The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.

The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.

The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).
Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04BRUSSELS2114.

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 002114
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR; CA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2014
TAGS: CMGTCVISSMIGELABEUNUSEUBRUSSELS
SUBJECT: VISA WAIVER PROGRAM AND AN ENLARGED EU
REF: (A) 03 BRUSSELS 5470 (B) BRUSSELS 1907 (C)
BRUSSELS 0916
Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
¶1. (C) Summary. The enlargement of the EU on May 1 raised
the number of EU countries not included in the visa waiver
program (VWP) from one to ten. New Member States harbor
hopes that their EU accession can become a way to wrest from
the U.S. via the EU what they could not obtain bilaterally:
inclusion in the VWP. Under existing rules of the Schengen
Agreement, EU Member States which are not granted visa waiver
by third countries can in theory invoke a "solidarity
mechanism" requiring automatic visa reciprocity. The
European Commission (EC) fears that votes might not be in
place to override the solidarity mechanism if invoked by one
of the new Member States, and is pressing the U.S. to expand
VWP to include the new members. The EC argues that 2007
(when internal Schengen borders with the new members are
expected to be dropped) will be the logical time for VWP
expansion to occur. The EU warns that failure to address the
grievances of the new Member States over visa rules -- or
removing any current EU Member State from the VWP -- could
lead to a reaction both side want to avoid. End Summary.
------------------------
VWP: Impact of Enlargement
------------------------
¶2. (SBU) The different treatment of Member States under the
VWP has emerged as an especially nettlesome issue with the
enlargement of the EU. Before enlargement, only one EU
member state was not on VWP (Greece). After enlargement,
that number rises to ten. At a time when increased scrutiny
and tightening of the VWP is taking place in Washington, the
EU has stepped up its lobbying campaign to expand the program
to include all 25 EU Member States (reftel a). Expanding VWP
is consistently at the top of the EU's agenda in all
transatlantic migration dialogues, including the inaugural
session of the Policy Dialogue on Borders, Transportation and
Security (PDBTS) on 4/26 (reftel b), and increasingly is in
the media as well.
¶3. (C) The EU is under pressure to be seen making the case
for new Member States which already suffer from feelings of
second-class status. Transitional provisions invoked by the
15 Member States -- including restricted access to labor
markets for up to seven years (reftel c) and internal border
checks until at least 2007 -- have created ill will between
the old and the new members. The newcomers have also been
forced to accept the Schengen Agreement's visa black list,
which includes their immediate eastern neighbors with whom
they have traditionally enjoyed strong commercial, cultural
and political ties. In return for accepting the burdens of
Schengen, the new members fully expect to reap the benefits
-- which they see as including visa free travel to the U.S.
(Comment: In some sense, the EU is trying to salve feelings
they have created by foisting them onto the bilateral
relationship. End Comment.)
¶4. (C) While EU officials have heard our views that adding to
the current list of VWP grantees is unlikely, and some have
privately acknowledge they are swimming against the tide in
this regard, others have convinced themselves that their
rationale is persuasive and that the U.S. may in due time
expand the VWP list. Optimists in Brussels envision the
following scenario for 2007, their target year for expanding
VWP:
-- all EU Member States will be issuing biometric passports
as a result of internal EU directives (with some going beyond
the required ICAO and U.S. domestic standards by
incorporating both fingerprints and digitized photographs);
-- the new Member States will have just passed a rigorous
assessment of their border controls in order to accede to the
benefits of the Schengen agreement as internal borders
between old and new are removed. (The EC stresses that this
assessment will be more than just a pro-forma, rubber-stamp
because of all the hysteria in the Western Europe about waves
of "benefit tourists" and other hordes of migrants long
trumpeted by the media.);
-- the EU Border Agency, most likely to be based in either
Warsaw or Prague, will be fully functioning and coordinating
border security measures among the 25 Member States,
including policy, training and equipment purchases;
-- the upgraded lookout information system (SIS 2) will be
providing instant access to all Member States, including
biometrics-based data on malafide travelers and potential
terrorists;
-- the Member States will also be tied together by the new
Visa Information System where visa issuances can be instantly
verified at ports of entry;
-- some old Member States will have opened up their labor
markets to all new EU citizens; those Europeans eager to gain
higher wages will have legal options nearby, reducing the
attractiveness of the U.S. as a destination for clandestine
laborers;
-- as happened before with Spain, Portugal and Ireland, the
economic and social benefits of EU membership will be felt
most strongly after enlargement. Labor migration will
increasingly become cyclical; and
-- expatriates will increasingly move home with their nest
eggs and stimulate domestic markets, many of which have
already been growing faster than the EU norm.
