PART I.

86. There is, in Dr. Tillotson's
writings, an argument against the real presence, which is as concise, and
elegant, and strong as any argument can possibly be supposed against a
doctrine, so little worthy of a serious refutation. It is acknowledged on all
hands, says that learned prelate, that the authority, either of the scripture
or of tradition, is founded merely in the testimony of the apostles, who were
eye-witnesses to those miracles of our Savior, by which he proved his divine
mission. Our evidence, then, for the truth of the Christian religion is less
than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because, even in the first
authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it must
diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one rest such
confidence in their testimony, as in the immediate object of his senses. But
a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and therefore, were the
doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture, it were
directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it. It
contradicts sense, though both the scripture and tradition, on which it is
supposed to be built, carry not such evidence with them as sense; when they
are considered merely as external evidences, and are not brought home to
every one's breast, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit.

Nothing
is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which must at least
silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and free us from their impertinent
solicitations. I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like
nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting
check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be
useful as long as the world endures. For so long, I presume, will the
accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred and
profane.

87.
Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact;
it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in
some cases is apt to lead us into errors. One, who in our climate, should
expect better weather in any week of June than in one of December, would
reason justly, and conformably to experience; but it is certain, that he may
happen, in the event, to find himself mistaken. However, we may observe,
that, in such a case, he would have no cause to complain of experience;
because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that
contrariety of events, which we may learn from a diligent observation. All
effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes. Some
events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been constantly
conjoined together: Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes
to disappoint our expectations; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter
of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest
certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence.

A wise
man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions
as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the
last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of
the future existence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds with more
caution: He weighs the opposite experiments: He considers which side is
supported by the greater number of experiments: to that side he inclines,
with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgment, the
evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability,
then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one
side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence,
proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one
side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event;
though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory,
reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must
balance the opposite experiments, where they are opposite, and deduct the
smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the
superior evidence.

88. To
apply these principles to a particular instance; we may observe that there is
no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human
life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports
of eye-witnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning, perhaps, one may
deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute
about a word. It will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any
argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation
of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to
the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any
discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we can
draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their
constant and regular conjunction; it is evident that we ought not to make an
exception to this maxim in favor of human testimony, whose connexion with any
event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other. Were not the memory
tenacious to a certain degree; had not men commonly an inclination to truth
and a principle of probity; were they not sensible to shame, when detected in
a falsehood: Were not these, I say, discovered by experience to be qualities,
inherent in human nature, we should never repose the least confidence in
human testimony. A man delirious, or noted for falsehood and villainy, has no
manner of authority with us.

And as
the evidence, derived from witnesses and human testimony, is founded on past
experience, so it varies with the experience, and is regarded either as a proof
or a probability, according as the conjunction between any particular kind of
report and any kind of object has been found to be constant or variable.
There are a number of circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgments
of this kind; and the ultimate standard, by which we determine all disputes,
that may arise concerning them, is always derived from experience and
observation. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side, it is
attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgments, and with the same
opposition and mutual destruction of argument as in every other kind of
evidence. We frequently hesitate concerning the reports of others. We balance
the opposite circumstances, which cause any doubt or uncertainty; and when we
discover a superiority on any side, we incline to it; but still with a
diminution of assurance, in proportion to the force of its antagonist.

89. This
contrariety of evidence, in the present case, may be derived from several
different causes; from the opposition of contrary testimony; from the
character or number of the witnesses; from the manner of their delivering
their testimony; or from the union of all these circumstances. We entertain a
suspicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witnesses contradict each
other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful character; when they have an
interest in what they affirm; when they deliver their testimony with
hesitation, or on the contrary, with too violent asseverations. There are
many other particulars of the same kind, which may diminish or destroy the
force of any argument, derived from human testimony.

Suppose,
for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavours to establish,
partakes of the extraordinary and the marvelous; in that case, the evidence,
resulting from the testimony, admits of a diminution, greater or less, in
proportion as the fact is more or less unusual. The reason why we place any
credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any connexion, which
we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are
accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is
such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of
two opposite experiences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its
force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force, which
remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain
degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case,
another degree of assurance against the fact, which they endeavor to
establish; from which contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoise,
and mutual destruction of belief and authority.

I should
not believe such a story were it told me by Cato, was a proverbial saying in Rome, even during the
lifetime of that philosophical patriot.[i]
The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, might invalidate so great an
authority.

