After appellant newspaper had refused to print appellee's replies
to editorials critical of appellee's candidacy for state office,
appellee brought suit in Florida Circuit Court seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief and damages, based on Florida's "right of reply"
statute that grants a political candidate a right to equal space to
answer criticism and attacks on his record by a newspaper, and making
it a misdemeanor for the newspaper to fail to comply. The Circuit
Court held the statute unconstitutional as infringing on the freedom
of the press and dismissed the action. The Florida Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the statute did not violate constitutional
guarantees, and that civil remedies, including damages, were
available, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Held:

1. The Florida Supreme Court's judgment is "final" under 28 U.S.C.
1257, and thus is ripe for review by this Court. North Dakota
Pharmacy Bd. v. Snyder's Stores, 414 U.S. 156. Pp. 246-247.

2. The statute violates the First Amendment's guarantee of a free
press. Pp. 247-258.

(a) Governmental compulsion on a newspaper to publish
that which "reason" tells it should not be published is
unconstitutional. P. 256.

(b) The statute operates as a command by a State in the same
sense as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant to publish
specified matter. P. 256.

(c) The statute exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of
a newspaper by imposing additional printing, composing, and
materials costs and by taking up space that could be devoted to
other material the newspaper may have preferred to print. Pp.
256-257.

(d) Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to
comply with the statute and would not be forced to forgo
publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the
statute still fails to clear the First Amendment's barriers
because of its [242] intrusion into the function of
editors in choosing what material goes into a newspaper and in
deciding on the size and content of the paper and the treatment of
public issues and officials. P. 258.

The issue in this case is whether a state statute granting a
political candidate a right to equal space to reply to criticism and
attacks on his record by a newspaper violates the guarantees of a
free press.

I

In the fall of 1972, appellee, Executive Director of the Classroom
Teachers Association, apparently a teachers' collective-bargaining
agent, was a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives. On
September 20, 1972, and again on September 29, 1972, appellant
printed editorials critical of appellee's candidacy.[note 1]
In [244] response to these editorials appellee demanded that
appellant print verbatim his replies, defending the role of the
Classroom Teachers Association and the organization's accomplishments
for the citizens of Dade County. Appellant declined to print the
appellee's replies, and appellee brought suit in Circuit Court, Dade
County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and actual and
punitive damages in excess of $5,000. The action was premised on
Florida Statute 104.38 (1973), a "right of reply" statute which
provides that if a candidate for nomination or election is assailed
regarding his personal character or official record by any newspaper,
the candidate has the right to demand that the newspaper print, free
of cost to the candidate, any reply the candidate may make to the
newspaper's charges. The reply must appear in as conspicuous a place
and in the same kind of type as the charges which prompted the reply,
provided it does not take up more space than the charges. Failure to
comply with the statute constitutes a first-degree
misdemeanor.[note 2] [245]

Appellant sought a declaration that 104.38 was unconstitutional.
After an emergency hearing requested by appellee, the Circuit Court
denied injunctive relief because, absent special circumstances, no
injunction could properly issue against the commission of a crime,
and held that 104.38 was unconstitutional as an infringement on the
freedom of the press under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution. 38 Fla. Supp. 80 (1972). The Circuit Court concluded
that dictating what a newspaper must print was no different from
dictating what it must not print. The Circuit Judge viewed the
statute's vagueness as serving "to restrict and stifle protected
expression." Id., at 83. Appellee's cause was dismissed with
prejudice.

On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that
104.38 did not violate constitutional guarantees. 287 So.2d 78
(1973).[note 3] It held that free speech was enhanced and not
abridged by the Florida right-of-reply statute, which in that court's
view, furthered the "broad societal interest in the free flow of
information to the public." Id., at 82. It also held that the statute
is [246] not impermissibly vague; the statute informs "those
who are subject to it as to what conduct on their part will render
them liable to its penalties." Id., at 85.[note 4] Civil
remedies, including damages, were held to be available under this
statute; the case was remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the Florida Supreme Court's
opinion.

We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the
hearing of the case on the merits. 414 U.S. 1142 (1974).

