"AFTER the conviction and condemnation of
the Pelagian heresy with its authors by the bishops of the Church of Rome,--first
Innocent, and then Zosimus,--with the co-operation of letters of African
councils, I wrote two books against them: one On the Grace of Christ, and
the other On Original Sin. The work began with the following words: 'How
greatly we rejoice on account of your bodily, and, above all, because of
your Spiritual welfare.'"

A TREATISE ON THE GRACE OF CHRIST, AND ON
ORIGINAL SIN.BY AURELIUS AUGUSTIN, BISHOP OF HIPPO;

IN TWO BOOKS,

WRITTEN AGAINST PELAGIUS AND COLESTIUS IN
THE YEAR A.D, 418.

BOOK I.

ON THE GRACE OF CHRIST.

WHEREIN HE SHOWS THAT PELAGIUS IS DISINGENUOUS
IN HIS CONFESSION OF GRACE, INASMUCH AS HE PLACES GRACE EITHER IN NATURE
AND FREE WILL, OR IN LAW AND TEACHING; AND, MOREOVER, ASSERTS THAT IT IS
MERELY THE "POSSIBILITY" (AS HE CALLS IT) OF WILL AND ACTION, AND NOT THE
WILL AND ACTION ITSELF, WHICH IS ASSISTED BY DIVINE GRACE; AND THAT THIS
ASSISTING GRACE, TOO, IS GIVEN BY GOD ACCORDING TO MEN'S MERITS; WHILST
HE FURTHER THINKS THAT THEY ARE SO ASSISTED FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF BEING
ABLE THE MORE EASILY TO FULFIL THE COMMANDMENTS. AUGUSTIN EXAMINES THOSE
PASSAGES OF HIS WRITINGS IN WHICH HE BOASTED THAT HE HAD BESTOWED EXPRESS
COMMENDATION ON THE GRACE OF GOD, AND POINTS OUT HOW THEY CAN BE INTERPRETED
AS REFERRING TO LAW AND TEACHING,--IN OTHER WORDS, TO THE DIVINE REVELATION
AND THE EXAMPLE OF CHRIST WHICH ARE ALIKE INCLUDED IN "THE TEACHING,"--OR
ELSE TO THE REMISSION OF SINS; NOR DO THEY AFFORD ANY EVIDENCE WHATEVER
THAT PELAGIUS REALLY ACKNOWLEDGED CHRISTIAN GRACE, IN THE SENSE OF HELP
RENDERED FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF RIGHT ACTION TO NATURAL FACULTY AND INSTRUCTION,
BY THE INSPIRATION OF A MOST GLOWING AND LUMINOUS LOVE; AND HE CONCLUDES
WITH A REQUEST THAT PELAGIUS WOULD SERIOUSLY LISTEN TO AMBROSE, WHOM HE
IS SO VERY FOND OF QUOTING, IN HIS EXCELLENT EULOGY IN COMMENDATION OF
THE GRACE OF GOD.

CHAP.I[I.]--INTRODUCTORY.

How greatly we rejoice on account of your
bodily, and, above all, your spiritual welfare, my most sincerely attached
brethren and beloved of God, Albina, Pinianus, and Melania, we cannot express
in words; we therefore leave all this to your own thoughts and belief,
in order that we may now rather speak of the matters on which you consulted
us. We have, indeed, had to compose these words to the best of the ability
which God has vouchsafed to us, while our messenger was in a hurry to be
gone, and amidst many occupations, which are much more absorbing to me
at Carthage than in any other place whatever.

CHAP. 2 [II.]--SUSPICIOUS CHARACTER OF PELAGIUS'
CONFESSION AS TO THE NECESSITY OF GRACE FOR EVERY SINGLE ACT OF OURS.

You informed me in your letter, that you had
entreated Pelagius to express in writing his condemnation of all that had
been alleged against him; and that he had said, in the audience of you
all: "I anathematize the man who either thinks or says that the grace of
God, whereby 'Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners,' is not
necessary not only for ever hour and for every moment, but also for every
act of our lives: and those who endeavour to disannul it deserve everlasting
punishment." Now, whoever hears these words, and is ignorant of the opinion
which he has clearly enough expressed in his books,--not those, indeed,
which he declares to have been stolen from him in an incorrect form, nor
those which he repudiates, but those even which he mentions in his own
letter which he forwarded to Rome,--would certainly suppose that the views
he holds are in strict accordance with the truth. But whoever notices what
he openly declares in them, cannot fail to regard these statements with
suspicion. Because, although he makes that grace of God whereby Christ
came into the world to save sinners to consist simply in the remission
of sins, he can still accommodate his words to this meaning, by alleging
that the necessity of such grace for every hour and for every moment and
for every action of our life, comes to this, that while we recollect and
keep in mind the forgiveness of our past sins, we sin no more, aided not
by any supply of power from without, but by the powers of our own will
as it recalls to our mind, in every action we do, what advantage has been
conferred upon us by the remission of sins. Then, again, whereas they are
accustomed to say that Christ has given us assistance for avoiding sin,
in that He has left us an example by living righteously and teaching what
is right Himself, they have it in their power here also to accommodate
their words, by affirming that this is the necessity of grace to us for
every moment and for every action, namely, that we should in all our conversation
regard the example of the Lord's conversation. Your own fidelity, however,
enables you clearly to perceive how such a profession of opinion as this
differs from that true confession of grace which is now the question before
us. And yet how easily can it be obscured and disguised by their ambiguous
statements!

CHAP. 3 [III.]--GRACE ACCORDING TO THE PELAGIANS.

But why should we wonder at this? For the
same Pelagius, who in the Proceedings of the episcopal synod unhesitatingly
condemned those who say "that God's grace and assistance are not given
for single acts, but consist m free will, or in law and teaching, upon
which points we were apt to think that he had expended all his subterfuges;
and who also condemned such as affirm that the grace of God is bestowed
in proportion to our merits:--is proved, notwithstanding, to hold, in the
books which he has published on the freedom of the will, and which he mentions
in the letter he sent to Rome, no other sentiments than those which he
seemingly condemned. For that grace and help of God, by which we are assisted
in avoiding sin, he places either in nature and free will, or else in the
gift of the law and teaching; the result of which of course is this, that
whenever God helps a man, He must be supposed to help him to turn away
from evil and do good, by revealing to him and teaching him what he ought
to do, but not with the additional assistance of His co-operation and inspiration
of love, that he may accomplish that which he had discovered it to be his
duty to do.

CHAP. 4.--PELAGIUS' SYSTEM OF FACULTIES.

In his system, he posits and distinguishes
three faculties, by which he says God's commandments are fulfilled,--capacity,
volition, and action: meaning by "capacity," that by which a man is able
to be righteous; by "volition" that by which he wills to be righteous;
by "action," that by which he actually is righteous. The first of these,
the capacity, he allows to have been bestowed on us by the Creator of our
nature; it is not in our power, and we possess it even against our will.
The other two, however, the volition and the action, he asserts to be our
own; and he assigns them to us so strictly as to contend that they proceed
simply from ourselves. In short, according to his view, God's grace has
nothing to do with assisting those two faculties which he will have to
be altogether our own, the volition and the action, but that only which
is not in our own power and comes to us from God, namely the capacity;
as if the faculties which are our own, that is, the volition and the action,
have such avail for declining evil and doing good, that they require no
divine help, whereas that faculty which we have of God, that is to say,
the capacity, is so weak, that it is always assisted by the aid of grace.

CHAP. 5 [IV.]--PELAGIUS' OWN ACCOUNT OF THE
FACULTIES, QUOTED.

Lest, however, it should chance to be said
that we either do not correctly understand what he advances, or malevolently
pervert to another meaning what he never meant to bear such a sense, I
beg of you to consider his own actual words: "We distinguish," says he,
"three things, arranging them in a certain graduated order. We put in the
first place 'ability;' in the second, 'volition;' and in the third, 'actuality.'
The 'ability' we place in our nature, the 'volition' in our will, and the
'actuality' in the effect. The first, that is, the 'ability,' properly
belongs to God, who has bestowed it on His creature; the other two, that
is, the 'volition' and the 'actuality,' must be referred to man, because
they flow forth from the fountain of the will For his willing, therefore,
and doing a good work, the praise belongs to man; or rather both to man,
and to God who has bestowed on him the 'capacity' for his will and work,
and who evermore by the help of His grace assists even this capacity. That
a man is able to will and effect any good work, comes from God alone. So
that this one faculty can exist, even when the other two have no being;
but these latter cannot exist without that former one. I am therefore free
not to have either a good volition or action; but I am by no means able
not to have the capacity of good. This capacity is inherent in me, whether
I will or no; nor does nature at any time receive in this point freedom
for itself. Now the meaning of all this will be rendered clearer by an
example or two. That we are able to see with our eyes is not of us; but
it is our own that we make a good or a bad use of our eyes. So again (that
I may, by applying a general case in illustration, embrace all), that we
are able to do, say, think, any good thing, comes from Him who has endowed
us with this 'ability,' and who also assists this 'ability;' but that we
really do a good thing, or speak a good word, or think a good thought,
proceeds from our own selves, because we are also able to turn all these
into evil. Accordingly,--and this is a point which needs frequent repetition,
because of your calumniation of us,--whenever we say that a man can live
without sin, we also give praise to God by our acknowledgment of the capacity
which we have received from Him, who has bestowed such 'ability' upon us;
and there is here no occasion for praising the human agent, since it is
God's matter alone that is for the moment treated of; for the question
is not about 'willing,' or 'effecting,' but simply and solely about that
which may possibly be."

CHAP. 6 [V.]--PELAGIUS AND PAUL OF DIFFERENT
OPINIONS.

The whole of this dogma of Pelagius, observe,
is carefully expressed in these words, and none other, in the third book
of his treatise in de-fence of the liberty of the will, in which he has
taken care to distinguish with so great subtlety these three things,--the
"capacity," the "volition,'' and the "action," that is, the" ability,"
the "volition," and the "actuality,"--that, whenever we read or hear of
his acknowledging the assistance of divine grace in order to our avoidance
of evil and accomplishment of good,--whatever he may mean by the said assistance
of grace, whether law and the teaching or any other thing,--we are sure
of what he says; nor can we run into any mistake by understanding him otherwise
than he means. For we cannot help knowing that, according to his belief,
it is not our "volition" nor our "action" which is assisted by the divine
help, but solely our "capacity" to will and act, which alone of the three,
as he affirms, we have of God. As if that faculty were infirm which God
Himself placed in our nature; while the other two, which, as he would have
it, are our own, are so strong and firm and self-sufficient as to require
none of His help! so that He does not help us to will, nor help us to act,
but simply helps us to the possibility of willing and acting. The apostle,
however, holds the contrary, when he says, "Work out your own salvation
with fear and trembling." And that they might be sure that it was not simply
in their being able to work (for this they had already received in nature
and in teaching), but in their actual working, that they were divinely
assisted, the apostle does not say to them, "For it is God that worketh
in you to be able," as if they already possessed volition and operation
among their own resources, without requiring His assistance in respect
of these two; but he says, "For it is God which worketh in you both to
will and to perform of His own good pleasure;" or, as the reading runs
in other copies, especially the Greek, "both to will and to operate." Consider,
now, whether the apostle did not thus long before foresee by the Holy Ghost
that there would arise adversaries of the grace of God; and did not therefore
declare that God works within us those two very things, even "willing"
and "operating," which this man so determined to be our own, as if they
were in no wise assisted by the help of divine grace.

CHAP. 7 [VI.]--PELAGIUS POSITS GOD'S AID ONLY
FOR OUR "CAPACITY."

Let not Pelagius, however, in this way deceive
incautious and simple persons, or even himself; for after saying," Man
is therefore to be praised for his willing and doing a good work," he added,
as if by way of correcting himself, these words: "Or rather, this praise
belongs to man and to God." It was not, however, that he wished to be understood
as showing any deference to the sound doctrine, that it is "God which worketh
in us both to will and to do," that he thus expressed himself; but it is
clear enough, on his own showing, why he added the latter clause, for he
immediately subjoins: "Who has bestowed on him the 'capacity' for this
very will and work." From his preceding words it is manifest that he places
this capacity in our nature. Lest he should seem, however, to have said
nothing about grace, he added these words: "And who evermore, by the help
of His grace, assists this very capacity,"--" this very capacity," observe;
not "very will," or "very action;" for if he had said so much as this,
he would clearly not be at variance with the teaching of the apostle. But
there are his words: "this very capacity;" meaning that very one of the
three faculties which he had placed in our nature. This God "evermore assists
by the help of His grace." The result, indeed, is, that "the praise does
not belong to man and to God," because man so wills that yet God also inspires
his volition with the ardour of love, or that man so works that God nevertheless
also cooperates with him,--and without His help, what is man ? But he has
associated God in this praise in this wise, that were it not for the nature
which God gave us in our creation wherewith we might be able to exercise
volition and action, we should neither will nor act.

CHAP. 8.--GRACE, ACCORDING TO THE PELAGIANS,
CONSISTS IN THE INTERNAL AND MANIFOLD ILLUMINATION OF THE MIND.

As to this natural capacity which, he allows,
is assisted by the grace of God, it is by no means clear from the passage
either what grace he means, or to what extent he supposes our nature to
be assisted by it. But, as is the case in other passages in which he expresses
himself with more clearness and decision, we may here also perceive that
no other grace is intended by him as helping natural capacity than the
law and the teaching. [VII.] For in one passage he says: "We are supposed
by very ignorant persons to do wrong in this matter to divine grace, because
we say that it by no means perfects sanctity in us without our will,--as
if God could have imposed any command on His grace, without also supplying
the help of His grace to those on whom he imposed His commands, so that
men might more easily accomplish through grace what they are required to
do by their free will." Then, as if he meant to explain what grace he meant,
he immediately went on to add these words: "And this grace we for our part
do not, as you suppose, allow to consist merely in the law, but also in
the help of God." Now who can help wishing that he would show us what grace
it is that he would have us understand? Indeed, we have the strongest reason
for desiring him to tell us what he means by saying that he does not allow
grace merely to consist in the law. Whilst, however, we are in the suspense
of our expectation, observe, I pray you, what he has further to tell us:
"God helps us," says he, "by His teaching and revelation, whilst He opens
the eyes of our heart; whilst He points out to us the future, that we may
not be absorbed in the present; whilst He discovers to us the snares of
the devil; whilst He enlightens us with the manifold and ineffable gift
of heavenly grace." He then concludes his statement with a kind of absolution:
"Does the man," he asks, "who says all this appear to you to be a denier
of grace? Does he not acknowledge both man's free will and God's grace?"
But, after all, he has not got beyond his commendation of the law and of
teaching; assiduously inculcating this as the grace that helps us, and
so following up the idea with which he had started, when he said, "We,
however, allow it to consist in the help of God." God's help, indeed, he
supposed must be recommended to us by manifold lures; by setting forth
teaching and revelation, the opening of the eyes of the heart, the demonstration
of the future, the discovery of the devil's wiles, and the illumination
of our minds by the varied and indescribable gift of heavenly grace,--all
this, of course, with a view to our learning the commandments and promises
of God. And what else is this than placing God's grace in "the law and
the teaching"?

CHAP. 9 [VIII.]--THE LAW ONE THING, GRACE
ANOTHER. THE UTILITY OF THE LAW.

Hence, then, it is clear that he acknowledges
that grace whereby God points out and reveals to us what we are bound to
do; but not that whereby He endows and assists us to act, since the knowledge
of the law, unless it be accompanied by the assistance of grace, rather
avails for producing the transgression of the commandment. "Where there
is no law," says the apostle, "there is no transgression;" and again: "I
had not known lust except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet." Therefore
so far are the law and grace from being the same thing, that the law is
not only unprofitable, but it is absolutely prejudicial, unless grace assists
it; and the utility of the law may be shown by this, that it obliges all
whom it proves guilty of transgression to betake themselves to grace for
deliverance and help to overcome their evil lusts.

For it rather commands than assists; it discovers
disease, but does not heal it; nay, the malady that is not healed is rather
aggravated by it, so that the cure of grace is more earnestly and anxiously
sought for, inasmuch as "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life."
"For if there had been a law given which could have given life, verily
righteousness should have been by the law." To what extent, however, the
law gives assistance, the apostle informs us when he says immediately afterwards:
"The Scripture hath concluded all under sin, that the promise by faith
of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe." Wherefore, says the
apostle, "the law was our schoolmaster in Christ Jesus." Now this very
thing is serviceable to proud men, to be more firmly and manifestly "concluded
under sin," so that none may pre-sumptuously endeavour to accomplish their
justification by means of free will as if by their own resources; but rather
"that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before
God. Because by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified
in His sight: for by the law is the knowledge of sin. But now the righteousness
of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the
prophets." How then manifested without the law, if witnessed by the law?
For this very reason the phrase is not, "manifested without the law," but
"the righteousness without the law," because it is "the righteousness of
God;" that is, the righteousness which we have not from the law, but from
God,--not the righteousness, indeed, which by reason of His commanding
it, causes us fear through our knowledge of it; but rather the righteousness
which by reason of His bestowing it, is held fast and maintained by us
through our loving it,--"so that he that glorieth, let him glory in the
Lord."

CHAP. 10 [IX.]--WHAT PURPOSE THE LAW SUBSERVES.

What object, then, can this man gain by accounting
the law and the teaching to be the grace whereby we are helped to work
righteousness? For, in order that it may help much, it must help us to
feel our need of grace. No man, indeed, is able to fulfil the law through
the law. "Love is the fulfilling of the law." And the love of God is not
shed abroad in our hearts by the law, but by the Holy Ghost, which is given
unto us.8 Grace, therefore, is pointed at by the law, in order that the
law may be fulfilled by grace. Now what does it avail for Pelagius, that
he declares the self-same thing under different phrases, that he may not
be understood to place in law and teaching that grace which, as he avers,
assists the "capacity" of our nature? So far, indeed, as I can conjecture,
the reason why he fears being so understood is, because he condemned all
those who maintain that God's grace and help are not given for a man's
single actions, but exist rather in his freedom, or in the law and teaching.
And yet he supposes that he escapes detection by the shifts he so constantly
employs for disguising what he means by his formula of "law and teaching"
under so many various phrases.

