PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff/counterdefendant, Lofgrens Enterprises, Inc. (plaintiff), appeals of right the trial
court?s May 28, 2003, order granting summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in
favor of defendant/counterplaintiff, Dore & Associates Contracting, Inc. (defendant). This
appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Pursuant to its contract with the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality
(MDEQ), defendant was obligated to remove and recycle or dispose of a 30,000-ton sawdust pile
that had been in the City of Cheboygan (the City) for over one hundred years. Defendant entered
into a contract with plaintiff, whereby defendant would pay plaintiff to ?receive and own non-
contaminated sawdust? from defendant at one of two locations owned by plaintiff. The contract
between plaintiff and defendant did not obligate defendant to recycle or reprocess the sawdust at
plaintiff?s sites. Defendant?s sole obligation was to pay plaintiff for the depositing of sawdust at
one of plaintiff?s sites.
The City required the posting of a $2 million performance bond for the use of one of
plaintiff?s sites, and the MDEQ approved the other site as a recycling location only. Although
plaintiff presented evidence that the City decided to require the $2 million performance bond
before plaintiff and defendant actually signed their contract, plaintiff admitted that neither party
contemplated the $2 million performance bond when they entered into the contract. Because
neither of plaintiff?s sites would be acceptable locations for defendant to simply deposit the
sawdust, defendant made other arrangements for its removal and disposal. Plaintiff filed a
complaint against defendant, alleging that defendant breached the contract. This breach of
contract claim forms the basis for this appeal.

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Plaintiff filed a second complaint against the City, alleging intentional interference with a
contractual relationship and impairment of contract.1 Plaintiff?s president signed the complaint
against the City, in which plaintiff alleged as follows:
¶ 7. That [defendant] contracted with the Plaintiff to deposit a portion of said
?sawdust pile? on property owned by the Plaintiff or under contract with the
Plaintiff . . . .
¶ 8. That [defendant] applied to the Zoning Board of Appeals for the City of
Cheboygan for permission to deposit said material on the property owned or
under the control of the Plaintiff.
* * *
¶ 11. That the $2,000,000.00 bond, which was not subject of [sic] the contract
agreement with the Department of Natural Resources, made the cost of said
contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant prohibitive.
¶ 12. The Cheboygan City Council then offered that [defendant and another
contractor] could deposit said materials on the property directly adjacent to the
property under the control of the Plaintiff without posting any bond, but only a
letter of credit.
¶ 13. That [defendant], as a result of said offer, negated the contract with the
Plaintiff and undertook to deposit some forty (40) tons of materials on [sic] the
?Old City Dump.?
¶ 14. That the City Council for the City of Cheboygan by using its legislative
authority impaired the contract between the Plaintiff and [defendant] by
legislative action for its own benefit.
¶ 15. That Article I, Section 10 of the Michigan Constitution provides as
follows:
?Sec. 10. No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the
obligation of contract shall be enacted.?
¶ 16. That there is [sic] no immunity provisions for the actions of the City
Council and the City of Cheboygan for the intentional interference with
contractual relationships and impairment of a contract for the specific benefit of
the City of Cheboygan, and in this case, by literally taken [sic] the contract away
from the Plaintiff by imposing a bond requirement not imposed against one of the
contracting parties if it provides a service to the legislative body at its direction.

1 The issues raised in plaintiff?s complaint against the City are not at issue in this appeal.

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Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff?s allegations in
the complaint against the City constituted an admission that it was impossible for defendant to
perform the contract. Plaintiff?s president submitted an affidavit, in which she claimed that her
earlier statement about the prohibitive nature of the contract ?referred only to the
processing/recycling of the sawdust for sale to an end user. It did not release Dore from its
responsibility under the contract for the gravel pit site as a processing/recycling area or the
Lincoln Avenue property for the agricultural use of the sawdust.? Although plaintiff is correct in
its assertion that nothing prohibited defendant from using plaintiff?s sites for agricultural
spreading or reprocessing of the sawdust, defendant was under no contractual obligation to do so.
Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court erred in granting defendant?s motion for
summary disposition because it overlooked genuine issues of material fact about whether
defendant breached the contract. We review de novo a trial court?s ruling on a motion for
summary disposition. Spiek v Michigan Dept of Transp, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201
(1998). MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a plaintiff?s claim. Spiek, supra at 337.
The court considers the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary
evidence submitted or filed in the action to determine whether a genuine issue of any material
fact exists to warrant a trial. Id.
We agree with the trial court?s conclusion that plaintiff could not disown the
representations it made in the complaint it filed against the City. In light of plaintiff?s
representations in its complaint against the City, plaintiff may not rely on the affidavit of its
president to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dykes v William
Beaumont Hosp, 246 Mich App 471, 479; 633 NW2d 440 (2001). It is well established that
?parties may not contrive factual issues merely by asserting the contrary in an affidavit after
having given damaging testimony in a deposition.? Id., citing Mitan v Neiman Marcus, 240
Mich App 679, 682-683; 613 NW2d 415 (2000) and Kaufman & Payton, PC v Nikkila, 200 Mich
App 250, 256-257; 503 NW2d 728 (1993). As a result of plaintiff?s own assertions in its
complaint against the City, plaintiff?s ability to present a case was challenged. Dykes, supra at
481-482, applying Gamet v Jenks, 38 Mich App 719, 726; 197 NW2d 160 (1972).
Unlike the parties in Gamet and Dykes, plaintiff?s president was not subject to cross-
examination when she made the statements in the complaint against the City. MCR 2.114(D),
however, provides that the signature of a party constitutes a certification by the signer that:
(1) he or she has read the document;
(2) to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry, the document is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law; and
(3) the document is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.

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Because MCR 2.114(D) dictates that the president certified her assertions by signing the
complaint against the City, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting defendant?s
motion for summary disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Donald S. Owens