POLITICAL LEGITIMACY TRENDS IN CENTRAL ASIA

H.B. Paksoy

The basis of Central Asia's primary challenge to an invader
has always been the inhabitants' collective ability to withold
legitimacy. During the 19th century, the latest invader, the
Russian Empire, attempted to gain legitimization by claiming to
have a "civilizing mission;" and the Soviet empire, by asserting
to have "progressive significance" in industrial, political and
cultural terms. Though Moscow continuously used various types of
coercion in its relationship with Central Asia, it has most
continuously used means which the Central Asians themselves
employed for centuries before the Russian conquests and, in fact,
even before the name of the Rus appears in the chronicles. That
weapon of political persuasion, used to argue legitimacy of rule,
is literature. The Soviet establishment recognized this fact and
has manipulated Soviet Central Asian literature; the Central
Asian writers have fought back. For scholars or analysts, to
ignore this arena of struggle is to miss a wealth of
information.

Recent examples of Chora Batir[1] and Olmez
Kayalar
(Immortal Cliffs)[2] may be cited as initial
representative case studies. The original versions of these types
of works were
called dastans, ornate oral histories.

Known copies of Chora Batir indicate that the work
dates from the 16th c., from the Russian invasion of Kazan. But, there
are internal clues that it may be older. The fact that Chora
Batir was utilized in the 19th and 20th centuries, as a means of
mobilizing the populace, is of interest. The personage of Chora
Batir was held up to the Tatar youth as an example for emulation;
and when a Tatar community leader wished to send a sharp but
concise message to his detractors, he chose to convey the essence
of his retort through a specific reference to Chora
Batir.

The fact that the motifs of Chora Batir appeared in
a 1981 Ozbek "fiction," actually historical narrative replete with
footnotes, by the name of Olmez Kayalar, is yet
another example of how literature can serve to transmit undying
ideas. If the inherent message of Chora Batir was to
have been penned by a modern author, he would certainly would
have been hunted down by the Soviet thought police. As it was,
the state apparatus in Moscow tried to eradicate an entire
treasury of Central Asian literature, including Chora Batir,
precisely because those works contained the essence of Central Asian identity in
opposition to soviet-man notion. One surmises, even Stalin's
security chief Beria (d. 1953?) was in on the effort, in hot
pursuit of Chora Batir himself. This is not a far
fetched thought, for it is known that a dragnet was mounted to
corner Alpamysh, a work dating at least from the 8th
c., in the late 1940s. How often does one discover a particular
work of literature being tried in a specially convened court of
the government?[3].

Misperceptions of Central Asia is reflected, among others
in: A) the various inaccurate names by which the region and its
inhabitants have been known (from "Tartary" in the 15th century
to talk of "Sarts" in the early 20th); B) What Central Asians
believed in as the sources of legitimacy.

A) The term "Muslim" has been used haphazardly, and not
necessarily in the religious sense. After 1865, the Imperial
Russian bureaucratic designations aliens (inorodtsy) and "Muslim"
were employed with the establishment of tsarist Military
Governorships in Central Asia. On the other hand, the
designation Turkistan Military District has been in continuous
use since the late 19th c., reflecting deeper meanings, as
outlined by Togan.[4] Meanwhile, portions of the population, on
some of whom tsarist citizenship was imposed, were still
designated Turk, Tatar, Kirghiz, Sart; including those living to
the West of the Urals (Tatars, Bashkurt), and either side of the
Caucasus mountain ranges, including Azerbaijan. The Central
Asians living around the Altai mountain range were assigned still
other designations, despite what they called themselves.
Moreover, those designations were changed at various junctures.
As Denis Sinor points out in his introduction to Radloff's
Proben,[5] in the past 100 years, "New, artificial, names have
been created and it is not always easy to establish
equivalencies." Today, it is the practice to label the Central
Asians as "Muslims." In fact, Islam is a newcomer religion,
following in the footsteps of Shamanism, Tengri, Manichaeanism
and Buddhism.