For in another passage, after asserting at
length that it is not by the help of God, but out of our own selves, that
a good will is formed within us, he confronted himself with a question
out of the apostle's epistle; and he asked this question: "How will this
stand consistently with the apostle's words, 'It is God that worketh in
you both to will and to perfect'?" Then, in order to obviate this opposing
authority, which he plainly saw to be most thoroughly contrasted with his
own dogma, he went on at once to add: "He works in us to will what is good,
to will what is holy, when He rouses us from our devotion to earthly desires,
and from our love of the present only, after the manner of brute animals,
by the magnitude of the future glory and the promise of its rewards; when
by revealing wisdom to us He stirs up our sluggish will to a longing after
God; when (what you are not afraid to deny in another passage) he persuades
us to everything which is good." Now what can be plainer, than that by
the grace whereby God works within us to will what is good, he means nothing
else than the law and the teaching? For in the law and the teaching of
the holy Scriptures are promised future glory and its great rewards. To
the teaching also appertains the revelation of wisdom, whilst it is its
further function to direct our thoughts to everything that is good. And
if between teaching and persuading (or rather exhorting) there seems to
be a difference, yet even this is provided for in the general term "teaching,"
which is contained in the several discourses or letters; for the holy Scriptures
both teach and exhort, and in the processes of teaching and exhorting there
is room likewise for man's operation. We, however, on our side would fain
have him sometime confess that grace, by which not only future glory in
all its magnitude is promised, but also is believed in and hoped for; by
which wisdom is not only revealed, but also loved; by which everything
that is good is not only recommended, but pressed upon us until we accept
it. For all men do not possess faith, who hear the Lord in the Scriptures
promising the kingdom of heaven; nor are all men persuaded, who are counselled
to come to Him, who says, "Come unto me, all ye that labour." They, however,
who have faith are the same who are also persuaded to come to Him. This
He Himself set forth most plainly, when He said, "No man can come to me,
except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him." And some verses afterwards,
when speaking of such as believe not, He says, "Therefore said I unto you,
that no man can come unto me except it were given unto him of my Father."
This is the grace which Pelagius ought to acknowledge, if he wishes not
only to be called a Christian, but to be one.

CHAP. 12 [XI.]--THE SAME CONTINUED: "HE REVEALS
WISDOM."

But what shall I say about the revelation
of wisdom? For there is no man who can in the present life very well hope
to attain to the great revelations which were given to the Apostle Paul;
and of course it is impossible to suppose that anything was accustomed
in these revelations to be made known to him but what appertained to wisdom.
Yet for all this he says: "Lest I should be exalted above measure through
the abundance of the revelations, there was given to me a thorn in the
flesh, the messenger of Satan to buffet me. For this thing I besought the
Lord thrice, that He would take it away from me. And He said unto me, My
grace is sufficient for thee; for my strength is made perfect in weakness."
Now, undoubtedly, if there were already in the apostle that perfection
of love which admitted of no further addition, and which could be puffed
up no more, there could have been no further need of the messenger of Satan
to buffet him, and thereby to repress the excessive elation which might
arise from abundance of revelations. What means this elation, however,
but a being puffed up? And of love it has been indeed most truly said,
"Love vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up." This love, therefore, was
still in process of constant increase in the great apostle, day by day,
as long as his "inward man was renewed day by day," and would then be perfected,
no doubt, when he was got beyond the reach of all further vaunting and
elation. But at that time his mind was still in a condition to be inflated
by an abundance of revelations before it was perfected in the solid edifice
of love; for he had not arrived at the goal and apprehended the prize,
to which he was reaching forward in his course.

CHAP. 13 [XII.]--GRACE CAUSES US TO DO.

To him, therefore, who is reluctant to endure
the troublesome process, whereby this vaunting disposition is restrained,
before he attains to the ultimate and highest perfection of charity, it
is most properly said, "My grace is sufficient for thee; for my strength
is made perfect in weakness," --in weakness, that is, not of the flesh
only, as this man supposes, but both of the flesh and of the mind; because
the mind, too, was, in comparison of that last stage of complete perfection,
weak, and to it also was assigned, in order to check its elation, that
messenger of Satan, the thorn in the flesh; although it was very strong,
in contrast with the carnal or animal faculties, which as yet understand
not the things of the Spirit of God. Inasmuch, then, as strength is made
perfect in weakness, whoever does not own himself to be weak, is not in
the way to be perfected. This grace, however, by which strength is perfected
in weakness, conducts all who are predestinated and called according to
the divine purpose to the state of the highest perfection and glory. By
such grace it is effected, not only that we discover what ought to be done,
but also that we do what we have discovered,--not only that we believe
what ought to be loved, but also that we love what we have believed.

CHAP. 14 [XII.]--THE RIGHTEOUSNESS WHICH IS
OF GOD, AND THE RIGHTEOUSNESS WHICH IS OF THE LAW.

If this grace is to be called "teaching,"
let it at any rate be so called in such wise that God may be believed to
infuse it, along with an ineffable sweetness, more deeply and more internally,
not only by their agency who plant and water from without, but likewise
by His own too who ministers in secret His own increase,--in such a way,
that He not only exhibits truth, but likewise imparts love. For it is thus
that God teaches those who have been called according to His purpose, giving
them simultaneously both to know what they ought to do, and to do what
they know. Accordingly, the apostle thus speaks to the Thessalonians: "As
touching love of the brethren, ye need not that I write unto you; for ye
yourselves are taught of God to love one another." And then, by way of
proving that they had been taught of God, he subjoined: "And indeed ye
do it towards all the brethren which are in all Macedonia." As if the surest
sign that you have been taught of God, is that you put into practice what
you have been taught. Of that character are all who are called according
to God's purpose, as it is written in the prophets: "They shall be all
taught of God." The man, however, who has learned what ought to be done,
but does it not, has not as yet been "taught of God" according to grace,
but only according to the law,--not according to the spirit, but only according
to the letter. Although there are many who appear to do what the law commands,
through fear of punishment, not through love of righteousness; and such
righteousness as this the apostle calls "his own which is after the law,"--a
thing as it were commanded, not given. When, indeed, it has been given,
it is not called our own righteousness, but God's; because it becomes our
own only so that we have it from God. These are the apostle's words: "That
I may be found in Him, not having mine own righteousness which is of the
law, but that which is through the faith of Christ the righteousness which
is of God by faith." So great, then, is the difference between the law
and grace, that although the law is undoubtedly of God, yet the righteousness
which is "of the law" is not "of God," but the righteousness which is consummated
by grace is "of God." The one is designated "the righteousness of the law,"
because it is done through fear of the curse of the law; while the other
is called "the righteousness of God," because it is bestowed through the
beneficence of His grace, so that it is not a terrible but a pleasant commandment,
according to the prayer in the psalm: "Good art Thou, O Lord, therefore
in Thy goodness teach me Thy righteousness; " that is, that I may not be
compelled like a slave to live under the law with fear of punishment; but
rather in the freedom of love may be delighted to live with law as my companion.
When the freeman keeps a commandment, he does it readily. And whosoever
learns his duty in this spirit, does everything that he has learned ought
to be done.

CHAP. 15 [XIV.]--HE WHO HAS BEEN TAUGHT BY
GRACE ACTUALLY COMES TO CHRIST.

Now as touching this kind of teaching, the
Lord also says: "Every man that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father,
cometh unto me." Of the man, therefore, who has not come, it cannot be
correctly said: "Has heard and has learned that it is his duty to come
to Him, but he is not willing to do what he has learned." It is indeed
absolutely improper to apply such a statement to that method of teaching,
whereby God teaches by grace. For if, as the Truth says, "Everyman that
hath learned cometh," it follows, of course, that whoever does not come
has not learned. But who can fail to see that a man's coming or not coming
is by the determination of his will? This determination, however, may stand
alone, if the man does not come; but if he does come, it cannot be without
assistance; and such assistance, that he not only knows what it is he ought
to do, but also actually does what he thus knows. And thus, when God teaches,
it is not by the letter of the law, but by the grace of the Spirit. Moreover,
He so teaches, that whatever a man learns, he not only sees with his perception,
but also desires with his choice, and accomplishes in action. By this mode,
therefore, of divine instruction, volition itself, and performance itself,
are assisted, and not merely the natural "capacity" of willing and performing.
For if nothing but this "capacity" of ours were assisted by this grace,
the Lord would rather have said, "Every man that hath heard and hath learned
of the Father may possibly come unto me." This, however, is not what He
said; but His words are these: "Every man that hath heard and hath learned
of the Father cometh unto me." Now the possibility coming Pelagius places
in nature, or even--as we found him attempting to say some time ago --in
grace (whatever that may mean according to him),--when he says, "whereby
this very capacity is assisted;" whereas the actual coming lies in the
will and act. It does not, however, follow that he who may come actually
comes, unless he has also willed and acted for the coming. But every one
who has learned of the Father not only has the possibility of coming, but
comes; and in this result are already included the motion of the capacity,
the affection of the will, and the effect of the action.6

CHAP. 16 [XV.]--WE NEED DIVINE AID IN THE
USE OF OUR POWERS. ILLUSTRATION FROM SIGHT.

Now what is the use of his examples, if they
do not really accomplish his own promise of making his meaning clearer
to us; not, indeed, that we are bound to admit their sense, but that we
may discover more plainly add openly what is his drift and purpose in using
them? "That we are able," says he, "to see with our eyes is not of us;
but it is of us that we make a good or a bad use of our sight." Well, there
is an answer for him in the psalm, in which the psalmist says to God, "Turn
Thou away mine eyes, that they behold not iniquity." Now although this
was said of the eyes of the mind, it still follows from it, that in respect
of our bodily eyes there is either a good use or a bad use that may be
made of them: not in the literal sense merely of a good sight when the
eyes are sound, and a bad sight when they are bleared, but in themoral sense of a right sight when it is directed
towards succouring the helpless, or a bad sight when its object is the
indulgence of lust. For although both the pauper who is succoured, and
the woman who is lusted after, are seen by these external eyes; it is after
all from the inner eyes that either compassion in the one case or lust
in the other proceeds. How then is it that the prayer is offered to God,
"Turn Thou away mine eyes, that they behold not iniquity "? Or why is that
asked for which lies within our own power, if it be true that God does
not assist the will?

CHAP. 17 [XVI.]--DOES PELAGIUS DESIGNEDLY
REFRAIN FROM OPENLY SAYING THAT ALL GOOD ACTION IS FROM GOD?

"That we are able to speak," says he, "is
of God; but that we make a good or a bad use of speech is of ourselves."
He, however, who has made the most excellent use of speech does not teach
us so. "For," says He, "it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your
Father that speaketh in you." "So, again," adds Pelagius, "that I may,
by applying a general case in illustration, embrace all,--that we are able
to do, say, think, any good thing, comes from Him who has endowed us with
this ability, and who also assists it." Observe how even here he repeats
his former meaning --that of these three, capacity, volition, action, it
is only the capacity which receives help. Then, by way of completely stating
what he intends to say, he adds: "But that we really do a good thing, or
speak a good word, or think a good thought, proceeds from our own selves."
He forgot what he had before said by way of correcting, as it were, his
own words; for after saying, "Man is to be praised therefore for his willing
and doing a goOd work," he at once goes on to modify his statement thus:
"Or rather, this praise belongs both to man, and to God who has given him
the capacity of this very will and work." Now what is the reason why he
did not remember this admission when giving his examples, so as to say
this much at least after quoting them: "That we are able to do, say, think
any good thing, comes from Him who has given us this ability, and who also
assists it. That, however, we really do a good thing, or speak a good word,
or think a good thought, proceeds both from ourselves and from Him!" This,
however, he has not said. But, if I am not mistaken, I think I see why
he was afraid to do so.

CHAP. 18 [XVII.]--HE DISCOVERS THE REASON
OF PELAGIUS' HESITATION SO TO SAY.

For, when wishing to point out why this lies
within our own competency, he says: "Because we are able to turn all these
actions into evil." This, then, was the reason why he was afraid to admit
that such an action proceeds "both from ourselves and from God," lest it
should be objected to him in reply: "If the fact of our doing, speaking,
thinking anything good, is owing both to ourselves and to God, because
He has endowed us with this ability, then it follows that our doing, thinking,
speaking evil things, is due to ourselves and to God, because He has here
also endowed us with ability of indifferency; the conclusion from this
being--and God forbid that we should admit any such--that just as God is
associated with ourselves in the praise of good actions, so must He share
with us the blame of evil actions." For that "capacity" with which He has
endowed us makes us capable alike of good actions and of evil ones.

CHAP. 19 [XVIII.]--THE TWO ROOTS OF ACTION,
LOVE AND CUPIDITY; AND EACH BRINGS FORTH ITS OWN FRUIT.

Concerning this "capacity," Pelagius thus
writes in the first book of his Defence of Free Will: "Now," says he, "we
have implanted in us by God a capacity for either part. It resembles, as
I may say, a fruitful and fecund root which yields and produces diversely
according to the will of man, and which is capable, at the planter's own
choice, of either shedding a beautiful bloom of virtues, or of bristling
with the thorny thickets of vices." Scarcely heeding what he says, he here
makes one and the same root productive both of good and evil fruits, in
opposition to gospel truth and apostolic teaching. For the Lord declares
that "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt
tree bring forth good fruit;" and when the Apostle Paul says that covetousness
is "the root of all evils," he intimates to us, of course, that love may
be regarded as the root of all good things. On the supposition, therefore,
that two trees, one good and the other corrupt, represent two human beings,
a good one and a bad, what else is the good man except one with a good
will, that is, a tree with a good root? And what is the bad man except
one with a bad will, that is, a tree with a bad root? The fruits which
spring from such roots and trees are deeds, are words, are thoughts, which
proceed, when good, from a good will, and when evil, from an evil one.

CHAP. 20 [XIX.]--HOW A MAN MAKES A GOOD OR
A BAD TREE.

Now a man makes a good tree when he receives
the grace of God. For it is not by himself that he makes himself good instead
of evil; but it is of Him, and through Him, and in Him who is always good.
And in order that he may not only be a good tree, but also bear good fruit,
it is necessary for him to be assisted by the self-same grace, without
which he can do nothing good. For God Himself cooperates in the production
of fruit in good trees, when He both externally waters and tends them by
the agency of His servants, and internally by Himself also gives the increase.1
A man, however, makes a corrupt tree when he makes himself corrupt, when
he falls away from Him who is the unchanging good; for such a declension
from Him is the origin of an evil will. Now this decline does not initiate
some other corrupt nature, but it corrupts that which has been already
created good. When this corruption, however, has been healed, no evil remains;
for although nature no doubt had received an injury, yet nature was not
itself a blemish.2

CHAP. 21 [XX.]--LOVE THE ROOT OF ALL GOOD
THINGS; CUPIDITY, OF ALL EVIL ONES.

The "capacity," then, of which we speak is
not (as he supposes) the one identical root both of good things and evil.
For the love which is the root of good things is quite different from the
cupidity which is the root of evil things--as different, indeed, as virtue
is from vice. But without doubt this "capacity" is capable of either root:
because a man is not only able to possess love, whereby the tree becomes
a good one; but he is likewise able to have cupidity, which makes the tree
evil. This human cupidity, however, which is a vice, has for its author
man, or man's deceiver, but not man's Creator. It is indeed that "lust
of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, which is
not of the Father, but is of the world."3 And who can be ignorant of the
usage of the Scripture, which under the designation of "the world" is accustomed
to describe those who inhabit the world ?

CHAP. 22 [XXI.]--LOVE IS A GOOD WILL.

That love, however, which is a virtue, comes
to us from God, not from ourselves, according to the testimony of Scripture,
which says: "Love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God,
and knoweth God: for God is love." It is on the principle of this love
that one can best understand the passage, "Whosoever is born of God doth
not commit sin; " as well as the sentence, "And he cannot sin." Because
the love according to which we are born of God "doth not behave itself
unseemly," and "thinketh no evil." Therefore, whenever a man sins, it is
not according to love: but it is according to cupidity that he commits
sin; and following such a disposition, he is not born of God. Because,
as it has been already stated, "the capacity" of which we speak is capable
of either root. When, therefore, the Scripture says, "Love is of God,"
or still more pointedly, "God is love;" when the Apostle John so very emphatically
exclaims, "Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us,
that we should be called, and be, the sons of God !" with what face can
this writer, on hearing that "God is love," persist in maintaining his
opinion, that we bare of God one only of those three, namely, "the capacity;"
whereas it is of ourselves that we have "the good will" and "the good action?"
As if, indeed, this good will were a different thing from that love which
the Scripture so loudly proclaims to have come to us from God, and to have
been given to us by the Father, that we might become His children.

CHAP. 23 [XXII.]--PELAGIUS' DOUBLE DEALING
CONCERNING THE GROUND OF THE CONFERRENCE OF GRACE.

Perhaps, however, our own antecedent merits
caused this gift to be bestowed upon us; as this writer has already suggested
in reference to God's grace, in that work which he addressed to a holy
virgin,10 whom he mentions in the letter sent by him to Rome. For, after
adducing the testimony of the Apostle James, in which he says, "Submit
yourselves unto God; but resist the devil, and be will flee from you,"
he goes on to say: "He shows us how we ought to resist the devil, if we
submit ourselves indeed to God and by doing His will merit His divine grace,
and by the help of the Holy Ghost more easily withstand the evil spirit."
Judge, then, how sincere was his condemnation in the Palestine Synod of
those persons who say that God's grace is conferred on us according to
our merits! Have we any doubt as to his still holding this opinion, and
most openly proclaiming it? Well, how could that confession of his before
the bishops have been true and real? Had he already written the book in
which he most explicitly alleges that grace is bestowed on us according
to our deserts--the very position which he without any reservation condemned
at that Synod in the East? Let him frankly acknowledge that he once held
the opinion, but that he holds it no longer; so should we most frankly
rejoice in his improvement. As it is, however, when, besides other objections,
this one was laid to his charge which we are now discussing, he said in
reply: "Whether these are the opinions of Coelestius or not, is the concern
of those who affirm that they are. For my own part, indeed, I never entertained
such views; on the contrary, I anathematize every one who does entertain
them." But how could he "never have entertained such views," when he had
already composed this work? Or how does he still "anathematize everybody
who entertains these views," if he afterwards composed this work?

CHAP. 24.--PELAGIUS PLACES FREE WILL AT THE
BASIS OF ALL TURNING TO GOD FOR GRACE.

But perhaps he may meet us with this rejoinder,
that in the sentence before us he spoke of our "meriting the divine grace
by doing the will of God," in the sense that grace is added to those who
believe anti lead godly lives, whereby they may boldly withstand the tempter;
whereas their very first reception of grace was, that they might do the
will of God. Lest, then, he make such a rejoinder, consider, some other
words of his on this subject: "The man," says he, "who hastens to the Lord,
and desires to be directed by Him, that is, who makes his own will depend
upon God's, who moreover cleaves so closely to the Lord as to become (as
the apostle says) 'one spirit' with Him, does all this by nothing else
than by his freedom of will." Observe how great a result he has here stated
to be accomplished only by our freedom of will; and how, in fact, he supposes
us to cleave to God without the help of God: for such is the force of his
words, "by nothing else than by his own freedom of will." So that, after
we have cleaved to the Lord without His help, we even then, because of
such adhesion of our own, deserve to be assisted. [XXIII.] For he goes
on to say: "Whosoever makes a right use of this" (that is, rightly uses
his freedom of will), "does so entirely surrender himself to God, and does
so completely mortify his own will, that he is able to say with the apostle,
'Nevertheless it is already of I that live, but Christ liveth in me;' and
'He placeth his heart in the hand of God, so that He turneth it whithersoever
He willeth.'" Great indeed is the help of the grace of God, so that He
turns our heart in whatever direction He pleases. But according to this
writer's foolish opinion, however great the help may be, we deserve it
all at the moment when, without any assistance beyond the liberty of our
will, we hasten to the Lord, desire His guidance and direction, suspend
our own will entirely on His, and by close adherence to Him become one
spirit with Him. Now all these vast courses of goodness we (according to
him) accomplish, forsooth, simply by the freedom of our own free will;
and by reason of such antecedent merits we so secure His grace, that He
turns our heart which way soever He pleases. Well, now, how is that grace
which is not gratuitously conferred? How can it be grace, if it is given
in payment of a debt? How can that be true which the apostle says, "It
is not of yourselves, but it is the gift of God; not of works, lest any
man should boast;" and again, "If it is of grace, then is it no more of
works, otherwise grace is no more grace:''6 how, I repeat, can this be
true, if such meritorious works precede as to procure for us the bestowal
of grace? Surely, under the circumstances, there can be no gratuitous gift,
but only the recompense of a due reward. Is it the case, then, that in
order to find their way to the help of God, men run to God without God's
help? And in order that we may receive God's help while cleaving to Him,
do we without His help cleave to God? What greater gift, or even what similar
gift, could grace itself bestow upon any man, if he has already without
grace been able to make himself one spirit with the Lord by no other power
than that of his own free will?

