This study examines the tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. The book seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the ...
More

This study examines the tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. The book seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied at its best in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, this book examines issues in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.Less

An Essay on Belief and Acceptance

L. Jonathan Cohen

Published in print: 1995-09-14

This study examines the tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. The book seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied at its best in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, this book examines issues in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.

This chapter suggests three basic standards for distinguishing ethical from unethical uses of incentives. These are legitimacy of purpose, voluntariness, and effect on the character of the parties ...
More

This chapter suggests three basic standards for distinguishing ethical from unethical uses of incentives. These are legitimacy of purpose, voluntariness, and effect on the character of the parties involved. These standards, in turn, rest on the notion that ethical uses of any kind of power must treat human beings as free and rational agents. Acts of power can be judged by whether they serve a rationally defensible purpose, whether they allow for a voluntary response or are based on freely given consent, and whether they accord with the requirements of moral character. These are the conceptual materials we can use to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate incentives, just as we would distinguish between the use and abuse of other forms of power.Less

Ethical and Not So Ethical Incentives

Ruth W. Grant

Published in print: 2011-11-27

This chapter suggests three basic standards for distinguishing ethical from unethical uses of incentives. These are legitimacy of purpose, voluntariness, and effect on the character of the parties involved. These standards, in turn, rest on the notion that ethical uses of any kind of power must treat human beings as free and rational agents. Acts of power can be judged by whether they serve a rationally defensible purpose, whether they allow for a voluntary response or are based on freely given consent, and whether they accord with the requirements of moral character. These are the conceptual materials we can use to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate incentives, just as we would distinguish between the use and abuse of other forms of power.

This chapter returns to the contrast between treating incentives simply as a form of trade and treating incentives as a form of power. The problem with the “trade” approach is that it tends to focus ...
More

This chapter returns to the contrast between treating incentives simply as a form of trade and treating incentives as a form of power. The problem with the “trade” approach is that it tends to focus on voluntariness as the only important ethical issue to consider. To increase a person's choices always seems to be a good thing, but it does not settle every ethical question. The chapter identifies two conceptions of voluntariness: Voluntariness I (choice) and Voluntariness II (autonomy). Voluntariness I is a standard that can be met so long as the incentive is not coercive. Voluntariness II is a more demanding requirement that leads to considering—and criticizing— manipulative, exploitive, paternalistic, and seductive offers as well.Less

Beyond Voluntariness

Ruth W. Grant

Published in print: 2011-11-27

This chapter returns to the contrast between treating incentives simply as a form of trade and treating incentives as a form of power. The problem with the “trade” approach is that it tends to focus on voluntariness as the only important ethical issue to consider. To increase a person's choices always seems to be a good thing, but it does not settle every ethical question. The chapter identifies two conceptions of voluntariness: Voluntariness I (choice) and Voluntariness II (autonomy). Voluntariness I is a standard that can be met so long as the incentive is not coercive. Voluntariness II is a more demanding requirement that leads to considering—and criticizing— manipulative, exploitive, paternalistic, and seductive offers as well.

This chapter argues that if we have a unified, comprehensive account of rationality for both domains, we should have much of the theoretical material needed to understand the notion of a rational ...
More

This chapter argues that if we have a unified, comprehensive account of rationality for both domains, we should have much of the theoretical material needed to understand the notion of a rational person. But the matter is complicated. There are tradeoffs; for instance, a high degree of theoretical rationality might counterbalance some degree of practical irrationality, and no rational person need exhibit rationality all of the time. Some irrational actions, and even isolated moments of a wider irrationality, are compatible with the overall rationality of a person. Indeed, if some things, such as certain emotions, may fail to be rational without being irrational, then it is entirely consistent with being a rational person that one cultivate certain non-rational elements in oneself and allow them to play a significant role in one's life.Less

Global Rationality

Robert Audi

Published in print: 2002-11-07

This chapter argues that if we have a unified, comprehensive account of rationality for both domains, we should have much of the theoretical material needed to understand the notion of a rational person. But the matter is complicated. There are tradeoffs; for instance, a high degree of theoretical rationality might counterbalance some degree of practical irrationality, and no rational person need exhibit rationality all of the time. Some irrational actions, and even isolated moments of a wider irrationality, are compatible with the overall rationality of a person. Indeed, if some things, such as certain emotions, may fail to be rational without being irrational, then it is entirely consistent with being a rational person that one cultivate certain non-rational elements in oneself and allow them to play a significant role in one's life.

