Abstract

Although emotions punctuate almost all the significant
events in our lives, the nature, causes, and consequences of the
emotions are among the least well understood aspects of human
experience. Despite their apparent familiarity, emotions are an
extremely subtle and complex topic which was neglected by many
social scientists and philosophers. Emotions are highly complex and
subtle phenomena whose explanation requires an interdisciplinary
and systematic analysis of their multiple characteristics and
components. Providing such an analysis is the major task of my
book. The book is unique in the broad perspective it takes on
emotions: it provides both a conceptual framework for
understanding emotions and a detailed analysis of the major
emotions. Part I provides an answer to the question : "What is an
emotion?" It does so by analyzing the typical characteristics and
components of emotions, distinguishing emotions from related
affective phenomena, classifying the emotions, and discussing major
relevant issues such as: emotional intensity, functionality and
rationality, emotional intelligence, emotions and imagination,
regulating the emotions, and emotions and morality. The principal
emotions discussed in Part II are envy, jealousy, pity, compassion,
pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, anger, hate, disgust, love, sexual
desire, happiness, sadness, pride, regret, pridefulness and shame.

Keywords

emotion, affect, feeling, change, evaluation, intensity,
comparison

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I. THE COMPLEXITY OF EMOTIONS

1. Describing the emotions is a very complex task. Emotions are
something people think they can recognize when they see them, yet it is
difficult to define them unambiguously. Emotional complexity stems from
the fact that emotions are highly sensitive to contextual and personal
factors; emotions do not appear in isolation, but in a cluster of
emotional attitudes; and the linguistic use of emotional terms is
confusing.

2. In light of this complexity, it is useful to describe emotions by
using prototypical categories in which membership is determined by the
degree of similarity of an item to the best example in each category.
These categories have neither clear-cut boundaries nor is the degree of
membership equal. Each emotion can be analyzed on some level of
description, for example, physiological, biological, psychological, or
sociological. This book concentrates on the philosophical and
psychological levels. Another way of dealing with the complexity of
emotions is to use various systematic classifications of different
emotional aspects and components.

3. Due to the diverse linguistic usage surrounding the emotions, any
discussion of them calls for an explanation of the way the author uses
the term "emotion." Since I believe that emotions constitute a
prototypical category , it is not necessary to present a precise
definition of emotions, but only a characterization of typical cases.
Such a characterization may yield an approximation of what an emotion
is.

II. WHAT IS AN EMOTION?

4. The chapter dealing with this issue provides an initial
characterization of typical emotions. It is suggested that the typical
cause of emotions is a perceived significant change in our situation,
the typical emotional concern is a comparative concern, and the typical
emotional object is a human being. Typical emotions are considered to
have a few basic characteristics: instability, great intensity, a
partial perspective, and relative brevity.

II.I THE TYPICAL CAUSE OF EMOTION: A PERCEIVED SIGNIFICANT CHANGE

5. Emotions typically occur when we perceive positive or negative
significant changes in our personal situation-or in that of those
related to us. A positive or negative significant change is that which
significantly interrupts or improves a smoothly flowing situation
relevant to our concerns. Like burglar alarms going off when an
intruder appears, emotions signal that something needs attention.
Emotions are generated when we deviate from the level of stimulation we
have experienced for long enough to get accustomed to it.

II.II THE TYPICAL EMOTIONAL CONCERN: A COMPARATIVE PERSONAL CONCERN

6. Emotions occur when a change is appraised as relevant to our
personal concerns. Concerns are our short- or long-term dispositions to
prefer particular states of the world or of the self. Emotions serve to
monitor and safeguard our personal concerns; they give the eliciting
event its significance. Emotional meaning is mainly comparative. The
emotional environment contains not only what is, and what will be,
experienced but also all that could be, or that one desires to be,
experienced; for the emotional system, all such possibilities are
posited as simultaneously there and are compared to each other. The
emotional comparison is done from a personal and interested
perspective.

7. The importance of comparative concern in emotions is also connected
with the central role of changes in generating emotions. An event can
be perceived as a significant change only when compared against a
certain background framework. If emotions occur when we confront a
significant change in our situation, our concern is mainly comparative,
referring to a situation different from the novel one. The background
framework against which emotional events are compared may be described
as a personal baseline.

8. The comparison underlying emotional significance encompasses the
mental construction of an alternative situation. The more available the
alternative, namely, the closer the imagined alternative is to reality,
the more intense the emotion. A crucial element in emotions is, indeed,
the imagined condition of "it could have been otherwise."

9. Among humans, the social world is a principal theater of emotions
since other people are most important for our well-being. Emotions are
a very important glue that links us to others, and the links to others
are important determinants for the generation of emotions. Our
emotional environment is mainly social and our social environment is
highly emotional. Social emotional comparison is not exercised
indiscriminately; it typically refers to people and domains currently
perceived to be relevant to our well-being or predominant in our
concerns. We neither compare ourselves with everyone nor do we compare
every aspect of ourselves. Although social comparison typically occurs
with those close to us, it can also occur upon a merely casual contact
with another person. Accordingly, group membership is one of the most
powerful factors in our emotional lives: the mere act of assigning
people to different groups tends to accentuate the perceived cognitive
and evaluative differences between them.

II.III THE TYPICAL EMOTIONAL OBJECT: A HUMAN BEING

10. The typical emotional object is either the person experiencing the
emotion or another person. People are more interesting to people than
anything else. The things that people do and say, including the things
that we ourselves do and say, are the things that influence us most.
Emotions are typically directed toward agents who are capable of
enjoyment and suffering. Emotions may also be directed at objects which
are actually not agents but have some properties resembling agents or
at least are construed to have such properties.

