The tremendous progress made by capitalism in recent
decades and the rapid growth of the working-class movement in all the
civilised countries have brought about a big change in the attitude of the
bourgeoisie to the proletariat. Instead of waging an open, principled and
direct struggle against all the fundamental tenets of socialism in defence
of the absolute inviolability of private property and freedom of
competition, the bourgeoisie of Europe and America, as represented by their
ideologists and political leaders, are coming out increasingly in defence
of so-called social reforms as opposed to the idea of social
revolution. Not liberalism versus socialism, but reformism versus socialist
revolution—is the formula of the modern, “advanced”, educated
bourgeoisie. And the higher the development of capitalism in a given
country, the more unadulterated the rule of the bourgeoisie, and the
greater the political liberty, the more extensive is the application of the
“most up-to-date” bourgeois slogan: reform versus revolution,
the partial patching up of the doomed regime with the object of dividing
and weakening the working class, and of maintaining the rule of the
bourgeoisie, versus the revolutionary over throw of that rule.

From the viewpoint of the universal development of socialism this
change must be regarded as a big step forward. At first socialism fought
for its existence, and was con fronted by a bourgeoisie confident of its
strength and boldly and consistently defending liberalism as an integral
system of economic and political views. Socialism has grown into a force
and, throughout the civilised world, has already
upheld its right to existence. It is now fighting for power and
the bourgeoisie, disintegrating and realising the inevitability of its
doom, is exerting every effort to defer that day and to maintain its rule
under the new conditions as well, at the cost of partial and spurious
concessions.

The intensification of the struggle of reformism against revolutionary
Social-Democracy within the working-class movement is an
absolutely inevitable result of the changes in the entire economic and
political situation throughout the civilised world. The growth of the
working-class movement necessarily attracts to its ranks a certain number
of petty-bourgeois elements, people who are under the spell of bourgeois
ideology, who find it difficult to rid themselves of that ideology and
continually lapse back into it. We can not conceive of the social
revolution being accomplished by the proletariat without this struggle,
without clear demarcation on questions of principle between the socialist
Mountain and the socialist
Gironde[2]prior to this revolution, and without a complete
break between the opportunist, petty-bourgeois elements and the
proletarian, revolutionary elements of the new historic force
during this revolution.

In Russia the position is fundamentally the same; only here matters are
more complicated, obscured, and modified, because we are lagging behind
Europe (and even behind the advanced part of Asia), and we are still
passing through the era of bourgeois revolutions. Owing to this, Russian
reformism is distinguished by its particular stubbornness; it represents,
as it were, a more pernicious malady, and it is much more harmful to the
cause of the proletariat and of the revolution. In our country reformism
emanates from two sources simultaneously. In the first place, Russia is
much more a petty-bourgeois country than the countries of Western
Europe. Our country, therefore, more frequently produces individuals,
groups and trends distinguished by their contradictory, unstable,
vacillating attitude to socialism (an attitude veering between “ardent
love” and base treachery) characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie in
general. Secondly, the petty-bourgeois masses in our country are more prone
to lose heart and to succumb to renegade moods at the failure of any
one phase of our bourgeois revolution; they are more ready to
renounce the aim of a complete democratic
revolution which would entirely rid Russia of all survivals of medievalism
and serfdom.

We shall not dwell at length on the first source. We need only mention
that there is hardly a country in the world in which there has been such a
rapid “swing” from sympathy for socialism to sympathy for
counter-revolutionary liberalism as that performed by our Struves,
Izgoyevs, Karaulovs, etc., etc. Yet these gentlemen are not exceptions, not
isolated individuals, but representatives of wide spread trends!
Sentimentalists, of whom there are many out side the ranks of the
Social-Democratic movement, but also a goodly number within it, and who
love to preach sermons against “excessive” polemics, against “the
passion for drawing lines of demarcation”, etc., betray a complete lack of
understanding of the historical conditions which, in Russia, give rise to
the “excessive” “passion” for swinging over from socialism to
liberalism,

