Monday, June 30, 2014

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was most famous for leading Al Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI). In fact, his first organization was called Tawhid wal Jihad, which
he formed in the 1990s before he had joined al Qaeda. In 2002, Zarqawi
travelled to Iraq to prepare for the U.S. invasion. It wasn’t until January
2004 that he asked for assistance from Al Qaeda central, and then in October
2004 he finally pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden. Zarqawi proved to be a
much more bloodthirsty terrorist than even bin Laden was used to as AQI became
committed to attacking Iraqis, and especially Shiites to start a civil war,
which was hoped would destabilize the country and lead to the failure of the
American effort in Iraq. To help explain Zarqawi’s career in Iraq is former CIA
analyst Nada Bakos. She was part of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center who was
sent to Iraq shortly after the 2003 invasion to track Zarqawi’s activities.

Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi turned his Tawhid wal Jihad into Al Qaeda In Iraq in 2004 (Institute for the Study of Violent Groups)

1. When did the CIA
send you to Iraq?

That was right after the invasion in May 2003.

2. When you were sent
there were you tasked with following the insurgency or just intelligence
gathering in general?

Remember in May 2003 we hadn’t experienced an increase in violence
yet. The uptick started while I was there.

I was sent to Iraq as an expert for my team [the CIA’s Iraq
Counterterrorism unit] because they needed someone who could evaluate Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi’s network, and if he had a connection to Al Qaeda. They wanted at
least one expert on the ground in case something came up, but also at that
point the CIA was just trying to find out what Zarqawi’s network was doing.

3. Zarqawi had his
own group Tawhid wal Jihad that he started in the 1990s. After he came to Iraq
in January 2004 he asked Al Qaeda for aid, and then in October 2004 pledged
allegiance to Osama bin Laden. Why did he decide to make that connection to Al
Qaeda?

At the time everyone thought of course Zarqawi was going to
join Al Qaeda, because it’s Al Qaeda, it’s a bigger brand. Yet he had all the
money. He was galvanizing all this support and new recruits because he was gaining
ground, not unlike what the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) is
doing now. Al Qaeda at the time was still the big dog on the block. They were
worth joining from his perspective because they would have more consistent
funding, weapons, people, and give him a broader reach. Yet, he managed to do
it on his terms.

4. In the HBO
documentary “Manhunt, The Search for Bin Laden” you said that Zarqawi was different from others
leaders in Al Qaeda. What was the big difference that led AQ to criticize him
in 2005-2006 in two letters saying that he was hurting their cause?

The tactics that ISIS are using today stem from Zarqawi’s
strategy. He took advantage of the sectarian divide, using it purposely to
cause more destruction. He knew that was going to cause a huge disruption for
U.S. troops, which it did.

The differences that emerged with Al Qaeda was how Zarqawi
was waging jihad. Al Qaeda was disgruntled with how he was going about killing
Muslims and civilians seemingly at random. They wanted to reign him in, but he
wasn’t having it. He had figured out his strategy early on, and this was how he
was going to approach jihad, and he was actually going to take advantage of the
insurgency. That’s what ISIS is doing now.

5. It seems like ISIS
is trying to do the same things Zarqawi did. ISIS cooperates with different
insurgent groups, and it sees itself as the vanguard leading all these other organizations.
What kind of cooperation did Zarqawi have with other militant groups?

Zarqawi ran a very different organization than core Al
Qaeda. He wasn’t as stringent about the hierarchy in his organization. He
started out with what we termed as a network. His nodules of contact were more
like concentric circles whereas Al Qaeda has a hierarchy. He wasn’t as
concerned with that. He ended up working with random insurgent groups just from
an opportunist perspective versus worrying about whether they were pledging
allegiance to him or really why they were fighting. His concern wasn’t the same
as what Al Qaeda does when they join allegiance with someone. He was taking
advantage of the insurgency just depending upon the territory. That was a big
distinction. That was a strength and a drawback. When you look at ISIS today it
appears that they are more military like in the way that they approach what
they’re doing. They seem to have more of a structure, more of a hierarchy. In
large part probably because these are Iraqis that were probably in the military
or the Baathist regime at one point, so that’s their background and experience.

