Maria Carolina Araullo

vs Benigno Aquino III

W hen President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggishgrowth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan.Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called theDisbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAPenables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects insteadof waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certaingovernment project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the fundsallotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds aredeclared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priorityprojects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was infact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the SupremeCourt).Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General AppropriationsAct (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he,and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favorof the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that themoney was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realignfunds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded;to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for theMNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M forcertain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan,and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Courtquestioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that nomoney shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made bylaw.Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savingsand augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of thePresident to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President tosuspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).Issues:I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasuryexcept in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by theexecutive.III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.HELD:I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely aprogram by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program forprioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision citedin Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn fromthe Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds,which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to thePresidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations forwhatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be anunmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was thetransfer of funds.III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President(and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitutionto make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be madewithin their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may beallowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA forthe Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to anexisting project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within theExecutive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no fundswere appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate,they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. Assuch, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.On the issue of what are savingsThese DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive.Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances,when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finallydiscontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawnfrom a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not compliedwith under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only bedeclared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawnfrom certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by theExecutive particularly by the DBM.IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAPbecause under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from theNational Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenuetargets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds wereused.V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to itbeing declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP hasdefinitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive isordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. TheDAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to returnwhat they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, theDoctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, andproponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, oradministrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.Facts:The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacantseat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Coronas departure.Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need tocreate a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nomineesto the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all thestakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial andBar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that

(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of theSupreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, theSecretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officioMembers, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retiredMember of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. Incompliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC,designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act asone of the ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered.

Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member wasadded to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting inthe JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate,with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case,Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.(respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framersoriginally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating arepresentative of the National Assembly to the JBC. The phrase, however,was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which wasadopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondentsalso contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequenceof having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they wouldhave made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress inthe JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBCwould deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle ofbalance.

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives ofCongress to be members of the JBC does not render JBCs purpose ofproviding balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members fromCongress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6)members who are undeniably presidential appointees

Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is anobject of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all thecitizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legalblunders.

Issue:Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter andspirit of the 1987 Constitution.Held:No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress toperform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such,it is unconstitutional.One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where thewords of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given itsliteral meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settledprinciple of constitutional construction that the language employed in theConstitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technicalterms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discernedfrom Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in thephrase, a representative of Congress, the use of the singular letter apreceding representative of Congress is unequivocal and leaves no room forany other construction. It is indicative of what the members of theConstitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate onlyone (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more thanone (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framerscould have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or

phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, itscorrect construction may be made clear and specific by considering thecompany of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Everymeaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from thecontext of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is alwaysused in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may bemodified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to thiscase, it becomes apparent that the word Congress used in Article VIII,Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particularallusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House ofRepresentatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singularrepresentative may be allowed to sit in the JBC

Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain

and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records ofthe Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court shouldproceed to look into the minds of the members of the ConstitutionalCommission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended thatthe JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reasonleads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half(1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sittingmembers of the JBC for that matter.

With the respondents contention that each representative should be admitted

from the Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, afterthe perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held that Congress,in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body.While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and thatan inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of thelegislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot beapplied in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the twohouses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required betweenthe Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening andnomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term Congress must be taken tomean the entire legislative department.

The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector andthe three branches of government would have an active role and equal voicein the selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow theLegislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having morethan one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each,would negate the principle of equality among the three branches ofgovernment which is enshrined in the Constitution.

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be

composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of anothermember, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against thatmandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress withan equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointeesto the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandateshould not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of theland. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other lawsmust conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of theland, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matterwhat may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway andaccommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whimsand caprices of the government and the people who run it.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of

the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fairplay under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declarationof unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the

Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and BarCouncil is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member ofCongress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.Civil Service Commission vs. Cortez, G.R. No. 200103,April 23, 2014ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; NEPOTISM; DEFINITION. Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favorof a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointingauthority; (2) recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediatesupervision over the appointee. Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of CommissionerMallari in the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallari.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; NEPOTISM; EXCEPTIONS. By way of exception, the following shall not becovered by the prohibition: (1) persons employed in a confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians;and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In the present case, however, the appointment ofrespondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR does not fall to any of the exemptions provided by law.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE CODE; SECTION 59; PURPOSE. The purpose of Section 59on the rule against nepotism is to take out the discretion of the appointing and recommending authority onthe matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative. The rule insures the objectivity of theappointing or recommending official by preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested. Clearly, theprohibition against nepotism is intended to apply to natural persons. It is one pernicious evil impeding thecivil service and the efficiency of its personnel.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; NEPOTISM; PROHIBITION; INCLUDES APPOINTMENTS BY A GROUP.