"Islam" as label or analytical category must be used
cautiously --even among the Central Asians it isn't a monolith.
Accordingly, in most cases (perhaps with the exception of Bukhara
and Khiva residents), Islam largely remained a veneer on all
previous religions. Even when the Russian Christianization
campaigns began in the 19th c., not all Central Asians were
Muslims. In addition, due to the very nature of its spread in
Central Asia, the context of Islam was greatly altered from one
location to the next. The doctrines of the madrasa based ulama
were rather different than the teachings of the itinerant sufi
dervishes in their endeavors to spread Islam. As Islam became an
overlay, the underlying elements of previous religions remained
mostly visible. Today, most prominent of those underlays belong
to the Tengri and Zoroastrianism.[6]

B) Any newcomer idea, doctrine or orthodoxy requires
"legitimacy" in the minds of the recipients, the nature of which
differs according to the society. Political legitimacy in
Central Asia always demanded persuasion. Persuasion required
mass communication. How was it possible, for example, in early
16th c., an era preceding the invention of movable type, to
conduct mass communication? In the case of Central Asia, the
task was accomplished through the medium of literature. Perhaps
the Shibaninama of the early 16th c., a poetry
anthology, is a good example, among many, seeking to convince the
population that this ruler, Shiban of the Ozbeks, was every bit a
good and
capable ruler as those preceded him.[7] Today we might call
this variously as propaganda, nation building, or, social
engineering. In Central Asia, literature grew due to indigenous
needs and is still employed widely.

Indeed, if a Central Aian ruler did not come from a long and
identifiable lineage, he did not hesitate in manufacturing one in
his writings. It was up to the population to decide whether they
were going to accept the new ruler's claims, primarily on the
basis of the brilliance thus displayed. All this, the new ruler
did by writing poetry and "political tracts," in which he shared
in the common values of the people --whether those were also his
own or not-- he wished to lead. Those poetry anthologies, in
manuscript, were duplicated by copyists in palace libraries and
by private savants. The contents of these collected treasures
(or single poems) were committed to memory by individuals for
later oral recitation. This constituted, what was later termed
by the British in the 20th c. Malaya/Burma "Emergency," a "minds
and hearts" campaign. In Central Asia, these campaigns were used
more often than armed troops, for poetry proved more effective
than the sword in convincing the Central Asians. In this manner,
the rulers also wished to preserve the history of their
reigns.

The impetus for mass communication also came from the
people, wishing to safeguard their heritage. The Oghuz, also
called the Turkmen, came to constitute the basis of the 11th c.
Seljuk empire.[8] After the fall of the Seljuk empire, the
Oghuz/Turkmen groups did not disappear.[9] Being members of a
confederation, the Turkmen/Oghuz simply regrouped in the time
honored process and joined other kindred confederations.[10]
Abul-Ghazi Bahadur Khan (1603-1663), ruler of Khiva after the
Shibanid period, was asked by his Turkmen subjects (which
constituted a large portion of the population under his rule) to
compile the authoritative genealogy of their common lineage from
many extant written variants. He prepared two, under the titles
Secere-i Terakime (probably completed in 1659) and
Secere-i
Turk.[11] It should not be inferred from this very brief
sketch
that the new ruler did not resort to arms to convince the
population. But, sooner the new king resorted to armed force
after taking over, more hasty was his decline. When the
population is unhappy with the ruler, an alternative leader can
be fostered. If such a person is not immediately available, a
temporary substitute might be tolerated. The Central Asians
might just be indulging the present political leadership for that
purpose. But underneath there are the ever-present signs of
search for that popular figure who will capture the hearts and
minds.[12]

The Soviet apparatus, having inherited the tsarist studies,
has been well informed of this Central Asian use of literature,
including prose, poetry, histories.[13] It was for that reason
that the Soviet Oriental Institutes of the USSR Academy of
Sciences produced libraries full of narratives very much in the
model of Shibaninama, but without the poetic beauty
intrinsic in Central Asian literature. Only so much lyrical
pleasure can be
derived from a tractor or kolkhoz produced in the 1930s.
Hardbound copies of these "modern" examples abound. Not only did
the Russians seek to write themselves into the history and
culture of Central Asia, but pretended that there was no culture
in the region until they, the Russians gave it one. The Central
Asian response was standard. Regarding the Moscow version of
Central Asian history an example of fiction, the Central Asians
began writing true history, as they knew it, under the guise of
literature. Olmez Kayalar and "Sun is also Fire"[14]
are two
prime examples.

In order to better understand the current developments, we
need to spend a bit more time in the origins of these events.
Now, let us look at what the Russian apparatus have learned over
time.

The 16th c. Shibani and his Ozbeks, a tribal confederation
modeled after its predecessors, were hard pressed, working to
supplant the already rooted Timurid culture. That the Ozbeks of
Shibani militarily defeated the Timurids did not necessarily
assure a victory for the former. There is not much point in
being the ruler of an empty land. If one is to be the king, one
must have a population to rule over. At the time and place, if
the population did not like the new khan, they could always
move.

