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Just reading an article about Okinawa. It said that if you total up all the American casualties of killed, wounded, and shell shocked you get a total of 83,000 men. When compared to Japanese casualties you get a ratio of 1:1.2. At the time it was thought there were 4 million Japanese waiting for an invasion and there were really 6 million waiting. Doing the math and you get an unbelievable number of American casualties which is what the Japanese High Command wanted. A war of attrition where we would sue for peace and they could preserve themselves. That many casualties would have stunned the American population and no doubt they would have demanded an end themselves.

That is true. There were close to 400 thousand American dead at World War II. And the highest death toll that United States ever took was in the Secession War, with 620 thousand people. I believe that for the United States to procure a white peace (nobody takes anything or loses anything) or at least let them keep Korea and give back what they held in China to the Chinese, it wouldn't take more than 1~1,5 million deaths. And This wouldn't take much more in the Japanese Mainland, specially if you take into consideration that the bombings there probably would diminish in power and frequency because most of the fight would be in Urban environments and at that time there was no precision bombings.

If we had not allied with the USSR, the lend lease program, which supplied large numbers of trucks, tanks, and equipment for the Soviets would not have happened. Russia at the time was a third rate industrial power, and the Germans would likely have taken Moscow in '42, and then pushed Stalin (if he hadn't been captured at Moscow, where he refused to leave) back to the Urals. The Soviets would have sued for peace, similar to WW1. A big factor would have been how much territory the Germans and Finns gave back to the USSR after the cease fire, and if Japan would be granted Eastern Siberia. The USSR might have turned into a German puppet state and been remade.

That's a lot of hostile territory to hold though, and the amount of troops the Germans would have been able to remove from the area and turn toward the west for defense would be an interesting debate. You're talking about +10,000 sq miles and 200 million people (counting Poland, France, the Balkans, Norway, and former USSR) that you have to keep in check, all the while beating off aircraft from the West.

Bottom line is that it was probably for the best that we did make a deal with Stalin.

I think that if you read Mein Kampf and take into consideration Hitler's ideas and actions overtime, he really talks and believed of expanding to the East, where the lands were still of a low population density.
However, he really despised the Austrian Empire or Austria-Hungary, that had more than enough lebensraum but was a multi-ethnic fest. Every thing that he did in peace time, and also in war doesn't contradict this notion:
He declared Alsace Lorraine again as part of the Reich, but he did not invade Switzerland or Italy to get the South Tyrol back. His main goal was to make a Reich with all of the Germans possible inside of it and connected by land.

If you take that into consideration you will understand his despise for colonies and also that he wouldn't annex any big chunk of land that there wasn't at least a significant minority of Germans that could increase in population and germanize the other Europeans there over long periods of time. Taking that into consideration, I believe he would make the Soviets cut their Army to less than half and pay reparations to Germany, but would not take actual land out of them.
At the same time, he would probably give independence - even if only as a puppet state - to Ukraine and possible Belarus. This, together with the very diminished Poland (He would expand significantly further than the 1914 borders) would be buffer countries if the Soviets ever tried to take that territory back and would raise their own armies. That would make it even longer and harder for the Soviets to take that land back, what they might try to do some decades after.

What if America hadn't traded with Germany? How many Russians wouldn't of died?

But the heartbreaking truth is that a number of financial and industrial figures of World War II and several members of the government served the cause of money before the cause of patriotism. While aiding the United States' war effort, they also aided Nazi Germany's.I first came across this fact in 1978 when I was declassifying documents in the course of writing a biography that dealt with motion picture star Errol Flynn's Nazi associations. In the National Archives Diplomatic Records Room I found numerous cross-references to prominent figures who, I had always assumed, were entirely committed to the American cause, yet who had been marked down for suspected subversive activities.

Because in 1939 Britain and France had (finally!) realised that Nazi Germany was aggressive and expansionist and planned to take over the whole of Europe, and was powerful enough to do it if nobody stopped them.

On the other hand, nobody back then really took Soviet Russia seriously. Oh, they didn't trust Stalin, and were wary of Communism; but everybody - both the Germans and the Western Allies - thought that the USSR would be useless in a fight. They could defend themselves well enough, simply by retreating into the steppes and letting the Russian winter do its work, but they were no big threat to the rest of Europe. The military might the USSR showed in 1941-45 came as a nasty surprise to everybody.

So the alliance Britain and France made with Poland was specifically directed against Hitler. It was a line in the sand, saying "Attack the Poles, and you'll have to face us too." It wasn't about Poland as such; Poland was just the excuse. (They tried to make a similar deal with Romania at the same time).

