As the twenty-first century begins, the following nations possess
biological weapons: Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, China, North Korea,
Russia, Israel, Taiwan, and possibly Sudan, India, Pakistan, and
Kazakhstan. The list cuts across lines of ideology, politics, and
geography. In addition, according to intelligence sources in Europe and
the United States, militant political groups across the globe are now
developing or seeking to purchase biological weapons for terrorist use.

Meanwhile, the sophistication of biological weaponry has improved by
leaps and bounds. Until 1985, all of the world's biological-weapons
makers were stuck with the same list of pathogens and toxins that could
kill thousands of enemies and be delivered with missiles or large-scale
aerosol systems. Each nation knew the list and stocked antidotes and
vaccines. It was a standoff.

But biology in the last decade has been what physics was in the 1940s
and 1950s: a field of exponential discovery. What seemed impossible in
1980 was accomplished by 1990 and, by 2000, had become ho-hum fodder for
high school biology classes. By the late 1990s, a massive pool of
bioengineers, equipped with genetic blueprints to guide their efforts,
had emerged. Determining the genetic sequence of a virus, such as Ebola,
was no longer much of a feat. In 1998, scientists at the Frederick
Cancer Research Center in Maryland determined, at the genetic level,
exactly how anthrax kills human cells.

In response to such advances, Western militaries hardened their
defenses against biological warfare as they vaccinated troops,
stockpiled antitoxins, stored appropriate antibiotics, purchased
protective suits and masks, practiced war-game drills involving
biological weapons, and supported research on potential microbe-
detecting devices. But no one had a master plan for dealing with the
collateral impact of biological weapons on civilians located around the
combat zone -- or the deliberate impact of bioterrorist damage inflicted
on an unsuspecting community. Were a terrorist to disperse the smallpox
virus, for example, populations that were once universally vaccinated
would now be horribly vulnerable. Today the U.S. government stows only
about 15.4 million doses of the smallpox vaccine -- enough for less than
seven percent of the American population. The World Health Organization
(WHO) keeps another 500,000 doses in the Netherlands, and other national
stockpiles total about 60 million more doses of varying quality and
potency. If the smallpox virus were released today, the majority of the
world's population would be defenseless, and given the virus' 30 percent
kill rate, nearly two billion people could die.

The picture worsened in 1999, when scientists discovered that the
U.S. samples of the smallpox vaccine had severely deteriorated.
Originally made in the 1970s by the Wyeth pharmaceutical company, the
samples were stored at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
in Atlanta in the form of freeze-dried crystals parceled out in 100-dose
quantities inside vacuum-sealed glass tubes. The tubes were further
sealed with rubber stoppers secured by metal clamps. To their dismay,
CDC investigators discovered condensation in many of the glass tubes,
indicating that the rubber stoppers had decayed and vacuum pressure had
been lost. Such vaccine supplies can no longer be considered safe for
human use. Although the rest of the world's vaccine reserves have not
undergone similar scrutiny, experts do not have much confidence in those
either. Furthermore, the world's supplies of bifurcated needles - -
uniquely designed for scratch-administering the smallpox vaccine on
human skin -- have been depleted, and companies are no longer interested
in manufacturing such specialized devices.

The world is thus completely vulnerable to a smallpox attack. The
last time a mass emergency vaccination took place in the United States
was 1947, when a traveler from Mexico spread smallpox to New York City.
Vaccines were then readily available, and 6.35 million New Yorkers were
immunized in less than four weeks. In 1961, a similar vaccination
campaign was administered following a smallpox outbreak in England: 5.5
million people were immunized in a month's time. A decade later,
smallpox cases in Yugoslavia prompted the rapid vaccination of 20
million people in that country. Were a smallpox crisis to emerge today,
none of these efforts could be repeated.

LETHAL LAG TIME

Even if large stockpiles of the smallpox vaccine could be collected
immediately, they would be of limited value for two reasons: only
several days after infection would individuals develop recognizable
symptoms, by which time thousands -- even millions -- would have been
exposed; and only several days or weeks after vaccination would
individuals develop sufficient antibodies to stave off infection.

For other diseases preventable by vaccine, such as anthrax, the lag
time between inoculation and the development of powerful antibodies
could be far longer -- up to a year, even with boosters. And of course,
immunization efforts would be useless against vaccine-resistant
pathogens, such as those created by Soviet scientists working on anthrax
weapons. Furthermore, a determined bioterrorist could simply try a
succession of microbial weapons -- or use a cocktail at the outset --
defying even the best-organized vaccination programs.

The cost of a delayed response to an anthrax attack would be
staggering, explains CDC economist Martin Meltzer: in a model city of
100,000 people, the number of "deaths is 5,000 if you start [a
vaccination program] on day one [after the attack], versus 35,000 on day
six." Cities large and small, then, should start stockpiling
relevant antibiotics, vaccines, and general medical supplies.

But even if cities were well equipped for a bioterrorist attack, they
would still have a difficult time recognizing that such an attack had
occurred. Local authorities "probably aren't going to be able to
recognize it has happened ... until the incubation period is over,"
says Clark Staten, executive director of the Emergency Response and
Research Institute in Chicago. "And by then, you've got it spread
over a wide area. And it may take longer to recognize there's a pattern
going on."

Once an outbreak is recognized, an epidemiologist would be dispatched
to identify the cause. If the pathogen were fairly common, like
Clostridium botulinum (the bacterium that causes botulism, a fatal food
poisoning), local hospital laboratories could probably identify the
culprit first. But if the microbe were rare, like those that cause
anthrax, Q fever, Ebola, smallpox, or plague, local facilities would
probably be unable to diagnose the problem. With precious time passing,
people dying, and disease possibly spreading, local officials would then
await word from the diagnostic labs at the CDC. If the suspected
pathogen were highly deadly, like the smallpox virus, the analysis would
be handled in the CDC's Special Pathogens laboratory, which is normally
staffed by fewer than a dozen highly specialized scientists. And during
a crisis, it would be difficult to find qualified supplementary staff to
scale up operations. During the 1995 Ebola outbreak in Zaire, for
example, the lab was staffed by a mere six scientists WHO toiled around
the clock trying to identify the presence of the lethal virus in some
30,000 tissue, blood, plant, insect, and animal samples. In the case of
a bioterrorist attack, valuable time -- and lives -- might be lost
during such an arduous process.

In a large urban center, the true costs of a bioterrorist attack
might be the consequences of panic, such as a stock market collapse in
New York or a commodities market crash in Chicago. At a 1998 Senate
hearing on bioterrorism, then Minnesota State Epidemiologist Michael
Osterholm warned against underestimating the degree of panic such an
event would provoke:

[A] single case of meningitis in a local high school causes enough
fear and panic to bring down a whole community. ... Now imagine you're
telling people, "This is going to unfold for eight weeks, and I
can't tell you if you're going to die." And with every symptom ...
real or imagined, [people are] going to think, "I've got it! I'm
going to die!"

A TELLING SCENARIO

In February 1999, the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Defense
Studies enacted an elaborate bioterrorist scenario in Crystal City,
Virginia. The details played out over a tense eight-hour period in a
room packed with public health, military, and law enforcement personnel.
Under the scenario, the vice president of the United States makes a
speech at a prestigious university located in a fictional town dubbed
Northeast. It's April 1. Eleven days later, a 20-year-old student who
attended the vice president's speech shows up in the university
hospital's emergency room with flu-like symptoms: high fever, muscle
aches, fatigue, headache. She is sent home with aspirin and the old
maxim: get some rest and drink plenty of fluids.

Two days later, the young woman returns to the hospital, now fighting
for her life. And a janitor who cleaned up after the vice president's
speech turns up with the same symptoms. By six o'clock that night, April
13, the hospital's infectious disease expert gingerly voices an
outrageous conclusion: both patients have smallpox.

Since smallpox was officially eradicated in 1977, and remaining
samples of the virus exist only in Atlanta and Siberia under lock and
key, there can be but one conclusion: someone has stolen laboratory
samples of the virus and deliberately released them in a bioterrorist
attack aimed at the vice president of the United States.

