Given the advertisement surrounding the use of MOAB, it is possible that the Trump administration is signalling to its adversaries the very lethal weapons in its arsenal and its willingness to use them.

Time and again, civilian masses the world over have been at the receiving end of legions of conventional weapons systems leaving destructive direct and indirect consequences in their wake. The copious arms -and their ammunition- currently in circulation range from assault rifles, rocket launchers, anti-aircraft weapons to pistols, machine guns as well as missiles, grenades and other explosive ordnances.

If we have no qualms about importing from other countries why cannot we buy ammunition from our own private sector companies? While restrictions could apply to production of small arms and ammunition, for large calibre arms and ammunition there is a case for permitting the private sector companies to chip in.

Vivek Chadha replies: It is a well established fact that the transfer and smuggling of arms does take place across India’s borders. This is especially an acute problem in the case of Northeast India. The challenge is accentuated because of porous borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar. It is also difficult to stop such activities due to limited control over the border areas of these countries. In some cases, there is also collusion between state and non-state agencies to smuggle arms. These arms come from weapon markets in Cambodia, Laos and are often sourced from China.

There are two major factors which lead to the smuggling of arms. First, it takes place as a result of terrorist groups and smugglers active in the border areas exploiting it as an illegal trade to make money. Given the high profit nature of this kind of trade, the incentive to undertake gun running remains high. This is furthered because of the need for such military hardware by terrorist groups like CPI (Maoist) in the hinterland, which may not have access to sophisticated weapons, with the exception of those captured from security forces. Second, weapons smuggling is done as part of a state sponsored strategy to destabilise India.

In both these cases, the measures required to be put in place to prevent this activity are similar. First, cooperation with countries which are not directly involved in gun running should be strengthened by way of intelligence sharing and mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties. Second, fencing along borders should be completed urgently to limit free movement. Third, there is a need to enhance the employment of electronic means for surveillance along the borders. Fourth, both the strength and capacity of border guarding forces should be enhanced to ensure that they are better equipped to stop gun running. Fifth, intelligence along border areas needs to improve. This can best be accomplished by coordination between intelligence, border guarding forces, local police and the people in the area. Sixth, stringent laws should be employed to ensure conviction through newly amended acts like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 2012, which can book offenders under counter terrorism offences. Last, since the nature of this crime is international in its scope, there is a need to highlight it and build pressure upon countries in the diplomatic fora to curb the existing trend.

Military planners believe that the ‘blast and fragmentation’ type conventional weapons cannot advance much further technologically.The next chapter in weapons technology development is expected to be realized from Directed Energy weapons (DEWs). It can be assumed that by 2035, DEWs consisting of laser, microwave and millimeter waves can reach current performance levels of the existing kinetic energy weapons(KEWs) and conventional weapons. While these will co-exist with KEWs,a non-DEW option would have a debilitating effect on the defence preparedness of any nation.

The United States dominates global defence markets, but the nature of this dominance is shifting. Strategic and budgetary considerations—the latter being constantly restructured by the rising relative cost of defence labour—drive US defence production towards international collaboration. In this essay, I examine the politics of a high-calibre international collaborative programme that has made headlines in recent years: the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). What motivated the US government to take on partners, and what influence, if any, have the partners had on the programme so far?

Though public-private partnerships is encouraged, privately the government continues to retain its monopoly on research and development and defence production through the DRDO, the ordnance factories and the defence PSUs.

This paper discusses such delivery mechanisms commonly known together as nuclear triad in the Indian context. The paper has four major parts. The first part attempts to set the context for the overall discussion. The second, third and fourth parts deals with the evaluation about missile forces, aerial platforms and submarine based platforms for nuclear weapon delivery on the targets.