So why is the UK so persistent in pursuing new nuclear power? If the nuclear lobby is driving this, why have other countries with stronger nuclear industries nonetheless developed far more sceptical positions? In the case of Germany, this has meant the country with the world’s most successful nuclear industry and a less attractive renewable resource than the UK, nonetheless undertaking a wholesale shift from one to the other.

Yet there may be other clues. Looking back to the New Labour era, one may lie in the remarkable flurry of activity that immediately followed a rare and brief loss of control, in which the 2003 energy white paperfirmly concluded nuclear power was “unattractive” – instead backing renewables and energy efficiency.

What followed was one of the most spectacular U-turns in recent British politics. After only three years, a cursory further energy review was completed in 2006. Despite unchanged conditions and no new arguments, this reinstated a strongly pro-nuclear policy. Although the 2006 paper was itself overturned by judicial review on the grounds of being too superficial, the Blair government retorted that any further appraisal “won’t affect the policy at all”.

What has not been examined until now is the intense policy commotion behind the scenes during this same period on the arcane topic of submarines. By 2004, the well-funded Keep Our Future Afloat Campaign (KOFAC) was underway. Run by a consortium of nuclear industry, trade union and nuclear-dependent local authorities, this was among the country’s most effective lobby groups. Aiming to maintain a UK nuclear submarine industry, KOFAC’s activities were not confined to the military sector. It also engaged enthusiastically in energy policy consultations, highlighting the importance of a shared skills pool for the military and civilian nuclear sectors.

Joining these efforts, submarine producer BAE Systems set up a key suppliers group to improve co-ordination among nuclear contractors. This culminated in 2009, with the government launching the Nuclear Skills Institute whose remit again quietly spans the linkages between crucial skills across civilian and defence sectors.

So the links between UK civilian nuclear power and military interests in nuclear submarines run deep. What is remarkable is the complete lack of discussion these provoke in the media, public policy documents, or wider critical debate. Yet the stakes are very high. Does the commitment to a submarine based nuclear deterrent help to explain the intensity of high-level UK support for costly, risky and slow nuclear power, rather than cheaper, quicker and cleaner renewable technologies?

If so, the conclusions are not self-evident. For some supporters of a nuclear deterrent, the additional burdens of nuclear power may seem entirely reasonable. But the almost total silence on these connections raises crucial implications for democracy. Imminent decisions that the government must take over nuclear power and the nuclear deterrent are hugely significant. There is a responsibility on all involved to be open and accountable. Otherwise, it will not just be electricity consumers and taxpayers that pay the price, but British democracy itself.