* Vladimir Mikhailovich Petlyakov learned his trade as an aircraft designer
under the instruction of the Russian aviation pioneer N.E. Zhukovskii. From
1920 onward, Petlyakov worked under Andrei Tupolev, one of the godfathers of
Soviet aircraft design. He worked on a number of projects for Tupolev, most
significantly heading the design team for the "TB-3 (ANT-6)" bomber of the
early 1930s. The TB-3 was a big four-engine bomber with an open cockpit and
fixed landing gear. It looks archaic now, and its service in combat a decade
later would be mostly regrettable, but for its time it was an advanced
aircraft.

The first aircraft to bear the Petlyakov name actually formally started out
as a Tupolev machine. In 1934, the Soviet government issued a requirement
for a new four-engine heavy bomber as a follow-on to the TB-3. The new
bomber would feature the latest innovations in aircraft design and would
operate at high altitude to avoid interception. It would also have a heavy
bombload and strong defensive armament. The engines were to be Mikulin AM-34
water-cooled vee-12 engines, then in development, which were expected to
provide 640 kW (840 HP) each initially.

The Tupolev OKB (experimental design bureau) came up with a design with some
general resemblance to the contemporary Boeing XB-15 and B-17 bombers,
constructed mostly of metal but with fabric-covered flight control surfaces.
It was given the official designation of "TB-7" and had the internal OKB
designation of "ANT-42", where "ANT" stood for "Andrei N. Tupolev". Approval
was given for construction of an initial prototype.

The AM-34 engines were a problematic issue, partly because they weren't
available at the time, and also because they weren't going to be introduced
with any optimizations for high-altitude operation. The first problem had to
be tolerated, while the second was addressed by installing a Klimov M-100
water-cooled inline vee-12 engine in the center fuselage to drive a blower
system that supplied air to the four AM-34s in the wing. It would have been
preferable to use an AM-34 in the fuselage as well to simplify maintenance,
but it wouldn't fit, and so the smaller M-100 was used instead.

The ANT-42 was to have a bombload of 4,000 kilograms (8,800 pounds) and
particularly impressive defensive armament for the time, with power-operated
nose, dorsal, and tail turrets, plus gunner's positions at the end of each of
the inboard engine nacelles and fitted with a flexible machine gun.
Apparently other flexibly-mounted gun positions were considered but
eliminated in development. There was a glassed-in gondola under the nose for
the bombardier. The pilot and copilot sat in tandem, with positions for
flight engineer, radio operator, navigator, and reserve navigator underneath.
Total crew complement was to be 11.

The first (unarmed) prototype TB-7 performed its initial flight on 27
December 1936, with Mikhail Gromov at the controls and the aircraft fitted
with AM-34FRN engines with 835 kW (1,120 HP) each. The prototype evaluation
was not entirely smooth. The AM-34FRN engines were unreliable -- not
surprising as they were preproduction units, and in fact the AM-34 would
never go into production -- and the aircraft was overweight.

The second prototype was built to a near-operational standard, with armament
and armor, and performed its first flight on 26 July 1938. Pre-series
production of six aircraft had already been authorized, in April 1937,
Petlyakov was not in command for the moment, around the same time that
Petlyakov was arrested on trumped-up charges and thrown into the Gulag.
Direction of the program was taken over by Josef Nezval.

However, producing the aircraft proved troublesome, partly because of
difficulties in delivering the AM-34 engines and in developing critical
components for the air-blower system. In 1939 the Kremlin considered
cancelling the program, but advocates managed to save the program, partly by
obtaining AM-35 inlines and redesigning the pre-series aircraft to
accommodate them.

The first TB-7 was delivered in May 1940. By July of that year, Petlyakov
had been rehabilitated, and in fact was assigned his own OKB, which retained
ownership of the TB-7. The bomber would be presently redesignated "Pe-8" to
reflect the change in management. It is not clear when this change was
actually made, different sources claiming 1941 or 1942, but the designation
"Pe-8" will be used in the rest of this document for simplicity.

* In production, the Pe-8 was fitted with twin ShKAS 7.62 millimeter machine
guns in the nose turret, while the dorsal and tail turrets were fitted with a
single ShVAK 20 millimeter cannon. The gunners in the rear of the engine
nacelles each fired a single flexibly-mounted Berezin 12.7 millimeter machine
gun. There had been considerable variation in armament fit during prototype
development, and some late-production Pe-8s were delivered with one ShKAS
machine gun in the nose instead of two.

The initial production machine were fitted with AM-35A inlines with 1,010 kW
(1,350 HP) each. The scheme involving the M-100 engine in the fuselage to
drive a blower system was not used in production machines. Following the
initial production aircraft, Pe-8s were then built with Charomskii M-30 and
M-40 two-stroke diesels, which proved unreliable to the point of
unacceptable, leading to retrofit of AM-35As. Ultimately, problems with
delivery of the AM-35A forced conversion to Shvestsov M-82 air-cooled
radials, with 1,380 kW (1,850 HP) each. The refit of the air-cooled engines
required considerable redesign of the engine nacelles. Aircrews liked the
greater power provided by the M-82s but found the old AM-35As more reliable.

The Pe-8 performed the Soviet Union's first bombing raid on Berlin, on the
night of 10 August 1941, barely three weeks after the Nazi invasion. It was
mostly a propaganda exercise, with only five of the eight bombers on the raid
actually reaching Berlin, and then dumping their loads haphazardly. The
difficulties with the raid and other Pe-8 operations in the same timeframe
were mostly chalked up to the unreliable diesel engines, leading to their
wholesale replacement with AM-35As.

Along with conducting long-range night raids, Pe-8s also served as long-range
transports, dropping agents and supplies and delivering diplomats. In April
1942, a Pe-8 performed a non-stop flight to England to deliver embassy
personnel and mail, and in May one carried Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav
Molotov and his staff to Britain and the US.

* It is unclear how many Pe-8s were built. Western sources list only 79
built into October 1941, when the state factory building the type had to be
abandoned in front of the German invasion, and that the M-82-powered aircraft
were mostly or all refits. More reliable Russian sources claim that the Pe-8
was actually built into 1944 and that total production was 93 or 96, with
later production of new M-82 powered machines from a state factory in Kazan.

In any case, by 1944 the Pe-8 was no longer up to first-line combat against
much improved Luftwaffe night fighter defenses, and was retired to
second-line duties. It operated in various roles in the postwar period,
including operation as a testbed and transport service with Aeroflot, and
flew into the early 1950s before being phased out entirely.

The report card on the Pe-8 seems a bit mixed. It was an advanced aircraft
for its time, comparing well at least on paper with contemporary British and
American heavy bombers, but given the small number built it made no major
contribution to the Soviet war effort, and was clearly not regarded as a
weapon deserving of priority production. The Red Air Force was focused on
battlefield support and there was little emphasis on strategic bombing at the
time.

In the postwar nuclear period, strategic bombing would become much more
important. The USSR would turn to the Boeing B-29 Superfortress, instead of
an indigenous design, as the basis for the Soviet Union's strategic bombing
force. B-29s forced down in Siberia would be reverse-engineered and produced
as the Tupolev "Tu-4", which would ultimately evolve into the most distinctly
Soviet of aircraft, the Tu-95 "Bear".

* Petlyakov's true success would actually start out as an offshoot of the
ANT-42 work. After his arrest in November 1937 on charges that he was
deliberately delaying development of the ANT-42, indicating that the Kremlin
was unhappy with his progress on the project, he was allowed to go back to
his work in aircraft design at a "special technical prison" run by the NKVD,
the state security service led by the dreaded Lavrenti Beria.

Such technical prisons were nicknamed "sharashkas", a Russian term that
roughly translates as a criminal gang, which is how the unlucky residents
were formally regarded. The engineers in the sharashkas worked long hours,
and they were not even allowed the privilege of signing their design
documents, instead being issued numbered stamps to identify their work.

At the sharashka, Petlyakov was assigned to develop a long-range twin-engine
fighter to escort the ANT-42, as well as serve as a high-altitude
interceptor. Petlyakov and his team of prisoners responded with a design
that featured twin engines, all-metal construction, and a pressurized cabin
for a crew of two, including pilot and navigator. The new aircraft was
designated "Vysotnyi Istrebitel 100 (VI-100 / High-Altitude Fighter 100)".

The VI-100 was a very clean aircraft of conventional twin-engine design and a
twin-fin tail, with a general configuration along the lines of the German
Messerschmitt Me-110 and some resemblance to Japanese twin-engine aircraft
such as the Mitsubishi Ki-46 "Dinah". The VI-100 was powered by twin Klimov
M-105R liquid-cooled 12-cylinder vee inline engines, enhanced versions of the
French Hispano-Suiza 12Y engine, for which the Soviets had acquired a
manufacturing license. The engines were to be fitted with TK-2
turbochargers. Each engine provided 820 kW (1,100 HP) on take-off and drove
three-bladed variable-pitch propellers.

The aircraft was designed strong to handle any class of aerobatic maneuvers,
and also included an unusually high number of electrically-actuated
subsystems for its time. The pilot and navigator rode in separate cockpits
joined by a long, sealed canopy that provided excellent visibility. The crew
got into the aircraft using separate ventral (belly) hatches, which were
equipped with quick-release latches to make baling out easier. The VI-100
featured tricycle landing gear, all with single wheels, with the main gear
retracting backward into the engine nacelles. The tailwheel was also
retractable.

It was to be armed with two ShKAS 7.62 millimeter machine guns with 900
rounds each and two ShVAK 20 millimeter cannon with 300 rounds each, fitted
in a cluster in the nose. There was also provision for a fixed ShKAS machine
gun in the tail with 700 rounds of ammunition to be fired by the navigator in
the back seat, but this weapon would never be fitted. The VI-100 could carry
bombs on wing racks outboard of the engines. It appears that a secondary
bombing role was envisioned for the machine, but there was also some scheme
being floated at the time in which the VI-100 would drop clusters of
time-delay bomblets into enemy bomber formations.

Initial flight of the first of two prototypes was on 22 December 1939, with
pilot Major Piotr Stefanovsky at the controls. There were some clear bugs,
including main landing gear that was a bit too springy and put the machine
through some kangaroo-like bounds on landing. This actually worked out,
since Stefanovsky found he was undershooting his approach to the runway and
was about to smash into some ground equipment, but the aircraft bounded over
the top of it. He still had some words with the relevant design engineer.

There were more serious problems with the engines, which were gradually
fixed, and with the aircraft's landing characteristics. It had a nasty
tendency to suffer an asymmetrical stall at high angles of attack on
approach, which is possibly why Stefanovsky undershot his approach on the
first flight. This problem was never completely resolved through the further
evolution of the type, and was a danger to inexperienced pilots. The second
prototype was wrecked in a landing accident, the aircrew surviving but
several unlucky bystanders being killed. Beria was furious, but Petlyakov
managed to plead for the well-being of the aircrew. Otherwise, the
development program went well, and the VI-100 was recommended for volume
production, with plans laid in March 1940 for constructing a preproduction
batch of ten machines.

* Stefanovsky took the VI-100 prototype on a public display over Red Square
on May Day 1940, with the design crew watching the performance from the roof
of their sharashka. However, in that month Hitler invaded the Low Countries
and France, and the work of the Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive bomber in that
lightning campaign impressed Soviet officials. Soviet efforts to build a
diver bomber were going nowhere at the time, and so the word went down in
early June 1940 to design a variant of the VI-100 for the dive-bombing role.

Petlyakov's team was given 45 days to come up with the new design. About a
hundred more engineers were temporarily recruited from design OKBs on the
"outside", and the daily work schedule was stretched, with the engineers
given a break and another meal to keep them going. They met their schedule,
providing manufacturing drawings and documents to the relevant state
factories on 1 August 1940.

The new aircraft was known as the "Pikiruyuschii Bombardirovschik 100 (PB-100
/ Dive Bomber 100)". It had the same overall configuration as the VI-100 and
retained many of its innovations, such as extensive use of electrical
systems, but also featured many significant changes. Many of the changes
came from analysis of the German Junkers Ju-88A twin-engine bomber. The
Soviets and the Nazis were, as it turned out very temporarily, on good terms,
and the USSR had purchased Ju-88As from Germany for evaluation.

The cabin pressurization and turbochargers were discarded, with the
elimination of the turbochargers leading to streamlining of the engine
nacelles. The wings were fitted with perforated dive brakes and the
extensions of the horizontal tailplane beyond the tailfins were trimmed off.
The cockpit was completely redesigned, and a glass-bottomed nose was fitted
for the navigator / bombardier.

