S. Hrg. 105-183
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
P.M. SESSION
Albright, Hon. Madeleine Korbel, Secretary of State.............. 61
Prepared statement........................................... 64
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1997--P.M. SESSION
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:30 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Coverdell, Hagel, Smith,
Grams, Brownback, Biden, Sarbanes, Robb, Feinstein, and
Wellstone.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Madam Secretary, I was delighted late yesterday to learn
that you wanted to appear before this committee today to give
the benefit of the administration's perspective on the treaty
again. I think it is clearly a matter of public record that the
entire Helms family admires you. I think they are going to
score some points by having you up here this afternoon.
Now, if Senator Biden will agree, this is the first time
you have appeared as Secretary of State formally.
Secretary Albright. That is true.
The Chairman. And this being such an important issue, I
know that the Senators will have questions either in writing or
in person that they want to ask directly of you. I know,
knowing you, that you will respond to these written questions,
realizing the Senators have commitments to other places.
I and the other members of the committee will forego our
statements, unless Senator Biden wishes to make one.
Senator Biden. I will be happy to place mine in the record,
Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Biden
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank Secretary Albright
this afternoon for appearing on such very short notice and making time
in her busy schedule to be with us this afternoon because she
recognizes the central importance of this issue for our national
security.
I appreciate the opportunity to take a few minutes again to address
perhaps the most important issue to come before the 105th Congress to
date: The Chemical Weapons Convention.
This afternoon we will hear more testimony about this treaty and
what it does and does not do, but the core issue is very simple: This
treaty outlaws poison gas weapons.
The Chemical Weapons Convention would make it illegal under
international and domestic laws for a country to use, develop, produce,
transfer or stockpile chemical weapons.
The Chemical Weapons Convention represents a significant step
forward in our efforts to contend with the greatest immediate threat to
our national security: The proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
The CWC will help protect our citizens from the use of poison gas
weapons by terrorist groups. It will benefit our military by requiring
other nations to follow our lead and destroy their chemical weapons. It
will improve the ability of our intelligence agencies to monitor
chemical weapons threats to our armed forces and our Nation.
The convention has the strong support of the American chemical
industry, which was centrally involved in the negotiation of the CWC.
It also takes into account all of the protections afforded Americans
under our Constitution.
The CWC will make pariahs out of states that refuse to abide by its
provisions. Through the sanctions required by the convention, it will
make it more difficult for those pariah states to obtain the precursor
chemicals they need to manufacture poison gas. It will create
international pressure on these states to sign and ratify the CWC and
to abide by its provisions.
The CWC will create a standard for good international citizens to
meet. It will brand as outlaws those countries that choose to remain
outside this regime.
The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention will mark a
major milestone in our efforts to enlist greater international support
for the important american objective of containing and penalizing rogue
states that seek to acquire or transfer weapons of mass destruction.
we need to disregard arguments that are superfluous to the core
reality of what this convention will accomplish: It outlaws poison gas,
period. The United States is already committed to destroying its
chemical weapon arsenal. By ratifying the CWC, we can hold other
countries to the same standard we have set for ourselves.
In this morning's testimony, we heard three very distinguished
former Secretaries of Defense tesify on this treaty.
Among the claims they made about the CWC are that it would force us
to share our most advanced defensive technology with all states,
including countries of concern, that have ratified this agreement.
Another assertion they made is that it requires us to abandon all
controls we have on the proliferation of sensitive technology through
mechanisms like the australia group.
In reviewing the treaty, we find both claims are false.
With regard to sharing defensive technology, paragraph seven of
article ten states that: ``Each state party undertakes to provide
assistance through the organization and to this end to elect to take
one or more of the following measures.'' Let me emphasize: ``Elect to
take one or more.''
Among the options, the option I expect the United States would
choose, is that we could: ``Declare, not later than 180 days after this
convention enters into force for [us], the kind of assistance we might
provide in response to an appeal by the organization.''
That's right: We would declare what we might provide.
The Chairman and I are very close to agreement on a condition that
would require the executive branch not to provide any assistance to a
rogue state beyond medical antidotes and treatment. And that would be
fully in keeping with article ten of the CWC.
As for the argument that we would be forced to abandon our current
mechanisms to control the proliferation of sensitive technology, the
CWC explicitly allows us to keep these protections in place.
Article eleven supports chemical trade and technology exchange
``for purposes not prohibited under this convention.'' It also requires
that trade restrictions not be ``incompatible with the obligations
undertaken under this convention.''
But the CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement of
the Australia Group controls, which member states use to keep chemical
and biological weapons material out of the hands of rogue states. The
executive branch has said this time and again, and so have our
Australia Group allies.
I am convinced that the CWC does not require us to share our most
advanced defensive technology or to abandon existing controls on
chemical weapons. I will be interested to hear how the officials in the
administration today view these provisions.
I understand that Secretary Albright must leave after her statement
today, and I welcome the opportunity to hear her testimony and the
statements and responses of all of our witnesses here today.
The Chairman. And we will print any statement that you wish
to make for the record, and that will give you an opportunity
to summarize if you wish. In other words, you are a free agent
and you are welcome. Madam Secretary, the stage is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE KORBEL ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE
Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
delighted to see you here, as I enjoyed our trip to North
Carolina.
The Chairman. We enjoyed it.
Secretary Albright. I had a good time.
Senator Biden and Senator Brownback, I am very glad that
you were able to make time for me to testify on such short
notice. I am also delighted to note the return of Admiral
Nance, who just walked through the door. I wish him continued
recovery, and I say that sincerely on behalf of the entire
Department and not simply those whose names are scheduled to
come up before you for confirmation.
Mr. Chairman, the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC, is
one of the President's top foreign policy priorities and, this
afternoon, I would like to explain why. I begin with the
imperative of American leadership. The United States is the
only nation with the power and respect to forge a strong global
consensus against the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
In recent years, we have used our influence wisely to gain
the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakstan. We have led in securing the extension of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. We have frozen North Korea's nuclear
program. We have maintained sanctions against Iraq. We have
joined with others in controlling the transfer of dangerous
conventional arms. In these and other efforts, we have counted
on the support and counsel of this committee and your Senate
colleagues.
American leadership on arms control is not something we do
as a favor to others. Our goal is to make the world safer for
Americans and to protect our allies and friends. We have now
another opportunity to exercise leadership for those ends and,
once again, we look to this committee for help.
The CWC will enter into force on April 29th. For reasons I
will discuss, we believe it is essential to ratify the
agreement before then, so that America will be an original
party. Chemical weapons are inhumane. They kill horribly,
massively, and--once deployed--are no more controllable than
the wind.
We decided years ago to renounce the use of these weapons
and to begin destroying our own chemical weapons stockpiles.
Thus, the CWC will not deprive us of any military option we
would ever use against others, but it would help ensure that
others never use chemical weapons against us.
In considering the value of this treaty, we must bear in
mind that today, keeping and producing chemical weapons are
legal. The gas Saddam Hussein used a decade ago to massacre
Kurdish villagers was legally produced. In most countries,
terrorists can buy chemical agents, such as sarin gas, legally.
