Thursday, October 30, 2014

Iraq is facing another huge refugee crisis. This started
when fighting broke out in Anbar at the end of December 2013 and has only
gotten worse since then. Many of the major urban centers in Anbar, Ninewa, and
Salahaddin such as Fallujah, Mosul, and Tikrit have seen mass displacement, as
well as smaller towns like Hit, which recently fell to the Islamic State. There
are now an estimated 1.8 million internal refugees. The Iraqi government has
promised aid to these people through the Migration and Displacement Ministry as
well as a special committee run by Deputy Premier Salah al-Mutlaq. Both of
these organizations have been charged with corruption stealing the money meant
for people who have lost their homes, and even extorting funds from them. This
is another sad chapter in the dysfunction of the Iraqi state.

Various reports have come out that the Migration Ministry
and displaced committee are ripe with corruption. On October
1, 2014 the displacement committee in Iraq’s parliament charged the special
committee on displacement headed by Deputy Prime Minister Salah al-Mutlaq with
blackmailing people. The parliamentary committee said that it was launching an investigation
into it. It later reported
that Mutlaq’s committee was not providing aid or services and was stealing
money. An article by IRIN accused the Migration Ministry of being duplicitous
as well. It said that internal refugee families had to pay bribes to officials
to receive assistance. It also found evidence that ministry officers were
filing fake papers claiming that they were displaced so that they could collect
money. Internal refugee families are supposed to get $850 from the ministry to
help pay for food and shelter. These are common practices throughout the Iraqi
bureaucracy, which is regularly ranked as one of the most corrupt in the world.
All too often Iraqi civil servants seek out their own cut of government
programs. This ranges from the lowest public employees all the way up to
director generals and even ministers themselves. The problem is systemic
throughout the government.

Thousands of displaced families and local officials have
complained that Baghdad is not providing assistance to the new wave of refugees
caused by the insurgency. In the face of this crisis bureaucrats have responded
by conducting business as usual siphoning off funds in any number of ways. The
displacement of almost two million people has simply offered them more
opportunities to steal money that is desperately needed for others who have
lost their homes and are now residing in refugee camps, with family or friends
or are squatting in abandoned buildings. The situation is only supposed to get
worse as winter arrives, yet Baghdad is proving incapable of helping those in
need.

Wednesday, October 29, 2014

New Prime Minister Haider Abadi is making some small steps towards
reforming Iraq’s dysfunctional government. In the middle of October 2014 he
announced a small, but important move in that direction. The premier said that
the fake bomb detectors that were purchased back in 2007 and had been proven
not to work over and over again would finally be replaced. New devices from the
U.S. are supposed to arrive soon to be installed in Karbala to protect the
shrine cities, and then another alternative is supposed to be found for the
rest of the country. These detectors, known as the ADE-651 have been a massive
scandal wrapped in corruption and incompetence that no one in Iraq would own up
to previously. Finally, the new prime minister is moving to rectify this
situation that has cost the lives of hundreds of people.

On October
23, 2014 Prime Minister Haider Abadi finally said that the ADE-651s would
be removed from service at checkpoints. An alternative would be found, but he
didn’t say what that would be. Two days later Adnan Asadi who is the
deputy Interior Minister held a press conference stating that modern U.S. bomb
detectors would arrive in Iraq this month to be employed in Karbala to protect
the pilgrims who flock to that province. He repeated Abadi’s remark that the
fake devices would be replaced as well. The ADE-651s were symbolic of the
corruption and hubris within the Iraqi government. Despite everyone knowing
they did not work Baghdad refused to get rid of them, and denied any wrong
doing. Abadi finally moving to get rid of them would be a huge move for
improving security. If real detectors can be found and deployed they could help
bring down the daily number of bombings, which plague the country and kill
hundreds of people every week.

