat bases in
Huntingdonshire and East Anglia. Efficiency of operation on the scale planned
for the Eighth required ready access to spare parts and other supplies;
moreover, third echelon repair of battle damage did

--637--

not fall within the province
of the base depot,* nor could it be performed at combat stations without a
wasteful dispersion of skilled personnel. The need was for an advance depot, or
depots, through which supplies from the base depots could be distributed to
combat stations, and at which urgent maintenance and repair beyond the
capacities of the combat group could
be provided.117
The bomber command plan of 20 March recommended that a "mobile air depot," the
standard AAF designation for that type of service organization and a term
reflecting the emphasis on mobility in the earlier GHQ Air Force, be
established at Molesworth
in Huntingdonshire.118
During the spring, planning agencies in the United States as well as those in
England gave attention to the need for a complete service organization and the
placing of air depot groups within reach of
the combat stations.119
But whether because of the almost overwhelming number of tasks requiring
attention and a natural tendency to give first place to the fundamental problem
of the base depot, or because of a certain difficulty in shifting the emphasis
from a mobile to a static system, Eaker was compelled to report to Spaatz in
May that the principal lag in the development of an adequate organization in
Britain fell in the general area of "the Air Service Command Depots and
establishments."120
Not until after the arrival of the VIII Air Force Service Command in July was a
comprehensive plan fully developed.

Another phase of the problem that required
close attention was the securing of adequate storage space in a country already
strained in this particular virtually to capacity. In the location of base
depots the question of storage had been a major consideration, but it became
evident that these establishments could not meet the need, and in June steps
were taken to find a total of 3,000,000 square feet. By the end of the month the
Eighth had secured approximately 750,000 square feet, and another 1,160,000
square feet not yet available had been located. Storage areas fell in general
in the neighborhood of the western ports of Liverpool and Bristol, with
additional space at Burton-on-Trent northwest of Huntingdon, and in
Northern Ireland.121

With the formal establishment of the
Eighth Air Force in the United Kingdom at the end of June, its service
organization still remained largely in the stage of planning and construction.
The plans had been drawn on an ambitious scale and in keeping with the AAF's

* Langford Lodge, originally conceived by General Brett as performing third echelon
maintenance, was now to be a base depot for fourth echelon maintenance.

--638--

determination to establish a
self-sufficient force. During World War I, American military forces in
Europe had achieved organizational and operational independence, but they had
remained (and this was particularly true of the air service) dependent upon
their allies for much of the equipment and many of the services used.
Leaders of the AAF at the outset in World War
II had been determined this time to achieve as a general policy logistical as
well as operational independence.122
Circumstances, of course, were far more favorable to such a policy than had
been the case in the earlier war, for our allies now depended heavily upon
American production in their own efforts. But the building of a service
organization on the scale required for support of so ambitious an undertaking as
had been projected for the Eighth Air Force required time, even with the
advantage which circumstances fortunately had provided in the opportunity for a
certain amount of prewar planning. And so in June 1942, Langford Lodge and
Warton would not be ready for months; the Ministry of Aircraft Production
installation at Burtonwood would have to carry the main burden until the
following year, and only because of this assistance and a variety of other aids
provided by the British would it be possible for the Eighth to make its
presence felt by the Germans in advance of that time.

Overseas Movement

Meanwhile, the overseas movement of the
Eighth, given an added impetus by the decision in favor of ROUNDUP, had begun
on 27 April, when advance echelons of the headquarters of the Eighth Air Force
and of the VIII Bomber, Fighter, and Base Commands, together with a weather
detachment, the 15th Bombardment Squadron (Separate), and the 2d Air Depot
Group, comprising in all approximately 1,800 officers and men, sailed from
Boston for Liverpool on the
transport Andes.123
That same day the War Department directed that the air force and all command
headquarters, the 97th Bombardment Group (H), the 1st and 31st Pursuit Groups,
the 5th Photo Squadron, and the 5th Air Depot Group be prepared for movement
overseas not later than 1 June 1942.124
Like most AAF overseas deployments, this first movement of the Eighth Air Force
was divided into two echelons--ground and air. The bulk of the troops and
equipment would proceed by water transport, while the aircraft with skeleton
crews would fly by way of the
North Atlantic route.125

