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I believe you would see a large difference in the capabilities of NATO forces come the 1980s vice the 1970s. In the US we had converted a lot of our 8-inch to MLRS with much greater range and lethality. The firing batteries in all US units went from 6 to 8 guns...while not seeming like much it allowed a battery to have 2 firing platoons with one firing while the other displaced. Also the M109A3s started to get replaced by M109A5s with a much greater range and accuracy.

There was also the differences in doctrine (which S-2 would be much better at than I). The US believed in massing fires on a target, shifting and shooting the next target, then the next target. Another key system coming on line which allowed this to occur was the TACFIRE digital fire control system. It was faster, more accurate and reliable than the older system.

All the NATO members were upgrading at the same time.

Conversely the Warsaw Pact modernized somewhat but in order maintain the momentum a lot of their guns had to be displacing forward.

“Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
Mark Twain

Unfortunately as Officer of the Engineers rightly brought out there are very few Indian Army professionals retired or serving who put forth their views on topics like the t-90 vs the Arjun for reasons only known to them.It only adds to the confusion in the minds of the uninitiated and have them to ask you on the merits of these tanks!These boys will then lap it up , go back to the Indian Defence sites with baised views and expound theories on tank designing which are astounding to say the least. The Indian media are as cluless on matters military and will print on what has been fed to them.You must visit our sites for the gems on military knowledge.

My humble opinion on the these tanks in question- both are required. The t-90 when India was at a risk of being out gunned by the t-80s was the fastest we could get to counter the threat ,cheap vis a vis the other tanks available then, fast delivery[the russians stood by us] ,enough to meet the requirements of the sub continent, soldier proof like all russian equipment, good night fighting capablelity,minimum operational maintance,etc.

The arjun -delay after delay made the Indian army vexxed as operational requirments dictated an stop gap asset. The DRDO just could not convince the users that they can deliver. When they could pigheadeness by the army saw further delay.Smooth suspension, crew comfort good, good gun, good sights,the MTU power pack question mark,will the germans give us the leopard 2 power pack? the maintance procedures, spares ,tote, etc will have to be smoothened out.The mark 2 will be better i hope.We require it to progress into the future .unforunately, the DRDO is so bogged down sorting out the Arjun ,I hope they have started working on a new tank!

I believe you would see a large difference in the capabilities of NATO forces come the 1980s vice the 1970s.

Depends on the NATO country. Germany basically kept its 1970s numbers while shifting artillery from corps down to division level. M114 replaced with FH70, M107 rebarreled to become M110 and the entire divisional heavy artillery effectively assigned a primary nuclear role (was one battery of M110 in the 70s).
The nukes in heavy artillery really dominated, where the early 1970s Corps had five nuke-capable fire batteries - two Sergeant (ie. 8 launchers), three M110 (ie. 18 tubes) - the same mid-1980s Corps would have had 14 - two Lance (6 launchers), six M110 (54 tubes), six M109/FH70 (54 tubes).

And a quarter of the LARS were cut when the launchers were put on new chassis in 1981-83 ("LARS 2"), compensated with better fire control. Which really hurts that yield calculation.

We've all read the "...Quantity is also a quality..." maxim tossed about. In the end it's an excuse for an absence of professionalism in artillery applications. I confess it had some influence on our doctrine in the mid to late-seventies. To that end we looked at notions of "scoot and shoot" to counter the weight of expected fire we'd face.

With that comes problems. Guns that are moving aren't shooting. Guns that aren't shooting aren't supporting. Guns that are moving are vulnerable to BAI and small-unit interdiction. How to do both and survive? We increased accuracy and the size of our firing units. Going to eight gun batteries not only allowed continuous fires while elements displaced but, MORE IMPORTANTLY, it dispersed the sources of fire thus complicating the Soviet counter-battery solution. More guns firing from more locations accurately meant less rounds fired to service a target from each position. With that came less exposure and risk of detection thus the ability to stay in position and shoot.

The late seventies/early eighties saw a veritable revolution in field artillery technical development. PADS (Position Azimuth Determining System) allowed artillery units to finally be freed from the encumbrances of traditional labor and time-intensive survey. Previously, we'd rarely seen our survey sections. They were phsically overwhelmed. First survey priority always went to Pershing/Lance missile batteries. Ad hoc map-spotting was an inadequate substitute because it didn't provide the position accuracy necessary for immediate fire-for-effect missions. Adjust-fire missions unnecessarily exposed units to counter-battery fire.

PADS was just one part of the gunnery equation, however. M-90 Chronograph radars allowed for the rapid collection of accurate MV data. Remember, with available metro and accurate MV data I don't need to register my guns. Avoiding registration means limiting exposure and wasteful expenditures of ammunition. Now we could fire from surveyed positions and do so with accurate MV data.

Our observers benefited from PADS because they now had surveyed observation posts. With a known observer location coupled with laser rangefinding we were now able to accurately determine target distance and direction. Knowing your location as an observer and the range/direction to your target provides THEIR location. Again, no need to adjust fires because of observer inaccuracies.

AN/TPQ 36/37 FIREFINDER radar and TACFIRE tied the loop together. Coupled with our development of scrambled, burst transmission VHF radios and redundant wire links we were able to find and process a huge amount of firing data while passing that data both rapidly and securely. Doing so mitigated the ability of Soviet RDF (radio direction finding) as another means of detection. The most overworked man in the field artillery became the targeting officers at a field artillery battalion FDC. No longer were Battalion FDCs used to provide technical computational backup for the batteries. Instead, they processed target data into SEAD and counter-battery programs and fed those comprehensive solutions to the batteries. TACFIRE would also compute the firing solutions at the batteries automatically. That was fine but less important as batteries could do the same nearly as responsively and accurately provided the targeting data was accurate.

The last element was the tactical application of these developments. In short, how to take best advantage of our new capabilities to rapidly and accurately deliver fires? First, we practiced time-honored solutions to counter-battery fires by revisiting our comms procedures, particularly the use of directional antennas. We also dug in our intra-battery wire networks. With directional antennas and burst transmissions that were scrambled you had to listen very hard to hear us and you weren't going to leech info from our nets.

Secondly, like infantry and armor, we made best use of terrain to mask our fires and communication signals. Intervening crests became our friend even if it meant high-angle fires.

Third, like infantry and armor we dispersed our firing units but not our fires. We were now able to mass fires from multiple firing units at multiple locations onto a single target. More guns firing less rounds meant greater weight of shot delivered accurately with minimal exposure to each firing unit. No creeping adjustment. No time to disperse and find cover. Just BOOM! First round fire-for-effect missions (preferably ToT-Time On Target) became the standard-not the exception.

Finally, we re-learned hardening our positions and accepting counter-fire. You had to accurately target us to force our displacement. We could move fast if necessary. I've seen a six-gun 155mm S.P. battery displace en toto from a firing position in less than five minutes from the command "MARCH ORDER!". Guns, supply, maintenence, mess section, FDC-everybody GONE.

Trust, though, that we hadn't moved far. Maybe half a klic to a klic. But in which direction? Just enough to disturb the firing solution and back in business. Like infantry and armor we had alternate positions that had been reconned and surveyed from which to support the same mission.

It would have been VERY INTERESTING to see how things might have unfolded by the mid-eighties.

"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski"The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

AN/TPQ 36/37 FIREFINDER radar and TACFIRE tied the loop together. Coupled with our development of scrambled, burst transmission VHF radios and redundant wire links we were able to find and process a huge amount of firing data while passing that data both rapidly and securely. Doing so mitigated the ability of Soviet RDF (radio direction finding) as another means of detection

When the Cb radar is emitting radiation is it not exposing his position to RDF?

We've all read the "...Quantity is also a quality..." maxim tossed about. In the end it's an excuse for an absence of professionalism in artillery applications. I confess it had some influence on our doctrine in the mid to late-seventies. To that end we looked at notions of "scoot and shoot" to counter the weight of expected fire we'd face.

With that comes problems. Guns that are moving aren't shooting. Guns that aren't shooting aren't supporting. Guns that are moving are vulnerable to BAI and small-unit interdiction. How to do both and survive? We increased accuracy and the size of our firing units. Going to eight gun batteries not only allowed continuous fires while elements displaced but, MORE IMPORTANTLY, it dispersed the sources of fire thus complicating the Soviet counter-battery solution. More guns firing from more locations accurately meant less rounds fired to service a target from each position. With that came less exposure and risk of detection thus the ability to stay in position and shoot.

The late seventies/early eighties saw a veritable revolution in field artillery technical development. PADS (Position Azimuth Determining System) allowed artillery units to finally be freed from the encumbrances of traditional labor and time-intensive survey. Previously, we'd rarely seen our survey sections. They were phsically overwhelmed. First survey priority always went to Pershing/Lance missile batteries. Ad hoc map-spotting was an inadequate substitute because it didn't provide the position accuracy necessary for immediate fire-for-effect missions. Adjust-fire missions unnecessarily exposed units to counter-battery fire.

PADS was just one part of the gunnery equation, however. M-90 Chronograph radars allowed for the rapid collection of accurate MV data. Remember, with available metro and accurate MV data I don't need to register my guns. Avoiding registration means limiting exposure and wasteful expenditures of ammunition. Now we could fire from surveyed positions and do so with accurate MV data.

Our observers benefited from PADS because they now had surveyed observation posts. With a known observer location coupled with laser rangefinding we were now able to accurately determine target distance and direction. Knowing your location as an observer and the range/direction to your target provides THEIR location. Again, no need to adjust fires because of observer inaccuracies.

AN/TPQ 36/37 FIREFINDER radar and TACFIRE tied the loop together. Coupled with our development of scrambled, burst transmission VHF radios and redundant wire links we were able to find and process a huge amount of firing data while passing that data both rapidly and securely. Doing so mitigated the ability of Soviet RDF (radio direction finding) as another means of detection. The most overworked man in the field artillery became the targeting officers at a field artillery battalion FDC. No longer were Battalion FDCs used to provide technical computational backup for the batteries. Instead, they processed target data into SEAD and counter-battery programs and fed those comprehensive solutions to the batteries. TACFIRE would also compute the firing solutions at the batteries automatically. That was fine but less important as batteries could do the same nearly as responsively and accurately provided the targeting data was accurate.

The last element was the tactical application of these developments. In short, how to take best advantage of our new capabilities to rapidly and accurately deliver fires? First, we practiced time-honored solutions to counter-battery fires by revisiting our comms procedures, particularly the use of directional antennas. We also dug in our intra-battery wire networks. With directional antennas and burst transmissions that were scrambled you had to listen very hard to hear us and you weren't going to leech info from our nets.

Secondly, like infantry and armor, we made best use of terrain to mask our fires and communication signals. Intervening crests became our friend even if it meant high-angle fires.

Third, like infantry and armor we dispersed our firing units but not our fires. We were now able to mass fires from multiple firing units at multiple locations onto a single target. More guns firing less rounds meant greater weight of shot delivered accurately with minimal exposure to each firing unit. No creeping adjustment. No time to disperse and find cover. Just BOOM! First round fire-for-effect missions (preferably ToT-Time On Target) became the standard-not the exception.

Finally, we re-learned hardening our positions and accepting counter-fire. You had to accurately target us to force our displacement. We could move fast if necessary. I've seen a six-gun 155mm S.P. battery displace en toto from a firing position in less than five minutes from the command "MARCH ORDER!". Guns, supply, maintenence, mess section, FDC-everybody GONE.

Trust, though, that we hadn't moved far. Maybe half a klic to a klic. But in which direction? Just enough to disturb the firing solution and back in business. Like infantry and armor we had alternate positions that had been reconned and surveyed from which to support the same mission.

It would have been VERY INTERESTING to see how things might have unfolded by the mid-eighties.

Wonder how arty is used in the low intensity ops in say Afghanistan? Are the fire units dispersed piece meal or kept concentrated Vietnam style?I am sure a fire grid would have been worked out to provide fire support to all elements moving out of their firm bases.Or is use of arty a big no no ? I doubt it as air support is used often.

It's not only US Army,but all armies use arty and will use it until the end of times and wars.Because the gun is faster,more accurate, has a variable of lethality, doesn't costs tens of thousands of bucks/hour to operate,it's not weather dependent,it doesn't require 30 technicians/per piece and you can buy 100 for the price of an aircraft.Also you can fire guns while the enemy has air dominance given a few precautions.You won't fly your aircraft in such conditions.

Those who know don't speak
He said to them, "But now if you have a purse, take it, and also a bag; and if you don't have a sword, sell your cloak and buy one. Luke 22:36

tanker_jitty Reply

It's a thread devoted to redlegs and has lots of pics and videos of U.S. artillery units firing in Afghanistan.

You'll like it and it may answer some of your questions. Along the eastern border with Pakistan we've typically got two-gun platoon fire bases. Further south in Helmand I believe the marines shoot as a battery but could be wrong.

But if your AF is weaker and your tubes are not on Mt. Everest they are sitting ducks? Or I am wrong?

I understand they are cheaper, Are they easier and safer to be deployed then let's say a cruise missile?

Tube artillery gives you a 24 hour all weather continuous fire support UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE MANEUVER COMMANDER. That is key. You also have a wider range of options with arty than air. Cruise missiles take to long and costs too much.
This was a huge lesson of the Yom Kippur war...the Israelis learned some painful lessons by depending too much on air. There is A whole thread on this topic.

“Loyalty to country ALWAYS. Loyalty to government, when it deserves it.”
Mark Twain