Snowballing Ignorance

by reichorn

“Sceptics are philanthropic and wish to cure by argument, as far as they can, the conceit and rashness of the Dogmatists.”

— Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism

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Roger here again. This is going to be my final post as a guest-blogger for a while. I’ll still check in when I can, but I simply have too many demands on my time to keep up with the go-go blogging lifestyle.

In parting, I’ve written a pretty thorough — and no doubt thoroughly exhausting — response to Vox Day’s multi-part ‘dissection‘ of my twoposts on ancient skepticism. I apologize in advance.

“Why bother?” is an entirely understandable question. I could dress it up any number of ways, but given that I have zero expectation of actually making any dialogic progress with Vox or his partisans, it comes down to vanity.

So here it is: my vanity post.

I’ll do my best to keep up with any comments, and I hope to return as a guest-blogger soon.

P.S.: My wife and I went to see The Avengers tonight. How awesome is that movie?! It was especially sweet for old Buffy/Angel fans like us.

Dissecting “Dissecting the Skeptics I”

It seems to me that textual criticism can be charted along two axes: the axis of charitability (of the reading) and the axis of depth (of the criticism). It is easy to know what to do with criticisms that place high on the charitable-reading axis: if they are shallow, you answer the criticism while filling in what the critic has overlooked or misunderstood; if they are deep, you ponder the criticisms for as long as it takes to come to grips with them. But when criticisms, whether deep or shallow, score low on the charitable-reading axis, it’s difficult to know what to do with them. In the case of deep-but-uncharitable criticisms, it’s often the case, it seems to me, that you’re not really dealing with ‘criticism’ at all, properly speaking, but rather with an articulation of views held by the critic that are only tangentially related—if they’re related at all—to the text ostensibly being criticized.

In the case of shallow-and-uncharitable criticisms, it’s generally best simply to ignore them, for the following two related reasons: (1) if the critic read your initial text uncharitably, then (ceteris paribus) you have no reason to expect him to read your responses charitably; (2) given that they are based on an uncharitable reading of the text, the criticisms are likely to betray such deep misunderstandings of the text as to require a great deal of work to reach the point at which you and the shallow-and-uncharitable critic are on the same page (and are thus able to avoid talking past each other)—and given (1), you have no reason to expect that your work will be rewarded.

I have done my best to give Vox’s ‘dissection’ of my two posts on ancient skepticism a charitable reading. He doesn’t make it easy, given how frequently his ‘logical dissection’ is interrupted by personal insults—all directed at me, of course. But again, I have done my best. My conclusion is that, if we put aside all the posturing and name-calling, Vox’s response to my posts are (through no fault of his own) shallow and (very much through a fault of his own) uncharitable.

Let me say a few words on what I mean by ‘charitable.’ The so-called ‘principle of charity’ is a basic hermeneutic principle according to which it is incumbent upon (honest, bipartisan, truth-seeking) critics of texts both (a) to give that text the fairest reading possible and (b) to develop the most sympathetic interpretation of the texts they can. It should be evident why the principle of charity is a hermeneutic virtue. Most obviously, it conduces to fruitful debate by avoiding straw-man arguments. Less obviously, perhaps, it contributes to the development of deep criticisms as opposed to shallow ones.

It seems to me that Vox is pretty upfront about his uncharitable approach to my texts. He starts out “Dissecting the Skeptics I” by writing, “I’ve been asked in the past to explain how go [sic] about breaking down and critically analyzing an argument and how I am able to so readily spot the flaws it contains… [Delavagus’s] two posts on ancient scepticism will serve as an ideal specimen for this example.” Now, of course you could argue that, having already read the posts charitably, Vox is able to identify them as “ideal specimen[s].” But (a) it is clear from the context in which Vox was directed to the posts that he approached them with an uncharitable attitude (I cannot possibly dredge up the evidence here—I’m simply airing my opinion of the matter; you are free to see for yourself, if you care to); and (b) the ‘dissections’ themselves offer ample evidence of uncharitable readings and scant to no evidence of charitable readings. (For example, he starts out with this: “And since he’s an academic of sorts, we know to look for the word games, in particular the definitional bait-and-switch of which they are so very fond. At this point, I wouldn’t go so far as to say that I smell a rat, only that I believe there is a high probability that a rat or two will soon present itself.” The thing about these sorts of interpretive preconceptions is that they tend to be self-fulfilling prophecies.)

Most obviously, Vox immediately slaps the label ‘Error!’ on what a charitable critic would formulate as a question or as a remark on a passage’s lack of clarity. In other words, where a charitable critic would say something like, “It isn’t clear to me why the author has chosen this particular definition of knowledge,” Vox instead declares, “Error!”

The uncharitability of the reading goes so deep and is so pervasive that I’m left at a loss to pick out particular examples, since essentially every sentence of every post is an example. But I’ll make one more general remark: Vox says, in post 1, that he always asks himself four questions when faced with a text. It’s striking that the most obvious candidates are nowhere to be found in his list. Among the things any reader should ask themselves when faced with a text (at least if they intend to criticize the text) are: (1) For what purpose was this written? (Note that this is a charitable question as opposed to Vox’s fourth, uncharitable variant: “What is the author trying to prove?”) (2) Who is the intended audience for this text? (3) What are the author’s goals? And so on.

I like to think that, had Vox asked himself these questions, he would not have been led to write some of the things he wrote in his first post. For example, take question (1): the purpose of my two posts on ancient skepticism were to give a brief, thumbnail sketch of a much larger topic. Question (2): these posts are clearly intended for a general audience; thus, they’re intended to be generally accessible (i.e., not weighed down with too much detail or too many technicalities). In several places throughout his ‘dissections,’ Vox levels complaints along the lines of: “Delavagus failed fully to address problem x or y, which he himself admits are clearly relevant to the points he wants to make.” I grant the charge, but dispute its relevancy. (And, contra Vox, the fact that I point out issues that I fail to address seems to me to suggest intellectual honesty rather than dishonesty on my part!) A charitable reader—or simply a good reader of texts—would have known from the start that I was not attempting to deal comprehensively with any of the numerous topics I bring up. It seems that nothing short of an entire scholarly, footnoted tome on the subject would satisfy Vox (though of course it wouldn’t satisfy him, since he’d read the book uncharitably!). To label as ‘Errors’ what are nothing more than unavoidable internal constraints of the texts themselves (i.e., constraints arising from the posts’ purpose, scope, goals, etc.) indicates nothing but Vox’s inability to recognize or accept the texts for what they are.

Here’s an example. One of the errors Vox charges me with under the heading First Error (he lumps two separate charges together) is the following: I make “irrelevant musings on what would fascinate Sextus and an unjustified belief claim concerning how Sextus would have made use of modern scientific evidence.” From this, he concludes that I am “not a rigorous thinker and… [am] liable to going off on irrelevant tangents and making groundless assertions concerning things [I] can’t possibly know.”

But any competent reader should see what I was attempting to do with my introductory remarks. Noting that I somehow failed in my intention would be fine; but the intention itself is surely plain as day (so to speak). I start out by saying, “In this post, I’d like to discuss one of Scott’s favorite themes—human stupidity—in relation to Pyrrhonism. Scott focuses, and for good reason, on the growing scientific (that is, empirical) evidence to the effect that humans are stupid, stupid creatures… However, Sextus did not think that we require empirical evidence in order to arrive at the conclusion that we’re all idiots. That conclusion, he thought, can be arrived at purely a priori, that is, while lounging in our armchairs and merely thinking through our knowing.”

It’s obvious what I’m trying to do, yes? I’m trying to segue, in my first post as a guest-blogger on the Three Pound Brain, from topics typical of the Three Pound Brain (cognitive psych, neuroscience) to the more abstract philosophical musings of my post by suggesting a connection between the two. That connection takes the form of my claim that Sextus Empiricus, the ancient Pyrrhonian, utilized both empirical and a priori arguments as part of his skeptical dialectic. Scott talks a lot about the empirical side, whereas I want to discuss the a priori, philosophical side. Again, this all seems like something any reader should pick up on. But apparently Vox missed it.

Now, as we’ve seen, Vox charges me with making an “unjustified belief claim concerning how Sextus would have made use of modern scientific evidence.” But this is what I actually wrote: “Sextus Empiricus himself based many of his arguments on empirical evidence. Though, of course, his ‘evidence’ was not the sort of thing that would pass muster in a modern scientific context, I believe there’s every reason to think that, were he alive today, Sextus would be at least as fascinated by the growing body of evidence concerning human cognitive shortcomings as Scott is—and moreover, there’s every reason to think that he would have made potent use of this evidence in his skeptical dialectic.”

It’s telling, and indicative of Vox’s uncharitable reading, that he reads right past the two instances of “there’s every reason to think” in my passage. It honestly boggles my mind to think that a competent reader would call foul—let alone ‘Error!’ (what kind of error, anyway? logical? factual?)—on speculative claims like, “If x were alive today, he’d probably y.” This is a common enough, and perfectly harmless, thought-experiment. Any half-intelligent (or halfway-charitable) reader ought to know what I’m saying, namely, “Since Sextus made use of the empirical evidence that was available to him, were ‘he’ alive today (‘he’ meaning: a contemporary analogue to Sextus, i.e., a person alive today writing with the same goals, philosophical outlook, and methodology as Sextus) would no doubt also make use of what empirical evidence is now available.” Is this really so hard to understand? Is this really an ‘error’? Not in any meaningful sense.

The second half of the First Error is this: “a questionable word game being played with ‘evidence.’” What does this refer to? The following passage: “Sextus Empiricus himself based many of his arguments on empirical evidence. Though, of course, his ‘evidence’ was not the sort of thing that would pass muster in a modern scientific context.” What is ‘questionable’ about this? By putting the second instance of ‘evidence’ in scare-quotes, I’m signaling that it would not pass muster in a modern scientific context. This is true. Science has advanced considerably since the second-century; for this reason, modern readers are not likely to consider Sextus’s ‘evidence’ to be genuine evidence. This is not hard to understand.

The Second Error Vox identifies concerns my use of ‘justified true belief’ as an analysis of knowledge. The oddity of labeling this an ‘error’ is so startling I’m not even sure what to say about it. I’ve already explained elsewhere to Vox the wrong-headedness of appealing to the dictionary as a final word on the matter even in ordinary contexts, let alone in philosophical contexts. As far as I’ve seen, Vox has not responded to these remarks. I will not repeat them here. Suffice it to say that ‘justified true belief’ is the standard philosophical analysis of knowledge. It is not intended to capture everyday usage of variants of ‘to know,’ and thus pointing out that it fails to do so is not a criticism. This is such an elementary point that, again, I’m not sure what to say about it. I can only marvel at Vox’s shallowness.

Now, Vox seems to think that the proffered philosophical analysis is just one more definition, on a par with the nine he pulls from whatever dictionary he consults. But that is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature and purpose of a philosophical analysis of a concept. In short, the idea behind the ‘justified true belief’ formulation (as I say in my first post) is that there are, on the one hand, beliefs, while on the other hand there is the truth. A certain kind of person—most of us, I would hope—ideally want our beliefs to be true, that is, we want to believe true things. We have this word, knowledge, that is generally (my God, I said ‘generally’! ‘error’! ‘error’!) taken as a contrast to belief, in the sense that ‘knowledge’ differs from (mere) belief in also being true. This is backed up by most of the definitions Vox trots out: knowledge has to do with ‘facts’ and ‘truths.’ The question, then, is how we can bridge the prima facie gap between ‘belief’ and ‘truth.’ We do so, philosophy has long maintained, by way of justification. Hence, ‘justified true belief’ is an analysis of the concept of knowledge, not a definition of the use of the word.

A brief comment on ‘generally.’ I wrote: “Knowledge is generally taken to be justified true belief.” Vox claims: “Weasel words such as ‘generally’, ‘basically’, and ‘pretty much’ are always red flags, particularly when they precede something as important as the definition of an argument’s foundation or central subject.” This is such a bizarre criticism that it boggles the mind. ‘Generally’ is not (or needn’t be) a ‘weasel’ word; it is simply a qualifier. It appears all the time in scholarly literature, or anything written by people who are actually conversant with the welter of views on a complex subject. When it comes to something like the proper analysis of ‘knowledge,’ it is to be expected that not all philosophers agree. In other words, it is to be expected that any analysis is, at best, only ‘generally’ accepted.

Vox concludes: “As should be clear, Delavagus’s definition of knowledge isn’t a valid one in common usage, but instead represents a different concept altogether. His statement is provably incorrect, as knowledge is quite clearly NOT ‘generally taken to be justified true belief’.”

To sum up: Vox mistakes a philosophical analysis of a concept for a definition of the everyday usage of a word. Now, of course, I could have been clearer. I could have said, “Knowledge is generally taken by philosophers to be ‘justified true belief.’” But this admission merely underscores the shallowness of the criticism. Vox’s remark here also demonstrates clearly his arrogant uncharitability.

Earlier today I was reading Luciano Floridi’s brilliant article “The Problem of the Justification of a Theory of Knowledge, Part I: Some Historical Metamorphoses.” I came across the following passage: “… it is generally recognized that neither Plato… nor Aristotle were very concerned with sceptical problems. Even when Plato and Aristotle can be seen to be interested in proto-sceptical questions, the latter are generally to be characterized as objections on the nature of knowledge rather than objections on the nature of epistemology…” (209). Floridi attached a footnote to the second instance of ‘generally.’ That footnote reads: “I say ‘generally’ because it has seemed possible to recognize in Meno’s paradox a methodological interested by Plato… But I shall disregard such as an issue in this context.”

Vox, apparently, would call ‘Error!’ on Luciano Floridi. Again, the shallowness of Vox’s criticism is incredible. I won’t even bother to comment on his ‘criticism’ of my footnote regarding Gettier.

Dissecting “Dissecting the Skeptics II”

Vox’s inept interpretive skills (or intentionally tendentious interpretations) are put on display again. He claims: “Delavagus even goes so far as admitting he has ‘no way to establish the truth/justification of a putative criterion of truth/justification’.” What I actually wrote, however, was: “… without an already-established criterion of truth/justification, we have no way to establish the truth/justification of a putative criterion of truth/justification.”

In other words, Vox turns what is an articulation of the problem into a claim in my own voice. This is just sloppy reading.

The Fourth Error. I wrote, “But even if we bracket out the problem of the criterion, our difficulties are hardly over. For the sake of argument, let’s all agree to construe justification in purely rationalistic terms. Let us, in other words, agree to seek justification solely on the basis of the autonomous exercise of our capacity to reason. (Let us, that is, become philosophers.)” Vox labels this an error because “[i]nstead of giving up the philosophical definition of knowledge as intrinsically worthless due to what he has admitted is the impossibility of providing any established justifications for true beliefs, Delavagus simply waves his hand again and attempts to leap over the bottomless pit of the epistemic abyss by asking the reader to agree to pretend the problem of the criterion does not exist.”

Again, this interpretation of what I said is so bizarre as to beggar the understanding. Notice how Vox has leveraged the misreading I pointed out at the start of this section: I did not “[admit] the impossibility of providing any established justifications of true beliefs.” Rather, the passage cited was an articulation of the skeptical challenge. This illustrates the more general fact that Vox’s misinterpretations have now begun to snowball, making it more and more difficult to push them aside. We saw above that Vox fails to understand the difference between a philosophical analysis of a concept and a definition of the usage of a word. I suggested that he saw the philosophical analysis as just one more definition to be added to the list. Therefore, he thinks that we can just abandon the analysis in favor of one of the other definitions. But this is a simple category mistake. Above, I said a little about the motivation behind the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. It should be clear that none of the dictionary definitions of knowledge address what is at issue in the analysis. They are not the right sort of thing; it is not their purpose. (Vox also overlooks, in this connection, the fact that I do consider a number of other ways of analyzing knowledge.)

As for the charge of ‘hand-waving,’ it seems as though Vox is fond of leveling this criticism against people, but there’s no grounds for it here. It is a common procedure—notably so in Sextus himself!—to grant something in order to show that even if we do so, the problem persists. The expression ‘for the sake of argument’ is so common, and so understandable, that it’s frankly bizarre for Vox to label my use of it an ‘Error.’ Moreover, I would think any intelligent, alert reader would see what I’m doing by granting that rationality is the path to knowledge: I’m explicitly locating the rest of the discussion at a philosophical level. The fact is, most philosophers simply fail to recognize that the initial problem I point out—that is, the problem of establishing that rationality is the path to knowledge—is even a problem. They simply take it for granted. So what I’m doing in this passage is (a) pinpointing a problem so fundamental, so ‘under the radar,’ that it is usually overlooked, and (b) reorienting the argument in such a way that even if we give philosophers what they want, they’re still not out of the woods.

Where is the ‘error’ here? Again, I could have been clearer on all of this. But I doubt that many intelligent readers would get tripped up the way Vox repeatedly does. The key is to try to understand the text. As far as I can see, all Vox is doing is trying to pick the text apart, not in order to understand it, but to leave it in tatters. Unfortunately for him—and fortunately for the rest of us—you have to understand a text before you can successfully pick it apart.

Fifth Error. Vox claims that there are three errors in the claim “wherein [I state] that ‘If a claim to knowledge cannot be justified, then the claimant is rationally constrained to withdraw it’.” The ‘three problems’ are as follows:

1. “As it stands, (3) is nothing more than an appeal to authority of the sort that Delavagus has already ruled out of bounds.”

This criticism is, once again, utterly bizarre. Let’s look at what I actually wrote: “Ancient skeptics suggested the following as non-tendentious rational constraints… (3) If a claim to knowledge cannot be justified, then the claimant is rationally constrained to withdraw it (at least qua knowledge-claim).”

So Vox’s mistakes include (a) attributing this statement to me personally, when instead I present it as a view of the ancient skeptics, and (b) it is not an ‘appeal to authority’ either way, since, as I wrote, the ancient skeptics viewed all three of these constraints as “non-tendentious,” that is, noncontroversial constraints that dogmatists themselves are bound to endorse. So it would be one thing had Vox challenged the constraint, i.e., if he had argued that it is tendentious. But he doesn’t do that. Even if he had, that would only be a mark against the ancient skeptics, not an ‘error’ committed by me. At most, it would be a misreading of the ancient skeptics on my part, but he has hardly shown that. In fact, he has not provided any reason whatsoever for rejecting (3), as we’ll see.

2. “Second, it is a circular statement, as how can a constraint intended to mark the limits between the rational and the irrational be itself dependent upon a rational constrainment?”

Vox has not shown that the statement is circular. The constraints come down to this: “If you say you know something, then you open yourself up to being asking how you know. If you can’t say how you know, then you don’t know, you only believe. Therefore, you should give up your claim to knowledge.” What is circular about this? Furthermore, the idea of using rationality to “mark the limits between the rational and irrational” is common in philosophy. Now, of course Vox could argue that it’s incoherent in some way, but he hasn’t done that. On the face of it, it’s perfectly possible. Vox himself seems to think that he’s an ultimately authority on what is and is not rational! He draws the limit himself, constantly!

3. “Third, since Delavagus has permitted himself to simply ‘bracket out the problem of the criterion’, he has no ability to assert that anyone with a claim to knowledge that cannot be justified cannot do exactly the same in refusing to withdraw that claim. The statement isn’t necessarily untrue, but it is both questionable and unjustified.”

This overlooks the point that these constraints are rational. They are supposed to embody non-tendentious views on what separates rational (epistemically responsible) from irrational (epistemically irresponsible) knowledge-claims. Of course someone can refuse to withdraw their claim despite their inability to justify it (it happens all the time!). And of course they can even go on thinking themselves perfectly rational (Vox is a great example of this!). But given these constraints, that person would nonetheless be failing to be epistemically responsible, i.e., failing to live up to the standards of rationality.

Dissecting “Dissecting the Skeptics III”

Sixth Error. My sixth error, according to Vox, is in failing to acknowledge that externalist theories of knowledge answer the skeptical trilemma. I readily admit that I could have been much clearer on this point. Indeed, I could have written an entire post (to say nothing of an entire scholarly article) on just this one point. So Vox is right to have questions about my position. He is right to be unsure about what I’m saying, whether I’m right, and so on. But notice that he does not have questions; he is not unsure. No, he hits me with another ‘Error!’

