Creator:
Stanford University. Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Title: Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, records

Dates: 1970-2013

Physical Description:
13.75 Linear feet and 33382.4megabytes

Language(s): The materials are in English.

Physical Location: Special Collections and University Archives materials are stored offsite and must be paged 36-48 hours in advance. For more
information on paging collections, see the department's website: http://library.stanford.edu/depts/spc/spc.html.

Repository:
Department of Special Collections and University Archives

Green Library

557 Escondido Mall

Stanford, CA 94305-6064

Email: specialcollections@stanford.edu

Phone: (650) 725-1022

URL: http://library.stanford.edu/spc/university-archives

Administrative Information

Provenance

The materials were transferred from the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), 2011.

Information about Access

Restricted files closed until January 1, 2086. Otherwise the collection is open for research; materials must be requested
at least 48 hours in advance of intended use. Audio-visual materials are not available in original format, and must be reformatted
to a digital use copy.

Ownership & Copyright

All requests to reproduce, publish, quote from, or otherwise use collection materials must be submitted in writing to the
University Archivist, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, California 94304-6064. Consent is given on behalf of University
Archives as the owner of the physical items and is not intended to include or imply permission from the copyright owner. Such
permission must be obtained from the copyright owner, heir(s) or assigns. See: http://library.stanford.edu/depts/spc/pubserv/permissions.html.

Restrictions also apply to digital representations of the original materials. Use of digital files is restricted to research
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Cite As

[identification of item], Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Records (SC1058). Dept.
of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, Calif.

Biographical/Historical note

The Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
(FSI), is an interdisciplinary university-based research and training center addressing some of the world's most difficult
security problems with policy-relevant solutions. The Center is committed to scholarly research and to giving independent
advice to governments and international organizations.

The Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) traces its origins to the Vietnam War and the mass teach-ins
that took place on campus during that turbulent era. At one of the gatherings, political scientist John Lewis, a noted China
scholar, met physicist Wolfgang (Pief) Panofsky, then director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), and Stanford
law Professor John Barton. The three men, Lewis recalled, found that the students had little knowledge about war and how security
policies are developed. In response, the scholars decided to create a teaching environment in which students from different
disciplines could examine international security matters and understand how government policy is formed.

In 1970, their class, "Arms Control and Disarmament," focused on nuclear weapons and efforts to control them through treaties
and negotiations. Today, the descendant of that class is still team-taught by CISAC faculty every winter quarter under the
name, "International Security in a Changing World." Over time, this course has influenced thousands of Stanford undergraduates.

In 1973, the Ford Foundation awarded Stanford a grant to develop a course on arms control and an accompanying textbook. International
Arms Control: Issues and Agreements (subsequently published in two editions; the second, edited by Coit Blacker and Gloria
Duffy, became the standard textbook on the subject.) A year later, the foundation gave the fledgling program a five-year grant
for training, research and outreach activities. In 1978, along with three other university-based centers, Stanford's "Arms
Control Program" received Ford Foundation endowment funds that Stanford subsequently matched. When the match was finalized
in 1983, Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) was established. John Lewis and SLAC physicist
Sidney Drell were the Center's first two co-directors, a structure maintained ever since.

From early in its history, CISAC emphasized a three-part mission, which continues today:

To produce policy-relevant research on international security problems; To teach and train the next generation of security
specialists; To influence policymaking in international security.

From inception, the Center focused on the study of U.S.-Soviet-China relations, arms control and nonproliferation, and the
technical aspects of international security issues. In 1983, Carnegie Corporation of New York gave CISAC a grant to bring
mid-career scientists to the Center to work on international security issues. Ever since, CISAC has brought scientists, social
scientists and policy experts to the Center as fellows.

After Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, CISAC was able to foster deeper ties with the Soviet academic
and policy-making communities. In 1990, when Gorbachev visited Stanford and gave a lecture on cooperation and reconciliation
between the two longtime adversaries, he singled out the efforts of Stanford and CISAC researchers in bridging Cold War hostilities.