This chapter discusses the main streams of contract philosophy in order to elucidate the extent to which boilerplate is a permissible means of creating contractual obligation. In particular, it ...
More

This chapter discusses the main streams of contract philosophy in order to elucidate the extent to which boilerplate is a permissible means of creating contractual obligation. In particular, it considers the deep embeddedness—the ineradicability—of the notion of voluntariness. It also compares and contrasts the economic efficiency theory of contract with the various theories based more directly on freedom of the will. The chapter first provides an overview of contract theory, focusing on autonomy (rights) and welfare theories, reliance theory, and equivalence of exchange theory. It then describes the basic premises of the economic theory of law, the role of incentives in maximizing social welfare, contract law, and property and liability rules. It shows that the existing philosophical theories of contract depend on the core notions of voluntariness, freedom of choice, or consent, thus making it difficult to incorporate boilerplate into the theories of contract.Less

A Summary of the Philosophy of Contract : The Theories of World A

Margaret Jane Radin

Published in print: 2012-11-25

This chapter discusses the main streams of contract philosophy in order to elucidate the extent to which boilerplate is a permissible means of creating contractual obligation. In particular, it considers the deep embeddedness—the ineradicability—of the notion of voluntariness. It also compares and contrasts the economic efficiency theory of contract with the various theories based more directly on freedom of the will. The chapter first provides an overview of contract theory, focusing on autonomy (rights) and welfare theories, reliance theory, and equivalence of exchange theory. It then describes the basic premises of the economic theory of law, the role of incentives in maximizing social welfare, contract law, and property and liability rules. It shows that the existing philosophical theories of contract depend on the core notions of voluntariness, freedom of choice, or consent, thus making it difficult to incorporate boilerplate into the theories of contract.

This chapter analyzes the pedagogical effectiveness of a course titled the Moral Agency of Women, which was offered to graduate students in theological education, ethics, and women's studies. The ...
More

This chapter analyzes the pedagogical effectiveness of a course titled the Moral Agency of Women, which was offered to graduate students in theological education, ethics, and women's studies. The course integrated classic descriptions of moral agency (such as Aristotle on voluntariness and constraint and Kant on autonomy), feminist theory, and contemporary cinematic portrayals of women who are facing moral dilemmas. Beginning with the assumption that Western moral thought does not resonate with women's experience, the course entertained several questions. What does women's moral agency look like? Does it differ from that which has been described traditionally? Additionally, given the plurality within women's experience, can we even speak in a monolithic way about their moral agency? The result was an appropriately complex study of moral agency with all of its varied expressions. This chapter expounds on the strengths and weaknesses of using film in this way and identifies some of the unanticipated questions that became central to our course.Less

Teaching Ethics with Film : A Course on the Moral Agency of Women

Ellen Ott Marshall

Published in print: 2008-08-21

This chapter analyzes the pedagogical effectiveness of a course titled the Moral Agency of Women, which was offered to graduate students in theological education, ethics, and women's studies. The course integrated classic descriptions of moral agency (such as Aristotle on voluntariness and constraint and Kant on autonomy), feminist theory, and contemporary cinematic portrayals of women who are facing moral dilemmas. Beginning with the assumption that Western moral thought does not resonate with women's experience, the course entertained several questions. What does women's moral agency look like? Does it differ from that which has been described traditionally? Additionally, given the plurality within women's experience, can we even speak in a monolithic way about their moral agency? The result was an appropriately complex study of moral agency with all of its varied expressions. This chapter expounds on the strengths and weaknesses of using film in this way and identifies some of the unanticipated questions that became central to our course.

