In the spirit of #SkinInTheGame, Taleb’s idea that pundits should at least stake their reputations on the strength of their knowledge, last year I made some predictions about what has come to be known as The Current Year.

Like Scott Alexander, I am calibrating my predictions by comparing the percentage of predictions I got right at each probability level versus their probability (e.g., for predictions at the 70% confidence level, perfect calibration would represent getting 7/10 of them correct). Predictions with a probability rating of less than 50% are converted to their inverse.

Correct predictions are left as is, while wrong predictions are crossed out.

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Conflict

(1) The Syrian government will control a larger proportion of territory in a year’s time relative to today: 80%.Gains in Latakia and the capture of Aleppo, but ironically, pushed back further in Palmyra than at the same period last year. Though the strategic value of Aleppo cancels out Palmyra tenfold, in technical terms this is still a failed prediction. My main area of uncertainty was regarding Turkish or Western intervention against Assad. In truth, the sadder and more banal reality is that outside a few elite units the SAA remains mostly worthless.

(2) A majority of these happen: (a) SAA liberates Deir Hafir; (b) Palmyra; (c) All of Latakia; (d) Links up with the Nubl pocket; (e) Maintains hold on Deir ez-Zor airport. 80%. Deir Hafir is still under Islamic State, while small bits of Latakia are still controlled by the rebels. The Nubl pocket was linked up with, and Deir ez-Zor airport is still under Syrian control. Though recently recaptured, Palmyra was still liberated, so this is technically a correct prediction.

(3) Assad will remain President of Syria: 90%. YES.

(4) The Iraqi government will control a larger proportion of territory in a year’s time relative to today: 90%. YES.

(5) Islamic State will continue to lose ground in its heartlands and might end the year controlling little more than its capitals, but its overseas franchises – most notably in Libya – will expand further: 50%.Has been all but excised from Libya.

(6) The Houthis gain ground in Yemen: 60%.Comparing the maps between Dec 2015 and today, the Houthis seem to have lost ground, although very marginally. I should probably stop making predictions about wars and places I know very little about.

(10) A new conflict in the former Soviet space: 20%. INVERSE 80% no conflict: YES. Actually I outright said the most likely place for that would be Armenia vs. Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, and it came to pass, though not at a large enough scale to quality as a conflict.

Russia/Eurasia

(1) Politics – The Russian Duma elections are slated for September 2016. United Russia will comfortably take a majority of the seats: 95%. YES. UR took 343/450 = 76% of the seats (I predicted 80%).

(2) Politics – Electoral falsifications will be less than in the 2011 Duma elections: 70%. YES. There was much more than I expected – I was expecting the introduction of a partial FTPT system to greatly reduce this problem – but fewer than in 2011 nonetheless.

(3) Economics – The recession will end in 2016: 80%. YES. Multiple indicators suggest this has indeed happened in the second half of the year, so I am willing to call this as a win.

(4) Economics – There will be overall positive GDP growth in 2016: 60%.Nope.

(5) Ukraine – The recession will end in 2016: 70%. YES. Ultimately, its so depressed that there’s hardly any room to fall further.

(6) Ukraine – The Poroshenko regime remains in power: 80%. YES.

(7) Demographics – Russia will see natural population growth: 40%.INVERSE 60% there will be no natural growth. I was wrong – according to preliminary figures, the Russian population increased by 18K to November, relative to 24K in the same period last year. The population also almost always grows in December.

(8) Demographics – Russia will see population growth: 95%. YES.

(9) Demographics – Life expectancy will increase: 80%. The mortality rate continues falling, a modest 1.3%, and the population isn’t getting any younger, so that’s a YES. It will probably be around 72 years in 2016, just as I predicted.

(10) Demographics – TFR will increase: 50%. This is currently very hard to assess. The number of births fell by 1.7%, but its well known that the number of women in their childbearing years is still falling, so overall the two effects will have almost perfectly canceled out. Therefore I am not yet in a position to rate this prediction. The total TFR for 2016 will certainly be in the TFR = 1.75-1.8 range, just as in the past two years.

(19) Russia will predictably disappoint at UEFA Euro 2016 and will get knocked out at the group stage: 50%. YES. “… But Russia fans are regularly schooled on the dangers of abandoning pessimism” – indeed!

USA

(3) Hillary Clinton becomes US President: 70%. Do note that I raised my assessment to 50% by June 2016 in a discussion with Razib Khan, and to 60-70% by September 2016 (no Internet record of it but ask Mike Johnson or Scott Jackisch), but then my nerve failed at the last moment (even though my final prediction of a 291-247 HRC win in the Electoral Collage was closer than that of most analysts, and I even got Michigan right). I may not be the God-Emperor’s psyker like the brilliant Scott Adams but being wrong was never sweeter.

(4) The US enters recession: 20%. INVERSE 80% no recession. YES.

(5) Peak SJW?: No percentage due to inability to measure. My impression is that “peak SJW” has indeed passed, at least for now. Do you agree?

Myself

(1) I will write a record amount of blog posts: 70%.127 to 130 last year.

(2) I will author or coathor an academic paper: 60%.Currently collaborating on an S factor analysis of Russia with Emil Kirkegaard

(3) I will finish writing at least one book: 30%. INVERSE 70% no books. YES.

(5) I will end up being underconfident on these predictions: 50%. Seems evenly calibrated. But the New Year is arriving in 15 minutes, so I don’t have time to calculate the exact calibration, so most fortuitously my two responses at the 50% confidence level remain exactly 50% correct. Wasn’t a great idea to have three questions at this confidence level!!

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Here is my calibration graph:

I got really unlucky on my 60% confidence level predictions.

Here is what happens where all the 60% and 70% confidence predictions are combined into one 65% confidence level:

Very interesting – thanks.
But I’d just point out that knowing the right odds for your bets (=calibration) is not a money making strategy in itself. To cash in you have to find someone else offering the wrong odds!

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In 1 “The Syrian government will control a larger proportion of territory in a year’s time relative to today” you are formally right. The prediction made before the start of the offensive the forces of Assad against ISIS. After this offensive, Assad has lost part of the reconquered territories , but of the part reconquered territories kept under control. On other fronts the territory under the control of Damascus has increased too.

Thanks, but I looked at the maps of Syria in late December 2015/early January and today, and whereas the SAA were at the very gates of Palmyra back then they have now been driven 50km away, together with huge chunks of the adjoining desert, and have been almost encircled at Tiyas airbase.

I did foolishly define success there in terms of territory, so technically speaking I lost, even though as I mentioned the capture of Aleppo is strategically far more important than the reversal in Palmyra. However, I can't exactly go back and redefine things in my favor.

In 1 "The Syrian government will control a larger proportion of territory in a year's time relative to today" you are formally right. The prediction made before the start of the offensive the forces of Assad against ISIS. After this offensive, Assad has lost part of the reconquered territories , but of the part reconquered territories kept under control. On other fronts the territory under the control of Damascus has increased too.

Thanks, but I looked at the maps of Syria in late December 2015/early January and today, and whereas the SAA were at the very gates of Palmyra back then they have now been driven 50km away, together with huge chunks of the adjoining desert, and have been almost encircled at Tiyas airbase.

I did foolishly define success there in terms of territory, so technically speaking I lost, even though as I mentioned the capture of Aleppo is strategically far more important than the reversal in Palmyra. However, I can’t exactly go back and redefine things in my favor.

Gains in Latakia and the capture of Aleppo, but ironically, pushed back further in Palmyra than at the same period last year.

Palmyra will likely be back under SAA control in 2017. The SAA has already halted the ISIS advance and retaken some of the lost territory around the Tiyas airbase, and the major counter-offensive hasn’t started yet.

Reportedly, when ISIS retook Palmyra with a force of 4000-5000 jihadis, it was barely defended, by only about 1000 pro-Assad fighters, almost all of whom were poorly trained and equipped NDF militia (Putin almost certainly could have prevented this embarrassment, by deploying a mere 3000-4000 Russian troops to help defend the place while the SAA was occupied in Aleppo).

Demographics – TFR will increase: 50%. This is currently very hard to assess. The number of births fell by 1.7%, but its well known that the number of women in their childbearing years is still falling, so overall the two effects will have almost perfectly canceled out. Therefore I am not yet in a position to rate this prediction. The total TFR for 2016 will certainly be in the TFR = 1.75-1.8 range, just as in the past two years.

TFR was 1.78 in 2015, so if the ceiling is for 2016 is only 1.8, it will likely decline. Which would be the first time that has happened since 2005. Although perhaps some decrease in fertility should be expected after two years of recession.

I also got the Yemen more correct than you. On November 8, I predicted Trump getting 264 EC votes (including NH) on the day of the vote, but he ended up winning my home state of Michigan instead, which I did not predict would occur.

Also, I (like many other worthwhile men) was banned from the Slate Star Codex comments for supporting Trump a bit too fervently before the election, but it was all worth it in the end (he won the state Scott A. and I live in).

I also got the Yemen more correct than you. On November 8, I predicted Trump getting 264 EC votes (including NH) on the day of the vote, but he ended up winning my home state of Michigan instead, which I did not predict would occur.

Blogroll

This is not so much meant to be comprehensive as to illustrate the themes and individual thinkers whom I follow and am inspired by.

I do not bother including any MSM outlets, since I’m sure they can do just fine without my publicity.

Blogs which I consider to be particularly good and/or prominent are highlighted in bold, and blogs that appear to have gone dormant appear at the end in italics. While I try to keep these things objective, if you include me in your blogroll that does vastly increase the chances that I’ll reciprocate.