PETITIONER:
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, JABALPUR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
S. S. SHUKLA ETC. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT28/04/1976
BENCH:
RAY, A.N. (CJ)
BENCH:
RAY, A.N. (CJ)
KHANNA, HANS RAJ
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.
BHAGWATI, P.N.
CITATION:
1976 AIR 1207 1976 SCR 172
1976 SCC (2) 521
CITATOR INFO :
R 1977 SC1027 (12)
RF 1977 SC1361 (137)
R 1977 SC1496 (24)
RF 1978 SC 290 (3)
RF 1978 SC 489 (1,10,11,12,15,16,17,18,24,25,
RF 1978 SC 597 (5,11,15,19,21,196)
E 1978 SC 727 (55,57)
R 1978 SC 803 (14)
RF 1982 SC 710 (35)
ACT:
Locus standi to move habeas corpus petition under
Article 226 of the constitution of India-effect of the
Presidential order dared June 27 1975- Constitution of India
Articles 19 21 25, 226 and 359(1A).) read with Maintenance
Of Internal Security Act (Act 26 of 1971),1971, section 3-
Remedy way of writ petition to challenge the legality of an
order of detention under the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act is not open to a detenu during the emergency.
Maintenance of Internal Security Act (Act 26 of 1971),
1971 Section 16A(9) is a rule of evidence and
constitutionally valid-Not open to challenge oh the ground
of any violation of Part III of the Constitution fn view of
the provisions of article 359(1A).
Maintenance of Internal Security Act (Act 26 of 1971),
1971-Section 18 applies to all orders of detention a valid
piece of legislation and docs not suffer from the vice of
excessive delegation Not open to challenge on the ground of
the theory of basic structure re.
Constitution of India-Article 21 is the sole repository
of rights to life and liberty.
Constitution of India Articles 358 and 359-Distinction
between.
Constitution of India Articles 20 and 21-Difference
between.
Disclosure to court section 16A(9) of the Maintenance
of Internal Security Act (Act 26 of 1971) 1971 is an
exception and constitutes an encroachment. on the
constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court.
Eclipse theory of-Applicability to the enforcement of
Fundamental Rights under Art. 359(1).
Good return theory of-Not applicable to the practiced
of Indian courts.
Obiter dictum-When a decision] becomes an obiter
dictum.
Constitution of India article 256-Non-compliance with
Article 256 by the State-Grievance at the instance of a
private party not entertainable by courts.
Rule Of Law-Constitution itself is the rule of law and
the mandate.
Judicial review-scope of during the period of
emergency.
Constitution of India Article 12-whether State Includes
judiciary.
Constitution of India 372-Law in force whether includes
laws included fn Part 111 of the Con Construction of Article
372.
Maintenance of Internal Security Act (Act 26 of 1971)
1971 Section 16 Leaves open a remedy by way of a suit for
damages for wrongful confinement scope of Section. 16
173
Basic structure theory-Constitution of India Article
368-Emergency provisions themselves are to be regarded as
the basic structure of the Constitution.
objects of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act
(Act 26 of 1971), 1971 and the Amending Acts 31 of 1975 and
14 of 1976 thereto
Presidential order under Art 359(1) and Martial Law
under Articles 23 and 73 of the Constitution-Distinction
Constitution of India Art. 359(1) 359(1A) 53 and 73 read
with Art. 355 scope of.
Constitution of India Article 226-extent of the powers
of inquiry by the High Courts in a petition for writ of
habeas corpus when once a prima facie valid detention order
is shown to exist.
Rule of law Concept of is inapplicable to emergency
provisions since the emergency provisions themselves contain
the rule of law for such situations.
Separation of powers-Principles of-Preventive detention
being placed exclusively within the control of the Executive
authorities of the State for the duration ,. Of the
emergency does not violate any principle of separation of
powers. '
Basic structure theory is nothing more than a mode of
construction of documents of the Constitution.
Jurisdiction of courts under Articles 136 and 226-
Nature of.
Constitution of India Articles 34 and 359, effect
Whether powers of the courts to issue writ of habeas corpus
during the period of Martial Law are taken away,.
Rule of construction-decision of the Supreme Court and
the other high judicial authorities-constitution of India
Article 141 explained.
Rights under s. 8 of the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act (Act 26 of 1971), 1971-Nature of vis-a-vis
rights under Constitution of India Article 22(5)-Rights
under Article 22(5) do not bar the enforcement of right
under
Reflection theory of is not applicable to 5. 8 of the
Maintenance of Internal Security Act (Act 26 of 1971), 1971.
Practice-Place of dissent in the court of last resort-
desirability of unanimity among judges Constitution of India
Article 141.
Fundamental Rights-object of guaranteed Fundamental
Right.
Natural justice Rules of law being on the same footing
as Fundamental Rights do not override the express terms of a
statute.
Maxims:
(1) Expression Facit cessare tacitum"-
Applicability to Art. 21 of the Constitution.
(ii) Ut res magis valeat quam pereat .
(iii)Salus populi est supreme le.
Words and phrases:
(a) Purported to be made under s. 3" in s. 18 of
the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (Act
26 of 1971), 1971.
(b) For any other purpose in Art. 226 of the
Constitution-meaning of.
(c) Conferred by Part III of the Constitution in
Art. 359(1)-Intent
HEADNOTE:
174
In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (1) of
Art. 352 of the Constitution The President of India, by
proclamation dated December 23, 1971 declared that a grave
emergency exists whereby the security of India is threatened
by external aggression and the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act (Act 26 of 1971), 1971 was published on July 2
1971, for effectively dealing with the emergency.
On November 16, 1974, the President of India, in
exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (1) of Art. 359
of the Constitution declared: (a) that the right to move any
court with respect to orders of detention which have already
been made or which may hereafter be made under s. 3(1)(c) of
the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (as amended
by ordinance ll of 1974) for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by Articles 14, 21 and Clauses (4) (5), (6) and
(7) of Article 22 of the Constitution; and (b) All
proceedings pending in any court or the enforcement of any
of the aforesaid rights with respect to all orders of
detention made under the said section 3(1)(c) shall remain
suspended for a period of six months from the date of issue
of the order. Or the period during which the proclamation of
emergency issued under Clause ll) of Art. 352 of the
Constitution of India on December 3, 1971, is in force,
whichever period expires earlier. the order stood extended
to the whole of the territory of India.
On June 20, 1975, the President of India, amended the
above order by substituting 12 months for '6 months' in
the order.
On June 25, 1975, the President, in exercise of his
powers conferred by Clause (2) of Article 352 of the
Constitution declared that a grave emergency exists
whereby the security of India is threatened by internal
disturbances.
On June 27, 1975, in exercise of powers conferred by
Clause (1) of Art. 359 the President declared that the right
of any person (including a foreigner) to move any court for
the enforcement of the rights conferred by Articles 14 21
and 22 of the Constitution and all proceedings pending in
any court for the enforcement of the above mentioned rights
shall remain suspended for the period during which the
proclamation of emergency made under Clause (1) of Act. 352
of the Constitution on December 3, 1971, and on June 25,
1975, are both in. force. The Presidential order of June
27, 1975, further stated that the same shall be in addition
to and not in derogation of any order made before the date
of the aforesaid order under Clause (1) of Art. 359 of the
Constitution. on June 29, l 975, by another order, the
President made the ordinance of June 27, 1975, applicable to
the State of Jammu and Kashmir as well. On September 25,
1975, the last paragraph in the Presidential order dated
June 27 1975, was omitted. The President promulgated the
amending ordinances No. i and 7 of 1975, and replaced by the
Maintenance of Internal Security (Amending Act) (No. 39 of
1975) Act introducing a new section 16A, and . giving a
deemed effect to s. 7 of the Act as on from June 25, 1975,
while the rest having a deemed effect from June 29, 1975. By
the same Act a new section 18 was also inserted with effect
from June 25, 1975.
By the Constitution (Thirty-eighth Amendment) Act,
1975, Articles 123, 213, 239(b), 352, 356, 359 and 368 were
amended. Clauses (4) and (5) were added in Art. 352 of the
Constitution. Broadly stated, the Thirty-eighth Con
Constitution (Amendment) Act renders the satisfaction of the
President or the Governor in the relevant Articles final and
conclusive and to be beyond any . question in any court on
any ground.
The power conferred on the President by Art. 352 shall
include the power. to issue different proclamations on
different grounds being war or external aggression or
internal disturbance or imminent danger of war or external
aggression or internal disturbance whether or not there is a
proclamation already issued by the President By
Constitution Thirty-Eight Amendment Act l '1975 new Clause
(1A) was also added after Clause (1) of Article 359.
The Constitution Thirty-ninth Amendment Act was
published on August 10 1975, amending Articles 71, 329 and
329(A) and added Entries after Entry 86 in the 9th Schedule
and the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (Act 26 of
1971) 1971 as item 92 in the said Schedule.
175
On October 17, 1975, on ordinance 16 of 1975 was issued
making further amendments ill s. 16A of the maintenance of
internal Security Act introducing sub-Clause (8) and (9) to
s. 16A. On November 16, 1975 ordinance 22 of 1975 was
issued making certain amendments in the Maintenance of
Internal security Act inserting also sub-section 2A ill s.
16A. All the amendments made by the (ordinance were given
retrospective effect for the purpose of validating all Acts
done previously. 'The said ordinances were published as the
Maintenance of Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1976 (Act
14 of 1976) on- Janurary ''5, 1976.
The respondents detained under s. 3(IA)(ii) read with
s. 3(2) of the maintenance- of Internal Security Act (Act
26 of 1971 j as amended by the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act (Amendment Act 39 of 1975), 1975 challenged in
several High Courts, the vires of the ordinance issued on
June 27, 1975, by the President of India as unconstitutional
and inoperative in law and prayed for (a) the setting aside
of the said order and (b) for directing their release
forthwith. In come cases, they challenged the validity of
the Thirty-eight and I thirty-ninth constitution Amendment
Acts.
When these petitions came up for hearing, the appellant
raised the preliminary objection to the maintainability on
the ground that in asking For l release by the issuance of a
writ of habeas Corpus. the respondents were, in substance,
claiming that they have been deprived of their personal
liberty in violation of the procedure established by law,
which plea was available to them under. Art. 21 of the
Constitution only and in view of the Presidential order
dated June 27 1975, suspending the right to move for
enforcement of the right conferred by that article, the
petitions were liable to be dismissed at the threshold.
While the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and
Madras have upheld The preliminary objection, this
contention did not find favour with the High Courts of
Allahabad, Bombay (Nagpur Bench), Delhi Karnataka, Madhya
Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana respectively. 'I these High
(courts broadly took the view that (a) despite the
Presidential order it is open to the detenus to challenge
their detention on the ground that it is ultra vires, as
for example, by showing that the order, on the face of it,
IS passed by an authority not empowered of pass it or it is
not in exercise of the power delegated to the authority or
that the power has been exercised in breach of the
conditions prescribed in that behalf by the Act under which
the order is passed, or that he order is not in strict
conformity with the provisions of the Act. Some of these
High Court have further held that the detenus can attack the
order of detention on the ground that it is mala fide, as
for example, by showing that the authority did not
supply its mind to the relevant considerations, or that the
authority was influenced by irrelevant considerations or
that the authority was influenced by improper motives. The
Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court read down s. 16A(9) of
the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 1 implying an
exception in favour of disclosure to the Court. The High
Court did not decide about the validity of the Thirty-eighth
and Thirty-ninth Constitution Amendment Acts.
Accepting the States' appeals, some by certificates
granted by the High Court and some by special leave, the
Court by majority (Khanna, J. dissenting),
^
HELD . (Per majority A.N. Ray C.J. M.H. Beg. Y.V.
Chandrachud and P.N. Bhagwati JJ.)
(1) In view of the Presidential Order. Dated June 27,
1975, under Clause (1) of Art. 359. no person has any locus
standi to move any writ petition under Art 226 before a High
Court for habeas corpus or any other writ or order or
direction to challenge the legality of an order. Of
detention on the ground that the order is not under or in
compliance with the Act or is illegal or is vitiated by mala
fides factual or legal or is based on extraneous
considerations.
[477 E-F].
(2) Section 16A(9) of the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act, 1971 is constitutionally valid. [477 F]
(3) Section 18 of the Maintenance of' Internal Security
Act, 1971 is not invalid. [240 A-D, 342 F-G, 414 D]
176
(4)Article 21 of the Constitution is the sole
repository of rights to life and personal liberty against
State. [246 B]
Per A. N Ray J
In view of the Presidential order dated June 27, 1975,
under Clause (1) of Art. 359, no person has locus standi to
move writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution
before a High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ or
order or direction to enforce any right to personal liberty
of a person detained under the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act, 1971 on the grounds that the order of
detention or the continued detention is for any reason not
in compliance with the Act or is illegal or male fide [245
H, 246 A]
Article 21 is the sole repository of rights to life and
personal liberty against a State. Any claim to a writ of
hebeas corpus is enforcement of Art. 21 and . is,
therefore, barred by the Presidential order. [246 B]
Girindra Nath Banerjee v Birendra Nath Lal ILR 54 Cal.
727; Kinng emperor v. Shib Nath Banerjee 1972 Indian Appeals
241 and Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] (4) SCR 797
referred to.
Scope of judicial reivew in emergency.
In times of emergency the executive safeguards the
life of the nation and, therefore, its actions either on
the ground that these are arbitrary or unlawful cannot
be challenged in view of the fact that considerations of
security forbid proof of the evidence upon which the
detention was ordered. [219 B-E]
Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson [1942] AC 206. Greene
v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1942] AC 284; Mohan
Chaudhary v. Chief Commissioner Union Territory of Tripura
[1964] 3 SCR 442 and Makhan Singh v. ," State of Punjab
[1964] 4 SCR 797 followed.
Queen v. Halliday Ex Parte Zadiq [1917] AC 210,
referred. to.
Liberty is confined and controlled by law, whether
common law or statute. The safeguard of liberty is in the
good sense of the people and in the system of representative
and responsible Government which has been evolved. If
extraordinary powers are given, they are given because the
emergency is extraordinary and are limited to the period of
emergency. Liberty is itself the gift of the law and may by
the law forfeited or abridged. [222 D, G]
Zamora's case [1916]2 Ac 107 and Liversidge v. Sir John
Anderson [1942] AC 206, referred to.
The vital distinction between Arts. 358 and 359 is that
Art 358 suspends the rights only in Article 19 to the
extent that the Legislature can make laws contravening Art.
19 during the operation of a Proclamation of emergency and
the Executive can take action which The Executive is
competent to take under such laws Article 358 does not
suspend any Fundamental Right. While a proclamation of
emergency is in operation the Presidential order under Art.
359(1) can suspend the enforcement of any or all
Fundamental Rights. Article 359(1) also suspends any pending
proceedings for the enforcement of such Fundamental Right or
Rights. Another important distinction between the two
Articles is that Art. 358 provides for indemnity. whereas
Article 359(1) does not: Article 359(1A) is on the same
lines as Art. 358, but Article 359(1A) includes all
Fundamental Rights which may be mentioned in a Presidential
order aud is, therefore, much wider than Art. 358 which
includes Art. lg only. [223 E-G]
The purpose and object of Art. 359(1) is that the
enforcement of any Fundamental Right mentioned in the
Presidential order is barred or it remains suspended
during the emergency. The scope of Art. 359(1) is not only
to restrict the application of the Article to the
legislative field. bet also to the acts of the Executive.
The object of Article 359(1) is not only that the right
177
to move this Court only is barred but also the right to move
any High Court The bar created by Art. 359(1) applies to
petitions for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights
mentioned in the Presidential order whether by way of an
application under Art. 32 or by way of application under
Art. 226. An application invoking habeas corpus under s. 491
of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot simultaneously be
moved in the High Court. [223 H, 224 D]
Shri Mohan Chaudhary v. Chief Commissioner Union
Territory of Tripura [1964] 3 SCR 442. Makhan Singh v. State
of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797 and Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v.
State of Bihar & ors. [1966] 1 SCR 709, applied.
The argument that jurisdiction and powers of this Court
under Art. 32 and of the High Courts under Art. 226 are
virtually abolished by the Presidential order without any
amendment of the Constitution is incorrect. No amendment to
the Constitution is necessary because no jurisdiction and
power either of this Court or of the High Court is taken
away. When a Presidential order takes away the locus standi
of the detenu to move any court for the enforcement of
Fundamental Rights for the time being, the jurisdiction and
powers of this Court and of the High Courts remain
unaltered. [224 E-F]
Article 359(1) is not directed against any court, it is
directed against an individual and deprives him of his locus
standi. If courts will in spite of the Presidential order
entertain the applications and allow the detenu to enforce
to start or to continue proceedings or enforce Fundamental
Rights, Article 359(1) will be nullified and rendered
otiose. [224 F, 227 C-D]
Unlike the 1962 Presidential order, in the 1975 order,
the suspension is not hedged with any condition of
enforcement of any right under Articles 21 and 22. The
Presidential order is, therefore, a bar at the threshold.
[228 D-E]
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797 and
State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Pandurang Sangzgiri & Anr.
[1966] 1 SCR 702, distinguished.
There are no natural rights. Fundamental Rights in our
Constitution are interpreted to be what is commonly said to
be natural rights. [229 C-D]
H. H. Kesvananda Bharti Sripadagalavaru v. State of
Kerala [1973] SUPP. I SCR 702. followed.
Law means law enacted by the State. Law means positive
State made law The phrase "Procedure established by law" in
Art. 21 includes substantive and procedural law. A law
providing for the procedure depriving a person of liberty
must be a law made by statute. [229 D-E]
A K. Gopalan v. Stale of Madras [1950] SCR 88; P. D.
Shamdasani & ors v. Central Bank of India Ltd. [1952] SCR
391; Smt. Vidya Verma through next friend R. V. S. Mani v.
Dr. Shiv Narain Verma [1955] 2 SCR 983, applied.
There is no difference between the expression "except
according to procedure established by law" in Art. 21 and
the expression "save by the authority of law" in Art. 31(1)
or the expression "except by authority of law" in Art. 265.
It is incorrect to suggest that when Art. 21 was enacted,
the founding fathers only enshrined the right to personal
liberty according to procedure and did not frame the
constitutional mandate that personal liberty could not be
taken except according to law. [232 B-D]
Part III of our Constitution confers Fundamental Rights
in positive as well as negative language. A Fundamental
Right couched Couched negative language accentuates by
reason thereof the importance of that right. The negative
language is worded to emphasize the immunity from State
action as Fundamental Right. Fundamental Rights have the
texture of Basic Human Rights.
[229 G, 230 A-B]
State of Bihar. v. Maharaja Dhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh
of Dhrbhanga & Ors. [1952] SCR 889 at 988 989; A. K Gopalan
v. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v.
Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 578 571 and 576 to 578: Shambhu
Nath Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. [1974]
14-833SupCI/76
178
1 SCR; Haradahan Saha & Anr. v. State of West Bengal [1975]
1 SCR 778 and Khudiram Das .v State of West Bengal & ors.
[1975] 2 SCR 832, referred to.
Article 21 is our Rule of Law regarding life and
liberty. No other Rule of Law can have separate existence as
a distinct right. The negative language of Fundamental Right
incorporated in Part III imposes limitations on the power of
the State and declares the corresponding guarantees of the
individual to that fundamental Right. Limitation and
guarantee are complementary. The limitation of State
action embodied in a Fundamental Right couched in a negative
form is the measure of the protection of the individual.
[230 C-D]
Rustom Cavasji Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR
568, applied.
Personal liberty in Article 21 includes all varieties
of rights which go to make personal liberty other than those
in Art. 19(1)(d). [230 C-C]
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. and ors. [1964] 1 SCR 332
and Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v Union of India [1970] 3 SCR
530, referred to.
If any right existed before the commencement of the
Constitution and the same right with its content is
conferred by Part III as a Fundamental Right the source of
that right is in Part III and not in any pre-existing right.
Such pre-constitutional rights have been elevated in Part
III as Fundamental Rights. If there is a pre-constitution
right which is expressly embodied as a Fundamental Right
under our Constitution, the common law right has no separate
existence Under Our Constitution. If there be any right
other than and more extensive than the Fundamental Right in
Part III, such right may continue to exist under Art. 372.
[230 F-H]
Dhirubha Devi Singh Gohil v. State of Bombay [1955] 1
SCR 691-693, referred to.
B. Shankara Rao Badami and ors. v. State of Mysore and
Anr. [1969] 3 SCR 1 @ 11-13, applied.
Apart from the remedy under the common law of torts, by
way of suit for false imprisonment and claim for damages,
there was no civil remedy for unlawful infringement of the
right to personal liberty in India before the Constitution.
Even this remedy, after the amendment of s. 491 of the Code
of criminal Procedure became a statutory right in the nature
of a habeas corpus. The provisions of s. 491 of the Criminal
Procedure Code have been repealed by Act II of 1974 as being
superfluous in view of Art. 226. [231 C-D]
Waghela Rajsanji v. Sheik Masludin and ors. 14 I.A. 89
1) 96. Satish Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Dayal De I.L.R. 48
Cal. 388 @ 407-10, 425-426. Baboo S/o Thakur Dhobi v. Mst.
Subanshi w/o Mangal Dhobi AIR 1942 Nagpur 99; Makhan Singh
v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797; District Magistrate
Trivandrum v. K. C. Mammen Mappillai I.L.R. [1939] Mad. 708;
Matthen v. District Magistrate Trivandrum L.R. 66 I.A. 222.
Girindranath Banerjee v. Birendranath Pal ILR 54 Cal. 727
and King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee 72 1.A. 241, referred
to.
There was no statutory right to enforce the right to
personal liberty other than that in s. 491 of the Criminal
Procedure Code before the commencement of the Constitution
which could be carried over after its commencement under
Art. 372. Law in Art. 21 will include all post-
constitutional statute, law including Maintenance of
Internal Security Act, 1971 and by virtue of Art. 372 all
pre-constitutional statute law, including the I.P.C. and the
Cr.P.C. [231 F-G]
The present appeals do not touch any aspect of Art. 20.Article 20 is a constitutional mandate to the judiciary and
Art. 21 is a constitutional mandate to the Executive. The
expression "no person shall be prosecuted for the same
offence more than once" in Art. 20 would apply only to the
executive. It is
179
incorrect to say that "State" in Art. 12 will also include
the Judiciary and Art. 20 is enforceable against the
Judiciary in respect of illegal orders.
[232 E-F, G-H]
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797 and
Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi and ors. [1953] SCR 652 not
applicable.
Articles 256, 265 and 361 have no relevance to displace
the proposition that Art. 21 is the repository of rights to
life and liberty. Nor does an appeal in a criminal
proceedings have anything to do with Art. 21. [233 C-D]
Garikapatti Veerayya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury [1957] SCR
488 and Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. v. Ram Tahal
Ramnand and ors. [1973] 1 SCR 185, referred to.
The right arising from a decree is not a Fundamental
Right and, therefore, will not be prima facie covered by a
Presidential order under Art. 359(1)
[233 G]
Fundamental Rights including the right to personal
liberty are conferred by the Constitution. Any pre-
constitution rights which are included in Art. 21 do not
after the Constitution remain in existence which can be
enforced, if Art. 21 is suspended If it be assumed that
there was any pre-constitutional right to personal liberty
included in Art. 21 which continued to exist as a distinct
and separate right then Art. 359(1) will be an exercise in
futility. [234 A-B]
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] SCR 797
explained.
The theory of eclipse is untenable. The theory of
eclipse refers to pre-constitutional laws which were
inconsistent with Fundamental Rights. By reason of Art.
13(1) such laws did not became void but became devoid of
legal force. Such laws became eclipsed for the time being.
The theory of clipse has no relevance to the suspension of
the enforcement of fundamental Rights under Art. 359(1). The
constitutional provisions conferring Fundamental Rights
cannot be said to be inconsistent with Art. 13(1). [234 B-D]
P. D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India Ltd. [1952]
SCR 391 and Smt. Vidya Verma through next friend R. V. S.
Mani v. Dr. Shiv Narain Verma [1955] 2 SCR 983, reiterated.
The Act in the present case is valid law and it has
laid down procedure of applying the law. The validity of the
Act has not been challenged and cannot be challenged. The
Legislature has competence to make the law. The procedure,
therefore, cannot be challenged because Art. 21 and 22
cannot be enforced. 'The suggestion that the power of the
Executive is widened is equally untenable.
[235 E-F]
The fact that s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code has
been abolished in he new Code establishes that the pre-
existing right was embodied as a Fundamental Right in the
Constitution. The right to personal liberty became
identified with Fundamental Right to personal liberty under
Art. 21. [236 A]
The Presidential orders does not alter or suspend any
law. The rule of law is not a mere catchword or incantation.
The certainty of law is one of the elements in the concept
of the rule of law. The essential feature of rule of law is
that the judicial power of the State is, to a large extent,
separate from the Executive and the Legislature. [236 B-C]
It is not correct to argue that if pre-existing law is
merged in Art. 21, there will be conflict in the Article
372. The expression "law in force" in Art. 372 cannot
include laws which are incorporated in the Constitution,
viz. in Part III. The expression "law" in Articles 19(1) and
21 takes in the statute law. [235 B]
The Presidential order under Art. 359(1) is not a law.
The order does not repeal any law either. The contention
that permanent law cannot be repealed by temporary law is
misplaced. [235 C]
The entire concept in Art. 21 is against Executive
action. There is no question of infringement of Fundamental
Right under Art. 21 where the detention
180
complained of is by a private person and not by a State or
under the authority or orders of a State. [235 D]
The Executive cannot detain a person otherwise than
under valid legislation. The suspension of any Fundamental
Right does not affect this rule of the Constitution. Article
358 does not detract from the position that the Executive
cannot act to the prejudice of a person without the
authority of law. [237 A-F]
Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur & ors. v. The State of
Punjab [1955] 2 SCR 225; MP. State v. Bharat Singh [1967] 2
SCR 454; Dy. Collector v. Ibrahim & Co. [1970] 3 SCR 498.
Bennet Coleman & Co v. Union of India [1973] 2 SCR 757 and
Meenakshi Mills v. Union of India [1974] 2 SCR 398,
discussed and distinguished.
The Constitution is the mandate. The Constitution is
the rule of law. No one can arise above the rule of law. The
suspension of right to enforce Fundamental Rights has the
effect that the emergency provisions in Part XVIII are by
themselves the rule of law during times of emergency. There
cannot be any rule of law other than the constitutional rule
of law. 'There cannot be any pre-constitution or post-
constitution rule of law which can run counter to the rule
of law embodied in the Constitution, nor can there be any
invocation to any rule of law to nullify the constitutional
provisions during the times of emergency. [224 B, 238 D-E]
Eshugbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the Govt. Of
Nigeria [1931] AC 662 and Christie and Anr. v. Leachinsky
[1947] AC 573. not applicable.
The expression "for any other purpose" in Art. 226
means for any purpose other than the enforcement of
Fundamental Rights. A petition for habeas corpus by any
person under Art. 226 necessarily invokes a question whether
the detention is legal or illegal. An executive action if
challenged to be ultravires a statute cannot be challenged
by any person who is not aggrieved by any such ultra vires
action. [239 D-E]
The expression "purported to be made under s. 3 of the
Act" in s. 18 will include an Executive act made by the
District Magistrate within the scope of his authority as
District Magistrate even if the order is made in breach of
the section or is mala fide. [240 A-B]
Hari Ram Singh v. The Crown [1939] F.C.R. 159.
Bhagchand Dagadusa v. The Secretary of State for India L.R.
54 I.A. 338 @ 352; Albert West Meade v. The King AIR 1948
P.C. 156 at 157-59; Animistic v. Foreign Compensation etc.
[1969] 1 All E.R. 208 at 212, 213 and 237 and Dakshina
Ranjan Ghosh v. Omar Chand Oswal I.L.R. SO Cal. 992 at 995
1003, applied.
Poona Municipal Corporation v. D. N. Deodhar [1964] 8
SCR 178; Kala Bhandar v. Municipal Committee [1965] 3 SCR
489 and Indore Municipality v. Niyamultulla AIR 1971 SC 97
and Joseph v. Joseph [1966] 3 All. E.R. 486 not applicable.
There is no question of excessive delegation in s. 18
which lays down the law. To contend that s. 18 applies only
to post-detention challenge is wrong. Section 18 applies to
all orders of detention. Section 18 of Maintenance of
Internal Security Act, 1971 is only an illustration of the
Act by the officers authorised by the Act. [240 C-E]
Section 16A(9) of the Act is valid. It is a rule of
evidence and it is not open either to the detenu or the
Court to ask for the grounds of detention.
[246 C]
Materials and information on which orders of preventive
detention are passed necessarily belong to a class of
documents whose disclosures would impair the proper
functioning of Public service and administration. [242 D]
Liversidge v. John Anderson [1942] AC 206 at 221, 253,
254, 266, 267, 279, 280 and Roger's case [1973] AC 388 @
400, 401, 405, applied.
181
Legislature has enacted 5. 16A(9) providing for a
general exclusion from evidence of all such material as
would properly fall within the classification instead of
forcing the State to claim in individual cases privilege
under ss. 123, 162 of the Evidence Act or under Art. 22(6)
of the Constitution. [242 E-F]
Section 16A cannot be said to be an amendment to Art.
226. The jurisdiction to issue writs is neither abrogated
nor abridged. Section 16A(9) enacts provisions analogous to
a conclusive proof of presumption. Such a provision is a
genuine rule of evidence. It is in the nature of an
explanation to ss. 123 and 162 of the Evidence Act. Section
16A(9) is a rule of evidence. When the detaining authority
is bound by s. 16A(9) and forbidden absolutely from
disclosing such material no question can arise of adverse
inference against the authority. [242 G-H]
Section 16A(9) cannot be read implying an exception in
form of disclosure to the Court. Such disclosure to the
Court alone and not to the detenu will introduce something
unknown to judicial procedure and will bring in an element
of arbitrariness and preclude both the parties from
representing their respective cases. The view of the
detaining authority is not to be substituted by the view of
the court. [243 A-C]
State of Bombay v Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya [1951] SCR
167; Shiban Lal Saksena v. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors.
[1954] SCR 418; Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate
Burdwan and Anr. [1964] 4 SCR 921; Jaichand Lal v. W. Bengal
[1966] Supp. SCR 464 and Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of
Bihar [1966] I SCR 709, referred to.
The theory of good return mentioned in the English
decisions is based on the language of Habeas Corpus Act and
the Rules of the Supreme Court of England. The practice of
our Court is different. [243 C-D]
M. M. Damnoo v. J. K. State [1972] 2 SCR 1014 and A. K.
Gopalan v. State of Madras [1952] SCR 391, distinguished.
It is not competent for any court to go into questions
of malafides of the order of detention or ultra vires
character of the order of detention or that the order was
not passed on the satisfaction of the detaining authority.
Section 16A of the Act contains definite indications of
implied exclusion of judicial review on the allegations of
mala fide. The reason why s. 16A has been enacted is to
provide for periodical review by Government and that is the
safeguard against any unjust or arbitrary exercise of power.
The production of the order which is duly authenticated
constitutes a peremptory answer to the challenge. [243 G-H,
244 A, 245 B]
In view of the inability of the court to grant any
relief on the basis whether order of detention is the result
of malice or ill will, the detention of malafides is not
only ineffective but also untenable. [244 DE]
Lawrence loachim Joseph D's Souza v. The State of
Bombay [1956] SCR 382 @ 392, 393; Smith v. East Elloc Rural
District Council & ors. [1966] AC 736 at 776 and Dr. Ram
Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and ors. [1966] 1 SCR 709,
referred to.
A decision on a point not necessary for the purpose or
which does not fall to be determined in that decision
becomes obiter dictum. [227 F]
Maharaja Dhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur
JUDGMENT:

and 193 to 194, referred to.

Per M. H. Beg, 1.

A prima facie valid detention order, that is to say,
one duly authenticated and passed by an officer authorised
to make it recording a purported satisfaction to detain the
petitioner under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act,
which is operative either before or after its confirmation
by the Government, is a
182
complete answer to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Once such an order is shown to exist in response to a
notice for a writ of habeas corpus, the High Court cannot
inquire into its validity or vires on the ground of either
mala fides of any kind or of non-compliance with any
provision of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act in
habeas corpus proceedings. [371 G-H, 372 A]
The fundamental law found in the Constitution is
paramount. The Constitution provides the test for the
validity of all other laws. It seeks to determine the
spheres of executive and legislative and judicial powers
with meticulous care and precision. The judicial functions
though wider in range when interpreting or applying other
articles of the Constitution, particularly Articles 14 and
19, the enforcement of which is also suspended during the
current emergency, is especially constricted by the
elaborate provisions of Articles 21 and 22, which deal with
personal liberty and preventive detention. The wider the
sweep of the provisions of Articles 21 and 22 the more
drastic must be the effect of suspending their enforcement.
Suspension does not and cannot mean retention under a
disguise. [312 F-H]
Marbury v. Madison [1803] I Cranch 137; A. K. Gopalan
v. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88 @ p. 109, referred.

The only Rule of Law which can be recognised by courts
of our country is what is deducible from our Constitution
itself. The Constitution is an embodiment of the highest
"positive law" as well as the reflection of all the rules of
natural or ethical or common law Lying behind it which can
be recognised by courts. The spirit of law or the Rule of
Law Cannot hover ominously around like some disembodied
ghost serving as a substitute for the living Constitution.
It has to be found always within and operating in harmony
with and never outside or in conflict with what our
Constitution enjoins.

[313 A, D-E]
The most important object of making certain basic
rights fundamental by the Constitution is to make them
enforceable against the State and its agencies through the
Courts. [329 F]
Under our constitutional jurisprudence courts cannot,
during a constitutionally enjoined period of suspension of
the enforceability of fundamental rights through courts,
enforce hat may even be a Fundamental Right sought to be
protected by Part III of the Constitution. [314 C-D]
The enforceability of a right by a constitutionally
appointed judicial organ has necessarily to depend upon the
fulfillment of two conditions: firstly, its recognition by
or under the Constitution as a right; and, secondly,
possession of the vower of its enforcement by the judicial
organs. Article 226 of the Constitution is not meant for
futile and unenforceable declarations of right. The whole
purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to enforce a right to
personal freedom after the declaration of the detention as
illegal when it is so found upon investigation.
Enforceability of rights, whether. they are constitutional
or common law or statutory, in constitutionally prescribed
ways by constitutionally appointed judicial organs is
governed solely by the terms of the written instrument in n
Constitution such as ours. The scope for judicial law making
on the subject of enforcement of the right to personal
freedom was deliberately restricted by our Constitution
makers. It is difficult to see any such scope when
enforcement itself is suspended. [314 E-F, 315 B-C]
What is suspended is really the procedure for the
enforcement of a right through courts which could be said to
flow from the infringement of a statutory procedure. If the
enforcement of a right to be free, resulting derivatively
from both the constitutional and statutory provisions based
on an infraction of the procedure. which is statutory in
cases of preventive detention, is suspended, it is
impossible to lay down that it becomes enforceable when that
part of the procedure which is mandatory is violated but
remains unenforceable so long as the part of the procedure
infringed is directory. Such a view would introduce a'
distinction which is neither warranted by the language of
Article 359 of the Constitution nor by that of the
Presidential order of 1975. [315 F-G]
183
If the protection of enforceability is validly
suspended for the duration of an Emergency, declared under
constitutional provisions, the courts will have nothing
before them to enforce so as to able to afford any relief to
a person who comes with a grievance before them. [329 G]
A court cannot. in exercise of any supposed inherent or
implied or unspecified power, purport to enforce or, in
substance enforce, a right the enforcement of which is
suspended. To permit such circumvention of the suspension is
to authorise doing indirectly what law does not allow to be
done directly. [317 E-F]
[His Lordship felt that it was unnecessary to consider
"any other purpose" in Art. 226 of the Constitution in view
of the fact that each of detenus asked for a writ or habeas
corpus and for no other kind of writs or orders.]
The Constitution given unto themselves by the people,
is legally supreme. A notional surrender by the people of
India of control over their several or individual rights to
a Sovereign Republic by means of a legally supreme
Constitution only means that the Constitution is supreme and
can confer rights and powers. One has to look to it alone
and not outside it for finding out the manner in which and
the limits subject to which individual citizens can exercise
their separate freedoms. A satisfactory explanation of the
language of conferment used with reference to rights is that
there has to be necessarily, as a result of such a process
of Constitution making, a notional surrender of individual
freedom so as to convert the possibility of "licence" to
all, which ends in the exploitation and oppression of the
many weak by the few strong into the actuality of a freedom
for all regulated by law or under the law applicable to all.
[318 F-H]
Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain [1976] 2 SCR
referred to.

Rules of natural justice, which are impliedly read into
statutes from the nature of Functions imposed upon statutory
authorities or bodies have sometimes been placed on the same
footing as "Fundamental Rights of men which are directly and
absolutely safeguarded" by written Constitutions. The
implied rules of natural justice do not override the express
terms of a statute. They are only implied because the
functions which the statute imposes are presumed to be meant
to be exercised in accordance with these rules, and
therefore treated as though they were parts of enacted law.
The principles of natural justice which are so implied must
always hang, if one may so put it on pegs of statutory
provisions or necessarily flow from them and have no
independent existence. [319 G-H, 320 A]
State of Orissa v. Dr. Miss Binapani Dei & ors. [1967]
2 SCR 625, applied.

Fundamental Rights are basic aspects of rights selected
from what may previously have been natural or common law
rights. These basic aspects of rights are elevated to a new
level of importance by the Constitution. Any other co-
extensive rights, outside the Constitution, are necessarily
excluded by their recognition as or merger with Fundamental
Rights. [329 B]
The object of making certain general aspects of rights
fundamental is to guarantee them against illegal invasions
of these rights by executive, legislative. Or judicial
organs (i e. Article 20) of the State. This necessarily
means that these safeguards can also be legally removed
under appropriate constitutional or statutory provisions,
although their suspension does not, by itself, take away the
illegalities or their legal consequences. The intention was
to exclude all other control or to make the Constitution,
the sole repository of ultimate control over those aspects
of human freedom which are guaranteed in Part m. [319 A-C &
329 C]
Article 21 of the Constitution has to be interpreted
comprehensively enough to include, together with Art. 19
practically all aspects of personal freedom. It embraces
both procedural and substantive rights. Article 22 merely
makes it clear that deprivations of liberty by means of laws
regulating preventive detention would be included in
"procedure established by law" and indicates what that
procedure should be. In that sense, it could be viewed as,
sub-

184

stantially, an elaboration of what is found in Article 21,
although it also goes beyond it inasmuch as it imposes
limits on ordinary legislative power. [329 D-E]
Taken by itself, Art. 21 of the Constitution is
primarily a protection against illegal deprivations by the
executive action of the State's agents or officials
although, read with other Articles, it could operate also as
a protection against unjustifiable legislative action
purporting to authorise deprivations of personal freedom.
[329-F]
Article 21 was only meant, on the face of it, to keep
the exercise of executive power, in ordering deprivations of
life or liberty, within the bounds of power prescribed by
procedure established by legislation Article 21 furnishes
the guarantee of "Lex", which is equated with statute law
only, and not of "jus" or a judicial concept of what
procedural law ought really to be. The whole idea in using
this expression was to exclude judicial interference with
executive action in dealing with lives and liberties of
citizens and others living in our country on any ground
other than that it is contrary to procedure actually
prescribed by law which meant only statute law. According to
well established canons of statutory construction, the
express terms of "Lex" (assuming, of course, that the "Lex"
is otherwise valid), prescribing procedure, will exclude
"Jus" or judicial notions of "due process" or what the
procedure. Ought to be. [321 H. 322 A-C]
A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88 referred
to.

The suggestion that 'jus", which has been deliberately
excluded from the purview of "procedure established by law",
can be introduced by courts, through a back door, as though
it was an independent right guaranteed by Chapter III or by
any other part of the Constitution, cannot be acceded to.
[322 E-F]
R. C. Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 530, 578,
distinguished.

Neither rights supposed to be recognised by some
natural law nor those assumed to exist in some part of
Common Law could serve as substitutes for those conferred by
Part III of the Constitution. They could not be, on any
principle of law or justice or reason, virtually added to
Part III as complete replacements for rights whose
enforcement is suspended, and then be enforced, through
constitutionally provided machinery, as the unseen
appendages of the Constitution or as a separate group of
rights outside the Constitution meant for the emergency
which suspends but does not resuscitate in a new form
certain rights. [325 B-D]
His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v.
State of Kerala [1973] Supp. SCR @ 1. Satish Chandra
Chakraworti v. Ram Dayal De ILR 48 Cal. 388 P @ 407-410, 425
and 426: Waghela Rajsanji v. Sheikh Masludin and ors. 14
Indian Appeals p. 89 and Baboo Seo Thakur Dhobi v. Mst.
Subanshi w/o Mangal Dhobi, AIR 1942 Nagpur 99, referred to.

Not only all steps leading up to the deprivation of
personal liberty but also the substantive right to personal
freedom. by implication, is covered by Article 21 of the
Constitution. [328 E-F]

Even if Art. 21 is not the sole repository of all
personal freedom, it will be clear, that all aspects of
freedom of person are meant to be covered by Articles 19,
21, and 22 of the Constitution. If the enforcement of these
rights by Courts is suspended during the emergency, an
inquiry by a court into the question whether any of them is
violated by an illegal deprivation of it by executive
authorities of the State seems futile. [328 H, 329 A]
A. K. Gopalan State of Madras [1950] SCR 88 and Kharak
Singh v. State of UP & ors. [1964] I SCR 332, applied.

The power to issue a writ is conferred upon courts
exclusively by our Constitution All the powers of our courts
flow from the Constitution which is the source of their
jurisdiction. If any provision of the constitution
authorises the
185
suspension of the right to obtain relief in any type of
cases, the power of courts is thereby curtailed even though
a general jurisdiction to afford the relief in other cases
may be there. If they cannot issue writs of habeas corpus to
enforce a right to personal freedom against executive
authorities during tho emergency, the original nature of
this writ issuing power comparable to a "prerogative" power
cannot help the detenu. [330 G-H]
It is a well recognised principle of law that whatever
could be formerly even said to be governed by a common law
prerogative power becomes merged in the Constitution as soon
as the Constitution takes it over and regulates that
subject. [331 A]
Principle in Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal
Hotel Limited, [1920] A.C. 508 @ 526 applied.

If there is no enforceable right either arising under
the Constitution or otherwise, it is useless to appeal to
any general power of the court to issue a writ of habeas
corpus. If the effect of suspension of the right to move the
court for a writ of habeas corpus is that no inquiry can
take place beyond finding out that the cause is one covered
by the prohibitions mere possession of general power will
not assist the detenu. [331 C-D]
If the right to enforce personal freedom through a writ
of habeas corpus is suspended, it cannot be said that the
enforcement can be restored by resorting to "any other
purpose". That other purpose could not embrace defeating the
effect of suspension of the enforcement of a constitutional
guarantee and if held so would be making a mockery of the
Constitution. [331 D-E]
Nothing in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus or any
power of a High Court under Art. 226 could come to the aid
of a detenu when the right to enforce a claim to personal
freedom, sought to be protected by the Constitution is
suspended. [331 E-F]
Provision for preventive detention in itself aptly
described as "jurisdiction of suspicion" is a departure from
ordinary norms, and resorted to either in times of war or of
apprehended internal disorders and disturbances of a serious
nature, with the object of preventing a greater dager to
national security and integrity than any claim which could
be based upon a right, moral or legal, to individual
liberty. [332 B-C]
Haradhan Saha & Anr. v. The State of West Bengal and
ors. [1975] 1 SCR 778; Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal
[1975] 2 SCR p.832 @ p. 842; State of Madras v. V.G. Row AIR
1952 SC 197 @ 200 and Rex v. Halliday [1917] A.C. 260 @ 275,
referred to.

It is true that the Presidential order of 1975 like the
Presidential order of 1962, does not suspend the general
power of this Court under Art. 32 or the general powers of
High Courts under Art. 226, bot the effect of taking away
enforceability of the right of a detenu to personal freedom
against executive authorities is to affect the locus standi
in cases which are meant to be covered by the Presidential
order. Courts, even in habeas corpus proceedings, do not
grant relief independent of the rights of the person
deprived of liberty. If the locus standi of a detenu is
suspended, no one car. claim to get his right enforced.,
[338 E-F]
If a case so patently gross and clear of a detention
falling, on the face of the order of detention or the return
made to a notice from the court, outside the provisions of
the Act on the ground of personal malice of the detaining
authority, or, some other ground utterly outside the Act,
arises so that no further investigation is called for, it
may be possible to contend that it is not protected by the
Presidential order of June 27, 1975, and by the provisions
of Art. 359(1) of the Constitution at all. The mere presence
of an official seal or signature on a detention order, in
such a purely hypothetical case, may not be enough to
convert it into a detention by the State or its agents or
officers. That is the almost utterly inconceivable situation
or type of case which could still
186
be covered by the general power to issue writs of habeas
corpus. The remedy by way of a writ of habeas corpus is more
general than relief against official action. It lies even
against illegal detentions by private persons although not
under Art. 32 which is confined to enforcement of
Fundamental Rights. [339 A-E]
Shrimati Vidya Verma, though next friend R.V.S. Mandi
v. Dr Shiv Narain Verma [1955] 2 SCR p. 983, referred to.

Courts must presume that executive authorities are
acting in conformity with both the spirit and the substance
of the law: The maxim "omnia praeswumuntur rite esse actus"
means that all official acts are presumed to have been
rightly and regularly done. If the burden to displace that
presumption is upon detenu, he cannot, in a habeas corpus
petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, ask the court
to embark upon an inquiry, during the emergency, and allow
him to lead evidence to rebut this presumption. To do so
would be plainly to countenance a violation of the
Constitutional mandate suspending the procedure. [340 A-C]
Eshughayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the Government
of Nigeria & Anr. [1931] A.C. 622 @ 670; Liversidge v. Sir
John Anderson and Anr. [1942] A.C. p. 206 @ 217 and 219 and

Decisions on what restraints should be put and on which
persons during a national emergency, in the interests of
national security, are matters of policy which are outside
the sphere of judicial determination. [344 G]
Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson [1942] AC 206 and Rex
v. Halliday Ex Parte Zadiq [1917] AC 260, referred to.

Under our Constitution, there is no distinction between
the effects of a declaration of emergency under Art. 352(1)
whether the threat to the security of the State is from
internal or external sources. Presidential declarations
under Art. 352(1) and 359(1) of' our Constitution are immune
from challenge in courts even when the emergency is over. A
noticeable feature of our Constitutions is that, whereas the
consequences given in Art. 358 as a result of a Proclamation
under Art. 352(1) are automatic, Presidential orders under
Article 359(1) may have differing consequence, from
emergency to emergency depending upon the terms of the
Presidential orders involved. And then, Article 359(1A) made
operative retrospectively by the 38th Constitutional
amendment of 1st August 1975, makes it clear that both the
legislative and executive organs of the State are freed for
the duration of the emergency from the limits imposed by
Part III of the Constitution. [348 A-D]
The striking differences in the terms of the two
Presidential orders are:

(1) The Presidential order of 1962 did not specify
Article 14 of the Constitution, but Art. 14, guaranteeing
equality before the law and equal protection of laws to all
persons in India, is mentioned in the 1975 order. This does
make some difference between the intentions behind and
effects of' the two Presidential orders. [352 B-C]

(ii) The President Order of 1962 expressly hedges the
suspension of the specified Fundamental Rights with the
condition, with regard to deprivations covered by Article 21
and 22 of the Constitution that the detenu should be
deprived of his rights "under the Defence of India Act, 1962
or any rules or order made thereunder". In other words. On
the terms of the 1962 Presidential Order, the courts were
under a duty to see whether a deprivation satisfies these
conditions or not. They could adjudicate upon the question
whether a detention was "under " the Act or a rule "made
thereunder". On the other hand, the Presidential order of
1975 unconditionally suspends the enforcement of the rights
conferred upon "any person including a foreigner" to move
any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by
Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution. The Courts are.
therefore, no longer obliged or able to test the validity of
a detention by examining whether they conform to statutory
187
requirements. They will have to be content with compliance
shown with forms of the law. [352 C-E]

(iii) Presidential order of 1962 makes no mention of
pending proceedings, but. the 1975 order suspends all
pending proceedings for the enforcement of the rights
mentioned therein. This further clarifies and emphasizes
that the intention behind the Presidential order of 1975 was
to actually affect the jurisdiction of courts in which
proceedings were actually pending. the inference from this
feature also is that all similar proceedings in future will
similarly be affected. [352 E-F]
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the Presidential
order of June 27, 1975, was a part of a unmistakably
expressed intention to suspend the ordinary processes of law
in those cases where persons complain of infringement of
their fundamental rights by the executive authorities of the
State. The intention of the Parliament itself to bring about
this result so that the jurisdiction of courts under article
226 in this particular type of cases is itself affected for
the duration of the emergency, seems clear enough from the
provisions of S. 16A(9) of the Act, introduced by Act No. 14
of 1976, which received Presidential assent on January 25.
1976, making s. 16A(9) operative retrospectively from June
25, 1975. [352 F-H]
There is no doubt that the object of the Presidential
(order of June '27, 1975, by suspending the enforcement of
the specified rights, was to affect the powers of courts to
afford relief to those the enforcement of whose rights was
suspended. This was within the purview of Article 359(1).
Hence objections that powers of the courts under. Art. 226
may indirectly be affected is no answer to the direct
suspension of rights which was bound to have its effect upon
the manner in which jurisdiction is or could reasonably be
exercised even if that jurisdiction cannot be itself
suspended for all types of cases. [353 A-B]
The term Rule of Law is hot a magic wand which can he
waved to dispel every difficulty. It is not an Aladin's lamp
which can be scratched to invoke a power which brings to any
person in need whatever he or she may desire to have It can
only mean what the law in a particular State or country is
and what it enjoins. This means that the Rule of Law must
differ in shades of meaning and emphasis from time to time
and country to country. It could not be rigid, unchanging,
and immutable like the proverbial laws of the Medes and
Persians. It cannot be like some brooding omnipotence in the
skies. Its meaning cannot be what anyone wants to make it.
It has to be, for each particular situation. indicated by
the courts as to what it means. [353 F-H, 354 A]
The Rule of Law includes the concept of determination
by courts, of the question whether an impugned executive
action is within the bounds of law. It pre-supposes,
firstly, the existence of a fixed or identifiable rule of
law which the executive has to follow as distinguished from
a purely policy decision open to it under the wide terms of
the statute conferring a discretionary power to act. and
secondly the power of the courts to test the action by
reference to the rule. [354 E-F]
Even in emergencies provided the power of the court to
so test the legality of some executive act is not curtailed,
courts will apply the test' of legality "if the person
aggrieved brings the action in the competent court". But, if
the locus standi of the person to move the court is gone and
the competence of the court to enquire into the grievance is
also impaired by inability to peruse the ground of
executive action or their relationship with the power to
act, it is no use appalling to this particular concept of
the Rule of Law. It is just inapplicable to the situation
which arises here. Such a situation is governed by the
emergency provisions of the Constitution. [354 F-H]
Youngs Town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
655 and Chief Settlement Commissioner, rehabilitation
Department Punjab & Ors. etc. v. Om Prakash & Ors. etc.
[1968] 3 SCR 655 @ [354 F-H]
Whereas Art. 358, by its own force. suspends the
guarantees of Art. 19, Article 359(1) has the effect of
suspending the operation of specified Funda
188
mental Rights. If, however, the application of Articles 14,
19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution is suspended it is
impossible to say that there is a Rule of Law found there
which is available for the courts to apply during the
emergency to test the legality of executive action. [355 A-
C]
Mohd. Yaqab etc. v. The State of Jammu & Kashmir [1968]
2 SCR p. 227 @ 234, referred to.

The suggestion that a common law remedy by way of writ
of habeas corpus exists, even after s. 491 was introduced in
the. Criminal Procedure Code in 1923, is incorrect. The
sweep of Art. 359(1) of the Constitution taking in the
jurisdiction of "any court" is wide enough to cover any kind
of relief claimed by a petitioner for the enforcement of a
specified Fundamental Right.

[355 D-E]
Pleas which involve any adduction of evidence would be
entirely excluded by the combined effect of the terms of The
Presidential order of June 27, 1975 read with the amended
provisions of s. 16A(9) of the Act. In a case in which the
officer purporting to detain had in fact, not been invested
at all with any authority to act, the detention would be on
the same footing as one by a private person who has no legal
authority whatsoever to detain. [357 C-E]
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797 @ 821-
822 and 5. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 733,
referred to.

lt is very difficult to see the bearing of any such
doctrine that the Rule of Law under our Constitution is
embodied in the principle of Separation of Powers on a pure
and simple question of determination of the meaning of
constitutional and statutory provisions couched in words
which leave few doubts unresolved. [361 C-D]
If an order of preventive detention is not quasi-
judicial, as it cannot be because of the impossibility of
applying any objective standards to the need for it in a
particular case, there could be no question of violating any
principle of Separation of Powers by placing preventive
detention exclusively within the control of executive
authorities of the State for the duration of the emergency.

Means of redress in cases such as those of mistaken
identity or misapprehension of facts or of detenus due to
false and malicous reports circulated by enemies are still
open to detenu by approaching executive authorities. There
189
is no bar against that. What is hot possible is to secure a
release by an order in habeas corpus proceedings after
taking the courts behind a duly authenticated prima facie
good return. [366 B-C]
If the meaning of the emergency provisions in our
Constitution and the provisions of' the Act is clearly that
what lies in the executive field should not be subjected to
judicial scrutiny or judged by judicial standards of
correctness the courts cannot arrogate unto themselves a
power of judicial superintendence which they do not, under
the law during the emergency, possess. [362 H]
It does not follow from a removal of the normal
judicial superitendence even over questions of vires, of
detention orders, which may require going into facts behind
the returns that there is no Rule of Law during the
emergency or that the principles of ultra vires are not to
be applied at all by any authority except when, on the face
of the return itself, it is demonstrated in a court of law
that the detention does not even purport to be in exercise
of the executive power or authority or is patently outside
the law authorising detention The intention behind emergency
provisions and of the Act is that although such, executive
action as is not susceptible to judicial appraisement,
should not be subjected to it, yet, it should be honestly
supervised and controlled by the hierarchy of executive
authorities themselves. It enhances the powers and
therefore, the responsibilities of the Executive. [363 F-H]
In actual practice, the grounds supplied always operate
as an objective test for determining the question whether a
nexus could reasonably exist between the grounds given and
the detention order or whether some infirmities had crept
in. The reasonableness of the detention because the
justiciable issue because it related to the decision. It is
doubtful whether this could be said to be an object of
preventive detention authorised by the Constitution and
embodied in the Act. [334 D-E]
The object of the amending Acts 39 of 1975 and 14 of
1976 was to affect the manner in which jurisdiction of
courts in considering claims for reliefs by detenus oh
petitions for writs of habeas courts was being exercised so
that the only available means that has been developed for
such cases by the courts, that is to say, the scrutiny of
grounds supplied under s. 8 of the Maintenance. Of Internal
Security Act may be removed from the judicial armoury, for
the duration of emergency. [336-C-D]
Prabhu Dayal Deorah etc. v. District Magistrate Kamrup
and ors. AIR 1974 SC 183, referred to.

The contention that s. 16A(9) affects the jurisdiction
of High Courts under Art. 226 which an order under Art.
359(1) could not do, is untenable. A Presidential Order
which prevents a claim for the enforcement of a Fundamental
Right from being advanced in a court, during the period of
an emergency could possibly be said not to be intended to
affect the exercise of jurisdiction of courts at all, is not
correct. [336 F-G]
That s. 16A(9) amounts to a general legislative
declaration in place of judicial decisions which courts had
themselves to give after considering, on the facts of each
case, whether Art. 226 could be applied, is also not
acceptable. the result of s. 16A(9) to be valid would be to
leave to the presumption of correctness of an order under s.
3 of the Act untouched by any investigation relating to its
correctness. Now if this be the object and effect of The
amendment, it could not be said to go beyond it to rebut a
presumption of legality and validity or an order under s. 3
of the Act, if prima facie case is made out.

[336 G-H, 337 A]
Observation
[The same result could have been achieved by enacting
that a detention order under s. 3, prima facie good, will
operate as "conclusive proof" that the requirements of s. 3
have been fulfilled. But, as the giving of grounds is not
entirely dispensed with under the Act even as it now exists,
this may have left the question in doubt, whether courts
could call upon the detaining authorities
190
to produce the grounds. Enactment of a rule of conclusive
proof is a well established form of enactments determining
substantive rights in the form of procedural provisions].
[337 A-B]
Section 16A(9) makes it impossible for courts to
investigate questions relating to the existence or absence
of bona fides at least in proceeding under An. 226, It is
clear that the validity of s. 16A(9) cannot be challenged on
the ground, of any violation of Part III of' the
Constitution in view of the provisions of Art. 359(1)(A).
[353 C-D]
A challenge to the validity of s. 16A(9) based either
on the submission on hat grounds for detention do not call
for secrecy or that the provision is an unwarranted invasion
of judicial power, even in an emergency, is not well-
founded. There is no such strict separation of power under
our Constitution No particular provision of the
Constitution could be pointed out in support of the
proposition that preventive detention is a matter in which
judicial superintendence must necessarily be preserved as a
part of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Section 16A(9) imposes a bar which cannot be overcome
in habeas corpus proceedings during the emergency. In
addition, a specific suspension or enforcement of the right
of personal freedom against executive authorities places the
presumption arising from a duly authenticated order of a
legally authorised detaining officer on a higher footing
than merely ordinary rebuttable presumption for purposes of
proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. [367 F-G]
[His Lordship felt it unnecessary to consider the
validity of s. 16A(9) if it was to be applied at a time not
covered by the emergency, or whether it should, be read down
for the purposes of a suit for damages where the issue is
whether the detention was ordered by a particular officer
out of malice in, fact and for reasons completely outside
the purview of the Act itself. [337 C-D]
Section 16 of the Act seems to leave open a remedy by
way of suit for Damages for wrongful imprisonment in a
possible case of what may be called "malice in fact". In the
cases for habeas corpus, proceedings under Art. 226 of the
Constitution where "malice-in-fact" could not be
investigated. as it is bound to be an allegation subsidiary
to a claim for the enforcement of a right to personal
liberty, a Fundamental Right which cannot be enforced during
the Emergency. [337 G-H]
Sree Mohan Chowdhury v. The Chief Commissioner, Union
Territory of Tripura [1964] 3 SCR 442 @ 450, followed.

Even the issue that the detention order is vitiated by
"malice in fact' will not be justifiable in habeas corpus
proceedings during the emergency although it may be in an
ordinary suit which is not filed for enforcing a Fundamental
Right but for other reliefs. The question of bona fides
seems to be left open for decision by such suits on the
language of s. 16 of the Act itself. [368 D-E]
In the case of preventive detention, placing the burden
upon the executive authorities of proving the strict
legality and correctness of every step in the procedure
adopted in a case of deprivation of personal liberty, and
asking the executive authorities to satisfy such a
requirement, in accordance with what has been called the
principle in Eschugbayi Eleko's case, [1931] A.C. 662 @ 670,
would be to nullify the effect of the suspension of the
enforceability of the procedural protection to the right of
Personal freedom. To do so is really to take the
Presidential order under Article 359(1) of the Constitution
ineffective.

[368 B-C]
No question of "malice in law" can arise in habeas
corpus proceedings when such a protection is suspended. As
regards the issue of "malico in fact" it cannot be tried at
all in a habeas corpus proceedings although it may be
possible to try it in a regular suit the object of which is
not to enforce a right to personal freedom but only to
obtain damages for a wrong done which is not
191
protected by the terms of s. 16 of the Act. The possibility
of such a suit should be another deterrent against
dishonest use of these powers by detaining officers. [1368
D-E]
Section 18, though unnecessary, appears to have been
added by way of abundant caution. It cannot be assailed on
the ground of violation of basic structure. [342 F-G]
The theory of basic structure oil the Constitution
cannot be used to build into the Constitution an imaginary
part which may be in conflict with the constitutional
provisions. The Constitution cannot have a base out away
from the superstructure. Indeed, the emergency provisions
could themselves be regarded as part of the basic structure
of the Constitution. [366 E-F]
The theory of basic structure of the constitution
cannot be considered as anything more than a part of a well
recognised mode of constructing a document The Constitution
like any other document has to be read and constructed as a
whole. The theory was nothing more than a method of
determining the intent behind the constitutional provisions
it could not and did not build and add a new part to the
Constitution. It cannot imply new tests outside he
Constitution or be used to defeat constitutional provisions.
[366 G, 367 A]
His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v.
State of Kerala, [1973] Supp SCR 1, applied.

There is no provision in our Constitution for a
declaration of Martial Law except Art. 34 of the
Constitution which recognises the possibility of Martial Law
in this country. There is no separate indication in the
Constitution of conditions in which Martial Law could be
"proclaimed". A Presidential order under Art. 359(1) of the
Constitution would, ordinarily, have a wider range and
effect throughout the country than the existence of Martial
Law in any particular part of the country. The Presidential
proclamations are meant generally to cover the country as a
whole. Martial Law is generally of a locally restricted
application. The conditions in which what is called "martial
law" may prevail result in taking Military Courts of powers
even to try offences: and, the ordinary or civil courts will
not interfere with this special jurisdiction under
extraordinary conditions. Such a taking over by Military
courts is certainly outside the provisions of Alt. 359(1) of
the Constitution taken by itself. It could perhaps fall
under Presidential powers under Articles 53 and 73 read with
Art. 355. [368 F-H. 369 A-C]
Judicial proceedings in criminal courts not meant for
the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, are not either at the
initial or appellate or revisional stages, covered by the
Presidential order of 1975. Habeas corpus petitions are not
maintainable, in such cases since the prisoner is deemed to
be in proper custody under orders of a court. [371-F-G]
Neither Article 136 nor Art 226 of the Constitutional
is meant for the exercise of an advisory jurisdiction.
Attempts to lay down the law in an abstract form, unrelated
to the facts of particular cases, not only do not appertain
to the kind of jurisdiction exercised by this Court or by
the High Courts under the provisions of Art. 136 and 226
respectively, but may result in misapplications of the law
declared by courts to situations for which they were not
intended at all. [306 D-E].

Per Chandrachud, J.

The order issued by the President on June 27, 1975,
under Article 359(1) does not suspend the fundamental
principle that all executive action must have the authority
of law to support it. Nor does the Presidential order give
to the executive a charter to disobey the laws made by the
Parliament which is the supreme law making authority.[413 B-
C]
The aforesaid Presidential order, however, deprives a
person of his locus stand; to move any court, be it the
Supreme Court or the High Court, for enforcement of his
Fundamental Rights which are mentioned in the order
192
Such deprivation or suspension enures during the period that
the proclamation of emergency is in force or for such
shorter period as may be specified in the order. [413 C-D]
The dominant purpose of the present petitions is to
obtain an order of release from detention by enforcing the
right to personal liberty. The purpose is not to obtain a
mere declaration that the order of detention is ultra vires
the Act under which it is passed. The former plea is barred
by reason of the Presidential order. The latter is also
barred because regard must be had to the substance of the
matter and not to the form in which the relief is asked for.

[413 E-F]
The Presidential order dated June 27, 1975, bars any
investigation or inquiry into the question whether the order
of detention is vitiated by mala fides, factual or legal, or
whether it is based on extraneous considerations or whether
the detaining authority had reached his subjective
satisfaction validly on proper and relevant material [413 F-
G]
Whether or not Art. 21 of the Constitution is the sole
repository of the right to personal liberty, in a petition
filed in the High Court under Art. '226 for the release of a
person detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security
Act 1971, no relief by way of releasing the detenu can be
granted because no person has a legal capacity to move any
court to ask for such relief. The Presidential order takes
away such legal capacity by including Art. 21 within it. The
source of the right to personal liberty is immaterial
because the words "conferred by" which occur in Art. 359(1)
and in the Presidential order are not words of limitation.
[413 G-H, 414 A]
The Presidential order does not bring about any
amendment of Art. 226 and is not open to challenge on that
ground. [414 B]
The contention that Art. 226 which occurs in Chapter V,
Part VI of the Constitution is an entrenched provision and,
therefore, under Art. 368 no amendment can be made to Art.
226 without ratification by the Legislatures of not less
than one-half of the States is untenable. It is true that
Art. 226 is in entrenched provision which cannot suffer an
amendment except by Following the procedure prescribed by
the proviso to Art. 368(2). But the presidential order is
issued under the Constitution itself and if its true
constitutional produces a certain results it cannot be said
that some other Article of the Constitution stands thereby
amended article 359(1) provides for the passing of an order
by the President declaring that the right to move for the
enforcement of Fundamental Rights mentioned. in the order
shall be suspended. That may, in effect. affect the
jurisdiction of the High Courts to entertain a petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. But, that does
not bring about any amendment of Article 226 within the
meaning of Art. 368, which speaks of amendments to the
Constitution by the Parliament in the exercise of its
constitutional power. Article 226 and Article 359(1) are
parts of the same fundamental instrument and a certain
interpretation of one of these Article cannot amount to an
amendment of the other. 1;385 G-H, 386 A-B]
The Presidential order neither bars the right of an
accused to defend his personal liberty in the court of first
instance or in a higher court nor does it bar the execution
of decrees passed against the Government, nor dos it bar the
grant of relief other than or less than the release of the
detenu from detention. [414 B-C]
Detention without trial is a serious on personal
freedom but it bears the sanction of our Constitution. The
"clear and present danger test" evolved by Justice Holmes
in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 1919 may well be
extended to cases where there is a threat of external
aggression. [384 D-E]
The object of Art 359 is to confer wider powers on the
President than the power merely to suspend the right to file
a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Article 359 aims
at empowering the President to suspend the right to enforce
all or any of the Fundamental Rights conferred be Part III.
It is in order to achieve that object that Article 359 does
not provide that the President may declare that the remedy
by way of habeas corpus shall be suspended during emergency.
Personal liberty is but one of the Fundamental Rights
conferred by Part m and the writ of habeas corpus is
neculiar to the enforcement of the
193
right to personal liberty and, therefore the suspension of
the right to enforce the right conferred by Art. 21 means
and implies the suspension of the right tc file a habeas
corpus petition or to take any other proceeding to enforce
the right to personal liberty conferred by Article 21. [384
G-H, 385 A-B]
The true implication of the Presidential order is to
take away the right of any person to move any court for the
enforcement of the rights mentioned in the order. In strict
legal theory the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme
Court and the High Courts remain the same as before since
the Presidential order merely take away the locus standi of
a person to move these courts for the enforcement of certain
Fundamental Rights during the operations of the Proclamation
of Emergency. The drive of Article 359(1) is not against the
courts but is against individuals, the object of the Article
being to deprive the individual concerned of his normal
right to move the Supreme Court or the High Court for the
enforcement of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Part III
of the Constitution [386 C-E]
Sree Mohan Chowdhury v. The Chief Commissioner, Union
Territory of Tripura [1964] 3 SCR 442, 451, referred to.

The argument that the limited object of Art. 359(1) is
to remove restrictions on the power of the Legislature so
that during the operation of the Emergency it would be free
to make laws in violation of the Fundamental Rights
specified in the Presidential order loses sight of the
distinction between the provisions of Art. 358 and Art. 359
(1A) on the one hand and of Art 359(1) on the other. Article
358, of' its own force, removes the restrictions on the
power of the Legislature to make laws inconsistent with Art.
19 and on the power of the Executive to take action under a
law which may thus violate Art. 19.Article 358 does not
suspend any right which was available under Art. 19 to any
person prior to the Proclamation of Emergency. Article
359(1) is wider in scope than Art. 358. In view of the
language of Art. 359(1) and considering the distinction
between it and the provisions of Art. 358, there is no
justification for restricting the operation of Art. 359(1)
as against laws made by the Legislatures in violation of the
Fundamental Rights. [386 G-H, 387 A-E]
Sree Mohan Choudhary v. The Chief Commissioner, Union
Territory of Tripura [1964] 3 SCR 442 and Makhan Singh v.
State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797. referred to.

Article 359(1) is as much a basic feature of the
Constitution as any other, and it would be inappropriate to
hold that because in normal times the Constitution requires
the Executive to obey the laws made by the Legislature,
therefore. Article 359(1) which is an emergency measure,
must be construed consistently with that position. The
argument of basic feature is wrong for yet another reason
that Art. 359(1) does 'not provide that the Executive is
free to disobey the laws made by the Legislature. To permit
a challenge in a court of law to an order of detention,
which is an Executive action, on the ground that the order
violates ar Fundamental Right mentioned in the Presidential
order, is to permit the detenu to enforce a Fundamental
Right during emergency in manner plainly contrary to Art.
359(1). [388 E-H, 389 A]
All executive action which operates to the prejudice of
any person must have the authority of law to support it.
Art. 358 does not purport to invest the State with arbitrary
authority to take action to the prejudice of citizens and
other. It provides that so long as the Proclamation of
Emergency subsists laws may be enacted and executive action
may be taken ill pursuance of such laws, which if the
provisions of Art. 19 were operative would have been
invalid. Article 359(1) bars the enforcement of any
Fundamental Right mentioned in the Presidential order,
thereby rendering it incompetent for any person to complain
of its violation, whether the violation is by the
Legislature or by the Executive.

The Rule of Law argument like the "basic feature"
argument is intractable. Emergency provisions contained in
Part XVIII of the Constitution which are designed to protect
the security of the State are as important as any other
provision. Of the Constitution. The Rule of Law during an
emergency, is as one finds it in the provisions contained in
Chapter XVIII of the Constitution. There cannot be a
brooding and omnipotent Rule of Law drowning in its
effervescence the emergency provisions of the Constitution.
[393-B-D]
Article 359(1) neither compels nor condones the
breaches by the executive of the laws made by the
Legislature. Such condonation is the function of an act of
indemnity. [393 G]
The object of empowering the President to issue an
order under Alt. 359(1) suspending the enforcement of the
right to personal liberty conferred by Part III of the
Constitution cannot be to save all other rights to personal
liberty except the one conferred by Part III which seems
totally devoid of meaning and purpose. Their is nothing
peculiar in the content of the right to personal liberty
conferred by Part III so that the Constitution should
provide only for the suspension of the right to enforce that
particular kind of right leaving all other rights to
personal liberty intact and untouched. This purpose cannot
ever be achieved by interpreting Article 359(1) to mean that
every right to personal liberty shall be enforceable and
every proceeding involving the enforcement of such right
shall continue during the emergency except to the extent to
which the right is conferred by Part III of the
Constitution. The existence of the right to personal liberty
in the pre constitution period was surely known to the
makers of the Constitution. [395 H, 396 A-D]
The right to personal liberty is the right of the
individual to personal freedom, nothing more and nothing
less. That right along with certain other rights was
elevated to the status of a Fundamental Right in order that
it may not be tinkered with and in order that a mere
majority should not be able to trample over it Article
359(1) enables the President to suspend the enforcement even
of the right which were sanctified by being lifted out of
the common morass of human rights. If the enforcement of the
Fundamental Rights can be suspended during an emergency it
is hard to accept that the right to enforce no Fundamental
Rights relating to the same subject matter should remain
alive.

[396 G-H 397 A]
The words "conferred by Part Ill' which occur in Art.
359(1) are not intended to exclude or except from the
purview of the Presidential Order rights of the same variety
or kind as are mentioned in Part III but which were in
existence prior to the Constitution or can be said to be in
existence in the post Constitution era. apart from the
Constitution. The words "conferred by Part III are used only
in order to identify the particular rights the enforcement
of which can be suspended by tho President and not in order
to impose a limitation the power of the President so as to
put those rights which exist or which existed apart from the
constitution beyond the reach of that power. It therefore
does not make any difference whether any right to personal
liberty was in existence prior to the enactment of the
Constitution either by way of a natural right statutory
right common law right or a right available under the law of
port. Whatever may be the source of the right and whatever
may be its justification. the right in essence and substance
is the right to personal liberty. That
195
right having been included in Part III, its enforcement will
stand suspended if it is mentioned in the Presidential
order issued under Article 359(1).

[397 E-H 398 A-C]
The rights conferred by Art. 21 and 19 cannot be
treated as mutually exclusive But the suspension of the
right to enforce the right of personal liberty means the
suspension of that right wherever it is found unless its
content is totally different as from one Article to another.
The right conferred by Article 21 is only a description of
the right of personal liberty in older to facilitate its
exact identification and such a description cannot limit the
operation of the Presidential order to those cases only
where the right to personal liberty is claimed under Article

The circumstance that The pre-constitution rights
continued in force after the enchantment of the Constitution
in view of Art. 372 does not make any difference to this
position because even assuming that certain rights to
personal liberty existed before the Constitution and
continued thereafter as they were not repugnant to any
provision of the Constitution all rights to personal
liberty. having the same content as the right conferred by
Art. 21 would fall within the mischief to the Presidential
order. [398 C-H, 399 A]
The theory of eclipse has no application to such cases
because that theory applies only when a pre-Constitution law
becomes devoid of legal force on the enactment of the
Constitution by reason of its repugnancy to any provision of
the Constitution. Such laws are not void but they are under
an eclipse so long as the repugnancy lasts. When the
repugnancy is removed the eclipse also is removed and the
law becomes valid. [399 A-B]
As regards the doctrine of merger, every prior right to
personal liberty merged in the right to personal liberty
conferred by Part III. But whether it merged or not, it
cannot survive the declaration of suspension if the true
effect of the Presidential order is the suspension of the
right to enforce all and every right to personal liberty. In
that view, it would also make no difference whether the
right to personal liberty arises from a statute or from a
contract or from a constitutional provision contained in
some Part other than Part III. [399 B-C]
Article 361(3) speaks of a process for the arrest or
imprisonment of a Governor issuing from any court.
Fundamental Rights can be exercised as against judicial
orders but the circumstances in which such a Process may
come to be issued. if at all, may conceivably affect the
decision of the question whether a Presidential Order issued
under Article 359(1) can bar the remedy of an aggrieved
Governor.[400 B-C]
A failure to comply with Article 256 may attract
serious consequences but no court is likely to entertain a
grievance at the instance of a private party that Art. 256
has not been complied with by a State Government. [400 D]
[As regards the claim to personal liberty founded on a
challenge to an order on the ground of excessive delegation
His Lordship preferred to express no firm opinion though,
the greater probability is that such a challenge may tail in
face of a Presidential order of the kind which has. been
passed in the instant case. [400 D-E]
The existence of common law rights prior to the
Constitution will not curtail the operation of the
Presidential order by excepting. those rights from the
purview of the order. [400 E]
Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil v. The State of Bombay [1955]
1 SCR and Makhan Singh v State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797,
818-819, applied.

The Presidential order dated June 27, 1975, does not
contain any clause like the one in the order dated November
3, 1962 Article 359(1) is only an
196
enabling provision and the validity of a plea cannot be
tested with reference to that Article. The right to move a
court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part
III is not taken away by Article 359(1). It is the
Presidential order passed in pursuance of the powers
conferred by that Article by which such a consequence can be
brought about. The Presidential order in the instant case is
not subject to the preconditions that the detenu should have
been deprived of his right under any particular Act and
therefor, there is no scope for the enquiry whether the
order is consistent or in conformity with any particular
Act. [405 B-H, 406 A, 407 B-C]
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797; Dr.
Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar [1966] 1 SCR 709. K.
Anandan Nambiar and Anr. v. Chief Security Government of
Madras & ors. [1966] 2 SCR 406. State of Maharashtra v.
Prabhakar Pandurang Sangzgiri & Anr. [1966] 1 SCR 702,
discussed and distinguished.

A mala fide exercise of power does not necessarily
imply any moral turpitude and may only mean that the
statutory power is exercised for purposes Other than those
for which the power was intended by law to be exercise. In
view of the fact that an unconditional Presidential order of
the present kind effects the locus standi of the petitioner
to move any court for the enforcement of any of his
Fundamental Rights mentioned in the order, it would not be
open to him to show that the statutory power has been
exercised for a purpose other than the one duly appointed
under the law. So long as the statutory prescription can be
seen on the face of the order to have been complied with no
further inquiry is permissible as to whether the order is
vitiated by legal mala fides. [409 E-F]
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797; Jai
Chand Lall Sethia v. State of West Bengal & ors. [1966]
Supp. SCR 464 and Durgadas Shirali v. Union of India & ors.
[1966] 2 SCR 573, referred to.

As regards mala fides in the sense of malice in fact,
the same position must hold good because the Presidential
order operates as a blanket ban on any and every judicial
inquisition into the validity of the detention order. If in
any given ease an order of detention appears on the very
face of it to be actuated by an ulterior motive, the court
would have jurisdiction to set it aside because no judicial
inquiry of any sort is required to be undertaken in such a
case. But, short of such ex facie vitiation, any challenge
to a detention order on the around of actual mala fides is
also excluded under the Presidential order dated June 27,
1975. 1407 G-H, 408 A-B]
Section 16A(9) is not unconstitutional on the ground
that it constitutions an encroachment on the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court and Art. 226. There is no
warrant for reading down that section so as to allow the
courts to inspect the relevant files, to the exclusion of
all other parties.

The principles of res judicata and estoppel, the
conclusive presumptions of law and various provisions of
substantive law deny a free play to courts in the exercise
of their jurisdiction. These are not for that reason
unconstitutional qua the High Court's jurisdiction under
Art. 226. [410 F]
The limits of judicial review have to be co-extensive
and commensurate with the right of an aggrieved person to
complain of the invasion of his rights. Section 16A(9)
cannot be said to shut out an inquiry which is otherwise
within the jurisdiction of the High Court to make. [411 B]
197Section 18 does not suffer from the vice of excessive
delegation and is a valid piece of legislation. [414 D]
That section only declares what was the true position
prior to its enactment on June 25, 1975. The amendment of
section 18 by the substitution of the words "in respect of
whom an order is made or purported to be made under s. 3",
in place of the words "detained under this Act", does not
render the section open to a challenge on the ground of
excessive delegation. The words "purported to be made" have
been inserted in order to obviate the challenging that the
detention is not in strict conformity with the Act. Such a
challenge is even otherwise barred under the Presidential
order. The object of he said provision is not to encourage
the passing of lawless orders of detention but to protect
during emergency orders which may happen lo be in less Than
absolute conformity with the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act, 1971.

A jurisdiction of suspicion is not a forum for
objectivity. The only argument which the court can entertain
is whether the authority which passed the order of detention
is duly empowered to pass it, whether the detenu is properly
identified and whether on the face of its order, the stated
purpose of detention is within the terms of law. [414 E-F]
Zamora's case [1916] (2) AC 77; Rex v. Halliday [1917]
AC 260, 271. liversidge v. Sir John Anderson [1942] AC 206
and Greene v. Secretary of State [1942] AC 284, referred to.

No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. The
generality of the expressions which may be found in a
judgment are not intended to be expositions of the who's
law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts
of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It
is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and
there from a judgment and to build upon it because . the
essence of the decision is its ratio and not every
observation found therein. [401 C-E]
Quinn v. Leatham, [1901] AC 495, 506 auld State of
Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra & Ors.[1968] 2 SCR 154, 163,
reiterated.

Per P. N. Bhagwati, J.

The Presidential order dated June 27, 1975, bars
maintainability of a petition for a writ of habes corpus
when an order of detention is challenged on the ground that
it is vitiated by mala fides, legal, factual or is based on
extraneous considerations or is not under the Act or is not
in compliance with it. [477 B-C]
The suspension of the privilege of the writ does not
legalise what is done while it continues: it merely
suspends for the time. being the remedy of the writ. [461 A-
B]
The words "the right to move any court" are wide enough
to include all claims made by citizens in any court of
competent jurisdiction where it shown that the said claims
cannot be effectively adjudicate upon. without examining the
question as to whether the citizen is, in substance, seeking
to enforce any of the specified Fundamental Rights. There
can be no doubt that in view of the Presidential order which
mentions Art. 21, the detenus would have no locus standi to
maintain the writ petitions if it could be shown that the
writ petitions were for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by Art. 21. [424 C-E]
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797,
followed.

When a Presidential order is issued under Art. 353,
clause (1), the Fundamental Right mentioned in the
Presidential order is suspended so that the restriction on
the power of the executive or the legislature imposed by the
Fundamental Right is lifted while the Presidential order is
in operation and
198
the executive or the legislature is free to make any law or
to make any action which it would, but for the provisions
contained in Part 111, be competent to make or to take. the
words 'but for the provisions contained in that part" that
is, but for the Fundamental Rights, mean "if the
Fundamental Rights were not there in the Constitution, the
executive being limited by law would still be unable to take
any action to the prejudice of a person except by authority
of law and in conformity with or in accordance with law and,
therefore, even the Presidential order mentions Art. 21,
clause (1A) of Art. 359 Would not enable the executive to
deprive a person of his Personal liberty without sanction
of law and except in conformity with or in accordance with
law. It' an order or dentention is made by the executive
without the authority of law it would be invalid and its
invalidity would not be cured by clause (IA) or Art. 359
because that clause does not protect executive action taken
without lawful authority. An unlawful order of detention
would not be protected from challenge under- Art. 21 by
reason of clause (IA) of Art. 359 and the detenu would be
entitled to complain of such unlawful detention as being, in
violation of' Art. 21 except in so far as his right tor move
the court for that purpose may be held to have been taken
away by clause (1) of Art. 359. [427 C-H]
State of Madhya Pradesh v Thakur Bharat Singh [1967] 2
SCR 454; District Collector of Hyderabad v. M/s Ibrahim &
Co. [1970] 3 SCR 498; Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of
India [1973] 2 SCR 757 and Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v.
Union of India [1974] 2 SCR 398, applied.