11. We may distinguish between the emotional object and the focus of
emotional concern. The emotional object is the focus of our attention;
it is the cognitive object. The focus of emotional concern is the
evaluative object; it is the basis for our evaluative stand. We may
also speak about the emotional cause, which may be characterized as the
specific event eliciting the emotional attitude. The emotional cause
often precedes the emotion and is separate from it. The focus of
concern and the emotional object are constitutive parts of the
emotional experience.

12. I suggest that instability, great intensity, a partial perspective,
and relative brevity be considered as the basic characteristics of
typical emotions. This characterization refers to "hot emotions," which
are the typical intense emotions. The more moderate emotions lack some
of the characteristics associated with typical emotions. Hot emotions,
or, simply, emotions, should be distinguished from other affective
experiences such as moods, affective disorders, and sentiments.

13. In light of the crucial role that changes play in generating
emotions, instability of the mental (as well as the physiological)
system is a basic characteristic of emotions. Emotions indicate a
transition in which the preceding context has changed, but no new
context has yet stabilized. Emotional instability is applicable not
only to the personal domain, but also to the sociological arena:
emotions are more intense in unstable societies where, for example, the
regime can rapidly change or people's personal status is subject to
fluctuations. In stable, or static, societies, the availability of
alternatives hardly exists, and hence emotional intensity is reduced.

14. One of the typical characteristics of emotions is their relative
great intensity. Emotions are intense reactions. In emotions the mental
system has not yet adapted to the given change, and due to its
significance, the change requires the mobilization of many resources.
One basic evolutionary function of emotions is indeed that of immediate
mobilization. No wonder that emotions are associated with urgency and
heat.

15. Emotions are partial in two basic senses: they are focused on a
narrow target as on one person or a very few people; and they express a
personal and interested perspective. Emotions direct and color our
attention by selecting what attracts and holds our attention; they make
us preoccupied with some things and oblivious to others. Emotions are
not detached theoretical states; they address a practical concern from
a personal perspective. This perspective may also include
considerations of those related to us. These people are like extensions
of our egos, even though their emotional weight is typically of a
lesser degree than the weight of personal considerations having direct
bearing upon our own lives. Not everyone and not everything is of
emotional significance to us. We cannot assume an emotional state
toward everyone or those with whom we have no relation whatsoever. The
intensity of emotions is achieved by their focus upon a limited group
of objects. Emotions express our values and preferences; hence, they
cannot be indiscriminate. Being indiscriminate is tantamount to having
no preferences and values; in other words, it is a state of
nonemotion.

16. Contrary to the partial nature of emotions, intellectual reasoning
is typically not partial: it may be focused on a broad, rather than
narrow, target, and it is not done from a personal and interested
perspective. Intellectual reasoning is often a detached state: it looks
at all implications of a current state; it takes us far beyond the
current situation. Intellectual reasoning is committed to formal
logical rules of valid arguments, but it has no commitment to values;
it is value-free. In intellectual reasoning we are supposed to consider
all available alternatives and then choose the best one. Unlike the
case in emotions, the present situation has no privileged status in
intellectual reasoning; on the contrary, we are required not to be
influenced by that situation, but to consider all other possible
situations in an objective manner.

17. Typical emotions are essentially transient states. The
mobilization of all resources to focus on one event cannot last
forever. A system cannot be unstable for a long period and still
function normally; it may explode due to continuous increase in
emotional intensity. A change cannot persist a very long time; after a
while, the system construes the change as a normal and stable
situation. The association of emotional intensity with change causes
the intensity to decrease steadily due to the transient nature of
changes. This association is a natural mechanism enabling the system to
return within a relatively short period to normal functioning-which may
be somewhat different from the previous normal functioning.

III. BASIC COMPONENTS

III.I DESCRIBING THE DIFFERENT COMPONENTS

18. In addition to the typical characteristics, that is, instability,
intensity, partiality, and brevity, there are other relevant features
of emotions which might help us to understand emotions. One such
feature is the division of emotions into four basic components, namely,
cognition, evaluation, motivation, and feeling. The difference between
typical characteristics and basic components is that characteristics
are properties of the whole emotional experience, whereas components
express a conceptual division of the elements of this experience. It is
arguable that one could perhaps find a few relevant characteristics
other than those I have discussed; however, the conceptual division of
emotions into four components is more comprehensive and is supposed to
cover all possible components.

19. I consider intentionality and feeling to be the two basic mental
dimensions. Intentionality refers to a subject-object relation, whereas
feeling expresses the subject's own state of mind. When a person is in
love with someone, the feeling dimension surfaces in a particular
feeling, say a thrill, that is experienced when they are together; the
intentional dimension is expressed in the person's knowledge of her
beloved, her evaluation of his attributes, and her desires toward him.

20. The feeling dimension is a primitive mode of consciousness
associated with our own state. It is the lowest level of consciousness;
unlike higher levels of awareness, such as those found in perception,
memory, and thinking, the feeling dimension has no meaningful cognitive
content. It expresses our own state, but is not in itself directed at
this state or at any other object. Since this dimension is a mode of
consciousness, one cannot be unconscious of it; there are no unfelt
feelings.

21. The intentional dimension in emotions can be divided into three
components: cognitive, evaluative, and motivational. The cognitive
component consists of information about the given circumstances; the
evaluative component assesses the personal significance of this
information; the motivational component addresses our desires, or
readiness to act, in these circumstances. When John envies Adam for
having better grades, John has some information about Adam's grades,
evaluates his own inferior position negatively, and wishes to abolish
this inferiority.