6. Did Zarqawi get
into arguments with other insurgent groups as well?

Yes, I think I vaguely remember some. It wasn’t on the scale
of Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS. Not even remotely close. There were certainly
plenty of arguments. Look at the arguments between him and core Al Qaeda,
Zarqawi wasn’t someone who was going to give up his stance. How much
inter-jihadi violence there was I’m not really sure.

7. How about Zarqawi’s
funding. Today a lot of Iraqis talk about how ISIS is funded from donations
from the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. Where did Zarqawi’s money mostly come
from?

ISIS has a lot of its own funding. I don’t think even the
U.S. government thinks most of their funding is coming from the Gulf States. Zarqawi
began his start up in the 1990s, it was a $200,000 loan from bin Laden. He
continued to galvanize more support as time went on because he was focusing on
the Jordanian government. He was getting support from people that supported
that cause. He was really looking at the Levant at that time. Then of course
once Iraq popped up that was an opportunity for him. He ended up getting a lot
of money from different sources and donors because he was the main player. Al
Qaeda wasn’t doing anything on the same scale as Zarqawi after 9/11. So he
ended up attracting a lot more funding at that time.

8. Was he getting
most of that money from within Iraq or from foreign sources?

The majority of his network was foreign fighters. He pulled
from all sorts of areas. He pulled guys from the Maghreb, from the Levant. He
had some fighters from the Caucuses. He had a global network not unlike Al
Qaeda, so they were tapping into a lot of the same sources.

9. Zarqawi had a plan
called the Baghdad Belts. It seems like ISIS is trying to follow the same thing
today, get into Babil province, Anbar, etc. surround Baghdad and head for the
capital. Did you get any information about Zarqawi’s strategy?

We didn’t have the same open source visibility that you have
today about ISIS. It was not like that with Zarqawi. It was much more
clandestine and compartmented. The basic information that ISIS shares all over
social media was treated as classified by Zarqawi’s organization. Zarqawi
released videos that revealed some of his political messages, and military
capabilities, but not on the same scale as ISIS. Obviously we had clandestine
sources as well.Zarqawi’s battle plan
looks very similar to what ISIS is doing today.

10. Could you tell
the story of how the U.S. finally tracked down Zarqawi?

This is the ironic part of my experience, I spent five years
focusing on Zarqawi and two months before he was killed I decided to move onto
another assignment. I was just ready to go. Everyone I had known who had worked
on this topic had largely moved onto something else, so I decided to do the
same at that time too. In the end it doesn’t matter, it was a team effort from
the beginning and I was relieved after hearing the news.

SOURCES

Benjamin, Daniel and Simon, Steven, The Next Attack, New York: Times Books, 2005

Friday, June 27, 2014

Salahaddin was where the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and
militias stopped the insurgent’s surge south from Mosul. That was not before nearly
half of the province fell to militants. Salahaddin became where the government
drew the line because it contains the Askari shrine in Samarra, which is
important not only for Baghdad, but the militias and Iran. Since that time the
fight in the governorate has settled into a war of attrition, foreshadowing
what the battle against the militants will be like in the entire country.

HUMVEE captured at army base in Tikrit by Naqshibandi (via Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi)

After the Fall of Mosul the insurgents charged south for
Baghdad, but were stopped in Salahaddin. June 10, 2014 the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) collapsed
in Ninewa province, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and
other insurgent groups immediately went for the capital. They took Highway 2 south
taking Shirqat
and Baiji in northern Salahaddin, while another force went through western
Kirkuk and ended up taking
Sulaiman Bek in the western part of the province. They stopped outside
the provincial capital of Tikrit. Like in Ninewa most of the ISF fled,
sometimes without putting up a fight. The army depot in Baiji for example was abandoned leaving behind
all the weapons and supplies for the insurgents. This also led the peshmerga to
move into the Tuz Khurmato district in the west to fill the security vacuum
left by the retreating security forces. The Tuz area is also a disputed area
that the Kurdish regional government has long claimed. The next day the
militants took
Tikrit, and launched an assault
upon Samarra, which was repulsed. It was during this period that ISIS
released pictures on social media claiming that it had executed
1,700 soldiers who were captured in Tikrit. That was made for propaganda
purposes, and Human Rights Watch believes that around 160-190 men were actually
killed in two locations in the city. By June 14 the ISF had rallied a bit and
were able to clear Dhuluiya, which
is to the east of Samarra, and Ishaqi
that is to the west of Balad, while holding onto the Tikrit
air base. By that time there was a general mobilization in the country
after Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani called on the public to
support the security services. Militias also moved into Samarra to help the
army and police protect the Askari shrine there.

