Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume
XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

290. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk0

Washington, June 7,
1962.

SUBJECT

Israel and United States Policy

Following our meeting on June 1 to discuss Israel’s security situation we
have prepared a revision (attached at Tab A) of the paper on the above
subject in line with your comments on the previous version.1
Principal changes are as follows: [Page 711]

1.

Arguments from the US foreign policy point of view in favor of a
special national security arrangement with Israel and in favor of
supplying the Hawk to Israel have been added. They are few.

2.

We prefer that decision on the sale of the Hawk to Israel be
deferred for about two years, until after the issue of Israel’s
large-scale withdrawal of water from Lake Tiberias has been dealt
with. We consider it wise, if possible, to deal with the Arabs on
only one major issue at a time. However, we leave the door open
against the contingency of earlier UAR/or Syrian acquisition of ground-to-air
missiles.

3.

We are exploring the possibility of unilaterally reactivating the
Tripartite Declaration of 1950 in private statements orally to both
Israel and certain Arab states, principally to meet Israel’s desire
for a security guarantee.

4.

In accordance with your request we are reviewing our policy on the
status of Jerusalem and shall provide you shortly a study with
recommendations.

At the conference of GTI and NE ambassadors being held in Athens June 12–15,
I propose to have a full discussion of principal problems in the Near East.
Following my return I shall forward to you such further views as I might
have as a result of the conference.

Within the limits (described in D. below) dictated by the necessity for a
reasonably friendly relationship with most of the Arab states, in order
to protect our interest in the Near East, we:

(1)

seek to maintain cordial and close relations with
Israel;

(2)

contribute heavily in money or money equivalents to enable
Israel to meet its security and growth (including immigration)
objectives without directly implicating the United States on the
sensitive aspects;

(3)

frequently reassure Israel that it has in effect an unwritten
but effective security guarantee from the US, that the Arabs
understand this, and that Israel is thus in a position to
conduct a policy of restraint;

(4)

encourage other friendly states to assist Israel in meeting
its military needs;

(5)

encourage Israel to expand its unilateral efforts to earn
wider friendship and economic benefits in the community of
nations;

(6)

support those UN
instrumentalities in the Near East which contribute to
maintenance of a peaceful condition, and demonstrate support for
certain UN resolutions of
importance to the world community;

(7)

permit Israel to buy, and provide credit for, a wide range of
unclassified military equipment and supplies requiring export
licenses;

(8)

avoid close military relationships and consultations as well
as partnership with Israel in ventures outside of Israel;
and

(9)

undertake a wide range of cultural contacts and placement of
many research contracts in Israel.

Each matter arising in our relationship with Israel is carefully weighed
in terms of its effect on our policy of impartiality as between Israel
and the Arabs and of its effect on Israel’s security. Over a period of
years we have come to learn what can be done on behalf of Israel without
creating serious tensions with the Arabs.

B. Israel’s Desires and
Tactics.

During the first year or so of the Kennedy Administration, Israel appeared principally to
watch developments, creating no major issues, but constantly probing
relatively gently in such areas as a security guarantee, military
equipment, military relationships, economic assistance, cooperation in
technical assistance to third countries, and an Israel relationship with
the Common Market and the OECD.

Perhaps the opening gun of the current major offensive was the so-called
“Brazzaville resolution” of December 1961 inspired originally by Israel
and sponsored by 15 other members, principally African, of the General
Assembly calling upon Israel and the Arabs to conduct direct peace
negotiations for the settlement of the Palestine conflict. US opposition
to this resolution has been a source of continuing criticism of the US
Government, to a limited extent by Israeli officials, but on a
considerable scale by Israel’s American sympathizers. The criticism
increasingly has been linked by domestic critics to President Kennedy’s campaign statements calling
for a comprehensive settlement in the Near East. Statements are
appearing more frequently to the effect that it is time for the
President to redeem his campaign pledges.

A steady campaign of criticism has flowed also from the Security Council
resolution of April 9 censuring Israel for its retaliatory raid and only
deploring Syrian “hostile acts.” Israel’s action is portrayed as being
necessary to defense of its security in the absence of prompt and
effective UN action.