The end of the Cold War reduced many security dangers but increased others. As new challenges emerged, CISAC's research agenda
adapted accordingly. New areas of study included the safeguarding of nuclear weapons and the study of internal and regional
wars, peacekeeping operations, and peace settlements.

In 1998, CISAC moved to larger quarters in Encina Hall and changed its name--in reflection of its broadened mandate--to the
Center for International Security and Cooperation. The Center continued to mentor visiting fellows and expanded its teaching
activities by establishing an undergraduate honors program in international security studies in 2000.

After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the center's research agenda broadened again to include questions of terrorism and counterterrorism.
Work at the Center continues to reflect the ongoing and emerging security challenges worldwide. For example, senior scholar-practitioners
such as CISAC'S William Perry and George Shultz at Hoover, the center's first co-directors Sid Drell and John Lewis, former
visiting scholar James Goodby, and faculty members David Holloway and Scott Sagan--are working with a vision to eliminate
nuclear weapons worldwide, with a focus on practical steps that can be taken now.

From its roots in the teach-ins of the Vietnam War, CISAC's mission continues to focus on making useful and relevant contributions
to peace and security. By promoting cross-disciplinary research that tackles complex challenges in innovative ways, by training
the next generation of security experts and by using knowledge to influence policymakers, CISAC works for a safer, more secure
world.

Scope and Contents

The History Project records include organizational files, files about Fellows, and biographical files about visiting speakers.
Audiovisual material is comprised of recordings of CISAC workshops and conferences recorded on audiocassettes and VHS videocassettes.
Restricled Files include donor information, salary information, recommendations, endorsements, reviews, etc.

The Drell Lecture is an annual public event sponsored by CISAC. By tradition, the Drell lecturer addresses a current and critical
national or international security issue that has important scientific or technical dimensions. The Drell Lecture is named
for Sidney Drell, CISAC's founding science co-director. Albert and Cicely Wheelon generously endowed the lectureship.

Sherman, Nancy. The Moral Wounds of War: The War Within
2011 Sep 22

Physical Description:
73 computer file(s) (JPG)

Scope and Content Note

The author of the acclaimed The Untold War: Inside the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of Our Soldiers provides a unique analysis
of the moral weight of warfare through the lenses of philosophy and psychology.

Thirteen Days -- and Fifty Years Later: What Have We Learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis?2012 Sep 22

Physical Description:
90 computer file(s) (JPG)

Scope and Content Note

Fifty years ago, the Soviet Union and the United States stood on the brink of nuclear war. For thirteen days in October 1962,
people around the world held their breath and hoped for a peaceful resolution to the Cuban Missile Crisis. This distinguished
panel will discuss and debate the crisis from the perspectives of Moscow and Washington, and consider what history has taught
us since those thirteen days in 1962.

SPEAKERS David Kennedy - History, Emeritus at Stanford Eliot Cohen - Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins Jean Bethke Elshtain
- Social and Political Ethics at University of Chicago Divinity School Scott D. Sagan (moderator) - (Moderator) Political
Science at Stanford

Should citizens be required to serve their country by fighting for it? Do we think differently about the decision to go to
war when only a small number of citizens will fight it? Do volunteer armies and draft armies fight differently in combat?

This panel discussion focuses on the draft versus the volunteer army in the U.S. Our distinguished panelists examine "who
should fight" in a democracy, focusing on the ethical dimension of a state's system of military service.

Who should fight? It is no idle question in an era in which thousands of U.S. troops are fighting and dying in Afghanistan
and Iraq to protect Americans back home. In fact, the answer has profound consequences for the way policymakers make decisions
about how these wars are waged. On Dec. 2, scholars from Stanford, the University of Chicago, and the School of Advanced International
Studies at Johns Hopkins University examined this issue as part of the Stanford Ethics & War Series, co-sponsored by the Center
for International Security and Cooperation. Their conclusion: there is a wide and troubling divide between the 2.4 million
Americans who volunteer to serve in the military and the many millions more who choose not to.

The statistics are revealing: During World War II, some 16 million men, and several thousand women, served in the military,
representing 12 percent of the U.S. population. They came from all walks of life, and those who stayed home made sacrifices
of their own for the greater war effort. But while the U.S. population has more than doubled since then, the military is now
just 4 percent of the size it was in the 1940s. At the same time, today's wars require virtually no sacrifice at home, and
those who enlist come from an extremely narrow demographic segment of the U.S. population. According to Stanford historian
David Kennedy, who spoke at the event, in 2007, only 2.6 percent of enlisted personnel had exposure to college, compared to
32 percent of men age 18 to 24 in the general population. The military is disproportionately composed of racial, ethnic, and
other demographic minorities, he noted. The political elites making the decisions about warfare seldom have children serving.
Among the 535 elected members of Congress in 2008 only 10 had children in the military.

The implications of this are vast. A lack of personal familiarity for many Americans with the military breeds to some puzzling
behavior, says Eliot Cohen, the Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies. Congressmen say they can't imagine U.S. troops committing the kinds of atrocities recorded at the Abu Ghraib prison
in Iraq; left-leaning anti-war advocates at Moveon.org refer to General David Petraeus, the highly regarded commander of the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as General Betray Us. More than that, a large gap between those who make the decisions about
war and those who fight it raises serious questions about accountability. The Vietnam-era draft inspired thousands of Americans
to push back against Washington's decisions to expand the war. Conversely, the existence of the all volunteer army, in effect
since 1973, may have one been one reason for the relatively smaller level of protest in the run up to, and the execution of
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, at a 2006 Oval Office meeting with President George W. Bush, Kennedy said the president
told him that if the draft had been in place he "would have been impeached by now."

The gap also raises concerns about civic unity. Earth-shaking events such as World War II and Sept. 11 brought citizens together,
says Jean Bethke Elshtain, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics in the Divinity School at
the University of Chicago. But sustaining that unity is extremely difficult, and becomes even more so when one segment of
the population is willing to give its life to protect Americans while the vast majority go on with their lives without making
any sacrifice of their own. To Elshtain, this raises a basic issue of fairness and social justice. There is a general lack
of equity, she says, when "some families bear a radically disproportionate burden of service and sacrifice." As their peers
"study or work or frolic, they die" in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Redressing this imbalance is an extraordinary challenge. Surely a draft would help. But it raises ethical questions of its
own. There is also no political will to reinstate it. Nor, says Cohen, is it necessary or even desirable from a military perspective.
A better set of solutions, he suggests, would start with expanding the depth and scope of relations between civilians and
military personnel. He recommends siting military bases around the country so that civilians in New England, say, where there
is virtually no military presence, can have greater exposure to an institution about which many of them know very little.
Elite universities such as Stanford and Harvard, which have long prohibited on-campus ROTC activities, should start revisiting
and revising their policies so that over time the military will have a wider diversity of background. Doing so might enrich
the campus experience, and it could also lead to a stronger military in which the highly educated graduates of America's elite
educational institutions would take a greater role influencing America's elite military institutions. For now, Kennedy observes,
we have effectively "hired some of the least advantaged of our fellow countrymen to do some of our most dangerous business."
And we continue down this path at our peril.

Our understanding of warfare often derives from the lofty perspective of political leaders and generals: what were their objectives
and what strategies were developed to meet them? This top-down perspective slights the experience of the actual combatants
and non-combatants caught in the crossfire. This course focuses on the complexity of the process by which strategy is translated
into tactical decisions by the officers and foot soldiers on the field of battle. We will focus on three battles in American
history: Gettysburg (July 1863), the Battle of Little Bighorn (June 1876), and the Korengal Valley campaign in Afghanistan
(2006-2010). In addition to reading major works on these battles and the conflicts in which they occurred, we will travel
to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and the Little Bighorn battlefield in Montana. The course¿s battlefield tours are based on the
¿staff rides¿ developed by the Prussian Army in the mid-1800s and employed by the U.S. Army since the early 1900s. While at
Stanford, students will conduct extensive research on individual participants at Gettysburg and Little Bighorn. Then, as we
walk through the battlefield sites, students will brief the group on their subjects' experience of battle and on why they
made the decisions they did during the conflict. Why did Lt. General Longstreet oppose the Confederate attack on the Union
Army at Gettysburg? What was the experience of a military surgeon on a Civil War battlefield? Why did Custer divide his 7th
Cavalry troops as they approached the Little Bighorn River? What was the role of Lakota Sioux women after a battle? Travel
will be provided and paid by Sophomore College (except incidentals) and is made possible by the support of the Center for
International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).

