Scholarship on Plato's dialogues persistently divides its focus between the dramatic or literary and the philosophical or argumentative dimensions of the texts. But this hermeneutic division of labor ...
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Scholarship on Plato's dialogues persistently divides its focus between the dramatic or literary and the philosophical or argumentative dimensions of the texts. But this hermeneutic division of labor is naïve, for Plato's arguments are embedded in dramatic dialogues and developed through complex, largely informal exchanges between literary characters. Consequently, it is questionable how readers can even attribute arguments and theses to the author himself. The answer to this question lies in transcending the scholarly divide and integrating the literary and philosophical dimensions of the texts. This is the task of Trials of Reason.The study focuses on a set of fourteen so-called early dialogues, beginning with a methodological framework that explains how to integrate the argumentation and the drama in these texts. Unlike most canonical philosophical works, the early dialogues do not merely express the results of the practice of philosophy. Rather, they dramatize philosophy as a kind of motivation, the desire for knowledge of goodness, and as a discursive practice, motivated by this desire and ideally governed by reason. And they dramatize the trials to which desire and reason are subject, that is, the difficulties of realizing philosophy as a form of motivation, a practice, and an epistemic achievement. In short, Trials of Reason argues that Plato's early dialogues are as much works of metaphilosophy as philosophy itself.Less

Trials of Reason : Plato and the Crafting of Philosophy

David Wolfsdorf

Published in print: 2008-06-01

Scholarship on Plato's dialogues persistently divides its focus between the dramatic or literary and the philosophical or argumentative dimensions of the texts. But this hermeneutic division of labor is naïve, for Plato's arguments are embedded in dramatic dialogues and developed through complex, largely informal exchanges between literary characters. Consequently, it is questionable how readers can even attribute arguments and theses to the author himself. The answer to this question lies in transcending the scholarly divide and integrating the literary and philosophical dimensions of the texts. This is the task of Trials of Reason.

The study focuses on a set of fourteen so-called early dialogues, beginning with a methodological framework that explains how to integrate the argumentation and the drama in these texts. Unlike most canonical philosophical works, the early dialogues do not merely express the results of the practice of philosophy. Rather, they dramatize philosophy as a kind of motivation, the desire for knowledge of goodness, and as a discursive practice, motivated by this desire and ideally governed by reason. And they dramatize the trials to which desire and reason are subject, that is, the difficulties of realizing philosophy as a form of motivation, a practice, and an epistemic achievement. In short, Trials of Reason argues that Plato's early dialogues are as much works of metaphilosophy as philosophy itself.

The Stoic philosopher Epictetus has been one of the most influential of ancient thinkers, both in antiquity itself and in modern times. This book includes ten chapters which discuss Epictetus' ...
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The Stoic philosopher Epictetus has been one of the most influential of ancient thinkers, both in antiquity itself and in modern times. This book includes ten chapters which discuss Epictetus' thought on a wide range of subjects, including ethics, logic, theology, and psychology. They explore his relations to his predecessors (including his two philosophical heroes, Socrates and Diogenes the Cynic, as well as the earlier Stoic tradition) and examine his influence on later thinkers. Topics which receive special attention include Epictetus' conception of philosophical education; his view of God, and of the philosopher's divine vocation; his distinctive conception of proairesis (will or rational decision), which is one of the most innovative features of his philosophy; and his theory of the different roles an individual can perform in life, and the different perspectives which they involve.Less

The Philosophy of Epictetus

Published in print: 2007-10-01

The Stoic philosopher Epictetus has been one of the most influential of ancient thinkers, both in antiquity itself and in modern times. This book includes ten chapters which discuss Epictetus' thought on a wide range of subjects, including ethics, logic, theology, and psychology. They explore his relations to his predecessors (including his two philosophical heroes, Socrates and Diogenes the Cynic, as well as the earlier Stoic tradition) and examine his influence on later thinkers. Topics which receive special attention include Epictetus' conception of philosophical education; his view of God, and of the philosopher's divine vocation; his distinctive conception of proairesis (will or rational decision), which is one of the most innovative features of his philosophy; and his theory of the different roles an individual can perform in life, and the different perspectives which they involve.

