Friday, February 22, 2013

I find the fascination with the ‘collapse
of power’ thesis as annoying, as the fantasy about new rising powers.
Fluctuations in power on the world stage come and go, and rarely have anything
to do with genuine collapses.

What they do have to do with, is people’s
unrealistic beliefs being shattered.

This childish habit has been with us since
the post war anti-colonialists tried to prove that the British Empire collapsed
through lack of power (as all empires must they think). Crap.

First, the artificial economic high that Britian
enjoyed in the post Napoleonic war was never going to last long term. Less than
5% of the world’s population cannot have half the world’s economic power for
anything but a brief period. Eventually things start to balance out.

(I heard
one idiot economics 'commentator' recently talking about the collapse of Apple’s market share in
i-phones. Hello.. if you invent the first one and no one else sells anything similar becasue it is not very good, you can have 100% market share. If
they start welling millions and are good enough that everyone tries to copy
them, you will not have 100% market share - just billions in profits. This is not a collapse by Apple. It
is everyone else adapting to Apple’s techniques and moving forward. It is how
human progress happens. Live with it.)

The same goes for the ‘collapse’ of American
power. Post World War Two the United States had a similar domination of the
world economy that Britain had 130 years earlier. But times have moved on, and
communication of ideas is faster. It took only half as long for the US to fall
back to a more realistic percentage of wealth for population. This is not a
collapse, it is a correction. Deal with it.

Still the academic loons who make money
from predicting doom and despair don’t seem to understand natural correction.

The fantasy of China as the next great
superpower for instance. China usually (over 2 or 3 thousand years) controls
20-25% of the world’s population. It’s economy could potentially be 20-25% of
the world’s economy. China could be powerful almost to the extent of the
British Empire after the Napoleonic war, or the United States after World War
Two.

It could be, but it won’t be.

China is, as it has always been, an
unstable conglomeration of people’s who simply do not coalesce very well. It is
an empire, not a state. More importantly it is not an empire like the Roman’s
who adopted talented outsiders, or the British, who trained indigenous groups
to run their own affairs. It is an Empire that has always been about
controlling those dangerous people who won’t toe the line inside its borders,
and living in fear of those outside its borders.

The dominant cultures and tribes in China
spend as much time stamping on the fringe groups as they do developing anything
useful. As a result the hierarchy of the Chinese nobility is as corrupt and
self serving as any feudal aristocracy in decline at its most venal. (In fact I
think I might be insulting post-feudal oligarchs with such an invidious
comparison. Even the French aristocracy of the 1780’s made some efforts to look
after those ontheir estates… they just hadn’t got the hang of all these new
cities yet…)

China has always been ruled by the aristocracy of those who count,
and has always treated the vast majority of its population as peasants and
lackeys. Economically and socially, China would have to change quite enormously
to evolve into a stable and productive power. It won’t.

It suprises me that people make such a big
thing about the economic growth of China since the artificial brakes of
Communist idealogy were removed. If something has been repressed as hard and
long as the Chinese economy was repressed, then it will automatically make
great leaps forward once the brakes are loosened. But the fantasy that this
will inevitably lead to economic dominance is as ridiculous as it was for the
Asian Tigers, or the Japanes miracle, or whatever other guide you want to use.

We have a parallel in the last century of a
choatic but rumbunctious free market democracy versus a centrally controlled
state system. So many theorists over decades spent vast effort trying to
convince themselves that the Soviet Union was inevitably going to triumph over
the US. (See Kennedy’s “Rise and Fall of the Great Power’s’ for a sample.) The
same idiots seem intent on ignoring Indian growth in economics and power
altogether. They shouldn’t.

Yet a vast number of bad theoreticians
continue to act as if their home grown fantasies are revelations from God.
China must be inevitably going to dominate, because we have learned nothing
from the Asian Tigers or Japan, and we haven’t bothered to look at India at
all. We just continue believing the propaganda of the command economies, and
try to ignore the evidence of the Soviet Union and all other command economies.
Really.

