1. The case originated in an application (no.
32457/04) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an
Irish national, Ms Ann Brecknell (“the applicant”), on 10 September
2004.

2. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid,
was represented by Madden & Finucane, solicitors practising in Belfast.
The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented
by their Agent, Mr J. Grainger of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London.

3. The applicant alleged that there had been no
adequate investigation into allegations of collusion and/or involvement
by security forces in the killing of her husband, nor any effective
remedy for the same. She invoked Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention.

4. By a decision of 6 March 2007, the Court declared
the application admissible.

5. The applicant and the Government each filed
further written observations (Rule 59 § 1), to which they each responded
with further written comments (Rule 59 § 1). The Chamber decided, after
consulting the parties, that no hearing on the merits was required (Rule
59 § 3 in
fine).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

6. The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in
Armagh. She is the widow of Trevor Brecknell.

A. The attack on Donnelly’s Bar and the initial
investigation

7. On 19 December 1975, loyalist gunmen arrived
at Donnelly’s Bar, Silverbridge, in County Armagh and fired a machine
gun at persons outside the bar. Two men entered the bar. One sprayed
the room with automatic gunfire and the other threw a bomb into the
premises. Trevor Brecknell, Patrick Donnelly and Michael Donnelly (aged
14) were killed and six other people received serious injuries. The
applicant was at the time in hospital following the birth of her daughter
and was informed of her husband’s death by the hospital chaplain and
her doctor.

8. The emergency services and the police were
alerted to the incident within a short time. While the dead and injured
were being removed from the scene, soldiers of the Royal Scots Regiment
were stoned upon their arrival and had to withdraw. As a consequence
of the hostile reception, police decided not to investigate the scene
until first light.

9. On 20 December, detectives and scene of crime
officers attended the scene. Items were taken for forensic examination,
including 9mm spent cartridge cases. A number of persons who had been
in the bar on the previous night were spoken to and later statements
were taken from a substantial number of the customers who had been there
during the incident. The Government believed that all had been spoken
to but that some would only give detectives an oral account.

10. The bodies of the deceased were identified
and post mortems held.

11. A claim of responsibility for the incident
was subsequently made by the Red Hand Commandos, an illegal loyalist
paramilitary organisation.

12. The Government stated that despite the efforts
of the police it was not possible to identify any particular suspect.
No one had witnessed the arrival of the gunmen on the night of the attack.
While a Ford Cortina car had been seen moving away from the location
after the attack no one was able to identify this vehicle as belonging
to the gunmen or as being used by them as a getaway vehicle. Although
conversations with customers in the bar had led to a photofit picture
being compiled this did not lead to anyone being connected with the
incident. The view of the investigating officer at the time was that
extreme loyalist elements from the Portadown area were likely to be
responsible. It was believed that some persons in this category were
arrested and interviewed but without any positive outcome. A report
was prepared for the Director of Public Prosecutions who, in the absence
of any evidence linking individuals to the incident, did not direct
any prosecution to be brought.

13. On 26 November 1976 an inquest was held into
the deaths of the three deceased persons.

14. The applicant was first contacted by the police
three days after the murder. The investigating officer of the Royal
Ulster Constabulary (“RUC”) who returned her husband’s personal
effects told the applicant that the police knew who was responsible
for the attack but that they all had alibis that they were playing pool
in Markethill at the time of the murder. There was no further contact
by the RUC with the applicant concerning the case at this time.

15. The investigation into the attack on Donnelly’s
Bar did not close and became active again in 1978, when a Catholic priest
Father Hugh Murphy was abducted by loyalist paramilitaries intending
to use him as a hostage vis-à-vis the IRA. The police arrested a reserve
police constable William McCaughey, who, in the course of questioning,
revealed his part in the abduction of the priest and in a variety of
other loyalist paramilitary incidents. A number of other arrests followed,
including that of a police officer John Weir who was named as having
been involved in the murder of a shopkeeper called Strathearn in Ahoghill
in April 1977: he was convicted for that murder in June 1980. The Government
stated that both McCaughey and Weir refused to name the two loyalist
paramilitaries also involved with them in the murder unless they received
immunity from prosecution. The police and prosecuting authority took
the decision prior to the trial not to enter into any process of bargaining
with Weir and McCaughey. While both were approached by the police after
their convictions to see if at that stage they would give evidence against
the loyalist paramilitaries, each again refused to do so unless there
was something in it for themselves. The Government stated that during
the period in which Weir was detained he was interviewed on a large
number of occasions. At no time did he implicate himself or others in
any offence other than the Strathearn murder.

16. McCaughey, however, did name a RUC reserve
officer Laurence McClure as being involved in a range of incidents including
the attack on Donnelly’s Bar.

17. McClure was arrested along with a woman called
Elizabeth or Liz Shields.1
After questioning, both admitted to driving three persons, McConnell,
who was a member of the Ulster Defence Regiment and two other unknown
persons on the night of the incident. While admitting to knowing that
the three persons must have been engaged in illegal activity they claimed
that they did not know the details and only after the event were able
to relate the picking up of these persons to the incident at Donnelly’s
Bar. McClure and Shields were charged with offences under section 5
of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 – failure to disclose
information relating to an offence. McConnell had by this date been
murdered by the IRA and it was not possible to identify the other two
persons in the car. In April 1981 the DPP made a decision not to pursue
the charges against McClure and Shields. This decision was based on
the receipt of an opinion of senior prosecuting counsel and was based
on a series of factors: the delay in bringing the case to trial, the
disposal of charges against others accused of offences arising from
the investigation into McCaughey’s revelations, the absence of a prospect
of a custodial sentence and the impact of a judgment of Jones LJ cited
in another case (R v Donnelly [1986] NI 54) which was viewed as eliminating
any reasonable prospect of conviction as a legal defence was available
to the accused on a charge of withholding information.

C. The Weir allegations and the response of
the authorities

18. In or about January 1999 John Weir, who had
been released from prison on licence in 1993, made a statement to a
journalist alleging RUC and Ulster Defence Regiment (“UDR”) collusion
with loyalist paramilitaries from the Portadown area in the mid-1970s.
This statement was published in the Sunday Times newspaper in March
1999. It was obtained by the Patrick Finucane Centre, a human rights
non-governmental organisation in Derry (hereinafter “the Centre”).
A copy was provided by the Centre to Alan Brecknell, Trevor Brecknell’s
son.

19. John Weir’s statement made detailed allegations
about security force collusion with loyalist paramilitaries, including
the allegation that he had been told by McClure, a former reserve constable
in the RUC, that Mitchell’s farmhouse owned by another RUC officer
was used as a base from which to carry out loyalist attacks, including
the attack on Donnelly’s Bar in Silverbridge. Weir also alleged that
Stuart Young, Sammy McCoo, Shilly Silcock [suspect T] and Robert McConnell
(a part-time UDR member) were responsible for the attack and that the
getaway car was provided by Laurence McClure and Elizabeth Shields.
He alleged that after the attack the group re-assembled at Mitchell’s
farmhouse.