The intensely human culture of newly literate Ionia spread into every field of intellectual endeavor. Though it was obviously anti-religious, serious opposition to it took nearly a century to ...
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The intensely human culture of newly literate Ionia spread into every field of intellectual endeavor. Though it was obviously anti-religious, serious opposition to it took nearly a century to develop. Ionian thought came to Athens later than to Italy. It was introduced by Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and by members of a new “profession,” the Sophists –itinerant lecturers and tutors. The most famous of these was Protagoras, the first Relativist and explicit agnostic. Socrates, a native Athenian, started out as a friend of the scientific side of Pythagoreanism. As such he was caricatured by the comic poet Aristophanes; and as such he was condemned and put to death for “impiety.” But by that time he had undergone a conversion from science to the moral and religious interests also associated with the Brotherhood.Less

Athens I

Wallace Matson

Published in print: 2011-12-09

The intensely human culture of newly literate Ionia spread into every field of intellectual endeavor. Though it was obviously anti-religious, serious opposition to it took nearly a century to develop. Ionian thought came to Athens later than to Italy. It was introduced by Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and by members of a new “profession,” the Sophists –itinerant lecturers and tutors. The most famous of these was Protagoras, the first Relativist and explicit agnostic. Socrates, a native Athenian, started out as a friend of the scientific side of Pythagoreanism. As such he was caricatured by the comic poet Aristophanes; and as such he was condemned and put to death for “impiety.” But by that time he had undergone a conversion from science to the moral and religious interests also associated with the Brotherhood.

The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ...
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The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ruler of her political society, Creon. Emphasis is given to the point that though obligations of joint commitment are absolute in the sense discussed, and supersede one’s personal inclinations and self-interest as such, it is possible for other considerations to ‘trump’ them. Antigone believed there were such considerations in her case; Socrates seems not to have thought so. A number of avenues for further empirical investigation and moral inquiry are noted.Less

Summary and Prospect

Margaret Gilbert

Published in print: 2006-05-11

The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ruler of her political society, Creon. Emphasis is given to the point that though obligations of joint commitment are absolute in the sense discussed, and supersede one’s personal inclinations and self-interest as such, it is possible for other considerations to ‘trump’ them. Antigone believed there were such considerations in her case; Socrates seems not to have thought so. A number of avenues for further empirical investigation and moral inquiry are noted.

This book is an evolution of Plato’s Moral Theory where Irwin presented for the first time his personal interpretation of Plato’s ethics. The aim of this book is to demonstrate that Plato’s rejection ...
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This book is an evolution of Plato’s Moral Theory where Irwin presented for the first time his personal interpretation of Plato’s ethics. The aim of this book is to demonstrate that Plato’s rejection of Socrates’ instrumentalism is one of the key elements in the development of Plato’s philosophical perspective. The book, which is structured in 20 chapters, is a dialogue by dialogue commentary, which discusses Plato’s ethics in context of his metaphysics and epistemology. The first chapters study how in his early dialogues (Laches, Charmides, and Euthydemus) Plato interprets Socrates’ method and doctrines. Then, from chapter 6 to 9, it is illustrated how in later dialogues (Gorgias, Meno, Protagoras) Plato tries to defend and support Socrates’ theories against some possible critics. The core of the book (chapters 10 through 18) is devoted to a careful analysis of how Plato in the Republic develops his own views, moving away from the positions of his master. Lastly, in the two final chapters how the mature views of the Republic are advanced in the late dialogues (the Philebus, the Statesman, and the Laws) is examined.Less

Plato's Ethics

Terence Irwin

Published in print: 1995-03-02

This book is an evolution of Plato’s Moral Theory where Irwin presented for the first time his personal interpretation of Plato’s ethics. The aim of this book is to demonstrate that Plato’s rejection of Socrates’ instrumentalism is one of the key elements in the development of Plato’s philosophical perspective. The book, which is structured in 20 chapters, is a dialogue by dialogue commentary, which discusses Plato’s ethics in context of his metaphysics and epistemology. The first chapters study how in his early dialogues (Laches, Charmides, and Euthydemus) Plato interprets Socrates’ method and doctrines. Then, from chapter 6 to 9, it is illustrated how in later dialogues (Gorgias, Meno, Protagoras) Plato tries to defend and support Socrates’ theories against some possible critics. The core of the book (chapters 10 through 18) is devoted to a careful analysis of how Plato in the Republic develops his own views, moving away from the positions of his master. Lastly, in the two final chapters how the mature views of the Republic are advanced in the late dialogues (the Philebus, the Statesman, and the Laws) is examined.

