Discovering the adversary, one day at a time

Resources: Documents & Reports

April 07, 2013

More thoughtful analyts know that militant Islamic momvements existed long before September 11th. I make it an effort to collect books on political Islam, Islamism, jihad-centered groups, etc that predate 2001. This, in order to view radical movements without the poison of 9/11's violence to color our contextual understanding of a global, decades-old movement. Cudsi and Hillal Dessouki's 1981 article anthology, Islam and Power, is one of those early books. Its reference lists are very interesting, and I thought I'd share them with you.

December 23, 2012

In October, Marianne, a French weekly, reported on the existence of two training camps in Tunisia and little government interest in addressing the issue. The Tunisian government denied the report. I found a translation of the original article, excerpted below.

Meanwhile this is causing nightmares to the great Algerian
neighbor. In Algiers, the border with Tunisia has become a matter of great
concern. Within the space of a few weeks, two major operations have highlighted
the scale of the danger. A major jihadist network from Tunisia was dismantled at
Annaba. Near Tebessa, the Algerian security forces apparently found
ground-to-air missiles from Libya, having passed via Tunisia, where jihadis no
longer even bother to conceal themselves.

For instance, an incredible carnival of God's warriors was
held in Kairouan, under Abou lyad's auspices. This man used to be one of Bin Ladin's
lieutenants and organized the attack on Commander Masud in Afghanistan. He was
identified recently during the attack on the US Embassy in Tunis. At Kairouan,
this man convened members of Ansar Al-Charia, his jihadist group formed in
2011. Several thousand men came from all
over the country, most of them youngsters, dressed in Afghan style, with white
qamis (long robes) or jeans, T-shirts, and designer trainers. The flag of the
Islamic caliphate flew triumphantly, while Mokhta Jebali, president of the
Tunisian Front of Islamic Organizations, declared. "People fear jihadis
because our enemies have destroyed our image. But, by definition, a Muslim is a
jihadi. The Prophet was the greatest mujahid." The ecstatic crowd wanted
only one thing -- to reach the assigned destinations for Tunisia's mujahedin,
in the North and South, Watched by to a former Guantanamo detainee, 3,000
supporters of holy war chanted: "Obama, Obama, we are Usama!" This
was the slogan shouted on 14 September during the attack on the US Embassy.

In order to show that the Tunisia's youth are ready to fight,
the organizers held displays of "zamaktel tounsi," a Tunisian martial
art, which can now be learned at Ansar Al-Charia camps. Youngsters were
fascinated by the "combatants," with camouflaged faces, demonstrating
it. The recruitment drive was underway. Out in the open. "Since Ben Ali's
fall, we have experienced a euphoric mood, without worrying about the Salafists,"
one secular intellectual complained. "We despised them and never imagined that
they could pose a danger to the country. Now, here they are, trained, armed,
and gathered into militias." Obsessed with the huntfor members of the
former regime, Tunisians refused to see that the radical Islamists were making
headway.

The first warning sign may have come from reports of the
death of Imad, the youngster from Bizert, near Benghazi, during the lighting against
Al-Qadhafi’s regime. "At that time," we were told by Mounir, a
architecture student, "we told ourselves that he was just a young man who
had died for the sake of democracy, whereas these were in fact the beginnings
of a jihadist international expected to fight wherever their chief demands."

Now not a week goes by without reports that a young Tunisian
has died "a martyrs death" in Syria. Young jihadis start their
training in Tunisia and go on to complete their combat raining in such lands of
jihad as Syria, Mali, or Libya. One sign of the times is the fact that jihadis'
families are no longer regarded with disapproval. Mounir noticed this when he
went to offer his condolences following the death of a childhood friend
"on God's path" in Aleppo: "this modest family, at one time
socially marginalized, has gained a new status and is held up as an
example."

July 26, 2011

As I’m reading through the second edition of Zawahiri’s Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet, I’m drawing from a small but very useful collection of 80s-era works on radical Islamic movements, including early editions of books by Moussalli, Dekmedjian, Kepel, MERIP Reports articles and several other sources.

I started collecting books and articles on radical Islam around 2003, and haven’t really stopped. My librarian-training teaches me to approach subject-area collection in its totality. That means, in part, collecting old and new sources, as a means of building a broad understanding of a subject area. And that means collecting books and articles published before 9/11 and untainted by its cataclysmic effects.

The Soviet view of Islamic fundamentalism is also somewhat less than positive. In its editorials, the Soviet press agency, Tass, criticizes the movement for being anew wave of "religious repression," similar to fascism, replacing the idea of a superior race with the idea of a superior religion which oppresses other religions or "free thinkers" whose followers are assigned less civil and human rights.

Oddly enough, its 1990 publication date makes it much “younger” than Dekmejian and Kepel, but its decidedly non-politically correct generalizations makes it read like something from the “olden tymes,” like some Victorian travelogue among the “Mohammedans.” Yet, the book may provide thinking analysts some benefits. Its cited works and bibliography point to studies and ideas long-forgotten in the chaos of the ten years following 9/11.

December 28, 2010

I've received numerous requests for the full copy of Martyrs in a Time of Alienation, my never-ending analysis of a collection of 120 biographies of contemporary mujahideen published back in January 2008. I still believe that the document offers fascinating insights into the current "character" of the mujahideen networks operating along the Afghan-Pakistan border. One day I will finish it, but in order to satisfy my European readers -- apparently I have many! -- I am publishing my entire unfinished draft -- typos, grammatical monstrosities, and embarassingly bad analytical bits -- that includes the complete document. It was originally available through DataStar (accession number: 17YT16E7 20080308) when I found it back in 2008, and I believe that you may still find it there. I hope that the analysts and academics who need it use it wisely.

Santé!

-------------------------------------------------------

Quote from the translation's summary:

"The book opened with a dedication to Sayyid Qutb, Abdallah Azzam, and Abu−Mus'ab al−Zarqawi for their supposedly unique respective roles in guiding, reviving, and implementing jihad. The preface praised the role of jihad and the unique elevated status of martyrs in the eyes of God according to Islamic teachings. The book went on to give biographical accounts about a list of jihad martyrs who fell in Afghanistan. These accounts gave a glimpse of the martyrs' upbringing, their decision to join jihad, and their piousness and dedication to the cause of jihad throughout their jihadist endeavor. A list of names and pseudonyms contained in this issue of the publication follows:"

Ibrahim al−Muhajir al−Masri: His real name is Muhsin Bin Musa Bin Mitwalli Atwah from Egypt. He was an engineering graduate who had migrated to Iraq for work before he decided two years later to join the mujahidin in Afghanistan during the war against the Soviet invasion. He left Afghanistan for Sudan where he purportedly participated in the planning of US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Ibrahim al−Masri was described as an expert in explosives who spent much of his time experimenting in his laboratory and whose specialty was "engineering martyrdom operations" and "preparing martyrs." He was killed in a US air raid in Afghanistan.

Ibrahim al−Dagestani: His real name is Habib−Allah from Dagestan. Two years after his meeting with Chechen mujahidin, he went back to Dagestan to form his group of mujahidin and was sending recruits to Afghanistan for training. The public turned against Habib−Allah and his group and they were forced to flee Dagestan. Habib−Allah ended up in Afghanistan where he died in battle with the Pakistani military.

Abrar (nickname): His name is Tariq from Kashmir. He fought in Afghanistan and was killed by the Pakistani military in Waziristan.

Abu−Ahmad al−Suri (nickname): His real name is Mahmud Bin Mustafa Bin Kamal al−Bakri from Aleppo, Syria. He joined jihad in Afghanistan and trained in Abu−Mus'ab al−Suri camp. His second trip to Afghanistan coincided with the US invasion and he was killed in Shahi−Kot, Afghanistan.

Ahmad al−Hasan Dawur from Waziristan: He died shortly after he joined Abu−Al−Layth al−Libi camp in an air raid by the Pakistani military.

Idris al−Turkistani (nickname) from Aqsu in the region of Eastern Turkistan in China: He arrived in Afghanistan where he received military training. He was assigned to fight against the "northern alliance" in northern Afghanistan where he was captured shortly afterward after the US invasion of Afghanistan. He moved to Waziristan after his release where he died in a raid by Pakistani forces.

Usamah al−Hamawi (nickname): His name is Ridwan Bin Abd−al−Rahman al−Sharif from Syria. He fought against the northern alliance until the US invasion of Afghanistan when he was forced to flee to the tribal areas where he continued to train and fight until he was killed in a missile attack.

Abu−Usamah al−Sharqi (nickname): His name is Muhammad al−Rashid from Al−Khubar, Saudi Arabia. He went to Afghanistan soon after the September 11 attacks in the US. Soon after he finished his military training, he was assigned to train new recruits from the tribal areas in Jalalabad. He was killed in a raid in Zabul. Abu

Usamah al−Dagestani (nickname): He is Abd−al−Rahman Bin−Muhammad from Dagestan. He joined jihad in 1995 alongside Chechen fighters and then went to Afghanistan where he received more military training. He went back to Dagestan where he engaged in kidnapping for ransom until he was assigned second in command for a Chechnya based group of fighters who staged attacks against Dagestan. Unable to return to his homeland Dagestan, he went to Turkey then Afghanistan where he was killed in a battle with Pakistani forces.

