The real meaning of Thailand’s referendum

If history is a guide, Thailand’s latest constitution will be short-lived, writes Patrick Jory.

Many observers of Thailand’s ongoing debilitating political crisis have been scratching their heads trying to understand how Thai voters approved a draft constitution in the referendum on 7 August which is so blatantly designed to entrench military rule.

The result of the referendum appeared to show an easy win to the ‘Yes’ camp. Sixty-one per cent of voters approved the draft constitution while 39 per cent voted ‘No’. Fifty-eight per cent also approved a second question, inserted by the regime at the last minute, on whether a non-elected prime minister could be appointed by a joint sitting of the Senate and House of Representatives.

The real aim of the draft constitution is to weaken the authority of any future elected government and to constitutionally protect the political influence of the military and its conservative backers. Its drafter, 78-year-old conservative lawyer Meechai Ruchupan, has close Palace and military connections. In the 1980s he headed the Prime Minister’s Office under the then prime minister, General Prem Tinsulanonda, who, now aged 96, is chairman of the King’s Privy Council. The intention of this draft is to return Thailand to that era in which elections and political parties were held tightly in check by the military and its backers in the Palace.

Yet the result of the referendum is less conclusive than it would appear.

The turnout was 59 per cent, less than the 80 per cent the military had hoped for, and below the average turnout for the last six general elections, which pro-Thaksin political parties have consistently won. But it was slightly higher than the turnout for the 2007 referendum (58 per cent). And the ‘Yes’ vote increased by by two per cent, while the ‘No’ vote decreased by almost two per cent.

Campaign banWhile no evidence of electoral fraud has been uncovered, this was in no sense a free and fair referendum. The military junta banned any campaigning. The ‘Vote No’ camp never had a chance to put their case to the people. Scores of people who defied the ban were arrested, charged, and some imprisoned. Because of the ban many voters did not know what was actually in the constitution. Meanwhile the regime made it clear through its control of the mass media and its influence over the bureaucracy that it expected the constitution to be passed.

Under such favourable circumstances the 36 per cent of eligible voters who supported the draft constitution is hardly a ringing endorsement of the constitution or its military junta backers.

Nevertheless, 36 per cent is not an insubstantial figure either. Indeed, it is enough for a political party to win government in some Western democracies. So how can we explain the strength of is apparent antidemocratic vote?

It is important to acknowledge that, unlike during the period from the 1950s to the 1980s, the Thai military today does not rule in its own right. It has a substantial social base of support. It is backed to varying degrees by middle and upper-class Thais, the powerful bureaucracy, the judiciary, university administrations and faculty, and large Sino–Thai corporations. For historical reasons it also has significant support in the upper and middle region of southern Thailand.

The Thai military’s real role today is as the armed vanguard of what the political scientist Fred Riggs famously coined ‘the bureaucratic polity’ that has dominated the Thai state since the 1950s. Members of the bureaucratic polity have historically seen themselves as serving the king, not ‘civil servants’. Indeed the Thai word for bureaucrat, kha ratchakan, literally means, ‘the king’s servant’.

The bureaucratic polity ensures that the lion’s share of state revenue is spent on Bangkok. The best schools, universities, hospitals, as well as job opportunities are all found there. Democratisation of Thai politics threatens this concentration of resources in Bangkok. It is no wonder that the Bangkok middle and upper classes are so opposed to it.

These antidemocratic tendencies also have religious and cultural roots.

The prominent place of the kha ratchakan in Thai society receives a subtle religious justification through the ancient Buddhist doctrine of ‘merit’ (bun). The poor are poor because of their lesser merit — that is accumulation of good deeds in past and present lives. Morally they are inferior to the wealthy, who are wealthy because of their superior merit (good deeds).

Rallying cryThe conception that the poor have low merit slips easily into the middle class’s biggest gripe about democratic politics — the scourge of corruption. Politicians, because they represent these low merit/corrupt people, cannot themselves escape the stain of corruption. Indeed, majoritarian democracy—rule by ‘the people’—is problematic in Buddhist terms, since it means rule by people of low merit.

By contrast, since the military and bureaucrats serve the king, the most meritorious being in the kingdom, they rank highly in the moral hierarchy. Of course, not all Thais are fervent Buddhists, but these ideas are over 1,000 years old. It is hard to believe they have been completely replaced by Western political thinking.

