Selected Correspondence:
Letter 49 Spinoza to Isaac Orobio.

Most Learned Sir, --You doubtless wonder why I have
kept you so long waiting. I could hardly bring myself to
reply to the pamphlet of that person, which you thought
fit to send me; indeed I only do so now because of my
promise. However, in order as far as possible to
humour my feelings, I will fulfil my engagement in as
few words as I can, and will briefly show how perversely
he has interpreted my meaning; whether through
malice or through ignorance I cannot readily say. But to
the matter in hand.

First he says, "that it is of little moment to
know what nation I belong to, or what sort of
life I lead." Truly, if he
had known, he would not so easily have persuaded himself that
I teach Atheism. For Atheists are wont greedily to covet rank
and riches, which I have always despised, as all who know me
are aware. Again, in order to smooth his path to the object he
has in view, he says that, "I am possessed of no
mean talents," so that he may, forsooth, more easily convince his
readers, that I have knowingly and cunningly with evil intent
argued for the cause of the deists, in order to discredit it. This
contention sufficiently shows that he has not understood my
reasons. For who could be so cunning and clever, as to be able
to advance under false pretences so many and such good
reasons for a doctrine which he did not believe in? Who will
pass for an honest writer in the eyes of a man, that thinks one
may argue as soundly for fiction as for truth? But after all I
am not astonished. Descartes was formerly served in the same
way by Voet, and the most honourable writers are constantly
thus treated.

He goes on to say, "In order to shun the
reproach of superstition, he seems to me
to have thrown off all religion." What this
writer means by religion
and what by superstition,
I know not. But I would ask, whether a man throws off all
religion, who
maintains that
God must be acknowledged as the highest good,
and must, as such, be loved with a free mind? or, again, that
the reward of virtue is virtue
itself, while the punishment of
folly and weakness is folly itself? or, lastly, that every man
ought to love his neighbour, and to obey the commands of the
supreme power? Such doctrines I have not only expressly
stated, but have also demonstrated them by very solid
reasoning. However, I think I see the mud wherein this person
sticks. He finds nothing in virtue and the understanding in
themselves to please him, but would prefer to live in
accordance with his passions, if it were not for the single
obstacle that he fears punishment. He abstains from evil
actions, and obeys the divine commands like a slave, with
unwillingness and hesitation, expecting as the reward of his
bondage to be recompensed by
God with gifts far more pleasing
than divine love, and greater in proportion to his dislike to
goodness and consequent unwillingness to practice it. Hence it
comes to pass, that he believes that all, who are
not restrained by this fear, lead a life of licence and throw off all
religion.
But this I pass over, and proceed to the deduction,
whereby he wishes to show, that "with covert and
disguised arguments I teach atheism." The
foundation of his reasoning is, that he thinks I take away freedom
from God,
and subject Him to fate. This is flatly false. For I have
maintained, that all things follow by inevitable necessity from the
nature of God,
in the same way as all maintain that it follows
from the nature of God,
that He understands Himself: no one
denies that this latter consequence follows necessarily from the
divine nature, yet no one conceives that
God is constrained by
any fate; they believe that He understands Himself with entire
freedom, though necessarily. I find nothing here, that cannot be
perceived by everyone; if, nevertheless, my adversary thinks that
these arguments are advanced with evil intent, what does he think
of his own Descartes, who asserted that nothing is done by us,
which has not been pre-ordained by
God, nay, that we are newly
created as it were by God every moment,
though none the less
we act according to our own
free will? This, as Descartes
himself confesses, no one can understand.

Further, this inevitable necessity in things destroys neither
divine laws nor human. For moral principles, whether they have
received from God
the form of laws or not, are nevertheless
divine and salutary. Whether we accept the good, which follows
from virtue and
the divine love, as given us by
God as a judge, or
as emanating from the necessity of the divine nature, it is not in
either case more or less to be desired; nor are the evils which
follow from evil actions less to be feared, because they
follow necessarily: finally, whether we act under necessity or
freedom, we are in either case led by hope and fear. Wherefore
the assertion is false, "that I maintain that there
is no room left for precepts and
commands." Or as he goes on to say, "that there is
no expectation of reward or punishment,
since all things are ascribed to fate, and
are said to flow with inevitable necessity
from God."