III.II COMPARING THE DIFFERENT COMPONENTS

22. Cognition, which contains descriptive information about the object,
logically comes prior to the evaluation of this object, namely, to a
normative appraisal of its value. Hence, there can be cognition without
evaluation. Evaluation presupposes a certain degree of cognition; we
cannot evaluate something without having some information about it.
Evaluation typically occurs prior to motivation; motivation usually
implies evaluation. In having desires one makes certain evaluations,
but one can evaluate something as good without being thereby motivated
to pursue it. The pursuit involves practical considerations which may
result in different types of desires. However, when the evaluation is
highly positive or negative, it is likely to be expressed by a certain
motivation. The feeling component has no logical connection with the
intentional components, but is associated with them in typical
emotions. The actual link between the cognitive and other components is
contingent: the same cognitive content may give rise to different
evaluations, motivations, and feelings. The link between the evaluative
and the motivational and feeling components is more rigid: all these
components are correlated with the positive or negative nature of the
emotion.

23. Despite the logical priority of the cognitive component over the
evaluative component, the evaluative component is the most important
component in emotions: emotions are basically evaluative attitudes
rather than cognitive states. Perception, on the other hand, is
essentially a cognitive state. Accordingly, an emotion may be described
as reasonable or justified, but not as true or false; whereas a
perceptual state may be described as true or false, but not as
reasonable or justified. To perceive something is to be aware of a
particular content. Although an emotion involves some type of
awareness, it is not merely a mode of awareness in the same way as
perception.

24. The emphasis upon the evaluative component suggested here is not a
new explanatory direction. It can be found in the writings of ancient
and contemporary philosophers and psychologists. Indeed, today
evaluative theories are the foremost approach to emotions in philosophy
and psychology. The general assumption underlying these theories is
that evaluations (appraisals) are the most crucial factor in emotions.
This assumption may imply at least two different claims:

These claims, which are not clearly distinguished by appraisal
theorists, are not necessarily related. I believe that whereas a
simplistic formulation of (b) is false, (a) is basically true.

25. The view suggested here may be considered as an evaluative view, or
an appraisal theory of emotions. We may distinguish two types of
appraisal theory: constitutive and causal. In the constitutive type,
which is a weaker version of appraisal theory, appraisals (or
evaluations) are necessary constituents in the emotional state; in the
causal type, appraisals are necessary constituents not only in the
emotional state but in its cause as well. Take, for example, joy. The
constitutive view claims that joy must include a certain evaluation,
for instance, a positive evaluation of my present situation. The causal
view agrees with this claim but also adds that such evaluation is
included in the cause of this emotions-that is, I had evaluated the
eliciting event positively prior to the emergence of joy.

26. I believe that although in typical emotions appraisals are a
constitutive element in both the cause and the experience of the
emotion, this is not necessarily so. There may be emotional states
whose generation does not involve evaluations; they are generating by
merely having the suitable facial or physiological features. Thus, joy
may be induced by merely changing the facial configurations in a way
typical of a smile. In such a case, we should not say that we smile
because we are happy, but that we are happy because we smile. These
cases are problematic only for the causal type of appraisal theories
but not for the constitutive type which is adopted here-while
remembering that in typical cases the causal view is valid as well.
Many heated disputes concerning the role of appraisals in emotions
could be settled by clarifying the distinction between these two types
of appraisal theories; as yet, little attention has been paid to such a
distinction.

IV. THE AFFECTIVE REALM

IV.I TYPICAL CASES OF AFFECTIVE PHENOMENA

27. In characterizing the mental aspects of the affective realm, a
reference to the two basic dimensions, namely, intentionality and
feeling, is in order. Accordingly, I characterize an affective
phenomenon as having an inherent positive or negative evaluation (this
is the intentional feature) and a significant feeling component. The
combination of a valenced aspect, namely, an inherent evaluation, with
a significant feeling component is what distinguishes affective
phenomena from nonaffective ones. A mere positive or negative
evaluation, as is expressed for example in verbal praise, is not an
affective attitude; similarly, a mere feeling, such as a tickle, which
is devoid of an inherent evaluation, is not included within the
affective spectrum.

28. The two suggested characteristics, namely, inherent evaluation and
a significant feeling component, may serve not only to distinguish
affective from nonaffective phenomena, but also to discern the various
phenomena within the affective realm. Accordingly, I suggest that we
characterize the differences between the major types of affective
phenomena by referring to (a) the specific or general type of
evaluation involved, and (b) the occurrent or dispositional nature of
the given phenomenon. These suggested criteria form four possible
combinations which can be considered as the basic types of affective
phenomena:

3. General intentionality, occurrent state-moods, such as being
cheerful, satisfied, "blue," and gloomy;

4. General intentionality, dispositional state-affective traits,
such as shyness and enviousness.

29. Emotions and sentiments have a specific intentional object, whereas
the intentional object of moods, affective disorders, and affective
traits is general and diffuse. Emotions and moods are essentially
occurrent states; sentiments and affective traits are dispositional in
nature. These differences are expressed in temporal differences.
Emotions and moods, which are occurrent states, are relatively short,
whereas sentiments and affective traits, which are essentially
dispositional, last for a longer period. Emotions typically last
between a few minutes and a few hours, although in some cases they can
also be described as lasting seconds or days. Moods usually last for
hours, days, weeks, and sometimes even for months. Sentiments last for
weeks, months, or even many years. Affective traits can last a
lifetime.

30. The above types of affective phenomena represent major paradigmatic
cases; there are various phenomena which are borderline cases. This
should be expected in light of the fact that one of the defining
criteria of affective phenomena, namely, the specificity of the
intentional object, admits various degrees.

31. Affective disorders, such as depression and anxiety, do not clearly
fit in either group of affective phenomena; their intentionality is not
as specific as that of emotions, nor as general as that of moods.
Furthermore, with regard to the dispositional and occurrent nature,
affective disorders are in an intermediate position between emotions
and moods on the one hand, and sentiments and affective traits on the
other hand. I suggest that we explain affective disorders as extreme,
or pathological, instances of the above typical cases. For example,
when fear takes a very extreme form, it may turn into anxiety and in a
similar vein, sadness may turn into depression.

