In November 2003, Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional
Authority in Iraq, persuaded Washington to speed up the transfer of power to
representative Iraqi bodies, not least as a response to the worsening security situation
in the country. Bremers initial proposals were partly abandoned in the face of
opposition on the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) and particularly from Iraqs Shiite
leadership. The interim agreement eventually arrived at by the IGCs membership in
early March 2004 determined that direct elections must take place by 31 January 2005. In
early June 2004 the membership of Iraqs interim government to take over on 1 July
was announced.

Given that eight of
the 33-member interim government are ethnic Kurds, these arrangements suggest a secure
place in the evolving post-Saddam Iraq for the Kurds of northern Iraq. Furthermore, the
interim constitution, or Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), that emerged from the
Iraqi Governing Council in March, in accordance with which Iraq is expected to be governed
until a permanent constitution is drawn up by an elected National Assembly during 2005, is
also generally regarded as favorable to the Kurds.1 It recognizes the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) as the
official government for the interim period of the three ethnically Kurdish northern Iraqi
provinces over which it has presided since 1992, and the federal nature of Iraqs
transitional administration. Kurdish is designated as one of Iraqs two official
languages, along with Arabic. Even in light of the decree banning the various militias in
Iraq announced by the new interim government in early June, the Kurdish peshmerga, the
largest of Iraqs private forces, will be permitted to function as an internal
security and police force in the KRG zone.2 In any case, it is doubtful the decree will be enforceable for
some time. The Transitional

18/19

Administrative Law
gives the green light to some managed resettlement back to their place of origin both of
Kurds displaced by Saddams Arabization of the north and of Arabs (mostly
Shiite) who moved there as a consequence of it, and affords considerable scope for the
primacy of local law above federal law. It also states that a referendum on a permanent
constitution would fail if two-thirds of the voters in three or more
governoratesprincipally a reference to the KRG zonewere to reject it.

The fate of Kirkuk,
on the other hand, is deferred until after a permanent constitution has been settled and a
census held in the region, and the Transitional Administrative Law permits up to a maximum
of three of the 18 provinces to join together to form a region, thus
prohibiting the formation of a larger KRG zone. Nevertheless, the Shiites balked at
signing the interim constitution, largely as a consequence of their opposition to
concessions made to the Kurds.3 Ankara too reiterated to Washington its
oft-stated concerns about Kurdish aspirations.4 There also have been indications of increased Shiite and Turkmen
armed militancy in Kirkuk,5 not least by the followers of Sheik
Muqtada al-Sadr.6 Concessions the Kurds feel they have made
appear to have been insufficient to assuage the doubts of others.

Prior to Ambassador
Bremers November 2003 plan, the Kurdish preference had been to first entrench
federal arrangements guaranteeing Kurdish autonomy before the introduction of democracy
into Iraq. Their reasoning was clear. Kurds make up at most one-fifth of the Iraqi
population, and are greatly outnumbered by the Arab majority. Shiite Arabs alone
constitute around 60 percent of the Iraqi population. This demography explained initial
Shiite support for, and Kurdish opposition to, direct elections in the formation of the
Transitional National Assembly.7
Iraqs permanent constitution will now be determined only after nationwide elections
have taken place, and it is unclear that these interim arrangements will be carried over
in light of the continued unhappiness of the Shiite leadership in particular with their
terms.

For this reason,
Iraqs two Kurdish leaders, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talibani, sent a wide-ranging
letter to President Bush on 1 June 2004 expressing unhappiness with, among many other
grievances, the draft US-UK resolution put to the UN Security Council in late May 2004,
because it failed to refer

19/20

to the contents of
the Transitional Administrative Law. The letter threatened a Kurdish withdrawal from the
central governmentin effect, Kurdish independence from Iraqif the TAL is not
incorporated into a permanent constitution.8 Shiite leader Ayatollah Ali Sistani, on the other hand,
successfully warned against including references to the TAL in the United Nations
resolution, which in early June and to Kurdish anger was unanimously passed in this form.9 It is evident that a great deal remains to be settled in
Iraq.

