THE AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION was createdby Congress
in 1923 for the purpose of commemorating the services of American forces
in Europe during the World War. In the accomplishment of this mission,
the Commission has erected suitable memorials in Europe and improved and
beautified the eight American cemeteries there. It has also published a
book entitled "American Armies and Battlefields in Europe" which
gives a concise account of the vital part played by American forces in
the World War and detailed information regarding the memorials and cemeteries.

In order that the actions of American troops might be accurately set
forth, detailed studies were made of the operations of each division which
had front-line battle service. In certain cases studies of sector service
were also prepared. It is felt that the results of this research should
now be made available to the public. Therefore, these studies are being
published in a series of twenty-eight booklets, each booklet devoted to
the operations of one division.

In these booklets only the active service of the divisions is covered
in detail. The accounts, however, are comprehensiveenough to be
of general interest and establish a great body of fact concerning the operations.
For the military student, they provide an excellent background for tactical
studies and present an extensive list of sources upon which further study
can be based.

AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION

s/John J. Pershing, Chairman

PREFACE

IN READING the booklets of this series it should be borne in mindthat they are based on historical studies which were prepared by the
American Battle Monuments Commission primarily for the purpose of determining
the front line of each American division for each day of its active operations.
Consequently, they were essentially front-line infantry studies. The operations
of other arms, movements of reserves and other phases of the operations
were covered only in sufficient detail to afford a complete understanding
of the infantry action.

The preparation of these studies was begun soon after the Commission
was created, and every precaution was taken to insure that the research
would be conducted with the utmost accuracy and thoroughness. A number
of officers from the Regular Army as well as from the Marine Corps were
selected and detailed to the Commission from time to time to carry on the
work. All records of the War Department pertaining to the subject were
exhaustively examined, as were the French, British and German documents
which had been collected by the Army War College. From these sources, the
daily front lines of each division were determined and plotted on large-scale
maps, and brief accounts of the operations were prepared. The maps and
accounts of operations were then referred to officers of the divisions
concerned for comment and additional information. They were normally sent
to officers of all ranks down to and including company commanders. In cases
of doubtful or controversial points, the reference was carried further.
The replies received were carefully studied, evaluated and used to correct
and amplify the original studies. In this way, the Commission was able
to secure and preserve valuable datawhich otherwise would have
been lost.

In these booklets, it has not been the purpose to go far beyond the
scope of the original studies. However, casualty and strength tables have
beenadded and enough other material

v

has been included to present connected histories of the division from
their organization until the conclusion of their service itEurope,
and to portray their actions in proper relationship to the operations of
the corps and armies with which they served.

In order to indicate to the reader the areas in which the divisions
served, a general map of France and Belgium has been included in each booklet.
This map shows the principal cities and the battle lines of July 17 and
November 11. In addition it shows, by special symbol, certain localities
of particular interest to the division concerned.

All dates are 1918 unless otherwise indicated and are inclusive for
example, October 9-11 includes the three days, October 9, 10 and 11. Dates
in the headings of chapters dealing with operations, and in the titles
of accompanying maps, are in general the dates between which one or more
infantry regiments of the division have been awarded battle honors by the
War Department. In certain cases infantry regiments, as well as other elements
of the division, have been awarded battle honors for dates other than those
indicated. The dates on the battle line of the maps include the period
during which the division held command. The lines are as of midnight unless
otherwise indicated; for example, October 9 indicates the line held at
midnight, October 9.

The operation maps are reproductions of maps commonly used by American
forces during the World War. In a great number of cases it was necessary
to use parts of two or moresheets of the wartime maps to make one
operation map, which accounts for the different treatments of topographical
detail often found on the same operation map. Names which appear on the
maps in the abbreviated form are spelled in full in the text. A table of
abbreviations with the French equivalent and English translation appears
in the front of each booklet. Names of certain topographical features which
are well known, and are frequently referred to, appear in the text in the
Anglicized form for example, Argonne Forest rather than Forêt d'Argonne,
Marne River rather than Marne Rivière.

The casualty figures are based on the official casualty records of The
Adjutant General. Tables of casualties have been prepared, however, only
for the periods of active operations. The

vi

purpose is to show the casualties which occurred under the division
command during specific actions. Therefore, casualties of elements which
were detached during the actions are not included, while casualties of
elements of other divisions which were attached have been included. It
will be noted that, in the majority of cases, the dates in the casualty
tables cover longer periods than those in the chapter headings or on the
maps. This was found necessary in order to include all casualties incident
to entering or leaving the line.

Organization, and Service fromArrival in the A. E. F. until September 25

THE 92D DIVISION, National Army, was organized in November 1917, from
colored selective service men from the United States at large. The various
units were assembled and received their preliminary training at Camps Funston,
Kansas; Grant, Illinois; Upton, New York; Dix, New Jersey; Meade, Maryland;
Dodge, Iowa; and Sherman, Ohio. The division was brought to full strength
in May 1918. [1]1

The details of organization of the American infantry division were changed
from time to time during the World War. Under

1 The figures in brackets at the ends of paragraphs refer
to the sources on which the statements in the paragraphs are based. All
sources are listed in the appendix (p. 37).

4

the tables of organization which were in use in the American Expeditionary
Forces on November 11, 1918, and which, in general, were in force during
1918, the maximum authorized strength of the division was 991 officers
and 27,114 men. Its principal armament was 24 155-mm howitzers, 48 75-mm
guns, 12 6-inch trench mortars, 260 machine guns and 16,193 rifles. Further
details concerning the composition of the American infantry division appear
in the table on page 35. The divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces
seldom attained the maximum authorized strength shown above. The actual
strength of the 92d Division on certain dates is shown in the table one
page 36. The approximate strength of the division for other dates may be
obtained by applying to these figures the battle losses which appear in
the casualty tables following the accounts of battle operations. [2]

In May the greater part of the division, less artillery, was concentrated
at Camp Upton, New York, prior to embarkation. Sailings from Hoboken began
on June 7. The various elements landed at Brest and St. Nazaire, the last
troops arriving in France on July 12. [1]

Following its arrival in France, the 92d Division, less artillery, proceeded
to the 11th (Bourbonne-les-Bains) Training Area. The artillery brigade
upon its arrival proceeded to Montmorillon for training. On August 12 the
division, less artillery, moved to the vicinity of Bruyères, in
the Vosges Mountains, in the area of the French Seventh Army. On the 13th
the artillery moved to La Courtine for further training. [1]

From August 23 to 30 the division, less artillery, affiliated with the
French 87th Division, and under control of the French XXXIII Corps, participated
in the occupation of the St. Dié Sector. This sector, which was
about 25 kilometers wide, lay in the Vosges north of St. Dié, and
controlled the southerners exit of the Saales Pass. At the end of this
period the 92d Division assumed command of the sector and held it until
September 20, when it was relieved by the French 20th Division, with which
the American 81st Division was affiliated. The next day the division commenced
a move to the region north

5

of Triaucourt, about 30 kilometers southwest of Verdun, and was assigned
to the American I Corps. [1]

