Thursday, 28 January 2016

In the first time a senior official has
publicly announced a time line for wrapping up negotiations on India’s proposed
purchase of 36 Rafale fighters, France’s ambassador to New Delhi says he
expects the price to be negotiated and agreed to within four months.

“It will be too long if it goes beyond that”,
said Ambassador Francois Richier, speaking to journalist Karan Thapar on India
Today TV on Wednesday evening.

On Monday, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and
visiting President Francois Hollande of France signed an inter-governmental
agreement (IGA), agreeing that India would purchase 36 Rafale fighters from
French company, Dassault Aviation. However, both leaders admitted that the
price of the contract continued to be a sticking point.

Richier said France was hopeful that,
eventually, India would buy more than 36 Rafales. He said that if the contract were
extended beyond 36 fighters, there would definitely be a “Make in India”
component to the deal.

It has been reported that the deal for 36
Rafales, in flyaway condition, could include an “options” clause of 50 per cent
of the contract size. In that case, New Delhi would decide whether or not to
buy an additional 18 fighters.

Aerospace industry experts unanimously
agree that very little “Make in India” would be possible with just 18 additional
Rafales. At best, they would be assembled in India from knocked down kits.

Richier also confirmed in the interview
that the Rafale offset agreement had been finalised. However he refused to confirm
whether 50 per cent offsets would be imposed on Dassault and Thales, the main
Tier-1 supplier to the Rafale programme.

In 2012, Dassault was declared the winner
of India’s global tender for 126 medium fighters. However, with price
negotiations deadlocked, Modi and Hollande agreed last April that India would
buy 36 Rafales on favourable terms. However, these price negotiations too have
not made headway.

Three segments: metallic materials and alloys; non-metallic materials; and ammunition, including smart munitions

Two private companies to be chosen for each segment

Must have Rs 500 crore turnover for last three years

Capital assets of Rs 100 crore

Should have grown at least 5% in three of last five years

Credit rating at least CRISIL/ICRA “A”

No default on loans, or declared non-performing assets

A ministry of defence (MoD) task force, under the leadership
of former Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) chief, VK Aatre, has recommended stiff
guidelines for selecting private sector companies as “strategic partners” for
building high-technology, complex systems for the military.

The report was submitted to the MoD last week, but has not
yet been publicly released. The Business
Standard has reviewed a copy of the report

The Aatre Task Force (hereafter, Task Force) has laid down
two sets of eligibility criteria for evaluating prospective strategic partners.
A “financial gate” will ensure a company has deep pockets to support its
equipment for the duration of its service life, which is often decades long;
and a “technical gate”, which requires applicants to be capable of building
systems with multiple technologies.

The financial gate will exclude all but very large
companies. A strategic partner must have a consolidated turnover of at least Rs
4,000 crore for each of the last three financial years; and capital assets of
Rs 2,000 crore. The company should have grown at minimum 5 per cent for at
least three of the preceding five years. Finally, its credit rating must be equivalent
to at least CRISIL/ICRA “A” (stable).

The Task Force was set up after a MoD expert committee,
under Dhirendra Singh, recommended that one be constituted to lay down criteria
for selecting one private “strategic partner” for each of six “strategic
segments”. These were: aircraft/helicopters, warships/submarines, armoured
vehicles, missiles, command & control systems, and critical materials.

However, the Task Force has rearranged these into two
groups. Group I has seven segments that include aircraft; helicopters; aero
engines; submarines; warships; guns and artillery; and armoured vehicles. The
Task Force recommends that just one strategic partner be chosen for each
segment.

For the three segments in Group II --- metallic material and
alloys; non-metallic materials; and ammunition, including smart munitions --- the
Task Force recommends two strategic partners for each.

The financial requirements for Group II are less stringent
than for Group I, since integration of systems is not needed for developing
materials and ammunition. The Task Force stipulates that strategic partners
must be “an engineering and/or a process technology company”. The financial
gate is Rs 500 crore turnover for each of the last three financial years; and
capital assets worth Rs 100 crore.

In addition, strategic partners in both Group I and II are
required to have “robust good governance”. They should not have defaulted on
loans, or have loans they have taken classified as non-performing assets. They
should not be under Corporate Debt Restructuring Mechanism (CDR) or Strategic
Debt Restructuring Scheme.

In rearranging the “strategic segments”, the Task Force has
recommended that separate strategic partners be appointed for aircraft and
helicopters, since these are “essentially different segments and require
different technologies.”