Under this scenario, more than 15,000 people die of smallpox
worldwide within two months, and epidemics rage out of control in 14
nations. All global supplies of the smallpox vaccine are depleted, and
it will take years to manufacture enough to save humanity. The global
economy teeters on the brink of collapse as nations close their borders
and sink into isolation, barring all Americans from entering their
countries. In the city of Northeast, utter chaos reigns, and the
National Guard enforces martial law over the city's two million
residents. Similarly, government authority either breaks down or reverts
to military-style control in cities all over the world as smallpox
claims lives and pits terrified citizens against one another. Meanwhile,
back in Northeast, a top smallpox expert scribbles projections on the
back of an envelope and gently slides it in front of the state governor:
within 12 months 80 million people worldwide will be dead.

"We blew it," declared California's top public health
scientist, Michael Ascher, commenting on the fictional scenario.
"It clearly got out of control. Whatever planning we had ... didn't
work. I think this is the harsh reality [of] what would happen."

BUDDING BIOTERRORISTS

Although most people remain ignorant of the issues raised in that
scenario, handfuls of Internet-hooked extremists, right-wing militia
members, psychologically imbalanced belligerents, and postmodern
fascists are well versed in the fine points of bioterrorism. Recipes for
producing botulinum and anthrax are posted on the Web. Books describing
biological-warfare assassination techniques are readily available. Some
private militia groups train to use biological weapons.

Indeed, law enforcement leaders claim that religious cults and
militant political groups are likely to engage in biological terrorism.
After all, they argue, the first bioterrorist attack in America was
carried out by members of an Oregon-based religious cult led by Bagwan
Shree Rajneesh. The cult members, hoping to disrupt an upcoming county
election, contaminated local salad bars with salmonella, infecting
hundreds of Oregonians.

Perhaps it is the tone of some militants' rhetoric that sparks the
most concern. In The Poisoner's Handbook, for example, Maxwell
Hutchkinson suggests that readers poison or kill Internal Revenue
Service workers by filling out phony tax-return forms and lacing them
with a mixture of ricin (a poisonous protein) and dimethylsulfoxide (DMSO)
-- a concoction Hutchkinson claims is 100 percent lethal. "The
purpose of all this is to disrupt the operations" of the IRS,
Hutchkinson writes. "If done on a large enough scale, it would
serve two purposes -- it would make it more difficult for the IRS to
operate efficiently, thus helping tax cheats and tax protesters. It
might also awaken the politicians to the depth of resentment felt by the
taxpaying public."

Fortunately, Hutchkinson is a lousy chemist: only simple chemicals --
not proteins such as ricin -- can dissolve in DMSO. But the depth of
Hutchkinson's antagonism is unmistakable: he suggests that readers kill
Catholics by soaking their rosary beads in Phytotoxin abrin, a toxin
derived from a rare bean; he writes that botulinum is "fun and easy
to make"; and he urges survivalists around the world to hone their
skills, readying themselves for biological warfare in the coming
Armageddon.

RAISING THE BAR

In response to such threats, Congress has passed a number of laws
aimed at making it harder for anyone -- domestic or foreign -- to attack
America with biological weapons. In 1989, Congress passed the Biological
Weapons Act, outlawing the possession, trade, sale, or manufacture of a
biological substance "for use as a weapon." In 1991, it
enacted an embargo, soon enforced against Iraq, barring U.S. companies
from trading with countries believed to be developing biological
weapons. After the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed the
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996, allowing federal authorities to arrest
anyone WHO even "threatens" to develop or use biological
weapons. And the following year, by order of Congress, the CDC named 24
infectious organisms and 12 toxins as "restricted agents," the
use or possession of which requires a federal permit. Although these
measures now provide legal instruments for federal law enforcement
officials, it is impossible to judge how effectively they have, or have
not, deterred biological terrorism.

The Clinton administration hoped to stave off the worst threats by
training the National Guard and local hazardous-material defense teams
to rapidly respond to bioterrorist attacks. But the teams, comprising
elite local police squads and fire department personnel, handled
chemical and biological threats as if they were roughly synonymous -- a
fatal mistake, according to biologists. Having been trained in classical
techniques for limiting the spread of lethal chemicals, the defense
teams assumed that a visible source of contamination could be
identified, that exposed individuals could be isolated, and that a toxin
could be swiftly cleared out of the environment with water or
neutralizing chemicals. None of these assumptions holds true for lethal
microbes, biologists argue, because their long incubation periods in
potentially contagious human beings render it nearly impossible to
identify and contain a source. Furthermore, "washing" an area
contaminated with pathogens might only spread them.