20. The statement also made links between the
attack on Donnelly’s Bar and other attacks allegedly carried out by
members of the security forces, both RUC and UDR, and loyalist paramilitaries.
This group used the farmhouse in Glennane owned by James Mitchell, a
RUC reservist, as a base from which to carry out attacks on Catholics
and nationalists. Other attacks allegedly included the murder of Colm
McCartney and Sean Farmer at a bogus vehicle checkpoint in August 1975
(see application no. 34575/04): the murder of John and Brian Reavey
and wounding of Anthony Reavey in their home on 4 January 1976 (see
application no. 34640/04); the murder of Joseph, Barry and Declan O’Dowd
and wounding of Barney O’Dowd in the latter’s home in January 1976
(see application no. 34622/04); and the attack on the Rock Bar in which
Michael McGrath was seriously injured (see application no. 34651/04).
Weir also linked these attacks to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings in
which 33 people were killed in the Republic of Ireland.

21. On or about 10 June 1999, RTE, an Irish television
channel, broadcast a television programme that contained allegations
of security force involvement in a number of deaths, including that
of Trevor Brecknell. Weir made allegations on that programme that members
of the RUC and UDR were directly involved in the attack on Donnelly’s
Bar. A BBC Spotlight programme produced a similar documentary dealing
with these allegations.

22. These allegations attracted considerable attention
on both sides of the Irish border and became the subject of police investigation
in both jurisdictions. The Government stated that the police investigation
in Northern Ireland was focussed on determining whether Weir’s allegations
should be assessed as sufficiently credible to require a full investigation.
They obtained from the journalist an edited transcript of the interview
with Weir. While his whereabouts were unknown to the RUC, Weir met with
senior Irish police officers at the Irish Embassy on 15 April 1999.
A copy of his statement was provided by the Garda to the RUC, along
with a further statement made by Weir to another journalist dated 3
February 1999. The police analysed the available materials and sought
to identify the personalities to be interviewed. It became apparent
that some had died and that others, living abroad, could not be traced.
A series of seven interviews were conducted, under cautions, between
July and December 2001, of those individuals central to Weir’s account
who could be traced. No charges were preferred. The interviews followed
the format of Weir’s allegations being put to the interviewee for
his or her response. The predominant response was denial of any involvement
and claims that Weir had been untruthful. No admissions were made by
any interviewee. Interviews were also conducted with less central personalities
and with police officers involved in interviewing Weir in 1978. The
latter stated that Weir had not mentioned the matters now being alleged.

23. Meetings were held regularly with RUC counterparts
in the Republic of Ireland. The RUC co-operated also with the judicial
inquiry established in the Republic of Ireland into the Dublin and Monaghan
bombings (see further below). Amongst matters about which the RUC team
provided information to the inquiry was ballistics information which
linked some of the weapons used to more than one incident. In February
2000 a substantial report was compiled by the RUC for the Garda dealing
with Weir’s allegations. It profiled Weir and dealt inter alia with a description of the 1978 investigation into
McCaughey, Weir and others. It concluded that the investigation would
continue but that his credibility was in doubt. According to the Government,
despite inquiries being conducted, Weir’s whereabouts could not be
traced. This report was not disclosed as the investigation was continuing.
An internal RUC report dated 27 February 2001 concluded that it would
be necessary to interview Weir before any view could be finalised in
respect of the credibility of his allegations: such interview was not
possible as his whereabouts were not known. The report noted the absence
of any previous mention of the allegations before 1999 and that much
of what he said was hearsay and speculation. Inquiries made of the British
Embassy in Nigeria (where he had a known address) and the criminal intelligence
service and others failed to locate Weir. Contact was made with the
Garda and the secretariat of the Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan
bombings without positive result.

24. In November 2003, a further report was written
for the Assistant Chief Constable (Crime Operations) in respect of Weir’s
allegations. This also could not be disclosed due to the ongoing investigation
but the Government have stated that this focussed directly on the attack
on Donnelly’s Bar, noting that Weir had mentioned the names of six
persons, three of whom were known to have played a role in the attack.
It noted that it was difficult to advance inquiries without interviewing
Weir and recommended that there should be an overall review of the file
on the attack and that the case be examined by the Serious Crime Review
Team (“SCRT”) so that it could be determined whether the investigation
should be reopened. This recommendation was accepted. The SCRT was established
in March 2004, with responsibilities including the review of all historical
murders by way of case assessment for evidential and investigative opportunities.
It carried out a preliminary case review culminating in a report dated
14 June 2005 by Detective Inspector Ramsay of the Police Service Northern
Ireland (“PSNI”). His view was that the investigation if looked
at alone could not be progressed but that in the context of linked cases
might be worth further exploration. He suggested a referral of the case
for further assessment. The Historical Enquiry Team (“HET”) director
of Investigations, Detective Chief Superintendent James of the London
Metropolitan Police Force, took over personal supervision of the investigation
which progressed through the first three of five stages of the HET process
(collection of all relevant material; assessment of the investigations
to date; review of evidence, with intelligence and open and non-police
sources, together with a meeting with the families of the victims of
the attack). As a number of investigative opportunities were identified
and to be followed up, the case was to continue to be processed by HET,
which had been put in touch with Weir by the Centre. The Government
submitted that if any evidence of police involvement in the murders
was found, the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland would
then become involved. For the latest information from the Government
concerning the investigation, see their most recent observations, paragraph
64 below.

D. The position of the applicant and the concerned
families

25. Meanwhile, in July 1999, Mr Donnelly, owner
of the bar and father of one of the people killed in the attack, informed
the applicant’s family that he had received a summons to appear in
court many years earlier. After contact with the authorities by the
applicant’s lawyers and the Centre, it appeared that in or about 1980
Laurence McClure, a RUC reservist and Elizabeth Shields, housekeeper
at Mitchell’s farm, had been charged with withholding information
in relation to the murders. McClure had been the person identified by
Weir as the main source of his information about security force collusion.
The applicant and her family had never been informed about these proceedings.

26. By letters dated 5 July and 10 November 1999,
the Northern Ireland Office informed the Centre that the allegations
made by Weir and shown on the RTE programme were under investigation
by the RUC.

27. On 31 January 2000, the Centre was informed
by Chief Superintendent Sillery, on behalf of the Chief Constable, that
charges against two persons connected with the attack had been dropped.
This followed a meeting on 22 January, when relatives of Trevor Brecknell
and others killed at Donnelly’s Bar met with Chief Superintendent
McCann of the RUC, who had been the investigating officer in that incident
and also for the murders of the Reavey family. He advised the relatives
and a member of the Centre that as a result of his investigations he
believed that there had been collusion between the loyalist paramilitaries
and members of the security forces (RUC and UDR) and that the gang that
had carried out the attack included security force personnel. While
he was sure of the identities of the gang members, one of whom he named
as Sammy McCoo, a well-known loyalist extremist, he considered however
that there had been insufficient evidence available to convict; he dismissed
suggestions of any conspiracy or any policy to block from above and
gave his view that the charges against McClure and Shields had been
thrown out for lack of evidence. He commented that some of those involved
were now dead and one was very old, in his seventies.

28. By letter dated 31 January 2001, the Northern
Ireland Office informed the Centre that the police were not investigating
the attacks on the bar and that the current police inquiry centred on
establishing the veracity of the disclosures made by John Weir and whether
or not any further investigation was justified. The family would be
informed if a further investigation was found to be warranted.