Two fixed ShKAS 7.62 millimeter machine guns were fitted in the nose. The
navigator was provided with a flexibly-mounted ShKAS gun, firing out the back
of the cockpit for protection up and to the rear. This gun was stowed under
a retractable screen called a "turtle" for its appearance, with the screen
pulled forward when the gun needed to be used.

Along with the bombsight for level bombing in the glass nose, the pilot had a
windscreen bombsight for dive bombing. A ventral position for a ShKAS gun on
a flexible mount was fitted under the rear fuselage for protection below and
to the rear, to be operated by a third crew member who sighted the weapon
with a periscopic sight, with eyelike portholes on either side of the
fuselage to provide more visibility. The gunner doubled as a radio operator.
A radio compass was added along with the radio, and a camera was added for
reconnaissance and post-strike assessment.

A bombbay was fitted in the fuselage, as well as in the rear of each engine
nacelle. The main bombbay could accommodate four 100 kilogram (220 pound)
bombs, while the bombbays in the engine nacelles could carry a single 100
kilogram bomb each. There were external racks between the engines and the
fuselage that could carry a total of four 250 kilogram (550 pound) or 500
kilogram (1,100 pound) bombs. Typical bombload was 600 kilograms (1,320
pounds) and maximum bombload was 1,000 kilograms (2,200 pounds).

* The haste in which the PB-100 program had been conducted meant that the
aircraft was to be put into production without construction of a prototype.
The state factories assigned to produce the new aircraft were supposed to
roll out a working machine by 7 November 1940, but this proved impossible
despite threats by the authorities. The command came down that at least one
machine had to be produced in 1940 or drastic measures would be taken against
those responsible. In the Soviet Union under Stalin, drastic measures could
be extremely unpleasant, and the first PB-100 flew on 15 December 1940. By
this time, Petlyakov had been rehabilitated, and the aircraft had been
designated "Pe-2", following a new designation scheme put into effect at the
beginning of December.

To no surprise considering the circumstances, the first five Pe-2s were in
very rough condition, lacking most operational kit and suffering from many
defects, and the evaluation that followed in early 1941 uncovered a wide
range of problems. Miraculously, none of the aircraft used in the evaluation
-- they were really prototypes whether anybody wanted to admit it or not --
were lost in crashes, but there were a number of emergency landings.

However, the evaluation did show that the aircraft was an excellent dive
bomber and very rugged, although it had a high landing speed and the
unpleasant low-speed stall characteristics noted for the VI-100. The
aircraft's high speed, 540 KPH at 5,000 meters (335 MPH at 16,400 feet), more
than made up for these vices.

By early spring 1941, the Pe-2 was being delivered to field units. As far as
the VI-100 went, its priority dropped as that of the Pe-2 rose, and it was
gradually simply forgotten. The ten preproduction machines were never built.

Although the initial Pe-2s had retained the fighter stick control of the
VI-100, this turned out to give the pilot inadequate "leverage" and was
upgraded to a bomber-type yoke control. The flexible ShKAS light machine gun
in the rear of the cockpit was replaced after early production by a more
potent Berezin UBT 12.7 millimeter machine gun, and one of the fixed ShKAS
guns in the nose was also replaced by a heavy UBT machine gun with 150
rounds.

Pilots and crew had some difficulties with the type at first, since it
retained some nasty design defects for the moment and would always have some
unpleasant handling quirks. However, they would grow more fond of it, and
refer to it as the "Petlyakov", or the affectionate "Peshka (Pawn)".

* Several hundred Pe-2s had rolled off the production lines by the time of
the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. After the Nazi
attack, the German Luftwaffe enjoyed almost complete air superiority,
shooting down thousands of Soviet aircraft for losses of hundreds of their
own.

Most of the Red aircraft were obsolete types and easy kills for the
Luftwaffe's Messerschmitt Bf-109 fighters, but German pilots found the fast
Pe-2s difficult to catch and destroy. The British, with a new ally in the
war against Hitler, sent a detachment of Hawker Hurricane IIBs to Vianga,
near Murmask, and flew top cover for a Pe-2 bombing mission on 24 September
1941. The Hurricane pilots found they had to stay at full throttle to keep
up with the Petlyakovs.

