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Cisco Response
==============
This is Cisco PSIRT's response to the statements made by Arhont Ltd.-
Information Security in its message: [Full-disclosure] Cisco PIX TCP
Connection Prevention, posted on November 22, 2005.
The original email is available at:
http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/2005-November/038971.html
This issue is being tracked by two Cisco Bug IDs:
* CSCsc14915 -- PIX 6.3 Spoofed TCP SYN packets can block
legitimate TCP connections
This Bug ID tracks the issue for PIX software version 6.3
and older. This DDTS is under investigation and while not
resolved there are workarounds available to mitigate the
issue.
* CSCsc16014 -- PIX 7.0 Spoofed TCP SYN packets can block
legitimate TCP connections
This Bug ID tracks the issue for PIX/ASA software version
7.0. This DDTS is under investigation and while not
resolved additional mitigations and workarounds exist
to limit or eliminate the issue.
We would like to thank Arhont Ltd.- Information Security for
reporting this issue to us.
We greatly appreciate the opportunity to work with researchers on
security vulnerabilities, and welcome the opportunity to review and
assist in product reports.
Additional Information
======================
PIX 6.3
=======
* CSCsc14915 -- PIX 6.3 Spoofed TCP SYN packets can block
legitimate TCP connections
This issue affects PIX software version 6.3 and older. The Release
Note Enclosure for this Bug ID states:
Symptom
+------
TCP connections through the firewall may be silently blocked.
Conditions
+---------
By sending a TCP SYN packet with an incorrect checksum through a PIX
firewall, the PIX will block new TCP connections using the same
source and destination TCP ports and IP addresses. Connections will
remain blocked for approximately two minutes after which connections
will be allowed. This behavior may be seen on all firewall interfaces
but can be expected to have the most impact on TCP connections
originating from higher security level interfaces to lower security
level interfaces.
Since the spoofed packets have an incorrect checksum, they are
silently discarded by the destination and the firewall will not see a
RST packet from either the destination or the legitimate source and
will hold the embryonic connection open until the embryonic
connection timeout which is 2 minutes by default.
The root cause is due to the spoofed packet creating an embryonic
connection which sets up the TCP sliding window. A valid packet from
a real host using the same connection as the spoofed packet sends a
SYN over the same connection. The sequence number of the valid
packet is out-of-window and rejected by the firewall's TCP sequence
number check. Any subsequent retransmissions of the valid packet are
also out-of-window and are rejected by TCP sequence number check.
Other spoofed TCP SYN packets that create embryonic connections can
also cause this behavior, blocking legitimate TCP connections until
the embryonic connection times out.
Workarounds
+----------
Issuing the commands "clear xlate" or "clear local-host " will allow the firewall to
pass connections again.
TCP connections discarded because of this issue can be verified by
enabling "debug fixup tcp". 'Out of Window' drops will then generate
messages that begin with "tcpseq: discard old packet". Debug messages
may impact firewall performance and should be tested before being
enabled in a production environment.
For discarded TCP connections originating from lower security level
interfaces to higher security level interfaces, TCP Intercept can be
configured on "STATIC" commands by setting the "emb_limit" to 1. This
results in the PIX proxying all connection attempts after the first
connection. The PIX will create and send the TCP SYN,ACK from the
destination to the original source. Since the original TCP SYN packet
was spoofed, the source IP address will not be tracking the TCP
connection and it will send a TCP RST to the PIX. The PIX will then
close the connection originating from the TCP SYN packet with the
incorrect checksum. TCP Intercept may impact firewall performance and
should be tested before being enabled in a production environment.
Further Problem Description
+--------------------------
PIX software version 6.3 does not verify the TCP checksum of packets
transiting through the firewall.
Because the PIX does not verify the TCP checksum, the malformed TCP
packet is allowed through the firewall in a half-opened, embryonic
state.
The destination host discards the received malformed segments.
Because the firewall does not see a return segment from the
destination host it holds the half-open TCP connection open until the
embryonic timeout which is set to two minutes for PIX 6.3 and earlier
software.
Because the firewall is holding a connection open, any additional
packets with the same protocol, IP addresses, and ports will be
treated as part of the existing half-open connection. In this case, a
legitimate SYN packet following the malformed SYN will be discarded
because it is outside of the window of acceptable sequence numbers
established by the malformed packet.
