John Henderson has prepared this document
from various official records,In Memory of his Grand Uncle
Private JAMES ANDERSON KERR (1895-1917)
(Stirling, Scotland)
15075, 9th Bn., Royal Fusiliers
who died on 30 November 1917
Remembered with honour at
CAMBRAI MEMORIAL, LOUVERVAL, FRANCE

++++++++++++++++++++++

THE ROYAL FUSILIERS
1914-18

9th Battalion

Formed at Hounslow on
21.8.14 and became part of 36th Brigade, 12th (Eastern) Division at
Colchester. November 1914 to Hythe. February 1915 to Aldershot. Landed
in France 31.5.15. On 11.11.1918 located east of Orchies, France.

James Anderson KERR
presumed dead on 30th November, 1917.

Louverval

In Memory of
Private JAMES ANDERSON KERR
15075, 9th Bn., Royal Fusiliers
who died
on 30 November 1917
Remembered with honour
CAMBRAI MEMORIAL, LOUVERVAL
Commemorated in perpetuity by
the Commonwealth War Graves Commission

Casualty
Details

Name:

KERR, JAMES ANDERSON

Initials:

J A

Nationality:

United Kingdom

Rank:

Private

Regiment:

Royal Fusiliers

Unit Text:

9th Bn.

Date of Death:

30/11/1917

Service No:

15075

Casualty Type:

Commonwealth War Dead

Grave/Memorial
Reference:

Panel 3 and 4.

Cemetery:

CAMBRAI MEMORIAL,
LOUVERVAL

Cemetery
Details

Cemetery:

CAMBRAI
MEMORIAL, LOUVERVAL

Country:

France

Locality:

Nord

Visiting
Information:

Wheelchair access to this site with some difficulty. For further
information regarding wheelchair access, please contact our
Enquiries Section on telephone number 01628 507200. The Panel
Numbers quoted at the end of each entry relate to the panels
dedicated to the Regiment served with. In some instances where a
casualty is recorded as attached to another Regiment, his name may
alternatively appear within their Regimental Panels. Please refer to
the on-site Memorial Register Introduction to determine the
alternative panel numbers if you do not find the name within the
quoted Panels.

Location
Information:

The small
village of Louverval is on the north side of the N30, Bapaume to
Cambrai road, 13 kilometres north-east of Bapaume and 16 kilometres
south-west of Cambrai. The Memorial stands on a terrace in Louverval
Military Cemetery, which is situated on the north side of the N30,
south of Louverval village. CWGC signposts on the N30 give advance
warning of arrival at the Cemetery

Historical Information:

The CAMBRAI MEMORIAL
commemorates more than 7,000 servicemen of the United Kingdom and
South Africa who died in the Battle of Cambrai in November and
December 1917 and whose graves are not known. Sir Douglas Haig
described the object of the Cambrai operations as the gaining of a
'local success by a sudden attack at a point where the enemy did not
expect it' and to some extent they succeeded. The proposed method of
assault was new, with no preliminary artillery bombardment. Instead,
tanks would be used to break through the German wire, with the
infantry following under the cover of smoke barrages. The attack
began early in the morning of 20 November 1917 and initial advances
were remarkable. However, by 22 November, a halt was called for rest
and reorganisation, allowing the Germans to reinforce. From 23 to 28
November, the fighting was concentrated almost entirely around
Bourlon Wood and by 29 November, it was clear that the Germans were
ready for a major counter attack. During the fierce fighting of the
next five days, much of the ground gained in the initial days of the
attack was lost. For the Allies, the results of the battle were
ultimately disappointing but valuable lessons were learnt about new
strategies and tactical approaches to fighting. The Germans had also
discovered that their fixed lines of defence, no matter how well
prepared, were vulnerable. The Cambrai Memorial was designed by H
Chalton Bradshaw with sculpture by C S Jagger.
The memorial stands on a terrace at one end of LOUVERVAL MILITARY
CEMETERY. The chateau at Louverval, was taken by the 56th Australian
Infantry Battalion at dawn on 2 April 1917. The hamlet stayed in
Allied hands until the 51st (Highland) Division was driven from it
on 21 March 1918 during the great German advance, and it was retaken
in the following September. Parts of Rows B and C of the cemetery
were made between April and December 1917 and in 1927, graves were
brought in from Louverval Chateau Cemetery, which had been begun by
German troops in March 1918 and used by Commonwealth forces in
September and October 1918. The cemetery now contains 124 First
World War burials.

