United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (UN OIOS) 6 Jul 2004 report titled "Audit of the UNHCR Emergency Operation in Chad [AR2004-111-02]" relating to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The report runs to 14 printed pages.

Simple text version follows

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UNITED NATIONS
Office of Internal Oversight Services
UNHCR Audit Service
Assignment AR2004/111/02 6 July 2004
Audit Report 04/R21
OIOS AUDIT Of THE UNHCR EMERGENCY OPERATION IN CHAD
Auditor:
Alpha Diallo
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UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
Office of Internal Oversight Services
UNHCR Audit Service
OIOS AUDIT OF THE UNHCR EMERGENCY OPERATION IN CHAD
(AR2004/111/02)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Between March and June 2004, OIOS conducted an audit of the UNHCR Emergency Operation in
Chad. The audit covered activities with a total expenditure of US$ 8 million in 2003. Audit
Observations were shared with the Chief of Mission in May 2004, whose comments were received
by June 2004. The Chief of Mission pointed out that the current management team was not
involved in the financial management during the year 2003, and that his comments were based on
available documents. The Chief of Mission has accepted most of the recommendations and is in
the process of implementing them.
Overall Assessment
� OIOS assessed the UNHCR operation in Chad as seriously deficient. A lack of the
application of internal controls was found to be so widespread as to undermine the overall
system of internal control. This failure of the control infrastructure has had or is likely to
have, significant implications on the use of UNHCR funds and on the achievement of
programme objectives. It should be taken into account, however, that the situation in Chad
during 2003 was marked by the emergency nature of the operation. Urgent attention by
management and intervention by UNHCR Headquarters is required to implement effective
controls.
Programme Management
� For the main partner reviewed, MSF-Belgium, which accounted for over 60 percent of the
programme funds, reasonable assurance could be taken that UNHCR funds were properly
accounted for and disbursed in accordance with the Sub-agreements.
� For Croix Rouge Tchadienne, a local NGO, OIOS assessed that their financial reports could
not be relied upon. Funded activities were not carried out, albeit disbursements under those
activities were charged to the sub-project; CRT was unable to substantiate expenditures of
US$ 185,000 representing some 50 percent of their budget. CRT cash management,
budgetary and expenditure controls were deficient. In the absence of any accounting system,
expenditures were not recorded and could not be reconciled to those reported to UNHCR.
Significant amounts of cash (up to US$ 100,000) were withdrawn from the bank and
disbursed without adequate controls. OCM informed that the documentation supporting
expenditures of some US$ 90,000 had now been submitted, leaving some US$ 95,000 still
unsupported.
� Monitoring of the operations in Chad by the UNHCR Representation in Central African
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Republic was less than satisfactory. To provide financial and administrative support to the
Chad operation, UNHCR Bangui sent an Associate Protection Officer with no relevant
experience in this area and with no expertise to deal with an emergency operation of such
magnitude. Many of the problems disclosed by the audit could have been identified and
corrective actions taken timely, had proper financial monitoring been carried out.
Supply Management
� Procurement activities were marked by serious deficiencies and non-compliance with
UNHCR procurement procedures. Purchases of a significant value were made without
spending authority. Albeit much of the procurement exceeded the threshold of US$ 100,000,
approval of the Headquarters Committee on Contracts was not sought. OCM explained that
the ERT Leader, in charge of the management of the operations during the period under
reviewed had been asked to comments. OIOS has not yet received those comments.
� The implementing partner MSF levied operating margins of up to 25 percent on international
procurement carried out on behalf of UNHCR. OIOS estimated that margins totalling some
US$ 160,000 were thus charged to the project, without a legal basis in the sub-agreement. In
the view of OIOS, excessive charges should be recovered from MSF.
� No records were kept of UNHCR's assets with an estimated value of several millions of US
dollars; this included light vehicles, trucks, and telecommunication equipment. The
AssetTrak system was only recently installed, but was not operational.
� For fuel, OCM paid a 25 percent higher price than other UN agencies, since no exemption
from Value Added Tax (VAT) had been arranged. Based on UNHCR' projected needs of
fuel in 2004, OIOS estimated that some US$ 138,000 could be saved yearly if the tax
exemption was obtained. OCM indicated that the VAT exemption had now been obtained.
