Discovering the adversary, one day at a time

Jihad Media

July 06, 2012

I tweeted this last week, but I forgot to post it to the blog. Consider it a curio from a different time. It's an English-language periodical, published in 1990 through a Cairo-based Muslim Brotherhood publishing house - Ummah Press Service. The Library of Congress record is here.

There are no bombshells in this document, but if you're an observer of the Egyptian Brotherhood - and you're reading about this for the first time - you may find this artifact something of interest. It, along with other English language Ummah Press Service publications, suggest that the editors had a Western audience in mind. It begs the question: whose ambition was it to reach an English-reading audience, and for what purpose?

Back in 2007, I posted on another Ummah Press Service publication, The West in the Eyes of the Egyptian Islamic Movement. That document (a copy of my original file can found here) was a discussion of the political distinctions and means of action between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian jihadi groups of the period, Jihad and Islamic Group.

The periodical linked here was part of an ambitious experiment to construct an English-language identity for the group. The experiment failed. There's little in the LC records to show that Ummah Press regularly produced English language material after the early 1990s. Perhaps this is what makes the Biannual Review so interesting. So little English-language scholarship about the Brotherhood exists from this time period. Of the 19 records drawn from the LC catalog, only one is in English. As a result, this tiny collection of English-language works, published in earnest by the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1990s, may be the only extant English-language primary source material of the period available for further scholarly study of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

February 15, 2012

While I work on another Knights2 post, I’ve decided to toss out an idea that will probably remain underdeveloped unless someone else wants to pick up the loose threads I’m about to drop.

Not long ago, I decided to read all the poetry in Knights2 in succession, but out of narrative context, in order to test out a hunch. In short, Zawahiri’s use of poetry and sacred text are signs in and of themselves, representing secondary and tertiary layers of meaning not commonly expressed in our paint-by-numbers understanding of al-Qaeda and the global Salafist-jihadist movement.

Overlooked rhetorical patterns, built from passages of sacred and profane poetry, Quranic verse, and ahadith, would probably broaden the language of spiritual self-sacrifice, and offer a far more expansive understanding of the movement and its dedicated members than the utilitarian analysis often employed in our intelligence and foreign policy industries.

A jihadi reading this poetry will more than likely receive different messages from it than would a western secular analysts. The nature of that difference is obviously unknown.

Then there's AQ's use of visual signs; they're a sadly neglected subject of study, abandoned to fools who approach them armed with analytical skills honed from years of reading Dan Brown books.

Perhaps there’s an essay in this...I’m thinking of one on al-Muqrin’s halo.

September 30, 2011

Having watched Samir Khan - aka The Pest - since the beginning of his career in 2006, I'm sorry to see him go, but not because I cared about him. He and his online buddies pestered me and other(more) decent bloggers for years. In the process, they took what was a tiny, sleepy little corner of the English-language jihadi internet, and turned it into an industry of inane commentary and pointless domestic policy.

No, I can't gloat over his demise. The Pest was an American kid who abused the privilege of his citizenship and the gift of his free will. He died as a consequence.

My thoughts are with his parents, who had to watch their child die a violent, ugly death, as the entire world celebrated.

August 27, 2011

One of the first things UK-based jihadis did once the movement established its first tenuous foothold online (2003-2004) was to share historic videos (no doubt readily accessible to them in hard copy) through commercial file servers (Sendspace, etc) and, of course, Archive.org. Numerous videos piled onto the web between 2003-2006, featuring a host of historic figures that would test the meddle of any young student of the Salafist-jihadi movement (Sheik Tameem al-Adnani, Rifai Taha, etc).

The following video was available on Archive.org for years (but not now). It is perhaps the perfect “jihad” video. It features four primary players of the Global jihad movement sitting/standing on a dais together -- filmed in an effort to raise money for the Chechen jihad. It's 48-minutes long, in Arabic and English; it features "stars" of the movement, and includes a bit of recent history. It is a perfect example of how jihad media was used in fundraising and recruitment before 9/11, and it provides some much-needed historical continuity in the current study of the origins of the jihad media phenomenon.

The video epitomizes 90s-era Londonistan: a cultural, theological, and entrepreneurial milieu that was the heart of the global jihad movement. Some analysts say the jihad went global after 9/11. Still other believe it happened after Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa. I believe that the “Jihad” went global once it established itself in London in the early 1990s. A group of Salafist-jihadi exiles thrived under UK's lax policies toward "dissidents," exploting both the government's disinterest and commonplace Western freedoms - religion, speech, etc. In this global stew, Londonistan became a safehaven with limitless freedom and cash. It became a proving ground for a global mindset.

As I said, the video appears to be a late-90s fundraiser for Chechen mujahideen -- probably during the second Chechen War. It's being held in what looks like a school or mosque auditorium. It features (L to R) Abu Hamza al-Masri, Omar Bakri, and Saudi dissident Mohammed al-Massari (known as the purveyor of one of the first jihadi forums: Tajdeed). Standing up at the podium (speaking in Arabic) is Abu Qatada al Filistini, one of the most popular and divisive characters among the Londonistan cadre.

As Abu Qatada describes the situation among the Chechen fighters, a film (most likely from Chechnya) is projected onto a screen behind the dais, giving us an idea of how jihad videos were used before the age of Youtube and social networking. Omar Bakri translates Qatada’s raspy Arabic. Massari looks rather bored.

Though the audio and resolution are awful, the video highlights Abu Qatada’s famous public persona, and poses an analyst's challenge to identify the individuals walking behind the panel and whose role in the community may never be fully known. At about 29:00, Qatada concludes his part, and Abu Hamza addresses the audience in English, noting the strategic advantages in maintaining the Chechen jihad for the global jihad movement (excuse my miserable transcription skills)

“...I just want to stress two points he did...our brothers there [pointing to the screen behind him] are the most experienced fighters on earth. If we lose them, if we lose any one of them, we have lost a great asset, a great potential, a great trainer, a great expert in war, a great [????] for the kafirs, a great bodyguard for Muslims, and is time, time if we are negligent, will not be in our favor. Secondly, the tactics of the mujahidin is to trap the Russians...they know that they cannot fight Russians face to face, they have to fight guerilla wars...”

Bakri speaks, briefly toward the end. At one point he mentions Bin Laden, but the audio is terrible, and I'm not sure what he's saying. However, my guess is that he's mentioning the then-recent Africa embassy bombings.

There you go. A little bit of recent history, with some provocative statements by Londonistan’s professional provocateurs. Much has changed in London since the 1990s, but that history hasn’t been written yet, and we’d be short-sighted if we thought we knew everything that needed to be known.

August 02, 2011

The Introduction to the second edition of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet, begins with a verse of secular poetry.

Cutting forest trees is not useless, They are for a pulpit or for a cross.

The verse comes from a poem of Mohammed Iqbal. A secular poet and champion of the Islamic revival, Iqbal is the second secular poet Zawahiri turns to, and like al-Kawakbi, Iqbal advocated for broader Islamic revival. Iqbal was also an advocate for the Pakistani state, and an ideal choice if Zawahiri had in part a Pakistani audience in mind. Iqbal would appeal to the tastes of many of his Pakistani supporters and protectors.

He formally opens Knights 2 with a prayer of repentance.

All praise is due to God. We worship Him, We seek His help and His forgiveness and we turn to Him in repentance. We seek refuge in God from the evil within ourselves and our ill deeds. Whoever God guides cannot be led astray and whomever He leads astray, for him there is no guide. There is no god but God. He is alone, He has no partner and Muhammad is his servant and messenger.

A few paragraphs down he’ll note that the book isn’t a history (my word) or an analysis (my word). And it certainly doesn’t leave a knowledgeable reader with the impression that its an ideological “manifesto." Then what is it? This prayer of repentance suggests that Zawahiri primarily intends Knights 2 as a confessionary work. It’s unknown whether that was the original intention for Knights 1, but it comes through clearly in the opening prayer for Knights 2: We seek refuge in God from the evil within ourselves and our ill deeds. It ends, appropriately, with an assertion of the mystical foundation of Salafist-jihadist thought: tawhid, the oneness of God.

He goes on:

"Ye who believe! Fear Allah as He should be feared, and die not except in a state of Islam,” [Koranic verse, Al Imran, 3:102]. “O mankind! Reverence your Guardian-Lord, who created you from a single person, created, of like nature, his mate, and from them twain scattered (like seeds) countless men and women; reverence Allah, through whom ye demand your mutual (rights), and (reverence) the wombs (That bore you): for Allah ever watches over you” [Koranic verse, Al-Nisa, 4:1]. “O ye who believe! Fear Allah, and (always) say a word directed to the Right, that He may make your conduct whole and sound and forgive you your sins: He that obeys Allah and His Messenger, has already attained the highest achievement” [Koranic verse, Al-Ahzab, 33:70, 71].

Three passages from the Quran (drawn from three Medinan suras, if you keep track of those things) represents a three-fold paradigm of worship within the Salafist-jihadi milieu: fear of God, reverence for life given you, and the practice of righteous conduct accompanied with a penitent heart. Even though practically all Zawahiri's work include some religious context, that context will change from work to work. He chose the words to this prayer, probably because they emphasize significant and recurring themes throughout the book, and place its historical accounts in their appropriate context.

Zawahiri begins his “re”-introduction of Knights with the intention of correcting the record and settling a few scores associated with Knights 1. But first he offers personal context and motivation for the second edition:

Thereafter, I chose to publish this first part of the second edition of the book "Knights Under the Prophet's Banner" before the completion of the second edition, due to the circumstances that the mujahidin pass through. I hope to complete the second edition if God, to Whom is ascribed all perfection, prolongs my life, grants me support, and facilitates the circumstances.

In this edition, I expanded on a number of passages in the book, particularly those relating to the blessed raids on Washington, New York, and Pennsylvania. However, I stopped there, choosing not to elaborate on the events that followed these raids, because the battle is still violent and the enemy seeks any information. Moreover, many Muslim brothers are captured by the enemy and may be influenced by what I might mention. Therefore, I preferred to talk only about the blessed raids, and as I mentioned in the introduction of the first edition:

The reader might expect to find in this book a history of a certain period or a narration of the incidents of a certain phase. He might also expect to find an analysis of policies, evaluation of certain methodologies, or critique of some systems. However, I draw the honorable reader's attention to the fact that the book -- even if it deals with any of that -- has not been written for such purposes, nor can its writer fulfill it.