The reasons US power will not ‘collapse’,
are:

First and foremost, their demographics are
better than anyone else’s. Europe, China, large parts of Asia, and almost the
entire Muslim world, is going through demographic retraction that will soon be
astonishing. The US is not.

Second, the knowledge industry. The old
Soviet empire was lagely driven under by misplaced arrogance and secrecy. The
arrogance was in such simple things as avoiding English as a scientific common ground (Soviet science
was done in German! The problem there being that a language that makes up new
words to explain things will never match a language that uses commonly
understood Latin roots for descriptive words.) The secrecy was state
restriciton of information that led to a ‘right to know’ culture of permission
before using a photocopier. Again, science was put back to the pre-printing
press days.

Chinese firewalls, and repression of freedon of information, may
have ony a few % slowing effect on their development, but it will be enough to
prevent them being a serious knowledge society (no matter how good their hackers are... more shades of Cold War scares). The US economy is still open.

Third, oppenness. Immigrants want to go to
the US to study and research and work and invest. China has pretty significant
barriers to all those things. (See what’s happening to Japanese trade as a
result of the argument over a few rocks in the South China Sea.)

However…

US influence may collapse.

Because of US internal politics…

To be precise, the US population has
traditionally been isolationist, and their willingness to play ‘world
policeman’ for a few decades after World War Two is a significant aberation
from their normal practices. US public opinioin these days is all about
‘bringing troops home’, not ‘making the world safe for democracy'. (Which is
apparently – in Mali - being left to the French!!!)

I would suggest that the withdrawal of
Britain from the role of international policeman after the Great War had far
more to do with voters at home being sick of paying for it and wanting peace
treaties, than with any major problems with the British economy. (I will post
on that another time.)

Frankly the British taxpayer wanted out, and after being
forced to carry 6 further years of conflict in World War Two, abandoned their
international obligations with indecent haste. Three centuries of colonial
development and defence and trade obligations were thrown over within a couple
of decades. (The taxpayer having previously undercut the defence budgets so
badly in the interwar period that this was considered both logical and
‘inevitable’.)

The danger is not US collapse, the danger
is US voter disinterest, apathy, and revulsion, with having to carry the can
for the international policing role.

Frankly if you read the abuse over
‘imperial aggression’ the Americans have been receiving from the EU
(particularly France until the last few months), it sounds remarkably like the
abuse Americna politicians were giving the Britsh for doing exactly the same
job a century ago. Eventually, people who only get abused for trying to help tend to want to say 'f... it, you have a go...".

The British took 100 years after Napoleon
to lose their economic dominance, but were still ready to play policeman up
until WW1 (achieving minor things like safe international trade, virtual
elimination of piracy, and the end of slavery worldwide, etc., in the process).
Between the wars the British taxpayer was rebellious, and by the 1950’s,
delighted to let the Yanks have a go at a task that never gets you anything but
abuse.

The American’s are still economically (per
head), reasonably dominant, but it only took about 30 years for the glow to go off
for their policing efforts (Vietnam anyone?), and the US taxpayer has been pretty down on it for
much of that time.

I heard a visiting US admiral speak at ANU
when I was at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre in the early 1990’s. He
commented that in the 1970’s the US could intimidate India by parking a carrier
battle group off the coast, but that by the 1990’s the Indians were pretty
contemptuous. When pressed on whether the USN could still achieve intimidationo,
he said “possibly, but the US taxpayer would never go for it”.

This was interesting because the first Gulf War, while fought largely with US troops, was not financed by the US. They
passed the hat, and got money from client states like Saudi Arabia and Germany. The
post 9.11 response of the US voter was a bit more into willingness to spend..
for a while.. but not to the level that would make the US an effective world’s
policeman. (See Libya, Mali, Syria, etc.)

It is also notable that the Pax Americana
has seen a rebirth of piracy, unsafe trade routes, and possibly even interntional
slavery. (US is certainly not the only state to blame here, but the trend is
worrying.)

So while I do not fear a ‘collapse’ of US
power, I do fear a vacuum caused by internal politics…

I enjoy
doing these little discussions on topics that ‘everyone knows’ the answer
too. (And frankly, arguing a highly debatable issue is always fun.) I
particularly enjoy challenging what ‘everyone knows’. I may not get the perfect
answer, but I often get a good discussion.

