Against the odds of history

Against the odds of history

Maya Tudor

Maya Tudor, a University Lecturer in Government and Public Policy at
the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University, is the author of
‘The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy
in Pakistan’.

The surprising landslide of Nawaz Sharif marks a historic moment in
Pakistan’s political history. Many are optimistic that Pakistan has
taken a momentous step towards strengthening its democracy. But for this
opening to endure, Pakistan must overcome the long odds of history.

To be sure, there are reasons to hope that last month’s election
marks a turning point in Pakistani politics. High voter turnout and fair
elections produced an unambiguous mandate for a single party that can
govern with less backroom wrangling than previous civilian
administrations. Moreover, despite Taliban-directed violence, the
elections evinced democratic engagement among Pakistan’s youth, which
constitutes two-thirds of the country’s population.

For democracy to consolidate, though, this engagement must be
channelled into strategically side-lining the military and the tough,
slow work of building of political parties that have organisational
depth and programmatic commitments beyond their charismatic leaders.
This challenge is hardly new for Pakistan — it is eerily similar to the
situation Pakistan faced upon Independence in 1947. That year, Pakistan
and India were created amidst nationalist fervour, under the leadership
of charismatic leaders, possessing militaries confined to the barracks
and nationalist political parties that had governed in pre-independence
colonial provinces.

Despite these similarities, India and Pakistan’s first independent
decade witnessed a startling democratic divergence. India promulgated a
representative Constitution, held fair national elections, and installed
an accountable chief executive, while Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly
was twice dismissed and a military coup formally arrogated governing
power in 1958. Six decades and three military coups since, no civilian
government in Pakistan was allowed to finish a term in office — until
last month.

What catapulted Pakistan onto such a dramatically different
trajectory? And what lessons can one draw from this divergence for the
democratic crossroads at which Pakistan currently stands? My research
shows that the most critical explanation for these different democratic
trajectories lies in the organisational capacities of their nationalist
political parties. This organisational capacity continues to condition
Pakistan’s ongoing political instability today.

Upon Independence, though Pakistan inherited a more pressing economic
situation and a larger refugee crisis, it was the inability of
Pakistan’s nationalist party to broker governing compromises between its
core supporters that directly led the military to aggrandise executive
power. In India, by contrast, it was the presence of an integrated,
relatively disciplined political party able to discipline regional
leaders that established civilian control over the military.

The early trend of autocratic instability has continued to
characterise Pakistan for different reasons. First and foremost, the
Pakistani security establishment has become deeply vested in the
perpetuation of a status quo in which India allegedly poses an
existential threat. In addition, US patronage of Pakistan’s security
establishment for Cold War and anti-terrorist considerations has served
to strengthen the military’s bargaining power vis-à-vis other domestic
actors.

Seen from a long-term perspective then, democratic consolidation in
Pakistan is up against two fundamental challenges. Perhaps the most
critical challenge will be preventing another military coup. This will
involve changing the self-image of the military as the competent
guardian of national interests. Improving Indo-Pakistan relations will
be a key element of accomplishing that goal because the perception of an
existential threat from India has long been the narrative raison d’etre
for military assumption of executive power.

Thus, Sharif should move as quickly as he can to normalise relations
with India — accepting the Line of Control in Kashmir as the effective
international border and boosting trade links with India — because these
policies will be least difficult to implement on the immediate tail of a
widely legitimate democratic election. Such steps will surely
antagonise elements within the military. But Sharif should use his
political capital while he still has it. Minimising the military’s
political prerogative is fraught with danger. It is for this reason that
Sharif should adopt an attitude of clemency towards Musharraf. If his
overarching priority is keeping the military in the barracks, then
unnecessarily antagonising the former military chief is unhelpful.

Helpfully, there are reasons to believe it is an auspicious moment
for confining the Pakistani military to its barracks. It is increasingly
difficult to silence unfavourable news stories, with the loss of state
control over the media and the spread of mobile information technology.
Pakistan’s increasingly assertive Supreme Court, which Musharraf
unsuccessfully attempted to shut down in 2007, is generally a
pro-democratic force that has emerged strengthened from its stand-offs
with the Musharraf and Zardari governments. And the development of
extensive economic interests within the military means it may be more
open to the growth-promoting normalisation of Indo-Pakistan relations.

The second long-term challenge will be to embark upon the
strengthening of the PML-N and other political parties such that they
outlive their leader’s tenure. Building organisationally robust parties
that outlive charismatic leadership is no easy task. It requires
sustained deliberation, engagement, and above all, organised popular
pressure from below. A vibrant democratic process is unthinkable without
organisations that support and broker compromises between core social
groups. Political parties are often corrupt and patronage-based, but
there is no democratic alternative.

Despite the long historical odds, then, the recent elections could
portend democratic deepening in Pakistan and warming relations with
India. But it remains too early to say whether this will come to pass.
It is worth remembering that Pakistan’s democratic moment unfolds
against a background of deeply unfavourable institutional history. While
these elections are a decisive step in the right direction, Pakistan’s
growing democratisation is hardly irreversible.