I agree Hornetfinn, from what I know about radars (which is not much) the main advantages of AESA against PESA are:

-LPI, since each TRM is able to generate its own beam using its own unique frequency. a PESA system on the other hand can only use a single beam of radio waves at a single frequency at a time. So to me, a PESA system's LPI capabilities will be far less effective than an AESA. Is that basically correct or is there more to it.

-AESA systems should also have a higher jamming resistance. If DRFM based jammers can replicate the frequency of the radar and re-transmit that, it will be much harder to do against an AESA system using different beams each with a changing frequency than a PESA system using 1 beam.

The S-400 40N6 missile has shot down a target at 200+ miles, OTH, with CEC from a forward targeting source.

What altitude was the target?

From SOC (who also happens to be an analyst at Janes):"From my S-300P article:

"Fakel MKB engineers began work on dealing with the issue of a 400 kilometer ranged missile immediately upon the initiation of S-400 development. Boris Bunkin and Petr Grushin analyzed the characteristics of the 48N6 series missiles and realized that there was still potential in the missile for increased range. The missiles of the S-300P series weapons initially fly a near-ballistic profile towards their target. Increasing the altitude at apogee of the trajectory results in an increase in range. In-service weapons had their apogee restricted to 38 kilometers. This was due to the fact that at a higher altitude the aerodynamic control surfaces would no longer function effectively. Thrust vectoring control used during the boost stage was no longer viable either as the motor had already burnt out prior to reaching apogee. It was discovered that operating the control surfaces at higher altitudes resulted in an instability in the flight path, potentially impacting the accuracy of the weapon. Bunkin and Grushin's solution to increase the range of the missile system was to modify the control surfaces to allow them to lock during the near-ballistic portion of the trajectory. This would eliminate any unwanted movement, with the control surfaces unlocking upon reaching lower altitude to provide maneuverability during endgame. The new missile was tested in 1985 and reached an apogee of 70 kilometers. The significant increase in altitude enabled the missile to fly out to a range of 400 kilometers. Upon descending to 20 kilometers, the missile's guidance system was recaptured by an experimental engagement radar complex and guided normally, validating the concept of a 400 kilometer missile for the S-400.

After the 400 kilometer test firing, Almaz MKB set about redesigning the experimental engagement radar components to allow the system to be employed on a mobile chassis. The S-400 design was approved in 1988. Events surrounding the breakup of the Soviet Union would affect production of system components, so testing of the S-400 did not commence until 1993. By this time testing of strategic-level SAM systems had been relocated to Kapustin Yar in southwestern Russia as Sary Shagan now resided in the independent nation of Kazakhstan. System testing initially commenced with the existing 48N6D missile, with testing of the new 48N6DM designed for the S-400 being reported in 2004. The first S-400 battallion entered operational service near the town of Elektrostal in the Moscow region on 6 August 2007.

...skip down a bit...

The long-range weapon designed to give the S-400 its 400 kilometer engagement range is believed to be designated 40N6. As mentioned previously, the 48N6 has proved capable of operating effectively at this range, so 40N6 may in fact be a cover designation for an appropriately modified 400 kilometer ranged 48N6 series weapon destined for the S-400. Alternatively, it may be a wholly different missile designed for a different weapon system, such as the forthcoming S-500 strategic defense system. Ergo, despite rumors persisting of the continued development of what is referred to as the 40N6, it may well be that the S-400 is already capable of engaging targets at maximum range using the existing 48N6DM. This is reinforced by the fact that some sources claim that a 400 kilometer range missile has been in service with air defense units around Moscow since 2001. Were this to be the case, the 400 kilometer missile would almost certainly have to be a variant of the 48N6, as the only air defense units capable of operating such a system around Moscow would have been the various S-300PM batteries. This would also likely imply that off-board targeting of the missile for extreme-range engagements is possible, perhaps using the 64N6 battle management radar system. Endgame intercept without the standard SAGG guidance mode provided by the engagement radar would likely be performed using active radar homing were this to be the case. Active radar homing is another feature commonly attributed to the 40N6 missile, further reinforcing the fact that the missile may be the 48N6DM or another unknown variant. With active radar homing missiles could theoretically be fired using off-board targeting data, allowing them to engage targets outside the range of the engagement radar as SAGG guidance commands would not be required. It may even be possible that new-build 48N6 series weapons came with Bunkin and Grushin's locking control surfaces, allowing them to be operated at extreme range. Until Russia releases information regarding the 400 kilometer missile system employed by the S-400, the missile providing this capability will have to remain an enigma."

zero-one wrote:I agree Hornetfinn, from what I know about radars (which is not much) the main advantages of AESA against PESA are:

-LPI, since each TRM is able to generate its own beam using its own unique frequency. a PESA system on the other hand can only use a single beam of radio waves at a single frequency at a time. So to me, a PESA system's LPI capabilities will be far less effective than an AESA. Is that basically correct or is there more to it.

-AESA systems should also have a higher jamming resistance. If DRFM based jammers can replicate the frequency of the radar and re-transmit that, it will be much harder to do against an AESA system using different beams each with a changing frequency than a PESA system using 1 beam.