------------------------
Solidarity Mechanism: Potential Transatlantic Risk
------------------------
¶5. (C) This is obviously a rosy scenario, especially
regarding how quickly the economic benefits of EU membership
would penetrate to the wider population in the new member
states. Still, under current Schengen regulations, the EU
could in theory be forced at any time by the new Member
States to invoke a "solidarity mechanism" which might
ultimately result in a visa requirement for all American
citizens traveling to the 25 members of the Schengen
Agreement. Under existing terms, any Member State which
suffers from a lack of visa waiver reciprocity can (but is
not required to) invoke the solidarity mechanism. An
automatic visa requirement would begin after 30 days for
citizens of that county traveling to all 25 Schengen members
unless a qualified majority vote determined otherwise. For
now, EC officials have been trying to discourage new Member
States from triggering the solidarity mechanism, but they are
worried about their ability to manage the process.
¶6. (C) During the PDBTS meeting, Justice and Home Affairs
Director General Jonathan Faull stated, "We urge you to think
again about ways to treat all EU countries the same way in
the foreseeable future." He acknowledged Washington-based
difficulties by noting that the expansion was not expected to
take place immediately and that the EC would not expect all
countries to be added simultaneously. Faull explained that
the EU's own certification process on new member compliance
with Schengen border standards will be done on a
country-specific basis. This certification process, which
must take place for new members to gain unhindered movement
within the union, will begin in 2006. (Note. Although
certification is done individually, for practical reasons it
is likely that the eastern European countries will be brought
in as a block. If not, a huge effort would have to be made
on "temporary" external frontiers, such as the Polish-Slovak
border, if one of these two countries were certified before
the other and granted full Schengen privileges. End note.)
¶7. (C) Faull described the internal struggle to keep "the
more worried, more excitable" new Member States from invoking
the solidarity mechanism. "We have had to fight to keep the
lid on this," he said. Regarding a potential visa
requirement for Americans traveling to the Schengen area,
Faull noted, "We don't want to do that" and added "we're not
trying to frighten" the U.S. He also briefly mentioned theEC might attempt to
modify the existing solidarity mechanism
to make reciprocity less automatic.
¶8. (C) During separate consultations on 4/26 with CA DAS
Janice Jacobs, DG JHA Head of Unit for Borders and Visas Jan
de Ceuster sketched a few more details about current thinking
to diffuse the potentially damaging nature of the solidarity
mechanism vis-a-vis the transatlantic relationship. This
would include eliminating the automatic visa imposition in
order to give the EC more room to maneuver and negotiate with
the third party. Another change would be taking the
initiative from an aggrieved state to trigger the solidarity
mechanism, and replacing it with an obligation for all states
to notify the EC about any lack of reciprocity.
Theoretically, this would relieve any aggrieved Member State
from being labeled a spoiler or troublemaker. (Greece, for
example, has chosen to ignore the lack of reciprocity with
the U.S. and has not invoked the solidarity mechanism.)
¶9. (C) De Ceuster said that JHA Commissioner Vitorino was
convinced that the agreement needed to be amended. However,
whether this will be possible given the highly charged
atmosphere remains to be seen. Already, some press reports
characterize this rethinking of the Schengen agreement as
"caving in" to the U.S.
¶10. (SBU) Jacobs outlined the procedure for adding any new
countries to the VWP, pointing out that the first criterion
was B1/B2 visa refusal rates of three percent or less. In
the post 9/11 world, EU interlocutors have a hard time
remembering that socio-economic factors loom large in visa
waiver in addition to homeland security concerns. Instead,
they continue to pin high hopes on technological advances
with passports and border controls.
