United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (UN OIOS) 28 Jun 2006 report titled "Audit of Operations in Lybia [AR2005-131-07]" relating to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The report runs to 15 printed pages.

Simple text version follows

UNITED NATIONS
Office of Internal Oversight Services
UNHCR Audit Service
Assignment AR2005/131/07 28 June 2006
Audit Report R06/R012
AUDIT OF UNHCR OPERATIONS IN LIBYA
Auditor:
Rachel Roy
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UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
Office of Internal Oversight Services
UNHCR Audit Service
AUDIT OF UNHCR OPERATIONS IN LIBYA (AR2005/131/07)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In October 2005, OIOS conducted an audit of UNHCR Operations in Libya. The audit covered
activities with a total expenditure of US$ 1.5 million in 2004 and 2005. A draft report was shared
with the Director of the Bureau for CASWANAME and the Chief of Mission in April 2006, on
which comments were received by May 2006. The Bureau and the Chief of Mission have accepted
most of the recommendations made and are in the process of implementing them.
Overall Assessment
� OIOS assessed the UNHCR Operation in Libya as average, it was adequately run but although
the majority of key controls were being applied, the application of certain important controls
lacked consistency or effectiveness. In order not to compromise the overall system of internal
control, timely corrective action by management is required.
Programme Management
� For the two partners reviewed, reasonable assurance could be taken that UNHCR funds were
properly accounted for and disbursed in accordance with the Sub-Project Agreements.
Improvements were needed over the maintenance of accounting records for cash disbursements
and compliance with UNHCR procurement procedures.
� Further efforts were required to ensure programme management reaches an acceptable level of
conformity to UNHCR's rules and procedures. Financial monitoring was not performed on
time and was not documented. For instance, it took UNHCR five months after the termination
of a partnership to question the validity of expenditures charged to the project. The selection of
partners was not sufficiently transparent, and frequent changes of the partners had a negative
impact on the cost and performance of projects. Some of the complications that OCM referred
to in its reply to OIOS were due to an inadequate understanding of programme management.
� The low rate of implementation of projects was partly due to the lack of the capacity of
partners. The support provided in terms of logistics (no vehicle was provided) and
administrative equipment was insufficient to ensure the smooth implementation of the projects.
The involvement of UNHCR in capacity building was almost nonexistent despite the fact that
the partners had no previous experience in implementing UNHCR activities.
� Financial and human resources were not sufficient to cover the basic needs of UNHCR
beneficiaries. The Bureau indicated that a mission will be conducted to determine budget
requirements and the required level of capacity building of partners.
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� A Programme Assistant without adequate supervision carried out the closure of the Somali
Compound. Several weaknesses in procedures were noted, in particular there was not
sufficient evidence that payments totalling US$ 36,500 were made to genuine UNHCR
beneficiaries. The beneficiary list was prepared and modified without the approval of the
Assistance Advisory Committee, payments were made to persons to whom the status of refugee
had been denied, and some payments were recorded as paid by UNHCR, but this was not the
case. A detailed report on this activity by the responsible Chief of Mission has never been done.
� The refugee statistics were not accurate. The figures, previously maintained on Excel were
downloaded into RICSS in 2003 without being verified for accuracy. They may have been
inflated since the distinction between active and non-active refugee cases had not been made
and all the individual cases were not supported by an open file. Moreover, RICSS was not
operational in 2005 due to the absence of staff to run it. OIOS was informed that since the
installation of proGres, the data transferred to the system is being verified by a newly hired
UNV.
Supply Management
� OIOS assessed that the procurement procedures were weak. There was no designated focal
point, a register of commercial contracts has not been maintained and the procurement files did
not provide evidence that proper competition had been conducted.
� Most of the assets were fully depreciated and should be replaced to make the office more
effective and operational. In view of the implementation of MSRP, the procurement of new
computers and communications facilities were required.
� AssetTrak had not been updated since the end of 2004. The LAMB meetings were held
sporadically with the last minutes dated October 2003. Also, without any authority, the Field
Programme Assistant proceeded to transfer ownership of assets that were no longer required
due to the closure of the Somali Compound.