Quoth Vox: “Remember, the original question which Delavagus intended to answer was this: ‘What, if anything, do we know?’ So, if an individual possesses knowledge, defined as justified true belief, then reason dictates he possesses it regardless of whether he happens to be aware of the validity of the justification for his true belief or not. What do we know? Those true beliefs that are justified, whether we know they are justified or not.”

Vox is right that this is the externalist position. And it’s right to say that I could have been clearer on this point. But an intelligent reader should have had little trouble understanding the view. Vox, clearly, does not understand.

Recall the three constraints on rational justification discussed above. They are:

(1) If a person claims to know something, then that person opens herself up to the standing possibility of being asked how she knows, i.e., to being asked for the justification of her belief.

(3) If a claim to knowledge cannot be justified, then the claimant is rationally constrained to withdraw it (at least qua knowledge-claim).

It is clear that, within this framework, the externalist position simply fails to answer the challenge. An obvious consequence of the elaboration of these rational constraints on justification is that the question “What, if anything, do we know?” comes down to the question “What, if anything, do we know that we know?” On this view—one I endorse, and one which Vox has not addressed at all—philosophical knowledge is staunchly internalist. Per (1), if a person claims to know something, then she must be prepared to explain how she knows. Per (3), if she can’t, then she must withdraw her knowledge-claim. Per (2), she’s going to have a helluva time justifying her knowledge-claim.

Within this framework, what the externalist position comes down to is: “Subject S can be said to know p on the basis of q even if S is not aware that she knows p or that q justifies p.” Fine! That’s great. As I say in the original post: I accept that, Sextus accepts that, no problem! But it doesn’t answer the challenge, for if S cannot produce a justification for p, then she must withdraw her claim to know p. It might well be that she had never before thought about p in epistemic terms; but once the challenge is put to her, the idea here is that rationality requires that she produce a justification… or withdraw the claim qua knowledge-claim.

The Seventh Objection simply reiterates the sixth, as far as I can see.

Dissecting “Dissecting the Skeptics IV”

It seems to me that this post consists of (a) reiterations of misunderstandings of Vox’s that I’ve already addressed above, and (b) name-calling and baseless accusations.

Dissecting “Dissecting the Skeptics V”

In this post, Vox trots out his reading of the Pyrrhonian way of life: “The philosophy cannot be impractical because the skeptic maintains a firewall of sorts between his reason and his daily life.”

This is an understandable first impression of the passage he cites, but this interpretation is almost certainly false. It’s actually closer to my view than most. The standard reading rejects this sort of interpretation outright. Vox, read some Myles Burnyeat or Gisela Striker if you actually want to understand what you’re talking about.

Now, Vox claims that Sextus’s argument against self-refutation fails for three reasons:

1. “First, Sextus erroneously conflates the subset of his particular philosophy with the set of all philosophico-rational thought; because we can observe there is philosophico-rational thought that is not Pyrrhonian skepticism, all refutation of the latter cannot automatically be taken as any refutation of the former.”

2. “Second, even if Sextus were correct and charging the skeptic with self-refutation actually did amount to charging philosophico-rational thought as such with self-refutation, that doesn’t change the fact that if the charge is substantiated and all philosophico-rational thought is, in fact, self-refuting, then the charge of peritrope against Scepticism must also be correct! If the set is refuted, then the subset is refuted as well. So, it’s not a valid defense against the charge.”

3. “Third, Delavagus doesn’t realize that the intended target of Pyrrhonian skepticism is irrelevant with regards to its self-refuting nature; it doesn’t matter what Sextus is intending to target when it can be shown that the same arguments can be used just as effectively against his own clearly stated aims.”

All of these points are wrong—though Vox’s arguments are understandable, given a superficial reading and a limited understanding of the text. I want to emphasize again that if Vox wasn’t such an arrogant ass, I would welcome these sorts of questions. I like teaching this stuff. But Vox isn’t interested in learning anything. Oh no. He’s only interested in being right.

Regarding (1), I argue that Pyrrhonism is best seen as a metaphilosophy—a philosophy about philosophizing—rather than as a philosophy. Vox responds: “even if we accept his contention that Pyrrhonism is not a philosophy, it still specifically purports to be rational thought.” Yes. But apparently Vox doesn’t understand the conception of ‘meta,’ nor the concept of ‘ad hominem’ argumentation (in the ancient style). The Pyrrhonian takes up the second-order rational principles of the dogmatists and shows that, given those principles, we’re led to suspension of judgment. It is immanent critique, but it operates at a metaepistemological level. I see no evidence that Vox comprehends what this means.

He then says: “Delavagus’s view that Pyrrhonism is not a philosophy is provably wrong.” This is understandable, given a superficial familiarity with the ancient texts. Yes, Sextus introduces Pyrrhonism as a ‘philosophy,’ but (a) he clearly distinguishes it from other philosophies (in a significant early passage of the Outlines, he refers to “what they call philosophy,” ‘they’ being the dogmatists, suggesting that Pyrrhonism is not a philosophy in the way that dogmatic philosophies are), and (b) in claiming that Pyrrhonism is best understood as a metaphilosophy, I’m using modern conceptions. ‘Philosophy’ had a much broader meaning in the Hellenistic world than it does now. Given what we understand by ‘philosophy,’ Pyrrhonism doesn’t really qualify, since it always adopts a second-order, ‘meta’ position vis-à-vis whatever dogmatism it is engaging.

Dissecting “Dissecting the Skeptics VI”

Vox calls me on my description of the Pyrrhonian method as ad hominem, in the sense of utilizing the beliefs, convictions, etc., of one’s interlocutors. It’s entirely right to pinpoint this as a topic deserving of elaboration. But again, instead Vox hits me with an ‘Error.’ (I’m assuming this is Error Eight; I don’t see an eighth error singled out anywhere.)

It can seem that the ad hominem approach flies in the face of the equipollence method, according to which skeptics oppose dogma to dogma. After all, surely then we’re dealing with two different dogmatists with two different sets of beliefs, convictions, etc. So how can we be said to make arguments on the basis of premises, etc., which both parties agree to? This is a good question. But it has an obvious answer, one that is explicitly brought up in the paragraph under discussion.

I write: “At their most abstract… Pyrrhonian arguments depend only on our most abstract rational commitments. The Five Agrippan Modes… are merely a handy formulation by skeptics of the rational commitments of non-skeptics (‘dogmatists,’ in Sextus’s sense). For those who accept their constraints, the Five Modes constitute part of the framework of any search for the truth.”

The claim, then, is that equipollence arguments are set up on the basis of abstract rational commitments shared by both parties to the dispute. Notice that the competing dogmas Sextus considers are all philosophical. The idea is that, at their most abstract, Pyrrhonian arguments trade only on those rational commitments that structure any search for truth, that is, that structure all philosophical inquiries.

Then we have some more examples of really terrible textual interpretation. Vox writes: “Delavagus then goes on to assert because the skeptic adopts the rational commitments of the philosophical dogmatist, ‘the self-refutatory character of skepticism demonstrates the self-refutatory character of all philosophizing done under the aegis of the rational commitments that give rise to the skeptical conclusion.’ First, note that this is an admission that the skeptic has no commitment to rational thought.”

The conclusion Vox draws from the passage he quotes from me simply does not follow, for nowhere is it claimed that “the rational commitments that give rise to the skeptical conclusion” are the only rational commitments available to us, that they are the locus of ‘rational thought’ as such. Vox seems, dimly, to be picking up on the dialectic working in the background (and later the foreground) of my posts: the undermining of philosophy from within and the reconception of our shared human epistemic situation. Yes, the mature Pyrrhonian, as Vox says, “has no commitment to rational thought,” but only when “rational thought” is construed in purely philosophical terms. He seems to have missed the moral of the story, namely, that the failure of philosophy reveals to the mature Pyrrhonian the pragmatic-transcendental character of common life. (As far as I can see, Vox has no idea what this means. Nor does he care to know.)

The rest of the problems he cites here are just artifacts of previous misunderstandings, snowballing ignorance.

Dissecting “Dissecting the Skeptics VII”

I found nothing of substance worth discussing in this post. Vox’s remarks display a complete lack of understanding of the view he is so quick to dismiss.

Dissecting “Dissecting the Skeptics VIII”

Ninth Error. I’ve misrepresented Pyrrhonism by claiming that Pyrrhonians will believe all sorts of things in an everyday way, and that they will claim to know all sorts of things in an everyday way. He writes: “Either Delavagus truly does not understand Pyrrhonian skepticism on a fundamental level or he is blatantly misrepresenting it in order to provide a false foundation for his own dogmatic opinions.”

Simply put, there is no question whatsoever that throughout his texts Sextus claims to ‘champion common life.’ Vox himself, above, claimed that: “The philosophy cannot be impractical because the skeptic maintains a firewall of sorts between his reason and his daily life.” I think this is wrong—what would it mean to have a ‘firewall’ between ‘reason’ and ‘daily life,’ given that ‘daily life’ involves the use of ‘reason’?—but it gestures precisely in the direction that Vox is now saying is clearly false of Pyrrhonians. Vox himself quotes the chapter of the Outlines entitled “Do Skeptics hold beliefs?” It is clear that Sextus’s answer to this question is yes. The only dispute is over what this ‘yes’ amounts to. Interpreters from Hegel down to Myles Burnyeat have argued that the ‘belief’ in question is not genuine belief, whereas others, from Montaigne to Kant down to Michael Frede, have argued otherwise.

Consider the following quotes from Sextus:

(1) “We accept, from an everyday point of view, that piety is good and impiety bad” (PH 1.24). By ‘everyday point of view,’ Sextus is clear that he means “without holding opinions [adoxastōs]” (PH 1.23). Adoxastōs is a very difficult term to interpret, but I maintain that it ought to understood as meaning ‘without holding dogmata.’

(2) “Following ordinary life without opinions [adoxastōs], we say that there are gods and we are pious towards the gods and say that they are provident” (PH §3.2).

It is only “against the rashness of the Dogmatists” that Sextus brings his skeptical dialectic to bear against belief in the gods (PH §3.2). What does the skeptical dialectic demonstrate? It demonstrates that belief in the gods is not, by the dogmatist’s own lights, philosophically justified. “The existence of the gods… is neither clear in itself [i.e., self-evident] nor proved by something else” (PH §§3.8–9). Then how can Pyrrhonians claim to believe in the gods? They can do so undogmatically, that is, without the added belief that their belief in the gods enjoys objective, philosophical justification.

Tenth Error. According to Vox, I’ve misrepresented Pyrrhonism by claiming that the Pyrrhonian agōgē (the life adoxastōs) involves adopting a new sort of attitude toward ourselves, one purified of dogmatism. Why is this an ‘error’? Because, Vox claims: “The entire purpose of Pyrrhonian scepticism is to rob us of our judgment, to suspend it, in the interest of our tranquility.” Note, first, that I made no mention of tranquility (ataraxia) in my posts. I never claimed, nor would any good reader suppose that I had intended, to provide a complete interpretation of Pyrrhonism. I left out ataraxia even though it is obviously central to any complete account of Pyrrhonism. But given that I did not mention it, Vox is bound by the principle of charity to interpret my claims about Pyrrhonism as claims that are separable from claims about ataraxia. He has failed in that. Moreover, all he’s done is present his own, flat-footed reading of the texts in opposition to my more nuanced account.

In other words, Vox wants to trade on appeals to his reading of the ancient texts as clearly correct. But notice that my posts were not intended as textual exegesis. Simply put, Vox has no idea how I correlate my reading with the ancient texts. Moreover, it is clear, given the decidedly ‘modern’ cast of the discussion, that I was stating a Pyrrhonian view in largely contemporary terms.

If Vox was actually interested in understanding the view he is so quick to dismiss, then he would have had questions, not condemnations.

“What, if anything, do we know?” comes down to the question “What, if anything, do we know that we know?”

I have no idea why this follows, unless you start by essentially assuming that the former means the latter. It appears that you conflate “knowing” with “ claiming to know”. The question you ask, “What, if anything, do we know?” is ambiguous between the above two issues. It was unclear whether you meant “What constitutes knowledge?” or “Given a set of beliefs, can we identify which are knowledge and which aren’t?” When reading through the post, I definitely agreed with Vox that you seemed to be “moving the goalposts” by first offering a definition of knowledge as JTB, which indicated to me we would look at what satisfies the definition, even if we do not know it satisfies the definition, and then switching to the separate question of when it is acceptable to claim to know that a proposition is true. It’s now apparent that you at least grasp the issue, since you accept the externalist response, but you certainly failed to make it clear in your writing.

When put like this, it’s also clear that the arguments you outline do not support the early contention that “we are all idiots”. We could all be geniuses with lots of knowledge but just not be aware of it or able to prove it.

Finally, why even both asking “What, if anything, do we know?” Why is knowledge a worthwhile category to consider? Why not simply ask, “what is true?” and then have standards for assessing the validity of truth claims? Can we answer the question: “when can we act as if a belief is true?” without reference to knowledge? Does worrying about “knowing that we know” help us obtain more knowledge?

I don’t know how I could be any clearer, 691. I’ve given my characterization of the nature of ‘the problem of knowledge’ (or ‘the need for an account of knowledge’) several times now. You can dispute that this is the actual problem, but unless you do, you’re not leveling any real objection to what I’m saying.

So let’s try again, for old time’s sake. The problem, it seems to me, is this:

On the one hand, there are beliefs. On the other hand, there is truth. We have this word, ‘knowledge,’ which is (generally, i.e., in epistemic contexts) used to distinguish between (mere) beliefs and beliefs that are true. The question “What, if anything, do we know?”, then, comes down to the question, “Which of our beliefs, if any, do we know to be true?” Externalism, it seems to me, simply does not respond to this challenge — unless it collapses into a sort of ‘third-personal internalism.’ Yes, there are loads of subtleties you could pick at here. I could go on all day. But right at the heart of my presentation are the three proposed rational constraints. These rational constraints rule out purely externalist forms of justification. You can argue that one or more of the three constraints ought to be rejected; but given how prominently I introduced them, it’s patently unfair to claim that I was ‘moving the goalposts.’ The goalposts were fixed right from the start. Again, you can argue that the goalposts ought to be over there, rather than here, but I’m not seeing any argument to that effect.

And remember, reading texts is a two-way street. You can claim that I wasn’t clear on these points, but I can with equal justice claim that you simply failed to see what was clearly there in front of you.

Moving on. You (and Vox) seem to make a lot out of my “we’re all idiots” remark. This just seems like more bad reading. Those sorts of remarks are just a bit of flippant color thrown in for the hell of it. After all, if such remarks were really important to anything I have to say, then I would have elaborated, for instance, on what ‘idiot’ means in this context.

Finally, you ask, “Why is knowledge a worthwhile category to consider?” You suggest asking ‘what is true?’ rather than asking ‘what do we know?’ But this is a distinction without a difference, it seems to me. When you ask ‘Is x true?’, you’re simply asking ‘Do we know x?’ Put picturesquely, ‘truth’ is a matter of how the world is constituted. It gets by fine without us. But ‘knowledge’ is something human beings possess — namely, at least when we analyze it in terms of justified true belief, it refers to the epistemic state in which our beliefs about the world correspond to how the world is, i.e., to the truth. So “assessing the validity of truth claims” is exactly the procedure by which we attempt to arrive at knowledge. Worrying about “knowing that we know,” then, comes down to ‘worrying whether our beliefs are true.’ Think of it this way: our beliefs might be true even if we don’t know it; but if we’re worried about whether our beliefs are true, then we’re worried about whether we know that our beliefs are true. Finally, it is surely the case that being aware of which of our beliefs are true and which are not is helpful when attempting to “obtain more knowledge.”

But this is a distinction without a difference, it seems to me. When you ask ‘Is x true?’, you’re simply asking ‘Do we know x?’

if we’re worried about whether our beliefs are true, then we’re worried about whether we know that our beliefs are true

Like I said, it’s clear what you mean if you simply declare these two questions to be the same, which you have. But I argue that the language is certainly ambiguous. The clue is that you use “we”, which strikes me as a philosophical fiction or just a parochial use of language among philosophers.

Compare it with the questions, “Does person A know X?” or “Do person A and person B know X?” That is very different than asking “Is X true?”. Because X could be true but A and B could not know it, might not believe it, or might not “really know” X, whatever that means. If we substitute Delavagus and 691 for person A and person B, then it’s clear the questions “Do we [Delavagus and 691] know X?” and “Is X true?” are not the same.

This distinction is crucial outside of philosophy, because we are often interested in assessing who knows X, not whether X is true. For instance, does this calculus student know the Mean Value Theorem? Does this job applicant know how to program in Python/Ruby/C/Java, etc…?

Again, your argument is clear if it’s simply understood that they mean the same thing, but that understanding is not universal and a non-philosopher audience will not know that.

Further, I know that you did not make the distinction between methodological skepticism and philosophical skepticism, but I assume Sextus would fall into the second category? Yet it seems that a methodological skeptic would certainly worry that his beliefs are true and subject them to great scrutiny but might still reject full-blown philosophical skepticism. I think that the methodological/philosophical distinction is crucial to my confusion with your language.

So, why must we be philosophical skeptics and not merely methodological skeptics?

The ‘methodological-skepticism’ vs. ‘philosophical-skepticism’ issue that Vox pulled from Wikipedia has its native home in modern philosophy and thus can’t be applied directly to ancient skepticism. It is an issue that arises from Descartes’s Meditations, which appeared some fourteen-hundred years after Sextus wrote. Descartes claimed to use ‘the Method of Doubt’ as a means of arriving at the indubitable foundations of human knowledge. This Method unfolds over the course of his Meditations. The ‘philosophical’ skeptic, then, is the (fictional) character who is actually in the state at which Descartes’s ‘meditator’ arrives at the end of Meditation 2 (or more precisely: the person who actually doubts all the things that are called into question by Descartes’s skeptical scenarios). There has never been such a person, as Descartes himself admitted. The ‘methodological’ skeptic, on the other hand, is not a skeptic at all (Descartes certainly wasn’t!), but is rather someone who utilizes (something like) Descartes’s Method of Doubt as a propaedeutic to whatever dogmatism they want to advance.

Note that, in my posts on ancient skepticism, I explicitly say that Pyrrhonians are not philosophical skeptics in the sense of those who hold negative epistemic claims; rather, Pyrrhonians are skeptics about philosophy. In this sense, then, they are ‘methodological skeptics,’ for their skepticism (understood as negative dogmatism) is not an end-in-itself; but they should more properly speaking be called ‘methodological philosophers‘ (though, for obvious reasons, that’s a misleading phrase), for it is not skepticism they attempt to overcome, but philosophy itself.

At the end of the day, I have no idea why this would matter to non-philosophers. Your argument is that Pyrrhonians are skeptics about philosophy and our “unknowing” only extends to objective, philosophical knowledge. Not that there is anything wrong with that; I don’t think anyone here would care about my research. But the scope is far more limited than I originally thought (and hoped). I just feel like you tricked me into reading a precis of your dissertation.

We have this word, ‘knowledge,’ which is (generally, i.e., in epistemic contexts) used to distinguish between (mere) beliefs and beliefs that are true. The question “What, if anything, do we know?”, then, comes down to the question, “Which of our beliefs, if any, do we know to be true?”

Where does this leave the obvious missing question, “Which of our beliefs are true?”, the direct result of replacing “knowledge” with “true belief” in “what do we know”?

Going from “what do we know” to “which of our beliefs do we know to be true” doesn’t make much sense to me, because you still have “we know” in the second sentence, waiting to be expanded according to its definition. It’s endless recursion, turtles all the way down.

Externalism, it seems to me, simply does not respond to this challenge…

That’s because it interprets “what do we know” as “which of our beliefs are true”, instead of “which of our beliefs do we know to be true”, doesn’t it?

It seems to me that, for all intents and purposes, the question “Which of our beliefs are true?” amounts to the same thing as “Which of our beliefs qualify as knowledge?”

Justification, on the view we’re considering, is supposed to ‘bridge the gap’ between (mere) belief and truth. So:

“What do we know?” = “Which of our beliefs do we know to be true?” = “Which of our beliefs are justified?”

The externalist wants to say that the third (and first) question can be answered without answering the second question. Okay, but it won’t answer the challenge, which is to produce a justification. It’s simply uninformative to tell us that we might know all sorts of things. If we’re concerned with distinguishing (mere) belief from knowledge, then we have to be in possession of the justification or else we won’t be able to distinguish the two.

In other words, the externalist wants to be able to make claim C: “Subject S knows p even though S is unaware that she knows p or that q justifies p.” But the question is this: How does the externalist know C?

