Below are seven key changes that need to occur for Turkey to be able to contain the current fallout from its ad hoc Syria policies particularly since 2012. They are written from the perspective of Turkey's security and long term interests.

1) Shift policy focus from toppling Assad to ensuring immediate and nationwide ceasefire: It is high time to completely re-orient Turkey's focus. Yes, Assad staying in power is not conducive to positive peace, but in the immediate necessity of negative peace, ceasefire is much more important. Turkey can and should maintain its view that Assad cannot stay in office, but should not in anyway be part of any effort to oust him through military means. Such efforts did not, and will not work, and while it is Assad who is culpable for his crimes, pushing for that outcome is only producing new victims and refugees. Turkey has done all it can, and paid a serious price for it. It now has no option to prioritise both its safety, and establishment of peace in Syria.

2) Take a longer view on advances of PKK related groups in Northern Syria: Turkey has every right to be concerned with PKK achieving a territory it governs in Northern Syria. It is fair to assume it will only be a serious security risk for Turkey until there is an indefinite ceasefire and end of hostilities between Turkey and PKK, which is not possible in the near future. While Turkey has taken a strong diplomatic line in challenging its allies empowering actors with direct relationship with PKK, it has also shelled YPG targets and threatened a stronger action. In realistic terms, Turkey cannot stop YPG by merely such a threat or limited shelling, to do so would require a serious military investment including sending troops, which is out of question at this stage. Such responses also impact relations with key allies such as US negatively, which Turkey cannot afford to let deteriorate. The other option is to take a longer view: continue diplomatic stand within a constructive frame that just like with Iraq's KRG, a Kurdish ruled part of Syria could be a great partner for Turkey but that means PKK has to end hostilities to Turkey, and play a waiting game to see the end of PKK advances. It is one thing to seize a land in current conditions in Syria with US and Russian air backup and international goodwill vis a vis fighting ISIS, all together another to maintain it when those factors change and militancy needs to give way to governance. There is still the question of how Sunni Arabs forced out of their homes and rest of Syrians, including Assad regime, will eventually respond to advances of PKK related groups. Turkey's harsh responses might only be undermining its long term interests. If in the process of quick changes Kurdish groups in Syria follow KRG's model and move on from PKK's hold, then it is only good for news for Turkey. Ultimately, however, only a domestic solution to Kurdish issues in Turkey will ease security risks emerging from Syrian territory. Therefore, the main security threat for Turkey is domestic and Turkey can find a way to solve it unlike developments in Syria.

3) Continue to be a cautious partner in anti-ISIS campaigns: Turkey was right to be weary and sceptical of willy nilly US quick-fixes on ISIS. It is right to remain so and offer support but do not pursue any adventure without full commitment from US and all allies. It is after all only Turkey with a 900 km border with Syria, not US or any other concerned Western ally. ISIS is here to remain in myriad forms, and its root causes and future of Sunni experiences in Iraq and Syria will demand a truly complex diplomacy from Turkey, which can be undermined by ill thought through 'defeat ISIS with any idea possible, but only ISIS not sort out rest of the country' approach. Without a robust focus on stability in Iraq and Syria, all anti-ISIS efforts are temporary victories. However, Turkey has to take domestic threat from ISIS networks much more seriously and work much more closely with European allies on counter-terrorism for its own security.

4) Gradually distance from all armed groups within Syria: It is time to clearly accept: supporting of armed groups did not achieve the aim. It has made Turkey vulnerable, charged relations with allies, placed it within a proxy war with other stakeholders it cannot afford to lose. It is time to gradually pull back from all direct support and engagement. If the process is handled right, it can even open new diplomatic influences for Turkey in post-conflict Syria. It has been a risky, and ultimately truly costly and counter-productive policy with serious human costs and security outcomes. It has placed Turkey within regional fault lines that it cannot maintain. Turkey has to retreat to its pre 2011 policies of being a neutral partner with all countries in the region based on geo-economic interests.

5) Make border security number one priority: Turkey has undertaken some impressive steps on security of its Syria border last 18 months. It must continue to advance them, and make border security a priority. This is not about the usual 'jihadi highway' perspectives, but about the fact that Syria will take decades to recover from what it has gone through, and a failed state on borders is never a positive for any country.

6) Start preparations for the next phase: This too shall pass, like each war. Sooner or later fatigue, field victories, consumption of resources and will to fight will de-escalate the armed clashes. It will then be about localised skirmishes and tensions, and eventually re-construction of the country. Turkey will be the main passage way for reconstruction, from provisions of goods to hosting of all international actors that will work on reconstruction for decades to come. This will give Turkey a serious economic boost and an important influence channel in Syria and internationally. But this can only happen and reach a maximum profit if Turkey is seen as a neutral peace supporter for a unified Syria and protection of all Syrians. Turkey's honourable treatment of Syrian refugees will be a truly positive platform for Turkish share of reconstruction of Syria. It is time to prepare Turkish businesses, NGOs, civil society, and diplomats for the next phase.

7) Internalise a Syrian population as part of Turkey: Some Syrians will never leave Turkey. Many Syrians are being born and will see Turkey as much as home as their countries of origin. Till Syria is fully back on its knees, many have no incentive and so much trauma to face if they return. Thus, Turkey has to internalise a sizeable Syrian population as its own from now on. Its focus on Syrians cannot be short term management of 'guests'. They are not anymore. But they cannot be seen simply as burdens. They can play a seriously positive domestic economic and social role if their cohesion and adaptation is actively encouraged. While the latest EU deal has attracted headlines, and offers some temporary relief for troubled European politicians, for Turkey, question of Syrian refugees is a generational one. Therefore, they have to play a key aspect in a new Syria policy.

A terror attack in Ankara sends tremendous political signals and have tremendous security policy implications. Ankara is not only the nation's capital city, it has always been seen as its safest and most orderly metropolis. Yesterday's attack was the third one to hit the city within the last 6 months with unprecedented levels of civilian casualties. They alter perceptions of safety, confidence in the state, and touch deep social fault-lines, grievances and emotions.

The personal and political pressure this puts on policy makers is clear. Such attacks always evoke strong military responses. With initial signs pointing to PKK for yesterday's terror attack with almost all casualties being civilians, it is fair to expect that Turkish air force will bomb PKK targets in Northern Iraq through out the day, mass arrests of people with PKK links across the country will follow, HDP officials that do not follow a careful balancing act and emerge in support of the attack (after the last attack, an HDP MP was present at the burial of the suicide bomber) will face fierce political and legal pressure.

Yet, none of these will achieve the desired security outcomes for Turkey. In the short run, heavy security responses are understandable and often necessary. However, without addressing three major issues Turkey will continue to face serious insecurities: Kurdish issues, Syria portfolio and Chaos.

Much has been written on Kurdish issues in Turkey, and there is already a mass body of literature on how the issues can be addressed. Yet, neither the PKK nor the state seem to accept the fact that their self declared aims will never be achieved and use of force only deepens problems and have serious human costs. PKK will never be able to create a Kurdistan or cantons it governs out of Turkey, and given how such things became possible in Syria or Iraq, it will have to wait till the country collapses or is invaded by a superpower, both of which are rather implausible. Turkey will never see PKK leave weapons behind and disappear and continue as if nothing has ever happened and that somehow peace merely means lack of PKK attacks. Kurdish grievances are real, and they demand real responses. Political creativity, constructive attitudes and a genuine shared desire to work things out are needed, but alas, such basic commodities are rare in Turkey's zero-sum highly emotive and highly tribal social landscape.

In regards to Syria, Turkey's policy has been ad hoc and reactive, like all other stakeholders. It has evolved from seeking to use personal relations to convince Assad to compromise to eventually partaking in operations in supporting rebel groups to oust Assad. Though Turkey's Syria policy is largely now about its own security and concerns over advances of PKK related groups in Northern Syria, unless Turkey seeks a way to untangle itself from the war it will continue to pay a high price. Turkey has to accept realities on the ground, shift to a self-defensive long term policy and declare a new policy of ceasefire focus rather than toppling Assad.

What makes it impossible for Turkish policy makers at this stage to face these challenges, however, is the chaos that has dominated the country's politics, state structures and public arena for the last 2 years. Currently, Turkey faces a structural chaos with an over reaching presidency undermined prime ministry. Ever since the Gezi protests, but more significantly since the shady corruption scandal that broke out and triggered a messy clash between AKP and Gulen movement, Turkey has been managed through a state of exception, with the government taking any extraordinary measure it can take to protect itself with serious human rights breaches and chaos across state structures.

In the process, Turkey has become a country that can neither rejoice nor mourn together, or find a common sense to unite around. It has become an angry country, with ever shrinking and fragmenting tribal outlooks as each new development divided people more. Pressure on media and denials of freedom of expression are only fueling mistrust, dangerous propaganda and misinformation. This alone impacts Turkey's security climate more than it is imagined. It hinders solutions. It creates a perfect storm for new terror groups to emerge, young ones with no memories of where militancy took us seeing streets and mountains as a solution, and angry public demanding a heavy zero sum security response.

The key question that remains is whether the current Turkish government will be able address these. And the answer to that is possibly a No. AKP has played a part and at times was the main actor in these tensions. While it still enjoys a domination of politics by virtue of having no real opponents, it is no longer driven by pragmatism but only by its survival and securing of a presidential system. This means that unless AKP has an epiphany and decides to turn back to what it was prior to 2011, or unless a new party emerges, or somewhat miraculously CHP completely reforms itself thus emerge as a middle ground that can meet anxieties of the wider public, Turkey is set for a truly vulnerable 5 years ahead.

The chaos continues.. EU capitals are frustrated that they are still impacted by the worst humanitarian crisis since WWII.. Turkey is rightfully reluctant to serve as the quick fix for Europe without seeking compromises and guarantees.. EU heads of state cannot agree to disagree or agree with Turkey's requests, though they are in agreement over what they demand from Turkey.

As where things stay today, it is clear that Turkey has been able to secure promise of 3 billion euros more, doubling the initial promise. Yet, whether all EU states will follow up on their promises, how this money will be put together, when and how it will be transferred to Turkey, and what benchmarks EU will demand as a condition for their release and what control Turkey will have over its use is far from clear. Remarks by Turkish officials had signalled that a large portion of the funds would be used for schooling and health care expenses.

Then comes the promises given to Turkey on possibility of looking into visa liberalisation and further negotiation chapters being opened. While the latter seems to be a plausible possibility, particularly given the good will that is in the air over the Cyprus issue, the former is a promise EU can not deliver within the timelines requested by Turkey. In fact, even if Turkey was allowed to enter into union, it would possibly wait a further period for possibility of full freedom of movement. The Turkish government desperately needs a positive spin to sell this expensive agreement with the EU to a public that has honourably welcomed almost 3 million Syrians thus far, but is showing serious shifts in attitudes lately. EU is misleading the Turkish public with promises it cannot deliver, and a sudden public shift will cause Turkish gov to suspend all cooperation on the subject.

Neither NATO's involvement in patrolling the Aegean Sea, nor Turkey's agreement to accept deportees from Europe and host Syrians while they are being processed are ultimately going to bring down irregular migration to a level that can make populist sentiments in Europe happy. The situation in North, East and West Africa, as well as the Middle East and Afghanistan means that thousands will continue to risk their lives, seek alternative routes and attempt to make it to Europe.

EU has to look beyond this immediate influx while it is trying to secure a quick fix with Turkey. It needs to develop a genuine and unison neighbourhood policy, it needs to proactively seek to strengthen key refugee host countries in MENA, and regain moral credibility by relocating adequate number of refugees. This crisis cannot be defined as a refugee crisis. It is ultimately an EU political crisis, and it risks untangling the entire union, deconstructing its global standing and stripping off whatever self image it enjoyed as a beacon of human rights standards.

As for Turkey, its polarised domestic politics have seemed to largely framed the EU-Turkey talks vis a vis the narrative of 'EU selling out to Erdogan'. EU has been a vocal critic of AKP government, and remains so. It uses multiple forums to raise serious human rights deterioration in the country. It enjoys no renewed love towards AKP, or to Turkish EU membership, to that matter. Meanwhile, EU's desire to secure a costly agreement with a strong government that can do it on its own without the constituency pressure facing most EU governments seem to be lost to Turkish opposition figures. Turkey will pay a heavy price for the next few decades with this agreement. Neither EU's few billion euros, nor promises of an eschatological membership can take that away. Turkish opposition had to be much more vocal in demanding full transparency and public debate on what it is that Turkey is signing into.

A clear agreement might take time to finalise, which, for the weary EU observer, means bad news for a robust agreement as it will inevitably mean a watered-down final text that can get everyone's support.. For the optimist, it might be a chance to imagine a new approach to EU-Turkey relations and handling of this crisis. For the time being, however, pessimists might be right.

As I write this note, the news that the Turkish courts have basically took control of yet another Turkish newspaper critical of the AKP government continue to spread across the world.

The steps to close Today's Zaman is just the latest step taken by AKP government to curb the power and reach of Gulen movement. Yet, it is also the latest step in the truly worrying decline of freedom of media in the country. Form shutting down access to social media to taking thousands of people to courts on accusations of insulting the President, the government has long crossed any defendable limitation that can be brought against freedom of speech under international law.

The outcome is not good for Turkey. Yes, its media is often more political than factual, more biased and partisan than fair and objective. But without a full spectrum of those voices Turkey cannot leap forward. AKP officials themselves should remember how the same state aggression for decades ultimately did not work, and the old rules are now hardly remembered. Thus, this is also not good for AKP. The frantic effort to secure its control by such means will eventually backfire and it is making AKP more and more vulnerable for a sudden loss of votes and loss of government.

This is not merely a human rights issue anymore. Gross failures of the government in upholding international standards, blurring the lines between executive and legal branch, governing through a chaotic power structures beyond constitutionally defined roles are causing Turkey serious long term damage. This is exactly the moment Turkey needs a new foreign policy, a new momentum to advance its economy and domestic stability. Yet, neither its government, nor opposition parties to that matter, seem to be able to lift their heads and realise the wild forest fire raging around Turkey.

Turkey desperately needs positive, constructive and creative voices. Such voices can only emerge if there is a free public space. At the moment, some of the brightest minds in the country are choosing to remain quiet, so as not to be a victim of government pressure, or lynching by pro and anti government angry, zero sum partisan voices that are dominating the conversations.

I joined Twitter after a 20 mins long homily by a TV producer who told me that someone in my profession had to use the platform to make new connections, access information and promote ideas. Since then, I must confess, I have been hooked on Twitter, often spending more time on it than I should, thanks largely due to prolonged commutes and lonely hours spent in front of computer screens for writing deadlines.

In the process, I have learned a lot from what I read, and my interactions with people who had specialisms in areas I did not. I also made new friends, became aware of many people with similar interests that I did not know about. I stumbled upon some truly beautiful, unique and exceptional people, and even if I never directly engaged with them, they enriched my life. And yes, I did unashamedly use it for promoting my articles, and projects.