Security and Safety
� Security matters were not given the necessary attention, and a number of mandatory
security requirements were not complied with. OCM indicated that security measures
had now been taken and would be further reinforced.
Administration
� Compliance with regulations, rules and procedures in administration and finance was not
satisfactory, and needed improvement. OCM has adequately addressed most of these issues.
� During 2003, OCM lost control over expenditures incurred and outstanding obligations,
resulting in unrecorded expenditures totalling some US$ 145,000. To honour these
obligations in 2004, OCM would need additional funds. Advances totalling some US$ 0.5
million were outstanding; there was a need to better monitor the timely settlement of
advances.
� The MIP system was not operational, and medical claims had not been processed, nor any
reimbursements made. OIOS recommended that immediate attention be given to this issue.
- July 2004-
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER Paragraphs
I. INTRODUCTION 1-4
II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES 5
6-8
III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
III. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Supply Management 9�27
B. Other Programme Issues 28-29
C. Review of Implementing Partners 30-39
D. Administration 40-51
E. Security and Safety 52-55
IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 56
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. From 24 March to 6 April 2004, OIOS conducted an audit of the UNHCR Emergency
Operation in Chad. The audit was conducted in accordance with the Standards for the
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, promulgated by the Institute of Internal Auditors and
adopted by the Internal Audit Services of the United Nations Organizations. OIOS reviewed the
activities of the Office of the Chief of Mission in N'djamena, its Sub-Office (SO) in Abeche and
of two of its implementing partners. OIOS also reviewed, in June 2004, the related monitoring
activities of the Representation in Bangui.
2. OIOS' previous audit of UNHCR in Chad was conducted in February 2001. The review
focused on 1999 and 2000 project and administrative expenditures totalling US$ 1.8 million.
The main issues pertained to unsatisfactory project monitoring, inability to reconcile SPMRs to
partners' books of accounts, and significant unauthorized budgetary overruns. Serious
deficiencies were also noted in the area of procurement, which had resulted in a loss of US$
80,000 to UNHCR.
3. In early 2003, following the fighting in the Darfur region of Western Sudan and in
Central African Republic (CAR), tens of thousands of civilians were displaced in Darfur, while
an estimated 110,000 took refuge in neighbouring Chad, living in extremely precarious
situations. UNHCR deployed an Emergency Response Team to Chad (under the overall
responsibility of the Representation in Bangui) to deal with major influx of refugees, and
subsequently re-established its presence in the country. UNHCR focussed its efforts on
providing life-saving assistance to vulnerable refugees through a number of implementing
partners.
4. The findings and recommendations contained in this report have been discussed with the
officials responsible for the audited activities during the exit conference held on 7 April 2004.
Audit Observations detailing the audit findings were issued directly to the Office of the Chief of
Mission in May 2004. The replies, which were received in June 2004, are reflected in the Audit
Report. The Chief of Mission has accepted most of the audit recommendations made and is in
the process of implementing them.
II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES
5. The main objectives of the audit were to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of
controls to ensure:
� Reliability and integrity of financial and operational information;
� Effectiveness and efficiency of operations;
� Safeguarding of assets; and,
� Compliance with regulations and rules, Letters of Instruction and Sub-agreements.
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III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
6. The audit focused on 2003 programme activities under projects 03/SB/CHD/EM/130 and
03/SB/CHD/EM/133 with expenditure of US$ 6.4 million. Our review concentrated on the
activities implemented by M�d�cins sans Fronti�res - Belgium (MSF-B) � expenditure of US$ 2
million, and Croix Rouge Tchadienne (CRT) � expenditure of US$ 0.4 million. We also
reviewed activities directly implemented by UNHCR with expenditure of US$ 4 million,
including procurement by SMS.
7. The audit reviewed the administration of the Office of the Chief of Mission in
N'djamena and its Sub-Office in Abeche with administrative budgets totalling US$ 1.6 for 2003.
No record of the acquisition and current value of the assets purchased and used in the operation
was available, an issue addressed in the report. The number of staff working for the UNHCR
Operation in Chad was 15. This included staff on regular posts, staff on temporary assistance,
United Nations Volunteers and staff on mission.
8. The audit activities included a review and assessment of internal control systems,
interviews with staff, analysis of applicable data and a review of the available documents and
other relevant records.
IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Supply Management
Procurement
9. Until late in 2003, in the absence of a UNHCR Representation in Chad, the UNHCR
Representation in CAR was responsible for the monitoring of the emergency operations
(implemented in Chad by an Emergency Relief Team). Therefore, the approval for the
procurement of goods or services was to be sought from the LCC in Bangui (or the HCC as
appropriate) since no such committee was established in N'djamena.
10. OIOS noted serious deficiencies and non-compliance with UNHCR procurement
procedures. Purchases of a significant value were made without any evidence that goods and
services were procured competitively, and without due regard to spending authority limits. In
effect, much of the procurement exceeded the threshold of US$ 100,000 and should have been
submitted to the Headquarters Committee on Contracts. In some instances, the Representation
in Bangui provided specific guidance/instructions, which the Emergency Relief Team (ERT)
chose to ignore.
11. For example, in October 2003, the ERT procured buckets at a cost of some US$ 113,000.
Although the procurement exceeded the threshold of US$ 100,000, approval of the Chairperson of
the Headquarters Committee on Contracts was not sought. Instructions from the Representation in
Bangui to limit the purchase to less than US$ 50,000 were disregarded. In another example in
August 2003 mats and soaps were procured locally at a cost of some US$ 127,000, without
adherence to procurement procedures. There were numerous other examples of non-compliance.
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12. Also, suppliers were selected without ensuring their ability to supply the goods or
services at the required deadline. For instance, steel buckets were procured for some US$
103,000 from a local supplier, on the basis of three pro forma invoices. The goods, which were
supposed to be delivered within 15 days, were actually delivered more than two months later.
Given the emergency nature of the operation, adherence to delivery time was essential.
13. In 2003, the Office paid some US$ 138,000 to a Clearing Agent, who had been selected
without competitive bidding. No written contract was awarded, and the amount involved largely
exceeded the spending authority, and should have been referred to the HCC. OIOS
recommended that the Office issue a tender for clearing services, and ensure that the selection is
made on a competitive basis.
14. OCM explained that the current management team was not involved in the 2003
financial management of the operations. They further indicated that a copy of the Audit
Observation had been sent to the former ERT Leader for him to comment on the supply chain
system put in place during his management period. So far, OIOS has not received those
comments. OCM also explained that clear instructions had now been given to all staff members
to adhere to rules and regulations for procurement.
15. There was no signed lease agreement for the UNHCR office premises in N'djamena, and
despite this, OCM undertook additional construction work on the premises, without a written
understanding/acceptance from the landlord. OIOS was concerned with the fact that UNHCR's
interests had not been protected. OCM explained that the office lease agreement has now been
signed with the landlord, after the endorsement by the Legal Affairs Section at HQs.
Procurement by MSF
16. UNHCR's main implementing partner, MSF-Belgium was not pre-qualified for
procurement on behalf of UNHCR, yet they were entrusted with the procurement of goods and
services of over US$ 1.4 million. OIOS did not obtain any evidence that, as an alternative, MSF
had made a written commitment to apply UNHCR IP procurement guidelines. Further, most of
the items procured internationally (drugs, mosquito nets etc.) were available under UNHCR
frame agreements, and could have been directly procured by UNHCR
17. MSF made their procurement internationally through their subsidiary (called Transfer),
with a lead-time of 30 days (except for medical items already in MSF' stocks). OIOS found that
MSF levied operating margins ranging from 15 up to 25 percent on their international
procurement, while similar Purchasing Centres in Europe only charged between five and 10
percent. For example, 3,200 tents were procured for some US$ 317,000, while the amount
charged to UNHCR was some US$ 396,000 a margin of US$ 79,000 (25 percent). Also,
medical kits were procured for US$ 61,000 while the cost to UNHCR came to US$ 71,500, a
margin of US$ 10,000 (16.5 percent).
18. For 2003, MSF spent a total of some US$ 804,000 on international procurement.
Therefore, OIOS estimated that, at an average operating margin rate of 20 percent, MSF had
levied a margin of some US$ 160,000 on their international procurement. MFS explained that
the margin levied was required to cover their procurement costs (bidding process, cost of
stocking, transfers etc). In OIOS' view, however, while it is justified to cover such costs, the
margin rates applied were by far higher than those charged by similar Purchasing Centres in
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Europe, such as GTS in Italy, which charged only between 5 and 10 percent. OIOS therefore
considers the cost charged as excessive and not eligible for UNHCR funding.
