Against Eunomius.

Book VII.

ø1. The seventh book shows from various statements made to the
Corinthians and to the Hebrews, and from the words of the Lord, that
the word "Lord" is not expressive of essence, according to Eunomius'
exposition, but of dignity. and after many notable remarks concerning
"the Spirit" and the Lord, he shows that Eunomius, from his own words,
is found to argue in favour of orthodoxy, though without intending it,
and to be struck by his own shafts.

Since, however, Eunomius asserts that the word "Lord" is used in
reference to the essence and not to the dignity of the Only-begotten,
and cites as a witness to this view the Apostle, when he says to the
Corinthians, "Now the Lord is the Spirit [811] ," it may perhaps be
opportune that we should not pass over even this error on his part
without correction. He asserts that the word "Lord" is significative
of essence, and by way of proof of this assumption he brings up the
passage above mentioned. "The Lord," it says, "is the Spirit [812] ."
But our friend who interprets Scripture at his own sweet will calls
"Lordship" by the name of "essence," and thinks to bring his statement
to proof by means of the words quoted. Well, if it had been said by
Paul, "Now the Lord is essence," we too would have concurred in his
argument. But seeing that the inspired writing on the one side says,
"the Lord is the Spirit," and Eunomius says on the other, "Lordship is
essence," I do not know where he finds support for his statement,
unless he is prepared to say again [813] that the word "Spirit" stands
in Scripture for "essence." Let us consider, then, whether the Apostle
anywhere, in his use of the term "Spirit," employs that word to
indicate "essence." He says, "The Spirit itself beareth witness with
our Spirit [814] ," and "no one knoweth the things of a man save the
Spirit of man which is in him [815] ," and "the letter killeth, but
the Spirit giveth life [816] ," and "if ye through the Spirit do
mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live [817] ," and "if we live
in the Spirit let us also walk in the Spirit [818] ." Who indeed could
count the utterances of the Apostle on this point? and in them we
nowhere find "essence" signified by this word. For he who says that
"the Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit," signifies nothing
else than the Holy Spirit Which comes to be in the mind of the
faithful; for in many other passages of his writings he gives the name
of spirit to the mind, on the reception by which of the communion of
the Spirit the recipients attain the dignity of adoption. Again, in
the passage, "No one knoweth the things of a man save the spirit of
man which is in him," if "man" is used of the essence, and "spirit"
likewise, it will follow from the phrase that the man is maintained to
be of two essences. Again, I know not how he who says that "the letter
killeth, but the Spirit giveth life," sets "essence" in opposition to
"letter"; nor, again, how this writer imagines that when Paul says
that we ought "through the Spirit" to destroy "the deeds of the body,"
he is directing the signification of "spirit" to express "essence";
while as for "living in the Spirit," and "walking in the Spirit," this
would be quite unintelligible if the sense of the word "Spirit"
referred to "essence." For in what else than in essence do all we who
are alive partake of life?--thus when the Apostle is laying down
advice for us on this matter that we should "live in essence," it is
as though he said "partake of life by means of yourselves, and not by
means of others." If then it is not possible that this sense can be
adopted in any passage, how can Eunomius here once more imitate the
interpreters of dreams, and bid us to take "spirit" for "essence," to
the end that he may arrive in due syllogistic form at his conclusion
that the word "Lord" is applied to the essence?--for if "spirit" is
"essence" (he argues), and "the Lord is Spirit," the "Lord" is clearly
found to be "essence." How incontestable is the force of this attempt!
How can we evade or resolve this irrefragable necessity of
demonstration? The word "Lord," he says, is spoken of the essence. How
does he maintain it? Because the Apostle says, "The Lord is the
Spirit." Well, what has this to do with essence? He gives us the
further instruction that "spirit" is put for "essence." These are the
arts of his demonstrative method! These are the results of his
Aristotelian science! This is why, in your view, we are so much to be
pitied, who are uninitiated in this wisdom! and you of course are to
be deemed happy, who track out the truth by a method like this--that
the Apostle's meaning was such that we are to suppose "the Spirit" was
put by him for the Essence of the Only-begotten!

Then how will you make it fit with what follows? For when Paul says,
"Now the Lord is the Spirit," he goes on to say, "and where the Spirit
of the Lord is, there is liberty." If then "the Lord is the Spirit,"
and "Spirit" means "essence," what are we to understand by "the
essence of the essence"? He speaks again of another Spirit of the Lord
Who is the Spirit,--that is to say, according to your interpretation,
of another essence. Therefore in your view the Apostle, when he writes
expressly of "the Lord the Spirit," and of "the Spirit of the Lord,"
means nothing else than an essence of an essence. Well, let Eunomius
make what he likes of that which is written; what we understand of the
matter is as follows. The Scripture, "given by inspiration of God," as
the Apostle calls it, is the Scripture of the Holy Spirit, and its
intention is the profit of men. For "every scripture," he says, "is
given by inspiration of God and is profitable"; and the profit is
varied and multiform, as the Apostle says--"for doctrine, for reproof,
for correction, for instruction in righteousness [819] ." Such a boon
as this, however, is not within any man's reach to lay hold of, but
the Divine intention lies hid under the body of the Scripture, as it
were under a veil, some legislative enactment or some historical
narrative being cast over the truths that are contemplated by the
mind. For this reason, then, the Apostle tells us that those who look
upon the body of the Scripture have "a veil upon their heart [820] ,"
and are not able to look upon the glory of the spiritual law, being
hindered by the veil that has been cast over the face of the
law-giver. Wherefore he says, "the letter killeth, but the Spirit
giveth life," showing that often the obvious interpretation, if it be
not taken according to the proper sense, has an effect contrary to
that life which is indicated by the Spirit, seeing that this lays down
for all men the perfection of virtue in freedom from passion, while
the history contained in the writings sometimes embraces the
exposition even of facts incongruous, and is understood, so to say, to
concur with the passions of our nature, whereto if any one applies
himself according to the obvious sense, he will make the Scripture a
doctrine of death. Accordingly, he says that over the perceptive
powers of the souls of men who handle what is written in too corporeal
a manner, the veil is cast; but for those who turn their contemplation
to that which is the object of the intelligence, there is revealed,
bared, as it were, of a mask, the glory that underlies the letter. And
that which is discovered by this more exalted perception he says is
the Lord, which is the Spirit. For he says, "when it shall turn to the
Lord the veil shall be taken away: now the Lord is the Spirit [821] ."
And in so saying he makes a distinction of contrast between the
lordship of the spirit and the bondage of the letter; for as that
which gives life is opposed to that which kills, so he contrasts "the
Lord" with bondage. And that we may not be under any confusion when we
are instructed concerning the Holy Spirit (being led by the word
"Lord" to the thought of the Only-begotten), for this reason he guards
the word by repetition, both saying that "the Lord is the Spirit," and
making further mention of "the Spirit of the Lord," that the supremacy
of His Nature may be shown by the honour implied in lordship, while at
the same time he may avoid confusing in his argument the individuality
of His Person. For he who calls Him both "Lord" and "Spirit of the
Lord," teaches us to conceive of Him as a separate individual besides
the Only-begotten; just as elsewhere he speaks of "the Spirit of
Christ [822] ," employing fairly and in its mystic sense this very
term which is piously employed in the system of doctrine according to
the Gospel tradition. Thus we, the "most miserable of all men," being
led onward by the Apostle in the mysteries, pass from the letter that
killeth to the Spirit that giveth life, learning from Him Who was in
Paradise initiated into the unspeakable mysteries, that all things the
Divine Scripture says are utterances of the Holy Spirit. For "well did
the Holy Spirit prophesy [823] ,"--this he says to the Jews in Rome,
introducing the words of Isaiah; and to the Hebrews, alleging the
authority of the Holy Spirit in the words, "wherefore as saith the
Holy Spirit [824] ," he adduces the words of the Psalm which are
spoken at length in the person of God; and from the Lord Himself we
learn the same thing,--that David declared the heavenly mysteries not
"in" himself (that is, not speaking according to human nature). For
how could any one, being but man, know the supercelestial converse of
the Father with the Son? But being "in the Spirit" he said that the
Lord spoke to the Lord those words which He has uttered. For if, He
says, "David in the Spirit calls him Lord, how is He then his son
[825] ?" Thus it is by the power of the Spirit that the holy men who
are under Divine influence are inspired, and every Scripture is for
this reason said to be "given by inspiration of God," because it is
the teaching of the Divine afflatus. If the bodily veil of the words
were removed, that which remains is Lord and life and Spirit,
according to the teaching of the great Paul, and according to the
words of the Gospel also. For Paul declares that he who turns from the
letter to the Spirit no longer apprehends the bondage that slays, but
the Lord which is the life-giving Spirit; and the sublime Gospel says,
"the words that I speak are spirit and are life [826] ," as being
divested of the bodily veil. The idea, however, that "the Spirit" is
the essence of the Only-begotten, we shall leave to our dreamers: or
rather, we shall make use, ex abundanti, of what they say, and arm the
truth with the weapons of the adversary. For it is allowable that the
Egyptian should be spoiled by the Israelites, and that we should make
their wealth an ornament for ourselves. If the essence of the Son is
called "Spirit," and God also is Spirit, (for so the Gospel tells us
[827] ), clearly the essence of the Father is called "Spirit" also.
But if it is their peculiar argument that things which are introduced
by different names are different also in nature, the conclusion surely
is, that things which are named alike are not alien one from the other
in nature either. Since then, according to their account, the essence
of the Father and that of the Son are both called "Spirit," hereby is
clearly proved the absence of any difference in essence. For a little
further on Eunomius says:--"Of those essences which are divergent the
appellations significant of essence are also surely divergent, but
where there is one and the same name, that which is declared by the
same appellation will surely be one also":--so that at all points "He
that taketh the wise in their own craftiness [828] " has turned the
long labours of our author, and the infinite toil spent on what he has
elaborated, to the establishment of the doctrine which we maintain.
For if God is in the Gospel called "Spirit," and the essence of the
Only-begotten is maintained by Eunomius to be "Spirit," as there is no
apparent difference in the one name as compared with the other,
neither, surely, will the things signified by the names be mutually
different in nature.

And now that I have exposed this futile and pointless sham-argument,
it seems to me that I may well pass by without discussion what he next
puts together by way of attack upon our master's statement. For a
sufficient proof of the folly of his remarks is to be found in his
actual argument, which of itself proclaims aloud its feebleness. To be
entangled in a contest with such things as this is like trampling on
the slain. For when he sets forth with much confidence some passage
from our master, and treats it with preliminary slander and contempt,
and promises that he will show it to be worth nothing at all, he meets
with the same fortune as befalls small children, to whom their
imperfect and immature intelligence, and the untrained condition of
their perceptive faculties, do not give an accurate understanding of
what they see. Thus they often imagine that the stars are but a little
way above their heads, and pelt them with clods when they appear, in
their childish folly; and then, when the clod falls, they clap their
hands and laugh and brag to their comrades as if their throw had
reached the stars themselves. Such is the man who casts at the truth
with his childish missile, who sets forth like the stars those
splendid sayings of our master, and then hurls from the ground,--from
his downtrodden and grovelling understanding,--his earthy and unstable
arguments. And these, when they have gone so high that they have no
place to fall from, turn back again of themselves by their own weight
[829] . Now the passage of the great Basil is worded as follows [830]
:--

"Yet what sane man would agree with the statement that of those things
of which the names are different the essences must needs be divergent
also? For the appellations of Peter and Paul, and, generally speaking,
of men, are different, while the essence of all is one: wherefore, in
most respects we are mutually identical, and differ one from another
only in those special properties which are observed in individuals:
and hence also appellations are not indicative of essence, but of the
properties which mark the particular individual. Thus, when we hear of
Peter, we do not by the name understand the essence (and by `essence'
I here mean the material substratum), but we are impressed with the
conception of the properties which we contemplate in him." These are
the great man's words. And what skill he who disputes this statement
displays against us, we learn,--any one, that is, who has leisure for
wasting time on unprofitable matters,--from the actual composition of
Eunomius.

From his writings, I say, for I do not like to insert in my own work
the nauseous stuff our rhetorician utters, or to display his ignorance
and folly to contempt in the midst of my own arguments. He goes on
with a sort of eulogy upon the class of significant words which
express the subject, and, in his accustomed style, patches and sticks
together the cast-off rags of phrases: poor Isocrates is nibbled at
once more, and shorn of words and figures to make out the point
proposed,--here and there even the Hebrew Philo receives the same
treatment, and makes him a contribution of phrases from his own
labours,--yet not even thus is this much-stitched and many-coloured
web of words finished off, but every assault, every defence of his
conceptions, all his artistic preparation, spontaneously collapses,
and, as commonly happens with the bubbles when the drops, borne down
from above through a body of waters against some obstacle, produce
those foamy swellings which, as soon as they gather, immediately
dissolve, and leave upon the water no trace of their own
formation--such are the air-bubbles of our author's thoughts,
vanishing without a touch at the moment they are put forth. For after
all these irrefragable statements, and the dreamy philosophizing
wherein he asserts that the distinct character of the essence is
apprehended by the divergence of names, as some mass of foam borne
downstream breaks up when it comes into contact with any more solid
body, so his argument, following its own spontaneous course, and
coming unexpectedly into collision with the truth, disperses into
nothingness its unsubstantial and bubble-like fabric of falsehood. For
he speaks in these words:--"Who is so foolish and so far removed from
the constitution of men, as, in discoursing of men to speak of one as
a man, and, calling another a horse, so to compare them?" I would
answer him,--"You are right in calling any one foolish who makes such
blunders in the use of names. And I will employ for the support of the
truth the testimony you yourself give. For if it is a piece of extreme
folly to call one a horse and another a man, supposing both were
really men, it is surely a piece of equal stupidity, when the Father
is confessed to be God, and the Son is confessed to be God, to call
the one `created' and the other `uncreated,' since, as in the other
case humanity, so in this case the Godhead does not admit a change of
name to that expressive of another kind. For what the irrational is
with respect to man, that also the creature is with respect to the
Godhead, being equally unable to receive the same name with the nature
that is superior to it. And as it is not possible to apply the same
definition to the rational animal and the quadruped alike (for each is
naturally differentiated by its special property from the other), so
neither can you express by the same terms the created and the
uncreated essence, seeing that those attributes which are predicated
of the latter essence are not discoverable in the former. For as
rationality is not discoverable in a horse, nor solidity of hoofs in a
man, so neither is Godhead discoverable in the creature, nor the
attribute of being created in the Godhead: but if He be God He is
certainly not created, and if He be created He is not God; unless
[831] , of course, one were to apply by some misuse or customary mode
of expression the mere name of Godhead, as some horses have men's
names given them by their owners; yet neither is the horse a man,
though he be called by a human name, nor is the created being God,
even though some claim for him the name of Godhead, and give him the
benefit of the empty sound of a dissyllable." Since, then, Eunomius'
heretical statement is found spontaneously to fall in with the truth,
let him take his own advice and stand by his own words, and by no
means retract his own utterances, but consider that the man is really
foolish and stupid who names the subject not according as it is, but
says "horse" for "man," and "sea" for "sky," and "creature" for "God."
And let no one think it unreasonable that the creature should be set
in opposition to God, but have regard to the prophets and to the
Apostles. For the prophet says in the person of the Father, "My Hand
made all these things" [832] , meaning by "Hand," in his dark saying,
the power of the Only-begotten. Now the Apostle says that all things
are of the Father, and that all things are by the Son [833] , and the
prophetic spirit in a way agrees with the Apostolic teaching, which
itself also is given through the Spirit. For in the one passage, the
prophet, when he says that all things are the work of the Hand of Him
Who is over all, sets forth the nature of those things which have come
into being in its relation to Him Who made them, while He Who made
them is God over all, Who has the Hand, and by It makes all things.
And again, in the other passage, the Apostle makes the same division
of entities, making all things depend upon their productive cause, yet
not reckoning in the number of "all things" that which produces them:
so that we are hereby taught the difference of nature between the
created and the uncreated, and it is shown that, in its own nature,
that which makes is one thing and that which is produced is another.
Since, then, all things are of God, and the Son is God, the creation
is properly opposed to the Godhead; while, since the Only-begotten is
something else than the nature of the universe (seeing that not even
those who fight against the truth contradict this), it follows of
necessity that the Son also is equally opposed to the creation, unless
the words of the saints are untrue which testify that by Him all
things were made.