You say that the externalist is concerned with the question “Which of our beliefs are true?” Okay, but how does the externalist go about determining which beliefs are true? Internalism has to enter the picture somewhere or else all we’re left with is mere speculation concerning the possibility of (a) our beliefs happening to accord with the truth, and (b) our beliefs happening to be justified in some way we’re unaware of. None of this helps us, real-life human beings, distinguish between (mere) belief and knowledge.

I would think that the ratio of belief to truth has to hit a certain proportion before a person can be called knowledgeable, otherwise, as I said on one post or another over at Vox’s, a idiot could simply believe any proposition and still be called all knowing. When you go to a doctor, you prize his or her opinion because you know that the proportion of true belief to bogus belief is high, and you know due to this correspondence between belief and reality, he might help you. A doctor probably also “knows” a number of falsehoods, but the hope is that there aren’t enough to matter. A witch doctor is a bad bet, since he’s just making shit up, although he may believe a great many things. Knowledge is like those lousy tests you had to take in high school where wrong answers detracted -1 from your grade and not just 0 (not sure how many here had sadistic instructors like I had). With knowledge, believing wrong stuff counts against you; false belief matters, otherwise you conclude absurdities like the all knowing idiot.

“What do we know?” = “Which of our beliefs do we know to be true?” = “Which of our beliefs are justified?”

The externalist wants to say that the third (and first) question can be answered without answering the second question. Okay, but it won’t answer the challenge, which is to produce a justification.

It seems to me that the externalist simply doesn’t need to accept the challenge as valid. “X holds a justified true belief Y” is not the same as “X can justify his true belief Y”. Somebody, or something, else (external to X) may be doing (or have already done) the justification. X need not know how, or whether, he (or it) knows Y. Knowledge need not imply self-awareness.

In other words, the externalist wants to be able to make claim C: “Subject S knows p even though S is unaware that she knows p or that q justifies p.” But the question is this: How does the externalist know C?

Ah, sorry for my hasty previous response, you’ve anticipated it.

The externalist (E) knows that S knows p, because S claims p, has claimed p in the past, the observable behavior of S matches that of a subject knowing p, the creator of S has made it so it knows p… In short, E has a justified (true) belief of S knowing p.

E knows that p is justified, because he knows a subject or entity S’ that can justify p. S’ can be E.

(For JTB, you have to accept that E somehow knows that p is true in order to know C, so why not accept that he can know other things, without the help of S? The above works for JB as well though, as far as I can see.)

Yes, yes. And a big thank you to our friend Mr. delavagus for this wonderful discussion. A pleasure to experience, to be sure. Now, for those of you who will be sticking around for Mr. Beale’s remarks, I will be handing out grains of salt. I suggest you bring a container, as the grains are quite small indeed.

Can we not assume that when a proposition k is justified, then we can easily use the justification j(k) of k to build a justification of the existence of j(k)? This might answer the issue raised by 691.

This happens, for example, in Peano arithmetics (a system for giving formal proof of assertions about natural number, addition and multiplication) with proof as justifications, a proof of a proposition gives a proof of the proof of its existence automatically. (The concept of provability in P.A. can be expressed as a first order formula in P.A..) This seems to be correct for justifications in the common sense too. A justifications asking for a justification that it is a justification isn’t much of one.

In this case, knowing and knowing that we know would be equivalent. (In P.A. though, I guess that we do not have implications in both directions, The analogy breaks down because, P.A. does not imply that provable things are true.)

This is all a bit complicated and the philosophical definition of knowledge is a bit tortuous. In my view, the core of the issue is the notion of justification and the question is: can we find “absolute” justifications for our beliefs. Talk about knowledge (and the Gettier problem) are just distractions.

Is automatic justifiability of justifications a requirement on justification that is assumed implicitly? Does it follow from your rationality postulates? What do you think about it? Is your reason for not being interested in the Gettier problem the same as mine?

Sorry! Instead of “a proof of a proposition gives a proof of the proof of its existence automatically.” I should have written “a proof of a proposition gives a proof of its own existence automatically.”.

I’m not entirely sure what to say in response to your post, tickli. It seems to me that the philosophical analysis of ‘knowledge’ is pretty straightforward. Humans believe all sorts of stupid things. Not all of those beliefs are true (thank the Maker!). So which of them qualify as ‘knowledge’ (as opposed to mere belief)? The idea is simply that justification will function, if anything will, to ‘bridge the gap’ between belief and truth: that is, we measure our beliefs according to some sort of epistemological (justificatory) standard in order to sift the true from the false.

Seems pretty non-tortuous to me. But then maybe I’ve been in this field too long…

The $64,000 question is what qualifies as ‘justification.’ Do justifications themselves have to be justified? Sure — unless you think that an infinite regress of justifications is okay. (Some do: Peter Klein, for instance, endorses ‘infinitism.’ But he stands alone in the entire history of philosophy.)

My reasons for rejecting Gettier cases in simply that they are supposed to be instances of justified true belief that fail to qualify as knowledge, yet I reject the contention that the ‘beliefs’ in Gettier cases are justified. What Gettier cases point to, it seems to me, is the way in which justificatory practices push relentlessly outward, toward the ideal epistemic state of presuppositionlessness. Given this tendency of justification to resist presuppositional constraints, it becomes extremely difficult (if not impossible) to justify our beliefs.

I could get into specifics here, but I’m not going to bother. Suffice it to say that the supposedly ‘justified beliefs’ of people in Gettier cases could easily be dislodged by simply asking them, “Sure, but do you really know that x is going to happen?” I.e., “Do you really know that Bob (or whoever) is going to get the job instead of you?” The answer, it seems to me, is clearly no (in the same way that the answer is ‘no’ to the question: “But do you really know that your lottery ticket isn’t a winner?”)

The putative justifications offered in Gettier cases are merely everyday justifications, not philosophical justifications. They are eminently defeasible. Thus, they fail to ‘bridge the gap’ between belief and truth.

(Needless to say — except that it must be said, since Vox might read this — what I’ve said here is just a quick and dirty summation of a much more complicated story.)

Am I correct if I say that, for you, a justified claim is true? Is that what you mean by “justification bridges the gap between belief and truth”?

We agree that the most important problem is the nature of justification.

One way in which the philosophical definition of knowledge caused confusion is that when you say that knowledge is “justified true belief”, as far as I understand, you imply that the person who knows possesses the justification. (Am I correct?) This is probably obvious for you, but it is not clear from the definition itself and it is very probably what caused the disagreement above with 691.

Eww – there are some layers of a text to which I would prefer to remain ignorant…me, I just say VD…

Anyway, sometimes I wonder if this link Jorge gave awhile ago applies to VD. Much like in the article where ‘Laurel and…’ or ‘Black and…’ would have the subject thinking the word that came to their head had actually been said by the researcher, it’d be tempting to run a test and give an argument that leave a handful of sentences which seem to lead to some word (but do not). Even give a notice at the start this will be present. Then see how many of VD’s refutations rely on words that were never said except in his own head.

It must be strange to live a whole life seeing all language as being technical writing, without any ambiguity in it. Technical writing everywhere…? Yet that seems to be VD’s life.

I never claimed, nor would any good reader suppose that I had intended, to provide a complete interpretation of Pyrrhonism. I left out ataraxia even though it is obviously central to any complete account of Pyrrhonism. But given that I did not mention it, Vox is bound by the principle of charity to interpret my claims about Pyrrhonism as claims that are separable from claims about ataraxia. He has failed in that. Moreover, all he’s done is present his own, flat-footed reading of the texts in opposition to my more nuanced account.

Correction: All I have done is present a textually accurate reading of the texts in opposition to your fictional account. I have no doubt that you think piling more of your bullshit on top of the heaping, steaming mass you previously produced will snow a number of those people who don’t have the patience to go through it in detail, but, as you know, I do have the patience and I shall very much enjoy going through and pointing out all the new errors and attempts to deceive you have committed in trying to cover your previously exposed ass.

As a larval academic, you clearly do not understand that there is no principle of intellectual charity. I am not bound by that figment of your imagination; no one is. And the rationale for your appeal to it is obvious, as anyone can see by looking at the bizarre claim insisting that charity means one must “interpret my claims about Pyrrhonism as claims that are separable from claims about [an obviously central Pyrrhonian concept]. You simply can’t legitimately make the sort of claims you did about Pyrrhonism while leaving out its central aim.

I have to say that you have been a wonderful poster boy for the deceptive academic style of argument. I particularly enjoy your constant claims to have been misunderstood, when you know perfectly well that I am one of the few who understood from the beginning what you were attempting to do with your bait-and-switch concerning your claim of the way in which the impossibility of philosophers possessing philosophically defined knowledge proves that non-philosophers don’t know anything in their various non-philosophical manners.

The core of the issue is that you committed a fundamental category error in attempting to tie your philosophy to the TPB theme. As one of my readers correctly noted, “he screwed up by trying to kiss Scott’s ass”. Anyhow, I look forward to adding my critical analysis of this response to the Dissecting series.

In what way is the principle of charity different from trying to understand what the other person is saying? I am not a philosopher and yet I felt that you misunderstood a good part of what Delavagus wrote.

I claim that discussions in which both interlocutors apply the principle of charity are more fruitful than adversarial debates, do you disagree?

You sometime act as if the goal of a discussion is to convince the audience that you are correct and that the other is an imbecile. I think that the best discussions are the ones where at the end, the interlocutors agree.

Of courese he disagrees. Charity is for the weak of mind! And in case you haven’t noticed: You’re dealing with a SUPER-Intelligence! The rules and priciples of ordinary human beings are of no interest for a demi-god-like creature like Vox!
If you argue against him you get stomped to the ground like. Afterward you will feel like an avalanche of arguments hit you and you will try to run away like a litte girl and scream, “Stop! Please stop!” You will raise your fist to the sky and curse ignorant existence.

In what way is the principle of charity different from trying to understand what the other person is saying?

The principle of charity involves pretending that the person said something different than what he actually said. For example, I understand what Delavagus actually wrote when he claimed that Sextus thought that we’re all idiots. The “charitable” reader is willing to pretend that Delavagus did not mean that even though he undeniably wrote it. This is why I agree with Delavagus that I am an uncharitable reader, in fact, I would even say that I pride myself on my extreme uncharitability in this regard.

Charitable reading is nothing more than accepting imprecision and often results in accepting blatant intellectual dishonesty.

I am not a philosopher and yet I felt that you misunderstood a good part of what Delavagus wrote.

I would say precisely the same about you. You are probably insufficiently unfamiliar with the way academics attempt to dazzle the non-academics, who tend to be less able to maintain their focus on what the academic is actually saying versus what he pretends to be saying. This is why I prefer debates, because it is a very effective way of forcing the academic bullshit artist to admit when he is switching between X=X and X=Not X.

I claim that discussions in which both interlocutors apply the principle of charity are more fruitful than adversarial debates, do you disagree?

Absolutely. Charitable discussions are much more likely to end up with both parties agreeing to agree that X=X or Not X, depending upon one’s personal preference. This is useless. Adversarial debates usually clarify. Charitable discussions tend to muddle.

You sometime act as if the goal of a discussion is to convince the audience that you are correct and that the other is an imbecile. I think that the best discussions are the ones where at the end, the interlocutors agree.

Well, MPAI. Most people are idiots. But in this case, I don’t think Delavagus is an imbecile at all. Quite the opposite, actually, as he’s talking right over most of your heads and few, if any of you, even recognize what he’s doing even after I’ve pointed it out for you. I mean, his attempt to pull yet another definitional switch by substituting “philosophical analysis of knowledge” for “philosophical definition of knowledge” is precisely the tactic that I predicted he would rely upon in my very first post. And yet, the gullible idiots here nod and smile as if he made a legitimate point!

I think the best discussions or debates are when the interlocutors agree because one successfully persuades the other that he is wrong. I am confident I can prove, even to Delavagus, that his core assertion concerning adoxastōs, which is that it ought to understood as meaning ‘without holding dogmata'” is fundamentally false.

I have no problem admitting when I am shown to be wrong. So far, Delavagus has absolutely refused to show that he is willing to do the same and is in fact claiming that none of the 10 errors I identified are, in fact, errors. Clearly, one of us is incorrect… and so I will carefully and uncharitably look at each of his ten defenses provided.

Ah, Voxy-pants. It’s nice to know that, in an ever-changing world, some things stay the same!

I will provide one substantive response to one of your points. In doing so, I will appeal to authority, namely, the authority of Jonathan Barnes, an expert on the ancient Greek language. (Do you even know Greek, Vox?) Regarding Sextus’s use of ‘adoxastos,’ Barnes has the following to say:

“What does adoxastos mean in PH [i.e., Outlines of Pyrrhonism]? Plainly, it means ‘having no doxa,’ but that is capable of three importantly different glosses. (a) ‘Having no mere opinion’: that is the word’s meaning in DL 7.162 (and in the Phaedo–‘not an object of mere opinion’). If the word was used by Timon, then it might well bear that meaning in the sentence: ‘having no mere opinion,’ i.e. ‘fixed’, ‘firm’… In many–but not all–passages in PH a sense like ‘fixedly’, ‘unwaveringly’, fits perfectly well. (b) ‘Having no dogmata‘: that meaning is hardly suggested by the word’s etymology or by its history; but adoxastos is frequently contrasted with dogmatism vel sim, and such a contrast could well give the word that particular colouring. (And some might see a neat polemical point: the Stoic sage lives adoxastos, with dogma but without doxa, and so in tranquillity; the Pyrrhonian lives adoxastos, without dogma, and so in tranquillity.) All the PH passages will readily accept that meaning…” (Barnes, “The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist,” in The Original Sceptics: A Controversy, Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede (eds.), p. 79 fn. 77; final emphasis added).

Vox is most definitely exempt from adhering to the principle of charity (which, by the way, is just about the least controversial hermeneutic principle imaginable!). As I say in my post, the principle only constrains “honest, bipartisan, truth-seeking critics of texts.” It is clear that Vox does not belong to this group.

01, this work on so many level! If (for Dawkins and Dennett) ideas are like genes, discussion is a mating ritual and if the interlocutors agree on a few points, conjugation (bacteries exchanging genes) occurs!

I think there is more to that then this. Both interlocutors have proponents and detractors who invariably side with respective participants, so, irrespective of relationship between interlocutors, memetic exchange occurs, just not necessarily directly between debating parties.

It’s as if your spermatozoa, upon finding out that they might not reach the ovum in time, dumped some of the genetic material into available microflora.

As I see it, the danger of charitable discussions that you point out can be avoided by agreeing on definitions (or rephrasing to avoid contentious terms) and being a bit careful.

“The principle of charity involves pretending that the person said something different than what he actually said.”
I disagree with this characterisation. I think that (outside of formal language) it is impossible to give definitions that completely determine the concept defined. Therefore. in the course of reading a text, or in the course of a discussion, definitions need to be refined in the light of new elements. As long as the new elements are not incompatible with the old ones, there might not be a bait and switch. So charity is using all the possible resources of the text to refine the definitions we use and to reconstruct what is implicit.

Let’s take a specific example. You give replacing “philosophical definition” by “philosophical analysis” as an example of definitional switch. But a definition might well be an analysis too. In the case of interest, splitting a “problematic” concept like knowledge in three others (belief, truth and justification) is what can be called an analysis. As long as you don’t come up with Delavagus using “philosophical analysis” in ways that are incompatible with “philosophical definition”, you cannot be sure that it is a dishonest switch and not an innocent refinement.

My main interest in the subject is the nature and possibility of justification. Could you try to separate posts about this and posts about the conformity of Delavagus’ interpretation of Sextus? For example, if you write about it on your blog? I think it will make the discussion both easier to read and more attractive to people not equally interested in both subjects.

pdimov, 691 — you ‘like’ Vox, right? Meaning, you read Vox’s blog, you came here from there. Is that right? If so, I’m really interested to know what you make of posts like the above, from Vox. This post in particular seems to me addled, delusional, paranoid. I’m honestly beginning to think that Vox is mentally ill. (I’m entirely serious — I don’t mean this as an insult.)

So what do you make of it? Your posts here — at least the ones responding to me, i.e., the ones I’ve read — have struck me as sane and well-thought-out. So what do you think of Vox? Do posts such as this one not strike you as insane?

Vox thinks that 03 is the doom of the so-called “West”, and it appears to me he is quite serious about it. He’s very serious about this whole culture war / “civilization’s last stand against barbarism” thing, basically living a lovecraftian nightmare (sans the things that make lovecraftian nightmares cool, I might add).

I doubt this constitutes clinical “insanity”, but it is just a perspective worth minding when interacting with him.
Remember, WE ARE THE HARBINGER OF HIS SALVATION THROUGH DESTRUCTION, or something like that.

Okay. But what do you make of the post I was asking about? Can you recognize the features of it that strike me as delusional, paranoid, etc.? Can you provide any insight into what you think I’m supposed to make of the things he says? I’m honestly having trouble viewing him as a rational animal.

Honestly, del? I don’t think you should make very much of what he says at all. He’s an obviously intelligent person, but he has so thoroughly convinced himself of his own superiority that even those things that he takes on faith have been distorted to represent empirical facts in his mind.

He argues by using his opinion, which is absolutely fine, but he attempts to turn around and act as if the opinion isn’t really an opinion at all. He uses it as if it were a fact that any idiot with half a brain should know. He won’t accept that someone has a different view, because he engages people with the assumption that they’re idiots, and idiots obviously can’t have valid views. If you try to tell him, “Hey, that’s a totally subjective opinion.” he will write you off as an imbecile who doesn’t understand logic, argumentation, or whatever.

I’m not going to say he’s totally insane, but the thought crossed my mind. In my discussion with him, he didn’t even seem to be aware that he was using an opinion as a fact. I don’t even really think he knows he does this and I’m not sure how to convey it to him without having to wade through all the damned insults. He just trots out the opinions as if they were immutable laws. I have no doubt that he’s considered them at length, but they remain opinions no matter how convinced of them he is.

I think you need to just leave him be. You cannot win and it won’t be because you’re an inept fraud, no matter how many times he calls you that. He’ll mock you for running away and use all the tricks a schoolyard bully would use. It’s like arguing with a toddler. And at the bottom of most of his really big arguments is the premise, “I believe that this is true because god says it is.”

He claims that you’re too stupid to realize the word games you’re playing, but I think he’s too ignorant to realize how subjective and metaphysical are the foundations upon which he bases his arguments.

Please, pdimov, help me out here. I’ve tried to take this guy seriously, to treat with some respect, but what am I supposed to do with the kind of responses he’s written here? Am I supposed to bow down before apparent irrationality out of some sort of faith that it’s a kind of rationality so far beyond me that I can’t recognize it for what it is?

@ Beale: The other thing that’s more frequently indistinguishable from insanity: insanity. And I’m not at all surprised that this would be your first law. I’m not terribly surprised to see you’ve ripped off Arthur C. Clarke to get it.

@ Delavagus: Our friend here uses the above claim as a panacaea. If people don’t understand him, it’s not because he’s not making sense: it’s because he’s so advanced. Since he doesn’t have much grasp on the concepts of objective vs. subjective reality, he can’t justify to himself that anyone else might have a valid point. There is one version of the truth. It is his. It is the truth because he has so thoroughly considered, dissected, explicated, and demonstrated it. How could it not be the truth? How could it not be The Truth? He forgets that his truth comes, to paraphrase Nietzsche, from the same stinking excremental miasma from which all other undertakings emerge.

He believes that there is One True Way, and a person can access it by being scientifically rigorous enough, logical enough, Western enough, civilized enough. People using other paths are ridiculous. They’re not really even there. They think they are, but because they’re not on The Way, they’re going nowhere.

It is this failure to understand, or even reliably entertain the idea that other people might understand something in a way he will never be able to grasp, in spite of his intellect, that marks him as unworthy of your effort. And if he can’t distinguish between the world as it is and the world as he understands it to be, then his grip on reality is questionable. Dogma will do that. Thus, your concerns about his sanity are well-placed.

Okay. But what do you make of the post I was asking about? Can you recognize the features of it that strike me as delusional, paranoid, etc.?

As far as I can see – I’m not sure what particular post you’re referring to – what you find delusional and paranoid is that Vox both ascribes (nonexistent) sinister motivations to you and claims that he’s the only one here sharp enough to detect them.

