Tag Archives: Military-Industrial Commission

On 10 September, Kremlin.ru posted President Putin’s opening remarks to a session on developing the draft State Program of Armaments (GPV) 2016-2025.

Putin’s speech can be divided into several themes: financing, the arms race, threats, particular weapons systems, and other tidbits.

A critical question is how will funding for a new GPV compare with the approximately 20 trillion rubles laid out or earmarked for GPV 2011-2020. But Putin took pains to stress only that financing for the new GPV will be based on the government’s macroeconomic forecasts. He noted:

“The government has prepared two variants [not good and possibly worse?] of such a preliminary macroeconomic development forecast, and today, we will hear about it in a meeting with the government, and talk more about this. We will proceed exclusively from realities, from our possibilities, and we will not inflate our military expenditures.”

“I ask you to choose and present the most balanced variant of resource support for the new state program of armaments before the end of October 2014. It must fully account for missions in the area of military organizational development and still be realistic, and proceed, as I already said, from the country’s financial-economic possibilities. But I am sure we can find a variant acceptable both according to financial support and to the quality of those weapons systems which we will discuss more today.”

This seems consonant with his statement last December that the OPK and military should not expect future procurement budgets to match what was laid out in recent years.

In this September 10 session, Putin eschewed interest in a new arms race, but stressed that Moscow has no choice but to take “countermeasures” against U.S. and NATO threats. A few examples:

“[modernizing the armed forces and defense industry] is not connected to any kind of arms race . . . .”

“And we already many times said and warned that we will be forced — exactly forced — to take adequate countermeasures to guarantee our security.”

“We have spoken many times, and very much hope that there will not be excessive hysteria [from the U.S. and NATO?] when these decisions [about the GPV?] are finally made and begin to be realized. I want to note that everything we are doing are only countermeasures.”

“Sometimes the impression is created, I just talked about this, that someone wants to launch a new arms race. We will not, of course, be dragged into this race, it is simply absolutely excluded . . . .”

The Russian president also laid out at length his view of the threats requiring countermeasures:

U.S. missile defense;

U.S. Prompt Global Strike;

Militarization of space [?];

Conventional strategic weapons;

Prospective build-up of NATO forces in Eastern Europe.

He restated the official Kremlin narrative explaining why that alleged NATO build-up will happen:

“The crisis in Ukraine, which was actually provoked and created by some of our Western partners, is now being used to reanimate this military bloc.”

A regime that wants to prevent a Maydan on Red Square pretty much has to declare that the revolutionary impetus came from outside. It also has to overlook that it was the seizure of Crimea and the start of Moscow’s war in eastern Ukraine that awakened NATO.

Look for a more detailed exposition of Moscow’s new threat assessment when the updated Military Doctrine appears in December.

What did Putin say about what will be purchased under the new GPV? In short, not too much new:

“. . . our fundamental systems: both of a defensive nature and strike systems have simply already reached or are reaching the end of their service lives. And if we need to replace them, then replace them, of course, with prospective, modern ones having a future of long use.”

“I note that for the draft GPV-2025 there is already a unified system of preliminary data which confirmed the basic directions of arms and equipment development for the period to 2030 and formed a list of types determining the future profile of weapons systems.”

“Most of all we are talking about the creation of a rational list of strike means, including the guaranteed resolution of nuclear deterrence missions, about rearming strategic and long-range aviation, and continuing formation of an aerospace defense [VKO] system.”

“Further. In coming years, it is already essential to support the breakthrough development of all components of precision weapons, to create unified types of general purpose arms and equipment, and for the Navy — new ship projects, standardized in armament, command and control systems, and communications.”

Overall, continuing the course and priorities — such as they are — of the current GPV.

Now, the tidbits . . . .

Putin seemed to say the 2015 goal of more than 30 percent modern arms and equipment has already been reached.

According to the president, more than 3,600 items of “fundamental weapons” (68% of the contracted quantity) have already reached the troops this year, along with 241,000 other items [presumably procurement not part of a major weapons system].