--639--

The first shipment reached Liverpool on 11
May, after a two-week voyage. The several headquarters detachments joined
the bomber command staff at High Wycombe; the 2d Air Depot Group went to
Molesworth, the 15th Bombardment Squadron to Grafton Underwood, whence it moved
to Molesworth in June.126
Destined to become the first Eighth Air Force unit to enter combat, the 15th
Squadron began its training with RAF Bostons instead of the specially equipped
night fighters earlier intended for it.127

Back in Washington the chief difficulty in
moving the main part of the ground echelon was to find the necessary shipping,
a problem that was not solved until the Queen
Elizabeth was made available for an early June trip and the War Department
gave to the Eighth a priority for the shipment of 15,000 troops
in that month.128
During the preceding month, warning and movement orders reached the several
headquarters concerned, and from stations throughout the country, but
especially from the concentration area in the southeast, the assigned units
moved to Fort Dix, where the Eighth Air Force had established its own temporary
Staging Area Command to facilitate the
final preparations.129
The first contingent of about 1,200 men, out of the total of more than 11,000,
sailed on 29 May with a slow convoy, which also carried 7,500 tons of Eighth
Air Force equipment, and did not reach England until 12 June. The remainder,
comprising chiefly the ground echelons of the 97th Bombardment Group, the 1st
and 31st Fighter Groups, the 60th Transport Group,* the 5th Air Depot Group,
and other service units, left New York aboard the Queen Elizabeth on 4 June and
arrived in the United Kingdom six
days later.130
Everything considered, the movement had been completed remarkably close to the
date originally set. A critical shortage of shipping continued, but high
priorities were accorded additional bomber, fighter, transport, and service
units that were to follow during the summer.131

Even so, the prospect of an early
commitment of the Eighth to battle depended upon a plan to fly its planes and
aircrews across the Atlantic. This plan, which covered the intended movement of
fighters as well as bombers, represented at the time a more daring decision
than would be true of any similar action today. In early 1942, AAF pilots were
becoming accustomed to long and hazardous overwater flights, but the AAF had
not as yet made the idea commonplace. RAF

* Transport units were redesignated "troop carrier" in July 1942.

--640--

pilots had been ferrying
bombers across the North Atlantic since 1940, and since the summer of 1941 the
Air Corps Ferrying Command had given attention to the development of facilities
along the route; but in April 1942, these facilities were still unequal to the
demands of such a movement as was now proposed.132
And so while General Eaker directed preparations in England and General Spaatz
supervised the organization of a force in the United States, the Ferrying
Command, under General George, redoubled its efforts to prepare the airway
along which so many of the AAF's planes were destined to find their way into
combat.133
The route ran from Presque Isle in Maine to Goose Bay in Labrador, then either
by BLUIE WEST 1 (Narsarssuak) on the
southern coast of Greenland or BLUIE WEST
8 (Sondre Stromfjord) on the west coast to Reykjavik in Iceland, and thence to
Prestwick, the British terminal of trans-Atlantic flights on the west
coast of Scotland. The distances involved varied from the 569 statute miles
separating Presque Isle from Goose Bay to the grueling 1,002 miles from there
to BLUIE WEST 8.

It had been decided by the middle of April
that the combat groups would fly their own planes--the 97th its B-17's,
the 1st its P-38's, the 31st its P-39's--and that the Eighth Air
Force would have responsibility fo
the movement.134
To the VIII Fighter Command, under Brig. Gen. Frank O'D. Hunter, General Spaatz
assigned control of the entire air movement. Because of the special hazards
involved in the dispatch of fighter aircraft on long overseas hops, the B-17's
were to be detailed to lead flights of up to six aircraft on each leg of the
journey. The pilots, who had been trained for combat rather than for ferrying,
required special training, and so it was planned to move all units into a
concentration area for the purpose about
the middle of May.135
Accordingly, on the 15th of that month the three groups were ordered to Grenier
Field in New Hampshire and Dow Field in Maine.136
During the first week of June, the 60th Transport Group with its C-47's
was added to the movement and ordered to Westover Field in Massachusetts, where
it, too, came under the control of the
VIII Fighter Command.137

But while the combat units of the Eighth
in New England studied the problems and procedures of the projected air
movement,138
the Japanese fleet steamed toward Midway; and on 1 June, orders went out from
Washington suspending the movement of the Eighth and directing that all planes
be held on six hours' notice for dispatch to a