On September 24 the division, less the 368th Infantry and artillery,
proceeded to the Argonne Forest northwest of Clermont-en-Argonne, where
it was in reserve of the I Corps. The 368th Infantry moved to an area north
of Sainte Menehould in the adjoining area of the French XXXVIII Corps.
[1]

6

Meuse-Argonne Offensive

MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER 26—OCTOBER 5

FROM THE TIME that the American Commander-in-Chief arrived
in France, he bent every effort toward organizing an American army under
American command at the earliest possible moment. To accomplish this would
normally consume considerable time because it would first be necessary
to transport a large number of troops to Europe, provide for their supply
and complete their training. The organization of this army was further
deferred by the critical situation created by the German offensives launched
in the spring and early summer of 1918. These offensives so depleted the
Allied reserves that the Allies faced almost certain defeat unless they
received immediate support. In this crisis the American Commander-in-Chief
postponed for the time being the concentration of American divisions for
the formation of an American army, and made all American combatant forces
available for service with the British and French armies. With this assistance,
the Allies were able not only to stop the German offensives before they
gained a decisive victory but, on July 18, to launch a successful counteroffensive
against the Germans in the Marne salient. On July 24, while this offensive
was still in progress, a strategic offensive plan was agreed upon by the
Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief which included a
mission for an American army. The immediate purpose of this plan was to
reduce the salients which interfered with railroad communications which
were essential to further offensive operations. One of these was the St.
Mihiel salient. [3, 5]

The American First Army was organized on August 10, and on August 30
assumed command of the front from Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle
River, to Watronville, 11 kilometers southeast of Verdun. From September
11 to 16 it conducted

7

the St. Mihiel Offensive which resulted in the reduction of
the St. Mihiel salient. [5]

With the reduction of the St. Mihiel and other salients theimmediate
purpose of the strategic offensive plan of July 24 had been accomplished,
and it became possible to undertake the great converging offensives which
had bean agreed upon by the Commanders-in-Chief and the Allied Commander-in-Chief
early in September. These offensives included an American attack to be
launched on September 26 between the Meuse River and the Argonne Forest,
supported on the left by the French Fourth Army between the Argonne and
the Suippes River; a renewal on September 27 of the British-French attack
between the Oise and Scarpe Rivers; and a combined Allied attack east of
Ypres on September 28. Between these principal offensives, secondary operations
were to be undertaken. [5, 6, 7, 107]

The Meuse-Argonne Offensive of the American First Army was to be directed
against the principal German lateral line of supply, the Carignan—Sedan—Mézières
railroad, which, at Sedan, lay 53 kilometers from the front. The severing
of this artery would render the German positions to the west and northwest
of Sedan untenable. [5]

Protecting this vital supply line, the Germans had, during the previous
four years, constructed a strong system of field fortifications. On the
Meuse-Argonne front, there were four distinct defensive positions. The
first lay close behind the front line. The second included Montfaucon and
traversed the Argonne south of Apremont. The third, which was known to
the Germans as the Kriemhild Stellung, formed a part of their great defensive
system, popularly called the Hindenburg Line which ran from the vicinity
of Metz to the North Sea. This position extended from Bois de Forêt,
across the heights of Cunel and Romagne, to include the high ground north
of Grandpré. The fourth position included the heights of Barricourt,
and extended westward to Buzancy and Thénorgues. The first three
positions had been thoroughly organized, and numerous intermediate positions
constructed between them.

8

These defenses, together with the natural military strength of the terrain,
presented a formidable obstacle to an attacking army. The importance of
the communications protected by this front made it certain that the Germans
would resist here to the last extremity. [5]

The plan of the First Army contemplated an initial advance of 16 kilometers
and a penetration of the hostile third position. This penetration would
force the enemy to evacuate the Argonne Forest, and insure the junction
of the First Army with the French Fourth Army at Grandpré. A further
advance of 16 kilometers was then to be made to the line, Stenay—le Chesne.
Such an advance would outflank the enemy's position along the Aisne River,
in front of the French Fourth Army, and clear the way for an advance on
Mézières or Sedan. These operations were to be supplemented
by an attack to clear the heights east of the Meuse River as far as Bois
de la Grande Montagne. [5]

In preparation for the Meuse-Argonne Offense, the front of the First
Army was extended from Watronville to the west edge of the Argonne Forest
on September 22. The attack was to be launched at 5:30 a. m., September
26, with the III, V and I Corps in line from right to left. West of the
Argonne Forest, the French Fourth Army was to attack in conjunction with
the American forces. Elements of the First Army east of the Meuse were
not to attack during the opening days of the offensive. [5]

P

The following paragraphs, in italic, are a synopsis of the service
of the 92d Division in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. This synopsis is designed
to make the principal facts concerning this service available to the reader
in compact form.

Thc 92dDivision, less the 368th Infantry and the 167th Field
Artillery Brigade, was in reserve of the I Corps on September 26.The
368th Infantry was an element of the Franco-American liaison group known
as Groupement Durand which operated between the American First Army
and the French Fourth Army. The regiment attacked on the right of Groupement
Durand on the morning

9

of the 26th on a 1-battalion front from La Harazée to Vienne-le-Château.
Thc regiment advanced about 1 kilometer, but in the evening all except
scattered platoons and its left company withdrew. Thc left company maintained
positions for the night in Tranchée des Baleines.

On the morning of September 27 the regiment, with two battalions
in line, reached and held scattered positions in Tranchée de la
Tringle, Tranchée Tirpitz and the upper reaches of Vallée
Moreau. In another attack late in the afternoon positions were reached
east and west of the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road; in and near
Tranchée Tirpitz and in Vallée Moreau.

On September 28 one company gained and occupied a line in the ravine
north of Tranchée Tirpitz. Troops on the left occupied positions
in Vallée Moreau.

Thc regiment took no offensive action on September 29. The left battalion
was relieved by French troops. The right battalion was relieved by the
former reserve battalion which took up positions in Tranchée Tirpitz.

On September 30 the regiment had moved forward to Tranchée
du Dromadaire by noon, and in the late afternoon joined the French in an
assault on Binarville. The town was captured and a line for the night held
about 300 meters to the south. There were detachments northeast
of the town and one company in line with the French.

The 368th Infantry was withdrawn from the front line on the morning
of October 1. The 92d Division, less artillery, engineers, and the 183d
Infantry Brigade, had been placed at the disposal of the French XXXVIII
Corps on the 29th, and remained in reserve of that corps from October 1
to 4.

The plan for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive contemplated that the First
Army would advance rapidly east of the Argonne Forest, and that the main
attack of the French Fourth Army would be made west of the Aisne River.
By this enveloping action, the enemy was to be forced to evacuate his strong
positions in the Argonne Forest. Liaison between the two armies was to
be maintained by a Franco-American group which was to

10

operate between the Argonne Forest and the Aisne River. [8, 12]

The 92d Division was designated as reserve of the I Corps. It was still
without its artillery brigade, but had attached to it the 62d Field Artillery
Brigade, 37th Division. The engineer regiment, three battalions of infantry,
two companies of the 351st Machine-Gun Battalion, and the 368th Infantry
had been detached for other missions. The 368th Infantry, by arrangement
with the French Fourth Army, was to form a part of the Franco-American
liaison group which was to maintain contact between the 77th Division,
I Corps, the left element of the First Army, and the French 1st Dismounted
Cavalry Division, French XXXVIII Corps, the right element of the French
Fourth Army. [8, 9, l0, 11, 12]

This liaison group, organized as a provisional brigade, was known both as Groupement
Durand and Groupement Rive Droite, and was to operate as the right element of
the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division. It was to attack in the following
formation:

Right boundary, American 368th Infantry (as ordered by Groupement Durand):
La Harazée (excl.)—crossroads about 700 meters north of point 213—Binarville—Lançon.

