Contents

Background

Whilst we've had constrained delegation support in the KDC since 1.7, it has required a proprietary backend that supports validating the Windows PAC. This project provides a constrained delegation implementation that works without this requirement.

Architecture

In constrained delegation, the service passes the KDC a ticket from a user it has authenticated. This "evidence" ticket is placed in the additional tickets field of the TGS-REQ: there is nothing preventing the service from forging this, because it knows its long-term key. To avoid this attack, Windows takes advantage of the fact the PAC is signed with the TGS long-term key: in the constrained delegation case, this is verified before proceeding.

Heimdal implements PAC-less constrained delegation by including an authorization data element containing a checksum over the client, authtime, authorization data and delegation path with the TGS key. The ASN.1 encoding of this element is described below:

Note: krb5_ad_signedpath_data represents data to be checksummed, krb5_ad_signedpath is what is actually encoded and sent on the wire. The enctype field in the latter is a hint to which TGS key to use, but presently this is unused in our implementation: we require it be the same key used to encrypt the ticket.

Constants are added for the signed path AD type and the checksum key usage:

I have kept this aligned with Heimdal so that, when using the HDB bridge, a mixed realm of Heimdal and MIT KDCs should interoperate with constrained delegation.

API changes:

krb5int_get_authdata_containee_types() is added to return the authorization data types within an authdata container without completely decoding it

When issuing and verifying KRB5SignedData and AD-KDCIssued, we now ensure the checksum type is keyed

KDC-issued elements are rejected if present in the AP-REQ authenticator

KDC

Note: some changes were imported from the HDBBridge branch to speed implementation. Besides that, the changes are principally confined to kdc_authdata.c.

A summary of changes follows:

We now correctly filter out known KDC issued AD elements when copying authorization data from the TGT. (This uses the krb5int_get_authdata_containee_types() API above.)

Because of the above fix, we can now separate the copying of TGT authdata from the propagation of KDB authdata. We previously relied on the backend to do this.

A new authdata handler, handle_signedpath_authdata(), is added, which supports the verification and generation of the signed data path. This element is skipped if the Windows PAC is the only authorization data element, as some versions of Windows have trouble processing additional authorization data.

The merge_authdata() internal API now takes an additional argument denoting whether KDC issued authdata we recognise should be omitted.

When creating a reply ticket, only fields protected by the TGS checksum (client, authtime and authorization data) are copied from the evidence ticket

Finally, the greet_server authdata plugin has been updated for these changes

KDB

CHECK_ALLOWED_TO_DELEGATE

We provide a CHECK_ALLOWED_TO_DELEGATE db_invoke callback for the LDAP backend that authorizes that target service against the krbAllowedToDelegateTo attribute. There is no support for administrating this attribute via kadmin, or for the DB2 backend.

Open issues

Status

Review

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