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new destination.139
The critical hour had come in the Pacific, and all available planes were moving
west--west from Hawaii to Midway, from Hamilton and March to Hickam, and
westward across the North American continent to fill the vacuum created on the
Pacific coast by departures for Hawaii and the Aleutians, where the enemy also
was expected. On 2 June the War Department ordered the 97th Bombardment Group
and the 1st Fighter Group to the West Coast on assignment to the Western
Defense Command.140
They would be released in approximately a week from this
new assignment,141
and would return to New England from the Pacific coast to resume preparations
for their trans-Atlantic movement, but the resultant delay occasioned by
this emergency cost at least two weeks.*

The 31st Fighter Group had been ordered on
4 June to proceed to England, but without the B-17's of the 97th to lead
the P-39's across it was not considered practicable to move the unit by
air.142
And so the 31st went by water, and having left its planes in the United States
for the lack of space, it reached England by the middle of June to take up its
station at Atcham and High Ercall west
of Huntingdon.143
In lieu of the P-39's left behind, the unit promptly acquired RAF
Spitfires, in which it began training
almost at once.144
Thus it came about that the first complete American combat group in the
European theater entered battle with British planes. It was not alone in this
particular for it was followed in July and August by the 52d Fighter Group,
which also made its movement by water and was equipped in the theater with
Spitfires.145

Meantime, preparations had been pushed for
the delayed movement of the 97th, the 1st, and the 60th. On 15 June, General
Spaatz, stopping at BLUIE WEST 1 in his
flight across the North Atlantic,
advised Arnold by radio that all B-17's not needed for escort of the P-38's
should proceed without delay, and that the pursuits should follow not later
than 21 June, by which time the C-47's should
also be ready.146
On the 18th the VIII Fighter Command from its temporary headquarters at Grenier
Field issued orders for the movement:

*On 2 June, the 97th left the concentration area and flew across the
country in two separate elements, one to McChord Field, Washington, by way of
Mitchel Field, Ft. Leavenworth, and Boise; and the other to Hammer Field,
Fresno, California, by way of Scott Field and Albuquerque. On 11 June both
elements left the Pacific coast, and by 18 June they had returned to their
stations at Grenier and Dow fields. The 1st, Fighter Group left Dow Field on 5
June and flew to Morris Field, North Carolina, on the first leg of its journey
to the west. On 6 June it was ordered to return to Dow Field and departed for there
on the same day.

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Map No. 30: Routes of the BOLERO Movement

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all planes--forty-nine
B-17's, eighty P-38's, and fifty-two C-47's--would
proceed to Presque Isle, where they would be organized for the movement into
squadrons of three flights each, each flight to comprise two elements, and each
element to consist of one B-17 and four P-38's. The B-17's
not required for escort under this arrangement also would make the flight in
small elements.147
The hardy C-47, as befitted its mission, in addition to getting itself to
England, would carry a cargo of freight.

The first planes, eighteen B-17's,
took off from Presque Isle on 23 June for Goose Bay, where before the day was
over all of the big bombers had come in.148
Three days later these planes left for BLUIE WEST
1 and 8, but only nine reached
their destination safely, six having turned back to Goose Bay and the other
three having been forced down along the coast of Greenland. The crews of the
wrecked bombers were all saved, but weather and communications were fully
revealed as the major difficulties governing the use of the route. Also on 23
June the first flights of P-38's safely negotiated the initial leg from
Presque Isle to Goose Bay. Additional flights proceeded, as weather and other
circumstances permitted, without mishap until 15 July, when six P-38's
and two B-17's came down on the ice cap on the eastern coast of
Greenland. For this misfortune, which all crews survived, unfavorable weather
and misleading directional broadcasts by the enemy
were blamed.149
On 1 July, the first American-operated tactical aircraft to reach the
United Kingdom by air in World War II--B-17 No. 19085--landed at
Prestwick.150
Twenty-six days later, Col. Newton Longfellow brought into the British
terminal the last planes of this first BOLERO
air movement.151
The AAF had estimated that losses would run as high as
10 per cent;152
yet despite extremely unfavorable weather which seriously delayed
the movement,153
it had been accomplished with the loss of few planes and with no serious injury
to any of the personnel engaged in it.

