This Population Bulletin, published in September 1999, offers
readers a chance to see how America's racial and ethnic groups compare
with one another across a host of demographic dimensions. Below is the
full text of the report.

Introduction

The 20th century has witnessed the transformation of the United States
from a predominately white population rooted in Western culture to a society
with a rich array of racial and ethnic minorities. As the century began,
the U.S. population was 87 percent white. The nonwhite minority was composed
primarily of black Americans living in the rural South. At the century's
end, non-Hispanic whites account for less than 75 percent of the U.S. population.
The minority population is comprised of nearly as many Hispanics as blacks,
surging numbers of Asians, and a small but growing American Indian population.
By the middle of the 21st century, non-Hispanic whites will make up a slim
and fading majority of Americans. Hispanics will be nearly one-fourth of
the U.S. population. Blacks, Asians, and American Indians together will
make up close to one-fourth of the population. "Minority" is likely to
have a very different meaning in the 21st century.

America's ethnic landscape also includes a rapidly growing Arab population,
a sizeable Jewish population, and other ethnic groups. But in the 1990s,
the term "minority" usually refers to four major racial and ethnic groups:
African Americans, American Indians and Alaska Natives, Asians and Pacific
Islanders, and Hispanics.

This transformation of America's racial and ethnic profile is most visible
in certain states and communities. The four minority groups make up at
least one-half of the residents in Honolulu, Los Angeles, Miami, San Antonio,
and several other metropolitan areas. Within 25 years, California, Hawaii,
New Mexico, and Texas will be "minority majority" states in which minorities
will be more than one-half the population. But many parts of the country
have little racial or ethnic diversity. Minorities make up less than 5
percent of the populations of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and West Virginia,
for example.

The nation's changing demographic profile has important economic and
social implications. Immigration is transforming the U.S. Asian and Hispanic
populations. Hispanics from Guatemala, El Salvador, Ecuador, and other
Central and South American countries have created communities alongside
well-established Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban communities. The U.S.
Asian population was predominately Japanese, Filipino, and Chinese just
two decades ago. At the century's end, Asian Americans with roots in India,
Vietnam, or Korea outnumber Japanese Americans.

Minorities have also become more diverse socioeconomically. The number
of minorities in the highest income brackets has more than doubled since
1980, for example, yet minorities still account for a disproportionate
share of the poor. More minority politicians are being elected to public
office, but minorities are more likely than non-Hispanic whites to serve
time in prison. More minorities are earning graduate and professional degrees,
yet a disproportionately large percentage never finish high school.

The growth of the African American, Hispanic, Asian, and American Indian
populations is profoundly changing the racial and ethnic makeup of the
country's schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods, and it is creating a
new multiracial and multicultural heritage in the United States. Many businesses
target their products to specific minorities because they recognize that
minorities are an expanding market. Aspects of black, Hispanic, Asian,
and American Indian culture — including art, food, music, and styles of
dress — are being adopted throughout American society.

Americans are divided in their beliefs about the long-term effects of
the growing diversity. Some see the rapid growth of minorities as a key
to the revitalization of America and a logical continuation of the "melting-pot"
tradition. Others see the rapid increase in racial and ethnic minorities
as an unwelcome departure from America's European heritage. Discussions
on this topic sometimes become heated because the increase in the minority
populations is closely linked to important policy issues relating to immigration,
affirmative action, welfare, and education reform.

Few Americans have a good grasp of how large the different minority
groups are. A 1997 survey by the Gallup organization found that just 8
percent of Americans knew that African Americans make up between 10 percent
and 15 percent of the U.S. population; more than half (54 percent) thought
that blacks make up at least 30 percent of the total population. In a 1990
Gallup poll, respondents estimated that Hispanics made up about 20 percent
of the U.S. population, yet Hispanics accounted for just 9 percent of population
in 1990.1

Opinion polls also show that many white Americans believe that racial
discrimination no longer impedes the advancement of minorities. Yet numerous
studies document continued discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities
in employment, housing, criminal arrests and prosecutions, and many other
sectors of society.2

Although the transition to a multiethnic America is moving at a rapid
pace, it is occurring remarkably smoothly. But occasionally tensions build
and erupt into serious confrontations. In the 1990s, Americans have witnessed
racial riots in Los Angeles, the burning of African American churches in
the South, and the murders of a Filipino postal worker in California and
of a black man in Texas.

Hate crimes against minorities, especially African Americans, reportedly
increased in the 1990s.3 Yet such confrontations
are rare and involve far fewer people than the violence among racial and
ethnic groups in many other countries. Hate crimes and blatant racism directed
against immigrants have been widely reported in Western Europe in recent
decades as these countries received an influx of economic migrants and
political refugees.4 During the last
decade of the century, ethnic and religious differences have led to massacres
of ethnic Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda; full-scale war involving Serb, Bosnian,
Albanian, and other ethnic groups in the Balkans; and violence against
ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.

To the rest of the world, the United States is a grand and daring experiment.
No other country has so successfully blended so many people of different
races and cultures. At a time when racial and ethnic rivalries are promoting
violence around the globe, how Americans handle their transition to a multiracial
society has implications that extend far beyond U.S. borders.

If the United States can avoid a violent clash of cultures, the country
can benefit from its growing diversity. A multicultural, multiethnic America
has a competitive advantage in the global economy. The United States is
geographically positioned to serve the growing Latin American market to
its south, its traditional European market to its east, and the burgeoning
Asian market to its west. America's increasingly multicultural population
can enhance its ability to prosper in the new global marketplace. With
ties to all the regions of the world, America's racial and ethnic minorities
can help American businesses understand the needs and preferences of people
in other countries.

A History of Disadvantage

Many scholars maintain that the frictions that plague contemporary race
relations are probably no worse than those that divided European immigrant
groups 100 years ago.5 Clashes between
Germans, Irish, Italians, Poles, and other groups during the 19th and early
20th centuries often were intense and violent. Members of specific immigrant
groups suffered discrimination in employment, housing, and other areas.
But most European immigrants and their descendants eventually achieved
full participation in U.S. society.

This was not the case for the groups most Americans now think of as
"minorities." African Americans, Native Americans, Hispanics, and Asians
all have experienced institutionalized or state-sanctioned discrimination
as well as social prejudice and oppression. Many were involuntary Americans
— they were brought as slaves or they became Americans when their home
territory was transferred to the United States through war settlements,
purchase, or political agreements.

The legal oppression of African Americans has been the most blatant
and well documented. The ancestors of most African Americans were brought
to the United States as slaves. After slavery was abolished in 1865, blacks
could own land and vote, and some held public office. But their social
position deteriorated when post-civil war Reconstruction ended and the
Southern states began to pass "Jim Crow" laws, which required the segregation
of blacks from whites in schools, public transportation, restaurants, and
other public places. Whites justified these laws with the theory that intimate
social contact between blacks and whites would harm both races. In addition,
covenants and business practices maintained racial segregation by, for
example, renting or selling property to blacks only in certain neighborhoods,
or refusing to serve blacks who entered white restaurants. Before 1965,
discriminatory voter-registration laws prevented all but 7 percent of African
Americans in Mississippi from registering to vote. As recently as the 1960s,
some school districts maintained separate schools for black and white students.6

American Indians also have a long history of social and legal oppression
by European settlers and the U.S. government. As many as 7 million indigenous
people lived in North America when the Europeans arrived. Yet disease,
warfare, and in some cases, genocide, reduced the Indian population to
less than 250,000 by 1890. In the first half of the 19th century, the U.S.
government imposed treaties that forced Indians in the South and the Ohio
River Valley from their homelands. These forced migrations accelerated
after President Andrew Jackson signed the Indian Removal Act of 1830. Many
tribes were compelled to live on marginal land that was reserved for them
by the U.S. government and where they had little chance of prospering.7

American Indians have occupied a unique legal status as members of self-governing,
independent tribes. Despite this special status, many members of these
independent nations live in poverty and encounter overt discrimination.
American Indians became U.S. citizens only after passage of the Indian
Citizenship Act of 1924, which later was amended to include Alaska Natives.8

Most Hispanic groups have met with discrimination by governments controlled
by non-Hispanic whites. U.S. Hispanics often are erroneously assumed to
be illegal residents and a massive drain on public services.

Mexican Americans in southwestern states lost property and political
rights as Anglo Americans began to move into the region in the 1800s. As
late as the 1940s, local ordinances in some Texas cities blocked Mexican
Americans from owning land or voting. Mexican Americans had to attend segregated
public schools in many jurisdictions before 1950.9

There were relatively few Puerto Ricans on the U.S. mainland until World
War II, when they began moving to New York and other large cities of the
Northeast. They encountered widespread discrimination in education and
employment and sometimes incurred the resentment of blacks and other minorities
who saw them as competitors for jobs.

The Cuban American community was established by mostly white, well-educated
professionals who fled the Communist government of Fidel Castro in the
1960s. But later Cuban immigrants were generally poorer and less educated,
and thus met considerable resentment and discrimination from Americans.10

Most U.S. Asians come from recent immigrant families, but many can trace
their family's American history back more than 150 years. Much of this
period was marked by legal and social discrimination against Asians. Legislation
enacted in 1790 excluded Asians and other nonwhites from gaining U.S. citizenship
by limiting citizenship to "free white" residents. This racial requirement
for citizenship formed the basis for excluding nonwhites from many activities
and rights. Because most Asians were foreign-born and were not citizens,
some states could legally keep Asians from owning land or businesses, attending
school with white students, or living in white neighborhoods.11
Asian immigrants were not eligible for U.S. citizenship until 1952.

The 1879 California Constitution barred the hiring of Chinese workers
and the federal Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 halted the entry of most
Chinese immigrants until 1943. The 1907 Gentleman's Agreement and a 1917
law restricted immigration from Japan and a "barred zone" known as the
Asia-Pacific Triangle. During World War II, Americans of Japanese ancestry
were interned in camps by an executive order signed by President Franklin
D. Roosevelt.

Today's minority groups all have suffered — and to some extent continue
to suffer — economic, political, and social disadvantages because of their
racial or ethnic identity. Some analysts believe that the racial and ethnic
minorities of contemporary America will follow the path of European immigrant
groups; they will eventually assimilate into the wider society and lose
their minority status.12 Other analysts
point out that African Americans and American Indians have not been assimilated
after 200 years in the United States. These groups still face discrimination
and remain at the lowest rungs of society. Some analysts also caution that
social and economic conditions are so different now that today's minorities
have more limited opportunities for social mobility than did the European
American groups 100 years ago.13

Minority Status

How minorities are defined in statistics collected and published by
government agencies is driven by political considerations, laws, and regulations.
Minority scholar Juanita Tamayo Lott explains that "minority group status
did not derive from a specific race or ethnicity per se, but on the treatment
of race and ethnicity to confer a privileged, disadvantaged, or equitable
status and to gauge representation and underrepresentation."14

In 1977, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed federal
agencies to collect data on whites and four racial and ethnic minorities
— African Americans, Hispanics, Asians and Pacific Islanders, and American
Indians (including Alaska Natives). The OMB directive standardized statistics
on race and ethnicity, which provided data needed to monitor the effectiveness
of civil rights legislation in protecting minority groups from racial or
ethnic discrimination.15 In 1997, a
new OMB directive recommended that people be allowed to identify with more
than one race, but with only one ethnic group (that is, people may identify
as Hispanic or non-Hispanic, but not both). OMB also recommended that federal
agencies report statistics for Asians separately from those for Pacific
Islanders by Jan. 1, 2003.

The minority group categories are not mutually exclusive because Hispanic
origin is considered an ethnic identity rather than a race (see
Box
1). These overlapping race and ethnicity definitions affect national
figures only slightly, but they can skew statistics from areas with large
Hispanic populations. In New Mexico, for example, where Hispanics are two-fifths
of the population, the 1990 Census showed that 16 percent of whites in
the state (including white Hispanics) were poor. The percentage of whites
in poverty dropped to 11 percent when Hispanics were excluded because Hispanics
have a much higher poverty rate. [In this
Bulletin, data are given
separately for non-Hispanics in each racial category (white, African American,
Asian/Pacific Islander, and American Indian) where available.]

The Hispanic and Asian and Pacific Islander categories pose additional
difficulties for analysts because the people in these groups are so heterogeneous.
Anyone with ancestral ties to Spain and the Spanish-speaking countries
of Latin America can identify as Hispanic. Hispanic Americans include,
for example, persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and Salvadoran descent
— people who have different cultural backgrounds and different social and
economic characteristics. Likewise, many Asian Americans have little in
common except for ties to the same world region. They include people from
locations as disparate as India, Manchuria, and Samoa. They follow different
religions, speak different languages, and even use different alphabets.
Some Asian ethnic groups were adversaries in their homelands.

Another technical problem in comparing statistics on minorities is related
to the relatively small number of Asians and Pacific Islanders and American
Indians and Alaska Natives. Many socioeconomic and demographic measures
are not available for such small population groups. Survey-based measures
for these groups often are considered too unreliable to report in statistical
publications because the measures are calculated from a small number of
respondents. Even with administrative data, the relatively small numbers
of births, deaths, marriages, and other such "events" among these groups
make rates unreliable.