Left boundary, American 368th Infantry (as ordered by Groupement Durand):
east edge of Bois Long—Bois Carré—Boyau de la Cote 176 (incl.)—point
500 meters west of Binarville.

11

The right boundary of Groupement Durand and the 368th Infantry did not
coincide precisely with the left boundary of the 77th Division. A gradually
widening gap existed between thetwo boundaries, and at Binarville
was about 800 meters wide. [8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]

The French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division was to advance astride the
Aisne River, making its main effort with those elements west of the river.
Groupement Durand, operating east of the river, was to protect the right
of the troops making the main effort, and maintain liaison with the 77th
Division in the Argonne Forest. As the attack progressed, it was expected
that the French 11th Cuirassiers would be pinched out by the convergent
advances to both flanks. [12, 15, 17]

On September 24 Groupement Durand issued orders directing one battalion
of the 368th Infantry to relieve the 1st Battalion, 11th Cuirassiers, during
the night of September 24-25 in the Biesme subsector, from point 213 west
to a point about 300 meters west of the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville
road. The support and reserve battalions were to remain south of La Biesme
Rivière. At 9 p. m. on the 24th the 368th Infantry commenced its
forward movement, and on the following morning completed the relief. [13,
18]

On September 25 the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division announced
that the assault troops of Groupement Durand would be in position on the
night of September 25-26. Special efforts were to be made not to attract
the attention of the enemy in gaining the line of departure, which ran
northwest from point 213 to a point about 300 meters southeast of Bois
Beaurain. An artillery preparation was to commence six hours before the
hour of attack. The troops west of the Aisne were to keep in advance of
Groupement Durand. At H-hour Groupement Durand was to advance to a line
extending generally east and west through Servon and occupy the first line
of hostile trenches, whereupon units were to be reorganized, reconnaissance
to the front was to be made and positions were to be held against hostile
counterattack, particularly from the Argonne Forest. Upon command of the
French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Divi-

12

sion, the elements west of the Aisne were to make a further thrust to
the north. [19]

The mission assigned the 368th Infantry was to keep the enemy under
surveillance and maintain contact, assure liaison to both flanks and, in
case of enemy withdrawal, to pursue in conjunction with the 11th Cuirassiers.
To accomplish the latter portion of this mission, the assault battalion
was to form a line of resistance as far forward as possible, feeling out
the enemy with patrols and advance as opportunity offered. Mixed liaison
detachments were to be provided to both flanks. Finally, if the 368th Infantry
was to be ready to send an advance guard toward Binarville. The regimental
reserve battalion, from a position to be taken up north of the Biesme,
was to be prepared to meet counterattacks from the northeast, but was not
to be engaged in the attack of the regiment without authority of Groupement
Durand. On the 25th this battalion was to make reconnaissances of the roads
in the direction of Binarville, and to the northeast. The battalion in
division reserve was to be engaged only upon orders of the French 1st Dismounted
Cavalry Division. On September 25 it was to reconnoiter routes of advance
to Vienne-le-Château and vicinity. [14, 20]

In orders issued by the 368th Infantry the 3d Battalion was directed
to secure and maintain liaison with support elements of the 77th Division.
The hour for the attack was announced as 5:30 a. m. September 26. [21]

Sept. 26

The 2d Battalion, 368th Infantry, attacked about 5:25 a. m., supported
by the regimental machine-gun company. The artillery at the disposition
of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division was insufficient to provide
efficient preparation in the zone of action of the regiment, and did little
or no damage to the heavily wired enemy positions in its front. Furthermore,
no heavy wirecutters were supplied by the French division in time to be
of use for the attack, and as a consequence the troops were forced to advance
through the existing trenches or paths. This made lateral communication
extremely difficult. [13, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 ]

The action of the leading battalion soon developed into separate movements
by three groups, only one of which was con-

13

trolled by the battalion commander. These groups, which became separated
soon after leaving the line of departure, consisted of Companies E and
H, on the right, Company F, in the center, and Company G, on the left.
[24, 25]

Companies E and H crossed Tranchée de Suede in the morning and
reached the vicinity of Tranchée de Courlande. In the advance, isolated
hostile machine guns were silenced. There was no liaison to either flank,
and patrolling to the front disclosed no enemy. The advance was resumed
about 1:15 p. m. and followed the narrow-gauge railroad which generally
paralleled Boyau de Turquie. After passing Tranchée Tirpitz, enemy
rear-guard machine guns were again encountered and a halt was made for
reconnaissance and reorganization. By dark liaison had not been secured
to either flank, and these two companies withdrew during the evening, taking
positions in rear of the line of the 3d Battalion. [23, 24, 25, 26]

Company F reached the first line of enemy trenches without opposition,
but soon split into two groups of two platoons each. The right group advanced
to Tranchée de Finlande via Boyau de Stuttgart, where it was temporarily
held up, about 11 a. m., by enemy machine guns. In the afternoon portions
of this group reached Tranchée Tirpitz, advancing up Boyau de Stuttgart,
but, receiving artillery fire in this position, withdrew about 5:30 p.
m. to the ravine in rear of Tranchée de Damas. Receiving more artillery
fire here, a further withdrawal was made to the south of Tranchée
du Goeben, where this group spent the night. The left group advanced to
the ravine south of Tranchée de Finlande, but received artillery
fire and withdrew south of Tranchée de Breslau, where it spent the
night. A liaison detachment of Company K was with this group. Both of these
groups of Company F were out of touch with all other units. [24, 25, 27,
28]

On the left, Company G spent the day working forward through the wire
and trenches, and reached Tranchée des Baleines about dusk. A position
was held here with Company M in support. Liaison was maintained to the
left with support elements of the French 11th Cuirassiers, but not with
the front

14

line of that regiment, which had reached the vicinity of Tranchée
de l'Euphrate. [24, 25, 29, 30]

The 3d Battalion, 368th Infantry, in regimental reserve, crossed the
Biesme during the night of September 25-26 and, in compliance with an order
of Groupement Durand, moved about 1 p. m. to the line of trenches about
350 meters in rear of the former French front line. Detachments of Company
K operated as liaison groups to both flanks of the regiment during the
day, one group remaining with Company F. The line of the3d Battalion,
extending west from a point 600 meters north of La Harazée to point
188, was the only organized front line of the 368th Infantry at midnight,
September 26, with the exception of that portion of the line held by Company
G on the left. It was through this line of the 3d Battalion that elements
of the 2d Battalion withdrew during the evening. The scattered groups of
Companies E, F and H ahead of the line of the 3d Battalion were not in
liaison with this line or with one another. [13, 24, 31]