A second movement followed hard upon the
first, so close, in fact, as already to suggest the parallel of a pipeline
extending from Presque Isle to Prestwick. The ground echelons of the 92d and
301st Bombardment Groups (H), of the 14th Fighter Group, and of the 64th Troop
Carrier Group had moved to the port of embarkation in July and left for the
United Kingdom late that month and in
early August.154
Simultaneously, their air echelons moved into a northeastern concentration area
preparatory to a take-off from Presque

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Isle as soon as the other
movement had cleared the field there. The way was clear by 22 July, when twenty-eight
P-38's of the 14th Group escorted by six B-17's flew from Presque
Isle to Goose Bay. The other planes followed in a continuing movement that was
distinguished chiefly by the pioneering effort of the 92d Group in
accomplishing between 15 and 27 August the nonstop flight of all four of its
squadrons from Gander in Newfoundland to Prestwick without the
loss of a plane. 155

By the end of August, 386 aircraft--164 P-38's,
119 B-17's, and 103 C-47's--had crossed to England by the North
Atlantic ferry route. Additional groups and replacement aircraft for the Eighth
and Twelfth Air Forces would follow during the remainder of the year; all told,
920 planes by 1 January 1943 had attempted the crossing and 882 reached their
destinations, of which approximately 700 belonged to the Eighth. The
anticipated accident ratio of 10 per cent did not materialize--it actually
amounted to 5.2 per cent. Of the 38 planes failing to reach Prestwick, 29 were
classified as "wrecked" and 9 as "lost." The AAF had been particularly anxious
about the P-38's, but out of 186 dispatched during 1942 only 7 failed to
reach their destination; in addition to the 6 wrecked in July, 1 was
subsequently lost.156
And before passing on, it should be noted that nearly all of the 700 planes
delivered to the Eighth were flown by their own combat crews, not by veteran
and highly trained ferry or transport pilots.

As the movements developed, the principal
concern of AAF leaders in England was over the slowness of the initial movement
and the prospect that winter would cut off this line of reinforcement. They
hoped that improvement of communications and weather facilities would permit
not only bombers but fighters to make the flight, but Headquarters, AAF felt
the risks were too great. After December, the North Atlantic route was closed
to virtually all planes until spring.157

Establishment in United Kingdom

The period extending from the opening of General Spaatz' headquarters in the United
Kingdom on 18 June158
to the first heavy bomber mission on 17 August saw the completion of the
initial stage in the development of the Eighth Air Force. Its headquarters--in
code WIDEWING--was located in the suburbs southwest of London at Bushy Park,
Teddington. During the latter part of June and in July, the newly established
headquarters gathered into its hands the

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reins of command and assumed
the responsibility for planning which theretofore had belonged chiefly to the
VIII Bomber Command.159

It is not surprising that the VIII Bomber
Command under General Eaker was in many ways further advanced than were any of
the other commands, for its staff enjoyed by far the widest experience in
coping with problems peculiar to the theater. Already in mid-June the
bomber command had taken a significant step toward the development of adequate
machinery for the control of combat operations by establishing the Provisional 1st
Bombardment Wing at Brampton Grange under the command of Col. Claude E. Duncan,
who had been in the theater since January.160
Still another step came on 27 July with the full-fledged activation of
both the 1st and 2d Bombardment Wings; the command of the latter, at Old Catton
in Norfolk, was given to Col. Newton Longfellow, who on that day landed at
Prestwick to complete the first
BOLERO movement.161
There would be some reshuffling of the paper over the next few weeks: the two
wings were dependent upon action in the United States for provision of
necessary headquarters personnel, and headquarters and headquarters squadrons
meanwhile having been established in the States for each of the wings, the
theater organizations were redesignated "provisional" in August and re-established
on a permanent basis in September.162
But all this was for the sake of the record; at the end of August the 97th,
301st, and 92d Groups had been assigned to
the 1st Wing,163
while the 2d Wing awaited the early arrival of its headquarters squadron and
additional combat groups.

Arnold and Portal had agreed in May that
the American fighter units would be stationed at first with RAF fighters in
southern England. General Hunter's headquarters, accordingly, was opened on 28
July, shortly after his arrival in the theater, at Bushey Hall, Watford, on the
outskirts of northwest London and within easy reach of the headquarters of the
RAF Fighter Command.164
There were four American fighter groups in the theater a month later, all of
them--the 1st and 14th with their P-38's and the 31st and 52d with
Spitfires--stationed on RAF fields and already showing progress in the mastery
of RAF procedures and techniques of control.165

The VIII Ground Air Support Command under
Brig. Gen. Robert C. Candee did not open its headquarters at Membury in
Berkshire, about fifty miles west of London, until 17 August, after close study
of RAF organization for air-ground cooperation.166
Its mission being