CHAP. 25 [XXIV.]--GOD BY HIS WONDERFUL POWER
WORKS IN OUR HEARTS GOOD DISPOSITIONS OF OUR WILL.

Now I want him to tell us whether that king
of Assyria, whose holy wife Esther "abhorred his bed," whilst sitting upon
the throne of his kingdom, and clothed in all his glorious apparel, adorned
all over with gold and precious stones, and dreadful in his majesty when
he raised his face, which was inflamed with anger, in the midst of his
splendour, and beheld her, with the glare of a wild bull in the fierceness
of his indignation; and the queen was afraid, and her colour changed as
she fainted, and she bowed herself upon the head of the maid that went
before her; --I want him to tell us whether this king had yet "hastened
to the Lord, and had desired to be directed by Him, and had subordinated
his own will to His, and had, by cleaving fast to God, become one spirit
with Him, simply by the force of his own free will." Had he surrendered
himself wholly to God, and entirely mortified his own will, and placed
his heart in the hand of God? I suppose that anybody who should think this
of the king, in the state he was then in, would be not foolish only, but
even mad. And yet God converted him, and turned his indignation into gentleness.
Who, however, can fail to see how much greater a task it is to change and
turn wrath completely into gentleness, than to bend the heart to something,
when it is not preoccupied with either affection, but is indifferently
poised between the two? Let them therefore read and understand, observe
and acknowledge, that it is not by law and teaching uttering their lessons
from without, but by a secret, wonderful, and ineffable power operating
within, that God works in men's hearts not only revelations of the truth,
but also good dispositions of the will.

CHAP. 26 [XXV.]--THE PELAGIAN GRACE OF "CAPACITY"
EXPLODED. THE SCRIPTURE TEACHES THE NEED OF GOD'S HELP IN DOING, SPEAKING,
AND THINKING, ALIKE.

Let Pelagius, therefore, cease at last to
deceive both himself and others by his disputations against the grace of
God. It is not on account of only one of these three --that is to say,
of the "capacity" of a good will and work--that the grace of God towards
us ought to be proclaimed; but also on account of the good "will" and "work"
themselves. This "capacity," indeed, according to his definition, avails
for both directions; and yet our sins must not also be attributed to God
in consequence, as our good actions, according to his view, are attributed
to Him owing to the same capacity. It is not only, therefore, on this account
that the help of God's grace is maintained, because it assists our natural
capacity. He must cease to say, "That we are able to do, say, think any
good, is from Him who has given us this ability, and who also assists this
ability; whereas that we really do a good thing, or speak a good word,
or think a good thought, proceeds from our own selves." He must, I repeat,
cease to say this. For God has not only given us the ability and aids it,
but He further works in us "to will and to do." It is not because we do,
not will, or do not do, that we will and do nothing good, but because we
are without His help. How can he say, "That we are able to do good is of
God, but that we actually do it is of ourselves," when the apostle tells
us that he "prays to God" in behalf of those to whom he was writing, "that
they should do no evil, but that they should do that which is good?" His
words are not, "We pray that ye be able to do nothing evil;" but, "that
ye do no evil." Neither does he say, "that ye be able to do good;" but,
"that ye do good." Forasmuch as it is written, "As many as are led by the
Spirit of God, they are the sons of God," it follows that, in order that
they may do that which is good, they must be led by Him who is good. How
can Pelagius say, "That we are able to make a good use of speech comes
from God; but that we do actually make this good use of speech proceeds
from ourselves," when the Lord declares, "It is the Spirit of your Father
which speaketh in you"? He does not say, "It is not you who have given
to yourselves the power of speaking well;" but His words are," It is not
ye that speak." Nor does He say, "It is the Spirit of your Father which
giveth, or hath given, you the power to speak well;" but He says, "which
speaketh in you." He does not allude to the motion of "the capacity," but
He asserts the effect of the cooperation. How can this arrogant asserter
of free will say, "That we are able to think a good thought comes from
God, but that we actually think a gOod thought proceeds from ourselves"?
He has his answer from the humble preacher of grace, who says, "Not that
we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves, but our
sufficiency is of God." Observe he does not say, "to be able to think anything;"
but, "to think anything."

Now even Pelagius should frankly confess that
this grace is plainly set forth in the inspired Scriptures; nor should
he with shameless effrontery hide the fact that he has too long opposed
it, but admit it with salutary regret; so that the holy Church may cease
to be harassed by his stubborn persistence, and rather rejoice in his sincere
conversion. Let him distinguish between knowledge and love, as they ought
to be distinguished; because "knowledge puffeth up, but love edifieth."
And then knowledge no longer puffeth up when love builds up. And inasmuch
as each is the gift of God (although one is less, and the other greater),
he must not extol our righteousness above the praise which is due to Him
who justifies us, in such a way as to assign to the lesser of these two
gifts the help of divine grace, and to claim the greater one for the human
will. And should he consent that we receive love from the grace of God,
he must not suppose that any merits of our own preceded our reception of
the gift. For what merits could we possibly have had at the time when we
loved not God? In order, indeed, that we might receive that love whereby
we might love, we were loved while as yet we had no love ourselves. This
the Apostle John most expressly declares: "Not that we loved God," says
he, "but that He loved us;" and again, "We love Him, because He first loved
us." 10 Most excellently and truly spoken! For we could not have wherewithal
to love Him, unless we received it from Him in His first loving us.

And what good could we possibly do if we possessed
no love? Or how could we help doing good if we have love? For although
God's commandment appears sometimes to be kept by those who do not love
Him, but only fear Him; yet where there is no love, no good work is imputed,
nor is there any good work, rightly so called; because "whatsoever is not
of faith is sin," and "faith worketh by love." Hence also that grace of
God, whereby "His love is shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Ghost,
which is given unto us," must be so confessed by the man who would make
a true confession, as to show his undoubting belief that nothing whatever
in the way of goodness pertaining to godliness and real holiness can be
accomplished without it. Not after the fashion of him who clearly enough
shows us what he thinks of it when he says, that "grace is bestowed in
order that what God commands may be the more easily fulfilled;" which of
course means, that even without grace God's commandments may, although
less easily, yet actually, be accomplished.

CHAP. 28 [XXVII.]--PELAGIUS TEACHES THAT SATAN
MAY BE RESISTED WITHOUT THE HELP OF THE GRACE OF GOD.

In the book which he addressed to a certain
holy virgin, there is a passage which I have already mentioned, wherein
he plainly indicates what he holds on this subject; for he speaks of our
"deserving the grace of God, and by the help of the Holy Ghost more easily
resisting the evil spirit." Now why did he insert the phrase "more easily"?
Was not the sense already complete: "And by the help of the Holy Ghost
resisting the evil spirit"? But who can fail to perceive what an injury
he has done by this insertion? He wants it, of course, to be supposed,
that so great are the powers of our nature, which he is in such a hurry
to exalt, that even without the assistance of the Holy Ghost the evil spirit
can be resisted--less easily it may be, but still in a certain measure.

CHAP. 29 [XXVIII.]--WHEN HE SPEAKS OF GOD'S
HELP, HE MEANS IT ONLY TO HELP US DO WHAT WITHOUT IT WE STILL COULD DO.

Again, in the first book of his Defence of
the Freedom of the Will, he says: "But while we have within us a free will
so strong and so sted-fast against sinning, which our Maker has implanted
in human nature generally, still, by His unspeakable goodness, we are further
defended by His own daily help." What need is there of such help, if free
will is so strong and so stedfast against sinning? But here, as before,
he would have it understood that the purpose of the alleged assistance
is, that may be more easily accomplished by grace which he nevertheless
supposes may be effected, less easily, no doubt, but yet actually, without
grace.

CHAP. 30 [XXIX.] --WHAT PELAGIUS THINKS IS
NEEDFUL FOR EASE OF PERFORMANCE IS REALLY NECESSARY FOR THE PERFORMANCE.

In like manner, in another passage of the
same book, he says: "In order that men may more easily accomplish by grace
that which they are commanded to do by free will." Now, expunge the phrase
"more easily," and you leave not only a full, but also a sound sense, if
it be regarded as meaning simply this: "That men may accomplish through
grace what they are commanded to do by free will." The addition of the
words "more easily," however, tacitly suggests the possibility of accomplishing
good works even without the grace of God. But such a meaning is disallowed
by Him who says, "Without me ye can do nothing."

Let him amend all this, that if human infirmity
has erred in subjects so profound, he may not add to the error diabolical
deception and wilfulness, either by denying what he has really believed,
or by maintaining what he has rashly believed, after he has once discovered,
on recollecting the light of truth, that he ought never to have so believed.
As for that grace, indeed, by which we are justified,--in other words,
whereby "the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost,
which is given unto us," --I have nowhere, in those writings of Pelagius
and Coelestius which I have had the opportunity of reading, found them
acknowledging it as it ought to be acknowledged. In no passage at all have
I observed them recognising "the children of the promise," concerning whom
the apostle thus speaks: "They which are children of the flesh, these are
not the children of God; but the children of the promise are counted for
the seed."6 For that which God promises we do not ourselves bring about
by our own choice or natural power, but He Himself effects it by grace.

CHAP. 32.--WHY THE PELAGIANS DEEMED PRAYERS
TO BE NECESSARY. THE LETTER WHICH PELAGIUS DESPATCHED TO POPE INNOCENT
WITH AN EXPOSITION OF HIS BELIEF.

Now I will say nothing at present about the
works of Coelestius, or those tracts of his which he produced in those
ecclesiastical proceedings, copies of the whole of which we have taken
care to send to you, along with another letter which we deemed it necessary
to add. If you carefully examine all these documents, you will observe
that he does not posit the grace of God, which helps us whether to avoid
evil or to do good, beyond the natural choice of the will, but only in
the law and teaching. Thus he even asserts that their very prayers are
necessary for the purpose of showing men what to desire and love. All these
documents, however, I may omit further notice of at present; for Pelagius
himself has lately forwarded to Rome both a letter and an exposition of
his belief, addressing it to Pope Innocent, of blessed memory, of whose
death he was ignorant. Now in this letter he says that "there are certain
subjects about which some men are trying to vilify him. One of these is,
that he refuses to infants the sacrament of baptism, and promises the kingdom
of heaven to some, independently of Christ's redemption. Another of them
is, that he so speaks of man's ability to avoid sin as to exclude God's
help, and so strongly confides in free will that he repudiates the help
of divine grace." Now, as touching the perverted opinion he holds about
the baptism of infants (although he allows that it ought to be administered
to them), in opposition to the Christian faith and catholic truth, this
is not the place for us to enter on an accurate discussion, for we must
now complete our treatise on the assistance of grace, Which is the subject
we undertook Let us see what answer he makes out of this very letter to
the objection which he has proposed concerning this matter. Omitting his
invidious complaints about his opponents, we approach the subject before
us; and find him expressing himself as follows.

CHAP. 33 [XXXI.]--PELAGIUS PROFESSES NOTHING
ON THE SUBJECT OF GRACE WHICH MAY NOT BE UNDERSTOOD OF THE LAW AND TEACHING.

"See," he says, "how this epistle will clear
me before your Blessedness; for in it we clearly and simply declare, that
we possess a free will which is unimpaired for sinning and for not sinning;
and this free will is in all good works always assisted by divine help."
Now you perceive, by the understanding which the Lord has given you, that
these words of his are inadequate to solve the question. For it is still
open to us to inquire what the help is by which he would say that the free
will is assisted; lest perchance he should, as is usual with him, maintain
that law and teaching are meant. If, indeed, you were to ask him why he
used the word" always," he might answer: Because it is written, And in
His law will he meditate day and night." Then, after interposing a statement
about the condition of man, and his natural capacity for sinning and not
sinning, he added the following words: "Now this power of free will we
declare to reside generally in all alike--in Christians, in Jews, and in
Gentiles. In all men free will exists equally by nature, but in Christians
alone is it assisted by grace." We again ask: "By what grace?" And again
he might answer: "By the law and the Christian teaching."

CHAP. 34.--PELAGIUS SAYS THAT GRACE IS GIVEN
ACCORDING TO MEN'S MERITS. THE BEGINNING, HOWEVER, OF MERIT IS FAITH; AND
THIS IS A GRATUITOUS GIFT, NOT A RECOMPENSE FOR OUR MERITS.

Then, again, whatever it is which he means
by " grace," he says is given even to Christians according to their merits,
although (as I have already mentioned above ), when he was in Palestine,
in his very remarkable vindication of himself, he condemned those who hold
this opinion. Now these are his words: "In the one," says he, "the good
of their created condition is naked and defenceless;" meaning in those
who are not Christians. Then adding the rest: "In these, however, who belong
to Christ, there is defence afforded by Christ's help." You see it is still
uncertain what the help is, according to the remark we have already made
on the same subject. He goes on, however, to say of those who are not Christians:
"Those deserve judgment and condemnation, because, although they possess
free will whereby they could come to have faith and deserve God's grace,
they make a bad use of the freedom which has been granted to them. But
these deserve to be rewarded, who by the right use of free will merit the
Lord's grace, and keep His commandments." Now it is clear that he says
grace is bestowed according to merit, whatever and of what kind soever
the grace is which he means, but which he does not plainly declare. For
when he speaks of those persons as deserving reward who make a good use
of their free will, and as therefore meriting the Lord's grace, he asserts
in fact that a debt is paid to them. What, then, becomes of the apostle's
saying, "Being justified freely by His grace "? And what of his other statement
too, "By grace are ye saved"? --where, that he might prevent men's supposing
that it is by works, he expressly added, "by faith." And yet further, lest
it should be imagined that faith itself is to be attributed to men independently
of the grace of God, the apostle says: "And that not of yourselves; for
it is the gift of God." It follows, therefore, that we receive, without
any merit of our own, that from which everything which, according to them,
we obtain because of our merit, has its beginning--that is, faith itself.
If, however, they insist on denying that this is freely given to us, what
is the meaning of the apostle's words: "According as God hath dealt to
every man the measure of faith"? But if it is contended that faith is so
bestowed as to be a recompense for merit, not a free gift, what then becomes
of another saying of the apostle: "Unto you it is given in the behalf of
Christ, not only to believe in Him, but also to suffer for His sake"? Each
is by the apostle's testimony made a gift,--both that he believes in Christ,
and that each suffers for His sake. These men however, attribute faith
to free will in such a way as to make it appear that grace is rendered
to faith not as a gratuitous gift, but as a debt--thus ceasing to be grace
any longer, because that is not grace which is not gratuitous.

CHAP. 35 [XXXII.]--PELAGIUS BELIEVES THAT
INFANTS HAVE NO SIN TO BE REMITTED IN BAPTISM.

But Pelagius would have the reader pass from
this letter to the book which states his belief. This he has made mention
of to yourselves, and in it he has discoursed a good deal on points about
which no question was raised as to his views. Let us, however, look simply
at the subjects about which our own controversy with them is concerned.
Having, then terminated a discussion which he had conducted to his heart's
content,--from the Unity of the Trinity to the resurrection of the flesh,
on which nobody was questioning him,--he goes on to say: "We hold likewise
one baptism, which we aver ought to be administered to infants in the same
sacramental formula as it is to adults." Well, now, you have yourselves
affirmed that you heard him admit at least as much as this in your presence.
What, however, is the use of his saying that the sacrament of baptism is
administered to children "in the same words as it is to adults," when our
inquiry concerns the thing, not merely the words? It is a more important
matter, that (as you write) with his own mouth he replied to your own question,
that "infants receive baptism for the remission of sins." For he did not
say here, too, "in words of remission of sins," but he acknowledged that
they are baptized for the remission itself; and yet for all this, if you
were to ask him what the sin is which he supposes to be remitted to them,
he would contend that they had none whatever.

CHAP. 36 [XXXIII.]--COELESTIUS OPENLY DECLARES
INFANTS TO HAVE NO ORIGINAL SIN.

Who would believe that, under so clear a confession,
there is concealed a contrary meaning, if Coelestius had not exposed it?
He who in that book of his, which he quoted at Rome in the ecclesiastical
proceedings there, distinctly acknowledged that "infants too are baptized
for the remission of sins," also denied "that they have any original sin."
But let us now observe what Pelagius thought, not about the baptism of
infants, but rather about the assistance of divine grace, in this exposition
of his belief which he forwarded to Rome. "We confess," says he, "free
will in such a sense that we declare ourselves to be always in need of
the help of God." Well, now, we ask again, what the help is which he says
we require; and again we find ambiguity, since he may possibly answer that
he meant the law and the teaching of Christ, whereby that natural "capacity"
is assisted. We, however, on our side require them to acknowledge a grace
like that which the apostle describes, when he says: "For God hath not
given us the spirit of fear; but of power, and of love, and of a sound
mind;" although it does not follow by any means that the man who has the
gift of knowledge, whereby he has discovered what he ought to do, has also
the grace of love so as to do it.

CHAP. 37 [XXXIV.]--PELAGIUS NOWHERE ADMITS
THE NEED OF DIVINE HELP FOR WILL AND ACTION.

I also have read those books or writings of
his which he mentions in the letter which he sent to Pope Innocent, of
blessed memory, with the exception of a brief epistle which he says he
sent to the holy Bishop Constantius; but I have nowhere been able to find
in them that he acknowledges such a grace as helps not only that "natural
capacity of willing and acting" (which according to him we possess, even
when we neither will a good thing nor do it), but also the will and the
action itself, by the ministration of the Holy Ghost.

CHAP. 38 [XXXV.]--A DEFINITION OF THE GRACE
OF CHRIST BY PELAGIUS.

"Let them read," says he, "the epistle which
we wrote about twelve years ago to that holy man Bishop Paulinus: its subject
throughout in some three hundred lines is the confession of God's grace
and assistance alone, and our own inability to do any good thing at all
without God." Well, I have read this epistle also, and found him dwelling
throughout it on scarcely any other topic than the faculty and capacity
of nature, whilst he makes God's grace consist almost entirely. in this.
Christ's grace, indeed, he treats with great brevity, simply mentioning
its name, so that his only aim seems to have been to avoid the scandal
of ignoring it altogether. It is, however, absolutely uncertain whether
he means Christ's grace to consist in the remission of sins, or even in
the teaching of Christ, including also the example of His life (a meaning
which he asserts in several passages of his treatises); or whether he believes
it to be a help towards good living, in addition to nature and teaching,
through the inspiring influence of a burning and shining love.

CHAP. 39 [XXXVI]--A LETTER OF PELAGIUS UNKNOWN
TO AUGUSTIN.

