April 29: CENTCOM releases investigation into airstrike on Doctors Without Borders trauma center

U.S. Central Command releases U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Investigation into Airstrike on Doctors Without Borders Trauma Center in Kunduz, Afghanistan

TAMPA, Fla. – ‎The U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) investigation into the U.S. airstrike on Oct.
3, 2015, against a medical facility in Kunduz, Afghanistan, resulting in
civilian casualties has been released and posted online at CENTCOM’s Freedom of
Information Act Reading Room.

“We extend our deepest
condolences to those injured and to the families of those killed in this tragic
incident,” said Gen. Joseph L. Votel, U.S. Central Command commander. “We
are fully committed to learning from this tragedy and minimizing the risk of
civilian casualties during future combat operations.”

On Oct. 3, 2015, members of USFOR-A
supporting a partnered Afghan force, conducted a combat operation that struck a
trauma center in Kunduz operated by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), also known
as “Doctors without Borders.”

U.S. Army Gen. John Campbell,
then the Commander of USFOR-A, directed an investigation to determine the cause
of this incident. The lead investigating officer was Army Maj. Gen.
William Hickman. He was assisted by Air Force Brig. Gen. Robert Armfield
and Army Brig. Gen Sean Jenkins. All three generals were brought in from
outside Afghanistan in order to provide an objective perspective. The
investigation team included over a dozen subject matter experts from several
specialty fields.

The investigative team visited
the MSF Trauma Center site and several other locations in the city of Kunduz.
The team interviewed more than 65 witnesses including personnel at the trauma
center, members of U.S. and Afghan ground forces, members of the aircrew, and
representatives at every echelon of command in Afghanistan. The team had
full access to classified information, and the investigation includes more than
3,000 pages of documentary evidence, much of it classified. Gen. Campbell
approved the investigation on Nov. 21, 2015.

The extensive report was
subjected to comprehensive reviews before the public release in order to ensure
that classified information, protected personally identifying information, and
other non-releasable information remains protected. The names of the
service members involved were redacted from the released materials to protect
the privacy of the individuals and because some of them remain assigned to
overseas, sensitive, or routinely deployable units.

The investigation concluded that
the personnel involved did not know that they were striking a medical facility.
The intended target was an insurgent-controlled site which was approximately
400 meters away from the MSF Trauma Center. The investigation found that
an AC-130U Gunship aircrew, in support of a U.S. Special Forces element that
was supporting a partnered Afghan ground force, misidentified and struck the
MSF Trauma Center. The investigation determined that all members of both
the ground force and the AC-130U aircrew were unaware the aircrew was firing on
a medical facility throughout the engagement.

The comprehensive investigation
concluded that this tragic incident was caused by a combination of human
errors, compounded by process and equipment failures. Fatigue and high
operational tempo also contributed to the incident. These factors
contributed to the “fog of war,” which is the uncertainty often encountered
during combat operations. The investigation found that this combination
of factors caused both the ground force commander and the air crew to believe
mistakenly that the air crew was firing on the intended target, an
insurgent-controlled site approximately 400 meters away from the MSF Trauma
Center.

The Commander of USFOR-A
concluded that certain personnel failed to comply with the rules of engagement
and the law of armed conflict. However, the investigation did not
conclude that these failures amounted to a war crime. The label “war crimes”
is typically reserved for intentional acts --
intentionally targeting civilians or intentionally targeting protected objects. The investigation
found that the tragic incident resulted from a combination of unintentional
human errors and equipment failures, and that none of the personnel knew that they were striking a medical facility.

‎The investigation identified sixteen U.S. servicemembers whose conduct warranted consideration for appropriate administrative or disciplinary action, including a general officer. Gen. Campbell took the action he deemed appropriate regarding twelve of the sixteen personnel involved in this tragic incident who were in Afghanistan, including the general officer. The actions included suspension and removal from command, letters of reprimand, formal counseling, and extensive retraining. Five personnel involved were directed out of theater.

Gen. Campbell also forwarded the investigation to Gen. Votel, then the Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, to consider action regarding the five personnel who had returned to the United States. These five personnel included the officer who Gen. Campbell removed from command and ordered out of Afghanistan. Gen. Votel took action with respect to four of these five personnel, including issuing four letters of reprimand and admonishment, and directing boards to evaluate the flight certification of three aircrew members. Gen. Votel referred the fifth servicemember to the Commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, who issued a written reprimand and directed recertification in the servicemember’s job specialty.

‎Gen. Campbell directed a series of actions to improve operations in Afghanistan as a result of this incident:

Gen. Campbell issued an order to conduct supplemental training on the applicable authorities framework, rules of engagement, and the Commander’s tactical guidance, all of which were designed to minimize the risks that a tragedy like this would occur. This training was delivered to over 9,000 personnel and completed in Nov. 2015.

Gen. Campbell directed a comprehensive review of the targeting process and published an order reinforcing the application of the No Strike List (NSL), including use of the U.S. Central Command-maintained NSL database.

Coordinates for MSF and similar facilities in Afghanistan were verified. Aircraft systems are now pre-loaded with key information -- including the NSL database -- to minimize the reliance on post-launch communications.

The USFOR-A provided MSF leadership with detailed information to facilitate direct contact with the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan Command Center.

Engagements: Senior U.S. representatives have spoken with MSF officials, including the MSF Executive Director, over two dozen times to express condolences, explain how the tragic incident occurred, and outline future steps.

Condolence payments: USFOR-A leaders have offered their sympathies and provided condolence payments to more than 170 individuals and families affected by this tragedy.

Medical capability: The
Department of Defense has approved $5.7 million in funds to reconstruct the facility that MSF was using and is working closely with the Afghan government, which owns it, to return the building to its previous condition and help restore a medical capability for the residents of Kunduz.

Separately, the Secretary of Defense has
directed the military services and combatant commands to take steps to mitigate the potential for similar incidents in the future by incorporating lessons learned from the Kunduz strike into leadership development and operational training and by conducting a comprehensive review of relevant policies, tactical directives, and rules of engagement.