Countries such as Iran and Libya can buildup their stockpiles
of chemical weapons legally.
If we are ever to rid the world of these horrible weapons,
we must begin by making not only their use, but also their
development, production, acquisition, and stockpiling illegal.
This is fun-
damental. Making chemical weapons illegal is the purpose of the
CWC.
The CWC sets the standard that it is wrong for any nation
to build or possess a chemical weapon and gives us strong and
effective tools for enforcing that standard. This will not
eliminate all danger, but it will make chemical weapons harder
for terrorists or outlaw states to buy, build, or conceal.
Under the treaty, parties must give up the chemical weapons
they have and refrain from developing or acquiring them in the
future. To enforce these requirements, a comprehensive
inspection regime will be in place. The treaty will give us the
tools we need to learn more about chemical weapons programs. It
will also enable us to act on the information we obtain.
In the future, countries known to possess chemical weapons
and who have joined the CWC will be forced to choose between
compliance and sanctions. Countries outside the CWC will be
subject to trade restrictions whether or not they are known to
possess chemical weapons.
These penalties would not exist without the treaty. They
will make it more costly for any nation to have chemical
weapons and more difficult for rogue states or terrorists to
acquire materials needed to produce them.
Over time, I believe that if the United States joins the
CWC, most other countries will, too.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the problem
states will never accept a prohibition on chemical weapons if
America stays out, keeps them company, and gives them cover. We
will not have the standing to mobilize our allies to support
strong action against violators if we ourselves have refused to
join the treaty being violated.
The core question here is, who do we want to set the
standards? Critics suggest that the CWC is flawed, because we
cannot assume early ratification and full compliance by the
outlaw states. To me, that is like saying that because some
people smuggle drugs, we should enact no law against drug
smuggling. When it comes to the protection of Americans, the
lowest common denominator is not good enough. Those who abide
by the law, not those who break it, must establish the rules by
which all should be judged.
Moreover, if we fail to ratify the agreement by the end of
April, we would forfeit our seat on the treaty's Executive
Council for at least 1 year, thereby losing the right to help
draft the rules by which the Convention will be enforced; we
would lose the right to help administer and conduct
inspections; and because of the trade restrictions imposed on
nonmember states, our chemical manufacturers are concerned that
they would risk serious economic loss.
Eliminating chemical weapons has long been a bipartisan
goal. The convention itself is the product of years of effort
by leaders from both parties. The treaty has strong backing
from our defense and military leaders.
I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that the committee heard this
morning from three former Secretaries of Defense who do not
favor approval of this convention. Their arguments deserve
consideration. I would point out, however, that other former
Secretaries of Defense from both parties support the treaty,
and that every former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, going back
to the Carter administration, has endorsed it.
Just this past week, we received a letter signed by 17
former four-star generals and admirals, including three of the
former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs and five former service
chiefs.
Let me quote from that letter:
Each of us can point to decades of military experience in
command positions. We have all trained and commanded troops to
prepare for the wartime use of chemical weapons and for defense
against them.
The quote continues:
Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations, but instead on
its many strengths. The CWC destroys stockpiles that could
threaten our troops; it significantly improves our intelligence
capabilities; and it creates new international sanctions to
punish those states who remain outside the treaty. For these
reasons, we strongly support the CWC.
I also note, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
that your witnesses this morning have not had the benefit of
the dialog we have been conducting with Senators, including
yourself, the Ranking Member and other members of this
committee. We have attempted, in the course of this dialog, to
address the major issues treaty opponents have raised.
For example, some believe the CWC will require its members
to exchange manufacturing technology that could then be used to
make chemical agents. In fact, the CWC prohibits members from
providing any assistance that would contribute to chemical
weapons proliferation.
There are those who suggest that if we were to ratify the
CWC, America would then become complacent about the threat that
chemical weapons pose. This, too, is false, and this body can
help ensure that it remains false.
The President has requested an increase of almost $225
million over 6 years in our already robust program to equip and
train our troops against chemical and biological attack.
Some have expressed the view that the inspection
requirements of the CWC could raise constitutional problems
here in the United States. However, the CWC provides explicitly
that inspections will be conducted according to each nation's
constitutional process.
Another fear is that the CWC could become a regulatory
nightmare for small business. But after reviewing the facts,
the National Federation of Independent Business concluded that
its members ``will not be affected'' by the treaty.
Finally, I have heard the argument that the Senate really
need not act before April 29th. But, as I have said, there are
real costs attached to any such delay. The treaty has already
been before the Senate for more than 180 weeks. More than 1,500
pages of testimony and reports have been provided and hundreds
of questions have been answered. The Senate is always the
arbiter of its own pace; but from where I sit, a decision prior
to April 29 would be very welcome and, Mr. Chairman, I believe
very much in the best interest of the United States.
Mr. Chairman, America is the world's leader in building a
future of greater security and safety for us and for all who
share our commitment to democracy and peace. The path to that
future is through the maintenance of American readiness and the
expansion of the rule of law. We are the center around which
international consensus forms. We are the builder of
coalitions, the designer of safeguards, the leader in
separating acceptable international behavior from that which
cannot be tolerated.
This leadership role for America may be viewed as a burden
by some, but I think, to most of our citizens, it is a source
of great pride. It is also a source of continuing strength, for
our influence is essential to protect our interests, which are
global and increasing. If we turn our backs on the CWC after so
much effort by leaders from both parties, we will scar America
with a grievous and self-inflicted wound. We will shed the
cloak of leadership and leave it on the ground for others to
pick it up.
But if we heed the advice of wise diplomats such as James
Baker and Brent Scowcroft, experienced military leaders such as
Generals Powell, Mundy and Schwarzkopf, and thoughtful public
officials such as former Senators Nunn, Boren and Kassebaum-
Baker, we will reinforce America's role in the world.
By ratifying the CWC, we will assume the lead in shaping a
new and effective legal regime. We will be in a position to
challenge those who refuse to give up those poisonous weapons.
We will provide an added measure of security for the men and
women of our armed forces. We will protect American industry
and American jobs. We will make our citizens safer than they
would be in a world where chemical arms remain legal.
This treaty is about other people's weapons, not our own.
It reflects existing American practices and advances enduring
American interests. It is right and smart for America. It
deserves the Senate's support and it deserves that support now.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Albright follows:]
Prepared Statement of Madeleine K. Albright
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify before you this afternoon. As evidenced by the
bipartisan show of support at the White House last week, timely
approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC, is one of the
President's top foreign policy priorities.
This afternoon, with the help of my colleagues, I would like to
explain why.
I begin with the imperative of American leadership. The United
States is the only nation with the power, influence, and respect to
forge a strong global consensus against the spread of weapons of mass
destruction. In recent years, we have used our position wisely to gain
the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan. We
have led in securing the extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty. We have frozen North Korea's nuclear program. We have
maintained sanctions against Iraq. And we have joined forces with more
than two dozen other major countries in controlling the transfer of
dangerous conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and
technologies.