Putin gave only the briefest acknowledgement that, with looming sanctions, defense industry must be ready to manufacture its own critically important equipment, components, and materials. Industry, he said, should also be looking to produce important civilian machinery in the future.

He only slightly criticized work on past GPVs, saying:

“It goes without saying we must carefully analyze the experience of realizing the previous programs, including the problems and oversights which led to delays in placing and fulfilling orders, and at times even to tasks not being completed.”

However, Putin also took the chairmanship of the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) on himself, indicating that he thinks the GPV could use some “manual control.”

That’s about 950 words describing what Putin said in roughly 1,200. One hopes his speech has been deconstructed and reconstructed in such a way that it illuminates more than the original.

Last week Rossiyskaya gazeta’s Sergey Ptichkin reviewed Dmitriy Rogozin’s comments on the formation of the next state armaments program, GPV 2016-2025. Rogozin is Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) attached to the RF Government.

Rogozin indicated the next GPV will be very different from the current one, according to Ptichkin.

Rogozin said fulfillment of GPV 2016-2025 will be tracked with a new automated system GAS-GOZ, or the State Automated System of the State Defense Order (or perhaps State Automated Defense Order System?). It’s supposed to allow for “quickly reacting to the smallest failures” in the GOZ.

The Future Research Fund (FPI or ФПИ, the emerging Russian DARPA) will effectively develop the most promising military and civilian technologies in 2016-2025.

Systems now in RDT&E are supposed to be in serial production. There may be some weapons based on “new physical principles.”

The PAK DA, a new strategic bomber, should be developed and produced during this GPV. The fifth generation fighter, PAK FA, will be in production.

There will be new missiles, from operational-tactical to strategic, hypersonic ones too.

It’s “not excluded” that aviation-carrying formations (aircraft carriers) will appear in the Navy.

Rogozin said the “active inclusion of the Military-Industrial Commission in developing the future GPV” is a first, and will allow for avoiding “many problems and collisions” along the way.

These armored vehicles are supposed to enter the force in a year or two, but this seems unlikely. They will probably become part of GPV 2016-2025.

Rogozin promised the next GPV will be the most balanced, most well-calculated, most innovative, and, at the same time, most realistic.

It’s very early to talk about the next GPV. Traditionally, this is a sign things aren’t going well in the GOZ or the current GPV. The overlap in consecutive GPVs makes it difficult (perhaps impossible) for anyone — citizens, lawmakers, bureaucrats, military men, and, defense industrialists — to understand exactly what’s been procured (or not) under each GPV. This state of confusion probably serves the interests of some of the same groups. Rogozin makes it sound as if defense industry, rather than the military, will drive the train this time around.

There was plenty of interesting media coverage of the Defense Minister’s meeting with the Duma on Wednesday, and plenty of criticism of what he said or didn’t say. Plenty worth covering in a Part II, especially regarding Serdyukov’s effort to shift the blame for another failing GOZ.

Radio Svoboda quoted KPRF deputy Vladimir Ulas putting all the blame for the army’s current state right at Anatoliy Serdyukov’s feet:

“The public clearly understands that the situation in the Armed Forces is far from favorable. Constant scandals which rock this department, the morale-psychological situation in which personnel, first and foremost, the officer corps, find themselves, both the material condition, and the lack of modern armaments – all these problems are completely real. I also hoped to hear answers to questions, how the Defense Ministry intends to solve them, from the minister. But, to my greatest regret, the biggest, in my view, problem of today’s Armed Forces is the absolutely dense incompetence of the military leadership. With people like Serdyukov still heading our Armed Forces, and he, unfortunately, is far from the only one, hoping for some kind of positive shifts is absolutely senseless.”

There was plenty more to be said about problems with the GOZ, the OPK, and the VPK and Defense Ministry blaming each other for what looks like a failing GOZ-2011.

“I have the impression that these sessions are ‘closed’ to hide the bitterness of the questions and negative results of the work of Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) and Defense Ministry leaders.”