II

Although both parties contend that this Court has jurisdiction to
review the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court, a suggestion was
initially made that the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court might
not be "final" under 28 U.S.C. 1257.[note 5] In North
Dakota State Pharmacy Bd. v. Snyder's Stores, 414 U.S. 156
(1973), we reviewed a judgment of the North Dakota Supreme Court,
under which the case had been remanded so that further state
proceedings could be conducted respecting Snyder's application for a
permit to operate a drug store. We held that to be a final judgment
for purposes of our jurisdiction. Under the principles of finality
enunciated in Snyder's Stores, the judgment of [247] the
Florida Supreme Court in this case is ripe for review by this
Court.[note 6]

III

A

The challenged statute creates a right to reply to press criticism
of a candidate for nomination or election. The statute was enacted in
1913, and this is only the second recorded case decided under its
provisions.[note 7]

Appellant contends the statute is void on its face because it
purports to regulate the content of a newspaper in violation of the
First Amendment. Alternatively it is urged that the statute is void
for vagueness since no editor could know exactly what words would
call the statute into operation. It is also contended that the
statute fails to distinguish between critical comment which is and
which is not defamatory.

B

The appellee and supporting advocates of an enforceable right of
access to the press vigorously argue that [248] government
has an obligation to ensure that a wide variety of views reach the
public.[note 8] The contentions of access proponents will be
set out in some detail.[note 9] It is urged that at the time
the First Amendment to the Constitution [note 10] was
ratified in 1791 as part of our Bill of Rights the press was broadly
representative of the people it was serving. While many of the
newspapers were intensely partisan and narrow in their views, the
press collectively presented a broad range of opinions to readers.
Entry into publishing was inexpensive; pamphlets and books provided
meaningful alternatives to the organized press for the expression of
unpopular ideas and often treated events and expressed views not
covered by conventional newspapers.[note 11] A true
marketplace of ideas existed in which there was relatively easy
access to the channels of communication.

Access advocates submit that although newspapers of the present
are superficially similar to those of 1791 the press of today is in
reality very different from that known in the early years of our
national existence. In the past half century a communications
revolution has seen the introduction of radio and television into our
lives, the promise of a global community through the [249]
use of communications satellites, and the specter of a "wired" nation
by means of an expanding cable television network with two-way
capabilities. The printed press, it is said, has not escaped the
effects of this revolution. Newspapers have become big business and
there are far fewer of them to serve a larger literate
population.[note 12] Chains of newspapers, national
newspapers, national wire and news services, and one-newspaper
towns,[note 13] are the dominant features of a press that has
become noncompetitive and enormously powerful and influential in its
capacity to manipulate popular opinion and change the course of
events. Major metropolitan newspapers have collaborated to establish
news services national in scope.[note 14] Such national news
organizations provide syndicated "interpretive reporting" as well as
syndicated features and commentary, all of which can serve as part of
the new school of "advocacy journalism."

The elimination of competing newspapers in most of our large
cities, and the concentration of control of media that results from
the only newspaper's being owned by the same interests which own a
television station and a radio station, are important components of
this trend toward [250] concentration of control of outlets
to inform the public.

The result of these vast changes has been to place in a few hands
the power to inform the American people and shape public
opinion.[note 15] Much of the editorial opinion and
commentary that is printed is that of syndicated columnists
distributed nationwide and, as a result, we are told, on national and
world issues there tends to be a homogeneity of editorial opinion,
commentary, and interpretive analysis. The abuses of bias and
manipulative reportage are, likewise, said to be the result of the
vast accumulations of unreviewable power in the modern media empires.
In effect, it is claimed, the public has lost any ability to respond
or to contribute in a meaningful way to the debate on issues. The
monopoly of the means of communication allows for little or no
critical analysis of the media except in professional journals of
very limited readership.

"This concentration of nationwide news organizations - like other
large institutions - has grown increasingly remote from and
unresponsive to the popular constituencies on which they depend and
which depend on them." Report of the Task Force in Twentieth Century
Fund Task Force Report for a National News Council, A Free and
Responsive Press 4 (1973).

Appellee cites the report of the Commission on Freedom of the
Press, chaired by Robert M. Hutchins, in which it was stated, as long
ago as 1947, that "[t]he right of free [251] public
expression has . . . lost its earlier reality." Commission on Freedom
of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press 15 (1947).

