V.I. Lenin

MATERIALISM and EMPIRIO-CRITICISM

Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy

( Chapter Four: The Philosophical Idealists as Comrades-In-Arms and Successors of Empirio-Criticism )

8. How Could J. Dietzgen Have Found Favour
with the Reactionary Philosophers?

The previously cited example of Helfond already contains the
answer to this question, and we shall not examine the
innumerable instances in which J. Dietzgen receives Helfond
like treatment at the hands of our Machians. It is more
expedient to quote a number of passages from J. Dietzgen
himself in order to bring out his weak
points.[1]

“Thought is a function of the brain,” says
Dietzgen (Das Wesen der menschlichen Kopfarbeit,
1903, S. 52; there is a Russian translation). “Thought
is a product of the brain. . . . My desk, as the content of my
thought, is identical with that thought, does not differ from
it. But my desk outside
of my head is a separate object quite
distinct from it” (p. 53). These perfectly clear
materialistic propositions are, however, supplemented by
Dietzgen thus: “Nevertheless, the non-sensible idea is
also sensible, material, i.e.,real. . . . The mind
differs no more from the table, light, or sound than these
things differ from each other” (p. 54). This is
obviously false. That both thought and matter are
“real,” i.e.,exist, is true. But to say
that thought is material is to make a false step, a step
towards confusing materialism and idealism. As a matter of
fact this is only an inexact expression of Dietzgen’s,
who elsewhere correctly says: “Mind and matter at least
have this in common, that they exist”
(p. 80). “Thinking,” says Dietzgen, “is a
work of the body. . . . In order to think I require a
substance that can be thought of. This substance is provided
in the phenomena of nature and life. . . . Matter is the
boundary of the mind, beyond which the latter cannot
pass. . . . Mind is a product of matter, but matter is more
than a product of mind. . .” (p. 64). The Machians
refrain from analysing materialist arguments of the
materialist Dietzgen such as these! They prefer to fasten on
passages where he is inexact and muddled. For example, he says
that scientists can be “idealists only outside their
field” (p. 108). Whether this is so, and why it is so,
on this the Machians are silent. But a page or so earlier
Dietzgen recognises the “positive side of modern
idealism” (p. 106) and the “inadequacy of the
materialist principle,” which should rejoice the
Machians. The incorrectly expressed thought of
Dietzgen’s consists in the fact that the difference
between matter and mind is also relative and not
excessive (p. 107). This is true, but what follows from
this is not that materialism as such is inadequate, but that
metaphysical, anti-dialectical materialism is inadequate.

“Simple, scientific truth is not based on a person. It
has its foundation outside [i.e., of the person], in
its material; it is objective truth. . . . We call ourselves
materialists. . . . Philosophical materialists are
distinguished by the fact that they put the corporeal world at
the beginning, at the head, and put the idea, or spirit, as
the sequel, whereas their opponents, after the manner of
religion, derive things from the word. . . the material world
from the idea” (Kleinere philosophische
Schriften, 1903, S. 59, 62). The Machians avoid this
recognition of objective truth and repetition of
Engels’
definition of materialism. But Dietzgen
goes on to say: “We would be equally right in calling
ourselves idealists, for our system is based on the total
result of philosophy, on the scientific investigation of the
idea, on a clear insight into the nature of mind”
(p. 63). It is not difficult to seize upon this obviously
incorrect phrase in order to deny materialism. Actually,
Dietzgen’s formulation is more inexact than his basic
thought, which amounts to this, that the old materialism was
unable to investigate ideas scientifically (with the aid of
historical materialism).

Here are Dietzgen’s ideas on the old
materialism. “Like our understanding of political
economy, our materialism is a scientific, historical
conquest. Just as definitely as we distinguish ourselves from
the socialists of the past, so we distinguish ourselves from
the old materialists. With the latter we have only this in
common, that we acknowledge matter to be the premise, or prime
base of the idea” (p. 140). This word “only”
is significant! It contains the whole epistemological
foundation of materialism, as distinguished from
agnosticism, Machism, idealism. But Dietzgen’s attention
is here concentrated on dissociating himself from vulgar
materialism.

But then follows a little further on a passage that is quite
incorrect: “The concept matter must be broadened. It
embraces all the phenomena of reality, as well as our faculty
of knowing or explaining” (p. 141). This is a muddle
which can only lead to confusing materialism and idealism
under the guise of “broadening” the former. To
seize upon this “broadening” would be to forget
the basis of Dietzgen’s philosophy, the
recognition of matter as the primary, “the boundary of
the mind.” But, as a matter of fact, a few lines further
down Dietzgen corrects himself: “The whole governs the
part, matter the mind. . . . In this sense we may love and
honour the material world . . . as the first cause, as the
creator of heaven and earth” (p. 142). That the
conception of “matter” must also include thoughts,
as Dietzgen repeats in the Excursions (op. cit.,
p. 214), is a muddle, for if such an inclusion is made, the
epistemological contrast between mind and matter, idealism and
materialism, a contrast upon which Dietzgen himself insists,
loses all meaning. That this contrast must not be made
“excessive,” exaggerated, metaphysical,
is beyond
dispute (and it is to the great credit of the
dialectical materialist Dietzgen that he emphasised
this). The limits of the absolute necessity and absolute truth
of this relative contrast are precisely those limits which
define the trend of epistemological
investigations. To operate beyond these limits with the
distinction between matter and mind, physical and mental, as
though they were absolute opposites, would be a great
mistake.