Our bourgeois revolution has not been completed. The autocracy is
trying to find new ways of solving the problems bequeathed by
that, revolution and imposed by the entire objective course of economic
development; but it is unable to do so. Neither the
latest step in the transformation of old tsarism into a renovated bourgeois
monarchy, nor the organisation of the nobility and the upper crust of the
bourgeoisie on a national scale (the Third Duma), nor yet the bourgeois
agrarian policy being enforced by the rural
superintendents[3]—none of these “extreme” measures, none of these
“latest” efforts of tsarism in the last sphere remaining to it,
the sphere of adaptation to bourgeois development, prove adequate, It just
does not work! Not only is a Russia “renovated” by such means
unable to catch up with Japan, it is perhaps, even beginning to fall behind
China, Because the bourgeois-democratic tasks have been left unfulfilled, a
revolutionary crisis is still inevitable. It is ripening again, and we are
heading toward it once more, in a new way, not the same way as
before, not at the same pace, and not only in the old forms—but that we
are heading toward it, of that there is no doubt.

The tasks of the proletariat that arise from this situation are fully
and unmistakably definite. As the only consistently
revolutionary class of contemporary society, it must be the leader in the
Struggle of the whole people for a fully democratic revolution, in the
Struggle of all the working and exploited people against the
oppressors and exploiters. The proletariat is revolutionary only insofar as
it is conscious of and gives effect to this idea of the hegemony of the
proletariat. The proletarian who is conscious of this task is a slave who
has revolted against slavery. The proletarian who is not conscious of the
idea that his class must be the leader, or who renounces this idea, is a
slave who does not realise his position as a slave; at best he is a slave
who fights to improve his condition as a slave, but not one who
fights to overthrow slavery.

It is, therefore, obvious that the famous formula of one of the young
leaders of our reformists, Mr. Levitsky of Nasha Zarya, who
declared that the Russian Social-Democratic Party must represent
“not hegemony, but a class party”, is a formula of the most
consistent reformism. More than that, it is a formula of sheer renegacy. To
say, “not hegemony, but a class party”, means to take the side
of the bourgeoisie, the side of the liberal who says to the slave of our
age, the wage-earner: “Fight to improve your condition as a slave, but
regard the thought of overthrowing slavery as a harmful utopia”! Compare
Bernstein’s famous formula—“The movement is everything, the final aim is
nothing”—with Levitsky’s formula, and you will see that they are
variations of the same idea. They both recognise only reforms, and
renounce revolution. Bernstein’s formula is broader in scope, for it
envisages a socialist revolution (==the final goal of Social-Democracy, as
a party of bourgeois society). Levitsky’s formula is narrower; for while it
renounces revolution in general, it is particularly meant to renounce what
the liberals hated most in 1905-07—namely, the fact that the proletariat
wrested from them the leadership of the masses of the people
(particularly of the peasantry) in the struggle for a fully democratic
revolution.

To preach to the workers that what they need is “not
hegemony, but a class party” means to betray the cause of the proletariat
to the liberals; it means preaching that Social-Democratic labour
policy should be replaced by a liberal labour policy.

Renunciation of the idea of hegemony, however, is the crudest form of
reformism in the Russian Social-Democratic movement, and that is why not
all liquidators make bold to express their ideas in such definite
terms. Some of them (Mr. Martov for instance) even try, mocking at the
truth, to deny that there is a connection between the renunciation of
hegemony and liquidationism.

A more “subtle” attempt to “substantiate” reformist. views is the
following argument: The bourgeois revolution in Russia is at an end; after
1905 there can be no second bourgeois revolution, no second nation-wide
struggle for a democratic revolution; Russia therefore is faced not with a
revolutionary but with a “constitutional” crisis, and all that
remains for the working class is to take care to defend its rights and
interests on the basis of that “constitutional crisis”. That is how the
liquidator Y. Larin argues in Dyelo Zhizni (and previously in
Vozrozhdeniye).

“October 1905 is not on the order of the day,” wrote
Mr. Larin. “If the Duma were abolished, it would be restored more
rapidly than in post-revolutionary Austria, which abolished the
Constitution in 1851 only to recognise it again in 1860, nine years
later, without any revolution (note this!), simply because it was in the
interests of the most influential section of the ruling classes, the
section which had reconstructed its economy on capitalist lines.” “At
the stage we are now in, a nation-wide revolutionary movement like that
of 1905 is impossible.”