19. In OIOS' view, written authorisation should have been sought and obtained from
UNHCR prior to charging these margins to the SPMRs. Given that these were not foreseen and
agreed to in the relevant sub-agreements signed with UNHCR, OIOS recommended that
UNHCR negotiate with MSF and reduce the margin level to a mutually acceptable level, with
any excess reimbursed to UNHCR. OCM did not address this issue in their replies.
Recommendation:
The UNHCR Office of the Chief of Mission, N'djamena, should
consult with DOS and SMS, and negotiate ex-post-facto with
MSF a mutually acceptable operating margin for the 2003
procurement. Excessive charges estimated at least US$ 100,000
should be recovered from MSF (Rec. 01).
20. MSF `s procurement procedures in the field were deficient, and the documentation
supporting the expenditure was often inadequate. In some instances, the validity of the payments
made was questionable, as the receipt of the goods was not evidenced. MSF acknowledged the
weaknesses noted, and explained that this was due to the then prevailing conditions on the
field. MSF also indicated that they would ensure in the future, that the documentation
supporting the expenditure is kept on file.
Asset Management
21. Considerable work was required from OCM in the area of asset management. OIOS
could not find any records of UNHCR's assets, albeit large quantities of assets (including light
vehicles/ heavy trucks, office and telecommunication equipment, etc.), estimated at several
millions of US dollars, were procured both locally and internationally. Not even an Excel table
was maintained to keep track of the assets procured, and no copies of the receiving reports (for
incoming shipments from SMS) were available. The AssetTrak system was not installed during
2003, and at the time of OIOS' review in 2004, the system was still not operational, due to the
lack of trained staff. OIOS regrets to see such problems recurring in many emergency
operations. Also, no records were available for the UNHCR-managed warehouse in N'Djamena,
which meant that shortages, if any, could go undetected. Despite the assistance received from a
visiting staff member to design and compile an asset database, this task was only partially
carried out because of his other priorities.
22. At the time of the review, only one inexperienced Logistics Assistant (on temporary
assistance) was trying to cope with tremendous tasks of procurement, warehousing, custom
clearance, fleet management, etc. In OIOS' view, such responsibilities would represent a very
difficult challenge even for an experienced Logistics Officer, unless he is seconded by an
adequate number of logistics staff.
23. OCM acknowledged the shortcoming, and explained that these were due to the lack of
professional staff in the Logistics Unit. They also indicated that the office planned to bring in
qualified staff from other offices for assistance.
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Recommendation:
The UNHCR Office of the Chief of Mission, N'djamena, should
undertake a comprehensive physical inventory of its assets with an
estimated value of several million US dollars, and ensure that the
AssetTrak system is fully operational and up-to-date (Rec. 02).
Fuel management
24. UNHCR had no formal arrangement with any suppliers, despite its need of significant
quantities of fuel. Consequently, higher prices were paid for the purchase of fuel, including
value Added Tax (VAT), which UNHCR should have been exempted from. No request for
VAT tax exemption had been made. OIOS found that other UN agencies (including UNDP) had
requested and obtained the tax-exemption, and were therefore paying at least 25 percent less
than UNHCR.
25. In 2003, the total amount of fuel purchased for the programme could not be determined,
given that the various payments were recorded under various budget lines (and locations), and
that some payments made in the field had not been recorded at all. Under the Administrative
Budget, however, UNHCR spent some US$ 40,000, inclusive of US$ 10,000 for VAT, which
could have been saved. For 2004, UNHCR estimated that some 60,000 litres of diesel would be
needed monthly, which meant that if the VAT exemption is obtained, some US$ 138,000 could
be saved yearly.
26. OIOS found that controls were deficient over the management of fuel. OCM procured
fuel in the form of fuel booklets (blank forms), validated by the only signature of a new local
staff on temporary assistance, with no further verification or supervisory approval. This is a
spending authority that should not be delegated to a staff at this level. Further, the average fuel
consumption per vehicle was not tracked/monitored, which gives rise to potential misuse.
27. OCM explained that, due to the lack of professional staff in the Logistics Section, there
was a mismanagement of the office assets. They clarified that the situation had now changed,
with main tasks and responsibilities given to professional staff newly appointed. Regarding the
VAT on fuel, OCM indicated that arrangements had now been made, and that the office was no
longer paying the VAT tax. They also explained that fuel coupons were now signed by
professional staff.
