Providing global or transnational public goods – from development to justice, from mitigating climate change to ensuring peace around the world – can be considered a central task for multilateral organisations. Recent studies suggest, however, that the finances and budgeting of international organisations may not always favour multilateral decision-making or the provision of truly global public goods.

Member states attempt to influence seemingly autonomous bodies such as International Courts or decision-making within international public administrations through their financial weight. The growing importance of trust funds, multi-bi aid, and other forms of contributions earmarked ahead of collective decision-making is used to effectively undermine multilaterally agreed priorities. Credit-type arrangements become more important in multilateral finances, and so is the influence of actors such as credit-rating agencies in defining which recipients and goals will be eligible to receive multilateral support. And, while individual donors start allocating bilateral aid to multilaterally agreed global goals, there is little guarantee that they can be held accountable, directly or indirectly, when their finances do not actually contribute to these goals.

The papers in this panel will address these topics and thereby answer the following questions: How do the challenging conditions of multilateral financing affect individual international organisations, their structures and procedures? How are international administrations adapting to the changing financial environment and new budgetary pressures? And, what are the mechanisms to prevent that state and non-state actors ultimately undermine the provision of global public goods, whether their resources are channeled through multilateral organization or bilateral aid?