The DDG-79 Arleigh
Burke
Flight IIA class destroyer is regarded by many
to be the
leading contender for SEA 4000. Equipped with the SPY-1D AEGIS system,
late build examples displace over 9,000 tonnes full load. The US Navy
plans to operate 48 examples, replacing the DDG-2 class (US Navy).

The SEA 4000 Air Warfare
Destroyer (AWD) project is the largest single naval project currently
in the funding pipeline, and in scope and size is the biggest ADF
project other than the NACC project. Given the enormous impact this
project will have on the Navy's budget, and indeed the Defence budget
as a whole, it is well worth careful scrutiny.

Many interesting questions arise in relation to the role
definition of these warships, and the technological choices to be made,
which Dr Carlo Kopp will explore in detail.

The SEA 4000 Requirement

The RAN has long and hard lobbied for a replacement class of
vessels to plug the hole left by the departure of the capable Charles F
Adams DDG-2 class Air Warfare Destroyers. The Oliver Hazard Perry FFG-7
class and ANZAC class warships have very limited air defence and indeed
anti-missile defence capabilities, and would be seriously challenged to
survive in any high intensity conflict. Indeed, neither class of
warship was designed to operate independently, the FFGs being a
lightweight US Navy design used as a gap filler to supplement the
Spruance class ASW frigates, and the ANZAC class being designed for use
in low intensity regional contingencies. The three AWDs are to become
the core assets for the RAN's surface fleet, as the oldest FFGs are
retired over the coming decade.

The RAN's aims in the AWD project are manifold. In a 2003
presentation, CMDR G.A. McGUIRE, DDSC, stated the following aims:

Although having an Air Warfare focus, the AWD will be a
"Sea Control" Combatant.

The air warfare capability would be for Task Group defence
not own ship defence and Protection for forces deployed ashore.

The vessels would provide for an Electronic Attack
capability to supplement RAAF assets, and provide Protection of
supporting air assets.

The vessels would have a strike capability using a long
range gun system such as the ERGM, but the BGM-109 Tomahawk was
described as unaffordable.

These aims have been amplified by Defence Minister Sen Robert
Hill to include a capability to provide ballistic missile defence to
protect amphibious landing sites and other high value assets,
ostensibly using a SPY-1 Aegis derivative radar and evolutions of the
RIM-66/67 Standard Surface to Air Missile (SAM) family.

These are some very ambitious aims, which also make some very
strong assumptions about the future regional threat environment.

The SEA 4000 schedule was intended to include a requirements
analysis and an Operational Concept Definition document to be produced
in 2003, followed by 2nd pass design phase ending in 2004/5 and 3rd
pass with a contractual commitment in 2007. The first vessel is the
class was planned to be delivered in 2012 and following acceptance
trials, to enter fleet service at some date after that.

The ship's combat system and hull designs were to be
considered separately, with the caveat that some systems would be tied
to specific warship designs.

The Three Contenders

At the time of writing three warship designs were shortlisted.
These are the US Gibbs & Cox DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class, the
Spanish IZAR Alvaro De Bazan Class (F100), and the German Blohm + Voss
Sachsen Class (Type F124).

The DDG-51 class is the US Navy's current tier one destroyer,
which replaced the DDG-2 class. The US Navy defines the DDG-51 as a
Multi-Mission Guided Destroyer Missile designed to operate
independently, or as units of Carrier Strike Groups (CSG),
Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG), and Missile Defense Action Groups in
multi-threat environments that include air, surface, and subsurface
threats and regards the ship to be the most powerful surface
combatant ever put to sea. At this time in service and planned DDG-51
class vessels number 48, with three variants in service. Hulls DDG
51-78 (Flights I/II) are 153.92 metres in length, hulls DDG 79-98
(Flight IIA) 155.29 metres in length, with full load displacements
between 8,448.04 and 9,347.2 tonnes. The ships are propelled by four GE
LM 2500-30 gas turbines driving two shafts with 100,000 SHP. The
DDG-51s have a complement of 23 officers and 300 enlisted personnel.
The first in the class entered service during the early 1990s.

In terms of its mission payload, the DDG-51 class is built
around the Lockheed-Martin 4 MegaWatt 4,100 element class SPY-1D AEGIS
radar/combat system, and the vessels are typically armed with a mix of
vertical launch ASROC, BGM-109 Tomahawk, RIM-66/67 Standard area
defence SAMs in Mk.41 Vertical Launch Systems fore and aft, a pair of
triple tube torpedo launchers carrying Mk.46, a pair of Phalanx 20 mm
CIWS guns, and a 5 inch Mk.45 gun. A helicopter flight deck is
provided, but no hangars. The RIM-162 ESSM point defence SAM would be
carried in four packs each occupying a single Mk.41 VLS cell.

