Tuesday, 30 September 2014

India’s navy: strong on aircraft carriers, short of submarines. A two-part analysis of naval strategy

Fleet support ship, INS Jyoti (centre) replenishes two warships in the Tropex exercise earlier this year

By Ajai Shukla

Business Standard, 30th Sept 14

Over the last
six weeks, the Indian Navy commissioned three frontline warships, boosting its fleet
to 140 vessels. Another 41 warships are being built in the country, including
the 40,000-tonne aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant. All these will join a “blue
water” navy that will radiate influence across the Indian Ocean.

This navy’s
strike power will centre on at least two carrier battle groups (CBGs), self-sufficient
flotillas built around a floating air base --- the aircraft carrier. Each
carrier will be escorted by multi-role corvettes, frigates and destroyers,
which together handle threats from all three dimensions --- underwater, surface
and air. With its arsenal of weapons and sensors, the CBG dominates a huge
chunk of ocean, establishing “sea control” wherever it moves.

Sea control
is central to the outlook of the Indian Navy, which draws inspiration from
Alfred Thayer Mahan, the 19th century US strategist. Mahan argued
that a navy’s primary task is to locate and destroy the enemy fleet, thereby dominating
the sea and controlling commercial shipping. Essential for this is the powerful
surface fleet that India is building.

Naval guru
Julian Corbett presented an alternative philosophy, placing naval warfare in a
larger political-economic-strategic context. More defence-minded than Mahan, Corbett
emphasised the importance of sea lines of communications (SLOCs), essential for
the movement of warships and merchant fleets. Corbett’s outlook shapes the “sea
denial” strategy of weaker navies like Pakistan. Their smaller fleets --- inadequate
for sea control --- instead deny the enemy unfettered use of the sea by using
platforms like submarines to interdict SLOCs, ambush his shipping and laying
mines at straits, narrows and outside his harbours, or by using missile boats
for swarm attacks on large warships.

Given its Mahanian
outlook and superior surface fleet, the Indian Navy would, in any future war
with Pakistan, seek sea control over the northern Arabian Sea by sending one,
or even two, CBGs to destroy or degrade Pakistan’s surface fleet. With that
done, the attack would shift to coastal installations and to supporting the
land battle through amphibious landings.

“Indian sea
control would complicate Pakistan’s defence dilemma. In addition to defending
2,900-odd kilometres of land border, Pakistan would then have to defend an
additional 1,046 kilometres of coastal boundary”, points out Vice Admiral
Pradeep Chauhan (Retired), a highly regarded naval strategist who has commanded
the aircraft carrier, INS Viraat.

Yet, sea
control must go hand-in-hand with sea denial. While CBGs seek battle with
Pakistan’s navy, Indian submarines would cut oil supplies and war material from
Pakistan’s West Asian allies; and bottle up shipping in Karachi, Gwadar and the
new naval base at Ormara. For this, Indian submarines would lurk outside this
ports, while also deploying in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz.

This
combination of sea control and sea denial would also play out in a war with
China. Sea control would be quickly imposed over China’s SLOCs through the
Indian Ocean, since our CBGs would enjoy proximity to bases; and to shore-based
air support from the “unsinkable aircraft carrier” that is the Andaman &
Nicobar Islands. Even as China’s oil supplies and trade are strangled, Indian
submarines would block the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) from the Indian
Ocean, at the straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Ombai Wetar. It would be vital
to hold the PLA(N)’s 77 major surface warships, 60 submarines, 55 amphibious
ships, and 85 missile boats, at bay.

Here lies
India’s Achilles’ heel. With just 14 submarines in its fleet, the navy’s sea
denial capacity is less convincing than its ability for sea control --- which stems
from a far-sighted decision in the 1950s to include aircraft carriers in the
fleet. (Part II of this article tomorrow
will deal with sea denial).

Sea control against Pakistan

In establishing
sea control across the northern Arabian Sea, the Indian Navy would fight a
tricky battle in coastal waters against the Pakistan Navy. The latter,
outnumbered and outgunned, knows it would get quickly wiped out on the open
seas. It is likely, therefore, to withdraw close to the Pakistan coast where the
Pakistan Air Force (PAF) would provide it air cover.