Dietzgen, unlike Engels, expresses his thoughts in a vague,
unclear, mushy way. But apart from his defects of exposition
and his individual mistakes, he not unsuccessfully champions
the “materialist theory of knowledge”
(pp. 222 and 271), “dialectical materialism”
(p. 224). “The materialist theory of knowledge
then,” says Dietzgen, “amounts to the recognition
that the human organ of perception radiates no metaphysical
light, but is a piece of nature which reflects other pieces of
nature” (pp. 222-23). “Our perceptive faculty is
not a supernatural source of truth, but a mirror-like
instrument, which reflects the things of the world, or
nature” (p. 243). Our profound Machians avoid an
analysis of each individual proposition of Dietzgen’s
materialist theory of knowledge, but seize upon his
deviations from that theory, upon his vagueness and
confusion. J. Dietzgen could find favour with the reactionary
philosophers only because he occasionally gets muddled. And,
it goes without saying, where there is a muddle there you will
find Machians.

Marx wrote to Kugelmann on December 5, 1868: “A fairly
long time ago he [Dietzgen] sent me a fragment of a manuscript
on the ‘faculty of thought’ which in spite of a
certain confusion and of too frequent repetition, contains
much that is excellent and—as the independent product of
a working man—admirable” (Russian translation.,
p. 53).[2] Mr. Valentinov quotes this opinion,
but it never dawned on him to ask what Marx regarded
as Dietzgen’s confusion, whether it was that
which brings Dietzgen close to Mach, or that which
distinguishes Dietzgen from Mach. Mr. Valentinov does not ask
this question because he read both Dietzgen and Marx’s
letters after the manner of Gogol’s Petrushka. Yet it is
not difficult to find the answer to this question. Marx
frequently called his world outlook dialectical materialism,
and Engels’ Anti-Dühring,the whole of
which Marx read through inmanuscript, expounds precisely
this world outlook. Hence, it should have been clear even to
the Valentinovs that Dietzgen’s confusion could
lie only in his deviation from a consistent
application of dialectics, from consistent
materialism, in particular from
Anti-Dühring.

Does it now dawn upon Mr. Valentinov and his brethren that
what Marx could call Dietzgen’s confusion is only
what brings Dietzgen close to Mach, who went from Kant
not towards materialism, but towards Berkeley and Hume? Or was
it that the materialist Marx called Dietzgen’s
materialist theory of knowledge confused, yet approved his
deviations from materialism, that is, approved what differs
from Anti-Dühring, which was written with his
(Marx’s) participation?

Whom are they trying to fool, our Machians, who desire to be
regarded as Marxists and at the same time inform the world
that “their” Mach approved of Dietzgen?
Have our heroes failed to guess that Mach could approve in
Dietzgen only that which Marx called confusion?

But taken as a whole, J. Dietzgen does not deserve so severe a
censure. He is nine-tenths a materialist and never made any
claims either to originality or to possessing a special
philosophy distinct from materialism. He spoke of Marx
frequently, and invariably as the head of the trend
(Kleinere philosophische Schriften, S. 4—an opinion
uttered in 1873; on page 95—1876—he emphasises
that Marx and Engels “possessed the necessary
philosophical training”; on page 181—1886—he
speaks of Marx and Engels as the “acknowledged
founders” of the trend). Dietzgen was a Marxist, and
Eugene Dietzgen, and—alasl—Comrade P. Dauge are
rendering him left-handed service by their invention of
“Naturmonismus,” “Dietzgenism,”
etc. “Dietzgenism” as distinct from dialectical
materialism is confusion, a step towards
reactionary philosophy, an attempt to create a trend not from
what is great in Joseph Dietzgen (and in that
worker-philosopher, who discovered dialectical materialism in
his own way, there is much that is great!) but from his
weak points.

I shall confine myself to two examples in order to illustrate
how Comrade P. Dauge and Eugene Dietzgen are sliding into
reactionary philosophy.

In the second edition of the
Akquisit[3]
(p. 273), Dauge writes: “Even bourgeois criticism points
out the connection between Dietzgen’s philosophy and
empirio-criticism and also the immanentist school,” and,
further on, “especially Leclair” (a quotation from
a “bourgeois criticism”).