In US Navy service the DDG-51s are used to supplement the
CG-47 Ticonderoga class AEGIS cruisers in air defence roles, but are
also commonly used to lead Surface Action Groups. It is a very capable
surface combatant, its principal air defence limitation being in the
use of three SPG-62 X-band illuminators, compared to the four carried
by the CG-47 class.

The IZAR F100 Alvaro de Bazan class multirole frigate is the
Spanish Navy's latest surface combatant, and one of the few non-US
warships to carry the SPY-1D AEGIS system (Japan's Kongo class also
uses SPY-1). Like the DDG-51 the F100 is essentially a multi-role
surface combatant, with a bias to air defence capability. The four
ships in the class have a full load displacement of 5,800 tonne, with a
length of 146.7 metres, the last to launch this year. Propulsion is
provided by a pair of GE LM 2500 gas turbines and a pair of IZAR
diesels, driving a pair of variable pitch props. The F100 has a
complement of 48 officers and 202 enlisted personnel.

The mission payload is similar to that of the DDG-51s. The
SPY-1D AEGIS is the primary air defence sensor, used to target the
SM-2MR Block IIIA and RIM-162 SAMs in Mk.41 VLS, and providing cueing
for the FABA 20mm Meroka 2B CIWS. A pair of dual tube Mk.32 torpedo
launchers are used, carrying Mk.46 rounds, as well an a pair of mortars
and 20 mm guns. ASuW capability is provided with a pair of four round
BGM-84 Harpoon launchers, and a 5 inch Mk.45 Mod 2 gun. The helicopter
flight deck is sized for the SH-60 Seahawk.

The F100 class will be used as task group air defence escorts,
as lead vessels for SAGs, and also for ASW and ASuW tasks. While
smaller than the DDG-51 class, this is still a formidable surface
combatant.

Ostensibly an Air Defence Frigate, the F124 Sachsen (Saxon)
class warships are more the multirole surface combatant than the
specialised air defence vessel. Unlike the DDG-51 and F100 series,
built around the SPY-1 AEGIS system, the F124 is the first warship to
deploy an X-band active phased array engagement radar, coupled with a
mechanically steered 200 NMI class L-band Thales Nederland (formerly
Signaal) SMART-L 3D radar. The three ships in this class, FGS Sachsen
(F219), FGS Hamburg (F220) and FGS Hessen (F221) are 143.0 metres in
length, with a displacement of 5,600 tonnes. Propulsion is provided by
a single GE LM 2500 gas turbine and a pair of MTU 20V1163 diesels,
driving a pair of variable pitch props. The F124 class has a complement
of 37 officers and 191 enlisted personnel.

The mission payload of the F124 class is very different from
the DDG-51 and F100, but in the same capability class. The mechanically
steered SMART-L 3D radar provides long range search and acquisition,
and missile engagements using the SM-2MR Block IIIA and RIM-162 SAMs in
a 32 cell Mk.41 VLS are prosecuted using the 3,000+ element class
X-band Thales Nederland APAR active phased array. A pair of Mk.31
launchers with RIM-116A Rolling Airframe Missiles are used for point
defence. ASW capability is provided with a pair of triple tube Mk.32
torpedo launchers carrying EurotorpMU90 rounds. ASuW capability is
provided with a pair of four tube RGM-84 Harpoon launchers, an Oto
Melara 76mm gun and a pair of Rheinmetall 20mm guns. EU sources claim
that a KMW PzH 2000 155mm gun was trialled on the FGS Hamburg (F220)
late last year. The helicopter flight deck is sized for the large 15
tonne helicopter, such as the EH101 Merlin, with paired hangars sized
for the NH90.

The systems and weapon fit on the F124 make it a very capable
multirole surface combatant, despite its Air Defence Frigate
designation.

All three warships are significantly larger and heavier than
the 4,500 tonne class DDG-2s, and the 3,600 tonne class FFG-7s, the
DDG-51 being almost 2.5 times larger in displacement than an FFG-7. All
three are multirole surface combatants suitable for leading SAGs, with
a strong bias toward to air defence roles.

All three represent the last modern Western surface combatant
classes likely to be constructed with conventional hull and
superstructure designs, as EU nations will likely follow the US lead
with the DD(X) class and build future surface combatants using faceted
stealth techniques.