The combined population of the four minority groups was estimated at 74.9
million in 1998. If all these Americans lived in an independent country,
it would be the 15th largest in the world — more populous than Great Britain,
France, Italy, or Spain.

For most of this century, the minority population was overwhelmingly
African American, and it represented a relatively stable share of the total
U.S. population. Between 1900 and 1950, the minority share remained at
about 13 percent (see Figure 1). The number of minorities
surged from just under 10 million to nearly 21 million in the first half
of the century. But the non-Hispanic white population grew just as rapidly
because of high birth rates and immigration from Europe, which kept the
minority share about the same.

Between 1950 and 1998, the minority population more than tripled in
size as waves of immigration from non-European countries, higher birth
rates among minorities, and a relatively young age structure accelerated
the minority growth rates. The non-Hispanic white population grew slowly
after 1970 as birth rates fell and immigration from Europe dwindled. Between
1980 and 1998, the minority population increased 63 percent, compared with
an 8 percent growth of the non-Hispanic white population. Minorities now
comprise one-fourth of the U.S. population.

Asians and Pacific Islanders had the fastest rate of growth during
the 1980s and 1990s. The number of non-Hispanic Asians grew 179 percent
over the period, and reached 9.9 million. Nearly as many Asians as blacks
were added to the population (see Table 1). Hispanics
had the greatest numerical increase. Between 1980 and 1998, 15.6 million
Hispanics (and just 14.8 million non-Hispanic whites) were added to the
U.S. population.

The American Indian and Alaskan Native population has shown a remarkable
increase since the 1960s — it grew 255 percent between 1960 and 1990. The
increase reflects a tendency among Americans of partial American Indian
ancestry to reclaim their American Indian heritage. Improvements in census
coverage, immigration, high birth rates, and reductions in mortality can
explain just part of that growth — the remainder occurred because people
who previously had identified as white, black, or another race switched
their racial identity to American Indian.16
Nearly 570,000 people were added to the American Indian population between
1980 and 1998 — an increase of 40 percent.

The African American population is growing more slowly than other minority
populations. The number of blacks increased by 25 percent between 1980
and 1998, from 26.1 million to 32.7 million. The number of whites increased
even more slowly — at one-third the rate of African Americans — but they
remain the predominate racial and ethnic group in numbers as well as in
political and economic power.

The four minority groups accounted for 66 percent of the 43.8 million
people added to the U.S. population between 1980 and 1998.

In 1900, nine of every 10 minorities were African American. In 1998, blacks
made up less than one-half of all minorities, and their share is declining.
Hispanics, with a 1998 population of 30 million, are the second- largest
minority, accounting for 40 percent of U.S. minorities. The U.S. Census
Bureau projects that Hispanics will outnumber non-Hispanic blacks by 2005.
Asians accounted for 13 percent of minorities in 1998, while American Indians,
Eskimos, and Aleuts made up 3 percent.

The national-origin groups within the Hispanic and Asian populations
are growing at different rates, which is changing the mix of cultures,
languages, and socioeconomic characteristics of these groups. Interethnic
marriage is also increasing, which contributes further to America's ethnic
diversity. (see Box 2).

African Americans

Most African Americans are descendants of families that have been in
the United States for many generations. Increasing numbers of blacks also
share ties with immigrant groups from Africa, the Caribbean, and elsewhere
that have differing linguistic and cultural backgrounds. Immigration is
likely to increase the diversity within the African American population.
In 1980, about 3 percent of blacks were foreign-born. Many African-origin
immigrant groups swelled in size over the past two decades and by 1998,
5 percent of blacks were foreign-born.

The Caribbean is the source of most U.S. immigrants of African descent.
In 1998, nearly 3 million Americans were born in the Caribbean, and almost
one-half of these immigrants were black.17
The Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica are among the leading sources
of black Caribbean immigrants, including Hispanic blacks.

Immigration from this region continued at a high level throughout the
1990s. Severe political and economic problems in Haiti brought 163,000
Haitian immigrants to the United States between 1990 and 1998. Jamaica
sent 168,000 immigrants over the period; about 60,000 entered from Trinidad
and Tobago. And, many black Hispanics were among the nearly 350,000 immigrants
from the Dominican Republic who arrived between 1990 and 1998.18
Caribbean immigrants helped the number of black Hispanics to grow from
1.2 million to 1.7 million over the period.

Africa was the source of less than 4 percent of U.S. immigrants between
1981 and 1998, but new migration streams are being formed that suggest
the flow from Africa may expand in the future. In 1998, about 560,000 Americans
were born in Africa, up from 360,000 in 1990, and from just 60,000 in 1970.

Some African immigrants identify as white, in particular those from
North Africa, but an increasing share are blacks from sub-Saharan countries.
In 1990, 55,000 foreign-born Americans were from Nigeria and 35,000 were
from Ethiopia. Ghana, Kenya, and Morocco were other major source countries
for African immigrants.19

New population estimates for African immigrant groups will not be available
until after the 2000 census, but the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) reports that nearly 250,000 immigrants came from African countries
between 1990 and 1998; about 54,000 came from Nigeria and 41,000 from Ethiopia.

Hispanics

The nation's Hispanic population primarily includes people who can trace
their ancestry to Spanish-speaking countries throughout Latin America.
The Census Bureau publishes data for at least four Hispanic groups: Cubans,
Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and an "other Hispanics" category. In 1997, there
were 18.7 million Mexican Americans, 3.1 million Puerto Ricans (living
on the U.S. mainland), 1.3 million Cubans, and 6.4 million Hispanics from
other areas (see Table 2). Salvadorans, Colombians,
and Dominicans led the "other Hispanics" group in the 1990 Census, the
most recent source of counts for these groups. The "other Hispanics" category
has seen remarkable growth in the last two decades — the number more than
doubled between 1980 and 1997. Central Americans and South Americans are
becoming a larger share of the U.S. Hispanic population as immigrant streams
from Latin America expand and diversify. Central and South Americans accounted
for 14 percent of all U.S. Hispanics in 1997, up from 11 percent in 1990.
The Mexican-origin population remains the largest group and continues to
expand. The Mexican share of U.S. Latinos rose from 59 percent to 64 percent
between 1980 and 1997.

Asians and Pacific Islanders

Asians and Pacific Islanders are the most diverse U.S. minority group.
Publications from the 1990 Census included population characteristics for
13 Asian ethnic groups and six Pacific Islander groups, but many smaller
groups were listed in census questionnaires.20
Among the 10 million Asian Americans (including about 600,000 Hispanic
Asians) estimated in 1997, six groups numbered 900,000 or more: Chinese,
Filipino, Vietnamese, Asian Indian, Korean, and Japanese. These six groups
made up 84 percent of Asians and Pacific Islanders. Hawaiians and other
Pacific Islanders accounted for just 5 percent of the Asian and Pacific
Islander population.

Primarily because of immigration, the number of Asian Indians, Chinese,
Filipinos, Koreans, and Vietnamese more than doubled over the past two
decades. In comparison, the number of Japanese Americans (who had low immigration
levels) and Hawaiians (a native American group) grew relatively slowly
over the period.

American Indians and Alaska Natives

The American Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut minority population also combines
people with different pasts and presents. They are linked because their
civilizations were thriving in North America before Europeans and Africans
began to settle the continent. The Census Bureau estimated there were 2.4
million American Indians and Alaska Natives in 1998, including 347,000
Hispanic Indians. The 1990 Census provides the most recent estimates of
the Eskimo and Aleut populations. The 2 million American Indians counted
in the 1990 Census included 57,000 Eskimos and 24,000 Aleuts.

There are more than 500 recognized American Indian tribes, but one-half
of all American Indians identify with one of the eight largest tribes.
The Cherokee, Navajo, Chippewa, and Sioux tribes have the most members
and account for four of 10 American Indians, as shown in Table
3. The largest of the other tribes are Choctaw, Pueblo, Apache, and
Iroquois.

Higher birth rates among American Indians than among most other racial
and ethnic groups, better census reporting, and a resurgence of ethnic
pride helped increase the American Indian population by 28 percent between
the 1980 and 1990 Censuses. The Apache, Chippewa, Choctaw, and Navajo tribes
grew by 38 percent to 64 percent over the decade, for example, and the
number of Aleuts increased by 68 percent, far more than could be accounted
for by natural increase.

Immigration has accounted for more than one-third of the growth of the
minority population since 1980. Along with higher fertility among minority
women than white women, immigration caused the number of minorities to
increase faster than the number of whites. Some minorities also have higher
death rates than whites, especially at specific ages and from certain causes,
which affects the health and demographic profile of the U.S. population.
Immigration, fertility, and mortality — the basis of all demographic change
— affect and are affected by the relatively youthful age profile of U.S.
minorities.

Immigration

Between 1980 and 1998, nearly three-quarters of all immigrants entering
the United States came from Asia and Latin America; another 4 percent of
immigrants came from Africa. About 20 percent of U.S. immigrants came from
Europe between 1980 and 1998. This pattern is a marked change from the
1950s, when about one-half of immigrants came from Europe and 15 percent
came from Canada. Less than 40 percent of immigrants arriving in the 1950s
came from Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Oceania, the source regions
for the three largest U.S. minority groups.

Immigration accounted for about two-fifths of the growth of Hispanics
and nearly two-thirds of the growth of Asian Americans in the 1990s. Consequently,
a large proportion of people from these populations became Americans very
recently. Most Asian Americans were not born in the United States — 59
percent were foreign-born in 1998 (see Figure 2). About
74 percent of these Asian immigrants arrived since 1980. Thirty-eight percent
of Hispanics were born outside the United States. In contrast, just 5 percent
of African Americans and 3 percent of non-Hispanic whites and American
Indians were foreign-born.

The large numbers arriving over a short time period have promoted the
growth of immigrant communities, which provide support for newcomers but
can also isolate them from other Americans. Cohesive immigrant communities
can slow the acquisition of English and the assimilation of newcomers into
mainstream society.

The forces propelling immigrants to leave their home countries and come
to the United States are varied. Some people come to escape deplorable
conditions. Others are attracted by economic opportunities in the United
States. Still others join families already living here. And while most
come legally, some slip across the border without proper documentation,
or remain in the United States long after their temporary student or tourist
visas have expired.

Immigrants already here often help newcomers from their home countries
find housing and employment. They form networks that perpetuate the flow
from their countries. Recent immigration from Asia and the Pacific Islands
reflects two major streams. One stream flows from the Asian countries that
already have large communities here, including China, Korea, and the Philippines.
Many of these immigrants are college-educated and gained entry under the
employment provisions of immigration laws that favor immigrants with special
skills and knowledge.

The second stream is composed of immigrants and refugees from Southeast
Asia: Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Their arrival is tied to U.S. policies
following the Vietnam War and the unstable political and economic conditions
in their home countries. These immigrants tend to arrive with less education
and fewer resources than other Asian immigrants. They are much more likely
to be poor and to live in segregated neighborhoods than are Asians.21

Immigration from Africa and the Caribbean has accounted for about one-fifth
of the growth of the African American population (including Hispanics)
between 1990 and 1997.22 Immigration
(primarily from Canada, Mexico, and Central America) accounted for one-sixth
of the increase in the American Indian and Alaska Native population (including
Hispanics), according to Census Bureau estimates.

Immigration is likely to sustain the brisk rate of minority population
growth. The most recent projections from the Census Bureau anticipate a
net addition of 820,000 immigrants a year until 2050, including 350,000
Hispanics, 226,000 non-Hispanic Asians, 186,000 non-Hispanic whites, and
57,000 non-Hispanic blacks.23 Annual
immigration at these levels will bring the share of minorities in the population
from 28 percent in 1998 to 47 percent in 2050.

Immigration could slow, accelerate, or change direction because of world
events, economic trends, or new immigration laws. U.S. immigration laws
are inextricably linked to minority issues because they affect the number
and ethnic origins of people who move here.

Americans are divided on many immigration issues. Should we try to slow
or increase the flow of immigrants? Should we give a greater preference
to foreign relatives of U.S. residents or immigrants with valuable skills
and financial resources to invest in our economy? How much should we spend
to apprehend and deport illegal immigrants? Events outside Americans' control
— population pressures, racial and ethnic strife, and poor economic opportunities
— will determine the origins and numbers of people who want to come to
this country. But U.S. policies will determine how many and whom we will
accept and, in part, reflect Americans' assessment of the effect of minorities
on society.

Higher Fertility

Minorities contributed 40 percent of the 3.9 million U.S. births in
1997, although they made up only 28 percent of the population. One reason
minorities account for a disproportionate share of births is that a larger
proportion of minority women are in their childbearing ages, but minority
women also have more children than non-Hispanic white women, on average.
African Americans have had higher fertility rates than whites throughout
the 20th century. Many of the "new minorities" tend to come from countries
where large families are the norm. In Mexico and Vietnam, for example,
women have three children, on average. In Honduras and the Philippines,
the average is closer to four children.

The average for U.S. whites has been two or fewer children since 1972.
Hispanic women have the highest fertility rates. In 1997, the total fertility
rate (TFR, the total number of children a woman will have given current
birth rates) was estimated at 3.0, one child more per woman than the rate
for non-Hispanic whites (see Figure 3).