B. Other Programme Issues
28. Prior to re-establishing the UNHCR office in Chad, UNHCR emergency operations were
implemented by an ERT, under the overall monitoring and assistance by the UNHCR
Representation in CAR. However, in light of the various shortcomings noted in Chad, OIOS
assessed that programme monitoring was less than satisfactory. Many of the problems disclosed
by the audit could have been identified and dealt with, had proper financial monitoring been
carried out.
29. OIOS found that the staff member sent by the Representation in Bangui to provide
financial and administrative support was an Associate Protection Officer, with no proven
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expertise to deal with an emergency operation of general scale. According to the Representation
in Bangui, overseeing the operations in Chad was very difficult, due to limited flights,
unreliable telecommunication system, lack of security for travel by road, etc.
C. Review of Implementing Partners
30. For UNHCR' main partner, M�d�cins sans Fronti�res, systems and procedures were in
place, and reasonable assurance could be taken that UNHCR funds were properly accounted for
and disbursed in accordance with the Sub-agreements. For Croix Rouge Tchadienne, OIOS
could not reconcile the SPMRs due to the lack of accounting system and records. Therefore, no
assurance could be taken that UNHCR funds were properly controlled, managed and reported
on.
31. The 2003 audit certificates for both partners were not yet due at the time of the review,
but OIOS understands that an external audit of implementing partners will be soon carried out.
(a) Croix Rouge Tchadienne
32. OIOS found that CRT, a local implementing partner, had no accounting system in place
for the recording and reporting on UNHCR project expenditures. Bank and cash transactions
were not tracked, and there was no evidence to show how the expenditures reported onto the
SPMRs were arrived at. This practice did not leave any audit trail, and was contrary to sound
financial management and to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. In addition, the SPMRs
showed significant unauthorised budgetary overruns both at the budget line level (from 50 to
over 480 percent) and at the overall budget level.
33. The review of the expenditure under some selected budget lines disclosed several
discrepancies with the SPMR' figures, and more significantly, CRT could not substantiate
expenditure totalling some US$ 185,000, which represented about 50 percent of their 2003
budget. According to CRT, the money was withdrawn from the bank (and sent to the field) for
construction activities that had not yet taken place. In OIOS' view, since the expenditure was not
incurred, and no payments had taken place at the end of the sub-project liquidation date, the
unspent amount should not have been included. OIOS recommended that an effective
accounting system be implemented, and that a corrected financial SPMR reflecting actual
disbursements be submitted.
34. OCM explained that CRT admitted the weaknesses noted, and stated that project
expenditure and budget monitoring is now being recorded on Excel tables. On the issue of the
unjustified expenditure totalling some US$ 185,000, OCM explained that this amount was
budgeted only in December 2003 for the construction of schools, an emergency UNHCR was
faced with. They also clarified that the funds were transferred (with some delay) to CRT in
order to avoid direct implementation, while at the same time ensuring that the funds allocated
for this activity remained available to the 2003 sub-project.
35. OCM also indicated that the documentation supporting about half the amount (some
US$ 90,000) had now been received, and that these would be verified. OIOS takes note of the
explanations provided, but wished to stress that final SPMR should only include payments made
until the end of the liquidation period. If an activity cannot take place within the agreed
implementation period, OCM should consider amending the sub-project to extend its duration,
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or alternatively include the activity as part of subsequent year projects.
Recommendation:
The UNHCR Office of the Chief of Mission should obtain from its
implementing partner Croix Rouge Tchadienne documentation
properly supporting expenditures totalling some US$ 95,000 and
recover any amounts that cannot be accounted for (Rec. 03).
36. Significant amounts of cash (up to US$ 100,000) were regularly withdrawn from the
bank for use in the field. Despite this practice, CRT did not establish any petty cashbook to
record cash movements, and cheque counterfoils were not properly filled out, consequently
discrepancies were noted with the relevant bank statements. Given the complete lack of
accounting records, we could not reconcile the amount of cash in hand, nor could we evidence
any supervisory controls. OIOS made a number of recommendations to address the various
shortcomings noted.
37. OCM explained that, on the basis of additional documentation produced by CRT, the
bank discrepancies noted had now been reconciled, and that the postings would be further
verified. They further stated that actions would be taken to address the weaknesses noted in the
internal controls of CRT.
