Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to prevent his extradition under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act
(UCEA), ORS 133.743 et seq., for alleged probation violations in the state of
Washington. He asserts that he is not a person "who has fled from justice" within the
meaning of ORS 133.747 (1) because he was located in Oregon at the time of his alleged
probation violations. We conclude that the "fled from justice" requirement in ORS
133.747 is satisfied if the documents supporting extradition demonstrate that the person
has been charged with and convicted of committing a crime in the requesting state and
allege that the person has violated the terms of his or her probation or parole.
Consequently, we affirm.

The material facts are undisputed. Plaintiff was convicted in Washington of
attempt to elude (RCW 46.61.024), second degree burglary (RCW 9A.52.030), and bail
jumping (RCW 9A.76.170), and was sentenced to both confinement and "community
supervision." (2) The terms of his community supervision permitted plaintiff to live in
either Washington or Oregon, but required that he regularly report to a community
corrections officer in Washington. Plaintiff was also required to pay $75 a month to
reimburse his court costs.

Plaintiff was first released from jail in August 1995 but failed to comply
with the terms of his community supervision, and was jailed for an additional 120 days.
He was released for the second time in January 1997 and immediately returned to Oregon.
Since his January 1997 release, plaintiff has remained in Oregon and has neither reported
to Washington nor made any monthly payments as required by the terms of his
community supervision.

In March 1999, the Governor of Oregon issued a warrant authorizing
plaintiff's arrest and extradition to Washington. That warrant was based on a request by
the Governor of Washington, which stated that plaintiff "stands convicted of the crimes of
attempt to elude; burglary in the second degree and bail jumping and * * * thereafter
violated the terms of [his] sentence." The documents accompanying the request included
an authenticated copy of the "Findings, Conclusion and Judgment and Sentence"
adjudicating plaintiff guilty of attempting to elude, second degree burglary, and bail
jumping, and sentencing him to both confinement and community supervision. See ORS
133.753 (authenticated copy of judgment of conviction or sentence will support
extradition demand).

In April 1999, plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In that
petition, plaintiff challenged his extradition, arguing that he was not in Washington at the
time of the alleged probation violation and thus did not "flee" from the demanding state
as required for ORS 133.747 to be applicable. (3) In particular, plaintiff asserted:

"The documents [supporting the extradition request] allege that while
plaintiff was 'personally present' in the State of Washington he committed
the offense of violating the terms of his sentence by failing to report to his
probation officer and failing to make payments on fines and court costs.
The requisition alleges that the offense, or offenses, occurred sometime
between Jan. 9, 1997 and Nov. 16, 1998. During that period of time,
Plaintiff was legally residing in the State of Oregon and did not travel into
the State of Washington."

The trial court denied plaintiff's petition.

On appeal, plaintiff reiterates the same argument he made to the trial court.
As discussed below, however, plaintiff's argument is based on an erroneous premise, viz.,
that the "crime" from which he is fleeing is the probation violation itself, rather than the
underlying offense.

"Interstate extradition is intended to be a summary and mandatory executive
proceeding derived from the language of Article IV, section 2, of the United
States Constitution. Michigan v. Doran, 439 US 282, 288, 99 S Ct 530,
534-35, 58 L Ed 2d 521 (1978). The courts of an asylum state are bound by
the constitution and, where adopted, by the UCEA, and a governor's grant
of extradition is prima facie evidence that the constitutional and statutory
requirements have been met. Id."

A person subject to extradition can challenge the extradition in a habeas corpus
proceeding, but the scope of that inquiry is limited. In particular, a habeas corpus court
reviewing an extradition warrant can examine only whether: (1) the documents supporting
extradition are facially flawed; (2) the plaintiff has been charged with a crime in the
demanding state; (3) the plaintiff is, in fact, the person named on the request; and (4) the
plaintiff is a fugitive. Doran, 439 US at 289.

Plaintiff argues that he has not "fled from justice" for purpose of the UCEA.
See ORS 133.763(1). Plaintiff's argument is similar to that of the plaintiff in Hidalgo v.
Purcell, 6 Or App 513, 488 P2d 858 (1971), cert den 405 US 957, 92 S Ct 1188, 31 L Ed
2d 235 (1972). There, the plaintiff, a habeas corpus petitioner, had been convicted of a
crime in California and placed on parole. He later violated the terms of that parole by
moving to Oregon without permission, and California sought extradition from Oregon. In
resisting extradition by way of a habeas corpus petition, the plaintiff asserted that he was
not subject to mandatory extradition because, as a parolee, he was not "charged with a
crime" in California. Id. at 514. We rejected that argument, concluding that a person
who has been convicted of a crime in the demanding state and has violated the terms of
the person's parole has been "charged with a crime" and has "fled from justice" for
purposes of the UCEA. Id. at 514-15; see also Ex Parte Montoya, 170 Or 499, 502-03,
135 P2d 281 (1943) (defining "fugitive" for extradition purposes as "person who commits
a crime within a state and withdraws himself from such jurisdiction without waiting to
abide the consequences of such act"). Thus, consistent with Hidalgo, plaintiff here is a
fugitive under the UCEA because, having violated his parole, he is avoiding the
consequence of his crimes in Washington.

