Washington Sadly Out Of Touch When It Comes To Mine Warfare

COMMENTARY

August 1, 1987|By MAX MORRIS, Special Correspondent

It was a shock to hear that our defense and naval authorities ``had not expected`` open-sea mining in the Persian Gulf. It certainly came as no surprise to most naval analysts outside the service. As stated in this column two years ago when mines were found in the Red Sea, mining is a tactically and cost effective form of warfare for any state. Mines are an excellent weapon for denial of ship movements, especially in relatively confined and shallow waters.

An Iranian mine damaged a Soviet merchantman in the northern Gulf some weeks ago. The channels to Kuwait`s harbor have been mined serveral times. Our response was to send divers and equipment to help clear the approaches. Apparently no one expected open sea mining in the middle Gulf, but they certainly should have taken no chances.

Our Navy knows that Iran has mines. Indeed, we sold some moored mines to Iran between 1970-78. So far as can be seen from unclassified sources, those mines have been in outside storage since then. Some probably are usable.

The mine which the tanker Bridgeton struck could well have been one of the stockpiled units. Alternately, it could have been one of the mines from the Soviet bloc. Finally, it could have been a floating mine devised from other components gathered by the Iranians since the revolution. Until one is retrieved, no one can determine the source with any accuracy.

There are clear international legal rules for uses of mines in maritime wars. These rules differentiate between mining of one`s own water, the waters of an opponent in a declared war like that in the Gulf, and mining of the high seas. It was in the latter area, the high seas beyond territorial seas, that the Bridgeton was hit.

If moored mines are laid in the high seas, the general area of mining must be delineated and information promulgated to allow neutral vessels to steer clear of the area. This does, of course, allow a belligerent to confuse and deceive an enemy. During the two world wars both sides laid mines and both sides generally exaggerated the extent of the areas covered.

No requirement exists to state how dense mine fields may be but records must be kept in order to permit mine clearance at the end of hostilities. These may seem like outmoded rules in an era of undeclared wars and terrorists strikes, but ther U.S. and most other countries, including Iran, are nonetheless signatories to treaties that require this.

Floating mines are another story. They are totally banned by at least two treaties. They can float with currents into any waters, and were banned after fishing vessels of neutral countries were hard hit in past wars. They rarely have been used, in addition, since they have a nasty habit of coming back into ones own waters and sinking ones own ships.

Whether floating or moored, what we need to do in the Gulf is sweep and hope to obtain a mine. Those that we found in the Red Sea two years ago, for instance, were of communist manufacture and were traced to Libya. This time Iran would be the most likely source.

The sweeping will require either surface minesweeping vessels or mine countermeasures (MCM) helicopters or both. Given our government`s strong statements on continued Gulf operations, it would seem that some combination is mandatory.

This column has covered our lack of naval mining and countermining capabilities twice in the past eight years. Our government has pressed forward with purchase of naval aircraft, major surface combatants, and tremendously cabaple submarines during that period. Conversely, it has largely ignored mine warfare, spending little on either minelaying or minesweeping assests, airborne or afloat, this depsite abudnant historical evidence of the value of both.

The RH-53D MCM helicopters we do have are excellent sweepers and even better MH-53 choppers are coming into inventory. But we have less than 40 of both in service. On the surface we have only three ocean-going minesweepers manned and in service with three more ordered. We have some obsolete sweeps in mothballs and a few harbor MCM boats.

All of our European allies have more MCM assets than we do. Early indications are, however, that only France is prepared to assist.

Even those of us with a bias favoring our Navy must admit that it has been caught with its guard down twice in the Gulf. Steaming along a straight, predictable track as was done this week was an invitation for covert minelaying and the Iranians obviously accepted with pleasure.

It is past time for our naval leadership to begin to think ahead instead of reacting after the fact. The next surprise may be deadly. If we, on the other hand, can retrieve a mine from the area, we can pull a few surprises, too, presuming our government has the will to do so.