Moreover, basic rule in statutory construction is the legal maxim that "we must interpret not by the letterthat killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life." To rule that the prohibition applies only to the Commission, andnot to the individual members who compose it, will render the prohibition meaningless. Apparently, theCommission En Banc, which is a body created by fiction of law, can never have relatives to speak of.

Indeed, it is absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil on nepotism does not include appointments made bya group of individuals acting as a body. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Thisprinciple is elementary and does not need explanation. Certainly, if acts that cannot be legally done directlycan be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.IVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS. MARICELLE M. CORTES (G.R. NO.200103, APRIL 23, 2014)FACTS:The Commission en banc of the Commission of Human Rights approved the appointment ofMaricelle M. Cortes as Information Officer V. Eligio P. Mallari Maricelles father, was a CHRCommissioner but he abstained from voting and instead requested CHR to render an opinion onthe legality of Maricelles appointment.CHRs Legal Division opined that Maricelles appointment was not nepotic, hence valid, becausethe Commission En Banc had a separate and distinct personality from its members. Subsequentlythough, CSC-NCR invalidated Maricelles appointment on the ground of nepotism. According toCSC-NCR, Commissioner Mallari is still considered an appointing authority despite being a meremember of the Commission En Banc.Maricelle argued that her appointment was not nepotic because the appointing authority referredto in Sec. 59 of the Administrative Code is the Commission En Banc and not the individualCommissioners who compose it.ISSUE:Is Maricelles appointment covered by the prohibition against nepotism?

RULING:Yes. In dismissing Maricelles arguments, the Supreme Court held that the prohibition is intendedto apply to natural persons and not juridical persons because the latter can never have relatives.Neither did the Court appreciate Commissioner Mallaris abstention from voting since his merepresence during the deliberation already casted doubt on the impartiality and neutrality ofthe Commission En Banc. To quote the Supreme Court:Indeed, it is absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil on nepotism does not include appointmentsmade by a group of individuals acting as a body. What cannot be done directly cannot be doneindirectly. This principle is elementary and does not need explanation. Certainly, if actsthat cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.In the present case, respondent Cortes appointment as IO V in the CHR by the Commission EnBanc, where his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition. Commissioner Mallarisabstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evilsought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation forthe appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality andneutrality of the Commission En Banc.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYOG.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10,2010.These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from theforthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, orseven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation toSection 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from theoccurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by theJudicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15,Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the Presidentor Acting President from making appointments within two monthsimmediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of histerm, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continuedvacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed tostart the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered forthe position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices ofthe Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate JusticeRenato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; AssociateJustice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through lettersdated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next ChiefJustice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of theConstitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It arguesthat any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from itsoccurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that hadthe framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Courtappointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (ExecutiveDepartment) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and thatthe framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitationson the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensureits independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from politicalpressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, theestablishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shallappoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properlyinitiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (thatis, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC mayresume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision ofSection 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President toappoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be itthe Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrenceof the vacancy.ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of ChiefJustice Puno upon his retirement.HELD:Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to filla vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15.Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to theend of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,except temporary appointments to executive positions when continuedvacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4.(1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteenAssociate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three,five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days fromthe occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they couldhave explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous orderingof the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibitionmade explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to theappointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, mostlikely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done onlyreveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President makingappointments within two months before the next presidential elections and upto the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to theMembers of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they couldhave explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous orderingof the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibitionmade explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to theappointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, mostlikely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done onlyreveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President makingappointments within two months before the next presidential elections and upto the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to theMembers of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, inthat they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Departmentrenders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the ExecutiveDepartment. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of thestatute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every partmust be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to thegeneral intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framersdeliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if theyintended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that wastheir intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if onlyto be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition inArticle VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

Case Digest: De la Salle University, Petitioner, v. De la Salle

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

On May 30, 2000, some of De La Salle University Employees Association (DLSUEA-NAFTEU) membersheaded by Belen Aliazas (the Aliazas faction) filed a petition for the election of union officers in theBureau of Labor Relations (BLR). They alleged therein that there has been no election for DLSUEA-NAFTEUs officers since 1992 in supposed violation of the unions constitution and by-laws whichprovided for an election of officers every three years. It would appear that DLSUEA-NAFTEU repeatedlyvoted to approve the hold-over of the previously elected officers led by Baylon Baez (Baez faction).

When the matter was eventually elevated to the BLR Director, the latter ruled that the Baez factionstenure in office is valid and subsisting until their successors have been duly elected and qualified.