(b) M�decins sans Fronti�res-Belgium
38. MSF did not always comply with the sub-agreements signed with UNHCR. Despite
being UNHCR' main implementing partner with over US$ 2 millions of expenditures in 2003,
MSF did not prepare and submit any Performance Monitoring Reports. MSF explained that a
narrative report for 2003 was drafted for the activities carried out in the two camps. They also
explained that the draft was being finalised at the time of the review, and that it was
subsequently submitted to UNHCR in April 2004. OIOS wished to point out that, according to
the sub-agreement, the first Performance Monitoring Report (Part 2 of the SPMR) was due by 10
June 2003, while the final one was to be submitted not later than 15 February 2004. None of
these reports had been submitted to UNHCR at the time of our review in April 2004.
39. MSF needed to strengthen their internal controls; incompatible functions were exercised
by one person, responsible for authorizing/approving payments, signing Purchase Orders and
cheques, recording financial transactions, and preparing bank reconciliations. Also, as MSF did
not introduce the use of payment voucher, authorisation and approval of the expenditure could
not be evidenced. In their replies, MSF indicated that the Finance Officer did not issue
Purchase Orders but only approved it to certify availability of funds. However, MSF did not
comment on other incompatible functions identified.
Recommendation:
The UNHCR Office of the Chief of Mission, N'djamena should
request its implementing partners to submit their Performance
Monitoring Reports in accordance with sub-project agreements,
and to ensure adequate segregation of duties (Rec. 04)
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D. Administration
40. In the areas of administration and finance, OCM did often not comply with UNHCR's
regulations, rules, policies and procedures. Key financial controls were not functioning. The
Medical Insurance Plan was not operational, albeit the system was in place.
(a) Delegation of authority chart not available
41. The UNHCR Delegation of Financial Signing Authority, IOM 67/2000 & FOM 69/2000,
dated 9 September 2000 had not yet been implemented. OIOS recommended that proper
administrative and financial procedures be implemented to strengthen internal controls. The
delegation of authority chart has now been established.
(b) Unrecorded expenditures and commitments
42. OIOS found that the expenditure incurred during 2003 was only partially recorded and
reported on, and therefore the Administrative Budget Control Sheet (ABCS) was understated.
The unrecorded expenditure amounted to some US$ 73,000. The ABCS is an important tool for
the monitoring of the budget, obligation and disbursement levels, and for ensuring that
expenditure does not exceed the obligated amount in the ABOD. According to OCM, the
problem arose because the FMIS system was not installed at field offices, and this had created an
overwhelming flow of payment documents originating from those offices, which they had been
unable to cope with.
43. In addition, the 2003 year-end commitments were understated by over US$ 72,000,
which meant that OCM had lost its overview over commitments entered and outstanding
obligations. Further, these obligations/commitments had not been recorded in the FMIS system
(using notional vouchers), and could therefore not be reconciled. OCM would need to create and
record the 2003 notional vouchers under the new MSRP system. OIOS estimated that OCM
would need additional funds totalling some US$ 145,000 to honour the outstanding obligations.
OCM explained that the 2003 commitments would be charged against the 2004 ABOD, which
had been submitted to HQs for revision.
(c) Outstanding receivables (VF)
44. Better monitoring and timely settlement of advances was required. At the time of the
audit, advances totalling some US$ 0.5 million had been outstanding for several months. Many
of these receivables pertained to official travel, with the travel claims either not submitted or not
processed. In some instances, the advances were made to staff on mission, who had left the
country without submitting their travel claims. This was the case, for instance, for two staff
members with advances totalling some US$ 36,000, who had departed Chad without settling
their advances.
45. OCM indicated that many efforts had been made to reconcile all outstanding payable
and receivable accounts. They further explained that, for staff members who already left the
country, their current duty stations had been contacted, and the amounts due would be
recovered immediately.
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(d) Communications
46. In 2003, over US$ 60,000 was spent for communications. The controls over the usage of
telephone equipment were found to be weak. The established logbook was actually not use, and
the switchboard was bypassed by direct calls made from any of the five telephone lines, with
direct international access. The concerned staff did not maintain any logbook to track their
private calls. Despite the fact that, during 2003, telephone bills were periodically circulated to
staff so they can identify their private calls, in general, no such calls were identified and
refunded.