Sagan, Scott celebration
2011 Oct 24

Physical Description:
282 computer file(s) (JPG)

Book Launch for Philip Taubman's ''The Partnership: Five Cold Warriors and Their Quest to Ban the Bomb"2012 Jan 25

In The Partnership: Five Cold Warriors and Their Quest to Ban the Bomb, Philip Taubman, a former editor and reporter at the
New York Times, explores the lives of Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn, William Perry, and Sidney Drell, and their
attempt to reduce the nuclear threat. Taubman, a CISAC consulting professor, is also the author of Secret Empire: Eisenhower,
the CIA, and the Hidden Story of America's Space Espionage.

The president, surrounded by his Cabinet members and senior national security and foreign policy advisors, appears grim as
he declares: “This is certainly the greatest crisis I’ve ever faced as a president.”

He has ordered the deployment of U.S. forces into Syrian territory to protect civilians and establish safe zones. His Cabinet
must now determine whether to order a pre-emptive strike against Syrian troops on word from the CIA that the Bashar al-Assad
regime appears ready to use chemical and biological weapons stored in underground bunkers east of Damascus.

After a military briefing by the commander of CENTCOM, the president cautions those assembled at the classified briefing:
“Remember, history will judge us, in part, by how thoroughly we discuss all the options today.”

With imagined top-secret memorandums from the CIA and the White House – as well as the real-deal Obama Nuclear Posture Review
– some 20 Stanford undergraduate and law students dressed in suits and armed with laptops and position papers spend three
hours debating the merits of an attack on Syrian forces.

Scott Sagan, a political science professor and senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC),
plays Obama in the class co-taught by Allen Weiner, director of the Center on International Conflict and Negotiation at the
Law School.

The Ethics and Law of War class presents law and political science students with some of the political, legal and moral consequences
of war. For their final simulation, they must stay in character, grill one another as policymakers and world leaders might
do behind closed doors – and then defend their final decisions.

“Instead of simply learning abstract just-war theory or international law doctrine, the simulations encourage students to
apply what they've learned to real problems,” says Weiner, once a legal adviser at the State Department. “This provides for
much deeper awareness of the subject matter and richer appreciation of the nuances and complexities.

Scott Sagan as President Obama

Ethics & War

The class grew out of Stanford’s hugely successful, two-year War & Ethics lecture series, which concluded last month. Philosophers,
writers, journalists, historians, social scientists, human rights activists and policy makers came together several times
a month to grapple with the complex ethical equations of war. Co-sponsored by a dozen centers and departments across campus,
the series drew big names and big crowds.

Vietnam War veterans and award winning authors Tobias Wolff – a Stanford English professor – and Tim O’Brien told a sold-out
audience that writing about war was both therapeutic and heartbreaking. O’Brien was a Pulitzer Prize finalist for “The Things
They Carried,” a harrowing string of stories about a platoon of American soldiers in Vietnam.

How do you write about war? “You do it sentence by sentence, line by line, character by character, even syllable by syllable,’
O’Brien told a mesmerized audience. “You dive into that wreck and try to salvage something.”

Journalist Sebastian Junger spoke at the screening of “Restrepo,” his documentary about the Afghanistan War. Stanford students
and faculty performed in George Packer’s play, “Betrayed,” which illuminated the U.S. abandonment of young Iraqi interpreters
who risked their lives for Washington during the Iraq War. For the final event, Debra Satz, a philosophy professor and director
of the McCoy Family Center for Ethics in Society, Sagan, and Charles Dunlap, a retired Air Force general who now leads the
Center on Law, Ethics and National Security at Duke University, debated the future ethical challenges of war.

