Colorado Supreme Court - Justia Case Law Summarieshttp://law.justia.com/summaryfeed/colorado-supreme-court/2016-12-09T05:31:26-08:00Justia Inchttp://www.justia.com/Justia Lawhttps://justatic.com/v/20161021154947/shared/images/social-media/law.pngCopyright 2014 Justia Inchttp://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa38.htmlIn re Rumnock v. Anschutz2016-12-05T10:00:49-08:002016-12-05T17:25:27-08:00
The issue this matter presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a discovery dispute between plaintiff Stephen Rumnock and defendant American Family Mutual Insurance Company. After being ordered to produce documents that Rumnock requested, American Family disclosed some and simultaneously moved for a protective order. The motion sought to preclude Rumnock from using or disclosing the documents (alleged to be trade secrets) outside of this litigation. The trial court granted in part and denied in part, ordering that the alleged trade secrets not be shared with American Family's competitors, but declining to further limit their use. American Family petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to direct the trial court to enter the protective order. The Supreme Court declined to do so, finding that American Family failed to present to the trial court evidence demonstrating the documents were trade secrets or otherwise confidential commercial information. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa38.html" target="_blank">View "In re Rumnock v. Anschutz" on Justia Law</a>
2016-12-05stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III16SA38http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sa303.htmlGrand Valley Water Users Ass'n v. Busk-Ivanhoe, Inc.2016-12-05T10:00:48-08:002016-12-05T17:24:44-08:00
The City of Aurora was the sole owner of the capital stock of Busk-Ivanhoe, Inc., which owned a one-half interest in water rights decreed in 1928 to the Busk-Ivanhoe System for supplemental irrigation in the Arkansas River Basin by Garfield County District Court (in Civil Action 2621, known as the "2621 Decree"). The decree contained no reference to storage of exported water on the eastern slope prior to its decreed use for supplemental irrigation in the Arkansas River Basin. Nevertheless, water decreed to the Busk-Ivanhoe System has been stored in reservoirs before put to beneficial use. In 1987, Busk-Ivanhoe began to put its water rights to use in Aurora. Busk-Ivanhoe did not file an application to change the type and place of use of these rights until 2009. The water court for Water Division 2 approved Busk-Ivanhoe's change application allow use of the rights within Aurora's municipal system. The rulings were confirmed in 2014. The issues raised in this appeal centered on the water court's quantification of the water rights to be changed under the application. After review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the water court erred when it concluded that storage of the Busk-Ivanhoe rights on the eastern slope prior to use was lawful; (2) because the storage of the water rights was unlawful, the water court erred in concluding the volumes of exported water paid as rental fees for storage in its historic consumptive use quantification of the water rights; and (3) the water court erred in concluding it was required to exclude the twenty-two years of undecreed use of the water rights from the representative study period. The water court's 2014 order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sa303.html" target="_blank">View "Grand Valley Water Users Ass'n v. Busk-Ivanhoe, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
2016-12-05stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtMonica M. Márquez14SA303http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa163.htmlColorado v. Delacruz2016-12-05T10:00:48-08:002016-12-05T17:25:58-08:00
The State filed an interlocutory appeal of a district court's suppression order. The court suppressed a firearm that Denver Police seized from a car in which defendant Randiray Delacruz was a passenger. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the firearm was discovered during a valid protective search of the vehicle in light of the circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the search. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's order and remanded this matter for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa163.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Delacruz" on Justia Law</a>
2016-12-05stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtMonica M. Márquez16SA163http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc94.htmlColorado v. Adams2016-11-21T09:00:43-08:002016-11-21T10:39:19-08:00
Respondent Curtis Adams was found guilty by jury of assaulting a correctional officer. The presumptive sentencing range for that offense was two to six years, but because Adams committed the assault while serving a sentence for a prior felony, the trial court imposed an aggravated sentence of twelve years, to be served consecutively to Adams’ remaining sentence. This case arose out of the intersection between two sources of sentence enhancement: one requiring an aggravated term-of-years range; the other requiring consecutive sentencing. The appellate court concluded Adams was not subject to the term-of-years enhancement as applied by the trial court. The State appealed, arguing that the trial court was required to apply both enhancements. The Supreme Court, in its review of the plain language of the applicable statutes, concluded both enhancements applied. The Court reversed a portion of the appellate court’s judgment vacating respondent’s sentence. The case was then remanded for resentencing. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc94.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Adams" on Justia Law</a>
2016-11-21stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III14SC94http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa231.htmlColorado v. Cooper2016-11-21T09:00:42-08:002016-11-21T10:39:21-08:00
Alamosa County police officers applied for and received a warrant to search Lonnie Cooper’s residence and vehicles on his property for illegal drugs and other items associated with the sale of illegal drugs. The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed an interlocutory appeal to answer whether an officer could reasonable and in good faith rely on a warrant when the warrant affidavit was devoid of specific dates, but established a long, ongoing pattern of drug trafficking from a home. After review of the specifics of this case, the Supreme Court concluded there was enough evidence in the warrant affidavit of an ongoing drug trafficking operation that an officer could have a reasonable, good faith belief that the warrant was proper. The Court reversed the trial court’s suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa231.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Cooper" on Justia Law</a>
2016-11-21stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice16SA231http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc494.htmlCalderon v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company2016-11-07T08:30:47-08:002016-11-07T08:43:56-08:00
Petitioner Arnold Calderon was injured in a vehicle accident with an uninsured motorist. At the time, petitioner was insured with respondent American Family Mutual Insurance. American Family paid the policy limit to petitioner's medical providers; it denied payment with respect to his uninsured/underinsured (UM/UIM), disputing the amount of petitioner's damages. A jury returned an award in petitioner's favor. The trial court offset the amount of the jury award by the amount already paid to the medical providers. Petitioner argued on appeal of that offset, that the "MedPay" coverage was separate from the UM/UIM coverage, and that the MedPay amount should not have been deducted. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the amount of UM/UIM coverage, as listed in petitioner's policy, in this case should not have been reduced by the MedPay amount. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc494.html" target="_blank">View "Calderon v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law</a>
2016-11-07stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtAllison H. Eid14SC494http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa2.htmlPeople in the Interest of A.L.-C.2016-10-24T08:00:40-08:002016-10-25T04:51:48-08:00
Police responded to a domestic disturbance involving then 16-year-old A.L.-C., who was feuding with he mother and stepfather on the first floor of the family home. B.O., his sister, told an aunt who was in the house, that A.L.-C. had sexually assaulted her. B.O. repeated her allegations to the police. A.L.-C. was briefly detained, but then returned to his parents. The following day, A.L.-C. and his parents went to the police station for questioning about the alleged sexual assaults. A detective and Spanish interpreter advised the three of A.L.-C.'s "Miranda" rights, then the detective and interpreter stepped out of the room to allow the family to discuss whether A.L.-C. would waive his rights. A videorecorder captured their exchange. Initially, the tape showed the parents individually asking A.L.-C. whether he understood his rights. A.L.-C. replied that he was "always the liar, or the one lying" and told his mother he would rather keep quiet. Whether A.L.-C. meant this as a refusal to speak with his mother or with the police was unclear. Minutes later, the detective and interpreter re-enetered the room and A.L.-C. and his mother both signed the Miranda waiver form. A.L.-C. indicated he understood his rights and agreed to discuss his sister's allegations. A.L.-C.'s stepfather left the room before more questioning began, but his mother remained for its entirety. At issue was A.L.-C.'s statement to his mother outside of police presence. The trial court suppressed A.L.-C.'s incriminating statements, concluding that although his mother was present, she could not protect his right to remain silent because she did not share his interests. The State sought the Colorado Supreme Court's review. Finding that the plain language of section 19-2-511(1) C.R.S. (2016) required only that a parent be present during the advisement and interrogation, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa2.html" target="_blank">View "People in the Interest of A.L.-C." on Justia Law</a>
2016-10-24stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III16SA2http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc873.htmlSchneider v. Colorado2016-10-17T08:00:38-08:002016-10-17T13:50:49-08:00
Petitioner Fritz Schneider appealed when the court of appeals affirmed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault: one for sexual assault of a physically helpless victim and another for "sexual assault by causing submission of a victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will" These charges were based on evidence of a single, continuous penetration of the same victim. The court of appeals upheld the convictions against challenges of jeopardy and merger on grounds petitioner had been convicted of two separate crimes. The appellate court upheld the consecutive sentences on grounds that the sentences were mandated by statute. Petitioner again appealed, arguing the court of appeals erred in its judgment. The Supreme Court concurred in the outcome, if on slightly different grounds. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc873.html" target="_blank">View "Schneider v. Colorado" on Justia Law</a>
2016-10-17stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtCoats13SC873http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa114-0.htmlGriffith v. SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Co.2016-10-17T08:00:38-08:002016-10-17T13:50:18-08:00
Plaintiff Christine Griffith filed a complaint against eleven entities and two individuals alleging they injured her father, who was a resident of a nursing home operated by defendant SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Company (d/b/a Belmont Lodge Health Care Center). Plaintiff alleged that her father's injuries eventually caused his death. The individuals and four of nine entities conceded jurisdiction and answered the complaint. Five entities contested jurisdiction, arguing they were nonresident companies not subject to Colorado's jurisdiction. The issue for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on when a nonresident parent company could be subject to jurisdiction in Colorado based on the activities of its resident subsidiary. The Court held that trial courts had to perform a two-step analysis before concluding a nonresident parent company was subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado. Because the trial court in this case did not perform that analysis, the case was remanded for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa114-0.html" target="_blank">View "Griffith v. SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Co." on Justia Law</a>
2016-10-17stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice16SA114http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa96.htmlJohnson v. Colorado2016-10-03T08:00:45-08:002016-10-03T10:14:12-08:00
At issue in this case were questions involving what a trial court could order when a juvenile seeks a reverse-transfer of her criminal case from trial court to juvenile court. The district attorney directly filed a criminal complaint against defendant Sienna Johnson in trial court, treating her as an adult and charging her with two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Defendant requested a reverse-transfer hearing, and the trial court granted her request. The State appealed, arguing that C.R.S. 19-2-517(3)(b)(VI) (the reverse-transfer statute) required a trial court to evaluate the petitioner's mental health. The DA requested access to defendant's mental health and psychological records and requested a court-ordered mental health assessment. Defendant responded that she should not have to produce the records because she had not waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege in her request for a reverse-transfer, and the statute did not give the trial court authority to order an assessment. The trial court ruled in favor of the DA on both counts. The Supreme Court concluded after review: (1) nothing in the reverse-transfer statute stated that a juvenile waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege by requesting a reverse-transfer hearing, so the trial court could not order her to produce her mental records; and (2) nothing in the statute gave the trial court explicit authority to order the mental health assessment. The case was therefore remanded for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa96.html" target="_blank">View "Johnson v. Colorado" on Justia Law</a>
2016-10-03stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice16SA96http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa94.htmlHiggins v. Colorado2016-10-03T08:00:44-08:002016-10-03T10:14:48-08:00
Similar to "Colorado v. Johnson," (2016 CO 69 (2016)), at issue in this case were questions involving what a trial court could order when a juvenile seeks a reverse-transfer of her criminal case from trial court to juvenile court. Defendant Brooke Higgins was a juvenile respondent before a magistrate judge. The district attorney requested, and Higgins' then-defense-counsel agreed to, a state administered mental health assessment of Higgins. Because the parties agreed, the magistrate judge ordered the assessment. Later, in front of a trial court, the DA dismissed the juvenile charges against Higgins and charged her as an adult with two counts of conspiracy to commit murder. Higgins sought, and the trial court granted, a reverse-transfer hearing to determine whether she should remain in adult court. Before that hearing, Higgins, now represented by different counsel, filed a motion to suppress the mental health assessment and disqualify the trial court judge. The trial court denied both requests, holding that the parties stipulated to the assessment, and there was independent statutory authority for the magistrate judge to order the assessment. Higgins appealed, arguing the trial court lacked authority to order a juvenile-charged-as-an-adult to undergo a mental health assessment for a reverse-transfer hearing. The Supreme Court found that based on the facts of this case, Higgins' arguments, while loosely related to those in "Johnson," were hypothetical and premature. The Court therefore vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa94.html" target="_blank">View "Higgins v. Colorado" on Justia Law</a>
2016-10-03stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice16SA94http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc756.htmlIn re Marriage of Johnson2016-09-26T08:00:59-08:002016-09-26T12:39:58-08:00
This case centered on whether a father could use the doctrine of laches to defend against a mother's claim for interest on his child support debt. In the precedential case "Hauck v. Schuck," (353 P.3d 79 (1960)), the Colorado Supreme Court decided laches did not apply to a claim for unpaid child support that accrued within the statutory limitations period. The court of appeals determined in the present case, that laches could not apply to bar one parent's right to collect interest on arrearages owed by the other parent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this matter to address whether laches was an appropriate defense in an interest-collection action, and also to resolve "the arguable tension" in "Hauck." The Court concluded that laches could be asserted as a defense to a claim for interest on child support arrearages, and therefore reversed the court of appeals. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc756.html" target="_blank">View "In re Marriage of Johnson" on Justia Law</a>
2016-09-26stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtGabriel14SC756http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa133.htmlColorado v. Chavez-Barragan2016-09-26T08:00:58-08:002016-09-26T12:43:10-08:00
In this case's first appeal, the Supreme Court reversed a suppression order by the trial court, concluding that the police lawfully stopped defendant Amadeo Chavez-Barragan for failing to drive within a single lane (weaving). Methamphetamine was discovered following the stop, and evidence of the methamphetamine was suppressed. The trial court had not ruled on other issues raised in the suppression motion, so the case was remanded. The trial court found different grounds upon which to base its suppression and again suppressed the evidence. This time, the trial court determined that the seizure that followed the initial stop was unreasonable, and defendant's consent to the search was not voluntary. After review, the Supreme Court again reversed the suppression order. Concluding that the initial stop and detention was reasonable and the consent to search was voluntary. The drugs found should not have been suppressed. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa133.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Chavez-Barragan" on Justia Law</a>
2016-09-26stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III16SA133http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc431.htmlRyan Ranch Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Kelley2016-09-26T07:31:02-08:002016-09-26T12:42:25-08:00
Ryan Ranch was a residential common interest community. The homeowners association filed a complaint against several low owners abutting Ryan Ranch, seeking past-due assessments, penalties and fees for maintenance and services provided by the association. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the abutting owners owed the fees and penalties when it was discovered the developer inadvertently annexed their lots. In a split decision, the court of appeals determined the lots were not validly annexed because the annexation failed to comply with the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act. The Supreme Court agreed that the annexation failed for failure to comply with the CCIOA, and affirmed. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc431.html" target="_blank">View "Ryan Ranch Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Kelley" on Justia Law</a>