Security and Safety
� Due to several security incidents, the Government provided the services of armed security
guards for the UNHCR office. A mission by a UN Regional Security Officer in April 2005
recognized that UNHCR is more at risk than most of the other UN agencies working in Libya.
In spite of this, most of the recommendations made had not yet been implemented. OCM
indicated that they have sought advice from Headquarters on various security issues.
Administration
� In the areas of administration and finance, the Office of the Chief of Mission in Libya generally
complied with UNHCR's rules, policies and procedures, and controls were operating
effectively during the period under review. Some improvement and strengthening of internal
controls were required over financial management.
June 2006
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER Paragraphs
I. INTRODUCTION 1-4
II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES 5
III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 6-8
IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Review of Implementing Partners 9-18
B. Other Programme Issues 19-33
C. Supply Management 34-40
D. Security and Safety 41
E. Administration 42-49
V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 50
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. From 15 to 27 October 2005, OIOS conducted an audit of UNHCR's Operations in
Libya, which was the first OIOS' audit of UNHCR in Libya. The audit was conducted in
accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
OIOS reviewed the activities of the UNHCR Office of the Chief of Mission (OCM) in Libya and
its implementing partners Al-Wafa and Libyan Society for Safe Childhood (LSSC).
2. Approximately 12,000 refugees are registered with UNHCR in Tripoli, the majority are
Palestinians followed by Somalis, Sierra Leoneans, Iraqis and a few from other African and Arab
countries. The refugee population in Libya is mostly urban-based in Tripoli, spontaneously
settled with the local population and residing in rented accommodation. Arab and African
nationals with valid travel documents were permitted to obtain employment. UNHCR's
assistance was aimed at self-reliance including job placement, vocational training,
apprenticeships and micro-credit agricultural schemes.
3. Libya has not signed the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967
Protocol. Given that a legal framework and administrative structure to deal with refugees and
asylum seekers to determine refugee status have not yet been established, UNHCR is providing
the whole range of services in Protection. UNHCR conducted the Refugee Status Determination
(RSD) for all asylum seekers except for Palestinians and Liberians who are recognized on a
prima facie basis.
4. The findings and recommendations contained in this report have been discussed with the
officials responsible for the audited activities during the exit conference held on 27 October
2005. A Summary of Preliminary Findings and Recommendations was shared with the Chief of
Mission in October 2005. The findings and recommendations were also discussed with the
previous Chief of Mission and officials of the Bureau for CASWANAME in November 2005. In
addition, a draft of the report was shared with the Director of the Bureau for CASWANANE and
the present Chief of Mission in April 2006. The comments, which were received in May 2006,
are reflected in the final report. The Office of the Chief of Mission has accepted most of the audit
recommendations made and is in the process of implementing them.
II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES
5. The main objectives of the audit were to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of
controls to ensure:
� Reliability and integrity of financial and operational information
� Effectiveness and efficiency of operations
� Safeguarding of assets
� Compliance with regulations and rules, Letters of Instruction and Sub-Project Agreements
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III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
6. The audit focused on 2004 and 2005 programme activities under projects
AB/LBY/CM/200 and AB/LBY/RP/370 with a budget of US$ 1.3 million. Our review
concentrated on the activities implemented by Al-Wafa - expenditure of US$ 238,700 for 2005;
and, LSSC with budget/expenditure amounting to US$ 357,000. We also reviewed activities
directly implemented by UNHCR with expenditure of US$ 217,000.
7. The audit reviewed the administration of the Office of the Chief of Mission in Tripoli
with administrative budgets totalling US$ 218,000 for the years 2004 and 2005 and assets with
an acquisition value of US$ 98,000 and a current value of US$ 25,000. The number of staff
working for the UNHCR Operation in Libya was eight. This included staff on regular posts (one
international, and five nationals) and two United Nations Volunteers.
8. The audit activities included a review and assessment of internal control systems,
interviews with staff, analysis of applicable data and a review of the available documents and
other relevant records.
IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Review of Implementing Partners
9. For the two partners reviewed, Al-Wafa and LSSC, reasonable assurance could be taken
that UNHCR funds were properly accounted for and disbursed in accordance with the
Sub-Project Agreements. OIOS' observations are common for both partners, as although they
were two different legal entities, the same personnel were used to implement the UNHCR sub-
project, and LSSC's accounting records were kept in Al-Wafa premises.
10. Audit certificates with unqualified audit opinions were received for all partners including
those for which an audit certificate was not required, i.e. sub-projects implemented by local
NGOs or government organizations with expenditure of less than US$ 100,000.
(a) Al-Wafa/LSSC
11. Al-Wafa used a manual accounting system, which was mainly a cashbook where
expenditures were recorded by budget line to facilitate reporting to UNHCR. Although Al-Wafa
maintained a separate bank account for the UNHCR's project, all payments were made in cash.
The internal controls over cash were lax; it was not kept in a safe and there was no proper
accounting record of cash on hand. It was only in January 2005 that Al-Wafa started using
spreadsheets to record cash withdrawals. While OIOS appreciated the efforts made to improve
the accounting of expenditures, we cautioned against the use of spreadsheets as an accounting
system as they are not sufficiently secure, and data can easily be altered. OIOS recommended
that UNHCR Libya request Al-Wafa to maintain a cashbook journal. Action has been taken and
the partner is now using a new developed Cashbook Journal.
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12. The internal control procedures for payments were not satisfactory. For example, the
payment voucher (PV) did not always identify the beneficiary, there were no supporting
documents to check the validity of invoices for medical services, and the global invoices from
the pharmacy did not always agree to the corresponding individual invoices. Moreover, the
beneficiaries did not sign that they had received the medicines. OIOS recommended that
UNHCR request Al-Wafa to modify the PV to include both the name of the beneficiary and the
description of expenditures, as well as better document the controls over payments. OCM have
assisted the partner in developing a new PV form providing the name of the beneficiary and the
description of the expenditure.
13. Contrary to UNHCR requirements, beneficiary cards had not been used since 2002
despite the need to have a single source detailing assistance provided to each beneficiary. OIOS
recommended that Al-Wafa use beneficiary cards to record all types of assistance provided. The
partner has already started using beneficiary cards in addition to an electronic database to
record the assistance provided to refugees and other persons of concern.
14. Financial assistance was not paid on a monthly basis, which was in line with normal
procedures. There were five payments per year and the first took place only at the end of March
or early April (covering the period from January to March). This happened, as the partner did not
have sufficient funds to make the payments, and none was received prior to signing the Sub-
Project Agreement. This cash flow problem resulted due to a misunderstanding of UNHCR's
programme management procedures. OCM had requested the partners to reimburse unspent
balances in early January instead of using them to initiate current year activities. OIOS could not
establish why there was such a delay in signing the Sub-Project Agreement since Headquarters
issued the LOI in good time.
(b) Procurement
15. OIOS assessed that the procurement procedures were not satisfactory. Al-Wafa was given
a budget for procurement of goods and services exceeding US$ 20,000 per year. Al-Wafa was
not pre-qualified to conduct procurement on behalf of UNHCR nor was it requested to apply the
UNHCR IP Procurement Guidelines. The procurement of goods and services was mainly related
to the purchase of tool kits and medical services. According to the Al-Wafa Project Coordinator,
a price comparison was made on information received verbally, but it was not documented.
Moreover, Al-Wafa stated that competitive selection of medical services was not made as all the
clinics applied similar rates. OIOS recommended that Al-Wafa adhere to UNHCR procurement
procedures and select suppliers on a competitive basis. The selection process should be
adequately documented. OCM indicated that they gave ad hoc training to Al-Wafa to assist them
in complying with UNHCR IP Procurement Guidelines. The selection of medical clinics has
been made according to UNHCR procedures.
16. Al-Wafa could not provide documents supporting the procurement of goods to be
distributed by UNHCR to asylum seekers living in detention centres. Al-Wafa explained that the
transactions were made directly by UNHCR through its service provider and it was subsequently
recorded as Al-Wafa's transactions. OIOS recommended that this practice stop, as it is not
appropriate for a partner to record UNHCR direct expenditures. These expenditures should be
recorded by UNHCR's books of account, as it is directly responsible for them. OCM denied that
they were directly responsible for the procurement. OCM were unable to provide any
documentary evidence of the partner's sole involvement in these transactions. OIOS noted that in
some other cases, there was evidence that OCM intervened in activities delegated to partners,
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indicating an unclear understanding of its supervision and monitoring role.