In these and other efforts, we have counted on the strong support
and wise counsel of this committee and your Senate colleagues. Your
consent to ratification of the START II Treaty made possible the
agreement in Helsinki to seek further significant reductions in cold
war nuclear arsenals. And the Nunn-Lugar program set the standard for
forward-looking bipartisan action to promote nuclear security.
American leadership on arms control is not something we do as a
favor to others. Our goal is to make the world safer for Americans and
to protect our allies and friends. We have now another opportunity to
exercise leadership for those ends. And once again, we look to this
committee for help.
The CWC will enter into force on April 29. Our goal is to ratify
the agreement before then so that America will be an original party. By
so doing, as the President said last Friday, we ``can help to shield
our soldiers from one of the battlefield's deadliest killers * * * and
we can bolster our leadership in the fight against terrorism, and
proliferation around the world.'' Chemical weapons are inhumane. They
kill horribly, massively, and--once deployed--are no more controllable
than the wind. That is why the United States decided--under a law
signed by President Reagan in 1985--to destroy the vast majority of our
chemical weapons stockpiles by the year 2004. Thus, the CWC will not
deprive us of any military option we would ever use against others; but
it would help ensure that others never use chemical weapons against us.
In considering the value of this treaty, we must bear in mind that
today, keeping and producing chemical weapons are legal. The gas Saddam
Hussein used to massacre Kurdish villagers in 1988 was produced
legally. In most countries, terrorists can produce or procure chemical
agents, such as sarin gas, legally. Regimes such as Iran and Libya can
buildup their stockpiles of chemical weapons legally.
If we are ever to rid the world of these horrible weapons, we must
begin by making not only their use, but also their development,
production, acquisition, and stockpiling illegal. This is fundamental.
This is especially important now when America's comparative military
might is so great that an attack by unconventional means may hold for
some potential adversaries their only perceived hope of success. And
making chemical weapons illegal is the purpose of the CWC.
The CWC sets the standard that it is wrong for any nation to build
or possess a chemical weapon, and gives us strong and effective tools
for enforcing that standard. This is not a magic wand. It will not
eliminate all danger. It will not allow us to relax or cease to ensure
the full preparedness of our armed forces against the threat of
chemical weapons. What it will do is make chemical weapons harder for
terrorists or outlaw states to buy, build or conceal.
Under the treaty, parties will be required to give up the chemical
weapons they have, and to refrain from developing, producing or
acquiring such weapons in the future. To enforce these requirements,
the most comprehensive and intense inspection regime ever negotiated
will be put in place. Parties will also be obliged to enact and enforce
laws to punish violators within their jurisdictions.
Of course, no treaty is 100 percent verifiable, but this treaty
provides us valuable tools for monitoring chemical weapons
proliferation worldwide--a task we will have to do with or without the
CWC.
CWC inspections and monitoring will help us learn more about
chemical weapons programs. It will also enable us to act on the
information we obtain. In the future, countries known to possess
chemical weapons, and who have joined the CWC, will be forced to choose
between compliance and sanctions. And countries outside the CWC will be
subject to trade restrictions whether or not they are known to possess
chemical arms.
These penalties would not exist without the treaty. They will make
it more costly for any nation to have chemical weapons, and more
difficult for rogue states or terrorists to acquire materials needed to
produce them.
Over time, I believe that--if the United States joins the CWC--most
other countries will, too. Consider that there are now 185 members of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and only five outside. Most
nations play by the rules and want the respect and benefits the world
bestows upon those who do.
But the problem states will never accept a prohibition on chemical
weapons if America stays out, keeps them company and gives them cover.
We will not have the standing to mobilize our allies to support strong
action against violators if we ourselves have refused to join the
treaty being violated.
The core question here is who do we want to set the standards?
Critics suggest that the CWC is flawed because we cannot assume early
ratification and full compliance by the outlaw states. To me, that is
like saying that because some people smuggle drugs, we should enact no
law against drug smuggling. When it comes to the protection of
Americans, the lowest common denominator is not good enough. Those who
abide by the law, not those who break it, must establish the rules by
which all should be judged.
Moreover, if we fail to ratify the agreement by the end of April:
We would forfeit our seat on the treaty's Executive Council
for at least 1 year, thereby costing us the chance to help
draft the rules by which the convention will be enforced;
We would not be able to participate in the critical first
sessions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons, which monitors compliance;
We would lose the right to help administer and conduct
inspections; and
Because of the trade restrictions imposed on nonmember
states, our chemical manufacturers are concerned that they
would risk serious economic loss.
According to a letter signed by the CEOs of more than fifty
chemical manufacturing companies, the American chemical industry's
``status as the world's preferred supplier * * * may be jeopardized if
* * * the Senate does not vote in favor of the CWC.''
According to those executives ``we stand to lose hundreds of
millions of dollars in overseas sales, putting at risk thousands of
good-paying American jobs.''
Eliminating chemical weapons has long been a bipartisan goal. The
convention itself is the product of years of effort by leaders from
both parties.
And the treaty has strong backing from our defense and military
leaders.
I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that the committee heard this morning
from three former Secretaries of Defense who do not favor approval of
this convention. There is no question their arguments are sincerely
held, and deserve consideration. I would point out, however, that other
former Secretaries of Defense from both parties are on record in
support of the treaty, and that every former chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, going back to the Carter Administration, has endorsed
it.
Just this past week, we received a letter of support signed by 17
former four star generals and admirals, including three of the former
chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and five former service chiefs.
In their words:
Each of us can point to decades of military experience in
command positions. We have all trained and commanded troops to
prepare for the wartime use of chemical weapons and for
defenses against them. Our focus is not on the treaty's
limitations, but instead on its many strengths. The CWC
destroys stockpiles that could threaten our troops; it
significantly improves our intelligence capabilities; and it
creates new international sanctions to punish those states who
remain outside of the treaty. For these reasons, we strongly
support the CWC.
I also note, Mr. Chairman, that the former officials who testified
before the committee this morning have not had the benefit of the
intensive dialog we have been conducting with Members of the Senate
leadership, including yourself, the ranking Member, and other key
members of this committee. We have attempted, in the course of this
dialog, to address the major issues the opponents of the treaty have
raised, and to provide appropriate assurances in binding conditions to
accompany the resolution of ratification.
For example, critics have asserted that the CWC obliges member
states to exchange manufacturing technology that can be used to make
chemical agents. This is untrue. The CWC prohibits members from
providing any assistance that would contribute to chemical weapons
proliferation.
Nothing in the CWC requires any weakening of our export controls.
Further, the United States will continue to work through the Australia
Group to maintain and make more effective internationally agreed
controls on chemical and biological weapons technology. And, as I have
said, the CWC establishes tough restrictions on the transfer of
precursor chemicals and other materials that might help a nation or
terrorist group to acquire chemical weapons.
Opponents also suggest that if we ratify the CWC, we will become
complacent about the threat that chemical weapons pose. This, too, is
false--and this body can help ensure it remains false. The President
has requested an increase of almost $225 million over 5 years in our
already robust program to equip and train our troops against chemical
and biological attack. We are also proceeding with theater missile
defense programs and intelligence efforts against the chemical threat.