Usayd al−Ta'zi al−Yamani (nickname): He is A'id Qasim Muhammad from Yemen. He traveled to Afghanistan where he received military training in Al−Faruq camp and was assigned as an administrator. He moved between Afghanistan and Pakistan until he was killed in a raid by Pakistani forces.

Uwis al−Najdi (nickname): His name is Muhannad from Najd, Saudi Arabia. According to his biographical account, Muhannad traveled to Afghanistan around the time of the USS Cole bombing in Yemen. He joined Al−Faruq military training camp where he was selected later on to join leadership training course. He was appointed a trainer is Al−Faruq camp until the US invasion of Afghanistan. He participated in the battles in Kabul and led a group of fighters to Jalalabad areas where he spent the next fours until he was killed in a raid by US forces.

Once again we see an example of how a major attack inspired others inclined toward violent jihad to actively seek it. In this case we have a Saudi who eventually became a member of al-Qaida’s deep bench of leaders.

Asadallah al−Uzbaki (nickname): He fled Uzbekistan with his parents who sought refuge in Afghanistan. Asadallah joined the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and attended its schools until the US invasion of Afghanistan. He moved with his family to Pakistan and then to Iran where he pursued his religious studies. Asadallah moved back to Pakistan to pursue his schooling but shortly afterward decided to join jihad in Afghanistan where he was killed in an ambush against US forces.

This bio of an Uzbek named “Asadallah” highlights the porous nature of the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Pakistan and Iran. It clearly gives this al-Qaida operative the opportunity to move from one country to the next in search of ideological and religious training. It also begs the question, what role is Iran playing in the sheltering current and would-be Sunni radicals?

Asadallah al−Libi: He is Ziyad Bin Farraj al−Bah from Libya. He went to Afghanistan in 1990 and fought with the Afghan mujahidin in their war against the Soviet. He moved to Tajikistan with Khattab and was among the first to take part in jihad in that country. After an unsuccessful attempt to embark on jihad against the Libyan regime as a result of his expulsion from Sudan, he went back to Afghanistan after the Taliban took Kabul. After the US invasion, Ziyad al−Bah fled Afghanistan to Pakistan, and then Iran where he was captured. He managed to escape Iran and join Abu−al−Layth al−Libi in Afghanistan where he was killed.

The bio here of a key al-Qaida member, shows several important historical characteristics of al-Qaida’s early development. First, it was already developing a deep bench in Chechnya in the mid-1990s, drawing military commanders from the decade’s ongoing regional jihads. Second, is the central Asia proving ground – the countries of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Western China, etc. that appears to be source of both leaders (for training) and ground troops.

Abu−Umamah al−Masri: His name is Awf Bin−Muhammad Bin−Abd−al−Rahman from Egypt. He went to Afghanistan to fight with Afghan mujahidin in their war against the Soviets. Awf Bin−Abd−al−Rahman joined jihad in Tajikistan after the break out of civil war in Afghanistan and was appointed a teacher in the Islamic institute where he taught the locals about Islam. He went back to Pakistan after the failure of the jihadist project in Tajikistan and then back to Afghanistan where he joined Bin Ladin in Kandahar. He left Afghanistan after the US invasion and returned to join mujahidin in Jalalabad region where he died in a battle with the US forces.

The first of two Egyptians profiled in this post, Abu-Ummah’s bio highlights the role of dawah, or sometimes translated as preaching or training, in the ongoing development of communities sympathetic to the radical cause. It also shows, once again, the porous character of the region’s borders, and to a lesser extent the feeling of identity tied to Islam, not a nation-state.

Abu−Ayman al−Masri: His name is Mamduh Bin−Muhammad al−Sayyid from Egypt. He was a member of Egyptian Jihad Group who traveled to Afghanistan to receive military training and later become a trainer. He left Afghanistan after the civil war broke out and was later arrested in Syria where he was planning to smuggle weapons into Palestinian territories. He later left Syria to Yemen, and back to Afghanistan after the Taliban took control. After the US invasion, Al−Sayyid fled to Waziristan where he later died in a battle against US forces.

Another Egyptian is profiled here, clearly a member of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian cadre. His bio shows that the spillover affect that followed the Afghan civil war in the early 1990s, had the kind of regional repercussions that could be seen in the coming months as Iraq becomes hostile territory for al-Qaida’s ideology and organization.

Abu−Bakr Azzam al−Falastini: His name is Iyyad Adil al−Qunnah from Jordan. His first visit to Afghanistan was when he joined jihad against the Soviets. He went back for after the Taliban took control and remained there until he was killed in the eastern region of Afghanistan in a battle against what was referred to as "Crusader forces."

A Palestinian by birth, this bio exposes one of the advantages that al-Qaida could exploit in any possible Levant strategy; its small cadre of ethnic Palestinians who could return to Gaza or other parts of the Occupied Territories and begin to build communities sympathetic to al-Qaida through the use of dawah and other forms of persuasion.

Abu−Bakr al−Maghribi: According to the biographical account, Abu−Bakr was born and raised in the southern part of Morocco. He traveled to Afghanistan for the first time only few weeks before September 11 attacks in the US. He trained with the Libyan group let by Abu−al−Layth al−Libi. He was killed in a US air raid in eastern Afghanistan.

Here we’re given a little window into the ethnic subdivisions within the pre 9/11 camp culture. Al-Maghribi was either guided toward or fell in with other North Africans. It’s this aspect of camp culture that may continue to prefigure the strategic affects of “spillover” from any regional jihad. The cadres built up in Afghanistan – cadres of Uyghurs, Uzbeks, Chechens, North Africans, Palestinians, Egyptians and Saudis – could return to their home regions and apply the skills and continue to build the social and logistical networks to continue the jihad.

Abu−Bak al−Iraqi: His name is Abd−al−Rahman from Iraq. He fled Iraq during Saddam Hussayn's rule with parents to Pakistan, then to Afghanistan where he joined military training camp after the US invasion. He died in a military operation by Pakistani forces in the eastern region of Afghanistan.

This bio doesn’t explain why Abd-al-Rahman fled Iraq, but it does point to the existence of an organized resistance prepared in response to American intervention in the region. There were military training camps in place soon after the invasion to prep young men for jihad against the Americans. It’s another example of the response pattern in global jihad that’s been around since the 1980s: whenever a non-Muslim government projects its power into regions dominated by Muslims, the response is to call a jihad and prepare for jihad. No matter where the US projects its power into traditionally Muslim territories, the jihad will follow.

Abu−Bakr al−Waziri: His name is Nawaz from Waziristan. He trained in Abu−al−Layth al−Libi's camp. He participated in battles against Pakistani forces and was subsequently killed in a missile attack in eastern Afghanistan.

There’s not much to comment on here, only to note that it appears that AQ prepped some men to fight Pakistani troops and some to fight Americans. If this is so, then what does it say about its possible ground strategies?

Abu−al−Bara al−Sharqi: His name is Fahd Bin−Ibrahim al−Ibrahimi from Saudi Arabia. He participated in the war in Bosnia−Herzegovina and was arrested upon his return to Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan after September 11 attacks in the US and participated in the publication of "The Vanguards of Khorasan" magazine. He died in an attack in eastern Afghanistan.

Here we have an example of two typical blurry lines seen in the both the 90s-era Afghan Arabs and this current generation. First is the blurry line between jihadi media and activity on the battlefield. Al-Sharqi is described here as an individual who was involved in the production of the Taliban’s journal. Here, too, is the blurry operational line between AQ and the Taliban, in al-Sharqi we see one of many Saudi “career” jihadis working with the Taliban toward the same goal.

Abu−al−Bara al−Maqdisi: His name is Izz−al−Din al−Maqdisi from Syria. He was a military trainer in Kandahar and Kabul before he was forced to flee to the eastern region of Afghanistan after the US invasion. He died in one of the battles [incomplete].

Once again we have an example of the toll the initial US invasion took at that first generation of Afghan Arabs, many of who were seasoned “career” jihadis. The fact that he was a military trainer suggests that he had previous formal training (perhaps Syrian army) or had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets.

Bilal al−Maghribi: His name was Abd−al−Aziz Buzlaf from Morocco. He traveled to Afghanistan from Spain and fought alongside pro−Taliban forces. After the demise of the Taliban government, he fled to the tribal area in eastern Afghanistan where he was later killed in Jalalabad where he was assigned with reorganizing and recruiting for prop−Taliban [sic] and Al−Qa'ida.

