HCSS has tracked overall trends in global cooperation and conflict as part of its contribution to the Strategic Monitor of the Dutch government. Our study takes into consideration two overarching questions: “Will state or non-state actors be most dominant in the future world?” and “Will whoever becomes most dominant be more cooperative, or more conflictual?”

HCSS has tracked overall trends in global cooperation and conflict as part of its contribution to the Strategic Monitor of the Dutch government. Our study takes into consideration two overarching questions: “Will state or non-state actors be most dominant in the future world?” and “Will whoever becomes most dominant be more cooperative, or more conflictual?”

Our approach to this ‘monitoring’ effort aspires to collate and curate a systematic empirical evidence base that allows all relevant stakeholders – analysts, military planners, policy-makers, but also interested companies, NGOs, citizens, etc. – to get a better grip on these fundamental international trends. With the advent of (open-source) event datasets, this has become more possible than ever.

This year we updated our findings using data from three different sources and have uncovered a number of different trends. How can we leverage big data to inform policymakers on complex geopolitical trends in our new uncertain era? What are the world’s most cooperative countries? Where in the world can we find the highest concentrations of conflictual behavior? What is the Netherlands’ position in the ebb and flow of international communications?

HCSS’ original term “nowcasting” – as opposed to forecasting – describes the process of monitoring, depicting, and analyzing ongoing developments in international relations as they occur. Once again, our study “Nowcasting Geodynamics” uses a rich base of quantitative data to move beyond the anecdotal, and towards the systematic.

HCSS’ original term “nowcasting” – as opposed to forecasting – describes the process of monitoring, depicting, and analyzing ongoing developments in international relations as they occur. Once again, our study “Nowcasting Geodynamics” uses a rich base of quantitative data to move beyond the anecdotal, and towards the systematic.

We intend our empirical approach to add to debates across all domains – diplomatic, economics, legal, military, etc. – and across all countries, whether they are great powers such as the United States or China, or smaller but strategically important states, such as Indonesia, and Egypt.

This year’s analysis covers the geodynamic trends of countries across the world and traverses the different domains in order to give perspectives on the “now” trends, and where they might lead us in the future.

Corruption and the perceived partiality of the justice system and state administration of Moldova have long frustrated efforts – both internal and external – to improve its domestic politics. It nevertheless remains an important partner for both the European Union and Russia, however its strategic positioning between these two powers have left its citizens stretched at times, even torn, in terms of national identity.

Corruption and the perceived partiality of the justice system and state administration of Moldova have long frustrated efforts – both internal and external – to improve its domestic politics. It nevertheless remains an important partner for both the European Union and Russia, however its strategic positioning between these two powers have left its citizens stretched at times, even torn, in terms of national identity.

Looking into recent domestic developments as well as the EU and Russia’s strategies towards Moldova in recent years, this study gives a brief overview of the European and Russian stakes held in Moldova and how its recent presidential election may change Moldova’s future geostrategic positioning.

The modern era’s Great Power Peace has come under severe strain in recent years. The seams of the western-based world political order have stretched to the point of breaking, with non-state actors rising in response to exploit the global climate of paralysis and uncertainty. Indeed, violence levels are at historically high levels that haven’t been seen since 2004. But what does the violence waged on Europe’s borders mean for European citizens and their leaders?

The modern era’s Great Power Peace has come under severe strain in recent years. The seams of the western-based world political order have stretched to the point of breaking, with non-state actors rising in response to exploit the global climate of paralysis and uncertainty. Indeed, violence levels are at historically high levels that haven’t been seen since 2004. But what does the violence waged on Europe’s borders mean for European citizens and their leaders?

HCSS has analyzed trends in political violence using various open-data sources and provides a forecast of civil war onset risk for the year 2017 using in-house forecasting models based on rich quantitative datasets and complex theoretical frameworks.

Appearing seemingly out of nowhere over the course of 2013-14, the Islamic State, or Daesh, captured the attention of international audiences through widely broadcast acts of barbarity, followed by the proclamation of its own state and upending state borders in the process. The rise of the terror organization has prompted many questions: where did it originate from? How has it been able to establish itself so quickly? Can it actually persist? Can it be defeated?

Appearing seemingly out of nowhere over the course of 2013-14, the Islamic State, or Daesh, captured the attention of international audiences through widely broadcast acts of barbarity, followed by the proclamation of its own state and upending state borders in the process. The rise of the terror organization has prompted many questions: where did it originate from? How has it been able to establish itself so quickly? Can it actually persist? Can it be defeated?

The aim of this year’s study, entitled “The Rise and Fall of ISIS: from Evitability to Inevitability”, is to understand the organization, its motivations, its inherent weaknesses, as well as its ability to endure. A broader aim is to set out how it could develop as it comes under ever more pressure by regional powers and, in the case of its defeat, how to prevent the arrival of the next ISIS.

A key message of this chapter is that ISIS is a ‘child of its time’ and is not destined to persist. Its professed millenarian or eschatological bent is meant to cast the conflict between the Caliphate and the rest of the word as a cosmic battle, but in reality is largely of instrumental value. Also, while its rise could have been prevented, its fall looks all but inevitable, even if it remains unclear what will replace it.