Even though a Presidential Order issued under clause
(1) of Art, 359 mentions Art. 21, where it is found that a
detention has not been made in pursuance of lawful authority
or in other words, the detention is without the authority of
law, whether by reason of there being no law at all or by
reason of the law under. which the detention is made being
void, clause (1A) of Art, 359 would not protect it from
challenge under Art. 21 and it would be in conflict with
that Article [429 H. 430 A] ,
The words "rights, conferred by Part III" cannot be
read in isolation nor can they be construed by reference to
theoretical or doctrinaire considerations. 'They must be
read in the context of the provisions enacted in Part 111 in
order. to determine what are the rights conferred by the
provisions in that Part, It is true that Art, 21 is couched
in negative language. It is not uncommon in legislative
practice to use negative language for conferring a right.
That is often done for lending greater emphasis and strength
to the legislative enactment. Article 21 confers the
Fundamental Right of personal liberty. [430 F-H]
Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh 73 Indian Appeals 59;
Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi &
Rajasthan [1959] Supp. (1) SCR 529; State of Bihar v.
Maharajidhiraj Kameshwar Singh of Derbhanga & Ors. [1952]
SCR 889 at p.988; P.D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India
Ltd. [1952] SCR 391 AND R.C. Cooper v. Union of India [1970]
3 SCR 530 referred to
If Art. 21 were construed as not conferring a right to
personal liberty, then there would be no Fundamental Right
conferred by Art. 21 and even if a person is deprived of his
personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with the
procedure established by law and there is infringement of
Art .21, such person would not be entitled to move the
Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus under Art. 32, for
that Article is available only for enforcement of the
rights. conferred by Part III. That would be a starting
consequence, as it would deprive the Supreme Court of a
wholesome jurisdiction to protect the personal liberty of an
individual against illegal detention, resulting in a
departure from the well settled constructional position of
Art. 21. [432 B-D]
No attribute of personal liberty can be regarded as
having been calved out of Art. 21. That Article protects all
attributes of persona; liberty against, executive action
which is not supported by law. When a person is detained.
there is deprivation of personal liberty within the meaning
of Art. 21. 1433 A-BI
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors. [1964] 1 SCR 332.
referred to
199
The protection under Art. 21 is only against State
action and not against private individuals and the
protection, it secures, it is a limited one. The only
safeguard enacted by Art. 21 is that a person cannot be
deprived of his persona liberty except according to
procedure prescribed by "State made" law. It is clear on
plain natural construction of its language that Art. 21
imports two requirements: first, there must be a law
authorising deprivation of personal liberty and secondly,
such law must prescribe a procedure. The first requirement
is indeed implicit in the phrase "except according to
procedure prescribed by law". When a law prescribes a
procedure for depriving a person of personal liberty, it
must a fortiori authorise such deprivation. Article 21,
thus, provides both substantive as well as procedural
safeguards. Two other ingredients of Art. 21 are that there
must not only be a law authorising deprivation of personal
liberty there must also be a procedure prescribed by law or
in other words law must prescribe a procedure. [433-C-F;
434 A-C,H: 435 B]
P. D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India Ltd. [1952] 2
SCR 391; Smt. Vidya Verma v. Dr. Shiv Narain [1995] 2 SCR
983 and A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88,
followed.

Article 21, operates not merely as a restriction on
executive action against deprivation of' personal liberty
without authority of law, but it also enacts d check on the
legislature by insisting that the law, which authorises
depravation, must establish a procedure. What the procedure
should be is not laid down in this Article, but there must
be some procedure and at the least, it must conform to the
minimal requirements of Art. 22. "Law" within the meaning of
Art. 21 must be a valid law and' not only must it be within
the legislative competence of the legislature enacting it,
but it must also not be repugnant to any of the Fundamental
Rights enumerated in Part III. [435 C-D]
Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal [1974]
1 SCR 1; and Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal &
ors. [1975] 2 SCR 832, referred
The constitutional principle in Eshugabayi E eko v. The
officer Administrating the Government of Nigeria AIR 1931
PC' 248 has been accepted by the courts in India as part of
the law of the land. In our country, even in pre-
Constitution days, the executive was a limited executive,
that is, an executive limited by law and it could act only
in accordance with law. [438 B, 439 A]
Liversidge v. Sit. John Anderson [1942] 2 AC 206,
Vimlabai Deshpande v. Emperor AIR 1945 Nag. 8. Jitenderanath
Ghosh v. The Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal,
ILR 60 Cal. 364 at 377; In re: Banwarilal Roy 48 Cal. Weekly
Notes 766 at 780; Secretary of State for India v. Hari
Bhanji (1882) ILR 5 Mad. 373; Province of Bombay v.
Khushaldas Advani [1950] SCR 621 and P. K. Tare v. Emperor
AIR 1943 Nag. 26, referred.

Even prior the Constitution, the principle of rule of
law that the executive cannot act to the prejudice of a
person without the authority of law was recognised as part
of the law of the land and was uniformly administered by the
courts. It was, clearly "law" in force" and, ordinarily, by
reason of Art. 372 it would have continued to subsist as a
distinct and separate principle of law hr even after the
commencement of the Constitution, until some aspects of'
this principle of Law were expressly recognised and given
constitutional embodiment in different Articles of the
Constitution. [439 B-C]
When this principle of rule of law that the executive
cannot deprive a person of his liberty except by authority
of law, is recognised and embodied as a Fundamental light
and enacted as such in Art. 21, it cannot continue to have a
distinct and separate existence, independently and apart
from this Article in which it has been given constitutional
vesture, unless it were also enacted as a statutory
principle by some positive law of the State. It cannot
continue in force under Art. 372 when it is expressly
recognised and embodied as a Fundamental Right in Art. 21
and finds a place in the express provisions of the
Constitution When the Constitution makers have clearly
intended
200
that this right should be subject to the limitation imposed
by Art. 359, clause (1) and (1A), it would be contrary to
all canons of construction to hold that the same right
continues to exist independently, but free from the
limitation imposed by Art. 359, clauses (1) and (1A) Such a
construction would defeat the object of the constitution
makers in imposing the limitation under Art. 359, clauses
(1) and (1A) and make a mockery of that limitation. The
Presidential order would in such a case become meaningless
and ineffectual. [439 F-H, 440 A-C]
The only way in which meaning and effect can be given
to the Presidential order suspending the enforcement of the
right of personal liberty guaranteed under Art. 21 is that
the principle of Rule of Law, on what the executive cannot
interfere with the personal liberty of any person except by.
authority of law, is enacted in Art. 21 and it does not
exist as a distinct and separate principle conferring a
right of personal liberty independently and apart from that
Article. Consequently, when the enforcement of the right of
personnel liberty conferred by Art. 21 is suspended by a
Presidential order the detenu cannot circumvent the
Presidential order and challenge the legality of his
deletion by falling back on the supposed right of personal
liberty based on the principle of Rule of Law. [440F-H]
The executive is plainly and indubitably subordinated
to the law and it cannot flout the mandate of the law but
must act in accordance with the law. [441-B]
Eastern Trust Company v. Mckenzie Mann. & Co. [1915] AC
750; Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. The State of Punjab
[1955] 2 SCR 225 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur
Bharat Singh [1967] 2 SCR 454 referred to
The Presidential orders issued under Art. 359 clause
(1) do not give any power to the executive to alter or
suspend or flout the law nor do they enlarge the power. Of
the executive so as to permit it to go beyond what is
sanctioned by law. As soon as the emergency comes to an end
and the Presidential order ceases to be operative, the
unlawful action of the executive becomes actionable and the
citizen is entitled to challenge it by moving a court of
law. [161 A-C]
Whilst a Presidential Order issued under Art. 359,
clause (1) is in operation, the Rule of Law is not
obliterated and it continues to operate in all its vigour.
The executive is bound to observe and obey the law and it
cannot ignore or disregard it. If the executive commits a
breach of the law its action would be unlawful but merely
the remedy would be temporarily baned where it involves
enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights specified in
the Presidential order. [461 C-D]
When the right of personal liberty based on the Rule of
Law which existed immediately prior to the Commencement of
the Constitution has been enacted in the Constitution as a
Fundamental Right in Art. 21 with the limitation that when
there is a Proclamation of Emergency, the President may by
order under Art. 359, clause (1) suspend its enforcement,
that right of personal liberty based on the Rule of law
cannot continue to exist as a distinct and independent right
free from the limitation as to enforcement contained in Art.
359 clause (1). It would be meaningless and futile for the
Constitution-makers to have imposed this limitation in
regard to enforcement of the right of personal liberty
guaranteed by Art. 21, if the detenu could with impunity,
disregard such limitation and fall back on the right of
personal liberty based on the Rule of Law. [445 E-G]
Attorney General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, [1920] AC
508, discussed.

On an application of the maxim expressum facit cessare
tacitum. that is what is expressed makes what is silent
cease-a principle of logic and common
201
sense and not merely a technical rule of construction-the
express provision in Art. 21 that no person shall be
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure prescribed by law will necessarily exclude a
provision to the same effect to be gathered or implied from
the other provisions of the Constitution. [447 D-E, 448 D]
Shankara Rao Badami v. State of Mysore [1969] 3 SCR 1
and State (Walsh and ors.) v. Lennon and ors. 1942 Irish
Report. of 112, applied.

The words 'any court in Article 21 must be given their
plain grammatical meaning and must be construed to mean any
court of competent jurisdiction which would include the
Supreme Court and the High Courts before which the specified
rights in Art. 359 clause ( 1 ) can be enforced by the
citizens.[454-Al
Makhan Singh V. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 737,
followed.

There is no scope for the contention that even if the
enforcement of the Fundamental Right conferred by Art. 21 is
suspended by the Presidential order, the detenu can still
enforce a supposed natural right of personal liberty in a
court of law. [459 D]
His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v.
State of Kerala [1973] Supp. SCR 1 and Golak Nath & Ors. v.
State of Punjab [1967] 2 SCR 762, referred to.

If the positive law of the State degrees that no person
shall be deprived of his personal liberty except according
to the procedure described by law, the enforcement of such
statutory right would not be barred by the Presidential
order. But, there is no legislation in our country which
confers the right of personal liberty by providing that
there shall be no deprivation of it except in accordance
with law. (in the contrary, s. 18 of the Maintenance of
Internal Security Act, 1971, enacts that no person in
respect of whom an order of detention is made or purposed to
be made under s. 3 shall have any right to personal liberty
by virtue of natural law or common law, if any. h Because
the Indian Penal Code in s. 342 makes it penal to would
fully confine any person and the offence of wrongful
confinement postulates that no one shall be deprived of his
personal liberty except by authority of law, it cannot
202
be said on that account that s. 342 of the Indian Penal Code
confers a right of personal liberty.. The utmost that can be
said is that this section proceed on a recognition of the
right of personal liberty enacted in Art. 21 and makes it an
offence to wrongfully confine a person in breach of the
right conferred by that constitutional provision [459 E-H,
460 A]
The words four any other purpose in Art. 226 greatly
enlarge the jurisdiction of the High Court and the High
Court can issue a writ of habeas corpus if it finals that
the intention of a person is illegal. It is not necessary
for this purpose that the court should be moved by the
detenu. It is sufficient if it is moved by any person
affected by the order of intention. When it is so moved and
it examines the legality of the order of detention it does
not enforce the right of personal liberty of the detenu, but
it merely keeps the executive within the bounds of law and
enforces the principle of legality. The words . any other
purpose cannot be availed of for the purpose of
circumventing the constitutional inhibition flowing from the
Presidential order. [460 B-G]
Article 359 clause (1) and the Presidential order
issued under it do not have the effect of making unlawful
actions of the executive lawful. [461 F-G]
When a person takes proceedings under the Code of
Criminal Procedure in connection with the offence of
wrongful confinement or murder or launches of prosecution
for such offence, he cannot be said to be enforcing the
fundamental Right of the detenu or the murdered man under
Art. 21 so as to attract the inhibition of the Presidential
order. [461 F-G]
An application seeking to enforce a statutory
obligation imposed on the police officer and a statutory
right created in favour of an arrested person by s. 57 of
the Criminal Procedure Code would not be barred, because
what is suspended by a Presidential Order specifying Art. 21
is the right to move the court for enforcement of the
Fundamental Right conferred by that article and not the
right to move the court for enforcement of the statutory
right to be released granted under s. 57, Cr. P C..[462 G]
If a positive legal right is conferred on a person by
legislation and he seeks to enforce it in a court, it would
not be within the inhibition of a Presidential Order issued
under Art. 359, clause (1). [463 G-H]
This does not mean that whenever a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus comes before the court it must be rejected
straightaway without even looking at the averments made in
it. The court would have to consider where the bar of the
Presidential order is attracted and for that purpose the
court would have to the whether the order of detention is
one made by an authority empowered to pass such an order
under the Act. If it is not, it would not be State action.
and the petition would not be one for enforcement of the
right confirmed by Art. 21. [463 G-H, 464 A]
Once it is held that the obligation of the executive is
not a deprive a person of his personal liberty except in
accordance with law, is to be found only an Art. 21 and no-
where-else it must follow necessarily that in challenging
the legality of the detention, what the applicant claims is
that there. is, , in fact fact, by the executive of the
right of personal liberty conferred by Art 21 and that
immediately attracts the applicability of the Presidential
order. [460-D-E]
It is the basic characteristic and essence of martial
law that during the time that it is in force, the individual
cannot enforce his right to life and liberty by resorting to
judicial process and the courts cannot issue the writ of
habeas corpus or pass any suitable orders [442 G]
John Allen's case (1921) 2 Irish Reports 241, referred
to:

Merely by declaring martial law would not by itself
deprive the courts of the power to issue the writ of habeas
corpus or other process for the protection of the right of
the individual to life and liberty. [443 A]
203
The declaration of martial law, which is not even
expressly provided in the Constitution, cannot override the
provisions of the Articles conferring the right to life and
liberty as also of Articles 32 an l 226 and unless the right
of an individuals to move the courts for enforcement of the
right to life and liberty can be suspended or taken away by
or under an express provision of the Constitution, the
individual would be entitled to enforce the right to life
and liberty under Art. 32 or Art. 226 or by resorting to the
ordinary process w. even during martial law. [443 A-C]
Article 34 clearly postulates that during the time that
material law is in force no judicial process can issue to
examine the legality of an act done by the military
authorities or the executive in connection with the
maintenance of restoration or order. [443 E-F]
During the martial law, the courts cannot and should
not have the power to examine the legality of the action of
the military authorities or the executive on any ground
whatsoever, including, the ground of mala fides. But, if the
courts are to be prevented from exercising such power
during, martial law the situation can be brought about only
by a Presidential order issued under C. Act 359 clause (i)
and in no other way, and the Presidential Order. in so far
as it suspends the enforcement of the right of personal
liberty confirmed under Art. 21 must be constructed to bar
challenge to the legality of detention in am, court
including the Supreme Court and the High Courts whilst the
Presidential Order is in operation, [444 A-C]
Ex parte Milligan (1866) 4 Wallace 2; Moyer v. Peabody
(1909) 212 US 76, and Duncan v. Kohanmeku (1945) 327 US
304, referred to.

There are two rights which the detenu has in this
connection: one is the Fundamental Right conferred by Art.
22, clause (5) and the other is the statutory right
conferred by s. 8. Though the content of both these rights
is the same, they have distinct and independent existence
and merely because enforcement of one is suspended, it does
not mean that the other also cannot be enforced. [463 B-C]
The theory of reflection is clearly erroneous. If the
right conferred under s. 8 were a reflection of the
Fundamental Right conferred by Art. 22, clause (5) which is
the object reflected must necessarily result in the
effacement of the right under s. 8 which is said to
constitute the reflection. But even if Art. 22 clause (5)
were deleted from the Constitution, s. 8 would still remain
on the statute book until repealed by the legislature. The
Presidential Order would not therefore, bar enforcement of
the right conferred by s. 8. [463 C-D]
Fathima Beebi v. M. K. Ravindranathan (1975) Crl. LJ.
1164, over-ruled.

It is true that sub-sec. (9) (a) of s. 16A does not
specifically refer to any court. But, there is inherent
evidence in the sub-section itself to show that it is
intended to prevent disclosure of such grounds, information
and materials before a court. There is clearly an echo of s.
123 of the Indian Evidence Act. Sub-section (9) of s. It is
must also be held to be designed to achieve the same
intention as prohibiting disclosure even to a court. Sub-
section (9) (a) of S. 16A cannot, therefore, be read down so
as to imply an exception in favour of disclosure to a court.
[469 D, F]
Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. [1375]
` SCR 832; , Lee v. Burrel 170 English Reports 1402 and
Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson [1942] AC 206. referred to.

There can be no doubt that Art. 226 is a constitutional
provision and it empowers the High Court to issue a writ of
habeas corpus for enforcement of the Fundamental Right by
Art. 21 and also for any other purpose. The High Court has.
therefore, constitutional power to examine the Legality of
detention and for that purpose to inquire and determine
whether the detention is in accordance with the provisions
of law. The constitutional Power cannot be taken away or
abridged by a legislative enactment. If there is any
legislative.

204

provision which obstructs or retards the exercise of this
constitutional power it would be void. It is, therefore,
clear that if it can be shown that sub section (9) (a) of s.
16A abridges or whitles down the constitutional power of the
High Court under Art. 226 or obstructs or retards its
exercise, it would be void as being in conflict with Art.

A rule of evidence merely determines what shall be
regarded as relevant and admissible material or the purpose
of enabling the court to come to a decision in the exercise
of its jurisdiction and it does not in any way detract from
or affect the jurisdiction of the court and it cannot, in
the circumstances, be violative of Art. 226. But in order
that if should not fall foul of Art. 226, is must be a
genuine rule of evidence. If in the guise of enacting a rule
of evidence the legislature in effect and substance disable
and impedes the High Court from effectively exercising its
constitutional power under Art. 226. such an enactment would
be void. It will be colourable exercise of legislative
power. The legislature cannot be permitted to violate a
constitutional provision by employing an indirect method.
It a legislative provision, though in form and outward
appearance a rule of evidence, is in substances and reality
something different obstructing or impeding the exercise .
The jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226, the form
in which the legislative provision is clothed would not safe
it from condemnation. [474 B-C]
It is well settled that in order to determine the true
character of a legislative provision. the court must have
regard to the substance of the provision and not its form.
Sub-section (9)(a) of s. 16A is in form and outward
appearance a rules of evidence which says that the grounds,
information and materials on which the order of detention is
made or the declaration under sub-section) or sub-section
(3) is based shall be treated as confidential and shall be
deemed to refer to matters of State and be against the
public interest to disclose. Sub-s. (9) (a) of s. 16A
assumes valid declaration under sub-s. (2) or sub-s. (3) and
it is only when such a declaration has been made that sub-s.
(9)(a) of s. 16A applies or in other words. It is only in
cases where a person is detained in order to deal
effectively with the emergency. that the disclosure of the
grounds, information and materials is prohibited by sub-sec.
(9)(a) of s. 16A. [474 E-F 475 B-C, E-F]
The rule enacted in sub-s. (9)(a) of s. 16A bears close
analogy to a rule of conclusive presumption and in the
circumstance it must be regard as a genuine rule of
evidence. [476 D]
If the grounds, information and materials have no
relation to matter of State or they cannot possibly be of
such a character that their closure would injure public
interest, the legislature cannot, by merely employing a
legal function, deem them to refer to matters of State which
it would be against public interest to disclose an 1 thereby
exclude them from the judicial ken. That would not be a
genuine rule of evidence: it would be a colourable
legislative device-a fraudulent exercise of power. There can
be no blanket ban on disclosure of the grounds, information
and materials to the High Court of this Court irrespective
of their true character in such cases [476 E-F]
205
M. M. Damnoo v. State of J & K [1972] 2 SCR 1014; A.
K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88 and Liversidge
v. Sir John Anderson [1942] AC 206. referred to.

The grounds, information and materials in almost all
cases would be of a confidential character falling within
the class of documents privileged under s. 123 and hence the
rule enacted in sub-section genuinely partakes of the
character of a rule of evidence. Sub-s. (9) (a) of s. 16A
enacts a genuine rule of evidence and it does not detract
from or affect the jurisdiction of the High Court- under
Art. 225 and hence it cannot be successfully assailed as
invalid. [476 G-H, 477 A]
There is no warrant for reading down sub-section 9A of
s. 16 so as to imply a favour in favour of disclosure to the
court The provision does not constitute an encroachment on
the constitutional jurisdiction or the High Court under Art.
226 and is accordingly not void. [477, C-D]
If the declaration under sub-section (2) or sub-s. (3)
is invalid, subs 9(a) of s. 16A will not be attracted on the
grounds of information and materials on which the order of
detention is made, would not be privileged under sub section
therefore, sub-section 9(a) of s. 16A enacts a genuine rule
of evidence. [477 A-B]
[His Lordship thought it unnecessary to go into the
question of construction and validity of s. 18 of the
Maintenance of Internal Security Act.] [464 A]
An obiter cannot take the place of the ratio. Judges
are not oracles. It has no binding effect and it cannot be
regarded as conclusive on the point when considering the
observations of a High judicial authority like this Court,
the greatest possible care must be taken to relate the
observations of a Judge to the precise issues before him and
to confine such observations, even though expressed in
broad terms, in the general compass of the question before
him unless he makes it clear that he intended his remarks to
have a wider ambit. It is not possible for Judges always to
express their judgments so as to exclude entirely the risk
that in some subsequent case their language may be
misapplied and any attempt at such perfection of expression
can only lead to the opposite result of uncertainty and even
obscurity as regard the case in hand. [1455 F-H, 456 A-C]
H. M. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia
Bahadur & Ors. v. Union of India [1971] 3 SCR 9, applied
Per H. R. Khanna, J. (dissenting)
Article 21 cannot be considered to be the role
repository of the right to life and personal liberty. The
right to life and personal liberty is the most decisions
right of human beings in civilised societies governed by the
rule of law. [266 F. 302 H]
Sanctity of life and liberty was not something new when
the Constitution was drafted. It represented a facet of
higher values which mankind began to cherish in its,
evolution from a state of tooth and claw to a civilized
existence. The principle that no one shall be deprived of
his life and liberty without the authority of law was not
the gift of the Constitution. It was a necessary corollary
of the concept relating to the sanctity of life and liberty,
it existed and was in force before the coming into force of
the Constitution. [268 C-D]
Even in the absence of Art. 21 in the Constitution, the
State has got no power to deprive a person of his life or
liberty without the authority of law. That is the essential
postulate and basic assumption of the Rule of Law and not of
men in all civilised nations. Without such sanctity of life
and liberty, the distinction between a Lawless society and
one governed by laws would cease to have any meaning. the
principle that no one shall be deprived of his life or
liberty without the authority of law is rooted in the
consideration that life and liberty are priceless
possessions which cannot be made the plaything of individual
whim and caprice and that any act which has
206
the effect of tampering with life and liberty must receive
substance from and sanction of the laws of the land. Article
21 incorporates an essential aspect of that principle and
makes it part of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in part
III of the Constitution. It does not, however, follow from
the above that if Art. 21 had not been drafted and inserted
in Part III, in that even would have been permissible for
the State to deprive a person of his life or liberty without
the authority of law. There are no case, to show that before
the coming into force of the Constitution or in countries
under Rule of Law where there is no provision corresponding
to Art. 21, a claim was ever sustained by the court, that
the State can deprive a person of his life or liberty
without the authority of law. [302 H, 269 H, 270 A C]
Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438 (1928); James
Sommersett's case (1772), 16 Cr. Pract. 289. Fabrigas v.
Mostyn 1 Cowp., 161. Ameer Khan's case 6 Bengal Law Reports

The view, that when right to enforce the right under
Art. 21 is supplied the result would be that there would be
no remedy against deprivation of a persons life or liberty
by the State even though such deprivation is without the
authority of law or even in flagrant violation of the
provisions of law is hot acceptable. the facts that the
framers of the Constitution made an aspect of such right a
part or the fundamental Rights did not have the effect of
determining the independent identity of such right and of
making Art. 21 to be the sole repository. Of that right. The
real effect was to ensure that a law under which a per on
can be deprived of his life or personal liberty should
prescribe a procedure for such deprivation or such law
should be a valid law not violation of Fundamental Rights
guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution Recognition as
Fundamental Right of one aspect of the pre-constitutional
right cannot have the effect of making things less
favourable so far as the sanctity of life and personal
liberty is concerned. compared to the position if an aspect
of such right had not been recognised as Fundamental Right
because of The vulnerability of Fundamental Rights accruing
from Art. 359. 1271 D-G]
A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88 and
Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil v. The State of Bombay [1955] I SCR
691, referred to.

After the coming into force of the Constitution a
detenu has two remedies one under Art. 226 or Art. 32 of the
Constitution and another under s. 491 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The remedy under an earlier statutory
provision would not get obliterated because of the identical
remedy by a subsequent Constitutional provision and that the
two can co-exist without losing their independent identity.
1272 D-E]
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797,
applied.

The principle that no one shall be deprived of his life
or liberty without the authority of law stems not merely
from the basic assumption in every civilised society
governed by the Rule of Law of the sanctity of life and
liberty, it flows equally from, the fact that under our
penal laws no one, is empowered to deprive a, person of his
life or liberty without the authority of law [272 l I, 273
A]
The fact that penal laws of India answer to the
description of the word law which has been used in Art. 21
would not militate against the inference
207
that Art. 21 is not the sole repository of the right to life
or personal liberty. Nor is it the effect of Art. 21 that
penal laws get merged in Art. 21 because of the act that
they constitute law as mentioned in Art. 21, for were it so
the suspension of the right to move a court for enforcement
of Fundamental Right contained in Art.. 21 would also result
in suspension of the right to move any court for enforcement
of penal laws. At one time the Constitution came into force,
the legal position was that no one could be deprived of his
life or liberty without the authority of law. [273 A-C]
Director of Rationing and Distribution v. 'The
Corporation of Calcutta & ors. [1961] 1 SCR 158, relied on.

It is difficult to accede to the contention that
because of Art. 21 of the Constitution, the law which was
already in force that no One could be deprived of his life
or liberty without the authority of law was obliterated and
ceased to remain in force. No rule of construction or
interpretation warrants such an inference. The
constitutional recognition of the remedy of writ of habeas
corpus did not obliterate or abrogate the statutory remedy
of writ of habeas corpus. Section 491. Of the Code of
Criminal Procedure continued to he a part of that Code till
that Code was replaced by the new Code. Although the remedy
of writ of habeas corpus is not now available under. the new
Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973, the same remedy is still
available under Art. 226 of the Constitution. [273 H, 274-A-
Ci
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797,
relied on.

According to the law in force in India before the
coming into force of the Constitution, no one could be
deprived of his life and personal liberty without the
authority of law. Such a claw continued to be in force after
the coming into force of the Constitution in view of Art.
372 of the Constitution. [303
The word law has been used in Art. 21 in the sense of
State made law and not as an equivalent of law in the
abstract or general sense embodying, the principles of
natural justice. The procedure established by law means the
procedure established by law made by the State, that is to
say, the Union Parliament or the legislatures of the States.
Law meant a valid and binding law under the provisions of
the Constitution and not one infringing Fundamental Rights.
[266 C-D]
A, K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [1950] SCR 88,
explained.

The effect of the suspension of the right to move any
court for the enforcement of the right conferred by Art. 21
is that when a petition is filed in a court, the court would
have to proceed upon the basis that no reliance can be
placed upon that Article for obtaining relief from the court
during the period of emergency. [266 D-E]
Starting consequences would follow from the acceptance
of the contention that consequent upon the issue of the
Presidential order in question, no one can seek relief from
courts during the period of emergency against deprivation of
life and personal liberty. If two constructions of the
Presidential order were possible, the court should lean in
favour of a view which does not result in such consequence.
The construction which does not result in such consequences
is not only possible, it is also pre-eminently possible.
1303 B-C]
Equally well established is the`rule of construction
that if there be a conflict between the municipal law on one
side and the international law or the provisions of any
treaty obligations on the other, the courts would give
effect to municipal law. If. however, two constructions of
the municipal law are possible, The court should lean in
favour of adopting such construction as would make the
provisions of the municipal law to the in harmony with the
international law or treaty obligations. While dealing with
the Presidential Order under Art. 359(1) such a construction
should be a adopted. as would, if possible, not bring it in
conflict with the above Articles 8 and 9 of U.N Charter. It
is plain that such a constructional is not only possible, it
is a also pre-eminently
208
reasonable The Presidential orders therefore, should be so
constructed as not to warrant arbitrary arrest or to bar
right to an effective remedy by competent national
tribunals for acts violating basic right of personal liberty
granted by law. 1276 A-B. 277 D-E]
Corocraft Ltd. v. Pan American Airways Inc [1969] 1
All. E.R. 80; Article 51 of` the Constitution, H. H.
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [1973] Supp.. SCR I,
referred to.

The argument that suspending the right of a person to
move any court for the enforcement of right to life and
personal liberty is done under a constitutional provision
and, therefore, it cannot be said that the resulting
situation would mean the absence of the Rule of law. cannot
stand close scrutiny for it tries to equate illusion of the
Rule of Law with the reality of Rule of Law. A state of
negation of Rule of Law would not cease to be such a slate
because of the tact that such a state of negation of Rule of
Law has been brought About by a statute. Absence of Rule of
Law would nevertheless be absence of Rule of Law even though
it is brought about by a law to repeal all laws. The Rule of
Law requires something, more the legal principle "quod
principi placuit legis habet vigorem." [277 E-H, 278 A-Bl
Freedom under law is not absolute freedom. It has its
own limitations in its own interest, and can properly be
described as regulated freedom. The truth that every man
ought to be free has for its other side the complementary
and consequential truth that no man can be absolutely free.
The need of liberty for each is necessarily qualified and
conditioned by the need of liberty for all Liberty in the
State, or legal liberty. is never the absolute liberty or
all, but relative and regulated liberty. Rule of law is true
antithesis of arbitrariness. The rule of law has come to be
regarded as the mark of a free society. Its content is
different in different countries. It is, however, identified
with the liberty of 'he individual. It seeks to maintain a
balance between the opposing notions of individual liberty
and Public order. 1267 C-D; 268 B-C]
In a long chain of authorities the Supreme Court has
laid stress upon the prevalence of the Rule of Law in the
country, according to which the executive cannot take action
prejudicial to the right of an individual without the
authority of law. There is no valid reason to depart from
the rule laid down in those decisions. 1278 E. 281 E, 303 C-
D]-

According to Art. 21. no one can be deprived of his
right to personal liberty except in accordance with the
procedure established by law. Procedure for the exercise of
power of depriving a person of his right of personal Liberty
necessarily postulates the existence of the substantive
power. When Art. 21 is in force, law relating to deprivation
of life and personal liberty must provide both for the
substantive power as well as the procedure for the exercise
of such power. When right to move in court for enforcement
of right guaranteed by Art 21 is suspended, it would have
the effect of dispensing with the necessity of prescribing
procedure for the exercise of substantive power to deprive a
person of his life and personal liberty, it cannot have the
effect of permitting an authority to deprive a person of his
life or personal liberty without the existence of such
substantive power. [303 D-F]
209
The difference in phraseology of the Presidential order
dated June 27, 1975 and that of the earlier Presidential
orders would not, however, justify the Conclusion that
because of the new Presidential order dated rune 27, 1975, a
detention order need not comply with the requirements of the
law providing for preventive detention. Such a detention
order would still be liable to be challenged in a court on
the ground that it does not comply with the requirement of
law For preventive detention if ground for such challenge be
permissible in spite of and consistently with the new
Presidential order. The effect of the change in phraseology
would only be that such of the observation made by his Court
fn the context of the language of the earlier Presidential
orders cannot now be relied upon. Reliance, however, can
still be placed upon the observations made in various cases
which were not linked with the phraseology of the earlier
Presidential orders. [263 F-H]
Makhan Singh v. Stare of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 797; State
of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Pandurang Sangzgiri & Anr.
[1966] 1 SCR 702 and Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of
Bihar & Ors. [1967] 1 SCR 709, referred to.

A Presidential order. under Art. 359(1) can suspend
during the period of emergency only the right to move any
court for enforcement of the Fundamental Rights mentioned in
the order. Rights created by statutes being not Fundamental
Rights can be enforced during the period of emergency
despite the Presidential order. Obligations and liabilities
flowing from statutory provisions likewise remain unaffected
by the Presidential order. Any redress sought from a court
of law on the score of breach of statutory provision would
be outside the purview of Art. 359(1) and the Presidential
order made thereunder. 1303 C-Hl
Anandan Nambiar & Anr. v. Chief Secretary, Govt. Of
Madras [1966] 2 SC`R 406 @ 410, referred to.

Clause (1A) of Art.. 359 protects laws and executive
actions from any attack on validity on the score of being
violation of the Fundamental Rights mentioned in the
Presidential order in the same way as Art. 358 protect the
laws and executive actions from being challenged on the
ground of being violative of Art. 19 during the period of
emergency. The language of clause (IA) of It. 359 makes it
clear that the protection which is afforded by that clause h
is to such law or execute action as the State would but for
the provisions contained in Part 111 of the Constitution be
competent to make or take. The word competent has a
significance and it is apparent that despite the
Presidential order under Art. 359(1) in the case of
executive action the competence of the State to take such
action would have to be established. Such competence .
Would, however, be judged ignoring the restriction placed by
the provisions or Part III of tho Constitution. To put it in
other words, clause (IA) of Art. 359 does not dispense with
the necessity of competence to make laws. Or take executive
action. But it would still be necessary to establish the
competence de hors the restrictions of the Fundamental
Rights. [283 D-E]
Though, there is no reference to substantive power in
Art. 21, it would cover both the existence of the
substantive power of depriving a person of his life and
personal liberty as well as the procedure for the exercise
of that power [284-D]
The suspension of the right to move a court for the
enforcement of the right contained in Art. 21 cannot have
the effect of debarring an aggrieved person from approaching
the courts with the complaint regarding deprivation of life
or personal liberty by an authority on the score that no
power has been vested in the authority to deprive a person
of life or liberty. The pre-supposition of the existence of
substantive power to deprive a person of his life or
personal liberty in Art. 21 even though that article only
mentions the procedure, would not necessarily point to the
conclusion that in the event of the suspension of the right
to move any court for the enforcement of Art. 21, the
suspension would also dispense with the necessity of the
existence of the substantive power The co-existence of
substantive power and procedure established by law for
depriving R person of his life and liberty which is implicit
in Art. 21 would not lead to the result that even if there
is suspension of the right regarding
16 -833 SCI/76.

210

procedure, suspension would also operate upon the necessity
of substantive power. What is true of a proposition need not
be true of the converse of that proposition. The suspension
of the right to make. any court for the enforcement of the
right contained in Art. 21 may have the effect of dispensing
with the necessity of prescribing procedure for the
exercise.. Of substantive power to deprive a person of his
life or personal liberty, it can in no case have the effect
of permitting an authority to deprive a person of his life
or personal liberty without the existence of substantive
power. The close bond which is there between the existence
of substantive power of depriving a Person of his life or
personal liberty and the procedure for the exercise of that
power, if the right contained in Art. 21 were in operation,
would not necessarily hold good if that right were suspended
because the removal of compulsion about the prescription of
procedure for the exercise of the substantive power would
not do away with the compulsion regarding the existence of
that power. [284 G-H, 285 A-G]
In considering the effect of Presidential order
suspending the right of a person tn move my court for
enforcement of right guaranteed by Art, 21, the words
"except according to procedure established by law should not
be treated to be synonymous with save by authority of law .
[285 D]
A Presidential order under Art. 359(1) cannot have the
effect of suspending the right to enforce rights flowing
from statutes, nor can it bar access to the courts of
persons seeking redresses on he s ore of contravention of
statutory provisions. Statutory provisions are enacted to be
complied with and it is not permissible to contravene them.
Statutory provisions cannot be treated as mere pious
exhortations or words of advice which may be adjured or
disobeyed with impunity. Nor is compliance with statutory
provisions optional or at the sufference of the official
concerned. It is the presence of legal sanctions which
distinguished positive law from other systems of rules and
norms. To be a legal system a set of norms must furnish
sanctions for some of its precepts. A legal sanction is
usually thought of as a harmful consequence to induce
compliance with law. Non-complince with statutory provisions
entails certain legal consequences. The Presidential order
cannot stand in the way of the courts giving effect to those
consequences. To put it differently, the executive
authorities exercising power under a statute have to act in
conformity with its provisions and within the limits set out
therein. When a statute deals with matters effecting
prejudicially the rights of individuals, the ambit of the
power of the authorities acting under the Statute would be
circumscribed by its provisions and it would not the
permissible to involve some indefinite general powers of the
executive. [286 D-H]
Attorney General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd. [1902]
AC 508, Jaichand Lall Sethia v. State of West Bengal [1966]
Supp. SCR 464; Durgadas Shirali V. Union of India & ors.
[1966] 2 SCR 573 and G. Sadanandan v. State of Kerala .&
Anr. [1966] 3 SCR 590, referred to.

Article 226 under which the High Courts can issue writs
of habeas corpus is an integral part of the Constitution. No
power has been conferred upon any authority in the
Constitution for suspending the power of the High Court to
issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus during the period
of emergency. Such a result cannot be brought about by
putting some particular construction on the Presidential
order in question. [288 B, 304 A-B]
Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1942] AC
284, Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien [1923]
AC 603 (609) and Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur & Ors. v. The
State of Punjab [1955] 2 SCR 225, referred to.

Article 226 of the Constitution confers power upon the
High Courts of issuing appropriate writs in case it is found
that the executive orders are not in conformity with the
provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the land.
Judicial scrutiny of executive orders with a view to ensure
that they are not violative of the provisions of the
Constitution and the laws of the land being an integral part
of our constitutional scheme. it is not permissible to
exclude judicial scrutiny except to the extent such
exclusion is warranted by the provi
211
sions of the Constitution and the laws made in accordance
with those provisions. [290 F-&]
There is a clear demarcation of the spheres of function
and power in our .`Constitution. The acceptance of the
contention advanced on behalf of the appellants would mean
that during the period of emergency, the courts would be
reduced to the position of being helpless spectators even if
glaring and blatant instances of deprivation of Life and
personal liberty in contravention of the statute are brought
to their notice. It would also mean that whatever it may be
the law passed by the legislature, in the matter of life,
and personal liberty of the citizens, the executive during
the period of emergency would not be bound by it and would
be at liberty to ignore and contravene it. It is obvious
that the acceptance of the contention would result in a kind
of supremacy of the executive over the legislate and
judicial organs of the State, and thus bring about a
constitutional imbalance which perhaps was never in the
contemplation of the framers of the Constitution. The fact
the the government which controls the executive has to enjoy
the confidence so the legislator does not d-tract from the
above conclusion. The executive under our constitutional
scheme is nob merely to enjoy the confidence of the majority
in the legislature it is also bound to carry out the
legislative as manifested by the statutes passed by the
legislature. The Constitution further contemplated that the
function of deciding whether the executive has acted in
accordance with the legislative intent should be performed
by the Courts. [290 G-H, 291 A-C]
No one can call deny the power of the State to assume
vast powers of the detention in the interest of the security
of the State. It may indeed the necessary to do so to meet
the peril acing the nation. The consideration of security
of the State must have a primacy and be kept in the
forefront compared to which the interests of the individual
can only take as secondary piece. The motto has to be who
lives, if the country dies. Extraordinary powers are always
assumed by the Government in all countries in times of
emergency because of the extraordinary nature of the
emergency. The exercise of the power of detention. it is
well-settled depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority and the courts can neither act as courts
of appeal over the decisions of the detaining authority nor
can they substitute their own opinion for that of the
authority regarding the necessity of detention. There is no
antithesis between the power of the State to detain a person
without trial under a law or preventive detention and the
power of the court to examine the legality of such
detention. Tn dealing with an application for a writ of
habeas corpus, the courts only, ensure that the detaining
authorities act in accordance with the law of preventive
detention. The impact upon the individual of the massive and
comprehensive powers of preventive detention with which the
administrative officers are armed l has to be cushioned with
legal safeguarded.. against arbitrary deprivation of
personal liberty if the premises of the rule of law is not
to lose its content and become meaningless. The chances of
an innocent person being detained under a law providing for
preventive detention on the subjective satisfaction of an
administrative authority are much greater compared on the
possibility of an innocent person being convicted at trial
in a court of law. 1291 F-H, 292 A, D-E]
Rex v. Halliday Ex-parte Sadiq [1917] A.C. 260 @ 272
and Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson [1942] A.C. 206 referred
to 7
The Presidential order of June 27. 1975, did not aspect
maintainability of the habeas corpus petitions to question
the legality of the detention orders and such petitions
could be proceeded with despite that order. [293 F]
Principle in James Commersett's case 1772 State Trials
p. 1, referred to.

A law of preventive detention is not punitive but
precautionary and preventive. The power of detention under
such law is based on circumstance of suspicion and not on
proof of allegation as is required at a regular trial for
the commission of an offence. [294 F]
A court cannot go behind the truth of the alleged
facts. If The material is germane to the object for which
detention is legally permissible and an
212
order. for detention is made don the basis of that material,
the courts cannot sit as a court of appeal and substitute
their own opinion for that of the authority concerned
regarding the necessity of detention. [295 E-F]
Sharpe v. Wakefield [1891] A.C. 172 at p. 179 and Ross
v. Papadopollos [1958] 2 All. E.R. 23 (on P. 33), referred
to.

Malice in fact is quite a different thing: it means an
actual malicious intention on the part of the person who has
done the wrongful act, and it May be, in proceedings based
on wrongs independent or contract, a very material
ingredient in the question of whether a valid cause of
action can be stated. [269 C-D]
Shearer v. Shields [1914] A.C. 808 Bhut Nath v. State
of West Bengal, [1974] 3 S.C.R. 315, referred to.

In view of the Presidential Order suspending the right
of the person to move any court for enforcement of specified
Fundamental Rights including the one under Art. 22(5), it
may with plausibility be argued that the vagueness of
grounds of detention would not warrant the quashing of such
detention order during the pendency of the Presidential
order on the score of violation of Art. 22(5). The
Presidential order would. however not stand in the way of
the infirmity of the vagueness of grounds of detention
because of the contravention of s. X(l) of Maintenance of
Internal Security Act. 1971. [297 E-F]
Every law providing for preventive detention contains
certain procedural safeguards. It is imperative that there
should be strict compliance with the requirements of those
procedural safeguards to sustain the validity of detention.
Detention without trial results in serious inroads into
personal liberty of an individual. In such case it is
essential to ensure. that there is no deviation from the
procedural safeguards provided by the statute. In the matter
of even a criminal trial. it is procedure that spells out
much of the difference between the rule of law and the rule
by whim and caprice. The need for strict adherence to`strict
procedural safeguards is much greater when we are dealing
with preventive detention which postulates detention of a
person even though he is not found guilty of the commission
of an offence. To condone or allow relaxation in the matter
of compliance with procedural requirements would necessarily
have the effect of practically doing away with even the
slender safeguards is provide by the legislature against
the arbitrary use of the provisions relating to prevention
detention. The history of personal Liberty is largely the
history of insistence upon procedure. It would. therefore be
wholly inappropriate to countenance and laxity in the mutter
of strict compliance with procedural requirements prescribed
for preventive detention. [297 G-H, 9`s A-B]
Once substantial disquieting doubt: are raised by the
detenue in the mind of the court regarding the validity or
his detention. it would be the bounden duty of the State to
dispel those doubts by placing sufficient material before
the court with a view to satisfy it about the validity of
the detention by filing a good return. [299 C-D]
Kishori Mohan v. State of West Bengal AIR 1974 SC`
1749; king Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji 71 IA 241 and G.
Sadanandan v. State of Kerala & Anr., [1966] 3 SCR 590,
referred to.

[His Lordship did not express any opinion on the
question of the validity of s 16A(9) of the Maintenance of
Internal Security Act.[ 301-A]
The appropriate occasion for the High Court to go into
the constitutional validity of s. 16A(9) and external all
judicial scrutiny in writs of habeas corpus would be when
the State or a detenu whoever is aggrieved upon, comes in
appeal against the final judgments in any of the petitions
pending in the High courts. The whole matter would then be
at large before the Supreme Court and it would not be
inhibited by procedural or other constraints. It would not
be permissible or proper for the Supreme Court to short
circuit the whole
213
thing and decide the matter by by-passing the High Courts
who are seized of the matter. [302 F-G and 304 D-E]
Section 18 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act
would not detract from the view that Art. 21 is not the sole
repository of the right to personal liberty. The principle
that no one shall be deprived of his life and personal
liberty without the authority of law is also an essential
facet of the Rule of law. Section 18, therefore, cannot be
of much assistance. The view that s. 18 would have the
effect of enlarging the ambit of the power of the detaining
authority for the purpose of passing an order for detention
is not correct. There has been no amendment of s. 3 of the
Act. [274 D-F]
Section 18 cannot be construed to mean that even if an
order for detention is made on grounds not warranted by s. 3
of the Act, it shall be taken to be an order under s. 3 of
the Act. Apart from the fact that such an inference is not
permissible on the language of s. 18, the acceptance of this
view would also render the validity of s. 18 open to
question on the ground that it suffers from the vice of
excessive delegation of legislative power. The legislature
is - bound to lay down the legislative policy by
prescribing the circumstances in which an order for
detention can be made. It is not permissible for the
legislature to confer a power of detention without laying
down guidelines and prescribing the circumstances in which
such order should be made. To do so would be tantamount to
abdication of Legislation function for in such an event it
would be open to the detaining authority to detain a person
on any ground whatsoever. [274 F-H, 275 A]
This Court in appeal by the State enlarge the area of
the Unfavourable decision qua the state and make its
position worse compared to what it was before the filing of
the appeal. Procedural propriety in matters relating to
appeals forbids such a course. The question of event of
judicial scrutiny in the- light of s. 16A should be gone
into when the whole matter is at large before this court and
this court is not inhibited by procedural and other
constraints from going into certain aspects which have a
vital bearing. It is primarily for the High Courts before
which the matters are pending to decide the question of the
of judicial scrutiny in the light of s. 16A(9), as amended
by Act. 14 of 1976. A course which has the effect of
bypassing the High Courts and making this Court in appeals
from orders on preliminary objection to decide the matter
even before the matter has been considered by the High Court
in the light of S. 16A(9), as, amended by Act 14 of 1976
should be avoided. [301 F-H]
There is no sufficient ground to interfere with the
view taken by all the nine High Courts which went into the
matter that the Presidential order dated June 27, 1975, did
not affect the maintainability of the habeas corpus
petitions to question the legality of the detention orders.
[304-C]
The principles which should be followed by the courts
in dealing with petitions for writs of habeas corpus to
challenge the legality of detention are well-established.
1304-D]
Unanimity obtained without sacrifice of conviction
commends the decision to public confidence. Unanimity which
is merely formal and which is recorded at the expense of
strong conflicting views is not desirable in a court of last
resort. [304-E]
A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the
brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future
day when a later decision may possibly correct the error
into which the dissenting Judge believes the court have been
betrayed. [304-G]
Prophets with Honor by Alan Barth 1974 Ed. p. 3-6.
referred to.

Observation: Judges are not there simply to decide
cases, but to decide them as they think they should be
decided, and while it may be regrettable that they cannot
always agree, it is better that their independence should be
maintained and recognise than that unanimity should be
secured through its sacrifice.

214

&
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 279 of
1975.

(From the Judgment and order dated 1.9.75 of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court m M. P. No. 597 of 1975) and
Criminal Appeals No. 355-356 of 1975.

(From the judgment and order dated 12.11.1975 of the
Allahabad Court in W.P. Nos 7428 and 6885 of 75) and
Civil Appeal Nos. 1845-1849 of 1975
(From the Judgment and order dated 26.11.1975 of the
Karnataka High Court in W. N. Nos. 3318, 4101, 4103, 4177
and 4178 of 1975) and
Criminal Appeal No. 380 of 1975.

(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order
dated 31.10.1975 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Writ
No. 149/75) and
Criminal Appeal No. 41 of 1976
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order
dated 19-11-1975 of Delhi High Court in Criminal Writ No.
158 of 149/75) and
Criminal Appeal No. 41 of 1976
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order
dated 31 10.75 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Writ No.
128/75) and
Criminal Appeal No. 389 of 1975
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order
dated 5/ 6/8th Dec. 1975 of the Bombay High Court in
Criminal Appln. Nos. 171, 95, 97, 99, 109, 115, 116 and
168/75) and
Criminal Appeal No. 3 of 1976
(From the Judgment and order dated 12.12.1975 of the
High Court of Rajasthan in D. B. Crl. Habeas Corpus petition
No. 1606 of 1975) and
Applicant/Interveners

O. K. Tikhu, Advocate General and Vineet Kumar for the
state of Jammu and Kashmir in CA. Nos. 1845-1849
R. N. Byra Reddy, Advocate General and N. Nettar for
the State of Karnataka in Crl. A. 279 and 1845/75.

M. M. Abdul Khader, Advocate General and D. K. M. K.
Nair for the State of Kerala in Crh As. 279, 35S-3S6/75.

R. W. Adik Advocate General and D. R. Dhanuka and M. N.
Shroff for the state of Maharashtra in Crl. As. 279, 355-
356/75.

J. S. Wasu, Advocate General and O. P. Rana for the
state of Punjab in Crl. As. 279, 355-356/75.

A. V. Rangam and Miss A. Subhashini for the state of
Tamil Nadu in Crl. As. 279, 355-356/75.

S. N. Kakar, Advocate General and J. M. Nanavati (O.P. Rana)
for the state of Uttar Predesh in Crl. A. 279 and CA No.
1845-1849/75.

J. M. Thakore, Advocate General, J. M. Nanavati, S. K.
Dholakia and R. C. Bhatia for the state of Gujarat in an
appeals.

The following Judgments were delivered:

RAY, C.J. These appeals are by certificates in some
cases and by leave in other cases. The state is the
appellant, The respondents were petitioners in the High
Courts.

217

The respondents filed applications in different High
Courts for the issue of writ of habeas corpus. They
challenged in some cases the validity of the 38th and the
39th Constitution Amendment Acts, the Proclamation of
Emergency by the President under Article 352 of the
Constitution made on 25 June, 1975. They challenged the
legality and validity of the orders of their detention in
all the cases.

The State raised a preliminary objection that the
Presidential order dated 27 June, 1975 made under Article
359 of the Constitution suspending the detenus right to
enforce any of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and
22 of the Constitution and the continuance of emergency
during which by virtue of Article 358 all rights conferred
by Article 19 stand suspended are a bar at the threshold for
the resonants to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution and to ask for writs
of habeas corpus.

The Judgment are of the High Courts of Allahabad,
Bombay (Nagpur Bench), Delhi, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh,
Punjab and Rajasthan.

The High Courts held that notwithstanding the
continuance of emergency and the Presidential Order
suspending the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred
by Articles 14,21 and 22 the High Courts can examine whether
an order of detention is in accordance with the provisions
of Maintenance of Internal Security Act (hereinafter
referred to as the Act), which constitute the conditions
precedent to the exercise of powers thereunder excepting
those provisions of the Act which are merely procedural or
whether the order was necessary. The High courts also held
that in spite of suspension of enforcement of fundamental
rights conferred by Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution a
person's right to freedom from arrest or detention except in
accordance with law can be enforced only where such arrest
and detention except in accordance with law can be enforced
only where such arrest and detention are not in accordance
with those provisions of the statue which form the
conditions precedent to the exercise of power under the
status as distinguished from merely procedural provisions or
are malafide or are not based on relevant materials by which
the detaining authority could have been satisfied that the
order of detention was necessary.

The High Courts held that the, High Courts could not go
into the questions whether the Proclamation of Emergency was
justified or whether the continuance thereof was malafide.

It is appropriate lo mention here that on 3 December,
1971 in exercise of powers conferred by clause (1) of
Article 352 of the Constitution the President by
Proclamation declared that a grave emergency exists whereby
he security of India is threatened by external aggression.

On 25 June, 1975 the President in exercise of powers
conferred by clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution
declared that a grave. emergency exists whereby the security
of India is threatened by internal disturbances.

On 27 June, 1975 in exercise of powers conferred by
clause (1) of Article 359 the President declared that the
right of any person including a foreigner to move any Court
for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 14,
Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution and all
proceedings pending in any Court for the enforcement of the
above-mentioned rights shall remain suspended for the period
during which the Proclamations of Emergency made under
clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution on 3 December,
1971 and on 25 June, 1975 are both in force. The
Presidential order of 27 June, 1975 further stated that the
same shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any
order made before the date of the aforesaid order under
clause (1) of Article 359 of the Constitution.

It should be noted here that on 8 January, 1976 there
was a notification that in exercise of powers conferred by
clause (1) article 359 of the Constitution the President
declares that the right of any perh son to move any Court
for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 19 of
the Constitution and all proceedings pending in any Court
for the enforcements the above-mentioned rights shall remain
suspended for the period during which the Proclamation of
Emergency made under clause (1) of Article 352 of the
Constitution on 3 December 1971 and on 25 June, 1975 are in
force.

The questions which fall for consideration are two .
First, whether in view of the Presidential orders date 27
June, 1975 and 8 January, 1976 under clause (1) of Article
359 of the Constitution any writ petition under Article 226
before a High Court for habeas corpus to enforce the right
to personal liberty of a person detained under the Act on
the ground that the order of detention or the continued
detention is for any reason not under or in compliance with
the Act is maintainable. Second if such a petition is
maintainable what is the scope or extent of judicial
scrutiny particularly in view of the Presidential order
dated 27 June, 1975 mentioning, inter alia, Article 22 of
the Constitution and also in view of sub section (9) of
section 16A of the Act.

The Attorney General contended that the object and
purpose of emergency provisions is that the Constitution
provides special powers to the Executive because at such
times of emergency the considerations of state assume
importance. It has been recognised that times of grave
national emergency demand grant of special power to the
Executive Emergency provisions contained in Part XVIII
including Articles 358,
219
359(1) and 359(1A) are constitutional imperatives. The
validity of law cannot be challenged on the ground of
infringing a fundamental right mentioned in the Presidential
Order under Article 359(1). Similarly, if the Executive
take any action depriving a person of a fundamental right
mentioned in the Presidential order any not complying with
the law such Executive action can not be challenged because
such challenge would amount in substance to and would
directly impinge on the enforcement of fundamental rights
mentioned in the Presidential order. The reason given by the
Attorney General behind e principle is that in times of
emergency the Executive safeguards the life of nation.
Challenge to Executive actions either on the ground that
these are arbitrary or unlawful has been` negatived in
England in Liversidge v. Anderson(l) and Greene v. Secretary
of State for Home Affairs(') and also by this Court in Sree
Mohan Chowdhury v. the Chief Commissioner, Union Territory
of Tripura(3) and Makhan Singh v, State of Punjab(4).

The contentions of the respondents are as follows: The
arguments on behalf of the state mean that during the
emergency there is no right to life or liberty. Article 358
is more extensive as the fundamental right itself is
suspended. The Presidential order under Article 359(1) does
not suspend any fundamental right.

Second, the object of Article 359(1) is to bar moving
the Supreme Court under Article 32 for the enforcement of
certain specified rights without affecting in any manner the
enforcement of common law and statutory rights to personal
liberty under Article 226 before the High Court.

Third, Article 359(1) removes the fetter in Part III
but does not remove the fetters arising from the principles
of limited power of the Executive under the system of checks
and balances based on separation of powers.

Fourth, while the Presidential order operates only in
respect of fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential
order it would not affect the rights of personal liberty at
common law or under statute law or under natural law.

Fifth, Article 359(1) is not to protect illegal orders
of the Executive. The Executive cannot flout the command of
Parliament relying on a Presidential older under Article
359(1). The suspension of fundamental right or of its
enforcement cannot increase the power of the executive vis-
a-vis the individual.

Sixth, there is no reason to equate the state with the
Executive. The suspension of the fundamental right or the
right to enforce it has only this consequence that it
enables the Legislature to make laws violative of the
suspended fundamental rights and the Executive to implement
such laws. The suspension of the fundamental right does not
unable the Executive to flout legislative mandates and
judicial decisions.

(1) [1942] A. C. 206. (2) [1942] A. C. 284.

(3) [1964] 3 S. C. R. 442. (4) [196414 Sr C. R. 797.

220

Seventh, the Executive can act to the prejudice of
citizens only to the extent permitted by valid laws. The
Proclamation of Emergency does not widen the Executive power
of the state under Article 162 so as to empower the State to
take any Executive action which it is not otherwise
competent to take.

Eighth, the right to arrest is conferred by the Act on
the State and their officers only if the conditions laid
down under section 3 of the Act are fulfilled. Therefore, if
the conditions laid down under section 3 of the Act are not
complied with by the detaining authority then the order of
detention would be ultra vires the said Act.

Ninth, Habeas corpus is a remedy not only for the
enforcement of he right to personal liberty,, whether under
natural law or a statute but is also a remedy for the
enforcement of the principle of ultra vires viz., when the
detaining authority has failed to comply with the conditions
laid down in section 3 of the Act. In such a case the High
Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ af haheas corpus for
the enforcement of the principle of ultra vire.;.

In England it was the practice in times of danger to
the state to pass what were popularly known as Habeas
Corpus Suspension Acts. Suspension did not legalise illegal
arrest; it merely suspended a particular remedy in respect
of particular offences. Accordingly it was the practice in
England at the close of the period of suspension to pass an
Indemnity Act in order to protect official concerned from
the consequences of any incidental illegal acts which they
might have committed under cover of the suspension of the
prerogative writ.

In England the Defence of the Realm Acts 1914-18
empowered the Executive to make regulations by order in
Council for securing the public safety or for the defence of
the realm. In The King v. Hallday Ex parte Zadiq(1) the
House of Lords held that a regulation was valid which
authorised the Secretary of state to detain a British
subject on the grounds of his hostile origin or association.
It was contended on behalf of Zadiq that there was no
provision for imprisonment without trial. The substantial
contention was that general words in a statute could not
take away the vested right of a subject or alter the
fundamental law of the Constitution because it would be
repugnant to the Constitutional tradition of the country.
The majority of the court swept aside these arguments and
held that on the construction of the Act. the Executive had
unrestricted powers.

During the Second World War the Emergency Powers
(Defence) Act, 1939 in England empowered the making of
regulations for the detention of persons by the Secretary of
state in the interests of the public safety or the defence
of the realm, and for authority to enter and search any
premises.

Although access to the courts was not barred during the
Second World War in England the scope for judicial review of
executive action
(1) [1917] A. C. 260.

221

was limited. The courts could not consider whether a
particular regulation is necessary or expedient for the
purpose of the Act which authorised it. The question of
necessity or expediency was one for the Government to
decide. The court could, however, hold an act to be illegal
as being not authorised by the regulation relied upon to
Justify it.

It was open to the subject in England to challenge
detention by application for a writ of habeas corpus, but
such application had little chance of success in view of the
decision of the House of Lords in Liversidge's case (supra).
The House of Lords took the view that the power to detain
could not be controlled by the courts, if only because
considerations of security forbade proof of the evidence
upon which detention was ordered. It was sufficient for the
Home Secretary to have a belief which in his mind was
reasonable. The courts would not enquire into the grounds
for his belief, although apparently they might examine
positive evidence of mala fides or mistaken identity. In
Greece's case (supra) the House of Lords held that a mistake
on the part of the advisory committee in failing, as was
required by the regulation, to give the appellant correct
reasons for his detention did not invalid the detention
order. It is noticeable how the same House expressed this
view without any dissent.

Dicey states that this increase in the power of the
Executive is no trifle, but it falls far short of the
process known in some foreign countries as `'suspending the
constitutional guarantees" or in France as the proclamation
or a State of siege'`. Under the Act of 1881 the Irish
executive obtained the absolute power of arbitrary and
preventive arrest, and could without breach of law detain in
prison any person arrested on suspicion for the whole period
for which the Act continued in force. Under the Prevention
of Crime (Ireland) Act, 1882 the Irish Executive was armed
with extraordinary powers in the case of certain crimes to
abolish right to trial by jury.

The Act of Indemnity in England is a retrospective
statute which frees persons who had broken the law from
responsibility for its breach, and thus make acts lawful
which when they were committed were unlawful. A Habeas
Corpus Suspension Act does not free any person from civil or
criminal liability for a violation of the law. The
suspension, indeed, of the Habeas Corpus Act may prevent the
person arrested from taking at the moment any proceeding
against the Secretary of State. While the suspension lasts,
he will not be able to get himself discharged from prison.
If the prisoner has been guilty of no legal offence then on
the expiration of the Suspension Act the Secretary of State
and his subordinates arc liable to actions or indictments
for their illegal conduct.

Dicey stated that the unavowed object of a Habeas
Corpus Suspension Act is to unable the Government to do acts
which, though politically expedient may not he strictly
legal. The Parliament which suspends one of the guarantees
for individual freedom must hold that a crisis has arisen
when the rights of individuals must be postponed to
consideration or State. A Suspension Act would in facts fail
of it.

222

main object, unless the officials felt. assured that, as
long as they bonafide, and uninfluenced by malice or by
corrupt motives, carried out the policy of which the Act was
visible sign, they would be protected from penalties for
conduct which, though it night be technically a breach of
law, was nothing more than the free exertion for the public
good of that discretionary power which the suspension of
Habeas Corpus Act was intended to confer Upon the executive.

The position in America is described in Cooley on the
General Principles of Constitutional Law in the U.S.A.
Fourth Edition. In America he right to the writ of Habeas
Corpus is not expressly declared in the Constitution, but it
is recognised in the provision Article 1 in section 9 clause
(2) that the privilege of writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the
public safety may require it. In America the power in
suspend the privilege is a legislative power and the
President cannot exercise it except as authorised by law.
The suspension does not legalise what is doing while it
continues. It merely suspends or the time this particular
remedy. All other remedies for illegal arrests remain, and
may be pursued against the parties making or continuing
them.

Liberty is confined and controlled by law, whether
common law or statute. It is in the words of Burke a
regulated freedom. It is not an abstract or absolute
freedom. The safeguard of liberty is in the good sense of
the people and in the system of representative and
responsible government which has been evolved. If
extraordinary powers are given, they are given because the
emergency is extraordinary, and are limited to the period of
the emergency.

Unsuitability of a court of law for determining matters
of discretionary policy was referred to by Lord Parker in
the Zamora(1) case and Lord Finlay in the Zadiq case
(supra). In the Liversidge's case (supra) it was held that
the. court is not merely an inappropriate tribunal, but one
the jurisdiction of which is unworkable and even illusory in
these cases. A court of law could not have before it the
information on which the Secretary acts still less the
background of statement and national policy what is and what
must determine the action which he takes upon it.

The Liversidge case (supra) referred to these
observations in the Zadiq case (supra) "However precious the
personal liberty of the subject may be, there is something
for which it may well be, to some extent, sacrificed by
legal enactment, namely, national success in the war or
escape from national plunder or enslavement". Liberty is
itself the gift of the law and may by the law be forfeited
or abridged.

There is no record of any life of an individual being
taken away either in our country during emergency or in
England or America during emergency in their countries. It
can never be reasonably assumed that such a think will
happen. Some instances from different countries were
referred to by some counsel for the respondents as to what
happened there when people were murdered in gas chambers or
(1) [1916] 2 A. C. 107.

223

people were otherwise murdered. Such instances are intend to
produce a kind of terror and horror and are hortative in
character. People who have faith in themselves and in their
country will not paint pictures of diabolic distortion and
mendacious malignment of the governance of the country.
Quite often arguments are heard that extreme examples the
given to test the power. If there is power, extreme examples
will neither add to the power nor rob the same. Extreme
examples tend only to obfuscate reason and reality.

The reffect of the Suspension of Habeas Corpus Acts and
of Indemnity Acts in England has been to give every man
security and confidence in periods of public danger or
apprehension. Rarely, however, has this been suffered
without jealousy, hesitation and remonstrance. Whenever the
perils of the State have been held sufficient to warrant
this sacrifice of personal liberty, no Minister or
Magistrate has been suffered to tamper with the law at his
discretion. Where the Government believes the State be
threatened by traitorous conspiracies during times of grave
emergencies the rights of individuals of ordinary times
become subordinate to considerations of the State.

The pre-eminent questions are four. First, is the
Presidential order under Article 359 a bar at the threshold
Second, is Article 21 the sole repository of right to the
and personal liberty. Third is the Presidential order
subject to the rubric of Rule of Law ? Fourth is section
16A(9) of the Act a rule of evidence ?

The first question turns on the depth and content of
the Presidential order. The vital distinction between
Article 358 and Article 359 is that Article 358 suspends the
rights only under Article 19 to the extent that the
Legislature can make laws contravening Article 19 during the
operation of a Proclamation of Emergency and the Executive
can take action which the Executive is competent to take
under such laws. Article 358 does not suspend any
fundamental right. While a Proclamation of Emergency is in
operation the Presidential order under Article 359(1) can
suspend the enforcement of any or all fundamental rights.
Article 359(1) also suspends any pending proceedings for the
enforcement of such fundamental right or rights. The purpose
and object of Article 359(1) is that the enforcement of any
fundamental right mentioned in the Presidential order is
barred or it remains suspended during the emergency. Another
important distinction between the two Articles is that
Article 355 provides for indemnity where as Article 359(1)
does not Article 359(1A) is on the same lines as Article 358
but Article 359(1A) now includes all fundamental rights
which may be mentioned in a Presidential order and is
therefore much wider than Article 358 which includes Article
19 only.

A person can enforce a fundamental right both in the
case of law being made in violation of that right and also
if the Executive acts in non-compliance with valid laws or
acts without the authority of law. It cannot be said that
the scope of Article 359(1) is only to restrict the
application of the Article to the Legislative field and not
to the Acts of the Executive. The reason is that and
enforcement of the fundamental rights mentioned in the
Presidential order is barred
224
and any challenge either to law or to any act of the
Executive on the ground that it is not in compliance with
the valid law or without authority of law will amount to
enforcement of fundamental rights and will, therefore, be
within the mischief of the Presidential order. The effect of
the Presidential order suspending the enforcement of
fundamental r right amounts to bar the locus standi of any
person to move the court on the ground of violation of a
fundamental right.

The Constitution is the mandate. the Constitution is
the rule of law. No one can arise above the rule of law in
the Constitution. The decisions of this Court in Mohan
Chowdhury's (supra) case, Makhan Singh's (supra) case and
Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Ors (1) are that
any court means all courts including this Court and high
Courts and the right to initiate legal proceedings. A person
can enforce fundamental rights in this Court under Article
32 as well as in the High Courts under Article 226. It is
idle to suggest that the object of Article 359(1) is that
the right to move this Court only is barred and not the
right to move any High Court. Article 226 does not provide
a guaranteed fundamental right like Article 32. This
guaranteed right under Article 32 itself may be suspended by
a Presidential order under Article 359(1). In such a case it
could not be said that the object of the makers of the
Constitution is that a person could not move this Court for
the enforcement of fundamental rights mentioned in the
Presidential order but could do so under article 226. the
bar created by. Article 359(1) applies to petitions for the
enforcement of fundamental rights mentioned in the
Presidential order whether by way of an application under
Article 32 or by way of any application under Article 226.
[See Makhan Singh's case (supra) and Ram Manohar Lohia's
case (supra)].

It is incorrect to say that the jurisdiction and powers
of this Court under Article 32 and of the High Courts under
Article 226 are virtually abolished by the Presidential
order without any amendment of the Constitution. No
amendment of the Constitution is necessary because no
jurisdiction and power either of this Court or of the High
Court is taken away. When a Presidential order takes away
the locus standi of the detenus to move any court for the
enforcement of fundamental rights for the time being the
jurisdiction and powers of this Court and of the High Courts
remain unaltered Article 359(1) is not directed against any
court. It is directed against an individual and deprives him
of his locus standi.

The courts cannot either increase or curtail the
freedom of individuals contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution. The courts interpret the Constitution and the
laws in accordance with law and judicial conscience and not
emotion. It is wrong to say that the Executive has asked or
directed any one not to comply with the conditions of the
Act. The question is not whether the Executive should comply
or should not comply with the Act but whether a detenu has a
locus standi to move any court for a writ in the nature of
habeas corpus of the ground of non-compliance with the
provisions of the Act.

(1) [1966] 1 S. C. R. 709.

225

In period of public danger or apprehension the
protective law which gives every man security and
confidence in times of tranquility has to give way to
interests of the State. The opinion in England has been
that when danger is imminent, the liberty of the subject is
sub ordinated to the paramount interests of the State. Ring
leaders are seized and outrages anticipated. Plots are
disconcerted, and the dark haunts of conspiracy filled with
distrust and terror (See May-Constitutional History of
England, Vol. l, pp. 130-135).

While the courts of law are in normal times peculiarly
competent to weigh the competing claims of individuals and
government they are in equipped to determine whether a given
configuration of events threatens the life of the community
and thus constitutes an emergency. Neither are they
equipped, once an emergency has been recognised particularly
a war emergency or emergency on account of security of the
country being threatened by internal aggression to measure
the degree to which the preservation of the life of the
community may require governmental control of the activities
of the individual. Jurists do not have the vital sources of
information and advice which are available to the executive
and the legislature; nor have they the burden of formulating
and administering the continuing programme of the
government, and the political responsibility of the people,
which, though intangibles, are of crucial importance in
establishing the content within which such decisions must be
made.

Article 359(1) makes no distinction between the threat
to the security of India by war or external aggression on
one hand and threat to the security of India by internal
disturbance on the other. In fact, both situations are
covered by the expression "grave emergency" in Article
352(1). Apart from Article 359(1) all provisions of the
Constitution laying down the consequences of a Proclamation
of Emergency under Article 352(1) would apply to both
situations. The consequences of a Proclamation of Emergency
under Article 352(1) of our Constitution are much wider than
in England or America.

Article 353 provides that the executive power of the
Union shall extend to giving of directions to any State as
to manner in which the executive power thereof is to be
exercised. The exercise of such executive power by the Union
totally displaces the provisions of Article 162. Non-
compliance with directions of the Union Executive under
Article 353 by any State Executive may attract the
provisions of Article 356 and the President's Rule may be
imposed on that State. In such an event, Parliament may,
under Article 357(1) confer on the President the power of
the Legislature of that State to make laws or to delegate
such legislative power to any other authority. In such a
situation, the federal structure and representative
Government on which the Constitution is based may be
completely changed in the State or States concerned. Article
250 provides that during the operation of Proclamation of
Emergency Parliament may make laws with respect to any of
the matters enumerated in the State list. The Federal
Structure and representative government may suffer its full
place in that situation.

17-833 SCI/76.

226

on the expiry of the operation of the Presidential
order under Article 359(1), the infringement of the
fundamental rights mentioned in the order, either by the
legislative enactment or by an executive action, may be
challenged in a court of law and if after such expiration
Parliament passes an Act of Indemnity, the validity and the
effect of such legislation may have to be scrutinised. [See
Makhan Singh's case (supra) at 813].

The provisions in our Constitution relating to
emergence, are of wide amplitude. The Executive is armed
with special powers because individual interests are
subordinated to State security. If law is invalid vis-a-vis
fundamental rights there cannot be any challenge during the
operation of Articles 358 and 359 on the ground that law
violates fundamental rights. It is contradictory to say that
there can yet be challenge to orders under that law as being
not in accordance with law. Article 19 is a prohibition
against law. Article 19 has nothing to do with the
Executive. Law under Article 21 can be punitive or
preventive. In Article 22 reference is made to grounds and
representation in cases of preventive detention. If
enforcement of Article 22 is suspended one is left with
Article 21.

The Act in the present case is law. The Executive
orders are under that law. Any allegation that orders are
not under that law will not rob the orders of the protective
umbrella of Article 359. The challenge by a detenu that law
is broken will be enforcement of Article 21 because law
contemplated under Article 21 is substantive as well as
procedural law. A law can be broken either of substantive or
procedural parts. Neither enforcement of nor relief to
personal liberty is based on Article 19. No executive action
is valid unless backed by law. In the present cases there is
law authorising detention. In the present cases, the writs
questioned the validity of detention. The Legislature under
Article 358 is authorised to act in breach of Article 19.
The executive can act only in terms of that law. If this is
pre emergency law it has to satisfy Part III of our
Constitution. If it is emergency law it can violate Article
19 because it is protected by Article 358.

Under Article 359 the Presidential orders have been of
two types. on 3 November, 1962 in exercise of powers
conferred by clause (1) of Article 359 of the Constitution
the President declared that "the right of any person to move
any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by
Article 21 and Article 22 shall remain suspended for the
period during which the Proclamation of Emergency issued
under clause (1) of Article 352 on 26 October, 1962 is in
force, if such a person has been deprived of any right under
the Defence of India ordinance 1962 or of any rule or order
made thereunder". the 1975 Presidential order under Article
359(1) does not have the words "if such a person has been
deprived of any such right under the Defence of India
ordinance 1962 or any rule or order made thereunder". In
other words, the 1962 Presidential order is limited to the
condition of deprivation of rights under the Defence of
India ordinance or any rule or order made thereunder whereas
in the 1975 Presidential order no statute is mentioned. The
illegality of orders was challenged in
227
Makhan Singh's case (supra) in spite of the Presidential
order under the 1962 Proclamation on the ground that the
impeached orders are not in terms of the statute or they are
made in abuse of law.

The decisions of this Court in Mohan Chowdhury's and
Makhan Singh's cases (supra) are that during the operation
of a Proclamation of emergency no one has any locus standi
to move any court for the enforcement of any fundamental
rights mentioned in the Presidential Order. The ratio must
necessarily apply to Executive acts because Executive acts
are challenged on the grounds of being contrary to law and
without the authority of law. The submission of the
respondents that a person in detention can come to a court
of law in spite of the Presidential order under Article
359(1) and contend that a habeas corpus should be issued for
his release or that the Executive should answer the detenu's
challenge that the Act complained of is without authority of
law or the challenge of the detenu that the provisions of
the Legislative Act under which the detention has been made
have not been complied with are all rooted in the
enforcement of fundamental rights to liberty under Articles
21 and 22. If courts will in spite of the Presidential order
entertain such applications and allow the detenus to enforce
to start or continue proceedings or enforce fundamental
rights. Article 359(1) will be nullified and rendered
notice.

This Court in Makhan Singh's case (supra) said that if
there was challenge to the validity of the detention order
based on any right other than those mentioned in the
Presidential order that detenu's right to move any court
could not be suspended by the Presidential order because the
right was outside Article 359(1). This was explained by
stating that if the detention was challenged on the ground
that it contravened the mandatory provisions of the relevant
Act or that it was malafide and was proved to be so, the bar
of the Presidential order could have no application.

This observation in Makhan Singh's case (supra) is to
be understood in the context of the question that arose for
decision there. Decision on a point not necessary for the
purpose of or which does not fall to be determined in that
decision becomes an obiter dictum [See Maharajadhiraja
Madhav Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia Bahadur & Ors. v. Union of
India(1). In Makhan Singh's case (supra) the detention
orders which were the subject matter of the judgment were
orders made by the Executive under the Defence of India
ordinance or Act and rules and orders made thereunder which
was the express condition for detention in respect of which
the Presidential order of 1962 under Article 359(1) applied.

The Presidential order in the present case is on the
face of it an unconditional order and as such there is the
vital and telling difference between the effect of the
Presidential order of 1962 and the present Presidential
order. It is obvious that the Government fully conscious of
the Presidential order of 1962 and its effect as determined
by the decisions of this Court in Makhan Singh's case
(supra) and subsequent
(1) [1971] S. C. R. 9 at pp. 97-98, 193-194.

228

cases deliberately made the present Presidential order an
unconditional order under Article 359(1).

Reference may be made to State of Maharashtra v.
Prabhakar Pandurang Sangzgiri and Anr.(1) which clearly
pointed out that the Presidential order of 1962 was a
conditional one and therefore if a person was deprived of
his personal liberty not under the Act or rules and orders
made thereunder but in contravention thereof, his right to
move the courts in that regard would not be suspended The
decision of this Court in Pandurang's case (supra) is by the
Constitution Bench of five learned Judges, three of whom
were on the Constitution Bench of seven learned Judges
deciding Makhan Singh's case (supra). In Pandurang's case
(supra) the ratio was that if a personal was deprived of his
personal liberty not under the Act or rules and orders made
thereunder but in contravention thereof, his right to move
the courts in that regard was not suspended
It, therefore, follows from the decisions in
Pandurang's case and Makhan Singh's case (supra) that the
ratio in both the cases was that the 1962 Presidential order
being a conditional one the enforcement of rights under
Articles 21 and 22 was suspended only to the extent of the
conditions laid down in the Presidential order and the
suspension could not operate in areas outside the
conditions. There is no aspect whatever. Of any condition in
the present Presidential order. Therefore, the decisions in
Makhan Singh's case (supra) and subsequent cases following
it have no application to the present cases where the
suspension is not hedged with any condition of enforcement
of any right under Articles 21 and 22. The conclusion for
the forging reasons is that the Presidential order is a bar
at the threshold.

The heart of the matter is whether Article 21 is the
sole repository of the right to personal liberty. If the
answer to that question be in the affirmative the
Presidential order will be a bar.

The contentions of the Attorney General are two-fold.
First, the legal enforceable right to personal liberty for
violation thereof by the Executive is a fundamental right
conferred by the Constitution and is embodied in Article 21.
Second, apart from Article 21 the right to personal liberty
against the Executive is neither a common law right nor a
statutory right nor a natural right. He relies on three
decisions. The earliest is Girindra Nath Banerjee v.
Birendra Nath Pal(2). The others are King Emperor v. Sibnath
Banerjee(3) and Makhan Singh's case (supra). In the first
two decisions it has been held that the right to habeas
corpus is only under section 491 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. In Makhan Singh's case (supra) it has been said
that this right under section 491 became embodied in Article

21. The statutory right under section 491 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure has been deleted from the new Code of
Criminal Procedure which came into effect on 1 April, 1974.

(1) [1966] 1 S. C. R 702.

(2) I. L,. R. 54 Cal 727.

(3) 72 I. A. 241
229
The arguments on behalf of the respondents are that the
right to life and personal liberty is not only in Article
21 but also under common law and statutes for these reasons.

In A. K. Gopalan's case (supra) it has been said that
to read law as meaning natural law is to lay down vague
standards. Law means law enacted by the State. Law must have
some firmness. Law means positive State made law. Article 21
has been interpreted in A. K. Gopalan's case (supra) to
include substantive as well as procedural law in the phrase
"procedure established by law". The reason is obvious. A law
providing for procedure depriving a person of liberty must
be a law made by statute. P. D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank
of India Ltd.(7) held that Article 21 is prohibition against
unauthorised executive action. In Shrimati Vidya Verma
through next friend R. V. S. Mani v. Dr. Shiva Narain
Verma(8) law in Article 21 has been held in mean State made
law.

In Makhan Singh's case (supra) it was decided that
during the subsistence of the Presidential order suspending
the enforcement of fundamental rights neither a petition
under Article 32 nor a petition under Article 226 could be
moved invoking habeas corpus. An application invoking habeas
corpus under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
cannot similarly be moved in the High Court.

Part III of our Constitution confers fundamental rights
in positive as well as in negative language. Articles 15(1),
16(1), 19, 22(2).

(1) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530.

(2) [1950] 3 S. C. R. 88.

(3) [1974] 1 S. C. R. 1.

(4) [1975] 1 S. C. R. 778.

(S) [1975] 2 S. C. R. 832.

(6) [1973] Supp. S. C. R. 1.

(7) [1952] S. C. R. 391.

(8) [1955] 2 S. C. R. 983.

230

22(5), 25(1), 26, 29(1), 30 and 32(1) can be described to be
Articles in positive language. Articles 14, 15(2), 16(2),
20, 21, 22(1), 22(4), 27, 28(1), 29(2), 31(1) and (2) are in
negative language. It is apparent that most categories of
fundamental rights are in positive as well as in negative
language. A fundamental right couched in negative language
accentuates by reason thereof the importance of that right.
The negative language is worded to emphasise the immunity
from State action as a fundamental right. [See The State of
Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga
and ors (1) ] These fundamental rights conferred by our
Constitution have taken different forms. Some of these
fundamental rights are said to have the texture of Basic
Human Rights (See A. K. Gopalan's case (supra) at pp. 96-97,
248, 249, 293 and Bank Nationalisation case (supra) at pp.
568-71, 576-78).

