]]>As the Trump administration navigates through a series of historically unprecedented North Korean crises, questions abound regarding the specifics of US policy on North Korea. Will the US initiate preventive military action against North Korea? What would be the trigger? When such questions arise, American policymakers turn to the intelligence community (IC) to reduce the uncertainties that surround decision-making.
Kim Jong Un observing missile test in July 2017. (Source: KCNA)

North Korea is no different. Kim Jong Un and his military advisors are likely asking the same questions to the North Korean IC—the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). As one might expect, the architecture of the North Korean IC is vastly different from that of the United States and has inherent limitations that favor a reliance on open-source intelligence (OSINT), such as news media, social media and publicly-available information. In fact, one US news correspondent recently reported that North Korean officials tune in to MSNBC’s “Morning Joe” to glean insights into US policy discussions. If this is true, do statements from President Trump that consistently advertise lethal military options against North Korea carry weight? The answer appears to be no, at least until other administration officials provide amplifying comments, whether consistent or contradictory, on US North Korea policy.

Evaluative Language in Intelligence

When intelligence professionals make judgments on actions, capabilities and intentions of adversaries, they assign evaluative language to them. Evaluative language includes both estimative terms that reflect the likelihood of certain actions or events and measures of confidence which reflect the subjective assessment on the quality and reliability of supporting intelligence.[1] Using such language helps produce actionable intelligence that can guide important policy decisions, such as posturing military forces for decisive action against an adversary. The quality of supporting intelligence is the product of the extent and quality of a nation’s intelligence collection enterprise—for example, its network of overhead intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, placement and access to adversary sources of information. Much of this rests on the ability to finance intelligence activities as well as physical access.

North Korea and OSINT

As a nation confronting significant financial constraints and limited foreign travel for the vast majority of its citizens, North Korea’s IC faces significant barriers to intelligence collection. Its ability to direct intelligence gathering against South Korea is one of the few exceptions to this reality. South Korea’s proximity and shared heritage and language enable the flow of information to the North that might benefit North Korean intelligence collection. It is no surprise that North Korean sleeper cells are active throughout South Korea and have been implicated in recent intelligence activities.

With regard to intelligence collection against the United States, however, North Korea leans heavily on OSINT—a readily available and potentially valuable source of reliable intelligence. Public statements from US officials and powerbrokers, in particular, can have added significance when they provide insights into US military courses of action. Corroboration through other intelligence disciplines can amplify the value of these statements. If, for example, North Korea were able to acquire and leverage long-range ISR platforms like the United States and its allies, it could exploit geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) to better ascertain whether US forces were actually postured for preventive military action. Without such capabilities, North Korea greatly appreciates OSINT exploitation.

Like their American adversary, North Korea’s intelligence analysts assign measures of analytic confidence to their intelligence sources—namely, the statements of US officials, power-brokers and other influential voices on US Asia policy. High-confidence intelligence can serve as effective guideposts for policy decisions. For example, former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper’s claim that North Korea will never relinquish its nuclear weapons likely sent a strong signal to North Korean intelligence officials that this represents the summary judgment of the American IC at-large based on its vast instruments of collection. North Korea may have read his opinion as “we, the US IC, assess with high confidence that North Korea will never relinquish nuclear weapons.” When viewed alongside the absence of US/South Korean military action, Pyongyang could have been convinced that such an intelligence judgment may have led the US to abandon the goal of denuclearizing North Korea. In other words, the DNI may have unwittingly served as a credible, high-confidence source for North Korean intelligence on US intentions. It is entirely possible that this may have emboldened North Korea to continue its aggressive pursuit of missile and nuclear development.

North Korea’s Intelligence Assessment of President Trump’s Rhetoric

Still from June 12, 2017 Cabinet Meeting. (Source: White House)

On the contrary, North Korea appears to have dismissed the credibility of President Trump’s pronouncements of military action against North Korea, particularly in light of alternate and corroborative views. Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson have both acknowledged a preference for diplomatic solutions, not military ones.[2] For an intelligence analyst, whether North Korean or American, assessing the probability of military action rests on the sum credibility of such individuals. Additional factors, like the assurances of American interlocutors engaged in Track II diplomacy, can bolster such assessments when they are consistent with official statements.

Of course, the question is, how do we know with reasonable certainty that North Korea actually favored such voices? One way, from the perspective of an intelligence analyst, is to assess the buildup of combat power. After North Korea’s retaliatory threats of a strike towards Guam, the US maintained normal operational readiness in and around the Korean peninsula: no evacuation of American citizens and no unusual troop deployments. If the US had heeded North Korea’s warning and prepared for military action against the United States, one would have expected an entirely different US reaction. Thus, North Korea could have simply interpreted President Trump’s fiery rhetoric and threats of military action as poor indicators of actual US policy responses. Pyongyang no doubt also learned a larger lesson—namely, that North Korea’s testing of strategic weapons capabilities fails to satisfy the threshold for US military action.