An ADE-651 detector

The purchase of the ADE-651s were shrouded in controversy
from the very beginning. The devices were built by Jim
McCormick’s ATC out of England. McCormick was inspired to create the 651s
when he saw an ad for golf ball finders. He bought 300 of them for $20 each,
repackaged them and sold them as detectors for $7,000 a piece. He claimed they
could find explosives, drugs, ivory, and money. If that wasn’t enough the devices
had no power source, and were supposed to be run by static electricity
generated by the operating walking around in circles. In 2007 McCormick signed
a deal to sell around 7,000 of them for $2,500-$30,000 each to Iraq’s Interior
Ministry. Like all too many contracts this involved huge
payoffs to 15 Iraqi officials. The Inspector
General at Interior estimated that up to 75% of the $122 million deal could
have gone to bribes. Corruption is institutionalized within Baghdad, so it was
no surprise that the ATC deal involved it. What made the situation worse was
that no one in the leadership would own up to it despite all of the evidence
that the devices were not working and that they were killing people.

As soon as the ADE-651s were put into service there were
warnings about them. In November 2008, a whistleblower in the British
government said that the devices should be banned because they did not work,
but he was ignored. In January 2009 another official got the attention of the
British parliament who began looking into the detectors. That year the British
and American forces in Iraq were investigating the 651s. In June 2009, the U.S.
military did a study of the ADE-651 and found that it did not work. The Iraqis
were told about the report, but they did nothing. In 2010 England banned the
exportation of ATC’s devices, and McCormick was arrested. Finally, in May 2013
McCormick was convicted of fraud and received ten years in prison. The judge
said that McCormick’s greed had resulted in the deaths of people around the
world, while the ATC owner insisted that they worked all the way to the end.

ATC owner Jim McCormick was sentenced to 10 yrs in prison in 2013.
That wasn’t enough to stop Iraq from continuing to use the 651s (EPA)

Within Iraq there were investigations as well. In 2009 the
Interior Ministry’s Inspector General started an inquiry, followed by Maliki
ordering one after England banned the export of the 651s. Then Interior
Minister Jawad Bolani said that his office had looked into the devices and found
that they worked, and then stopped the prosecution of six Interior officers who
were charged with corruption in the buying of the detectors. In February 2011,
the head of the explosives department at the Interior Ministry and two other
officers were arrested over buying the 651s, and the Inspector General was able
to recover $20 million from the deal. Despite all this, Maliki would not admit
to any wrong doing. In May
2013 he said that most of the devices actually worked. He seemed more
interested in denying that his government was corrupt and incompetent then
removing the devices from service. By then everyone in Iraq knew that the 651s
were a farce, but the prime minister wanted to act like business as usual. To
do otherwise might have opened the door to more accusations of theft and
bribery something Maliki was completely unwilling to do probably because he
would have taken it as a personal attack. His hubris outweighed protecting the
public from insurgent bombs.

It took seven years for the Iraqi government to do anything
about the fake detectors. That only happened after Maliki was removed from
office. Even then, Karbala is supposed to get bomb detectors, but what will be
employed in the rest of the country has not been detailed nor when they are to
arrive. Until then more bombs will go off that could have been deterred if Iraq
had taken this matter seriously years ago instead of thinking about money and
image over people’s lives.

Monday, October 27, 2014

Violence remains relatively low in Iraq in October 2014 in
comparison to the height of the summer offensive. The third week of the month
saw a decline in attacks, deaths and wounded from the second week, which
witnessed a slight jump in all of those categories. Anbar remained under
threat, and the Islamic State (IS) launched a major assault upon a town in
Diyala, but eventually withdrew. More importantly fighting returned to Ninewa
as Mount Sinjar was fully encircled. In places like Salahaddin and Babil
however, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were on the offensive themselves. This
is what the military situation in Iraq will look like in the immediate future.
The insurgents still have the initiative with the ability to launch attacks
when and where they want, but the government forces are trying to reclaim some
of the ground that they lost.