As Hitler's columns rolled into the Soviet Union, as much of the Red
industrial machine as could be dismantled was packed up and shipped off to
beyond the Urals. Whatever could not be moved was destroyed. Despite the
chaos of the relocation, by the end of the year hundreds more Pe-2s had
rolled off the production line. Performance deteriorated slightly due to
reduced production quality and additions of armor for the navigator and radio
operator.

Production of reconnaissance Pe-2s began in August 1941, with these aircraft
lacking the dive brakes and fitted with additional fuel tankage in the
bombbay and three cameras in the rear fuselage. They could carry flares for
night reconnaissance.

* Soviet resistance through the summer and fall of 1941 was disorganized and
not very effective. Such Pe-2s as were available were not used to their
fullest potential, being employed in intermittent bombing sorties and as
improvised night fighters, using searchlights mounted under the wings to pin
down Luftwaffe bombers for destruction by single-engine fighters.

When the Red Army finally rallied in December 1941, Pe-2s began to make their
first significant strikes on the enemy. On 9 December, Pe-2s of the 23rd
Bomber Air Division annihilated a retreating German troop convoy, striking at
the lead vehicles to block the road and then destroying the rest.

The Soviets endured further setbacks in the spring and summer of 1942. The
Pe-2 was able to make the Germans pay for their gains, as Russian pilots
perfected tactics. Such tactics included the "Vertushka (Carousel)", in
which the bombers circled, making successive dive attacks on targets inside
the circle. Other tactics were devised to make the best use of fighter
cover, with fighters assigned to provide top cover, while two or three
followed the dive bombers down to provide flanking protection.

Vladimir Petlyakov was killed in an air crash on 12 January 1942, ironically
in a Pe-2. He had been called to a meeting and preferred to ride in his own
creation, rather than a VIP transport. The aircraft was believed to have
encountered a snowstorm and run into a hill. Petlyakov was replaced by
Alexander I. Putilov.

In any case, by late 1942 the design bureau had come up with the needed
improvements, adding more crew armor and better defensive armament: the
ShKAS 7.62 millimeter dorsal and ventral guns were replaced by Berezin UBT
12.7 millimeter guns. The hand-held dorsal gun position was replaced by a
turret, with an odd "weather-vane" fixture on top to balance the effects of
wind resistance on the barrel when the turret was turned off the centerline.
The turret design went through a number of iterations before a proper
solution was found. Another noticeable change was simplification and
streamlining of the nose, with the elimination of all the bombardier's
glazing except for the bottom panels.

The updated Pe-2 was designated "Pe-2FT" for "Frontovoye Trebovaniye (Front
Line Demand)". This reflected a process in which front-line pilots had
meetings with the design engineers to provide feedback and suggest practical
changes. The introduction of the M-105PF engine (with 1,200 kW / 1,610 HP)
in February 1943 resulted in improved performance at low altitudes, but
aircrew were not happy with the change since the new engine's high-altitude
performance was inferior, and the real reason behind the use of the M-105PF
was to rationalize engine production, as it was also used on Soviet
single-engine fighters.

The quirks of the Pe-2's handling led to the development of a two-seat
trainer for familiarization training. This aircraft was sometimes referred
to as the "Pe-2UT", and the first rolled out in late 1942. The Pe-2UT
featured duplicate cockpits and controls and was built in modest quantities
through the rest of the war.

* As the Pe-2 was refined, it was thrown into battle after battle: the
struggle for Stalingrad through late 1942 into early 1943; the Kursk
counteroffensive in the spring of 1943; the Belorussian offensive in 1944;
and the final drive on Berlin in 1945. Pe-2 pilots sometimes became
proficient "snipers", capable of planting bombs "down chimney stacks". Some
of these pilots were women: squadrons led by Captains Nadezhda Fudutenko,
Klavdia Fumicheva, and Maria Dolina performed vital service during the battle
for Borisov in June, 1944.

The type was continuously refined through the conflict, with modifications of
armament, external stores, and equipment fit. Near the end of the war, a
"Pe-2M" with improved defensive armament was developed but not produced,
though a "Pe-2K" with provision for rocket- assisted takeoff boosters was
built in small numbers. Production of the Pe-2 trailed off after the war.

