The
Fourth Balkan War

On
Tuesday night it seemed as if the Albanian militants who invaded the Macedonian
border village of Tanusevci [Tanushevtsy] were retreating, unhindered,
into Kosovo after Monday’s pitched battle with Macedonian forces. Despite the
fierce fighting, government forces did not manage to dislodge the militants,
who were well-armed, even better positioned, and protected by minefields. Three
Macedonian soldiers were killed
during the operation – two hit
landmines and bled to death, as Albanians shot
at KFOR helicopters that tried to evacuate them, while one was killed by
sniper fire. Parallel to NATO’s statements that the militants were supposedly
retreating, the government in Skopje said the insurgency was far from over.
The army detected traces of militants that suggested other villages in the area
might have been affected. Prior experience indicates that this is not the last
Macedonians have seen of the "National Liberation Army," or the last
attempt of militant Albanians to carve out their desired Balkan empire.

ONE,
TWO, THREE

Early
in the 20th century, the continued Ottoman occupation of Balkan lands
was of great concern to those nations that spent the prior century struggling
for their freedom. In 1912, they formed a coalition and attacked the Turks in
what became known as the First
Balkan War, driving them almost all the way back to the Bosporus before
Austria-Hungary intervened to stop the Turkish defeat. The great powers then
dictated the terms of peace, creating Albania as a state and limiting the territorial
gains of Serbia and Greece. Bulgaria, unhappy with its share of the spoils,
attacked Serbia in 1913. Other allies joined Serbia and defeated Bulgaria in
the Second Balkan War, which gave the Turks a chance to recapture some territory
and cut Bulgaria off from the Aegean. Events of the 1990s could justifiably
be called the Third Balkan War – as events from 1991 to 1995 represented a continuum
that ended with the Dayton
Agreement, once again a solution forced upon the combatants by the world
powers. Given that the fighting in Kosovo, which started in 1998, stopped only
under a temporary armistice between NATO and Yugoslavia in June 1999, we might
as well face the stark reality that we are in the middle of the Fourth Balkan
War. The stakes are as high this time as they were ninety years ago, or ten
years ago, and the bloodletting may have just begun.

CAUSES
OF WAR

At
the heart of this Fourth War is the Albanian drive for separation, not only
from Serbia but from Macedonia, Greece and even Montenegro. Whether this separation
serves the purpose of a "Greater
Albania," or a "Greater
Kosovo" seems immaterial. The program of Greater
Albania is, after all, advocated by Kosovo Albanians more than any others,
and the future capital of this "country" is supposed to be in Pristina,
not Tirana. Albania proper may be on the periphery of events right now, and
could even express public
criticism in order to deflect bad press, but there is little doubt it would
join a Greater Kosovo if that monstrous creation ever came into being.

PATTERNS
OF BEHAVIOR

From
what little is known of them, it seems the Albanian militants in Macedonia have
the same modus operandi as those in southern Serbia, even the KLA in
Kosovo. It seizes and holds a village or multiple villages, provoking an armed
response. At the same time, it rants and raves to the international press about
the horrible "repression"
Albanians are subjected to. Once attacked by government forces, the insurgents
fight hard, then withdraw, taking or ordering
many civilians along. These "refugees" are then used to bolster the
militants’ claim of "genocide" now pursued by the government that
have until then merely "repressed" them. Of course, the militants
declare their absolute commitment to a peaceful solution, which invariably entails
the de facto separation
of the territories they claim, and its placement under international protectorate
or armed occupation. This "peace process" should be "mediated"
by an external broker, preferably NATO or the US. This was the case at Rambouillet
in early 1999, and the Albanians claiming Presevo valley in southern Serbia
are demanding it be the case
again. If the pattern holds, Albanians from Macedonia are likely to make a similar
demand in a month or so. All along, however, these militants will refuse to
disarm, retreat or disband, claiming their existence is necessary to "protect
and defend" their people. They are, of course, open to the possibility
of "demilitarization" by submitting to NATO command and getting on
the payroll, as the "reformed" KLA did by transforming into the KPC.

EASY
PICKINGS

Another
mark of Albanian militants is that their attacks usually follow the path of
least resistance. If fought decisively they will retreat and regroup, but never
quit. At this point, Macedonia and Yugoslavia are both theoretically strong
enough to deal with the militants. However, they are hobbled by NATO’s insistence
on restraint and, in come cases, indirect
support for the militants. In Yugoslavia’s case, the lingering effect of
the conflict with Kosovo militants has left a bad taste in Belgrade’s mouth
– not to mention depleted uranium marks – and seriously undermined
the new government’s will to fight. Barred from resolving the issue themselves,
they demand of NATO to intervene
on their behalf. The logic of this is most peculiar, especially in the case
of Yugoslavia, officially still the enemy of NATO in Kosovo. For if Yugoslavia
were not considered
an enemy, there would be no need for KFOR’s continued occupation.

Both
Macedonia and Yugoslavia have other problems, which further weakens their capability
for self-defense. Macedonia has to find a way to act without alienating a large
Albanian population, whose representatives are part of the ruling coalition
government. The issue of its official name and southern border, which was about
to be resolved with Greece, was postponed due to the Albanian attack, and represents
a permanent strategic liability.