Non-Hispanic blacks, with a TFR of 2.2 children per woman, have the
second-highest fertility, followed by American Indians (2.0), Asians (1.9),
and whites (1.8).

Hispanic, black, and American Indian women tend to have their first
child at a younger age than do white or Asian women — which contributes
to a larger total family size. They are also more likely to become teenage
mothers. Overall, 13 percent of U.S. births occurred to teenage mothers
in 1997. But the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) reported
that teenagers accounted for 22 percent of black births, 21 percent of
American Indian births, 17 percent of Hispanic births, 10 percent of non-Hispanic
white births, and 5 percent of Asian and Pacific Islander births.24

Teen childbearing has been associated with negative economic consequences
for both mother and child, although some researchers debate whether these
consequences reflect age at birth or the socioeconomic circumstances of
many teen mothers before they had a child.25
Women who have children while in their teens are less likely to finish
high school, to be employed, or to earn high wages, and are more likely
to live in poverty than women who became mothers after age 20. The children
of teenage mothers start life at a disadvantage. In addition to economic
disadvantages, they are more likely to live apart from their fathers and
to encounter problems in school.

Black, Latino, and American Indian babies are more likely than white
or Asian babies to be born to an unmarried mother. In 1997, 32 percent
of U.S. children were born to unmarried women, according to NCHS. The share
was 69 percent among African Americans, 59 percent among American Indians,
41 percent among Hispanics, 22 percent among non-Hispanic white women,
and 16 percent among Asian women. Like children of teen mothers, children
born to unmarried mothers are more likely than other children to grow up
in poverty.26

Disparities in Health and Mortality

While the health of all Americans has improved markedly over the past
century, minorities often have more health problems and higher mortality
rates than whites in the same age groups. Much of this difference in health
status is associated with minorities' lower socioeconomic status and more
limited access to health care.

Life expectancy estimates, which are published only for blacks and whites,
show a persistent racial gap. In 1997, the average life expectancy at birth
was 77.1 years for whites (including Hispanics) and 71.1 years for blacks
— the highest levels ever for both groups. Life expectancy has increased
more rapidly for whites than for African Americans, which caused the gap
between the two groups to expand from its historic low point of 5.7 years
in 1982 to 7.1 years in 1987. By 1997, the white advantage in life expectancy
had narrowed to 6.0 years. Life expectancy increased every year for whites
over the period, while it fluctuated for blacks after 1984, primarily because
of a temporary decline in life expectancy for black men.27

African Americans have higher mortality rates in most age groups. The
difference is especially stark among infants. The infant mortality rate
(deaths to children under age 1 per 1,000 births) for African Americans
was 14.7 in 1995, more than twice the rate for Asians or whites and Hispanics,
and more than one-third higher than the rate for American Indians.28

Many minority infants face precarious health situations that begin before
their birth. Because of a lack of health insurance, limited access to health
facilities, and a host of other reasons, less than three-fourths of black
(72 percent), American Indian (68 percent), and Hispanic (74 percent) women
reported receiving prenatal care during their first trimester of pregnancy
in 1997. Asian women (82 percent) and white women (88 percent) were much
more likely to receive first trimester prenatal care.

African American babies are much more likely than other babies to be
born prematurely and to have a low birth weight. Thirteen percent of African
American babies born in 1997 were low-birth-weight babies — they weighed
less than 2,500 grams (about 5.5 pounds) at birth. In sharp contrast, just
6 percent to 7 percent of American Indian, Hispanic, Asian, and white babies
weighed less than 2,500 grams at birth in 1997. Low birth weight is associated
with a lower chance of surviving the first year of life and with many long-term
health and developmental problems.29

Minorities of all ages face a much greater risk of death from homicide
and HIV/AIDS than whites. Homicide was not among the top 10 causes of death
for white men in 1997, for example, yet it was the fourth most common cause
of death for Hispanic men, and the fifth most common cause of death for
African American men. In 1996 — the latest year available — homicide ranked
as the ninth most common cause of death among American Indian and Asian
men. NCHS reports show that minority men are much less likely than white
men, however, to die from an automobile crash, heart disease, or (except
for American Indians) from suicide.

Among women, death rates from diabetes — a disease exacerbated by poor
nutrition and health care — are noticeably higher among blacks, Hispanics,
and American Indians than among Asians or whites. Minority women also face
a greater risk of dying from infectious diseases or homicide than white
women, but they have a lower risk of dying from suicide.

Inadequate prenatal care, higher death rates, and other health problems
among a sizeable segment of the minority population stem in part from their
limited access to health insurance and, consequently, to medical care.
Minorities are much less likely than whites to have health insurance. About
12 percent of non-Hispanic whites reported they had no health coverage
in 1997, compared with 21 percent of Asians and African Americans, 25 percent
of American Indians, and 34 percent of Hispanics.30

Age and Gender

Minority groups have a different age and sex profile than non-Hispanic
white Americans. Accordingly, public policies related to education or social
security, for example, will have different effects on minorities than on
whites. This racial and ethnic age imbalance can also have a number of
social and political consequences. Whites may be less likely to support
tax increases to improve schools, for example, and more likely to support
programs that would benefit the largely white elderly population.

Immigration, fertility, and mortality trends among America's minorities
are reflected in the age and sex profiles of each group. The ratio of men
to women among Hispanics in the United States is unusually high, for example,
because early immigration streams were dominated by men whose economic
circumstances caused them to leave their families behind. In contrast,
African Americans have a slightly lower ratio of men to women, most noticeably
among young adults. This gap is thought to reflect both an underestimation
of the number of African American men (because of undercounting in the
census, surveys, and administrative records (see
Box
3) and the relatively high mortality among young black men.

The minority population is younger than the non-Hispanic white population,
on average. This age difference is one reason that the minority population
is growing faster than the white population. Younger populations have proportionately
more women of childbearing age than do older populations. Consequently,
they are likely to have more births than a population with an older profile.
Even if the United States had accepted no more immigrants after 1995, the
higher fertility rates among minorities, combined with their younger age
structure, would increase the share of the minority population from 28
percent in 1998 to 39 percent by 2050.31

The large numbers of Asian and Hispanic immigrants keep these minority
groups relatively young because most immigrants are young adults. Young,
working-age people are usually the most willing to face the challenges
involved in moving to a new country. Many immigrants bring children with
them or start families after they arrive.

In 1998, about one-third of the minority population was under age 18,
compared with just one-fourth of the non-Hispanic white population. In
contrast, about 7 percent of minorities were ages 65 and older, compared
with 15 percent of non-Hispanic whites. By 2050, an estimated 14 percent
of minorities and 25 percent of non-Hispanic whites will be ages 65 and
older.

Immigration trends will directly affect the age structure of U.S. minorities,
and, consequently, of the total U.S. population. If immigration from Latin
America and Asia subsides, it will slow the infusion of young adults and
their children into the Hispanic and Asian populations and these populations
will age faster. If immigration from African and Caribbean countries increases,
the African American population may age more slowly.

Because minorities account for an increasing share of the nation's children,
the racial and ethnic composition of the country's schools, future work
force, and future retirement population is changing. More than one-third
(35 percent) of all children under age 18 were minorities in 1998; nearly
one-half are projected to be a minority by 2025. In four states — California,
Hawaii, New Mexico, and Texas — the minority share of children has already
exceeded one-half, and the percentage is close to one-half in two other
states — Louisiana and Mississippi.32

Minorities' growing share of U.S. children — the future work force —
has implications for American businesses and public policy. Minorities
have lower educational attainment and higher poverty rates than whites,
on average. Because such a large percentage are immigrants or the children
of immigrants, many Asian and Hispanic children have limited English skills
and require special language classes. Policymakers will need to ensure
that minority children from disadvantaged homes receive adequate education,
nutrition, and health care in order to provide the nation with a trained
and competitive work force in the years ahead.

The working-age population will also become increasingly diverse (see
Figure
4). More than one-quarter (27 percent) of Americans ages 18 to 64 are
minorities; by 2050, this share will rise to nearly one-half. Minorities
tend to be concentrated in the younger working ages, ages 18 to 44. In
1998, 73 percent of minorities of working age were in the younger age group
(ages 18 to 44), compared with 62 percent of non-Hispanic whites of working
age.

The older working ages (45 to 64) are generally the ages when people
are most likely to reach the top ranks of management. In part because whites
are concentrated in the older working ages and because of the history of
discrimination against minorities in hiring and promotion, a largely white
group of managers supervises a work force that is increasingly multiracial
and multicultural. Many business leaders recognize the need for diversity
training within their corporations, and minority advocates are keeping
a watchful eye on signs of a "glass ceiling" that appears to prevent minorities
from rising to the upper ranks of management.

This age gap between minorities and non-Hispanic whites also means that
minority workers support a disproportionately large number of white retirees.
Under the U.S. retirement system, Social Security payments for retirees
are deducted from the income of current workers

Older Americans will also be affected by the nation's growing racial
and ethnic diversity. Between 1998 and 2025, for example, the number of
minorities ages 65 and older will increase from 5.4 million to 14.6 million
— a 171 percent increase, compared with a 63 percent increase among the
non-Hispanic white older population. Minorities represented 16 percent
of the population ages 65 and older in 1998, but their share is expected
to reach 24 percent by 2025, and 34 percent by 2050 — more than double
the 1998 share. Asians and Hispanics will be the fastest growing segments
of the older population. As a result of these changes, policies, programs,
and even commercial products targeted at today's older population need
to be reassessed to meet the needs of tomorrow's elderly.

Families and Households

Primarily because minorities are younger and have higher birth rates than
the non-Hispanic population, they are more likely to live in family households
and to have dependent children (see Table 4). In
1998, between two-thirds and four-fifths of households among all racial
and ethnic groups were family households. Under the Census Bureau definition,
a family household consists of two or more people living together who are
related by adoption, blood, or marriage. It may or may not include dependent
children.

Differences in living arrangements among minority groups often were
as large as the difference between minorities and whites. Asians and Hispanics
were most likely to live in family households and least likely to live
alone. Nearly 30 percent of both white and black households consisted of
a single person in 1998, compared with just 14 percent of Hispanic and
18 percent of Asian households. Elderly people, particularly widows, often
live alone, which partially explains the lower incidence of single-person
households among the relatively young Hispanic and Asian populations.

Nearly two-thirds (64 percent) of Hispanic family households and 57
percent of African American family households included children under age
18 in 1998. Less than one-half of white families included children, reflecting
the older age structure of white adults and lower fertility among white
couples.

Except for Asians, minority families were more likely than white families
to be headed by a single parent — usually a woman — living with dependent
children. In 1998, nearly 20 percent of Hispanic and American Indian families
and 33 percent of African American families were composed of a single parent
with dependent children. Such families comprised just 6 percent of Asian
families and 9 percent of white families. Female-headed households with
children were the most common family arrangement for African Americans.
They accounted for 30 percent of black family households in 1998.

Cultural traditions and economic differences also affect peoples' living
arrangements. Many researchers have noted the tendency for Asian households
to include extended family members; others have noted the greater tendency
of young Hispanics, especially women, to live with their parents until
marriage.33 These living patterns may
be even more pronounced among recent immigrants, who are more likely to
adhere to traditional values, or who may be less able to afford a home
of their own.

Minority Americans are found in every U.S. region, state, and metropolitan
area, but they are highly concentrated in a few states and areas. In much
of the United States, non-Hispanic whites have relatively little contact
with minorities. More than one-half of America's minority population lives
in just five states: California, Texas, New York, Florida, and Illinois.
Twenty-two percent live in California alone. The regional location of different
minority groups is linked to historical circumstances and migration streams.

African Americans

Although African Americans may be the most widely dispersed minority
group, they are still highly concentrated in southern states (see Figure
5). As late as 1910, 89 percent of all blacks resided in the South,
a legacy of the pre-civil war plantation economy.34
Blacks started to move to the industrial cities of the North when the cheap
labor supplied by European immigrants was cut off during World War I. Following
World War II, blacks continued to move north but also began to migrate
to a few large cities in the West, mostly in California. Blacks were drawn
by California's strong economy and relatively benign race relations, and
the state's blacks have fared well relative to blacks in other parts of
the country.35In 1997, however, 55
percent of African Americans (including black Hispanics) lived in the South.
Another 36 percent lived in the Northeast and Midwest, mostly in metropolitan
areas. About 9 percent of blacks lived in the West.

Hispanics

Hispanics are highly concentrated in the Southwest (see Figure
6). Five southwestern states (California, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado,
and Texas) were home to 61 percent of U.S. Hispanics in 1997. More than
one-half lived in just two states: California and Texas. While many southwestern
Latinos are recent immigrants, others identify as "Hispanos," who are descendants
of Mexican and Spanish settlers who lived in the territory before it belonged
to the United States. More recent immigrants from Mexico and Central America
are drawn to this region because of its close proximity to their home countries,
job opportunities, and established Latino communities that can help newcomers
find jobs. Outside the Southwest, New York and Florida house the largest
concentrations of Latinos. New York had 9 percent and Florida contained
7 percent of Latinos in 1997.

The geographic concentration of specific Hispanic populations is even
more striking. More than four-fifths of Mexican Americans live in the Southwest
(three-fourths in Texas and California alone). Two-thirds of Puerto Ricans
are in the Northeast (primarily New York and New Jersey), and two-thirds
of Cubans live in Florida. This intense geographic concentration makes
it important to look beyond national averages to better understand U.S.
Latinos.

In the 1980s and 1990s, new job opportunities in such industries as
meat processing brought Hispanic immigrants to communities that had little
previous experience with foreigners. New Latino communities are emerging
in small towns and rural areas in Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, New
York, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Washington, among other states.36

Asians and Pacific Islanders

Asians and Pacific Islanders are also concentrated in the West (see
Figure
7). More than one-half (53 percent) lived in that region in 1997. Some
Asian Americans are descendants of Chinese workers brought to western states
beginning in the mid-1800s to work as laborers on the railroads, or are
Japanese who came in various immigration waves in the late 19th and early
20th centuries. But most Asians immigrated here after 1965. Asian immigrants
tend to enter the United States through either California or New York.
Next to California, New York has the largest number of Asians, with Hawaii
a close third. In 1997, 37 percent of all Asians and Pacific Islanders
lived in California, 10 percent lived in New York, and 7 percent lived
in Hawaii.

The largest share of nearly every major Asian ethnic group lives in
California. The 1990 Census showed that three-fifths of Chinese Americans
lived in California or New York, while about two-thirds of Filipinos and
Japanese lived in California or Hawaii. Asian Indian and Korean populations
are somewhat less concentrated geographically, although large communities
have emerged in a handful of states, including Illinois, New Jersey, and
Texas, as well as California and New York. Southeast Asians had a different
pattern because of federal resettlement schemes that created pockets of
Southeast Asian refugees in a few states. Nearly two-fifths of the U.S.
Hmong population lived in Minnesota and Wisconsin in 1990. One-tenth of
American Vietnamese lived in Texas — the largest concentration of Vietnamese
outside California.

American Indians

American Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts are also concentrated in the West.
Nearly one-half (48 percent) lived in that region in 1997 (see Figure
8). The geographic concentration of American Indian populations reflects
government policies and private practices that reduced the American Indian
population in the eastern part of the United States during the 1800s. Many
Indians were killed, while others were forced to move to reservations in
the West.

In 1930, just 10 percent of American Indians lived in urban areas, compared
with 56 percent of all Americans. World War II and federal urban relocation
policies of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s brought large numbers of Indians
to cities. More than 25,000 American Indians served in the armed forces
during World War II and another 50,000 left reservations to work in war-related
industries. Many remained in urban areas after the war; some took advantage
of job opportunities or education benefits for former military personnel
through the GI Bill.37 By the 1990s,
about one-half of American Indians lived in urban areas compared with three-fourths
of all Americans.

The geographic distribution of American Indians has changed little since
the 1970s, and demographer Matthew Snipp sees that "the current distribution
of American Indians appears to be a relatively stable one for the foreseeable
future." He notes that, although Indians are highly mobile, they tend to
move according to well-established patterns that maintain the current distribution
among counties and states.38

California's 1997 American Indian population of 307,000 (including 118,000
American Indians of Hispanic origin) results in part from the urban relocation
programs of the 1950s and 1960s. Oklahoma had the second-largest population
of American Indians (including Hispanics): 260,000 in 1997.

The Navajo Reservation and Trust Lands, which extend from Arizona into
New Mexico and Utah, contain by far the largest Indian enclave in the country.
The 1990 Census counted 143,000 Navajos and other Indians in this area
— but this number is known to be an undercount. An estimated 12 percent
of American Indians living on reservations may have been missed in the
census.39

Eskimos and Aleuts are highly concentrated in the Pacific Northwest.
In 1990, 78 percent of Eskimos and 42 percent of Aleuts lived in Alaska.
Nine percent of Eskimos and 26 percent of Aleuts lived in other Pacific
states.

Urban Residence

Minorities are more likely than whites to live in cities and metropolitan
areas. In 1997, 88 percent of minorities lived in metropolitan areas, compared
with 77 percent of non-Hispanic whites.40
Blacks and American Indians are the only minority groups with any significant
rural population. Nearly one-half of American Indians live in rural areas,
many on reservations. About one in seven African Americans resided in rural
areas in 1997 — primarily in the South.

Minorities are a significant presence in many of the nation's largest
metropolitan areas. Minorities accounted for at least one-third of the
residents in seven of the largest metropolitan areas in 1997, including
New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington-Baltimore, and San Francisco-Oakland-San
Jose. Minorities were more than one-half of the residents in the Los Angeles
and Miami-Fort Lauderdale metropolitan areas.41
In most cases, these metro areas include a mix of racial and ethnic groups
— no single group dominates.

Central Cities

Minorities make up a disproportionately large share of residents in
the central cities that form the core of metropolitan areas. The percentage
has been increasing. Between 1980 and 1998, the minority share of central-city
populations climbed from 35 percent to 47 percent.

The growing minority share of central city populations is reflected
in the shifting makeup of local governments and has contributed to a new
generation of minority politicians. Many of the nation's leading minority
politicians gained national prominence as mayors of large cities, including
Michael White (Cleveland) and Federico Peña (Denver). Peña
later served in President Bill Clinton's cabinet.

Several factors help explain the high concentration of minorities in
central cities. First, cities are the ports of entry for Asian, Hispanic,
and other minority immigrants. Second, large industrial cities where segregated
neighborhoods were the rule absorbed most of the millions of southern blacks
who moved north after 1910. Third, discriminatory real estate practices
and de facto segregation restrained the movement of minorities to the suburbs
at the same time that non-Hispanic whites were moving out of central cities.
Fourth, minorities are disproportionately poor and many cannot afford housing
in the suburbs. About 11 percent of white renter-households lived in public
or subsidized housing in 1998, compared with 24 percent of black, 17 percent
of American Indian, 16 percent of Latino, and 8 percent of Asian renter-households.

While economies are booming in some central cities, they are in decline
in others. The restructuring of the American economy eliminated many traditional
entry-level jobs in manufacturing and other industries located in cities.
Meanwhile, many entry-level service jobs have moved to suburban areas.
Entry-level jobs available in central cities tend to pay less than similar
jobs in the suburbs.42

Suburbs

At the same time that low-income minorities have been concentrating
in central cities, middle-class and affluent minorities have been moving
to the suburbs, particularly in large metropolitan areas. The minority
share of suburban populations increased in most metropolitan areas during
the 1980s and 1990s. Minorities accounted for 22 percent of suburbanites
in 1998, up from 18 percent in 1990 and 13 percent in 1980. In 1998, 31
percent of blacks, 43 percent of Hispanics, and 53 percent of Asians lived
in the suburbs. In 1990 — the most recent figure available — about 25 percent
of American Indians lived in suburban areas.43

Minority suburbanization tends to be greatest in metropolitan areas
where post-1965 immigration helped create large Hispanic and Asian populations.44
Suburbanization of minorities is most pronounced in western cities — where
51 percent of minorities and 62 percent of non-Hispanic whites lived in
suburban areas in 1990. The trend is least pronounced in the North, where
just 27 percent of minorities lived in suburbs, compared with 70 percent
of non-Hispanic whites.

Because suburbanization coincides with increasing incomes for many minority
families, suburbs with large minority populations are being targeted by
businesses looking for affluent consumers. Starting in the late 1980s,
for example, developers began to build new shopping centers in areas with
large minority populations and to select retailers and merchandise that
reflected the preferences of specific minority groups.45

Residential Segregation

Minorities tend to live in residential areas that are segregated by
race and ethnicity, but living patterns differ among minority groups. In
most metropolitan areas, demographers Roderick Harrison and Daniel Weinberg
found that in 1990, "… blacks suffer the most segregation. American Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleuts have roughly the same level of segregation as Asians
or Pacific Islanders, but both have lower levels than Hispanics."46

Movement to the suburbs does not necessarily mean living in integrated
neighborhoods, especially for blacks. In a study of the New York metro
area, for example, Asian Americans were fully integrated in the suburbs,
Hispanics were somewhat integrated, and blacks were largely segregated,
even after adjusting for differences in family size and education.47

Patterns of residential segregation vary among cities and regions. African
Americans in fast-growing, economically vibrant metropolitan areas of the
South and West live in less segregated neighborhoods than African Americans
in the older industrial cities in the Northeast and Midwest. Except for
Chicago, the most segregated cities for Hispanics are all in the Northeast.
For Asian Americans, cities in California tend to be the most segregated;
for American Indians, the most segregated cities are in the West and Midwest.48

The influx of new Asian and Hispanic groups has increased residential
segregation in many cities that are major ports of entry for immigrants.
Demographer William Clark finds, for example, that Southeast Asians in
the Los Angeles area are highly segregated. "These very high levels of
separation reflect strong cultural and economic differences and the presence
of very recent arrivals," and shows "the importance of ethnic havens in
creating new residential environments."49
Segregation was lower for Asian Indians and Filipinos in Southern California.

Clark suggests that immigrant ethnic groups cluster to protect and enhance
their status — much as Italian or Polish Americans did at the beginning
of the century. But, he says, whether the new enclaves are way-stations
through which immigrants will pass into the mainstream or whether they
are permanently segregated neighborhoods will depend on the socioeconomic
advancement and the preferences of each group.

The segregation of blacks declined in metropolitan areas that received
large numbers of Asian and Hispanic immigrants in the 1980s, according
to demographers William Frey and Reynolds Farley.50
Similarly, William Clark found that while the separation increased among
some ethnic groups in Southern California between 1970 and 1990, the residential
separation of blacks from whites and Hispanics decreased.

While racial discrimination — past and present — explains much residential
segregation, personal preference also plays a role. A study of Los Angeles
residents found, for example, that most minorities prefer to live in areas
where their ethnic or racial group makes up at least 40 percent of the
population.51 Public policies have
sought to end involuntary segregation, reflecting the consensus that discrimination
in housing harms society, but there is less agreement about whether voluntary
segregation is detrimental.

Racial differences in perceptions of what constitutes an integrated
neighborhood may also sustain residential segregation. Clark found, for
example, that blacks in several large cities preferred neighborhoods that
were equally divided among blacks and whites. Most whites preferred an
integrated neighborhood as well, but one where 80 percent of the residents
were white and just 20 percent black.52

Where people live often signifies their socioeconomic status and may
affect their chances of employment or determine their ability to borrow
money. Neighborhoods also differ in the caliber of schools and services,
and the likelihood of being affected by crime. Residential segregation
is one of the fundamental features that distinguishes minorities from the
majority society. While it may serve as a source of strength, by virtue
of the support a cohesive community can provide, it can also hinder advancement.
Using the conventional measures of success — such as education, occupation,
and income — minorities are unlikely to advance in U.S. society unless
they have the opportunity to interact with the majority society outside
their own ethnic communities.

Educational Achievements

For most Americans, education is the key to a good job and promising future.
In addition, upgrading the skills and education of minorities is crucial
if the United States is to compete in the global economy of the 21st century.

Educational attainment has increased for minorities — as it did among
non-Hispanic whites — over the past few decades. The percentages graduating
from high school and attending four or more years of college improved most
for African Americans and American Indians. Yet a smaller percentage of
minority students than non-Hispanic whites graduate from high school. This
is an increasingly serious problem given U.S. Department of Labor projections
that most new jobs in the next decade will require an education beyond
high school.53 Smaller percentages
of minorities than whites get the college or postgraduate degrees that
provide access to jobs with the highest pay and greatest potential for
advancement. During the 1980s and 1990s, college graduates were the only
group whose income increased after adjusting for inflation.54

The parents of today's minority youths often had less formal education
than the parents of young whites. Because a student's academic performance
is often affected by the parents' educational level, minority students
may start school at a disadvantage. Children whose parents never attended
college are much less likely to visit a library, or to have books read
to them, for example, than children whose parents attended college.55

But parents' educational levels do not explain all of the education
gap among U.S. racial and ethnic groups. Researchers also look for explanations
in the quality of schools, cultural values that de-emphasize education,
and a tendency to track minority students into lower-level, remedial classes
rather than the more rigorous classes needed to get into college.56

Among younger adults, Hispanics have the lowest educational attainment,
while non-Hispanic whites and Asians have the highest (see Figure
9). Nearly 40 percent of Latinos ages 25 to 44 never finished high
school in 1998, compared with 18 percent of American Indians, 14 percent
of African Americans, 10 percent of Asians, and 7 percent of non-Hispanic
whites.

The generally lower education levels of Hispanics are partially explained
by the large numbers of Hispanic immigrants who completed little formal
education in their home country. In 1998, 44 percent of foreign-born Hispanic
adults were high school graduates, compared with 70 percent of U.S.-born
Hispanic adults. Many Hispanic students come from homes in which little
English is spoken, which can hinder their academic progress. Hispanic children
are also much less likely to attend preschool, where many young children
learn the social and academics skills that help them succeed in school.
In 1996, 49 percent of Hispanic 4-year-olds were enrolled in a school program,
compared with 65 percent of white and 79 percent of black 4-year-olds.