The reason why this book has not been written for such purposes is in fact a message from the writer to his ummah. It is nothing like what the honorable reader might expect, even if the book includes a history or an analysis.

As for why the writer cannot fulfill it, there are many reasons. One of the reasons is that the writer does not have enough stability to ‘gather enough documentation necessary for this kind of analytical writing.’ Furthermore, the author possesses only his testimony which he cannot provide in detail because many of its characters are still in the midst of battle, and many of its events are still interacting in the field."

Thus, I ask the reader to accept this book (message) from me as it is, and this book is enough for a goal and a success.

What I want from this book is to deliver a message and a loyalty. It is not just a historiography and analysis, for I am not nor can I be, in my circumstances, a historiography or an analyst, even if I was one of these two.

February 18, 2011

A few of my law enforcement readers may find this interesting. It's a directory of "Muslim and Muslim-related Media in the United States." I'm making no analytical determination about any of the groups or individuals on this list. I'll leave that to you. However, I believe some of the sources listed are legitimate, mainstream operations. Others, eh, not so much.

Militant groups often place a lot of legitimate emphasis on their media and communication functions. Sometimes media operations are directed toward legitimate, sincere dawah functions. And sometimes media ops play the important role of providing a patina of legitimacy to otherwise shell organizations used to direct money to militants overseas. Sometimes, it's both.

The Journal of Islamic Law published the list in 1997. As I noted last month the Journal was the brain child of an Islamist working out of Takoma Park, Maryland in the 1990s. My guess is that there are no hippy dippy Sufi sources on the list, or Shia for that matter. Rather it's a list of mainstream and Islamist media, representing a few savory data breadcrumbs that could help shed more light onto the pre-9/11 Islamist networks in the United States.

January 26, 2011

Little did I know that deleting the BestofthePest from my Box.net directory would cause such a fuss. I received four requests from four different academics in the past two weeks asking me to restore the files. Unprecedented for this blog. Honest, I didn't even know that many people read it!

The study of online radicalization is very much the fad in academic circles right now, and as a service to my academic readers who have theses to write and crappy undergrad essays to grade, I am reposting BestofthePest.

However, I am also posting the directories from several other blogs that were active in 2007 and 2008. The first is http://www.forpeopleofunderstanding.blogspot.com/. Mostly active in 2007 and 2008, this appeared to be an online jihadi who was/is located in New Jersey.

Also in the collection: an archive of Tarek Mehanna's wordpress blog, iskandrani.wordpress.com. Mehanna is a former Boston blogger arrested in October 2009.

There is also an archive of jihadi files associated with muslimpad.com hosting site, unavailable as if this writing. This is mostly Samir Khan's (aka The Pest) works when his blog was hosted at muslimpad.

And then there are two collections of files associated with The Pest's web content. Some of these files are copies, no doubt, but I am making it all available just in case there's value in the total:

Please don't stop with my work, folks. There's plenty to grab and analyze still out there. Archives exist of many salafi/salafi-jihadi blogs that came and went with their creator's enthusiasm. I found this one tonight -- Islam is the Sunnah and the Sunnah is Islam. My eagle eyes apparently missed this one when it was active in 2007-08. While there, check out the links on the right. Mexico City? Really? I had a "senior security advisor" recently tell me that there were no Salafists in Mexico.

January 24, 2011

Well, sort of. I’m trying to be “back.” After a crazy 2010 in which I married a real life Frog and really turned 40. Not sure what my 40s will bring, but a few things are certain -- it will include counter-jihad, vulgar French idioms, petanque, and plenty of very fine wines. Unfortunately, it will also include English Premier and Ligue 1 “fuutbawl,” but that’s for a different post.

The two Aaron’s

Aaron, did some excellent work not too long ago exploring the connections between the online world of Swede suicide bomber, Taimour al-Abdaly and the online world of The Pest, aka Samir Khan.

Meanwhile, if you were reading Aaron Zelin’s Jihadology you would know that...

-- Bin Laden’s recent message to the French had nothing to say about the burqa law.

It is also through Aaron Z -- retweeted by the estimable Mr Orange -- that Mark Stout just posted a fascinating analysis of an early EIG (Egyptian Islamic Group) counter-intel piece.

One last thing...

I forgive you, Jarret...

...for employing any ideas that spring forth from the demented mind of 1998 Bad Writing contest winner, Judith Butler in your noble struggle against online jihadis. I admire your work. I loved your book. But the Butler reference is beyond the pale. She’s Lacan without the pen. Come back to us, Jarret, come back! Come back to the real world of applied jihad analysis! Sigh, well, if you insist on wasting your time in the dark chambers of post structuralism, just remember this: Sometimes a pen is just a pen.

January 22, 2011

The other day I was performing a search on a topic unrelated to jihad when to my surprise I ran into a jihadi website. This wasn't just any jihadi website, however. This blog has the title "Best Mobiles" and is hosted on a site adorned with various gynecological key words. The root site also contains links to sonogram imagery. I've provided screen caps below just in case you think I'm kidding.

It's hosted in Russia, and is dedicated to one "Abu Omar," the target of a rendition case in Italy back in 2003. It contains a combination of "shaheed" videos, intermixed with Western news clips, nasheeds and other media, originating mostly from EU countries: Italy, Germany and the UK predominate.

Now, there are some inconsistencies with the usual strict codes of Salafist-jihadi media content. In some media clips women's faces are shown, unblocked. Other clips are clearly Shiite preachers.

Not sure what to make of it all, but I thought you may find it interesting.

January 19, 2011

The Emerson Begolly IM transcripts (and other evidence) submitted into the court record on 13 January, is an excellent, if incomplete, picture of the online habits of contemporary American self-radicalized jihadis. The transcripts have provided Rusty with sublime consumation of his endless years of online toil. On the other hand, Jarret points out how Begolly exploits a harmless redneck teen video as a learning experience for future terrorist plots.

The part that caught my eye comes somewhere in the middle of an 28 October 2010 IM session. Begolly, using the ID "abunancy@almanhajribat.net" mentions the audio collection I profiled here last week: Azzam Publication's In the Hearts of Green Birds.

What's equally interesting is how Begolly picked up on the cues and details so common in jihadi media, like his comment on the "smiling shaheeds." It's common to find death mask images of dead jihadis in videos and still images. It's clear that Begolly believed it and took it to heart.

January 09, 2011

This cassette contains some of the thought provoking, and at times, miraculous biographies of the Shuhadaa.

Last year I decided to dedicate a few posts to Salafist-jihadi texts that emphasize the movement's mysticism and spiritualism. Part IV profiles In the Hearts of Green Birds, a 90s-era English-language martyrology of individuals who died during the Bosnian War. The product of UK-based Azzam Publications, it came to my attention back in 2006 when it was distributed around the then-limited English-language jihadi web. It’s part of a popular genre in the Salafist-jihadi media that highlights the sacred qualities of the deaths of young men who die during what Abu Musab al-Suri called “open front” jihads.

Azzam Publications was a close-knit network of UK-based e-hadis (some of the earliest examples we have) who distributed Salafist-jihadi multimedia often used in recruitment and fund raising for the various open front jihads of the pre-9/11 era. NEFA Foundation has a screen capture from the group’s website before it was shut down after 9/11.

The current version -- still active on (where else?) Archive-dot-org -- was posted on 08 Feb 2007 by someone employing the uploader ID, "caravansofmartyrs@yahoo.fr" It carries a comment by a member of the ozooo media group, posted on 22 Feb 2008. It lacks the transcript.

http://www.archive.org/details/In_The_Heart_Of_Green_Birds

My copy of the file, however, was posted to a commercial server probably by someone active on the Ummah.com forum, where I first came across it, back in Feb 2006. The Ummah.com post includes the transcript. I also found the audio file and transcript on Archive around the same time. The current Archive file lacks the transcript.

Born of Turkish parents in Germany, his parents did not have enough money to bring him up and so they sold him to a German family. He was brought up as a non-Muslim by a German family. He was a model student and a very well behaved child, and no one could see the difference, as he was very fair in skin color. All of a sudden when he reached the age of 15, things began to go wrong for him. He began to mess around in school, and he became confused. He knew there was something different about him. He knew he was different than these people and that he was not German. Once he had an argument with his German mother, and she told him: "You are not my son!" And he went back and said that: "...That statement reverberated in my mind, and I went back and asked my mom what does this mean? She refused to tell me. After much battery, she told me the whole story, and that she was still in touch with my Turkish parents. My real parents, I went to see them and I began to live with them...." So he began to live with them and after a number of years, at the age of 21, he traveled to Bosnia.

---more anasheed---

And this brother, he had some experience in how to make video-films and mix videotapes. So in Bosnia, they made him the cameraman in the Operation. So, along with a Kalashnikov and his weapons, he’d carry a camera. And this brother; I witnessed this brother, he would be in the front of the attacks, with his camera, fighting and even reaching the Serb bunkers before the rest of the brothers, and he’d be standing on top of the bunkers. The Serbs would still be shooting from out of the window of the bunker and he’d be filming on top. And he said to me; he reached the bunkers and he said to me: "I felt: should I throw a grenade inside or should I put a camera inside?" And then he said he’d put the camera inside so he could get the best possible pictures, so he could mix the best film, so that he could send it back to the other brothers that don’t know anything about Jihad so that they could see the Jihad in their TV’s so that they could find out and learn about Jihad. That was his intention, he wanted to make the best possible tapes, that’s why he was always in the front with his camera. In the second operation, Allah took him as Shaheed inshaAllah.

---more anasheed---

....many people who knew Abu Musa, described him like a walking cartoon character. And you’d look at this man and you’d think that he is dumb or that he’s mental, but he is, and was, very clever.

January 03, 2011

I drop off the face of the earth for a year only to return to discover that Archive-dot-org is still a wretched hive of evil media. Just type "ansar1.info" in the search box at the top, and look at the crap that comes up. I was looking for some texts to add to MSJ's growing stash. I found only one, but what a one it is.