Our holding accords not only with Hidalgo, but also with decisions in other
jurisdictions that have adopted the UCEA. See ORS 133.853 (Oregon's UCEA must be
interpreted so as to "make uniform the law of those states which enact the [UCEA]"). (4)
All of the states that have considered the issue have reached the same conclusion: A
person who violates the terms of his or her probation or parole is a fugitive from justice
subject to extradition, regardless of where he or she is when the alleged violation occurs. (5)

We thus conclude that a person has "fled from justice" for purposes of ORS
133.747 if the supporting documents demonstrate that the person has been charged with
and convicted of committing a crime in the demanding state, and allege that the person
has violated the terms of his or her probation, parole, or other form of community
supervision imposed as a sentence for that conviction. Here, the Governor of
Washington's request for extradition included a certified copy of plaintiff's conviction and
alleged that plaintiff violated the terms of his probation. That is enough to establish that
he is a fugitive, and we will not inquire into the merits of that putative probation
violation. See, e.g., Ex Parte Summers, 40 Wash 2d 419, 243 P2d 494, 495-96 (1952)
("The state in which he is found cannot inquire into the propriety of the decision by the
demanding state that he is a parole violator. That question, like the question of guilt or
innocence of an accused, is one for decision in the demanding state."). (6)

We reject, without discussion, plaintiff's remaining arguments.

Affirmed.

1. ORS 133.747 states:

"Subject to the qualifications of ORS 133.743 to 133.857 and the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States controlling, and Acts of
Congress in pursuance thereof, it is the duty of the Governor of this state to
have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state
of the United States any person charged in that state with treason, felony, or
other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this state."

2. "Community supervision" is a "period of time during which a convicted
felon is subject to crime-related prohibitions and other sentence conditions." State v.
Julian, 102 Wash App 296, 304, 9 P3d 851, 856 (2000); see also RCW 9.94A.030(8)
("For purposes of the interstate compact for out-of-state supervision of parolees and
probationers, RCW 9.95.270, community supervision is the functional equivalent of
probation and should be considered the same as probation by other states.").

3. ORS 133.763 requires that the documents supporting a demand for
extradition under ORS 133.747 show that "the accused, when demanded upon a charge of
crime, was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, and thereafter fled from that state[.]" Plaintiff's petition challenged the allegation
that he was present in Washington when the "crime" was committed.

4. Cf. State ex rel Leo v. Tuthill, 170 Or App 79, 87 n 8, 11 P3d 270 (2000)
("Even putting aside the potential difficulties of prospective delegation, there is the
surreal prospect of the first state to consider an issue fixing the law of every other state by
virtue of 'uniformity.'").

5. See Wynsma v. Leach, 189 Colo 59, 536 P2d 817, 819-20 (1975) ("[A]
parolee is subject to extradition as a fugitive because, as a convict with an unexpired
sentence, he remains criminally 'charged.' His extradition is for his original offense. * * *
Since [the petitioner] is being extradited for an uncompleted sentence for narcotics
possession, his location at the time of the parole violation is also immaterial."). See also
Calhoun v. State, 726 So 2d 751, 755 (Ala Crim App 1998) ("This State will not inquire
into the propriety of Ohio's decision that [the petitioner] is an alleged probation
violator."); Ex Parte Trignani, 13 NJ Super 306, 80 A2d 371, 373 (1951) ("A paroled
convict leaving the state even by consent of the paroling authority becomes, on revocation
of such parole, a fugitive from justice[.]"); Carpenter v. Jamerson, 69 Ohio St 2d 308,
432 NE2d 177, 180-81 (1982) (petitioners on probation have not yet "satisfied" their
criminal convictions; notwithstanding petitioner's testimony that his Georgia probation
officer told him he could move to Ohio and could cease making payments as required by
his probation, petitioner was fugitive from justice simply by virtue of alleged probation
violation); In re Hval, 148 Vt 544, 537 A2d 135, 1137 (1987) ("[T]he crime referenced
under [the UCEA] is not the 'crime' of probation violation, but is rather the original crime
on conviction of which the probation was based in the requisitioning state."); Ex Parte
Summers, 40 Wash 2d 419, 243 P2d 494, 495-96 (1952) (where the extradition papers
from Illinois properly alleged that a petitioner had violated his parole in Illinois, he was a
fugitive from justice despite his allegation that his earlier release from custody in Illinois
was a final discharge: "An alleged parole violator is a fugitive from justice from the state
which claims to have granted his parole. One who has been sentenced and paroled is,
during the maximum term of his sentence, amenable to the process of the paroling state to
enforce the terms of his parole. By absenting himself from that state, he renders himself
unavailable for this purpose.").

6. Plaintiff relies on State v. Hershey, 31 Wash App 366, 641 P2d 1201
(1982), to support his argument that he is not a fugitive subject to extradition. That
reliance is misplaced. In Hershey, the court concluded that the documents supporting
extradition were facially flawed, because they failed to allege that the petitioner was a
fugitive from justice:

"Here, the documents are fatally flawed. Hershey allegedly committed acts
in another state which resulted in a crime in Oregon, while the supporting
documentation only asserts Hershey committed crimes within Oregon.
There is no factual assertion that Hershey fled from Oregon without
authorization[.]" Id. at 1204.

Thus, the holding in Hershey is inapposite to the issue of whether or not plaintiff is a
fugitive from justice for purposes of the UCEA simply by virtue of his alleged probation
violations and absence from Washington.