The Soviet strategy was designed around a high-tech, mechanized force intended to win quickly and decisively; in other words, the force was trained and structured for a high-intensity war. Lacking light infantry, the force eventually adopted an ineffective "mobile bunker" mentality to "stabilize the major routes and cities." (5) Fortieth Army's four divisions, five separate brigades, and three regiments also entered the country without doctrine for the environment or for counterinsurgency; nor were they properly organized or prepared for such combat. Although units created tactics, techniques, and procedures to overcome some problems, the Soviets failed to devise a system for sharing these lessons learned across the 40th Army. Their materiel was generally sufficient--some of it worked well, some of it did not--but poor employment of the equipment in the country's diverse terrain eventually failed both Soviet and Afghan troops. (6)

The Soviets' inadequate doctrine and force structure led to vicious ad hoc tactics that increasingly alienated the Afghan people. The Soviets booby-trapped toys, emplaced extensive minefields, and instituted a systematic plan to terrorize civilians that included nothing less than a scorched earth policy. (7) Conscription also brought a microcosm of problems from Soviet society into the ranks. Weak political will, differing ethnic backgrounds, and a clash of cultural norms beset the mission before it began. ( War exacerbated these problems. Of 642,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, 73 percent (or 469,685) became casualties of one kind or another. (9) Fortieth Army units were chronically short of personnel and "the continual loss of rotating cadre and corresponding loss of developed and tested combat experience, leadership, and techniques had a negative effect on the training [of Afghan forces]." (10)

Unanticipated shortcomings also plagued the Soviet effort to establish a new Afghan military. The Russian General Staff identified a Soviet soldier's lack of time in the country as a major factor in the failure to train DRA forces. Junior personnel could expect to be in Afghanistan for 18 to 21 months, and officers usually served for 2 years. One role for midgrade and senior soldiers was adviser, but being an "adviser to a DRA unit was considered a hardship assignment by Soviet officers." (11) Living conditions were poor, language and cultural barriers were ever-present, and advisers felt insecure because of covert mujahideen activity. Finally, DRA duty was not considered a "stepping stone to promotion." (12) Soldier and tactical problems were compounded by a lack of national political will: "[Soviet] political will even for this limited level of commitment [in Afghanistan] was not sustainable in the long term." (13) Deterioration and eventual loss of the will to fight might seem surprising considering the usual picture we have of a heavyhanded, tightly controlling Soviet Government, but as the war wore on, the Kremlin slowly and inevitably folded to public opinion and the bleak reality of the situation.

Nawroz and Grau summarize the Soviet commitment to Afghanistan: "No army, however sophisticated, well-trained, materially rich, numerically overwhelming, and ruthless, can succeed on the battlefield if it is not psychologically fit and motivated for the fight." (14) Historian and Soviet expert Robert F. Baumann suggests that Soviet soldiers were told to expect one thing about their role in Afghanistan--that they were liberators--but they quickly discovered this was not the whole truth or even close to it. (15) A Spetsnaz soldier from unit "Recon 66" recalls the varying messages, or "political training," for the Afghan campaign: "First they told us we were defending our southern borders, then we were doing our international duty, then there was some other nonsense." (16) As the troops became frustrated and then angry, they focused their aggression counterproductively on the Afghan people. In short, the Soviet military was not ready for the fight they found in Afghanistan.

Dolls, yo-yos, and other defused items aquired by ODAs who operated in A-stan are in the inventory at 5th group's residence on Fort Campbell... eventually the artifacts will reside in the SF museum but for the moment they are used as training aids.

Soviet war in Afghanistan was senseless and resultless. The withdrawal after almost a decade of fightings was inevitable. If you would like to know how Iraqi war (and also current Afghan war) would end then read about Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. There is only one exception I fancy. Pro-Soviet puppet regime was able to be at power 2 years. But the West hasn't reliable pro-Western regimes in the mentioned countries.

Soviet war in Afghanistan was senseless and resultless. The withdrawal after almost a decade of fightings was inevitable. If you would like to know how Iraqi war (and also current Afghan war) would end then read about Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. There is only one exception I fancy. Pro-Soviet puppet regime was able to be at power 2 years. But the West hasn't reliable pro-Western regimes in the mentioned countries.

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well we should know ourselves by now... we have been there 3 times already and those were the days when we were the biggest superpower in the world with no americans to impede us