PER CURIAM: In this
civil case, we must determine whether the circuit court abused its discretion
in refusing to set aside a default judgment against Jose Reyes d/b/a/ Cinco De
Mayo Restaurant (Reyes) because Miguel Vazquez's counsel (Vazquez's counsel) personally
served notice of the damages hearing on Reyes rather than on Reyes's counsel. We
affirm.

FACTS

On April 17, 2007,
Alexander Gutierrez (Driver) was driving a vehicle owned by his father, Ernesto
Gutierrez (Owner). In the vehicle with Driver were three others: Francisco
Marco (Marco), Humberto Antonio Cruz (Cruz), and Miguel Vazquez (Vazquez). The
four men had just left the Cinco De Mayo Restaurant (the Restaurant) in Horry
County where they had been drinking. Driver lost control of the vehicle and
drove off the road into a tree. Cruz and Marco were killed instantly. Vazquez
suffered severe and permanent brain damage.

On June 12, 2007,
Vazquez filed suit[1] against Driver and Owner based on negligence and against Reyes based on dram
shop violations (the Vazquez Action).[2]
On June 13, 2007, a companion case was filed on behalf of the Estate of Marco
(the Marco Action).[3]
On June 14, 2007, the Vazquez and Marco complaints were simultaneously served
on Reyes. On July 2, 2007, an action (the Cruz Action) was filed on behalf of
the Estate of Cruz containing the same allegations as the Vazquez and Marco
actions.[4]
Marco, Cruz, and Vazquez were represented by the same attorney (hereinafter
Vazquez's counsel). On July 12, 2007, the Axelrod Law Firm (Axelrod) served an
answer and counterclaim in the Marco Action only.

Thereafter,
Johanna Bufford (Bufford), a paralegal with Vazquez's counsel contacted Axelrod
to ask if it was accepting service on behalf of Reyes in the Cruz Action. She
was told, "No." Bufford then contacted process server Timothy Hecker
(Hecker) to personally serve the Cruz complaint on Reyes at the Restaurant.
According to Hecker, when he arrived at the Restaurant, a bartender told him Reyes
was out of the country. However, the bartender was able to call Reyes on his
cell phone and allowed Hecker to speak directly to Reyes. Hecker stated Reyes
instructed him to serve the papers on his attorney at Axelrod. At that point,
Hecker drove to Axelrod and attempted to serve Axelrod with the Cruz complaint;
however, "the lady that answers the phone, who is a translator" told
Hecker that Axelrod would not accept service on Reyes's behalf.[5] When Hecker reported this to Bufford, she instructed him again to personally serve
Reyes. Knowing that Reyes was out of the country, Hecker waited for Reyes to
return.

Meanwhile,
on August 1, 2007, having received no responsive pleading from Reyes in the
Vazquez Action, Vazquez's counsel filed a motion for entry of default against Reyes
in the Vazquez Action. On the motion for entry of default, Vazquez's counsel
listed W. Christopher Castro (Castro) of Axelrod as the "Defendant's
Attorney." Bufford again called Axelrod and asked if it would accept
service of the motion for entry of default on Reyes's behalf. An employee at
Axelrod told Bufford that Axelrod would not accept service of the motion.[6]
Accordingly, Bufford contacted Hecker (who, at that point, had still not been
able to serve the Cruz complaint on Reyes), gave him a copy of the motion, and
instructed Hecker to personally serve the Vazquez motion for entry of default
on Reyes at the same time he served Reyes with the Cruz complaint. On August
2, 2007, at 6:30 a.m., Hecker finally made contact with Reyes at his home and
served him with the Cruz complaint and the motion for entry of default in the
Vazquez Action.

On
September 5, 2007, the circuit court entered default against Reyes in the Cruz
and Vazquez Actions. On September 7, 2007, Vazquez's counsel sent a letter to Reyes
at his home address informing him that a damages hearing in the Vazquez action
had been scheduled for September 21, 2007, at the Horry County Courthouse. On
September 19, 2007, however, the hearing date was moved to September 20, 2007.
That same day, Vazquez's counsel sent Reyes another letter informing him of the
change. On September 20, 2007, the damages hearing was held before the
Honorable Doyet J. Early, III. Reyes did not appear, nor did anyone appear on
his behalf. Judge Early heard evidence on the issue of Vazquez's brain
injuries. On October 25, 2007, Judge Early entered a default judgment in favor
of Vazquez against Reyes in the amount of $1,575,066.20.