2016-09-26stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III14SC431http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc77.htmlPulte Home Corp. v. Countryside Cmty. Ass'n, Inc.2016-09-26T07:31:01-08:002016-09-26T12:40:27-08:00
The Countryside Townhome Subdivision was a residential common interest community. The homeowners association for the Subdivision filed a complaint against the developer, seeking over $400,000 in past-due assessments for maintenance of the developer's unsold properties and related common elements. The developer's liability was implicated when its properties became part of the Subdivision under the community's governing instruments and the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act. In a split decision, the court of appeals determined that the community was formed when the document containing the community's covenants and the plat were recorded, and that the developer's properties were brought into the community at that time. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, finding that the mere recordation of the covenants and plat did not create the common interest community. "Rather, the community was created when the developer first subjected the property to the covenants." Because the developer's property could not become part of the community until it was added, and the developer was not otherwise liable for the assessments. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc77.html" target="_blank">View "Pulte Home Corp. v. Countryside Cmty. Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
2016-09-26stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III14SC77http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa75.htmlColorado Dept. of Transportation v. Amerco Real Estate2016-09-26T07:31:00-08:002016-09-26T11:44:56-08:00
The Department of Transportation petitioned to acquire property owned by Amerco Real Estate Co. and occupied by U-Haul Co. by eminent domain, asserting that the property in question was necessary for a highway expansion project. U-Haul opposed the petition, asserting that the Department lacked authority to condemn its land on grounds that the statutory perquisites for acquiring land in the manner the Department used, were not met. The district court declined to dismiss the petition and instead granted the Department's motion for immediate possession. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the transportation commission's enabling legislation, to the extent that it purported to delegate to the Department the choice of particular properties to be taken for highway projects and the manner of their taking, was an unlawful delegation of the commission's statutorily imposed obligation. The case was remanded back to the district court for dismissal of the Department's original petition. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa75.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado Dept. of Transportation v. Amerco Real Estate" on Justia Law</a>
2016-09-26stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtCoats16SA75http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc136.htmlColorado v. Hoskin2016-09-26T07:31:00-08:002016-09-26T11:44:11-08:00
The Colorado State Patrol gave petitioner Gregory Hoskin a speeding ticket. Hoskin pled not guilty, and the matter went to a bench trial, which ultimately ended against Hoskin. He appealed, and the district court reversed, concluding that the county court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to Hoskin when it required him to prove that his speed was reasonable and prudent, thereby violating his due process rights. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the speeding statute (C.R.S. 42-2-1101) created a mandatory rebuttable presumption that did not violate due process. Furthermore, the Court found sufficient evidence in the record to support the county court's judgment that Hoskin was speeding. The Court therefore reversed the district court and remanded the case for reinstatement of the county court's judgment. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc136.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Hoskin" on Justia Law</a>
2016-09-26stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtBrian D. Boatright15SC136http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa124.htmlMeeks v. SSC Colorado Springs Colonial Columns Operating Co.2016-09-26T07:30:59-08:002016-09-26T10:51:56-08:00
The facts of this case were similar to those in "Griffith v. SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Co.," (2016 CO 60 (2016)). The Supreme Court remanded this case back to the trial court for reconsideration under the test it announced in that case. Here, the Court held that the "Griffith" test applied when an issue arose of whether nonresident parent companies were subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado courts based on the actions of their resident subsidiaries. Plaintiff Khalid Meeks sued ten entities and one individual alleging that the parties injured his mother, a resident of Colonial Columns Nursing Center. Four of ten entities conceded jurisdiction in Colorado; the others argued they were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado. The nonresident defendants were upstream parent companies of the resident nursing center and the four that conceded jurisdiction. On remand, the Supreme Court mandated the trial court hold a hearing to resolve the disputed jurisdictional facts, and apply the "Griffith" framework. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa124.html" target="_blank">View "Meeks v. SSC Colorado Springs Colonial Columns Operating Co." on Justia Law</a>
2016-09-26stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice16SA124http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa114.htmlGriffith v. SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Co.2016-09-26T07:30:59-08:002016-09-26T10:51:27-08:00
Plaintiff Christine Griffith sued nine entities and two individuals, alleging that they injured her father, who was a resident of a nursing home in Colorado. She alleged her father's injuries eventually caused his death. The individuals and four of the nine entities conceded jurisdiction and answered the complaint. The remaining five entities contested jurisdiction, arguing they were nonresident companies who were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was the circumstance under which nonresident parent companies could be haled into Colorado courts based on the activities of their resident subsidiaries. The Colorado Supreme Court held that in order for a Colorado court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident parent company, the trial court will analyze: (1) whether it may pierce the corporate veil and impute the resident subsidiary's contacts to the parent; and if the veil was pierced, the trial court will analyze (2) all of the subsidiary's contacts to determine whether jurisdiction comports with due process. If the trial court cannot pierce the corporate veil, then it shall treat each entity separately and analyze only the contacts that the parent company has with the state. Because the trial court did not perform this two-step analysis when it determined petitioners were subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado, the Supreme Court remanded for the trial court to perform that analysis. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa114.html" target="_blank">View "Griffith v. SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Co." on Justia Law</a>
2016-09-26stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice16SA114http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc83.htmlJohnson v. Colorado2016-09-12T08:00:58-08:002016-09-12T08:20:06-08:00
Petitioner Donald Johnson was convicted of careless driving-no injury, and the county court ordered him to pay $23,435.20 in restitution for pecuniary losses suffered by, among others: (1) a woman whose vehicle he struck with his vehicle; and (2) the woman’s seven medical providers. Initially, the restitution payments were disbursed to the woman, who was obliged to pay her medical providers. After the State learned that the woman had not paid the providers, it moved to change the restitution payee, so that the restitution payments would be disbursed directly to the providers. The court granted that motion. Johnson moved for reconsideration, arguing the State's request to change the restitution payee was effectively a new restitution request and was untimely. The county court rejected this argument and denied Johnson’s motion. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc83.html" target="_blank">View "Johnson v. Colorado" on Justia Law</a>
2016-09-12stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtGabriel15SC83http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc346.htmlMartinez v. Estate of Bleck2016-09-12T08:00:57-08:002016-09-12T09:59:03-08:00
Upon obtaining information that Steven Bleck was suicidal and possibly armed, officers with the Alamosa Police Department, including petitioner Jeffrey Martinez, entered Bleck’s hotel room. Bleck did not respond to the officers’ command to show his hands and lie down on the floor. Martinez approached him, and, without holstering his weapon, attempted to subdue him. In the process, the firearm discharged, injuring Bleck. As relevant here, Bleck brought suit against Martinez in federal court, alleging excessive force and a state law battery claim. The federal court granted summary judgment and dismissed Bleck’s federal claim, concluding that there was no evidence that the shooting was intentional. After the federal district court declined to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the state law battery claim, Bleck refiled the claim in state district court. Martinez then moved to dismiss the state law claims against him, arguing he was immune from suit and that his actions were not "willful and wanton." The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that Martinez should have known the situation would have been dangerous by not holstering his weapon prior to subduing Bleck. The court of appeals determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and did not consider Martinez' claim that the trial court applied the wrong "willful and wanton" standard before deciding his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court applied the wrong standard, and that the court of appeals erred in not hearing the appeal. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred by not determining all issues relating to Martinez' immunity claim. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc346.html" target="_blank">View "Martinez v. Estate of Bleck" on Justia Law</a>
2016-09-12stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtAllison H. Eid14SC346http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sa332.htmlMagill v. Ford Motor Co.2016-09-12T08:00:57-08:002016-09-12T09:58:23-08:00
The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the trial court erred in concluding that defendant Ford Motor Company was subject to general personal jurisdiction in Colorado, despite the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in "Daimler A.G. v. Bauman," (134 S. CT. 746 (2014)). This case arose out of a 2013 accident in Colorado in which plaintiff John Magill's 2007 Ford Fusion collided with a vehicle driven by defendant Mark Polunci. Magill (and his wife) alleged that Ford, as manufacturer of the Fusion, was liable for Mr. Magill's serious injuries based on three causes of action sounding in tort. Ford moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. After review, the Colorado Court determined that the record did not support a finding that Ford was "essentially at home" in Colorado, and therefore not subject to general personal jurisdiction here, "maintaining a registered agent in the state does not convert a foreign corporation to a resident." Because none of the parties resided in Denver and the accident did not occur there, the Supreme Court concluded venue was not appropriate where the action was originally filed, in Denver County. The Supreme Court remanded this case for the trial court to transfer this case to an appropriate venue. The proper venue would then determine whether Ford was subject to specific jurisdiction. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sa332.html" target="_blank">View "Magill v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law</a>
2016-09-12stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice15SA332http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc722-0.htmlMurray v. Just In Case Bus. Lighthouse, LLC2016-07-18T08:00:46-08:002016-07-18T09:59:47-08:00
This case started out of a business dispute between respondent-cross-petitioner Just In Case Business Lighthouse, LLC (JIC) and petitioner-cross-respondent Patrick Murray. To prepare for the litigation, JIC hired Preston Sumner, a businessman with knowledge of business sales and valuation, as an advisor. Sumner agreed to help with the case in exchange for a ten-percent interest in the case's outcome. Murray objected to Sumner's involvement in the case, arguing: (1) Sumner's interest in the case outcome was an improper payment violating Colorado Rule of Professional Conduce (RPC) 3.4(b); (2) Sumner lacked the requisite personal knowledge of the case's underlying events as required by Colorado Rule of Evidence (CRE) 602; and (3) the summary charts Sumner prepared were inadmissible under CRE 1006. The trial court ruled that Sumner could testify as a summary witness, but not as an expert or fact witness. Sumner testified and laid foundation for two of the summary exhibits, which the trial court admitted into evidence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of JIC. Murray renewed his arguments on appeal, and the Court of Appeals rejected them in part, and remanded for the trial court to determine whether Sumner's testimony should have been excluded as a sanction for JIC's violation of RPC 3.4(b). After review, the Colorado Supreme Court held that violation of the ethical rule did not displace the rules of evidence, and that trial courts retained discretion under CRE 403 to exclude testimony of improperly compensated witnesses. The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude Sumner's testimony. Further, the Court held that trial courts could allow summary witness testimony if they determine that the evidence was sufficiently complex and voluminous that the witness would assist the trier of fact. The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the summaries. Finding no reversible errors with the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment remanding the case for consideration of whether Sumner's testimony should have been excluded. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc722-0.html" target="_blank">View "Murray v. Just In Case Bus. Lighthouse, LLC" on Justia Law</a>
2016-07-18stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtBrian D. Boatright13SC722http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa153.htmlIn re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2015-2016 #132 & #1332016-07-05T09:30:39-08:002016-07-05T12:18:26-08:00
Petitioner Donna Johnson challenged the Ballot Title Board's decision to set the title, ballot title and submission clause for Initiatives 2015-2016 #132 and 133, contending that the titles did not satisfy the clear title requirement and they did not contain a single subject. If passed, the Initiatives, substantially similar in language and form, represented two of several redistricting concepts proposed by the Proponents during the 2016 election cycle. Both Initiatives would have amended article V, section 44 through 48 of the Colorado Constitution by restructuring or replacing the Colorado Reapportionment Commission. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that both of the proposed Initiatives encompassed multiple subjects in violation of Colorado law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Title Board and remanded for revision. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa153.html" target="_blank">View "In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2015-2016 #132 & #133" on Justia Law</a>
2016-07-05stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtMonica M. Márquez16SA153http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa157.htmlIn the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2015-2016 Initiative #1562016-07-05T07:05:47-08:002016-07-05T12:17:28-08:00
Petitioner John Robinson challenged the Ballot Title Board's decision to set the title, ballot title and submission clause for Initiative 2015-2016 #156, contending that the title did not satisfy the clear title requirement and it did not contain a single subject. If passed, Initiative #156 would have added a new section to the Colorado Revised Statutes prohibiting state and local licensing authorities from issuing "a license to food store that offers for sale, in sealed containers for off-premises consumption," certain "intoxicants, namely marijuana, marijuana product, liquor, wine and malt liquor. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the title indeed violated the clear title requirement because it was confusing and failed to help voters decipher the purpose of the initiative, or to help voters decide whether to support or oppose it. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Title Board's setting of title for Initiative #156, and returned it to the Board for revision. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa157.html" target="_blank">View "In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2015-2016 Initiative #156" on Justia Law</a>
2016-07-05stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtBrian D. Boatright16SA157http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa8.htmlColorado v. The Castle Law Grp., LLC2016-07-05T07:05:46-08:002016-07-05T12:19:06-08:00
The State brought a civil law enforcement action against the foreclosure law firm The Castle Law Group, LLC and its principles, as well as some of Castle's affiliated vendors. Among other things, the State alleged that between 2009 and 2014, the Castle defendants conspired with their affiliated vendors to generate and submit deceptive invoices reflecting inflated costs incurred for foreclosure-related services, while falsely representing to mortgage servicers that these inflated costs were "actual, necessary and reasonable." The State alleged defendants' conduct violated the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA), the Colorado Antitrust Act of 1992, and the Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The trial court granted a Castle motion limiting the State's expert testimony, and the State appealed the trial court's rulings. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in its limiting orders, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa8.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. The Castle Law Grp., LLC" on Justia Law</a>
2016-07-05stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtMonica M. Márquez16SA8http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc787-0.htmlOpen Door Ministries v. Lipschuetz2016-06-27T07:30:54-08:002016-06-28T04:31:57-08:00
Jesse Lipschuetz lived next door to Open Door Ministries. Lipschuetz filed claims against the City of Denver and Open Door looking to revoke a rooming and boarding permit the City granted to Open Door. The trial court concluded the City should not have issued the permit, but stayed revocation until Open Door's cross-claims were resolved. Several months later, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Open Door on those cross-claims. On appeal, Lipscheutz argued Open Door's cross-claims against the City were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act because they "could lie in tort." Therefore, Lipscheutz argued, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the cross-claims. The court of appeals agreed with that reasoning, and reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding that the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act did not apply to Open Door's request for prospective relief to prevent future injury. Because Open Door had not suffered an injury before it filed its cross-claims, the Act did not bar those claims seeking prospective relief from future injury. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction over those cross-claims. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc787-0.html" target="_blank">View "Open Door Ministries v. Lipschuetz" on Justia Law</a>
