The LRA: what's to be done?

Supporters of the Kony 2012 campaign have posed two questions to critics: 'what would you do?', and 'what's the problem with getting the issue more attention?'. But African and international efforts have already solved most of the problems associated with the LRA, let's keep up those efforts.

As a critic of the KONY2012 campaign, I
have been asked the eminently practical question, “so what would you do about Joseph Kony and the Lord’s
Resistance Army?” Let me take this opportunity to respond.

There have been a number of proposals
for peace in northern Uganda and the resolution of the LRA problem. As a
framework, let me use a nine point comprehensive approach proposed by the International Crisis Group in January 2006. Three
points are military, six non-military. Let me give a scorecard for each one.

1. Apprehending the Indictees. Crisis Group
called for capturing Joseph Kony and the other LRA commanders wanted by the
International Criminal Court. Clearly, six years on, this has not been
achieved, despite at least two major multinational operations (2006 and 2008)
and other military efforts. The most recent initiative, set up in November
2011, is an African Union-led, UN and US-supported, four national joint
military command. The scorecard: repeated effort, no success yet.

2. Crossing Borders in pursuit of the LRA.
Before 2006, the LRA had evaded military pressure by escaping into southern
Sudan or DRC, so this recommendation was intended to ensure an end to safe
havens, and in particular that the Ugandans could pursue the LRA when it
crossed a border. Since 2006, there has been good cooperation, culminating in
the current AU effort, which surpasses the recommendation insofar as there are
four armies, from Uganda, South Sudan, DRC and Central African Republic under a
single command, with international backing. Scorecard: expectations surpassed.

3. Protecting Civilians. The Ugandan
People’s Defence Force (UPDF) failed to protect civilian populations from the
LRA. Equally seriously, UPDF troops, who were far more numerous than the LRA,
were themselves responsible for many abuses against civilians. The withdrawal
of the LRA from Uganda in 2006 meant that it ceased to threaten Ugandans,
though it has since threatened Congolese, South Sudanese and Central Africans.
The removal of the LRA threat also meant that the UPDF deployment in northern
Uganda has been scaled down, and IDPs have returned to their homes. Scorecard:
near total success in Uganda, limited progress outside Uganda.

4. Comprehensive Dialogue. This
recommendation referred primarily to the peace talks that were convened from
2006-2008 in southern Sudan, that didn’t succeed. There is now little prospect
of new peace talks, and so the recommendation as framed six years ago is no
longer relevant. However, the wider issue of the political accommodation of
northern Uganda within Ugandan national politics is important, and this has
indeed occurred. Peace has returned to northern Uganda. Scorecard: mostly
successful.

5. Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration Initiative. The main concern of Crisis Group was to the
return and rehabilitation of former LRA combatants, many of whom were
abductees, and many of whom were children. The figure of 30,000 abductees
sometimes mentioned includes both adults and children and refers to those who
have been processed through reintegration programs. This represents the vast
majority of former members of the LRA. Scorecard: mostly successful.

6. Humanitarian Aid. Crisis Group focused
on emergency assistance to people displaced by the war. It didn’t go so far as
calling for reconstruction and development. Six years on, the humanitarian
crisis has been resolved to the extent that emergency relief has been replaced
by reconstruction and development. Scorecard: success, with expectations
exceeded.

7. UN Security Council Action. The issue
here was appointing a “UN envoy of stature” to lead the negotiations. Former
Mozambican President Joachim Chissano was appointed but the initiative did not
succeed. The UN Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security
Council remain actively engaged, for example in mandating the four-nation
military force that is spearheading the current military effort. Scorecard:
recommendation implemented, but these actions have not yet achieved their goals.

8. Truth and Reconciliation Efforts. The
reference here was to healing the wounds of war, going beyond the headline
issue of prosecuting the major human rights offenders and also promoting
reconciliation, involving traditional reconciliation approaches, psycho-social
programs, reopening schools, etc. These are all slow and complicated processes
and it is difficult to assess the record, but they are being attempted, more
seriously and systematically than in most post-conflict situations. Scorecard:
recommendation implemented.

9. Diplomatic Engagement. In 2006, Crisis
Group referred to the need of donor countries “to engage quietly but strongly
with President Yoweri Museveni and other Ugandan political leaders to make
resolution of the conflict a major priority of the government and of all
presidential candidates.” This was a coded reference to the political
marginalization of northern Uganda and the way in which the UPDF had vested
interests in the ongoing conflict (senior officers had opportunities to profit)
and the ruling party had political motives for retaining the country on a war
footing. Six years on, although the authoritarian and militaristic nature of
the Ugandan government is unchanged, its political inclusion of northern Uganda
is much improved. Scorecard: partial success.

The overall scorecard is therefore:

Exceeded expectations: two.

Mostly successful: three.

Partial success: three.

Failure: one.

My answer to the question, “if you
criticize KONY2012, what would you do?” is that African and international
efforts have already solved most of the problems associated with the LRA and
the conflict and humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda, and are making
progress in the remaining areas. Let’s keep up those efforts.

A second criticism is, “so what’s the
harm in drawing more attention to this problem?” I have a number of concerns
about the impact of simplistic and paternalistic portrayals of African
problems, in which Africans are treated as children waiting for Americans and
Europeans to save them. I have concerns about military action being presented
as the principal solution.

I also have another concern, less often
voiced: the high level of attention on Kony is a distraction from other issues
that are equally grave or more so. Senior policymakers’ time is a very scarce
resource. I recall that in 2006, senior officials in the U.S. administration
estimated that President George Bush was spending more time focusing on Sudan
(mostly on Darfur) than on China. What this meant in detail was that, (1) White
House and State Department staff spent more time dealing with the U.S. activist
groups than with the problems in Sudan itself, (2) decisions were shaped and
timed by the demands of those campaigners as much as by the requirements of
Sudanese realities, and (3) there was no other African political issue that
could make it on to the agenda of the top decision-makers in Washington DC.
Darfur was important, but not that
important. Also, this exceptionally high level of attention gave the Darfur
rebels the impression that they were very special indeed and could behave
accordingly.

I am worried that the
African troops chasing Kony will think that they have special privileges, and
that the hunt for the LRA will drive other African issues off the U.S. policy
agenda. Given that Invisible Children has achieved – in an election year – the
remarkable feat of joining liberal internationalist students with hard-right
Republican evangelicals, I worry that the U.S. administration’s Africa staff
will focus more effort on managing the implications of the KONY2012 campaign
than responding to the many and complicated problems of the central African region.

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Security for the future: in search of a new vision

What does ‘security’ mean to you? The Ammerdown Invitation seeks your participation in a new civic conversation about national security in the UK and beyond. Its authors offer an analysis of the shortcomings of current approaches and propose a different vision of the future. Please use the invitation summary document for seminars, workshops and public meetings, and share the responses and insights that emerge.