This paper by Wouter Wils – available at https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/numeros/no-1-2017/articles/the-use-of-leniency-in-eu-cartel-enforcement-an-assessment-after-twenty-years – describes 20 years of leniency in Europe. In addition to some interesting statistics, it contains an overview of arguments for and against the use of leniency. It is useful for anyone doing bid-rigging / promoting the virtues of competition, but putting at risk the job of thousands of trainee lawyers who will no longer have a job searching for examples of the practical application of leniency by the European Commission.

This paper by Josef Drexl – a chapter on a book on the ‘The Regionalisation of Competition Law and Policy within the ASEAN Economic Community – focuses on the transplantability of competition law systems across regions(in this case, from the EU to ASEAN). Basic argument: some elements of a competition system are transplantable, others are not. A full, successful transplant from the EU to ASEAN must take into consideration the goals of ASEAN competition law, the degree and potential of economic integration of the national economies, the level of economic development of these economies, the development of a competition culture in these countries, the comparative advantages of centralised and decentralised enforcement, and the willingness of ASEAN countries to surrender sovereignty in the field of competition law. In short, transplants depend on socio-economic conditions. I think we can all agree with this article of faith in spirit, even if I’m doubtful that anyone is very good at embracing it in practice –…

This is a paper – published in the George Mason Law Review and available at http://www.georgemasonlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/Kovacic-and-Hyman_ReadyforJCI.pdf – by Bill Kovacic and David Hyman on the desirability of competition agencies having regulatory competences in addition to those related to antitrust, and on how the spill-over between these various areas of competence may work. The paper provides a theoretical framework (the first of its kind, as far as I’m aware) for the various types of leveraging of competition and other regulatory concerns in practice, both inter- and intra-agencies . It also includes examples of the various types of spill-over that may occur, mainly by reference to FTC work but also including some European authorities; and a cost-benefit analysis of the various types of spill-over (bottom line: “it depends, but regulatory spill-over should mainly be avoided”). Good stuff, potentially useful.