2016-06-27stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice14SC787http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa92.htmlColorado v. Zuniga2016-06-27T07:30:53-08:002016-06-27T09:45:28-08:00
A Colorado State Trooper stopped the vehicle in which Victor Zuniga was riding as a passenger. The vehicle was carrying over a pound of raw marijuana and marijuana concentrate. Zuniga was ultimately charged with two counts of possession with intent to manufacture or distribute marijuana or marijuana concentrate. Zuniga pled not guilty, and moved to suppress, arguing that the seized marijuana was the fruit of an illegal detention and search. In particular, Zuniga argued: (1) the Trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in the first place; (2) the prolonged detention was unlawful; and (3) the vehicle search was not supported by probable cause. The trial court found that because marijuana possession was legal in certain circumstances in Colorado, and drug-sniffing dogs were unable to differentiate between legal and illegal amounts of marijuana, the court concluded there was no probable cause to search the vehicle because the Trooper could only speculate about the amount of marijuana he smelled. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that after a review of the facts, noting the driver and Zuniga's divergent stories about their time in Colorado, their "extreme" nervousness, the strong odor of marijuana and the drug-dog's sniff test, there was probable cause. Therefore, the trial court erred in suppressing evidence of the marijuana. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa92.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Zuniga" on Justia Law</a>
2016-06-27stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtBrian D. Boatright16SA92http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc87.htmlPinnacol Assurance v. Hoff2016-06-27T07:30:53-08:002016-06-28T04:31:18-08:00
Norma Hoff owned a home she rented through a property management agency. The roof sustained hail damage, and she contracted with Alliance Construction & Restoration, Inc. (Alliance) to make the repairs. Alliance subcontracted the roof repairs to MDR Roofing, Inc. (MDR). MDR employed Hernan Hernandes as a roofer. While working on Hoff's roof, Hernandez fell from a ladder and suffered serious injuries. He filed a workers' compensation claim against MDR, but MDR's insurer, Pinnacol Assurance, denied the claim because MDR's insurance coverage had lapsed. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Pinnacol had a legal obligation to notify MDR of a certificate of insurance when the policy evidenced by the certificate was cancelled. Based on the certificate at issue in this case and the applicable statute, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the insurer had no such obligation. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court's judgment to the contrary. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc87.html" target="_blank">View "Pinnacol Assurance v. Hoff" on Justia Law</a>
2016-06-27stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III15SC87http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc66.htmlVan Rees v. Unleaded Software, Inc.2016-06-27T07:30:52-08:002016-06-28T04:33:20-08:00
Petitioner John Van Rees, Sr. contracted with respondent Unleaded Software, Inc. to perform web-related services and to design additional websites. After Unleaded missed deadlines and failed to deliver the promised services, Van Rees sued, asserting multiple tort claims, a civil theft claim, three breach of contract claims, and a claim for violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA). The trial court granted Unleaded's 12(b)(5) motion, dismissing all but Van Rees' contract claims, on which a jury found in Van Rees' favor. Van Rees appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. After its review, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appellate court had determined that the tort and civil theft claims were barred by the "economic loss rule" because they were related to promises memorialized in the contracts, and the CCPA claim failed to allege a significant public impact. The Supreme Court found the issue pertaining to the economic loss rule was not whether the tort claims related to a contract, but whether they stemmed from a duty independent of the contact. The Court found pre-contractural misrepresentations in this case distinct from the contract itself, and could have formed the basis of an independent tort claim. Accordingly, the Court reversed as to Van Rees' tort claims. With respect to civil theft, the court affirmed the court of appeals on the ground that the claim failed to adequately allege the "knowing deprivation of a thing of value." <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc66.html" target="_blank">View "Van Rees v. Unleaded Software, Inc." on Justia Law</a>
2016-06-27stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtAllison H. Eid14SC66http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc176.htmlWarne v. Hall2016-06-27T07:30:51-08:002016-06-28T04:32:46-08:00
Menda Warne appealed the court of appeals' judgment reversing dismissal of Bill Hall's complaint, which asserted a claim of intentional interference with contract. The trial court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted without addressing the applicable case law in its written order. The court of appeals expressly declined to apply more recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence governing Fed. R. Vic. P. 12(b)(6), finding itself bound by the Colorado Supreme Court's existing precedent, which heavily relied on the federal Supreme Court's earlier opinion in "Conley v. Gibson," (355 U.S. 41 (1957)). The court of appeals reversed the trial court, finding the complaint sufficient to state a claim. The Colorado Supreme Court found that the court of appeals too narrowly understood the Court's existing precedent. After review of the complaint, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc176.html" target="_blank">View "Warne v. Hall" on Justia Law</a>
2016-06-27stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtCoats14SC176http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc345.htmlPandy v. Independent Bank2016-06-20T07:30:54-08:002016-06-20T11:51:49-08:00
The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether a property titled in the name of a judgment debtor's co-settled revocable trust was subject to a judgment lien against the debtor. Petitioners were co-settlors and co-trustees of a revocable trust that held title to some Colorado property. Respondent obtained two judgments, and filed a quiet title action for a decree of foreclosure. Petitioner moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that respondent's complaint was barred by the statute of limitations in 13-80-101(1)(k), C.R.S. (2015). The trial court denied the motion. After granting certiorari review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that as a settlor of a revocable trust, petitioner held an ownership interest in the trust's assets. Respondent could properly seek to enforce its judgment against petitioner, and the action was not barred by the statute of limitations. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc345.html" target="_blank">View "Pandy v. Independent Bank" on Justia Law</a>
2016-06-20stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtGabriel15SC345http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc469.htmlLewis v. Taylor2016-06-20T07:30:53-08:002016-06-20T11:52:15-08:00
Respondent Steve Taylor invested $3 million in several investment companies operated by Sean Mueller. Unbeknownst to Taylor, the companies were part of a multi-million dollar Ponzi scheme. The "Mueller Funds" received approximately $150 million in investments, and paid out a little less than $90 million to investors before collapsing. Taylor happened to receive approximately $3.4 million (a return of his invested principal plus net profit) prior to the collapse. Other investors were not as fortunate, losing a sum total of approximately $72 million. In 2010, Mueller ultimately pled guilty to securities fraud, and was sentenced to a total of 40 years in prison. In addition, he was ordered to pay over $64 million in restitution. Petitioner C. Randel Lewis was appointed as Receiver for the Mueller Funds, tasked with collecting Mueller's assets to his creditors and defrauded investors. The Receiver and Taylor signed a tolling agreement that extended the time period within which the Receiver could bring suit against Taylor in an attempt to recover assets. The eventual complaint sought to recover the net profit Taylor received. Taylor received his last payout in April 2007, and moved for summary judgment claiming the Receiver's claim was time barred due to the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court considered the tolling agreement and ruled in the Receiver's favor. Taylor appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, interpreting the term "extinguished," as used in 38-8-110(1), C.R.S. (2015), imposed a jurisdictional time limit on filing a claim, and that the parties could not toll that limit by agreement. The Supreme Court concluded that 38-8-110(1)'s time limitation could indeed be tolled by express agreement. The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc469.html" target="_blank">View "Lewis v. Taylor" on Justia Law</a>
2016-06-20stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III14SC469http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc722.htmlMurray v. Just In Case Bus. Lighthouse, LLC2016-06-20T07:30:52-08:002016-06-20T11:53:13-08:00
Just in Case Business Lighthouse (JIC) , owned and operated by Joseph Mahoney, entered into an agreement with Pearl Development Company, whereby Pearl agreed to pay JIC a specified commission if it found a buyer for Pearl. Without JIC's knowledge, Pearl's agents, including its president, Patrick Murray, signed a letter of intent to sell Pearl with Epic Energy Resources, Inc. Before the sale was completed, Murray contacted Mahoney and convinced him to sign a termination agreement, ending their previous business arrangement. Five months later, Epic bought Pearl. Upon learning of the sale, JIC sued Pearl's officers and owners (including Murray) alleging they fraudulently misrepresented their intentions and failed to disclose that Epic was planning to purchase Pearl. The misrepresentation was used to induce Mahoney to sign the termination agreement and deprive him of his commission. In its preparation for trial, JIC hired businessman Preston Sumner as an advisor, and granted him a ten-percent interest in the case contingent on the outcome. Sumner did a variety of work related to the suit. JIC disclosed Sumner as a witness and indicated that it intended to use Sumner as an expert in the case. Murray moved to preclude Sumner from testifying, arguing that RPC 3.4(b) prohibiting compensating witnesses on a contingency fee basis. The trial court granted the motion in part and denied in part, finding that RPC 3.4(b) only prohibited Sumner from testifying as a non-expert witness. The court allowed him to testify as a law witness. Sumner testified; the jury returned its verdict in favor of JIC. Murray appealed, renewing arguments he made at the trial court challenging Sumner's testimony. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment to the extent that it remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether Sumner's testimony should have been excluded. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc722.html" target="_blank">View "Murray v. Just In Case Bus. Lighthouse, LLC" on Justia Law</a>
2016-06-20stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtBrian D. Boatright13SC722http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc99.htmlAm. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hansen2016-06-20T07:30:52-08:002016-06-20T11:54:13-08:00
Respondent Jennifer Hansen was injured in a motor vehicle accident in late 2007. Four months later, she presented an underinsured motorist (“UIM”) claim to petitioner American Family Mutual Insurance Company (“American Family”), insurer of her vehicle. As proof of insurance, Hansen offered lienholder statements issued to her by American Family’s local agent that identified her as the named insured at the time of the accident. American Family’s own records, however, indicated that the named insureds on the policy at the time of the accident were Hansen’s stepfather and mother, William and Joyce Davis (the “Davises”). In reliance upon the policy as reflected in its own records, American Family determined that Hansen was not insured under the policy and denied coverage. Hansen filed an action against American Family asserting claims for breach of contract, common law bad faith, and statutory bad faith for unreasonable delay or denial of benefits under sections 10-3-1115 and -1116, C.R.S. (2015). Prior to trial, American Family reformed the contract to name Hansen as the insured, and the parties settled the breach of contract claim, leaving only the common law and statutory bad faith claims for trial. The trial court ruled that the deviation in the records issued by American Family’s agent and those produced by its own underwriting department created an ambiguity in the insurance policy as to the identity of the named insured, and instructed the jury that an ambiguous contract must be construed against the insurer. The jury found in favor of Hansen on the statutory bad faith claim, indicating on a special verdict form that American Family had delayed or denied payment without a reasonable basis for its action. The trial court awarded Hansen attorney fees, court costs, and a statutory penalty. American Family appealed the judgment and award of statutory damages, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in finding that the lienholder statements created an ambiguity in the insurance contract as to the identity of the insured and that, at the very least, the contract was arguably unambiguous such that the company had a reasonable basis to deny coverage and could not be liable for statutory bad faith. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the lienholder statements created an ambiguity and that, even assuming American Family’s legal position was a reasonable one, American Family could still be held liable for statutory bad faith. After its reverse, the Supreme Court reversed. Because the insurance contract unambiguously named William and Joyce Davis as the insureds at the time of the accident, the trial court and court of appeals erred in relying on extrinsic evidence to find an ambiguity in the insurance contract, "[a]n ambiguity must appear in the four corners of the document before extrinsic evidence can be considered." Accordingly, American Family’s denial of Hansen’s claim in reliance on the unambiguous insurance contract was reasonable, and American Family could not be held liable under sections 10-3-1115 and -1116 for statutory bad faith. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc99.html" target="_blank">View "Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hansen" on Justia Law</a>
2016-06-20stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtAllison H. Eid14SC99http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc998.htmlColorado Motor Vehicle Dealer Board v. Freeman2016-06-20T07:30:51-08:002016-06-20T11:56:43-08:00
Jeffery Freeman was convicted of third degree assault on an at-risk adult. Later, when he applied for a motor vehicle salesperson’s license, the Colorado Motor Vehicle Dealer Board (the Board) denied his application pursuant to the mandatory disqualification statute, section12-6-118(7)(a)(I), C.R.S.(2015). Under the statute, a person who has been convicted of a felony “in violation of article3, 4 or 5 of title 18, C.R.S., or any similar crime” must have his or her application for a license to sell cars denied. The question before the Supreme Court was whether Freeman’s conviction for the felony offense of third degree assault on an at-risk person was a “felony in violation of article 3” for the purpose of the mandatory disqualification statute, where the elements of the crime were contained in section 18-3-204, but the felony enhancement provision was contained in section 18-6.5-103(3)(c). Because the felony enhancement for third degree assault did not constitute a separate offense under "Colorado v. McKinney," (99 P.3d 1038, 1043 (Colo. 2004)), the Supreme Court concluded that Freeman was convicted of a felony “in violation of article 3. . . of title 18,”and therefore he was ineligible to receive a motor vehicle salesperson’s license under section 12-6-118(7)(a)(I). Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals holding to the contrary, and remanded for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc998.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado Motor Vehicle Dealer Board v. Freeman" on Justia Law</a>
2016-06-20stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice14SC998http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc768.htmlHutchins v. La Plata MountaIn re ., Inc.2016-06-20T07:30:51-08:002016-06-20T11:55:59-08:00
Petitioners Scot Hutchins and John Casper petitioned for review of a court of appeals’ judgment affirming the district court’s ruling in favor of La Plata Mountain Resources, Inc. (La Plata) in an action brought by La Plata to collect on certain debentures issued by Leadville Mining and foreclose on a deed of trust securing the debts. Although Leadville’s authorized agent had signed documents acknowledging its obligations for the amounts owed on other similar debentures held by Hutchins and Gasper, the applicable statute of limitations had run on any action by Hutchins and Gasper to collect on the debts or foreclose on the deed of trust, leaving La Plata as the sole secured creditor. Because the documents in question were in writing, were signed by Leadville, and contained a clear and unqualified acknowledgement of the debt owed to Hutchins and Gasper, the Supreme Court concluded they constituted a new promise to pay, establishing a new accrual date and effectively extending the limitations period on collection of the debt, according to the statutes and case law of this jurisdiction, whether or not the documents in question also successfully modified the terms of the debentures. The judgment of the court of appeals in this case was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc768.html" target="_blank">View "Hutchins v. La Plata MountaIn re ., Inc." on Justia Law</a>
2016-06-20stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtCoats13SC768http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc1.htmlMartinez v. Mintz2016-05-31T08:30:49-08:002016-05-31T10:34:06-08:00
