The United States has a tremendous stake both in the democratization and
reform of Russia, Ukraine, and the other New Independent States (NIS) and in the further
normalization of U.S. relations with NIS governments, militaries, and other institutions.
Given the Soviet weapons arsenal legacy, these states are key to ensuring that the
security environment remains favorable and stable. Through increasing ties to these
countries, the United States is contributing to continued and lasting reductions in and
effective Russian control over the former Soviet nuclear arsenal and other weapons of mass
destruction.

Through its various programs and activities with the NIS, the United
States seeks to ensure that Russia, Ukraine, and the other nations of the region become
stable market democracies that are cooperative partners in promoting regional stability
and arms control in Europe and other regions. Integral to this goal is U.S. support of
efforts to eliminate, or return to Russia, any Soviet nuclear weapons and associated
delivery systems remaining in the other New Independent States. The United States also
seeks to deter strategic nuclear threats against its citizens and territory. The United
States desires Russia to play a constructive role in European affairs, in partnership with
NATO, and to maintain strong relations with an independent Ukraine. Ultimately, the United
States hopes the NIS will resolve any ethnic and regional tensions through peaceful means.

In its bilateral interactions with all the NIS, the Department of Defense
seeks to impart the principles of civilian leadership, defense transparency, and military
reform and restructuring. The Department will continue to broaden military and civilian
defense contacts and support the ongoing reduction of former Soviet weapons of mass
destruction and related infrastructure.

CAPABILITIES, INTENTIONS, AND TRENDS

Introduction

With the breakup of the USSR, Russia has inherited the largest stockpile
of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems in the world. While its public
statements and actions regarding the safety, security, and dismantlement of this massive
inventory have been positive, some actions indicate Moscow is not yet fully committed to
all nonproliferation regimes. Nevertheless, as of November 1996, all of the strategic
nuclear weapons that remained outside Russia after the breakup of the Soviet Union had
been transferred from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to Russia. Collectively, Russia,
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus have eliminated or deactivated about 1,300 operational
strategic launchers equipped with approximately 4,100 warheads and are more than a year
ahead of schedule in meeting the first phase of reduction limits of the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START I).

Serious concerns remain about the status of Russian chemical and
biological warfare programs, the accuracy of the information provided by Russia in its
declarations, and the willingness of the Russian defense establishment to eliminate these
capabilities. Further, with serious economic and political challenges and the large number
of weapons involved, the threat of proliferation of NBC systems and technologies from
former Soviet states continues to exist.

Objectives, Strategies, and Resources

Russia is still developing a national political identity and corresponding
foreign and security policies. In Europe, Moscow seeks to retain a voice in security
issues by cooperating with NATO through the new Permanent Joint Council and by promoting
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as the central European
institution. At the same time, Moscow strongly opposes NATO membership for the Baltic
states or any former Soviet state.

Russia and Belarus have ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. Ukraine and
Kazakhstan have signed it.

Biological

Key components of the former Soviet Unions biological warfare program remain
intact in Russia.

Russia may be continuing some research related to biological warfare.

Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus have no biological warfare programs.

Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus have ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention;
Kazakhstan has not signed it.

Ballistic Missiles

Operational strategic nuclear delivery vehicles have been reduced by nearly half since
1991.

No operationally deployed ICBMs remain in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, or Belarus.

Russia has a large SRBM force and reportedly is marketing SRBM-related technology.
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus also have SRBM forces.

Russia is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime; Kazakhstan and Belarus are
not. While Ukraine is not a member of the MTCR, it has committed to unilaterally adhere to
the MTCR Guidelines and Annex.

Other Means Of Delivery Available

Russia and Ukraine have land-, sea-, and air-launched cruise missiles; some are
anti-ship; some have longer ranges. Kazakhstan and Belarus have air-launched tactical
missiles. Only Russia has any land-attack, nuclear-capable cruise missiles.

All have a
variety of combat aircraft and ground systems.

