In wartime Commander,
Corps Logistic Command was dual-hatted as Commander, Corps
Rear Area.
The staff and staff company included a Rear Area section (sectie
achtergebied) (mobilisable) (14/12/12 (38)) which comprised a command
group, a tactical
operations/intelligence bureau, a CIMIC bureau, an engineer/NBC
bureau, a traffic bureau and a Royal Military Constabulary bureau.1

Likely
filled by personnel
from the general pool of mobilisable
reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty
period in relevant functions up to eight and a half years prior to
mobilisation.2

Filled
by personnel from the
general pool of mobilisable
reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty
period in relevant functions up to eight and a half years prior to
mobilisation.3

b.

Filled by mobilisable
personnel that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 41 Brigade Supply
Companyup to
eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.3

RIM
company until mid-1985, filled
by
mobilisable platoons that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 42
Brigade Medical Company between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation. After mid-1985 the
company lost its RIM status, retaining the same personnel until 1990.3
31

e.

Filled by mobilisable
personnel that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 43 Brigade
Supply Companyup to
eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.3

f.

Wartime organisation; under command of 109
Materiel Support Battalion
in peacetime.4
Disbanded in September 1985.5
The company had a detachment in Hohne (GE), which became the
core of the newly formed 125 Repair Company (Corps).4

g.

GRIM
company, largely filled
by
mobilisable platoons that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 14
Corps Repair Company between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation.3
31 Under command
of 54 Corps Support
Battalion in July 1985, by December 1985 under command of 114 Corps
Support Battalion. This change probably went into effect per September
1985, following the disbandment of 44 Corps Repair Company and the
formation of 125 Repair Company (Corps).6

h.

RIM
company until mid-1985, filled
by
mobilisable platoons that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 43
Brigade Medical Company between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation. After mid-1985 the
company lost its RIM status, retaining the same personnel until 1990.3
31

i.

Filled by mobilisable
personnel that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 43 Brigade
Supply Companyup to
eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.3
6

j.

Formed in
September 1985.7Wartime
organisation;
under command of 41
Armoured Brigade in peacetime.

k.

Filled by mobilisable
personnel from 44 Medical Company
(RIM) after
their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up
to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.3
31

Filled
by personnel from the
general pool of mobilisable
reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty
period in relevant functions up to twelve and a half years prior to
mobilisation.3

b.

RIM
company, filled
by
mobilisable platoons that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 146 Labour Company between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation.3
31

c.

GRIM
unit, largely filled
by
mobilisable subunits that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in Staff and Staff
Detachment, 103 Supply Point Battalion between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation.3
31

d.

GRIM
company, largely filled
by
mobilisable platoons that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 112 Mixed Supply
Point Company between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation.3
31

e.

GRIM
company, largely filled
by
mobilisable platoons that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 129 Ammunition
Supply Point Company between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation.3
31

f.

GRIM
company, largely filled
by
mobilisable platoons that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 113 General Supply
and Services Company between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation.3
31

g.

Filled
by mobilisable
personnel from 186 Labour
Company (RIM) after
their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up
to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.3
31

h.

GRIM
unit, largely filled
by
mobilisable subunits that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in Staff and Staff
Detachment, 102 Supply Point Battalion between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation.3
31

i.

GRIM
company, largely filled
by
mobilisable platoons that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 121 Mixed Supply
Point Company between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation.3
31

j.

GRIM
company, largely filled
by
mobilisable platoons that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 139 Ammunition
Supply Point Company between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation.3
31

k.

GRIM
company, largely filled
by
mobilisable platoons that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 115 General Supply
and Services Company between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation.3
31

l.

Wartime organisation;
under command of 103 Supply Point Battalion in peacetime. This pipeline
platoon was able to put into operation an
Emergency
Offtake Point (EOP) in the NATO Central Europe Pipeline System
(CEPS) within twelve hours. There were three
(inconspicuous) EOPs in the 1 (NL) Corps sector. The platoon
could further provide general assistance in fuel supply operations.8

GRIM
company, largely filled
by
mobilisable platoons that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 113 Corps
Repair Company between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation.3
31

b.