In the activity of this North African, we see the AQ author telling us that one of their goals was the reorganization of the group. This suggests to me that AQ leadership may have anticipated the possibility that their Afghan operation might be broken up and maintained some contingency plans to reorganize once the dust settled. Did US/NATO planners anticipate this possibility when they before or during the invasion? If so, what went wrong? If not, then perhaps it should be considered in any future large-scale actions. It’s not enough to destroy the safe-haven.

Abu−Turab al−Pakistani: Born in Punjab, Pakistan, he received his first military training in Kashmir where he fought until he joined the Taliban in Afghanistan. He fled to the tribal areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan until he was later killed in an ambush that targeted US convoys.

Al-Pakistani’s brief bio highlights the deep connections between the 90s-era Kashmir conflict and AQ. I explore this in my study of Issa al-Hindi’s Army of Madinah in Kashmir. Al-Hindi was AQ’s emir in the UK, but he earned his jihadi creds in Kashmir fighting for Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (aka the Army of Madinah). It also hints at the strategy of Pakistan’s ISI, which bankrolls and supports both Lashkar (under its myriad of new names) and the Taliban. It operates an expansionist policy against its two more powerful neighbors: Iran and India.

Abu−Ja'far al−Maghribi: His name was Amir al−Azizi from Morocco. He was recruited in Spain and later traveled to Afghanistan where he received him military training. He returned to Afghanistan after his plans of a terrorist attack inside Spain was foiled. He crossed Iran with Abd−al−Aziz Buzlaf (Bilal al−Maghribi) reaching Kandahar. After the demise of the Taliban government, he fled to the tribal areas of Afghanistan where he fought for pro−Taliban and Al−Qa'ida forces and played a role in media production. He was later killed in US strike in Jalalabad area.

The timeline of this jihadi’s biography is quite murky but it’s clear that it reflects the common arc of radicalization in the Afghan/Soviet era. He was a first generation immigrant to Spain. It hints at the possibility that he knew Abu Dahdah or Al-Suri. Iran features in this biography like it does in several others. Clearly, the Iranians have facilitated the transit of Al Qaeda members and supporters. His life provides yet another example of the clear intersection of media and operational activity. They’re “journalists,” they’re jihadis first.

Mawlawi Gul Manur: Gul Manur was a student of religion from Waziristan. He traveled to Afghanistan before the US invasion to fight alongside the Taliban. He remained in Afghanistan until he died in a bombing.

Not much here, but this biography does offer some hint of the recruitment or facilitation role played by Pakistani madrassahs.

Ibn Harrathah al−Makki: He is Abdallah Bin Salman al−Qathami al−Uthiby from Saudi Arabia. He began his jihad in Kashmir then traveled to Afghanistan here he later died in the eastern provinces.

Could this Saudi have been an Arab member of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba? Here again, we have an example of the near seamless connections between regional jihad wars and the global movement of which Al Qaeda is a prominent member.

Abu−Hazim al−Suri: His name is Muhammad Banghali from Syria. He traveled to Afghanistan shortly before September 11 attacks in the US. He was killed in the eastern region of Afghanistan.

It’s unclear just what motivated this man to join Al Qaeda or some other group in Afghanistan. It is possible that he was active in the camps dominated by other men from the al-Shams region, like the ones lead by Zarqawi or Al-Suri.

Abu−al−Hasan al−Sumali: His name is Ibrahim (last name unknown). He was born and raised in Kenya. He fought in his country of origin Somalia before he went to Afghanistan where he was killed in the eastern region.

The influence of the global Salafist-Jihadist presence in East Africa probably hasn’t been assessed with any thoroughness, but it’s clear that this son of Somalian refugees was radicalized in Kenya (not a good sign), easily moved between borders, and eventually traveled to Afghanistan to train (or perhaps seek advanced training?). Without a better idea of how many “al-Sumalis” are in the Afghan/Pak region right now or have made it back to Somalia, I think we’ll continue to underestimate the influence of the global Salafist-Jihadist movement.

Hakim al−Tataristani: He traveled to Afghanistan from Tatarstan after serving in the Russian Army. He trained in the Al−Faruq camp then joined mujahidin in Kabul. After the fall of Kabul to the US and northern alliance forces, he withdrew with other fighters to Khost in the eastern region of Afghanistan. He died months later in a Pakistani checkpoint.

“Tartarstan” is a broader region in the jihadi “map” than the current boundaries defined by the former Soviet republic. And so it’s difficult to determine where in “Tartarstan” this man originated, but it’s clear he had former military training. That must have given him an advantage in the camp culture of 90s-era Afghanistan.

Hamzah al−Rabi al−Masri: His name is Hamzah al−Rabi from Egypt. He took part in jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan and was charged with security in the Egyptian Jihad Group (Jama'at al−Jihad) and later a personal bodyguard for Ayman al−Zawahiri. He was allegedly charged with running "clandestine operations" for Al−Qa'ida in Pakistan after the US invasion and was responsible for recruiting for an attack in Britain before he was killed in air raid.

Here we clearly have a senior member of Zawahiri’s retinue. He was probably counted among the members of the deep bench of potential leaders. He was trusted enough to know intimate details of Zawahiri’s life. Knowing that he was killed in an “air raid” suggests that our military engagements with Al Qaeda do have the advantage of clearing the bench. Perhaps the best method of bleeding the group is clearing the bench faster than it can be filled. We haven’t been doing that with much effectiveness lately, and with Al Qaeda finding secure regions of operation in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia it is likely that the bench could be refilled quite quickly.

Hamzah al−Zubayr al−Falastini: His name is Muhammad al−Faqi born in Egypt to Palestinian parents. He traveled to Afghanistan where he received military training and became a trainer. He moved to Karachi, Pakistan where he continued to train the Taliban fighters and supporters in the area until he was killed by Pakistan forces.

Karachi stands out for me as a curious place to see Taliban training. Of all the major cities in Pakistan, this one is the farthest away from the NWFP and any likely location for Taliban training. This biography suggests a broad network of Taliban support, funding and training throughout Pakistan. It also suggests that elements of the Pakistani government showed indifference or open support for Al Qaeda and Taliban activities long before the current civil war broke out.

Hamzah al−Tataristani: He studied in Saudi Arabia and joined the group of Abu−Abdallah al−Tatari before he move[d] to Afghanistan. He fled to the tribal areas after the fall the US invasion where he died in [unfinished]

I’m unsure what “group of Abu-Abdallah al-Tatari” is describing, a “brigade” or cell within Al Qaeda or a regional jihadi group, but it’s clear that he was drawn to Saudi Arabia, probably for religious training, and networked with this group upon his return. Who were the Saudis influencing his radicalization? How did he come to Saudi Arabia? Understanding little known areas could help fill in gaps of knowledge of the global Salafist Jihadist movement.

Hamzah Burakhil: His name is A'zam (no last name provided) from Waziristan. He fought for the Taliban and was later killed in raid by Pakistani forces.

Not much to say about this person. It is interesting to see how much effort the editors of this document put into integrating Taliban members into their own narrative.

Abu−Khalid al−Maghribi: His name is Muhammad Zarli from Morocco. He traveled to Afghanistan from Italy after the US invasion. He fought in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan where he died.

It’s not clear whether Zarli had been an immigrant to Italy before his fateful trip, or whether he was simply using Italy as a transit point, but it’s clear from this and several other bios and numerous CT arrests that Western European countries are a key transit node for men seeking jihad in the East regardless of whether they provide support for the effort.

His bio also belies the idea that Afghanistan was considered a “good” war that people supported. We now have hundreds of examples of individuals who sought jihad in Afghanistan after the US invasion. Clearly at least some Muslims rejected the argument.

Abu−Khalid al−Kuwaiti: His name is Ali Bin−Sanafi al−Shammari from Kuwait. He fought in the tribal areas in eastern Afghanistan where he died along with Abu−Khalid al−Maghribi in an attack on their position.

Khattab al−Azadi: His name is Talal Bin−Hasan al−Zahrani from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan where he died in a battle with US forces.

Another Saudi. His kunya is probably a paean to Ibn Khattab.

Abu−Dujanah al−Imarati: His name is Miftah Bin−Sa'id al−Tanaji from the United Arab Emirates. He traveled to Kashmir where he trained then later joined Abu−al−Layth al−Libi in eastern Afghanistan.

Perhaps another Arab working or training with Lashkar? How did he get to Kashmir one wonders? Through what connections in the Emirates? And just how did he move from a Lashkar operation/camp to working directly with senior Al Qaeda leadership? How closely are they operating with Lashkar?

Darwish al−Waziri: Darwish is from Waziristan where he was recruited to lead the men of his village in jihad. He was later killed in an air raid that targeted their position.

Here is an example of what kind of recruits the Taliban uses, entire villages of men, most likely fighting under the banner of the Taliban, and more likely fighting in the name of their tribal leader.

Abu−Dhakir al−Jaza'iri: His name is Al−Sayyid Muhammad from Algeria. He traveled to Afghanistan from Spain where he had worked. He joined the Libyan group led by Abu−al−Layth al−Libi and died later in an operation in Shankay, Afghanistan.