The third week of October tied for the second fewest
reported attacks of any week of 2014. The press had 156 security incidents from
October 15-21. That was down from the previous week, which saw a brief surge in
violence with 188 attacks. For the week Anbar had the most attacks with 41,
followed by 40 in Baghdad, 34 in Salahaddin, 21 in Ninewa, and then just 7 in
Babil, 5 in Diyala, 3 in Basra, 2 each in Kirkuk and Wasit, and one in Karbala.
So far Iraq has been averaging 24.4 attacks per day for the month, which is up
from September’s 23.0, but below August’s 26.9, July’s 30.0, and June’s 29.3
when fighting was really raging across the center of the country.

Casualties dipped from October 15-21, back down to what was
seen at the start of the month. There were 449 dead and 770 wounded recorded in
the media. The former was made up of 35 members of the ISF, 24 Peshmerga, four
Sahwa, and 386 civilians. The latter consisted of 75 ISF, 51 Peshmerga, five
Sahwa, and 639 civilians. That was on par with the first week’s 451 killed and
687 wounded, and below the second week’s 532 fatalities and 875 injured. Baghdad
had almost half of the week’s casualties with 205 killed and 453 wounded. That
was followed by 79 dead in Salahaddin, 54 in Ninewa, 39 in Anbar, 27 in Diyala,
26 in Karbala, 12 in Babil, 3 in Basra, and two each in Kirkuk and Wasit. Deaths
were decidedly down this month from September. During the latter there was an
average of 91.4 deaths per day. In October there has only been 68.0 so far.
That highlights how fighting has decreased across Iraq since the summer time.
That dip started in the middle of August and has continued since then.

