Currently
pending before the court is the motion to set aside default
and permit the filing of responsive pleadings (Rec. Doc. 12),
which was filed by the defendant, Michaud Construction Group,
LLC. The motion is not opposed. Considering the evidence, the
law, and the arguments of the parties, and for the reasons
fully explained below, the motion is GRANTED.

Background

The
plaintiff filed this lawsuit in March 2018, contending that
his employer failed to properly pay overtime wages in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
The defendant agreed to waive service, and the signed waiver
of service form was filed in the record. (Rec. Doc. 7). When
no responsive pleadings were timely filed, however, the
plaintiff filed a motion for entry of default. (Rec. Doc. 8).
On June 21, 2018, the Clerk of Court filed an entry of
default. (Rec. Doc. 9). The next day, the defendant filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for more
definite statement of claims. (Rec. Doc. 10). But that motion
was deemed deficient because the only permissible response to
the entry of default is a motion to set aside default. (Rec.
Doc. 11). The defendant promptly filed a motion to set aside
default (Rec. Doc. 12), which is now before the court for
resolution.

Law
and Analysis

Rule 55
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs applications
for default judgment. It states that a default judgment is
proper “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend.”[1] However, the Fifth Circuit generally
disfavors default judgments and favors resolving cases on
their merits.[2] Consequently, “[d]efault judgments
are a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules and
resorted to by courts only in extreme
situations.”[3] Even when a defendant is technically in
default, a “party is not entitled to a default judgment
as a matter of right.”[4] This principle, however, is
“counterbalanced by considerations of social goals,
justice, and expediency, a weighing process [that] lies
largely within the domain of the trial judge's
discretion.”[5] Therefore, the entry of a default judgment
is committed to the discretion of the district
court.[6]

A party
is entitled to the entry of default by the clerk of court if
the opposing party fails to plead or otherwise defend as
required by law.[7] This first step, entry of a default, is a
ministerial matter performed by the clerk, and is a
prerequisite to a later default judgment. A default judgment
may be entered by the clerk of court if the claim is for a
sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by calculation,
but in all other cases may be entered by the court on the
motion of the plaintiff.[8] In this case, the plaintiff has not
prayed for the recovery of a sum certain or a calculable
amount of damages nor has the plaintiff requested that a
judgment of default be entered against the defendants.
However, the defendant has requested that the clerk's
entry of default be set aside.

An
entry of default may be set aside if the party seeking relief
shows good cause.[9] The decision lies within the sound
discretion of the district court, [10] and the district court
should consider whether the default was willful, whether
setting it aside would prejudice the adversary, and whether a
meritorious defense is presented.[11] These factors are neither
talismanic nor exclusive, and other factors may be
considered, [12] including whether “the defendant
acted expeditiously to correct the
default.”[13] Regardless of the specific factors
considered, any doubt as to whether to enter or set aside a
default judgment must be resolved in favor of the defaulting
party.[14] Furthermore, “the requirement of
good cause has generally been interpreted liberally,
”[15] and in this case, this Court finds that
there is good cause to set aside the clerk's entry of
default.

The
defendant candidly admitted that the failure to timely
respond to the complaint was due to an inadvertent error in
calendaring the date on which responsive pleadings were due.
(Rec. Doc. 12-1 at 4). Accordingly, the default was not
willful or intentionally designed to delay the proceedings.
At this early stage in the litigation, setting the default
aside will not prejudice the plaintiff. This is particularly
true since the defendant has potentially meritorious
defenses. In particular, the defendant has suggested that it
actually was not the plaintiff's employer at relevant
times, and the plaintiff has filed a motion seeking to amend
his complaint to identify another entity as the
plaintiff's employer and the proper defendant in the
lawsuit. Additionally, it is clear that the defendant meant
to respond to the complaint in a timely fashion, as evidenced
by the filing of a motion to dismiss on the day that the
defendant erroneous thought to be the day when responsive
pleadings were due. Further, the defendant acted
expeditiously to cure the default, filing the motion to set
aside the entry of default just five days after default was
entered. These factors weigh heavily and unanimously in favor
of setting aside the clerk's entry of default.

Conclusion

Having
found that all relevant factors favor setting aside the clerk
of court's entry of default, IT IS ORDERED that the
defendant's motion to set aside default and permit the
filing of responsive pleadings (Rec. Doc. 12) is GRANTED.

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