ABSTRACT: I explore the
nature of scientific explanation in a culture centering
on the doctrine of yin and yang combined with that of five
phrases, wu-hsing (YYFP). I note how YYFP functions as an
alternative to the causal way of thinking, as well as the meaning of
scientific explanation in a culture. I also consider whether a
scientific concept becomes metaphorical when it is superseded by an
alternative organizing concept.

To a Western eye, or even to a contemporary Eastern eye, many
explanations given under the doctrine of yin and yang combined with that
of five phases (wu-hsing), apparently intended to be scientific, would
seem either absurd or too arbitrary at first sight. An intriguing fact,
however, is that the doctrine of yin and yang and that of five phases
(hereafter YYFP) has prevailed until quite recently in almost all the
areas of Far-Eastern cultures including medicine, astronomy, music, dance,
architecture, geomancy.

In this essay, I pay attention to the questions such as how YYFP
functioned as an alternative to the causal way of thinking, and what it is
to be a scientific or theoretical explanation in a culture. I also
consider the question of whether a scientific concept becomes metaphorical
when it is superseded by an alternative organizing concept. Let me begin
with the development of the concept of YYFP, as you may not know in the
first place what YYFP is.

Until around the 4th century B.C., yin and yang were current words
for "sunshine" and "shade" and were used separately from the five phases
of change. Soon after, they came to be included in the six ch'i (six
powers or forces) of Heaven. The six ch'i refer to wind, rain, dark,
light, yin and yang. Yin and yang as parts of the six ch'i are now powers
that would balance the order of nature inducing proper seasonal changes
and controlling precipitation or wind.

And yet, it was not until the Warring States (403-222 B.C.) that yin
and yang became two opposing forces generating everything in the universe.
The concepts of yin and yang as two fundamental forces are most
conspicuous in I Ching (the Book of Changes) being
epitomized in the statement, "The successive movement of yin and yang
constitutes the Way (Tao)" ("Commentary on the Appended Phrases", part I,
ch. 5). As they settled into the categories of opposing forces, they came
to provide an explanatory apparatus applicable to opposites, contraries,
and hierarchical pairs. For instance, heaven, sun, fire, flying, running,
being round, and male, on the one hand, belong with the force of yang;
earth, moon, water, hibernating, hiding, being square, and female, on the
other hand, belong with the force of yin.

The supposed explanatory power of yin and yang grew enormously when
combined with the doctrine of the five phases. The doctrine of the five
phases provides a system where everything is categorized into one of five
groups. Everything in the world is thought to follow the cyclic changes of
fives, and things in the same phase are correlated to each other in such a
way that they can be observed together in natural or social phenomena, and
people are thought to act in accordance with the correlations among
things.

The principle that governs the cyclic changes is either generation or
conquest:

wood generates(catches) fire, fire (reduces to) soil, soil (in which)
metal (forms), metal (upon melting is liquidified) water, and water
(nourishes) wood . . .(in this case, the cyclic order of fives is wood,
fire, soil, metal, water); or wood conquers (digs) soil, metal (cuts)
wood, fire (melts) metal, water (extinguishes) fire (in this case, the
order would be soil, wood, metal, fire, water). The order gives a rule to
interpret changes and even to predict (or anticipate) what would come
next. It also provides heuristics by which people can remedy problems they
have. For instance, if one has a problem with one's liver, which belongs
to the category of wood, the treatment, given the second order of fives,
would be attempted by strengthening the lung, which belongs to the
category of metal, which overcomes wood by cutting.

On the other hand, the relations among numerous things belonging to the
same phase are often based on prima facie or symbolic similarities. You
may get a glimpse of the basic idea of the five phases from the following.
I use the first order here:

Wood

Fire

Soil

Metal

Water

Direction

North

East

South

Center

West

Season

Spring

Summer

Late summer

Autumn

Winter

Viscera

Liver

Heart

Spleen

Lung

Kidneys

Sense organ

Eye

Tongue

Mouth

Nose

Ear

Color

Green

Red

Yellow

White

Black

Time

Morning

Noon

Afternoon

Evening

Night

Feeling

Anger

Joy

Woe

Sorrow

Fear

Taste

Sour

Bitter

Sweet

Hot

Salty

Voice

Calling

Laughing

Sighing

Sobbing

Moaning

Number

8

7

5

9

6

Creature

Scaly

Feathered

Naked

Furred

Shelled

Ch'i

Wind

Hot

Wet

Dry

Cold

It is not clear what kind of principle or rule governs the groupings.
If everything in the universe belongs to one of the five phases of change,
there must be some principle by which we classify things. But we do not
know by what criteria things are thought to be in the phase of wood and
under the power or virtue of wood. In some cases, we may observe intuitive
similarities, but in many cases the groupings seem quite arbitrary, and
even absurd.