Smoke billowing from the Baiji refinery which the ISF has been able to hold after several ISIS attacks

Today Salahaddin represents how even if the ISF and militias
stand and fight it will be a long and bloody war ahead of them to defeat the
insurgency. Neither the militants nor the government have been able to make
much headway since June 14. Ishaqi for example was cleared that day, then again
on June 19, and then a
third time on June 25. To
the west ISIS has repeatedly clashed with the peshmerga and Turkmen units in
the Tuz
Kharmato area, but have gained no ground. Militants have also attacked Balad
air base. The real point of contention has been the Baiji
refinery, which is one of the largest producers of fuel in the country.
Despite continued assaults by tribes and ISIS and most of the guards and army
units withdrawing the ISF were able to hold onto the facility. Ishaqi shows how
even if the government is able to retake an area it lacks the capability to
hold it. This has been repeated again and again in Anbar for the last six
months where the ISF has cleared a town and then left allowing the insurgents
to move right back in, requiring another operation and another and another. In
western Salahaddin ISIS has run into the Kurdish and Turkmen forces and made
little headway, but Irbil is content with just holding onto the disputed areas
and not moving forward. That means there will be constant clashes along this
area between Sulaiman Bek and Tuz Kharmato but nothing decisive. Baiji refinery
has been held for now due to some valiant fighting by a SWAT unit, but the
Islamic State is not going to give up as the facility could provide a huge
source of fuel for Mosul and other territory it has captured in northern Iraq. Finally,
Samarra is too important for Baghdad, the militias or Iran to let it fall. That
has led to the current stalemate in the province.

Salahaddin is one area of Iraq where the Iraqi forces have
stopped running and put up a fight. They have been able to hold onto roughly
the southern half of the province with the Kurds securing the western section.
In the future some new towns may fall to the insurgents, and others could be
taken back, but the battle lines are pretty much set and the two sides are
facing a long war ahead of them. Samarra has become a rallying cry for the government,
the militias, and Iran, and the government has been able to hold onto the Baiji
refinery. Those have both blunted the militants’ fast war of maneuver. At the
same time, the ISF and militias have not proven successful at retaking and
holding any territory as has happened in Ishaqi. The larger problem is that
Baghdad has no strategy on how to turn around the security situation. That has
left it and its militia allies to simply shoot it out with the insurgents,
which will be a very long and costly endeavor.

Thursday, June 26, 2014

Back in December 2013 Prime Minister Nouri al-Malik
instigated the current fighting in Iraq by making a poor political decision in
Anbar. In the middle of December the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIS) ambushed
the leadership of the Iraqi Army’s 7th Division and killed all
the commanding officers along the Anbar-Ninewa border. The premier announced a
security operation to clear the province of insurgents, which rallied most of
the country behind it. Maliki decided to take the opportunity to arrest
Parliamentarian Ahmed Alwani from the Iraqi Islamic Party who had been one of
the more vitriolic speakers at the Anbar protests, and then shut down the
Ramadi demonstration site. Immediately afterward gunmen were seen in many of
the provinces’ cities. Fighting quickly ensued and Fallujah and much of the
surrounding area fell to militants. Since that time Baghdad has continuously
claimed that it has the situation under control and that the insurgency is
losing the fight there. The reality has been much different. Since ISIS’s surge
across much of northern Iraq in June 2014 the security situation in Anbar has
gotten worse and it appears that it could be the next province to fall.