This is not to say that North Korea simply rejects President Trump’s statements as empty threats. No one, not even the US public, truly understands the Trump administration’s sensitivities for military action and what precisely constitutes a “red line” for the current administration. With the exception of the April strike against Shayrat Airfield in Syria in response to allegations of a Syrian regime-instigated chemical attack on civilians, we have yet to witness what actions by adversaries will trigger this administration to take strategically significant military action.

Until we collectively understand the logic of the Trump administration and the impetus for military action, it is critical that US interlocutors continue to convey the seriousness of potential US responses to North Korean actions both in an official and unofficial capacity. These individuals have a tremendous potential to influence North Korea’s OSINT intelligence apparatus so long as its overall intelligence capabilities remain unchanged.

Right now, we should not be surprised if the North’s intelligence community is advising their leader that they should heed the messages of the Trump administration as a whole, not simply those of President Trump.

]]>North Korean and Chinese Nuclear Weapons Development: Two Peas in a Pod?https://www.38north.org/2016/11/clee110116/
https://www.38north.org/2016/11/clee110116/#commentsTue, 01 Nov 2016 18:59:49 +0000https://www.38north.org/?p=10324North Korea’s rapid nuclear and missile development has intensified the debate over the efficacy of US and South Korean policies…

]]>North Korea’s rapid nuclear and missile development has intensified the debate over the efficacy of US and South Korean policies toward Pyongyang.[1] Comparing North Korea’s weapons development to China’s own arms activities can contextualize these discussions, in part by highlighting the remarkable speed with which North Korea has accomplished its recent technical milestones. Moreover, two other considerations drive this comparison: allegations of recent Chinese technical assistance to the North and their common geopolitical interests. While both China and North Korea share the need to project a nuclear deterrence capability against the US in the Pacific, it appears that Chinese assistance in this process has been largely indirect. The picture that emerges from this discussion also suggests that rather than being dependent on Chinese technology, Pyongyang’s tremendous progress may in fact be the result of persistent trial-and-error on overdrive, an effort which will accelerate the emergence of new and dangerous threats.

Side-by-Side: North Korea and China

By comparing North Korea’s and China’s key nuclear and missile development milestones, we can benchmark Pyongyang’s progress to date and assess its future development trajectory (figure 1).[2] The framework below incorporates four key events: 1) commencing nuclear development; 2) conducting an initial nuclear test; 3) developing the means to deliver a nuclear payload; and 4) attaining recognition as a nuclear weapons state. The timeline further expands the third phase—developing a means of delivery—into four additional components: successful initial testing of an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), a space launch vehicle (SLV), a re-entry vehicle (RV), a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and a road-mobile long-range missile platform. This broad comparison yields several important insights discussed in the next section.

Note: Highlighted numbers represent achievements only attained to date by the PRC.

Two Peas in a Pod?

North Korea’s and China’s nuclear and missile development programs are similar in their sequencing of key milestones, but differ in their rates of progress. The first and most striking difference between the two timelines is the significant acceleration of North Korea’s advances in the past year. The passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 in March 2016 may have helped to precipitate this dramatic surge in development. Political opportunity could be another contributing factor.[3] Pyongyang may be intentionally consolidating its gains within a short timeframe to exploit political gridlock stemming from a lame-duck presidency in Seoul and a presidential election in Washington. However, it is still unclear how the North has significantly outpaced China’s historical nuclear and missile development.

Some analysts are skeptical that Pyongyang could have achieved success at such an impressive rate without aid from a more technologically capable benefactor—namely, China. These analysts have noted similarities between the KN-11, North Korea’s indigenous SLBM, and the Chinese-made JL-1.[4] Nevertheless, it is unlikely that China offered the North direct technical assistance in recent years.[5] As Henry Kissinger once stated, Beijing is fully aware of the costs of complicity in helping advance Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. A nuclear North Korea risks the nuclearization of East Asia—most notably, Japan and South Korea.[6] Such proliferation would shift the balance of military power in Asia, boding poorly for Chinese interests. China has, however, tolerated indirect assistance to North Korea that likely helped to accelerate its nuclear and missile program. The recent US indictment of Ma Xiaohong, the CEO of Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Company, demonstrates both the scale and nature of Chinese complicity.[7] By one estimate, the Hongxiang Group’s trade with North Korea totaled in excess of $500 million over the last five years. The concern is that the company’s subsidiaries have exported dual-use commodities with nuclear and missile applications.[8] Beijing’s early cooperation on this matter suggests that it may not have provided direct support to Pyongyang’s weapons program and that it is willing to enforce the US Treasury Department’s sanctions against North Korean companies, at least for the time being.[9]