The need for government by ‘good people’ has been the rallying cry of the conservative elite since the crisis began in 2006. The preamble to the draft constitution explicitly states that it is designed to prevent people of ‘no morals’ from taking power in the country.

There is also an ethnic dimension to this Bangkok–provincial political cleavage. As historian Chris Baker has pointed out in a recent article, the predominantly Sino–Thai middle class has ‘almost no affinity with rural Thailand’. Indeed, they may be more familiar with Singapore, Hong Kong or Los Angeles than the provincial regions of Thailand. For many Sino–Thai, the countryside is ‘unknown and hence fearsome’.

This fear intensified in April–May 2010, when over 100,000 Red Shirt protesters, many from the northeast and north, marched into Bangkok with the aim of pressuring the elite-installed government to resign. The protests were bloodily suppressed by the military with up to 100 killed and thousands injured. One of the military leaders in charge of the crackdown, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, led the 2014 coup and is now prime minister.

This is Thailand’s 20th constitution in 84 years. Each constitution has an average life of just over four years. The frequency with which constitutions have been torn up following military coups has degraded their significance. Rather than setting in stone for perpetuity the basic legal framework for a nation, constitutions are almost always merely the attempt by the coup group and their backers to legally extend the authority they have won through force of arms.

But the debate over this particular constitution comes at a unique moment in Thailand’s modern political development. After 70 years on the throne, the reign of King Bhumibol is coming to an end. Since the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932 two competing conceptions of political legitimacy have been at war with each other. One holds that legitimate power lies with the monarch and is administered by his royal officials and defended by the military; the other, that it derives from the people and is exercised by their elected political representatives. This conflict has never been resolved.

Can the political domination of the bureaucratic polity survive the succession? Will the legitimacy that the monarchy confers on it and it military protectors continue under the new king? The level of repression since the 2014 coup, the draft constitution’s attempt to legally hobble any elected government and shore up bureaucratic power, and the lengths to which the regime has gone to force the referendum through, all suggest that the regime and its backers are far from certain.

Given all this, it is unlikely that this constitution will last much longer than its predecessors.

Patrick Jory is senior lecturer in Southeast Asian History, University of Queensland.

This article was first published at Asian Currents, the website of the Asian Studies Association of Australia.

Jory has half of it in reverse when he cites the military backers in the Palace. In fact, royalists are being supported by the military. The reason is two-fold: protect the institution and secondly, keep using it to preserve and enhance elite social stations.

Frank G. Anderson – that’s a chicken or the egg question, if ever I saw one !! It’s obviously a two-way intercourse between Palace backers and packers of the military, and military backers and packers of the Palace. Defense a la derniere !!

The following statements are patently false because of the claimed basis of “ancient Buddhist doctrine of ‘merit’ (bun):

“The prominent place of the kha ratchakan in Thai society receives a subtle religious justification through the ancient Buddhist doctrine of ‘merit’ (bun). The poor are poor because of their lesser merit — that is accumulation of good deeds in past and present lives. Morally they are inferior to the wealthy, who are wealthy because of their superior merit (good deeds).”

“Indeed, majoritarian democracy—rule by ‘the people’—is problematic in Buddhist terms, since it means rule by people of low merit.”

While it is difficult to say what exactly ancient Buddhists believed about karma, taking the Pali Canon and historical evidence as guides, the karma of kha ratchakan is rather far more Hindu than Buddhist.

Early Buddhist karma and that of the Pali Canon can justify just about anything: poor man becomes rich, rich man becomes poor because karmic fruits depend on both past and present actions and one never knows when good or bad karmic fruits will ripen. Thus if a poor man becomes rich he is fully deserving according to this Buddhist system of karma and the same for the rich man becoming poor.

Early Buddhism is known to have been anti-class/caste system and the system of karma underlying it. The Buddha famously said that one is not born a Brahmin but rather earns the title with one’s meritorious actions in this life. The Buddha had redefined Brahmin to be a virtuous person according to his ethical system. Thus while one may be born into a privileged position/class because of past good karma, one’s new karma in this life will determine whether that person is actually “good people” or not. There are also cases of born good people in the Pali Canon not acting so good, most notably Prince Ajatasattu who killed his father King Bimbisara in order to take the crown. Indeed, Ajatasttu gained a kingdom, but in Buddhist terms he was morally corrupt and karmically doomed. Hardly an example for kha ratchakan to maintain good people are born and remain morally and karmically superior to lower classes.

