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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 DAR ES SALAAM 000444
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
FOR AF/E, INR/AA, S/CT, DRL
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOVPHUMPINRPRELPTERTZIGAD
SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR PRIMER: THE ISSUE, WHY IT MATTERS & WHAT
WE ARE DOING ABOUT IT
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Zanzibar accounts for only three percent
of Tanzania's population, yet it is a major preoccupation for
the Government of Tanzania due to its longrunning severe
political tensions, history of violent and flawed elections,
and mediocre governance. The Zanzibar/Tanzania relationship
is convoluted and occasionally contentious. This mission is
concerned about the negative influence of Zanzibar's
persistent political problems on our counterterrorism,
regional stability, human rights and health promotion goals.
We are engaged with central government and Zanzibari leaders
to encourage a power sharing deal to address these concerns.
The USG's extensive interagency assistance programs in
Zanzibar give us great standing with the Zanzibari people and
with political leaders from both camps, allowing us to speak
out on Zanzibari political issues as a proven friend of the
islands' people. In mid-August 2008 our Zanzibar affairs
officer will arrive to staff our newly established Zanzibar
American Presence Post (initially to operate from Embassy Dar
es Salaam). A less fractious, more united, and better
governed Zanzibar could reawaken a dynamic and creative
culture to the benefit of Zanzibaris, Tanzanians and East
Africans. END SUMMARY.
Background to the Conflict
--------------------------
¶2. (U) Zanzibar, population about one million, consists of
two main islands and several small ones just off the
Tanzanian coast. The two largest islands are Unguja (often
referred to simply as Zanzibar) and Pemba. Prior to the
bloody anti-Arab uprising of 1964, Zanzibar's population was
roughly 15 percent Arab, 5 percent Asian (Indo-Pakistani), 60
percent Shirazi (native Zanzibari) and 20 percent mainland
African. Shirazis consider themselves to be the descendants
of settlers from southwestern Iran who arrived in Zanzibar
and intermarried with the Bantu original inhabitants of the
islands during the 10th century. Together with their
ethnic-linguistic cousins in the Comoros Islands, Mombassa,
Lamu, Dar es Salaam and elsewhere on the East Africa coast,
they further developed the Swahili language, which is a Bantu
language with significant Arabic-origin vocabulary. Islam
appears to have arrived in Zanzibar prior to the wave of
Arab/Persian immigrants as a result of trade contacts with
Islamic societies. Shirazis as a whole tend to identify more
with the Arab world than with mainland Africa.
¶3. (U) In the early 1830s the Omani Sultan transferred his
capital to Zanzibar, set up an Arab state and encouraged Arab
immigration. The Arab population comprised the ruling class
and landed aristocracy under the Sultanate, which became a
British Protectorate in the 1880s. At one time the Zanzibar
Sultanate controlled much of the East African coast between
Mozambique and Somalia. Arabs, primarily from Oman, seized
large tracts of land on Unguja (except in the less fertile
far north of the island) to set up highly profitable spice
plantations (mostly cloves). Dispossessed Shirazis became
agricultural workers, sharecroppers or semi-serfs. Their
labor was supplemented by the importation of slaves from the
mainland. Zanzibar was long the primary entrepot for the
East Africa-Middle East slave trade. There was also
significant mainland migration to the islands, especially
Unguja, to work menial jobs during the boom years of the
clove trade. The Afro-Shirazi population of Unguja mostly
resented their Omani and British rulers.
¶4. (U) Shirazis from the northern tip of Unguja (and the
nearby island of Tumbatu) and Pembans enjoyed symbiotic
commercial relations with the Arab new arrivals and their
Sultanate. They were not dispossessed of their lands. They
mostly prospered under the Omanis. (The Pembans had
previously been ruled by an Arab Sultanate based in Mombasa.)
Pembans and far northern Ungujans intermarried with Arab
families. Some Pembans became major landholders and even
owned slaves. Consequently, Pemban and far northern Ungujan
Shirazis tended to identify their interests with the Omani
Sultanate.
