African National Congress

Expatriate Scots everywhere will have followed the dramatic victory of the SNP at the recent Holyrood polls with interest. And they will not have been alone. I suspect that party political strategists from every corner of the globe will have looked to learn from the success of the nationalists.

Here in South Africa, for example, the leading opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), has recently made electoral gains in Cape Town and the Western Cape that, in many ways, have mirrored the growth of the SNP in Scotland.

Many in the SNP and the DA will probably object to the comparison, as they occupy very different political and ideological spaces. Nonetheless, they have used similar strategies in ascending to power. Both parties got their first taste of government at the head of minority administrations and both exploited the resulting credibility boost to take overall majorities at their respective recent elections.

At the 2006 municipal elections, the DA won the most votes in Cape Town – but, like the SNP in 2007, fell short of a majority. It was enough, however, for the DA’s mayoral candidate (and now party leader) Helen Zille to wrest control of the council from the incumbent African National Congress (ANC).

A minority administration was formed with the support of several smaller parties. Five years of largely effective civic government followed, which were recognised in 2008 when Zille won the World Mayor of the Year award.

Like the SNP, the DA’s first term in office in Cape Town ended in May this year, when their record was put before the electorate as part of nationwide mid-term council elections.

Capetonians clearly liked what they had seen, because the DA was returned with an impressive 61 per cent of the vote and was able to take absolute control of the city for the first time.

Outside Cape Town and the Western Cape, the national results of the 18 May elections may suggest that little has changed. As expected, the ANC swept the board in terms of the national vote with over 63 per cent support and has retained overall control of the vast majority of councils. However, dig a little deeper and the results indicate that the old voting patterns may be starting to change.

The DA has consolidated its position as the single nationally competitive opposition party. With one in four voters nationwide, it is now challenging strongly in many areas and has largely obliterated or absorbed the remaining opposition parties. Most significantly, for the first time it is attracting measurable – if still small – numbers of black voters and is even now winning wards with largely black electorates.

Nonetheless, these gains must still be put into the perspective. Like Old Labour in the Scotland of yesteryear, the South African political landscape remains completely dominated by the ANC. The old adage that Labour used to “weigh rather than count” their votes in Glasgow may no longer apply, but it certainly holds true in large parts of South Africa, where the ANC piles up majorities that would make even Robert Mugabe blush.

When it kicks into gear, the ANC has one of the most effective electoral machines on the continent and one of the world’s strongest political brands. Its core strengths have always been its unmatched “struggle history”, the power and patronage that it can deploy – and, if all else fails, the option to play the “race card” in mobilising its support.

This final “strength” is made possible by to the uncomfortable reality that South African political allegiances remain inextricably linked with identity and race. Whatever their misgivings, black South Africans invariably vote ANC, while white South Africans generally vote for one of the opposition parties. The result is that an election here has traditionally been little more than a racial census.

However, indications from the 2011 election are that this pattern may be weakening – and this has got the ANC leadership worried. The ANC’s traditional strengths of history, power and racial solidarity may, over time, emerge as the movement’s Achilles’ heel.

By its nature, history is always receding into the past. The allegiances forged in the struggle against apartheid will remain forever with the older generation, yet mean less and less to first-time voters. Senior ANC politicians have continued to remind people “not to forget your history”, but these calls are increasingly falling on deaf ears.

Patronage has always a very effective glue to bind together a party of government. The ANC has always been a very broad church of competing interests and factions, so it needs strong glue. Given that it lacks a consistent, unifying ideology and that a lack of policy clarity has been one of the defining characteristics of the Zuma administration, the use of patronage is essential keep the “troops” in line.

This generally works, but the problem comes where power is lost. In constituencies where the ANC has lost control, such as in the Western Cape, the local structures often disintegrate in a bout of faction fighting and recrimination. The ANC has found to its cost that once it loses power, it rarely gets it back.