* The Pe-2 had its origins in a fighter design, the VI-100, and would evolve
back into a fighter of sorts during its lifetime. On 2 August 1941, very
shortly after the German invasion, Petlyakov was ordered to develop a
twin-engine long-range fighter version of the Pe-2 on an absolute rush,
minimum-change basis. The result, the "Pe-3", performed its first flight on
7 August, only five days after the request was issued!

Of course, this was hardly a design miracle, since all the engineers could do
on such short notice was take a standard early-production Pe-2 and hastily
refit it as a fighter. The changes consisted of fitting additional fuel
tanks in the fuselage, one in the bombbay and one replacing the ventral
gunner / radio operator's position, turning the machine into a two-seater.

Nose armament fit was modified by addition of another Berezin UBK 12.7
millimeter machine gun in the nose, resulting in nose armament of two UBKs,
with 150 rounds per gun, and a single ShKAS 7.62 millimeter gun with 750
rounds per gun. The rear turret of the Pe-2 was retained, though the ventral
gun was removed, to be replaced by a fixed rearward-firing ShKAS light
machine gun with 250 rounds in the tail, a scheme derived from the VI-100
fighter.

One external bomb rack was retained under each wing, along with the bombbays
in the engine nacelles. Typical bombload was about 400 kilograms (880
pounds), though more could be carried in an overload condition. The
electrical bomb-release system was stripped, with the mechanical emergency
bomb-release system retained. The dive brakes were removed, the radio
compass was removed, and the bomber-type radio was swapped for a fighter-type
radio.

It is a further indication of the haste in this program that production was
authorized on 14 August 1941, with five preproduction aircraft to be
delivered by 25 August. Delivery of these machines was problematic, since it
was easier to modify a Pe-2 on short notice than to produce proper
engineering drawings and documents for use by the manufacturing engineers to
build the aircraft. However, difficulties were overcome and Pe-3s were being
delivered to operational units by the end of the month.

To no surprise, given the haste behind the effort, the Pe-3 left something to
be desired, with the front-line aircrew immediately calling for changes. The
fighter radio had inadequate range, and the lack of a radio compass was very
troublesome; forward firepower was inadequate; and the lack of frontal armor
left the Pe-3 very vulnerable to defensive fire, one commander of an air
regiment saying that he would be wiped out after two combat actions if armor
wasn't fitted.

The Petlyakov OKB responded immediately, with the first improved "Pe-3bis"
flying in September. Nose armament was increased to two UBK 12.7 millimeter
machine guns and one ShVAK 20 millimeter cannon, all with 250 rounds per gun.
The fixed tailcone ShKAS gun, which was generally regarded as a joke, was
deleted. Frontal armor was fitted; automatic slats were added to the leading
edges of the wings to improve landing characteristics; provision was added
for carriage of a reconnaissance camera; and a number of other small changes
were added. These changes were added in ongoing production and, to an
extent, retrofitted to aircraft in the field, while the design OKB went
through another iteration to further refine the design. The nose glazing was
deleted; the two UBK 12.7 millimeter guns in the nose were moved to the wing
roots; and a propeller and canopy de-icing system was added.

Pe-3 series aircraft were produced in relatively small batches into 1944,
with a total of a few hundred built to end of production, a small quantity
compared to the massive quantities of Pe-2s rolled off the production line.
They were used for air combat, reconnaissance, and attack, and served to the
end of the war. Many Pe-3s were refitted with improved armament in the
field.

While the Petlyakov OKB was engaged in the rush job that created the Pe-3,
they also worked on another quick modification, the "Pe-2I (Istrebitel)".
This was a Pe-2 with fuel tanks and a ShVAK cannon mounted in the bombbay, as
well as provision for underwing external tanks. The Pe-2I did not go into
production, but the designation would be recycled later.

* There were a number of miscellaneous Pe-2 variants and modifications.
There were a series of experiments with different engine fits. A single
prototype of a "Pe-2F" was built with turbocharged M-105F water-cooled inline
engines and a "lowered" fuselage that accommodated a more spacious bombbay to
reduce the need to carry "draggy" external stores. Its performance was
disappointing and the turbochargers were troublesome. Experiments followed
using M-107 and M-107A engines, but no Pe-2F variant ever went into
production.