The liaison detachments of the 3d Battalion and portions of Company
E had maintained contact to both flanks during the early part of the day,
but by 2:30 p. m. contact with the front-line troops of the 77th Division
had been lost. Later in the day contact was also lost with the French to
the left. In the late afternoon a platoon of Company M was detached from
its company and sent to Ravin de l'Artillerie. It failed to gain contact
with the left of the regiment's front line, and did not return to its company
during the remainder of the operation. Late in the day liaison was reestablished
with patrols sent out by the 77th Division. [13, 24, 31, 32]

By dark the French l1th Cuirassiers, operating in open country, had
taken Servon, and had strong outposts beyond the town. The right of their
line was in the vicinity of Tranchée de l'Euphrate. [30]

The French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division ordered a continuation of
the attack on the 27th on both sides of the Aisne. Groupement Durand was
directed to reconnoiter the enemy points of resistance at daybreak, and
push forward during the

15

day to the line, Tranchée de la Palette—Tranchée de Charlevaux,
north of the Binarville—Autry road. [33]

27 Sept.

At 3:45 a. m., September 27, the 368th Infantry received orders from
Groupement Durand, directing an advance in accordance with the division
orders toward a line, Tranchée du Dromadaire—Tranchée Clotilde.
A group of 75-mm guns was placed at the disposal of the 368th Infantry.
Orders of the 368th Infantry to attack at 5:15 a. m. with two battalions
in line, the 2d and 3d from right to left, were transmitted to battalion
commanders. The 1st Battalion remained in division reserve. [13, 34]

The 2d Battalion, 368th Infantry, ordered the attack, but as the companies
were in some confusion, the morning was spent in assembling the battalion.
However, early in the morning Company G, from its positions in Tranchée
des Baleines, moved forward until stopped by hostile machine guns at Tranchée
de l'Euphrate. Contact with the French lath Cuirassiers was established
about 9 a. m. Company G was moved under cover of the ravine to Tranchée
de Finlande. [13, 23, 26, 27, 28, 30, 35]

On the right, Company H was assembled in Tranchée de Suede, with
Company E in support. During the afternoon this company, supported by Company
E, advanced from Tranchée de Suede, and placed two platoons in Tranchée
de la Tringle, with the remainder in support in Tranchée de Courlande.
The right of the front line was in Tranchée de la Tringle, generally
east of Boyau von Mudra, with no liaison to either flank. Company E attempted
to locate the 77th Division to the right, but failed. [13, 36]

About 4:30 p. m. Companies G and F commenced an advance from Tranchée
de Finlande, in the course of which the two companies became separated.
Company G, on the right, reached Tranchée Tirpitz in the vicinity
of Boyau de Kehl, where it remained during the night with no liaison to
either flank. Company F advanced past Tranchée Tirpitz, reaching
and reconnoitering the ravine to the north. Patrols working northeast from
this point encountered machine-gun resistance.

16

About 10 p. m. Company F withdrew from its advance position to a less
exposed position just north of Tranchée Tirpitz, where it was at
midnight, with no liaison to either flank. During the late afternoon and
evening a detachment of regimental headquarters personnel advanced up the
ravine southwest of the cemetery (in square 43), capturing prisoners. [13,
27, 29]

In the 3d Battalion, Company M, supported by Company I, attacked about
9 a. m., and advanced to the northwest over Hill 176. In this movement,
Company M got behind Company G in the advance on Tranchée de l'Euphrate,
and it remained south of that trench when Company G was withdrawn about
noon for its afternoon attack from Tranchée de Finlande. After the
withdrawal of Company G, Company M moved to the right so that its right
rested on the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road. It moved forward
and occupied Tranchée de l'Euphrate against slight resistance. Company
L was held in battalion reserve behind Company I during the morning. Company
K was again assembled in preparation for an attack in the afternoon. [13,
24, 31, 36]

During the afternoon the 3d Battalion was formed in the left of the
regimental zone of action, and attacked about 5:30 p. m. with Companies
K, I and M, from right to left, in line. Companies I and M guided on the
Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road, with Company M to the left of
the road in contact with the French l1th Cuirassiers. About 7 p. m. the
advance was halted, at which time Companies I and K took positions for
the night extending from the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road about
400 meters to the east on a line, Depot—Tranchée Tirpitz. Company
M, to the west of the road, advanced about 350 meters fartheralong
the road, and took position west of it, holding a line for the nightin Vallée Moreau. It extended to the west about 500 meters with
an outpost to the northeast. Liaison was not maintained with the remainder
of the battalion, nor was there front-line liaison with the French 11th
Cuirassiers, whose right was about 600 meters east of Cote 172. [24, 31,
361

At 3 p. m. the French XXXVIII Corps ordered its troops not to advance
by means of formal attacks, but to infiltrate by numerous small columns
so as to get behind the hostile rear

17

guards. Groups of artillery were ordered to support what were termed
"the advance-guard regiments advancing to the Aisne." [37]

During the day the 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, was moved north to
the Biesme in the vicinity of Vienne-le-Château. [38]

28 Sept.

For the attack of the 28th, the Machine-Gun Company, 368th Infantry,
was divided between the 2d and 3d Battalions. Two companies of the 351st
Machine-Gun Battalion, 92d Division, were attached to the 368th Infantry,
which in turn attached them to the assault battalions. [24, 39, 40]

At 2:15 a. m. Groupement Durand issued orders, in accordance with instructions
from the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division, directing the 368th Infantry
to attack in the direction of Binarville, astride the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville
road. The 368th Infantry was to be reinforced by a squadron of the French
10th Dragoons, which by this order was assigned a mission of preceding
that regiment in the direction of Binarville and maintaining liaison with
the right of the French 11th Cuirassiers. This squadron, with attached
machine guns, had the specific mission of informing the French 1st Dismounted
Cavalry Division as to the situation in the region of Binarville. The hour
of attack was to be determined by the 368th Infantry. A group of 75-mm
guns and one of 155-mm guns was to be at the disposal of that regiment.
The 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, in division reserve, was ordered to
move to Tranchée de Breslau, near the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville
road, prepared to repulse counterattacks from the east and northeast. This
battalion was further ordered to determine the exact dispositions of the
front-line battalions and establish liaison by patrols with the left of
the 77th Division. [13, 41, 42]

On the right, the 2d Battalion was somewhat disorganized, and no coordinated
attack was made during the morning. Company F. the most advanced unit,
moved south from its positions just north of Tranchée Tirpitz about
5 a. m. It reorganized small scattered detachments which had been lost
from the company in the advance of September 27. By 11 a. m. this company
was in Tranchée de Finlande. During the morning Company H moved
from Tranchée de Damas toward

18

Tranchée Tirpitz, paralleling Boyau de Fribourg. Company E was
reorganized and placed on the right in Tranchée de Finlande. Company
G, also assembled in Tranchée de Finlande, was in support. [23,
25, 26, 27, 28]

