BACKGROUND PRESS BRIEFING BY
A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS IN PAKISTAN
Islamabad, Pakistan

2:55 P.M. (L)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me go through each of the
meetings in a little bit more detail then. First of all, the meeting
with President Tarar lasted, as Joe said, about 15 minutes. The
President indicated his great happiness. President Tarar expressed his
great happiness at having President Clinton here and how much the
Pakistani people were eager to have him here.

President Clinton underscored his own interest in coming here. He
noted the long history of friendly cooperation between the United States
and Pakistan that actually goes back to the birth of Pakistan in the
1940s; our cooperation together during the Cold War; our work together
in Afghanistan in dealing with Soviet invasion; our work over the years
in fighting terrorism and the cooperation we've had on several occasions
in that.

The meeting then broke and the President went over to the meeting
with the Chief Executive. This meeting had about five or six on each
side. On the American side it was the President, Sandy Berger,
Secretary Albright, John Podesta, Ambassador Milam, an NSC notetaker.
And on the Pakistani side, the Foreign Minister, the Foreign Secretary
and some of the Chief Executive's chief aides were there.

As we've already indicated, this was a very good conversation, very
serious, very frank, I think a very thorough conversation and covered
all of the issues which are on both sides' agenda.

The President began by explaining why he was here -- that he came
here because the United States does have a long history of friendship
with Pakistan, of working with the Pakistani people; but secondly,
because he's also worried about the direction Pakistan is moving in, and
that there are trends here which disturb the United States and disturb
the President in particular, and that he wanted to have the chance to
come here and be honest and speak as an old friend of this country and
listen to what they had to say.

The discussion began with a discussion about democracy. The
President reiterated our support for an orderly restoration of
democratic civilian rule. He urged the Chief Executive to develop a
timetable and a road map for getting back to national-level civilian
rule. He noted that just two days ago the Chief Executive had laid out
plans for local and district elections, and that, while these are a
step, what is needed is a game plan that will restore democracy at the
top.

The President noted that democracies are growing in number
throughout the developing world, and that Pakistan finds itself in an
unusual position of working against the trends in the developing world
today by having gone away from a democratic system.

There was an extended discussion on nonproliferation issues. The
President laid out, as he did in New Delhi, our views that nuclear
testing had not made Pakistan safer, did not enhance its deterrent
capability, had not made the Pakistani people safer, and that, in fact,
embarking upon a nuclear arms race was an expensive way to squander the
country's wealth.

He urged early signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
cutoff in fissile material production, no export of technologies to
other countries, firm export controls, and also restraint in the
development and deployment of new systems.

Let me say in this regard that General Musharraf gave the President
a very firm assurance that Pakistan would not be the source of the
export of any dangerous technologies or weapons of mass destruction.

The discussion also covered terrorism. The President made clear,
as he had in New Delhi, our very strong opposition to terrorism
throughout the region, and in particular, encouraged General Musharraf
to use the influence that Pakistan has with the Taliban to see that
Usama bin Laden is brought to justice as soon as possible.

Regarding the Taliban in general, the President also raised our
human rights concerns vis-a-vis the Taliban, particularly its treatment
of women and minorities, and pressed the General, again, to do what he
could with Pakistan's influence to assist in that area.

There was, not surprisingly, an extensive discussion of Pakistani
relations with India and the Kashmir issue. As he did in New Delhi, the
President made clear our view that there is no role for United States
mediation in this issue, and that the road forward requires restraint,
respect for the line of control, efforts to ensure an end to the
violence, and a return to dialogue as soon as possible. The President
underscored again the same message that he had in New Delhi, that there
is no military solution to the Kashmir issue.

The President also discussed the trial of former Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif, and expressed continued interest in fair and transparent
process, and underscored our view that the Prime Minister should not be
executed.

The President raised a particular issue of terrorism, which is the
issue of a missing American, Don Hutchins, who was kidnapped in Kashmir
in 1995, and which his widow, Jane Shelley, has asked the government of
Pakistan for any assistance it can provide in providing information that
would lead to a determination of his fate. General Musharraf indicated
that he would do what he could in this area.

In the larger meeting, there was a discussion of Pakistan's
economic policies. General Musharraf briefed the President on the
efforts he is trying to do to revive the Pakistani economy and to lift
Pakistani people out of poverty. The President expressed support for
economic reforms aimed at privatization, and he noted that the team that
the Pakistani Prime Minister has put together to deal with economic
issues is a very strong team.