Here again is the Western European connection. Where and to whom are these men going to receive the logistical support they need to make it to Afghanistan? And how much of this network is still intact in Spain and other countries? Is it possible for this network to reemerge if there are other operations in other parts of the world, like Somalia or Sudan?

Abu−Rawahah al−Suri: His name is Anas Ihsan Banghali from Syria. He went to Afghanistan soon before the US invasion. He joined the training camps in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and went on to fight within a group in Jalalabad where he was later killed.

Not much to comment on here.

Abu−Rahil al−Harbi: His name is Muhammad Ghazay al−Harbi from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks in the US. He moved to Khost Province after the defeat of the Taliban and was later killed in Jalalabad.

Here is another example of someone who sought jihad against the US invasion of Afghanistan. I wonder what would have happened if we hadn’t gone into Iraq. The West’s accepted Iraq narrative: that it “enflamed” the radicals and created more seems less likely once it’s understood that Afghanistan (considered by some as a “good” war) was doing the same exact thing. The fact of the matter is even humanitarian actions in predominately Muslim countries will be interpreted as an “invasion” of Muslim land and warrant the same exact response we have received in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Al−Zubayr al−Turkistani: He fled the Communist regime in Turkmenistan to Kyrgyzstan then later to Afghanistan where he received his military training in Hirat and Jalalabad training camps. He fled to Khost Province after the fall of the Taliban and was later arrested in Turkmenistan. After his release he went back to Afghanistan where he died in a suicide operation against US forces in Kabul.

Here is an interesting bio of a career jihadi. It highlights the role Central Asia’s porous borders and borderless ethnicities play in fill the jihadi ranks. I suspect that even if no Arabs sought jihad in Afghanistan, AQ and the Taliban would not lack for recruits from regional countries.

Abu−al−Zubayr al−Maghribi: His name is Khalid al−Mahuli from Morocco. He fought alongside Abu−al−Layth al−Libi and was killed in an air raid by Pakistani forces.

An example here of a North African cadre, led by abu Layth, and obviously developed with the intention of strengthening the North African groups. In this I wonder if one of AQ’s strategies is to create the next generation jihadis and rather have them all fight and die in Afghanistan, instead send some back to their home regions. In this way they are developing a new generation of global jihadis for the next five to ten years.

Al−Zubayr al−Turki: Born in Turkey, he traveled to Afghanistan where he received his first military training. He tried to join Al−Qa'ida in Iraq after the fall of the Taliban but was unable to find his way through Iran. He returned to Afghanistan where he later dies [sic] in an aim [sic] bombing.

Al-Zubayr’s bio evokes questions of Iranian facilitation. How much of this post-US invasion migration did the Iranian permit, and how much were they redirecting. We they preventing all Afghan-based jihadis from transiting to Iraq, were they making some offers they just couldn’t refuse?

Zayd al−Dagestani: He joined his father in Afghanistan where he trained and fought until he was killed in an air bombing.

How would we characterize a father-son jihadi team? It is clear that for some of these jihadis, they were raised into the ideology rather than being “radicalized” by some outside influence. How much of these cradle radicals exist within AQ’s cadres? And is it a recent phenomenon?

Abu−Sa'd al−Kandahari al−Najdi: His name Turki al−Dahish from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan and received his training in Al−Faruq camp in Kandahar. He returned to Afghanistan for a second time after the US invasion and was among a group of fighters assigned to form jihadist cells and promote jihad in Jalalabad where he was killed.

Originally a member of the 90s-era cadre, al-Dahish probably represented an ideologically trained jihadi. It’s interesting that the bio notes that part of his responsibilities was the recruitment in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. This was clearly part of a strategy to regroup and reform capabilities soon after the dust settled. It’s interesting to note that they felt safe enough to operate a recruitment effort inside of a country so soon after its government fell. This is the kind of behavior that needs to be curtailed in future post war efforts.

Samarqand al−Urduni: His name is Habis Bin−Abdallah Bin−Falah from Jordan. He took part in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan and later joined the so−called Al−Khilafah Group (Jama'at Al−Khilafah) in Peshawar after the civil war broke out. Habis Bin−Abdallah tried to return to the US where he once preached but was forced to change his plan when the September 11 attacks in the US took place. He traveled to China, Bangladesh, and back to Pakistan where he was killed in a raid by Pakistani forces in Waziristan.

Here we have an astonishing admission of a career jihadi desiring to “return” to the United States. Just when he had been to the United States and what he had done here goes undiscussed, but it’s clear that within the cadres of al-Qaeda’s “foot soldiers” are men who wish to dedicate effort to “preaching” as much as fighting. The line between the two is very thin; however, we’re still inadequate at describing the general lack of distinction between the two, particularly in Western courts of law. I’ve been unable to identify the “Al-Khilafah Group.”

Sahm al−Ta'ifi: His name is Muhammad al−Zahrani from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Kashmir where he trained then joined Abu−al−Layth al−Libi's group in eastern Afghanistan where he died in a battle against government forces.

Why would this Saudi travel to Kashmir first? We hear now about the training camps along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Yet this might not have always been the case. Apparently, earlier on in the Afghan-Pakistan conflict al-Qaeda cadres were training in Pakistan-controlled paramilitary camps probably connected to the ISI or Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. Of AQs training and personnel assets, how remains on the other side of Pakistan, away from America’s presence?

Sayfallah al−Zahrani: His name is Muhannad al−Zahrani from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Iraq where he received his first military training then moved on to Afghanistan. He joined Al−Qa'ida fighters in the tribal area between Pakistan and Afghanistan where he finished his military training and was later killed in a bombing of their position.

Talut al−Ta'ifi: Khalid Husayn al−Qathami from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan where he received military training and fought in Kabul and northern Afghanistan against the northern alliance until he was injured. He moved to Pakistan for treatment and was later killed in the tribal areas on Pakistan−Afghanistan borders.

Another Saudi easily transiting the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Had he survived, he would be a senior member of an AQ cadre.

Abu−A'id al−Falastini: His name is Khalil Bin−Sa'id al−Dik. He is a Palestinian from Jordan. He began his studies in the US as student of civil aviation then went on to graduate as a computer engineer. He accompanied Abdallah Azzam (central figure in rallying support for Afghan mujahidin against the Soviet invasion) during his tour in the US. He fought with Afghanistan and Bosnia before he settled in Peshawar, Pakistan where he was the first to publish the popular military encyclopedia and Abdallah Azzam's sermons and writings on compact disk. He was arrested in Jordan before he returned to Afghanistan where he met Abu−Zubaydah for the first time. He moved to Shahi−Kot after US Afghanistan where he remained until he was assassinated by an alleged "Pakistani agent."

Khalil al-Deek is one of the most well known subjects in the document. He was a US-based AQ supporter who worked for the same “charity” as Adam Gadahn in SoCal. The bio notes with confidence what Western CT officials would only suggest: that he was one of the authors of AQ’s pre-9/11 Encyclopedia of Jihad. It’s difficult to say whether this is information drawn from AQ knowledge of al-Deek or from circular reporting available on the Internet. However, this bio does highlight the murky lines between charity work and violent jihad, between non-profit media production and incitement to violence.

Abu−Amir al−Sudani: His name is Mustafa (last name not provided) from Sudan. He was killed in an air raid in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

A Sudanese native, probably one of many, who could easily return to their home country to fight if US or other Western forces feel compelled to occupy parts of southern Sudan.

Abu−Amir al−Falastini: He grew up in Kuwait and traveled to Afghanistan from Yemen where he earned a living as a trader. He fought in Kandahar after the US invasion then fled to Shahi−Kot area after the fall of the Taliban where he was killed in an air bombing.

This biography highlights the fluid nature of violent jihad, where average men will participate in fighting, return to the daily grind, and jump back into it at the first sign of opportunity. It suggests a deeper, spiritual role than a simple call to fight.

Abu−al−Abbas al−Kurdi: He is from Kurdistan, Iraq. He traveled to Afghanistan where he fought in support of the Taliban until the US invasion. He moved to Shahi−Kot in eastern Afghanistan where he was killed in a battle with US and Afghan forces.

This bio highlights the connections between the so-called independent jihadi groups of pre-2003 Northern Iraq and AQ. Apparently, al-Kurdi never got the memo that there were no connections between the Iraqi groups and AQ.

Abdallah al−Mudir al−Libi: His name is Bashir (last name not provided). He traveled to Sudan and Yemen before he joined mujahidin in Afghanistan where he played various roles. He fled to the tribal areas in Afghanistan after the US invasion where he was later killed in an air bombing.

A Libyan by birth, this jihadi moved easily into Sudan – probably in the 1990s – through Yemen and into Afghanistan. His bio suggests here too the fluid borders between North Africa, East Africa, and the regions of AQ’s most significant fighting.