My
favourite example of this is those who try to suggest that the M4 Sherman was
the ‘best’ tank of the war. It was, at best, a functional design when it
appeared in 1942, but had fallen behind the pace by 1943, and was certainly a
deathtrap against the infinitely better German Panthers and Tigers. The only
positive thing you can say about it from 1943 on was that it was available in
such vast numbers that you could sacrifice several of them to get each Panther
(pity about the crews…) But you can also say that about the Russian T34, which
– as ‘everyone knows’ – was a contemporary and much better tank (certainly a
better candidate for ‘best’ tank of the war). In fact the continued production
of an obsolete model like the Sherman almost certainly had a negative effect on
the prosecution of the war. Which means that the Sherman was a worse choice
than the alternatives the Americans could have produced for 1944 and 1945 – not
least for American crews.

So moving
on to aircraft carriers. ‘Everyone’ knows that the Essex class was the best carrier of
the war. Why do they know this? Because there were lots of them and they seemed
to work pretty well. Oh, and none actually sunk, even when put out of action.

Did they
have the biggest airgroup? No that was the Midway class (which
in fact had a designed air group - 130 - that was soon realised to be too big
for a single ship to manage in combat). Could they take the most punishment and
remain operational? No that was the Illustrious class? Were they the longest
surviving in service? No that was the Colossus and Majestic classes (some of
which served into this century).

So what
makes them possible contenders for ‘best’? Well they were bigger than anything
completed to fit into the interwar treaties, because they were started after
those treaties lapsed. This gave them an advantage over British or Japanese
designs in pure space. They were fast, and long ranged. They were flexible, and
could adapt to bigger aircraft. And they tended to survive bomb or kamikaze
damage, even when gutted by fire, or after having their combat capacity removed
by a single bomb damaging the deck or burning the air-wing.

What
makes them not contenders? Well they could be put out of combat operations by a
single bomb. They could be reduced to a gutted wreck that would need six months
in drydock by just about anything that happened to hit them. (On 12 occasions
Essex class vessels were seriously damaged by air attack, and what happened to USS Franklin and USS Bunker Hill are good
samples of the weaknesses of the design.) For something so much bigger than the
British or Japanese equivalents, they were suprisingly innefficient by
comparison.

So what
alternatives are there?

Once
again, that depends on when and where.

I hate
statements that suggest that the best tank of the war was the Panther. It
wasn’t there until 1943? By 1945 the Stalin, Patton and Centurion were all
better. What can you sensibly say about best?

There is
also the issue of where. British carriers are usually decried for having too
small airgroups in European operations. But this is because the Pacific
practice of having 50% of aircraft in permanent deckparks could not be
considered in European waters. Once British carriers arrived in the Pacific they
too had 50% deck parks, and HMS Indomitable for instance, with a hangar area
85% of that of USS Yorktown, operated 72 aircraft in the Pacific compared to
the Yorktown’s 80 odd. Which means that British carriers could have operated
bigger air groups in Europe, if anyone had considered that wise.

No one
did.

The
difference being that if a bomb hit a deckpark, the planes tended to catch
fire. In British carriers, even with Pacific style deck parks, that tended to
be the end of the problem, and the other planes below deck could usually be
used to continue operations after some concrete had been poured on any dents in
the deck. In American or Japanese carriers, burning deckparks usually led to
exploding ships, or at the very least months in the dockyards. Certainly
continued air operations were not very common (though it did happen once or
twice, which just shows that anything is possible, not that anything is
actually likely).

So at
what time and where are significant issues in comparing carrier abilities. Or
perhaps, which designs were most successful for what purpose?