These warships are also likely to be the last of a generation
built using classical antenna and radar configurations. The DDG-51
and F100 using the S-band passive phased array SPY-1 system as a long
range search and acquisition radar, and the F124 using a mechanically
steered 3D radar. Only the F124 class uses the upcoming generation of
active phased arrays in its APAR X-band engagement radar.

In terms of basic technology, this raises some interesting
questions as to the 'technological strategy' being pursued by Defence
with the SEA 4000 project, no less interesting questions than the role
optimisations of these warships' weapon systems.

The
SPY-1 radar system is at the heart of the AEGIS weapon
system, and was first deployed on the CG-47 Ticonderoga class air
defence cruisers. This long range S-band Moving Target Indicator radar
uses passive phase shifter based phased array technology, and was
designed to engage and destroy aircraft and Russian supersonic missiles
like the Kh-22/AS-4 Kitchen and KSR-5/AS-6 Kingfish. The depicted
missile launch is from a Mk.41 Vertical Launch System on a CG-47 class
cruiser (Lockheed-Martin).

The
core of the AEGIS system is a powerful, software based
battle management system, providing a highly automated capability to
track and engage large numbers of targets concurrently. It remains the
benchmark in naval air defence systems (Lockheed-Martin).

Spain's
F100 class is the first non-US warship to be equipped
with the AEGIS system, using the SPY-1D variant common to the DDG-51
class. Although only 2/3 of the displacement of a late build DDG-51,
the F100 is highly capable multirole surface combatant.

Germany's
F124 air defence frigate is the odd one out amongst
the SEA 4000 contenders, as it does not use the AEGIS weapon system. It
employs a conventional long range search radar, combined with the APAR
X-band phased array engagement radar, used for tracking, missile
midcourse guidance and illumination. As such it is the only contender
system built for handling saturation Anti-Ship Cruise Missile attacks
(Blohm & Voss Image).

The
Block III RIM-66 Standard Missile is the primary air defence
weapon used by all three contenders, using terminal X-band semi-active
homing guidance with midcourse datalink updates (Raytheon).

The
Block IV RIM-66 Standard Missile is being developed as an
anti-ballistic missile interceptor, intended to engage Tactical and
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles. Note the additional booster
stage and enlarged strakes (Raytheon).

The
RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile is the weapon of choice
for engaging sea skimming Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles. Developed in an
international program, the missile employs terminal X-band semi-active
homing guidance with midcourse datalink updates. A single Mk.41 VLS
cell can be loaded with an insert carrying four ESSM rounds, to
maximise weapon loadout (Raytheon).

The Thales Nederland (formerly Signaal) APAR is the first
production X-band active phased array engagement radar to be deployed,
reaching its users several years ahead of the US Navy Raytheon SPY-3
X-band Multi-Function Radar. With 3,000+ TR-Modules per face, the APAR
has two to three times the module count of contemporary X-band AESA
fighter radars. As this radar provides the beam steering agility of a
phased array, it is capable of much better handling saturation missile
attacks, where antenna dwell time for tracking, midcourse guidance and
illumination must be carefully scheduled between targets (Thales).

Roles and Missions vs Threat
Capabilities

On the strength of public statements by Defence it would
appear that
the SEA 4000 warships are primarily intended to provide long range air
defence cover for amphibious operations in the region, air defence
escort cover for amphibious vessels or convoys, and blue water
capabilities as lead vessels for SAGs. The role optimisations of the
three shortlisted warships fit this classical role definition
reasonably well.

More curious is the case put publicly for the use of these
warships as anti-ballistic missile defence platforms, ostensibly to
defend amphibious landing sites from tactical or intermediate range
ballistic missiles. Indeed some media commentators have suggested these
warships might be used for a broader national missile defence role,
something even the most ambitious overseas proponents of ballistic
missile defence would dare not suggest.

The principal threat to surface shipping and amphibious
landings within this region will be anti-shipping and land attack
cruise missiles, of Russian, cloned Russian or indigenous origin. Such
weapons are now well established in regional inventories, with highly
ambitious shopping plans by a number of regional operators. These
weapons can be launched by coastal batteries from mobile trailers, by
surface warships, submarines and a wide range of aircraft. The sheer
diversity of these weapons is an issue in its own right. In statistical
terms regional cruise missile inventories already outnumber
conventional theatre ballistic missile capabilities, and this trend
will continue over time. Cruise missiles are more accurate, cheaper per
range/payload, and harder to detect in flight.