Finally, if reluctantly, the ANC has always been able resort to the race card. However, this sits very uncomfortably with the ANC’s non-racial ethos and in any case may be increasingly ineffective. A major reason why minorities, including Indians, Coloureds and Asians, joined whites in deserting the ANC on 18 May was the racially loaded and even offensive comments about minorities made by such as Julius Malema, president of the ANC Youth League, and Jimmy Manyi, the government spokesperson.

Given this reality of a dominant ruling party (albeit one with inherent weaknesses), the DA had to come up with a strategy to shed its “white party” image and expand its base beyond its core liberal, white constituency.

Taking a leaf out of the SNP’s book, the DA decided to run with an unashamedly positive and upbeat campaign that highlighted its track record of competent service delivery in local government. In Zille, the DA has an energetic, feisty campaigner with a sharp intellect and something of the Anne Robinson about her. She dived into a whirlwind tour of township rallies and was rarely seen on camera without a group of black DA supporters around her.

Unlike in previous elections, the DA resisted the temptation to respond to the goading and provocation of ANC supporters and always kept “on message” about competent service delivery.

Like Labour in the Scottish elections – who couldn’t decide whether to target the Nationalists at Holyrood or the Conservatives at Westminster – the ANC was wrong-footed by this strategy and didn’t know how to respond. They were torn between going defensive on their record or attacking the DA’s record, and in the process rarely presented a positive vision of an ANC future.

The DA also made maximum use of new technology in reaching its potential supporters. Facebook, Twitter and text messaging were used to the full – and, when not addressing crowds, Zille seemed to be perpetually Tweeting.

In contrast, Zuma did eventually get round to sending a Tweet, but even this was widely suspected to have come from an aide. This turned out to be symptomatic of an ANC campaign that was slow to start and that, for much of the time, appeared directionless. The result was that, while the ANC may have won the election, the general consensus is that they lost the campaign and certainly failed to set the agenda.

Yet in the final analysis, it was still an ANC victory – and, for all its slick campaigning, the DA was only able to “do a Salmond” in Cape Town and a number of Western Cape municipalities.

Going forward, both the DA in South Africa and the SNP in Scotland face a number of challenges. The first is to make good on all those election promises. This is a challenge for all administrations, but both the SNP and the DA appear well placed in this regard.

Obtaining an absolute majority does give parties the freedom to push through legislation and set the agenda without needing to compromise. In addition, given that both parties are not in power in the top tier of government, they are generally not held accountable for macro issues such as unemployment, the economy and international relations. This is a considerable advantage as they can get the credit for prudent government without carrying any of the downside risk from “events”.

The challenge for both parties is to sustain a record of good governance in their respective second terms, so that voters feel confident in entrusting them with greater power and responsibility. In the SNP’s case, this additional trust could come in the form of some greater independence, while for the DA it could include further gains at the next South African national elections in 2014.

The second major challenge is to balance the aspirations of both party activists and their newly acquired supporters. This is perhaps the most subtle and tricky exercise and it is the job that party strategists are paid to grapple with.

Ryan Coetzee, the DA’s principal strategist, has said that the DA must be in tune with the real concerns of voters, not just party activists, if it is to grow. “One good way of assessing where a party’s heart really lies,” Coetzee said, “is to ask the question: What makes the people in this party angry?

“I submit that the DA’s anger attaches to things like crime, corruption, discrimination against minorities and name changes, but not to racism against blacks, the state of education, unemployment or poverty. If that division provides some insight into what we care about, then what does it say about who we care about?

“If we are going to become a party that is attractive to South Africans of all races, then we need to find a way to do two things: first, care as deeply about the ‘delivery issues’ that affect black South Africans as we do about those that affect whites; second, find a way to bridge the racial divide on ‘identity issues’.”

Voters can easily spot a fraud, so the challenge for the DA is to change not just the message of its leadership, but the priorities that they hold in their hearts. It is a fundamental shift.

This assessment of the DA’s prioritisation problem in South Africa could equally be modified for the SNP in Scotland. The independence issue has always been at the very heart of the SNP, but the impression (albeit from this distance) is that it is not a high priority for most of the new SNP voters. So the challenge for the SNP is to move the independence debate forward without alienating the huge support that it gained in 2011.