General Musharraf then talked about his efforts to deweaponize
Pakistani society and to outlaw the display of weapons. And he also
spoke about his efforts to increase women's rights in Pakistan and to
bring more women into positions of power in government and elsewhere.

As we indicated earlier, I think it was a serious discussion. It
was frank. There was a great deal of engagement and give-and-take
between the two leaders. There were no particular surprises. But I
think the principal objective that we had developed for coming here,
which was keeping open our lines of communication to the nation of
Pakistan and to the leadership of Pakistan, we're well on the way to
having accomplished.

Q Did the Chief Executive have any response to the appeal of
democracy -- to the request that a timetable --

Q What was the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He asked what was General
Musharraf's response on the question of democracy. General Musharraf
reiterated positions which we have heard previously, which is that in
his judgment Pakistan's democracy before October was a deeply flawed
one, and that he needed to set the stage for restoration of democracy by
working from the ground up. He did not offer a timeline or an extended
road map for the restoration of democracy.

Q Did he offer anything on terrorism, specifically to shut down any
of the militant groups here like -- Mujahadeen? Anything specific on
terrorism?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He did indicate that he would make
an effort to work with the Taliban leadership to bring Usama bin Laden
to justice, or to find a resolution of the Usama bin Laden issue. You
may be aware that he has earlier indicated a willingness to go to
Kanduhar to meet with Mullah Omar. And he indicated he will continue
his efforts to press in that area. But he did not make any commitments
with regard to HUM.

Q What was the General's response to the President's position on
Kashmir --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that General Musharraf and
the Pakistani government can speak better for themselves on their
position. You know what their position is, and I --

Q What did he say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He didn't break any new ground in
his position on that issue.

Q Did he secure any commitments from the General to reduce the
level of violence along the line of control, or to reduce the
infiltration -- India and Kashmir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President certainly raised the
issue of Pakistan using its influence to help build confidence on both
sides of the line of control. But we heard no new assurances from the
General.

Q On the democracy issue, did the General raise at all the idea
that if the U.S. and the world don't deal with the likes of him, they
might well be dealing with a radical fundamentalist regime here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he did not make that point.
He did not make that argument.

Q -- did this point come up in the discussion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in exactly those terms, but
the President was clear his concern about violence in Kashmir, and using
every effort in order to diminish it and bring about an end to it.

Q Is there any pressure on the President to mitigate against the
impression that his visit here is an endorsement of the military
dictatorship? And, is that going to be -- is there pressure on his
message this afternoon to the people? And was there any sort of quid
pro quo about his visit and allowing him to air this broadcast?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't describe it as a quid
pro quo. We made clear from the beginning of our discussions with them
that the President would like to have that opportunity to speak to the
Pakistani people. And I don't believe the Pakistani authorities have
quarreled with that request.

On your other question, let me be very clear -- this is not an
endorsement of a military government. This is not a state visit. I
think we have made clear that business as usual between the United
States and Pakistan is not possible until there is a restoration of
normal civilian democratic rule. And I think if you look at the way
this trip has been structured, I think we've made it very clear that
this was a businesslike, straightforward meeting in order to maintain a
communications channel.

Q -- the President asked Musharraf for respect of the line of
control, what was Musharraf's response? And how did he reply --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He did not use those words.
Again, I think the Pakistanis are going to have every opportunity to
describe their position, and I don't think it's my place to do it for
them. I would only say that the President made very clear, as he had in
New Delhi, our view, the so-called four Rs: restraint, respect for the
line of control, reduction -- renunciation of violence, and a renewal of
the dialogue. We did not get assurances from Pakistan of a change of
their policy vis-a-vis infiltration or other things.

Q I mean, if they aren't going -- four Rs, what did the President
say when he --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the President was very
eloquent in talking about the future, and asking -- in fact, he did this
also in New Delhi -- asking the leadership, but particularly here, to
look 10, 20 years out: Where do they want their countries to be? What
do they want to have spent their nations' wealth on over the next 10 or
20 years -- weapons of mass destruction, a conflict in Kashmir? Those
are alternatives which are designed, wittingly or unwittingly, to
squander the tremendous potential and opportunity that the people of
South Asia have for a better future.

And he appealed, both here and in New Delhi -- and you heard him in
the speech to the Lok Sabha -- to look to a different kind of a future,
a future in which the economic potential of both these countries and
this entire subcontinent is realized.