Yugoslavia
also has to deal with a potentially fatal issue of Montenegrin secessionism,
running more rampant as the country weakens. The cobbled-together government
of Serbia is very politically unstable and often contradicting itself. As if
that weren't enough, the US-funded War Crimes Tribunal continues to blackmail
and pressure
Belgrade on the issue of its former leaders, indicted for alleged (and yet unproven)
war crimes as a boost to NATO’s position during the 1999 war. This relentless
pressure also magnifies the scope of new Albanian claims of "repression
and genocide," propaganda which defies countermeasures in a US/NATO-dominated
media world. Even Macedonia has to be sensitive to these accusations, because
Balkans mud does not come off easily.

LOCAL
INTEREST

The
surrounding countries are also interested in the progress and outcome of the
conflict. In the west, Croatia hopes the region would calm down but also secretly
hopes Serbia would be further weakened and eliminated as a rival. Croat and
Muslim ethnic interests in Bosnia are also watching, hoping that Serbia’s defeat
could open the possibility of "revising" the Dayton treaty by taking
out the Serbs within Bosnia’s boundaries. In the most moderate scenario,
the Serbs would be assimilated into a unitary state. In some less amicable plans,
they would meet the fate
of Croatian Serbs at the end of the Third War.

In
the north, there is a growing possibility that Serbia’s province of Vojvodina
might split off if Albanians have their way. A sizable Hungarian population
there could likely advocate annexation
by Hungary. Bulgaria could also hope to increase its territory, by marching
into what’s left of Macedonia after the Albanians are done. Some fear that Bulgaria’s
offer to
send troops to help fight the Albanians might be the first act of just such
a move. Moreover, a week ago Bulgaria’s president signed a treaty with NATO
giving its troops free
access to all of Bulgaria.

Greece
has plenty of reasons to worry, as Albanian aspirations include some of its
territory as well. If Albanians are allowed to expand and grow stronger, it
may be just a matter of time before Greece is "asked" by its NATO
allies to relinquish the so-called "Chameria"
region, "in the interest of regional stability," of course.

THE
GREAT POWERS

A
common thing to all four Balkan Wars has been the presence of a "shadow
participant" – the great power(s). In the First and Second, the strongest
force was Austria-Hungary, backed by Germany. In the Third and Fourth, without
a doubt, that force is the United States, through NATO.

Why?
United States’ motivation is an area that deserves a column – and volumes of
books – in its own right. But it is more than anything else, "realist".
It seeks the greatest tangible gains at the lowest cost. American involvement
in Bosnia, according to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, reasserted US
leadership in Europe. This purpose was again served in Kosovo, when the
US dragooned its European allies into launching a war against Yugoslavia in
violation of the entire body of international law. Even though the war barely
achieved its publicized objectives, it was far more successful at revamping
NATO as the tool of US domination in Europe and elevating it above the UN as
the supreme arbiter of conflicts in the "Atlantic" sphere of influence,
wherever it might reach.

Some
politicians in Yugoslavia and Macedonia
live under the illusion that NATO fought the Kosovo war in the name of democracy,
human rights and international law. This assumption has tremendous potential
to prove fatal to both countries. The US (and hence NATO) could care less about
the first two, save to use them as propaganda slogans, while they brazenly violated
the third. If power is America’s foremost goal, why would it possibly risk aiding
the powerless FRY and Macedonia at the expense of Albanian militants its special
forces and contractors had trained
and equipped, and on whose behalf its bombers went to war?

Last,
but not least, the United States and its allies enjoy domination in the media
theater, thanks to which they can effortlessly manipulate propaganda and
perceptions in favor of their allies. Thus a Reuters reporter can write an absolutely
irrational statement that NATO is "worried the gunmen, emboldened by the
success or an armed struggle in Kosovo, might extend it to Macedonia" (Reuters,
March 6), while leaving out that the "gunmen" owe the success of their
"armed struggle in Kosovo" squarely to the Alliance’s bombing spree
against everything that moved in Serbia, so that NATO’s concern stems from either
idiocy or hypocrisy.

WORDS
AND DEEDS

Manipulation
of facts is a tremendously understated weapon. Hypocrisy is another. The US
is officially striving for stability
in the region. And indeed, it might be. A Greater Albania and an expanded Bulgaria,
both in America’s fold and leaning on Turkey as a staunch
US ally, would ensure US domination over southern Europe for decades, and
enable the Empire to push into central Asia, towards the vast oil and gas fields
of the former Soviet Union. As for the public US commitment to the integrity
of borders, the same policy espoused by the Bush I administration never stopped
Ambassador Warren Zimmerman from doing his best to encourage the destruction
of Yugoslavia by 1992. As Zimmerman himself said to a Croatian magazine in 1992,
"nothing
is forever." Respect for borders and sovereignty would imply respect
for international law, which the US and NATO got to be immune from since their
1999 bombing war.
Hoping that the Empire would actually favor ideological ends  protecting
democracies, for example – over practical gains is, to put it mildly, irrational.
Freed from any moral responsibility, the Empire would sacrifice anyone and anything
– especially the people it has demonized for so long – if the result of that
sacrifice was more power and more money.

Hence,
if the US could interfere in the Third Balkan War to assert its domination over
Europe and help start the Fourth to cement this leadership, what makes anyone
think it would abandon that objective, or the war that leads to it, midway through
the fighting? Two years after the armistice,
under a new leadership anxious to prove itself in battle, it might be time again
to show the increasingly uppity European vassals who the real rulers of the
known world are, and if the Balkans is secured in the process, why that would
be splendid.

Just
splendid.

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