29. On 18 February 2001, members of the Centre
met with John Weir in Paris. He made links between the attack on Donnelly’s
Bar and the other incidents above. He named Stuart Young, Sammy McCoo,
Shilly Silcock and Robert McConnell (a part-time UDR member, allegedly
working with the army and SAS) as carrying out the attack on the bar
and considered that the security forces would have known about it. He
mentioned that McConnell had been shot dead in a later incident.

30. During this period the Centre was in contact
with the police (which had changed name from the RUC to the Police Service
of Northern Ireland “PSNI”) seeking to have questions answered about
the original investigations into the various incidents. On 19 December
2001, a meeting was held between members of the Centre and Detective
Inspector Aiken. Questions were put by and on behalf of the families
concerning the investigations into the incidents. A request was made
by the Brecknell family to have access to the investigation file.

31. The applicant’s representatives made further
requests for access to the police investigation file, on 29 May 2002
to the DPP and the Secretary of State and on 19 September 2002 to the
PSNI.

32. On 28 October 2002, the PSNI wrote to the
applicant’s solicitors:

“(i) The investigation into the allegations
made by John Weir has been advanced as far as possible at this stage
– this investigation focussed on establishing the veracity of allegations
made by John Weir and whether or not there is any justification for
further investigation.

(ii) There are a number of discrepancies contained
within the allegations made by John Weir and he has not made himself
available to PSNI detectives for further interview in an effort to clarify
these discrepancies. He is presently living outside the jurisdiction.

(iii) As a consequence of an investigation in
1978, former Reserve Constable Laurence McClure and civilian Sarah Elizabeth
(Lily) Shields were interviewed and admitted that they had conveyed
three other persons, including Robert McConnell (now deceased) from
the area... about eight miles from Donnelly’s Licensed Premises to
Mitchell’s farm. Neither person was able to identify the other two
persons collected. The allegations made by Weir in relation to this
incident are similar to the facts disclosed by McClure and Shields during
interview and would have been in the public domain at the time of the
court case. The names of Stuart Young, Sammy McCoo and Phillip Silcock
have been given by Weir as also involved – these personalities would
have been known to John Weir.

(iv) Much of what John Weir alleged is based
on hearsay allegedly having been told to him by other police officers,
including the former Reserve Constables McClure and James Mitchell.
Those persons have been re-interviewed and deny all Weir’s allegations,
other than what they admitted during the 1978 investigation. As previously
stated, there are a number of allegations made by John Weir which detectives
would like to clarify with him but because he is outside the jurisdiction,
this has not been possible to date.”

33. On 20 November 2002, a further meeting was
held with Detective Chief Inspector Williamson attended by members of
the Centre and the Brecknell family as well as relatives of victims
of other incidents, in which questions were asked about the investigation
and prosecution inter alia in the Brecknell case.

34. On 11 December 2002, the applicant’s solicitors
requested the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to conduct an
Article 2-compliant investigation into the allegations made by John
Weir, in particular submitting that it was not compatible with Article
2 that it was the PSNI that had conducted the investigation into the
allegations implicating RUC officers. They also submitted that an investigation
was required to be prompt, public and accessible, that the relatives
be kept fully informed of the course of the investigation and involved
to the fullest extent and that they should receive full disclosure of
the documents relating to the investigation.

35. On 29 January 2003, the Centre requested on
behalf of the families involved, ballistics information about the guns
used in the various attacks. On 3 October 2003, the PSNI replied that
such information was not given out as it could prejudice the trial of
any person charged in the future but that if an individual family could
show how they might be prejudiced by non-disclosure the Chief Constable
would give the matter full consideration.

36. On 30 April 2003, the applicant’s solicitors
wrote to the DPP requesting inter alia copies of the admissions made by Laurence McClure
and Elizabeth Shields and an explanation as to why no prosecution had
been brought. On 9 May 2003, the DPP stated that the fact that a custodial
sentence was not likely was not the only factor in the decision not
to prosecute, while on 12 May 2003, the DPP referred them to the PSNI
regarding the statements and on 22 May 2003 refused to provide them.

37. In June and August 2004, the Centre had meetings
with the Chief Constable of the PSNI, aimed at persuading him to recommence
investigations in these cases and to discuss a way forward. No commitment
was made, although the Chief Constable expressed the view that if an
investigation was carried out it would be conducted from within the
PSNI.

38. Repeated requests for information concerning
the investigation and for access to the file met with the response that
the matter was under consideration by the SCRT (letters of 14 December
2004 and 9 February 2005).

E. Application for judicial review concerning
the inadequacy of the investigation

39. On or about 1 April 2003, the Brecknell family
applied for permission to apply for judicial review inter alia for a declaration that there had been no adequate
investigation into the death of the applicant’s husband as required
by Article 2 of the Convention and requiring that the Secretary of State
provide for an Article 2-compliant investigation. Leave was granted
by the High Court on 30 April 2003. The proceedings were adjourned pending
the outcome of another case

40. On 11 March 2004, the House of Lords held
in the case of McKerr v. the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland that
a complainant alleging a procedural breach of Article 2 could not bring
a complaint under the Human Rights Act 1998 unless the death in question
occurred on or after 2 October 2000, when that Act came into force.
This overturned the decision of the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal
on 10 January 2003 to the effect that the obligation to provide an effective
investigation was a continuing one.

41. On 3 September 2004, following an application
by the Secretary of State to set aside the grant of leave in the applicant’s
case, the Brecknell family withdrew their application for judicial review.

F. Reports of the Independent Commissions of
Inquiry (Republic of Ireland)

1. The report into the Dublin and Monaghan
bombings

42. Meanwhile in October 2003 the Report of the
Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings
(known as the Barron Report) was given to the Taoiseach of the Republic
of Ireland. The report was made public on 10 December 2003. The Independent
Commission had taken into account interviews by the Irish police with
John Weir in 1999 (concerning allegations of offences in the Irish Republic),
a memorandum of a meeting between an organisation known as the Justice
for the Forgotten and John Weir in 1999, a transcript of audiotapes
sent by Weir to Justice for the Forgotten in June 2000 and the inquiry’s
own interview with John Weir on 15 and 16 February 2001. The Report
listed sectarian attacks alleged to have a link with the “Glennane
group” of known paramilitaries and members of the RUC and UDR, including
the murder of the applicant’s husband. It noted:

“John Weir’s allegations have been subject
of inquiries by both the RUC and [the Irish police]. These inquiries
have relied on shared information, for the most part obtained by the
RUC. Despite this, the RUC and [the Irish police] have arrived at markedly
different conclusions regarding his credibility as a witness.”