To close in
with this fleet, India’s CBGs must have the air defence capability to beat off
the PAF. Key to this would be the MiG-29K fighter, flying from aircraft carriers;
and air defence systems like the Barak, and the much-awaited new Long Range
Surface to Air Missile. The LR-SAM, which the Defence R&D Organisation
(DRDO) is developing with Israel, will be deployed on warships by end-2015.
These missiles would also protect the CBG against anti-ship missiles --- like
the Harpoon and Exocet --- fired from Pakistani submarines, warships and
aircraft.

“The Israeli
Barak missile, which was bought in 2001, for the first time provided the Indian
Navy with genuine air defence capability. The LR-SAM will make air defence even
more reliable,” asserts Chauhan.

Until the
LR-SAM is operational, Indian warships remain critically vulnerable to air and
missile attack, but the navy believes it will be worth the wait. “This (delay) is
the price that you pay when you go in for high-tech, state-of-the-art systems”,
says Vice Admiral Satish Soni, who heads Eastern Naval Command.

The LR-SAM will
also defend Indian warships against a feared ocean predator --- long-range
maritime patrol (LRMP) aircraft like Pakistan’s P3C Orion, which will fly
12-hour missions from Karachi to scour the seas, locate Indian warships, and
launch anti-ship missiles from 50 kilometres away.

The LR-SAM’s
70-kilometre range will let it engage the LRMP aircraft even before it launches
its anti-ship missile. If the aircraft manages to launch, the LR-SAM is
designed to shoot down the missile before it strikes a warship. For the LRMP
aircraft, an attack on a CBG would be suicidal. Its presence betrayed by the
launch of a missile, MiG-29Ks fighters scrambled from an aircraft carrier would
quickly overtake it and shoot it down.

After coming
within range of Pakistan’s surface fleet, Indian warships would launch an
air-sea attack --- striking Pakistani warships with anti-ship missiles like the
Brahmos, from ranges of up to 300 kilometres; and with fighter aircraft launched
from the aircraft carrier.

Detracting
from India’s convincing naval superiority in the Indian Ocean region is only
its vulnerability to enemy submarines. This stems not just from a depleted
submarines force, but also neglect of the capability to detect and destroy
enemy submarines.

(This is the first of a two-part series on
naval strategy. In Part II tomorrow: In submarine operations, the Indian Navy’s
Achilles’ heel)

Buddy nukes are there never to be used! If it came to nukes then that will be the end. Like any villain in any Hollywood or Bollywood film, when he is dying he will try to take everyone else with him too!

Nukes are there for that.

Either we only hurt him just about enough that he might learn about his mistakes or the other option would be to totally KILL HIM before he can press the trigger for the nukes.

These are two different strategies. I like the first one where either side is made aware about the mutual destruction which prevents both sides from acting stupid.

BTW Indian side is not stupid! I am obviously talking about Pakistan!

China will never even think of using Nukes against us cos she has way too much to lose!

If erotica grabs your attention to a level of 10 - 10. This was with out doubt a 9 - 10 !

@Anonymous 30 September 2014 08:47

Until very recently P'TAN was declared to use Strategic Nuclear Weapons on its own territory in case of an existential threat.

Now with the Hatf IX Tactical Nuclear weapons (lower destructive yields designed for eliminating large military formations)with a range of 60 KM and a new doctrine to boot, it is probable that PAK may use TNW as soon as an opposing military formation has penetrated its boundary completely.

However, in the naval scenario 3 questions come to mind.

1. Is the Hatf IX capable of detonating at Sea Surface ?

2. Being that Pak territorial waters extend up to 12 NM from the coast, what is rule regarding use of nuclear weapons at sea fleets located in international waters. Since its nobody's territory ?

3. Will such an attack on an any Fleet located in International waters justify (legally or policy wise) full scale nuclear retaliation ? if yes, at what level ?

Hi Col Shukla, can you kindly share your view point or knowledge on the three questions I had regarding usage of nuclear weapons at sea. I'd be happy to read :).

if TNW can be used against corps battle groups on land, if I were Pak, it would make more sense to use them against an enemy Carrier Battle Group where I am clearly at a major disadvantage, numerical and qualitative. Also, civilian casualties will be far less which lessens political pressure for such use.

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In the unlikely event that this has not been given thought by our northern and western neighbors, you may choose to not publish this comment.