They often did. And the population must accept the ruler as
legitimate, to provide him with the necessities of life. Not
even under the heavy hand of Stalinism did Central Asia fully
complied with the demands of pretending rulers. When they could
not move, the Central Asians began engaging in passive
resistance. They slaughtered cattle, forcing the Stalinist
propagandists to exhort the benefits of rabbit farming; which fad
was not accepted either, and allowed to fade quietly. It is also
known that the Soviet cotton quotas were rarely, if ever, were
fulfilled to the satisfaction of the center.

Timurids, spread throughout Central Asia, had established a
very recognizable and successful political and cultural
identity.

In this sense, the use of the term "culture" refers to both
varieties: the political and the arts. Timur, the founder, had
died in 1405, and the unity of the vast empire he founded did not
survive him. His progeny began fighting among themselves for the
highest title immediately. The palace intrigues certainly
contributed to the process. But the main reason was the system
dictated by the nature of the society. Every member of the royal
family was in training from birth to be the grand ruler. Given
the rate of fatalities of the time (even Timur lost a son or two
in his own life), it was a necessary precaution against the
ravages of nature and military opponents.

Eventually, none of Timur's offspring was able to succeed to
Timur's throne. Instead, several kingdoms sprang from Timur's
domains. Establishment of the Moghuls of Babur (1483-1530)
is one of the end results.[15] The astronomer mathematician Ulug
Bey's (d. 1449)[16] Samarkand and the Herat kingdom under
Huseyin Baykara (r. 1469-1506) are two others.[17] In the
latter, some of the highest forms of Central Asian literature and
arts flourished, from a peculiar amalgam of different traditions,
ranging from Uyghur to the Persian. The focus of that era
revolved around poet courtiers such as Ali Shir Navai (1441-
1501).[18]

Shibanid's personal rule did not last long. Even though he
declared the end of the Timurids in 1500, Shibani himself fell in
battle in 1510, fighting against the Safavids (dynasty r. 1501-
1736) of Shah Ismail (r. 1501-1524). Shah Ismail was in return
defeated by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (r. 1512-1520) at
Chaldiran, in 1514. Shibani and Ozbeks also fought Babur, which
are detailed in his Baburnama[19] and corroborated in Muhammad
Haidar's Tarikh-i Reshidi.[20] Babur sought and
received the aid of Shah Ismail and his kizilbash Safavids in his
opposition. But Babur lost the greater struggle, and went on to
found the Moghul empire in India.

After the death of Sibani Khan, his Ozbek confederation
melted into the extant population of the realm, just as its
forerunners did, and in the same manner itself was formed. But,
their confederational appellation remained as a designation.
Shibani's descendants, much like those of Timur, took possession
of principalities and competed against one another. Once again,
such confederations were not separate and distinct ethnicities,
but simply political groupings of smaller units. Their
composition, ethnic, linguistic or historical bases are not much
different from each other. In fact, they are of the basic stock
of the Timurids. Neither side needed translators to converse
with the other, for they spoke the same language, but perhaps
with different accents. The vastness of space and their contacts
with other cultures or groups were the prime reasons for the
establishment of new confederations.

Up to Timur's domination of Central Asia, the legitimacy
rested with the (Mongol) Chinggisid line. So much so that even
Timur throned puppet Chinggisid Khans, replacing them at will,
and ruled in their name. Such was also the case in the Golden
Horde in the North. Omeljan Pritsak wrote:

The seventeenth century chronicles record an interesting
event under the year 1574: "At that time Tsar Ivan
Vasil'evich enthroned Simeon Bekbulatovich as tsar in Moscow
and crowned him with the crown of the tsars, and called
himself [simply] Ivan of Moscow; he left the city and lived
in Petrovka. All the offices of the tsardom he passed to
Simeon, and himself rode simply, like a boyar with shafts,
and whenever he comes to Tsar Simeon, he sits at a distance
from the Tsar's place, together with the boyars." That such
an event did in fact take place, we have the testimony of
contemporary witness, the English envoy Danyell
Silvester.... Among the "epistles" of Ivan the Terrible
there is also one addressed to Simeon. It begins thus: "To
the lord and great prince Simeon Bekbulatovich of all
Russia, Ivanets Vasil'ev with his children Ivanets and
Fedorets incline their heads [bow very humbly]".... Who was
this Simeon Bekbulatovich? He was a genuine Chinggisid, a
descendant of Orda, the eldest son of Jochi, who was the
eldest son of Chinggis Khan.[21]

What was the ideology or the ultimate goal and purpose of
the Chinggisids? Much has been speculated. The Secret History
of the Mongols,[22] the compilation of traditions and admonitions
of Chinggis, contains a line which might be regarded as the
essence: "Tengri opened the gate and handed us the reigns."[23]
Some authors speculated that Chinggis was thus motivated by a
thought of racial superiority. This assertion is not
substantiated. Moreover, the troops of Chinggis were distinctly
multiracial. Chinggis appears to have been after personal
security and power.