Congress has sought technological solutions as well, allocating money
for Department of Defense (DOD) research on devices that might sniff out
bugs and sanitize contaminated areas. First in line was the Navy's
TagMan, a sophisticated gene scanner that could, in less than half an
hour, determine whether a liquid sample contained any of several known
pathogens. But the system had significant limitations: weighing 300
pounds, it was hardly portable. And it could not detect pathogens of
high "biohazard levels" -- precisely the most worrisome
microbes. Most significant, the device could not analyze air samples.

In 1998, Congress also gave the DOD's Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) $2 billion to sponsor wild and crazy science
projects -- ideas so far-out that standard civilian funding sources
would not consider them. These projects included $61.6 million of
bioweapons defense efforts, the foremost of which was the development of
a fast, cheap, safe, and portable way to sample air for the presence of
nasty pathogens. Most of the research focused on unique genetic
attributes of bacteria and viruses.

One project involved trying to grow human nerve cells on microscopic
chips that would change color or light up if they detected a neurotoxin,
such as botulinum. Several laboratories -- notably the Argonne National
Laboratory in Chicago -- tried to develop chips lined with thousands of
pieces of bacterial DNA to serve as probes. Argonne's goal was to build
a bacteria detector small enough to be handheld, akin to a police radar
gun. But research director Eli Huberman said such a device "is
years away from mass production or for widespread use."
Furthermore, neither Argonne nor any other research group envisioned
sampling the air for viruses. Even DARPA's wild thinkers could not
imagine how that could be done.

Even the simplest technological defense against biological weapons
has proven to be too much for DOD contractors. In the spring of 2000,
DOD officials revealed that the protective suits U.S. troops had relied
on during the Persian Gulf War (and that still form the basis of
soldiers' defense against deadly microbes) were defective. At least five
percent of the 900,000 suits the DOD had purchased during the 1990s were
useless, and the reliability of the entire inventory was suspect.

It seems unlikely, then, that a technological quick fix will soon be
found. The three immediate American responses to bioterrorism --
military defense, hazardous-material defense teams, and high-technology
sensors -- appear to be seriously flawed.

WHO'S IN CHARGE?

Consider this hypothetical scenario: the Red Army terrorist group
successfully releases drug-resistant anthrax spores in the Bourse
station of the Paris Metro at 8:00 am on a warm Wednesday in June. What
would be the role of the French military, Surete (the French
intelligence service), the Paris police, or any number of high-tech
sensory devices? None.

The most important responders would not be the military or law
enforcement officials. They would be the doctors, epidemiologists,
ambulance drivers, nurses, and bureaucrats of the Paris public health
system. It is they who would note -- days after the actual attack --
that large numbers of Parisians appeared to be ill, suffering similar
symptoms. With further questioning they would perhaps realize that all
the ailing individuals routinely took the same Metro train or stopped at
the same station. Whether or not anyone would ever discover that
terrorists had sprayed a lethal biological mist in the Bourse Metro
station, it would be the public health workers who would track down and
treat the patients, dispense appropriate drugs, determine whether the
outbreak was spreading from the Bourse source, and analyze the
microorganism for any special attributes.

Yet military-like responses have dominated Western government
thinking, sparking recent outcries among defenders of civil liberties.
During role-playing episodes in 1998-99, the DOD claimed the right to
seize command during a bioterrorist attack -- a constitutionally shaky
move. And on February 1, 1999, Defense Secretary William Cohen announced
the creation of a special command within the DOD designed to coordinate
responses to domestic bioterrorist attacks. Cohen's plans echoed the
popular 1995 movie Outbreak, in which the U.S. Army declared martial law
and took full control of an American city to limit the spread of an
airborne form of the Ebola virus. Civil-liberties advocates responded to
Cohen's announcement with indignation: Such a clear violation of the
Constitution might be OK for Hollywood, they cried, but not for the real
world.

