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Purpose . We aimed to understand how employer characteristics relate to the use of incentives to promote participation in wellness programs and to explore the relationship between incentive type and participation rates. Design . A cross-sectional analysis of nationally representative survey data combined with an administrative business database was employed. Settings/Subjects . Random sampling of U.S. companies within strata based on industry and number of employees was used to determine a final sample of 3000 companies. Of these, 19% returned completed surveys. Measures . The survey asked about employee participation rate, incentive type, and gender composition of employees. Incentive types included any incentives, high-value rewards, and rewards plus penalties. Analysis . Logistic regressions of incentive type on employer characteristics were used to determine what types of employers are more likely to offer which type of incentives. A generalized linear model of participation rate was used to determine the relationship between incentive type and participation. Results . Employers located in the Northeast were 5 to 10 times more likely to offer incentives. Employers with a large number of employees, particularly female employees, were up to 1.25 times more likely to use penalties. Penalty and high-value incentives were associated with participation rates of 68% and 52%, respectively. Conclusion . Industry or regional characteristics are likely determinants of incentive use for wellness programs. Penalties appear to be effective, but attention should be paid to what types of employees they affect.

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Employers commonly use adjustments to health insurance premiums as incentives to encourage healthy behavior, but the effectiveness of those adjustments is controversial. We gave 197 obese participants in a workplace wellness program a weight loss goal equivalent to 5 percent of their baseline weight. They were randomly assigned to a control arm, with no financial incentive for achieving the goal, or to one of three intervention arms offering an incentive valued at $550. Two intervention arms used health insurance premium adjustments, beginning the following year (delayed) or in the first pay period after achieving the goal (immediate). A third arm used a daily lottery incentive separate from premiums. At twelve months there were no statistically significant differences in mean weight change either between the control group (whose members had a mean gain of 0.1 pound) and any of the incentive groups (delayed premium adjustment, -1.2 pound; immediate premium adjustment, -1.4 pound; daily lottery incentive, -1.0 pound) or among the intervention groups. The apparent failure of the incentives to promote weight loss suggests that employers that encourage weight reduction through workplace wellness programs should test alternatives to the conventional premium adjustment approach by using alternative incentive designs, larger incentives, or both.

Timely follow-up after hospital discharge may decrease readmission to hospital. Financial incentives to improve follow-up have been introduced in the United States and Canada, but it is unknown whether they are effective. Our objective was to evaluate the impact of an incentive program on timely physician follow-up after hospital discharge.

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We assess the additional forest cover protected by 13 rural communities located in the southern state of Chiapas, Mexico, as a result of the economic incentives received through the country’s national program of payments for biodiversity conservation. We use spatially explicit data at the intra-community level to define a credible counterfactual of conservation outcomes. We use covariate-matching specifications associated with spatially explicit variables and difference-in-difference estimators to determine the treatment effect. We estimate that the additional conservation represents between 12 and 14.7 percent of forest area enrolled in the program in comparison to control areas. Despite this high degree of additionality, we also observe lack of compliance in some plots participating in the PES program. This lack of compliance casts doubt on the ability of payments alone to guarantee long-term additionality in context of high deforestation rates, even with an augmented program budget or extension of participation to communities not yet enrolled.

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There is no evidence comparing head-to-head the effects of monetary incentives to act and to abstain from acting on behaviour. We present an experiment, conducted between June and September 2012, that directly compares the effects of those two different monetary incentive schemes on eating behaviour: we evaluate incentives to eat against incentives not to eat. A large number of participants (n = 353) had bowls of sweets next to them while they watched different videos over two experimental sessions that were two days apart. Sweets eating was monitored and monetary incentives to eat or not to eat were introduced during one of the videos for participants randomly allocated to these conditions. Our results show that, while both types of incentives were effective in changing sweets-eating behaviour when they were in place, only incentives not to eat had significant carryover effects after they were removed. Those effects were still significant two days after the monetary incentives had been eliminated. We also present some additional results on personality and health-related variables that shed further light on these effects. Overall, our study shows that incentives not to eat can be more effective in producing carryover effects on behaviour in domains like the one explored here.

A randomized controlled trial ‘Money for Medication’(M4M) was conducted in which patients were offered financial incentives for taking antipsychotic depot medication. This study assessed the attitudes and ethical considerations of patients and clinicians who participated in this trial.

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Employers often make payment contingent on performance in order to motivate workers. We used fMRI with a novel incentivized skill task to examine the neural processes underlying behavioral responses to performance-based pay. We found that individuals' performance increased with increasing incentives; however, very high incentive levels led to the paradoxical consequence of worse performance. Between initial incentive presentation and task execution, striatal activity rapidly switched between activation and deactivation in response to increasing incentives. Critically, decrements in performance and striatal deactivations were directly predicted by an independent measure of behavioral loss aversion. These results suggest that incentives associated with successful task performance are initially encoded as a potential gain; however, when actually performing a task, individuals encode the potential loss that would arise from failure.