Saturday, November 15, 2014

Staunton, November 15 – The nationality
issue together with “the crisis in the political economy of socialism”
destroyed the Soviet Union a generation ago. “Today in Russia, we observe
almost the same picture,” with the growth of Russian nationalism trigger “the
responsive growth of the nationalism” of the non-Russians, according to the
editor of a Tatarstan weekly.

Non-Russians are responding in this
way because, under current circumstances, it is the only way that they can hope
to block “cultural assimilation,” Rashit Akhmetov of “Zvezda Povolzhya” says. Moreover,
“the smaller the people, the more it has to do so because the loss of national culture
leads to the disappearance of the ethnos.”

Were it what he calls “’elevated’
Russian nationalism,” a nationalism committed to democracy and freedom, that
might not be the case, but what is now being promoted is not that but rather “great
power Russian nationalism which is hostile” not only to democracy but to the best
traditions of Russian culture (“Zvezda Povolzhya,” 42 (722), 13-19.XI.14, p.
1).

As three decades ago, he continues, one
can only be shocked by the Kremlin’s approach to nationality issues: its
proclivity to see the correct response to any and all challenges being the use
of force and the celebration of a single nation rather than recognizing that a
democratic requires negotiation and compromise with all its peoples.

And that single nation is not nearly
as predominant as the Kremlin believes, something that adds to the dangers of
acting in this way, Akhmetov says.There
are at least 10 million immigrants in the Russian Federation, and there are “approximately
20 million” non-Russians and “approximately 40 million ‘half Russians,’” people
of mixed ethnic background.

That means, the Kazan editor says,
that “there are not so many pure Russians in Russia, perhaps they represent even
less than half of the population.”

This is “well confirmed” by
elections, he continues. A maximum of 20 percent of the population votes “for
the ideas of Russian nationalism.” At the very least, 70 million residents of
the Russian Federation are cautious about or even negatively inclined to the
slogan “’Russia for the ethnic Russians,’” as a result at least in part of
their own ethnic background.

Among elites in the country,
opposition to this slogan is even higher, perhaps as much as 90 percent, given
that the most members of the elites are in fact not ethnically Russian and
fully understand the importance of a democratic and European choice for the
country.

Thus the slogan “Russia for the
ethnic Russians” can’t work for very long. The only slogan that can work is “friendship
of the peoples,” something that is impossible if the regime in Moscow keeps
proclaiming that only one people, the ethnic Russians, are “a state-forming
people” and all the others are somehow only hangers on.

A failure to recognize this reality
can lead to serious, potentially fateful mistakes. Moscow’s current push to
deprive Tatarstan of the office of presidency is an example of this, Akhmetov
says. Indeed, it “could be a historic Rubicon,” the crossing of which will involve
“the subconscious alienation” of the Tatars from Moscow, an alienation that
even flexibility on other issues won’t overcome.

What should happen is a referendum on
the matter, and the outcome of that referendum must be respected. If that does
not happen, then the danger to the Russian Federation, the Kazan editor
suggests, could be really dangerous indeed.