No. of
Identified Casualties:

7042

The 12th (Eastern)
Division

The
Division was always called ‘The Ace of Spades’

Summary history of the division

This was one of the first New Army divisions
to be formed, as part of K1. It was assembled around Colchester (with
the divisional artillery at Shorncliffe) from late August 1914.
Divisional training was completed near Aldershot from February 1915, and
the Division moved to France on 29 May - 4 June 1915. The Division
served with distinction on the Western Front throughout the war.

The
Battle of Cambrai ranks as one of the most thrilling episodes of the
whole war. Tanks at last came into their kingdom. The notion that the
Hindenburg Line was impregnable was exploded.'

By
1917, Cambrai had become one of the most important railheads and HQ
towns behind the German lines. In front of it lay the immensely powerful
Siegfried Stellung - better known to the British as the Hindenburg Line.
So strong was the defensive position here that German Divisions
decimated during Third Ypres were sent here to recuperate and refit. It
included two lines of fortifications, with barbed wire belts tens of
yards wide, concrete emplacements and underground works. A third
parallel line was also under construction. Haig approved a novel plan
for an attack on Cambrai that was put to him on 16th September 1917,
while the Third Battle of Ypres
(Passchendaele) was at its height and Plumer was about to launch the
next assault which was to become known as the Battle of the Menin Road.
The plan outlined a tactically sophisticated sweep that would encircle
and capture Cambrai. It required breaking through the Hindenburg Line,
capturing the dominating heights of Bourlon Wood on the left, and
exploitation of the breakthrough by sending three cavalry Divisions
across the St Quentin canal and to the rear of the town. The cavalry
would encircle the town, joining the other troops north of Bourlon. Key
elements of the plan included the use of recently developed tactics,
including airborne interdiction bombing to stop German reinforcement by
rail; the maintenance of surprise by the use of predicted artillery fire
that required no registration; and the use of massed tanks with infantry
groups in support. This latter tactic was not wholly welcomed, for the
tanks had yet to prove themselves, having hardly excelled in the 1917
fighting at Arras, Bullecourt and Ypres. The assault was planned and
carried out by the Third Army, commanded by
Julian Byng.

Cambrai was an important regional town, occupied by the enemy and
fronted by the immense defensive complex of the Siegfried Stellung. The
landscape is gently rolling, cut by canals, railways and roads

