Wednesday, May 17, 2017

Adam Gib gives a comprehensive reply to those who say that we ought not to acknowledge the present civil government and constitution and subjection to it in lawful commands. This was a point of contention with Reformed Presbyterians in his day. When he refers to the Presbytery he means the Associate Presbytery who were a Secession body.

To Gib it was very clear.

The verdict of Scripture in this matter, is not comprehended in some few, dark or transitory hints. This is obviously taught and confirmed by a great number of passages throughout Holy Writ: Yea, there are few truths, relative to the practice of Christians, that are more clearly taught in the Word, or more inculcated, than this is.

He presents arguments from 6 Scriptures precepts or commands before examining approved examples in Scripture and then demonstrates the perpetual obligation of the precepts and examples. After this he shows that this was the position of the Continental Reformed Churches also before examining the historic position of the Church of Scotland and the Covenanters. It is a very long and comprehensive treatment!

Scripture Precepts

Argument I. From Prov. xxiv. 21.

The first that shall be
noticed, is recorded Prov. xxiv. 21. My son, fear thou the Lord and
the King: And meddle not with them that are given to change. Though these
words be expressed in the singular number, it would be superfluous to prove,
That they must be taken in a plural sense; determining the duty, particularly
of the Lord’s people, towards Kings: Nor
could Solomon, while himself a King, be partial in this case, because he
spoke as moved by the Holy Ghost.

I. The former clause of
this precept is positive; My son, fear thou the Lord and the King. And
the first thing which, in the present case, must be considered, is the duty here
prescribed towards Kings, viz. to fear them. This fear cannot be
of a slavish sort, because it is commanded; and that as subordinate unto the fear
of the Lord. Again, this fear cannot merely signify that disposition
of mind which we ought to have toward Kings. But, as the fear of the Lord, in
Scripture stile, doth signify, not only an inward disposition of mind; but also
all these external duties that we owe to him: So the fear of Kings must
also denote all these external duties that we owe to them. Now, from the nature
of the thing, all such duties are reducible to these two heads. First,
We must confess that they are Kings; by owning their authority, and submitting
to their just laws. Secondly, That this acknowledgment and submission
may not be treacherous, we must, in our several capacities, testify against all
these particular evils whereby they answer not or contradict the duty of Kings.
These are the parts of fear toward Kings; so inseparable, that neither of them
can be duly managed unless they be jointly exercised. And this is just what the
Presbytery asserts, with respect to the present Civil Government. The next
thing to be considered here is, the objects of the duty enjoined, viz.
Kings. And, upon this head, it must be premised, that as the different
forms of Civil Government agree in their general nature, and as none of them
has any institution exclusive of others; so the general rule of duty towards
the supreme legislative power under any one of these forms, answers as well
under them all: However, it is monarchical or kingly government that is here
immediately respected.

The question will now be,
What sort of Kings are the people of God thus commanded to fear? And, in
the first place, it is certain, that they are commanded to fear only such as
are acknowledged by the kingdom they are in; while none else are Kings with
respect to them. In the next place, It is as certain, that they are commanded
to fear any whom that kingdom acknowledges as Kings, and while they
do so. For,

1. This precept was still
handed down to the Jews, from one generation to another, as part of the
oracles of God immediately committed unto them; nor was it at any time altered,
limited or suspended: And therefore it continued always an uniform rule of duty
from God unto them, with reference to whatever Kings were acknowledged
as such, by the kingdom of Judah and Israel; though most of these
were chargeable with unparalleled evils, not only in respect to their private
character and conduct, but in their public administration. As it must be still
remembered, that though God might justly plead a controversy with that land,
and many time did so, both for the sins of the body politic, in not attending
to all the rules he gave them anent the choice of their Kings, and in not
endeavouring to reform their wicked Kings; as also, for the sins of the people
severally, in not testifying duly against, but complying with the sinful
statutes and idolatrous practices of their Kings: Yet, while the primores
regni and better part of the nation acknowledged such as their Kings,
consenting to their regal authority; the office and authority of these Kings
did, therefore, still continue valid, so as the particular subjects were bound
in conscience to submit unto, and obey their lawful commands: Because that
civil authority, having its rise in the consent of the people according to the
indispensable law of nature,it could not be subverted by their defection and
apostasy; or by their Kings, in consequence thereof, wanting scriptural qualifications.

2. The Jewish people
were obliged by God to reckon that, in the matter of this precept, they were
but on a level with the people of all other kingdoms; in respect of whatever
Kings were thereby acknowledged: And that they themselves were, by this
precept, bound to fear these Kings, when, sojourning in their dominions. For
these whom other kingdoms acknowledged as Kings, are, all along, by the Spirit
of God in scripture, acknowledged and accounted of as such; and that in as
unexceptionable terms as any of the Jewish Kings are: In regard there is not
the least word in scripture, which so much as insinuates that these kingdoms
were wrong in thus acknowledging them; but, on the contrary, the scripture
always countenances them in doing so, and leaves not the Jews any
occasion of doubting, that the character and right of these Kings did not agree
unto this precept. To this purpose, when our Lord Jesus, who is Mediator
betwixt God and man, says, by his Spirit through Solomon (Prov.
viii. 15, 16.); By me Kings reign, and Princes decree justice; By me Princes
rule, and Nobles, even all the Judges of the earth: It is undeniable that,
in these words, he not only narrates the government, but sustains the authority
of Judges or Kings: And it is as plain, that not only the Jewish Kings are here
spoken of, but all the Kings of the earth; so that the authority of all is
sustained on a level. When therefore the Jews received this precept, with
reference unto their own Kings; it is evident that other oracles of God, and
particularly the above cited, did at the same time necessitate them to reckon, that
whatever Kings were acknowledged as such by other kingdoms, had an equal right
unto fear from their people; and that they themselves were equally obliged, by
this precept, to fear such Kings, when sojourning in their dominions: According
whereunto, when long after some of them were scattered through the countries of
such Kings; this same precept was repeated [1 Pet. ii. 17.], as in force
with application to them in these circumstances.

In a word, this text doth
plainly teach, that the Lord’s people, particularly, ought to fear all Kings
who are acknowledged as such by the kingdom they belong to; as there is no
exception made here or elsewhere in scripture.

And, indeed, there was no
need of any exception or limitation to be added unto this precept. He who
commanded to fear Kings, did, at the same time, know well enough, that neither
all, not most, nor any of them, were free of manifold and gross corruptions. By
his inspiration it was, that Solomon saw under the sun the place of
judgment, that wickedness was there; and the place of righteousness, that
iniquity was there, Eccl. iii. 16. However, the precept given did
sufficiently hit such cases, without needing any restriction. For as there
never were, nor could be, any Kings acknowledged as such by a kingdom, but who
administered some justice; so all the duty of particular subjects, under the
worst of these Kings, is sufficiently comprehended in this command: As it binds
them to acknowledge and submit unto their authority, in any lawful exercise of
it, while the kingdom sustains their government; but at the same time obliges
them, and leaves them full capacity to testify and contend, in their several
places, against all their corruptions, and, in this way, to endeavour the
reformation of the government: So that the subjection commanded, can never
involve them in the guilt of public corruptions.

