I was the Commanding Officer of Task Force Builder, an Army
engineer group of 60 soldiers that was stationed in the small rural village of
Rach Kein, Vietnam in 1968. Rach Kein was approximately 20 miles SW of Saigon,
located in Long An Province.

Our base camp was next to the base camp of the 3/39 Infantry Battalion of the
9th Infantry Division.

Ben Tre, Vietnam,is
a moderately size town that is located on the Mekong River about 25 miles SE of
Rach Kein. It was much bigger than Rach Kein, probably even bigger than the town
of Long An.

During the first week of the Tet Offensive the VC made
their big move of attacking Saigon. The 3/39 Inf.was initially sent to fight in the big battle for Saigon. This left us
alone to face an NVA regiment of 5,000 men that surrounded us on January 29. We
survived that. And we remained surrounded and cut off for several weeks. As best
I recall, the 3/39 Inf. was in Saigon for about two weeks. I certainly remember this,
because while they were gone from Rach Kein we were on our own as far as
defending against ground attacks. These must have been likely, for at one point,
the 9th Inf. Div. sent in several companies of the 2/39 Inf. to bolster
the town defenses and to conduct sweeps around Rach Kein while the 3/39 was
away.

I especially remember that one platoon of infantry was
wiped out in a well laid ambush in an open rice paddy. It was just a few
hundred yards from where we eventually built a school near the first village
North of Rach Kein (can’t remember its name). The VC had cleverly built
machinegun
bunkers into the rice paddy dikes (it was the dry season), and the infantry
walked right up to them before the VC opened fire.

Then the 3/39 returned. Or I should say that 75 percent of
them returned. The fighting in Saigon had been intense. After only a few days
rest, they were air-lifted by chopper to retake the town of Ben Tre. Ben
Tre had
been occupied by the VC during Tet. The VC had dug in heavily, and were not ready to
retreat without a big fight. So the still exhausted and depleted infantry troops
of the 3/39 were thrown into another vicious fight. I cannot tell you how much
respect that I have for those guys. True heroes, every one of them. Tough,
plucky, and mostly draftees. I still remember my wonder at the ability of
America’s youth to endure.

I sometimes wonder if I am the only one who remembers
them. So I willingly tell this story, so you can help me to remember. Their deeds
should not be forgotten. The 3/39 Inf. Bn. suffered 100% casualties during the
year 1968. I watched it. It is something that still haunts me. Eight hundred young men gone,
dying bravely to serve the country they so loved.

Anyway, the fighting in Ben Tre went badly for the
Americans. House-to-house all the way. The VC were so well dug in and
barricaded that progress got stalled. So, in desperation, artillery and air
strikes were called in on the town. Much of the town was heavily damaged in the
resulting melee, but the town was retaken.

Several days later, Major Robert Black (the Rach Kein
U.S. Army Advisor) invited me to attend with him an evening briefing that the 3/39 was
going to give for a group of journalists and Saigon army brass. I had never
before been invited to attend an infantry battalion briefing. I accepted the
invitation. The briefing was held in a Vietnamese house that served as the S-3
office. It was about 7 houses East of where the VC barbershop was at one time
set up. The house was on the left side of the road as you drove through the infantry
compound, just about across from the infantry mess hall.

Anyway, the living room of the house was packed, mostly
with civilians. The purpose of the briefing was to explain the battle of Ben Tre.
Such briefings are usually conducted by the S-3, in this case, Major Booris. He
was a heavy-set fellow.

He was also not my favorite officer. This was because he
was the guy who told the infantry on guard to open fire on us the morning when
we were walking back to Rach Kein across the rice paddies. This was when we had
chased the VC who had ambushed the infantry Road Runners that one infamous and
well-remembered morning (but that is another story). Fortunately for us, the
infantry sergeant (an E-5) on duty had ignored the major’s orders. I’ll never forget his
grin as he told me that he had saved our bacon by ignoring the S-3’s orders.
He could clearly see that we were friendlies, so he withheld his fire.

Anyway, at one point the journalists were pressing Major
Booris to explain why it had been necessary to wipe out the town. They were
definitely pressing the point that perhaps too much force had been applied by
the US forces. Major Booris was trying his best to put a good face on the situation.
But at one point he got flustered, and blurted out, “We had to destroy Ben Tre
in order to save it.” I have to admit that I almost laughed when he said that.
It was a really unfortunate comment. But Major Booris, in his defense, was
trying his best to defend his battalion’s honor. His CO, Lt. Colonel Anthony P.
Deluca, deftly jumped to his feet and interceded to rescue Major Booris from this
difficult moment. He smoothly carried the rest of the conversation. I really
liked LTC Deluca. He was a good combat leader, and he was always fair to Task
Force Builder.

Anyway, that was the only briefing of the infantry that I
ever attended. But it turned out to be the most famous. Some of the
journalists present at that briefing seized Major Booris’ comment, and they really
publicized it. As I recall, it appeared on the cover of Newsweek or Time
magazine within the month. And it has gone down in history as an example of the
some of the insanity that was Vietnam.

Last year I was reading an historical assessment of the
Vietnam War. The famous historian who wrote it actually challenged whether
or not that Ben Tre statement was ever made. Well I know, because I witnessed it
being made. I wrote to the historian, explaining this. I hope that he got my
message.

Regards,

Michael D. Miller

Former Captain, US Army Corps of Engineers

Commander, Task Force Builder, 1968

46th Engineer Battalion

159th Engineer Group

PO Box 640

Crestone CO 81131

Tel 719 256 4926

Oct 25, 2006

Postscript: On 7/5/08 I was emailed by Jonathon Hubbert
who was a lieutenant with an engineer unit attached to the 9th Infantry Division
in 1968. Jonathon says that he also attended the infantry briefing in Rach Kein
where Major Booris made his infamous comment. Jonathon's address is 114
Charlotte Close, Georgetown KY 40324