The personal blog of Peter Lee a.k.a. "China Hand"... Life is a comedy to those who think, a tragedy to those who feel, and an open book to those who read. You are welcome to contact China Matters at the address chinamatters --a-- prlee.org or follow me on twitter @chinahand.

Monday, May 26, 2014

Cold War Heats Up in Asia

The People’s Republic of China decided to defy the “pivot to
Asia” by parking its HYSY 981 drilling platform—protected by a flotilla of
various vessels perhaps not including PLAN ships-- in waters that Vietnam
considers part of its EEZ.

Vietnam has been displeased, to put it mildly.It has reached out to the Philippines,
indicating that it may support Manila’s legal challenge to the nine-dash-line
or perhaps institute a legal case of its own.

A Vietnamese deputy prime minister is also visiting Washington DC at US Secretary of State John Kerry's invitation, apparently to provide optics for an expected US congressional resolution
condemning PRC activities in the South China Sea. The visit also raises the specter (for the PRC) of a US return to Cam Ranh Bay, the massive
US-built naval base on the southish Vietnamese coast.

Many Western observers believe that the PRC has blundered
into the pivot’s clever trap, and its aggressive moves are simply driving its
neighbors into the welcoming arms of the United States, enabling a more forward
military presence for the US around China’s borders, and justifying US claims
to a central role in the region as security guarantor.

I suspect, however, that the PRC has gamed this out and is
willing to roll the dice in the South China Sea.

The long-term view from Beijing, I think, is that China occupies
enough islands to move beyond the hard to defend “cow tongue” claim to a more
defensible island sovereignty + EEZ formula for pursuing its interests in the
SCS; China’s growing economic and military heft, its ability to limit the terms
of dispute to economic terms, the unresolved issues of EEZ ambiguity,
definition, and enforcement, and the PRC’s unwillingness to budge from its
positions will force its neighbors to come to terms, albeit reluctantly and
resentfully, over the long haul.

East China Sea is a different matter.

On the issue of the Senkakus, the “possession is 9/10s of
the law” shoe is on Japan’s foot.Furthermore, the islands are unambiguously included in the scope of the
US-Japan security treaty thanks to President Obama’s statement during his
recent pivot tour to Asia (even though the US doesn’t recognize Japanese
sovereignty over the islands; that’s another story), and Japan’s military infrastructure
and capabilities to defend them are increasing.Assuming that Prime Minister Abe is able to thread the needle through
the Japanese constitution and past the suspicious Japanese public and institute
“collective self defense”, Japanese military power will be augmented by its
ability to engage in “defensive” military activity while conducting joint
operations with the US.

I read the red tea leaves and believe that the PRC does not
have a realistic expectation of seizing the Senkakus or otherwise changing the
status quo vis a vis Japan over the islands.I wouldn’t be surprised if the PRC has few serious intentions of
occupying the Senkakus and foments tension simply as a “pricetag” retaliation
for Japan’s increasingly overt and aggressive anti-PRC foreign policy.

With the PRC deterred from making a genuine move against the
Senkakus, the dominant dynamic in the East China Sea will be of Japan trying to
achieve unity of doctrine and response with the United States for a
contain-China policy, while the PRC will be trying to wedge US and Japan.

The process plays out with Japan’s invocation of “gray zone
crises” i.e. friction with the PRC manifested in non-military ways.Japan is trying to establish a definition of
gray zone conflicts that permits a military response to a non-military scenario such as the PRC's ceaseless salami-slicing, and thereby gets the
United States on the hook to provide backup muscle for the Japanese move. I see this as Japan's desired quid pro quo for signing on to "collective self defense".

One scenario I saw involved “armed Chinese fishermen” i.e.
the idea that the PRC might try to seize the Senkakus with some kind of
irregular force that the coast guard couldn't handle, and would require an SDF response even though PLA forces nominally weren't involved. As the United States digests the Crimea annexation precedent, expect Japan to invoke this kind of scenario more frequently.