Here, then, the duty of the
Lord’s people, particularly, towards
Kings, is fully stated; and it is the same with what the Presbytery now
affirms. Nor is this a duty of small importance; while the fear of the King
is commanded jointly with the fear of the Lord: And so, whatever
religion any profess toward God, they will not be found duly
upright therein, when contradicting the duty toward Kings which God here
requireth.

II. The latter clause of
this precept is negative; Meddle not with them that are given to change.

For understanding this, it
must first be considered, who are the persons referred to by the pronoun [them]:
And it is needless to prove, because so evident, that the text will
not admit of any other sense here,than to understand it of those who are bound
to fear the Lord and the King, who yet are given to change; and whom,
therefore, the sincerer sort are discharged to meddle with.

And now it is supposed,
that there will readily be some men given to change; men of a restless
spirit, of a double mind, and of an unstable conduct: Men addicted to
novelties; and who, particularly, will depart out of the old road of duty
toward civil superiors, upon new pretences. And where innovations are made
here, there will readily be some change in the profession or practice of
religion; as the fear of the Lord and the King are linked
together, and the text speaks jointly of being given to change in both.

At the same time it is here
implied, that even the children of God are in danger of meddling with
such persons; and have special need to be upon their guard against them.

Thus, in these words, there
is an express condemnation of changes from the old path of duty towards civil
superiors.

Again, there is here a
solemn charge given to the sons of God, to notice the danger they are in of
being led aside by the specious pretences that such persons may use, and not so
much as to meddle with them; for if they stand not at a distance, they
may readily be entangled.

Moreover, this caution and
charge is a plain confirmation of, and a sense that God hath set about
that very principle and conduct which the Presbytery does maintain from this
text.

Argument II. From Eccles.
x. 4.

The next precept that
shall be considered, is found in Eccles. x. 4. If the spirit of the
ruler rise up against thee, leave not thy place; for yielding pacifieth great
offences. And here the following observations may be made.

1. For the same reasons
that were advanced upon the former text, this must necessarily be understood as
spoken to the Lord's people, with reference to any rulers presently
acknowledged by the civil state which they belong to.

2. There is a supposition
here made, If the spirit of the ruler rise up against thee. This rising
up of spirit must be understood as groundless, and therefore sinful;
because the person spoken to is supposed not, as yet, to have left his place or
duty. Again, this rising spirit must be understood as venting itself, by
word or action; for, otherways, it could have no tendency to drive a person out
of his place. And as the expression is general, without being confined unto any
certain occasion or degree of rising up, or unto any particular manner of
venting itself; it will therefore necessarily comprehend any wrath or wrong
that a particular subject may meet with at the ruler ‘s hand, whether upon
private quarrels, or on account of religion; as enmity against religion is
vented always upon the professors thereof.

3. There is a direction
here given, Leave not thy place: Which cannot be taken in a local sense,
on several accounts; and particularly, because then the next words (viz. For
yielding pacifieth great offences), instead of being a reason for this
command, would be a plain contradiction of it. The words must therefore be
taken in a moral sense, as respecting the special business and duty of the
subject; which, as hath been considered, is to fear the King or Ruler. The
first two clauses, then, of this text, do plainly teach us, That, upon
supposition of a ruler ‘s being so corrupt as, without just ground, to
discountenance, discourage or distress the subject, upon personal or religious
accounts; the subject must not, in the mean time, repay him evil for evil: But
while he is bound to use lawful endeavours, as his calling gives access, for
self- preservation, for vindicating his innocency and the cause for which he
suffers, and for having the government reformed; he must, at the same time,
continue in subjection and obedience to the ruler in lawful matters, while the
civil state continues to acknowledge him. And as this can be no way
inconsistent with his faithful endeavours otherways; so hereby he will approve
himself unto God and men, as single, self-denied, and conscientious in these
endeavours. But,

4. There is a reason added
to this command, For yielding pacifieth great offences. This clause
cannot consist with the former, unless it be taken in a moral sense. And
as a reason is here given of the foregoing command, so it cannot make sense,
unless this yielding be understood as the same thing with the duty
commanded. And therefore, the meaning will be this, Leave not, or keep, thy
place; for yielding, or the keeping of thy place, pacifieth great
offences.

Here then we are informed
that, when the spirit of the ruler riseth up unjustly against the subject,
corrupt nature (as is evidently seen in the present controversy) is ready to
manage a selfish opposition; in retaliating the ruler, by transgressing also
the rule of duty toward him: And therefore, the subject ‘s keeping by his duty
in that case, is fitly called an yielding; as it is contrary to that
selfish opposition which corrupt nature is inclined unto.

It is said, that this yielding
pacifieth great offences: And it does so in two ways.

(1.) By way of antidote.
For the subject ‘s standing to his duty in that capacity, when the spirit of
the ruler riseth up against him, is an habile mean for convincing the ruler of
his error, and for extinguishing the offence he has taken.

(2.) By way of
anticipation; as it is an habile mean for preventing farther evils and extremes
which both the ruler and the subject may afterwards be driven to, if once the
subject leave his place: For the beginning of strife is as when one letteth
out water; therefore (saith the Lord) leave off contention, before it be
meddled with, Prov. xvii. 4.

And, upon the whole, it is
very evident from this text, that the scheme of such as oppose what the
Presbytery here affirms, as it is a leaving their place, because of the
unwarrantable opposition that the ruler stands in to them in any cause of truth
which they profess; so it is a direct breach of God’s command, and has a proper tendency to
perpetuate these errors or evils wherewith the ruler is chargeable, instead of
reforming him: Yea, it is properly calculated for driving both him and them
farther forward into great offences. And, on the other hand, it is as plain, that
the principle and conduct which the Presbytery maintains, is openly held forth
and expressly enjoined by God’s command;
and that it is a mean and method of God's appointment, for pacifying
great offences, viz. in reforming the Magistrate from his present
corruptions, in preventing the farther growth thereof, and in preserving the Lord’s
people from other evils and extremes
they may be driven to, in this time of trial and temptation, if they study not
to keep their place as above explained.

Argument III. From
Luke xx. 25.

The third precept which
the Presbytery adduces for confirming the principle here maintained is
delivered by our Lord, Luke xx. 25. Render therefore unto Caesar the things
which be Caesar’s and unto God the things which be God’s. And, for the
clearing of this text, there are several things to be considered; viz.