Filled
by personnel from the
general pool of mobilisable
reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty
period in relevant functions up to eight and a half years prior to
mobilisation.3

c.

Handled
the repairs of all electronic equipment in use in 1
(NL) Corps
such as radio, telephone and fire control equipment, as well
as
modern weapon systems such as the TOW antitank guided
missile system. Disbanded in 1986 after these tasks had been
distributed over other repair units within Corps Logistic Command.9
The company's personnel strengths given above are per December 1985; in
July 1985 peacetime strength was 6/62/100 (168),
wartime
strength 6/94/135 (235).

Wartime
organisation; under command of 101 Materiel Support Battalion in
peacetime. Disbanded in 1986 after its engineer-specific repair
capacity had been distributed over other repair units
within Corps Logistic Command.10

f.

GRIM
company, largely filled
by
mobilisable platoons that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 131 Corps
Repair Company between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation.3
31

g.

Filled
by mobilisable
personnel from 135 Corps
Repair Company Wheeled Vehicles (GRIM) after
their fourteen to sixteen-month RIM period in that unit had expired, up
to eight and a half years prior to mobilisation.3
31

GRIM
unit, largely filled
by
mobilisable subunits that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in Staff and Staff
Detachment, 101 Materiel Support Battalion between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation.3
31

j.

Wartime
organisation; under command of 109 Materiel Support Battalion
in peacetime.

k.

GRIM
company, largely filled
by
mobilisable platoons that had fulfilled their active-duty period
in 103 Corps
Repair Company between four and twenty
months prior to mobilisation.3
31

Each
light transport company had three platoons, each probably with 20 x
three-tonne
truck (DAF YA-314 or perhaps YA-328) and 1 x DAF YA-4440.11

b.

Disbanded in 1986 to form 110 Medium Transport
Company.

c.

Wartime organisation;
under command of Transport Training Centre in peacetime.

d.

Formed in March 1986.

e.

Wartime organisation. Peacetime organisation: under
direct command
of 41 Armoured
Brigade in June 1985, by December 1985 placed
under the command
of 41 Brigade Supply Company, 41 Armoured
Brigade.

f.

In
wartime the heavy transport companies would mainly
handle transport of fuel and ammunition to the corps
supply
points. In 1985 these units began to receive
ten-tonne trucks
of
the DAF YA-2300 series, which gradually replaced their six-tonne trucks
of the DAF YA-616 series.12

g.

Referred to as 829/832 Heavy Transport
Company in peacetime; see note h. In some
documents the company carries the suffix '10t' (ten-tonne).3 Moved
to Grave in 1986.12

h.

This
mobilisable company had one platoon on active duty, which was attached
to 829 Heavy Transport Company in peacetime;
see note g.12
GRIM
company, largely filled
out by
one or more mobilisable platoons that had fulfilled their active-duty
period as the
active-duty platoon between
four
and twenty
months prior to mobilisation, and probably by a platoon on
Short
Leave as well.3
31 In some
documents the company's unit name carries the suffix 'POL' (Petroleum,
Oil and Lubricants).3

i.

Filled
by personnel from the
general pool of mobilisable
reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty
period in relevant functions up to twelve and a half years prior to
mobilisation.
In
some documents the company's unit name carries the suffix 'POL'.3

j.

Filled
by personnel from the
general pool of mobilisable
reserves
(vrij-indeelbaar bestand) that had fulfilled their active-duty
period in relevant functions up to six and a half years prior to
mobilisation.3

Operational Role Corps Logistic
Command oversaw the logistic operations within1
(NL) Corps,
both in peace and in wartime. The logistical support to 1 (NL) Corps was
provided by National Logistic Command.13 The role of
Corps Logistic Command comprised four basic logistic
functions: supply, materiel support, transport and medical support.14
In wartime its main units would handle these functions as
follows:

Thirteen, mostly platoon-sized, equipment-specific
materiel support modules (see Part I)
would each support a specific corps unit: 601
Materiel Support
Platoon
Leopard 1V for instance would support 104
Reconnaissance Battalion.
During operations the materiel support modules would be
attached to the brigade or corps repair company
in whose area they would operate.15

Three corps
support battalions (see Part II)
would support
those corps troops that had either been placed under the operational
command of a division or had taken up positions
in a
divisional
sector. They comprised the same logistic support
elements as the logistically
self-sufficient brigades:
a supply company handling supply and general transport duties,
a
repair company performing both repair and materiel support tasks, and a
medical company.16

Four
supply point battalions (see Part III) would
each establish and operate a corps supply point area
in the field. 102
Supply Point Battalion would operate Corps Supply Point Area
5, 103
Supply Point Battalion would operate Corps Supply Point Area
6, and 258
and 501 Supply Point Battalion
would operate Corps Supply Point Areas 4
and 7.17From these
four areas
the supply companies of the brigades and the corps
support
battalions would replenish their supplies, as would the corps troops
present
in the Corps
Rear Area. Each
corps supply point area included separate supply points for
Class I, Class III and
Class V supplies. Apart from the
self-evident role of the ammunition supply point companies the
mixed supply
point companies would handle Class I and III supplies,
whilst the general
supply and
services
companies would take care of Class II and IV
supplies, provide bathing facilities and take care
of burials. The
labour
companies would provide
extra manpower, for example for loading ammunition.18

Three
materiel support battalions (see part IV)
were responsible for the supply, repair and
withdrawal of a
variety of
equipment such as vehicles, weapons, tents, heaters,
etc., as
well as for the supply of spare parts. Within its area of
responsibility each
battalion would deploy supply
points and field workshops on which the
repair companies of the brigades and corps support battalions could
fall back. In addition the battalions would
support the corps troops in the Corps
Rear Area.19

A transport
battalion, a personnel replacement battalion and a medical group (see Part V) would perform
their (self-explanatory) roles in support of 1 (NL) Corps.

The division,
being a tactical level only, was not a level
in the
logistical chain. Corps Logistic Command was responsible for the
execution of logistic operations in support of brigades and corps
troops placed under divisional command. Within this framework units of
Corps Logistic Command could be placed under (operational) command of
the division.20In
wartime Commander, Corps Logistic Command would exert control
over
his area of operations as Commander, Corps Rear Area
(see Part
I, note a). <Forward
Storage SitesThe four corps supply
point
areas were to be (re)stocked from Forward Storage Sites (FStS)
in the Corps
Rear Area. The construction of
FStS had begun in the late 1970s as part of a common-funded NATO
project,
but progress was slow.21 Out of nine planned
FStS (Jesteburg, Töpingen, Wintermoor, Tostedt, Neuenkirchen,
Seedorf, Sehlingen, Hellwege and Dünsen) only four were operational by the end of 1985: Töpingen,
Sehlingen, Hellwege and Dünsen.22
This meant that two or three of the four corps supply point
areas would still depend on vulnerable and time-consuming logistical build-up
operations from military depots in
the Netherlands. Notably, the three FStS
from which the first-line Corps Supply Point Areas 5 and 6 would be
stocked, Wintermoor, Tostedt and Neuenkirchen,
had, through various circumstances, been moved to the rear of
the realisation scheme.The
two easternmost FStS, Jesteburg and Töpingen, served a somewhat
different purpose: they would enable those units engaged in the covering
force battle to replenish their fuel and ammunition supplies.23 The nine FStS
together were eventually to store 35,500 tonnes of supplies, of which
two thirds ammunition; enough to get 1
(NL) Corps through seven days of
combat (fifteen standard days of supplies).24In
peacetime the FStS fell under National Logistic Command and were
manned by German civilian personnel and/or personnel of
active-duty Corps Logistic Command detachments. In wartime they would
be under control of Corps Logistic Command.25<