It also recommends that a separate strategic partner be
appointed to develop aero engines since “these are critical for any aircraft
project and India does not have adequate expertise in this field.” The report
cites the global environment, where aero engine makers like Pratt &
Whitney, General Electric, Rolls-Royce are separate from aircraft developers like
Boeing, Airbus, etc.

The Task Force recommends that “C4IRS networks” --- which govern
the realms of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, reconnaissance
and surveillance --- should not be developed through a strategic partner.
Instead, it recommends the model of “Development Partners”, presumably
referring to the “Make” procedure, under which two network systems are being
developed --- the Tactical Control System and the Battlefield Management
System.

The Task Force has recommended a gradual implementation. In
the first phase, it recommends that strategic partners be identified for just
five segments: aircraft, helicopters, submarines, armoured vehicles and
ammunition.

Norms have been laid down to ensure that only an Indian
companies can be a strategic partner. Applicants cannot have a composite foreign
direct investment (FDI) of over 49 per cent, including all types of
investments. The chief executive must be a resident Indian.

In extreme situations, like war, the government “would have
the right to acquire control over the intellectual property used and facilities
developed pursuant to the Strategic Partnership.”

The Task Force has also recommended the establishment of an
independent regulator for Strategic Partnerships, which would allow “orderly
development and regulation.”

The report notes that the chosen strategic partners must function
as systems integrators, building a large eco-system of specialized vendors and
suppliers, including from the MSMEs sector.

Defence industry experts say the notion of strategic
partners is no different from that of “Raksha Udyog Ratnas”, or RuRs, that the
Kelkar Committee had mooted in 2005. That, however, was put on the back burner
by then defence minister, AK Antony, following strong resistance from the trade
unions of defence public sector undertakings, who had apprehensions about the
entry of the private sector into defence.

Perhaps to allay these fears, the Task Force notes:
“Strategic Partners shall co-exist with the Defence Public Sector Undertakings
(‘DPSUs’), Ordnance Factories (‘OFs’) and Defence Research and Development
Organisation (‘DRDO’) and the MoD (defence ministry) shall be at a liberty
(sic) to utilize all these entities for its needs."

Tuesday, 26 January 2016

For months, it has been whispered that New
Delhi is unwilling to pay the price that French company Dassault Aviation is demanding
for the 36 Rafale fighters that Prime Minister Narendra Modi had asked for in
Paris last April. Today, Modi, and visiting French president, Francois
Hollande, both confirmed those rumours.

Addressing the media after bilateral talks
in New Delhi on Monday, Modi admitted that “financial issues” remain to be
sorted out, which would be resolved quickly.

Speaking after Modi, Hollande stated: “There
are some financial issues that will be sorted out in a couple of days, but the
memorandum has been signed.”

The French president was referring to an
Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) that was inked today. An IGA is a high-level
expression of intent that does not have the force of a contract. Several IGAs
signed by India are languishing --- such as the Indo-Russian IGA, signed in
2007, to jointly develop a multi-role transport aircraft.

There are two major hurdles to the
contract. First, New Delhi and had Paris agreed the price of the 36 Rafales
would be less than what Dassault had quoted in response to the Indian tender of
2007 for 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA). Of those 126 fighters,
the first 18 were to be supplied in “flyaway condition”, i.e. fully built.
Since 36 Rafales are now being bought in “flyaway condition”, their per-piece
price must be lower than what Dassault quoted for those 18 fighters.

In Paris last April, Modi and Hollande “agreed
to conclude an Inter-Governmental Agreement for supply of the aircraft on terms
that would be better than conveyed by Dassault Aviation as part of a separate
process underway [ie the MMRCA contract].”

Media reports put Dassault’s quote for 36
fighters as $7-9 billion dollars (Rs 47,500 – 60,000 crore). That figure would
include the cost of an initial scale of weaponry and spare parts, as well as
hangar facilities. That is an astronomic Rs 1,320 – 1,660 crore per aircraft.

“The government would find it extremely
difficult to justify that price. For the cost of a Rafale, the Indian Air Force
(IAF) could buy 4-5 Sukhoi-30MKI, or 10 Tejas light fighters”, points out
Bharat Karnad of the Centre for Policy Research, who has been critical of the
MMRCA procurement.

The second hurdle to buying 36 Rafales in
flyaway condition is the abandonment of any “Make in India” component. To bring
in an element of that prime ministerial initiative, the defence ministry would
have to strictly enforce a 50 per cent offsets clause, which would raise Dassault’s
cost further.