Q -- both here and in New Delhi, how would you characterize the
nuclear arms competition between the two countries? Is it fair or
accurate to characterize this as a "race"? Or is it something less than
that? How does the U.S. see that now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think we made very clear
our deep concern about the development of nuclear weapons systems and
missile systems in South Asia. And we have made very clear that we
think that that process needs to be fire-breaked now, that there needs
to be agreement on no more testing, no more production on fissile
material, restraint on the development and deployment of new weapons,
and that the best way to ensure that there doesn't become a full-scale
nuclear arms race is by taking those firebreaks now.

Q Did he have assurances of that, did he have assurance of those
firebreaks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I was very clear we do not
have assurances, and that is something that is a work in progress and we
will still have to work on.

Q What was General Musharraf's reaction -- (inaudible) --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Starting from the back and going
forward, our understanding is that that limitation on public activities
is limited only for the duration of our visit, as a security measure.
And we certainly hope that that will be the case.

Regarding the massacre of the Sikhs, you know our position. The
General did not specifically comment on it. And the one in the middle
-- the General repeated a position which I think he stated publicly,
that he is not a vindictive or vengeful man, but that this issue is up
to the courts in order to decide.

Q -- (inaudible.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's a question better
left to them to answer.

Q You made a point of singling out Musharraf's reaction to one of
the agenda items on export control -- he reacted very positively. Can
you tell us, on any of the other items was there a point when he
bristled or reacted negatively to anything that Mr. Clinton --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think this was --
there were not obviously body movements showing bristling or reactions
-- this was a civil, serious, and I think extremely frank and honest
conversation.

Q So he agreed with everything the President said?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I didn't say he agreed with
it. I think they had a civil and frank conversation. There were many
areas where they disagreed. I think I made that clear. But nobody
stormed out in protest.

Q Beyond maintaining a line of communication, is there any reason
now to be more optimistic than yesterday about the situation in this
country with this leader?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we've made -- certainly
made every effort to make our position clear at the highest level in
this country. And shortly the President will have an opportunity to
make it clear to the people of Pakistan.

Q -- is this a direct quote where you said the President warned him
that embarking on a nuclear arms race was an expensive way to squander
the country's wealth? Were those the President's words or a paraphrase?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Those were paraphrased.

Q And on the economic talk that followed, was there something
specifically that Musharraf was asking -- debt relief or some specific
item on the table they were looking for?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it was primarily a briefing by
the Chief Executive of his policies.

Q Was there anything on how the United States might be helpful in
that regard?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As you know, under the sanctions
imposed first on proliferation issues and then in reaction to the events
of October, there's very little room for U.S. economic or other kinds of
assistance for Pakistan.

Q -- did you get any clarity on any of these issues as a result of
the discussions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Regarding economic issues?

Q Well, I'm talking across the gamut.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I've laid out the areas
where I thought we heard some response. But I think most areas, this
was honest, straight-forward. We didn't expect to come here and in an
hour persuade the leadership here of the wisdom of all of our positions.
But I think we made of where we are on this.

Q Are you leaving the region with any hope of a Musharraf-Vajpayee
meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have no expectation or no
reason to believe that's around --

Q Beyond the President's reiteration of the four Rs, did he have
any response to General Musharraf's very different perspective on
Kashmir --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think our policy and our views
on Kashmir don't change when we travel from New Delhi to Islamabad. I
think we have a position which is clear and which the President said in
New Delhi, he was going to say the same thing when he came here, and
that's what he did.

Q (Inaudible.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there was -- I'll go back
to what Joe said -- it was a very straightforward, serious, honest
discussion in which we made very clear our positions. And we kept open
an important line of communication to the leadership of a very important
country in this part of the world.

Q Will there be future meetings?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have no plans for future
meetings, but I that doesn't mean I rule out the possibility of future
meetings.

Q Do you expect any movement at all by Musharraf on CTBT? And did
he at all raise the fact that the United States did not ratify it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Actually, the President raised the
last point, as he has -- on every occasion that I've heard him raise
CTBT in the last several months, and as he said in New Delhi, we hope
the democratic system and the United States will produce ratification of
the CTBT.

Q (Inaudible.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't characterize the
comment.

Q Back home the President is a supporter of the death penalty. Can
you explain why the White House believes that it would be inappropriate
for Musharraf to take --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think our position here is based
upon a reading of the unfortunate history of this country, and the
execution of a Prime Minister in the past was not a step forward towards
producing a long-term democratic path in this country.