ø2. He then declares that the close relation between names and things
is immutable, and thereafter proceeds accordingly, in the most
excellent manner, with his discourse concerning "generated" and
"ungenerate."

Now seeing that the Only-begotten is in the Divine Scriptures
proclaimed to be God, let Eunomius consider his own argument, and
condemn for utter folly the man who parts the Divine into created and
uncreated, as he does him who divides "man" into "horse" and "man."
For he himself says, a little further on, after his intermediate
nonsense, "the close relation of names to things is immutable," where
he himself by this statement assents to the fixed character of the
true connection of appellations with their subject. If, then, the name
of Godhead is properly employed in close connection with the
Only-begotten God (and Eunomius, though he may desire to be out of
harmony with us, will surely concede that the Scripture does not lie,
and that the name of the Godhead is not inharmoniously attributed to
the Only-begotten), let him persuade himself by his own reasoning that
if "the close relation of names to things is immutable," and the Lord
is called by the name of "God," he cannot apprehend any difference in
respect of the conception of Godhead between the Father and the Son,
seeing that this name is common to both,--or rather not this name
only, but there is a long list of names in which the Son shares,
without divergence of meaning, the appellations of the
Father,--"good," "incorruptible," "just," "judge," "long-suffering,"
"merciful," "eternal," "everlasting," all that indicate the expression
of majesty of nature and power,--without any reservation being made in
His case in any of the names in regard of the exalted nature of the
conception. But Eunomius passes by, as it were with closed eye, the
number, great as it is, of the Divine appellations, and looks only to
one point, his "generate and ungenerate,"--trusting to a slight and
weak cord his doctrine, tossed and driven as it is by the blasts of
error.

He asserts that "no man who has any regard for the truth either calls
any generated thing `ungenerate,' or calls God Who is over all `Son'
or `generate.'" This statement needs no further arguments on our part
for its refutation. For he does not shelter his craft with any veils,
as his wont is, but treats the inversion of his absurd statement as
equivalent [834] , while he says that neither is any generated thing
spoken of as "ungenerate," nor is God Who is over all called "Son" or
"generate," without making any special distinction for the
Only-begotten Godhead of the Son as compared with the rest of the
"generated," but makes his opposition of "all things that have come
into being" to "God" without discrimination, not excepting the Son
from "all things." And in the inversion of his absurdities he clearly
separates, forsooth, the Son from the Divine Nature, when he says that
neither is any generated thing spoken of as "ungenerate," nor is God
called "Son" or "generate," and manifestly reveals by this
contradistinction the horrid character of his blasphemy. For when he
has distinguished the "things that have come into being" from the
"ungenerate," he goes on to say, in that antistrophal induction of
his, that it is impossible to call (not the "unbegotten," but) "God,"
"Son" or "generate," trying by these words to show that which is not
ungenerate is not God, and that the Only-begotten God is, by the fact
of being begotten, as far removed from being God as the ungenerate is
from being generated in fact or in name. For it is not in ignorance of
the consequence of his argument that he makes an inversion of the
terms employed thus inharmonious and incongruous: it is in his assault
on the doctrine of orthodoxy that he opposes "the Godhead" to "the
generate"--and this is the point he tries to establish by his words,
that that which is not ungenerate is not God. What was the true
sequence of his argument? that having said "no generated thing is
ungenerate," he should proceed with the inference, "nor, if anything
is naturally ungenerate, can it be generate." Such a statement at once
contains truth and avoids blasphemy. But now by his premise that no
generated thing is ungenerate, and his inference that God is not
generated, he clearly shuts out the Only-begotten God from being God,
laying down that because He is not ungenerate, neither is He God. Do
we then need any further proofs to expose this monstrous blasphemy? Is
not this enough by itself to serve for a record against the adversary
of Christ, who by the arguments cited maintains that the Word, Who in
the beginning was God, is not God? What need is there to engage
further with such men as this? For we do not entangle ourselves in
controversy with those who busy themselves with idols and with the
blood that is shed upon their altars, not that we acquiesce in the
destruction of those who are besotted about idols, but because their
disease is too strong for our treatment. Thus, just as the fact itself
declares idolatry, and the evil that men do boldly and arrogantly
anticipates the reproach of those who accuse it, so here too I think
that the advocates of orthodoxy should keep silence towards one who
openly proclaims his impiety to his own discredit, just as medicine
also stands powerless in the case of a cancerous complaint, because
the disease is too strong for the art to deal with.

Footnotes

[834] That is, in making a rhetorical inversion of a proposition in
itself objectionable, he so re-states it as to make it really a
different proposition while treating it as equivalent. The original
proposition is objectionable as classing the Son with all generated
existences: the inversion of it, because the term "God" is substituted
illicitly for the term "ungenerate."

ø3. Thereafter he discusses the divergence of names and of things,
speaking, of that which is ungenerate as without a cause, and of that
which is non-existent, as the Scindapsus, Minotaur, Blityri, Cyclops,
Scylla, which never were generated at all, and shows that things which
are essentially different, are mutually destructive, as fire of water,
and the rest in their several relations. But in the case of the Father
and the Son, as the essence is common, and the properties reciprocally
interchangeable, no injury results to the Nature.

Since, however, after the passage cited above, he professes that he
will allege something stronger still, let us examine this also, as
well as the passage cited, lest we should seem to be withdrawing our
opposition in face of an overwhelming force. "If, however," he says,
"I am to abandon all these positions, and fall back upon my stronger
argument, I would say this, that even if all the terms that he
advances by way of refutation were established, our statement will
none the less be manifestly shown to be true. If, as will be admitted,
the divergence of the names which are significant of properties marks
the divergence of the things, it is surely necessary to allow that
with the divergence of the names significant of essence is also marked
the divergence of the essences. And this would be found to hold good
in all cases, I mean in the case of essences, energies, colours,
figures, and other qualities. For we denote by divergent appellations
the different essences, fire and water, air and earth, cold and heat,
white and black, triangle and circle. Why need we mention the
intelligible essences, in enumerating which the Apostle marks, by
difference of names, the divergence of essence?"

Who would not be dismayed at this irresistible power of attack? The
argument transcends the promise, the experience is more terrible than
the threat. "I will come," he says, "to my stronger argument." What is
it? That as the differences of properties are recognized by those
names which signify the special attributes, we must of course, he
says, allow that differences of essence are also expressed by
divergence of names. What then are these appellations of essences by
which we learn the divergence of Nature between the Father and the
son? He talks of fire and water, air and earth, cold and heat, white
and black, triangle and circle. His illustrations have won him the
day: his argument carries all before it: I cannot contradict the
statement that those names which are entirely incommunicable indicate
difference of natures. But our man of keen and quick-sighted intellect
has just missed seeing these points:--that in this case the Father is
God and the Son is God; that "just," and "incorruptible," and all
those names which belong to the Divine Nature, are used equally of the
Father and of the Son; and thus, if the divergent character of
appellations indicates difference of natures, the community of names
will surely show the common character of the essence. And if we must
agree that the Divine essence is to be expressed by names [835] , it
would behove us to apply to that Nature these lofty and Divine names
rather than the terminology of "generate" and "ungenerate," because
"good" and "incorruptible," "just" and "wise," and all such terms as
these are strictly applicable only to that Nature which passes all
understanding, whereas "generated" exhibits community of name with
even the inferior forms of the lower creation. For we call a dog, and
a frog, and all things that come into the world by way of generation,
"generated." And moreover, the term "ungenerate" is not only employed
of that which exists without a cause, but has also a proper
application to that which is nonexistent. The Scindapsus [836] is
called ungenerate, the Blityri [837] is ungenerate, the Minotaur is
ungenerate, the Cyclops, Scylla, the Chimæra are ungenerate, not in
the sense of existing without generation, but in the sense of never
having come into being at all. If, then, the names more peculiarly
Divine are common to the Son with the Father, and if it is the others,
those which are equivocally employed either of the non-existent or of
the lower animals--if it is these, I say, which are divergent, let his
"generate and ungenerate" be so: Eunomius' powerful argument against
us itself upholds the cause of truth in testifying that there is no
divergence in respect of nature, because no divergence can be
perceived in the names [838] . But if he asserts the difference of
essence to exist between the "generate" and the "ungenerate," as it
does between fire and water, and is of opinion that the names, like
those which he has mentioned in his examples, are in the same mutual
relation as "fire" and "water," the horrid character of his blasphemy
will here again be brought to light, even if we hold our peace. For
fire and water have a nature mutually destructive, and each is
destroyed, if it comes to be in the other, by the prevalence of the
more powerful element. If, then, he lays down the doctrine that the
Nature of the Ungenerate differs thus from that of the Only-begotten,
it is surely clear that he logically makes this destructive opposition
to be involved in the divergence of their essences, so that their
nature will be, by this reasoning, incompatible and incommunicable,
and the one would be consumed by the other, if both should be found to
be mutually inclusive or co-existent.

How then is the Son "in the Father" without being destroyed, and how
does the Father, coming to be "in the Son," remain continually
unconsumed, if, as Eunomius says, the special attribute of fire, as
compared with water, is maintained in the relation of the Generate to
the Ungenerate? Nor does their definition regard communion as existing
between earth and air, for the former is stable, solid, resistent, of
downward tendency and heavy, while air has a nature made up of the
contrary attributes. So white and black are found in opposition among
colours, and men are agreed that the circle is not the same with the
triangle, for each, according to the definition of its figure, is
precisely that which the other is not. But I am unable to discover
where he sees the opposition in the case of God the Father and God the
Only-begotten Son. One goodness, wisdom, justice, providence, power,
incorruptibility,--all other attributes of exalted significance are
similarly predicated of each, and the one has in a certain sense His
strength in the other; for on the one hand the Father makes all things
through the Son, and on the other hand the Only-begotten works all in
Himself, being the Power of the Father. Of what avail, then, are fire
and water to show essential diversity in the Father and the Son? He
calls us, moreover, "rash" for instancing the unity of nature and
difference of persons of Peter and Paul, and says we are guilty of
gross recklessness, if we apply our argument to the contemplation of
the objects of pure reason by the aid of material examples. Fitly,
fitly indeed, does the corrector of our errors reprove us for rashness
in interpreting the Divine Nature by material illustrations! Why then,
deliberate and circumspect sir, do you talk about the elements? Is
earth immaterial, fire an object of pure reason, water incorporeal,
air beyond the perception of the senses? Is your mind so well directed
to its aim, are you so keen-sighted in all directions in your
promulgation of this argument, that your adversaries cannot lay hold
of, that you do not see in yourself the faults you blame in those you
are accusing? Or are we to make concessions to you when you are
establishing the diversity of essence by material aid, and to be
ourselves rejected when we point out the kindred character of the
Nature by means of examples within our compass?

Footnotes

[835] On this point, besides what follows here, see the treatise
against Tritheism addressed to Ablabius.
[836] These are names applied to denote existences purely imaginary;
the other names belong to classical mythology.
[837] These are names applied to denote existences purely imaginary;
the other names belong to classical mythology.
[838] That is, in the names more peculiarly appropriate to the Divine
Nature.

ø4. He says that all things that are in creation have been named by
man, if, as is the case, they are called differently by every nation,
as also the appellation of "Ungenerate" is conferred by us: but that
the proper appellation of the Divine essence itself which expresses
the Divine Nature, either does not exist at all, or is unknown to us.

But Peter and Paul, he says, were named by men, and hence it comes
that it is possible in their case to change the appellations. Why,
what existing thing has not been named by men? I call you to testify
on behalf of my argument. For if you make change of names a sign of
things having been named by men, you will thereby surely allow that
every name has been imposed upon things by us, since the same
appellations of objects have not obtained universally. For as in the
case of Paul who was once Saul, and of Peter who was formerly Simon,
so earth and sky and air and sea and all the parts of the creation
have not been named alike by all, but are named in one way by the
Hebrews, and in another way by us, and are denoted by every nation by
different names. If then Eunomius' argument is valid when he maintains
that it was for this reason, to wit, that their names had been imposed
by men, that Peter and Paul were named afresh, our teaching will
surely be valid also, starting as it does from like premises, which
says that all things are named by us, on the ground that their
appellations vary according to the distinctions of nations. Now if all
things are so, surely the Generate and the Ungenerate are not
exceptions, for even they are among the things that change their name.
For when we gather, as it were, into the form of a name the conception
of any subject that arises in us, we declare our concept by words that
vary at different times, not making, but signifying, the thing by the
name we give it. For the things remain in themselves as they naturally
are, while the mind, touching on existing things, reveals its thought
by such words as are available. And just as the essence of Peter was
not changed with the change of his name, so neither is any other of
the things we contemplate changed in the process of mutation of names.
And for this reason we say that the term "Ungenerate" was applied by
us to the true and first Father Who is the Cause of all, and that no
harm would result as regards the signifying of the Subject, if we were
to acknowledge the same concept under another name. For it is
allowable instead of speaking of Him as "Ungenerate," to call Him the
"First Cause" or "Father of the Only-begotten," or to speak of Him as
"existing without cause," and many such appellations which lead to the
same thought; so that Eunomius confirms our doctrines by the very
arguments in which he makes complaint against us, because we know no
name significant of the Divine Nature. We are taught the fact of Its
existence, while we assert that an appellation of such force as to
include the unspeakable and infinite Nature, either does not exist at
all, or at any rate is unknown to us. Let him then leave his
accustomed language of fable, and show us the names which signify the
essences, and then proceed further to divide the subject by the
divergence of their names. But so long as the saying of the Scripture
is true that Abraham and Moses were not capable of the knowledge of
the Name, and that "no man hath seen God at any time [839] ," and that
"no man hath seen Him, nor can see [840] ," and that the light around
Him is unapproachable [841] , and "there is no end of His greatness
[842] ";--so long as we say and believe these things, how like is an
argument that promises any comprehension and expression of the
infinite Nature, by means of the significance of names, to one who
thinks that he can enclose the whole sea in his own hand! for as the
hollow of one's hand is to the whole deep, so is all the power of
language in comparison with that Nature which is unspeakable and
incomprehensible.