Hispanics are less likely than other minority groups to attend or graduate
from college. Less than one-third of young Hispanic adults had attended
college in 1998, compared with two-fifths of American Indians, nearly one-half
of blacks, three-fifths of non-Hispanic whites, and two-thirds of Asians.

American Indians also have a relatively low likelihood of graduating
from high school or college. Uneven access to good schools and cultural
and linguistic barriers explain some of this lower educational attainment.
In the past, many reservation Indians attended boarding schools that stressed
cultural assimilation rather than academic achievement. Native languages
and religious practices were forbidden, which discouraged many children
from attending school. In 1980, just over one-half (56 percent) of American
Indians ages 25 or older had completed 12 or more years of school. By 1990,
about two-thirds of all American Indians ages 25 or older were high school
graduates. Four-fifths of younger adults (ages 25 to 44) had graduated
from high school by 1998. One-seventh of young American Indian adults had
graduated from college in 1998.

The lower educational attainment among African Americans adults is in
part a vestige of past discrimination that denied educational opportunities
to large numbers of blacks, especially in the rural South. In 1970, only
about one-third of African American adults had graduated from high school.
Younger blacks have benefited from the civil rights advances of the 1960s.
In 1998, 86 percent of blacks ages 25 to 44 graduated from high school,
close to the percentage for whites and Asians (see Figure
9). Yet non-Hispanic whites in this age group are still twice as likely
— and Asians are three times as likely — as young African Americans to
complete four or more years of college.

About 90 percent of both Asians and non-Hispanic whites graduate from
high school, but Asians are more likely than whites to complete four or
more years of college. The educational success of Asians and Pacific Islanders
may be best exemplified by the share who continue beyond a four-year college
degree. About 15 percent of Asians and Pacific Islanders ages 25 or older
had a graduate or professional degree in 1998 — much higher than the percentage
for whites (9 percent) and roughly three to four times the rates for other
minorities.57 This may reflect the
fact that many Asian adults came to the United States specifically to attend
universities. Others came already holding college degrees.

The persistent gap in educational attainment is linked to experiences
in elementary and secondary school for many minorities. Many black, Hispanic,
and American Indian students do not take the advanced math and science
courses that prepare students for higher education. Among eighth graders
in 1996, 27 percent of white and Asian students were taking algebra, compared
with 20 percent of black and Hispanic students and 14 percent of American
Indian students. The gap widens at higher levels of mathematics. Nearly
one-fourth (23 percent) of the Asian graduates of the high school class
of 1994 had taken calculus, compared with 4 percent of black and American
Indian students, 6 percent of Hispanics, and 10 percent of whites.58

Beginning in the 1960s, affirmative action policies tried to make up
for past discrimination by giving minority youth some advantage in college
admissions. In the 1990s, however, these policies are being scaled back
or abandoned in many states (see Box
4). Some minority advocates fear that minorities will lose ground in
educational attainment if they are not given extra help in getting into
good colleges. Others maintain that minorities were not really helped by
preference policies, and that the policies discriminated against whites.

Working Lives

The more education people complete, the more likely they are to be working.
Eighty-one percent of college-educated Americans were in the labor force
in 1998, for example, compared with 45 percent of high school dropouts.
And fewer new jobs will be available for lower-skilled workers in the future.

But labor force participation differs among racial and ethnic groups
regardless of educational level, which suggests that cultural, societal,
economic, and other factors also affect employment. Among men, Hispanics
were the mostly likely to be working in 1998 — 79 percent of Hispanic men
ages 16 and older were in the labor force. Black men were least likely
to be working (68 percent). The reverse was true for women. Black women
had the highest female labor force participation (64 percent) of all racial
and ethnic groups, while Hispanic women (56 percent) had the lowest.59

Although many minority Americans have achieved remarkable success in
business, academia, and other sectors, minorities encounter difficulties
in getting and keeping good jobs. They tend to be clustered in the lower-status
occupations, and many continue to face discrimination in hiring and promotion.
Except for Asians, minorities are more likely than whites to be unemployed.
African American, American Indian, and Hispanic men were roughly twice
as likely as white men to be unemployed in 1998. The pattern is similar
among women.

Unemployment statistics do not capture the number of discouraged workers
— people who have given up hope of finding a job. Neither do they reflect
the number of underemployed individuals — people who are working part-time
or in jobs for which they are overqualified. Bureau of Labor Statistics
data show that minorities are overrepresented among discouraged and part-time
workers as well.

Hispanics, African Americans, and American Indians are more likely than
non-Hispanic whites or Asians to work in lower-paying, semi-skilled jobs,
or as service workers (see Table 5). They are less
likely to hold white-collar jobs, which range from managerial and professional
to clerical positions. Minorities who do hold white-collar jobs are more
likely than whites or Asians to work as typists, clerks, or salespeople
rather than as higher-earning managers or professionals. And, while the
share of U.S. workers in farming, fishing, or forestry is quite small,
it is greatest among Hispanics, reflecting the large number of Hispanics
who work in agriculture.

The occupational status of minorities has improved slowly over the past
decade. Between 1990 and 1998, the percentage of blacks in managerial and
professional occupations increased from 17 percent to 20 percent, while
the percentage increased from 13 percent to 15 percent for Hispanics and
from 16 percent to 20 percent for American Indians.

Economic restructuring during the last few decades eliminated many jobs
in large industrial cities that have sizable minority populations. These
job losses were especially problematic for African American men living
in the Northeast and Midwest. While black men were struggling to find and
keep jobs, black women saw their employment options expanding. Some analysts
think that the near equality of labor force participation rates and earnings
of African American men and women discouraged marriage and contributed
to the high rates of unmarried childbearing and of female-headed families.60

The growing importance of information technology in the U.S. economy
has also put many minorities at a disadvantage. A 1999 report by the U.S.
Department of Commerce noted that black, Hispanic, and American Indian
households are less likely than white or Asian households to own a computer
or use the Internet.61 In 1998, roughly
one-half of Asian and white households had a personal computer, compared
with only one-third of American Indians and one-fourth of blacks and Hispanics.
Minorities are also less likely to use a computer at work. The report warns
that non-Asian minorities will not be as competitive for jobs in the future
if they lack experience with information technology.

The labor force experience of minorities — and its effects on other
aspects of life — is a crucial part of U.S. society. The growing size of
the minority population makes the full participation of all racial and
ethnic groups in the labor force increasingly important for the United
States. The share of minorities in the civilian labor force grew from 18
percent in 1980 to 26 percent in 1998, and is projected to increase further.62
While more minorities are getting the education that provides entry to
higher-status jobs, many remain in "dead-end" jobs or face frequent unemployment.
And many minorities who have made it to the professional sphere still encounter
barriers to full participation. As doors open to better opportunities,
they often reveal closed doors farther along the career path. This "glass
ceiling" that keeps many minorities out of executive suites and board rooms
remains a salient issue as we enter the new century.

Income, Wealth, and Poverty

The disadvantaged position that minorities hold in the United States is
exemplified by their low economic status. Minorities tend to earn less
than whites — even when they have similar educational levels — and they
possess far fewer material and financial assets than whites. But averages
and medians mask vast differences in the economic well-being within minority
groups and the improvements in minorities' socioeconomic status.

In 1997, Asians earned higher incomes than whites or other minorities,
which reflects their higher educational attainment and higher-status jobs.
At $45,400 per year, the median household income of Asians was 12 percent
higher than that of whites ($40,600) in 1997. The incomes of other minority
groups were significantly lower. Annual median household income was lowest
among blacks (about $25,100) and was only slightly higher for Hispanics
and American Indians (see Figure 10).

Incomes have risen for most Americans in the past 30 years. Black households
enjoyed a 31 percent boost in real median household income between 1967
and 1997, compared with a 18 percent increase for whites (including Hispanics).
But neither Hispanics nor Asians have seen much improvement in the years
that the Census Bureau has tracked their incomes. Hispanic households suffered
a slight decline in median income between 1972 and 1997, and Asian households
were no better off financially in 1997 than they were in the late 1980s.63

During the 1990s, the U.S. economy went from a recession to a protracted
period of growth. The robust economy during the middle and late 1990s helped
raise the median household income for blacks, whites, and American Indians;
yet the gaps between whites and Asians and the other minorities changed
little. Hispanics and Asians saw a modest decline in household income between
1989 and 1997. The influx of Asian and Hispanic immigrants in the 1990s
reduced the average incomes for these groups because recent immigrants
usually earn less than longer-term residents. Immigrants' incomes tend
to rise over time as they improve their language skills, knowledge of the
job market, and U.S. job experience.

The racial and ethnic disparities in household income arise from a variety
of reasons. Some of these reasons appear to be straightforward. Minorities
have lower educational attainment than whites, for example, which usually
translates into lower incomes. But income gaps also reflect complex social,
cultural, and economic factors that affect educational levels, occupational
choices, and ultimately household income. Hispanic women are less likely
to work outside the home, for example; Asians are more likely than blacks
or whites to include more than two working adults in the same household;
and African American women are more likely to head a household without
a husband. Also, minority youths may not be encouraged to prepare for college,
and once in the workplace, they may be routed into jobs with little chance
of advancement.

Even the educational differences among racial and ethnic groups have
a complicated association with income. The financial rewards for education
are lower for minorities than for whites, and they are not consistent across
minority groups. Asians have higher earnings than other minorities with
the same level of education, but they must complete more education than
whites to earn comparable salaries.

Non-Hispanic whites with at least a bachelor's degree earned $19,000
(in 1997 dollars) more per year than whites who had no more than a high
school education, on average. The annual income added by a bachelor's degree
was $18,700 for Asians, $16,000 for Hispanics, $15,500 for American Indians,
and $12,800 for blacks.64 The differences
in the return on a college education probably also reflect regional differences
in incomes, racial discrimination in hiring and promotions, and disparities
in the quality of education they received.

Average incomes and living costs tend to be higher in cities and geographic
regions where minority groups are concentrated. Most Asians, for example,
live in large cities of the West or Northeast where salaries and living
costs are relatively high. Although Asians' median household income exceeds
that of whites for the nation as a whole, the 1990 Census showed that Asians'
median income was less than that of non-Hispanic whites in New York, Dallas,
Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C., in 1989. The lower average
incomes of blacks and American Indians are related to the large share of
blacks in the rural South and of American Indians in rural areas where
average incomes and living costs are lower.

Blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians are more likely than whites
or Asians to live in single-parent families with children. This could contribute
to their lower median family incomes because single-parent families have
lower incomes than married-couple families, in part because there are fewer
potential workers in the household and because single-parent families tend
to be headed by women, who earn less than men, on average. In 1997, the
annual median family income for female-headed families ($21,000) was less
than one-half that of all married-couple families ($51,600).65
Even among married couples, however, median income is lower among minorities.
The median for black married couples is 84 percent that of non-Hispanic
whites; the median for Hispanic couples is 62 percent that of non-Hispanic
whites.

Household income reflects the number of earners in a household, as well
as the income of each earner. In 1997, 58 percent of white families had
two or more household members working, compared with 45 percent of black
households and 49 percent of Hispanic households. But 18 percent of Asian
families had three or more earners, compared with 13 percent of non-Hispanic
white families.66

Within the minority population, more families and households have entered
upper-middle-class, even affluent, income levels. The number of minority
households with inflation-adjusted incomes of $50,000 or more grew from
2.7 million in 1979 to 4.4 million in 1989 and 6.0 million in 1997. Part
of this increase resulted from the rapid growth of minority populations
over nearly two decades, but it also reflects improvement in incomes within
minority groups. The percentage of minority households with incomes of
$50,000 or more grew from 20 percent to 24 percent between 1979 and 1997.67

More Hispanic, African American, and American Indian households climbed
into the upper income bracket during the 1990s. Between 21 percent and
25 percent of these three groups had incomes of $50,000 or more in 1997.
But the percentages are small relative to whites and Asians. About 40 percent
of white households and 46 percent of Asian households had an annual income
of $50,000 in 1997.

While median incomes remain generally lower for minorities than for
whites, the economic success of some minorities provides a positive example
for minority youth and wider access to power and greater financial resources
for minority communities. But this same success has some negative aspects
as well. It has convinced many white Americans that racial discrimination
no longer hinders the advancement of U.S. minorities and that minorities
no longer need extra protection or help. Within minority groups, the movement
of some families into the middle and upper classes can provide social connections
that help others improve their status. It also may strain minority group
cohesion because some remain in poverty while others are advancing.

Accumulated Wealth

Income is only one measure of economic advancement and well-being. Minorities
still lag far behind whites in terms of net savings and accumulated or
inherited assets. Accumulated wealth is a critical dimension of economic
status because it can cushion the financial impact of sudden health problems,
unexpected unemployment, or other emergencies. Savings or loans secured
by assets also help pay college costs for children or the down payment
on a house. The vast racial gap in wealth perpetuates the lower status
of minorities.68

The median net worth of whites including Hispanics is about 10 times
that of blacks or Latinos (see Table 6). Differences
in family structure account for some of this disparity. The percentage
of female-headed households is greater for blacks and Latinos than for
whites. In 1993, the median net wealth of all married-couple households
($61,900) was nearly five times that of female-headed households ($13,300).

A large wealth gap exists even for households with similar incomes or
composition. Among households in the highest fifth (or quintile) of all
incomes, for example, the median wealth of white households ($123,400)
is two to three times that of blacks or Hispanics. For households in the
lowest fifth of incomes, the median wealth of white households was $7,600
in 1993, more than 30 times that of black households, and 15 times that
of Hispanics. Part of the reason for this gap is that low-income white
households — especially those with elderly people — are more likely than
their minority counterparts to own a home.

Data on the accumulated wealth of Asians and American Indians are not
available, but measures of homeownership and business ownership provide
clues to the value of their assets.

Homeownership

Equity in a home is the largest single source of wealth for most Americans.
While rates vary among groups, all minority groups have homeownership rates
17 to 27 percentage points below that of whites. In 1998, 72 percent of
white households owned homes. Just over one-half of American Indian and
Asian American households owned a home in 1998, while about two-fifths
of Hispanic and black households owned a home.

Homeownership is surprisingly low among Asians and Pacific Islanders,
given their relatively high income levels. One reason for this apparent
anomaly is the large share of recent Asian immigrants who may not have
been here long enough to accumulate enough money for a down payment. Another
factor is that Asians and Pacific Islanders tend to live in cities with
the nation's most expensive housing. Nearly one-half of all Asians and
Pacific Islanders reside in the Los Angeles, New York, Honolulu, or San
Francisco metropolitan areas, where average home prices were between $177,000
and $307,000 in 1997, well above the national average price in metropolitan
areas: $122,000.69 Many middle-class
Asians cannot afford to buy a home in these cities.

Business Ownership

The rapid growth of the minority population and a surge in business
activity within minority groups is changing the profile of U.S. business
owners. Many immigrants begin their own businesses because they are excluded
from promising jobs by limited English proficiency, lack of American educational
credentials, or discrimination.70 The
number of minority-owned firms grew by about 750,000 between 1987 and 1992
— increasing from 1,214,000 to 1,966,000. The minority share of all U.S.
businesses rose from 9 percent to 11 percent over the same period — a notable
increase, but still far below their proportion of the population.

The number of Hispanic-owned firms surged between 1987 and 1992, and
surpassed the number owned by African Americans (see Table
7). These two minority groups account for just over two-thirds of all
minority-owned businesses. Asians account for nearly 30 percent of minority
businesses, although they make up just 13 percent of the minority population.
Barely 2 percent of minority-owned firms are held by American Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleuts.

Many Asian immigrants came to the United States specifically to take
advantage of the business opportunities available here, and Asians' overall
business ownership rates are higher than those of other minorities. The
business ownership rate for Asians was 68 (businesses for every 1,000 Asians)
in 1992, more than twice the rate for Hispanics, who had the next highest
ownership rates among minorities. The average annual receipts for Asian-owned
firms ($166,000) were significantly higher than those of any other minority
group.

Some Asian groups surpass the white business ownership rate of 80 per
1,000. By 1992, for example, Koreans had a business ownership rate of 113
per 1,000 population. The high Korean rate reflects the selective migration
of highly educated Koreans, and possibly a greater willingness among Korean
immigrants to pool resources to start or expand a business. Asian Indians
(with 93 businesses per 1,000 population), Chinese (79 businesses per 1,000),
Vietnamese (78 businesses per 1,000), and Japanese (69 businesses per 1,000)
are other Asian groups well represented in the business community. Hawaiians
and Filipinos, in contrast, are much less likely than other Asian groups
to own businesses.

Among Hispanics, Cubans have the highest business-ownership rate. In
1992 Cubans owned 84 businesses for every 1,000 Cubans — more than three
times the rate of Mexicans, and nearly five times the rate for Puerto Ricans.
Many U.S. Cubans were professionals or business owners in Cuba before they
immigrated to the United States. Cubans are heavily concentrated in southern
Florida, which provides a solid base of Hispanic consumers. More than one-half
of all Cuban businesses are in the Miami area, and many rely on a Cuban
clientele.

Poverty and Welfare

While many minority group members have achieved economic success, the
poverty rate for each minority group is higher than the rate for whites.
The percentage of blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians in poverty is
about three times that of non-Hispanic whites (see Table
8). Even Asian Americans, who have a higher average income than non-Hispanic
whites, are more likely than whites to live in families with incomes below
the poverty line established by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget
— $16,400 for an average family of four in 1997. Further, minorities are
overrepresented among the poorest of the poor — families with incomes less
than one-half the official poverty threshold. More than one-half (57 percent)
of those in extreme poverty are minorities.

The lower average educational attainment of minorities explains only
part of their greater poverty rates. poverty rates are higher among minorities
than among non-hispanic whites at every level of educational attainment.
among high school dropouts ages 25 or older, the poverty rate for blacks
(37 percent) is still more than twice that of non-hispanic whites (18 percent).
latinos and american indians with less than a high school education also
have higher poverty rates than non-hispanic whites or asians without a
high school diploma. among college graduates, the poverty rates for blacks,
latinos, and american indians are two to three times that of non-hispanic
whites. even among asians ages 25 and older, the poverty rate for college
graduates is more than twice that of non-hispanic whites.

Minorities in poverty rely on welfare benefits at a higher rate than
poor non-Hispanic whites. About 70 percent of non-Hispanic whites lived
in households where someone received government assistance in 1997, while
nearly 90 percent of poor blacks and poor American Indians received welfare
benefits. Eighty-three percent of poor Hispanics and nearly 70 percent
of poor Asians received welfare in 1997. The relatively high reliance on
welfare among blacks, Latinos, and American Indians may reflect the lack
of savings, credit, home equity, or other assets that can sustain people
through spells of poverty. Also, minorities are more likely to be in extreme
poverty, and to remain poor for longer periods than whites.

An important segment of the population is highly vulnerable to long-term
poverty and welfare dependence, problems with the law, and other personal
and family problems. This highly disadvantaged population — sometimes referred
to as the "truly needy" or "underclass" — tends to be concentrated in neighborhoods
of extreme poverty and to share certain risk factors, such as dropping
out of high school, teenage childbearing, and incomes below the poverty
line. The children raised in these high-risk circumstances are particularly
worrisome for Americans, and a disproportionate share of these children
are minorities. A recent study shows that, in 1998, minorities accounted
for two-thirds of the 9.2 million children at greatest risk of joining
the truly needy population.71

Political Participation

The rapid growth of the U.S. minority population has increased its political
clout. In particular, protracted residential segregation, a strong Voting
Rights Act, and good political organization created a surge of new minority-majority
districts when political districts were redrawn following the 1990 Census.72
Partly as a result of this, more minorities than ever are serving in the
U.S. Congress. The 106th Congress includes among its 535 voting members
37 African Americans, 18 Hispanics, and three Asians and Pacific Islanders
in the U.S. House of Representatives; and two Asians and Pacific Islanders
and one American Indian in the U.S. Senate.73

Minority voters are being wooed by both major political parties. African
Americans and most Hispanic groups have tended to support Democratic candidates,
while Asians and Pacific Islanders have more varied political preferences.
Minority voters helped re-elect Bill Clinton as president in 1996. Whites
supported Republican candidate Bob Dole over Clinton by 3 percentage points
(46 percent to 43 percent). Asians supported Dole over Clinton (48 percent
to 43 percent), but 84 percent of blacks and 72 percent of Hispanics voted
for Clinton.74

Minorities played a key role in state political races as well. In November
1998, African American voters helped elect Democratic governors in Alabama,
Georgia, and South Carolina and re-elect a Democratic governor in Maryland.
In each case, most white voters supported the Republican candidate. Minority
voters also played a pivotal role in U.S. Senate elections in North Carolina
and South Carolina. Moreover, black, Hispanic, and Asian coalitions were
instrumental to the outcome of the U.S. Senate race in New York and the
governor's race in California.75

The growing number of minority voters has also helped elect more minorities
to public offices. The ability of minorities to translate their growing
numbers into political power was also bolstered by the federal Voting Rights
Act, especially after it was extended in 1982. The number of African American
elected officials jumped from 4,890 in 1980 to 8,658 in 1997, and the number
of Hispanic public officials rose from 3,147 in 1985 to 5,459 in 1994.76

The rapid growth and close proximity of minority groups in many multiethnic
cities occasionally pits one minority group against another. In other cases,
members of different minority groups within a jurisdiction can build effective
coalitions that can control the outcome of elections when no single minority
represents most voters.

Coalitions between minority and white voters also can sweep a minority
candidate to office. Multiracial and multiethnic coalitions in recent years
have led to the election of African American mayors in Denver, Minneapolis,
Houston, and other cities, and to the election of African- American Douglas
Wilder as governor of Virginia and Chinese-American Gary Locke as governor
of Washington state. In 1992, according to the U.S. Conference of Mayors,
minorities represented nearly one-third of the mayors of cities with populations
of 500,000 or more.

As minority populations continue to grow and recent immigrants become
naturalized, minorities will have a larger voice in politics. The geographic
concentration of minorities will enhance their political strength, especially
in large cities where non-Hispanic whites are no longer a majority. The
number of cities of 50,000 or more residents in which non-Hispanic whites
are a minority increased from 58 in 1980 to 100 in 1990, and it is likely
to have increased further during the 1990s.

Minorities are still underrepresented among elected officials. A 1992
survey by the Census Bureau found that less than 5 percent of local elected
officials were black, Hispanic, Asian, or American Indian. African Americans
were 3 percent of all local elected officials, Hispanics were 1percent,
American Indians and Alaska Natives were 0.4 percent, and Asians and Pacific
Islanders were only 0.1 percent of all elected local officials.77

Minorities make up 28 percent of the total population, yet they represent
just 21 percent of the citizen voting-age population. In the November 1996
elections, minorities accounted for 18 percent of voters.78

There are three reasons why the political strength of minorities still
falls short of what their total population size would suggest. First, the
younger age structure of minorities means that a smaller share of the minority
population is of voting age, and an even smaller share is over age 50,
the age when Americans are most likely to vote. Second, the large number
of immigrants among minorities means that many are not citizens and therefore
are ineligible to vote. Finally, minorities generally have a lower socioeconomic
status than the national average, and individuals with low incomes and
educational levels are less likely to register and vote than are more affluent,
better-educated individuals.

Minorities and U.S. Culture

For much of this century, Americans of different racial backgrounds came
into contact with one another in few places and in limited ways. Legal
and social changes in the 1950s and 1960s lowered the barriers to minority
participation in society and schools and workplaces became more integrated.
But the private lives of minorities and non-Hispanic whites have continued
along largely separate tracks. In recent decades, however, minorities'
growing numbers and economic strength have helped introduce aspects of
minority cultures to the majority white population.

American popular music provides a telling example of how minority groups
can influence U.S. culture. A February 1999 Time magazine cover
story examined the growing dominance of hip-hop, a musical form that began
two decades earlier among blacks in the inner cities. Hip-hop is not only
influencing popular music, but also films and fashions. Latin music and
culture are also gaining popularity among non-Hispanics. In 1999, several
Hispanic artists, including Ricky Martin and Jennifer Lopez, had number
one songs on Billboard magazine's pop music charts.African American
music has long influenced the American mainstream. Swing music — popular
in the 1930s and 1940s — drew heavily from African American jazz, just
as early rock-and-roll drew from African American rhythm and blues influences
in the mid- and late 1950s. The black-owned Motown Records gained universal
appeal in the 1960s.79 More recently,
Latin music has been influencing popular American music. Cuban-American
Gloria Estefan, for example, has melded Latin and mainstream American popular
music in a successful recording career.Food preferences reflect another
area of minority influence on mainstream culture. Until recently, most
non-Hispanic whites distinguished between "American" and "ethnic" food,
and encountered the latter only in "ethnic" restaurants. More recently,
American cuisine has included traditional American dishes with ingredients
and cooking techniques that are commonly used in minority cultures.Changes
in the nation's school curriculums are another example of how the majority
sometimes must adapt to the minority culture, and illustrate that assimilation
can involve adjustments by both sides. Many people are concerned that shifting
the curriculum from one based solely on European history and culture to
one that includes the history and literature of all the world's peoples
will weaken students' education.80
Other people believe that a broader understanding of world cultures will
benefit all students, especially as they prepare for employment in an economy
involved in global competition.

Resegregation and Market Segmentation

The widening influence of food and music originating with U.S. minority
groups has paralleled other, potentially divisive trends: the resegregation
of neighborhoods and schools and the increasing segmentation of the U.S.
population into racial, ethnic, age, and geographic market groups.