However, in protracted price negotiations
that followed, the defence ministry found that Dassault’s payment would amount
to more than what its commercial bid initially suggested. The United
Progressive Alliance government dragged on the negotiations. The National
Democratic Alliance government chose to abandon the MMRCA tender altogether,
and instead buy 36 Rafales over-the-counter.

The IAF insists it needs the Rafale, since
it now operates just 34 squadrons against the 45 squadrons needed for a
two-front war.

Critics of the Rafale procurement object,
first, to its price; but also point out that the IAF already operates seven
different fighters --- Sukhoi-30MKI, MiG-29, MiG-27, MiG-21, Mirage 2000,
Jaguar and Tejas LCA. Buying an eighth fighter, would require major expenditure
on depots, maintenance infrastructure and spare part stocks.

Furthermore, the multi-billion dollar MMRCA
contract was to be a springboard for galvanising India’s aerospace industry.
Buying 36 fully built Rafales would only benefit that of France. The India
contract is vital for Dassault, which provides 11,600 French jobs and earned
Euro 3.68 billion in revenue last year. But critics wonder what part of India’s
defence industry stands to benefit.

Monday, 25 January 2016

The Indian Air
Force (IAF), once an ardent backer of the proposed Indo-Russian fifth generation
fighter aircraft (FGFA), has for the last two years sharply attacked
the project. Critics say the FGFA is
on the back burner to clear the way for the French Rafale fighter.

President
Francois Hollande of France, who arrives in Delhi on Monday, has talked up the
sale of 36 Rafales to India for an estimated $9 billion (Rs 60,000 crore).

Yet the FGFA
remains alive. Last month Indian and Russian negotiators achieved a major
breakthrough, agreeing to develop the FGFA at a lowered cost of $4 billion (Rs
27,000 crore) in India. That would open the doors to building of 250 FGFAs to
replace the Sukhoi-30MKI.

Now
negotiators from Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd and Sukhoi - the development
agencies; have agreed to do this 40 per cent more cheaply, for $4 billion
spread over seven years. In the first year after signing, each side would pay
$1 billion (Rs 6,750 crore), and another $500 million (Rs 3,380 crore) in each
of the following six years.

Sukhoi is
already test-flying the FGFA's precursor, which Russia calls the PAK-FA
(Perspektivny Aviatsionny Kompleks Frontovoy Aviatsii, or "Prospective
Airborne Complex of Frontline Aviation"). The FGFA project involves
improving the PAK-FA significantly to meet the IAF's specifications. The IAF
wants some 50 improvements to the PAK-FA, including a 360-degree radar and more
powerful engines.

The proposal
for a $4 billion research and development contract (R&D contract) will now
come before a defence ministry "cost negotiation committee", and then
to the Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar.

The R&D
Contract visualises a prototype fighter flying in India within three years. In
total, 11 prototypes would be built - eight of these PAK-FAs for the Russian
Air Force, and three FGFAs for India.

Each country
has already spent $295 million (Rs 1483 crore) on a "preliminary design
contract" (PDC), Parrikar told parliament on August 4, 2015. The PDC,
which spelt out the fighter's detailed configuration, was completed in June
2013.

The R&D
contract should have followed immediately, but the IAF came out against the
FGFA. As Business Standard reported (January 21, 2014, "Russia can't
deliver on Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft: IAF") top air marshals
alleged during a high-level ministry meeting in New Delhi that the FGFA would
fall short of Indian expectations.

According to
the details of that meeting, IAF objections to the FGFA were: (a) The Russians
would not share critical design information with India; (b) The PAK-FA's
engines are inadequate, being mere upgrades of the Sukhoi-30MKI's engines; and
(c) Paying $6 billion to co-develop the FGFA would mean that "a large
percentage of IAF's capital budget will be locked up."

On January 15,
the IAF renewed its attack in a ministry meeting meant to review FGFA progress.
It said the FGFA's engine was unreliable, radar was inadequate; stealth
features were poor, India's work share being too low, and the price being too
high. In a letter to the ministry, the IAF vice-chief raised 27 different
objections to the FGFA.

Yet, in a
baffling volte-face last year, the IAF proposed the PAK-FA be bought
over-the-counter, rather than co-developing the FGFA. There was no official
response to questions over why the IAF was willing to buy a fighter it had
roundly criticised.