Early
experimental carriers:

The
carriers from the Great War and the 1920’s included HMS’s Argus, Hermes, and
Eagle, INS Hosho and Ryujo and USS’s Langley and Ranger (and the French Bearn).
All served during the Second World War, but mostly as escort or transport or
training vessels. Those that were involved in operational duties tended to be
easy targets, and HMS Argus in particular must have been a very lucky ship to
have survived her various combat missions unscathed. The only one of these
experimental models with a lengthy, and surprisingly successful, combat career was HMS Eagle,
which fought for two years against the Italian and German navy’s and airforces,
before finally succumbing to a torpedo in 1942. None of these vessels can count
as very succesful as fleet carriers, but all were invaluable as escort,
training or transport carriers. Given that they had to be operated within their
limits, they were pretty successful carriers.

The
interwar conversions:

Many of
the early battles of the war was fought with interwar fleet carriers, a number
of which were rebuilds of First World War battleships or battlecruisers. HMS’s
Furious, Courageous and Glorious; INS’s Akagi and Kaga, USS’s Lexington and
Saratoga. All of these vessels showed potential, but all had flaws. We will
never know how effective Couragous and Glorious might have been, because both
were early losses before their potential could be tested. This is a shame
because the three half sisters had pioneered carrier group offensives in the
Mediterranean in the 1930’s, and arguably three decks with 130-140 operational
aircraft in Europe (would have been closer to 200 with deck parks in Pacific)
was a better and more efficient (and survivable) option than most of the two
deck alternatives operating similar numbers later in the war. Certainly
Furious, with the smallest airgroup of the three, was still invaluable for most
of the war.

The
Japanese and American monsters were twice the size of British conversions, but
all proved very vulnerable. They were too big and unmaneouvrable to avoid
torpedo’s, and the sheer size of the air-wings made their refuelling and
re-arming processes a disastrous weakpoint. Kaga and Akagi were incapable of withstanding
bomb hits, and their aviation fuel systems were easily primed bombs. Lexington was lost not directly
from a torpedo hit, but from the similar weaknesses in safety and damage control
that were revealed thereby. Saratoga was astonishingly lucky
to survive two torpedo hits and a Kamizaze attack, despite having been put into
drydock for months on each occasion. It is a tribute to her improved safety
procedures as the war went on, but it is notable that her aircraft capacity
went down to about 70 (equivalent to ships less than half her size) as part of
this improvement of safety. She also had only one working lift for most of the
war, so her flexibility in combat was never as great as her size, or the size
of her air-group, would otherwise suggest.

An
interesting side point here is that the size of the two American super-carriers
(and the tendency to put them on opposite sides in interwar naval games), means
that the Americans failed to develop multi-carrier techniques until well into
the war. At Coral Sea for instance the Americans ‘Task Forces’ were well
separated, at a time when the British (who needed more smaller carriers for the
same effect), or Japanese (who had bet everythig on a ‘hit harder and first’
strategy), concentrated their available carriers in defensive rings. The
American ‘doctrine’ here was years behind the other two, which is an fascinating
issue to grow out of such big conversions.

The
‘treaty’ carriers:

This
group, mostly commissioned in the late 1930’s, are the most interesting. HMS
Ark Royal, IJN’s Soryu and Hiryu, USS Yorktown and Enterprise. Again, all were
quite competent vessels. Again all had weaknesses.

The Yorktown's were a good workmanlike design, but terribly vulnerable to fire. Unlike Japanese carriers, they did not blow up and sink when hit (in fact they were almost impossible to sink even when the USN tried hard to do so to damaged ones), but they could be reduced to un-flightworthy, and sometimes imobile hulks, by relatively minor damage.

The Soryu and Hiryu were fundamentally flawed in the
weakness of their defenses. A single hit anywhere could convert them to
floating bombs, just waiting for their own aviation fuel to finish their
demise. They were the ultimate expression of attempting to use the biggest
possible airgroup to hit your opponent first, and hope your oppnent never got a
chance ot hit back. Unsuprisingly, they were revealed as time bombs when
someone did get to hit back. Yorktown and Enterprise were somewhat tougher, but
also capable of being put out of combat by a single hit. (Though with a much
better chance of surviving to go into dock. )

Ark Royal
was probably the best, and in many ways was the pinnacle of the interwar
designs. A good airgroup of 60+ (even without deckpark!). Fast, maneouvrable,
with an extremely powerful anti-aircraft armament, and enough armour to
continue operations after the sort of the damage that usually sunk or drydocked
Japanese or American carriers. Her main problem was the poor quality aircraft
available early in the war (which was largely an issue of the Fleet Air Arm
only coming back to naval control in 1938.)

