Ten years after the Rwandan genocide
and despite years of soul-searching, the response of the international
community to the events in Sudan has been nothing short of shameful. The
initial reason for deferring consideration of the war in Darfur was that
serious peace talks had started in mid-2002 to end the twenty-year war between
the Sudanese government and the rebel Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army
(SPLM/A), a mostly-southern Sudanese force. The parties were making progress
but the war in western Sudan, which only started in 2003, was not on the agenda
at these Naivasha, Kenya talks.

The diplomatic community feared that too much attention to
Darfur would distract from the attention and energy the parties and the Troika (U.S., U.K., and Norway) were bringing to the
successful conclusion of these talks, still pending. As various Troika-suggested
deadlines were missed by the parties, Darfur began to overshadow Naivasha as
the scope of the human rights and humanitarian crisis began to shake
public opinion.

Sudanese President Omar El Bashir prematurely declared
victory over the rebels in Darfur and promised full humanitarian access to the
international relief community on February 9, 2004146. The
victory was prematurely claimed, and access was not forthcoming.

The government of Sudan almost completely banned humanitarian agencies from Darfur for four crucial months, from late
October 2003 through late-February 2004. The governments continued violence and
forced displacement of civilians had and continues to have enormous
humanitarian consequences.147
More than a million people are estimated to be displaced from their homes, the
vast majority still within Darfur.

Access only began to improve in March after months of NGO
and U.N. lobbying, but the government continued to impede humanitarian access,
imposing bureaucratic procedures on visas and layers of travel authorizations
for aid workers. The U.N. humanitarian mission to Darfur
warned on May 1 that the crisis in Darfur, western Sudan, will worsen
dramatically unless security there is immediately improvement and humanitarian
agencies have better access to those in need.

Under pressure, another round of peace
negotiations between the rebels and the Sudanese government was held in
Ndjamena, Chad, under the auspices of Chadian President Idriss Deby, in
late March; a previous ceasefire in August 2003 was long dead.148

The Sudanese government rejected
internationalizing the Darfur conflict and tried to obstruct E.U. and U.S.
participation in the talks, perhaps because it has greater ability to influence
the fledgling A.U. and its ally, Chadian President Idriss Deby, whom it helped
come to power in 1990his military coup was launched from Darfur. Despite
Sudanese government foot-dragging, the talks were attended by representatives
of the European Union and the United States who offered to support the process
and a ceasefire with personnel, logistics, funding, and other support.149

It nevertheless took strong statements
by both the U.N. Secretary-General and the U.S. president, on April 7 and 8
respectively, to pressure the government to take any action. The Sudanese
government and the two rebel groups hastily signed a minimal humanitarian
ceasefire agreement on April 8, also committing themselves to further political
negotiations to resolve the war.

The ceasefire came into effect on
April 11, 2004, but was followed almost immediately by allegations of
violations, mainly continuing Janjaweed attacks on civilians. This was
unsurprising given the governments lack of commitment to disarm and disband
the groups. The ceasefire agreement referred to the governments responsibility
to neutralize the militias, but did not define this term. Many observers are
concerned that the government may simply incorporate the militias into the
police and regular armed forces, an alarming possibility given the gravity of
their crimes.

Additional flaws in the April 8
ceasefire agreement included the lack of a clear timetable and structure for
international monitoring and the lack of any mechanism to monitor ongoing
human rights abuses which continue to affect thousands of Darfurians. The
ceasefire also lacked measures to reverse ethnic cleansing, such as an
agreement that the Sudanese government would immediately withdraw the Janjaweed
militia from
those parts of Darfur it seized from 2003 to the present.

By late April, political talks in
Ndjamena had begun amid reports that the Sudanese government was attempting to
split the rebel coalition along ethnic lines. The ceasefire monitors had not
yet deployed. Reports of ceasefire violations and the consistent lack of
protection for civilians continued to grow.