43. The Report referred to a report sent by the
RUC on 14 February 2000 to the Garda team investigating Weir’s allegations
(see also page 10). The RUC report concluded that as Weir was a convicted
murderer his credibility had to be in doubt and that the results of
research did not encourage any belief that he was now being genuine.
The Independent Commission did not find the RUC’s reasons sufficient
to dismiss Weir’s claims and it also noted a number of errors and
discrepancies: for example, the RUC claimed that Lily Shields was dead
whereas Garda enquiries revealed that she was still alive and the information
given did not take into account Special Branch extracts, which indicated
that James Mitchell knew ten named loyalists who came to the farm, of
whom six appeared in Weir’s allegations. Nor had the RUC paid sufficient
attention to the evidence which supported Weir’s allegations. The
Garda officers, in contrast to the view formed by the RUC, found Weir
“came across as an intelligent and discerning man who is a very convincing
witness” and that he was “highly credible and had very comprehensive
details about the crimes he purports to have knowledge of.” The Report
concluded that :

“... in relation to the attacks on Donnelly’s
Bar (Silverbridge).... John Farmer and Colm McCartney, the Reavey family
and the O’Dowd family, information was given by one or more of the
interviewees which confirmed Weir’s account of who was responsible
in each case.”

44. The Report mentioned that the Garda had, with
the assistance of the RUC, interviewed Mitchell, McClure, Shields, McCaughey
and others mentioned by Weir; they denied his allegations. While the
Garda had doubts as to their credibility, no further evidence was forthcoming
to implicate them in the incidents, beyond any statements already made
in other proceedings. The Report also set out ballistics evidence provided
by the RUC, indicating that there was a chain in gun use between the
attacks on Donnelly’s Bar, the shooting of the Reavey family, the
murder of Farmer and McCartney and the attack on the Rock Bar.

45. The Report stated that:

“All this information leads strongly to the
conclusion that there were one or more groups operating in Northern
Ireland involving not only loyalist paramilitaries but also members
of the RUC and of the UDR, and using weapons obtained from the central
quartermaster to whom the guns were returned after use. ...”

2. The report into the Dundalk bombing

46. The Independent Commission was also commissioned
to investigate the bombing of Kay’s Tavern in Dundalk in the Republic
of Ireland which was bombed on 19 December 1975, the same date as the
gun and bomb attack on Donnelly’s Bar, Silverbridge, in which Trevor
Brecknell was killed and which the Barron Report had found to be linked.

47. In July 2006 the Commission issued an interim
report. It found a number of factors suggested that the two incidents
were linked. Both attacks were claimed by the Red Hand Commandos. The
evidence before it was not conclusive but suggested that the Dundalk
bombing was carried out by a group of loyalist subversives associated
with the Mid-Ulster Ulster Volunteer Force (“UVF”) with the assistance
of UVF members from the Shankill Road area of Belfast. As regarded the
RUC investigation, it noted that eight persons contacted by the Centre
stated that they had not given statements to the RUC and that it seemed
that no house-to-house inquiries had been made. According to the owner
of the bar, however, the investigating officer did keep in touch with
him as the investigation proceeded and he was satisfied that the officer
was genuinely trying to identify and arrest those responsible. It was
also noted that on 29 December 1975 the RUC made a public appeal for
anyone with information about the Silverbridge attack to come forward,
with particular reference to two cars that had been seen in the area
at the time. The information about the cars had been forwarded to the
Irish police.

48. The report considered the further inquiries
which followed in 1978-81 and quoted parts of the statements given by
McClure admitting involvement in an attack on the Rock Bar and concerning
a possible role in the Silverbridge attack, when together with Lily
Shields, he drove Robert O’Connell and two other men on that night.
Part of the statement of Lily Shields was also quoted. The report also
quoted extracts from police Daily Record Sheets which indicated that
William McCaughey incriminated Sammy McCoo and [Suspect T] in the Silverbridge
attack while James Mitchell stated that O’Connell and some ‘Portadown
boys’, one of whom was named, as a guess, as McCoo, were involved.
Noting the lack of information about what had happened on 28 June 1980
when the RUC had said that the charges against McClure and Shields were
marked “no prosecution” and about the judgment of Jones LJ that
was relied on (see page 8 above), it stated that “a perception persisted
that the case against McClure and Shields was managed or dropped in
order to reduce the culpability of the latter when he came to be sentenced
for his role in the Rock Bar attack”. It also referred to a letter
sent by the Centre to the Northern Ireland Office, assessing McClure’s
admissions as going beyond failure to provide information to giving
actual assistance to the perpetrators. It did not consider that correspondence
from the Northern Ireland Office, which set out reasons for not pursuing
more serious charges against the two accused and clarified that the
DPP had been aware at the time of Jones LJ’s judgment, could be taken
as a complete answer to the allegations of managing the matter to lessen
McClure’s perceived culpability in the Rock Bar attack.

49. It was stated that before his trial for involvement
in the attack on Donnelly’s Bar, on 30 June 1980, McClure had been
sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, suspended for three years, for
his involvement in the attack on the Rock Bar (possession of an explosive
substance and firearms and ammunition with intent to endanger life).

G. Proceedings against the Director of Public
Prosecutions

50. On 14 April 2003, the applicant commenced
proceedings against the DPP, challenging various aspects of his decision-making
in connection with the decision not to proceed with the case against
McClure and Shields, in particular seeking orders to quash any decisions
not to prosecute, offer evidence or enter a nolle prosequi and to quash his refusal to provide full and
comprehensive reasons for not continuing the prosecution and his refusal
to make available copies of their admissions The applicant also challenged
the failure of the DPP to exercise his statutory power under Article
6(3) of the Prosecution of Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 to
conduct further investigations into the death of Trevor Brecknell.

51. In an affidavit from a senior officer of the
Public Prosecution Service dated 2 February 2006, it was stated that
due to the considerable vintage of the prosecutions in question the
full facts relating to the mechanism whereby the prosecutions were actually
terminated could not be established. It was known that the opinion of
senior prosecuting counsel was considered before a discontinuance direction
of 8 April 1981 was made. The effective decision maker had been the
then DPP Sir Barry Shaw who had retired some sixteen years before. The
senior Assistant Director involved in the decision, and author of the
discontinuance direction, had since died.

52. By decision dated 23 May 2006, the High Court
judge rejected the applicant’s application. He found that correspondence
with the Attorney General in April 2003 established that the Attorney
General had not issued a nolle prosequi. It appeared that a decision was taken by the
DPP not to offer evidence against the accused at trial, which practice
at the time was called, misleadingly, a nolle prosequi. Noting that the offence occurred in 1975 and
the charges dropped in 1981 and that it had been clear throughout 2002
when the family and the Centre had been in contact with the police that
no further action on this matter would be taken, he commented that the
passage of time until bringing the judicial review application in May
2003 was very considerable. However, if he was wrong on the question
of delay, the application still failed on the merits. The application
for disclosure of files failed on the procedural ground that it was
brought against the DPP, not the Chief Constable who had control of
the said files. The decision of the DPP not to use his statutory power
to direct a police investigation was a matter of discretion and the
decision could not be said to be irrational or unlawful in the circumstances.
As regarded reasons, the DPP had departed from his practice and reasons
had been given by his officer in affidavit. In any event, the extent
of the reasoning was a matter for the DPP and the court could not make
an order to require the decision maker to give sufficient reasons to
justify the decision not to prosecute. In relation to the discontinuance
of the prosecution, the judge noted that the reasons included delay
in bringing the case to trial, the perceived unlikelihood of a custodial
sentence and "crucially the impact of a judgment in another case
which was judged to eliminate any reasonable prospect of a conviction"
which was a reference to the decision of Jones LJ discussed in R v Donnelly
[1986] NI 54. He considered that it was evident that the decision was
taken at the highest level and not lightly. At this long remove, with
the death and retirement of the principal actors, it was not possible
to establish that the decision, which had a rational basis was Wednesbury
irrational or unlawful. He emphasised that a legal challenge of this
kind directly affected third parties, namely the two defendants against
whom the prosecution was dropped, and that it would be intrinsically
unfair to reach a decision adverse to their position without giving
them an opportunity to be heard - neither had been given notice of the
application – and such a decision might also, potentially, be in breach
of their rights or of the presumption of innocence. He noted that the
purported entry of a nolle prosequi by the prosecution was admitted to be wrong
in principle and law, as only the Attorney General could do such. The
court record and documentation tended to suggest that the court was
told that there was a nolle prosequi. While it would have been open to the prosecution
merely to tender no evidence, this could have led to the direction of
an acquittal; it was less clear whether an acquittal should have followed
as a matter of law. He declined to give declaratory relief as to the
invalid nature of the purported nolle prosequi due to the universal acceptance that this had
been inappropriate, the fact that this practice had ceased, the applicant’s
delay and the absence of the accused as parties to the application.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2
OF THE CONVENTION