Posted by one "lal.masjid@yahoo.com" on Oct 9 2010, it is a meditation on jihad with imagery common in the more mystical jihad writings, regardless of how artless that imagery is employed.

While the ten horses neigh waiting for their bit and while the smith blows the bellows and strikes the white iron and the sparks fly, and while the weaver calls his friend to give him the thread to finish the remaining saddles, the horseman whispers an important matter in the blacksmith’s ear and says: “Reinforce the shield and armor.” This whisper deserves its reward and consideration.

And this whopper.

The fingertips long for the trigger and the ear grows accustomed to the sound of swords clashing. Likewise, the heart yearns to see the Merciful One and paradise. The breast longs for the 70 virgins, and the eye for Allah’s waving banners on top of the minaret. The ear hopes for the blessed sound of “God is Greater!”, so where are those who are rolling up their sleeves for the Lord of the Kaaba?

Wow! What comes first the triggers or the sword clashes? Awesomely bad stuff that is. Stick to engineering they should.

December 28, 2010

I've received numerous requests for the full copy of Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, my never-ending analysis of a collection of 120 biographies of contemporary mujahideen published back in January 2008. I still believe that the document offers fascinating insights into the current "character" of the mujahideen networks operating along the Afghan-Pakistan border. One day I will finish it, but in order to satisfy my European readers -- apparently I have many! -- I am publishing my entire unfinished draft -- typos, grammatical monstrosities, and embarassingly bad analytical bits -- that includes the complete document. It was originally available through DataStar (accession number: 17YT16E7 20080308) when I found it back in 2008, and I believe that you may still find it there. I hope that the analysts and academics who need it use it wisely.

Santé!

-------------------------------------------------------

Quote from the translation's summary:

"The book opened with a dedication to Sayyid Qutb, Abdallah Azzam, and Abu−Mus'ab al−Zarqawi for their supposedly unique respective roles in guiding, reviving, and implementing jihad. The preface praised the role of jihad and the unique elevated status of martyrs in the eyes of God according to Islamic teachings. The book went on to give biographical accounts about a list of jihad martyrs who fell in Afghanistan. These accounts gave a glimpse of the martyrs' upbringing, their decision to join jihad, and their piousness and dedication to the cause of jihad throughout their jihadist endeavor. A list of names and pseudonyms contained in this issue of the publication follows:"

Ibrahim al−Muhajir al−Masri: His real name is Muhsin Bin Musa Bin Mitwalli Atwah from Egypt. He was an engineering graduate who had migrated to Iraq for work before he decided two years later to join the mujahidin in Afghanistan during the war against the Soviet invasion. He left Afghanistan for Sudan where he purportedly participated in the planning of US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Ibrahim al−Masri was described as an expert in explosives who spent much of his time experimenting in his laboratory and whose specialty was "engineering martyrdom operations" and "preparing martyrs." He was killed in a US air raid in Afghanistan.

Ibrahim al−Dagestani: His real name is Habib−Allah from Dagestan. Two years after his meeting with Chechen mujahidin, he went back to Dagestan to form his group of mujahidin and was sending recruits to Afghanistan for training. The public turned against Habib−Allah and his group and they were forced to flee Dagestan. Habib−Allah ended up in Afghanistan where he died in battle with the Pakistani military.

Abrar (nickname): His name is Tariq from Kashmir. He fought in Afghanistan and was killed by the Pakistani military in Waziristan.

Abu−Ahmad al−Suri (nickname): His real name is Mahmud Bin Mustafa Bin Kamal al−Bakri from Aleppo, Syria. He joined jihad in Afghanistan and trained in Abu−Mus'ab al−Suri camp. His second trip to Afghanistan coincided with the US invasion and he was killed in Shahi−Kot, Afghanistan.

Ahmad al−Hasan Dawur from Waziristan: He died shortly after he joined Abu−Al−Layth al−Libi camp in an air raid by the Pakistani military.

Idris al−Turkistani (nickname) from Aqsu in the region of Eastern Turkistan in China: He arrived in Afghanistan where he received military training. He was assigned to fight against the "northern alliance" in northern Afghanistan where he was captured shortly afterward after the US invasion of Afghanistan. He moved to Waziristan after his release where he died in a raid by Pakistani forces.

Usamah al−Hamawi (nickname): His name is Ridwan Bin Abd−al−Rahman al−Sharif from Syria. He fought against the northern alliance until the US invasion of Afghanistan when he was forced to flee to the tribal areas where he continued to train and fight until he was killed in a missile attack.

Abu−Usamah al−Sharqi (nickname): His name is Muhammad al−Rashid from Al−Khubar, Saudi Arabia. He went to Afghanistan soon after the September 11 attacks in the US. Soon after he finished his military training, he was assigned to train new recruits from the tribal areas in Jalalabad. He was killed in a raid in Zabul. Abu

Usamah al−Dagestani (nickname): He is Abd−al−Rahman Bin−Muhammad from Dagestan. He joined jihad in 1995 alongside Chechen fighters and then went to Afghanistan where he received more military training. He went back to Dagestan where he engaged in kidnapping for ransom until he was assigned second in command for a Chechnya based group of fighters who staged attacks against Dagestan. Unable to return to his homeland Dagestan, he went to Turkey then Afghanistan where he was killed in a battle with Pakistani forces.

Usayd al−Ta'zi al−Yamani (nickname): He is A'id Qasim Muhammad from Yemen. He traveled to Afghanistan where he received military training in Al−Faruq camp and was assigned as an administrator. He moved between Afghanistan and Pakistan until he was killed in a raid by Pakistani forces.

Uwis al−Najdi (nickname): His name is Muhannad from Najd, Saudi Arabia. According to his biographical account, Muhannad traveled to Afghanistan around the time of the USS Cole bombing in Yemen. He joined Al−Faruq military training camp where he was selected later on to join leadership training course. He was appointed a trainer is Al−Faruq camp until the US invasion of Afghanistan. He participated in the battles in Kabul and led a group of fighters to Jalalabad areas where he spent the next fours until he was killed in a raid by US forces.

Once again we see an example of how a major attack inspired others inclined toward violent jihad to actively seek it. In this case we have a Saudi who eventually became a member of al-Qaida’s deep bench of leaders.

Asadallah al−Uzbaki (nickname): He fled Uzbekistan with his parents who sought refuge in Afghanistan. Asadallah joined the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and attended its schools until the US invasion of Afghanistan. He moved with his family to Pakistan and then to Iran where he pursued his religious studies. Asadallah moved back to Pakistan to pursue his schooling but shortly afterward decided to join jihad in Afghanistan where he was killed in an ambush against US forces.

This bio of an Uzbek named “Asadallah” highlights the porous nature of the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Pakistan and Iran. It clearly gives this al-Qaida operative the opportunity to move from one country to the next in search of ideological and religious training. It also begs the question, what role is Iran playing in the sheltering current and would-be Sunni radicals?

Asadallah al−Libi: He is Ziyad Bin Farraj al−Bah from Libya. He went to Afghanistan in 1990 and fought with the Afghan mujahidin in their war against the Soviet. He moved to Tajikistan with Khattab and was among the first to take part in jihad in that country. After an unsuccessful attempt to embark on jihad against the Libyan regime as a result of his expulsion from Sudan, he went back to Afghanistan after the Taliban took Kabul. After the US invasion, Ziyad al−Bah fled Afghanistan to Pakistan, and then Iran where he was captured. He managed to escape Iran and join Abu−al−Layth al−Libi in Afghanistan where he was killed.

The bio here of a key al-Qaida member, shows several important historical characteristics of al-Qaida’s early development. First, it was already developing a deep bench in Chechnya in the mid-1990s, drawing military commanders from the decade’s ongoing regional jihads. Second, is the central Asia proving ground – the countries of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Western China, etc. that appears to be source of both leaders (for training) and ground troops.

Abu−Umamah al−Masri: His name is Awf Bin−Muhammad Bin−Abd−al−Rahman from Egypt. He went to Afghanistan to fight with Afghan mujahidin in their war against the Soviets. Awf Bin−Abd−al−Rahman joined jihad in Tajikistan after the break out of civil war in Afghanistan and was appointed a teacher in the Islamic institute where he taught the locals about Islam. He went back to Pakistan after the failure of the jihadist project in Tajikistan and then back to Afghanistan where he joined Bin Ladin in Kandahar. He left Afghanistan after the US invasion and returned to join mujahidin in Jalalabad region where he died in a battle with the US forces.

The first of two Egyptians profiled in this post, Abu-Ummah’s bio highlights the role of dawah, or sometimes translated as preaching or training, in the ongoing development of communities sympathetic to the radical cause. It also shows, once again, the porous character of the region’s borders, and to a lesser extent the feeling of identity tied to Islam, not a nation-state.

Abu−Ayman al−Masri: His name is Mamduh Bin−Muhammad al−Sayyid from Egypt. He was a member of Egyptian Jihad Group who traveled to Afghanistan to receive military training and later become a trainer. He left Afghanistan after the civil war broke out and was later arrested in Syria where he was planning to smuggle weapons into Palestinian territories. He later left Syria to Yemen, and back to Afghanistan after the Taliban took control. After the US invasion, Al−Sayyid fled to Waziristan where he later died in a battle against US forces.

Another Egyptian is profiled here, clearly a member of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian cadre. His bio shows that the spillover affect that followed the Afghan civil war in the early 1990s, had the kind of regional repercussions that could be seen in the coming months as Iraq becomes hostile territory for al-Qaida’s ideology and organization.

Abu−Bakr Azzam al−Falastini: His name is Iyyad Adil al−Qunnah from Jordan. His first visit to Afghanistan was when he joined jihad against the Soviets. He went back for after the Taliban took control and remained there until he was killed in the eastern region of Afghanistan in a battle against what was referred to as "Crusader forces."

A Palestinian by birth, this bio exposes one of the advantages that al-Qaida could exploit in any possible Levant strategy; its small cadre of ethnic Palestinians who could return to Gaza or other parts of the Occupied Territories and begin to build communities sympathetic to al-Qaida through the use of dawah and other forms of persuasion.