It is apparent that SNP strategists are already grappling with this conundrum and punting a more palatable form of partnership as distinct from complete separation.

Only time will tell whether the SNP or the DA are able to achieve their ultimate objectives. For now though, they are certainly setting the agenda and that has got to be a good start.

Arthur’s Seat and Table Mountain are maybe not that far apart, after all.

Expatriate Scots everywhere will have followed the dramatic victory of the SNP at the recent Holyrood polls with interest. And they will not have been alone. I suspect that party political strategists from every corner of the globe will have looked to learn from the success of the nationalists.

Here in South Africa, for example, the leading opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), has recently made electoral gains in Cape Town and the Western Cape that, in many ways, have mirrored the growth of the SNP in Scotland.

Many in the SNP and the DA will probably object to the comparison, as they occupy very different political and ideological spaces. Nonetheless, they have used similar strategies in ascending to power. Both parties got their first taste of government at the head of minority administrations and both exploited the resulting credibility boost to take overall majorities at their respective recent elections.

At the 2006 municipal elections, the DA won the most votes in Cape Town – but, like the SNP in 2007, fell short of a majority. It was enough, however, for the DA’s mayoral candidate (and now party leader) Helen Zille to wrest control of the council from the incumbent African National Congress (ANC).

A minority administration was formed with the support of several smaller parties. Five years of largely effective civic government followed, which were recognised in 2008 when Zille won the World Mayor of the Year award.

Like the SNP, the DA’s first term in office in Cape Town ended in May this year, when their record was put before the electorate as part of nationwide mid-term council elections.

Capetonians clearly liked what they had seen, because the DA was returned with an impressive 61 per cent of the vote and was able to take absolute control of the city for the first time.

Outside Cape Town and the Western Cape, the national results of the 18 May elections may suggest that little has changed. As expected, the ANC swept the board in terms of the national vote with over 63 per cent support and has retained overall control of the vast majority of councils. However, dig a little deeper and the results indicate that the old voting patterns may be starting to change.

The DA has consolidated its position as the single nationally competitive opposition party. With one in four voters nationwide, it is now challenging strongly in many areas and has largely obliterated or absorbed the remaining opposition parties. Most significantly, for the first time it is attracting measurable – if still small – numbers of black voters and is even now winning wards with largely black electorates.

Nonetheless, these gains must still be put into the perspective. Like Old Labour in the Scotland of yesteryear, the South African political landscape remains completely dominated by the ANC. The old adage that Labour used to “weigh rather than count” their votes in Glasgow may no longer apply, but it certainly holds true in large parts of South Africa, where the ANC piles up majorities that would make even Robert Mugabe blush.

When it kicks into gear, the ANC has one of the most effective electoral machines on the continent and one of the world’s strongest political brands. Its core strengths have always been its unmatched “struggle history”, the power and patronage that it can deploy – and, if all else fails, the option to play the “race card” in mobilising its support.

This final “strength” is made possible by to the uncomfortable reality that South African political allegiances remain inextricably linked with identity and race. Whatever their misgivings, black South Africans invariably vote ANC, while white South Africans generally vote for one of the opposition parties. The result is that an election here has traditionally been little more than a racial census.

However, indications from the 2011 election are that this pattern may be weakening – and this has got the ANC leadership worried. The ANC’s traditional strengths of history, power and racial solidarity may, over time, emerge as the movement’s Achilles’ heel.

By its nature, history is always receding into the past. The allegiances forged in the struggle against apartheid will remain forever with the older generation, yet mean less and less to first-time voters. Senior ANC politicians have continued to remind people “not to forget your history”, but these calls are increasingly falling on deaf ears.

Patronage has always a very effective glue to bind together a party of government. The ANC has always been a very broad church of competing interests and factions, so it needs strong glue. Given that it lacks a consistent, unifying ideology and that a lack of policy clarity has been one of the defining characteristics of the Zuma administration, the use of patronage is essential keep the “troops” in line.

