MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court (Parts I, II,
III, and IV-C) and an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST joined (Parts IV-A and IV-B).

This case requires that we decide whether the Federal Communications
Commission has any power to regulate a radio broadcast that is
indecent but not obscene.

A satiric humorist named George Carlin recorded a 12-minute monologue
entitled "Filthy Words" before a live audience in a California
theater. He began by referring to his thoughts about "the words you
couldn't say on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely
wouldn't say, ever." He proceeded to list those words and repeat them
over and over again in a variety of colloquialisms. The transcript of
the recording, which is appended to this opinion, indicates frequent
laughter from the audience.

At about 2 o'clock in the afternoon on Tuesday, October 30, 1973, a
New York radio station, owned by respondent Pacifica Foundation,
broadcast the "Filthy Words" monologue. A few weeks later a man, who
stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young
son, wrote a letter complaining to the Commission. He stated that,
although he could perhaps understand the "record's being sold for
private use, I certainly cannot understand the broadcast of same over
the air that, supposedly, you control."

The complaint was forwarded to the station for comment. In its
response, Pacifica explained that the monologue had been played during
a program about contemporary society's attitude toward la0nguage and
that, immediately before its broadcast, listeners had been advised
that it included ++"sensitive language which might be regarded as
offensive to some." Pacifica characterized George Carlin as "a
significant social satirist" who "like Twain and Sahl before him,
examines the language of ordinary people. . . . Carlin is not mouthing
obscenities, he is merely using words to satirize as harmless and
essentially silly our attitudes towards those words." Pacifica stated
that it was not aware of any other complaints about the broadcast.

On February 21, 1975, the Commission issued a declaratory order
granting the complaint and holding that Pacifica "could have been the
subject of administrative sanctions." 56 F. C. C. 2d 94, 99. The
Commission did not impose formal sanctions, but it did state that the
order would be "associated with the station's license file, and in the
event that subsequent complaints are received, the Commission will
then decide whether it should utilize any of the available sanctions
it has been granted by Congress."[fn1]

In its memorandum opinion the Commission stated that it intended to
"clarify the standards which will be utilized in considering" the
growing number of complaints about indecent speech on the airwaves.
Id., at 94. Advancing several reasons for treating broadcast speech
differently from other forms of expression,[fn2] the Commission found
a power to regulate indecent broadcasting in two statutes: 18 U.S.C.
1464 (1976 ed.), which forbids the use of "any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communications,"[fn3] and 47 U.S.C.
303 (g), which requires the Commission to "encourage the larger and
more effective use of radio in the public interest."[fn4]

The Commission characterized the language used in the Carlin monologue
as "patently offensive," though not necessarily obscene, and expressed
the opinion that it should be regulated by principles analogous to
those found in the law of nuisance where the "law generally speaks to
channeling behavior more than actually prohibiting it. . . . [T]he
concept of `indecent' is intimately connected with the exposure of
children to language that describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium,
sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when
there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." 56
F. C. C. 2d, at 98.[fn5]

Applying these considerations to the language used in the monologue as
broadcast by respondent, the Commission concluded that certain words
depicted sexual and excretory activities in a patently offensive
manner, noted that they "were broadcast at a time when children were
undoubtedly in the audience (i. e., in the early afternoon)," and that
the prerecorded language, with these offensive words "repeated over
and over," was "deliberately broadcast." Id., at 99. In summary, the
Commission stated: "We therefore hold that the language as broadcast
was indecent and prohibited by 18 U.S.C. [] 1464."[fn6] Ibid.