On
October 25, 2007, Castro filed motions to set aside the default judgment in both the Cruz and Vazquez Actions. On February 27, 2008, a hearing was held before
the Honorable Michael J. Baxley to hear arguments on, among other things, the
motions to set aside default in the Cruz and Vazquez Actions.[7]
Vazquez's counsel argued Reyes was in default in both actions. In response, Castro
presented evidence that on August 20, 2007, he filed an answer and counterclaim
in the Cruz Action, which was within thirty days of the August 2, 2007 service
of the Cruz complaint on Reyes. Vazquez's counsel countered that the answer
and counterclaim were, in fact, directed to the Marco Action because even
though they listed the Cruz number, they contained the Marco caption. Judge
Baxley ruled the mismatch between the caption and the case number within the
answer and counterclaim was a good faith error. Accordingly, Judge Baxley
orally granted the motion to set aside default as to Cruz, and allowed Reyes
ten days to file a correctly captioned and numbered pleading in the Cruz
Action.

When
the circuit court addressed the motion to set aside default as to the Vazquez
Action, Castro stated, "My motion was strictly under 4066 [the Cruz
action], Your Honor, motion to set aside default 4066." On March 25, 2008,
the circuit court entered a written order from the February 27, 2008 hearing,
in which the court granted Reyes's motion to set aside default as to Cruz. The
March 25, 2008 order did not, however, mention the default judgment in favor of
Vazquez. Reyes did not appeal the March 25, 2008 order, nor did he move for
reconsideration of that order.

A
trial for the consolidated cases began on September 15, 2008. In an order
dated September 15, 2008, the circuit court denied the motion to set aside the
default judgment in the Vazquez Action. On September 25, 2008, Reyes filed a
motion pursuant to Rule 59, SCRCP, and Rule 60, SCRCP, for reconsideration of
the September 15, 2008 order.

On
October 15, 2008, a hearing was held before Judge Baxley. Judge Baxley made no
decision at that hearing, but he instructed the parties to return for a
subsequent hearing on January 14, 2009, at which time they were to present
testimony on the issue of service in the Vazquez Action. At the January 14,
2009 hearing, the court heard testimony from Hecker regarding his service of process
on Reyes in the Vazquez and Cruz Actions.

After
the testimony concluded, Castro argued the circuit court should grant the
motion to set aside default because Vazquez's counsel had engaged in misconduct
by serving Reyes personally when Vazquez's counsel knew Castro was Reyes's
attorney. As evidence Vazquez's counsel knew Castro was Reyes's attorney,
Castro pointed to the August 1, 2007 motion for entry of default, in which Vazquez
had entered Castro's name in the space for "Defendant's attorney."

In
response, Vazquez argued that leading up to the August 1, 2007 filing, there
had been no responsive pleading in the Vazquez action at all, and the only
reason he entered Castro's name on the motion for entry of default was because
Castro had already filed an answer and counterclaim in the Marco Action on July
12, 2007. Vazquez argued he was simply anticipating Castro's involvement in
the Vazquez action when he entered Castro's name on the motion for entry of
default because of his law firm's involvement in the Marco Action.

Judge
Baxley denied the motion to set aside default as to Vazquez, stating:

[W]hat
I find here is it's just not fair for the [defendant]'s counsel to take the
position that we don't accept service for our clients when the process server
went to . . . try to serve it on the specific instructions of the [plaintiff],
and then serve the defendant and then come forward and say there's no notice.

This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The
decision whether to set aside an entry of default or a default judgment lies
solely within the sound discretion of the circuit court. Thompson v.
Hammond, 299 S.C. 116, 119, 382 S.E.2d 900, 902-03 (1989). The circuit
court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an
abuse of that discretion. Mitchell Supply Co. v. Gaffney, 297 S.C. 160,
162-63, 375 S.E.2d 321, 322-23 (Ct. App. 1988). An abuse of discretion arises
when the court issuing the order was controlled by an error of law or when the
order, based upon factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support. Goodson
v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 295 S.C. 400, 402, 368 S.E.2d 687, 689 (Ct. App. 1988).

ANALYSIS

A. Preservation

Vazquez
argues Reyes has not preserved the issue of the motion to set aside default in
the Vazquez Action because at the February 27, 2008 hearing, Reyes failed to
argue the motion, and he failed to seek reconsideration of the circuit court's
March 25, 2008 written order. We disagree.