Abu−Bakr al−Maghribi: According to the biographical account, Abu−Bakr was born and raised in the southern part of Morocco. He traveled to Afghanistan for the first time only few weeks before September 11 attacks in the US. He trained with the Libyan group let by Abu−al−Layth al−Libi. He was killed in a US air raid in eastern Afghanistan.

Here we’re given a little window into the ethnic subdivisions within the pre 9/11 camp culture. Al-Maghribi was either guided toward or fell in with other North Africans. It’s this aspect of camp culture that may continue to prefigure the strategic affects of “spillover” from any regional jihad. The cadres built up in Afghanistan – cadres of Uyghurs, Uzbeks, Chechens, North Africans, Palestinians, Egyptians and Saudis – could return to their home regions and apply the skills and continue to build the social and logistical networks to continue the jihad.

Abu−Bak al−Iraqi: His name is Abd−al−Rahman from Iraq. He fled Iraq during Saddam Hussayn's rule with parents to Pakistan, then to Afghanistan where he joined military training camp after the US invasion. He died in a military operation by Pakistani forces in the eastern region of Afghanistan.

This bio doesn’t explain why Abd-al-Rahman fled Iraq, but it does point to the existence of an organized resistance prepared in response to American intervention in the region. There were military training camps in place soon after the invasion to prep young men for jihad against the Americans. It’s another example of the response pattern in global jihad that’s been around since the 1980s: whenever a non-Muslim government projects its power into regions dominated by Muslims, the response is to call a jihad and prepare for jihad. No matter where the US projects its power into traditionally Muslim territories, the jihad will follow.

Abu−Bakr al−Waziri: His name is Nawaz from Waziristan. He trained in Abu−al−Layth al−Libi's camp. He participated in battles against Pakistani forces and was subsequently killed in a missile attack in eastern Afghanistan.

There’s not much to comment on here, only to note that it appears that AQ prepped some men to fight Pakistani troops and some to fight Americans. If this is so, then what does it say about its possible ground strategies?

Abu−al−Bara al−Sharqi: His name is Fahd Bin−Ibrahim al−Ibrahimi from Saudi Arabia. He participated in the war in Bosnia−Herzegovina and was arrested upon his return to Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan after September 11 attacks in the US and participated in the publication of "The Vanguards of Khorasan" magazine. He died in an attack in eastern Afghanistan.

Here we have an example of two typical blurry lines seen in the both the 90s-era Afghan Arabs and this current generation. First is the blurry line between jihadi media and activity on the battlefield. Al-Sharqi is described here as an individual who was involved in the production of the Taliban’s journal. Here, too, is the blurry operational line between AQ and the Taliban, in al-Sharqi we see one of many Saudi “career” jihadis working with the Taliban toward the same goal.

Abu−al−Bara al−Maqdisi: His name is Izz−al−Din al−Maqdisi from Syria. He was a military trainer in Kandahar and Kabul before he was forced to flee to the eastern region of Afghanistan after the US invasion. He died in one of the battles [incomplete].

Once again we have an example of the toll the initial US invasion took at that first generation of Afghan Arabs, many of who were seasoned “career” jihadis. The fact that he was a military trainer suggests that he had previous formal training (perhaps Syrian army) or had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets.

Bilal al−Maghribi: His name was Abd−al−Aziz Buzlaf from Morocco. He traveled to Afghanistan from Spain and fought alongside pro−Taliban forces. After the demise of the Taliban government, he fled to the tribal area in eastern Afghanistan where he was later killed in Jalalabad where he was assigned with reorganizing and recruiting for prop−Taliban [sic] and Al−Qa'ida.

In the activity of this North African, we see the AQ author telling us that one of their goals was the reorganization of the group. This suggests to me that AQ leadership may have anticipated the possibility that their Afghan operation might be broken up and maintained some contingency plans to reorganize once the dust settled. Did US/NATO planners anticipate this possibility when they before or during the invasion? If so, what went wrong? If not, then perhaps it should be considered in any future large-scale actions. It’s not enough to destroy the safe-haven.

Abu−Turab al−Pakistani: Born in Punjab, Pakistan, he received his first military training in Kashmir where he fought until he joined the Taliban in Afghanistan. He fled to the tribal areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan until he was later killed in an ambush that targeted US convoys.

Al-Pakistani’s brief bio highlights the deep connections between the 90s-era Kashmir conflict and AQ. I explore this in my study of Issa al-Hindi’s Army of Madinah in Kashmir. Al-Hindi was AQ’s emir in the UK, but he earned his jihadi creds in Kashmir fighting for Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (aka the Army of Madinah). It also hints at the strategy of Pakistan’s ISI, which bankrolls and supports both Lashkar (under its myriad of new names) and the Taliban. It operates an expansionist policy against its two more powerful neighbors: Iran and India.

Abu−Ja'far al−Maghribi: His name was Amir al−Azizi from Morocco. He was recruited in Spain and later traveled to Afghanistan where he received him military training. He returned to Afghanistan after his plans of a terrorist attack inside Spain was foiled. He crossed Iran with Abd−al−Aziz Buzlaf (Bilal al−Maghribi) reaching Kandahar. After the demise of the Taliban government, he fled to the tribal areas of Afghanistan where he fought for pro−Taliban and Al−Qa'ida forces and played a role in media production. He was later killed in US strike in Jalalabad area.

The timeline of this jihadi’s biography is quite murky but it’s clear that it reflects the common arc of radicalization in the Afghan/Soviet era. He was a first generation immigrant to Spain. It hints at the possibility that he knew Abu Dahdah or Al-Suri. Iran features in this biography like it does in several others. Clearly, the Iranians have facilitated the transit of Al Qaeda members and supporters. His life provides yet another example of the clear intersection of media and operational activity. They’re “journalists,” they’re jihadis first.

Mawlawi Gul Manur: Gul Manur was a student of religion from Waziristan. He traveled to Afghanistan before the US invasion to fight alongside the Taliban. He remained in Afghanistan until he died in a bombing.

Not much here, but this biography does offer some hint of the recruitment or facilitation role played by Pakistani madrassahs.

Ibn Harrathah al−Makki: He is Abdallah Bin Salman al−Qathami al−Uthiby from Saudi Arabia. He began his jihad in Kashmir then traveled to Afghanistan here he later died in the eastern provinces.

Could this Saudi have been an Arab member of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba? Here again, we have an example of the near seamless connections between regional jihad wars and the global movement of which Al Qaeda is a prominent member.

Abu−Hazim al−Suri: His name is Muhammad Banghali from Syria. He traveled to Afghanistan shortly before September 11 attacks in the US. He was killed in the eastern region of Afghanistan.

It’s unclear just what motivated this man to join Al Qaeda or some other group in Afghanistan. It is possible that he was active in the camps dominated by other men from the al-Shams region, like the ones lead by Zarqawi or Al-Suri.

Abu−al−Hasan al−Sumali: His name is Ibrahim (last name unknown). He was born and raised in Kenya. He fought in his country of origin Somalia before he went to Afghanistan where he was killed in the eastern region.

The influence of the global Salafist-Jihadist presence in East Africa probably hasn’t been assessed with any thoroughness, but it’s clear that this son of Somalian refugees was radicalized in Kenya (not a good sign), easily moved between borders, and eventually traveled to Afghanistan to train (or perhaps seek advanced training?). Without a better idea of how many “al-Sumalis” are in the Afghan/Pak region right now or have made it back to Somalia, I think we’ll continue to underestimate the influence of the global Salafist-Jihadist movement.

Hakim al−Tataristani: He traveled to Afghanistan from Tatarstan after serving in the Russian Army. He trained in the Al−Faruq camp then joined mujahidin in Kabul. After the fall of Kabul to the US and northern alliance forces, he withdrew with other fighters to Khost in the eastern region of Afghanistan. He died months later in a Pakistani checkpoint.

“Tartarstan” is a broader region in the jihadi “map” than the current boundaries defined by the former Soviet republic. And so it’s difficult to determine where in “Tartarstan” this man originated, but it’s clear he had former military training. That must have given him an advantage in the camp culture of 90s-era Afghanistan.

Hamzah al−Rabi al−Masri: His name is Hamzah al−Rabi from Egypt. He took part in jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan and was charged with security in the Egyptian Jihad Group (Jama'at al−Jihad) and later a personal bodyguard for Ayman al−Zawahiri. He was allegedly charged with running "clandestine operations" for Al−Qa'ida in Pakistan after the US invasion and was responsible for recruiting for an attack in Britain before he was killed in air raid.

Here we clearly have a senior member of Zawahiri’s retinue. He was probably counted among the members of the deep bench of potential leaders. He was trusted enough to know intimate details of Zawahiri’s life. Knowing that he was killed in an “air raid” suggests that our military engagements with Al Qaeda do have the advantage of clearing the bench. Perhaps the best method of bleeding the group is clearing the bench faster than it can be filled. We haven’t been doing that with much effectiveness lately, and with Al Qaeda finding secure regions of operation in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia it is likely that the bench could be refilled quite quickly.

Hamzah al−Zubayr al−Falastini: His name is Muhammad al−Faqi born in Egypt to Palestinian parents. He traveled to Afghanistan where he received military training and became a trainer. He moved to Karachi, Pakistan where he continued to train the Taliban fighters and supporters in the area until he was killed by Pakistan forces.

Karachi stands out for me as a curious place to see Taliban training. Of all the major cities in Pakistan, this one is the farthest away from the NWFP and any likely location for Taliban training. This biography suggests a broad network of Taliban support, funding and training throughout Pakistan. It also suggests that elements of the Pakistani government showed indifference or open support for Al Qaeda and Taliban activities long before the current civil war broke out.

Hamzah al−Tataristani: He studied in Saudi Arabia and joined the group of Abu−Abdallah al−Tatari before he move[d] to Afghanistan. He fled to the tribal areas after the fall the US invasion where he died in [unfinished]

I’m unsure what “group of Abu-Abdallah al-Tatari” is describing, a “brigade” or cell within Al Qaeda or a regional jihadi group, but it’s clear that he was drawn to Saudi Arabia, probably for religious training, and networked with this group upon his return. Who were the Saudis influencing his radicalization? How did he come to Saudi Arabia? Understanding little known areas could help fill in gaps of knowledge of the global Salafist Jihadist movement.