After the order issued, the Commission was asked to clarify its
opinion by ruling that the broadcast of indecent words as part of a
live newscast would not be prohibited. The Commission issued another
opinion in which it pointed out that it "never intended to place an
absolute prohibition on the broadcast of this type of language, but
rather sought to channel it to times of day when children most likely
would not be exposed to it." 59 F. C. C. 2d 892 (1976). The Commission
noted that its "declaratory order was issued in a specific factual
context," and declined to comment on various hypothetical situations
presented by the petition.[fn7] Id., at 893. It relied on its "long
standing policy of refusing to issue interpretive rulings or advisory
opinions when the critical facts are not explicitly stated or there is
a possibility that subsequent events will alter them." Ibid.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed, with each of the three judges on the panel writing
separately. 181 U.S. App. D.C. 132, 556 F.2d 9. Judge Tamm concluded
that the order represented censorship and was expressly prohibited by
326 of the Communications Act.[fn8] Alternatively, Judge Tamm read the
Commission opinion as the functional equivalent of a rule and
concluded that it was "overbroad." 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 141, 556
F.2d, at 18. Chief Judge Bazelon's concurrence rested on the
Constitution. He was persuaded that 326's prohibition against
censorship is inapplicable to broadcasts forbidden by 1464. However,
he concluded that 1464 must be narrowly construed to cover only
language that is obscene or otherwise unprotected by the First
Amendment. 181 U.S. App. D.C., at 140-153, 556 F.2d, at 24-30. Judge
Leventhal, in dissent, stated that the only issue was whether the
Commission could regulate the language "as broadcast." Id., at 154,
556 F.2d, at 31. Emphasizing the interest in protecting children, not
only from exposure to indecent language, but also from exposure to the
idea that such language has official approval, id., at 160, and n. 18,
556 F.2d, at 37, and n. 18, he concluded that the Commission had
correctly condemned the daytime broadcast as indecent.

Having granted the Commission's petition for certiorari, 434 U.S.
1008, we must decide: (1) whether the scope of judicial review
encompasses more than the Commission's determination that the
monologue was indecent "as broadcast"; (2) whether the Commission's
order was a form of censorship forbidden by 326; (3) whether the
broadcast was indecent within the meaning of 1464; and (4) whether the
order violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The general statements in the Commission's memorandum opinion do not
change the character of its order. Its action was an adjudication
under 5 U.S.C. 554 (e) (1976 ed.); it did not purport to engage in
formal rulemaking or in the promulgation of any regulations. The order
"was issued in a specific factual context"; questions concerning
possible action in other contexts were expressly reserved for the
future. The specific holding was carefully confined to the monologue
"as broadcast."

"This Court . . . reviews judgments, not statements in opinions."
Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 297. That admonition has
special force when the statements raise constitutional questions, for
it is our settled practice to avoid the unnecessary decision of such
issues. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-569. However
appropriate it may be for an administrative agency to write broadly in
an adjudicatory proceeding, federal courts have never been empowered
to issue advisory opinions. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126.
Accordingly, the focus of our review must be on the Commission's
determination that the Carlin monologue was indecent as broadcast.

The relevant statutory questions are whether the Commission's action
is forbidden "censorship" within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. 326 and
whether speech that concededly is not obscene may be restricted as
"indecent" under the authority of 18 U.S.C. 1464 (1976 ed.). The
questions are not unrelated, for the two statutory provisions have a
common origin. Nevertheless, we analyze them separately.

Section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927 provided:

"Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construedto give the
licensing authority the power of censorshipover the radio
communications or signals transmitted byany radio station, and no
regulation or condition shall bepromulgated or fixed by the licensing
authority whichshall interfere with the right of free speech by means
ofradio communications. No person within the jurisdictionof the United
States shall utter any obscene, indecent,or profane language by means
of radio communication."44 Stat. 1172.

The prohibition against censorship unequivocally denies the Commission
any power to edit proposed broadcasts in advance and to excise
material considered inappropriate for the airwaves. The prohibition,
however, has never been construed to deny the Commission the power to
review the content of completed broadcasts in the performance of its
regulatory duties.[fn9]

During the period between the original enactment of the provision in
1927 and its re-enactment in the Communications Act of 1934, the
courts and the Federal Radio Commission held that the section deprived
the Commission of the power to subject "broadcasting matter to
scrutiny prior to its release," but they concluded that the
Commission's "undoubted right" to take note of past program content
when considering a licensee's renewal application "is not
censorship."[fn10]