At the top end of the threat scale are large Russian
supersonic
ramjet cruise missiles, such as the sea skimming Raduga Kh-41 Moskit
(SS-N-22 Sunburn) Mach 2.2 135 NMI class ASCM, and the Kh-61
Yakhont/PJ-10 Brahmos A/S (SS-N-26) Mach 2.5 160 NMI class ASCM.
Designed to inflict serious damage to aircraft carriers or large
transports, these supersonic sea skimmers can cut smaller warships in
half. China has deployed the Sunburn on its Sovremenyy destroyers,
while India intends to launch licence built Brahmos missiles from
surface warships, coastal batteries and aircraft.

An arguably no less lethal arrival in the region is the
Novator 3M54
Alfa/Club/Kalibr family of ASCMs, now available as torpedo tube launch
rounds for the Kilo class SSKs. The sea-skimming subsonic 3M-54E1 Alfa
(SS-N-27) subsonic 160 NMI class ASCM most closely resembles the now
retired BGM-109 TASM anti-ship Tomahawk variant. Its sibling, the 120
NMI class 3M-54E is a more lethal variant, which carries a rocket
propelled Mach 2.9 class manoeuvring sea skimming payload section. When
the 3M-54E seeker acquires its target, the aft section of the missile
is jettisoned, the rocket motor ignited and the victim warship has to
deal with a sea skimming Mach 3 class weapon. India has acquired the
3M-54 series, and reports now claim a tit for tat buy by China. An air
launch 3M-54E variant has been marketed on the Su-32FN/34 fighter,
while the Yakhont and Moskit have been integrated on the Su-27/30
Flanker series.

If India proceeds with its intended lease of the Tu-22M3
Backfire C, we are also apt to see the arrival of the massive 200 NMI
class Raduga Kh-22M Burya (AS-4 Kitchen), capable of Mach 4 class
speeds at altitude. Designed with its smaller sibling, the KSR-5
(AS-6), to kill aircraft carriers, the Kh-22 was the impetus for the
development of AEGIS during the 1970s.

One tier down from these weapons are shorter ranging ASCMs.
The
Mach 4 class ramjet Zvezda-Strela Kh-31 (AS-17 Krypton) family of
weapons has been acquired by China for its Su-30 fleet, it is available
in 60 NMI and extended range 110 NMI variants with antishipping radar
and passive anti-radiation seekers. China is also to deploy the 50 NMI
class subsonic Kh-59MK2 Ovod, a antishipping radar seeker equipped
derivative of the AS-18 Kazoo. India operates the 70 NMI class Kh-35U
Uran/Kharpunski (AS-20 Kayak) - a Russian Harpoon - with reports
claiming China has ordered the same.

China has manufactured since the 1970s a wide range of
derivatives of the Russian liquid rocket propelled Styx missile,
usually labelled the Silkworm family of missiles. While subsonic,
these large 2 to 3 tonne weapons are available in ship, coastal battery
and air launch versions, including a turbojet powered model and a range
of seeker variants are available. China also builds an indigenous
analogue to the Exocet/Harpoon in its YJ-8 family of sea skimming
missiles, available with rocket and turbojet propulsion.

While all of these weapons are available with anti-shipping
seekers, some are also available in land attack variants, or dual role
variants. Evidence is now also emerging of a Chinese program to field
sub/ship and air launched land attack cruise missiles in the class of
the 600 NMI range US Tomahawk and CALCM. Reports indicate a Tomahawk
clone, and Kh-55/65 (AS-15 Kent) derivative will enter service by the
end of the decade. China is now testing a new Badger variant, the H-6H,
equipped to carry four such cruise missiles.

This is highly lethal mix of weapons, likely to be encountered
in blue water operations, and littoral operations including the support
of amphibious landings.

The key and perhaps most important common feature of most of
these weapons is that they have sea skimming or low altitude cruise
profiles, and range performance in excess of 40 NMI. With most of these
weapons being of Russian origin, it is inevitable that the Russian
doctrine of massed saturation attack will be adopted as part of the
training package provided. Developed during the Cold War to defeat US
Navy battle groups, this doctrine aims to place as large as possible a
number of missiles onto the target warships in as narrow a time window
as possible to saturate the ships' defences.