The United States, whose primary interest is to get Japan on
the hook for US military adventures, not the other way around, is apparently
resistant to nailing down the “gray zone conflict” definition and giving Japan
a green light (or at least a blinking yellow) for pushing back on the PRC, especially in murky a.k.a. "gray" clashes between Japanese and PRC vessels on the high seas.

Indeed, the gray zone problem neatly crystallizes the whole
problem of the pivot: that it creates a moral hazard (in Western terms) or
emboldens US allies (the PRC formulation) to engage in reckless behavior not
necessarily advantageous to US interests, specifically the US interest in not
engaging in a scorched earth economic conflict with the PRC for the sake of
some uninhabited rocks.

Failing a meeting of the minds on “gray zone” conflicts,
Japan has to content itself with provocations against the PRC in the hope that
a PRC over-reaction will compel the US to expand its de facto security
guarantees to Japan.

I place the recent contretemps over the close-quarters flyby conducted by Chinese fighter jets against
Japanese military surveillance aircraft in the area of the joint PRC-Russia
naval exercise in the category of a provocation, committed with an awareness of growing US disgruntlement with the PRC as well as the Obama administration's need to explicitly stand with allies post-Crimea.

Western media has reliably regurgitated Japanese government
spin that the flyby was some recklessly aggressive behavior by the PRC.

The only justification that Japan can offer is that it
refuses to recognize the PRC ADIZ over the East China Sea.In fact, the incident shows why it’s important
to respect other countries’ declared ADIZs and in fact the reckless party in
this episode was not the PRC, but Japan. In terms of unintended consequences, it may also feed into US concerns about the hazards of letting Japan
take the initiative in butting heads with the PRC in the ECS and then demanding US backing.

An as yet unnoted element of the ADIZ issue is that the
United States is the only power that asserts the right to fly military aircraft
through somebody else’s ADIZ without filing a flight plan (to refresh everybody’s
memory, US-flagged civilian carriers respect the PRC ADIZ regs.But the US immediately flew two B-52s into the ADIZ unannounced to affirm the US military prerogative).

Now Japan seems to be asserting that same right for its
military aircraft, at least within the PRC ADIZ, a “destabilizing” “status quo-changing”
state of affairs, one that also places the Japanese military at parity with the
United States on this issue.I wonder if
the US is terribly happy about this but will have to suck it up since Japan is
currently dangling the collective self defense and TPP carrots before it.

It would seem unlikely that the United States would take
Japan under its wing, so to speak, and conduct joint military flight patrols
within China’s ADIZ as a show of support, but the Obama administration’s red
line manhood is being questioned worldwide post-Syria and post-Crimea.So it might happen.

And the PRC might just have to suck it up, consoling itself
with the idea that getting its way in the South China Sea is adequate
compensation for getting balked in the East China Sea.

At the back of everybody’s mind, I think, is the potential
real crisis in East Asia: the possibility that Taiwan will declare de jure
independence at some time, and the PRC will be compelled to put up or shut up
on the relatively existential issue of losing Taiwan.That’s when military posturing, military
threats, and military maneuvers become genuinely pressing issues.

In this context, I consider the most disturbing development
in US-PRC relations is not the tussling over rocks in the South China Sea or the East China Sea; it is the decision to twist China’s nuts with the indictment of
five PLA officers for hacking.I expect
the US national security civilian apparatus considers the indictment one of those
clever, legalistic soft power moves that, again, traps China in the web of law
and international norms.

But the battle lines in Asia have hardened: pivot vs.
China.The status quo is becoming
confrontation, at least in regional security issues.With the expectation that US and PRC forces
will be engaging and confronting each other, it would seem desirable that both
sides have a better understanding of their opposite numbers. Indeed, the US Department of Defense has shown little enthusiasm for the White House's anti-hacking jihad which, in addition to clearing out the US government's stock of cyberrighteousness, seriously depreciated by the Snowden revelations, has scotched US-PRC military-to-military exchanges on ground rules for cyberwarfare.

Engagement with the PRC, for better or worse, has become a military matter. And if a clash
occurs, it had better be because at least one side really wants it, and not because of the main abettors of military catastrophe: FUD or "Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt."