Centrifugal political forces are bad for business since they spell uncertainty and ultimately disruption if they come to fruition as they did in Britain regarding the EU. And, Britain, of course, isn't the only country in Europe facing breakaway movements. The people of Spain's Catalonia region have for some time sought a referendum on independence from Spain. Only last year Catalan separatists won a majority in the regional government. The movement cites cultural and linguistic reasons for independent statehood, reasons that could be asserted by many groups across Europe and lead to more instability.

The larger question is why there is building discontent with global economic and political integration not only in Europe, but also in the United States as evidenced by the candidacies of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders.

The slim defeat for pro-EU forces has been explained as a vote against EU immigration and business regulation policies and against the loss of national sovereignty. But there is also a feeling afoot that the move toward greater integration through the EU and through global and regional trade agreements is designed primarily to enrich global financial elites--all the while subjecting middle- and lower-class wage earners to stagnant and even falling incomes as they compete against cheap labor in developing countries.

In the conversation about the rising revulsion against further integration, one factor is not being discussed: energy. With oil, natural gas and coal, the world's primary energy sources, all far below their high prices of the last decade, all would seem well on the energy front.

As you'll see below, this trend combined with the effects of high energy prices on productivity growth had a negative effect on the incomes of middle- and lower-class voters who simultaneously paid a higher proportion of their incomes for increased energy bills. This double whammy has likely contributed to discontent among such voters who were looking for a way to express their frustration and found it in the Brexit vote.

If the cause of our current economic difficulties was, in part, high oil prices which slowed the world economy, then an energy connection comes into view. Current low oil prices become a symptom of economic weakness rather than merely a reflection of excess supply. (Much of the world outside of North America also experienced high natural gas prices during this period in the form of high landed costs for liquefied natural gas in Japan and Europe, far higher than the U.S. pipeline price during this period.)

There are other reasons why wage earners may not be receiving wage increases, but lack of productivity growth is an important one.

So, here's what all this had to do with the Brexit vote: Stagnant or declining living standards breed discontent among a populace used to rising standards. Pro free trade and economic integration forces argue that such integration into larger trading federations leads to greater prosperity. When the prosperity disappeared as it did in Ireland, Spain and Greece, significant political movements arose in the latter two (Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece) which question further integration and suggest at least substantial alteration of the terms of EU membership. The effect on British wage earners was more subtle, but found its expression in the Brexit vote.

It's instructive to note that in the United States median hourly wages leveled off in 1973, the year of the Arab Oil Embargo. Energy costs in the United States rose dramatically after that though they returned to lower levels in the 1980s and 1990s. Still, the country was increasingly dependent on foreign oil and sent more and more of its income abroad during this period to pay for that oil. During the recently expired oil and natural gas boom in the United States, high prices enriched those involved while transferring wealth from those who weren't. The effect on overall wages seems to have been slightly negative.

None of this definitively proves that stagnant wages are caused by high energy prices, increasing energy imports or skewed trade agreements. But there is strong evidence that all three are implicated. Not surprisingly, energy is the theme that is being neglected in this discussion because energy is currently in a cyclical price trough, one that may very well have resulted from the dampening effect previously high prices had on economic and productivity growth.

Such effects are hard to pin down. And, the mythology brought to us by the public relations arm of the fossil fuel industry is that we need not worry about sufficient energy supply--a story they've been touting since the lows in oil prices in 1998. Every step of the way on the path to the price spike of 2008, the industry said big new supplies were just around the corner.

When a special kind of hydraulic fracturing made new oil deposits available in the United States, only prices near $100 a barrel made them economical (as we can see by the widespread bankruptcies among those companies reliant on such deposits in the recent low-price environment).

It's those high prices which I believe have slowed the economy making oil now seem temporarily plentiful. If we don't go into a major recession or depression, a rise in demand could send prices soaring and put further pressure on overall productivity growth while increasing energy bills for households. That would set the stage for more discontent among those who believe that increased economic global integration is hurting rather than helping them.

Kurt Cobb is an author, speaker, and columnist focusing on energy and the environment. He is a regular contributor to the Energy Voices section of The Christian Science Monitor and author of the peak-oil-themed novel Prelude. In addition, he has written columns for the Paris-based science news site Scitizen, and his work has been featured on Energy Bulletin (now Resilience.org), The Oil Drum, OilPrice.com, Econ Matters, Peak Oil Review, 321energy, Common Dreams, Le Monde Diplomatique and many other sites. He maintains a blog called Resource Insights and can be contacted at kurtcobb2001@yahoo.com.

Sunday, June 19, 2016

Recently, I toured a U.S Navy mine sweeper and destroyer during Fleet Week. Just before the tour entrance line a tent with exhibits caught my attention. On the first table were a set of small bottles containing various kinds of liquid fuels, a sampling meant to highlight the biofuels now being developed and used by the Navy. At the second table I was greeted by a Navy public relations specialist who handed me a quarterly magazine devoted exclusively to the Navy's energy and environmental initiatives.

The U.S. Navy isn't the only service seeking to make itself less dependent on fossil fuels and friendlier to the environment. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has committed itself to more sustainable practices and alternative fuels across all services. The reason: The DOD takes climate change and fossil fuel dependence as serious risks to the nation's security and to the U.S. military's own ability to fight and protect the nation.

Why does the U.S. military establishment take these threats seriously and act on them in such a thoroughgoing fashion while the military's strongest congressional supporters are the most ardent opponents of sustainable practices?

Using the hawkish Center for Security Policy's (CSP) 2013-2014 congressional scorecard as a proxy for devotion to all things military, we find 21 so-called "champions" of national security in the U.S. House and Senate who voted for all items favored by the CSP during the session. Among those 21 legislators, nine had a 0 percent rating from the League of Conservation Voters for 2014, four had a 3 percent rating, four had a 6 percent rating, one had 20 percent rating, one had a 60 percent rating, and two were not rated.

This is not a perfect indicator by any means, but it provides a general outline of the disconnect between a military establishment which has embraced sustainability and its most ardent legislative supporters who refuse to recognize and act on those same imperatives for sustainability in the civilian economy.

Certainly, part of the explanation is that the budget of the U.S. military is very large, and many constituencies which benefit from it in both political parties need to be satisfied before it can pass. But another part of the explanation is the way the military assesses risk versus the way we assess risk in the civilian economy.

For military commanders every decision has life-and-death implications. Poor planning for any part of military operations--food, clothing, shelter, fuel, weapons, ammunition, intelligence, transport, coordination with other armed services, and so on--can hinder success and cost lives. Contingencies, however remote, are often considered since they can mean substantial loss of life if ignored. Essentially, mission planners are asking, "What if?"

Climate change models suggest widespread disruption of agriculture, water supplies and coastal settlements (due to sea level rise) resulting in growing instability around the world and leading to increased military threats. A 2015 DOD report to Congress on climate-related risk summarizes the department's thinking.

The DOD also understands that renewable energy gathered on military bases is less vulnerable to disruption from hostile actions, actions that could prevent imported fuel from reaching those bases and which could also compromise civilian electrical grids. The department has therefore adopted aggressive goals for renewable energy with the Navy setting a 50 percent goal by 2020.

Why is the DOD moving so fast? Because it perceives that risks related to fuel supplies and climate change are real and immediate. The department believes these risks must be addressed now to maintain readiness not only for violent attacks from hostile forces, but also for sustainability in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions.

Why are we not applying the same analysis to the U.S. civilian economy? Certainly, there are many people who do, but they have not been able to convince enough federal legislators to move more quickly on an energy transition that would both lessen our dependence on fossil fuels and mitigate climate change.

But the most important difference is that in civilian society we have to set policy by consent, by legislative action. In the military, policy can be set by top commanders and enforced, policy that often puts security above cost and that fossil fuel lobbyists are generally impotent to alter.

Moreover, civilian society operates under a market system in which priorities for investment are affected by millions upon millions of buying and investment decisions made by individuals and companies. And, those individuals and companies have a say in public policy, a say that tends to value stability over change.

For example, utilities are being forced to adopt renewable energy targets by state utility commissions around the country. But, it would be difficult to force those utilities to shut down, say, half their fossil fuel plants by 2020 without bankrupting them and endangering the stability of the electrical grid to boot. Existing infrastructure is not so easily disposed of because its owners want to get maximum value out of it before disposing of it and because its integration with larger systems (such as the electrical grid) must be carefully taken into account.

Still, the threat of climate change to food and water supplies, to the stability of existing infrastructure including coastal settlements, and to the health of human populations (more very hot days and more tropical diseases) suggest that adapting to and mitigating climate change ought to be as much a priority in U.S. civilian society as it is in the U.S. military. And, we now have compelling demonstrations from the military that a rapid transition can take place.

All we have to do is to find the will to make that transition. The military recognizes that its effectiveness at its mission is at stake. If only we civilians everywhere could embrace alternative energy and climate-change adaptation and mitigation with the same zeal, maybe the very conflicts which the U.S. military anticipates as an outcome of climate change and resource pressures could be considerably lessened or eliminated.

And then, just maybe the sailors I met during Fleet Week wouldn't have to fight in conflicts related to those twin risks because we civilians would be taking climate change and energy resource pressures as seriously as they do and doing what is necessary to address them.

Kurt Cobb is an author, speaker, and columnist focusing on energy and the environment. He is a regular contributor to the Energy Voices section of The Christian Science Monitor and author of the peak-oil-themed novel Prelude. In addition, he has written columns for the Paris-based science news site Scitizen, and his work has been featured on Energy Bulletin (now Resilience.org), The Oil Drum, OilPrice.com, Econ Matters, Peak Oil Review, 321energy, Common Dreams, Le Monde Diplomatique and many other sites. He maintains a blog called Resource Insights and can be contacted at kurtcobb2001@yahoo.com.

Sunday, June 12, 2016

Recently, word leaked out that Norway may ban the sale of diesel- and gasoline-powered vehicles by 2025. The move toward electric vehicles is part of a dream shared by those concerned about climate change and about fossil fuel depletion (especially oil depletion), namely, to turn the world into one big all-electric paradise by running everything we can on electricity.

But the ban wouldn't take effect until 2025. While Norwegian electric car registrations are rising, so are total car registrations. Even if we generously assume that the rise in electric car registrations between now and 2025 will shave five years off the transition, that still means Norway won't achieve an all-electric private automobile fleet until 2035. And, Norway is already a leader in the move toward all-electric transportation. Other countries lag far behind.

Transitioning to electric transportation in places that primarily burn coal, natural gas and/or diesel fuel to produce electricity would undermine the goal of lowering greenhouse gas emissions. In thermal power plants, the ones that burn fossil fuels, two-thirds of the energy produced is lost in the form of heat. Only one-third is turned into electricity.

Electric automobile manufacturers claiming that their cars get the equivalent of 100 miles per gallon aren't factoring in the fossil fuel portion of the electricity used to power such cars. And, while electric automobiles reduce emissions to zero at the site where you use them, if they are powered exclusively by electricity generated from fossil fuels, the actual miles per gallon equivalent may drop to between 30 and 40. That would make such electric cars no more climate-friendly than high-mileage gasoline-powered cars and less climate-friendly than some hybrid-electric cars.

The Union of Concerned Scientists in a 2014 update of an earlier survey outlines the best regions in the United States for electric vehicles based on the fuel mix of utilities. Where nuclear and renewable power are highest, emissions are, of course, lowest. That's why electric transportation only really addresses climate change when it is powered primarily by electricity from nuclear and renewable energy.

Of course, transportation is not the only area that we could electrify. While most industrial processes are powered by electricity, many industries require process heat to melt metals, foster chemical reactions, and cook and bake foods. These industries usually burn fossil fuels for that heat, mostly natural gas. Using electric heat would be extremely inefficient and injurious to the climate in this case unless, of course, the electricity comes from nuclear and/or renewables.

Let's not forget that homes, stores and offices need heat in colder climates, most often supplied by heating oil and natural gas. The same tradeoffs exist for these users as for industrial firms needing heat for their various processes.

While renewable energy is growing rapidly, a full transition to a renewable energy economy is still decades away. Projections from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) suggest continued heavy dependence on fossil fuel energy as late as 2040. That is a recipe for climate disaster if we are supposed to reduce carbon emissions worldwide by 80 percent by 2050 in order to maintain a livable planet.

This brings us to a less risky, but nevertheless challenging strategy for addressing our twin crises. We could reduce dramatically the amount of energy we require. While we need to continue the renewable energy build-out and quicken its pace, we also need to meet that build-out halfway by reducing our energy use. The trouble with our current system is that if one group of people, say, the European Union, reduces its energy use overall, another group, say, fast-growing Asian nations, may be glad to buy the unused energy resources (mostly fossil fuels) now available at prices made lower by reduced EU demand.

This is called the Jevons Paradox in which increased energy efficiency actually creates more demand. To reach our goal of drastically cutting emissions and still have enough renewable energy to meet the needs of a modern technical society, we would actually need to put limits on fossil fuel energy use in order to short-circuit Jevons Paradox which could lead to increased rather than reduced burning of fossil fuels. As long as energy demand continues to grow and as long as we depend so heavily on fossil fuels for that energy, we run the risk of destroying our habitable climate, finding ourselves without the necessary energy to run our economies and/or paying a price for energy that our economies cannot bear without sinking into stagnation.

What this suggests is that economic growth itself might have to slow or even stop altogether. That could spell widespread economic and social problems in a society that has been designed only for continuous economic growth.

The methods for drastically cutting energy use are already available. We don't require new technology (though new technology will likely make energy use even more efficient). So-called passive house methods (which can and are being used for commercial and industrial buildings) can reduce heating and cooling needs by 80 to 90 percent. Widely available LED lighting offers deep reductions in energy use while providing that same level of light. Simply changing the way we do things can have a dramatic effect on energy use. Such nonprofits as the Rocky Mountain Institute have been showing government and industry how to reduce energy consumption dramatically by changing processes using existing technology.

Going all-electric or mostly electric has clear advantages. Electricity is an extremely flexible form of energy that can be applied to widely disparate tasks. Lighting rooms, heating water, and refrigerating food are typical household examples. A major argument for moving toward electricity derives from the simple fact that the most cost-effective form of renewable energy is electricity.

In order to make a climate-friendly transition that electrifies those areas of our economy that are not already powered by electricity, we would have to transition our electric generation simultaneously to renewable energy. Success would depend on government policies and an alert public willing to pay the costs of such a transition and willing to change the way it lives in order to accommodate that transition.

One example of a possible accommodation comes from the fact that renewable electricity sources such as wind and solar are intermittent. We get them only when the wind blows and the sun shines. For this reason, cheap electric energy storage has been considered a prerequisite before wind and solar could dominate electricity generation.

But one alternative would be to manage the intermittent nature of such sources by managing when we perform certain tasks. Those that are more critical might be scheduled during daylight hours when sun and possibly wind are both available. This is the kind of change that may very well be necessary as part of an electric transition, a transition that would require a revolution both in policy and in expectations concerning our daily life and work.

UPDATED June 14, 2016

Kurt Cobb is an author, speaker, and columnist focusing on energy and the environment. He is a regular contributor to the Energy Voices section of The Christian Science Monitor and author of the peak-oil-themed novel Prelude. In addition, he has written columns for the Paris-based science news site Scitizen, and his work has been featured on Energy Bulletin (now Resilience.org), The Oil Drum, OilPrice.com, Econ Matters, Peak Oil Review, 321energy, Common Dreams, Le Monde Diplomatique and many other sites. He maintains a blog called Resource Insights and can be contacted at kurtcobb2001@yahoo.com.