The insurgency is pushing from Qaim and Rawa in the west and Fallujah in the east to squeeze out the government forces in between in places like Haditha, Hit, and Ramadi (Institute for the Study of War)

There has been heavy fighting in Anbar throughout June with
the insurgency holding the upper hand. Starting on June 7, 2014 20 Islamic
State of Iraq (ISIS) gunmen stormed
the Anbar University campus in Ramadi and held thousands of students
hostage. They were repelled, but not before they raided the school’s treasury
of 15 billion dinars. The insurgents then continued their campaign to cut off
the major thoroughfares in the province to limit the mobility of the security
forces (ISF). June
9 the bridge from Fallujah to neighboring Amiriya Fallujah in the south was
blown up. The
next day the bridge from Amiriya Fallujah to Baghdad was detonated. Starting
in May the ISF said that it was launching a major operation to clear
Fallujah, but it has gone nowhere. That’s because it has not been able to
secure the insurgent bases and supply lines surrounding the city and has had its
own cut by the bombings of these bridges. Things really turned for the worse
starting on June 12 when the security forces began collapsing. The ISF withdrew
from Kubaisa near Hit after a short gunfight, lost
Saqlawiya to the north of Fallujah after a determined attack, almost lost
Baghdadi, which is between Haditha and Hit, and suddenly withdrew from the
Anbar-Syrian border near the town of Qaim and the major
entrances to Fallujah with no provocation. That included fleeing the Mazra
army base and leaving most if not all of its equipment behind. That was
followed by the ISF fleeing Rawa, Ana, and Qaim on June
14. ISIS also took the border crossing
from Qaim into Syria. That secured all the major towns in western Anbar along
Highway 12 the major travel route through the province. The next day
insurgents tried to storm the Tahadi power plant that supplies electricity for
most of province, fired rockets at the Al-Asad army base the home of the 7th
Division, and started fighting in Garma to the east of Fallujah. June 16
insurgents laid siege to Habaniya air base. The ISF
responded with a security operation in southern Ramadi, retook Qaim, and sent
in reinforcements, while the deputy head of the council Faleh Issawi claimed Rawa,
Anan, Saqlawiya, Amiriya Fallujah, and Khalidiya had all been cleared. Those
victories were short lived as the militants quickly recaptured
Qaim, Rawa, Ana, Rutba,
two
small towns outside of Haditha, and the major
border crossings to Syria and Jordan. The governing council was so alarmed
by these advances that it told the press it was afraid the entire province was
about to fall, while the Iraqi command claimed that these reversals were in
fact a tactical
withdrawal so that the security forces could regroup and attack again. By
June 25, Haditha, which is the next major town on Highway 12 was nearly
surrounded, and officials were afraid Ramadi might go next. Radio Free
Iraq, which has been keeping track of the security situation in Anbar estimated
that up to 85%
of the province is now under insurgent control. It is important to note
that while the Islamic State has done plenty of fighting in Anbar there are
several other major groups involved as well, such as the Baathist Naqshibandi and its Military Councils, Jaysh al-Mujahadeen, many tribes, and others. Together they have made the
security forces chase them across Anbar, while seizing town after town.

Just as the Iraqi forces collapsed in Ninewa and parts of
Kirkuk and Salahaddin in June, it has done the same in much of Anbar. The
border crossings with Syria and Jordan are now under insurgent control, along
with much of the area around Fallujah. The militants are now attempting to
seize the remaining towns and cities between those two points such as Ramadi,
Haditha, and Hit. The security forces, allied tribes, and the militias were
already doing a bad job in holding the province before the June offensive
started. They have repeatedly gone into the same towns again and again, but
then leave allowing the insurgents to move right back in. Now they are fleeing
like they have in the rest of the country. That could lead to the fall of
Anbar, and another huge setback for the Iraqi government. The fact that it has
not come up with any clear strategy to reverse the advances of the insurgency helps
explain why these failures continue to occur.

SOURCES

BBC, “Iraq violence: Dozens killed
by Baghdad bombings,” 6/7/14

Buratha News, “Combat and
logistical reinforcements to Anbar for security forces after achieving great
victories with clans in 7 areas,” 6/17/14

- “Start the process of an
extensive security campaign in the district of Rawa, west of Ramadi cleared of
“Daash,”” 6/16/14

Al Forat, “ISF liberate Saadan
area in Anbar province,” 6/20/14

El-Hamed, “ISIS and the Anbar
Crisis,” Sada, 6/12/14

Independent Press Agency, “Army
regains control of the areas west of Ramadi,” 6/19/14

Al Jazeera, “Sunni rebels seize
more towns in Iraq,” 6/22/14

Al Mada, “Anbar Operations regain
control of Qaim after the storming of Daash,” 6/17/14