Article 31(1) and (2) subordinate the exercise of the
power of the State to the concept of the Rule of Law
enshrined in the Constitution. (See Bank Nationalisation
case (supra) at p. 568). Similarly Article 21 is our Rule of
Law regarding life and liberty. No other rule of law can
have separate existence as a distinct right. The negative
language of fundamental right incorporated in Part III
imposes limitations on the power of the State and declares
the corresponding guarantee of the individual to that
fundamental right. The limitation and guarantee are
complementary. The limitation of State action embodied in a
fundamental right couched in negative form is the measure of
the protection of the individual.

Personal liberty in Article 21 includes all varieties
of rights which go to make personal liberty other than those
in Article 19(1)(d). (see Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. &
Ors.(2). The Bank Nationalisation case (supra) merely brings
in the concept of reasonable restriction in the law. In the
present appeals, the Act is not challenged nor can it be
challenged by reason of Article 358 and Article 359(1A) and
the Presidential order mentioning Article 19 as well.

If any right existed before the commencement of the
Constitution and the same right with its same content is
conferred by Part III as a fundamental right the source of
that right is in Part III and not in any pre-existing right.
Such pre-Constitution right has been elevated by Part III as
a fundamental right. The pre-existing right and the
fundamental right have to be grouped together as a
fundamental right conferred by the Constitution. See
Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil v. The State of Bombay(3).

If there is a pre-Constitution right which is expressly
embodied as a fundamental right under our Constitution, the
common law right has no separate existence under our
Constitution. (See B. Shanknra Rao Badami & Ors. v. State of
Mysore & Anr.(4). If there be any right other than and more
extensive than the fundamental right in Part III, such right
may continue to exist under Article 372.

(1) [1952] S. C. R. 889 at 988-89.

(2) [1964] 1 S. C. R. 332.

(3) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 691 at 693-97.

(4) [19691 3 S. C. R. 1 at 11-13
231
Before the commencement of the Constitution the right
to personal liberty was contained in Statute law, e.g. the
Indian Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code as also in
the common law of Torts. In the event of any wrongful
infringement of the right to personal liberty the person
affected could move a competent court by way of a suit for
false imprisonment and claim damages.

Suits for false imprisonment are one of the categories
of law of Torts. The common law of Torts prevailed in our
country before the Constitution on the basis of justice,
equity and good conscience. (See Waghela Rajsanji v. Shiekh
Masludin & Ors.(1) Satish Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Doyal
Deo and Baboo s/o Thakur Dhobi v. Mt. Subanshi w/o Mangal
Dhobi(3). This principle of justice, equity and good
conscience which applied in India before the Constitution is
generally known as the English Common Law. Apart from the
law of Torts, there was no civil remedy for unlawful
infringement of the right to personal liberty in India
before the Constitution.

After the amendment of section 491 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure in 1923, the right to obtain a direction
in the nature of a habeas corpus became a statutory right to
a remedy in India. After 1923 it was not open to any party
to ask for a writ of habeas corpus as a matter of common
law. (See Makhan Singh's case (supra) at pp 818-19; District
Magistrate, Trivandrum v. K. C. Mammen Mappillai(4), Matthen
v. District Magistrate, Trivandrum(5), Girindra Nath
Banerjee's case (supra) and Sibnath Banerjee's case (supra).
The provisions of section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code
have been repealed recently as being superfluous in view of
Article 226. (See 41st Report of Law Commission of India
(Vol.1) p. 307).

The present appeals arise from petitions filed in High
Courts for writs in the nature of habeas corpus. The
statutory right to remedy in the nature of habeas corpus
under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be
exercised now in view of the repeal of that section. Even if
the section existed today it could not be exercised as a
separate right distinct from the fundamental right, the
enforcement of which is suspended by the Presidential order
as was held by this Court in Makhan Singh case (supra) at
pp. 818-825. There was no statutory right to enforce the
right to personal liberty other than that in section 491 of
the Criminal Procedure Code before the commencement of the
Constitution which could be carried over after its
commencement under Article 372. Law means enacted law or
statute law. (See A. K. Gopalan's case (supra) at pp. 112,
199, 276, 277, 288, 307, 308, 309, 321, 322). It follows
that law in Article 21 will include all post-constitutional
statute law including the Act in the present case and by
virtue of Article 372 all pre-constitutional statute law
including the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure
Code.

The expression "procedure established by law" includes
substantive as well as procedural law. (See A. K. Gopalan's
case (supra) at p. 111 and S. Krishnan & ors. v. The State
of Madras(6). It means
(1) 14 I. A 59 at 96.

(2) I.L.R. 48 Cal. 388 at 407-10, 425. 426.

(3) A.I.R. 1942 Nag. 99.

(4) I.L.R. [1939] Mad. 708.

(5) L.R. 66 I.A. 222.

(6) [1951] S. C. R. 621 at p. 639.

232

some step or method or manner of procedure leading upto
deprivation of personal liberty. A law depriving a person of
personal liberty must be a substantive and procedural law
authorising such deprivation. It cannot be a bare law
authorising deprivation of personal liberty. The makers of
the Constitution had the Criminal Procedure Code in mind.
The repealed Criminal Procedure Code as well as the present
Criminal Procedure Code has substantive as well as
procedural provisions. The 13 substantive as well 35 the
procedural parts in a law depriving a person of personal
liberty must be strictly followed. There is no distinction
between the expression "save by authority of law" in
Article.- 31(1) and the expression "except by authority of
law" in Article 265. Laws under Article 31(1) must lay down
a procedure containing reasonable restrictions. Law under
Article 265 also lays down a procedure. Therefore, there is
no difference between the expression "except according to
procedure established by law" in Article 21 and the
expression "save by authority of law" in Article 31(1) or
the expression "except by authority of law" in Article 265.
When Article 21 was enacted it would be a blunder to suggest
that the founding fathers only enshrined the right to
personal liberty according to procedure and not frame the
constitutional mandate that personal liberty could not be
taken except according to law.

The Attorney General rightly submitted at the outset
that Article 21 confers a fundamental right against the
Executive and law in that Article means State law or statute
law. In the present appeals, the respondents allege that
section 3 of the Act has not been complied with. In the
present appeals the Act is not challenged nor can it be
challenged on the ground of infringement of Article 19 by
reason of Articles 358, 359(1) and the Presidential order.
It has been pointed out earlier that non-compliance with the
provisions of the Act cannot be challenged as long as the
Presidential order is in force.

Article 20 states that no person shall be prosecuted
and published for the same offence more than once. The
present appeals do not touch any aspect of Article 20. The
reason why reference is made at this stage to Article 20 is
to show that Article 20 is a constitutional mandate to the
Judiciary and Article 21 is a constitutional mandate to the
Executive.

The respondents contend that "State" in Article 12 will
also include the Judiciary and Article 20 is enforceable
against the Judiciary in respect of illegal orders. The
answer is that Article 20 is a prohibition against the
Judiciary in the cases contemplated there. If a person is
detained after the Judiciary acts contrary to the provision,
in Article 20 such detention cannot be enforced against the
Judicially. In the event of the Judiciary acting contrary to
the provisions in Article 20 such, detention can be
challenged by moving the court against the Executive for
wrongful detention or conviction or punishment as the case
may be. The expression "No person shall be prosecuted for
the same offence more than once" in Article 20 would apply
only to the Executive
The decision in Makhan Singh's case (supra) is that
fundamental rights cannot be enforced against the Judiciary
in case of illegal
233
orders. The decision in Ram Narayan Singh v. The State of
Delhi & Ors.(1) is no authority for the proposition that
fundamental rights can be enforced against the Judiciary.
This Court held that the detention of Ram Narayan was
illegal because Ram Narayan was being detained without any
order of remand by the Magistrate. In Ram Narayan's case
(supra) there was no aspect of the bar. under Article 359.
It is not correct to say that the suspension of fundamental
rights or of their enforcement can increase the power of
the Executive. The effect of suspension or enforcement of
fundamental rights is that an individual cannot move any
court for the enforcement of his fundamental right to
personal liberty for the time being;.

Reference to Articles 256, 265 and 361 has make by the
respondents to show that Article 21 is not the repository of
rights to life and liberty. These references arc irrelevant.
Article 256 do. not confer any right on any person. It deals
with relations between the Union and the State. Article 265
has nothing to do with right to personal liberty. Article
361 (3) refers to the issue of a process from any court
which is a judicial act and not any Executive action. In any
event, these Articles have not relevance in the present
appeals.

Reference was made by the respondents to an accused
filing appeal relating to criminal proceedings to show that
Article-21 is not the sole respository of right to life and
liberty. In a criminal proceeding the accused defends
himself against the accusation of an offence against him. He
does not move any court for the enforcement of his
fundamental right of personal liberty. In an appellant
against the order of conviction the accused challenges the
correctness of the judicial decision. An appeal or revision
is a continuation of' the original proceeding. (See
Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury(2) and
Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Pvt. Co. Ltd. v. Ram Tahal Ramnand &
Ors.(3).

The respondents posed the question whether a decree
given against the Government could be enforced because of
the Presidential order. This is irrelevant. However, a
decree conclusively determines the rights of the parties in
the suit and after a decree is passed the right of the
decree-holder is not founded on the right which is
recognised by the decree but on the decree itself. This
right arising from a decree is not a fundamental right, and,
therefore, will not be prima facie covered by a Presidential
order under Article 359(1).

The other examples given by the respondents are seizure
of property by Government, requisition by Government
contrary to Articles 31 and 19(1) (f). If any seizure of
property is illegal or in acquisition or requisition is
challenged it will depend upon the Presidential order to
find out whether the proceedings are for the enforcement of
fundamental rights covered by the Presidential Order
(1) [1953] S. C. R 652. (2) [1957] S. C. R 488.
(3) [1973] 1 S. C. R. 185.

234

Fundamental rights including the right to personal
liberty are enforced by the Constitution. Any pre-
Constitutional rights which are included in Article 21 do
not after the Constitution remain in existence which can be
enforced if Article 21 is suspended. If it be assumed that
there was any pre-constitutional right to personal liberty
included in Article 21 which continued to exist as a
distinct and separate right then Article 359(1) will be an
exercise in futility. In Makhan Singh's case (supra) there
was not suggestion that apart from Article 21 there was any
common law or pre-Constitution right to personal liberty.

The theory of eclipse advanced on behalf of the
respondents is untenable. Reliance was placed on the
decision in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras & Ors. v. The State of
Madhya Pradesh & Anr.(1). The theory of eclipse refers to
pre-constitutional laws which were inconsistent with
fundamental right. By reason of Article 13 (1) such laws
could not become void but became devoid of legal force. Such
laws became eclipsed for the time being. The theory of
eclipse has no relevance to the suspension of the
enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 359 (1) .
The constitutional provisions conferring fundamental rights
cannot be said to be inconsistent with Article 13 (1) .

Article 21 is not a common law right. There was no pre-
existing common Law remedy to habeas corpus. Further, no
common law right which correspond's to a fundamental right
can exist as a distinct right. apart from the fundamental
right. See Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil's v. The State of Bombay
(supra) and B. Shankar Rao Badami's , case (supra). In
Gohil's case (supra) the validity of the Bombay Act of 1949
was challenged on the ground that it took away or abridged
fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution. The Act
was held to be beyond question in view of Article 31-B which
had been inserted in the Constitution by the First Amendment
and the Act being mentioned as Item 4 of the 9th Schedule.
It was said that one of the rights secured by Part III of
our Constitution is a right that the property shall be
acquired for a public purpose and under a law authorising
such acquisition and providing for compensation. That is
also the very right which was previously secured to a person
under section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935. is
Court said that what under the Government of India Act was a
provision relating to the competency of the Legislature, was
also clearly in the nature of a right of the person
affected. The right under Article 299 which was pre-
existing, became along with other fundamental rights for the
first time secured by our Constitution when grouping them
together as fundamental rights.

The respondents gave the example that although section
12(2) of the Act makes it obligatory on the Executive to
revoke the detention order and if the Executive does not do
so such Executive action will amount to non-compliance with
the Act. Here again, the detenu
(1) [1955] 2 S. C. R. 589.

235

cannot enforce any statutory right under the Act for the
same reason that it will amount to enforce his fundamental
right to personal liberty by contending that the Executive
is depriving him of his personal liberty not according to
"procedure established by law". Similarly, the example given
of an illegal detention of a person by a Police officer will
be met with the same plea.

An argument was advanced on behalf of the respondents
that if n pre-existing law is merged in Article 21 there
will be conflict with Article 372. The expression "law in
force" in Article 372 cannot include laws which are
incorporated in the Constitution viz., in Part III. The
expression "law" in Articles 19(1) and 21 takes in statute
law.

The respondents contended that permanent law cannot be
repealed by temporary law. The argument is irrelevant and
misplaced. The Presidential order under Article 359(1) is
not a law. The order does not real any law either. The
suggestion that Article 21 was intended to afford protection
to life and personal liberty against violation lay private
individuals was rejected in Shamdasani's case (supra)
because there cannot be any question of one private
individual being authorised by law to deprive another of his
property or taking away the life and liberty of any person
by procedure established by law. The entire concept in
Article 21 is against Executive action. In Vidya Verma's
case (supra) this Court said that there is no question of
infringement of fundamental right under Article 21 where the
detention complained of is by a private person and not by a
State or under the authority or orders of a State.

The Act in the present case is valid law and it has
laid down procedure of applying the law. The validity of the
Act has not been challenged and cannot be challenged. The
Legislature has competence to make the law. The procedure?
therefore. cannot be challenged because Articles 21 and 22
cannot be enforced. The suggestion of the respondents that
the power of the Executive is widened is equally untenable.

The suggestion on behalf of the respondents that the
right to private defence is available and if any one
resorted to private defence in resisting detention there
might be civil war is an argument to excite emotion. If
there are signs of civil wars as the respondents suggestion,
it is for the Government of our country to deal with the
situation. It is because of these aspects that emergency is
not justifiable because no court can have proper standard to
measure the problems of emergency in the country. If any
person detained finds that the official has the authority to
arrest him no question of resistance arises and if there is
no authority the same cannot be challenged during the
operation of the Presidential order but the person shall
have his remedy for any false imprisonment after the expiry
of the Presidential order.

The respondents submitted that if Article 21 were the
repository of a right to personal liberty it would mean that
Article 21 destroyed pre-existing rights and then made a
fresh grant. There is no
236
question of destruction of any right. Our fundamental rights
came into existence for the first time under the
Constitution. The fact that section 491 of the old Criminal
Procedure Code has been abolished in the new Code
establishes that the pre-existing right was embodied as a
fundamental right in the Constitution. The right to personal
liberty because identified with fundamental right to
personal liberty under Article 21.

The third question is whether Rule of law overrides the
Presidential Order. The Presidential Order does not alter
or suspended any law. The Rue of law is not a mere catchword
or incantation. Rule of Law is not a law of nature
consistent and invariable at all times and in all
circumstances. The certainly of law is one of the elements
in the concept of the Rule of law but it is only one element
and taken by itself, affords little guidance. The essential
feature if Rule of law is that the judicial power of the
state is to a large extent, separate from the Executive and
the Legislature. The Rule of Law us a normative as much as
it is a descriptive term. It expresses an ideal as much as
a juristic fact. The Rule of Law is nit identical with a
free society. If the sphere of the Rule of Law involves
what can be called the "Existence of the Democratic system"
it means two things. In the first place the individual
liberties of a democratic system involves the right of the
members of each society to choose the Government under the
which they lie. In the second place come freedom of speech,
freedom of assembly and freedom f association. These are
not absolute tights, Their exceptions are justified by the
necessity if reconciling the claims of different individuals
to those rights, The criterion whereby this reconciliation
an be effected is the concern of law to ensure that the
status and dignity of all individuals is to the greatest
possible extent observed.

Freedom of speech may be limited by conception as clear
present danger", attack, on the free democratic order". The
institutions and procedures by which the fundamental regard
for the status and dignity of the human person an be
effected is that rights and remedies are complimentary to
the other, The phrases such as "equality before law" or
"equal protection of the laws: are in themselves equivocal.
The supremacy of the law means that the faith of civil
liberty depends on the man who has to administer civil
liberty much more than on any legal formula. Aristotle,
pointed out that the rigid certainty of law is not
applicable to all circumstances. this plea would be echoed
by the modern administrator called upon to deal with the
ever changing circumstances of economic and social life of
the nation.

The Executive cannot detain a person otherwise than
under valid legislation. The suspension of any fundamental
right does not effect this rule of the Constitution. In
normal situations when there is no emergency and when there
is no Presidential order of the type like the present tile
situation is different. In Bharat Singh's case (supra) this
Court was concerned with the pre-emergency law and an order
of the Executive thereunder. It was held that the pre-
emergency law was void as violative of Article 19, and,
therefore, such a law being pre-emergency law could not
claim the protection under Article 358.

The ratio in Bharat Singh's case (supra) is this:
Executive action which operates to the prejudice of any
person must have the authority of law to support it. [See
also Ram Jawaya Kapur's case (supra). The provisions of
Article 358 do not detract from that rule. Article 358
expressly authorises the State to take legislative or
Executive action provided such action was competent for the
State to make or take but for the provisions contained in
Part III of our Constitution. Article 358 permits an
Executive action under a law which may violate Article 19
but if the law is void or if there be no law at all, the
Executive action will not be protected by Article 358.
Bharat Singh's case (supra) considers the effect of Article
358 so far the Executive action is concerned, but was not
concerned with any Executive action taken infringing any
fundamental right mentioned in a Presidential order under
Article 359 (1) .

Ibrahim's case (supra), the Bannett Coleman case
(supra) and the Meenakshi Mill's case (supra) follow Bharat
Singh's case (supra) regarding the proposition that the
terms of Article 358 do not detract from the position that
the Executive cannot act to the prejudice of a person
without the authority of law.

The ratio in Bharat Singh's case (supra) is that the
Madhya Pradesh Public Security Act was brought into force
before the Emergency Article 358 empowers the legislature to
make a law violating Article 19.Article 358 does not mean
that a pre-emergency law violating Article 19 would have
constitutional validity during the period of emergency. The
Executive action which was taken during the emergency on the
basis of the pre-emergency law did not have the authority of
law inasmuch as the Madhya Pradesh Act of 1959 was a void
law where it was enacted in violation of Article 19.

In Ibrahim's case (supra), is the Sugar Control order
1963 permitted allocation of quotas of sugar. The State
Government ordered that the sugar allocated to the two
cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad were entirety to be
given to the Co-operative Stores. Under Article
(1) [1973] 2 S. C. R .757.

(2) [1974] 2 S. C. R. 398.

238

358 the respondents there could not challenge an Executive
action which, but for the provisions contained Article 19,
the State was competent to take. But the Executive order
there was one which had the effect canceling the licenses of
the respondents which could be done only after an enquiry
according to the procedure prescribed in the order. The
Executive order there was contrary to the provisions
contained in the Sugar Control order. In other words, the
Executive action which was in breach of the order could not
be immune from attack under Article 358. In the Bennet
Coleman case (supra) it was said that the Newsprint Control
order could not authorise the number of pages. In the
Meenakshi Mill case (supra) it was said that the Yarn
Control order could not be resisted on the ground that it
had no direct impact on the rights of the mills.

In these four cases referred to there was no question
of enforcement of fundamental right mentioned in the
Presidential order. These four cases were not concerned with
any Executive action taken infringing any fundamental right
mentioned in a Presidential order under Article 359.

The suspension of right to enforce fundamental right
has the elect that the emergency provisions in Part XVIII
are by themselves the rule of law during times of emergency.
There cannot be any rule of law other than the
constitutional rule of law. There cannot be any pre
Constitution or post-Constitution Rule of Law which can run
counter to the rule of law embodied in the Constitution, nor
can there be any invocation to any rule of law to nullify
the constitutional provisions during the times of emergency.

The respondents relied on the decision in Eshugbayi
Eleko v. officer Administering the Government of Nigeria(1)
support of the proposition that Rule of Law will always
apply even when there is Presidential order. It has to be
realised that the decision in Eshuqbavi Eleko cannot over-
reach our Constitution.

Article 358 does not permit the Executive action to
have the authority of law. Article 359 prevents the
enforcement of the fundamental rights mentioned in the
Presidential order. It bars enforcement against any
legislation or executive! action violating a fundamental
right mentioned in the Presidential order.

The principle in Eshugbayi Eleko's case (supra) will
not apply where Article 359 is the paramount and supreme law
of the country. There is no question of amendment of the
concept of rule of law or any suggestion of destruction of
rule of law as the respondents con tended because the
Presidential order under Article 359 neither nullifies nor
suspends the operation of any law. The consequence of the
Presidential order is of a higher import than the suspension
of any law because the remedy for the enforcement of
fundamental rights is barred for the time being because of
grave emergency.

(1) [1931] A. C. 662.

239

The respondents contend that if an individual officer
acts outside his authority, it will be an illegal act and
the High Court under Article 226 can deal with it. Reliance
is placed on the English decision in Christie & Anr. v.
Leachinsky(1) in support of the proposition that the action
of an individual officer will be an Executive action when he
acts within the scope of his authority. ,
The decision in Leachinsky's case (supra) is an action
for false imprisonment and damages against two persons of
Liverpool City Police for wrongfully arresting a person
without informing that person of the grounds for arrest.
That case has no relevance here.

An individual officer acting within the scope of his
official duty would not cease to be so if he makes an order
which is challenged to be not in compliance with the statute
under which he is authorised to make the order-. Any
challenge to the order of detention would come within the
fold of breach of fundamental right under Article 21,
namely, deprivation of personal liberty.

The obligation of the Executive to act in accordance
with the Act is ail obligation as laid down in Article 21.
If such an obligation is not performed, the violation is of
Article 21. It will mean that the right of the person
affected will be a violation of fundamental right.

The expression "for any other purpose" in Article 226
means for any purpose other than the enforcement of
fundamental rights. A petition for habeas corpus by any
person under Article 226 necessarily involves a question
whether the detention is legal or illegal. An Executive
action if challenged to be ultra vires a statute cannot be
challenged by any person who is not aggrieved by any such
ultra vires action.

Section 18 of the Act has been argued by the
respondents to mean that a malafide order of detention
cannot be regarded as an order made under the Act. Section
18 has also been challenged to suffer from the vice of
excessive delegation. Section 18 has been amended by the
words "in respect of whom an order is made or purported to
be made under section 3" in substitution of the words
"detained under this Act". The result is that no person in
respect of whom and order is made or purported to be made
under section 3 shall have any right to personal liberty by
virtue of natural law or common law, if any. It has been
earlier held that there is no natural law or common law
right to habeas corpus. The respondents rely on the
decisions in Poona Municipal Corporation v. D. N.
Deodher(2), Kala Bhandar v. Munc. Committee(3), Indore
Municipality v. Niyamatulla(4) and Joseph v. Joseph(5) in
support of the proposition that the expression "purports"
means "has the effect of". The respondents contend that
(1) [1947] A. C. 573.

(2) [1964] 8 S. C. R. 178.

(3) [1965] 3 S. C. R. 499.

(4) A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 97.

(5) [1966] 3 All. E. R. 486.

240

Section 18 of the Act can apply only when a valid order of
detention is made. If the section be interpreted to include
malafide orders or orders without jurisdiction then it is
said that such interpretation will prevail upon the judicial
power and violate Article 226.

The section applies to any person in respect of whom an
order as been made or purported to be made. There is no
question of excessive delegation. Section 18 of the Act lays
down the law. Section 18 of the Act is only an illustration
of an application of the act by the officers authorised by
the Act.

Section 18 identifies the person to whom it applies and
in what cases it applies to such a person. The word
"purport" covers acts alleged to be malafide. The decisions
to which reference has been made indicate that the acts
whatever their effect be are all acts made or purported to
be made under the Act.

A contention is advanced by the respondents that
section 18 of the Act will apply only to post-detention
challenge. This is wrong. Sec lion 18 applies to all orders
of detention.

Counsel on behalf of the respondents submitted that the
High Courts had only heard the matters on preliminary points
and not on the area of judicial scrutiny, and, therefore,
this Court should not express any view on the latter
question. There are three principal grounds why this Court
should express views. First. The Bombay High Court (Nagpur
Bench) has read down section 16A(9) of the Act. One of the
appeals is from the judgment of the Bombay High Court
(Nagpur Bench). This judgment directly raises the question
of section 16A(9) of the Act. Second. The Additional
Solicitor General made his submissions on this part of the
case and all counsel for the respondents made their
submissions in reply. Considerable time was spent on hearing
submissions on both sides. Time of the Court is time of the
nation. Third. It is only proper that when so much time has
been taken on these questions this Court should express
opinions and lay down areas for judicial scrutiny.

The respondents contend that if the Presidential order
does not bar the challenge on the ground that the orders
are malafide or that the orders are not made in accordance
with the Act the non-supply of grounds will not affect the
jurisdiction of the Court. It is said by the respondents
that the scope of judicial scrutiny is against orders. The
respondents submit that court has gone behind the orders of
detention in large number of cases.

The respondents submit as follows: It is open to the
Court to judge the legality of the orders. This the Court
can do by going beyond the order. Though satisfaction is
recorded in the order and such recording of satisfaction
raises the presumption of legality of order the initial onus
on a detenu is only to the extent of creating "disquieting
doubts" in the mind of the Court. The doubts are that the
orders are based on irrelevant non-existing facts or on
facts on which no reasonable person could be satisfied in
respect of matters set out in section 3 of the Act. If such
a prima facie case is established the burden shifts and the
detaining authority must satisfy the court about the
legality of detention and the detaining authority must
remove doubts on all aspects of legality which have been put
in issue. If the detaining authority for whatever reasons ]
fails to satisfy the court either by not filing an affidavit
or not placing such facts which may resolve the doubts about
the legality of detention the court may direct release of
the detenus.

The respondents submit that all that they want is that
if the detenus challenge the orders to be malafide or to be
not in compliance with the statute and if the court does not
have any "disquieting doubts" the court will dismiss the
petitions. If the court has any such doubt the court will
call for the return. On a return being made if the court is
satisfied that the return is an adequate answer the court
will dismiss the petition. If the court wants to look into
the grounds the court will ask for the production M the
grounds and the court itself will look into the grounds but
will not show the grounds to the detenus. In short, the
respondents submit that the jurisdiction of the court to
entertain the application should not be taken away as a
result of the Presidential order. F
The appellants submit that if Article 359 is not a bar
at the threshold and if the Court can entertain a petition,
judicial review should be limited within a narrow area. In
the forefront 16A(9) of the Act is put because that section
forbids disclosure of grounds and information in the
possession of the detaining authority. The Nagpur Bench of
the Bombay High Court read down section 16A(9) but the
Additional Solicitor General submitted that section 16A(9)
should not be read down because it enacts a rule of
evidence.

The Additional Solicitor General submitted as follows:
the scrutiny by courts will extend to examining first
whether detention is in exercise or purported exercise of
law. That will be to find out whether there is a legal
foundation for detention. The second enquiry will be whether
the law is valid law. If it is a pre-emergency law the same
can be tested as to whether it was valid with reference to
Articles
18-833Sup. CI/76
242
14, 19, 21 and 22. If it is an emergency legislation the
validity of law cannot be gone into first, because of
Article 358, and, second, because of the Presidential order
under Article 359. The other matters which the court may
examine are whether the detaining authority is a competent
authority under the law to pass the order, whether the
detenu has been properly identified, whether the stated
purpose is one which ostensibly conforms to law and whether
the procedural safeguards enacted by the law are followed.

With regard to grounds of detention it is said by the
Additional Solicitor General that if the grounds are
furnished or are required to be furnished the Court can
examine whether such grounds ex-facie justify reasonable
apprehension of the detaining authority. Where the grounds
are not to be furnished, it is said that this enquiry does
not arise. The Additional Solicitor General submits that
judicial scrutiny cannot extend to three matters-first,
objective appraisal of the essential subjective satisfaction
of the detaining authority, second, examination of the
material and information before the detaining authority for
the purpose of testing the satisfaction of the authority,
and, third, directing compulsory production of the file
relating to detenu or drawing and adverse inference from the
non-production thereof.

Material and information on which orders of preventive
detention are passed necessarily belong to a class of
documents whose disclosure would impair the proper
functioning of public service and administration. The file
relating to a detention order must contain intelligence
reports and like information whose confidentiality is beyond
reasonable question. This was the view taken in the Live
sidge (1) case. See also Rogers(2) case. If privilege were
to be claimed in each case such a claim would in terms of
sections 123 and 162 of the Evidence Act have been
invariably upheld. Article 22(G) also contemplates such
claims on behalf of the State. That is why instead of
leaving it to individual decision in each case or to the
discretion of individual detaining authorities to make a
claim for privilege, the legislature has enacted section
16A(9) providing for a general exclusion from evidence of
all such material as would properly fall within the
classification.

Section 16A cannot be said to be an amendment to
Article 226. The jurisdiction to issue writs is neither
abrogated nor abridged. A claim of privilege arises in
regard to documents or information where a party to a suit
or proceeding is called upon to produce evidence. Section
16A(9) enacts provisions analogous to a conclusive proof of
presumption. Such a provision is a genuine rule of evidence.
It is in the nature of an Explanation to sections 123 and
162 of the Evidence Act. Section 16A(9) is a rule of
evidence. Therefore when the detaining authority is bound by
section 16A(9) and forbidden absolutely from disclosing such
material no question can arise for adverse inference against
the authority. If a detenu makes out a prime facie case and
the court calls for a return, the affidavit of the
(1) [19421 A. C. 206 at 221, 253, 254, 266, 267, 279
and 280
(2) [1973] A. C. 388 at 400, 401 and 405.

243

authority will be an answer. The Court cannot insist on the
production of the file or hold that the case of the detenu
stands unrebutted by reason of such non-disclosure. To hold
otherwise would be to induce reckless averments of malafides
to force production of the file which is forbidden by law.

Section 16A(9) cannot be read down implying an
exception in favour of disclosure to the Court as was
suggested by the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench). Such
disclosure to the court alone and not to the detenu will
introduce something unknown to judicial procedure. This will
bring in an element of arbitrariness and preclude both
parties from representing their respective cases. Further,
it would substitute or super-impose satisfaction of the
Court for that of the Executive. This Court has held that
the view of the detaining authority is not to be substituted
by the view of the court. (See State of Bombay v. Atma Ram
Sridhar Vaidya (1), Shibban Lal Saksena v. The State of
Uttar Pradesh & Ors(2)., Rarneshwar Shaw v. District
Magistrate, Burdwan & Anr.,(.3) Jaichand Lal v. W. Bengal(4)
and Ram Manohar Lohia's case (supra).

The theory of good return mentioned in the English
decisions is based on the language of Habeas Corups Act and
the Rules of the Supreme Court of England. The practice of
our Court is different. The respondents relied on M. M.
Damnoo v. J. & K. State(5) in support of the proposition
that the file was produced there and also contended that
section 16A(9) can be struck down as happened in A. K.
Gopalan's case (supra) where section 14 of the Preventive
Detention Act was struck down. When A. K. Gopalan's case
(supra) was decided Article 22 was in force. Prevention of
court from on seeing the grounds contravened Article 22.
There was no question of privilege. Section 14 of the
Preventive Detention Act in A. K. Gopalan's case (supra)
offended Article 22. (See A. K. Gopalan's case 1950 S. C. R.
88 at 130, 217, 242, 283-84, 332-33).

In Damnoo's case (supra) there was no question of
privilage. The file was produced but there was no direction
of the court to produce the file. Second. There was no
aspect of Article 359. Third. In Damnoo's case (supra) the
analogy of section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act in
Gopalan's case was considered. No provision like section
16A(9) was on the scene. Fourth, The State did not rely on
the proviso to section 8 of the relevant Act there to
contend that the file could not be produced.

Section 16A(9) of the Act contains definite indications
of implied exclusion of judicial review on the allegations
of malafide. It is not possible for the court to adjudicate
effectively on malafides. The reason why section 16A has
been enacted is to provide for periodi-

(1) [1951] S. C. R. 167.

(2) [1954] S. C. R. 418.

(3) [1964] 4 S. C. R. 921.

(4) [1966] Supp. S. C. R. 464.

(5) [1972] 2 S. C. R. 1014.

244

cal review by Government and that is the safeguard against
any unjust or arbitrary exercise of power.

It will be useless to attempt to examine the truth of
the fact alleged in the order in a case when the fact
relates to the personal belief of the relevant authority
formed at least partly on grounds which he is not bound to
disclose. It is not competent for the court to decide
whether the impugned order of detention under section 3(1)
or the declaration under section 16A(2) and (3) or the Act
during the emergency is a result of malice or ill-will. The
reason is that it is not at all possible for the court to
call for and to have a look at the grounds of the order of
detention under section 3(1) or the declaration under
section 16A(2) and (3) of the Act that induced the
satisfaction in the mind of the detaining authority that it
was necessary to detain the person or to make a declaration
against him.

The grounds of detention and any information or
materials on which the detention and the declaration were
made are by section 16A(9) of the Act confidential and
deemed to refer to matters of State and to be against public
interest to disclose. No one under the provisions of the Act
and in particular section 16A(9) thereof shall communicate
or disclose such grounds, materials or information except as
provided in section 16A(5) and (8) of the Act. Sub sections
(5) and (8) have no application in these cases. The court
cannot strike down the order as vitiated by malafide and
grant relief since it is not possible for the court without
the examination of such grounds, materials and information
to decide whether the order of detention is the result of
malice or ill-will. When the court cannot give any relief on
that basis the contention of malafides is not only
ineffective but also untenable. (See Lawrence Joachim Joesph
D'Souza v. The State of Bombay(1).

The provision for periodical review entrusted to the
Government under section 16A(4) of the Act in the context of
emergency provides a sufficient safeguard against the misuse
of power of detention or arbitrary malafide detention during
the emergency. The Government is in full possession of the
grounds, materials and information relating to the
individual detentions while exercising the power of review.

The jurisdiction of the court in times of emergency in
respect of detention under the Act is restricted by the Act
because the Government is entrusted with the task of
periodical review. Even if the generality of the words used
in section 3(1) of the Act may not be taken to show an
intention to depart from the principle in ordinary times
that the courts arc not deprived of the jurisdiction where
bad faith is involved, there are ample indications in the
provisions of the Act, viz., section 16A(2), proviso to
section 16A(3), section 16A(4), section 16A(5), section
16A(7)(ii) and section 16A(9) of the Act to bar a challenge
to the detention on the basis of mala-

(1) [1956] S. C. R. 382 at 392-93.

245

fides. (See Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council &
Ors.(1) and Ram Manohar Lohia's case (supra) at 716, 732).
This Court said that an action to decide the order on the
grounds of malafides does not lie because under the
provisions no action is maintainable for the purpose. This
Court also referred to the decision in the Liversidge case
(supra) where the Court held that the jurisdiction of the
court was ousted in such way that even questions of bad
faith could not be raised.

The production of the order which is duly authenticated
constitutes a peremptory answer to the challenge. The onus
of showing that the detaining authority was not acting in
good faith is on the detenu. This burden cannot be
discharged because of the difficulty of proving bad faith in
the exercise of subjective discretionary power vested in the
administration. De Smith in his Judicial review of
Administrative Actions 1973 Edition at page 257 seq. has
said that the reservation for the case of bad faith in
hardly more than a formality. Detenu will have to discharge
the impossible burden of proof that the detaining authority
did not genuinely believe he had reasonable cause
In Lawrence Joachim Joseph D'Souza's case (supra)
malafide exercise of power was untenable having regard to
the grounds on which detention was based. In the context of
emergency section 3 (1) of the Act confers an unlimited
discretion which cannot be examined by courts. This rule of
construction of the phrases "is satisfied", "in the opinion
of", "it appears to be", "has reason to believe" adopted by
courts in times of national emergency will be rendered
nugatory and ineffective if allegations of malafides are
gone into. A distinction is to be drawn between purpose and
motive so that where an exercise of power fulfils the
purpose for which power was given, it does not matter that
he who exercised it is influenced by an extraneous motive
because when an act is done which is authorised by the
Legislature it is not possible to contest that discretion.
So long as the authority is empowered by law action taken to
realise that purpose is not malafide. when the order of
detention is on the face of it within the power conferred,
the order is legal.

The width and amplitude of the power of detention under
section 3 of the Act is to be adjudged in the context of the
emergency proclaimed by the President. The Court cannot
compel the detaining authority to give the particulars of
the grounds on which he had reasonable cause to believe that
it was necessary to exercise this control. An investigation
into facts or allegations of facts based on malafides is not
permissible because such a course will involve advertence to
the grounds of detention and materials constituting those
grounds which is not competent in the context of the
emergency.

For the foregoing reasons the conclusions are as
follows:-

First. In view of the Presidential order dated 27 June,
1975 under clause (1) of Article 359 of our Constitution no
person has locus
(1) [1956] A. C. 736 at 776.

246

standi to move any writ petition under Article 226 before a
High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ or order or
direction to enforce any right to personal liberty of a
person detained under the Act on the grounds that the order
of detention or the continued detention is for any reason
not under or in compliance with the Act or is illegal or
malafide.

Second. Article 21 is the sole repository of rights to
life and personal liberty against the State. Any claim to a
writ of habeas corpus is enforcement of Article 21 and, is,
therefore, barred by the Presidential order
Third. Section 16A(9) of the Act is valid. It is a rule
of evidence and it is not open either to the detenu or to
the court to ask for grounds of detention.

Fourth. It is not competent for any court to go into
questions of malafides of the order of detention or ultra
vires character of the order of detention or that the order
was not passed on the satisfaction of the detaining
authority.

The appeals are accepted. The judgments of the High
Courts are set aside.

KHANNA, J.-Law of preventive detention, of detention
without trial is an anathema to all those who love personal
liberty. Such a law makes deep inroads into basic human
freedoms which we all cherish and which occupy prime
position among the higher values of life. It is" therefore
not surprising that those who have an abiding faith ill the
rule of law and sanctity of personal liberty do not easily
reconcile themselves with a law under which persons can be
detained for long periods without trial. The proper forum
for bringing to book those alleged to be guilty of the
infraction of law and commission of crime, according to
them, is the court of law where the correctness of the
allegations can be gone into in the light of the evidence
adduced at the trial. The vesting of power of detention
without trial in the executive, the assert, has the effect
of making the same authority both the prosecutor as well as
the judge and is bound to result in arbitrariness.

Those who are entrusted with the task of administering
The land have another viewpoint. According to them,
although they are conscious of the value of human liberty,
they cannot afford to be obvious of the need of the security
of the State or the maintenance of public order. Personal
liberty has a value if the security of the State is not
jeopardised and the maintenance of public order is not
threatened. There can be the administrator assert, no
freedom to destroy . Allegiance to ideals of freedom cannot
operate in vacuum. Danger lurks and serious consequences can
follow when thoughts become encysted in fine phrases
oblivious of political realities and the impact of real
politik. No government can afford to take risks in
247
matters relating to the security of the State. Liberty, they
accordingly claim, has to be measured against community's
need for security against internal and external peril.

It is with a view to balancing the conflicting
viewpoints that the framers of the Constitution made express
provisions for preventive detention and at the same time
inserted safeguards to prevent abuse of those powers and to
mitigate the rigour and harshness of those provisions. The
dilemma which faced the Constitution-makers in balancing the
two conflicting viewpoints relating to liberty of the
subject and the Security of the State was not, however,
laid to rest for good with the drafting of the Constitution.
It has presented itself to this Court in one form or the
other ever since the Constitution came into force. A. K'.
Gopalan's(1) was he first case where in a Bench of six
Judges of this Court dealt with the matter. Another Bench of
seven Judges again dealt with the matter in 1973 in the case
of Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal & Ors(2) In
between a number of Benches have dealt with the various
facets of the question one such facet has now presented
itself to this Constitution Bench
The question posed before us is whether in view of the
Presidential order dated June 27, 1975 under clause (1) of
article 359 of the Constiution, any petition under article
226 before a High Court for writ of habeas corpus to enforce
the right of personal liberty of a person detained under the
Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (Act 26 of 1971)
(hereinafter referred to as MISA) as amended is
maintainable. A consequential question which may be numbered
as question No. 2 is, if such a petition is maintainable,
what is the scope or extent of judicial scrutiny. The above
questions arise in criminal appeals Nos. 279 of 1975" 355
and 356 of 1975, 1845-49 of 1975, 380 of 1975, 1926 of 1975
389 of 1975, 3 of 1976, 41 of 1976 and 46 of 1976. These
appeals have been filed against the orders of Madhya Pradesh
High Court, Allahabad High Court, Karnataka High Court,
Delhi High Court, Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court and
Rajasthan High Court whereby the High Courts repelled the
preliminary objections relating to the maintainability of
petitions under article 226 for writs of habeas corpus on
account of Presidential order dated June 27, 1975. On the
second question" some of the high Courts expressed the view
that this was a matter which would be gone into while
dealing with individual cases on their merits. The other
High Courts went into the matter and expressed their view.
This judgment would dispose of all the appeals.

MISA was published on July 2, 1971. Section 2 of the
Act contains the definition clause. Section 3 grants powers
to make orders for detaining certain persons and reads as
under:

"3. (1) The Central Government of the State
Government may,-

(a) if satisfied with respect to any person
including a foreigner) that with a view to
preventing him from acting in any manner
prejudicial to-

(1) [1950] S.C.R. 88.

(2) [1974] 1 S. C. R. 1.

248

(1) the defence of India, the relations of India
with foreign powers, or the security of
India, or

(ii) the security of the State or the maintenance
of public order, or

(iii)the maintenance of supplies and services
essential to the community, or

(b) if satisfied with respect to any foreigner that
with a view to regulating his continued presence
in India or with a view to making arrangements for
his expulsion from India,
it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such
person be detained.

(2) Any of the following officers, namely:-

(a) district magistrates,

(b) additional district magistrates specially
empowered in this behalf by the State Government,

(c)Commissioners of Police, wherever they have been
appointed,
may, if satisfied as provided in sub-clauses (ii) and (iii)
of clause (a) of sub-section (1)" exercise the power
conferred by the said sub-section.

(3) When any order is made under this section by an
officer mentioned in sub-section (2), he shall forthwith
report the fact to the State Government to which he is
subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has
been, made and such other particulars as in his opinion have
a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in
force for more than twelve days after the making there of
unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State
Government:

Provided that where under section 8 the grounds of
detention are communicated by the authority making the order
after five days but not later than fifteen days from the
dates of detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to
the modification that for the words 'twelve days', the words
'twenty-two days' shall be substituted.

(4) When any order is made or approved by the State
Government under this section, the State Government shall
within seven days, report the fact to the Central Government
together with the grounds on which the order has been made
and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State
Government have a bearing on the necessity for the order."

249

Section 4 and 5 deal respectively with execution of
detention orders and the power to regulate place and
conditions of detention. According to section 6, detention
orders are not to be invalidated or inoperative on the
ground that the person to be detained is outside the limits
of the territorial jurisdiction of the Government or officer
making the order' or that the place of detention of such
person is outside the said limits. Section 8 requires that
the Grounds of order of detention should be disclosed to
persons affected by the order and he should be granted the
earliest opportunity of making a representation against the
order. Section 9 deals with the constitution of Advisory
Boards. Section 10 makes provision for reference to Advisory
Boards. Section 11 prescribes the procedure of Advisory
Boards and section 12 requires that action should be taken
in accordance with the report of the Advisory Board.
According to section 13, the maximum period of detention
shall be 12 months from the date of detention. Section 14
confers power of revocation of detention orders. Section 15
confers power upon the appropriate Government to temporarily
release the detained persons. Section 16 gives protection to
action taken in good faith. Section 17 provides for
detention up to two years in certain cases of foreigners.
Section 18, which has subsequently been re-numbered as
section 19, provides for the repeal of the Maintenance of
Internal Security ordinance and the saving clause.

According to clause (1) of article 352 of the
Constitution, if the President is satisfied that a grave
emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any
part of the territory thereof is threatened whether by war
or external aggression or internal disturbance he may, by
Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect. On December
3 1971 the President of India issued the following
proclamation of emergency:

"In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1)
of article 352 of the Constitution, I, V. V. Giri,
President of India; by this Proclamation declare that a
grave emergency exists whereby the security of India is
threatened by external aggression.

"Where a Proclamation of Emergency is in
operation, the President may by order declare that the
right to move any court for the enforcement of such of
the rights conferred by Part III as may be mentioned in
the order and all proceedings pending in any court for
the enforcement of the rights so mentioned shall remain
suspended for the period during which the Proclamation
is in force or for such shorter period as may be
specified in the order."

On November 16, 1974 the President of India made the
following order:

250

"In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1)
of article 359 of the Constitution, the President
hereby declares that-

(a) the right to move any count with respect to orders
of detention which have already been made or which
may hereafter be made under section 3 (1) (c) of
the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 as
amended by ordinance 11 of 1974 for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by article 14,
article 21 and clauses (4), (5), (6) and (7) of
article 22 of the Constitution, and

(b) all proceedings pending in any court for the
enforcement of any of the aforesaid rights with
respect of orders of detention made under the said
section 3(1) (c)'
shall remain suspended for a period of six months from
the date of issue of this order or the period during
which the Proclamation of Emergency issued under clause
(1) of article 352 of the Constitution on the 3rd
December, 1971, is in force, whichever period expires
earlier.

2. This order shall extend to the whole of the
territory of India."

On June 20, 1975 the President of India amended the above
order by substituting twelve months" for "six months" in the
order. On June 25, 1975 the President of India issued
another proclamation of emergency and the same reads as
under:

"PROCLAMATION OF EMERGENCY
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1)
of article 352 of the Constitution, I Fakhruddin Ali
Ahmed, President of India, by this Proclamation declare
that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of
India is threatened by internal disturbance.

Sd/- F. A. Ahmed
President"

New Delhi
the 25th June" 1975
On June 27, 1975 the President of India made the following
order:

exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of
article 359 of the Constitution, the President hereby
declares that the right of any person (including a
foreigner) to move any court for the enforcement of
their rights conferred by article 14, article 21 and
article 22 of the Constitution
251
and all proceedings pending in any court for the
enforce- h men of the above mentioned rights shall
remain suspended for the period during which the
Proclamation of Emergency made under clause (1) of
article 352 of the Constitution on the 3rd December,
1971 and on the 25th June, 1975 are both in force.
This order shall extend to the whole of the
territory of India except the State of Jammu and
Kashmir.

This order shall be in addition to and not in
derogation of any order made before the date of this
order under clause (1) of article 359 of the
Constitution."

On June 29, 1975 another order was issued by the President
whereby the words "except the State of Jammu & Kashmir" in
the order dated June 27, 1975 were omitted. On September 25,
1975 another Presidential order was issued as a result of
which the last paragraph in the Presidential order dated
June 27, 1975 was omitted.

By Act 39 of 1975 Section 16A was introduced in MISA
with effect from June 29, 1975 and the same reads as under :

"16A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
this Act or any rules of natural justice, the
provisions of this section shall have effect during the
period of operation of the Proclamation of Emergency
issued under clause (1) of article 352 of the
Constitution on the 3rd day of December, 1971 or the
Proclamation of Emergency issued under that clause on
the 25th day of June, 1975, or a period of twelve
months from the 25th day of June, 1975, whichever
period is the shortest.

(2) The case of every person (including a
foreigner) against whom an order of detention was made
under this Act on or after the 25th day of June, 1975,
but before the commencement of this section, shall,
unless such person is sooner related from detention, be
reviewed within fifteen days from such commencement by
the appropriate Government for the purpose of
determining whether the detention of such person under
this Act is necessary for dealing effectively with the
emergency in respect of which the Proclamations
referred to in sub-section (1) have been issued
hereinafter in this section referred to as the
emergency) and if, on such review, the appropriate
Government is satisfied that it is necessary to detain
such person for effectively dealing with the emergency,
that Government may make a declaration to that effect
and communicate a copy of the declaration to the person
concerned.

(3) When making an order of detention under this
Act against any person (including a foreigner) after
the commencement of this section, the Central
Government or the
252
State Government or, as the case may be, the officer
making the order of detention shall consider whether
the detention of such person under this Act is
necessary for dealing effectively with the emergency
and if, on such consideration, the Central Government
or the State Government or, as the case may be, the
officer is satisfied that it is necessary to detain
such person for effectively dealing with the emergency,
that Government or officer may make a declaration to,
that effect and communicate a copy of the declaration
to the person concerned.

Provided that where such declaration is made by an
officer, it shall be reviewed by the State Government
to which such officer is subordinate within fifteen
days from 5 the date of making of the declaration and
such declaration shall cease to have effect unless it
is confirmed by the State Government, after such
review, within the said period of fifteen days.
(4) The question whether detention of any person
in respect of whom a declaration has been made under
sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) continues to be
necessary for effectively dealing with the emergency
shall be reconsidered by the appropriate Government
within four months from the date of such declaration
and thereafter at intervals not exceeding four months
and if, on such re-consideration, it appears to the
appropriate Government that the detention of the person
is no longer necessary for effectively dealing with the
emergency, that Government may revoke the declaration.
(5) In making any review, consideration or
reconsideration under sub-sections (2), (3) or (4), the
appropriate Government or officer may, if such
Government or officer considers it to be against public
interest to do otherwise act on the basis of the
information and materials in its or his possession
without disclosing the facts or giving an opportunity
of making a representation to the person concerned
(6) In the case of every person detained under a
detention order to which the provisions of sub-section
(2)S apply, being a person the review of whose case is
pending under that sub-section or inrespect of whom a
declaration has been made under that sub-section.-
(1) section 8 to 12 shall not apply; and

(ii) section 13 shall apply subject to the
modification that the words and figures
which has been confirmed under section 12
shall be omitted.

(7) In the case of every person detained under a
deten-

253

tion order to which the provisions of sub-section (3)
apply being a person in respect of whom a declaration
has been made under that sub-section,-
(1) section 3 shall apply subject to the
modification that for sub-sections (3) and (4) thereof,
the following sub-section shall be substituted,
namely:-

(3) when order of detention is made by a State
Government or by an officer subordinate to it, the
State Government shall, within twenty days, forward to
the Central Government a report in respect of the
order;"

(iii) section 13 shall apply subject to the
modification that the words and figures 'which has been
confirmed under section 12' shall be omitted."

Act 39 of 1975 also inserted section 18 with effect from
June 25, 1975 and the same reads as under:

"18. No person (including a foreigner) detained
under this Act shall have any right to personal liberty
by virtue of natural law or common law, if any."

By the Constitution (Thirty eighth Amendment) Act, 1975
clauses (4) and (5) which read as under were added in
article 352 of the Constitution :

"(4) The power conferred on the President by this
article shall include the power to issue different
Proclamation on different grounds, being war or
external aggression or internal disturbance or imminent
danger of war or external aggression or internal
disturbance, whether or not there is a Proclamation
already issued by the President under clause (1) and
such Proclamation is in operation.

(5) Notwithstanding anything in this
Constitution,-
(a) the satisfaction of the President mentioned
in clause (1) and clause (2) shall be final

and conclusive and shall not be questioned in
any court on any ground;

(b) subject to the provisions of clause (2),
neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall
have jurisdiction to entertain any question, on any
ground, regarding the validity of-

(1) a declaration made by Proclamation by the
President to the effect stated in clause (1); or

(ii) the continued operation of such Proclamation."

254

Following clause (1A) was also added after clause (1) of
article 359 and the same reads as under:

(1A) While an order made under clause (1)
mentioning any of the rights conferred by Part III is
in operation, nothing in that Part conferring those
rights shall restrict the power of the State as defined
in the said Part to make any law or to take any
executive action which the State would but for the
provisions contained in that Part be competent to make
or to take, but any law so made shall, to the extent of
the in competence, cease to have effect as soon as the
order aforesaid ceases to operate, except as respects
things done or omitted to be done before the law so
ceases to have effect."

The Constitution (Thirty ninth Amendment) Act, 1975 was
published on August 10, 1975 and inserted the Maintenance of
Internal Security Act, 1971 as item 92 in the Ninth Schedule
to the Constitution.

On October 17, 1975 ordinance 16 of 1975 was issued
making further amendment in section 16A of MISA and the same
read as under:

"(a) for sub-section (5), the following sub-section
shall be substituted, namely:-

'(5) In making any review, consideration or re-
consideration under sub-section (2), sub-section (3) or
sub section (4), the appropriate Government or officer
may act on the basis of the information and materials
in its or his possession without communicating or
disclosing any such information or materials to the
person concerned or affording him any opportunity of
making any representation against the making under sub-
section (2), or the making or confirming under sub-
section (3), or the non-revocation under sub-section
(4), of the declaration in respect of him.';

(b) in sub-section (7), in clause (1),-
(1) in the opening portion, for the words 'the
following sub-section', the words 'the
following' shall be substituted;

(ii) in sub-section (3), as substituted by that
clause, for the words 'forward to the Central
Government a report in respect of the order',
the words 'report the fact to the Central
Government' shall be substituted;

(iii)after sub-section (3) aforesaid, the
following shall be inserted, namely:-
'(4) At any time after the receipt of a report
under sub-section (3), the Central Government may
require the State Government to furnish to the Central
Government the grounds on which the order has been made
and such other particulars
255
as, in the opinion of the State Government, have a
bearing on the necessity for the order.':

(c) after sub-section (7), the following sub-sections
shall be inserted, namely:-

'(8) in the case of any person in respect of whom
a declaration has been made by a State Government under
sub-section (2) or a declaration has been made by a
State Government or an officer subordinate to it or
confirmed by the State Government under sub-section
(3), or a declaration has not been revoked by a State
Government under sub section (4), the Central
Government may, whenever it considers it necessary so
to do, require the State Government to furnish to the
Central Government the information and materials on the
basis of which such declaration has been made or
confirmed, or not revoked, as the case may be, and such
other information and materials as the Central
Government may deem necessary.

(9) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law or any rule having the force of law,-

(a) the grounds on which an order of detention is
made under sub-section (1) of section 3 against any
person in respect of whom a declaration is made under
sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) and any information
or materials on which such grounds or a declaration
under sub-section (2) or a declaration or confirmation
under sub-section (3) or the non revocation under sub-
section (4) of a declaration are based, shall be
treated as confidential and shall be deemed to refer to
matters of State and to be against the public interest
Lo disclose and save as. Otherwise provided in this
Act, no one shall communicate or disclose any such
ground, information or material or any document
containing such ground, information or material;

(b) no person against whom an order of detention
is made under sub-section (1) of section 3 shall be
entitled to the communication or disclosure of any such
ground, information or material as is referred to in
clause (a) or the production to him of any document
containing such ground, information or material."

On November 16, 1975 ordinance 22 of 1975 was issued
making certain amendments in MISA. By section 2 of the
ordinance the words "twelve days" and "twenty days" in sub-
section (3) of section 3 of MISA were substituted by the
words "twenty days" and "twentyfive days" respectively. In
section 14 of the principal Act following sub-section was
substituted for the original sub-section:

"(2) The expiry or revocation of a detention order
(hereafter in this sub-section referred to as the
earlier detention order) shall not bar the making of
another detention
256
order (hereafter in this sub-section referred to as the
subsequent detention order) under section 3 against the
same person:

Provided that in a case where no fresh facts have
arisen after the expiry or revocation of the earlier
detention order made against such person, the maximum
period for which such person, may be detained in
pursuance of the subsequent detention order shall, in
no case, extend beyond a period of twelve months from
the date of detention under the earlier detention order
or until the expiry of the Defence and Internal
Security of India Act, 1971, whichever is later."

Following sub-section (2A) was also inserted in section 16A
of the principal Act:

"(2A) If the State Government makes a declaration
under sub-section (2) that the detention of any person
in respect of whom a detention order is made by an
officer subordinate to that Government is necessary for
dealing effectively with the emergency, the State
Government shall be deemed to have approved such
detention order and the provisions of sub-section (3)
of section 3, in so far as they relate to the approval
of the State Government, and of sub section (4) of that
section, shall not apply to such detention order."

The amendments made by the ordinance were given
retrospective effect for the purpose of validating all acts
done previously.

During the pendency of these appeals, the Maintenance
of Internal Security (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 14 of 1976)
was published on January 25, 1976. This amending Act
incorporated and in same respects modified the changes which
had been brought about in the principal Act by ordinance 16
of 1975 and ordinance 22 of 1975. Section 2 and 3 of the
amending Act incorporate the changes which had been
introduced by sections 2 and 3 of ordinance 22 of 1975. At
the same time sections 2 and 3 of the amending Act make it
clear that substitution brought about by those sections
shall be with effect from June 29, 1975. Sections 4, 5 and 6
of the amending Act read as under:

(a) after sub-section (2), the following sub-
section shall be inserted, and shall be deemed to have
been inserted with effect from the 29th day of June,
1975, namely:-

'(2A) If the State Government makes a declaration
under sub-section (2) that the detention of any person
in respect of whom a detention order is made by an
officer subordinate to that Government is necessary for
dealing effectively with the emergency, the State
Government shall be
257
deemed to have approved such detention order and the
provisions of sub-section (3) of section 3, in so far
as they relate to the approval of the State Government,
and of sub-section (4) of that section, shall not apply
to such detention order.';

(b) for sub-section (5), the following sub-section
shall be substituted, and shall be deemed to have been
substituted with effect from the 29th day of June,
1975, namely:-

'(5) In making any review, consideration or
reconsideration under sub-section (2), sub-section (3)
or sub section (4), the appropriate Government or
officer may act on the basis of the information and
materials in its or his possession without
communicating or disclosing any such information or
materials to the person concerned or affording him any
opportunity of making any representation against the
making under sub-section (2), or the making or
confirming under sub-section (3), or the non-revocation
under sub-section (4), of the declaration in respect of
him.,;

(c) in sub-section (7), in clause (1),-
(1) in the opening portion, for the words the
following sub-section', the words 'the
following' shall be substituted and shall be
deemed to have been substituted with effect
from the 29th day of June, 1975;

(ii) in sub-section (3), as substituted by that
clause, for the words 'forward to the Central
Government a report in respect of the order',
the words 'report the fact to the Central
Government' shall be substituted, E; and
shall be deemed to have been substituted with
effect from the 29th day of June, 1975;

(iii)after sub-section (3) aforesaid, the
following shall be inserted. and shall be
deemed to have been inserted with effect from
the 17th day of October, 1975 namely:-
'(4) At any time after the receipt of a report
under sub-section (3), the Central Government may
require the State Government to furnish to the Central
Government the grounds on which the order has been made
and such other particulars as. in the opinion of the
State Government, have a bearing on the necessity for
the order.',

(d) after sub-section (7), the following sub-
sections shall be inserted, and shall be deemed to have
been inserted with effect from the 29th day' of June,
1975, namely:-

'(8) In the case of any person in respect of whom
a declaration has been made by a State Government under
sub-section (2) or a declaration has been made by a
State Government or an officer subordinate to it or
confirmed by the State Government under sub-section
(3), or a declaration has not been revoked by a State
Government under sub-sec
19-833 SCI/76.

258

tion (4), the Central Government may, whenever it
considers it necessary so to do, require the State
Government to furnish to the Central Government the
information and materials on the basis of which such
declaration has been made or confirmed, or not revoked
as the case may be, and such other information and
materials as the Central Government may deem necessary.
(9) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law or any rule having the force of law,-

(a) the grounds on which an order of detention is
made or purported to be made under section 3 against
any person in respect of whom a declaration is made
under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) and any
information or materials on which such grounds or a
declaration under sub-section (3) or the non-revocation
under sub-section (4) of a declaration are based, shall
be treated as confidential and shall be deemed to refer
to matters of State and to be against the public
interest to disclose and save as otherwise provided in
this Act, no one shall communicate or disclose any such
ground, information or immaterial or any document
containing such ground, information or material;

(b) no person against whom an order of detention
is made or purported to be made under section 3 shall
be entitled to the communication or disclosure of any
such ground, information or material as is referred to
in clause (a) or the production to him of any document
containing such ground, information or material.'

5. In section 18 of the principal Act, for the
words 'detained under this Act', the words and figure
'in respect of whom an order is made or purported to be
made under section 3' shall be substituted, and shall
be deemed to have been substituted with effect from the
25th day of June, 1975.

6. Any act or thing done or purporting to have
been done; before the 16th day of November, 1975, under
the principal Act in respect of any person against whom
an order of detention was made under that Act on or
after the 25th day of June, 1975 or in respect of any
such order of detention shall, for all purposes, be
deemed to be as valid and effective as if the
amendments made to the principal Act by sections 2 and
3, and clause (a) of section 4, of this Act had been in
force at all material times."

During the pendency of these petitions under article
226 of the Constitution of India before the High Courts for
issue of writs of habeas corpus, it was contended on behalf
of the Union of India and the States that in view of the
Presidential order dated June 27, 1975 under article 359
suspending the right of all persons to move any court for
the enforcement of the rights conferred by articles 14 21
and 22 of the Constitution, petitions for issue of writs of
habeas corpus were not maintainable. Particular stress was
laid upon the fact that
259
the right to move the court for enforcement of the right
under article 21 had been suspended and as such no petition
for a writ of habeas corpus could be proceeded with. The
above mentioned Presidential order was stated to be an
absolute bar to the judicial security of the detention
orders. This contention did not find favour with the High
Courts and they held that despite the said Presidential
order the petitions were maintainable and could be proceeded
with. Although opinions were not unanimous on the point as
to whether the High Courts should without examining the
individual facts of each case go into the question of the
area of the judicial scrutiny and if so, what was the area
of the judicial scrutiny, all the nine High Courts which
dealt with the matter came to the conclusion that the
Presidential order did not create an absolute bar to the
judicial scrutiny of the validity of the detention. The nine
High Courts are:

In these appeals before us, learned Attorney-General on
behalf of the appellants has drawn our attention to the
difference in phraseology of the Presidential order dated
June 27, 1975 and the earlier Presidential orders dated
November 3, 1962 and November 16, 1974 and has urged that in
view of the absolute nature of the Presidential order of
June 27, 1975, petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not
maintainable.

There can be no doubt that the Presidential order dated
June 27, 1975 has been worded differently compared to the
earlier Presidential orders which were issued under clause
(1) of article 359 and that there has been a departure from
the pattern which used to be adopted while issuing such
orders. The Presidential order dated November 16, 1974 has
already been reproduced earlier. Presidential order dated
November 3, 1962 issued under clause (1) of article 359 of
the Constitution read as under:

"ORDER
New Delhi, the 3rd November, 1962
G.S.R. 146-In exercise of the powers conferred by
clause (1) of article 359 of the Constiution, the
President hereby declares that the right of any person
to move any court for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by article 21 and article 22 of the
Constitution shall remain suspended for the period
during which the Proclamation of Emergency
260
issued under clause (1) of article 352 thereof on the
26th October, 1962 is in force, if such person has been
deprived of any such rights under the Defence of India
ordinance, 196 (4 of 1962) or any rule or order made
thereunder."

on November 6, 1962, the rules framed under the ordinance by
the Central Government were published. On November 11, 1962
the Presidential order reproduced above was amended and for
the words and figure "article 21", the words and figures
"articles 14 and 21" were substituted. The Defence of India
ordinance was subsequently replaced by the Defence of India
Act and the rules framed under the ordinance were deemed to
have been framed under the Act. Perusal of the above
Presidential order of 1962 shows that what was suspended was
the right of any person to move any court for the
enforcement of rights conferred by articles 14, 21 and 22.
The suspension was, however, conditioned by the circumstance
that such person had been deprived of such rights under the
Defence of India Act or any rule or order made thereunder.
It was plain that in case a detention order was made or any
other action was taken not under the provisions of the
Defence of India Act or any rule or order made thereunder,
the same could not enjoy the protection of the Presidential
order under article 359. Another effect of the Presidential
order was that as long as the proclamation of emergency was
in force, the validity of the provisions of the Defence of
India Act or the rules or orders made thereunder could not
be assailed on the ground of being violative of articles 14,
21 and 22. It is also clear that in view of article 358,
while a proclamation of emergency was in operation, nothing
in article 19 could have restricted the power of the State
to make any law or to take any executive action which the
State could but for the provisions contained in Part III was
competent to make or to take.

Likewise, under the Presidential order dated November
16, 1974 which has been already reproduced earlier, what was
suspended was the right to move any court with respect to an
order of detention which might have been made or which might
be made thereafter under section 3(1)(c) of the Maintenance
of Internal Security Act as amended for the enforcement of
rights conferred by articles 14, 21 and clause (4) to (7) of
article 22 of the Constitution. Proceedings pending in any
court for the enforcement of any of the aforesaid rights
with respect to orders of detention made under section 3 (1)

(c) too were suspended. It was plain from the language of
the Presidential order that there could be no suspension of
the right mentioned in the Presidential order if the
detention order could not be shown to have been made under
section 3(1)(c) of MISA because an order not under section
3(1) (c) was outside the Presidential order.

The Presidential order of 1962 under article 359(1) of
the Constitution came to be considered by this Court in the
case of Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab.(1) Gajendragadkar
J. (as he then was) speaking for six out of the Bench of
seven Judges of this Court observed while dealing with the
effect of the Presidential order on a petition of habeas
corpus:

(1) [1964] 4 S. C. R. 797.

261

"We have already seen that the right to move any
court which is suspended by Art. 359(1) and the
Presidential order issued under it is the right for the
enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III
as may be mentioned in the order. If in challenging the
validity of his detention order, the detenu is pleading
any right outside the rights specified in the order,
his right to move any court in that behalf is not
suspended, because it is outside Art. 359(1) and
consequently outside the Presidential order itself. Let
us take a case where a detenu has been detained in
violation of the mandatory provisions of the Act. In
such a case, it may be open to the detenu to contend
that his detention is illegal for the reason that the
mandatory provision of the Act have been contravened.
Such a plea is outside Art. 359(1) and the right of the
detenu to move for his release on such a ground cannot
be affected by the Presidential order.
Take also a case where the detenu moves the Court
for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his
detention i has been ordered malafide. It is hardly
necessary to ; emphasise that the exercise of a power
malafide is wholly outside the scope of the Act
conferring the power and can ; always be successfully
challenged. It is true that a mere allegation that the
detention is malafide would not be enough; the detenu
will have to prove the malafides. But if the malafides
are alleged, the detenu cannot be precluded from
substantiating his plea on the ground of the bar
created by Art. 359(1) and the Presidential order. That
is another kind of plea which is outside the purview of
Art. 359(1)."

It was further observed :

"It is only in regard to that class of cases falling
under s. 491(1) (b) where the legality of the detention
is challenged on grounds which fall under Art. 359(1)
and Presidential order that the bar would operate. In
all other cases falling under s. 491(1) the bar would
be inapplicable and proceedings taken on behalf of the
detenu will have to be tried in accordance with law. We
ought to add that these categories of pleas have been
mentioned by us by way of illustrations, and so, they
should not be read as exhausting all the pleas which do
not fall within the purview of the Presidential order.
There is yet another ground on which the validity
of the detention may be open to challenge. If a detenu
contends that the operative provision of the law under
which he is detained suffers from the vice of excessive
delegation and IS, therefore, invalid, the plea thus
raised by the detenu cannot at the threshold be said to
be barred by the Presi-

262

dential order. In terms, it is not a plea which is
relatable to the fundamental rights specified in the
said order. It is a plea which is independent of the
said rights and its validity must be examined."

"Article 358 of the Constitution suspends the
provisions of Art. 19 of Part III of the Constitution
during the period the proclamation of emergency is in
operation; and the order passed by the President under
Art. 359 suspended the enforcement, inter alia, of Art.
21 during the period of the said emergency. But the
President's order was a conditional one. In effect it
said that the right to move the High Court or the
Supreme Court remained suspended if such a person had
been deprived of his personal liberty under the Defence
of India Act, 1962, or any rule or order made
thereunder. If a person was deprived of his personal
liberty not under the Act or a rule or order made there
under but in contravention thereof, his right to move
the said Courts in that regard would not be suspended.
The question, therefore, in this case is whether the
first respondent's liberty has been restricted in terms
of the Defence of India Rules where under he was
detained. If it was in contravention of the said Rules
he would have the right to approach the High Court
under Art. 226 of the Constitution."

Similar view was expressed in the case of Dr. Ram
Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Ors.(2) Sarkar J. (as be
then was) in that case observed that where a person was
detained in violation OF the mandatory provisions of the
Defence of India Act, his right to move the court was not
suspended. Hidayatullah and Bachawat JJ. referred to the
fact that the Presidential order did not say that even if a
person was proceeded against in breach of the Defence of
India Act or the rules, he could not move the court or
complain that the Act and the Rules under colour of which
some action was taken did not warrant it. The Presidential
order was held to have not intended to condone an
illegitimate enforcement of the Defence of India Act.
Raghubar Dayal J. held that the Court could go into the
question as to whether the District Magistrate exercised the
power of detention under the Defence of India Rules bonafide
and in accordance with the rules. Mudholkar J. Observed that
if a detenu contends that the order. though it purports to
be under rule 30(1) of the Defence of India Rules, was not
competently made, this Court had a duty to enquire into the
matter. Sarkar, Hidayatullah, Mudholkar and Bachawat JJ. On
consideration of the material before them found that as the
detention order had been made with a view to present the
detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of
(1) [1966] 1 S. C. R. 702.

(2) [1966] 1 S. C. R. 709
263
law and order and not public order, as contemplated by rule
30, the detention order was not in conformity with law. The
petitioner in that case was accordingly directed to be set
at liberty.

The observations in the cases referred to above show
that the validity of the detention orders could be assailed
despite the Presidential orders of: 1962 and 1974 under
article 359 in case the right relied upon was not one
covered by these Presidential orders. The protection
afforded by those Presidential orders was not absolute, it
Was conditional and confined to ruling out the challenge to
detention orders and other actions taken under the
provisions mentioned in those Presidential orders on the
score of contravention of the articles specified in those
orders. If the detention of a detenu was not in accordance
with the provisions mentioned in the Presidential orders,
the Presidential orders did not have the effect of affording
protection to the detention order and it was permissible to
challenge the validity of the detention on the ground that
it had not been made under the specified provisions but in
contravention of those provisions.

We may now deal with the Presidential order dated June
27, 1975 with which we are concerned. Unlike the
Presidential orders under clause (1) of article 359 issued
earlier, this Presidential order makes no reference to any
detention order made under any specified provision. It seeks
to impose a blanket suspension of the right of any person,
including a foreigner, to move any court far the enforcement
of the rights conferred by articles 14, 21 and 22 of the
Constitution and of all proceedings pending in any court for
the enforcement of the above mentioned rights for the period
during which the proclamation of emergency is in force. The
observations which were made by this court in the cases
referred to above in the context of the phraseology of the
earlier Presidential orders of 1962 and 1974 namely the
detention orders made under specified provisions, cannot now
be relied upon while construing the ambit of the
Presidential order of June 27, 1975.

The difference in phraseology of the Presidential order
dated June 27, 1975 and that of the earlier Presidential
orders would not, however, justify the conclusion that
because of the new Presidential order dated June '27, 1975 a
detention order need not comply with the requirements of the
law providing for preventive detention. Such a detention
order would still be liable to be challenged in a court on
the ground that it does not comply with the requirement of
law for preventive detention if ground for such challenge be
permissible in spite of and consistently with the new
Presidential order. The effect of the change in phraseology
would only be that such of the observations which were made
in the cases mentioned above in the context of the language
of the earlier Presidential orders cannot now be relied
upon. Reliance, however, can still be placed upon the
observations made in those cases which were not linked with
the phraseology of the earlier Presidential orders.

Question then arises as to what is the effect of the
suspension of the right of a person to move any court for
the enforcement of rights
264
conferred by articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution. One
obvious result of the above is that no one can rely upon
articles 14, 21 and 22 with a view to seek relief from any
court. According to the stand taken by the learned Attorney
General, the effect of the suspension of the right of a
person to move any court for the enforcement of the right
conferred by article 21 is that even if the order for
detention has been made without the authority of law, no
redress can be sought from the court against such detention
order. Article 21 of the Constitution reads as under:

"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to procedure established by
law."

It is urged that article 21 is the sole repository of one's
right to life or personal liberty. The moment the right to
move any court for enforcement of article 21 is suspended,
no one can, according to the submission, complain to the
court of deprivation of life or personal liberty for any
redress sought from the court on that score would be
enforcement of article 21. Petition under article 226 for
the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, it is contended by
learned Attorney General, is essentially a petition to
enforce the right of personal liberty and as the right to
move any court for the enforcement of the right conferred by
article 21 is suspended, no relief can be granted to the
petitioner in such petition.

In order to assess the force of the above argument, it
may be necessary to give the background and the history of
article 21. In the original draft of the Indian
Constitution, in the article which now stands as article 21
the words used were "in accordance with due process of law"
instead of the words "according to procedure established by
law." The concept of expression "due process of law" or its
equivalent "law of the land" traces its lineage for back
into the beginning of the 13th century A.D. The famous 39th
chapter of the Magna Carta provides that "no free man shall
be taken or imprisoned or disseized, or outlawed or exiled
or in any way destroyed; nor shall we go upon him nor send
upon him but by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the
law of the land." Magna Carta as a charter of English
liberty was confirmed by successive English monarchs. It was
in one of these confirmations (28 Ed. III, Chap. 3) known as
"Statute of Westminster of the liberties of London" that the
expression "due process of law" appears to have been used
for the first time. Neither of the expressions "due process
of law" or "law of the land" was explained or defined in any
of the documents, but on the authority of Sir Edward Coke it
may be said that both the expressions have the same meaning.
In substance, they guaranteed that persons should not be
imprisoned without proper indictment and trial by peers, and
that property should not be seized except in proceedings
conducted in due form in which the owner or the person in
possession should have an opportunity to show cause why
seizure should not be made. The expression "due process of
law" came to be a part of the US Constitution by the Fifth
Amendment which was adopted in 1791 and which provided that
"no person shall be
265
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." A Similar expression was used in the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868. It has been said that few phrases in the
law are so elusive of exact apprehension as "due process of
law." The United States Supreme Court has always declined to
give a comprehensive definition of it and has preferred that
its full meaning should be gradually ascertained by the
process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the
decisions as they arise. The expression "due process of
law," as used in the US Constitution, has been taken to
impose a limitation upon the powers of the Government,
legislative as well as executive and judicial. Applied in
England as protection against executive usurpation and royal
tyranny, in America it became a bulwark against arbitrary
legislation. "Due process of law," according to Cooley,
"means in each particular case such an exercise of the
powers of Government as the settled maxims of law permit and
sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of
individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of
cases to which the one in question belongs" (Constitutional
Limitations, Vol. II, p. 741).

'Till about the middle of the 19th Century, due process
clause was interpreted as a restriction upon procedure, and
particularly the judicial procedure, by which the Government
exercises its power. Principally it related to the procedure
by which persons were tried for crimes and guaranteed to
accused persons the right to have a fair trial in Compliance
with well established criminal proceedings. The same
principle applied to the machinery or proceedings by which
property rights were adjudicated and by which the powers of
eminent domain and taxation were exercised. During this
period it was not considered to have any bearing on
substantive law at all. Subsequently view came to be
accepted that the concept of due process of law protected
rights of life, liberty and property. This change in
judicial thinking was influenced in a great measure by the
industrial development leading to accumulation of large
capital in the hands of industrialists and the emergence of
a definite labouring class. What constituted legitimate
exercise of the powers of legislation now came to be a
judicial question and no statute was valid unless it was
reasonable in the opinion of the Court. The US Supreme Court
laid stress upon the word "due" which occurs before and
qualifies the expression "process of law." "Due" means "what
is just and proper" according to the circumstances of a
particular case. The word introduces a variable element in
the application of the doctrine, for what is reasonable in
one set of circumstances may not be so in another set of
circumstances. The requirement of due process clause as a
substantial restriction on Government control is also now
becoming a thing of the past and the rule is being
restricted more and more to its original procedural aspect
(see observations of Mukherjea J. in the case of A. K.
Gopalan, (supra).

At the time the Constitution was being drafted, the
Constitutional Adviser Mr. B. N. Rau had discussions with US
Constitutional experts some of whom expressed the opinion
that power of review implied in due process clause was not
only undemocratic because it
266
gave the power of vetoing legislation to the judges, but
also threw an unfair burden on the judiciary. This view was
communicated by Mr. Rau to the Drafting Committee which
thereupon substituted the words "except according to
procedure established by law" for words "due process, of
law." In dropping the words "due process of law," the
framers of our Constitution prevented the introduction of
elements of vagueness, uncertainty and changeability which
had grown round the due process doctrine in the United
States. The words ' except according to procedure
established by law" were taken from article 31 of the
Japanese Constitution, according to which "no person shall
be deprived of life or liberty nor shall any criminal
liability be imposed, except according to procedure
established by law. The article is also somewhat similar to
article 40(4)(1) of Irish Constitution, according to which
no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in
accordance with law." It was laid down in Gopalan's case by
the majority that the word "law" has been used in article 21
in the sense of State-made law and not as an equivalent of
law in the abstract or general sense embodying the
principles of natural justice. "The procedure established by
law" was held to mean the procedure established by law made
by the State, that is to say, the Union Parliament or the
legislatures of the States, Law, it was also observed by
Mukherjea J., meant a valid and binding law under the
provisions of the Constitution and not one infringing
fundamental rights.

The effect of the suspension of the right to move any
court for the enforcement of the right conferred by article
21, in my opinion, is that when a petition is filed in a
court, the court would have to proceed upon the basis that
no reliance can be placed upon that article for obtaining
relief from the court during the period of emergency.
Question then arises as to whether the rule that no one
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty without
the authority of law still survives during the period of
emergency despite the Presidential order r suspending the
right to move any court for the enforcement of the right
contained in article 21. The answer to this question is
linked with the answer to the question as to whether article
21 is the sole repository of the right to life and personal
liberty. After giving the matter my earnest consideration, I
am of the opinion that article 21 cannot be considered to be
the sole repository of the right to life and personal
liberty. The right to life and personal liberty is the most
precious right of human beings in civilised societies
governed by the rule of law. Many modern constitutions
incorporate certain fundamental rights, including the one
relating to personal freedom. According to Blackstone, the
absolute rights of Englishmen were the rights of personal
security, personal liberty and private property. The
American Declaration of Independence (1776) states that all
men are created equal, and among their inalienable rights
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The Second
Amendment to the US Constitution refers inter alia to
security of person, while the Fifth Amendment prohibits
inter alia deprivation of life and liberty without due
process of law. The different Declarations of Human Rights
and fundamental freedoms have all laid stress upon the
sanctity
267
of life and liberty. They have also given expression in
varying words to the principle that no one shall be
deprived of his life or liberty without the authority of
law. The International Commission of Jurists, which is
affiliated to Unesco, has been attempting with considerable
success to give material content to "the Rule of Law," an
expression used in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. One of its most notable achievements was the
Declaration of Delhi, 1959. This resulted from a Congress
held in New Delhi attended by jurists from more than 50
countries, and was based on a questionnaire circulated to
75,000 lawyers. "Respect for the supreme value of human
personality" was stated to be the basis of all law (see page
21 of the Constitutional and Administrative Law by o. Hood
Phillips, 3rd Ed.

Freedom under law, it may be added, is not absolute
freedom. It has its own limitations in its own interest, and
can properly be described as regulated freedom. In the words
of Ernest Barker, (1) the truth that every man ought to be
free has for its other side the complementary and
consequential truth that no man can be absolutely free. that

(ii) the need of liberty for each is necessarily qualified
and conditioned by the need of liberty for all: that (iii)
liberty in the State or legal liberty, is never the absolute
liberty of all: that (iv) liberty within the State is thus a
relative and regulated liberty; and that (v) a relative and
regulated liberty; actually, operative and enjoyed. is a
liberty greater in amount an absolute liberty could ever be-
if indeed such liberty could ever exist, or even amount to
anything more than nothing at all.

Rule of law is the antithesis of arbitrariness. Plato
believed that if philosophers were kings or kings
philosophers government by will would be instrinsically
superior to government by law, and he so proclaimed in his
Republic. Experience eventually taught him that this ideal
was not obtainable and that if ordinary men were allowed to
rule by will alone the interests of the community would be
sacrificed to those of the ruler. Accordingly. in the Laws
he modified his position and urged the acceptance of the
"second best", namely government under law. Since then the
question of the relative merits of rule by law as against
rule by will has been often debated. In the aggregate the
decision has been in favour of rule by law. On occasions
however, we have slipped back into government by will only
to return again, sadder and wiser men, to Plato's "second
best" when the hard facts of human nature demonstrated the
essential egotism of men and the truth of the dictum that
all power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
Bracton's dicta that if the king has no bridle one ought to
be put upon him, and that although the king is under no man
he is under God and the law Fortescue's insistence that the
realm of England is a reginem politicium et regale and hence
limited by law. Coke's observation that "Magna Carta is such
a fellow that he will have no sovereign"; these are but a
few of the beacons lighting the way to the triumph of the
rule of law (see pages 3-6 of the Rule of Law by Malcolm
Macdonald & ors.). Rule of law is now the accepted norm of
all civilised societies. Even if there have been deviations
268
from the rule of law, such deviations have been covert and
disguised for no government in a civilized country is
prepared to accept the ignominy of governing without the
rule of law. As observed on page 77 of Constitutional Law by
Wade and Phillips, 8th Ed., the rule of law has come to be
regarded as the mark of a free society. Admittedly its
content is different in different countries, nor is it to be
secured exclusively through the ordinary courts. But
everywhere it is identified with the liberty of the
individual. It seeks to maintain a balance between the
opposing notions of individual liberty and public order. In
every State the problem arises of reconciling human rights
with the requirements of public interest. Such harmonising
can only be attained by the existence of independent courts
which can hold the balance between citizen and State and
compel Governments to conform to the law.