I. A question was now
proposed unto our Lord, anent a certain people ‘s subjection to a certain
ruler. The people were not Gentiles, or such as had never been reformed; but Jews,
a people in covenant with God, whom the Lord had chosen to be a peculiar people
unto himself, above all the nations that were upon the earth. Again, the ruler
was Caesar, an heathen; who, at this time, did actually rule over the
Jewish people, being by them
acknowledged as their King, John xix. 15.

II. The question proposed
to our Lord anent that people and this ruler, was, Is it lawful for us to
give tribute unto Caesar or no? The question is not, whether any
tribute allotted to the use of the temple should be alienated unto Caesar ‘s
use; but it is anent paying of tribute in general, as an effect and token of
their subjection unto Caesar. And unto this general question our Lord answers,
in the words above cited.

When his answer is
considered, it appears too bold to pretend, that therein he shifts the
question, and leaves Caesar’ s title unto tribute from the Jews undetermined.
For,

1. It is very true that
these hypocrising spies, who put the question to our Lord, were sent out, by
the Chief priests and the scribes, upon a captious and very wicked design;
which they were at liberty to pursue more privately, or before the people, as
they should find occasion. And, accordingly, when they did now question him
before

the people, it was not
for information, as if they doubted anent paying of tribute to Caesar;
but it was that they might take hold of his words (or entangle him,
as Matth. xxii. 15). And it is equally true, that as he perceived their
craftiness, and rebuked them for it; so he gave them an answer that
disappointed them: For they could not take hold of his words before the
people; and they marveled at his answer, and held their peace. Their
disappointment, then, did ly here, that they could not take hold of his
words before the people, which was the malicious errand they had been sent
out upon. And this does not signify, that they could not understand his words;
for then their wicked errand had been no more than to understand what he spoke,
which is absurd: But the meaning is, that they could not entangle him, or
make an handle of his words against him.

However, for the farther
opening of this case, it is needful to observe, That, when proposing the
question, as they deceitfully introduced themselves by professing that he did
not accept the person of any; so, they did not want that our Lord should
own Caesar’s title, as if hereby he would raise the people against
himself: For there is no ground given to suppose that this would have provoked
them, but the contrary. And besides, they were sent to take hold of his words,
so as to deliver him unto the power and authority of the Governor who
ruled under and for Caesar; and before whom, therefore, they durst not
accuse any for owning Caesar. And so it is plain, that they could not
presently have any thing in view, but that either he should expose himself to
the pains of the Roman law, by disowning Caesar’ s title; or that
he should own it in such terms, as would reflect or encroach upon the
privileges of the Jewish Church and religion, so as they might deceitfully
forge an accusation against our Lord Jesus before the Governor, upon the
matters of their law. But in any such expectations our Lord disappointed
them. For, in his answer, he acknowledged Caesar’s title: And by
annexing, at the same time, the command of rendering unto God the things
which be God’s, he preserved the
regard and obedience that were due unto God, in his Being and institutions; and
determined the just manner and measure of obedience unto Caesar,
so as, however they might be rebuked by it, they could not find fault with it.
Thus, he disappointed their wicked design in all respects. They could
not take hold of his words before the people; they could not find him
chargeable with any encroachment upon either civil or ecclesiastic law; nor
durst they alledge any such thing, while the people were present and capable of
contradicting so false an accusation. And now, they were not only silent, but
they marveled at his answer: There was divine wisdom in it, worthy of
the Son of God and worthy to be marveled at; as it would have been every way
unworthy of him, and unworthy of being marvelled at, if his words had contained
no wisdom but what lies in ambiguity, shifting or equivocation. But again,

2. To alledge that this was
the case here, would be an using too much freedom with the person and
perfection of Jesus Christ. He might indeed have lawfully refused to
answer their captious question, had he seen meet; but to impute a shifting or
equivocal answer unto our Lord, is to reproach and blaspheme him.For, either Caesar had not a just
title, or he had: If he had not, then a shifting answer would
have, at least, dissembled and palliated sin; instead of tending to reclaim
from it; if he had, then such an answer would have, at least, dissembled
and dishonoured truth; instead of declaring and recommending it. Besides, the
answer given plainly bears the shape and force of a command: And it must be
very dishonouring unto the person and perfection of Christ, to fix upon
him an ambiguous and shifting command, or a command that commands no certain
thing. Again,

3. To suppose, that our Lord’s
answer shifts the question, would be an
using violence upon the words; for, shifting is inconsistent with the very
nature of a command: And farther, it is remarkable that,

(1.) Our Lord begins to
confound his crafty examiners, by enquiring at them anent the coin of their
current money, (as the tribute money could have no coin distinct from other
money); and he finds, out of their own mouth, that it bore Caesar’s image and
superscription: Thus he draws from themselves, both an evidence and
acknowledgment of Caesar’s dominion over them.

(2.) He immediately brings
this in as a reason of the command, Render THEREFORE unto Caesar the
things which be Caesar’s. And this word [therefore] can have no
reasoning in it, and the form and strength of the whole argument must be
destroyed; unless it be understood to intimate that the command is brought in
as agreeing unto, and as an inference from what had been immediately before
confessed, viz. That the money bore Caesar’s image and superscription.
Now the command cannot possibly agree unto, or be an inference from this;
unless it enjoin the paying of tribute to Caesar. And so the meaning is,
as if our Lord had said, Caesar is actually, and by the nation ‘s
consent, your Supreme Civil Ruler; as appears, among other things, from this, that
the money ye use bears his image and superscription: For though this be not a
mark of his having the property of all your money; yet it is a plain evidence
of his said superiority, and your subjection: Therefore
render unto Caesar whatsoever is incumbent upon subjects, and
particularly tribute; as unto all this he has a lawful right. But,

(3.) Abstracting from the
connection, these words [Render unto Caesar the things which be Caesar’s]
can mean nothing at all; if they mean not that Caesar had a civil right,
that there were things thus belonging unto him. And moreover, to deny this
would not only be the utmost violence upon these words; but would also force a
meaning upon the next words, grossly erroneous, which could not be ascribed
unto our Lord without blasphemy. For, if Caesar’s right be undetermined
here, then God’s right is undetermined
in the following words, viz. And unto God the things which be God’s. If
there be ambiguity in any of these clauses, there must be in both; for both God’
s right and Caesar’s are in the same terms asserted: And this is, of
itself, a sufficient argument against interpreting our Lord’s words as equivocal, which some have done; that
thereby he is brought in as shifting and calling in question the prerogatives
of his Father, before that generation, which stood in peculiar need of
quite other doctrine.

Thus, that our Lord
enjoined subjection by individuals unto Caesar,
particularly in paying tribute, has been cleared: Yea, in doing so, he
proceeds upon no other or better qualification in Caesar, than that he
was actually and allowedly in power over the Jewish nation; as
appearing, particularly, by the coin of their money. And it must be granted,
that the command is of equal force in all parallel cases; and that, therefore,
it plainly agrees to the principle here maintained by the Presbytery.