The presence of peace is more than the absence of conflict. Analyses and evaluations of the state of the international security environment often focus solely on the most concerning developments and tend to fall back on various conflict-centric metrics when providing assessments of a given security landscape. This chapter, entitled “The Other Side of the Security Coin” investigates a number of positive socioeconomic trends occurring on a global level and how they can contribute to sustainable peace in the future.

The presence of peace is more than the absence of conflict. Analyses and evaluations of the state of the international security environment often focus solely on the most concerning developments and tend to fall back on various conflict-centric metrics when providing assessments of a given security landscape. This chapter, entitled “The Other Side of the Security Coin” investigates a number of positive socioeconomic trends occurring on a global level and how they can contribute to sustainable peace in the future.

Improving citizens’ access to socioeconomic opportunities and livelihood-enhancing goods and services is a key factor in increasing the stake that citizens hold in the state of peace in their communities. Fitting within global trends such as the rise of the platform economy and social media, the role of technological and developmental processes improving individual empowerment will become more important for security and defense organizations in the near future. As to how we can leverage the dramatic changes ongoing throughout the world to better suit our security objectives remains yet to be seen. This study provides a brief overview of these trends and identifies the options for security and defense organizations to remain on top of them.

With the World Health Organization (WHO), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the U.S. Blue Ribbon panel publishing reports on the emerging risks of biological weaponry in past months, there is a new sense of urgency regarding biological weapons. In August 2016, the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon told the Security Council that “non-state actors are actively seeking chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.”

With the World Health Organization (WHO), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the U.S. Blue Ribbon panel publishing reports on the emerging risks of biological weaponry in past months, there is a new sense of urgency regarding biological weapons. In August 2016, the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon told the Security Council that “non-state actors are actively seeking chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.”

This report presents the changing dynamics of the development and use of biological weapons and the preparation against them. The dynamics relate to technological advances in biotechnology and the concomitant attraction to non-state actors to use biological agents as weapons due to their financial appeal and diverse impact. The relative ease with which biological weapons can be produced, and the intent of non-state actors to use biological weapons- based on historical precedent and recent surge in international terrorism- call for a renewed focus on this field and an increased effort to respond to these developments. We provide illustrations of new policy initiatives in a variety of countries and outline the current state of play in the Netherlands, providing a point of departure to discuss whether the current approach is sufficient to tackle the upcoming issues.

In the face of a rapidly-changing geopolitical landscape, contemporary perspectives on security have drastically changed in reaction to new conflict factors that have arisen out of, and are related to, unpredictable patterns of climate change. Already, in both the short and long term future, it is increasingly likely that conflict will result from a multitude of such stress factors. Environmental stress, stress caused by climate change in particular, is only one of these factors. Nonetheless, in light of its diverse and multiplier impacts, it remains an important one.

In the face of a rapidly-changing geopolitical landscape, contemporary perspectives on security have drastically changed in reaction to new conflict factors that have arisen out of, and are related to, unpredictable patterns of climate change. Already, in both the short and long term future, it is increasingly likely that conflict will result from a multitude of such stress factors. Environmental stress, stress caused by climate change in particular, is only one of these factors. Nonetheless, in light of its diverse and multiplier impacts, it remains an important one.

This report, intended for policy makers and business professionals, examines the economic aspects of the relatively under-explored concept of planetary security. Planetary security refers to the role of the environment in geopolitical risks and conflicts. The report evaluates the vulnerabilities and resilience of countries to environmentally induced conflict. It first discusses the concept of planetary security and the role of economics therein, and then builds a quantitative framework and monitor capturing the vulnerabilities and resilience of different countries.

The monitor is innovative in its inclusion of a variety of security risks related to the transition to a low carbon economy: Conflict Vulnerability, Climate Change Vulnerability, Low Carbon Risk and Economic Resilience. These layers are combined to create a Consolidated Risk Layer and a Consolidated Resilience Layer, in order to provide insight into how resilience to the above vulnerabilities could be bolstered.

The monitor and accompanying report, have been produced by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and Clingendael Institute as a key input to the Planetary Security Initiative conference, which took place in The Hague, the Netherlands on December 5 and 6, supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To access the Planetary Security Monitor click here.

This study addressed the question of future food challenges and how these may play out. Part of the analysis focused on the question as to how we may enhance our understanding of the effects of climate change, increased population growth and rising incomes worldwide on future food systems. The worldwide food system is vulnerable to many influences. The approach used in this study focused on the most significant possible influencers of drivers, or the elements having the most effect on how drivers will develop.

This study addressed the question of future food challenges and how these may play out. Part of the analysis focused on the question as to how we may enhance our understanding of the effects of climate change, increased population growth and rising incomes worldwide on future food systems. The worldwide food system is vulnerable to many influences. The approach used in this study focused on the most significant possible influencers of drivers, or the elements having the most effect on how drivers will develop. This approach was employed due to our understanding that the system’s complexity cannot be reduced to the drivers alone. The applied research method however allows us to look at the different aspects while recognizing their interlinkages.