"Let them also read," says he, "my epistle
to the holy Bishop Constantius, wherein I have--briefly no doubt, but yet
plainly--conjoined the grace and help of God with man's free will." This
epistle, as I have already stated, I have not read; but if it is not unlike
the other writings which he mentions, and with which I am acquainted, even
this work does nothing for the subject of our present inquiry.

CHAP. 40 [XXXVII--THE HELP OF GRACE PLACED
BY PELAGIUS IN THE MERE REVELATION OF TEACHING.

"Let them read moreover" says he, "what I
wrote, when I was in the East, to Christ's holy virgin Demetrias, and they
will find that we so commend the nature of man as always to add the help
of God's grace." Well, I read this letter too; and it had almost persuaded
me that he did acknowledge therein the grace about which our discussion
is concerned, although he did certainly seem in many passages of this work
to contradict himself. But when there also came to my hands those other
treatises which he afterwards wrote for more extensive circulation, I discovered
in what sense he must have intended to speak of grace,--concealing what
he believed under an ambiguous generality, but employing the term "grace"
in order to break the force of obloquy, and to avoid giving offence. For
at the very commencement of this work (where he says: "Let us apply ourselves
with all earnestness to the task which we have set before us, nor let us
have any misgiving because of our own humble ability; for we believe that
we are assisted by the mother's faith and her daughter's merit" ) he appeared
to me at first to acknowledge the grace which helps us to individual action;
nor did I notice at once the fact that he might possibly have made this
grace consist simply in the revelation of teaching.

CHAP. 41.--RESTORATION OF NATURE UNDERSTOOD
BY PELAGIUS AS FORGIVENESS OF SINS.

In this same work he says in another passage:
"Now, if even without God men show of what character they have been made
by God, see what Christians have it in their power to do, whose nature
has been through Christ restored to a better condition, anti who are, moreover,
assisted by the help of divine grace." By this restoration of nature to
a better state he would have us understand the remission of sins. This
he has shown with sufficient clearness in another passage of this epistle,
where he says: "Even those who have become in a certain sense obdurate
through their long practice of sinning, can be restored through repentance."
But he may even here too make the assistance of divine grace consist in
the revelation of teaching.

CHAP. 42 [XXXVIII.]--GRACE PLACED BY PELAGIUS
IN THE REMISSION OF SINS AND THE EXAMPLE OF CHRIST.

Likewise in another place in this epistle
of his he says: "Now, if even before the law, as we have already remarked,
and long previous to the coming of our Lord and Saviour, some men are related
to have lived righteous and holy lives; how much more worthy of belief
is it that we are capable of doing this since the illumination of His coming,
who have been restored by the grace of Christ, and born again into a better
man? How much better than they, who lived before the law, ought we to be,
who have been reconciled and cleansed by His blood, and by His example
encouraged to the perfection of righteousness!" Observe how even here,
although in different language, he has made the assistance of grace to
consist in the remission of sins and the example of Christ. He then completes
the passage by adding these words: "Better than they were even who lived
trader the law; according to the apostle, who says, 'Sin shall not have
dominion over you: for ye are not under the law, but under grace.' Now,
inasmuch as we have," says he, "said enough, as I suppose, on this point,
let us describe a perfect virgin, who shall testify the good at once of
nature and of grace by the holiness of her conduct, evermore warmed with
the virtues of both." Now you ought to notice that in these words also
he wished to conclude what he was saying in such a way that we might understand
the good of nature to be that which we received when we were created; but
the good of grace to be that which we receive when we regard and follow
the example of Christ,--as if sin were not permitted to those who were
or are under the law, on this account, because they either had not Christ's
example, or else do not believe in Him.

CHAP. 43 [XXXIX.]--THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS
AND EXAMPLE OF CHRIST HELD BY PELAGIUS ENOUGH TO SAVE THE MOST HARDENED
SINNER.

That this, indeed, is his meaning, other words
also of his show us,--not contained in this work, but in the third book
of his Defence of Free Will, wherein he holds a discussion with an opponent,
who had insisted on the apostle's words when he says, "For what I would,
that do I not;" and again, "I see another law in my members, warring against
the law of my mind." To this he replied in these words: "Now that which
you wish us to understand of the apostle himself, all Church writers assert
that he spoke in the person of the sinner, and of one who was still under
the law,--such a man as was, by reason of a very long custom of vice, held
bound, as it were, by a certain necessity of sinning, and who, although
he desired good with his will, in practice indeed was hurried headlong
into evil. In the person, however, of one man," he continues, "the apostle
designates the people who still sinned under the ancient law. This nation
he declares was to be delivered from this evil of custom through Christ,
who first of all remits all sins in baptism to those who believe in Him,
and then urges them by an imitation of Himself to perfect holiness, and
by the example of His own virtues overcomes the evil custom of their sins."
Observe in what way he supposes them to be assisted who sin under the law:
they are to be delivered by being justified through Christ's grace, as
if the law alone were insufficient for them, without some reinforcement
from Christ, owing to their long habit of sinning; not the inspiration
of love by His Holy Spirit, but the contemplation and copy of His example
in the inculcation of virtue by the gospel. Now here, at any rate, there
was the very greatest call on him to say plainly what grace he meant, seeing
that the apostle closed the very. passage which formed the ground of discussion
with these telling words: "0 wretched man that I am, who shall deliver
me from the body of this death? The grace of God, through Jesus Christ
our Lord." Now, when he places this grace, not in the aid of His power,
but in His example for imitation, what further hope must we entertain of
him, since everywhere the word "grace" is mentioned by him under an ambiguous
generality?

CHAP. 44 [XL.]--PELAGIUS ONCE MORE GUARDS
HIMSELF AGAINST THE NECESSITY OF GRACE.

Then, again, in the work addressed to the
holy virgin, of which we have spoken already, there is this passage: "Let
us submit ourselves to God, and by doing His will let us merit the divine
grace; and let us the more easily, by the help of the Holy Ghost, resist
the evil spirit." Now, in these words of his, it is plain enough that be
regards us as assisted by the grace of the Holy Ghost, not because we are
unable to resist the tempter without Him by the sheer capacity of our nature,
but in order that we may resist more easily. With respect, however, to
the quantity and quality, whatever these might be, of this assistance,
we may well believe that he made them consist of the additional knowledge
which the Spirit reveals to us through teaching, and which we either cannot,
or scarcely can, possess by nature. Such are the particulars which I have
been able to discover in the book which he addressed to the virgin of Christ,
and wherein he seems to confess grace. Of what purport and kind these are,
you of course perceive.

"Let them also read," says he, "my recent
little treatise which we were obliged to publish a short while ago in defence
of free will, and let them acknowledge how unfair is their determination
to disparage us for a denial of grace, when we throughout almost the whole
work acknowledge fully and sincerely both free will and grace." There are
four books in this treatise, all of which I read, marking such passages
as required consideration, and which I proposed to discuss: these I examined
as well as I was able, before we came to that epistle of his which was
sent to Rome. But even in these four books, that which he seems to regard
as the grace which helps us to turn aside from evil and to do good, he
describes in such a manner as to keep to his old ambiguity of language,
and thus have it in his power so to explain to his followers, that they
may suppose the assistance which is rendered by grace, for the purpose
of helping our natural capacity, consists of nothing else than the law
and the teaching. Thus our very prayers (as, indeed, he most plainly affirms
in his writings) are of no other use, in his opinion, than to procure for
us the explanation of the teaching by a divine revelation, not to procure
help for the mind of man to perfect by love and action what it has learned
should be done. The fact is, he does not in the least relinquish that very
manifest dogma of his system in which he sets forth those three things,
capacity, volition, action; maintaining that only the first of these, the
capacity, is favoured with the constant assistance of divine help, but
supposing that the volition and the action stand in no need of God's assistance.
Moreover, the very help which he says assists our natural capacity, be
places in the law and teaching. This teaching, he allows, is revealed or
explained to us by the Holy Ghost, on which account it is that he concedes
the necessity of prayer. But still this assistance of law and teaching
he supposes to have existed even in the days of the prophets; whereas the
help of grace, which is properly so called, he will have to lie simply
in the example of Christ. But this example, you can plainly see, pertains
after all to "teaching,"--even that which is preached to us as the gospel.
The general result, then, is the pointing out, as it were, of a road to
us by which we are bound to walk, by the powers of our free will, and needing
no assistance from any one else, may suffice to ourselves not to faint
or fail on the way. And even as to the discovery of the road itself, he
contends that nature alone is competent for it; only the discovery will
be more easily effected if grace renders assistance.

CHAP. 46 [XLII]--PELAGIUS PROFESSES TO RESPECT
THE CATHOLIC AUTHORS.

Such are the particulars which, to the best
of my ability, I have succeeded in obtaining from the writings of Pelagius,
whenever he makes mention of grace. You perceive, however, that men who
entertain such opinions as we have reviewed are "ignorant of God's righteousness,
and desire to establish their own," and are far off from "the righteousness
which we have of God " and not of ourselves; and this they ought to have
discovered and recognised in the very holy canonical Scriptures. Forasmuch,
however, as they read these Scriptures in a sense of their own, they of
course fail to observe even the most obvious truths therein. Would that
they would but turn their attention in no careless mood to what might be
learned concerning the help of God's grace in the writings, at all events,
of catholic authors; for they freely allow that the Scriptures were correctly
understood by these, and that they would not pass them by in neglect, out
of an overweening fondness for their own opinions. For note how this very
man Pelagius, in that very treatise of his so recently put forth, and which
he formally mentions in his self-defence (that is to say, in the third
book of his Defence of Free Will), praises St. Ambrose.

CHAP. 47 [XLIII.]--AMBROSE MOST HIGHLY PRAISED
BY PELAGIUS.

"The blessed Bishop Ambrose," says he, "in
whose writings the Roman faith shines forth with especial brightness, and
whom the Latins have always regarded as the very flower and glory of their
authors, and who has never found a foe bold enough to censure his faith
or the purity of his understanding of the Scriptures." Observe the sort
as well as the amount of the praises which he bestows; nevertheless, however
holy and learned he is, he is not to be compared to the authority of the
canonical Scripture. The reason of this high commendation of Ambrose lies
in the circumstance, that Pelagius sees proper to quote a certain passage
from his writings to prove that man is able to live without sin. This,
however, is not the question before us. We are at present discussing that
assistance of grace which helps us towards avoiding sin, and leading holy
lives.

CHAP. 48 [XLIV].--AMRBOSE IS NOT IN AGREEMENT
WITH PELAGIUS.

I wish, indeed, that he would listen to the
venerable bishop when, in the second book of his Exposition of the Gospel
according to Luke, he expressly teaches us that the Lord co-operates' also
with our wills. "You see, therefore," says he, "because the power of the
Lord co-operates everywhere with human efforts, that no man is able to
build without the Lord, no man to watch without the Lord, no man to undertake
anything without the Lord. Whence the apostle tires enjoins: 'Whether ye
eat, or whether ye drink, do all to the glory of God.' " You observe how
the holy Ambrose takes away from men even their familiar expressions,--such
as, "We undertake, but God accomplishes,"--when he says here that "no man
is able to undertake anything without the Lord." To the same effect he
says, in the sixth book of the same work, treating of the two debtors of
a certain creditor: "According to men's opinions, he perhaps is the greater
offender who owed most. The case, however, is altered by the Lord's mercy,
so that he loves the most who owes the most, if he yet obtains grace."
See how the catholic doctor most plainly declares that the very love which
prompts every man to an ampler love appertains to the kindly gift of grace.

CHAP. 49 [XLV.]--AMBROSE TEACHES WITH WHAT
EYE CHRIST TURNED AND LOOKED UPON PETER.

That repentance, indeed, itself, which beyond
all doubt is an action of the will, is wrought into action by the mercy
and help of the Lord, is asserted by the blessed Ambrose in the following
passage in the ninth book of the same work: "Good, says he, "are the tears
which wash away sin. They upon whom the Lord at last turns and looks, bewail.
Peter denied Him first, and did not weep, because the Lord had not turned
and looked upon him. He denied Him a second time, and still wept not, because
the Lord had not even yet turned and looked upon him. The third time also
he denied Him, Jesus turned and looked, and then he wept most bitterly."
Let these persons read the Gospel; let them consider how that the Lord
Jesus was at that moment within, having a hearing before the chief of the
priests; whilst the Apostle Peter was outside, and down in the hall, sitting
at one time with the servants at the fire, at another time standing, as
the most accurate and consistent narrative of the evangelists shows. It
cannot therefore be said that it was with His bodily eyes that the Lord
turned and looked upon him by a visible and apparent admonition. That,
then, which is described in the words, "The Lord turned and looked upon
Peter," was effected internally; it was wrought in the mind, wrought in
the will. In mercy the Lord silently and secretly approached, touched the
heart, recalled the memory of the past, with His own internal grace visited
Peter, stirred and brought out into external tears the feelings of his
inner man. Behold in what manner God is present with His help to our wills
and actions; behold how "He worketh in us both to will and to do."

CHAP. 50.--AMBROSE TEACHES THAT ALL MEN NEED
GOD'S HELP.

In the same book the same St. Ambrose says
again: "Now if Peter fell, who said, 'Though all men shall be offended,
yet will I never be offended,' who else shall rightly presume concerning
himself? David, indeed, because he had said, 'In my prosperity I said,
I shall never be moved,' confesses how injurious his confidence had proved
to himself: 'Thou didst turn away Thy face,' he says, 'and I was troubled.'
" Pelagius ought to listen to the teaching of so eminent a man, and should
follow his faith, since he has commended his teaching and faith. Let him
listen humbly; let him follow with fidelity; let him indulge no longer
in obstinate presumption, lest he perish. Why does Pelagius choose to be
sunk in that sea whence Peter was rescued by the Rock?

CHAP. 51 [XLVI.]--AMBROSE TEACHES THAT IT
IS GOD THAT DOES FOR MAN WHAT PELAGIUS ATTRIBUTES TO FREE WILL.

Let him lend an ear also to the same godly
bishop, who says, in the sixth book of this same book: "The reason why
they would not receive Him is mentioned by the evangelist himself in these
words, 'Because His face was as though He would go to Jerusalem.' But His
disciples had a strong wish that He should be received into the Samaritan
town. God, however, calls whomsoever He deigns, and whom He wills He makes
religious." What wise insight of the man of God, drawn from the very fountain
of God's grace! "God," says he, "calls whomsoever He deigns, and whom He
wills He makes religious." See whether this is not the prophet's own declaration:
"I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and will show pity on whom
I will be pitiful;" and the apostle's deduction therefrom: "So then," says
he, "it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God
that showeth mercy." Now, when even his model man of our own times says,
that "whomsoever God deigns He calls, and whom He wills He makes religious,"
will any one be bold enough to contend that that man is not yet religious
"who hastens to the Lord, and desires to be directed by Him, and makes
his own will depend upon God's; who, moreover, cleaves so closely to the
Lord, that he becomes (as the apostle says) 'one spirit' with Him?" Great,
however, as is this entire work of a "religious man," Pelagius maintains
that "it is effected only by the freedom of the will." But his own blessed
Ambrose, whom he so highly commends in word, is against him, saying, "The
Lord God calls whomsoever He deigns, and whom He wills He makes religious."
It is God, then, who makes religious whomsoever He pleases, in order that
he may "hasten to the Lord, and desire to be directed by Him, and make
his own will depend upon God's, and cleave so closely to the Lord as to
become (as the apostle says) 'one spirit' with Him;" and all this none
but a religious man does. Who, then, ever does so much, unless he be made
by God to do it?

CHAP. 52 [XLVII.]--IF PELAGIUS AGREES WITH
AMBROSE, AUGUSTIN HAS NO CONTROVERSY WITH HIM.

Inasmuch, however, as the discussion about
free will and God's grace has such difficulty in its distinctions, that
when free will is maintained, God's grace is apparently denied; whilst
when God's grace is asserted, free will is supposed to be done away with,--Pelagius
can so involve himself in the shades of this obscurity as to profess agreement
with all that we have quoted from St. Ambrose, and declare that such is,
and always has been, his opinion also; and endeavour so to explain each,
that men may suppose his opinion, to be in fair accord with Ambrose's.
So far therefore, as concerns the questions of God's help and grace, you
are requested to observe the three things which he has distinguished so
very plainly, under the terms "ability," "will," and "actuality," that
is, "capacity," "volition," and "action." If, then, he has come round to
an agreement with us, then not the "capacity" alone in man, even if he
neither wills nor performs the good, but the volition and the action also,--in
other words, our willing well and doing well,--things which have no existence
in man, except when he has a good will and acts rightly:--if, I repeat,
he thus consents to hold with us that even the volition and the action
are assisted by God, and so assisted that we can neither will nor do any
good thing without such help; if, too, he believes that this is that very
grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ which makes us righteous through
His righteousness, and not our own, so that our true righteousness is that
which we have of Him,--then, so far as I can judge, there will remain no
further controversy between us concerning the assistance we have from the
grace of God.

CHAP. 53 [XLVIII.]--IN WHAT SENSE SOME MEN
MAY BE SAID TO LIVE WITHOUT SIN IN THE PRESENT LIFE.

But in reference to the particular point in
which he quoted the holy Ambrose with so much approbation,--because he
found in that author's writings, from the praises he accorded to Zacharias
and Elisabeth, the opinion that a man might possibly in this life be without
sin; although this cannot be denied if God wills it, with whom all things
are possible, yet he ought to consider more carefully in what sense this
was said. Now, so far as I can see, this statement was made in accordance
with a certain standard of conduct, which is among men held to be worthy
of approval and praise, and which no human being could justly call in question
for the purpose of laying accusation or censure. Such a standard Zacharias
and his wife Elisabeth are said to have maintained in the sight of God,
for no other reason than that they, by walking therein, never deceived
people by any dissimulation; but as they in their sincerity appeared to
men, so were they known in the sight of God. The statement, however, was
not made with any reference to that perfect state of righteousness in which
we shall one day live truly and absolutely in a condition of spotless purity.
The Apostle Paul, indeed, has told us that he was "blameless, as touching
the righteousness which is of the law;" and it was in respect of the same
law that Zacharias also lived a blameless life. This righteousness, however,
the apostle counted as "dung" and "loss," in comparison with the righteousness
which is the object of our hope, and which we ought to "hunger and thirst
after," in order that hereafter we may be satisfied with the vision thereof,
enjoying it now by faith, so long as "the just do live by faith."

CHAP. 54 [XLIX.]--AMBROSE TEACHES THAT NO
ONE IS SINLESS IN THIS WORLD.

Lastly, let him give good heed to his venerable
bishop, when he is expounding the Prophet Isaiah, and says that "no man
in this world can be without sin." Now nobody can pretend to say that by
the phrase "in this world" he simply meant, in the love of this world.
For he was speaking of the apostle, who said, "Our conversation is in heaven;"
and while unfolding the sense of these words, the eminent bishop expressed
himself thus: "Now the apostle says that many men, even while living in
the present world, are perfect with themselves, who could not possibly
be deemed perfect, if one looks at true perfection. For he says himself:
'We now see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know
in part; but then shall I know, even as also I am known.' Thus, there are
those who are spotless in this world, there are those who will be spotless
in the kingdom of God; although, of course, if you sift the thing minutely,
no one could be spotless, because no one is without sin." That passage,
then, of the holy Ambrose, which Pelagius applies in support of his own
opinion, was either written in a qualified sense, probable, indeed, but
not expressed with minute accuracy; or if the holy and lowly-minded author
did think that Zacharias and Elisabeth lived according to the highest and
absolutely perfect righteousness, which was incapable of increase or addition,
he certainly corrected his opinion on a minuter examination of it.