This
resistance to the co-development also scuppered a Russian offer to co-develop a
more powerful, fifth-generation engine for the FGFA. After roundly criticising
the PAK-FA's AL-41F1 engines - upgraded versions of the Sukhoi-30MKI's AL-31FP
engines, with 25 per cent more power - the IAF was ready to buy them in an
over-the-counter sale.

The FGFA was
once the IAF's future. Former defence minister AK Antony rebuffed the US-built
fifth generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, saying India would have the FGFA.
Indian planners viewed the FGFA as a launch pad for India's fifth generation
fighter, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).

Now, with the
Rafale's astronomical cost, a cheaper R&D Contract for a "Make in
India" FGFA could turn the spotlight back in the Indo-Russian fighter.

Revealing
that Defence Procurement Procedure of 2016 (DPP-2016) is on track to be
released in February, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar termed it a
“game-changer”.

“The DPP
has already been approved. It is in the final stages where you have to change
the appendices and annexures. Maybe next month it will be notified,” Parrikar
told a defence industry seminar in Delhi on Thursday.

The new DPP
will have overshot Parrikar’s own timeline by a year, but he ascribes that to
painstaking consensus building within the ministry.

The defence
minister also revealed he was finalising a new, flexible policy to deal with
corrupt arms vendors. “I don’t call it blacklisting any more. Probably we will
have the discussion today or tomorrow to finalise it. It is now being termed as
‘penal provisions’”, he said.

This would
replace automatic blacklisting, and arm the ministry with a range of
instruments, including financial penalties and a formula to impose them; short
term banning from defence tenders; and, in extreme cases, long-term banning.

“Punishment
has to be based on the intensity of the crime, and seriousness. You cannot
punish every crime with ten years sentence. Sometimes financial penalties are
needed”, said Parrikar.

The
minister provided new glimpses into DPP-2016, which he first outlined on
January 11. It had promised a boost to indigenous design, and to the “Make”
programme in which the government subsidises equipment development by the private
and public sector.

With only
two “Make” projects actually awarded in the decade since the “Make” procedure
was instituted, Parrikar said: “We shall be starting 8-10 projects every year
under “Make” category. These will create an eco-system in terms of vendor
development.

Owners of
micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in the audience later told Business
Standard that 8-10 projects a year were not nearly enough. Given that DPP-2016
includes a special category of “Make” projects for MSMEs, they are looking to
the ministry for many more such projects.

There was
praise however for the DPP decision to allow vendors to retain the intellectual
property (IP) they develop in a “Make” project, allowing them to translate that
into equipment for sale in India and internationally.

Parrikar
addressed criticism over DPP-2016’s dilution of the offset policy, which has so
far imposed offsets on international defence contracts worth Rs 300 crore or
more. The new policy dilutes that liability to contracts worth Rs 2,000 crore
or more.

“The Rs 300
crore limit was set up in 2012; the cost [of defence equipment] has also gone
up. Secondly, we are piling up offsets at a huge rate. And no one gives you
offsets free… You have to pay for it
up-front in the [equipment] price. And the cost can be anywhere between 12-13
per cent to 17-18 per cent,” said Parrikar.

“Secondly,
we have got a lot of offsets which have been [already] signed. $5 billion
signed, and another $6-7 billion are in the pipeline. This itself takes it to
around $11-12 billion. I think this is enough for us to absorb over the next
8-10 years. Just piling up offsets may not be required,” he continued.

Parrikar
also claimed that offsets would be made irrelevant by “Make in India”. “If my
full strategy is shifting towards producing the product in India itself,
indirectly I’m asking for almost 100 per cent offsets”, said the defence
minister.

There were
few takers for this amongst Indian entrepreneurs in the audience. As several
pointed out to Business Standard, well-structured offsets could benefit both
the foreign vendor and Indian industry, which offers high quality, low-cost
manufacture that would lower the vendors’ costs. Furthermore, offsets
liabilities are piling up mainly because the defence ministry has performed
woefully in overseeing and enforcing the offset programme. Finally, even if a
high percentage of a foreign weapon system were to be built in India, offsets
could be discharged through technology transfer, skills development, and
carrying out research & development in India.

DPP-2016
could see changes, with Parrikar repeatedly soliciting suggestions from the
environment. “No document can be perfect, and [the new DPP] is also not static.
We are willing to take into consideration different viewpoints later, even
after it is promulgated,” he promised.