From an air defence perspective this is as ugly an environment
as possible. Because most of the these weapons are sea skimmers with
more than 25 NMI range, they can be launched without warning from well
below the radar horizon of an air defence warship. The long range
detection capability of such warships is nearly irrelevant here, since
the launching aircraft can be flown in under the mainlobes of the radar
to the missile release point. The tactics long used by the RAAF with
its F-111C/Harpoon combination are simply replicated using Russian
weapons.

A warship is thus likely to get its first warning as the
missiles pop up over the radar horizon, 15 to 25 NMI distant, depending
on radar antenna elevation. With around 2 to 3 minutes warning time for
subsonic missiles, and as little as 40 seconds for supersonic missiles,
the warship must be capable of tracking these ASCMs, launching its
SAMs, providing terminal phase illumination, assessing the kill, and
repeating with a second shot if need be, before the ASCMs get inside
the minimal engagement distance of the weapon system. If the ASCMs get
past the point defence SAMs, then the last line of defence is the
terminal gun system or short range SAM, which even if effective may not
prevent the ship from being showered with debris.

In a cruise missile rich threat
environment, all surface
warships are confronted with the physics of radar propagation which
hide inbound low flying missiles below the radar horizon. For wide area
air defence operations, AEW&C aircraft are a much more productive
means of surveilling airspace (Author).

The RIM-162 ESSM was designed for this style of engagement.
However,
the issue is as much one of missile dynamics as it is of having an
X-band tracking and illuminating system capable of concurrently
tracking and illuminating for multiple defensive SAMs. On average up to
two SAMs must be launched to guarantee the kill of an incoming ASCM, if
a half a dozen ASCMs are inbound, then there is a real risk that the
ship's illuminators will be saturated and an ASCM will get through.
While a single missile may not sink a warship, it could inflict enough
damage to render it vulnerable to subsequent attacks.

The game for a warship is thus one of being able to exceed the
rate of fire in missiles thrown against it, in the narrow time and
space window afforded by the radar horizon. Having a 250 NMI range 3D
radar and 100 NMI range two stage SAMs may be almost irrelevant. Only
an opponent devoid of modern anti-shipping missiles would even consider
an conventional air attack from medium altitudes, using dumb and smart
bombs or rockets. Such opponents will be a scarce commodity in this
region.

Basic Technology Issues

The high availability of modern ASCMs, especially
supersonic weapons, has seen the evolution of a new generation of
defensive technologies for warships. The first of these are X-band
phased array radars (Active Electronically Steered Arrays or AESAs),
the second is low observable faceted hull shaping rules to reduce the
warship's radar signature.

At this time two X-band AESA radar systems are in production
or
development for this application, these are the Raytheon AN/SPY-3
Multi-Function Radar (MFR) planned for the US Navy DD(X), CG(X),
retrofits on CVN-77, CVNX aircraft carriers and possibly LHD-8, LPD-12
and LPD-17 amphibious ships, and the Thales Active Phased Array Radar
(APAR) on the F124 class. The planned NATO Self-Defense ESSM Active
Phased Array Radar (SEAPAR) is intended to combine aspects of the SPY-3
and APAR, and is a joint project between Raytheon Naval & Maritime
Integrated Systems (N&MIS) and Thales Naval Nederland (TNNL) under
the sponsoship of the NATO SeaSparrow Surface Missile System Project
Office. The basic technology in these X-band arrays compares closely to
the APG-77 and APG-81 radars on the F/A-22A and JSF fighters
respectively.

These radars are designed to stop saturation ASCM attacks -
the
specific buzzword being raid density as a measure of how many inbound
ASCMs can be engaged. This class of radar will track the incoming
missiles, provide midcourse guidance for outbound SAMs, and terminal
illumination to SAM impact. As they are electronically steered, a
single AESA panel can be timeshared in milliseconds between multiple
inbound missiles and outbound SAMs. With potentially large panel
apertures, this class of radar will match or exceed the detection
performance of top tier fighter radars like the APG-77 - which can
detect a 1 m2 target at more than 100 NMI. Operating in the X-band,
such radars can provide highly accurate angle tracking, and can be very
effective at detecting skin returns from small surface features on
small targets. It is no accident that specialised ballistic missile
defence radars like the Raytheon THAAD radar, the Israeli Green Pine,
the Russian 9S19 Imbir (High Screen) and the Raytheon X-Band Radar
(XBR) for the NMD system are all X-band designs.

Active array technology offers other important benefits. One
is
graceful degradation with individual module failures, unlike passive
arrays like the SPY-1 generation which are vulnerable to single point
failures in the main transmitter tube. Another is much lower sidelobe
emissions resulting from the ability to apply better taper functions
through module gain and phase control - in effect such radars are much
stealthier than passive phase control only arrays like the SPY-1
generation.