Sanctity of life and liberty was not something new when
the Consitution was drafted. It represented a fact of higher
values which mankind began to cherish in its evolution from
a state of tooth and claw to a civilized existence.
Likewise, the principle that no one shall be deprived of his
life and liberty without the authority of law was not the
gift of the Constitution. It was a necessary corollory of
the concept relating to the sanctity of life and liberty; it
existed and was in force before the coming into force of the
Constitution. The idea about the sanctity of life and
liberty as well as the principle that no one shall be
deprived of his life and liberty without the authority of
law are essentially two facets of the same concept. This
concept grew and acquired dimensions in response to the
inner urges and nobler impulses with the march of
civilisation. Great writers and teachers, philosophers and
political thinkers nourished and helped in the efflorescence
of the concept by rousing the conscience of mankind and by
making it conscious of the necessity of the concept as
necessary social discipline in self-interest and for orderly
existence. According even to the theory of social compact
many aspects of which have now been discredited, individuals
have surrendered a part of their theoretically unlimited
freedom in return or the blessings of the government. Those
blessings include governance in accordance with certain
norms in the matter of life and liberty of the citizens.
Such norms take the shape of the rule of law. Respect for
law, we must bear in mind, has a mutual relationship with
respect for government. Erosion of the respect for law, it
has accordingly been said, affects the respect for the
government. Government under the law means, as observed by
Macdonald, that the power to govern shall be exercised only
under conditions laid down in constitutions and laws
approved by either the people or their representatives. Law
thus emerges as a norm limiting the application of power by
the government over the citizen or by citizens over their
fellows. Theoretically all men are equal before the law and
are equally bound by it regardless of their status, class,
office or authority. At the same time that the law enforces
duties it also protects rights, even against the sovereign.
Government under law thus seeks the establishment of an
ordered community in which the individual, aware of his
rights and duties, comprehends the area of activity within
which, as a responsible and intelligent person, he may
269
freely order his life, secure from interference from either
the government or other individuals (see Rule of Law, page

6). To quote further from Professor Macdonald:

"It is clear enough that high echelon
administrators are understandably impatient with the
restraints imposed upon them by the traditional concept
of the rule of law as developed by Dicey.

Administrators deal with the implementation of highly
technical and complex matters involving the immediate
interests of many citizens, To accomplish this they are
granted wide discretion in the use of administrative
power to effectuate broad policies laid down by the
legislators. It is natural that they should desire to
have the conflicts which arise as the result of the
exercise of their discretion adjudicated by tribunals
composed of experts acquainted with the details of the
matters at issue, rather than by judges trained only in
the law. Hence their resistance to judicial review of
administrative 'findings of fact' as opposed to
'findings of law'. The very things which a court of law
prizes-rules of evidence, common law procedures, even
due process-frequently appear to the administrators as
obscurantist devices employed by those who oppose the
very principle of the policy he is attempting to
effectuate. Often, secretly if not openly, the
administrator considers his policy to be the
incarnation of the best interests of the people, or at
least of their best interests if they really understood
them, and hence considers himself as arrayed on the
side of progress and light against the dark forces of
reaction. E
Thus our 'wonderland of bureaucracy', as Beck has
called it, has sought autonomy from the traditional
rule of courts and law. If it should succeed we should
then indeed be confronted with a vital segment of
govern mental power which would have escaped from legal
control and become arbitrary in its acts. To prevent
this we have subjected the acts of administrators to
challenge in the courts on the basis of ultra vires,
and provided for judicial review of administrative
tribunals' finding of law." (see ibid page 8) .
To use the words of Justice Brandeis(1) with some
modification, experience should teach us to be most on our
guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are
beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel
invasion of their liberty by evil-minded persons. Greatest
danger to liberty lies in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning but lacking in due deference for the rule
of law
Even in the absence of article 21 in the Constitution,
the State has got no power to deprive a person of his life
or liberty without
(1) Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928).

270

the authority of law. This is the essential postulate and
basic assumption of the rule of law and not of men in all
civilised nations. Without such sanctity of life and
liberty, the distinction between a lawless society and one
governed by laws would cease to have any meaning. The
principle that no one shall be deprived of his life or
liberty without the authority of law is rooted in the
consideration that life and liberty are priceless
possessions which cannot be made the plaything of individual
whim and caprice and that any act which has the effect of
tampering With life and liberty must receive sustenance from
and sanction of the laws of the land. Article 21
incorporates an essential aspect of that principle and makes
it part of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of
the Constitution. It does not, however, follow from the
above that if article 21 had not been drafted and inserted
in Part III, in that event it would have been permissible
for the State to deprive a person of his life or liberty
without the authority of law. No case has been cited before
us to show that before the coming into force of the
Constitution or in countries under rule of law where there
is no provision corresponding to article 21, a claim was
ever sustained by the courts that the State can deprive a
person of his life or liberty without the authority of law.
In fact, any suggestion to such a claim was unequivocally
repelled. In the case of James Sommersett(1) Lord Mansfield
dealt with a case of a negro named Sommersett, who was being
taken in a ship to Jamaica for sale in a slave market. When
the ships anchored at London port, a habeas corpus petition
was presented by some Englishmen who were moved by the
yelling and cries of Sommersett. In opposition to the
petition the slave trader took the plea that there was no
law which prohibited slavery. Lord d Mansfield while
repelling this objection made the following observation in
respect of slavery which is one of the worst forms of
deprivation of personal freedom:

"It is so odious that nothing can be suffered to
support it but positive law: whatever inconveniences,
therefore, may follow from this decision, I cannot say
this case is allowed or approved by the law of England;
and therefore the black must be discharged."

"To lay down in an English court of Justice that a
Governor acting by virtue of Letters Patent. under the
Great Seal, is accountable only to God and his own con
science; that he is absolutely despotic and can spoil,
plunder. and affect His Majesty's subjects, both in
their liberty and property, with impunity, is a
doctrine that cannot be maintained"

The above observations were relied upon in the matter of
Ameer Khan(3). I may also refer to the observations of Lord
Atkin in the
(1) [1772], 16 Cr. Pract. 289.

(2) 1 Cowp., 161.

(3) 6 Bengal Law Reports 392.

271

case of Eshuqbavi Eleko v. Officer Administering the
Government of Nigeria (1)
"In accordance with British jurisprudence, no
member of the executive can interfere with the liberty
or property of ;3 British subject except on the
condition that he can sup port the legality of his
action before a Court of Justice. And it is the
tradition of British Justice that Judges should not
shrink from deciding such issues in the face of the
executive
The above rule laid down in Eleko's case was followed by the
High Courts in India before the coming into force of the
Constitution in Prabhakar Kesheo Tare & ors. v. Emperor(2),
Vimlabai Deshpande v. Emperor(2), Jitendranath Ghosh v, The
Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal(4) and In re:
Banwari Lal Roy & ors.(5). The rule laid down in Eleko's
case was also followed by the Constitution Benches of this
Court after the coming force of the Constitution in the
cases of Bidi Supply Co. v. The Union of India & ors.(6) and
Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi &
Rajasthan & Anr.(7).

I am unable to subscribe to the view that when right to
enforce the right under article 21 is suspended, the result
would be that there would be no remedy against deprivation
of a person's life or liberty by the State even though such
deprivation is without the authority of law or even in
flagrant violation of the provisions of law. The right not
to be deprived of one's life or liberty without the
authority of law was not the creation of the Constitution.
Such right existed before the Constitution came into force.
The fact that the framers of the Constitution made an aspect
of such right a part of the fundamental rights did not have
the effect of exterminating the independent identity of such
right and of making article 21 to be the sole repository of
that right. Its real effect was to ensure that a law under
which a person can be deprived of his life or personal
liberty should prescribe a procedure for such deprivation
or, according to the dictum laid down by Mukherjea, J. in
Gopalan's case, such law should be a valid law not violative
of fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the
Constitution. Recognition as fundamental right of one aspect
of the pre-Constitutional right cannot have the effect of
making things less favourable so far as the sanctity of life
and personal liberty is concerned compared to the position
if an aspect of such right had not been recognised as
fundamental right because of the vulnerability of
fundamental rights accruing from article 359. I am also
unable to agree that in view of the Presi-

(1) AIR 1931 P.C. 248.

(2) AIR 1943 Nag. 26.

(3) A. I. R. 1945 Nag. 8.

(4) I. L. R. 60 Cal. 364.

(5) 48 C. W. N. 766.

(6) [1956] S. C. R. 267.

(7) [1959] Supp. (1) S. C. R. 528.

272

dential order in the matter of sanctity of life and liberty,
things would be worse off compared to the state of law as it
existed before the coming into force of the Constitution.

The case of Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil v. The State of
Bombay(1) upon which reliance has been placed by learned
Attorney General cannot be of much assistance to him. In
that case this Court held that the validity of the Bombay
Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 cannot be questioned on
the ground that it takes away or abridges the fundamental
rights conferred by the Constitution of India in view of the
fact that Act had been inserted, in the Ninth Schedule of
the Constitution. This Court also repelled the contention
that the said Act was violative of section 229 of the
Government of India Act, 1935 because, in the opinion of the
Court, the right secured by section 229 was lifted into the
formal category of a fundamental right. The principle laid
down in that case cannot be invoked in a case like the
present wherein the area covered by the right existing since
before the Constitution is wider than the area covered by
the fundamental right and the fundamental right deals with
only an aspect of such pre-existing right. Moreover, the
correctness of the view taken in the above case, in my
opinion, is open to question in view of the later decision
of Makhan Singh (supra) decided by a Bench of seven Judges
wherein it has been observed on page 821 that after the
coming into force of the Constitution, a detenu has two
remedies, one under article 226 or article 32 of the
Constitution and another under section 491 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Makhan Singh's case, as discussed
elsewhere, shows that the remedy under an earlier statuory
provision would not get obliterated because of the identical
remedy by a subsequent Constitutional provision and that the
two can co-exist without losing their independent identity.

Preventive detention, though not strictly punishment,
is akin to punishment, because of the evil consequences of
being deprived of one's liberty. No one under our laws can
be deprived of his life or liberty without the authority of
law. This would be evident from the fact that if a person
without the authority of law takes another person's life, he
would normally be guilty of the offence of culpable
homicide. Likewise, if a person deprives another of his
liberty by confining him, he would in the absence of any
valid justification, be guilty of wrongful confinement. It
is for that reason that courts have insisted upon the
authority of law for a public servant to take away someone's
life or liberty. An executioner carrying out the sentence of
death imposed by the court would not commit the offence of
homicide, because he is executing the condemned man in
obedience to a warrant issued by a court having jurisdiction
in accordance with the law of the land. Likewise, a jailor
confining a person sentenced to imprisonment is not guilty
of the offence of wrongful confinement. The principle that
no one shall be deprived of his life or liberty without the
authority of law stems not merely from the basic assumption
in every civilised society governed by the rule of law of
the
(1) [1955] 1 S. C. R. 691.

273

sanctity of life and liberty, it flows equally from the fact
that under our penal laws no one is empowered to deprive a
person of his life or liberty without the authority of law.

The fact that penal laws of India answer to the
description of the word "law", which has been used in
article 21 would not militate against the inference that
article 21 is not the sole repository of the right to life
or personal liberty and that the principle that no one shall
be deprived of his life or personal liberty without the
authority of law flows from the penal laws of India. Nor is
it the effect of article 21 that penal laws get merged in
article 21 because of the fact that they constitute "law" as
mentioned in article 21 for were it so the suspension of
the right to move a court for enforcement of fundamental
right contained in article 21 would also result in
suspension of the right to move any court for enforcement of
penal laws
It has been pointed out above that even before the
coming into force of the Constitution, the position under
the common law both in England and in India was that the
State could not deprive a person of his life and liberty
without the authority of law. The same was the position
under the penal laws of India. It was all offence under the
Indian Penal Code, as already mentioned, to deprive a person
of his life or liberty unless such a course was sanctioned
by the laws of the land. An action was also maintainable
under the law of torts for wrongful confinement in case any
person was deprived of his personal liberty without the
authority of law. In addition to that, we had section 491 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure which provided the remedy of
habeas corpus against detention without the authority of
law. Such laws continued to remain in force in view of
article 372 after the coming into force of the Constitution.
According to that article, notwithstanding the repeal by
this Constitution of the enactments referred to in article
395 but subject to the other provisions of this
Constitution, all the law in force in the territory of India
immediately before the commencement of this Constitution
shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or
amended by competent legislature or other competent
authority. The law in force, as observed by the majority of
he Constitution Bench in the ease of Director of Rationing
and Distribution v. The Corporation of Calcutta & Ors.
include not only the statutory law but also custom or usage
having the force of law as also the common law of England
which was adopted as the law of the country before the
coming into force of the Constitution. The position thus
seems to be firmly established that at the time the
Constitution came into force, the legal position was that no
one could be deprived of his life or liberty without the
authority of law.

It is difficult to accede to the contention that
because of article 21 of the Constitution, the law which was
already in force that no one could be deprived of his life
or liberty without the authority of law
(1) [1961] 1 S. C. R. 158.

18-833SCI/76
274
was obliterated and ceased to remain in force. No rule of
construction interpretation warrants such an inference.
Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure continued to
remain an integral part of that Code despite the fact that
the High Courts were vested with the power of issuing writs
of habeas corpus under article 226. No submission was ever
advanced on the score that the said provision had become a
dead letter of unforceable because of the fact that article
226 was made a part of the Constitution. Indeed, in the case
of Malkha Singh (supra) Gajendragadkar J. speaking for the
majority stated that after the coming into force of the
Constitution, a party could avail of either the remedy of
section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or that of
article 226 of the Constitution. The above observations
clearly go to show that constitutional recognition of the
remedy of writ of habeas corpus did not obliterate or
abrogate the statutory remedy of writ of habeas corpus.
Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure continued to
be part of that Code till that Code was replaced by the new
Code. Although the remedy of writ of habeas corpus is not
now available under the new Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, the same remedy is still available under article 226
of the Constitution.

Our attention has been invited to section 18 of the
maintenance of Internal Security Act as amended. According
to that section, no person, including a foreigner, in
respect of whom an order is made or purported to be made
under section 3 shall have any right to personal liberty by
virtue of natural law or common law, if any. This section
would not, in my opinion, detract from my conclusion that
article 21 is not the sole repository of the right to
personal liberty. It has been pointed out above that the
principle that no one shall be deprived of his life and
personal liberty without the authority of laws follows not
merely from common law, it flows equally from statutory law
like the penal law in force in India. The above principle,
as would appear from what has been discussed elsewhere, is
also an essential facet of the rule of law. Section 18,
therefore, cannot be of much assistance to the appellants. I
am also unable to subscribe to the view that section 18
would have the effect of enlarging the ambit of the power of
the detaining authority for the purpose of passing an order
for detention. There has been, it needs to be emphasised, no
amendment of section 3 of the Act. Section 18 cannot be
construed to mean that even if an order for detention is
made on grounds not warranted by section 3 of the Act, it
shall be taken to be an order under section 3 of the Act.
Apart from the fact that such an inference is not
permissible on the language of section 18, the acceptance of
this view would also render the validity of section 18 open
to question on the ground that it suffers from the vice of
excessive delegation of legislative power. The legislature
is bound to lay down the legislative policy by prescribing
the circumstances in which an order for detention can be
made. It is not permissible for the legislature to confer a
power of detention without laying down guidelines and
prescribing the circumstances in which such order should be
made. To do so would be tantamount to abdication of
legislatitve function for in such
275
an event it would be open to the detaining authority to
detain a person on any ground whatsoever.

l agree with the learned Attorney General that if we
are to accept his argument about the scope of the
Presidential order of June 27, 1975, in that event we have
to accept it in its entirety and go the whole hog; there is
no half way house in between. So let us examine the
consequences of the acceptance of the above argument. This
would mean that if any official, even a head constable of
police, capriciously or maliciously, arrests a person and
detains him indefinitely without any authority of law, the
aggrieved person would not be able to seek any relief from
the courts against such detention during the period of
emergency. This would also mean that it would not be
necessary to enact any law on the subject and even in the
absence of any such law, if any official for reasons which
have nothing to do with the security of State or maintenance
of public order, but because of personal animosity, arrests
and puts behind the bar any person or a whole group or
family of persons, the aggrieved person or persons would not
be able to seek any redress from a court of law. The same
would be the position in case of threat of deprivation or
even actual deprivation of life of a person because article
21 refers to both deprivation of life as well as personal
liberty. Whether such things actually come to pass is not
the question before us; it is enough to state that all these
are permissible consequences from the acceptance of the
contention that article 21 is the sole repository of the
right life and personal liberty and that consequent upon
the issue of the Presidential order, no one can approach any
court and seek relief during he period of emergency against
deprivation of life or personal liberty. In order words, the
position would be that so far as executive officers are
concerned, in matters relating to life and personal liberty
of citizens, they would not be governed by any law, they
would not be answerable to any court and they would be
wielding more or less despotic powers.

To take another illustration. Supposing the
Presidential order under article 359(1) were to mention
article 21 but not article 22. The acceptance of the above
submission advanced on behalf of the appellants would mean
that if the State does not release a detenu despite the
opinion of the Advisory Board that there is no sufficient
cause for his detention and thus keeps him in detention in
fragrant violation of the provisions of article 22, no
habeas corpus petition would be maintainable and this would
be so even though article 22 itself is a fundamental right.

The right to move a court for enforcement of a right
under article 19 has now been suspended by the President
under an order issued under article 359(1). The effect of
that, on a parity of reasoning advanced on behalf of the
appellant would be, that no one can file a suit during the
period of emergency against the State for recovery of
property or money (which is a form of property) because such
a suit, except in some contingencies, would be a Suit to
enforce the right contained in article 19.

276

Not much argument is needed to show that if two
constructions of Presidential order were possible, one
leading to startling results and the other not leading to
such results, the court should lean in favour of such
construction as would not lead to such results.

Equally well established is the rule of construction
that if there be a conflict between the municipal law on one
side and the inter national law or the provisions of any
treaty obligations on the other, the courts would give
effect to municipal law. If, however, two constructions of
the municipal law are possible, the courts should lean in
favour of adopting such construction as would make the
provisions of the municipal law to be in harmony with the
inter national law or treaty obligations. Every statute,
according to this rule, is interpreted, so far as its
language permits, so as not to be inconsistent with the
committee of nations or the established rules of
international law, and the court will avoid a construction
which would give rise to such inconsistency unless compelled
to adopt it by plain and unambiguous language. But if the
language of the statute is clear, it must be followed
notwithstanding the conflict between municipal and
international law which results (see page 183 of Maxwell on
the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition.) As
observed by Oippenheim's International law, although
municipal courts must apply Municipal Law even if it
conflicts with the Law of Nations, there is a presumption
against the existence of such a conflict. As the Law of
Nations is based upon the common consent of the different
States, it is improbable that an enlightened State would
intentionally enact a rule conflicting with the Law of
Nations. A rule of Municipal Law, which ostensibly seems to
conflict with the Law of Nations, must, therefore, if
possible, always be so interpreted as to avoid such conflict
(see Vol. 1, pages 45-46), Lord Denning gave expression to
similar view in the case of Corocraft craft Ltd. v. Pan
American Airways Inc. (1) when he observed
"The Warsaw Convention is an international convention
which is binding in international law on all the
countries who have ratified it and it is the duty of
these courts to construe our legislation so as to be in
conformity with international law and not in conflict
with it."

The rule about the construction of municipal law also holds
good when construing the provisions of the Constitution as
would appear from International Law by Fenwick, Third
Edition, page 90, wherein is observed:

"But while in the case of a direct conflict between
national and international law, the rule of national
law will of necessity take priority until changed to
conform to the international obligations of the state,
there are numerous cases in which the provisions of the
national constitution of the provisions of a particular
legislative act are not so but that they may be
interpreted so as to enable the executive and the
judicial agencies of the state to act in accordance
with the obligations of international law."
(1) [1969] 1 All E. R.80.

277

According to article 51 our Constitution, the State shall
endeavour to inter alia foster respect for international
law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised
peoples with one another. Relying upon that article, Sikri
CJ. Observed in the case of Kesavananda Bharathi v. State of
Kerala(1):

"It seems to me that, in view of art 51 of the
directive principles, this Court must interpret
language of the Constitution, if not intractable, which
is after all a municipal law, in the light of the
United Nations Charter and the solemn declaration
subscribed to by India."

Articles 8 and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in respect of which resolution was passed by the
United Nations and was supported by India read as under:

ARTICLE 8
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or
by law.

ARTICLE 9
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest,
detention or exile.'
While dealing with the Presidential order under article
359(1), we should adopt such a construction as would, if
possible, not bring it in conflict with the above articles 8
and 9. From what has been discussed elsewhere, it is plain
that such a construction is not only possible, it is also
preeminently reasonable. The Presidential order, therefore,
should be so construed as not to warrant arbitrary arrest or
to bar right to an effective remedy by competent national
tribunals for acts violating basic right of personal liberty
granted by law.

It has been argued that suspending the right of a
person to move any court for the enforcement of right to
life and personal liberty is done under a constitutional
provision and therefore it cannot be said that the resulting
situation would mean the absence of the rule of law. This
argument, in my opinion, cannot stand close scrutiny for it
tries to equate illusion of the rule of law with the reality
of rule of law. Supposing a law is made that in the matter
of the protection of life and liberty, the administrative
officers would not be governed by any law and that it would
be permissible for them to deprive a person of life and
liberty without any authority of law. In one sense, it might
in that event be argued that even if lives of hundreds of
persons are taken capriciously and maliciously without the
authority of law, it is enforcement of the above enacted
law. As observed by Friedmann on page 500 of Law in Changing
Society, 2nd Ed., in a purely formal sense, any system of
norm based on a hierarchy of orders, even the organised mass
murders of Nazi regime qualify as law. This argument cannot
however, disguise the reality of the matter that hundreds of
innocent lives have been taken because of the absence of
rule of law. A state of negation of rule of law would not
cease to be such a state because of the fact that such a
state of negation of rule of law has been brought about by a
statute. Absence of rule
(1) [1973] Supp. S.C.R. 1.

278

of law would nevertheless be absence of rule of law even
though it is brought about by a law to repeal all laws. In
the words of Wade, Government under the rule of law demands
proper legal limits on the exercise of power. This does not
mean merely that acts of authority must be justified by law,
for if the law is wide enough it can justify a dictatorship
based on the tyrannical but perfectly legal principle quod
principi placuit legis habet vigorem. The rule of law
requires something further. Powers must first be approved by
Parliament, and must then be granted by Parliament within
definable limits (see Administrative Law, Third Edition,
page 46). It is no doubt true that Dicey's concept of rule
of law has been criticised by subsequent writers since it
equates the rule of law with the absence not only of
arbitrary but even of wide discretionary power. The
following reformulation of Dicey's ideas as applicable to
modern welfare state given by H.W. Jones eliminates the
equation of arbitrary and wide discretionary powers:

"There are, I believe, ideas of universal validity
reflected in Dicey's 'three meanings' of the rule of
law (1) in a decent society it is unthinkable that
government, or any . Officer of government, possesses
arbitrary power over the person or the interests of the
individual; (2) all members of society, private persons
and governmental officials alike, must be equally
responsible before the law; and (3) effective judicial
remedies are more important than abstract
constitutional declarations in securing the rights of
the individual against encroachment by the State" (see
Law in a Changing Society by Friedmann, 2nd Ed., page

501).

One of the essential attributes of the rule of law is
that executive action to the prejudice of or detrimental to
the right of an individual must have the sanction of some
law. This principle has now been well settled in a chain of
authorities of this Court.

"Specific legislation may indeed be necessary if the
Government require certain powers in addition to what
they possess under ordinary law, in order to carry on
the particular trade or business. Thus when it is
necessary to encroach upon private rights in order to
enable the Government to carry on their business a
specific legislation sanctioning such course would have
to be passed."

The above attribute of the rule of law has been
specially high lighted in the decision of this Court in the
case of State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Thakur Bharat
Singh(2). In that case the State Government made an order
under section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Security Act,
1959, directing that the respondent (1) shall not be in any
place in Raipur District, (ii) shall immediately proceed
(1) [1955] 2 S. C. R. 225,
(2) [1967] 2 S. C. R. 454.

279

to and reside in a named town, and (iii) shall report daily
to a police station in that town. The respondent challenged
the order by a writ petition under articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution on the ground inter alia, that section 3
infringed the fundamental rights guaranteed under article 19
of the Constitution. The High Court declared clauses (ii)
and (iii) of the order invalid on the ground that clauses

(b) and (c) of section 3 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Public
Security Act on which they were based contravened article

19. On appeal this Court held that section 3 (1) (b)
violated article 19 and as it was a pre-emergency enactment,
it must be deemed to be void when enacted. Section 3 (1) (b)
was further held not to have revived as a result of the
proclamation of emergency by the President. Counsel for the
State submitted in the alternative that even if section 3
(1) (b) was void, article 358 protected action, both
legislative and executive, taken after proclamation of
emergency, and therefore any executive action taken by the
State would not be liable to be challenged on the ground
that it infringed the fundamental freedoms under article 19.
This contention was repelled. Shah J. (as he then was)
speaking for the Court observed:

"All executive action which operates to the prejudice
of any person must have the authority of law to support
it, and the terms of Art. 358 do not detract from that
rule. Article 358 expressly authorises the State to
take legislative or executive action provided such
action was competent for the State to make or take, but
for the provisions contained in Part III of the
Constitution. Article 358 does not purport to invest
the State with arbitrary authority to take action to
the prejudice of citizens and others: it merely
provides that so long as the proclamation of emergency
subsists laws may be enacted, and executive action may
be taken in pursuance of lawful authority, which if the
provisions of Art. 19 were operative would have been
invalid. Our federal structure is founded on certain
fundamental principles: (1) the sovereignty of the
people with limited Government authority i. e. the
Government must be conducted in accordance with the
will of the majority of the people. The people govern
themselves through their representatives, whereas the
official agencies of the executive Government possess
only such powers as have been conferred upon them by
the people; (2) There is distribution of powers between
the three organs of the State-legislative, executive
and judicial each organ having some check direct or
indirect on the other: and (3) the rule of law which
includes judicial review of arbitrary executive
actions. As pointed out by Dicey in his Introduction
to the study of the Law of the Constitution', 10th
Edn., at P. 202 the expression 'rule of law' has three
meanings, or may be regarded from three different
points of view. 'It means in the first place, the
absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as
opposed to the HE influence of arbitrary power, and
excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative
or even of wide discretionay
280
authority on the part of government.' At p. 188 Dicey
points out:

'In almost every continental community the
executive exercises far wider discretionary authority
in the matter of arrest, of temporary imprisonment, of
expulsion from its territory, and the like, than is
either legally claimed or in fact exerted by the
government in England: and a study of European polities
now and again reminds English readers that wherever
there is discretion there is room for arbitrariness,
and that in a republic no less than under a monarchy
discretionary authority. On the part of the government
must mean insecurity for legal freedom on the part of
its subjects.' We have adopted under our Constitution
not the Continental system but the British system under
which tile rule of law prevails. Every act done by the
Government or by its officers must, if it is to operate
to the prejudice of any person, be supported by some
legislative authority."

"In our constitutional system, the central and most
characteristic feature is the concept of the rule of
law which means, in the present context, the authority
of the law courts to test all administrative action by
the standard of legality. The administrative or
executive action that does not meet the standard will
be set aside if the aggrieved person brings the
appropriate action in the competent court."
In District Collector of Hyderabad & Ors. v. M/s.

Ibrahim & Co. etc. (2) the respondents who were recognized
dealers in sugar were prevented by an executive order from
carrying on the business. The question which actually arose
for decision before this Court was whether the said order
was protected under articles 358 and 359 because of the
declaration of state of emergency by the president. Shah J.
speaking for Bench of six Judges of this Court observed:

"But the executive order immune from attack is only
that order which the State was competent, but for the
provisions contained in Art. 19, to make. Executive
action of the State Government which is otherwise
invalid is not immune from attack, merely because a
proclamation of emergency is in operation when it is
taken. Since the order of the State Government was
plainly contrary to the statutory provisions contained
in the Andhra Pradesh Sugar Dealers Licensing Order and
the Sugar Control order, it was not protected under
Art. 358 of the Constitution.

"Executive action which is unconstitutional is not
immune during the proclamation of emergency. During the
proclamation of emergency Article 19 is suspended. But
it would not authorise the taking of detrimental
executive action during the emergency affecting the
fundamental rights in Article 19 without any
legislative authority or in purported exercise of power
conferred by any per-emergency law which was invalid
when enacted."

In Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Union of India(2) this
Court dealt with petitions challenging the validity of the
fixation of price of cotton yarns under an executive order.
Objection was raised to the maintainability of the petitions
on the score of proclamation of emergency. This objection
was repelled and reliance was placed on the decision of the
Court in the case of Bennett Coleman & Co.

In Naraindas lndurkhya v. The State of Madhya Pradesh
(3) the Constitution Bench of this Court to which three of
us (Ray C. J, I) Khanna and Bhagwati JJ.) were parties
placed reliance on the decisions in the cases of Ram Jawaya
Kapur, Thakur Bharat Singh and Bennett Coleman & Co. (surpa)
These authorities clearly highlight the principle that
executive authorities cannot under the rule of law take any
action to the prejudice of an individual unless such action
is authorised by law. A fortiori it would follow that under
the rule of law it is not permissible to deprive a person of
his life or personal liberty without the authority of law.

It may be appropriate at this age to refer to other
eases in which stress has been laid on rule of law by this
Court.

In Bishan Das & ors. v. The State of Punjab & ors.(5)
S. K. Das J. speaking for the Constitution Banch of this
Court deprecated action C; taken by the State and its
officers on the ground that it was destructive of the basic
principles of the rule of law.

In G. Sadanandan v. State of Kerala & Anr. (supra)
Gajendragadkar CJ. speaking for the Constitution bench
observed that the Paramount requirement of the Constitution
was that even during
(1) [1973] 2 S. C. R. 757.

(2) [1974] 2 S. C. R. 398.

(3) A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 1232.

(4) [1961] 1 S. C. R. 158.

(5) 11962] 2 S. C.R.. 69.

282

emergency. the freedom of Indian citizens would not be
taken away without the existence of justifying necessity
specified by the Defence of India Rules.

"In this context it is important to emphasise that
the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential
of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional
system is based. In a system governed by rule of law,
discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities,
must be confined within clearly defined limits. The
rule of law from this point of view means that
decisions should be made by the application of known
principles and rules and, in general, such decisions
should be predictable and the citizen should know where
he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or
without any rule it is unpredictable and such a
decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in
accordance with the rule of law. (See Dicey-'Law of the
Constitution' Tenth Edn., Introduction ex). 'Law has
reached its finest moments', stated Douglas, J. in
United States v. Wunderlick(2), 'when it has freed man
from the unlimited discretion of some ruler .... Where
discretion is absolute, man has always suffered'. It is
in this sense that the rule of law may be said to be
sworn enemy of caprice. Discretion, as Lord Mansfield
stated it in classic terms in the case of John
Wilkes(3), 'means sound discretion guided by law. It
must be governed by rule, not by humour: It must not be
arbitrary, value and fanciful.' "

It would not, in my opinion, be correct to consider
rule of law as a vague or nebulous concept because of its
description as an unruly horse by Ivor Jennings. Indeed,
according to Jennings, the rule of law demands in the first
place that the powers of the Executive should not only be
derived from law, but that they should be limited by law.
Whatever might be the position in peripheral cases, there
are certain aspects which constitute the very essence of the
rule of law. Absence of arbitrariness and the need of the
authority of law for official acts affecting prejudicially
rights of individuals is one of those aspects. The power of
the courts to grant relief against arbitrariness or absence
of authority of law in the matter of the liberty of the
subject may now well be taken to be a normal feature of the
rule of law. To quote from Halsbury's Laws of England, Third
Edition, Vol. 7,
(1) [1967] 2 s. C. R. 703.

(4) [19761 2 S. C. R. 347
283
para 416, the so-called liberties of the subject are really
implications drawn from the two principles that the
subjects may say or do what he pleases, provided he does not
transgress substantive law, or infringe the legal rights of
others, whereas public authorities including the Crown) may
do nothing but what they are authorised to do by some rule
of common law or statute. The essence of rule of law,
according to Prof. Goodhart, is that public officers are
governed by law, which limits their powers. It means
Government under law- the supremacy of law over the
Government as distinct from Government by law-the mere
supremacy of law in society generally-which would apply also
to totalitarian states (See page 42 of constitutional and
Administrative Law by Hood Phillips, Third Edition).

I may mention that there has been an amendment of
article 359 inasmuch as clause (1A) has been added in that
article. The effect of the insertion of that clause in
article 359 is that while an order made under clause (1)
mentioning any of the rights conferred by Part III is in
operation, nothing ill that Part conferring those rights
shall restrict the power of the State to make any law or to
take any executive action which the State would but for the
provisions contained in that Part be competent to make or to
take, but any law so made shall. to the . extent of the
incompetency, cease to have effect as soon as the order
aforesaid ceases to operate, except as respects thing done
or omitted to be done before the law so ceases to have
effect. Clause (1A) thus protects laws and executive actions
from any attack on validity on the score of being violative
of the fundamental rights mentioned in the Presidential
order in the same way as article 358 protects the laws and
executive actions from being challenged on the ground of
being violative of article 19 during the period of
emergency. If the existence of article 358 did not have the
effect of dispensing with the necessity for an executive
action operating to the prejudice of tile right of a citizen
of the authority of law, the same must necessarily be the
position after the insertion of clause (1A) in article 359.
It is significant that the language of clause (1A) of
article 359 in material respect is substantially the same as
that of article 358. The language of clause (1A) of article
359 makes it clear that the protection which is afforded by
that clause is to such law or executive action is the State
would but for the provisions contained in Part III of the
Constitution be competent to make or take. The word
"competent" has a significance and it is apparent that
despite the Presidential order under article 359(1), in the
case of executive action the competence of the State to take
such action would have to be established. Such competence
would, however, be judged ignoring the restriction placed by
the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. To put it in
other words, clause (1A) of article 359 does not dispense
with the necessity of competence to make law or take
executive action. The only effect of that clause is that
during the period of emergency the restriction placed upon
the competence by fundamental rights would not be there. But
it would still be necessary to establish the competence
dehors the restrictions of the fundamental rights.

284

The matter can also be looked at from another angle.
Before any public authority can deprive a person of his life
or personal liberty, two requirements are to be satisfied:

(1) Power must be conferred by law upon such
authority to deprive a person of his life or
liberty; and
(2) Law must also prescribe the procedure for the
exercise of such power.

Suspension of the right to move any court for the
enforcement of the right under article 21 can at the best
impinge upon the second requirement; it cannot affect the
first requirement which is a cardinal principle of the rule
of law. l am conscious of the fact that though article 21
refers to procedure established by law, there are
observations in Gopalan's case that the article would also
cover substantive law for affording protection to life and
liberty. What article 21 lays down is that no person shall
be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according
to procedure established by law. Procedure about the
exercise of power of depriving a person of his life or
personal liberty necessarily presupposes that the
substantive power of depriving a person of his life or
personal liberty has been vested in an authority and that
such power exists. Without the existence of such substantive
power, no question can arise about the procedure for the
exercise of that power. It has, therefore, been held that
though there is no reference to substantive power in article
21, the said article would cover both the existence of the
substantive power of depriving a person of his life and
personal liberty as well as the procedure for the exercise
of : that power. The question with which we are concerned is
as Lo what is the effect of the suspension of the right to
move a court for. the enforcement of the right contained in
article 21. The effect. it may possibly be argued, is that
consequent upon such suspension if a person is deprived of
his life or personal liberty under a law not satisfying the
second requirement indicated above, he cannot seek judicial
redress on that score. Would it, however, follow from the
suspension of such right that no judicial remedy would be
available if a personal is deprived by an authority of his
life or personal liberty even though such an authority has
not been vested with the substantive power of deprivation of
life and personal liberty. The answer to this question in my
opinion, should plainly be in the negative. The suspension
of the right to move a court for the enforcement of the
right contained in article 21 cannot have the effect of
debarring an aggrieved person from approaching the courts
with the complaint regarding deprivation of life or personal
liberty by an authority on the score that no power has been
vested in the authority to deprive a person of life or
liberty. The presupposition of the existence of substantive
power to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty in
article 21 even though that article only mentions the
procedure, would not necessarily point to the conclusion
that in the event of the suspension of the right to move any
court for the enforcement of article 21, the suspension
would also dispense with the necessity of the existence of
the substantive power. The coexistence of substantive power
and procedure established by law for depriving a person of
his life and liberty
285
which is implicit in article 21 would not lead to the result
that even if there is suspension of the right regarding
procedure, suspension would also operate upon the necessity
of substantive power. What is true of a proposition need not
be true of the converse of that proposition. The suspension
of the right to move any court for the enforcement of the
right contained in article 21 may have the effect of
dispensing with the necessity of prescribing procedure for
the exercise of substantive power to deprive a person of his
life or personal liberty, it can no case have the effect of
permitting an authority to deprive a person of his life or
personal liberty without the existence of substantive
personal. The close bond which is there between the
existence of substantive power of depriving a person of his
life or personal liberty and the procedure for the exercise
of that power, if the right contained in article 21 were in
operation, would not necessarily hold good if that right
were suspended because the removal of compulsion about the
prescription of procedure for the exercise of the
substantive power would not do away with the compulsion
regarding the existence of that power.

It is significant that there is a difference in the
language of article 21 and that of article 31(1) wherein the
framers of the Constitution said that no one shall be
deprived of his property save by the authority of; law. In
considering the effect of Presidential order suspending the
right of a person to move any court for enforcement of right
guaranteed by article 21, we should not treat the words
"except according to procedure established by law" to be
synonymous with save by authority of law".

The President can in exercise of powers conferred by
article 359(1) suspend when the proclamation of emergency is
in operation, the right to move any court for the
enforcement of such of the fundamental rights as may be
mentioned in the order. On the plain language of article
359(1), the President has no power to suspend the right to
move any court for the enforcement of rights which are not
fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the
Constitution. Rights created by statutes are not fundamental
rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and as such
enforcement of such statutory rights cannot be suspended
under article 359(1). Likewise, article 359(1) does not deal
with obligations and liabilities which flow from statutory
provisions, and it would follow that an order under article
359(1) cannot affect those obligations and liabilities
arising out of statutory provisions. Nor can a Presidential
order under article 359(1) nullify or suspend the operation
of any statute enacted by a competent legislature. Any
redress sought from a court of law on the score of breach of
statutory provisions would be outside the purview of article
359 ( 1 ) and the Presidential order made hereunder. The
Presidential order cannot put the detenu in a worse position
than that in which he would be if article 21 were repealed
It cannot be disputed that if article 21 were repealed, a
detenu would not be barred from obtaining relief under a
statute in case there is violation of statutory provisions.
Likewise, in the event of repeal of article 21, a detenu can
rightly claim in a court of law that he cannot be deprived
of his life or personal liberty without the authority of
law. Article
286
359(1) ousts the jurisdiction of the court only in respect
of matters specified therein during the period of emergency.
So far as matters not mentioned in article 359(1) and the
Presidential order thereunder concerned, the jurisdiction of
the court is not ousted. A provision which has the effect of
ousting the jurisdiction of the court should be construed
strictly. No inference of the ouster of the jurisdiction of
the court can not be drawn unless such inference is
warranted by the clear language of the provision ousting
such Jurisdiction. I may in this context refer to the
observations of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the
case of K. Anandan Nambiar & Anr. v. Chief Secretary,
Government of Madras & Ors(1) Gajendragadkar J. speaking for
the Constitution Bench observed:

"In construing the effect of the Presidential
order, it is necessary to bear in mind the general rule
of construction that where an order purports to suspend
the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens by
the Constitution, the said order must be strictly
construed in favour of the citizens' fundamental
rights." ;

I am also unable to accede to the argument that though
the position under law may be that no one can be deprived
of his right to life or personal liberty without the
authority of law, the remedy to enforce the right to life or
personal liberty is no longer available during the period of
emergency because of the suspension of right to move any
court for enforcement of right conferred by article 21. The
basic assumption of this argument is that article 21 is the
sole repository of right to life and personal liberty. Such
an assumption, as already ` I stated above, is not well
founded. This apart, a Presidential order under article
359(1) cannot have the effect of suspending the right to
enforce rights flowing from statutes, nor can it bar access
to the courts of persons seeking redress on the score of
contravention of statutory provisions. Statutory provisions
are enacted to be complied with and it is not permissible to
contravene them. Statutory provisions cannot be treated as
mere pious exhortations or words of advice which may be
abjured or disobeyed with impunity. Nor is compliance with
statutory provisions optional or at the sufferance of the
official concerned. It is the presence of legal sanctions
which distinguishes positive law from other systems of rules
and norms. To be a legal system a set of norms must furnish
sanctions for some of its precepts. A legal sanction is
usually thought of as a harmful consequence to induce
compliance with law. Non-compliance with statutory provision
entails certain legal consequences. The Presidential order
cannot stand in the way of the courts giving effect to those
consequences. To put it differently, the executive
authorities exercising power under a statute have to act in
conformity with its provisions and within the limits set out
therein. When a statute deals with matters affecting
prejudicially the rights of individuals, the ambit of the
power of the authorities acting under the statute would be
circumscribed by its provisions, and it would not be
permissible to invoke some indefinite general powers of the
executive. As observed by Lord Atkinson in
(1) [1966] 2 S. C. R. 406 (oh p. 410).

287

the case of Attorney General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel
Ltd.,(l) the constitutional principle is that when the
power of the Executive to interfere with the property or
liberty of subjects has been placed under Parliamentary
control, and directly regulated by statute, the Executive no
longer derives its authority from the Royal Prerogative of
the Crown but from Parliament, and that in exercising such
authority the Executive is bound to observe the restrictions
which Parliament has imposed in favour of the subject. It is
also not the result of the Presidential order, as discussed
elsewhere, that because of the suspension of the right to
move any court for enforcement of right under article 21,
the remedy of a writ of habeas corpus ceases to be available
against the State. The Presidential order would not preclude
a person from challenging the validity of a law or order on
grounds other than violation of articles 14, 19, 21 and 22.
It may be pertinent to refer to a decision of this Court in
the case of Jaichand Lall Sethia v. State of West Bengal(2)
wherein the Constitution Bench of this Court observed after
referring to the case of Makhan Singh (supra):

"It was pointed out that during the pendency of
the Presidential order the validity of the ordinance or
any rule or order made thereunder cannot be questioned
on the ground that it contravenes Arts. 14, 21 and 22.

But this limitation cannot preclude a citizen from
challenging the validity of the ordinance or any rule
or order made thereunder on; any other ground. If the
appellant seeks to challenge the validity of the
ordinance, rule or order made thereunder on ally ground
other than the contravention of Arts. 14. 21 and 22,
the Presidential order cannot come into operation. It
is not also open to the appellant to challenge the
order on the ground of contravention of Art. 19,
because as soon as a Proclamation of Emergency is
issued by the President under Art. 358 the provision of
Art. 19 are automatically suspended. But the appellant
can challenge the validity of the order on a ground
other than those covered by Art. 358, or the
Presidential order issued under Art. 359(1 ) . Such a
challenge is outside the purview of the Presidential
order. For instance. a citizen will not be deprived of
the right to move an appropriate Court for a writ of
habeas corpus on the ground that his detention has been
ordered mala fide Similarly, it will be open to the
citizen to challenge the order of detention on the
ground that any of the grounds given in the order. of
detention is irrelevant and there is no real and
proximate connection between the ground given and the
object which the legislature has in view. It may be
stated in this context that a mala fide exercise of
power does not necessarily imply any moral turpitude as
a matter of law. It only means that the statutory power
is exercised for purposes foreign to those for which it
is in law intended. In other words, the power conferred
by the statute has been utilised
(1) [1920] A. C. 508.

(2) [1966] Supp. S .C. R. 464.

288

for some indirect purpose not connected with the
object of the statute or the mischief it seeks to
remedy."

Our founding fathers made article 226 which confers
power on the High Court to issue inter alia writs in the
nature of habeas corpus an integral part of the
Constitution. They were aware that under the US Constitution
in accordance with article 1 section IX the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus could be suspended when in cases of
rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.
Despite that our founding fathers made no provision in our
constitution for suspending the power of the High Courts
under article 226 to issue writs in the nature of habeas
corpus during the period of emergency. They had perhaps in
view the precedent of England where there had been no
suspension of writ of habeas corpus since 1881 and even
during tile course of First and Second World Wars. It would,
in my opinion, be not permissible to bring about the result
of suspension of habeas corpus by a strained construction of
the Presidential order under article 359(1) even though
Article 226 continues to remain in force during the period
of emergency.

The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which is
commonly known as the writ of habeas corpus, is a process
for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an
effective mean or immediate release from unlawful or
unjustifiable detention, whether in prison or in private
custody. By it the High Court and the judges of that Court,
at the instance of a subject aggrieved, command the
production of that subject, and inquire is the cause of his
imprisonment. If there is no legal justification for the
detention, the party is ordered to be released. Release on
habeas corpus is not, however, an acquittal, nor may the
writ be used as a means of appeal (see Halsbury's Laws of
England" Vol. 11, Third Edition, page 24).

In Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs(3)
Lord Wright observed :

"It is clear that the writ of habeas corpus deals
with the machinery of justice, not the substantive law,
except in so far as it can be said that the right to
have the Writ is itself part of substantive law. it is
essentially a procedural writ, the object of which is
to enforce a legal right .... The inestimable value of
the proceedings is that it is the most efficient mode
ever devised by any system of law to end unlawful
detainments and to secure a speedy release where the
circumstances and the law so required."
(1) [1966] 2 S. C. R. 573
(2) [1966] 3 S. C. R. 590.

(3) [1942] A. C. 284.

289

Writ of habeas corpus was described as under by Lord
Birkenhead in the case of Secretary of State for Home
Affairs v. O'Brien(1):

"It is perhaps the most important writ known to
the constitutional law of England, affording as it does
a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal
restraint or confinement. It is of immemorial
antiquity, an instance of its use occurring in the
thirtythird year of Edward I. It has through the ages
been jealously maintained by courts of law as a check
upon the illegal usurpation of power by the executive
at the cost of the liege."

The existence of the power of the courts to issue a
writ of habeas corpus is regarded as one of the most
important characteristic of democratic states under the rule
of law. The significance of the writ for the moral health of
the society has been acknowledged by all jurists. Hallam
described it as the "principal bulwark of English liberty".
The uniqueness of habeas corpus in the procedural armoury of
our law cannot be too often emphasised. It differs from all
others remedies in that it is available to bring into
question the legality of a person's restraint and to require
justification for such detention. of course this does not
mean that prison doors may readily be opened. It does mean
that explanation may be exacted why they should remain
closed. It is not the boasting of empty rhetoric that has
treated the writ of habeas corpus as the basic safeguard of
freedom. The great writ of habeas corpus has been for
centuries esteemed the best and sufficient defence of
personal freedom (see Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms by
Jagdish Swarup, page 60).

As article 226 is an integral part of the Constitution,
the power of the High Court to enquire in proceedings for a
writ of habeas corpus into the legality of the detention of
persons cannot" in my opinion, lie denied. Although the
Indian Constitution, as mentioned by Mukherjea CJ. in the
case of Ram Jawaya Kapur (supra), has not recognised the
doctrine of separation of powers in its, absolute rigidity,
the functions of the different parts, or branches of the
Government have been sufficiently differentiated and
consequently it can very well be said that our Constitution
does not contemplate assumption, by one organ or part of the
State, of functions that essentially belong to another. The
executive can exercise the powers of departmental or
subordinate legislation when such powers are delegated to it
by the legislature. It can also, when so empowered exercise
judicial function in a limited way. The executive however,
can never go against the provisions of the Constitution or
of any law. To quote the words of Dr. Ambedkar in the
Constituent Assembly:

"Every Constitution, so far as it relates to what
we call parliament democracy requires three different
organs of the State, the executive, the judiciary and
the legislature. I have ; . not anywhere found in any
Constitution a provision saying that the executive
shall obey the legislature, nor have I found anywhere
in any Constitution a provision that the executive
shall obey the judiciay. Nowhere is such a provision to
be
(1) [1923] A. C. 603 (609).

22 833 Sup CI/76
290
found That is because it is generally understood that
the provisions of the Constitution are binding upon the
different organs of the State. Consequently, it is to
be presumed that those who work the Constitution, those
who compose the Legislature and those who compose the
executive and the judiciary know their functions, their
limitations and their duties. It is therefore to be
expected that if the executive, is honest in working
the Constitution, then the executive is bound to obey
the Legislature without any kind of compulsory
obligation laid down in the Constitution.
Similarly if the executive is honest in working the
Constitution, it must act in accordance with the
judicial decisions given by the Supreme Court.
Therefore my submission is that this is a matter of one
organ of the State acting within its own limitations
and obeying the supremacy of the other organs of the
State. In so far as the Constitution gives a supremacy
to that is a matter of constitutional obligation which
is implicit in the Constitution itself."

It was further observed by him:

"No constitutional Government can function in any
country unless any particular constitutional authority
remembers the fact that its authority is limited by the
Constitution and that if there is any authority created
by the Constitution which has to decided between that
particular authority and any other authority,, then the
decision of that authority shall be binding upon any
other organ. That is the sanction which this
Constitution gives in order to see that the President
shall follow the advice of his Ministers, that the
executive shall not exceed in its executive authority
the law made by Parliament and that the executive shall
not give its own interpretation of the law which is in
conflict with! the interpretation of the judicial organ
created by the Constitution."

Article 226 of the Constitution confers power upon the High
Courts of issuing appropriate writs in case it is found that
the executive orders are not in conformity with the
provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the land.
Judicial scrutiny of executive orders with a view to ensure
that they are not violative of the provisions of the
Constitution and the laws of the land being an integral part
of our constitutional scheme, it is not permissible to
exclude judicial scrutiny except to the extent such
exclusion is warranted by the provisions of the Constitution
and the laws made in accordance with those provisions.

There is, as already mentioned, a clear demarcation of
the spheres of function and power in our Constitution. The
acceptance of the contention advanced on behalf of the
appellants would mean that during the period of emergency,
the courts would be reduced to the position of being
helpless spectators even if glaring and blatant instances of
deprivation of life and personal liberty in contravention of
the statute are brought to their notice. It would also mean
that whatever
291
may be the law passed by the legislature, in the matter of
life and personal liberty of the citizens, the executive
during the period of emergency would not be bound by it and
would be at liberty to ignore and contravene it. It is
obvious that the acceptance of the contention would result
in a kind of supremacy of the executive over the legislative
and judicial organs of the State, and thus bring about a
constitutional imbalance which perhaps was never in the
contemplation of the framers of the Constitution. The fact
that the government which controls the executive has to
enjoy the confidence of the legislature does not detract
from the above conclusion. The executive under our
constitutional scheme is not merely to enjoy the confidence
of the majority in the legislature, it is also bound to
carry out the legislative intent as manifested by the
statutes passed by the legislature. The Constitution further
contemplates that the function of deciding whether the
executive has acted in accordance with the legislative
intent should be performed by the courts.

The cases before us raise questions of utmost
importance and gravity, questions which impinge not only
upon the scope of the different constitutional provisions,
but have impact also upon the basic , . values affecting
life, liberty and the rule of law. More is at stake in these
cases than the liberty of a few individuals or the correct
construction of the wording of are order. What is at stake
is the rule of law. If it could be the boast of a great
English judge* that the air of England is too pure for a
slave to breathe, cannot we also say with ' I justifiable
pride that this sacred land shall not suffer eclipse of the
rule of law and that the Constitution and the laws of India
do not permit life and liberty to be at the mercy of
absolute power of the executive, a power against which there
can be no redress in courts of law. even if it chooses to
act contrary to law or in an arbitrary and capricious
manner. The question is not whether there-can be curtailment
of personal liberty when there is threat to the security of
the State. I have no doubt that there can be such
curtailment even on an extensive scale, in the face of such
threat. The question is whether the laws speaking through
the authority of the courts shall be absolutely silenced and
rendered mute because of such threat.

No one can deny the power of the State to assume vast
powers of detention in the interest of the security of the
State. It may indeed be necessary to do' so to meet the
peril facing the nation. The considerations of security of
the State must have a primacy and be kept in the forefront
compared to which the interests of the individuals can only
take a secondary place. The motto has to be "Who lives, if
the country dies". Extraordinary powers are always assumed
by the. government in all countries in times of emergency
because of the extraordinary nature of the emergency. The
exercise of the power of detention, it is well-settled"
depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority and the courts can neither act as courts of appeal
over the decisions of the detaining authority nor can they
substitute their own opinion for that of the authority
regarding the necessity of detention. There is no antithesis
between the power of the *Lord Mansfield in the case of
James Sommersett
(1772 State Trials page 1)
292
State to detain a person without trial under a law of
preventive detention and the power of the court to examine
the legality such detention. As observed by Lord Atkin in
Rex v. Halliday(l) while dealing with the argument that the
Defence of Realm Consolidation Act or 1914 arid the
regulation made under it deprived the subject of his right
under the several Habeas Corpus Acts, that is all entire
misconception. The subject retains every right which those
statutes confer upon him to have tested and determined ill a
court of law, by means of a writ of Habeas Corpus, addressed
to the person in whose custody he may be, the legality of
the order or warrant by virtue of which he is given into or
kept in that custody. To quote the words of Lord Macmillan
in the case of Liversidge v. Anderson(2).

"It is important to have in mind that the
regulation question is a war measure. This is not to
say that the Court sought to adopt in war time canons
of construction different from those they follow in
peace time. The fact that the nation is at war is no
justification for any relaxation of the vigilance of
the Courts in seeing that the law is duly observed,
especially in a matter so fundamental as the liberty of
the subject. Rather the contrary."

In dealing with an application for a writ of habeas corpus,
the court only ensure that the detaining authorities act in
accordance with the law of preventive detention. The impact
upon the individual of the massive and comprehensive powers
of preventive detention with which the administrative
officers are armed has to be cushioned with legal safeguards
against arbitrary deprivation of personal liberty if the
premises of the rule of law is not to lose its content and
become meaningless. The chances of an innocent person being
detained under a law providing for preventive detention on
the subjective satisfaction of an administrative authority
are much greater compared to the possibility of an innocent
person being convicted at trial in a court of law. It would
be apposite in this context to refer to the observations of
Professor Alan M. Dershowitz:

The available evidence suggest that our system of
determining past guilt results in erroneous conviction
of relatively few innocent people. We really do seem to
practice what we preach about preferring the acquittal
of guilty men over the conviction of innocent men.
But the indications are that any system of
predicting future crimes would result in a vastly
larger number of erroneous confinements-that is
confinements of persons predicted to engage in violent
crime who would not, in fact" do so. Indeed, all the
experience with predicting violent conduct suggests
that in order to spot a significant proportion of
future violent criminals, we would have to reverse the
traditional maxim of the criminal law and adopt a
philosophy that it is 'better to confine ten people who
would not commit predicted crimes, than to release one
who would'."

(1) [1917] A. C. 26') (on page 272).

[1942] A. C. 206.

293

(see p. 313 Crime, Law and Society by Goldstein and
Goldstein) .

It would, therefore, seem to be a matter of melancholy
reflection if the courts were to stay their hand and
countenance laxity or condone lapses in relation to
compliance with requirements prescribed by law for
preventive detention.

In England there was no suspension of the power of the
courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus during the First
World War and the Second World War. In India also, there was
no absolute bar to approaching the courts during the
Sino-Indian hostilities of 1962 and the Indo-Pak wars of
1965 and 1971. It has not been suggested that because of the
existence of the powers of the court to issue writs of
habeas corpus war efforts were in any way prejudicially
affected. The United Nations' Economic and Social Council
endorsed the general agreement reached at the Baguio Seminar
that "the writ of habeas corpus or similar remedy of access
lo the courts to test the legality and bona-fides of the
exercise of the emergency powers should never be denied to
the citizen". It drew attention to the following passage
from the report of the seminar: "All members recognised that
in times of emergency it might be necessary to restrict
temporarily the freedom of the individual. But they were
firmly of the view that, whatever temporary restrictive
measures might be necessary, recourse to the courts through
the right of habeas corpus or other similar remedy should
never be suspended. Rather the legislature could, if
necessary,, subject to well defined procedures safeguarding
human dignity. authorise the temporary detention of persons
for reasons specified in the law. By that means the
executive can act as emergency may require but the ultimate
judicial protection of individual liberty is preserved.
Members hold strongly that it is a fundamental principle
that the individual should never be deprived of the means of
testing the legality of his arrest or. custody by recourse
to judicial process even in times of emergency. If that
principle is departed from, the liberty of the individual is
immediately put in great peril".

l am, therefore, of the view that there is no
sufficient ground to interfere with the view taken by all
the nine High Courts which went into the matter, that the
Presidential order of June 27, 1975 did not affect the
maintainability of the habeas corpus petitions to question
the legality of the detention orders and that such petitions
could be proceeded with despite that order.

We may now deal with the second question regarding the
scope and extent of judicial scrutiny in petitions for writ
of habeas corpus relating to persons detained under MISA.
For this purpose it would be appropriate to first deal with
the position under the above law so far as cases not covered
by section 16A are concerned.

According to section 3(1) of MISA, the authorities
specified in the sub-section may if satisfied with respect
to any person (including a foreigner) that with a view to
preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to (i)
the defence of India, the relations of India with foreigner
powers, or the security of India, or (ii) the security of
294
the State or the maintenance of public order, or (iii) the
maintenance of supplies and services essential to the
community, it is necessary so to make an order that such
person be detained. The words 'if satisfied" indicate that
the satisfaction of the authority concerned is a condition
precedent to the making of a detention order. Unless
therefore the authority concerned is satisfied on the
material before it than it is necessary to detain a person
with a view to prevent him from indulging in any of the
specified prejudicial activities, it has no power to make an
order for his detention. Section 3 also contains an implied
injunction that the said authority shall not detain a person
under that section for reasons other than those specified
therein. Although the satisfaction contemplated by the sub-
section is the subjective satisfaction of the authority
concerned, it is necessary that it should be arrived at in
an objective manner. It is consequently essential that the
facts on the basis of which the authority concerned reaches
the conclusion that it is necessary to detain a person
should have a rational nexus or probative value and by
germane to the object for which such detention is allowed
under section 3(1) of MISA. In case the facts which are
taken into account are extraneous, not germane or do not
have any live link or reasonable connection with the object
for which the detention order can be made, the order would
be liable to be quashed. Even if one out of the many grounds
on which a detention order is based is not germane or
legally not tenable, the detention order would be quashed
because it is difficult to predicate that the detaining
authority would have come to the requisite satisfaction even
in the absence of that ground. It is plainly not possible to
estimate as to how far the irrelevant or untenable ground
operated on the mind of the appropriate authority and
contributed to the creation of the satisfaction on the basis
of which the detention order was made. To Say that the other
ground which still remains is quite sufficient to sustain
the order would be to substitute an objective judicial test
for the subjective decision of the executive authority which
is against the legislative policy underlying the statute.

A law of preventive detention is not punitive but
precautionary. and preventive. The power of detention under
such law is base(l on circumstance of suspicion and not on
proof of allegation as is required at a regular trial for
the commission of an offence. Such a power is exercised
because of apprehension of future prejudicial activity on
the part of the person ordered to be detained judged in the
light of his past conduct and propensity. The order for
preventive detention in such cases postulates prior
restraint so that the mischief apprehended at the hands of
the person ordered to be detained might not materialise. The
consequences of waiting and declining to take action against
that person till the mischief is actually clone would quite
often be disastrous and the nation may in some cases have to
pay a heavy price for such abstention. The quantum of
material available regarding the conduct and propensity of a
person may not be sufficient to warrant his conviction in a
court of law for an offence and yet if the material is
germane to the object for which detention order can legally
be made and the detaining authority is satisfied in view of
that material regarding the necessity of making a detention
order, such order made by that authority would be upheld as
being in accordance with
295
law. It is also not difficult to visualise a situation
wherein serious crimes are committed in broad daylight and
yet the witnesses to the crime are so much terrified and
awestricken that they dare not depose against the culprits
in a court of law. In such cases also because of the
difficulty of securing the conviction of the culprits, the
courts have upheld the detention orders, if the activities
of the culprits are of such a nature as has a nexus with the
object for which detention order can be made. In a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus the courts do not normally
question the veracity and sufficiency of the material on the
basis of which the authority concerned arrives at the
conclusion regarding the necessity of detention. In case the
detenu challenges the correctness or truth of the
allegations on the basis of which the detention order is
made, he should normally do so by means of representation
contemplated by clause (5) of article 22. It is legitimate
to expect that the authority concerned and the advisory
board when the matter comes up before them shall take into
account the stand taken by the detenu regarding those
allegations. It would be also their function to give
consideration to any fresh material which may be produced
before them regarding the truth and correctness of those
allegations. In a habeas corpus petition, if it becomes
apparent on the record from the admission made by the
detaining authority in the return or some other evidentiary
material of unquestioned authenticity and probative value
that some of the alleged facts upon the basis of which
detention order is made are non-existent, the court would be
well justified in quashing the detention order. A, court
apart from that cannot go behind the truth of the alleged
facts If the material is germane to the object for which
detention is legally permissible and an order for detention
is made on the basis of that material, the courts cannot sit
as a court of appeal and substitute their own opinion for
that of the authority concerned and hold that the authority
concerned should not have arrived at the conclusion
regarding the necessity of detention. At the same time, it
is necessary that the authority concerned before deciding to
detain a person should apply its mind to the facts before
lit in a fair and reasonable manner. If the conclusion
arrived at is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority
could ever come to it, the legitimate inference would be
that the authority concerned did not apply its mind to the
relevant facts and did not honestly arrive at the
conclusion. To use the words of Lord Halsbury in Shrape v.
Wakefield (1):

" ... when it is said that something is to be done
with in the discretion of the authorities .. that
something is to be done according to the rules of
reason and justice, not according to private opinion
.... according to law and not humour. It is to be, not
arbitrary, vague" fanciful, but legal and regular."

Likewise, if there were no grounds, as observed by Lord
Morton in Ross v. Papadopollos(2), or which the authority
concerned could he satisfied, the court might infer either
that the authority did not honestly form that view or that
in forming it, the authority could not
(1) [1891] A. C. 172-at p. 179.

(2) [1958] 2 All. E. R. 23 (on p. 33).

296

have applied its mind to the relevant facts. The courts
would also interfere if the power of detention is exercised
malafide, not in good faith or for an ulterior purpose. It
would follow from the above that if the power of detention
is exercised for an improper purpose, i.e., a purpose not
contemplated by the statute, the order for detention would
be quashed.

Between malice in fact and malice ill law, as observed
by Viscount Haldana L.C. in the case of Shearer v.
Shields(1), there is a broad distinction which is not
peculiar to any particular system of jurisprudence. A person
who inflicts an injury upon another person in contravention
of the law is not allowed to say that he did so with an
innocent mind; he is taken to know the law, and he must act
within the law. He may, therefore, be guilty of malice in
law, although, so far as the state of his mind is
concerned., he acts ignorantly, and in that sense
innocently. Malice in fact is quite a different thing; it
means an actual malicious intention on the part of the
person who has done the wrongful act, and it may be, in
proceedings based on wrongs independent of contract, a very
material ingredient in the question of whether a valid cause
of action can be stated. The above principle was applied by
this Court in detention matters in Bhut Nath v. State of
West Bengal(2).

Normally, it is the past conduct or antecedent history
of a person which shows a propensity or attendency to act in
a particular manner The past conduct or antecedent history
of a person can, therefore be appropriately taken into
account in making a detention order. It is indeed largely
from the past events showing tendencies or inclinations of a
person that an inference can be drawn that he, is likely in
the future to act in a particular manner. In order to
justify such an inference. it is necessary that such past
conduct or antecedent history should ordinarily be proximate
in point of time. It would, for instance, be normally
irrational to take into account the conduct and activities
of a person which took place ten years before the date of
his detention and say that even though after the said
incident took place nothing is known against the person
indicating his tendency to act in a prejudicial manner, even
so on they strength of the said incident which is ten. years
old, the authority is satisfied that his detention is
necessary. It is both inexpedient and undesirable to lay
down an inflexible test as to how far distant the past
conduct or the antecedent history should be for reasonably
and rationally justifying the conclusion that the person
concerned if not detained may indulge in prejudicial
activities. The nature of the activity would have also a
bearing in deciding the question of proximity. If, for
example, a person who has links with a particular foreign
power is known to have indulged in subversive activities
when hostilities broke out with that foreign power and
hostilities again break out with that foreign power after
ten years, the authorities concerned, if satisfied on the
basis of the past activities that it is necessary to detain
him with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner
prejudicial to the security of India, might well pass a
(1) [1914] A. C. 808.

(2) [1974] 3 S. C. R. 315.

297

detention order in respect of that person. The fact that in
such a case there is a time lag of ten years between the
activities of the said person and the making of the
detention order would not vitiate such an order. Likewise, a
remote prejudicial activity may be so similar to a recent
prejudicial activity as may give rise to an inference that
the two are a part of chain of prejudicial activities
indicative of a particular inclination. In such an event the
remote activity taken along with the recent activity would
retain its relevance and reliance upon it would not
introduce an infirmity. If, however, in a given case and in
the context of the nature of activity the time lag between
the prejudicial activity of a detenu and the detention order
made because of that activity is ex facie long, the
detaining authority should explain the delay in the making
of the detention order with a view to show that there was
proximity between the prejudicial activity and the detention
order. If the detaining authority fails to do so, in spite
of an opportunity having been afforded to it, a serious
infirmity would creep into the detention order (see
Rameshwar Singh v. District Magistrate Burdwan & Anr.(1) and
Sk. Abdul Munnaf v. State of West Bengal(2) .

One other requirement of a valid order of detention is
that the grounds of detention which are communicated to the
detenu should not be vague so that he may not be handicapped
in making an effective representation against the detention
order. Both article 22(S) of the Constitution and section 8
( 1 ) of MISA refer to such representation and provide that
the detaining authority shall as soon as may be, and in any
case not later than the prescribed period, communicate to
the person detained the grounds on which the detention order
has been made "and shall afford him the earliest opportunity
of making representation against the order". In view of the
Presidential order suspending the right of a person to move
any court for enforcement of specified fundamental rights,
including the one under article 22(5), it may with
plausibility be argued that the vagueness of grounds of
detention would not warrant the quashing of such detention
order during the pendency of the Presidential order on the
score of violation of article 22(S). The Presidential order
would, however, not stand in the way of the court quashing
the detention order on the score of the infirmity of the
vagueness of grounds of detention because of the
contravention of section 8 ( 1 ) of MISA.

Every law providing for preventive detention contains
certain procedural safeguards. It is imperative that there
should be strict compliance with the requirements of those
procedural safeguards to sustain the validity of detention.
Detention without trial results in serious inroads into
personal liberty of an individual. In such cases it is
essential to ensure that there is no deviation from the
procedural safeguards provided by the statute. In, the
matter of even a criminal trial? it is procedure that spells
out much of the difference between the rule of law and the
rule by whim and caprice. The need for strict adherence to
strict procedural safeguards is much greater when we are
dealing with preventive detention which postulates detention
of a
(1) [1964] 4 S. C. R. 921.(2) A. 1. R 1974 S. C. 2066.

298

person even though he is not found guilty of the commission
of an offence. To condone or allow relaxation in the matter
of compliance with procedural requirements would necessarily
have the effect of practically doing away with even the
slender safeguards provided by the legislature against the
arbitrary use of the provisions relating to preventive
detention. The history of personal liberty, we must bear in
mind, is largely the history of insistence upon procedure. I
am, therefore, of the view that it would be wholly
inappropriate to countenance any laxity in the matter of
strick compliance with procedural requirements prescribed
for preventive detention. The observations made in the case
of Kishori Mohan v. State of West Bengal(1) have relevance.
It was observed by this Court in that case .

"The Act confers extraordinary power on the
executive to detain a person without recourse to the
ordinary laws of the land and to trial by courts.
Obviously, such power places the personal liberty of
such a person in extreme peril against which he is
provided with a limited right of challenge only. There
can, therefore, be no doubt that such a law has to be
strictly construed. Equally also, the power con feared
by such a law has to be exercised with extreme care and
scrupulously within the bounds laid down in such a law.

Question then arises as to how far are the recitals in
the order of detention binding upon the court, and upon whom
and to what extent does the onus lie in a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus relating to a detained person. In this
respect I find that in the case of King Emperor v. Sibnath
Banerji(2) the Judicial Committee, speaking through Lord
Thankerton" approved the following observation of the
learned Chief Justice of the Federal Court:

"It is quite a different thing to question the
accuracy of a recital contained in a duly authenticated
order, particularly where the recital purports to state
as a fact the carrying out of what I regard as a
condition necessary to the valid making of that order.
In the normal case the existence of such a recital in a
duly authenticated order will, in the absence of any
evidence as to its accuracy, be accepted by a court as
establishing that the necessary condition was
fulfilled. The presence of the recital in the order
will place a difficult burden on the detenu to produce
admissible evidence sufficient to establish even a
prima facie case that the recital is not accurate."

"After all, the detention of a citizen in every
case is the result of the subjective satisfaction of
the appropriate authority; and so, if a prima facie
case is made by the petitioner that his detention is
either mala fide, or is the result of the casual
approach adopted by the appropriate authority, the
(1) A. T, R. 1974 S. C. 1749.

(1) 71 1. A. 241 .

299

appropriate authority should place before the
Court sufficient material in the form of proper
affidavit made by a duly authorised person to show that
the allegations made by the petitioner about the casual
character of the decision or its mala fides, are not
well-founded. The failure of respondent No. 1 to place
any such material before us in the pre sent proceedings
leaves us no alternative but to accept the plea made by
the petitioner that the order of detention against him
on the 20th October, 1965.1 and more particularly, his
continued detention after the 20th October, 1965, ale
totally invalid and unjustified."

The initial burden is on the detenu to show that at his
detention is mala fide or not in accordance with law. If the
detenu makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts on
the State and it becomes essential for the State to file a
good return. Once substantial disquieting doubts are raised
by the detenu in the mind of the court regarding the
validity of his detention, it would be the bounden duty of
the State to dispel those doubts by placing sufficient
material before the court with a view to satisfy it about
the validity of the detention. In case the detenu fails to
discharge the initial burden, his petition for writ of
habeas corpus would be dismissed. Even if the detenu
discharges the initial burden and makes out a "prima facie
case against the validity of his detention, but the State
files a good return and adduces sufficient material before
the court to show that his detention is valid, the detenu's
petition would be dismissed. In case, however,, the detenu
discharges the initial burden and makes out a prima facie
case against the validity of his detention and the State
fails to file a good return and does not place sufficient
material on the record to show that the detention is valid,
a serious infirmity would creep into the State case as might
justify interference by the court and release of the detenu.
More than that, it is not necessary to say for everything in
the final analysis would depend upon the individual facts of
the case.

We may now turn to the newly added section 16A of MISA. This
section was inserted by section 6 of Act 39 of 1975 with
effect from June 29, 1975. Subsequently, there was a further
amendment of section 16A by Act 14 of 1976 which was
published on January 25 1976. According to subsection (1) of
section 16A, the provisions of the section would have effect
notwithstanding anything contained in MISA or any rules of
natural justice during the period of emergency proclaimed on
December 3, 1971 and June 25, 1975 or a period or 12 months
from June 25., 1975 whichever period was the shortest. Sub-
sections (2) and (3) provides for the making of a
declaration to that effect by the authorities concerned if
they are so satisfied on consideration that it is necessary
to detain a person for effectively. dealing with the
emergency. Sub-section (2) deals with cases of persons
against whom orders of detention were made under the Act on
or after June 25, 1975 but before the coming into force of
this section, viz., June 29, 1975? while sub-section (3)
deals with cases of detention in respect of persons-against
whom orders for detention were made after the coming into
force of the section. The provision to sub-sectional (3)
provides for review and the necessity of confirmation within
fifteen days of the declaration by the State Government in
case
300
such declaration is made by an officer subordinate to the
State Government. Sub-section (2A) provides for deemed
approval of a detention order made by an officer subordinate
to the State Government in case the State Government makes a
declaration that the detention of the person ordered to be
detained is necessary for dealing effectively with the
emergency. Sub-section (4) provides for reconsideration at
intervals not exceeding four months of the necessity of
detention of a person in respect of whom a declaration is
made under sub-section (2) or (3). According to sub-section
(5), in making any review, consideration or reconsideration
under sub-sections (2), (3) or (4), the appropriate
Government or officer may act on the basis of the
information and materials in its or his possession without
communicating or disclosing any such information or
materials to the person concerned or affording him any
opportunity of making any representation against the making
under sub-section (2)" or the making or confirming under
sub-section (3), or the non-revocation under sub-section
(4), of the declaration in respect of him. Sub-sections (6)
and (7) provide inter alia that sections 8 to 12 shall not
apply in the case of a person detained under a detention
order to which the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3)
apply. Sub-section (8) authorises the Central Government
whenever it considers it necessary so to do to require the
State Government to furnish to the Central Government the
information arid materials on the basis of which declaration
has been made or confirmed or not revoked and such other
information and materials as the Central Government may deem
necessary.

It would appear from what has been stated above that
once a declaration is made with respect to a detenu under
sub-sections (2). or (3) of section 16A of MISA, the
provisions of sections 8 to 12 of MISA would not apply to
such a detenu. The result would be that the grounds of the
order of detention would not be disclosed to the person
affected by the order. There would also be no reference of
the case of such a person to the Advisory Board.

We may now turn to sub-section (9) of section 16A.
According to this sub-section, notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law or any rule having the force of
law, the grounds on which an order of detention is made or
purported to be made under sections against any person in
respect of whom a declaration is made under sub-section (2)
or sub-section (3) and any information or materials on which
such grounds or a declaration under sub-section (2) or a
declaration or confirmation under sub-section (3) or the
non-revocation under sub-section (4) of a declaration are
based, shall be treated as confidential and shall be deemed
to refer to matters of State and to be against the public
interest to disclose and save as otherwise provided in this
Act, no one shall communicate or disclose any such ground
information or material or any document containing such
ground information or material. According to clause (b) of
sub-section (9) no person against whom an order of detention
is made or purported to be made under section 3 shall be
entitled to the communication or disclosure of any such
ground, information or material as is referred to in clause

(a) or the production to him of any document containing such
ground, information or material.

301

So far as the impact of section 16A(9) is concerned on
the extent of the power of judicial scrutiny in writs of
habeas corpus relating to persons detained under MISA, I am
of the view that the matter should not be gone into in these
appeals for the following reasons.

Out of the nine High Courts which dealt with the
question of maintainability of petitions for writs of habeas
corpus, only two, namely, Rajsthan High Court and Nagpur
Bench of Bombay High Court have gone into this aspect, while
the other seven have not expressed and view in the matter.
Both Rajasthan High Court and Nagpur Bench of the Bombay
High Court have upheld the validity of section 16A(9). While
Rajasthan High Court has not read down the provisions of
section 16A(9) the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court has
expressed the view that it would be permissible for the High
Court to can for and peruse the grounds in certain
circumstances. The Nagpur Bench, it may be pointed out,
dealt with the provisions of section 16 A(9), as they then
existed before its amendment by Act 14 of 1976.

Before us arguments have been addressed on behalf of
the respondents challenging the validity of section 16,A(9)
on the ground that it is violative of article 226 inasmuch
as it prevents the High Court from effectively exercising
the jurisdiction under that article to issue was of habeas
corpus. In my opinion, it would not be permissible in these
appeals against orders disposing of preliminary objection to
decide the question of validity of section 16A(9). It is
manifest that any decision on the question of the validity
of section 16A(9) would result either in upholding the
validity of the provision or in striking it down. The latter
course is out of question for it would be plainly
impermissible to strike down the provision in appeal by the
State when the validity of such provision has been upheld by
the High Court. Like-wise, it would he impermissible in
these appeals to record a finding that the ambit of judicial
scrutiny is greater than that found by the High Court even
though this Court on consideration of the relevant
provisions comes to that conclusion. There is no appeal
before us by the detenu-respondents. This Court in appeal by
the State cannot enlarge the area of the unfavourable
decision qua the State and make its position worse compared
to what it was before the filing of the appeal. Procedural
propriety in matters relating to appeals forbids such a
course. The appeals before us are primarily against the
orders of the High Court disposing of the preliminary
objections relating, to the maintainability of petitions
under article 226 for writs of habeas corpus in view of the
Presidential order. The question of extent of judicial
scrutiny in the light of section 16A should, in my opinion
be gone into when the whole matter is at large before us and
we are not inhibited by procedural and other constraints
from going into certain aspects which have a vital bearing.
It is primarily for the High Courts before which the matters
are pending to decide the question area of judicial scrutiny
in the light of section 16A(9), as amended by Act 14 of
1976. A course which has the effect of bypassing the High
Courts and making this Court in appeals from orders on
preliminary objection to decide the matter even before the
matter has been considered by the High Court in the light of
section 16A, as amended by Act 14 of 1976" should, in my
opinion, be avoided.

302

The observations on pages 658 and 659 in the case of J.
K. Synthetics Ltd. v. J. K. Synthetics Mazdoor Union (1) can
be of no assistance in this case because what has been laid
down there is that the respondent can support an award of an
Industrial Tribunal on a ground no adopted by the Tribunal
so long as in the final result the amount award ed is not
exceeded. The observations in that case do not warrant the
enlargement of the area of unfavourable decision against an
appellant in the absence of an appeal by the respondent. Nor
does that decision justify adoption of a course which might
conceivably lead to such result. Likewise, no assistance can
be derived from clause (3) of article 132 of the
Constitution because of the fact that the appeal against the
order of the Rajsthan High Court has been filed in pursuance
of a certificate of fitness granted under that article. The
only point on which the Rajasthan High Court has decided
against the appellant is regarding the maintainability of
the petition under article 226. The effect of article 132(3)
would only be that it would be permissible to assail the
order of the High Court on the question of Maintability of
the petition under article 226 not only on the ground
relating to the question of as to the interpretation of the
Constitution mentioned in the order granting the certificate
but also with the leave of this Court on other grounds. It
is, however, not the effect of article 132(3) that if the
High Court in the impugned order decides two distinct
preliminary issues, one in favour of one party and the other
in favour of the opposite party, this Court in an appeal by
only one party against that order of the High Court can also
go into the correctness of the issue which has been decided
in favour of the appellant. The fact that the respondents in
these appeals have as a matter of abundant caution addressed
arguments on sub section (9) of section 16A, so that the
submissions of the appellants on that point may not remain
unanswered, would not justify departure from the principle
that this Court cannot, in the absence of an appeal by the
respondent, adopt a course which might conceivably enlarge
the area of unfavourable decision against the appellant.

I am, therefore, of the view that the appropriate
occasion for going into the question of the constitutional
validity of section 16A(9) of MISA and its impact on the
power and extent of judicial scrutiny in writs of habeas
corpus would be when the State or detenu, whosoever is
aggrieved, comes up in appeal against the final judgment in
any of the petitions pending in the High Courts. The whole
matter would then be at large before us and we would not be
inhibited by procedural and other constraints referred to
above. It would not, in my opinion, be permissible or proper
to short circuit the whole thing and decide the matter by
bypassing the High Courts who are seized of the matter.

I may now summarise my conclusions:

(1) Article 21 cannot be considered to be the sole
repository of the right to life and personal liberty.
(2) Even in the absence of article 21 in the
Constitution, the State has got no power to deprive a
person of his life or personal liberty without the
authority of law. That is
(1) [1972] 1 S. C. R 651.

303

the essential postulate and basic assumption of the
rule of law in every civilised society.

(3) According to law in force in India before the
coming into force of the Constitution, no one could be
deprived of his life or personal liberty without the
authority of law. Such a law continued to be in force
after the coming into force of the Constitution in view
of article 372 of the Constitution.

(4) Startling consequences would follow from the
acceptance of the contention that consequent upon the
issue of the Presidential order in question no one can
seek relief from courts during the period of emergency
against deprivation of life and personal liberty. If
two constructions of the Presidential order were
possible, the court should lean in favour of a view
which does not result in such consequence. The
construction which does not result in such consequences
is not only possible, it is also preeminently
reasonable.