Kurdish
Aspirations

The Kurdish
aspiration that Iraq should be organized as an ethnically-based federation dates back at
least to the Kurdish Regional Governments establishment in 1992. A draft
constitution adopted by Iraqs two Kurdish parties in 2002 envisaged that the
oil-bearing Iraqi Kurdish provinces to the south of the KRG zone would be incorporated
into any future Kurdish self-governing area within a loose Iraqi federal framework, that
Kirkuk should be the Kurdish capital, that the Kurds would retain control over their own
armed forces (the peshmerga), and that the proposed Kurdish state should have the
constitutional right to secede.10 In
December 2003, the Kurdish leadership sent a proposal along these lines to the Iraqi
Governing Council, where it was met with profound disapproval.11 As Henry Kissinger has put it, Kurds define
self-government as only microscopically distinguishable from independence.12

The more than a
decade of self-rule which Iraqi Kurds have exercised in Iraqs three northernmost
provinces appears to have strengthened Kurdish determination to seize the historic
opportunity presented by Iraqs current circumstances to cement their autonomy.
Notwithstanding the violent conflict between the two governing factions during the
mid-1990s, Iraqs self-governing Kurdish provinces have thrived relative both to the
rest of Iraq and to the period preceding the establishment of the KRG. This has been due
partly to the UN-administered share of the now terminated oil-for-food income that was
allocated to the KRG, and partly through smuggling and other illegal and semi-legal
activities, the scope of which has now dramatically reduced with the lifting of sanctions
against Iraq. Although the KRG has by no means enjoyed a perfect democracy, there has been
little of the repression, lawlessness, and anarchy that has been the sad fate of so much
of the rest of Iraq since the first Gulf War up to the present time, and the autonomous
period has seen commendable improvements in the regions infrastructure. More
pointedly, the KRG also has represented Kurdish freedom from Arab, Turkish, or Iranian
repression.13

In an effort to
strengthen their bargaining position and to lay the foundation for the single Kurdish
entity they envisage will eventually form a loose federation with Iraqs Arab
provinces, the KRGs two governing par-

20/21

ties are speeding up
the creation of a single Kurdish government in the north.14 Since Saddams overthrow, they also have enjoyed de
facto control of those areas beyond the KRG zone and to which they lay claim as part of
their expanded Kurdish zone, such as Kirkuk and much of Mosul province.15 Demographic squabbles and ethnic tensions have simmered
in the region, especially in Kirkuk, as the Kurds have endeavored to reverse Saddams
policy of Arabization and resettle displaced Kurds. These tensions have periodically
spilled over into violence, notably in August 2003 and in the following December and
January. During this latter outbreak, Arabs and Turkmen fought alongside each other
against Kurds, and US forces were obliged to impose a curfew. As talks on the interim
constitution heated up, the Kurdish leadership intensified its insistence on self rule,16 and a petition demanding a referendum on Kurdish autonomy
attracted almost two million signatures.17

There are
indications that the Kurdish leaders may have gone out on a limb with their own
constituency in the concessions they have made, notably concerning control over future oil
revenues, incorporation of Kirkuk and other lands deemed traditionally Kurdish, and the
extent of Kurdish independence generally.18 The Kurdish
leadership has fully participated in US initiatives in Iraq since the demise of
Saddams regime. They held five of the 25 seats on the Iraqi Governing Council and a
number of ministerial posts too, including that of foreign minister under Hoshyar Zebari.
This is given additional significance by the fact that, unlike so many of the IGCs
Arab members, and those of the new interim government, the Kurdish leaders are not
returned exiles but elected representatives of their populations who head well-organized
political parties and armed militias. Furthermore, in the war to remove Saddam, the
Kurdish peshmerga cooperated closely with US forces in the north, securing the
runways used by American airborne troops dropped into northern Iraq, engaging with Iraqi
forces, liberating Mosul and Kirkuk, handing nominal control of these areas over to
American forces, and, since then, ensuring that the areas under their control have been
relatively trouble-free and secure. In return, the Kurds have sought, and expected,
sympathy and support for their goals. The June letter to President Bush from Barzani and
Talibani makes it clear they feel let down by Washington, as do many Iraqi Kurds.