He ought, moreover, carefully to note that,
in the very same context from which he quoted that passage of Ambrose's,
which seemed so satisfactory for his purpose, he also said this: "To be
spotless from the beginning is an impossibility to human nature." In this
sentence the venerable Ambrose does undoubtedly predicate feebleness and
infirmity of that natural "capacity," which Pelagius refuses faithfully
to regard as corrupted by sin, and therefore boastfully extols. Beyond
question, this runs counter to this man's will and inclination, although
it does not contravene the truthful confession of the apostle, wherein
he says: "We too were once by nature the children of wrath, even as others."
For through the sin of the first man, which came from his free will, our
nature became corrupted and ruined; and nothing but God's grace alone,
through Him who is the Mediator between God and men, and our Almighty Physician,
succours it. Now, since we have already prolonged this work too far in
treating of the assistance of the divine grace towards our justification,
by which God co-operates in all things for good with those who love Him,
and whom He first loved --giving to them that He might receive from them:
we must commence another treatise, as the Lord shall enable us, on the
subject of sin also, which by one man has entered into the world, along
with death, and so has passed upon all men, setting forth as much as shall
seem needful and sufficient, in opposition to those persons who have broken
out into violent and open error, contrary to the truth here stated.

BOOK II.ON ORIGINAL SIN.

WHEREIN AUGUSTIN SHOWS THAT PELAGIUS REALLY
DIFFERS IN NO RESPECT, ON THE QUESTION OF ORIGINAL SIN AND THE BAPTISM
OF INFANTS, FROM HIS FOLLOWER COELESTIUS, WHO, REFUSING TO ACKNOWLEDGE
ORIGINAL SIN AND EVEN DARING TO DENY THE DOCTRINE IN PUBLIC, WAS CONDEMNED
IN TRIALS BEFORE THE BISHOPS -- FIRST AT CARTHAGE, AND AFTERWARDS AT ROME;
FOR THIS QUESTION IS NOT, AS THESE HERETICS WOULD HAVE IT, ONE WHEREIN
PERSONS MIGHT ERR WITHOUT DANGER TO THE FAITH. THEIR HERESY, INDEED, AIMED
AT NOTHING ELSE THAN THE VERY FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN BELIEF. HE AFTERWARDS
REFUTES ALL SUCH AS MAINTAINED THAT THE BLESSING OF MATRIMONY IS DISPARAGED
BY THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL DEPRAVITY, AND AN INJURY DONE TO GOD HIMSELF,
THE CREATOR OF MAN WHO IS BORN BY MEANS OF MATRIMONY.

NEXT I beg of you, carefully to observe with
what caution you ought to lend an ear, on the question of the baptism of
infants, to men of this character, who dare not openly deny the layer of
regeneration and the forgiveness of sins to this early age, for fear that
Christian ears would not bear to listen to them; and who yet persist in
holding and urging their opinion, that the carnal generation is not held
guilty of man's first sin, although they seem to allow infants to be baptized
for the remission of sins. You have, indeed, yourselves informed me in
your letter, that you heard Pelagius say in your presence, reading out
of that book of his which he declared that he had also sent to Rome, that
they maintain that "infants ought to be baptized with the same formula
of sacramental words as adults." Who, after that statement, would suppose
that one ought to raise any question at all on this subject? Or if he did,
to whom would he not seem to indulge a very calumnious disposition --previous
to the perusal of their plain assertions, in which they deny that infants
inherit original sin, and contend that all persons are born free from all
corruption ?

CHAP. 2 [II.] --COELESTIUS, ON HIS TRIAL AT
CARTHAGE, REFUSES TO CONDEMN HIS ERROR; THE WRITTEN STATEMENT WHICH HE
GAVE TO ZOSIMUS.

Coelestius, indeed, maintained this erroneous
doctrine with less restraint. To such an extent did he push his freedom
as actually to refuse, when on trial before the bishops at Carthage, to
condemn those who say, "That Adam's sin injured only Adam himself, and
not the human race; and that infants at their birth are in the same state
that Adam was in before his transgression." In the written statement, too,
which he presented to the most blessed Pope Zosimus at Rome, he declared
with especial plainness, "that original sin binds no single infant." Concerning
the ecclesiastical proceedings at Carthage we copy the following account
of his words.

CHAP. 3 [III.] --PART OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE COUNCIL OF CARTHAGE AGAINST COELESTIUS.

"The bishop Aurelius said: 'Let what follows
be recited.' It was accordingly recited, 'That the sin of Adam was injurious
to him alone, and not to the human race.' Then, after the recital, Coelestius
said: ' I said that I was in doubt about the transmission of sin, but so
as to yield assent to any man whom God has gifted with the grace of knowledge;
for I have heard different opinions from those who have been even appointed
presbyters in the Catholic Church.' The deacon Paulinus said: 'Tell us
their names.' Coelestius answered: 'The holy presbyter Rufinus, who lived
at Rome with the holy Pammachius. I have heard him declare that there is
no transmission of sin.' The deacon Paulinus then asked: 'Is there any
one else?' Coelestius replied: 'I have heard more say the same.' The deacon
Paulinus rejoined: 'Tell us their names.' Coelestius said: 'Is not one
priest enough for you?'" Then afterwards in another place we read: "The
bishop Aurelius said: 'Let the rest of the accusation be read.' It then
was recited 'That infants at their birth are in the same state that Adam
was before the transgression; and they read to the very end of the brief
accusation which had been previously put in. [iv.] The bishop Aurelius
inquired: 'Have you, Coelestius, taught at any time, as the deacon Paulinus
has stated, that infants are at their birth in the same state that Adam
was before his transgression?' Coelestius answered: 'Let him explain what
he meant when he said, "before the transgression."' The deacon Paulinus
then said 'Do you on your side deny that you ever taught this doctrine?
It must be one of two things: he must either say that he never so taught,
or else he must now condemn the opinion.' Coelestius rejoined: 'I have
already said, Let him explain the words he mentioned, "before the transgression."'
The deacon Paulinus then said: ' You must deny ever having taught this.'
The bishop Aurelius said: 'I ask, What conclusion I have on my part to
draw from this man's obstinacy; my affirmation is, that although Adam,
as created in Paradise, is said to have been made immortal at first, he
afterwards became corruptible through transgressing the commandment. Do
you say this, brother Paulinus?' 'I do, my lord,' answered the deacon Paulinus.
Then the bishop Aurelius said: 'As regards the condition of infants before
baptism at the present day, the deacon Paulinus wishes to be informed whether
it is such as Adam's was before the transgression; and whether it derives
the guilt of transgression from the same origin of sin from which it is
born?' The deacon Paulinus asked: 'Let him deny whether he taught this,
or not.' Coelestius answered: 'As touching the transmission of sin, I have
already asserted, that I have heard many persons of acknowledged position
in the catholic Church deny it altogether; and on the other hand, others
affirm it: it may be fairly deemed a matter for inquiry, but not a heresy.
I have always maintained that infants require baptism, and ought to be
baptized. What else does he want?'"

You, of course, see that Coelestius here conceded
baptism for infants only in such a manner as to be unwilling to confess
that the sin of the first man, which is washed away in the lover of regeneration,
passes over to them, although at the same time he did not venture to deny
this; and on account of this doubt he refused to condemn those who maintain
"That Adam's sin injured only himself, and not the human race;" and "that
infants at their birth are in the same condition wherein Adam was before
the transgression."

CHAP. 5 [v.] --CO0LESTIUS BOOK WHICH WAS PRODUCED
IN THE PROCEEDINGS AT ROME.

But in the book which he published at Rome,
and produced in the proceedings before the church there, he so speaks on
this question as to show that he really believes what he had professed
to be in doubt about. For these are his words: "That infants, however,
ought to be baptized for the remission Of sins, according to the rule of
the Church universal, and according to the meaning of the Gospel, we confess.
For the Lord has determined that the kingdom of heaven should only be conferred
on baptized persons; and since the resources of nature do not possess it,
it must necessarily be conferred by the gift of grace." Now if he had not
said anything. elsewhere on this subject, who would not have supposed that
he acknowledged the remission of original sin even in infants at their
baptism, by saying that they ought to be baptized for the remission of
sins? Hence the point of what youhave stated in your letter, that Pelagius'
answerto you was on this wise, " That infants are
baptized with the same words of sacramental formula as adults," and that
you were rejoiced to hear the very thing which you were desirous of hearing,
and yet that you preferred holding a consultation with us concerning his
words.

CHAP. 6 [VI.] -- COELESTIUS THE DISCIPLE IS
INTHIS WORK BOLDER THAN HIS MASTER.

Carefully observe, then, what Coelestius has
advanced so very openly, and you will discover what amount of concealment
Pelagius has practised upon you. Coelestius goes on to say as follows:
"That infants, however, must be baptized for the remission of sins, was
not admitted by us with the view of our seeming to affirm sin by transmission.
This is very alien from the catholic meaning, because sin is not born with
a man,-- it is subsequently committed by the man for it is shown to be
a fault, not of nature, but of the will. It is fitting, therefore, to confess
this, lest we should seem to make different kinds of baptism; it is, moreover,
necessary to lay down this preliminary safeguard, lest by the occasion
of this mystery evil should, to the disparagement of the Creator, be said
to be conveyed to man by nature, before that it has been committed by man."
Now Pelagius was either afraid or ashamed to avow this to be his own opinion
before you; although his disciple experienced neither a qualm nor a blush
in openly professing it to be his, without any obscure subterfuges, in
presence of the Apostolic See.

CHAP. 7. --POPE ZOSIMUS KINDLY EXCUSES HIM.

The bishop, however, who presides over this
See, upon seeing him hurrying headlong in so great presumption like a madman,
chose in his great compassion, with a view to the man's repentance, if
it might be, rather to bind him tightly by eliciting from him answers to
questions proposed by himself, than by the stroke of a severe condemnation
to drive him over the precipice, down which he seemed to be even now ready
to fall. I say advisedly, "down which he seemed to be ready to fall," rather
than "over which he had actually fallen," because he had already in this
same book of his forecast the subject with an intended reference to questions
of this sort in the following words: "If it should so happen that any error
of ignorance has stolen over us human beings, let it be corrected by your
decisive sentence."

CHAP. 8 [VII.] -- Coelestius CONDEMNED BY
ZOSIMUS.

The venerable Pope Zosimus, keeping in view
this deprecatory preamble, dealt with the man, puffed up as he was with
the blasts of false doctrine, so as that he should condemn all the objectionable
points which had been alleged against him by the deacon Paulinus, and that
he should yield his assent to the rescript of the Apostolic See which had
been issued by his predecessor of sacred memory. The accused man, however,
refused to condemn the objections raised by the deacon, yet he did not
dare to hold out against the letter of the blessed Pope Innocent; indeed,
he went so far as to "promise that he would condemn all the points which
the Apostolic See condemned." Thus the man was treated with gentle remedies,
as a delirious patient who required rest; but, at the same time, he was
not regarded as being yet ready to be released from the restraints of excommunication.
The interval of two months being granted him, until communications could
be received from Africa, a place for recovery was conceded to him, under
the mild restorative of the sentence which had been pronounced. For in
truth, if he would have laid aside his vain obstinacy, and be now willing
to carry out what he had undertaken, and would carefully read the very
letter to which he had replied by promising submission, he would yet come
to a better mind. But after the rescripts were duly issued from the council
of the African bishops, there were very good reasons why the sentence should
be carried out against him, in strictest accordance with equity. What these
reasons were you may read for yourselves, for we have sent you all the
particulars.

CHAP. 9 [VIII.]-- PELAGIUS DECEIVED THE COUNCIL
IN PALESTINE, BUT WAS UNABLE TO DECEIVE THE CHURCH AT ROME.

Wherefore Pelagius, too, if he will only reflect
candidly on his own position and writings, has no reason for saying that
he ought not to have been banned with such a sentence. For although he
deceived the council in Palestine, seemingly clearing himself before it,
he entirely failed in imposing on the church at Rome (where, as you well
know, he is by no means a stranger), although he went so far as to make
the attempt, if he might somehow succeed. But, as I have just said, he
entirely failed. For the most blessed Pope Zosimus recollected what his
predecessor, who had set him so worthy an example, had thought of these
very proceedings. Nor did he omit to observe what opinion was entertained
about this man by the trusty Romans, whose faith deserved to be spoken
of in the Lord,, and whose consistent zeal in defence of catholic truth
against this heresy he saw prevailing amongst them with warmth, and at
the same time most perfect harmony. The man had lived among them for a
long while, and his opinions could not escape their notice; moreover, they
had so completely found out his disciple Coelestius, as to be able at once
to adduce the most trustworthy and irrefragable evidence on this subject.
Now what was the solemn judgment which the holy Pope Innocent formed respecting
the proceedings in the Synod of Palestine, by which Pelagius boasts of
having been acquitted, you may indeed read in the letter which he addressed
to me. It is duly mentioned also in the answer which was forwarded by the
African Synod to the venerable Pope Zosimus and which, along with the other
instructions, we have despatched to your loving selves.1 But it seems to
me, at the same time, that I ought not to omit producing the particulars
in the present work.

Five bishops, then, of whom I was one, wrote
him a letter, wherein we mentioned the proceedings in Palestine, of which
the report had already reached us. We informed him that in the East, where
this man lived, there had taken place certain ecclesiastical proceedings,
in which he was thought to have been acquitted on all the charges. To this
communication from us Innocent replied in a letter which contains the following
among other words: "There are," says he, "sundry positions, as stated in
these very Proceedings, which, when they were objected against him, he
partly suppressed by avoiding them, and partly confused in absolute obscurity,
by wresting the sense of many words; whilst there are other allegations
which he cleared off, -- not, indeed, in the honest way which he might
seem at the time to use, but rather by methods of sophistry, meeting some
of the objections with a fiat denial, and tampering with others by a fallacious
interpretation. Would, however, that he would even now adopt what is the
far more desirable course of turning from his own error back to the true
ways of catholic faith; that he would also, duly considering God's daily
grace, and acknowledging the help thereof, be willing and desirous to appear,
amidst the approbation of all men, to be truly corrected by the method
of open conviction, -- not, indeed, by judicial process, but by a hearty
conversion to the catholic faith. We are therefore unable either to approve
of or to blame their proceedings at that trial; for we cannot tell whether
the proceedings were true, or even, if true, whether they do not really
show that the man escaped by subterfuge, rather than that he cleared himself
by entire truth."3 You see clearly from these words, how that the most
blessed Pope Innocent without doubt speaks of this man as of one who was
by no means unknown to him.

You see what opinion he entertained about
his acquittal. You see, moreover, what his successor the holy Pope Zosimus
was bound to recollect,-- as in truth he did,-- so as to confirm without
hesitation the judgment of his predecessor in this case.

CHAP. II [X.] --HOW THAT PELAGIUS DECEIVED
THE SYNOD OF PALESTINE.

Now I pray you carefully to observe by what
evidence Pelagius is shown to have deceived his judges in Palestine, not
to mention other points, on this very question of the baptism of infants,
lest we should seem to any one to have used calumny and suspicion, rather
than to have ascertained the certain fact, when we alleged that Pelagius
concealed the opinion which Coelestius expressed with greater frankness,
while at the same time he actually entertained the same views. Now, from
what has been stated above, it has been clearly seen that Coelestius refused
to condemn the assertion that "Adam's sin injured only himself, and not
the human race, and that infants at their birth are in the same state that
Adam was before the transgression," because he saw that, if he condemned
these propositions, he would affirm that there was in infants a transmission
of sin from. Adam. When, however, it was objected to Pelagius that he was
of one mind with Coelestius on this point, he condemned the words without
hesitation. I am quite aware that you have read all this before. Since,
however, we are not writing this account for you alone, we proceed to transcribe
the very words of the synodal acts, lest the reader should. be unwilling
either to turn to the record for himself, or if he does not possess it,
take the trouble to procure a copy. Here, then, are the words: --

CHAP. 12 [XI.] --A PORTION OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SYNOD OF PALESTINE IN THE CAUSE OF PELAGIUS.

"The synod said: 4 Now, forasmuch as Pelagius
has pronounced his anathema on this uncertain utterance of folly, rightly
replying that a man by God's help and grace is able to live <greek>agamarghgqs</greek>,
that is to say, without sin, let him give us his answer on other articles
also. Another particular in the teaching of Coelestius, disciple of Pelagius,
selected from the heads which were mentioned and heard at Carthage before
the holy Aurelius bishop of Carthage, and other bishops, was to this effect:
'That Adam was made mortal, and that he would have died, whether he sinned
or did not sin; that Adam's sin injured himself alone, and not the human
race; that the law no less than the gospel leads us to the kingdom; that
before the coming of Christ there were persons without sin; that newborn
infants are in the same condition that Adam was before the transgression;
that, on the one hand, the entire human race does not die on account of
Adam's death and transgression, nor, on the other hand, does the whole
human race rise again through the resurrection of Christ; that the holy
bishop Augustin wrote a book in answer to his followers in Sicily, on articles
which were subjoined, and in this book, which was addressed to Hilary,
are contained the following statements: That a man is able to be without
sin if he wishes; that infants, even if they are unbaptized, have eternal
life; that rich men, even if they are baptized, unless they renounce and
give up all, have, whatever good they may seem to have done, nothing of
it reckoned unto them, neither can they possess the kingdom of heaven.'
Pelagius then said: As regards man's ability to be without sin, my opinion
has been already spoken. With respect, however, to the allegation that
there were even before the Lord's coming persons who lived without sin,
we also on our part say, that before the coming of Christ there certainly
were persons who passed their lives in holiness and righteousness, according
to the accounts which have been handed down to us in the Holy Scriptures.
As for the other points, indeed, even on their own showing, they are not
of a character which obliges me to be answerable for them; but yet, for
the satisfaction of the sacred Synod, I anathematize those who either now
hold or have ever held these opinions."

You see, indeed, not to mention other points,
how that Pelagius pronounced his anathema against those who hold that"
Adam's sin injured only himself, and not the human race; and that infants
are at their birth in the same condition in which Adam was before the transgression."
Now what else could the bishops who sat in judgment on him have possibly
understood him to mean by this, but that the sin of Adam is transmitted
to infants? It was to avoid making such an admission that Coelestius refused
to condemn this statement, which this man on the contrary anathematized.
If, therefore, I shall show that he did not really entertain any other
opinion concerning infants than that they are born without any contagion
of a single sin, what difference will there remain on this question between
him and Coelestius, except this, that the one is more open, the other more
reserved; the one more pertinacious, the other more mendacious; or, at
any rate, that the one is more candid, the other more astute? For, the
one before the church of Carthage refused to condemn what he afterwards
in the church at Rome publicly confessed to be a tenet of his own; at the
same time professing himself "ready to submit to correction if an error
had stolen over him, considering that he was but human;" whereas the other
both condemned this dogma as being contrary to the truth lest he should
himself be condemned by his catholic judges, and yet kept it in reserve
for subsequent defence, so that either his condemnation was a lie, or his
interpretation a trick.