The precepts already
insisted on were given unto the Jewish people, as a special rule of duty
toward civil rulers; and, as such, they were immediately handed down to Christians,
in these Churches that were planted by the Apostles. But the Divine care, in
providing for their establishment in this duty against all temptations, did not
rest here. The Apostles of our Lord, and by his counsel, were not ignorant or
forgetful of Satan ‘s devices; in improving every handle, for tempting such as
he cannot detain in profanity, to turn over into some apparent purity of their
own invention. And considering the extraordinary handles which that subtle
adversary had, for tempting these Christians unto such an extreme, in throwing
off all civil concern with such rulers as they had then ado with; the Apostles
were therefore specially directed to build some new and very strong bulwarks,
for defence at this quarter: And which are of standing use in all ages, against
any such errors and mistakes. Thus,

Argument IV. From Rom.
xiii. 1, 7.

There is another precept,
very express unto the purpose in hand, which is declared Rom. xiii. 1;
being also explained and confirmed downwards unto the 8th verse of that
chapter: Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers, etc.

The present design neither
requires or permits, that these verses be expounded, either wholly, or
according to the order in which they ly: But it is needful briefly to lay open
and vindicate the establishment they give unto the principle now asserted; so
as any who will wrest them (against the express warning, 2 Pet. iii. 16,
17.) may be left inexcusable. And, for this end, there must be some separate
consideration of four things; whereunto the matter of these verses
is reduceable, viz. The objects of the command, the duty commanded,
the objects of this duty, and the reasons whereby it is enforced.

I. The objects of the
command are called, every Soul; by which expression (according to
Scripture-stile, the context, and the Apostle ‘s scope) are signified human
persons: Particularly all these at this time in Rome, who had
embraced the Christian profession. The whole Epistle was specially directed to
them: And in the 3d, 4th, 5th and 6th verses of this chapter, the Apostle
expressly inculcates the duty commanded upon them; in the pronouns, Thou,
thee, you, and ye.

II. The duty here commanded
comprehends the whole of what men can owe, even unto any civil superiors as
such. It is, in general, to be subject, (ver. 1.): particularly in rendering
tribute, custom, fear, and honour, (verses 6, 7); and that not
only for wrath, but also for conscience-sake, (ver. 5.), or, not only from
the consideration of danger but also of duty. This is the utmost civil
subjection that can be due to any: And all this is here enjoined upon every
soul; particularly, upon all the Christians then living in Rome.

III. The objects of this
duty are called higher powers, ver. 1. And it is certain, that this
character doth properly signify, not civil offices but officers; not magistracy
in the abstract, but Magistrates in the concrete: And particularly
the Magistrates then existing in the Roman empire.

Toward the clear perception
of this, it may be considered, that if the Apostle were speaking without any
respect to the persons at that time in power through the Roman empire,
and so excluding them from the proper right of Magistrates; he would then be
plainly departing from other Scripture-precepts, particularly these already
insisted on: He would be openly contradicting his own inspired writings, [Tit.
iii. 1. 1 Tim. ii. 1, 2, 3.]; he would be openly condemning the
constant and approven tract of Scripture-examples, and particularly his own, Acts
xxiv and xxv. Thus, also, he would be openly commending what is openly
condemned, 2 Pet. ii. 10. Jude ver. 8. But, moreover,

1. To alledge that he
speaks of magistracy in the abstract, and not of Magistrates,
particularly such as then were, makes his language altogether absurd. For there
is a plurality here spoken of [viz. higher powers]; and this plurality
must be all of the same general nature, because it is but one and the same duty
which is commanded towards them all: But it is absolutely impossible and
absurd, that there should be a plurality of abstracts of the same
general nature; because one abstract thing exhausts the whole nature of that
thing. Though then there be many Magistrates, yet magistracy can be but one in
number: And to use or explain the plural word [powers] in a civil sense,
and any other way than as properly signifying persons in power, is perfectly
absurd, as being inconsistent with the nature of things. Nor is it any thing
less absurd, to enjoin subjection unto Magistracy in the abstract; because it
has no real being in the abstract, and it is impossible to be subject unto that
which really is not. In the matter of subjection, magistracy must always be
considered as subsisting only in the person of Rulers; and the Romans of
that time could not be subject to it, but as subsisting in the person of these
Rulers who then were. Agreeably unto all this,

2. It is usual in
Scripture, that the abstract be put for the concrete; as there are five
instances of this in one verse, 1 Cor. xii. 28. And God hath set some
in the Church,miracles, then
gifts of healings, helps, governments, diversities of tongues. But, more
particularly, when the plural word here translated [powers] is elsewhere
used in Scripture, it always properly signifies persons in power; as Luke xii.
11. Eph. iii. 10. and vi. 12. Col. i. 16. and ii. 15. 1 Pet.
iii. 22. Tit. iii. 1. The first and last of which texts are parallel, in
the present case, unto this now under consideration. And,

3. To fix any other meaning
upon the word here, as if the Apostle were not speaking of Magistrates,
particularly such as then were; not only is inconsistent with the nature of
things, contradicts parallel texts of Scripture, and renders Scripture-
language of an unfixed sense: But it represents the Apostle as writing
needlessly, and under a sinful and dangerous mistake; contrary to the
infallible conduct of the Holy Spirit he was
under. It is essential to all the books of Scripture, that every part of them
was needful, with respect to the duty and interest of men; at that very time
when they were first wrote, as well as in after ages: while it would be an
impeachment of God to alledge, that he ever made any revelation which was of no
use in the time when it was made. But as the passage of Scripture now insisted
upon belongs to the rule of manners, what need of it could the Romans then
living stand in; if it was not to be applied unto themselves, with reference to
the rulers then in being? What manner of use could they, in this case, have for
it? How needless behoved to be the Apostle ‘s labour, in giving a rule of
manners, with reasonings and expostulations thereanent, unto persons who had no
interest in it; no warrant, no access to meddle with it? Yea, his mistake in
doing so behoved to be sinful and dangerous: Because if it was unlawful for
that people to apply what he wrote unto their own case, the manner of his
writing was calculated for leaving them unto, and leading them into sin. For,
while he presseth and reasons with them anent the duty of subjection to higher
power; he nowhere gives them the least hint, that they ought not thus to apply
his words: He says nothing to prevent their doing so. Yea, as appears from what
has been advanced, it was impossible for them to receive his Epistle as
canonical, without making such application: Nor was it otherways possible for
them to understand what is here written. For,

4. In this passage, the
Apostle puts it beyond all doubt, that,
when mentioning higher powers, he properly means persons in power;
particularly these whom the Romans had then ado with: So that his words
do openly reject any other sense. For, when giving a reason of subjection to
these same higher powers, he calls them RULERS, (ver. 3.), and God’s MINISTERS,
(ver. 6.): And, speaking individually of the power, he calls him the
MINISTER of God;He that beareth
not the sword in vain,a REVENGER to
execute wrath upon him that doth evil, (ver. 4.). There can nothing be
plainer than this; and it is as plain, that he speaks immediately of the rulers
who then were. For (ver. 1.) he calls them powers THAT BE (ousai a word
denoting real and present existence); Powers that ARE ordained:
And, all along, he speaks of the powers and power in the present
time; as persons then actually in office. Accordingly, he inculcates subjection
in its several parts; as the duty of these very Christians then in Rome,
and as a present duty: While (ver. 6, 7.) he says unto them, Pay YOU tribute, Render tribute, Custom, Fear,
Honour. And that Paul should enjoin, or they undertake the
present performance of such things, except toward present rulers, is altogether
absurd and inconceivable.