Hamzah Burakhil: His name is A'zam (no last name provided) from Waziristan. He fought for the Taliban and was later killed in raid by Pakistani forces.

Not much to say about this person. It is interesting to see how much effort the editors of this document put into integrating Taliban members into their own narrative.

Abu−Khalid al−Maghribi: His name is Muhammad Zarli from Morocco. He traveled to Afghanistan from Italy after the US invasion. He fought in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan where he died.

It’s not clear whether Zarli had been an immigrant to Italy before his fateful trip, or whether he was simply using Italy as a transit point, but it’s clear from this and several other bios and numerous CT arrests that Western European countries are a key transit node for men seeking jihad in the East regardless of whether they provide support for the effort.

His bio also belies the idea that Afghanistan was considered a “good” war that people supported. We now have hundreds of examples of individuals who sought jihad in Afghanistan after the US invasion. Clearly at least some Muslims rejected the argument.

Abu−Khalid al−Kuwaiti: His name is Ali Bin−Sanafi al−Shammari from Kuwait. He fought in the tribal areas in eastern Afghanistan where he died along with Abu−Khalid al−Maghribi in an attack on their position.

Khattab al−Azadi: His name is Talal Bin−Hasan al−Zahrani from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan where he died in a battle with US forces.

Another Saudi. His kunya is probably a paean to Ibn Khattab.

Abu−Dujanah al−Imarati: His name is Miftah Bin−Sa'id al−Tanaji from the United Arab Emirates. He traveled to Kashmir where he trained then later joined Abu−al−Layth al−Libi in eastern Afghanistan.

Perhaps another Arab working or training with Lashkar? How did he get to Kashmir one wonders? Through what connections in the Emirates? And just how did he move from a Lashkar operation/camp to working directly with senior Al Qaeda leadership? How closely are they operating with Lashkar?

Darwish al−Waziri: Darwish is from Waziristan where he was recruited to lead the men of his village in jihad. He was later killed in an air raid that targeted their position.

Here is an example of what kind of recruits the Taliban uses, entire villages of men, most likely fighting under the banner of the Taliban, and more likely fighting in the name of their tribal leader.

Abu−Dhakir al−Jaza'iri: His name is Al−Sayyid Muhammad from Algeria. He traveled to Afghanistan from Spain where he had worked. He joined the Libyan group led by Abu−al−Layth al−Libi and died later in an operation in Shankay, Afghanistan.

Here again is the Western European connection. Where and to whom are these men going to receive the logistical support they need to make it to Afghanistan? And how much of this network is still intact in Spain and other countries? Is it possible for this network to reemerge if there are other operations in other parts of the world, like Somalia or Sudan?

Abu−Rawahah al−Suri: His name is Anas Ihsan Banghali from Syria. He went to Afghanistan soon before the US invasion. He joined the training camps in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and went on to fight within a group in Jalalabad where he was later killed.

Not much to comment on here.

Abu−Rahil al−Harbi: His name is Muhammad Ghazay al−Harbi from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks in the US. He moved to Khost Province after the defeat of the Taliban and was later killed in Jalalabad.

Here is another example of someone who sought jihad against the US invasion of Afghanistan. I wonder what would have happened if we hadn’t gone into Iraq. The West’s accepted Iraq narrative: that it “enflamed” the radicals and created more seems less likely once it’s understood that Afghanistan (considered by some as a “good” war) was doing the same exact thing. The fact of the matter is even humanitarian actions in predominately Muslim countries will be interpreted as an “invasion” of Muslim land and warrant the same exact response we have received in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Al−Zubayr al−Turkistani: He fled the Communist regime in Turkmenistan to Kyrgyzstan then later to Afghanistan where he received his military training in Hirat and Jalalabad training camps. He fled to Khost Province after the fall of the Taliban and was later arrested in Turkmenistan. After his release he went back to Afghanistan where he died in a suicide operation against US forces in Kabul.

Here is an interesting bio of a career jihadi. It highlights the role Central Asia’s porous borders and borderless ethnicities play in fill the jihadi ranks. I suspect that even if no Arabs sought jihad in Afghanistan, AQ and the Taliban would not lack for recruits from regional countries.

Abu−al−Zubayr al−Maghribi: His name is Khalid al−Mahuli from Morocco. He fought alongside Abu−al−Layth al−Libi and was killed in an air raid by Pakistani forces.

An example here of a North African cadre, led by abu Layth, and obviously developed with the intention of strengthening the North African groups. In this I wonder if one of AQ’s strategies is to create the next generation jihadis and rather have them all fight and die in Afghanistan, instead send some back to their home regions. In this way they are developing a new generation of global jihadis for the next five to ten years.

Al−Zubayr al−Turki: Born in Turkey, he traveled to Afghanistan where he received his first military training. He tried to join Al−Qa'ida in Iraq after the fall of the Taliban but was unable to find his way through Iran. He returned to Afghanistan where he later dies [sic] in an aim [sic] bombing.

Al-Zubayr’s bio evokes questions of Iranian facilitation. How much of this post-US invasion migration did the Iranian permit, and how much were they redirecting. We they preventing all Afghan-based jihadis from transiting to Iraq, were they making some offers they just couldn’t refuse?

Zayd al−Dagestani: He joined his father in Afghanistan where he trained and fought until he was killed in an air bombing.

How would we characterize a father-son jihadi team? It is clear that for some of these jihadis, they were raised into the ideology rather than being “radicalized” by some outside influence. How much of these cradle radicals exist within AQ’s cadres? And is it a recent phenomenon?

Abu−Sa'd al−Kandahari al−Najdi: His name Turki al−Dahish from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan and received his training in Al−Faruq camp in Kandahar. He returned to Afghanistan for a second time after the US invasion and was among a group of fighters assigned to form jihadist cells and promote jihad in Jalalabad where he was killed.

Originally a member of the 90s-era cadre, al-Dahish probably represented an ideologically trained jihadi. It’s interesting that the bio notes that part of his responsibilities was the recruitment in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. This was clearly part of a strategy to regroup and reform capabilities soon after the dust settled. It’s interesting to note that they felt safe enough to operate a recruitment effort inside of a country so soon after its government fell. This is the kind of behavior that needs to be curtailed in future post war efforts.

Samarqand al−Urduni: His name is Habis Bin−Abdallah Bin−Falah from Jordan. He took part in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan and later joined the so−called Al−Khilafah Group (Jama'at Al−Khilafah) in Peshawar after the civil war broke out. Habis Bin−Abdallah tried to return to the US where he once preached but was forced to change his plan when the September 11 attacks in the US took place. He traveled to China, Bangladesh, and back to Pakistan where he was killed in a raid by Pakistani forces in Waziristan.

Here we have an astonishing admission of a career jihadi desiring to “return” to the United States. Just when he had been to the United States and what he had done here goes undiscussed, but it’s clear that within the cadres of al-Qaeda’s “foot soldiers” are men who wish to dedicate effort to “preaching” as much as fighting. The line between the two is very thin; however, we’re still inadequate at describing the general lack of distinction between the two, particularly in Western courts of law. I’ve been unable to identify the “Al-Khilafah Group.”

Sahm al−Ta'ifi: His name is Muhammad al−Zahrani from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Kashmir where he trained then joined Abu−al−Layth al−Libi's group in eastern Afghanistan where he died in a battle against government forces.

Why would this Saudi travel to Kashmir first? We hear now about the training camps along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Yet this might not have always been the case. Apparently, earlier on in the Afghan-Pakistan conflict al-Qaeda cadres were training in Pakistan-controlled paramilitary camps probably connected to the ISI or Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. Of AQs training and personnel assets, how remains on the other side of Pakistan, away from America’s presence?

Sayfallah al−Zahrani: His name is Muhannad al−Zahrani from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Iraq where he received his first military training then moved on to Afghanistan. He joined Al−Qa'ida fighters in the tribal area between Pakistan and Afghanistan where he finished his military training and was later killed in a bombing of their position.

Talut al−Ta'ifi: Khalid Husayn al−Qathami from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan where he received military training and fought in Kabul and northern Afghanistan against the northern alliance until he was injured. He moved to Pakistan for treatment and was later killed in the tribal areas on Pakistan−Afghanistan borders.

Another Saudi easily transiting the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Had he survived, he would be a senior member of an AQ cadre.

Abu−A'id al−Falastini: His name is Khalil Bin−Sa'id al−Dik. He is a Palestinian from Jordan. He began his studies in the US as student of civil aviation then went on to graduate as a computer engineer. He accompanied Abdallah Azzam (central figure in rallying support for Afghan mujahidin against the Soviet invasion) during his tour in the US. He fought with Afghanistan and Bosnia before he settled in Peshawar, Pakistan where he was the first to publish the popular military encyclopedia and Abdallah Azzam's sermons and writings on compact disk. He was arrested in Jordan before he returned to Afghanistan where he met Abu−Zubaydah for the first time. He moved to Shahi−Kot after US Afghanistan where he remained until he was assassinated by an alleged "Pakistani agent."

Khalil al-Deek is one of the most well known subjects in the document. He was a US-based AQ supporter who worked for the same “charity” as Adam Gadahn in SoCal. The bio notes with confidence what Western CT officials would only suggest: that he was one of the authors of AQ’s pre-9/11 Encyclopedia of Jihad. It’s difficult to say whether this is information drawn from AQ knowledge of al-Deek or from circular reporting available on the Internet. However, this bio does highlight the murky lines between charity work and violent jihad, between non-profit media production and incitement to violence.

Abu−Amir al−Sudani: His name is Mustafa (last name not provided) from Sudan. He was killed in an air raid in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

A Sudanese native, probably one of many, who could easily return to their home country to fight if US or other Western forces feel compelled to occupy parts of southern Sudan.

Abu−Amir al−Falastini: He grew up in Kuwait and traveled to Afghanistan from Yemen where he earned a living as a trader. He fought in Kandahar after the US invasion then fled to Shahi−Kot area after the fall of the Taliban where he was killed in an air bombing.