She
served magnificently until late 1941, and, with her long term partners – the
heavily modernised battlecruiser Renown and the cruiser Sheffield and their
destroyer escorts – she pioneered the techniques later thought of as ‘Fast
Carrier Task forces’. Had she survived until the availability of Wildcat's,
Hellcat's and Firefly's instead of Fulmar's; and Barracuda's and Avenger's
instead of Swordfish and Albacore's: her value would have increased even more.

She was
unfortunately sunk by a single torpedo,
possibly due more to the new Captain’s panicked attempt to evacuate the crew
quickly rather than see what damage control could achieve. (Admittedly the
suprisingly quick capsizing of the Great War design Courageous was in his
mind.)

It would
have been fascinationg to see what Ark Royal, with a deck park lifting her
airgroup towards the 90-100 mark, could have achieved in the Indian Ocean or
Pacific. She would certainly have been transferred to fight the Japanese in the
Indian Ocean had she survived a few months longer, as she was more suitable there,
leaving the heavily armoured Illustrious class in the more vulnerable
Mediterranean fleets. For a design limited to 22,000 tons by treaty, she
was an astonishing achievement. All the sadder that her loss to a single
torpedo revealed design and handling flaws that should not have been fatal.

The
‘compromise’ carriers:

The USS Wasp was squeezed into the
American program to use up a few thousand spare tons of treaty allowance. Despite
being a 1930’s effort, she suffered all the problems of the earlier
experimental builds in being an overly optomistic attempt on inadequate
tonnage. Her theoretical 70 aircraft capacity was based on not embarking any of
the bigger torpedo aircraft, and in fact her airgroup was more like 60 in
service anyway. Her protection was fatally flawed, and indeed, in the case of
torpedo defense, practically non-existent. She served well as a transport
carrier, but her use as a combat vessel was – as in the case of the early
experimental designs – an act of unwarranted optimism by desperate superiors
who should have known better. Torpedo hits caused the same uncontrolled
aviation fuel explosions that bedevilled other Japanese and American carriers.
She did not belong in fleet combat.

The
Japanese equivalents of Wasp were the Zuiho and Shoho. Sneaky
attempt to build carriers disguised as submarine depot ships. With small
airgroups (no bigger than the old experimental carriers) they were really the
forerunners of the American Independence and British Collossus class light
fleet carriers, but without the survivability. As escort carriers they were successful
designs. As fleet carriers they were not. By contrast their larger but slower
sister Ryuho was treated as a training carrier, and can be considered a success
in that role.

The ‘war
is coming’ carriers:

The early
wartime launches all tended to be modifications of designs based on the treaty
limits. The HMS’s Illustrious, Formidable and Victorious,
and the USS Hornet (a slightly bigger repeat of the 5 year old Yorktown design).
The Hornet joined her two sisters in the
glory of winning the battle of Midway. She also joined with Yorktown to
demonstrated conclusively both the toughness of fundamental American
constructions techniques (both carriers stayed afloat long after being
abandoned, despite multiple attempts to sink them), and the vulnerability of
American carriers to having their flight decks and air groups put out of
operation by hits that would not sink them.

The
Illustrious class were designed specifically to survive in close proximity to
land based air power (ie European waters), and sacrificed airgroup to increase
defensive capacity. The result was incredibly tough, and every one of the
eventual six ships in the class shrugged off multiple bomb or Kamizaze hits,
usually with little more effect than what one USN observer descrbed as
‘sweepers man your brooms’. (A huge effort by the Luftwaffe near Malta was the
only time one of these carriers was put out of action, but she survived to
fight many more campaigns.) On one occasion a Kamikaze attack caused fires
which destroyed half the aircraft on one of the sister ships, but even then she
still continued to mount operations.

The cost was smaller air groups. Initially
the class only operated 36 aircraft in the Mediterranean, though 52-57 was more
common later in the war once deck parks were possible.