Now, I happen to think that there’s nothing sinister in your posts; you were just writing about your area of expertise for the TPB audience.

Still, instead of wondering aloud whether Vox is clinically insane, as if he can’t hear, why not just tell him that your motivations were not, in fact, sinister and see how he responds?

Fair enough. But… do you find that his criticisms are valid, let alone powerful? That they’re rational, even? Do you think that there’s some way for me to make dialogic progress with Vox, and if so, how? And do you actually think he’s a super-intelligence, and if so, why?

I’m asking you as a sort of last resort, a final stab at giving Vox the benefit of the doubt, since you seem like a reasonable person.

Fair enough. But… do you find that his criticisms are valid, let alone powerful?

You’re asking too much of me. Not only am I not a superintelligence, I haven’t even read Sextus on a plane.🙂

That they’re rational, even?

They look plausible for a layman who isn’t paying that much attention. I’ve no idea how a philosopher would view them.

Do you think that there’s some way for me to make dialogic progress with Vox, and if so, how?

That probably depends on how much time you’re willing to invest (and whether you’re willing to overlook the insults). It should be easy, in principle, to address a shallow criticism by pointing out why it’s shallow, but not when you can assume neither certain background knowledge nor charitability from the audience.

And do you actually think he’s a super-intelligence, and if so, why?

I have no idea. It’s difficult to evaluate someone’s intelligence over the internet with much precision. Vox says that his IQ is “over the so-called “genius” threshhold.”

Do you think that there’s some way for me to make dialogic progress with Vox,

On the topic of pyrrhonism, it’ll be rough. On something else, yes.

You have to take Vox for what he is. He will only interact with you in specific ways and if you want to engage him, he will force you to do so on his terms. He has no interest in being your friend; he has no interest in validating your opinions as a way of establishing rapport. You should never project yourself onto him as a way to try to understand his actions or motivations. He’s not another grad student or academic philosopher; there are certain social norms governing discourse in that context which he feels no need to obey. You need a lot of self-awareness to interact productively with him and developing that self-awareness can be very tough on the ego.

But he’s definitely honest if you agree to play by his rules. You might not win, of course, because he is very good at some things and knows certain things very well. He’s much more interesting when you figure out what those things are.

I rarely comment on his blog. The tempo is too fast and I’m more interested in speculating than arguing. I find it far more interesting to read what he writes than to interact with him; it’s a more productive way for me to extract what worthwhile things he has to say. I like keeping some critical distance because it’s easy to get sucked into his vortex, which you clearly have here.

And do you actually think he’s a super-intelligence, and if so, why?

Going by IQ, he and I are roughly equal in intelligence (between 3 and 4 std dev above the mean). So I don’t put much personal weight in the “superintelligence” talk. And he’s nowhere near the smartest person I’ve come across (or he’s come across, for that matter). But I’m very careful to remember that he’s smarter than I am in certain respects. He’s probably stronger with verbal while I’m almost certainly higher in spatial reasoning, for example.

However, I do find it useful to sometimes have an internal debate with a mythical, imaginary, archetypal Vox who really is a superintelligence and is also willing to play by my rules. I’ve met several people who I really do consider to be superintelligences (John Conway for instance). The experience is unsettling, because there is no way to weasel yourself out from under their intellect, but humbling and leads you to be very honest with yourself. Part of his shtick is recreating that feeling for people much lower on the IQ spectrum. And sometimes I try to recreate that experience by letting mythical Vox play that role.

Most obviously, Vox immediately slaps the label ‘Error!’ on what a charitable critic would formulate as a question or as a remark on a passage’s lack of clarity. In other words, where a charitable critic would say something like, “It isn’t clear to me why the author has chosen this particular definition of knowledge,” Vox instead declares, “Error!”

Of course. Because, unlike the charitable critic, I know perfectly well why you chose that particular definition of knowledge. It better suited your purpose as the other ones would have completely undermined your case. I also know why you omitted any reference to ataraxia, because doing so would have rendered some of your arguments observably incorrect. As for errors, when Sextus says X is X, and you contradict him by saying that X is Not X, then you have quite clearly committed an error so long as we accept Sextus Empiricus, and not you, as the legitimate authority on Pyrrhonism.

You didn’t write about “Delavagusism”. You wrote about Pyrrhonism. Had you not planted your flag on the latter, my critique would have been very different.

So you still think there’s no difference between a philosophical analysis of a concept and the definition of the use of word. Please, explain to me your reasoning here. That is, actually respond to my arguments.

You wrote: “As for errors, when Sextus says X is X, and you contradict him by saying that X is Not X, then you have quite clearly committed an error.”

Given your penchant for Dwight–Shrute–like standards of technical correctness, you ought to agree that it is not the case, e.g., that Sextus ever wrote that Pyrrhonism is a “philosophy.” Philosophy is an English word. He wrote in ancient Greek.

I’ve claimed that the (Greek) word ‘philosophy’ had a much broader meaning in the Hellenistic world than it does now. Is this wrong? Again, actually responding to my arguments would be a good way to start locating my ‘errors.’

I don’t care how “broad” a meaning you try to encompass, there’s still no way that “philosophy” under even the broadest Hellenistic definition, could ever possibly mean “not philosophy,” which is exactly the notion you advanced.

“They say that travel broadens the mind, ’til you can’t get your head out of doors.” – Elvis Costello.

Therefore, according to the modern/contemporary notion of ‘philosophy,’ x and y are not philosophy.

That’s still not quite right with respect to Pyrrhonism’s relation to philosophy, since — as I say in my post — Sextus clearly distinguishes the Pyrrhonian style of ‘philosophy’ even from other Hellenistic philosophies. His point is this: to the extent that ‘philosophy’ is understood as ‘a way of life’ guided by some sort of principle, then yes, Pyrrhonism is a philosophy. But it is not a philosophy in the sense of “what they [i.e., the Dogmatists] call philosophy” (PH 1.6). Consider this passage:

“Do Sceptics belong to a [philosophical] school? If you say that a school involves adherence to a number of beliefs which cohere both with one another and with what is apparent, and if you say that belief is assent to something unclear, then we shall say that Sceptics do not belong to any school [i.e., we shall say that Pyrrhonism is not a philosophy]. But if you count as a school a way of life [agoge] which, to all appearances, coheres with some account [logos], the account showing how it is possible to live correctly (where ‘correctly’ is taken not only with reference to virtue, but more loosely, and extends to the ability to suspend judgement)–in that case we say that Sceptics do belong to a school [i.e., that Pyrrhonism is a philosophy]. For we coherently follow, to all appearances, an account which shows us a way of life in conformity with traditional customs and the law and persuasions and our own feelings.” (PH 1.16-7)

Bringing the two together, the idea is that, in the Hellenistic world, philosophy was in fact primarily a way of life (in an ethical sense, i.e., not in a sense that would encompass ‘the way of life of an academic philosopher in the twenty-first century’): the theorizing, etc., was all subordinate to the practical end of how best to live. This is not true of the modern conception of philosophy. So ‘philosophy’ in the Hellenistic world included both x and y; today, ‘philosophy’ includes only x.

But as far as Hellenistic dogmatists were concerned, you could not separate x and y: that is, you could not have the ‘way of life’ without the dogmas (i.e., without ‘beliefs concerning unclear matters’). So Sextus defines Pyrrhonism’s relation to philosophy in a such a way as to distinguish it from contemporary notions of philosophy as well as from those current in his own day.

So you still think there’s no difference between a philosophical analysis of a concept and the definition of the use of word. Please, explain to me your reasoning here. That is, actually respond to my arguments.

Sure, in fact, I’ll point out that you are wrong no matter which way you try to defend yourself. Because, you know, that’s what we superintelligences do.

1. You are writing in the context of addressing a non-philosophical crowd. You admit as much.

2. You asserted that your theme was “human stupidity”, refer to empirical evidence that humans are “stupid, stupid creatures”, then claimed that Sextus Empiricus thought it was possible to conclude that “we are all idiots” a priori. You also concluded your first post with the assertion “We are all idiots”.

3. You clearly implied that stupidity and idiocy are negatively correlated with knowledge. This implication was necessary for you to even begin making your case. It is the absence of knowledge that marks us as being stupid and idiotic.

4. You then raised the question “What, if anything, do we know?” At this point, you switched from the implied common definition to the highly technical definition, claiming that knowledge, which stupid, stupid people and idiots necessarily (as per your argument) lack, is justified true belief.
5. Wikipedia entry: “Justified true belief is one definition of knowledge that is most frequently credited to Plato and his dialogues. This is not to say that Plato was the first to come up with such a definition, but he is commonly referenced as the original author.” In other words, it is a definition, albeit not one that matches the one implied by your argument.

Now, this is enough to prove that you’re intellectually dishonest and your argument fails. But, I’m not done exposing you yet. Having been busted on your definitional switch, you’ve chosen to engage in a Fighting Withdrawal, claiming that you were not substituting a definition for a definition – even though I just proved you literally did just that – you were substituting an analysis for a definition. Let’s see if that holds up.

1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “According to the following analysis, which is usually referred to as the “JTB” account, knowledge is justified true belief”.” So far, so good. it is an analysis as well as a definition.

2. However, the encyclopedia goes on to say: “The objective of the analysis of knowledge is to state the conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for propositional knowledge: knowledge that such-and-such is the case. Propositional knowledge must be distinguished from two other kinds of knowledge that fall outside the scope of the analysis: knowing a place or a person, and knowing how to do something.” Oops! So, even if we accept your evasive retreat, we see that your non-definitional analysis is limited in scope, it’s not knowledge to which you were referring, but rather that subset of knowledge called “propositional knowledge”.

3. Even ignoring the various errors related to the justified true belief aspects of your argument, you neglected to provide the any link between “absence of propositional knowledge” and human stupidity. How stupid can we be even if we merely possess knowledge concerning people, places, and how to do things? How idiotic are we if we only possess two of the three types of knowledge delineated by your non-definitional analysis?

If you were intellectually honest, you would have either a) stuck with one of the common dictionary definitions of “knowledge” or b) provided similar technical philosophical analyses of the words “stupid’ and “idiot”. The amusing thing isn’t that you made various errors in the course of your argument, but rather, it could never have succeeded given the way in which you attempted too construct it. The entire thing is fundamentally and structurally deficient.

Your criticisms are so shallow, and betray such a limited grasp of the topics under consideration, that you simply come off as a megalomaniacal joker with your “I’m-so-much-smarter-than-you” posturing.

‘Philosophical analyses’ are often referred to as ‘philosophical definitions,’ or simply as ‘definitions.’ More careful writers will use ‘analysis,’ but using ‘definition’ instead should only trip up DwightSchrute. Notice how you got ‘definition’ from Wikipedia, and ‘analysis’ from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy!

Propositional knowledge is knowledge that something is the case. The other two kinds of knowledge mentioned in the SEP article are (1) so-called ‘knowledge by acquaintance,’ which is highly disputed, since it seems that mere acquaintance can never have the normative force required to qualify as knowledge (and, at any rate, knowledge-by-acquaintance is posited merely as a foundation of propositional knowledge), and (2) know-how.

I think it is safe to say that when we’re talking about ‘knowledge,’ especially when answering questions like “What, if anything, do we know?”, we’re talking about propositional knowledge, i.e., knowing that something is true. (For instance, it’s hardly an answer to the question to say: “I know how to throw a ball.” That might be true, but who — except perhaps Dwight Schrute — would fail to see that the response misses the point of the question?)

Your criticisms are so shallow, and betray such a limited grasp of the topics under consideration, that you simply come off as a megalomaniacal joker with your “I’m-so-much-smarter-than-you” posturing.

You see, that’s precisely what I find amusing. The criticisms aren’t shallow, in fact, they completely undermine your entire argument. You can’t seem to understand that your actual argument, however “deep” you consider it to be, is extremely narrow and is therefore absolutely irrelevant to practically everyone in your proclaimed target audience. You’re such a cliche, posing as the deep thinker misunderstood by the shallow, superficial hoi polloi. Grow up, little larval, get over your credentials already!

‘Philosophical analyses’ are often referred to as ‘philosophical definitions,’ or simply as ‘definitions.’ More careful writers will use ‘analysis,’ but using ‘definition’ instead should only trip up Dwight Schrute. Notice how you got ‘definition’ from Wikipedia, and ‘analysis’ from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy!

Yes, and how many people in your self-proclaimed target audience read the SEP compared to Wikipedia? That’s your defense? That you’re a bad writer and you didn’t mean to switch definitions, which kind of are definitions, but not really, so long as you avoid dictionaries and encyclopedias in favor of the right technical encyclopedia? Dance, little larval, dance! And you’re completely missing the point anyhow. Nobody, including you, actually thinks of knowledge in the SEP definition/analytical sense when they’re calling someone stupid or an idiot. You consistently fail to understand that your theme isn’t even connected to the case you attempted to present in support of it.

I think it is safe to say that when we’re talking about ‘knowledge,’ especially when answering questions like “What, if anything, do we know?”, we’re talking about propositional knowledge, i.e., knowing that something is true. (For instance, it’s hardly an answer to the question to say: “I know how to throw a ball.” That might be true, but who — except perhaps Dwight Schrute – would fail to see that the response misses the point of the question?)

You’re completely wrong. In fact, you’re the one who can’t seem to understand that only being in possession of non-propositional knowledge as well as true belief, though not justified true belief, doesn’t make anyone stupid, much less an idiot. Seriously, you can’t seem to defend yourself at all, except to keep referring to a lame television show and repeatedly offering new definitions to try to dig yourself out of the hole you previously dug.

And you still haven’t shared with us the SEP analysis for “stupid” and “idiot”. They’re the theme, after all, surely you defined them in some technical philosophical sense!

I’m resolving to make this my final response to you, Vox, unless you man up and answer the question I’ve been asking you (in one context or another) since our very first exchange:

Please provide me, in your own words, with a summary of my two posts, i.e., explain what you take my interpretation of skepticism to be.

I’ll even provide you with a template:

“On delavagus’s view, as set out in his two posts on ancient skepticism, there is a negative and a positive side to Pyrrhonism. According to the negative side… According to the positive side…”

All you have to do is fill in the blanks. Then we can see if you’ve understood the view. I suspect, based on your ‘dissections,’ that you do not understand the view. Furthermore, I suspect, from your repeated refusals to provide an account of the view you are dismissing, that you are aware, at least in some dark corner of your soul, that any attempt on your part to provide such an account would leave you looking rather foolish, either because your account would be obviously wrong or because it would be readily apparent that your previous criticisms failed to address the view in any serious way.

@Vox
In a text, some parts are central and some are just fluff, baiting the audience, having a little fun by calling people idiots, gaining their interest. This is not meant for close analysis, you are just wasting time analysing it.
And you didn’t even manage to show that it is incoherent or false! The absence of propositional knowledge might well be enough to qualify someone as idiot.

In a text, some parts are central and some are just fluff, baiting the audience, having a little fun by calling people idiots, gaining their interest. This is not meant for close analysis, you are just wasting time analysing it.

To be sure, but in most cases, the part described as the theme being discussed, that is also the conclusion, is the central part.

And you didn’t even manage to show that it is incoherent or false! The absence of propositional knowledge might well be enough to qualify someone as idiot.

I wasn’t trying to. I was proving that he committed a bait-and-switch. Are you seriously suggesting that someone who possesses a considerable amount of true belief, as well as knowledge that is non-propositional, can be qualified as an idiot regardless of whether he can justify it or not?

“Are you seriously suggesting that someone who possesses a considerable amount of true belief, as well as knowledge that is non-propositional, can be qualified as an idiot regardless of whether he can justify it or not?”

If someone cannot justify his beliefs, he stands on shaky ground. So if someone suddenly discovers that the beliefs that he previously thought solid might crumble at any moment, it seems to me he will feel like an idiot. My charitable interpretation of Delavagus is that he uses idiot in a relative sense, he means that we are more idiotic than we thought we were because we cannot actually justify, while we thought we had justifications.

The hypothetical idea of someone with considerable true belief and know-how being unable to give some justification (not necessarily in the stringent sense that Delavagus introduce) seems contradictory to me. So I think your question is somewhat of a logical trap.😉

When you say that there is a bait and switch, because of the sense of the word idiot, I can agree with you that it is a possible interpretation. But the interpretation that Delavagus was simply provocative and said idiot instead of “not as certain in our beliefs as we thought” is far more likely. I think he just wanted to spice a little his arguments, not be dishonest. While reading his text, I never interpreted “idiot” in the absolute sense. When he says “We are all idiots” (or something approaching), I don’t think that there is the least risk that we interpret idiot in the usual sense.

For me the conclusion (in the first half) is something like: Certitude is not rationally justifiable.

Oh. Sorry. Vox puts me on edge, makes me see uncalled-for hostility everywhere I turn. (And now Vox will use that line to show that I’m not a ‘true’ Pyrrhonian since I’ve not achieved ataraxia! *pff*)

See, we superintelligences can even make you do our work for us. Actually, I was more thinking that you don’t have any right to expect charity, since you clearly don’t abide by the principle. I’ve demonstrated your intellectual dishonesty, you, on the other hand, are now making suggestions of mental illness. Well done.

And no, I don’t speak Greek. Only English, Italian, German, some French and a bit of Japanese.

I’m being entirely genuine when I say that the more I read from you, the more I think you’re mentally unstable. It’s a fact that there are mentally unstable people in the world. You may be one of them, and you do in fact seem like one to me.

Come on – “mental illness?” Because you don’t agree with him? I don’t believe you’ll find much evidence, outside your fantasies that he would qualify as mentally ill. The guy is widely and well known, with a long and documented history in technology, business, economics and literature, and as a notorious gadfly. I am unaware of a single instance or account of an illness.

But you’ve already proven an inability or unwillingness to accept terms by their plain meaning, so perhaps “mental illness” is just your code word for “rhetorically correct?”

Time for a reality-check, xdpaul. I specifically asked Vox-supporters for their impressions of responses of his such as the one I flagged. It seems to me that the post in question provides plenty of examples of addled thinking, paranoia, and delusion. I really do want to hear from Vox-supporters. I really do want to know their impressions of the post.

Why? Because, you see, unlike Vox, I don’t jump to conclusions. Yes, he seems mentally unstable to me, but I’m suspending judgment on the matter. Hence my question to his supporters.

The guy is widely and well known, with a long and documented history in technology, business, economics and literature

Huh? You mean that 18-button mouse, The War in Heaven game, and the Eternal Warriors series? Because those if those are “widely and well known”, it’s only in a negative sense. I only know about the books ’cause a dude complained about Vox personally contacting him after posting a negative review on Amazon; and The War in Heaven got a lengthy, scathing review on Something Awful once upon a time.

@ Delvagus: I don’t see why you need to stoop to suggesting he’s mentally ill, though. Just another nutter on the web with an inflated sense of self-importance, is all.

You’re probably right, Severian. Still, the more I read of Vox’s writing, the more his (let’s kindly agree to call them) ‘idiosyncrasies’ strike me as positively pathological. At the same time, people who strike me as entirely reasonable — pdimov, for one — apparently have a different view of Vox. So I’m curious.

No, actually. I was talking about the World of Warcraft AI, the game company presidency, the national syndication, the groundbreaking economics text and the Billboard charts, but his hobbies like the mouse and novels will do fine, too.

Theodore Beale wrote WoW AI ? Care to source ? I’m pretty sure the game’s credits can be found on Bliz’s website somewhere…

As to his “groundbreaking” economics text, it seems to have about as much academic acclaim as little fun contraptions I jury-rig in my spare time as a hobby. That is, they might be known, within a certain…shall we say, niche, but they hardly amount to any, shall we say, claim to glory.

And when was the last time that your work appeared on Something Awful? As I said: widely known. Come on – he’s interviewed Umberto Eco, Ron Paul and John Julius Norwich. He’s been interviewed on the CBC and national radio for his economic analysis of the recession.

Pretending he’s not widely known only serves to demonstrate your parochialism, and underscores the fair observation that the supporters of Delavagus are poorly read, insular and easily led by pseudointellectual sleight of hand. Now that’s something awful.

And when was the last time that your work appeared on Something Awful?

You know, “appearing” on SA in the manner Vox’s so-called “work” did is about as good as appearing in a late-night police documentary as “that fat, drunk white supremacist who got tasered and soiled himself”. A very questionable honor, to put it mildly.