In addition, fingers are pointed at the hostile propaganda conducted by
the Arabs against Israel, the indoctrination of young Arabs with hatred
of Israel, the increasing Soviet armaments (particularly [Page 713]aircraft) reportedly being acquired by
the UAR and Syria, the strengthening of
the UAR by expanded US economic
assistance, and the declaration by the Arabs that large-scale withdrawal
by Israel in 1963–64 of Jordan waters will be a casus belli.

The ensemble of these arguments appears designed to point to a growing
threat to Israel’s security and a need for measures by the US to redress
the balance. No doubt Israel is concerned that with an Algerian
settlement France will reduce its support. We are sure neither the
Israelis nor their supporters in the US believe it possible to achieve a
peace settlement in the Near East or to eliminate hostile propaganda or
teachings. We have evidence from several sources that Israel expected to
be condemned for its retaliatory raid of March 16–17. We believe the
Israelis intellectually understand that a better US–UAR relation is useful to Israel. While
they are concerned at a possible UAR
surprise air strike, they have a variety of means of assuring effective
defense. They know that the UAR has the
means to acquire Soviet arms whether the US assists the UAR economically or not. The Israelis also
know that their water diversion system cannot be damaged seriously from
the air and that Syria cannot successfully mount a ground action to
destroy the pumping station.

While American Jewry has concentrated on the need for an overall
settlement, we believe the recent visit of Israel’s Deputy Minister of
Defense, Shimon Peres, has brought
into focus the true Israel objectives. Ambassador Harman’s call on you on May 28 tends to
confirm our thesis. A principal argument used by both Peres and Harman was that the US, having worsened Israel’s
position by aiding the UAR, should now
make a compensatory gesture to Israel. The fact that Peres did not mention Israel’s desire
for a United States assurance on Israel’s right to Jordan waters may
well stem from his understanding that such an assurance will be
forthcoming. Mr. Peres’ principal
concerns seemed to be a) an arrangement for continuing military
consultations between Israel and the US, b) bolstering of Israel’s air
defenses by acquisition of the Hawk missile system, and the Minister of
the Israeli Embassy proposed in the context of Peres’ visit a c) security guarantee by
letter from President Kennedy to
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion.

Thus, we believe that considerable pressure will be mounted against the
Administration domestically in the context of the President’s campaign
references to the Near East and in terms of US assistance to the UAR, but that Peres’ objectives are what Israel will really seek.
Israel has pressed in past years for both the Hawk missile system and
US- Israel military consultations, as well as for a security guarantee.
It seems reasonable to assume that in this election year another
“college try” will be made by Israel and its supporters here and that a
serious effort will be [Page 714]made to
show that Israel faces a situation of unusual peril in the next two to
three years.

C. Israel’s Security Problem.

The latest “Israel-Arab Situation” report prepared by the intelligence
community is dated December 1961. The next revision is due in June.
Dealing with military factors alone, the report of last December does
indicate certain Israeli vulnerability to air attack, but points to
continuation of Israeli air superiority, despite acquisition by the
UAR of TU–16 bombers, as a result of
Israel’s purchase of Mirage III aircraft, some of which have now been
delivered. Israel’s clear military superiority on the ground
continues.

We continue to believe there are a number of political and psychological
factors which will indefinitely deter the Arabs, principally the UAR and Syria, from undertaking major
aggression against Israel, whether by ground attack, by air attack, or
by a combination of both:

(1)

The Arabs have a deep fear of Israel and its military
prowess.

(2)

The Arabs fear, with reason, Western intervention on behalf of
Israel.

(3)

The consequences of defeat would be serious for those Arab
leaders responsible for it.

(4)

The UAR clearly has given high
priority to domestic development for some years to come. The
Egyptians have consistently proved capable of calculating coldly
where their interests lie and are not controlled by emotions.
They now appear to be considering the problem of Israel on a
long-range rather than a short-range basis.

(5)

A lesson learned by the Arabs in 1948 is that they cannot
possibly cope with Israel if their forces are operating
independently. Divisive forces in the Arab world are too deep to
be overcome in a short time.

(6)

The Arabs have come to have more confidence in the US as the
US has continued to pursue a balanced policy and to show due
regard for Arab interests. As time passes and as our policy is
implemented consistently, the Arabs will have greater confidence
in our will to prevent expansion by Israel.

(7)

We plan to continue inspections of the Dimona reactor by
qualified American scientists and, if possible, by “neutrals” as
well, and to continue to provide the Arabs with assurances of
its peaceful nature. This course of action should be sufficient
to remove temptation for a surprise UAR or UAR-Syrian
air raid on the reactor.