Another distinguishing feature of North Korea’s arms development is the long period between the initiation of its nuclear program and its first nuclear weapons test. From a policy perspective, this makes sense. Developing a credible strategic nuclear deterrent was not a core objective for Pyongyang during Kim Il Sung’s rule. The elder Kim first promulgated the byungjin line of parallel economic and military development in the 1950s. Under Kim Jong Il, songun politics began in the 1990s to emphasize the centrality of military strength to the regime’s survival. Nuclear weapons therefore factored heavily into realizing songun policy. The prevailing belief among North Korean leadership was that only nuclear capabilities could counterbalance the tremendous weight of the US and South Korean military alliance. Kim Jong Un’s approach is something of a hybrid of the two preceding generations. His revival of the byungjin line restored Kim Il Sung’s emphasis on dual military and economic development, but it also specified the necessity for developing more capable nuclear means.[10]

A third difference, and a major source of contention and speculation, is whether North Korea has mastered re-entry vehicle technology. China developed and successfully tested an RV prior to its successful launch of the JL-1 SLBM in 1979, and North Korea claims to have completed similar testing in March 2016.[11] However, there are significant differences between each nation’s RV development. Chinese scientists spent over a decade improving missile nosecones to protect nuclear payloads. Moreover, this was accompanied by robust in-flight testing.[12] North Korea has so far only conducted ground-testing of RVs, and many analysts speculate that its trials to date may not have achieved the conditions necessary to demonstrate workable RV technology.[13] Of course, outside observers have long underestimated North Korea’s technical abilities.

With the exception of its steps to master RV technology, North Korea has yet to test its elusive road-mobile KN-08. Notably, Chinese technicians were able to effectively convert an earlier land-based version of its JL-1 into a solid-state, road-mobile DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM).[14] In August 2016, North Korea’s KN-11 achieved flight success using similar solid-state fuel technology. Could North Korea’s promising results lead to success for its road-based missile system as in China? If so, how soon? Much like its accomplishments so far, it may only be a matter of time. The US and South Korea should certainly be wary of this outcome. Successful development of a KN-08 could offer North Korea a significant and valuable coercive bargaining tool in any discussion regarding the status of its nuclear weapons program. Worse still, systems like the KN-08 could embolden North Korea to turn its attention to a new generation of capabilities, perhaps again following in China’s footsteps.

Assessing the Road to Future Progress

As the comparison above illustrates, North Korea’s core weapons capabilities are reaching an apex. Even more concerning is the fact that North Korea’s relentless trial-and-error—not Chinese technical assistance—is principally generating its positive momentum. For policymakers in Washington and Seoul, the comparative analysis of Chinese and North Korean weapons development highlights the urgency of reevaluating North Korea policy before it has perfected its nuclear and missile technologies. While Pyongyang seems to be headed rapidly down the track Beijing has already traversed, this comparison is not meant to suggest a single culminating point in weapons development. One should hope though that the comparative timeline used here does not continue into the future, or else the US will be faced with significantly greater challenges.

________________

[1] Jane Harman and James Person, “The U.S. Needs to Negotiate with North Korea,” Washington Post, September 30, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-us-needs-to-negotiate-with-north-korea/2016/09/30/c1f0123e-85b2-11e6-92c2-14b64f3d453f_story.html.; Jay Lefkowitz, “A North Korea Strategy for the Next U.S. President,” Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-north-korea-strategy-for-the-next-u-s-president-1475169715.

[2] For purposes here, the first step in the timeline is defined as joint nuclear research with the Soviet Union, a step that precedes the construction of the first nuclear reactors within both countries; “China,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/china/nuclear/.;­ “North Korea,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/nuclear/.; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).; Jae Ho Chung, Assessing China’s Power, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).; Zhihua Shen and Xia Yafeng, Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History, (Lexington Books, 2015). See page 210 for a discussion on Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev offering initial support for the Chinese nuclear program.; Russian joint cooperation began with the North Koreans shortly thereafter. See Richard Stone, “North Korea’s nuclear shell game.” Science 303, no. 5657 (2004): 452-454. Correspondence from Kim il-Sung also supports the view that North Korean interest and cooperation began as early as the 1950s. See “Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov for 20 January 1956,” January 20, 1956, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGANI Fond 5, Opis 28, Delo 412, Translated by Gary Goldberg. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/120790.

[3]“Assessing the North Korean Hazard,” Stratfor, May 23, 2016, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/assessing-north-korean-hazard.

[5] Beginning in 1971, China signed a cooperative weapons transfer agreement which resulted in North Korea’s development of a number of coastal defense missile capabilities. See “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK” by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.