I do not here inquire, why it is the same, or almost the same to
say that all things necessarily flow from
God, as
to say that God
is universal; but I would have you observe the
insinuation which he not less maliciously subjoins, "that I
wish that men should practice virtue, not
because of the precepts and law of
God, or
through hope of reward and fear of punishment,
but," &c. Such a sentiment you will assuredly not find
anywhere in my treatise: on the contrary, I have expressly
stated in Chap. 4 [TPT04],
that the sum of the divine law (which, as I
have said in Chap. 2, [TPT02]
has been divinely inscribed on our
hearts), and its chief precept is, to love
God as the highest good:
not, indeed, from the fear of any punishment, for love cannot
spring from fear; nor for the love of anything which we desire for
our own delight, for then we should love not
God, but the object
of our desire.

I have shown in the same chapter
[TPT04], that
God revealed this law
to the prophets, so that, whether it received from
God the form
of a command, or whether we conceive it to be like
God's other
decrees, which involve eternal necessity and truth, it will in
either case remain God's decree and a salutary principle.
Whether I love God
in freedom, or whether I love Him from the
necessity of the divine decree, I shall nevertheless love
God, and
shall be in a state of salvation. Wherefore, I can now declare
here, that this person is one of that sort, of whom I have said at
the end of my preface, that I would rather that they utterly
neglected my book, than that by misinterpreting it after their
wont, they should become hostile, and hinder others without
benefiting themselves.

Though I think I have said enough to prove what I intended,
I have yet thought it worth while to add a few observations --
namely, that this person falsely thinks, that I have in view the
axiom of theologians, which draws a distinction between the
words of a prophet when propounding doctrine, and the same
prophet when narrating an event. If by such an axiom he
means that which in Chap. 15 [TPT15]
I attributed to a certain R.
Jehuda Alpakhar, how could he think that I agree with it, when
in that very chapter I reject it as false? If he does not mean this,
I confess I am as yet in ignorance as to what he does mean, and,
therefore, could not have had it in view.

Again, I cannot see why he says, that all will adopt my
opinions, who deny that reason and philosophy should be the
interpreters of Scripture; I have refuted the doctrine of such
persons, together with that of Maimonides.

It would take too long to review all the indications he gives of
not having judged me altogether calmly. I therefore pass on to
his conclusion, where he says, "that I have no
arguments to prove, that Mahomet was not a
true prophet." This he endeavours to show from my
opinions, whereas from them it clearly follows, that Mahomet
was an impostor, inasmuch as he utterly forbids that freedom,
which the Catholic religion revealed by our natural faculties
and by the prophets grants, and which I have shown should be
granted in its completeness. Even if this were not so, am I, I
should like to know, bound to show that any prophet is false?
Surely the burden lies with the prophets, to prove that they are
true. But if he retorts, that Mahomet also taught the divine
law, and gave certain signs of his mission, as the rest of the
prophets did, there is surely no reason why he should deny,
that Mahomet also was a true prophet.

As regards the Turks and other non-Christian nations; if
they worship God
by the practice of justice and charity towards
their neighbour, I believe that they have the spirit of
Christ,
and are in a state of salvation, whatever they may ignorantly
hold with regard to Mahomet and oracles.

Thus you see, my friend, how far this man has strayed from
the truth; nevertheless, I grant that he has inflicted the
greatest injury, not on me but on himself, inasmuch as he has
not been ashamed to declare, that "under disguised
and covert arguments I teach atheism."

I do not think, that you will find any expressions I have
used against this man too severe. However, if there be any of
the kind which offend you, I beg you to correct them, as you
shall think fit. I have no disposition to irritate him, whoever
he may be, and to raise up by my labours enemies against
myself; as this is often the result of disputes like the present, I
could scarcely prevail on myself to reply --nor should I have
prevailed, if I had not promised. Farewell. I commit to your
prudence this letter, and myself, who am, &c.
[Note N1]: The rough copy of this letter is still preserved,
and contains many strong expressions of Spinoza's
indignation against Velthuysen, which he afterwards
suppressed or mitigated.