The
‘freed of limits’ carriers:

The later
ships of the Illustrious class grew in size as treaty limits were removed, and
Indomitable (72+ aircraft) and Indefatigable and Implacable (81+) were quite
capable of holding their own with the Essex class in any battle-line.
(Particularly given their superior fighter direction abilities, which the
American Admiral had noted when HMS Victorious served with the American Pacific fleet in 1943,
and which continued to require markedly smaller CAP’s in 1945).

The
Japanese response to the dropping of limits were the Zuikaku and Shokaku, ships
often described as the best Japanese carriers of the war. (They weren't
actually the best designs, but the better ones were sunk before firing a shot,
so I suppose this is an acceptable generalisation.)

They were
soon followed by the American equivalent, the Essex class. The Essex’s are
renowned for their effectiveness, and (like the Yorktown’s) for their
resistance to sinking. But they were remarkably easy to disable by fire, and
could be put out of action by single bombs. By contrast the Shokaku class were
actually well designed to absorb battle damage (for Japanese ships anyway), and
Shokaku was bombed and survived for repair on two occassions (though surviving
remained quite different from continuing combat operations after damage).

The
Japanese proved that the Shokaku class were not a fluke by designing the
magnificent Taiho (my choice for the best Japanese
design), which was pretty much a non treaty enlarged copy of the British
Illustrious class. The Japanese adopted the British style armour and
enclosed 'hurricane' bow that had proved so useful in European waters (and
that the Americans were later to adopt in their Midway class). The resulting
vessel was probably a better design than the contemporary Essex’s, but
unfortunately still had the damage control and aviation fuel issues that the
Japanese never overcame. A torpedo could have been survivable had the ship not
been in hard action, where, once again, the aviation leaks were not overcome.

It is
interesting to compare the American Essex, Japanese Taiho, and British
Implacable classes. They finally come to ships of a similar size, with similar
capacities. The American ships are a bit larger, and were rated for 91
aircraft. The Japanese were middle sized, and carried between 65 and 84 (never
actually served in combat so debatable). The British ships, despite being
smaller, were much tougher, and (with deck parks) carried 81 aircraft. Of the
three types, the Essex’s were best for Japanese style ‘hit and run’ operations
(though Taiho might actually have been better), and the Implacable’s were best
for ‘slug it out’ combat operations. (Ie: each nation achieved the best design
for its preferred strategic approach.) However the limitation of the late
expansion of the British ships design was lower hangers, which limited the
types of aircraft they could carrry later in the war. So they had less ability
to adapt than their earlier sisters which had higher hangers.

Wartime
emergency carriers:

(We will
leave aside the escort carriers. Good little ships for convoy escort and
aircraft transport, but not suitable for fleet work. The most effective combat
trole was to use them as floating airbases to cover invasions. This worked well
for the British in the Meditteranean and Indian Oceans, and for the Americans
in the Pacific. Some of the British, and most of the Japanese escort carriers
were conversions, and most of the American ones purpose built. Within their
limits, they mostly did quite good jobs. It is worth noting however that the
British were horrified by the lack of fire safety on American escort carriers,
and insisted on refitting them to higher standards before using them. This may
have been a ‘European waters’ thing, but most American escort carriers when hit
tended to respond in the unfortunate fashion of Japanese carriers – see Liscombe Bay for instance – not what
was expected of American built ones. Only the 4 Sangamon class conversions
from fleet oilers actually demonstrated combat survivability – see USS Chenango.)

So the
American version of a ‘wartime emergency’ design was the light fleet cruiser
conversions known as the Independence class. These though, were forced on a
reluctant navy as a stopgap even before combat began. President Roosevelt
became concerned that not enough fleet carriers would be available to cover
combat losses while waiting for the arrival of the Essex’s, and demanded
compromise vessels. They were too fast and expensive to be ecort carriers, and
too small to operate on their own as fleet carriers (and had so little ammo
storage that munitions were often carried on the hangar deck - even less
protected than Japanese carriers!). But at a time when the Americans had to beg
or borrow British carriers to stage diversions in the Indian Ocean or provide
an extra carrier for the South West Pacific campaign, they were useful
stopgaps. But stopgaps they remained – for good reason, see the loss of USS Princeton – and
they were phased out as quickly as possible when real carriers arrived.