And now, that the Spirit
of God, by Paul, did here enjoin civil subjection in its full
latitude and all its parts, upon the Christians then in Rome, toward
rulers then in the Roman empire, is so certain and manifest, that it
must be astonishing if any doubt were entertained anent it.

IV. The reasons of this
duty, which are here improven, come next to be considered. And these are
generally two: The first whereof lies in the original institution of
Civil Magistrates, (ver. 1, 2.); and the second in their duty and administration,
(ver. 3, 4, 6.).

And it must be first
observed, that to refuse any thing already proven (particularly the precept of
subjection, ver. 1, 5, 7.), as having an immediate respect unto Magistrates in
the concrete, and these in the Roman empire, upon pretence of any
insuperable difficulty in applying unto them what is asserted in the Reasons of
Subjection now before us; not only implies an heavy reflection upon the
Apostle, as writing falsehood or no way to the purpose: But, it is a plain and
open abuse of these very reasons. For it is essential unto the nature of
reasons, that they suppose it to be already concluded upon, what the thing is
for which they are advanced; otherways they are advanced for nothing, or we
know not for what, and so are no reasons at all, can have no light in them, nor
cast light upon any thing. Thus, in the present case, before the reasons of the
command be noticed, it must first be determined who are the objects of the
command, what is the duty commanded, and who are the objects of that duty. The
reasons must suppose these things to be already determined; and,
therefore, can give no help in determining them: And when the determination is
once made, no objection can be brought from the reasons against it; because, in
the nature of the thing, it must be the standard for trying the reasons, and
not they for trying it, but only for illustrating and confirming it. The sense,
then, of these reasons [ver. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.], must be regulated by the things
already proven: And to proceed otherways, is to wrest these dictates of the
Holy Ghost, to cast the whole matter loose; and most unreasonably deny
Scripture that common justice which all language requires. Moreover, it is
certain, that civil subjection, in its full latitude and all its parts, is here
enjoined upon the Christians then in Rome, toward rulers then in the Roman
empire; and this has been so far manifested, that there is no room left, in
any event, for coming back upon it. If, therefore, there should seem any
insuperable difficulty in applying unto such Magistrates the characters here
given of the higher powers; nothing remains unto one, who would deal
reverently with the oracles of God, but to believe the certain evidence that
these indeed are the persons meant, and to rest in an humble confession of
ignorance as to how they come to be so spoken of. However, that in these
reasons the Apostle doth no way contradict or darken the command of subjection,
as respecting these Roman powers, by advancing any thing which was not
applicable unto them; is sufficiently plain. For,

1mo, The first
reason of subjection lies in the original institution of Civil
Magistrates, (as expressed ver. 1.); For there is no power but of God, the
powers that be are ordained of God. Here then it is asserted, That the
powers that BE (viz. the rulers presently in the Roman empire)
are ordained of God. Yea, it is farther asserted, That there is NO
power (viz. no Civil Magistrate) but of God, viz. in a way
of ordination. Now this says not, that men who are of a superior place in civil
society by bare possession or mere force, are, as such, ordained of God: For
these are not powers in a moral sense, and the text speaks only of all
that are so; or of all those who are in the possession and exercise of
magistracy by the will and consent of civil society, as these
only do properly fall under the denomination of Magistrates.

Such, yea all such, are
here said to be ordained of God. And they are so, not merely in respect of
providential dispensation; but also of preceptive institution. For the
remainder of natural light, in the moral dictates of right reason, is the
natural and eternal law of God: Now this divine law not only endues men, in
their present estate, with a natural inclination to Civil Society and
Government; but it prescribes unto them an indispensible necessity of erecting
and maintaining the same in some form, as a moral duty, the obligation and
benefit whereof no wickedness in them can loose or forfeit. And therefore,
wherever they voluntarily constitute or consent unto any form of Civil
Government, under the rule of any particular persons, whatever sin be in the
circumstances of this their deed, with respect to the Government or Governors
which they constitute or consent unto; yet the deed itself, or the substance of
the deed, is always in consequence of, and agreeable to God’s law: Wherefore their Governors, as such and in
the substance of the matter, are ordained of God according to that law.

And this is that divine
ordination which the Apostle ascribes to all Magistrates as such; and,
particularly, unto these of his day in the Roman empire: While, whatever
distinguishing qualifications or approbation God may bestow upon some; yet no
Civil Magistrates in the world can have any other sort of divine ordination.
And, as this did belong unto these Roman Magistrates, justly therefore does
the Apostle argue, with application to them (ver. 2.); That whosoever
resisteth the power (viz. the Civil Magistrate, as such) resisteth
the ordinance of God: And they that resist, shall receive to themselves
damnation; or be condemned on this account.

2do, The second reason of
subjection lies in the duty and administration of Civil
Magistrates (as expressed, vers. 3, 4, 6.); For rulers are not a terror to
good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that
which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: For he is the minister
of God unto thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he
beareth not thesword in vain: For he
is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil.For they
are God’ s ministers, attending continually upon this very thing.

Now, for laying open the
force of this reason, and obviating any seeming difficulty, in applying the
things here said unto Magistrates, particularly such as ruled among the Romans
in Paul’s day; the following considerations may suffice.

1. The public good of
outward and common order in all reasonable society, unto the glory of God, is
the great and only end which these invested with Magistracy can propose; in a
sole respect unto that office. And as, in prosecuting this end civilly,
according to their office, it is only over mens good and evil works that they
can have any inspection; so, it is only over these which they must needs take
cognizance of, for the said public good: While, at the same time, their doing
so must be in such a manner, and proceed so far allenarly, as is requisite for
that end; without assuming any Lordship immediately over mens consciences, or
making any encroachment upon the special privileges and business of the Church.
And moreover, as the whole institution and end of their office are cut out by,
and lie within the compass of natural principles; it were absurd to suppose,
that there could or ought to be any exercise thereof towards its end, in the
foresaid circumstances, but what can be argued for and defended from natural
principles: as indeed there is nothing especially allotted and allowed unto
Magistrates, by the word of God and the confessions of the reformed Churches,
but what can be so. Now, it must be agreeably to all THIS, that the Apostle
signifies Magistrates to be God’s Ministers for good; concerning
themselves with good and evil works, in a way of terror,
praise, or revenge: For he does so in a sole respect unto their
civil office.

