Forum Police Reforms

Monday, November 20, 2017

AN organisation with large human
resources can only function proficiently if a proper service structure has been
provisioned for its members. This factor attains greater importance if the
organisation supervises a disciplined force responsible for law enforcement.
For such an institution, induction at different levels is determined by its
size and the nature of the duties of the members of the organisation along with
sound career progression.

The police departments in Pakistan
perform important functions. Therefore the establishment of a structure based
on internationally recognised standards is essential for their efficacy as a
force. The police that we inherited at the time of Independence met the
benchmarks of that period. To maintain order in Pakistan at the time of its
inception, it was, therefore, possible to revive police functionality with the
existing colonial structure, although this was not an ideal arrangement.

The police structure that was
inherited had multiple layers of induction at three levels. At the entry level,
a constable with elementary education was recruited and put through rigorous
militarised training with the basics of policing and criminal law.

The middle level allowed the
selection of educated candidates at the rank of assistant sub-inspector/sub-inspector.
At the mid level, they were recruited through a selection process of candidates
who possessed specified educational quali­fications.

At the senior level of supervision,
assistant superintendents of police (ASPs) were recruited centrally from
amongst the cohort of graduate candidates through a countrywide competitive
examination. The bulk of the force comprised the lowest rung of the structure,
performing routine duties of maintaining order and preventing the commission of
offences. Only selected literate members of this level were imparted in-service
training for promotion to higher levels, and the system allowed these police
officers to rise to the rank of inspector.

The situation will take decades to
reset even if such inductions are stopped.

A combination of these directly
inducted officers and promoted officers from the lower level formed the
backbone of the police department. They were directly involved in day-to-day
and on-ground policing. They manned the police stations, supervised the
constabulary, investigated the cases, performed watch-and-ward duties and
maintained order.

At the third and highest tier, the
assistant superintendents of police (ASPs) were recruited for command and
control assignments of the police department.

This three-tiered induction had
evolved on the basis of experience that called for the provision of a smooth
promotion system that did not create distortions or conflict. For instance,
lower-tier officers would be nearing retirement when they were promoted to the
next level.

This was a neat arrangement for
police officers progressing through various levels of induction and who did not
end up in posts that were principally meant for officers recruited for a
specific level of responsibility. It not only ensured a smooth transition but
also combined fresh blood with experience at different levels.

Before Independence, there were some
exceptions with the direct recruitment to the level of inspectors and deputy
superintendent of police (DSPs) from the public at large. This was done purely
out of political considerations, but the number was so restricted that it did
not have any impact on the structure of the police department. These officers
were absorbed by the system and accepted by their colleagues; as such, these
inductions did not create any serious distortion or anomalies in the
department.

The need to enact structural reforms
to meet the new challenges of changing environments prompted governments of the
time to exploit the system for furthering political opportunities rather than
improve it. Governments with the stated intention of reforming the police
started making exceptions to existing functioning police structures.

In the name of changing the thana
culture, recruitment was done at the level of inspectors, and for engineered
shortages DSPs were inducted. Then in the name of special requirements,
officers from other institutions, including the armed forces, were inducted as
superintendent of police and even deputy inspectors general. The results of
these whimsical decisions caused opaque induction, violation of merit,
conflicting/ competing claims on vacancies and administrative distortions with
promotion blocks for juniors and groupings at command levels.

These also gave rise to litigation
and a number of rulings that had a very negative impact on the discipline of
the police forces. Some of these politically motivated decisions were set aside
by the courts, but continuing multiple inductions have damaged the department,
which is now facing very serious challenges in maintaining discipline within
the force.

The situation will take decades to
reset even if such inductions are stopped. The political leadership must
understand the implications of interference in human resource management and
realise that the key to good governance lies in merit-based human resource
management for every department/ institution of the government, and more so for
the police force that has the vital responsibility of maintaining order.