All Mr. Larin’s arguments are nothing more than an expanded rehash of
what Mr. Dan said at the Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. in
December 1908. Arguing against the resolution which stated that the
“fundamental factors of economic and political life which gave
rise to the Revolution of 1905, continue to operate”, that a
new—revolutionary, and not “constitutional”—crisis was
developing, the editor of the liquidators’ Golos exclaimed: “They
[i.e., the R.S.D.L.P.] want to shove in where they have once been
defeated”.

To shove again toward revolution, to work tirelessly, in the changed
situation, to propagate the idea of revolution and to prepare the forces of
the working class for it—that, from the standpoint of the reformists, is
the chief crime of the R.S.D.L.P., that is what constitutes the
guilt
of the revolutionary proletariat. Why “shove in where they have once been
defeated”—that is the wisdom of renegades and of persons who lose heart
after any defeat.

But in countries older and more “experienced” than Russia the
revolutionary proletariat showed its ability to “shove in where it has
once been defeated” two, three, and four times; in France it accomplished
four revolutions between 1789 and 1871, rising again and again
after the most severe defeats and achieving a republic in which it now
faces its last enemy—the advanced bourgeoisie; it has achieved a
republic, which is the only form of state corresponding to the conditions
necessary for the final struggle for the victory of socialism.

Such is the distinction between socialists and liberals, or champions
of the bourgeoisie. The socialists teach that revolution is inevitable, and
that the proletariat must take advantage of all the contradictions
in society, of every weakness of its enemies or of the intermediate
classes, to prepare for a new revolutionary struggle, to repeat the
revolution in a broader arena, with a more developed population. The
bourgeoisie and the liberals teach that revolutions are unnecessary and
even harmful to the workers, that they must not “shove” toward
revolution, but, like good little boys, work modestly for reforms.

That is why, in order to divert the Russian workers from
socialism, the reformists, who are the captives of bourgeois ideas,
constantly refer to the example of Austria (as well as
Prussia) in the 1860s. Why are they so fond of these examples? Y. Larin let
the cat out of the bag; because in these countries, after the
“unsuccessful” revolution of 1848, the bourgeois transformation was
completed “without any revolution”.

That is the whole secret! That is what gladdens their hearts, for it
seems to indicate that bourgeois change is possible without
revolution!! And if that is the case, why should we Russians bother our
heads about a revolution? Why not leave it to the landlords and factory
owners to effect the bourgeois transformation of Russia “without any
revolution”!

It was because the proletariat in Austria and Prussia was weak that it
was unable to prevent the landed proprietors
and the bourgeoisie from effecting the, transformation regardless
of the interests of the workers, in a form most prejudicial to the
workers, retaining the monarchy, the privileges of the nobility, arbitrary
rule in the countryside, and a host of other survivals of medievalism.

In 1905 our proletariat displayed strength unparalleled in any
bourgeois revolution in the West, yet today the Russian reformists use
examples of the weakness of the working class in other countries, forty or
fifty years ago, in order to justify their own apostasy, to
“substantiate” their own renegade propaganda!

The reference to Austria and Prussia of the 1860s, so beloved of our
reformists, is the best proof of the theoretical fallacy of their arguments
and of their desertion to the bourgeoisie in practical politics.

Indeed, if Austria restored the Constitution which was abolished after
the defeat of the Revolution of 1848, and an “era of crisis” was ushered
in in Prussia in the 1860s, what does this prove? It proves, primarily,
that the bourgeois transformation of these countries had not been
completed. To maintain that the system of government in Russia has
already become bourgeois( as Larin says), and that government
power in our country is no longer of a feudal nature (see Larin again), and
at the same time to refer to Austria and Prussia as an example, is to
refute oneself! Generally speaking it would be ridiculous to deny that the
bourgeois transformation of Russia has not been completed: the very policy
of the bourgeois parties, the Constitutional-Democrats and the Octobrists,
proves this beyond all doubt, and Larin himself (as we shall see further
on) surrenders his position. It cannot be denied that the monarchy is
taking one more step towards adapting itself to bourgeois development—as
we have said before, and as was pointed out in a resolution adopted by the
Party (December 1908). But it is still more undeniable that even
this adaptation, even bourgeois reaction, and the Third Duma, and
the agrarian law of November 9, 1906 (and June 14, 1910) do not
solve the problems of Russia’s bourgeois transformation.