After Timur, legitimacy was almost entirely transferred to
the Timurid line. Timur was also concerned with the security of
his domains. This he did by removing potential threats to his
own rule, which forced him to wage continuous military
campaigns.

After each expedition, he brought back artisans, scholars and
poets to his beloved city of Samarkand. He doubtlessly succeeded
in his military goals. The same assessment cannot be made with
respect to his social organizational attempts. Timur's actions
demonstrate a desire to rearrange the existing tribal structures,
to create a new confederation loyal only to himself. But, that
confederation having been formed through the forceful actions of
one man, Timur, did not assure its survival. The tribal groups
did not come together under their own volition, as they have been
doing throughout their history. Timur's deeds were recorded as
well, again by a third party, and those do not mention any claims
to racial superiority. All that can safely be asserted is that
Timur's ideology, too, was one of survival of unity.

At the moment, the political map of Central Asia resembles
very much the time that gave rise to Timur: Mongols, the absolute
rulers of the region during the 12th-13th c. were in steep
decline, having lost the cultural and economic battle to more
deeply rooted civilizations. Timur began his professional life
in the 14th c. as a single adventurer. His early personal
successes attracted followers, which grew in number with every
follow on victory. His defeat of a sizeable Mongol detachment,
long before his name reached the ears of Christopher Marlowe (who
gave "Tamarlane," the distorted spelling of Timur to us), laid
the foundation for his personal power and the beginning of his
reign.

After so many centuries in the life of Central Asia, the
legitimacy question is still alive in the late 20th c. Since
Timur, no one had legitimacy across Central Asia.

To recapitulate: there are currently two overarching trends
in Central Asia. Both are closely intertwined and neither can be
considered without reference to the other: 1) Nature,
ideological orientation and legitimacy of the present political
leadership; 2) Recovery of the historical identity by the masses
in light of the present.

For the most part, these two issues will be in serious
contention against each other for the foreseeable future. The
outcome will influence the attributes of the emerging society in
Central Asia. The solutions to problems ranging from
environmental pollution to water distribution rights will come
from the emerging competition between these two. Ideologies
cannot do battle in abstract. They must have human adherents
through which to compete. The first category represents the
interests of the current leadership, while the second is the
platform of the mass politics minded peoples' guides. Which one
is legitimate, and when one will triumph over the other is the
implicit contest.

It is remembered that the current Central Asian leadership
was installed not by the will of the people, but by a central
government whose political character has became known over the
past forty years or so. The Soviet Central government also
attempted to create new political groups, but in reverse. While
Chinggis, Timur and Shibani sought to form larger polities from
smaller units, Moscow wished to reverse the process and foster
the smallest possible identities. Soviet bureaucrats bent all
known data to claim that the language spoken, for example by the
Turkmen, Ozbek and Karakalpak are entirely distinct, unrelated
and separate languages even when all these groups can speak to
each other without any difficulty. The histories written in
Moscow strenuously attempted to create different identities and
"geneses" for each artificially differentiated republic. As
every Central Asian confederation had an identity, even if their
components migrated from one to the next and constituted common
elements, on the surface these new "identities" were accepted.

Each Republic thus created by decrees of Moscow were also
equipped with local leaders trained in Moscow, to follow the
orders of the CPSU under Marxist Leninist rhetoric. The only
legitimacy of the republican leaderships flowed from the presence
of Red Army and KGB divisions nearby. These leaders had to
compel the population to comply with the demands of the center.
Members of those Central Asian leaderships were replaced when
they could not deliver what Moscow wanted. On the other hand,
Moscow backed leaders also had to placate the population. It is
easier to walk on a tight-rope than a sagging one, and the rope
these leaders were obliged to walk on has been a rather droopy
one. As of late, this Central Asian leadership became
"nationalist" overnight, and in some cases declared independence
for the "republics" they lead. Thus the existing gaps between
the entrenched leadership and the populations at large, who
expect some material and economic results the word independence
implies, grew even further.