I’m being entirely genuine when I say that the more I read from you, the more I think you’re mentally unstable. It’s a fact that there are mentally unstable people in the world. You may be one of them, and you do in fact seem like one to me.

Now you’re really getting desperate, Delavagus.

I only know about the books ’cause a dude complained about Vox personally contacting him after posting a negative review on Amazon;

I don’t recall ever contacting anyone after any review, positive or negative, of any of my books. What would that accomplish? I’ve never even so much as posted a comment on Amazon.

I was talking about the World of Warcraft AI

Correction: I never had anything to do with Blizzard other than being friendly acquaintances with Pat and Adam. Well, that’s not quite true. They did contact me to ask me to write the Starcraft novelization, but I turned it down because they wanted something very cliched.

“The findings get more disturbing. Perkins found that IQ was by far the biggest predictor of how well people argued, but it predicted only the number of my-side arguments. Smart people make really good lawyers and secretaries, but they are no better than others at finding reasons on the other side. Perkins concluded that “people invest their IQ in buttressing their own case rather than in exploring the entire issue more fully and evenhandedly.”

– Haidt, “Righteous Minds”, page 81

i can only assume that “superintelligence” must mean that at some point people lose the ability to even understand the arguments of their interlocutors because they are so busy piling up their own arguments. that might explain what’s happening here.

“How stupid can we be even if we merely possess knowledge concerning people, places, and how to do things? How idiotic are we if we only possess two of the three types of knowledge delineated by your non-definitional analysis?”

however, he’s not crazy (or no crazier than most wingnuts). he’s just not very bright, but cannot be convinced of it because he’s an “IQ fundamentalist”:

“I’m not the smartest one in my extended family and I wasn’t even the second-smartest in a house I shared with three other guys after college; both Horn and Big Chilly test out higher than I do.”

Note the use of “test out” in the quote from his post “Wangsty doubles down again.” thus, nothing can shake his faith in his own genius because he once demonstrated a knack for Raven’s progressive matrices and since – not much else.

this is why his books on subjects he claims to know something about (i.e., economics) are reviewed only by fellow wingnuts, and ignored by serious academics, resulting in reviews like this:

“It is amazing to find within one page an explanation of why the government’s unemployment numbers are chronically faulty yet also learn of Mr. Day’s raids within World of Warcraft, although his penchant for the Alliance is regrettable – long live the Horde!”

this should come as no surprise, since the “principle of charity” is endemic to serious scholarship, as delavagus explained concisely above. what Vox does stands outside it, looking in, scratching on the glass, and calling technical fouls from a rule book he wrote himself (with a little help from wikipedia here and there).

“The findings get more disturbing. Perkins found that IQ was by far the biggest predictor of how well people argued, but it predicted only the number of my-side arguments. Smart people make really good lawyers and secretaries, but they are no better than others at finding reasons on the other side. Perkins concluded that “people invest their IQ in buttressing their own case rather than in exploring the entire issue more fully and evenhandedly.”

– Haidt, “Righteous Minds”, page 81

i can only assume that “superintelligence” must mean that at some point people lose the ability to even understand the arguments of their interlocutors because they are so busy piling up their own arguments. that might explain what’s happening here.

I doubt it. I’ve heard that people find it hard to comprehend an IQ level that is more than 2 SD away from their own. But they are also incapable of thinking at an IQ level that is higher than their own, almost by definition. So – in my opinion – it’s not like a lower IQ is better for seeing the arguments of the other side; it’s just that an IQ of about +1 SD covers the widest area.

“I doubt it. I’ve heard that people find it hard to comprehend an IQ level that is more than 2 SD away from their own. But they are also incapable of thinking at an IQ level that is higher than their own, almost by definition. So – in my opinion – it’s not like a lower IQ is better for seeing the arguments of the other side; it’s just that an IQ of about +1 SD covers the widest area.”

the above quote, by the way, perfectly illustrates what simpleminded “IQ fundamentalism” sounds like, in case the meaning was not clear.

the notion that IQ is highly – and necessarily – correlated with the ability to discern the truth or falsity of particular claims is the subject of empirical research, and the answer seems largely negative when applies to things other than toy-model problems (at least, that’s how i see Perkins and others, like Stanovich, from a cursory search).

this more modern study has lots of useful links for those interested in the issue:

In contrast, cognitive ability displayed near zero correlations with myside bias as measured in two different paradigms.

So, high IQ does not increase myside bias, as I thought you claimed:

i can only assume that “superintelligence” must mean that at some point people lose the ability to even understand the arguments of their interlocutors because they are so busy piling up their own arguments. that might explain what’s happening here.

i was joking about the idea of “superintelligence” – hence the quotes. the “i can only assume” should have tipped you off (i had never encountered the term outside of threads like these). in fact, i thought Vox made it up, but apparently, he didn’t, and is simply misapplying it (or more likely, using it to bait people):

The transhumanist movement distinguishes between “weak” and “strong” superintelligence. Weak superintelligence operates on the level of human brains, but much faster. Strong superintelligence operates on a superior level, as a human brain is considered qualitatively superior to a dog’s.

I’ve often wondered whether these two aren’t, in fact, one and the same. Chess programs on much faster hardware appear qualitatively superior.

You don’t get it, do you ?
WE HAVE ASSUMED DIRECT CONTROL of academia, ensuring that the warm, sticky goodness of little Beale’s economic insight is forever doomed to ferment in dark, forsaken holes at the fringe of fringes, instead of enjoying mainstream recognition and winning little Beale the Nobel prize he so certainly deserves.

We, the harbingers of civilizational demise do such things to those who don’t toe the line.

I bet you we’re an only child and Mommy loved you a lot. She probably called you Precious and told you how much smarter and better you were than everyone. Well. Mommy’s not here, but I am and I have a few things to say.

You may not be mentally unstable, but you are a rude, crass, malicious, dim-witted, arrogant, egotistical, prideful, insufferable, anal-retentive, psuedo-academic that I’ve had the privelege to ever read. If your Mother knew about your vicious attack she’d be ashamed of you. In fact shame on you for her.

You pick pick pick at definitions from sources like Wikipedia? No one in their right mind, much less academia would use Wikipedia as an actual source, it’s too corrupted by other peoples entries. And as for bait and switch, do you even understand the argument you’re are in Mr. Super Intelligent Being? And yes, I’m mocking you, just like the first person who called you that before you took it as a moniker. Have you no shame?

delavegus has been patient, calm and willing to explain what you call Errors. Now give everyone a break and go see your Mommy for some hugs and some kudos, so you can get it out of your system. You missed your calling, instead of hunting documents for words, you should have been hunting spreadsheets for beans. A good CFO can make a lot of money, and I think you’d be good, minus the attitude. Say hello to Mommy for me!

Far more probably, father issues. Dad was a technically talented entrepreneur, successful enough to make Vox a rich kid. He also seems to have set the high jump record for obnoxiousness and arrogance. Vox evidently learned early that that’s how it’s done.

Still I doubt he’s mentally ill. I get the same sense I had in elementary school around the schoolyard bully. While he was posturing, taunting, and causing dismay, you knew some kind of heavy shit had happened to him somewhere along the line, which made you pity him — but not enough to make you want to try to be friends.

I hope you aren’t expecting a biscuit after behaving exactly as you were expected to behave. I suppose smug delusion is its own reward.

Correction noted. I was probably blurring the patent for the APC AI with the Starcraft thing. In any case, either are easily more widely known achievements than anything produced by this limp band of panickers.

Holy cow. Collapse came about as fast as expected, but I didn’t expect such naked abandon.

You haven’t exactly shown yourself to be an intellectual heavyweight either, there, xd. You’ve made at least two substantive remarks to which I responded. Do you have anything more of substance to add, or are you content with insults?

Oh, and by the way: so you think it’s fine for Voxy to insult people, but if someone insults him in turn, they’re making fools of themselves? Really?

Not at all! But if you are going to insult Vox, they should expose him, not the insulter. That’s the difference: when he insults, he cuts and offends because it is true. When his insulters insult, they expose themselves as buffoons who are incapable of attacking him at his weak points.

In other words, he insults stupid people for being measurably less intelligent than himself. That hurts. His insulters make fun of him for being well-known, competent and incomprehensibly (to them) intelligent.

Only knowing what he has written, I could insult the guy to far greater effectiveness than all of your fanboys, combined. Compared to you, I’d be de Bergerac.

If you insist on insulting, insult well.

Here’s a hint: if it causes him and anyone familiar with his work to experience genuine mirth, it is being performed wrong. If “Mommy,” “Crazy,” and “Famous” are your bullets, don’t bother upgrading to cannons: they wouldn’t launch a clown at a circus.

But don’t worry: I’m not laughing at you, I’m laughing instead of you.

That’s the difference: when he insults, he cuts and offends because it is true.
Whilst this exposes you.

You’re another sole interpretor – only you get to judge if he is ‘true’ or not. You think you get sole judgement rights – would you hand over sole judgement rights to me or 03? Like hell you would. But you think somehow we aught to hand over the sole right to judge to you. I’ll steal the judgement cap for a second and say it’s incredibly narcissistic.

ochlocrat’s post makes it clear that this is not the first nor last confrontation people will have with Vox.

Given the stark futility and rapidly spiraling descent to ad hominem, I have new question regarding the Earwa books…

I understand this blog is run by their author?😉

Anyway, my question:

A sorcerer is given the title “Necromancer” in one book, yet we’ve yet to see magic related to the dead beyond a witches Wathi doll and rumors of arcana designed to prevent a soul from experiencing its damnation.

If Vox or ACM are involved, this is the only possible outcome. They seek to goad, not discuss. Roger’s complaints about ‘uncharitable’ readings are valid, but they miss the point that from pundits/trolls there can be no such thing.

Anyhow…. yeah Scott? What’s a necromancer? I vaguely remember the passage being referred to. Care to find us the context Saajanpatel?

The dude is living the sweet life with a healthy family atop a massive bank account (relative to you or I) in sunny Italy. Desperation must be your deal, because it is provably not his.

Conversely, Vox’s insults

1. Pick academic credentials. Definitely in Delavagus’ wheelhouse.
2. The words that Del actually writes (this is the learning part).
3. The validity of Del’s life’s work and career objectives and prospects.

Ouch. It isn’t nice, it isn’t pretty and socially, it is quite painful. I’d be very hurt if I was in his shoes, and I would be off-put by what would feel like an “unwarranted”, “uncharitable” attack on my very being.

But here’s the thing: Delavagus, wittingly or not, put his entire reputation and life’s work on the line when he engaged the debate. Losing it means a massive blow to everything he’s working on right now.

Now there’s two ways to go after that: be refreshed and renewed and start over completely from scratch and build a new outlook – something better with firmer foundations, obviously, or take it as the insults of a madman and cling to the scraps of the precious, if provably (and proven) untenable, philosophical wreckage.

That’s the power of Vox’s insults vs. your window dressing that don’t even begin to address his weaknesses. Even insult for the sake of insult is an art, and everything here is artless.

If you are going to stand for truth and knowledge and thought, it is part of the package that your statements are going to be attacked. Only the rooted ones are going to remain intact. It hurts to be uprooted, and good insults are the uprooting kind. Bad ones are just bark, running up the wrong tree.

Dude, a PhD thesis is hardly one’s “life’s work”. It’s something you do to get a fucking piece of paper so you can eventually build up the academic clout to do and study what you really want (after the prerequisite period of grovelling for funds).

He is invested of course, but if we compare Roger’s investment in Pyrrhonean skepticism and Theo’s investment in INVISIBLE SKY MASTER WHO TEACHES HIM TO PREDICT HUMAN BEHAVIOR THROUGH MAGIC BOOK it becomes immediately obvious who really has more of stake.

So… in addition to the piece of paper that he doesn’t have yet that allows him to get a late start on his life’s work, what other work has Delavagus accomplished in his life?

Funny, most people study what they really want without spending decades seeking approval from a bureaucracy. But if you want to call that particular bug a feature, you are, if nothing else providing an entertaining “defense” of your fellow. With support like that, I’m sure he’ll cut a good three-months off his five-year grovelling sentence.

This is especially lovable:Picking something meaningful to you, meaningless to the target. – Anguish regarding the establishment.

Would you care to enlighten us as to junior Beale’s attitude in regards to the fact that mainstream economics ignore his precious insights (as well as insights of those “economists” he holds dear), or the fact that establishment has been consistently shifting stances on social issues in the direction little Theo finds unacceptable for at least the last 30 years?

Would you care to enlighten us as to junior Beale’s attitude in regards to the fact that mainstream economics ignore his precious insights (as well as insights of those “economists” he holds dear), or the fact that establishment has been consistently shifting stances on social issues in the direction little Theo finds unacceptable for at least the last 30 years?

With regards to the economists, I think he finds their stupidity amusing, and regularly points out their failures.

With regards to the social issues, I think he may be mildly disappointed, but as he often points out on his blog, these things sort themselves out in the long run if you look at history. No use crying over the endarkenment of Western civilization; you can’t do anything about it.

What’s the point of writing if one is neither concerned with the situation (as you seek to convince the kind company gathered in this thread) nor capable of affecting the situation (per factual observation) ?

It seems to me that claims of lack of emotional involvement are not very consistent with the sheer volume of material Vox has published, as well as the degree of his “community participation” and rather strong attitude.

Whereas I care a great deal about securing Vox’s approval. (Sarcasm.) I’ve put my whole reputation and career on the line here, haven’t you heard?

But oh wait, no I haven’t! I find it difficult to believe that any philosopher in the world gives two shits about Vox’s estimation of a philosopher’s work. His criticisms of me are just plain pedestrian stuff, like mediocre undergraduate essays. At the least, it’s patently untrue that any hiring committee or editorial board would consult Vox or his blog before hiring me or publishing my work.

It seems Vox isn’t the only person who harbors delusions about the greatness and importance of Vox and his ideas.

Yes, and he expresses his nonchalant and uncaring attitude by concocting conservative essays, writing recursively escapist fantasy, and uttering an occasional rallying cry for “salvation” of his “civilization”.

Right, Vox doesn’t care care whit about how US of Amerkka is being overrun by Mexins. He only obsesses on it in every other article while absconded in sunny Italy. He strikes me as one of those expats who spends his every waking hour pining for home and never integrates into his adopted land to any significant extent. And when his grandkids are chattering away with their Italian friends, he’s still be sitting at the end of the dinner table wondering why they aren’t more concerned about Mexicans than he is.

Yes Clearly he cares SOOO little he has devoted going on a dozen posts to this blog, and its commenters. The fact is he is an aggressively mediocre person who has never achieved much that anybody would find notable, but has managed to make a shitload of money off it. Let’s face it, most people are fully aware that there are a lot of rich people that are pretty well useless. No need to to belabor that point, Theo.

Would you care to enlighten us as to junior Beale’s attitude in regards to the fact that mainstream economics ignore his precious insights (as well as insights of those “economists” he holds dear),

Financially I love it. Shorting the Euro against the Aussie dollar and the Swiss franc has been a gold mine. But I think it is tragic for the world… anyone who reads the reaction of the Fed economists to Robert Wenzel’s speech should be downright terrified. And given that they ignored Mises and Rothbard in the past and they’re ignoring Keen now, why would they pay me any attention?

or the fact that establishment has been consistently shifting stances on social issues in the direction little Theo finds unacceptable for at least the last 30 years?

Enjoy the decline is my attitude. I was just talking with a friend today about how we should meet for a holiday in Greece once they go to the New Drachma and the currency depreciates 40% or so. We’ve had the benefit of enjoying one of the greatest economic expansions in history, but it had to end sometime. Pity it had to be now, but at least we got to see the peak. As for the social trends you mention, most are closely correlated with wealth and the corresponding decadence; those trends will reverse with the global depression.

I find it difficult to believe that any philosopher in the world gives two shits about Vox’s estimation of a philosopher’s work.

I was totally going to agree with you until I realized that was not actually true. Jacob Needleman is a philosopher who quite liked TIA and blurbed it for the publisher. I suspect he would give at least one shit, though I couldn’t guarantee two.

It seems Vox isn’t the only who harbors delusions about the greatness and importance of Vox and his ideas.

I wouldn’t have thought it possible, but I’m beginning to think you’re actually more butthurt than Wängsty. By the time this ends, you’re going to be claiming that TPBers who find my case convincing are delusional too. I believe it’s called projection, my dear larval. Do you even realize none of them understand your arguments or your purpose as well as I do? I’d be surprised if most of them even read through your original posts, much less my eight, to say nothing of this latest masterpiece.

What’s the point of writing if one is neither concerned with the situation (as you seek to convince the kind company gathered in this thread) nor capable of affecting the situation (per factual observation) ?

Writing is what writers do. I mean, since I first responded to Scott on my blog last August, I’ve written 175,000 words on my next novel, 29,250 words of WND columns, and published two short stories. Will any of those words change anything? Perhaps, but I doubt it.

It seems to me that claims of lack of emotional involvement are not very consistent with the sheer volume of material Vox has published, as well as the degree of his “community participation” and rather strong attitude.

That would normally be true, but in addition to being a superintelligence, I am an Award Winning Cruelty Artist. And you guys haven’t ceased to provide entertainment yet. I really feel as if we’re just getting warmed up here, don’t you?

It appears your cruelty award is as awesome as your record in the game industry😀

As to your next novel, could it please be more recursively escapist, like for instance, christian high fantasy that actually happens inside The Matrix or something along those lines ? Nothing is better than layered escapism.

Scott, at least, admits that his books scratch a figurative itch, while you try to appear nonchalant despite your quite apparent focus permeating everything you happen to work on, ranging from fiction to blog posts to opinion pieces to computer games.

There is nothing to be embarrassed about in having concerns Vox, even ones as trivial as yours😉

I’m not looking for Vox’s approval. Responding to public criticism in no way entails giving a shit about convincing the critic. As 01 points out, this was a vanity post. Entirely selfish. I was explicit about the fact that I had zero expectations of denting Vox’s bubble of delusion. In fact, the first several paragraphs of my post are devoted to explaining why.

And what makes you think I’m ‘butthurt’?

You can go ahead and point out where I’m wrong and Vox is right, if you want to, He-Of-The-Long-Neck. As it is, you’re just being an ass. I mean, really. What would you say if I went on Vox’s site and commented that all his ‘dissections’ of my posts are nothing but expressions of his ‘butthurt’? That would be obnoxious, no? You’d think I was being an ass, yes?

Also, I just want to register the fact for the Vox-loving crowd out there that he has once again, it seems, refused to rise to the challenge of summarizing my view. Can any of you justify this? From the start, I’ve been asking him to explain his interpretation of the views he criticizes (first Scott’s, then mine). He has flatly refused to do so, time after time. But why? I’m convinced, as I’ve said repeatedly, that he simply doesn’t understand my view. He could dispel that worry by explaining the view to me. He must know what it is — or at least, he must know what he thinks it is. So why doesn’t he summarize it?

This is not a rhetorical question. I’m honestly curious. As I’ve said before, it smells of — to use one of Vox’s own favored insults — intellectual dishonesty to me. Doth my nose deceive?

Because it would look like positive claims about what you believe, and positive claims cause burden of proof. It is always much easier when the opponent has most of the burden, and you have willingly assumed it by giving your work out to criticism.

Vox is not out to convince you, after all, he just wants to have some easy fun at your expense. There are several other debates going on or starting soon, in which he is actually committed to defending his own ground too.

You may think this is dishonest (that he doesn’t willingly assume any burden of his own for you), but then you will have to specify what is the exact false claim he is making or implying.

I’m not sure I buy the claim that summarizing a view you’re attacking — that is, explaining what you take the view to be — necessarily involves shifting the burden of proof. I mean, it seems quite simple, really: if you think position x is wrong, then you must think you know what position x is. If this is right (it seems indisputable to me), then Vox simply must know what he thinks position x is, namely, my position. Stating what that interpretation is ought to have no impact on the validity or power of his critique. And if it does — and here’s my point — then that just shows that the critique is less valid and less powerful than it (may have) seemed.

As for specifying “what is the exact false claim he is making or implying,” I’ve gone down that road, believe me! I mean, shit, just look at the post we’re commenting on! I did my level best to read his posts, isolate his objections, formulate those objections as best I could, and respond to them. But already I’ve found it necessary to repeat myself.

