The Iran time bomb

By Michael
Hayden, Olli Heinonen and Ray Takeyh

Washington Post

March
22

Michael Hayden led the Central Intelligence Agency from 2006 to 2009 and the
National Security Agency from 1999 to 2005. Olli Heinonen is a senior fellow at
Harvardís Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a former
deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Ray Takeyh is
a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

As negotiations
between Iran and the great powers press forward, Secretary of State John F.
Kerry seems to have settled on this defense of any agreement: The terms will
leave Iran at least a year away from obtaining a nuclear bomb, thus giving the
world plenty of time to react to infractions. The argument is meant to reassure,
particularly when a sizable enrichment capacity and a sunset clause appear to
have already been conceded. A careful assessment, however, reveals that a one-year
breakout time may not be sufficient to detect and reverse Iranian
violations.

Once the United States had an indication that
Iran was violating an agreement, a bureaucratic process would be necessary to
validate the information. It could be months before the director of national
intelligence would be confident enough to present a case for action to the
president. Several U.S. intelligence agencies, the Energy Department and
national nuclear laboratories would need a chance to sniff the data to be
convinced that a technical breach had occurred. Only after this methodical
review was finished could the director go to the White House with conclusions
and recommendations.

Given that the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would be the on-site inspection organization
responsible for the verification of an agreement, the United Statesí scoop
would have to be forwarded to that body. Of course, both the speed and the
extent of U.S. sharing would be affected by the need to protect sensitive human
or technical sources of information. Only then would IAEA representatives begin
talking with their Iranian counterparts about gaining access to disputed sites
or activities. History
suggests the Iranians would engage in protracted negotiations and much
arcane questioning of the evidence. Iran could eventually offer some access
while holding back key data and personnel. It would be only after tortured
discussions that the IAEA could proclaim itself dissatisfied with Iranís
reaction. This process also could take months.

Should the indication of infractions originate with the IAEA, the United States
would likewise want to validate the findings itself, which would also be
time-consuming.

Once the IAEA arrived at a verdict of
noncompliance, it would forward its grievances to the U.N. Security Council for
adjudication. The United States would have to convince the other member states
invested in the agreement ó including veto-wielding Russia and China ó that
the accord was being violated and that forceful action was needed. Time would be
spent quarrelling over divergent views, with several outcomes possible,
including a Security Council presidential statement or a resolution whose
content would need to be agreed upon. And only then could new economic sanctions
be imposed on Iran. So, add at least a few more months.

Could sanctions really make a meaningful
impact on Iran in whatever time, if any, remained in a one-year scenario? Any
sanctions would take time to stress Iranís economy, particularly in the
aftermath of an agreement that paved the way for the return of trade and
investment. Of course, the United States would not have to wait for the economic
pressure to work and could use force against Iran without U.N. endorsement.
However, since the advent of nuclear weapons, the United States has negotiated
arms-control agreements with an entire spectrum of adversaries and has never
used force in response to violations.

And the reality is that any cheating by Iran would always be incremental and
never egregious. Throughout the duration of an agreement, there would be
occasional reports of Iran enriching to unacceptably high levels and revelations
of unreported nuclear installations and experimentation in weapon designs.
Iranís habit of lulling the world with a cascade of small infractions is an
ingenious way to advance its program without provoking a crisis. In the end, a
year simply may not be enough time to build an international consensus on
measures to redress Iranian violations.

In the midst of all the typical Washington
political cacophony about the progress of the negotiations, what is lost is that
an accord between the United States and Iran would be the most consequential
arms-control agreement of the post-Cold War period. It would determine the level
of stability in the Middle East and impact global nuclear nonproliferation
norms. With stakes so high, we need a national debate about the nature and
parameters of any agreement. The right venue for that debate is the halls of
Congress. No agreement can be considered viable or enduring without such
legislative approbation.