Russia has stated publicly that it is opposed to the proliferation of NBC
weapons. Its arms control priorities include updating the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe Treaty to match its view of the changed situation in Europe and ensuring strict
observance of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. Because of its economic situation and
serious financial shortfalls, Russia remains concerned about the costs of implementation
of key arms control agreements. This is particularly true for the destruction of its large
chemical weapons stockpile, where it believes Western aid is critical.

Regardless of the ultimate disposition of START II, or follow-on arms
reduction talks (START III), the overall number of Russian strategic nuclear warheads will
likely decline over time. START III limits proposed at Helsinki will set new limits for
deployed warheads in the 2,000 to 2,500 range and include measures relating to the
transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic
nuclear warheads.

The recent Friendship and Cooperation Treaty and agreement on the Black
Sea Fleet could lead to constructive and more stable relations between Ukraine and Russia.
Kiev seeks good relations with Russia, upon which it is economically dependent, and with
Ukraines other neighbors and seeks to integrate itself into Euro-Atlantic security
structures.

Ukraine has lived up to its commitment to move all nuclear weapons to
Russia. By June 1996, it had completed removal of roughly 1,900 strategic nuclear weapons
from its territory and had deactivated all of its 176 ICBM silos. Kiev is working with the
United States to facilitate its accession to the MTCR; a presidential decree was issued in
December 1996 to further improve export controls.

Kazakhstans policies are heavily influenced by Russia, which is
concerned about the large ethnic Russian population that remains in Kazakhstan. Russia
also has a sizable number of troops in the country related to its control of the Baikonur
Cosmodrome. Kazakhstan has demonstrated its commitment to denuclearization and
nonproliferation in several important ways. It returned to Russia all the nuclear warheads
on its territory by April 1995. Also, by fall 1996, Kazakhstan had eliminated all 104 of
its deployed SS-18 silos, returned all SS-18 missile airframes to Russia, and continued
working with the United States on destruction of remaining silos.

Belarus has sought closer ties with Russia to compensate for its lack of
political and economic reform and its growing financial needs, but it has been surprised
by Russias insistence that Belarus abide by international human rights norms and
pursue market reform. Nevertheless, Belarus has lived up to its commitment to become
nuclear weapons free. All strategic offensive arms and their associated warheads were
withdrawn from Belarus to Russia by December 1996. Further, in efforts to provide evidence
of its commitment to nonproliferation, Minsk has cooperated with the United States on
improving the Belarus export control system.

Nuclear Programs

As of January 1997, the stockpile of Russian strategic and tactical
nuclear warheads was estimated at 25,000 warheads, a reduction of more than 5,000 warheads
since a major elimination program began in 1992. This gradual reduction took place as a
result of tactical nuclear warhead reduction initiatives and bilateral agreements
involving strategic warheads.

If carried out, the Russian tactical warhead reduction initiatives,
announced in 1991, could result in the elimination of a total of about 15,000 tactical
warheads. Also, strategic arms agreements could result in the retirement and eventual
disassembly of a total of more than 7,000 strategic warheads. The process of eliminating
strategic warheads began in earnest in 1994. Russia is believed to be dismantling
warheads, but Moscow has not divulged specific information on warhead reductions. The
economic situation in the country probably has slowed the reduction effort; many retired
warheads slated for elimination are awaiting dismantlement. However, the U.S. government
assesses that strategic warheads constitute the majority of the warheads eliminated so
far.

The START II Treaty would require a reduction in accountable warheads to
3,000-3,500 by December 31, 2007. Even if the START II Treaty is not ratified by the
Russian Duma and Federation Council, the Russian strategic forces are likely to decline to
fewer than 3,000 operational warheads by the middle of the next decade as a result of
economic constraints and system obsolescence. Strategic nuclear forces remain a critical
priority for Moscow. Strategic nuclear forces have received a higher funding priority than
the conventional forces, allowing them to maintain operational readiness, but they also
have been a victim of budgetary constraints and their future modernization will be slow.
At the same time, however, production of additional warheads will continue into the 21st
century as new strategic missile systems are deployed and obsolete warheads replaced.