The National Center for Education Statistics and a recent Harvard study
report that students are more isolated by race and ethnicity in schools
now than in the 1980s.81 The change
is relatively small and is largely explained by the increasing percentage
of minority students in many school districts, but it shows that minority
students have less opportunity to interact with white students in school
and vice versa. In 1987, the average black student attended a school that
was 36 percent white. By 1996, this had dropped to about 33 percent. Hispanic
students saw a similar drop in white classmates over this period — from
33 percent to 30 percent. Asians are much less segregated residentially
and are much more likely than blacks or Hispanics to attend a majority
white school. In 1996, the average Asian student attended a school that
was 49 percent white, but this is a big drop from 1987, when Asian students
were likely to attend a school that was 55 percent white.Segmentation also
has affected America's favorite leisure activity — television. According
to A.C. Nielsen, the company that monitors television viewing, many minority
groups have higher viewership rates than non-Hispanic whites.82
Yet minorities were almost nonexistent on TV until the 1960s. The civil
rights movement and the growth in the nation's minority population prompted
TV networks to become more inclusive. This shift was also promoted by advertisers
working to attract minority consumers. In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
viewers of all races and ethnic groups made programs like the all-black
Bill Cosby family show national favorites.More recently, changes in the
broadcast industry, in which programmers focus on small demographic groups
desired by advertisers, have fostered programming targeted at specific
racial and ethnic groups. In addition, the rise of cable television has
led to whole networks aimed at specific minority groups (such as Black
Entertainment Television, Univision, and the International Channel). This
proliferation of minority-themed programs on cable, however, has accompanied
a decline in the number of such shows on the major broadcast networks.
Few minority actors will appear, for example, in the new TV shows on the
major networks' fall 1999 schedule. This lack of diversity has angered
minority activists and called attention to the near absence of minorities
among top network programming executives.83Recent
data from Nielsen show that whites, blacks, and Hispanics watch different
programs. African Americans are more likely than whites to watch TV shows
that feature black casts, while Spanish-language programming has garnered
the highest ratings among Hispanics. While targeted programming provides
alternatives for minority television viewers, it can reinforce differences
among groups and impede the development of a common culture shared by all
Americans.

New Realities

The traditional image of racial and ethnic minorities in U.S. society is
shifting. The relatively young age structure, high birth rates, and heavy
immigration flows of minorities will continue to make the U.S. population
more racially and ethnically diverse. Minorities will increasingly shape
the national character, adding racial and ethnic diversity to schools,
workplaces, and legislatures.

Shifting immigration patterns are injecting more diversity into individual
racial and ethnic groups and eroding the numerical dominance of African
Americans in the minority population. The U.S. Hispanic population includes
more Central Americans now than in the 1970s, for example, while the 1980s
and 1990s brought impoverished refugees along with wealthy, college-educated
professionals into the Asian American population. These demographic changes
can disrupt established social patterns and at times contribute to racial
tensions.

Minorities are still overrepresented among America's poor, but minority
status is no longer synonymous with poverty. A growing segment of minorities
are achieving affluence within mainstream society. All these changes are
challenging traditional views about minorities. One belief has been that
minorities will eventually blend into America's cultural melting pot. This
was the experience of the European immigrants who came to America in the
19th and early 20th centuries and were absorbed into the broader society
a few generations after they arrived.

Another view holds that pervasive racism, economic changes, and other
factors still exclude minorities, in particular blacks and American Indians,
from full participation in American society. Without intervention to ensure
their civil rights and affirmative action in education and employment,
a disproportionate share of minorities will remain stuck on the bottom
rungs of the economic ladder.

Neither conceptual model fits today's minority groups completely. While
many new immigrants seem to be following the assimilation path of European
immigrants nearly a century ago, many blacks, American Indians, and Latinos
— long-time Americans — remain undereducated, underemployed, and impoverished.
On the other hand, the achievements of some minorities indicate that minority
status alone need not thwart advancement. An alternative future may be
a more pluralistic or multicultural America, in which minorities participate
fully in all aspects of society while maintaining their racial and ethnic
identities.

Both the growing racial diversity of Americans and divergent economic
paths followed by minorities call into question many government policies.
Is providing aid solely on the basis of race or ethnicity unnecessary or
unwise given the growing affluence of some minorities? Was this affluence
possible only because of special government loans, scholarships, or other
affirmative action programs? Recent court decisions regarding employment,
minority business set-aside programs, education, and voting rights may
reflect a growing tendency to abolish or weaken racially specific policies
that were set in place to help minorities.

As we move into the 21st century, governments at all levels will be
grappling with the new realities of America's minority population. Policymakers
need to recognize the complexity and diversity of today's minority population
as they reconsider existing public policies and formulate new ones. And,
all Americans need to recognize that policies alone cannot ensure the inclusion
of minorities at all levels of society. Individual behavior must also change.
Given the broader context of majority-minority conflicts around the world,
success in developing a harmonious multicultural society will offer the
United States another avenue for global leadership.

Suggested Resources

Council of Economic Advisers for the President's Initiative on Race. Changing
America: Indicators of Social and Economic Well-Being by Race and Hispanic
Origin. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September
1998.

Del Pinal, Jorge, and Audrey Singer. "Generations of Diversity: Latinos
in the United States," Population Bulletin 52, no. 3. Washington,
DC: Population Reference Bureau, October 1997.

Farley, Reynolds, ed. State of the Union, Vols. I and II. New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995.

Farley, Reynolds, and Walter R. Allen. The Color Line and the Quality
of Life in America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987.

"An American Dilemma (Part II), Black-White Relations:
Contradictions Abound," The Public Perspective (February/March 1996).
Accessed online through NEXIS, on June 22, 1999; Michael Fix and Margery
Austin Turner, "Measuring Racial and Ethnic Discrimination in America,"
in A National Report Card on Discrimination in America: The Role of
Testing, eds. Michael Fix and Margery Austin Turner (Washington, DC:
The Urban Institute, 1999), accessed online at www.urban.org/civil/report_card.html
on June 22, 1999; and Joleen Kirschenman and Kathryn M. Neckerman, "We'd
Love to Hire Them But …! The Meaning of Race to Employers," in The Urban
Underclass, eds. Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson (Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991).

Reynolds Farley and Walter R. Allen, The Color Line
and the Quality of Life in America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
1987): 136-37; and Frank Parker, Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment
in Mississippi after 1965 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina,
1990): 2.

Russell Thornton, American Indian Holocaust and Survival:
A Population History Since 1492 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1987); and Vine Deloria, American Indian Policy in the 20th Century
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985).

Department of the Interior. Information accessed online
at www.doi.gov/oait/faqrite.html on July 21, 1999.

See Ben Wattenberg, The First Universal Nation
(New York: Free Press, 1991); and Deroy Murdock, "The Greatest Story Never
Told: Everyday America's Racial Harmony," The American Enterprise
(November/December 1998). Accessed online at www.theamericanenterprise.org/taend98o.htm
on July 22, 1999.

Population Reference Bureau analysis of the March 1998
Current Population Survey.

Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1996 Statistical
Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997): Table 3; and unpublished figures.

U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 Census of Population, General
Social and Economic Characteristics: United States 1990 CP-2-1 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993): Table 29. Many immigrants who
are natives of South Africa and countries in North Africa identify as white.

U.S. Census Bureau, "Population Projections of the United
States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050," by Jennifer
Cheeseman Day, Current Population Reports P25-1130 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996): 32-41, Table 1.

C. Matthew Snipp, "The Size and Distribution of the American
Indian Population: Fertility, Mortality, Residence, and Migration," in
Changing
Numbers, Changing Needs: American Indian Demography and Public Health,
eds. Gary D. Sandefur, Ronald R. Rindfuss, and Barney Cohen (Washington,
DC: National Academy Press, 1996): 21-23.

Ibid.: 49; and C. Matthew Snipp, American Indians:
The First of This Land (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989): 281,
Table 9.6.

U.S. Census Bureau, American Indian Population by Tribe
for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States 1992 -L-99 (1992);
and Howard Hogan, "The 1990 Post-Enumeration Survey: Operations and New
Estimates." (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Statistical
Association, Boston, Aug. 9-13, 1992): Table 3.

Authors' analysis of online data from U.S. Bureau of the
Census. Accessed online at www.census.gov/population/estimates/county/crh/
(various files), on Mar. 4, 1999; and at www.census.gov/population/estimates/metro/
(various files), on Jan. 8, 1998.

William H. Frey, analysis of data from the U.S. Bureau
of the Census. Accessed online at http://www.frey-demographer.org/cgi-bin/usdata-all.cgi,
on July 21, 1999.

Keith R. Ihlandfeld and David L. Sjoquist, "The Impact
of Job Decentralization on the Economic Welfare of Central City Blacks,"
Journal
of Urban Economics 26 (1989): 110-30.

U.S. Census Bureau, "Poverty in the United States: 1997,"
by Joseph Dalaker and Mary Naifeh, Current Population Reports P60-201
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998): 26, Table 5; data
accessed online at www.census.gov/population/socdemo/race/black/tabs98
and www.census.gov/population/socdemo/race/api98/table01.txt
on Aug. 19, 1999; Frey, "The New Geography of Population Shifts: Trends
Toward Balkanization," in State of the Union, ed. Reynolds Farley:
271-336; and authors' analysis of Summary Tape File 1C of the 1990 Census
of Population and Housing.

International Council of Shopping Centers, "The Changing
Profile of the Consumer." (Paper presented at the Spring Convention of
the International Council of Shopping Centers, May 1992).

Roderick J. Harrison and Daniel H. Weinberg, "Racial and
Ethnic Residential Segregation in 1990." (Paper presented at the annual
meeting of the Population Association of America, Denver, May 1992.). See
also Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation
and the Making of the Underclass (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1993).

Richard D. Alba and John R. Logan, "Minority Proximity
to Whites in the Suburbs: An Individual-Level Analysis of Segregation,"
American
Journal of Sociology 98, no. 6 (May 1993): 1388-427.

U.S. Census Bureau, "Measuring 50 Years of Economic Change
Using the March Current Population Survey," Current Population Reports
P60-203
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 1998). See also
"A Brief Look at Postwar U.S. Income Inequality," Current Population
Reports P60-191 by Daniel Weinberg(June 1996); and Lawrence
Mishel, Jared Bernstein, and John Schmitt, The State of Working America
1996-97 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996).

National Center for Education Statistics, The Condition
of Education 1999 (Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics,
1999): 74.

Population Reference Bureau analysis of the March 1998
Current Population Survey.

See discussion in M. Belinda Tucker and Claudia Mitchell-Kernan,
The
Decline in Marriage Among African Americans: Causes, Consequences, and
Policy Implications (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995); William
P. O'Hare, "An Evaluation of Three Theories Regarding the Growth of Black
Female-Headed Families," Journal of Urban Affairs 10, no. 2 (1988):
183-95; and William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears: The World of
the New Urban Poor (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997): 25-50.

National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce, Falling Through The Net: Defining the Digital
Divide. Accessed online at www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn99/fttn.pdf
, on July 30, 1999.

U.S. Census Bureau, "Money Income in the United States:
1997 (With Separate Data on Valuation of Noncash Benefits)," Current
Population Reports P60-200 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, September 1998): Table 3.

The Annie E. Casey Foundation, 1999KIDS COUNT
Data Book: 5-11. Children were considered "highly vulnerable" if they
had at least four of the following risk factors: The child did not live
with two parents; the household head was a high-school dropout; family
income was below the poverty line; the parent with whom the child lived
did not have a steady job; the family received welfare benefits; and the
child did not have health insurance.

U.S. Census Bureau, "Voting and Registration in the Election
of 1996," by Lynne M. Casper and Loretta E. Bass, Current Population
Reports P20-504 (July 1998); Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation
in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); and Population Reference
Bureau analysis of data from March 1998 Current Population Survey.

Ted Gioia, The History of Jazz (New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997): 133, 137-45; and Nelson George, Where
Did Our Love Go? The Rise and Fall of the Motown Sound (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1985): 103.

National Center for Education Statistics, Condition
of Education 1999: 102; and Gary Orfield and John T. Yun, "Resegregation
in American Schools" (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Civil Rights Project,
June 1999). Accessed online at www.law.harvard.edu/groups/civilrights/publications
resegregation99.html, on July 7, 1999.

Kelvin M. Pollard is a research demographer at the Population
Reference Bureau. Mr. Pollard is the author of PRB's "United States Population
Data Sheet" and numerous articles on U.S. topics, and he provides data
analysis and technical assistance for The Annie E. Casey Foundation's KIDS
COUNT program. He has contributed to a number of PRB publications, including
Population Bulletins, U.S. in the World, and the Population Handbook, U.S.
Edition. Mr. Pollard did his graduate work with the Population Studies
Center at the University of Michigan, where he received his master's degree
in applied social research.

William P. O'Hare is director of the KIDS COUNT program at The
Annie E. Casey Foundation. He directed population and policy research at
the Urban Research Institute, University of Louisville, and he has worked
in several policy-related research organizations in Washington, D.C., including
the Population Reference Bureau, the Joint Center for Political Studies,
and the National Social Science and Law Center. He uses his training in
sociology and demography to enhance understanding of social policy issues,
particularly those related to disadvantaged Americans. He has written numerous
publications on population and policy issues, including four Population
Bulletins.

Box 1Return to TextWhat Are Race and Ethnicity?Race and ethnicity are defined by society, not by science. A racial
group is often defined according to such physical characteristics as hair
type, facial features, and skin color. Ethnicity usually refers to social
and linguistic background and often to physical appearance. Categories
of race and ethnicity vary from one society to another, and they change
over time within the same society.

The shifting labels and definitions used in the U.S. census reflect
the growing diversity of the population and changing political and social
climate. The first population census in 1790 asked enumerators to classify
free residents as white or "other" (a category that included American Indians
living in white communities, free African Americans, Asians, or other nonwhites).
Slaves were counted separately. By 1860, the census requested that residents
be classified as white, black, or mulatto (see table). American Indian
and Chinese were added as separate categories in 1870.