In Lue-shih ch'un-ch'iu (the records of the events during the Spring
and Autumn period<722-481 B.C.> by Lue-shih in the 3rd century
B.C.), we find a principle to the effect that similar things respond to
each other:

If things are of the same kind, they are more likely to harmonize. If
they are in the same ch'i, they unite, and if the sounds are alike, they
make harmony. Thus, if we strike the kung note, then another kung sound
will respond to it, and if we strike the chiao, then another sound of
chiao will answer it. If we pour water onto the flat land, the water will
be running toward the wet part, and if we set fire on the firewood, fire
makes its way to the dry part. (1)

The principle that similar things respond to each other does not
purport to give a systematization of natural and human phenomena providing
the greatest possible general principle under which less general ones are
to be subsumed. Even though the systematization by laws of causation also
presupposes similarity among events, the similarity condition runs
diachronically, whereas it runs synchronically in the case of YYFP. That
is, causes that are similar to each other in the relevant respects will
produce effects that are similar to each other in the relevant respects.
Instances of causation are grouped together by causal laws based on
certain sorts of similarities between the instances. A similarity relation
runs through similar instances of causation occurring in different times.
The use of the principle of similarity in the system of YYFP generates a
harmonized world that is ever more enlarged as objects are categorized in
accordance with the principle. It is the world of order where all people
and nature, according to their similarity relations, go well with, or
respond to each other in a harmonious way. This harmonized world is
distinct from the world of order where all events or occurrences in time
are brought under laws that would relate different events in terms of
causality. Harmony and order come about in the former as assimilated
things grouped together in one of the fives move in ever-lasting cyclic
order, whereas in the latter they lie in lawfulness where similar cases
are subsumed under a general law. It is intriguing to note that a similar
mystery prevails concerning what the responding or assimilating relation
between things amounts to, and what the causal relation between events is.
In both cases, a uniformity of nature is presupposed. But it is not clear
if it is by their internal nature that things respond to certain other
things, or if the similarity relation is determined by a culture or what
Wittgenstein called 'the form of life'. As it is not clear whether
causality belongs to nature, so it is not clear if there is inherent an
assimilating power among things.

The similarity relation in most cases is not natural but dependent on a
particular background system. The similiarity relation that has been
thought of as running through Heaven, king, husband, and the noble was
made possible by a patriarchal monarchy. Insofar as the similarity
relation is not natural, the concepts of yin/yang and the five phases take
on the characteristic of metaphor. However, the more deeply the metaphors
are rooted in the background system, the more powerful they become, to the
extent that they are taken to be natural and scientific. Once the
similarity relation is assumed and once things are grouped according to
whatever similarities they might have, the only thing you can do is to
behave as the order thus generated dictates.

Now, how is the concept of yin-yang related to the doctrine of the five
phases? Tung Chung-suh thought that yin and yang as two opposite material
forces help the workings of the five phases. Small yang accompanying the
wood phase helps activate the birth of Spring; large yang accompanying the
fire phase, the growth of Summer; small yin accompanying the metal phase,
the harvest of Fall; and large yin accompanying the water phase, the
storing and the hiding of Winter. (2) They were considered two mobile forces
that made the Five Phases go round trying to conquer each other while
reinforcing their power by activating things of the same kind.

As the YYFP provided explanations about what happens in both the
natural and the human worlds, including the human body, the extent the
YYFP claimed for its explanatory force was excessively enlarged, with
arbitrariness accordingly increased. Arbitrary as it may be, we find, in
the explanatory system of YYFP, a similar craving for reduction and
explanatory efficiency that permeated the development of modern Western
culture, where extensive causal explanations are sought. Once you adopt
YYFP, it gives you a simple and convenient way of finding an explanation
by relating the thing or event to something else that is similar in a
certain aspect, by categorizing it into yin or yang (or one of the fives).
By way of analogy, the thing or the phenomenon to be explained acquires
the properties that something it was related to allegedly has. Since they
belong to the same category, they are governed by the same force or
virtue.

By being located in the huge network of expanding relations and in the
system of assimilations, things and phenomena related to them are thought
to be understood and explained. People have lived within this system with
its conceptions of disease, cure, life, death, happiness, justice,
reality, and so on, that the system has prescribed. Within this framework,
one seeks to find a possible relation things or properties observed in an
event might have to other things. If one finds to what category they
belong on the basis of similarity, then one claims to have an explanation
of their occurrence, and even predictions about their future occurrences
and behaviors (in the case of humans). That's how the system of divination
has developed. Instead of seeking possible causes and effects, one seeks a
possible similarity relation.

This attitude hampers causal thinking, because if the system of
assimilations works well, there is no need to wonder about the cause. But
what is it for the system to be working? When all the sciences a society
has and virtually everything in it were organized on the basis of YYFP, it
is quite likely to work. It is made to work, as people live out the rules
the system is built on. And as people live that way, the system, in turn,
is consolidated. Insofar as the system of assimilation is working,
explanations in terms of YYFP are counted good or at least relevant and
acceptable. It is like the situation where causal-mechanical explanations
are considered genuine insofar as the system (whether culture or science)
based on mechanical physics is working and taken to be genuinely
scientific.

