Press Release
DC/2716

As the Disarmament Commission continued its general
debate this morning, the representative of the United States expressed
his strong disagreement with the Chinese representative's
characterization during yesterday afternoon's discussion of his
country's development of a limited national missile defence as "a
unilateral nuclear arms expansion in another form".

He said
that the non-nuclear missile defence programme of the United States was
designed to counter certain limited, possibly nuclear, threats which
could be the result of proliferation in a world quite different from
that in 1972, when the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) was
concluded.

Also recalling the Chinese delegate's reference to
the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament concerning the resumption
of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, he said the
United States failed to see how it made sense to block progress on an
issue of such importance. The United States had sought to demonstrate
flexibility in developing a consensus and looked to others to be
similarly flexible.

South Africa's representative pointed out
that his Government had decided to destroy all surplus arms rather than
sell them. Studies on the implications of that policy were being
completed, and the weapons would soon be destroyed in a transparent
manner. Government policies on the destruction of surplus weapons, as
well as cooperative agreements with neighbouring States to destroy
collected or confiscated weapons, formed the basis of the General
Assembly resolution on the illicit traffic in small arms. While those
measures would promote confidence among States in support of regional
stability, they would also provide the means to limit illicit
trafficking in those weapons.

India's representative said his
country was the only nuclear-weapon State calling for a convention
prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment,
stockpiling, threat or use of nuclear weapons. It was disappointing
that the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating
forum on that issue, had been unable to begin negotiations on the
matter. India was willing to participate in agreed, multilateral,
non-discriminatory and

irreversible measures, including a global
no-first-use agreement and revitalization of the bilateral process. It
had also consistently opposed the weaponization of outer space.

The representative of Egypt said that nuclear disarmament efforts
should begin within regions, for example, the Middle East, where all
countries except Israel had committed to nuclear disarmament. All those
countries had acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
which expressed a clear denouncement of the nuclear option and a
commitment to free the region of nuclear weapons. United Nations
instruments should reflect Israel's refusal to comply with
international regulations.

Malaysia's representative
questioned the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to eliminating
their arsenals. They clung blindly to the doctrine of nuclear
deterrence, believing that nuclear weapons remained essential for their
national security. That, in turn, encouraged others to aspire to
similar status for the same reason, which, however, was frowned upon.
The cavalier attitude of the nuclear-weapon States made a mockery of
the participation of non-nuclear States in instruments aimed at
restricting and controlling nuclear capabilities.

Also
speaking this morning were the representatives of Mexico, Guatemala,
Uruguay, Peru, Republic of Korea, Costa Rica and Algeria.

The Disarmament Commission will meet again at 3 p.m. today to conclude its general debate.

Commission Work Programme

The Disarmament Commission met this morning to continue the general
debate of its 2000 substantive session.

Statements

SATYABRATA PAL (India) said his country remained committed to global
nuclear disarmament. The Government agreed that negotiations leading to
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects needed to be concluded. In
addition, India was the only nuclear-weapon State calling for a
convention that would prohibit the development, production, testing,
deployment, stockpiling, threat or use of nuclear weapons and that
would lead to their elimination. It was disappointing that the
Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating forum on
the issue, had been unable to begin negotiations on the matter. The
failure of the international community to effectively address the
threat posed by nuclear weapons over 50 years suggested that efforts
needed to be redoubled.

He said that India was willing to
participate in agreed, multilateral, non- discriminatory and
irreversible measures, including a global no-first-use agreement and
revitalization of the bilateral process which should also be
complemented by reductions in a multilateral framework. Although the
Government of India was aware that a fissile materials convention would
be a partial measure towards global nuclear disarmament, it still
supported that step. India had also consistently opposed weaponization
of outer space and maintained that arms control treaties needed to be
fully implemented to maintain stability.

He expressed his
country's support for greater transparency in the global arms trade as
an important confidence-building measure, noting that it had regularly
provided to the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms since its
inception. Also, the question of arms transfers could be divided in two
categories: licit State-to-State transfers to meet legitimate defence
requirements; and security concerns based on the perception of threats
and illicit arms transfers often involving cross-border terrorism, drug
trafficking and organized crime. The latter had implications for the
security of States, as well as for economic and social development. A
successful conclusion to the 2001 conference on small arms would
constitute another important confidence-building measure for
international peace and security.

There should also be efforts
to achieve a global ban on anti-personnel mines through a phased
process which addressed the legitimate defence requirements of States,
while ameliorating the humanitarian crises resulting from the
irresponsible transfer and indiscriminate use of landmines, he
continued. A phased approach would enable States, particularly those
with long borders, to move ahead while remaining sensitive to
safeguarding their legitimate security requirements. India also
subscribed to the concept of confidence-building measures, because it
would mean that landmines could only be used to defend a country's
borders.

GUSTAVO ALBIN (Mexico) described as a positive
development the final document adopted at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) 2000 Review Conference, which had been marked by the
unequivocal commitment of the nuclear- weapon States to eliminate their
arsenals. While the Commission was not a body where binding commitments
could be made, it was a forum for discussions and negotiations towards
that end. It could provide a decisive impetus to other bodies dealing
with the disarmament issue.

With respect to conventional
weapons, he said the Commission's member States had accumulated
experience that could be useful in discussions about their reduction.
In the Americas, the countries of the region had made progress in
confidence-building measures that followed the structure of the United
Nations Registry for Conventional Arms.

He said his country
supported the Secretary-General's call for an international conference
on disarmament, which would be a special occasion to discuss measures
necessary for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Mexico hoped that the
proposals would be reviewed at the present session.

LUIS RAUL
ESTEVEZ LOPEZ (Guatemala) recalled that at the end of the NPT 2000
Review Conference, a consensus had been achieved on a final document
which, although in the nature of a compromise text, did not amount to a
significant advance in the area covered. However, one positive
development had been the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of
their unequivocal determination ultimately to eliminate them.

In the course of the Review Conference, participants had been able to
appreciate some strides in respect to safeguards, as well as the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he said. However, it was unfortunately
clear that wide disagreement continued to plague the nuclear
disarmament issue, which had been the central theme of debates during
the Conference together with the issue of establishing
nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia.

He said that the Latin American and Caribbean region had played a
pioneering role in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and placed a
high value on the benefits derived from that undertaking. The region
supported all similar endeavours in other parts of the world and
considered that such zones should become regional platforms for
promoting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the disarmament
process. The use of nuclear energy should contribute towards the
development of humankind and not to its destruction.

Guatemala
supported the United Nations Arms Registry of Conventional Weapons and
had co-sponsored most of the resolutions on conventional weapons, he
said. Having suffered from armed conflict, and having to cope with
ordinary criminal violence in which small and light weapons played such
an important part, Guatemala urged all States members of the Commission
to combine their efforts to reduce as much as possible the arms race in
all its aspects.

AHMED ABOUL GHEIT (Egypt) said his delegation
had hoped that discussions on nuclear disarmament in the Commission
would be more specific and explicit. That would have been more
effective in freeing the world of the scourge. Moreover, those efforts
should begin within regions; for example, in the Middle East all
countries had committed to nuclear disarmament with the exception of
one. Those countries had acceded to the NPT, and accession to that
Treaty expressed a clear denouncement of the nuclear option and a
commitment to free the region of such weapons. However, Israel had
refused to comply with the international regulations, and United
Nations instruments should reflect that fact. Egypt placed great
importance on nuclear disarmament and felt that the international
community needed to act urgently, he continued. Since 1974, his
Government had submitted a draft resolution, adopted in 1980, to the
General Assembly. That resolution declared the Middle East a
nuclear-free zone. In 1998, the Minister for Foreign Affairs had
participated in issuing a declaration for the need for a new agenda,
which would accelerate States to achieve nuclear disarmament, a goal to
which nuclear-weapon States should also aspire.

He affirmed
his country's support for a major international conference on nuclear
disarmament and said the issue of confidence building was also another
important element, which, although it had been heretofore discussed in
the Commission, still needed agreed guidelines. Some of those elements
included the success of the register on conventional arms, military
acquisitions and local production and manufacture. Transparency would
also be useful and, in that light, discussions should also focus on
destructive and conventional weapons. The panel of intergovernmental
experts could reach an agreement to expand the register or else efforts
to realize that as a confidence-building measure would deteriorate.

DUMISANI S. KUMALO (South Africa) said the inability of the
international community to substantively address the issue reflected a
deepening crisis in non- proliferation, disarmament and arms control. A
part of the problem was that the disarmament mechanisms created many
years ago did not reflect current realities. The Commission was created
during the cold war to consider making recommendations on various
problems that occurred during that time. During this year, the
Commission would be the first to focus consideration on only two issues
-- nuclear disarmament and conventional weapons. Many States considered
nuclear disarmament to be the most important of disarmament issues, he
added. South Africa was concerned about the continuing refusal to
recognize that it was the business of the entire international
community.

He stated that the long and frustrating
negotiations to formulate an agenda item for the Commission's
consideration of an issue that was of global concern was indicative of
the lack of commitment to achieve progress in nuclear disarmament. The
outcome of the recent 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, as well as
efforts to establish an appropriate body in the Conference on
Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament and a treaty banning the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive
devices within the next five years, all provided momentum for progress
in the area of nuclear disarmament. However, much remained to be done
and concrete agreed measures to reduce the operational status of
nuclear weapons such as de-alerting and removal of nuclear warheads
from their delivery systems were urgently required.

He
emphasized that his Government would not support any outcome of the
present deliberations that would undermine the success achieved at the
recent NPT Review Conference. The deliberations should support that
process and should consider other tangible ways to address the core
elements for action and results in moving the disarmament agenda
forward. Although nuclear weapons constituted the greatest threat to
the survival of mankind, the build-up of conventional weapons, in
particular small arms and light weapons, were the source of most of the
death and suffering caused in conflicts around the world. The
underpinning factor to practical confidence-building measures in the
field of conventional weapons would be the need for transparency. The
2001 conference should consider measures to enhance that transparency.
Pointing out that his Government had decided to destroy all surplus
arms, rather than to sell them, he said that studies on the
implications of that destruction were being completed and that those
weapons would soon be destroyed in a transparent manner. The South
African Government's policies on destruction of surplus weapons, as
well as cooperative agreements with some of its neighbouring States to
destroy collected or confiscated weapons, formed the basis of the
General Assembly resolution on illicit traffic in small arms. That
resolution called for States to take appropriate national measures to
destroy surplus, confiscated or collected small arms and light weapons,
and to voluntarily provide information to the Secretary-General on
types and quantities destroyed. While those measures would promote
confidence among States in support of regional stability, it would also
provide the means to limit illicit traffic in those weapons.

JULIO BENITEZ SAENZ (Uruguay) said the Commission was meeting more than
a month after the end of the NPT 2000 Review Conference. That event had
concluded with the adoption of an unprecedented final document in which
the nuclear-weapon States had made an unequivocal commitment to
eliminate their arsenals. However, there was no clear idea how long
those nuclear arsenals would continue to exist.

He said that
in the midst of that discussion, the Disarmament Commission had the
responsibility for launching a plea to unblock the initiative to
prohibit the use of nuclear arms. The call for the entry into force of
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was becoming stronger
every day. Uruguay had ratified that Treaty on 20 June and welcomed the
Secretary-General's initiative to select, among the 25 most important
treaties for the next millennium, a large number of disarmament-related
resolutions.

Uruguay was awaiting the Millennium Summit with
the expectation that there would be further commitment to the
elimination of nuclear weapons, he said. It also awaited with fervent
hope the international conference proposed by the Secretary-General to
tackle disarmament. A vigorous stand would have to be taken in the
coming years, to prevent a return to the arms race, which the world
already considered obsolete.

MANUEL PICASSO (Peru) said there
were still problems such as the affirmation of pending instruments,
risks contained in the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti- Ballistic
Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and impending blockages to the Disarmament
Conference, which should be considered during the Commission's session.
The Government of Peru would support the convening of an international
conference on disarmament, and would encourage States to sign
international instruments and declare new nuclear-weapon free zones, in
addition to other initiatives.

He said confidence-building
measures were important as they would provide complementary measures to
limit and reduce nuclear spending. Those measures went beyond the
military dimension and the capacity for action on non-military spending
based on economic and social processes should also be considered,
particularly in the regional context. In addition, he believed that
bilateral relations were also important, and Peru had established
relations with its neighbours to carry out joint tasks to establish
democracy. He underscored the important role of the Register on
Conventional Arms, which still needed to be expanded. The Anti-
Personnel Mine Convention was another important element for creating an
environment of security and trust. SUH DAE-WON (Republic of Korea) said
his country, recognizing that the complex and delicate nuclear
disarmament was closely linked to global strategic relations, believed
in a practical, step-by-step approach. In that respect, the Treaty on
the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) should
be revitalized through the earliest possible entry into force of START
II. The Republic of Korea hoped that the United States and the Russian
Federation would commence and conclude negotiations on START III as
soon as possible.

At the same time, he said, further efforts
could be made voluntarily to increase transparency with regard to
nuclear-weapon capabilities and to diminish the role of nuclear weapons
in the security policies of nuclear-weapon States as a
confidence-building measure leading to nuclear disarmament. The
Republic of Korea attached great importance to the early entry into
force of the CTBT, and the nuclear-weapon States should provide the
leadership to facilitate that.

He said that the fissile
material cut-off treaty enhanced non-proliferation and was essential in
underpinning nuclear disarmament. Negotiations on that instrument
should commence immediately and all States concerned should place
moratoria on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

Turning to conventional arms, he said that the primary goal of
confidence- building measures in that field was to reduce the risk of
armed conflicts among States by diminishing mistrust, misunderstanding
and miscalculation. The measures should be applied comprehensively,
embracing military and non-military aspects. The 2001 United Nations
Conference on illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons would
provide the opportunity to devise a plan of action to address that
issue. If adopted, it would be an important milestone in efforts to
curb the illicit trade and to build confidence among States on the
global level.

BERND NIEHAUS (Costa Rica) said priority should
be given to the early entry into force of the CTBT and to conclude
negotiations on the fissile material treaty. To that end,
nuclear-weapon States were obliged to deactivate their systems and
begin a gradual systematic dismantling of their arsenal. Nowadays,
humankind was living under the threat of a new arms race fostered by
the development of sophisticated nuclear systems by some countries and
the urge felt by others to develop anti-missile systems.

Costa
Rica strongly supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones
and believed that the international community should respect the desire
of States who wished to declare those zones, he said. The national
policies of a country should, therefore, reflect that, and it must be
recognized that it was necessary for the international community to
establish strategic instruments when regulating disarmament.

Greater democracy and peace would promote security, he noted, pointing
out that the first step for increasing confidence would be to limit the
transfer of conventional weapons. That was a true obstacle to the end
of conflicts. Arms trafficking led to human rights violations, among
other things, and countries that produced and traded weapons must
exercise controls over the exchange of arms. Efforts should also be
made to prevent the diversion of arms whose transfer had

been duly authorized. In addition, the international community must
prohibit the transfer of military material and hinder financial and
logistic support to States whose forces committed human rights
violations, as well as to States that neither respected the relevant
instruments nor supported United Nations efforts.

The
Government of Costa Rica supported the initiative for an international
code of conduct for arms controls, he said. During the past 50 years,
Costa Rica had not invested in arms production or trade.

PIERCE CORDEN (United States) said that in the wake of the United
States Senate's decision not to ratify the CTBT, the country was
continuing to work for the Treaty's eventual ratification. The United
States, respecting its moratorium on nuclear explosions initiated in
1992, had called on States to sign and ratify the CTBT and, in the
interim, not to carry out nuclear explosions. The United States
welcomed the Treaty's ratification by the Russian Federation and
China's indication that it might accelerate its own ratification of the
CTBT.

Recalling the Chinese representative's reference
yesterday to the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament concerning
the resumption of the fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations, he
said his country had a different view of the reasons why progress had
been blocked in Geneva. It made no sense to block progress on an issue
of such importance, where there was consensus, by linking it to another
item where it was well known that consensus had not been established.
The United States had sought to demonstrate flexibility in developing
consensus and looked to others to be similarly flexible.

He
strongly disagreed with the Chinese representative's characterization
of the United States work to develop a limited national missile defence
as "a unilateral nuclear arms expansion in another form". That
non-nuclear programme was designed to counter certain limited threats
which could by themselves be nuclear and be the result of proliferation
in a world quite different from that in 1972 when the ABM Treaty was
concluded.

Agreeing that a great deal of progress had been
achieved in the field of conventional weapons, he stressed the
importance of focusing on regional developments and of taking regional
differences into account. While reviewing the progress achieved, and in
seeking to apply that progress, regional variations should be kept
carefully in mind. In studying current confidence- and security-
building measures with respect to conventional arms, the Commission
could usefully catalogue what had already been or was being pursued in
various forums, including regional ones.

MOHAMMAD KAMAL YAN
YAHYA (Malaysia) questioned the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States
to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. The outlook for nuclear
disarmament for the foreseeable future remained bleak. The established
nuclear-weapon States still clung, in blind faith, to the doctrine of
nuclear deterrence in the belief that nuclear weapons remained
essential for their national security. That encouraged others to aspire
to similar status for the same reason, which, however, was frowned
upon.

He noted that the Conference on Disarmament had failed
yet again to agree on a programme of work so as to start negotiations
on a treaty banning the production

of fissile material.
Clearly, developments did not augur well for the future of disarmament.
Despite assurances by States with nuclear capabilities of their
commitment towards disarmament, their actions had not matched their
words. Unless concerted actions were taken soon to reverse the
dangerous trend towards nuclear proliferation, existing nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament regimes could very well become hollow
instruments.

The cavalier attitude of the nuclear-weapon
States made a mockery of the signing and ratification by non-nuclear
States of treaties and protocols to restrict and control nuclear
capabilities, which they did not even possess to begin with, he said.
Over time, they would begin to question the usefulness of those
treaties and conventions and of their own participation in them.

He said his country accepted that many States depended on arms imports
to ensure a reasonable level of security. Unfortunately, arms purchases
for legitimate national defence often triggered an arms race,
especially in regions where there were underlying tensions in relations
between regional States. Hence the imperative for concrete
confidence-building measurers between and among those States so as to
resolve, or at least manage, those tensions.

All countries
should refrain from arms transfers which could be destabilizing or
exacerbate existing tensions, he said. Special restraint should be
exercised in the transfer of advanced technology weapons and in sales
to countries and areas of particular concern. A special effort should
be made to define sensitive items and production capacity for advanced
weapons, to the transfer of which similar restraints could be applied.
All States should ensure the strict enforcement of those criteria.

ABDELKADER MESDOUA (Algeria) said recent developments, such as nuclear
tests in South Asia and the refusal by the United States Congress to
accede to the CTBT, were real cause for concern. Nuclear disarmament
must remain an absolute priority and must continue to benefit from
sustained attention at the multilateral, bilateral and unilateral
levels. Furthermore, measures must be developed to prohibit recourse or
threat of recourse to the use of those weapons. In the new thrust
towards globalization, defence must be a collective perception, rather
than a unilateral one, he added.

He stated that Algeria had
made a dual proposal to establish a separate committee for disarmament
and for the prohibition of the production of fissile materials. The
international community should make special efforts to prohibit the
production of fissile materials. The dynamics of disarmament would
remain incomplete if the aspect of conventional weapons was not dealt
with, particularly the illicit transfer of those arms that fuelled a
number of phenomena that threatened national security and social
development. The change in international relations had engendered a
surplus of those weapons that had global effects.

He noted
that his country devoted the lowest percentage of its gross national
product (GNP) to national defence and supported the United Nations
efforts to research and compile information on weapons trafficking.
However, that must be undertaken through international cooperation.
Algeria could also only support the confidence-building measures if
those also dwelt on conventional weapons. To be useful, those measures
must reflect the specific features of regions. Therefore, they could
not be imposed as a single model. The issue of disarmament and internal
security were inseparable from economic and social development, he
pointed out. It was legitimate for developing countries to expect more
than unfulfilled promises. What would the confidence-building measures
be worth if they were not backed up by economically sustainable
measures? The enormous amounts that were being used in defence and arms
spending could be diverted to development projects.