United States v. Williams

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana

May 29, 2018

UNITED STATES OF AMERICAv.EDWARD WILLIAMS

OPINION AND ORDER

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CHIEF
JUDGE

This
matter is before the Court on Defendant Edward Williams's
Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or
Correct Sentence By a Person in Federal Custody [ECF No. 55],
filed on January 29, 2018. The Government has filed a
Response [ECF No. 60], arguing that the Defendant's
Motion is time-barred, and that, according to the terms of
his plea agreement, he waived his right to collaterally
attack his sentence. Because the Defendant filed the Motion
well outside of § 2255's one-year statute of
limitations, his Motion is dismissed.

On
September 15, 2014, this Court sentenced the Defendant as a
result of his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for
being a felon in possession of a firearm. A federal prisoner
must file his § 2255 motion within one year from the
date on which his “judgment of conviction becomes
final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). When a defendant does
not take a direct appeal, the sentence becomes final when the
deadline for filing a notice of appeal expires. Clarke v.
United States, 703 F.3d 1098, 1100 (7th Cir. 2013);
see also Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 525
(2003). The time for filing an appeal in a criminal case is
fourteen days after the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P.
4(b). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction became final on
September 29, 2014, and the limitations period expired one
year later. The Defendant's habeas Motion, filed on
January 29, 2018, is well outside the one-year statute of
limitations.

The
Defendant does not specifically ask the Court to find that
equitable tolling applies. However, the Defendant's
Motion, which is submitted on a form, contains his response
to the question why he did not appeal from an adverse action
on any previous motion. The Court construes these reasons as
the same (or similar to) ones he would offer in favor of
equitable tolling. The Defendant states that he “was
heavily medicated” and not mentally
“capable.” (Mot. 4.) Additionally, he states that
he was not allowed to see his Presentence Investigation
Report, which contained the sentencing enhancements. The
Defendant maintains that, “[a]fter a couple of years of
not being medicated, I was able to competently think.”
(Id.) Finally, the Defendant states that in the
county jail where he was housed, he did not have adequate
access to a law library to research his case.

The
Defendant has not presented any facts from which the Court
could conclude that he diligently pursued his rights before
the statute of limitations expired. The Defendant has
presented no instances in which he sought relief, much less
with reasonable diligence, or sought to preserve his rights.
See Tucker, 538 F.3d at 735 (equitable tolling
inapplicable because petitioner “had the burden to
demonstrate his own diligence in pursuing his claim, but
failed to present any evidence in support of it”)
(citations omitted). The Court's own review of the record
does not reveal any such efforts. The docket contains a
letter [ECF No. 49] that the Defendant wrote to the Clerk of
Court shortly after he was sentenced, wherein he requested
copies of his plea agreement and the docket sheet. A copy of
the docket was sent to the Defendant, and he was advised that
a copy of his plea agreement would cost $.60 [ECF No. 51].
The next submission from the Defendant is a letter filed
nearly three years later, on December 18, 2017 [ECF No. 53],
beyond the limitations period for filing a collateral attack.

Additionally,
the Defendant has not provided any proof that obstacles or
extraordinary circumstances beyond his control prevented him
from filing a timely motion. For example, he makes the
conclusory claim that his medications rendered him incapable.
Statements the Defendant made to the probation officer who
prepared his Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) reveal no
problems with his medication for anxiety and bipolar
disorder. To the contrary, the Defendant reported that it was
during periods when he was not incarcerated, and thus
“not properly medicated, ” that he felt
“paranoid, frustrated and extremely aggressive towards
others. He added that when he is not medicated he often feels
urges and impulses and feels that other people have something
against him without them necessarily saying so.” (PSR
¶ 72, ECF No. 44.)

The
Defendant was taking prescribed medications during the
pretrial phase of his case, including during the change of
plea hearing. During that hearing, with the Defendant
present, the court took measures to ensure that the Defendant
was competent to plead. The Defendant advised the court that
he was taking Trazadone 100 mg, Wellbutrin XL 150 mg, and
Zyprexa 5 mg. He explained that the medications helped him
sleep, stabilized his mood, and kept him feeling normal. He
unequivocally stated that none of the medications impacted
his ability to think clearly, and that he understood the
proceedings and the consequences of pleading guilty. After
making further inquiry of the probation officer, the court
specifically asked the Defendant whether he ever experienced
confusion after taking Trazadone. The Defendant assured the
court that he did not. Both the Defendant's lawyer and
the Government stated that they had no concerns with the
Defendant's competence to plead guilty. The court found
that the Defendant understood the significance of the
proceedings and was competent to continue.[1]

Nothing
in the record indicates that the Defendant's prescribed
medications had a different effect on the Defendant after he
was sentenced than they did when he entered the plea of
guilty. There is no evidence to suggest that the prescribed
medications created an obstacle to the Defendant's
pursuit of his rights. See, e.g., Obriecht v.
Foster, 727 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding no
diligent pursuit where the petition “offered only the
conclusory statements that he suffered from mental health
problems and was incarcerated in [a mental health
facility]” but had “not explained, or provided
evidence to demonstrate, how these two facts actually
impaired his ability to pursue his claims”).

A
potential additional obstacle is implied in the
Defendant's complaint that the county jail did not have
an adequate law library. However, after sentencing, the
Defendant was transferred from the county jail to the
designated federal facility to serve his term of
imprisonment. Thus, the adequacy of the law library at the
county jail could not have presented an obstacle to pursuing
collateral relief. In any event, many of the issues the
Defendant cites in his Motion were not dependent on legal
research and were capable of being presented without access
to a law library.

Finally,
the Defendant complains that he did not have access to his
Presentence Investigation Report containing his sentencing
enhancements. The Defendant, however, was sentenced pursuant
to a binding agreement for a specific term of imprisonment
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). (Plea
Agr. ¶ 8.c., ECF No. 26.) This binding term was set
forth in his plea agreement, and was not dependent on the
advisory Guideline calculations contained in his PSR.

The
Court does not find that a basis has been presented to
justify applying the extraordinary remedy of equitable
tolling to the Defendant's untimely Motion.

NO
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Pursuant
to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings,
the Court must &ldquo;issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the
applicant.&rdquo; A certificate of appealability may be
issued &ldquo;only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.&rdquo; 28
U.S.C. &sect; 2253(c)(2); Rule 11 of Rules Governing Section
2255 Proceedings. The substantial showing standard is met
when &ldquo;reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for
that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented
were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.&rdquo; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000) (quotation marks omitted); Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983). Where, as
here, “a plain procedural bar is present and the
district court is ...

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