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Formal Verification of Cryptographic Protocols

Members

Mohamed Layouni

Dr. Sofiene Tahar

Dr. Jozef Hooman

Description

Many of today's distributed applications rely on communication between groups of users. Such applications involve a set of participants that may not fully trust each others. Even if group participants are, a priori, trusted, it is still safe to assume that an external attacker may gain illicit access to the system. Intrusion-tolerance is the application of fault-tolerance to security. Assuming that faults, both benign and Byzantine, are unavoidable, the main goal of Intrusion-tolerance is to preserve an acceptable, though possibly degraded, service of the overall system despite intrusions at some of its sub-parts.
In this project, we consider the Intrusion-tolerant Enclaves protocol, a Byzantine fault-tolerant platform for secure group communication developed at SRI. We formally analyse the protocol, with a special focus the processes Byzantine behaviour, using an adaptive combination of techniques including Model Checking, Theorem Proving and Analytical mathematics.