IV.II CLASSIFYING THE EMOTIONS

32. A comprehensive classification of emotions is suggested. The
proposed classification is based on two evaluative characteristics: (a)
the positive or negative nature of the state, and (b) the object at
which the state is directed. Concerning their object, emotions have
been divided into three basic groups: (a) fortunes of agents, (b)
actions of agents, and (c) the agent as a whole. Each group is further
divided into emotions directed at others and at oneself. Various issues
related to the suggested conceptual framework should be determined by
further empirical investigations. Among these are the prevalence of
particular emotions in a specific individual or in a specific society,
as well as the developmental order and functional value of various
emotions.

33. The division of emotions into positive and negative ones is a basic
division expressing the centrality of the evaluative component in
emotions: an emotional evaluation can be either positive or negative.
Although in the proposed classification, every negative emotion has a
corresponding positive emotion, negative emotions are more noticeable
and more differentiated than positive emotions. It seems that, in
general, negative emotions are closer to the prototype of emotions than
are positive emotions. This does not mean that different explanatory
models should explain the two types of emotions.

IV.III BASIC AND NONBASIC EMOTIONS

34. Though various classifications of emotions have been suggested,
classification into basic and nonbasic emotions has a continuing
fascination, and is seen as central by many theorists. Above all,
"basic" means simple, as opposed to complex. Criteria for simple or
basic emotions vary from one theory to another, however, and such
differences may cast doubt on the existence of basic emotions.

35. In light of their similar eliciting circumstances and functions, we
can postulate that both basic and nonbasic emotions are made of similar
psychological components, including cognition, evaluation, motivation,
and feelings. The characteristics of both groups include instability of
the system, substantial intensity, relative brevity, and a partial
perspective. If the psychological aspects of basic and nonbasic
emotions were more clearly differentiated, then it would be easier to
distinguish between them.

36. The classical dispute about basic emotions is formulated in terms
of the possibility of reducing nonbasic emotions to basic emotions.
Those favoring such a reduction suppose that basic emotions express
reactions to basic types of emotional situations, but that nonbasic
emotions are reactions to situations that maintain some similarity with
these basic types. Those opposing the notion of basic emotions argue
against this reduction. They argue that in the course of evolutionary
and individual development, the environment has changed and brought
about entirely new emotional situations, especially complex social
ones. In this new emotional environment, social comparative concerns
become as crucial as the self-preservative biological concerns and
cannot be reduced to them.

37. I believe that the dispute concerning reduction of nonbasic
emotions to basic ones may be less important than questions of how
intentional capacities and social concerns have developed. The notion
of basic emotions is valuable for certain explanatory purposes -
especially those referring to the development of emotions. The
development of complex social environments has generated novel emotions
which do not seem to derive from basic emotions. Moreover, the major
concerns of basic emotions have become social as well. In this sense, a
major evolution in human emotions is this development of basic
emotions, thus bringing them closer to nonbasic emotions.

38. The emotional realm has been frequently explained by reducing
emotions either to their components, such as feeling, cognition,
evaluation, and motivation, or to basic emotions, such as anger,
sadness, fear, and happiness. The two explanations are not
contradictory in that they refer to different aspects of emotions; as
such, they both have some explanatory value. However, a simple
reduction to either one component or to one or a few basic emotions
ignores other interesting aspects of emotions. The complexity of the
emotional realm is unlikely to be compatible with any kind of a simple
reduction.

V. EMOTIONAL INTENSITY

V.I THE COMPLEXITY OF EMOTIONAL INTENSITY

39. People often talk about the intensity of their emotions: they tell
us that their anger is overwhelming, that they feel extremely sad, or
that they are madly in love. Despite the common usage of terms which
measure emotional intensity, the notion of "emotional intensity" is far
from clear as it applies to different phenomena, not all of which are
correlated.

40. The diverse features of emotional intensity are expressed in two
basic aspects: magnitude (peak intensity) and temporal structure
(mainly, duration). The two basic aspects of emotional intensity,
namely, peak intensity and duration, are expressed in each of the four
basic emotional components: feeling, motivation, evaluation, and
cognition. We may speak about the peak intensity and duration of a
certain feeling, urge to act, extremity of evaluation, and cognitive
preoccupation. Highly significant emotional events are expressed by the
two aspects of all four components.

41. From a psychological point of view, then, an emotional state of
great intensity is a state in which the two aspects of the basic four
components or a certain combined measure of them, have high values.
From a physiological point of view, an emotional of great intensity has
different measures referring to the strength of various physiological
activities. In both perspectives, emotional intensity is a property of
the agent experiencing the emotion and not of the event giving rise to
the emotion.

42. Various difficulties in determining the intensity of different
emotions exist. The central ones concern the relative weight of the
various aspects and components of emotional intensity. The concept of
"emotional intensity" denotes a complex construct whose components seem
to be incommensurable; nevertheless, the intensity of the whole
emotional state can be estimated by comparison with similar states. Our
ability to compare various emotional intensities is based on finding a
certain feature whose changes are typically correlated with intensity
changes of the whole state. Instability may be such a feature, as it is
a basic characteristic of emotions, and it is easy to make comparative
estimate of its value. Greater instability manifests itself in many
obvious physiological and psychological aspects. Another factor like
this may be overall felt intensity. Referring merely to one feature in
order to get a rough approximation of emotional intensity represents a
psychological abbreviation of complex mathematical formulas.

V.II INTENSITY VARIABLES

43. Emotional intensity depends on the way in which we evaluate the
significance of events. Although emotions arise from an immediate
eliciting event, their intensity depend on broader sets of
circumstances that circumscribe our sensitivity to such an event. Since
the typical emotional cause is a perceived significant change in our
situation, the circumstances influencing emotional sensitivity
determine which, of the multiple changes we continuously undergo, are
perceived as significant. The significance of a change is not an
intensity variable, but the way in which we evaluate the situation on
the basis of the different intensity variables.