Abu−Abdallah al−Jaddawi: His name is Muhsin Bin−Abdallah Bin−Salih al−Awlaqi from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan where he received his military training in Kandahar. He fled to the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan and was later assigned with other Al−Qa'ida fighters to go to Jalalabad to recruit and reorganize. He was killed in an operation against their position.

This Saudi’s bio shares a common element with several others in the collection: after the fall of the Taliban, AQ went through a period of recollection and regrouping. It’s training capabilities moved quickly to the other end of Pakistan (just how would make for an interesting research paper), and some members were scattered throughout Afghanistan with the task of reconstituting the group’s support among the local tribes. It may appear to be so much old news, but these reformative years actually provide insights into how current AQ (and other future groups) respond to extreme pressures.

Abdallah Jan al−Afghani: His name is Salwalah from Afghanistan. He worked in the clandestine service of Al−Qa'ida alongside Abu−Zubaydah and was charged with recruiting foreign fighters to Afghanistan and smuggling them to Pakistan as secret agents. He joined Abu−al−Layth al−Libin in eastern Afghanistan where he was killed in a US air bombing.

What the hell is the “clandestine service”?! This is very interesting, because it suggests that AQ has some kind of secret apparatus (a la the Muslim Brotherhood) that helped move recruits into Pakistan for some unclear purpose, possibly training (?), after the Taliban fell. It also suggests that Zubaydah had some leadership role other than being the group’s “#3” after the death of Abu Hafs al-Masri.

Abdallah Bin al−Basri: His full name is Abdallah Bin Sami Bin−Muhammad Bin−Fahmi Tufankashi born in Saudi Arabia to Egyptian parents. He traveled at an early age to Afghanistan with his father who participated in jihad against the Soviet invasion. They left and returned after the Taliban took control of Kabul. Abdallah Tufankashi received his military training in Kandahar. He fled to eastern Afghanistan after the US invasion where trained new recruits and was later killed in an operation by US forces.

Here is another example of family-centered Salafist-Jihadism. Clearly not all AQ members and supporters convert to the group’s ideology. Some men are raised into it. It’s difficult to say whether the generational Salafist-Jihadis are better represented into the current incarnation of the group, but it suggests that father-son relationships sometimes play a role.

Abdallah al−Afghani: His name was Muhammad Anwar from Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He was a member of the Taliban who was assigned the role of an interpreter. He died in a battle against government forces in Zabul, Afghanistan.

Interesting to see that even the Taliban apparently needs interpreters.

Abu−Ubaydah al−Banshiri al−Shahri: His name was Sa'd Bin−Khalid al−Shahri from Saudi Arabia. He served in the Saudi armed forces before he traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan. He fled to the tribal areas of Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban and later died in Shankay area.

How many more members of the “Saudi armed forces” are active supporters of AQ?

Abu−Ubaydah al−Hijazi: His name was Muhammad bin Dulaym al−Asmari from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan through Iran. His arrival to Kandahar coincided with the fall of the Taliban and was forced to flee to the tribal areas among Abu−al−Layth al−Libi's fighters. He was killed in Shankay, Afghanistan.

Another Saudi – this one is known to have transitted through Iran – who died in Shankay, apparently a victim of bad timing.

Abu−Abd−al−Rahman al−Kanadi al−Masri: His name was Ahmad bin Sa'id bin Khudr from Egypt. He traveled to Afghanistan to support mujahidin against the Soviet invasion. He returned to Afghanistan from Canada and remained there until the fall of the Taliban. He fled to the eastern region of Afghanistan where he was later killed.

An Egyptian by birth, this jihadi’s bio suggests at how easy it has been for some Western passport holders to travel to and from regions of active violent jihad.

Abu−Abd−al−Rahman Bin al−Masri: His name was Sami Bin−Muhammad Bin−Fahmi Tufankashi from Egypt. He traveled to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia to support the Afghan mujahidin against the Soviet invasion. He began his journey in Jalalabad and was described as "one of the twelve founders of what became known later as Al−Qa'ida Organization." Sami Tufankashi left Afghanistan after the civil war broke out and returned again after the Taliban took power. Like most the Taliban and Al−Qa'ida fighters, he fled to the tribal areas after the US invasion. He died when his BM rocket exploded prematurely.

After a long, distinguished career, it’s interesting that this AQ “founding father” was still performing the grunt work of firing rockets. It suggests that the group was under severe strain during this time.

Abd−al−Rahman al−Uzbiki al−Khawarizmi: His name was Ulughbik Asta from Uzbekistan. He fled a government crack down on the Islamists to end up in Afghanistan where he joined pro−Taliban fighters. He fled to the eastern region of Afghanistan after the US invasion and was later killed in Shahi−Kot in an air bombing.

An interesting bio, because it shows the fluid character of the jihadi identity. Members of regional jihadi groups will often be absorbed into AQ, giving persistence to the regional ones, and opening AQ to a new region of influence.

Abd−al−Rahman al−Najdi: His name was Abd−al−Ilah al−Musa from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan where he received his military training and fought in support of the Taliban in Kabul. He fled to the eastern part of Afghanistan after the US invasion and was allegedly killed in a suicide operation against a German convoy.

Another Saudi, this one chose to be a suicide bomber.

Abd−al−Rahman al−Masri: His name was Iyyad al−Sayyid from Egypt. He traveled to Afghanistan during the Taliban rule. He fled to Khost after the US invasion where he was later killed by a landmine.

Nothing to add here.

Abd−al−Rahim al−Uzbiki: His name was Qawandiq Suji from Uzbekistan. He fought alongside the Taliban forces until the US invaded Afghanistan. He fled to eastern Afghanistan where he was later killed in an air bombing.

The number of Uzbeks involved in both AQ and Taliban operations is a curiosity, and would be interesting to study. There are staggering implications for future jihad in the region from this large a cadre of Uzbeks. Even if NATO takes control of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan the jihad may just migrate into other regions of Central Asia.

Abd−al−Salam al−Turki: His name was Umar (last name not provided) from Turkey. He traveled to Afghanistan where he died in an ambush against a US convoy.

Turkey has contributed a sizeable number of AQ recruits. This cadre could pose future problems for the EU, and may act as a conduit between the EU and Central Asia in any future AQ expansionism.

Abd−al−Aziz al−Uzbiki: His name was Amid Asta from Uzbekistan. He joined jihad in Tajikistan where he received his first military training and took part in attacks against Kyrgyz forces. He traveled to Afghanistan where he continued his jihad until he was killed in Shahi−Kot.

Another example of the significant role of 90s-era Tajikistan to AQ’s presence in Afghanistan.

Abd−al−Rahman al−Aswad al−Libi: He participated in the Afghan war against the Soviet invasion and fought in Bosnia. He returned to Afghanistan after the Taliban took power. He remained there until the fall of the Taliban. He was killed in Peshawar by Pakistani forces.

Another North African, not much to analyze.

Abdallah al−Libi: His name was Sami (last name not provided) from Libya. He joined the Libyan Group in Afghanistan several months before September 11 attack in the US. He fled to Khost region with Abu−al−Layth al−Libi and was later killed in an air raid.

It is interesting to note how many bio subjects are connected to al-Libi.

Abu−Abdallah al−Turkistani: His name was Shawkat (last name not provided) from Kazakhstan. He traveled to Afghanistan and was later given an assignment in Kazakhstan. He returned to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban where he was killed in an operation by Pakistan forces.

Who assigned him to Kazakhstan and what he was assigned to do remains a mystery, but it suggests that AQ was interested in building networks of support throughout Central Asia.

Abdallah al−Shami: His name was Ziyad al−Shayib from Syria. He traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan where he received his military training. He was killed in a bombing in eastern Afghanistan.

Not enough information to analyze this bio.

Abdallah al−Mu'athin al−Uzbaki: Born in Afghanistan, Abdallah al−Uzbaki left Uzbekistan for Tajikistan where he received his military training with the Uzbek jihadist group before he continued to Afghanistan. He fled to Shahi−Kot after the fall of the Taliban and was later killed in an operation in eastern Afghanistan.

This bio hints at the strategic significance of the 90s-era jihad in Tajikistan. It’s an area and era of violent jihad that has received little analytical attention.

Abdallah Haydarah: His name was Abd−al−Rahman al−Husaynan from Saudi Arabia. He served in the Saudi Armed forces and traveled to Afghanistan after September 11 attacks in the US. He moved to eastern Afghanistan where he was later killed.

Like I’ve said in previous posts, the 9-11 attacks played a significant role in drawing new recruits into the group.

Abu−Abdallah al−Sumali: Born in Somalia, he participated in jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and was active in training and financing jihad activities in Somalia. After his name appeared on the FBI wanted list, he fled Sweden where his family lived to Somalia and then to Afghanistan where he was killed.

An interesting bio highlighting the Western character of and the deep connection to AQ for Somalia’s Salafist-Jihadist. It suggests that many members of the Somalian AQ cadre could jump between Western diaspora communities and regions of violent jihad.

