For the first time, a sitting Director of Central Intelligence has
given his conditional endorsement to routine annual disclosure of
the size of the national intelligence budget.

"If there is a separate appropriation for the foreign intelligence
program, the National Foreign Intelligence Program, as distinct
from the current arrangement where that appropriation is buried in
the larger Defense Department bill, I think it would make some
sense to declassify the overall number for the foreign intelligence
program," said Acting DCI John E. McLaughlin, testifying before the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on September 8.

"I would not go so far as to declassify the numbers for the
individual agencies," as the 9/11 Commission unanimously
recommended.

"But I don't think that declassifying the top line would be a major
security threat," Mr. McLaughlin said in response to a question
from Senator Joe Lieberman. See:

This is a remarkable reversal on the part of the CIA, which has made
budget secrecy an article of faith, contending that even
half-century-old intelligence budget figures would damage national
security if disclosed. (Aggregate intelligence budget figures from
1997 and 1998 were released under pressure of litigation.)

In making his statement, the Acting DCI abandoned two flimsy but
longstanding CIA arguments against intelligence budget disclosure:
(1) the "slippery slope" argument, referring to the claim that if
the total budget figure were disclosed, the government would then
be powerless to stop other, more sensitive budget disclosures; and
(2) the claim that sensitive programmatic information could somehow
be discerned by hostile analysts from the annual increases or
decreases in the total budget figure.

Acting DCI McLaughlin's support for budget disclosure was, however,
conditioned on the establishment of a separate budget appropriation
for the National Foreign Intelligence Program. This reflects the
CIA view that the current concealment of intelligence spending
within the Defense Department budget is itself an "intelligence
method" that must be protected, and that routine annual disclosure
of the budget total would lead to exposure of exactly where the
funding is concealed.

But this is a circular argument that amounts to saying that the
budget must remain secret so that it can remain secret. Aside from
that, it is objectively false: prior declassifications of
intelligence budget totals in 1997 and 1998 could not be "reverse
engineered" so as to locate exactly where the funds were hidden in
the Defense budget. (We tried.)

Interestingly, Mr. McLaughlin expressed support for declassification
of the national intelligence (NFIP) budget rather than the
aggregate total of all intelligence spending. But by leaving out
tactical and joint military intelligence spending, this form of
disclosure would actually be more revealing of the national
intelligence budget than the aggregate figure; it would provide a
finer level of detail, or "granularity."

"We have not heard a compelling argument for maintaining overall
classification," said 9/11 Commission member John F. Lehman, at a
September 7 hearing of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

"The American public would be shocked if they knew the misallocation
of resources between HUMINT and other aspects of our intelligence
budget," he said. "They need to know that. How can you carry on a
debate on the floor of the Senate without talking about those kind
of gross numbers?" See:

South Korea's acknowledgment that it conducted experiments involving
the laser enrichment of uranium four years ago (and earlier
experiments with plutonium) came as an unwelcome surprise,
particularly since these appeared to be a violation of the
country's obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

But a considerable amount of information has long been available in
the public domain regarding South Korea's interests and
capabilities in the field.

A survey of that information was produced in 1996 by independent
researcher Mark Gorwitz. See "The South Korean Laser Isotope
Separation Experience":

The U.S. State Department has published a new documentary account of
atrocities committed in the Darfur region of Sudan. The Secretary
of State said this week that the systematic abuses constitute
genocide.

The new report, entitled "Documenting Atrocities in Darfur," was
produced by the Department's intelligence organization, the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research (INR). It is available here:

Unrestricted access to the genetic makeup of lethal biological
agents serves the best interests of science and public health,
according to a new report from the National Academy of Sciences,
and existing policies should not be modified to limit such access.

To see the issue as a choice between security and openness involves
"a false dichotomy," the NAS authors wrote. "Openness has enhanced
security in the past and is the best way to ensure security in the
future."

"The committee believes firmly that the policies currently in place
for genome data -- immediate release and free access -- are correct
because openness is essential to maintain the progress needed to
stay ahead of those who would attempt to cause harm."

A group of whistleblowers led by Daniel Ellsberg yesterday called on
government employees to "expose governmental wrong-doing, lies and
coverups" by leaking documents, including classified documents,
that reveal such misconduct. (The call for leaks excludes several
narrow categories of classified information such as the names of
intelligence officers under cover that are protected by statute.)

The initiative "aims to change the norms and practices that sustain
the cult of secrecy, and to de-legitimize silence that costs
lives." See:

While unauthorized disclosures of government information are
essential to daily news gathering and are obviously morally
justified in various circumstances -- "an expression of a higher
loyalty," as Ellsberg put it -- they can also place the leaker in
legal jeopardy.

Even the unauthorized disclosure of unclassified information may in
some circumstances entail criminal prosecution.

"The improper release of such information can be prosecuted as a
crime under the general theft of government property statute 18
U.S.C. section 641," noted David Berry of the National Labor
Relations Board office of the inspector general in a journal
article last year.

See "Theft and Misuse of Government Information," Journal of Public
Inquiry, Fall-Winter 2003 (thanks to MJR):