Wednesday, September 14, 2011

Zuma's Opposition to the Libyan NTC

The day before an African Union meeting in Pretoria to discuss Libya,
Zuma reminded the South African National Assembly that the AU does not recognize
the Libyan transitional government, despite the fact that Qaddafi is
gone. These statements are part of what has been Zuma’s consistent
opposition to intervention in Libya, including the NATO airstrikes and unfreezing Libyan assets for the NTC. (South Africa ultimately agreed to the later, but only after pressure).

This is curious given that twenty African governments have recognized the NTC, including, Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, and even Sudan. Or maybe not all that curious.

South Africa commentator Greg Mills explains Zuma’s quixotic stance, one that, as some commentators have noted,
risks undermining South African credibility and effectiveness as a
regional leader on foreign policy. Mills identifies six “drivers”: “a
visceral rejection of external involvement,” which, he notes, likely has
a racial dimension considering NATO’s role in Qaddafi’s fall; that
South Africa is trying to reestablish its “radical credentials,” which
were damaged by South Africa’s initial support for the UN resolution
that brought NATO into the fray. This approach, Mills argues, is a low
cost way of doing so, at least domestically. (Internationally, South
Africa has likely diminished its political capital).
Mills’ third driver is the impact of the Israel-Palestinian conflict
on South Africa’s Middle East policy, and its perceived similarities in
South Africa with apartheid. Number four is “a predilection to replicate
the South Africa negotiated solution,” which Mill’s argues the success
of has been “distorted and mythologized”; and number 5 is the “misplaced
notion” of a global power shift east.”

Finally, and perhaps most damningly, is Qaddafi’s proclivity for
“spraying money around the continent and at its politicians,” implying
that at least some of the former Libyan leader’s support has been
purchased.