1 (NL) Corps Sector: Supply, 198526

Reorganisations 1984-1990s
27Throughout
the 1970s and 1980s the
logistic services of the Royal Army underwent several
reorganisations, which aimed to integrate the various logistical chains
(such as supply, repair and materiel support)
into one client-oriented logistic system. In the second half of
the 1980s the focus
shifted from supporting client units
to supporting the operational
role of those units: the integration of the logistical and tactical
systems.28Between
1984 and 1988 the materiel support services (materieeldienst) of
the Royal Army were restructured in order to improve their capability
to
handle the maintenance of complicated weapon systems such as the PRTL
self-propelled antiaircraft gun system,
the YPR-765 series of infantry fighting vehicles and the
Leopard 1V and Leopard 2 main battle tanks.29 The brigade repair
companies were
reorganised to form weapon system-oriented repair teams,
rather than being subdivided by service-oriented
categories such as
artillery, weapons
and instruments. At corps level the repair companies
of the
corps support battalions (see Part II)
and materiel support battalions (see Part
III)
were reorganised in a similar way. In addition to
this separate equipment-specific materiel support modules were
formed
(see Part I).In 1984
the Army
Board (Legerraad) ordered the modernisation of
the Class III and Class V supply systems.
The Class III supply system was obsolescent, vulnerable and lacked
flexibility, with
bulk fuel distribution limited to 10,000 liter semi-trailer
tanker trucks (DAF
YT-514) and individual distribution hinging on the use of jerrycans. The
Class V supply system too had its limitations. Though by 1985 about
ninety percent of ammunition had been palletised, the methods
of
its transshipment, by tractor cranes and by hand, remained
inefficient and time-consuming. Moreover, brigade distribution
points for ammunition had been left out
of the supply chain in order to reduce the number
of transshipments: client
units had to
pick up
their ammunition from the ammunition supply points in
the Corps
Rear Area, up to a
hundred kilometres to the rear. This meant long
turnaround times and long supply
lines vulnerable to
congestion
and enemy interdiction.The
modernised Class III and Class V supply systems would,
roughly, work as follows:

Class
III: new 20,000 liter semi-trailer tanker trucks (DAF YTV-2300) would
handle fuel transports from CEPS
depots to the fuel supply points and from there to
brigade
and corps distribution points, where new 4,000 liter fuel tanker trucks
(DAF YF-4442)
of client units would refill. The YF-4442s were able to
directly
tank up vehicles of client units.

Class
V: new twenty-tonne
semi-trailer trucks (DAF YTV-2300 with roll loader crane) would
transport ammunition from FStS
to the ammunition supply points and from there to brigade and corps
distribution points, where
ten-tonne trucks (the new DAF YAZ-2300
with loader crane) and four-tonne trucks
(DAF YA-4440 and the new YA-4442
series, a number of which with loader crane)
of client units would pick up the ammunition.

Apart
from improving speed and efficiency both new systems would enable
the dispersal of supplies, thus reducing
vulnerability to enemy interdiction. As can be gathered from the above,
the modernisations depended on the influx of new vehicles.
The YAZ-2300 and YTV-2300 ammunition trucks began
entering
service from 1985, which allowed the new Class V
supply system to be tested in 1988 during the 1
(NL) Corps Field
Training Exercise (FTX) Free Lion. The results proved
satisfactory, and the new Class V supply system became operational in
1989. At that time the new Class III supply system was still only
partially operational, due to delays in the development of the YF-4442
fuel tanker truck. The first of these entered
service as late
as the early 1990s; the YTV-2300 semi-trailer tanker
trucks
meanwhile entered service from 1988.30The
corps medical support system, certainly as much in need of
modernisation as the supply and materiel
support services, would not see such
a project begin until 1988. For an overview see 102 Medical
Group, Organisational Obsolescence
and Reorganisation 1988-1992.<

_________________________________________________

1.