53. The applicant complained that the United Kingdom
had failed to provide an effective official investigation into the circumstances
of her husband’s death after allegations were made in 1999 by John
Weir as to RUC involvement, invoking Article 2 of the Convention which
provides:

“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected
by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the
execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime
for which this penalty is provided by law.

2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as
inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the
use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;

(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent
the escape of a person lawfully detained;

(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of
quelling a riot or insurrection.”.

A. The parties’ submissions

1. The applicant

54. The applicant did not invite the Court to
assess the adequacy of the original investigation into her husband’s
death, though, in answer to the Government’s submissions, she drew
attention to the fact that some eight potential witnesses had never
given statements to the RUC and that house-to-house enquiries had not
been carried out. She also disputed that McClure and Shields had only
been implicated to the degree of realising after the event that they
had picked up the persons involved in the attack: to the extent that
she had been able to see the statements, reproduced in the Dundalk report,
the state of knowledge of both McClure and Shields was such as properly
to give rise to a charge of murder, as McClure admitted knowing that
a shooting was involved and Shields realised that it had something to
do with “The Troubles”. She also considered that doubts arose as
to the circumstances in which a nolle prosequi had been entered against McClure, there being
no adequate explanation for dropping these charges, the delay in proceeding
with them or their separation from other charges faced by him. She submitted
that the separation of these charges undoubtedly impacted on the sentencing
for the Rock Bar attack in which he only received a suspended sentence.

55. As regarded the investigation into Weir’s
allegations, which was the subject-matter of her complaint, the applicant
drew attention to the discrepancies between the conclusions reached
by the RUC and the Barron Report as regarded credibility. The latter
noted that the Irish police who had interviewed Weir and had access
to all the information at the RUC’s disposal found him a convincing
witness. This underlined, in her view, the lack of RUC independence,
both hierarchical and practical and the lack of an effective and thorough
investigation by the RUC. She pointed out that the PSNI did not come
into existence until November 2001 and in any event was largely a continuation
of the former organisation without hierarchical or practical independence.
In particular, she noted that the RUC officer conducting the investigation
in 1999 was denied access to the information held by RUC Special Branch
(e.g.
the abstracts of information from interview notes, themselves since
lost, known as Daily Record Sheets); the significant number of factual
errors and inaccuracies in the RUC report (e.g. it stated that Shields was dead when she was in fact still
living at Mitchell’s farm); the failure of the RUC report to draw
sufficient attention to evidence which supported Weir’s stories; and
the fact that discrepancies in the accounts given by Mitchell in 1978
and 2000 were not explored, while denials made by David Payne which
were contradicted by his previous convictions2
were not followed up, thus showing that the interview process by the
RUC in 1999 was inadequate. Indeed, she asserted that the interviews
conducted by the RUC were only carried out at the behest of the Irish
police and that they were conducted in a manner which did not press
the interviewees in relation to their involvement in terrorist activities
and contributed to the conclusion that Weir lacked credibility. Insofar
as the Government claimed that it had not been possible for the authorities
to interview Weir themselves, she noted that he had been easily accessible
to journalists, the Irish Police and the Independent Commission and
that it had been possible for the HET, some seven years later, to trace
him using the Centre as a conduit. Similarly the process of linking
the weapons used in various attacks only appeared to have been done
at the behest of the Independent Commission.

56. The applicant also contradicted the Government’s
assertion that Weir had never made reference to his allegations during
the 1978 investigation, pointing to Weir’s affidavit in which he stated
that he had provided some information to the RUC in 1978 but that they
had been uninterested. As shown by the failure to interview a named
suspect in the murder of Colm McCartney and John Farmer (see application
no. 34575/04), the RUC were not interested in a full investigation into
security force collusion with loyalists and had closed down relevant
lines of inquiry. The reports dated November 2003 to which the Government
referred had not been made available to the applicant.

57. The applicant pointed out that Weir made his
allegations in 1999 and that the investigation into these matters did
not therefore coincide with examination of the deaths during “The
Troubles” which was carried out by the SCRT (established in March
2004) and by HET (established in March 2005). There was no basis for
suggesting a lack of adequate resources.

58. The applicant argued that an obligation arose
to conduct an Article 2 - compliant investigation due to the nature of
the allegations made by Weir, which were credible and from a person
in a position to have the relevant knowledge, and due to the fact that
the RUC, in accordance with domestic law, decided to conduct an investigation
in 1999. The Court’s case-law established that such an obligation
could arise where circumstances, in particular the emergence of new
evidence, arose casting doubt on the original investigation or which
raised new or wider issues. The test for determining whether an investigation
was required was whether the nature of the evidence was such as to make
it reasonable to impose a duty on the authorities to investigate that
information or material or whether it was in the interests of justice
to impose a duty on the authorities to investigate the new evidence.
Further, where the state’s own authorities determined that an investigation
was necessary, such investigation must necessarily be Article 2 - compliant.
The requirements of independence, accountability and transparency, effectiveness,
promptness and expedition remained undiminished, even after the passage
of time, although the steps that could reasonably be taken might be
influenced by that factor. Also relevant was the nature and efficacy
of any earlier investigation and the nature of the new evidence. However
the investigation in this case, lasting over seven years, could not
be regarded as prompt. Commenced in July 1999, the RUC investigation
concluded in October 2003, then further work was undertaken prior to
transmission to the SCRT, the HET took up the case in April 2006and the
investigation was still ongoing. She noted that in any event the HET
was not carrying out a full effective investigation but was only seeking
to identify if further evidentiary opportunities existed. Furthermore
the applicant had not been informed by the RUC of the investigation
but only found out through the efforts of the Centre to persuade the
authorities to take action and since then information had only been
provided in a “drip-feed manner”. She had obtained far more information
from the Barron and Dundalk Reports, the RUC and DPP refusing to provide
her with information which was provided to those inquiries.

59. The applicant disputed the Government’s
claims that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant further investigation
or prosecution, pointing out that the statements by McClure and Shields
contained evidence justifying further prosecution and that, in any event,
the investigation served not only the narrow aim of obtaining a prosecution
but in reassuring the public and relatives. She further argued that
the issue of police time and resources could not be used to justify
a failure to conduct an effective investigation.