For LPI AESA does have many advantages versus PESA.

- Wider operating bandwidth. With GaAs TRMs this can be 5-10 times wider than with PESA. With GaN TRMs, the difference can be even wider. This means that the frequency hopping and spread spectrum techniques can be done over much wider bandwidth.

- Quicker frequency change. PESA uses TWTs in fighter radars and they take longer time to change frequencies. TRMs can switch frequencies much faster.

- Much lower sidelobe levels making it much harder to detect the radar from the sidelobes.

- Higher duty cycles meaning lower peak power levels which make it more difficult to detect the signals

- Higher sensitivity which means that significantly lower power levels achieve similar performance making it more difficult to detect the radar signals.

- Ability to form many beams simultaneously and have different kinds of beams for different purposes.

There are others as well, but they are not as important. Cmbination of these make AESA much better when it comes to LPI than either PESA or MSA radars. These same things also make it much more difficult to jam the AESA.

euromaster wrote:No the Aegis network is mostly built into the legacy Burke class destroyers which make up the most of the US fleet defense operation. Burke has a low to its hull, fairly old radar that struggles with skimming missiles with detection only in hundreds of meters.

Arleigh Burke class (Flight III) are equipped with the AN/SPY-6 AMDR (AESA)which can be used for detection, Tracking, illumination of targets and jamming.

Now because Aegis equipped units can share information seamlessly, Flight III ships can guide weapons launched from Flight I ships or even from the Carrier itself.

This is actually why I consider the Aegis system to be so superior as a SAM system to the S-400. I'm not entirely sure if the S-400 can share targeting data to the the extent that the Aegis can and if it is as effective against the wide variety of targets the Aegis can engage. aircraft, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, ships and even satellites can be killed by the AEGIS system, the S-400 can't effectively engage half of those.

"This is actually why I consider the Aegis system to be so superior as a SAM system to the S-400. I'm not entirely sure if the S-400 can share targeting data to the the extent that the Aegis can and if it is as effective against the wide variety of targets the Aegis can engage. aircraft, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, ships and even satellites can be killed by the AEGIS system, the S-400 can't effectively engage half of those.

Got a few points. SAM systems can be slaved to the S-400. Polyana-D4m1 a control station is able to monitor 500 targets and track 255. So for example if a system is tracking 100 and a pantsir system is tracking 8 low altitude targets that this system cannot track for being below the radar horizon all the information is sent to the control station which sees 108 targets instead than decides what launchers to use against the targets. Does this count as sharing data?

S-400 is said to engage same based targets, although there is no confirmed tests of 40n6 hitting satellites. I am wondering where you got your sources or data that the s-400 cannot do half of AEGIS? I hope your not supposedly using data based off of Syria where attacks happen in Damascus which is very far away from where Latakia is in Syria and if they planned on using the systems to begin with?

"This is actually why I consider the Aegis system to be so superior as a SAM system to the S-400. I'm not entirely sure if the S-400 can share targeting data to the the extent that the Aegis can and if it is as effective against the wide variety of targets the Aegis can engage. aircraft, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, ships and even satellites can be killed by the AEGIS system, the S-400 can't effectively engage half of those.

Got a few points. SAM systems can be slaved to the S-400. Polyana-D4m1 a control station is able to monitor 500 targets and track 255. So for example if a system is tracking 100 and a pantsir system is tracking 8 low altitude targets that this system cannot track for being below the radar horizon all the information is sent to the control station which sees 108 targets instead than decides what launchers to use against the targets. Does this count as sharing data?

S-400 is said to engage same based targets, although there is no confirmed tests of 40n6 hitting satellites. I am wondering where you got your sources or data that the s-400 cannot do half of AEGIS? I hope your not supposedly using data based off of Syria where attacks happen in Damascus which is very far away from where Latakia is in Syria and if they planned on using the systems to begin with?

The systems are designed to engage hard targets such as nuclear warheads, rather than satellites.The new 40N6 missile guarantees a direct hit on a target at a range of 400 kilometers and at heights of up to 185 kilometers – effectively near space. This missile’s specialization is not soft targets like low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites with easily intercepted predetermined orbits.The 40N6 missile is capable of exo-atmospheric interception of IRBM (intermediate-range ballistic missile) warheads in their terminal phase, leave alone any aircraft target within the missile range perimeter.

fidgetspinner wrote:S-400 is said to engage same based targets, although there is no confirmed tests of 40n6 hitting satellites. I am wondering where you got your sources or data that the s-400 cannot do half of AEGIS? I hope your not supposedly using data based off of Syria where attacks happen in Damascus which is very far away from where Latakia is in Syria and if they planned on using the systems to begin with?

Thank you for the added info. Well from what we know, the Aegis system is designed to engage-Satellites-Ballistic missiles-Aircraft-Cruise missiles-Surface vessels

Is the hull mounted and towed Sonar array integrated to the Aegis combat system? We can probably add submarines

The S-400 on the other hand is claimed to engage only-Aircraft -cruise missiles

Perhaps ballistic missiles in terminal or boost phase.