Let us look a little further. Why were “crises” In Austria and in
Prussia in the 1860s constitutional, and not revolutionary?
Because there were a number of special circumstances
which eased the position of the monarchy (the “revolution from above” in
Germany, her unification by “blood and iron”); because the proletariat
was at that time extremely weak and undeveloped in those countries, and the
liberal bourgeoisie was distinguished by base cowardice and treachery, just
as the Russian Cadets are in our day.

To show how the German Social-Democrats who themselves took part in the
events of those years assess the situation, we quote some opinions
expressed by Bebel in his memoirs (Pages from My Life), the first
part of which was published last year. Bebel states that Bismarck, as has
since become known, related that the king at the time of the
“constitutional” crisis in Prussia in 1862 had given way to utter
despair, lamented his fate, and blubbered in his, Bismarck’s, presence that
they were both going to die on the scaffold. Bismarck put the coward to
shame and persuaded him not to shrink from giving battle.

“These events show,” says Bebel, “what the liberals might have
achieved had they taken advantage of the situation. But they were already
afraid of the workers who backed them. Bismarck’s words that if he were
driven to extremes he would set Acheron in motion [i.e., stir up a popular
movement of the lower classes, the masses], struck fear into their heart.”

Half a century after the “constitutional” crisis which “without any
revolution” completed the transformation of his country into a
bourgeois-Junker monarchy, the leader of the German Social-Democrats refers
to the revolutionary possibilities of the situation at that time,
which the liberals did not take advantage of owing to their fear of the
workers. The leaders of the Russian reformists say to the Russian workers:
since the German bourgeoisie was so base as to cower before a cowering
king, why shouldn’t we too try to copy those splendid tactics of
the German bourgeoisie? Bebel accuses the bourgeoisie of not having “taken
advantage of the “constitutional” crisis to effect a revolution because
of their fear, as exploiters, of the popular movement. Larin and Co. accuse
the Russian workers of having striven to secure hegemony (i.e., to draw the
masses into the revolution in spite of the liberals), and advise them to
organise “not for revolution”, but “for the defence of
their interests
in the forthcoming constitutional reform of Russia”. The liquidators offer
the Russian workers the rotten views of rotten German liberalism as
“Social-Democratic” views! After this, how can one help calling such
Social-Democrats “Stolypin Social-Democrats”?

In estimating the “constitutional” crisis of the 1860s in Prussia,
Bebel does not confine himself to saying that the bourgeoisie were afraid
to fight the monarchy because they were afraid of the workers. He also
tells us what was going on among the workers at that time. “The appalling
state of political affairs,” he says, “of which the workers were becoming
ever more keenly aware, naturally affected their mood. Everybody clamoured
for change. But since there was no fully class-conscious leadership with a
clear vision of the goal and enjoying the confidence of the workers, and
since there existed no strong organisation that could rally the forces, the
mood petered out [verpuffte]. Never did a movement, so splendid in
its essence [in Kern vortreffliche], turn out to be so futile in
the end. All the meetings were packed, and the most vehement speakers were
hailed as the heroes of the day. This was the prevailing mood,
particularly, in the Workers’ Educational Society at Leipzig.” A mass
meeting in Leipzig on May 8, 1866, attended by 5,000 people, unanimously
adopted a resolution proposed by Liebknecht and Bebel, which demanded, on
the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage, with secret ballot, the
convening of a Parliament supported by the armed people. The resolution
also expressed the “hope that the German people will elect as deputies
only persons who repudiate every hereditary central government power”. The
resolution proposed by Liebknecht and Bebel was thus unmistakably
revolutionary and republican in character.

Thus we see that at the time of the “constitutional” crisis the
leader of the German Social-Democrats advocated resolutions of a
republican and revolutionary nature at mass meetings. Half a century later,
recalling his youth and telling the new generation of the events of days
long gone by, he stresses most of all his regret that at that time there
was no leadership sufficiently class-conscious and capable of understanding
the revolutionary tasks (i.e., there was no revolutionary
Social-Democratic Party understanding thetask implied by thehegemonyof the proletariat);
that there was no strong organisation; that the revolutionary mood
“petered out”. Yet the leaders of the Russian reformists, with the
profundity of Simple Simons, refer to the example of Austria and Prussia in
the 1860s as proving that we can manage “without any revolution”! And
these paltry philistines who have succumbed to the intoxication of counter
revolution, and are the ideological slaves of liberalism, still dare to
dishonour the name of the R.S.D.L.P.!