¶5. (U) The British ruled Zanzibar on behalf of the Sultan,
not on behalf of his subjects. Their policies explicitly
favored Arabs and Asians over Shirazis and mainland Africans
(in that order). A series of pre-independence elections
revealed two camps: the anti-Sultanate, Africa-oriented, and
secular Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) with a stronghold in the
densely populated areas of Unguja, and the pro-Sultanate,
Middle East-oriented, and explicitly Islamic Zanzibar
Nationalist Party (ZNP) and its Pemban ally (the Zanzibar and
Pemban People's Party - ZPPP), which was supported by most
Arabs, Asians, far northern Ungujans, Pembans and those who
worked for the state. The ASP consistently received a larger
share of the popular vote (though not by much), but the ZNP
and its ally received more seats because they predominated in
more constituencies. At independence the British handed
power to the two parties friendliest to the Sultanate and the
status quo: the ZNP and ZPPP.
¶6. (SBU) In January, 1964, one month after independence from
the UK, Zanzibar (specifically Unguja) experienced a very
bloody uprising against the institutions of the Sultanate,
the ZNP/ZPPP government, the Arab and Asian communities and
any Shirazis considered friendly to the state (such as ZNP
members and Pembans). Several thousand Arabs were murdered.
Rape and other atrocities were widespread. Arabs were
expelled or fled in large numbers. Asian shops were looted.
(Many Arab, Asian and pro-Sultanate Shirazis fled no further
than Dar es Salaam, Mombasa and Tanga, on the mainland
Swahili Coast). Property was expropriated and re-distributed
to ASP-supporters. After a period of confusion, the ASP
leadership and its allies assumed control under a "Supreme
Revolutionary Council" dictatorship and extended their
control to Pemba (which had not participated in the
uprising). Pemba was ruled by "Commissars" who used
floggings, forced labor and public humiliation to enforce
their will over a hostile population. After a few months,
the ASP leadership opted to accept an offer of union with
Tanganyika (forming the nation of Tanzania), both to prevent
a counter-revolution and to buttress the political position
of the ASP leaders among other members of the Supreme
Revolutionary Council. The Union Agreement granted
wide-ranging autonomy for Zanzibar.
¶7. (U) This history is quite fresh. Zanzibaris in their 50s
and older recall these traumatic events. Younger Zanzibaris
have all been told of how their families fared during the
"revolution," for better or worse. Politics in Zanzibar is
infused with a great deal of raw emotion and bitter memories.
Zanzibar's Relation to Tanzania
-------------------------------
¶8. (SBU) Under the Union Agreement, Zanzibar has extensive
autonomy within Tanzania. Although Zanzibar accounts for
only 3 percent of Tanzania's population, it is guaranteed at
least 18 percent of seats in the Union Parliament (plus an
indeterminate number of appointed seats). Furthermore, the
constitution stipulates that either the Union President or
the Vice President must be Zanzibari. Zanzibar has its own
President, legislature and bureaucracy ("the Revolutionary
Government of Zanzibar" led by "the Revolutionary Council")
that presides over all non-union matters. The Tanzanian
Union Parliament legislates on all union matters (Foreign
Affairs, Defense, Police, monetary issues, etc.) and
non-union matters for the mainland. Thus Zanzibari members
of the Tanzanian legislature have a say on non-union matters
governing the mainland, but their mainland colleagues have no
say on non-union issues concerning Zanzibar. Aside from
Zanzibar, no other region of Tanzania has its own government.
Many mainlanders complain that Zanzibar was given too much
influence when the union deal was struck. Yet Zanzibaris
regularly complain that their autonomy is not far-reaching
enough. Most Zanzibari leaders from both political camps
insist that Zanzibar has the status of a country, not merely
a region of Tanzania.
Zanzibar Politics in the Multiparty Era
---------------------------------------
¶9. (SBU) The Supreme Revolutionary Council, dominated by the
ASP, directly ruled Zanzibar without the benefit of elections
from 1964 until 1985. In 1977 the ASP merged with the single
legal party of the mainland, the Tanganyika African National
Union, to form a new Tanzania-wide single authorized party,
the Chama Cha Mapinduzi Party (CCM - Revolutionary Party).
Under ASP/CCM-Zanzibar rule dissent was violently repressed.
In 1985 Zanizibar's constitution was changed to permit
constituency-based single-party elections. This meant that
Pembans could once again be guaranteed seats in the
legislature. In 1995 Tanzania, including Zanzibar, returned
to multiparty politics after 30 years as a one-party state.