Tuesday, 19 January 2016

Is Pakistan
actually cracking down on the perpetrators of the January 2 attack on the
Indian Air Force base in Pathankot? We can only guess what that country’s
policymakers really intend, but here is what is known: Islamabad has
constituted a multi-agency “joint investigation team” to probe the attack,
including military intelligence and ISI officers. It has rounded up some mid-ranking
members of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), the radical Islamist group that New
Delhi believes is behind the attack. A central minister in Islamabad has said
JeM chief, Masood Azhar, is in “protective custody” since he cannot be arrested
without hard evidence of wrongdoing. Meanwhile, other branches of the Pakistan
government have denied that Azhar is in custody.

Almost
everyone in India who can spell P-a-k-i-s-t-a-n has already pointed out that
previous “crackdowns” on India-focused jihadis
were mere theatre. It is also well known that this subterfuge comes easily to
both Pakistan’s policymaking elements --- the elected government in Islamabad;
and the all-powerful army headquarters in Rawalpindi. But it is still worth carefully
considering the question: is anything different this time?

The Indian
government apparently thinks so, going by the substance and tone of recent
statements from New Delhi’s foreign policy and security establishment. The woeful
history of Indo-Pakistan engagement is replete with instances where talks have
been cancelled or postponed. But never has a scheduled meeting been postponed
with such cordiality, especially on the heels of a terror attack. In a phone
call the day before they were to meet, both foreign secretaries amicably agreed
on a token postponement. Talks will resume in what India’s foreign ministry
spokesman termed “the very near future”. Underlining the bonhomie in thick
pencil, the spokesperson declared that the postponement was arranged in “a
mutually acceptable manner”.

This
foreign ministry cordiality was in line with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s approach,
who blamed the Pathankot attack on “enemies of humanity who can’t see India
progress”. His counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, responded in kind, with his foreign
ministry offering to join hands with India “to completely eradicate the menace
of terrorism afflicting our region.”

Given these
atmospherics, it is worth wondering whether some rarified layer of the Indian
government has an assurance from Pakistan’s top power brokers that action will
be taken against the JeM, but gradually and without fanfare? We simply do not
know, and will not know until later. Even so, with the government continuing
the dialogue with only a token display of pique at the Pathankot attack, it seems
as if Messrs Modi and Doval know something that we do not.

On the
other hand Mr Modi may have no explicit assurances from Islamabad and
Rawalpindi about restraining India-directed jihad,
but he believes something is fundamentally changing in Pakistan; and that a
tipping point has been reached. Given Pakistan’s long record of duplicity, India’s
government is vulnerable to charges of naivety and gullibility. But here is the
catch: when (and if) Pakistan starts putting the squeeze on India-directed groups,
this cannot be accompanied by a public promise to New Delhi. Whatever Islamabad
says would be in private.

Indian
public anger restrains New Delhi from talking peace with Islamabad after a
terrorist attack, unless Pakistan appears to be acting against those
responsible. At the same time, Pakistani self-esteem prevents its government from
acting against extremists under Indian pressure, even if there were consensus in
that country that this was essential. For that reason, were Mr Modi to believe
that Islamabad and Rawalpindi are willing to defang groups like the JeM now,
and perhaps later the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), he would have to give Pakistan
time and space to shield it from allegations of acting under Indian pressure.

Expecting
the Pakistani security megacorp to backtrack from 68 years of sub-conventional military
options against India is, admittedly, a long shot. Even so, our strategy should
not assume an unchanging world. Like many others, Pakistan is concerned over the
changing face of political Islam, with Frankenstein’s monsters like the Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) and the Islamic State challenging the Pakistan Army. Numerous
Indian experts on Pakistan (and every Indian believes she is one) had
confidently predicted that Rawalpindi would never crack down on the TTP, or launch
a military offensive in North Waziristan. But the ideological swings and
shifting allegiances of international jihad, forced Pakistan to confront one
set of its own monsters.

True,
Pakistan has so far cracked down only on the bad terrorists, the rebellious TTP.
For now, the good terrorists --- including the JeM and LeT--- remain loyal to Rawalpindi and offer no
provocation that justifies winding them up. But this is not a constant. In 2003
the JeM --- a perfect Pakistan Army poodle for years --- turned on its master, staging
at least three assassination bids on General Pervez Musharraf. Rawalpindi knows
well how growing ideological and operational linkages between the good and the
bad terrorists have the potential to subvert the army’s control over the
former.