Conventional wisdom in radar engineering favours the lower
VHF/UHF and L-bands for long range search radars, and the X-band for
shorter ranging tracking and engagement radars. The S-band used in the
SPY-1 is a compromise, to improve performance in tracking smaller
targets and to avoid the additional array size incurred with longer
wavelengths. The Volume Search Radar (VSR) intended to complement the
SPY-3 on the DD(X)/CG(X) was originally defined as an L-band radar and
recently shifted to the S-band. Notwithstanding this, an X-band AESA
radar built to detect a 0.001 m2 cruise missile at 20 NMI will also
detect a 10 m2 aircraft at 200 NMI, making it quite competitive in the
long range surveillance role.

The generational jump we are seeing now in shipboard radars
will be paralleled in stealth shaping techniques. Trialled originally
in the Lockheed Sea Shadow program during the 1980s, stealth techniques
are to be used full scale in the new US Navy DD(X)/CG(X) family of
12,000 tonne class warships. These vessels will have no exposed masts,
a tall faceted superstructure will carry all antennas flush mounted in
the skin panels. The result will be a warship which is much harder to
detect on radar, especially if microwave absorbent or lossy coating
materials are exploited. While absorbers can be used to reduce the
signature of conventional warships, the results cannot compete against
a design shaped for stealth from the outset. Stealth of this quality
must be designed in from the outset, as with combat aircraft, and shape
alone will account for much of the gains seen.

Lockheed's
1980s Sea Shadow technology demonstrator was the
first ever stealth warship. Anecdotes from the period claim it was so
stealthy, it could be detected as a black hole in the ocean wave
clutter background (Lockheed-Martin).

The US
Navy's
new 12,000 tonne class Northrop-Grumman DD(X)
destroyers will be the first of a new generation of surface combatants
incorporating a wide range of technological innovations. Two of these
are of particular interest. The first is the integrated dual band
radar suite combining the active phased array X-band SPY-3 MFR and
S-band Volume Search Radars, both sharing a common back end for antenna
control and processing. The SPY-3, also planned for the CG(X) and a
wide range of larger vessels, is designed to defeat saturation missile
attacks. The wave piercing hull shape and superstructure is designed
for stealth from the outset, resulting in a much lower radar signature
than any current warships (US Navy/Northrop-Grumman).

Conclusions

Given the enormous investment of taxpayer's funds about to be
sunk into the Air Warfare Destroyer project, some fundamental questions
must be asked:

We are at the beginning of a major and radical transition
point
in naval surface combatant technologies, a transition which cannot be
crossed by evolutionary modification or upgrades of existing designs,
yet the program implementation as it stands is centred in technologies
many of which date back to the 1970s. Why must the program follow the
current timeline? Why can it not be deferred to encompass designs
exploiting DD(X)/CG(X) generation technologies? With Westralia, Tobruk,
Manoora and Kanimbla coming due for replacement, there is ample work
for the domestic industry regardless of AWD timelines.

Why is the warship to be optimised around providing long range
air defence cover and ballistic missile defence cover, when clearly the
dominant threat to warships, transport shipping and amphibious landings
over coming decades will be in low flying cruise missiles, which the
region is already awash in? Indeed, if the warship is to be effective
at all in its stated primary roles of defending other vessels and
amphibious landing sites, then it must be equipped with an X-band
active phased array in the class of the SPY-3 or APAR systems, designed
from the outset to stop saturation sea skimming missile attacks.

Given the radar horizon constrained low altitude coverage
limitations
of a long range radar on a warship, why is so much investment being put
into a capability with inherent limitations, while only four Wedgetails
are planned, despite these providing the low altitude surveillance
coverage equivalent to dozens of warships each?

There is no doubt that the RAN will need a new class of
surface
combatant to replace the older FFGs, and there is no doubt that this
vessel will need to be highly survivable in the most competitive
maritime warfighting environment worldwide. The current AWD program is
misdirected in its role optimisation, and poorly thought out in its
choice of technologies.

A very good case can be made for the AWD program to be delayed
by at least a half decade to permit the incorporation of modern low
observable hull technology, and the latest X-band active array
technology, preferably in a smaller and more affordable hull. If SEA
4000 materialises in its current form, the RAN will be burdened for the
next three decades with the last of a generation of technologies, with
a design ill adapted to the developing realities of regional maritime
warfare.