Robert C. Solomon

Published in print:

2003

Published Online:

November 2003

ISBN:

9780195165401

eISBN:

9780199870103

Item type:

book

Publisher:

Oxford University Press

DOI:

10.1093/0195165403.001.0001

Subject:

Philosophy, General

The Joy of Philosophy: Thinking Thin and the Passionate Life is a return to some of the perennial questions of philosophy, questions about the meaning of life, about death and tragedy, about the ...
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The Joy of Philosophy: Thinking Thin and the Passionate Life is a return to some of the perennial questions of philosophy, questions about the meaning of life, about death and tragedy, about the respective roles of rationality and passion in the good life, about love, compassion, and revenge, about honesty, deception, and betrayal, about who we are, and how we think about who we are. It is an attempt to save philosophy from a century‐old fiber diet of thin arguments and logical analysis and recover the richness and complexity of life in thought. It tackles the question, loathed by professional philosophers but asked all too often by nonphilosophers, “Has Analytic Philosophy Ruined Philosophy?” The answer is “no,” or at least, “not yet,” but superprofessionalization and a near‐exclusive emphasis on the “thinnest” of philosophical formulations and arguments have either robbed the perennial questions of their gut‐level force or dismissed them altogether as “pseudoquestions” suited only for sophomores. This is a book that tries to put the fun back in philosophy, recapturing the heartfelt confusion and excitement that originally brings us all into philosophy. But it is not a critique of contemporary philosophy so much as it is an attempt to engage in philosophy in a different kind of way, beginning with a reevaluation of Socrates and the nature of philosophy and defending the passionate life in contrast to the calm life of thoughtful contemplation so often held up as an ideal by traditional philosophers. It includes discussions of love as a virtue, Nietzsche's Will to Power, the politics of emotion, rationality in a multicultural perspective, the rationality of emotions, and the rationality of such emotions as sympathy and vengeance, the tragic sense of life, the nature of fate and luck, the denial of death and death fetishism, the nature of personal identity in multicultural and emotional perspective, and the role of deception and self‐deception in philosophy. In short, it is an attempt to recapture the kind of philosophy that Nietzsche celebrated as a “joyful wisdom.” My concern is to break down the walls between academic philosophy and its lost audience, between thin logic and thick rhetoric, between philosophical reason and philosophical passion, between “analytic” and “continental” philosophy, and between philosophy and life. As the great Chilean poet Pablo Neruda says (of his poetry), the result is an “impure philosophy, as impure as old clothes, as a body with its foodstains and its shame, with wrinkles, observations, dreams, wakefulness, prophesies, declarations of love and hate, stupidities, shocks, idylls, political beliefs, negations, doubts, affirmations, and taxes.”Less

The Joy of Philosophy : Thinking Thin versus the Passionate Life

Robert C. Solomon

Published in print: 2003-05-22

The Joy of Philosophy: Thinking Thin and the Passionate Life is a return to some of the perennial questions of philosophy, questions about the meaning of life, about death and tragedy, about the respective roles of rationality and passion in the good life, about love, compassion, and revenge, about honesty, deception, and betrayal, about who we are, and how we think about who we are. It is an attempt to save philosophy from a century‐old fiber diet of thin arguments and logical analysis and recover the richness and complexity of life in thought. It tackles the question, loathed by professional philosophers but asked all too often by nonphilosophers, “Has Analytic Philosophy Ruined Philosophy?” The answer is “no,” or at least, “not yet,” but superprofessionalization and a near‐exclusive emphasis on the “thinnest” of philosophical formulations and arguments have either robbed the perennial questions of their gut‐level force or dismissed them altogether as “pseudoquestions” suited only for sophomores. This is a book that tries to put the fun back in philosophy, recapturing the heartfelt confusion and excitement that originally brings us all into philosophy. But it is not a critique of contemporary philosophy so much as it is an attempt to engage in philosophy in a different kind of way, beginning with a reevaluation of Socrates and the nature of philosophy and defending the passionate life in contrast to the calm life of thoughtful contemplation so often held up as an ideal by traditional philosophers. It includes discussions of love as a virtue, Nietzsche's Will to Power, the politics of emotion, rationality in a multicultural perspective, the rationality of emotions, and the rationality of such emotions as sympathy and vengeance, the tragic sense of life, the nature of fate and luck, the denial of death and death fetishism, the nature of personal identity in multicultural and emotional perspective, and the role of deception and self‐deception in philosophy. In short, it is an attempt to recapture the kind of philosophy that Nietzsche celebrated as a “joyful wisdom.” My concern is to break down the walls between academic philosophy and its lost audience, between thin logic and thick rhetoric, between philosophical reason and philosophical passion, between “analytic” and “continental” philosophy, and between philosophy and life. As the great Chilean poet Pablo Neruda says (of his poetry), the result is an “impure philosophy, as impure as old clothes, as a body with its foodstains and its shame, with wrinkles, observations, dreams, wakefulness, prophesies, declarations of love and hate, stupidities, shocks, idylls, political beliefs, negations, doubts, affirmations, and taxes.”