In two urgent field messages of 11:25 a. m. and 12:30 p. m., the 368th
Infantry ordered the 2d Battalion to advance and take Tranchée du
Dromadaire, to protect the right of the 3d Battalion, which at this time
was approaching the line, Tranchée du Dromadaire—Tranchée
Clotilde. The advance was taken up about 12:30 p. m. with Companies E,
F and H in the assault echelon, and Company G in support. On the right,
Company E advanced north along the narrow-gauge railroad paralleling Boyau
de Turquie, keeping the railroad to its left, and about 4 p. m. reached
positions just north of Tranchée Tirpitz. Enemy machine-gun and
grenade fire held up the advance here, and about 5:30 p. m. the company
withdrew to trenches in the ravine south of Tranchée de Finlande.
In the center, Company F reached a position on the ridge 500 meters south
of the cemetery by 5:30 p. m. Resistance was encountered and some disorganization
resulted. A withdrawal was made to trenches south of the ridge, where positions
were held for the night. On the left, Company H reached the trenches north
of Tranchée Tirpitz. An attempt was made to attack west down Vallée
Moreau toward the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road, but enemy machine
guns stopped the movement. About 6 p. m. this company withdrew to Tranchée
de Damas. [13, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28]

Company F was the only company of the 2d Battalion retaining an advance
position for the night, and this company had no liaison to either flank.
The three rear companies organized a line of resistance in the ravine south
of Tranchée de Finlande. [25]

On the left, the 3d Battalion attacked about 7:30 a. m., with Companies
K, I and M in line from right to left. Little opposition was encountered
while crossing Vallée Moreau, and the whole line reached a position
just south of the line, Tranchée du Dromadaire—Tranchée Clotilde.
Here the advance was stopped, and about 2:30 p. m., when the hostile fire
increased in

19

intensity, the three companies, less a detachment of Company M, withdrew
south of the stream in Vallée Moreau for reorganization. Company
L, from reserve in the trenches south of Depot, attacked eastward to relieve
pressure on the 2d Battalion, but meeting resistance in the vicinity of
Boyau de Stuttgart, withdrew in disorder and was again placed in reserve.
Another advance on Binarville was made about 5:30 p. m. Companies K, I
and M, astride the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road, again advanced
to the stream in Vallée Moreau. Companies K and I on the right did
not succeed in crossing the valley, but portions of Company M reached positions
on the southern slopes of ridge 182. Through a misunderstanding of orders,
parts of two companies began an unauthorized movement to the rear. This
was checked south of Vallée Moreau, and the three companies finally
held a line for the night astride the Vienne-le-Château—Binarville
road about 300 meters north of Depot. There was no liaison with Company
F to the right, or to the left with the French who were holding along the
same general line in the vicinity of Cote 172. The detachment of Company
M, which had remained about 200 meters south of Tranchée Clotilde
after the earlier withdrawal, retained its positions for the night, but
was not part of the front line. [13, 24, 31, 36]

The 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, which up to this time had been in
reserve of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division, moved to Tranchée
de Breslau during the day. At 3:30 p. m., Groupement Durand assigned it
to the 368th Infantry to reinforce the attack on Binarville. The town was
ordered taken by the 368th Infantry on this date. A battalion of the French
8th Cuirassiers was assigned to Groupement Durand, and was ordered to take
Binarville if the 368th Infantry did not succeed in doing so. A detachment
of the French 9th Cuirassiers was placed at the disposal of the 2d Battalion,
368th Infantry, to act with that organization in the same manner as the
squadron of the French 10th Dragoons assigned to the regiment. [13, 38,
43]

Late in the afternoon, when word was received that the 3d Battalion's
advance was stopped, the 1st Battalion was formed

20

along the Binarville—Vienne-le-Château road for the purposeof relieving the 3d Battalion. This relief was completed the following
day. [24, 38]

The orders of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division for a resumption
of the attack on September 29 reaffirmed the original mission of the two
groups operating on both sides of the Aisne. The group on the right was
to make the main effort in the direction of the Binarville—la Mare aux
Boeufs road, with the 368th Infantry and the French 9th Cuirassiers; from
right to left. The Vienne-le-Château—Binarville road was assigned
as the boundary between the French 9th Cuirassiers and the French 11th
Cuirassiers. The assault battalion of the French 9th Cuirassiers was to
pass through the left of the 368th Infantry and attack at dawn, while the
368th Infantry was directed to attack on a 1-battalion front to the right.
[44]

Sept. 29

At 12:55 a. m., September 29, Groupement Durand ordered the 1st Battalion,
368th Infantry, to move from reserve and take position in Tranchée
Tirpitz between Boyau de Kehl and Boyau de Fribourg. It was to maintain
liaison with the 77th Division to the right, and the assault battalion
of the French 9th Cuirassiers to the left. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 368th
Infantry, were to be withdrawn from the front line. The detachment of the
French 10th Dragoons, attached to the 368th Infantry for the movements
of September 28, was ordered to assure liaison between the French l1th
Cuirassiers, which regiment was to stay in position on the left, and the
incoming assault battalion of the French 9th Cuirassiers. The Boyeu de
Fribourg was assigned by this order as the boundary between the French
9th Cuirassiers and the 368th Infantry. [45]

No offensive action took place in the zone of the 368th Infantry during
the morning of September 29. The 1st Battalion sent forward strong patrols
to locate the positions of the advanced troops preparatory to the contemplated
relief during the afternoon. At daylight Company F withdrew from its positions
of the night of September 28-29 to Tranchée de Finlande. At 11 a.
m. the 1st Battalion moved forward to effect the relief of the 2d Battalion
in Tranchée Tirpitz. This relief was com-

21

pleted about 3:30 p. m. The 2d Battalion went into reservein
the former French front line. [13, 24, 25, 38]

The relief of the 3d Battalion, 368th Infantry, was not accomplished
by the 1st Battalion, French 9th Cuirassiers, by daylight, as ordered,
but was completed at 4:30 p. m. The 3d Battalion went into support in Tranchée
de Breslau and Tranchée de Magdebourg. [24, 31, 36]

At 12:35 p. m. the American I Corps notified the 92d Division that the
division, less artillery, engineers, and the 183d Infantry Brigade, was
to be attached to the French XXXVIII Corps. The French corps issued orders
at 5 p. m. announcing this attachment, and assigning a zone of assembly
south of the Biesme. Upon its relief by the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry
Division, the 368th Infantry was ordered assembled in the rear area under
its own brigade and division command. After the regiment had rejoined the
184th Infantry Brigade, the 92d Division was to reconnoiter in the area
between the right of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division and the
American 77th Division, with a view to theultimate engagement of
the brigade in the direction of Binarville. [10, 46]

During the day the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division issued orders
in preparation for another attack on Binarville. This order announced that
the enemy occupied Tranchée du Dromadaire with numerous machine
guns and impeded not only the advance of Groupement Durand on Binarville,
but also the advance of the American 77th Division past Dépôt
de Machines. The division artillery was ordered to place a preparatory
fire upon the enemy defenses. At an hour to be announced later, the French
9th Cuirassiers, in conjunction with the French 11th Cuirassiers and the
American 77th Division, was to attack Tranchée du Dromadaire, and
hold it, so as to provide a base for attack on Binarville on September
30. [47]