The enthusiasm for scientific methods toward the end of the 19th century
helped promote the idea that people could be classified according to distinct
biological and physical characteristics, which was reflected in attempts
to establish valid mixed-race categories.1 In the 1890
census, census-takers were instructed to distinguish the color of household
members as white, black, octoroon (one-eighth black), quadroon (one-quarter
black), mulatto (one-half black), or as Chinese, Japanese, or American
Indian. Separate census forms for American Indian areas in the 1800s recorded
the "blood quantum" of individuals listed — that is, their percentage of
white, black, and American Indian blood.

In the 20th century, the categories have expanded and the terms have
shifted. The census changed from a house-to-house enumeration to mass mailings
and self-administration. Residents, not census enumerators, reported their
race. By 1970, the mulatto category was long gone. The accepted term for
Americans of African descent had changed from black to colored to Negro
and back to black. Four Asian groups (Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese, and
Koreans) and Hawaiians were listed separately.

The 1970 census was the first to collect data on Hispanic origin. Hispanics
were increasing in numbers and political strength in the 1960s, and Hispanic
leaders wanted demographic data to combat discrimination. But Hispanics
(people with an origin in a Spanish-speaking country) could be of African,
American Indian, Asian, European, or another origin as well. The category
clearly crossed established racial lines and was classified as an ethnic
group, not a race.

Race and ethnicity appear to be intertwined in the public's consciousness,
however. Many Hispanics do not check "white" on the census form because
they do not identify with the non-Hispanic white population. But they do
not consider themselves to be black, Asian, or American Indian either.
In the 1990 Census, more than 40 percent of Hispanics identified their
race as "other."2 The Census Bureau generally counts
these Hispanics as white, based on surveys in which about 96 percent of
Hispanics identified as white, 3 percent as black, and 1 percent as Asian
or American Indian.

The confusion about racial and ethnic classifications may become more
acute after 2000, when people will be allowed, for the first time, to select
more than one race. A simple table of census results by race and ethnicity
could contain 126 cells to account for all the combinations of groups,
although most cells would be empty in many geographic areas.3
Government statistical agencies have not yet decided on a standard format
for tabulating combinations of racial and ethnic groups. They may eventually
report the most common mixed-race groups — such as white-Asian or black-white
— but we are entering new territory in the classification of U.S. racial
and ethnic groups.

While opinion polls show that many Americans think that the government
should stop collecting statistics on race, these statistics serve a number
of purposes. The need for data on racial and ethnic groups expanded in
response to civil rights laws of the 1960s that prohibit discrimination
by race or ethnicity. Also, businesses use such data to target products
and advertising, scientists use them in many kinds of research, and lawyers
use them for evidence. Race and ethnic categories are no more exact today
than they were when the first census was taken, but they reflect contemporary
American society and they continue to serve important functions in U.S.
society.

The requirement to choose only one race or ethnic group on standard
forms has long been a sore point with people whose parents or grandparents
are of different races. Many feel they are rejecting one parent and part
of their heritage by officially identifying with a single race.1
Some resolve their dilemma by selecting the "other" race category or by
refusing to choose a race at all.

The 2000 census will be the first to let Americans identify with more
than one race. Less than 3 percent of Americans are likely to identify
themselves with more than one race in the 2000 census, but this percentage
is almost certain to expand in the next century because of increases in
interracial marriages.

Marriages between people of different races are still the exception
in the United States, which reveals a persistent social gulf between racial
groups. The prevalence of intergroup (interracial or interethnic) marriage
is a telling indicator of the social distance between racial and ethnic
groups. It also depends on the pool of marriage partners — the number of
American Indians is relatively small, for example, which makes it less
likely that Indians will marry within their race.2

In 1998, about 5 percent of U.S. married couples included spouses of
different races, or a Hispanic married to a non-Hispanic.3
This small percentage masks a remarkable growth in the number of interracial
marriages since 1970. Between 1970 and 1998, the number of interracial
couples surged from 300,000 to 1.4 million.4 The number
of Hispanics married to non-Hispanics rose from 600,000 to 1.7 million.

Marriage between Hispanics and non-Hispanics is one of the most prevalent
types of intergroup unions. This suggests there is less "social distance"
between Hispanics and non-Hispanics than among people from different racial
groups.

American Indians are the racial group most likely to marry outside their
group. They are more likely to marry a white American than another American
Indian.

Asians also marry non-Asians — primarily white Americans — at a high
rate. The 1990 Census found that about 40 percent of Asians were married
to non-Asians.

African Americans are much less likely than other minority groups to
marry outside their race. About 9 percent of couples with a black spouse
included a nonblack spouse in 1998, a modest increase from about 6 percent
in 1980. About 89 percent of these marriages consisted of black-white couples.

Whites are slightly less likely than blacks to marry outside their race.
In 1998, less than 3 percent of married couples including a white American
had a nonwhite husband or wife. Most were married to an Asian or American
Indian.

Even if the social distance between blacks and whites does not narrow
substantially, the share of interracial marriages and interracial births
is likely to expand because American Indians, Asians, and Hispanics are
an increasing share of U.S. minorities.

For much of U.S. history, many states had laws prohibiting marriage
between people of different races. In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
in Loving vs. Virginia that states could not prohibit interracial
marriages. This ruling invalidated the 16 remaining state statutes that
outlawed interracial marriage.

The increase in interracial marriage and growth of the minority population
since the 1960s produced a boomlet of interracial children. The number
of babies born to parents of different races increased from about 60,000
(less than 2 percent of births) to at least 159,000 (about 5 percent of
births) between 1977 and 1997. The numbers may be higher because many birth
certificates do not record the race of both parents. In 1997, about 15
percent of birth certificates did not record the race of the father. Father's
race was not recorded for 40 percent of births to African American mothers
and 28 percent of births to American Indian mothers.

In California, where one-fifth of U.S. interracial couples live, interracial
babies were the third largest racial or ethnic category of births in 1997
— after Latinos and whites, but ahead of Asians, blacks, and American Indians.
With the nation's largest concentrations of almost every ethnic minority,
California is likely to have the largest population of interracial Americans
in coming years.

Interracial births are highest for American Indians — about one-half
of American Indian births were biracial in 1997 (excluding babies with
fathers of unknown race). About 20 percent of births to Asian women were
biracial. In sharp contrast, less than 5 percent of births to whites and
blacks were biracial in 1997.

The likely increase in the number of interracial Americans in the next
century raises a number of intriguing questions about racial identity and
the status of minorities in the United States. Will interracial Americans
be considered a separate group that requires special protection from discrimination?
Will they be included or excluded from the minority population depending
on their mix of races? Will the increase in interracial Americans mean
that race will become less important in American society? Such social change
is slow, as evidenced by the low status of some minority groups that have
been in the United States for generations. But by the end of the 21st century,
race, minority status, and ethnicity are certain to hold different meanings
than they do today.

The decennial census attempts to count each U.S. resident every 10 years,
but enumerators always miss a small fraction of the population. Minorities
are more likely than non-Hispanic whites to be undercounted. About 60.6
million Hispanics and non-Hispanic blacks, Asians, and American Indians
were counted in the 1990 census, but the true number, after adjusting for
the undercount, was estimated at 63.3 million. Young blacks living in inner-city
areas, illegal immigrants, children, American Indians living on reservations,
and non-English-speaking minorities are among the groups most likely to
be missed by the census and by other surveys and administrative records
used to derive demographic estimates. In the 1990 Census, 4 percent to
5 percent of African Americans, Hispanics, and American Indians were missed,
compared with 1 percent to 2 percent of Asians and whites (see table).

The differential undercount between whites and minorities has been observed
in every census since 1940, and over the past two decades the undercount
has become a contentious political issue. Preparations for the 2000 census
have been particularly fractious because of disagreements over the use
of scientific sampling methods to adjust for the undercount. In January
1999, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Census Bureau could not use
sampling for reapportioning seats among the states in the U.S. House of
Representatives — but it left open the possibility of using sampling for
other purposes, such as distributing federal funds among states and communities.1

While the undercount is small relative to the total U.S. population,
it affects some areas more than others, and it can distort the size and
racial makeup of specific areas. Some cities and states with large populations
of poor minorities feel they are not receiving their fair share of public
funds because of the census undercount. The amount at stake can be large.
In 1998, for example, $185 billion in federal funds were distributed in
part based on population. But cities and states were unsuccessful in their
suits against the U.S. Department of Commerce to force an adjustment of
the 1980 and 1990 Census figures.

The undercount can disrupt long-range planning, especially planning
services for children. In New York City, for example, 77,000 children were
missed in the 1990 Census. This number is equivalent to the enrollment
in 150 average-sized elementary and secondary schools.2
Minority children are most likely to be undercounted, and minorities will
make up more than one-third of the children in the 2000 census.

Results from 1998 "dress rehearsals" in three
communities — Columbia, S.C., Sacramento, Calif., and Menominee County,
Wis. (home to an American Indian reservation) — hint at how high the undercount
might be in 2000. In Columbia, for example, the net undercount rate for
non-Hispanic blacks (13 percent) was more than twice that of non-Hispanic
whites (6 percent). In Sacramento, the net undercount rates for blacks
(9 percent), Hispanics (8 percent), and even Asians (6 percent) were higher
than the rate for whites (5 percent). In Menominee County, the net undercount
was 4 percent for American Indians and 3 percent for all racial and ethnic
groups.3 These results are not necessarily indicative
of what will happen in the 2000 census because the undercount for the dress
rehearsal traditionally has been much higher than that for the actual census.
But they do suggest that the differential undercount will continue to be
a problem in 2000.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided the most comprehensive anti-discrimination
initiatives in history. It outlawed discrimination in employment, public
accommodations, and programs funded by the federal government. The following
year, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued Executive Order 11246, which authorized
the U.S. Department of Labor to take "affirmative" efforts to ensure the
employment and equal treatment of minority workers. The latter order launched
an umbrella of programs designed to remedy past discrimination against
minorities and women in such areas as hiring, job promotion, and education.1

Affirmative action measures in education have been especially contentious
in the 1990s for two reasons. First, despite affirmative action, young
whites (and Asians) are more likely to graduate from college than young
blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians. Second, this gap in educational
attainment is a major barrier to minorities' entry into higher status occupations
and upper-level incomes.

Supporters argue that affirmative action programs are necessary to combat
institutional barriers to the advancement of historically disadvantaged
groups. Affirmative action opponents feel that these programs often promote
less qualified individuals, dilute academic and employment standards, unfairly
exclude whites, and even heighten racial tensions. Few proponents or opponents
have focused on why minorities are not on equal footing with whites when
they graduate from high school.

The last several years have seen various efforts to roll back affirmative
action, mostly in university admissions. In a 1996 ruling in Hopwood
vs. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court let stand a lower court decision
that prohibited public universities in Texas from using race as a consideration
for admission. Also in 1996, California voters approved Proposition 209,
a ballot initiative that abolished affirmative action in various state
programs, including college admissions. Voters in Washington state passed
a similar measure two years later, and efforts are being made to place
an anti-affirmative action initiative on the Florida ballot in 2000. These
state actions appear to reflect national sentiments. A 1995 Washington
Postpoll showed that three-fourths of Americans opposed programs giving
preference to minorities. And while whites were much more likely to oppose
affirmative action, nearly half of African Americans also opposed it.2

Early findings resulting from these measures have concerned affirmative
action supporters. In fall 1997, the 6,500-student freshman class at the
University of Texas contained just 150 African Americans, about half the
previous year's number. The university's first-year law school class that
year had just four blacks and 26 Hispanics. There also was a sharp decline
in the number of black and Hispanic freshmen at the two elite universities
in the University of California system — Berkeley and Los Angeles (UCLA)
— in 1998, although that number edged up in 1999. Asian admissions to Berkeley
and UCLA increased both years.3 The number of black applicants
to University of Washington Law School declined 41 percent between 1998
and 1999.4

Universities and policymakers in these states are scrambling for ways
to ensure than minorities will not be excluded from enrolling in their
top universities. Soon after the Hopwood decision, the Texas legislature
passed a measure guaranteeing that all high school seniors who graduated
in the top 10 percent of their class will be admitted to the state's major
public universities. In early 1999, California announced a "diversity plan"
for the University of California system, which would admit all students
graduating in the top 4 percent of their graduating class. Also in 1999,
the University of Massachusetts — in a decision referred to as a "sign
of the times" — announced that it would de-emphasize race in admissions
while placing greater emphasis on socioeconomic status and extracurricular
activities.

Affirmative action probably will remain a hot topic for many years to
come. Part of what makes the issue so complex is the fact that Americans
overwhelmingly favor an equal opportunity society — the type of society
to which Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. referred in his famous "I Have a Dream"
speech of 1963. In that speech, Dr. King expressed his hope for a society
in which his children "will not be judged by the color of their skin but
by the content of their character."5 With ample evidence
that race does make a difference in the kind of education students get,
the question of exactly how to achieve equal opportunity for everyone will
continue to be debated well into the next century.