This book argues that the Socrates of the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, Gorgias, and Republic 1 can consistently and compellingly speak of pleasure and virtue as the good for human beings by ...
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This book argues that the Socrates of the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, Gorgias, and Republic 1 can consistently and compellingly speak of pleasure and virtue as the good for human beings by identifying pleasant with virtuous activity for a human being (ch. 10). The argument is as follows: Socrates (in the Protagoras and Gorgias) can consistently and compellingly speak of pleasure as the good for human beings (chs. 3–5). Socrates’ hedonism can be interpreted to be a compelling theory of modal, not sensate pleasure (chs. 6 and 7). Socrates (in the Apology, Crito, Gorgias, and Republic 1) can consistently and compellingly speak of virtue as the good for human beings (chs. 8 and 9). Chapter 2 defends the method of interpretation used throughout the book.Less

Socrates, Pleasure, and Value

George Rudebusch

Published in print: 2002-11-28

This book argues that the Socrates of the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, Gorgias, and Republic 1 can consistently and compellingly speak of pleasure and virtue as the good for human beings by identifying pleasant with virtuous activity for a human being (ch. 10). The argument is as follows: Socrates (in the Protagoras and Gorgias) can consistently and compellingly speak of pleasure as the good for human beings (chs. 3–5). Socrates’ hedonism can be interpreted to be a compelling theory of modal, not sensate pleasure (chs. 6 and 7). Socrates (in the Apology, Crito, Gorgias, and Republic 1) can consistently and compellingly speak of virtue as the good for human beings (chs. 8 and 9). Chapter 2 defends the method of interpretation used throughout the book.

The peculiarity of Hellenistic ethics is explored to understand its special significance. The issue is approached as a question concerning the intellectual history of Hellenistic philosophy in its ...
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The peculiarity of Hellenistic ethics is explored to understand its special significance. The issue is approached as a question concerning the intellectual history of Hellenistic philosophy in its formative years. A comprehensive answer would have to include subsequent developments of the Hellenistic schools, their reception at Rome, and their entry into the Renaissance. The focus of this chapter is the investigation of what it was about the ethical projects of the innovative Hellenistic philosophers that prepared the way for this curious legacy.Less

Hellenistic Ethics and Philosophical Power

A. A. Long

Published in print: 2006-09-14

The peculiarity of Hellenistic ethics is explored to understand its special significance. The issue is approached as a question concerning the intellectual history of Hellenistic philosophy in its formative years. A comprehensive answer would have to include subsequent developments of the Hellenistic schools, their reception at Rome, and their entry into the Renaissance. The focus of this chapter is the investigation of what it was about the ethical projects of the innovative Hellenistic philosophers that prepared the way for this curious legacy.

This collection of chapters composed in honor of Julia Annas by her colleagues and students reflects the enormous influence Annas has had on diverse philosophical topics: the ancients’ (and others’) ...
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This collection of chapters composed in honor of Julia Annas by her colleagues and students reflects the enormous influence Annas has had on diverse philosophical topics: the ancients’ (and others’) many representations of Socrates; the interpretation of that fascinating and maddening text, Plato’s Republic; contemporary virtue ethics; and our understanding of the structure of ancient ethical theories.Less

Virtue and Happiness : Essays in Honour of Julia Annas

Published in print: 2012-08-02

This collection of chapters composed in honor of Julia Annas by her colleagues and students reflects the enormous influence Annas has had on diverse philosophical topics: the ancients’ (and others’) many representations of Socrates; the interpretation of that fascinating and maddening text, Plato’s Republic; contemporary virtue ethics; and our understanding of the structure of ancient ethical theories.