Footnotes

ø5. After much discourse concerning the actually existent, and
ungenerate and good, and upon the consubstantiality of the heavenly
powers, showing the uncharted character of their essence, yet the
difference of their ranks, he ends the book.

Now in saying these things we do not intend to deny that the Father
exists without generation, and we have no intention of refusing to
agree to the statement that the Only-begotten God is generated;--on
the contrary the latter has been generated, the former has not been
generated. But what He is, in His own Nature, Who exists apart from
generation, and what He is, Who is believed to have been generated, we
do not learn from the signification of "having been generated," and
"not having been generated." For when we say "this person was
generated" (or "was not generated"), we are impressed with a two-fold
thought, having our eyes turned to the subject by the demonstrative
part of the phrase, and learning that which is contemplated in the
subject by the words "was generated" or "was not generated,"--as it is
one thing to think of that which is, and another to think of what we
contemplate in that which is. But, moreover, the word "is" is surely
understood with every name that is used concerning the Divine
Nature,--as "just," "incorruptible," "immortal," and "ungenerate," and
whatever else is said of Him; even if this word does not happen to
occur in the phrase, yet the thought both of the speaker and the
hearer surely makes the name attach to "is," so that if this word were
not added, the appellation would be uttered in vain. For instance (for
it is better to present an argument by way of illustration), when
David says, "God, a righteous judge, strong and patient [843] ," if
"is" were not understood with each of the epithets included in the
phrase, the enumerations of the appellations will seem purposeless and
unreal, not having any subject to rest upon; but when "is" is
understood with each of the names, what is said will clearly be of
force, being contemplated in reference to that which is. As, then,
when we say "He is a judge," we conceive concerning Him some operation
of judgment, and by the "is" carry our minds to the subject, and are
hereby clearly taught not to suppose that the account of His being is
the same with the action, so also as a result of saying, "He is
generated (or ungenerate)," we divide our thought into a double
conception, by "is" understanding the subject, and by "generated," or
"ungenerate," apprehending that which belongs to the subject. As,
then, when we are taught by David that God is "a judge," or "patient,"
we do not learn the Divine essence, but one of the attributes which
are contemplated in it, so in this case too when we hear of His being
not generated, we do not by this negative predication understand the
subject, but are guided as to what we must not think concerning the
subject, while what He essentially is remains as much as ever
unexplained. So too, when Holy Scripture predicates the other Divine
names of Him Who is, and delivers to Moses the Being without a name,
it is for him who discloses the Nature of that Being, not to rehearse
the attributes of the Being, but by his words to make manifest to us
its actual Nature. For every name which you may use is an attribute of
the Being, but is not the Being,--"good," "ungenerate,"
"incorruptible,"--but to each of these "is" does not fail to be
supplied. Any one, then, who undertakes to give the account of this
good Being, of this ungenerate Being, as He is, would speak in vain,
if he rehearsed the attributes contemplated in Him, and were silent as
to that essence which he undertakes by his words to explain. To be
without generation is one of the attributes contemplated in the Being,
but the definition of "Being" is one thing, and that of "being in some
particular way" is another; and this [844] has so far remained untold
and unexplained by the passages cited. Let him then first disclose to
us the names of the essence, and then divide the Nature by the
divergence of the appellations;--so long as what we require remains
unexplained, it is in vain that he employs his scientific skill upon
names, seeing that the names [845] have no separate existence.

Such then is Eunomius' stronger handle against the truth, while we
pass by in silence many views which are to be found in this part of
his composition; for it seems to me right that those who run in this
armed race [846] against the enemies of the truth should arm
themselves against those who are fairly fenced about with the
plausibility of falsehood, and not defile their argument with such
conceptions as are already dead and of offensive odour. His
supposition that whatever things are united in the idea of their
essence [847] must needs exist corporeally and be joined to corruption
(for this he says in this part of his work), I shall willingly pass by
like some cadaverous odour, since I think every reasonable man will
perceive how dead and corrupt such an argument is. For who knows not
that the multitude of human souls is countless, yet one essence
underlies them all, and the consubstantial substratum in them is alien
from bodily corruption? so that even children can plainly see the
argument that bodies are corrupted and dissolved, not because they
have the same essence one with another, but because of their
possessing a compound nature. The idea of the compound nature is one,
that of the common nature of their essence is another, so that it is
true to say, "corruptible bodies are of one essence," but the converse
statement is not true at all, if it be anything like, "this
consubstantial nature is also surely corruptible," as is shown in the
case of the souls which have one essence, while yet corruption does
not attach to them in virtue of the community of essence. And the
account given of the souls might properly be applied to every
intellectual existence which we contemplate in creation. For the words
brought together by Paul do not signify, as Eunomius will have them
do, some mutually divergent natures of the supra-mundane powers; on
the contrary, the sense of the names clearly indicates that he is
mentioning in his argument, not diversities of natures, but the varied
peculiarities of the operations of the heavenly host: for there are,
he says, "principalities," and "thrones," and "powers," and "mights,"
and "dominions [848] ." Now these names are such as to make it at once
clear to every one that their significance is arranged in regard to
some operation. For to rule, and to exercise power and dominion, and
to be the throne of some one,--all these conceptions would not be held
by any one versed in argument to apply to diversities of essence,
since it is clearly operation that is signified by every one of the
names: so that any one who says that diversities of nature are
signified by the names rehearsed by Paul deceives himself,
"understanding," as the Apostle says, "neither what he says, nor
whereof he affirms [849] ," since the sense of the names clearly shows
that the Apostle recognizes in the intelligible powers distinctions of
certain ranks, but does not by these names indicate varieties of
essences.

Footnotes

[843] Cf. Ps. vii. 8
[844] What "this" means is not clear: it may be "the Being," but most
probably is the distinction which S. Gregory is pointing out between
the Being and Its attributes, which he considers has not been
sufficiently recognized.
[845] Reading ton onomaton ouk onton with the Paris editions. Oehler
reads noematon, but does not give any authority for the change.
[846] The metaphor seems slightly confused, being partly taken from a
tournament, or gladiatorial contest, partly from a race in armour.
[847] The word ousia seems to have had in Eunomius' mind something of
the same idea of corporeal existence attaching to it which has been
made to attach to the Latin "substantia," and to the English
"substance."
[848] Cf. Col. i. 16, and Eph. i. 21.
[849] 1 Tim. i. 7.

Book VIII.

ø1. The eighth book very notably overthrows the blasphemy of the
heretics who say that the Only-begotten came from nothing, and that
there was a time when He was not, and shows the Son to be no new
being, but from everlasting, from His having said to Moses, "I am He
that is," and to Manoah, "Why askest thou My name? It also is
wonderful";--moreover David also says to God, "Thou art the same, and
Thy years shall not fail;" and furthermore Isaiah says, "I am God, the
first, and hereafter am I:" and the Evangelist, "He was in the
beginning, and was with God, and was God:"--and that He has neither
beginning nor end: --and he proves that those who say that He is new
and comes from nothing are idolaters. And herein he very finely
interprets "the brightness of the glory, and the express image of the
Person."

These, then, are the strong points of Eunomius' case; and I think that
when those which promised to be powerful are proved by argument to be
so rotten and unsubstantial, I may well keep silence concerning the
rest, since the others are practically refuted, concurrently with the
refutation of the stronger ones; just as it happens in warlike
operations that when a force more powerful than the rest has been
beaten, the remainder of the army are no longer of any account in the
eyes of those by whom the strong portion of it has been overcome. But
the fact that the chief part of his blasphemy lies in the later part
of his discourse forbids me to be silent. For the transition of the
Only-begotten from nothing into being, that horrid and godless
doctrine of Eunomius, which is more to be shunned than all impiety, is
next maintained in the order of his argument. And since every one who
has been bewitched by this deceit has the phrase, "If He was, He has
not been begotten, and if He has been begotten, He was not," ready
upon his tongue for the maintenance of the doctrine that He Who made
of nothing us and all the creation is Himself from nothing, and since
the deceit obtains much support thereby, as men of feebler mind are
pressed by this superficial bit of plausibility, and led to acquiesce
in the blasphemy, we must needs not pass by this doctrinal "root of
bitterness," lest, as the Apostle says, it "spring up and trouble us
[850] ." Now I say that we must first of all consider the actual
argument itself, apart from our contest with our opponents, and thus
afterwards proceed to the examination and refutation of what they have
set forth.

One mark of the true Godhead is indicated by the words of Holy
Scripture, which Moses learnt by the voice from heaven, when He heard
Him Who said, "I am He that is [851] ." We think it right, then, to
believe that to be alone truly Divine which is represented as eternal
and infinite in respect of being; and all that is contemplated therein
is always the same, neither growing nor being consumed; so that if one
should say of God, that formerly He was, but now is not, or that He
now is, but formerly was not, we should consider each of the sayings
alike to be godless: for by both alike the idea of eternity is
mutilated, being cut short on one side or the other by non-existence,
whether one contemplates "nothing" as preceding "being [852] ," or
declares that "being" ends in "nothing"; and the frequent repetition
of "first of all" or "last of all" concerning God's non-existence does
not make amends for the impious conception touching the Divinity. For
this reason we declare the maintenance of their doctrine as to the
non-existence at some time of Him Who truly is, to be a denial and
rejection of His true Godhead; and this on the ground that, on the one
hand, He Who showed Himself to Moses by the light speaks of Himself as
being, when He says, "I am He that is [853] ," while on the other,
Isaiah (being made, so to say, the instrument of Him Who spoke in him)
says in the person of Him that is, "I am the first, and hereafter am I
[854] ," so that hereby, whichever way we consider it, we conceive
eternity in God. And so, too, the word that was spoken to Manoah shows
the fact that the Divinity is not comprehensible by the significance
of His name, because, when Manoah asks to know His name, that, when
the promise has come actually to pass, he may by name glorify his
benefactor, He says to him, "Why askest thou this? It also is
wonderful [855] "; so that by this we learn that there is one name
significant of the Divine Nature--the wonder, namely, that arises
unspeakably in our hearts concerning It. So, too, great David, in his
discourses with himself, proclaims the same truth, in the sense that
all the creation was brought into being by God, while He alone exists
always in the same manner, and abides for ever, where he says, "But
Thou art the same, and Thy years shall not fail [856] ." When we hear
these sayings, and others like them, from men inspired by God, let us
leave all that is not from eternity to the worship of idolaters, as a
new thing alien from the true Godhead. For that which now is, and
formerly was not, is clearly new and not eternal, and to have regard
to any new object of worship is called by Moses the service of demons,
when he says, "They sacrificed to devils and not to God, to gods whom
their fathers knew not; new gods were they that came newly up [857] ."
If then everything that is new in worship is a service of demons, and
is alien from the true Godhead, and if what is now, but was not
always, is new and not eternal, we who have regard to that which is,
necessarily reckon those who contemplate non-existence as attaching to
Him Who is, and who say that "He once was not," among the worshippers
of idols. For we may also see that the great John, when declaring in
his own preaching the Only-begotten God, guards his own statement in
every way, so that the conception of non-existence shall find no
access to Him Who is. For he says [858] that He "was in the
beginning," and "was with God," and "was God," and was light, and
life, and truth, and all good things at all times, and never at any
time failed to be anything that is excellent, Who is the fulness of
all good, and is in the bosom of the Father. If then Moses lays down
as a law for us some such mark of true Godhead as this, that we know
nothing else of God but this one thing, that He is (for to this point
the words, "I am He that is [859] "); while Isaiah in his preaching
declares aloud the absolute infinity of Him Who is, defining the
existence of God as having no regard to beginning or to end (for He
Who says "I am the first, and hereafter am I," places no limit to His
eternity in either direction, so that neither, if we look to the
beginning, do we find any point marked since which He is, and beyond
which He was not, nor, if we turn our thought to the future, can we
cut short by any boundary the eternal progress of Him Who is),--and if
the prophet David forbids us to worship any new and strange God [860]
(both of which are involved in the heretical doctrine; "newness" is
clearly indicated in that which is not eternal, and "strangeness" is
alienation from the Nature of the very God),--if, I say, these things
are so, we declare all the sophistical fabrication about the
non-existence at some time of Him Who truly is, to be nothing else
than a departure from Christianity, and a turning to idolatry. For
when the Evangelist, in his discourse concerning the Nature of God,
separates at all points non-existence from Him Who is, and, by his
constant repetition of the word "was," carefully destroys the
suspicion of non-existence, and calls Him the Only-begotten God, the
Word of God, the Son of God, equal with God, and all such names, we
have this judgment fixed and settled in us, that if the Only-begotten
Son is God, we must believe that He Who is believed to be God is
eternal. And indeed He is verily God, and assuredly is eternal, and is
never at any time found to be non-existent. For God, as we have often
said, if He now is, also assuredly always was, and if He once was not,
neither does He now exist at all. But since even the enemies of the
truth confess that the Son is and continually abides the Only-begotten
God, we say this, that, being in the Father, He is not in Him in one
respect only, but He is in Him altogether, in respect of all that the
Father is conceived to be. As, then, being in the incorruptibility of
the Father, He is incorruptible, good in His goodness, powerful in His
might, and, as being in each of these attributes of special excellence
which are conceived of the Father, He is that particular thing, so,
also, being in His eternity, He is assuredly eternal. Now the eternity
of the Father is marked by His never having taken His being from
nonexistence, and never terminating His being in non-existence. He,
therefore, Who hath all things that are the Father's [861] , and is
contemplated in all the glory of the Father, even as, being in the
endlessness of the Father, He has no end, so, being in the
unoriginateness of the Father, has, as the Apostle says, "no beginning
of days [862] ," but at once is "of the Father," and is regarded in
the eternity of the Father: and in this respect, more especially, is
seen the complete absence of divergence in the Likeness, as compared
with Him Whose Likeness He is. And herein is His saying found true
which tells us, "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father [863] ."
Moreover, it is in this way that those words of the Apostle, that the
Son is "the brightness of His glory, and the express image of His
Person [864] ," are best understood to have an excellent and close
application. For the Apostle conveys to those hearers who are unable,
by the contemplation of purely intellectual objects, to elevate their
thought to the height of the knowledge of God, a sort of notion of the
truth, by means of things apparent to sense. For as the body of the
sun is expressly imaged by the whole disc that surrounds it, and he
who looks on the sun argues, by means of what he sees, the existence
of the whole solid substratum, so, he says, the majesty of the Father
is expressly imaged in the greatness of the power of the Son, that the
one may be believed to be as great as the other is known to be: and
again, as the radiance of light sheds its brilliancy from the whole of
the sun's disc (for in the disc one part is not radiant, and the rest
dim), so all that glory which the Father is, sheds its brilliancy from
its whole extent by means of the brightness that comes from it, that
is, by the true Light; and as the ray is of the sun (for there would
be no ray if the sun were not), yet the sun is never conceived as
existing by itself without the ray of brightness that is shed from it,
so the Apostle delivering to us the continuity and eternity of that
existence which the Only-begotten has of the Father, calls the Son
"the brightness of His glory."

