It is apparent from this simultaneous consideration by the FirstCongress of the appointment and compensation of chaplains, on the one hand, and the framing of the EstablishmentClause, on the other, that the Members of the FirstCongress did not consider their own legislative chaplaincy to run afoul of the EstablishmentClause.

It is apparent from this simultaneous consideration by the FirstCongress of the appointment and compensation of chaplains, on the one hand, and the framing of the EstablishmentClause, on the other, that the Members of the FirstCongress neither perceived nor intended any friction between legislative chaplaincies and the FirstAmendment.

In the first session of Congress after the ratification of the FirstAmendment (the Second Session of the Second Congress), the House and Senate continued their practice of electing chaplains.

The current framework for determining whether a statute violates the EstablishmentClause of the Constitution was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v.

In holding that the provision did not violate the EstablishmentClause, the Court explained that [f]or a law to have forbidden "effects" under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence.

In Larkin, the statute held to be violative of the EstablishmentClause authorized churches to prevent the government from issuing liquor licenses to any establishment within a 500-foot radius of the church.

In applying the FirstAmendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, it would be incongruous to interpret that Clause as imposing more stringent FirstAmendment limits on the states than the draftsmen imposed on the Federal Government.

First, it is significant that the Court's historical argument does not rely on the legislative history of the EstablishmentClause itself.

The first 10 Amendmentswere not enacted because the Members of the FirstCongress came up with a bright idea one morning; rather, their enactment was forced upon Congress by a number of the States as a condition for their ratification of the original Constitution.

For the first 150 years of our nation’s history, there were very few occasions for the courts to interpret the establishmentclause because the FirstAmendment had not yet been applied to the states.

Board of Education that the establishmentclause is one of the “liberties” protected by the due-processclause.

Although the Court’s interpretation of the establishmentclause is in flux, it is likely that for the foreseeable future a majority of the justices will continue to view government neutrality toward religion as the guiding principle.

The EstablishmentClause of the FirstAmendment plainly prohibits the establishment of a national religion by Congress or the preference of one religion over another.

It was not, however, until the middle and later years of the twentieth century that the Supreme Court began to interpret the establishment and free exercise clauses in such a manner as to reduce substantially the promotion of religion by state governments.

It was only a violation of the establishmentclause to erect a religious monument on government property; Moore was free to maintain that monument on private land.

The FirstAmendment was adopted to curtail Congress' power to interfere with the individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience, and the Fourteenth Amendment imposed the same substantive limitations on the States' power to legislate.

As is plain from its text, the FirstAmendment was adopted to curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.

First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v.

First was the premise that the establishmentclause spelled out in the FirstAmendment as a limitation on what Congress could do was made applicable to the state legislatures by the Fourteenth Amendment — even though the Fourteenth Amendment never mentions religion.

The second premise was that Jefferson was the ultimate authority on the original intent of the FirstAmendment’sestablishmentclause.

Rehnquist in that dissent pointed out that not only was Jefferson not the ultimate authority on the original intent of the establishmentclause, he was not a party to any of the deliberations that went into formulation of the wording of the FirstAmendment.

Two clauses of the FirstAmendment concern the relationship of government to religion: the EstablishmentClause and the Free Exercise Clause.

At an absolute minimum, the EstablishmentClause was intended to prohibit the federal government from declaring and financially supporting a national religion, such as existed in many other countries at the time of the nation's founding.

In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State.''' 43 But the majority sustained the provision of transportation.

66 First, the loan of instructional material and equipment directly to qualifying nonpublic elementary and secondary schools was voided as an impermissible extension of assistance of religion.

First, it had been argued that the tuition reimbursement program promoted the free exercise of religion in that it permitted low-income parents desiring to send their children to school in accordance with their religious views to do so.

Prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1868, the Supreme Court generally took the position that the substantive protections of the Bill of Rights did not apply to actions by state governments.

The "establishment of religion" clause of the FirstAmendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the federal government can set up a church.

Kmiec thinks this reading of the FirstAmendment is wrong, and so do I. But he goes on to demonstrate that his understanding (or misunderstanding) of the meaning of the FirstAmendment is fundamentally the same as that which led the court to its current position.

First is the massive fact that the FirstAmendment was meant to place restrictions on the actions of Congress only, not states, counties or cities.

The EstablishmentClause was meant to do one thing: prevent the establishment of an official religion, so that sectarian differences could be taken out of the political realm, thus securing the possibility of a free government that operates by majority rule, while protecting minority rights.

This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

The article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress.

Established a loyalty oath for legislators and government employees, requiring them to believe in the Trinity, and/or the divine inspiration of the Bible.

The first phrase in the FirstAmendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion..." is called the establishmentclause.