For information on configuring the emb_limit as part of the "STATIC"
command in PIX software version 6.3 refer to:
STATIC
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/iaabu/pix/pix_sw/v_63/cmdref/s.htm#wp1026694
PIX/ASA 7.0
===========
* CSCsc16014 -- PIX 7.0 Spoofed TCP SYN packets can block
legitimate TCP connections
This issue affects PIX/ASA software version 7.0. Additional
mitigations and workarounds to limit or eliminate the issue. The
Release Note Enclosure for this Bug ID states:
Symptom
+------
TCP connections through the firewall may be silently blocked.
Conditions
+---------
By sending a TCP SYN packet with an invalid checksum through a PIX
firewall, the PIX will block new TCP connections using the same
source and destination TCP ports and IP addresses. Connections will
remain blocked until the embryonic connection timeout which is 30
seconds by default. This behavior may be seen on all firewall
interfaces but can be expected to have the most impact on TCP
connections originating from higher security level interfaces to
lower security level interfaces.
Since the spoofed packets have an invalid checksum, they are silently
discarded by the destination and the firewall will not see a RST
packet from either the destination or the legitimate source and will
hold the embryonic connection open until the embryonic connection
timeout which is 30 seconds by default.
The root cause is due to the spoofed packet creating an embryonic
connection which sets up the TCP sliding window. A valid packet from
a real host using the same connection as the spoofed packet sends a
SYN over the same connection. The sequence number of the valid
packet is out-of-window and rejected by the firewall's TCP sequence
number check. Any subsequent retransmissions of the valid packet are
also out-of-window and are rejected by TCP sequence number check.
Other spoofed TCP SYN packets that create embryonic connections can
also cause this behavior, blocking legitimate TCP connections until
the embryonic connection times out.
This behavior can be verified by issuing the command: "show asp drop"
The counter for "TCP RST/SYN in window" or "TCP SEQ in SYN/SYNACK
invalid" should increment for every packet dropped in this manner.
Workarounds
+----------
Several workarounds exist for this issue.
1. Issuing the commands "clear xlate" or "clear local-host " will allow the
firewall to pass connections again.
2. The default TCP embryonic connection timeout is 30 seconds. This
default can also be modified which further mitigates the issue. This
workaround should be effective regardless of the cause of the issue.
This configuration example sets the TCP embryonic connection timeout
to 10 seconds for the default "global_policy" policy-map:
access-list tcp_inspection extended permit tcp any any
access-list tcp_inspection extended deny ip any any
class-map my_inspection_tcp
match access-list tcp_inspection
policy-map global_policy
class my_inspection_tcp
set connection timeout embryonic 0:00:10
service-policy global_policy global
3. TCP Intercept can be configured to allow the PIX to proxy all TCP
connection attempts originated from behind any firewall interface
after the first connection. PIX will create and send the TCP SYN,ACK
from the destination to the original source. Since the original TCP
SYN packet was spoofed, the source IP address will not be tracking
the TCP connection and it will send a TCP RST to the PIX. The PIX
will then close the connection originating from the TCP SYN packet
with the invalid checksum. This workaround should be effective
regardless of the cause of the issue.
This example proxies all TCP connection attempts originated from any
firewall interface
after the first connection for the default "global_policy"
policy-map:
access-list tcp_inspection extended permit tcp any any
access-list tcp_inspection extended deny ip any any
class-map my_inspection_tcp
match access-list tcp_inspection
policy-map global_policy
class my_inspection_tcp
set connection embryonic-conn-max 1
service-policy global_policy global
4. When invalid checksums are the cause of this issue, PIX/ASA
software version 7.0 can be configured to verify TCP checksums which
will eliminate the impact. Verifying TCP checksums may impact
firewall performance and should be tested before being enabled in a
production environment.
This example verifies TCP packet checksums for the default
"global_policy" policy-map:
tcp-map verify-chksum
checksum-verification
access-list tcp_inspection extended permit tcp any any
access-list tcp_inspection extended deny ip any any
class-map my_inspection_tcp
match access-list tcp_inspection
policy-map global_policy
class my_inspection_tcp
set connection advanced-options verify-chksum
service-policy global_policy global
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
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