This course will discuss the developments in the Middle East from the early 20th century to the present. It will discuss the rise and retreat of Arab nationalism, the problems of internal cohesion of the Arab states, issues of religion and state, and the evolution of Islamist politics. It will also focus on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on the region and will conclude with an in depth analysis of the “Arab Spring” by placing these contemporary revolutionary events in their historical context.
Please note that this course builds upon a previous course - The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part I
Learn about the history of the Middle East for a deeper understanding of current regional developments!

And were presented as evidence of the pre-Islamic historical greatness of Syria.

There wasn't even an effort to present these finds as part

of the Arab heritage but rather as part of Syria's past.

Occupation of large parts of Lebanon in 1976 by Syria and the interstate

arrangement between these two states did not

bring about any change in the boundaries.

Syria continued to preserve the boundary between Syria and Lebanon.

Even though this was regarded in Baath ideology

as something very artificial that shouldn't really be there.

And Greater Syria became a question more

of strategic need rather than an ideological conviction.

It was all about serving the strategic needs of the Syrian

state, and Syria had indeed become a player in its own right.

It was now a stable and a powerful country,

the fountainhead and beating heart of Arabism in theory.

But the emphasis was on Syria far more than it was of Arabism.

Jordan and the Palestinians have also had their development of stateness

and territorial identity, each one of these in their own particular way.

Palisteniansts was quite unique, created in the crucible of 1948, the

Nakba, the defeat by Israel, and as opposed to other Arab states,.

Searching for some kind of usable past to give a

measure of historical content to their auth, artificial territorial creations.

For the Palestinians it was all about the loss of

territory that served as the backbone of the cohesive collective memory.

The loss of Palestine is what gave the Palestinians their territorial identity.

The loss of Palestine, being the backbone of their collective memory.

As for the Jordanians, their Jordanian-ness

was defined against the ultimate Palestinian other.

Especially after the civil war between the

Jordanian government and the PLO in September, 1970.

Since September, 1970 there has been a very deliberate

promotion in Jordan, of a particular Jordanian identity based

on a common past even if it is a bit of historical invention.

The Jordanian identity was therefore portrayed as having

existed as a separate identity, in Ottoman times in

the 19th century, and though this wasn't really

so, it became part of the Jordanian national narrative.

And therefore, if this is to be true, the foundation of the monarchy was based on self-determination of the Jordanian people.

That was an existent people in the 1920s, and not a colonial fiat.

As it had actually been in reality, like other Arab states seeking to create

a territorial identity, Jordan was also in search of a usable past.

And thus, Jordan was described as a wellspring of

civilization ever since the Roman conquests, through the ancient

Nevetians of Jordan and the Muslim conquests of the

seventh century, which all became part of Jordanian history.

Jordanian-ness was also founded on

the uniqueness of the tribal monarchical compact as the core of Jordanian

national identity, the special association between the tribes

and their support for the monarchical regime in Jordan.

Jordan's relative cohesion in comparison to the other Arab states of

the fertile crescent has also contributed to its surprisingly long-term stability.

No less an artificial creation than its neighbors,

and many would argue even considerably more so.

Jordan has had a much better political record, and this better political

record is definitely related to Jordan's

being a homogeneous society in religious terms.

More than 90% of the Jordanians are Sunni Muslim Arabs.

Since 1948, it has become increasingly Palestinian, and Palestinians

presently constitute a majority of just over 50% in Jordan of the East Bank alone.

That is not taking into account the

West Bank territory occupied by Israel, since 1967.

But as tense as relationships are between Jordanians and Palestinians, the distinctions between them are latter-day 20th century ones, they are skin-deep in comparison to the far more profound fault lines, such as between Sunnis and Shi'ias that date back centuries.

Tribalism amongst Jordan's East Bankers is a strong and very relevant social marker.

But tribalism in Jordan has actually been mobilized far

more in the service of the state than against it.

In fact, the Jordanian state has become their political

patrimony, that is the political patrimony of the Jordanian tribes.

They have no other patrimony, and they will fight to defend their own.