This generally works, but the problem comes where power is lost. In constituencies where the ANC has lost control, such as in the Western Cape, the local structures often disintegrate in a bout of faction fighting and recrimination. The ANC has found to its cost that once it loses power, it rarely gets it back.

Finally, if reluctantly, the ANC has always been able resort to the race card. However, this sits very uncomfortably with the ANC’s non-racial ethos and in any case may be increasingly ineffective. A major reason why minorities, including Indians, Coloureds and Asians, joined whites in deserting the ANC on 18 May was the racially loaded and even offensive comments about minorities made by such as Julius Malema, president of the ANC Youth League, and Jimmy Manyi, the government spokesperson.

Given this reality of a dominant ruling party (albeit one with inherent weaknesses), the DA had to come up with a strategy to shed its “white party” image and expand its base beyond its core liberal, white constituency.

Taking a leaf out of the SNP’s book, the DA decided to run with an unashamedly positive and upbeat campaign that highlighted its track record of competent service delivery in local government. In Zille, the DA has an energetic, feisty campaigner with a sharp intellect and something of the Anne Robinson about her. She dived into a whirlwind tour of township rallies and was rarely seen on camera without a group of black DA supporters around her.

Unlike in previous elections, the DA resisted the temptation to respond to the goading and provocation of ANC supporters and always kept “on message” about competent service delivery.

Like Labour in the Scottish elections – who couldn’t decide whether to target the Nationalists at Holyrood or the Conservatives at Westminster – the ANC was wrong-footed by this strategy and didn’t know how to respond. They were torn between going defensive on their record or attacking the DA’s record, and in the process rarely presented a positive vision of an ANC future.

The DA also made maximum use of new technology in reaching its potential supporters. Facebook, Twitter and text messaging were used to the full – and, when not addressing crowds, Zille seemed to be perpetually Tweeting.

In contrast, Zuma did eventually get round to sending a Tweet, but even this was widely suspected to have come from an aide. This turned out to be symptomatic of an ANC campaign that was slow to start and that, for much of the time, appeared directionless. The result was that, while the ANC may have won the election, the general consensus is that they lost the campaign and certainly failed to set the agenda.

Yet in the final analysis, it was still an ANC victory – and, for all its slick campaigning, the DA was only able to “do a Salmond” in Cape Town and a number of Western Cape municipalities.

Going forward, both the DA in South Africa and the SNP in Scotland face a number of challenges. The first is to make good on all those election promises. This is a challenge for all administrations, but both the SNP and the DA appear well placed in this regard.

Obtaining an absolute majority does give parties the freedom to push through legislation and set the agenda without needing to compromise. In addition, given that both parties are not in power in the top tier of government, they are generally not held accountable for macro issues such as unemployment, the economy and international relations. This is a considerable advantage as they can get the credit for prudent government without carrying any of the downside risk from “events”.

The challenge for both parties is to sustain a record of good governance in their respective second terms, so that voters feel confident in entrusting them with greater power and responsibility. In the SNP’s case, this additional trust could come in the form of some greater independence, while for the DA it could include further gains at the next South African national elections in 2014.

The second major challenge is to balance the aspirations of both party activists and their newly acquired supporters. This is perhaps the most subtle and tricky exercise and it is the job that party strategists are paid to grapple with.

Ryan Coetzee, the DA’s principal strategist, has said that the DA must be in tune with the real concerns of voters, not just party activists, if it is to grow. “One good way of assessing where a party’s heart really lies,” Coetzee said, “is to ask the question: What makes the people in this party angry?

“I submit that the DA’s anger attaches to things like crime, corruption, discrimination against minorities and name changes, but not to racism against blacks, the state of education, unemployment or poverty. If that division provides some insight into what we care about, then what does it say about who we care about?

“If we are going to become a party that is attractive to South Africans of all races, then we need to find a way to do two things: first, care as deeply about the ‘delivery issues’ that affect black South Africans as we do about those that affect whites; second, find a way to bridge the racial divide on ‘identity issues’.”