The
Indian prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning the
effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very strong
testimony to engage his assent to facts, that arose from a state of nature,
with which he was unacquainted, and which bore so little analogy to those
events, of which he had had constant and uniform experience. Though they were
not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it.[ii]

90. But
in order to increase the probability against the testimony of witnesses, let
us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm, instead of being only marvelous,
is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the testimony considered apart
and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case, there is proof
against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a
diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist.

A
miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable
experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the
very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can
possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men must die;
that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes
wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found
agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these
laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a
miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle
that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a
kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently
observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life;
because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must,
therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise
the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience
amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of
the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be
destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which
is superior.[iii]

91. The
plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention),
"That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the
testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous,
than the fact, which it endeavours to establish; and even in that case there
is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an
assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting
the inferior." When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to
life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that
this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he
relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the
other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my
decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his
testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then,
and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.

PART II.

92. In the foregoing reasoning we
have supposed that the testimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may
possibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falsehood of that testimony
would be a real prodigy: But it is easy to show that we have been a great
deal too liberal in our concession, and that there never was a miraculous
event established on so full an evidence.

For
first, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a
sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense, education, and
learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of such
undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to
deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to
have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood;
and at the same time, attesting facts performed in such a public manner and
in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable:
All which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the
testimony of men.

93.
Secondly. We may observe in human nature a principle which, if strictly
examined, will be found to diminish extremely the assurance, which we might,
from human testimony, have, in any kind of prodigy. The maxim, by which we
commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, is, that the objects, of which
we have no experience, resemble those, of which we have; that what we have
found to be most usual is always most probable; and that where there is an
opposition of arguments, we ought to give the preference to such as are
founded on the greatest number of past observations. But though, in
proceeding by this rule, we readily reject any fact which is unusual and
incredible in an ordinary degree; yet in advancing farther, the mind observes
not always the same rule; but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and
miraculous, it rather the more readily admits of such a fact, upon account of
that very circumstance, which ought to destroy all its authority. The passion
of surprise and wonder, arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion,
gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events, from which it
is derived. And this goes so far, that even those who cannot enjoy this
pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous events, of which they are
informed, yet love to partake of the satisfaction at second-hand or by
rebound, and place a pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others.

With
what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travelers received, their
descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations of wonderful
adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But if the spirit of religion
join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense; and human
testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority. A
religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality: he
may know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it, with the best
intentions in the world, for the sake of promoting so holy a cause: or even
where this delusion has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation,
operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other
circumstances; and self-interest with equal force. His auditors may not have,
and commonly have not, sufficient judgment to canvass his evidence: what judgment
they have, they renounce by principle, in these sublime and mysterious
subjects: or if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion and a heated
imagination disturb the regularity of its operations. Their credulity
increases his impudence: and his impudence overpowers their credulity.

Eloquence,
when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason or reflection; but
addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the affections, captivates the
willing hearers, and subdues their understanding. Happily, this pitch it
seldom attains. But what a Tully or a Demosthenes could scarcely effect over
a Roman or Athenian audience, every Capuchin, every itinerant or stationary
teacher can perform over the generality of mankind, and in a higher degree,
by touching such gross and vulgar passions.

The many
instances of forged miracles, and prophecies, and supernatural events, which,
in all ages, have either been detected by contrary evidence, or which detect
themselves by their absurdity, prove sufficiently the strong propensity of
mankind to the extraordinary and the marvelous, and ought reasonably to beget
a suspicion against all relations of this kind. This is our natural way of
thinking, even with regard to the most common and most credible events. For
instance: There is no kind of report which rises so easily, and spreads so
quickly, especially in country places and provincial towns, as those
concerning marriages; insomuch that two young persons of equal condition
never see each other twice, but the whole neighborhood immediately join them
together. The pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting, of
propagating it, and of being the first reporters of it, spreads the
intelligence. And this is so well known, that no man of sense gives attention
to these reports, till he find them confirmed by some greater evidence. Do
not the same passions, and others still stronger, incline the generality of
mankind to believe and report, with the greatest vehemence and assurance, all
religious miracles?

94.
Thirdly. It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and
miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant
and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given admission to
any of them, that people will be found to have received them from ignorant
and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with that inviolable sanction
and authority, which always attend received opinions. When we peruse the
first histories of all nations, we are apt to imagine ourselves transported
into some new world; where the whole frame of nature is disjointed, and every
element performs its operations in a different manner, from what it does at
present. Battles, revolutions, pestilence, famine and death, are never the
effect of those natural causes, which we experience. Prodigies, omens,
oracles, judgments, quite obscure the few natural events, that are
intermingled with them. But as the former grow thinner every page, in
proportion as we advance nearer the enlightened ages, we soon learn, that
there is nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case, but that all
proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind towards the marvelous, and
that, though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and
learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature.