44. The various intensity variables may be divided into two major
groups, one referring to the perceived impact of the event eliciting
the emotional state and the other to background circumstances of the
agents involved in the emotional state. The major variables
constituting the event's impact are the strength, reality, and
relevance of the event; the major variables constituting the background
circumstances are accountability, readiness, and deservingness. The
suggested classification is not arbitrary; it expresses two major
aspects of the emotional situation: the impact of the eliciting event
and the subjective background circumstances preceding it. The first
group is crucial for determining our current situation; the importance
of the second group is in realizing whether the situation could have
been prevented and whether we deserve to be in such a situation.

V.II.A THE EVENT'S STRENGTH

45. The event's strength is a major factor in determining the intensity
of the emotional encounter. It refers, for example, to the extent of
the misfortune in pity or the level of damage we suffer in anger. A
positive correlation usually exists between the strength of the event
as we perceive it and emotional intensity: the stronger the event is,
the more intense is the emotion. Though positive, the correlation is
not always linear: a stronger event may result in a more intense
emotion, but the increase in intensity is not always proportional to
the increase in the event's strength. In very strong events, an
additional increase in their strength will hardly increase emotional
intensity which is anyway quite high and almost at its peak. This kind
of correlation is also typical of other variables. The typical curve of
emotional intensity rises up to a point with increases in the given
variable; from this point on, emotional intensity hardly changes with
an increase in the given variable.

V.II.B THE EVENT'S REALITY

46. The more we believe the situation to be real, the more intense the
emotion. The importance of the degree of reality in inducing powerful
emotions is illustrated by the fact that a very strong event, which may
be quite relevant to our well-being, may not provoke excitement if we
succeed in considering it as fantasy: the emotional intensity decreases
accordingly.

47. In analyzing the notion of "emotional reality" two major senses
should be discerned: (a) ontological, and (b) epistemological. The
ontological sense is expressed in the actual existence of the emotional
object, and the epistemological sense is typically expressed in its
vividness. The degree of reality is highest when the object is real in
both senses. Interesting cases are those with a conflict between the
two senses, for example, when a fictional character is more vivid than
a person we have just met. Both persons are real for us, and it is not
obvious as to who may induce greater emotional intensity.

48. Works of art are not real in the ontological sense, but they are
quite real in the epistemological sense of being vivid. They provide us
with more vivid information than that reported about actual existing
events. We have some background knowledge about the imaginary nature of
the emotional object-this is what distinguishes emotional and aesthetic
imagination from hallucination, psychotic fantasy, or dreams. Despite
this knowledge, we attribute to the object some kind of existence. It
is as if we "put in brackets" its imaginary existence. We are moved by
a book or movie despite and not because of its being imaginary: its
higher degree of reality in the sense of its being vivid generates
intense emotions despite its low degree of reality in the sense of its
actual existence.

V.II.C RELEVANCE

49. The more relevant the event is, the greater the emotional
significance and hence intensity. Relevance is of utmost importance in
determining the significance of an emotional encounter. What is
irrelevant to us cannot be emotionally significant for us.

50. Emotional relevance typically refers either (a) to the achievement
of our goals, or (b) to our self-esteem. The two related aspects of
relevance are associated with all emotions, but to varying degrees.
Sometimes greater relevance changes the nature of a given emotion. If
someone is better than us in an area that is of little relevance to our
self-evaluation, then our attitude toward this person may often be
admiration. However, in a case of high relevance, other things being
equal, the attitude is more likely to be envy.

51. Emotional relevance is closely related to emotional closeness.
Events close to us in time, space, or effect are usually emotionally
relevant and significant. Closeness may be broken down into two
factors: (a) similarity in background, for example, biological
background, place of birth, education, significant experiences, and
opportunities; and (b) proximity in current situation, for example,
proximity in time, space, age, status, salary, or possession of a
certain object.

V.II.D ACCOUNTABILITY

52. Accountability refers to the nature of the agency generating the
emotional encounter. Generally, the more responsible we are for the
given change, the more available is the alternative and hence the more
intense the emotion. The major issues relevant in this regard are: (a)
degree of controllability, (b) invested effort, and (c) intent.

53. The various types of controllability may be divided into two major
groups: (a) personal controllability, and (b) external
controllability. Each group may be further divided into two
subgroups. In the first group we can distinguish between events due to
(a1) our deliberative behavior, (a2) behavior stemming from our
character and habits, and (a3) our nondeliberative behavior. The second
group may be divided into events due to (b1) others' deliberative
behavior, (b2) others' nondeliberative behavior, and (b3) impersonal
circumstances. The order of controllability is as follows: (a1), (a2),
(a3), (b1), (b2) and (b3). The order of emotional intensity is
similar: events due to our deliberative behavior have the greatest
emotional impact and those due to impersonal circumstances the least.

54. Effort is an additional factor constituting the variable of
accountability. Like controllability, effort describes the extent of
our involvement in the generation of emotions. Effort should be
understood as including physical and mental effort as well as
investment of all types of resources. Generally, the more effort we
invest in something, the more significant it becomes and the more
intense is the emotion surrounding it. As the saying goes: the more you
pay, the more it is worth. The converse is, of course, also true: when
the stakes are greater, we invest more effort.

55. Intent is another factor constituting our accountability. If we
intended to do something, then our involvement and responsibility will
typically be greater than when the event happened without our prior
intention. Accordingly, emotional intensity is typically greater. Thus,
our anger will be more intense if we believe that the other person
intended to hurt us, and our shame will be more intense if we intended
to act in the abysmal way we did.

V.II.E READINESS

56. The variable of readiness measures the cognitive change in our
mind; major factors in this variable are unexpectedness (or
anticipation) and uncertainty.