Plaintiff’s initial attorneys were discharged for cause and replaced by successor counsel. Initial counsel had been hired on a contingency basis. When discharged, they asserted a lien against any settlement or judgment entered in the underlying action and in favor of the plaintiff. The underlying action was subsequently settled, and successor counsel filed a motion to void the lien. Initial counsel responded by moving to strike successor counsel’s motion and to compel arbitration, based on an arbitration clause contained in initial counsel’s contingent fee agreement with the plaintiff. The district court ultimately concluded that this dispute was between the lawyers, and thus, the arbitration clause contained in initial counsel’s contingent fee agreement with the plaintiff did not apply. The court then determined that initial counsel was not entitled to fees because it had been discharged for cause, and under the express terms of the contingent fee agreement, it had forfeited the right to those fees. Initial counsel appealed, and a division of the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that successor counsel’s motion to void the lien at issue was properly filed in the underlying action and that the underlying action was a “proper civil action.” In light of this determination, the Supreme court further concluded that the lien dispute was between initial and successor counsel and that therefore, the matter: (1) was not subject to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in initial counsel’s contingent fee agreement with the plaintiff; and (2) was properly before the district court. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc1.html" target="_blank">View "Martinez v. Mintz" on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-31stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtGabriel14SC1http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sa26.htmlUpper Eagle Reg'l Water Auth. v. Wolfe2016-05-31T08:30:49-08:002016-05-31T10:34:40-08:00
On July 4, 2004, the Upper Eagle Regional Water Authority (the “Authority”) diverted 0.716 cubic feet per second (“cfs”) of water at the Edwards Drinking Water Facility on the Eagle River and delivered that water to the Cordillera area for beneficial use. On that date, there was a “free river” (meaning that there was no call on the Colorado or Eagle Rivers). Of the water diverted and delivered to Cordillera, the Authority allocated 0.47 cfs to its Eagle River Diversion Point No. 2 conditional water right (the “Junior Eagle River Right”) and filed an application to make this amount absolute. The State and Division Engineers opposed the application, asserting that the Authority could not make its Junior Eagle River Right absolute when it owned another, more senior conditional water right, the SCR Diversion Point No. 1 water right (the “Senior Lake Creek Right”), decreed for the same claimed beneficial uses at the same location and for diversion at the same point. The water court agreed with the Engineers, and held that the July 4, 2004, diversion had to be allocated first to the Senior Lake Creek Right. The Authority appealed, and the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that where there was no evidence of waste, hoarding, or other mischief, and no injury to the rights of other water users, the owner of a portfolio of water rights was entitled to select which of its different, in-priority conditional water rights it wished to first divert and make absolute. "[T]he portfolio owner must live with its choice. Since it has chosen to make a portion of the Junior Eagle River Right absolute, the Authority may not now divert and use the Senior Lake Creek Right unless it demonstrates that it needs that water right in addition to the Junior Eagle River Right." <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sa26.html" target="_blank">View "Upper Eagle Reg'l Water Auth. v. Wolfe" on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-31stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtAllison H. Eid15SA26http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc224.htmlFleury v. IntraWest Winter Park Operations Corp.2016-05-31T08:30:47-08:002016-05-31T10:35:16-08:00
Petitioner Salynda E. Fleury brought a negligence and wrongful death suit against respondent IntraWest Winter Park Operations Corporation (“Winter Park”) after her husband was killed in an in-bounds avalanche at its resort. Fleury claimed that, although Winter Park knew that avalanches were likely to occur in the area where her husband was skiing that day, it neither warned skiers about this risk nor closed the area. Winter Park filed a motion for a determination of law under C.R.C.P. 56(h) and for judgment on the pleadings under C.R.C.P. 12(c), arguing that in-bounds avalanches were an inherent risk of skiing as defined in the Ski Safety Act of 1979 (SSA) and that the SSA therefore precluded the lawsuit. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action pursuant to section 33-44-112. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal in a split decision. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed: the definition of “inherent dangers and risks of skiing” in section 33-44-103(3.5), C.R.S. (2015), specifically included “snow conditions as they exist or may change.” This phrase encompassed an in-bounds avalanche, "which is, at its core, the movement, or changing condition, of snow." <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc224.html" target="_blank">View "Fleury v. IntraWest Winter Park Operations Corp." on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-31stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtAllison H. Eid14SC224http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc815-0.htmlTravelers Prop. Cas. Co. v. Stresscon Co.2016-05-23T07:30:37-08:002016-05-23T08:45:09-08:00
Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (Travelers) petitioned for review of a court of appeals judgment affirming the district court’s denial of its motion for directed verdict in a lawsuit brought by its insured, Stresscon Corporation. Stresscon, a subcontracting concrete company, filed suit against Travelers, alleging, among other things, that Travelers acted in bad faith, unreasonably delaying or denying its claim for covered insurance benefits; and Stresscon sought awards of two times the covered benefits along with fees and costs, as prescribed by statute. Stresscon’s claims for relief arose from a serious construction accident in July 2007, which was caused by a crane operator employed by a company that was itself a subcontractor of Stresscon. Stresscon’s general contractor, Mortenson, sought damages from Stresscon, asserting Stresson’s contractual liability for the resulting construction delays, and Stresscon in turn sought indemnification from Travelers. Although there was much dispute over the factual and legal import of Travelers’ reservation of rights and other of its communications with both Stresscon and Mortenson concerning Mortenson’s claim, there was no dispute that by December 31, 2008, Travelers had not paid the damages asserted by Mortenson. The appellate court rejected Travelers’ contention that the no-voluntary-payments clause of their insurance contract relieved it of any obligation to indemnify Stresscon for payments Stresscon had made without its consent. Instead, the court of appeals found that the Colorato Supreme Court's opinion in "Friedland v. Travelers Indemnity Co.," (105 P.3d 639 (2005)) had effectively overruled prior “no voluntary payments” jurisprudence to the contrary and given Stresscon a similar opportunity. The Supreme Court found that its adoption of a notice-prejudice rule in "Friedland" did not overrule any existing “no voluntary payments” jurisprudence in Colorado, and because the Court declined to extend notice-prejudice reasoning in Friedland to Stresscon’s voluntary payments, made in the face of the no-voluntary-payments clause of its insurance contract with Travelers, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc815-0.html" target="_blank">View "Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. v. Stresscon Co." on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-23stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtCoats13SC815http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc514.htmlE.S.V. v. Colorado in the Interest of C.E.M.2016-05-23T07:30:36-08:002016-05-23T08:45:41-08:00
In this case, E.S.V. (“mother”) challenged the termination of her parental rights with respect to C.E.M. and M.F.M. (“children”). Mother’s treatment plan included as one of its objectives that mother would “demonstrate appropriate protective capacities to ensure her children’s safety.” To achieve this objective, mother was required to report to her caseworker and the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) any contact that she had with the children’s abusive father. The district court found that mother had failed to report numerous contacts with father and was unable or unwilling to internalize the safety concerns at which the treatment plan was directed, despite the efforts of many professionals and treatment providers. The court therefore terminated mother’s parental rights as to the children. Mother appealed this ruling, and a division of the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court concluded that the evidence amply supported the district court’s decision to terminate mother’s parental rights. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc514.html" target="_blank">View "E.S.V. v. Colorado in the Interest of C.E.M." on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-23stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtGabriel15SC514http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc57.htmlColorado in the Interest of J.G.2016-05-23T07:30:35-08:002016-05-23T08:46:13-08:00
After a jury found that the environment of M.L.’s four children was injurious to their welfare, the trial court adjudicated the children dependent or neglected. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to resolve two points: (1)whether determination of a child’s status as dependent or neglected under the injurious environment provision of Article 3 of the Colorado Children’s Code must take into account each parent’s actions or failures to act; and (2)whether findings as to parental fault are required to adjudicate a child dependent or neglected under the same provision. Mother (“M.L.”) appealed a jury’s finding that the environment for four of her five children was injurious to their welfare and the trial court’s resulting adjudication. Relying on "Troxel v. Granville," (530 U.S. 57 (2000)), the court of appeals agreed with M.L. and reversed the trial court’s adjudication. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Troxel’s due process requirements did not necessitate that the State prove that both parents lack the availability, ability, and willingness to provide reasonable parental care before a child may be adjudicated dependent or neglected under the injurious environment provision. Additionally, the Court held that neither the plain language of the dependency or neglect statute nor Troxel required the State to prove parental fault when adjudicating a child dependent or neglected under the injurious environment provision. Hence, the trial court’s jury instructions were consistent with the plain language of the statute and the trial court did not err when it allowed the jury to find that the children’s environment was injurious to their welfare without first requiring the jury to make findings of parental fault. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc57.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado in the Interest of J.G." on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-23stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtBrian D. Boatright15SC57http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sa292.htmlCarson v. Reiner2016-05-23T07:30:34-08:002016-05-23T08:46:42-08:00
On October 27, 2015,one week before the November 3 regular biennial school board election for Mesa County Valley School District 51, three registered electors of the school district, Kent Carson, James “Gil” Tisue, and Dale Pass, filed a verified petition with the district court, challenging as wrongful the certification of one of the candidates. Carson and two other electors of Mesa County Valley School District 51 sought certiorari review of the district court’s order denying their requested relief concerning a school board election. After review, the Supreme Court found that C.R.S. section 1-1-113(1) did not permit a challenge to an election official’s certification of a candidate to the ballot, solely on the basis of the certified candidate’s qualification, once the period permitted by section 1-4-501(3), C.R.S. (2015), for challenging the qualification of the candidate directly has expired. Therefore the district court's ruling was affirmed. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sa292.html" target="_blank">View "Carson v. Reiner" on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-23stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtCoats15SA292http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc787.htmlOpen Door Ministries v. Lipschuetz2016-05-23T07:30:34-08:002016-05-23T08:47:20-08:00
In June 2010, the Denver City Council passed Ordinance 333, replacing the old zoning code but including an exception that allowed any person seeking to “erect or alter structures” to apply for a permit under the old zoning code until December 30, 2010. On December 30, 2010, Open Door Ministries (Open Door) applied for a use permit under the old code to change the use of 740 Clarkson Street to provide transitional housing for people in need. The Denver Zoning Authority (“the DZA”) issued the rooming and boarding permit. Open Door then purchased the property for $700,000; made improvements to the property; and began providing room and board to people at risk of becoming homeless. Several months later, Jesse Lipschuetz, who owned a home adjacent to 740 Clarkson, sought administrative review of the DZA’s decision to issue the permit. He argued that Open Door did not meet the exception under Ordinance 333 because the permit was for a change of use, not to “erect or alter” a structure. The DZA defended its decision to issue the permit, explaining that it had consistently interpreted the exception to allow parties to seek any kind of permit under the old zoning code until December30, 2010. The trial court concluded that the City should not have issued the permit, but stayed its order to revoke the permit until Open Door’s cross-claims were resolved. Several months later, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Open Door on the cross-claims. On appeal, Lipschuetz argued that Open Door’s cross-claims against the City were barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act because they “could lie in tort.” Because Open Door did not notify the City prior to filing its cross-claims, Lipschuetz argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the cross-claims. The court of appeals agreed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the court of appeals failed to consider whether, at the time of filing, Open Door had suffered an injury that would subject its cross-claims to the Act. The Court concluded that the Act did not apply to Open Door’s request for prospective relief to prevent future injury. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc787.html" target="_blank">View "Open Door Ministries v. Lipschuetz" on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-23stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice14SC787http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sa268.htmlColorado v. Roberson2016-05-16T08:00:37-08:002016-05-17T04:47:14-08:00
The State challenged a district court order denying the probation department's complaint to revoke Bryan Roberson's sex offender intensive supervision probation (SOISP). The State sought to revoke probation because Roberson (among other thins) allegedly failed to participate in a sex offender evaluation and treatment program, allegedly refusing to answer during a polygraph test. Roberson refused to answer on advice of counsel, fearing that the answers would be used against him in future criminal proceedings (he had a direct appeal of his conviction pending at the time of the polygraph test). The district court denied the State's revocation complaint, concluding that answering the questions would have violated Roberson's Fifth Amendment rights to self-incrimination. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court and affirmed. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sa268.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Roberson" on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-16stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtGabriel13SA268http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc587.htmlColorado v. Ruch2016-05-16T08:00:35-08:002016-05-17T04:47:16-08:00
As a condition of probation, the trial court ordered Carl Ruch to complete a sex offender polygraph and participate in sex offense specific treatment intervention. Ruch refused such treatment, contending that participating would have violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Due to this refusal, the trial court revoked Ruch's probation and sentenced him to a prison term. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Ruch's Fifth Amendment rights would have been violated had he complied with the trial court's order. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether Ruch's probation officer would have sought to revoke probation based solely on the other probation violations, and if so, whether the trial court would have revoked on other grounds. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court found no Fifth Amendment violation, finding Ruch's purported invocation of the Fifth was premature and amounted to a "prohibited blanket assertion of the privilege." <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc587.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Ruch" on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-16stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtGabriel13SC587http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc216.htmlColorado v. Corson2016-05-16T08:00:34-08:002016-05-17T04:47:21-08:00
In 2001 when he was twenty-eight years old, respondent David Corson had a sexual relationship with "K.B.," a seventeen-year-old client of the residential treatment facility where Corson worked. Two years later, he pled guilty to sexual assault on a child, position of trust. The prosecution agreed to recommend a sentence of probation and dismiss a separate charge. Approximately three years before this plea, the prosecutor in this case obtained a juvenile adjudication against K.B. for falsely reporting a sexual assault. That case had no connection except that it could have been used to impeach K.B.'s credibility at Corson's trial. This adjudication was not disclosed to Corson, and as a result, he sought to overturn his conviction. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the court of appeals reversed. The Attorney General petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Corson argued that the State's non-disclosure rendered his plea involuntary and his plea counsel ineffective. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding no due process violation, that Corson knew of K.B.'s adjudication prior to his plea, and that the adjudication was not part of K.B.'s criminal history and therefore not subject to automatic disclosure. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc216.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Corson" on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-16stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III13SC216http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa51.htmlIn the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 20152016-05-16T08:00:34-08:002016-05-17T04:47:19-08:00
Initiative #63 would establish a right to a healthy environment in Colorado by amending the state Constitution. Petitioners argued the text of the Initiative filed a motion to the Title Board, arguing the Initiative as written was misleading and contained multiple subjects. The Supreme Court reviewed the Title Board's action setting the title, ballot title and submission clause for the Initiative, and concluded that the Initiative contained a single subject, and that the title clearly expressed the subject and was not misleading. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa51.html" target="_blank">View "In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2015" on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-16stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III16SA51http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc951.htmlColorado v. Penn2016-05-16T08:00:33-08:002016-05-17T04:47:24-08:00