CHAP. 14 [XIII.]-- HE SHOWS THAT, EVEN AFTER
THE SYNOD OF PALESTINE, PELAGIUS HELD THE SAME OPINIONS AS COELESTIUS ON
THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN.

I see, however, that it may be most justly
demanded of me, that I do not defer my promised demonstration, that he
actually entertains the same views as Coelestius. In the first book of
his more recent work, written in defence of free will (which work he mentions
in the letter he despatched to Rome), he says: "Everything good, and everything
evil, on account of which we are either laudable or blameworthy, is not
born with us but done by us: for we are born not fully developed, but with
a capacity for either conduct; and we are procreated as without virtue,
so also without vice; and previous to the action of our own proper will,
that alone Is in man which God has formed." Now you perceive that in these
words of Pelagius, the dogma of both these men is contained, that infants
are born without the contagion of any sin from Adam. It is therefore not
astonishing that Coelestius refused to condemn such as say that Adam's
sin injured only himself, and not the human race; and that infants are
at their birth in the same state in which Adam was before the transgression.
But it is very much to be wondered at, that Pelagius had the effrontery
to anathematize these opinions. For if, as he alleges, "evil is not born
with us, and we are procreated without fault, and the only thing in man
previous to the action of his own will is what God has formed," then of
course the sin of Adam did only injure himself, inasmuch as it did not
pass on to his offspring. For there is not any sin which is not an evil;
or a sin that is not a fault; or else sin was created by God. But he says:
"Evil is not born with us, and we are procreated without fault; and the
only thing in men at their birth is what God has formed." Now, since by
this language he supposes it to be most true, that, according to the well-known
sentence of his: "Adam's sin was injurious to himself alone, and not to
the human race," why did Pelagius condemn this, if it were not for the
purpose of deceiving his catholic judges? By parity of reasoning, it may
also be argued: "If evil is not born with us, and if we are procreated
without fault, and if the only thing found in man at the time of his birth
is what God has formed," it follows beyond a doubt that "infants at their
birth are in the same condition that Adam was before the transgression,"
in whom no evil or fault was inherent, and in whom that alone existed which
God had formed. And yet Pelagius pronounced anathema on all those persons
"who hold now, or have at any time held, that newborn babes are placed
by their birth in the same state that Adam was in before the transgression,"
--in other words, are without any evil, without any fault, having that
only which God had formed. Now, why again did Pelagius condemn this tenet
also, if it were not for the purpose of deceiving the catholic Synod, and
saving himself from the condemnation of an heretical innovator?

CHAP. 15 [XIV.] --PELAGIUS BY HIS MENDACITY
AND DECEPTION STOLE HIS ACQUITTAL FROM THE SYNOD IN PALESTINE.

For my own part, however, I, as you are quite
aware, and as I also stated in the book which I addressed to our venerable
and aged Aurelius on the proceedings in Palestine, really felt glad that
Pelagius in that answer of his had exhausted the whole of this question.
To me, indeed, he seemed most plainly to have acknowledged that there is
original sin in infants, by the anathema which he pronounced against those
persons who supposed that by the sin of Adam only himself, and not the
human race, was injured, and who entertained the opinion that infants are
in the same state in which the first man was before the transgression.
When, however, I had read his four books (from the first of which I copied
the words which I have just now quoted), and discovered that he was still
cherishing thoughts which were opposed to the catholic faith touching infants,
I felt all the greater surprise at a mendacity which he so unblushingly
maintained in a synod of the Church, and on so great a question. For if
he had already written these books, how did he profess to anathematize
those who had ever entertained the opinions alluded to? If he purposed,
however, afterwards to publish such a work, how could he anathematize those
who at the time were holding the opinions? Unless, to be sure, by some
ridiculous subterfuge he meant to say that the objects of his anathema
were such persons as had in some previous time held, or were then holding,
these opinions; but that in respect of the future--that is, as regarded
those persons who were about to take up with such views -- he felt that
it would be impossible for him to prejudge either himself or other people,
and that therefore he was guilty of no lie when he was afterwards detected
in the maintenance of similar errors. This plea, however, he does not advance,
not only because it is a ridiculous one, but because it cannot possibly
be true; because in these very books of his he both argues against the
transmission of sin from Adam to infants, and glories in the proceedings
of the Synod in Palestine, where he was supposed to have sincerely anathematized
such as hold the opinions in dispute, and where he, in fact, stole his
acquittal by practising deceit.

CHAP. 16 [XV.]--PELAGIUS' FRAUDULENT AND CRAFTY
EXCUSES.

For what is the significance to the matter
with which we now have to do of his answers to his followers, when he tells
them that "the reason why he condemned the points which were objected against
him, is because he himself maintains that primal sin was injurious not
only to the first man, but to the whole human race, not by transmission,
but by example;" in other words, not because those who have been propagated
from him have derived any fault from him, but because all who afterwards
have sinned, have imitated him who committed the first sin? Or when he
says that "the reason why infants are not in the same state in which Adam
was before the transgression, is because they are not yet able to receive
the commandment, whereas he was able; and because they do not yet make
use of that choice of a rational will which he certainly made use of, since
otherwise no commandment would have been given to him"? How does such an
exposition as this of the points alleged against him justify him in thinking
that he rightly condemned the propositions, "Adam's sin injured only himself,
and not the whole race of man;" and "infants at their birth are in the
self-same state in which Adam was before he sinned;" and that by the said
condemnation he is not guilty of deceit in holding such opinions as are
found in his subsequent writings, how that "infants are born without any
evil or fault, and that there is nothing in them but what God has formed,"
-- no wound, in short, inflicted by an enemy?

CHAP. 17.-- HOW PELAGIUS DECEIVED HIS JUDGES.

Now, is it by making such statements as these,
meeting objections which are urged in one sense with explanations which
are meant in another, that he designs to prove to us that he did not deceive
those who sat in judgment on him? Then he utterly fails in his purpose.
In proportion to the craftiness of his explanations, was the stealthiness
with which he deceived them. For, just because they were catholic bishops,
when they heard the man pouring out anathemas upon those who maintained
that "Adam's sin wasinjurious to none but himself, and not to
the human race," they understood him to assert nothing but what the catholic
Church has been accustomed to declare, on the ground of which it truly
baptizes infants for the remission of sins--not, indeed, sins which they
have committed by imitation owing to the example of the first sinner, but
sins which they have contracted by their very birth, owing to the corruption
of their origin. When, again, they heard him anathematizing those who assert
that "infants at their birth are in the same state in which Adam was before
the transgression," they supposed him to refer to none others than those
persons who "think that infants have derived no sin from Adam, and that
they are accordingly in that state that he was in before his sin." For,
of course, no other objection would be brought against him than that on
which the question turned. When, therefore, he so explains the objection
as to say that infants are not in the same state that Adam was in before
he sinned, simply because they have not yet arrived at the same firmness
of mind or body, not because of any propagated fault that has passed on
to them, he must be answered thus: "When the objections were laid against
you for condemnation, the catholic bishops did not understand them in this
sense; therefore, when you condemned them, they believed that you were
a catholic. That, accordingly, which they supposed you to maintain, deserved
to be released from censure; but that which you really maintained was worthy
of condemnation. It was not you, then, that were acquitted, who held tenets
which ought to be condemned; but that opinion was freed from censure which
you ought to have held and maintained. You could only be supposed to be
acquitted by having been believed to entertain opinions worthy to be praised;
for your judges could not suppose that you were concealing opinions which
merited condemnation. Rightly have you been adjudged an accomplice of Coelestius,
in whose opinions you prove yourself to be a sharer. And though you kept
your books shut during your trial, you published them to the world after
it was over."

CHAP. 18 [XVII.]--THE CONDEMNATION OF PELAGIUS.

This being the case, you of course feel that
episcopal councils, and the Apostolic See, and the whole Roman Church,
and the Roman Empire itself, which by God's gracious favour has become
Christian, has been most righteously moved against the authors of this
wicked error, until they repent and escape from the snares of the devil.
For who can tell whether God may not give them repentance to discover,
and acknowledge, and even proclaim His truth, and to condemn their own
damnable error? But whatever may be the bent of their own will, we cannot
doubt that the merciful kindness of the Lord has sought the good of many
persons who followed them, for no other reason than because they saw them
associated in communion with the catholic Church.

CHAP. 19.--PELAGIUS' ATTEMPT TO DECEIVE THE
APOSTOLIC SEE; HE INVERTS THE BEARINGS OF THE CONTROVERSY.

But I would have you carefully observe the
way in which Pelagius endeavoured by deception to overreach even the judgment
of the bishop of the Apostolic See on this very question of the baptism
of infants. He sent a letter to Rome to Pope Innocent of blessed memory;
and when it found him not in the flesh, it was handed to the holy Pope
Zosimus, and by him directed to us. In this letter he complains of being
"defamed by certain persons for refusing the sacrament of baptism to infants,
and promising the kingdom of heaven irrespective of Christ's redemption."
The objections, however, are not urged against them in the manner he has
stated. For they neither deny the sacrament of baptism to infants, nor
do they promise the kingdom of heaven to any irrespective of the redemption
of Christ. As regards, therefore, his complaint of being defamed by sundry
persons, he has set it forth in such terms as to be able to give a ready
answer to the alleged charge against him, without injury to his own dogma.
[XVIII.] The real objection against them is, that they refuse to confess
that unbaptized infants are liable to the condemnation of the first man,
and that original sin has been transmitted to them and requires to be purged
by regeneration; their contention being that infants must be baptized solely
for being admitted into the kingdom of heaven, as if they could only have
eternal death apart from the kingdom of heaven, who cannot have eternal
life without partaking of the Lord's body and blood. This, I would have
you know, is the real objection to them respecting the baptism of infants;
and not as he has represented it, for the purpose of enabling himself to
save his own dogmas while answering what is actually a proposition of his
own, under colour of meeting an objection.

CHAP. 20.--PELAGIUS PROVIDES A REFUGE FOR
HIS FALSEHOOD IN AMBIGUOUS SUBTERFUGES.

And then observe how he makes his answer,
how he provides in the obscure mazes of his double sense retreats for his
false doctrine, quenching the truth in his dark mist of error; so that
even we, on our first perusal of his words, almost rejoiced at their propriety
and correctness. But the fuller discussions in his books, in which he is
generally forced, in spite of all his efforts at concealment, to explain
his meaning, have made even his better statements suspicious to us, lest
on a closer inspection of them we should detect them to be ambiguous. For,
after saying that "he had never heard even an impious heretic say this"
(namely, what he set forth as the objection) "about infants," he goes on
to ask: "Who indeed is so unacquainted with Gospel lessons, as not only
to attempt to make such an affirmation, but even to be able to lightly
say it or even let it enter his thought? And then who is so impious as
to wish to exclude infants from the kingdom of heaven, by forbidding them
to be baptized and to be born again in Christ?"

CHAP. 21 [XIX.]--PELAGIUS AVOIDS THE QUESTION
AS TO WHY BAPTISM IS NECESSARY FOR INFANTS.

Now it is to no purpose that he says all this.
He does not clear himself thereby. Not even they have ever denied the impossibility
of infants entering the kingdom of heaven without baptism. But this is
not the question; what we are discussing concerns the obliteration 1 of
original sin in infants. Let him clear himself on this point, since he
refuses to acknowledge that there is anything in infants which the layer
of regeneration has to cleanse. On this account we ought carefully to consider
what he has afterwards to say. After adducing, then, the passage of the
Gospel which declares that "whosoever is not born again of water and the
Spirit cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven" (on which matter, as we
have said, they raise no question), he goes on at once to ask: "Who indeed
is so impious as to have the heart to refuse the common redemption of the
human race to an infant of any age whatever?" But this is ambiguous language
for what redemption does he mean? Is it from evil to good? or from good
to better? Now even Coelestius, at Carthage, allowed a redemption for infants
in his book; although, at the same time, he would not, admit the transmission
of sin to them from Adam.

CHAP. 22 [XX.]--ANOTHER INSTANCE OF PELAGIUS'
AMBIGUITY.

Then, again, observe what he subjoins to the
last remark: "Can any one," says he, "forbid a second birth to an eternal
and certain life, to him who has been born to this present uncertain life?"
In other words: "Who is so impious as to forbid his being born again to
the life which is sure and eternal, who has been born to this life of uncertainty?"
When we first read these words, we supposed that by the phrase "uncertain
life" he meant to designate this present temporal life; although it appeared
to us that he ought rather to have called it "mortal" than "uncertain,"
because it is brought to a close by certain death. But for all this, we
thought that he had only shown a preference for calling this mortal life
an uncertain one, because of the general view which men take that there
is undoubtedly not a moment in our lives when we are free from this uncertainty.
And so it happened that our anxiety about him was allayed to some extent
by the following consideration, which rose almost to a proof, notwithstanding
the fact of his unwillingness openly to confess that infants incur eternal
death who depart this life without the sacrament of baptism. We argued:
"If, as he seems to admit, eternal life can only accrue to them who have
been baptized, it follows of course that they who die unbaptized incur
everlasting death. This destiny, however, cannot by any means justly befall
those who never in this life committed any sins of their own, unless on
account of original sin."

CHAP. 23 [XXI.]--WHAT HE MEANS BY OUR BIRTH
TO AN "UNCERTAIN" LIFE.

Certain brethren, however, afterwards failed
not to remind us that Pelagius possibly expressed himself in this way,
because on this question he is represented as having his answer ready for
all inquirers, to this effect: "As for infants who die unbaptized, I know
indeed whither they go not; yet whither they go, I know not;" that is,
I know they do not go into the kingdom of heaven. But as to whither they
go, he was (and for the matter of that, still is ) in the habit of saying
that he knew not, because he dared not say that those went to eternal death,
who he was persuaded had never committed sin in this life, and whom he
would not admit to have inherited original sin. Consequently those very
words of his which were forwarded to Rome to secure his absolute acquittal,
are so steeped in ambiguity that they afford a shelter for their doctrine,
out of which may sally forth an heretical sense to entrap the unwary straggler;
for when no one is at hand who can give the answer, any solitary man may
find himself weak.

CHAP. 24.--PELAGIUS' LONG RESIDENCE AT ROME.

The truth indeed is, that in the book of his
faith which he sent to Rome with this very letter to the before-mentioned
Pope Innocent, to whom also he had written the letter, he only the more
evidently exposed himself by his efforts at concealment. He says: "We hold
one baptism, which we say ought to be administered in the same sacramental
words in the case of infants as in the case of adults." He did not, however,
say, "in the same sacrament" (although if he had so said, there would still
have been ambiguity), but "in the same sacramental words,"--as if remission
of sins in infants were declared by the sound of the words, and not wrought
by the effect of the acts. For the time, indeed, he seemed to say what
was agreeable with the catholic faith; but he had it not in his power permanently
to deceive that see. Subsequent to the rescript of the African Council,
into which province this pestilent doctrine had stealthily made its way--without,
however, spreading widely or sinking deeply--other opinions also of this
man were by the industry of some faithful brethren discovered and brought
to light at Rome, where he had dwelt for a very long while, and had already
engaged in sundry discourses and controversies. In order to procure the
condemnation of these opinions, Pope Zosimus, as you may read, annexed
them to his letter, which he wrote for publication throughout the catholic
world. Among these statements, Pelagius, pretending to expound the Apostle
Paul's Epistle to the Romans, argues in these words: "If Adam's sin injured
those who have not sinned, then also Christ's righteousness profits those
who do not believe." He says other things, too, of the same purport; but
they have all been refuted and answered by me with the Lord's help in the
books which I wrote, On the Baptism of Infants. But he had not the courage
to make those objectionable statements in his own person in the fore-mentioned
so-called exposition. This particular one, however, having been enunciated
in a place where he was so well known, his words and their meaning could
not be disguised. In those books, from the first of which I have already
before quoted, he treats this point without any suppression of his views.
With all the energy of which he is capable, he most plainly asserts that
human nature in infants cannot in any wise be supposed to be corrupted
by propagation; and by claiming salvation for them as their due, he does
despite to the Saviour.

CHAP. 25 [XXII.]--THE CONDEMNATION OF PELAGIUS
AND COELESTIUS.

These things, then, being as I have stated
them, it is now evident that there has arisen a deadly heresy, which, with
the Lord's help, the Church by this time guards against more directly--now
that those two men, Pelagius and Coelestius, have been either offered repentance,
or on their refusal been wholly condemned. They are reported, or perhaps
actually proved, to be the authors of this perversion; at all events, if
not the authors (as having learnt it from others), they are yet its boasted
abettors and teachers, through whose agency the heresy has advanced and
grown to a wider extent. This boast, too, is made even in their own statements
and writings, and in unmistakeable signs of reality, as well as in the
fame which arises and grows out of all these circumstances. What, therefore,
remains to be done? Must not every catholic, with all the energies wherewith
the Lord endows him, confute this pestilential doctrine, and oppose it
with all vigilance; so that whenever we contend for the truth, compelled
to answer, but not fond of the contest, the untaught may be instructed,
and that thus the Church may be benefited by that which the enemy devised
for her destruction; in accordance with that word of the apostle's, "There
must be heresies, that they which are approved may be made manifest among
you"?

CHAP. 26 [XXIII.]--THE PELAGIANS MAINTAIN
THAT RAISING QUESTIONS ABOUT ORIGINAL SIN DOES NOT ENDANGER THE FAITH.

Therefore, after the full discussion with
which we have been able to rebut in writing this error of theirs, which
is so inimical to the grace of God bestowed on small and great through
our Lord Jesus Christ, it is now our duty to examine and explode that assertion
of theirs, which in their desire to avoid the odious imputation of heresy
they astutely advance, to the effect that "calling this subject into question
produces no danger to the faith,"--in order that they may appear, forsooth,
if they are convicted of having deviated from it, to have erred not criminally,
but only, as it were, courteously. This, accordingly, is the language which
Coelestius used in the ecclesiastical process at Carthage: "As touching
the transmission of sin," he said, "I have already said that I have heard
many persons of acknowledged position in the catholic Church deny it, and
on the other hand many affirm it; it may fairly, indeed, be deemed a matter
for inquiry, but not a heresy. I have always maintained that infants require
baptism, and ought to be baptized. What else does he want?" He said this,
as if he wanted to intimate that only then could he be deemed chargeable
with heresy, if he were to assert that they ought not to be baptized. As
the case stood, however, inasmuch as he acknowledged that they ought to
be baptized, he thought that he had not erred [criminally], and therefore
ought not to be adjudged a heretic, even though he maintained the reason
of their baptism to be other than the truth holds, or the faith claims
as its own. On the same principle, in the book which he sent to Rome, he
first explained his belief, so far as it suited his pleasure, from the
Trinity of the One Godhead down to the kind of resurrection of the dead
that is to be; on all which points, however, no one had ever questioned
him, or been questioned by him. And when his discourse reached the question
which was under consideration, he said: "If, indeed, any questions have
arisen beyond the compass of the faith, on which there might be perhaps
dissension on the part of a great many persons, in no case have I pretended
to pronounce a decision on any dogma, as if I possessed a definitive authority
in the matter myself; but whatever I have derived from the fountain of
the prophets and the apostles, I have presented for approbation to the
judgment of your apostolic office; so that if any error has crept in among
us, human as we are, through our ignorance, it may be corrected by your
sentence." You of course clearly see that in this action of his he used
all this deprecatory preamble in order that, if he had been discovered
to have erred at all, he might seem to have erred not on a matter of faith,
but on questionable points outside the faith; wherein, however necessary
it may be to correct the error, it is not corrected as a heresy; wherein
also the person who undergoes the correction is declared indeed to be in
error, but for all that is not adjudged a heretic.