ø2. He then discusses the "willing" of the Father concerning the
generation of the Son, and shows that the object of that good will is
from eternity, which is the Son, existing in the Father, and being
closely related to the process of willing, as the ray to the flame, or
the act of seeing to the eye.

After these distinctions on our part no one can well be longer in
doubt how the Only-begotten at once is believed to be "of the Father,"
and is eternally, even if the one phrase does not at first sight seem
to agree with the other,--that which declares Him to be "of the
Father" with that which asserts His eternity. But if we are to confirm
our statement by further arguments, it may be possible to apprehend
the doctrine on this point by the aid of things cognizable by our
senses. And let no one deride our statement, if it cannot find among
existing things a likeness of the object of our enquiry such as may be
in all respects sufficient for the presentation of the matter in hand
by way of analogy and resemblance. For we should like to persuade
those who say that the Father first willed and so proceeded to become
a Father, and on this ground assert posteriority in existence as
regards the Word, by whatever illustrations may make it possible, to
turn to the orthodox view. Neither does this immediate conjunction
exclude the "willing" of the Father, in the sense that He had a Son
without choice, by some necessity of His Nature, nor does the
"willing" separate the Son from the Father, coming in between them as
a kind of interval: so that we neither reject from our doctrine the
"willing" of the Begetter directed to the Son, as being, so to say,
forced out by the conjunction of the Son's oneness with the Father,
nor do we by any means break that inseparable connection, when
"willing" is regarded as involved in the generation. For to our heavy
and inert nature it properly belongs that the wish and the possession
of a thing are not often present with us at the same moment; but now
we wish for something we have not, and at another time we obtain what
we do not wish to obtain. But, in the case of the simple and
all-powerful Nature, all things are conceived together and at once,
the willing of good as well as the possession of what He wills. For
the good and the eternal will is contemplated as operating,
indwelling, and co-existing in the eternal Nature, not arising in it
from any separate principle, nor capable of being conceived apart from
the object of will: for it is not possible that with God either the
good will should not be, or the object of will should not accompany
the act of will, since no cause can either bring it about that that
which befits the Father should not always be, or be any hindrance to
the possession of the object of will. Since, then, the Only-begotten
God is by nature the good (or rather beyond all good), and since the
good does not fail to be the object of the Father's will, it is hereby
clearly shown, both that the conjunction of the Son with the Father is
without any intermediary, and also that the will, which is always
present in the good Nature, is not forced out nor excluded by reason
of this inseparable conjunction. And if any one is listening to my
argument in no scoffing spirit, I should like to add to what I have
already said something of the following kind.

Just as, if one were to grant (I speak, of course, hypothetically) the
power of deliberate choice to belong to flame, it would be clear that
the flame will at once upon its existence will that its radiance
should shine forth from itself, and when it wills it will not be
impotent (since, on the appearance of the flame, its natural power at
once fulfils its will in the matter of the radiance), so that
undoubtedly, if it be granted that the flame is moved by deliberate
choice, we conceive the concurrence of all these things
simultaneously--of the kindling of the fire, of its act of will
concerning the radiance, and of the radiance itself; so that the
movement by way of choice is no hindrance to the dignity of the
existence of the radiance,--even so, according to the illustration we
have spoken of, you will not, by confessing the good act of will as
existing in the Father, separate by that act of will the Son from the
Father. For it is not reasonable to suppose that the act of willing
that He should be, could be a hindrance to His immediately coming into
being; but just as, in the eye, seeing and the will to see are, one an
operation of nature, the other an impulse of choice, yet no delay is
caused to the act of sight by the movement of choice in that
particular direction [865] ,--(for each of these is regarded
separately and by itself, not as being at all a hindrance to the
existence of the other, but as both being somehow interexistent, the
natural operation concurring with the choice, and the choice in turn
not failing to be accompanied by the natural motion)--as, I say,
perception naturally belongs to the eye, and the willing to see
produces no delay in respect to actual sight, but one wills that it
should have vision, and immediately what he wills is, so also in the
case of that Nature which is unspeakable and above all thought, our
apprehension of all comes together simultaneously--of the eternal
existence of the Father, and of an act of will concerning the Son, and
of the Son Himself, Who is, as John says, "in the beginning," and is
not conceived as coming after the beginning. Now the beginning of all
is the Father; but in this beginning the Son also is declared to be,
being in His Nature that very thing which the Beginning is. For the
Beginning is God, and the Word Who "was in the Beginning" is God. As
then the phrase "the beginning" points to eternity, John well conjoins
"the Word in the Beginning," saying that the Word was in It;
asserting, I suppose, this fact to the end that the first idea present
to the mind of his hearer may not be "the Beginning" alone by itself,
but that, before this has been impressed upon him, there should also
be presented to his mind, together with the Beginning the Word Who was
in It, entering with It into the hearer's understanding, and being
present to his hearing at the same time with the Beginning.

Footnotes

[865] Oehler's punctuation here seems faulty.

ø3. Then, thus passing over what relates to the essence of the Son as
having been already discussed, he treats of the sense involved in
"generation," saying that there are diverse generations, those
effected by matter and art, and of buildings,--and that by succession
of animals,--and those by efflux, as by the sun and its beam. The lamp
and its radiance, scents and ointments and the quality diffused by
them,--and the word produced by the mind; and cleverly discusses
generation [866] from rotten wood; and from the condensation of fire,
and countless other causes.

Now that we have thus thoroughly scrutinized our doctrine, it may
perhaps be time to set forth and to consider the opposing statement,
examining it side by side in comparison with our own opinion. He
states it thus:--"For while there are," he says, "two statements which
we have made, the one, that the essence of the Only-begotten was not
before its own generation, the other that, being generated, it was
before all things, he [867] does not prove either of these statements
to be untrue; for he did not venture to say that He was before that
supreme [868] generation and formation, seeing that he is opposed at
once by the Nature of the Father, and the judgment of sober-minded
men. For what sober man could admit the Son to be and to be begotten
before that supreme generation? and He Who is without generation needs
not generation in order to His being what He is." Well, whether he
speaks truly, when he says that our master [869] opposed his
antitheses to no purpose, all may surely be aware who have been
conversant with that writer's works. But for my own part (for I think
that the refutation of his calumny on this matter is a small step
towards the exposure of his malice), I will leave the task of showing
that this point was not passed over by our master without discussion,
and turn my argument to the discussion, as far as in me lies, of the
points now advanced. He says that he has in his own discourse spoken
of two matters,--one, that the essence of the Only-begotten was not
before Its own generation, the other, that, being generated, It was
before all things. Now I think that by what we have already said, the
fact has been sufficiently shown that no new essence was begotten by
the Father besides that which is contemplated in the Father Himself,
and that there is no need for us to be entangled in a contest with
blasphemy of this kind, as if the argument were now propounded to us
for the first time; and further, that the real force of our argument
must be directed to one point, I mean to his horrible and blasphemous
utterance, which clearly states concerning God the Word that "He was
not." Moreover, as our argument in the foregoing discourse has already
to some extent dealt with the question of his blasphemy, it would
perhaps be superfluous again to establish by like considerations what
we have proved already. For it was to this end that we made those
former statements, that by the earlier impression upon our hearers of
an orthodox mode of thought, the blasphemy of our adversaries, who
assert that non-existence preceded existence in the case of the
Only-begotten God, might be more manifest.

It seems at this point well to investigate in our argument, by a more
careful examination, the actual significance of "generation." That
this name presents to us the fact of being as the result of some cause
is clear to every one, and about this point there is, I suppose, no
need to dispute. But since the account to be given of things which
exist as the result of cause is various, I think it proper that this
matter should be cleared up in our discourse by some sort of
scientific division. Of things, then, which are the result of
something, we understand the varieties to be as follows. Some are the
result of matter and art, as the structure of buildings and of other
works, coming into being by means of their respective matter, and
these are directed by some art that accomplishes the thing proposed,
with a view to the proper aim of the results produced. Others are the
results of matter and nature; for the generations of animals are the
building [870] of nature, who carries on her own operation by means of
their material bodily subsistence. Others are the result of material
efflux, in which cases the antecedent remains in its natural
condition, while that which flows from it is conceived separately, as
in the case of the sun and its beam, or the lamp and its brightness,
or of scents and ointments and the quality they emit; for these, while
they remain in themselves without diminution, have at the same time,
each concurrently with itself, that natural property which they emit:
as the sun its beam, the lamp its brightness, the scents the perfume
produced by them in the air. There is also another species of
"generation" besides these, in which the cause is immaterial and
incorporeal, but the generation is an object of sense and takes place
by corporeal means;--I speak of the word which is begotten by the
mind: for the mind, being itself incorporeal, brings forth the word by
means of the organs of sense. All these varieties of generation we
mentally include, as it were, in one general view. For all the wonders
that are wrought by nature, which changes the bodies of some animals
to something of a different kind, or produces some animals from a
change in liquids, or a corruption of seed, or the rotting of wood, or
out of the condensed mass of fire transforms the cold vapour that
issues from the firebrands, shut off in the heart of the fire, to
produce an animal which they call the salamander,--these, even if they
seem to be outside the limits we have laid down, are none the less
included among the cases we have mentioned. For it is by means of
bodies that nature fashions these varied forms of animals; for it is
such and such a change of body, disposed by nature in this or that
particular way, which produces this or that particular animal; and
this is not a distinct species of generation besides that which is
accomplished as the result of nature and matter.

Footnotes

[866] To make the grammar of the sentence exact ten should here be
substituted for ton, the object of the verb being apparently gennesin
not logon. The whole section of the analysis is rather confused, and
does not clearly reproduce S. Gregory's division of the subject. A
large part of this section, and of that which follows it, is repeated
with very slight alteration from Bk. II. §9 (see pp. 113-115 above).
The resemblances are much closer in the Greek text than they appear in
the present translation, in which different hands have been at work in
the two books.
[867] i.e.S. Basil.
[868] anotato may be "supreme," in the sense of "ultimate" or "most
remote," or in the more ordinary sense of "most exalted."
[869] i.e.S. Basil.
[870] Or (reading as proposed above, p. 114, oikonomei for oikodomei),
"the ordering of nature."

ø4. He further shows the operations of God to be expressed by human
illustrations; for what hands and feet and the other parts of the body
with which men work are, that, in the case of God, the will alone is,
in place of these. And so also arises the divergence of generation;
wherefore He is called Only-begotten, because He has no community with
other generation such as is observed in creation [871] , but in that
He is called the "brightness of glory," and the "savour of ointment,"
He shows the close conjunction and co-eternity of His Nature with the
Father [872]

Now these modes of generation being well known to men, the loving
dispensation of the Holy Spirit, in delivering to us the Divine
mysteries, conveys its instruction on those matters which transcend
language by means of what is within our capacity, as it does also
constantly elsewhere, when it portrays the Divinity in bodily terms,
making mention, in speaking concerning God, of His eye, His eyelids,
His ear, His fingers, His hand, His right hand, His arm, His feet, His
shoes [873] , and the like,--none of which things is apprehended to
belong in its primary sense to the Divine Nature,--but turning its
teaching to what we can easily perceive, it describes by terms well
worn in human use, facts that are beyond every name, while by each of
the terms employed concerning God we are led analogically to some more
exalted conception. In this way, then, it employs the numerous forms
of generation to present to us, from the inspired teaching, the
unspeakable existence of the Only-begotten, taking just so much from
each as may be reverently admitted into our conceptions concerning
God. For as its mention of "fingers," "hand," and "arm," in speaking
of God, does not by the phrase portray the structure of the limb out
of bones and sinews and flesh and ligaments, but signifies by such an
expression His effective and operative power, and as it indicates by
each of the other words of this kind those conceptions concerning God
which correspond to them, not admitting the corporeal senses of the
words, so also it speaks indeed of the forms of these modes of coming
into being as applied to the Divine Nature, yet does not speak in that
sense which our customary knowledge enables us to understand. For when
it speaks of the formative power, it calls that particular energy by
the name of "generation," because the word expressive of Divine power
must needs descend to our lowliness, yet it does not indicate all that
is associated with formative generation among ourselves,--neither
place nor time nor preparation of material, nor the co-operation of
instruments, nor the purpose in the things produced, but it leaves
these out of sight, and greatly and loftily claims for God the
generation of the things that are, where it says, "He spake and they
were begotten, He commanded and they were created [874] ." Again, when
it expounds that unspeakable and transcendent existence which the
Only-begotten has from the Father, because human poverty is incapable
of the truths that are too high for speech or thought, it uses our
language here also, and calls Him by the name of "Son,"--a name which
our ordinary use applies to those who are produced by matter and
nature. But just as the word, which tells us in reference to God of
the "generation" of the creation, did not add the statement that it
was generated by the aid of any material, declaring that its material
substance, its place, its time, and all the like, had their existence
in the power of His will, so here too, in speaking of the "Son," it
leaves out of sight both all other things which human nature sees in
earthly generation (passions, I mean, and dispositions, and the
co-operation of time and the need of place, and especially matter),
without all which earthly generation as a result of nature does not
occur. Now every such conception of matter and interval being excluded
from the sense of the word "Son," nature alone remains, and hereby in
the word "Son" is declared concerning the Only-begotten the close and
true character of His manifestation from the Father. And since this
particular species of generation did not suffice to produce in us an
adequate idea of the unspeakable existence of the Only-begotten, it
employs also another species of generation, that which is the result
of efflux, to express the Divine Nature of the Son, and calls Him "the
brightness of glory [875] ," the "savour of ointment [876] ," the
"breath of God [877] ," which our accustomed use, in the scientific
discussion we have already made, calls material efflux. But just as in
the previous cases neither the making of creation nor the significance
of the word "Son" admitted time, or matter, or place, or passion, so
here also the phrase, purifying the sense of "brightness" and the
other terms from every material conception, and employing only that
element in this particular species of generation which is suitable to
the Divinity, points by the force of this mode of expression to the
truth that He is conceived as being both from Him and with Him. For
neither does the word "breath" present to us dispersion into the air
from the underlying matter, nor "savour" the transference that takes
place from the quality of the ointment to the air, nor "brightness"
the efflux by means of rays from the body of the sun; but this only,
as we have said, is manifested by this particular mode of generation,
that He is conceived to be of Him and also with Him, no intermediate
interval existing between the Father and that Son Who is of Him. And
since, in its abundant loving-kindness, the grace of the Holy Spirit
has ordered that our conceptions concerning the Only-begotten Son
should arise in us from many sources, it has added also the remaining
species of things contemplated in generation,--that, I mean, which is
the result of mind and word. But the lofty John uses especial
foresight that the hearer may not by any means by inattention or
feebleness of thought fall into the common understanding of "Word," so
that the Son should be supposed to be the voice of the Father. For
this reason he prepares us at his first proclamation to regard the
Word as in essence, and not in any essence foreign to or dissevered
from that essence whence It has Its being, but in that first and
blessed Nature. For this is what he teaches us when he says the Word
"was in the beginning [878] ," and "was with God [879] ," being
Himself also both God and all else that the "Beginning" is. For thus
it is that he makes his discourse on the Godhead, touching the
eternity of the Only-begotten. Seeing then that these modes of
generation (those, I mean, which are the result of cause) are
ordinarily known among us, and are employed by Holy Scripture for our
instruction on the subjects before us, in such a way as it might be
expected that each of them would be applied to the presentation of
Divine conceptions, let the reader of our argument "judge righteous
judgement [880] ," whether any of the assertions that heresy makes
have any force against the truth.