Police Order 2002 was an attempt to
address this problem and provided induction through a transparent procedure.
Its provisions ensure transparency and recognise the importance of harmony in
an organisation that exercises the coercive powers of the state. Unfortunately,
this attempt was frustrated in the name of the 18th Constitutional Amendment,
and this law stands repealed by three provinces, with Punjab set to change it.

Police forces all over the world
have a unique status as each is answerable to its own hierarchy, but each
member of the force also has an inherent role that is independent of this
hierarchy and all officers have legal powers that they exercise for which they
are answerable to the courts.

This exclusive status of the police
presents a complex and challenging dilemma vis-à-vis its management structure.
This peculiar position, therefore, needs to be managed, supervised, guided and
controlled through an intricate process.

Political interference in such a
delicately calibrated management system can be fatal as the outcome will be
chaos and anarchy that inevitably derails democratic governance. We are in the
midst of such a chaotic situation, thanks to tinkering with the police
organisation and the equally unwise decision to ask the army to take up
policing. It is no surprise then that complaints of ‘institutional conflict’
follow when policing powers are given to other security forces.

Friday, August 11, 2017

UPON
independence, we inherited a functional criminal justice system (CJS) that
delivered and maintained peace in the country until the late 1960s. However, as
Pakistan became embroiled in regional issues, the system faltered and the
country paid a heavy price in the form of the virtual annihilation of the CJS’s
fundamental structure, one that had evolved over decades.

Against
this backdrop, attention shifted from institution building/improvement to
fulfilling the onerous responsibilities of the newly assumed role of ‘regional
leader’. Every institution was sacrificed at the altar of local political
expediency to the point where its purpose and function were rendered obsolete.
It goes without saying that in the absence of strong institutions to control
arbitrary decision-making by the government, which legitimises its actions
through a questionable political process, the hope for just governance is
likely to remain a chimera.

The
British rulers established the structure of the CJS around the Indian Penal
Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPc) and the Evidence Act, which were
drafted by great minds that foresaw all possible eventualities. This vision
formed an all-encompassing legal foundation for the criminal justice structure
in India. Despite its colonial antecedents, it was an efficient system lasting
for more than 100 years. The continuation of these laws in all the South Asian
countries bears testimony to its legislative efficacy.

However,
as the laws were not amended to address the evolving challenges of a changing
world, the very institutions created and empowered by these laws were instead
used to serve the political elite coveting regional dominance.

The
role of the judicial magistrates is critical for thorough investigations and as
a check on police.

This
negligence in improving basic structures prefaced the breakdown of societal law
and order and the fractured CJS found it difficult to deal with the emergent
threat of terrorism. As a result, the government began to rely inordinately on
the army in a strategy that was tantamount to firefighting without any
comprehensive plan.

In
this context, the National Action Plan was essentially adopted to address
mounting public pressure for action. Yet even on the NAP agenda, the most vital
topic of improvement of the CJS was relegated to the bottom of the 20 points.
As feared, little was done to improve the system, for the outcome would have
also been politically awkward.

In
addition to hearing important cases against political governments in Karachi,
and carrying out situation hearings and reports on the Quetta Civil Hospital
bombing, the superior judiciary took note of the negligence in reforming the
CJS, intervening proactively to force the executive to address the issues
related to its functioning.

Undeniably,
terrorism can only be confronted through an effective CJS, wherein the weakest
link is the investigative process. If purged of political influence and closely
monitored by the institution mandated to do so, positive results can be
expected. However, no one wants to undertake this. Even the special and
draconian legislation enacted in recent years has been of little help.

In
this regard, a careful examination of the CrPc shows that the role of the lower
judicial magistrates is critical for carrying out thorough investigations and
as a check on police. This basic law has provided a delicately calibrated
balance that defines the role of the magistracy in the investigation without
its direct involvement in the process. In this way, it ensures the independence
of the investigation.

For
instance, Chapter XIV of the CrPc defines the role of the concerned magistrate
by creating a fine balance of oversight and soft intervention in the process.
For the investigation of a non-cognisable offence, the permission of a
magistrate is mandatory under Section 155 CrPc. Section 156 (3) holds that a
magistrate empowered under Section 190 can order a police officer to
investigate a cognisable offence and under Section 157 it is binding for the
police officer to send to the magistrate concerned a report of any information
regarding the commission of a cognisable offence. Similarly, under Section 158,
the investigating officer has to send the reports of every case investigated by
him under Section 157 to the magistrate for his perusal.

Moreover,
Section 159 empowers the magistrate to order an investigation and, if required,
either proceed himself or depute a magistrate junior to him for preliminary
enquiry. It is again the magistrate who has to give physical remand of an
accused to the police for investigation after determining the need for
extending the remand. This is a very potent tool in the hands of the magistrate
for monitoring the investigation. Yet again, the closing of a case against an
accused under Section 169 is subject to review by the magistrate. During the
investigation, Section 164 empowers the magistrate to record the statements
related to a crime or confession.

After
the separation of the judiciary from the executive and the abolition of the
executive magistracy, judicial magistrates are reluctant to play the proactive
role provisioned in the procedural law. In the light of the worsening law and
order situation and the emergence of the threat of terrorism, it is important
to revert to the basics and strictly adhere to the provisions discussed above.

The
higher judiciary should provide the guidelines on considering the CJS as a
package that can only deliver if the functioning of its many arms is
synchronised. The example of Britain in the wake of the 2011 London riots is
illuminating, where the judiciary played a leading role by instituting double
shifts of court hearings and punishing the offenders.

Of
course, the situation in Pakistan is far more serious. That makes it even more
imperative that the investigators be not only supported but also monitored in
bringing the offenders to book. Responsible institutions must work together
towards this goal, with the higher judiciary guaranteeing the active
participation of all the players and the transparency of CJS’s functioning.

Oft-repeated
recommendations for resuscitating the old system of executive magistracy as a
panacea for contemporary challenges will prove futile, for it has outlived its
utility and serves but to attenuate the judiciary and distort the entire
criminal justice system.

Sunday, May 29, 2016

A suspect is arrested, and
in line with the special law, the court gives a 90-day remand to the Rangers to
interrogate him for his alleged involvement in criminal activities. On the
third day, the man dies while being rushed to the hospital. The media explodes
with headlines, and the whole process of investigation is called into question,
with even the postmortem report becoming publicized. The reporting and analysis
by the media disfavours the very force that has been widely lauded hitherto for
restoring peace to Karachi. This is how a single blunder or botched
investigation can obscure the months and years of good work done by members of
the same force.

A death in police custody is
something that cannot be completely eliminated in the same way as death cannot
be banished from our lives. What should be addressed is the transparency of the
process regulating custodial investigations. In a number of cases, custodial
deaths happen because the individual under investigation is placed under a
great deal of stress due to the fearful environment existing in police custody.
Different methods are employed by the investigators to pressure, confront and
scare the accused persons to reveal the truth as to the allegations levelled at
them. Admittedly, in many cases, the accused persons may be severely tortured.
However, in a larger number of cases, deaths can occur due to heightened
anxiety, guilt and fear of being discovered, which can trigger underlying, and
in some cases, undetected medical conditions to devastating and fatal effect.

In order to address the
problems arising due to such contestable custodial deaths, legal provisions
within the Criminal Procedural Law allow the area magistrate to conduct an
inquiry to determine the cause of death. In case of torture being proven, the
magistrate can initiate legal action immediately. In all unnatural deaths, an
inquest report is based on the post-mortem report conducted by an authorised
doctor or board of doctors.

With time, this law has lost
its efficacy in determining the actual cause of the death. As the relationship
between the police and the magistracy degenerated into collusion, the
magistracy that was the part of the executive began to be used for covering up
facts rather than for ensuring the transparency of findings. The Police Order
2002 specifically addressed this issue of public interest and made a detailed
provision that laid down the course of action in case of death, grievous hurt
and complaint of rape in custody. In such cases, it was within the remit of the
government to automatically request the high court to appoint a session judge
to conduct a judicial inquiry in order to determine the facts of the case for
possible criminal or departmental action.

Over time, the civilian
police in the country has begun to be replaced by the civil armed forces
because police personnel have lost their capacity to deal with law enforcement
and maintenance of order in society. Due to political interference in police
work, encompassing case investigations, arrests, bails, and even internal and
administrative matters of appointment, training, promotion and postings, the
police supervisory structure has been paralysed. This has completely fragmented
the institutional capacity of police to perform its duties. Instead of
addressing this malaise, the political government has resorted to inducting the
civil armed forces for maintenance of order and crime control. The forces are
ideally suited to dealing with a serious breakdown of order or to handle a hard
target within a given timeframe. However, they should not be expected to
perform regular police duties as they lack a system of internal management
based on a mechanism that monitors and records all actions and movement of each
policeman. Such a process, which is integrated into the institutional capacity
of the police force, ensures effective control for affixing the responsibility
in case of a mishap.

The deployment of the
Rangers in Karachi has seen some critical reports in the media regarding the
purported highhandedness of the Rangers. After the death of the MQM activist in
the custody of the Rangers, those with vested interests have attempted to
malign the paramilitary force, despite its impressive work at restoring peace
to the city. While the military has rightly ordered an inquiry because of the
government inaction, even this inquiry, which has been welcomed by the affected
party, is being criticised. It cannot be stressed enough that the existing law
should be allowed to run its course through an inquest by the magistrate to determine
the cause of death and to furnish evidence for further legal action, should a
need to hold the Rangers accountable be established in this instance.

The government must deal
with law enforcement on priority, and instead of playing politics by deploying
the civil armed forces to deal with unsavoury situations, it should assume full
responsibility and desist from political interference in policing. Continued
deployment of the military for policing functions will not only thin out its
resources, it will also unnecessarily embroil it in needless political
controversies. The solution consists of ensuring that the rule of law prevails
in the operation of a fully accountable and neutral police force, which is
insulated from all extraneous interference. As an immediate measure, all police
chiefs should have legally ensured tenures with total operational autonomy.
This would prevent the government from playing political games by embroiling
the military in policing, which is ultimately the function of a civilian force.

Saturday, May 14, 2016

Shariq Jamal Siddiqi District Police Officer of Bhawalnagar an upright
and brave officer took action against the gunman of local MNA who had reported
slapped a police constable. This was not acceptable to the MNA because he
considers himself and his minions above the law that he legislates. The MNA very
graciously offered to allow the officer to stay as the district head of police
provided he had lunch at his house and apologized for the affront to him. Shariq
is an honorable man and was not prepared to agree to such a humiliating treatment
at the hands of a local politician for doing his duties. He refused and was
transferred as OSD by the government of Punjab.

Sometimes back another upright officer Mr. Nekokara was also not only transferred
for giving professional advice but also dismissed from service. His appeal is
pending before the services tribunal. The political governments unfortunately
are unable to differentiate between their personal servants and a public
servant. Therefore such whimsical and unlawful decisions are being taken
repeatedly. Politicians also expect the police to violate laws to meet their
every unreasonable demand. It is not limited to petty matters but extends to
investigation of the serious criminal cases, their prosecution, arrests and
even matters of bail. Most of the elected members of assemblies from the ruling
party consider it their right to even interfere in the internal administration
of police department. There is no check on their wanton behavior and they have
the full support of the government.

Transfer of an officer like Shariq for upholding the law is illegal, unwarranted
and deplorable. The Chief Minister and the Prime Minster must understand that such
actions are primarily responsible for the ineffectiveness of the police forces
in the country. Depoliticize the police and half the problems will be solved in
a day. Showcasing fancy forces like Dolphin and elite squads will not address
the policing problems they have to address the fundamental issue of treating
police as servant of the state and not their private employees.

Comments from the serving and retired officers are sought on this
incident. Shariq was given a very good farewell because of his principled stand.
He is a hero to his force and has earned their gratitude for standing by them.