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Event Detail

Wednesday, December 5, 2012

The Art of the Nuclear Deal: When to Use Carrots and Sticks in Nuclear Nonproliferation

This presentation examines how coercive threats and sanctions
(“sticks”) on the one hand, and offers of positive inducements
(“carrots”) affect the decision making of states with nuclear
weapons aspirations. In many past cases US counter-proliferation
efforts, including with Iran and North Korea, US decision makers
have thus far judged preventive military force too costly or risky.
They have instead typically relied on other means to try to
convince the proliferating state to change its behavior: coercive
instruments such as economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation,
and offers of positive inducements such as improved relations and
technology transfers. Although there are heated debates in policy
circles over the relative merits of sticks and carrots as policy
instruments (as well as their use in tandem), there has been little
scholarly research to help resolve these debates. In fact, there
are a number of reasons to believe that positive inducements are
underused, and in many circumstances are a more promising policy
tool than sanctions. Not only can positive inducements be effective
in the absence of negative sanctions, but sanctions can undermine
their efficacy. To illustrate, Libya’s 2003 decision to turn over
its nuclear program is considered. The implications of these
findings for US policy toward Iran’s nuclear program are also
considered.