The obvious solution, which was available to dissidents at an
earlier time when entry into publishing was relatively inexpensive,
today would be to have additional newspapers. But the same economic
factors which have caused the disappearance of vast numbers of
metropolitan newspapers,[note 16] have made entry into the
marketplace of ideas served by the print media almost impossible. It
is urged that the claim of newspapers to be "surrogates for the
public" carries with it a concomitant fiduciary obligation to account
for that stewardship.[note 17] From this premise it is
reasoned that the only effective way to insure fairness and accuracy
and to provide for some accountability is for government to take
affirmative action. The First Amendment interest of the public in
being informed is said to be in peril because the "marketplace of
ideas" is today a monopoly controlled by the owners of the
market.

Proponents of enforced access to the press take comfort from
language in several of this Court's decisions which suggests that the
First Amendment acts as a sword as well as a shield, that it imposes
obligations on the owners of the press in addition to protecting the
press from government regulation. In Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), the Court, in [252]
rejecting the argument that the press is immune from the antitrust
laws by virtue of the First Amendment, stated:

"The First Amendment, far from providing an argument
against application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful
reasons to the contrary. That Amendment rests on the assumption
that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public, that a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely
a command that the government itself shall not impede the free
flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a
refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally
guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means freedom for all and
not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the
Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from
publishing is not. Freedom of the press from governmental
interference under the First Amendment does not sanction
repression of that freedom by private interests." (Footnote
omitted.)

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964), the Court spoke of "a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open." It is argued that the "uninhibited, robust" debate is
not "wide-open" but open only to a monopoly in control of the press.
Appellee cites the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 47, and n. 15 (1971), which he suggests seemed
to invite experimentation by the States in right-to-access regulation
of the press.[note 18] [253]

"Where one paper has a monopoly in an area, it seldom
presents two sides of an issue. It too often hammers away on one
ideological or political line using its monopoly position not to
educate people, not to promote debate, but to inculcate in its
readers one philosophy, one attitude - and to make money."

"The newspapers that give a variety of views and news that is
not slanted or contrived are few indeed. And the problem promises
to get worse . . . ." The Great Rights 124-125, 127 (E. Cahn ed.
1963).

They also claim the qualified support of Professor Thomas I.
Emerson, who has written that "[a] limited right of access to
the press can be safely enforced," [254] although he believes
that "[g]overnment measures to encourage a multiplicity of
outlets, rather than compelling a few outlets to represent everybody,
seems a preferable course of action." T. Emerson, The System of
Freedom of Expression 671 (1970).

IV

However much validity may be found in these arguments, at each
point the implementation of a remedy such as an enforceable right of
access necessarily calls for some mechanism, either governmental or
consensual.[note 19] If it is governmental coercion, this at
once brings about a confrontation with the express provisions of the
First Amendment and the judicial gloss on that Amendment developed
over the years.[note 20]

The Court foresaw the problems relating to government-enforced
access as early as its decision in Associated Press v. United
States,supra. There it carefully contrasted the private
"compulsion to print" called for by the Association's bylaws with the
provisions of the District Court decree against appellants which
"does not compel AP or its members to permit publication of anything
which their 'reason' tells them should not be published." 326 U.S.,
at 20 n. 18. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972),
we emphasized that the cases then [255] before us "involve no
intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction
on what the press may publish, and no express or implied command that
the press publish what it prefers to withhold." In Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412
U.S. 94, 117 (1973), the plurality opinion as to Part III noted:

"The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its
own political, social, and economic views is bounded by only two
factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers -
and hence advertisers - to assure financial success; and, second,
the journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers."

An attitude strongly adverse to any attempt to extend a right of
access to newspapers was echoed by other Members of this Court in
their separate opinions in that case. Id., at 145 (STEWART, J.,
concurring); id., at 182 n. 12 (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL, J.,
dissenting). Recently, while approving a bar against employment
advertising specifying "male" or "female" preference, the Court's
opinion in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413
U.S. 376, 391 (1973), took pains to limit its holding within narrow
bounds:

"Nor, a fortiori, does our decision authorize any
restriction whatever, whether of content or layout, on stories or
commentary originated by Pittsburgh Press, its columnists, or its
contributors. On the contrary, we reaffirm unequivocally the
protection afforded to editorial judgment and to the free
expression of views on these and other issues, however
controversial."