As for the Winter War, some people in Britain did say that they ought to go to Finland's defence. But since they were already at war with Germany, and Germany had a far larger army than Britain and was winning the war on all fronts, then picking a fight with the Soviets at the same time would have been suicidal.

More than three. Nothing Japan could have done would win her the war. For Germany to win she has to do everything right and this is not possible with the Nazi regime running things.

The one that I will always remember as the critical mistake was to declare was on US after Pearl Harbour. Dec 13th was date I believe.

Pearl Harbour was between Japan and US. I think the Nazi leader got carried away in excitement and traded off easy upfront U-boat victories in the opening shots of war against US against major mobilization of the US industrial base that came to bite him not long after.

Although 60 years later it might feel impossible to think that Germany could have stayed out of a Japan-US conflict. It was very possible given that Tokyo and Berlin were not natural allies. A good example is how Japan stayed neutral with USSR (even though the latter was at war with Germany) until the invasion of Manchuria in August '45. Which was really you snooze you loose (loose the Far East) scenario for the Soviet Union at that point.

People often talk about how USSR bore the brunt of war, but it was US that wipe out the Luftwaffe and tied up 1.5 million German troops in Ruhr and Berlin region to man the 88s against the Anglo-American bombing campaign.

I don't see a way for a US/Germany war to be avoided, even if Hitler hadn't declared war. FDR & an increasing percentage of Americans saw a Nazi-controlled Europe as a threat to their view of the world. America was getting deeper & deeper into the conflict there. With war underway in the Pacific America was already allied with Britain & the exiled Dutch government. Domestic support for Britain was very high in the US - well ahead of a more general acceptance that war was inevitable. At some point another US ship was going to get sunk helping Britain & it would be on.

I'm not even convinced the timing of US direct involvement would have changed much. FDR would have similar resources as he did in 1942 and most likely plans with the British on how to deploy them. He might even start moving forces to Britain to support his ally before war started. Won't be hard to sell with US & British personnel already fighting and dying together in Sth East Asia. 'Torch' was 12 months after Pearl Harbor. In this scenario that might not change much, if at all.

I don't see a way for a US/Germany war to be avoided, even if Hitler hadn't declared war. FDR & an increasing percentage of Americans saw a Nazi-controlled Europe as a threat to their view of the world. America was getting deeper & deeper into the conflict there. With war underway in the Pacific America was already allied with Britain & the exiled Dutch government. Domestic support for Britain was very high in the US - well ahead of a more general acceptance that war was inevitable. At some point another US ship was going to get sunk helping Britain & it would be on.

I'm not even convinced the timing of US direct involvement would have changed much. FDR would have similar resources as he did in 1942 and most likely plans with the British on how to deploy them. He might even start moving forces to Britain to support his ally before war started. Won't be hard to sell with US & British personnel already fighting and dying together in Sth East Asia. 'Torch' was 12 months after Pearl Harbor. In this scenario that might not change much, if at all.

BF,
i don't disagree with the powerful anti-nazi sentiment in the FDR administration. But that just wasn't enough for FDR to declare war against Germany.
Pearl Harbour's rallying cry was to kill the Japs. Not Germans. Hitler solved FDR's problem for him on Dec 13, 1941.

It is just that USSR-Japan managed to keep their neutrality pact for several years before war became inevitable. With a Germany-first Japan-second FDR administration, perhaps that 'neutrality' would have lasted much shorter (i.e. only half-year) before US was pulled into the German war. But perhaps, that may have not changed much at the end, to your point about 'Torch'.

U.S. Navy ships were already escorting ship convoys to an exchange point in the Atlantic. U.S. Marines had "occupied" Reykjavik with the intent of securing an early version G.I.U.K ASW barrier. We were, in the FDR administration, a cocked trigger even if our ground forces were wholly inadequate to the immediate requirements.

That thing with Germany was going to quickly happen.

"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski"The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

BF,
i don't disagree with the powerful anti-nazi sentiment in the FDR administration. But that just wasn't enough for FDR to declare war against Germany.
Pearl Harbour's rallying cry was to kill the Japs. Not Germans. Hitler solved FDR's problem for him on Dec 13, 1941.

It wasn't 'sentiment' that was going to get the US into a war with Germany, it was Germany attacking US ships. As S@ pointed out, the US was already 'in' by mid-1941. By the time Japan attacked German U boats had sunk 1 US supply ship (no casualties) one destroyer (over 100 dead) and damaged another destroyer with a dozen lost. FDR was a man in search of an excuse to go to war. With the public's blood already up over Japan attacking, it would have taken no effort at all to get a declaration of war with another US ship sunk. That would have been a matter of weeks or months.