When
an issue or argument has been raised to but not ruled upon by the circuit
court, a party must file a Rule 59(e) motion in order to preserve it for
appellate review. Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 24, 602
S.E.2d 772, 780 (2004).

On
October 25, 2007, Reyes filed two motions to set aside default judgments: one
in the Cruz Action and one in the Vazquez Action. At the February 27, 2008
hearing, Reyes declined to argue the motion in the Vazquez Action. Thereafter,
the circuit court issued a written order in which it did not address the motion
in the Vazquez case. Vazquez argues because Reyes failed to present arguments at
the hearing or file a motion for rehearing of the March 25, 2008 order, Reyes
abandoned the motion.

However,
we find the circuit court intended to hear the motion in the Vazquez Action at
a later time. After the discussion of the motion to set aside default in the
Cruz Action at the February 27, 2008 hearing, the court asked if there were any
further motions. In response, Castro asked, "[A]re we going to address
[the motion in the Vazquez Action] I guess since everything has been re-captioned
3654 should those be left alone since they are already filed or how should they
be addressed?" The circuit court responded, "Let's leave it alone
since they are already filed . . . ." After briefly discussing the motion
with counsel for both sides, the circuit court ultimately held, "I sense
that you guys are talking to me and not talking to one another, clearly, so I'm
going to let y'all have some discussions on that. We'll leave it where it
is and move on, all right. Have a good day. Thank you." (emphasis
added).

We hold the circuit
court was merely continuing the motion to set aside default in the Vazquez
Action. Accordingly, Reyes did not abandon the motion at the February 27, 2008
hearing.

B. Rule 60(b), SCRCP

Reyes
argues the circuit court erred in refusing to set aside the default judgment
because Vazquez's counsel personally served Reyes, despite the fact that Vazquez's
counsel affirmatively acknowledged in the motion for entry of default that Reyes
was represented by counsel. We disagree.

"Once
a default judgment has been entered, a party seeking to be relieved must do so
under Rule 60(b), SCRCP." Sundown Operating Co. v. Intedge Indus.,
Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 608, 681 S.E.2d 885, 888 (2009). "The standard
for granting relief from an entry of default is 'good cause' under Rule 55(c) .
. . while the standard is more rigorous for granting relief from a default
judgment under Rule 60(b) . . . ." Ricks v. Weinrauch, 293 S.C.
372, 374, 360 S.E.2d 535, 536 (Ct. App. 1987). Rule 60(b) requires a more
particularized showing of mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, surprise,
newly discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party. Rule 60(b), SCRCP. In determining whether to grant a motion
under Rule 60(b), the circuit court should consider: (1) the promptness with
which relief is sought; (2) the reasons for the failure to act promptly; (3)
the existence of a meritorious defense; and (4) the prejudice to the other
party. Mictronics, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 345 S.C. 506, 510-11,
548 S.E.2d 223, 226 (Ct. App. 2001). "The movant in a Rule 60(b) motion
has the burden of presenting evidence proving the facts essential to entitle
him to relief." Bowers v. Bowers, 304 S.C. 65, 67, 403 S.E.2d 127,
129 (Ct. App. 1991).

1. Promptness with which
relief is sought

The
original complaint in the Vazquez Action was served on June 14, 2007. Castro
contended at oral argument that he undertook representation of Reyes on behalf
of Axelrod at some time in early August 2007, soon after an Axelrod employee
told Hecker that Axelrod did not represent Reyes. However, Castro made no
attempts whatsoever to inform either the circuit court or opposing counsel of
his representation until September 27, 2007, when Castro filed a purported
answer. The answer did not contain a motion for relief from default. The
first time Castro filed a motion to set aside the default in the Vazquez Action
was on October 25, 2007, which was the same day Judge Early issued the
$1,575,066.20 default judgment. At the subsequent February 27, 2008 hearing on
the two motions to set aside default, Castro declined to argue the motion in the
Vazquez Action. The issue of the Vazquez default does not appear to have been
raised again until the trial in September 2008. In sum, Reyes failed to act
promptly in seeking relief.

2. Reasons for the failure to
act promptly

Reyes
argues the default judgment should be set aside because Vazquez's counsel sent
notice of the damages hearing to Reyes, who does not read English, instead of
sending notice to Reyes's counsel. We disagree.