ø5. Then, after showing that the Person of the Only-begotten and Maker
of things has no beginning, as have the things that were made by Him,
as Eunomius says, but that the Only-begotten is without beginning and
eternal, and has no community, either of essence or of names, with the
creation, but is co-existent with the Father from everlasting, being,
as the all-excellent Wisdom says, "the beginning and end and midst of
the times," and after making many observations on the Godhead and
eternity of the Only-begotten, and also concerning souls and angels,
and life and death, he concludes the book.

I will now once more subjoin the actual language of my opponent, word
for word. It runs thus:--"While there are," he says, "two statements
which we have made, the one, that the essence of the Only-begotten was
not before its own generation, the other, that, being generated, it
was before all things--"What kind of generation does our dogmatist
propose to us? Is it one of which we may fittingly think and speak in
regard to God? And who is so godless as to pre-suppose non-existence
in God? But it is clear that he has in view this material generation
of ours, and is making the lower nature the teacher of his conceptions
concerning the Only-begotten God, and since an ox or an ass or a camel
is not before its own generation, he thinks it proper to say even of
the Only-begotten God that which the course of the lower nature
presents to our view in the case of the animals, without thinking,
corporeal theologian that he is, of this fact, that the predicate
"Only-begotten", applied to God, signifies by the very word itself
that which is not in common with all begetting, and is peculiar to
Him. How could the term "Only-begotten" be used of this "generation,"
if it had community and identity of meaning with other generation?
That there is something unique and exceptional to be understood in His
case, which is not to be remarked in other generation, is distinctly
and suitably expressed by the appellation of "Only-begotten"; as, were
any element of the lower generation conceived in it, He Who in respect
of any of the attributes of His generation was placed on a level with
other things that are begotten would no longer be "Only-begotten." For
if the same things are to be said of Him which are said of the other
things that come into being by generation, the definition will
transform the sense of "Only-begotten" to signify a kind of
relationship involving brotherhood. If then the sense of
"Only-begotten" points to absence of mixture and community with the
rest of generated things, we shall not admit that anything which we
behold in the lower generation is also to be conceived in the case of
that existence which the Son has from the Father. But non-existence
before generation is proper to all things that exist by generation:
therefore this is foreign to the special character of the
Only-begotten, to which the name "Only-begotten" bears witness that
there attaches nothing belonging to the mode of that form of common
generation which Eunomius misapprehends. Let this materialist and
friend of the senses be persuaded therefore to correct the error of
his conception by the other forms of generation. What will you say
when you hear of the "brightness of glory" or of the "savour of
ointment [881] ?" That the "brightness" was not before its own
generation? But if you answer thus, you will surely admit that neither
did the "glory" exist, nor the "ointment": for it is not possible that
the "glory" should be conceived as having existed by itself, dark and
lustreless, or the "ointment" without producing its sweet breath: so
that if the "brightness" "was not," the "glory" also surely "was not,"
and the "savour" being non-existent, there is also proved the
non-existence of the "ointment." But if these examples taken from
Scripture excite any man's fear, on the ground that they do not
accurately present to us the majesty of the Only-begotten, because
neither is essentially the same with its substratum--neither the
exhalation with the ointment, nor the beam with the sun--let the true
Word correct his fear, Who was in the Beginning and is all that the
Beginning is, and existent before all; since John so declares in his
preaching, "And the Word was with God, and the Word was God [882] ."
If then the Father is God and the Son is God, what doubt still remains
with regard to the perfect Divinity of the Only-begotten, when by the
sense of the word "Son" is acknowledged the close relationship of
Nature, by "brightness" the conjunction and inseparability, and by the
appellation of "God," applied alike to the Father and the Son, their
absolute equality, while the "express image," contemplated in
reference to the whole Person [883] of the Father, marks the absence
of any defect in the Son's proper greatness, and the "form of God"
indicates His complete identity by showing in itself all those marks
by which the Godhead is betokened.

Let us now set forth Eunomius' statement once more. "He was not," he
says, "before His own generation." Who is it of Whom he says "He was
not"? Let him declare the Divine names by which He Who, according to
Eunomius, "once was not," is called. He will say, I suppose, "light,"
and "blessedness," "life" and "incorruptibility," and "righteousness"
and "sanctification," and "power," and "truth," and the like. He who
says, then, that "He was not before His generation," absolutely
proclaims this,--that when He "was not" there was no truth, no life,
no light, no power, no incorruptibility, no other of those pre-eminent
qualities which are conceived of Him: and, what is still more
marvellous and still more difficult for impiety to face, there was no
"brightness," no "express image." For in saying that there was no
brightness, there is surely maintained also the non-existence of the
radiating power, as one may see in the illustration afforded by the
lamp. For he who speaks of the ray of the lamp indicates also that the
lamp shines, and he who says that the ray "is not," signifies also the
extinction of that which gives light: so that when the Son is said not
to be, thereby is also maintained as a necessary consequence the
non-existence of the Father. For if the one is related to the other by
way of conjunction, according to the Apostolic testimony--the
"brightness" to the "glory," the "express image" to the "Person," the
"Wisdom" to God--he who says that one of the things so conjoined "is
not," surely by his abolition of the one abolishes also that which
remains; so that if the "brightness" "was not," it is acknowledged
that neither did the illuminating nature exist, and if the "express
image" had no existence, neither did the Person imaged exist, and if
the wisdom and power of God "was not," it is surely acknowledged that
He also was not, Who is not conceived by Himself without wisdom and
power. If, then, the Only-begotten God, as Eunomius says, "was not
before His generation," and Christ is "the power of God and the wisdom
of God [884] ," and the "express image" [885] and the "brightness
[886] ," neither surely did the Father exist, Whose power and wisdom
and express image and brightness the Son is: for it is not possible to
conceive by reason either a Person without express image, or glory
without radiance, or God without wisdom, or a Maker without hands, or
a Beginning without the Word [887] , or a Father without a Son; but
all such things, alike by those who confess and by those who deny, are
manifestly declared to be in mutual union, and by the abolition of one
the other also disappears with it. Since then they maintain that the
Son (that is, the "brightness of the glory,") "was not" before He was
begotten, and since logical consequence involves also, together with
the non-existence of the brightness, the abolition of the glory, and
the Father is the glory whence came the brightness of the
Only-begotten Light, let these men who are wise over-much consider
that they are manifestly supporters of the Epicurean doctrines,
preaching atheism under the guise of Christianity. Now since the
logical consequence is shown to be one of two absurdities, either that
we should say that God does not exist at all, or that we should say
that His being was not unoriginate, let them choose which they like of
the two courses before them,--either to be called atheist, or to cease
saying that the essence of the Father is un-originate. They would
avoid, I suppose, being reckoned atheists. It remains, therefore, that
they maintain that God is not eternal. And if the course of what has
been proved forces them to this, what becomes of their varied and
irreversible conversions of names? What becomes of that invincible
compulsion of their syllogisms, which sounded so fine to the ears of
old women, with its opposition of "Generated" and "Ungenerate"?

Enough, however, of these matters. But it might be well not to leave
his next point unanswered; yet let us pass over in silence the comic
interlude, where our clever orator shows his youthful conceit, whether
in jest or in earnest, under the impression that he will thereby have
an advantage in his argument. For certainly no one will force us to
join either with those whose eyes are set askance in distorting our
sight, or with those who are stricken with strange disease in being
contorted, or in their bodily leaps and plunges. We shall pity them,
but we shall not depart from our settled state of mind. He says, then,
turning his discourse upon the subject to our master, as if he were
really engaging him face to face, "Thou shalt be taken in thine own
snare." For as Basil had said [888] that what is good is always
present with God Who is over all, and that it is good to be the Father
of such a Son,--that so what is good was never absent from Him, nor
was it the Father's will to be without the Son, and when He willed He
did not lack the power, but having the power and the will to be in the
mode in which it seemed good to Him, He also always possessed the Son
by reason of His always willing that which is good (for this is the
direction in which the intention of our father's remarks tends),
Eunomius pulls this in pieces beforehand, and puts forward to
overthrow what has been said some such argument as this, introduced
from his extraneous philosophy:--"What will become of you," he says,
"if one of those who have had experience of such arguments should say,
`If to create is good and agreeable to the Nature of God, how is it
that what is good and agreeable to His Nature was not present with Him
unoriginately, seeing that God is unoriginate? and that when there was
no hindrance of ignorance or impediment of weakness or of age in the
matter of creation,"--and all the rest that he collects together and
pours out upon himself,--for I may not say, upon God. Well, if it were
possible for our master to answer the question in person, he would
have shown Eunomius what would have become of him, as he asked, by
setting forth the Divine mystery with that tongue that was taught of
God, and by scourging the champion of deceit with his refutations, so
that it would have been made clear to all men what a difference there
is between a minister of the mysteries of Christ and a ridiculous
buffoon or a setter-forth of new and absurd doctrines. But since he,
as the Apostle says, "being dead, speaketh [889] " to God, while the
other puts forth such a challenge as though there were no one to
answer him, even though an answer from us may not have equal force
when compared with the words of the great Basil, we shall yet boldly
say this in answer to the questioner:--Your own argument, put forth to
overthrow our statement, is a testimony that in the charges we make
against your impious doctrine we speak truly. For there is no other
point we blame so much as this, that you [890] think there is no
difference between the Lord of creation and the general body of
creation, and what you now allege is a maintaining of the very things
which we find fault with. For if you are bound to attach exactly what
you see in creation also to the Only-begotten God, our contention has
gained its end: your own statements proclaim the absurdity of the
doctrine, and it is manifest to all, both that we keep our argument in
the straight way of truth, and that your conception of the
Only-begotten God is such as you have of the rest of the creation.

Concerning whom was the controversy? Was it not concerning the
Only-begotten God, the Maker of all the creation, whether He always
was, or whether He came into being afterwards as an addition to His
Father? What then do our master's words say on this matter? That it is
irreverent to believe that what is naturally good was not in God: for
that he saw no cause by which it was probable that the good was not
always present with Him Who is good, either for lack of power or for
weakness of will. What does he who contends against these statements
say? "If you allow that God the Word is to be believed eternal, you
must allow the same of the things that have been created"--(How well
he knows how to distinguish in his argument the nature of the
creatures and the majesty of God! How well he knows about each, what
befits it, what he may piously think concerning God, what concerning
the creation!)--"if the Maker," he says, "begins from the time of His
making: for there is nothing else by which we can mark the beginning
of things that have been made, if time does not define by its own
interval the beginnings and the endings of the things that come into
being."