2. The Government

60. The Government submitted that no procedural
obligation arose under Article 2 to investigate Weir’s allegations
as these were made in 1999, over 20 years’ after the event and long
after the period for fulfilment of the State’s obligation of investigation
had expired. They pointed out that there had been a police investigation
into the murders immediately after they occurred, with an inquest; there
had also been a second police investigation in 1978-1981 in light of
allegations made and information provided by McCaughey and information
from McClure and Shields. There was no continuing obligation to investigate
after this initial period and any complaints about these investigations
would be out of time under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.

61. The Government submitted that it was not open
to an applicant to claim that the procedural obligations could be revived
each time potentially relevant new evidence came to light. Such an approach
would fundamentally undermine the legal certainty which Article 35 §
1 was intended to achieve. Not only was it not acceptable for the obligation
to be revived after every new item of evidence, however trivial, arose
but also no sensible dividing-line based upon the supposed quality of
any further item of information received could be spelled out in clear
and certain terms, which would enable all parties to know precisely
where they stood in relation to whether the obligation of investigation
had revived or not. Nor could any new investigation be wholly divorced
in practical terms from those carried out before and with the lapse
of time, the inability to trace complete files and lack of any useful
recollection of details by erstwhile investigators, there might well
be no realistic prospect of a further viable investigation that could
reasonably be made the subject of further supervision by the Court.
There was, accordingly, a powerful argument in support of the simple
application of the clear limitation rule in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention
(relying on McDaid and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 25681/94, Commission
decision of 9 April 1996, Decisions and Reports (DR) 85-A, p. 134 and Walker v. the
United Kingdom (dec.), no. 34979/97, ECHR 2000-I

62. In addition, where positive obligations arose,
the Court had stated that no impossible or disproportionate burden should
be placed on the State; when with the passage of time the objective
of identifying and punishing those responsible for killing became less
capable of being achieved, the point would eventually be reached where
it became disproportionate to expect the State to devote scarce resources
to undertaking investigations unlikely to yield any significant gains.
To the extent that the case of Hackett appeared to support the contrary
approach, the Court had adopted its decision without the benefit of
argument on these points. In the present case, given a lapse of some
24 years from the death in issue, there was no realistic prospect that
new material would be brought to light which would be likely to allow
the perpetrators to be prosecuted and punished. Accordingly, no procedural
obligation arose.

63. If this submission was not accepted, the Government
submitted in the alternative that no procedural obligation arose as
the allegations made by Weir in 1999 were not such as to give rise to
any reasonable expectation that they would produce new evidence capable
of supporting a prosecution after the time which had elapsed and hence
were not of a character or substance which could trigger or revive any
procedural obligation of investigation. To do so, any new evidence would
have to be very weighty and, prima facie, compelling in nature and hold
out a serious or realistic prospect of a successful prosecution, otherwise
the State authorities would face a disproportionate burden in investigating
historic crimes, possibly to the detriment of the investigation of recent
crimes and the prevention of future ones. In this case, the allegations
made by Weir about this incident were limited references, made indirectly
to third parties rather than to the authorities in Northern Ireland,
based largely on hearsay and speculation and not pointing to any source
of hard evidence. The most that could be done was to challenge the individuals
named by Weir who would inevitably deny them. Further, Weir’s credibility
was seriously in doubt due to his own background and the fact that he
did not make the allegations earlier despite having had the opportunity.
For a long period he had gone to ground, leaving the United Kingdom
and making himself untraceable.

64. However, even if the allegations did trigger
or revive a procedural obligation, the investigations into his allegations
did comply with the requirements of Article 2, which in the circumstances
involving a serious lapse of time, were less stringent or extensive.
What steps may reasonably be taken are also affected by the time factor.
The investigations were independent, as the RUC personnel involved in
the initial investigations had long since left the security forces or
died, PSNI had undergone extensive reform and was to be regarded as
independent of the RUC, and in any event the HET which was now carrying
out the investigation was independent of both the RUC and PSNI, while
the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland was also independent and in
a position to investigate and monitor the HET investigation. The investigations
were reasonably prompt having regard to the circumstances and the other
pressures on policing resources in Northern Ireland: the police were
hampered by the failure of Weir to give a statement to them and their
attempts to trace him had proved fruitless. Further, the investigations
had been as effective as could reasonably be expected in the circumstances,
the applicant not identifying any concrete line of inquiry or step which
should have been taken but was not. Efforts had been made to meet with Weir. However, when he
did agree to meet with the HET in Dublin, he refused to make a written
statement or to give evidence in court. There had also been involvement
of the family and public scrutiny to the requisite degree, given that
there was no obligation to provide relatives with access to the file
of an ongoing criminal investigation and that police officers had met
with and discussed the case with the family on a number of occasions.
They referred to the Court’s case-law that there was no absolute right
to obtain a prosecution and that no breach arose in such cases where
there were no culpable failures in seeking to hold perpetrators of criminal
offences accountable (relying on Szula v. the United Kingdom, no. 18727/06, (dec.) 4 January
2007). In this case, where the review process was close to conclusion,
there were no more realistic additional evidential opportunities to
follow up and they had been unable to compile a sufficient evidential
case for further prosecutions.

B. The Court’s assessment

1. Applicable principles

65. The obligation to carry out an effective investigation
into unlawful or suspicious deaths is well-established in the Court’s
case-law (for a full statement of principles by the Grand Chamber, see,
most recently, Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98,
§§ 110-113, ECHR 2005-VII). When considering the requirements flowing
from the obligation, it must be remembered that the essential purpose
of such investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the
domestic laws which protect the right to life and, in those cases involving
State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring
under their responsibility. Furthermore, even where there may be obstacles
or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular
situation, a prompt response by the authorities is vital in maintaining
public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing
any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts (see McKerr v. the
United Kingdom, no. 28883/95, §§ 111 and 114, ECHR 2001-III).

66. The obligation comes into play, primarily,
in the aftermath of a violent or suspicious death and in the normal
course of events, a criminal trial, with an adversarial procedure before
an independent and impartial judge, must be regarded as furnishing the
strongest safeguards of an effective procedure for the finding of facts
and the attribution of criminal responsibility. There is no absolute
right however to obtain a prosecution or conviction (e.g. Szula v. the United Kingdom, cited above) and the fact
that an investigation ends without concrete, or with only limited, results
is not indicative of any failings as such. The obligation is of means
only (Avşar v.
Turkey, no. 25657/94, § 394, ECHR 2001-VII (extracts)) However,
as in this case, it may be that some time later, information purportedly
casting new light on the circumstances of the death comes into the public
domain. The issue then arises as to whether, and in what form, the procedural
obligation to investigate is revived.

67. The Court must reject the Government’s argument
that no new obligation arises and that a strict six month time-limit
must be applied, rendering applications more than six months after the
end of the original investigation out of time within the meaning of
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. It has already had cause to examine
cases in which new evidence came to light after the conclusion of the
original proceedings concerning a death. In McKerr v. the United Kingdom (cited above) where there had
been a criminal trial of three officers charged with murder of unarmed
IRA suspects and subsequently serious concerns arose that this incident,
together with two others at the time, involved a practice of excessive
use of force by the RUC and the deliberate concealment of evidence,
the Court held:

"... there may be circumstances where issues
arise that have not, or cannot, be addressed in a criminal trial and
that Article 2 may require wider examination. ...... the aims of reassuring
the public and the members of the family as to the lawfulness of the
killings had not been met adequately by the criminal trial. In this
case therefore, the Court finds that Article 2 required a procedure
whereby these elements could be examined and doubts confirmed, or laid
to rest. It considers below whether the authorities adequately addressed
these concerns."

68. Similarly, where in Hackett v. the United Kingdom (no. 34698/04, (dec.) 10 May
2005) a book was published in which the author alleged that he had been
wrongly convicted of the murder of the applicant’s husband years earlier
and purported to name the actual perpetrator, the Court noted that events
or circumstances may arise which cast doubt on the effectiveness of
the original investigation and trial or which raise new or wider issues
and an obligation may therefore arise for further investigations to
be pursued. It considered that the nature and extent of any subsequent
investigation required by the procedural obligation would inevitably
depend on the circumstances of each particular case and might well differ
from that to be expected immediately after a suspicious or violent death
has occurred.

69. The Court would also comment that there is
little ground to be overly prescriptive as regards the possibility of
an obligation to investigate unlawful killings arising many years after
the events since the public interest in obtaining the prosecution and
conviction of perpetrators is firmly recognised, particularly in the
context of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

70. The Court would, however, draw attention to
the following considerations. It cannot be the case that any assertion
or allegation can trigger a fresh investigative obligation under Article
2 of the Convention. Nonetheless, given the fundamental importance of
this provision, the State authorities must be sensitive to any information
or material which has the potential either to undermine the conclusions
of an earlier investigation or to allow an earlier inconclusive investigation
to be pursued further. Both parties have suggested possible tests. The
Court has doubts as to whether it is possible to formulate any detailed
test which could usefully apply to the myriad of widely-differing situations
that might arise. It is also salutary to remember that the Convention
provides for minimum standards, not for the best possible practice,
it being open to the Contracting Parties to provide further protection
or guarantees. For example, contrary to the applicant’s assertion,
if Article 2 does not impose the obligation to pursue an investigation
into an incident, the fact that the State chooses to pursue some form
of inquiry does not thereby have the effect of imposing Article 2 standards
on the proceedings. Lastly, bearing in mind the difficulties involved
in policing modern societies and the choices which must be made in terms
of priorities and resources, positive obligations must be interpreted
in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden
on the authorities (Osman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1998-VIII, § 116).

71. With those considerations in mind, the Court
takes the view that where there is a plausible, or credible, allegation,
piece of evidence or item of information relevant to the identification,
and eventual prosecution or punishment of the perpetrator of an unlawful
killing, the authorities are under an obligation to take further investigative
measures. The steps that it will be reasonable to take will vary considerably
with the facts of the situation. The lapse of time will, inevitably,
be an obstacle as regards, for example, the location of witnesses and
the ability of witnesses to recall events reliably. Such an investigation
may in some cases, reasonably, be restricted to verifying the credibility
of the source, or of the purported new evidence. The Court would further
underline that, in light of the primary purpose of any renewed investigative
efforts (see paragraph 65 above), the authorities are entitled to take
into account the prospects of success of any prosecution. The importance
of the right under Article 2 does not justify the lodging, willy-nilly,
of proceedings. As it has had occasion to hold previously, the police
must discharge their duties in a manner which is compatible with the
rights and freedoms of individuals and they cannot be criticised for
attaching weight to the presumption of innocence or failing to use powers
of arrest, search and seizure having regard to their reasonably held
view that they lacked at relevant times the required standard of suspicion
to use those powers or that any action taken would not in fact have
produced concrete results. (Osman, cited above, § 121).

72. The extent to which the requirements of effectiveness,
independence, promptness and expedition, accessibility to the family
and sufficient public scrutiny apply will again depend on the particular
circumstances of the case, and may well be influenced by the passage
of time as stated above. Where the assertion or new evidence tends to
indicate police or security force collusion in an unlawful death, the
criterion of independence will, generally, remain unchanged (see, for
the importance of this criterion from the very earliest stage of the
procedure, Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands[GC], no. 52391/99, §§. 325, 333-341, ECHR 2007-...). Promptness
will be likely not to come into play in the same way, since, for example,
there may be no urgency as regards the securing of a scene of the crime
from contamination or in obtaining witness statements while recollections
are sharp. Reasonable expedition will remain a requirement, but what
is reasonable is likely to be coloured by the investigative prospects
and difficulties which exist at such a late stage.

2. Application in the present case

73. The Court recalls that in the present application
the investigation into the shooting of the applicant’s husband came
to an inconclusive conclusion in 1981, when the decision was taken not
to pursue charges against McClure and Shields, who had apparently driven
the perpetrators on the night of the incident, for failure to disclose
information about the killing. It was more than seventeen years later
that allegations by John Weir were made public concerning collusion
between security forces and loyalist terrorists and naming four loyalists
as having been responsible for the attack. These allegations were published,
or made known from March 1999 and received wide publicity when included
in a television programme in June 1999. An investigative response appears
to have been commenced by the RUC at around that time. Interviews with
seven individuals central to Weir’s allegations and amongst those
who could be traced or were still alive, were conducted in 2001, without
obtaining any useful new or incriminating evidence. Information was
received from counterparts in the Irish police force and also provided
to the inquiry in Dublin which was investigating a number of incidents
at this time (paragraphs 42-45 above). It would appear that the RUC
investigation was acknowledged as failing to progress due to the need
to interview Weir directly. While the applicant alleged, in answer to
the Government’s assertion that Weir had proved inaccessible to the
United Kingdom authorities, that the Dublin police and the Centre had
no difficulty in talking to him, the Court would note that Weir refrained
from coming within the jurisdiction, where he might well have risked
further criminal charges being lodged against him or retaliatory steps
from those whom he had been naming in the press. It sees no reason to
disbelieve the Government’s statement that they took steps to locate
Weir, including approaching his last known address and making inquiries
from the Irish police and the Barron inquiry staff.

74. The Court notes that in 2004 the case was
transferred to the SCRT which carried out a further assessment and then
referred it to the HET where evidence was reviewed under the supervision
of a Metropolitan Police senior officer. This team did succeed in interviewing
Weir who refused either to make a statement or to agree to give evidence
in a United Kingdom court. The HET has now apparently reached the conclusion
that there is insufficient evidence to proceed further although it does
not appear that any formal decision has yet been issued to that effect.

