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This report is the first edition of a yearly publication that examines the development and challenges of nuclear power projects in the Middle East. Nuclear power has become a reality in the region. The six nuclear power aspirants in the Middle East (Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates) are at different levels of commitment and progress towards establishing their civilian nuclear power programs (see Exhibit 1). The content of this report is largely based on interviews conducted by the authors with various stakeholders including government officials, industry insiders and experts. It provides detailed and up-to-date accounts on the status of the ongoing six nuclear power programs in the region.

In this inaugural report, the focus is on the bidding processes, the financing and stakeholder agreements, and the technology and fuel providers. As for fuel cycle activities, this report provides, when available, the status of activities for uranium exploration, mining, milling, conversion, fuel fabrication, reprocessing, and waste storage plans.

In the early 1970s, Israel was on the cusp of launching an ambitious nuclear power programme. It had technical nuclear experience and a pressing need to limit its dependency on imported oil and coal, and interest in nuclear powered water desalination. This nuclear vision enjoyed the support of the Nixon administration, which proposed in June 1974 to export reactors to both Israel and Egypt. But by the end of the decade, under the Carter administration, the plan was all but gone. What was the original US and Israeli rationale behind the reactor deal? How did this initiative relate to other developments such as the Indian nuclear explosion, the Arab oil embargo and the peace talks with Egypt? How important was the Carter administration’s policy shift in determining the outcome of the initiative? This paper will address these questions by analysing newly declassified documents from several US and Israeli archives.

Overview

Recent events in the UK and Syria have forced the international community to re-examine how the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons can be upheld in modern conflict situations and how both state and non-state actors can be made accountable for any violations.

Dr. Beyza Unal from the MENACS network chaired an event on May 25th, 2018, that looked at the lessons learned in the aftermath of the chemical attacks in Salisbury and Douma. In light of the changing nature of warfare and the prevalence of non-state actors in modern conflicts, panelists discussed how the international prohibition against chemical weapons can be effectively upheld, and if there are new ways to re-energize the global norm against the use of chemical weapons.

This event draws on an ongoing research collaboration between the International Security Department at Chatham House and Government of the Netherlands aimed at supporting compliance with and implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This page originally appeared on the Chatham House website.

Or Rabinowitz, MENACS member and lecturer in international relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, deciphers Israeli PM Netanyahu’s ‘Iran Nuclear Archives’ presentation in The Washington Post, providing a deep-dive analysis into what the presentation reveals about Iran’s nuclear program, as well as about Israel’s Middle East policy.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is no amateur when it comes to appearing on live television. In a televised speech Monday, Netanyahu made bold accusations about Iran’s nuclear record. The speech came ahead of President Trump’s expected announcement about whether the U.S. will continue to participate in the Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, on May 12.

Not one to shy away from props, Netanyahu dramatically pulled a curtain to reveal bookshelves containing dozens of files and CDs, copies of original Iranian documents secretly removed from Tehran by Israeli agents in recent weeks. The documents, Netanyahu said, represented Iran’s “nuclear archive” — information on Iran’s 1999-2003 nuclear weapons program. Incoming Secretary of State Mike Pompeo vouched for their authenticity.

Iranian possession of this “nuclear archive” is not a clear JCPOA violation. However, a precedent supports the argument that retaining these documents violates Iran’s obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Did the presentation reveal anything new?

As commentator Joshua Pollack noted, some of the documents contained details hitherto unknown outside the intelligence community. Most notable was the planned Iranian nuclear arsenal’s size: It would have included five nuclear devices with a yield of 10 kilotons each.

But the captured documents refer only to Iranian activities that were finished by 2003 — about which the international community already knew. While Netanyahu implied that nuclear weapons development had continued, he presented no evidence to that effect.

Western reaction was split. The White House welcomed Netanyahu’s presentation as containing “new and compelling details.” European powers maintained that they had learned nothing new.

1. Did Netanyahu prove that Iran was in violation of the JCPOA?

No. Netanyahu accused Iran of lying in 2015 “when it didn’t come clean to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] as required by the nuclear deal.” However, this by itself does not violate the JCPOA. The agreement, signed in July 2015, did require Iran to cooperate with the IAEA in investigating its nuclear past. The deal did not require Iran to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

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