Ankaras
Fears

US diplomacy in Iraq
has been reflective of the wider US responsibility for the future of Iraq, and has taken
into account both majority Iraqi and broader regional opposition to extensive Kurdish
autonomy, most notably and vociferously from NATO ally Turkey, where about half of all
ethnic Kurds live. Although the KRGs autonomous zone was afforded protection by the
US and

21/22

UK-enforced no
fly zone based at Incirlik in Turkey, and although Turkish security forces had in
effect enjoyed a free hand in their struggle with activists in the Kurdish Workers Party
(PKK) and the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) based on the Iraqi side of
the mountainous border with Turkey, Ankara never fully acclimatized itself to the
existence of the KRG.19 Turkey feared the KRG might serve as a pole of attraction for
Turkeys restive Kurds, or that it might become emboldened enough to lend them direct
support. It could garner international sympathy for the idea of wider Kurdish national
self-determination, possibly leading ultimately to a sovereign Kurdish state. Ankara has
long feared that a fully independent and sovereign Kurdish state could emerge by design or
by default, and this would threaten not only Turkish territorial integrity but an
unravelling of the region as a whole.

Indeed, as US plans
to take military action against Saddam Hussein took shape during 2002 and early 2003,
Ankara intensified its warnings to Washington that war could raise the risk of an
enlarged, oil-rich, and more autonomous if not fully independent Kurdish self-governing
entity emerging in northern Iraqi territorywhether by design, default, or through
opportunistic exploitation of chaos and uncertainty. For a time, Turkish military
intervention in northern Iraq designed in part to forestall such an eventuality was a
prospect sufficiently realistic enough for the Bush Administration to feel compelled to
warn Ankara against it. Ankaras unease with the possible consequences of US military
action contributed to the 1 March 2003 vote by the Turkish National Assembly that denied
US forces access to Turkish territory.20

Fearful both of its
own diplomatic isolation and of the possible regional ramifications of Iraqs
fragmentation, Ankara also has conducted an uncharacteristically active diplomatic
campaign in the Middle East region, giving rise to suspicions that a major shift in
Turkish foreign policy could be under way.21 Thus, in January 2003 Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul
initiated and hosted a summit in Istanbul attended by Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
and Iran, aimed both at finding alternatives to war and at explaining Ankaras
perspective on the Kurdish issue. Subsequent gatherings have been held in Riyadh, Tehran,
Damascus, and, most recently, in Kuwait in

22/23

February 2004. This
loose regional alliance broadly shares Ankaras unease concerning possible Kurdish
aspirations for greater independence, and has been incorporated into a UN Advisory Group
by the UN Secretary General.22

Ankara has made
particularly diligent efforts to align its position with those of Iran and Syria,
producing bilateral declarations in support of Iraqs territorial integrity and
against the Kurdish preference for an ethnically-based Iraqi federation. Turkish, Syrian,
and Iranian unease is also bound to intensify in light of the extensive rioting by Iranian
Kurds that greeted the signing of the TAL in Iraq,23 the recent disturbances in Syrias Kurdish-populated areas,24 and the PKKs announcement of the end of its
cease-fire and the associated increase in violence in Turkeys southeast.25

A Still
Uncertain Future for Iraqi Kurds

The US preference
for a strongly unified Iraq that is administratively rather than ethnically federal is
partly rooted in the need to reassure Turkey. Ankara has repeatedly sought reassurance
concerning Washingtons commitment to Iraqs territorial integrityfor
example, during the January 2004 visit to Washington of Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip
Erdogan and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul. Concurrently with the Washington visit, US
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz argued in an interview with senior Turkish
commentators that some degree of . . . federalism or federation is probably going to
be inevitable, but that should be based on administrative and geographic lines, not on
ethnic lines. Our message to the Kurds is your future doesnt lie in separating
yourselves from the Iraqis.26

However, the interim
agreement of early March leaves Iraqs future, and the position of the Kurds in it,
largely unresolved. There could, of course, be benefits for the Kurds in reintegrating the
KRG zone into a unified Iraq, and the Kurdish leadership does indeed continue to declare
its commitment to Iraqs future unity. The termination of the sanctions and the
oil-for-food program with the removal of Saddams regime might render independence
unsustainable in any case. Reintegration could afford Kurdish leaders the opportunity to
weave themselves into the countrys political fabric, following on from their
participation in Iraqs interim arrangements.