Not only did the Federal Radio Commission so construe the statute
prior to 1934; its successor, the Federal Communications Commission,
has consistently interpreted the provision in the same way ever since.
See Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 Harv. L. Rev.
701 (1964). And, until this case, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit has consistently agreed with this
construction.[fn11] Thus, for example, in his opinion in
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 131 U.S. App. D.C. 146,
403 F.2d 169 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930, Judge Wright
forcefully pointed out that the Commission is not prevented from
canceling the license of a broadcaster who persists in a course of
improper programming. He explained:

"This would not be prohibited `censorship,' . . . any more than would
the Commission's considering on a license renewal application whether
a broadcaster allowed `coarse, vulgar, suggestive, double-meaning'
programming; programs containing such material are grounds for denial
of a license renewal." 131 U.S. App. D.C., at 150-151, n. 3. 403 F.2d,
at 173-174, n. 3.See also Office of Communication of United Church of
Christ v. FCC, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 328, 359 F.2d 994 (1966).

Entirely apart from the fact that the subsequent review of program
content is not the sort of censorship at which the statute was
directed, its history makes it perfectly clear that it was not
intended to limit the Commission's power to regulate the broadcast of
obscene, indecent, or profane language. A single section of the 1927
Act is the source of both the anticensorship provision and the
Commission's authority to impose sanctions for the broadcast of
indecent or obscene language. Quite plainly, Congress intended to give
meaning to both provisions. Respect for that intent requires that the
censorship language be read as inapplicable to the prohibition on
broadcasting obscene, indecent, or profane language.

There is nothing in the legislative history to contradict this
conclusion. The provision was discussed only in generalities when it
was first enacted.[fn12] In 1934, the anticensorship provision and the
prohibition against indecent broadcasts were re-enacted in the same
section, just as in the 1927 Act. In 1948, when the Criminal Code was
revised to include provisions that had previously been located in
other Titles of the United States Code, the prohibition against
obscene, indecent, and profane broadcasts was removed from the
Communications Act and re-enacted as 1464 of Title 18. 62 Stat. 769
and 866. That rearrangement of the Code cannot reasonably be
interpreted as having been intended to change the meaning of the
anticensorship provision. H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
A106 (1947). Cf. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151,
162.

We conclude, therefore, that 326 does not limit the Commission's
authority to impose sanctions on licensees who engage in obscene,
indecent, or profane broadcasting.

The only other statutory question presented by this case is whether
the afternoon broadcast of the "Filthy Words" monologue was indecent
within the meaning of 1464.[fn13] Even that question is narrowly
confined by the arguments of the parties.

The Commission identified several words that referred to excretory or
sexual activities or organs, stated that the repetitive, deliberate
use of those words in an afternoon broadcast when children are in the
audience was patently offensive, and held that the broadcast was
indecent. Pacifica takes issue with the Commission's definition of
indecency, but does not dispute the Commission's preliminary
determination that each of the components of its definition was
present. Specifically, Pacifica does not quarrel with the conclusion
that this afternoon broadcast was patently offensive. Pacifica's claim
that the broadcast was not indecent within the meaning of the statute
rests entirely on the absence of prurient appeal.

The plain language of the statute does not support Pacifica's
argument. The words "obscene, indecent, or profane" are written in the
disjunctive, implying that each has a separate meaning. Prurient
appeal is an element of the obscene, but the normal definition of
"indecent" merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of
morality.[fn14]

Pacifica argues, however, that this Court has construed the term
"indecent" in related statutes to mean "obscene," as that term was
defined in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15. Pacifica relies most
heavily on the construction this Court gave to 18 U.S.C. 1461 in
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87. See also United States v. 12
200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n. 7 (18 U.S.C. 1462)
(dicta). Hamling rejected a vagueness attack on 1461, which forbids
the mailing of "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile"
material. In holding that the statute's coverage is limited to
obscenity, the Court followed the lead of Mr. Justice Harlan in Manual
Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478. In that case, Mr. Justice
Harlan recognized that 1461 contained a variety of words with many
shades of meaning.[fn15] Nonetheless, he thought that the phrase
"obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile," taken as a
whole, was clearly limited to the obscene, a reading well grounded in
prior judicial constructions: "[T]he statute since its inception has
always been taken as aimed at obnoxiously debasing portrayals of sex."
370 U.S., at 483. In Hamling the Court agreed with Mr. Justice Harlan
that 1461 was meant only to regulate obscenity in the mails; by
reading into it the limits set by Miller v. California, supra, the
Court adopted a construction which assured the statute's
constitutionality.