On this ground he says that the Maker of time must commence His
existence from a like beginning. Well, the creation has the ages for
its beginning, but what beginning can you conceive of the Maker of the
ages? If any one should say, "The `beginning' which is mentioned in
the Gospel"--it is the Father Who is there signified, and the
confession of the Son together with Him is there pointed to, nor can
it be that He Who is in the Father [891] , as the Lord says, can begin
His being in Him from any particular point. And if any one speaks of
another beginning besides this, let him tell us the name by which he
marks this beginning, as none can be apprehended before the
establishment of the ages. Such a statement, therefore, will not move
us a whit from the orthodox conception concerning the Only-begotten,
even if old women do applaud the proposition as a sound one. For we
abide by what has been determined from the beginning, having our
doctrine firmly based on truth, to wit, that all things which the
orthodox doctrine assumes that we assert concerning the Only-begotten
God have no kindred with the creation, but the marks which distinguish
the Maker of all and His works are separated by a wide interval. If
indeed the Son had in any other respect communion with the creation,
we surely ought to say that He did not diverge from it even in the
manner of His existence. But if the creation has no share in such
things as are all those which we learn concerning the Son, we must
surely of necessity say that in this matter also He has no communion
with it. For the creation was not in the beginning, and was not with
God, and was not, God, nor life, nor light, nor resurrection, nor the
rest of the Divine names, as truth, righteousness, sanctification,
Judge, just, Maker of all things, existing before the ages, for ever
and ever; the creation is not the brightness of the glory, nor the
express image of the Person, nor the likeness of goodness, nor grace,
nor power, nor truth, nor salvation, nor redemption; nor do we find
any one at all of those names which are employed by Scripture for the
glory of the Only-begotten, either belonging to the creation or
employed concerning it,--not to speak of those more exalted words, "I
am in the Father, and the Father in Me [892] ," and, "He that hath
seen Me hath seen the Father [893] ," and, "None hath seen the Son,
save the Father [894] ." If indeed our doctrine allowed us to claim
for the creation things so many and so great as these, he might have
been right in thinking that we ought to attach what we observe in it
to our conceptions of the Only-begotten also, since the transfer would
be from kindred subjects to one nearly allied. But if all these
concepts and names involve communion with the Father, while they
transcend our notions of the creation, does not our clever and
sharp-witted friend slink away in shame at discussing the nature of
the Lord of the Creation by the aid of what he observes in creation,
without being aware that the marks which distinguish the creation are
of a different sort? The ultimate division of all that exists is made
by the line between "created" and "uncreated," the one being regarded
as a cause of what has come into being, the other as coming into being
thereby. Now the created nature and the Divine essence being thus
divided, and admitting no intermixture in respect of their
distinguishing properties, we must by no means conceive both by means
of similar terms, nor seek in the idea of their nature for the same
distinguishing marks in things that are thus separated. Accordingly,
as the nature that is in the creation, as the phrase of the most
excellent Wisdom somewhere tells us, exhibits "the beginning, ending,
and midst of the times [895] " in itself, and extends concurrently
with all temporal intervals, we take as a sort of characteristic of
the subject this property, that in it we see some beginning of its
formation, look on its midst, and extend our expectations to its end.
For we have learnt that the heaven and the earth were not from
eternity, and will not last to eternity, and thus it is hence clear
that those things are both started from some beginning, and will
surely cease at some end. But the Divine Nature, being limited in no
respect, but passing all limitations on every side in its infinity, is
far removed from those marks which we find in creation. For that power
which is without interval, without quantity, without circumscription,
having in itself all the ages and all the creation that has taken
place in them, and over-passing at all points, by virtue of the
infinity of its own nature, the unmeasured extent of the ages, either
has no mark which indicates its nature, or has one of an entirely
different sort, and not that which the creation has. Since, then, it
belongs to the creation to have a beginning, that will be alien from
the uncreated nature which belongs to the creation. For if any one
should venture to suppose the existence of the Only-begotten Son to
be, like the creation, from any beginning comprehensible by us, he
must certainly append to his statement concerning the Son the rest
also of the sequence [896] ; for it is not possible to avoid
acknowledging, together with the beginning, that also which follows
from it. For just as if one were to admit some person to be a man in
all [897] the properties of his nature, he would observe that in this
confession he declared him to be an animal and rational, and whatever
else is conceived of man, so by the same reasoning, if we should
understand any of the properties of creation to be present in the
Divine essence, it will no longer be open to us to refrain from
attaching to that pure Nature the rest of the list of the attributes
contemplated therein. For the "beginning" will demand by force and
compulsion that which follows it; for the "beginning," thus conceived,
is a beginning of what comes after it, in such a sense, that if they
are, it is, and if the things connected with it are removed, the
antecedent also would not remain [898] . Now as the book of Wisdom
speaks of "midst" and "end" as well as of "beginning," if we assume in
the Nature of the Only-begotten, according to the heretical dogma,
some beginning of existence defined by a certain mark of time, the
book of Wisdom will by no means allow us to refrain from subjoining to
the "beginning" a "midst" and an "end" also. If this should be done we
shall find, as the result of our arguments, that the Divine word shows
us that the Deity is mortal. For if, according to the book of Wisdom,
the "end" is a necessary consequence of the "beginning," and the idea
of "midst" is involved in that of extremes, he who allows one of these
also potentially maintains the others, and lays down bounds of measure
and limitation for the infinite Nature. And if this is impious and
absurd, the giving a beginning to that argument which ends in impiety
deserves equal, or even greater censure; and the beginning of this
absurd doctrine was seen to be the supposition that the life of the
Son was circumscribed by some beginning. Thus one of two courses is
before them: either they must revert to sound doctrine under the
compulsion of the foregoing arguments, and contemplate Him Who is of
the Father in union with the Father's eternity, or if they do not like
this, they must limit the eternity of the Son in both ways, and reduce
the limitless character of His life to non-existence by a beginning
and an end. And, granted that the nature both of souls and of the
angels has no end, and is no way hindered from going on to eternity,
by the fact of its being created, and having the beginning of its
existence from some point of time, so that our adversaries can use
this fact to assert a parallel in the case of Christ, in the sense
that He is not from eternity, and yet endures everlastingly,--let any
one who advances this argument also consider the following point, how
widely the Godhead differs from the creation in its special
attributes. For to the Godhead it properly belongs to lack no
conceivable thing which is regarded as good, while the creation
attains excellence by partaking in something better than itself; and
further, not only had a beginning of its being, but also is found to
be constantly in a state of beginning to be in excellence, by its
continual advance in improvement, since it never halts at what it has
reached, but all that it has acquired [899] becomes by participation a
beginning of its ascent to something still greater, and it never
ceases, in Paul's phrase, "reaching forth to the things that are
before," and "forgetting the things that are behind [900] ." Since,
then, the Godhead is very life, and the Only-begotten God is God, and
life, and truth, and every conceivable thing that is lofty and Divine,
while the creation draws from Him its supply of good, it may hence be
evident that if it is in life by partaking of life, it will surely, if
it ceases from this participation, cease from life also. If they dare,
then, to say also of the Only-begotten God those things which it is
true to say of the creation, let them say this too, along with the
rest, that He has a beginning of His being like the creation, and
abides in life after the likeness of souls. But if He is the very
life, and needs not to have life in Himself ab extra, while all other
things are not life, but are merely participants in life, what
constrains us to cancel, by reason of what we see in creation, the
eternity of the Son? For that which is always unchanged as regards its
nature, admits of no contrary, and is incapable of change to any other
condition: while things whose nature is on the boundary line have a
tendency that shifts either way, inclining at will to what they find
attractive [901] . If, then, that which is truly life is contemplated
in the Divine and transcendent nature, the decadence thereof will
surely, as it seems, end in the opposite state [902] .

Now the meaning of "life" and "death" is manifold, and not always
understood in the same way. For as regards the flesh, the energy and
motion of the bodily senses is called "life," and their extinction and
dissolution is named "death." But in the case of the intellectual
nature, approximation to the Divine is the true life, and decadence
therefrom is named "death": for which reason the original evil, the
devil, is called both "death," and the inventor of death: and he is
also said by the Apostle to have the power of death [903] . As, then,
we obtain, as has been said, from the Scriptures, a twofold conception
of death, He Who is truly unchangeable and immutable "alone hath
immortality," and dwells in light that cannot be attained or
approached by the darkness of wickedness [904] : but all things that
participate in death, being far removed from immortality by their
contrary tendency, if they fall away from that which is good, would,
by the mutability of their nature, admit community with the worse
condition, which is nothing else than death, having a certain
correspondence with the death of the body. For as in that case the
extinction of the activities of nature is called death, so also, in
the case of the intellectual being, the absence of motion towards the
good is death and departure from life; so that what we perceive in the
bodiless creation [905] does not clash with our argument, which
refutes the doctrine of heresy. For that form of death which
corresponds to the intellectual nature (that is, separation from God,
Whom we call Life) is, potentially, not separated even from their
nature; for their emergence from non-existence shows mutability of
nature; and that to which change is in affinity is hindered from
participation in the contrary state by the grace of Him Who
strengthens it: it does not abide in the good by its own nature: and
such a thing is not eternal. If, then, one really speaks truth in
saying that we ought not to estimate the Divine essence and the
created nature in the same way, nor to circumscribe the being of the
Son of God by any beginning, lest, if this be granted, the other
attributes of creation should enter in together with our
acknowledgment of this one, the absurd character of the teaching of
that man, who employs the attributes of creation to separate the
Only-begotten God from the eternity of the Father, is clearly shown.
For as none other of the marks which characterize the creation appears
in the Maker of the creation, so neither is the fact that the creation
has its existence from some beginning a proof that the Son was not
always in the Father,--that Son, Who is Wisdom, and Power, and Light,
and Life, and all that is conceived of in the bosom of the Father.

Footnotes

[881] Heb. i. 3, and Cant. i. 3, referred to above.
[882] S. John i. 1
[883] hupostasei
[884] 1 Cor. i. 24.
[885] Heb. i. 3.
[886] Heb. i. 3.
[887] Or perhaps "or an irrational first cause," (alogon archen.)
[888] The reference is to S. Basil adv. Eunomium II. 12 (p. 247 in
Ben. ed.)
[889] Cf. Heb. xi. 4
[890] Reading humas for hemas. If the reading hemas, which Oehler
follows, is retained, the force would seem to be "that you think we
ought not to make any difference," but the construction of the
sentence in this case is cumbrous.
[891] S. John xiv. 10
[892] S. John xiv. 10
[893] S. John xiv. 9
[894] Apparently an inexact quotation of S. Matt. xi. 27.
[895] Wisd. vii. 18.
[896] That is, he must also acknowledge a "middle" and an "end" of the
existence which has a "beginning."
[897] Oehler's emendation, for which he gives weighty ms. authority,
is certainly an improvement on the earlier text, but in sense it is a
little unsatisfactory. The argument seems to require the hypothesis
not of some one acknowledging a person to be a man in all, but in some
attributes. The defect, however, may possibly be in S. Gregory's
argument, not in the text.
[898] i.e."if the `middle' and `end' are not admitted, at the
`beginning,' which is the `beginning' of a sequence, is thereby
implicitly denied." Oehler's punctuation has been somewhat altered
here, and at several points in the remainder of the book, where it
appears to require emendation.
[899] Reading ktethen, with the Paris ed. of 1638. Oehler's reading
ktisthen hardly seems to give so good a sense, and he does not give
his authority for it.
[900] Phil. iii. 13.
[901] Reading with Oehler, tois kata gnomen prosklinomene. The reading
proskinoumenois, found in the earlier editions, gives a tolerable
sense, but appears to have no ms. authority.
[902] Or (if pantos be constructed with antikeimenon), "will end, as
it seems, in that state which is absolutely opposed to life."
[903] Cf. Heb. ii. 14
[904] Cf. 1 Tim. iii. 16.
[905] i.e.the order of spiritual beings, including angels and human
souls. Of these S. Gregory argues that they are capable of an akinesia
pros to agathon which is death in them, as the absence of motion and
sense is bodily death: and that they may therefore be said to have an
end, as they had a beginning: so far as they are eternal it is not by
their own power, but by their mutable nature being upheld by grace
from this state of akinesia pros to agathon. On both these grounds
therefore--that they have an end, and that such eternity as they
possess is not inherent, but given ab extra, and contingent--he says
they are not properly eternal, and he therefore rejects the proposed
parallel.

Book IX.

ø1. The ninth book declares that Eunomius' account of the Nature of
God is, up to a certain point, well stated. Then in succession he
mixes up with his own argument, on account of its affinity, the
expression from Philo's writings, "God is before all other things,
which are generated," adding also the expression, "He has dominion
over His own power." Detesting the excessive absurdity, Gregory
strikingly confutes it [906]

But he now turns to loftier language, and elevating himself and
puffing himself up with empty conceit, he takes in hand to say
something worthy of God's majesty. "For God," he says, "being the most
highly exalted of all goods, and the mightiest of all, and free from
all necessity--" Nobly does the gallant man bring his discourse, like
some ship without ballast, driven unguided by the waves of deceit,
into the harbour of truth! "God is the most highly exalted of all
goods." Splendid acknowledgment! I suppose he will not bring a charge
of unconstitutional conduct against the great John, by whom, in his
lofty proclamation, the Only-begotten is declared to be God, Who was
with God and was God [907] . If he, then, the proclaimer of the
Godhead of the Only-begotten, is worthy of credit, and if "God is the
most highly exalted of all goods," it follows that the Son is alleged
by the enemies of His glory, to be "the most highly exalted of all
goods." And as this phrase is also applied to the Father, the
superlative force of "most highly exalted" admits of no diminution or
addition by way of comparison. But, now that we have obtained from the
adversary's testimony these statements for the proof of the glory of
the Only-begotten, we must add in support of sound doctrine his next
statement too. He says, "God, the most highly exalted of all goods,
being without hindrance from nature, or constraint from cause, or
impulse from need, begets and creates according to the supremacy of
His own authority, having His will as power sufficient for the
constitution of the things produced. If, then, all good is according
to His will, He not only determines that which is made as good, but
also the time of its being good, if, that is to say, as one may
assume, it is an indication of weakness to make what one does not will
[908] ." We shall borrow so far as this, for the confirmation of the
orthodox doctrines, from our adversaries' statement, percolated as
that statement is by vile and counterfeit clauses. Yes, He Who has, by
the supremacy of His authority, power in His will that suffices for
the constitution of the things that are made, He Who created all
things without hindrance from nature or compulsion from cause, does
determine not only that which is made as good, but also the time of
its being good. But He Who made all things is, as the gospel
proclaims, the Only-begotten God. He, at that time when He willed it,
did make the creation; at that time, by means of the circumambient
essence, He surrounded with the body of heaven all that universe that
is shut off within its compass: at that time, when He thought it well
that this should be, He displayed the dry land to view, He enclosed
the waters in their hollow places; vegetation, fruits, the generation
of animals, the formation of man, appeared at that time when each of
these things seemed expedient to the wisdom of the Creator:--and He
Who made all these things (I will once more repeat my statement) is
the Only-begotten God Who made the ages. For if the interval of the
ages has preceded existing things, it is proper to employ the temporal
adverb, and to say "He then willed" and "He then made": but since the
age was not, since no conception of interval is present to our minds
in regard to that Divine Nature which is not measured by quantity or
by interval, the force of temporal expressions must surely be void.
Thus to say that the creation has had given to it a beginning in time,
according to the good pleasure of the wisdom of Him Who made all
things, does not go beyond probability: but to regard the Divine
Nature itself as being in a kind of extension measured by intervals,
belongs only to those who have been trained in the new wisdom. What a
point is this, embedded in his words, which I intentionally passed by
in my eagerness to reach the subject! I will now resume it, and read
it to show our author's cleverness.

"For He Who is most highly exalted in God Himself [909] before all
other things that are generated," he says, "has dominion over His own
power." The phrase has been transferred by our pamphleteer word for
word from the Hebrew Philo to his own argument, and Eunomius' theft
will be proved by Philo's works themselves to any one who cares about
it. I note the fact, however, at present, not so much to reproach our
speech-monger with the poverty of his own arguments and thoughts, as
with the intention of showing to my readers the close relationship
between the doctrine of Eunomius and the reasoning of the Jews. For
this phrase of Philo would not have fitted word for word into his
argument had there not been a sort of kindred between the intention of
the one and the other. In the Hebrew author you may find the phrase in
this form: "God, before all other things that are generated"; and what
follows, "has dominion over His own power," is an addition of the new
Judaism. But what an absurdity this involves an examination of the
saying will clearly show. "God," he says, "has dominion over His own
power." Tell me, what is He? over what has He dominion? Is He
something else than His own power, and Lord of a power that is
something else than Himself? Then power is overcome by the absence of
power. For that which is something else than power is surely not
power, and thus He is found to have dominion over power just in so far
as He is not power. Or again, God, being power, has another power in
Himself, and has dominion over the one by the other. And what contest
or schism is there, that God should divide the power that exists in
Himself, and overthrow one section of His power by the other. I
suppose He could not have dominion over His own power without the
assistance to that end of some greater and more violent power! Such is
Eunomius' God: a being with double nature, or composite, dividing
Himself against Himself, having one power out of harmony with another,
so that by one He is urged to disorder, and by the other restrains
this discordant motion. Again, with what intent does He dominate the
power that urges on to generation? lest some evil should arise if
generation be not hindered? or rather let him explain this in the
first place,--what is that which is naturally under dominion? His
language points to some movement of impulse and choice, considered
separately and independently. For that which dominates must needs be
one thing, that which is dominated another. Now God "has dominion over
His power"--and this is--what? a self-determining nature? or something
else than this, pressing on to disquiet, or remaining in a state of
quiescence? Well, if he supposes it to be quiescent, that which is
tranquil needs no one to have dominion over it: and if he says "He has
dominion," He "has dominion" clearly over something which impels and
is in motion: and this, I presume he will say, is something naturally
different from Him Who rules it. What then, let him tell us, does he
understand in this idea? Is it something else besides God, considered
as having an independent existence? How can another existence be in
God? Or is it some condition in the Divine Nature considered as having
an existence not its own? I hardly think he would say so: for that
which has no existence of its own is not: and that which is not, is
neither under dominion, nor set free from it. What then is that power
which was under dominion, and was restrained in respect of its own
activity, while the due time of the generation of Christ was still
about to come, and to set this power free to proceed to its natural
operation? What was the intervening cause of delay, for which God
deferred the generation of the Only-begotten, not thinking it good as
yet to become a Father? And what is this that is inserted as
intervening between the life of the Father and that of the Son, that
is not time nor space, nor any idea of extension, nor any like thing?
To what purpose is it that this keen and clear-sighted eye marks and
beholds the separation of the life of God in regard to the life of the
Son? When he is driven in all directions he is himself forced to admit
that the interval does not exist at all.