United Nations officials have played a
key role in raising the awareness of international governments and media to the
gravity and scale of the abuses in Darfur, but the U.N.s political bodies such
as the Security Council and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights have failed to
respond adequately to the crisis, thus far.

Several leading U.N. human rights
officials and experts made strong statements of concern about Darfur in January
and February 2004.150
On March 19, 2004, the then United Nations Resident Representative for Sudan,
Mukesh Kapila, speaking to reporters in Nairobi, made the strongest statement
thus far, describing the situation in Darfur as ethnic cleansing. 151 He said
some Arab groups, backed by the government, were conducting a campaign
affecting one million persons that was comparable in character with the Rwandan
genocide of 1994.

On April 2, U.N.
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief
Coordinator Jan Egeland briefed the Security Council on the humanitarian
situation in Darfur which he described as one of ethnic cleansing152
and expressed his hope that the Council would remain seized of the matter and
would consider taking further action if the situation did not improve. 153
Despite these strong remarks, the Security Council President issued a
pre-approved, tepid statement to the press in which he expressed concern at the
humanitarian crisis in Darfur but refrained from acknowledging that the human
rights situation is the cause of the humanitarian crisis.154

U.N. concern about the situation in
Darfur was strongly expressed yet again on April 7, when U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan spoke before the Commission on U.N. Human Rights on the tenth anniversary
of the Rwandan genocide, referred to Egelands ethnic cleansing remarks, and
cautioned that the international community would have to take action if full
access was not given to human rights and humanitarian workers.155 He noted that reports of the large-scale human
rights abuses in Darfur:

leave me with a deep sense of foreboding. Whatever terms
it uses to describe the situation, the international community cannot stand
idle.

At the invitation of the Sudanese government, I propose
to send a high-level team to Darfur to gain a fuller understanding of the
extent and nature of this crisis, and to seek improved access to those in need
of assistance and protection. It is vital that international humanitarian
workers and human rights experts be given full access to the region, and to the
victims, without further delay. If that is denied, the international community
must be prepared to take swift and appropriate action.

By action in such situations I mean a continuum of
steps, which may include military action.156

The mission referred to in Annans
remarks was due to leave in mid-April, led by Under-Secretary Jan Egeland, but
was delayed by the Sudanese government, which refused visas to several of its
members, including Egeland. The mission finally left in late April, under the
leadership of WFP Executive Director James Morris and was due to be completed
in early May.157

Despite the strong words of Secretary-General Kofi Annan at
the Commission for Human Rights and an earlier statement, on March 26, 2004, by
eight human rights experts of the Commission who took the unusual step of issuing
a joint statement of concern at the scale of reported human rights abuses and at the
humanitarian crisis unfolding in Darfur, Sudan . . . ., the final
deliberations of the Commission were disappointing for those who had been
hoping that the worlds premier human rights entity would set a strong moral
tone on this issue. 158

In early April, the U.N. Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) sent a team of human rights experts
to investigate the Darfur abuses.159 This was to be a separate mission from
the humanitarian assessment mission being conducted in April under the
direction of Jan Egeland.

From April 5-15 the OHCHR team conducted research among the
Sudanese refugees in Chad, then more than 100,000 people. Its efforts to
investigate abuses from inside Sudan were initially rejected by the Sudanese
government, which refused to issue visas to the delegation. However, the
Sudanese government, a member of the Commission, suddenly had a change of heart
and reversed its refusal of visas for the OHCHR team the day the report was to
be released in the opinion of most, to prevent the report from being
distributed at the Commission.