Plato’s Theaetetus is thought to have been written after his main middle-period dialogues, in which he expounded his celebrated metaphysical doctrine of Forms. Yet, it is an open-ended Socratic ...
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Plato’s Theaetetus is thought to have been written after his main middle-period dialogues, in which he expounded his celebrated metaphysical doctrine of Forms. Yet, it is an open-ended Socratic dialogue and investigates the question ‘What is knowledge?’ without positive result, and with an unexpected restraint about invoking the metaphysical theory. Why? This book develops a new solution to the old question. Plato wants to demonstrate the continuity of his mature work with that of his master Socrates and does so by invoking the now famous image, unique to this dialogue, of Socrates as the barren midwife of others’ brainchildren. The message is that Socrates, although not himself a Platonist, was the midwife of Platonism. This is brought out by portraying a Socrates who, rather than Plato’s current spokesman, is a throwback to the semi-historical figure immortalized in the early dialogues. We see this Socrates, in the course of his characteristic dialectical investigations, pointing us to recognizably Platonic solutions, but himself unable to articulate them that way because of his lack of a Platonic metaphysics. In addition to linking Plato’s Socratic past to his Platonic present, the same device also points forward to Plato’s future work in such dialogues as Sophist and Timaeus.Less

The Midwife of Platonism : Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus

David Sedley

Published in print: 2004-05-20

Plato’s Theaetetus is thought to have been written after his main middle-period dialogues, in which he expounded his celebrated metaphysical doctrine of Forms. Yet, it is an open-ended Socratic dialogue and investigates the question ‘What is knowledge?’ without positive result, and with an unexpected restraint about invoking the metaphysical theory. Why? This book develops a new solution to the old question. Plato wants to demonstrate the continuity of his mature work with that of his master Socrates and does so by invoking the now famous image, unique to this dialogue, of Socrates as the barren midwife of others’ brainchildren. The message is that Socrates, although not himself a Platonist, was the midwife of Platonism. This is brought out by portraying a Socrates who, rather than Plato’s current spokesman, is a throwback to the semi-historical figure immortalized in the early dialogues. We see this Socrates, in the course of his characteristic dialectical investigations, pointing us to recognizably Platonic solutions, but himself unable to articulate them that way because of his lack of a Platonic metaphysics. In addition to linking Plato’s Socratic past to his Platonic present, the same device also points forward to Plato’s future work in such dialogues as Sophist and Timaeus.

Al-Kindī’s extant ethical corpus is relatively small, but sufficient to show that his ethics is an application of his Neoplatonic ideas about metaphysics and psychology. He provides the first Arabic ...
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Al-Kindī’s extant ethical corpus is relatively small, but sufficient to show that his ethics is an application of his Neoplatonic ideas about metaphysics and psychology. He provides the first Arabic account of Socrates, a philosophical hero who is presented as despising things of the physical world, or “external goods” — Socrates is here conflated with the Cynic philosopher Diogenes. In al-Kindī’s largest ethical treatise, On Dispelling Sorrows, al-Kindī provides a work of consolation which uses Platonist ideas to undergird a broadly Stoic or Cynic teaching on the value of external goods.Less

Ethics : Socratic, Stoic, Platonic

Peter Adamson

Published in print: 2006-12-01

Al-Kindī’s extant ethical corpus is relatively small, but sufficient to show that his ethics is an application of his Neoplatonic ideas about metaphysics and psychology. He provides the first Arabic account of Socrates, a philosophical hero who is presented as despising things of the physical world, or “external goods” — Socrates is here conflated with the Cynic philosopher Diogenes. In al-Kindī’s largest ethical treatise, On Dispelling Sorrows, al-Kindī provides a work of consolation which uses Platonist ideas to undergird a broadly Stoic or Cynic teaching on the value of external goods.

It is generally supposed that what Socrates in Plato's Apology describes himself as having spent his life doing in obedience to a divine command (activity A), what Socrates has urged others to do ...
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It is generally supposed that what Socrates in Plato's Apology describes himself as having spent his life doing in obedience to a divine command (activity A), what Socrates has urged others to do (activity B), and what Plato depicts Socrates as doing in other ‘Socratic’ dialogues (activity C), are all one and the same activity. This chapter argues that the identification is ambiguous and either false or misleading and, either way, cannot be presupposed, as it standardly is presupposed, in the interpretation of the dialogues. Socrates implicitly distinguishes two modes of philosophical activity in the Apology, which is called missionary and lay philosophy; conflating these makes nonsense of Socrates' defence. Activity A is missionary philosophy. Activity B and (insofar as the Gorgias is representative of ‘Socratic’ dialogues) activity C, are both lay philosophy.Less

Socratic Methods

James Doyle

Published in print: 2012-07-19

It is generally supposed that what Socrates in Plato's Apology describes himself as having spent his life doing in obedience to a divine command (activity A), what Socrates has urged others to do (activity B), and what Plato depicts Socrates as doing in other ‘Socratic’ dialogues (activity C), are all one and the same activity. This chapter argues that the identification is ambiguous and either false or misleading and, either way, cannot be presupposed, as it standardly is presupposed, in the interpretation of the dialogues. Socrates implicitly distinguishes two modes of philosophical activity in the Apology, which is called missionary and lay philosophy; conflating these makes nonsense of Socrates' defence. Activity A is missionary philosophy. Activity B and (insofar as the Gorgias is representative of ‘Socratic’ dialogues) activity C, are both lay philosophy.