(5) In a long chain of authorities this Court has
laid stress upon the prevalence of the rule of law in
the country, according to which the executive cannot
take action prejudicial to the right of an individual
without the authority of law. There is no valid reason
to depart from the rule laid down in those decisions
some of which were given by Benches larger than the
Bench dealing with these appeals.

(6) According to article 21, no one can be
deprived or his life or personal liberty except in
accordance with procedure established by law. Procedure
for the exercise of power of depriving a person of his
life or personal liberty necessarily postulates the
existence of the substantive power. Then article 21 is
in force, law relating to deprivation of life and
personal liberty must provide both for the substantive
power as wen as the procedure for the exercise of such
power. When right to move any Court for enforcement of
right guaranteed by article 21 is suspended, it would
have the effect of dispensing with the necessity of
prescribing procedure for the exercise of substantive
power to deprive a person of his life or personal
liberty, it cannot have the effect of permitting an
authority to deprive a person of his life or personal
liberty without the existence of such substantive
power.

(7) A Presidential order under article 359(1) can
suspend during the period of emergency only the right
to move any court for enforcement of the fundamental
rights mentioned in the order. Rights created by
statutes being not fundamental rights can be enforced
during the period of emergency despite the Presidential
order. Obligations and liabilities flowing from
statutory provisions likewise remain unaffected by the
Presidential order. Any redress sought from a court of
law on the score of breach of statutory pro visions
would be outside the purview of article 359(1) and the
Presidential order made thereunder.

304

(8) Article 226 under which the High Courts can
issue writs of habeas corpus is an integral part of the
Constitution. No power has been conferred upon any
authority in the Constitution for suspending the power
of the High Court to issue writs in the nature of
habeas corpus during the period of emergency. Such a
result cannot be brought about by putting some
particular construction on the presidential order in
question
(9) There is no antithesis between the power of
the State to detain a person without trial under a law
of preventive detention and the power of the court to
examine the validity of such detention. In exercising
such power the courts only ensure that the detaining
authority acts in accordance with the law providing for
preventive detention.

(10) There is no sufficient ground to interfere
with the view taken by an the nine High Courts which
went into the matter that the Presidential order dated
June 27, 1975 did not affect the maintainability of the
habeas corpus petitions to question the legality of the
detention orders.

(11) The principles which should he followed by
the courts in dealing with petitions for writs of
habeas corpus to challenge the legality of detention
are well-established.

(12) The appropriate occasion for this Court to go
into the constitutional validity of section 161A(9) of
MISA and its impact on the power and extent of judicial
scrutiny in writs of habeas corpus would be when the
State or a detenu whosoever is aggrieved, comes up in
appeal against the final judgment in any of the
petitions pending in the High Courts. The whole matter
would then be at large before this Court and it would
not be inhabited by procedural and other constraints.
It would not be permissible or proper for this Court to
short circuit the whole thing and decide the matter by
by-passing the High Courts who are seized of the
matter.

Before I part with the case, I may observe that the
consciousness that the view expressed by me is at variance
with that of the majority of my learned brethern has not
stood in the way of my ex pressing the same. I am aware of
the desirability of unanimity, if possible. Unanimity
obtained without sacrifice of conviction comments the
decision to public confidence. Unanimity which is merely
formal and which is recorded at the expense of strong
conflicting views is not desirable in a court of last
resort. As observed by Chief Justice Hughes (1) judges are
not there simply to decide cases, but t to decide them as
they think they should be decided, and while if may be
regrettable that they cannot always agree, it is better that
their independence should be maintained and recognized than
that unanimity should be secured through its sacrifice. A
dissent in a court of last resort to use his words, is an
appeal lo the brooding spirit of the law to the intelligence
of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct
the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court
to have been betrayed.

The appeals are disposed of accordingly.

(1) Prophets with Honor by Alan Barth, 1974 Ed. P. 3-6.

305

BEG, J. The two principal questions placed before us
for determination in these appeals from decisions given by
various High Courts, on certain preliminary objections to
the maintainability and hearing of Habeas Corpus petitions,
under Article 226 of our Constitution, have been stated as
follows by the Attorney General of India:-

1. Whether, in view of the Presidential order
dated June 27, 1975, under Clause (1) of
Article 359, any writ petition is
maintainable under Article 226, before a High
Court for Habeas Corpus to enforce the right
to personal liberty of a person detained
under the Maintenance of Internal Security
Act on the ground that the order of detention
or the continued detention is, for any
reason, not under or in compliance with
Maintenance of Internal Security Act ?

2. If such a petition is maintainable, what is
the scope or ex tent of judicial scrutiny,
particularly, in view of the aforesaid
Presidential order which covers, inter alia,
Clause (5) of Article 22, and also in view of
sub-section (9) of Section 16A of the
Maintenance of Internal Security Act ?

If the only reason on which a detention is assailed,
could be that the provisions of the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act 26 of 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Act') have not been complied with, there could be little
difficulty in holding, having regard to the natural and
obvious meaning of the suspension of "the right to move any
Court for the enforcement" of the fundamental right to
personal liberty, protected by Article 21 of the
Constitution, that this right, with whatever it evolved from
or embraced, could not be the basis for any claim to its
enforcement during the Emergency. An that would then remain
to consider would be the exact point at which and the form
in which the order of the Court denying the petitioner an
enforcement of the right could be passed. The last part of
the first question, however, also brings into the area of
discussion the case where a petitioner alleges that "for any
reason" his detention fans completely outside the Act.
Detenues allege not merely infraction of some provision of
the Act, under which a detention is ordered, but, more
often, that the detention is for extraneous reasons falling
either entirely or partially outside the Act. "Malafides" is
almost invariably alleged presumably on the assumption that
almost everything the detenue considers either wrong or
erroneous or improper must be "mala fide".

Arguments addressed to us on behalf of the detenues
have raised a host of hypothetical questions, such as: What
would be the position if the order of detention, on the face
of it, either fans outside the provisions of the Act or is
made mala fide ? Would a detention order, by any Government
servant without even an ostensible or purported statutory
authority to support it, not stand on the same footing as a
detention by a private person? Would remedy against
detention which may be patently illegal. without need for
any real investigation into facts at an also be barred ?
Could remedy by way of a writ of Habeas Corpus against any
illegal detention by any one in this country,
22-833 Sup CI/76
306
under any circumstances, be held to be suspended during the
Emergency ? The next steps in the argument on behalf of
detenues consisted of attempts to show that there could be
no distinction in principle, between an order which is,
prima facie, ultra vires or made mala fide and one which can
be shown to be that only if the facts and circumstances
surrounding a detention were fully investigated in a Court.
Processes of reasoning, based on hypothetical cases put
forward for consideration by us, by learned Counsel for tile
detenus seek, by stages to so expand the area of
maintainability and investigation on claims for writs of
Habeas Corpus in the High Courts that, if we accept them,
the result would be that Article 359 of the Constitution and
the Presidential orders of 1975 made under it would become
entirely meaningless and infructuous.

It seems to me that the two questions set out above,
could very wen be compressed into a single question: To what
extent, if at an, can a High Court be moved to assert a
right to personal liberty, by means of a petition under
Article 226 for a writ of Habeas Habeas Corpus during the
operation of the Presidential order of 27th June, 1975 ?

Speaking for myself, I am extremely reluctant to embark
on a consideration and decision of any "pure" question of
law. In cases coming up before Courts, no question of law
can be "pure" in the sense that it has no bearing on the
facts of a particular case to which it must necessarily be
related. Neither Article 136 nor Article 226 of the
Constitution is meant for the exercise of an advisory
jurisdiction. Attempts to lay down the law in an abstract
form, unrelated to the facts of particular cases, not only
do not appertain to the kind of jurisdiction exercised by
this Court or by the High Courts under the provisions
mentioned above, but may result in misapplications of the
law declared by Courts to situations for which they were not
intended at an.

Learned Counsel for the detenus have tried to induce us
to answer many questions which may arise in purely
hypothetical situations some of which seem to me to be far
removed from the realms of reality. We cannot assume that
those who exercise powers of detention are bound to do so,
as a rule, as though they were demented reports without any
regard for law, justice, reason, or honesty of purpose,
solely for achieving objects other than those which are
really meant to be served by the Act. Both sides, however,
desire that we should answer questions indicated above on
the assumption that the provisions of law contained in the
Act have been infringed, in some way, by the detaining
authorities in a particular case. They want us to indicate
degrees of transgression of the provisions of the Act, if
any, which can justify interference by the High Courts in
Habeas Corpus proceedings. As the facts of no particular
case are before s, we can only answer the questions before
us with the help, where necessary, of appropriate
hypothetical examples.

The learned Attorney General has, very frankly and
honestly, submitted that there was no need to bestow upon
actions of the detaining authorities the protection given to
them only for the duration of the Emergency proclaimed under
Article 352(1 ) of the Constitution, if the
307
President did not really intend to confer certain immunities
from judicial scrutiny and interference upon detentions by
executive authorities, even if some of them were contrary to
the letter of the law, so that certain over-riding interests
of national security and independence may not be
jeopardized. The Attorney General's submission is that the
risks of misuse of powers by the detaining officers and
authorities, which are certainly there, must be presumed to
have been over-ridden by the higher claims of national
security which the proclamation of emergency denotes. It was
pointed out that a citizen, or other person who may have
been unfairly or illegally detained due to some unfortunate
misapprehension or error, does not loose his remedy
altogether. Only his right to move a Court for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of
the Constitution would be suspended for the time being. He
could always approach higher Governmental authorities. All
of them could not be so unreasonable as to deny redress in a
case of genuine injustice.

The propositions thus stated appear to be so reasonable
and are so wen founded, as I shall endeavour to show later,
in the course of this judgment, in the Constitutional and
legal history and the case law of other countries, during
periods of Emergency, from whose constitutions what has been
described as the "ancient writ of habeas Corpus" has been
taken and transplanted into our Constitution that it may
seem somewhat surprising that their correctness should be
doubted or denied at an. The propositions have, however, not
only been vehemently assailed but the attacks upon them were
sought to be supported by attempts to engraft theories upon
our Constitution which, if accepted, win destroy the basic
principle of the supremacy of the written Constitution which
I attempted, in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain
(1), to explain at some length.

If the clear and unequivocal language of Article 359(1)
of our Constitution is the bed-rock on which the Attorney
General's arguments to sustain the preliminary objections to
the maintainability of Habeas Corpus petitions during the
Emergency rest, learned Counsel for the detenus have put
forward theories of a nebulous natural law and a common law
which, on close scrutiny, appear to me to resolve themselves
into what according to the notions of learned Counsel for
the detenus, the law ought to be. Strenuous attempts have
been made to dress up these notions in the impressive garb
of the "Rule of Law" which evokes the genuine and our and
respectful devotion of lawyers and public spirited citizens.
But, the mere veneration of a caption without an
understanding of what it really denoted in the past and what
it means or should mean today, is another name for
obfuscation of thought.

Even in England, the reputed home of the Rule of Law,
the rather loose, general, and in exact meaning given to the
term by Dicey to describe and glorify certain assumedly
special characteristics of the English Constitution, have
given place to more realistic, critical, and scientific
views of the "Rule of Law" and what Dicey meant: by it. Sir
(1) [1976] 2 S.C.R.347.

308

Ivor Jennings, in "The Law and the Constitution" (3rd Edn.
p. 296) pointed out: .

"Dicey honestly tried (in The Law of the
Constitution, not in his polemical works) to analyse,
but, like most, he saw the Constitution through his own
spectacles, and his vision was not exact. The growth of
the new functions of the State has made much of his
analysis irrelevant. Moreover, the argument from
history or, what is the same thing, from the
Constitution must be used with discretion. To say that
a new policy is 'unconstitutional' is merely to say
that it is contrary to tradition, and it must always be
considered whether the tradition is relevant to new
circumstances. Even if the rule of law as Dicey
expounded it had been exact, it would not be a
sufficient argument to say of any proposal, as the
Committee on Ministers' Powers said on a minor point,
that it was contrary to the rule of law".

Those who glibly talk of the Rule of Law, as expounded
by Dicey, forget that Prof. Dicey had made a very gallant
and effective (I would not like to use here a colloquial
expression, "desperate", to describe it) attempt to repel
the correctness of what he caned "the dark saying" of de
Tocqueville that the largely conventional "English
Constitution has no real existence 'elle n'existe point)"
(See: page 22 of the Dicey's "Introduction to the Study of
the Law of the Constitution"-10th Edn.). He was at pains to
show that the Constitutional Law of Eng land did exist. It
lived and functioned not only in the hearts and minds of
Englishmen, also reflected in Parliament, but through the
force of healthy conventions and highly disciplined habits
of life and thought of the British people. These conventions
and habits had, behind them, the sanction not only of a
powerful and intelligent public opinion but also of the
control by the Houses of Parliament, wrested from the Crown
in the course of historic constitutional struggles, over the
finances of the nation. Dicey distinguished this peculiarly
British Constitutional Law from "political ethics" which,
according to him, was "mis-called Constitution Law". It was
not, he pointed out, International law, the "vanishing
point" of law.

Dicey succeeded, at least so far as his statement of
the Rule of Law is concerned, in doing nothing more than
indicating, under this heading, certain common guiding
principles for Courts as wen as Legislators to follow when
they needed these. Hence, he said that the Rule of law and
the legal Sovereignty of Parliament were allies in England.
According to him, both these principles so operated as to
always support and strengthen each other. This idealistic
rosy optimism, reflecting the Whig tradition of minimum
interference with individual freedoms and representing the
Constitutional jurisprudence of the hey-day of a laissez
faire British economic prosperity, was destined to be
displaced by the more "down to the earth" pragmatism of the
Twentieth Century Britain, attempting to meet economic
difficulties and distress through socialistic planning and
to build a welfare State by making laws which appeared to
those brought up on the traditional postulates of Dicey's
Rule of Law to deny the validity of its basic assumptions.

309

The first of these assumptions or meanings was that any
depravation of personal liberty or property must not only be
for a "distinct breach of law" but "established in the
ordinary legal manner before the ordinary Courts of the
land". He contrasted this "with every system of government
based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide,
arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint". He
concluded, from what he regarded as a basic Feature of the
British Constitution, that an modes of dispensing justice,
through specialised administrative authorities and bodies,
must necessarily be autocratic and unfair. He compared the
British system with the one under which Voltaire, in 1717,
was "sent to the Bastille for a poem which he had not
written, of which he did not know the author, and with the
sentiments of which he did not agree". The second assumption
of Dicey's Rule of law was. "Every man, whatever be his rank
or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm
and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals".
He overlooked the not infrequent injustice caused in England
of his time, due to want of adequate remedies against the
servants of the Crown, by applications of the maxim: "The
King can do no wrong". He wrote "With us every official,
from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector
of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act
done without legal justification as any other citizen". The
third assumption on which Dicey's Rule of Law rested was
what he caned "the predominance of the Legal Spirit" which
he described "as a special attribute of English
Institutions". He explained:

"We may say that the constitution is pervaded by
the rule of law on the ground that the general
principles of the constitution (as for example the
right to personal liberty, or the right of public
meeting) are with us the result of judicial decisions
determining the rights of private persons in particular
cases brought before the Courts; whereas under many
foreign constitutions the security (such as it is)
given to the rights of individuals results, or appears
to result from the general principles of the
constitution".

Dicey observed:

"There is in the English constitution an absence
or these declarations or definitions of rights so dear
to foreign constitutionalists. Such principles?
moreover, as you can discover in the English
constitution are, like an maxims established by
judicial legislation, mere generalisations drawn either
from the decisions or dicta of judges, or from statutes
which, being passed to meet special grievances, bear a
close resemblance to judicial decisions, and are in
effect judgments pronounced by the High Court of
Parliament. To put what is really the same thing in a
somewhat different shape, the relation of the rights of
individuals to the principles of the constitution is
not quite the same in countries like Belgium, where the
Constitution is the result of a legislative act, as` it
is in England, where the constitution itself is based
upon legal decisions".

310

Thus, Dicey depicted the British Parliament, while
performing even-its legislative functions, as if it was a
Court following the path shown by judges fined with the
spirit of law and with meticulous concern for an the canons
of justice. He concluded: "Our Constitution, in short, is a
Judge-made Constitution and it bears on its face an the
features, good and bad, of judge made law".

Dicey thought that the difference between the unwritten
British Constitution and a written Constituion, such as that
of Belgium, was not merely a formal one, but revealed
entirely differing approaches to basic freedoms. He observed
.

"The matter to be noted is, that where the right
to individual freedom is a result deduced from the
principles of the constitution, the idea readily occurs
that the right is capable of being suspended or taken
away. Where, on the other hand, the right to individual
freedom is part of the constitution because it is
inherent in the ordinary law of the land, the right is
one which can hardly be destroyed without a through
revolution in the institutions and manners of the
nation."

After making the distinction mentioned above, Dicey
deals with "the so-called suspension of the Habeas Corpus
Act". He said that it bears "a certain similarity to what is
caned in foreign countries 'suspending the constitutional
guarantees' ".. He euphemistically, explained:

"But, after an, a statute suspending the Habeas
Corpus Act falls very far short of what its popular
name seems to imply; and though a serious measure
enough, is not, in reality, more than a suspension of
one particular remedy for the protection of personal
freedom. The Habeas Corpus Act may be suspended and yet
Englishmen may enjoy almost all the rights of citizens.
The constitution being based on the rule of law, the
suspension of the constituion, as far as such a thing
can be conceived possible, would mean with us nothing
less than a revolution".

If Dicey, bewitched by the beauties of an unwritten British
Constitution could have been shocked by any modern
transgressions of the basic principles of his "Rule of Law"-
in the Introduction to later editions of his book, Dicey
modified his earlier views, to some extent, about. the
nature and purposes of "Droit Administratif", accepted the
inevitability of change, and noticed the logical
consequences of what he himself had described, in his "Law
and opinion in England", as the Collectivist or Socialistic
trend-he would have been even more shocked by the
proposition that the cherished principles of his Rule' of
Law could override the statute law which the British
Parliament could make and unmake in the exercise, of what
Dicey called the "Sovereignty of Parliament". The truth is
that Dicey did not, at first visualise the possibility of
any conflict between the Rule of Law and the principles of
Parliamentary Sovereignty in England. And, correctly
understood and applied, there should not be serious conflict
between them. But, are principles always correctly
understood and applied ?

311

Jennings critically commented upon Dicey's views (See:
"The Law and the Constitution" 3rd Edn. p. 294) as follows:

The rules which in foreign countries naturally
form part of a constitutional code "mostly do not exist
in England, for the recognised (or legal) supremacy of
Parliament presents any fundamental distribution of
powers and forbids the existence of fundamental rights.
The supremacy of Parliament is the Constitution. It is
recognised as fundamental law just as a written
constitution is recognised as fundamental law Various
Public., authorities the Crown, the Houses of
Parliament, the courts, the administrative authorities
have powers and duties. Most of them are determined by
statute. Some are traditional, and so are 'determined'
by the common law. The powers of administrative
authorities in respect of 'fundamental liberties' are
mainly contained in statutes. But even if they were
not, I do not understand how it is correct to say that
the rules are the consequence of the rights of
individuals and not their source. The powers of the
Crown and of other administrative authorities are
limited by the rights of individuals; or the rights of
individuals are limited by the powers of the
administration. Both statements are correct; and both
powers and rights come from the law-from the rules".

Thus, Jennings pointed out that what was material was
the existence of rules, as a part of Constitutional law, and
not their sources or forms. He tried to show that the basic
rule being the supremacy of Statutory law that was "The
Constitution" in Britain. No other rule could compete with
it or stand in its way or be a substitute for it. Dicey, on
the other hand, believed that the difference in sources and
forms of rules made a great difference in approach and
outlook. But, Dicey also treated the judge-made Rule of Law
and the rights "guaranteed" by a written constitution as
alternatives or different modes of protecting same species
of rights. He never dreamt of looking upon them both as
simultaneously existing and available Under a written
Constitution in addition to what such a Constitution
contained.

Dicey, indicated the basic distinction between the
Constitutional position in England" with an unwritten
Constitution where the supremacy of Parliament prevailed,
and that in the United States of America, with a written
Constitution which was supreme. But, despite the differences
in the logical consequences of an unwritten constitution, in
a country so largely governed by its conventions and
disciplined habits of life and thought as Dicey's England,
and those of the written Constitution of the U.S.A., one
common feature, snared by both English and American systems,
was the large amount of judicial Constitutional law making
which took place in both countries.

In Britain, although the Parliament is the supreme law-
giver, yet, as Dicey pointed out, there was, out of respect
for the judicial function and the Rule of Law, an acceptance
of judge made law as the constitutional law of the land
which the Parliament could alter, whenever it
312
liked, but did not think of altering presumably because it
served very wen, the needs of British people who took pride
in their judge made law. Of course, if Parliament did make a
law on any subject and it has made some laws on
Constitutional matters also the Courts could not think of
questioning the validity of the law so made.

In America, not only was the doctrine of judicial
review of legislation, established by Marshall, C. J., in
Marbury v. Madison (1) but the "due process" clauses,
introduced by the 5th amendment (1791) and by the 14th
amendment (1868) of the American Constitution, became the
most prolific sources of judicial law-making. They gave to
the American Courts an amplitude of power to indulge in what
is caned "judicial legislation" which our Constitution
makers, after considerable debate, deliberately eschewed by
using the expression ''procedure established by law" instead
of the "due process of law". Willis, adverting to the very
skeletal character of the American Constitution, said:

"Our original Constitution was not an anchor but a
rudder. The Constitution of one period has not been the
Constitution of another period. As one period has
succeeded another, the Constitution has become larger
and larger."

In A. K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras,(2) the
earliest case in which a comprehensive discussion of
fundamental guaranteed freedoms in our Constitution took
place, Kania, C. J., after referring to observations of
Munro, of James Russen Lowen, of Winis, and of Cooley, on
the American Constitution, noted about the nature of our
Constitution (at p. 109):

"The Constitution itself provides in minute
details the legislative powers of the Parliament and
the State Legislatures. The same feature is noticeable
in the case of the judiciary, finance, trade, commerce
and services. It is thus quite detailed and the whole
of it has to be read with the same sanctity, without
giving undue weight to Part III or article 246, except
to the extent one is legitimately and clearly limited
by the other".

The position in this country is clearly one in which
the fundamental law found in the Constitution is paramount.
The Constitution provides the test for the validity of an
other laws. It seeks to deter mine. the spheres of executive
and legislative and judicial powers with meticulous care and
precision. The judicial function, though wider in range when
interpreting or applying other articles of the Constitution,
particularly Articles 14 and 19, the enforcement of which is
also suspended during the current Emergency, is especially
constricted by the elaborate provisions of Articles 21 and
22, which deal with personal liberty and preventive
detention. The wider the sweep of the provisions of Article
21 and 22 the more drastic must be the effect of suspending
their enforcement. After an, suspension does not and cannot
mean retention under a disguise.

(1) (1803) (1 Cranch 137).

(2) [1950] S. C. R. 88 @ p. 109.

313

The only Rule of Law which can be recognised by Courts
of our country is what is deducible from our Constitution
itself. The Constitution is, for us, the embodiment of the
highest "positive law" as wen as the reflection of an the
rules of natural or ethical or common law Lying behind it
which can be recognised by Courts. It seems to me to be
legally quite impossible to successfully appeal to some
spirit of the Constitution or to any law anterior to or
supposed to lie behind the Constitution to frustrate the
objects of the express provisions of the Constitution. I am
not aware of any Rule of Law or reason which could enable us
to do that. What we are asked to do seems nothing short of
building some imaginary parts of a Constitution, supposed to
lie behind our existing Constitution, which could take the
place of those parts of our Constitution whose enforcement
is suspended and then to enforce the substitutes. And, we
were asked by some learned Counsel, though not by an, to
perform this ambitious task of judicial Constitution making
without even using the crutches of implied imperatives of
our Constitutional provisions as though we had some plenary
legislative Constituent powers. Fortunately, Judges in this
country have no such powers. And, those who are meant to so
function as to keep the other authorities and organs of
State within the limits of their powers cannot themselves
usurp powers they do not possess. That is the path of
descent into the arena of political controversy which is so
damaging for the preservation of the impartiality and
prestige of the Judicial function. We cannot, therefore,
satisfy those who may feel the urge, as Omar Khayyam did "to
shatter" what they regard as "this sorry scheme of things
entire" and to "remould" it nearer their "heart's desire"'.
I think we must make it clear that the spirit of law or the
Rule of Law, which we recognise, cannot, however ominously
around like some disembodied ghost serving as a substitute
for the living Constitution we actually have. It has to be
found always within and operating in harmony with and never
outside or in contact with what our Constitution enjoins. An
that we can do is to faithfully explain what the
Constitution and its spirit mean. We cannot alter or twist
these.

The distinction made above between law as it exists and
as it has to be recognised and enforced by the State's
judicial organs, and "the law", if we may can it that at an,
which could only constitute some rules of ethics but could
not be enforced at an, whatever may be its moral worth, was
thus stated by John Codman Hurd in his "Law of Freedom and
Bondage in the United States" (Negro Universities Press New
York (Vol. I, at p. 3):

"Now, jurisprudence is taken to be the science of
a rule not merely existing, but one which is actually
operative or enforced in or by the win of society or
the state. The Science of what rule ought to be made
operative by the win of the state is a different thing;
it is a science of rules regarded only as existing,
whether operative in civil society-that is enforced-or
not.

A rule made operative by the authority of society,
or of the state, is a rule identified with the
expressed win of so
314
ciety or of the State. The win of the state, indicated
in some form of expression, is the law, the subject of
jurisprudence, and no natural rule which may exist,
forms a part of the law unless identified with the win
of the state so indicated. What the state wins is the
conterminous measure of law, no pre existing rule is
the measure of that win".

John Codman Hurd went on to point out that judicial
authorities constituted by the State can only carry out the
mandates of the positive law which, for purposes of
enforcement, must be deemed to embody an the pre-existing
enforceable natural and ethical values.

Enforceability, as an attribute of a legal right, and
the power of the judicial organs of the State to enforce the
right, are exclusively for the State, as the legal
instrument of Society, to confer or take away in the legally
authorised manner. It follows from these basic premises of
our Constitutional jurisprudence that Courts cannot, during
a constitutionally enjoined period of suspension of the
enforceability of Fundamental Rights through Courts, enforce
what may even be a "fundamental right" sought to be
protected by Part III of the Constitution. The Attorney
General has, very fairly and rightly, repeatedly pointed out
that no substantive right, whether declared fundamental or
not. except the procedural rights converted into substantive
ones by Article 32. could be suspended. Even the enforcement
in general of an such rights is not suspended. Even the
enforcement of specified rights through Courts is suspended
for the time being.

The enforceability of a right by a constitutionally
appointed judicial organ has necessarily to depend upon the
fulfillment of two conditions: firstly its recognition by or
under the Constitution as a right. and, secondly, possession
of the power of its enforcement by the judicial organs. Now,
if a right is established, on facts, as a right, it will
certainly satisfy the first condition. But, if the right is
unenforceable, because the power of its enforcement by
Courts is constitutionally suspended or inhibited, for the
duration of the Emergency, its mere recognition or
declaration by Courts, either as a right or as a fundamental
right, could not possibly help a petitioner to secure his
personal liberty. Article 226 of the Constitution is not
meant for futile and unenforceable declarations of right.
The whole purpose of a writ of Habeas Corpus is to enforce a
right to personal freedom after the declaration of a
detention as illegal when it is so found upon investigation.

It may be that many moral and natural obligations exist
outside the Constitution and even outside any positive law-
this is not denied by the learned Attorney General at an
but, their existence is not really relevant for purposes of
petitions for writs of Habeas Corpus which lie only to
enforce Legally enforceable rights. Neither the existence
nor the possibilities of denials of any rights by the
detaining officers of the State, due to frailities of human
nature and errors of judgment, are denied by the Attorney
General. ALL that is denied is the correctness of the
assertion that they are enforceable, during the period of
Emergency, through Courts, if they fan within the purview of
rights whose enforcement is suspended.

315

The result of the few very general observations made
above by me, before examining, in greater depth, any of the
very large number of connected questions and side issues
raised I doubt whether it is necessary or of much use, in
view of my opinion on the preliminary issue of
enforceability, to consider an of then even if it were
possible for me to do so-may be summarised as follows .

Dicey's Rule of Law, with special meanings given to it,
was meant to prove the existence and peculiarities of the
uncodified English Constitutional Law. According to Dicey
himself, these features either did not exist elsewhere or
were the very objectives of provisions of written
Costitutions of other countries. On Dicey's very exposition,
no ordinary Judge-made law or common law could survive in
opposition to statutory law in England, or, in conflict with
a written Constitution where there was one. Enforceability
of rights, whether they are constitutional or common law or
statutory, in constitutionally prescribed ways by
constitutionally appointed judicial organs, is governed
solely by he term of the written instrument in a
constitution such as curs. The scope for judicial law making
on the subject of enforcement of the right to personal
freedom was deliberately restricted by our Constitution
makers. In any case, it is difficult to see any such scope
when "enforcement" itself is suspended. All we can do is to
determine the effect of this suspension. We have now to
consider in greater detail: What is it the enforcement of
which is suspended and what, if anything remains to be
enforced ?

In this country, the procedure for the deprivation as
wen as enforcement. Of a right to personal freedom is
governed partly by the Constitution and partly by ordinarily
statutes. Both fan within the purview of procedure". Article
21 of the Constitution guarantees, though the guarantee is
negatively framed, that "no person shall be deprived of his
life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law. If an enforcement of this negatively
framed right is suspended, a deprivation contrary lo the
prescribed procedure is not legalised. The suspension of
enforcement does not either authorise or direct any
authority to violate the procedure. It has to be clearly
understood that who.. is suspended is really the procedure
for the enforcement of a right through Courts which could be
said to flow from the infringment of a statutory procedure.
If the enforcement of a right to be free resulting
derivatively from both the Constitutional and statutory
provisions, based on an infraction of the procedure, which
is statutory in cases of preventive detention, is suspended,
it seems to me to be impossible to lay down that it becomes
enforceable when that part of the procedure which is
mandatory is violated but remains unenforceable so long as
the part of the procedure infringed is directory. Such a
view would, in any opinion, introduced a distinction which
is neither warranted by the language of Article 359 of the
Constitution nor by that of the Presidential orders of 1975.
If the claim to assert the right is one based on violation
Of procedure, the degree of violation may affect the
question whether the right to be free is established at all,
but, it should not, logically speaking, affect the result
where the enforcement of the right, even in a case in which
it has become apparent, is suspended.

316

The question, however, which has been most vehemently
argued is: Does Article 21 exhaust every kind of protection
given to rights to personal freedom ? Another way in which
this question was put is Article 21 of the Constitution "the
sole repository" of the substantive as wen as procedural
rights embraced by the expression "personal liberty" ? one
of the contentions before us was that Article 21 does not go
beyond the procedural protection to persons who may be
deprived of personal liberty.

Mr. Jethmalani, learned Counsel appearing for one of
the detenues, contended that personal freedom was a by
product of the removal of constraints or hindrances to the
positive freedom of action of the individual. The contention
seemed to be that procedure for depreciation of personal
liberty being one of the ways of imposing positive
constraints, the removal of a negative procedural protection
could not dispense with the necessity to establish a right
of the detaining authority under some positive or statutory
law to deprive a person detained of his liberty whether the
authority concerned followed the right procedure or not in
doing so. The argument is that proof of a just and reason
able cause, falling within the objects of the Act so as to
create a liability to be detained, must precede the adoption
of any procedure to detail a person under the Act. A
"satisfaction" that one of the grounds of detention,
prescribed by Section 3 of the Act, is there, was thus said
to be a "condition precedent" to the exercise of
jurisdiction to detain. This argument obviously proceeded on
a restricted meaning given to the "procedure established by
law". It is very difficult to see why the satisfaction,
required by Section 3 of the Act, is not really part of
"procedure established by law".

There is, however, an even more formidable difficulty
in the way of this argument. If, as it is undeniable, the
procedure under Article 226 is the direct procedural
protection, which is suspended by the terms of the
Presidential order, read with Article 359, Article 226 win
not be available to the detenue at an, for the time being,
for showing absence of the required "satisfaction", as a
condition precedent to a valid detention order under
Section 3 of the Act. If the "right to move any Court" can
be suspended Article 359 is very clear on the point there
remains no right, for the time being, to an inquiry into
conditions which may enable a party to secure release in
assertion of rights guarantee either by Article 21 or by
other articles whose "enforcement" is suspended. Indeed, the
clear object of such a suspension seems to me to be that
Courts should not undertake inquiries into the violations of
the alleged right.

If the fundamental rights in Part III of the
Constitution are not suspended, as they obviously are not,
but only their enforcement can be and is suspended what is
really affected is the power conferred on Courts by Articles
32 and 226 of the Constitution. The power of the Courts is
the direct and effective protection of the rights sought to
be secured indirectly by Article 21, and perhaps less
indirectly, by some other articles and laws. Indeed, it is
the basic protection because other protections operate
through it and depend on it. If this is curtailed
317
temporarily, the other affected protections become
automatically inoperative or ineffective so far as Courts
are concerned.

It is no answer to say that the Constitutional power of
High Courts cannot be affected by a Presidential order under
Article 359 which is as much a part of the constitution as
Article 226. Both articles were there from the commencement
of the Constitution. I do not see how it can be reasonably
urged that our Constitution-makers did not visualise and
intend that the Presidential order under Article 359 must,
for the duration of the Emergency, necessarily limit the
powers of High Courts under Article 226 albeit indirectly by
suspending rights to enforcement of fundamental rights.

It is also not possible for a detenue to fan back upon
the last part of Article 226 of the Constitution which
enables the use of powers given by this Article "for any
other purpose". Sq long as that purpose is enforcement of a
right which is covered by Articles 14 or 19 or 21 or 22
either separately or conjointly, as the enforcement of each
of these is now suspended, the inhibition win be there.
Moreover, we have no case before us in which a detenu asks
for an order for any purpose other than the one which can
only be served by tho issue of a writ of Habeas Corpus. Each
detenu asks for that relief and for no other kind of writ or
order. Therefore, there is no need to consider 'any other
purpose".

It is true that some of the learned Counsel for the
detenus have strongly relied upon "any other purpose",
occurring at the end of Article 226, for enabling the High
Court to undertake an investigation suo motu into the
question whether the executive is performing its duties.
Other Counsel have submitted that such an enquiry such motu
can be undertaken by this Court or by a High Court in
exercise of powers to issue writs of Habeas Corpus quite
apart from the enforcement of the right of a detenu to any
writ or order. As I have indicated earlier, I am not
prepared to answer purely hypothetical questions, except
within certain limits, that is to say, only so far as it is
necessary for the purposes of illustrating my point of view.
I do not think that the powers of Courts remain unaffected
by the suspension of rights or locus standi of detenus. A
Court cannot, in exercise of any supposed inherent or
implied or unspecified power, purport to enforce or in
substance enforce a right the enforcement of which is
suspended. To permit such circumvention of the suspension is
to authorise doing indirectly what law does not allow to be
done directly. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that
there is some unspecified residue of judicial' power in
Courts of Record in this country, without deciding what it
could be, as that question does not really arise in cases
before us, there must be undeniable facts and circumstances
of some very grave, extraordinary, and exceptional character
to justify the use of such powers, if they exist at and
either by this Court or by the High Courts. So long as the
powers of Government are exercised by the chosen
representatives of the people, their exercise is presumed to
be of the people and for the people. It has to be borne in
mind that the validity of the declaration of Emergency under
Article 352 has neither been nor can it be constitutionally
challenged in view of Article 352(5)318
of the Constitution. And, the validity of Presidential
orders of 1975 under Article 359 has not been questioned.

So far, I have only indicated the nature of the
problems before us and` my general approach to them. Before
specifically answering questions, stated at the outset, I
win deal, as briefly as possible, Under the following Six
main heads, with such of the very large number of points
raised and authorities cited before us as appear to me to be
really necessary for answering the questions caning for our
decision:

(A) "Rights conferred by Part III" of our
Constitution from the point of view of
Personal Freedom.

(B) Power to issue writs of Habeaus Corpus and
other powers of High Courts under article 226
of the constitution.

(C) The objects of the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act ('the Act') and the amendments
of it.

(E) The effect of the Presidential orders,
particularly the order of 27th June, 1975, on
the rights of Detenus.

(F) The Rule of Law, as found in our
Constitution, and how it operates during the
Emergency.

(A) "Rights conferred by Part In" from the point of view of
personal freedom.

It is somewhat difficult to reconcile the language of a
purported conferment of rights upon themselves by citizens
of India with their political sovereignty. The language of
the preamble to the Constitution recites that it is they who
were establishing the legally Sovereign Democratic Republic
with the objects given there. Of course, some rights are
"conferred" even on non-citizens, but that does not remove
the semantic difficulty which gave rise to some argument
before us. It seems to me that if, as this Court has already
explained earlier (e.g. by me in Shrimati Indira Nehru
Gandhi's case (supra), the Constitution, given unto
themselves by the people, is legally supreme, it win not be
difficult to assign its proper meaning to the term
"conferred". I do not find the theory unacceptable that
There was a notional surrender by the people of India of
control over their several or individual rights to a
sovereign Republic by means of a legally supreme
Constitution to which we owe allegiance. It only means that
we recognise that the Constitution is supreme and can confer
rights and powers. We have to look to it alone and not
outside it for finding out the manner in which and the
limits subject to which individual citizens can exercise
their separate freedoms. There has to be necessarily, as a
result of such a process of Constitution making, a notional
surrender of individual freedom so as to convert the
possibility of "licence" to an, which ends in the
exploitation and oppression of the many weak by the few
strong, into the actuality of a freedom for an regulated by
law or under the law applicable to an. This seems to
319
me to be a satisfactory explanation of the language of
conferment used with reference to rights.

Apart from the explanation given above, of the language
or conferment, the meaning of placing some rights in Part
III, whatever be tile language in which this was done, is
surely to select certain rights as most essential for
ensuring the fulness of lives of citizens. The whole object
of guaranteed fundamental rights is to make those basic
aspects of human freedom, embodied in fundamental rights,
more secure than others not so selected. In thus recognising
and declaring certain basic aspects of rights as fundamental
by the Constitution of the country, the purpose was to
protect them against undue encroachments upon them by the
legislative, or executive, and, sometimes even judicial
(e.g. Article 20) organs of the State. The encroachments
must remain within permissible limits and must take place
only in prescribed modes. The intention could never be to
preserve something concurrently in the field of Natural Law
or Common Law. It was to exclude an other control or to make
the Constitution the sole repository of ultimate control
over those aspects of human freedom which were guaranteed
there.

I have already referred to Dicey's attempt to show that
one of the meanings of the Rule of Law in England was that
the law made by the ordinary Courts served purposes sought
to be achieved in other countries by means of written
Constitutions. This meant that one of the two systems
governs the whole field of fundamental rights but not both
This very idea is thus put by Keir & Lawson in "Cases in
Constitutional Law (5th Edn. p. 11) :"

"The judges seem to have in their minds an ideal
constitution, comprising those fundamental rules of
common law which seem essential to the liberties of the
subject and the proper government of the country. These
rules cannot be repealed but by direct and unequivocal
enactment. In the absence of express words or necessary
intendment, statutes win be applied subject to them.
They do not override the statute, but are treated, as
it were, as implied terms of the statute. Here may be
found many of those fundamental rights of man which are
directly and absolutely safeguarded in the American
Constitution or the Declaration des droits de 1'
homme".

In the passage quoted above, Rules of Natural Justice,
which are impliedly read into statutes from the nature of
functions imposed upon statutory authorities or bodies, are
placed on the same footing as "fundamental rights of men
which are directly and absolutely safeguarded" by written
Constitutions. There is, however, a distinction between
these two types of basic rights. The implied rules of
natural justice do not, as has been repeatedly pointed out
by us, over-ride the express terms of a statute. They are
only implied because the functions which the statute imposes
are presumed to be meant to the exercised in accordance with
these rules. Hence, they are treated as though they were
parts of enacted law. This Court has repeatedly
320
applied this principle (see: e.g. State of Orissa v. Dr.
(Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors)(1)
The principles of natural justice which are so implied
must always hang, if one may so put it, on pegs of statutory
provisions or necessarily follows from them. They can also
be said sometimes to be implied as necessary parts of the
protection of equality and equal protection of laws
conferred by Article 14 of the Constitution where one of the
pillars of Dicey's principles of the Rule of Law is found em
bodied. Sometimes, they may be implied and read into
legislation dealing with rights protected by Article 19 of
the Constitution. They could, at times, be so implied
because restrictions on rights conferred by Article 19 of
the Constitution have to be reasonable. Statutory provisions
creating certain types of functions may become unreason
able, and, therefore, void unless rules of natural justice
were impliedly annexed to them. And, the wen known method of
construction is: ut res magis valeat guam pereat"-to prefer
the construction which upholds rather than the one which
invalidates. Thus, rules of natural justice, even when they
are read into statutory provisions, have no independent
existence. They are annexed to statutory duties or
fundamental rights so long as they are not expressly
excluded. Their express exclusion by statute may, when the
enforcement of fundamental rights. It is not suspended,
affect the validity of a statute. But, that is so because of
the requirements of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution
and not because they are outside the Constitution
altogether.

It is also very difficult for me to understand what is
meant by such "Common Law" rights as could co-exist and
compete with constitutional provisions or take their place
when the constitutional provisions become unenforceable or
temporarily inoperative. The whole concept of such alleged
Common Law is based on an utter misconception of what
"Common Law" means. The origin of Common Law in England is
to be found in the work done by the King's Judges, who,
through their judicial pronouncements, gave to the people of
that country a law common to the whole country in the place
of the peculiar or conflicting local customs. Let me quote
here from a recent book by Prof. George W. Keeton on
"English Law-The Judicial Contribution" (at p. 68-69), about
what Judges appointed by Henry the II of Anjou did:

"It is in his reign that something recognisable as
a Common Law begins to emerge. It is an amalgam of
Anglo Saxon and Danish customs and Norman laws
governing military tenures, both of which are about to
be transformed by several mighty agencies-the ever-
expanding body of original writs, of which Glanville
wrote; the assizes which Henry introduced and finally,
by the activities of his judges, whether 3 at
Westminster or on Circuit. It is significant that
although for some centuries to come, English law was to
remain remarkably rich in local customs, we no longer
hear, after t Henry's reign, of the laws of Mercia,
Wessex and Northumbria, but of a Common Law of England-
that is to say,
(1)[1967] 2 S. C. R. 625.

321

the law of the king's courts, about which treatises of
the calibre of Bracton and Fleta would be written
almost exactly a century later, and as the concluding
words of Pollock and Maitland's great work remind us,
they and their judicial colleagues were building, not
for England alone but 'for king less common-wealths on
the other shore of the Atlantic ocean and now, one can
perhaps add, for many other commonwealths, too. This we
owe ultimately, not to a Norman Conqueror, nor even to
a distinguished line of Saxon kings, but to a bow-
legged and unprepossessing prince of Anjou, of restless
energy and great constancy of purpose who built,
perhaps, a good deal better than even he knew".

Such were the origins of the Common Law in England. It
is true that Common Law did try to dig its tentacles into
Constitutional Law as well. Chief Justice Coke not only
denied to King James the 1st the power to administer justice
directly and personally, but he went so far as to claim for
the King's Courts the power to proclaim an Act of Parliament
invalid, in Dr. Bonham's case, if it sought to violate a
principle of natural law. Such claims, however, were soon
abandoned by Common Law Courts.

It is interesting to recall that, after his dismissal,
by King James the 1st, in 1616, Sir Edward Coke entered
politics and became a Member of the House of Commons in
Liskeard. He led a group which resisted Royal claims. He was
the principal advocate of the Petition of Rights which
Parliament compelled a reluctant King of England to accept
in 1628. Courts of justice, unable to withstand Royal
onslaughts on their authority, joined hands with Parliament
and laid down some of the rules which, according to Dicey,
gave the Rule of Law to England. Thus, the judge-made
fundamental rights, which Parliament would not disturb, out
of innate respect for them, existed, legally speaking,
because Parliament, representing the people, wanted them.
They could not compete with or obstruct the legal authority
of Parliament. Coke's doctrine, however, found expression in
a constitution which enabled judges to test the validity of
even legislation P' with reference to fundamental rights.
This is also one of the primary functions of Chapter III of
our own Constitution. Another function of provisions of this
chapter is to test the validity of the State's executive
action.

So far as Article 21 of the Constitution is concerned,
it is abundantly clear that it protects the lives and
liberties of citizens primarily from legally unwarranted
executive action. It secures rights to 'procedure
established by law'. If that procedure is to be established
by statute law, as it is meant to be, this particular
protection could not, on the face of it, be intended to
operate as a restriction upon legislative power to lay down
procedure although other articles affecting legislation on
personal freedom might. Article 21 was only meant, on the
face of it, to keep the exercise of executive powers in
ordering deprevations of life or liberty, within the bounds
of power prescribed by procedure established by legislation.

23-833 Sup C I/76
322
The meaning of the expression "procedure established by law"
came in for discussion at considerable length, by this
Court, in A. K. Gopalan's case (supra). The majority of the
learned James clearly held there that it furnishes the
guarantee of "Lex", which is equated with statute law only,
and not of "Jus" or a judicial concept of what procedural
law ought really to be. The whole idea, is using this
expression, taken deliberately from the Japanese
Constitution of the advice, amongst others, of Mr. Justice
Felix Frankfurter of the American Supreme Court was to
exclude judicial interference with executive action in
dealing with lives and liberties of citizens and others
living in our country on any ground other than that it is
contrary to procedure actually prescribed by law, which,
according to the majority view in Gopalan's case, meant only
statute law. The majority view was based on the reason,
amongst others, that, according to well established canons
of statutory construction, the express terms of "Lex"
(assuming, of course, that The "Lex" is otherwise valid),
prescribing procedure, will exclude "Jus" or judicial
notions or "due process" or what the procedure ought to be.

Appeals to concepts of "Jus" or a just procedure were
made in Gopalan's case (supra), as implied by Article 21, in
an attempted application of "Jus" for testing the validity
of statutory provisions. Although no such question of
validity of the procedure established by the Act in ordering
actual deprivations of personal liberty has arisen before
us, yet, the argument before us is that we should allow use
of notions of "Jus" and the doctrine of ultra vires by the
various High Courts in judging the correctness of
applications of the established procedure by executive
authorities to each case at a time when the Presidential
order of 27th June 1975 precludes the use of Article 21 by
Courts for enforcing a right to personal liberty. Therefore,
the question which arises here is whether "Jus" held by this
Court. in Gopalan's case, to have been deliberately excluded
from the purview of procedure established by law", can be
introduced by Courts, through a back door, as though it was
an independent right guaranteed by Chapter III or by any
other Part of the Constitution. I am quite unable to accede
to the suggestion that this could be done.

We have been referred to the following passage in R. C.
Cooper v, Union of India(1) to substantiate the submission
that the decision of this Court in Gopalan's case (supra),
on the question mentioned above, no longer holds the field:

"We have found it necessary to examine the
rationale of the two lines of authority and determine
whether there is anything the Constitution which
justifies this apparently inconsistent development of
the law. In our judgment, the assumption in A.K.
Gopalan's case that certain articles in the
Constitution exclusively deal with specific matters and
in determining where there is infringement of the
individual's guaranteed rights, the object and the form
of the State action alone need be considered, and
effect of the laws on fundamental rights of the
individuals in general will be ignored cannot be
accepted as correct. We hold that the
(1) [1970] 3 S. C. R. 530 @ 578,
323
validity 'of law' which authorises deprivation of
property and 'a law' which authorises compulsory
acquisition of property for a public purpose must be
adjudged by the application of the same tests. A
citizen may claim in an appropriate case that the law
authorising compulsory acquisition of property imposes
fetters upon his right to hold property which are not
reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general
public".

It seems to me that Gopalan's case (supra) was merely
cited, in Cooper's case (supra), for illustrating a line of
reasoning which was held to be incorrect in determining the
validity of "law" for the acquisition of property solely
with reference to the provisions of Article 31. The question
under consideration in that case was whether Articles
19(1)(f) and 31(2) are mutually exclusive. Even if, on the
strength of what was held in Cooper's case (supra), we hold
that the effects of deprivation upon rights outside Article
21 have also to be considered in deciding upon the validity
of "Lex", and that the line of reasoning in Gopalan's case
(supra), that the validity of a law relating to preventive
detention must be judged solely with reference to the
provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution, is incorrect?
in view of the opinion of the majority of learned Judges of
this Court hl Cooper's case (supra), it seem to me that this
is hardly relevant in considering whether any claims based
on natural law or common law can be enforced. There is no
challenge before us based on Article 19, to any provision of
the Act. Moreover, now that the enforcement of Article 19 is
also suspended, the question whether a law dealing with
preventive detention may directly or indirectly infringe
other rights contained in Article 19 of the Constitution is
not relevant at all here for this additional reason.

Mr. Shanti Bhushan, appearing for some of the detenu,
seems to have seriously understood the meaning of the
majority as well as minority views of Judges of this Court
in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v. State
of Kerala.(1) when he submitted that, as the majority view
there was not that natural rights do not exist, these rights
could be enforced in place of the suspended guaranteed
fundamental rights. One learned Judge after another in that
case emphatically rejected the submission that any theory of
natural rights could impliedly limit powers of
Constitutional amendment contained in Article 368 of the
Constitution. Tn doing so, none or us held that any natural
rights could impliedly become legally enforceable rights. G
Dwivedi, J., in Kesavananda Bharti's case (supra) said
about what could be characterised as a far more "unruly
horse" than public policy (at p. 918):

"Natural law has been a sort of religion with many
political and constitutional thinkers. But it has never
believed in a single Godhead. It has a perpetually
growing pantheon. Look at the pantheon, and you will
observe there: 'State
(1) [1973] Suppl. S. C. R. 1 @ 918.

324

of Nature', 'Nature of Man', 'Reason,' 'Cod',
'Equality', 'Liberty', 'Property', 'Laissez Faire',
'Sovereignty', 'Democracy', 'Civilised Decency',
'Fundamental Conceptions of Justice' and even 'War'.
The religion of Natural Law has its illustrious
Priestly Heads such as Chrysippus, Cicero, Seneca, St.
Thomas Acquinas, Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Paine,
Hamilton, Jefferson and Trietschke. The pantheon is not
a heaven of peace. Its gods are locked in constant
internecine c nflict.

Natural Law has been a highly subjective and
fighting faith. Its bewildering variety of mutually
warring gods has provoked Kelson to remark:
"outstanding representatives of the natural law
doctrine have proclaimed in the name of Justice or
Natural Law principles which not only contradict one
another, but are in direct opposition to many positive
legal orders. There is no positive law that is not in
conflict with one or the other of these principles; and
it is not possible to ascertain which of them has a
better claim to be recognised than any other. All these
principles represent the highly subjective value
judgments of their various authors about what they
consider to be just or natural."

If the concepts of natural law are too conflicting to
make them a secure foundation for any alleged "right",
sought to be derived from it, until it is accepted and
recognised by a positive laws notions of what Common Law is
and what it means, if anything, in this country, are not
less hazy and unsettled.

Mr. Setalvad, in his Harnlyn Memorial Lectures on
"Common Law in India", treated the whole body of general or
common statute law and Constitutional Law of this country as
though they represented a codification of the Common Law of
England. If this view is correct, Common Law could not be
found outside the written constitution and statute law
although English Common Law could perhaps be used to explain
and interpret our statutory provisions where it was possible
to do so due to some uncertainty.

Sometimes, Judges have spoken of the principles of
"Justice, equity, and good conscience" (See: Satish Chandra
Chakramurthi v. Ram Dayal De(1) Waghela Raj Sanji v. Sheik
Mashuddirl & ors. (2); Baboo S/o Thakur Dhodi v. Mst.
Subanshi W/o Mangal(8), as sources of "Common Law" in this
country. One with some knowledge of development of law in
England will distinguish the two broad streams of law there:
one supposed to be derived from the customs of the people,
but, actually based on judicial concepts of what custom is
or should properly be; and another flowing from the Court of
the Chancellor, the "Keeper of the King's Conscience", who
used to be approached
(1) I. L. R. 48 Cal. 388 @ 407-410.

(2) 14 Indian Appeals p. 89 @ 96.

(3) A. I. R. 1942 Nag. 99.

325

when plain demands of justice failed to be met or caught in
the meshes of Common Law, or, were actually defeated by some
statute law which was being misused. The two streams, one of
Common Law and an other of Equity, were "mixed" or "fused"
by statute as a result of the Judicature Acts in England at
the end of the last century in the sense that they became
parts of one body of law administered by the same Courts,
although they are still classified separately due to their
separate origins. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, we find
(See: Vol. I, 4th Edn. p. 517): "The common law of England
is that body of law which has been judicially evolved from
the general custom of the realm".

Here, all that I wish to indicate is that neither
rights supposed to be recognised by some natural law nor
those assumed to exist in some part of Common Law could
serve as substitutes for those conferred by Part III of the
Constitution. They could not be, on any principle of law or
justice or reason, virtually added to part III as complete
replacements for rights whose enforcement is suspended, and
then be enforced, through constitutionally provided
machinery, as the unseen appendages of the Constitution or
as a separate group of rights outside the Constitution meant
for the Emergency which suspends but does not resuscitate in
a new form certain rights.

A submission of Dr. Ghatate, appearing for Mr. Advani,
was that we should keep in mind the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in interpreting the Constitution. He relied on
Article Sl of the Constitution, the relevance of which for
the cases before us is not at all evident to me. He also
relied on the principle recognised by British Courts that
International Law is part of the law of the land. Similarly,
it was urged, it is part of our law too by reason of Article
372 of the Constitution. He seemed to imply that we should
read the universal declaration of human rights into our
Constitution as India was one of the signatories to it.
These submissions appear to me to amount to nothing more
than appeals to weave certain ethical rules and principles
into the fabric of our Constitution which is the paramount
law of this country and provides the final test of validity
and enforceability of rules and rights through Courts. To
advance such arguments is to forget that our Constitution
itself embodies those rules and rights. It also governs the
conditions of their operation and suspension. Nothing which
conflicts with the provisions of the Constitution could be
enforced here under any disguise.

Emergency provisions in our Constitution are, after
all, a recognition and extension of the individual's natural
law right of self-defence, which has its expression in
positive laws, to the State, the legal organisation through
which society or the people in its collective aspect,
functions for the protection of the common interests of all
Such provisions or their equivalents exist in the
Constitutions of even the most advanced democratic countries
of the world. No lawyer can seriously, question the
correctness, in Public International Law, of the proposi-

326

tion that the operation and effects of such provisions are
matter which are entirely the domestic concern of legally
sovereign Slates and ca brook no outside interference.

"Now, what are the fundamental rights ? They are
em bodied in Part III of the Constitution and they may
be classified thus: (1) right to equality (ii) right to
freedom, (iii) right against exploitation, (iv) right
to freedom of religion, (v) cultural and educational
rights, (vi) right to property, and (vii) right to
constitutional remedies. They are the rights of the
people preserved by our Constitution. "Fundamental
rights' are the modern name for what have been
traditionally known as "natural rights". As one author
puts: "they are moral rights which every human being
everywhere at all times ought to have simply because of
the fact that in contradistinction with other beings,
he is rational and moral". They are the primordial
rights necessary for the development of human
personality. They are the rights which enable a man to
chalk out his own life in the manner he likes best. our
Constitution, in addition to the well-known fundamental
rights, also included the rights of the minorities,
untouchables and other backward communities, in such
rights".

I do not know of any statement by this Court of the
relation between natural rights and fundamental
constitutional rights which conflicts with what is stated
above.

Hidayatullah, J., in Golaknath's case (supra) observed
(at p 877 ):

"What I have said does not mean that Fundamental
Rights are not subject to change or modification. In
the most inalienable of such rights a distinction must
be made between possession of a right and its exercise.
The first is fixed and the latter controlled by justice
and necessity. Take for example Art. 21:
"No person shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law'. of all the rights, the right to
one's life is the most valuable. This article of the
Constitution, therefore, makes the right fundamental.
But the inalienable right is curtailed by a murderer's
conduct as viewed under laws. he deprivation, when it
takes place, is not of the right which was immutable
but of the continued exercise of the right".

The contents of Article 21 were considered at some
length and given a wide connotation by this Court ill
Gopalan's case (supra). Patanjali Sastri, J., held at pages
195-196:

(1) [1967] 2 S. C. R. 762 @ 789.

327

"It was further submitted that article 19 declared
the substantive rights of personal liberty while
article 21 provided the procedural safeguard against
their deprivation. This view of the correlation between
the two articles has found favour with some of the
Judges in the High Courts which have occasion to
consider the constitutional validity of the impugned
Act. It is, however, to be observed that article 19
confers the rights therein specified only on the
citizens of India, While article 21 extends the
protection of life and . personal liberty to all
persons citizens and non-citizens alike. Thus, the two
articles do not operate in a conterminous field, and
this is one reason for rejecting the correlation
suggested. Again, if article 21 is to be understood as
providing only procedural safeguards, where is the
substantive right to personnel liberty, of non-citizens
to be found in the Constitution ? Are they denied such
right altogether ? If they are to have no right of
personal liberty, why is the procedural safeguard in
article 21 extended to them ? And where is that most
fundamental right of all, the right to life, provided
for in the Constitution? The truth is that article 21,
like its American prototype in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States,
presents an example of The fusion of procedural and
substantive rights in the same provision. The right to
live, though the most fundamental of all, is also one
of the most difficult to define and its protection
generally takes the form of a declaration that no
person shall be deprived of it save by due process of
law or by authority of law. 'Process' or 'procedure' in
this context connotes both the act and the manner of`
proceeding to take away a man's life or personal
liberty. And the first and essential step in a
procedure established by law for such deprivation must
be a law made by a competent legislature authorising
such deprivation".

Mahajan, J., also observed at pages 229-230:

"Article 21, in my opinion, lays down substantive
law as giving protection to life and liberty inasmuch
as it says that they cannot be deprived except
according to the procedure established by law; in other
words, it means that before a person can be deprived of
his life or liberty as a condition precedent there
should exist some substantive law conferring authority
for doing so and the law should further provide for a
mode of procedure for such deprivation. This article
gives complete immunity against the exercise of
despotic power by the executive. It further gives
immunity against invalid laws which contravene the
Constitution. It gives also further guarantee that in
its true concept there should be some form of
proceeding before a person can be condemned either in
respect of his life or his liberty. It negatives the
idea of fantastic arbitrary and oppressive forms of
proceedings. The principles therefore underlying
article 21 have been kept in view in drafting article
22".

328

Das, J., said at page 295:

"If personal liberty as such is guaranteed by any
of the sub-clauses of article 19(1) then why has it
also been protected by article 21 ? The answer
suggested by learned counsel for the petitioner is that
personal liberty as a substantive right is protected by
article 19(1) and article 21 gives only an additional
protection by prescribing the procedure . according to
which that right may be taken away. I am unable to
accept this contention. If this argument were correct,
then it would follow that our Constitution does not
guarantee to any person, citizen or non-citizen, the
freedom of his life as a substantive right at all, for
the substantive right to life does not fall within any
of the sub-clauses of clause (1) of article 19".

He also said at p. 306-307:

"Article 21, as the marginal note states,
guarantees to every person 'protection of life and
personal liberty'. As I read it, it defines the
substantive fundamental right to which protection is
given and does not purport to prescribe any particular
procedure at all. That a person shall not be deprived
of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law is the substantive
fundamental right to which protection is given by the
Constitution. The avowed object of the article, as I
apprehend it, is to define the ambit of the right to
life and personal liberty which is to be protected as a
fundamental right. The right to life and personal
Liberty protected by article 21 is not an absolute
right but is a qualified right-a right circumscribed by
the possibility or risk of being lost according to
procedure established by
It will thus be seen that not only all steps leading up
to the deprivation of personal liberty but also the
substantive right to personal Freedom has been held, by
implication, to be covered by Article 21 of the
Constitution.

In Kharak Singh v. the State of U.P. & Ors(1) he wide
import of personal liberty, guaranteed by Article 21, was
considered. By a majority of 4 against 2 learned Judges of
this Court, it was held that the term "personal liberty", as
used in Article 21, is a compendious one and includes all
varieties of rights to exercise of personal freedom, other
than those dealt with separately by Article 19 which could
fall under a broad concept of freedom of person. It was held
to include freedom from surveillance, from physical torture,
and from all kinds of harassment of the person which may
interfere with his liberty.

Thus, even if Article 21 is not the sole repository of
all personal freedom, it will be clear, from a reading of
Gopalan's case (supra) and
(1) [1964] 1 S. C. R. 332.

329

Kharak Singh's case (Supra), that all aspects of freedom of
person are meant to be covered by Articles 19 and 21 and 22
of the Constitution. If the enforcement of these rights by
Courts is suspended during the Emergency an inquiry by a
Court into the question whether any of them is violated by
an illegal deprivation of it by executive authorities of the
State seems futile.

For the reasons indicated above I hold as follows:-
Firstly, fundamental rights are basic aspects of rights
selected from what may previously have been natural or
common law rights. These basic aspects of rights are
elevated to a new level of importance by the Constitution.
Any other co-extensive rights, outside the Constitution, are
necessarily excluded by their recognition as or merger with
fundamental rights.

Secondly, the object of making certain general aspects
of rights fundamental is to guarantee them against illegal
invasions of these rights by executive, legislative, or
judicial organs of the State. This necessarily means that
these safeguards can also be legally removed under
appropriate constitutional or statutory provisions. although
their Suspension does not, or itself, take away the
illegalities or their legal consequences.

Thirdly, Article 21 of the Constitution has to be
interpreted comprehensively enough to include, together with
Article 19, practically all aspects of personal freedom. It
embraces both procedural and substantive rights. Article 22
merely makes it clear that deprivations of liberty by means
of laws regulating preventive detention would be included in
"procedure established by law" and indicates what that
procedure should be. In that sense, it could be viewed as,
substantially, an elaboration of what is found in Article
21, although it also goes beyond it inasmuch as it imposes
limits on ordinary legislative power.

Fourthly, taken by itself, Article 21 of the
Constitution is primarily a protection against illegal
deprivations by the executive action of the State's agents
or officials, although, read with other Articles, it could
operate also as a protection against unjustifiable
legislative action purporting to authorise deprivations of
personal freedom.

Fifthlty, the most important object or making certain
basic rights fundamental by the 'Constitution is to make
them enforceable against the State and its agencies through
the Courts.

Sixthly, if the protection of enforceability is validly
suspended for the duration of an Emergency, declared under
constitutional provisions the Courts will have nothing
before them to enforce so as to be able to afford any relief
to a person who comes with a grievance before them.

(B) Power to issue writs of Habeas Corpus and other
powers of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution
Reliance has been placed on behalf of the detenus on
the following statement of the law found in Halsbury's Laws
of England (Vol. 11, p. 27, paragraph 15), where dealing
with the jurisdiction to issue such writs in England it is
said:

330

"The right to the writ is a right which exists at
common law independently of any statute, though the
right has been confirmed and regulated by statute. At
common law the jurisdiction to award the writ was
exercised by the Court of Queen's Bench, chancery and
Common Pleas, and, in a case of privilege, by the Court
of Exchequer".

It is, therefore, submitted that the High Courts as well as
this Court which have the same jurisdiction to issue writs
of Habeas Corpus as English Courts have to issue such writs
at common law
The argument seems to me to be based on several
misconceptions
Firstly, there are no Courts of the King or Queen here
to issue writs of Habeas Corpus by reason of any
"prerogative" of the British Monarch. The nature of the writ
of Habeas Corpus is given in the same volume of Halsbury's
Laws of England, dealing with Crown proceedings at page 24,
as follows:

"40. The prerogative writ of habeas corpus. The
writ of habeas corpus and subjiciendum, which is
commonly known as the writ of habeas corpus, is a
prerogative process for securing the liberty of" the
subject by affording an effective means of immediate
release from unlawful or unjustifiable detention,
whether in prison or in private custody. It is a
prerogative writ by which the Queen has a right to
inquire into the causes for which any of her subjects
are deprived of their liberty. By it the High Court and
the judges of that Court, at the in stance of a subject
aggrieved, command the production of that subject, and
inquire into the cause of his imprisonment. If there is
no legal justification for the detention, the party is
ordered to be released. Release on habeas corpus is
not, however, an acquittal? nor may the writ be used as
a means of appeal".

It will be seen that the Common Law power of issuing
the writ of Habeas Corpus is possessed by only certain
courts which could issue "prerogative" writs. It is only to
indicate the origin and nature of the writ that the writ of
habeas corpus is known here as a "prerogative" writ. The
power to issue it is of the same nature as a "prerogative"
power inasmuch as the power so long as it is not suspended,
may carry with it an undefined residue of discretionary
power. Strictly speaking. it is a constitutional writ. The
power to issue it is conferred upon Courts in this country
exclusively by our Constitution. All the powers of our
Courts flow from the Constitution which is the source of
their jurisdiction. If any provision of the Constitution
authorises the suspension of the right to obtain relief in
any type of cases, the power of Courts is thereby curtailed
even though a general jurisdiction to afford the relief in
other cases may be there. If they cannot issue writs of
Habeas Cor pus to enforce a light to personal freedom
against executive authorities during the Emergency, the
original nature of this writ issuing power comparable to a
"prerogative" power, cannot help the detenu.

331

Secondly, as I have already indicated, whatever could
be formerly even said to be governed by a Common Law
prerogative power becomes merged in the Constitution as soon
as the Constitution makes it over and regulates that
subject. This is a well recognised principle or law. I will
only cite Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel
Limited(1). Where Lord Dunedin, in answer to a claim of the
Crown based on prerogative, said (at p. 526):

None the less, it is equally certain that if the
whole ground of something which could be done by the
prerogative is covered by the statute, it is the
statute that rules. On this point I think the
observation of the learned Master of the Rolls
unanswerable. He says: "What use could there be in
imposing limitations, if the Crown could at its
pleasure disregard them and fall back on prerogative ?
".

Thirdly, if there is no enforceable right either
arising under the Constitution or otherwise, it is useless
to appeal to any general power of the Court to issue a writ
of Habeas Corpus. The jurisdiction to issue an order of
release, on a Habeas Corpus petition, is only exercisable
after due enquiry into the cause of detention. If the effect
of the suspension of the right to move the Court for a writ
of Habeas Corpus is that no enquiry can take place, beyond
finding out that the cause is one covered by the
prohibition, mere possession of some general power will not
assist the detenu.

If the right to enforce personal freedom through a writ
of habeas corps suspended, it cannot be said that the
enforcement can be restored by resorting to "any other
purpose". That other purpose could not embrace defeating the
effect of suspension of the enforcement of a Constitutional
guarantee. To hold that would be to make a mockery of the
Constitution.

Therefore, I am unable to hold that anything of the
natural of a writ of habeas corpus or any power of a High
Court under Article 226 could come to the aid of a detenu
when the right to enforce a claim to personal freedom,
sought to be protected by the Constitution, is suspended.

(C)The objects of the Maintenance of Internal Security
Act (the Act) and the amendments of it.

As this Court has recently held, in Haradhan Saha & Anr
v. The State of West Bengal & ors.(2) preventive detention
is to be differentiated from punitive detention.
Nevertheless, it is evident, whether detention is preventive
or punitive, it necessarily results in the imposition of
constraints. which, from the point of view justice to the
detenu should not be inflicted or continue without fair and
adequate and careful scrutiny into its necessity. This Court
pointed out that, Article 22 of the Constitution was
designed to guarantee these requirements of fairness and
justice which are satisfied by the provisions of the Act. It
said in said Haradhan Saha & Anr. (supra) (at p. 784).

(1) [1920] A. C. 508 @ 526.

(2) [1975] 1 S.C. R. 778
332
"Constitution has conferred rights under Article
19 and also adopted preventive detention to prevent the
greater evil of elements imperilling the security, the
safety of a State and the welfare of the Nation. It is
not possible to think that a person who is detained
will yet be free to move or assemble or form
association or union or have the right to reside in any
part of India or have the freedom of speech or
expression
Provision for preventive detention, in itself, is a
departure from ordinary norms. It is generally resorted to
either in times of war or of apprehended internal disorders
and disturbances of a serious nature. Its object is to
prevent a greater danger to national security and integrity
than any claim which could be based upon a right, moral or
legal, to individual liberty. It has been aptly described as
a "jurisdiction of suspicion." See: Khudiram Das v. State of
West Bengal., (1) State of Madras v. V. G. Row; (2) R. v.
Halliday (3). It enables executive authorities to proceed on
bare suspicion which has to give rise to a "satisfaction",
as the condition precedent to passing a valid detention
order, laid down as follows in Section 3 of the Act:

"3 (1) (a) if satisfied with respect to any person
(including a foreigner) that with a view to preventing
him from acting in any manner prejudicial to-
(1) the defence of India, the relations of India
with foreign powers, or the security of India, or

(ii) the security of the State or the maintenance
of public order, or

(iii) the maintenance of supplies and services
essential to the community, or

(b) if satisfied with respect to any foreigner
that with a view to regulating his continued presence
in India or With a view to making arrangements for his
expulsion from India, It is necessary so to do, make an
order directing that such person is detained"

The satisfactions as held consistently by a whole line
of authorities of this Court, is a "subjective" one. In
other words, it is not possible to prescribe objective
standards for reaching that satisfaction. Although the
position in law, as declared repeatedly by this Court, has
been very clear and categorical that the satisfaction has to
be the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authorities,
yet, the requirements for sup ply of grounds to the detenus
as provided in Section 8 of the Act, in actual practice,
opened up a means of applying a kind of objective test by
Courts upon close scrutiny of these grounds. The result has
been, according to the Attorney General, that the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authorities has `tended to be
substituted by the
(1) [1975] 2 S. C. R. p. 832 @ p. 842.

(2) A. I. R. 1952 S. C. 197 @ 200.

(3) [1917] A. C. 260 @ 275.

333

subjective satisfaction of Court on the objective data
provided by the grounds, as to the need to detain for
purposes of the Act. The`question thus arose: Did this
practice not frustrate the purposes of the Act ?

The position of the detenu has generally evoked the
sympathy of lawyers and law Courts. They cherish a tradition
as zealous protectors of personal liberty. They are engaged
in pointing out, day in and day out, the essentials of fair
trial. They are used to acting strictly on the rules of
evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act. The
possibility of indefinite incarceration, without anything
like a trial, not unnaturally, seems abhorrent to those with
such traditions and habits of thought and action.

There is an aspect which perhaps tends to be overlooked
in considering matters which are generally placed for
weighment on the golden scales of the sensitive judicial
balance. It is that we are living in a world of such strain
and stress, satirised in a recent fictional depiction of the
coming future, if not of a present already enveloping us. in
Mr. Alva Toffler's "Future Shock", with such fast changing
conditions of life dominated by technological revolutions as
well as recurring economic, social, and political crises,
with resulting obliterations of traditional values, that
masses of people suffer from psychological disturbances due
to inability to adjust themselves to these changes and
crises. An example of such maladjustment is provided by what
happened to a very great and gifted nation within having
memory. The great destruction, the inhuman butchery, and the
acute suffering and misery which many very civilised parts
of the world had to pass through, because some
psychologically disturbed people led by Adolf Hitler, were
not prevented in time from misleading and misguiding the
German nation, is still fresh in our minds. Indeed the whole
world suffered, and felt the effects of the unchecked
aberrant Nazi movement in Germany and the havoc it unleashed
when it acquired a hold over the minds and feelings of the
German people with all the vast powers of modern science at
their disposal. With such recent examples before them, it
was not surprising that our constitution makers, quite far
sightedly, provided not only for preventive detention in our
Constitution but also introduced Emergency provisions of a
drastic nature in it. These seem to be inescapable
concomitants of conditions necessary to ensure for the mass
of the people of a backward country, a life of that
decipline without which the country's security, integrity,
independence, and pace of progress towards the objectives
set before us by the Constitution will not be safe.

I do not know whether it was a too liberal application
of the principle that courts must lean in favour of the
liberty of the citizen, which is, strictly speaking, only a
principle of interpretation for cases of doubt or
difficulty, or, the carelessness with which detentions were
ordered by Subordinate officers in the Districts, or the
inefficiency in drafting of the grounds of detention, which
were not infrequently found to be vague and defective, the
result of the practice developed by Courts was that detenus
did, in quite a number of cases, obtain
334
from High Courts, and, perhaps even from this Court, orders
of release on Habeas Corpus petitions on grounds on which
validity of criminal trials would certainly not be affected.

In Prabhu Dayal Deorah etc etc. v. District Magistrate
Kamrup :& Ors. (1) . I ventured, with great respect, in my
miniority opinion, to suggest that the objects of the Act
may be frustrated if Courts interfere even before the
machinery of redress under the Act through Advisory Boards,
where questions relating to vagueness or irrelevance or even
sufficiency of grounds could be more effectively thrashed
out than in Courts in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of
the Constitution, had been allowed to complete its full
course of operation. In some cases, facts were investigated
on exchange of affidavits only so as to arrive at a
conclusion that some of facts upon which detention orders
were passed did not exist at all. In other cases, it was
held that even if a single non-existent or vague ground
crept into The grounds for detention, the detention order
itself was vitiated as it indicated either the effects of
extraneous matter or carelessness or non-application of mind
in making the order. Courts could not separate what has been
improperly considered from what was properly taken into
account. Hence detentions were held to be vitiated by such
detects. In some cases, the fact that some matter ton remote
in time from the detention order was taken into
consideration, in ordering the detention, was held to be
enough to invalidate the detention. Thus, grounds supplied
always operated as an objective test for determining the
question whether a nexus could reasonably exist between the
grounds given and the detention order or whether some
infirmities had crept in. The reasonableness of the
detention became the justiciable issue really decided. With
great respect, I doubt whether this could be said to be the
object of preventive detention provisions authorised by the
Constitution and embodied in the Act. In any case, it was
the satisfaction of the Court by an application of a kind of
objective test more stringently than the principle of
criminal procedure, that a defective charge could be amended
and would not vitiate a trial without proof of incurable
prejudice to the accused, which became, for all practical
purposes, the test of the correctness of detention orders.

I have ventured to indicate the background which seems
to me to have probably necessitated certain amendments in
the Act in addition to the reasons which led to the
proclamation of Emergency, the effects of which are
considered a little later below. We are not concerned here
with the wisdom of the policy underlying the amendments. It
is, however. necessary to understand the mischief aimed at
so as to be able to correctly determine the meaning of the
changes made
The Central Act 39 of 1975 which actually came into
effect after Emergency added Section 16A to the Act, to sub-
sections of
(1) A. 1. R. 1974 S. C. 183.

335

which have been the subject matter of arguments before us.
They read as follows:

"(2) The case of every person (including a
foreigner) against whom an order of detention was made
under 'this Act on or after the 25th day of June, 1975.
but before the commencement of this section, shall,
unless such person is sooner released from detention,
be viewed within fifteen days from such commencement by
the appropriate Government for the purpose of
determining whether the detention of such person under
this Act is necessary for dealing effectively with the
emergency in respect of which the Proclamations
referred to in sub-section (1) have been issued (here
after in this section referred to as the emergency) and
if, on such review, the appropriate Government is
satisfied that it is necessary to detain such person
for effectively dealing with the emergency, that
Government may make a declaration to that effect and
communicate a copy of the declaration to the person
concerned.

(3) When making an order of detention under this
Act against any person (including a foreigner) after
the commencement of this section, the Central
Government or the State Government or, as the case may
be, the officer making the order of detention shall
consider whether the detention of such person under
this Act is necessary for dealing effective by with the
emergency and if, on such consideration, the Central
Government or the State Government or, as the case may
be, the officer is satisfied that it is necessary to
detain such person for effectively dealing with the
emergency, that Government or officer May make a
declaration to that effect and communicate a copy of
the declaration to the person concerned:
Provided that where such declaration is made by an
officer it shall be reviewed by the State Government to
which such officer is subordinate within fifteen days
from the date of making of the declaration and such
declaration shall cease to have effect unless it is
confirmed by the State Government, after such review,
within the said period of fifteen days".

Act No. 14 of 1976, which received the Presidential
assent on 25th January 1976, added Section 16A(9) which runs
as follows:

"16A(9) Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law or any rule having the force of law,-

(a) the Grounds on which an order of detention is
made or purported to be made under section 3 against
any person in respect of whom a declaration is made
under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) and any
information or materials on which such grounds or a
declaration under sub-section (2) or declaration or
confirmation under sub-section (3) or the non-

336

revocation under sub-section (4) of a declaration are
based, shall be treated as confidential and shall be
deemed to refer to matters of State and to be against
the public interest to disclose and save as otherwise
provided in this Act, on one shall communicate or
disclose any such ground, information or material or
any document containing such ground, information or
material;

(b) No person against whom an order of detention
is made or purported to be made under section 3 shall
be entitled to the communication or disclosure of any
such ground, information or material as is referred to
in clause (a) or the production to him of any document
containing such ground, information or material".

This Section and Section 18 of the Act are the only
provisions whose validity is challenged before us.

It appears to me that the object of the above mentioned
amendments was to affect the manner in which jurisdiction of
Courts in considering claims for reliefs by detenus on
petitions for writs of Habeas Corpus was being exercised so
that the only available means that had been developed for
such cases by the Courts, that is to say, the scrutiny of
grounds supplied under section 8 of the Act" may be re moved
from the judicial armoury for the duration of the Emergency.
It may be mentioned here that Art. 22(5) and 22(6) of the
Constitution provided as follows:

"22(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of
the order made under any law providing for preventive
detention, the authority making the order shall, as
soon as may he, communicate to such person the grounds
on which the order has been made and shall afford him
the earliest opportunity of making a representation
against the order.

22(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the
authority making any such order as is referred to in
that clause to disclose facts which such authority
considers to be against the public interest to
disclose".

The first contention, that Section 16A(9) affects the
jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226, which an
order under Article 359(1) could not do, appears to me to,
be untenable. I am unable to see how a Presidential order
which prevents a claim for the enforcement of a fundamental
right from being advanced in a Court during the existence of
an Emergency, could possibly be said not to be intended to
affect the exercise of jurisdiction of Courts at all.

The second argument, that Section 16A(9) amounts to a
general legislative declaration in place of judicial
decisions which Courts had themselves to give after
considering" on the facts of each case, whether Article
22(6) could be applied, also does not seem to me to be.
acceptable. The result of Section 16A(9), if valid, would be
to leave the presumption of correctness of an order under
Section 3 of the Act, good on the face of it, untouched by
any investigation relating
337
to its correctness. Now, if this be the object and effect of
the amendment, it could not be said to go beyond making it
impossible for detenus to rebut a presumptions of legality
and validity which an order under Section 3 of the Act, if
prima facie good, would raise in any event. The same result
could have been achieved by enacting that a detention order
under section 3, prima facie good, will operate as
"conclusive proof" that the requirements of Section 3 have
been fulfilled. But, as the giving of grounds is not
entirely dispensed with under the Act even as it now exists
this may have left the question in doubt whether Courts
could call upon the detaining authorities to produce the
grounds. Enactment of a rule of conclusive proof is a well
established form of enactments determining substantive
rights in the form of procedural provisions.

In any case, so far as the rights of a detenu to obtain
relief are hampered, the question raised touches the
enforcement of the fundamental right to personal freedom.
Its effect upon the powers of the Court under Article 226
is, as I have already indicated, covered by the language of
Article 359(1) of the Constitution. It is not necessary for
me to consider the validity of such a provision if it was to
be applied at a time not covered by the Emergency, or
whether it should be read down for the purposes of a suit
for damages where the issue is whether the detention was
ordered by a particular officer out of "malice in fact" and
for reasons completely outside the purview of the Act
itself. That sort of inquiry is not open, during the
Emergency, in proceedings under Article 226.

On the view I take, for reasons which will be still
clearer after a consideration of the remaining questions
discussed below., I think that even the issue that the
detention order is vitiated by "malice in fact" will not be
justiciable in Habeas Corpus proceedings during the
Emergency although it may be in an ordinary suit which is
not filed for enforcing a fundamental right but for other
reliefs. The question of bona fides seems to be left open
for decision by such suits on the language of Section 16 of
the Act itself which says:

"16. No suit or other legal proceedings shall lie
against the Central Government or a State Government,
and no suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings
shall lie against any person, for anything in good
faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this
Act.

Section 16 of the Act seems to leave open a remedy by
way of suit for damages for wrongful imprisonment in a
possible case of what may be called "malice in fact". In the
cases before us, we are only concerned with Habeas Corpus
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution where in
my opinion, malice in fact could not be investigated as it
is bound to be an allegation subsidiary to a claim for the
enforcement of a right to personal liberty, a fundamental
right which cannot be enforced during the Emergency.