There is no doubt that the current Central Asian political
leadership is unwilling to voluntarily relinquish the perks they
have so enjoyed under the Soviet system. With further loss of
their legitimacy, recognized only in Moscow, some local leaders
went so far as to establish private "enforcement" squads to
protect their own status, and substantial private income. This
caused their sagging-rope walk even more hazardous. The
opposition to their rule is assembled under the umbrella of the
"Popular Fronts" in each republic, and are ready to talk.
Regardless of their actual designations or names, these
opposition groups are not yet fully rooted. That, too, is not an
accident, for the top political leadership in the republics have
been actively working to render the popular fronts ineffective.
Methods employed are standard, those very techniques used by
Moscow earlier: infiltrate, manipulate and discredit.

The primary weapon of the opposition to the entrenched
Central Asian leadership is the printed word. Though the Central
Asian press is somewhat more "brazen" nowadays, the unofficial
papers are still not free to offer the full spectrum of political
options. That is not because there are no options, or that there
are no thinking souls. The reasons lie more with the tinkering
of the holdover apparatus, despite their present political
color.

Newsprint and presses are still in the control of the republican
leadership. As a result, most of the opposition papers, once
begun, have not been able to sustain publication. So, contraband
cassettes are also pressed into service by the opposition, as had
been done in the pre-Gorbachev era. But, in the minds of the
populace, the nagging legitimacy issue is not silenced. It
seems, at every instance one paper is muled, another takes
its
place, however briefly.

One of the vehicles utilized by the Soviet state to
manipulate public opinion and legitimacy was the creation of
straw-men. Anyone who showed the least bit of popularity with
the masses on any given issue could be built-up to be a media
figure. When the movement ascribed to this newly shining
celebrity gained any measure of strength at the expense of the
central power, a series of charges could be manufactured against
him. That would not only assure the toppling of the person from
his temporary plinth, but also discredit the movement he is
associated as well. Birlik in Ozbekistan, Agzi Birlik in
Turkmenistan, and the Azerbaijan Popular Front have been the
target of those tactics.

More than likely, most of the Popular Front movements in
Central Asia were originally staffed by individuals who had the
best of intentions. But soon they fell victim to the "straw-men"
treatment. First, they were lauded in the leadership controlled
republican newspapers. When the integrity of the leadership of
the Peoples' Fronts did not allow them to comply with the
requirements of the republican leaderships, they were dealt with
in more physical manner. Some were killed, others were roughed-
up to the point of requiring lengthy convalescence. A number are
living and working in exile.

As in most other cases in their history, the thinking
Central Asians responded to the dire emergencies with biting
satire. Their newspapers, official or otherwise, pre-glasnost or
post-coup, are brimming with humor of various types. Cartoons
often carry the message as much as the short stories. This also
has historical roots. Molla Nasreddin was one of the
most
successful satirical magazines, published in Tbilisi, Baku and
also in exile in Iran between 1906-1920.[24] This journal was
later co-opted by the Bolsheviks, in the post 1920 era, due to
its powerful legacy. There have been efforts to resuscitate it
recently, fighting against the continuing but unspoken
censorship. Even starting with the Brezhnev and continuing with
his successors' periods, Central Asian humor persistently pounded
at the legitimacy issue. The overwhelming majority of these
struggles were carried out in local dialect press and not in
Russian. Even in the period of Openness, these publications were
not allowed by the center to leave their localities. In the
West, one cannot openly subscribe to them. Only personal contact
can secure an occasional sample.

Any one or a group of publications cannot be singled out in
Central Asia as best representing the views of this or that
independence minded group. The Peoples' Front leaderships
occasionally gain control of a particular journal of newspaper,
and air their views in that publication. The entrenched
republican leadership, reminiscent of the earlier practice,
manages to replace them with their own adherents. The
independence minded authors move to other publications. The
chase continues.