The logistic system supporting the nuclear weapons stockpile has changed
considerably since 1991. With the consolidation of tactical nuclear warheads and the
transfer of strategic warheads, the number of storage sites holding warheads has been
reduced from over 500 facilities to fewer than 100. This consolidation has improved
nuclear warhead security. However, the current resource shortages in Russia have subjected
the nuclear security system to new stresses and risks.

Chemical Programs

Moscow has declared the worlds largest stockpile of chemical agents:
40,000 metric tons of chemical agent, mostly weaponized, including artillery, aerial
bombs, rockets, and missile warheads. U.S. estimates of the Russian stockpile generally
are larger. The inventory includes a wide variety of nerve and blister agents in weapons
and stored in bulk. Some Russian chemical weapons incorporate agent mixtures, while others
have added thickening agents to increase the time of contamination on the target.

According to official Russian statements, all former Soviet chemical
weapons are stored at seven locations in Russia, mostly in the Volga/Ural section of the
country. An extensive consolidation process of chemical warfare material, both from sites
within Russia and from non-Russian locations, was carried out during the late 1980s and
early 1990s.

Russian officials do not deny research has continued but assert that it is
for the purpose of developing defenses against chemical weapons, a purpose that is not
banned by the CWC. Many of the components for new binary agents developed by the former
Soviet Union are not on the CWCs schedules of chemicals and have legitimate civil
applications, clouding their association with chemical weapons use. However, under the
CWC, all chemical weapons are banned, whether or not they are on the CWC schedules.

Consolidate ground-launched tactical nuclear warheads and eliminate all of them by 2000
(nuclear mines by 1998).

Eliminate 50 percent of tactical air-launched nuclear warheads by the end of 1997.

Consolidate all naval tactical warheads and eliminate one-third of them by the end of
1996.

Consolidate air defense warheads and eliminate half of them by the end of 1996.

Strategic Nuclear Warheads

Under START I, the former Soviet Union must reduce its strategic nuclear force to
1,600 launchers having 6,000 accountable nuclear warheads by December 5, 2001. START II,
if ratified, would reduce U.S. and Russian levels to between 3,000 and 3,500 accountable
warheads by December 31, 2007. (The 1997 Helsinki Joint Statement extended the START II
reduction period from January 1, 2003, to December 31, 2007.) Neither treaty requires that
warheads be eliminated.

The 1994 Russia-Ukraine-U.S. Trilateral Statement stipulated
that strategic warheads from Ukraine would be returned to Russia for elimination.

The Lisbon Protocol obligated Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to comply with
all terms of the START agreement.

In 1995, Russia and Kazakhstan agreed to withdraw nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan to
Russia. The agreement does not require elimination of the warheads, but Kazakhstan will be
compensated for the amount of highly enriched uranium contained in them.

The outlook for timely Russian elimination of its chemical warfare
stockpile appears unclear despite President Yeltsins signing of the federal law on
the destruction of chemical weapons in May 1997. Russias efforts to destroy its
chemical stockpile remain slowed by a number of technical, ecological, financial, and
political problems. Further, the unique nature of some Russian weapons complicates their
destruction. For example, destruction of thickened agent and of arsenic-containing
Lewisite presents a serious challenge because technology for their large-scale destruction
has yet to be certified as safe and reliable. No permanent Russian destruction facilities
have been built. According to preliminary Russian estimates, the destruction of
Russias large stockpile will cost the equivalent of $5 billion. Because of current
economic conditions in Russia, Moscow will continue to look to the United States, Europe,
and others for substantial financial and technical assistance to implement a timely and
effective destruction program.