Some critics of the treaty have expressed the fear that its
inspection requirements could raise constitutional problems here in the
United States. However, the CWC provides explicitly that inspections
will be conducted according to each nation's constitutional processes.
Another issue that arose early in the debate was that the CWC could
become a regulatory nightmare for small businesses here in the United
States. But after reviewing the facts, the National Federation of
Independent Business concluded that its members ``will not be
affected'' by the treaty.
Finally, I have heard the argument that the Senate really need not
act before April 29. But as I have said, there are real costs attached
to any such delay. The treaty has already been before the Senate for
more than 180 weeks. More than 1,500 pages of testimony and reports
have been provided, and hundreds of questions have been answered. The
Senate is always the arbiter of its own pace. But from where I sit, a
decision prior to April 29 would be very much in the best interests of
the United States.
Mr. Chairman, America is the world's leader in building a future of
greater security and safety for us and for those who share our
commitment to democracy and peace. The path to that future is through
the maintenance of American readiness and the expansion of the rule of
law. We are the center around which international consensus forms. We
are the builder of coalitions, the designer of safeguards, the leader
in separating acceptable international behavior from that which cannot
be tolerated.
This leadership role for America may be viewed as a burden by some,
but I think to most of our citizens, it is a source of great pride. It
is also a source of continuing strength, for our influence is essential
to protect our interests, which are global and increasing. If we turn
our backs on the CWC, after so much effort by leaders from both
parties, we will scar America with a grievous and self inflicted wound.
We will shed the cloak of leadership and leave it on the ground for
others to pick up.
But if we heed the advice of wise diplomats such as James Baker and
Brent Scowcroft, experienced military leaders such as Generals Powell,
Mundy, and Schwartzkopf, and thoughtful public officials such as former
Senators Nunn, Boren, and Kassebaum-Baker, we will reinforce America's
role in the world.
By ratifying the CWC, we will assume the lead in shaping a new and
effective legal regime. We will be in a position to challenge those who
refuse to give up these poisonous weapons. We will provide an added
measure of security for the men and women of our armed forces. We will
protect American industry and American jobs. And we will make our
citizens safer than they would be in a world where chemical arms remain
legal.
This treaty is about other people's weapons, not our own. It
reflects existing American practices and advances enduring American
interests. It is right and smart for America. It deserves the Senate's
timely support.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Let us see, we have nine, and you need to leave here by
about 4:15 or 4:20?
Secretary Albright. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. I think we will have to confine ourselves to
about 3 minutes per Senator.
Let me just say to you, as your well-advertised friend,
that during the 103d Congress, both the Congress and the
administration were controlled by the political party to which
you belong and to which I once belonged. The CWC was submitted
in November 1993 and it lay absolutely fallow for the entire
remainder of the 103d Congress, with no action even hinted by
the Senate.
During the 104th Congress, with the Senate controlled by
Republicans, we passed the treaty from this committee and were
prepared to vote for it--or vote on it--on September 14, 1996.
But, what do you know? On the very day that the vote was
scheduled, the administration panicked and asked the Senate not
to vote on the treaty. Now I read in the press that members of
the administration are either openly stating or insinuating
that some of us are to be blamed for blocking passage of the
treaty.
Now, that kind of thing will not do. I have said
repeatedly, and I will say it to you again--and as we discussed
when you were good enough to go to North Carolina--if some in
the administration will stop stonewalling and let us look at
some of the important changes that I think need to be made in
this treaty, I think you might be surprised at the outcome. But
as long as the administration stonewalls, I can stonewall, too.
I am going to reserve the balance of my time. I think I
have about a minute and a half remaining.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I will adopt your practice and
yield to my colleague from California, since I get to speak to
the Secretary all the time on this issue.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.
Good afternoon, Madam Secretary. I very much appreciated
your comments.
Let me ask you a question that is somewhat speculative, but
I hope you will answer it. I have been really very puzzled. I
have read all of the analyses, all of the discussions that I
could find between our Ranking Member and our Chairman over why
this situation seems to have become so polarized. It is hard
for me to understand it. I see the argument made on
verification. It seems to me, though, that we are a step ahead
whenever we make illegal the manufacture of some of these
gasses.
I think the important points you made in your speech were
that the Iraqi gasses were legally made, and the degree to
which nations will conform to an international concordat which
simply states these are illegal and that the verification is
based on the constitutional methodology of each country, that
still we accomplish something. Have you been able to pinpoint
more definitively any of the rationale for the opposition to
this?
Secretary Albright. Senator Feinstein, you ask, I think, a
very important question. Because from the perspective of those
of us who believe that this Chemical Weapons Convention is a
tool for those countries, especially the United States, that
have already given up the use of chemical weapons, to get
insight and control over what is going on in other countries in
chemical weapons programs, it seems mighty strange that we
would want to deprive ourselves of what is clearly a very good
method for checking up on what others are doing.
I must say that as I have read testimony by the others or,
frankly, have listened to my friend, the Chairman, who I think
is a true patriotic American, there is something that makes one
wonder what is the problem with this. I think that the issue
comes down to the fact that we would all very much like to have
perfect arms control treaties. That is, those that are
completely and totally verifiable, that limit everybody else
and leave us some options. This is not possible.
This treaty does have certain issues raised about
verification. But our estimation is that the treaty can verify
and does verify problems where there can be a massive problem
or a large military problem for the United States. Therefore,
we can go through other parts, but I think that the reason that
good Americans are concerned about this is that they want
perfection, and what we have is a treaty that is excellent and
very good and a useful tool for the United States.
I would, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, like to enter
into the record two letters that I have for you--one from the
Secretary of Defense and one from the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs--that really, I believe, address in a very cogent and
coherent way some of the questions that have been raised. If I
might just take one more minute and deal with the verification
issue--and this is in Secretary Cohen's letter. He says:
Critics have argued that the CWC's verification regime is
not good enough. While no verification regime is perfect, the
CWC's comprehensive and extensive regime will improve our
ability to monitor possible chemical weapons proliferation,
which we must do with or without the CWC. As you know, the
military use of any weapon typically requires significant
testing, equipping, and training of forces. These activities
would be more difficult to hide in the face of the CWC's
comprehensive inspection regime that includes a broad-based
data declaration and both routine and challenge inspection
rights. Together with our unilateral intelligence efforts, this
regime should enable us to more readily detect significant
violations before they become a real problem for U.S. national
security.
So the point is the same--that it is impossible to have
perfection. But with this convention, it is a huge step forward
for America.
[The material referred to by Secretary Albright follows:]
The Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC 20501.
The Honorable Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC 20510.
Dear Mr. Chairman,
Thank you for the opportunity to provide the views of the
Department of Defense on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). I
sincerely regret that my duties as Secretary of Defense have taken me
out of the country and thereby, have precluded me from testifying
before your Committee on this most important national security treaty.