Although the picture that emerges from the various datasets we track is more mixed than many may have expected, our event datasets do indicate that the presumably most dangerous form of great power assertiveness – the factual negative military one – did increase quite noticeably over the past few years. The main findings reveal two great powers that show clear signs of what we have dubbed assertivitis – an affliction characterized by an almost pathological (from a Western European point of view) inclination to assert one’s power, especially in negative ways. We find one case – China – of quickly deteriorating developing assertivitis and one – Russia – of inchoate (but recidivist) acute assertivitis. We find another great power – the United States – suffering from chronic assertivitis for an extended period of time, but seeming to have embarked upon the path of (a modest and uneven) recovery under the Obama administration. And we find two Great Powers – India and the European Union – that are by and large asymptomatic and do not (yet?) appear to be suffering from this affliction. The report still comes to the conclusion that the chance of a ‘Cuban Missile crisis’-type event (or worse) in Syria, the South China Sea, Ukraine, Moldova, the Baltics or elsewhere – whether because of miscalculation and unmanageable escalation – continues to increase.

The study also looks at how Great Power Assertiveness is affecting the Netherlands and how it (or other small- to medium sized countries) can deal with it. Examining some lessons learned from another - better documented - form of 'bullying' (school bullying and the lessons schools and societies have learned for how to deal with them), the study concludes with some policy recommendations.

A transition towards a ‘circular economy’ - in which redundant consumer goods are viewed as input rather than waste - offers great potential for societies to reduce their environmental footprint. Once products reach the end of their lifespan new value can be generated by re-using valuable resources.

A transition towards a ‘circular economy’ - in which redundant consumer goods are viewed as input rather than waste - offers great potential for societies to reduce their environmental footprint. Once products reach the end of their lifespan new value can be generated by re-using valuable resources.

In today’s globalized world, widely used (consumer) goods such as mobile phones, are generally composed of resources and materials from all corners of the world. For example, in 2014, Brazil was the largest exporter of iron ore to the EU. Lithium, a key component of batteries, is mostly imported from the US. And nearly half of aluminum ores and concentrates imported by the EU come from Guinea. Various economic sectors in Europe (e.g. aerospace, renewable energy, technology, etc.) are highly dependent on the availability of specific sets of raw materials.

However, in spite of the strong interconnectivity between export markets and countries of origin, meager attention is paid to the consequences that a transition to circularity may have on countries that rely on the export of raw materials for (economic) stability, in particular developing countries. After all, a circular economy could, ceteris paribus, result in reduced revenues for resource-exporting developing countries.

In conjunction with the upcoming Dutch government-wide program on the circular economy and the EU’s circular economy action plan, this Issue Brief by the Centre of Expertise on Resources presents the outcome of a data-analysis into the effects that a circular transition in the Netherlands and Europe may have on developing countries heavily reliant on the export of a select number of (critical) raw materials (minerals and metals) to the Dutch and EU market.

A new HCSS report “Better Together” is about cooperation, the way it is changing, and what this means for our national defense organizations (NDOs). Cooperation is the foundation of any human society. The scale and extent of cooperation is what distinguishes humans from other species.

Watch an introductory video to the study below.

A new HCSS report “Better Together” is about cooperation, the way it is changing, and what this means for our national defense organizations (NDOs). Cooperation is the foundation of any human society. The scale and extent of cooperation is what distinguishes humans from other species.

Watch an introductory video to the study below.

In recent years, the digital revolution has drastically reduced the cost of cooperating and simultaneously expanded the opportunities for cooperation. The new cooperation calculus has given rise to much more open, smaller scale, and vibrant forms of collaboration, in many instances rapidly displacing traditional models.

NDOs face a turbulent environment and an uncertain future. In these times of geopolitical shifts and rapid technological change no defense organization can go it alone. The Dutch defense organization already manages a broad portfolio of cooperation partners. Its portfolio consists of other nations’ NDOs, government departments and agencies; NGOs; local communities; defense and non-defense industry firms; knowledge institutes; etc. However, this cooperation portfolio tends to be lopsided toward long-term, formalized, closed forms of collaboration with mostly like-minded organizations. While these traditional kinds of cooperation clearly remain important, this report sets out to explore other forms of cooperation that NDOs have thus far not had much experience with - with unfamiliar partners and in more open and more loosely coupled ways, facilitated by new technological developments.

In order to gain insight into new forms of cooperation and draw lessons for NDOs, HCSS has explored three cases: InnoCentive, an open marketplace for R&D solutions; hacker communities; and Ushahidi, an open platform for crisis informatics. The report describes how these new forms of cooperation are initiated, how they are managed, and what their strengths and weaknesses are.

Based on the results of the case studies, the report makes some general recommendations for the Dutch defense organization. They suggest that our NDO should continue its first steps and move further along the road towards full-spectrum cooperability, that is the capability to engage in a broad portfolio of cooperation partners and forms, to strengthen and draw strength from a diverse defense and security ecosystem.