Generally, other countries are reluctant to spend large sums to assist
Russian destruction of chemical agents while Russia apparently is not spending its own
funds to establish a destruction program. U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction chemical
weapons destruction assistance is described in Section II of this document.

Moscow ratified the CWC on November 5, 1997. Now that it is a party to the
CWC, it is obligated to destroy its chemical stocks within 10 years, unless it asks for,
and is granted, a five-year extension by the CWCs organization in The Hague.

Ukraine has signed the CWC and has no chemical weapons program, although
some remnants of the Soviet chemical warfare infrastructure still remain in Ukraine. The
chemical warfare-related facility that Kazakhstan inherited is being demilitarized and
converted to peaceful purposes. Kazakhstan also has signed the CWC. Belarus has no
chemical warfare program and has already ratified the CWC. A former Soviet chemical
warfare test range in Uzbekistan has been abandoned and Uzbekistan has ratified the CWC.

Biological Program

The former Soviet offensive biological program was the worlds
largest and consisted of both military facilities and nonmilitary research and development
institutes. This program employed thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians
throughout the former Soviet Union, with some biological warfare agents developed and
weaponized as early as the 1950s. The Russian government has committed to ending the
former Soviet biological weapons program. Plants outside the Russian Federation have been
closed or abandoned. Nevertheless, serious concerns about Russias offensive
biological warfare capabilities remain.

Key components of the former Soviet program remain largely intact and may
support a possible future mobilization capability for the production of biological agents
and delivery systems. Moreover, work outside the scope of legitimate biological defense
activity may be occurring now at selected facilities within Russia. Such activity, if
offensive in nature, would contravene the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972,
to which the former Soviet government is a signatory. It would also contradict statements
by top Russian political leaders that offensive activity has ceased.

The United States remains concerned at the threat of proliferation, both
of biological warfare expertise and related hardware, from Russia. Russian scientists,
many of whom either are unemployed or have not been paid for an extended period, may be
vulnerable to recruitment by states trying to establish biological warfare programs. The
availability of worldwide information exchange via the Internet or electronic mail
facilitates this process.

While former Soviet biological warfare facilities existed in Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, none are active now and the current governments in these new
republics have no plans to establish any such program. Also, Belarus has no program and no
intention of establishing one. Ukraine and Belarus have ratified the BWC, while Kazakhstan
has not yet signed it.

Ballistic Missiles

Russia retains a significant strategic missile force of some 1,200
operational ICBM and SLBM launchers. By the end of 1996, there were no longer any
operationally deployed ICBMs in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Roughly 1,200 former
Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs have been removed from the overall force since 1990. On the other
hand, Russia is developing a new ICBM and a new SLBM within the limitations of existing
arms control treaties and also has programs underway to use ICBMs and SLBMs as space
launch boosters. Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus continue to have inventories
that together total hundreds of launchers and thousands of SCUD and SS-21 SRBMs. Russia
retains the great preponderance of these systems, as well as large amounts of aircraft and
naval launch platforms capable of delivering NBC weapons. Russia also is developing a new
battlefield missile to replace the SCUD. Russias industrial base can support
production of the full range of both solid- and liquid- propellant ballistic missiles and
all associated technologies.

Ukraine plans to eliminate all of its 130 SS-19 airframes at an
elimination facility built with U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance. Also,
Ukraine has signed an agreement to sell 43 nondeployed SS-19s to Russia. About 55 SS-19
missile airframes and about two-thirds of Ukraines SS-19 silos have been eliminated.
In May 1997, President Kuchma announced that Ukraine would also eliminate all SS-24 silos
and missiles. Ukraine has accepted an offer of U.S. technical assistance for elimination
of its 55 SS-24 solid-propellant ICBM airframes and 46 SS-24 silos.

Ukraine manufactures some of the guidance and control components used in
current Russian ICBMs and SLBMs. It also has the infrastructure to design, develop, and
produce both liquid- and solid-propellant ICBMs and space launch vehicles and related
components.