Brian Penn was convicted by jury of unlawful sexual contact. On appeal, he argued that the county court erred in allowing an investigating officer to testify that he "had reason to arrest the defendant for a crime that had been committed." The district court agreed and reversed the conviction. The State moved for reconsideration which was denied, then appealed to the Supreme Court. Penn moved to dismiss the State's appeal, arguing it was outside the time limit set by Colorado Appellate Rule 52(a). The Supreme Court granted certiorari review and concluded that the State's petition was timely, and that the county court's admission of the officer's testimony was not reversible plain error. The Court reversed the district court and remanded for reinstatement of Penn's conviction. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc951.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Penn" on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-16stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtMonica M. Márquez14SC951http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc586.htmlLiberty Mortg. Corp. v. Fiscus2016-05-16T08:00:31-08:002016-05-17T04:47:27-08:00
Petitioner Branch Banking and Trust Company (BB&T) petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for review of whether a deed of trust securing a promissory note was a negotiable instrument under Colorado's Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The court of appeals held that deeds of trust were not negotiable instruments within the meaning of Article 3 of the UCC, therefore BB&T was not a holder in due course with respect to the deed at issue here. The Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds: in this case, the deed and other documents were forged. "[E]ven assuming a deed of trust qualifies as a negotiable instrument, holder-in-due-course status does not preclude a purported maker from asserting a forgery defense." Here, the purported maker possessed a valid forgery defense, his negligence didn't contribute to the forgery, and he did not ratify the forged documents. As such, the Court did not reach the issue of negotiability under Article 3 of the UCC. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc586.html" target="_blank">View "Liberty Mortg. Corp. v. Fiscus" on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-16stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtAllison H. Eid14SC586http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc668.htmlCity of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil and Gas Ass'n2016-05-02T07:30:32-08:002016-05-02T12:20:36-08:00
The citizens of home-rule city Fort Collins voted in favor of a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing and the storage of its waste products within city limits. The Colorado Oil and Gas Association (the Association), an industry organization, sued Fort Collins and requested: (1) a declaratory judgment declaring that the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, and the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, preempted Fort Collins’s fracking moratorium; and (2) a permanent injunction enjoining the enforcement of the moratorium. The Association subsequently moved for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claim, and Fort Collins filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asking the district court to find that the moratorium was not preempted by state law. The Supreme Court concluded that "fracking is a matter of mixed state and local concern," Fort Collins’s fracking moratorium was subject to preemption by state law. Furthermore, the Court concluded that Fort Collins’s five-year moratorium on fracking and the storage of fracking waste operationally conflicted with the effectuation of state law. Accordingly, the Court held that the moratorium was preempted by state law and was, therefore, invalid and unenforceable. The district court’s order was affirmed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc668.html" target="_blank">View "City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil and Gas Ass'n" on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-02stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtGabriel15SC668http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc667.htmlCity of Longmont v. Colo. Oil and Gas Ass'n2016-05-02T07:30:32-08:002016-05-02T12:20:38-08:00
The citizens of home-rule City of Longmont voted in favor of a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing and the storage of its waste products within city limits. Thereafter, the Colorado Oil and Gas Association (the Association), an industry organization, sued Longmont seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating, and a permanent injunction enjoining Longmont from enforcing, Article XVI. "In a lengthy and thorough written order," the district court granted these motions, ruling that the Oil and Gas Conservation Act preempted Longmont’s bans on fracking and the storage and disposal of fracking waste. Longmont and the citizen intervenors argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that: (1) the district court erred in its preemption analysis; and (2) the inalienable rights provision of the Colorado Constitution trumped any preemption analysis and required the Supreme Court to conclude that ArticleXVI superseded state law. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc667.html" target="_blank">View "City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil and Gas Ass'n" on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-02stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtGabriel15SC667http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc123.htmlCity of Englewood v. Harrell2016-05-02T07:30:31-08:002016-05-02T12:24:39-08:00
The Colorado Supreme Court accepted this case from the court of appeals because it had granted certiorari in two other cases involving similar issues ("City of Littleton v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office," 2016 CO 25, ___ P.3d ___, and "Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Town of Castle Rock," 2016 CO 26, ___ P.3d ___). In these cases, the Court interpreted section 8-41-209, C.R.S. (2015), of the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado, which provided workers’ compensation overage, under certain conditions, for occupational diseases affecting firefighters. An employer can show, by a preponderance of the medical evidence, either: (1) that a firefighter’s known or typical occupational exposures are not capable of causing the type of cancer at issue, or (2) that the firefighter’s employment did not cause the firefighter’s particular cancer where, for example, the claimant firefighter was not exposed to the cancer-causing agent, or where the medical evidence renders it more probable that the cause of the claimant’s cancer was not job-related. Englewood firefighter Delvin Harrell was diagnosed with melanoma, underwent surgery to remove it, and sought workers' compensation benefits. Englewood sought to overcome the statutory presumption. Because the ALJ and the Panel in this case did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's analysis in City of Littleton and Town of Castle Rock, it set aside the Panel’s order affirming the ALJ and remanded this case to the Panel with directions to return the matter to the ALJ for reconsideration in light of the "Littleton" and "Castle Rock" decisions. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc123.html" target="_blank">View "City of Englewood v. Harrell" on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-02stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtMonica M. Márquez14SC123http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc560.htmlIndus. Claim Appeals Office v. Town of Castle Rock2016-05-02T07:30:31-08:002016-05-02T12:22:14-08:00
Castle Rock firefighter Mike Zukowski was diagnosed with melanoma. He had three surgeries to remove the melanoma and was then released to return to work on full duty. He sought both medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits under the "firefighter statute" of the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado, asserting that his melanoma qualified as a compensable occupational disease. At issue here was whether Zukowski’s employer, the Town of Castle Rock, and Castle Rock’s insurer, the Colorado Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency (collectively, “Castle Rock”), could overcome a statutory presumption that Zukowski’s condition resulted from his employment as a firefighter by presenting evidence indicating that Zukowski’s risk of melanoma from other sources was greater than his risk of melanoma from firefighting. After review, the Supreme Court held that the employer, through a preponderance of the evidence, could meet its burden to show the firefighter's cancer "did not occur on the job" by establishing the absence of specific causation. Here, Castle Rock sought to establish the absence of specific causation by presenting evidence indicated that Zukowski's particular risk of developing melanoma from other, non-job-related sources outweighed his risk of developing it from on-the-job, and that an employer could rely on such evidence to overcome the statutory presumption. The Court affirmed the court of appeals and remanded this case back to the ALJ for reconsideration. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc560.html" target="_blank">View "Indus. Claim Appeals Office v. Town of Castle Rock" on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-02stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtMonica M. Márquez13SC560http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/12sc871.htmlCity of Littleton v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office2016-05-02T07:30:30-08:002016-05-02T12:22:20-08:00
Littleton firefighter Jeffrey Christ was diagnosed with glioblastoma multiforme (“GBM,” a type of brain cancer). After undergoing surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation, he returned to work, but ultimately died as a result of the disease. He (and later his widow and child) sought workers’ compensation benefits to cover his cancer treatment, asserting that his brain cancer qualified as a compensable occupational disease under the “firefighter statute” of the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado. .At issue here was whether Christ’s employer, the City of Littleton, and Littleton’s insurer, Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc. (collectively “Littleton”), successfully overcame a statutory presumption that Christ’s condition resulted from his employment as a firefighter. After review, the Supreme Court held that the employer, through a preponderance of the evidence, could meet its burden to show the firefighter's cancer "did not occur on the job" by establishing the absence of specific causation. Here, the ALJ applied the statutory presumption and found that Littleton established by a preponderance that Christ's GBM condition was not caused by his occupational exposures. A panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (“Panel”) reversed, concluding that Littleton’s medical evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption. In a split decision, a division of the court of appeals affirmed the Panel. Because the Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals’ interpretation of the breadth of the statutory presumption and of the employer’s burden to overcome the presumption, the Court concluded that the court of appeals erroneously evaluated the medical evidence presented by Littleton and erroneously failed to defer to the ALJ’s findings of fact, which are supported by substantial evidence. The court of appeals' judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded back to the Panel for reinstatement of the ALJ’s original findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/12sc871.html" target="_blank">View "City of Littleton v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office" on Justia Law</a>
2016-05-02stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtMonica M. Márquez12SC871http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa48.htmlIn the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2015-2016 #732016-04-25T07:30:32-08:002016-04-25T12:05:32-08:00
Proponents Mike Spalding and David Ottke proposed Initiative #73, which would amend article XXI of the Colorado Constitution to change the procedures leading to and the conduct of recall elections for state and local elective officials. A review and comment hearing was held before representatives of the Offices of Legislative Counsel and Legislative Legal Services. Thereafter, the proponents submitted a final version of their proposed initiative to the Secretary of State for purposes of submission to the Title Board. The Title Board conducted a hearing, concluded that the proposed initiative contained a single subject, and set a title. Petitioner Phillip Hayes filed a motion for rehearing, contending that the title comprised multiple subjects and was misleading, confusing, and inaccurate. Hayes petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for review The Supreme Court concluded that Initiative #73 contained one subject, namely, the manner in which recall elections are triggered and conducted; however, the title set by the Title Board did not satisfy the clear title requirement because it did not alert voters to central elements of the initiative; it was misleading as to other elements; and, as all parties agreed, it unnecessarily recited existing law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Title Board and returned this measure to the Board to fix a new title. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/16sa48.html" target="_blank">View "In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2015-2016 #73" on Justia Law</a>
2016-04-25stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtGabriel16SA48http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc996.htmlBP Am. v. Colo. Dept. of Revenue2016-04-25T07:30:31-08:002016-04-25T12:04:46-08:00
The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether 39-29-105(1)(a) permitted a deduction for the “cost of capital” associated with natural gas transportation and processing facilities. In general terms, the cost of capital was defined as the amount of money that an investor could have earned on a different investment of similar risk. In this case, the cost of capital was the amount of money that BP America Production Company’s (“BP”) predecessors could have earned had they invested in other ventures rather than in building transportation and processing facilities. BP claimed it could deduct the cost of capital because it was a cost associated with transportation and processing activity. Respondent Colorado Department of Revenue argued that the cost of capital was not a deductible cost because it was not an actual cost. The court of appeals held that the cost of capital as not a deductible cost under the statute. BP appealed, and the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of section 39-29-102(3)(a) authorized a deduction for any transportation, manufacturing, and processing costs and that the cost of capital was a deductible cost that resulted from investment in transportation and processing facilities. The appellate court was reversed and the case remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc996.html" target="_blank">View "BP Am. v. Colo. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law</a>
2016-04-25stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtBrian D. Boatright13SC996http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sa244.htmlColo. Ethics Watch v. Indep. Ethics Comm'n2016-04-25T07:30:30-08:002016-04-25T12:01:51-08:00
In 2006, Colorado voters passed Amendment 41 and created Independent Ethics Commission (IEC), an independent commission tasked with investigating allegations of government officials’ misconduct. In an original proceeding, the issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the IEC's decision to dismiss a complaint against a public officer as frivolous is subject to judicial review. The plaintiff contended that the General Assembly authorized such review when it enacted section 24-18.5-101(9), C.R.S. (2015), which provided that “[a]ny final action of the commission concerning a complaint shall be subject to judicial review.” The Supreme Court found that the Colorado Constitution forbade the General Assembly from “limit[ing] or restrict[ing]” IEC’s powers. Moreover, although the constitution provided that “penalties may be provided by law,” it also provided that IEC “may dismiss frivolous complaints without conducting a public hearing,” The Supreme Court concluded that, while the General Assembly could authorize judicial review of IEC’s enforcement decisions, it could not encroach upon IEC’s decisions not to enforce. Therefore, the Court held the General Assembly’s “judicial review” provision did not apply to frivolity dismissals. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sa244.html" target="_blank">View "Colo. Ethics Watch v. Indep. Ethics Comm'n" on Justia Law</a>
2016-04-25stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice15SA244http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc815.htmlTravelers Prop. Cas. Co. v. Stresscon Co.2016-04-25T07:30:30-08:002016-04-25T12:04:12-08:00
Stresscon Corporation, a subcontracting concrete company, filed suit against Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, alleging, among other things, that Travelers acted in bad faith, unreasonably delaying or denying its claim for covered insurance benefits; and Stresscon sought awards of two times the covered benefits along with fees and costs, as prescribed by statute. Stresscon’s claims for relief arose from a 2007 serious construction accident which was caused by a crane operator employed by a company that was itself a subcontractor of Stresscon. Stresscon’s general contractor, Mortenson, sought damages from Stresscon, asserting Stresson’s contractual liability for the resulting construction delays, and Stresscon in turn sought indemnification from Travelers. Travelers petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the district court’s denial of its motion for directed verdict in a lawsuit brought by its insured, Stresscon. Much as the district court had done, the appellate court rejected Travelers’ contention that the no-voluntary-payments clause of their insurance contract relieved it of any obligation to indemnify Stresscon for payments Stresscon had made without its consent. Instead, the court of appeals found that the Colorado Supreme Court's opinion in "Friedland v. Travelers Indemnity Co.," (105 P.3d 639 (2005)) had effectively overruled the Court's prior “no voluntary payments” jurisprudence to the contrary and given Stresscon a similar opportunity. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that its adoption of a notice-prejudice rule in "Friedland" did not overrule any existing “no voluntary payments” jurisprudence. The Court declined to extend a notice-prejudice reasoning to Stresscon’s voluntary payments, made in the face of the no-voluntary-payments clause of its insurance contract with Travelers. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc815.html" target="_blank">View "Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. v. Stresscon Co." on Justia Law</a>
2016-04-25stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtCoats13SC815http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sa165.htmlIn re Colorado v. Chavez2016-04-18T07:05:35-08:002016-04-18T12:16:43-08:00
