01809cam a22002297 4500001000600000003000500006005001700011008004100028100001900069245011500088260006600203490004100269500001000310520089900320530006101219538007201280538003601352710004201388830007601430856003701506856003601543w2137NBER20150802185516.0150802s1987 mau||||fs|||| 000 0 eng d1 aAbowd, John M.10aCollective Bargaining and the Division of the Value of the Enterpriseh[electronic resource] /cJohn M. Abowd. aCambridge, Mass.bNational Bureau of Economic Researchc1987.1 aNBER working paper seriesvno. w2137 a1987.3 aThe enterprise (firm) is modeled as a collection of formal and informal contracts providing various factors of production with claims on the income stream in consideration of assets or services supplied to the enterprise. The strongly efficient bargaining model implies that the division of the quasi-rents will result in dollar for dollar exchanges of wealth between the union members and the shareholders. The leading inefficient bargaining models do not imply such tradeoffs in general. The model is tested by considering contract settlements during the years 1976 to 1982 as recorded by the Bureau of National Affairs in Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts. Security price data for the firms were merged with these bargaining unit level settlement data. The tests provide substantial confirmation of the dollar for dollar wealth tradeoff between union members and shareholders. aHardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. aSystem requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files. aMode of access: World Wide Web.2 aNational Bureau of Economic Research. 0aWorking Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research)vno. w2137.4 uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w213741uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2137