CHAP. 27 [XXIII.]--ON QUESTIONS OUTSIDE THE
FAITH--WHAT THEY ARE, AND INSTANCES OF THE SAME.

But he is greatly mistaken in this opinion.
The questions which he supposes to be outside the faith are of a very different
character from those in which, without any detriment to the faith whereby
we are Christians, there exists either an ignorance of the real fact, and
a consequent suspension of any fixed opinion, or else a conjectural view
of the case, which, owing to the infirmity of human thought, issues in
conceptions at variance with truth: as when a question arises about the
description and locality of that Paradise where God placed man whom He
formed out of the ground, without any disturbance, however, of the Christian
belief that there undoubtedly is such a Paradise; or as when it is asked
where Elijah is at the present moment, and where Enoch--whether in this
Paradise or in some other place, although we doubt not of their existing
still in the same bodies in which they were born; or as when one inquires
whether it was in the body or out of the body that the apostle was caught
up to the third heaven,--an inquiry, however, which betokens great lack
of modesty on the part of those who would fain know what he who is the
subject of the mystery itself expressly declares his ignorance of, without
impairing his own belief of the fact; or as when the question is started,
how many are those heavens, to the "third" of which he tells us that he
was caught up; or whether the elements of this visible world are four or
more; what it is which causes those eclipses of the sun or the moon which
astronomers are in the habit of foretelling for certain appointed seasons;
why, again, men of ancient times lived to the age which Holy Scripture
assigns to them; and whether the period of their puberty, when they begat
their first son, was postponed to an older age, proportioned to their longer
life; or where Methuselah could possibly have lived, since he was not in
the Ark, inasmuch as (according to the chronological notes of most copies
of the Scripture, both Greek and Latin) he is found to have survived the
deluge; or whether we must follow the order of the fewer copies--and they
happen to be extremely few--which so arrange the years as to show that
he died before the deluge. Now who does not feel, amidst the various and
innumerable questions of this sort, which relate either to God's most hidden
operations or to most obscure passages of the Scriptures, and which it
is difficult to embrace and define in any certain way, that ignorance may
on many points be compatible with sound Christian faith, and that occasionally
erroneous opinion may be entertained without any room for the imputation
of heretical doctrine?

CHAP. 28 [XXIV.]--THE HERESY OF PELAGIUS AND
COELESTIUS AIMS AT THE VERY FOUNDATIONS OF OUR FAITH.

This is, however, in the matter of the two
men by one of whom we are sold under sin, by the other redeemed from sins--by
the one have been precipitated into death, by the other are liberated unto
life; the former of whom has ruined us in himself, by doing his own will
instead of His who created him; the latter has saved us in Himself, by
not doing His own will, but the will of Him who sent Him: and it is in
what concerns these two men that the Christian faith properly consists.
For "there is one God, and one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ
Jesus;" since "there is none other name under heaven given to men, whereby
we must be saved;" and "in Him hath God defined unto all men their faith,
in that He hath raised Him from the dead." Now without this faith, that
is to say, without a belief in the one Mediator between God and men, the
man Christ Jesus; without faith, I say, in His resurrection by which God
has given assurance to all men and which no man could of course truly believe
were it not for His incarnation and death; without faith, therefore, in
the incarnation and death and resurrection of Christ, the Christian verity
unhesitatingly declares that the ancient saints could not possibly have
been cleansed from sin so as to have become holy, and justified by the
grace of God. And this is true both of the saints who are mentioned in
Holy Scripture, and of those also who are not indeed mentioned therein,
but must yet be supposed to have existed,--either before the deluge, or
in the interval between that event and the giving of the law, or in the
period of the law itself,--not merely among the children of Israel, as
the prophets, but even outside that nation, as for instance Job. For it
was by the self-same faith. In the one Mediator that the hearts of these,
too, were cleansed, and there also was "shed abroad in them the love of
God by the Holy Ghost," "who bloweth where He listeth," not following men's
merits, but even producing these very merits Himself. For the grace of
God will in no wise exist unless it be wholly free.

CHAP. 29.--THE RIGHTEOUS MEN WHO LIVED IN
THE TIME OF THE LAW WERE FOR ALL THAT NOT UNDER THE LAW, BUT UNDER GRACE.
THE GRACE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT HIDDEN UNDER THE OLD.

Death indeed reigned from Adam until Moses,
because it was not possible even for the law given through Moses to overcome
it: it was not given, in fact, as something able to give life; but as something
that ought to show those that were dead and for whom grace was needed to
give them life, that they were not only prostrated under the propagation
and domination of sin, but also convicted by the additional guilt of breaking
the law itself: not in order that any one might perish who in the mercy
of God understood this even in that early age; but that, destined though
he was to punishment, owing to the dominion of death, and manifested, too,
as guilty through his own violation of the law, he might seek God's help,
and so where sin abounded, grace might much more abound, even the grace
which alone delivers from the body of this death. [XXV.] Yet, notwithstanding
this, although not even the law which Moses gave was able to liberate any
man from the dominion of death, there were even then, too, at the time
of the law, men of God who were not living under the terror and conviction
and punishment of the law, but under the delight and healing and liberation
of grace. Some there were who said, "I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin
did my mother conceive me;" and, "There is no rest in my bones, by reason
of my sins;" and, "Create in me a clean heart, O God; and renew a right
spirit in my inward parts;" and, "Stablish me with Thy directing Spirit;"
and, "Take not Thy Holy Spirit from me." There were some, again, who said:
"I believed, therefore have I spoken." For they too were cleansed with
the self-same faith with which we ourselves are. Whence the apostle also
says: "We having the same spirit of faith, according as it is written,
I believe, and therefore have I spoken; we also believe, and therefore
speak." Out of very faith was it said, "Behold, a virgin shall conceive
and bear a son, and they shall call His name Emmanuel," "which is, being
interpreted, God with us." Out of very faith too was it said concerning
Him: "As a bridegroom He cometh out of His chamber; as a giant did He exult
to run His course. His going forth is from the extremity of heaven, and
His circuit runs to the other end of heaven; and no one is hidden from
His heat." Out of very faith, again, was it said to Him: "Thy throne, O
God, is for ever and ever; a sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of
Thy kingdom. Thou hast loved righteousness, and hated iniquity; therefore
God, Thy God, hath anointed Thee with the oil of gladness above Thy fellows."
By the self-same Spirit of faith were all these things foreseen by them
as to happen, whereby they are believed by us as having happened. They,
indeed, who were able in faithful love to foretell these things to us were
not themselves partakers of them. The Apostle Peter says, "Why tempt ye
God to put a yoke upon the neck of the disciples, which neither our fathers
nor we were able to bear? But we believe that through the grace of the
Lord Jesus Christ we shall be saved, even as they." Now on what principle
does he make this statement, if it be not because even they were saved
through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and not the law of Moses, from
which comes not the cure, but only the knowledge of sin? Now, however,
the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed
by the law and the prophets. If, therefore, it is now manifested, it even
then existed, but it was hidden. This concealment was symbolized by the
veil of the temple. When Christ was dying, this veil was rent asunder,
to signify the full revelation of Him. Even of old, therefore there existed
amongst the people of God this grace of the one Mediator between God and
men, the man Christ Jesus; but like the rain in the fleece which God sets
apart for His inheritance, not of debt, but of His own will, it was latently
present, but is now patently visible amongst all nations as its "floor,"
the fleece being dry,--in other Words, the Jewish people having become
reprobate.

CHAP. 30 [XXVI]--PELAGIUS AND COELESTIUSDENY
THAT THE ANCIENT SAINTS WERE SAVED BY CHRIST.

We must not therefore divide the times, as
Pelagius and his disciples do, who say that men first lived righteously
by nature, then under the law, thirdly under grace,--by nature meaning
all the long time from Adam before the giving of the law. "For then," say
they, "the Creator was known by the guidance of reason; and the rule of
living rightly was carried written in the hearts of men, not in the law
of the letter, but of nature. But men's manners became corrupt; and then,"
they say, "when nature now tarnished began to be insufficient, the law
was added to it whereby as by a moon the original lustre was restored to
nature after its blush was impaired. But after the habit of sinning had
too much prevailed among men, and the law was unequal to the task of curing
it, Christ came; and the Physician Himself, through His own self, and not
through His disciples, brought relief to the malady at its most desperate
development."

CHAP. 31.--CHRIST'S INCARNATION WAS OF AVAIL
TO THE FATHERS, EVEN THOUGH IT HAD NOT YET HAPPENED.

By disputation of this sort, they attempt
to exclude the ancient saints from the grace of the Mediator, as if the
man Christ Jesus were not the Mediator between God and those men; on the
ground that, not having yet taken flesh of the Virgin's womb, He was not
yet man at the time when those righteous men lived. If this, however, were
true, in vain would the apostle say: "By man came death, by man came also
the resurrection of the dead; for as in Adam all die, even so in Christ
shall all be made alive." For inasmuch as those ancient saints, according
to the vain conceits of these men, found their nature self-sufficient,
and required not the man Christ to be their Mediator to reconcile them
to God, so neither shall they be made alive in Him, to whose body they
are shown not to belong as members, according to the statement that it
was on man's account that He became man. If, however, as the Truth says
through His apostles, even as all die in Adam, even so shall all be made
alive in Christ; forasmuch as the resurrection of the dead comes through
the one man, even as death comes through the other man; what Christian
man can be bold enough to doubt that even those righteous men who pleased
God in the more remote periods of the human race are destined to attain
to the resurrection of eternal life, and not eternal death, because they
shall be made alive in Christ? that they are made alive in Christ, because
they belong to the body of Christ? that they belong to the body of Christ,
because Christ is the head even to them? and that Christ is the head even
to them, because there is but one Mediator between God and men, the man
Christ Jesus? But this He could not have been to them, unless through His
grace they had believed in His resurrection. And how could they have done
this, if they had been ignorant that He was to come in the flesh, and if
they had not by this faith lived justly and piously? Now, if the incarnation
of Christ could be of no concern to them, on the ground that it had not
yet come about, it must follow that Christ's judgment can be of no concern
to us, because it has not yet taken place. But if we shall stand at the
right hand of Christ through our faith in His judgment, which has not yet
transpired, but is to come to pass, it follows that those ancient saints
are members of Christ through their faith in His resurrection, which had
not in their day happened, but which was one day to come to pass.

CHAP. 32 [XXVII.]--HE SHOWS BY THE EXAMPLE
OF ABRAHAM THAT THE ANCIENT SAINTS BELIEVED IN THE INCARNATION OF CHRIST.

For it must not be supposed that those saints
of old only profited by Christ's divinity, which was ever existent, and
not also by the revelation of His humanity, which had not yet come to pass.
What the Lord Jesus says, "Abraham desired to see my day, and he saw it,
and was glad," meaning by the phrase his day to understand his time, affords
of course a clear testimony that Abraham was fully imbued with belief in
His incarnation. It is in respect of this that He has a "time;" for His
divinity exceeds all time, for it was by it that all times were created.
If, however, any one supposes that the phrase in question must be understood
of that eternal "day" which is limited by no morrow, and preceded by no
yesterday,--in a word, of the very eternity in which He is co-eternal with
the Father,--how would Abraham really desire this, unless he was aware
that there was to be a future mortality belonging to Him whose eternity
he wished for ? Or, perhaps, some one would confine the meaning of the
phrase so far as to say, that nothing else is meant in the Lord's saying,
"He desired to see my day," than "He desired to see me," who am the never-ending
Day, or the unfailing Light, as when we mention the life of the Son, concerning
which it is said in the Gospel "So hath He given to the Son to have life
in Himself." Here the life is nothing less than Himself. So we understand
the Son Himself to be the life, when He said, "I am the way, the truth,
and the life; " of whom also it was said "He is the true God, and eternal
life." Supposing, then, that Abraham desired to see this equal divinity
of the Son's with the Father, without any precognition of His coming in
the flesh--as certain philosophers sought Him, who knew nothing of His
flesh--can that other act of Abraham, when he orders his servant to place
his hand under his thigh, and to swear by the God of heaven, be rightly
understood by any one otherwise than as showing that Abraham well knew
that the flesh in which the God of heaven was to come was the offspring
of that very thigh ?

CHAP. 33 [XVIII.]--HOW CHRIST IS OUR MEDIATOR.

Of this flesh and blood Melchizedek also,
when he blessed Abram himself,6 gave the testimony which is very well known
to Christian believers, so that long afterwards it was said to Christ in
the Psalms: "Thou art a Priest for ever, after the order of Melchizedek."
This was not then an accomplished fact, but was still future; yet that
faith of the fathers, which is the self-same faith as our own, used to
chant it. Now, to all who find death in Adam, Christ is of this avail,
that He is the Mediator for life. He is, however, not a Mediator, because
He is equal with the Father; for in this respect He is Himself as far distant
from us as the Father; and how can there be any medium where the distance
is the very same? Therefore the apostle does not say, "There is one Mediator
between God and men, even Jesus Christ;" but his words are, "The MAN Christ
Jesus." He is the Mediator, then, in that He is man,--inferior to the Father,
by so much as He is nearer to ourselves, and superior to us, by so much
as He is nearer to the Father. This is more openly expressed thus: "He
is inferior to the Father, because in the form of a servant;" superior
to us, because without spot of sin.

CHAP. 34 [XXIX.] --NO MAN EVER SAVED SAVE
BY CHRIST.

Now, whoever maintains that human nature at
any period required not the second Adam for its physician, because it was
not corrupted in the first Adam, is convicted as an enemy to the grace
of God; not in a question where doubt or error might be compatible with
soundness of belief, but in that very rule of faith which makes us Christians.
How happens it, then, that the human nature, which first existed, is praised
by these men as being so far less tainted with evil manners? How is it
that they overlook the fact that men were even then sunk in so many intolerable
sins, that, with the exception of one man of God and his wife, and three
sons and their wives, the whole world was in God's just judgment destroyed
by the flood, even as the little land of Sodom was afterwards with fire?
From the moment, then, when "by one man sin entered into the world, and
death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all sinned," the
entire mass of our nature was ruined beyond doubt, and fell into the possession
of its destroyer. And from him no one--no, not one--has been delivered,
or is being delivered, or ever will be delivered, except by the grace of
the Redeemer.

CHAP. 35 [XXX.]--WHY THE CIRCUMCISION OF INFANTS
WAS ENJOINED UNDER PAIN OF SO GREAT A PUNISHMENT.

The Scripture does not inform us whether before
Abraham's time righteous men or their children were marked by any bodily
or visible sign.12 Abraham himself, indeed, received the sign of circumcision,
a seal of the righteousness of faith. And he received it with this accompanying
injunction: All the male infants of his household were from that very time
to be circumcised, while fresh from their mother's womb, on the eighth
day from their birth; so that even they who were not yet able with the
heart to believe unto righteousness, should nevertheless receive the seal
of the righteousness of faith.

And this command was imposed with so fearful
a sanction, that God said: "That soul shall be cut off from his people,
whose flesh of his foreskin is not circumcised on the eighth day."1 If
inquiry be made into the justice of so terrible a penalty, will not the
entire argument of these men about free will, and the laudable soundness
and purity of nature, however cleverly maintained, fall to pieces, struck
down and fractured to atoms? For, pray tell me, what evil has an infant
committed of his own will, that, for the negligence of another in not circumcising
him, he himself must be condemned, and with so severe a condemnation, that
soul must be cut off from his people? It was not of any temporal death
that this fear was inflicted, since of righteous persons, when they died,
it used rather to be said, "And he was gathered unto his people;" or, "He
was gathered to his fathers:" for no attempt to separate a man from his
people is long formidable to him, when his own people is itself the people
of God.

CHAP. 36 [XXXI]--THE PLATONISTS' OPINION ABOUT
THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL PREVIOUS TO THE BODY REJECTED.

What, then, is the purport of so severe a
condemnation, when no wilful sin has been committed? For it is not as certain
Platonists have thought, because every such infant is thus requited in
his soul for what it did of its own wilfulness previous to the present
life, as having possessed previous to its present bodily state a free choice
of living either well or ill; since the Apostle Paul says most plainly,
that before they were born they did neither good nor evil.4 On what account,
therefore, is an infant rightly punished with such ruin, if it be not because
he belongs to the mass of perdition, and is properly regarded as born of
Adam, condemned under the bond of the ancient debt unless he has been released
from the bond, not according to debt, but according to grace? And what
grace but God's, through our Lord Jesus Christ? Now there was a forecast
of His coming undoubtedly contained not only in other sacred institutions
of the ancient Jews, but also in their circumcision of the foreskin. For
the eighth day, in the recurrence of weeks, became the Lord's day, on which
the Lord arose from the dead; and Christ was the rock whence was formed
the stony blade for the circumcision; and the flesh of the foreskin was
the body of sin.

CHAP. 37 [XXXII.]--IN WHAT SENSE CHRIST IS
CALLED "SIN."

There was a change of the sacramental ordinances
made after the coming of Him whose advent they prefigured; but there was
no change in the Mediator's help, who, even previous to His coming in the
flesh, all along delivered the ancient members of His body by their faith
in His incarnation; and in respect of ourselves too, though we were dead
in sins and in the uncircumcision of our flesh, we are quickened together
in Christ, in whom we are circumcised with the circumcision not made with
the hand, but such as was prefigured by the old manual circumcision, that
the body of sin might be done away which was born with us from Adam. The
propagation of a condemned origin condemns us, unless we are cleansed by
the likeness of sinful flesh, in which He was sent without sin, who nevertheless
concerning sin condemned sin, having been made sin for us.10 Accordingly
the apostle says: "We beseech you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled unto
God. For He hath made Him to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might
be made the righteousness of God in Him." God, therefore, to whom we are
reconciled, has made Him to be sin for us,--that is to say, a sacrifice
by which our sins may be remitted; for by sins are designated the sacrifices
for sins. And indeed He was sacrificed for our sins, the only one among
men who had no sins, even as in those early times one was sought for among
the flocks to prefigure the Faultless One who was to come to heal our offences.
On whatever day, therefore, an infant may be baptized after his birth,
he is as if circumcised on the eighth day; inasmuch as he is circumcised
in Him who rose again the third day indeed after He was crucified, but
the eighth according to the weeks. He is circumcised for the putting off
of the body of sin; in other words, that the grace of spiritual regeneration
may do away with the debt which the contagion of carnal generation contracted.
"For no one is pure from uncleanness" (what uncleanness, pray, but that
of sin?), "not even the infant, whose life is but that of a single day
upon the earth."

CHAP. 38 [XXXIII.]--ORIGINAL SIN DOES NOT
RENDER MARRIAGE EVIL.