Dissenting in Pittsburgh Press, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, joined by MR.
JUSTICE DOUGLAS, expressed the view that no "government agency -
local, state, or federal - can tell [256] a newspaper in
advance what it can print and what it cannot." Id., at 400. See
Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d
133, 135 (CA9 1971).

We see that beginning with Associated Press,supra,
the Court has expressed sensitivity as to whether a restriction or
requirement constituted the compulsion exerted by government on a
newspaper to print that which it would not otherwise print. The clear
implication has been that any such a compulsion to publish that which
"'reason' tells them should not be published" is unconstitutional. A
responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press
responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many
other virtues it cannot be legislated.

Appellee's argument that the Florida statute does not amount to a
restriction of appellant's right to speak because "the statute in
question here has not prevented the Miami Herald from saying anything
it wished" [note 21] begs the core question. Compelling
editors or publishers to publish that which "'reason' tells them
should not be published" is what is at issue in this case. The
Florida statute operates as a command in the same sense as a statute
or regulation forbidding appellant to publish specified matter.
Governmental restraint on publishing need not fall into familiar or
traditional patterns to be subject to constitutional limitations on
governmental powers. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233, 244-245 (1936). The Florida statute exacts a penalty on the
basis of the content of a newspaper. The first phase of the penalty
resulting from the compelled printing of a reply is exacted in terms
of the cost in printing and composing time and materials and in
taking up space that could be devoted to other material the newspaper
may have preferred to print. It is correct, as appellee contends,
that a newspaper is not subject to the [257] finite
technological limitations of time that confront a broadcaster but it
is not correct to say that, as an economic reality, a newspaper can
proceed to infinite expansion of its column space to accommodate the
replies that a government agency determines or a statute commands the
readers should have available.[note 22]

Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that
published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the
right-of-access statute, editors might well conclude that the safe
course is to avoid controversy. Therefore, under the operation of the
Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted or
reduced.[note 23] Government-enforced right of access
inescapably "dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public
debate," New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., at 279. The
Court, in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966),
stated:

"[T]here is practically universal agreement that
a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course
includes discussions of candidates . . . ." [258]

Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with
a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo publication
of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute
fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its
intrusion into the function of editors. A newspaper is more than a
passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and
advertising.[note 24] The choice of material to go into a
newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and
content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public
officials - whether fair or unfair - constitute the exercise of
editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how
governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised
consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they
have evolved to this time. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Florida is reversed.

I join the Court's opinion which, as I understand it, addresses
only "right of reply" statutes and implies no view upon the
constitutionality of "retraction" statutes affording plaintiffs able
to prove defamatory falsehoods a statutory action to require
publication of a retraction. [259] See generally Note,
Vindication of the Reputation of a Public Official, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
1730, 1739-1747 (1967).

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.

The Court today holds that the First Amendment bars a State from
requiring a newspaper to print the reply of a candidate for public
office whose personal character has been criticized by that
newspaper's editorials. According to our accepted jurisprudence, the
First Amendment erects a virtually insurmountable barrier between
government and the print media so far as government tampering, in
advance of publication, with news and editorial content is concerned.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). A
newspaper or magazine is not a public utility subject to "reasonable"
governmental regulation in matters affecting the exercise of
journalistic judgment as to what shall be printed. Cf. Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (966). We have learned, and continue
to learn, from what we view as the unhappy experiences of other
nations where government has been allowed to meddle in the internal
editorial affairs of newspapers. Regardless of how
beneficent-sounding the purposes of controlling the press might be,
we prefer "the power of reason as applied through public discussion"
[note 1] and remain intensely skeptical about those measures
that would allow government to insinuate itself into the editorial
rooms of this Nation's press.

"Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of
the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that
a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes
discussions of candidates, structures and forms of [260]
government, the manner in which government is operated or should
be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.
The Constitution specifically selected the press . . . to play an
important role in the discussion of public affairs. Thus the press
serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any
abuses of power by governmental officials and as a
constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the
people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to
serve. Suppression of the right of the press to praise or
criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or
against change . . . muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers
of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to
improve our society and keep it free." Mills v. Alabama,supra, at 218-219.