Abd−al−Jabbar al−Turkistani: His name was Qurban Muhammad from the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region in China. He traveled to Afghanistan where he trained and joined jihad in support of the Taliban. He fled to the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan where he was killed by Pakistani forces.

Not much to analyze here.

Abd−al−Hakim al−Uzbaki: Born in Uzbekistan, he traveled to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan where he received his first military experience before he went to Afghanistan. He fled to eastern Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban where he was later killed.

Abd−al−Salam al−Turkistani: Born in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region in China, traveled to Afghanistan where he received his military training and fought for the Taliban before he went to Turkey. He returned to Afghanistan soon before the fall of the Taliban and was forced to flee to the tribal areas of eastern Afghanistan where he mainly Kazakh fighters until he was killed.

This bio inspired questions regarding the role of Turkey as a base for Salafist-Jihadist ideology within the Turkic language communities of Central Asia.

Abd−al−Majid al−Tajiki: His name was Abd−al−Haq (last name not provided) from Tajikistan. He traveled to Afghanistan where he attended religious schools and fought in support of the Taliban. With the defeat of the Taliban, Abd−al−Haq fled to Iran where he spent a year studying in the religious schools of Baluchestan province before he returned to Afghanistan where he was killed in an operation by US forces.

As a Tajik, Abd-al-Salam could easily move between Afghanistan and Iran’s sizeable refugee population. It is also interesting to see that some AQ members are moving through Iran’s only predominantly Sunni region.

Abd−al−Wakil al−Masri: His name was Mustafa Mahmud Fadl from Egypt. He traveled to Afghanistan where he trained and fought in support of mujahidin against the Soviet invasion. He was later appointed a trainer in Al−Faruq training camp until the break of the civil war. He moved with his group to Sudan and later trained and organized Somali fighters against US forces and was directly involved in the bombings against US embassies in East Africa. He returned to Afghanistan after the Taliban took control and remained there until the US invasion when he was forced to move to the tribal areas where he was later killed.

Clearly a member of AQ’s senior Egyptian leadership, his must have been a blow. It also highlights the group’s deep bench, because it is thriving in some areas including Somalia.

Abd−al−Shahid al−Turkistani: Born in Kazakhstan, he traveled to Afghanistan where he received his military training soon before the US invasion. After the defeat of the Taliban, he fled to the tribal areas in eastern Afghanistan where he was killed in an operation by Pakistani forces.

As someone who self-identified as a “Turkistani,” possibly from Western China, it’s interesting that he was born in Kazakhstan. Such a connection hints at active supporters in a country known for its tolerance.

Abd−al−Halim al−Uzbaki: Born in Uzbekistan, he received his military training in Tajikistan then traveled to Afghanistan where he remained until the fall of the Taliban. He was killed in US strike in eastern Afghanistan.

Abd−al−Mu'min al−Tajiki: Born in northern Afghanistan to Tajik parents, he received his military training in Afghanistan and fought in Tajikistan. He died in a suicide operation that targeted Abd−al−Rashid Dustum.

Two more members of the Tajik cadre. How many remain alive?

Uthman al−Uzbaki: His name was Mukhtar Bin−Sultan Bay from Uzbekistan. He joined the Uzbek group in Tajikistan and participated in an operation in Kyrgyzstan to open a passage to Uzbekistan. He later traveled to Afghanistan and fought under the Taliban rule until he was killed in eastern Afghanistan in an operation by US forces.

It is interesting to see here that some AQ members were deeply involved in developing the regional networks of sympathizers.

Azzam al−Maghribi: His name was Yunus al−Alami from Morocco. He traveled to Afghanistan where he received his military training and training new recruits. He fled to the tribal areas where he later died in a battle with US forces.

Not much in this bio to analyze.

Ikrimah al−Ghamidi: His name was Sultan al−Ghamidi from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan where he received his military training until he was forced to flee to the tribal areas in eastern Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. He was later killed in a US air strike.

Again, not much to analyze here that hasn’t already be blogged on.

Abu−Ali al−Maliki al−Jaza'iri: He traveled to Afghanistan to support mujahidin against the Soviet invasion. He remained in Afghanistan until the fall of the Taliban. He fled to eastern Afghanistan where he trained foreign fighters on explosives and prepared suicide bombers until he was killed in an air raid by US forces.

What stands out for me here is the emphasis on Abu-Ali’s central role as a trainer. It shows that

Ali al−Tataristani: He was born in Tajikistan where his parents had emigrated from Tatarstan republic in the Russian Federation. He trained in Chechnya and later traveled to Afghanistan during the rule of the Taliban. He was later killed in the tribal area between Afghanistan and Pakistan in a government checkpoint.

Ammar al−Dali'i al−Yamani: He was born in Yemen where he joined the armed forces before he traveled to Afghanistan in 1997. He was appointed as a bodyguard to Usama Bin Ladin until the fall of the Taliban. He fled to eastern Afghanistan and tried to return to Yemen but was unable to cross Iran. He was forced to return to Karachi where he was killed in an operation by Pakistan forces.

Abu−Umar al−Maghribi: He was born in Egypt and moved to Saudi Arabia where he decided to travel to Afghanistan. He received his training and fought with the Taliban forces until they were forced to flee to eastern Afghanistan where he was later killed.

Imran Khan: He was from southern Waziristan. He traveled to Afghanistan where he was killed in a battled against US forces.

Awjal al−Rahman Bibli: Born in Waziristan, Afghanistan, he joined Arab fighters in the eastern region to train in their camps. He was later killed in a US air raid on their position.

Gharib al−Turkistani: He was from Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region in China. He traveled to Afghanistan where he remained until the defeat of the Taliban. He fled the eastern region where he later died in battle against US forces.

Faruq al−Madani: His name was Badr Bin−Abdallah al−Anzi from Saudi Arabia. He was killed in a failed suicide operation in Jalalabad.

Qash'amyar al−Makki: His name was Badr Bin−Abdallah al−Anzi from Saudi Arabia. He fought under the Taliban. He remained there until he was forced to flee to Pakistan. He was later killed in the eastern region of Afghanistan.

Mukhtar al−Karibi: He was born in the Caribbean Islands and migrated to France with his parents. He was recruited upon his visit to Britain where he met a group of Algerians. He traveled to Afghanistan until he was killed in the eastern region in an operation by US forces.

Abu−Muslim al−Tajiki: Born in Tajikistan, he traveled to Afghanistan where he joined al−Qa'ida fighters. He remained in Afghanistan until he was killed in a raid by Pakistani forces.

Abu−Muhammad al−Turkistani: He was from Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region in China. He preached jihad in his homeland and recruited many from his homeland to join the jihadist training camps of Afghanistan. He fled to the tribal areas after the fall of the Taliban and was later killed in a raid by Pakistani forces.

Abu−Muhammad al−Qasimi: His name was Muhammad Bin Salim al−Mazni from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Afghanistan shortly before the fall of the Taliban. After failed attempts to return to Saudi Arabia, he joined Al−Qa'ida fighters in the tribal areas and remained there until he was killed in strike against their position.

Abu−Muhammad al−Uzbaki: His name was Hurmat Mulakim from Uzbekistan. He received his military training in Chechnya and later traveled to Afghanistan where he trained other Uzbek fighters. After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to the eastern region where he was later killed in an air strike.

Abu−Muhammad al−Kurdi: He traveled to Afghanistan from Kurdistan, Iraq. He trained in Al−Faruq camp in Kandahar and remained in Afghanistan until the defeat of the Taliban. He fled to the tribal areas where he died when a grenade he was carrying exploded.

Abu−Muhammed al−Iraqi: His name was Hatim al−Sa'idi from Iraq. He traveled to Afghanistan from Australia to join his father−in−law Mukhtar al−Kurdi. After the fall of the Taliban, he moved to Pakistan for a year before he joined Al−Qa'ida and pro−Taliban fighters in eastern Afghanistan. He was later killed in an air strike.

Abu−Muhammad al−Masri: His name was Hamdi Bin Muhammad Bin−Ibrahim al−Thib from Egypt. He traveled to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia after September 11 attacks in the US. He fled to eastern Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban and died in a suicide operation that target a Canadian convoy in Kabul.

Muhammad Jan Sifli al−Waziri: Muhammad Jan Bin−Ghazi Jan from Pakistan. He joined pro−Taliban fighters in the tribal areas where he took part in a campaign of ambushes against US convoys and was later killed in one of these operations.

Mukhtar al−Suri: His name was Umar Bin−al−Hajj Hamid from Syria. After a failed attempt to join jihad in Chechnya, he traveled to Afghanistan where he remained until the fall of the Taliban. He fled with the rest of pro−Taliban forces to Shahi−Kot in eastern Afghanistan and was later killed in battles against Pakistan forces in Zabul Province.