The
interesting thing of course is that the ‘emergency wartime’ designs were
decided by when the nations entered the war. Britain had to start earlier, and
therefore reworked an earlier period design. Japan had more time to adapt, and
a large part of the timing of Pearl Harbour was based on when the Shokaku class
would be ready. The US by contrast didn’t finalise its post Yorktown design
until too late to have new ships ready for war. (The name ship Essex, even with
wartime pressure on construction speed, did not arrive to see action until May
1943!) As a result the Americans settled on the Essex design (or a slightly
enlarged version) for most of the rest of the war.

The
British and Japanese by contrast, experienced the shortfalls of their older
designs early enough to start designing new vessels after actual combat and
operational experience.

The
Japanese emergency ship is the most amazing. They took an incomplete Yamato
class battleship, and tried to build a huge version of the British ‘aircraft
support carriers’ like HMS Unicorn.
The resulting 66,000 ton monster – the Shinano – had a theoretical capacity of
120 aircraft in a hull armoured like a battleship, but in fact was designed ot
operate maybe 50 aircraft, and have vast workshops and stores of supplies to
support other carriers. The much smaller British versions worked brilliantly,
so possibly Shinano would have too, except that she was torpedoed and sunk
while still incomplete.

The
British went in the opposite direction, and developed proper ‘light fleet’
vessels on the basis of the success of the Unicorn. They had discovered that
30+ knotts speed was not vital for most fleet work, and 25 knotts would be
fine. Also, they knew that standing up for slugging matches was not necessary
for most aircraft carrier work, so the short term ships could be built on
merchant principles, not warship ones. The resulting 10 Colossus and 6 Majestic class
carriers were an amazing success. A belief re-inforced by the fact that a dozen
of them were in service into the 1970’s, and a couple lasted until this
century. They became the ideal peacetime carriers for any nation that didn’t
need or want (or couldn’t afford) large fleet carriers. They also became the
model for the large number of amphibious assault ships, through-deck-cruisers,
and V/STOL carriers built for many nations after these ships finally retired.
Half a dozen of them were finished before the end of the war, including several
active with the British Pacific and East Indies Fleets, but none actually
engaged the Japanese before the surrender.

The late
war carriers:

The need
to rethink designs was caused by different things in different countries.

For the
Japanese it was combat losses, and the recongnition of weakness that involved.
The Shokaku class demonstrated toughness and survivability, but were too
expensive and complex for emergency mass production. The Hiryu class were much
simpler, and with a smaller and better protected aviation fuel supply, might
have been more survivable. (Though the solution of pouring concrete over the
fuel tanks of the resulting Unryu class does not inspire great confidence.) 17 Unryu's were planned, 6 were laid down,
3 were completed, but only 1 actually made it into service. Too little, too
late of course, but that is more a reflection on Japanese industry than on the
design. Nonetheless, as virtual repeats of the Hiryu class, they were really
too light and vulnerable to take on even a pre-war Yorktown, let alone an Essex
or Indomitable. They were possibly the best option, but they were never good
enough for what was needed.

For the
Americans, the need for changes also came from combat damage. As several
Essex’s demonstrated the continuation of concerns over the flamability of
American carriers, the fact that they usually survived to be repaired became
less of an issue than the fact that a deck in a fleet action could be easily
put out of action by a single bomb. The Americans started looking with envy at
the British armoured flight decks, and Admiral Nimitz pressed to beg, borrow,
or prefereably build, as many armoured carriers ASAP. (Particularly after the
Kamikaze’s appeared).

The
obvious response was the Midway class, which – like the Japanese Taiho class –
aimed to incorporate British design principles without the size limits of the
treaty carriers. (A lot of the motivation being the inspection in the American
repair yards of British carriers that had survived multiple hits by German dive
bombers.) Unfortunately none were finished in time to see action. But these
excellent designs served well for decades after the war, and would have undoubtedly
been much more effective in surviving Kamikaze combat than their wooden decked
predecessors, had Japan not surrendered earlier than was expected.

