This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by
the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect
of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons
attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research
aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research
up to 1968, when the Swedish government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations
about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all
together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure
nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid-50's. The reason for
this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of
involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take
place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured
a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed
the parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the
Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of
nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the parliament
would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic
Government. The prime minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement
of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented
to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would
be allowed. The government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of
action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a
decision on the issue. During this period of 'wait and see' FOA was not allowed to
conduct research directed towards producing nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it
was stated that it was impossible to make a clear-cut line between protection and
construction research within a freedom of action. The parliament accepted the government's
recommendation. Was then protection research the only research that was performed?
The question has been under debate in the media and also the issue for one government
investigation. Former classified FOA documents have now been released and enabled
this study. The conclusion of this report is that FOA went further in its efforts
to make technical and economical estimations than the defined S-programme allowed,
at least in a couple of instances. The findings in this report support the assumption
that it was a political game that made the Swedish government introduce the term protection
research to escape criticism, while in practical terms construction research was performed
in order to obtain technical and economical estimations for a possible production.
A second finding of this report is that Sweden reached latent capacity to produce
nuclear weapons in 1955. This is at least two years earlier than what is normally
accepted in the international literature on nuclear proliferation. For example, in
Stephen M Meyer's classical study The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation, Sweden is
said to have reached latent capacity in 1957. Meyer's study refers to another study
in this respect. An analysis of the declassified documents from FOA concludes that
this is at least two years to late. A third aim of this report is to analyse the decommissioning
of the nuclear weapons research after the NPT was signed in 1968. The fourth aim is
to investigate how much plutonium, natural and depleted uranium and heavy water FOA
had at its disposal within the research programme. The result of this investigation
is given in appendix 2$$$$

The Transparency and Nuclear Safety Act, which took effect in 2006, requires each
operator to document the measures taken to ensure nuclear safety and radiological
protection and to list incidents and accidents as well as actions taken to protect
the environment. This specifies the nature and limits of radioactive and non-radioactive
releases, the quantity of waste to be stored at the facility, actions taken to limit
waste volume, and effects on health and the environment, especially on soil and water.
(authors)$$$$

For decades, international nuclear cooperation and transfer of technology to India
had been withheld, not only by the U.S. but by the entire Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Whereas, now that the sanctions have been be lifted, the long isolation of India's
nuclear scientists has ended. We can also hope to purchase badly needed supplies of
uranium and other materials for enlarging our nuclear energy program to meet the surging
demands for energy in the coming decades.How much will the Deal help on the energy
front ? Not as much as some of the exaggerated claims a few of its supporters made
in the heat of the debate. It will not even contribute a half or quarter of our energy
needs in the coming decades nor will it significantly help global warming. But in
absolute, if not fractional, terms it will make a significant contribution to our
energy needs, which would not have been possible otherwise$$$$

For rough estimation of isotopic composition in a single plutonium particle before
precise measurement by thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS), alpha spectrometry
was demonstrated using 10 particles in a standard reference material NBS947. The particles
with diameters of around one micrometer were picked up and put onto TIMS filaments
by a micromanipulator attached to a scanning electron microscope (SEM). The particle
on the filament was transferred to an alpha spectrometer chamber. And then, the activity
ratio of (238Pu+241Am)/(239Pu+240Pu) was
measured for each particle. Finally, precise Pu isotope ratios of 240Pu/239Pu
and 241Pu/239Pu were determined with TIMS. The measured activity
ratios and isotope ratios were in good agreement with the reference data within the
measurement uncertainty. (author)$$$$

Remote monitoring technologies offer many opportunities, not only to strengthen IAEA
safeguards, but also to improve national, industrial and local oversight of various
nuclear operations. Remote monitoring benefits in greater timeliness, reduced inspector
presence and improved state-of-health awareness are well-known attributes. However,
there is also the capability to organize data into a comprehensive knowledge of the
'normal operating envelope' of a facility. In considering future applications of remote
monitoring there is also a need to develop a better understanding of the potential
cost-savings versus higher up-front costs and potential long-term maintenance or upgrade
costs. (author)$$$$

This paper first discusses where and why those ideas for nuclear fuel supply assurance
and guarantee mechanisms came out, and attempts to draw a comparison among the proposed
schemes and thereby examine possible steps forward. (author)$$$$

The experiences obtained from the current construction projects at Olkiluoto clearly
point out the need to introduce the safeguards requirements into facility design process
at an early stage. The early Design Information is completed, in principle, before
the construction. However, during the design of containment, surveillance systems,
and non-destructive assay equipment and their cabling, the design requirements for
safeguards systems were not available either for the new reactor unit or for the disposal
plant with a geological repository. Typically, the official Design Information documents
are not available early enough for efficient integration of safeguards systems into
new facilities. In case of the Olkiluoto projects, this was due to understandable
reasons: at the new reactor unit the design acceptance by the ordering company and
by the nuclear safety authorities was a long process, ongoing simultaneously with
parts of the construction; and at the geological repository the national legislation
assigns the repository the status of a nuclear facility only after the initial construction
and research phase of the repository when the long-term safety of the disposal concept
is demonstrated. As similar factors are likely to delay the completion of the official
Design Information documents with any new reactor projects until the construction
is well underway and efficient integration of safeguards systems is impossible. Therefore,
the proliferation resistance of new nuclear installations should be addressed in the
design phase before the official Design Information documents are finished. This approach
was demonstrated with the enlargement of the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage building.
For this approach to work, strong national contribution is needed to facilitate the
early communication and exchange of information between the IAEA and the other stakeholders
to enable the design of facilities that can be efficiently safeguarded. With the renaissance
of nuclear energy, the world-wide nuclear technology holders, facility designers,
manufacturers and supply organisations should be invited to participate in the development,
construction and operation of safe, secure and efficiently safeguarded nuclear installations.
(author)$$$$

Nuclear terrorism has been identified as one of the most serious security threats
facing the world today. Many countries, including the United States, have incorporated
nuclear forensic analysis as a component of their strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism.
Nuclear forensics involves the laboratory analysis of seized illicit nuclear materials
or debris from a nuclear detonation to identify the origins of the material or weapon.
Over the years, a number of forensic signatures have been developed to improve the
confidence with which forensic analysts can draw conclusions. These signatures are
validated and new signatures are discovered through research and development programs
and in round-robin exercises among nuclear forensic laboratories. The recent Nuclear
Smuggling International Technical Working Group Third Round Robin Exercise and an
on-going program focused on attribution of uranium ore concentrate provide prime examples
of the current state of nuclear forensics. These case studies will be examined and
the opportunities for accelerator mass spectrometry to play a role in nuclear forensics
will be discussed.$$$$