United Russia’s Igor Barinov reiterated what he said he told President Medvedev a year ago:

“I noted then that the lack of competition and incomprehensible system of price formation in the VPK is a deadend path. We’re reaping the fruits of this now. Judge yourself: one, well, a maximum of two enterprises produce this or that type of our armament or military equipment. Meanwhile, enterprises getting money from the federal budget dispose of it as they wish. Prices simply come from the ceiling. No one bears any responsibility for quality. No one invests money in improving types of military equipment, in the end it goes that even in infantry weapons we’ve fallen behind. Our legendary automatic weapon Kalashnikov, the value of which everyone recognized before, now lags the best Western types in tactical-technical characteristics. And so it is in almost every area, with rare exceptions in the areas of missiles and some aircraft.”

“The Defense Ministry announced it won’t buy airborne combat vehicles [BMDs] and infantry combat vehicles [BMPs] from ‘Kurganmashzavod.’ This enterprise was one of the guilty in breaking the Gosoboronzakaz. And here’s the thing in this. ‘Kurganmashzavod’ is part of the United ‘Tractor Plants’ Corporation. Budget money is shared out with ‘Kurganmashzavod’ in a targeted way for the purchase of equipment, but the corporation’s directors dispose of it according to their discretion, and, naturally, BMP and BMD production is the last thing of concern for the owners of this holding company.”

“If they understand that they can be deprived of budget resources, then this enterprise will be forced to invest in quality, and in cutting defects, and in the improvement of product types. In addition, strict supervision is needed. Money was allocated but no one asked anyone about this money, and the result was zero.”

The KPRF’s Lokot also dwelled on the GOZ:

“It’s obvious that if the Gosoboronzakaz isn’t formed in the first half of the year, then nothing will be accomplished in the remaining part of the time since money will only begin coming in at the end of the year. Serdyukov acknowledged that today 13.4% of all contracts in the plan have been formed. Some time ago, Sergey Ivanov gave us other numbers. But I think that this number juggling was caused by competition between the Defense Minister and the Military-Industrial Commission. Ivanov lumps all the blame on the Defense Ministry, Serdyukov – on the defense-industrial complex. He even began his [Duma] speech with this, saying that the military-industrial complex is guilty of everything. They have poor qualifications, technology losses, poor production and so forth. But really at a minimum the Defense Ministry itself bears 50% percent of the responsibility for such a situation.”

“I have given the example of Novosibirsk proving the obvious guilt of the Defense Ministry in breaking the order. One of the enterprises – the Lenin Factory, which puts out very important products for infantry weapons, became a victim of Defense Ministry officials. In January this year, Serdyukov opened a state order tender with his signature, but closed it in March. Now half the year is gone, and there are no results. The enterprise isn’t working, products aren’t coming out, 211 million rubles spent on reequipping won’t bring any returns, and now they’re generally talking about cutting part of the work force.

“Right in Novosibirsk at the Comintern Factory the S-400 surface-to-air missile system is being produced on the enterprise’s own money, and not with government resources. Serdyukov says: ‘I don’t see anything terrible in this, let the enterprise do it on its own money.’ But where does it get its capital resources? What world is Serdyukov living in?”

Vedomosti talked to a former Defense Ministry official who basically said the threat of arms purchases abroad really didn’t scare anyone. And, according to him, although Serdyukov considers defense industry leaders lazy and prone to stealing, everyone understands imports can never replace domestic production. Finally, a source close to the PA told the business daily that Serdyukov himself opposes the Mistral acquisition because of the large expenditures required to build its base infrastructure.

President Medvedev is irritated as ever that the Defense Ministry and OPK aren’t moving out smartly to rearm and reequip the Armed Forces. He’s trying to kick them into gear, but can he get results where his predecessors either didn’t care or simply failed?

Medvedev’s opening monologue enumerated what’s been done for defense industry — providing a full state defense order and financial support, creating integrated development and production structures [OSK, OAK], etc..