57. Unexpectedness, which may be measured by how surprised one is by
the situation, is widely recognized as central in emotions. Since
emotions are generated at the time of sudden change, unexpectedness is
typical of emotions and is usually positively correlated with their
intensity, at least up to a certain point. We are more angry if we
happen to be expecting a contrary result, just as the quite unexpected
fulfillment of our wishes is especially sweet. In light of the
importance of unexpectedness in determining emotional intensity, one
way to decrease negative emotional impact is to lower our
expectations.

58. A factor related to, but not identical with, unexpectedness is
uncertainty. We can expect some event to happen but may not be certain
of its actual likelihood. Uncertainty is positively correlated with
emotional intensity. The more we are certain that the eliciting event
will occur, the less we are surprised at its actual occurrence and the
lesser the emotional intensity accompanying it. In situations of
certainty, the alternative to the situation is perceived as less
available and hence emotions are less intense.

V.II.F DESERVINGNESS

59. The perceived deservingness (equity, fairness) of our situation or
that of others is of great importance in determining the nature and
intensity of emotions. No one wants to be unjustly treated, or to
receive what is contrary to one's wish. Even though people disagree
about what is just and unjust, most people would like the world to be
just. Most people believe, whether explicitly or implicitly, that the
world is a benevolent and meaningful place and that the self is a
worthwhile person. Accordingly, the feeling of injustice is hard to
bear-sometimes even more so than actual hardship caused. When we
perceive ourselves to be treated unjustly, or when the world in general
is perceived to be unjust, this is perceived as a deviation and
generates emotional reactions. The more exceptional the situation, the
more we consider the negative situation to be unfair or the positive
situation to be lucky. In such circumstances, the issue of
deservingness is crucial and emotions are intense.

60. The characterization of deservingness is complex due to its
similarity to, yet difference from, moral entitlement. Claims of
desert, such as "I deserve to win the lottery," are based on our sense
of the value of our attributes and actions; claims based on moral
right, such as "she is entitled to receive a raise in her salary,"
often refer to obligations constitutive of the relationships with other
agents. Claims of desert are not necessarily grounded in anyone's
obligations, but rather in the value persons perceive themselves to
deserve. Entitlement requires eligibility and satisfying some general
rules, whereas deservingness requires satisfying certain conditions of
personal worthiness which are not written down in any legal or official
regulation. It is obvious that claims based on right do not exhaust the
normative terrain of fairness.

61. The relationship between emotional intensity and deservingness is
complex due to the personal nature of deservingness. Generally,
undeserved situations are perceived to be less normal; hence the
availability of an alternative is stronger and consequently emotional
intensity is also stronger.

62. The complex, personal considerations underlying deservingness often
change not merely the intensity, but also the nature of the emotional
attitude. Considering the other's superiority to be undeserved may
change the emotion from envy to resentment or anger. On the other hand,
considering their superiority to be deserved may change the emotion
from envy to admiration.

63. There are various phenomena which seem to contradict a suggested
correlation between a certain intensity variable and emotional
intensity. I believe that in such cases, the correlation is absent
because other variables besides the given one have also changed and
these are responsible for the apparent exception to the general
correlation.

V.III PERSONAL MAKE-UP

64. In assessing the significance of an emotional change, our personal
make-up should be taken into consideration. Factors such as personality
traits, world views, cultural background, and current personal
situation are crucial for determining the emotional significance of
given events. Differences in personal make-up may result in assigning
different significance to given events, but they do not undermine
general regularities concerning a certain intensity variable and
emotional intensity. For example, different people may evaluate
differently the reality of a given event: some consider the event to
pose a real threat to their self-image, while others consider it to be
imaginary. Thus, trivial social conversations between married women and
other men may be perceived differently by their husbands depending on
their personalities and cultural backgrounds. One man may perceive the
situation as posing a real threat for him, while another will consider
it as posing no real threat at all. The differences in attached
significance will result in differences in the intensity of jealousy.
However, in both cases the general correlation between the degree of
reality and emotional intensity is maintained; the more real the event
is perceived to be, the greater the emotional intensity it provokes.

65. Personal make-up can be divided into two parts: (a) personality,
and (b) personal current situation. Variables of the first group are
relatively stable and include, for example, personality type (e.g.,
nervous or calm), sensitivity to other people, fundamental beliefs (for
instance, moral and religious beliefs), gender, age, and cultural
background. Variables constituting our current situation are more
transient and include, for instance, our moods, attitudes, and personal
resources.

66. The intensity variables are global in the sense that they are
related to all emotions. This does not mean that they are necessarily
prominent in every emotional situation. For instance, the issue of
readiness may not be significant in sexual desire, but it is not
entirely irrelevant to this emotion either-in some cases, readiness
greatly influences the intensity of sexual desire. Generally, the more
complex the emotion, the more variables of emotional intensity are
likely to be associated with its emergence. In addition to global
variables associated with all emotions, there may be also local
variables which derive from the particular nature of the given
emotion.

67. Determining the influence of a certain variable should be limited
to comparisons within a given emotion. Thus, it is misleading to say
that anger, which is typically characterized as having a low degree of
controllability, since it is primarily caused by others, would always
be a less intense emotion than shame, which is characterized as having
a high degree of controllability. The positive correlation between
controllability and emotional intensity is maintained in both anger and
shame: a greater degree of controllability will result in more intense
anger and in more intense shame. Although the correlation between each
intensity variable and emotional intensity is positive in all emotions,
the specific curve depicting the details of this correlation may vary
from one emotion to another. An important task for future research is
that of determining the adequacy of the suggested correlation in
specific emotions.

68. The proposed framework for characterizing emotional intensity has
important implications for understanding the emotional process and for
emotional management. Regulating emotional experiences should refer,
among other things, to the intensity variables.