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Organization of Eighth Air Force as of August 1942

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that of preparation for the
support of ground operations not yet definitely scheduled, the command at the
time had only one unit assigned to it and that, the 15th Bombardment Squadron,
was actually attached to the VIII Bomber Command for its
current operations.167
In August the VIII Ground Air Support Command took control of a troop carrier
wing whose two groups, the 60th and 64th, were stationed at Aldermaston and
Ramsbury, both places in the vicinity
of Membury.168

Under Brig. Gen. Charles C. Chauncey, the
VIII Air Force Composite Command in September set up temporary headquarters at
Long Kesh, an RAF station southwest of Belfast.169
It carried forward plans for an ambitious program of training, but it would
remain for over a year without a job to do beyond that of planning. While the
Eighth remained a relatively small organization, operational training continued
to be predominantly a unit affair conducted on the home bases of the several
groups.

Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank and the
headquarters of the VIII Air Force Service Command arrived early in July. Because
its responsibility for supply and maintenance included every element in the
Eighth Air Force, the service command's relationship to the force headquarters
and to the several commands was both close and constant. Consequently, General
Frank, who as commanding general of the Third Air Force had been actively
identified with the origins of the Eighth, set up his headquarters at Bushy
Park.170
The need for close co-ordination between the VIII Air Force Service
Command and its parent organization was thus recognized in their close physical
proximity; the same need would result in 1944 in the integration of the two
headquarters into a single operational and logistical organization. Meanwhile,
in August 1942 the service command established two subcommands, known as
service areas, for the direction of activities respectively in Ireland and in
England and Wales.171
Under the service command, too, the 12th Replacement Control Depot took over
responsibility for receipt and process of incoming casual and filler personnel.
Its stations at Stone in Staffordshire and Chorley in Lancashire would become
familiar to hundreds of thousands of air force officers and enlisted men during
the next three years.172

The European Theater of Operations United
States Army (ETOUSA) having replaced USAFBI shortly before the assumption of
the new command by Mai. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower on 24

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The Spitfire Mk-5

The Spitfire Mk-5, Side View

Crash-Landed Planes of the Eighth Air Force
Greenland-BOLERO-Summer 1942

June, General Spaatz on 21
August was assigned additional responsibilities as theater
Air Officer.173
Over and above the special assurance thus provided of the active participation
of air officers in theater planning at its highest level, the step marked the
beginning of a close personal relationship between Generals Eisenhower and
Spaatz which contributed greatly to the successful development and employment
of American air power in the war against Germany. The Eighth Air Force had been
assigned to the theater's command, and already a directive of 21 July to
General Spaatz had gone far toward clarifying the main outlines of the
relationship thus established.174
That relationship naturally reflected something of the new status of
semiautonomy attained by the AAF within the Army, as well as some of the
difficulties inherent in a status which required sharper definition.

In the attempt to work out a practical
definition suited to the requirements of the European theater, primary
importance attached to questions of supply. Maj. Gen. John C. H. Lee having
been selected for command of the theater Services of Supply (SOS), which was on
an organizational level with the Eighth Air Force, conferences between him and
key figures of the VIII Air Force Service Command prior to their departure from
the United States went far toward fixing the basic policies that would be
followed after the opening of General Lee's headquarters in England
on 24 May.175
The SOS would be responsible for all problems of construction, for debarkation
activities, and for the supply of items common to both ground and air forces.
In addition the theater retained the final authority for determining priorities
for shipping from the United States. Under the over-all logistical
control of the SOS, however, the VIII Air Force Service Command held primary
responsibility for all supply and maintenance peculiar to
the air force.176
The decision in effect conceded to the AAF in Britain a substantial degree of
logistical autonomy; yet in a matter as vital as airdrome construction VIII Air
Force Service Command could act only
through SOS.177
A certain amount of friction was unavoidable, and though individual differences
usually could be settled by agreement, the fundamental difficulty continued. A
natural goal of AAF personnel became the establishment of a service command
independent of SOS and on the same echelon
of command.178

In July the details of a master plan for
the occupation and development of an VIII Bomber Command sector were worked out
with