Voters can easily spot a fraud, so the challenge for the DA is to change not just the message of its leadership, but the priorities that they hold in their hearts. It is a fundamental shift.

This assessment of the DA’s prioritisation problem in South Africa could equally be modified for the SNP in Scotland. The independence issue has always been at the very heart of the SNP, but the impression (albeit from this distance) is that it is not a high priority for most of the new SNP voters. So the challenge for the SNP is to move the independence debate forward without alienating the huge support that it gained in 2011.

It is apparent that SNP strategists are already grappling with this conundrum and punting a more palatable form of partnership as distinct from complete separation.

Only time will tell whether the SNP or the DA are able to achieve their ultimate objectives. For now though, they are certainly setting the agenda and that has got to be a good start.

Arthur’s Seat and Table Mountain are maybe not that far apart, after all.

With the world’s attention focused on the uprisings across the Gulf and North Africa, another pro-democracy movement has been gathering pace, far away in southern Africa. This one was also put down with violence, but has inspired hope that it may have shifted the basis of politics – at least in part – in this region forever.

This is Swaziland. A mountainous and generally peaceful country, it lies between South Africa and Mozambique and has been ruled by King Mswati III since 1986. Mswati III is one of the world’s wealthiest monarchs and maintains a royal household of 14 wives in considerable luxury. Meanwhile, two-thirds of his 1.2 million subjects live on less than US$1 a day and are struggling to cope with the effects of the world’s highest HIV infection rate.

The Swazi government suppressed the Facebook-inspired “April 12 uprising” with violence – and, as a result, may now have forced opposition activists in Africa’s last absolute monarchy to revisit their tactics. The much-advertised uprising failed to live up to its billing and was unable, but maybe only for now, to extend North Africa’s Jasmine Revolution into southern Africa.

Swaziland’s minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation, Lutfo Dlamini, has branded the brutally crushed peaceful protest a “failure”. King Mswati III’s success may, however, prove short-lived and a Pyrrhic victory.

It is true that the regime has not been toppled, but the whole episode has been a public relations disaster for the Swazi authorities. The excessive use of force by the police against demonstrators has put Swaziland on the global map for all the wrong reasons. Previously known as a quiet tourist destination, the country is now bracketed with Zimbabwe as being a run by a man who will stop at almost nothing to crush opposition to his autocratic rule.

Landlocked, Swaziland is heavily dependent on remittances from migrant workers in South Africa and on its share of import duties from the Southern African Customs Union. The country has been hard hit by the economic recession and also by a reduction in its share of customs union import duties from US$741 million to US$281 million. In response, the government has implemented an austerity program that has made thousands redundant and cut most government budgets by up to 25 per cent.

The situation has increased the hardship being endured by Swazis and set the scene for the recent protests. Apparently inspired by the North African revolutions, a Facebook group called “April 12 uprising” was set up to provide a forum for pro-democracy activists to organise and share ideas about the prospects for change. The date of 12 April was selected to coincide with the date, 38 years ago, when Mswati’s father, King Sobhuza II, abandoned the country’s British-style constitution and set himself up as an absolute monarch.

While the uprising was marketed as a spontaneous, the truth was that activists had been mobilising against the royal regime for years.

With the banning in 2008 of Swaziland’s main liberation movement, the People’s United Democratic Movement, the opposition cause was taken up by a variety of organisations, including church groups, unions and activist groups inside the country. Meanwhile exiled Swazis mobilised through the Swaziland Solidarity Network (SSN), which has been the main conduit of information to the outside world.

The date of 12 April was advertised widely in advance and considerable expectation built up inside Swaziland. In the capital, Mbabane, Mswati III apparently went into something of a panic and reportedly asked the South African intelligence services to closely monitor those working with the SSN.

Locally the king mobilised his military, set up roadblocks and put known activists under 24-hour surveillance. As the day of the proposed uprising approached, Swazis started to talk about the possibility of change and to express their frustrations openly.