Defendant Saul Chavez was charged with one count of sexual assault. The alleged victim lived in a home with other members of her family. The State alleged that Chavez, a family friend, had been allowed to stay the night at the victim’s house after drinking alcohol late into the evening. The State further alleged that Chavez entered a bedroom where the victim was asleep, where he engaged in sexual intercourse with her, without her consent, while she was physically helpless. Chavez filed a motion requesting court-ordered access to the home (the scene of the alleged crime). He argued that he needed access in order to “be able to investigate and photograph the property for his defense.” Chavez cited Crim. P. 16(I)(d) in support of his motion, arguing that, under that rule, the court had “discretionary power” to order the disclosure of “relevant material and information.” The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether a trial court had the authority to grant a defendant’s discovery motion seeking access to the private residence of a non-party. The Court held that the trial court lacked the authority to order such access, and abused its discretion by its order. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sa165.html" target="_blank">View "In re Colorado v. Chavez" on Justia Law</a>
2016-04-18stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice15SA165http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc298.htmlColorado in the Interest of E.G.2016-04-18T07:05:34-08:002016-04-18T12:17:19-08:00
Defendant E.G. was convicted of two counts of sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of sexual abuse. Before trial, he filed a motion requesting court-ordered access to the scene of the crime, his grandmother’s basement. The trial court concluded that it had no authority to order such access and denied the motion. The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning, though not its result, holding that atrial court does indeed have authority to order defense access to a third-party residence. It nevertheless affirmed the denial of the motion for access because it concluded that E.G. had “failed to demonstrate” that inspection of the crime scene was “necessary to present his defense.” The Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked the authority to order access to a private residence, and therefore affirmed the court of appeals on alternate grounds. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sc298.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado in the Interest of E.G." on Justia Law</a>
2016-04-18stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice15SC298http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc931.htmlKlingsheim v. Cordell2016-04-04T08:00:27-08:002016-04-04T09:11:40-08:00
The Cordells were the record owners of a tract of land in La Plata County (Tract1), and Mr. Cordell was also the record owner of an adjoining tract that had been deeded to him by his grandmother (Tract2). After the Cordells failed to pay the taxes owed on these properties for three successive years, Brenda Heller purchased tax liens for each tract and later assigned these liens to Bradley Klingsheim. Thereafter, Klingsheim requested deeds for the properties from the Treasurer. The question this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review principally required the Court to determine the scope of a county treasurer’s duty of diligent inquiry, pursuant to section 39-11-128(1), C.R.S. (2015), in attempting to notify a taxpayer that his or her land may be sold to satisfy a tax lien. The Cordells contended that the deeds were void because the La Plata County Treasurer’s Office had not fulfilled its statutory duty of diligent inquiry in attempting to notify the Cordells that it would be issuing a tax deed for the Cordells’ properties. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that a county treasurer had an initial duty to serve notice of a pending tax sale on every person in actual possession or occupancy of the property at issue, as well as on the person in whose name the property was taxed or specially assessed, if upon diligent inquiry, such persons can be found in the county or if their residences outside the county are known. In addition, we hold that a treasurer owed a duty of further diligent inquiry after an initial notice has been sent only when the facts known to the treasurer show that the taxpayer could not have received the notice of the pending tax sale. The Court concluded the Treasurer satisfied its duty of diligent inquiry. In addition, the Court concluded that the notice that the Treasurer provided in this case satisfied due process requirements. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc931.html" target="_blank">View "Klingsheim v. Cordell" on Justia Law</a>
2016-04-04stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtGabriel14SC931http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sa348.htmlCty. of Boulder v. Boulder & Weld Cty. Ditch Co.2016-03-21T08:00:26-08:002016-03-21T08:42:11-08:00
Boulder County chose to develop "the Bailey Farm" into a public open-space park which would feature several ponds formed from abandoned gravel pits filled with groundwater. The County had to replace out-of-priority stream depletions caused by evaporation from those ponds. To meet this obligation, the County filed an application for underground water rights, approval of a plan for augmentation, a change of water rights, and an appropriative right of substitution and exchange. The water court dismissed the application without prejudice, and the County now appeals that judgment. The components of the County’s application were interdependent, such that approval of the application as a whole hinged on approval of the plan for augmentation, which in turn hinged on approval of the change of water rights. To ensure this change would not unlawfully expand the Bailey Farm's water rights, the County conducted a parcel-specific historical consumptive use (“HCU”) analysis of that right. The water court found this HCU analysis inadequate for several reasons and therefore concluded the County failed to carry its burden of accurately demonstrating HCU. The pivotal consideration in this case was whether the County carried its burden of proving HCU. Like the water court, the Supreme Court concluded it did not. The Court therefore affirmed the water court’s judgment on that basis. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sa348.html" target="_blank">View "Cty. of Boulder v. Boulder & Weld Cty. Ditch Co." on Justia Law</a>
2016-03-21stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III14SA348http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/12sc1005.htmlColorado v. Graves2016-02-29T09:00:33-08:002016-02-29T10:43:57-08:00
The Colorado Supreme Court granted the State's petition to review a district court's order that concluded that the "lewd fondling or caress" provision of the Colorado public indecency statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The Court found that the provision did not burden a substantial amount of protected speech or expressive conduct, so it was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Moreover, because defendant's conduct in this case met any reasonable definition of "lewd fondling or caress," the statute wasnot vague as applied to his actions. The Court reversed the trial court's order holding to the contrary. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/12sc1005.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Graves" on Justia Law</a>
2016-02-29stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtMonica M. Márquez12SC1005http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sa286.htmlColorado v. Chavez-Barragan2016-02-29T09:00:33-08:002016-02-29T10:48:20-08:00
Defendant-appellee Amadeo Chavez-Barragan was charged with possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute. After the trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress certain evidence, the State appealed. The Supreme Court concluded reasonable suspicion supported the initial stop, the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sa286.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Chavez-Barragan" on Justia Law</a>
2016-02-29stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III15SA286http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/12sc585.htmlColorado v. Dean2016-02-29T09:00:32-08:002016-02-29T10:43:50-08:00
Petitioner Charles Dean was convicted by jury of second degree murder, the sentence for which carried a maximum presumptive sentencing range of twenty-four years. The trial court adjudicated him a habitual criminal and sentenced him under Colorado's habitual criminal statute. Under the corresponding parole eligibility provision governing his conviction, petitioner had to serve seventy-five percent of his sentence, here, seventy-two years, before he was eligible for parole. On appeal of that sentence, petitioner contended that the interplay of the habitual criminal statute and the parole eligibility statute, as applied to his case, violated his right to equal protection because he had to serve a longer period of incarceration before he was eligible for parole than a habitual offender with a history of more serious felony convictions. After review, the Supreme Court held that the sentencing and parole eligibility scheme for habitual criminal offenders did not violate petitioner's constitutional right to equal protection. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/12sc585.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Dean" on Justia Law</a>
2016-02-29stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtMonica M. Márquez12SC585http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc902.htmlSebastian v. Douglas County2016-02-29T09:00:31-08:002016-02-29T10:43:49-08:00
Petitioner Fabian Sebastian filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2014) action against Douglas County, the Douglas County Sheriff's Office, the Douglas County Sheriff David Weaver, and Deputy Greg Black. Petitioner alleged his Fourth Amendment right was violated when he was attacked by a K-9 police dog. The dog was released by the deputy to seize two suspects who fled a vehicle and climbed a fence; petitioner was sitting with his hands up, in the vehicle's backseat. Petitioner failed to respond to the County's motion to dismiss, then moved to set aside the resulting dismissal, claiming excusable neglect. The trial court denied petitioner's motion, and petitioner appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a full three-factor analysis under "Goodman Assocs., LLC v. Mountain Properties, LLC." The trial court performed the analysis, again denied petitioner's motion. On appeal, petitioner argued the appellate court erred in its conclusion that he did not allege a meritorious claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, but on narrower grounds: petitioner failed to allege a meritorious claim because his allegations regarding an intentional seizure consisted only of legal conclusions. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc902.html" target="_blank">View "Sebastian v. Douglas County" on Justia Law</a>
2016-02-29stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtAllison H. Eid13SC902http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc465.htmlColorado v. Perez2016-02-29T09:00:29-08:002016-02-29T10:43:47-08:00
Defendant-respondent Eduardo Perez was convicted of identity theft and criminal impersonation for using another person's Social Security Number in order to get a job. The issue his case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review involved the applicability of the culpable mental state, "knowingly," to the elements of identity theft as enumerated in 18-5-902, C.R.S. (2015). After review, the Supreme Court held that to be guilty of identity theft, an offender must have used the identifying information of another with knowledge that the information belonged to an actual person. The Court concluded that the evidence presented at respondent's trial was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that responded indeed knew the Social Security number he used belonged to actual person. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc465.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Perez" on Justia Law</a>
2016-02-29stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice13SC465http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/12sc826.htmlMulberger v. Colorado2016-02-22T09:00:30-08:002016-02-22T12:26:42-08:00
The issue for the Colorado Supreme Court's review in this case required an interpretation of the statute that provided for challenges for cause to potential jurors in criminal cases. Specifically, the issue involved the scope of the provision that directed trial courts to sustain a challenge to a potential juror who was a "compensated employee of a public law enforcement agency." Petitioner Samuel Mulberger brought a challenge to a juror who worked as a nurse for the El Paso County Jail. The nurse was paid by a governmental contractor, but was not a compensated employee of the jail. Mulberger used a peremptory challenge to dismiss the potential juror and ultimately exhausted all of his challenges. The jury found Mulberger guilty, and the court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Mulberger argued the trial court erred in concluding the contract-employee was not an employee of the public law enforcement agency, and that the trial court erroneously denied his challenge for cause, then exhausted his challenges to remove the juror. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's judgment and affirmed the court of appeals. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/12sc826.html" target="_blank">View "Mulberger v. Colorado" on Justia Law</a>
2016-02-22stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtBrian D. Boatright12SC826http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc58.htmlColorado v. Bonvicini2016-02-22T09:00:30-08:002016-02-22T12:27:19-08:00
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari review of this matter to determine whether the trial court erred by denying a challenge for cause to a potential juror who was an employee of a privately owned and operated prison. The court of appeals held that because the private prison used "sovereign police powers characteristic of law enforcement in the service of the public interest," it was a "public law enforcement agency" as used by statute. The appellate court concluded the trial court should have sustained the defendant's challenge for cause. The Supreme Court found that under the plain language of 16-10-103(1)(k) C.R.S. 2015, a private company that operates a prison was not a "public law enforcement agency" because it was not a division of a state or federal government that has the authority to investigate crimes or to arrest, prosecute or detain criminals. The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded this case for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc58.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Bonvicini" on Justia Law</a>
2016-02-22stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtBrian D. Boatright13SC58http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc339.htmlNewman, LLC v. Roberts2016-02-08T09:00:25-08:002016-02-08T12:24:55-08:00
During jury selection in this civil case, plaintiff challenged a juror for cause. The trial court denied the challenge, and in response, plaintiff exercised one of his peremptory challenges to excuse the juror. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's challenge, reversed and remanded for a new trial without examining whether the error was harmless. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded. As the Court detailed in "Colorado v. Novotny," (320 P.3d 1194 (2014)), the automatic reversal rule in the criminal context rested on the assumption that impairment of the ability to shape the jury through peremptory challenges affected a "substantial right," and amounted to a due process violation. Such impairment was per se reversible and not subject to harmless error review. "[H]owever, subsequent developments in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence wiped away the foundations of that assumption, suggesting that an error regarding the ability to shape the jury is not a due process violation, and would affect a substantial right only if it substantially affected the outcome of the trial." The Court overruled Colorado cases to the contrary and held that allowing a civil litigant fewer peremptory challenges than authorized, or than available to and exercised by the opposing party, does not, by itself, require automatic reversal. Reviewing courts must determine whether the error substantially influenced the outcome of the case in accordance with the civil harmless error rule. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc339.html" target="_blank">View "Newman, LLC v. Roberts" on Justia Law</a>
2016-02-08stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtAllison H. Eid13SC339http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc904.htmlEsquivel-Castillo v. Colorado2016-01-25T09:00:27-08:002016-01-25T09:21:36-08:00
Petitioner Salvador Esquivel-Castillo appealed the court of appeals decision to affirm his conviction for felony murder. A jury acquitted him of a separate count of kidnapping, but convicted him of felony murder for a death caused during his commission or attempted commission of kidnapping the same victim, during the same charged timeframe, by a different statutorily qualifying act of kidnapping. The appellate court rejected petitioner's assertion that a more specific kidnapping charge necessarily limited the scope of the more generally-charged felony murder county to a charge of death caused in the court of or in furtherance of the commission of kidnapping by seizing and carrying the victim from one place to another, resulting in his having been convicted of a crime with which he had never been charged. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed: the crime of kidnapping alleged more generally as an element of felony murder was not limited to the specific alternative act of kidnapping alleged in the separate kidnapping count, and therefore jury instructions as to all statutory forms of kidnapping supported by the evidence did not constructively amend the felony murder charge. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc904.html" target="_blank">View "Esquivel-Castillo v. Colorado" on Justia Law</a>
2016-01-25stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtCoats13SC904http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sa84.htmlRyals v. City of Englewood2016-01-25T09:00:27-08:002016-01-26T04:39:24-08:00
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified a question of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The issue centered on whether the City of Englewood's Ordinance 34 (effectively barring sex offenders from residing within the city) was preempted by Colorado law. The federal district court in this case concluded that such a conflict did exist because Colorado had generally opted for a policy of individualized treatment of sex offenders, and the ordinance acted as a bar to residency. The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed with the federal district court and found no conflict. With no conflict between state law and the ordinance, the Colorado Court concluded Ordinance 34 was not preempted. The case was returned to the Tenth Circuit for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sa84.html" target="_blank">View "Ryals v. City of Englewood" on Justia Law</a>
2016-01-25stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtAllison H. Eid14SA84http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sa151.htmlP.W. v. Children's Hospital2016-01-25T09:00:26-08:002016-01-25T09:21:11-08:00