What happened? The tank
attack, 20-21 November 1917

The
attack was launched at 6.20am on the 20th November. The British
Divisions in the front line were, from right to left, the12th,
20th, 6th,
51st (Highland), 62nd
(West Riding) and 36th
(Ulster). In immediate support were the
29th, and ready to exploit the anticipated
breakthrough and sweep round Cambrai were the 1st, 2nd and 5th Cavalry
Divisions. The Tank Corps deployed its
entire strength of 476 machines, of which more than 350 were armed
fighting tanks. They were led by the Tank Corps GOC, Hugh Elles, in a Mk
IV tank called 'Hilda'. The attack opened with an intensive
predicted-fire barrage on the Hindenburg Line and key points to the
rear, which caught the Germans by surprise. Initially, this was followed
by the curtain of a creeping barrage behind which the tanks and infantry
followed. On the right, the 12th Division moved forward through Bonavis
and Lateux Wood, and dug in a defensive flank to allow the cavalry to
pass unrestricted, as ordered. On the extreme right of the attack, the
7th Royal Sussex got into Banteux, which had been subjected to gas
attack from Livens projectors. The 20th Division captured La Vacquerie
after a hard fight and then advanced as far as Les Rues Vertes and
Masnieres where there was a bridge crossing the St Quentin Canal.
Securing the bridge was going to be vital for the 2nd Cavalry Division,
planning to move up to the east of Cambrai. However, the weight of the
first tank to cross the bridge, 'Flying Fox', broke its back. Infantry
could cross slowly by a lock gate a couple of hundred yards away, but
the intended cavalry advance was effectively halted. An improvised
crossing also allowed the B squadron of the Fort Garry Horse to cross,
but they were left unsupported and withdrew. (For no good reason, it was
not noticed that further canal crossings at Crevecoeur-sur-Escaut were
very lightly defended, until too late in the day). The 6th Division,
once it had crossed the Hindenburg Line, moved forward and captured
Ribecourt and fought as far as and through Marcoing. The 5th Cavalry
Division advanced through them but were repulsed in front of Noyelles.
The 51st Division had a very hard fight for Flesquieres, but its failure
to capture it and keep up with the pace of the advance on either side
left a dangerous salient which exposed the flanks of the neighbouring
Divisions. On the left of Flesquieres, the 62nd Division fought hard
through the ruins of Havrincourt, up to and through Graincourt and by
nightfall were within sight of Anneux in the lee of the commanding
height crowned by Bourlon Wood. The division had covered almost five
miles from their start point, and were exhausted. (This was later
claimed to be a record advance in the Great War for troops in battle).
The 36th Division moved up the dry excavations of the Canal du Nord, and
lay alongside the Bapaume-Cambrai road by nightfall. By recent Western
Front standards, the advance was little short of miraculous, and victory
bells were pealed in Britain on the 23rd. In the light of subsequent
events, this was indeed ironic.

The Capture of Bourlon Wood, 23-28 November

When
first presented with the plan for the attack, Douglas Haig recommended
strengthening the left flank to take Bourlon Wood very early. He wasted
his breath: Byng ignored his advice. By nightfall on the 20th, it was
clear that Haig had been right. From the dominating height of the Wood,
the Germans held the British advance in front of Anneux and Graincourt.
There was good news, however, as the 51st Division crept into
Flesquieres, abandoned during the night by the Germans. On the morning
of the 21st, the 51st Div. moved forward with the aid of two tanks
towards Fontaine, but were held up by fire from the Wood. Harper ordered
a halt until the 62nd Division had captured the heights. The latter had
a violent and costly battle for Anneux, led by the 186th Brigade, under
R.B.Bradford. To the north, the 36th Division, planning to continue
their advance beyond Moeuvres, waited for the success signal, signifying
that the 62nd had captured Bourlon. It never came, for the 62nd could
not penetrate beyond the sunken lane facing the wood. By the evening of
the 21st, Haig was satisfied that 'no possibility any longer existed of
enveloping Cambrai from the south'. In other words, the rationale for
the whole action had now been lost. But the British were now in an
exposed position in the lee of Bourlon Wood, the capture of which would
still prove to be useful, in cutting German access to key light railway
lines feeding their front. Haig and Byng decided to press on, even
though it meant deepening the salient that had been created, and
throwing in even more troops into this northern sector of the
battlefield. On the 22nd, the GOC 40th
Division at Beaumetz-les-Cambrai received
orders to relieve the 62nd Division the next day. The 40th was a
division of Bantams, men under
regulation height. By now the roads were breaking up under the strain of
thousands of men, wagons and lorries. It took 40th Divisional HQ 15
hours to travel the 9 miles to Havrincourt. A relief and assault plan
was quickly drawn up: 121 Brigade to capture Bourlon, 119 Brigade to go
for the Wood, both jumping off from the sunken lane. On their right, the
51st would move forward to Fontaine. On the left, the 36th would go in
again at Moeuvres. 92 tanks would support these units. They attacked
through ground mist on the morning of the 23rd. Some of the units of the
40th had to cross 1000 yards down the long slope from Anneux, across the
sunken lane and up the final rise into the Wood, all the while under
shell fire. There was close and vicious fighting in the Wood, but after
3 hours, the Welsh units of 119 Brigade were through and occupying the
northern and eastern ridges at the edge of the undergrowth. The 121st
Brigade were cut down by heavy machine gun fire, and few got as far as
the village. 7 tanks did, but were unsupported and the survivors
withdrew. On the flanks, the 36th and 51st Divisions made little
progress, against strengthening opposition. Over the next few days,
further trops were thrown into the battle, including the Guards who
advanced into Fontaine. Once his troops had been driven from the Wood,
the enemy switched all of his artillery onto it. Battalions in the Wood
were wiped out. Three companies of the14th HLI miraculously penetrated
to the far side of Bourlon, but were cut off and gradually annihilated.
And it began to snow. Life began to return to trench normality as the
troops settled into the newly-won positions. The British now sat some
way ahead of the position of 20th November, being in possession of a
salient reaching towards Cambrai, with the left flank facing Bourlon,
and the right alongside the top of the slope which ran down towards
Banteux.