A prototype, apparently a rebuild of an early production Pe-2, and 22
production Pe-2s were actually built with Svetsov M-82FN air-cooled radials,
the first of these machines flying in June 1942. The aircraft featured big
prop spinners to improve streamlining, and the unneeded radiators in the
wings were replaced by fuel tanks. The higher power rating of the M-82
provided improved performance, but there were engine reliability problems,
and though work was ongoing to result them, the Lavochin La-5 single-engine
fighter had priority for M-82 deliveries. There was some notion of
redesignating Pe-2s with M-82FN engines as "Pe-4s", but this idea was
abandoned along with full production of the variant.

* In the summer of 1943, Vladimir Myasishchev took over what had been the
Petlyakov OKB. He supervised the development of a series of prototypes,
including the "Pe-2A", "Pe-2B", and "Pe-2D" that featured a number of
aerodynamic improvements over existing Pe-2 production. It appears these
were test machines only, with some of the features evaluated on them being
flowed into standard Pe-2 production. Myasishchev's most interesting
development was the "Pe-2I" fast bomber variant, which recycled the
designation of an earlier Pe-2 fighter derivative, mentioned previously,
though in this case it seems the "I" was just a sequence code and did not
stand for "istrebitel / interceptor".

Myasishchev's Pe-2I featured extensive streamlining, inspired by the British
de Havilland Mosquito light bomber, with no turret but a tail stinger; a
"lowered" fuselage to increase bombbay volume; M-107A engines; and two crew.
A prototype flew in 1944 and performance was excellent, but only five were
built before the end of the war and Pe-2 production. Some sources hint that
Myasishchev also proposed a high-altitude fighter variant of the Pe-2I, the
"Pe-2VI (Vysotnyi Istrebitel)", with a pressurized cabin and four ShVAK 20
millimeter cannon in the nose, but this may be a confusion with a Pe-2VI
program conducted by his predecessor, Alexander Putilov, that came to
nothing.

* Finally, a number of Pe-2s were used as test platforms during and after the
war, including evaluations of downward-firing gun packs for battlefield
support; ejection seats; ramjets; and liquid-fuel rockets, one experiment
along this line, designated the "Pe-RD", involving Sergei Korolev, who would
become the "Chief Rocket Designer" of the Soviet space program and put the
first man into space.

* Cited production figures for the Pe-2 range from about 10,500 to 11,500.
At its height, the Pe-2 comprised 75% of all Soviet twin-engined bombers in
operation. The Finns operated several captured examples against the Soviets,
and the type was supplied in the postwar period to Czechoslovakia, Communist
China, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

One interesting detail concerning the Pe-2 was its use of the AG-2 aerial
grenade. A store of them were carried in the tail, to be ejected and explode
about 80 meters (260 feet) behind the aircraft and scatter shrapnel in the
path of a pursuer. The Soviets claimed that about 1 out of every 5 aerial
kills obtained by the Pe-2 were obtained with this weapon.

* Sources include:

THE PETLYAKOV PE-2 AND VARIANTS, by Malcolm Passingham and Waclaw
Klepacki, PROFILE PUBLICATIONS.

AIRCRAFT OF WORLD WAR II, by Bill Gunston, CRESCENT BOOKS, 1980.

THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 20TH CENTURY WEAPONS AND WARFARE, general
editor Bernard Fitzsimons, Columbia House, 1977.

SOVIET COMBAT AIRCRAFT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR by Yefim Gordon & Dmitri
Khazanov, Midland Publishing LTD, 1999.

Trying to document aircraft is troublesome -- if you read three different
sources you usually get three slightly different stories -- but in the case
of Soviet aircraft the stories are often wildly inconsistent, and some
sources even contradict themselves. I have relied on the Gordon and
Khazanov's book as the most definitive source as it is very detailed and
seems to be based on primary-source records, though its writing style is
jumbled and a real pain to sort through.

History is actually more about records of the past than the past itself. The
moving finger having writ and gone on, it is likely that the true facts are
often lost forever, and worse, debate over them seems to often muddy matters
more than clarifying them.