Violence
In Iraq By Week 2014

Date

Incidents

Dead

Wounded

Jan 1-7

244

363

736

Jan 8-14

273

364

683

Jan 15-21

205

358

616

Jan 22-28

236

305

618

Jan 29-31

57

93

237

JAN

1,015

1,483

2,890

Feb 1-7

204

296

700

Feb 8-14

226

258

505

Feb 15-21

264

346

703

Feb 22-28

251

374

618

FEB

945

1,274

2,526

Mar 1-7

253

412

702

Mar 8-14

206

324

612

Mar 15-21

216

423

736

Mar 22-27

211

279

580

Mar 28-31

110

168

271

MAR

996

1,606

2,901

Apr 1-7

238

259

550

Apr 8-14

223

362

646

Apr 15-21

251

406

786

Apr 22-28

226

347

744

Apr 29-30

61

82

179

APR

999

1,456

2,905

May 1-7

198

246

483

May 8-14

257

469

752

May 15-21

183

256

426

May 22-28

204

407

817

May 29-31

64

90

132

MAY

906

1,468

2,610

Jun 1-7

227

629

1,021

Jun 8-14

227

1,238

891

Jun 15-21

171

758

754

Jun 22-28

200

720

775

Jun 29-30

56

127

236

JUN

881

3,472

3,684

Jul 1-7

200

511

622

Jul 8-14

213

577

625

Jul 15-21

227

400

1,000

Jul 22-28

224

589

801

Jul 29-31

66

163

230

JUL

930

2,280

3,278

Aug 1-8

269

1,122

885

Aug 9-14

179

710

1,152

Aug 15-21

150

354

499

Aug 22-28

178

523

798

Aug 29-31

59

125

289

AUG

835

2,834

3,623

Sep 1-7

168

616

751

Sep 8-14

157

933

722

Sep 15-21

166

620

749

Sep 22-28

153

395

567

Sep 29-30

47

112

252

SEP

691

2,676

3,047

Oct 1-7

170

451

687

Oct 8-14

188

532

875

Oct 15-21

156

446

769

Violence
In Iraq By Province Oct 1-21, 2014

Province

Oct 1-7

Oct 8-14

Anbar

39 Incidents

145 Killed: 78 ISF, 13 Sahwa, 54 Civilians

136 Wounded: 43 ISF, 7 Sahwa, 86 Civilians

27 Shootings

5 IEDs

3 Car Bombs

1 Suicide Car Bomb

2 Suicide Bombers

37 Incidents

44 Killed: 9 ISF, 4 Sahwa, 31 Civilians

56 Wounded: 3 Sahwa, 53 Civilians

28 Shootings

2 IEDs

2 Suicide Car Bombs

Babil

10 Incidents

17 Killed: 3 ISF, 14 Civilians

64 Wounded: 4 ISF, 60 Civilians

1 Shooting

7 IEDs

1 Sticky Bomb

10 Incidents

39 Killed: 2 ISF, 37 Civilians

26 Wounded: 4 ISF, 22 Civilians

8 Shootings

2 IEDs

Baghdad

27 Incidents

77 Killed: 3 ISF, 2 Sahwa, 72 Civilians

212 Wounded: 3 ISF, 2 Sahwa, 207 Civilians

4 Shootings

11 IEDs

4 Sticky Bombs

2 Car Bombs

1 Suicide Car Bomb

36 Incidents

171 Killed: 5 ISF, 166 Civilians

453 Wounded: 1 ISF, 452 Civilians

5 Shootings

20 IEDs

3 Sticky Bombs

2 Car Bombs

5 Suicide Car Bombs

2 Suicide Bombers

Basra

2 Incidents

1 IED

2 Incidents

1 Killed: 1 Civilian

1 Shooting

Diyala

17 Incidents

41 Killed: 30 ISF, 8 Peshmerga, 3 Civilians

34 Wounded: 20 ISF, 8 Peshmerga, 2 Sahwa, 4 Civilians

12 Shootings

5 IEDs

2 Suicide Bombers

24 Incidents

93 Killed: 8 ISF, 31 Peshmerga, 54 Civilians

152 Wounded: 6 ISF, 4 Peshmerga, 142 Civilians

9 Shootings

16 IEDs

4 Suicide Car Bombs

Kirkuk

11 Incidents

2 Killed: 2 Civilians

24 Wounded: 4 Peshmerga, 20 Civilians

3 Shootings

3 IEDs

1 Motorcycle Bomb

1 Suicide Car Bomb

8 Incidents

7 Killed: 1 ISF, 2 Peshmerga, 4 Civilians

30 Wounded: 5 ISF, 4 Peshmerga, 21 Civilians

7 Shootings

1 Motorcycle Bomb

Ninewa

11 Incidents

53 Killed: 53 Civilians

5 Shootings

1 IED

10 Incidents

37 Killed: 37 Civilians

8 Shootings

2 IEDs

Salahaddin

52 Incidents

116 Killed: 44 ISF, 6 Sahwa, 66 Civilians

217 Wounded: 49 ISF, 15 Sahwa, 153 Civilians

25 Shootings

33 IEDs

2 Car Bombs

5 Suicide Car Bombs

2 Suicide Bombers

58 Incidents

140 Killed: 59 ISF, 3 Sahwa, 78 Civilians

158 Wounded: 48 ISF, 3 Sahwa, 107 Civilians