Footnotes

[906] This section of the analysis is so confused that it cannot well
be literally translated. In the version given above the general sense
rather than the precise grammatical construction has been followed.
[907] S. John i. 1
[908] This quotation would appear from what follows not to be a
consecutive extract, but one made "omissis omittendis."
[909] This seems to be the force of the phrase if we are to follow
Oehler's mss. and read ho gar exochotatos autou theou. The autos theos
of the earlier editions gives a simpler sense. The phrase as read by
Oehler certainly savours more of Philo than of Eunomius: but it is
worth noting that S. Gregory does not dwell upon this part of the
clause as being borrowed from Philo (though he may intend to include
it in the general statement), but upon what follows it: and from his
citation from Philo it would seem that the latter spoke (not of ho
exochotatos theou but) of ho Theos pro ton allon hosa genneta.

ø2. He then ingeniously shows that the generation of the Son is not
according to the phrase of Eunomius, "The Father begat Him at that
time when He chose, and not before:" but that the Son, being the
fulness of all that is good and excellent, is always contemplated in
the Father; using for this demonstration the support of Eunomius' own
arguments.

However, though there is no interval between them, he does not admit
that their communion is immediate and intimate, but condescends to the
measure of our knowledge, and converses with us in human phrase as one
of ourselves, himself quietly confessing the impotence of reasoning
and taking refuge in a line of argument that was never taught by
Aristotle and his school. He says, "It was good and proper that He
should beget His Son at that time when He willed: and in the minds of
sensible men there does not hence arise any questioning why He did not
do so before." What does this mean, Eunomius? Are you too going afoot
like us unlettered men? are you leaving your artistic periods and
actually taking refuge in unreasoning assent? you, who so much
reproached those who take in hand to write without logical skill? You,
who say to Basil, "You show your own ignorance when you say that
definitions of the terms that express things spiritual are an
impossibility for men," who again elsewhere advance the same charge,
"you make your own impotence common to others, when you declare that
what is not possible for you is impossible for all"? Is this the way
that you, who say such things as these, approach the ears of him who
questions about the reason why the Father defers becoming the Father
of such a Son? Do you think it an adequate explanation to say, "He
begat Him at that time when He chose: let there be no questioning on
this point"? Has your apprehensive fancy grown so feeble in the
maintenance of your doctrines? What has become of your premises that
lead to dilemmas? What has become of your forcible proofs? how comes
it that those terrible and inevitable syllogistic conclusions of your
art have dissolved into vanity and nothingness? "He begat the Son at
that time when He chose: let there be no questioning on this point!"
Is this the finished product of your many labours, of your voluminous
undertakings? What was the question asked? "If it is good and fitting
for God to have such a Son, why are we not to believe that the good is
always present with Him [910] ?" What is the answer he makes to us
from the very shrine of his philosophy, tightening the bonds of his
argument by inevitable necessity? "He made the Son at that time when
He chose: let there be no questioning as to why He did not do so
before." Why, if the inquiry before us were concerning some irrational
being, that acts by natural impulse, why it did not sooner do whatever
it may be,--why the spider did not make her webs, or the bee her
honey, or the turtle-dove her nest,--what else could you have said?
would not the same answer have been ready--"She did it at that time
when she chose: let there be no questioning on this matter"? Nay, if
it were concerning some sculptor or painter who works in paintings or
in sculptures by his imitative art, whatever it may be (supposing that
he exercises his art without being subject to any authority), I
imagine that such an answer would meet the case of any one who wished
to know why he did not exercise his art sooner,--that, being under no
necessity, he made his own choice the occasion of his operation. For
men, because they do not always wish the same things [911] , and
commonly have not power co-operating with their will, do something
which seems good to them at that time when their choice inclines to
the work, and they have no external hindrance. But that nature which
is always the same, to which no good is adventitious, in which all
that variety of plans which arises by way of opposition, from error or
from ignorance, has no place, to which there comes nothing as a result
of change, which was not with it before, and by which nothing is
chosen afterwards which it had not from the beginning regarded as
good,--to say of this nature that it does not always possess what is
good, but afterwards chooses to have something which it did not choose
before,--this belongs to wisdom that surpasses us. For we were taught
that the Divine. Nature is at all times full of all good, or rather is
itself the fulness of all goods, seeing that it needs no addition for
its perfecting, but is itself by its own nature the perfection of
good. Now that which is perfect is equally remote from addition and
from diminution; and therefore, we say that perfection of goods which
we behold in the Divine Nature always remains the same, as, in
whatsoever direction we extend our thoughts, we there apprehend it to
be such as it is. The Divine Nature, then, is never void of good: but
the Son is the fulness of all good: and accordingly He is at all times
contemplated in that Father Whose Nature is perfection in all good.
But he says, "let there be no questioning about this point, why He did
not do so before:" and we shall answer him,--"It is one thing, most
sapient sir, to lay down as an ordinance some proposition that you
happen to approve [912] , and another to make converts by reasoning on
the points of controversy. So long, therefore, as you cannot assign
any reason why we may piously say that the Son was "afterwards"
begotten by the Father, your ordinances will be of no effect with
sensible men."

Thus it is then that Eunomius brings the truth to light for us as the
result of his scientific attack. And we for our part shall apply his
argument, as we are wont to do, for the establishment of the true
doctrine, so that even by this passage it may be clear that at every
point, constrained against their will, they advocate our view. For if,
as our opponent says, "He begat the Son at that time when He chose,"
and if He always chose that which is good, and His power coincided
with His choice, it follows that the Son will be considered as always
with the Father, Who always both chooses that which is excellent, and
is able to possess what He chooses. And if we are to reduce his next
words also to truth, it is easy for us to adapt them also to the
doctrine we hold:--"Let there be no questioning among sensible men on
this point, why He did not do so before"--for the word "before" has a
temporal sense, opposed to what is "afterwards" and "later": but on
the supposition that time does not exist, the terms expressing
temporal interval are surely abolished with it. Now the Lord was
before times and before ages: questioning as to "before" or "after"
concerning the Maker of the ages is useless in the eyes of reasonable
men: for words of this class are devoid of all meaning, if they are
not used in reference to time. Since then the Lord is antecedent to
times, the words "before" and "after" have no place as applied to Him.
This may perhaps be sufficient to refute arguments that need no one to
overthrow them, but fall by their own feebleness. For who is there
with so much leisure that he can give himself up to such an extent to
listen to the arguments on the other side, and to our contention
against the silly stuff? Since, however, in men prejudiced by impiety,
deceit is like some ingrained dye, hard to wash out, and deeply burned
in upon their hearts, let us spend yet a little time upon our
argument, if haply we may be able to cleanse their souls from this
evil stain. After the utterances that I have quoted, and after adding
to them, in the manner of his teacher Prunicus, [913] some unconnected
and ill-arranged octads of insolence and abuse, he comes to the
crowning point of his arguments, and, leaving the illogical exposition
of his folly, arms his discourse once more with the weapons of
dialectic, and maintains his absurdity against us, as he imagines,
syllogistically.

Footnotes

[910] Cf. S. Basil adv. Eun. II. 12, quoted above, p. 207.
[911] Reading tauta for tauta, which appears in the text of Oehler as
well as in the earlier editions.
[912] Reading ti ton kata gnomen, for ti ton katagnomon, which is the
reading of the editions, but introduces a word otherwise apparently
unknown.
[913] So in Book I. proton men tes Prounikou sophias ginetai mathetes,
and Book XIII. p. 844 (Paris Edit.). It may be questioned whether the
phrase in Books I. and XIII., and that here, refers to a supposed
connection of Eunomius with Gnosticism. The Prounikos Sophia of the
Gnostics was a "male-female," and hence the masculine ton paideuten
might properly be applied to it. If this point were cleared up, we
might be more certain of the meaning to be attached to the word
oktadas, which is also possibly borrowed from the Gnostic phraseology,
being akin to the form ogdoadas. [On the Gnostic conception of
"Prunicus," see the note on the subject in Harvey's Irenæus (vol. I.
p. 225), and Smith and Wace's Dict. Chr. Biogr. s.v. On the Gnostic
Ogdoads, see Mansel's Gnostic Heresies, pp. 152 sqq., 170 sqq., and
the articles on Basilides and Valentinus in Dict. Chr. Biogr.]

ø3. He further shows that the pretemporal generation of the Son is not
the subject of influences drawn from ordinary and carnal generation,
but is without beginning and without end, and not according to the
fabrications constructed by Eunomius, in ignorance of His power, from
the statements of Plato concerning the soul and from the sabbath rest
of the Hebrews.

What he says runs thus:--"As all generation is not protracted to
infinity, but ceases on arriving at some end, those who admit the
origination of the Son are absolutely obliged to say that He then
ceased being generated, and not to look incredulously on the beginning
of those things which cease being generated, and therefore also surely
begin: for the cessation of generation establishes a beginning of
begetting and being begotten: and these facts cannot be disbelieved,
on the ground at once of nature itself and of the Divine laws [914] ."
Now since he endeavours to establish his point inferentially, laying
down his universal proposition according to the scientific method of
those who are skilled in such matters, and including in the general
premise the proof of the particular, let us first consider his
universal, and then proceed to examine the force of his inferences. Is
it a reverent proceeding to draw from "all generation" evidence even
as to the pre-temporal generation of the Son? and ought we to put
forward ordinary nature as our instructor on the being of the
Only-begotten? For my own part, I should not have expected any one to
reach such a point of madness, that any such idea of the Divine and
unsullied generation should enter his fancy. "All generation," he
says, "is not protracted to infinity." What is it that he understands
by "generation"? Is he speaking of fleshly, bodily birth, or of the
formation of inanimate objects? The affections involved in bodily
generation are well known--affections which no one would think of
transferring to the Divine Nature. In order therefore that our
discourse may not, by mentioning the works of nature at length, be
made to appear redundant, we shall pass such matters by in silence, as
I suppose that every sensible man is himself aware of the causes by
which generation is protracted, both in regard to its beginning and to
its cessation: it would be tedious and at the same time superfluous to
express them all minutely, the coming together of those who generate,
the formation in the womb of that which is generated, travail, birth,
place, time, without which the generation of a body cannot be brought
about,--things which are all equally alien from the Divine generation
of the Only-begotten: for if any one of these things were admitted,
the rest will of necessity all enter with it. That the Divine
generation, therefore, may be clear of every idea connected with
passion, we shall avoid conceiving with regard to it even that
extension which is measured by intervals. Now that which begins and
ends is surely regarded as being in a kind of extension, and all
extension is measured by time, and as time (by which we mark both the
end of birth and its beginning) is excluded, it would be vain, in the
case of the uninterrupted generation, to entertain the idea of end or
beginning, since no idea can be formed to mark either the point at
which such generation begins or that at which it ceases. If on the
other hand it is the inanimate creation to which he is looking, even
in this case, in like manner, place, and time, and matter, and
preparation, and power of the artificer, and many like things, concur
to bring the product to perfection. And since time assuredly is
concurrent with all things that are produced, and since with
everything that is created, be it animate or inanimate, there are
conceived also bases of construction relative to the product, we can
find in these cases evident beginnings and endings of the process of
formation. For even the procuring of material is actually the
beginning of the fabric, and is a sign of place, and is logically
connected with time. All these things fix for the products their
beginnings and endings; and no one could say that these things have
any participation in the pretemporal generation of the Only-begotten
God, so that, by the aid of the things now under consideration, we are
able to calculate, with regard to that generation, any beginning or
end.

Now that we have so far discussed these matters, let us resume
consideration of our adversaries' argument. It says, "As all
generation is not protracted to infinity, but ceases on arriving at
some end." Now, since the sense of "generation" has been considered
with respect to either meaning,--whether he intends by this word to
signify the birth of corporeal beings, or the formation of things
created (neither of which has anything in common with the unsullied
Nature), the premise is shown to have no connection with the subject
[915] . For it is not a matter of absolute necessity, as he maintains,
that, because all making and generation ceases at some limit,
therefore those who accept the generation of the Son should
circumscribe it by a double limit, by supposing, as regards it, a
beginning and an end. For it is only as being circumscribed in some
quantitative way that things can be said either to begin or to cease
on arriving at a limit, and the measure expressed by time (having its
extension concomitant with the quantity of that which is produced)
differentiates the beginning from the end by the interval between
them. But how can any one measure or treat as extended that which is
without quantity and without extension? What measure can he find for
that which has no quantity, or what interval for that which has no
extension? or how can any one define the infinite by "end" and
"beginning?" for "beginning" and "end" are names of limits of
extension, and, where there is no extension, neither is there any
limit. Now the Divine Nature is without extension, and, being without
extension, it has no limit; and that which is limitless is infinite,
and is spoken of accordingly. Thus it is idle to try to circumscribe
the infinite by "beginning" and "ending"--for what is circumscribed
cannot be infinite. How comes it, then, that this Platonic Phædrus
disconnectedly tacks on to his own doctrine those speculations on the
soul which Plato makes in that dialogue? For as Plato there spoke of
"cessation of motion," so this writer too was eager to speak of
"cessation of generation," in order to impose upon those who have no
knowledge of these matters, with fine Platonic phrases. "And these
facts," he tells us, "cannot be disbelieved, on the ground at once of
nature itself and of the Divine laws." But nature, from our previous
remarks, appears not to be trustworthy for instruction as to the
Divine generation,--not even if one were to take the universe itself
as an illustration of the argument: since through its creation also,
as we learn in the cosmogony of Moses, there ran the measure of time,
meted out in a certain order and arrangement by stated days and
nights, for each of the things that came into being: and this even our
adversaries' statement does not admit with regard to the being of the
Only-begotten, since it acknowledges that the Lord was before the
times of the ages.