¶10. (SBU) The 1995 multiparty election in Zanzibar returned
to the same dynamics of the pre-independence multiparty
elections. The Civic United Front (CUF), which is also the
main opposition party on the mainland (as measured by the
Union President vote), is supported by mostly the same
electorate that once supported the ZNP/ZPPP alliance: the
great majority of Pembans, far north Ungujans and pockets
within Zanzibar town. CCM/Zanzibar is supported by most
Ungujan Shirazis and those of mainland origin. (The Arab and
Asian communities of Zanzibar now amount to only a small
fraction of their independence-era numbers.) Both camps have
roughly equal numbers of supporters, generating close
elections which CCM/Zanzibar won in 1995, 2000 and 2005. In
all three of these contests there were widespread reports
from Zanzibaris, the media and international observers of
state violence and state-managed rigging to ensure
CCM/Zanzibar victories (although the 2005 election was
appreciably better in these regards than were the previous
two). There were also reports of CUF electoral misdeeds and
of post-election violence initiated by youthful CUF
supporters, but not on the same scale as CCM/Z abuses.
¶11. (SBU) Note that CCM/CUF political competition on the
mainland is more civil. CCM so dominates mainland politics
that the party has never needed to manipulate elections to
secure a national majority, but is credibly accused of having
done so in some constituencies in some elections.
Unguja & Pemba: Disparate Treatment
------------------------------------
¶12. (SBU) Pemba, which was relatively prosperous prior to
the events of 1964, has been purposely neglected ever since.
Even CCM/Zanzibar supporters admit this, stating that "of
course the island hosting the capital must get more
resources." However, CCM/Z's policy of disparate treatment
is clearly aimed at punishing Pembans for their refusal to
support CCM/Z and at implicitly offering Pembans a fairer
share of resources once they shift their political loyalties.
Pemba has very little infrastructure or utilities, no proper
airport and few government services. Foreign investors and
NGO leaders tell us that the CCM/Zanzibar government actively
discourages investment or NGO activity on Pemba. Pemban
elders recently petitioned for Pemba to be divorced from
Zanzibar and placed directly under mainland rule.
CCM/Zanzibar leaders accused them of seeking independence
from Tanzania (which nowhere appears in the petition). The
elders were arrested and briefly held. The elders warn that
the islands youth are becoming increasingly desperate and
frustrated.
CCM/Zanzibar Narrative: Representing the Oppressed
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶13. (SBU) The following presents Zanzibari politics from the
viewpoint of a CCM/Zanzibar supporter: "In 1964 we liberated
ourselves from British colonialism and Arab colonialism. For
well over a century the Arabs and their British allies
oppressed us, taking our land and depriving us of our rights.
They treated Africans with contempt. We will always support
the revolution. Our opponents are Islamic extremists and
pro-Arab reactionaries who wish to separate Zanzibar from
Tanzania and re-institute the Sultanate. We will resist our
re-enslavement with every possible means. Most of the people
are with us. Exiled Arab elites have paid traitors to tell
lies about us to foreigners. The elections are run fairly
and police actions are only taken to prevent the intimidation
of our supporters by Islamist thugs paid by Arab exiles.
Pembans have only themselves to blame for their situation.
They stubbornly persist in resisting the revolution. Once
they show loyalty to Zanzibar and Tanzania, and drop their
ties to counter-revolutionary and separatist exiles, then
they will find us prepared to forgive them and to include
them in the economic development of Zanzibar."
¶14. (SBU) Following the events of 1964, many Pembans and ZNP
supporters turned to the mosque as the only institution not
entirely taken over by the revolutionaries. Nearly all
Zanzibaris are Muslim, but in general CCMers have a more
modern and secular orientation while CUFites have a more
traditional and Islamic orientation. CCMers are more
Africa-oriented and more favorable toward the Union, while
CUFites are more Middle East-oriented and more skeptical of
the union. Though of course there are individual exceptions
to these generalities. "Exiled Arab counter-revolutionaries"
are almost entirely figments of inflamed CCM/Zanzibar
imaginations, although CUF likely receives some financial
support from Middle East-based supporters. (Note that CUF,
like all other Tanzanian parties, receives nearly all its
funding from state subsidies provided on the basis of vote
share.) While some CUF youth are known to feel the pull
toward Islamic radicalism, the leadership and the great
majority of the rank and file are in no sense Islamic
extremists. There is no radical, salafist/wahabist religious
tradition in Zanzibar. It is well documented that
CCM/Zanzibar committed vote-rigging and violence (including
rape, extrajudicial killings and police firing into unarmed
gatherings of CUF supporters) during the last three
multiparty elections, with the 2005 vote less marred by these
abuses than were the previous two.