For the
British, with the luxury of their armoured carriers surviving everything thrown
at them, and living to fight again; plus an abundance of light fleet carriers
entering service for the expected continuation of the Pacific war, the issue
was simply one of getting bigger ships than the treaty limited or modified
ships.

First
they enlarged the design of the Illustrious class to be equivalent to the
Essex’s in size and airpower, but with greater weight to allow proper
protection. The resulting Audacious class were not
prioritised, and were put on hold when the war ended, and finished with many
design changes at a leisurely rate post war.

Then,
they upsized the succcessful HMS Unicorn and Colossus designs to produce
the Centaur class. Light
carriers of the same weight as the treaty limit Ark Royal or Illustrious. (The
Centaur’s were finished post war, but had long careers. HMS Hermes, now INS
Viraat, is still flagship of the Indian Navy and potentially likely to stay in
service until 2020 - more than 75 years after she was laid down!).

Finally
they came up with their own version of the Miway class, but even a bit larger.
The Malta class would have been the final
development of wartime technology, and, like the Midways, would have been
capable of adapting to steadily increasing aircraft sizes for decades. But they
were cancelled uncompleted when it was accepted that there was non chance of
them being needed. (Britain had dozens of carriers to potentially use against
post war nations who had none, and only a single contemporary who had carriers
to fight… their major ally. Much as some Malta class might have been useful in the unlikely event they still been around at the time of the Falklands war, the post war
government was probably sensible to think that more than enough capacity was
available in 1945.)

Conclusion

So
although the Midway and Malta classes were the best carrier designs of the war,
neither were really relevant to the war.

Although
the Collossus, Majestic and Centaur classes were fabulously successful post
war, they were not important in the war.

Although
the Yorktown, Essex and Shokaku classes had significant operational flaws in
terms of the ease with which they were put out of action, they (and possibly
HMS Unicorn) were the best of the unarmoured carriers of the war.

Although
the Illustrious class were the best battle carriers of the war, they were
constrained in offensive air capacity by the effects of treaty limitations. (I am
tempted to think that the Taiho, with its inclusion of all the best parts of the
highly successful Shokaku class, PLUS British style armour and hurricane bow,
PLUS a large airgroup: might have potentially been even better battle carriers.
But the appalling Japanese record with battle damage played true for her as well?’)

Although
the conversion carriers served well, they all showed significant limits, and
most were lost due to them (and in the American case these also had a baleful
effect on carrier doctrine).

The experimental
carriers actually served very well, as long as they were not used for actual
combat…

The usual
balance for successful battleships is between speed to engage, armour for
defense and gunpower for offence. For aircraft carriers it turns out to be between
speed to engage and escape, air-group size for offense, armour or toughness for
protection and defensive firepower. The best carrier of the war appears to have
been the best compromise. A carrier with the air group capacity to do well in
the Indian Ocean or Pacific, and the armour to be capable of staying in action
after combat damage, and firepower and toughness to have a reasonable chance of
surviving in European waters.

Given
that every one of the wartime carrier had major design flaws, the best
compromise appears to leave the Ark Royal. (I think that despite the fact that
her particular design flaws led to her loss to a single torpedo, because, on
balance, I believe a non explosive torpedo weakness seems a better choice than
a highly explosive torpedo or bomb weakness. For a ship I would want to serve
on anyway.)

Frankly,
until you get to the Midway or the Malta, they all had their own design flaw
problems that made them less than perfect, so the idea that any wartime carrier
was ‘ideal’ is dubious.

It is amusing that the Ark Royal, possibly the ideal
carrier for the Indian/Pacific conflict, served her whole combat career in the
far more dangerous European waters that she was less than ideal for. That she
did so well there just emphasises her flexibility.

About Me

A professional historian and educator challenges some assumptions.
(A sometimes tongue-in-cheek polemic, with a Socratic emphasis on challenging people to argue back. Please do so... I make some of it outrageous largely to encourage a debate).