25 Shootings

53 IEDs

1 Sticky Bomb

7 Car Bombs

1 Suicide Car Bomb

1 Suicide Bomb

Province

Oct 15-21

Anbar

41 Incidents

39 Killed: 4 ISF, 3 Sahwa, 32 Civilians

69 Wounded: 5 Sahwa, 64 Civilians

28 Shootings

3 IEDs

2 Suicide Car Bombs

Babil

7 Incidents

12 Killed: 12 Civilians

33 Wounded: 4 ISF, 29 Civilians

3 Shooting

3 IEDs

1 Suicide Car Bomb

Baghdad

40 Incidents

205 Killed: 19 ISF, 186 Civilians

453 Wounded: 44 ISF, 409 Civilians

10 Shootings

18 IEDs

1 Sticky Bombs

9 Car Bombs

1 Suicide Car Bomb

2 Suicide Bombers

Basra

3 Incidents

3 Killed: 3 Civilians

1 Wounded: 1 ISF

3 Shootings

Diyala

5 Incidents

27 Killed: 27 Civilians

4 Shootings

3 IEDs

Karbala

1 Incident

26 Killed: 26 Civilians

55 Wounded: 55 Civilians

4 Car Bombs

Kirkuk

2 Incidents

2 Killed: 2 Civilians

2 IEDs

Ninewa

21 Incidents

54 Killed: 1 ISF, 22 Peshmerga, 31 Civilians

51 Wounded: 51 Peshmerga

12 Shootings

10 IEDs

1 Suicide Car Bomb

1 Suicide Bomber

Salahaddin

34 Incidents

79 Killed: 11 ISF, 2 Peshmerga, 1 Sahwa, 65 Civilians

108 Wounded: 26 ISF, 82 Civilians

18 Shootings

92 IEDs

2 Suicide Bombers

1 Suicide Car Bomb

1 Car Bomb

Since the Islamic State began its summer offensive in June
there have been fewer car bombs each month, but more car bomb waves with
greater frequency. In the third week of October there were a total of 20
vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) costing the lives of 167
people and wounding another 289. So far this month there have been four such
waves going from October 1-4, October 7-9, October 11-14, and October 19-21. At
the beginning of the year there were only around 2-3 waves each month.

Despite promises by Prime Minister Haider Abadi government
forces have not stopped shelling and carrying out air strikes on civilian
areas. In the third week of October Fallujah and an area north of Tikrit were
all hit with 47 dead and 56 wounded. The reason why this is such an issue is
because the Iraqi army’s artillery is notoriously inaccurate due to poor
intelligence and coordination. That means most of the shelling is
indiscriminate and has killed a huge number of civilians. Abadi’s remarks about
ending this practice would not only appeal to Sunnis who are the victims, but
stop a useless tactic that does nothing militarily and just costs the lives of
innocent people. Unfortunately nothing has changed.

Casualties
From Government Shelling & Air Strikes In Iraq Oct. 2014

Date

Location

Dead

Wounded

Oct. 1

Fallujah,
Anbar

6

Oct. 3

Fallujah,
Anbar

4

11

Oct. 4

Rabad,
Salahaddin

3

5

Oct. 6

Hit,
Anbar

15

Fallujah,
Anbar

1

8

Rabia,
Ninewa

12

Oct. 7

Fallujah,
Anbar

3

5

Khalidiya,
Anbar

5

7

1st
Wk Oct Totals

-

43

42

Oct. 8

Fallujah,
Anbar

7

16

Tikrit,
Salahaddin

14

Oct 9

Dour,
Salahaddin

7

3

Oct. 10

Fallujah,
Anbar

4

13

Oct. 11

Fallujah,
Anbar

2

6

Oct. 14

Fallujah,
Anbar

3

3

Baiji,
Salahaddin

4

2nd
Wk Oct Totals

-

41

41

Oct. 15

Fallujah,
Anbar

3

6

Oct. 18

Fallujah,
Anbar

4

7

North
of Tikrit, Salahaddin

18

4

Oct. 19

Fallujah,
Anbar

3

9

Oct. 20

Fallujah,
Anbar

18

17

Oct. 21

Fallujah,
Anbar

1

13

3rd
Wk Oct Totals

-

47

56

The Islamic State is continuing its charge across Anbar. In
the middle of October it captured an army base outside of Hit. It was able to seize
seven Abrams tanks, 22 Humvees, and 18 other vehicles. This adds to the huge
stocks of weapons and material that the group has been able to get from the
government since June.

