Canada needs a National Security Strategy

Presented below are the Executive Summary and Recommendations sections of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) Institute’s 5th Vimy Paper, The Strategic Outlook for Canada. The paper, which was released today, provides a comprehensive review of recent developments in the international security environment and an insightful analysis of the outlook for 2012. The authors offer 16 recommendations related to foreign and defence policy and planning. The CDA Institute recommends that the Government of Canada:

commission the preparation of a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS);

update the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) which would flow from the NSS; and

produce a comprehensive review of Canada’s strategic interests in Asia-Pacific; explore with allies the parameters of a new collective security arrangement in the region; and re-assess the balance of CF commitments between East and West.

The year 2011 demonstrated that collective action can be mobilized to rid the world of despots and protect the innocent, but it also revealed on-going challenges of collective engagement within present international systems and structures. Events offered graphic evidence of the continued need for US leadership, and showed how much the world is economically interconnected as the debt crisis drove decisions on security and defence.

Americans are war-weary, disappointed with what has been achieved at great expense, and feeling exploited by ungrateful allies. Debate is intensifying over how national interests should be defined and the degree to which the security of Americans requires expenditure of lives and treasure in faraway places. The rising mood of disengagement coupled with a fragile economy will make it very difficult for the Administration to send large forces anywhere in 2012 unless security interests are openly threatened or humanitarian need is overwhelming.

In Syria, an international intervention is emerging as a probability. To be most effective, the resistance must coalesce and hold ground which the outside world can help defend, as happened in Libya. Some legitimizing authorization is preferable but increasingly unlikely. Given the extent of state sanctioned murder, individual nations, on a moral basis alone, will need to offer forces and determine the degree and nature of the intervention.

The most dangerous scenario involves Iran where the ayatollahs have set a course for hostilities. Unless sanctions succeed or the revolutionary theocracy in Tehran collapses, conflict is likely unavoidable.

Iran is well along the road to developing a nuclear weapon, has advanced delivery technology, and in the near future may be able to detonate a rudimentary nuclear device. Israel, perceiving an existential threat, will not let the Iranians succeed, even if it has to act alone.

Another scenario with the potential for conflict in 2012 would be Egypt renouncing its 1979 non-aggression treaty with Israel and remilitarizing the Sinai. It has already breached an agreement with Israel to prevent Hamas fighters and weapons entering the Gaza Strip from the south. Islamists control two-thirds of the seats in the Egyptian parliament and some have called for action to undo the treaty.

Finally, with an untried “military genius” now at the helm, there is the possibility that a DPRK stunt designed merely to provoke precipitates a full-scale war. One hopes the Chinese do not lose their grip on the North Koreans. Ambiguity surrounds much of what the Chinese are up to. Their build-up of forces is transforming the geopolitics of the region and has contributed to an American “pivot” towards Asia-Pacific.

Because the global economy is so interconnected, Canada is not immune to economic crises elsewhere, especially if economic failure leads to political and security problems. Canada’s interests are at stake and it is time for an overall strategy to take account of developments across the globe and inform our decisions on security and defence policy.

[The following are the recommendations laid out in the report, as related to Canadian interests:]

In keeping with these interests, the Strategic Outlook for 2012 concludes that Canada’s own international security agenda should focus on the following:

1. A National Security Strategy

In Canada, most of the attention in the first half of 2012 will likely be on the federal budget and its effects – a development yet to transpire at the time of this writing. In the lead-up to the budget, there has been speculation that all sectors of government could expect to see significant reductions in expenditures in aid of achieving balanced budgets by FY 2014-15. These would include spending cuts related to Canada’s foreign policy operations and national defence programs. There has been little discussion,
however, of the options which might then present themselves and how Canada’s international security interests could best be served in future years. In short, questions of national security strategy have yet to be addressed and, as the dust settles post-budget, policy makers will have to decide what course Canada should follow given the strategic outlook this report has described.