Kurds might also
benefit from any economic recovery enjoyed by a post-Saddam, stable, and sovereign Iraq.
Softening their stance on autonomy would enable them to avoid the wrath of Iraqs
neighbors, particularly Turkey, and even win their gratitude. In any case, Kurdish
economic well-being remains largely at the mercy of Ankara and other neighboring states.
Ethnically mixed areas such as Kirkuk and Mosul could develop power-sharing arrangements
between the various factions making up the populations there, as will presumably happen in
Baghdad and other multi-ethnic areas.

23/24

The drawbacks of
such an arrangement would be that Kurdish autonomy would be less than the virtual
independence enjoyed for the past decade or so. The Kurds would also once again be at the
mercy of Iraqs Arab majority, a hitherto unhappy experience. A Shiite-dominated Iraq
might bring problems of its own for the relatively secular Kurds, not least an Iraq based
on Islamic Sharia law. The interim constitution, while declaring that any law
contradicting the tenets of Islam will be impermissible, identifies Islam as a, but
not the, source of legislation in the new Iraq. On the other hand, there are
grounds for doubting that the Shiite leadership will be satisfied with these limitations,
as the future role of Islam in Iraq contributed both to the heat generated by the
preparation of the TAL and the Shiite delay in signing the agreement.27

In any case, there
appears to have been little softening of the Kurdish insistence on autonomy. Kurdish
nationalism is now a genie out of the bottle, and Iraqi Kurds generally seem indisposed to
risk their autonomy on the alter of an Arab-dominated Iraq. In addition to the
historically unprecedented opportunity offered by the present situation, the pressure of
circumstances in Iraq and the intervening obstacles that must be overcome look formidably
discouraging. Arab Iraq remains distinctly unstable, and it is not yet certain that a
functioning political system will emerge into which the Kurds could integrate even if they
were in principle prepared to do so. In a set of circumstances in which civil war or,
possibly more likely, armed and violent chaos constantly threatens, the Kurds are unlikely
to agree to disband their long-established militias in any foreseeable future. Nor will
other Iraqi factions.28 Washingtons officially upbeat line
is not mirrored everywhere, and there is a sense that events could spiral beyond US
control.29

Arrangements in
northern Iraq also will hinge on the fraught and contested demography of the area. Kurds
were certainly the majority in Kirkuk in 1957, and are almost certainly the largest single
group today,30 although the Turkish-backed Iraqi Turkmen
Front has claimed that this honor falls to the Turkmen.31 Kurdish victims of Saddams population transfers have been
returning to the north in significant numbers, welcomed by the Kurdish authorities who
control the area, though not necessarily by coalition forces.32 If
the Kurds succeed in creating facts in the north, then they might achieve
their objectives through the ballot box, although there is bound to be resistance from the
Arabs and Turkmen, who would be the losers. Intensified inter-communal tension in the
north is thus foreseeable.

Towards
Iraqs End?

Events could easily
slip from Washingtons grasp. This possibility has encouraged some US analysts to ask
difficult questions. Among the most eminent is Leslie Gelb, who has argued that the Iraqi
state, created as it was

24/25

from three distinct
Ottoman provinces by the British, possesses no natural unity. Only the oil-less Sunni Arab
minority, who have dominated Iraq since its inception, have a stake in its survival. Gelb
has proposed that the US encourage a three-state solution to Iraqi disorder, and he takes
events in post-Tito Yugoslavia as his guide.33 Henry Kissinger shares some of Gelbs pessimism about the
chances of Iraqi unity, and has argued, It may be that like Yugoslavia, Iraq,
created for geostrategic reasons, cannot be held together by representative institutions,
that it will tend towards autocracy or break up into its constituent parts.34 He too concludes that a breakup into three states
is preferable to refereeing an open-ended civil war. Former US Ambassador Peter
Galbraith is another who has openly contemplated the prospect of Iraqs ethnic
breakup as a least-bad option.35

