The "Persian Corridor" was one of two major theaters of operations
in World War II whose paramount mission was supply. (The other was China-Burma-India.)
The Army's mission in Iran was to accelerate the delivery of lend-lease
supplies to the Soviet Union. The operation involved delicate and complex
relations with three cooperating powers: Great Britain, the USSR, and Iran.
These relations transcended logistics and military administration and entered
the diplomatic sphere. This volume was written with an awareness of this
difficult experiment in cooperation. It is therefore a book for the statesman,
administrator, and historian, as well as for officers responsible for future
planning in the realm of logistics and strategy. More specifically the
book is indispensable to the study of Anglo-American aid to the USSR after
the breakdown of the Murmansk route in 1942 and the Anglo-American invasion
of North Africa.

The point of view is that of top command responsibility; but all aspects
of planning and operations from Washington and London to the "theater"
itself are illustrated. The study emphasizes organization and administration
as well as achievement in terms of operational results.

In addition to the task of moving supplies through Iran to the Soviet
Union, the Army was charged with responsibility for rendering economic
and military aid to Iran. This was accomplished by advisory missions to
the Iranian Army and the Iranian Gendarmerie (Chs. IX and XXI) and by the
broadening of the commander's directive to include economic assistance
to Iran (Ch. XX). The volume therefore describes precedents of importance
to readers interested in the development of the policy of

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containment and military assistance, adopted by the United States in
the post-World War II era.

Key topics:
1. The use of civilian contractors versus militarization of a large effort
of supply in wartime (Chs. II, III, V, VI, VII).
2. Procurement of materiel and manpower (American and Iranian) for construction
and the operation of theater services (Chs. VI, VII, XII).
3. Changes in organization required by changes in Allied policy and theater
mission (Ch. XI).
4. The problem of overlapping functions and the rivalries between military
and civilian (Army, State Department, War Shipping Administration, and
Lend-Lease Administration) agencies in an overseas area (Chs. II, IV, XVI-XVIII).
5. Anglo-American command relationships in Iran (Ch. V).
6. Difficulties of cooperation with the USSR (Ch. I).
7. Rivalries between Great Britain and the Soviet Union in Iran and their
continued efforts to exclude each other from their respective zones (Chs.
VII, XIII).
8. Anglo-American-Soviet negotiations directed toward legalization of the
status of American troops in Iran and the relation of these to the Declaration
of the Three Powers regarding Iran, 1 December 1943 (Ch. XX).
9. Anglo-American-Iranian negotiations regarding payment for the use of
the Iranian State Railway (Ch. XVII).
10. Diplomatic background of the U.S. advisory missions to Iran (Chs. V,
XX).
11. Employment of native labor (see Index: "Native employees").
12. Security arrangements in tribal areas (Chs. II, III, V, XI).
13. Planning for expansion of the oil pipeline net in Iran and of the refinery
capacity at Bahrein and Abadan (Ch. XV).
14. The role of the Army Service Forces in organizing and administering
a supply theater (Ch. X).
15. Command relations between the Middle East Theater and the administration
of the Army's responsibilities in Iran (see Index: "U.S. Army Forces
in the Middle East (USAFIME); U.S. Military Iranian Mission; U.S. Military
North African Mission; Persian Gulf Command; Maxwell, Maj. Gen. Russell
L.; Connolly, Maj. Gen. Donald H.; and Shingler, Brig. Gen. Don G.").
16. Shipping-the conflict between global and local interests (see Index:
"Shipping").
17. The tendency to overexpand staff and organize beyond the demands of
function (Chs. II, III, V, XI).