It is bad
strategy for India to assume an unchanging world, even if the prospects of
change are tenuous. Instead of waiting for change to happen within Pakistan,
New Delhi should adopt a pro-active strategy --- catalysing, facilitating and
making room for that change. This does not imply looking at Pakistan through
rose-tinted glasses, or condoning terrorist strikes by so-called “non-state
actors” in the hope that Islamabad will take them down. What this strategy does
involve is strengthening our intelligence and security networks so that
terrorists are denied operational success of the kind they obtained in
Pathankot; developing retaliatory capability for pin-point strikes on jihadi
targets inside Pakistan; diplomatically managing the potential for escalation;
and, meanwhile, keeping a tight lid on political rhetoric and name-calling, so
that Rawalpindi and Islamabad can crack down on jihadi groups without appearing
to be acting at India’s behest.

For this, Mr
Modi must be convinced that Pakistan is moving, even if cautiously, towards restraining
and eventually shutting down the factories of jihad. It may well turn out that Pakistan’s internal incoherence
and weakness prevents it from doing what it badly needs to in its own interest.
Yet, in deliberately creating the space for such a turnaround in Pakistan, New
Delhi would actually have a plan instead of what has passed for strategy over
the last one-and-a-half decades --- shrill name-calling, public demands for
action that will always remain unmet; and repeated cancellations of talks
before starting the sorry circle yet again.

A former
Congress minister has publicly advocated dealing with Pakistan by “building a
high wall all along the border. There is an Indian security plan to cover gaps
in the border fence with “laser walls.” The fact, as our planners probably
know, is that physical barriers cannot keep India and Pakistan apart. The two
countries will have to accommodate each other, discovering common interest to
bridge the chasms that divide them.

Since 1958, when Tibetan-inhabited areas
erupted in armed revolt against Chinese rule, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
has propagated the convenient myth that unrest in Tibet is the handiwork of “a
small number of troublemakers”, orchestrated by the “Dalai clique” in India.

Now, the indefinite extension of a vast
Chinese surveillance programme across all 5,000 villages in the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR) makes it plain that the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) regards every Tibetan as suspect.

The intrusive surveillance grid is detailed
in a new Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, “China: No End to Tibet Surveillance
Program”, released on Monday. Imposed in 2011 for a three-year period, the
surveillance is set to become permanent.

The report describes an “Orwellian
campaign” intended to guard against any recurrence of the mass protests that
engulfed TAR in 2008, after originating in the Tibetan-inhabited areas in the
Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan.

The 2008 protests, which embarrassed China
in the year of the Beijing Olympics, marked the 50th anniversary of
the 1958 Tibetan uprising in Amdo and Kham regions --- parts of the Tibetan
plateau, now merged into Chinese provinces.

The surveillance programme, which consumed
a quarter of the regional government’s budget, involved 21,000 communist cadres
fanning out in groups of four or more to live in each of Tibet’s 5,000
villages. The report says their role was initially described as improving
conditions in the villages, but the CCP chief in TAR admitted in 2011 that “their
primary requirement was to turn each village into ‘a fortress’ in ‘the struggle
against separatism.’”

In typically paternalistic CCP rhetoric,
the surveillance campaign was entitled “Benefit the Masses”. Its official
slogan was: “all villages become fortresses, and everyone is a watchman”. The
party cadres have been “re-educating” the Tibetan villagers with programmes
like “Feeling the Party’s Kindness”.

According to the report, the intrusive
surveillance of Tibetans included “questioning them about their political and
religious views, subjecting thousands to political indoctrination, establishing
partisan security units to monitor behavior, and collecting information that
could lead to detention or other punishment. Official reports describe the teams
pressuring villagers to publicly show support for the ruling Communist Party
and to oppose the Dalai Lama.”

“The Chinese government’s decision to
extend its Tibet surveillance program indefinitely is nothing less than a
continuous human rights violation,” said Sophie Richardson, China director of
HRW. “The new normal is one of permanent surveillance of Tibetans.”

The “village-based cadre teams” incorporate
CCP officials, government officers and security officials from the People’s
Armed Police. Each team includes at least one Tibetan as translator. A team’s
tour of duty in a particular village is about one year.

“Before 2011, there were no qualified party
officials permanently stationed below township level. Intensive security
measures were used in trouble spots, especially places and monasteries with a
political record of opposition to CCP rule. However, the entire population was
not earlier targeted at this level”, says India-based Tibet analyst, Matthew
Akester.