They feel that the Amendment should be interpreted literally to mean that the government may not raise any one denomination or religion to the status of an official or established religion of the country.

Rather than examining the case under the usual EstablishmentClause framework, the Court looked to the history of the use of prayer before legislative sessions, in both the state and federal systems, and relied on this history when finding these prayers to be constitutional.

First, the court found that a literal reading of the “no public money or property” clause would cause the government to discriminate against religious groups.

Based on this reasoning, the court held that there was not an EstablishmentClause violation when a legislative body chose not to appoint a certain person to give its prayers.

Here, the Court established the Endorsement test which analyzes whether a direct government action that endorses religion or a particular religious practice that makes adherence to religion relevant to a person's standing in the political community is invalid because it sends a message to those who do not adhere that they are outsiders.

The court held that student prayers read at high school assemblies violated the EstablishmentClause where the principal with concurrence of superintendent granted permission for student council to recite prayers and bible verses of their choosing during school hours.

This statute was later influential in constructing the EstablishmentClause in the FirstAmendment.

In assessing the constitutionality of government actions under the establishmentclause of the firstamendment, "the statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally the statute must not foster 'an excessive government Entanglement with religion.'"

The third prong is based on the idea that the Court, in keeping with the history and tradition of the establishmentclause, wants to avoid government surveillance of religion and political division along religious lines.

The establishmentclause of the firstamendment does not forbid the Catalina Foothills School District from providing a sign-language interpreter for a deaf student at a Roman Catholic High School.

A table of important EstablishmentClause cases dealing with religion and education: 1899 to 1970.

This was the first time the Court would allow indirect aid to religious schools based on the "child benefit" theory.

The Court acknowledged that the FirstAmendment was intended to erect a wall of separation between church and state; however, the Court found that the plan to reimburse parents for bus transportation came under the child benefit theory.

members.tripod.com /~candst/table1.htm (1363 words)

Senator Schumer Misrepresents First Amendment(Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-13)

In an attempted refutation of Thomas’ reported position Schumer referred to the “establishmentclause” of the FirstAmendment, and exclaimed “it says ‘separation of church and state’”.

The Everson Court concocted a perverted construction of the establishmentclause, and introduced the now prevalent myth of separation by means of quoting Thomas Jefferson out of context in order to invert the meaning of his phrase "a wall of separation between Church and State".

The purpose of the FirstAmendment was to prohibit the federal government from establishing a single, national denomination, as was the situation in England.

First, schools may not forbid students acting on their own from expressing their personal religious views or beliefs solely because they are of a religious nature.

First, school districts should use these guidelines to revise or develop their own district wide policy regarding religious expression.

The Equal Access Act is designed to ensure that, consistent with the FirstAmendment, student religious activities are accorded the same access to public school facilities as are student secular activities.

The Court held that the Act was constitutional generally, but that the 20 year restriction of use of the facility to secular activities alone did foster excessive entanglement and was struck from the plan.

The plan included the loan of textbooks; appropriations of money to schools for state standardized testing, diagnostic health services on school grounds and therapy and counseling to be held at public schools; loan of instructional equipment to parents of parochial school children; and funding of field trips.

The Court held "the pre-eminent purpose for posting the 10 Commandments on school room walls is plainly religious in nature." The plan was held to violate the EstablishmentClause.

members.tripod.com /~candst/table2.htm (1853 words)

Leonard Levy on origins of the First Amendment Establishment Clause(Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-13)

The Senate three times defeated versions of the amendment embodying that narrow interpretation, on a fourth vote adopted such a version, and finally abandoned it in the face of uncompromising hostility by the House.

At bottom the amendment expressed the fact that the Framers of the Constitution had not empowered Congress to act in the field of religion.

The great object of the Bill of Rights, as Madison explicitly said when introducing his draft of amendments to the House, was to limit and qualify the powers of Government for the purpose of making certain that the powers granted could not be exercised in forbidden fields, such as religion.

The EstablishmentClause of the FirstAmendment prohibits the government from endorsing any particular religious belief.

Our public schools must be true to the FirstAmendment's mandate against religious divisiveness and remain free from the influence of religious dogma in order for students of all faiths to attend school without fear of coercion.

But proponents of teaching religious explanations for creation in public schools share a distinctly religious view of the world's origin and believe that the public schools should present that view even to the exclusion of science.

Inside the First Amendment(Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-13)

The Court's "play in the joints" means, for example, that the free-exercise clause doesn't require the military to allow members of the armed forces to wear religious head coverings such as yarmulkes (as the Supreme Court ruled in 1986 in Goldman v.

But the establishmentclause doesn't prevent Congress from passing legislation that permits military personnel to wear religious headgear while in uniform (as Congress did in 1987).

Although the difference between permissible accommodation and establishment of religion is sometimes murky in Court decisions, the justices have drawn some general lines.