Sagan, an expert in nuclear policy and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction who worked at the Pentagon and was
a consultant to the Secretary of Defense, said the lecture series enriched his students by forcing them to pay attention and
question the moral and legal underpinnings of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“I was stretched, intellectually, by this series,” he said. “It encouraged me to read and discuss both fiction and philosophy
that raises the same ethical issues – from a very different perspective – that we analyze in political science.”

Back to class

Weiner, as stand-in for Vice President Joe Biden, tells those assembled they must consider that within 24 hours, 6,000 American
troops will be in danger. The CIA has a “high degree of confidence” that Assad has ordered the removal of the chemical weapons
from the underground bunkers and transport trucks have been spotted at the sights.

“As we head into an election cycle, the difficulties of the decision that we make today will be placed under even greater
scrutiny,” Weiner says.

That decision will be to make one of these hard choices:

The U.S. military withdraws its troops and avoids a military confrontation, but risks further civilian deaths and the condemnation
of Arab Spring allies; Obama orders conventional airstrikes against Syrian troops, which could lead to thousands of inadvertent
civilian casualties; Washington takes extraordinary measures and uses nuclear weapons to destroy the underground storage bunkers
for its weapons of mass destruction. This last option likely would eliminate any chance of Syrian troops using chemical weapons,
but it would open a Pandora’s box for the Nobel Peace Prize president who has pledged to work toward a nuclear-free world.

U.S. Army Col. Viet Luong as CENTCOM Commander Gen. James Mattis The students know Americans are weary of war after the WMD
fiasco in Iraq and a decade-long war in Afghanistan, both of which have claimed countless lives and a trillion-plus in taxpayer
dollars. Their decision – as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, among others – is weighted
by the concern that Americans likely won’t re-elect a president who drags them into another costly warm, and by the fear that
a successful president cannot let American troops be exposed to deadly chemical attacks.

The mock military briefing by Gen. James Mattis – played by visiting CISAC military fellow, U.S. Army Col. Viet Luong, himself
a commander in Afghanistan – lays out the risks and probabilities of casualties under each scenario.

A student asks Luong which military option he would recommend.

The general prevaricates: “I’m a military guy; I tend to lean toward success and then I also consider civilian casualties.
But I’m also very concerned about putting my soldiers at risk.”

Clinton, voiced by international policy student Micaela Hellman-Tincher, says she’s concerned about mission creep. “Consider
the international implications of us entering into conflict,” she says.

The fake Samantha Power of the National Security Council, played by Ashley Rhoades, urges diplomatic measures and a stand-down
from military conflict. “I’m not advocating in any way for inaction,” she says. “There are several diplomatic solutions. We
ask that you give us 24 hours to be able to work on these diplomatic options and multilateral diplomacy.”

Such as what? Such as calling on Moscow to mediate or seeking a U.N. envoy.

The legal team from the law school lays out their arguments for why a preventive strike would be illegal under certain conventions;
while a pre-emptive strike based on imminent and unavoidable threats of attack might be permissible.

Then Stanford law student Alex Weber – playing Avril Haines, legal advisor to the National Security Council – addresses the
elephant in the room: the nuclear option.

“If you use a nuclear weapon, regardless of whether the Syrians use chemical weapons against our troops, you are, as Colin
Powell said in the 1991 Gulf War, opening a Pandora’s Box, particularly because Syria has no nuclear weapon,” Weber says.
“You are the nuclear nonproliferation president. There is a psychological button that you push that will prompt the media
to take the ethical debate to new levels.”

In the end, consensus appears to be growing around an immediate preventive strike against the storage bunkers using conventional
forces. The Cabinet knows this could lead to deaths on both sides, but allowing the Syrians to use chemical weapons could
lead to even more.