Then there was the darker side; anonymous trolls, personal slurs, random people who think you are obliged to engage with them and who think social conventions of respect and boundaries do not exist online. At no stage in my life have I received such personal attacks, and seen break down of cordial relationships simply due to differences of opinions expressed as complex developments unfold. The list of labels I got given ranged every spectrum of every political group and conspiracy theory characters. I often felt peer pressure to raise hands in Mexican waves of thoughts, out of proportion emotional outbursts. And when I didn't, even when I shared those particular concerns, I faced judgement for what I did not say and how strongly or weakly I said it. I also saw how what people said was being catalogued, and saved as an arsenal for a later use to slap them on the face. It was sad to accept that while I saw engagement and conversation as a chance to learn and grow, many did not. Each expressed thought was a test of whether you are with 'them' or the 'other'. Communication was merely taking a stand, and engagement merely a battle to defeat and mute an opponent, not win him or her. And being impacted by engagement and new ideas, thus altering one's own views and clear cut conclusions was a sin. If someone did in fact change positions, tweets from previous thoughts would always be thrown back at them with commentary of intentions, hypocrisy, weak mindedness.

I came to recognise how such interactions impact my own personal wellbeing. I recognised a disparity between my day to day life interactions and 'social media' ones. When my own expressions in tweets only reflected a tiny slice and often 'fresh out of oven' thoughts, the reader only perceived me as a picture, and a name, and whatever emotional signal those communicated to them. While seeing my name and pic regularly on their timeline brought familiarity, it always amazed me how much they assumed about me, my intentions, what my religious and political beliefs are, what issues I am sensitive about.

More worryingly, I came to realise that the medium is now shaping thoughts and language. Rather than enabling them to reach out, it is shaping them into its own patterns. This was a similar issue I had with excessive use of PowerPoints, that yes helped to share some forms of data, but by and large forced thoughts into single bullet points and visually expressible language patterns, increasingly dumbing down thoughts, taking more time and effort than the actual content. Nuance, complexity disappeared, brains were geared towards outwitting each other in catchy phrases. The medium only encouraged partisanship and amigos wanting to cheer crowds. Its reward system of follower, like and retweet numbers meant that it incentivised harshest, and most edgy statements. Its quick firing speed was helpful for quick thinking when news broke, but horribly harmful in helping with an actual understanding. These not only contradicted my entire academic formation, but also professional work, and most importantly personal outlook in life.

Alas, I shall leave Twitter for now, not in a Stephen Fry style frustration or due to a specific recent incident, but in recognition that it works for what it is, and for some people that is great. But for me, at least for now, it is time to take a leave. There is enough on-line print where you can, if you wish to, follow my musings and work. In addition to this website, you can follow me on Academia.edu and if you know me professionally in real life on Linked-In. Or perhaps, like in the old days, do drop me a line to ask for a cup of coffee if you are in London, email an article you think I should read or a project you are working on that you think I would be interested in. On the positive side, one less "mr know it all" on your timeline and one less loud voice telling you whey they are right but others are wrong..

Last weekend’s terror attack in Ankara, the capital of Turkey, have sent shock waves across the world. The number of fatalities has past a hundred, with many still in critical condition. This is the single most fatal terror attack in Turkey’s history. While most commentary focuses on the domestic context and developments, few are drawing attention to the implications of this event for Turkey’s partners and wider international community.

It will indeed take a while for the entire picture to be clear, but the initial clues from the attack point to a certain direction. The type of bombs used, as well as their deployment and target choice show striking similarities with at least two prior attacks in Diyarbakir and Suruc. The gathering in Ankara was organised by a wide coalition of left-leaning trade unions, civil society groups, political activists with a large presence from the Kurdish party HDP. The rally was held to ask for a political solution to the lapse in Turkey-PKK ceasefire which saw more than 600 people – including Turkish soldiers, PKK militants and civilians, killed since the elections in June

In Diyarbakir, the attack was directly on a rally of HDP, and in Suruc it was on a wider group of left-leaning activists with a dominance of Kurds heading to bring aid and practical help to the town of Kobane in Syria, which ISIS tried to overtake from Kurds last year. Thus, these attacks clearly aimed at not only Kurds, but also at fuelling the on-going clashes in Turkey, as large number of Kurds accuse the Government of not taking necessary caution and some even accuse it to be directly involved with ISIS. It is telling that the Ankara attack occurred on the day that the PKK declared a temporary ceasefire until the next set of elections in November.