This chapter focuses on freedom of the will, questions about agents' responsibility for their virtues and vices, and the way in which the covenant between God and human beings has implications for ...
More

This chapter focuses on freedom of the will, questions about agents' responsibility for their virtues and vices, and the way in which the covenant between God and human beings has implications for understanding human agency and responsibility. Freedom of the will had a crucial place in medieval Jewish thought because it was widely held that without such freedom, the Law (commandments) would be futile. The differences between Jewish philosophical thought about agency and the Aristotelian conception of voluntariness and self‐determination are brought into relief.Less

Freedom of the Will, Covenant, and Moral Capability

Jonathan Jacobs

Published in print: 2010-08-25

This chapter focuses on freedom of the will, questions about agents' responsibility for their virtues and vices, and the way in which the covenant between God and human beings has implications for understanding human agency and responsibility. Freedom of the will had a crucial place in medieval Jewish thought because it was widely held that without such freedom, the Law (commandments) would be futile. The differences between Jewish philosophical thought about agency and the Aristotelian conception of voluntariness and self‐determination are brought into relief.

This chapter argues against the claim that criminal liability is and ought to be imposed only for an act. No persuasive argument for this claim has yet been given. As an alternative, it suggests that ...
More

This chapter argues against the claim that criminal liability is and ought to be imposed only for an act. No persuasive argument for this claim has yet been given. As an alternative, it suggests that criminal liability is and ought to be imposed only for states of affairs over which persons exercise a sufficient degree of control. It explores the advantages of this alternative principle for the justifiability of status criminality and the punishment of mental states.Less

Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?

Douglas Husak

Published in print: 2010-03-18

This chapter argues against the claim that criminal liability is and ought to be imposed only for an act. No persuasive argument for this claim has yet been given. As an alternative, it suggests that criminal liability is and ought to be imposed only for states of affairs over which persons exercise a sufficient degree of control. It explores the advantages of this alternative principle for the justifiability of status criminality and the punishment of mental states.

The chapter summarizes the nature of interrogations prior to the Miranda v. Arizona decision in 1966, as well as those Supreme Court decisions that preceded it. Special emphasis is given to Warren ...
More

The chapter summarizes the nature of interrogations prior to the Miranda v. Arizona decision in 1966, as well as those Supreme Court decisions that preceded it. Special emphasis is given to Warren Court decisions on defendants’ rights, including the Gideon and Escobedo cases that foretold the decision in Miranda.Less

What Led Up to the Miranda Decision?

Lawrence S. WrightsmanMary L. Pitman

Published in print: 2010-04-21

The chapter summarizes the nature of interrogations prior to the Miranda v. Arizona decision in 1966, as well as those Supreme Court decisions that preceded it. Special emphasis is given to Warren Court decisions on defendants’ rights, including the Gideon and Escobedo cases that foretold the decision in Miranda.

The final chapter examines the positions of several prominent advocates of defendants’ rights who have come to believe that the Miranda warning procedure should be ignored because it is now ...
More

The final chapter examines the positions of several prominent advocates of defendants’ rights who have come to believe that the Miranda warning procedure should be ignored because it is now ineffective. We recognize the reasons for these beliefs, but our position is that procedures are available which could reinstate reaching the goals of Miranda. Some of these have the purpose of reducing the number of false confessions; for example, requiring the presence of an attorney when defendants are informed of their rights, so that we can be assured that any waiver of rights reflected understanding of the choices. Other recommendations would be applied at the time of the trial; for example, requiring corroboration of nay details from the confession, allowing an expert to testify about the effects of coercion, and presenting a videotape of the entire interrogation.Less

The Future of the Miranda Ruling

Lawrence S. WrightsmanMary L. Pitman

Published in print: 2010-04-21

The final chapter examines the positions of several prominent advocates of defendants’ rights who have come to believe that the Miranda warning procedure should be ignored because it is now ineffective. We recognize the reasons for these beliefs, but our position is that procedures are available which could reinstate reaching the goals of Miranda. Some of these have the purpose of reducing the number of false confessions; for example, requiring the presence of an attorney when defendants are informed of their rights, so that we can be assured that any waiver of rights reflected understanding of the choices. Other recommendations would be applied at the time of the trial; for example, requiring corroboration of nay details from the confession, allowing an expert to testify about the effects of coercion, and presenting a videotape of the entire interrogation.