It is
strange, a judicious reader is apt to say, upon the perusal of these
wonderful historians, that such prodigious events never happen in our days.
But it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in all ages. You must
surely have seen instances enough of that frailty. You have yourself heard
many such marvelous relations started, which, being treated with scorn by all
the wise and judicious, have at last been abandoned even by the vulgar. Be
assured, that those renowned lies, which have spread and flourished to such a
monstrous height, arose from like beginnings; but being sown in a more proper
soil, shot up at last into prodigies almost equal to those which they relate.

It was a
wise policy in that false prophet, Alexander, who though now forgotten, was
once so famous, to lay the first scene of his impostures in Paphlagonia,
where, as Lucian tells us, the people were extremely ignorant and stupid, and
ready to swallow even the grossest delusion. People at a distance, who are
weak enough to think the matter at all worth enquiry, have no opportunity of
receiving better information. The stories come magnified to them by a hundred
circumstances. Fools are industrious in propagating the imposture; while the
wise and learned are contented, in general, to deride its absurdity, without
informing themselves of the particular facts, by which it may be distinctly
refuted. And thus the impostor above mentioned was enabled to proceed, from his
ignorant Paphlagonians, to the enlisting of votaries, even among the Grecian
philosophers, and men of the most eminent rank and distinction in Rome: nay,
could engage the attention of that sage emperor Marcus Aurelius; so far as to
make him trust the success of a military expedition to his delusive
prophecies.

The
advantages are so great, of starting an imposture among an ignorant people,
that, even though the delusion should be too gross to impose on the
generality of them (which, though seldom, is sometimes the case) it has a
much better chance for succeeding in remote countries, than if the first
scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and knowledge. The most
ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry the report abroad. None of
their countrymen have a large correspondence, or sufficient credit and
authority to contradict and beat down the delusion. Men's inclination to the marvelous
has full opportunity to display itself. And thus a story, which is
universally exploded in the place where it was first started, shall pass for
certain at a thousand miles distance. But had Alexander fixed his residence
at Athens, the philosophers of that renowned mart of learning had immediately
spread, throughout the whole Roman empire, their sense of the matter; which,
being supported by so great authority, and displayed by all the force of
reason and eloquence, had entirely opened the eyes of mankind. It is true;
Lucian, passing by chance through Paphlagonia, had an opportunity of
performing this good office. But, though much to be wished, it does not
always happen, that every Alexander meets with a Lucian, ready to expose and
detect his impostures.

95. I
may add as a fourth reason, which diminishes the authority of prodigies, that
there is no testimony for any, even those which have not been expressly
detected, that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses; so that not
only the miracle destroys the credit of testimony, but the testimony destroys
itself. To make this the better understood, let us consider, that, in matters
of religion, whatever is different is contrary; and that it is impossible the
religions of ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Siam,
and of China
should, all of them, be established on any solid foundation. Every miracle,
therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions (and all
of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish the
particular system to which it is attributed; so has it the same force, though
more indirectly, to overthrow every other system. In destroying a rival
system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles, on which that
system was established; so that all the prodigies of different religions are
to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of these prodigies,
whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other. According to this method
of reasoning, when we believe any miracle of Mahomet or his successors, we
have for our warrant the testimony of a few barbarous Arabians: And on the
other hand, we are to regard the authority of Titus Livius, Plutarch,
Tacitus, and, in short, of all the authors and witnesses, Grecian, Chinese,
and Roman Catholic, who have related any miracle in their particular
religion; I say, we are to regard their testimony in the same light as if
they had mentioned that Mahometan miracle, and had in express terms
contradicted it, with the same certainty as they have for the miracle they
relate. This argument may appear over subtle and refined; but is not in
reality different from the reasoning of a judge, who supposes that the credit
of two witnesses, maintaining a crime against any one, is destroyed by the
testimony of two others, who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues
distant, at the same instant when the crime is said to have been committed.