24-833 Sup CI/76
338
"The order of the President dated November 3,
1962, already set out, in terms, suspends the right of
any person to move any Court for the enforcement of the
rights conferred by Arts. 21 and 22 of the
Constitution, during the period of Emergency Prima
facie, therefore, the petitioner's right to move this
Court for a writ of Habeas Corpus, as he has purported
to do by this petition, will remain suspended during
the period of the Emergency. But even then it has been
contended on behalf of the petitioner that Art. 359
does not authorise the suspension of the exercise of
the right guaranteed under Art. 32 of the Constitution,
and that, in terms, the operation of Art. 32 has not
been suspended by the President. This contention is
wholly unfounded. Unquestionably, the Court's power to
issue a writ in the nature of habeas corpus has not
been touched by the President's order, but the
petitioner's right to move this Court for a writ of
that kind has been suspended by the order of the
President passed under Art. 359(1). 'the President's
order does not suspend all the rights vested in a
citizen to move this Court but only his right to
enforce the provisions of Arts. 21 and 22. Thus, as a
result of the President's order aforesaid, the
petitioner's right to move this Court, but Mot this
Court's power under Art. 32" has been suspended during
the operation of the Emergency, with the result that
the petitioner has no locus standi to enforce his
right, if any, during the Emergency".

It is true that the Presidential order of 1975, like
the residential order of 1962, does not suspend the general
power of this Court under Article 32 or the general powers
of High Courts under Article 226, but the effect of taking
away enforceability of the right of a detenu to personal
freedom against executive authorities is to affect the locus
standi in cases which are meant to be covered by the
Presidential order. Courts, even in Habeas Corpus
proceedings, do not grant relief independently if rights of
the person deprived of liberty. If the locus standi of a
deteneu is suspended no one can claim,, on his behalf, to
get his right enforced. The result is to affect the powers
of Courts, even if this be an indirect result confined to a
class of cases, but, as the general power to issue writs of
habeas Corpus is not suspended, this feature was, quite
rightly, I respectfully think, pointed out by this Court in
Mohan Chowdhury's case (supra). It would not e correct to go
further and read more into the passage cited above than
seems intended to have been laid down there. The passage
seems to me to indicate quite explicitly, as the language of
article 359(1) itself; shows that the detenu's right to move
the Courts for the enforcement of his right to personal
freedom, by proving an illegal deprivation of it by
executive authorities of the State, is certainly not there
for the duration of the Emergency. And, to the extent that
Courts do not, and, indeed. cannot reasonably, act without
giving the detenu some kind of a right or locus standi,
their power to proceed with a Habeas petition against
executive authorities of the State is itself impaired. It
may be that in form and even in subs-

(1) [1964] 3 S. C. R. 442 @ 450.

339

tance, a general power to issue writs of Habeas Corpus
remains with Courts. But, that court only be invoked in
cases falling entirely outside the purview of the
Presidential order and Article 359(1). That is how I, with
great respect, understand the effect of Sree Mohan
Chowdhury's case (supra).

It is possible that, if a case so patently gross and
clear of a detention falling, on the face of the order of
detention or the return made to a notice from the Court
outside the provisions of the Act on the ground of personal
malice of the detailing authority, or, some other ground
utterly outside the Act, arises so that no further
investigation is called for., it may be possible to contend
that it is not protected by the Presidential order of 27th
June, 1975, and by the provisions of Article 359(1) of the
Constitution at all. If that, could be patent, without any
real investigation or inquiry at all, it may stand on the
same footing as an illegal detention by a private
individual. The mere presence of an official seal or
signature on a detention order, in such a purely
hypothetical case, may not be enough to convert it into a
detention by the State or its agents or officers. That is
the almost utterly inconceivable situation or type of case
which could still be covered by the general power to issue
writs of Habeas Corpus. There may, for example, be a case of
a fabricated order of detention which, the alleged detaining
officer, on receipt of notice, disclaims. It is admitted
that Part Ill of the Constitution is only meant to protect
citizens against illegal actions of organs of the State and
not against wrongs done by individuals. The remedy by way of
a writ of Habeas Corpus is more general. It lies even
against illegal detentions by private persons although not
under Article 32 which is confined to enforcement of
fundamental rights (Vide: Shrimati Vidya Verma through next
friend R. V. S. Mani, v. Dr. Shiv Narain (1). The Attorney
General also concedes that judicial proceedings for trial of
accused persons would fall outside the interdict of the
Presidential order under Article 359 ( 1 ) . 'therefore it
is unnecessary to consider hypothetical cases of illegal
convictions where remedies under the ordinary law are not
suspended.

Now, is it at all reasonably conceivable that a
detention order would, on the face of it, state that it is
not for one of the purposes for which it can be made under
the Act or that it is made due to personal malice or animus
of the officer making it ? Can we, for a moment, believe
that a return made on behalf of the State, instead of
adopting a detention order, made by an officer duly
authorised to act, even if there be a technical flaw in it,
admit that it falls outside the Act or was made mala fide
and yet the State is keeping the petitioner in detention ?
Can one reasonably conceive of a case in which, on a Habeas
Corpus petition, a bare look at the detention order or on
the return made, the Court could hold that the detention by
a duly authorised officer under a duly authenticated order,
stands on the same footing as a detention by a private
person? I would not like to consider purely hypothetical,
possibly even fantastically imaginary, cases lest we are
asked to act, as we have practically been asked to, on the
assumption that reality is stranger than fiction., and that
be-

(1) 119551 2 S. C. R. p. 983.

340

cause, according to the practice of determining validity of
detention orders by the contents of grounds served, a number
of detentions were found, in the past, to be vitiated, we
should not present that executive officers will act
according to law.

Courts must presume that executive authorities are
acting in conformity with both the spirit and the substance
of the law: "omina praesumutur rite esse acts", which means
that all official acts are presumed to have been rightly and
regularly done. If the burden to displace that presumption
is upon the detenu, he cannot, on a Habeas Corpus petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution., ask the Court to
embark upon an inquiry, during the Emergency, to allow him
to rebut this presumption. To do so would, in my opinion, be
plainly to countenance a violation of the Constitution.

A great deal of reliance was placed on, behalf of the
detenus, on the principle stated by the Privy Council in
Eshuqbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the Government of
Nigeria & Anr. (1) where Lord Aktin said (at p. 670):

"Their Lordships are satisfied that the opinion
which has prevailed that the Courts cannot investigate
the whole of the necessary conditions is erroneous. The
Governor acting under the ordinance acts solely under
executive powers, and in no sense as a Court. As the
executive he can only act in pursuance of the powers
given to him by law. In accordance with British
jurisprudence no member of the executive can interfere
with the liberty or property of a British subject
except on the condition that he can support the
legality of his action before a court of justice. And
it is the tradition of British justice that judges
should not shrink from deciding, such issues in the
face of the executive. The analogy of the powers of the
English Home Secretary to deport alience was invoked in
this case. The analogy seems very close. Their
Lordships entertain no doubt that under the legislation
in question, in the Home Secretary deported a British
subject in the belief that he was an alien,, the
subject would have the right to question the validity
of any detention under such order by proceedings in
habeas corpus, and that it would be the duty of the
Courts to investigate the issue of alien or not"."

The salutary general principle, enunciated above, is
available, no doubt, to citizens of this country as well in
normal times. But it was certainly not meant to so operate
as to make the executive answerable for all its actions to
the Judicature despite the special provisions for preventive
detention in an Act intended to safeguard the security of
the nation, and, muchless, during an Emergency" when the
right to move Courts for enforcing fundamental rights is
itself suspended. Principles applicable when provisions,
such as those which the Act contains, and a suspension of
the right to move Courts for fundamental rights, during an
Emergency, are operative, were thus
(1) [1931] A. C. 662 @ 670.

"There can plainly be no presumption applicable to
a regulation made under this extraordinary power that
the liberty of the person in question will not be
interfered with, and equally no presumption that the
detention must not be made to depend (as the terms of
the Act indeed suggest) on the unchallengeable opinion
of the Secretary Of State".

Following the ratio decidendi of Rex v. Secretary of State
for Home Affairs, Ex party Lees,(2) the learned Law Lord
said (at p. 217).

"As I understand the judgment in the Lees case it
negatived the idea that the court had any power to
inquire into the grounds for the belief of the
Secretary of State His good faith not being impugned)
or to consider whether there were grounds on which he
could reasonably arrive at his belief".

In Liversidge's case (supra), the Court's power to inquire
into the correctness of the belief of the Secretary of State
was itself held to be barred merely by the terms of a
Regulation made under a statute without even a
constitutional suspension of the right to move Courts such
as the one we have before us.

"The other matter for comment is the decision in
Eshuqbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the Government
of Nigeria (1931) (A.C. 662), where the government
claimed to exercise certain powers, including
deportation, against the appellant. The appellant
applied for a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that
the ordinance relied on gave by express terms the
powers contained only against one who was a native
chief, and who had been deposed, and where there was a
native custom requiring him to leave the area, whereas
actually not one of these facts was present in the
case. It was held in effect that me powers given by the
ordinance were limited to a case in which these facts
existed. It was a question of the extent of the
authority given by the ordinance. That depended on
specific facts capable of proof or disproof in a court
of law, and unless these facts existed, there was no
room for executive discretion. This authority has, in
my opinion, no bearing in the present case, as I
construe the powers and duties given by the regulation.
There are also obvious differences between the ordinary
administrative ordinance there in question and an
emergency power created to meet the necessities of the
war and limited in its operation to the period of the
war. The powers cease with the emergency. But that
period still continues and, it being assumed that the
onus is on the respondents in this action of
unlawful imprisonment, the onus
(1) [1942] A. C. p. 206 & 217 & 219 & 273.

(2) [1941] 1 K. B. 72.

342

is sufficiently discharged, in my opinion, by the fact
of the order having been made by a competent authority
within the ambit of the powers entrusted to him and
being regular on its face".

Viscount Maugham, in Greene v. Secretary of State for
Home Affairs,(1) after referring to a very comprehensive
opinion of Wilmot C. J. On the nature of Habeas Corpus
proceedings in Common Law, pointed out that a return, good
on its face and with no affidavit in support of it, could
not be disputed on the application for a writ. At Common
Law, the "sacred" character of the return, as Wilmot C. J.
called it, even without a supporting affidavit, could not be
touched except by the consent of the parties", because the
whole object of the writ was to enquire into the existence
of a legally recognised cause of detention, in a summary
fashion, and not into the truth of facts constituting the
cause. By the Habeas Corpus Act of 1816, the powers of
Courts were extended so that it became possible to go behind
the return in suitable cases other than those where a person
was confined for certain excepted matters including criminal
charges. In these excepted matters the return was and is
still collective that English Courts do not go behind
them. In Greene's case, (supra), the rule of presumptive
correctness of the return was applied to the return made on
behalf of the Secretary of State to the extent of treating
it as practically conclusive. It was held that the mere
production of the Home Secretaries order, the authenticity
and good faith of which were not impugned, constituted a
complete answer to an application for a writ of Habeas
Corpus and that it was not necessary for the Home Secretary
to file an affidavit. It is interesting to note that, in
that case, which arose during the Emergency following the
war of 1939, the failure of the Advisory Committee to supply
the correct reasons for his detention to the petitioner were
not held to be sufficient to invalidate his incarceration.
On the other hand, in these country" a violation of the
obligation to supply grounds of detention has been
consistently held to be sufficient to invalidate a detention
before the changes in the Act and the Presidential order of
1975.

By Section 7 of the Act 39 of 1975 Section 18 was added
to the Act with effect from 25th June 1975. This provision
reads:

"18. No person (including a foreigner) detained
under this Act shall have any right to personal liberty
by virtue of natural law or common law, if any".

In view of what I have pointed out earlier, this provision
was not necessary. It appears to have been added by way of
abundant caution.

By Section 5 of the amendment Act 14 of 1976 another
amendment was made in Section 18, substituting , for the
words "under this Act" used in Section 18, the words "in
respect of whom an order is made or purported to have been
made under Section 3", respectively from 25th day of June,
1975.

These amendments are covered by Article 359 (1A) of the
Constitution., so that their validity is unassailable during
the Emer-

(1) [1942] A. & . 284 @ 293.

343

gency on the ground of violation of any right conferred by
Part III Of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the validity of
Section 18 of the Act, as it stands, was challenged on the
ground, as I understand it that is described as "the basic
structure.' of the Constitution was violated because, it was
submitted, the Rule of Law, which is a part of the "basic
structure" was infringed by the amended provisions. As` I
have indicated below., I am unable to subscribe to the view
that the theory of basic structure amounts to anything more
than a mode of interpreting the Constitution. It cannot
imply new tests outside the constitution or be used to
defeat Constitutional provisions. I am unable to see any
force in the attack on the validity of Section 18 of the Act
on this ground.

The result of the amendments of the Act, together with
the emergency provisions and the Presidential order of 27th
June, 1975, in my opinion, is clearly that the jurisdiction
of High Courts is itself affected and they cannot go beyond
looking at the prima facie validity of the return made. The
production of a duly authenticated order, purporting to have
been made by an officer competent to make it under Section 3
of the Act, is an absolute bar to proceeding further with
the hearing of a Habes Corpus petition.

From the inception of our Constitution, it was evident
that the framers of it meant to establish a secular
democratic system of Government with certain objectives
before it without which real democracy is a mirage. Hence,
they provided us not only with an inspiring Preamble to the
Constitution and basic Fundamental Rights to citizens, but
also with Directive Principles of State Policy so as to
indicate how not only a political, but, what is more
important, social and economic democracy, with maximum
practicable equality of status and opportunity, could be
attained. They foresaw that it may be necessary, for
preserving the system thus set up and for ensuring a rapid
enough march towards the objectives placed before the people
of India, to give the executive branch of Government wide
powers, in exceptional situations, so that it may deal with
all kinds of emergencies effectively, and., thereby,
safeguard the foundations of good Government which lie in
discipline and orderliness combined with speedy and
substantial justice. The late Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru once said: "You may define democracy in a hundred
ways, but surely one of its definitions is self-discipline
of the community. The more the self-discipline, the less the
imposed discipline".

Laws and law Courts are only part of a system of that
imposed discipline which has to take its course when self-
discipline fails. Conditions may supervene, in the life of
a nation, in which the basic values we have stood for and
struggled to attain, the security, integrity, and
independence of the country, or the very conditions on which
existence of law and order and of law courts depend, may be
imperilled By forces operating from within or from outside
the country. What these forces are how they are operating,
what information exists for the involvement of various
individuals, wherever placed, could not
344
possibly be disclosed publicly or become matters suitable
for inquiry into or discussion in a Court of Law.

In Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson (supra) the
following passages from Rex v. Halliday,(2) were cited by
Lord Romer to justify principles adopted by four out five
of their Lordships in Liversidges case in their judgments:
(1) Per Lord Atkins (at p. 271):

"However precious the personal liberty of the
subject may be, there is something for which it may
well be, to some extent sacrificed by legal enactment,
namely, national success in the war, of escape from
national plunder or enslavement .

(2) Per Lord Finlay, L.C. (at p. 269).

"It seems obvious that no tribunal for
investigating the question whether circumstances of
suspicion exist warranting some restraint can be
imagined less appropriate then a Court of law"

"I respectfully agree. I cannot believe that the
legis legislature or the framers of the regulation ever
intended to constitute the courts of this country the
ultimate judges of the matters in question".

If, as indicated above, the opinion of the overwhelming
majority of the Law Lords of England" in Liversidge's
cause (supra), following the principles laid down earlier
also in Rex. v. Halide Ex Parte Zadig's (supra) was that the
jurisdiction of Courts is itself ousted by a statutory rule
vesting the power of detention on a subjective
satisfaction, based possibly on nothing more than a detenu's
descent from or relationship or friendship with nationals of
a country with which England may be at war, and that the
Secretary of State's order indicating that he was satisfied
about one of these matters, on hearsay information which
could not be divulged in courts, in the interests of
national safety and security, was enough, I do not think
that either our Constitution contemplating an ouster of
jurisdiction of Courts in such cases, or our Parliament, in
enacting provisions which have that effect, was going beyond
the limits of recognised democratic principles as they
operate during emergencies. In fact. decisions on what
restraints should be put and on which persons" during a
national emergency, in the interests of national security,
are matters of policy as explained below, which are outside
the sphere of judicial determination.

Situations of a kind which could not even be thought of
in Eng land are not beyond the range of possibility in Asian
and African countries or even in Continental Europe or in
America judging from events of our own times. Indeed, we too
have had our fill of grim tragedies, including the
assassination of the father of the nation, which
(1) 1917 A. C. 260 (a) n. 271. 269.

345

could rock the whole nation and propel it towards the brink
of an unfathomable abyss and the irreparable disaster which
anarchy involves.

Let me glance at the Constitutional History of England
from where we took the writ of Habeas Corpus.

Sir Erskine May wrote (See: Constitutional History of
England, B Chapter XI):

"The writ of habeas corpus is unquestionably the
first security of civil liberty. It brings to light the
cause of every imprisonment, approves its lawfulness"
or liberates the prisoner. It exacts obedience from the
highest courts: Parliament itself submits to its
authority. No right is more justly valued. It protects
the subject from unfounded suspicions, from the
aggressions of power, and from abuses in the
administration of justice. Yet, this protective law,
which gives every man security and confidence, in times
of tranquillity, has been suspended, again and again,
in periods of public danger or apprehension. Rarely.,
however, has this been suffered without jealousy,
hesitation, and re monstrance; and whenever the perils
of the State have been held sufficient to warrant this
sacrifice of personal liberty, no Minister or
magistrate has been suffered to tamper with the law at
his discretion. Parliament alone, convinced of the
exigency of each occasion, has suspended, for a time,
the right of individuals, in the interests of the
State.

The first years after the Revolution were full of
danger. A dethroned king, aided by foreign enemies, and
a powerful body of English adherents, was threatening
the new settlement of the Crown with war and treason.
Hence, the liberties of Englishmen, so recently
assured, were several times made to yield to the
exigencies of the State. Again, on occasions of no less
peril-the rebellion of 1755 the Jacobite conspiracy of
1722, and the invasion of the realm li by the Pretender
in 1745-the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended.
Henceforth, for nearly half a century, the law remained
inviolate. During the American War, indeed, it had been
necessary to empower the king to secure persons
suspected of high treason, committed in North America,
or on the high seas, or of the crime of piracy: but it
was not until 1794 that the civil liberties of
Englishmen at home were again to be suspended. The
dangers and alarms of that dark period have already
been recounted. Ministers, believing the State to be
threatened by traitorous conspiracies once more sought
power to countermine treason by powers beyond the law.

Relying upon the report of a secret committee, Mr.
Pitt moved for a bill to empower his Majesty to secure
and detain persons suspected of conspiring against his
person and Government. He justified this measure on the
ground that
346
Whatever the temporary danger of placing such power in
the hands of the Government" it was far less than the danger
with which the Constitution and society were threatened. If
Ministers abused the power entrusted to them, they would be
responsible for its abuse. It was vigorously op posed by Mr.
Fox, Mr. Grey, Mr. Sheridan, and a small body of adherents.
They denied the disaffection imputed to the people
ridiculed the revelations of the committee and declared that
no such dangers threatened the State as would justify the
surrender of the chief safeguard of personal freedom. This
measure would give Ministers absolute power over every
individual in the kingdom. It would empower them to arrest,
on suspicion, any man whose opinions were abnoxious to then
the advocates of reform., even the members of the
Parliamentary opposition. Who would be safe, when
conspiracies were everywhere suspected, and constitutional
objects and language believed to be the mere cloak of
sedition'? Let every man charged with treason be brought to
justice; in the words of Sheridan, 'where there was guilt,
let the broad axe fall, but why surrender the
liberties of the innocent ?"

"The strongest opponents of the measure, while
denying its present necessity, admitted that when
danger is imminent, the liberty of the subject must be
sacrificed to the paramount interests of the State.
Ring leaders must be seized, outrages anticipated,
plots disconcerted, and the dark haunts of conspiracy
filled with distrust and terror. And terrible indeed
was the power now entrusted to the executive . Though
termed a suspension of the Habeas groups Act, it was.
in truth, a suspension of Magna Charta, and of the
cardinal principles of the common law. Every man had
hitherto been free from imprisonment until charged with
crime, by information upon oath, and entitled to a
speedy trial, and the judgment of his peers. But any
subject could now he arrested on suspicion of
treasonable practices, with out specific charge or
proof of guilt, his accusers were unknown ; and in
vain might he demand public accusation and trial. Spies
and treacherous accomplices" however circumstantial
in their narratives to Secretaries of State and law
officers, shrank from the witness-box; and their
victims rotted in gaol. Whatever the judgment, temper,
and good faith of the executive, such a power was
arbitrary, and could scarcely fail to be abused.
Whatever the danger by which it was justified, never
did the subject; so much need the protection of the
laws, as when Government and society were filled with
suspicions and alarm".

It was not until 1801 that the Act was considered "no
longer defensible on grounds of public danger and Lord
Thurlow announced that he could "not resist the impulse to
deem men innocent until tried and convicted". It was urged
in defence of a Bill indemnifying an those who may have
misused or exceeded their powers during the
347
period of suspension of the Habeas Corpus in England that,
unless it was passed, "those channels of Information would
be stopped on which Government relied for guarding the
public peace". Hence a curtain was drawn to shield all whose
acts could have been characterized as abuse or excess of
power.

It is unnecessary to cite from dicey or modern writers
of British Constitutional Law, such as M/s Wade and
Phillips, to show how, in times of emergency, the ordinary
functions of Courts, and, in particular, powers of issuing
writs of Habeas Corpus, have been curtailed. In such
periods, legislative measures known as "suspension of the
Habeas Corpus Act". Followed by Acts of Indemnity, after
periods of emergency are over, have been restored to
England. But, during the first world war of 1914 and the
last world war of 1939, it was not even necessary to suspend
the Habeas Corpus Act in England . The Courts themselves,
on an interpretation of the relevant regulations under the
Defence of Realm Act, abstained from judicial interference
by denying, themselves power to interfere .

In Halsbury`s Laws of England (4th Edn. Vol. 8, para
871, page 624), we find the following statement about the
Crown's Common Law prerogative power in an Emergency:

"The Crown has the same power as a private
individual of taking all measures which are absolutely
and immediately necessary for the purpose of dealing
with an invasion or other emergency".

"If it appears to Her Majesty that events of a
specified nature have occurred or are about to occur,
Her Majesty may by proclamation declare that a state or
emergency exists. These events are those of such a
nature as to be calculated, by interfering with the
supply and distribution of food, water fuel or light
, or with the means of locomotion, to deprive the
community or any substantial portion of the community,
or the essentials of life. No proclamation is to be in
force for more than one month., without prejudice to
the issue of another proclamation at or before the end
of that period.

xxx xxx xxx xxx
Where a proclamation of emergency has been made,
and, so long as it remains in force, the Crown has
power by order in Council to make regulations for
securing the essentials of life to the Community."

In America also, the suspension of the right to writes
of Habeas Corpus, during emergencies, so as to temporarily
remove the regular processes of law, is permissible by
legislation (See: Cooley`s Constitutional Law' 4th Edn.
Chapter 34. p. 360), but it is limited by (Article 1. Sec.
9, clause 2) the American Constitution to situations in
which there may be a rebellion or an invasion (See: Willis
on
348
"Constitutional Law of United States", 1936 edn. p. 441 and
p. 570. Even more drastic consequences flow from what is
known in France as declaration of a "State of Seige", and,
in other countries, as a "Suspension of Constitutional
Guarantees".

Under our Constitution, it will be seen, from an
analysis of emergency provisions, that there is no
distinction between the effects of a declaration of
Emergency, under Article 352(1), whether the threat to the
security of the State is from internal or external sources.
Unlike some other countries" powers of Presidential
declarations under Article 352(1) and 359(1) of our
Constitution are immune from challenge in Courts even when
the Emergency is over.

Another noticeable feature of our Constitution is that,
whereas the consequences given in Article 358, as a result
of a Proclamation under Article 352 (1), are automatic,
Presidential orders under Article 359(1) may have differing
consequences, from emergency to emergency, depending upon
the terms of the Presidential orders involved. And then,
Article 359 (1A), made operative retrospectively by the 38th
Constitutional amendment, of 1st August, 1975, makes it
clear that both the Legislative and Executive organs of the
State, are freed, for the duration of the Emergency, from
the limits imposed by Part III of the Constitution.

It is unnecessary to refer to the provisions of
Articles 356 and 357 except to illustrate the extremely wide
character of Emergency powers of the Union Govt. which can,
by recourse to these powers, make immune from judicial
review, suspend the federal features of our Constitution
which have, sometimes, been elevated to the basic level.
These provisions enable the Union Govt. to supersede both
the legislative and executive wings of Government in a State
in the event of a failure of Constitutional machinery in
that State, and to administer it through any person or body
of persons under Presidential directions with powers of the
State Legislature "exercisable by or under the authority of
Parliament". Article 360, applicable only to Proclamations
of financial emergencies, with their special consequences,
indicates the very comprehensive character of the Emergency
provisions contained in part XVIII of our Constitution. We
are really directly concerned only with Articles 352 and 353
and 358 and 359 as they now stand. They are reproduced
below:

"352. (1) If the President is satisfied that a
grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or
of any part of the territory thereof is threatened,
whether by war or external aggression or internal
disturbance, he may, by Proclamation, make a
declaration to that effect.

(2) A Proclamation issued under clause (1)- (a)
may be revoked by a subsequent Proclamation;

(b) shall be laid before each House of
Parliament;

(c) shall cease to operate at the expiration of
two months unless before the expiration of
that period it has been approved by
resolution of both Houses of Parliament.

349

Provided that if any such Proclamation is issued
at a time when the House of the People has been
dissolved or the dissolution of the House of the People
takes place during the period of two months referred to
in sub-clause (c), and if a resolution approving the
Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States,
but no resolution with respect to such Proclamation has
been passed by the House of the People before the
expiration of that period, the Proclamation shall cease
to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the
date on which the House of the People first sits after
its reconstitution unless before the expiration of the
said period of thirty days a resolution approving the
Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the
People.

(3) A Proclamation of Emergency declaring that the
security of India or of any part of the territory
thereof is threatened by war or by external aggression
or by internal disturbance may be made before the
actual occurrence of war or of any such aggression or
disturbance if the President is satisfied that there is
imminent danger thereof.

(4) The power conferred on the President by this
Article shall include the power to issue different
Proclamations on different grounds, being war or
external aggression or internal disturbance or imminent
danger of war or external aggression or internal
disturbance whether or not there is a Proclamation
already issued by the President under clause (1) and
such Proclamation is in operation.

(5)Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,-

(a) the satisfaction of the President mentioned
in clause (1) and clause 3) shall be final
and conclusive and shall not be questioned in
any court on any ground;

(b) subject to the provisions of clause (2),
neither the Supreme Court nor any other court
shall have jurisdiction to entertain any
question, on any ground, regarding the
validity of-

(i) a declaration made by Proclamation by
the President dent to the effect stated
in clause (1); or
(ii) the continued operation of such
Proclamation".

"353. While a Proclamation of Emergency is in
operation, then-

(a) notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,
the executive power of the Union shall extend to the
giving of directions to any State as to the manner in
which the executive power thereof is to be exercised;

(b) the power of Parliament to make laws with
respect to any matter shall include power to make laws
conferring
350
powers and imposing duties, or authorising the
conferring of powers and the imposition of duties, upon
the Union or officers and authorities of the Union as
respects that matter, notwithstanding that it is one
which is not enumerated in the Union List."
"358. While a Proclamation of Emergency is in
operation, nothing in article 19 shall restrict the
power of the State as defined in Part III to make any
law or to take any executive action which the State
would but for the provisions contained in that part be
competent to make or to take, but any law so made
shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have
effect as soon as the Proclamation ceases to operate,
except as respects things done or omitted to be done
before the law so ceases to have effect".
"359 (1) Where a Proclamation of Emergency is in
operation, the President may by order declare that the
right to move any court for the enforcement of such of
the rights conferred by Part III as may be mentioned in
the order and all proceedings pending in any court for
the enforcement of the rights so mentioned shall remain
suspended for the period during which the Proclamation
is ill force or for such shorter period as may be
specified in the order.

(1A) While an order made under clause (1)
mentioning any of the rights conferred by Part III is
in operation, nothing in that Part conferring those
rights shall restrict the power of the State as defined
in said Part to make any law or to take any executive
action which the State would but for the provisions
contained in that Part be competent to make or to take,
but any law so made shall, to the extent of the in
competency, cease to have effect as soon as the order
aforesaid ceases to operate, except as respects things
done or omitted to be done before the law so ceases to
have effect.

(2) An order made as aforesaid may extend to the
whole or any part of the territory of India.
(3) Every order made under clause (1) shall, as
soon as may be after it is made, be laid before each
House of Parliament".

Before dealing with relevant authorities on the meaning
and effects of Article 358 and 359 of the Constitution, I
will indicate the special features and context of the
Presidential order of 27th June, 1975, as compared with the
Presidential order of 3rd November, 1962, which was the
subject matter of earlier pronouncement of this Court on
which considerable reliance has been placed on behalf of the
detenus. In fact, the next two topics are so connected with
the Emergency provisions that there is bound to be a good
deal of overlapping between what I have, for the sake of
convenience only, tried to discuss under three heads.
Different heads or names are not infrequently used only to
indicate different aspects of what is really one connected
subject
351
matter. Perhaps the last and concluding topic is wide enough
to cover the scope of the whole discussion.

E. The effect of the Presidential orders and
particularly the order of 27th June, 1975, on the rights of
detenus.

The Presidential order of 3rd November 1962 was issued
after the proclamation of Emergency under Article 352(1) on
26th October, 1962. That proclamation said:

"...... a grave emergency exists whereby the
security of India is threatened by external
aggression".

On the other hand, the Presidential order of 27th June,
1975, with which we are concerned here was issued under a
proclamation which declares "that a grave emergency exists
whereby the security. Of India is threatened by internal
disturbances".

There was also a Presidential proclamation of 3rd
December, 1971, repeating the terms of the proclamation of
26th October, 1962, as under:

"In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1)
of article 352 of the Constitution, I, V. V. Giri,
President of India, by this Proclamation declare that a
grave emergency exists whereby the security of India is
threatened by external aggression .

The Presidential order of 3rd November, 1962, reads as
follows:

"In exercise of the powers conferred by
clause (1) of article 359 of the Constitution, the
President hereby declares that the right of any person
to move any court for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by article 21 and article 22 of the
Constitution shall remain suspended for the period
during which the Proclamation of Emergency issued under
clause (1) of Article 352 thereof on the 26th October,
1962 is in force, if such person has been deprived of
any such rights under the Defence of India ordinance,
1962 (4 of 1962) or any rule or order made thereunder".

The Presidential order of 27th June, 1975, runs as
follows:

"In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1)
of article 359 of the Constitution the President hereby
declares that the right of any person (including a
foreigner) to move any Court for the enforcement of the
rights conferred by article 14, article 21 and article
22 of the Constitution and ail proceedings pending in
any court for the enforcement of the above mentioned
rights shall remain suspended for the period during
which the Proclamations of Emergency made under clause
(1) of article 352 of the Constitution on the 3rd
December, 1971 and on the 25th June, 1975 are both in
force
352
(2) This order shall extend to the whole of the
territory of India except the State of Jammu and
Kashmir.

(3) This order shall be in addition to and not in
derogation of any order made before the date of this
order under clause (1) of article 359 of the
Constitution".

The striking differences in the terms of the two
Presidential orders set out above are:

(1) The Presidential order of 1962 did not specify
Article 14 of the Constitution, but Article 14, guaranteeing
equality before the law and equal protection of laws to all
persons in India, is mentioned in the 1975 order. To my
mind, this does make some difference between the intentions
behind and effects of the two Presidential orders.

(2) The Presidential order of 1962 expressly hedges the
suspension of the specified fundamental rights with the
condition, with regard to deprivations covered by articles
21 and 22 of the Constitution that, "if such person is
deprived of such right under the Defence of India, Act,
1962, or any rules or order made thereunder". In other words
on the terms of the 1962 Presidential order, the Courts were
under a duty to see whether a deprivation satisfies these
conditions or not. They could adjudicate upon the question
whether a detention was under the Act or a rule made
thereunder. On the other hand, the Presidential order of
1975 unconditionally suspends the enforcement of the rights
conferred upon "any person including a foreigner" to move
any Court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by
Articles 14, 21, and 22 of the Constitution. The Courts are,
therefore, no longer obliged or able to test the validity of
a detention by examining whether they conform to statutory
requirements. They will have to be content with compliance
shown with forms of the law.

(3) Presidential order of 1962 makes no mention of
pending proceedings, but the 1975 order suspends all pending
proceedings for the enforcement of the rights mentioned
therein. This further clarifies and emphasizes that the
intention behind the Presidential order of 1975 was to
actually affect the jurisdiction of Courts in which
proceedings were actually pending. The inference from this
feature also is that all similar proceedings in future will,
similarly, be affected.

The result is that I think that there can be no doubt
whatsoever that the Presidential order of 27th June, 1975,
was a part of an unmistakably expressed intention to suspend
the ordinary processes. Of law in those cases where persons
complain of infringement of their fundamental rights by the
executive authorities of the State. The intention of the
Parliament itself to bring about this result, so that the
jurisdiction of Courts under Article 226, in this particular
type of cases is itself affected for the duration of the
emergency, seems clear enough from the provisions of Section
16A(9) of the Act, introduced by Act No. 14 of 1976, which
received Presidential assent on 25th January 1976, making
Section 16A(9) operative retrospectively from 25th June,
1975.

353

The question before us is: What is the intention behind
the Presidential order of 27th June, 1975. After assigning a
correct meaning to it, we have to determine whether what was
meant to be done lay within the scope of powers vested by
Article 359 of the Constitution in the President. There is
no doubt in my mind that the object of the Presidential
order of 27th June, 1975, by suspending the enforcement of
the specified rights, was to affect the powers of Courts to
afford relief to those the enforcement of whose rights was
suspended. I have already indicated, this was within the
purview of Article 359(1) is the Constitution. Hence, the
objection that the powers of the Court under Article 226 may
indirectly be affected is no answer to the direct suspension
of rights which was bound to have its effect upon the manner
in which jurisdiction is or could reasonably be exercised
even if that jurisdiction cannot be itself suspended for all
types of cases. It is enough if the ambit of the power to
suspend under Article 359(1) is such as to make exercise of
the jurisdiction to protect guaranteed fundamental rights
not reasonably possible.

Section 16A(9) also appears to me, as held by My lord
the Chief Justice, to make it impossible for Courts to
investigate questions relating to the existence or absence
of bona fides at least in proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution. It is clear that the validity of Section
16A(9) cannot be challenged on the ground of any violation
of Part III of the Constitution in view of the provisions of
Article 359 (1A) .

No previous decision of this Court deals with a
situation which results from the combined effect of a
Presidential order couched in the language of the order of
27th June 1975, and a statutory provision, such as Section
16A(9) of the Act, the validity of which cannot be
challenged. Hence, strictly speaking, earlier decisions are
not applicable. I will, however, consider them under the
next heading as considerable argument has taken place before
us on the assumption that these cases do apply to such a
situation.

(F)The Rule of Law as found in our Constitution, and
how it operates during the Emergency.

As I have indicated earlier in this judgment, the term
Rule of Law is not a magic wand which can be waved to dispel
every difficultly. It is not an Aladin's Lamp which can be
scratched to invoke a power which brings to any person in
need whatever he or she may desire to have. It can only
mean, for lawyers with their feet firmly planted in the
realm of reality, what the law in a particular State or
country is and what it enjoins. That law in England is the
law made by Parliament. That is why Sir Ivor Jennings said
(See: Law and the Constitution-III Edn.) that "in England
supremacy of Parliament is the Constitution". And naturally,
the Constitution of a country and not something outside it
contains the Rule of Law of that country. This means that
the Rule of Law must differ in shades of meaning and
emphasis from time to time and country to country. It could
not be rigid unchanging, and immutable like the' proverbial
laws of the Medes and Persians. Nevertheless, one has to
understand clearly what it means
25-833 Sup C I/76
354
in a particular context. It cannot be like some brooding
omnipotence in the skies. Its meaning cannot be what anyone
wants to make it. It has to be, for each particular
situation, indicated by the Courts which are there to tell
the people what it means.

This Court has, in no unmistakable terms, indicated
what the Constitution means and how the Rule of Law embedded
in it works even during Emergencies.

"With all its defects delays and inconveniences
men have discovered no technique for long preserving
free government except that the Executive be under the
law, and that the law be made by Parliamentary
deliberations".

It was explained there:

In our constitutional system, the central and most
characteristic feature is the concept of the rule of
law which means, in the present context, the authority
of the law courts to test all administrative action by
the standard of legality. The administrative or
executive action that does not meet the standard will
be set aside if the aggrieved person brings the
appropriate action in the competent court. The rule of
law rejects the conception of the Dual State in which
governmental action is placed in a privileged position
of immunity from control of law. Such a notion is
foreign to our basic constitutional concept".

This statement, no doubt, includes the concept of
determination by Courts of the question whether an impugned
executive action is within the bounds of law. However, it
presupposes: firstly, the existence of a fixed or
identificable rule of law which the executive has to follow
as distinguished from a purely policy decision open to it
under the wide terms of the statute conferring a
discretionary power to act. and, secondly, the power of the
Courts to test that action by reference to the Rule. Even,
in Emergencies, provided the power of the Court to so test
the legality of some executive act is not curtailed, Courts
will apply the test of legality "if the person aggrieved
brines the action in the competent Court". But, if the locus
standi of the person to move the Court is gone and the
competence of the Court to enquire into the grievance is
also impaired by inability to peruse the grounds of
executive action or their relationship with the power to
act, it is no use appealing to this particular concept of
the Rule of law set out above. It is just inapplicable to
the situation which arises here. Such a situation is
governed by the Emergency provisions of the Constitution
These provisions contain the Rule of Law for such situations
in our country.

(1) 343 U.S. 579, 655.

(2) [1968] 3 S. C. R. 655 @ 661.

355

In Mohd. Yaqub etc. v. the State of Jammu & Kashmir(1),
a seven Judge bench of this Court pointed out that, whereas
Article 358, by its own force, suspends the guarantees of
Article 19, Article 359(1) has the effect of suspending the
operation of specified fundamental rights (strictly speaking
it is enforcement only which is suspended) so that these
concepts cannot be used to test the legality of executive
action. Now, much of what Dicey meant by the Rule of Law was
certainly sought to be embodied in Part III of our
Constitution. If, however, the application of Articles 14,
19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution is suspended, it is
impossible to say that there is a Rule of Law found there
which is available for the Courts to apply during the
emergency to test the legality of executive action.

Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab(2), a seven Judge
decision of this Court was sought to be made a foothold for
several arguments on behalf of the detenus. It, however,
seems to me to have laid down more propositions which
demolish various contentions advanced on behalf of the
detenus than those which could assist them. One main
question considered in that case was whether Section
491(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure could afford a
statutory remedy, by an order or direction in the nature of
a writ of Habeas Corpus, at a time when enforcement of the
fundamental right to personal liberty was suspended by the
Presidential order of 1962 already set out above. The
suggestion that a Common Law remedy by way of writ of Habeas
Corpus exists, even after Section 491 was introduced in the
Criminal Procedure Code in 1923, was negatived. The sweep of
Article 359(1) of the Constitution, taking in the
jurisdiction of "any Court", was held wide enough to cover
any kind of relief claimed by a petitioner for the
enforcement of a specified fundamental right. Inter alia, it
was held (at p. 821-822):

"If Art. 359(1) and the Presidential order issued
under it govern the proceedings taken under s.
491(1)(b) the fact that the court can act suo motu
will not make any difference to the legal position for
the simple reason that if a party is precluded from
claiming his release on the ground set out by him in
his petition, the Court cannot, purporting to act suo
motu, pass any order inconsistent with the provisions
of Art. 359(1) and the Presidential order issued under
it. Similarly, if the proceedings under s. 491(1)(b)
are hit by Art. 359(1) and the Presidential order, the
arguments based on the provisions of Art. 372 as well
as Arts. 225 and 375 have no validity. The obvious and
the necessary implication of the suspension of the
right of the citizen to move any court for enforcing
his specified fundamental rights is to suspend the
jurisdiction of the Court pro tanto in that behalf"

This is exactly the interpretation which I have adopted
above of Sree Mohan Chowdhury's case (supra).

(1) [1968] 2 S. C. R. p. 227 @ 234.

(2) [1964] 4 S. C. R. 797 @ 821-822
356
It was also held in Makhan Singh`s case (supra) that,
as no attack on the validity of the Defence of India Act of
1962 and the Rules framed thereunder, on the ground of
violation of fundamental rights, was open during the
emergency, no petition was maintainable on the ground of
such alleged invalidity. It was held (at p. 825-826) there:

"Therefore, our conclusion is that the proceedings
taken on behalf of the appellants before the respective
High Courts challenging their detention on the ground
that the impugned Act and the Rules are void because
they contravene Arts. 14, 21 and 22, are incompetent
for the reason that the fundamental rights which are
alleged to have been contravened are specified in the
Presidential order and all citizens are precluded from
moving any Court for the enforcement of the said
specified rights".

After having decided the questions actually calling for
determination in that case, Gajendragadkar, J., speaking for
the majority, ex pressed some views on the possible pleas
which may still be open to petitioners in hypothetical cases
despite the Presidential order of 1962, set out above,
passed under Article 359(1). He said (at page 828):

"If in challenging the validity of his detention
order, the detenu is pleading any right outside the
rights specified in the order, his right to move any
court in that behalf is not suspended, because it is
outside Art. 359(1) and consequently outside the
Presidential Order itself. Let us take a case where a
detenu has been detained in violation of the mandatory
provisions of the Act. In such a case, it may be open
to the detenu to contend that his detention is illegal
for the reason that the mandatory provisions of the Act
have been contravened. Such a plea is outside Art.
359(1) and the right of the detenu to move for his
release on such a ground cannot be affected by the
Presidential order."

Again, it was observed (at page 828-829):
"Take also a case where the detenu moves the Court
for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his
detention has been ordered malafide. It is hardly
necessary to emphasis that the exercise of a power
malafide is wholly outside the scope of the Act
conferring the power and can always be successfully
challenged. It is true that a mere allegation that the
detention or malafide would not be enough, the detenu
will have to prove the malafides. But in the mala fides
are alleged, the detenu cannot be precluded from
substantiating his plea on the ground of the bar
cleated by Art. 359(1) and the Presidential order. That
is another kind of plea which is outside the purview of
Art. 359(1)"

The two passages set out above, stating what may be the
position in purely hypothetical cases, are the mainstrays of
some of the argu
357
ments for the petitioners But, none of the Counsel for the
petitioners has stated how these observations are applicable
to facts of the case to the particular petitioner for whom
he appears. Assuming, however, that the hypothetical cases
indicate good grounds on which a Habeas Corpus petition
could be allowed even in an Emergency, it was certainly not
decided in Makhan Singh`s case (supra) what the process
could be for ascertaining that one of these grounds exist.
if that process involves a consideration of evidence in
support of a plea, such as that of mala fides in proceedings
under Article 226" the most important, evidence would be
grounds of detention. These grounds constituted the lever
which could have been and was used in the past by Courts to
reach decisions on various pleas, such as the plea that the
order was not passed after due application of mind to the
facts of the detenu's case or that the' satisfaction reached
was not with regard to legally relevant grounds at all. No
such means are available now. This difficulty was certainly
not in the way at the time of the decision in Makhan Singh`s
case (supra).

I am therefore, of the opinion that pleas which involve
any adduction of' evidence would, at any rate, be entirely
excluded by the combined effect of the terms of the
Presidential order of 27th June, 1975, read with the amended
provisions of Section 16A(9) of the Act. A perusal of S.
Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab,(1) will show the kind of
evidence which often becomes necessary to justify a plea of
"malice in fact". Pleas about vires of the detention order
itself e.g. whether it is based on, irrelevant grounds or
was not passed after due application of mind) often require
investigation or questions of fact involving scrutiny of
actual grounds of detention which is hit by the embargo
against an assertion of a right to move for enforcement of
the right to personal`freedom and prohibition against
disclosure of grounds. So long as the executive authorities
of the State purport to act under the Act,, their
preliminary objection against further hearing will prevail
unless, of course, the officer purporting to detain had, in
fact, not been invested at all with any authority to act in
which case the detention would, in my opinion, be on the
same footing as one by a private person who has no legal
authority whatsoever to detain. But, such a defect has to be
apparent either on the face of the order or admitted in the
return. Moreover, it can be cured by an adoption of the
order by the State.

Detentions which not only do not but could not possibly
have ally apparent, ostensible" or purported executive
authority of the State whatsoever to back them, could be
equated with those by private persons. The suspension of
enforcement of specified fundamental rights operates only to
protect infringements of rights by the State and its
authorised agents, acting or purporting to act? in official
capacities which they could and do hold. A claim to an order
of release from such a patently illegal detention, which is
not by the State or on its behalf. could be enforced even
during the current Emergency. But there is no such case
before us. All the cases before us are, as far as I know. OF
detentions by duly empowered official under, prima facie,
good orders. The possibility, however, of so unlikely a
hypothetical case
(1)[1964] 4 S. C. R. 733.

358

where there is a lack of legal power to act, which could be
easily removed by the executive authorities of the State
concerned themselves, whenever they desire to do so, is only
mentioned to illustrate my view that the test of legality,
applied by Courts, is not entirely abrogated and abandoned
in the current emergency. But, it can be only one. which
should be applicable without going into facts lying behind
the return. The presumption of validity of a duly
authenticate order. of an officer authorized to pass it is
conclusive in Habeas Corpus proceedings during the current
emergency
State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Thakur Bharat
Singh,(1) was another decision of the Constitution Bench of
this Court relied upon strongly on behalf of detenus. In
that case, an order prohibiting petitioner from residing in
a specified area under section 3(1)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh
Public Security Act, 1959, which was found to be void,
because the provision infringed Article 19 of the
Constitution, was held to be challengeable during an
Emergency despite the provisions of Art. 358 of the
Constitution. The ground of the decision was that,
although, the empowering provision could not have been
challenged if it was contained in an enactment made during
the emergency, yet as the provision was made by an Act
passed at a time when Article 19 was operative the
invalidity of the provision could be demonstrated despite
the existence of the emergency. I do not think that there is
any such case before us. It seems to me to he possible to
distinguish the case on the ground that it was a case of
patent voidness of the order passed so that the principle of
legality, which is not suspended, could be affirmed even
apart from enforcement of a specified fundamental right. I
think it was placed on such a footing by Shah J., speaking
for this Court.

State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Pandurang Sangzgiri &
Anr.,(2) another decision of the Constitution Bench of this
Court, was also cited. There, an illegal order prohibiting
the sending out of jail by a detenu of a book on matters of
scientific interest only, for publication, was quashed by a
High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution" despite
the Presidential order under Article 359 of the
Constitution, on the ground that there was no condition at
all in the Bombay Conditions of Detention order, 1951,
authorising the Government of Maharashtra to prohibit the
publication of a book of purely scientific interest just
because the petitioner happened to be detained under the
Defence of India Rules, 1962. The High Court's view was
affirmed by this Court. This case has nothing to do with
preventive detention. It is a case in which this Court held
that an ultra vires order could be set aside. This could be
done under the residuary jurisdiction of the High Court,
which could operate for "any other purpose". The mere
existence of the emergency could not, it was held, suspend
this power. The test applied was of bare illegality outside
Article 19 of the constitution .

(1) 11967] 2 S. C. R. 454.

(2) [1966] Supp S. S. C. R 702.

359

In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & ors.,(1)
this Court did, in a petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution apply the test of a satisfaction required on
relevant grounds, by Rule 30, subrule 1, Defence of India
Rules, 1962, as a condition precedent to detention, because
the grounds of detention were mentioned in the detention
order itself so that they could be used to determine whether
the detention order fell within the purposes of the Act. The
writ petition was allowed. The alleged satisfaction of the
District Magistrate, who was the detaining authority, was
found, on the ground given for detention, to fall outside
Rule 30. It was held that the Presidential order under
Article 359 was not intended to condone violations of the
defence of India Act or the rules made thereunder and did
not authorise ultra vires or mala fide detentions. It was
pointed out here that satisfaction about the need to detain
in the interests of "law and order ' was not the same thing
as one in the interests of "public order". In this case, a
well-known distinction between `'public order" and "law and
order", was drawn by Hidayatullah, J., in the following
terns:

"It will thus appear that just as "public order"
in the rulings of the Court (earlier cited) was said to
comprehend disorders of less gravity than those
affecting "security of State", "law and order" also
comprehends disorders of less gravity than those
affecting "public order". One has to imagine three
concentric circles. Law and order represents the
largest circle within which is the next circle
representing public order and the smallest circle
represents security of State. It is then easy to see
that an act may affect law and order but not public
order just as an act may affect public order but not
security of the State. By using the expression
'maintenance of law and. Order" the District Magistrate
was widening his own field of action and was adding a
clause to the Defence of India Rulers.

I take the decision of this Court in Dr. Lohia`s case
to mean that if the order, on the face of it., is bad and
does not satisfy the requirements of the law authorising
detention, the detenu may be released. Sarkar, J., pointed
out there:

"The satisfaction of the Government which
justifies the order under the rule is a subjective
satisfaction. A court cannot enquire whether grounds
existed which would have created that satisfaction on
which alone the order could have been made in the mind
of a reasonable person. If that is so-and that indeed
is what the respondent State contends it seems to me
that when an order is on the face of it not in terms of
the rule a court cannot equally enter into an
investigation whether the order of detention was in
fact, that is to say, irrespective of what is stated in
it, in terms of the rule. In other words. in such a
case the State cannot be heard to say or prove that the
order was in fact made for example, to prevent acts
prejudicial to public. Order which would
(1) [1966] 1 S. C. R. 709.

360

bring it within the rule though the order does not say
so. To allow that to be done would be to uphold a
detention without a proper order".

The case was also decided on a consideration of
evidence on the ground that there was an area of enquiry
opened up by the grounds given for entry by the Court. I do
not know how any decision could have been given in Dr.
Lohia's case if grounds of detention were not found to be
bad on the very face of the order stating those grounds, or,
if there was no door left open for judicial scrutiny due to
a provision such a Section 16A(9) of the Act before us.
Thus, the law considered and applied in Dr. Lohia`s case was
different from the law we have to apply under a different
set of circumstances as explained above.

"The petitioners contend that the relevant Rule
under which the impugned orders of detention have been
passed is invalid on grounds other than those based on
Arts. 14, 19, 21 and 22" and if that plea is well-
founded, the last clause of the Presidential order is
not satisfied and the bar created by it suspending the
citizens' fundamental rights under Articles 14, 21 and
22 cannot be pressed into service".

Apparently, the view adopted in Nambiar's case (supra)
was that to question the validity of the provision under
which the detention order is made could not be equated with
an allegation of infringement of procedure established by
law. Moreover, this decision was also in a different context
with a different set of applicable provisions. None of the
cases before us involves the assertion that the power under
which the detention order purports to be made itself did not
exist in the eye of law.

In Durga Dass Shirali v. Union of India & ors. a
Habeas Corpus petition against a detention order under
Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, was again
dismissed. But, it was held that Article 358 and the
Presidential order under Article 359(1) did not debar the
petitioner from assailing his detention on the ground of
mala fides or on the ground that any of the grounds
mentioned in the order of detention is irrelevant. This case
is also distinguishable on the ground that the context" from
the point of view of the applicable law, was different.

In Jai Lal v. State of West Bengal, (8) this Court,
after taking evidence by affidavits into account and
considering the pleas of mala fides, rejected the
petitioner's case although the petitioner was held on the
strength of earlier decisions of this Court, entitled to
raised the
(1) [1966] 2 Sr C. R. 406.

(2) [1966] S. C. R. 573.

(3) [1966] Supply. S. C. R. p. 4, 64.

361

pleas of mala fides despite the Proclamation of emergency
and the Presidential order. Again, the context and the
applicable law there were different
We, however, see that, despite the Proclamation of
emergency and a Presidential order under Article 359(1),
this Court has held that High Courts, in exercise of their
supervisory jurisdiction, could entertain Habeas Corpus
petitions and enforce the principle of legality against the
detaining authorities. No doubt, the executive and the
legislative organs of the State were fully aware of the
nature and effect of the decisions of this Court. It is,
therefore., not surprising that, by means of a differently
phrased Presidential order of 17th Junc. 1975, and the
amendment in the Act, introducing rather drastic provisions
of Section 16A of the Act, the intention has been made clear
that preventive detention should be a matter controlled
exclusively by the executive departments of the State.

It was contended by Mr. Tarkunde that the Rule of Law
under our Constitution is embodied in the principle of
Separation of Powers. It is very difficult for me to see the
bearing of any such doctrine on a pure and simple question
of determination of the meaning of constitutional and
statutory provisions couched in words which leave few D'
doubts unresolved. However, as arguments based on this
doctrine were advanced, I will deal with the manner in
which, I think, laws relating to preventive detention fit in
with the extent to which our constitution recognises the
doctrine.

In Rai Sahib) Ram Jawaya Kapur & ors. v. The Stale of
Punjab,(1) Mukherjea, C.J., speaking for this Court, said: E
"The Indian Constitution has not indeed recognised
the doctrine of separation of powers in its absolute
rigidity but the functions of the different parts of
branches of the Government have been sufficiently
differentiated and consequently it can very well be
said that our Constitution does not contemplate
assumptions, by one organ or part of the State, of
functions that essentially belong to another. The
executive indeed can exercise the powers of
departmental or subordinate legislation when such
powers are delegated to it by the legislature".
He further added:

"Our Constitution, though federal in its structure,
is modelled on the British Parliamentary system where
the executive is deemed to have the primary
responsibility for the formulation of Governmental
policy and its transmission into law though the
condition precedent to the exercise of this
responsibility is its retaining the confidence of the
legislative branch of the State".

If an order of preventive detention is not quasi-
judicial, as it cannot be because of the impossibility or
applying any objective
(1) A. I. R 1955 S. C. 549.

362

standards to the need for it in a particular case, there
could be no question of violating any principle of
separation of powers by placing preventive detention
exclusively within the control of executive authorities of
the State for the duration of the Emergency. That seems lo
me to the effect of the emer ency provisions of the
Constitution and the amendments of the Act already dealt
with by me.

Commenting upon Liversidge's case (supra) in "The Law
Quarterly Review" (1942) (Vol. 58-p. 2)., the celebrated
jurist and authority on English Constitutional history and
law, Sir William Holdsworth, supporting majority decision
there, opined:

"The question turns not, as Lord Atkin says upon
whether the common law or the statute law has
postulated a 'reasonable ' cause for a decision or an
action, but upon the question whether or not the
decision or the action to be taken on a reasonable
cause raises a justifiable issue. Clearly the question
whether a person is of hostile origin or associations
so that it is necessary to exercise control over him,
raises, not a justifiable,, but a political or
administrative issue".

He added
"On principle this distinction seems to me be he
clearly right. If the issue is justifiable, if, that
is, it raises an issue within the legal competence of
the Court to try, the Court can decide on the facts
proved before it whether a cause or a suspicion is
reasonable, for it knows the law as to what amounts in
the circumstances to a cause or a suspicion which is
reasonable. If, on the other hand, the issue is not
justifiable, if, that is, it turns, not on a knowledge
of the law as to what amounts in the circumstances to a
reasonable cause or suspicion, but on political or
administrative considerations it can have no
knowledge of the weight to be attached to facts adduced
to prove the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the
cause or suspicion.. for it has neither the knowledge
nor the means of acquiring the know ledge necessary to
adjudicate upon the weight to be attach ed to any
evidence which might be given as to the existence of
circumstances of suspicion or as to the reasonableness
of belief Since, therefore, it is impossible to apply
an objective standard through the agency of the
Courts? the only possible standard to be applied the
subjective standard, so that the Secretary of State's
statement that he had a reason able cause for his
belief must be conclusive".

If the meaning of the emergency provisions in our
Constitution and the provisions of the Act is clearly that
what lies in the executive field, as indicated above.,
should not be subjected to judicial scrutiny or judged by
judicial standards of correctness, I am unable to see how
the Courts can arrogate unto themselves a power of judicial
superintendence which they do not, under the law during the
emergency , possess.

363

Dean Roscoe Pound, in the Green Foundation Lectures on
"Justice h According to Law" (Yale University Press, 1951)
begins his answer to the question as to what justice is by a
reference to the jesting Pilate, who would not stay for the
answer because he knew that philosophers disagreed so much,
in their answers, that there could be no completely
satisfactory answer. He divides justice itself into three
heads according to the three types of bodies or authorities
which could administer it, and discusses the advantages and
disadvantages of each: Legislative, Executive, Judicial. He
rejects "Legislative Justice", said to be most responsive to
popular will, as too "uncertain, unequal, and capricious'.
He said that its history, even in modern times, was filled
with "legislative lynchings"" and that this kind of justice
was ton susceptible to "the influence of personal
solicitation, lobbying, and even corruption", and subject to
guests of passion, prejudice, and partisanship. He thought
that executive or administrative justice, which becomes
inevitable in carrying out vast schemes of modern socialistic
control and planning of economic, social, and cultural life
of the people by the State was also, despite its own
mechanisms of control against misuse of power" fraught with
serious dangers indicated by him. Finally, Dean Pound finds
judicial justice, though not entirely immune from error-and,
sometimes, grievous and costly error-to be superior to the
other two types of justice despite its own inherent
shortcomings as compared with executive or administrative
justice for special types of cases.

Now , the question before us is not whether Courts
should apply the high standards of "judicial justice" to the
facts of each individual case which are not before us for
consideration at all. The question before us is purely one
of the interpretation of laws as we find them. If. on a
correct interpretation of the legal provisions, we find that
the jurisdiction of Courts was itself meant to be ousted,
for the duration af the emergency, to scrutinise the facts
or reasons behind detention orders purporting to have been
made under the Act. because the judicial process suffers
from inherent limitations in dealing with cases of this
type, we are bound, by the canons of "judicial justice"
itself to declare that this is what the laws mean.

It appears to me that it does not follow from a removal
of the normal judicial superintendence, even over questions
of vires, of detention orders, which may require going into
facts behind the returns, that there is no Rule of Law
during the emergency or that the principles of ultra vires
are not to be applied at all by any authority except when,
on the face af the return itself, it is demonstrate in a
Court of Law that the detention does not even purport to be
in exercise of the executive power or authority or is
patently outside the law authorising detention. It seems to
me that the intention behind emergency provisions and of the
Act is that although such executive action as is not
susceptible to judicial appraisement, should not be
subjected to it, yet, it should be honestly supervised and
controlled by the hierarchy of executive authorities
themselves It enhances the powers and, therefore, the
responsibilities of the Executive.

A maxim of justice is sometimes said to be :"Let the
heavens fall but justice must be done ". As applied to
judicial justice, it means
364
that justice must accord with the highest standards of
objective, impartial , unruffled dictates a clear
judicial conscience working "without t fear or favour,
affection or ill-will". It does not mean that the object of
"judicial justice" is either to make the heavens fall' or
that it should be oblivious to consequences of judicial
verdicts on the fate of the nation. It fully recognises the
legal validity of the principle adopted by the English House
of Lords in both Sadiq`s case (supra and Liversidge's case
(supra): "Salus Populi Est Supreme Lex" (regard for the
public welfare is the highest law). This is the very first
maxim given Broom's Legal Maxim under the first head "Rules
founded on public policy" (See Broom's 'legal Maxims" p. 1).

It is not my object to animadvert here at length on any
weakness in our legal or judicial system. I would however,
like to point out that judicial justice can only be "justice
according to law". It tends more often to accord with legal
justice than moral justice. Not only are the fact finding
powers of Courts limited by rules of evidence and procedure,
but the process of fact finding and adjudication can miss
their objects due to the buying power of money over venel
witnesses and the capacity of the wealthy to secure the best
forensic talents in the country even if we do not take into
account the liability of judges. like the rest of human
beings, to err. Ends of justice can be frustrated by all
kinds of abuses of the processes of Courts
The machinery of executive justice, though not hide-
bound by technical rules of evidence and procedure, can also
be and often is inordinately dilatory. Its wheels can be
clogged by red-tape and by corrupt clerical underlings if
their palms are not greased by honest citizens. Even those
in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy can be sometimes
hopelessly unable to see the true objects of an
administrative scheme or of the policy embodied in a
statute. They tend to be more anxious to please their
superiors than to do justice so that matters in which
executive heads may not get interested are liable to be
neglected for years and even forgotten, whereas others, in
which they are interested, received speedy attention. They
are not even aided by lawyers who, whatever else may be said
about them, have undoubtedly imagination, courage,
independence, and devotion to their client's interests. In
any case, executive justice lacks the appearance of
detachment. Justifiable disputes between the State and the
citizen. On principles of natural justice? require
independent authorities for their resolution. It is for this
reason that Article 226 of the Constitution places
administrative action and inaction, even at the highest
levels, under judicial superintendence, when it impinges on
rights of persons, although this may have given rise to
problems of its own either due to misuse by litigants of the
powers of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution
or want of clarify in the drafting of our statutes or the
difficulties experienced by the executive officers of
Government in understanding the laws or the manner in which
their own duties are to be carried out.

Considerations, such as those mentioned above, arising
out of alleged carelessness with which, according to the
learned Counsel for the detentes, detentions are sometimes
ordered, were placed before us so
365
that we may not deny powers of rectification of apparent
errors of detaining officers to High Courts. It was stated
by one learned Counsel that a detention order was once
issued against a person who was dead. Obviously, no
detention order could be executed against a dead person and
no writ petition could be moved on behalf of such a person.
I have, however., no doubt, that the machinery of the
preventive detention is not so defective as to prevent
executive authorities at the highest levels from doing
justice in appropriate cases where real injustice due to
misrepresentations or mis-apprehensions of fact is brought
to their. notice. Not only are the highest executive
authorities, under whose supervision the administration of
preventive detention laws is expected to take place, better
able than the High Courts, acting under Article 226 of the
Constitution, to go into every question of fact and are in a
much better position to know all relevant facts, but their
knowledge f the meaning of laws to be administered and the
policies underlying them could not be less, even if they are
not better, known to them than to the High Courts on such a
matter as preventive detention. As already indicated, it
raises essentially matters of policy. Courts cannot decide
what individuals with what kind of associations and
antecedents should be detained. In some cases,, the
associations and affiliations of individuals with groups or
originations may certainly be matters of common public
knowledge. But, it is only the membership and
associations of persons which may be matters of public
knowledge. The nature of information, and the manner in
which individuals or organisations concerned may do
something, which may constitute a danger to the security of
the State, are matters of appraisement of situations and
policies on which information could certainly not be
broadcast.

I, therefore, think that a challenge to the validity of
Section 16A(9) based either on the submission that grounds
for detention do not call for secrecy or that the provision
is an unwarranted invasion of judicial power, even in an
emergency, is not well-founded. I will indicate below the
safeguards which exist in the Act itself for obtaining
redress on the executive side in cases` of preventive
detention. As was held by this Court in Ram Jawaya Kapur's
case (supra), there is no such strict separation of powers
under our Constitution as one finds in the American
Constitution. No particular provision of the Constitution
could be pointed out in support of the proposition that
preventive detention is a matter in which judicial
superintendence must necessarily be preserved as a part of
the doctrine of separation of powers.

Section 3. sub. sec. 3 of the Act shows that the
detaining officer has to submit a report forthwith on a case
of preventive detention, to ether with grounds of detention
and particulars of the case, for the approval of the State
Government. The detention order itself unless approved by
the State Government, lapses automatically after 12 days. In
special cases, covered by Section 8 of the Act, the proviso
to Section 3, sub. sec. 3, makes the initial order, subject
to the approval of the State Government" operative for 22
days. In cases covered by Section 16A(2) and (3) of the Act,
in which no grounds of detention are to be supplied to the
detenu, the State Government has to review and confirm the
order if the detention is to continue beyond 15 days.

366

Section 14 of the Act provides for revocation of detention
orders without prejudice to the provisions of Section 21 of
the General Clauses Act, 1897. The power of revocation may
be exercised not only by the detaining officer concerned,
but by the State Government or the Central Government also
Temporary release of persons detained is also provided for
by Section 15 of the Act on the order of the appropriate
Government as to prevent undue hardship and to Meet special
con contingencies. The provisions of Article 353(a) of the
Constitution also the Union Government to issue directions
to a State Government relating to the manner in which a
State's executive power is to be exercised during the
Emergency. Means of redress, in cases such as those of
mistaken identity or misapprehension of facts or detentions
due to false and malicious reports circulated by enemies,
are thus still open to a detenu by approaching executive
authorities. There is no bar against that. What is not
possible is to secure a release by an order of a Court in
Heabeas Corpus proceedings after taking the Court behind a
duly authenticated prima facie good return.

An argument before us, to which would like to advert
here, was that, notwithstanding the emergency provisions.,
some undefined or even defined principles of Rule of Law,
outside the emergency provisions, can be enforced by the
High Courts in exercise of their powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution because the Rule of Law has been held by
this Court to be a part of the inviolable 'basic structure"
of the Constitution. It was submitted that, as this basic
structure was outside even the powers of amendment of the
Constitution under Article 368 of the Constitution, it could
not be affected by emergency provisions or by provisions of
the Act. We were asked to atleast interpret the emergency
provisions and the Act in such a way as to preserve what
was`represented to be the "Rule of Law" as a part of the
basic structure of the Constitution.

It seems to me that the theory of a "basic structure"
of the Constitution cannot be used to build into the
Constitution an imaginary part which may be in conflict with
Constitutional provisions. The Constitution cannot have a
base cut away from the super-structure. Indeed, as explained
above, it seems to me that the emergency provisions could
themselves be regarded as part of the basic structure of the
Constitution. At any rate, they are meant to safeguard the
basis of all orderly Government according to law.

Speaking for myself, I do not look upon the theory of a
basic structure of the constitution an anything more than a
part of a well recognised mode of construing a document. The
constitution, like any other document, has to be read and
construed as a whole. This is the common principle which
was applied, though in different ways and with differing
results, both by Judges taking the majority as well as
minority views in Kesavananda Bharti`s case (supra). Some of
the learned Judges thought that, by an application of this
rule, the scope of the power of amendment, contained in
Article 368 of the Constitution , was limited by certain
principles which, though not expressly laid down in Article
368, could be read into the word "amendment" as implied
limitations upon powers under Article 368. On the other
367
hand other learned Judges (including myself) took the view
that, considering the provisions of the Constitution as a
whole, the powers of amendment of the Constitution in
Article 368, which operated on all parts of the Constitution
itself and embraced even the power of amending Article 368
of the Constitution, could not reasonably be so limited. The
theory, therefore, was nothing more than a method of
determining the intent behind the constitutional provisions.
It could not and did not build and add a new part to the
Constitution
It was then urged that want of bona fides was expressly
left open for determination by Courts even in an emergency
in Liversidge`s s case. It must not, however, be forgotten
that Liversidge`s case was not a decision upon a habeas
corpus proceeding, but, it came to the House of Lords at an
interlocutory stage of a suit for damages for false
imprisonment when Liversidge was denied access to
particulars of grounds of his detention. The question
considered there was whether he could ask for them as a
matter of right. The House of Lords denied him that right.

In Greene's case (supra)" which was heard with
Liversidge's case (supra) by the House of Lords, the
decision was that the return made on behalf of the Secretary
of State could not be questioned. It is true that even in
Greene's case (supra), a theoretical exception was made
for a case of want of bona fides. I call it "theoretical"
because such a case is perhaps not, easily conceivable in
England. It also requires some explanation as to what could
be meant by holding that a return is "conclusive", but the
bona fides of the order can be challenged. The explanation
seems to me to be that want of bona fides or "malice in
fact" was placed on the same footing as fraud, which
nullifies and invalidates the most solemn proceedings. It
may, however, be pointed out that, in Greene`s case (supra),
it was not held that mala fides or any other invalidating
fact could be proved during the emergency in habeas corpus
proceedings. An explanation of an almost formal exception
for a case of want of bona fides could be that the
reservation of such a plea was meant only for such
proceedings in which "malice in fact" could reasonably be
gone into and adjudicated upon. The position before us,
however., is very clear. Section 16A(9) imposes a bar which
cannot be overcome in Habeas Corpus proceedings. In
addition, a specific suspension or enforcement of the right
of personal freedom against executive authorities places the
presumption arising from a duly authenticated order of a
legally authorised detaining officer on a higher footing
than a merely ordinary rebuttable presumption for purposes
of proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. These
are, as already indicated summary proceedings.

I may point out here that the term "mala fide" is often
very loosely used. Even in England, the scope of malice is
wide enough to include both "malice in law" and "malice in
fact". Lord Haldane in Shearer v. Shields,(1) said:
"Between 'malice in fact' and 'malice in law' there
is a broad distinction which is not peculiar to any
system of jurisprudence. The person who inflicts a
wrong or an injury upon any person in contravention of
the law is not allowed
(1) [1914] A.C. 808.

368

to say that he did so with an innocent mind. He is
taken to know the law and can only act within the law.
He may, therefore, be guilty of 'malice in law',
although. so far as the state of his mind was concerned
he acted ignorantly, and in that sense innocently.
'Malice in fact' is a different thing. It means an
actual malicious intention on the part of the Person
who has done the wrongful act".

Now, applying the broad concepts of "malice in law`',
as stated t above, it has often been argued before us, in
cases of preventive detention, that the burden is upon the
executive authorities of proving the strict legality and
correctness of every step in the procedure adopt ed in a
case of deprivation of personal liberty. To ask the
executive authorities to satisfy such a requirements in
accordance with what has been called the principle in
Eshuqbayi Eleko's case (supra)) would be in my opinion, to
nullify the effect of the suspension of the enforceability
of the procedural protection to the right of personal
freedom. To do so is really to make the Presidential order
under Article 359(1) of the Constitution ineffective.
Therefore, no question of "malice in law' can arise in
Habeas Corpus proceedings when such a protection is
suspended. As regards the issue of "malice in fact", as I
have already pointed out, it cannot be tried at all in a
Habeas Corpus proceeding although it may be possible to try
it in a regular suit the object of which is not be enforce a
right to personal freedom but only to obtain damages for a
wrong done which is not protected by the terms of Section 16
of the Act. The possibility of such a suit should be another
deterrent against dishonest use of these powers by detaining
officers.

Mr. Mayakrishnan, learned Counsel for one of the
detenus, con tended that state of emergency, resulting from
the Presidential order of 27th June, 1975, cannot be equated
with a situation in which Martial Law has been proclaimed.
The argument seems to be that if the jurisdiction of Courts
to enforce the right ht to personal freedom is affected, the
resulting position would be no different from that which
prevails when Martial Law is declared.

There is no provision in our Constitution for a
declaration of Martial Law. Nevertheless, Article 34 of the
Constitution recognises the possibility of Martial Law in
this country. It provided:

"34 notwithstanding anything in the foregoing
provisions of this Part, Parliament may by law
indemnify any person in the service of the Union or of
a State or any other t person in respect of any act
done by him in connection with the maintenance or
restoration of order in any area within the territory
of India where martial law was in force or validate any
sentence passed, punishment inflicted, forfeiture
ordered or other act done under martial law in such
area?'
As there is no separate indication in the Constitution
of conditions in which Martial Law could be "proclaimed", it
could be urged that a Presidential order under Article
359(1) has a similar effect and
369
was intended to provide for situations in which Martial Law
may have to be declared in any part of the country. But, a
Presidential order under Article 339(1) of the Constitution
would, ordinarily, have a wider range and effect throughout
the country than the existence of Martial Law in any
particular part of the country. The Presidential
Proclamations are meant generally to cover the country as a
whole. "Martial Law" is generalIy of a locally restricted
application. Another difference is that conditions in which
what is called "Martial Law" may prevail result in taking
over by Military Courts of powers even to try offences; and,
the ordinary or civil Courts will not interfere with this
special jurisdiction under extraordinary conditions. Such a
taking over by Military Courts is certainly outside the
provisions of Article 359(1) of the Constitution taken by
itself. lt could perhaps fall under Presidential powers
under Articles 53 and 73 read with Article 355.Article
53(2) lays down:

"53 (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing provision the supreme command of the Defence
Forces of the Union shall be vested in the President
and the exercise thereof shall be regulated by law".
And, Article 355 provides:

"355. It shall be the duty of the Union to protect
every State against external aggression and internal
disturbance and to ensure that the government of every
State is carried on in accordance with the provisions
of this Constitution."

A similarity in results however between Martial Law and
conditions, resulting from a Presidential order under
Article 359(1) is that, if no provision is made by an Act of
Indemnity the civil liabilities of military or civil
officers, acting mala fide and outside the law, are not
removed ipso facto by either Martial Law or the Proclamation
of Emergency.

In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn. vol. 8, para
982, page 625), an explanation of Martial Law, as it is
known in British Constitutional Law, is given as follows:

"The Crown may not issue commissions in time of
peace to try civilians by martial law; but when a state
of actual war, or of insurrection, riot or rebellion
amounting to war exists, the Crown and its officers may
use the amount of force necessary in the circumstances
to restore order. This use or force is sometimes termed
"martial law". When once a state of actual war exists
the civil courts have no authority to call in question
the actions of the military authorities, but it is for
the civil courts to decide, if their jurisdiction is
invoked, whether a state of war exists which justifies
the application of martial law. The powers. such as
they are, of the military authorities cease and those
of the civil courts resumed ipso facto with the
termination of the State of war. and in the absence of
an act of Indemnity, the civil courts may inquire into
the
24-833SCI\76
370
legality of anything done during the state of war.
Even if there is an Act of Indemnity couched in the
usual terms, malicious acts will not be protected.
Whether this power of using extraordinary measures is
really a prerogative of the Crow, or whether it is
merely an example of the common law right and duty of
all, ruler and subject alike, to use the amount of
force necessary to suppress disorder, is not quite free
from doubt. it is, however, clear that so-called
military courts set up under martial law are not really
courts at all, and So an order of prohibition will not
issue to rest rain them. Probably the correct view to
take of' martial law itself is that it is no law at
all.

It is not at all necessary for the purposes of the
decision of cases before us to determine how proclamations
of emergency are related to the more drastic conditions in
which "Martial Law" if it is "law" at all, may come into
existence due to the very necessities of a situation. It is
evident that the emergency provisions of our Constitution
arc very comprehensive. They are intended not merely to deal
with situations when actual out-break of hostilities with
another country try has taken place and a war is going on
but also when the country's peace, progress, security and
independence are threatened by dangers either internal or
external or both. Whether there is a "grave emergency",
falling within Article 352(1), is a matter entirely for the
President to determine.

Attempts were made by some learned Counsel to paint
very gloomy pictures of possible consequences if this Court
held that no relief was open to petitioners against
deprivation of their personal freedoms by executive officers
in an emergency of indefinite duration, when a number of
cases of serious misuse of their powers by the detaining
officers were said to be in evidence. I do not think that it
is either responsible advocacy or the performance of any
patriotic or public duty to suggest that powers of
preventive detention are being misused in the current
emergency when our attention could not be drawn to the
allegations in a single case even by way of illustration of
the alleged misuse instead of drawing upon one s own
imagination to conjure up phantoms. In fact, I asked
some learned Counsel to indicate the alleged facts of any
particular case before us to enable us to appreciate how the
power of preventive detention had been misused. Mostly, the
answers given were that the facts of the cases were not
before us at this stage which is true. But, it is
significant that no case of alleged "malice in fact" could
be even brought to our notice.

It seems to me that Courts can safely act on the
presumption that powers of preventive detention are not
being abused. The theory that preventive detention serves a
psycho-therapeutic purpose may not be correct. But, the
Constitutional duty of every Govt. faced with threats of
wide-spread disorder and chaos to meet it with appropriate
steps cannot be denied. And, if one can refer to a matter of
common knowledge, appearing from newspaper reports, a number
of detenus arrested last year have already been released.
This shows that whole situation is periodically reviewed.
Furthermore, we under-

371

stand that the care and concern bestowed by the State
authorities upon the welfare of detenus who are well
housed, well fed, and well treated. is almost maternal. Even
parents have to take appropriate preventive action against
those children who May threaten to burn down the house they
live in.

If there are, under our Constitution, some supreme
obligations or overriding powers or duties, vested in
superior Court-s, as learned Counsel for the detenus seemed
to be contending for, to enforce the claims of
constitutionality, quite apart from the suspended powers and
duties of Courts to enforce fundamental rights, I am sure
that the current emergency, justified not only by the rapid
improvement. due to it in the seriously dislocated national
economy and discipline but also by the rapid dangers of
tomorrow, apparent to those who have the eyes to see them,
averted by it, could not possibly provide the occasion for
the discharge of such obligations towards the nation or the
exercise of such powers, if any, in the Courts set up by the
Constitution. Where there are such great obligations and
powers they must always be guided by the principle already
indicated: "Sauls Populi Est Suprema Lex". Indeed, as I
understand even the majority view in Golaknath`s case
(supra), it was that, despite the invalidity of
constitutional amendments of provisions containing
fundamental 1) rights, to give effect to the view would be
contrary to this principle. The case for the detenus before
us, however, fails on preliminary hurdles. Despite strenuous
efforts, their learned Counsel were quite unable to show any
constitutional invalidity, directly or indirectly, in any of
the measures taken, whether legislative or executive, by or
on behalf of the State.

The real question for determination by us relates only
to the meaning and effect of the Constitutional and
statutory provisions indicated above which are applicable
during the current Emergency. A large number of other
questions including even some quite remotely connected with
the real question involved, were permitted Court to be
argued because of the great concern and anxiety of this
Court when problems relating to personal liberty are raised.
On the interpretation of the relevant provisions adopted by
me, the validity of detention orders purporting to be passed
under the Act cannot. be challenged in Habeas Corpus
proceedings. Judicial proceedings in criminal Courts, not
meant for the enforcement of fundamental rights, are not,
either at the initial or appellate or revisional stages,
covered by the Presidential order of 1975. Habeas Corpus
petitions are not maintainable in such cases on another
ground. It is that the prisoner is deemed to be in proper
custody under orders of a Court.

My answer to the two questions set out in the beginning
of this judgment which I compressed into one, is as
follows:

A prima facie valid detention order, that is to say,
one duly authenticated and passed by an officer authorised
to make it, recording purported satisfaction to detain the
petitioner under the maintenance of Internal Security Act,
which is operative either before or after its confirmation
by the Government, is a complete answer to a petition for a
writ of Habeas Corpus. Once such an order is shown
372
to exist in response to a notice for a writ of Habeas
Corpus, the High Court cannot inquire into its validity or
vires on the ground of either mala fides of any kind or of
non-compliance with any provision of the Maintenance of
Internal Security Act in Habeas Corpus proceedings. The
preliminary objection of the State must be accepted in such
a case.

The result is that the appeals before us are allowed
and the judgment and order of the High Court in each case is
set aside. The High Court concerned will itself now pass an
order on each petition in accordance with law as laid down
by this Court and the provisions of Article 359(1) of the
Constitution.

CHANDRACHUD, J. During, the last few years, many
questions of far-reaching constitutional importance have
engaged the attention of this Court but these appeals,
perhaps, present problems of the gravest magnitude. They
involve an adjustment between two conflicting
considerations, the liberty of the individual on one hand
and exigencies of the State on the other. This balancing of
the most precious of human freedoms the liberty of the
subject as against the most imperative of the State's
obligations the security of the State gives rise to multi-
dimensional problems quite beyond the scope and compass of
each right considered separately and in isolation. Can the
freedom of the individual be subordinated to the exigencies
of the State and if so, to what extent ? The Constitution
concedes to the Executive the power of Preventive detention,
but in the name of national security can that
jurisdiction of suspicion be so exercised as to reduce the
guarantee of personal liberty to a mere husk ? Detention
without trial is a serious inroad on personal freedom but it
bears the sanction of our Constitution. The Constituent
Assembly composed of politicians. statesmen, lawyers and
social workers who had attained a high status in their
respective specialities and many of whom had experienced the
travails of incarceration owing solely to their political
beliefs resolved to put Article 22, clauses (3) to (7) into
the Construction. may be as a necessary evil. But does that
mean that, more as a rule than as an exception, any person
can be detained without disclosing the grounds of detention
to him or to the Court which may be called upon to try his
Habeas Corpus petition ? And can such grounds and the
information on which the grounds are based be deemed by a
rule of evidence to relate to the affairs of the State,
therefore, confidential , and therefore privileged ? Blind,
unquestioning obedience does not flourish on English soil,
said Lord Simonds in Christie v. Leachinsky(1). Will it
flourish one Indian soil ? These broadly are the sensitive
questions for decision and importantly, they arise in the
wake of Proclamations of Emergency issued by the President.

Part XVIII of the Constitution, called "Emergency
provisions", consists of Articles 352 to 360. Article 352(1)
provides that if the President is satisfied that a grave
emergency exists whereby the secu-

(1) [1947] A. C. 573. 591.