Thereafter, DLSUEA-NAFTEU entered into a five-year CBA with De La Salle University (DLSU). TheAliazas faction wrote a letter to DLSU requesting it to place in escrow the union dues and other feesdeducted from the salaries of employees pending the resolution of the intra-union conflict. DLSUEA-NAFTEU filed a complaint for unfair labor practice in the NLRC alleging that DLSU violated Article 248(a)and (g) of the Labor Code. DLSUEA-NAFTEU asserted that that the creation of escrow accounts was notan act of neutrality as it was influenced by the Aliazas factionss letter and was an act of interference withthe internal affairs of the union. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice.

Subsequently, DLSUEA-NAFTEU sent a letter to DLSU requesting for the renegotiation of the economicterms for the fourth and fifth years of the then current CBA. DLSU denied the request promptingDLSUEA-NAFTEU to file a notice of strike. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and found DLSUguilty of unfair labor practice.

Consequently, DLSUEA-NAFTEU reiterated its demand on DLSU to bargain collectively pursuant to theaforementioned Decision of the Secretary of Labor. Again, DLSU declined the request. Thus, DLSUEA-NAFTEU filed another notice of strike. The Secretary of Labor cited his earlier decision and ruled thatDLSU is guilty of unfair labor practice. In accordance with the said decision, DLSU turned over toDLSUEA-NAFTEU the collected union dues and agency fees from employees which were previouslyplaced in escrow.

Aggrieved, DLSU appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition. When the matterwas elevated to the Supreme Court, the Court affirmed the CA. DLSU moved to reconsider but the Courtdenied the same. Thus, the decision attained finality. Meanwhile, DLSUEA-NAFTEU was ordered to file acomment, and, subsequently, this petition was given due course.

ISSUE: Whether or not DLSU is guilty of unfair labor practice when it refused to bargain collectively withDLSUEA-NAFTEU in light of the intra-union dispute between DLSUEA-NAFTEU two opposing factions?

HELD: The petition is denied.

Inevitably, G.R. No. 168477 and this petition seek only one relief, that is, to absolve petitioner fromrespondents charge of committing an unfair labor practice, or specifically, a violation of Article 248(g) inrelation to Article 252 of the Labor Code. In other words, our previous affirmance of the Court of Appealsfinding that petitioner erred in suspending collective bargaining negotiations with the union and inplacing the union funds in escrow considering that the intra-union dispute between the Aliazas and Baezfactions was not a justification therefor is binding herein.

The law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means thatwhatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the sameparties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not,so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before thecourt.

Neither can petitioner seek refuge in its defense that as early as November 2003 it had already releasedthe escrowed union dues to respondent and normalized relations with the latter. The fact remains thatfrom its receipt of the July 28, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-0015-2003 until itsreceipt of the November 17, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-0033-2003, petitionerfailed in its duty to collectively bargain with respondent union without valid reason.

FACTS:On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by RepresentativeFelix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, inaid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of theSupreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President JosephE. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and sevenAssociate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trustand other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, RonaldoB. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The HouseCommittee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficientin form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Todate, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordancewith the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filingon June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee onJustice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary Generalof the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella againstChief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated byabove-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of theHouse of Representatives.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaintand referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoingmanner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following ArticleXI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filedby former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associatejustices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and FelixWilliam Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutionalprohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officerwithin a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear thatjudicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the merespecter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened toclarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions."From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly politicalquestions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thusbeyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained.On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questionswhich are not truly political in nature.

G.R. No. 171092.

March 15, 2010. EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, petitioner, vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS, respondent.FACTS: On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages againstrespondent British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. The tortuousconduct by the flight attendants of said Airways, which prompted petitioner to file a case for damages,allegedly transpired when petitioner boarded respondents flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. On May30, 2005, respondent, by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss ongrounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent. Respondentalleged that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over thecomplaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1) of which provides:An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of domicile of the carrier or his principalplace of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, orbefore the court of the placeof destination. ISSUE: Whether or not Philippines, a signatory to the Warsaw Convention, should adhere to theprovision of the Warsaw Convention in the determination of its jurisdiction with respect to a case fordamages involving a tortuous conduct committed by an airline personnel while in an internationalcarrier against a Filipino citizen.HELD: Yes. It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. InSantos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256 (1992), we held that: The Republic of thePhilippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to InternationalTransportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13,1933. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950.The Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950,and was deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention becameapplicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President RamonMagsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherencethereto, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observedand fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof.The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and,as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.