Kazakhstan retains the capability, with Russian assistance, to produce
ballistic missiles and launchers but has no plans to do so. In Belarus, all 81 SS-25 ICBMs
originally deployed there were returned to Russia by December 1996. Belarus has no
capability to produce missiles but does produce the chassis for road-mobile missile
launchers.

Cruise Missiles and Other Means of Delivery

Russia and Ukraine have a variety of land-, and sea, and air-launched
cruise missiles. Many are designated as short range anti-ship weapons, although other
tactical cruise missile systems have ranges of up to 500 kilometers. Kazakhstan and
Belarus also have a variety of short range air-launched tactical missiles. All of these
systems were produced by the former Soviet Union and many were exported to numerous
countries worldwide. Only Russia has any long range land attack nuclear capable cruise
missiles. All four states have a variety of fighter aircraft, helicopters, artillery, and
rockets available as potential means of delivery for NBC weapons.

Role as Supplier

Despite official statements by the governments of Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus that they are opposed to proliferation of NBC weapons and
missiles, some sales have and are taking place. Whether these are officially sanctioned or
efforts by local entities to ignore or circumvent controls is unclear. Further, the
controls in place now are not yet adequate or enforced to the degree to prevent
proliferation of components or technical expertise. Some officials may turn a blind eye to
such activity because of the critical need for revenues.

Nuclear cooperation between Russia and China includes the sale of nuclear
weapons-related technologies. Because Russia and China are nuclear weapons states, as
defined under the NPT, there are no NPT-related restrictions on their nuclear
weapons-related trade. There is concern, however, that Russian nuclear exports to China
may enhance Chinas ability to complete existing, or sign new, contracts with
countries of proliferation concern, such as Iran or Pakistan.

Russia also has contracts for the sale of nuclear power reactors to Iran
and India. While the sale to Iran is not prohibited by the NPT, it will enhance
Irans currently limited nuclear infrastructure and thus advance Tehrans
nuclear weapons program. India has not signed the NPT and many of its reactors are not
under IAEA safeguards. Therefore, the sale of Russian reactors should not be allowed under
the terms agreed upon by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The Russians contend their
contracts predate export controls adopted by the NSG and are therefore unaffected by it.

There are indications that Moscow is not fully capable of controlling
personnel and institutions involved in chemical warfare. If this situation continues,
Russian entities could become a major source for advanced chemical warfare-related
material and technology. There is similar evidence that Russian technologies and expertise
related to biological warfare may be reaching countries of proliferation concern.

Russia has been a member of the MTCR since 1995. However, activities of
Russian companies remain a significant proliferation concern. For example, Russian
entities reportedly have aided missile programs in China, the Middle East, and South Asia.
Given Russias sophisticated missile production capabilities, it is likely Russian
technological support or training will continue to find its way to such countries,
sometimes without necessarily gaining Moscows approval.

Because Ukraine and to a lesser extent Kazakhstan have missile production
infrastructures, there is potential for both these countries, or entities within them, to
supply missile-related equipment, components or technology to states trying to develop
missile capabilities. Similarly, Belarus produces missile launcher-related equipment,
which could be marketed.

CONCLUSION

The steady decline in the number of operational strategic nuclear warheads
and delivery systems over the last five years is a strong indication of the adherence of
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to arms control regimes. All states are meeting
their commitments regarding strategic weapons and delivery systems. At the same time,
however, the threat of possible diversion of nuclear material, some from the very weapons
that have been deactivated, remains a serious security challenge. The possible continued
presence of large chemical and biological warfare programs remains a serious concern.

The poor economic conditions in the former Soviet Union, where large
stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction related material still exist, combined with
continued shortfalls in the ability of regional states to control and protect sensitive
materials, contribute to this region remaining a proliferation concern. The same is true
for production technology and expertise in the form of knowledgeable scientists and
technicians, related to the weapons, as well as to missile delivery systems.