ALTHOUGH land reform was once accepted as the
foundation of rural development and social and political stability, its
significance has eroded both as a policy issue and in development thinking. The
great enthusiasm for land reform in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s appears to have
withered away. Apparently a dying issue, land reform, however, has staged a
comeback after dramatic structural changes in the former socialist countries.
This time, however in a different form, not in the fashion of the wholesale
state acquisition, but in restoration and restitution of land rights of the
cultivating peasantry. The empirical evidence drawn from Asia, Africa and Latin
America shows a strong and positive correlation between rural household income
and access to land.Land reforms have fallen from the grace of contemporary
development literature and international development agencies as a victim of new
intellectual fashion. The post-independent Bangladesh was under a socialist
spell for a few years, with a radical land reform seen as an essential step
towards the socialist goal. But the step was not taken, as the condition in
Bangladesh was not at all compatible with radical changes. The governments that
emerged with the state power in the following years were also hesitant to
implement the already existing provisions of land acquisition and
distribution.The land reform issues got dissolved in the recent past in the
apparently dominant issues of environment, rural development and micro-credit
operation. Although all governments through Ministry of Land and district and
sub-district offices kept the process of land distribution alive for name's sake
alone, the success was always far from satisfactory.

A closer look at land reform attempts of the
1950s (the major legal instruments being the East Bengal State Acquisition and
Tenancy Act 1950), 1970s (the Presidential Ordinance No. 98 of 1972) and 1980s
(the Land Reform Ordinance 1984) shows that the proclaimed success was often
fictitious and overblown. What was projected to be the success of land reforms,
particularly in terms of distribution of land had very little to do with the
landless population, as the land had often remained occupied by the affluent
section of rural population.A DFID study undertaken by Saurav Sinha of
University of Sussex and Kazi Ali Taufique of Bangladesh Institute of
Development Studies comes up with some recommendations towards promoting land
rights. An important recommendation that the landless should have access to
public land at a market price, of course not free of cost, triggered a
debate.The proposed approach of payment for land at market price excellently
suits the orthodox market mechanism and market economy and eliminates the phobia
of price distortion at the land market. The DFID sponsored study mentions that
the landless it has examined are willing to pay at the market rate provided they
are assured of their access and rights.But the point that deserves further
examination is whether the landless people are really capable of paying the
government the land price at the market rate? If they are capable, should their
inclusion in the priority list of the prospective beneficiaries of land
distribution programme was logical?Payment of price by the landless has been
viewed as a disincentive approach which tends to reduce capture- attempts by the
rich and minimises the bribe package paid by the poor. The government can invest
the sale proceeds of land to update land records and evict encroachers.

While appreciating the market norms for
efficiency, market price approach also seems politically correct. But DFID can
give another thought on the idea of lesser capture-assumption by the rich. The
assumption has ignored the supply side of land market. When the land scarcity
situation is properly understood, then putting market price in land does not
appear to have any disincentive effect on the rich to reduce their land-based
interest.

The land, on the one hand, with a price tag is
likely to create a disincentive environment for the poor, while the rich on the
other hand are more likely to cook up plots to grab public land by a process of
pseudo-financing the poor and keeping them at the forefront. They are capable of
using this proposed disincentive approach to their advantage.

The second assumption of reduction of bribe with
price tagged to land does not reflect the Bangladesh situation. There is no
doubt that the prospective beneficiaries of land distribution are to bribe
almost at every stage, from applying for an application form for a piece of land
to obtaining a deed from the land office and taking over the possession. But in
reality the size of bribe is directly proportional to the price of the asset.
Hence the escalation of price will equally escalate the amount of bribe, and
thus distance the actual landless from the benefits of land distribution. The
third one i.e. investment of sale proceeds in land development, particularly in
updating land records, would be highly appreciable. But experience suggests that
Land Ministry does not have a record of useful investment of its earned money.
The payment at the market price formula will work if the state arranges for the
actual landless a low-interest land purchase credit and an income generating
package and ensures a profitable investment environment. The landless people,
only after an ensured subsistence, may love to pay from their savings. It needs
a poor-friendly market and a market-friendly polity and economy. These, however,
appear to be a remote dream.DFID experts make some relevant findings in line
with a distributive land reforms suited to Bangladesh. Policymakers may make
good use of these findings. A three-pronged strategy has been advanced. It
approaches the government to promote reform by updating records and
rationalisation of process, the market to take care of the land price and the
civil society to make essential mobilisation and play watchdog. A reduction of
corruption in the government, elimination of urban-based distortion of markets,
and upgradation of the civil society will work for the landless and poor.The
writer is a Management and Training Specialist with the South-South Centre,
Bangladesh.