urge parliamentary scrutiny of the state within a state of the Khakis, especially the dreaded spy agency (DGFI). The interference of the Khakis into state politics will once again jeopardize institutionalization of elective democracy, good governance and secularism. The rogues fear social justice activists, critics, politicians and journalists too - Joy Manush!

Monday, February 04, 2013

Indo-Bangladesh Relations: Continuous Consolidation

S. BINODKUMAR SINGH

On January 28, 2013, Bangladesh Home Minister Muhiuddin Khan
Alamgir and his Indian counterpart Union Home Minister (UHM) Sushil Kumar
Shinde signeda landmark Extradition Treatyat
Dhaka, the Bangladesh
capital, to combat terrorism and facilitate suppression of crime by making
further provision for the reciprocal extradition of offenders. Significantly,
however, Article 6 of the Treaty says that "it would not be applicable in
case the offence is of a political character."

Earlier, as a precedent, the two countries had signed the
Agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters, Transfer of
Sentenced Persons and Combating International Terrorism, Organized Crime and
Illicit Drug Trafficking, during Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's
visit to New Delhi between January 10 and 13, 2010.

In the intervening time, to reduce the incidents of border
killings and smuggling of arms and drugs, human trafficking and other illegal
activities along the Indo-Bangladesh border, Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) and
India's Border Security Force (BSF) on March 13, 2012, started
"coordinated patrolling" and "night coordinated patrolling"
at 120 border points selected by two different teams of the BGB and the BSF
under the India-Bangladesh Coordinated Border Management Plan (CBMP), which had
been jointly signed on July 30, 2011, at Dhaka.

Notably, since the Sheikh Hasina led Awami League (AL)
Government (it is in alliance with five other parties) came to power in Bangladesh in January 2009, the state initiated
a decisive campaign against radical forces on the domestic front, and also
acted relentlessly against various militant formations operating in India's North
East, which had long been sheltered on Bangladeshi soil. Since Hasina assumed
power, security cooperation between Bangladesh
and India has been dramatic,
resulting in the arrest of some of the top northeast insurgent leaders by
Indian Security Forces after they were 'pushed back' into India. Prominent
among those held in Bangladesh and 'handed over' to India were: All Tripura
Tiger Force (ATTF)
'chairman' Ranjit Debbarma (January 23, 2013); Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA)
'Chairman' Champion R. Sangma (July 30, 2012); United Liberation Front of Asom
(ULFA)
'captain' Antu Chaudang and 'second lieutenant' Pradeep Chetia (February 5,
2011); United National Liberation Front (UNLF)
'chairman' R. K. MeghenaliasSanayaima
(November 30,2010); Anti-talks faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland
(NDFB)
'chief' Ranjan DaimaryaliasD
R Nabla (May 1, 2010); ULFA 'chairman' Arabinda RajkhowaaliasRajiv
Rajkonwar' and 'deputy commander-in-chief' Raju Baruah (December 4, 2009); ULFA
'foreign secretary' Sashadhar Choudhury and 'finance secretary' Chitraban
Hazarika (November 4, 2009).

India has also been requesting Bangladesh to hand over Anup
ChetiaaliasGolap
Barua, 'general secretary' of the ULFA, who was arrested in Dhaka along with
two other ULFA militants on December 21, 1997, for illegally carrying foreign
currencies and a satellite phone, and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Even
after spending more than 15 years in various prisons the Bangladesh, he
continues to remain behind bars. However, despite the fresh Extradition Treaty,
Bangladesh Home Minister Muhiuddin Khan Alamgir on January 28, 2013, stated
that Bangladesh would not be able to send back Anup Chetia under the treaty as
he had prayed for political asylum in the Supreme Court, adding, "The
Supreme Court will first have to dispose of his prayer for political asylum. After
that, we will decide whether to treat this person or any other persons under
this extradition treaty or in some other way."