The reasons supporting Hamling's construction of 1461 do not apply to
1464. Although the history of the former revealed a primary concern
with the prurient, the Commission has long interpreted 1464 as
encompassing more than the obscene.[fn16] The former statute deals
primarily with printed matter enclosed in sealed envelopes mailed from
one individual to another; the latter deals with the content of public
broadcasts. It is unrealistic to assume that Congress intended to
impose precisely the same limitations on the dissemination of patently
offensive matter by such different means.[fn17]

Because neither our prior decisions nor the language or history of
1464 supports the conclusion that prurient appeal is an essential
component of indecent language, we reject Pacifica's construction of
the statute. When that construction is put to one side, there is no
basis for disagreeing with the Commission's conclusion that indecent
language was used in this broadcast.

Pacifica makes two constitutional attacks on the Commission's order.
First, it argues that the Commission's construction of the statutory
language broadly encompasses so much constitutionally protected speech
that reversal is required even if Pacifica's broadcast of the "Filthy
Words" monologue is not itself protected by the First Amendment.
Second, Pacifica argues that inasmuch as the recording is not obscene,
the Constitution forbids any abridgment of the right to broadcast it
on the radio.

The first argument fails because our review is limited to the question
whether the Commission has the authority to proscribe this particular
broadcast. As the Commission itself emphasized, its order was "issued
in a specific factual context." 59 F. C. C. 2d, at 893. That approach
is appropriate for courts as well as the Commission when regulation of
indecency is at stake, for indecency is largely a function of context
it cannot be adequately judged in the abstract.

The approach is also consistent with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367. In that case the Court rejected an argument that the
Commission's regulations defining the fairness doctrine were so vague
that they would inevitably abridge the broadcasters' freedom of
speech. The Court of Appeals had invalidated the regulations because
their vagueness might lead to self-censorship of controversial program
content. Radio Television News Directors Assn. v. United States, 400
F.2d 1002, 1016 (CA7 1968). This Court reversed. After noting that the
Commission had indicated, as it has in this case, that it would not
impose sanctions without warning in cases in which the applicability
of the law was unclear, the Court stated:

"We need not approve every aspect of the fairness doctrine to decide
these cases, and we will not now pass upon the constitutionality of
these regulations by envisioning the most extreme applications
conceivable, United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 694 (1948), but
will deal with those problems if and when they arise." 395 U.S., at
396.

It is true that the Commission's order may lead some broadcasters to
censor themselves. At most, however, the Commission's definition of
indecency will deter only the broadcasting of patently offensive
references to excretory and sexual organs and activities.[fn18] While
some of these references may be protected, they surely lie at the
periphery of First Amendment concern. Cf. Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380-381. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 61. The danger dismissed so summarily in Red Lion, in
contrast, was that broadcasters would respond to the vagueness of the
regulations by refusing to present programs dealing with important
social and political controversies. Invalidating any rule on the basis
of its hypothetical application to situations not before the Court is
"strong medicine" to be applied "sparingly and only as a last resort."
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613. We decline to administer
that medicine to preserve the vigor of patently offensive sexual and
excretory speech.

When the issue is narrowed to the facts of this case, the question is
whether the First Amendment denies government any power to restrict
the public broadcast of indecent language in any circumstances.[fn19]
For if the government has any such power, this was an appropriate
occasion for its exercise.