However, the advance notice of the uprising on Facebook proved a “double-edged sword” in that, while it did focus international attention on Swaziland, it also gave the authorities time to prepare. The result was that on Tuesday 12 April, the police were ready with water cannon and tear gas to violently suppress the demonstrations before they achieved any sort of critical mass.

So what lessons can be learned from the Swaziland revolt that wasn’t a revolution?

The first lesson for the pro-democracy forces is that successful revolutions cannot be diarised in advance. Such an approach may maximise publicity, but it minimises the chance of success.

Secondly, while modern communication media such as the internet, Facebook and Twitter are fabulous tools for communication and publicity, they have severe limitations as demonstration-planning tools. Their very characteristics of universal access and broad reach mean they are easily intercepted and so are practically useless as a means of mobilising effective demonstrations.

Finally, progressive Swazis have learned that the world is unlikely to come to help them and that regime change has to be home-grown. Swazis need to learn to stand up and fight for their own right to live in a democratic state.

Another knock-on effect is that Swaziland’s powerful neighbour South Africa has been forced to examine its stance on the country. President Jacob Zuma, with his strong traditional Zulu roots, has a natural affinity for the Swazi royal family and many in the African National Congress (ANC) leadership have close ties with the country.

Prior to 12 April, only the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the ANC Youth League had spoken out against Mswati III. However, the ruling ANC has now officially broken its silence and has started to criticise the Swazi king’s actions.

“We call on the government of Swaziland to work towards the normalisation of the political environment,” said Ebrahim Ebrahim, the deputy South African international relations minister, “by unbanning opposition political parties, releasing political activists and engaging in a meaningful dialogue with opposition political and trade union leaders to find a collective solution to the socio-economic situation faced by that country.

“The use of security forces to quell any form of political dissent and failure to address legitimate concerns of citizens can only lead to the worsening of relations between government and civilians, something that does not augur well for economic stability.”

So Swaziland’s Facebook revolution may not have succeeded in producing a democratic republic, but it has probably changed Swazi politics for ever.

Never again will Mswati III be seen as a quaint and benign royal curiosity. He was now joined the ranks of Robert Mugabe and Muammar al-Gaddafi as a despot ruling in spite of the wishes of most of his people.

Journalists in South Africa with long memories are no strangers to repressive legislation and heavy handed intimidation from the political establishment.

During the apartheid era, the fourth estate was a frequent target of the Nationalist Government. In the 1980s, heavy handed censorship of the print media was commonplace. Eventually the policy backfired, most famously when the Weekly Mail newspaper used blank spaces or gaps to highlight the presence of the censor’s knife.

However with the dawn of the new democracy in 1994 and the adoption of a progressive, liberal constitution, most thought that the bad old days of censorship were gone forever.

Unfortunately the more things change, the more they appear to stay the same. The ruling ANC government has obviously taken some pages out of the Nationalist playbook and is currently tabling legislation that could signal a return to censorship and the repression of critical investigative reporting.

The introduction of the “Protection of Information Bill” has incensed a huge number of South Africans, who see in the bill an attempt by the ruling party to muzzle criticism of the government.

The bill, in its current form, has two main elements.

Firstly it proposes to set up a Media Appeals Tribunal to adjudicate on cases where journalists are considered to have overstepped the line.

Currently the media in South Africa is regulated by a Press Ombudsman and the Press Council. This process is not perfect and there have been cases of inaccurate and unfair reporting.

Nonetheless the system has generally worked well and ultimately the press is, by its nature, accountable to the court of public opinion.

The proposed state-appointed Media Tribunal will be a government appointed panel, charged with monitoring and disciplining the media. In theory, it is not an inherently bad idea though the concerns centre on the independence of this panel. It is very difficult to see any such government-appointed panel deviating significantly from a position that is acceptable to the ANC Headquarters at Luthuli House.

The second and perhaps more troublesome element is that the bill seeks to restrict the dissemination of “government information”. The definition of government information is extremely broad and effectively includes just about everything the government does.

