Tuesday, 29 October 2013

Since the 26/11 Mumbai terror
strike in 2008, India's security czars have summed up New Delhi's Pakistan
policy as follows: there are many Pakistans; we will deal with each
appropriately.

In other words,
the government in Islamabad does not speak for all of Pakistan. The Pakistan
Army follows its own path. So does the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),
which --- despite being an integral part of the military --- is divided between
the notorious "S" Wing, which handles jihadi
allies like the Haqqani network and the Lashkar-e-Taiba;
and the "C" Wing, whose counter-terrorism centre battles other
jihadis. Then there are a plethora of political parties, ranging from the
jihad-happy Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf , which organises rallies
with the Lashkar-e-Taiba's Hafiz Saeed, to more India-friendly parties like the
Pakistan Peoples Party. There are jihadi groups of many stripes, some reserving
their venom for India, others focusing keenly on America and Afghanistan, but
most of them co-ordinating operationally. There is the business community,
mainly Punjabi, which sees profit in freer commerce with India. A wafer-thin
layer of liberal secularists unapologetically, and bravely, advocates
friendship with India. Finally, there is the broad Pakistani public that,
despite being indoctrinated with doses of religious conservatism and
anti-Indianism, realises that they are expendable pawns in a cynical and deadly
game.

Some of these
bits and pieces are predisposed to peace with India. Many will never be, for
obvious structural reasons. But only someone who is visiting earth after a
longish absence would argue that Pakistan is monolithic in its hatred of India,
or cohesive in dealing with fundamental questions of its identity.

It is,
therefore, mystifying why --- even while acknowledging the fragmentation within
Pakistan --- New Delhi responds to Pakistan as if it were a cohesive entity,
controlled by Nawaz Sharif.
Why else would Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
tell journalists on his flight from Moscow to Beijing last week that he did not
understand why Nawaz Sharif could not enforce the ceasefire with India?

Perhaps the
prime minister really believes that Ashfaq Parvez Kayani is waiting for orders
from Mr Sharif about calibrating the temperature on the border. Dr Manmohan Singh
might well assess that his counterpart is only feigning helplessness. After
all, in relations between states, it is established strategy (read Thomas
Schelling, for example) for one side to suggest that something is beyond its
control. But most people would agree that Mr Sharif does not have much say on
border policy. That is formulated in the Pakistan Army's General Headquarters
(GHQ) in Rawalpindi. New Delhi is scolding the little guy with spectacles for
what the bully has done.

Does New Delhi
have effective communication with GHQ? The two directors general of military
operations talk each week over a telephonic hotline. But they only clear
functional issues, such as ceasefire violations, since India's bureaucrats and
politicians do not want soldiers discussing substantive matters. Besides, New
Delhi does not want our "B" Team talking with Pakistan's
"A" Team.

Nor does New
Delhi communicate with the ISI, with Pakistani political parties or with
business associations. We have no contacts with Pakistan-based militant groups
since our external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing, has had
no covert capabilities since the late 1990s. Nor do we address the Pakistani
public, giving them visas to India to expose the propaganda they are fed about
this country. Getting a visa to India is almost as difficult for a Pakistani as
obtaining a United States visa. So much for the many Pakistans that India
addresses.

Contrast New
Delhi's isolation in Pakistan with how the US addresses multiple constituencies
there. It matters little to America that it is the single most hated country in
Pakistan (even more so than India). Washington addresses the government, and
the spectrum of opposition parties, academia and civil society. It maintains
contact with the Pakistani military and the ISI, even knowing that they have
masterminded the deaths of thousands of American soldiers in Afghanistan. US
intelligence agencies talk non-stop to jihadi groups, even as they listen
non-stop to their radio and digital conversations. The American people and the
US Congress are no more enamoured of Pakistan than is India. But Washington
knows that anger must be cloaked in engagement, since estrangement takes away
the power to influence.

US engagement
provides the leverage that allows the Pentagon to dismiss Pakistani objections
to drone strikes. A clear decision that drone operations would be needed over
Pakistan after 2014 compels John Kerry to conclude a strategic partnership
agreement with the often impossible Afghan President Hamid Karzai. And the need
to engage with post-2014 power groups compels the Central Intelligence Agency
to talk to the Taliban even while US soldiers are being killed by Taliban
bombs.

In an India that
has chosen to be irrelevant in Pakistan except as a hate figure, it is popular
to lament Washington's gullibility. "America is just so credulous when it
comes to Pakistan," you will hear again and again in New Delhi. This is
natural in a country where Pakistan has been dealt with mainly through scoring
debating points and periodically walking away from the dialogue table, only to
shuffle back later on the condition that the table is renamed.

India's
diplomats, who also dominate the making of strategy, have been bred in this
tradition, arguing for decades in international fora that Pakistan's national
strategy involves the sponsorship of terrorism. Global events since 9/11 have
brought much of the world around to this viewpoint. But this success has bred
stagnation. Generating real influence --- through a broad menu of diplomatic
engagement, economic incentives and coercive force, leveraged by intelligence
operations --- is apparently too much for our word-loving diplomats. New
Delhi's phrase, "addressing multiple Pakistans", remains little more
than a nice thought.

Thursday, 24 October 2013

It is heartening that New Delhi and Beijing are not allowing
the breadth of their engagement to be constrained by the border question, which
has not moved closer to resolution since 2005, when the two sides agreed on the
Political Parameters and Guiding Principles that would inform an eventual
solution. Since then, “special representatives” of both governments have labored
unsuccessfully to arrive at an “Agreed Framework” for a settlement. Only after
that can a mutually agreed border be delineated on a map, and then demarcated
on ground.