As you very well know, as we approach the next millennium, we face
the prospect of regional aggressors and others seeking to use chemical
weapons to achieve what they cannot achieve through conventional
military means. Dealing with this threat requires a coherent, multi-
faceted national response involving: active and passive defenses
against chemical weapons; strong unilateral and multilateral export
controls to limit the spread of chemical weapons technology; improved
intelligence collection and threat analysis; well-coordinated civil
defense capabilities and an international standard barring the
production and possession of chemical weapons. The CWC is a necessary
component of this response. It strengthens our hand in achieving
effective limits on the spread of technology that could be used against
us, supports our intelligence and civil defense efforts, and holds
others to the standard that Presidents Reagan and Bush and previous
Congresses set for the United States.
As I have stated before, the United States does not need chemical
weapons to protect our security interests. Our robust military response
capabilities and increasingly robust defensive capabilities provide an
effective deterrent and allow us to inflict an effective, devastating
and overwhelming response should we be attacked. We have a strong
national security interest in seeing other nations eliminate their
chemical weapons stockpiles and capabilities, since that elimination
will reduce the risk that our troops will face chemical weapons on the
battlefield.
Critics of the CWC have made several assertions regarding the
implications of the CWC for our national security that I urge you to
reject.
Chemical Defense: Critics suggest that if the United States
ratifies the CWC, it will reduce our support for defensive measures.
Nothing could be further from the truth. DOD not only maintains a
robust program to equip and train our troops against chemical and
biological attack, but I have asked Congress to increase our budget for
chemical and biological defenses by almost $225 million over the next
six years. Moreover, I place a high priority on our theater missile
defense programs and intelligence efforts against the chemical threat
U.S. Response Capability: Critics charge that the CWC, by
constraining riot control agents, will reduce our options for
responding to an attack against our troops, including our ability to
rescue downed pilots. In fact, the Chemical Weapons Convention does not
limit our options in the situations in which our troops are most likely
to be engaged and pilots might be downed: peacetime military operations
within an area of ongoing armed conflict in which the U.S. is not a
party to the conflict (such as Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda); consensual
peacetime operations when the receiving state has authorized the use of
force (including UN Chapter VI operations); and peacekeeping operations
under the Chapter VII authority of the UN Security Council.
In all such cases, the CWC's restrictions on the use of RCAs
against combatants apply only when U.S. forces are engaged in a use of
force of a scope, duration and intensity which would trigger the laws
of war. These are situations in which other options normally would be
used and for which I am accelerating the development and fielding of
non-chemical, non-lethal alternatives that are consistent with the CWC.
The CWC also does not limit our options in normal peacekeeping
operations and other likely scenarios, such as law enforcement
operations, humanitarian and disaster relief operations,
counterterrorist and hostage rescue operations and noncombatant rescue
operations outside of internal or international armed conflict.
Chemical Weapons Proliferation: Some have argued that by ratifying
the CWC, we would be contributing to chemical weapons proliferation.
This is because they believe that the CWC would require us to provide
to other member states our most advanced defensive equipment and
manufacturing technologies, which some of these states would then use
to build up clandestinely their chemical weapons capabilities. In fact.
nothing in the CWC requires that we share our advanced chemical weapons
defensive capabilities or chemical manufacturing technologies. Indeed,
quite the opposite is true. The CWC prohibits any member from providing
any assistance to anyone if that member believes that doing so would
contribute to chemical weapons proliferation. Further, it establishes
strict trade restrictions on precursor chemicals and requires that
member states ensure that their internal regulations, which would
include export controls, also are consistent with the object and
purpose of the CWC. We will continue to work in the Australia Group to
maintain effective internationally-agreed controls on chemical weapons-
usable elements and technology.
Rogue States: While some critics argue that it is meaningless since
only law-abiding nations will respect it, the reality is that the CWC
will reduce the chemical weapons problem to a few notorious rogue
states and impose trade restrictions that will curb their ability to
obtain the materials to make chemical agents. This is clearly better
than the status quo.
Verification: Critics have argued that the CWC's verification
regime is not good enough. While no verification regime is perfect, the
CWC's comprehensive and extensive regime will improve our ability to
monitor possible chemical weapons proliferation--which we must do with
or without the CWC. As you know, the military use of any weapon
typically requires significant testing, equipping and training of
forces. These activities would be more difficult to hide in the face of
the CWC's comprehensive inspection regime that includes a broad-based
data declaration and both routine and challenge inspection rights.
Together with our unilateral intelligence efforts, this regime should
enable us to more readily detect significant violations before they
become a real problem for U.S. national security.
U.S. Industry: Some critics have claimed that the CWC will impose
costly burdens on U.S. industry that could potentially erode our
technological edge and, by eroding our edge, affect our national
security. The reality is that the American chemical companies most
affected by the CWC view its requirements as reasonable and manageable.
Small chemical businesses who were initially troubled by critics'
claims now also agree that abiding by the CWC will be manageable. The
reality also is that, if the United States fails to ratify the CWC, it
will be U.S. industry that is penalized with trade restrictions that
industry estimates could cost hundreds of millions of dollars.
Mr. Chairman, in the 1980s, I led the Congressional fight to build
binary chemical weapons to deter Soviet chemical use in Europe. With
the end of the Cold War, the world has changed. Regional aggressors can
be deterred by our vow to respond with overwhelming and devastating
force to a chemical attack. Our military commanders agree that
threatening a chemical weapons response is not necessary and they
support the CWC.
The safety of our troops and the security of our nation will be
strengthened by the CWC. But, the clock is ticking. So that we can reap
the full security benefits of the CWC, it is imperative that the
Congress act on this national security treaty before the treaty goes
into force on April 29. If we ratify in time, the U.S. will have a seat
at the table during the first critical days of implementation of the
CWC and be assured that American citizens will be able to ensure the
fullest and most rigorous compliance with this treaty. I urge your
Committee to report the Chemical Weapons Convention out favorably to
the Senate and the Senate to act now to ratify the Convention before it
enters into force on April 29.
Sincerely,
William S. Cohen
cc:
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Ranking Member
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC 20510-3301,
8 April 1997.
The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate,
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301
Dear Mr. Chairman,
Thank you for the opportunity to provide you, and through you to
the United States Senate, my military appraisal of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
Let me state that the accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention
by as many nations as possible is in the best interest of the Armed
Forces of the United States. The combination of the nonproliferation
and disarmament aspects of the Convention greatly reduces the
likelihood that US Forces may encounter chemical weapons in a regional
conflict. The protection of the young men and women in our forces,
should they have to go in harm's way in the future, is strengthened not
diminished, by the CWC.
The United States has unilaterally commenced the destruction of its
chemical weapons stockpile--under the CWC, all other chemical weapons
capable State Parties incur this same obligation. While no verification
regime is perfect, the Convention's regime allows for intrusive
inspections while protecting national security concerns. The CWC
enjoins the world community to forego these heinous weapons, implements
a regime of enforcement, and impairs the ability of those outside the
Convention to obtain the materials to make chemical agents.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders are
steadfast in support for a strong chemical defense posture. We will
maintain a robust chemical defensive capability supported by aggressive
intelligence collection efforts, but will not rely solely an these
measures. As Secretary Perry testified in March 1996, if any country
was foolish enough to use chemical against the United States, the
response will be overwhelming and devastating. We do not need chemical
weapons to provide an effective deterrent or to deliver an effective
response.