Muslim al−Tunusi: His name was Habib al−Wadhan from Tunisia. He traveled to Afghanistan from Italy and received his first military training in Kandahar. Soon afterward, he was called upon to join the fight for Kabul against the Northern Alliance. He fled with the remaining pro−Taliban forces to eastern Afghanistan where he remained until he was allegedly killed in friendly fire on his way to Jalalabad.

Abu−Mujahid al−Shahri: His name was Muhammad Bin−Sa'id al−Shahri from Saudi Arabia. He was a member of the Saudi Special Forces before he traveled to Afghanistan. He trained in Kandahar and joined pro−Taliban forces in northern Afghanistan. He fled to the eastern region where he was later killed in an air strike.

Al−Mu'tasim al−San'ani: His name was Sultan al−Ashmuri from Yemen. He traveled to Afghanistan shortly before the US invasion. He fled to Khost in eastern Afghanistan and remained there until he was killed in an operation by Pakistan forces in Zabul.

Mina Jan Dawar: Born in northern Waziristan, Mina Jan joined the Taliban and took part in their battles against the Northern Alliance. After the fall of the Taliban, he withdrew with the rest of the pro−Taliban fighters to the tribal area in Waziristan. He remained there until he was killed in an air strike.

Al−Nibras al−San'ani: His name was Ahmad Bin−Yahya al−Mansur from Yemen. He traveled to Afghanistan where he received his military training and was appointed by Usama Bin Ladin to run a guest house in Hirat. After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to the tribal areas of Afghanistan where he was later killed when the explosives he was handling accidentally detonated.

Nik Muhammad Wazir: Nick Muhammad was born in southern Waziristan. He fought in the Taliban forces in northern Afghanistan until the US invasion when he was forced to flee to the tribal areas. He was later killed by Pakistan forces.

Wasim Muhammad Ra'uf Dur: Born in the tribal area of Waziristan, Pakistan. He joined pro−Taliban forces and was killed in an air strike.

Waqqas al−Jaza'iri: His name was Mukhtar (last name not provided) from Algeria. He lived in France before he traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan where he received his initial military training before he went on the Al−Faruq camp in Kandahar. After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to Pakistan then returned to the tribal area where he was later killed in US air strike.

Abu−al−Walid al−Murithani: His name was Muhammad Bin−Fadil al−Ya'qubi from Mauritania. He traveled to Afghanistan from Germany where he pursued his graduate studies. He joined Al−Faruq camp where he received his military training and was later appointed a trainer. After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to the tribal area in eastern Afghanistan where he was later killed in Shankay.

Abu−al−Walid al−Pakistani: His name was Muhammad Anwar Bin−Khushi Muhammad from Pakistan. He received his military training Lashkar−i−Tayyiba's camps in Afghanistan then in Kashmir before he joined pro−Taliban and Al−Qa'ida forces. He was later killed in an ambush.

Abu−al−Haytham al−Ta'zi al−Yamani: Born in Yemen, he traveled to Afghanistan in 1999 where he received his military training before he joined pro−Taliban forces in Kabul. After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to the tribal area in eastern Afghanistan where he was later killed in an air strike.

Abu−Yasir al−Namshi al−Harbi: His name was Fahd Bin−Salih al−Harbi from Saudi Arabia. He traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan where he received his military training. He graduated from Al−Faruq camp shortly before the September 11 attacks against the US. With the fall of the Taliban, Fahd al−Harbi fled to the eastern region of Afghanistan where he was later killed in an operation by government forces in Jalalabad.

Abu−Yahya al−Hawn al−Masri: His name was Zakariya (no last name provided) from Egypt. He traveled to Afghanistan to support mujahidin against the Soviet invasion. After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to the tribal areas where he continued to train new recruits. He later died of cancer.

Abu−Yahya al−Maghribi: His name was Zakariya al−Sabbar from Morocco. Al−Sabbar was a member of the Hamburg cell and an associate of many of the organizers of September 11 attacks against the US. According to the account, Zakariya al−Sabbar traveled to Afghanistan in 2000. After finishing his training in Al−Faruq camp, he was sent to Germany with a "mission that only unique individuals can carry out." (Al−Sabbar was reported to have delivered the cryptic message from Bin−al−Shibh to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad indicating the date that the September 11 attacks would be carried out.) After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to the tribal areas of Afghanistan. He joined Abu−al−Layth al−Libi camp in Khost Province where he was later killed.

December 21, 2009

It's back! Around the Web has returned (I know you've missed it). After thinking about it for some time, I admit that it's still the best way for me to keep up with the daily fire hose of information. And after a day of cooking (chicken chili soup anyone?), I’m ready to pick through the web for a little counter-terrorism fun.

Let's begin then...

One of the more intriguing recently thwarted plots comes to us from Bosnia .

New jihadi blog. New to me, anyway: http://madkhalis.com/

Hey, check out Aaron, all grown up and writing for Studies in Conflict and Terrorism: "Comparison of Visual Motifs in Jihadi and Cholo Videos on YouTube," Volume 32, Issue 12 December 2009 , pages 1066 – 1074

What this suggests to me is that we need to be able to speak / read not only spoken or written languages of our sources, suspects, informants and opponents — but also the language or underlying logic of their thought.

Charles, I call this “thinking with the adversary.” It’s a modification of an old Catholic theological principle.

I know this is old in blog-time, but I can’t resist writing this sentence: It was never 2000, and it’s not 50 now, and it was never 30 and it’s not 200 now. The numbers have always been in the 5 or 10s. Bradford’s law extends even to jihobbyists.

July 07, 2009

You've probably noticed that I haven’t been posting “around the web” posts recently. A new job and a busy personal life have drawn me away from dedicated posting here at MSJ. I’ll continue to post here, but not as regularly as in the past. I know that – somehow, some way – you will survive, readers, especially since Tim is doing such a good job with his InfoBore posts. Meanwhile, I’m contributing to CTLab’s Current Intelligence blog.

[In Stage] Three these "moderate" groups start making bizarre accusations hoping to test and intimidate said agency. In Stage Four said agency will apologize for something it's not doing and cave to all demands.

War is Boring is Corrects South Park.An aside: I can’t help but add a comment to the pirate coverage over the Easter weekend. It was awful. I don’t know what was worse CNN’s coverage of how the pirates were putting a damper on the President’s personal weekend plans or FoxNews' “jihadists on the sea” absurdities. I do know this: TV news is worthless as a source of information.

FIZ Karlsruhe now offers its computer science portal io-port.net…"The database contains bibliographical metadata, links to electronic full texts, and, for most of the references, article summaries or abstracts written by scientists."

UNESCO, et al has the new World Digital Library... "functions in seven languages-Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish-and includes content in more than 40 languages. Browse and search features facilitate cross-cultural and cross-temporal exploration on the site."

April 05, 2009

I know, I know. I've been remiss in my duties to post an Around the Web, and now I've been writing one for what feels like a week. It's going to take you about a week to get through it, too, but I don't want to hear any whining. It's a slow week in most offices. If you can catch up on your fantasy baseball picks, you can read this post.

We start with Jihadica, and the squibs from hell: Thomas surveys recent jihadi publications. They also have a roundup of their recent Workshop in Oslo (Part I and Part II). Excellent work all around.

Three of them, who lived in Naples, are though to be Islamist radicals sympathetic to the radical 'Takfiri' ideology...The three radicals had already been involved in falsifying documents to aid jihadist groups.

Meanwhile the Financial Times throws some cold water on all this talk of Islamic finance saving the world. [This talk concerns me, because the vast majority of people who know known nothing about Islamic finance.] (via Aqoul)

And the Times of London is reporting on something that happened, what? Two weeks ago?

Holy Spicolli! Abu Muqawama is an actual...guy. I thought he was just a blog.

In Stage One, the agency (in this case the FBI) embraces radical Islamist front groups. In Stage Two reality sets in and said agency withdraws their cooperation with groups, once understood that they share the same goals as AQ. In Stage Three these "moderate" groups start making bizarre accusations hoping to test and intimidate said agency. In Stage Four said agency will apologize for something it's not doing and cave to all demands.

So where does the money go? This recent Reuters list of "Gulf Arab foreign investments" gives you some idea. (via The Arabist)

I welcome to the club of "blogs she reads":

Shariah Finance Watch

http://www.shariahfinancewatch.org/blog/

And a jihadi blog (via The Pest)

http://millatibraheem.wordpress.com/

Flash: there are Salafi groups in the Levant, according to MEMRI there's a new Salafist-Jihadist one in Gaza, and two S-Js reported killed in Gaza.

Speaking of Africa: The Pest of all people pointed out the novel qualities of a current release from AQ's Somalia branch. It's an all-English video, featuring an American muj, rapping, or something. More at Jawa Report, Danger Room, and others including here and here.

The Pest's post is here: http://revolution.thabaat.net/?p=1096

You can find it here: http://www.archive.org/details/kmen-bradle

The video does suggest that there is an audience for this jihadi vileness in the US, and belies the commonly acknowledged trope that "our" Muslims (ie, the US) are not as radical as "their" Muslims (ie. Europe). Perhaps, but then, how do we know?