Of course, the press is not always accurate, or even responsible,
and may not present full and fair debate on important public issues.
But the balance struck by the First Amendment with respect to the
press is that society must take the risk that occasionally debate on
vital matters will not be comprehensive and that all viewpoints may
not be expressed. The press would be unlicensed because, in
Jefferson's words, "[w]here the press is free, and every man
able to read, all is safe."[note 2] Any other accommodation -
any other system that would supplant private control of the press
with the heavy hand of government intrusion - would make the
government the censor of what the people may read and know.

To justify this statute, Florida advances a concededly important
interest of ensuring free and fair elections by means of an
electorate informed about the issues. But [261] prior
compulsion by government in matters going to the very nerve center of
a newspaper - the decision as to what copy will or will not be
included in any given edition - collides with the First Amendment.
Woven into the fabric of the First Amendment is the unexceptionable,
but nonetheless timeless, sentiment that "liberty of the press is in
peril as soon as the government tries to compel what is to go into a
newspaper." 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 633
(1947).

The constitutionally obnoxious feature of 104.38 is not that the
Florida Legislature may also have placed a high premium on the
protection of individual reputational interests; for government
certainly has "a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and
redressing attacks upon reputation." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 86 (1966). Quite the contrary, this law runs afoul of the
elementary First Amendment proposition that government may not force
a newspaper to print copy which, in its journalistic discretion, it
chooses to leave on the newsroom floor. Whatever power may reside in
government to influence the publishing of certain narrowly
circumscribed categories of material, see, e. g., Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S., at 730 (WHITE, J.,
concurring), we have never thought that the First Amendment permitted
public officials to dictate to the press the contents of its news
columns or the slant of its editorials.

But though a newspaper may publish without government censorship,
it has never been entirely free from liability for what it chooses to
print. See ibid. Among other things, the press has not been wholly at
liberty to publish falsehoods damaging to individual reputation. At
least until today, we have cherished the average citizen's
[262] reputation interest enough to afford him a fair chance
to vindicate himself in an action for libel characteristically
provided by state law. He has been unable to force the press to tell
his side of the story or to print a retraction, but he has had at
least the opportunity to win a judgment if he has been able to prove
the falsity of the damaging publication, as well as a fair chance to
recover reasonable damages for his injury.

Reaffirming the rule that the press cannot be forced to print an
answer to a personal attack made by it, however, throws into stark
relief the consequences of the new balance forged by the Court in the
companion case also announced today. Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., post, p. 323, goes far toward eviscerating the
effectiveness of the ordinary libel action, which has long been the
only potent response available to the private citizen libeled by the
press. Under Gertz, the burden of proving liability is immeasurably
increased, proving damages is made exceedingly more difficult, and
vindicating reputation by merely proving falsehood and winning a
judgment to that effect are wholly foreclosed. Needlessly, in my
view, the Court trivializes and denigrates the interest in reputation
by removing virtually all the protection the law has always
afforded.

Of course, these two decisions do not mean that because government
may not dictate what the press is to print, neither can it afford a
remedy for libel in any form. Gertz itself leaves a putative remedy
for libel intact, albeit in severely emaciated form; and the press
certainly remains liable for knowing or reckless falsehoods under
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and its
progeny, however improper an injunction against publication might
be.

One need not think less of the First Amendment to sustain
reasonable methods for allowing the average citizen [263] to
redeem a falsely tarnished reputation. Nor does one have to doubt the
genuine decency, integrity, and good sense of the vast majority of
professional journalists to support the right of any individual to
have his day in court when he has been falsely maligned in the public
press. The press is the servant, not the master, of the citizenry,
and its freedom does not carry with it an unrestricted hunting
license to prey on the ordinary citizen.

"In plain English, freedom carries with it responsibility
even for the press; freedom of the press is not a freedom from
responsibility for its exercise." "Without . . . a lively sense of
responsibility a free press may readily become a powerful
instrument of injustice." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331, 356, 365 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted).

To me it is a near absurdity to so deprecate individual dignity,
as the Court does in Gertz, and to leave the people at the complete
mercy of the press, at least in this stage of our history when the
press, as the majority in this case so well documents, is steadily
becoming more powerful and much less likely to be deterred by threats
of libel suits.

Footnotes to the Majority Opinion

1. The text of the September 20, 1972, editorial is as
follows:

"The State's Laws And Pat Tornillo

"LOOK who's upholding the law!