But they argue thus, saying: "Is not, then,
marriage an evil, and the man that is produced by marriage not God's work?"
As if the good of the married life were that disease of concupiscence with
which they who know not God love their wives--a course which the apostle
forbids; and not rather that conjugal chastity, by which carnal lust is
reduced to the good purposes of the appointed procreation of children.
Or as if, forsooth, a man could possibly be anything but God's work, not
only when born in wedlock, but even if he be produced in fornication or
adultery. In the present inquiry, however, when the question is not for
what a Creator is necessary, but for what a Saviour, we have not to consider
what good there is in the procreation of nature, but what evil there is
in sin, whereby our nature has been certainly corrupted. No doubt the two
are generated simultaneously--both nature and nature's corruption; one
of which is good, the other evil. The one comes to us from the bounty of
the Creator, the other is contracted from the condemnation of our origin;
the one has its cause in the good-will of the Supreme God, the other in
the depraved will of the first man; the one exhibits God as the maker of
the creature, the other exhibits God as the punisher of disobedience: in
short, the very same Christ was the maker of man for the creation of the
one, and was made man for the healing of the other.

CHAP. 39 [XXXIV.]--THREE THINGS GOOD AND LAUDABLE
IN MATRIMONY.

Marriage, therefore, is a good in all the
things which are proper to the married state. And these are three: it is
the ordained means of procreation, it is the guarantee of chastity, it
is the bond of union. In respect of its ordination for generation the Scripture
says, " I will therefore that the younger women marry, bear children, guide
the house;''4 as regards its guaranteeing chastity, it is said of it, "The
wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband; and likewise also
the husband hath not power of his own body, but the wife;" and considered
as the bond of union: "What God hath joined together, let not man put asunder."
Touching these points, we do not forget that we have treated at sufficient
length, with whatever ability the Lord has given us, in other works of
ours, which are not unknown to you. In relation to them all the Scripture
has this general praise: "Marriage is honourable in all, and the bed undefiled."
For, inasmuch as the wedded state is good, insomuch does it produce a very
large amount of good in respect of the evil of concupiscence; for it is
not lust, but reason, which makes a good use of concupiscence. Now lust
lies in that law of the "disobedient" members which the apostle notes as
"warring against the law of the mind;" whereas reason lies in that law
of the wedded state which makes good use of concupiscence. If, however,
it were impossible for any good to arise out of evil, God could not create
man out of the embraces of adultery. As, therefore, the damnable evil of
adultery, whenever man is born in it, is not chargeable on God, who certainly
amidst man's evil work actually produces a good work; so, likewise, all
which causes shame in that rebellion of the members which brought the accusing
blush on those who after their sin covered these members with the fig-tree
leaves, is not laid to the charge of marriage, by virtue of which the conjugal
embrace is not only allowable, but is even useful and honourable; but it
is imputable to the sin of that disobedience which was followed by the
penalty of man's finding his own members emulating against himself that
very disobedience which he had practised against God. Then, abashed at
their action, since they moved no more at the bidding of his rational will,
but at their own arbitrary choice as it were, instigated by lust, he devised
the covering which should conceal such of them as he judged to be worthy
of shame. For man, as the handiwork of God, deserved not confusion of face;
nor were the members which it seemed fit to the Creator to form and appoint
by any means designed to bring the blush to the creature. Accordingly,
that simple nudity was displeasing neither to God nor to man: there was
nothing to be ashamed of, because nothing at first accrued which deserved
punishment.

CHAP. 40 [XXXV.]--MARRIAGE EXISTED BEFORE
SIN WAS COMMITTED. HOW GOD'S BLESSING OPERATED IN OUR FIRST PARENTS.

There was, however, undoubtedly marriage,
even when sin had no prior existence; and for no other reason was it that
woman, and not a second man, was created as a help for the man. Moreover,
those words of God, "Be fruitful and multiply," are not prophetic of sins
to be condemned, but a benediction upon the fertility of marriage. For
by these ineffable words of His, I mean by the divine methods which are
inherent in the truth of His wisdom by which all things were made, God
endowed the primeval pair with their seminal power. Suppose, however, that
nature had not been dishonoured by sin, God forbid that we should think
that marriages in Paradise must have been such, that in them the procreative
members would be excited by the mere ardour of lust, and not by the command
of the will for producing offspring,--as the foot is for walking, the hand
for labour, and the tongue for speech. Nor, as now happens, would the chastity
of virginity be corrupted to the conception of offspring by the force of
a turbid heat, but it would rather be submissive to the power of the gentlest
love; and thus there would be no pain, no blood-effusion of the concumbent
virgin, as there would also be no groan of the parturient mother. This,
however, men refuse to believe, because it has not been verified in the
actual condition of our mortal state. Nature, having been vitiated by sin,
has never experienced an instance of that primeval purity. But we speak
to faithful men, who have learnt to believe the inspired Scriptures, even
though no examples are adduced of actual reality. For how could I now possibly
prove that a man was made of the dust, without any parents, and a wife
formed for him out of his own side? And yet faith takes on trust what the
eye no longer discovers.

CHAP. 41 [XXXVI.]--LUST AND TRAVAIL COME FROM
SIN. WHENCE OUR MEMBERS BECAME A CAUSE OF SHAME.

Granted, therefore, that we have no means
of showing both that the nuptial acts of that primeval marriage were quietly
discharged, undisturbed by lustful passion, and that the motion of the
organs of generation, like that of any other members of the body, was not
instigated by the ardour of lust, but directed by the choice of the will
(which would have continued such with marriage had not the disgrace of
sin intervened); still, from all that is stated in the sacred Scriptures
on divine authority, we have reasonable grounds for believing that such
was the original condition of wedded life. Although, it is true, I am not
told that the nuptial embrace was unattended with prurient desire; as also
I do not find it on record that parturition was unaccompanied with groans
and pain, or that actual birth led not to future death; yet, at the same
time, if I follow the verity of the Holy Scriptures, the travail of the
mother and the death of the human offspring would never have supervened
if sin had not preceded. Nor would that have happened which abashed the
man and woman when they covered their loins; because in the same sacred
records it is expressly written that the sin was first committed, and then
immediately followed this hiding of their shame. For unless some indelicacy
of motion had announced to their eyes--which were of course not closed,
though not open to this point, that is, not attentive--that those particular
members should be corrected, they would not have perceived anything on
their own persons, which God had entirely made worthy of all praise, that
called for either shame or concealment. If, indeed, the sin had not first
occurred which they had dared to commit in their disobedience, there would
not have followed the disgrace which their shame would fain conceal.

CHAP. 42 [XXXVII.]--THE EVIL OF LUST OUGHT
NOT TO BE ASCRIBED TO MARRIAGE. THE THREE GOOD RESULTS OF THE NUPTIAL ORDINANCE:
OFFSPRING, CHASTITY, AND THE SACRAMENTAL UNION.

It is then manifest that must not be laid
to the account of marriage, even in the absence of which, marriage would
still have existed. The good of marriage is not taken away by the evil,
although the evil is by marriage turned to a good use. Such, however, is
the present condition of mortal men, that the connubial intercourse and
lust are at the same time in action; and on this account it happens, that
as the lust is blamed, so also the nuptial commerce, however lawful and
honourable, is thought to be reprehensible by those persons who either
are unwilling or unable to draw the distinction between them. They are,
moreover, inattentive to that good of the nuptial state which is the glory
of matrimony; I mean offspring, chastity, and the pledge. The evil, however,
at which even marriage blushes for shame is not the fault of marriage,
but of the lust of the flesh. Yet because without this evil it is impossible
to effect the good purpose of marriage, even the procreation of children,
whenever this process is approached, secrecy is sought, witnesses removed,
and even the presence of the very children which happen to be born of the
process is avoided as soon as they reach the age of observation. Thus it
comes to pass that marriage is permitted to effect all that is lawful in
its state, only it must not forget to conceal all that is improper. Hence
it follows that infants, although incapable of sinning, are yet not born
without the contagion of sin,--not, indeed, because of what is lawful,
but on account of that which is unseemly: for from what is lawful nature
is born; from what is unseemly, sin. Of the nature so born, God is the
Author, who created man, and who united male and female under tile nuptial
law; but of the sin the author is the subtlety of the devil who deceives,
and the will of the man who consents.

CHAP. 43 [XXXVIII.]-- HUMAN OFFSPRING, EVEN
PREVIOUS TO BIRTH, UNDER CONDEMNATION AT THE VERY ROOT. USES OF MATRIMONY
UNDERTAKEN FOR MERE PLEASURE NOT WITHOUT VENIAL FAULT.

Where God did nothing else than by a just
sentence to condemn the man who wilfully sins, together with his stock;
there also, as a matter of course, whatsoever was even not yet born is
justly condemned in its sinful root. In this condemned stock carnal generation
holds every man; and from it nothing but spiritual regeneration liberates
him. In the case, therefore, of regenerate parents, if they continue in
the same state of grace, it will undoubtedly work no injurious consequence,
by reason of the remission of sins which has been bestowed upon them, unless
they make a perverse use of it,--not alone all kinds of lawless corruptions,
but even in the marriage state itself, whenever husband and wife toil at
procreation, not from the desire of natural propagation of their species,
but are mere slaves to the gratification of their lust out of very wantonness.
As for the permission which the apostle gives to husbands and wives, "not
to defraud one another, except with consent for a time, that they may have
leisure for prayer," 1 he concedes it by way of indulgent allowance, and
not as a command; but this very form of the concession evidently implies
some degree of fault. The connubial embrace, however, which marriage-contracts
point to as intended for the procreation of children, considered in itself
simply, and without any reference to fornication, is good and right; because,
although it is by reason of this body of death (which is unrenewed as yet
by the resurrection) impracticable without a certain amount of bestial
motion, which puts human nature to the blush, yet the embrace is not after
all a sin in itself, when reason applies the concupiscence to a good end,
and is not overmastered to evil.

CHAP. 44 [XXXIX.]--EVEN THE CHILDREN OF THE
REGENERATE BORN IN SIN. THE EFFECT OF BAPTISM.

This concupiscence of the flesh would be prejudicial,[*]
just in so far as it is present in us,[*] if the remission of sins were
not so beneficial[*] that while it is present in men, both as born and
as born again, it may in the former be prejudicial as well as present,
but in the latter present simply but never prejudicial. In the unregenerate
it is prejudicial to such an extent indeed, that, unless they are born
again, no advantage can accrue to them from being born of regenerate parents.
The fault of our nature remains in our offspring so deeply impressed as
to make it guilty, even when the guilt of the self-same fault has been
washed away in the parent by the remission of sins-- until every defect
which ends in sin by the consent of the human will is consumed and done
away in the last regeneration. This will be identical with that renovation
of the very flesh itself which is promised in its future resurrection,
when we shall not only commit no sins, but be even free from those corrupt
desires which lead us to sin by yielding consent to them. To this blessed
consummation advances are even now made by us, through the grace of that
holy layer which we have put within our reach. The same regeneration which
now renews our spirit, so that all our past sins are remitted, will by
and by also operate, as might be expected, to the renewal to eternal life
of that very flesh, by the resurrection of which to an incorruptible state
the incentives of all sins will be purged out of our nature. But this salvation
is as yet only accomplished in hope: it is not realized in fact; it is
not in present possession, but it is looked forward to with patience. [XL.]
And thus there is a whole and perfect cleansing, in the self-same baptismal
layer, not only of all the sins remitted now in our baptism, which make
us guilty owing to the consent we yield to wrong desires, and to the sinful
acts in which they issue; but of these said wrong desires also, which,
if not consented to by us, would contract no guilt of sin, and which, though
not in this present life removed, will yet have no existence in the life
beyond.

CHAP. 45.--MAN'S DELIVERANCE SUITED TO THE
CHARACTER OF HIS CAPTIVITY.

The guilt, therefore, of that corruption of
which we are speaking will remain in the carnal offspring of the regenerate,
until in them also it be washed away in the layer of regeneration. A regenerate
man does not regenerate, but generates, sons according to the flesh; and
thus he transmits to his posterity, not the condition of the regenerated,
but only of the generated. Therefore, be a man guilty of unbelief, or a
perfect believer, he does not in either case beget faithful children, but
sinners; in the same way that the seeds, not only of a wild olive, but
also of a cultivated one, produce not cultivated olives, but wild ones.
So, likewise, his first birth holds a man in that bondage from which nothing
but his second birth delivers him. The devil holds him, Christ liberates
him: Eve's deceiver holds him, Mary's Son frees him: he holds him, who
approached the man through the woman; He frees him, who was born of a woman
that never approached a man: he holds him, who injected into the woman
the cause of lust; He liberates him, who without any lust was conceived
in the woman. The former was able to hold all men in his grasp through
one; nor does any deliver them out of his power but One, whom he was unable
to grasp. The very sacraments indeed of the Church, which she administers
with due ceremony, according to the authority of very ancient tradition
(so that these men, notwithstanding their opinion that the sacraments are
imitatively rather than really used in the case of infants, still do not
venture to reject them with open disapproval),--the very sacraments, I
say, of the holy Church show plainly enough that infants, even when fresh
from the womb, are delivered from the bondage of the devil through the
grace of Christ. For, to say nothing of the fact that they are baptized
for the remission of sins by no fallacious, but by a true and faithful
mystery, there is previously wrought on them the exorcism and the exsufflation
of the hostile power, which they profess to renounce by the mouth of those
who bring them to baptism. Now, by all these consecrated and evident signs
of hidden realities, they are shown to pass from their worst oppressor
to their most excellent Redeemer, who, by taking on Himself our infirmity
in our behalf, has bound the strong man, that He may spoil his goods; seeing
that the weakness of God is stronger, not only than men, but also than
angels. While, therefore, God delivers small as well as great, He shows
in both instances that the apostle spoke under the direction of the Truth.
For it is not merely adults, but little babes too whom He rescues from
the power of darkness, in order to transfer them to the kingdom of God's
dear Son.2

CHAP. 46.--DIFFICULTY OF BELIEVING ORIGINAL
SIN. MAN'S VICE IS A BEAST'S NATURE.

No one should feel surprise, and ask: "Why
does God's goodness create anything for the devil's malignity to take possession
of?" The truth is, God's gift is bestowed on the seminal elements of His
creature with the same bounty wherewith "He maketh His sun to rise on the
evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust."
It is with so large a bounty that God has blessed the very seeds, and by
blessing has constituted them. Nor has this blessing been eliminated out
of our excellent nature by a fault which puts us under condemnation. Owing,
indeed, to God's justice, who punishes, this fatal flaw has so far prevailed,
that men are born with the fault of original sin; but yet its influence
has not extended so far as to stop the birth of men. Just so does it happen
in persons of adult age: whatever sins they commit, do not eliminate his
manhood from man; nay, God's work continues still good, however evil be
the deeds of the impious. For although "man being placed in honour abideth
not; and being without understanding, is compared with the beasts, and
is like them," 4 yet the resemblance is not so absolute that he becomes
a beast. There is a comparison, no doubt, between the two; but it is not
by reason of nature, but through vice--not vice in the beast, but in nature.
For so excellent is a man in comparison with a beast, that man's vice is
beast's nature; still man's nature is never on this account changed into
beast's nature. God, therefore, condemns man because of the fault wherewithal
his nature is disgraced, and not because of his nature, which is not destroyed
in consequence of its fault. Heaven forbid that we should think beasts
are obnoxious to the sentence of condemnation! It is only proper that they
should be free from our misery, inasmuch as they cannot partake of our
blessedness. What, then, is there surprising or unjust in man's being subjected
to an impure spirit--not on account of nature, but on account of that impurity
of his which he has contracted in the stain of his birth, and which proceeds,
not from the divine work, but from the will of man;--since also the impure
spirit itself is a good thing considered as spirit, but evil in that it
is impure? For the one is of God, and is His work, while the other emanates
from man's own will. The stronger nature, therefore, that is, the angelic
one, keeps the lower, or human, nature in subjection, by reason of the
association of vice with the latter. Accordingly the Mediator, who was
stronger than the angels, became weak for man's sake.5 So that the pride
of the Destroyer is destroyed by the humility of the Redeemer; and he who
makes his boast over the sons of men of his angelic strength, is vanquished
by the Son of God in the human weakness which He assumed.

CHAP. 47 [XLI.]--SENTENCES FROM AMBROSE IN
FAVOUR OF ORIGINAL SIN.

And now that we are about to bring this book
to a conclusion, we think it proper to do on this subject of Original Sin
what we did before in our treatise On Grace, --adduce in evidence against
the injurious talk of these persons that servant of God, the Archbishop
Ambrose, whose faith is proclaimed by Pelagius to be the most perfect among
the writers of the Latin Church; for grace is more especially honoured
in doing away with original sin. In the work which the saintly Ambrose
wrote, Concerning the Resurrection, he says: "I fell in Adam, in Adam was
I expelled from Paradise, in Adam I died; and He does not recall me unless
He has found me in Adam,--so as that, as I am obnoxious to the guilt of
sin in him, and subject to death, I may be also justified in Christ." Then,
again, writing against the Novatians, he says: "We men are all of us born
in sin; our very origin is in sin; as you may read when David says, 'Behold,
I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me.' Hence
it is that Paul's flesh is 'a body of death;' even as he says himself,
'Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?' Christ's flesh, however,
has condemned sin, which He experienced not by being born, and which by
dying He crucified, that in our flesh there might be justification through
grace, where previously there was impurity through sin.'' The same holy
man also, in his Exposition Isaiah, speaking of Christ, says: "Therefore
as man He was tried in all things, and in the likeness of men He endured
all things; but as born of the Spirit, He was free from sin. For every
man is a liar, and no one but God alone is without sin. It is therefore
an observed and settled fact, that no man born of a man and a woman, that
is, by means of their bodily union, is seen to be free from sin. Whosoever,
indeed, is free from sin, is free also from a conception and birth of this
kind.'' Moreover, when expounding the Gospel according to Luke, he says:
"It was no cohabitation with a husband which opened the secrets of the
Virgin's womb; rather was it the Holy Ghost which infused immaculate seed
into her unviolated womb. For the Lord Jesus alone of those who are born
of woman is holy, inasmuch as He experienced not the contact of earthly
corruption, by reason of the novelty of His immaculate birth; nay, He repelled
it by His heavenly majesty."

CHAP. 48.--PELAGIUS RIGHTLY CONDEMNED AND
REALLY OPPOSED BY AMBROSE.

These words, however, of the man of God are
contradicted by Pelagius, notwithstanding all his commendation of his author,
when he himself declares that "we are procreated, as without virtue, so
without vice." What remains, then, but that Pelagius should condemn and
renounce this error of his; or else be sorry that he has quoted Ambrose
in the way he has? Inasmuch, however, as the blessed Ambrose, catholic
bishop as he is, has expressed himself in the above-quoted passages in
accordance with the catholic faith, it follows that Pelagius, along with
his disciple Coelestius, was justly condemned by the authority of the catholic
Church for having turned aside from the true way of faith, since he repented
not for having bestowed commendation on Ambrose, and for having at the
same time entertained opinions in opposition to him. I know full well with
what insatiable avidity you s read whatever is written for edification
and in confirmation of the faith; but yet, notwithstanding its utility
as contributing to such an end, I must at last bring this treatise to a
conclusion.