VI. RATIONALITY AND FUNCTIONALITY

69. The rationality and functionality of emotions have often been
regarded in negative terms: because of their assumed irrational nature,
emotions were perceived as disrupting optimal functioning. I believe
that this contention is wrong. Emotions are not irrational in the sense
of preventing optimal functioning; on the contrary, they serve
important functions in everyday life. Even emotional pretense is often
functional.

VI.I THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTIONS

70. There are two senses according to which something has usually been
considered rational: (a) a descriptive sense, in that the generation of
X involves intellectual calculations, and (b) a normative sense, in
that X may express an appropriate response in the given circumstances.
The two senses are not interdependent-something can be rational in one
sense or both. Emotions are essentially nonrational in the descriptive
sense, since they are typically not the result of deliberative,
intellectual calculations. Emotions are often rational in the normative
sense: frequently, they are the most appropriate response. In many
cases, emotions, rather than deliberative, intellectual calculations,
offer the best means to achieve our optimal response. This may be true
from a cognitive point of view-emotions may supply the most reliable
information in the given circumstances; from a moral point of view-the
emotional response is the best moral response in the given
circumstances; or from a functional point of view-emotions constitute
the most efficient response in the given circumstances. In such cases,
it is rational (in the normative sense) to behave nonrationally (in the
descriptive sense). The failure to distinguish between these two senses
of rationality underlies much of the heated dispute about the
rationality of emotions.

71. There is a long tradition criticizing the rationality and
functionality of emotions. In this tradition, which pervades much of
current culture, emotions are regarded as nonrational in the
descriptive sense-they are not the product of intellectual thinking-and
hence as irrational in the normative sense-they are an impediment to
rational reasoning and an obstacle to normal functioning and moral
behavior. While I accept that emotions are nonrational in the
descriptive sense, I reject the assumption that they are irrational in
the normative sense. Typical emotions are not the product of
intellectual thinking, but this does not imply that they are not the
optimal response in many circumstances.

72. A similar analysis can apply to the notion of "intelligence."
Intelligence may be characterized as our ability to function in an
appropriate (or even optimal) manner in complex situations. It has
often been assumed that such ability is basically an intellectual
ability. I reject this assumption as well and argue that this ability
usually consists of both emotional and intellectual capacities. Hence,
we may speak about emotional intelligence; that is, intelligence in
which the emotional system plays a major role.

VI.II EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

73. The emotional and intellectual systems may be regarded as two
systems of reasoning, each with its own set of different basic
principles. Accordingly, something that may be regarded as reasonable
in one system may not be regarded so in the other system. Hence, we can
easily understand expressions such as, "Emotionally, you're an idiot."
The different principles of the two systems stem from their different
focus of concern: whereas the emotional system is concerned with the
personal and volatile, the intellectual system is concerned with the
general and stable. However, both concerns are of great importance in
our lives; hence, our ability to combine them is of great value for
us. We may say, therefore, that intelligence in its broad sense, which
includes both intellectual and emotional intelligence, is the ability
to use in an optimal manner both types of intelligence.

74. In light of the differences between the two systems, we may speak
of emotional reasoning as different from intellectual reasoning.
Neither type violates the rules of formal logic, such as the rules of
contradiction and identity, but they do follow different principles
from the point of view of their content. (This distinction is in a
certain sense similar to Kant's distinction between formal and
transcendental logic.) To give one example. A basic principle of
emotional reasoning is that those who are close to us are more
precious; an alternative principle, more typical of intellectual
thinking, states that our distance from an object does not change its
value. There are certain everyday and moral circumstances in which
following the emotional principle is more appropriate and hence taking
the emotional avenue is more rational. The differences between the two
types of reasoning suggest that integrating them is not going to be an
easy task.

A spontaneous, emotional system and a deliberative, intellectual system
are both important for conducting a valuable life. The presence of
several systems in the psychological domain is as valuable as the
presence of several powers in the political domain.

VI.III THE FUNCTIONALITY OF EMOTIONS

76. Along with the tradition which considers emotions to be irrational,
there is a tradition considering emotions as disorganized interruptions
of mental activity and as impediments to normal functioning. Some even
consider emotions to be a kind of disease that we need to cure, since
to neglect these illnesses would be little short of suicidal. I believe
that this view is unfounded. Emotions are the optimal response in many
circumstances associated with their generation, namely, when we face a
sudden significant change in our situation but have limited and
imperfect resources to cope with it. In these circumstances the
emotional response is often the most optimal, because optimal
conditions for the normal functioning of the intellectual system are
absent. Emotions constitute an adaptive mechanism in the sense that
they are flexible, immediate responses to changing stimuli. They are
useful urgent responses to emergencies; indeed, emotions are often the
most practical and useful states that we can assume.

77. The functional value of emotions can be clarified by considering
three basic constraints imposed upon human activities:

(a) human beings often encounter uncertain circumstances in which
they must make immediate decisions;
(b) human beings have limited resources and multiple goals;
(c) human beings need other humans to achieve their goals.

In light of these constraints, emotions may be described as having
three basic evolutionary functions:

(a) an initial indication of the proper manner in which to respond;
(b) quick mobilization of resources;
(c) a means of social communication.

78. Emotions function within individuals to indicate and regulate
priorities, and between individuals to communicate intentions. Since
emotions are generated when we perceive a significant change in our
situation, their purposes must be related to our ability to function in
these circumstances. This is clearly expressed in the first two
functions. The indicative function is required to give us an initial
indication for how to cope with the uncertain circumstances we are
facing. The mobilizing function is needed to regulate the locus of
investment, that is, away from situations where resources would be
wasted, and toward those urgent circumstances where investment will
yield a significant payoff. The communicative function is used to
reveal our evaluative stand and thereby elicit aid from others and
insist upon social status. The cognitive component is essential for the
indicative function, the motivational component for the mobilizing
function, and the evaluative component is quite significant in the
communicative function. All functions are particularly important when
urgency is in evidence.

