The intelligence challenge in Vietnam was more than finding
the enemy. The challenge was providing timely, accurate, adequate, and usable
intelligence in support of decision makers from the Military Assistance Command
commander and his battlefield commanders to the Commander in Chief in
Washington. An organization designed to meet that challenge was created. It
established for the first time in history a combined military intelligence
system. It took longer to establish that system than it should have because,
once again, we were not prepared.

A few of the many lessons I learned, some for the umpteenth
time, follow.

Unity of Command. One of the long-accepted principles of
war-unity of command-was violated in Vietnam because of the nature of the
insurgency. In this conflict, all U.S. intelligence organizations were not
centralized under the MACV commander.

Combined Intelligence. Contingency plans should include
draft agreements; standing operating procedures; organizational, functional, and
manning concepts; and logistical support plans to establish a combined
intelligence system, preferably including all military and civilian agencies.

Combat-Ready Intelligence Force Structure. The force
structure of the services must include the combat-ready intelligence structure
to support contingency plans. Such forces should be engaged in collection and
production activities during peacetime as well as wartime. They should be
capable of deployment on very short notice and should arrive in the area of
operations with all equipment and facilities required. Time is precious.

Order of Battle. Order of battle is the foundation of
combat intelligence. Order of battle training in the U.S. Army has been
deplorable for many years. Military intelligence officers should have been
trained on enemy units, weapons, and tactics, as well as on the Viet Cong
infrastructure.

Human Intelligence. Among the best sources of combat
intelligence are knowledgeable informants and captured docu-

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ments. The drastic cutback in resources and training devoted
to human intelligence since World War II has seriously reduced our capacity in
this field. Officers slated for key command and staff positions should be
educated on the advantages and limitations of this aspect of military
intelligence.

Tactical Training. Our forces must know the tactics of the
enemy on the battlefield where he will be fought. We did not have that knowledge
when we were committed. Our combat units were not properly trained to maintain
contact with the enemy once it was made. Consequently, we did not fix the enemy
so that he could be destroyed on the ground.

Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance provides eyes and ears for the
commander. The intelligence officer should have staff supervision over all
reconnaissance, including ground reconnaissance.

Communications. Intelligence requires the timely movement of
extremely large volumes of words and pictures. Dedicated communications in
support of intelligence are a necessity. Automated systems designed to display
elements of intelligence in a format are good if capable of reflecting the human
analysis essential to valid intelligence. The human needs a data base. The data
base requires communications.

Initiative. Intelligence officers should be imbued with the
necessity to provide intelligence and appropriate recommendations upon which
plans and actions are initiated rather than just to respond to requests for
intelligence.

"Scouts Out." When I enlisted in the Army I was trained as a
scout of a rifle squad. When the command "Scouts Out" was given I ran forward
with my rifle at port arms to an area from which I supposedly could observe the
enemy. When I saw the enemy I faced my leader and signaled information on the
enemy. I believe that whenever a contingency plan is approved that identifies a
potential enemy our senior military authority should issue the order "Scouts
Out," implying that a few military intelligence "scouts" be dispatched to or
near the future potential area of operations to observe, report, and plan for
our next war, hoping that such scouts will be listened to and actions will be
taken to avoid another case of too little too late and inadequate training. I
know from experience that such an effort will be opposed strongly. I also know
from experience that such can and must be done.

Brigadier General Philip B. Davidson, Jr., a West Point
classmate and my successor as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
U.S. Army, Pacific, also succeeded me in Saigon. I had

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recommended him to General Westmoreland as the finest officer
available. I said my goodbyes and wrote the following letter to each member of
the team; they were the ones who developed the organization and conducted the
role of intelligence in Vietnam:

Upon my departure from this command I take pride in expressing
my admiration for your unexcelled performance of duty. You have earned for military
intelligence a reputation of excellence second to none. You consistently have
provided timely and accurate intelligence upon which the direction and support
of this war have been based. You collectively constitute the finest military
intelligence team to ever support our armed forces in combat. Your past performance
is magnificent history. Your future holds greater challenges and opportunities.
Your capabilities are extensive. I have full confidence that you, your officers,
noncommissioned officers, enlisted personnel and civilians will continue to
keep intelligence out front where it belongs. It has been a great honor serving
with you as a member of the First Team. Please convey my appreciation to all
concerned.