(c) Salaries
17. Contrary to good practices and common employment laws, Al-Wafa staff working on the
UNHCR sub-project, did not have employment contracts. OCM stated that Al Wafa confirmed
that all staff hired under the project had valid contracts. OIOS would like to highlight that
evidence of this could not be provided during the audit. In addition, reference was made in the
management letter issued by the external auditor for the 2004 project that the partner had not
paid social contributions to the Government. When OIOS raised this issue during the audit, Al-
Wafa indicated that its employees were paid higher salaries but no allowances to cover any
participation in social benefits. OCM agreed with Al-Wafa that it is the responsibility of
employees to pay such contributions and not the employer. OIOS is not fully satisfied with this
response, particularly as it contradicts the findings of the external auditor. Further efforts are
required by OCM to ensure that project staff funded by UNHCR have proper employment
contracts and are complying with the local employment law. OCM should also caution Al-Wafa
that any penalties that may arise for the non-payment of employer's contributions to social
benefits would not be funded by UNHCR.
Recommendation
The UNHCR Office of the Chief of Mission in Libya should obtain
evidence that project staff funded under the UNHCR sub-project
have proper employment contracts with Al-Wafa. These contracts
should also clearly state that it is the responsibility of the individual
to ensure compliance with local employment law with regard to
taxes and social benefits (Rec. 01).
18. The Bureau stated that OCM has already started the demarches to clarify this issue. In
addition, the ToR of a mission from Headquarters will review this issue.
B. Other Programme Issues
(a) Inadequate planning and budgetary procedures
19. For the period covered by the audit, the rate of implementation of the projects was
generally low, especially for the repatriation project where expenditures corresponded to 10 per
cent and 40 per cent of the budgets for 2003 and 2004 respectively. For Care and Maintenance,
the expenditures for 2004 represented only 65 per cent of the initial budget, which was explained
by the former Chief of Mission by the closure of the Somali compound in September.
20. The budget for financial assistance of sub-project 05/AB/LBY/CM/200 was established
for 225 persons but only about 135 persons were assisted. The former Chief of Mission explained
that the budget was established on the basis of a needs assessment however the partner did not
have the capacity to fully implement it. OIOS is concerned that a budget and sub-project
objectives were established without due consideration of the capacity of the partner and its
implementation constraints. OIOS sees this practice corresponding to a built-in contingency
reserve in the budget. OIOS believes that if a more realistic budget is requested for the Care and
Maintenance projects, more funds would be available to cover durable solution activities for
refugees.
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21. The support and resources provided to Al-Wafa from UNHCR was not sufficient to
ensure the smooth implementation of the project. While Al-Wafa was responsible for providing a
wide range of services, it had to operate from a single-room office. Moreover, sufficient office
equipment was not provided nor was a project vehicle, which was necessary to make visits to
beneficiaries and hence perform its tasks effectively. The Chief of Mission highlighted the fact
that the UNHCR beneficiaries needed more assistance in regard to durable solutions. Based on
the Chief of Mission's discussions with various embassies, people of concern to UNHCR in
Libya expected more support from UNHCR, which UNHCR cannot provide due to the current
lack of resources. Contrary to this, the Bureau stated that the low level of implementation
correlated to the level of request of assistance by refugees and not so much on the managerial
capacity/will of UNHCR staff.
Recommendation
The UNHCR Office of the Chief of Mission in Libya with
assistance from the Bureau for CASWANAME should improve the
effectiveness of the operation in Libya, with emphasis on durable
solutions, either by further capacity building of partners, training of
staff or an increase in resources to ensure that an adequate level of
assistance is provided to UNHCR's beneficiaries (Rec. 02).
22. The Bureau is considering a mission by the Senior Desk officer to determine the changes
required in the budgets, building the capacity of the partners and/or increasing the level of
assistance, as well as tapping possible sources for additional resources for the project.