The German Counter-attack, 30 November - 4
December

The
Germans began planning for a counter-strike around the 23rd November, as
their strength in the area began to mount and it bacme clear that the
British had shot their bolt. The plan was simply to cut of the neck of
the salient by attacking on each side, with the strongest blow to come
on the southern side. The blow fell at 7.30am on the 30th, and was
devastatingly fast and effective. By 9am, the Germans had penetrated
almost 3 miles towards Havrincourt Wood. Byng's Third Army faced
disaster, with the real prospect of several divisions being cut off in
the trap. The first attack fell on the 55th (West Lancs) and 12th
Divisions on the south-eastern side of the salient. The Germans climbed
the slope to re-take Lateau Wood, pushed up the complex of shallow
ravines south of Banteux, moved through Villers Guislain, and past
Gouzeaucourt. Amongst the troops defending the artillery positions at
Gouzeaucourt were the 11th US Engineer Company. The direction of the
assault was across British divisional boundaries, and the command
structure rapidly broke down as the troops became mixed up. Three German
divisions attacked to the north, supported by an intense Phosgene
barrage, intending to cut the Bapaume-Cambrai road near Anneux Chapel.
They were repulsed by the machine gun barrage of the 47th, 2nd and 56th
Divisions, who had relieved the 36th and 40th. No Germans reached the
road. Fierce fighting continued in the southeren area, for Gonnelieu,
Les Rues Vertes and Masnieres. Eventually, on the 3rd, Haig ordered a
retirement 'with the least possible delay from the Bourlon Hill-Marcoing
salient to a more retired and shorter line'. Later on, questions were
asked in the House. Byng's report blamed badly-trained troops. Several
middle-ranking commanders were sacked. But the hard fact remained that
this audacious plan had utterly failed, and although some ground had
been gained, in places the Germans were in ground formerly occupied by
the British. A small salient remained at Flesquieres, which was an
exposed position ruthlessly exploited by the German
assault in March 1918.

Tactics and Casualties

Great secrecy was maintained for this
operation. The artillery did not fire registration shots - and thus give
away their presence - but used predicted fire. The use of massed tanks
on favourable ground gave the British a real means of breaking through
the formidable enemy defences.

Third Army
reported losses of dead, wounded and missing of 44,207
between 20 November and 8 December. Of these, some 6,000 were taken
prisoner in the enemy counterstroke on 30 November. Enemy casualties are
estimated by the British Official History at approximately 45,000.

With thanks to Chris Baker, Author of ‘The
Long, Long Trail’ at www.1914-1918.net
and The National Archives

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