For the first time, the bill also specifically includes commercial information, which would make it difficult to report on possible tender irregularities, financial misconduct and even possibly the financial performance of some state-related institutions. At one stroke the, so-called, “tenderpreneurs” who are fast getting very rich from ill-gotten government contracts would be protected by a shield of secrecy.

Writing in the Mail and Guardian, its editor Nic Dawes explained that “the bill criminalises the entire chain of custody of any leak of material that is classified in terms of its provisions, so it is not just the whistleblower who could be prosecuted, but journalists or society activists who receive documents and who don’t immediately take these to their nearest police station. Punishments are severe and can include jail sentences of up to 25 years, in terms of the proposed bill. That is criminalising journalism.”

The legislation currently appears to be primarily aimed at the print media. New online newspapers such as the Daily Maverick (South Africa’s excellent equivalent of The Caledonian Mercury) do not yet appear to be in the firing line. However given the growing popularity of such sites, this may be only a matter of time.

Journalists have also been given a preview of life under the new legislation through the recent treatment of South African Sunday Times journalist, Mzilikazi wa Afrika. Wa Afrika was arrested last week in dramatic fashion by at least eight members of the new police priority crimes unit, the “Hawks” – without an arrest warrant – on charges of fraud and defeating the ends of justice.

He was one of the authors of a recent story on the current Police Commissioner, Bheki Cele, that exposed a potentially very suspect leasing contract for the new police headquarters.

However the official reason for his arrest is possession of a letter, purportedly written by David Mabuza, premier of the Province of Mpumalanga, announcing his resignation to President Jacob Zuma. The letter, allegedly forged, was faxed to Wa Afrika; but the Sunday Times could not verify its authenticity and consequently spiked the story.

At the time of his arrest, Wa Afrika was on his way to peacefully hand himself over, but the police were obviously intent on making a scene. It is probably no coincidence that the arrest took at the Sunday Times head office in Johannesburg – which was at the time hosting a meeting of editors and journalists to discuss the threatened Media Appeals Tribunal and the enactment of the Protection of Information Bill.

Whatever the rights and wrongs of Wa Afrika’s alleged offences, he has obviously made many enemies in high places and few can be in any doubt that the real objective of the arrest was to intimidate Wa Afrika and his colleagues. This is an ongoing story and, at the time of writing, Wa Afrika is out on bail.

It may be no coincidence that this breakdown in trust between the press and the government has happened so soon after the value of a free press was vindicated by the high profile conviction of the previous Police Commissioner, Jackie Selebi, on corruption charges.

South Africa’s former head of police and one time head of Interpol was found guilty of corruption and has just received a 15 year jail sentence. It is worth recalling that when the press first broke the Selebi allegations, they were widely vilified by President Mbeki and the political clique in power at the time. Numerous obstacles were put in place of the prosecution of Selebi and while the prosecution has ultimately been successful, casualties along the way have included Vusi Pikoli, who was suspended as the previous National Prosecutions Authority boss, and the successful crime fighting unit, the “Scorpions”.

The Scorpions, with their integrated investigation and prosecutorial capacity, have subsequently been dissolved and replaced by the Hawks, who lack independent prosecution powers and are ultimately answerable to the politicians. It is therefore extremely unlikely that someone of Selebi’s seniority within the ANC will ever have to worry about facing prosecution again.

Recent developments have caused many to ask why now? The official government line is that the press has been especially irresponsible of late and greater fairness and balance is required from the media.

However a more likely reason is that ANC politicians have grown increasingly tired and embarrassed by the numerous investigations into wasteful expenditure and government corruption. It is far easier to attack the messenger than deal with the cancer of corruption that is eating at the fabric of almost all state institutions.

Despite all these current worries, the proposed legislation is not yet law. The “Protection of Information Bill” will probably come before the Judges of the Constitutional Court, and there is a fair chance that they will view it as contrary to the democratic principles enshrined in the constitution.

Watershed moments in history are often prompted by apparently small changes that are best identified with hindsight. However there is a palpable sense in South Africa that we may look back on this current attack on press freedom as one such ‘tipping point’. The unanswered question is whether the right of access to information will continue to prevail over the right to repress information?

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