CUF Narrative: Representing the Oppressed
-----------------------------------------
¶15. (SBU) The following presents Zanzibari politics from the
viewpoint of a CUF/Zanzibar supporter: "We have always been
the majority in Zanzibar. "The revolution" is just a name
our opponents use to justify their violence against us. They
could not win by the ballot box, so they seized power through
the gun and the machete. They have not changed. They
continue to kill us, beat us, arrest us and charge us with
treason simply for opposing them politically through peaceful
means. It is slander to call us Islamic extremists. We are
not. It is slander to call us separatists. We are not. Of
course we want a better deal for Zanzibar within the Union
and we want a better deal for Pemba within Zanzibar. We
understand why some of our people are using the rhetoric of
religious extremism and separatism. It is out of
frustration. But the leadership and members of CUF reject
these views. We are Tanzania's main opposition party, both
in Zanzibar and the mainland. All we want is free and fair
elections, a power sharing arrangement that will end our
exclusion from government, an end to corruption, improved
governance, and a fair distribution of resources and services
to all parts of Zanzibar."
¶16. (SBU) CUF has occasionally used violence (mostly
beatings and property damage) and vote padding to pursue
their electoral campaigns. Their post-election
demonstrations have featured violence and property damage.
Neither the violence nor the padding were at CCM/Z levels,
but CUF is not as pure as they claim to be. CUF leaders do
not use religious extremist rhetoric, nor does the rank and
file membership, as a rule. However, some supporters,
especially youth, taunt CCM/Z supporters as Islamic apostates
who have sold their souls to Christian mainlanders and seek
the evangelization of Zanzibar. These populist anti-CCM/Z
charges are patently false.
Muafaka
-------
¶17. (SBU) President Kikwete announced soon after assuming
office in 2005 that Zanzibar reconciliation was a top
priority for his administration. Previous Union presidents
had tried and failed to achieve Zanzibar reconciliation. The
two sides once again entered into negotiations in January
2007 (referred to in kiSwahili as "Muafaka"). Agreement on a
power sharing formula that guaranteed a role in government
for both sides and improved electoral transparency was
tentatively reached in February 2008. In March 2008,
President Karume of Zanzibar, in closed-door CCM Central
Committee meetings, effectively scuttled the agreement by
unilaterally insisting that it be put to a referendum.
(There is no history or constitutional provisions for
referendums in Tanzania.) He secured the agreement of the
national CCM leadership on this point. Since then, CUF has
refused to re-engage with CCM. The party is now fanning
anti-Union sentiments as a way to garner cross-party support
among Zanzibari nationalists from both camps and so pressure
the Union and Zanzibar governments to deal with CUF sincerely
and respectfully.
Why Zanzibar Matters
--------------------
¶18. (SBU) Zanzibar consumes this mission's attention well
out of proportion to its share of Tanzania's population.
Zanzibar is a preoccupation of Tanzania's Union government as
well. Our reasons justifying this level of engagement are
several:
Counterterrorism: Zanzibaris are among the al-Queda members
involved in the 1998 attack on this mission. There are
pockets of extremist support throughout the Swahili cultural
region (the coasts of Kenya and Tanzania, Zanzibar and the
Swahilophone Comoros islands). The reservoir of unemployed,
desperate, hopeless, angry and alienated Islamic youth for
terrorists to recruit from is greater in Zanzibar than
elsewhere in the Swahili cultural area. Family and
commercial links within the Swahili world are such that
repercussions of events in one place are felt elsewhere in
the region. Increased radicalization in Zanzibar would
infect the whole region. Conversely, a settlement that led
to improved governance and increased prosperity would
decrease the attraction of extremist ideology throughout the
region.
Regional Stability: President Kikwete is nearly three years
into what is likely to be a ten year stay in office.
Tanzania is having some success at reforming itself and is a
net contributor to regional stability. It is important to
U.S. interests that Kikwete's presidency is successful and
that he continues to adhere to an agenda of economic and
governance reforms. He has publicly committed to Zanzibar
reconciliation as a top goal of his administration. Failure
to achieve that goal will hurt the president's political
standing and will allow Zanzibar to continue to blemish
Tanzania's international image.