The words of the Carlin monologue are unquestionably "speech" within
the meaning of the First Amendment. It is equally clear that the
Commission's objections to the broadcast were based in part on its
content. The order must therefore fall if, as Pacifica argues, the
First Amendment prohibits all governmental regulation that depends on
the content of speech. Our past cases demonstrate, however, that no
such absolute rule is mandated by the Constitution.

The classic exposition of the proposition that both the content and
the context of speech are critical elements of First Amendment
analysis is Mr. Justice Holmes' statement for the Court in Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52:

"We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in
saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their
constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the
circumstances in which it is done. . . . The most stringent protection
of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an
injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of
force. . . . The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent."

Other distinctions based on content have been approved in the years
since Schenck. The government may forbid speech calculated to provoke
a fight. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568. It may pay
heed to the "`commonsense differences' between commercial speech and
other varieties." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, at 381. It may
treat libels against private citizens more severely than libels
against public officials. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323. Obscenity may be wholly prohibited. Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15. And only two Terms ago we refused to hold that a "statutory
classification is unconstitutional because it is based on the content
of communication protected by the First Amendment." Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., supra, at 52.

The question in this case is whether a broadcast of patently offensive
words dealing with sex and excretion may be regulated because of its
content.[fn20] Obscene materials have been denied the protection of
the First Amendment because their content is so offensive to
contemporary moral standards. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476. But
the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient
reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that
gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it
constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet of the First
Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace
of ideas[fn21] If there were any reason to believe that the
Commission's characterization of the Carlin monologue as offensive
could be traced to its political content or even to the fact that it
satirized contemporary attitudes about four-letter words[fn22] First
Amendment protection might be required. But that is simply not this
case. These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity
offends.[fn23] Their place in the hierarchy of First Amendment values
was aptly sketched by Mr. Justice Murphy when he said: "[S]uch
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S., at 572.

Although these words ordinarily lack literary, political, or
scientific value, they are not entirely outside the protection of the
First Amendment. Some uses of even the most offensive words are
unquestionably protected. See, e. g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105.
Indeed, we may assume, arguendo, that this monologue would be
protected in other contexts. Nonetheless, the constitutional
protection accorded to a communication containing such patently
offensive sexual and excretory language need not be the same in every
context.[fn24] It is a characteristic of speech such as this that both
its capacity to offend and its "social value," to use Mr. Justice
Murphy's term, vary with the circumstances. Words that are commonplace
in one setting are shocking in another. To paraphrase Mr. Justice
Harlan, one occasion's lyric is another's vulgarity. Cf. Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 25.[fn25]

In this case it is undisputed that the content of Pacifica's broadcast
was "vulgar," "offensive," and "shocking." Because content of that
character is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under
all circumstances, we must consider its context in order to determine
whether the Commission's action was constitutionally permissible.

We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents
special First Amendment problems. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 502-503. And of all forms of communication, it is
broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment
protection. Thus, although other speakers cannot be licensed except
under laws that carefully define and narrow official discretion, a
broadcaster may be deprived of his license and his forum if the
Commission decides that such an action would serve "the public
interest, convenience, and necessity."[fn26] Similarly, although the
First Amendment protects newspaper publishers from being required to
print the replies of those whom they criticize, Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, it affords no such
protection to broadcasters; on the contrary, they must give free time
to the victims of their criticism. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367.

The reasons for these distinctions are complex, but two have relevance
to the present case. First, the broadcast media have established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans. Patently
offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the
citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home,
where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the
First Amendment rights of an intruder. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397
U.S. 728. Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and
out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer
from unexpected program content. To say that one may avoid further
offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is
like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the
first blow. One may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option
does not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm
that has already taken place.[fn27]

Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those
too young to read. Although Cohen's written message might have been
incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica's broadcast could have
enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant. Other forms of offensive
expression may be withheld from the young without restricting the
expression at its source. Bookstores and motion picture theaters, for
example, may be prohibited from making indecent material available to
children. We held in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, that the
government's interest in the "well-being of its youth" and in
supporting "parents' claim to authority in their own household"
justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression. Id., at
640 and 639.[fn28] The case with which children may obtain access to
broadcast material, coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg,
amply justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting.