A fragmentation of
Iraq would pose profound policy problems. As Kissinger asks, would the United States be
prepared to support an autocracy in Iraq, the historically tried and tested way of holding
the country together? What would the domestic American reaction be to any violent
suppression of Kurdish aspirations for self-determination by such a regime, particularly
in the light of Kurdish support and welcome for the United States in Saddams
overthrow? Can the denial of Kurdish self-determination be squared with the Bush
Administrations declared commitment to the democratization of the Middle East region
as a whole? Would the United States feel that the emergence of a Shiite-dominated,
theocratic, and probably unfriendly Iraqi regimewhich given Shiite demographic
preponderance is an outcome that could emerge even via the ballot boxbe worth the
blood, treasure, and American political capital that has been expended on it, and be worth
denying the Kurds their right to self-rule?

Problems for
US-Turkish Relations

In the face of the
dilemmas that could be thrown up, US reaction might hinge on the Turkish response, for
whom a breakup of Iraq might be seen as a first-order strategic threat. As already noted,
Turkey was initially

25/26

opposed to US
military action against Iraq because of fears over the ramifications for the Kurdish
issue. As it became clear that the United States was determined to oust Saddam militarily,
a substantial Turkish military force was built up on Iraqs borders, refusing US
command, and ready to intervene unilaterally should the Kurds transgress Ankaras
so-called red lines by moving toward the Kirkuk and Mosul oilfields or toward
political independence. Turks also asserted their guardianship toward the Turkmen ethnic
minority in northern Iraq, and more recently Ankara objected to the TAL partly because of
the insufficient attention it pays to the rights of Turkmen.36

In the wake of the
US invasion, and with a tightening Kurdish grip on northern Iraq, the Turks have been
largely on the outside looking in, seemingly without a clearly defined policy. This
frustrating and unstable situation has sometimes put the relationship between the two NATO
allies at further risk. This was amply demonstrated by the furor surrounding the 4 July
2003 arrest by US forces of 11 Turkish special forces commandos and a number of Turkish
and Turkmen civilians during a raid on a building in Sulaymaniyah, northern Iraq, on the
basis of intelligence reports that the Turks were engaged in disturbing
activities. The establishment of a US-Turkish commission to investigate the incident
did not prevent General Hilmi Ozkok, Chief of Turkeys General Staff, from
characterizing the incident as heralding the biggest crisis of confidence
between the two sides.37

Turkeys
enforced reliance on US troops and Kurdish peshmerga to confront the estimated
5,000 or so PKK separatists holding out in the mountains of northern Iraq has further
augmented Ankaras displeasure. In autumn 2003 Washington agreed to take on the PKK
presence in Iraq on Ankaras behalf. Although this gesture enjoyed the declared
support of the Iraqi Kurdish leadership, little will or capacity to invest in this mission
has been evident. In January 2004, Turkish General Ilker Basburg, who had helped negotiate
the agreement, declared that the USs fight against the PKK is not meeting our
expectation.38 Abdullah Gul repeated the complaint in
May.39 Ankaras discontent could mount were
this issue to remain unaddressed, particularly in light of the recent revival of PKK
violence.

Turkeys
relations with Iraqs Kurds are often fraught. Again, a demonstration of this was
offered as a consequence of last autumns US encouragement of, and inclination to
accept, Ankaras offer of up to 10,000 troops to assist in the post-Saddam
peacekeeping mission in Iraq. By November 2003 it had become manifestly evident that a
Turkish troop presence would do more harm than good, as the Kurds threatened to resist
militarily the introduction or even transit farther south of Turkish peacekeepers.40 This echoed a similar Kurdish threat to resist a Turkish
troop presence in northern Iraq which, it was rumored, the United States had agreed to on
the eve of the invasion of Iraq.

26/27

Nor has
Ankaras stridency with respect to the aspirations of Iraqs Kurds abated,
notwithstanding the latters repeated reassurances that they intend to remain an
integral part of Iraq. The issue was at the top of Turkeys agenda during the January
trip to Washington, on the eve of which Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned the
Kurds not to play with fire, and threatened that Syria, Iran, and Turkey were in agreement
that neighboring states might intervene should a breakup of Iraq look imminent.41 General Basbug warned that an ethnically-based Iraqi
federation would be difficult and bloody.42 Henry Kissinger has plausibly speculated, If Kurdish
autonomy goes beyond a certain point, there is a not negligible threat of a Turkish
military intervention, perhaps backed by Iran.43

A Turkish
Intervention?