However, within UNHCR's present economic constraints, the resources available both for
programme implementation and creation of any additional posts are limited. In this context, the
auditor's recommendation would be difficult to implement. OIOS appreciates the present
financial constraints nonetheless considerable efforts are required to ensure the operation in
Libya becomes more effective in achieving, at least to an acceptable level, UNHCR's objectives.
(b) Relationship with implementing partners
23. The relationship with UNHCR's implementing partners was unclear, as OIOS noted that
their responsibilities changed on an annual basis. Until 2003, UNHCR's partnership with Al-
Wafa was under the Care and Maintenance project. In 2004, these responsibilities were
transferred to LSSC and in 2005 they were reverted back to Al-Wafa. Despite the
`administrative' changes, the staff members of the sub-project team remained the same since
2003 irrespective of the name of the partner, even though they were different legal entities. The
decision for change and the subsequent reasons were not documented. Moreover, prior to signing
the first Sub-Project Agreement with LSSC, it was not evident that efforts had been made by
OCM to ensure it had the required capacity to implement a sub-project. In OIOS' view, the
selection of partners was not transparent and should have been better documented. OCM did not
comment on OIOS concerns with regard to the unclear relationship with its partners.
(c) Lack of understanding of budgetary and programme management procedures
24. OCM in managing project 05/AB/LBY/RP/370 for the repatriation of 30 persons, made a
chain of errors and applied a number of inconsistent steps, which in OIOS' view was due to the
lack of understanding of UNHCR budgetary procedures. In February 2005, a Sub-Project
Agreement was signed with Al-Wafa allocating to the partner an amount of US$ 39,000. No
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provision for this had been made in the LOI. Because of this, the instalment was incorrectly
charged to a sub-project established for activities to be directly implemented by UNHCR. OCM
did not immediately inform the Desk on the reallocation made nor did it later on when the
Bureau issued a draft amendment to the LOI for the transfer of these funds to another project.
Subsequently, OCM requested Al-Wafa to convert to Libyan Dinars the amount received in US
dollars and to consider it as an instalment for sub-project 05/AB/LBY/CM/200 (a). Given that
such practice is not compatible with FOAS, OIOS recommended that with the assistance of the
Desk adjustments be made to FOBS and FOAS data. OCM stated that this was discussed with
the Desk for action.
(d) Closure of the Somali Compound
25. Several weaknesses were noted in the closure of the Somali Compound that was done by
the Field/Programme Assistant in September 2004. As part of the closure procedures cash
payments were provided to individuals and their families to leave the Compound. OIOS was
concerned as to the validity of the payments made, as there was insufficient evidence that they
were made to genuine UNHCR beneficiaries. The weaknesses observed mainly related to a lack
of internal controls over the distribution of cash payments and its subsequent reporting. For
example, there was a lack of segregation of duties, inadequate authorization and approval
procedures, poor documentation of transactions and an absence of proper supervision.
26. A total of LD 47,500 (US$ 36,500) was paid to beneficiaries, and this amount was not
provided for in the LOI. The beneficiary list was prepared by OCM, but it remained unclear by
whom or on what basis. During the distribution, the initial list was modified without evidence of
this being approved. Contrary to normal practices in UNHCR Libya, the approval of the
Assistance Advisory Committee was not sought. OCM could not explain why many beneficiaries
were listed has having received no payment and why some payments were made to persons to
whom the status of refugee was denied by UNHCR and no refugee file existed.
27. The lump sum payments of assistance to residents of the Compound were recorded as
paid by the partner, LSSC but these were made directly by UNHCR. The identity of the person(s)
responsible for making the payments to the beneficiaries was unknown. They did not sign the
distribution list, highlighting a significant internal control weakness.