In Socratic literature divination is a featured return from the gods for ‘service’ to them and helps form the ‘partnership’ of gods and men. Virtually all philosophers except Xenophanes and Epicurus ...
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In Socratic literature divination is a featured return from the gods for ‘service’ to them and helps form the ‘partnership’ of gods and men. Virtually all philosophers except Xenophanes and Epicurus accepted the practice. Socrates practised divination and employed it as proof of the gods' concern for humans, and his own practice was used by his defenders as proof that he had ‘proper respect’ for the gods. Special attention is given to his unique daimonion and to Apollo's oracle as a motivator of his philosophic mission. Separate sections discuss dreams and manteis (soothsayers) as described and used in the philosophic tradition, and the chapter concludes with the argument that divination was a major determinant of elements of ‘service to the gods’ such as sanctuaries, sacrifices, festivals, and other cult activities.Less

Divination and Its Range of Influence

Jon D. Mikalson

Published in print: 2010-06-21

In Socratic literature divination is a featured return from the gods for ‘service’ to them and helps form the ‘partnership’ of gods and men. Virtually all philosophers except Xenophanes and Epicurus accepted the practice. Socrates practised divination and employed it as proof of the gods' concern for humans, and his own practice was used by his defenders as proof that he had ‘proper respect’ for the gods. Special attention is given to his unique daimonion and to Apollo's oracle as a motivator of his philosophic mission. Separate sections discuss dreams and manteis (soothsayers) as described and used in the philosophic tradition, and the chapter concludes with the argument that divination was a major determinant of elements of ‘service to the gods’ such as sanctuaries, sacrifices, festivals, and other cult activities.

This book examines ideas about personality and self in Hellenistic and Roman philosophy, and the possible influence of these ideas on Greek and Roman literature. The book is subdivided into three ...
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This book examines ideas about personality and self in Hellenistic and Roman philosophy, and the possible influence of these ideas on Greek and Roman literature. The book is subdivided into three parts. The first part focuses on the question of what is new and distinctive in the Hellenistic philosophical conception of self, especially in Stoicism and Epicureanism. A shared or converging set of ideas (the structured self) is analyzed in these two theories, centred on a combination of radical (Socratic) ethical claims and on psychophysical and psychological holism. This view of selfhood is contrasted with the non-holistic, part-based conception of personality found in the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophical tradition in this period. The second part illustrates this broad contrast with special reference to the Stoic theory of passions and its critical reception by thinkers in the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, such as Plutarch and Galen. It is suggested that the Stoic theory and its critics are both influenced by different strands in Plato’s thought about psychology. The third part of the book discusses theoretical issues about concepts of selfhood. It argues against the common view that Hellenistic-Roman thought shows a shift towards a subjective-individualistic notion of self. This part also considers the possible influence of the philosophical ideas discussed here on literature in this period. It identifies contrasting Platonic-Aristotelian and Stoic-Epicurean ways of thinking about collapse of character, and traces the possible influence of these patterns in Plutarch’s biography, Senecan tragedy, and Virgilian epic.Less

The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought

Christopher Gill

Published in print: 2006-04-06

This book examines ideas about personality and self in Hellenistic and Roman philosophy, and the possible influence of these ideas on Greek and Roman literature. The book is subdivided into three parts. The first part focuses on the question of what is new and distinctive in the Hellenistic philosophical conception of self, especially in Stoicism and Epicureanism. A shared or converging set of ideas (the structured self) is analyzed in these two theories, centred on a combination of radical (Socratic) ethical claims and on psychophysical and psychological holism. This view of selfhood is contrasted with the non-holistic, part-based conception of personality found in the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophical tradition in this period. The second part illustrates this broad contrast with special reference to the Stoic theory of passions and its critical reception by thinkers in the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, such as Plutarch and Galen. It is suggested that the Stoic theory and its critics are both influenced by different strands in Plato’s thought about psychology. The third part of the book discusses theoretical issues about concepts of selfhood. It argues against the common view that Hellenistic-Roman thought shows a shift towards a subjective-individualistic notion of self. This part also considers the possible influence of the philosophical ideas discussed here on literature in this period. It identifies contrasting Platonic-Aristotelian and Stoic-Epicurean ways of thinking about collapse of character, and traces the possible influence of these patterns in Plutarch’s biography, Senecan tragedy, and Virgilian epic.