Human Rights: A review of our annual human rights report
shows that Zanzibar looms large and compares unfavorably to
the state of human rights on the mainland (media freedom is a
strong case in point). The misbehavior of Zanzibar's
government mars Tanzania's otherwise respectable human rights
record. Much of the intensity of Zanzibari politics is
driven by fear that loss of power will result in loss of
wealth, privilege and even life. A power sharing settlement
that guarantees security and a role in government for the
leadership of both political camps while denying monopoly
power to either side, would establish a climate for greatly
improved human rights. Politics would no longer be a life or
death, zero-sum struggle.
Health: USAID/Tanzania, CDC and their Tanzanian/Zanzibari
counterparts have achieved a dramatic reduction in malaria
prevalence in Zanzibar, nearly eliminating the once pandemic
disease from the isles. Close collaboration with the
Zanzibar government plays a key role in that continuing
success. PEPFAR is also engaged on the islands. Without a
political settlement, rising tensions prior to the 2010
elections could likely disrupt ongoing health promotion
programs.
USG Engagement
--------------
¶19. (SBU) This mission encourages Zanzibaris and the Union
government to achieve a political settlement that improves
governance and ends the intense alienation of one-half of
Zanzibar's population. We believe that an abatement of
political tensions and improved governance could yield
dramatic gains for the prosperity of all Zanzibaris. In
Mid-August we will staff our new American Presence Post
Zanzibar office, initially working from Dar es Salaam. The
mission maintains a guest house and office in Zanzibar town.
Below is a summary of our engagement in Zanzibar.
Front Office: The Ambassador regularly travels to Unguja for
discussions with Zanzibari officials, political leaders from
both camps, civil society, religious leaders and the American
community. He has also traveled to Pemba. He has
participated in project inaugurations on both islands.
Zanzibar is an agenda item in our discussions with President
Kikwete and prominent mainland opinion leaders. The USG's
extensive interagency assistance programs in Zanzibar
(described below) give us great standing with the Zanzibari
people and with political leaders from both camps, allowing
us to speak out on Zanzibari political issues as a proven
friend of the islands' people.
American Citizen Services: At present, there are 40
registered American citizens on Unguja and none on Pemba. We
suspect that there are about another ten American citizens
resident on Unguja who have not registered. Temporary
registered American citizens on Unguja averages 25 a month,
but we believe this is a fraction of the true number as many
American tourists add a few days in Zanzibar to their
itineraries and do not register. During tourist high season
(June to September) we suspect the number of temporarily
resident American citizens to number about 100 a month. We
stay in contact with American community wardens in Unguja and
one third-country warden on Pemba.
USAID/CDC/PEPFAR: The USG supports development initiatives on
both Pemba and Unguja. USAID support to Unguja includes a
livelihoods program for women, which also encourages
sustainable use of coastal resources, through promotion of
pearl and seaweed farming. On Pemba and Unguja, the
President's Malaria Initiative (USAID & CDC) has undertaken a
comprehensive malaria program that includes prevention, case
finding and treatment and that resulted in a dramatic decline
in the rates of malaria. The Education team (USAID) has
supported the development of Pre-K curriculum in government
schools on both islands as well as general education and
literacy materials, complemented by radio programming, to be
used by communities in their Madrassas. Also, USAID has
provided funding for family planning services.
All of this work has been complemented by the PEPFAR program.
On both Pemba and Unguja, PEPFAR resources, implemented
through USAID and CDC programs, are supporting HIV/AIDS
treatment, care and prevention services, including the
prevention-of-mother to child transmission and the provision
of antiretroviral therapy. In addition, PEPFAR has
strengthened the national health care infrastructure on
Unguja by supporting the creation of a blood safety
laboratory and donation center as well as an HIV voluntary
and counseling center of excellence. A key prevention
intervention has been work with injecting drugs users and
commercial sex workers, the key drivers of the epidemic on
the main island.
USAID/POL-ECON - Ambassador's Self Help Fund: In FY 08, the
Ambassador's Special Self-Help Fund is providing grants
totaling $14,896 to three Zanzibar community based
organizations, one in Pemba and two on Unguja.