28. The former Chief of Mission, who was absent at the time of the closure, was not aware
of the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the list of beneficiaries and the
distribution of cash. He did not supervise the activity nor had he reviewed the adequacy of the
procedures that were followed on return to the office a few days later. He addressed a
memorandum to the Desk on 26 September 2004 referring to the smooth closure of the
Compound mentioning that a complete report would be issued. This was not done. In response
to OIOS' audit recommendation, OCM only referred to the statement made by the Programme
Assistant during the audit mission, and no additional information was provided. OIOS still
considers the comments made by the Programme Assistant as incomplete, confusing and even
contradictory. In OIOS' opinion, considering the seriousness of the audit findings and that
assurance cannot be obtained that UNHCR funds were appropriately used and paid to targeted
beneficiaries, the former Chief of Mission should as indicated in his memorandum to the desk
properly report on this issue.
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Recommendation
The UNHCR Bureau for CASWANAME should request that the
former Chief of Mission, who was ultimately responsible and hence
accountable for the supervision of the closure of the Somali
Compound and the criteria established in the selection of
beneficiaries paid a cash allowance, properly report on the
procedures taken and provide the necessary supporting
documentation to evidence that only eligible persons received
payment (Rec. 03).
29. The former Chief of Mission submitted an extensive reply providing detailed background
information on the Compound itself and describing the procedures followed for its closure.
OIOS takes note of the information received, but would like to highlight that the former Chief of
Mission's comments, although consistent with that provided by the UNHCR Programme
Assistant, do not include the expected documentary evidence that there was adequate supervision
over the activities undertaken. In OIOS' opinion, considering the former Chief of Mission's
absence during the process, it is his responsibility to verify a posteriori compliance with the
existing rules and procedures and ensure that only genuine UNHCR beneficiaries were assisted.
OIOS considers that the former Chief of Mission has not provided adequate evidence that project
objectives were achieved and only genuine beneficiaries received assistance.
(e) Inadequacy of financial monitoring
30. Although the SPMRs submitted by the partners were approved by the Field/Programme
Assistant, there was no record of the financial monitoring performed. There was no
documentation of monitoring visits of the partners' books of account and no formal
recommendations were made to improve their activities. OIOS acknowledges that there was
regular, almost daily, exchange of information between UNHCR and the partners nonetheless
there was no systematic review of the partners' accounting and project records. For instance, the
first review of the Ministry of Health's (MoH) records was five months after the end of the
partnership. In a letter addressed to the MoH, UNHCR expressed doubts on the validity of
assistance provided to beneficiaries and the charges made to UNHCR. Despite this, UNHCR
approved the SPMR with the mention "No comment". OIOS recommended that OCM establish
procedures for the financial monitoring of its partners. OCM stated that the Programme
Assistant was instructed to carry out regular verification and monitoring of partners records
and a note for the file would be prepared to better document the exercise.
(f) Statistics on refugees and asylum seekers
31. The registration system, RICSS was only implemented in Libya at the beginning of 2003.
The opening figures of 11,500 were taken from an Excel spreadsheet that was previously used
for compiling the statistics. At the time of the transfer of data to RICSS the figures were not
verified, and the distinction between active and non-active refugees was not made. In addition,
as there were not refugee files for all 11,500 ICs it is likely that double recording occurred.
32. Since the beginning of 2005, although the data was in the system, OCM was not able to
generate any reports, as there was no staff members properly trained on the system. The
responsible for RICSS was discontinued at the end of 2004, leaving the office without the
necessary expertise. OIOS recommended that OCM update the refugee and asylum seekers
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statistics. OCM stated that with the assistance of Headquarters, proGres has been installed and
all refugee data has been migrated to the new system. A UNV has been recruited to undertake
assignments related to data entry and statistics. OCM has started a verification exercise to
determine the active registered caseload and subsequently update records. OCM is hopefully
that by the end of 2006, they will be able to report a reliable figure of the refugee population.
(g) Audit certification
33. For the selection of an audit firm for 2004 a bidding process did not take place because
according to the Senior Administrative Assistant the number of qualified audit firms in Tripoli
was too low to make the process effective. The selected firm therefore was the one suggested by
UNDP. OIOS recommended that OCM properly document the justification of the selection of
the audit firm, and that an adequate briefing be given to the selected auditors regarding
UNHCR's rules and policies since weaknesses were observed in this regard. OCM reconfirmed
that they were having some difficulties competitively selecting an audit firm due to the limited
number based in Tripoli. For 2006, OCM have sent letters to some new firms seeking offers, but
so far, no replies have been received. OCM will continue to chase the matter. A prior briefing
will be provided to the audit firm selected.
