After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.

Appellant James L. Brooks appeals from two orders of the district court
and from the corresponding judgment dismissing with prejudice his civil rights
action against various federal, state, and local defendants.(1) We affirm.

The first order appealed from dismissed all but one of the defendants
because of failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).(2) The second order
dismissed the remaining defendant and
construed Mr. Brooks's motion for temporary injunction as a motion to recuse
and denied it. We conduct a de novo review of dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6),
Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.
1999), and review refusals to recuse for abuse of discretion, Higganbotham v.
Okla. ex rel. Okla. Transp. Comm'n, 328 F.3d 638, 645 (10th Cir. 2003). Based
on these standards, we affirm the judgment of the district court for substantially
the same reasons stated by that court in the orders appealed from.

With regard to the specific arguments made by Mr. Brooks and to the
extent we can understand them, we note that two of his arguments have already
been foreclosed by this court. See Brooks v. Sauceda, No. 00-3025, 2000 WL
1730892, at **2 (10th Cir. Nov. 22, 2000) (unpublished) (rejecting argument that
he was entitled to a default judgment because defendants filed a motion to
dismiss instead of an answer); see also Brooks v. Graber, 15 Fed. Appx. 764,
765-66 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (same and further rejecting Mr. Brooks's
contention "that federal judges are boneheads while he is a legal scholar");
Sauceda, 2000 WL 1730892 at **3 (rejecting argument that certain local
ordinances are bills of attainder).

As for his other arguments, Mr. Brooks failed to advance any factual
support for his conclusory allegation that a conspiracy prompted the ten-day
extension of time given the defendants in which to answer or otherwise defend.
The district court properly determined its jurisdiction in both of the orders
appealed from. The court did not abuse its discretion in striking Mr. Brooks's
second amended complaint. Mr. Brooks's contention that certain orders issued
by this court are fakes is unsupported and ludicrous. And finally, the district
court was well within its discretion to refuse to recuse.

As alluded to above, we have expended valuable court resources on at least
two separate occasions dealing with Mr. Brooks and his various meritless
theories. We repeat our sentiment expressed in Graber, 15 Fed. Appx. at 766:
"We will spend no more judicial time or resources addressing his frivolous
claims." Our local rule 46.5(D) permits this court, on its own motion, to impose
an appropriate sanction against any person who brings frivolous arguments on
appeal. Those sanctions can include a monetary fine and/or an order to pay the
reasonable expenses of the opposing party, including attorney's fees. We take
this occasion to warn Mr. Brooks that, should he appear before this court at any
time in the future with the same meritless arguments we have already rejected, he
will be subject to the sanctions described above.

FOOTNOTESClick footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text.

*. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

1. To the extent Mr. Brooks attempts to
appeal from two orders of the
magistrate judge involved in this case, we note that he failed to file objections to
those orders in the district court, and thus has waived any opportunity for
appellate review. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 73 F.3d 1057,
1059 (10th Cir. 1996).

2. In addition to dismissing under Rule
12(b)(6), the district court analyzed
some claims against some defendants under alternative rationales. Because we
find the dismissals under 12(b)(6) to be correct, we need not address other
theories supporting dismissal.