On the basis
of (a) common sense, (b) findings in cognitive ethology (the study
of animal thinking, consciousness and mind) and (c) the notion of
evolutionary continuity, a strong case can be made for admitting
great apes into the community of equals. Initially, I was
incredulous that such an appeal was even necessary. Next, I found
it difficult to conceive that this plea could ever be denied, not
only to great apes, but to most nonhuman animals. Considering,
however, how many nonhumans are used by humans for anthropocentric
ends, I came to see that it was my own stance that was unusual and
in need of justification.

Thinking
about great apes as members of the community of equals has also
made me think about some aspects of what it is like to be a
scientist. My early training was an instance of what Bernard
Rollin calls 'the common sense of science',[1]
in which science is viewed as a fact-gathering value-free
activity. There was little or no overt expression of concern for
the plight of nonhumans, and questions concerning morals and
ethics rarely arose. When such questions did surface, they were
invariably dismissed by invoking a vulgar form of utilitarianism,
in which suspected costs and benefits of animal use were assessed
from the human's point of view with little or no concern for the
nonhuman's perspective. Often, it was simply asserted that the
animals really didn't know or care what was going on. This apathy
and remoteness from the animals' points of view bothered me
deeply. I soon formed the opinion that ethical issues are integral
and legitimate parts of science; one cannot be neutral on such
matters. 'Moral privatists' who dispense with their moral and
ethical obligations to nonhumans are taking a position on matters
even though they are not aware of doing so.[2]

My own
laboratory and field experience in ethology showed me that all
behavioural research involves intervention, even 'simple
observation'. I asked myself just what humans do when they study
nonhumans and questioned what science was all about. I engaged in
these thoughts not because I wanted to terminate my career or
others' research, but because I thought it reasonable to think
about behavioural biology specifically, about science in general,
and also about how I spent a lot of my time. Among my scientific
colleagues, my contemplation of animal welfare and questioning of
science is not always well received. Recent accusations by some
prominent scientists concerning the presumed intentions and
characteristics of those who are interested in animal rights and
animal welfare have made it essential to stress that I am not (and
have never been) anti-science[3]
or an anti-intellectual or Luddite.[4]
Furthermore, I certainly do not want to end all research relating
to animals.[5]
For example, if some primates must be kept in protected areas
because they were bred in captivity and it would not be in their
interests to return them to the wild, or the habitat from which
they came has disappeared, research that could lead to
improvements in their welfare, and caused them no harm, would be
permissible. Some research on animals who had already been
injured, either physically or psychologically, might also be
acceptable if the animals were not to suffer any further harm. In
general, as far as apes are concerned, some studies would be
permissible on the same basis as they would be permissible on
humans incapable of giving consent: that is, where a guardian
appointed to represent the best interests of the apes would give
consent. While I value science, I do not worship the enterprise of
science, and one does not have to be anti-science or
anti-intellectual to question how science is done.[6]

Great Apes
and the Community of Equals

There seem to
be at least three interrelated reasons why great apes should be
included in the community of equals. The first concerns the use of
common sense to describe and to explain animal behaviour, the
second is motivated by recent work in comparative and evolutionary
cognitive ethology and the third centres on the notion of
evolutionary continuity, stemming mainly from the work of Charles
Darwin.

Common-sense
approaches to the study of animal behaviour are useful in
furthering our understanding of the behaviour of animals. The ways
in which humans describe and explain the behaviour of non-humans
can strongly colour views on animal welfare. Without the use of
common sense and familiar anthropomorphic terms, descriptions and
explanations of animal behaviour are tedious and inconvenient;
they frequently lack context and content, and do not tell us very
much (if anything) about what might have occurred in a given
situation. Even if explanations of animal behaviour based on
common sense or folk psychology are sometimes wrong (as are
'scientifically' based explanations), they can also be correct.

Data from
comparative evolutionary studies in cognitive ethology —
investigations into animal thinking, awareness and consciousness -
also support the suggestion that great apes should be admitted to
the community of equals. It has become clear that many nonhumans
have rich cognitive and intentional lives[7]
and also have the capacity to experience pain and to suffer;
studies in cognitive ethology inform questions concerning animal
cognition and animal welfare, especially when the level of
development of an individual's (or species') cognitive abilities
are used as a basis for moral and ethical decisions. The richness
of the cognitive and intentional lives of great apes is
particularly evident, as many of the essays in this book make
clear.

There is also
an evolutionary reason for claiming that great apes deserve
membership in the community of equals. Evolutionary continuity is
widely accepted by biologists, even when it is not very apparent.
Ethological studies of nonhuman primates in general, and great
apes in particular — species with which humans are most closely
evolutionarily continuous — can certainly inform and motivate
investigations into human behaviour.[8]
We readily acknowledge evolutionary continuity in physiology and
anatomy, and we should do so in behaviour. Some common sense is
important here: can we really believe that humans are the only
individuals with feelings, beliefs, desires, goals, expectations
and the ability to think about things?

Those who
deny that animals have beliefs or desires or propositional
attitudes of different orders must offer alternatives that will be
as useful for describing and explaining animal behaviour, and this
they have not done. How can one deny that a great ape has some
beliefs about what h or she is doing, even if the ape's beliefs
are not like ours? While I do not really know that an ape expects
(or has a belief) that food will be forthcoming when he or she
engages in a behaviour that most humans call 'begging', I feel
that this word adequately describes what he or she is doing.
Likewise, when Jethro chases another ape up what I call a ‘tree’
it does not really matter whether Jethro knows that it is an 'ape'
who ran up a 'tree'; Jethro does not need to have the concepts of
'ape' and ‘tree’ to engage in what we call 'ape-chasing'. I use
English, the language with which I am most familiar, to convey
information about Jethro to others who also understand English. I
also use anthropomorphic words and phrases that seem most likely
to capture the essence of what he is doing. I could describe, in
great and inconvenient detail, Jethro's behaviour from anatomical
and physiological perspectives, but this approach would convey
little or no useful information to another person about what
Jethro was doing.