The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review stemmed from a medical malpractice action, and whether, as a matter of law, a known suicidal patient admitted to the secure mental health unit of a hospital and place under high risk precautions, could be subject to a comparative negligence defense when the patient attempted suicide while in the hospital's custody. P.W. sued Children's Hospital both individually and as conservator of his son K.W., who was in a minimally conscious state after an unsuccessful attempt to kill himself by hanging while at the Hospital. The trial court granted P.W.'s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Hospital's comparative negligence and assumption of risk defenses. The trial court also issued an order preventing the Hospital from obtaining K.W.'s pre-incident mental health records. The Hospital petitioned the Supreme Court to review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding discovery of K.W.'s mental health records; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding discovery of K.W.'s treating psychiatrist's records when they were a part of a continuing course of treatment that included Children's Hospital; and (3) whether the trial court erred in granting P.W. summary judgment dismissing the comparative negligence and assumption of risk defenses despite evidence K.W. could think rationally and protect himself from harm during the hospitalization. The Supreme Court concluded that the Hospital could not assert comparative negligence or assumption of risk as a matter of law, and that it did not need to address the trial court's discovery order. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/15sa151.html" target="_blank">View "P.W. v. Children's Hospital" on Justia Law</a>
2016-01-25stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice15SA151http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc554.htmlBaker v. Wood, Ris & Hames2016-01-19T09:00:37-08:002016-01-19T11:36:54-08:00
The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether dissatisfied beneficiaries of a testator’s estate have standing to bring legal malpractice or claims against the attorney who drafted the testator’s estate planning documents. Specifically, petitioners Merridy Kay Baker and Sue Carol Kunda sought to sue respondents Wood, Ris & Hames, Professional Corporation, Donald L. Cook, and Barbara Brundin (collectively, the Attorneys), who were the attorneys retained by their father, Floyd Baker, to prepare his estate plan. Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to abandon what was known as the "strict privity rule," which precluded attorney liability to non-clients absent fraud, malicious conduct or negligent misrepresentation. The advocated instead for a "California Test" and for an extension of the third-party beneficiary theory of contract liability (also known as the Florida-Iowa Rule), both of which petitioners asserted would allow them as the alleged beneficiaries of the estate, to sue the Attorneys for legal malpractice and breach of contract. After review of this case, the Supreme Court declined to abandon the strict privity rule, and rejected petitioners' contention that the court of appeals erred in affirming dismissal of their purported fraudulent concealment claims. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc554.html" target="_blank">View "Baker v. Wood, Ris & Hames" on Justia Law</a>
2016-01-19stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtGabriel13SC554http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc437.htmlColorado v. Marquardt2016-01-19T09:00:36-08:002016-01-19T11:36:50-08:00
Respondent Larry Marquardt was committed to the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo (CMHIP) in 2013 after having been found not guilty by reason of insanity on charges of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, assault with a deadly weapon and assault on an at-risk adult. He was diagnosed with "schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, with prominent paranoia." Respondent took ten milligrams of an antipsychotic medication once daily, but refused to take more because of a fear of the side effects, namely tardive dyskinesia. The State petitioned to have the dosage increased to a maximum of twenty milligrams daily, because respondent's psychiatrist felt that ten milligrams was only partially effective. A trial court found that the increased dosage was "necessary to prevent a significant long-term deterioration in his mental condition." The court observed that because of respondent's mental illness and insanity plea, he would never be released from the institution unless his condition improved, and concluded that respondent's need for treatment was sufficiently compelling to override "any bona fide and legitimate interest of [Marquardt] in refusing treatment." The court ordered respondent to submit to the increased dose. Respondent appealed, arguing the trial court misapplied the controlling case law precedent to his case. "Colorado v. Medina," (705 P.2d 961 (1985)) outlined the rule that courts had to follow before ordering a patient to be forcibly medicated. In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the "Medina" rule applied to petitions to increase the dose of a medication over a patient's objection. Further, the Court held that if the patient was stable, a lack of improvement, without more, did not satisfy Medina's requirement that the patient be at risk of significant and likely long-term deterioration. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc437.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Marquardt" on Justia Law</a>
2016-01-19stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice14SC437http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/12sc820.htmlColorado v. Childress2016-01-11T09:00:31-08:002016-01-11T12:34:51-08:00
The State appealed a court of appeals' judgment that vacated Kenneth Childress' conviction of vehicular assault while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Though it was undisputed that Childress was not driving the vehicle at issue, the jury was instructed that he could be found guilty as a complicitor. The appellate court concluded that because vehicular assault while under the influence was a strict liability offense, no culpable mental state of the driver was required, and that the Colorado Supreme Court previously held complicitor liability inapplicable to crimes lacking a culpable mental state requirement. After review, the Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeals' judgment, clarified complicitor liability. The case was remanded for a determination of whether the jury was adequately instructed in light of the Court's holding. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/12sc820.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Childress" on Justia Law</a>
2016-01-11stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtCoats12SC820http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/12sc916.htmlDoubleday v. People2016-01-11T09:00:31-08:002016-01-11T12:32:50-08:00
A jury found petitioner John Doubleday guilty of felony murder despite finding him not guilty (based on the affirmative defense of duress) of the charged predicate offense. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and Doubleday appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that to establish that a defendant committed a predicate offense within the meaning of the Colorado felony murder statute, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of the predicate offense, including the inapplicability of any properly asserted affirmative defense to the predicate offense. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/12sc916.html" target="_blank">View "Doubleday v. People" on Justia Law</a>
2016-01-11stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtGabriel12SC916http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc152.htmlIn re Marriage of de Koning2016-01-11T09:00:30-08:002016-01-11T12:32:48-08:00
After a two-day permanent orders hearing, the trial court felt it lacked insufficient information to allocate attorney's fees in this divorce action. Therefore, the court chose to issue the decree dissolving the marriage, along with permanent orders addressing parental responsibilities, child support, the division of marital property, and spousal maintenance, but postponed a determination on fees. The hearing on fees was approximately six months later. In the gap between the permanent orders hearing and the fees hearing, Wife's counsel requested additional documents regarding her Husband's financial circumstances. Husband objected and requested a protective order, which the trial court issued. The court ultimately ordered each party to pay their own fees and costs. Wife appealed this order, and the court of appeals reversed, reasoning that the trial court should have permitted additional discovery in order to ensure an equitable determination of fees. The Supreme Court, after review, disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion, and instead held that for the purpose of deciding whether to award attorney's fees, a trial court should consider the parties' financial resources as of the date of the issuance of the decree of dissolution. The case was reversed and remanded to reinstate the trial court's protective order and the order instructing both sides to pay their own fees. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/14sc152.html" target="_blank">View "In re Marriage of de Koning" on Justia Law</a>
2016-01-11stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III14SC152http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc499.htmlColorado v. Kutlak2016-01-11T09:00:30-08:002016-01-11T12:32:42-08:00
Police arrested Levent Kutlak after he had a fight with his in-laws. A detective interviewed Kutlak at the police station. Kutlak was read his Miranda rights, after which he asked whether he could "get [his laywer] down here now, or…?" The detective responded that it might "be difficult" to get in touch with the attorney. Moments later, Kutlak stated that he was going to "take a dice roll" and talk with the detective. Kutlak signed a Miranda waiver and proceeded to make incriminating statements regarding the in-laws incident. Kutlak later moved to suppress the statements he gave the detective. The trial court denied the motion and a jury convicted Kutlak on charges of child abuse, first degree criminal trespass and two counts of third degree assault. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. The State appealed, and after review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. The Court concluded that Kutlak did not invoke his right to counsel and he otherwise validly waived his Miranda rights prior to making incriminating statements about himself. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2016/13sc499.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Kutlak" on Justia Law</a>
2016-01-11stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtMonica M. Márquez13SC499http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/13sc523.htmlRutter v. Colorado2015-12-21T09:57:18-08:002015-12-21T11:26:15-08:00
Defendant Jarrod Rutter was convicted of multiple felonies relating to the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine. Rutter was adjudicated a habitual criminal, which quadrupled the maximum presumptive range for the class-2 convictions from twenty-four to ninety-six years. Subsequent to his sentencing, the Colorado Legislature prospectively reduced the classification of the offenses for use and possession of methamphetamine, and amended the habitual criminal statute so that certain offenses no longer qualified as underlying felonies in habitual crime adjudications. The Legislature did not, however, reduce the classification for the manufacture of methamphetamine. Based on these changes, Rutter challenged the proportionality of his sentence under the Eighth Amendment. The court of appeals determined the legislative changes were prospective in nature and thus should not be considered, that all of Rutter's predicate and triggering offenses were per se grave and serious, and concluded that Rutter's sentence was not grossly disproportionate. Finding no error with the appellate court's review of Rutter's sentence, the Supreme Court affirmed. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/13sc523.html" target="_blank">View "Rutter v. Colorado" on Justia Law</a>
2015-12-21stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtBrian D. Boatright13SC523http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/14sc1045.htmlT.W. v. M.C.2015-12-21T09:57:18-08:002015-12-21T11:26:17-08:00
Central to the appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was a question of who would be the parents of two little boys. M.C. was unaware that he had become the father to the twin boys because the children's biological mother, J.Z., had told him she suffered a miscarriage. J.Z. relinquished her parental rights, and in doing do provided false information about the identity of the biological father. The trial court terminated M.C.'s parental rights and the children were put up for adoption. T.W. and A.W., the adoptive parents, were unaware of J.Z.'s deception. M.C. learned of the adoption and petitioned the court to void termination of his rights. The court reinstated M.C.'s rights, and he thereafter attempted to gain custody of the children. After a two-day bench trial, the trial court found that M.C. failed to take substantial responsibility for the children, and that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The court again terminated M.C.'s parental rights and returned custody to the adoptive parents. The court of appeals reversed and remanded back to the trial court, to "conduct a hearing on custody after affording [M.C.] a full and fair opportunity to establish a meaningful relationship" with the children. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the second termination of M.C.'s parental rights. Finding no error with the trial court's second termination decision, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/14sc1045.html" target="_blank">View "T.W. v. M.C." on Justia Law</a>
2015-12-21stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtBrian D. Boatright14SC1045http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/12sc605.htmlColorado v. Johnson2015-12-21T09:57:17-08:002015-12-21T11:23:27-08:00
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the trial court violated respondent Michael Johnson's statutory and constitutional rights by increasing his sentence on the remaining conviction on remand following a successful appeal on his other convictions. The trial court initially accepted, then rejected at sentencing, a plea agreement in which Johnson would have pled guilty to an added count of possession of a controlled substance, then the original counts would have been dismissed. The trial court rejected the plea agreement, the case proceeded to trial, and the jury found Johnson guilty of first-degree kidnapping, sexual assault, and possession of a controlled substance. Johnson was then sentenced to an aggregate sentence of twenty years to life. The court of appeals reversed and vacated the sexual assault and kidnapping convictions on double jeopardy grounds. The case was remanded for the trial court to reinstate the original plea agreement, and to resentence Johnson on the remaining possession conviction. Johnson received a twelve-year sentence (twice the length of the original six-year sentence). Johnson appealed a second time, arguing that the increased sentence violated his statutory and due process rights. The court of appeals rejected Johnson's statutory claim, but applied a presumption of vindictiveness to the trial court's resentencing and held that the sentence indeed violated Johnson's due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the court of appeals correctly rejected Johnson's statutory argument, but erred in applying the presumption of vindictiveness to the new sentence on the possession of a controlled substance conviction. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/12sc605.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Johnson" on Justia Law</a>
2015-12-21stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtBrian D. Boatright12SC605http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/13sc496.htmlColorado v. Madden2015-12-21T09:57:16-08:002015-12-21T11:23:22-08:00
Respondent Louis Madden was convicted of attempting to patronize a prostituted child and attempted third degree sexual assault by force. He was originally sentenced to an indeterminate sentence and ordered to pay costs, fees and restitution. He appealed his conviction. The attempt to patronize a prostituted child was reversed, leaving only the attempted sexual assault charge. The case was returned to the trial court with instructions to impose a determinate sentence. Madden was thereafter sentenced to three years with credit for time served. Madden moved for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The motion was granted, and the prosecution elected not to appeal or retry the case. Madden applied to be refunded that portion of the fees, costs and restitution he had already paid, and the trial court agreed to a partial refund; the trial court reasoned that money paid to a counseling service the victim used could not be returned. Madden appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's "refund" order, finding that the trial court did not have statutory authority to order a refund from public funds. "Madden did not pursue a refund through the procedures defined in the Exoneration Act" which provides trial courts the proper authority pursuant to which to issue refunds. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/13sc496.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Madden" on Justia Law</a>
2015-12-21stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice13SC496http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/13sc495.htmlColroado v. Nelson2015-12-21T09:57:16-08:002015-12-21T11:23:20-08:00
Respondent Shannon Nelson was convicted of five charges relating to sexual assaults allegedly committed against her children. She was sentenced to 20 years in prison, and ordered to pay court costs, fees and restitution. The court of appeals reversed the judgment against Nelson and remanded for a new trial based on the improper use of an unendorsed expert witness. In the second trial, a new jury acquitted Nelson of all charges. At issue for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was whether Nelson could get a refund of all the costs, fees and restitution she paid following her conviction after the first trial. The Supreme Court found that a trial court could not authorize a refund absent statutory authority. Because none of the statutes governing the fines, fees and restitution empowered the trial court in this case to issue a refund, it could not do so. Exonerated defendants could seek a refund of costs, fees and restitution through a separate civil proceeding (which Nelson did not pursue). <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/13sc495.html" target="_blank">View "Colroado v. Nelson" on Justia Law</a>
2015-12-21stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice13SC495http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/13sc930.htmlRitzert v. Board of Education2015-12-20T21:17:28-08:002015-12-21T07:22:25-08:00
Petitioner Cathy Ritzert had worked as a teacher for more than twenty years. She worked for the Air Academy High School, part of the Academy School District No. 20. A student's parents complained about Ritzert, and the District placed her on administrative leave, telling her they would recommend dismissal unless she resigned. Ritzert refused. Several months passed without the District making good on its threat to fire her. Ritzert eventually took a new job teaching special needs students in a neighboring district, claiming she did this to mitigate her damages. She still wanted the District to prove it had a legitimate basis for terminating her, so she again refused to quit. The District responded by ordering Ritzert to report to work as a floating substitute. When Ritzert did not comply, the District initiated formal dismissal proceedings, claiming in part that her refusal to return to work constituted insubordination. A hearing officer recommended that Ritzert be retained, finding in part that the District's insubordination allegation was pretextual and unreasonable under the circumstances. The Board dismissed Ritzert for insubordination anyway, making no comment about the complaint that triggered placing her on leave in the first place. Upon review of this matter, the Colorado Supreme Court held that under the Teacher Employment, Compensation and Dismissal Act of 1990 (TECDA), the School Board's order must be fully warranted by the hearing officer's evidentiary findings of fact. Because the Board here "abdicated" that responsibility here, the Court concluded that its decision to dismiss Ritzert for insubordination on the facts of this case was arbitrary and capricious. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded this case to the Board to reinstate Ritzert. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/13sc930.html" target="_blank">View "Ritzert v. Board of Education" on Justia Law</a>