To be sure, among the reformists who are abandoning socialism there are
people who substitute for Larin’s straight forward opportunism the
diplomatic tactics of beating about the bush in respect of the most
important and fundamental questions of the working-class movement. They try
to confuse the issue, to muddle the ideological controversies, to defile
them, as did Mr. Martov, for instance, when he asserted in the legally
published press (that is to say, where he is protected by Stolypin from a
direct retort by members of the R.S.D.L.P.) that Larin and “the orthodox
Bolsheviks in the resolutions of 1908” propose an identical
“scheme”. This is a downright distortion of the facts worthy of this
author of scurrilous effusions. The same Martov pretending to argue against
Larin, declared in print that he, “of course” did “not suspect Larin of
reformist tendencies”. Martov did not suspect Larin, who
expounded purely reformist views, of being a reformist! This is an
example of the tricks to which the diplomats of reformism
resort.[1]
The same Martov, whom some simpletons regard as being more “Left”, and a
more reliable revolutionary than Larin, summed up his “difference” with
the latter in the following words:

“To sum up: the fact that the present regime is an
inherently contradictory combination of absolutism and
constitutionalism, and that the Russian working class has sufficiently
matured to follow the example of the workers of the progressive
countries of the West in striking at this regime through the Achilles
heel of its contradictions, is ample material for the theoretical
substantiation and political justification of what the Mensheviks who
remain true to Marxism are now doing.”

No matter how hard Martov tried to evade the issue, the result of his
very first attempt at a summary was that all his evasions collapsed of
themselves. The words quoted above represent a complete renunciation of
socialism and its replacement by liberalism. What Martov proclaims as
“ample” is ample only for the liberals, only for the
bourgeoisie. A proletarian who considers it “ample” to recognise the
contradictory nature of the combination of absolutism and constitutionalism
accepts the standpoint of a liberal labour policy. He is
no socialist, he has not understood the tasks of his
class, which demand that the masses of the people, the masses of
working and exploited people, be roused against absolutism in all its
forms, that they be roused to intervene independently in the
historic destinies of the country, the vacillations or resistance of the
bourgeoisie notwithstanding. But the independent historical action of the
masses who are throwing off the hegemony of the bourgeoisie turns a
“constitutional” crisis into a revolution. The bourgeoisie
(particularly since 1905) fears revolution and loathes it; the proletariat,
on the other hands educates the masses of the people in the spirit of
devotion to the idea of revolution, explains its tasks, and prepares the
masses for new revolutionary battles. Whether, when, and under what
circumstances the revolution materialises, does not depend on the will of a
particular class; but revolutionary work carried on among the masses is
never wasted. This is the only kind of activity which prepares the masses
for the victory of socialism. The Larins and Martovs forget these
elementary ABC truths of socialism.

Larin, who expresses the views of the group of Russian liquidators who
have completely broken with the R.S.D.L.P., does not hesitate to go the
whole hog in expounding his reformism. Here is what he writes in Dyelo
Zhizni (1911, No. 2)—and these words should be remembered by
everyone who holds dear the principles of Social-Democracy:

“A state of perplexity and uncertainty, when people
simply do not know what to expect of the coming day, what tasks to set
them selves—that is what results from indeterminate, temporising
moods, from vague hopes of either a repetition of the revolution or of
‘we shall wait and see’. The immediate task is, not to wait fruitlessly
for something to turn up, but to imbue broad circles with the guiding
idea that, in the ensuing historical period of Russian life, the working
class must organise itself not ‘for revolution’, not ‘in expectation of
a revolution’, but simply [note the but simply] for the
determined and systematic defence of its particular interests in all
spheres of life; for the gathering and training of its forces for this
many-sided and complex activity; for the training and building-up in
this way of socialist consciousness in general; for acquiring the
ability to orientate itself [to find its bearings]—and to assert
itself—particularly in the complicated relations of the social classes
of Russia during the coming constitutional reform of the country after
the economically inevitable selfexhaustion of feudal reaction.”