Vazquez
presented evidence that Castro affirmatively denied representing Reyes in late
July 2007; both Bufford and Hecker filed affidavits to that effect.
Consequently, it was reasonable for Vazquez's counsel to thereafter serve
notice on Reyes personally, particularly when Vazquez's counsel did not receive
notice that Reyes was being represented in the Vazquez Action until September
27, 2007, when Castro served a purported answer in the Vazquez Action.

Reyes
also argues because Vazquez's counsel wrote Castro's name on the motion for
entry of default, Vazquez's counsel thereby acknowledged that Reyes was represented
by counsel, and this acknowledgment created a duty to serve Castro, as Reyes's
counsel, rather than Reyes. We disagree.

Reyes
cites Rule 5(b)(1), SCRCP, which states, in pertinent part: "Whenever
under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party
represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney unless
service upon the party himself is ordered by the court." Castro contended at oral argument he had "no
idea" of the default in the Vazquez Action until after the damages
hearing. However, Castro admitted at the January 14, 2009 hearing that Reyes
delivered two complaints to him in June 2007. Because the Cruz complaint was
not filed until July 2, 2007, and not served until August 2007, it would appear
the two complaints to which counsel referred were necessarily the Marco and
Vazquez complaints.[8]
Despite receiving these two complaints from Reyes in June, and undertaking to
represent Reyes in early August, Castro made no attempt to inform Vazquez's
counsel of his representation until the end of September. We hold that Rule
5(b)(1) does not require service upon an attorney when, as in this case, the
attorney gives no indication of his representation to either the court or
opposing counsel. Accordingly, there is evidence in the record that Reyes's reasons
for failing to act promptly were inadequate.

3. Existence of a meritorious
defense

To
establish that he has a meritorious defense, a complainant need not show that
he would prevail on the merits, only that his defense is meritorious. Thompson,
299 S.C. at 120, 382 S.E.2d at 903. A meritorious defense need only be one
"worthy of a hearing or judicial inquiry because it raises a question of
law deserving of some investigation or a real controversy as to real facts
arising from conflicting or doubtful evidence." Id. (quoting Graham
v. Town of Loris, 272 S.C. 442, 248 S.E.2d 594 (1978)).

As
stated above, "[t]he movant in a Rule 60(b) motion has the burden of
presenting evidence proving the facts essential to entitle him to
relief." Bowers, 304 S.C. at 67, 403 S.E.2d at 129. Reyes does
not appear to present a meritorious defense in his brief; rather, the brief is
limited to his argument that notice should have been sent to Reyes's counsel
rather than to Reyes directly. In his motion to set aside default, Reyes's
only defense is that Reyes does not read English. As noted above, however, Reyes's
counsel admitted Reyes relayed the pertinent pleadings served on Reyes to
counsel in June. Consequently, Reyes did not meet his burden of establishing a
meritorious defense.

4. Prejudice to the other
party

Reyes
does not discuss prejudice in his brief. Consequently, we find Reyes has
failed to meet his burden as to this factor. SeeBowers, 304
S.C. at 67, 403 S.E.2d at 129 ("The movant in a Rule 60(b) motion has the
burden of presenting evidence proving the facts essential to entitle him to
relief.").

CONCLUSION

We find Reyes
failed to establish he was entitled to have the default judgment set aside in
the Vazquez action. Thus, we hold the circuit court did not err in refusing to
set aside the default judgment.

Accordingly, the circuit court's decision is

AFFIRMED.

HUFF,
SHORT, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.

[1] Miriam
Rodriguez served as personal representative for the Estates of Cruz and Marco
as well as Next Friend for Vazquez in the underlying action. Although
Rodriquez's name is listed on the case caption, the court references the
substantive parties for purposes of this opinion.

[5] Although Hecker
did not recall the exact date he went to Axelrod, he did state it was "late
in July [2007]."

[6] In her
affidavit, Bufford does not identify the position of the employee with whom she
spoke on August 1, 2007; she only identifies her as "Karen."

[7] Prior to ruling
on the motions to set aside default, Judge Baxley consolidated the Cruz, Marco,
and Vazquez cases, along with an interpleader action brought by Nationwide
Insurance Company against Owner, Driver, Vazquez, Marco, and Cruz. Judge
Baxley consolidated the cases under case number 2007-CP-26-3664, which was
originally the case number for the Marco Action.

[8] The record
supports this conclusion, as it contains two affidavits of personal service-one
in the Marco Action, the other in the Vazquez Action-both of which state Reyes
was served on June 14, 2007.