373

rity of India or of any part of the territory thereof is
threatened, whether by war or external aggression or
internal disturbance, he may, by Proclamation, make a
declaration to that effect. A Proclamation issued under
clause (1) is required by clause (2) (b) to be laid before
each House of Parliament and by reason of clause (2) (c) it
ceases to operate at the expiration of two months unless
before the expiration of that period it has been approved by
resolutions of both Houses of Parliament. By clause (3) of
Article 352, a Proclamation of Emergency may be made before
the actual occurrence of war or of external aggression or
internal disturbance, if the President is satisfied that
there is imminent danger thereof. Clause (5) (a) makes the
satisfaction of the President under clauses (1) and (3)
final, conclusive and non-justiciable. By clause (5) (b),
neither the Supreme Court nor any other court has
jurisdiction, subject to the provisions of clause (2), to
entertain any question on any ground regarding the validity
of a proclamation issued under clause (1) or the continued
operation thereof.

"While a Proclamation of emergency is in operation,
nothing in Article 19 shall restrict the power of the
State as defined in Part III to make any law or to take
any executive action which the State would but for the
provisions contained in that Part be competent to make
or to take, but any law so made shall, to the extent of
the incompetency, cease to have effect as soon as the
Proclamation ceases to operate, except as respects
things done or omitted to be done before the law so
ceases to have effect."

Article 359(1) empowers the President, while a
Proclamation of emergency is in operation to declare by
order that:

"...the right to move any court for the enforcement
of such of the rights conferred by Part III as may be
mentioned in the order and all proceedings pending in
any court for the enforcement of the rights so
mentioned shall remain suspended for the period during
which the Proclamation is in force or for such shorter
period as may be specified in the order."

Clause (1A), which was inserted retrospectively in Article
359 by section 7 of the Thirty-eighth Amendment Act, 1975,
provides:

"While an order made under clause (1) mentioning
any of the rights conferred by Part III is in
operation, nothing in that Part conferring those rights
shall restrict the power of the State as defined in the
said Part to make any law or to take any executive
action which the State would but for the provisions
contained in that Part be competent to make or to take,
but any law so made shall, to the extent of the
incompetency, cease to have effect as soon as the order
aforesaid ceases to operate, except as respects
things done or omitted to be done before the law so
ceases to have effect."

374

Clause (3) of Article 359 requires that every order made
under clause (1) shall, as soon as may be after it is made,
be laid before each house of Parliament.

Article 352 was resorted to for the first time when
hostilities broke out with China. On October 26, 1962 the
President issued a Proclamation declaring that a grave
emergency existed whereby the security of India was
threatened by external aggression. This proclamation was
immediately followed by the defence of India ordinance, 4 of
1962, which was later replaced by the Defence of India Act,
1962. on November3, 1962 the President issued an order under
Article 359(1) of the Constitution, which was later amended
by an order dated November I 1, 1962 stating that:

"the right of any person to move any court for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 14,
Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution shall
remain suspended for the period during which the
proclamation of emergency issued under clause (1) of
Article 352 thereof on the 26th October, 1962, is in
force, if such person has been deprived of any such
rights under the Defence of India ordinance, 1962 (4 of
1962) or any rule or order made thereunder(Emphasis
supplied).

Article 14 was added to the order of November 3, 1962 by the
amendment dated November 11, 1962. The emergency declared on
October 26, 1962 was revoked by a Proclamation dated January
10, 1968 issued under Article 352(2)(a) of the Constitution.

The Defence of India Act, 1962 was to remain in force
during the period of operation of the Proclamation of
Emergency issued on October 26, 1962 and for a period of six
months thereafter . The Act of 1962 expired on July 10,
1968.

The maintenance of Internal Security Act, 26 of 1971,
(MISA) was brought into force on July 2, 1971 in the shadow
of hostilities with Pakistan. Section 3(1) of that Act
provides as follows:

"3.(1) The Central Government or the State
Government may,-

(a) if satisfied with respect to any person
(including a foreigner) that with a view to
preventing him from acting in any manner
prejudicial to-

(1) the defence of India, the relations of
India with foreign powers, or the
security of India, or

(ii) the security of the State or the
maintenance of public order, or

(iii)the maintenance of supplies and services
essential ll to the community, or

(b) if satisfied with respect to any foreigner
that with a view 2to regulating his continued
presence in India or
375
With a view to making arrangements for his
expulsion from India.

It is necessary so to do make an order directing that
such person be detained."

Section 8 of the Act requires that the grounds on
which the order of detention is made shall be communicated
to the detenu within a certain period but that the authority
making the order may not disclose facts which it considers
to be against the public interest to disclose
Consequent on the Pakistani aggression, the President
issued a Proclamation of Emergency on December 3, 1971 on
the ground that the security of India was threatened by
external aggression. By on. Order dated December S, 1971
issued under Article 359(1) of the Constitution, the right
of 'foreigners' to move any court for the enforcement of
rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and 22 was suspended.

In September 1974 the MISA was amended by ordinance
11 of 1974 to include sub-section (c) in section 3(1), by
which the right to detain was given as against smugglers and
offenders under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947.
On November 16, 1974 the President issued a Declaration
under Article 359(1) suspending the right of persons
detained under section 3 (1) (c) of the MISA lo move for
enforcement of tile rights conferred by Article 14, Article
21 and clauses (4), (5), (6) and (7) of Article 22 of the
Constitution
On June 25, 1975 the President issued a Proclamation
under Article 352(1) declaring that a grave emergency
existed whereby the security of India was threatened by
internal disturbance. On June 27, 1975 The President issued
an order under Article 359(1) which reads as follows:

"G.S.R. 361 (E)-In exercise of powers conferred by
clause (1) of Article 359 of the Constitution, the
President hereby declares that the right of any person
(including a foreigner) to move any court for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 14,
Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution and all
proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of
the above mentioned rights shall remain suspended for
the period during which the proclamation of emergency
made under clause (1) of Article 352 of the
Constitution on the 3rd December, 1971 and on the 25th
of June, 1975 are both in force.

The order shall extend to the whole of the territory of
India.

This order shall be in addition to and not in
derogation of any order made before the date cf this
order under Clause (1) of Article 359 of the
Constitution."

Various persons detained under section 3(1) of the MISA
filed petitions in different High Courts for the issue of
the writ of Habeas Groups. When those petitions can. up for
hearing, the Government
376
raised a preliminary objection to their maintainability on
the ground that in asking for release by the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus, the detenus were in substance
claiming that they had been deprived of their personal
liberty in violation of the procedure established by law,
which plea was available to them under Article 21 f he
Constitution only. The right to move for enforcement of the
right conferred by that Article having been suspended by the
Presidential order dated June 27, 1975 the petitions,
according to the Government, were liable to be dismissed at
the threshold. The preliminary objection has been rejected
for one reason or another by the High Courts of Allahabad,
Bombay, Delhi, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and
Rajasthan. Broadly, these High Courts have taken the view
that despite the Presidential order it is open to the
detenus to challenge their detention on the ground that it
is ultra vires, as for example,. by showing that the order
on the face of it is passed by an authority not empowered to
pass it, or it is in excess of the power delegated to the
authority, or that the power has been exercised in breach 0
the conditions prescribed in that behalf by the Act under
which the order is passed, or that the order is not in
strict conformity with the provision of the Act. Some of
these High Courts have further held that the detenus can
attack the order of detention on the grounded that it is
malafide, as for example, by showing that the detaining
authority did not apply its mind to the relevant
considerations, or that the authority was influenced by
irrelevant considerations, or that the authority was
actuated by improper motives. Being aggrieved by the finding
recorded by these High Courts on the preliminary point the
State Governments and the Government of India have filed
these appeals, some under certificates granted by the High
Courts and some by special leave granted by this Court. The
High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Madras have upheld
the preliminary objection.

During the pendency of these appeals and while the
hearing was in Progress, the President issued an order dated
January 8, 1976 under Article 359(1) declaring that the
right to move any court for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by Article 19 and the proceedings pending in any
court for the enforcement of those rights shall suspended
during the operation of the Proclamations of Emergency dated
December 3, 1971 and June 25, 1975.

On behalf of the appellants, the appeals were argued by
the learned Attorney-General and the learned Additional
Solicitor-General. The learned Advocates-General of various
States argued in support of their contentions. A string of
counsel appeared on behalf of the respondents, amongst them
being Shri Shanti Bhushan, Shri V. M. Tarkunde, Shri R. B.
Jethmalani, Shri S. J. Sorabji, Shri A. B. Dewan, Shri C.
K. Daphtary, Dr. N. M. Ghatate, Shri G. C. Dwivedi. Shri
Santokh Singh, Shri Sharad Manohar, Shri Daniel Latifi and
Shri Mayakrishnan. The learned Advocate-General of Gujarat
generally supported their submissions.

The learned Attorney-General contended that Article 21
is the sole repository of the right to life and personal
liberty and if the right to move any court for the
enforcement of that right is suspended by
377
the Presidential order issued under Article 359(1), the
detenus have no locus standi to file the writ petitions and
therefore these petitions must be dismissed without any
further inquiry into the relevance of the material on which
the grounds of detention are based or the relevance of the
grounds or the bona fides of the detaining authority. If the
MISA permits the non-disclosure of grounds and indeed
prevents their disclosure, there is no question of inquiring
into the reasons or grounds of detention and courts must
accept at its face value the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority has recorded in the order of detention.
"There is no half-way house" asserted the Attorney-General.
But, not inconsistently with the basic submission that the
detenus have no locus standi to file the petitions for
habeas corpus, he conceded that the court may grant relief
if the detention order is on the face of it bad, as for
example, if it is passed by a person not authorised to pass
it, or if it is passed for a purpose outside those mentioned
in section 3(1) of the MISA or if it does not bear any
signature at all.

The learned Additional Solicitor-General indicated
during the course of his argument the limits of judicial
review in the event of the court rejecting the main
submission of the Attorney-General. He contended that
section 16A(9) of MISA contains but a rule of evidence and
is therefore not open to attack on the ground that it
encroaches upon the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution. Since section 16A(9) is not
unconstitutional, no court can ask for the prosecution of
the file relating to a detente or ask for the disclosure of
the grounds of detention. If such disclosure is not made, no
adverse inference can be raised by holding that by reason of
non-disclosure, the detenu case stands unrebutted. The
learned Additional Solicitor-General contended that there
was no warrant for reading down section 16A(9) so as to
permit disclosure to the court to the exclusion of the
petition and if any inquiry is permissible at all into a
habeas corpus petition, the inquiry must be limited to the
following points: (1) Whether the order is made in exercise
or purported exercise of power conferred by a law; (ii) If
such law was pre-emergency law, is it a valid law; (iii)
whether the authority which passed the order is duly
empowered to do so by the law. (iv) Whether the person
sought to be detained is the person named in the order of
detention; (v) Whether the stated purpose of the detention
is one that comes within the law; (vi) Have the procedural
safeguards enacted by the law been followed; and (vii) Where
grounds are furnished (i.e. when 16-A does not apply) do
such grounds ex-facie justify the apprehension of the
detaining authority or is it vitiated by a logical non-
sequitur ? Such an inquiry, according to the learned
counsel, can never extend to an objective appraisal of the
material and the information for the purpose of testing the
validity of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority.

The arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents
covered a evidence but they may be summarized thus: H

1. The object of Article 359(1) and the effect of an
order issued under it is to remove restraints
against the
378
Legislature so that during the emergency, it is
free to make laws in violation of the fundamental
rights mentioned in the Presidential order.

2. Under a Constitution which divides State functions
into Executive, Legislative and Judicial, the
executive functions must be discharged
consistently with the valid laws passed by the
Legislature and the orders and decrees passed by
the Judiciary. The suspension of the right to
enforce fundamental rights cannot confer any right
on the Executive to flout the law by which it is
bound as much in times of emergency as in times
of peace. Since there is a valid law regulating
preventive detention, namely, the MISA, every
order of detention passed by the Executive must
confconfirm to the conditions prescribed by that
law.

3. Article 359(1) may remove fetters imposed by Part
Ill but it cannot remove those arising from the
principle or rule of law or from The principle of
the limited power of the Executive under the
system of checks and balances based on separation
of powers .

4. The obligation cast on the Executive to act in
accordance with the law does not arise from any
particular Article of the Constitution but from
the inherent com compulsion arising from the
principle of rule of law which is a central
feature our constitutional system and is a
basic feature of the Constitution. The suspension
of the right to enforce Article 21 does not
automatically entail the suspension of the rule of
law. Even during emergency, the rule of law is not
and cannot be suspended.

5. The Presidential order under Article 359(1)may bar
the enforcement of fundamental rights mentioned in
the order by a petition under Article 32 before
the Supreme Court. But, the Presidential order
cannot bar the enforcement of rights other than
fundamental rights by a petition filed under
Article 226 in the High Court.

6. Common law rights as well as statutory rights to
personal liberty can be enforced through writ
petitions filed under Article 226, despite the
Presidential order issued under Article 359(1).
Similarly, contractual rights, natural rights and
non-fundamental constitutional rights like those
under Articles 256, 265 and 361(3) of the
Constitution, can be enforced under Article 226.Article 226 empowers the High Courts to issue
writs and directions for the enforcement of
fundamental rights" "and for any other purpose".

7. The essence of the inquiry in a Habeas Corpus
petition ;9 whether the detention is justified by
law or is ultra
379
vires the law. Such an inquiry is not shut out by
the suspension of the right to enforce fundamental
rights.

8. If the Presidential order is construed as a bar to
the maintainability of the writ petitions under
Article 226 of the Constitution, that Article
shall have bee amended without a proper and valid
constitutional amendment.

9. Article 21 of the Constitution is not the sole
repository of the right to life or personal
liberty. There is no authority for the proposition
that on the conferment of fundamental rights by
Part III, the corresponding, pre-existing rights
merged with the fundamental rights and that with
the suspension of fundamental rights, the c
corresponding pre-existing rights also got
suspended.

10. Suspension of the right to enforce Article 21
cannot put a citizen in a worse position than in
the pre-constitution period. The pre-

Constitution right of liberty was a right in rem
and was totally dissimilar from the one created by
Article 21. 'The pre-constitution rights was
merely a right not to be detained, save under the
authority of law.

11. Civil liberty or personal liberty is not a
conglomeration of positive rights. It is a
negative concept and constitutes an area of free
action because no law exists curtailing it or
authorising its curtailment.

12. Section 16A(9) of the MISA is unconstitutional as
it encroaches upon the High Courts' powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution by creating a
presumption that the grounds on which the order of
detention is made and any information or materials
on which the grounds are based shall be treated as
confidential and shall be deemed to refer to
matters of State, so that it will be against the
public interest to disclose the same.

13. Section 18 of MISA as amended by Act 39 of 1975
which came into force with effect from June 25,
1975 cannot affect the maintainability of the
present petitions which were filed before the
Amendment.

14. The dismissal of writ petitions on the around that
such petitions are barred by reason of the
Presidential order issued under Article 359(1)
would necessarily mean that during the emergency
no person has any right to life or personal
liberty; and

15. If the detenus are denied any forum for the
redress of their grievances, it would be open to
the Executive to whip the detenus to start them,
to keep them in solitary confinement and even to
shoot them, which would
380
be a startling state of affairs in a country
governed by a written Constitution having in it a
chapter on Fundamental Rights. The Presidential
order cannot permit the reduction of Indian
citizens into slaves.

The validity of the 38th and 39th Constitution (amendments
Acts was not challenged by the respondents.

The key to these rival contentions can be found in the
emergency provisions contained in Chapter XVIII of the
Constitution. The Presidential declaration of emergency is
made final, conclusive and non-justiciable by clause (5) of
Article 352, which was introduced by the 38th Amendment
retrospectively. But apart from the fact that the
Constitution itself has given Finality to declarations of
emergency made by the President, it is difficult to see how
a Court of law can look at the declaration of emergency with
any mental reservations. The facts and circumstances leading
to the declaration of emergency are and can only be known to
the Executive, particularly when an emergency can be
declared, as provided in Article 352(3), before the actual
occurrence of war, external aggression or internal
disturbance, so long as the President is satisfied that
there is imminent danger thereof. The actual occurrence of
war or external aggression or internal disturbance can be
there for anyone to see but the imminent danger of these
occurrences depends at any given moment On the perception
and evaluation of the national or international situation,
regarding which the court of law can neither have full and
truthful information nor the means to such information.
Judge and Jury alike may form their personal assessment of a
political situation but whether the emergency should be
declared or not is a matter of high State policy and
questions of policy are impossible to examine in courts OF
law. The High Courts whose judgements are under appeal have,
with the greatest respect, failed to perceive this
limitation on the power of judicial review, though in
fairness to them it must be stated that none of them has
held that the declaration of emergency is open to judicial
scrutiny. But at the back of one's mind is the facile
distrust of executive declarations which recite threat to
the security of the country, particularly by internal
disturbance. The mind then weaves cobwebs of suspicion and
the Judge, without the means to knowledge of full facts,
covertly weighs the pros and cons of the political situation
and substitutes his personal opinion for the assessment of
the Executive, which, by proximity and study, is better
placed to decide whether the security of the country is
threatened by an imminent danger of internal disturbance. A
frank and unreserved acceptance of the Proclamation of
emergency, even in the teeth of one's own pre-disposition,
is conducive to a more realistic appraisal of the emergency
provisions.

A declaration of emergency produces far-reaching
constituencies. While it is in operation the executive power
OF the Union, by reason of Article 353, extends the giving
of directions to any State as to the manner in which the
executive power thereof is to be exercised. Secondly, the
power of Parliament to make laws with respect to any
matter includes, during emergency, the power to make laws
conferring powers and imposing duties or authorising the
conferring of powers
381
and imposition of duties upon the Union or Officers and
authorities of the Union as respects that matter,
notwithstanding that the matter is not enumerated in the
Union List. Article 354 confers power on the President
direct that the provisions of Articles 268 to 279, which
deal with distribution of revenues between the Union and the
States, shall have effect subject to such exceptions or
modifications as the President thinks fit, but not extending
beyond the expiration of the financial year in which the
proclamation ceases to operate. A Proclamation of emergency
automatically curtails the operation of Article 19. As
provided in Article 358, while the Proclamation is in
operation nothing in Article 19 shall restrict the power of
the State to make any law or to take any executive action
which the Stale would but for the provisions contained in
Part III be competent to make or to take. Any law so made
ceases to have effect to the extent of the incompetency as
soon as the proclamation ceases to operate.

Then comes Article 359 which is directly in point. It
authorises the President to issue an order declaring the
suspension of the right to move any court for the
enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III as
the President may specify in his order. Clause (1A) which
was introduced in Article 359 by tile 38th Amendment Act
retrospectively has, inter alia, transported the provisions
of Article 358 into Article 359 during the operation of an
order made by the President under Article 359(1). The orders
issued by the President in the instant case under Article
359(1) provide for the suspension of the right to move any
court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by
Articles 14, 19, 21 and clauses (4) to (7) of Article 22.Article 21 of the Constitution runs thus:

"No person shall be deprived of his life or person
liberty except according to procedure established by
law."

The principal question for decision in these appeals is
whether notwithstanding the fact that the order issued by
the President under Article 359(1) suspends the right of
every person to move any court for the enforcement of the
right to personal liberty conferred by Article 21, it is
open to a person detained under a law of preventive
detention like the MISA to ask for his release by filing a
petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution for the writ of habeas corpus.

The writ of habeas corpus is described by May in his
'Constitutional History of England(1) as the first security
of civil liberty. Julius Stone in 'Social Dimensions of Law
and Justice(2) calls it a picturesque writ with an
extraordinary scope and flexibility of application. The
Latin term "habeas corpus" means 'you must have the body'
and a writ for securing the liberty of the person was called
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. The writ affords an effective
means of immediate release from an unlawful or unjustifiable
detention whether in prison or in private custody. The writ
is of highest constitutional importance being a remedy
available to the lowliest subject against the most powerful
government.

(1) Ed 1912, Vol. II, p. 130 (Chapter XI).

(2) Ed. 1966. p. 203.

382

The liberty of the individual is the most cherished of
human freedoms and even in face of the gravest emergencies,
Judges have played a historic role in guarding that freedom
with real and jealousy, though within the bounds, the
farthest bounds, of constitutional power. The world-wide
interest generated by the lively debate in Liversidge v. Sir
John Anderson and Anr.(1) has still not abated. And repeated
citation has not blunted the edge of Lord Atkin's classic
dissent where he said:

"I view with apprehension the attitude of judges
who on a mere question of construction when face to
face with claims involving the liberty of the subject
show themselves more executing minded than the
executive. In this country, amid the clash of arms, the
laws are not silent. They may be changed, but they
speak the same language in war as in peace In this case
I have listened to arguments which might have been
addressed acceptably to the Court of King's Bench in
the time of Charles I."

Sir William Blackstone in his 'Commentaries on the Laws
of England'(2) says that the preservation of personal
liberty is of great importance to the public because if it
were left in the power of ever the highest person to
imprison anyone arbitrarily there would soon be an end of
all other rights and immunities. "To bereave a man of life,
or by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation
or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of
despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny
throughout the whole kingdom; but confinement of the person,
by secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his sufferings are
unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and
therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government."
The learned commentator goes on to add: "And yet, sometimes,
when the state is in real danger, even this may be a
necessary measure. But the happiness of our Constitution is,
that it is not left to the executive power to determine when
the danger of the state is so great, as to render this
measure expedient; for it is the parliament only, or
legislative power, that, whenever it sees proper, can
authorize the Crown, by suspending the Habeas Corpus Act for
a short and limited time, to imprison suspected persons
without giving any reason for so doing.''
May in his Constitutional History of England(3) says
that during the course of the last century every institution
was popularise and every public liberty was extended but
long before that period English men had enjoyed personal
liberty as their birthright. It was more prized and more
jealously guarded than and other civil right. "The Star
Chamber had fallen: the power of arbitrary imprisonment had
been wrested from the Crown and Privy Council: liberty had
been guarded by the Habeas Corpus Act ....". Speaking of the
writ of habeas corpus May says that it protects the subject
from unfounded suspicions, from the aggressions of power and
from abuses in the
(1) [1942] A. C. 206; Lord Atkin, p. 244.

(2) 4th Ed. Vol I. pp. 105 to 107.

(3) Ed. 1912, p. 124, 130.

383

administration or justice. "Yet this protective law, which
gives every man security and confidence, in times of
tranquillity, has been suspended, again and again, in
periods of public danger or apprehension. Rarely, however,
has this been suffered without jealousy, hesitation, and
remonstrance; and whenever the perils of the State have been
held sufficient to warrant this sacrifice of personal
liberty, no Minister or magistrate has been suffered to
tamper with the law at his discretion. Parliament alone,
convinced of the exigency of each occasion, has suspended,
for a time, the rights of individuals, in the interests of
the State."

Dicey in his Introduction to the Study of the Law of
the Constitution(1) says that:

"During periods of political excitement the power
or duty of the courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus,
and thereby compel the speedy trial or release of
persons charged with crime, has been found an
inconvenient or dangerous Limitation on the authority
of the executive government. Hence has arisen the
occasion for situates which are popularly called Habeas
Corpus Suspension Acts."

E.C.S. Wade and Godfrey Phillips observe in their
Constitutional Law(2) that in times of grave national
emergency, normal constitutional principles must if
necessary give way of the overriding need to deal with the
emergency. According to the learned authors:

"It has always been recognised that times of grave
national emergency demand the grant of special powers
to the Executive. At such times arbitrary arrest and
imprisonment may be legalised by Act of Parliament.

Modern war demands the abandonment of personal liberty
in that the duty of compulsory national service
necessarily takes away for the time being the right of
the individual to choose his occupation.'
The learned authors refer to the English practice of passing
Habeas Corpus Suspension Acts in times of danger to the
State. These Acts prevented the use of habeas corpus and as
soon as the period of suspension was over anyone who for the
time being had been denied the assistance of the writ could
bring an action for false imprisonment. Suspension did not
legalise illegal arrest, it merely suspended a particular
remedy and therefore, a practice grew under which at the
close of the period of suspension an Indemnity Act would be
passed in order to protect officials from the consequences
or any illegal acts which they might have committed under
cover of the suspension of the prerogative writ.

Thomas M. Cooley says in the "General Principles of
Constitutional Law"(3) in the U.S.A. that though the right
to H
(1) 10th Edition.

(2) 8th Ed., Chapter 48, 717, 718.

(3) 4th Ed., Chapter XXXIV. pp. 360-361.

384

the writ of habeas corpus by which the liberty of the
citizens is protected against arbitrary arrests is not
expressly declared in the American Constitution, it is
recognised in Article I, section 9, cl. 2 which says that:

The privileges of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or
invasion the public safety may require it."

It would appear that in America something similar lo the
passing of Acts of Indemnity has been done by making
provisions in State Constitutions.

Thus, though the liberty of the individual is a highly
prized free dom and though the writ of habeas corpus is a
powerful weapon by which a common man can secure his
liberty, there are times in the history of a Nation when the
liberty of the individual is required to be subordinated to
the larger interests of the State. In times of grave
disorders, brought about by external aggression or internal
disturbance, the stability of political institutions becomes
a sine qua non of the guarantee of all other rights and
interests. "To assert an absolute exemption from
imprisonment in all cases, is inconsistent with every idea
of law and political society; and in the end would destroy
all civil liberty, by rendering its protection
impossible.(1) The "clear and present danger test" evoked by
Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United Slates(-), may well be
extended to cases like the present where there is a threat
of external aggression. On the heels of American entry into
the first World War on June 15, 1917, the Congress adopted
the Espionage Act creating three new offences which went
beyond the prohibition of spying and sabotage. It prescribed
punishment of a fine of 10,000 dollars and 20 years
imprisonment. A year later, the Act was amended by what is
popularly called the Sedition Act which is rendered it
illegal even to say anything to obstruct the sale of United
States bonds or to say anything contemptuous regarding the
form of Government of the United States. A unanimous court
upheld Schenck's conviction under the Act for propagating
that compulsory service in the Armed Forces was "a monstrous
wrong against humanity in the interest of Wall Street's
chosen few". The judgment was delivered in 1919 when the war
was already over and Holmes J. held that things that can be
said in times of peace will not be endured during times of
war and no court will regard them as protected by any
constitutional right.

The emergency provisions were incorporated into our
Constitution on the strength of experience gained in England
and U.S.A. But the object of Article 359 is to confer wider
power on the President than the power to merely suspend the
right to file a petition for the writ if habeas corpus.
Article 359 aims at empowering the President to suspend the
right to enforce all or any of the fundamental rights
conferred by Part III. It is in order to achieve that object
that Article
(1) Blackston's Commentaries on the Laws of England,
4th Ed. Vol. III pp.125-126.

359 does not provide that the President may declare that the
remedy by way of' habeas corpus shall be suspended during
emergency. Personal liberty is but one of the fundamental
rights conferred by Part III and the writ of habeas corpus
is peculiar to the enforcement of the right to personal
liberty. lt must follow that the suspension of the right to
enforce the right conferred by Article 21 means and implies
the suspension of the right to file a habeas corpus petition
or to take any other proceeding to enforce the right to
personal liberty conferred by Article 21.

But then it is urged on behalf of the respondents that
by their writ petitions, respondents did not seek to enforce
the right to personal liberty conferred by Article 21 or
possessed by them apart from it. They were really seeking a
declaration that the order of detention was illegal for the
reason that it did not comply with the requirements of the
law under which it was passed. In support of this argument
reliance is placed upon a passage in H.W.R. Wade's
Administrative Law(1) to the effect that habeas corpus is a
remedy not only for the enforcement of the right to personal
liberty but is also a remedy for the enforcement of the
principle of ultra vires. This argument lacks substance and
overlooks the realities of the situation. lt ay be open to a
detenu by filing a petition for the writ of habeas corpus to
contend that order under which he is detailed is ultra vires
of the statute to which the order owes its existence. But
one must have regard to the substance of the matter and not
to mere from the real and substantial relief which the
detention for by a writ of habeas corpus is that he should
be freed from detention and the reason for the relief is
that the order of detention is ultra vires. It is clear,
apart from the Form in which the relief may or may not be
clothed, that the respondents through their writ petitions
were moving the High Courts for enforcing their right to
personal liberty. The history of the writ of habeas corpus
which is succinctly narrated in the late Mr. M. C.
Setalvad's 'The Common Law in India'(1) shows that the writ
of habeas corpus which was in its inception a purely
procedural writ gradually developed into a constitutional
remedy furnishing a most powerful safeguard for individual
freedom. Mr. Setalvad quotes that the writ has been
described as "the key that unlocks the door to freedom".
Respondents were surely not interested in obtaining an
academic declaration regarding the ultra vires ' character
of their detention. They wanted the door to freedom to be
opened by the key of the habeas corpus writ.

Equally untenable is the contention that article 226
which occurs in Chapter V, Part VI of the Constitution is an
entrenched provision and, therefore, under Article 368 no
amendment can be made to Article 226 without ratification by
the Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States. It
is true that Article 220 is an entrenched provision which
cannot suffer an amendment except by following the procedure
prescribed by the proviso to Article 368 (2). But the
Presidential order is issued under the Constitution itself
and if its true construction produces a certain result, it
cannot be said that some
(1) 3rd Ed., pp. 127, 128
(2) Pages 37-41 (Ed 1960, Hamlyn Lectures)
27-833 SCI/76
386
other Article of the Constitution stands thereby amended.
Article 359(1) provides for the passing of an order by the
President declaring that the right to move for the enforcing
of fundamental rights mentioned in the order shall be
suspended. That may, in effect, affect the jurisdiction of
the High Courts to entertain a petition for the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus. But that does not bring about any
amendment of Article 226 within the meaning of Article 368,
which speaks of amendments to the Constitution by the
Parliament in the exercise of its constitutional power.
Article 226 and Article 359(1) are parts of the same
fundamental instrument and a certain interpretation of one
of these Articles cannot amount to an amendment of the
other.

It is also not correct to say that any particular
interpretation of Article 359(1) will mean the abolition of
the jurisdiction and power of the Supreme Court under
Article 32 and of the High Courts under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The true implication of the Presidential order
is to take away the right of any person to move any court
for the enforcement of the rights mentioned in the order. In
strict legal theory the jurisdiction and powers of the
Supreme Court and the High Courts remain the same as before
since the Presidential order merely takes away the locus
standi of a person to move these Courts for the enforcement
of certain fundamental rights during the operation of the
Proclamation of Emergency. It is important to appreciate
that the drive of Article 359(1) is not against the courts
but is against individuals, the object of the Article being
to deprive the individual concerned of his normal right to
move The Supreme Court or the High Court for the enforcement
of The fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the
Constitution. In Sree Mohan Chowdhury v. The Chief
Commissioner, Union Territory of Tripura(1) a Constitution
Bench of this Court, dealing with an order issued by the
President on November 3, 1962 under Article 359(1),
observed:

"...Unquestionably, the Court's power to issue a
writ in the nature of Habeas corpus has not been
touched by the President's order, but the petitioner's
right to move this Court for a writ of that kind has
been suspended by the order of the President passed
under Art. 359 (1) . The President's order does not
suspend all the rights vested in citizen to move this
Court but only his right to enforce the provisions of
Arts. 21 and 22. Thus, as a result of the President's
order aforesaid, the petitioner's right to Move this
Court, but not this Court's power under Art. 32 has
been suspended during the operation of Emergency, with
the result that the petitioner by no locus standi to
enforce his right, if any, during the Emergency,
According to the respondents, the limited object of
Article 359(1) is to remove restrictions on the power of the
legislature so that during the operation of the emergency it
would be free to make laws in violation of the fundamental
rights specified ;11 the Presidential order. This argument
loses sight of the distinction between the provisions or
(1) [1964] 3 S. C.R. 442, 451
387Art. 358 and Art. 359(1A) on the one hand and of Art. 359(1)
on the other. Art. 358, of its own force, removes the
restrictions on the power of the Legislature to make laws
inconsistent with Art. 19 and on the power of the executive
to take action under a law which may thus violate Art. 19.

Article 358 does not suspend any right which was available
under Art. 19 to any person prior to the Proclamation of
Emergency. Under Art. 359(1) the President is empowered to
suspend the right of an individual to move any court for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III as may be
mentioned in the order. Consequent upon such order, all
proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the
rights so mentioned remain suspended during the period that
the Proclamation is in force or such shorter period as the
order may specify. Article 359 (1) is thus wider in scope
than Art. 358. This distinction has an important bearing on
the main point under consideration because it shows that it
was not enough to provide that nothing in Art. 19 shall
restrict the power of the State to make any law or to take
any executive action which the State would, but for the
provisions contained in Part III, be competent to make or
take. In order to effectuate the purposes of emergency, it
was necessary further to provide that no person would have
any right to move for the enforcement of his fundamental
rights mentioned hl the Presidential order and that pending
proceedings in that behalf shall remain suspended during the
operation of the emergency. It seems elementary that a
fundamental right can be enforced as much in regard to a law
which takes away that right contrary to the provisions of
the Constitution as against the Executive, if it acts
contrary to the provisions of a law or without the authority
of' law. In view of he language of Art. 359(1) and
considering the distinction between it and the provisions of
Art. 358, there is no justification for restricting the
operation of Art. 358 (1) as against laws made by the
Legislature in violation of the fundamental rights.

Reliance was placed by the respondents on the decisions
of this Court in Sree Mohan Chowdhury v. The Chief
Commissioner, Union Territory of Tripura(1) and Makhan Singh
v. State of Punjab(2) in support of their contention that
Art. 359(1) operates in the legislative and not in the
executive field. These decisions do not support such a
proposition. On the contrary, it is clear from the to
decisions that the effect of the Presidential order under
Art. 359(1) is to take away the locus standi of a person to
move any court for the enforcement or his fundamental rights
which are mentioned in the order. Neither of the two cases
deals directly with the question G whether the operation of
Art. 359(1) is restricted to the legislative field but, if
at all, the ratio of those cases may be logically extended
to cover executive acts also. During times of emergency, it
is the Executive which commits encroachments on personal
liberties and the object of Art. 359(1) is to empower the
President to suspend the right to move any court for the
enforcement of a right to complain against the actions of
the Executive, no less than against the
(1) [1964] 3 S. C. R. 142.

(2) [1964] 4 S. C. R. 797.

388

laws passed by The Legislature, if either the one or the
other contravenes any of the fundamental rights mentioned in
the order.

This position was controverted by the respondents from
several angles. It was contended that in a Constitution
which divides State functions into Executive. Legislative
and Judicial. the executive functions must be discharged
consistently with the laws passed by the Legislature and
the orders and decrees passed by the judiciary. The
suspension of the right to enforce fundamental rights cannot
confer any privilege on the Executive to flout the law by
which it is bound as much in times of emergency as in times
of peace. Therefore, the argument proceeds, there being a
valid law regulating preventive detention, namely the MISA,
every order of detention passed by the Executive must
conform to the conditions prescribed by that law. The
current of thought underlying this argument was highlighted
by a learned counsel for the respondents by saying that it
is strange that in the face of a law passed by the
Parliament, which in passing the law must assume that it
will be obeyed, the Executive can flout the law with
impunity by relying on the Presidential order issued under
Article 359(1). Yet another point of view presented on this
aspect of the case was that permitting the Executive to defy
and-disobey the law made by the Legislature is tentamount to
destroying one of the important basic features of the
Constitution that the Executive is bound by the laws made by
the Legislature. Finally, it was urged that the Preamble to
the Constitution speaks of a Sovereign Democratic Republic
and, therefore, the Executives which is subordinate to the
Legislature cannot act to the prejudice of the citizen save
to the extent permitted by laws validly made by the
Legislature which is the chosen representative of the
people.

In view of the true scope and object of Article 359(1),
which has already been dealt with above, these arguments
have to be rejected. In the first place, it is difficult to
appreciate the argument of 'basic features' because we are
not concerned to pronounce upon tile validity of an
amendment made to the Constitution by a parliamentary
measures. We are concerned to understand the scope of
Article 359(1) and what it implies. That Article is as much
a basic feature of the Constitution as any other and it
would be inappropriate to hold that because in normal times
the Constitution requires the Executive to obey the laws
made by the Legislature, therefore, Article 359(1) which is
an emergency measure, must be construed consistently with
that position. The argument of basic feature is wrong for
yet another reason that Article 359(1) does not provide that
the Executive is free to disobey the laws made by the
Legislature. Al the cost of repetition it must be said that
what Article 359(1) achieves is merely the suspension of the
right of an individual to move a court for the assertion of'
his fundamental rights which have been mentioned in the
Presidential order, even if such rights are contravened
either by the Legislature or by the Executive. To permit a
challenge in a court of law to an order of detention, which
is an executive action, on the ground that the order
violates a fundamental right mentioned in the Presidential
order, is to permit the detenu to enforce a fundamental
right during emergency in a manner
389
plainly contrary to Article 359(1). The language of that
Article, it is admitted on all hands, is clear and
unambiguous.

The constitutional consequences of a Proclamation of
Emergency are grave and far-reaching. Legislatures can,
during emergency, make laws in violation of the seven
freedom guaranteed by Article 19 the President has the power
to suspend the right to move for the enforcement of all or
any of the fundamental rights mentioned in the order issued
under Article 359(1); the Executive power of the Union
extends during emergencies to giving directions to any State
or to the manner in which the executive power thereof is to
be exercised. This particular power conferred on the Union
Executive is in total violation of the provisions of Article
162 of the Constitution and indeed of the federal structure
which is one of the principal features of our Constitution;
in any State Executive fails to comply with the directions
given by the Union Executive under Article 353(a), the
"President's rule" can be imposed on that State under
Article 356, in which event the Parliament is entitled under
Article 357(1) to confer on the President the power of the
Legislature of that State to make laws The Parliament can
even authorize the President to delegate such legislative
power to any other authority. The democratic structure of
the Constitution stands severely eroded in such a situation.
Finally, Parliament acquires during emergencies the power to
make laws on matters which are numerated in the State List.
If consequences so fundamentally subversive of the basic
federal structure of the Constitution can ensure during
emergencies, it is not as revolting as may be appear at
first sight that even if the Executive does not obey the
mandate of the Legislature, the citizen is powerless to move
any court for the protection of his fundamental rights, if
these rights are mentioned in the Presidential order.

A facet of the same argument was presented on behalf of
the respondents with even greater force. It was urged that
Art. 359(1) may remove fetters imposed by Part III but it
cannot ever remove the fetters arising from the principle of
rule of law or from the principle of the limited power of
the Executive under a system of checks and balances based on
separation of powers. The obligation cast on the Executive
to act in accordance with law does not, according to the
respondents, arise from any particular article of the
Constitution but it arises from the inherent compulsion of
the rule of law which is a central basic feature of our
constitutional system. The suspension of the right to
enforce Article 21 cannot automatically entail the
suspension of the rule of law because even during an
emergency the argument proceeds, the rule of law is not and
cannot be suspended. The Executive has a limited authority
under the Indian Constitution and it can act within the
residual area as it pleases, so long as it does not act to
the prejudice of the citizen. It is always incumbent on the
Executive to justify its action on the basis of law and
this, according to the respondents, is the principle of
legality or the rule of law.

The respondents' argument that all executive action
which operates to the prejudice of a person must have the
authority of law to support it is indisputably valid in
normal situations. In the absence of Proclamation of
Emergency and in the absence of a Presidential order
390Article 359(1) of the kind that we have in the instant case,
the I executive is under an obligation to obey the law and
if it acts to the prejudice of anyone by disobeying the law,
its action is liable to be challenged by an appropriate
writ. That the rule of law must prevail in normal times is
the rule of law under the Indian Constitution. But it is
necessary to clear a misconception. Even though the
compulsion to obey the law is a compulsion of normal times,
Article 358 takes in those cases only in which the executive
purports to act under the authority of a law. It does not
envisage that the executives can' act without the apparent
authority of law. In other words, Article 358 enables the
Legislature to make laws in violation of Article 19 and the
Executive to act under those laws, despite the fact that the
laws constitute an infringement of the fundamental rights
conferred by Article 19.

The argument of the respondents that the Presidential
order under Article 359(1) cannot ever suspend the rule of
law requires a close examination, particularly in view of
some of the decisions of this Court which apparently support
that contention.

In State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Thakur Bharat
Singh(1) the State Government, on April 24, 1963 made an
order under section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Security
Act, 1959 directing that the respondent shall not be in any
place in Raipur District, that he shall immediately proceed
to and reside in a named town and that he shall report daily
to a police station in that town. The order was challenged
by the respondent by a writ petition under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution on the ground that section 3
infringed the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article
19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution. The respondent
succeeded in the High Court which declared a part of the
order invalid on the ground that section 3 (1) (b) of the
Act was violative of Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution.
In appeal. it was contended in this Court on behalf of the
State Government that so long as the state of emergency
declared on October 20, 1962 was in force, the respondent
could not move the High Court by a petition under Article
226 on the plea that by the impugned order his fundamental
right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d) was infringed. It
was further contended on behalf of the State Government that
even if section 3(1)(b) was held to be void. Article 358
protected legislative as well as executive action taken
after the Proclamation of Emergency and therefore the order
passed by the Government after the emergency was declared
could not be challenged as infringing Article 19. Describing
this latter argument as involving "a grave fallacy" a
Constitution Bench of this Court dismissed the State's
anneal holding, that for acts done to the prejudice of the
respondent after the declaration of emergency under Article

352. no immunity from" the process of the Court could be
claimed under Article 358 of the Constitution since the
order was not supported by and, valid legislation. Shah J
who spoke on behalf of the Bench observed in his judgment
that an executive action which operates to the prejudice of
any person must have the authority of law to support it and
that the
(1) [1967] 2 S.C.R.454
391
terms of Article 358 do not detract from that rule. Article
358, according to this Court, did not purport to invest the
State with arbitrary authority to take action to the
prejudice of citizens and others but it merely provides that
so long as the Proclamation of Emergency subsists, laws may
be enacted and executive action may be taken in pursuance of
lawful authority, which if the provisions of Article 19 were
operative would have been invalid.

It is important to bear in mind that Bharat Singh's
case was concerned with a pre-emergency law, though the
impugned order was passed thereunder during the operation of
emergency. The law having been passed in 1959, which was
before the declaration of emergency, it had to comply with
Article 19 and if it did not, it was void to the extent of
the inconsistency. Since the law was held to be violative of
Article 19 it could not claim any protection under Article

358. That article lifts restrictions on legislative power
"while a proclamation of Emergency is in operation," that is
to say, it enables laws to be made during the emergency,
ever if they conflict with Article 19. The executive is then
free to act under those laws. But, if the law is void for
the reason that having been made prior to the emergency it
violates Article 19, or if there is no law at all under the
purported authority of which the executive has acted, the
executive action is not protected by Article 358. Bharat
Singh's case is distinguishable for the additional reason
that it was only concerned with the effect of Article 358
and no question arose therein with regard to any executive
action infringing a fundamental right mentioned in a
Presidential order issued under Article 359(1). I have
already indicated the vital difference between Article 358
and Article 359(1). The latter bars the enforcement of any
fundamental right mentioned in the Presidential order,
thereby rendering it incompetent for any person to complain
of its violation whether the violation is by the Legislature
or by the Executive. In other words, Article 359(1) bars the
remedy by depriving an grieved person of his locus to
complain of the violation, of such of his fundamental rights
as are mentioned in the Presidential Order.

Respondents also relied in support of the same
submission on the decisions of this Court in District
Collector of Hyderabad & ors. v. M/s. 'Ibrahim & Co. etc.(1)
Bennett Coleman & Co. and ors. v. Union of India & ors.,(2)
and Shree Meenakshi Milk Ltd. v. Union of India. (3) These
decisions are founded on the same principle as Bharat
Singh's case and are distinguishable for the same reason. In
Ibrahim case. the existing licences of recognised dealers in
sugar were cancelled by the State Government and a monopoly
licence was given to a Cooperative Stores thereby preventing
the dealers by a mere executive order from carrying on their
business. A question arose in the appeal whether the order
of the State Government canceling the licences of the
dealers was protected under Articles 358 and
(1) [1970] 3 S. C. R. 498.

(2) [1973] 2 S. C. R. 757, 773 775.

(3) [1974] 2 S. C. R. 398, 405, 406 and 428
392
359 the Constitution as the President had declared a state
of emergency on October 20, 1962. This question was answered
in the negative on the ground that the executive order which
was immune from attack is only that order which the State
was competent to make but for the provisions contained in
Article 19. Since the executive action of the State
Government was invalid apart from Article 19, it was not
immune from attack merely because a Proclamation of
Emergency was in operation. The important point of
distinction is that in Ibrahim's case, the impugned order
was not made under the authority reserved by the Defence of
India ordinance or the rules made thereunder but was issued
merely in pursuance of the policy laid down by the Central
Government in entrusting the distribution of sugar
exclusively to co-operative societies. In Bennett Coleman
Company's case the impugned Newsprint Control Policy was an
emanation of the old policy which was enunciated prior to
the Proclamation of Emer ency. Relying on Ibrahim's case and
Bharat Singh's case, this Court held that Article 358 does
not authorise the taking of detrimental executive action
during the emergency without any legislative authority or in
purported exercise of power conferred by a pre-emergency law
which was invalid when enacted. The decision in Bennett
Coleman Company's case was followed in Meenakshi Mills' case
where the executive action taken during the emergency did
not have the authority of any valid law and the impugned
orders having been made under a pre-emergency law were not
immune from attack under Article 358.

Respondents relied on a passage in the judgment of
Ramaswami who spoke on behalf of the Court in' Chief
Settlement Commissioner, Rehabilitation Department, Punjab &
Ors etc. v. Om Parkash & ors. etc.,(1) to the. effect that
whatever legislative Power the executive administration
possesses must be derived directly from the delegation of
the legislature and exercised validly only within the limits
prescribed. The Court emphatically rejected the notion of
inherent or autonomous law-making power in the executive
administration of the country and observed that the rule of
law rejects the conception of the Dual State in which
governmental action is placed in a privileged position of
immunity from control by law on the ground that such a
notion is foreign to our basic constitutional connects.
Respondents also relied upon the decision of the privy
council in Eshuqbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the
Government of Nigeria (2) where Lord Atkin observed that in
accordance with the British jurisprudence no member of the
Executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a
British subject except on the condition that he can support
the legality of his action before a Court of Justice. Our
attention was repeatedly drawn to a further observation made
by Lord Atkin that it is a tradition of British justice that
judges should not shrink from deciding such issues in the
face of the executive. These observations have been
considered by this court in Makhan Shingh's case where,
speaking of behalf of the majority, Gajendragad-

(1) [1968]3 S. C. R. 655. 661.

(2) [1931] A. C. 662, 670.

393

kar J. said that the sentiments expressed by Lord Aktin were
noble and eloquent but it was necessary to have regard to
the provision of our Constitution by which were governed and
which has itself made emergency provisions in order to
enable the nation to meet the challenge of external
aggression or internal disturbance. The principle enunciated
in Eleko's case, however lofty and stirring, has no
relevance here because we have to consider the meaning and
effect of Article 359 (1) which has no parallel in the
English law. Eleko's principle is unquestionably supreme in
times of peace and so is the validity of the observations
made by Ramaswami J. in Om Prakash's case. Both of those
cases were concerned with a totally different problem, the
problem of peace, not of war or internal disturbance.

The 'Rule of Law' argument like the 'Basic Feature'
argument is intractable. Emergency provisions contained in
Part XVIII of the Constitution which Lure designed Lo
protect the security of the State are as important as any
other provision of the Constitution. If the true
constriction and effect of article 359(1) is as I have
stated it to be, it is impossible to hold that such a
construction violates the rule of law. The rule of law,
during an emergency, is as one finds it in the provisions
contained in Chapter XVIII of the Constitution. There cannot
be a brooding and omnipotent rule of law drowning in its
effervescence the emergency provisions of the Constitution.

The Advocate General of Gujarat had peculiar problems
to voice. arising out of the fluid and uncertain political
situation in his State. He was unable to appreciate how the
Executive Government of the State could defy a parliamentary
mandate contained in the MISA, either as regards the
procedural or the substantive part of that law. Whatever may
be the requirements of emergency he seemed to contend, the
Gujarat Government could not, save at grave peril to its
existence, defy the provisions of a law made by the
Parliament. The anguish and embarrassment of the learned
Advocate General is understandable, but the short, answer to
his contention is that, on the record. the Government of
Gujarat has not been asked to flout the MISA and indeed no
one can dispute the right of the State Government to ensure
compliance with the laws of the land. Indeed that is its
plain and foremost duty. The important consideration is that
in the event of State Government coming to pass an order of
detention in violation of MlSA the detenu will have no right
to enforce his Corresponding fundamental right if it is
mentioned in the Presidential order. The learned Advocate
General built his argument as if. during emergencies, the
executive is under an obligation to flout the law or the h
ind. Article 359(1) neither compets nor condones the
breaches by the executive of the laws made by the
legislature. Such condonation is the function of an Act of
Indemnity.

I must now take up for consideration a very important
plank of the respondents' argument that Article 21 is not
the sole repository of the right to life and personal
liberty This argument has been presented before us from
aspects too numerous to mention and scores of instances have
been cited to buttress it. This was to some extent
inevitable because quite a few counsel argued the same point
and each
394
had his peculiar, favourite accent. I will try to compress
the arguments without, I hope, sacrificing their thematic
value
The respondents' arguments may be put thus:
(1) Article 21 is not the sole repository of the right
to personal liberty because that right can be found in
Articles 19(1) (b), 20 and 22 also. In view of the decision
in the Bank Nationalisation(1) case, which overruled
Gopalan's case, these rights are not mutually exclusive and
therefore the suspension of the right to enforce Article 21
cannot affect the right conferred by Articles 19, 20 and 22.

(2) Article 21 is not the sole repository of the right
to personal liberty because, (i) an accused convicted of
murder and sentenced to death can assert his right to life
by challenging the conviction and sentence in appeal, in
spite of the Presidential order under Article 359(1); (ii)
if a person is wrongfully confined. he can ask for his
personal liberty by prosecuting the offender in spite of the
Presidential order; and (iii) if a money-decree is passed
against the Government, the decree can lie enforced even if
the right to enforce the right to property is suspended by
the 'Presidential order.

(3) Prior to the enactment of the Constitution
statutory, contractual and common law rights were in
existence and those rights can be taken away only by the
Legislature. They cannot be affected by the Presidential
order. The pre-Constitution common law and statutory rights
to personal liberty continued in force by reason of Article
372 of the Constitution, since those rights were not
repugnant to any provision of the Constitution. If the
fundamental right to personal liberty is suspended by the
Presidential order, the pre-Constitution laws will begin to
operate by reason of the their of eclipse. There is no
authority for the proposition that on the conferment of
fundamental rights by the Constitution, the corresponding
pre-existing rights Merged in the fundamental rights and
that with the suspension of fundamental rights, the
corresponding pre-existing rights also got suspended.
Article 21 is different in content from the common law right
to personal liberty which was available against private
individuals also. Since Article 21 merely elevates the right
of personal liberty to the status of a fundamental right,
the pre-Constitution rights cannot be suspended by the
Presidential order. The object of Article 21 is to give and
not to take. In fact, the very language of that Article
shows that instead of conferring the right to personal
liberty, it assumed its existence in the first place and
then proceeded by a negative provision to prohibit its
deprivation. Examples of such pre-Constitution rights are:

(2) [1950] S. C. R. 88,
395
(4) Non-fundamental constitutional rights like those
arising under Articles 256, 265 and 361(3) or natural rights
or contractual rights or the statutory rights to personal
liberty are not affected by the Presidential order.
Statutory rights can only be taken away in terms of the
statute and not by an executive flat. By reason of Article

256. the executive power of every state must ensure
compliance with the laws made by the Parliament. The
executive power of the States must therefore comply with
section 56 and 57 of the Criminal Procedure Code and a
person aggrieved by the violation of those provisions can
enforce his statutory right to personal liberty in spite of
the Presidential order. By Article 265 no tax can be levied
or collected except by authority of law. A person affected
by the violation of this provision can enforce his right to
property even if Article 19 is suspended. If a process
happens to be issued against the Governor of a State in
contravention of Article 361(3), the Governor can exercise
his right to personal liberty despite the Presidential order
under Article 359(1) . Similarly, in cases not covered by
section 16A of the MISA, if the Advisory Board opines that
the detention is unjustified, the detenu can compel the
Government to accept that opinion, in spite of the
Presidential order.

(5) Even after the passing of a Presidential order,
Parliament may create new rights to personal liberty and
such rights can be enforced in spite of the Presidential
order.

(6) Civil liberty or personal liberty is not a
conglomeration of position rights. It operates in an area of
free action and no law can possibly curtail it.

(7) If a law affecting the fundamental right to
personal liberty is void for want of legislative
competence., it can be challenged in spite of the
Presidential order
(8) The suspension of the right to enforce personal
liberty cannot confer a licence on executive officers to
commit offences against the law of the land, and if they do
so, they can be brought to book in spite of the Presidential
order.

I look at the question posed by the respondents from a
different angle. The emergency provisions of the
Constitution are designed to protect the Security of the
State and in order to achieve that purpose, various powers
have been conferred on the Parliament and the President by
Chapter XVIII of the Constitution. One of such powers is to
be found in Article 359(1) under which the President, during
the operation of the emergency, can issue an order
suspending the right to move any court for the enforcement
of all or any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part
III. Proceedings commenced prior to the issuance of such an
order, including proceeding s taken prior to the declaration
of the emergency itself, automatically remain suspended
during the emergency or for such shorter period as the
President may in his order specify. The object of empowering
the President to issue an order under Article 359(1)
suspending the enforcement of the right to personal liberty
conferred by Part III of the
396
Constitution cannot be to save all other rights to personal
liberty except the one conferred by Part III, which to the
seems totally devoid of meaning and purpose. There is
nothing peculiar in the content of the right to personal
liberty conferred by Part III so that the Constitution
should provide only for the suspension of the right to
enforce that particular kind of right, leaving all other
rights to personal liberty intact and untouched. In times of
emergencies the executive, unquestionably though
unfortunately, is constrained to take various forms of
action in derogation of the rights of citizens and others,
including the cherished right to personal liberty. The
Constitution aims at protecting the executive, during the
operation of emergency, from attacks on the action taken by
it in violation of the rights of individuals. Accordingly,
in so far as the right to personal liberty, for example, is
concerned one of the objects of the emergency pro visions is
to ensure that no proceeding will be taken or continued to
enforce that right against the executive during the
operation of the emergency. The executive is then left free
to devote its undiluted attention to meeting the threat to
the security of the State. This purpose cannot ever be
achieved by interpreting Article 359(1) to mean that every
right to personal liberty shall be enforceable and every
proceeding involving the enforcement of such right shall
continue during the emergency, except to the extent to which
the right is conferred by Part III of the Constitution, The
existence of the right to personal liberty in the pre-
Constitution period was surely known to the makers of the
Constitution. The assumption underlying the respondent's
argument is that in spite of that knowledge, the Constituent
Assembly decided that all those rights will reign supreme in
their pristine glory even during the emergency and what will
remain in abeyance is only the enforcement of the right to
personal liberty conferred by Part III. The right to
personal liberty has no hallmark and therefore when the
right is put in action it is impossible to identify whether
the right is one given by the Constitution or is one which
existed in the pre-Constitution era. If the arguments of the
respondents is correct no action to enforce the right to
personal liberty can at all fall within the mischief of the
presidential order even if it mentions Articles19, 20, 21
and 22 because, every preliminary objection by the
Government to a petition to enforce the right to personal
liberty can be effectively answered by contending that what
is' being enforced is either the natural right to personal
liberty or generally, the pre-Constitution right to personal
liberty. The error of the respondents' argument lies in its
assumption, and in regard to the argument of some of the
counsel in the major articulate premise, that the
qualitative content of the non-constitutional or pre-
constitutional right to personal liberty is different from
the content of the right to personal liberty conferred by
Part III of the Constitution. The right to personal liberty
is the right or the individual to personal freedom. nothing
more and nothing less. That right along with certain other
rights was elevated to the status of a fundamental right in
order that it may not be tinkered with and in order that a
mere majority should not be able to trample over it. Article
359 (1) enables the President to suspend the enforcement
even of those rights which were sanctified by being lifted
out of the common morass of human rights. If the enforcement
of the fundamental
397
rights can be suspended during an emergency, it is hard to
accepts That the right to enforce non-fundamental rights
relating to the same subject matter should remain alive.

Article 359(1) contains three important clauses: (1)
The Proclamation of Emergency must be in operation at the
time when the President issues his order; (2) The President
must issue an order declaring the suspension of the right to
move any court; and (3) The power of the President to
declare such suspension can extend to such rights only as
are conferred by Part III. If these three conditions are
satisfied, no person can move any court for the enforcement
of such of the rights conferred by Part III as are mentioned
in the Presidential order.

The first and foremost question to ask when a
proceeding is filed to enforce a right as against the
Government while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation
is, whether the right is mentioned in the Presidential order
and whether it is the Kind of right conferred by Part III.
Article 21, for example, confers the right to life and
personal liberty. The power of the President therefore
extends under Article 359(1) to the suspension of the right
to move any court for the enforcement of the right to life
and personal liberty. The President cannot suspend the
enforcement of any right unless that right is included in
Part III which confers fundamental rights. The President, in
my opinion, would be acting within the strict bounds of his
constitutional power if, instead of declaring the suspension
of the right to enforce the right conferred by Article 21 he
were to declare that "the right not to be deprived of life
and personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law" shall remain suspend during the
emergency.

Article 359 (1) does not really contemplate that while
declaring the suspension of the right to move any court, the
President must or should specify the Article or the Articles
of the Constitution the enforcement of rights conferred by
which shall be suspended. What Article 359 (1) contemplates
is that the President can declare the suspension of the
right to move any court for the enforcement cf the rights
mentioned in Part III. The words "conferred by Part III"
which occur in Article 359(1) are not intended to exclude or
except from the preview of the Presidential order, rights of
the same variety or kind as are mentioned in Part III but
which were in existence prior to the Constitution or can be
said to be in existence in the post Constitution era, apart
from the Constitution. The emphasis of the Article is not
the right to suspend the enforcement of the kind of rights
mentioned in Part III and not on the fact that those rights
are conferred by Part III. To put it differently. the words
''conferred by Part III" are used only in order to identity
the particular rights the enforcement of which can be
suspended by the President and not in order to impose a
limitation on the power of' the President so as to put those
rights which exist or which existed apart from the
Constitution, beyond the reach of' the Presidential order.
The respondents by their petitions are enforcing their right
to personal liberty and that right is a right conferred by
or mentioned in Part III or the Consti
398
tution. As I have said above, if instead of saying that the
right to enforce the right conferred by Article 21 shall be
suspended the President were to say that the right not to be
deprived of life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law will remain suspended, no
argument of the kind made before us could reasonably have
been made. The true effect of the Presidential order, though
worded in the way it is, is the same as it would have been,
had it been worded in the manner I have indicated.

It therefore does not make any difference whether any
right to personal liberty was in existence prior to the
enactment of the Constitution, either by way of a natural
right, statutory right, common law right or a right
available under the law of torts. Whatever may be the source
of the right and whatever may be its justification, the
right in essence and substance is the right to personal
liberty. That rights having been included in Part III, its
enforcement will stand suspended if it is mentioned in the
Presidential order issued under Article 359(1).

The view which I have taken above as regards the scope
and meaning of Article 359(1) affords in my opinion a
complete answer to the contention of the respondents that
since Article 21 is not the 1) sole repository of the right
to personal liberty, the suspension of the right to enforce
the right conferred by that Article cannot affect the right
to enforce the right of personal liberty which existed apart
from that Article. I have held that on a true interpretation
of the terms of the Presidential order read with Article
359(1), what is suspended is the right to move for the
enforcement of the right to personal liberty whether that
right is conferred by Constitution or exists apart from and
independently of it. Otherwise, the Constitution has only
done much ado about nothing.

All the same I would like, briefly, to deal with the
argument of the respondents on its own merit, particularly
the illustrations cited in support of that argument.

It is true that in view of the decision in the Bank
Nationalisation case,(1) the right conferred by Articles 21
and 19 cannot be treated as mutually exclusive. But the
suspension of the right to enforce the right of personal
liberty means the suspension of that right wherever it is
found unless its content is totally different as from one
Article to another-. The "right conferred by Article 21" is
only a description of the right of personal liberty in order
to facilitate its exact identification and such a
description cannot limit the operation of the Presidential
order to those cases only where the right to personal
liberty is claimed under Article 21.

The circumstance that the pre-Constitution rights
continued in force after the enactment of the Constitution
in view of Article 372 does not make any difference to this
position because, even assuming that certain rights to
personal liberty existed before the Constitution and
continued thereafter as they were not repugnant to any
provision
(1) [1970] 3 S. C. R. 530, 578
399
of the Constitution, all rights to personal liberty having
the same content as the right conferred by Article 21 would
fall within the mischief of the Presidential order.

The theory of 'eclipse' has no application to such
cases because; that theory applies only when a pre-
Constitution law becomes devoid of legal force on the
enactment of the Constitution by reason of its repugnancy to
any provision of the Constitution. Such laws are not void
but they are under an eclipse so long as the repugnancy
lasts. When the repugnancy is removed, the eclipse also is
removed and he law becomes valid.

As regards the doctrine of 'merger' it is unnecessary
to go to the length of saying that every prior right to
personal liberty merged in the right to personal liberty
conferred by Part III. Whether it merged or not, it cannot
survive the declaration of suspension if the true effect of
the Presidential order is the suspension of the right to
enforce all and every right to personal liberty. In that
view, it would also make no difference whether the right to
personal liberty arises from a statute or from a contract or
from a constitutional provision contained in some Part other
than Part III.

As regards the illustrations, it is neither proper nor
possible to take each one of them separately and answer
them. Hypothetical illustrations cannot establish a point
and practical difficulties have to be solved as and when
they arise. But some of the more important illustrations
taken by the respondents' counsel seem to me to have a
simple answer. For example, when an accused challenges his
conviction for murder and the sentence of death imposed on
him for that offence, his remedy by way of an appeal is not
barred by the Presidential order because he is only trying
to get rid of a judgment which holds him guilty of murder.
It is not he who moved the court for his personal liberty
but it is the prosecution which dragged him to the court to
prove the charge of murder against him. The accused only
defends the charge of criminality whether it is in the trial
court or in a higher court. Similarly, if a person is
wrongfully confined, the prosecution of the offender is not
intended or calculated to secure the personal liberty of the
victim he court may in proper cases pass an order releasing
the complainant from wrongful confinement but the true
object of the prosecution is to punish the person who has
committed an offence against the penal law of the land. As
regards decretal rights against the Government, what the
decree-holder enforces in execution is not his right to
property. The original cause of action Merges in the decree
and therefor what is put into execution is the rights
arising under the decree. The illustration regarding The
issuance of a process against the Governor of a State need
not be pursued seriously because such an event is hardly
ever likely to happen and id it does, the gubernatorial
rights may possibly withstand the Presidential order under
Article 359(1) . As regards the flouting of the opinion of
the Advisory Board by the Government, a writ of mandamus
compelling the Government to obey the mandate of the law may
perhaps stand on a different hooting as the very nature of
such a proceeding is basically different. Lastly, it is
unrealistic to believe that after the passing of the
Presidential order suspending the
400
existing constitutional rights, Parliament would create new
rights to personal liberty so as to nullify the effect of
the Presidential order. The easier way for the Parliament
would be to disapprove of the Proclamation of emergency when
it is placed before it under Article 352(2) (b) of the
Constitution or to disapprove of the Presidential order
issued under Article 359(1) when it is placed before it
under Article 359(3) of the Constitution. But as I have said
earlier, it is difficult to furnish a clear and cogent
answer to hypothetical illustrations. In the absence of
necessary facts one can only make an ad hoc answer, as I
have attempted to do regarding the possible issuance of a
process against the Governor of a State. Actually, Article
361(3) speaks of a "Process" for the arrest or imprisonment
of a Governor issuing from any court. Fundamental rights can
be exercised as against judicial orders but the
circumstances in which such
a process may come to be issued, if at all, may conceivably
affect the decision of the question whether a presidential
order issued under Article 359(1) can bar the remedy of an
aggrieved Governor.

In so far as the illustrative cases go, I would like to
add that Article 256 which was chosen by the respondents as
the basis of an illustration cases not seem to confer any
right on any individual. That Article appears in Part XI
which deals with relations between the Union and the States.
A failure to comply with Article 256 may attract serious
consequences but no court is likely to entertain a
grievances at the instance of the private party that Article
256 has not been complied with by a State Government. As
regards the claim to personal liberty founded on a challenge
to an order on the ground of excessive delegation, I prefer
to express no firm opinion though the greater probability is
that such a challenge may fail in face of a Presidential
order of the kind which has been passed in the instant case.

I have held above that the existence of common law
rights prior to the Constitution will not curtail the
operation of the Presidential order by excepting those
rights from the purview of the order. I may add that the
decision of this Court in Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil v. The
State of Bombay(1) is an authority for the proposition that
if any pre-Constitution right has been elevated as a
fundamental right by its incorporation in Part III, the pre-
existing right and the fundamental right are to be
considered as having been grouped together as fundamental
rights "conferred" by the Constitution. The decision in
Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab) also shows that once right
to obtain a direction in the nature of habeas corpus became
in 1923 a statutory right to a remedy after the enactment of
section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was not
open to any party to ask for a writ of habeas corpus as a
matter of common law.

It was contended for the respondents that the High
Court have jurisdiction under Article 226 to issue writs and
directions not only for the enforcement of fundamental
rights but "for any other purpose" and since by their
petitions they had really asserted their non-

(1) [1955] 1 S. C. R. 691.

(2) [1964] 4 S. C. R. 797, 818-819.

401

fundamental rights the High Courts had the jurisdiction to
issue appropriate writs or directions upholding those rights
in spite of the Presidential order. This argument cannot be
accepted because the entire claim of the resonants is that
the order of detention are in violation of the MISA, which
in substance means that the respondents have been deprived
of their personal liberty in violation of Article 21 of the
Constitution. By that Article, no person can be deprived of
his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law. The grievance of the respondents is that
they have been deprived of their personal liberty in
violation of the procedure established or prescribed by the
MISA. In substance therefor they are complaining of the
violation of a fundamental right, which it is not open to
them to do in view of the Presidential order by which the
right to move any court for the enforcement of the right
conferred by Article 21 has been suspended.

This judgment, long as it is, will be incomplete
without least a brief discussion of some of the important
decisions of this Court which were referred to during the
course of arguments time and again. Before doing so, a
prefatory observation seems called for. The Earl of Halsbury
L. C. said in Quinn v. Leathem(') that the generality of the
expressions which may be found in a judgment are not
intended to be expositions of the whole law but are governed
and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which
such expression are to be found. This Court in the State of
orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra & Ors.(2) uttered the
caution that it is not a profitable task to extract a
sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it
because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not
every observation found therein. Counsel have not done any
such shearing but I thought I might beging the study of
cases with I se1f-admonition.

A decision of this Court on which the greatest reliance
was placed by the respondents is Makhan Singh v. State of
Punjab (3) The appellants therein were detained under Rule
30(l ) (b) of the Defence of India Rules made by the Central
Government under section 3 of the Defence of India
Ordinance, 1962. They applied for their release to the
Punjab and Bombay High Court under section 491(1)(b) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure? their contention being that
certain section of the Defence of India Act and Rule 30(l)

(b) of the Defence of India Rules were unconstitutional
since they contravened their fundamental rights under
Articles 14, 21 and 22(4) (5) and (7) of the Constitution.
The High Court held that in view of the Presidential order
which was issued on November 3, 1962 under Art. 359(1) of
the Constitution, the petitions of habeas corpusfiled by the
appellants were barred. Being aggrieved by the orders
dismissing their petitions, the detenus filed appeals in
this Court which were heard by a Constitution Bench
consisting of 7 Judges. The judgment of the majority was
delivered by Ganjendragadkar J. Sulbba Rao J. gave a
dissenting judgment.

(1) [1901] A. C. 495, 506.

(2) [1968] 2 S. C. R. 154, 163.

(3) [1964l 4 S. C. R. 797.

28-833 Supr Cl/76
402
Both the majority and the minority judgments agree that
the Presidential order would take away the right to move the
Supreme Court under Art. 32 and the High Court under Art.
226 for the enforcement of the rights mentioned in the
order. But while the majority took the view that the
petition under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code
was also barred, Subha Rao J. held that the petitioners'
right to ask for relief by filing an application under
section 491 was not affected by the Presidential order. This
difference in the view of the majority and the minority is
now of no consequence as section 491 has ceased to be on the
Statute Book after April 1, 1974 when the new Code of
Criminal Procedure came into force.

The conclusion of the Court in Makhan Singh's case may
be summed up thus:

1. Art. 359 is reasonably capable of only one
construction as its language is clear and
unambiguous.

2. The suspension of Art. 19 contemplated by Art. 358
removes during the pendency of the emergency the
fetters created on the legislative and executive
powers by Art. 19 and if the legislatures make
laws or the executive commits acts which are
inconsistent with the rights guaranteed by Art.
19, their validity is not open to challenge either
during the continuance of the emergency or even
thereafter.

3. As soon as the Proclamation ceases to operate, the
legislative enactments passed and the executive
actions taken during the course of the said
emergency shall be inoperative to the extent to
which they conflict with the rights guaranteed
under Art. 19 because as soon as the emergency is
lifted, Art. 19 which was suspended during
emergency is automatically revived and begins to
operate.

4. Art. 359, on the other hand, does not purport
expressly to suspend any of the fundamental
rights. What the Presidential order purports to do
by virtue of the power conferred of the President
by Art. 359 ( 1 ) is to bar the remedy of the
citizens to move any court for the enforcement of
the specified rights.

5. The Presidential order cannot widen the authority
of the legislatures or the executive; it merely
suspends the rights to move any court to claim a
relief on the ground that the rights conferred by
Part III have been contravened if the said right
are specified in the order. If at the expiration
of the Presidential order, Parliament passes any
legislation to protect executive action taken
during the pendency of the Presidential order and
afford indemnity to the executive in that behalf,
the validity and the effect of such legislative
action may have to be carefully scrutinised.

403

6. The words "the right to move any court" which
occur Art. 359(1) refer to the right to move any
court of . competent jurisdiction including both
the Supreme Court and the High Court.

7. In determining the question as to whether a
particular proceeding falls within the mischief of
the Presidential order or not, what has to be
examined is not so much the form which the
proceeding has taken, or the words in which the
relief is claimed, as the substance of the matter
and whether before granting the relief claimed by
the citizen it would be necessary for the Court to
enquire into the question whether any of his
specified fundamental rights have been
contravened. If any relief cannot be granted to
the citizen without determining The question of
the alleged infringement of the said specified
fundamental rights that is a proceeding which
falls under Art. 359(1) and would, therefore, be
hit by the Presidential order issued under the
said Article.

8. The right to ask for a writ in the nature of
habeas cor pus which could once have been treated
as matter of Common Law has become a statutory
right after 1923, and after section 491 was
introduced in the Cr. P. C., it was not open to
any citizen in India to claim the writ of habeas
corpus on grounds recognised by Common Law apart
from the provision of s. 491(1)(b) itself.

9. Whether or not the proceedings taken under s. 491
(1) (b) fall within the purview of the
Presidential order, must depend upon the
construction of Art. 359 ( 1 ) and the order, and
in dealing with this point, one must look at the
substance of the matter and not its form.

10. It is true that there are two remedies open to a
party whose right of personal freedom has been
infringed; he may move the Court for a writ under
Art. 226(1) of Art. 32(1) of the Constitution, or
he may take a proceeding under s. 491(1)(b) of the
Code. But despite the fact that either of the two
remedies can be adopted by a citizen who has been
detained improperly or illegally, the right which
he claims is the same if the remedy sought for is
based on the ground that there has been a breach
of his fundamental rights; and that is a right
guaranteed to the citizen by the Constitution, and
so, whatever is the form of the remedy adopted by
the detenu, the right which he is seeking to
enforce is the same. Therefore the prohibition
contained in Art. 359(1) and the Presidential
order will apply as much to proceedings under s.
491(])(b) is to those under Art., 226(1) & Art.
32(1).

11. If the detenu is prohibited from asking for and
order of release on account of the Presidential
order, it would not
404
be open to him to claim a mere declaration either
under A s. 491 or under Articles 32 or 226 that
the detention unconstitutional or void.

12. The right specified in Art. 359(1) includes the
relevant right, whether it is statutory,
constitutional or constitutionally guaranteed.

After recording these conclusions the majority judgment
proceeded to consider the question as to which are the pleas
which are open to a person to take in challenging the
legality or the propriety of his detention, either under
section 491 ( I ) (b) or under Art. 226(1 ) . The
conclusions of the Court on this question are as follows:-

(a) "If in challenging the validity of his
detention order, the detenu is pleading any
right outside the rights specified in the
order, his right to move any court in that
behalf is not suspended, because it is
outside Art. 359(1) and consequently outside
the Presidential order itself." (Emphasis
supplied) Accordingly if a detenu is detained
in violation of the mandatory provisions of
the Act it would be open to him to contend
that his detention is illegal. "Such a plea
is outside Art. 359(1) and the right of the
detenu to move for his release on such a
ground cannot be affected by the Presidential
order.'`

(b) The exercise of a power malafide is wholly
outside the scope of the Act conferring the
power and` can always be successfully
challenged.

(c) It is only in regard to that class of cases
falling under s. 491(1)(b) where the legality
of the detention is challenged on grounds
which fall under Art. 359(1) and the
Presidential order that bar would operate. In
all other cases falling under s. 491(1) the
bar would be inapplicable and proceedings
taken on behalf of the detenu will have to be
tried in accordance with law.

(d) If a detenu contends that the operative
provision of the law under which he is
detained suffers from the vice of excessive
delegation and is, therefore. ill valid, the
plea thus raised by the detenu cannot at the
threshold be said to be barred by the
Presidential order. In terms, it is not plea
which is relatable to the fundamental rights
specified in the said order. lt is a piea
which is independent of the said rights and
its validity must be examined. (The Court,
however, rejected the contention that the
impugned provisions of the Act suffered from
the vice of excessive delegation.)
405
No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. Though
the judgment of the majority contain the conclusions set out
in (a) to (d) above, I see no doubt that these conclusions
owe their justification to the peculiar wording of the
Presidential order which was issued in that case. The order
dated November 3, 1962, which was the subject matter of
Makhan Singh's case, has been set out at the beginning of
this judgment. That order suspends the right of a person to
enforce the rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and 22 "if.
such person has been deprived of any such rights under the
Defence of India Ordinance, 1962 (4 of 1962) or any rule or
order made thereunder". The Presidential order dated June
27, 1975 with which we are concerned in the instant case
docs not contain ally clause similar to the one extracted
above from the order dated November 3, 1962. The inclusion
of that clause ill the earlier order has a significant
impact on the question under consideration because, under
the earlier Presidential order the right to Move the court
was taken away only i-f a person was deprived of his rights
under the Defence of India ordinance or under any rule or
order made under the ordinance. A petition for habeas corpus
file(l during the operation of the Presidential order dated
November 3, 1962 was not barred at the threshold because
the detenu was entitled to satisfy the court that though his
detention purported to be under the Defence of India
Ordinance or the Rules it was in fact not so. The detenu
could establish this by satisfying the court that the
detaining authority had no power to detain him, which could
be shown by pointing out that the pre-conditions of the
power to detain were not fulfilled. It was also open to the
petitioner to establish that the order was vitiated by mala
fides because a mala fide order has no existence in the eye
of law and mala fides would take the order out or the
statute.

The same state of affairs continued under the two
subsequent Presidential orders dated November 16, 1 974 and
December 23 , l974. All the three orders were conditional
and were dependent for their application on the fulfillment
of the condition that the person concerned was deprived of
his rights under the Defence of India ordinance or any rule
or order made under it. The Presidential order of June 27,
1975 makes a conscious and deliberate departure from the
three earlier orders, the object obviously being to deprive
the detenu of the argument that he has been detained under
an order only purports to have been passed under a
particular Act but is ill fact n derogation thereof, the
terms of the Act having not been complied with. The order of
June 27, 1975 is not subject to ally condition-precedent for
its application and, therefore, there is no question of the
detenu satisfying the court that any pre-condition of the
power of detention has not fulfilled. Some of the
observations in Makhan Singh case may appear to support the
argument that certain pleas which are refferred to therein
are outside the scope of Article 359(1) itself. Which great
respect, those observations really mean that the pleas are
outside the Presidential order. Article 359(1) is only an
enabling provision and the validity of a plea cannot be
tested which reference to that Article. The right to move a
court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part
III is not taken away by Article 359 (1)406
It is the Presidenial order passed in pursuance of the
powers conferred by, that Article by which such a
consequence can be brought about.

It would be useful in this connection to refer Lo the
decision of this Court in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of
Bihar & ors.(') The appellant therein was also detained
under rule 30(l)(b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, and
he moved this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for
his release. the petition was argued on the basis that it
was filed for the enforcement of the right to personal
liberty under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. A
preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the Government
that the petition was barred by reason of the Presidential
order dated November 3, 1962, the same as in Makhan Singh's
case (supra) Sarkar J., who shared the majority view
repelled the preliminary objection by saying that the
petition could have been dismissed at the threshold if the
order of November 3, 1962 were to take away all rights to
personal liberty under Articles 21 and 22. According to the
learned Judge, the particular Presidential order did not do
so in that, it was a conditional order which deprived a
person of his right to move a court for the enforcement of a
right to personal liberty only if he was deprived of it by
the Defence of India Act or any rule or order made under it.
"If he has not been so deprived, the order does not take
away his right to move a court." This shows that if the
first Presidential order was unconditional like the order in
the instant case, Dr. Lohia's petition would have been
rejected by this Court at the threshold. The judgment of
Hidayatullah J., who on behalf of himself and Bachawat J.
concurred with the view of Sarkar J., also shows that the
conditional Presidential order left an area of inquiry open
as to whether the action was taken by a competent authority
and was in accordnce with the Defence of India Act and the
rules made thereunder.

Yet another case arose under rule 30(l)(b) of the
Defence of India Rules, 1962 involving the interpretation of
the first Presidential order dated November 3, 1962. That
case is K. Anandan Nambiar & Anr v. Chief Secretary,
Government of Madras & ors.(2) Gajendrgadkar C. J., who
delivered the judgment of the Constitution Bench referred to
Makhan Singh's case and pointed out that the sweep of the..
Presidential order dated November 3, 1962 was limited by its
last clause and, therefore, it was open to the detenu to
contend that the order of detention was contrary to the
conditions prescribed in that behalf by the Defence of India
Act or the rules made thereunder
In State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Pandurang
Sangzgiri & Anr.(3) the respondent, who was detained under
an order passe under section 30(l) (b) of the Defence of
India Rules, 1962, sought permission from the State
Government for publishing a book which he had written while
ill jail. On the Government refusing the per-
(1) [1966] 1 S. C. R.709 (2) [1966] 2 .S.C.R.406.
(3) [1966] 1 S.C.R.702
407
mission, he filed a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution for an appropriate direction and after that
petition was allowed by the A High Court, the Government of
Maharashtra filed an appeal in this Court. Subba Rao J., who
delivered the judgment of the Bench, observed while
dismissing the appeal that the President's order dated
November 3, 1962 was a conditional order and, therefore, if
a person was deprived of his personal liberty not under the
Act or a rule or order made thereunder but in contravention
thereof, his right to move the court in that regard would
not be suspended.

These judgments bring out clearly the ratio of Makhan
Singh's case which arose out of the first Presidential order
dated November 3, 1962. The Presidential order with which we
are concerned in The instant case is not subject to the pre-
condition that the detenu should have been deprived of his
rights under any particular Act and, therefore, there is no
scope for the inquiry whether the order is consistent or in
conformity with any particular Act. This important
distinction has not been fully appreciated in some of the
judgments under appeal.

The observations contained in the majority judgment in
Makhan Singh's case that the exercise of a power mala fide
is wholly outside the scope of the Act conferring the power
and can always be successfully challenged at once raises the
question whether in spite of the Presidential order dated
June 27, 1975 it is open to the respondents to show that the
order of detention in any particular case is vitiated by
mala fides. The proposition that a mala fide order has no
existence in the eye of law is not peculiar to Makhan
Singh's case but has been accepted in various decisions of
this Court, two of them being Jaichand Lall Sethia v. State
of West Bengal or.(2), and Durgadas Shirali v. Union of
India & ors.(2) A mala fide exercise of power does not
necessarily imply 'any moral turpitude and may only mean
that the statutory power is exercised for purposes other
than those for which the power was intended by law to be
exercised. In view of the fact that an unconditional
Presidential order of the present kind affects the locus
standi of the potitioner to move any court for the
enforcement of any of his fundamental rights mentioned in
the order, it would not be open to him to show that the
statutory power has been exercised for a purpose other than
the one duly appointed under the . So long as the statutory
prescription can be seen on the face of the order to have
been complied with, no further inquiry is permissible as to
whether the order is vitiated by legal mala fides.