------------------------
Other Countries on the Radar Scope
------------------------
¶11. (U) As of May 1, other developed countries have joined
the US in treating EU Member States differently with regard
to visas. Because the new Member States were obliged to
adopt the visa white list as of May 1, their Schengen
obligations forced them to drop visa requirements for Canada,
New Zealand, Australia and other countries on the white list.
These countries, by and large, have not reciprocated in
full. Canada retains visa requirements on all ten except
Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia. New Zealand's status is similar
to Canada, although Hungary is also on their visa waiver
list.
¶12. (U) Australia recently liberalized its travel regime for
the new EU Member States by granting "electronic visa
arrangements" (EVA) for the nine new members who do not enjoy
the "electronic travel authority" in place with the other 16.
Under the EVA, travelers submit visa requests and payments
on line. They can either be granted a visa electronically
and travel without any further bureaucratic impediment, or
they are directed to a consulate for a personal interview.
¶13. (C) According to a Canadian immigration officer in
Brussels, Canada fears that the new Member States might first
invoke the solidarity mechanism against Canada rather than
the U.S. The political ramifications would be fewer, as
would potential consular workload increases and disruptions
to tourist industries.
¶14. (C) On 5/6, New Zealand DCM told PRMOff that although New
Zealand was not considering immediate changes to its visa
waiver list, they had made a policy decision (which will not
be advertised) to extend visa waiver to all 25 EU Member
States in 2007 or as soon as the new Member States are fully
certified to meet Schengen standards and the internal
boundary between old and new is removed. Meanwhile, New
Zealand plans to expand its work holiday program (similar to
some of our J-1 visas), and it will also open an embassy in
Warsaw. Officials hope these positive signals discourage any
activation of the solidarity mechanism against New Zealand.
Furthermore, the DCM noted that there are no significant
Eastern European magnet communities in New Zealand (as is the
case in the U.S., Canada and Australia) which largely fuel
the demand for visa waiver.
------------------------
Comment
------------------------
¶15. (C) We doubt EU dissatisfaction over the VWP situation
will escalate to the worst-case scenario (visas all the way
around -- except the UK and Ireland) with regard to the U.S.
European countries are not equipped to begin issuing visas to
Americans any more than we are prepared to ramp back up visa
issuance for VWP-eligible countries. The negative impact on
U.S. tourism in Europe would also be a major disincentive.
And peer pressure from other EU countries that benefit from
VWP would prove a natural brake on those countries that might
consider invoking the solidarity clause. The EC is most
probably "buying time" with the new Member States on VWP by
selling the rationale (described in paragraph 4) that
positive changes will come in 2007.
¶16. (C) Still, the risks are there. At the Visa Working
Group on May 12, Lithuania threatened to invoke the
solidarity mechanism, and it reporedly took high level
intervention from Commissioner Vitorino to dissuade them.
Sensitivities of enlargement countries -- such as no access
to western European labor markets and border checks remaining
in place between old and new Member States -- give the EC
very little room for maneuvering internally if one or more of
the new members take up this issue with a vengeance. For
this reason Commissioner Vitorino raised VWP during his
consultations in Washington on May 12. The mention of VWP in
the Department's press statement regarding his meeting with
DepSec Armitage provoked a series of press inquiries, both to
the Commission and to USEU, regarding the outcome of
consultations on this issue. Whereas interest from the
Poles, Czechs and Hungarians has long been heard in Brussels,
new interest is being shown by the Baltics countries.
¶17. (C) The Washington dynamic and review process of current
VWP Members could also precipitate a transatlantic clash over
visas. While we doubt the EU would have the stomach to
provoke a visa spat over the new members, a decision to
remove VWP privileges from one of the EU's older members
would likely tip the balance within the Schengen group
against the U.S. In the spirit of the newly created PDTBS,
any possible changes in the visa regime should take place
only after close consultations with the EC, the EU Member
States and a well-coordinated public diplomacy campaign.
SCHNABEL