Plato's Socrates denies akrasia (wanting the course one thinks worse), but his Republic allows that Leontius did that, at the cost of revealing a divided soul, since one thing cannot simultaneously ...
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Plato's Socrates denies akrasia (wanting the course one thinks worse), but his Republic allows that Leontius did that, at the cost of revealing a divided soul, since one thing cannot simultaneously have opposite desires about the same thing. Pseudo-Plutarch protests one can have simultaneous opposite capacities. Plato becomes increasingly sensitive to different reasons why one can want the course one thinks worse, but Aristotle concedes Socrates' position that ignorance must be responsible, while explaining the ignorance as types of attention-failure, that allow violation of one's deliberate policy (prohairesis). Since Chrysippus denies Plato's division of the soul, he has to postulate that one's unitary reason oscillates between the better judgement and the worse. The Christians Origen and Augustine deny two souls in us, but accept two wills. One may act with less than one's full will. Christ engaged in a conditional willing comparable to Stoic willing with reservation.Less

Emotional Conflict and the Divided Self

Richard Sorabji

Published in print: 2002-09-05

Plato's Socrates denies akrasia (wanting the course one thinks worse), but his Republic allows that Leontius did that, at the cost of revealing a divided soul, since one thing cannot simultaneously have opposite desires about the same thing. Pseudo-Plutarch protests one can have simultaneous opposite capacities. Plato becomes increasingly sensitive to different reasons why one can want the course one thinks worse, but Aristotle concedes Socrates' position that ignorance must be responsible, while explaining the ignorance as types of attention-failure, that allow violation of one's deliberate policy (prohairesis). Since Chrysippus denies Plato's division of the soul, he has to postulate that one's unitary reason oscillates between the better judgement and the worse. The Christians Origen and Augustine deny two souls in us, but accept two wills. One may act with less than one's full will. Christ engaged in a conditional willing comparable to Stoic willing with reservation.

According to the Talmud, tractate Menahot 43b, Rabbi Meir taught that a Jewish man should thank God daily for “not making me a gentile, a woman or a slave.” These Jewish blessings have parallels in a ...
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According to the Talmud, tractate Menahot 43b, Rabbi Meir taught that a Jewish man should thank God daily for “not making me a gentile, a woman or a slave.” These Jewish blessings have parallels in a variety of classical Hellenistic sources and are attributed to Socrates and Plutarch, as well as other notable figures. The origins of the Jewish liturgical blessings probably began as a boundary-marking aphorism whose content was easily changed as it was adapted by Jewish, Zoroastrian and Hellenistic communities. The earliest Greek and Hebrew texts are parallel to each other; the oppositions they inscribe, internally and with each other, are dissolved by and explain the force of NT Galatians 3:26.Less

Defining Oneself against the Other : Sources and Parallels in Late Antiquity

Yoel H. Kahn

Published in print: 2010-12-24

According to the Talmud, tractate Menahot 43b, Rabbi Meir taught that a Jewish man should thank God daily for “not making me a gentile, a woman or a slave.” These Jewish blessings have parallels in a variety of classical Hellenistic sources and are attributed to Socrates and Plutarch, as well as other notable figures. The origins of the Jewish liturgical blessings probably began as a boundary-marking aphorism whose content was easily changed as it was adapted by Jewish, Zoroastrian and Hellenistic communities. The earliest Greek and Hebrew texts are parallel to each other; the oppositions they inscribe, internally and with each other, are dissolved by and explain the force of NT Galatians 3:26.

This chapter develops a hermeneutic framework for integrating the philosophical and literary dimensions of Plato's early dialogues. Central problems treated include: the thematic versus chronological ...
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This chapter develops a hermeneutic framework for integrating the philosophical and literary dimensions of Plato's early dialogues. Central problems treated include: the thematic versus chronological unity of the texts, the conception of philosophy as political activity, the function of dialogue versus monologue, the historicity of the dramatic elements, the uses of Socrates, and the limits of the mouthpiece principle.Less

Interpretation

David Wolfsdorf

Published in print: 2008-06-01

This chapter develops a hermeneutic framework for integrating the philosophical and literary dimensions of Plato's early dialogues. Central problems treated include: the thematic versus chronological unity of the texts, the conception of philosophy as political activity, the function of dialogue versus monologue, the historicity of the dramatic elements, the uses of Socrates, and the limits of the mouthpiece principle.