I know the difference between facing an objection from a source that understands what you’re saying and facing an objection from a source that does not. The experiences are quite distinct. Vox, it seems to me, is simply unmoved by anything I have to say. Why? Not because of what I say, because as far as I can tell, he doesn’t understand half of it. No, he remains unmoved because his readings are so uncharitable as to hopelessly distort what’s on the page (or the screen) in front of him.

if you think position x is wrong, then you must think you know what position x is. If this is right (it seems indisputable to me), then Vox simply must know what he thinks position x is, namely, my position.

My impression is that he doesn’t actually have a strong opinion on whether or not your position is incorrect. Only that in the work you have willingly put out for criticism contains specific errors and misleading statements. Going through these happens to be fun for him because he had just read Sextus Empiricus and you still label your beliefs as Pyrrhonism, even if you do put your own spin on them.

As for us VP denizens, Vox already promised a rebuttal to yours, so we will have our entertainment even if you bow out of the game at this point. After all, there’s still one other debate to wrap up, one already promised, and two others that have been in the plans for a long time. One of the latter two happens to be with me.

Hmm. Interesting. It sure seems as though Vox strongly believes that my view is wrong. I recall him suggesting that I’ve never read Sextus, or else was intentionally misrepresenting the ancient texts. That seems like a pretty strong stand to take. In fact, I thought the recurring theme of his ‘dissections’ was my utter, irredeemable stupidity and ineptitude.

You suggest that you found his ‘Dissecting the Skeptics’ posts to be ‘entertainment’? Am I right in assuming, then, that you have a high opinion of the critique? I’d be very interested to know what you think of my response, then. Not all of it, of course, but in general. I can’t find my way to thinking that Vox’s criticisms are anything other than shallow posturing, that is, attempts to score quick but hollow rhetorical victories without the slightest attempt to understand the view or to represent it faithfully (let alone charitably). Given that this is my impression, why should I consider Vox a worthy ‘debate partner’? Am I wrong about him? I think it was pdimov who said that part of Vox’s shtick is to try to recreate the sense, in those he critiques, of being overpowered by a vastly superior intelligence. But, again, all I see is posturing — the attempt to seem as though that’s what’s happening, without any of the substance to back it up.

Honestly, on the basis of his ‘Dissecting the Skeptics’ posts alone, my mind boggles at the thought that people take him seriously. Any insight you could offer me would be appreciated.

It sure seems as though Vox strongly believes that my view is wrong. I recall him suggesting that I’ve never read Sextus, or else was intentionally misrepresenting the ancient texts.

There are two different things at play here. One is about the way the world actually works. Wikipedia says: “According to them [Pyrrhonists], even the statement that nothing can be known is dogmatic.” If this is your position, then there isn’t much to disagree; It could just be that you haven’t faced the truth yet. There is no claim here at all.

The other thing is about how you argue for your view. This is what the debate is currently about, and for this, he doesn’t need to know all specifics of your view. Only whether or not your specific arguments hold water, in the way a normal, reasonable reader would understand them. Your intended audience, in other words.

You suggest that you found his ‘Dissecting the Skeptics’ posts to be ‘entertainment’?

Yes. It’s all entertainment. Even my future debate on Calvinism will be mostly taken as entertainment, even though it happens to be important for me. This doesn’t take away from the need for rigor, though. If Vox tries to pull a fast one and the opponent calls him on it, then it is all the more entertaining.

I’d be very interested to know what you think of my response, then.

Haven’t read it yet. Only a little bit of the beginning. I did notice that you either misunderstood Vox’s “error 1”, which in reality was only about your usage of “evidence”. The Sextus conjecture, as Vox said, was “neither here nor there” at this point, and that he would come to it in the future. In other words, not part of the first error.

I’ll try to read it in its entirety in the near future.

Given that this is my impression, why should I consider Vox a worthy ‘debate partner’?

You don’t need to. He is already a person of interest on this forum, so I’m sure you’ll have an audience. And over there, we will be highly entertained if you manage to make things difficult for him. You don’t need to convince him personally. But I’m not trying to argue why you should continue the debate, only why you might want to.

Any insight you could offer me would be appreciated.

Again, you could be referring to two separate things. A) The arguments he makes, or B) The style in which he makes them.

B is mere self-satire. Not parody, mind you, only satire. As for A, as I said, I haven’t read your text yet, but I very much doubt it will turn out as the coup de grâce that will convince me that Vox is full of crap.

It’s pretty obvious to everyone here that VD cares about it all, that he thinks this is a den of libs, that Bakker’s books have wikipedia articles and his don’t, the whole damn enchilada. It all matters; it all hurts, and everything turns the knife in the wound.

Yes, well, Vox hasn’t helped matters much, nor have his partisans xdpaul and Giraffe, who are little better than trolls, as far as I can tell. Pdimov’s and 691’s contributions are helpful and appropriate, it seems to me. But in responding to any of the rest of them, it’s tough not to turn ad hominem.

It also doesn’t help that I aired my suspicion that Vox is mentally unstable in some way. I’ve reached the end of my rope, basically. There’s nothing left for me to do with respect to Vox except ask, “Who the hell is this guy?”, that is, there’s nothing left for me to do but try to understand this person as best I can. There’s no progress to be made by reasoning with him, it seems to me. But perhaps we can try to get clearer on the nature of the impasse. Thus, I’ve tried to get a sense of how his supporters view him.

I don’t think it’s as easy as pointing to Vox’s tendency to insult people who disagree with him, or his other obviously unfortunate habits. As I said to someone a few days ago, it seems to me that Vox — with his massive ego, his off-the-charts arrogance, his blinkered dogmatism — simply gives exaggerated expression to tendencies that are deep-seated in all of us.

This makes him an interesting case for those of us concerned with questions surrounding dispute, disagreement, and fruitful dialogue.

Vox is like the Epistemic Hulk that lurks within all of us. We ought to be afraid of him — of what he represents — for that Big Green Smashing Machine is lodged within all of our breasts, to one degree or another, just waiting to come out.

It also doesn’t help that I aired my suspicion that Vox is mentally unstable in some way. I’ve reached the end of my rope, basically. There’s nothing left for me to do with respect to Vox except ask, “Who the hell is this guy?”, that is, there’s nothing left for me to do but try to understand this person as best I can. There’s no progress to be made by reasoning with him, it seems to me.

You haven’t reasoned with me at all, Delavagus. You’ve avoided dialogue and repeatedly attempted to lecture me. And you repeatedly demonstrate how dishonest you are, for example, you already know why I will not provide you with a summary of your views. You explained that you wanted a summary because you wanted an excuse to decide whether responding to me was worth your time or not, and I told you that I was not going to give you any such excuse nor permit you to assume the lecturer’s position that you keep attempting to assume… although now you’re attempting to play psychiatrist as well.

Of course, I knew from the start that due to your vanity, you would not be able to resist defending yourself because you care very deeply about what people think of you. Perhaps you should consider setting the skeptics aside and giving the stoics a go.

I mean, it seems quite simple, really: if you think position x is wrong, then you must think you know what position x is. If this is right (it seems indisputable to me), then Vox simply must know what he thinks position x is, namely, my position.

While I do know your position in this case, here is where we again see the intelligence delta, as I will show that what you think is indisputable is, in fact, completely wrong. You absolutely don’t need to know what position x is in order to know it to be wrong. You don’t even need to know very much about it. This is precisely how I regularly convince people who admittedly know much more than I do about various subjects that they have reached an incorrect conclusion. You see, you need merely know the foundational assumptions upon which position x rests and the false basis of one of those assumptions to know that position x is guaranteed to be wrong.

Now, if you had been willing to simply answer my questions in the beginning, rather than demanding I write a summary for you before deciding if you would answer them, your errors based on your incorrect assumptions would have been exposed in a much less public and brutal manner. The thing that many of my readers find so amusing is they know that I don’t necessarily disagree with you concerning the very narrow aspect of your position that is correct, based on the SEP analysis, I’m simply pointing out that the broad conclusions you have attempted to draw from it and the connection you have clumsily attempted to force with Pyrrhonism are totally unjustified. I suspect you already know this, given your appeals to charitable reading, a general audience, and your attempt to distinguish between Sextus’s text and your interpretation of Pyrrhonism.

Markku, in particular, understands that I’m using your vanity to force you to dance to my tune and further underminine your own case. Do you not see the tremendous irony in forcing a group of self-proclaimed skeptics to publicly exhibit a complete lack of both epoché and ataraxia? The critique is real, to be sure, but you haven’t even perceived the metacritique.

Vox himself, it seems, can with impunity insult anyone and everyone, but insult him and — heavens forefend! — now we’re dealing with ‘baseless ad hominem attacks,’ ‘irrationality,’ ‘intellectual dishonesty,’ ‘little children frightened of the God-like super-intelligence’!

Yes, that’s exactly the problem. My insults are based on specific, observable facts and never, ever, serve as a substitute for actual arguments. Here’s the difference. I show precisely how you switch definitions, then state my conclusion, based on that evidence, that you are intellectually dishonest. You simply state, without even pointing to anything specific, that you think I may be mentally ill, paranoiac, and delusional, and imply that my arguments are false on that basis. That’s a straightforward logical fallacy, as any philosophy 101 student would understand. It’s more than a little strange that you don’t.

Now, I don’t mind the insults at all. I understand quite well that most people throw them in lieu of making arguments when they are incapable of constructing a convincing argument.

Yet another sole interpretor. How about you hand over the judgement hat to myself, for example, to let me alone just declare what’s occuring? Like hell you’d hand over the right to judge the situation to me! Only your judgement counts, of course!

You sit there claiming the sole right to judge, yet you refer to hyper emotional in anyone else?

Another Vox-supporter trots out his astonishing double-standard: Vox himself, it seems, can with impunity insult anyone and everyone, but insult him and — heavens forefend! — now we’re dealing with ‘baseless ad hominem attacks,’ ‘irrationality,’ ‘intellectual dishonesty,’ ‘little children frightened of the God-like super-intelligence’!

A dirty underbelly? I literally feel dirty every time I glance over the comments section of any page on Vox’s site. The hatred, vitriol, and — you guessed it — ad hominem attacks come thicker and faster there than on any other forum I’ve had the displeasure of visiting.

Seriously, observer, I want to know your opinion on this. It strikes me as a simple, indisputable fact that Vox and his blog absolutely brim with hatred and personal attacks. Am I wrong? If not, then please explain why Vox’s site is not itself a ‘dirty underbelly,’ one far dirtier than this squishy little corner of the web.

People don’t ecpect anything else from Vox. With the insults you are just showing that you’re on his level (this doesn’t necessarily refer to you D, but others are really getting more rude with the time).

Can you provide any insight into what you think I’m supposed to make of the things he says? I’m honestly having trouble viewing him as a rational animal.

He believes in demons and eternal damnation like most here ‘believe’ in neuroscience or quantum physics and is determined to protect his (blog) followers from the seductions of disbelief. He gets into theological arguments over how real demons are (very real apparently). What might seem a psychotically antisocial approach to debate is acually rational and coherent if you consider what the ramifications of loss are to him, and an audience of varying sophistication that depends upon him and his intellectual authority to buttress their beliefs.

I mean, I realize Vox lives in a kind of Lovecraft County, but I thought it’s the boring kind of LC that is mostly about foreign barbarous scum and such, and not the cool kind of Lovecraft County which has rapetentacles, monstrous succubi and necromancy.

People who live in the cool kind of Lovecraft County and are “IRL” employed are fairly rare, so I gotta hafta ask you for a link to such shenanigans on part of our dear Vox, if you don’t mind🙂

Well I looked but all the comments from before last May are deleted or inaccessible. The closest I could find was this

Yes, I do believe in the literal existence of intelligent and supernatural beings that are not the Creator God and may or may not seek human worship. Some of the pagan gods in the written historical record are these creatures whereas others are mere human invention. The Bible describes both kinds. I would put Zeus and Amaterasu in the fictional category and Baal, Wotan, and Damballah Wedo in the non-fiction one based on the behavior of their human worshippers. from http://voxday.blogspot.com/2004/03/mailvox-answering-mr-brown.html

The ‘very real apparently’ comment references my recollections of an argument Vox was having with another Christian about omnipitence (or is it omnidirigence?), the thrust of it being that God cannot be condemned for allowing certain evils to occur since they are the work of the devil and/or demons who are somehow separate from a non-omnipotent God. He’s attacked here http://blog.evangelicalrealism.com/2009/01/06/tia-tuesday-an-even-deeper-hole/ for being a ‘superstitious theist’ by someone who’s read his anti-Dawkins book. I also recall, but can’t track down some comments he made about be Demons taking the form of particularly skilled dissemblers and his intent to confront and defeat said dissemblers. I don’t think he’d disagree but…

I must add that it’s remarkable how well Vox avoids mentioning this little issue, it must take significant effort.

P.S.: BTW, Vox believes (according to his TIA book) that judeochristian god is not truly omniscient in a universal sense (which, irrespective of omnipotence, would prevent using god’s power to full extent by creating potential situations where the omnipotent is caught off guard and pants-down).Combined with alleged explicit and intelligent IRL demonic activity that would suggest that judeochristian god in Vox’s “Cool Lovecraft County” can be theoretically…neutralized
Hmmmmm… Vox seems to have more than abstractly philosophical reasons to take an interest in Scott’s work😉

I would also like to add that, if we assume that Old Testament is a decent source of information about such a god’s behavior, then god can definitely outright mislead/lie (Binding of Isaac) and can carry out extremely violent experiments on humans for the solemn goal of pettily one-upping Satan at what is little more than a high-school frat bet (Job).
Assuming that this very god is also silently watching millions of believers being misled about the nature and extent of his knowledge every single day (which is exactly what is happening in a world where Vox’s “not really omniscience” model of godly knowledge is true), we get a picture of a cruel, sociopathic pathological liar with supernatural powers of unknown extent (possibly, but not necessarily unlimited).

Which kind of makes one wonder what was the actual utility of that weird “preternaturally impregnate an innocent man’s wife, prod things to have your son born through that procedure executed in a remarkably cruel way” showdown for such a god…

then god can definitely outright mislead/lie (Binding of Isaac) and can carry out extremely violent experiments on humans for the solemn goal of pettily one-upping Satan at what is little more than a high-school frat bet (Job).
Oh, this isn’t as much a good ‘un – they’ll just do the usual ‘god has mysterious reasons’ then work back from that blank cheque to say it all works out. Kind of an uber charitable reading thing. I mean, they subject the structure of how their morality works to the ascribed acts of their god idea. It’s like Kirk – if he cheats at the Kobayashi Maru scenario, then cheating at it becomes right. The deeds determine the morality/the deeds determine what is right, a morality/a sense of what is right does not determine the deeds. The causality is all back to front.

“What might seem a psychotically antisocial approach to debate is acually rational and coherent if you consider what the ramifications of loss are to him, and an audience of varying sophistication that depends upon him and his intellectual authority to buttress their beliefs.”

so, wait…Vox is a member of the Consult, then? i’ll have to reread The False Sun i guess.

Well, see above – he subscribes to a worldview with a seemingly omnipotent, but not “truly omniscient” god (which means a god that can be tricked/circumvented) and he believes in physical, literal, intelligent supernatural evildoers to be loose in the world…so…

I like in the link how it’s the other guys who “allowed zero possibility I knew what I was talking about”. But what is it when you’re not playing devils advocate? I would assume full blown belief, one which allows zero possibility the other knew what they were talking about.

“Establish that you are not only more intelligent than they are, but more intelligent than their precious authorities as well, and they have literally no recourse beyond the usual game of evasion and aspersion.”

Isn’t it funny how Vox tries to establish that he is more intelligent, by constantly CLAIMING it?

“Don’t make any assertions, simply ask questions that will reveal, to them and everyone else, how devoid of actual knowledge they are. ”

This must be the reason why the discussion is bothering him so much. Telling a skeptic how devoid of knowledge he is….

Bothering me? Are you serious? I am thoroughly enjoying this, as are a number of my more sadistic readers. And even though you read the CCD post, it apparently went right over your head. Do you truly not see how “they have literally no recourse beyond the usual game of evasion and aspersion” perfectly describes the responses here?

“hey have literally no recourse beyond the usual game of evasion and aspersion”

No this perfecty descibes YOUR responce here.

“it apparently went right over your head”

Another try to establish, that you’re smarter than me? Seriously, man, all your shallow opinions don’t put you in the best light. You are really making an ass of yourself from my point of view. You have clearly shown, that you have no idea, what you are talkung about. And you still go on and on and on….

Really? Aspersion I’ll give you, but what do you suggest that I have evaded? Can you provide even three examples? I’ll certainly be happy to address them, at which point you can retract the accusation.

Another try to establish, that you’re smarter than me? Seriously, man, all your shallow opinions don’t put you in the best light. You are really making an ass of yourself from my point of view. You have clearly shown, that you have no idea, what you are talkung about.

I hope you speak English as a second or third language, otherwise your punctuation and spelling should suffice to establish that. What is it that you claim I have no idea I am talking about? The Outlines of Pyrrhonism? The true state of Heaven? Justified true belief?

Vox:
“This is why I agree with Delavagus that I am an uncharitable reader, in fact, I would even say that I pride myself on my extreme uncharitability in this regard.”

You admit, that you’re an extremely uncharitable reader. If you don’t even want to understand what others are talking about, don’t even want to follw their reasonings, you are evading the things that people want to talk about.
But I’m still willing to retract the accusation, if you stop evading the following:

Vox:
O ye of weak resolve…. You really do have some problems understanding definitions, don’t you. It’s remarkable that I have to point out to you that a demand for a summary is not a question. A question would have been: “can I haz summary?”, to which I would have simply answered “no”. There’s your answer. But if you’re not going to get a summary, you will certainly get another series of posts critically and uncharitably analyzing your latest error-filled epic.

I hereby ask you: “can I haz summary?”

“Charitable discussions are much more likely to end up with both parties agreeing to agree that X=X or Not X, depending upon one’s personal preference. This is useless. Adversarial debates usually clarify. Charitable discussions tend to muddle.”

This shows very clearly, that you have no idea, what the principle of charity is really about. This is at least one of the things I was referring to.

But I’m truly curious what you have to say about the true state of heaven.

It’s not just vox’s casual rascism it’s his overwhelming mysogeny combined with a particularly strong dose of “my analysis of religion trumps everything” that means arguing with him is adding credibility to a very flawed character.
03 seems to have his measure, I would also promote the commentators of respectful insolence as having a fairly clear picture of the man.
After all his answer to his vaccine denial was a totally unethical trial of the likes of the Tuskagee experiment.

Vox fetishises deductive logic but burns himself when he tries his hand at induction. One clearly deficient study by researcher with clear conflicts of interest in cahoots with another utterly discredited researcher comes out and suddenly ‘Vaccines do cause autism’. Or watch him try to multiply probabilities from incongruent statistics quoted in random news-paper articles.

I think I’d describe part of the problem like this – imagine a piece of string on a table and a number of nails in a board in a somewhat random pattern, with numbers on them. The question is can the string wrap around each nail in order and eventually be long enough to reach back around to touch it’s own tail?

I suspect with cognitive bias, the more you have riding on the string touching it’s tail, the more you are inclined to think it will do so.

And that’s not so bad, that’s not the problem.

The problem is when you think you can solve the answer in your head, instead of getting that string and running it around the nails. When you are so biased towards an answer, you wont even wait for a physical test – you just know the answer in your head already. Your brain can just figure it out theoretically and just be right, no need for any actual test! And then you can act on this, because you’re just right!

I think the sort of ‘hacking’ point comes when one isn’t willing to just assume ones theory that they decide all their theoreticals are true, is true. This creates a vulnerability in the system they can hack and exploit.

Thanks, camelite. I was thinking the same thing. But you see, Vox is a cherry-picker extraordinaire. Here’s another example:

“Remember, this all started when Delavagus refused to answer my questions and insisted that I write a summary for him before he would consent to do so.” And: “And you repeatedly demonstrate how dishonest you are, for example, you already know why I will not provide you with a summary of your views. You explained that you wanted a summary because you wanted an excuse to decide whether responding to me was worth your time or not, and I told you that I was not going to give you any such excuse nor permit you to assume the lecturer’s position that you keep attempting to assume.”

What he conveniently ignores — a point I’ve made several times in recent comments — is that I’ve been asking him to summarize these views he finds so preposterous since the first time I engaged him online (a couple months ago, I think). He has not, it seems to me, provided any good reason for his repeated refusals, and now he wants to pretend that my second-to-last request for a summary was merely a device to ‘refuse to answer his questions.’ He has also never once, as far as I can see, addressed the reasons I’ve given — repeatedly — for why I keep requesting a summary. (Hint: ‘to decide whether responding to Vox is worth my time’ is not one of them. When I said something along those lines, it was — again, cherry-picking going on here — a response to his refusals to engage me in what I considered an honest manner, not a reason for requesting a summary.)

The guy sees what he wants to see, gets out of texts only what he wants to get. *shrugs* Strikes me as irrational in the extreme. My current hypotheses are (1) that he’s just a troll having some trollish fun, (2) that he actually thinks that his superficial, Dwight–Schrute–like critical tactics are effective in the absence of any attempt whatsoever to understand the views he rejects, or (3) that he suffers from some sort of pathology.

I suspect, mind you without having 90% much of this debate, that incredibly formalized language would be necessary…this would lead to a “recursion” issue, in that you have to agree on the definitions of definitions…hopefully this wouldn’t get absurd.

If a debate is desired, I would recommend tackling a subsection of the current…ten?…points under contention.

There are an incredibly small number of people who have likely followed all the arguments. Most of us I suspect are going on suspicion – or in observer’s case, a ref possibly bribed to overlook fouls – of the interlocutor that we find morally reprehensible. So in the case of the average TPBer, that would be Vox and for the Ilk that would be Delvagus.

It remains to formulate a question for the debate and to get Delavagus to accept to debate. Vox, would you give a short and precise description of a thesis you would like to debate with Delavagus and that he might accept? Would you prefer for someone else to propose one? Do you have one in mind Saajanpatel?

Vox, would you give a short and precise description of a thesis you would like to debate with Delavagus and that he might accept? Would you prefer for someone else to propose one? Do you have one in mind Saajanpatel?

Here are my two suggestions: (1) Possessing no justified true belief necessarily renders a human being both stupid and an idiot. (2) Pyrrhonian adoxastōs relies upon living with the possession of first-order beliefs and opinions but free of the second-order belief that those first-order beliefs and opinions are justified.

@Tickli – Having skipped over the debate I’m hardly in a position to suggest a topic. The problem for both sides seems to be slippery language, so I proposed narrowing the scope which would ideally promoting greater precision.

Vox, would you care to answer a question ? If your simulation hypothesis is, in a general sense, correct (that is, universe is a simulation, and religious rules are supposed to be a factor by which the system selects AI programs that are “fit” for some unknown external purpose), what exactly makes you believe that simulation-designer is granting a happy future existence to those who abide by the “in-universe” rules he set, and not vice-versa (sinners go to “data haven / a better employment”, pious ones are tortured eternally or deleted) ?

Is there any reliable way to tell that sim-op isn’t actually preferring AIs who see the author of “religious rules” as “crazy lying fucktard”, and deleting everyone else as soon as they “in-universe die” (or worse) ?

It’s not like you can have out-of-simulation knowledge of sim-op’s goals, can you ?😀

Vox, would you care to answer a question ? If your simulation hypothesis is, in a general sense, correct (that is, universe is a simulation, and religious rules are supposed to be a factor by which the system selects AI programs that are “fit” for some unknown external purpose), what exactly makes you believe that simulation-designer is granting a happy future existence to those who abide by the “in-universe” rules he set, and not vice-versa (sinners go to “data haven / a better employment”, pious ones are tortured eternally or deleted) ?

Sure. What leads me to believe is the various reliable predictive models of human behavior provided in the game manual called “The Bible”. I don’t know that I’d call it “a happy future existence” so much as “the next level”, though. The interesting question to me is if it is static as most Christians assume and Platonic Form theory would suggest, or if it is dynamic and it will be possible to fall from grace in that level too. I tend to incline towards the latter view, but it’s just an impression, not even an opinion.

Is there any reliable way to tell that sim-op isn’t actually preferring AIs who see the author of “religious rules” as “crazy lying fucktard”, and deleting everyone else as soon as they “in-universe die” (or worse)?

To some extent. Of course, the manual itself could be a deception, delivering on its in-game promises and deceiving with regards to its exogenous ones. I touch upon this in TIA; if Moloch were the sim-op aka Creator, abortionists would be ministers and Hitler and Mao two of the saints.

It’s not like you can have out-of-simulation knowledge of sim-op’s goals, can you?

No, you cannot. But to me, the important thing is to realize that you are playing regardless of whether you want to play or not, whether you believe you are playing or not. “If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.”

Ignore the celestial voice or not, decide or not, spend your days faffing about in philosophical wankery or not, no one’s subjective opinion will determine the objective Truth. It is what it is.

The Roman Empire inherited philosophy from the ancient Greeks; imposed law and order within its provinces; kept bureaucratic records; and enforced religious tolerance. The New Testament, created during the time of the Roman Empire, bears some traces of modernity as a result. You couldn’t invent a story about God completely obliterating the city of Rome (a la Sodom and Gomorrah), because the Roman historians would call you on it, and you couldn’t just stone them.

In contrast, the people who invented the Old Testament stories could make up pretty much anything they liked. Early Egyptologists were genuinely shocked to find no trace whatsoever of Hebrew tribes having ever been in Egypt – they weren’t expecting to find a record of the Ten Plagues, but they expected to find something. As it turned out, they did find something. They found out that, during the supposed time of the Exodus, Egypt ruled much of Canaan. That’s one huge historical error, but if there are no libraries, nobody can call you on it.

The Roman Empire did have libraries. Thus, the New Testament doesn’t claim big, showy, large-scale geopolitical miracles as the Old Testament routinely did. Instead the New Testament claims smaller miracles which nonetheless fit into the same framework of evidence. A boy falls down and froths at the mouth; the cause is an unclean spirit; an unclean spirit could reasonably be expected to flee from a true prophet, but not to flee from a charlatan; Jesus casts out the unclean spirit; therefore Jesus is a true prophet and not a charlatan. This is perfectly ordinary Bayesian reasoning, if you grant the basic premise that epilepsy is caused by demons (and that the end of an epileptic fit proves the demon fled).

“Sure. What leads me to believe is the various reliable predictive models of human behavior provided in the game manual called “The Bible”. I don’t know that I’d call it “a happy future existence” so much as “the next level”, though. “

Stop right there Vox🙂 Bible is not the game manual. Bible is an intra-simulation construct which comes with claims that it was inspired (but IIRC, not directly “spawned by”) the creator of the universe.
Even if we assume that these origin claims are true, and even if it contains some degree of valuable information about intra-sim events, it’s not a game manual. It is yet another of sim-ops tools to pick and prod simulated minds towards some inscrutable goal.

” To some extent. Of course, the manual itself could be a deception, delivering on its in-game promises and deceiving with regards to its exogenous ones. I touch upon this in TIA; if Moloch were the sim-op aka Creator, abortionists would be ministers and Hitler and Mao two of the saints. “

Excuse me, but you unnecessarily constrain the possible space of “hypothetically imaginable sim-ops” to “Yahweh” and “Moloch”.

There’s an immensely huge array of possibilities, and there is absolutely not necessary that any of currently existing mythologies reflect “true views” of the sim-op.

It might be that it selects for qualities like insidiousness and cruelty (maybe it’s gonna build some kind of genocide bots in its home universe, and runs the sim to “grow” pilot AIs ;)) and the whole social set-up of suppressing those qualities in-sim is to make the most persistently insidious and cruel simulated minds more easy to spot by “suppressing” those who are merely opportunists.

It might be that the entire set-up is a huge sadistic troll and everyone, from saint martyrs to little kids who died in the cradle to Hitler will all get to burn in the same hell while the laughing god plays rick-roll music (or maybe every “soul” that ever lived will be sequestered in a separate hell and will be told that the person they most hate went to “heaven” just to add insult to injury… sadistic misotheistic god might be very creative 🙂 ).

It might be that actual criteria for selection and point of the entire set up are fundamentally incomprehensible to entities inside the simulation because you need a decision making system based upon “actual” universe physics to comprehend it.

There does not appear to be a reasonable way to rule out any of the many, many possibilities like that.

” No, you cannot. But to me, the important thing is to realize that you are playing regardless of whether you want to play or not, whether you believe you are playing or not. “If you choose not to decide, you still have made a choice.”

Ignore the celestial voice or not, decide or not, spend your days faffing about in philosophical wankery or not, no one’s subjective opinion will determine the objective Truth. It is what it is. ”

If you can not know objective “out-of-sim” Truth, then such “realization” appears pretty useless.

Winning condition might be actually “break the rules” (of course it doesn’t say that in the rules!), and it isn’t even a certainty that you will get to know who “really won” at the end.

I’m resolving to make this my final response to you, Vox, unless you man up and answer the question I’ve been asking you (in one context or another) since our very first exchange: Please provide me, in your own words, with a summary of my two posts, i.e., explain what you take my interpretation of skepticism to be.

O ye of weak resolve…. You really do have some problems understanding definitions, don’t you. It’s remarkable that I have to point out to you that a demand for a summary is not a question. A question would have been: “can I haz summary?”, to which I would have simply answered “no”. There’s your answer. But if you’re not going to get a summary, you will certainly get another series of posts critically and uncharitably analyzing your latest error-filled epic.

Epic: “of unusually great size or extent.” 6,437 words from a guy who purports to be too busy to answer questions without first being provided with a summary of his own views is unusual. Especially when presented in defense of 3,350 previous words.

And some of the contortions involved in the dancing are almost heroic.

That’s the adjective definition. Bloggers! Bloggers! You see now the sheer extent of his disingenuousness! The bait and switch! First he uses the word as a noun, then shamelessly tries to cover his tracks by providing the definition for the adjective!!!
O. M. G.

Technically true, but the noun definition would have made the same point.

Oxford Dictionary
2 (informal) an exceptionally long and arduous task or activity: the business of getting hospital treatment soon became an epic

Now, to answer your implied point that Delavagus’s supposed errors are mere oversights such as this one from Vox: This is exactly the sort of thing that can be brought up in a rebuttal. If it can be shown that the original point can still be successfully made just by fixing a minor error, then the charge of dishonesty is successfully rebutted.

No matter what you do, Vox and his crew of retards are going to spit out rationalizations forever, than genuinely believe you’re running scared and accuse you of pulling a ‘fighting withdrawal’. I’t’s the exact same pattern… Every. Single. Time.

“You can almost read the shakiness in his voice.” – one of his followers

Delvagus: “Seriously, observer, I want to know your opinion on this. It strikes me as a simple, indisputable fact that Vox and his blog absolutely brim with hatred and personal attacks. Am I wrong? If not, then please explain why Vox’s site is not itself a ‘dirty underbelly,’ one far dirtier than this squishy little corner of the web.”

A few points in response to your comment, Delvagus. First, I would of course expect the blog of my political opponents to have a dirty underbelly. What I would not expect is for the comments here of my political and cultural allies to have exactly the same dirty underbelly of unreasonable groupthink. That I find to be quite shameful.

If the devil himself were to enter into a philosophical debate among other philosophers, I would not accept any ad hominem arguments against him. If he were to get up on a political stage and run for office, then I certainly would accept ad hominem arguments against him. The point is that if we are actually claiming to think here we should not be accepting ad hominem arguments of any kind, and the extent to which you and others here engage in them shows that you’ve allowed your philosophizing to become contaminated by your personal dislike of Vox and his views.

Incidentally, I do not recall seeing any actual ad hominem arguments in Vox’s own comments, while they are rife in attacks against him. If Vox interjects an insult into his argument that is not enough to make it ad hominem. And, even if he did argue in an ad hominem fashion, that does not give you any more right to if you claim to do philosophy. He can be, as you say, ‘brim with hatred and personal attacks,’ without ever making ad hominem arguments in the logical sense.

To me, the vitally important thing is that we distinguish faults in reasoning from differences in judgment or morals. Vox’s reasoning seems to me to be generally sound. Where I disagree with him is in matters of judgment. But I am not going to make the easy mistake of saying that just because I doubt Vox’s judgment, his arguments must be illogical, and therefore he is not just mistaken, but dead wrong to the point that no truly rational entity would be capable of accepting them.

Groupthink along the lines of politics or, what? I think you’re the one who mentioned “scientism,” which means it’s probable that you’re Catholic. Maybe you think there’s some type of religious battle going on here? Do you think Vox is waging some kind of war against disbelief?

Face it, observer, you’re a concern troll. You have an agenda, but damn if you’re unwilling to reveal what it is. Spill the beans. Things will make a hell of a lot more sense to everyone after you do so.

I am not a Catholic. But who I am is irrelevant as far as I can see. I might as well be a bot. The only concern I am ‘trolling’ is that basic principles of reason be adhered to in the discussion here.

I find it interesting and very fruitful to look at things from Vox’s perspective: because that perspective is so foreign to me, it provides a better chance of seeing things in a new light. This discussion would be most beneficial in my view if it aimed to tease out the whole structure and implications and foundations of each pattern of thought, both his and ours, and discover where our disagreements come from, and how those disagreements generate incompatible understandings of the world. Ad hominems serve no purpose and simply put this benefit out of reach. They are politically valuable, and useful in the general flow of life, but do more harm than good in a discussion such as we are having here.

OK, maybe unfair, although Catholics do tend to make a big deal about “scientism.” And not that being Catholic is here or there. If you are Catholic, I’m relying on you to frankly ‘fess whether you’re siding with VD out of Christian solidarity. If so, you might want to reconsider the company you keep, considering your IMMORTAL SOUL (humor). And, yes, others have noted that there seems to be something a bit “planted” about your take on matters. But it would be helpful to know what your stake is in all this.

Ah, sorry. Out of sync simultaneous posting. So, not Catholic. Have you read much at Vox’s blog? Are you a regular reader there, or are you a regular here, or did you just come on all this out of the blue?

Observer, we need to get clearer about this ‘ad hominem’ charge we keep throwing around.

On the one hand, ‘ad hominem’ can denote a logical fallacy, in which a person responds to a rational argument by attacking its source rather than its rational credentials. But it can also be used — and it’s certainly being used here — simply to denote personal attacks.

In order to fall into the ad hominem fallacy, you would have to be faced with a rational argument and claim to be answering the rational argument by means of the personal attack. But I don’t think that’s what’s going on here, certainly not most of the time. Most of the time, people are responding to insults with insults. This is to be expected, I would think.

My ‘psychological turn’ vis-a-vis Vox is also not ad hominem (in the sense of a logical fallacy), since I’m not claiming that my hypotheses about his mental stability are direct responses to any of his arguments. It is perfectly legitimate — perfectly ‘rational’ — to ask yourself whether or not you’re dealing with a crazy person. When I respond to his arguments, I respond to the arguments (such as they are) — I think I’ve provided more than enough evidence of that here!

To be honest, it all depends on how you define “crazy”. I happen to have a psychiatrist friend (it’s him who hooked me up with 03) and he kindly explained to me that it’s almost impossible to diagnose something that neither creates profound social dis-adaptation nor causes subjective discomfort in the patient (think horrible hallucinations) as a proper pathology, and current DSM and ICD pretty much ensure that.

So as long as Vox is employed/financially sound, capable of taking basic care of himself, and not a direct threat to his peers while simultaneously being more or less okay with his experience, he pretty much by definition can not be clinically insane.

I never intended to make a clinical diagnosis here, 01. I’ve met quite a few people over the years who I would label (colloquially) as ‘insane’ or as ‘pathological’* who are nonetheless high-functioning.

* = By ‘pathological,’ I mean to suggest both (1) “(Of a person) exhibiting a quality or trait to a degree considered extreme or psychologically unhealthy; (of a quality) possessed or manifested to such a degree,” and (2) “A person with a… pathological compulsion” (OED). In other words: his ‘extreme’ and ‘psychologically unhealthy’ ‘qualities or traits’ are a sort of ‘compulsion,’ something he can’t control.

Vox has said several times himself that he has two items of the Dark Triad, namely Narcissistic (“grandiose self-view, a sense of entitlement, lack of empathy, and egotism”) and Machiavellian (“characterized by manipulation and exploitation of others, with a cynical disregard for morality and a focus on self-interest and deception”) personality.

I doubt that he has control issues. I am reasonably sure he can control his attitude when situation demands, he just sees no point.

To further demonstrate the point, check out On the Existence of Gods (Scroll to the bottom and start from Round 1) and note how the debate proceeded with completely different level of mutual respect with Dominic, even though the topic was exactly as provocative.

I find it interesting and very fruitful to look at things from Vox’s perspective

How many posts have you actually directed toward him, asking him for his perspective? You mostly seem to try and engage on TPB comentators on the quality of their posts.

Granted I haven’t run a survey of your posts, but I think for myself I’ll set a line in the sand. You don’t actually talk with your facinating VD sufficently, and for others consideration I’ll end up noting that in replies to your posts, a link to your fascination with VD post here (and yet lack of engagement with him) and no dialog. It wouldn’t be hard to get out of that and into dialog, by engaging VD in dialog for atleast a few posts.

If the devil himself were to enter into a philosophical debate among other philosophers, I would not accept any ad hominem arguments against him.
So? Bully for you – but why does your approach matter all that much here?

Oh jeez, I only just clicked that ‘dirty underbelly’ is itself name calling. Hell, your hypocrisy even flies under my radar at first! Presumably were something less than the devil (certainly a devil would reinforce your ideas (ala ‘the bread we eat in dreams’ short story) and is thus you give the devil his due).

Here’s an idea- Vox, would you agree to a virtual reset with delevagus, for the purposes of starting the debate in the ask a question answer a question format you’ve used previously in correspondence debates, except in real time. This could give an opportunity for you both to debate something less diffuse now that you have felt out each other’s defenses a bit. I don’t think it’s necessary to scrap the debate just yet.

Here’s an idea- Vox, would you agree to a virtual reset with delevagus, for the purposes of starting the debate in the ask a question answer a question format you’ve used previously in correspondence debates, except in real time.

Sure. My only condition is that both parties have to abide by the same conditions. Neither party gets to decide if the other’s question is worthy of answering, but is obligated to provide an answer in a direct and unevasive manner even if the question appears to be a stupid and/or obvious one. The dumber the question, the easier it should be to answer.

I think the audience, regardless of bias, is intelligent enough to see if one party or the other is dissembling in that simple format.

You’ve shown yourself to be, and admitted to being, an utterly unpleasant interlocutor who uses personal (the more personal the better) insults to psych out your opponent. delvagus could simply say, and I would suggest it to him, you are too much of an asshole to bother with, and leave it at that – without losing face. How much more of an asshole were you before you became a Christian?

You’ve shown yourself to be, and admitted to being, an utterly unpleasant interlocutor who uses personal (the more personal the better) insults to psych out your opponent. delvagus could simply say, and I would suggest it to him, you are too much of an asshole to bother with, and leave it at that – without losing face.

You might think so. Most would tend to disagree with you. He doesn’t need your permission to run away from a few simple questions, if that’s what he wants. And, as Markku has noted, I’m not always an unpleasant interlocutor. I always respond in the manner with which I am addressed. I think you have forgotten that Scott has been the one attacking me from the start.

cornucopia: “And, yes, others have noted that there seems to be something a bit “planted” about your take on matters. But it would be helpful to know what your stake is in all this.”

I have been focusing some of my comments on defending Vox’s arguments because most of the others here were not going to do so. I have been trying to make sure that they are heard out properly. This doesn’t indicate agreement or non-agreement.

I am not religious, and I referred to ‘scientism’ because I think that the strictest form of naturalism ends up being religious and no more tenable than other religious views–probably less so. However, I don’t really see anything wrong with Mr. Bakker’s most recent summary of his position, and I don’t even think Vox does either. The fact is though that it’s a very watered down and limited position, and there are some important issues on which it seems to take no position at all–e.g. mathematics. It seems to be an incomplete summary.

Approaching this argument in an honest fashion can help us all to understand the ultimate grounds of our views.

I’ve read this blog off and on for some time. While I have some doubts about Mr. Bakker’s views, I wanted to see how they would play out over time. I don’t think that story is over yet.

I’ve recently begun reading some of Vox’s blog and I find some of it to be quite thought-provoking. But again, that doesn’t indicate agreement or disagreement; I also find Sade to be thought-provoking and worthwhile reading.

But it seems to me — not that you care what weak little me thinks — that you could stand to read some Nietzsche in order to nuance-up that little account of yours. We’re not in the master-slave age anymore, though it sounds like you’d prefer it if we were. And there’s no going back, only forward. The contemporary world requires a new kind of ‘master.’