2. What the apostle thus
ascribes unto Magistrates, is in some measure competent unto all such, in every
nation or state; and it always was so, particularly unto these in the Roman Empire
of whom he immediately speaks; as may be seen, Acts xxv. 16. True indeed, the advantage in this case lies very far on the
side of such as have occasion to exercise their office for
promoting the Church's public good; while at the same time
they are privileged with (and endeavour to discharge their other
special business as well as this, according to) the full discovery
which God’s word hath made, of these
natural principles that comprehend the due exercise of their office, as well as
its institution and end. However, as all Magistrates have still enjoyed some
discovery of these, in the dictates of reason; and as they have always had
occasion, and been obliged to improve the same, for the good of civil and
natural society, in what the Apostle here describes: So there never were, nor
could be any Magistrates or persons in civil power by the will of their people,
but in whose administration something of this took place; in so much as thereby
God has been pleased to preserve some external order and equity in the world, and
to restrain mankind from becoming altogether as the fishes of the sea, the
greater devouring the less. And this was now the case, with reference to these Roman
Magistrates whom the Apostle has particularly in his eye.

3. The Apostle is here
speaking of these rulers allenarly as such; abstracting from every other view
of them, either good or bad. For every thing he says of them was truly and only
verified, in their civil office and administration. Thus he says not a word,
nor any way enters into the question, anent their personal characters or
qualifications, moral or religious; though undoubtedly there was, at least,
much evil about them in this respect. Again, he takes no manner of notice anent
their being chargeable with any Mal-administrations; either in a way of
omission or commission: Though yet it was certain that there never were nor
could be any Magistrates, either wholly or near wholly free of these; and
without having much or any thing in their administration, besides what
precisely answers the fair character he now gives of them therein. It is
evident, then, that the Apostle, without refusing that there were many other,
and many contrary things to be said anent them, speaks of them allenarly as
rulers; or as in the lawful possession of ruling power, and in so far as truly
exercising the same. In a word, though
there were many things different, odious and opposite to be seen about them;
yet he does not pursue his present consideration of them any farther than as
they were truly wearing, and found walking within the proper compass and limits of
magistracy. Their practice did not always answer these things; their actual
attendance thereunto was far from being continual: But these things were true,
and always true of them, considered in the lawful possession of, and so far as
truly exercising civil power; their attendance, in this respect, was
continually unto these very things, because altogether confined thereunto. And
now the Apostle was, at this time, directed by the Spirit of God to represent
Magistrates purely in the above shape; and that for very good reasons and wise
purposes, viz.

(1.) His proper scope
toward the Romans here, was to inculcate upon them the duty of subjection unto
Magistrates; and this could not lead him out to consider such any other way,
than precisely as such.

(2.) For satisfying the
Romans anent the reasonableness and necessity of subjection unto Magistrates,
nothing could be more serviceable than the description he now gave of them;
while it manifests how wholesome, valuable and necessary are the purposes of
their institution and true administration; wherewith alone subjection properly
concurs: And his confining himself, at present, unto this description, was a
very fit mean for getting a due regard unto their office, and unto them in
their true possession and exercise thereof, so rivetted upon the minds of these
Romans; as it might not be extinguished by, but over-balance any
temptation they could be under, to refuse them due obedience, on account of
what gross evils they were otherways chargeable with.

(3.) It is evident that
while the Apostle discourses, in the present case, about Magistrates purely as
such, without noticing any thing good or bad anent their private character and
qualifications, moral or religious; or anent their Mal- administrations: his
design was to let the Romans see, that however deep a concern they otherways
had with them, in these personal respects; yet, in the case of subjection unto
their lawful commands, they were to abstract from all consideration of them
except as such, or as truly possessing and exercising civil power; confining
themselves unto this view of them allenarly.

(4.) At the same time the
manner of the Apostle ‘s argument was calculated for discovering unto the
Romans the whole cases wherein
they had any concern with Magistrates by way of subjection, viz. in so
far only as they answer the characters here given: And it was farther
calculated, for cautioning the Romans against carrying subjection the length of
any sinful compliance with them. For as, in the matter of subjection, the
Romans had ado only with the true concerns of their public office: So whatever
personal evils they were chargeable with, whether in their private character or
conduct, or in their Mal-administrations (as the evils thereof cannot cleave
unto their office but their persons); all these they were to oppose, contend
and testify against; according to their callings, knowledge and access. And the
Apostle not only leaves room for all this, but implicitely holds out the
necessity thereof; while he prescribes and admits of no compliance with them,
save in the cases expressed.

And now it is altogether
evident that, in the reasons of subjection (vers. 1.4. 6.) the Apostle is so far from
contradicting or darkening the command of subjection unto the higher powers (vers.
1. 5. 7.), as immediately respecting the Roman powers or Magistrates of
his day, by advancing any thing that was not applicable to them; that on the
contrary, by these reasons and what is advanced therein, he notably explains,
illustrates and establishes that command, in reference to these powers: So as
he could not have discoursed thereanent in any shape more suitable and pat to
the purpose.

Moreover when the Apostle
charged and persuaded the Christians in Rome to subject themselves unto the
Roman Magistrates; he thereby obliged them to conclude, not only that all other
Christians and people in the Roman Empire were bound unto the same thing; but
also, that whatever Magistrates any civil state acknowledged were to be
thus subjected unto throughout the same. For the Roman Magistrates could
have no title in this case, but what was common unto all these in their several
dominions; nor any better title, in respect to Christians than others: and so
the reasons, whereby the Apostle urgeth subjection to the Roman Magistrates,
were as pleadable, unto the same extent, in the case of all these other; as
indeed he signifies by the general assertion, There is no power but of God. Accordingly, when the rule of duty that has been
insisted on was specially directed unto all the Christians in Rome; it was also
(in the general nature and essential design of Holy Scripture) given forth as a
rule of duty unto all Christians in the world: Plainly teaching that all men,
but they especially, ought to be subject, not only for wrath but also for
conscience sake, unto all Magistrates presently acknowledged by the civil state
they belong to; and that in every lawful administration: As, at the same time,
they are bound to contend and testify against all the corruptions and evils,
private or public, wherewith any of these Magistrates are chargeable; and that
according to their callings, knowledge and access. Now this is all and no more
than what the Presbytery affirms, with respect to the present Civil Government;
as plainly taught in this passage of the Epistle to the Romans.

Argument V. From Tit.
iii. 1.

The fifth precept that
shall be improven for the establishment of this principle, is expressed Tit.
iii. 1. Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey
Magistrates; to be ready to every good work.