The report, never officially released, strongly condemned
the Sudanese governments abuses in Darfur, which it said might constitute
crimes against humanity and war crimes. The government, it asserted, was
conducting a reign of terror directed at the African Fur, Masalit, and
Zaghawa.160

On April 20 the OHCHR fact-finding mission left Geneva for Darfur.161 The strong OHCHR
reign of terror report was quickly leaked and was instantly news.162 Some members of the
Commission expressed outrage over the leak, and the governments of Pakistan, Sudan, and others demanded an investigation of the leaks.163

The Commission vote on Sudan was postponed until the last
day of the yearly Commission session, April 23. At the last minute the E.U.,
which had co-sponsored a strong resolution condemning the abuses and
re-establishing the mandate for a special rapporteur for human rights, backed
down. E.U. members reportedly feared insufficient support from key African and
Arab members of the U.N. body, who had bowed to Sudanese pressure. Instead, a
weaker decision eventually passed. This decision included the appointment of
an independent expert on human rights but failed to condemn the crimes against
humanity and war crimes or other violations of international humanitarian law
committed by the Sudanese government. Only one member voted against this
watered-down statementthe United Statesand two members abstained, Australia and Ukraine.

The U.S. asked for a special session of the Commission to
consider the situation in Darfur following the return of the OHCHR from Sudan in early May. In a speech to the Commission, U.S. Ambassador Richard Williamson
warned:

ten years from now, the 60th Commission on Human Rights
will be remembered for one thing and one thing alone: Did we have the courage
and strength to take strong action against the ethnic cleansing in Darfur. We will be asked, Where were you at the time of the ethnic cleansing? What did
you do?164

The worlds preeminent human rights body failed to perform
the role for which it was created, limiting itself to expressions of deep
concernrather than condemnationover the situation in Sudan. It appointed an independent expert to assess Sudans human rights performance rather than the
stronger special rapporteur.165

European reaction to the situation in Darfur has been mixed.
The European Union on February 25 expressed its serious concern and said it
was alarmed at reports that Janjaweed militias continue to systematically
target villages and centres for IDPs in their attacks. The EU strongly condemns
the attacks and calls upon the Government of Sudan to put an end to Janjaweed
atrocities.166 The
European Parliament also issued strong statements and resolutions on the Darfur crisis. Some individual European countries lobbied strongly behind the scenes for
improvements in Sudans human rights performance and the E.U. response to it.

Despite some strong public statements
from the European Union, however, there has been little public condemnation
from key individual European governments such as the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, and France, all of which have embassies in Khartoum, relations
with the government of Sudan, and longstanding interests in the IGAD peace
talks taking place in Naivasha, Kenya to end the war in southern Sudan. Indeed,
despite growing awareness of the scale of the abuses in Darfur, European
governments until April appeared loath to apply serious pressure on the
Sudanese government, at the risk of allowing Darfur to undermine two years of
Naivasha talks.

Europeans also have preferred to let the African Union take
the lead on ceasefire monitoring, choosing instead to offer personnel, funding
and logistical support to an A.U.-led mission. But a German minister urged that
U.N. troops be used to monitor the ceasefire, instead of the A.U. troops
contemplated.167

The E.U.'s rapid response mechanisms do not seem to have
worked in political, diplomatic, or practical terms to alert the E.U. to take
prompt and effective measures on Darfur. The U.N. had been warning of the
humanitarian emergency since late 2003. The E.U., and other donors, did not
react to the Sudanese government's denial of humanitarian access or early
reports of abuses. Instead the human rights abuses
generating the displacement continued, unmentioned by European governments
until one million Darfurians had already been forced out and a
humanitarian catastrophe was inevitable.

Individual African member states have made little or no
public condemnation of the government of Sudans abuses. African members of the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, acting as a group, helped to undermine the
resolution proposed at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in April to appoint a special rapporteur and to condemn the Sudanese
governments abuses in Darfur.

The African Union has played an observer role at the
ceasefire and political talks in Ndjamena, Chad, and was delegated the task of
setting up the ceasefire commission in Darfur pursuant to
the April 8 ceasefire agreement.

In a communiqué issued at an April session, the A.U. Peace
and Security Council expressed its concern over the grave humanitarian
situation in Darfur and called on the government of Sudan to bring to justice those responsible for violations of human
rights, but has since concentrated on deployment of the ceasefire monitors.