In the immediate future, regrettably, Canada will once again find itself with few long-term markers to guide it through the decisions it may have to take in 2012 on emerging issues engaging its security interests. About the only certainties are that Canadians will expect their government to do “the right thing” when a crisis arises, to work with Canada’s closest allies to develop a consensus on the way forward and, in the event military measures are required, to act within a coalition.

Recommendation 1

The government should follow up on its initiative of establishing a National Security Committee of Cabinet
and commission the preparation of a comprehensive National Security Strategy for Canada.

2. National Defence

Canada’s defence budget has doubled in the last ten years and now exceeds $20 billion a year. The new resources have gone to fighting in Afghanistan and more recently in Libya, to smaller CF deployments across the globe, to replacing equipment lost in battle – and, finally, to beginning the long process of modernizing the army, navy and air force. With “transformation” likely to reduce the defence budget in the order of 15%, and with limited room for economies (the transformation of 1994 cut $7 billion and 30,000 CF personnel), the CF will only be able to do “less with less” in 2012 and beyond.

This situation begs for policy clarity on a number of fronts:

What are the government’s expectations in respect of the capabilities of the Canadian Forces in the event they are called on to participate in a new NATO or coalition operation this year or next?

In a budget-constrained military, will decisions already taken regarding new equipment purchases have to be revisited and new choices made driven by affordability, return on investment, and emerging strategy?

Can previous sacred cows such as general purpose combat capability be maintained or is some degree of specialization needed across various elements of the Canadian Forces? For example, do we need specialized units and if so, what kind?

What is the balance to be struck between domestic and expeditionary capabilities?

Given that Canada will not engage in high-intensity full-spectrum military operations on its own, are there defence enablers or capabilities that should be considered only in the context of collective security operations?

What trade-offs may have to be made between traditional priorities such as the commitment to NATO and emerging priorities such as defence against cyber attack and ballistic missiles, sovereignty in the Arctic, security relations with partners in the Americas, and the geopolitical shifts under way in the Asia-Pacific region?

As a practical matter, will a new balance have to be struck between the weight placed on the three services (more navy and air force, will a new balance have to be struck between the weight placed on the three services (more navy and air force, less army?) and will forces have to be realigned between the East and West coasts of Canada?

Recommendation 2

The Canada First Defence Strategy will soon be four years old. It needs to be updated if it is to continue to serve its purpose of ensuring that the Canadian Forces have the people, equipment and support they need to meet existing and emerging security challenges. Before engaging in a re-write, the government should consider a series of first principles to guide the work and define more precisely the contribution the Canadian Forces are expected to make to the nation’s security.

Recommendation 3

Reductions to the National Defence operational budget create significant pressure on the ability to generate, employ and sustain capabilities. The cost to acquire and support new equipment begs the need to rationalize capital spending with the longer term ability to deliver all elements needed for a viable capability — personnel, infrastructure, maintenance, training, etc. Accordingly, the Defence Investment Plan should be critically evaluated to ensure that the scope, timing and relevance of new acquisitions correspond to their operational sustainability and future affordability.

Recommendation 4

The growth in the DND budget has outstripped the Department’s capacity to gain approvals and to deliver the capital program, with significant dollars remaining unspent at year-end. To address this, the government should permit reprofiling of lapsed capital funds to future years when the available funding will align more practically to actual project spending projections.

Recommendation 5

In light of the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and inter-continental range missiles, it is time to revisit the issue of Canadian participation in the ballistic missile defence of North America.

3. The United States

A top priority for Canadian defence and security policy will be remaining close enough to the United States to offer Canadian perspectives on its deliberations and decisions. Canada is uniquely positioned to influence the direction of the Administration’s thinking on international security issues. Its standing is high in Washington because of its economic performance and its contributions to the campaigns in Afghanistan and Libya, and Canada represents one of the few countries the United States will count on for moral and material support should a future crisis arise. Ottawa should already be talking to Washington about future collaboration. In equal measure, Canada should be discussing future contingencies with partners in the coalitions of the willing which have emerged both inside and outside NATO, especially the United Kingdom, France, Australia and New Zealand.

