NSCN (Khaplang), which is opposed to the deal and operates out of Myanmar, is likely to be encouraged by China

New Delhi, Aug 26 : The recent “framework” for a Nagaland Peace Accord inked
on August 3, by NSCN (IM) leader Thingaleng Muihvah and the Chairman of
the Joint Intelligence Committee RN Ravi, has raised hopes for the
establishment of peace and harmony in Nagaland.

Successful
implementation of a Peace Accord would also benefit the neighbouring
States of Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland, where there are Naga
populations, by ending decades of insurgency and ethnic conflict. In
expressing optimism about success of this Framework Accord, reference is
often made to the Rajiv Gandhi-Laldenga Accord of June 30, 1986, which
has brought about lasting peace, harmony and development in Mizoram.
This would, however, be a simplistic assumption.

The
Mizoram Accord was inked by the Mizo National Front led by Laldenga, who
was the sole and undisputed leader of the Mizo uprising, in a State
which is not afflicted with tribal differences and rivalries. Moreover,
the Accord was signed when there were no foreign patrons or havens left
for the Mizos.

The 8-point Accord clearly spelt out
the extent of autonomy the Mizos would enjoy, the process for laying
down arms and ammunition and measures for resettlement of underground
personnel. This was combined with the conferment of full Statehood and
establishment of a separate High Court for Mizoram.

China angle

While
the details of the recent Nagaland “framework” have not been made
public, it is acknowledged that many complex issues remain to be sorted
out. While the demand for a “Greater Nagaland” embracing the territories
of Nagaland and Naga dominated areas in Manipur, Assam and Arunachal
Pradesh appears to have been given up by the NSCN (IM), the issue of
Regional Councils or other such institutions for Nagas in the three
neighbouring States will remain contentious, especially given the
none-too-happy experiences following the establishment of a Bodoland
Council in Assam.

Moreover, Naga society is
afflicted by tribal rivalries and by the presence of large number of
armed groups, each with its own sense of self-importance. Finally, the
most powerful insurgent group after the NSCN (IM), the NSCN (Khaplang),
which broke along standing cease fire agreement with New Delhi on March 7
and killed 18 Indian soldiers on July 4,remains implacably opposed to
the August 3 Accord.

The NSCN (K) is predominantly
Myanmar based and its cadres are trained and operate from areas in the
neighbouring Sagaing Division and the Kachin State. These areas are
along the borders with China, where the Myanmar Government has scant
control and China now freely consorts with Indian separatist outfits.

New
Delhi has to bear in mind and react imaginatively to the reality that
Myanmar now faces serious problems on its borders with China’s Yunnan
Province in the Shan and Kachin States. The Chinese have a cosy
relationship with the Kachin Independence Army, which exercises full
control of areas in Kachin State bordering China.

Ever
since they were ousted by Sheikh Hasina from Bangladesh scores of
members of north eastern separatist groups including the NSCN (K), ULFA,
the Peoples’ Liberation of Army of Manipur and the National Democratic
Front of Bodoland have taken refuge along the Myanmar-China border, in
Kachin State.

These groups have now come under the
umbrella of an NSCN (K) led and quite evidently Chinese backed grouping,
calling itself the “United National Front of West Southeast Asia”.

As
its name suggests, the grouping is exclusively India centric. We are
evidently seeing a return to Chinese policies of the Maoist era, when
China backed and armed separatist groups along our borders with Burma
and the then East Pakistan.

Importance of Myanmar

Given
the policy of NSCN (K) to seek a peace accord for its people and desist
from violence within Myanmar, it is unlikely that Myanmar will be in a
position to respond positively to any request for the extradition of the
NSCN (K) leadership. What can at best be achieved is obtaining Myanmar
pressure on the Khaplang leadership to get the NSCN (K) to join the
Nagaland peace process and desist from violence. The Home Ministry and
needs a word of caution on this score. They should curb the propensity
to seek media publicity and conduct all moves involving Myanmar,
maintaining strict secrecy.

Apart from the inability
of the Myanmar Government to exercise control over areas of Kachin State
bordering China, where Indian insurgent groups are based and are
strengthening links with China, Myanmar itself seems headed for
political uncertainty, as the country heads toward elections for a new
Parliament and President on November 8. The two main Parties are the
National League for Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi (who is still
ineligible to be elected as President by the Legislature) and the army
backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), led by the
Parliament Speaker and former Armed Forces Chief General (Thura) Shwe
Mann.

The army establishment, in which former
military ruler Senior General Than Shwe wields considerable influence,
is still averse to Aung San Suu Kyi, or her Party assuming, or
influencing the Presidency.

In these circumstances,
both Shwe Mann, who realistically realised that his Party the military
backed USDP would receive a drubbing in the elections and Suu Kyi who
needed Army support to become eligible for office, appeared to be moving
towards a deal, in which Su Kyi’s NLD would back a Shwe Mann bid for
President, after the elections. Sensing this, President Thein Sein, with
the backing of the current armed forces Chief Senior General Min Aung
Hlaing and quite evidently the former Junta Leader Senior General Than
Shwe, acted decisively to marginalise Shwe Mann. While positioning
himself for re-election, President Thein Sein removed Shwe Mann for the
post of the Party Chief of the USDP and himself took charge of the
Party. Troops of Myanmar Army positioned themselves around the offices
of the USDP and the residence of Shwe Mann. The die was cast and the
message sent that while Suu Kyi would enjoy respect as an elected
leader, the army would resist her access to effective executive power.
It remains to be seen how developments play out in Myanmar.

It
is evident that in dealing with implementation of the August 3 MoU with
the NSCN (IM), New Delhi will have to tread carefully internally and
externally, in its relations with Myanmar.

The writer is a diplomat and former Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan