[162] In the present
section, our focus turns to some social processes that are likely to
occur within small crews. We shall consider the specific topics of
leadership, cohesiveness, conformity, group performance, and group
change over time.

Leadership

Leadership is a social influence process.
According to Hollander (1978), in the course of this process, leaders
organize, direct, and coordinate followers. They also exert influence
to (1 ) help the group maintain harmony and stability, (2) interpret
the conditions that confront it, (3) set goals, and (4) meet
challenges posed from without. The leader's right to exert this
influence may be conferred through appointment by a higher authority,
or by the group itself.

Although one group member may be appointed or
elected leader and assigned distinguishing tokens of status and rank,
the leader/follower distinction is oftentimes blurred (Hollander,
1978). First, leadership is a relational concept, with the result
that the person who is leader from one perspective is a follower from
another perspective. In any multilevel organizational hierarchy, most
people will fill both leader and follower roles. Second, leadership
involves a two-way influence process. Although the focus of
discussions of leadership is likely to be on the leader's influence
over his or her followers, the followers influence leaders in return.
Leaders, for example, need followers' inputs to reach informed
decisions. The appointed leader who fails to respond to followers'
influence attempts may find it increasingly difficult to lead, and
the nonresponsive elected leader may be booted out of office.
Finally, despite the fact that there is an identifiable leader,
certain leadership functions may be dispersed among various group
members. As we shall [163] see, one person may
organize and direct the group while another attempts to satisfy the
group members' human needs.

The course and outcome of the leadership
process depends on three general factors (Hollander, 1978). The first
is the characteristics of the leaders themselves, including
legitimacy, ability, experience, motivation, interests, expectations,
and so forth. The second is the characteristics of the followers,
again including such considerations as ability, motivation,
interests, and expectations. The third is the characteristics of the
situation, including the nature of the physical and social setting,
the available physical and social resources, and the structure of the
group's task. Prescriptions for good leadership often dwell upon the
selection and training of leaders. However, such prescriptions could
also involve the selection and training of followers, and the
structuring of situations and tasks.

Heavy demands will be placed upon people
performing leadership functions in space-capsule microsocieties.
These demands are expected to become increasingly burdensome as the
mission continues.

First there will be the stringent technical
requirements associated with operating safely in a hostile
environment. Although there will be advance preparation and some
degree of communication with resource people at mission control,
supplies will steadily decrease and as distance increases it will
become increasingly difficult to maintain good communications with
Earth. To a great extent, problems will have to be solved using the
highly limited resources available in the closed environment of the
space capsule.

Second, the demands on leaders' interpersonal
skills are likely to be formidable. As noted earlier, it has been
hypothesized that isolation, confinement, risk, and other conditions
associated with spaceflight are conducive to deteriorating
interpersonal relationships (George Washington University, 1974).
Because of this possibility, people in leadership roles will have to
be shrewd judges of human nature and display superior interpersonal
skills.

A failure to fulfill the requirements of
leadership can lead to severe penalties for an isolated and confined
group. In the 1959-1960 fallout-shelter studies, a deliberately
passive role on the part of the shelter commander was credited with a
general lowering of standards of behavior and a loss of interest in
matters of civil defense (Strope [164] et al., 1960,
1961). The Georgia fallout-shelter studies also revealed that a
failure in management led to increased friction and decreased morale
(Hammes et al., 1965; Hammes and Osborne,1965; Hammes and Watson,
1965). Weak or incompetent leadership has spelled disaster for a
number of polar expeditions (Leonov and Lebedev, 1975). Competent
leaders, on the other hand, may serve as models whose enthusiasm and
even temper are emulated by the crew. Good leaders can prevent
factionalism and ease group members through troubled
relationships.

Task and socioemotional leadership
activities- Repeatedly, distinctions
have been made between task activities (also known as initiation of
structure and concern for production) that help the group get the job
done or move toward its goals, and socioemotional activities (also
known as showing consideration and concern for people) that promote
harmonious relations within the group. Group functioning requires
people who take the initiative in each of these areas. Socioemotional
leadership is at least as important as task leadership, and perhaps
more so, judging by some of the research.

It is not clear how often the same individual
can satisfactorily fill both task and socioemotional leadership
roles. The pioneering research by Bales and his associates (Bales,
1950, 1953, 1958, 1970) found that some group members engaged in more
task and socioemotional activities than others, and as a result were
offered leadership status. But it was also found that the person who
engaged in the most task activities was not the same person who
performed the most socioemotional activities. There were, in effect,
two leaders: the task leader, who was rated as having the best ideas,
offering the most guidance, and being most influential in forming the
group's opinions; and the socioemotional leader, who was the best
liked. The usual explanation for the emergence of the second leader
is that a task leader's sense of purpose gives rise to activities
(unpopular orders, sharp criticism, etc.) that hurt group members'
feelings. The second leader emerges to smooth things over and restore
harmony to the group.

However, it should be noted that the initial
studies involved emergent leadership. That is, unacquainted
individuals joined in a discussion, and social structure emerged as
interaction progressed. The task leader took a role of power and
influence, and it may have been his presumptuousness that caused the
internal conflicts. According to Burke (1972), when a leader is
designated by a higher authority and is hence perceived as
"legitimate," group members are [165] more accepting of
heavy-handed task acts and the need for the second leader diminishes.
Certainly, Thor Heyerdahl and many of the other expeditionary leaders
discussed by Leonov and Lebedev (1975) appear to have had heroic
capacities to perform both task and socioemotional leadership roles.
Yet, the evidence reviewed by Katz and Kahn (1978) suggests that only
under rare conditions are task and socioemotional leadership roles
best filled by the same individual.

Researchers, planners, and managers are thus
confronted with the problem of understanding the optimal distribution
of leadership behaviors within the crew. Specifically, to what extent
should various task and socioemotional leadership behaviors be
concentrated in the hands of a specific leader, rather than
distributed across two or more people within the crew? Of particular
interest in light of Burke's arguments is determining the extent to
which a given crewmember should attempt to manage both task and
socioemotional leadership roles. To begin with, Leonov and Lebedev's
and Katz and Kahn's conclusions need to be reconciled. One
possibility, suggested largely by Burke's research, is that
structural factors, or possibly certain kinds of leader-follower
compatibilities, make it possible for people such as Thor Heyerdahl
to perform both roles. Another, definitely counterintuitive but
intriguing possibility is that isolation, confinement, and risk make
it relatively easy for one individual to perform both task and
socioemotional leadership roles. Yet another alternative is that
under conditions of isolation, confinement, and risk, followers have
a strong defensive need to perceive their leaders as highly competent
on both task and socioemotional dimensions. Evaluation of these
alternatives awaits the results of further research.

Personality, situation, and
leadership- A prevalent theme is that
certain personality traits can be identified with effective
leadership. Summarizing the results of scores of studies, Mann (1959)
reported that intelligence, adjustment, and extroversion are
moderately related to leadership, whereas dominance, masculinity, and
interpersonal sensitivity are somewhat less closely related.
Observations of Sealab II led Radloff and Helmreich (1968) to suggest
that people under stress in isolation and confinement may not need a
young, action-oriented leader as much as a mature individual who
inspires identification and provides reassurance. Citing work by
Misumi and Shirakashi (1966) and Cooper (1966), Kubis (1972, p. 55)
derived the following composite picture of the effective spacecrew
leader:

[166] . . . he elicits
the best from his men . . . is himself personally competent . . .
is interested primarily in results and achievement . . . but is
always aware of the normal human needs of the group and attempts
to provide opportunity for their satisfaction . .

A person who is a highly competent leader
under one set of conditions may prove to be a marginal or incompetent
leader under another set of conditions; thus, both personality
variables and situational variables influence quality of leadership
(Fiedler, 1967, 1971, 1978; Hollander, 1978; Katz and Kahn, 1978;
Mann, 1959). Perhaps the most promising theory which simultaneously
considers personality and situational factors is Fiedler's (1967,
1971, 1978) contingency theory of leadership. Concerned with
predicting performance rather than satisfaction or morale, the theory
has been tested successfully in many military and civilian settings,
and deserves close attention from space mission planners. The
independent variables are situational favorableness and leadership
style, and the dependent variable is leadership effectiveness.

Situational favorableness refers to the
structural and social climate variables which make a group easy (high
favorableness) or difficult (low favorableness) to lead. These
include (1) the extent to which the leader is accepted and respected
by the group, (2) the extent to which the group's goals are clear and
structured, and (3) the extent to which the leader has been invested
with the power to reward and punish group members.

Leadership style refers to the leader's
orientation toward tasks and people. This can be measured by asking
the leader to evaluate the least preferred co-worker (LPC) with whom
he or she has ever worked. High scorers, who tend to give favorable
ratings to the least preferred co-worker, are relatively
socioemotional in outlook. Low scorers, that is, people who assign
harsh ratings to their least preferred co-workers, have more of a
no-nonsense, task orientation. In Fiedler's theory, high scorers and
low scorers are referred to as high LPC leaders and low LPC leaders,
respectively. Leadership effectiveness, the dependent variable, can
be measured by any objective measure of task accomplishment.

According to contingency theory, different
degrees of situational favorableness require different leadership
styles. Under conditions of very high or very low situational
favorableness, the [167] task-oriented, low LPC leader is likely to prove most
effective. As Jacobs (1971) so aptly puts it, the leader can afford
to be firm when accepted by the group, pursuing clear goals, and
invested with power to reward and punish. He or she must be firm when
rejected by the group, grappling with ambiguous goals, and lacking
the power to reward or punish. Under conditions of intermediate
situational favorableness, the interpersonal sensitivity of the high
LPC leader is likely to be of use in working through the moderately
troubled relations within the group, thereby freeing the group to
continue toward its goal.

Careful planning may create and maintain a
high degree of situational favorableness on short-term missions, but
such conditions may be difficult to sustain on prolonged flights. For
example, it may be relatively easy to link the on-board leader's
evaluation of crewmembers to the latter's continuation and
advancement within the space program. However, as noted in chapter
VIII, as the link with Earth becomes tenuous, traditional bribes and
threats may lose force. Thus, we hypothesize that whereas task
oriented, low LPC leaders may do best on carefully planned short
flights, socioemotionally oriented, high LPC leaders may have an edge
on extended flights.

Contingency theory posits that leadership
style is fairly firmly ingrained. This implies that whereas leaders
may be selected for missions of varying degrees of situational
favorableness, training programs intended to change their styles
could be ineffective. However, Fiedler and his associates have
developed a self-instructional program called LEADER MATCH, which
helps leaders self-select and gain control over such variables as
those which determine situational favorableness (Fiedler, Chemers,
and Mahar, 1976; Fiedler, 1978). This program, as it stands, or with
some modifications, may prove useful for space-mission leader
preparation.

From Fiedler's contingency theory of
leadership flow many lines for future research. Efforts must extend
beyond assessing the situational favorableness of a given mission and
then choosing the leader with the most promising style. First, it is
necessary to understand fluctuations in situational favorableness
over time. Second, procedures must be developed to help spacecrew
leaders learn to identify shifts in situational favorableness, and
change their behavior accordingly.

Autocratic and participative
procedures- Leaders who make decisions
without soliciting subordinates' inputs are said to use
[168]
autocratic procedures. Leaders who solicit subordinates' inputs are
said to use participative procedures. These latter procedures include
(1) consultive decision making in which the leader seeks opinions of
informal leaders and of rank and file, (2) representative
democracies, and (3) full democracies.

Early "leadership climate" research undertaken
on the eve of World War I I suggested many advantages to the
democratic approach (Lewin, Lippitt, and White, 1939). Most reviewers
seem to believe that modal group members can offer very useful
information, and conclude that, more often than not, the quality of a
decision will be enhanced by membership participation ( Kleinhans and
Taylor, 1976; Steiner, 1972, 1976). In addition, it has been found
that organizational members are likely to feel a more personal
commitment to decisions they have helped make than to decisions
imposed from above (Coch and French, 1948; Hollander, 1978). However,
the overall picture contains many complexities, and the optimum point
along the autocratic-democratic continuum depends upon such variables
as the personalities of group members, the distribution of knowledge
and skills within the group, the group's size and organization, and
the degree of structure of the problem (Hollander, 1978; Vroom, 1976;
Vroom and Yetton, 1976).

Mission managers may find it neither necessary
nor desirable to establish procedures such that all decisions can be
traced to one point on the autocratic-democratic continuum. For
example, the Russians have reported success with procedures whereby
mission decisions were made by the commander and crew issues were
decided by democratic votes (Leonov and Lebedev, 1975).

An analysis of situations, personnel, and
likely scenarios would seem essential for maximizing the advantages
and minimizing the disadvantages associated with autocratic and
democratic decision making procedures. Perhaps a useful starting
point for such research is the Vroom-Yetton normative model of
participative decision making (Vroom, 1976, Vroom and Yetton, 1976).
In essence, this model is applied by first answering seven questions
(regarding such issues as the availability of information, the degree
of conflict among subordinates, and the need for subordinate
acceptance of decisions). On the basis of the pattern of answers, one
of five decision-making procedures is prescribed.

In summary, future research on small-crew
leadership should include an expanded range of leadership
alternatives and options. [169] Particularly
pressing problems include identifying the optimal distribution of
task and socioemotional activities, and achieving a good fit between
structural characteristics and leader characteristics. In addition,
we need to know more about the consequences of various autocratic and
participative decision-making procedures under conditions of
isolation, confinement, and risk.

Cohesiveness

Cohesiveness refers to the strength,
solidarity, or unity of a group. It is roughly synonymous to elan or
morale. Although originally intended to be a unitary construct,
cohesiveness sometimes designates a group with energy and a strong
sense of purpose, and other times a group whose members have a strong
sense of liking for and involvement with one another and who express
positive attitudes about the group. Whereas drive and amiability
often covary, it is possible for a group to be characterized by one
of these attributes but not by the other (Lott and Lott,1965).

In some cases, adverse conditions and
suffering seem to increase cohesiveness (Aronson and Mills, 1959;
Gerard and Mathewson, 1966). In effect, undergoing a trying
initiation encourages people to rationalize the discomfort by telling
themselves that membership in the group is extremely desirable.
However, most discussions focus on the rewards or satisfactions of
group membership as the major cause of cohesiveness. Cartwright
(1968), for example, has defined cohesiveness as the sum of the
satisfactions which membership accords all of the members of the
group. Satisfaction is likely to be high to the extent that the group
(1) engages in activities that the members find intrinsically
satisfying, (2) pursues goals of importance to the members, (3)
provides social support and emotional gratifications, and (4) serves
ulterior motives. Thus, a crew might be expected to be cohesive when
the crewmembers (1) enjoy flight and adventure, (2) subscribe to the
mission's overall goals, (3) encourage each other, and (4) help
fulfill each others' needs in areas tangential to or unrelated to the
mission.

The establishment and manipulation of group
goals is one commonly prescribed way to promote cohesiveness (Sherif
and Sherif, 1969). Goals refer to objectives or end states which have
motivational properties in that they instigate, strengthen, and
impart direction to behavior. Group goals refer to objectives or end
states which are endorsed or found compelling by the different people
who comprise the group. Group goals encourage people to coordinate
their [170] activities for mutual gain, and hence are likely to
affect the tone of interpersonal relations within the group. The
isolation and confinement literature, for example, suggests that
individuals may be able to suppress their differences in the interest
of group goals. In Sealab II, some aquanauts commented that teammates
who didn't always see eye to eye were able to get along for the
period of the mission (Radloff and Helmreich, 1968). In a field
experiment involving preadolescents who were camping in the
wilderness, Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961) found that
incompatible or separatist goals promoted prejudice and open
conflict, whereas goals that were of importance to all of the members
of the group promoted amiability and unity.

First, mission planners and managers should
take steps to help spacecrews identify group goals. Such goals should
be superordinate in the sense that they override individual or
subgroup goals which, if pursued, might encourage behavior that is
detrimental to the overall mission. Crewmembers must feel personally
committed to these goals; it will not suffice to simply impose them
from above. Additionally, these superordinate goals must require a
high degree of cooperative activity (Sherif and Sherif, 1969).

Second, steps should be taken to ensure that
group goals are clear and well understood. Discussing Antarctic
groups, Natani and Shurley (1974) have noted that scientists are
given a brief introduction to the "big picture" at an orientation
conference, but that their goals remain basically individualistic.
Navy personnel are given only a minimal understanding of their
science support role, with the result that they find it difficult to
become firmly committed to the overall mission. Under such
conditions, unwelcome forms of socioemotional behavior are likely to
take precedence over welcome forms of task behavior.

Third, a means must be found to maintain
astronauts' interest in distant goals over prolonged periods of time.
It may thus be desirable to establish a number of interim goals which
can be pursued and savored. Perhaps this has been best expressed by
Sells and Gunderson (1972, p. 82):

...To maintain group integrity and
motivation of group members, the void between initiation of a
mission and final attainment of its goals must be filled with
richly detailed programs of activities that permit achievement of
meaningful interim goals. It is also important that both the
[171]
ultimate and intermediate goals be expressed in a manner that
permits assessment of success in such a way that it is compatible
with supervisory controls, available rewards, and individual
career growth...

Another way to promote cohesiveness would be
to help minimize interpersonal conflicts. Presumably, initial social
compatibility (as discussed earlier in this chapter) will be a major
factor. Both task and socioemotional training can also be expected to
help minimize or contain interpersonal conflicts. People who do not
know what to expect and do not know how to do their jobs are likely
to frustrate and annoy one another. In addition, people who are
unskilled may respond to a poor overall level of performance by
acting toward one another in negative ways (Shurley et al., 1977).
Both Kubis (1972) and Berry (1973a) have advocated direct training in
human relations. Such training may involve the entire crew, or, if
this is impossible, crewmembers who are in managerial roles or whose
assignment is to work with other people. Training in interpersonal
relations was considered valuable by subjects in the Douglas
simulation study (George Washington University, 1974).

To devise adequate training programs, more
must be learned about the on-board diagnosis and management of
interpersonal frictions and conflicts. Such research would be aimed
at uncovering techniques that astronauts might use to identify and
combat the underlying sources of interpersonal stress. It might
address ways of recognizing and managing one's own rising tensions
and tensions in other people. Satisfactory experiential training in
interpersonal relations may require an authentic setting
characterized by isolation, confinement, and stress.

Another technique for increasing spacecrew
solidarity is derived from manning theory as developed by Barker
(1968) and Wicker (1979). An implication of this theory is that the
size of a spacecrew relative to the amount of work that needs to be
done will affect the level of energy that the crew will apply to the
task, the favorability of the attitudes that crewmembers maintain
toward one another, and the overall level of involvement of the
crewmembers in the group.

Adequate staffing occurs when there is a good
match between the number of people available, on the one hand, and
the situation's technical and social demands, on the other. Under
conditions of adequate staffing, people are neither rushed nor are
their abilities [172] allowed to languish. The group's interests and
energies cover the immediate demands, but do not extend much beyond
those demands.

Understaffing occurs when the number of people
available is less than typically hoped for or expected, given the
task demands. Wicker (1979) hypothesized that understaffing
encourages people to (1) work close to the limits of their abilities
and skills; (2) assume difficult, important, and varied tasks; (3)
feel important, responsible, and versatile; (4) monitor and improve
each others' performance; (5) display tolerance of the other people's
occasional lapses; and (6) ignore personal characteristics (such as
race, sex, and personality) that are irrelevant to performance. Thus,
members of a "short" or understaffed spacecrew may feel a bit harried
and pressured, but they may also work hard, feel good about
themselves, and be supportive of one another.

Overstaffing occurs when the number of people
available is greater than typically hoped for or expected, given the
situations' demands. Wicker (1979) hypothesized that overstaffing (1)
encourages perfunctory, lackadaisical performances; (2) fosters a
high degree of specialization accompanied by a jealous guarding of
all activities which fall within the associated narrow domain; (3)
undermines one's sense of self-esteem; (4) encourages little concern
of the crew for each others' progress; (5) develops cynical attitudes
of the crew toward one another; and (6) encourages the crew to dwell
upon race, sex, personality characteristics, and other
task-irrelevant individual differences. Working in an overstaffed
setting may be "easy time," but it may also be psychologically and
socially unhealthy.

The theory of manning grew from studies of
people engaging in voluntary activities (e.g., extracurricular school
activities and church affairs) and in service professions, and most
of its important tenets are yet to be tested in varied organizational
settings. Nonetheless, this theory raises the interesting possibility
that, subject to the limitations imposed by safety requirements,
spreading a spacecrew just a little bit "thin" may enhance the crew's
functioning. It must be emphasized, however, that manning theory
needs to be evaluated m isolated and confined settings, that optimal
understaffing is a question of degree, and that understaffing might
have disastrous consequences when a group must continue its
activities uninterrupted over a prolonged period of time.

[173] Some ambiguity
surrounds the relationship between drive and amiability, on the one
hand, and actual performance, on the other. Cohesive groups often are
efficient and effective (Cartwright, 1968; Lott and Lott, 1965; Shaw,
1976). However, this does not necessarily mean that enhancing
cohesiveness improves performance. First, successful performance can
be a cause, rather than an effect, of cohesiveness. This is most
clearly shown in Bakeman and Helmreich's (1975) study of divers
aboard Tektite. It was found that whereas measures of cohesiveness
obtained early in the mission were unrelated to measures of
performance obtained later in the mission, measures of performance
early in the mission were predictive of subsequent crew cohesiveness.
Second, group standards or norms mediate the relationship between
cohesiveness and performance. If norms support performance-related
activities, then cohesiveness is likely to improve performance. If,
on the other hand, norms support limited output or engagement in
irrelevant tasks, cohesiveness may undermine performance (Berkowitz,
1954).

In summary, cohesiveness is typically viewed
as a function of the rewards and satisfactions of group membership.
Major research and planning issues are associated with promoting a
high degree of cohesiveness within tomorrow's spacecrews.

Compliance, Conformity, and
Independence

A certain amount of social activity aimed at
ensuring adherence to group norms is generally regarded as
beneficial, because it promotes coordination of efforts and a sharing
of values within the group. However, such influence processes have
certain potentially adverse effects which may become pronounced under
conditions of isolation and confinement. Strong social pressures can
inhibit the flow of creative ideas, particularly in a cohesive group.
Individuals may fear that unorthodox suggestions will incur the
leader's displeasure, undermine morale, or lead to rejection. This
fear is justified, for it has long been known that a person who
violates group norms is likely to trigger a specific series of events
(Schachter, 1951). The initial reaction is an increase in
communications intended to bring that person back into line. If these
attempts are unsuccessful, communication ceases and the deviant is
ignored. Under normal conditions, such ostracism may simply result in
the deviant leaving the group, but under conditions of isolation and
confinement, the deviant cannot leave the group.

[174] Prolonged rejection
may lead to the pathological "long eye" syndrome (Haggard, 1964;
Rohrer, 1961). Noted primarily in polar camps, this syndrome may
involve hallucinations, tears, loss of appetite, silence,
suspiciousness, and sloth. This is not only extremely punishing to
the rejected individual, but it penalizes the group by robbing it of
the services of one of its members. This can be a major problem in
small crews that begin the mission only minimally staffed. Rohrer
(1961) documented at least 10 cases of "long eye" in the Antarctic.
Fortunately, the effects of "long eye" are temporary and vanish
quickly when the individual is reaccepted by the group. Further
research is required to better understand the causes and consequences
of ostracism under conditions of prolonged isolation and confinement.
It is essential to find ways to soften the blow of social rejection
without entirely eliminating it as a mechanism of social control.
Finally, it is important to find ways to reintegrate the deviant into
the crew once the episode is over.

Strong conformity pressures may reflect
attempts to maintain group harmony. Such harmony may be purchased at
the expense of performance. Janis has coined the term "groupthink" to
refer to conditions under which efforts to maintain group harmony
undermine critical thought and lead to poor decisions
(Janis,1971,1974; Janis and Mann, 1977). Spacecrews may be quite
vulnerable, since groupthink becomes likely when the group is
concerned with maintaining amiability, when there is little or no
communication with people outside of the group, and when the group is
confronted with a threatening situation. Among the most important
characteristics of groupthink are (1) false optimism and lack of
caution, (2) direct pressures on nonconformers, (3) a fear of
disapproval for expressing new alternatives, (4) an illusion of
unanimity, (5) the emergence of "mind guards" who protect the leader
from criticism, and (6) efforts to deny or rationalize all
ill-omens.

Safeguards against groupthink include
soliciting external inputs during the decision-making process,
appointing a devil's advocate to challenge majority views, and
reconsidering decisions before action is taken. It is not clear that
all of these safeguards are effective; for example, Bennis (1976)
argues that a devil's advocate is ignored because the group
recognizes that he or she is merely playing a social role. Those
safeguards which are effective under "normal" conditions may or may
not be workable under conditions of isolation and confinement.
Specifically, some of the remedies proposed for groupthink presuppose
a social system with a relatively permeable [175] boundary. More
research is needed on the emergence and control of groupthink under
conditions of isolation and confinement.

Special problems arise in emergency situations
in which leaders are likely to exert authority to gain prompt
acceptance of a course of action. Ideally, leaders would invariably
make appropriate decisions which would then be gracefully accepted
and implemented by the crew. Actually, leaders may make faulty
decisions because they may lack certain information or fail to
process information correctly. There are cases on record when
aviation accidents or near accidents could have been averted if
crewmembers had forcefully drawn the pilot's attention to unnoticed
conditions or had openly questioned the pilot's instructions
(Yanowitch, 1977; Murphy, 1980). That is, correctable pilot errors
have gone uncorrected because of unquestioning attitudes, a lack of
assertiveness, or deficient communication skills.

Certainly, we may expect selection and
training procedures to yield leaders who have a higher degree of
competence than the average member of the crew. Furthermore, we do
not expect a leader's performance to be enhanced if he or she is
constantly bombarded with wrong-headed suggestions. However, even as
a leader's inability to induce compliance can be regarded as a
failure in leadership, so can an inability to attend to relevant
subordinate input. It is necessary to find ways to help crewmembers
identify the conditions under which they should speak up, and to
devise training procedures to ensure that they have sufficient
assertiveness to do so. Moreover, it is necessary to find ways to
help leaders respond appropriately to unsolicited follower inputs. In
summary, it is necessary to identify and achieve a healthy balance
between crewmembers' acceptance of social influence and a willingness
to engage in appropriate independent action.

Group Performance

The determinants of group performance are many
and complex. Some degree of order and coherence is imposed by the
Hackman and Morris (1975, 1978) process model of group performance.
The model's name is derived from its emphasis on the processes that
occur as group members interact with one another.

According to the model, three factors or sets
of variables affect group performance. The first factor is the
knowledge and skills which group members are able to bring to bear.
The second factor is the [176] amount of energy or
effort that the group members apply. The third factor is the
performance strategies or procedures that the group members follow
while addressing their tasks. To the extent that conditions foster
the application of skill and effort, and to the extent that groups
choose appropriate performance strategies, the group will prove to be
efficient and effective. To the extent that the application of skill
or effort is dissuaded, and to the extent that groups follow
inappropriate performance strategies, poor performance will
result.

Hackman and Morris identify three levels of
inputs which directly affect group processes and indirectly affect
performance outcomes. Individual-level inputs include such variables
as the group members' skills, attitudes, and personality
characteristics. Grouplevel inputs include such variables as group
size, morale or cohesiveness, communication patterns, and social
norms. Environmental-level inputs include such variables as the
nature and structure of the group's tasks, and the level of
environmental stress. Through the manipulation of inputs, group
processes can be altered and performance outcomes improved.

First, by manipulating group composition,
changes can be effected in the knowledge and skills which group
members bring to bear on the group's tasks and problems. For example,
it might be possible for space crewmembers to be chosen, in part, on
the basis of complementary skills and interests (Haythorn et al.,
1972). A careful analysis of mission requirements and of the people
who might satisfy them could result in a large crew with a good
spread of abilities and skills.

Second, the model suggests that the
manipulation of task characteristics can increase group members'
commitment to work hard on the task. Drawing on the work of Hackman
and Lawler (1971) and Hackman and Oldham (1974), Hackman and Morris
(1975, 1978) suggest that a high degree of individual-effort
expenditure becomes likely when individual assignments (1) provide
the opportunity to use a variety of personal skills and abilities,
(2) involve "whole and visible" pieces of work, (3) are related to
the physical or psychological well-being of other people, (4) make
some allowance for individual initiative and discretion, and (5) are
structured in such a way as to allow the person to monitor his or her
level of performance.

Finally, through manipulating social norms it
should prove possible to influence task performance strategies. For
example, as already noted, groups whose norms foster a high degree of
[177]
conformity may have difficulty solving problems that require
innovative solutions. Pressures "not to be different" discourage
group members from sharing new or unusual ideas. If new norms could
be developed that encourage independence of thought and expression,
the group could rapidly uncover a wide array of creative solutions to
its problems. Hackman and Morris urge group members to continually
ask themselves if their usual performance strategies are the most
appropriate ways of proceeding under emerging conditions. They
suggest that an open preperformance discussion of strategies can pay
big performance dividends, particularly if the group finds itself
confronted with a nonroutine problem or task.

This promising model of group performance has
received only limited testing, and these tests have not involved
isolated and confined groups. Certain of the issues raised by Hackman
and Morris are prime research issues. These revolve around
constituting crews in such a way as to ensure a desirable range of
knowledge and skills, structuring tasks in such a way as to maximize
motivation and commitment, and identifying and encouraging social
norms which foster appropriate performance strategies under
conditions of isolation, confinement, and risk. Some of these issues
will be further addressed in our discussion of motivation in chapter
VIII.

Temporal Dynamics

Interpersonal dynamics within a crew can be
expected to change over time. Building on work by Bales (1950), a
number of researchers including Bennis and Shepard (1956), Mann,
Gibbard, and Hartman (1967), and Tuckman (1965) have identified
developmental stages within small groups. Although these formulations
differ in terms of their specifics, there is some agreement that
early in the group's life, activities center around the feelings that
members have about each other and their relationship to the leader.
Only after these issues are resolved will the group become highly
cohesive and gain the ability to effectively focus its energies on
the job at hand. Illustrative is Tuckman's (1965) formulation based
on studies of therapy groups. According to Tuckman, groups pass
through four sequential stages: (1) testing and dependence or
"forming," (2) intragroup conflict or "storming," (3) development of
group cohesiveness or "norming," and (4) task functioning or
"performing."

The research on group development implies that
using, as a crew, a well-established or mature group that has
thrashed out norms, tested limits, come to grips with authority
relations, and [178] reconciled individual differences would help minimize
interpersonal conflicts within the spacecraft. A relatively mature
group may have another advantage: It can be studied as a group prior
to departure and this study could provide a backup to the initial
selection process (Perry, 1965, 1967). The disadvantage of a
well-established group is that the members may find that they have
little new to offer each other socially. That is, as the natural
processes of social penetration continue (Altman and Taylor, 1973),
crewmembers will become increasingly familiar to one another, find
increasingly less to discuss, and perhaps lose interest in one
another. Future research is required for selecting and training crews
that are highly coordinated but retain the capacity to provide
appropriate levels of mutual stimulation.

As missions increase in duration, crews will
lose the characteristics associated with short-term groups and gain
the characteristics associated with long-term groups. Ziller (1977)
has identified four important ways in which short-term groups and
long-term groups differ. First, whereas short-term groups are locked
into the here-and-now, long-term groups have a sense of continuity
and view themselves in relationship to the past, the present, and the
future. Second, whereas short-term groups tend to be dominated by
immediate outcomes, long-term groups have images of the future and
may be willing to forego short-term gains in order to achieve
long-term goals. Third, relationships within short-term groups tend
to be impersonal and reflective of social roles, whereas
relationships within long-term groups tend to be personal and based
on strong attachments among members. Finally, whereas short-term
groups tend to be relatively static, long-term groups tend to be
dynamic, or, in Ziller's words, always "in process." Most group
dynamics research involves short-term groups, yet it is long-term
groups that we must understand to plan extended-duration space
missions.

Not all microsocieties in space will be closed
systems. There is likely to be some turnover in orbiting laboratories
or settlements. This raises the problem of introducing and
assimilating newcomers into preformed groups. According to a review
by Crandall (1978), because newcomers do not share the continuing
members' knowledge and attitudes, they may unintentionally act in
disruptive ways and hence come to be seen as disloyal to the group.
Aware of this problem, newcomers themselves are likely to be anxious
and prone to conform.

Crandall reviews several methods for easing
the integration of newcomers into ongoing groups. Each of these
procedures may [179] reduce conflict and attrition, and hence deserves
careful consideration for incorporation into mission plans. First,
there is preentry therapy, which is expected to encourage anxiety
control and reduce the need to conform. Second, newcomers can become
acquainted with current or former group members prior to their entry.
Third, newcomers can be given candid and realistic (as compared with
guarded and idealistic) information about the group. Finally,
newcomers can be sponsored; that is, an established group member can
introduce and tutor each newcomer.

In the area of personnel rotation, there are
many topics for future research. One hypothesis is that there is an
advantage to using, as newcomers, people selected and trained along
with those who have already entered space. Another possibility is
that there is an advantage to letting the crew help select its own
new members. Still another possibility is that assimilation is
enhanced as a result of telecommunication with the newcomer prior to
the newcomer's departure from Earth. Finally, it would be useful to
know more about the kinds of conditions that will result in newcomers
being given more time to gain acceptance by the group.

Yet another issue is fixing the number or
proportion of crewmembers that should be rotated or replaced at any
one time. In the military, piecemeal replacement has not been
particularly successful. On the other hand, introducing large groups
of newcomers means that many people have to be socialized
simultaneously and that old-timers will feel particularly threatened.
It is also necessary to find means for selecting individuals who are
to be placed during a given personnel exchange.

In the future, it should become increasingly
likely to actually train crewmembers or entire crews in space. This
might be done, for example, inside a well-established satellite or
lunar station. Such bases could provide a relatively safe environment
where new astronauts could learn to function under conditions of
weightlessness and come to grips with the psychological and social
realities of isolation, confinement, and risk. In addition, the
promise of being in outer space at a relatively early point in one's
career might help generate and sustain a high level of motivation.
On-board training should ease a new crew's transition from training
to operational status. Seasoned operational crews might be more
willing to accept new crewmembers who have already gained experience
in space than those whose prior experiences have been limited to
Earth.

[180] In summary, crew
dynamics will change over time. Future research is required to better
understand these changes. In addition, future research is needed to
ease the integration of newcomers into crews that will have rotating
memberships. On-board training may serve a number of useful purposes,
including the integration of newcomers into seasoned operational
crews.