In both the Diyarbakir and Suruc incidences, the suicide bombers were established to have been related to ISIS and travelled to Syria. Indeed, one of the bombers was reported to the police by his own parents following his affiliation with ISIS. There are still suspects at large from both incidents and, because of an injunction brought by the Turkish Government, the media has been limited in what it can pursue on the follow up to these attacks. Now the same patterns show themselves in yet another attack, raising questions on whether Turkish state security structures provided enough security to protesters and whether the intelligence services failed to prevent the attack. The fact that the attacks were successful is perhaps the answer to that question. Ahmet Davutoglu, the Prime Minister, jas stated that two suicide bombers were stopped last two weeks in Turkey, which suggests that the state may be keeping certain developments away from the public eye.

No group has publicly claimed the attacks, causing some to speculate that this is unlikely to be an ISIS attack, since ISIS often enjoys broadcasting its murderous campaigns. However, this does not necessarily follow. We have seen how in Iraq and elsewhere similar groups have at times not claimed responsibility, which creates the maximum social and political effect in causing confusion, fear and chaos. It also serves as a veil to protect new networks being formed by the terror group. In the case of Diyarbakir, Suruc and now Ankara, signs suggest a Turkish cell founded or operating from the city of Adiyaman, by Turks who have direct relationship with ISIS, though they may be acting on their own.

Clearly, the fight between ISIS and Kurdish groups in Syria is now manifesting itself in attacks by ISIS or other Islamist extremists on Kurds in Turkey. While Turkey is part of the anti-ISIS coalition that includes the UK, it has chosen to play a cautious role. However, by attacking the precarious Turkish-Kurdish fault lines, but not the Turkish soldiers or state amidst such political instability in the country, and by choosing to remain unknown, the terrorists are punching above their weight as their network in the country is relatively new and has limited social appeal and logistic support.

This creates larger worries for Turkey, for Europe and the UK. It is plausible to suggest that we will see more terror attacks in Turkey. While the Turkish security apparatus has once again pulled all of its resources to combat PKK, there are legitimate questions to ask on its capacity to handle an increasing domestic ISIS threat. ISIS expanding its activities into a NATO state and an EU candidate country brings the risk directly to us in wider Europe. It also creates substantial questions on foreign direct investment in the country as well as the tourism sector. Some 35 million tourists visit Turkey each year, with more than four million of them being Brits.

Yet every tragedy is also an opportunity. Following unprecedentedly strong single party rule by the AKP for 13 years, Turkey is now set for weak coalition governments when it desperately needs political unity and bold decisions on a wide range of issues ranging from solving the Kurdish issues to undertaking a serious foreign policy reconstruction project. Turkey needs its partners more than ever, and at such a moment no outreach goes missed by the public and by the state officials.

The UK remains one of Turkey’s closest and strongest allies in Europe. British diplomats in Turkey are doing exemplary work reaching out to the public, building relationships with officials and advancing British trade in the country. The British Government’s signing of a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Turkey has been a benchmark, bringing the two countries closer on a wide range of issues from trade to security and defence cooperation to joint research and investments. There is now much closer work between security agencies in both countries on handling British suspects travelling to Turkey to join ISIS in Syria. In Ankara, there is a deep awareness that its bid for EU will not be possible in the short-run, if ever. Thus bilateral relations gain much more importance. The UK’s steady stand on Turkey’s EU bid as well as cautious diplomacy places it at an advantageous place.

This is the time for the UK to seek much closer and pro-active relations with Turkey, both for UK’s interests but also for supporting a country that is pivotal to the protection of Europe’s borders, handling of Syrian refugees, and countering the increasing Russian ambitions. While such a call would get a hearty welcome from both the Foreign Office and the Government more widely, British NGOs, think-tanks, and universities have, sadly, a long way in discovering the importance of bilateral relations as well as the complexities of Turkey, including its desperate need for constructive support in its moment of need. To that extent, British Parliamentarians and political parties can play a key role in not only building bridges between the Turkish communities in the UK but also actively supporting closer relations between both countries. They must do so now.