The foregoing factors must be given heavy weight in assessing Israel’s
security situation. In our opinion, Israel is in little actual danger of
an Arab assault now and is not likely to be in any real danger over the
next few years. In NEA we consider this
problem practically daily and are fully alert to all its aspects.

D. The Rationale for Our Policy toward
Israel.

Our problems with Israel stem largely from: a) unrequited Israeli desires
for the establishment of a special relationship between Israel and [Page 715]the US in matters of national
security, and b) Arab-Israel frictions along Israel’s borders. Although
Israel has sought US sponsorship of training in Israel for third-country
nationals, has proposed cooperative US- Israel ventures in technical aid
to third countries, objects to our policy of suggesting to other
countries that they establish diplomatic missions in Tel Aviv rather
than in Jerusalem, and differs with us on the question of sovereignty
over Lake Tiberias, these matters are of relatively minor consequence to
the tenor of our relations.

We believe that in seeking continuing military consultations with the US
and in proposing periodically a US security guarantee, Israel seeks not
only reassurance for its own people, but also a clear demonstration to
the Arabs that the US is, in effect, allied with Israel. In requesting
the US to supply the Hawk missile system Israel seeks to eliminate any
vulnerability it may feel to attack by manned aircraft and thus assure
the security of Israel against the Arabs until such time as offensive
missile systems may be introduced into the Near East.

(1)

Arguments for and against a Special National
Security Arrangement with Israel.

a.

For

i.

From the foreign policy standpoint, there are
no advantages.

ii.

From a domestic point of view, the American
supporters of Israel would be pleased and would be
less critical of our policy.

b.

Against

i.

Would constitute a direct challenge to the
Arabs by the US, destroy growing Arab confidence
in our impartiality, and remove the protective
covering of the UN
behind which we deal with most Palestine
issues.

ii.

Could not be counterbalanced by creation of a
corresponding relationship with the Arabs.

iii.

Would render the US responsible in Arab eyes
for every Israeli military venture.

iv.

Would encourage the more fanatical Arabs to
seek a similar relationship with the Soviet Union
and would hand the Soviets a very useful
propaganda weapon.

v.

Would be the only US security arrangement with
another country not directed against the
Sino-Soviet bloc, and would cause us further
problems with Pakistan in refusing to take
Pakistan’s side in the Kashmir dispute.

We believe Israel and its supporters should accept that a
reasonably good US-Arab relationship is in Israel’s interest and
that Israel’s proposals [Page 716]for a special relationship with the US would be self-defeating
if executed. While rarely mentioned, the Tripartite Declaration
of 1950 has never been declared dead by the US and could
possibly be the basis for providing additional assurances to
Israel without provoking the Arabs.

(2)

Arguments for and against Supplying the Hawk
to Israel.

a.

For

i.

From the US foreign policy standpoint,
possession of the Hawk would strengthen the weak
link in Israel’s defenses and thereby reduce any
temptation Israel may have to take preemptive
offensive action.

ii.

From the domestic standpoint, American
supporters of Israel would be pleased and would be
less critical of US policy.

b.

Against

i.

Sale of the Hawk would jeopardize the security
of its classified elements.

ii.

Although the Hawk is a defensive weapon only,
its sale to Israel now would pin on the US
responsibility for adding a new element of
sophistication to weaponry in the Near East and
would contribute to heightening of the arms race
and the economic burdens attendant thereon. (At
such time as the UAR and/or Syria obtains such missiles
this factor will cease being a serious
one.)

iii.

In the interest of impartiality the US would
have to consider whether to offer the Hawk to
Israel’s Arab neighbors, whose ability to handle
it is doubtful. Spreading such weapons around the
Near East might place civil aviation in some
jeopardy.

iv.

The door would be opened to further requests
by sophisticated equipment such as air-to-air
missiles, also allegedly defensive. We doubt that
Israel would rest satisfied with having gotten the
Hawk. Rather, it would set a new objective and
would not have achieved appeasement or surcease of
pressure by Israel.

v.

Deterrents against Arab surprise air attack
are listed in C. above.

E. How We Propose to Deal with
Israel.

(1)

We consider it important not to give in to Israeli and domestic
pressures for a special relationship in national security matters.
To undertake, in effect, a military alliance with Israel would
destroy the delicate balance we seek to maintain in our Near Eastern
relations.