Turkish military
action against the Kurds of Iraq could conceivably be prompted by a crossing of
Ankaras red linesexcessive Kurdish autonomy, particularly of an
expanded Kurdish zone incorporating Kirkuk. A future drawdown of US troops in Iraq, or an
Arab Iraq either in chaos or itself seeking to rein in Kurdish ambitions, might be seen as
contexts permissive to Turkish military intervention. Ankara would surely seek, and
possibly receive, a degree of regional sympathy, so long as Ankara was not itself
suspected of expansionism.

Turkey is not
invariably trusted by its neighbors, however, and an occasional whiff of irredentism can
hint at a more sinister twist to Turkeys approach to Iraqi Kurdistan. Turks have
occasionally resurrected an earlier resentment at the loss of Mosul and Kirkuk as a result
of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. In 1986 Ankara apparently warned the United States and Iran
that it would demand the return of Mosul and Kirkuk in the event of disorder in Iraq as a
consequence of the Iran-Iraq War.44 During
the Gulf War, President Turgut Ozal had similarly mused about historic Turkish claims to
the region in the event of an Iraqi collapse.45 In August 2002, Defense Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu, admittedly
a member of the far right National Action Party (MHP), chose to remark that Iraqi
Kurdistan had been forcibly separated

27/28

from Turkey (by the
British) at the time of the republics founding in 1923, and that Ankara retained a
protective interest in the fate of the region.46 As military action against Iraq approached, the then-Foreign
Minister of the new Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, Yasar Yakis,
apparently sought legal clarification of the status of Mosul and Kirkuk,47 and a leading Turkish commentator pointed out that Mosul
and Kirkuk were ceded to Iraq, not to any Kurdish state that might subsequently emerge.48 More recently, former Turkish President Suleyman Demirel
expressed regret that Turkey was denied Mosul by the 1923 Lausanne agreement.49 It would be fanciful to build a prediction upon so
disjointed a set of utterances, although some Kurds might. But it does serve as a reminder
of the potentially explosive situation that now exists in northern Iraq.

Iraqi Kurds would
fiercely resist any Turkish invasion, a prospect that might itself serve as a deterrent.
This would certainly deny to Turkey the possibility of turning Iraqi Kurdistan into a kind
of northern Cyprus, compliantly semi-annexed. In the event of a long stay, global
diplomatic opposition and mischief-making by neighboring states would grow. The United
States in particular would be compromised, and could hardly be expected to stay
uninvolved. Were US troops still present in the region, both Washington and Ankara would
wish desperately to avoid a clash. In such a scenario, it could not be ruled out.

The best hope is
that Iraq proves able to arrive at an arrangement that satisfies both the broader
requirement for Iraqs territorial integrity and stability on the one hand, and
Kurdish demands for a degree of self-determination on the other. This could still happen.
As yet incomplete and uncertain changes may be under way in Turkey too, as the military
appears to be adopting a lower profile and the country readies itself for European Union
accession. The security-driven, militarized approach to the Kurds, both domestically and
in Iraq, could give way to a more nuanced and sophisticated policy on Ankaras part.
Poor Turkish-Kurdish relations need not be a given, and there has indeed been cooperation
and consultation between Ankara and Iraqs Kurds for some time, in particular on
economic issues and on the PKK presence in northern Iraq. In any case, a land-locked Iraqi
Kurdistan can acquire enormous benefit from good relations with Turkey, and suffer
enormous harm in their absence. There have even been reports of a future Turkish
protectorate over an autonomous Iraqi Kurdish entity.50

Some Broader
Considerations

Much of the analysis
offered here is predicated on the basis of a continued failure to achieve stability in
Iraq. There are indeed reasons to be pessimistic. As for the implications for US-Turkish
relations, the primary post-Cold

28/29

War value of Turkey
to Washington has been its proximity to Iraq. The lesson that access to Turkeys real
estate can be denied by a parliamentary vote is a profound one. Furthermore, Turkeys
democratization might combine with divergent regional interests to render less likely the
adoption by Ankara of positions complementary to those of Washington. Indeed, this is a
lesson that might apply to the Middle East generally, should the Bush
Administrations aspirations to transform it bear fruit.