President Clinton had tried to obviate such worries in his January
22, 1998, speech to the National Academy of Sciences. "We will be
aggressive," he said, referring to his administration's response to
the bioterrorist threat. "At the same time ... we will remain
committed to uphold privacy rights and other constitutional protections,
as well as the proprietary rights of American businesses. It is
essential that we do not undermine liberty in the name of liberty."
That day Clinton requested congressional approval of a $10 billion
antiterrorism program, including $86 million for improving public health
surveillance, $43 million for research on vaccines for anthrax,
smallpox, and other potential bioweapons agents, and $300 million for
stockpiles of essential drugs and vaccines. The proposed expenditures
doubled the previous year's bioterrorism budget.

The job of building the nation's drug and vaccine warehouse fell to
Margaret Hamburg, assistant secretary for the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services. She had to race to catch up with the DOD and the
FBI. Public health was a late entrant to the bioterrorism field, she
said, and significant dangers lurked in the developing antiterrorist
infrastructure. Beyond the civil liberties issues that had already been
voiced, Hamburg warned, "we don't want public health to be
identified with the CIA and FBI activities. ... We in public health need
to have public trust and confidence."

Already, local public health departments were having a hard time
responding to fake bioterrorist attacks. Claiming to have dropped off or
shipped an anthrax-containing device suddenly became chic at the turn of
the millennium. Terrorism expert Jessica Stern counted 47 such hoaxes in
the United States since 1992. In all 47 cases, local fire and police
authorities reacted seriously, decontaminating thousands of people and
appearing on the scenes dressed in full-body protection suits. And
Stern's list was by no means comprehensive.

Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig warned that panic, in and of
itself, is becoming the new terrorist tool. "Only through a new
union of our public health, police, and military resources," he
said, "can we hope to deal with this dangerous threat." But
Hamburg worried that the police and FBI responses actually encourage
such false alarms. It seems that bioterrorist hoaxes attract the type of
individuals WHO enjoy watching fire departments douse buildings they
have set afire. "When an envelope comes in saying 'This is
anthrax,' we don't need the fire department in full protective gear on
site," Hamburg insists. "What we need is to discreetly move
the envelope to a public health laboratory for proper analysis. Mass
decontamination and quarantine only [add] fuel to the fire of the hoax
perpetrators, and it's totally unnecessary in terms of public
health."

DIFFERENT DRUMMERS

It is obvious that public health, law enforcement, and defense
officials have very different priorities in the event of a bioterrorist
attack. For public health workers, the paramount concerns are limiting
the spread of infection, identifying the cause of the disease, and if
possible, treating and vaccinating the public. Law enforcement agents,
however, are in the business of stopping and solving crimes -- and the
scene of any bioterrorist incident is, first and foremost, a source of
evidence. Managing a response to an outbreak thus poses a conflict of
interest, since the police and the FBI would, by mandate, focus on
detaining witnesses and obtaining evidence, even if those efforts ran
counter to public health needs.

Even within the military itself, priorities blur when it comes to
bioterrorism. The DOD's primary mission is to protect the United States
against military foes. A secondary concern is to defend the health of
American troops. How those priorities square with intervening -- and
indeed, commanding -- responses to domestic bioterrorist attacks is not
at all clear.

What is even less clear is how a public health system can respond to
bioterrorism without destroying the basis of its credibility. When a
public health system needs to intrude on individuals' lives to protect
the larger community, it does so in limited ways and usually under the
hard-and-fast promise of confidentiality. During an epidemic, for
example, individuals may be asked to submit to blood tests and medical
exams, and their medical charts may be scrutinized -- but all under the
promise of confidentiality. In the long term, a public health system
protects the community by monitoring disease trends, which requires
tracking who has which diseases. Again, this information is generally
stored under confidential or anonymous terms. On a global level, the WHO
and a variety of other groups keep count of nations' diseases,
monitoring for the emergence of new epidemics. After the 1995 Ebola
outbreak in Zaire, for example, the WHO sought to create a more rigorous
surveillance system and pushed countries to be more open about epidemics
in their populations.

All of these functions, in all tiers of public health systems,
require the maintenance of a crucial social contract: the individual or
country agrees to openly disclose information for the sake of the larger
community's health. In return, public health authorities promise never
to abuse this trust, maintaining discretion and protecting patient
privacy.