This biography highlights the fluid nature of violent jihad, where average men will participate in fighting, return to the daily grind, and jump back into it at the first sign of opportunity. It suggests a deeper, spiritual role than a simple call to fight.

Abu−al−Abbas al−Kurdi: He is from Kurdistan, Iraq. He traveled to Afghanistan where he fought in support of the Taliban until the US invasion. He moved to Shahi−Kot in eastern Afghanistan where he was killed in a battle with US and Afghan forces.

This bio highlights the connections between the so-called independent jihadi groups of pre-2003 Northern Iraq and AQ. Apparently, al-Kurdi never got the memo that there were no connections between the Iraqi groups and AQ.

Abdallah al−Mudir al−Libi: His name is Bashir (last name not provided). He traveled to Sudan and Yemen before he joined mujahidin in Afghanistan where he played various roles. He fled to the tribal areas in Afghanistan after the US invasion where he was later killed in an air bombing.

A Libyan by birth, this jihadi moved easily into Sudan – probably in the 1990s – through Yemen and into Afghanistan. His bio suggests here too the fluid borders between North Africa, East Africa, and the regions of AQ’s most significant fighting.

Abu−Abdallah al−Jaddawi: His name is Muhsin Bin−Abdallah Bin−Salih al−Awlaqi from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan where he received his military training in Kandahar. He fled to the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan and was later assigned with other Al−Qa'ida fighters to go to Jalalabad to recruit and reorganize. He was killed in an operation against their position.

This Saudi’s bio shares a common element with several others in the collection: after the fall of the Taliban, AQ went through a period of recollection and regrouping. It’s training capabilities moved quickly to the other end of Pakistan (just how would make for an interesting research paper), and some members were scattered throughout Afghanistan with the task of reconstituting the group’s support among the local tribes. It may appear to be so much old news, but these reformative years actually provide insights into how current AQ (and other future groups) respond to extreme pressures.

Abdallah Jan al−Afghani: His name is Salwalah from Afghanistan. He worked in the clandestine service of Al−Qa'ida alongside Abu−Zubaydah and was charged with recruiting foreign fighters to Afghanistan and smuggling them to Pakistan as secret agents. He joined Abu−al−Layth al−Libin in eastern Afghanistan where he was killed in a US air bombing.

What the hell is the “clandestine service”?! This is very interesting, because it suggests that AQ has some kind of secret apparatus (a la the Muslim Brotherhood) that helped move recruits into Pakistan for some unclear purpose, possibly training (?), after the Taliban fell. It also suggests that Zubaydah had some leadership role other than being the group’s “#3” after the death of Abu Hafs al-Masri.

Abdallah Bin al−Basri: His full name is Abdallah Bin Sami Bin−Muhammad Bin−Fahmi Tufankashi born in Saudi Arabia to Egyptian parents. He traveled at an early age to Afghanistan with his father who participated in jihad against the Soviet invasion. They left and returned after the Taliban took control of Kabul. Abdallah Tufankashi received his military training in Kandahar. He fled to eastern Afghanistan after the US invasion where trained new recruits and was later killed in an operation by US forces.

Here is another example of family-centered Salafist-Jihadism. Clearly not all AQ members and supporters convert to the group’s ideology. Some men are raised into it. It’s difficult to say whether the generational Salafist-Jihadis are better represented into the current incarnation of the group, but it suggests that father-son relationships sometimes play a role.

Abdallah al−Afghani: His name was Muhammad Anwar from Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He was a member of the Taliban who was assigned the role of an interpreter. He died in a battle against government forces in Zabul, Afghanistan.

Interesting to see that even the Taliban apparently needs interpreters.

Abu−Ubaydah al−Banshiri al−Shahri: His name was Sa'd Bin−Khalid al−Shahri from Saudi Arabia. He served in the Saudi armed forces before he traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan. He fled to the tribal areas of Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban and later died in Shankay area.

How many more members of the “Saudi armed forces” are active supporters of AQ?

Abu−Ubaydah al−Hijazi: His name was Muhammad bin Dulaym al−Asmari from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan through Iran. His arrival to Kandahar coincided with the fall of the Taliban and was forced to flee to the tribal areas among Abu−al−Layth al−Libi's fighters. He was killed in Shankay, Afghanistan.

Another Saudi – this one is known to have transitted through Iran – who died in Shankay, apparently a victim of bad timing.

Abu−Abd−al−Rahman al−Kanadi al−Masri: His name was Ahmad bin Sa'id bin Khudr from Egypt. He traveled to Afghanistan to support mujahidin against the Soviet invasion. He returned to Afghanistan from Canada and remained there until the fall of the Taliban. He fled to the eastern region of Afghanistan where he was later killed.

An Egyptian by birth, this jihadi’s bio suggests at how easy it has been for some Western passport holders to travel to and from regions of active violent jihad.

Abu−Abd−al−Rahman Bin al−Masri: His name was Sami Bin−Muhammad Bin−Fahmi Tufankashi from Egypt. He traveled to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia to support the Afghan mujahidin against the Soviet invasion. He began his journey in Jalalabad and was described as "one of the twelve founders of what became known later as Al−Qa'ida Organization." Sami Tufankashi left Afghanistan after the civil war broke out and returned again after the Taliban took power. Like most the Taliban and Al−Qa'ida fighters, he fled to the tribal areas after the US invasion. He died when his BM rocket exploded prematurely.

After a long, distinguished career, it’s interesting that this AQ “founding father” was still performing the grunt work of firing rockets. It suggests that the group was under severe strain during this time.

Abd−al−Rahman al−Uzbiki al−Khawarizmi: His name was Ulughbik Asta from Uzbekistan. He fled a government crack down on the Islamists to end up in Afghanistan where he joined pro−Taliban fighters. He fled to the eastern region of Afghanistan after the US invasion and was later killed in Shahi−Kot in an air bombing.

An interesting bio, because it shows the fluid character of the jihadi identity. Members of regional jihadi groups will often be absorbed into AQ, giving persistence to the regional ones, and opening AQ to a new region of influence.

Abd−al−Rahman al−Najdi: His name was Abd−al−Ilah al−Musa from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan where he received his military training and fought in support of the Taliban in Kabul. He fled to the eastern part of Afghanistan after the US invasion and was allegedly killed in a suicide operation against a German convoy.

Another Saudi, this one chose to be a suicide bomber.

Abd−al−Rahman al−Masri: His name was Iyyad al−Sayyid from Egypt. He traveled to Afghanistan during the Taliban rule. He fled to Khost after the US invasion where he was later killed by a landmine.

Nothing to add here.

Abd−al−Rahim al−Uzbiki: His name was Qawandiq Suji from Uzbekistan. He fought alongside the Taliban forces until the US invaded Afghanistan. He fled to eastern Afghanistan where he was later killed in an air bombing.

The number of Uzbeks involved in both AQ and Taliban operations is a curiosity, and would be interesting to study. There are staggering implications for future jihad in the region from this large a cadre of Uzbeks. Even if NATO takes control of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan the jihad may just migrate into other regions of Central Asia.

Abd−al−Salam al−Turki: His name was Umar (last name not provided) from Turkey. He traveled to Afghanistan where he died in an ambush against a US convoy.

Turkey has contributed a sizeable number of AQ recruits. This cadre could pose future problems for the EU, and may act as a conduit between the EU and Central Asia in any future AQ expansionism.

Abd−al−Aziz al−Uzbiki: His name was Amid Asta from Uzbekistan. He joined jihad in Tajikistan where he received his first military training and took part in attacks against Kyrgyz forces. He traveled to Afghanistan where he continued his jihad until he was killed in Shahi−Kot.

Another example of the significant role of 90s-era Tajikistan to AQ’s presence in Afghanistan.

Abd−al−Rahman al−Aswad al−Libi: He participated in the Afghan war against the Soviet invasion and fought in Bosnia. He returned to Afghanistan after the Taliban took power. He remained there until the fall of the Taliban. He was killed in Peshawar by Pakistani forces.

Another North African, not much to analyze.

Abdallah al−Libi: His name was Sami (last name not provided) from Libya. He joined the Libyan Group in Afghanistan several months before September 11 attack in the US. He fled to Khost region with Abu−al−Layth al−Libi and was later killed in an air raid.

It is interesting to note how many bio subjects are connected to al-Libi.

Abu−Abdallah al−Turkistani: His name was Shawkat (last name not provided) from Kazakhstan. He traveled to Afghanistan and was later given an assignment in Kazakhstan. He returned to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban where he was killed in an operation by Pakistan forces.

Who assigned him to Kazakhstan and what he was assigned to do remains a mystery, but it suggests that AQ was interested in building networks of support throughout Central Asia.

Abdallah al−Shami: His name was Ziyad al−Shayib from Syria. He traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan where he received his military training. He was killed in a bombing in eastern Afghanistan.

Not enough information to analyze this bio.

Abdallah al−Mu'athin al−Uzbaki: Born in Afghanistan, Abdallah al−Uzbaki left Uzbekistan for Tajikistan where he received his military training with the Uzbek jihadist group before he continued to Afghanistan. He fled to Shahi−Kot after the fall of the Taliban and was later killed in an operation in eastern Afghanistan.

This bio hints at the strategic significance of the 90s-era jihad in Tajikistan. It’s an area and era of violent jihad that has received little analytical attention.

Abdallah Haydarah: His name was Abd−al−Rahman al−Husaynan from Saudi Arabia. He served in the Saudi Armed forces and traveled to Afghanistan after September 11 attacks in the US. He moved to eastern Afghanistan where he was later killed.

Like I’ve said in previous posts, the 9-11 attacks played a significant role in drawing new recruits into the group.

Abu−Abdallah al−Sumali: Born in Somalia, he participated in jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and was active in training and financing jihad activities in Somalia. After his name appeared on the FBI wanted list, he fled Sweden where his family lived to Somalia and then to Afghanistan where he was killed.

An interesting bio highlighting the Western character of and the deep connection to AQ for Somalia’s Salafist-Jihadist. It suggests that many members of the Somalian AQ cadre could jump between Western diaspora communities and regions of violent jihad.

