But
expectations about future unconventional resource development and
trade growth in the rest of the world should be
tempered.

It's a big unknown, how much and when, but certainly if the
world's unconventional gas resources are developed aggressively
— nominally, resource in
place in China is bigger than the U.S. for shale, Argentina has
got some very attractive looking reservoirs, Eastern
Europe.

Now a lot of this was
very enthusiastic a few years ago. A few below-ground realities
and above-ground realities have taken a little bit of the bloom
off the rose in some places, but again there is the potential for
dramatically shifting the flows of natural gas globally, that
will play out over next decade.

Moniz actually
played down the potential for shale oil development to remake
markets even further.

I think sometimes, especially on the oil side, the assumptions
about big geopolitical shifts just because of that tend to be
perhaps overplayed. I would note for example that we get very
little of our imported oil from the Middle East. It doesn't
change our security posture in that part of the world. I mean
that's just a fact right? There are many reasons — one is we have
many more security equities than just oil, but secondly the U.S.
has unique national security and foreign policy responsibilities
in the global order. And to the extent to which our key allies
are subject to strong energy security problems, that inevitably
influences our freedom of action in national security and foreign
affairs.

So I think it's a much more complicated story. Bottom line: if
unconventional resources are developed strongly over the next
decade there is no doubt global markets will change, shifts will
be different, infrastructure requirements will be different, and
we'll se how that plays out.