But the fear of bioterrorism threatens to destroy that vital social
contract, which is not shared by law enforcement and defense officials.
The closer a public health system draws to the other two systems, the
greater the danger that it will lose credibility in the eyes of the
public. Indeed, suspicions already run high in many American minority
communities, prompting widespread belief that such microbes as the aids
virus were created by the U.S. Public Health Service, the National
Institutes of Health, or the CIA with the intention of obliterating key
minority populations.

Some public health advocates are convinced that no marriage between
their profession and law enforcement could ever work and have denounced
all efforts to heighten concerns about bioterrorism. One prestigious
group argues that "bioterrorist initiative programs are strongly
reminiscent of the civil defense programs promoted by the U.S.
government during the Cold War ... [that fostered] the delusion that
nuclear war was survivable."

For many older public health leaders, the bioterrorism scare evokes
nasty memories of Cold War cover-ups and censorship. By adopting the
bioterrorism issue, they warn, public health officials are buying into a
similar framework of paranoid thinking. Indeed, in 1999, biologists
working in national laboratories found, for the first time, their work
facing censorship in the wake of allegations of Chinese espionage at the
Los Alamos National Laboratory. The Department of Energy (DOE), which
oversees the national labs, clamped down so hard in 1999 that the
National Academy of Sciences warned that the future of U.S. scientific
enterprise could be imperiled. Although the DOE's primary concern was
computer and nuclear secrecy, the threat of bioterrorism prompted the
agency to broaden its new security restrictions to embrace basic biology
research as well.

Many advocates argue that the public health system's role in the
fight against bioterrorism can be comfortable only if it is an equal
partner of the law enforcement and defense communities. One of the
loudest voices speaking on behalf of public health in this regard is
Michael Osterholm. In his new book, Living Terrors, Osterholm argues
that "the overuse of the term 'weapons of mass destruction' (WMD)
has done a great deal to stunt the necessary attention to the looming
threat of biological terrorism." The WMD terminology places defense
against bioterrorism in the hands of the military and the police,
Osterholm insists. And that means, he says, "our priorities are
really screwed up."

Osterholm's proposed solutions go to the heart of a larger public
health agenda: to enhance the readiness and capacities of local, state,
and federal health departments for responding to both natural and
deliberately created epidemics. After all, Osterholm argues, it is
impossible to tell at its outset whether an epidemic is a natural or
ghoulishly unnatural event.

The new administration must work out these tensions among public
health, law enforcement, and military authorities. The Clinton
administration offered a broader definition of national security,
bringing emerging infectious diseases and the aids pandemic under the
security umbrella. That allowed agencies more traditionally concerned
with terrorism, such as the National Security Council, the CIA, and the
FBI, into the public health arena. A new administration may seek to
redefine national security in more classic nation-state terms, or to
sharpen the public health focus on diseases that directly affect
terrorism and warfare. The future balance of authority and influence in
the fight against bioterrorism will undoubtedly hinge on a new
administration's larger view of national security.

Public health's role in the bioterrorism issue will also be better
defined when its leaders come up with a clear consensus on what exactly
they want. The issue is so new to most public health officials and
raises so many uncomfortable questions that the profession is currently
unable to speak with a clear, united voice. In contrast, the law
enforcement and military communities appear comparatively determined and
direct in their views of the bioterrorism threat and their desired
responses to it.

In a historic speech in Atlanta during the winter of 1998, D. A.
Henderson, head of Johns Hopkins University's Working Group on Civilian
Biodefense, beckoned public health officials to jump on board a train
already in motion, conducted by the law enforcement and defense
communities. Less than a year later, public health had boarded the
train, but only as a passenger. The train was fueled by an $8.4 billion
budget in fiscal year 2000, yet public health was allotted a mere 3.7
percent of those funds, according to a recent study by the Stimson
Center in Washington, D.C. With such comparatively paltry funding, it is
no wonder that public health found itself sitting at the back of the
train, watching the scenery race by as other government players steered
the locomotive's course. Unless this changes, the train is going to
crash.

Laurie Garrett is a Pulitzer Prize-winning science and medical writer
for Newsday. This article is adapted from her new book, Betrayal of
Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health. Copyright (c) 2000 by
Laurie Garrett. Published by Hyperion.