Other North East militant leaders on Bangladeshi soil, whose
expatriation India
seeks, include National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)
leaders Bishwamohan Debarman and Subir Debbarma, and NDFB leader ThulungaaliasTensu
Narzary.

Bangladesh
has unambiguously demonstrated its will to end the operation of Northeast
Indian terrorist and insurgent groupings from its soil. Nevertheless, Indian
intelligence inputs suggest that at least 55 camps of NE militants continue to
operate in Bangladesh,
and there is certainly some unfinished business at hand.

Similarly, Dhaka has been demanding that India arrest
and hand over Bangladesh's founding father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's two
convicted killers, Abdul Mazed and Moslehuddin Khan (who were at the rank of
Captain and Risaldar, respectively, at the time of the assassination), and are
believed to be hiding in India.

In addition, there are several other criminals operating
with impunity across the Indo-Bangladesh border, and the Extradition Treaty
should help the two countries break this criminal nexus.

As cooperation on the security front strengthened, the
resultant increase in trust has led to positive developments on other issues of
bilateral concern as well, despite hurdles. These include thehistoric agreementsigned
on September 6, 2011, during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to
Dhaka, to settle land boundary issues, including the exchange of 162 'enclaves'
which are in 'adverse possession'. Though the Teesta Water Sharing
Deal, could not be concluded because of last-minute objections raised by
West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee on the draft of the agreement,
India's Water Resources Minister Harish Rawat, on November 7, 2012, during a
meeting with visiting Bangladesh Agriculture Minister Motia Chowdhury at New
Delhi, expressed interest in inking a provisional Teesta Water Sharing
Agreement, until a permanent settlement was found.

On July 3, 2012, moreover, Dhaka gave its letter of consent
for the renewal of Transit and Transshipment Rights to India, for the
continuation of transshipment of bulk cargoes, with retrospective effect from
April 1, 2012 to March 31, 2014. The PIWTT, which was renewed annually till
then (July 3, 2012), as was agreed in the Protocol on Inland Water Transit and
Trade (PIWTT, 1972), was suspended on October 26, 2011, after Dhaka refused to
issue the letter of consent because of the failure to reach an agreement on the
Teesta Deal.

In addition, following up on the Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) on India-Bangladesh Energy Cooperation signed on September 6, 2011, at
Dhaka, the first Joint Working Group (JWG) meeting on renewable energy was held
in New Delhi on August 3, 2012, where Bangladesh and India briefed each other on the
present status and growth potential of renewable energy. Similarly, a
high-level Indian delegation led by Power Secretary P. Uma Shankar visited
Dhaka on January 29, 2013, to sign a deal for the proposed 1,320 megawatt
coal-fired power plant at Rampal in the Bagerhat District of Khulna
Division in Bangladesh, and
the purchase of power by Bangladesh
from India.

Significantly, at the time of the signing of the Extradition
Treaty, the two sides also inked a liberalized visa agreement, the Revised
Travel Arrangement (RTA), to remove restrictions on visits of businesspersons,
students, patients, senior citizens above 65 years and children below 12 years.

Conspicuously, Indo-Bangladesh relations have witnessed a
strong positive surge since 2009, and this has had a transformatory impact on
the trajectory of terrorism and extremism in both the countries, visibly
improving the general security environment in the region, and creating a strong
foundation of trust. Much, however, remains to be done and, in this, India needs to be the more proactive, both
because it is by far the larger partner, and also because Dhaka appears to have
done much more in the recent past than Delhi.

This equation becomes the more crucial as Bangladesh
approaches another General Election in which the present Opposition, backed by
a very substantial radicalized constituency, will attempt to cast improving
relations with India as a 'betrayal' of Bangladeshi interests. As disruptive
political mobilization in Bangladesh - of which significant evidence is already
visible - gathers force in the run up to the Elections, it will require
dramatic and demonstrable successes in the delivery of quantifiable benefits to
Dhaka, both to consolidate the relationship and, crucially, to diminish the
impact of vicious propaganda that could, otherwise, jeopardize the remarkable
gains of the past four years.