Public Diplomacy: The Public Affairs Section conducts a wide
range of outreach programs throughout
Unguja and Pemba using all the Public Diplomacy products and
programs in its arsenal. Examples in
the past year have included U.S. Speakers Programs on Islam
in America, a Performing Arts Initiative
with Muslim Hip Hop, journalist exchange programs, and an
English Language Fellow resident on Unguja
who split time between Pemba and Unguja to strengthen
education through teacher training. PAS recruits
from Zanzibar for Humphrey, Fulbright, Foreign Language
Teaching Assistants, Junior Staff Development
programs, and American Fulbrighters also conduct research and
lecture on the islands. Many prominent
Zanzibaris are alumni of International Visitor, Voluntary
Visitor, and other ECA programs; we actively
recruit from Zanzibar in each cycle for those programs. The
mission hosts an American Corner on Unguja
and one on Pemba as platforms for outreach to those
communities, including regional training for the
American Corners, staff. PAS operates the English Access
Microscholarship program exclusively on the
islands to provide English tutoring and exposure to American
culture.
Five of the last six Ambassador,s Fund for Cultural
Preservation projects were carried out on Pemba.
For FY 2008 the Department of Antiquities will restore one of
the oldest mosques in East Africa to
protect its 12th century Kufic inscriptions. In FY 2006, two
communities on Pemba were funded to
restore their mosques which date to the 17th and 18th
centuries. In FY 2005, the National Archives
was funded to digitize and catalogue their slave records from
Stone Town, a major slaving center until
slavery was outlawed in the late 1800s. In FY 2002 the AFCP
supported the restoration of a museum on
Pemba Island.
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA): (SBU)
CJTF-HOA began conducting Overseas Humanitarian Disaster
Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) projects and senior
religious leader engagement activities on Pemba in early
¶2007. CJTF-HOA,s OHDACA projects involve hiring local
contractors to construct schools and school dormitories,
medical dispensaries, and well bore holes. The first OHDACA
project completed on Pemba was Matale Village Primary School
in the central township of Chake Chake. This $200,000
project, completed in August 2007, supports over 250 students
ages 7-13 and will help alleviate the high illiteracy rate
among the adult population in an area known to be an entry
point for drug smuggling. CJTF-HOA is currently soliciting
bids for a primary school in Pemba,s northwestern township
of Bopwe. Bopwe is one of only two townships in Pemba,s
Wete district that don,t have a primary school. This
$350,000 project, with an estimated completion date of March
2009, will support over 300 students in one of Pemba,s most
poverty-stricken areas. Both projects are the result of an
ongoing partnership between CJTF-HOA and USAID, with USAID
providing all the furnishings. CJTF-HOA anticipates an
increase in OHDACA projects, senior religious leader
engagements, and Civil Affairs activities on Pemba in FY
2009, leveraging the momentum of successful CJTF-HOA projects
in the neighboring mainland region of Tanga.
MCC: Out of a total compact for Tanzania of USD 698 million,
Zanzibar is to receive USD 76.6 million in support (11
percent of the total). Unguja is slated for an underwater
electricity distribution cable (USD 63.1 million). Pemba is
programmed for USD 13.5 million in rural roads.
Peace Corps: Peace Corps volunteers serve on both islands.
Proposed Policies
-----------------
¶20. (SBU) We propose that:
I) To assist in breaking the impasse, and to bring pressure
on the parties to negotiate in good faith, the Ambassador
make a major policy statement on the way forward in Zanzibar
as seen by a historic friend of the Zanzibari people. He
will vet this statement with Africa Bureau leadership, other
friends of Zanzibar and with President Kikwete. The address
will call on both sides to rise above historic grievances for
the good of all Zanzibaris, point to the potential
post-settlement prosperity of the isles, and compare
Zanzibar's challenges to similar episodes in American
history. We will ensure wide media coverage of the address.
II) Senior policymakers express strong support for a Zanzibar
settlement in discussions with top Union and Zanzibar
leaders.
III) We make it known to leaders of both sides that we
prioritize our relations with the Zanzibari people over our
relations with any individual leader or party, i.e. we are
prepared to go public with our views identifying any leader
who selfishly obstructs an agreement.
IV) We make the point initially to political leaders but
publicly if necessary that continued political strife
threatens Zanzibar's sizable tourism industry.
Prospects
---------
¶21. (SBU) Zanzibar is widely considered to be the center of
Swahili culture. Its historic influence has never recovered
from the trauma of the 1964 uprising and the bitter divisions
that predated independence. A less fractious, more united,
and better governed Zanzibar could reawaken a dynamic and
creative culture to the benefit of Zanzibaris, Tanzanians and
East Africans.
GREEN