This attack took place as ordered, at 6 p. m., and the fist Battalion,
French 9th Cuirassiers, took the portion of Tranchée du Dromadaire
to its front, while the French 11th Cuirassiers advanced to and held Tranchée
Clotilde. The 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, to the right of the French
9th Cuirassiers, did not participate in this attack. With the exception
of the taking

22

of a small portion of Tranchée du Dromadaire, no gain was made
by the left flank unit of the77th Division. [13, 30, 48, 49]

At midnight, September 29, the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division
announced the success of the attack of 6 p. m., and stated that the enemy
was preparing to counterattack. The mission of advancing to the north by
the division was unchanged. Its right was ordered to continue on Binarville,
flanking any resistance on the heights north of Vallée Moreau. Groupement
Durand was specifically ordered to attack Binarville, with two objectives,
the first the line of enemy works south of Binarville between Moulin de
l'Homme Mort and Le Moinerie Ferme, and the second, Binarville. Two battalions
of the French 9th Cuirassiers were designated for the attack. The French
11th Cuirassiers, to the left, was to support the attack. Artillery preparatory
fire was to commence at noon, September 30. [50]

Sept. 30

On the 30th the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division ordered the two
rear battalions of the 368th Infantry to areas of assembly south of the
Biesme, and directed the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion from the line
and its assembly in the same area. The French 9th Cuirassiers was ordered
to assume the liaison mission of the 368th Infantry with the American 77th
Division. [51]

The 92d Division ordered the assembly of its troops, designating an
assembly area for the 184th Infantry Brigade, and announcing establishment
of division headquarters at Sainte Menehould, about 10 kilometers south
of La Harazée. The 368th Infantry was to march to the assembly area
when relieved in the front line by the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division.
[46, 52]

About 8 a. m. the 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, sent strong reconnaissance
patrols from Tranchée Tirpitz toward that portion of Tranchée
du Dromadaire to its front, without encountering the enemy. About 11 a.
m., Companies A, B and C advanced to Tranchée du Dromadaire, and
Company D, in support, was moved to Tranchée Tirpitz. In the morning
Groupement Durand issued orders announcing that the French 9th Cuirassiers
was to attack at noon in the direction of Binarville,

This latter order did not reach the 1st Battalion, 368th Infantry, until
late in the evening. In the absence of instructions and in the belief that
its orders for the attack had miscarried, and also observing the commencement
of the attack of the French 9th Cuirassiers, the battalion began the advance
on Binarville at 2 p. m. Companies A, B and C, from right to left, were
in the front line, and Company D in support. Binarville was entered about
4 p. m., and the battalion reorganized in the town. [24, 38, 53]

In the attack of 2 p. m. the assault elements of the French 8th Cuirassiers,
in conjunction with the French 11th Cuirassiers to their left, advanced
to the west of Binarville. They were stopped generally along the main road
leading north from the town, in the vicinity of point 3258. Company A,
368th Infantry, accompanied these troops and formed in line with the French.
Companies B and C, with French support troops, received heavy shelling
in the town, and moved to positions in the enemy works about 300 meters
to the south. An outpost of about 100 men was left in shell craters northeast
of the town to the east of Caniveau Téléphone. Companies
B and C established contact with the 77th Division, which advanced its
front to an east and west line immediately south of Moulin de l'Homme Mort
during the late afternoon. Company D remained in reserve about 1 kilometer
south of Binarville. [30, 38, 53]

At 4 p. m. the 184th Infantry Brigade notified the 368th Infantry that
the regiment had reverted to brigade control and that further orders would
come through its headquarters. The 368th Infantry was ordered to hold the
position it then occupied. The 367th Infantry was to take a position on
a 1-battalion front to fill the gap existing between the right of the 368th
Infantry and the 77th Division. The 367th Infantry was to move forward
to take over the line during the night of September 30-October 1. [38,
55]

24

At 8:30 p. m. the 184th Infantry Brigade notified the 368th Infantry
that the French XXXVIII Corps considered it inadvisable to move more American
troops into the front line, as it was expected that within 24 hours the
front would be so narrowed that French troops could cover it. Pending further
orders, the 368th Infantry was ordered to hold the positions it then occupied.
[13]

The order from the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division for the 1st
Battalion, 368th Infantry, to withdraw was not received by the battalion
until about 10 p. m. [38]

Oct. 1-5

About 4 a. m., October 1, Companies C, B and D, 368th Infantry, commenced
to withdraw from the front lines held during the night of September 30-October
1, and moved to Tranchée de Damas. Company A withdrew from its position
in the French front line north of Binarville about 7 a. m. and rejoined
its battalion. [24, 38]

During the day the 184th Infantry Brigade reconnoitered positions of
the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division, preparatory to relieving that
organization. At 5 p. m. the French XXXVIII Corps ordered the French 1st
Dismounted Cavalry Division to be withdrawn to army reserve, and its place
in the front line taken by a group under the command of the 92d Division.
Further details of this proposed relief of the French 1st Dismounted Cavalry
Division were issued by the French XXXVIII Corps at 10:30 p. m. However,
before the relief could be accomplished, the French Fourth Army countermanded
the relief orders. The 92d Division remained in reserve of the French XXXVIII
Corps until October 4, when it was returned to the American I Corps. It
was placed in reserve of that corps, and on the following day was assigned
to the American IV Corps and began to move to the vicinity of Nancy. [10,
13, 30, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60]

25

CASUALTIES, MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE

92d Division

Sept. 24-25

Sept. 26-Oct. 7

Total

365th Inf

W

8

8

DW

K

366th Inf

W

18

18

DW

1

1

K

1

1

367th Inf

W

2

2

DW

K

368th Inf

W

4

222

226

DW

16

16

K

42

42

349th MG Bn

W

DW

K

350th MG Bn

W

2

2

DW

K

351st MG Bn

W

3

3

DW

K

Others

W

DW

1

1

K

1

1

TOTAL

4

318

322

Attached Units

134th FA (37th Div) (Sept. 24-Oct.
7)

W

DW

K

135th FA (37th Div) (Sept. 24-Oct.
7)

W

DW

K

136th FA (37th Div) (Sept. 24-Oct.
7)

W

DW

1

1

K

TOTAL

1

1

AGGREGATE TOTAL

4

319

323

W=wounds not mortal; DW=died of wounds; K=killed in action.