- “Anbar police declared an
emergency to send three regiments to fight Daash in the western regions of the
province,” 6/18/14

- “Armed groups re-open ports Fallujah
after the withdrawal of the army surrounding the city,” 6/12/14

- “Army forces preparing to storm
the center of Saqlawiyah to purify it from Daash,” 6/19/14

- “Expectations of the armed
seizure of Anbar due to the withdrawal of the army and the provincial council
says state control of over 80% of cities,” 6/14/14

- “The start of a major military
operation to cleanse the western regions and border crossings in Anbar,”
6/24/14

Wednesday, June 25, 2014

Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshibandi (JRTN) is the Baathist
insurgent group led by Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, Saddam Hussein’s former number
two. After the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) the Baathists are
one of the largest insurgent groups in the country. Those two organizations
have had a very rough relationship. For years the two have cooperated in
carrying out attacks in Iraq with one usually providing the money and planning,
while the other launches the operation. Now however ISIS is demanding that JRTN
units pledge allegiance to it, which has been resisted. That has led to several
clashes between the two in Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Diyala provinces. These cracks
in the insurgency have continued in the midst of their uprising against
Baghdad, and are likely to grow in the future.

The Baathist Naqshibandi have had a difficult relationship with ISIS over the last few months leading to constant clashes between the two (Wikipedia)

Starting this spring there have been continued reports of
clashes between the JRTN and ISIS. The latest lasted several days in Kirkuk province.
The fighting started in Riyad on June
20 when ISIS allegedly confiscated the weapons of a Naqshibandi unit and kidnapped
one of its leaders, and told it that it had to pledge allegiance to the Islamic
State. When the JRTN refused there was a gunfight that left 9 Naqshibandi and 8
ISIS fighters dead. An alternative
story emerged that the two might have been fighting over money that would
come from a number of fuel tankers that JRTN was using. Two days later shooting
broke out again in the same area leaving 10 dead, and the next day an IED was
set off against an ISIS convoy killing one and wounding two. These were
just the most recent incidents between the two. On June 16 for example, 12 insurgents died
in Mosul after the JRTN’s Military Council criticized the Islamic State’s code
of conduct for the city. Control
over the money seized in Mosul might have been an issue as well. Those all occurred
after the current uprising started, but the two had been arguing over the same
issues for months beforehand. On May
28 ISIS killed 8 Naqshibandi fighters in Baiji, Salahaddin because the Islamic
State told them they had to follow its lead. JRTN retaliated by setting up an
ambush for an ISIS leader and two of his aides in the Hamrin area of Diyala. Earlier
on May
2 there was a news report that the Baathists had authorized the killing of
ISIS members in Diyala after it had killed six of its leaders since January
2014. For instance, the Islamic State murdered a Naqshibandi commander and his
son in Hamrin on April 7.
A member of the Diyala provincial council claimed that the conflict
between the two cost ISIS up to 70 fighters a not insignificant number.
Publicly the Baathists have
denied that there are any problems between it and the Islamic State. That
shows the basic inequality between the insurgent organizations. ISIS is by far
the most well armed and organized militant group in Iraq. The JRTN is in effect
living in its shadow willing to cooperate with it, but not give its loyalty
since the two have diametrically opposed worldviews. ISIS wants to create an
Islamic State across the Muslim world, while the Naqshibandi want to restore
Baathist rule in Iraq. These differences will persist in the future, and likely
grow in intensity as the insurgency spreads to new areas of the country.

As ISIS takes more territory and attempts to administer it
more examples of these conflicts with not only JRTN but other insurgent groups
will emerge. ISIS and its predecessor Al Qaeda in Iraq have a long history of
trying to impose itself upon others. That’s especially true of the Islamic
State who sees itself as a vanguard in the jihadist movement, which all others
should follow. Already in Syria it has fought not only the Assad government,
but various other opponents of the regime. The Americans were able to play upon
these divisions with the insurgency with the Anbar Awakening and Sons of Iraq
that were instrumental in turning the tide during the civil war years. Now it
is nearly impossible to imagine Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki or any other
Shiite premier making a deal with Baathists or other Islamist groups to turn on
ISIS since all are seen as existential threats to the state and Shiite rule. The
results are a lost opportunity to turn the militants upon themselves, which
will mean more fighting in the long run.