VII. EMOTIONS AND IMAGINATION

79. Imagination has a crucial role in generating emotions. This role
has to do with the comparative nature of emotions: emotional comparison
involves reference to a situation which is different from the present
one. Emotional imagination does not merely refer to situations which
are not present to our senses, but also to situations which do not
exist at the moment-most of which will never exist at all. An important
type of emotional imagination is counterfactual imagination, namely,
imagination whose content is incompatible with reality.

80. The reference to imaginary situations has important cognitive and
affective functions: (a) it helps us to understand our environment and
prepare ourselves for future situations, and (b) it improves our
affective attitudes. Like emotions, lucky experiences also involve
comparison to situations which do not exist, but unlike emotions they
do not refer to situations whose likelihood of existing approaches
zero; on the contrary, lucky experiences involve "almost" situations.
Although emotional imagination is frequently connected to illusions and
self-deception, it is often advantageous as it helps us to cope with
the harsh reality around us. The escape into emotional imagination may
be more pronounced in modern society. Although television and computer
communication create some links between people, they also separate us
from actual experiences of the world by creating an environment in
which images are substituted for reality.

VIII. REGULATING THE EMOTIONS

81. The description of the circumstances in which emotions are
generated and terminated is quite helpful for the discussion of the
means of regulating, and hence of coping with, emotions. Being aware of
these means is of the utmost importance if we are to use them
beneficially. Emotional regulation, or management, refers to any
initiative we take to influence which emotions we have, when we have
them, and how we experience and express these emotions.

82. Regulating emotions is quite common in our everyday life.
Nevertheless, reaching an optimal level of regulation usually requires
long practice. There are many kinds of regulating means; these can be
classified in light of the extent, focus, nature, and content of the
regulatory means. One important division is that between behavioral,
cognitive, and evaluative means. I suggest that whereas behavioral and
cognitive means are easier to apply, evaluative means have more
profound impact. Since regulating emotions can be accomplished in many
different ways, it is useful to be aware of these ways in order to
utilize them in our daily life.

IX. EMOTIONS AND MORALITY

83. The long tradition that criticizes emotions as being irrational and
nonfunctional also considers emotions to be essentially immoral. The
difficulties in attaching to emotions a significant moral value stem
from two basic characteristics of emotions: (a) the lack of
intellectual deliberations, and (b) their partial nature. The first
characteristic seems to contradict the possibility of assigning moral
responsibility to emotions and the second characteristic would appear
to contradict the general and egalitarian nature of many moral
evaluations. I argue that these characteristics eliminate neither
emotional responsibility nor the role of emotions in morality; they do,
however, introduce certain constraints in this regard.

84. Emotions are of special moral value in our relationships with those
near and dear to us. In such circumstances, which constitute the bulk
of our everyday behavior, partial emotional attitudes are not only
possible but morally commendable. Sincerity and particular attention to
specific needs, both typical of emotional attitudes, are of crucial
importance. Emotional attitudes are also a moral barrier against many
crimes. Emotional evaluations have emerged through a long process of
evolutionary and personal moral development. Accordingly, they are
significant in expressing some of our deepest values and commitments
and in providing basic guidelines for moral behavior. The crucial role
of emotions in moral life does not imply their exclusivity; the
intellectual capacity is important as well.

85. We can consider as moral a person who possesses an emotional
disposition which fits our moral values, as well as an intellectual
reasoning which can direct our moral behavior when there is no secure
emotional direction or when the emotional direction is obviously
morally distorted. Accordingly, our moral education should aim at
increasing the correlation between emotional dispositions and moral
values as well as developing the capacity for critical intellectual
reasoning which can examine our emotional behavior from a broader
perspective.

X. ANALYZING EMOTIONS

86. After providing in the first part of the book, a general framework
for understanding emotions, I turn in the second part to apply this
framework to individual emotions. The principal emotions discussed are
envy, jealousy, pity, compassion, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune,
anger, hate, disgust, love, sexual desire, happiness, sadness, pride,
regret, pridefulness and shame.

87. The analysis of particular emotions is made by comparing at least
two emotions. Such a comparison demonstrates the different
relationships between emotions, thereby improving our understanding of
each. A somewhat rigid form of discussion was chosen in order to
emphasize similarities and differences among the different emotions.
Such a systematic discussion is quite useful owing to the complex and
diverse perspectives of the relevant phenomena. Without a systematic
discussion we may uncover some interesting emotional phenomena, but
would not understand the realm as a whole. The discussion of each
emotion begins with describing its general characteristics to be
followed by an analysis of its relationships with other emotions. Then,
an examination of the intensity variables influencing the emotion is
presented. A discussion of the moral value of the emotion ends each
discussion.

XI. CONCLUSION

88. Philosophers (and lay people) have criticized the very possibility
of doing research on emotions. This criticism consists of two separate
claims; the first is descriptive and the second normative:

(a) In light of the complexity of emotions, there is no general
regularity typical of emotions and we must settle for descriptions
of specific cases;

89. I believe that both claims are basically mistaken and we can speak
about The Science of Emotions. Despite the generality and diversity
inherent in the concept of emotions, we nevertheless can provide
plausible generalizations. There are many studies on the emotions-
including this book-where this is exemplified. I also believe that the
normative claim is mistaken: although scientific progress is not a
unitary and direct march toward greater happiness, neither is it a
constant downward spiral into misery. The life of our ancestors was not
better than ours and they were not happier than we are.

90. I have tried in this book to somewhat reduce the mystery
surrounding the emotions. Although this work is merely a small step
toward understanding the emotions, it may indicate some initial
directions and the importance of emotions in everyday life.