December 4, 2007Issue: Validity of Electric Cooperative Election Code.Ruling:The ECEC is invalid. The ECEC applies to allelectriccooperatives in the country. It is not a mere internalmemorandum, interpretative regulation,or instruction tosubordinates. No proof was presented to show that it waspublished in OG or othernewspaper of general circulation.Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall takeeffectafter fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in theOfficial Gazetteor in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwiseprovided.ExecutiveOrder No. 292, otherwise known asthe Administrative Code of 1987, reinforced the requirementof publication and outlined the procedure, as follows: Sec. 3.Filing.(1)Every Agency shall file withthe University of the PhilippinesLawCenterthree (3) Certifiedcopies ofevery rule adopted by it.Rules inforce on the date of effectivity of this Codewhich are not filed withinthree (3) monthsfrom that date shall not thereafter be thebasis of any sanction against any partyorpersons. (2)The Records Officer of the agency, or hisequivalent functionary, shall carry outtherequirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3)A permanent register of all rulesshall bekept by the issuing agency and shall beopen to public inspection. Sec. 4.Effectivity In additionto other rule-making requirements provided by law notinconsistent with this Book, each ruleshallbecome effective fifteen (15) days from thedate of filing as above provided unless adifferent dateis fixed by law, or specifiedin this rule. Sec. 18.When Laws Take Effect Laws shalltake effect afterFifteen (15) days followingthe completion of their publication in theOfficial Gazette or in a newspaperof general circulation, unless it is otherwiseprovidedTolentino v. Secretary of FinanceFacts:The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on thesale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance itsadministration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging theconstitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required byArt. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No.11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by theConstitution.

Held:The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art.VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill whichis required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that arevenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment ofthe law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only toconcur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means isthat the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, privatebills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected asthey are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needsand problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation ofits receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt ofthe House bill.PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), Petitioner, versus PHILIPPINEGAMING JURISDICTION INCORPORATED (PEJI), ZAMBOANGA CITY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONEAUTHORITY, et al.,Respondent.

2009-04-24 | G.R. No. 177333

Facts:On 23 February 1995, R.A. No. 7903 was enacted into law, to which it conceived the Zamboanga City SpecialEconomic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among other things, the law givesthe ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the following power under Sec. 7 (f) Section 7. (f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and recreational and sports facilities;

In the exercise of its power granted under the above provision, public respondent ZAMBOECOZONE Authorityapproved the application of private respondent Philippine E-Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a MasterLicensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance within the economic zone.

Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) filed the present petition for Prohibition whichassails the authority of the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of gamesof chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.

Issue: WoN ZAMBOECOZONE Authority has the mandate of authorizing a private company, PEJI, to be aMaster Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance within the economic zone.

Held:No. Public respondent Zamboanga Economic Zone Authority is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST fromexercising jurisdiction to operate, license, or otherwise authorize and regulate the operation of any games ofchance.

The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous meanings in law which are clearlydifferent from "game of chance" or "gambling." In its ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest;while an "amusement" is a pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion, or enjoyment. On the other hand, a"game of chance" is "a game in which chance rather than skill determines the outcome," while "gambling" isdefined as "making a bet" or "a play for value against an uncertain event in hope of gaining something ofvalue."

The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index ofintention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctlyexpress its intention or will, and preclude the court from construing it differently. For the legislature ispresumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used them advisedly, and to have expressed the intentby use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of astatute there should be no departure.

The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would lead toabsurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. Using the literalmeanings of "games" and "amusement" to exclude" games of chance" and "gambling" does not lead toabsurdity, contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it defeat the intent of the legislators. The lawmakers couldhave easily employed the words "games of chance" and "gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended togrant the power to operate the same to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority.People vs. Jabinal55 SCRA 607 27 February 1974Antonio J.Facts:The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the accusedguilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of the conviction was basedupon a retroactive application of the Supreme Courts ruling in People vs. Mapa.As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was inpossession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without the requisite license apermit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and was likewisesubsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in theperformance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Courts decision in People vs.Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless decided otherwise,citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned inpeople vs. mapa.

Issue:Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or shouldhis conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?

Ruling:The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.

Reason:The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at thetime appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned by the trial court. It istrue that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court isoverruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not applyto partres who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc vs COMELECG.R. No. 190529Ponente: Justice Brion

Facts:The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a petition for review and a motion forreconsideration to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13,2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These resolutions delistedPGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions underthe party-list system.

According to Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941, known as Party-List System Act, COMELEC, uponverified complaint of any interested party, may remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registrationof any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if: (1) it fails to participate in the last twopreceding elections or (2)fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-listsystem in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.For May 2010 Elections, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-listgroups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations orcoalitions.

Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votescast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.

PGBI filed its opposition to Resolution No. 8679 and likewise, sought for accreditation as a party-listorganization. One of the arguments cited is that the Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177548 MINERO(Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association) vs COMELEC cannot apply in the instant controversy.

One of the reasons is because the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI's. Additionally, therequirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 179271 - BANAT (BarangayAssociation for Advancement and National Transparency) vs COMELEC.

