Georgia: Comparing Kosovo and South Ossetia

It was six months ago this week that Kosovo finally declared independence from Serbia, and worriers fretted that the move could prompt so-called â€œfrozen conflictsâ€ in Georgia and Trans-Dniester to thaw: emerging like some long buried monsters from the Arctic tundra in a Hollywood movie.

Kosovars celebrate the independence of Kosovo earlier this year

Few, however, could then have guessed how quickly their fears would be realised, that before summer was out Kosovoâ€™s name would be repeatedly whispered in connection with a very real, hot war, in South Ossetia.

South Ossetia is Russiaâ€™s Kosovo, we hear. Like Kosovo it is apparently a conflict over ethnic separatism. Like Kosovo, it is more fundamentally a squaring up of East and West, a tiny patch of land where giant spheres of influence rub up against each other.

In discussions over Kosovo, many readers of this blog argue about â€œwho was to blameâ€, â€œwho started itâ€ about the western plots to saddle Serbs unfairly with all the blame, about media distortions that peddle the orthodox line.

But following the Georgia conflict, it is clear that it is difficult, if not impossible, in this kind of conflict to determine who is to blame for what â€“ even as the events unfold.

As the smoke of the initial exchanges cleared, Georgia was criticised for launching a naÃ¯ve attack. Tbilisi, it appeared, was the aggressor, triggering war.

Of course, in the days since, we learn more, or reflect more, about a long period of â€œRussian provocationsâ€. Who then, really, is to blame?

What is certain is that if Kosovo is any example, there will never be a definitive answer. Each side will take its own line.

Carl Bildt, Swedenâ€™s foreign minister, for example, uses NATO intervention in the Balkans as a model to condemn the Russians.

"No state has the right to intervene militarily in the territory of another state simply because there are individuals there with a passport issued by that state or who are nationals of the state," he said. "We did not accept military intervention by Milosevic's Serbia in other Yugoslav states on the grounds of protecting Serbian passport holders.â€

And one could take the view that having condemned Kosovoâ€™s breakaway from Serbia, it would now seem hypocritical if Russia condoned a similar independence in South Ossetia.

Much more conventional, of course, is the view that Kosovoâ€™s independence and western Balkan meddling justifies Russiaâ€™s own intervention.

Lech Walesa and Poles generally knows a thing or two about throwing off the Moscow shackles, but he had this to say:

"Recognizing Kosovo will bring nothing but trouble. No one can be denied the right to self-determination, but only within the bounds of common sense

Kosovo, "with its irresponsible behaviour, [is] causing new divisions in Europe and globally and undermining international relations".

Ultimately, we must take our pick about which version of events we choose, and whose truth we believe. But for all the gripes here about western media distortions, and for all our failings, I for one am happier not to be getting my news, of Kosovo, of South Ossetia, of everything, filtered through the well controlled pages of Moscowâ€™s own media.