It is just that USSR-Japan managed to keep their neutrality pact for several years before war became inevitable. With a Germany-first Japan-second FDR administration, perhaps that 'neutrality' would have lasted much shorter (i.e. only half-year) before US was pulled into the German war. But perhaps, that may have not changed much at the end, to your point about 'Torch'.

The USSR & Japan were both heavily invested in not going to war. Both had bigger problems to deal with and neither was trying to change things until right near the end. FDR wanted in all the way against Germany.

The one that I will always remember as the critical mistake was to declare was on US after Pearl Harbour. Dec 13th was date I believe.

Pearl Harbour was between Japan and US. I think the Nazi leader got carried away in excitement and traded off easy upfront U-boat victories in the opening shots of war against US against major mobilization of the US industrial base that came to bite him not long after.

Although 60 years later it might feel impossible to think that Germany could have stayed out of a Japan-US conflict. It was very possible given that Tokyo and Berlin were not natural allies. A good example is how Japan stayed neutral with USSR (even though the latter was at war with Germany) until the invasion of Manchuria in August '45. Which was really you snooze you loose (loose the Far East) scenario for the Soviet Union at that point.

People often talk about how USSR bore the brunt of war, but it was US that wipe out the Luftwaffe and tied up 1.5 million German troops in Ruhr and Berlin region to man the 88s against the Anglo-American bombing campaign.

Declaring war on the US shaved off critical time he could have had in Russia and doomed him to fight a two front war in 44. Six months, just six months and Normandy would be a 1945 event and he gets an extra 6 months production before the bombers wreck things. Overall though the list of mistakes is the Nazi's made is huge. 1. Operation pause of Armygroup Nord in August 41. The decision to go after Kiev instead of Moscow. The failure to take Malta. Not pushing the Me262 into a bomber interceptor as early as possible. The Elephant and Tiger, building battleships in the 30's instead of U-boats, no true strategic bomber, not going to war time footing before early 1943, Hitler commanding field armies from Prussia, Nazi racial hierarchy, wasting millions of rail cars, untold supplies and tens of thousands of men on Jews instead of logistics for the army, not building enough trucks.... the list of critical mistakes is never ending.

I'm not even convinced the timing of US direct involvement would have changed much. FDR would have similar resources as he did in 1942 and most likely plans with the British on how to deploy them. He might even start moving forces to Britain to support his ally before war started. Won't be hard to sell with US & British personnel already fighting and dying together in Sth East Asia. 'Torch' was 12 months after Pearl Harbor. In this scenario that might not change much, if at all.

Hitler only has to hold off long enough that FDR is forced into a Japan first war. Had he played door mouse in the Atlantic for six months the US likely would have been forced to go pacific first with possible disastrous results if we tried to force the Japanese fleet to battle. Plus all the momentum of logistics, his generals getting emotionally invested in a Japan first strategy... With no war in Europe the US would have been sorely tempted to relieve the Philippines or help the British and Dutch more in the East Indies. A six month delay may buy him as much as a year in certain areas like strategic bombers and co-belligerent levels of LL to the Soviets. Even more so if the USN sallies for and gets sunk.

Declaring war on the US shaved off critical time he could have had in Russia and doomed him to fight a two front war in 44. Six months, just six months and Normandy would be a 1945 event and he gets an extra 6 months production before the bombers wreck things. Overall though the list of mistakes is the Nazi's made is huge. 1. Operation pause of Armygroup Nord in August 41. The decision to go after Kiev instead of Moscow. The failure to take Malta. Not pushing the Me262 into a bomber interceptor as early as possible. The Elephant and Tiger, building battleships in the 30's instead of U-boats, no true strategic bomber, not going to war time footing before early 1943, Hitler commanding field armies from Prussia, Nazi racial hierarchy, wasting millions of rail cars, untold supplies and tens of thousands of men on Jews instead of logistics for the army, not building enough trucks.... the list of critical mistakes is never ending.

Heading toward Kiev, declaring war on US with no major upfront gain etc. were gambles and strategic blunders.

Whereas aiming to build a large surface fleet under Raeder was actually pretty conventional and in fact perhaps expected from a large power. In the hindsight perhaps, one can say the focus ought to have been on u-boats but that is the hindsight. It wasn't a gamble.

Hitler taking over the army, labour camps and other Nazi related points etc. were just a natural consequences of whom the German choose to lead them. So not a mistake or blunder but rather a by-product of the decision made in the 30s to elevate NSDAP to the leadership position.

As for ME262 or strategic bomber, the air war was pretty new at time. Their mistake was not learning from their mistake.