C. Supply Management
(a) Procurement procedures
34. OIOS assessed that the procurement procedures in place were weak and no focal point
had been designated. OIOS found that a register of commercial contracts was not maintained and
all relevant documents in the procurement cycle were not found on file. Although some
information was available, it did not provide sufficient evidence that three offers had been
received when required. According to the Senior Administrative Assistant, three offers were
usually obtained, but only the offer received from the successful bidder was kept on file.
35. With regard to the activities related to the repatriation of refugees, the purchase of flight
tickets was increasing considerably. OIOS noted that only one travel agency was generally used.
In its selection there was no evidence that a comparison of prices and services offered was made.
OIOS recommended that OCM modify its practices to adhere to UNHCR rules and procedures
for procurement. OCM stated that the Senior Administration Assistant was designated as focal
point for procurement. An improved documentation system has been established, where the
required three bids are recorded and filed. With regard to the travel agencies, two companies
have been selected and approved by the local contracts committee. The selection will be
reviewed in six months for the sake of transparency and in an attempt to obtain better
prices/offers.
(b) Use of service providers
36. OCM used a service provider for security services and to procure supplies and
administrative services in instances where the supplier requested to be paid in advance or in
cash. No documentation could be provided to OIOS that the cost of services invoiced by the
service provider corresponded to the lowest market price available. In addition, the service
provider charged an administrative fee of 13 per cent (15 per cent in 2004) for each transaction.
There was also no evidence that the service providers were selected competitively. OCM
indicated that with the present opening in the economy, the situation has slightly improved.
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OIOS suggests therefore that the need for such services should be reduced.
(c) Asset management
37. At the time of the audit, most of UNHCR assets in Tripoli were fully depreciated,
especially the computer equipment. To be functional and more effective, most of the equipment
needed to be replaced including photocopiers, office furniture and light vehicles. In view of the
implementation of MSRP, the need for new computers and communication facilities was of
particular importance. OIOS recommended that the budget for 2006 be revised accordingly.
38. AssetTrak had not been updated since the end of 2004, mainly as the contract of a
national UNV responsible for IT was terminated. Moreover, although a LAMB was established
in 2002 and meetings were occasionally held, the last minutes available were dated October
2003. OIOS noted that LAMB approval was not sought in some cases, namely for the transfer of
ownership of UNHCR assets on the closure of the Somali Compound. In this case, the
Field/Programme Assistant signed the agreement for the transfer of ownership instead of the
Chief of Mission.
39. Medical furniture and equipment handed over to UNHCR by the MoH at the end of the
partnership in May 2005 were still stored in UNHCR premises waiting for distribution to a clinic
providing services to refugees. OIOS recommended that once approved by the appropriate asset
management board, OCM transfer its ownership to a clinic or a hospital providing services to
UNHCR beneficiaries.
40. OCM stated that computers have been purchased and some office equipment has been
replaced. The assets inventory has been updated. A LAMB meeting was convened and relevant
measures have been taken with regard to old equipment and the transfer of ownership to NGOs
and clinics.
D. Security and Safety
41. After several security incidents the Government was requested to provide round the clock
service of armed security guards at the Office of the Chief of Mission. A mission by a UN
Regional Security Officer was carried out in April 2005. The mission report recognized that
UNHCR is more at risk than most of the other UN agencies working in Libya, and it indicated
that the office was not MOSS compliant. Equipment needed to be purchased including a
generator, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers and a CCTV camera and recorder, as well as
shatter resistant films for the windows. Apart from the installation of the CCTV camera and
recorder none of the recommendations for the new equipment and the enhancement of security
measures have been implemented. The OCM indicated that the need for equipment to ensure
MOSS compliance had been communicated to Headquarters on several occasions. The Chief of
Mission also indicated he has sought security advice from Headquarters on various issues such
as training for staff, VHF communication and security measures over the area assigned for
interviews. The Bureau stated that the budget for security arrangements has been planned for
2007, considering the move of the office to new premises within a few months time.