"Pat Tornillo, boss of the Classroom Teachers Association and
candidate for the State Legislature in the Oct. 3 runoff election,
has denounced his opponent as lacking 'the knowledge to be a
legislator, as evidenced by his failure to file a list of
contributions to and expenditures of his campaign as required by
law.'

"Czar Tornillo calls 'violation of this law inexcusable.'

"This is the same Pat Tornillo who led the CTA strike from
February 19 to March 11, 1968, against the school children and
taxpayers of Dade Country. Call it whatever you will, it was an
illegal act against the public interest and clearly prohibited by the
statutes.

"We cannot say it would be illegal but certainly it would be
inexcusable of the voters if they sent Pat Tornillo to Tallahassee to
occupy the seat for District 103 in the House of
Representatives."

The text of the September 29, 1972, editorial is as follows:

"FROM the people who brought you this - the teacher strike of '68
- come now instructions on how to vote for responsible government,
i.e., against Crutcher Harrison and Ethel Beckham, for Pat Tornillo.
The tracts and blurbs and bumper stickers pile up daily in teachers'
school mailboxes amidst continuing pouts that the School Board should
be delivering all this at your expense. The screeds [244] say
the strike is not an issue. We say maybe it wouldn't be were it not a
part of a continuation of disregard of any and all laws the CTA might
find aggravating. Whether in defiance of zoning laws at CTA Towers,
contracts and laws during the strike, or more recently state
prohibitions against soliciting campaign funds amongst teachers, CTA
says fie and try and sue us - what's good for CTA is good for CTA and
that is natural law. Tornillo's law, maybe. For years now he has been
kicking the public shin to call attention to his shakedown
statesmanship. He and whichever acerbic prexy is in alleged office
have always felt their private ventures so chock-full of public weal
that we should leap at the chance to nab the tab, be it half the
Glorious Leader's salary or the dues checkoff or anything else except
perhaps mileage on the staff hydrofoil. Give him public office, says
Pat, and he will no doubt live by the Golden Rule. Our translation
reads that as more gold and more rule."

2. "104.38 Newspaper assailing candidate in an election; space for
reply - If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal
character [245] of any candidate for nomination or for
election in any election, or charges said candidate with malfeasance
or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record,
or gives to another free space for such purpose, such newspaper shall
upon request of such candidate immediately publish free of cost any
reply he may make thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same
kind of type as the matter that calls for such reply, provided such
reply does not take up more space than the matter replied to. Any
person or firm failing to comply with the provisions of this section
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as
provided in 775.082 or 775.083."

3. The Supreme Court did not disturb the Circuit Court's holding
that injunctive relief was not proper in this case even if the
statute were constitutional. According to the Supreme Court neither
side took issue with that part of the Circuit Court's decision. 287
So.2d, at 85.

4. The Supreme Court placed the following limiting construction on
the statute:

"[W]e hold that the mandate of the statute refers
to 'any reply' which is wholly responsive to the charge made in
the editorial or other article in a newspaper being replied to and
further that such reply will be neither libelous nor slanderous of
the publication nor anyone else, nor vulgar nor profane." Id., at
86.

5. Appellee's Response to Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement and
Motion to Affirm the Judgment Below or, in the Alternative, to
Dismiss the Appeal 4-7.

6. Both appellant and appellee claim that the uncertainty of the
constitutional validity of 104.38 restricts the present exercise of
First Amendment rights. Brief for Appellant 41; Brief for Appellee
79. Appellant finds urgency for the present consideration of the
constitutionality of the statute in the upcoming 1974 elections.
Whichever way we were to decide on the merits, it would be
intolerable to leave unanswered, under these circumstances, an
important question of freedom of the press under the First Amendment;
an uneasy and unsettled constitutional posture of 104.38 could only
further harm the operation of a free press. Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214, 221-222 (1966) (DOUGLAS, J., concurring). See also
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418
n. (1971).

7. In its first court test the statute was declared
unconstitutional. State v. News-Journal Corp., 36 Fla. Supp.
164 (Volusia County Judge's Court, 1972). In neither of the two
suits, the instant action and the News-Journal action, has the
Florida Attorney General defended the statute's
constitutionality.

9. For a good overview of the position of access advocates see
Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass
Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 8-9
(1973) (hereinafter Lange).

10. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances."