47. Moreover, staff members were provided with sat phones, but again proper controls over
their usage had not been established. Many international calls were made from these phones, but
in the absence of appropriate tracking mechanism, private calls, if any, were not identified for
recovery. OCM did not even maintain a comprehensive list of the sat phones and the name of
the holders, and the whereabouts of most of the sets were unknown to the Office, which made
accountability difficult to establish in case of loss or damage.
48. According to OCM, access to international lines were now restricted to senior staff
only, with other staff making their calls from the radio room, and that recovery of previous
private calls by staff members on mission was being made through their current duty station.
Regarding the inventory of telecom equipment, OCM explained that a Regional Telecom
Officer had assisted in carrying out a physical inventory and in implementing proper system for
recording them.
(e) Medical Insurance Plan (MIP)
49. The MIP system was still not operational, albeit the software had been installed several
months before. As a result, medical claims submitted by staff members could not be processed
nor any reimbursements made, while at the same time contributions to MIP system were
deducted from staff's salaries. OIOS recommended that immediate attention be given to this
issue. OCM explained that the computer on which the MIP system was installed was not
functioning for sometime, but that the problem has now been fixed, and that the processing of
medical claims would soon start. They also indicated that proper control mechanism of
medical claims have been put in place.
Review of Sub-Office, Abeche
50. The Sub-Office generally complied with UNHCR rules and regulations. As the Sub-
Office did not operate on a separate ABOD, funds were received from OCM through bank
transfers. OIOS noted that the FMIS system was not installed/operated, despite the fact that the
office had to cope with a significant level of financial transactions, including those from Field
Offices in Adre and Iriba. The expenditure was summarized on Excel tables, and did not allow
proper monitoring and accountability of "sub-advances" made by the Sub-Office to the two
Field Offices. This situation significantly contributed to the backlog of outstanding operational
advances noted at OCM N'Djamena. OIOS recommended that the FMIS be installed to lower
the risks associated with the delayed recording of transactions.
51. OIOS found that, for 2003, the Sub-Office still owed Daily Subsistence Allowance
(DSA) totalling some US$ 27,000 to local staff, which had been omitted in the 2003 list of
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commitments prepared by OCM. OCM explained that HQs had approved the installation of
the FMIS system, and that the outstanding issues noted by the audit were being solved.
E. Security and Safety
52. Security issues were not given the necessary attention, and a number of mandatory
security requirements were not complied with. Only some few international staff had completed
the mandatory basic security training. Further, none of the staff interviewed were aware of the
existence of, and familiar with the UN Field Security Handbook, nor were they briefed on
security matters upon their recruitment. According to IOM/FOM /17/2003 dated 14 March
2003, the security course is mandatory for all UNHCR staff, regardless of their contractual
status. Also, the course is to be completed by new staff within one month of their recruitment.
53. OIOS noted that no procedures were in place to evacuate the premises in case of
emergency, and that no badges were available to identify staff and visitors. While radio security
checks were carried out weekly, most of the UNHCR staff did not have handsets (including the
Chief of Mission). Further, compliance by UNHCR with the Minimum Operational Security
Standards (MOSS) was only achieved at some 70 percent. The OCM explained that no report of
the assessment was made available to the Office.
54. The Country Security Plan was drafted and finalised, but not tested. According to the
FSO, the designated wardens did not even know which areas they were responsible for. The
UNHCR FSA explained, however, that a full operational security plan is available to UNHCR
staffs, and that the plan would be incorporated into the more comprehensive country plan at the
time when the UNDP FSO is ready.
55. OCM explained that the improvement of staff and office premises security remained one
of their objectives, and that much efforts had been made to respond to UNSECOORD'
recommendations on MOSS. They also indicated that security at the office gates had been
reinforced, and that the necessary communication equipment had been ordered from HQs.
OCM said that security training would be organised for all staff, while the FSO would provide
basic security briefing to newly arrived staff, and added that during various meetings with
UNDP, the wardens had been informed of their responsibilities and areas of activities.
V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
56. I wish to express my appreciation for the assistance and cooperation extended to the
auditor by the staff of UNHCR and its implementing partners in Chad.
Egbert C. Kaltenbach, Chief
UNHCR Audit Service
Office of Internal Oversight Services
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