"There is suspicion, verified by the haulage
owner, that a 30tonne truck moved the piles of muck from Pirbright along
Westwood Lane to Compton (between Flexwood and Elstead) when it was
flooded." This is where they are pinning the blame for the virus getting into the
stream and paddocks.

Reading the final report and looking at the images you
get the impression that this is a piss-poor operation! I have worked in more
modern factories, institutions etc than this place in ENGLAND. Pirbright and
those who fund it are a disgrace!

1) In one installation I worked at in 1974 (Solihull,
Birmingham) we used Group 4 access cards. Each had it's own individual code that
had to be keyed into a pad after you had inserted the card into the
slot! You could not allow others through the door into the computer rooms
with you because the first door let you into a small corridor with a turnstyle
that when activated by the cardholder locked anyone coming through. The exit
door from this corridor had a time limit of 5-10 seconds before it locked you
out. If that happened you would be allowed to return through the turnstyle
and exit the corridor on the other side. I believe three times and you are out -
Security was notified automatically!

2) I see very few formal/paved roads on the Pirbright site and
lots of dirt roads - IN THIS DAY AND AGE???? Pirbright should be a showcase and
not such a dump! The copse and elsewhere on the grounds should be
landscaped with paths and rest areas for the workers not just an adjunct from
before the 1930s when the place was established.

3) All governments going back 70 years should be ashamed of
themselves to allow such a mess to evolve!

4) No wonder nobody wants to work there!

Best

Norm

From Norm Coates to warmwell September 9 2007

Quoting warmwell for Sept 8

"At least the BBC uses single quotation marks
around its headline Leaking drains 'caused outbreak'
but, in their official looking map, wrongly call Hunts Hill farm the "second
infected farm" , whereas actually it was the SOS farm whose 362 animals were
slaughtered even though all were healthy - to the grief of their owner.
"

Norm writes:

They were even wrong when depicting Woolford farm as the
first infected site. The FIRST infected site was an annex that the Prides rented
that was the first case (at Normandy next to the stream and the
allotments)! . The virus was then transported to the home farm - Woolfords
Farm (near Elstead) - where ONE animal was found to have contacted the virus.
All animals at Woolford Farm and the agistments were culled as were a
neighbouring small farm's animals just north of Elstead (this case has
surreptitiously never been mentioned very much in the media although documented
by Defra).

Now the other image (attached to the pathetic map)
shows "Two soil heaps"! where did they go?

Stabilitech - to me this company is a new player in the scheme of
things and became apparent in the HSE Finalreport.pdf and is initially
identified on the Defra site on the 8th of September 2007?

Quote -

98 Two Stabilitech researchers were involved in
freeze-drying cultures of the O1 BFS

strain in a laboratory within the main IAH facility.
Freeze-driers are a known source of

aerosol, and we inspected the arrangements. The equipment
did not have an in-line

filter for vented gases, however, the line did pass through
an oil sump before discharge

into the room. We consider release of live virus of the O1
BFS strain into the laboratory

as being of a low likelihood.

99 All work (excluding the freeze-drying process) was
undertaken in MSCs: these were

examined and found to be operating and tested
properly.

100 Our investigations did not reveal any accidents or
unusual incidents which may

have resulted in the laboratories used by Stabilitech staff
being contaminated with

the O1 BFS strain. However, our investigation
revealed that Stabilitech did not have

a written SOP for some procedures carried out in
their laboratories which relate to

biosecurity-critical areas during the period covered
by our investigation.

Furthermore,

records of staff training were poor. We recommend review of
arrangements for setting

and monitoring safe operating practices where work is
subcontracted under a single

Stabilitech' s technology allows
manufacturers to generate vaccines and other biological materials which are
stable and effective in a dry state at ambient temperature. The technique
removes the need for refrigeration at all points in the vaccine supply chain,
enabling treated vaccines to be stored and transported efficiently. In addition,
vaccine handling and administration becomes much simpler and safer than current
means. The technology addresses many key issues in the vaccine
industry:

The prohibitive cost of vaccine storage

The high cost of maintaining cross-continental
refrigerated supply chains

Excessive wastage due to unreliable power supplies
and temperature deviation

Medical supervision is a scarce resource,
particularly in developing nations

Vaccine budgets are overstretched, spending on
refrigeration not vaccines

The technology is applicable to all virus types -
including live and sub-unit, human and animal vaccines. The end result is robust
and non-toxic and is amenable to any drug administration route - oral, injection
etc

(from Stabiltech link)

148 Given that the overall chemical treatment required to
inactivate SAPO pathogens

involves both the preliminary and final treatments, Defra
informed us that both they

and the management of Merial accept that live pathogens may,
on occasion, enter the

Merial effluent sump and get from there into the site' s
effluent drainage system. We feel

that this is more relevant for the Merial process, given the
amounts of organic matter

and cellular debris generated by centrifuging the contents
of their 6000 litre bioreactors.

.

.

150 We conclude that it is likely that live virus of
the O1 BFS strain entered the

effluent drainage system from the Merial facilities
during the period covered by

our investigation.

151 This process was fully in compliance with their SAPO
requirements. We feel it

would be better practice for Defra to require a higher
degree of inactivation before the

centrifuge waste enters the effluent sump. We recommend that
Defra and Merial work

closely together to establish how best this could be
done.

.

.

154 An assessment of the condition of these pipes was
carried out. Dyno-Rod,

working with HSL undertook a CCTV survey which was
interpreted by experts from

Dyno-Rod, the Environment Agency and an HSE inspector who
has expertise in