Tuesday, June 24, 2014

Most of the attention on Iraq’s security situation right now
is focused upon the fighting in Salahaddin, Anbar and Ninewa, and to a lesser
extent Diyala and Kirkuk. Little has been said about the continued attacks upon
Baghdad province. The ultimate goal of the insurgency is to reach the capital
and overthrow the government. Right now the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIS) is the only group that has the capability to hit the central
governorate. It has kept up a steady dose of shootings and bombings there
showing that its networks continue to operate in Baghdad despite its commitments
to other parts of the country.

Despite heavy fighting across central Iraq the Islamic State
has been able to maintain its operating in Baghdad province. On June 6 ISIS and
other insurgent groups launched its assault upon Mosul. After the fall of that
city the militants charged across half of Salahaddin and western Kirkuk. Since
then it has made more advances in Anbar and across western Ninewa, along with
continued fighting in Diyala and northern Babil. None of that has stopped
ISIS’s operations in Baghdad. The average number of attacks per day has not
changed from the beginning of the year to June, and casualties are some of the
highest seen so far this year. From June 1-21 there were an average of 7.5
attacks per day reported in the press, which compared to February’s 7.2,
March’s 7.5, April’s 7.1, and May’s 7.8. The average number of dead was at 15.2
so far in June, which is the third highest of the year only behind May’s 15.9
and January’s 17.9. Likewise there have been 36.7 wounded per day in the first
three weeks of June with only January’s 38.2 being higher. This has been caused
by a steady stream of shootings, 2.3 per day, and bombings, 4.8 per day.
Surprisingly these casualties have not ben the result of car bombs. There have
been the same average number of those types of attacks at 0.8 in April, 0.9 in
May, and 0.8 in June, but they have not been launched in the consistent waves
as seen in previous periods. From June 1-23 vehicle born IEDs (VBIEDs) have
been spread out with June 7 the only exception when there were 6 across Baghdad
resulting in 23 killed and 91 injured. Otherwise there has only been one or two
about every other day during the month. In previous months there were one to
two days off and then a couple days of 1-3 car bombs followed by a huge number
on one or two days before ramping down and repeating the pattern. The series of
VBIEDs is the only change in violence in Baghdad governorate since fighting
started in other parts of Iraq.

Insurgents also continue to infiltrate into the capital
city. On June 16
for example Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) said that it had killed 56 ISIS
members and wounded another 21 as they were trying to infiltrate from Anbar in
the west, Babil in the south, and from the north as well. June 21
the Operations Command reported 10 dead militants who were trying to sneak into
the capital or plant improvised explosive devices. Then on June 23
the BOC told the press that another 12 insurgents lost their lives in various
outskirts of the capital province. ISIS’s charge from the north has been
blunted in central Salahaddin, but the Islamic State has been building up its
networks in the Baghdad Belts that surround the capital for months now. It is
currently trying to move more people into the capital from Anbar in the west,
Diyala in the east, and Babil in the south. Obviously the supply lines into and
throughout Baghdad continue to operate with no slackening due to the current
offensive as the security incident statistics show.

Baghdad and overthrowing the government is the goal of all
of Iraq’s insurgent groups. So far only the Islamic State of Iraq has been able
to carry out attacks in that province. It has an extensive network of safe
houses and supply lines going throughout the governorate and extending into the
surrounding areas that pass fighters, ammunition and explosives into the center
to carry out operations. These have shown no let up since June 4 when Mosul was
attacked. That means ISIS has maintained its manpower in the Baghdad Belts and
not diverted them to other areas to carry out fighting there. The only thing
that has seemingly decreased is the constant wave of car bombs, but the overall
number of them has remained steady. The sad fact is that violence in Baghdad
could actually get worse as the militants want to restart street fighting there
just as it did before to threaten the authorities. When that will happen is not
known but events have metastasized much quicker than anyone thought so gun
battles in the capital could be a reality sooner rather than later.

SOURCES

Buratha News, "Martyrdom and wounding 42 people, the
preliminary outcome of a suicide bombing in Bab al-Sheikh district in central
Baghdad," 6/15/14

- "Martyrdom and wounding seven people blown up in a car bomb
in Shaab district in northeastern Baghdad," 6/5/14

IRAQ HISTORY TIMELINE

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com