That P. Dauge values and esteems J. Dietzgen cannot be
doubted. But it also cannot be doubted that he is
defaming him by citing without protest the
opinion of a bourgeois scribbler who classes the sworn enemy
of fideism and of the professors—the “graduated
flunkeys” of the bourgeoisie—with the outspoken
preacher of fideism and avowed reactionary, Leclair. It is
possible that Dauge repeated another’s opinion of the
immanentists and of Leclair without himself being familiar
with the writings of these reactionaries. But let this serve
him as a warning: the road away from Marx to the
peculiarities of Dietzgen—to Mach—to the
immanentists—is a road leading into a morass. To class
him not only with Leclair but even with Mach is to lay stress
on Dietzgen the muddlehead as distinct from Dietzgen the
materialist.

I shall defend Dietzgen against Dauge. I assert that Dietzgen
did not deserve the shame of being classed with Leclair. And I
can cite a witness, a most authoritative one on such a
question, one who is as much a reactionary, as much a fideist
and “immanentist” philosopher as Leclair himself,
namely, Schubert-Soldern. In 1896 he wrote: “The
Social-Democrats willingly lean for support on Hegel with more
or less (usually less) justification, but they materialise the
Hegelian philosophy; cf. J. Dietzgen. . . . With
Dietzgen, the absolute becomes the universal, and this becomes
the thing-in-itself, the absolute subject, whose appearances
are its predicates. That he [Dietzgen] is thus converting a
pure abstraction into the basis of the concrete process, he
does not, of course, realise any more than Hegel himself
did. . . . He frequently chaotically lumps together Hegel,
Darwin, Haeckel, and natural-scientific materialism”
(Die soziale Frage, S. xxxiii). Schubert-Soldern is a
keener judge of philosophical shades than Mach, who praises
everybody indiscriminately, including the Kantian Jerusalem.

Eugene Dietzgen was so simple-minded as to complain to the
German public that in Russia the narrow materialists
had
“insulted” Joseph Dietzgen, and he translated
Plekhanov’s and Dauge’s articles on Joseph
Dietzgen into German. (See Joseph Dietzgen, Erkenntnis und
Wahrheit [Knowledge and Truth], Stuttgart, 1908,
Appendix). The poor “Natur-monist’s”
complaint rebounded on his own head. Franz Mehring, who may be
regarded as knowing something of philosophy and Marxism, wrote
in his review that Plekhanov was essentially right as against
Dauge (Die Neue Zeit, 1908, No. 38, 19. Juni,
Feuilleton, S. 432). That J. Dietzgen got into
difficulties when he deviated from Marx and
Engels (p. 431) is for Mehring beyond question. Eugene
Dietzgen replied to Mehring in a long, snivelling note, in
which he went so far as to say that J. Dietzgen might be of
service “in reconciling” the “warring
brothers, the orthodox and the revisionists” (Die
Neue Zeit, 1908, No. 44, 31. Juli, S. 652).

Another warning, Comrade Dauge: the road away from Marx to
“Dietzgenism” and “Machism” is a
road into the morass, not for individuals, not for
Tom, Dick and Harry, but for the trend.

And do not complain, Messrs. Machians, that I quote the
“authorities”; your objections to the authorities are
but a screen for the fact that for the socialist authorities
(Marx, Engels, Lafargue, Mehring, Kautsky) you are
substituting bourgeois authorities (Mach, Petzoldt,
Avenarius and the immanentists). You would do better not to
raise the question of “authorities” and
“authoritarianism”!

Notes

[1]The Institute of Marxism-Leninism has in its archives a copy
of Joseph Dietzgen’s book Kietnere philosophische
Sebriften. Eine Aoswohl (Minor Philosophical Writings. A
Selection), Stuttgart, Dietz, 1903, with annotations by
Lenin. The book includes seven articles published in 1870-78
in the newspapers Volksstaat (People’s State)
and Vorwarts (Forward) as well as a work entitled
Strcifzuge eines Solzialisten in das Gebiet der
Erkenntnistheorie (Excursions of a Socialist in the Field of
the Theory of Knowledge), which was published in 1887 as
a separate pamphlet.

Most of Lenin’s annotations were made while he was
working on the book Materialism and
Empirio-criticism. They consist of under linings and
remarks in the text and on the margins; in several cases Lenin
marks correct ideas of Dietzgen’s with the letter
“a” and departures from dialectical materialism with
the letter “B”. Lenin’s annotations bring into
prominence Dietzgen’s description of the partisan
character of philosophy, the relations between philosophy and
natural science, the subject-matter of philosophy, the
fundamental philosophical categories, the problem of the
cognisability of the world, the appraisal of Kant, Hegel and
Feuerbach, the attitude to Marx and Engels, and
Dietzgen’s militant atheism. At the same time Lenin
notes Dietzgen’s confusion in regard to philosophical
categories, his attempt to “widen” the concept of
matter by including in it “all the phenomena of
reality, hence also our cognitive ability”, etc.
p.

[2]Lenin is referring to Letters of Karl Marx to Kugelmann,
Member of the International, St. Petersburg, 1907 (see
K. Marx, Briefe an Kugelmann, Inoidat, 1940).

[3]P. Dauge wrote an afterword entitled “Joseph Dietzgen
and His Critic, G. Plekhanov” to the second Russian
edition of Joseph Dietzgen’s Akqaisit der
Philosophie.