It is quite undeniable
that, in these words, the Apostle strictly charges Titus to inculcate or
press upon the Christians then in Crete, the duty of universal
subjection and obedience, only in matters lawful, unto Magistrates who then
were in the Roman empire.

1. They, upon whom he is
charged to inculcate the duty of subjection and obedience, were the Christians
then in Crete; for it was among them that Titus laboured in the
work of the gospel, and them only could he now put in mind.

2. He is charged to press
upon them the duty of universal subjection and obedience, only in lawful
matters; for this is plainly the amount of being subject and obeying, in a way
of readiness unto every good work: Which is a thing quite different
from, and opposite unto any sinful compliances.

3. He is charged to
inculcate upon them the duty of such subjection and obedience, unto Magistrates
who then were in the Roman empire.
For it is expressly Magistrates, whom the Apostle points out
as the objects of this duty: And it must be these also whom he calls principalities
and powers, see (beside some reasons advanced to this purpose on Rom.
xiii. 1.), it is self-evident, that the civil subjection and obedience here
intended, being actually the same, cannot have different objects. Again, it is
not so much as supposable that, at this time, either Paul should intend,
or Titus press, or they should practice subjection and obedience, unto
any Magistrates, but such as then were: And, as these Cretians belonged
to the Roman empire; the Magistrates in that empire, then being, must
needs be specially respected in the charge here given to Titus.

How deep a concern the
Apostle entertained and recommends to Titus, anent the up-stirring of
these Christians unto subjection and obedience, in matters lawful, to the
foresaid Magistrates, is evident at the first reading of this text: And as the
same runs parallel unto, and confirms the whole interpretation of the other
passage [Rom. xiii. 1. etc.]; so, for such reasons as are thereupon
advanced, it must be understood as equally applicable unto all people, with
reference to whatever Magistrates are over them, by consent of the Civil
State they belong to. Upon the whole, it is undeniable, that Paul here
charges Titus to teach and preach that very same principle, which this
Presbytery maintain with reference to the present Civil Government.

Argument VI. From 1
Pet. ii. 13, 17.

The last Precept that
shall be argued from to this purpose, is exhibited by the Apostle Peter.
As he takes notice (2 Epist. iii. 16.) that, in Paul’s Epistles, there
are some things hard to be understood; which they that are unlearned, and
unstable, wrest: So he takes care to prevent this, particularly in respect
of the passages that have been considered; while he gives notable explication
and confirmation thereunto, by what is expressed 1 Epist. ii. 13, 14,
15, 16, 17.

What is spoken in these
verses, to the present case, hath been mostly met with already; all that needs
to be said farther,

shall be comprehended in
the remarks following.

1. That the Apostle is here
speaking immediately of persons in power, particularly such as then
were, or could then be submitted unto; cannot be refused, without an open
contradiction unto and contempt of holy Scripture.

2. He gives an infallible,
and the only habile mark, whereby to know what persons in power were ordained
of God; while he teaches (ver. 13.) That all those who are the ordinance
of man, or who have a constitution by the consent of civil society, are to
be submitted unto for the Lord’s sake, or, as having an institution from
him.

3. What is to be understood
[Rom. xiii. 1. and Tit. iii. 1.] is here expressed, viz. a
distinction of these persons in power, or Magistrates, into supreme and subordinate,
ver. 13, 14. The King is supreme (a word of the same derivation
and meaning with Sovereign, as they can differ only in sound and
grammatical construction, both signifying, in this case, the Chief Civil
Magistrate); while Governors are sent by him, and so subordinate
unto him.

4. He determines the whole
matter in respect of which they were to be submitted unto, viz. The
punishment of evil doers, and the praise of them that do well, ver. 14.
However seldom they were inclined or employed this way, yet the supreme power
of the King, and the commission of Governors, could morally extend no farther:
And thus it was only in so far as employed this way, that the King was to be
considered as supreme and Governors as sent by him; and both
submitted to accordingly.

5. The Apostle plainly
supposes [ver. 15.], that Christians were then charged with non-submission to
the King and Governors; though but ignorantly by foolish men, probably because
they refused sinful compliances: He therefore informs them of the will of God, That,
notwithstanding their Christian freedom, they should put these persons to
silence; by outshining them in submission as to well-doing. And he gives a
notable enforcement unto this duty, by telling [ver. 16.], That in neglecting
the same (on however specious pretences), they would not be using their
Christian liberty as the servants of God, but for a cloak of maliciousness;
or, to palliate some venom of their own spirits.

6. He orders them to yield
such submission, without farther question, to every ordinance of man;
every person in civil office by the will of society. And,

7. That he might prevent
their scrupling to do so, on account of the unworthiness or wickedness of any
of these persons; he teaches, That submission to them in well-doing, or
in matters lawful, should be studied for the Lord’s sake. If they were
to look no higher than the persons of these men, their hearts might readily
become quite alienated from any actual connection with them: But it was
necessary they should look up unto, and reverence God’ s institution in
the office these persons bore; and his sovereign will in chusing to make any
use of them, for maintaining any thing of public order that was to be found in
the world. And thus, being weaned from their own spirits, and walking in
self-denial, they behoved to cherish any thing just in the Civil
Administration; by submitting thereunto, from the powerful consideration of
their being obtested to do this much for the Lord’s sake: Yea to do it heartily,
as to the Lord, and not unto men; while this can no way interfere with a
due Testimony against prevailing evils, or with due endeavours for reformation.

Finally, What the Apostle
here said unto the Christians of his day, doth equally agree unto the case of
all; with respect to whatever Magistrates are sustained by the civil
body whereof they are members: And this is all that the Presbytery affirms in
the present case.

And now it fully appears,
what is the harmonious and indubitable verdict of Scripture-precepts,
upon the question in debate, viz. That all persons, and particularly the
Lord’s people, ought to render
subjection and obedience in all matters lawful, unto any Magistrate who is, and
while he is acknowledged as such by the Civil State they belong to; being what
is every way consistent, yea connected with due faithfulness, in reference to
these corruptions wherewith the Magistrates may be chargeable.

The clearest evidence hath
been given, that this duty (which was, upon the matter, originally taught by
the fifth Commandment), was also, by some precepts branched out therefrom,
expressly inculcated upon the Jewish people from one generation to
another; and even after they were incorporated with the Roman
State: Yea moreover, that besides the continued doctrine of these precepts,
the Holy Ghost has been more especially at pains by some others, for preventing
any transgression, neglect or forgetfulness of this duty among Christians.
And as that principle which the Presbytery here asserts, consisteth merely in a
particular maintenance of this duty; it is sufficiently manifest, that the said
principle only maintains a duty which is expressly taught by
Scripture-precepts: Yea, that singular care has been, all along, taken in
Scripture, for keeping this principle alive, in the faith and practice of the Lord’s
people.