Abd−al−Jabbar al−Turkistani: His name was Qurban Muhammad from the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region in China. He traveled to Afghanistan where he trained and joined jihad in support of the Taliban. He fled to the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan where he was killed by Pakistani forces.

Not much to analyze here.

Abd−al−Hakim al−Uzbaki: Born in Uzbekistan, he traveled to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan where he received his first military experience before he went to Afghanistan. He fled to eastern Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban where he was later killed.

Abd−al−Salam al−Turkistani: Born in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region in China, traveled to Afghanistan where he received his military training and fought for the Taliban before he went to Turkey. He returned to Afghanistan soon before the fall of the Taliban and was forced to flee to the tribal areas of eastern Afghanistan where he mainly Kazakh fighters until he was killed.

This bio inspired questions regarding the role of Turkey as a base for Salafist-Jihadist ideology within the Turkic language communities of Central Asia.

Abd−al−Majid al−Tajiki: His name was Abd−al−Haq (last name not provided) from Tajikistan. He traveled to Afghanistan where he attended religious schools and fought in support of the Taliban. With the defeat of the Taliban, Abd−al−Haq fled to Iran where he spent a year studying in the religious schools of Baluchestan province before he returned to Afghanistan where he was killed in an operation by US forces.

As a Tajik, Abd-al-Salam could easily move between Afghanistan and Iran’s sizeable refugee population. It is also interesting to see that some AQ members are moving through Iran’s only predominantly Sunni region.

Abd−al−Wakil al−Masri: His name was Mustafa Mahmud Fadl from Egypt. He traveled to Afghanistan where he trained and fought in support of mujahidin against the Soviet invasion. He was later appointed a trainer in Al−Faruq training camp until the break of the civil war. He moved with his group to Sudan and later trained and organized Somali fighters against US forces and was directly involved in the bombings against US embassies in East Africa. He returned to Afghanistan after the Taliban took control and remained there until the US invasion when he was forced to move to the tribal areas where he was later killed.

Clearly a member of AQ’s senior Egyptian leadership, his must have been a blow. It also highlights the group’s deep bench, because it is thriving in some areas including Somalia.

Abd−al−Shahid al−Turkistani: Born in Kazakhstan, he traveled to Afghanistan where he received his military training soon before the US invasion. After the defeat of the Taliban, he fled to the tribal areas in eastern Afghanistan where he was killed in an operation by Pakistani forces.

As someone who self-identified as a “Turkistani,” possibly from Western China, it’s interesting that he was born in Kazakhstan. Such a connection hints at active supporters in a country known for its tolerance.

Abd−al−Halim al−Uzbaki: Born in Uzbekistan, he received his military training in Tajikistan then traveled to Afghanistan where he remained until the fall of the Taliban. He was killed in US strike in eastern Afghanistan.

Abd−al−Mu'min al−Tajiki: Born in northern Afghanistan to Tajik parents, he received his military training in Afghanistan and fought in Tajikistan. He died in a suicide operation that targeted Abd−al−Rashid Dustum.

Two more members of the Tajik cadre. How many remain alive?

Uthman al−Uzbaki: His name was Mukhtar Bin−Sultan Bay from Uzbekistan. He joined the Uzbek group in Tajikistan and participated in an operation in Kyrgyzstan to open a passage to Uzbekistan. He later traveled to Afghanistan and fought under the Taliban rule until he was killed in eastern Afghanistan in an operation by US forces.

It is interesting to see here that some AQ members were deeply involved in developing the regional networks of sympathizers.

Azzam al−Maghribi: His name was Yunus al−Alami from Morocco. He traveled to Afghanistan where he received his military training and training new recruits. He fled to the tribal areas where he later died in a battle with US forces.

Not much in this bio to analyze.

Ikrimah al−Ghamidi: His name was Sultan al−Ghamidi from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan where he received his military training until he was forced to flee to the tribal areas in eastern Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. He was later killed in a US air strike.

Again, not much to analyze here that hasn’t already be blogged on.

Abu−Ali al−Maliki al−Jaza'iri: He traveled to Afghanistan to support mujahidin against the Soviet invasion. He remained in Afghanistan until the fall of the Taliban. He fled to eastern Afghanistan where he trained foreign fighters on explosives and prepared suicide bombers until he was killed in an air raid by US forces.

What stands out for me here is the emphasis on Abu-Ali’s central role as a trainer. It shows that

Ali al−Tataristani: He was born in Tajikistan where his parents had emigrated from Tatarstan republic in the Russian Federation. He trained in Chechnya and later traveled to Afghanistan during the rule of the Taliban. He was later killed in the tribal area between Afghanistan and Pakistan in a government checkpoint.

Ammar al−Dali'i al−Yamani: He was born in Yemen where he joined the armed forces before he traveled to Afghanistan in 1997. He was appointed as a bodyguard to Usama Bin Ladin until the fall of the Taliban. He fled to eastern Afghanistan and tried to return to Yemen but was unable to cross Iran. He was forced to return to Karachi where he was killed in an operation by Pakistan forces.

Abu−Umar al−Maghribi: He was born in Egypt and moved to Saudi Arabia where he decided to travel to Afghanistan. He received his training and fought with the Taliban forces until they were forced to flee to eastern Afghanistan where he was later killed.

Imran Khan: He was from southern Waziristan. He traveled to Afghanistan where he was killed in a battled against US forces.

Awjal al−Rahman Bibli: Born in Waziristan, Afghanistan, he joined Arab fighters in the eastern region to train in their camps. He was later killed in a US air raid on their position.

Gharib al−Turkistani: He was from Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region in China. He traveled to Afghanistan where he remained until the defeat of the Taliban. He fled the eastern region where he later died in battle against US forces.

Faruq al−Madani: His name was Badr Bin−Abdallah al−Anzi from Saudi Arabia. He was killed in a failed suicide operation in Jalalabad.

Qash'amyar al−Makki: His name was Badr Bin−Abdallah al−Anzi from Saudi Arabia. He fought under the Taliban. He remained there until he was forced to flee to Pakistan. He was later killed in the eastern region of Afghanistan.

Mukhtar al−Karibi: He was born in the Caribbean Islands and migrated to France with his parents. He was recruited upon his visit to Britain where he met a group of Algerians. He traveled to Afghanistan until he was killed in the eastern region in an operation by US forces.

Abu−Muslim al−Tajiki: Born in Tajikistan, he traveled to Afghanistan where he joined al−Qa'ida fighters. He remained in Afghanistan until he was killed in a raid by Pakistani forces.

Abu−Muhammad al−Turkistani: He was from Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region in China. He preached jihad in his homeland and recruited many from his homeland to join the jihadist training camps of Afghanistan. He fled to the tribal areas after the fall of the Taliban and was later killed in a raid by Pakistani forces.

Abu−Muhammad al−Qasimi: His name was Muhammad Bin Salim al−Mazni from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan shortly before the fall of the Taliban. After failed attempts to return to Saudi Arabia, he joined Al−Qa'ida fighters in the tribal areas and remained there until he was killed in strike against their position.

Abu−Muhammad al−Uzbaki: His name was Hurmat Mulakim from Uzbekistan. He received his military training in Chechnya and later traveled to Afghanistan where he trained other Uzbek fighters. After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to the eastern region where he was later killed in an air strike.

Abu−Muhammad al−Kurdi: He traveled to Afghanistan from Kurdistan, Iraq. He trained in Al−Faruq camp in Kandahar and remained in Afghanistan until the defeat of the Taliban. He fled to the tribal areas where he died when a grenade he was carrying exploded.

Abu−Muhammed al−Iraqi: His name was Hatim al−Sa'idi from Iraq. He traveled to Afghanistan from Australia to join his father−in−law Mukhtar al−Kurdi. After the fall of the Taliban, he moved to Pakistan for a year before he joined Al−Qa'ida and pro−Taliban fighters in eastern Afghanistan. He was later killed in an air strike.

Abu−Muhammad al−Masri: His name was Hamdi Bin Muhammad Bin−Ibrahim al−Thib from Egypt. He traveled to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia after September 11 attacks in the US. He fled to eastern Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban and died in a suicide operation that target a Canadian convoy in Kabul.

Muhammad Jan Sifli al−Waziri: Muhammad Jan Bin−Ghazi Jan from Pakistan. He joined pro−Taliban fighters in the tribal areas where he took part in a campaign of ambushes against US convoys and was later killed in one of these operations.

Mukhtar al−Suri: His name was Umar Bin−al−Hajj Hamid from Syria. After a failed attempt to join jihad in Chechnya, he traveled to Afghanistan where he remained until the fall of the Taliban. He fled with the rest of pro−Taliban forces to Shahi−Kot in eastern Afghanistan and was later killed in battles against Pakistan forces in Zabul Province.

Muslim al−Tunusi: His name was Habib al−Wadhan from Tunisia. He traveled to Afghanistan from Italy and received his first military training in Kandahar. Soon afterward, he was called upon to join the fight for Kabul against the Northern Alliance. He fled with the remaining pro−Taliban forces to eastern Afghanistan where he remained until he was allegedly killed in friendly fire on his way to Jalalabad.

Abu−Mujahid al−Shahri: His name was Muhammad Bin−Sa'id al−Shahri from Saudi Arabia. He was a member of the Saudi Special Forces before he traveled to Afghanistan. He trained in Kandahar and joined pro−Taliban forces in northern Afghanistan. He fled to the eastern region where he was later killed in an air strike.

Al−Mu'tasim al−San'ani: His name was Sultan al−Ashmuri from Yemen. He traveled to Afghanistan shortly before the US invasion. He fled to Khost in eastern Afghanistan and remained there until he was killed in an operation by Pakistan forces in Zabul.

Mina Jan Dawar: Born in northern Waziristan, Mina Jan joined the Taliban and took part in their battles against the Northern Alliance. After the fall of the Taliban, he withdrew with the rest of the pro−Taliban fighters to the tribal area in Waziristan. He remained there until he was killed in an air strike.

Al−Nibras al−San'ani: His name was Ahmad Bin−Yahya al−Mansur from Yemen. He traveled to Afghanistan where he received his military training and was appointed by Usama Bin Ladin to run a guest house in Hirat. After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to the tribal areas of Afghanistan where he was later killed when the explosives he was handling accidentally detonated.