11. See Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible
Press 14 (1947) (hereinafter sometimes Commission).

12. Commission 15. Even in the last 20 years there has been a
significant increase in the number of people likely to read
newspapers. Bagdikian, Fat Newspapers and Slim Coverage, Columbia
Journalism Review 15, 16 (Sept./Oct. 1973).

13. "Nearly half of U.S. daily newspapers, representing some
three-fifths of daily and Sunday circulation, are owned by newspaper
groups and chains, including diversified business conglomerates.
One-newspaper towns have become the rule, with effective competition
operating in only 4 percent of our large cities." Background Paper by
Alfred Balk in Twentieth Century Fund Task Force Report for a
National News Council, A Free and Responsive Press 18 (1973).

14. Report of the Task Force in Twentieth Century Fund Task Force
Report for a National News Council, A Free and Responsive Press 4
(1973).

15. "Local monopoly in printed news raises serious questions of
diversity of information and opinion. What a local newspaper does not
print about local affairs does not see general print at all. And,
having the power to take initiative in reporting and enunciation of
opinions, it has extraordinary power to set the atmosphere and
determine the terms of local consideration of public issues." B.
Bagdikian, The Information Machines 127 (1971).

16. The newspapers have persuaded Congress to grant them immunity
from the antitrust laws in the case of "failing" newspapers for joint
operations. 84 Stat. 466, 15 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.

17. "Freedom of the press is a right belonging, like all rights in
a democracy, to all the people. As a practical matter, however, it
can be exercised only by those who have effective access to the
press. Where financial, economic, and technological conditions limit
such access to a small minority, the exercise of that right by that
minority takes on fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary characteristics." A.
MacLeish in W. Hocking, Freedom of the Press 99 n. 4 (1947) (italics
omitted).

18. "If the States fear that private citizens will not be able to
respond adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in
the [253] direction of ensuring their ability to respond,
rather than in stifling public discussion of matters of public
concern.[fn[*]]

"One writer, in arguing that the First Amendment itself should be
read to guarantee a right of access to the media not limited to a
right to respond to defamatory falsehoods, has suggested several ways
the law might encourage public discussion. Barron, Access to the
Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1666-1678
(1967). It is important to recognize that the private individual
often desires press exposure either for himself, his ideas, or his
causes. Constitutional adjudication must take into account the
individual's interest in access to the press as well as the
individual's interest in preserving his reputation, even though libel
actions by their nature encourage a narrow view of the individual's
interest since they focus only on situations where the individual has
been harmed by undesired press attention. A constitutional rule that
deters the press from covering the ideas or activities of the private
individual thus conceives the individual's interest too
narrowly."

19. The National News Council, an independent and voluntary body
concerned with press fairness, was created in 1973 to provide a means
for neutral examination of claims of press inaccuracy. The Council
was created following the publication of the Twentieth Century Fund
Task Force Report for a National News Council, A Free and Responsive
Press. The background paper attached to the Report dealt in some
detail with the British Press Council, seen by the author of the
paper as having the most interest to the United States of the
European press councils.

20. Because we hold that 104.38 violates the First Amendment's
guarantee of a free press we have no occasion to consider appellant's
further argument that the statute is unconstitutionally vague.

21. Brief for Appellee 5.

22. "However, since the amount of space a newspaper can devote to
'live news' is finite,[*] if a newspaper is forced to publish
a particular item, it must as a practical matter, omit something
else.

"[*] The number of column inches available for news is
predetermined by a number of financial and physical factors,
including circulation, the amount of advertising, and, increasingly,
the availability of newsprint. . . ." Note, 48 Tulane L. Rev. 433,
438 (1974) (one footnote omitted).

Another factor operating against the "solution" of adding more
pages to accommodate the access matter is that "increasingly
subscribers complain of bulky, unwieldy papers." Bagdikian, Fat
Newspapers and Slim Coverage, Columbia Journalism Review 19
(Sept./Oct. 1973).

23. See the description of the likely effect of the Florida
statute on publishers, in Lange 70-71.

24. "[L]iberty of the press is in peril as soon as the
government tries to compel what is to go into a newspaper. A journal
does not merely print observed facts the way a cow is photographed
through a plateglass window. As soon as the facts are set in their
context, you have interpretation and you have selection, and
editorial selection opens the way to editorial suppression. Then how
can the state force abstention from discrimination in the news
without dictating selection?" 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass
Communications 633 (1947).