It is important to emphasize that the CWC permits the use of riot
control agents under most scenarios that the United States will likely
face during future operations. If US Forces are deployed during
peacetime to intercede in an internal or international armed conflict,
such as under a UN mandate, the CWC will not affect our use of RCAs
unless US or UN Forces become engaged in a use of force of a scope,
duration, and intensity that would trigger the laws of war with respect
to these forces. Until that time, the United States is not restricted
by the CWC in its RCA use options, including against combatants who are
parties to the conflict.
If we are a party to an international armed conflict, the CWC
prohibits the use of RCAs only in specific situations where combatants
are present. In these particular situations, options other than RCA
exist. As one example, non-lethal alternatives that are consistent with
the CWC could be employed. The CWC permits RCA use in riot control
situations under direct and distinct US military control, such as
controlling rioting prisoners of war, and in rear echelon areas outside
the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civilian
disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations. The ability
of our forces to defend themselves will not be reduced by the Chemical
Weapons Convention. Nothing will override our commanders' inherent
authority and obligation to use all legal means available and to take
all appropriate action, including the use of lethal force, in self
defense of their units and personnel.
In my military judgment, we are better served as an original member
of the Convention. I strongly support this Convention and respectfully
request the Senate's advice and consent.
Sincerely,
John M. Shalikashvili,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Copy to:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Ranking Member
The Honorable Strom Thurmond,
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
The Honorable Carl Levin,
Ranking Member, Senate Armed Services Committee
Senator Feinstein. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Madam Secretary, two of the strong points of
the convention are that our own intelligence will be enhanced--
namely, we know a lot about chemical weapons, or believe we do
now; but, given the network of inspections and a network of
finding out about the shipment of chemicals and their
precursors, we will have a better lead as to who is active and
where the materials are going.
The question that arises, and I suppose arose this morning,
is: Is there value to us in terms of having international law
behind us; that is, a norm in which clearly the production of
chemical weapons is illegal in the world? I just ask you from
your standpoint of your previous work in the United Nations,
dealing with other nations. If the charge is made that we might
let our guard down, would not be active, is it not your
experience that in fact, if we have international law going for
us, plus an international set of inspections and intelligence
collection, we are more likely not only to act, but to act
effectively, and maybe even, in some cases, unilaterally?
Specifically, if Libya had a situation that we felt was
undesirable, we could now, I presume, send aircraft there and
demolish the facilities before they knew what we were doing?
Are we more likely, however, as a Nation, to do that if we have
international law going for us, plus the intelligence apparatus
of all other nations going for us likewise?
Secretary Albright. Senator Lugar, I believe that we gain
greatly by having, first of all, the added intelligence
capability that comes from having an international regime and,
second, the force of being part of an international regime.
Though it is not exactly the same situation, I would say that
we have multiplied our own effectiveness through something like
the IAEA--the way to inspect and have safeguards on nuclear
weapons, by having a regime that puts the force of the entire
international community behind an inspection or behind a
determination to take action and provide international
sanctions.
So this is a force multiplier for us, the country that no
longer plans to use chemical weapons ourselves and knows that
others still have them.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, it seems to me--and I will
not take the time, in part, because I do not have the time--
that everything that the critics say is wrong with this treaty
is worse without the treaty, beginning with verification and I
think, literally, every major criticism.
Let me ask you a question. This is a strange-sounding
question, I guess. But let us assume we either bring this
treaty up--hopefully, we will have an opportunity to do that by
April 29th and vote on it--we bring it up and it is defeated or
we do not bring it up. What do you say? I mean what happens?
Describe to us what happens when you attend the next meeting of
your counterparts, where the Secretaries of State, your
counterparts in France and Germany and Great Britain, et
cetera--I mean our allies, our friends, the Australia Group--
not all of whom are European, obviously--what happens at that
meeting?
I am not being facetious when I ask the question; I am
being serious.
Secretary Albright. I would hope very much that I would
never have to be in that position; because I truly do think
that it would be not just a major embarrassment for the leading
country in the world to be in a position of having decided not
to become a part of what is now a hugely ratified convention,
but I think it would also hurt us, Senator, in other ways.
Because we see ourselves as the leaders of creating
international norms and regimes.
I think I have said to some of you that I believe that
there are four groups of countries in the world, and the
largest one are those countries of which we are the leader,
that are basically those countries that abide by international
norms, that provide--because they establish a better way of
life for our citizens--rules of the road. It would lessen our
credibility not only in this obviously important regime but
across the board if we decide, for some reason, not to become a
part of what is clearly a step forward in limiting weapons of
mass destruction.
I think it would hurt our credibility across the board, and
not just on this issue, Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary.
The Chairman. Senator Coverdell.
Senator Coverdell. Madam Secretary, I know that there have
been extensive discussions about conditions between the
administration, the Chairman, and others. Could you
characterize your assessment of the progress, your general
feeling at this hour, as we are embedded in the debate? Is
there an optimism on your part with regard to this process?
Have we gone as far as we can and we are down to our
differences? Do you characterize it as still being a viable
process that might move to an agreement?
Secretary Albright. Senator Coverdell, first of all, I
think that there has been a great deal of goodwill as the
process has gone forward and through a variety of meetings.
There has been, I think, considerable movement on dealing with
a variety of questions that obviously are legitimate, given our
process of government and the importance of having you all, as
the representatives of the people, understand more about how
this treaty is being carried out.
I do think that I am optimistic, because that is my nature.
I do think that while there are still a number of points on
which we disagree, that we are moving forward in a good way.
What I do think is absolutely important is for the time to come
for the Senate to vote. There have been, as I have stated--13
hearings that have been held before this one was, 1,500 pages
of testimony, lots of back-and-forth, in terms of trying to
exchange information. I think that if we cannot agree on some
of the differences within informal groupings, that there must
be some way that we can vote--you all can vote--on the
differences that still exist.
I cannot stress enough the importance of having the vote
before the time expires to be an original party. I think we are
definitely cutting off our nose to spite our face if we do not
ratify before that deadline. Our request to all of you is to
vote.
Senator Coverdell. If I have just a second, just as a
matter for clarification and not necessarily related to the
overall aspect of our position in the world, but has Israel
signed this treaty, do you know?
Secretary Albright. Israel has signed, but not ratified.
Senator Coverdell. But not ratified?
Secretary Albright. Right.
The Chairman. The Senator from Minnesota.
Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you.