Since then IS has been focused upon taking Ramadi. On October
15 IS attacked the city from three directions starting around midnight, and
were able to bomb the
provincial council building and the Anbar police headquarters. Afterward the
Anbar Operations Command said they were going to launch a counter
attack starting in the center of the city. The ISF and allied tribes were
also trying
to clear the outlying towns such as Albu Diab and Albu Jassim. By October
21, the ISF claimed it had secured 60th and 20th
Streets along with the Rimayla and Tamim districts of the city in the south and
center. Many of these regions have been contested since January however so any
gains are usually temporary. If IS was able to take Ramadi it would be a coup since
it is the provincial capital. Fighting has been going on there for months, but
it finally appears that the insurgents might be gaining the upper hand as they
have been able to taken control of new neighborhoods in recent weeks.

(Weather-forecast.com)

IS is also attempting to take Baghdadi and the neighboring
Al-Assad base. Militants have been able to surround
both the town and the
base, and cut off their supply lines. On October
18 reinforcements did arrive at Al-Assad, probably by air. One soldier
inside the compound told McClatchy
Newspapers that his compatriots were broken and didn’t know how long they
could hold out. Recently U.S.
advisers were deployed to the base as well. They find themselves in a
precarious situation, and could be the first American troops to face combat if
security continues to deteriorate there. More importantly Assad is the largest
remaining base in Anbar and its capture would be another coup for the
insurgents.

(Institute for the Study of War)

Amiriya Fallujah is a major target as well. October
15 IS began attacks on the city, and the local police chief said that the
town was almost surrounded. On October
16 insurgents launched another three pronged assault upon it, which was
repulsed. The next
day reinforcements arrived. October
18 IS made another attempt on the town. That failed as well, but the
insurgents have been able to consolidate their hold on the surrounding rural
areas. October
19 a member of the Anbar council told the press that the army backed by
coalition air strikes was able to break open supply lines to Amiriya relieving
some of the pressure there. The town is another part of Anbar that has been
hotly contested for weeks and gone back and forth between government and
insurgent hands. The attacks there, in Ramadi, Baghdadi and Al-Assad show that
the militants are operating in western, central and eastern Anbar
simultaneously, and rather successfully, while stretching the ISF and tribes.

On a positive note, the Interior Ministry approved the
formation of a local
security force for the province. It is to be made up of three brigades of
1,000 tribal fighters each. It will be called the Special Task Force Brigades,
and be trained by the U.S. at the Habaniya base in the center of the province.
The Anbar council has embraced the idea of a national guard to be under local
control. The Iraqi parliament has not passed the legislation to form this force
yet, so these new brigades are the next best the thing. The question is how
quickly can they be armed and trained and put out into the field as all of
Anbar is on the brink with militants controlling at least 80% of the territory.

The third week of October saw the fourteenth security
operation of 2014 begin in northern Babil. The thirteenth sweep of the province
was announced around October
15 when the Mayor of Musayib announced that Sadr’s Peace Brigades had
cleared the lakes region of Iskandiriya, and were going to turn over the area
to the ISF. Then on October 20 the fourteenth operation began. First, the ISF and militias
said it had cleared the road linking Jurf al-Sakhr to Amiriya Fallujah in Anbar,
which had been used as a supply route for the Islamic State. The government had
been working on this area for several weeks. Then the ISF and allies began advancing
into northeast Babil from Anbar. On October 21 it was reported that 100
insurgents surrounded, as the Babil Operations Command began the new campaign.
These are the exact same tactics employed in the last operation. That one
included the Anbar, Bahgdad and Babil Operation Commands and pushed in from the
north west and east into Babil. As with the previous ones there were reports of
success, but a new operation beginning almost immediately afterward belies
those comments. Militias have complained that there was a lack of coordination
with the ISF and volunteers in previous campaigns, and that Maliki was
interfering with the military leadership and planning. It’s yet to be seen
whether the government can clear and hold ground in this area, which is has
focused upon since the start of the year.