As regards mala fides in the sence of malice-in-fact,
the same position must hold good because the Presidential
order operates as a blanket ban on any and every judicial
inquisition into the validity of the detention order. Makhan
Singh's case as also Jaichand Lall Sethia's and Durgadas
Shirali's arose under the Defence of India Rules, 1962 and
the relevant Presidential order which applied was the one
dated November 3, 1962 which, as stated above, was a condi-
H
(1)[1966] Supp.S.C.R.464.

(2)[l966] 2 S.C.R.573.

408

tional order. If in any given case an order of detention
appears on the very face of it to be actuated by an ulterior
motive, the court would have jurisdiction to set it aside
because no judicial inquiry of any sort is required to be
undertaken in such a case. But short of such ex-facie
vitiation, any challenge to a detention order or. the ground
of actual mala fides is also excluded under the Presidential
order dated June 27, 1975.

Section 16A(9) of the MISA which was introduced by the
Third Amendment Ordinance, 16 of 1975, with effect from June
29, 1975 must make a significant difference to the question
whether in spite of the Presidential order, it is open to a
detenu to challenge hi detention on the ground of make
files. Prior to the enactment of section 16A(9), the
detaining authority was under an obligation by reason of
section 8(1) of the MISA to communicate to the detenu the
grounds of detention. The only exception was as stated in
section 8 (2 ), that the detaining authority need not
disclose facts which it considers to be against the public
interest to disclose. Section 16A(l) provides that the pro
visions of section 16A shall have effect during the period
of operation of Proclamation of Emergency issued on December
3, 1971 and on June 25, 1975 or for a period of 12 months
from June 25, 1975 whichever period is the shortest. By sub-
section (2) of section l6A, the case of every person against
whom an order of detention was made under the MISA on or
after June 25, 1975 but before the commencement of section
16A on June 29, 1975 is required to be reviewed by the
appropriate Government for the purpose of determining
whether the detention of such person is necessary for
dealing effectively with the emergency. the answer be in the
affirmative, the Government is required to make a
declaration to that effect By sub-section (3), whenever an
order of detention is made under the Act after June 29, 1975
the officer making the order of detention or the appropriate
Government is similarly required to consider whether the
detention of the persons is necessary for dealing
effectively with the emergency. If so a declaration is
required to be made to that effect. Sub-section (9)(a) of
section 16A provides that the grounds on which an order of
detention is made against any person in respect of whom a
declaration is made under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3)
of section 16A and any information or materials on which
such grounds are based "shall be treated as confidential and
shall be deemed to refer to matters of State and to be
against the public interest to disclose and save as
otherwise provided in this Act, no one shall communicate or
disclose any such grounds, information or material or any
document containing such ground, information or material."
Clause (b) of section 16A (9) provides that no person
against whom an order of detention is made under sub-section
(1) of section 3 shall be entitled to the communication or
disclosure of any such ground, information or material, as
is referred to in clause (a) or the production to him of
ally document containing such ground, information or
material.

409

I will deal with the constitutionality of section
16A(9) later but on the assumption that it is valid, it is
plain that not only is a detenu in regard to whom the
necessary declaration is made not entitled to be furnished
with the grounds of detention or the material or information
on which the grounds are based, but neither the Government
nor the officer passing the order of detention can
communicate or disclose the grounds, material or information
they are deemed to refer to matters of State and against the
public interest to disclose In view of this cast-iron
prohibition, it is difficult to see how, at least those
detenus falling within sub-sections (2) and (3) of section
16A can possibly establish, even prima facie a charge of
factual mala fides It is the grounds of detention from which
generally a plea of mala fides is spelt out and if the court
has access to the grounds, the material and the information,
it becomes possible to unravel the real motive of detention.
on the absence of these aids, a charge of fides can only The
a fling in the air and cannot hope to succeed. The
observation in Makhan Singh's case, therefore, that the
exercise, of a power mala fide can always be successfully
challenged could not apply to cases falling under sub-
sections (2) and (3) of section 16A, by reason of the
provisions contained in sub-section (9) of that section.

Turning to the constitutional validity of section
16A(9), the contention of the respondents is that clause (a)
of section 16A(9) by which the grounds of detention and the
information and materials on which the grounds are based
shall be treated as confidential and shall be deemed to
refer to matters of State and to be against the public
interest to disclose is not a genuine rule of evidence but
is designed to encroach upon the jurisdiction of the High
Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution and is,
therefore, void. It is urged that the amendment made by the
Parliament in the exercise of its ordinary legislative power
comes into direct conflict with the High Court's
jurisdiction under Article 226 because it would be
impossible for any High Court to consider the validity of an
order of detention when a petition for habeas corpus comes
before it, if the law prohibits the disclosure of the
grounds of detention and the necessary information or
materials to the High Court.

It is a relevant consideration for examining the charge
that the true purpose of section 16A(9) is to encroach on
the powers of the High Court under Article 226, that the
operation of section 16A itself is limited to the period
during which the two proclamations of emergency dated
December 3, 1971 and June 25, 1975 are in operation or for a
period of 12 months from June 25, 1975 whichever period is
the shortest. Following the proclamations of emergency, the
President has issued orders under Article 359 (1) By the
order dated Junc 27, 1975 the very locus standi of the
detenu to enforce any of his fundamental rights mentioned in
the Presidential order is taken away and consequently, there
is no matter of substance into which the High Courts in the
exercise of their writ jurisdiction can legitimately
inquire. The injunction contained in section 16A(9) is from
this point of view innocuous, for it purports to create a
check
410
on a power which for all practical purposes has but a formal
existence. Section 16A(9) is in aid of the constitutional
power conferred by Article 359(1) and further effectuates
the purpose of the Presidential order issued under that
Article. If so it cannot be declared unconstitutional.

Quite apart from this position, I am unable to agree
that the rule enunciated in section 16A(9) is not a genuine
rule of evidence. It is true that grounds of detention used
to be disclosed before the emergence of section 16A(9) but
that does not mean that the grounds on which the order of
detention is based or the information or materials on which
the grounds are based are not or cannot be of a confidential
nature. More likely than not, such grounds, material and
information would be of a confidential nature relating to
matters of State which would be against the public interest
to disclose. Instead of leaving each individual matter to be
judged under section 123 of the Evidence Act by the Head of
the Department concerned, who can give or withhold the
permission as he thinks fit, Parliament would appear to have
considered that since the grounds, material and information
in detention cases are of a confidential nature, it would be
much more satisfactory to provide that they shall be deemed
to refer to matters of State.

If section 16A(9) is unconstitutional so would sections
123, 124 and 162 of the Evidence Act. Section 123 gives the
necessary discretion to the Head of the Department
concerned. By reason of section 124, the High Court cannot
compel any public officer to disclose communications made to
him in official confidence if the officer considers that the
public interest would suffer by the disclosure. By section
162, the High Court cannot inspect a document if it refers
to matters of State. But these provisions do not constitute
an invasion of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article

226. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court under that
Article has to be exercised consistently with the laws made
by competent legislatures within the area of their
legislative power. I do not think that it is open to any
High Court to say that the law may be otherwise valid but
since it interferes with the High Court's power to undertake
the fullest enquiry into the matter before it. the law
becomes unconstitutional. The principles of res judicata and
estoppel, the conclusive presumptions of law and various
provisions of substantive law deny a free play to courts in
the exercise of their jurisdiction. These are not for that
reason unconstitutional qua the High Court's jurisdiction
under Article 226.

Counsel for the respondents cited the parallel of
section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 which was
struck down by this Court in A. K. Gupalan v. The State(1).
Sub-section (1) of that section provided, in substance,that
no court shall, except for certain purposes. allow any
statement to be made or any evidence to be given before it
of the substance of any communication of the grounds on
which a detention order was made against any person or of
any representation made by him. Sub-section (2) of section
14 made it an offence for
(1) [1950] S.C. R. 88.

411

any person to disclose or publish without the previous
authorization of the Government any contents or matter
purporting to be contents of any communication or
recpresentation referred to in sub-section (1). The right to
enforce Article 22 of the Constitution was not suspended by
any Presidential order when Gopalan's ease was decided and
therefore the court was entitled to find whether that
Article was complied with. The limits of judicial review
have to be co-extensive and commensurate with the right of
an aggrieved person to complain of the inversion of his
rights. Since in Gopalan's case, it was open to the detenu
to contend that the grounds of detention did not bear any
connection with the order of detention, the Court was
entitled to examine the grounds in order to determine
whether the plea of the detenu was well-founded. As section
14 debarred the court from examining the material which it
was entitled under the Constitution to examine, it was
declared ultra vires. (See pages 130-131, 217- 218, 244, 285
and 333). In the instant ease the Presidential order
deprives the respondents of their very locus standi and
therefore section 16A(9) cannot be said to shut out an
inquiry which is other wise within the jurisdiction of the
High Court to make.

Reliance WAS also placed by the respondents on the
decision of this Court in Mohd. Maqbool Danmool v. State of
Jammu and Kashmir(') in which it was observed that the
proviso to section 8, which was inserted by the Jammu and
Kashmir Preventive Denotation (Amendment) Act, 1967, would
have been unconstitutional if it had the same effect as
section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act was found to have
in Gopalan's case Damnoo's case did not involve any question
of privilege at all and in fact the relevant file was
produced by the Government for the perusal of the High
Court. The case also did not involve any question under
Article 359(1) and the effect of a provision like section
16A(9) was not even hypothetically considered the Court.

The view of the Bombay High Court that section 16A(9)
may be read down so as to enable the court to examine the
forbidden material is impossible to sustain. What use can a
court make of material which it cannot disclose to the
detenu and how can it form a judicial opinion on matters not
disclose to a party before it? The High Court, at the
highest, could satisfy its curiosity by tasting the
forbidden fruit but its secret scrutiny of the grounds and
of the file containing the relevant information and material
cannot enter into its judicial verdict. G
I am, therefore of the opinion that the challenge made
by the respondents to the constitutionality of section
16A(9) must fail.

Section 18 need not detain me long because it merely
declares that no person who is detained under the Act shall
have any right to personal liberty by virtue of natural law
or common law, any. the 'natural law' theory was discarded
in Kesavanadun Bharati's(')
(1) [1972] 2 S. C. R. 1014.

(1) [1973] Supp. S. C. R. I.

412

case and likewise the common law theory was rejected in
Makhan Singh's case. The section only declares what was the
true law prior to its enactment on June 25, 1975. The
amendment of section 18 by the substitution of the words "in
respect of whom all order is made on purported to be made
under section 3" in place of the words 'detained under this
Act" does not render the section open to a challenge on the
ground of excessive delegation. The words "purported to be
made" have been inserted in order to obviate the challenge
that the detention is not in strict conformity with the
MISA. Such a challenge is even otherwsie barred under the
Presidential order. The object of the added provision is not
to encourage the passing of lawless orders of detention but
to protect during emergency orders which may happen to be S
in less than absolute conformity with the MISA. The
executive is bound at all times to obey the mandate of the
legislative but the Presidential order bars during a certain
period the right to complain of any deviation from that
rule.

In numerous cases detenus have been released by this
Court and by the High Courts on. the ground that there is no
nexus between the grounds of detention and the object of the
law under which the order of detention is made or that the
acts complained of are too distant in point of time to raise
an apprehension that the past con duct of the detenu is
likely to project itself into the future or that the ground
are too vague for the formation even of subjective
satisfaction or that irrelevant and extraneous
considerations have materially influenced the mind of the
detaining authority. On some few occasions detention orders
have also been set aside on the ground of factual mala
fides. An unconditional Presidential order obliterates this
jurisprudence by striking at the very root of the matter.
locus of the detenu is its chose in target and it deprives
him of his legal capacity to move any court for the
vindication of his rights to the extant that they arc
mentioned in the Presidential order. In their passion for
personal liberty courts had evolved, carefully and
laborously, a sort of "detention jurisprudence" over the
years with the sale object of ensuring that the executive
does not transcend its duty under the law. In legal theory
that obligation still remains but its violation will now
furnish no cause of action. at least to an extent. and to a
significant extent. Amidst the clash of arms and conflict of
ideologies, laws will now be silent but in times when the
Nation is believed to be going through great strains and
stresses, it may be necessary to entrust sweeping powers to
the State. And it is no smail comfort that those powers are
granted with the consent of the Parliament. The people of
this country are entitled to expect when they go to the
ballot-box that their chosen representatives will not
willingly suffer an erosion of the rights of the people. And
the Parliament. while arming the executive with great and
vast powers of Government, may feel fairly certain that such
powers will be reasonably exercised. The periodical reviews
of detention orders. the checks and counter-checks which the
law provides and above all
413
the lofty faith in democracy which ushered the birth of the
Nation will, h l hope, eliminate all fear that great powers
are capable of the greatest abuse. Ultimately, the object of
depriving a few of their liberty for a temporary period has
to be to give to many the perennial fruits of freedom.

I find it not so easy to summarize my conclusions in
simple, straightforward sentences. The many-sided issues
arising before us do not admit of a monosyllabic answer-
'yes', or 'no'. All the same these broadly are my
conclusions:

(1) The order issued by the President on June 27,
1975 under Article 359(1) of the Constitution
does not suspend the fundamental principle
that all executive action must have the
authority of law to support it. Nor does the
Presidential order give to the executive a
clatter to disobey the laws made by the
Parliament, which is the supreme law-making
authority.

(2) The aforesaid Presidential order, however,
deprives a person of his locus standi to move
any court, be it the Supreme Court or the
High Court, for the enforcement of his
fundamental rights which are mentioned in the
order. Such deprivation or suspension ensures
during the period that the Proclamation of
Emergency is in force or for such shorter
period as may be specified in the order.
(3) The dominant purpose of the petitions filed
by the respondents in the High Courts is to
obtain an order of release from detention by
enforcing the right to personal liberty. The
purpose is not to obtain a mere declaration
that the order of detention is ultra vires
the Act under which it is passed. The former
plea is barred by reason of the Presidential
order. The latter plea is also barred because
regard must be had to the substance of the
matter and not to the form in which the
relief is asked for.

(4) The Presidential order dated June 27, 1975
baring investigation or inquiry into the
question whether the order of detention is
vitiated by mala fides factual or legal, or
whether it is based on extraneous
considerations or whether the detaining
authority had reached his subjective
satisfaction validly on proper and relevant
material.

(5) Whether or not Article 21 of the Constitution
is the sole repository of the right to
personal liberty, in a petition filed in the
High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution for the release of a person
detained under the MISA, no relief by way of
releasing the detenu can be granted because
no person has the legal capacity to move any
court to ask for such
414
relief. The Presidential order takes away
such legal capacity by including Article 21
within it. the source of the right to
personal liberty is immaterial because the
words" "conferred by" which occur i Article
359(1) and in the Presidential order are not
words of limitation.

(6) The Presidential order does not bring about
any amendment of Article 226 and is not open
to challenge on that ground.

(7) The Presidential order neither bars the right
of an accused to defend his personal liberty
in the court of first instance or in a higher
court, nor does it bar the execution of
decrees passed against the Government, nor
does it bar the grant of relief other or less
than the release of the detenu from
detention.

(8) Section 16A(9) of the MISA is not
unconstitutional on the ground that it
constitutes an encroachment on the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article

226. There is no warrant for reading down
that section so as to allow the court to
inspect the relevant files to the exclusion
of all other parties.

(9) Section 18 of the MISA does not suffer from
the vice of excessive delegation and is a
valid piece of legislation.

And so we go back to The Zamora(1)', Rex v.

Holliday(2), Liversidge v. Anderson(3), Greene v. Secretary
of State('). A jurisdiction of suspicion is not a forum for
objectivity. "These who are responsible for national
security must be the sole judges of what the national
security requires"; "However precious the personal liberty
of the subject may be, there is something for which it may
well be, to some extent, sacrificed by legal enactment,
namely, national success in the war, or escape from national
plunder or enslavement". As a result, perhaps the only
argument which the court can entertain is whether the
authority which passed the order of detention is duly
empowered to pass it, whether the detenu is properly
identified and whether on the face of the order the stated
purpose of detention is within the terms of law. These
questions, in almost all cases, will have an obvious answer.

Counsel after counsel expressed the fear that during
the emergency, the executive may whip and strip and starve
the detenu and if this be our judgment, even shoot him down.
Such misdeeds have not tarnished the record of Free India
and I have a diamond-bright, diamond-hard hope that such
things will never come to pass.

(1) [1916] 2 A. C. 77
(2) [1917] A. C. 260, 271.

(3) [1942] A. 206.

(4) [l942] A. 284.

415

BHAGWATI, J.-These appeals by special leave raise
issues of gravest constitutional importance. They affect
personal liberty which is one of our most cherished freedoms
and impinge on the rule of law which is one of the great
principles that lies at the core of constitutional democracy
and gives content to it. Does a Presidential order under
Article 359, clause (1) specifying Article 21 silence the
mandate of the law and take away personal liberty by making
it unenforceable in a court of law, or does judicial
scrutiny of legality of detention stand untouched and
unimpaired, so that, despite such Presidential order, a
person who is illegally detained can seek his freedom by
invoking the judicial Process. That is the anodizing
question before the Court.

The facts giving rise to these appeals have been fully
set out in the judgment of my Lord the Chief Justice and it
is not necessary for me to reiterate them as nothing turns
on the facts. None of the writ petitions out of which these
appeals arise has in fact been finally disposed of on
merits. Barring the writ petitions before the Rajasthan High
Court and the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court, where
one additional question has been considered, the only
question that has been decided in these writ petitions is as
to their maintainability. in view of the Presidential order
dated 27th June, 1975 issued under Article 359, clause (1)
of the Constitution. The High Courts of Allahabad, Madhya
Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Karnataka and Rajasthan and
the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court before whom these
writ petitions were heard on the preliminary issue as to
maintainability, took the view that the Presidential order,
dated 27th June, 1975, did not wholly bar the
maintainability of these petitions, but left open certain
grounds of challenge which could yet be urged against the
validity of the order of detention. These different High
Courts were not agreed upon what were the grounds of
challenge which were thus available to an applicant despite
the Presidential order dated 27th June, 1975. There were
differences of opinion amongst them, but for the purpose of
the present appeals, it is not necessary to refer to those
differences as they are not material. The Rajasthan High
Court and the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court also
considered the interpretation and validity of section 16A,
sub-section (9) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act,
1971 and while the Rajasthan High Court accepted the
interpretation of that sub-section canvassed on behalf of
the Government and upheld its validity even on that
interpretation, the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court
held the sub-section to be valid by reading it down so as
not to exclude the power of the High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution to call for the grounds, information and
materials on which the order of detention was based. Since
in the view of these High Courts, the writ petitions filed
by the detenus were maintainable, though on certain limited
grounds of challenge, each of the writ petitions was
directed to be set down for hearing on merits. There- upon
each of the aggrieved State Governments obtained special
leave to appeal against the decision of the concerned High
Court and that is how the present appeals have come before
this Court.

416

Two questions arise for consideration in these appeals.
They have been formulated by the learned Attorney General
appearing on behalf of the Union of India in the following
terms:

(1) Whether, in view of the Presidential order
dated June 27, 1975 under clause (1) of
Article 359, any writ petition under Article
226 before a High Court for habeas corpus to
enforce the right to personal liberty of a
person detained under MISA on the ground that
the order of detention or the continued
detention is for any reason, not under or in
compliance With MISA is maintainable ?
(2) If such a petition is maintainable, what is
the scope or extent of judicial scrutiny,
particularly, in view of tile said
Presidential order mentioning, inter alia,
clause (5) of Article 22 and also in view of
sub-section (9) of section 16A of MISA?

So far as the second question is concerned, it may be
pointed out straightaway that the learned Attorney General
with his usual candor conceded that if his first contention
in regard to maintainability of a writ petition for habeas
corpus is not accepted and the writ petition is held
maintainable, the area of judicial scrutiny would remain the
same as laid down in the decisions of this Court, subject
only to the qualification that the grounds, information and
materials, on which the order of detention is based, would
not be available either to the detenu or to the High Court
by reason of suspension of enforcement of the right
conferred by clause (S) of Article 22 and the enactment of
section 16A, sub-section (9) of the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act, 1971. The only point which would, therefore,
require to be considered under the second question is in
regard to the interpretation and validity of sub-section (9)
of section 16A.

Before we proceed to consider the first question which
turns on the true interpretation and effect of the
Presidential order dated 27th June, 1975, it would help to
place the problem in its proper perspective if we first
examine what is an emergency and how institutions and
procedures different from those in normal times are
necessary to combat it. It would be both profitable and
necessary to embark upon this inquiry, because Article 359,
clause (1) under which the Presidential order dated 27th
June, 1975 has been issued is a consequential provision
which comes into operation when a Proclamation of emergency
is issued by the President under Article 352. It is evident
that a national emergency creates problems for a democracy
no less than for other governments. A totalitarian
Government may handle such a situation without
embarrassment. But the apparent necessities evoked by danger
often conflict gravely with the postulates of constitutional
democracy. The question arises-and that was a question posed
by Abraham Lincoln on July 4, 1861: can a democ-

417

ratic constitutional government beset by a national
emergency be strong enough to maintain its own existence
without at the same time being so strong as to subvert the
liberties of the people it has been instituted to defend.
This question is answered affirmatively by the incontestable
facts of history if we have regard to the experience of
emergency governments of three large modern democracies-the
United States, Great Britain and France. There is no reason
why the Indian experience should be otherwise, if the basic
norms of constitutionalism in assumption of emergency powers
are observed. What are these basic norms in a constitutional
democracy and what is the purpose behind assumption of
emergency powers are matters which I shall presently
discuss. But before I do so, let me first consider what are
the different types of emergency which may plague the
government of a country.

There are three types of crisis in the life of a
democratic nation, three well defined threats to its
existence both as nation and democracy. The first of these
is war, particularly a war to repel invasion when "a State
must convert its peace-time political and social order into
a war-time fighting machine and over-match the skill and
efficiency of the enemy". There may be actual war or threat
of war or preparations to meet imminent occurrence of war,
all of which may create a crisis situation of the gravest
order. The necessity of concentration of greater powers in
the Government and of contraction of the normal political
and social liberties cannot be disputed in such a case,
particularly when the people are faced with a grim horror of
national enslavement. The second crisis is threat or
presence of internal subversion calculated to disrupt the
life of the country and jeopardize the existing of the
constitutional government. Such activity may stem from a
variety of causes. Perhaps the most common is disloyalty to
the existing form of government, often accompanied by a
desire to effect changes by vio1ent means. Another cause may
be strong disaffection with certain government policies.
Communal demands for States within the Federal on linguistic
or religious lines may fall within this category. Or the
presence of powerful lawless elements with perhaps no
political motivation, but for various reasons beyond the
scope of ordinary machinery of the law, may give rise to
this problem. The third crisis, one recognised particularly
in modern times as sanctioning emergency action by
constitutional government, is break down or potential break
down of the economy. It must be recognised that an economic
crisis is as direct a threat to a nation's continuing
constitutional existence as a war or internal subversion.
These are three kinds of emergencies which may ordinarily
imperil the existence of a constitutional democracy.

Now, it is obvious that the complex system of
government of a constitutional democratic State is
essentially designed to function under normal peaceful
conditions and is often unequal to the exigencies of a
national crisis. When there is an emergency arising out of a
national
29-833 Sup CI/76
418
crisis, a constitutional democratic government has to be
temporarily altered to whatever degree necessary to overcome
the peril and restore normal conditions. This alteration
invariably involves government of a stronger character. The
government has to assume larger power in order to meet the
crisis situation and that means that the people would have
fewer rights. There can be no doubt that crisis government
means strong and arbitrary government and as pointed out by
Cecil Carr in his article on "Crisis Legislation in Great
Britain" published during the Second World War "in the
eternal dispute between Government and liberty, crisis means
more government and less library." In fact Scrutton, L.J.
never a fulsome admirer of government departments, made the
classic remark in his judgment in Ronnfeldt v. Phillips(')
that war cannot be carried on according to the principles of
Magna Carta and there must be same modification of the
liberty of the subject in the interests of the State. The
maxim salus populi suprema lex esto, that is publicsafety is
the highest law of all, must prevail in times of crisis and
the people must submit to temporary abdication of their
constitutional liberties in order to enable the government
to combat the crisis situation which might otherwise destroy
the continued existence of the nation.

While dealing with the emergency powers which may be
assumed by a constitutional democracy to deal effectively
with a national crisis, it is necessary to refer to the
celebrated writ of habeas corpus. It is the most renowned
contribution of the English common law to the protection of
human liberty. It is one of the most ancient writs known to
the Common Law of England. It is a writ of immemorial
antiquity "throwing its roots deep into the genius" of the
Common Law. It is not necessary to trace the early history
of this writ which is to be found in the decision of this
Court in Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling &
ors (2) Suffice it to state that by the 17th Century this
writ had assumed great constitutional importance as a device
for impugning the validity of arbitrary imprisonment by the
executive and by invoking it, a person unlawfully imprisoned
could secure his release. As pointed out by Holdsworth in
Vol. 1 of his "History of English Law", "its position as the
most efficient protector of the liberty of the subject was
unquestioned after the great Rebellion". It was for this
reason that men began to assign as its direct ancestor the
clauses of the Magna Carta which prohibited imprisonment
without due process of law. This may not be strictly
accurate, but there can be no doubt that, far more effective
than any other remedy, this writ helped to vindicate the
right of freedom guaranteed by the famous words of the Magna
Carta. The decision in Darnel's case(3) was a set-back in
the struggle for liberty since it eroded to some extent the
effectiveness of the writ by taking the view that a return
that the arrest was "by the special command of the King" was
a good and sufficient return to the writ, which meant that a
lawful cause of imprisonment was shown. But the Petition of
Right. 1627 overruled this decision by declaring such a case
of imprisonment to
(1) 35 Times Law Reports 46.

(2) [1973] 2 S.C C. 674.

(3) (1627) 3 ST 1.

419

be unlawful. In the same way, it was enacted in the Habeas
Corpus A Act, 1640 abolishing the Star Chamber that any
person committed or imprisoned by order of the Star Chamber
or similar bodies or by the command of the King or of the
Council should have his habeas corpus. There were also
various other defects which were revealed in course of time
and with a view to remedying those defects and making the
writ more efficient as an instrument of securing the liberty
of the subject unlawfully detained, reforms were introduced
by the Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, and when even these reforms
were found insufficient, the Habeas Corpus Act, 18 1 6 was
enacted by which the benefit of the provisions of the Habeas
Corpus Act, 1679 was made available in cases of civil
detention and the judges were empowered to inquire into the
truth of the facts set out in the return to the writ. The
machinery of the writ was thus perfected by legislation and
it became one of the most important safeguards of the
liberty of the subject and, as pointed out by Lord Halsbury,
L.C., in Cox v. Hakes,(i) it has throughout "been jealously
maintained by courts of law as a check upon the illegal
usurpation of power by the executive at the cost of the
liege .

Now, in the United States of America, the right to this
important writ of habeas corpus by means of which the
liberty of a citizen is protected against arbitrary arrest,
is not expressly declared in the Constitution, but it is
recognised in Article I, Placitum 9, clause (2) of the
Constitution which declares that "The privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, when in
cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may
require it". Cooley in his "General Principles of
Constitutional Law in the U.S.A." points out: The privilege
of the writ consists in this: that, when one complains that
he is unlawfully imprisoned or deprived of his liberty, he
shall be brought without delay before the proper court or
magistrate for an examination into the cause of his
detention, and shall be discharged if the detention is found
to be unwarranted. The suspension of the privilege consists
in taking away this right to an immediate hearing and
discharge, and in authorising arrests and detentions without
regular process of law." The suspension of the privilege of
the writ does not legalise what is done while it continues:
it merely suspends for the time being the remedy of the
writ.

The decision of Chief Justice Taney in ex P.
Merryman(2) contains the leading American discussion of the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in a temporary
emergency. In the spring of 1861. the eve of the American
Civil War, President Lincoln was confronted by a state of
open insurrection in the State of Maryland following the
fall of Fort Sumter on April 15. Railroad communication to
the northern United States had been severed by the
Marylanders on April 20 and the Sixth Massachusetts Militia
reached Washington only after fighting its way through the
City of Baltimore. In these circumstances and under the
increasing threat of secession, President Lincoln issued a
Proclamation on April 27 authorising General Pinfield Scot
to suspend H
(1) [1890] 15 A. C.506.

(2) 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (C. C. D. Md. 1861).

420

the writ of habeas corpus "at any point on or in the
vicinity of the military line which is now, or shall be used
between the City of Philadelphia and the City of
Washington". Another Proclamation of July 2 extended this
power to a similar area between Washington and New York.
John Merryman who was a Marylander openly recruited a
company of soldiers to serve in the Confederate Army and
became their drill master and in consequence he was arrested
by the army of Lincoln and held prisoner in Fort McHenry. He
applied for a writ of habeas corpus and, despite the
Presidential authorisation suspending the writ, the Supreme
Court presided over by Chief Justice Taney granted the writ
on the view that the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ is a legislative power and the President cannot
exercise it except as authorised by law. History tells us
that President Lincoln declined to implement the order of
the Supreme Court and this would have led to a major
constitutional crisis, but the Congress hastened to resolve
the controversy by enacting legislation authorising the
President to suspend the privilege of the writ whenever in
his judgment the public safety requires it. It would,
therefore, be seen that even in United States of America,
where personal liberty is regarded as one of the most prized
possessions of man, the Congress has the power to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus and this power has been exercised
in the past, though very sparingly.

So also in Great Britain the writ of habeas corpus
which, as May points out, "is unquestionably the first
security of liberty" and which "protects the subject from
unfounded suspicions, from aggressions of power" has been
suspended, again and again, in periods of public danger or
apprehension. Parliament, convinced of the exigencies of the
situation, has on several occasions suspended, for the time
being, the rights of individuals in the interests of the
State. This of course has had the effect of arming the
executive with arbitrary power of arrest by making it
impossible for a person detained to secure his release even
if his detention is illegal. It has resulted in great
diminution in the interest of personal freedom, for,
suspension of habeas corpus is verily, in substance and
effect, suspension of the right of personal liberty granted
in Magna Carta, But it has been justified on the ground that
whatever be the temporary danger of placing such power in
the hands of the Government, it is far less than the danger
with which the constitution and the society are threatened,
or to put it differently "when danger is imminent, the
liberty of the subject must be sacrificed to the paramount
interests of the State". Moreover, on each occasion when the
writ of habeas corpus has been suspended, the suspension of
the writ has invariably been followed by an Act of Indemnity
"in order to protect officials concerned from the
consequences of any incidental illegal acts which they might
have committed under cover of suspension of the propogative
writ". During the period of emergency, many illegalities
might have been committed by the executive in order to deal
with a crisis situation and all such illegalities have been
retrospectively legalised by an Indemnity Act.

I may now turn to consider the emergency provisions
under our Constitution. Unlike many of the older
constitutions, our Constitution speaks in detail on the
subject of emergency in Part XVIII. That Part
421
consists of a fasciculus of Articles from Article 352 to
Article 360. A Article 352 enacts that if the President is
satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security
of India or of any part of the territory thereof is
threatened, whether by war or external aggression or
internal disturbance, he may, by Proclamation, make a
declaration to that effect and such Proclamation is required
to be laid before each House of Parliament and approved by
resolutions of both Houses before the expiration of two
months. It is not necessary that there should be actual
occurrence of war or external aggression or internal
disturbance in order to justify a Proclamation of Emergency.
It is enough if there is imminent danger of any such crisis.
It will be seen that this Article provides for emergencies
of the first two types mentioned above. The third type of
emergency threatening the financial stability of India or
any part thereof is dealt with in Article 360 but we are not
concerned with it and hence it is not necessary to consider
the provisions of that Article. So far as the emergencies of
the first two types are concerned, the constitutional
implications of a declaration of emergency under Article 352
are much wider than in the United States or Great Britain.
These are provided for in the Constitution itself. In the
first place, Article 250 provides that while a Proclamation
of Emergency is in operation, Parliament shall have the
power to make laws for the whole or any part of the
territory of India with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in the State List, which means that the federal
structure based on separation of powers is put out of action
for the time being. Secondly, Article 353 declares that
during the time that Proclamation of Emergency is in force,
the executive power of the Union of India shall extend to
the giving of direction to any State as to the manner in
which the executive power thereof is to be exercised and
this provision also derogates from the federal principle
which forms the basis of the Constitution. If there is non-
compliance by any State with the directions given by the
Union under Article 353, such non-compliance may attract the
provisions of Article 356 and 'President's rule' may be
imposed under that Article and in such event. Parliament
may, under Article 357, clause (1), confer on the President
the power of the legislature of the' State to make laws or
to delegate such legislative power to any other authority.
This not only contradicts the federal P principle, but also
strikes at the root of representative form of Government.
Then there are two Articles, Article 358 and Article 359
which set out certain important consequences of Proclamation
of Emergency and they read as follows:

"358. While a Proclamation of Emergency is in
operation nothing in article 19 shall restrict the
power of the State as defined in Part III to make any
law or to take any executive action which the State
would but for the provisions contained in that Part be
competent to make or to take, but any law so made
shall, to the extent of the incompetency. cease to have
effect as soon as the Proclamation ceases to operate,
except as respects things done or omitted to be done
before the law so ceases to have effect.
"359. (1) Where a Proclamation of Emergency is in
operation, the President may by order declare that the
right to
422
move any court for the enforcement of such of the
rights conferred by Part III as may be mentioned in the
order and all proceedings pending in any court for the
enforcement of the rights so mentioned shall remain
suspended for the period during which the proclamation
is in force or for such shorter period as may be
specified in the order.

(1A) While an order made under clause (1) mentioning
any of the rights conferred by Part III is in
operation, nothing in that Part conferring those rights
shall restrict the power of the State as defined in the
said Part to make any law or to take any executive
action which the State would but for the provisions
contained in that Part be competent to make or to take,
but any law so made shall, to the extent of the
incompetency, cease to have effect as soon as the order
aforesaid ceases to operate. except as respects things
done or omitted to be done before the law so ceases to
have effect.

(2) An order made as aforesaid may extend to the
whole or any part of the territory of India.
(3) Every order made under clause (1) shall, as
soon as may be after it is made, be laid before each
House of Parliament."

It may be pointed out that clause (1A) did not form part of
Article 359 when the Constitution was originally enacted but
it was introduced with retrospective effect by the
Constitution (Thirty-eighth Amendment) Act, 1975. We are not
directly concerned in these appeals with the interpretation
of Article 358 and clause (1A) of Article 359, but in order
to arrive at the proper meaning and effect of clause (1) of
Article 359, it will be relevant and somewhat useful to
compare and contrast the provisions of Article 358 and
clause (1A) of Article 35 on the one hand and clause (1) of
Article 359 on the other.

It would be convenient at this stage to set out the
various steps taken by the Government of India from time to
time in exercise of the emergency powers conferred under
Part XVIII of the Constitution. When hostilities broke out
with Pakistan in the beginning of December 1971, the
President issued a Proclamation of Emergency dated 3rd
December, 1971 in exercise of the powers conferred under
clause (1) of Article 352 declaring that "a grave emergency
exists whereby the security of India is threatened by
external aggression". This was followed by two orders, one
dated 5th December, 1971 and the other dated 23rd December,
1974, issued by the President under clause (1) of Article

359. It is not necessary to reproduce the terms of these two
Presidential orders since they were subsequently rescinded
by a Presidential order dated 25th December, 1975 issued
under clause (1) of Article 359. Whilst the first
Proclamation of Emergency dated 3rd December, 1971 based on
threat of external aggression continued in force, the
President issued another Proclamation of Emergency dated
25th June, 1975 declaring that "a grave emergency exists
whereby the security of India is threatened by internal
disturbance". This Proclamation of Emergency was also issued
in exercise of the powers confer red under Article 352,
clause (1) and it was followed by a fresh Presi-

423

dential order dated 27th June, 1975 under clause (1) of
Article 359. A The President, by this order made under
clause ( l ) of Article 359, declared that "the right of any
person, (including a foreigner) to move any court for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article
21 and Article 22 of the Constitution and all proceedings
pending in any court for the enforcement of the above
mentioned rights shall remain suspended for the period
during which the Proclamations of Emergency made under
clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution on the 3rd
December, 1971 and on the 25th June, 1975 are both in
force". The writ petitions out of which the present appeals
arise were filed after the issue of this Presidential order
and it was on the basis of this Presidential order that it
was contended on behalf of the State Governments and the
Union of India that the writ petitions were not
maintainable, since, by moving the writ petitions, the
detenus sought enforcement of the right of conferred by
Article 21. This contention was substantially negatived by
the High Courts and hence the present appeals were brought
by the State Governments and the Union of India raising the
same contention as to the maintainability of the writ
petitions. It may be pointed out that whilst the present
appeals were pending before this Court, the President issued
another order dated 8th January, 1976 under clause (1) of
Article 359 suspending the enforcement of the rights
conferred by Article 19. This Presidential order is not
material, but I have referred to it merely for the sake of
completeness.

Now the orders of detention challenged by the detenus
in the different writ petitions were all expressed to be
made in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the
Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. The detenus
challenged them on various grounds, namely, the orders of
detention were not in accordance with the provisions of the
Act, they were not preceded by the requisite subjective
satisfaction, which constitutes the foundation for the
making of a valid order of detention, they were actuated by
malice in law or malice in fact or they were outside the
authority conferred by the Act. The substance of these
grounds according to the Union of India and the State
Governments, was that, by these orders of detention, the
detenus, were deprived of their personal liberty otherwise
than in accordance with the procedure established by law.
This constituted infraction of the fundamental right
conferred by Article 21 and the writ petitions of the
detenus were, therefore, clearly proceedings for enforcement
of that fundamental right. But by reason of the Presidential
order dated 27th June, 1975, the right to move any court for
enforcement of the fundamental right conferred by Article 21
was suspended during the period when the Proclamations of
Emergency dated 3rd December, 1971 and 25th June, 1975 were
in force and, therefore, the detenus had no locus standi to
file the writ petitions and the writ petitions were barred.
The answer to this contention given on behalf of the detenus
was-and here we are setting out only the broad general
argument-that Article 21 merely defines an area of free
action and does not confer any right and hence it is outside
the scope and ambit of Article 359, clause ( I ) and
consequently outside the Presidential order itself. It was
also urged on behalf of the detenus that it is a basic
principle of the rule of
424
law that no member of the executive can interfere with the
liberty of a person except in accordance with law. The
principle of the rule of law was recognised and declared by
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Eshugbayi
Eleko v. Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria(l)
and it was uniformly administered by courts in India as the
law of the land prior to the coming into force of the
Constitution. It was consequently law in for in the
territory of India immediately before the commencement of
the Constitution and by reason of Article 372, it continued
in force ever after the coming into force of the
Constitution and since then it has been repeatedly
recognised and adopted by this Court as part of Indian
jurisprudence in several decided cases. Moreover, apart from
being continued under Article 372 as law in force, this
principle of the rule of law stems from the constitutional
scheme itself which is based on the doctrine of distribution
of powers amongst different bodies created by the
Constitution. Under the constitutional scheme the executive
is a limited executive and it is bound to act in accordance
with law and not go against it. This obligation of the
executive not to act to the detriment of a person without
the authority of law can be enforced under Article 226 by
issue of a writ "for any other purpose". When a detenu files
a petition under Article 226 challenging the validity of the
order of detention on the ground that it is not in
accordance with the Act or is outside the authority
conferred by the Act, he seeks to enforce this obligation
against the State Government and the suspension of
enforcement of the fundamental right under Article 21 does
not affect the maintainability of his writ petition. The
detenus also contended that in any event the right to
personal liberty was a statutory right and the suspension of
the fundamental right conferred by Art. 21 did not carry
with it suspension of the enforcement of this statutory
right. The Union of India and the State Governments rejoined
to this contention of the detenus by saying that Article 21
was the sole repository of the right of personal liberty and
there was no common law or statutory right in a person not
to be deprived of his personal liberty except in accordance
with law, apart from that contained in Article 21 and
therefore, the writ petitions filed by the detenus were in
substance and effect petitions for enforcement of the right
conferred by Article 21 and hence they were not
maintainable.

Before we proceed to consider these contentions which
have been advanced before us, it is necessary to remind
ourselves that the emergency provisions in Part XVIII of the
Constitution make no distinction whether the emergency is on
account of threat to the security of India by war or
external aggression or on account of threat to the security
of India by internal disturbance. The same provisions are
applicable alike in both situations of emergency,
irrespective of the reason for which emergency, has been
declared. The legal consequences are the same and,
therefore, whatever interpretation we place on Article 359,
clause (1) in the present case which relates to declaration
of emergency on account of internal disturbance would apply
equally where the emergency is declared on account of war or
external aggression by a hostile power. If we take the view
that the Presidential order under Article 359, clause (1)
suspending enforcement of
(1) [1931] A. C. 662.

425

Article 21 does not bar the remedy of a detained person to
seek his release on the ground that his detention is
illegal, it would be open to a detained person to challenge
the legality of his detention even when there is emergency
on account of war or external aggression, because, barring
Article 359, there is no other provision in the Constitution
which can even remotely be suggested as suspending or taking
away the right to move the Court in cases of illegal
detention. The consequence would be that even in a perilous
situation when the nation is engaged in mortal combat with
an enemy, the courts would be free to examine the legality
of detention and even if a detention has been made for
efficient prosecution of the war or protecting the nation
against enemy activities it would be liable to be struck
down by the courts if some procedural safeguard has been
violated though it may be bona fide and through
inadvertence. This would imperil national security and the
Government of the day would be helpless to prevent it. The
question is: whether such is the interpretation of Article
359, clause (1). Of course, if that is the only possible
interpretation, we must give effect to it regardless of the
consequence, leaving it to the constituent authority to
amend the Constitution, if it so thinks fit. But we may ask
ourselves: could the Constitution-makers have intended that
even in times of war or external aggression, there should be
no power in the President, as the head of the Nation, to bar
judicial scrutiny into legality of detention. It may be
pointed out that even in the United States of America, the
President has power under Article I Placitum 9, clause (2)
of the United States Constitution to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus "when in cases of rebellion or
invasion the public safety may require it". The British
Parliament has also on several occasions in the past
suspended the writ of habeas corpus by legislative
enactment, though in limited classes of cases. The
Constitution-makers were obviously aware that even in these
countries which are essentially democratic in character and
where the concept of constitutional government has had its
finest flowering, the power to exclude judicial review of
legality of detention through the means of a writ of habeas
corpus has been given to the Supreme legislature or the head
of the State and they must have realised that this was a
necessary power in times of national peril occasioned by war
or external aggression. Could the Constitution-makers have
intended to omit to provide for conferment of this power on
the head of the State in our Constitution ?

We must also disabuse our mind of any notion that the
emergency declared by the Proclamation dated 25th June, 1975
is not genuine, or to borrow an adjective used by one of the
lawyers appearing on behalf of the interveners, is 'phoney'.
This emergency has been declared by the President in
exercise of the powers conferred on him under Article 352,
clause (1) and the validity of the Proclamation dated 25th
June, 1975 declaring this emergency has not been assailed
before US. Mr. Shanti Bhushan and the other learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the detenus in fact conceded before
us that, for the purpose of the present appeals, we may
proceed on the assumption that the declaration of emergency
under the Proclamation dated 25th June, 1975 is valid. But
if this emergency is taken as valid, we must equally presume
that
426
it is genuine and give full effect to it, without any
hesitation or reservation.

With these prefatory observations I will now turn to
examine clause (1) of Art. 359 under which the Presidential
order has been issued. The language of this clause is clear
and explicit and does not present any difficulty of
construction. It says that where a Proclamation of Emergency
is in operation, the President may by order suspend the
right to move any court for the enforcement of such of the
rights conferred by Part III as may be mentioned in the
order. Any or all of the rights conferred by Part III can
find a place in the Presidential order. Whilst the
Presidential order is in force, no one can move any court
for the enforcement of any of the specified fundamental
rights. I shall presently discuss whether Article 21 can be
said to confer any right, but assuming it does-and, as will
be evident shortly, that is my conclusion-the right to move
any court for the enforcement of the fundamental right
guaranteed by Article 21 may be suspended by specifying it
in the Presidential order. When that is done, no one can
move any court, and any court would mean any court of
competent jurisdiction, including the High Courts and the
Supreme Court., for enforcement of the right conferred by
Article 21. The words "the right to move any court for the
enforcement" are wide enough "to include all claims made by
citizens in any court of competent jurisdiction when it is
shown that the said claims cannot be effectively adjudicated
upon without examining the question as to whether the
citizen is, in substance, seeking to enforce any of the
specified fundamental rights". Vide Makhan Singh v. State of
Punjab(1). Therefore, there can be no doubt that in view of
the Presidential order which mentions Article 21, the
detenus would have no locus standi to maintain their writ
petitions, if it could be shown that the writ petitions were
for enforcement of the right conferred by Article 21.

That should logically take me straight to a
consideration of the question as to what is the scope and
content of the right conferred by Art. 21, for without
defining it, it would not be possible to determine whether
the right sought to be enforced by the detenus in their writ
petitions is the right guaranteed under Article 21 or any
other distinct right. But before I examine this question, it
would be convenient first to deal with clause (1A) of
Article 359 and ascertain its meaning and effect. Clause
(1A) of Art. 359 did not find a place in the Constitution
when it was originally enacted, but it was inserted with
retrospective effect by the Constitution (Thirty-eighth)
Amendment Act, 1975. It provides that while an order made
under cl. (1) of Article 359 mentioning any of the rights
conferred by Part III is in operation, nothing in that Part
conferring those rights shall restrict the power of the
State to make any law or to take any executive action which
the State would, but for the provisions contained in that
Part, be competent to make or to take. It will be noticed
that the language of cl. (1A) of Art. 359 is in the same
terms as that of Article 358 and the decisions interpreting
Article 358 would, therefore, afford considerable guidance
in the interpretation of cl. (1A) of Art. 359. But before I
(1) [1964] 4 S. C. R. 797.

427

turn to those decisions, let me try to arrive at the proper
meaning of that clause on a plain interpretation of its
language.

In the first place, it is clear that clause (1A) of
Art. 359 is prospective in its operation, for it says that,
while a Presidential order is in operation, nothing in the
Articles mentioned in the Presidential order shall restrict
the power of the State to make any law or to take any
executive action which the State would, but for the
provisions contained in Part III, be competent to make or to
take. This clause does not operate to validate a legislative
provision or executive action which was invalid because of
the constitutional inhibition before the Proclamation of
Emergency. Secondly, it may be noted that the fundamental
rights operate as restrictions on the power of the State,
which includes the executive as well as the legislature.
When a Presidential order is issued under article 359,
clause (1), the fundamental right mentioned in the
Presidential order is suspended, so that the restriction on
the power of the executive or the legislature imposed by the
fundamental right is lifted while the Presidential order is
in operation and the executive or the legislature is free to
make any law or to take any action which it would, but for
the provisions contained in Part III, be competent to make
or to take. The words "but for the provisions contained in
that Part", that is, but for the fundamental rights, means
"if the fundamental rights were not there". The question
which has, therefore, to be asked is: if the fundamental
rights were not there in the Constitution, would the
executive or the legislature be competent to make the
impugned law or to take the impugned executive action'? If
it could, it would not be restricted from doing so by reason
of the particular fundamental right mentioned in the
presidential order. The Presidential order would, therefore,
have the effect of enlarging the power of the executive of
the legislature by freeing it from the restriction imposed
by the fundamental right mentioned in the Presidential
order, but it would not enable the legislature or the
executive to make any law or to take any executive action
which it was not otherwise competent to make or to take. Now
it is clear that, if the fundamental rights were not there
in the Constitution, the executive being limited by law
would still be unable to take any action to the prejudice of
a person except by authority of law and in conformity with
or in accordance with law and, therefore, even if the
Presidential order mentions Art. 21, clause (1A) of Article
359 would not enable the executive to deprive a person of
his personal liberty without sanction of law and except in
conformity with or in accordance with law. If an order of
detention is made by the executive without the authority or
law, it would be invalid and its invalidity would not be
cured by clause (1A) of Article 359, because that clause
does not protect executive action taken without lawful
authority. An unlawful order of detention would not be
protected from challenge under Article 21 by reason of
clause (1A) of Article 359 and the detenu would be entitled
to complain of such unlawful detention as being in violation
of Article 21, except in so far as his right to move the
court for that purpose may be held to have been taken away
by clause (1) of Article 359.

This interpretation of clause (1A) of Article 359 is
clearly supported by the decision of this Court in State of
Madhya Pradesh v.

428

Thakur Bharat Singh(l) and the subsequent decisions
following it, which relate to the interpretation of the
similarly worded Article 358. What happened in Bharat
Singh's case (supra) was that whilst the Proclamation of
Emergency dated October 20, 1962 was in operation, the State
Government made an order under sub-section (1) of section 3
of the Madhya Pradesh Public Security Act, 1959 directing
that Bharat Singh shall not be in any place in Raipur
District and shall immediately proceed to and reside in
Jhabua. Bharat Singh challenged the validity of the order
inter alia on the ground that sub-section (1) of section 3
of the Act infringed the fundamental rights guaranteed under
clauses (d) and (e) of Article 19(1). The State Government
sought to meet the challenge by pleading the bar of Article

358. But this Court held that Article 358 had no application
because sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Act which was
impugned in the petition was a pre-emergency legislation.
This Court, speaking through Shah, J. observed:

"Article 358 which suspends the provisions of Art.
19 during an emergency declared by the President under
Art. 352 is in terms prospective: after the
proclamation of emergency nothing in Art. 19 restricts
the power of the State to make laws or to take any
executive action which the State but for the provisions
contained in Part III was competent to make or take.
Article 358 however does not operate to validate a
legislative provision which was invalid because of the
constitutional inhibition before the proclamation of
emergency."

This Court accordingly proceeded to consider the validity of
section 3, sub-section (1) of the Act and held that clause

(b) of that sub-section was unconstitutional as it infringed
the fundamental rights under clauses (d) and (e) of Art.
19(1) and if it was void before the proclamation of
Emergency, "it was not revived by the Proclamation".

But on this view, another contention was put forward on
behalf of the State Government and that was that Article 358
protects not only legislative but also executive action
taken after the Proclamation of Emergency and, therefore,
executive action taken by the State would not be liable to
be challenged on the ground that it infringes the
fundamental rights under Art. 19, and consequently, the
order of the State Government, though made under void law
was protected against challenge under Art. 19. This
contention was also rejected by the Court in the following
words:

"In our judgment, the argument involves a grave
fallacy. All executive action which operates to the
prejudice of any person must have authority of law to
support it, and the terms of Art. 358 do not detract
from that rule. Article 358 does not purport to invest
the State with arbitrary authority to take action to
the prejudice of citizens and others . it merely
provides that so long as the proclamation of emer-
(1) [1967] 2 S. C. R. 454.

429

gency subsists laws may be enacted, and executive
action may be taken in pursuance of lawful authority,
which if the provisions of Art. 19 were operative would
have been invalid.

The view taken by the Court was that it is only where
executive action ii taken in pursuance of lawful authority
that it is immune from challenge under Art. 19 and in such a
case even if it conflicts with the fundamental rights
guaranteed under that Article, it would be valid But where
executive action is taken without lawful authority, as for
example, where it is taken without the authority of any law
at all or in pursuance of a law which is void, it is not
protected from challenge under Art. 19 by Article 358 and it
would be void to the extent it violates article 19.

The same view was taken by this Court in District
Collector of Hyderabad v. M/s Ibrahim Co.(1) where this
Court said, without referring expressly to the decision in
Bharat Singh's case (supra) that i' the executive order
immune from attack is only that order which the State was
competent, but for the provisions contained in Art 19, to
make", and that "executive action of the State Government,
which is otherwise invalid, is not immune from attack merely
because the Proclamation of Emergency is in operation when
it is taken". The reference here was to immunity from attack
under Art. 19 and it was held that executive action which
was contrary to law and hence invalid was not protected from
attack under Art. 19 by reason of Art. 358. So also in
Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India(2), this Court
referred to the decisions in Bharat Singh' case (supra) and
Ibrahim's case (supra) and observed: "Executive action which
is unconstitutional is immune during Proclamation of
Emergency. During the Proclamation of Emergency Art. 19 is
suspended. But it would not authorise the taking of
detrimental executive action during the emergency affecting
fundamental rights in Art. 19 without any legislative
authority or any purported exercise of power conferred by
any pre-emergency law which was invalid when enacted". This
Court also said to the same effect in Shree Meenakshi Mills
Ltd. v. Union of India(3): "-if it can be shown that the
executive action taken during the emergency has no authority
of a valid law, its constitutionality can be challenged".
These observations clearly show that where executive action
is taken without any legislative authority or in pursuance
of a law which is void it would not be protected by Art. 358
from challenge under Art. 19 and it would be
unconstitutional to the extent to which it conflicts with
that Article.

If this be the interpretation of Art. 358 as laid down
in the decisions of this Court, a fortiori a like
interpretation must be placed on clause (1A) of Art. 359, as
both are closely similar in form as well as language. It
must, therefore, be held that even though a Presidential
order issued under clause (1) of article 359 mentions Art.
21, where it is found that a detention has not been made in
pursuance of lawful
(1) [1970] 3 S. C. R. 498.

(2) [19731 2 S. C. R. 757
(3) [19741 2 S. C. R. 398.

430

authority or in other words, the detention is without the
authority of law, whether by reason or there being no law at
all or by reason of the law under which the detention is
made being void, clause ( 1A) of Art. 359 would not protect
it from challenge under Art. 21 and it would be in conflict
with that Article. The only question then would be whether
the detenu would be entitled to challenge the validity of
tile detention as being in breach of Art. 21, in view of
clause (1) of Art. 353 read with the Presidential order
mentioning Art. 21.

Now, at the outset, a contention of a preliminary
nature was advanced by Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned Advocate
appearing on behalf of some of the detenus, that clause (1)
of article 359 can have no operation in cases where a detenu
seeks to enforce his right of personal liberty by
challenging the legality of his detention. Mr. Shanti
Bhushan contended, and in this contention he was strongly
supported by Mr. Jethmalani, that personal liberty is not a
conglomeration of positive rights but is merely a negative
concept denoting an area of free action to the extent to
which law does not curtail it or authorise its curtailment
and such a negative right cannot by its very nature be the
subject of conferment under Art. 21. The argument of counsel
based on this contention was that when Art. 359 clause (1)
speaks of suspension of "the right to move any court for the
enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III as
may be mentioned in the order", it cannot include reference
to the right of personal liberty in article 21, because it
cannot be said of such a right that it is conferred by art.

21. It was urged that article 21 cannot therefore
appropriately find a place in a Presidential order under
clause (l) of article 359 and even if it is erroneously
mentioned there; it can have no legal sequitur and cannot
give rise to the consequences set out in clause (1) of
article 359. This argument was sought to be supported by
reference to two well known text books on jurisprudence, one
by Salmond and the other by Holland and the Declaration of
the Rights of Man and the Citizen adopted by the French
National Assembly was also relied upon for this purpose.
There is, however, no merit in this argument. The words
'rights conferred by Part III' cannot be read in isolation,
`nor can they be construed by reference to theoretical or
doctrinaire considerations. They must be read in the context
of the provisions enacted in Part III in order to determine
what are the rights conferred by the provisions in that
Part. Part III is headed ''Fundamental Rights" and it deals
with fundamental rights under seven heads, namely, right to
equality, right to freedom, right against exploitation,
right to freedom of religion, cultural and educational
rights, right to property and right to constitutional
remedies. Arts. 19 to 22 occur under the heading "Right to
Freedom" and what is enacted in Art. 21 is a right, namely,
the right to life and personal liberty. It is true that Art.
21 is couched in negative language, but it is axiomatic that
to confer a right it is not necessary to use any particular
form of language. It is not uncommon in legislative practice
to use negative language for conferring a right. That is
often done for lending greater emphasis and strength to the
legislative enactment. One instance may be found in s. 298,
sub-s. (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which
provided that no subject of His Majesty domiciled in India
shall on
431
grounds only of religion, place of birth descent, colour or
any of them A be ineligible for office under the Crown in
India, or be prohibited on any such grounds from acquiring,
holding or disposing of property or carrying on any
occupation, trade, business or profession in British India.
Though this provision was couched in negative language, the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Punjab Province
v. Daulat Singh(1) construed it as conferring a right on
every subject of His Majesty, domiciled in India. B
Similarly, Art. 14 also employs negative language and
yet it was construed to confer a fundamental right on every
person within the territory of India, S. R. Das, C.J.,
pointed out in Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of Income
Tax, Delhi & Rajasthan(2) that it is clear from the language
of Art. 14 that "The command of that Article is directed to
the State and the reality of the obligation thus imposed on
the State is the measure of the fundamental right which
every person within the territory of India is to enjoy."
(emphasis supplied).

Article 31, clause (1) is also couched in negative
language: it is almost in the same form as Article 21.
Speaking about Article 31, S. R. Das, J. Observed in State
of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraj Kameshwar Singh of Dharbhanga &
ors.(3). "It confers a fundamental right in so far as it
protects private property from State action. The only
limitation put upon the State action is the requirement that
the authority of law is prerequisite for the exercise of its
power to deprive a person of his property. This confers some
protection on the owner, in that, he will not be deprived of
his property save by authority of law and this protection is
the measure of the fundamental right. It is to emphasise
this immunity from State action as a fundamental right (that
the clause has been worded in negative language . . . "
(emphasis supplied) If Article 31 (1), by giving a limited
immunity from State action, confers a fundamental right, it
should follow equally on a parity of reasoning that Article
21 also does so. In fact, this Court pointed out in so many
terms in P. D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India Ltd.(4):
that clause (1) of-Art. 31 "is a declaration of fundamental
right of private property in the same negative form in which
Article 21 declares the fundamental right to life and
liberty".

Then again in R. C. Cooper v, Union of India(5) this
Court in a majority judgment to which ten out of eleven
judges were parties said:

"-it is necessary to bear in mind the enunciation
of the guarantee of fundamental rights which has taken
different forms. In some cases it is an express
declaration of a guaranteed right: Art. 29(1), 30(1),
26, 25 and 32, in others to ensure protection of
individual rights they take specific forms of
restrictions on State action-legislative or executive -

Arts. 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22(1), 27 and 28; The
enunciation of rights either express or by implication
does not follow a uniform pattern. But one thread runs
through
(1) 73 Indian Appeals 59.

(2) [1959] Supp. (I) S. C. R. 529.

(3) [1952] S. C. R. 889 at p. 988.

(4) [1952] S. C. R. 391.

(5) 119701 3 S. C. R. 530.

432

them; they seek to protect the rights of the individual
or groups of individuals against infringement of those
rights within specific limits. Part Ill of the
Constitution weaves a pattern of guarantees on the
texture of basic human rights."

This statement of the law establishes clearly and without
doubts that Article 21 confers the fundamental right of
personal liberty.

Let us, for a moment, consider what would be the
consequences if Art. 21 were construed as not conferring a
right to personal liberty. Then there would be no
fundamental right conferred by Art. 21 and even if a person
is deprived of his personal liberty otherwise than in
accordance with the procedure established by law and there
is infringement of Art. 21, such person would not be
entitled to move the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas
corpus under Art. 32, for that Article is available only for
enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III. That would
be a startling consequence, as it would deprive the Supreme
Court of a wholesome jurisdiction to protect the personal
liberty of an individual against illegal detention. Let it
not be for gotten that the Supreme Court has exercised this
jurisdiction in a large number of cases over the last 25
years and set many detenus at liberty where it found that
they were illegally detained. All this exercise of
jurisdiction in the past would be rendered illegal and void.
Ever since the commencement of the Constitution, this Court
has always regarded Article 21 as conferring the fundamental
right of personal liberty which can be enforced in this
Court by a petition under Article 32 and there is no
justification for departing from this well settled
constructional position.

What then is the scope and ambit of this fundamental
right conferred by Article 21 ? The first question that
arises in this connection is: what is the meaning and
content of the word 'personal liberty' in this Article ?
This question came up for consideration before a Bench of
six judges of this Court in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. &
Ors.(1). The majority judges took the view "that 'personal
liberty' is used in the Article as a compendious term to
include within itself all the varieties of rights which go
to make up the 'personal liberties' of man other than those
dealt with in the several of clauses of Article 19(1). In
other words, while Article 19(1) deals with particular
species or attributes of that freedom, 'personal liberty' in
Article 21 takes in and comprises the residue". The minority
judges, however disagreed with this view taken by the
majority and explained their position in the following
words: "No doubt the expression 'personal liberty' is a
comprehensive one and the right to move freely is an
attribute of that freedom personal liberty. It is said that
the freedom to move freely is carved out of personal liberty
and, therefore, the expression 'personal liberty' in Article
21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is not a
correct approach. Both are independent fundamental rights.
though there is overlapping. There is no question of one
being carved out of another. The fundamental right of life
and personal liberty have many attributes and some of them
are found in Article 19. If a person's fundamental right
under Article 21 is infringed, the State can rely upon a law
(1) [1964] 1 S. C. R. 332.

433

to sustain the action, but that cannot be a complete answer
unless the said law satisfies the test laid down in Article
19(2) so far as the attributes covered by Article 19(1) are
concerned." There can be no doubt that in view of the
decision of this Court in R. C. Cooper's case (supra) the
minority view must be regarded as correct and the majority
view must be held to have been overruled. No attribute of
personal liberty can be regarded as having been carved out
of Article 21. That Article protects all attributes of
personal liberty against executive action which is not
supported by law. lt is not necessary for the purpose of the
present appeals to decide what those attributes are or to
identify or define them. It is enough to say that when a
person is detained, there is deprivation of personal liberty
within the meaning of Article 21.

Now Article 21 gives protection against deprivation of
personal liberty but what is the nature and extent of this
protection ? In the first place, it may be noted that this
protection is only against State action and not against
private individuals. Vide P. D. Shamdasani v. Central Bank
of India Ltd. (supra) and Smt. Vidya Verma v. Dr. Shiv
Narain(l). Secondly, it is clear from the language of Art.
21 that the protection it secures is a limited one. It says
and I am quoting here only that part of the Article which
relates to personal liberty, that no one shall be deprived
of his personal liberty except by the procedure prescribed
by law. The meaning of the word 'law' as used in this
Article came to be considered by this Court in A. K. Gopalan
v. State of Madras(2) and it was construed to mean 'enacted
law' or 'State law'. Kania, C.J., observed: "It is obvious
that-law must mean enacted law", and to the same effect
spoke Patanjali Sastri, J., when he said: "In my opinion
'law' in Art. 21 means 'positive or State made law' ". So
also Mukherjee, J., said that his conclusion was that "in
Art. 21 the word 'law' has been used in the sense of State
made law",,and Das J. too expressed the view that law in
Art. 21 must mean State made law. The only safeguard enacted
by Article 21, therefore, is that a person cannot be
deprived of his personal liberty except according to
procedure prescribed by 'State made law. If a law is made by
the State prescribing the procedure for depriving a person
of his personal liberty and deprivation is effected strictly
in accordance with such procedure, the terms of Article 21
would be satisfied and there would be no infringement or the
right guaranteed under that Article.

Now, based on the phraseology "except according to
procedure established by law" in Article 21, an argument was
advanced on behalf of the detenus that it is only where
procedure prescribed by the law as not been followed in
making the order of detention that Article 21 is attracted
and the right conferred by that Article is breached and not
where an order of detention is made without there being any
law at all or where there is a law, outside the authority
conferred by it. It was urged that where an order of
detention is challenged as mala
(1) [1955] 2 S. C. R. 983.

(2) [1950] S. C. R. 88.

833 SCI/76
434
fide or as having been made without the requisite subjective
satisfaction, the challenge would not be on the ground of
breach of the procedure prescribed by the Act but it would
be on the ground that the order of detention is outside the
authority of the Act and such a challenge would not be
covered by Article 21. This argument is, in my opinion,
wholly unsustainable. It is clear on plain natural
construction of its language that Article 21 imports two
requirements: first, there must be a law authorising
deprivation of personal liberty, and secondly, such law must
prescribe a procedure. The first requirement is indeed
implicit in the phrase "except according to procedure
prescribed by law". When a law prescribes a procedure for
depriving a person of personal liberty, it must a fortiori
authorise such deprivation. Article 21 thus provides both
substantive as well as procedural safeguards. This was
pointed out by Patanjali Sastri, J. in A. K. Gopalan v.
State of Madras (supra) at page 195 of the Report where the
learned Judge said:

"If article 21 is to be understood as providing
only procedural safeguards, where is the substantive
right to personal liberty of non-citizens to be found
in the Constitution ? Are they denied such right
altogether ? If they are to have no right of personal
liberty, why is the procedural safeguard in article 21
extended to them ? And where is that most fundamental
right of all, the right to life, provided for in the
Constitution? The truth is that article 21,-presents an
example of the fusion of procedural and substantive
rights in the same provision-the first and essential
step in a procedure established by law for such
deprivation must be a law made by a competent
legislature authorising such deprivation."

Mahajan, J. also pointed out in the same case at page 229 of
the Report:

Article 21, in my opinion, lays down substantive
law as giving protection to life and liberty inasmuch
as it says that they cannot be deprived except
according to the procedure established by law; in other
words, it means that before a person can be deprived of
his life or liberty as a condition precedent there
should exist some substantive law conferring authority
for doing so and the law should further provide for a
mode of procedure for such deprivation."

S. R. Das, J. too spoke in the same strain when he
negatived the argument "that personal liberty as a
substantive right is protected by Article 19(1) and article
21 gives only an additional protection by prescribing the
procedure according to which that right may be taken away."
It would, therefore, be seen that both the safeguards of
Article 21, substantive as well as procedural, have to be
complied with in order that there should be no infraction of
the right conferred by that Article. Where there is a law
authorising deprivation of personal liberty, but a person is
detained otherwise than in conformity with the procedure
prescribed by such law, it would clearly constitute
435
violation of Article 21. And so also there would be breach
of Article A 21, if there is no law authorising deprivation
of personal liberty and yet a person is detained, for then
the substantive safeguard provided in the Article would be
violated. Therefore, when a detenu challenges an order of
detention made against him on the ground that it is mala
fide or is not preceded by the requisite subjective
satisfaction, such challenge would fall within the terms of
Article 21. B
It is also necessary to point out two other ingredients
of Article 21. The first is that there must not only be a
law authorising deprivation of personal liberty, but there
must also be a procedure prescribed by law, or in other
words, law must prescribe a procedure. Vide observations of
Fazal Ali, J. at page 169, Patanjali Sastri, J. at page 205,
Mahajan, J. at pages 229 and 230 and S. R. Das, J. at page
319 of the Report in A . K. Gopalan's case ( supra) .
Article 21, thus, operates not merely as a restriction on
executive action against deprivation of personal liberty
without authority of law, but it also enacts a check on the
legislature by insisting that the law, which authorises
deprivation, must establish a procedure. What the procedure
should be is not laid down in this Article, but there must
be some procedure and at the least, it must conform to the
minimal requirements of Article 22. Secondly, 'law' within
the meaning of Article 21 must be a valid law and not only
must it be within the legislative competence of the
legislature enacting it, but it must also not be repugnant
to any of the fundamental rights enumerated in Part III.
Vide Shambhu Nath Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal(1) and
Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal & ors.(2).

It was contended by Mr. Jethmalani on behalf of some of
the detenus that when a Presidential order suspends
enforcement of the right conferred by Art. 21, its effect is
merely to suspend enforcement of the aforesaid two
ingredients and, therefore, the only claims which a detenu
is interdicted from enforcing, whilst the Presidential order
is in operation, are: (1) that the law authorising
deprivation does not prescribe a procedure, and (2) that it
does not impose reasonable restrictions on the freedom
guaranteed under Art. 19. This contention is plainly
erroneous and does not need much argument to refute it. In
the first place, the requirement that the law which
authorises deprivation of personal liberty should not fall
foul of Article 19, or for the matter of that, with any
other fundamental right set out in Part III, is not a
requirement of Article 21, but it is a requirement of Art.

13. Secondly, the effect of suspension of enforcement of
Article 21 by the Presidential order is that no one can move
any court for a enforcement of the right conferred by Art.
21, whilst the Presidential order is in operation. The right
conferred by Article 21 is the right not to be deprived of
personal liberty except according to procedure prescribed by
law. Therefore, when the executive detains a person without
there being any law at all authorising detention or if there
is such law, otherwise than in accordance with its
provisions, that would clearly be in violation of the right
conferred by Art. 21 and such vio-

(1) [1974] S.C.R.1.

(2) [1975] 2 S. C. R. 832.

436

lation would a fortiori toe immune from challenge by reason
of the Presidential order: It must follow inevitably from
this that when a detenu challenges an order of detention on
the ground that it is mala fide or is not in accordance with
the provisions of the Act or is outside the authority
conferred by the Act, he would be seeking to enforce the
right of personal liberty conferred on him under Art. 21 and
that would be inhibited by the Presidential order.

That takes me to a consideration of the concept of the
rule of law on which so much reliance was placed on behalf
of the detenus in order to save their writ petitions from
the lethal effect of the Presidential order. The contention
on behalf of the detenus was that their writ petitions were
for enforcement of the right of the personal iiberty based
on the principle of the rule of law that the executive
cannot interfere with the liberty of a person except by
authority of law and that was not within the inhibition of
the Presidential order. The question is: what is this
principle of the rule of law and does it exist under our
Constitution as a distinct and separate constitutional
principle, independently and apart from Article 21, so as to
be capable of enforcement even when enforcement of Article
21 is suspended by the Presidential order.

The Great Charter of Liberties of England, commonly
known as the Magna Carta, was granted under the seal of King
John in the meadow called Runnymede on 15th June, 1215. This
was followed within a couple of years by a revised version
of the Charter which was issued in the name of Henry III in
1217 and ultimately with slight amendments, another Charter
was re-issued by Henry III in 1225 and that document has
always been accepted as containing the authorised text of
Magna Carta. Whenever reference is made to Magna Carta, it
is to the Charter of 1225. which is also described as "9
Henry III (1225)". Magna Carta, according to Sir Ivor
Jennings symbolises "what we should now call the rule of
law, government according to law or constitutional
government" which means that all power should come from the
law and that "no man, be he king or minister or private
person is above the law". It recognised that "the liberties
of England, which means the liberties of all free men-
depended on the observance of law by King, lord and commoner
alike", and "without law there is no liberty". Cap. XXIX
contains the famous clause of the Magna Carta which provided
that: "No free man shall be taken, or imprisoned, or
dispossessed, of his free tenement, or liberties, or free
customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed;
nor will we condemn him, nor will we commit him to prison,
excepting by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the laws
of the land." Thus for the first time the great principle
was enunciated-though even before, it was always part of the
liberties of the subject-that no one shall be imprisoned or
deprived of his liberty except by the authority of the law
of the land. The power of the King to arrest a person or to
deprive him of his liberty was circumscribed by law. That is
why Bracton said about the middle of the 13th Century "-the
king himself ought not to
437
under man but under God and under the law, because the law
makes A the King. Therefore, let the King attribute to the
law what the law attributes to the King, namely, lordship
and power, for there is no king where will governs and not
law". Magna Carta was confirmed again by the successive
kings on the insistence of Lords and commons and the rule of
law embodied in Magna Calla governed the actions of the King
vis-a-vis his subjects. But this great principle of liberty
was placed in jeopardy in the 17th Century when a claim was
made by the King that he had a prerogative right to arrest
and detain subject and this prerogative right was necessary
for the defence of the Realm. When the King sought to raise
moneys from the subjects without the sanction of the
Parliament, it was resisted by Darnel and others and they
were on that account committed to prison under the orders of
the King. On the application of these persons, who were so
imprisoned, a writ of habea corpus was issued and the return
made to it on behalf of the King was that they were
imprisoned per speciale mandate Domini Regis (1627 St. Tr. 1
warnel's case). This return was considered sufficient and
the writ was discharged. The effect of this decision was
that King needed no authority of law in order to deprive a
subject of his personal liberty. But the Parliament was
quick to nullify this decision by enacting the Petition of
Right, 1628 and it reaffirmed the right to personal liberty
in section 3 of that Act and declared such a cause of
imprisonment to be unlawful. The principle that the
Executive cannot interfere with the liberty of a subject
unless such interference is sanctioned by the authority of
law was thus restored in its full vigour.

Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England,
vol. 1, 4th ed. p. 105 stated the principle in these terms:
E
"-the law of England regards, asserts and
preserves the personal liberty of individuals. This
personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion,
of changing situation, or removing one's person to
whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, for
imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law-
It cannot ever be abridged at the mere discretion of
the magistrate, without the explicit per mission of the
laws. Here again, the language of the Great Charter is,
that no free man shall be taken or imprisoned, but by
the lawful judgment of his equals, or by the law of the
land." (emphasis supplied)
Since then, the validity of this principle has never been
doubted and the classical statement of it is to be found in
the oft quoted passage from the judgment of Lord Atkin in
Eshugbayi (Eleko) v. Officer Administering the Government of
Nigeria (supra) where the learned Law Lord said:

"The Governor acting under the ordinance acts
solely under executive powers, and in no sense a Court.
As the. executive he can only act in pursuance of the
powers given to him by law. In accordance with British
jurisprudence no member of the executive can interfere
with the liberty or
438
property of a British subject except on the condition
that he can support the legality of his action before a
Court of Justice. And it is the tradition of British
justice that Judges should not shrink from deciding
such issues in the face of the executive."

Since in this country prior to the commencement of the
Constitution, we were administering British jurisprudence,
this constitutional principle was equally applicable here.
That was the direct result of the binding authority of the
decision of the Privy Council in the aforementioned case.
But quite apart from that, the courts in India uniformly
accepted this constitutional principle as part of the law of
the land. Vide Secretary of State for India v. Hari
Bhanji(1) and Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas Advani(2).
Bose, J., in P. K. Tare v. Emperor(3) quoted with approval
the aforesaid passage from the judgment of Lord Atkin and
pointed out that before the executive can claim power to
override the rights of the subject "it must show that the
legislature has empowered it to do so". The learned Judge
also referred to the following passage from the dissenting
judgment of Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Anderson(4) "It has
always been one of the pillars of freedom, one of the
principles of liberty for which, on recent authority, we are
now fighting that the Judges are no respecter of persons and
stand between the subject and any attempted encroachments on
his liberty by the executive; alert to see that any coercive
action is justified in law." (emphasis supplied), and,
pointing out that Lord Macmillan and Lord Wright also agreed
with this principle, observed that these principles of
liberty "to which Lord Atkin refers, apply as much to India
as elsewhere". So also in Vimlabai Deshpande v. Emperor(5)
the same two passages, one from the judgment of Lord Atkin
in Eshugbayi's case (supra) and the other from the judgment
in Liversidge's case (supra) were referred to with approval
by Bose and Sen, JJ.

It was also accepted by a Division Bench of the
Calcutta High Court consisting of Malik and Remfry, JJ. in
Jitendranath Ghosh v. The Chief Secretary to the Government
of Bengal('i) that " in accordance with British
jurisprudence, and with the jurisprudence of British India,
no member of the excutive can interefere with the liberty or
property of a British subject, or of a foreigner in our
land, except on the condition that he can, and, if duly
called upon, must support the legality of his action before
a court of justice". The Division Bench pointed out that
"the courts can, and in a proper case must consider and
determine the question whether there has been a fraud on an
Act or an abuse of powers granted by the legislature,
Eshugbayi Eleko's case".

(7) (48 Cal. Weekly Notes 766 at 780)
439
of Lord Atkin in Eshugbayi Eleko's case (supra) and relied
on the decision in Jitendranath Ghosh's case (supra) and
particularly the observations from the judgment in that case
which I have just reproduced. These observations clearly
show that in our country, even in pre-constitution days, the
executive was a limited executive, that is, an executive
limited by law and it could act only in accordance with law.
B
It would be seen from the above discussion that, even
prior to the Constitution, the principle of rule of law that
the executive cannot act to the prejudice of a person
without the authority of law was recognised as part of the
law of the land and was uniformly administered by the
courts. It was clearly 'law in force' and ordinarily, by
reason of Article 372, it would have continued to subsist as
a distinct and separate principle of law even after the
commencement of the Constitution. But when the Constitution
was enacted, some aspects of this principle of rule of law
were expressly recognised and given constitutional
embodiment in different Articles of the Constitution..
Thereafter they did not remain in the realm of unwritten
law. Article 21 enacted one aspect of the principle of rule
of law that executive cannot deprive a person of his life or
personal liberty without authority of law and added a
requirement that the law which authorises such deprivation
must prescribe a procedure. Another aspect of the principle
of rule of law was enacted in clause (1) of Article 31.
namely, that no one shall be deprived of his property save
by authority of law. That is why it was pointed out by Shah,
J. in R .C. Cooper's case (supra) that "Clauses (1) and (2)
of Article 31 subordinate the exercise of the power of the
State to the basic concept of the rule of law". A third
aspect was constitutionailsed in various sub-clauses of
clause (1) of Article 19 inhibiting executive action
unsupported by law, which conflicted with the different
freedoms guaranteed in these sub-clauses. Then Article 265
recognised and enacted a yet fourth aspect, namely, that no
tax shall be levied and collected without authority of law.
Article 19, clause (1), Article 21, Article 31, clause (1)
and Article 265 thus embody different aspects of the
principle of rule of law. We are concerned in these appeals
only with Article 21 and, therefore, I shall confine my
discussion only to that Article.

Now, to my mind, it is clear that when this principle
of rule of law that the executive cannot deprive a person of
his liberty except by authority of law, is recognised and
embodied as a fundamental sight and enacted as such in
Article 21, it is difficult to comprehend how it could
continue to have a distinct and separate existence,
independently and apart from this Article in which it has
been given constitutional vesture. l fail to see how it
could continue in force under Article 372 when it is
expressly recognized and embodied as a fundamental right in
article 21 and finds a place in the express provisions of
the Constitution. Once this principle is recognised and
incorporated in the Constitution and forms part of it, it
could not have any separate existence apart from the
Constitution, unless it were also enacted as a statutory
principle by some positive law of the State. This position
440
indeed become incontrovertible when we notice that, while
recognising and adopting this principle of rule of law as a
fundamental right, the Constitution has defined its scope
and ambit and imposed limitation on it in the shape of
Article 359A, clauses (1) and (1A). When the constitution-
makers have clearly intended that this right should be
subject to the limitation imposed by Article 359, clause (1)
and (1A), it would be contrary to all canons of construction
to hold that the same right continues to exist
independently, but free from the limitation imposed by
Article 359, clauses (1) and (1A). Such a construction would
defeat the object of the constitution-makers in imposing the
limitation under Article 359, clauses (1) and (1A) and make
a mockery of that limitation. The consequence of such a
construction would be that, even though a Presidential order
is issued under clause (1) of Article 359 suspending the
right to move the court for enforcement of the right
guaranteed under Article 21, the detenu would be entitled to
ignore the Presidential order and challenge the order of the
detention on the ground that it is made otherwise, than in
accordance with law, which is precisely the thing which is
sought to be interdicted by the Presidential order. The
Presidential order would in such case become meaningless and
ineffectual. Can an interpretation be accepted which would
reduce to futility Article 359, clause (l) in its
application in relation to Article 21 ? Could the
constitution-makers have intended such a meaning? The only
explanation which could be offered on behalf of the detenus
was that the object of Article 359, clause (1) is merely to
prevent a person from moving the Supreme Court under Article
32 for enforcing the right of personal liberty and it is not
intended to effect the enforcement of the right of personal
liberty based on the rule of law by moving the High Court
under Article 226. But this explanation is wholly
unconvincing. It is difficult to understand why the
constitution-makers should have intended to bar only the
right to move the Supreme Court under Article 37 in so far
as the. right of personal liberty is concerned. There would
be no point in preventing a citizen from moving the Supreme
Court directly under Article 32 for securing his release
from illegal detention, while at the same time leaving it
open to him to move the High Court for the same relief and
then to come to the Supreme Court in appeal, if necessary.
That would be wholly irrational and meaningless Therefore,
the only way in which meaning and effect can be given to the
Presidential order suspending the enforcement of the right
of personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 is by
holding that the principle of rule of law, that the
executive cannot interfere with the personal liberty of any
person except by authority of law, is enacted in Article 21
and it does not exist as a distinct and separate principle
conferring a right of personal liberty, independently and
apart from that Article. Consequently, when the enforcement
of the right of personal liberty conferred by Article 21 is
suspended by a Presidential order, the detenu cannot
circumvent the Presidential order and challenge the legality
of his detention by falling back on the supposed right of
personal liberty based on the principle of rule of law.

It was also said on behalf of the detenus that under
our constitutional set up, the executive is bound to act in
accordance with law and
441
this obligation of the executive arises from the very basis
of the doctrine of distribution of powers amongst different
bodies created by the Constitution as also from the terms of
Articles 73, 154 and 256 of the Constitution. This
obligation, contended the detenus, coul