(2)

We believe a decision on sale of the Hawk missile to Israel should
be delayed for approximately two years, or, if earlier, until

a)

Ground-to-air missiles have been introduced into the area
by the Soviets, in which case sale of the Hawk to Israel
would be more defensible. Should at any time a decision to
sell Israel the Hawk be taken or become likely, we urge that
NEA be allowed time to
discuss the matter with the UAR and perhaps Syria with a view to reducing
reaction to our decision before it becomes public
knowledge.

b)

In the spring of 1964 Israel presumably will undertake
large-scale withdrawal of water from Lake Tiberias. Since
this is a matter of [Page 717]importance to the Arabs, we prefer to deal with it without
the complications that would ensue from the early provision
of the Hawk to Israel.

c)

Israel’s Chief of Staff has stated that Israel is not
afraid of the Arabs through 1966 and that the Arabs would be
no real threat to Israel’s existence up to 1970. If in 1964
Israel continues to have the same problems, i.e., defense
against low-flying aircraft, it might prove useful in the
next election year to have the Hawk available for
discussion.

d)

We expect to be able to carry out further inspections of
the Dimona reactor and thus to be able to continue to
reassure the Arabs. This should serve to remove an Arab fear
which might tempt the Arabs otherwise to attempt a surprise
air attack on the reactor.

(3)

To meet with relatively small risk the Israeli desire for a
security guarantee, we are exploring the possibility of a unilateral
reactivation of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 (attached Tab
B)3
insofar as it pertains to aggression. To do so would avoid the
necessity of a new formulation with resultant complications.
Tentatively we are considering oral statements to Israel and to
certain of the Arabs, without publicity, perhaps tieing our
approaches to the Jordan waters problem over which there already has
been violence.

(4)

NEA gives priority to appropriate
assurances to Israel of our support for its right to take an
equitable quantity of Jordan waters and to reciprocal assurances
from Israel (our memorandum of May 25 to you on this subject
attaching a proposed note to Israel is enclosed at Tab C).4 This is an immediate problem which
directly engages the US position and prestige with the Arabs and is
of the utmost significance to Israel. We cannot afford
simultaneously to create other serious issues with the Arabs. In
connection with assurances on water we propose to try to persuade
Israel (and Syria) to cooperate more fully with the UN mechanisms in the area, and as stated
in 3. above we would deal with the problem of a security guarantee
in the same context.

(5)

We are planning to propose shortly reinstitution of Sixth Fleet
visits to Haifa, initially on a modest scale and later an annual
visit of a number of units simultaneously. This should remove an
element of discrimination and should increase Israel’s sense of
security.

(6)

We propose to take as liberal a view as possible toward Israel’s
requests to purchase military equipment.

(7)

In recognition of the heavy cost to Israel of military purchases
elsewhere and of resettlement of large numbers of immigrants, we
shall support continued economic aid on as large a scale as in past
years.

(8)

Should it prove possible to invite Nasser for a state visit next winter, we plan to
suggest to the President that he sound out Nasser on the possibility of an
informal arms limitation arrangement, or a freezing of armaments at
the level then existing.

(9)

We have in mind a letter from President Kennedy to Nasser in the late summer and
believe a friendly letter to Ben-Gurion about the same time would be
useful, particularly if Israel has provided assurances in connection
with its water diversion plan and has proved willing to be more
cooperative with UNTSO and ISMAC.

(10)

As requested by the Secretary, we are reviewing our policy of
approaching other governments regarding the status of Jerusalem when
those governments are considering the question of where to locate
new diplomatic missions.

(11)

We propose to continue to oppose initiatives designed to place
pressure on the Arabs to undertake direct negotiations with Israel,
and at present we are inclined to wish Dr. Johnson to continue his
mission on the Arab refugee problem, thus requiring us to continue
to urge Israel to cooperate with him.

Our positions will not be fully satisfactory to Israel and its American
supporters, but we believe them to be defensible and that they should be
maintained as the most suitable to our own national security interests
while adequately protecting Israel’s security for a further period. We
should not underrate the importance to Israel of an undertaking by the
US to support fully Israel’s large-scale withdrawal of water from Lake
Tiberias. On this hangs resettlement of at least 500,000 immigrants and
the development of the Negev.