This is consummate, frank, smug reformism of the purest water. War
against the idea of revolution, against the “hopes” for revolution (in
the eyes of the reformist such “hopes” seem vague, because he
does not understand the depth of the contemporary economic and political
contradictions); war against every activity designed to organise the forces
and prepare the minds for revolution; war waged in the legal press that
Stolypin protects from a direct retort by revolutionary Social-Democrats;
war waged on behalf of a group of legalists who have completely broken with
the R.S.D.L.P.—this is the programme and tactics of the Stolypin labour
party which Potresov, Levitsky, Larin, and their friends are out to
create. The real programme and the real tactics of these people are
expressed in exact terms in the above quotation—as distinct from their
hypocritical official assurances that they are “also
Social-Democrats”, that they “also” belong to the “irreconcilable
International”. These assurances are only window-dressing. Their deeds,
their real social substance, are expressed in this programme, which
substitutes a liberal labour policy for socialism.

Just note the ridiculous contradictions in which the reformists become
entangled. If, as Larin says, the bourgeois revolution in Russia has been
consummated, then the socialist revolution is the next stage of historical
development. This is self-evident; it is clear to anyone who does not
profess to be a socialist merely for the sake of deceiving the workers by
the use of a popular name. This is all the more reason why we
must organise “for revolution” (for socialist revolution), “in
expectation” of revolution, for the sake of the “hopes” (not vague
“hopes”, but the certainty based on exact and growing scientific
data) of a socialist revolution.

But that’s the whole point—-to the reformist the twaddle about the
consummated bourgeois revolution (like Martov’s twaddle about the Achilles
heel, etc.) is simply a verbal screen to cover up his renunciation of
all revolution. He renounces the bourgeois-democratic revolution on
the pretext that it is complete, or that it is “ample” to recognise the
contradiction between absolutism and constitutionalism; and he renounces
the socialist revolution on the pretext that “for the time being” we must
“simply” organise to take part in the “coming constitutional reform” of
Russia!

But if you, esteemed Cadet parading in socialist feathers, recognise
the inevitability of Russia’s “coming constitutional reform”, then you
speak against yourself, for thereby you admit that the bourgeois-democratic
revolution has not been completed in our country. You are
betraying your bourgeois nature again and again when you talk about an
inevitable “self-exhaustion of feudal reaction”, and when you
sneer at the proletarian idea of destroying, not only feudal
reaction, but all survivals of feudalism, by means of a
popular revolutionary movement.

Despite the liberal sermons of our heroes of the Stolypin labour party,
the Russian proletariat will always and invariably put the spirit of
devotion to the democratic revolution and to the socialist revolution into
all that difficult, arduous, everyday, routine and inconspicuous
work, to which the era of counter-revolution has condemned it; it will
organise and gather its forces for revolution; it will ruthlessly repulse
the traitors and renegades; and it will be guided, not by “vague hopes”,
but by the scientifically grounded conviction that the revolution will come
again.

Notes

[1]Compare the just remarks made by the pro-Party Menshevik Dnevnitsky in
No. 3 of Diskussionny Listok (supplement to the Central Organ of
our Party) on Larin’s reformism and Martov’s evasions. —Lenin

[2]Mountain and Gironde—the two political groups of the
bourgeoisie during the French bourgeois revolution at the close of the
eighteenth century. Montagnards (representatives of the Mountain), or
Jacobins, was the name given to the more resolute representatives
of the bourgeoisie, the revolutionary class of the time; they stood for the
abolition of the autocracy and the feudal system. The Girondists, as
distinct from Jacobins, vacillated between revolution and
counter-revolution, and their policy was one of compromise with the
monarchy.

Lenin called the opportunist trend in Social-Democracy the “socialist
Gironde” and the revolutionary Social-Democrats “proletarian
Jacobins”. After the R.S.D.L.P. split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks,
Lenin frequently stressed that the Mensheviks represented the Girondist
trend in the working-class movement.

[3]Rural superintendent—the administrative post introduced in
1889 by the tsarist government in order to increase the power of the
landlords over the peasants. The rural superintendents were selected from
among the local landed nobility, and were given enormous administrative and
judicial powers over the peasantry including the right to have the peasants
arrested and flogged.