At the moment, discussions with visiting Central Asians
suggest that independence, or survival as a unit and culture, is
at the top of their agenda. The free market economic model they
seek is based on the Korean or Japanese or even the Chinese
versions. Various Central Asian groups are pressing for the full
disclosure of Central Asian history which has been officially
withheld from them under the Soviet rule.[25] Under varying
verbiage, the primary ideology proposed by the opposition is the
unity of Central Asia.[26] No evidence of Islamic fundamentalism
appear in any of the Peoples Front memoranda or platforms. This
has been perhaps one of the success stories of the Soviet
legacy.[27]

Any such claims to the contrary emanate from sources outside
Central Asia. (One also notes the formal existence of the
Islamic Party, for example, in Tajikistan, which runs on that
basis alone). What is raised by individuals and by some
organized groups is the nature of unification, as it existed
before, as recent as 1920s. The proponents of this unification
seem to be advocating the reenactment of another confederation,
as Central Asia has seen many times in its past. Origins of
Kazaks and Ozbeks, for example, reflect that heritage.

Under these conditions, Moscow center has changed tack yet
again. Domination of center through "guided economy" is the new
approach to Central Asia. "Give them 'independence' but control
the purse strings thus compel them to work for the benefit of the
central rulers" is how it can be briefly defined. Moscow's
insistence on signing mutual trade agreements, keeping the Ruble
as the single currency, and demanding that the republics share in
paying the foreign debt created by the center are the elements of
this policy. Some incumbent Central Asian leaderships are
perfectly willing to go along with the these initiatives of
Moscow. Others are not.

Nor are the so called democratic or independent news
services in Moscow (Interfax, PostFactum, etc.) have any reliable
or correct information concerning Central Asia. Despite their
extravagant claims, these supposedly radical or anti-conservative
elements are still expounding the old Soviet policies, mirroring
the well worn nationalities policies and wishes of the Russian
center. The contents of reports appearing in those services do
not correspond to the deeds and thoughts of the Central Asians.
For example, numerous ominous "analyses" have appeared in those
"independent" news services concerning the loss of the control of
nuclear weapons to Central Asians. Later it was elliptically
suggested that the control of the nuclear weaponry was never lost
by the Red Army. Which was true? Why the discrepancy? Similar
claims have been made about the so called the "Islamic Threat" to
emanate from Central Asia, ready to explode and engulf and devour
the civilization as we know it. We are waiting. In both
instances, the aim of the news services appear to provide support
for the central policies of the government in power ("poor us,
have mercy, do not press us hard....); and not provide "radical,
etc." fresh news to the West about the Soviet Union itself.
Central Asian works such as "Sun is also Fire" and "Let Us Learn
Our Heritage" go directly against the pronouncements of these
"radical" services.

The Central Asian opposition leaderships are well aware of
this scenario. But while the members of the opposition have a
collection of works to serve to legitimize themselves with, the
incumbent political leadership conspicuously lacks them. The
incumbents are spending treasuries in order to create such a
corpus of legitimizing literature. What the both sides can or
intend to do will be the subject of intense observations. We are
likely to read their views primarily in the form of literature,
probably well before the events take to the streets, and the
related political statements appear in the central press or the
"independent" news agencies.

12. An example may be found in Maria Eva Subtelny, "Art and
Politics in Early 16th Century Central Asia" Central
Asiatic
Journalz Vol. 27, No. 1-2 (1983); idem, "The Poetic Circle at the
Court of the Timurid Sultan Husain Baiqara, and its Political
Significance." PhD Dissertation (Harvard University, 1979).

13. Lowell Tillett, The Great Friendship (Chapel
Hill, 1969).

14. Central Asian Monuments (Istanbul: Isis Press,
1992).

15. See Lt. Col. Sir Wolseley Haig & Sir Richard Burn (Eds.)
The Cambridge History of India (1922-1953), Vol III,
Turks and Afghans (1928). M. G. S. Hodgson, in his
The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World
Civilization (Chicago, 1974), 3 Vols., suggests that the
above cited 1928 volume is written from the now outdated British
Empire point of view. See also V. Smith, Oxford History of
India (Oxford, 1958).

16. Timur's grandson, who ruled Samarkand and environs, author of
principal astronomical and mathematical works which were
translated into Western languages beginning with the 17th
century. See Ulugh Bey Calendar, John Greaves,
Savilian Professor of Astronomy, Tr. (Oxford, 1652). Ulug Beg's
works influenced European studies on the subject. Bartold
utilized a French translation by Sandillot, Prologomenes
des tables astronomiques d'Oloug-beg (Paris, 1847-53). See
Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia Vol.
II, Ulug Beg. (Leiden, 1963). For a more detailed
bibliography, see Kevin Krisciunas, "The Legacy of Ulugh Beg" H.
B. Paksoy, Editor, Central Asian Monuments
(Istanbul: Isis Press, 1992).