The Border Defence and Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) that was
signed on Wednesday as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Beijing takes the
two sides no closer to a final settlement. All that it does --- like the
earlier agreements of 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2012 --- is to bolster a relatively
benign operating environment on the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC). This
imposed calm is essential for curbing hotheaded tactical commanders; violence
between patrols that come face-to-face in disputed areas can easily blow up
into full-scale diplomatic crises.

But the BDCA does nothing to address the root cause of
tension on the border --- an absence of clarity on where the LAC runs. With both
sides needing to demonstrate physical presence and control up to their claimed LAC,
this gives rise to accusations of “patrol intrusions”, perceptions of
aggression and mal-intent, concomitant insecurity, and the consequential
massing of troops that heightens the probability of escalation.

Agreeing on an LAC is far simpler than agreeing on a border.
But, so far, India and China have shared perceptions on the LAC only in the
inconsequential Central Sector, i.e. Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh. In the
Western Sector (Ladakh) and Eastern Sector (Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh),
which is where the real disagreement lies, Beijing has resisted the exchange of
maps marked with each side’s claimed LAC alignment. It is unclear whether this
is because China wants to retain the option to expand its claim later, or
because of the apprehension that this would lead to unrealistic claims that
would complicate the situation further.

The absence of an agreed LAC blocks many of the
de-escalatory measures spelt out in the CBM agreements. The 1996 agreement
explicitly states “the full implementation of some of the provisions of the
present Agreement will depend on the two sides arriving at a common
understanding of the alignment of the line of actual control.” New Delhi must
press Beijing to move forward with the map exchange. True, this might result in
identifying more areas where the Indian perception of the LAC does not align
with that of China. But pretending that the LAC is disputed in only 14 areas
(the currently identified differences) is hardly a substitute for ascertaining
the real magnitude of the dispute. Once the situation is clear, solutions could
be tailored to de-escalate the disputed areas without prejudice to either
side’s claims.

On the plus
side, there was an agreement to enhance cooperation on the border, a move
towards sharing more data on river waters, and greater Chinese concern for
India’s negative trade balance with China. But India also scuttled a visa
agreement, sought by businessmen on both sides, to convey displeasure over
Beijing’s continued refusal to grant regular visas to Indians living in Arunachal
Pradesh, which China claims.

In the
final balance, the Beijing visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made
clear that no single issue — not even the border — dominates the agenda between
the two Asian giants.

The
showpiece signing, the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA),
incrementally adds to four earlier agreements signed over the past three decades
— the 1993 Agreement on Peace and Tranquillity on the Line of Actual Control
(LAC); the 1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures on the LAC; the 2005
Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the
Military Field; and the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on
India-China Border Affairs, signed last year.

The BDCA
reiterates many of the principles covered in earlier agreements, but
additionally formalises a five-layer mechanism for communication between the
two sides: First, flag meetings between border personnel on the LAC; second,
meetings between senior officers of China’s Military Regions and India’s Army
Commands; third, periodic meetings at the ministry level; fourth, meetings of
the Working Mechanism (set up last year) between diplomats handling Sino-India
relations; and fifth, the apex India-China Annual Defence Dialogue.

Implementing
real-time communications on the LAC, the BDCA provides for border meetings in
every sector, and for telephone links at various places along the LAC. There
will be “mutual consultations” to set up a hotline between the two military
headquarters. The Indian and Pakistani armies already have a hotline over which
the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs) speak every week.

“We decided
to encourage and institutionalise greater exchanges between the armed forces of
our two countries,” Singh said after the meeting.

Minimising
the risk of patrol clashes, the BDCA prohibits patrols from tailing (following)
opposing patrols. This has been traditionally done to ascertain that an
intruding patrol goes back into its own territory.

Interestingly,
in comments to the media on Wednesday, Singh spelt out a strategic framework
for Sino-Indian relations. His “strategic vision” was to “realise the full
promise of our partnership and maintain the friendliest of relations”.

The
“strategic benchmark” would be to maintain peace on the borders and “move
forward the negotiations towards a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable
settlement to the India-China border question”.

And,
perhaps most significantly, the PM said that “strategic reassurance” would
dictate that “the relationships pursued by India and China with other countries
must not become a source of concern for each other”.

While New
Delhi links this to China’s “all-weather friendship” with Pakistan, Beijing
would link it with India’s growing partnership with the US.

Indicating
that contentious issues were placed on the table, the PM said he raised India’s
“interest in continued and expanded cooperation on trans-border rivers and
received reassurances from Premier Li.” He did not elaborate what assurances
were given. The agreement signed between the two ministries for water resources
agreed to provide India with hydrological information on flows in the
Brahmaputra (Chinese: Yaluzangbu; Tibetan: Yarlung Tsangpo) from May 15 to
October 15. So far, data have been provided from June 1 to October 15 each
year.

Singh also
tabled the issue of India’s adverse trade balance. “Premier Li was receptive to
my concern about the unsustainable trade imbalance between our two countries
and we have agreed to explore avenues to bridge this gap.”

“We are
taking forward the suggestion made by Premier Li in New Delhi for a Chinese
industrial park to act as a magnet for Chinese investment in India,” Singh
added.

India and
China aim to boost trade to $100 billion a year by 2015. Last year, trade was
$66 billion, marginally down from the previous year. While Singh declared “when
India and China shake hands, the world takes notice”, China’s media was less
effusive. With the Russian and Mongolian prime ministers visiting Beijing along
with Singh, online English newspaper, Global Times, headlined these visits as,
“China receives three PMs”. The newspaper said China was “underlining an
emphasis on peripheral diplomacy in its overall diplomatic strategy against the
backdrop of the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific”.