ANALOGY

ANALOGY (ἀναλογία, proportion).—An argument from Analogy is a defensive
argument, in support of any suggested hypothesis, drawn from similarity of
phenomena recognised in different relations. The argument from analogy is not
constructive in nature, being competent only for defence, or suggestion.

It has been "defined 'the similarity of ratios or relations.' It is the
inference that, because two phenomena resemble in some points, therefore they
resemble in all. Its value depends on the importance of the points
of resemblance observed, and on their proportion to the points of
difference and to the whole points. In popular language we extend the
word to resemblances of things as well as relations. Analogy in this sense has exercised an immense
influence on the formation of language. In innumerable cases visible or tangible
things lend their names to invisible and spiritual, from a resemblance more or
less striking between them" (Thomson, Laws of Thought, 3rd ed., p. 327).

"Analogy does not mean the similarity of two things, but the similarity or
sameness of two relations... If A has
the same relation to B which C has to D, then there is an analogy. If the first
relation be well known, it may serve to explain the second, which is less known;
and the transfer of name from one of the terms in the relation best known to its
corresponding term in the other, causes no confusion, but on the contrary tends
to remind us of the similarity that exists in these relations, and so assists
the mind, instead of misleading it" (Coplestone, Four Discourses, p. 122).

"As analogy is the resemblance of ratios (or relations), two things may be
connected by analogy, though they have in themselves no resemblance; thus as a
sweet taste gratifies the palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear, and
hence the same word, 'sweet,' is applied to both, though no flavour can
resemble a sound in itself. To bear this in mind would serve to guard us against
two very common errors in the interpretation of the analogical language of
Scripture:—(1) The error of supposing the things themselves to be similar, from
their bearing similar relation to other things; (2) the still more common error
of supposing the analogy to extend further than it does, or to be more complete
than it really is, from not considering in what the analogy in each case
consists" (Whately, Logic, bk. III. sec. 10).

"The meaning of analogy is resemblance, and hence all reasoning from one case to
others resembling it might be termed analogical; but the word is usually
confined to cases where the resemblance is of a slight or indirect kind. We do
not say that a man reasons from analogy when he infers that a stone projected
into the air will fall to the ground. The circumstances are so essentially
similar to those which have been experienced a thousand times, that we call the
cases identical, not analogical. But when Sir Isaac Newton, reflecting on the
tendency of bodies at the surface of the earth to the centre, inferred that the
moon had the same tendency, his reasoning, in the first instance, was
analogical.

"By some writers the term has been restricted to the resemblance of
relations: thus knowledge is said to bear the same relation to the mind
as light to the eye—to enlighten it. But although the term is very
properly applied to this class of resemblances, I think it is not
generally confined to them" (Sam. Bailey, Discourses, p. 181,
8vο, London, 1852).

Berkeley distinguishes between Metaphorical and proper anology. "Analogy is a
Greek word used by mathematicians to signify a similitude of proportions. For
instance, when we observe that two is to six as three is to nine, this
similitude or equality of proportion is termed analogy. And, although proportion
strictly signifies the habitude or relation of one quantity to another, yet, in
a looser and translated sense, it hath been applied to signify every other
habitude, and consequently the term analogy, all similitude of relations or
habitudes whatsoever. Hence the schoolmen tell us there is analogy between
intellect and sight; forasmuch as intellect is to the mind what sight is to the
body: and that he who governs the state is analogous to him who steers a ship.
Hence a prince is analogically styled a pilot, being to the state as a pilot is
to his vessel. For the further clearing of this point, it is to be observed,
that a twofold analogy is distinguished by the schoolmen metaphorical and
proper. Of the first kind there are frequent instances in Holy Scripture,
attributing
human parts and passions to God. When He is represented as having a finger, an
eye, or an ear; when He is said to repent, to be angry, or grieved, every one
sees the analogy is merely metaphorical; because these parts and passions, taken
in the proper signification, must in every degree necessarily, and from the
formal nature of the thing, include imperfection. When, therefore, it is said
the finger of God appears in this or that event, men of common sense mean no
more, but that it is as truly ascribed to God as the works wrought by human
fingers are to man; and so of the rest. But the case is different when wisdom
and knowledge are attributed to God. Passions and senses, as such, imply defect;
but in knowledge simply, or as such, there is no defect. Knowledge, therefore,
in the proper formal meaning of the word, may be attributed to God
proportionally, that is, preserving a proportion to the infinite nature of God.
We may say, therefore, that as God is
infinitely above man, so is the knowledge of God infinitely above the knowledge
of man, and this is what Cajetan calls analogia proprie facta. And after the same
analogy we must understand all those attributes to belong to the Deity, which in
themselves simply, and as such, denote perfection" (Berkeley, Min. Phil.,
Dialog. 4; Fraser, Selections from Berkeley, 2nd ed., pi 258).

Kant, in his Transcendental Analytic, bk. II. ch. II. sec. 3, treats of "Analogies of Experience," saying that "experience is possible only through the
representation of a necessary connection of perceptions." The analogies of
experience referred to are these three—the permanence of substances through all
changes in phenomena,—all changes take place according to the law of the
connection of cause and effect,— all substances perceived in space, coexist in a
state of complete reciprocity of action (Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn, p.
132; Max Müller, II. 155).