It is appropriate, in conclusion, to emphasize the narrowness of our
holding. This case does not involve a two-way radio conversation
between a cab driver and a dispatcher, or a telecast of an Elizabethan
comedy. We have not decided that an occasional expletive in either
setting would justify any sanction or, indeed, that this broadcast
would justify a criminal prosecution. The Commission's decision rested
entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all-important.
The concept requires consideration of a host of variables. The time of
day was emphasized by the Commission. The content of the program in
which the language is used will also affect the composition of the
audience,[fn29] and differences between radio, television, and perhaps
closed-circuit transmissions, may also be relevant. As Mr. Justice
Sutherland wrote, a "nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong
place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388. We simply hold that when the
Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of
its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene.

"`[I]n some cases, public events likely to produce offensive speech
are covered live, and there is no opportunity for journalistic
editing.' Under these circumstances we believe that it would be
inequitable for us to hold a licensee responsible for indecent
language. . . . We trust that under such circumstances a licensee will
exercise judgment, responsibility, and sensitivity to the community's
needs, interests and tastes." 59 F. C. C. 2d, at 893 n. 1. [Back]

"This contention is without merit. There has been no attempt on the
part of the commission to subject any part of appellant's broadcasting
matter to scrutiny prior to its release. In considering the question
whether the public interest, convenience, or necessity will be served
by a renewal of appellant's license, the commission has merely
exercised its undoubted right to take note of appellant's past
conduct, which is not censorship." 60 App. D.C., at 81, 47 F.2d, at
672.[Back]

In Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 61 App.
D.C. 311, 62 F.2d 850 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599, the station
was controlled by a minister whose broadcasts contained frequent
references to "pimps" and "prostitutes" as well as bitter attacks on
the Roman Catholic Church. The Commission refused to renew the
license, citing the nature of the broadcasts. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, concluding the First Amendment concerns did not prevent the
Commission from regulating broadcasts that "offend the religious
susceptibilities of thousands . . . or offend youth and innocence by
the free use of words suggestive of sexual immorality." 61 App. D.C.,
at 314, 62 F.2d, at 853. The court recognized that the licensee had a
right to broadcast this material free of prior restraint, but "this
does not mean that the government, through agencies established by
Congress, may not refuse a renewal of license to one who has abused
it." Id., at 312, 62 F.2d, at 851.

We are assured by Pacifica that the free play of market forces will
discourage indecent programming. "Smut may," as Judge Leventhal put
it, "drive itself from the market and confound Gresham," 181 U.S. App.
D.C., at 158, 556 F.2d, at 35; the prosperity of those who traffic in
pornographic literature and films would appear to justify skepticism. [Back]

In holding that criminal sanctions could not be imposed on Cohen for
his political statement in a public place, the Court rejected the
argument that his speech would offend unwilling viewers; it noted that
"there was no evidence that persons powerless to avoid [his] conduct
did in fact object to it." Id., at 22. In contrast, in this case the
Commission was responding to a listener's strenuous complaint, and
Pacifica does not question its determination that this afternoon
broadcast was likely to offend listeners. It should be noted that the
Commission imposed a far more moderate penalty on Pacifica than the
state court imposed on Cohen. Even the strongest civil penalty at the
Commission's command does not include criminal prosecution. See n. 1,
supra. [Back]

"While this Court has recognized that government may properly act in
many situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of
unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be totally banned from the
public dialogue . . ., we have at the same time consistently stressed
that `we are often "captives" outside the sanctuary of the home and
subject to objectionable speech.'" 403 U.S., at 21.

The problem of harassing phone calls is hardly hypothetical. Congress
has recently found it necessary to prohibit debt collectors from
"plac[ing] telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the
caller's identity"; from "engaging any person in telephone
conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse,
or harass any person at the called number"; and from "us[ing] obscene
or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to
abuse the hearer or reader." Consumer Credit Protection Act
Amendments, 91 Stat. 877, 15 U.S.C. 1692d (1976 ed., Supp. II). [Back]