網頁

2017年2月1日 星期三

“美國優先” 對 “一中”

Russell
Hsiao is the Executive Director of the Global Taiwan Institute, a 501(c)(3)
think tank in Washington, DC dedicated to Taiwan policy research. David An is a
Senior Research Fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute.

Donald J. Trump is now the
forty-fifth president of the United States. As president of the world’s strongest democracy, Trump is bound by theTake
Care Clauseof the U.S. Constitution to
execute the laws of the land—laws such as theTaiwan
Relations Actof 1979. Under the principle ofseparation
of powersenshrined in the U.S.
Constitution, the executive branch—now headed by President Trump—is responsible for implementing the laws of the land by
formulating policies.

As president-elect, Trump
indicated that his administration’s approach to foreign policy
would not be bound by the outdated conventions and self-imposed restrictions
toed needlessly by previous administrations. He suggested that those policies
would be recalibrated to better suit American interests in the twenty-first
century. Indeed, the president-elect took acongratulatory phone callfrom the democratically
elected leader of Taiwan—a key security partner of the
United States—and questioned the efficacy of the
former administration’s China policy.

Despite the public outcry,
nothing Trump said or did as president-elect changed U.S. policy or the law.
Also, Trump was completely within his legal rights to take a phone call and “question” the former administration’s policies. (Former president Obama said as muchwhen he stated, “I think all of our foreign
policy should be subject to fresh eyes.”) Additionally, even if President
Trump does change U.S. policy, there is nothing tolegally stop himfrom doing so.

While much fuss has been made about
the policies in question, there has been limited discussion about the dangerous
logic that feeds the fear over the president’s questioning of policy. Lost
in the polemic discourse following the president’s comments is a recognition
of the legal underpinnings of U.S. policies toward Taiwan, which remain ever
constant, and the elasticity of the U.S. “One China” policy itself.

The reaction, even among
experts, was telling and laid bare a critical blind spot in the United States’ approach to cross-Strait relations. To be sure, U.S.
policy towards Taiwan has operated over the past forty-five years on the
premise thatAmerica’s primary interestis in the process—as opposed to the outcome—of resolving differences
between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

It was inherently a passive
policy by design, but the emphasis on process intentionally ceded the
initiative of shaping the outcome to the two other parties: Taiwan and the
People’s Republic of China. It was an
approach that some senior policymakers at the time expected would create a fait
accompli, yet it provided Washington, DC with the flexibility to adapt and
respond to broader geopolitical challenges while maintaining stability in the Taiwan
Straits.

Despite expectationsto the contrary, Taiwan
thrived in the ensuing four decades. The government liberalized from the top
down while an active civil society fervently pushed for political reforms from
the bottom up. Taiwan evolved from an authoritarian government to a vibrant
democracy. Support for Taiwan and its democracy grew within the United States
as well.

As the power disparity between
the two sides widens, however, the policy focused on the process is
increasingly under strain and has left Taiwan more susceptible to coercion and
Beijing more emboldened to use military force. Indeed, the PRC is gradually and
unceasingly pushing toward its own desired outcome for Taiwan. All the while,
America’s focus on process is drawing it
towards China’s objectives at the expense of its
values and strategic interests.

Some American scholars and
former policymakers have sounded the alarm about theneed to accommodateChina by reaching anew modus vivendiwith Beijing, which will effectively
abandon Taiwan. A debate over aHobson’s choice, however, obscures a much-needed discussion
about a Taiwan strategy that not only focuses on ensuring a peaceful process
but also a vision for a desired outcome.

As the two sides of the Taiwan
Strait struggle to engage in dialogue, the scope of this process-based approach
to policymaking has barred U.S. policymakers from actively shaping conditions
in the Taiwan Strait that would be more conducive to long-term peace and
stability. This outdated and partly flawed premise of the approach is based on
a Washington tendency to construct events in the Taiwan Strait in binary terms:
independence or unification. That is a false dilemma, which Beijing has framed
as aHobson’s choice.

On ensuring a peaceful process,
the Taiwan Relations Act—which legally governs
relations between the United States and Taiwan—sets out the primary goal of
U.S. policy towards cross-Strait relations as ensuringthat the resolutionis “not coercive, unilateral, or detrimental to U.S.
interests.” Towards that end, the new president
has a lot of tools and legal authority at his disposal to recalibrate Taiwan
policy.

•Consider any effort to determine the future of
Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a
threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave
concern to the United States.

•Provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive
character.

•Maintain the capacity of the United States to
resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
security—or the social or economic system—of the people on Taiwan.

•The preservation and enhancement of the human
rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the
United States.

On the second prong, former
Pentagon official and Air Force Lt. Col. Mark Stokes mapped out possible future
policy options in the Taiwan Strait.The report, known asThe United States and
Future Policy Options in the Taiwan Strait, outlines four alternative schools
of thought on the future of Taiwan policy: The Accommodation School; The Status
Quo School; The Normalization School; and The U.S. “One
China, Two Governments” School. As Stokes astutely
observed in a recentfollow-up article, “U.S. policy has yet to catch
up with the changes that have taken place on Taiwan since 1996, especially
since the first peaceful transfer of power in 2000.”

Despite all the uproar, the new
U.S. president—with his iconoclastic persona—has not changed U.S. policy. Rather, his administration
has raised an important and fundamental question about the long-term viability
of this current approach to policy. To be sure, the previous ambiguous approach
has outlived its utility, and the effects have been an emboldened Beijing and a
Taiwan that is now being gradually pushed into a corner (see, e.g.,Beijing’s diplomatic offensive).

Alternatives to a gradual
change in policy present equally destabilizing propositions, and there is a
great deal of uncertainty that comes with any change. However, a fear of change
could lead to a state of paralysis that is equally disruptive in the Taiwan
Strait. A one-sided focus on the process has left U.S. interests increasingly
susceptible to the vagaries of cross-Strait relations and Beijing’s increasing leverages. Indeed, policy towards Taiwan has
operated over the past forty-five years on the premise that America’s primary interest is in the process—as opposed to the outcome. It is time for U.S.
policymakers to refocus on a desired outcome.

Russell Hsiao is the Executive
Director of the Global Taiwan Institute, a 501(c)(3) think tank in Washington,
DC dedicated to Taiwan policy research. David An is a Senior Research Fellow at
the Global Taiwan Institute.