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Friday, 8 June 2012

A Fragile Détente on Turkey’s Kurdish Issue

Turkish politics recently has
been like a rolling avalanche. Issues and controversies get picked up and never
dropped; instead, they get tangled up together until every part of political
life is made up of myriad, interlocking dramas.

For instance, the historic
negotiations between the AKP government and the main opposition CHP over
the Kurdish question cannot be disentangled from: the bad blood between the two
parties, PM Erdoğan’s alleged authoritarian streak and his war of words with
the pro-Kurdish BDP, the new constitution, the clampdown on the KCK, foreign
policy, the aftermath of the Uludere airstrike, the role of the military in
politics and the internecine battles between the military, government, and
intelligence services.

With all that in mind, there are
grounds for a bit of scepticism over the negotiations between the main parties
to find a kind of grand bargain over the Kurdish issue. For one thing, there is
no love lost between the prickly Prime Minister and the CHP’s Kemal
Kılıçdaroğlu, who has largely shed his professorial image after a series of bruising
clashes with the government and with party rebels. The body language in this
photo is pretty indicative of their frosty relationship.

Nonetheless, what is significant
is not the CHP’s 10-point proposal on settling the conflict, but the fact that
they – and not the AKP – proposed a new ‘roadmap’, and that the government was
prepared to listen. At this stage the debate is about methodologies and
confidence-building, not concrete steps, but that is still quite an achievement
given the bitterness of political discourse in Turkey recently. Both sides are
being rather polite about each other.

However another stumbling block
is the continued absence of the nationalist MHP from the process. The party has
refused
to join the CHP’s initiative, insisting that the issue is one of terrorism, not
of the Kurds.

This could be a break between the
MHP and elements of the AKP. There was a brief moment a couple of weeks ago
when it seemed
that the government and the nationalists were aligned
on the fight against terrorism (and by extension the wider Kurdish issue) after
Interior Minister İdris Naim Şahin accused the 34 victims of the botched Uludere
airstrike of collaborating with the PKK, a stance backed
by the MHP.

But subsequent criticism
by senior AKP mandarins, and now the truce between Kılıçdaroğlu and Erdoğan,
suggests that the government prefers to have the CHP on board than the nationalists.
As columnists have pointed
out, a Kurdish roadmap backed by both parties would represent about 75% of
the electorate, unlike previous government-led initiatives.

There are many possible pitfalls
ahead, which underlines the complexity and the rapid shifts in Turkish
politics:

1)Where
does the BDP stand? So far the pro-Kurdish party, which has been hammered by
arrests, judicial pressure and harsh criticisms by the AKP, has expressed
cautious support for a process based on dialogue. There seems to be a sense
that the CHP can act as a middleman between the government and the Kurdish
party.

2)What
will the MHP do? One way it could act as a spoiler is to cause problems in the
process of drafting a new constitution, due to be complete by December. The party
has been clear about its red lines on issues such as language and national unity,
areas which any Kurdish roadmap could cause difficulties. The MHP may use this
as an indirect tool to influence the AKP-CHP process.

3)What
will the PKK do? As usual in such situations the militants appear to be divided
between pro- and anti-reconciliation elements. The hardline elements will view
any talks as a betrayal of the dream of Kurdish independence, and would be
likely to ramp up attacks and kidnappings to derail the negotiations. The pressure
on both the AKP and CHP – within party ranks and without – to call off talks could
soon become insurmountable.

4)On
a related issue, what will the process even be? Who will the government talk
to, and in what format? The CHP’s proposal for commissions on the subject are
all very well, but how will these work and how will they interact with the
panels drafting relevant sections of the constitution?

5)What
does the process mean for the CHP? It remains unclear why Kılıçdaroğlu has chosen
to reach out his hand to a man he called a “post-modern dictator” back in February.
Is the party seeking to become a new and more liberal force which can resolve
the Kurdish issue? Or is it merely angling to have more influence on the new
constitution? And how does this affect the CHP’s relationship with the remnants
of the avowedly secular, anti-AKP and anti-Kurd ‘deep state’?

6)Can
the AKP-CHP alliance endure? Even recently the two leaders were at loggerheads
and appear to viscerally dislike each other (particularly Erdoğan, who could be
an Olympic champion for grudge-holding). Previous alliances have crumbled.
Given the sensitivity and complexity of the issue at hand, this may soon
disintegrate too.

About Me

Alex Jackson is a political risk analyst working on politics, security, economics and energy in the Caspian region.
He has written and spoken widely on the region and currently works in London.
He can be contacted at ajackson320@gmail.com or @Caspian_Intel