NL-HaNA
2.13.110, inv.nr. 179, Aantekeningen bij reorganisatie Ststcie LLC
d.d. 2 november
1976. NL-HaNA, op. cit., Reorganisatie Ststcie LLC d.d. 14
februari 1977. NL-HaNA, op. cit., OTAS
(organisatietabel en autorisatiestaat) Staf en stafcompagnie Legerkorps
Logistiek Commando d.d. 7 december 1978. Given the dates of these
documents the details of the Rear Area section may not be entirely
correct for 1985; between 1978 and 1985
this organisation type's
OTAS was altered twice (compare the organisation type
numbers from NL-HaNa, op cit., 1978, and NIMH
430, inv. nr. 54 (Slagorde KL stand 1 juli 1985)). Wartime
command over the Corps
Rear Area had been assigned to Commander, Corps Logistic
Command
in 1977.
NL-HaNA, op. cit., 1976, 1977. Somewhere between 1985 and 1987
this command was transferred
to Commander, 101 Infantry Brigade and given the
designation Rear
Area Command (Commando Achtergebied, also more correctly referred to as
Commando Legerkorpsachtergebied); see further 101 Infantry Brigade, footnote 3. CIMIC: civil-military
cooperation. NBC: nuclear, biological, chemical.
For the role of the Royal Military Constabulary in the Corps Rear Area,
see 101 Military Constabulary Battalion, Operational
Role.

It
appears the company was deactivated as of May 1984. Van Hoof
en Roozenbeek, op. cit., 150.

6.

The
official Royal Army order of battle per December 1985 shows 54 Corps
Repair Company under command of 54 Corps Support Battalion and 54
Supply Company (Corps) under command of 114 Corps Support Battalion. I
hold this to be an error, as it would leave 114 Corps
Battalion
without a repair company and 54 Corps Support Battalion without a
supply company. Moreover, both the preceding and following orders of
battle show the regular 'train battalion' organisation
with each
corps support battalion having a repair, a supply and a medical
company. NIMH 430, inv. nrs. 54, 55, 56, 57
(Slagordes KL stand 1 juli 1985, 23
december 1985, 1 juli 1986, 29
december 1986).

Roozenbeek,
In dienst,
213.
There were two CEPS depots in the 1 (NL)
Corps sector,
one near Breddorf and one at Farge. In addition there was a
third CEPS depot
close by in the I (GE) Corps sector, near
Hodenhagen. See also
the map
above.

Van Hoof
en Roozenbeek, op. cit., 129-130, 153-154. See also
Bremer, 829/832 Zware
Transportcompagnie, 38. Bremer reports that 829/832 Heavy
Transport Company
had, apart from a number of tractor trucks (the new DAF
YTV-2300
and the old DAF YT-616), ninety-six semi-trailers, both
ten-tonne
(with and without loader crane) and twenty-tonne (for
peacetime
ammunition transport), and further eighteen DAF YA-4440 four-tonne
trucks, a number of Land Rovers and
two tow trucks. Bremer, loc. cit.

Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, loc. cit. Roozenbeek, loc. cit. The
location names of the third and fourth FStS operational in 1985 were
kindly
provided by mr. H.
Roozenbeek of the Netherlands Institute of Military History (NIMH)
(email 02.11.2009).
According to the initial planning all nine FStS were to
be operational before 1985. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op.
cit.,
346.By the end
of 1988 five FStS were operational and one was
partly operational; the three remaining sites were to be completed by
1992. HTK 1988-1989,
kamerstuknr. 20800 ondernr. 19,
20.

23.

Roozenbeek,
loc. cit. It was deemed
possible to use the FStS as static supply points if needed; the sites did however not
have the necessary layout for this, and as their locations were more or
less common knowledge such operations would be highly
vulnerable to enemy action. Ibid.

24.

Hoffenaar
en Schoenmaker, loc. cit. Roos, op.
cit., 336.
Apart from
ammunition
the FStS would also store fuel, combat rations, field fortification
and bridging materials. Roozenbeek, op. cit.,
204. In 1985 the expected
ammunition consumption per combat day for 1 (NL) Corps was
2,300
tonnes, whilst the application of intensity factors meant that
the entire supply system had to be able to handle a day consumption of
5,750 tonnes of ammunition. Roozenbeek, op. cit., 227.

25.

