In fact, if it
is not the case that good denotes something simple and indefinable, only
two alternatives are possible: either it is a complex, a given whole, about the
correct analysis of which there could be disagreement; or else it means nothing
at all, and there is no such subject as Ethics. In general, however, ethical
philosophers have attempted to define good, without recognising what such an
attempt must mean. They actually use arguments which involve one or both of the
absurdities considered in § 11. We are, therefore,
justified in concluding that the attempt to define good is chiefly due to want
of clearness as to the possible nature of definition. There are, in fact, only
two serious alternatives to be considered, in order to establish the conclusion
that good does denote a simple and indefinable notion. It might possibly
denote a complex, as horse does; or it might have no meaning at all.
Neither of these possibilities has, however, been clearly conceived and
seriously maintained, as such, by those who presume to define good; and both may
be dismissed by a simple appeal to facts. (§ 13 ¶ 1)

(1) The hypothesis that disagreement about the meaning of good is
disagreement with regard to the correct analysis of a given whole, may be most
plainly seen to be incorrect by consideration of the fact that, whatever
definition may be offered, it may always, be asked, with significance, of the
complex so defined, whether it is itself good. To take, for instance, one of the
more plausible, because one of the more complicated of such proposed
definitions, it may easily be thought, at first sight, that to be good may mean
to be that which we desire to desire. Thus if we apply this definition to a
particular instance and say When we think that A is good, we are thinking
that A is one of the things which we desire to desire, our proposition may
seem quite plausible. But, if we carry the investigation further, and ask
ourselves Is it good to desire to desire A? it is apparent, on a little
reflection, that this question is itself as intelligible, as the original
question, Is A good?—that we are, in fact, now asking for exactly the
same information about the desire to desire A, for which we formerly asked with
regard to A itself. But it is also apparent that the meaning of this second
question cannot be correctly analysed into Is the desire to desire A one of
the things which we desire to desire?: we have not before our minds anything
so complicated as the question Do we desire to desire to desire to desire
A? Moreover any one can easily convince himself by inspection that the
predicate of this proposition—good—is positively different
from notion of desiring to desire which enters into its subject: That
we should desire to desire A is good is not merely equivalent to
That A should be good is good. It may indeed be true that what we desire
to desire is always good; perhaps, even the converse may be true: but it is very
doubtful whether this is the case, and the mere fact that we understand very
well what is meant by doubting it, shews clearly that we have to different
notions before our mind. (§ 13 ¶ 2)

(2) And the same consideration is sufficient to dismiss the
hypothesis that good has no meaning whatsoever. It is very natural to
make the mistake of supposing that what is universally true is of such a nature
that its negation would be self-contradictory: the importance which has been
assigned to analytic propositions in the history of philosophy shews how easy
such a mistake is. And thus it is very easy to conclude that what seems to be a
universal ethical principle is in fact an identical proposition; that, if, for
example, whatever is called good seems to be pleasant, the proposition
Pleasure is the good does not assert a connection between two different
notions, but involves only one, that of pleasure, which is easily recognised as
a distinct entity. But whoever will attentively consider with himself what is
actually before his mind when he asks the question Is pleasure (or whatever
it may be) after all good? can easily satisfy himself that he is not merely
wondering whether pleasure is pleasant. And if he will try this experiment with
each suggested definition in succession, he may become expert enough to recognise
that in every case he has before his mind a unique object, with regard to the
connection of which with any other object, a distinct question may be asked.
Every one does in fact understand the question Is this good? When he
thinks of it, his state of mind is different from what it would be, were he
asked Is this pleasant, or desired, or approved? It has a distinct
meaning for him, even though he may not recognise in what respect it is
distinct. Whenever he thinks of intrinsic value, or intrinsic
worth, or says that a thing ought to exist, he has before his mind
the unique object—the unique property of things—that I mean by
good. Everybody is constantly aware of this notion, although he may never
become aware at all that it is different from other notions of which he is also
aware. But, for correct ethical reasoning, it is extremely important that he
should become aware of this fact; and as soon as the nature of the problem is
closely understood, there should be little difficulty in advancing so far in
analysis. (§ 13 ¶ 3)