At this point, a question of circularity concerning the relevance of
explanation or the criteria of good explanation, as well as a question
about the actual use of causal concepts in Eastern civilization, may
arise. First, what is it to determine that a given explanation is relevant
or good? What does it mean to say something is explained? What difference
is there between being explained and not being explained? Can there be a
universal model of scientific explanation as Hempel or other philosophers
of science attempted to establish? Can there be a model of explanation in
general against which all these questions could be settled? Can something
be an explanation in one context and not in another context, whether the
context is to be a culture or a disciplinary area or a form of life?

These questions are worth considering. It is because YYFP has prevailed
in some cultures for 2,000 years, providing a rational ground for various
human and natural phenomena, even if explanations given under the YYFP
cannot be counted as scientific from the modern Western point of view.
Chinese medicine is still very widely practiced in the East. This tells us
that what determines for a society or culture the relevance of a given
explanation is a knowledge framework a culture or a society has. It
determines not only what to count as a good explanation, but also what
calls for an explanation. In Chinese medicine, diseases are said to be the
imbalance between the two ch'is, yin and yang, in the body. Explanations
appealing to the movements of yin and yang are relevant and would serve
people's need in that context. The questions for which the explanations
are provided might not even appear in the context of Western medicine.

But if the relevance of an explanation is determined by the knowledge
framework that first generated the question, what is the point of
demanding an additional explanation within the framework? Even if
additional explanations are given, what kind of information, or knowledge,
or understanding would they provide in addition to the information that
the original knowledge framework would generate? If we live within the
framework of YYFP, the causal explanations given with regard to the
question, "Why are birds flying?" seem to be superfluous. Birds as the
feathered and belonging to large yang are readily correlated to flying,
which also belongs to yang. If we live with the causal-mechanistic world
view, causal-mechanistic explanations would be expected, and given with
reference to the readily existing framework of knowledge (i.e., physics,
chemistry, etc.). There seems to be an unavoidable circularity here in
that you already presuppose what you ask.

The problem of circularity puts us in a situation where the possibility
of establishing a general theory of explanation is called into question,
because it is not the general theory that determines what counts as an
explanation, but the knowledge framework you already presuppose. If the
relevance of explanation is determined by reference to the background
knowledge framework, how can the relativity of explanation be dealt with?
I seem to face the problem of incommensurability. I do not have a clear
answer to this question. But, I think, the explanatory circle breaks down
when one knowledge framework clashes with another. Various factors will
determine which one dominates the other. I don't think that it is just a
matter of explanatory power, since we cannot determine that power on a
neutral basis. Political, economic, or even military powers could also be
factors. Once the circle breaks down, and the other criteria of the
relevance of explanation dominate, then the old concepts used in old
explanations become metaphors. They no longer squarely fit into the newly
changed forms of life of people, which are based on new technology and new
science.

The ideal YYFP tends to achieve is cohesiveness and appropriateness
within things (including humans and nature) in the universe, whereas the
ideal of a causal-mechanistic system is necessity among phenomena and
events. Finding a proper place in and proper relations with the
surroundings is most important in the former, while finding exact causes
and reasons is required in the latter. As you are adapted to the forms of
life based on modern science and on the political ideal of free and
autonomous individuals as atomic units, you begin to demand explanations
in the face of 'why' questions that would provide you with the necessity
(instead of the approximate correlation of things involved) of some
occurrences and behaviors in terms of exact causes and reasons. You see
people around you as objective individuals to deal with on an even ground,
not as someone to be assimilated or differentiated based on a certain
order and relations. The concepts of yin/yang and the five phases become
vague and remote while losing their grip on peoples' lives. However, it
seems that the development of science and technology does not always bring
a change in peoples' worldviews as dramatic as it would have done in their
own fields. Insofar as people still hold to the old worldview and have the
old attitude toward other people and nature, YYFP may have explanatory
power, though on a metaphorical level. This would explain how it is
possible for the two radically different systems to coexist as they do in
the East.

My claim that the development of science and technology could be made
independently of the general worldview of a society may also be supported
by the scientific and technological inventions in Eastern Civilization,
which would not have been possible without applying the concepts of cause
and effect. The use of causal concepts in the East has not added to
building a comprehensive scientific framework that would function as a
paradigm of thought influencing the whole culture on a large scale. The
same point can be made even of Western culture. Recent developments in
quantum physics, biology and information science have put us in a position
where we question the uniqueness of the causal-mechanical model of
science. But these developments, even though sciences based on non-causal
concepts might dominate in the culture, would not eradicate the causal way
people have viewed the world and themselves, but only relegate the concept
of cause to the realm of metaphor, a rhetorical way of putting things. The
concept of cause then would no longer be a scientific concept, but would
still be alive in the culture. What brings a change in the general
worldview then? This would be the question I still have to ask.