The connection between terrorism and organized crime is a topic that has attracted considerable attention in the last decades. This thesis examines how the terrorist groups AQIM and MUJAO are connected to organized crime in the Sahel and Maghreb. This is a complex relationship with various dimensions. The starting point is a model which has been devised to assess the interaction between terrorism and organized crime. The key finding is that the link between the two organizations varies among activities and groups. AQIM and MUJAO are both involved in illicit activities, such as weapons smuggling and cigarette smuggling. AQIM forges documents; this is related to the fact that the group has operated for several years and has had cells in Europe. MUJAO, on the other hand, has not been visible with respect to document fraud. However, this has not been necessary due to lawlessness, long borders and sparsely populated border areas. MUJAO is to a larger extent involved in drug-related crime through its members and supporters. A consequence of this involvement might be loss of legitimacy and support among the local population since drugs are prohibited in islam. Kidnappings have also contributed financially to the rise of both groups. This is the clearest expression of the link between terrorism and organized crime. A difference, however, is that AQIM has kidnapped mostly western citizens, while MUJAO also has kidnapped Algerians and citizens from other African countries. Regarding organizational structure, there is no connection between AQIM and criminal groups. MUJAO has an ambiguous structure, and includes individuals who are actively involved in smuggling circles. This connects the jihadists to the criminal networks. Short-term objectives allow both groups to collaborate with criminal groups, but divergent long-term objectives prevent stable and long-term alliances. Neither of the groups has a direct link to criminal groups in relation to corruption. They do not depend upon each other in this area. Moreover, culture is an interaction area enabling the connection between AQIM and MUJAO on one hand and the criminal networks on the other. Religion, nationalism and local identity create a cultural community between the groups. In the end, no evidence suggests that modern communication technology is an interaction area resulting in closer collaboration between the terrorist groups and the criminal actors. AQIM has been active on the internet, but has not needed support from criminals. The most important common interests, and thus the closest relationship, are predominantly based on financial needs. Collaboration is essentially a matter of case by case, and does only to a small extent entail organizational ties.