Evopsych is well known for over-extending. But even its proponents would find anoncon ridiculous.

They find ways of relating being K-type with virginity before marriage! They explain that liberals are r-types while religious conservatives are K-types. This probably explain why liberals have so much more children than Mormons and why conservatives are pushing the US for more investment in education.

I basically advise anyone searching for a good laugh to look at their homepage.

Well, you know, I might even give you that it might live up to the Blindsight Vampire standard, but no further since it constantly sneaks interpretative and suggestive gems like ” Given that Liberals are shown to have diminished amygdala volume (Kanai et al.,2011), and that those with amygdala lesions cannot judge friend from enemy (Adolphs et al., 1998; Adolphs et al., 2002; Broks et al., 1998; Winston et al., 2002), this might arise due to the Liberal’s diminished ability to judge friend from foe” which oh so gently tries to misrepresent Settle (2010)

Also, as an apparent sidenote, neither spider monkeys nor cuttlefishes seem to be good human models (also, Gibson’s monkey research specifically demonstrates a set of behaviors notably more contrived than competition divide the not-quite-elusive author advocates, thus being an extra-poor example for this thesis)

Nonetheless, the tenacity of people who try to construct an evopsych account of…pretty much anything is kind of amazing, and am looking forward to this thing appearing in a peer-reviewed journal which seem to love evopsych stuff a lot these days😀 (I doubt I can motivate Third to do a full review, her being in China and me being far away)

” The novelty of contraception is precisely why r evolution hasn’t caught up to the innovation. ”

Care to put that in a more coherent manner ?

” Tribal resource allocation has existed as long as tribes have existed, and before. ”

And I assume you maintain that certain group of people has evolved a “hardwired” capacity to detect novel forms of resource management and a hardwired, highly abstract strategy to enact upon those irrespective of how different it has become ?

That seems quite a claim. Next you’ll claim that it is possible to evolve “firearm intuition” or “transport maintenance instinct”

” Is crossing the street r or K? ”

My dear friend, unlike crossing the street, choosing an insurance-conscious employer is clearly as much “involved” with “generalized, resource management” as “Expanding government social spending and fostering equality”.

Something capable of having a hardwired general resource management response that is capable of identifying rather novel constructs such as “fostering equality” and “expanding government social spending” should also be able to identify insurance issues as resource management issue and apply same hypothetical hardwired strategy to it.

So… specifically seeking out an employer with very good health insurance would be more consistent with r-behavior or K-behavior, in your opinion ?

I ask b/c I always wonder about the real life physical capabilities of internet tough guys. Also, just as rooting for a sports team doesn’t make you an athlete, rooting for Vox doesn’t mean you share any part of his victory over the life-game.

I wonder if Vox – who at least has measured success – would deign to dine with most of his readers, or dismiss them as chattel. Because I know real life sexists, even racists, who are successful. Frankly they are too busy enjoying their privileged existences to take up the position of cheerleaders in blog fights.

I wonder if Vox – who at least has measured success – would deign to dine with most of his readers, or dismiss them as chattel.

Easily answered. I had a wonderful three-hour lunch with one of my Roman readers at his friend’s beautiful hilltop restaurant overlooking the Piemontese vineyards just two weeks ago. Not all elitists are snobs.

Great example of the sort of reasoning that Vox’s supporters — at least the trollish ones who come on here to toss insults around — would never countenance if it came from the grubby, calloused fingertips of we pitiful mortals rather than from the Enchanted Digits of the Super Intelligence.

The question asked about “most of his readers.” Vox answers the question by referring to a circumstance involving only one of his readers.

First, “handouts” as implemented now are clearly dissimilar to any peer-assistance tradition that can be observed in tribal society, so that would still suggest a degree of sophisticated pattern matching designed to identify novel resource-management situations.

Otherwise it would be impossible to link such a complex and novel process as government social programs and any kind of genetically inherited behavior. Governmental programs are not simple issues of charitable personal giving, as you might realize, they are complex and expensive machines.

Gun confrontation is hardly necessarily direct – in fact, guns provide wonderful opportunities for subterfuge and medium-to-long range engagement (not as wonderfully indirect as a drone, but definitely something to settle for) so it stands to reason that the sneaky types would actually enjoy gun culture, just a different, less direct facet of it.
As usual, my dear friend, you overgeneralize and oversimplify things.

Also, it is generally considered unwise to make attempts at internet telepathy, it is a lost art.

michael trust has merely added a new gloss with political ideology. it’s patently stupid, but rather than spell out why, let’s follow the late, great Christopher Hitchens in recalling that what is asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.

that article is a complete shitshow. no wonder conservatives have to “publish” their “theories” within their own epistemic bubble so often (a search for reviews of Vox’s books will also show little interest beyond Wingnut Welfare Inc. and the intellectual ghetto that is “Christian” fantasy/gaming/whatever, etc.).

good luck with your Grand Unified Theory of Why Bigotry Is the Cornerstone of Civilization (now with more amygdalae!).

“Bigotry” is the cornerstone of survival, not civilization. Once you get so civilized as to guarantee the survival of all, no matter what, you no longer need it, along with the amygdala. This is just common sense.

Bigotry” is the cornerstone of survival, not civilization. Once you get so civilized as to guarantee the survival of all, no matter what, you no longer need it, along with the amygdala. This is just common sense.

Among other problems, r’s tend to promote psychopathic leaders to power over nations, as a result of faulty amygdalae – a failure of threat recognition. These leaders then commit democides, genocides, and initiate wars, partly to cope with unfulfillable r demands.

So no, civilization does not erase the utility of a functional amygdala.

threat assessment goes into more things than just detecting danger to life, and as long as we are talking about a general amygdala function reduction (and not some pinpoint lesions), that thingie is useful for far more things than mere fear response (and, it appears, isn’t even the only route by which fear response operates in humans, since patients with lost amygdala still have rapid response to fearful faces, indicating that even then fear detection perseveres http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2756300/?tool=pmcentrez )

It’s pretty clear that even relatively straightforward amygdala is pretty complicated, so it would be nice if people refrained from radical oversimplifications.

One more really funny quote.
Speaking of the kind of societies the liberals want to establish:

“Abstinence and monogamy are not favored, so as to facilitate a less competitive, less sexually selective environment. This is designed to prevent those who have competed for mates and won, from monopolizing the genetic fitness of their
highly fit mates.”

First, I cannot resist thinking that someone had some bad experience with the opposite sex…
Second, monogamy is presented as making the sexual competition more important while clearly the opposite is true. Without monogamy, a man can have thousand of children (Chinese emperor of old) or 0. With monogamy, all men tend to have the same number of children, because all men tend to have a wife.

Promiscuity puts a lot more selective pressure on males than monogamy for the same reasons as polygamy. So it is more sexually selective and not less.

About the different question as to what is more K… I am not sure the concept of K exposed in the article is very coherent. But I will try to use it nevertheless. For you or the author, in average, K males are more fit. (Tell me if you disagree, I am not clear on this point.) Then, they would favour more competition between themselves and other less fit individual, it seems in their best interest. So they will prefer promiscuity. For females that are K, it’s probably different, they have to weight the advantages of better genes through promiscuity against the advantages of having a fitter mate.
(Disclaimer: I do not hold those reasoning to be solid. They mostly show that this kind of thinking can get you to both positions. In particular, I should carefully differentiate between genetic fitness and phenotypical fitness and probably a bunch of other stuff that I am not thinking about.)

Okay, let’s play this game… would a knack for advanced urban warfare tactics, ambush propensity and a tendency for long-range warfare indicate a predisposition to “cowardice”. “dishonor” and general r-ness ?

This is fun! Let’s continue. The honourable way of finding mates is making war on some other group and raping their women once the war is won? Or do you have another explanation for how warfare allows reproduction? I mean, this is probably K in your way of thinking. Do you regard that as the way people should behave?

tickli, the kind gentleman seems 01’s close acquaintance of some sort, and apparently a member of “game” community (and I don’t mean the “Starcraft 2 et. al.” kind of game community), so I believe you can infer likelihood of possible attitudes towards rape from that data.

I find it honorable and inspiring.
Yeah, but you might be one of the apparent 2% of the population who are sociopaths.

You find relativism, niceness, and tentativeness to be profoundly compelling, the righteous pattern of life.
And you think your alive simply because of how macho tough you evaluate yourself as being. Rather than it being the case that people don’t put KOS designations on everyone else, because of niceness, tentativeness, etc. What is the quality of not killing on site, but tentativeness? Why didn’t someone just knife you as a baby? Because even as a baby you’re absolutely hardcore and nobody would fuck with you? Even as a crying, shitting child? Are you really telling yourself that? Or actually your only alive because of these values of tentativeness?

You’ve been living in a iron lung all your life, but now you think anyone who makes iron lungs is weak.

I guess maybe you have evidence, if we went on to let such bullshit thinking continue.

@Dharmakitri: Dharma, would you ever consider guest blogging on Buddhism? I ask because I recall one of the comments made after a lecture by Scott was that Buddhism possessed a belief system similar to what Scott was worried about (Individuality is ultimately an illusion, we’re part of a larger structure).

It seemed, to my cursory examination, that the key difference lay in whether the larger structure was part of a higher consciousness or if it were just a meaningless clump.

Vox’s support of the reality-as-simulation belief also ties into the Hindu (and I believe Buddhist?) concept of Maya, where the world is itself an illusion.

@Scott and Earwa fans: Looking at False Sun again, the Hero Mage Titirga, I can’t help but think of Chomsky’s idea of an inborn universal grammar. This guy is a proto-Cish, but what is it about blindness that allows for a great apprehension of the onta? Why would blindness clarify meaning?

Also, I had this whole thing about Earwa as simulation but I posted it somewhere in the numerous WLW threads on Westeros. Will see if I can dig it up.

I would be mightily interested by the philosophical underpinnings of Buddhism too!

For the french speakers interested on the philosophical issue of scepticism (and not just in using Vox as a punching ball), Claudine Tiercelin (a french philosopher, but apparently of the analytical tradition) gave a very nice sequence of course in 2011 on knowledge, spending the beginning of her course on problems related to scepticism and relativism.http://www.college-de-france.fr/site/claudine-tiercelin/audio_video.jsp

svabhāva (essence or intrinsic nature) – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Svabhava
See also the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Nāgārjuna (below) which breaks down svabhāva into two conceptual dimension, ontological and cognitive

“Dharma, would you ever consider guest blogging on Buddhism? I ask because I recall one of the comments made after a lecture by Scott was that Buddhism possessed a belief system similar to what Scott was worried about (Individuality is ultimately an illusion, we’re part of a larger structure). ”

I’m flattered that you would ask; however, I am not qualified, I’m too new to Buddhist studies. Plus, my writing is atrocious and it would be sadistic of me to subject anyone to it. 🙂

You might enjoy this YouTube video. It is from one of the MInd and Life Diaglouges and features John Dunne presenting basic aspects of a Buddhist model of consciousness and perception (starts at aprox. 1:05:20).

months ago when vox showed up people seemed to be unsure of him. Like a new kid in school. Now it seems most people are unimpressed here, his super-whatever claims are widely disregarded, and basically most people are losing interest. However it seems vox has not gotten over this “newness” and is still trying to impress everyone at school with the same, tired tricks. I find him rather irritating.

Some of you may have noticed that I’ve begun to get snippy with the snippiness, that is, I’ve begun deleting comments that strike me as containing nothing but personal attacks.

I don’t mean to offend anyone. I was hesitant to start moderating in this way, and I’m not going to go back through earlier comments to retroactively apply my new-found moderating scruples, but from here on, pure vitriol or name-calling in this thread will promptly find its way into the trash can.

I was on a forum for a long time that never deleted anything (even spam), but did punt the posts to an inactive folder. That way if someone thought it was an extra special post, they could still refer to it. I’m not sure wordpress has any sort of option like that, I grant, just pitching the idea.

Here’s an idea- Vox, would you agree to a virtual reset with delevagus, for the purposes of starting the debate in the ask a question answer a question format you’ve used previously in correspondence debates, except in real time.

Sure. My only condition is that both parties have to abide by the same conditions. Neither party gets to decide if the other’s question is worthy of answering, but is obligated to provide an answer in a direct and unevasive manner even if the question appears to be a stupid and/or obvious one. The dumber the question, the easier it should be to answer.

I think the audience, regardless of bias, is intelligent enough to see if one party or the other is dissembling in that simple format.”

Delevagus would you also agree to this format? Maybe this way, the debate could stay more directed and the debaters could safely ignore cross questioning from other interlocutors at least until an agreed upon time where they could field questions. I would suggest some sort of moderation but then I don’t know who would 1) be impartial enough, and 2) understand the material well enough to be able to call BS on either party here.

Don’t know if this is a good idea, but a moderator could maybe be found on the westeros board. There you would have a lot of different opinions. I don’t think that any are Vox-Supporters, but you definitly have Bakker-haters.

I’ll try for three (since the crossfire has died down a bit – didn’t want to add to it before). The ideas in the previous posts seem to make sense to me, assuming I understand them. But they seem a kind of platonic ideal? I mean, you eat and such – what’s driving that process to occur? I’m not trying to disprove the idea in saying that, instead I was wondering how you translate the idea of the skepticism to the apparent practicalities of life and continuing to live?

Heh, it’s funny. I’m thinking to myself that’s a far more reasonable approach than some others have pitched. But then I think “How do I know that?”.

It is the feeling I got from re-reading the thread. It’s not always possible to produce rational justifications for feelings, but I think that mine resulted from the mental comparison of what might have been, given the post, to what actually happened.

I figured that that was what you meant. And I agree with you — this thread is, all things considered, a dialogic trainwreck. But as you may have guessed from the opening remarks of my post, I had no expectations that my post would give rise to a fruitful discussion, not given that Vox and his merely trollish followers were bound to show up. It is a shame, though.

I have a professional as well as a personal interest in debate dynamics, the nature of disagreement, and in methods for fostering constructive dialogue (esp. across ideological divides), which is why I spent so long trying to get through to Vox. But I’d given up any hope of progress on that front prior to writing my last post.

The only things that continue to interest me about all this lie in the areas of psychology and sociology. As I said at some point above, Vox is an awfully interesting case-study when it comes to debate, disagreement, and dialogue. My conclusion remains that he merely gives exaggerated expression to tendencies innate, to a greater or lesser extent, in all of us: this is what makes him, from my standpoint, so fascinating, and spooky, and (of course) troubling…

I’m sure you have a very different view of the matter, pdimov. But I hope you can at least understand why I’ve reached this point.

So are we deleting now (in Delavagus’s threads, atleast), instead of calling out troll? Having been on the end of troll evaluations (sole evaluations, btw), I generally find it a double standard where somehow you are worthy of being spoken to, but not worthy of being spoken to (maybe it’s different if the only speaking being done is ‘troll’. Otherwise I find people pitch an arguement, then throw in troll accusations at the end, so they get to say their bit but then socially silence their interlocur). I don’t mind a ‘you need to be this high to ride’ standard (prefereably a fairly emperical one) or you can’t come in (indeed I encourage an upfront, explicit one). But letting someone in then calling them shortie isn’t any good, I think. As much as I like to see what I think are idiots get deleted, I don’t want to encourage a system I wouldn’t want applied to myself.

Especially when we pull them out of context, we tend to lose the ‘tone’ of written words. “What is the author trying to prove?” is the sort of thing one might say with a sneer. “For what purpose was this written?” is — to my ear, anyway — much less loaded.

Moreover, the two do not say the same thing. Vox, it seems, is proud of being unconcerned with extra-textual considerations such as context, purpose, etc., even though these things are central to any honest attempt to understand and engage a text. Asking “What is the purpose?” is much broader than asking “What is this trying to prove?” ‘Purpose’ points outside the text, looks to place it in a context, to figure out how best to orient oneself toward the text, to take it for what it is (e.g., not to criticize it for failing to accomplish what it never set out to accomplish). Asking after a text’s thesis does not do that (or at least not in the same way or to the same extent).

Finally, no, I wasn’t trying to ‘prove’ anything in my posts (not if ‘proof’ is understood in a strong sense). I was trying to provide an informal, relatively accessible, thumbnail sketch of large and complicated issues. Sure, I make a lot of claims in the posts, I say a lot of things, but it was all intended, first-and-foremost, as presentational (i.e., as an introduction, at best a starting point for discussion), not as didactic (i.e., as a ‘proof’ or any sort of final word on the matter).

Why isn’t this entirely obvious to everyone who read the posts? At the end of the day, that’s why this whole travesty bemuses me the way it does. I found them interesting and informative, and no doubt I’ll reflect on them for quite a while. Of course, Vox will just say that I’m too dumb to see that the wool is being pulled over my eyes. C’est la vie.

Corn, I think a VD supporter at some point put it that if you are right, then it’s not being rude or uncharitable. Ie, how can something be rude or uncharitable when it’s true? Of course they do the usual human thing of assuming they are right, then working backwards from that conclusion.

01: It’s pretty clear that even relatively straightforward amygdala is pretty complicated, so it would be nice if people refrained from radical oversimplifications.

A radical and oversimplified claim can still be better, for practical purposes, than no claim at all.

Consider the following example: 90% of certain entities are white and 10% of them are black, and, while their color can be predicted from other traits, it’s extremely hard to do so. Claim A: “these entities are white”. Claim B: “the color of such an entity is impossible to predict, because, well, it’s complicated”. Technically, A is wrong, not true at all, but it’s still a better bet.

But at the level of complexity found in neuroscience, even mild generalizing claims such as “larger structure volume indicates increased performance of the structure” (which is a claim that is, indeed, quite commonly true) are dangerously misleading (the volume increase may happen due to a fuckton-and-a-half of other reasons, and you never know till you rigorously check).

Brains appear to be oftentimes worse than PHP, and in such dark a forest it pays to be cautious

But at the level of complexity found in neuroscience, even mild generalizing claims such as “larger structure volume indicates increased performance of the structure” (which is a claim that is, indeed, quite commonly true) are dangerously misleading…

Yes. But that’s not how the argument proceeds. We start from the observation that “greater conservatism was associated with increased volume of the right amygdala”, then we get to the evo-psych explanation that, since the amygdala is more-or-less responsible for threat assessment, and since the present environment contains little to no threats…

Note that the first half is a “liberal” observation, and there’s not much frantic handwaving that “it’s more complicated than that!”

So it’s basically a matter of interpretation. When the claim is that conservatism is genetic and inferior, everything is fine; but if it’s that conservatism is genetic and superior… it becomes complicated. It really is complicated, of course. But not just in the second case.🙂

While I understand your frustration with evopsych/zombiesalmon just-so-stories from the “other side”, would you please show me where I endorsed “unwarranted overgeneralizations”/”evopsych bull from “that side”.

I distinctly do not recall doing so (and if I did, I was probably drunk🙂 )

As to me not denouncing that stuff in that particular case – you see, I am not paid for policing cases of hasty overgeneralization on TPB, and was probably caught up in some other discussion🙂

While I understand your frustration with evopsych/zombiesalmon just-so-stories from the “other side”, would you please show me where I endorsed “unwarranted overgeneralizations”/”evopsych bull from “that side”.

You’re right, you didn’t, and it wasn’t really my intent to accuse you of anything. Sorry.

I think some sort of physical test is probably warranted, so as to get anywhere in terms of both sides. Alot of the charitable reading Delavagus/Roger mentions probably consists of not being certain if it came down to a physical test, whether one would be right. Certainly when it never comes down to such a test, it’s easy for one (or both) parties to cease being charitable in that way. I was musing on another hypothetical dungeon scenario, where VD is in a room that will fill with water and drown him unless he can give an accurate summerisation of Delavagus’s view (doesn’t have to be identical wording – just the same meaning)

I have to say that this has been a fantastic waste of an hour of my life that i will never get back. I imagine some cheesy movie reviewer commenting along the lines of “Best movie since Ishtar! Vox has the glowing magnetic charisma and vitality of Dane Cook!”

Truly entertaining..I was not familiar w/the whole K v. R rigamarole but its always good to find out new (to me) and crazy theories from the lunatic fringe. Some things never change.. The ‘net has always been and will always be home to trolls, idiots, malcontents and faux tough-guys. This thread has all of those types in glorious, bountiful abundance.

Id like to give a sincere ‘thank you’ to 01 & 03 for all the laughs. You two made this thread, imo. Kudos!