COMELEC denied the motion and in response, pointed out that the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, asMINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.

Issue:Whether the MINERO ruling can be use as a legal basis in delisting PGBI.

Held:According to the Court, the MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence,it cannot sustain PGBI's delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

First the law is clear in that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independenceof one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which itordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law providesfor two separate reasons for delisting.

Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941 and therefore,simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-listorganization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote.

What MINERO effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an electionnecessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretationof the law, given the law's clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the two scenariosdifferently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delistingis therefore a strained application of the law - in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within thecontemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.

Instead, what should be taken into account is the ruling in BANAT vs COMELEC where the 2% party-listvote requirement provided in RA 7941 is partly invalidated.

The Court rules that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the twopercent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) ofR.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional; it finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossibleto achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seatsexceeds 50.The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seatsfrustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representativesshall consist of party-list representatives.

To reiterate, Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannotbe mixed or combined to support delisting; and the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votesin two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the BANAT ruling, to mean failure to qualifyfor a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This is howSection 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied under the authority of the Supreme Court to statewhat the law is and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis (to adhere to precedentsand not to unsettle things which are established).

The most compelling reason to abandon MINERO and strike it out from ruling case law is that it was clearlyan erroneous application of the law - an application that the principle of stability or predictability of decisionsalone cannot sustain. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of thelegislature and to the rule of law in general.

Therefore, the Supreme Court grants PGBIs petition and accordingly, annul COMELEC Resolution No.8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned and the Resolution dated December9, 2009 which denied PGBI's motion for reconsideration. PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-listgroup or organization in the May 2010 elections.SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANKMARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., andEVELINA E. SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTTG.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing fourcounts of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Policerecovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the ChinaBanking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil casefiled against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary andattorneys fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli withthe China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 ofCentral Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits fromattachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the SupremeCourt.

ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 ofRepublic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as theForeign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?HELD: NO.The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No.1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby heldto be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances.Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issuedin the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli insuch amount as would satisfy the judgment.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorablejudgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve.It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RANo. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned lawstill denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable andoppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failedto anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequalitysuch as the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that theOffshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System weredesigned to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and,subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currencydeposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouragedby PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said lawsbecause such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore,will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering thatBartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection ofSection 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 againstattachment, garnishment or other court processes.Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law depends on the extentof its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of CentralBank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or anyother order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency orany administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient,injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest likeaccused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Codewhich provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application oflaws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice toprevail.___________

NOTES: On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxedand lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to hisapartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, orup to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, andthree times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, afterpolicemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrestedand detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered fromBartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No.021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account China Banking Corp.,US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00)cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducingthe complainant.SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.

JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: Section 10 of RA 8042 vis-a-vis Section 7 of RA 10022

FACTS:

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment

and placement agency.

Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment

contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work forTaiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in heremployment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. InTaiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.

Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang fromWacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and thatshe should immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport.She was asked to prepare for immediate repatriation. Joy claims that she wastold that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket toManila.

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal withthe NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRCreversed LAs decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor RelationsCommission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her threemonths worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, andattorneys fees

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her

salary due to illegal dismissal.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent ofrespondents salary should be increased to the amount equivalent to theunexpired term of the employment contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation

Co., Inc., this court ruled that the clause or for three (3) months for every yearof the unexpired term, whichever is less is unconstitutional for violating theequal protection clause and substantive due process. A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not alaw. It confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; itcreates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.

The Court said that they are aware that the clause or for three (3)months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less was reinstatedin Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in2010.

Ruling on the constitutional issue

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or

office of the government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistentwith the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports suchexercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws mustbe read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is anullity.

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is

inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured byreincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A lawor provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as suchunless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided inRepublic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protectionand due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed toshow any compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant us torevisit the precedent. The Court declared, once again, the clause, or for three (3) monthsfor every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in Section 7 of RepublicAct No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declaredunconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)TAADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle thatlaws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ ofmandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidentialdecrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters ofimplementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending thatpetitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid andenforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if thelaw itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the generalpublic adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratialegis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for thetransgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. Theword shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced ifthe constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substanceand validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially andspecifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general applicationwhich have not been published have no force and effect.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent arguedthat while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decreesthemselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not asto their publication;2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement ofpublication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislaturemay make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previouspublication.

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all lawsrelate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without anybearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra viresact of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might bedirectly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition fortheir effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by thelegislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of thecontent of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and notelsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon thewisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with theirdark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as bindingunless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosureand give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry orcut unless the naked blade is drawn.