For local authors

21/01/2015

Given inclusion in Scopus, our estimate of a value of a CER article by the Research, Development and InnovationCouncil of the Czech Republic is in the range from 14.6 points (if only indexed journals with non-zero SJR count) to 16.5 points (if all indexed journals count).

Announcement of journals merger

01/01/2015

Effective from January 2015, Bulletin of the Czech Econometric Society is merging with the Czech Economic Review. The merged journal will continue with the title and ISSN of the Czech Economic Review (ISSN 1802-4696 Print, ISSN 1805-9406 Online).

In the recent past, the two journals have co-existed with a very similar focus, and the merger now serves to concentrate the efforts and focus of academics in closely related fields of economic theory and econometrics. The merged journal seeks to promote the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics and wants to serve as a focal point for the Central European community of scholars. It is now a joint venture of Charles University in Prague and the Czech Econometric Society.

The journal explicitly aims to attract relevant articles in both theoretical and quantitative economics, with the main interests in microeconomic theory, pure and applied game theory, macroeconomic theory, mathematical finance, and also in research on the boundaries between economics, statistics and applied mathematics.

The geographical reference in the journal's name signifies that it is an initiative of Czech scholars; we seek prospective authors from Central and Eastern Europe but our agenda does not have a strong regional focus.

The Czech Economic Review, Vol. 8, No. 3

22/12/2014

A new issue of the Czech Economic Review is available online. See table of contents:

To view, download, or recommend a single article, click on the article title. To unsubscribe, please fill in the form in the left column (Table of Contents Alert) on the journal homepage.

Forthcoming in the next issue 8(3)

09/12/2014

Relationship Lending, Bank Competition and Financial Stability

J.-P. Niinimäki

Abstract: This paper explores the effects of relationship lending on bank stability under perfect bank competition. Relationship banking generates profitable old lending relationships, which ease the stress to search and monitor new borrowers, and create great charter values for banks even under bank competition. These everlasting charter values mitigate risk-taking incentives improving finan-cial stability. We find the maximum growth speed for banks so that they will avoid risk taking, and discover the optimal equity capital requirement: new banks and rapidly growing banks should have relatively more capital.

The role of Trust in Determining the Propensity to Join Unofficial Strikes

G. Ruiu

Abstract: This paper offers a contribution to the literature on labour strikes by analysing the effect of trust in labour disputes. We maintain that the higher (or lower) the level of confidence that workers place in unions (or firms), the more likely it is that they will be willing to participate in an unofficial strike. A very simple model is presented to clarify this idea. Using WVS data, we also empirically show that the probability of having or being willing to participate in unofficial strikes increases (or decreases) as the level of confidence placed in labour unions (or firms) increases, with the effect of confidence in labour unions being larger than that of confidence in firms.

Bargaining Structures and Agendas in an Unconstrained Hotelling Model

D. Buccella

Abstract: The present paper investigates the effects of bargaining structures and agendas on the quality differentiation/ location in the final-goods market. The framework is a unionized duopoly industry in the context of an unconstrained Hotelling linear city model. The presence of labor union(s) and the bargaining processes (i.e., centralized vs. decentralized structure; right-to-manage vs. participatory framework agenda) change the locational incentives of the firms with respect to the case of exogenous production costs. The results reveal that the effect of centralization on the two bargaining agendas is diametrically opposed. More specifically, in the participatory framework, centralization is a centrifugal force, while it is a centripetal force in the right-to-manage. The social welfare consequences are also briefly discussed.

To view, download, or recommend a single article, click on the article title. To unsubscribe, please fill in the form in the left column (Table of Contents Alert) on the journal homepage.

Forthcoming in the next issue 8(2)

15/10/2014

Aggregating and Updating Information

H. Salonen

Abstract: We study information aggregation problems where to a set of measures a single measure of the same dimension is assigned. The collection of measures could represent the beliefs of agents about the state of the world, and the aggregate would then represent the beliefs of the population. Individual measures could also represent the connectedness of agents in a social network, and the aggregate would reflect the importance of each individual. We characterize the aggregation rule that resembles the Nash welfare function. In the special case of probability aggregation problems, this rule is the only one that satisfies Bayesian updating and some well-known axioms discussed in the literature.

The Discrete Charm of Uniform Linear Pricing of an Input Production Joint Venture

G. Rossini, C. Vergari

Abstract: A popular way of obtaining essential inputs is based on the establishment of an input production joint venture (IPJV) in the upstream (U) section of the vertical chain of production by firms competing and selling final goods downstream (D). Different governances may be designed for the management of an IPJV according to the ownership structure, the degree of delegation granted to the IPJV by parent firms and the extent of competition in the D market. Industry optimal arrangements with nonlinear pricing may be hard to implement and may be banned by regulators, mainly in the case of minimal delegationbased on coordination (collusion) among the D firms. A handy and endurable governance turns out to be maximal delegation, i.e., an independent IPJV, seasoned with linear uniform pricing, even if this solution may contain some inefficiency.

Refining the Information Function Method: Instrument and Application

D. Qin

Abstract: Information function method is a powerful tool for analyzing the information requirements of social welfare functions. However, the original information function provides only a coarse description of information structure. In this article, we propose a refinement of this method by changing the range of the information function. We also analyze the role of partially relevant information in preference aggregation through an application of the refined version of the information function method.