It remains to consider his support of his point by "the Divine laws,"
by which he undertakes to show both an end and a beginning of the
generation of the Son. "God," he says, "willing that the law of
creation should be impressed upon the Hebrews, did not appoint the
first day of generation for the end of creation, or to be the evidence
of its beginning; for He gave them as the memorial of the creation,
not the first day of generation, but the seventh, whereon He rested
from His works." Will any one believe that this was written by
Eunomius, and that the words cited have not been inserted by us, by
way of misrepresenting his composition so as to make him appear
ridiculous to our readers, in dragging in to prove his point matters
that have nothing to do with the question? For the matter in hand was
to show, as he undertook to do, that the Son, not previously existing,
came into being; and that in being generated, He took a beginning of
generation, and of cessation [916] ,--His generation being protracted
in time, as it were by a kind of travail. And what is his resource for
establishing this? The fact that the people of the Hebrews, according
to the Law, keep sabbath on the seventh day! How well the evidence
agrees with the matter in hand! Because the Jew honours his sabbath by
idleness, the fact, as he says, is proved that the Lord both had a
beginning of birth and ceased being born! How many other testimonies
on this matter has our author passed by, not at all of less weight
than that which he employs to establish the point at issue!--the
circumcision on the eighth day, the week of unleavened bread, the
mystery on the fourteenth day of the moon's course, the sacrifices of
purification, the observation of the lepers, the ram, the calf, the
heifer, the scapegoat, the he-goat. If these things are far removed
from the point, let those who are so much interested in the Jewish
mysteries tell us how that particular matter is within range of the
question. We judge it to be mean and unmanly to trample on the fallen,
and shall proceed to enquire, from what follows in his writings,
whether there is anything there of such a kind as to give trouble to
his opponent. All, then, that he maintains in the next passage, as to
the impropriety of supposing anything intermediate between the Father
and the Son, I shall pass by, as being, in a sense, in agreement with
our doctrine. For it would be alike undiscriminating and unfair not to
distinguish in his remarks what is irreproachable, and what is
blamable, seeing that, while he fights against his own statements, he
does not follow his own admissions, speaking of the immediate
character of the connection while refusing to admit its continuity,
and conceiving that nothing was before the Son and having some
suspicion that the Son was while yet contending that He came into
being when He was not. We shall spend but a short time on these points
(since the argument has already been established beforehand), and then
proceed to handle the arguments proposed.

It is not allowable for the same person to set nothing above the
existence of the Only-begotten, and to say that before His generation
He was not, but that He was generated then when the Father willed. For
"then" and "when" have a sense which specially and properly refers to
the denoting of time, according to the common use of men who speak
soundly, and according to their signification in Scripture. One may
take "then shall they say among the heathen [917] ," and "when I sent
you [918] " and "then shall the kingdom of heaven be likened [919] ,"
and countless similar phrases through the whole of Scripture, to prove
this point, that the ordinary Scriptural use employs these parts of
speech to denote time. If therefore, as our opponent allows, time was
not, the signifying of time surely disappears too: and if this did not
exist, it will necessarily be replaced by eternity in our conception
[920] . For in the phrase "was not" there is surely implied "once":
as, if he should speak of "not being," without the qualification
"once," he would also deny his existence now: but if he admits His
present existence, and contends against His eternity, it is surely not
"not being" absolutely, but "not being" once which is present to his
mind. And as this phrase is utterly unreal, unless it rests upon the
signification of time, it would be foolish and idle to say that
nothing was before the Son, and yet to maintain that the Son did not
always exist. For if there is neither place nor time, nor any other
creature where the Word that was in the beginning is not, the
statement that the Lord "once was not" is entirely removed from the
region of orthodox doctrine. So he is at variance not so much with us
as with himself, who declares that the Only-begotten both was and was
not. For in confessing that the conjunction of the Son with the Father
is not interrupted by anything, He clearly testifies to His eternity.
But if he should say that the Son was not in the Father, we shall not
ourselves say anything against such a statement, but shall oppose to
it the Scripture which declares that the Son is in the Father, and the
Father in the Son, without adding to the phrase "once" or "when" or
"then," but testifying His eternity by this affirmative and
unqualified utterance.

Footnotes

[914] This quotation from Eunomius presents some difficulties, but it
is quite as likely that they are due to the obscurity of his style, as
that they are due to corruption of the text.
[915] i. e.with the subject of discussion, the generation of the
Only-begotten.
[916] The genitive lexeos is rather awkward; it may be explained,
however, as dependent upon archen; "He began to be generated: He began
to cease being generated."
[917] Ps. cxxvi. 3.
[918] S. Luke xxii. 35.
[919] S. Matt. xxv. 1
[920] The phrase is obscure, and the text possibly corrupt. To read
tas ennoias (as Gulonius seems to have done) would simplify matters:
but the general sense is clear--that the denial of the existence of
time implies eternity.

ø4. Then, having shown that Eunomius' calumny against the great Basil,
that he called the Only-begotten "Ungenerate," is false, and having
again with much ingenuity discussed the eternity, being, and
endlessness of the Only-begotten, and the creation of light and of
darkness, he concludes the book.

With regard to his attempting to show that we say the Only-begotten
God is ungenerate, it is as though he should say that we actually
define the Father to be begotten: for either statement is of the same
absurdity, or rather of the same blasphemous character. If, therefore,
he has made up his mind to slander us, let him add the other charge as
well, and spare nothing by which it may be in his power more violently
to exasperate his hearers against us. But if one of these charges is
withheld because its calumnious nature is apparent, why is the other
made? For it is just the same thing, as we have said, so far as the
impiety goes, to call the Son ungenerate and to call the Father
generated. Now if any such phrase can be found in our writings, in
which the Son is spoken of as ungenerate, we shall give the final vote
against ourselves: but if he is fabricating false charges and
calumnies at his pleasure, making any fictitious statement he pleases
to slander our doctrines, this fact may serve with sensible men for an
evidence of our orthodoxy, that while truth itself fights on our side,
he brings forward a lie to accuse our doctrine and makes up an
indictment for unorthodoxy that has no relation to our statements. To
these charges, however, we can give a concise answer. As we judge that
man accursed who says that the Only-begotten God is ungenerate, let
him in turn anathematize the man who lays it down that He who was in
the beginning "once was not." For by such a method it will be shown
who brings his charges truly, and who calumniously. But if we deny his
accusations, if, when we speak of a Father, we understand as implied
in that word a Son also, and if, when we use the name "Son," we
declare that He really is what He is called, being shed forth by
generation from the ungenerate Light, how can the calumny of those who
persist that we say the Only-begotten is ungenerate fail to be
manifest? Yet we shall not, because we say that He exists by
generation, therefore admit that He "once was not." For every one
knows that the contradiction between "being" and "not being" is
immediate, so that the affirmation of one of these terms is absolutely
the destruction of the other, and that, just as "being" is the same in
regard to every time at which any of the things that "are" is supposed
to have its existence (for the sky, and stars, and sun, and the rest
of the things that "are," are not more in a state of being now than
they were yesterday, or the day before, or at any previous time), so
the meaning of "not being" expresses non-existence equally at every
time, whether one speaks of it in reference to what is earlier or to
what is later. For any of the things that do not exist [921] is no
more in a state of "not being" now than if it were non-existent
before, but the idea of "not being" is one applied to that which "is
not" at any distance of time. And for this reason, in speaking of
living creatures, while we use different words to denote the
dissolution into a state of "not being" of that which has been, and
the condition of non-existence of that which has never had an entrance
into being, and say either that a thing has never come into being at
all, or that which was generated has died, yet by either form of
speech we equally represent by our words "non-existence." For as day
is bounded on each side by night, yet the parts of the night which
bound it are not named alike, but we speak of one as "after
night-fall," and of the other as "before dawn," while that which both
phrases denote is night, so, if any one looks on that which is not in
contrast to that which is, he will give different names to that state
which is antecedent to formation and to that which follows the
dissolution of what was formed, yet will conceive as one the condition
which both phrases signify--the condition which is antecedent to
formation and the condition following on dissolution after formation.
For the state of "not being" of that which has not been generated, and
of that which has died, save for the difference of the names, are the
same,--with the exception of the account which we take of the hope of
the resurrection. Now since we learn from Scripture that the
Only-begotten God is the Prince of Life, the very life, and light, and
truth, and all that is honourable in word or thought, we say that it
is absurd and impious to contemplate, in conjunction with Him Who
really is, the opposite conception, whether of dissolution tending to
corruption, or of non-existence before formation: but as we extend our
thought in every direction to what is to follow, or to what was before
the ages, we nowhere pause in our conceptions at the condition of "not
being," judging it to tend equally to impiety to cut short the Divine
being by non-existence at any time whatever. For it is the same thing
to say that the immortal life is mortal, that the truth is a lie, that
light is darkness, and that that which is is not. He, accordingly, who
refuses to allow that He will at some future time cease to be, will
also refuse to allow that He "once was not," avoiding, according to
our view, the same impiety on either hand: for, as no death cuts short
the endlessness of the life of the Only-begotten, so, as we look back,
no period of nonexistence will terminate His life in its course
towards eternity, that that which in reality is may be clear of all
community with that which in reality is not. For this cause the Lord,
desiring that His disciples might be far removed from this error (that
they might never, by themselves searching for something antecedent to
the existence of the Only-begotten, be led by their reasoning to the
idea of non-existence), saith, "I am in the Father, and the Father in
Me [922] ," in the sense that neither is that which is not conceived
in that which is, nor that which is in that which is not. And here the
very order of the phrase explains the orthodox doctrine; for because
the Father is not of the Son, but the Son of the Father, therefore He
says, "I am in the Father," showing the fact that He is not of another
but of Him, and then reverses the phrase to, "and the Father in Me,"
indicating that he who, in his curious speculation, passes beyond the
Son, passes also beyond the conception of the Father: for He who is in
anything cannot be found outside of that in which He is: so that the
man who, while not denying that the Father is in the Son, yet imagines
that he has in any degree apprehended the Father as external to the
Son, is talking idly. Idle too are the wanderings of our adversaries'
fighting about shadows touching the matter of "ungeneracy," proceeding
without solid foundation by means of nonentities. Yet if I am to bring
more fully to light the whole absurdity of their argument, let me be
allowed to spend a little longer on this speculation. As they say that
the Only-begotten God came into existence "later," after the Father,
this "unbegotten" of theirs, whatever they imagine it to be, is
discovered of necessity to exhibit with itself the idea of evil. Who
knows not, that, just as the non-existent is contrasted with the
existent, so with every good thing or name is contrasted the opposite
conception, as "bad" with "good," "falsehood" with "truth," "darkness"
with "light," and all the rest that are similarly opposed to one
another, where the opposition admits of no middle term, and it is
impossible that the two should co-exist, but the presence of the one
destroys its opposite, and with the withdrawal of the other takes
place the appearance of its contrary?

Now these points being conceded to us, the further point is also clear
to any one, that, as Moses says darkness was before the creation of
light, so also in the case of the Son (if, according to the heretical
statement, the Father "made Him at that time when He willed"), before
He made Him, that Light which the Son is was not; and, light not yet
being, it is impossible that its opposite should not be. For we learn
also from the other instances that nothing that comes from the Creator
is at random, but that which was lacking is added by creation to
existing things. Thus it is quite clear that if God did make the Son,
He made Him by reason of a deficiency in the nature of things. As,
then, while sensible light was still lacking, there was darkness, and
darkness would certainly have prevailed had light not come into being,
so also, when the Son "as yet was not," the very and true Light, and
all else that the Son is, did not exist. For even according to the
evidence of heresy, that which exists has no need of coming into
being; if therefore He made Him, He assuredly made that which did not
exist. Thus, according to their view, before the Son came into being,
neither had truth come into being, nor the intelligible Light, nor the
fount of life, nor, generally, the nature of any thing that is
excellent and good. Now, concurrently with the exclusion of each of
these, there is found to subsist the opposite conception: and if light
was not, it cannot be denied that darkness was; and so with the
rest,--in place of each of these more excellent conceptions it is
clearly impossible that its opposite did not exist in place of that
which was lacking. It is therefore a necessary conclusion, that when
the Father, as the heretics say, "had not as yet willed to make the
Son," none of those things which the Son is being yet existent, we
must say that He was surrounded by darkness instead of Light, by
falsehood instead of truth, by death instead of life, by evil instead
of good. For He Who creates, creates things that are not; "That which
is," as Eunomius says, "needs not generation"; and of those things
which are considered as opposed, the better cannot be non-existent,
except by the existence of the worse. These are the gifts with which
the wisdom of heresy honours the Father, by which it degrades the
eternity of the Son, and ascribes to God and the Father, before the
"production" of the Son, the whole catalogue of evils!

And let no one think to rebut by examples from the rest of creation
the demonstration of the doctrinal absurdity which results from this
argument. One will perhaps say that, as, when the sky was not, there
was no opposite to it, so we are not absolutely compelled to admit
that if the Son, Who is Truth, had not come into existence, the
opposite did exist. To him we may reply that to the sky there is no
corresponding opposite, unless one were to say that its non-existence
is opposed to its existence. But to virtue is certainly opposed that
which is vicious (and the Lord is virtue); so that when the sky was
not, it does not follow that anything was; but when good was not, its
opposite was; thus he who says that good was not, will certainly
allow, even without intending it, that evil was. "But the Father
also," he says [923] , "is absolute virtue, and life, and light
unapproachable, and all that is exalted in word or thought: so that
there is no necessity to suppose, when the Only-begotten Light was
not, the existence of that darkness which is His corresponding
opposite." But this is just what I say, that darkness never was; for
the light never "was not," for "the light," as the prophecy says, "is
always in the light [924] ." If, however, according to the heretical
doctrine, the "ungenerate light" is one thing, and the "generated
light" another, and the one is eternal, while the other comes into
existence at a later time, it follows of absolute necessity that in
the eternal light we should find no place for the establishment of its
opposite; (for if the light always shines, the power of darkness has
no place in it;) and that in the case of the light which comes into
being, as they say, afterwards, it is impossible that the light should
shine forth save out of darkness; and the interval of darkness between
eternal light and that which arises later will be clearly marked in
every way. [925] For there would have been no need of the making of
the later light, if that which was created had not been of utility for
some purpose: and the one use of light is that of the dispersion by
its means of the prevailing gloom. Now the light which exists without
creation is what it is by nature by reason of itself; but the created
light clearly comes into being by reason of something else. It must be
then that its existence was preceded by darkness, on account of which
the light was of necessity created, and it is not possible by any
reasoning to make plausible the view that darkness did not precede the
manifestation of the Only-begotten Light,--on the supposition, that
is, that He is believed to have been "made" at a later time. Surely
such a doctrine is beyond all impiety! It is therefore clearly shown
that the Father of truth did not make the truth at a time when it was
not; but, being the fountain of light and truth, and of all good, He
shed forth from Himself that Only-begotten Light of truth by which the
glory of His Person is expressly imaged; so that the blasphemy of
those who say that the Son was a later addition to God by way of
creation is at all points refuted.

Footnotes

[921] Reading ton me huphestoton, as the sense seems to require,
unless we connect ton huphestoton with ouk estin. In this case the
sense will be practically the same, but the sentence will be extremely
involved. The point which S. Gregory desires to enforce is that "not
being," or "non-existence," is one and the same thing, whether it is
regarded as past, present, or future, and that it is, in any of these
aspects, an idea which we cannot without impiety attach to the Divine
Person of the Son.
[922] S. John xiv. 10
[923] The words are probably those of the imaginary objector; but they
may be a citation from Eunomius.
[924] The reference is probably to Ps. xxxvi. 9.
[925] i.e.the "later light" must have arisen from darkness; therefore
darkness must have intervened between the "eternal light" and the
"later light."