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the British. This plan
provided for the ultimate occupation of five areas, each of fifteen airdromes,
in the region extending eastward from Huntingdonshire through
East Anglia.179
The shortage of British labor had made necessary the provision of American
aviation engineer battalions. They were slow in arriving and sometimes came
without their equipment, but a similar delay in the build-up of combat
units served to prevent the development of any
immediate crisis.180
As construction at Langford Lodge and Warton fell behind schedule, Burtonwood
assumed increasing importance and some of Lockheed's civilian recruits went to
work there on their arrival in July pending the completion of facilities in
Ulster.181
In addition to Burtonwood, there were now added three small special depots for
Chemical Warfare and Ordnance at near-by Poynton, at Sharnbrook in
Huntingdonshire, and at Barnham in East Anglia. Still dependent largely on
storage space made available temporarily at RAF stations, the Eighth in July
refigured its long-range requirements at 4,000,000 square feet, much of
it to be provided through the new depot construction
program.182

Of immediate concern was the question of
advance air depots for the bomber sector. It had been proposed in June that one
mobile air depot should be established for every three operational airdromes,
and early in July, General Spaatz, on the basis of the currently anticipated
flow of combat units, was thinking in terms of twenty mobile depots for the
entire air force.183
It was decided in August, however, to impose a heavier burden on the individual
airdromes and the base depots, and on the suggestion of General Frank it was decided
to provide only three advance depots, two for the bomber command and one for
the fighter command, with the additional provision of such genuinely mobile
depots as might be required during intensive periods
of operation.184
The service command selected Honington and Warton, both in East Anglia, as
sites for the bomber areas; a final decision in the case of the fighter command
awaited settlement of the more fundamental question of its mission and
location.185
Thus the advance air depots which in 1943 became a functioning part of the
Eighth Air Force were considerably larger than the traditional mobile air depot
on which they originally had been patterned.

It will be readily apparent that in August
1942, while great progress had been made over the preceding six months toward
the establishment

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of a well-rounded
American air organization in England, the Eighth Air Force remained heavily
dependent upon the RAF. For some time yet, much of the heavy repair work on its
engines, airframes, and propellers would be done by RAF No. 24 Maintenance Unit
and by British workmen at Burtonwood, and all of the salvage work, of
importance at a time when planes and spare parts were scarce, by RAF No. 43
Group.186
When because of the shortage of shipping and other difficulties AAF units
arrived without their organic equipment and supplies, the RAF furnished
hundreds of items--ammunition, bombs, vehicles, tools, spares, flying clothing
ñ to supply the deficiencies. Again, when for the purpose at hand certain items
of British equipment, for example, pyrotechnics, synthetic training devices,
dinghies, and certain items of radio and electrical equipment, were found to be
superior to that of the Americans, the British made their procurement possible.
When unanticipated requirements for new equipment and new types of supplies
arose from operational needs, the British provided them or assisted in securing
their manufacture in the United Kingdom.187
In addition, the RAF continued to provide training as required for aircrews, ground
crews, technicians, and other specialists.188

By way of summation, the historian can do
no better than to quote from the warm tribute of General Eaker in his report to
General Spaatz of 19 June on the "Work of the
Advance Echelon."189
The British, he wrote,

in whose theater we have been
understudying and operating for the past five months, have co-operated
one hundred per cent in every regard. They have lent us personnel when we had
none, and have furnished us clerical and administrative staffs; they have
furnished us liaison officers for Intelligence, Operations and Supply: they
have furnished us transportation; they have housed and fed our people, and they
have answered promptly and willingly all our requisitions: in addition they
have made available to us for study their most secret devices and documents. We
are extremely proud of the relations we have been able to establish between our
British Allies and ourselves, and we are very hopeful that the present basis
can be continued, and that all incoming staff and tactical commanders will take
the same pains we have to nurture and maintain the excellent relations which
now exist.

Implicit in all of the arrangements being
made in the United Kingdom was the belief that the build-up, of American
air power in the European theater would take place within the time and on the
scale proposed in the spring of 1942 by way of preparation for Operation
ROUNDUP. To complement this strategic plan for the invasion of

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western Europe in the spring
of 1943, a plan for the build-up and accommodation of American forces in
the United Kingdom had been initiated in late April under the code name of
BOLERO.190
Combined committees of British and American members, their province falling
entirely in the field of logistics, were set up in Washington and London to
expedite arrangements for the build-up. Composed of key staff officers of
the several planning agencies concerned, these committees served to co-ordinate
the effort on the highest level.