26

Marbache Sector
and Woevre Plain Operation and Subsequent Services

MARBACHE SECTOR AND WOËVRE PLAIN OPERATION,

OCTOBER 8—NOVEMBER 11

SUBSEQUENT SERVICE, NOVEMBER 12, 1918—MARCH 1919

WHEN IT WAS DECIDED that the First Army would undertake the Meuse-Argonne
Offensive, it became necessary to limit the St. Mihiel Offensive to the
elimination of the salient itself. Therefore, at the conclusion of the
St. Mihiel operation, the First Army established a defensive position along
the general line, Pont-à-Mousson—Vandières—Jaulny—Woël—Haudiomont,
while it concentrated the bulk of its forces west of the Meuse River and
launched the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. This position was immediately in
front of the Hindenburg Line, which, on this portion of the front, was
known to the Germans as the Michel Stellung. The outposts of the Michel
Stellung extended along the general line, Prény—Bois de Grand Fontaine—Rembercourt—Dampvitoux—Jonville—Harville—Etain.
Since the close of the St. Mihiel Offensive on September 16, the activities
of the troops on this front had been limited to the defense of their sectors
and conducting demonstrations in support of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.
[5, 8]

The following paragraph, in italic, is a synopsis of the service
of the 92d Division in the Marbache Sector and Woëvre Plain Operation.
This synopsis is designed to make the principal

27

facts concerning this service available to the reader in compact form.

The 92d Division assumed command of the Marbache Sector on October
9, relieving the Frcneh 69th Division as the right division of the American
First Army. Its mission was to hold the line east of the Moselle River
and harass the enemy. On October 12it passed to the control of
the American Second Army. The west sector limit of the division was extended
west of the Moselle River on October 26. During its occupation of the Marbache
Sector, the division patrolled actively and made plans for its action in
case of an enemy withdrawal. On November 10 it attacked, capturing Bois
de Cheminot, the southern edge of Bois de la Voivrotte and Bois Fréhaut.
No advance was made west of the Moselle. On November 11 the division completed
the occupation of Bois de la Voivrotte prior to 11 a. m., the hour the
Armistice became effective.

Oct. 8-31

On October 8, the 92d Division, which had arrived two days previously
from the reserve of the I Corps in the Argonne Forest, was assembling northwest
of Nancy preparatory to relieving the French 68th Division. The latter
held the line of the Marbache Sector which extended from La Renaissance
inclusive, through Port-sur-Seille, Morville-sur-Seille and Lesménils
to the east bank of the Moselle, just north of Pont-à-Mousson. The
92d Division completed the relief and assumed command of the sector at
11 p. m., October 9. By this relief it became the right division of the
IV Corps, on the right of the First Army. The French 165th Division, French
XXXII Corps, French Eighth Army, was to the right and the American 7th
Division, then engaged in the relief of the 90th Division, to the left.
The division artillery remained in training at La Courtine until October
20. The 62d Field Artillery Brigade, 37th Division, was attached to the
92d Division. [1, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67]

The mission of the 92d Division was to hold the line of the First Army
east of the Moselle. It was to harass the enemy by frequent patrols, thus
insuring control of the immediate foreground in the divisional sector.
It was to hold itself in readiness

28

for offensive action. The 183d Infantry Brigade occupied the front line
with the 366th and 365th Infantry Regiments in linefrom right to
left. The 184th Infantry Brigade was in division reserve. [63, 64]

On October 12 the front of the First Army was divided. That portion
of the line from Port-sur-Seille to Fresnes-en-Woëvre, 18 kilometers
southeast of Verdun, was placed under the command of the newly organized
Second Army. The mission of the Second Army was to occupy and defend its
zone, cooperate with the French Eighth Army to the east in defending the
fortified areas of Frouard and Nancy, and to make preparations for eventual
offensive action. Its line was approximately 45 kilometers long and was
held by the American IV and French II Colonial Corps from right to left.
The IV Corps had the 92d, 7th and 37th Divisions in line, from right to
left. [5, 72, 73, 9l]

On October 23 the VI Corps assumed command of the 92d Division. On October
24 the 62d Field Artillery Brigade, less the 136th Field Artillery, was
relieved. The 136th Field Artillery Regiment continued in support of the
92d Division until October 30. [68, 69, 70, 71]

The west limit of the VI Corps was extended on October 26 and the 92d
Division was ordered to relieve elements of the 7th Division immediately
west of the Moselle River by 8 a. m. Command passed at that hour to the
92d Division and the west boundary of the division became a line, Villers
sous-Prény, exclusive—east edge of Bois des Rappes. The 367th Infantry,
under direct command of the division, occupied the new position with directions
to pay particular attention to flank liaison. The 368th Infantry, under
the command of the 184th Infantry Brigade, moved to the positions vacated
by the 367th Infantry, near Jaillon, 18 kilometers south of Pont-à-Mousson.
in reserve. [71, 74, 75]

During the period October 9-31 patrolling was engaged in on the division's
front. The 328th Field Artillery Regiment, 85th Division, was attached
on October 31, and remained with the 92d Division until after the Armistice.
[1, 76]

By the end of October, the First Army had accomplished the first part
of its plan for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive and was

29

ready to undertake the second operation, i. e., cut the Carignan—Sedan—Mézières
railroad, and drive the enemy beyond the Meuse. It was planned that an
attack to accomplish thiswould be launched on November 1. [5]

Nov. 1-9

On November 1 the Second Army issued field orders covering its action
in case the Germans withdrew on its front. The Nov. VI Corps issued
its field orders on the same day. In case the enemy withdrew, it was anticipated
that he would pivot on the Fortress of Metz, holding the outer defenses
along the general line, Verny—Ancy-sur-Moselle—Amanvillers, all about 12
kilometers from the center of the city. Pivoting on its right, the Second
Army was to follow closely and maintain contact with the French Eighth
Army, to its right, and with the First Army. On the left of the Second
Army, the French II Colonial Corps was to develop any weakness in the German
defenses, and hold the bulk of its troops in readiness to push the enemy's
withdrawal upon receipt of orders. It was to advance in the direction of
Conflans-en-Jarnisy in close liaison with the right corps of the First
Army, which would move on Etaín. In the center, the IV Corps, pivoting
on the left of the VI Corps, was to advance its left in liaison with the
French II Colonial Corps. The VI Corps was to hold its lines, send out
strong detachments to keep contact with the enemy and maintain liaison
with the French Eighth Army. To insure cohesion in the forward movement,
use was to be made of formed units from support and reserve. Special attention
was to be given to the prompt assembly of troops deployed in sectors. [77,
78]

The 92d Division issued its orders on November 4 covering its actions
in case of an enemy withdrawal. These orders embodied the provisions of
the field orders of the corps and army, and directed that troops deployed
in the outpost zone and the zone of resistance were to be ready to assemble
promptly and move forward. The division planned that two battalions of
infantry would lead the advance, and that a detachment of two companies
would maintain contact with the French to the right. West of the Moselle
two companies were directed to maintain combat liaison with the 7th Division.
[79]

In the meantime, the attack of the First Army, which had

30

been launched on November 1, had been highly successful. By November
5, it had broken through the enemy's defenses and artillery positions west
of the Meuse and was pursuing rapidly toward Sedan. Elements of the First
Army had also forced a crossing of the river and established a bridgehead
at Dun-sur-Meuse. [5]

The French XVII Corps relieved the French II Colonial Corps as the left
element of the Second Army on November 6. [91]