Over in Yemen, Waq-al-Waq notes a recent article in AQ's periodical Sada al-Malahim that provides some "good background" on KSA's 85 Most Wanted.

And MEMRIBlog reports that Yemeni officials have their own Most Wanted list

What about the analog version of the group? Al Qaeda Today: a Policy Forum luncheon hosted by The Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. (PolicyWatch #1477: Special Forum Report)

Drew has a post on a recent study that challenges the work of Robert Pape: Decision Processes of a Suicide Bomber

Question to the audience: How many suicidebombings in a row before it's called an offensive?It must be Spring.

The image of easy going weed-smoking free love (Islamic style) Sufis has always appealed to some in the West. After 9/11, it has gained new supporters who see it as a “form of Islam that we can live with”. Quite a few Muslims seem to have become drawn to Sufistic approaches to Islam precisely because it seems more West-friendly. But politics is not the right reason to adopt or support an ascetic and esoteric religious path. It’s also misguided. Sufis can fight when they want to.

Reading this Thomas Hegghammer review of a French language study of the current of Apocryphal theology in Islam, I was reminded of a particular columnist's hilarious jab at "Kyoto cultists:" that the problem with said global warming fanatics is that the "end of the world's nighness is never quite nigh enough." I think that could be said for most millenarians.

Hegghammer has also been busy browsing the periodicals section of the jihad and recently brought us an update.

In other book reviews, there's a look at a little known attempt at an African caliphate: http://ibnayyub.wordpress.com/2009/02/19/the-african-caliphate/

In a recent meeting with the Director of CIA Information Management Services, we reiterated our view that all unclassified, non-copyrighted publications of the Open Source Center (which is managed by CIA) should be made freely available to the public.

Oh, and that BBC News piece: The "schism" that that say is "evolving" in Pakistan has actually been around for, oh, about 1500 years. You can't have "sectarians" until you have schism. Shouldn't the Brits know something about this?

January 27, 2009

It's a 1969 Danish-language pamphlet published by the I.I.F.S.O with a forward by Afzal Rahman (from London). It appears to have been distributed by a group called the Scandinavian Foundation of Islamic Services. Not jihad related, but certainly a curio from the Brotherhood's still-formative years in Europe.

What happens when the friend of a few convicted terrorists meets the FBI? Find out here: http://umarlee.com/2008/12/25/meeting-with-the-fbi-at-a-st-louis-masjid-over-the-actions-of-minnesota-somali-youths/

BTW: you can tweet me @marisaurgoI plan to share my CT “finds” through my twitter feed, and leave the blog for longer pieces. The same behavioral rules apply for Twitter that apply for my general e-mail account. All mean tweets will be ignored. All threatening tweets will be shared with authorities, even if they have no idea what a tweet is.

New book: Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World, by Bruce K. Rutherford . To read the entire book description or a sample chapter, go here.

New report: Al Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: The Power of a Narrative, by Olivier Roy. Found here.

New article: "Mumbai: a turning point for jihadism." (via Islamists2day)

If you’re looking for an example of how to do OSINT, you can’t do better than health and medical sciences. The dominance (innovation, effectiveness) of medical and biotech research (particularly in the US) lies in its reliance on information sharing. It is a culture of information sharing where doctors’ and researchers’ reputations are based on their professional productivity. At the center of all this is the ultimate OSINT database: Medline, the US federally funded research database of the National Library Medicine, probably the single most important source of medical and biotech innovation in the world.Available online, for free.

December 17, 2008

I remember reading an article about the work done at the State Department to reconstruct Afghanistan's legal code. Apparently so little survived the decades of war that not even a complete code of law was available for reference. That's the reason this document title caught my eye:

[Note: there's little of the "black flag" jihadi media here. Rather, you'll find a lot of dawah, some of it mainstream (even hippie dippie), much of it of the Salafist current and some of straight out of Salafi-Jihadist current]

The programme takes an innovative micro level, multidisciplinary approach to studying the conflict cycle. Its main purpose is to promote understanding of individual and group interactions leading to and resulting from violent mass conflicts, aiming to better inform conflict policy and place individuals and groups at the centre of interventions.

November 03, 2008

Last week I linked to a speech on jihad given by the great Islamist thinker Mualana Maududi. There's much more to this man's work, and I'm increasingly interested in how he (and others) integrate the concept of jihad into a greater totality of thought.

If this recent article in Dar al-Hayat is an accurate reflection of the general sentiment following a recent visit by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, then the next administration will have its work cut out for them.

Perhaps the Maghreb and the Sahel will see stability operations. Hopefully not before there's much more cultural training for military, diplomats, and spies.

July 30, 2008

Every once in a while a new journal comes along, and I shrug. The content of most new publications isn't worth the effort to buy the inaugural issue.

But while I was on vacation, I received the TOC for a new journal called Dynamics of Asymmetric Warfare. Just browsing of the article titles shows that this journal could be a significant role in sharing substantive analysis in areas of counterterrorism and COIN.

Radicalization in the Persian Gulf: Assessing the potential of Islamist militancy in Saudi Arabia and YemenAuthor: Mohammed M. Hafez

July 12, 2008

I wrote a couple of weeks ago that I was heading into a lull on posting just to get through a few articles. Well, it didn't happen then, but is happening now. I need a break. Right now, I'm just more interested in "sahabs." No not As-Sahab, these "sahabs."

Don't get me wrong. Just because DC is easing into its summer lull, doesn't mean there's isn't plenty of interesting news and research to comment on. For instance:

Apparently, our man (al-)Libbi is too busy for video. His latest is an audio is summarized at Internet Terrori Monitor.

Half a world away, The Pest posts pics of a smiling Abu Qatada, who has apparently fallen off the wagon on his diet. The link is here: http://revolution.muslimpad.com/2008/07/11/may-allah-protect-you-shaykh-abu-qataadah/

The Long War Journalreports on the surrender of the "unconventional" warlord, Bibi Aysha. (Before you get shocked! that a patriarchal tribal society like the ones found in SW Asia could produce a Bibi Aysha, just remember there are Western examples, too, including my favorite.)

Perspectives on Terrorism published an article exploring the "battle of ideas" from the Pakistan perspective. Meanwhile, a new NEFA Foundation report reminds us why Pakistan is so important.

Kevin Knodell's "backgrounder" posts on Central Africa (at War is Boring here, here and here) are great starting off point for anyone curious about the region. I suspect that Central Africa is going to become a region of much greater strategic interest in the next five years.

Mihalka and Anderson have written "Is the Sky Falling? Energy Security and Transnational Terrorism." Good work. I agree with the conclusion, but it is based entirely on data analysis. Comprehensive CT analysis needs a little more. After all there were no hijack-jetliner-crash-into-skyscraper data points on September 10, 2001. Still it's worth reading, because it sums up all the OSINT data we do have on terrorist attacks on energy infrastructure. Their article is published in the US Navy's Center for Contemporary Conflict's journal Strategic Insights.

Speaking of oil IntelFusion recently linked to a Harvard-based report on the possible impact of a closure of the Straits of Hormuz. It's a reminder of how complex and -- vulnerable -- the global energy supplies are to "outside" events.

And speaking of IntelFusion, they're reporting on new efforts by DoD in something called "cloud computing." See also thisKMWorld report.

I'm back to those clouds again. Posting will be light over the next two weeks as I seek to get a little more out of my summer of "independence."

June 06, 2008

SWJ does the blogosphere a service by reviewing the works of lesser known authors, many of whom write from the experience of being on the front lines against terrorists. These accounts usually provide the kind of insider insights and anecdotes you don't get in the more sensationalist expose´s of this event or that group, usually because the authors are largely unknown to the media's elite.

Case in point: SWJ's recent review of Fred Burton's autobiography of his life at the head of Diplomatic Security's CT division.

In today's counter-IED terminology, Burton could be considered to have been working towards "getting to the left of boom," as his team sought to determine the vulnerabilities that the Department of State faced abroad and at home. Burton also does an admirable job of delineating the division of labor between the various three-letter agencies that work against terrorism in the "Dark World." He sums it up well by stating: "In many ways, we're America's Dark World redheaded stepchild. We maneuver in the cracks and crevices between the other agencies. It is a tough place to operate." This may be news to the casual reader who previously assumed that the Central Intelligence Agency was the dominant actor in defeating terrorism abroad, and thus those chapters contribute to the book’s readability.

June 03, 2008

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Panel: American Civil-Military Relations

A panel discussion on civilian-military relations from U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, KS). Panelists are: Dale Herspring, author of "Rumsfeld's Wars"; Marybeth Ulrich, author of "Democratizing Communist Militaries"; Col. Matthew Moten, author of "The Delafield Commission and the American Military Profession"; Peter Feaver, author of "Armed Servants"; and Don Snider, co-author of "The Future of the Army Profession."