2015-11-23stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III13SC930http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/15sa129.htmlColorado v. Swietlicki2015-12-20T21:17:28-08:002015-12-21T07:22:27-08:00
In 2014, a detective from the Douglas County Sheriff's Office (DCSO) responded to a middle school's report that twelve-year-old female student J.M. had posted a picture of herself drinking what appeared to be alcohol. Officials became worried that there was more to the posting, contacted police, and spoke to the student. DCSO was contacted by J.M.'s mother, stating that J.M. wanted to talk to them. J.M. and her mother separately participated in a series of video-recorded interviews. The interviews would reveal that the mother's then-fiancee, defendant-appellee John Swietlicki allegedly had regular sexual encounters, since the child was eight. J.M. J.M. told the detective that Swietlicki sometimes showed her pornography on his computer during these encounters. The mother corroborated various details pertinent to J.M.'s allegations. Swietlicki would ultimately be extradited back to Colorado to stand charges based on J.M.'s allegations. Police seized Swietlicki's laptop without a warrant until a search warrant issued. Once issued, police found that the laptop contained child pornography. Swietlicki moved to suppress all evidence found on the laptop, and the trial court granted the motion, finding that police lacked probable cause to seize the laptop. The State appealed the suppression motion. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's suppression order, finding that the search was justified under the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/15sa129.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Swietlicki" on Justia Law</a>
2015-11-23stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III15SA129http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/12sc820.htmlColorado v. Childress2015-12-20T21:17:27-08:002015-12-21T07:22:22-08:00
The State appealed an appellate court's judgment that vacated respondent Kenneth Childress' conviction of vehicular assault while operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. It was undisputed that Childress was not driving the vehicle in question, but the jury was instructed that he could be found guilty as a complicitor. The court of appeals concluded that because vehicular assault while under the influence was a strict liability offense, and required no culpable mental state on the part of the driver. Furthermore, the appellate court found that the Colorado Supreme Court had held previously that complicitor liability was inapplicable to crimes lacking a culpable mental state requirement. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, clarifying its holding that the appellate court relied on in vacating Childress' conviction. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/12sc820.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Childress" on Justia Law</a>
2015-11-23stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtCoats12SC820http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/13sc497.htmlOasis Legal Fin. Grp. v. Coffman2015-11-16T09:00:30-08:002015-11-16T09:03:05-08:00
This case concerned the nature of transactions that petitioners, national litigation finance companies, made with tort plaintiffs seeking funds to pay personal expenses while waiting for their lawsuits to settle or go to trial. Plaintiffs usually agreed to pay the companies a sum of money from the future litigation proceeds. By the terms of the agreements, any money the companies give tort plaintiffs were not to be used to prosecute the legal claims. The specific issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the companies’ forwarding of expense money to tort plaintiffs constituted a “loan.” Petitioners contended they were “asset purchases,” but the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code interprets these transactions as loans. The Supreme Court agreed with the UCCC: these transactions are loans. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/13sc497.html" target="_blank">View "Oasis Legal Fin. Grp. v. Coffman" on Justia Law</a>
2015-11-16stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III13SC497http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/14sa302.htmlMeridian Serv. Metro. Dist. v. Ground Water Comm'n2015-11-16T09:00:30-08:002015-11-16T09:02:06-08:00
Plaintiff-appellant Meridian Service Metropolitan District (Meridian) appealed a district court order finding that Meridian sought to appropriate designated ground water that was subject to the jurisdiction of the Colorado Ground Water Commission. Meridian petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to decide whether storm runoff could be classified as “designated ground water” subject to administration and adjudication by the Commission, or whether such water was in or tributary to a natural stream (vesting jurisdiction in the local water court). The Supreme Court concluded that because this case presented a question of whether the water at issue here met a statutory definition of “designated ground water,” the Commission had jurisdiction to make the initial determination. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/14sa302.html" target="_blank">View "Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist. v. Ground Water Comm'n" on Justia Law</a>
2015-11-16stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtGabriel14SA302http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/13sc712.htmlChavez v. Colorado2015-11-02T09:00:35-08:002015-11-02T09:08:40-08:00
Petitioner Anthony Chavez was convicted of a sex offense, and the trial court imposed an indeterminate, fifteen-year-to-life sentence. Chavez challenged that sentence on appeal, arguing that the trial court did not understand the range of its sentencing options. The Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s calculation of petitioner’s sentence and affirmed it. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/13sc712.html" target="_blank">View "Chavez v. Colorado" on Justia Law</a>
2015-11-02stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtWilliam W. Hood, III13SC712http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/14sa295.htmlTucker v. Town of Minturn2015-10-26T07:00:47-08:002015-10-26T13:02:49-08:00
The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a non-attorney trustee of a trust could proceed pro se before the water court. Appellant-trustee J. Tucker appealed the water court’s ruling that as trustee of a trust, he was not permitted to proceed because he was representing the interests of others. He also appealed the court’s order granting appellee Town of Minturn’s application for a finding of reasonable diligence in connection with a conditional water right. Appellant’s pro se issue was one of first impression before the Supreme Court, and the Court held that the water court correctly ruled that as a non-attorney trustee, appellant could not proceed pro se on behalf of the trust. In light of that determination, the Court did not address appellant’s other arguments regarding the sufficiency of the verification. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/14sa295.html" target="_blank">View "Tucker v. Town of Minturn" on Justia Law</a>
2015-10-26stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtGabriel14SA295http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/14sa281.htmlColorado v. Herrera2015-10-26T07:00:46-08:002015-10-26T13:02:43-08:00
In an interlocutory appeal, the State of Colorado argued that evidence of text messages between defendant Matthew Herrera and a juvenile girl (“Faith”) was admissible under a warrant authorizing a search of his cellphone for indicia of ownership, or in the alternative, under the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement. Faith’s mother told police she believed defendant was involved in a sexual relationship with her daughter. A police detective started texting defendant posing as a fourteen-year-old girl. These texts eventually led to defendant’s arrest, at which time police seized the cell phone in question. After review of the evidence in the record to the point of this appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the State’s argument that the texts were obtained under the warrant’s authorization to search for “indicia of ownership” of the cellphone. Further, the Court concluded the texts did not fall within the plain view exception. As such, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to suppress the evidence. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/14sa281.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Herrera" on Justia Law</a>
2015-10-26stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtAllison H. Eid14SA281http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/14sc64-0.htmlRTD v. 750 West 48th Ave., LLC2015-10-13T09:00:48-08:002015-10-14T03:16:36-08:00
In 2011, In 2011, Regional Transportation District (“RTD”) filed a petition in condemnation against 750 West 48th Avenue, LLC (“Landowner”) to acquire approximately the approximately 1.6 acre property a light rail project. Landowner was leasing the property to a commercial waterproofing business ("Tenant"). Over the years, Landowner made several luxury improvements to the property, including adding a steam room, fitness room, atrium, ceramic and cherry-wood flooring, and marble and granite finishes. The parties stipulated to every condemnation issue except the property's reasonable market value. Landowner elected to litigate the property's value through a commission trial. RTD established the value at $1.8 million; Landowner thought the property was worth $2.57 million. Landowner's calculations focused solely on the cost of replacement; RTD based its estimation on a "superadequacy" theory, asserting that many of the luxury improvements that Landowner made to an industrial property would not fetch a price on the open market commensurate with the cost of replacement. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the interplay between the respective authorities of the supervising judge and the commission to make evidentiary rulings in eminent domain valuation hearings. Specifically, the Court considered: (1) whether a commission could alter a supervising judge's ruling in limine regarding admissibility, and (2) whether the supervising judge could instruct the commission to disregard as irrelevant evidence that the commission had previously admitted. The Supreme Court held that judicial evidentiary rulings controlled in valuation hearings. Thus, the Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment insofar as it approved the supervising judge instructing the commission to disregard previously admitted evidence as irrelevant. The Court reversed that portion of the appellate court's opinion permitting the commission to alter the judge's evidentiary ruling in limine. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/14sc64-0.html" target="_blank">View "RTD v. 750 West 48th Ave., LLC" on Justia Law</a>
2015-10-13stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice14SC64http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/15sa92.htmlColorado v. Quintero-Amador2015-10-13T09:00:48-08:002015-10-14T03:16:34-08:00
In an interlocutory appeal, the State challenged an order suppressing at retrial the testimony given by defendant Ivan Quintero-Amador at his first trial. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in suppressing this evidence because: (1) defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights when he testified at the first trial; and (2) his trial counsel's ineffective assistance did not directly affect his prior testimony, thus precluding a finding that the admission of this testimony violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The trial court's suppression order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/15sa92.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Quintero-Amador" on Justia Law</a>
2015-10-13stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtGabriel15SA92http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/15sa22.htmlDwyer v. Colorado2015-09-21T08:00:30-08:002015-09-21T18:50:21-08:00
In an original proceeding, the issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on the legality of the "negative factor," a legislative enactment that operated to reduce education funding across all Colorado school districts. Plaintiffs sued the State, the Commissioner of Education, and the Governor, arguing that the negative factor was unconstitutional because it violated Amendment 23, a state constitutional provision requiring annual increases to "statewide base per pupil funding." The trial court denied the State's motion to dismiss, and the Supreme Court granted review to determine whether that denial was made in error. After review, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs' complaint misconstrued the relationship between the negative factor and the constitutional amendment: "[b]y its plain language, Amendment 23 only requires increases to statewide base per pupil funding, not to total per pupil funding." Therefore, the Court held that the negative factor did not violate Amendment 23. The trial court was reversed and instructed to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/15sa22.html" target="_blank">View "Dwyer v. Colorado" on Justia Law</a>
2015-09-21stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice15SA22http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/14sc64.htmlRTD v. 750 West 48th Ave., LLC2015-09-14T07:00:23-08:002015-09-14T16:17:38-08:00
In 2011, Regional Transportation District ("RTD") filed a petition in condemnation against 750 West 48th Ave., LLC ("Landowner") to acquire the property for development of a light rail project. Landowner was leasing the property to a commercial waterproofing business. Over the years, Landowner had made several luxury improvements to the property, including adding a steam room, a fitness room, an atrium, ceramic and cherry-wood flooring, and marble and granite finishes. The parties stipulated to every condemnation issue except the property's reasonable market value. Landowner elected to litigate the property's value through a commission trial, in which a trial judge appointed three independent freeholders to determine the value of a condemned property under a judge's supervision. RTD estimated the reasonable market value of the condemned property at $1,800,000. Landowner proffered a reasonable market value of $2,570,000. While Landowner's calculations focused solely on the cost of replacement, RTD based its estimation on a "superadequacy" theory, asserting that many of the luxury improvements that Landowner had made to the industrial property would not fetch a price on the open market commensurate with their costs of replacement. To bolster its theory, RTD sought to introduce the two pieces of evidence central to this appeal: (1) testimony from expert witness Steve Serenyi regarding alternate approaches to calculating the value, including comparable property values and an income-based approach; and (2) evidence regarding the value of the property to which Landowner relocated its business. The Colorado Supreme Court surmised that the overarching issue in this case centered on the interplay between the respective authorities of the supervising judge and the commission to make evidentiary rulings in eminent domain valuation hearings. Specifically, at issue was: (1) whether a commission may alter a supervising judge's ruling in limine regarding admissibility; and (2) whether the supervising judge may instruct the commission to disregard as irrelevant evidence that the commission had previously admitted. The Court held that judicial evidentiary rulings controlled in valuation hearings. Thus, the Court affirmed the court of appeals 'judgment insofar as it approved of the supervising judge instructing the commission to disregard previously admitted evidence as irrelevant and reverse that portion of the court of appeals opinion permitting the commission to alter the judge's evidentiary ruling in limine. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/14sc64.html" target="_blank">View "RTD v. 750 West 48th Ave., LLC" on Justia Law</a>
2015-09-14stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtNancy E. Rice14SC64http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/13sc404.htmlBd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Summit Cty. v. Rodgers2015-09-08T09:00:27-08:002015-09-08T12:47:35-08:00
Respondents Jason Rodgers and James Hazel brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against the Summit County Board of County Commissioners alleging the County violated the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution when it denied them a certificate of occupancy to their newly built home. The trial court issued partial directed verdicts against respondents on three of the four allegedly discriminatory actions they named in their complaint. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, concluding C.R.C.P. 50 did not permit partial directed verdicts, and that the trial court improperly considered the County' actions as separate issues rather than a pattern of conduct. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's ruling, finding that because Rule 50 is close to the summary judgment rule (C.R.C.P. 56) which permits partial judgments, the two rules should be interpreted in tandem. The Court could find "no convincing justification . . . for permitting partial summary judgments but not partial directed verdicts." The Court also disagreed with the court of appeals' additional rationale that the trial court misunderstood the nature of respondents' claim, as respondents requested the trial court to consider the four allegedly discriminatory actions as separate acts, rather than a pattern of conduct. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/13sc404.html" target="_blank">View "Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Summit Cty. v. Rodgers" on Justia Law</a>
2015-09-08stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtAllison H. Eid13SC404http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/14sc495-0.htmlColorado v. Vigil2015-08-03T08:00:27-08:002015-08-03T18:22:34-08:00
In 1997, Frank Vigil, Jr. was convicted of first degree murder for his participation in the kidnapping, rape, torture, and murder of a 14-year-old girl. Vigil was sixteen at the time of the crime. The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), because it was the statutorily-mandated sentence for crimes committed between 1990 and 2006. In 2013, Vigil filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)). Finding that Miller applied retroactively to Vigil’s sentence, the trial court granted the motion. The State petitioned pursuant to C.A.R. 50, arguing that "Miller" did not apply retroactively. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that this case was governed by "Jensen v. Colorado," (2015 CO 42), which held that "Miller" did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review of a final judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of post-conviction relief. <a href="http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/supreme-court/2015/14sc495-0.html" target="_blank">View "Colorado v. Vigil" on Justia Law</a>
2015-08-03stateColoradoColorado Supreme CourtAllison H. Eid14SC495