With April 1943 set tentatively as the
target date for ROUNDUP, the Operations Division of the War Department and AAF
Headquarters in May 1942 drafted plans to place by that time 1,000,000 American
troops in the United Kingdom. The troop basis was broken down to provide
525,000 ground troops, 240,000 air force troops, and 235,000 for Services of
Supply.191
Within the limit thus set, the AAF by 13 May had developed a "Rough Estimate-Tentative"
which called for the placing in the United Kingdom prior to 1 April 1943 of
twenty-one heavy bombardment groups, eight medium bombardment groups,
nine light bombardment groups, seventeen pursuit groups, six observation
groups, and eight transport groups--the grand total being sixty-nine
groups plus supporting service units.192
As the figures themselves indicate, the force would represent a balance between
the requirements of a previously planned program of strategic bombardment and
of the tactical operations to be expected in the actual invasion of Europe.

A further development and refinement of
these studies enabled General Arnold during his conferences with Air Chief
Marshal Portal in late May to present a "Programme of
Arrival of U.S. Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom" which provided for a
flow into the theater by March 1943 of sixty-six combat groups, exclusive
of observation squadrons, and of 3,649 airplanes. The breakdown had been
adjusted as follows: for bombardment, nineteen heavy, twelve medium, and twelve
light groups; for pursuit, fifteen groups; and for transport, eight. The
proposed build-up would advance from fifteen groups in July to thirty-five
in November and to sixty-six in March. General Arnold anticipated that by
1 April 1943 the Eighth would have in combat units 800 heavy bombers, 600
medium bombers, 342 light bombers, and
960 fighters.193
At the time of General Arnold's departure from London for home on 2 June 1942,
the actual strength

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of the Eighth Air Force in the United Kingdom was a mere 1,871 troops and no
American aircraft.194

By the first of July, a reappraisal of
possibilities in the light of new demands from other theaters had brought a
downward revision of the BOLERO build-up to a total of fifty-four
groups less transport units, and to 194,332 men. The main strength of the
Eighth would be concentrated in seventeen heavy and ten medium bombardment
groups; fighter groups had been reduced to thirteen and light bombardment to
three.195
These figures served as the basis upon which plans for the organization and
accommodation of the Eighth were drafted during its first weeks in the United
Kingdom. Even with the reductions forced by considerations of shipping,
production, training, and the demands of other theaters, the proposed build-up
underscored the ambitious scale on which leaders of the AAF projected plans for
their major effort.

An attempt by AAF Headquarters during
early July to extend its estimate of the BOLERO build-up to 31 December
1943 lends still greater emphasis to the point. Planners estimated that the
total number of groups by that date would stand at 137, or approximately half
of the currently projected strength of the AAF. There would be seventy-four
bombardment groups (forty-one heavy, fifteen medium, thirteen dive, and
five light), thirty-one fighter groups, twelve observation groups,
fifteen transport groups, four photo groups, and one mapping group, and a total
of 375,000 men, of which 197,000 would serve in tactical units and 178,000 in
the various service organizations.196
The estimate proved to be remarkably close, particularly with regard to the
heavy bomber force, to the actual strength established in the United Kingdom in
advance of the invasion of 6 June 1944, though the figures given for the number
of groups were high and for the total of personnel low.

In London during July the BOLERO committee
continued its work on plans calling for the accommodation of 195,000 air force
troops, 556,000 ground troops, 259,000 SOS troops, and 137,000 replacements, of
whom 35,000 would belong to the AAF--all to be placed in the United Kingdom by
the end of March 1943.197
But at the end of July, as has been noted elsewhere, it had been decided to
abandon SLEDGEHAMMER,* to mount instead TORCH, and to
postpone ROUNDUP,
probably until 1944. The BOLERO committee

thus found its work
reduced to an academic status, except insofar as it provided assistance in the
planning for an invasion of Northwest Africa and for distant objectives in the
United Kingdom.

Even before the first heavy bomber mission
of the Eighth could be flown, Operation TORCH had cast its shadow over the
hopes of the AAF for a major share in the strategic bombardment of Germany. It
would be the chief task of the Eighth Air Force through the ensuing weeks to
prepare the Twelfth Air Force for the invasion of Africa. JUNIOR was the name
pinned on the new air force, but JUNIOR would outgrow its parent and less than
three months after Mission 1 of the VIII Bomber Command, General Spaatz could
well ask: "What is left of the Eighth Air Force after the impact of
TORCH?"198