Then the President says:

“However, despite all adopted measures, the state of defense production cannot be called good, all attending understand this. There are objective reasons: the deterioration of enterprises’ basic capital is nearly 70 percent (on average), in some enterprises it’s all much worse. We still have not even managed to establish effective mechanisms to attract innovation and off-budget resources to the defense-industrial complex.”

Medvedev goes on to say that all relevant documents, including the GPV 2011-2020, have been signed, but the assembled group still needs to think about how to implement the GPV. He reviews how he talked at the Defense Ministry Collegium in March about balancing producer and buyer interests, about justifiable and understandable prices.

But in many areas, says Medvedev, this has already become moot, and he intends to increase responsibility for the fulfillment of these obligations.

First, he wants a Federal Goal Program for OPK Development in 2011-2020. Its focus is to be “real readiness” of the OPK to produce actual weapons and equipment.

Second, he wants the Defense Ministry to finish placing GOZ-2011 completely by the end of May, and advance payments issued to producers in accordance with the 2011 and 2012-2013 plans.

Work to date, he says, is going poorly and slowly. He reminds the assembled that he told them about the failure of previous state armament programs:

“Today I want to hear from all present why this happened: both from government leaders, and from industry leaders, who was punished for this and how. Report proposals to me, if they still aren’t implemented, with positions, with the types of responsibility, completely concretely. If such proposals aren’t reported, it means [industrial] sector leaders and government leaders have to answer for it.”

It’s unacceptable, he says, that high-level decisions have been made, money allocated, but a product isn’t supplied. He recalls his late 2009 Poslaniye in which he said 30 land- and sea-based ballistic missiles, 5 Iskander missile systems, nearly 300 armored vehicles, 30 helicopters, 28 combat aircraft, 3 nuclear submarines, one corvette, and 11 satellites would be delivered in 2010.

Everyone here, says Medvedev, agreed with this, so why wasn’t it done. He is, he says, waiting for an answer, and:

“. . . we have to answer for the duties we’ve taken on ourselves, we look simply in this sense absolutely unacceptable.”

Medvedev finishes by saying he knows military production is profitable, and it’s possible to attract strategic investors. He says he wants to talk about how to stimulate investment. The goal for the day is concrete reports on what’s been done on the level of those responsible for organizing work and correcting the situation in defense industry.

Where’s this leave things?

Not exactly throwing down the gauntlet, just another warning that he’s getting serious. But it’s doubtful the government or defense industry will take Medvedev seriously until he fires a minister, other high-ranking official, or an important enterprise director. And it’ll probably take more than a couple dismissals to get anyone’s attention. Medvedev is running out of time on this account (as well as others). Those he’d like to make responsible or punish will just take the tongue-lashings and wait him out.

Speaking before the Duma yesterday, acting Armaments Chief, General-Lieutenant Oleg Frolov indicated the proposed 13-trillion-ruble State Armaments Program (GPV or ГПВ) for 2011-2020 is not enough to accomplish the Kremlin’s rearmament goals. RIA Novosti reported the draft GPV will go the government’s Military-Industrial Commission (VPK or ВПК) by the end of this month.

From the Space Troops like his boss Vladimir Popovkin, Frolov is the Defense Ministry’s Deputy Armaments Chief, and Chief of the Main Armaments Directorate.

Frolov said 13 trillion rubles will guarantee development of strategic nuclear forces, air defense, and aviation, but the Ground Troops’ requirements for modern weapons will be underfinanced.

He added that 28 trillion rubles would allow the Defense Ministry to cover the Ground Troops’ needs, and 36 trillion—almost three times the planned amount of the GPV—would fully finance programs for the Navy and Space Troops.

First Deputy VPK Chairman, ex-general Vladislav Putilin responded that his commission hasn’t heard answers as to why the proposed 13-trillion-ruble allocation is insufficient for the military’s needs:

“In the Defense Ministry’s opinion, the armed forces will degrade under an allocation of 13 trillion rubles out to 2020. But we haven’t gotten explanations even though we’re asking: show us these horror stories.”

Putilin noted that the GPV is still a ‘working’ document at this point.

At the same time, the Audit Chamber (a GAO-type organization) told the Duma the Defense Ministry is not succeeding in using its allocated funding. Lenta.ru reported that, by varying measures, the Defense Ministry executed only 42-65 percent of the State Defense Order (GOZ, Gosoboronzakaz, ГОЗ, Гособоронзаказ) for last year. Also of interest from yesterday, SIPRI released its estimate of Russian defense spending for 2009–$53 billion (about 1.6 trillion rubles), good enough for fifth place worldwide. See also Grani.ru for coverage of the Defense Ministry’s difficulty spending the GOZ.

Newsru.comcaptured this story appropriately as a Defense Ministry demand for more funding. Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev have vowed repeatedly to increase new armaments, from the current level of 10 percent, to 30 and 70 percent of the inventory in 2015 and 2020 respectively. What’s unknown is why at least one uniformed military man has decided to challenge the feasibility of his political masters’ long-term rearmament goals.

Last Friday’s NVOprinted an interesting editorial that discussed arms exporter irritation with Deputy Defense Minister, Armaments Chief [former Commander of Space Troops and ex-General-Colonel] Vladimir Popovkin for publicly admitting the Defense Ministry’s dissatisfaction with many of the OPK’s products. The exporters are obviously upset that Popovkin’s comments have, and will, cost them sales abroad. But NVO concludes a greater danger would be trying to silence anyone–high-ranking defense official or independent defense analyst–who dares point out the OPK’s problems in the hope of remedying them.

NVO’s sub-title for the article is “The OPK’s systemic crisis threatens a breakdown in the supply of combat equipment to the Russian Army and a lack of export contracts.”

The Greeks have apparently called off a purchase of 420 BMP-3s for $1.5 billion (let’s call it $3.6 million per vehicle). The deal had been 2 years in the making, and it wasn’t the state of the Greek economy that caused the halt. According to NVO, the money was already in the defense budget. Rather it was Popovkin’s specific criticism of the BMP-3 that folded the deal.

Popovkin is quoted:

“We very much need to protect our soldiers. Today everyone rides on top of the BMP because no one wants to ride in this ‘coffin.’ We need to make a different vehicle.”

Greek journalists published his remarks, and opposition politicians turned them into a scandal: how can you buy unsuitable equipment that even the country that makes it won’t buy?

Popovkin also complained about the T-90 that the Indians are buying, the tank support combat vehicle (BMPT) that Rosoboroneksport recently demonstrated at an arms show in Kuala Lumpur, and other equipment which the army won’t buy for one reason or another, but which is put forth for export and actively advertised there.

According to NVO, the arms exporters are terribly offended because the [ex-] general cost them several lucrative contracts. But, in NVO’s estimation, his speech is very necessary. It says:

“. . . the truth about the condition of the Russian defense-industrial complex, about those processes occurring there, about the systemic crisis in it and the inability of its various directors, including even the government’s Military-Industrial Commission [VPK], to correct the existing situation, is not a secret at all. It’s been talked about more than once. On the most varied levels. Including even presidential.”

NVO says this truth is very important; it could help the powers-that-be uncover the problem areas, fix them, and produce the modern equipment needed for the defense of the country’s interests. Without an honest discussion, the deficiencies can’t be fixed. But the Kremlin, government, the legislature, executive organs, or the regions won’t undertake any serious measures against negligent managers. Despite constant talk of state arms programs, federal programs of technical reequipping of defense enterprises, in reality, with the exception of aviation and air defense firms, nothing is really happening. It’s moving at a snail’s pace. Or is it?

Foreign buyers send in 33 warranty claims for every 100 Russian weapons systems exported. And the scandal with the Algerian MiGs didn’t teach the OPK anything.

It would be possible to silence critics and protect military-technical cooperation with foreign countries and keep the profits coming to the budget and the manufacturers. But won’t the low quality of these systems, their inability to meet the demands of modern war, really be a negative advertisement? Does someone really think if they quiet the generals, together with the Moscow media, military analysts and experts then they can sell some kind of half-finished military goods to a serious buyer? Naive views worked out for illiterate dilettantes.