I guess, in the limited amount of time that we have, almost
more than asking the question, I just would like to amplify or
build on a point you made about the importance of our hoping to
have an agreement and moving this forward and having a vote. I
am on the Veterans' Affairs Committee, and General Schwarzkopf,
when he testified before our committee dealing with the illness
of the Gulf veterans, was really poignant in also expressing
his support for this agreement. Just to quote from not just
General Schwarzkopf, but any number of other military leaders:
``On its own, the CWC cannot guarantee complete security
against chemical weapons.'' I think that was your point. You
did not come here to argue it is perfect. We must continue to
support robust defense capabilities and remain willing to
respond through the CWC or by unilateral action to violators of
the convention. Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations
but, instead, on its many strengths. The CWC destroys
stockpiles that could threaten our troops, it significantly
improves our intelligence capabilities, and it creates new
international sanctions to punish those states who remain
outside the treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the
CWC.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will be able to have an
agreement and bring this to the floor. I do believe we owe it
to people in the country to have an up or down vote, and I hope
it will be a favorable vote.
Secretary Albright. I must say that I was very impressed
with the testimony that General Schwarzkopf gave earlier, in
which he basically said that, by our not ratifying, we put
ourself on the side of Iraq and Libya and on a different side
from our allies.
I think, when Senator Biden said, how would I feel in
meetings, I would find it mighty strange to be on the same side
of the table as Iraq and Libya.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Madam Secretary, always nice to see you.
Secretary Albright. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Since I last saw you, I know you have become
much more enlightened in many areas. You have played baseball.
You have gone to North Carolina.
Secretary Albright. That is true.
Senator Hagel. I know we can expect even greater things
from you now.
Senator Hagel. Madam Secretary, picking up on the Iraq,
Libya, North Korea, Syria issues, those are the real threats.
Those countries are the real threats. I do not believe the
threats of chemical warfare to our troops or civilized nations'
troops are within the signatory countries of the CWC. So my
question is: How do we get to the real threat, those countries
that we fear most, who we either suspect or know now possess
chemical weapons and are not afraid to use them?
Secretary Albright. Senator, I think that it is exactly
because of our concern over the rogue states that we have to
try to use the tools that the international regime puts before
us. I think that what happens here is, first of all, that it
becomes even more clear that the rogue states are isolated
politically and that they are subject to trade sanctions that
put pressure on their economies and limit their ability to
obtain the ingredients for chemical weapons.
If, for instance, there is also a concern, I think, by some
that they will sign in a cynical way, well, if they sign up and
then try to cheat, the rogue states will be subject to the
CWC's unprecedented verification measures, and they will
probably get caught. When they are caught, they will be subject
to international pressure and other CWC sanctions. I think that
by not putting ourselves in a position of being one of the
original ratifiers of CWC, we weaken the convention itself, and
then weaken our own ability and deprive ourselves of this force
multiplier to try to get at the rogue states.
This is the single best tool we have to try to get a handle
on the Iraqs and Libyas, because this will provide an eye into
their system.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you for coming. There is an old
saying in politics that to get a vote, you have got to ask for
a vote. I appreciate your being here, because no one from the
administration has ever asked for my vote on this. I have had
many people from the other side asking me for my vote on this.
Senator Biden. Ask him, will you, now, quick. Ask him.
Secretary Albright. Give me a minute. I was going to do it
with drama.
Senator Smith. And all I have heard is from the other side.
So my question, which has already been asked somewhat before,
is: Is this the best we can do? And Senator Helms' comments
earlier, which were that there are three points he wants to
work out. Is it too late to work anything else out in this
treaty?
Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, let me say
officially, openly, publicly, I am asking you for your vote.
Senator Smith. Thank you.
Secretary Albright. And let me also say that there are some
areas, I think, that the Chairman has concern about that I
think we can still work on. I think there are some where we may
not be able to work something out. You all will have to vote on
that.
Senator Smith. And would that be done in the OPCW
decisionmaking process, which means the April 29 deadline and
U.S. participation in the process are important? Is that where
we address questions like nonlethal chemicals that our police
may need for riot control and things of that nature?
Secretary Albright. Well, let us talk specifically about
the riot control issue. I think that difference, if I may be so
bold, is based on a misunderstanding about what the treaty
provides in terms of riot control. If I might just take a
minute while asking you for your vote to explain fully what
happens to the riot control agents.
The CWC does not limit our ability to use RCA's, riot
control agents, in the situations in which U.S. troops are most
likely to be involved. I think there is a concern that we are
robbing ourselves of a tool. What I am going to tell you is how
we are not doing that.
The CWC does not limit our options in such likely scenarios
as law enforcement operations, humanitarian and disaster relief
operations, counter-terrorist and hostage rescue operations,
and noncombatant rescue operations outside of armed conflict.
The CWC also does not limit RCA use under normal peacekeeping
operations. That includes peacetime operations within an area
of ongoing conflict, to which the U.S. is not a party, such as
Somalia, Bosnia or Rwanda, or in consensual peacetime
operations, when the receiving State has authorized the use of
force--that is including Chapter 6 operations under the U.N.
peacekeeping operations under Chapter 7.
So the CWC restrictions on riot control agents apply only
when combatants are present and U.S. forces are engaged in the
use of force of a scope, duration, and intensity that would
trigger the laws of war.
Now, the reason I read this to you in such detail is that I
think this is an example of where we may have a
misunderstanding of fact and as one of the areas where there
are still discussions, which we believe could be dealt with. In
the letter that I introduced into the record, written by
General Shalikashvili, I think more of this is addressed.
So I am hoping, in the intervening days we have here, that
we can address in a factual way some of the problems that still
exist.
Senator Smith. Thank you. I hope that we can do that. My
time is up. We are discharging our constitutional
responsibility to vote on this treaty. One of my concerns you
answered earlier in your testimony, which was that we are not
in fact voting for something that is unconstitutional or
violates the constitutional rights of Americans.
Finally, I hope at some point here you can address an
implication that Secretary Schlesinger made that some in the
FBI are being muzzled right now, not to speak unfavorably about
this treaty. I wonder, at some point, if you could comment on
that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Grams.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, a pleasure to see you.
Just to kind of clarify the last question that Senator
Smith asked, dealing with riot control chemicals. On February
2nd, an article in a column by John Deutch, who served as
Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Secretary of
Defense for President Clinton, wrote the following. He said:
We should reject interpretations of the CWC that prohibit
the use of tear gas or other nonlethal chemicals so that we do
not put ourselves in the bizarre position of having no choice
but to rely on guns and bullets when we face situations like
driving off noncombatants who might be threatening a downed
pilot.
Now, do you agree with that statement? And do you believe
that is what the CWC is stating clearly?
Secretary Albright. I think that the CWC does not prohibit
it. As I said, the restrictions apply only when combatants are
present and U.S. forces are engaged in the use of force of the
scope, duration and intensity that would trigger the laws of
war. I think we would have to see what the situation is. But,
basically, it is possible for us to use various new kinds of
chemical agents in order to rescue hostages and to deal with
isolated issues. We always have a third choice in a war, which
is to use nonlethal weapons. We are not left only with the
possibility of using chemical weapons or riot control agents.
Senator Grams. So, generally then, you would agree with the
statement that Mr. Deutch made?
Secretary Albright. Well, I would have to see it within its
overall context, but I generally agree with the statements that
he made.