The African Union appealed for U.S. $ 10 million for the
ceasefire observer mission and humanitarian assistance to Darfur.168The A.U.s proposal
for the establishment of a ceasefire commission is lacking in several respects,
namely in specifying the number of monitors. It also proposes that 100-200
troops participate as protectors for the ceasefire observers, should they be
required,169
and suggests Ethiopian and Chadian troops. Neither country can be considered as
neutral with regard to Sudan.

As of the writing of this report, one
month (thirty days) after the signing of the month-and-a-half (forty-five days)
ceasefire agreement, no monitors are on the ground although a reconnaissance
mission may be undertaken shortly.

The U.S. government has taken the strongest public stance on
Darfur of any individual government, with repeated statements condemning the
human rights abuses and calling on the government of Sudan to address the
situation. On April 7, U.S. President George Bush condemned atrocities in Sudan and called for unrestricted humanitarian access.170

The U.S. House of Representatives held hearings on Darfur,
or in which Darfur was prominently mentioned.171 U.S. aid officials have frequently drawn attention to the enormous humanitarian needs in the region,
with repeated visits to Darfur and statements. U.S. AIDs chief executive
Andrew Natsios held a press conference to denounce the Sudanese governments
stalling on visas for twenty-eight U.S. emergency relief workers.172

The fact that the U.S. and European policy-makers have not been unified in their approach to Darfur, however,
permitted the government of Sudan to play various governments against each
other to its own advantage, with the Europeans implicitly criticizing the U.S. for being too aggressive and perhaps threatening the Naivasha talks. As momentum
gathered, however, the U.S. pushed for having Darfur before the Security
Council while both the E.U. and U.S. have deferred on the ceasefire
commission to the A.U.

The vast majority of civilians at risk have been stripped of
their assets, land, security, and freedom of movement. Confined in camps and
settlements for the displaced and unable to access their land or even the wild
foods, markets, and labor migration that could normally sustain them in times
of crisis, they are entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance. To date, the humanitarian assistance available to civilians in Darfur remains far from adequate. Only a few international humanitarian agencies are active
in Darfur, and they say the needs far outstrip the capacity of the existing
humanitarian operations.

In many areas of Darfur, malnutrition
is on the increase and health conditions are rapidly worsening. In some
locations, peoples food stocks were exhausted in early April.173 There is a potential
humanitarian catastrophe looming, with some observers estimating that at least
100,000 individuals could die from disease, malnutrition and other conditions
if assistance is not dramatically increased.174

[146]
Statement by His Excellency Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir, President of the Republic of Sudan, Khartoum, February 9, 2004.

[148]
See
"Resumption of ceasefire unlikely, say Darfur rebels," IRIN, Nairobi, Dec. 3, 2003 http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=38203&SelectRegion=East_Africa&SelectCountry=SUDAN
("This ceasefire is a waste of time," said the SLA. "There is no
ceasefire.").

[149]
Amb. Michael
Ranneberger, special advisor on Sudan, U.S. Department of State, on "Death
and Displacement in the Sudan," NPR radio broadcast, Washington,
D.C., April 30, 2004, http://www.moretothepoint.com (accessed May 3, 2004).

[150]
Acting Rights
Chief Concerned Over Deteriorating Situation In Darfur Region Of Sudan,
Geneva, January 29, 2004 and Gerhart R. Baum, Press release, Cologne, Germany,
February 2, 2004. Baum was head of the German delegation to the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights from 1992-1998 and its Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Sudan from 2000-2003.

[151] BBC
Online, Mass rape atrocity in west Sudan, March 19, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3549325.stm (accessed April 30, 2004, as were all the
websites in this section).

[169] African
Union, Proposals for the establishment of the ceasefire commission, undated.
The proposal specifies that disengagement of forces take place within two
weeks of the signing of the ceasefire agreement and that a reconnaissance
mission occur within thirty daysvery late considering the urgency of the
situation.