In view of reports that the enemy was making preparations to withdraw,
the Second Army issued field orders on November 6 which directed that the
situation would be developed on D-day by a reconnaissance in force. A limited
portion of the Hindenburg Line was to be seized and, should any weakness
on the part of the enemy be developed, the movement was to be exploited
to the fullest extent. The principal mission was assigned to the IV Corps.
It was to employ two brigades of infantry, one from each division, to attack
in the direction of Waville and gain the general line, northeastern edge
of Bois de Grand Fontaine—north end of spur east of Rembercourt—northern
edge of Bois de la Perrière—Grande Fontaine. Part of the artillery
of the VI and French XVII Corps was to support the movement upon the request
of the IV Corps. In addition, the corps to the flanks were to fire artillery
demonstrations and conduct raids on their respective fronts. [80]

In the VI Corps it was planned, in addition to artillery fire, to support
the reconnaissance in force by advancing the outpost line of the 92d Division
east of the Moselle. The 183d Infantry Brigade was to seize Bois de Cheminot,
Bois de la Voivrotte and Bois Fréhaut. These objectives having been
gained, they were to be held and organized for defense. West of the Moselle,
the 367th Infantry was to act in conjunction with the 7th Division. [81,
94, 95, 96]

At 5:45 p.m., November 9, the Second Army issued field orders
designating November 11 as D-day for the reconnaissances in force covered
by its orders of the 6th. At 6:30 p. m., having received reports that the
enemy was withdrawing, it issued field orders directing that the follow-up
operation covered by its orders of the fist, be initiated at once. [82]

31

By November 9 the enemy was in full retreat along the entire front of
the Allied offensives. On this day the Allied Commander-in-Chief issued
instructions to the Commanders-in-Chief to push their attacks vigorously.
These instructions were transmitted by the American Commander-in-Chief
to the First and Second Armies. Those for the Second Army were contained
in a telegram received at 8:55 p. m. which directed that the enemy be pushed
with all energy and decisive results obtained. Verbal orders were given
to all corps commanders between 9 p. m. and 11 p. m., which were confirmed
by field orders issued at 1:30 a. m., November 10. The result of these
orders was to commit the Second Army to a general offensive instead of
an attack of limited objectives.2 [5, 97]

The attack was to be launched at 7 a. m. November 10. On the left, the
French XVII Corps was to advance northeast in Nov. 10 the direction of
Conflans. In the center, the IV Corps was to move on Vionville. The VI
Corps was to push forward on both banks of the Moselle toward Corny, about
8 kilometers north of Vittonville. [83]

Preceded by telephone instructions, field orders of the 92d Division
and 183d Infantry Brigade were issued at 3 a. m. and 7:50 a. m. respectively.
These orders were based upon the instructions for the attack in support
of the reconnaissance in force which had been issued on November 8. East
of the river, the 183d Infantry Brigade was to advance with two battalions
in the assault echelon to the line, Bois de Cheminot—Bois de la Voivrotte—Bois
Fréhaut. Upon gaining this objective, the troops were to be reorganized
and the advance continued to the second objective, the line, Longeville-les-Cheminot—Bouxieres-sous-Froidmont—Champey.
Liaison was to be maintained with the French 165th Division to the right.
West of the river, the 367th Infantry, with two companies in front line,
was to advance in close liaison with the 7th Division to its left. [84,
98, 99]

On the right of the 183d Infantry Brigade, one platoon of

———

2. All of the service of the Second Army has been officially classified
by the War Department as sector service. However, the offensive action
of November 10-11 is often referred to as the Woëvre Plain Operation.

32

Company H, 366th Infantry, advanced and occupied Bois de Cheminot. Two
platoons of Company F moved into Bois de la Voivrotte about 8 a. m., but
were forced to retire about one hour later to the southern edge of the
wood. They again advanced to the northern edge of the wood about 12:30
p. m. where they remained until about 4:30 p. m., when they were once more
compelled to retire to the southern edge. [22, 85, 86]

The 365th Infantry advanced its 2d Battalion to the northern edge of
Bois Fréhaut, and established a detached post on the Moselle. The
gap between Bois Fréhaut and this detached post was controlled by
machine guns sited on Mousson hill and on the west bank of the river. [24]

At 1:05 p. m. the 183d Infantry Brigade ordered the advance to the second
objective resumed at 5 p. m. The 366th Infantry was directed to move its
2d Battalion on Bouxieres from the southeast, and provide suitable protection
for the right flank of the battalion. The 1st Battalion, 365th Infantry,
was ordered into Bois Fréhaut to attack through the positions of
the 2d Battalion, 365th Infantry. At 3:55 p. m. the division revoked the
orders for this attack, and at 4:10 p. m. the 183d Infantry Brigade ordered
the consolidation of the positions gained. [87, 88, 99]

The mission of the 367th Infantry was one of protecting the flank of
any advance made by the 7th Division. The 7th Division attacked at 7 a.
m. against the ridge west of Prény, but because of heavy enemy fire
withdrew during the morning. The 367th Infantry did not move forward. It
patrolled the valley of Ruisseau Moulon during the day, denying it to the
enemy, although the valley was never occupied as an outpost while the regiment
was in the Marbache Sector. [24, 79, 89, 90, 104]

At 2:50 p. m. the Second Army issued field orders directing that the
attack would be continued. The VI Corps ordered the 92d Division to seize
the heights east of Champey and continue its advance astride the Moselle,
maintaining liaison with the French XXXII Corps by detachments along La
Seille Rivière. Elements west of the Moselle were to advance in
liaison with the IV Corps. [92, 93]

33

During the evening the 92d Division directed the resumption of the attack
on November 11. The 183d Infantry Brigade was directed to secure the line,
Bouxieres—Champey, and exploit the enemy withdrawal by strong combat patrols
operating to the north. The 367th Infantry was ordered to conform to the
movements of the 7th Division. [100]

Pursuant to instructions from the division, the brigade directed the
operation to begin at 5 a. m., November 11. [101]

Nov. 11

About 3 a. m., November 11, the 2d Battalion, 366th Infantry, reoccupied
the northern edge of Bois de la Voivrotte. Two companies then advanced
against Bouxieres, the remainder of the battalion providing flank protection
to their right. The companies attacking Bouxieres reached the southern
edge of the town but, being threatened by enemy machine-gun groups working
around their flank, had retired to the northern edge of Bois de la Volvrotte
by 9:30 a. m. In a later attempt to take Bouxieres they were again forced
back to the wood. When hostilities were suspended at 11 a. m. the line
rested in Bois de Cheminot and Bois de la Voivrotte. [24, 86, 99, 102]

The 365th Infantry made no advance from its lines in the northern edge
of Bois Fréhaut. [24]

West of the Moselle, the 367th Infantry made no advance, as the right
of the 7th Division did not attack. [103, 104, 105]

Nov. 12, 1918-Mar. 1919

On November 14 the division was relieved east of the Moselle River by
the French 39th Division and assembled west of the river in the vicinity
of Pont-à-Mousson. On December 15 it moved to the Mayenne area,
American Embarkation Center, Le Mans, thence on January 30, 1919, to Brest
for return to the United States. The leading elements sailed from Brest
on February 1. The last elements arrived in New York on March 6. [1, 106]

Order of Battle of the United States Land
Forces in the World War, American Expeditionary Forces–General Headquarters,
Armies, Army Corps, Services of Supply and Separate Forces. Prepared in
the Historical Section, Army War College.