Senator Grams. And just one other quick question dealing
with Russia. The recent record on arms control agreements has
been less than impressive for Russia. It has not implemented
the Bilateral Destruction Agreement on chemical weapons which
it signed with the United States several years ago. There have
been reports that Russia has developed a chemical weapons
program specifically designed to evade the CWC.
In addition, Russia has not even ratified the START II
Treaty on nuclear weapons, which I and many other Senators
strongly support. So does the administration believe that
Russia should agree to fully implement the Bilateral
Destruction Agreement before the U.S. would join the CWC?
Secretary Albright. Senator, let me just take a little
minute here to explain something. We just finished our meetings
in Helsinki with the Russians. We went there with the idea of
issuing a number of joint communiques. One which had not been
part of our original intention, because we were dealing with
Russia--NATO and with START and other issues--but the Russians
came to us and we then issued a joint U.S.-Russian statement on
chemical weapons. It was basically done because of President
Yeltsin's and Foreign Minister Primakov's interest in making
clear that they wanted to go forward in order to expedite
ratification.
So the second paragraph says: The Presidents reaffirm their
intention to take the steps necessary to expedite ratification
in each of the two countries.
President Clinton expressed his determination that the U.S.
be a party. Then President Yeltsin noted that the convention
had been submitted to the Duma with his strong recommendation
for prompt ratification--I am not reading it all. The
Presidents noted that cooperation between the two countries in
the prohibition of chemical weapons has enabled both countries
to enhance openness regarding their military chemical potential
and to gain experience with procedures and measures for
verifying compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, et
cetera.
So I would say that there is a major push on behalf of
President Yeltsin, who is going to use this document to make
sure that they go forward with ratification of the CWC also.
Senator Grams. How much cost will there be to the U.S. For
the Russian program to destroy its chemical weapons?
Secretary Albright. I will have to get that for you for the
record.
[The information referred to was unavailable at the time of
printing.]
Senator Grams. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I think I first ought to give you the opportunity--because
the question was simply left hanging out there by one of my
colleagues--that people within the administration were being
muzzled with respect to commenting on this treaty. I think the
specific reference was to the FBI. Could you address that?
Secretary Albright. Senator, I am completely unaware that
something like that would be taking place. I have heard nothing
like that. I have no reason to believe that that is true--
absolutely none.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, now, the Joint Chiefs are in favor
of this treaty, are they not?
Secretary Albright. They are, sir.
Senator Sarbanes. And I think they have been very clear in
indicating, not just the chairman, but all the other members of
the Joint Chiefs, as well, is that correct?
Secretary Albright. That is correct. Then, earlier, there
was a letter submitted, or a statement, by 17 other former
generals and former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs and other
generals very much in favor of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Senator Sarbanes. I do not quite understand--and I
addressed some questions this morning directed toward it--this
notion that unless the rogue states sign up, the rest of the
world should not approve and ratify this treaty and the United
States ought not to be part of it. Do you understand that
argument?
Secretary Albright. I do not, sir, because my own feeling
is that it is as if we had been provided with a brand-new
mechanism for looking inside potential violator societies to
find out what they are doing. We are eschewing that tool mainly
because the rogues, or those who are not part of the system, do
not want to sign it.
As I said in my statement, it is like saying that you are
not going to have laws against drug smuggling just because all
the drug smugglers have not signed up to it. What you do is you
try to develop the best possible regime, and not allow the
lowest common denominator to determine what the will of the
international community and the majority of nation-states would
like to have happen.
Senator Sarbanes. Would not the convention in fact make it
possible to put into place a more rigorous regime against the
rogue states than is possible under the current situation?
Secretary Albright. Absolutely. What it does is provide a
system for intrusive inspections into their societies, and then
a system for also having more stringent sanctions against them,
with the force of having international law and the
international community behind them. So, by deciding not to
take action until they do, I think we are cutting off our nose
to spite our face.
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, we are within 2 or 3 minutes
of fulfilling what I hope was a commitment. Before you leave,
let me suggest that you mention to the administration that it
would clear up the whole thing if a statement were issued in
the name of the President or the administration, saying that
nobody in the FBI nor anybody else employed by the Federal
Government must not speak disapprovingly of the treaty. Now,
that will clear it up.
Now, there is one other thing. The Chemical Manufacturers'
Association was claiming that $600 million in sales would be
lost if this treaty is not ratified. We discussed that when you
were here. They have since cut that number down by more than
half, and even their new figures are highly suspect. It was
said here this morning that the Chemical Manufacturers'
Association does not represent the small manufacturers--only a
few big ones.
During your confirmation hearing, you may recall that I
asked that you supply the committee with a detailed list of
chemicals that would be affected if the United States were not
to ratify the CWC. You told me then, in good faith I am sure,
that such a list would be forthcoming. It has not come. I
certainly understand why. Would you tell your people to get
that list to us?
Secretary Albright. Yes, absolutely.
The Chairman. I know you have another meeting. I thank you
for coming to see us. Do you have further comments to make? I
see notes being passed around. I figured there is one more
thing they want you to say.
Secretary Albright. Yes. Apparently the list has been sent
to you this morning in response to that question.
The Chairman. This morning. Very well.
Secretary Albright. So the check is in the mail.
The Chairman. If there be no further business to come
before the committee----
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any further
business for the Secretary. I want to just publicly thank you.
I was a bit of a pain in the neck in attempting to see you and
ask you to accommodate.
I guess I was a pain in the neck to Secretary Albright, as
well, to come up here this afternoon. I thought it was
important.
With regard to tomorrow's hearing, Mr. Chairman. I realize
that the committee has a rule that I am just learning. Back in
the good old days, when my team was in charge and I was
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, we used to have a one-to-
one rule. That is, the minority and majority could have the
same number of witnesses. I have learned subsequently that is
not the rule here.
The Chairman. It never has been.
Senator Biden. I understand that. But yesterday we were
going to have--I wanted to have Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch had to go out of town. I said to my staff--there was
a bit of a misunderstanding--that Scowcroft could come
tomorrow, along with General Rowny and Admiral Zumwalt. I am
now told by my staff that they may not be able to appear
tomorrow because of a rule.
I would like you to consider accommodating a rookie ranking
minority member here and allow them, since I have asked them to
change their schedules, so that I do not find myself--this is
probably the only thing I have ever agreed with General Rowny
on and Admiral Zumwalt.
And I do not want to completely ruin my credibility with
them. So I would like to publicly ask you to consider allowing
an exception to the rule. I will give up two future draft
choices at a later date if you would consider allowing me to
have them tomorrow, notwithstanding the committee tradition of
a 2- or 3-to-1 majority. So I am going to publicly ask you if
you would consider that. I am not asking for an answer now. If
the answer is no, do not give it to me now.
If it is yes, I would take it now.
The Chairman. Well, as Mr. English back in my home town of
Monroe used to say, I will study about it.
Senator Biden. All right. Good.
The Chairman. There being no further business to come
before the committee, we stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the committee adjourned to
reconvene at 2:11 p.m., April 9, 1997.]