E. Administration
42. In the areas of administration and finance, the Office of the Chief of Mission generally
complied with UNHCR's regulations, rules, policies and procedures, and controls were operating
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effectively during the period under review.
(a) Financial management
43. Our review of OCM's financial records revealed several financial management
deficiencies. In addition to recurrent coding and other accounting technical errors, the
verification of price and performance was not always adequate and properly documented and
was often carried out by non-UNHCR staff. The deficiencies identified was due to a
combination of factors such as the lack of training given to the newly appointed Senior
Administrative Assistant, weaknesses by the Approving Officer function and insufficient
monitoring by the Division of Finance and Supply Management and the Bureau. OCM reiterated
the need to have proper training on finance, administration and human resources issues for the
newly appointed administrative assistant.
44. OCM has been working independently from UNDP since 2002. As a result the Chief of
Mission has both certifying and approving functions as the only international staff member in the
office. OIOS noted that payments to the Chief of Mission were certified and approved by him.
OIOS would like to highlight that such a practice is not in accordance with the UNHCR rules and
instructions, and constitutes a serious weakness in internal controls. In this case, approval from
the desk at Headquarters should be sought. Moreover, contrary to UNHCR instructions on the
Delegation of Signing Authority, there was no monitoring performed by another office or by
Headquarters. OCM was expecting advice from the Bureau on these issues. The Chief of Mission
suggested that as a temporary measure, pending the arrival of the assigned Protection Officer,
the Finance Assistant perform certifying functions. No information was provided as to whether
FRS had been requested to sanction this. It is the responsibility of the Chief of Mission to initiate
such a request and to seek the support of the desk.
(b) Cash management
45. Petty cash is currently in Libyan Dinars with a ceiling of LD 200 (US$ 150). To facilitate
the financial operations and reduce the number of transactions made through the service provider
and simplify the payment of grants paid to repatriates, OIOS recommended that the ceiling of the
petty cash in Dinars be increased and a petty cash in US Dollars be authorized. According to the
reply received, it seems that the Chief of Mission has not yet submitted the relevant request to
FRS.
(c) Human Resources Management
46. The decision to terminate the contracts of four national UNVs at the end of 2004 was not
justified by budgetary constraints and in OIOS' view was taken without appropriate measures to
ensure the smooth continuation of their assigned responsibilities. This decision had a negative
impact on many aspects of the operation since the recruitment of two new national UNV only
took place in August and September 2005.
47. Training of staff was required for all sectors of activities including administration,
finance, programme, protection and language. OIOS suggested that this could be done through
workshops and/or on-the-job training. During the training, special attention should be given to
the filing of documents, which was a significant problem in the office.
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Recommendation
The UNHCR Office of the Chief of Mission in Libya, in
conjunction with the Bureau for CASWANAME, should ensure
that UNHCR staff members in Libya are conversant with
UNHCR's basic rules and procedures. Adequate training and
assistance should be provided (Rec. 04).
(d) Communication costs
48. There were currently only two lines for all types of communications (telephone, fax,
internet, etc.). The office did not have access to UNHCR Intranet, and only one of the computers
has the possibility of Internet connection. OCM indicated that action has been taken to provide
the office with a digital line and 256 Internet speed connectivity shortly after OIOS' mission,
which was necessary for MSRP implementation.
(e) Rental of premises
49. The current office premises did not adequately accommodate all staff. The office space
was not convenient, not well maintained and the lighting was inadequate. In addition the area for
the interviews with asylum seekers and refugees was not acceptable. OCM stated that after the
audit, the landlord requested an increase in rent of about 100 per cent, which was unjustified.
Following consultations with Headquarters, a decision has been taken to move to other premises
at the end of the current lease in July 2006. Resources are required however to implement this,
which are not available under the current financial constraints. According to the present market
price, it will be difficult if not impossible to rent new premises within the already approved
allocation under the 2006 ABOD. The office of the Chief of Mission has sought Headquarters
support in this respect.
V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
50. I wish to express my appreciation for the assistance and cooperation extended to the
auditor by the staff of UNHCR and its implementing partners in Libya.
Eleanor T. Burns, Acting Chief
UNHCR Audit Service
Office of Internal Oversight Services
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