Manned by army detachments: De Jong en Hoffenaar, Op herhaling, 114. German civilian personnel: information
kindly provided by mr. H.
Roozenbeek of the Netherlands Institute of Military History (NIMH)
(email 11.07.2013).
For some reason the FStS are not
included in the official orders of battle (NIMH
430, inv. nrs. 54 t/m 57). In peacetime National
Logistic Command possibly exerted control
over the FStS through the staff and staff company of 201 Service Support Command in
Emstek (GE).

Roos,
op. cit., 351. In
ibid., 289-361,
co-author J.F.M. Leuring provides a both extensive
and detailed
history of the development and operational context of the
Royal
Army's logistic systems during the Cold War. In the summary (ibid.,
349-354) which also comprises a critical analysis, he draws
three
main conclusions that are worth repeating here. Firstly, that
logistical concepts set up during
the 1950s, for example the reliance on jerrycans for fuel
supply, were held on to for too long (i.e. into the 1980s)
whilst
tactical and
operational concepts changed profoundly. Secondly, that
command and control over the logistical chains supporting 1 (NL) Corps
can be described as deficient: Corps
Logistic Command was equivalent to a Corps
Support Command (COSCOM) in the US Army (see also Isby and Kamps, loc.
cit);
however, a COSCOM was commanded at army level, which level did not
exist in
the Royal Army. Measures to fix this problem through liaisons
between National Logistic Command, Corps Logistic Command and NORTHAG
were inadequate (Roos, op. cit., 343). Leuring observes that both the
command and
control problem and the persistence of obsolescent logistical
concepts
may wel have stemmed from the fact that,
in the early 1950s, the Royal Army had adopted the logistic
structure of the US Army without, apparently,
understanding the deeper reasonings behind that structure. To
conclude, the author estimates that up to ± 1985 it would have been
somewhat doubtful whether the
logistic support to 1 (NL) Corps would have been satisfactory in
wartime, and that from ± 1985 results would have been better
thanks to the modernisation of logistical concepts.

29.

When
high-tech equipment began entering service in the late 1970s, the Royal
Army's logistical structure proved unprepared. Maintenance and repair
services were subdivided by specialism, such as vehicle technique,
weapon technique, hydraulics, pneumatics and electronics. High-tech
equipment however required a system-oriented approach in which
such specialisms were integrated. The lack of an integrated
approach resulted in long repair times and overall inadequate
maintenance. Hoffenaar en Schoenmaker, op. cit., 359. The consequences
of this became painfully clear in the early 1980s when the
deployability of the PRTL self-propelled
antiaircraft gun system
had dropped far below acceptable levels, and later when the army's
upgrading programme for the Leopard 1 main battle tank failed to
successfully marry high-tech components to the low-tech
vehicle. For
an outline of the maintenance problems with the PRTL and their effects
on
operational readiness, see Unit Organisation
and Equipment, The Armoured Antiaircraft Artillery Battery.
For the problems with the Leopard 1 upgrading programme see for
instance 13 Armoured Brigade, notes
a, b and footnote 5.

30.

Hoffenaar
en
Schoenmaker, op. cit., 410, 411. Roozenbeek, op. cit., 226-228. Of
the YA-2300 series all in all about 1,500 vehicles were
ordered.
In 1985 the Royal army ordered 5125 trucks of the YA-4442
series,
the first of which entered service in 1990. In that year
395 YF-4442 fuel tanker trucks were ordered.
Hoffenaar en
Schoenmaker, loc. cit.

31.

RIM was
the Dutch acronym for Direct Influx into Mobilisable Units (Rechtstreekse
Instroming in Mobilisabele Eenheden). GRIM was a variant of
this system, meaning "Largely RIM" (Grotendeels
Rechtstreekse Instroming in Mobilisabele Eenheden).
For a survey of the
Royal Army's unit filling and reserve system see Gijsbers, Blik
in de smidse, 2222-2231;Selles,
Personele
vulling;
Berghuijs, Opleiding,
14-23. In English: Isby and Kamps, Armies,
341-343; Sorrell, Je
Maintiendrai, 94-96; Van
Vuren, The
Royal Netherlands Army Today, Military Review April 1982, 23-28.