This chapter explores the roots of the Platonic notion of the person or self. The terms ‘person’ and ‘self’ are used interchangeably, and it is argued that persons or selves are treated by Plato as ...
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This chapter explores the roots of the Platonic notion of the person or self. The terms ‘person’ and ‘self’ are used interchangeably, and it is argued that persons or selves are treated by Plato as distinct from the natural kind ‘human being’. In Plato's ordinary use of the Greek language the word άνθρωπος refers to an individual member of this natural kind. It is shown that there are various circumlocutions used by Plato to refer to persons or selves. Sometimes the claim that Plato is speaking about a person and not a human being is an inference from an argument. Such inferences need to be carefully scrutinized. The possibility that the inference is ours and not Plato's must be acknowledged.Less

Souls and Persons

Lloyd P. Gerson

Published in print: 2006-03-02

This chapter explores the roots of the Platonic notion of the person or self. The terms ‘person’ and ‘self’ are used interchangeably, and it is argued that persons or selves are treated by Plato as distinct from the natural kind ‘human being’. In Plato's ordinary use of the Greek language the word άνθρωπος refers to an individual member of this natural kind. It is shown that there are various circumlocutions used by Plato to refer to persons or selves. Sometimes the claim that Plato is speaking about a person and not a human being is an inference from an argument. Such inferences need to be carefully scrutinized. The possibility that the inference is ours and not Plato's must be acknowledged.

The book presents in chapter format a selection of the author's essays in ancient philosophy, drawn from forty years of writings on the subject. The central theme is the moral psychology of Plato and ...
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The book presents in chapter format a selection of the author's essays in ancient philosophy, drawn from forty years of writings on the subject. The central theme is the moral psychology of Plato and Aristotle, with a special focus on pleasure and related concepts. It also contains discussions of Socrates and the Greek atomists (including the Epicureans) showing how Plato's ethics grows out of the thought of Socrates, and showing also that pleasure is a central concept for the atomists. It surveys a range of important topics in the work of some of the greatest ancient philosophers, which remain the subject of lively philosophical debate today.Less

Pleasure, Mind, and Soul : Selected Papers in Ancient Philosophy

C. C. W. Taylor

Published in print: 2008-01-24

The book presents in chapter format a selection of the author's essays in ancient philosophy, drawn from forty years of writings on the subject. The central theme is the moral psychology of Plato and Aristotle, with a special focus on pleasure and related concepts. It also contains discussions of Socrates and the Greek atomists (including the Epicureans) showing how Plato's ethics grows out of the thought of Socrates, and showing also that pleasure is a central concept for the atomists. It surveys a range of important topics in the work of some of the greatest ancient philosophers, which remain the subject of lively philosophical debate today.

For the last thirty years or more publications on Socrates have become a major growth industry. Its centre is the USA; and much of it has been occasioned by engagement with the work of Gregory ...
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For the last thirty years or more publications on Socrates have become a major growth industry. Its centre is the USA; and much of it has been occasioned by engagement with the work of Gregory Vlastos, conceivably the single most influential writer on ancient Greek philosophy in the English-speaking world in the twentieth century. A tricky area for US citizens is Socrates' political stance. Probably there would be fairly wide agreement among scholars that the principal motive behind the prosecution which led to Socrates' death in 399 bc was political animus against someone who had had close associations with Critias, leading member of the junta which overthrew the Athenian democracy in 403 bc. The assumption underpinning the formal charges brought against him will have been that Socrates was guilty by association, even if he had not engaged in political activity himself.Less

Socrates on trial in the USA

Malcolm Schofield

Published in print: 2006-01-26

For the last thirty years or more publications on Socrates have become a major growth industry. Its centre is the USA; and much of it has been occasioned by engagement with the work of Gregory Vlastos, conceivably the single most influential writer on ancient Greek philosophy in the English-speaking world in the twentieth century. A tricky area for US citizens is Socrates' political stance. Probably there would be fairly wide agreement among scholars that the principal motive behind the prosecution which led to Socrates' death in 399 bc was political animus against someone who had had close associations with Critias, leading member of the junta which overthrew the Athenian democracy in 403 bc. The assumption underpinning the formal charges brought against him will have been that Socrates was guilty by association, even if he had not engaged in political activity himself.