75. Before assessing these investigative measures
against the standards of Article 2 of the Convention, the Court notes,
first, that the allegations made by Weir were serious, involving security
force collusion in systematic targetting of innocent civilians and that
they were, prima facie, plausible, deriving from a source who had been
involved in such incidents and giving concrete details. In the circumstances
an obligation arose on the authorities to verify the reliability of
the information and whether a full investigation, with a view to bringing
charges against any suspect, could usefully be launched. Investigative
measures have been carried out in this case. Their compliance with Article
2 is examined below.

a. Independence

76. The Court would observe that the initial inquiries
were carried out by the RUC, which was itself implicated in Weir’s
allegations as their own officers had allegedly been heavily involved.
They cannot be regarded as disclosing the requisite independence (see Ramsahai,
cited above, §§ 333-341). It was the RUC which carried out the interviews
with those named by Weir and which was entrusted with the initial assessment
of the credibility of his allegations. This must be regarded as tainting
the early stage of the enquiries. The Court recalls that the PSNI took
over from the RUC in November 2001. It is satisfied that the PSNI was
institutionally distinct from its predecessor even if, necessarily,
it inherited officers and resources. It observes that the applicant
has not expressed any doubts about the independence of the teams which
took over from 2004 (the SCRT and HET). However this does not in the
circumstances detract from the fact that for a considerable period the
case lay under the responsibility and control of the RUC. In this respect,
therefore, there has been a failure to comply with the requirements
of Article 2 of the Convention.

b. Accessibility to the family and public
scrutiny

77. The Court notes that this aspect of the procedural
obligation does not require applicants to have access to police files,
or copies of all documents during an ongoing inquiry, or for them to
be consulted or informed about every step (McKerr, cited above, § 121; Green v. the United Kingdom, no. 28079/04, (dec.) 19 May 2005; Hackett v. the
United Kingdom, cited above). It would appear that the police
did make efforts to meet with members of the family from about 2000
onwards (see paragraphs 27, 30, 33 and 36) and there was also correspondence
between the police and the applicant’s representatives. If only limited
information has been passed on, it is not apparent that this flowed
from any obstructiveness or obfuscation rather than a lack of any concrete
results. The Court is not persuaded in the present case that the applicant
has been excluded from the investigative process to such a degree as
would infringe the minimum standard under Article 2.

c. Promptness and reasonable expedition

78. The Court considers that the RUC took up inquiries
without undue delay. If the matter has dragged on from 1999 to 2007
this has largely been due to the lack of any strong leads and difficulties
in interviewing Weir, who remained outside the jurisdiction. It is not
apparent that there has been any wilful foot-dragging or prevarication.
The Court also takes into account that a considerable number of other
cases were being simultaneously reviewed over this period. While there
might nonetheless be a question mark as to the slowness of progress
in the early stages when the RUC were in charge, the Court notes its
finding of lack of independence above and finds no separate issue arises
in the circumstances. No breach of these requirements has been made
out.

d. Effectiveness

79. As regards the adequacy of the steps taken,
the Court is not persuaded by the applicant that there have been any
significant oversights or omissions. The key traceable witnesses have
been interviewed, and the available evidence collected and reviewed.
The Court is not persuaded that the apparent errors or shortcomings
of the RUC identified by the applicant (see paragraph 55) can be regarded
as rendering the investigative process inadequate when viewed as a whole.

80. Insofar as the applicant claims that a further
prosecution could be brought against McClure and Shields, the Court
recalls that the earlier prosecution was dropped and that attempts to
challenge the lawfulness of this step failed, inter alia, due to the delay by the applicant in raising the
matter and the potential unfairness to the two involved individuals
who had not been parties to the case. It would note that these two individuals
were relatively minor participants in events and considers that the
authorities could reasonably take the view that attempting to revive
the previous charges, or upgrade them to aiding and abetting, would
at this stage be either doomed to failure or be unduly oppressive and
thus not assist materially in bringing to account those principally
responsible for the death of the applicant’s husband.

81. Nor is it apparent that any prosecution against
any other person would have any prospect of success given Weir’s refusal
to make a statement or to give evidence himself. In the circumstances,
the Court cannot impugn the authorities for any culpable disregard,
discernable bad faith or lack of will (mutatis mutandis, Szula v. the United Kingdom, cited above).

e. Conclusion

82. The Court finds that the investigative response
to Weir’s allegations lacked the requisite independence in its early
stages. There has been, in that respect alone, a violation of Article
2 of the Convention.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
13 OF THE CONVENTION

83. The applicant complained under this provision
about the lack of any effective remedy, submitting that the House of
Lords decision of 11 March 2004 in the case of McKerr v. the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland removed
any domestic remedy for her allegation that the current investigation
breached Article 2 of the Convention.

84. In view of its findings above, the Court considers
that is not necessary to examine separately the complaint under this
Article.

III. APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

85. Article 41 of the
Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation
of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law
of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation
to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”

A. Damage

86. The applicant claimed non-pecuniary damage
for the suffering and distress caused by the State’s failure to conduct
an effective official investigation into the circumstances of her husband’s
death.

87. The Government submitted that even if there
was a breach of the procedural obligation it would not be appropriate
to apply the same scale as in cases of procedural breaches in the immediate
aftermath of death. They considered a finding of a violation should
be held in itself to constitute just satisfaction. Alternatively, any
award should be modest.

88. The Court has found that the national authorities
failed in their obligation to provide a properly independent investigative
response in the initial stages following the allegations made by John
Weir concerning the death of the applicant’s husband. In the circumstances,
it considers that the applicant sustained some non-pecuniary damage
which is not sufficiently compensated by the finding of a violation
of the Convention. Making an assessment on an equitable basis, the Court
awards the sum of EUR 5,000.

B. Costs and expenses

89. The applicant claimed, for legal fees and
expenses, 29,239.71 pounds sterling (GBP) for her solicitors’ bill
and GBP 29,375 for counsel’s fees, both sums being inclusive of value-added
tax (VAT). The latter was a global figure which covered work in this
case and the four associated cases.

90. The Government submitted that the overall
solicitors’ charging rate (with an uplift of 50% for care and conduct)
was excessive, and half the amount was appropriate. The overall hours
claimed were also excessive given that similar issues arose in the four
other cases considered at the same time; 200 hours for counsel was remarked
upon. They proposed no more than GBP 20,000 for solicitors’ costs
and GBP 15,000 for counsel in total for all four cases together.

91. The Court recalls that only legal costs and
expenses found to have been actually and necessarily incurred and which
are reasonable as to quantum are recoverable under Article 41 of the
Convention (see, among other authorities, Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 31195/96, 25 March 1999, §
79, and Smith
and Grady v. the United Kingdom (just satisfaction), nos. 33985/96
and 33986/96, § 28, ECHR 2000-IX).

92. Having regard to the complexity of the case
and the procedure adopted, the Court awards the applicant EUR 29,000
for solicitors’ costs and EUR 22,000 for counsel’s fees, which figures
are inclusive of VAT.

C. Default interest

93. The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention
due to the lack of independence of the RUC during the initial stages
of the investigation begun in 1999;

2. Holds that it is not necessary to examine separately the applicant’s
complaint under Article 13 of the Convention;

3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay
the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment
becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention the
following amounts, to be converted into pounds sterling at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement;

(ii) in respect of costs and expenses, EUR 51,000 (fifty one thousand
euros);

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the
above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just
satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing
on 27 November 2007, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of
Court.

T.L. Early Josep Casadevall
Registrar President

1
Her name also appears as Lily.

2
In his 2002 interview he denied knowing Mitchell's farm although his
conviction in the late 80s related to the possession of arms obtained
at Mitchell's farm.