NVO figures there are two ways out: either give up, lose export orders, and accept the situation or sharply improve the quality and effectiveness of Russian weapons, reduce prices and defects, and strive to be on the leading edge of technology. In other words, saving defense industry is in the hands of defense industry itself. And no one else.

When it comes to combat vehicles, sniper rifles, UAVs, assault ships, night sights, and armor, the international division of labor in defense industry isn’t such a bad thing after all. It brings Russia closer to the ‘probable enemies’ of the recent past. But when it comes to nuclear-powered submarines and strategic missiles we still don’t know how to do them ourselves and no one’s going to sell us those. And [unless Russia remembers how and gets its OPK in order] it will remember national security the same way it remembers the long forgotten past.

This is NVO’s way of telling the Putin-Medvedev regime it would be foolish to shut down this feedback channel that tells it what needs fixing in the OPK.

“Sevmash” Will Not Meet Schedules for Nuclear Submarine Construction Due to Insufficient Personnel

SEVERODVINSK, 9 Feb – RIA Novosti. The “Sevmash” enterprise in Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast will fall behind schedule in constructing nuclear submarines, it was announced to RIA Novosti on Tuesday in the enterprise’s press service.

Information about the lag in the schedule was heard in the session of the interdepartmental coordinating council which took place under the leadership of RF Government Military-Industrial Commission member Vladimir Pospelov and Deputy Navy Commander-in-Chief for Armaments Nikolay Borisov.

Members of the coordinating council discussed the state of affairs in producing nuclear submarines at “Sevmash” – “Yuriy Dolgorukiy,” “Aleksandr Nevskiy,” “Vladimir Monomakh” (project 955 “Borey”), and also “Severodvinsk” and “Kazan.”

“Today, as noted in the session, there is some lag from the construction schedule acknowledged by Sevmash and its partner-enterprises,” stated the press service’s announcement.

Factory General Director Nikolay Kalistratov explained the delay was caused by a lack of qualified personnel.

“It’s essential to apply maximum effort to realize the outlined plans and complete orders on time. In the near future, we have to attract an additional 500 qualified production workers in the specialties pipefitter, machinist-fitter, ship finisher. It should also be noted that over two years we’ve increased the number of basic production workers by 2,000 people, but this force is still insufficient,” said the director of the enterprise’s press service.

Now at the “Sevmash” factory in various degrees of completion are three strategic nuclear submarines of project 955 “Borey” – “Yuriy Dolgorukiy,” “Aleksandr Nevskiy” and “Vladimir Monomakh.” Work on construction of the fourth strategic nuclear submarine of this project, with the provisional name “Saint Nikolay” began in December 2009. In all by 2015 it is planned to build eight nuclear submarines of this class.

This statement seems to imply there’s no problem with money, but, at a certain point, more workers equal money because higher wages should attract them, the northern climate notwithstanding. So to some degree, this is a Sevmash call for more resources to do the work already on its order books. Although these Sevmash officials said work’s begun on the fourth 955, RIA Novosti from 8 February made it clear there’s no firm idea of when its keel-laying ceremony would occur. And Navy CINC Vysotskiy said the problem was “technological,” not related to the fate of the Bulava SLBM or to funding. So maybe he meant a labor shortage, but, as noted, a lack of labor is an inability or unwillingness to pay what it costs to do the work.

Yuriy Dolgorukiy SSBN has more sea trials before handover to the Navy. Sevmash says Aleksandr Nevskiy will be launched in 2010 (it was laid down in early 2004). Vladimir Monomakh is about two years behind it. The big question for these boats is when and if they’ll have a missile. Late last year, a number of Russian media outlets claimed SSBN production was frozen due to Bulava’s problems. But Sevmash’s call for more workers doesn’t track with that. In October, the Russian government also announced Sevmash would receive 4 billion rubles to add to its working capital for modernization, along with a 6 billion ruble credit from VEB.