In the wake of
Saddams overthrow, and the consequent removal of the need to contain Iraq, it was
likely that US-Turkish relations would change in character regardless of US-Turkish
differences and become, in Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitzs words, less focused
on military cooperation, and instead derived from the common values, the common
beliefs in secular democracy.51 Washington has long held Turkey up as a
model for other Islamic states to emulate, and this inclination will surely strengthen in
the context of the Bush Administrations aspiration to democratize the region as a
means of stabilizing it. However, it is less than self-evident that the Turkish experience
is, or is perceived as, at all relevant or attractive to the rest of the region. In any
case, democracy, stability, and pro-US sympathies are not necessarily bedfellows in the
Middle East.

In short, the pieces
of the jigsaw thrown up by the US-led regime change in Baghdad are yet to hit the ground,
and Washington might yet have to reap what it has sownin Kurdistan in particular.

NOTES

1. For a list of the
membership of Iraqs interim government, and the text of the Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL), see http://www.cpa-iraq.org.

18. This theme is
developed strongly in the International Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 26, Iraqs
Kurds: Toward an Historic Compromise? 8 April 2004 (Amman/Brussels).

19. For an account
of the apparent contradictions in Turkish policy toward the KRG, see Philip Robins, Suits
and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (London: Hurst and Co., 2003),
pp. 312-42.

20. For a fuller
account of these developments, see my Strategic Location, Political Dislocation:
Turkey, the United States, and Northern Iraq, Middle East Review of International
Affairs (MERIA), 7 (June 2003), 11-23.

30. For an
interesting comparison of British, Ottoman, and Iraqi figures for the demographic
breakdown of Iraqi Kurdistan, see Nazhad Khasraw Hawramany, Ethnic
Distribution in Kirkuk, Past and Present, Kurdistan Observer, 15 January
2004.

31. See Some
2000 Sadr Militiamen March through Kirkuk, Kurdistan Observer, 8 March 2004,
for a recent reiteration of a traditional Turkmen claim that there are 3.5 million Iraqi
Turkmen, and that they constitute up to 65 percent of Kirkuks population.

33. Leslie H. Gelb,
The Three-State Solution, The New York Times, 25 November 2004. For the
transcript of a debate with Martin Indyk on Gelbs arguments, held under the auspices
of the Council for Foreign Relations, see
http://www.cfr.org/pub6749/martin_s_indyk_leslie_h_gelb/the_future_of_iraq_a_debate.php.

34. Kissinger,
Reflections on a Sovereign Iraq.

35. See Peter
Galbraith, How to Get Out of Iraq, New York Review of Books, 15 April
2004.

36. See Park,
Strategic Location, Political Dislocation.

37. For press
comment on this incident, see US to Return Freed Turkish Soldiers to North
Iraq, 6 July 2003, and US Resolves Troop Clash with Turkey, 8 July 2003,
both in The Washington Post; Ozkok: Biggest Crisis of Trust with US, Turkish
Daily News (TDN), 8 July 2003; and US Arrest of Soldiers Infuriates
Turkey, Guardian, 8 July 2003.

49. If Turkey
Had Kept Mosul, There Would Be No N. Iraq Issue, Says Demirel, TDN, 19
December 2003.

50. Timothy Noah,
Are the Kurds Coming Around? Kurdistan Observer, 19 May 2004, reporting
on an article by Hugh Pope and Bill Spindle, also on 19 May, in The Wall Street Journal.

51. Wolfowitz
interview.

Bill Park is a
Senior Lecturer with the Defence Studies Department (DSD) at the Joint Services Command
and Staff College, Watchfield, UK, which is attached to the UK Defence Academy. He is also
Research Associate at the Centre for Defence Studies (CDS). Both DSD and CDS are part of
the War Studies Group of Kings College, London University. He has published and
lectured widely on issues of European security and NATO politics and strategy, and he has
given oral and written testimony on Turkey to committees of both UK Houses of Parliament.