Baghdad saw another series of car bombings and suicide
attacks during the week. October
16 four VBIEDs went off in Dawlai, Kadhimiya and Hurriya killing 32 and
wounding 78. Kadhimiya has been targeted again and again in the past few weeks
as it is a core Shiite neighborhood with an important shrine. The next day,
three car bombs detonated in Adhamiya,
Baladiyat
and Karrada
costing 32 lives and injuring 101. Then October
19 and 20
suicide bombers hit two mosques killing a total of 40 and injuring 69. Finally,
October
21Kadhimiya
was struck by three more VBIEDs with 40 dead and 31 wounded.

(Arsenal For Democracy)

In Diyala IS attempted to seize a target of opportunity in
Qara Tapa. October
20 it assaulted and held the town for several hours. It entered wearing
peshmerga uniforms and were able to kidnap six people, while executing nine. Then
a full scale battle broke
out. Almost half of the town’s 9,000 residents fled as a result. The
seeming victory was short lived as the next
day the militants withdrew. The militias, ISF and peshmerga had all been on
the offensive in Diyala over the last few weeks. The attack upon Qara Tapa had
no strategic significance, but it highlighted the ability of the insurgents to
continue operations in the midst of military pressure being applied to them.

Fighting returned to Ninewa in the middle of October. During
the second week of the month the Kurds said that they were liberating Sinjar,
which was taken by the Islamic State in August, but then it was revealed that
IS had actually surrounded Mount Sinjar and were trying to take it once again.
On October 20 there were clashes in all the surrounding areas such as Khazir,
Bartella, Bashiqa, Tilkaif and Mount Sinjar
itself. IS was able to seize
two towns north of the mountain that day as Yazidi fighters ran out of
ammunition. Twenty peshmerga were also killed and 51 wounded. On Mount Sinjar
there are two Yazidi militias resisting the IS push. They told Rudaw that they
had not received supplies for weeks. There are also YPG, PKK, and peshmerga
fighters in the area as well. IS has cut off the supply routes to the mountain
and the Yazidi forces are desperate for weapons and ammunition. This reverses
the positive news that had come out of the area previously with the Kurds able
to take several towns and the Rabia border crossing with Syria. There are still
a few hundred families on Mount Sinjar, and if it were taken more massacres and
kidnappings would occur as happened during the first IS assault in August.

The security forces launched a multi-pronged operation in
Salahaddin to take Baiji and Tikrit. October
16 the chief of the Salahaddin Operations Command let the press know about
the new campaign. On October
19 the ISF freed Albu Tuma to the north of Tikrit. October
21 the elite Golden Division was fighting in Hajaj in the Baiji district to
the north of Tikrit as well. That area was said to have been cleared on October
10 and again on October
20, but as with many places it has gone back and forth. October 21 the Salahaddin
Police chief noted that the ISF had gotten to the outskirts of Baiji in the
south, and took the village of Mazra
in the district. The security forces are attempting to surround Tikrit, which
fell to insurgents back in June. Baiji is also important as the nearby Baiji
refinery is a major piece of infrastructure that needs to be kept in government
hands. The refinery itself has faced renewedattacks
in the last few weeks as well. It would be an important piece of equipment to
help IS maintain its territory if it could operate it.

(Wikipedia)

In eastern Salahaddin’s Tuz Kharmato there is on going
violence and problems between the militias and peshmerga. October
16 a car bomb went off at the offices of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in
the city of Tuz. Then on October
18 members of the Badr militia got into a gunfight with the peshmerga in
the district. A Badr vehicle refused to stop at a Kurdish checkpoint leading to
a skirmish that left 1 peshmerga and two militiamen injured. The two sides then
met to try to resolve the issue. This is not the first time an incident like
this has occurred there. The two forces are attempting to assert their control
over the district, which has led to tensions rising between them. The area appears
to be up for grabs as many of the Sunni residents have fled and the militias
are carrying out retaliatory
attacks to drive more out and stop others from returning by destroying
their houses.

IRAQ HISTORY TIMELINE

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com