Recommendation 6

The government should redouble its efforts to raise Canada’s public profile in the United States, so that Canadian advice on international security issues carries the weight it deserves.

Recommendation 7

Canada should begin discussions with both the United States and other democratic allies on new international architecture better suited to, indeed specifically designed for, the security environment of the 21st century. The doctrines, laws and institutions on which we have relied for our collective security over the decades are all well past their prime.

4. International Crises

In 2012 and the years immediately following, Canada is very likely to be faced with a host of decisions
related to the crises in the Middle East, in the Arabian Gulf, and on the Korean peninsula. More proactive
engagement on the part of the government is warranted.

Recommendation 8

The National Security Committee of Cabinet should maintain a close watching brief on the conflict scenarios described earlier, and ensure Foreign Affairs and National Defence are developing suitable contingency plans.

Recommendation 9

The government should undertake high-level political discussions with Israel, Egypt and Turkey, along with corresponding staff talks, to ensure it has a good grasp of the positions of the major parties to the various disputes in the Middle East and is in a position to influence their decisions.

Recommendation 10

Given the rising importance of the Arab League in addressing a number of regional security issues, the government should strive for Canada to be accorded official observer status at the Arab League.

Recommendation 11

The government should ensure that the Prime Minister, Ministers and senior officials always have the expertise and information they need to make timely and well-informed decisions on international security issues.

Among the measures the government should consider are:

Expanding the Canadian Defence Attaché Network across the globe and developing greater “foreign area officer” expertise within the Canadian Forces.

Building up international security expertise within the Department of Foreign Affairs, in particular recognizing a particular political-military “stream” within the Foreign Service Group.

5. Afghanistan

Canada has made an extraordinary contribution to the peace and stability of Afghanistan, and over the years Canadians have found many ways of expressing their appreciation for the courage and ingenuity displayed by their men and women in uniform, their diplomats and their aid workers. With the final phase of the engagement under way, however, public interest appears to have all but disappeared. In Parliament, there is little mention of the 950 Canadian Forces personnel leading the way in training the Afghan army and police to assume full responsibility for the security of their country. When the Governor General, the Minister of National Defence, and the Chief of the Defence Staff visited the troops at Christmas, not a single journalist was present — reflecting in equal measure where Afghanistan now ranks in the public mind in Canada (as in most NATO nations) and how the Department of National Defence has chosen to communicate with the Canadian public on this issue.

Recommendation 12

At the forthcoming NATO Summit in Chicago, the government in conjunction with Canada’s allies in the 10-year long campaign in Afghanistan should argue forcefully that the decisions of the Lisbon summit be respected and allies abide by their commitment to provide the Afghan government the training and financial support it needs to become the guarantor of its own security post 2014. Failing to do so would be an affront to the legacy of the more than 2800 allied men and women in uniform who have lost their lives in Afghanistan – and to the 35,000 Canadians who have served in that country.

6. Pakistan

Pakistan is on the brink. This should matter to Canada, for developments there will largely determine whether the enormous Canadian and allied effort in Afghanistan succeeds and shapes the future security of the region. Canada also has long-standing ties with Pakistan stretching back to independence in 1947 including once close military-to-military links. Pakistan is a member of the Commonwealth and currently holds a seat on the UN Security Council.

Recommendation 13

The Prime Minister and senior ministers should make a special effort in 2012 to connect with their Pakistani counterparts and explore avenues for assisting Pakistan to resolve its many problems. The government should also encourage the United States, India and Pakistan to re-examine the old idea of a regional security treaty guaranteed or overseen by outside parties.

7. The Americas

The government has regional and country programs to explain Canada’s official presence in every region of the world and to guide the activities of the many departments and agencies of government involved. But there appears to be a disconnection between the government’s expressed interests in the Americas and the priorities assigned to the Canadian Forces there.