Nik Muhammad Wazir: Nick Muhammad was born in southern Waziristan. He fought in the Taliban forces in northern Afghanistan until the US invasion when he was forced to flee to the tribal areas. He was later killed by Pakistan forces.

Wasim Muhammad Ra'uf Dur: Born in the tribal area of Waziristan, Pakistan. He joined pro−Taliban forces and was killed in an air strike.

Waqqas al−Jaza'iri: His name was Mukhtar (last name not provided) from Algeria. He lived in France before he traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan where he received his initial military training before he went on the Al−Faruq camp in Kandahar. After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to Pakistan then returned to the tribal area where he was later killed in US air strike.

Abu−al−Walid al−Murithani: His name was Muhammad Bin−Fadil al−Ya'qubi from Mauritania. He traveled to Afghanistan from Germany where he pursued his graduate studies. He joined Al−Faruq camp where he received his military training and was later appointed a trainer. After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to the tribal area in eastern Afghanistan where he was later killed in Shankay.

Abu−al−Walid al−Pakistani: His name was Muhammad Anwar Bin−Khushi Muhammad from Pakistan. He received his military training Lashkar−i−Tayyiba's camps in Afghanistan then in Kashmir before he joined pro−Taliban and Al−Qa'ida forces. He was later killed in an ambush.

Abu−al−Haytham al−Ta'zi al−Yamani: Born in Yemen, he traveled to Afghanistan in 1999 where he received his military training before he joined pro−Taliban forces in Kabul. After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to the tribal area in eastern Afghanistan where he was later killed in an air strike.

Abu−Yasir al−Namshi al−Harbi: His name was Fahd Bin−Salih al−Harbi from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan where he received his military training. He graduated from Al−Faruq camp shortly before the September 11 attacks against the US. With the fall of the Taliban, Fahd al−Harbi fled to the eastern region of Afghanistan where he was later killed in an operation by government forces in Jalalabad.

Abu−Yahya al−Hawn al−Masri: His name was Zakariya (no last name provided) from Egypt. He traveled to Afghanistan to support mujahidin against the Soviet invasion. After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to the tribal areas where he continued to train new recruits. He later died of cancer.

Abu−Yahya al−Maghribi: His name was Zakariya al−Sabbar from Morocco. Al−Sabbar was a member of the Hamburg cell and an associate of many of the organizers of September 11 attacks against the US. According to the account, Zakariya al−Sabbar traveled to Afghanistan in 2000. After finishing his training in Al−Faruq camp, he was sent to Germany with a "mission that only unique individuals can carry out." (Al−Sabbar was reported to have delivered the cryptic message from Bin−al−Shibh to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad indicating the date that the September 11 attacks would be carried out.) After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to the tribal areas of Afghanistan. He joined Abu−al−Layth al−Libi camp in Khost Province where he was later killed.

As you can see, there are some that are hard core and others that are just of the "really enthusiastic Muslim" variety. But it does help limit your searchable universe to blogs where the contributors with a bit of education, an internet connection, and a hankerin' for "jehaad." This could be helpful if you're following the emergence of new bloggers, now that The Pest and his friends have moved on.

September 11, 2010

Since everyone's favorite online ehadi has gone on to bigger and better things, I thought about sharing some of The Pest's past works with you. It's a directory of blog posts (from "inshallahshaheed") that I grabbed over the years, as the little one grew into full ehadihood. Whether we like it or not, Samir Khan's work was pioneering and pivotal in the early development of an American Salafi-jihadi community. This, despite the fact that it was mostly produced in his parent's basement.

I hope this helps any researchers out there who are exploring this early period (2006-2008).

August 24, 2010

I came across this scan the other day, and thought you might find it interesting. It's a copy of a list of Salafist and Salafi-jihadist websites, circa 2007. It is perhaps of interest to anyone doing research on the online jihad.

August 14, 2010

Back in 2004 the InfoVlad Clearinghouse was perhaps the only English-language online forum where users could share and discover jihadi media. It was a modest operation in comparison to the mega jihadi forums, all in Arabic, directed by the London jihadi frontgroups. Those forums were probably the most spooked-out websites on earth, and inhospitable places for non-Arabic speakers.

I was an "active" lurker on Infovlad. I posted a few comments; nothing memorable. However, I do remember one "graduate" going on to set up the Anti-Imperialist Forum (AIF). I also wonder whether the "Bilal" on the forum was the "Bilal" recently arrested in Alaska. Now I wonder if the Pest and some of his other friends weren't making their first forays into the virtual jihad on the Clearinghouse.

This may seem like "ancient" history to some. After all, the Pest has gone on to bigger and better things. "Bilal" is cooperating with authorities. And the Clearinghouse is no more. But accurate timelines do matter, particularly in dynamic environments like the US's virtual jihadi community. Incomplete or misdirected analysis now could create dramatically inaccurate pictures five or ten years down the analytical road. America's online jihadi community -- a center of media attention at the moment -- has a few starting points, and I am beginning to believe that the Clearinghouse was one of them.

July 18, 2010

The Pest has a new magazine out. Yes, I'm saying it's the Pest. Aaron and Rusty both say so, and that's all the convincing I need. That, and reading the thing. Hegghammer does a good job clearing some hysterical hype about it.

My first impression: its producers apparently sought to create the Salafist-jihadi answer to the yoga lifestyle magazines you find at a Whole Foods checkout.

If you're interested in seeing what all the hype is about, you can find a copy over at -- where else? -- archive <dot> org:

The uploader ID, maher_yassine@yahoo.com, is very active on archive.org [hint: search "maher_yassine" in archive.org]. He/she has shared a ton of material connected to or distributed through the Al Mojahden Electronic Network. I have no idea what, if any, connection exists between the uploader ID and The Pest and his network of miscreants, but my guess is that there is one.

I think it's safe to say now that the Pest and his American compatriot, Azzam al-Skippy, have applied the knowledge of American suburban pop culture to good effect in support of their cause. Integrating pop culture into religious practice isn't the summit of theological achievements, however. There are plenty of rinky dink store front churches that can do it effectively, and religious workers take courses on effective communications all the time. It's much harder to weave theological clarity into the contemporary American idiom.

April 15, 2010

I interrupt my MIA status to give you this warning -- dailymotion.com is a cesspool of French language Salafist-jihadi media. Enter cautiously, because if you follow one link -- like this one: http://www.dailymotion.com/khattab007 -- and you may be finding more hours later. Like these:

http://www.dailymotion.com/Cavalierdusud

http://www.dailymotion.com/wazeer-alerhab

http://www.dailymotion.com/Moujahidine-Du-Rif

http://www.dailymotion.com/la-soeur-a-avicen

http://www.dailymotion.com/sayfelislam

http://www.dailymotion.com/talibjan02

http://www.dailymotion.com/talibjan1

http://www.dailymotion.com/jazairstan

http://www.dailymotion.com/ALJZAHARA

http://www.dailymotion.com/resistancia_7

http://www.dailymotion.com/MUQAWEEM59

http://www.dailymotion.com/Frere_Mouslim

http://www.dailymotion.com/Ansar_Al_Muslimine

My guess is that French authorities are
well aware of the activity on dailymotion, but it's probably time for
those in the know on this side of the Atlantic to start paying more
attention to the French Salafist-Jihadi cultural "scene," including a fair helping of weird Eurotrash media: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xcy9ia_akhi-fi-llah-version-originale_webcam

December 21, 2009

It's back! Around the Web has returned (I know you've missed it). After thinking about it for some time, I admit that it's still the best way for me to keep up with the daily fire hose of information. And after a day of cooking (chicken chili soup anyone?), I’m ready to pick through the web for a little counter-terrorism fun.

Let's begin then...

One of the more intriguing recently thwarted plots comes to us from Bosnia .

New jihadi blog. New to me, anyway: http://madkhalis.com/

Hey, check out Aaron, all grown up and writing for Studies in Conflict and Terrorism: "Comparison of Visual Motifs in Jihadi and Cholo Videos on YouTube," Volume 32, Issue 12 December 2009 , pages 1066 – 1074

What this suggests to me is that we need to be able to speak / read not only spoken or written languages of our sources, suspects, informants and opponents — but also the language or underlying logic of their thought.

Charles, I call this “thinking with the adversary.” It’s a modification of an old Catholic theological principle.

I know this is old in blog-time, but I can’t resist writing this sentence: It was never 2000, and it’s not 50 now, and it was never 30 and it’s not 200 now. The numbers have always been in the 5 or 10s. Bradford’s law extends even to jihobbyists.

As a matter of fact it is such a deeply Catholic work that most movie watchers have no idea what they're experiencing. And so it is that the cyber jihadis get drawn into the pseudo-medieval world of Tolkien's Catholic imagination again and again, never knowing that the characters and symbols are Christendom through and through.

And this isn't the generic modern-day, ecumenical post-Vatican II Cat Stevens-songbook Catholicism either. Tolkien's is the unapologetically medieval Catholicism of pre-Reformation Christendom. It is the foundation of Western thought and, more important for the book, Western storytelling. This is the medieval civilization that produced the Icelandic Sagas, the Middle High German poets and the Pearl Manuscript, oh, and the Crusaders, too.

From a 13th century Crusader knights' dinner table straight into a Pakistani cyber jihadi's adoring ears.

December 02, 2009

I recently shared a document entitled, The West in the Eyes of the Egyptian Islamic Movements, over at my other blog. It was a surprisingly popular post. It got me thinking about the enduring importance of primary source media in counterterrorism analysis, and about how very little of it is reliably available. Jihadist websites come and go, and forums vanish. For US-based spooks there is always the Open Source Center's website; however, it is cumbersome and incomplete. That is why I rely on a personal collection of jihad media -- mostly documents. I pulled The West in the Eyes of the Egyptian Islamic Movements from it.

I am considering developing a list of primary source material with the aim of slowly making it publicly available to readers. However, like any good librarian, I am more interested in knowing what my readers want to read. So, what do you think? Any special requests? Be as specific as possible.

Please, no requests for documents on jihad. They're all on jihad.

I'm doing something I rarely do here. I'm opening the comments section for any suggestions.