Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security

Iraq War (Immediate Aftermath)

█ K. LEE LERNER

On May 1, 2003, United States President George W. Bush announced an end to
major military combat operations related to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Although evidence of Saddam Hussein's reign of terror was rapidly
forthcoming—including the discovery of numerous mass gravesites of
those brutally executed for resisting Hussein's rule—the
anticipated discovery of large caches of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) proved elusive. By the end of May 2003, both British and American
intelligence agencies began to downplay the possibility of finding large
stores of such weapons. Although both U.S. and British officials continued
to assert prior claims about the extent of Iraq's arsenal,
questions remained as to whether the weapons had been removed, destroyed,
or whether intelligence reports regarding the weapons had been mishandled,
exaggerated, or falsified.

Although some seized on the growing controversy regarding the lack of WMD
finds as a partisan political issue, all Western intelligence agencies,
including those of war dissenter nations France and Germany, agreed before
the war that Hussein's regime possessed weapons of mass
destruction.

Attention in America and Europe focused on to what degree claims regarding
Iraqi WMD programs might have been exaggerated, or as the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported, "sexed up" by both
the Bush and Blair administrations to gain support for the war.

At the core of the controversy lay the handling of critical reports
compiled by British intelligence regarding Hussein's possession and
potential use of weapons of mass destruction. One report, publicly
released by the British in 2002, asserted that Hussein's
"military planning allows for some weapons of mass destruction to
be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them." This statement
was used by Coalition governments to stress the urgency of war. Another
report, also compiled by British intelligence and released just weeks
before the start of military operations, allegedly had new intelligence
information, but was subsequently exposed to contain material plagiarized
from a previously published academic source.

A BBC report in late May 2003, alleged that a senior British official
involved in the preparation of the Fall, 2002 report (containing claims
regarding Iraq's ability to rapidly assemble and use biological and
chemical weapons) claimed that the report was rewritten on the
instructions of officials in the administration of British Prime Minister
Tony Blair to make it "sexier" (i.e., to stress the urgency
of war). The BBC described their source as one of a number of senior
British officials in charge of drawing up the report.

Officials in the Blair government, including John Scarlett, head of the
Joint Intelligence Committee, countered that the report was entirely the
work product of the intelligence community and that no pressure had been
exerted to change its contents. Blair administration officials demanded a
retraction and apology from the BBC. The BBC refused and stood by its
story. Other British government officials initially characterized the BBC
sources as "rogue elements within the intelligence services"
who were against the government.

The British House of Commons foreign affairs committee began a series of
hearings into the controversy and took statements from government
officials and journalists
regarding the BBC report. As of July 2003, the committee's initial
conclusion was there was insufficient evidence of "improper
influence," but that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that
parts of the reports regarding Iraqi weapons readiness were given
unwarranted emphasis. The committee specifically concluded that Alastair
Campbell, the Blair administration's director of
communications—specifically identified in BBC reports as one
administration official who tried to influence report content—was
not responsible for attempting to influence the contents of the report.

Another inquiry was led by the British Intelligence and Security
Committee. During their hearings, testimony was provided by David Kelly, a
government weapons expert. Although the BBC initially protected the
identity of its source, following Kelly's death the BBC
acknowledged that Kelly was the "principal source" for its
claim that the report had been "sexed-up."

After the BBC aired its story in late May 2003, other news organizations
sought the source of the BBC information and Kelly's name became
publicly identified as the potential source of the BBC story. In July
2003, Kelly initially confirmed meeting with a BBC reporter, but denied he
was the main source for the BBC report. Intense scrutiny along with and
criticism of Kelly and his potential role in the story circulated in both
press and government circles. Kelly blamed U.K. Ministry of Defense
officials and others in the Blair government for leaking his name to the
press. Kelly claimed that he was put under "intolerable"
pressure by the disclosure of his association with the potential
intelligence scandal.

Kelly went missing on July 17, 2003, and the next day his body was
discovered near his Oxfordshire home with a knife and a packet of
painkillers close to his body. Police confirmed that subsequent forensic
examination concluded that Kelly committed suicide and bled to death from
cuts to his wrist. Prime Minister Blair confirmed that there would be a
judicial inquiry dealing with the events surrounding Kelly's death.

In July, 2003, U.S. Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet
accepted the blame for allowing subsequently discredited information from
British Intelligence—that Hussein's government
"recently sought significant quantities of uranium from
Africa"—to remain in the text of President Bush's
January 2003 State of the Union speech. Tenet acknowledged that the CIA
had doubted the validity of the reports and that the evidence did not rise
to the "level of certainty" normally required for insertion
into presidential speeches.

At the end of July 2003, several inquires were underway into the
formulation and use by Coalition governments of intelligence related to
Iraqi possession and development of weapons of mass destruction.

The hunt for Hussein's regime.
Against steady sniper and terrorist attacks, Coalition forces continued
the hunt for former officials of Saddam Hussein's regime.

In July 2003, U.S. Army soldiers and Task Force 20 personnel (a special
unit tasked with capturing or killing former Iraqi leaders) surrounded and
killed Qusay and Uday Hussein, Saddam Hussein's sons and top
officials of the former Iraqi regime. Following their discovery in Mosul,
the former Iraqi leaders refused to surrender and an intense firefight
ended in their deaths. U.S. officials debated and then released photos of
the bodies, in part, to alleviate Iraqi fears that the two might still be
alive and attempt a return to power. U.S. officials also hoped that the
confirmation of the deaths of Qusay and Uday would encourage Iraqis to
come forward with intelligence related to capturing Saddam.

As of July 30, 2003, Coalition forces and Task Force 20 had killed or
captured almost 40 former Iraqi leaders depicted in a famous deck of
playing cards sometimes dubbed the "deck of death,"
circulated to Coalition forces to assist them in spotting wanted former
Iraqi leaders.

At the end of July, 2003, U.S. Central Command confirmed the deaths of 90
American service personnel killed in Iraq since President Bush's
May 1 declaration of an end to major combat operations. At least 49 of
those soldiers were killed in combat.

█ FURTHER READING:

PERIODICALS:

Schmitt, E. and B. Weinraub. "Pentagon Asserts the Main Fighting Is
Finished in Iraq."
New York Times.
April 15, 2003.

Sanger D., and J. Risen. "C.I.A. Chief Takes Blame in Assertion on
Iraqi uranium."
New York Times.
July 12, 2003.