Mexico is clearly Canada’s priority in the hemisphere. Other priorities in the region include major trade and investment partners such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru; prime destinations for Canadian tourism such as Cuba; the threats to Canada stemming from transnational criminal organizations operating out of Jamaica, Guatemala and Colombia; and the ongoing plight of Haiti.

Recommendation 14

The government should develop a defence and security engagement plan for the Americas to ensure greater unity of purpose and effort between departments and agencies in this area.

8. Asia-Pacific

Canada’s interests in Asia-Pacific cover the gamut from security and prosperity to international stability and the advancement of freedom and democracy. With the Northern Gateway and other initiatives reflecting Canada’s growing commercial interests in the region and with immigration across the Pacific now exceeding that across the Atlantic, the political stability and the security of trade routes in AsiaPacific are now as much concerns of Canada as they are of nations more often associated with the region.

But just as the region is becoming more important strategically to Canada, it is also drawing additional economic, security and military attention from others seeking to preserve and enhance their own interests. It would not be surprising to see Russia pay more attention to its previously neglected Pacific hub centered on Vladivostok (the site of the next APEC Summit). India too has a growing stake that will compel greater engagement in the affairs of the region to secure important trade routes especially through disputed waters.

Recommendation 15

Following the Prime Minister’s visit to China in February, the time is right for a comprehensive review of Canada’s strategic interests in Asia-Pacific. In order to improve the deployability of the Canadian Forces into the region, enhance Canada’s diplomatic influence and expand Canada’s trade with the region, the government will have to recalibrate the various dimensions of Canada’s engagement in Asia-Pacific:

In defence, distance and geography should inform a review of capital programs related to shipbuilding, airlift, and expeditionary capability, and the balance of commitments between East and West.

In foreign policy, the government should begin exploring with allies the parameters of new collective security arrangements in Asia-Pacific.

In trade policy, the government should continue to pursue opportunities to establish new free trade zones and ensure competitive access to markets for Canadian products.

9. Africa

Africa does not top the list of strategic issues to be watched in 2012, but it is an integral component of the interconnected world in which security and defence strategy much be developed. Canada should not take the position that it can remain uninvolved in the continent on the grounds of the limited means and capabilities available to it. Canada ranks among the ten leading nations with interests and investment in Africa.

There is one area which deserves close watching by Canadian policy makers in 2012. That is the recent Canadian International Development Agency initiative to parallel Canadian international development goals and funding with Canadian business interests in Africa, primarily mining-extractive industries and oil companies, in partnership with Canadian non-governmental organizations. Given that some of the firms in question have encountered problems in the past in meeting public expectations in respect of their comportment and commitment to corporate social responsibility, the government should take care to ensure that Canada’s international reputation is not compromised. The linkage being made holds the prospect of improving in fundamental and permanent ways the effectiveness of Canada’s assistance to Africa; but the risks need to be managed carefully and the situation monitored assiduously.

Recommendation 16

Political stability and the continued advancement of democracy in Africa are in Canada’s interest. Within its means, the government should consider:

Increasing Canadian military and police capacity-building programs in Africa, especially in locales where development funding is being directed to achieve political leverage;

Assisting the African Union to become a more effective regional security organization and mediator/peacekeeper through the provision of diplomatic and military advisors and mentors; and,

Leveraging its unique position as a bilingual nation, Canada should take a more active role in la Francophonie in building international partnerships which would contribute to peace initiatives in Africa.

The full report is available on the CDA Institute website. Click here to access.

About the authors:

Paul Chapin is Director of Research, at the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) Institute. He is a former vice president of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, and former Director General, InternationalSecurity, Department of Foreign Affairs.

George Petrolekas is an international telecommunications executive and former soldier. He has served as advisor to two Chiefs of Defence Staff, and Liaison Officer to several NATO commanders.