So the Aegis is designed to engage 5 kinds of targets, maybe 6 while the S-400 is designed to engage only 2 types, maybe 3. This is what I mean by it cannot engage half the targets Aegis can.

"The Triumf extended range air defense system has been designed to engage a wide spectrum of airborne threats at ranges of up to 250 kilometers including electronic warfare (EW) aircraft, strategic bombers, tactical fighter aircraft, strike aircraft, cruise missiles, airborne early warning aircraft such as NATO's E-3 Sentry, tactical ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and other hypersonic threats projected by at least 2030. To do so, it relies on the 48N6E2 missile introduced with the S-300PMU2 SAM system and the newest 48N6E3 missile featuring a range of 250 kilometers and enhanced capability against IRBM missiles. In its anti-ballistic missile (ABM) role, the 48N6E3 missile can engage ballistic missiles with a maximum range of 3,500 km flying at 4,800 meters per second at distances between 7 to 60 kilometers."

The only thing the system can't do is to be used to attack another surface target for example the SM-6 can attack another ship but the Navy does not prefer to use the missile that way because of its expense. Arrow-3 is said to engage satellites but its altitude seems no different from the 40n6 except that the 40n6 can only climb up to 185kms and the arrow 3 is said to go over 100kms.

The Russians do not even have a naval version of the S-400 let alone the s-500 naval version. The an/spy-6 is 100 times more sensitive with GaN AESA than its previous counterpart which I am sure would be fielded way before a s-500 based vessel comes out. To be honest I cannot see them catching up to us at all in terms naval missile defense. I do not even think they have intercepted any SRBMs, MRBMs or IRBMs from any of their ships while they have yet to make an s-400 based vessel to do so.

hornetfinn wrote: ... I think against modern fighters (and cruise missiles) smaller, lower cost/more numerous, geographically widely separated and more unpredictable systems are more dangerous. Systems like Snyder, IRIS-T SLM/SLS or NASAMS can be pretty nasty as they are all pretty capable systems with quick reaction times and more difficult to find and destroy. Of course they don't have similar range/altitude capability as larger systems. So they are kind of mine field type of systems which require enemy to come pretty close to be effective.

I doubt this approach will work out so well tactically or practically HF, nor be quite so dangerous to an attacking air force.

(1) Such distributed systems are not cheap to field and unlikely to be acquired in high enough numbers by most countries to operate them effectively in that way.

(2) The most useful and immediate role for them would be as an outer point-defense layer to preserve high-value targets from massed strikes early in a conflict (else you've already lost). This would be the most pressing as well effective way to employ them, for a considerable period into the conflict and to better preserve the overall armed force's capabilities.

(3) Translating into not too many such systems being available to create much of a SAM 'mine-field', of random and mobile pop-ups. Such a SAM menace is going to be more effective against helicopters and low to mid-altitude drones (rather than fast jets at Mach 0.9 @ FL400 or higher with copious standoff weapons. The fast-jet approach path and standoff weapon use is virtually unconstrained by geography (no or little need to radar-mask at low altitudes).

4) Logistical support for these distributed SAMs is going to immediately come under stress as well as attacked early and often at the source. So systems deployed closer in to a high-value target will be far easier to support.

5) Such SAMs are likely to be effective only against a 4th-gen air force which can't easily break the kill chain.

6) Rising missile point-of-origins, from DAS and any "YATO" indication will much more easy deal with than previous, and also to discover and target launchers fast, which can be almost immediately attacked by a 5th-gen ubiquitous HOBS-LOAL multi-role fire-and-forget missiles with automated D/L support and autonomous-homing and classifying glide-weapons.

So distributed hunters quickly become the hunted and the aerial 'minefield' will be cleared away.

Combine that with SAR surveillance and EOTS ID target prioritizing and a SAM system shooting 'n scooting shouldn't last long. Thus a mutually supporting point-defense layers may be the best use of low to mid-range SAM systems (especially if they're supported by F-35 data within an allied context).

euromaster wrote:No the Aegis network is mostly built into the legacy Burke class destroyers which make up the most of the US fleet defense operation. Burke has a low to its hull, fairly old radar that struggles with skimming missiles with detection only in hundreds of meters.

No, not even close. These are integrated systems-of-systems not some old stove-piped cold-war era Soviet cruiser.

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Vampir NGVampir NG is a very long-range infrared search/track system. It provides naval ships with passive panoramic surveillance functions including automatic detection, tracking and reporting of symmetric or asymmetric threats, from sea-skimming anti-ship missiles to Fast Incoming Attack Craft. Vampir NG offers two operational modes: "ocean" mode allows very large range search at high sea while "littoral" mode allows long-range and large elevation search along the coast. The false alarm rate is very low, even in the littoral environment. It is the most sensitive system on the market as well as the first one using the ultra-rapid "step-and-stare" principle enabling 360° coverage with a single high-performance IR camera. With unsurpassed performance and reliability, VAMPIR NG is the best selling naval IRST worldwide.