Of course, it
is very difficult for one to know with certainty what is going on
in the minds of other individuals, human or nonhuman. Some
sceptics conflate the difficulty of learning about animals'
cognitive lives with the impossibility of doing so. Stephen Stich
claims that because we cannot say what it is that an animal
believes - because we cannot precisely ascribe content- it is
fruitless to suggest that we can explain an animal's behaviour in
terms of desires and beliefs.[9]
More plausibly, Donald Davidson, although he is sceptical about
animals having beliefs, notes that we have no general and
practical alternative for explaining animal behaviour other than
by attributing beliefs, desires and intentions.[10]
He also holds that although language is not necessary for thought,
it is difficult to imagine that there would be much thought
without language.[11]
None the less, Davidson does not believe that the possible absence
of thought or of propositional attitudes in nonhumans means that
nonhumans may be mistreated. Furthermore, demanding that nonhumans
have language (as we know it) before they can ha propositional
attitudes, and requiring that animals have propositional altitudes
before they can be granted rights or their interests receive equal
consideration to those of humans, is anthropocentrically
self-serving and asserts an extremely narrow view of what it is
like to be nonhuman animal.

Investigation
into the cognitive skills of nonhumans frequently h surprising
results, and it is essential that people who write about animal
issues be cognisant of these findings. It is difficult to imagine
how any coherent thoughts about moral and ethical aspects of the
treatment animals could be put forth without ethological,
evolutionary a philosophical input. Clearly, ethologists must read
philosophy and philosophers must not only read ethology but also
watch animals.

Conclusion: The Importance of Ethological Research

Humans need
to make serious attempts to look at things from a nonhuman point
of view and to try to discover answers to the fascinating question
of how animals interact in their own worlds and why they do so.
There is no substitute for careful ethological research. While
some animals seem to respond in the same way as humans to a wide
variety of stimuli that are known to us to be pleasurable or
painful, and arguments from analogy are often very convincing, we
also know that many other animals process sensory information
differently from humans and that they perform motor activities
that are unlike any that humans typically perform. In these cases,
arguments from analogy may fail, but this does not mean that they
always fail. Furthermore, we should not conclude that any animals,
human or nonhuman, cannot do something when they do not do what we
expect them to do. We must be sure that the animal can perceive
the necessary stimuli, is able to perform the motor activity that
we think he or she should perform, and is motivated to perform
this task. Furthermore, when an animal makes what we call an
'error', it may not be an error in the context in which it was
made - when the animal's sensory and motor worlds are taken into
account.

Adopting a
common-sense approach to how we view the cognitive skills of
nonhumans and their pains and suffering will make this a better
world in which humans and nonhumans can live compatibly.
Common-sense intuitions about pain, suffering and animal cognition
should be combined with reliable empirical data, of which there
are already plenty. Some claim that cognitive explanations have
yet to prove their worth when compared with reductionist
behaviouristic explanations of the behaviour of nonhumans.[12]
Such sceptics ignore a wealth of data that demonstrate rather
impressive cognitive skills in many nonhuman animals; they may
also mislead those who look to cognitive ethology to provide
information for structuring their ideas about animal welfare, and
conclude that there is little or nothing in cognitive ethology
that is convincing. What we believe about the cognitive capacities
of nonhumans affects our thinking about animal welfare; different
views lead us to look at animals in particular ways. Ascribing
intentionality and other cognitive abilities to animals is not
moot, because it has moral consequences. Common sense, findings in
cognitive ethology and the idea of evolutionary continuity
strongly support the present appeal for admitting great apes into
the community of equals. In the future, after great apes have been
granted membership, it might be wrong to ignore other species.
Data from comparative and evolutionary studies in cognitive
ethology and arguments based on evolutionary continuity also point
to a broader view. As Degler rightly states, we must revisit
Darwin and draw inspiration from 'his insistence upon the
continuity between human and animal experience'.[13]

Acknowledgements
- I thank Anne Bekoff, Lori Gruen, Susan Townsend, Carol Powley,
Dale Jamieson, Bernard Rollin, Deborah Crowell and Robert Eaton
for comments on this paper. The editors of this volume also made
extremely valuable comments.

[7]
For numerous and diverse examples among which are included
communication and deception, play, vigilance (antipredatory)
behaviour, monitoring social relationships, the discrimination
of kin and other individuals, tool use, food-caching and
injury-feigning, see D.R. Griffin, Animal Thinking
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1984); Rollin, The
Unheeded Cry;Bekoff and Jamieson, 'Reflective
ethology'; C.A. Ristau (ed.), Cognitive Ethology: The Minds
of Other Animals; D.L. Cheney and R.M. Seyfarth How
Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990).

[8]
W.G. Kinzey (ed.), The Evolution of Human Behavior: Primate
Models (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1987);
D. Bickerton, Language and Species (University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990); J. Rachels Created from
Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (Oxford
University Press, New York, 1990); C.N. Degler, In Search
of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in
American Society, Thought (Oxford University Press, New
York, 1991); P. Lieberman, Uniquely Human: The Evolution of
Speech, Thought, and Selfless Behavior (Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991); J.D. Loy and C.B. Peters (eds),
Understanding Behavior: What Primate Studies Tell Us About
Human Behavior (Oxford University Press, New York, 1991).