Argument VII. From the Conformity
of the Precepts insisted on, with other Scriptures.

After all, it is affecting
and astonishing, to see any opposition made unto such an open and special
design of the Holy Ghost in Scripture; and that under a profession of
regard to these holy oracles. The precepts which have been insisted upon
speak so expressly, so certainly, so loudly, according to the interpretation
that has been given of them, plainly remonstrating against any other; that
there is no manner of room left for hesitating thereanent, even though a person
should remain difficulted, in apprehending the consistency thereof with any
other passages of Scripture.

I. In the first place,
there is no passage of Scripture that so much as seems openly inconsistent with
these precepts, as now interpreted; while no passage so much as seems openly to
forbid what is here expressly commanded, or to command any thing directly
opposite thereunto. And it must be a very intolerable abuse of Scripture, to
attempt warding off the notable light and force of these precepts, by passages
that do not so much as seem directly opposite or contradictory; while, even
though they did so, they ought to be explained in an agreeableness to such
direct and indubitable precepts. But,

But so it is, that no
necessity hereof can occur; unless a person will procure it unto himself. For,

II. In the next place, as
there are many other passages of Scripture plainly
homologating these precepts, in the genuine sense that has been
assigned them; so there are none which it is not very obvious, that accordingly
they are noways inconsistent with. If there were any, they behoved to ly, either
among approven examples, or doctrines, or precepts, or promises,
or threatenings; some way related to the general subject in hand:
But none such can there be found. For,

1. There are no approven examples,
in the conduct of civil members towards Magistrates, whereof these precepts, as
now stated, offer to disapprove.

2. Again, there are doctrines
and precepts, expressly or implicitly determining the duty of a Civil
State, as to what sort of Magistrates they should set up and seek after; and
there are some imitable examples recorded, of faithfulness and
reformation this way: All which doctrines, precepts and examples are here
uncontroverted; in full agreeableness to what has been affirmed. And it is very
obvious, that the above precepts, in their foresaid genuine sense, are
noways inconsistent therewith. For, as these precepts do plainly enjoin
different duties upon different objects; teaching us separately to yield
separate obedience, only in matters lawful, to whatever Magistrates the Civil
State actually sustains; so whatever defects in or defections from their duty
foresaid, the State be otherways chargeable with, it is plain such obedience
only homologates that part of their said duty which they perform: While we are,
at the same time, left indispensibly bound and evidently free to exert
ourselves, by all habile means, in testifying against these their evils; and
for getting them convinced of, and reconciled unto the whole extent of their
duty, in this matter.

In the next place, there
are doctrines and precepts, expressly or implicitly determining
the qualifications and duties of Magistrates, as to what they should be and do;
and there are some imitable examples recorded, of singular attainments
this way: All which doctrines, precepts and examples are here also
uncontroverted; in full agreeableness to what has been affirmed. And it is also
very obvious, that the above precepts, in their foresaid genuine sense,
are noways inconsistent therewith. For,

(1.) As these precepts do
plainly speak to different persons, and anent different things; so, on the one
hand, the passages holding forth these qualifications and duties of Magistrates
do not, by the remotest hint, imply, That if any way they be deficient in or
make defection from the same, their authority and commands, even in matters
lawful, must not be subjected unto and obeyed: And, on the other hand, these
precepts holding forth the duties of subjects, as above-stated, do never, by the remotest consequence, imply
any dispensing with those qualifications and duties of Magistrates, or any
countenancing of their defects and defections; but, on the contrary, they leave
us bound and in full room, to testify against the same, and essay their
reformation, by all methods that are habile for us. As,

(2.) Magistrates are here
always supposed to be in the actual and due possession of these needful and
natural abilities, which are common among men. Again, they are here always
supposed to be actually possessing and performing these moral and acquired
qualifications which they ought to have, and these duties which are incumbent
upon them; at least, in some useful and continued degree: For all this is
always in Scripture, and by all people, implied in the essential notion of
Magistrates.

Therefore it is only in
respect of the DUE Measure and Performance of these qualifications and duties,
that Magistrates can be understood as at any time chargeable with defects or
defections. Now this is indeed such, as without having attained and engaging
unto the same, at least in some hopeful and promising way, no Civil State ought
to invest any with magistracy. But then, SUCH a Measure and Performance of
these qualifications and duties cannot be required for the BEING of the
Magistrate ‘s office; either as essential to it, or as a condition of it
sine qua non. First, it cannot be required as essential thereunto: For
then it would be the same thing with magistracy, which is grossly absurd and
big with absurdities. In the next place, it cannot be required as a condition
thereof sine qua non; or without which one is not really a Magistrate,
however far sustained as such by civil society: For then no person could be
really a Magistrate, unless he were so faultlessly. And
this is a proposition (which Mr Nairn’ s scheme necessarily lands in, if
it come to any thing at all, and) which is so very dangerous, that it opens a
door for throwing off all relative duties, toward any that are not faultless in
their relative capacity. By this way of reasoning, it will follow, that
servants are not to obey their masters, while undutiful: Though yet the Spirit
of God says (1 Pet. ii. 18.), Servants be subject to your masters,
with all fear; not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward.

It is manifest, therefore,
that the due measure and performance of scriptural qualifications and duties, belongs
not to the being and validity of the Magistrate ‘s office; but to
the WELL-BEING and Usefulness thereof. But an acknowledgment of the
Magistrate ‘s authority in lawful commands, doth only homologate the being and
validity of his office, while sustained by the State: Wherefore this
acknowledgment can never be inconsistent with the necessity of these
qualifications and duties; can never palliate any defects in or defections from
the same; and can never encroach upon the necessity or due extent of testifying
against these defects or defections, and of essaying the reformation of
Magistrates in our several places and callings.

3. Farther, there are, in
Scripture, several promises of good, reformed, reforming Magistrates;
and of deliverance to the Lord’s people
from any grievance they presently ly under, in the want thereof: But these
promises can never belong to the rule of duty. A promise of the greatest future
good, can be no warrant for spurning at the least present good: Yea, the
cherishing any good which is presently bestowed, is the ready way of attaining
all the good that is promised. Wherefore no promise anent Magistrates to come,
can possibly interfere with the duty of subjecting to any thing lawful in the
administration of Magistrates that presently are.

4. Finally, there are threatenings
and curses pronounced against wicked Magistrates; and people
concurring with them in their wickedness: But it is dreadful to suppose, that
these are any way inconsistent with the duty toward Magistrates now pled for;
as if God’s indignation against

sinners, did dissolve the
obligation of relative duties betwixt them.

According to the
observations that have been made, it will appear, that no passage of Scripture
doth in the remotest manner militate against the cause now managed. And now it
is abundantly manifest, That the principle which the Presbytery holds anent the
present Civil Government, doth only maintain a duty that is expressly taught by
Scripture-precepts.