Thai “good people” hold to a system of karma, almost certainly inherited from the predominately Hindu Khmer Empire royal court, in which one is born into a class and remains there for life with the duty to fulfill the dharma of that class. Kha ratchakan then are born good people and remain so for life regardless of what they might do because they are in essence superior to lower classes. This more Hindu karma serves as a much better ideology for a ruling class than Buddhist karma which undermines the essentialist and absolutist position of kha ratchakan. However, this Hindu based kha ratchakan karma has for centuries flowed into the general Buddhist beliefs of the Thai and so it would not be mistaken to say that this karmic system is present in Thai Buddhism. Like so many beliefs and practices of the Thai royal court and network monarchy (including the heavy Sanskritization of the Thai language) to find the roots of Thai karma one must look equally, or even more so, to Hinduism rather than to Buddhism for the source.

Indeed. I was somewhat put out that on learning of my spouse’s death from cancer, a Thai remarked that they must have done something bad in a past life! Then we have the fact most Thais don’t believe in ‘Survival’ (their being Theravada (no atman/soul rather than Brahman Buddhist (atman). But they’re notoriously hung up on ghosts. Weird race.

I don’t think Patrick Jory meant to imply that the “moral hierarchy” that undoubtedly holds sway in Thai society is based in a careful reading of either the Pali canon or a profound affection for “ancient Buddhism” or what many farang apologists for Buddhism usually call “true” or “real” Buddhism.

Just as very few Christians turn away from wealth in order to ensure entrance to heaven or refrain from making judgments because that is God’s business alone, very few living Buddhists in Buddhist majority societies ponder the complexity and nuance of “ancient Buddhism”.

The founder of Buddhism was a princeling and many of his earliest supporters were wealthy and/or royal. Maybe that aspect of Buddhism is what seeps into actual existing Buddhist consciousness to create the sense that if you are born into wealth and power it must be because of merit accumulated in past lives.

Because it certainly isn’t the maunderings of “ancient” Buddhist philosophers as they contemplate the number of Arhats who can sit zazen on the head of a golden pin.

It is not correct to blame Hinduism for degenerate Buddhist views. However, I agree that the author’s description of these as ‘ancient Buddhist doctrine’ is incorrect.

The author assumes that contemporary Thai beliefs are all ‘Buddhism’ and therefore a representative yardstick for Buddhism, past and present. He makes the same series of false assumptions in respect of Buddhist kingship:
Thailand is Buddhist and undemocratic, therefore the Thai monarchy is Buddhist, therefore it has always been Buddhist, therefore Buddhism has always been undemocratic.

Unfortunately, Thailand isn’t really that Buddhist, not just because of historical interweaving with Khmer Hinduism and folk religion, but mainly because it has degenerated enormously in both monasteries and common culture over the last century and a half.
(Apart from the Thai-Lao and Thai-Khmer who have largely preserved their Buddhist heritage).

Not sure why you would expect anyone to “gripe”: everything in the Thai system of manners reflects the belief in hierarchical relations between people in all spheres of life.

The passive acceptance of low status by those afflicted with low status and the smug assumption of superiority and the justice thereof of you and your friends, vichai, is all the “empirical evidence” anyone needs in a discussion like this.

Of course there are educated upper-middle class Thais who will talk a good game of not believing in “this sort of thing”, especially when there are farang around or when everyone is playing at being “siwilai”, but they are simply not letting one hand know what the other is thinking.

I do. The line that middle-class Thais use for any argument are as follow: “Karma and sins are real”, “You don’t know what is high or low”, “Be careful what you say about our beloved king or you will go to hell”, “If you criticize our king and his family, you will get cancer in your mouth”, “People are poor because of their past life” blah blah blah. I think Vichai is “ดัดจริต” Perhaps you should read more on Facebook that belong to the Thai middle-class and you will understand why this country has not yet moved forward despite its rich natural resources.

If Jory’s assertion that the Thai middle class’ gripe of the Thai poor’s ‘low merit’ has no empirical evidence to back it up, then Jory’s assertion above must have been hearsay and of really very very low merit, Jory’s PhD notwithstanding

Military court has indicted a man for allegedly participating in a campaign against the junta-backed draft charter in late June despite the fact that the man merely observed the campaign. He was later released on bail without condition.