Subject: SMH/E.Timor: Revealed: When
Australia was forced onto war footing

Sydney Morning Herald June 22, 2001

Revealed: When Australia was forced onto war footing

Photo: Too close for comfort ... one of Indonesia's two German-built
Type 209 submarines that closely tracked the international flotilla
carrying Interfet troops to East Timor.

By Hamish McDonald, Foreign Editor

Indonesian submarines and combat aircraft shadowed so closely ships
carrying Australian and New Zealand troops into East Timor in 1999 that
escorting warships went onto full battle stations alert, it has been
revealed.

The "aggressive probing tactics" by Indonesian aircraft
against the Australian-led intervention force, Interfet, led to Australia
placing F/A-18 fighters on readiness to patrol over Timor and having F-111
strike aircraft "bombed up" to knock out Indonesian
communications as far back as Jakarta.

Revelations about the tensions caused by Indonesian deployments of
submarines, missile-boats and fighters during the first two weeks of the
operation cast a new light on the approach by Interfet's commander, the
then Major-General Peter Cosgrove.

They should help dispel lingering resentment in Indonesian military and
political circles that Interfet took an unnecessarily
"aggressive" and "arrogant" posture during the
transfer of control in East Timor.

Many details of the Indonesian manoeuvres are made public for the first
time in the forthcoming issue of the journal Contemporary Southeast Asia,
by the New Zealand defence expert Dr David Dickens, director of the Centre
for Strategic Studies in Wellington.

His article cites highly placed Australian and New Zealand defence
sources, and the Herald has independently confirmed some aspects of his
account, including submarine movements.

Dr Dickens argues that despite the co-operation General Cosgrove
received from the army and police when he landed in Dili, the naval and
air threats meant "a show of overwhelming force was still
necessary".

The Interfet force, which set off for Dili on September 19, 1999,
initially comprised about 5,000 troops, mostly from Australia and New
Zealand. It was transferred and protected by ships from Australia, New
Zealand, Britain, France and the United States.

General Cosgrove flew into Dili ahead of his troops without a personal
bodyguard or weapons, determined to strike a co-operative relationship
with the Indonesian ground commander, Major-General Kiki Syanakri.

Indonesian forces in East Timor were about 15,000, outnumbering the
Interfet force by three-to-one. When the forces arrived by air and sea the
next day, General Cosgrove succeeded in making it seem like a routine
exercise, despite the Indonesian-directed operation to raze the
territory's buildings and infrastructure and deport its population.

At the same time, he aimed to show determination by bringing in his
forces quickly, and immediately beginning security operations in Dili.
"The shock generated by this force, professional and well-equipped,
and deployed with speed, made it appear larger than it was when
deployed," Dr Dickens notes.

Behind the scenes, the Australian Defence Force made contingency plans
in case the Indonesian military, the TNI, decided to contest the landing.

The Indonesian Navy's two German-built Type 209 submarines appeared
around East Timor and the air force deployed aircraft, including a small
number of fighters, to West Timor, from where they adopted
"aggressive probing tactics".

"These tactics raised questions about the intentions of the
TNI," Dr Dickens writes. "Various Interfet ships went to action
stations during these incidents."

The submarines shadowed the Interfet fleet, with one of them detected
by the frigate HMNZS Canterbury close to the landing of New Zealand
soldiers at Suai.

The submarine contacts were passed on to defence headquarters in
Canberra, which took them up with Jakarta. "In response, and once the
Australian higher level commanders had provided information on the
location of the submarines that was convincing, the appropriate TNI
commander admitted his submarines had been deployed and agreed to retire
them from the area," the article said.

The air threats were tracked by the cruiser USS Mobile Bay, while the
RAAF put combat units in northern Australia on a "very high"
state of readiness.

As well as preparing the F/A-18s of the RAAF's No 75 Squadron and New
Zealand's Skyhawk fighters at Tindal air base to provide air cover and
ground strikes, contingency plans included higher level threats.

Dr Dickens was told by defence sources, although he has not included
this in his article, that the alert also involved the F-111 strike
aircraft at Amberley air base, near Brisbane, which were "bombed
up" and ready to knock out communications as far back as TNI
headquarters on the outskirts of Jakarta if necessary.

The pattern of aggressive movements by Indonesian submarines, missile
craft and fighters tapered off within two weeks. By September 28 the TNI
had only 1,200 troops in East Timor. With the threat ebbing and Interfet
gaining control outside Dili, the RAAF took its squadrons to a lower level
of readiness, and several warships were withdrawn.

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