96. One
of the best attested miracles in all profane history, is that which Tacitus
reports of Vespasian, who cured a blind man in Alexandria, by means of his
spittle, and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot; in obedience to a
vision of the god Serapis, who had enjoined them to have recourse to the
Emperor, for these miraculous cures. The story may be seen in that fine
historian;[iv]
where every circumstance seems to add weight to the testimony, and might be
displayed at large with all the force of argument and eloquence, if any one
were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous
superstition. The gravity, solidity, age, and probity of so great an emperor,
who, through the whole course of his life, conversed in a familiar manner with
his friends and courtiers, and never affected those extraordinary airs of
divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius. The historian, a contemporary
writer, noted for candor and veracity, and withal, the greatest and most
penetrating genius, perhaps, of all antiquity; and so free from any tendency
to credulity, that he even lies under the contrary imputation, of atheism and
profaneness: The persons, from whose authority he related the miracle, of
established character for judgment and veracity, as we may well presume;
eye-witnesses of the fact, and confirming their testimony, after the Flavian
family was despoiled of the empire, and could no longer give any reward, as
the price of a lie. Utrumque, qui
interfuere, nunc quoque memorant, postquam nullum mendacio pretium. To
which if we add the public nature of the facts, as related, it will appear,
that no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so gross and so palpable a
falsehood.

There is
also a memorable story related by Cardinal de Retz, which may well deserve
our consideration. When that intriguing politician fled into Spain, to avoid the persecution of his
enemies, he passed through Saragossa, the capital
of Aragon,
where he was shown, in the cathedral, a man, who had served seven years as a
doorkeeper, and was well known to every body in town, that had ever paid his
devotions at that church. He had been seen, for so long a time, wanting a
leg; but recovered that limb by the rubbing of holy oil upon the stump; and
the cardinal assures us that he saw him with two legs. This miracle was
vouched by all the canons of the church; and the whole company in town were
appealed to for a confirmation of the fact; whom the cardinal found, by their
zealous devotion, to be thorough believers of the miracle. Here the relater
was also contemporary to the supposed prodigy, of an incredulous and
libertine character, as well as of great genius; the miracle of so singular a
nature as could scarcely admit of a counterfeit, and the witnesses very
numerous, and all of them, in a manner, spectators of the fact, to which they
gave their testimony. And what adds mightily to the force of the evidence,
and may double our surprise on this occasion, is, that the cardinal himself,
who relates the story, seems not to give any credit to it, and consequently
cannot be suspected of any concurrence in the holy fraud. He considered
justly, that it was not requisite, in order to reject a fact of this nature,
to be able accurately to disprove the testimony, and to trace its falsehood,
through all the circumstances of knavery and credulity which produced it. He
knew, that, as this was commonly altogether impossible at any small distance
of time and place; so was it extremely difficult, even where one was
immediately present, by reason of the bigotry, ignorance, cunning, and
roguery of a great part of mankind. He therefore concluded, like a just
reasoner, that such an evidence carried falsehood upon the very face of it,
and that a miracle, supported by any human testimony, was more properly a
subject of derision than of argument.

There
surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one person, than
those, which were lately said to have been wrought in France upon the tomb of Abbe
Paris, the famous Jansenist, with whose sanctity the people were so long
deluded. The curing of the sick, giving hearing to the deaf, and sight to the
blind, were every where talked of as the usual effects of that holy sepulcher.
But what is more extraordinary; many of the miracles were immediately proved
upon the spot, before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses
of credit and distinction, in a learned age, and on the most eminent theatre
that is now in the world. Nor is this all: a relation of them was published
and dispersed every where; nor were the Jesuits, though a learned body,
supported by the civil magistrate, and determined enemies to those opinions,
in whose favor the miracles were said to have been wrought, ever able
distinctly to refute or detect them. Where shall we find such a number of
circumstances, agreeing to the corroboration of one fact? And what have we to
oppose to such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or
miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? And this surely, in the
eyes of all reasonable people, will alone be regarded as a sufficient
refutation.

97. Is
the consequence just, because some human testimony has the utmost force and
authority in some cases, when it relates the battle of Philippi or Pharsalia
for instance; that therefore all kinds of testimony must, in all cases, have
equal force and authority? Suppose that the Caesarean and Pompeian factions
had, each of them, claimed the victory in these battles, and that the
historians of each party had uniformly ascribed the advantage to their own
side; how could mankind, at this distance, have been able to determine
between them? The contrariety is equally strong between the miracles related
by Herodotus or Plutarch, and those delivered by Mariana, Bede, or any
monkish historian.

The wise
lend a very academic faith to every report which favors the passion of the
reporter; whether it magnifies his country, his family, or himself, or in any
other way strikes in with his natural inclinations and propensities. But what
greater temptation than to appear a missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from
heaven? Who would not encounter many dangers and difficulties, in order to
attain so sublime a character? Or if, by the help of vanity and a heated
imagination, a man has first made a convert of himself, and entered seriously
into the delusion I who ever scruples to make use of pious frauds, in support
of so holy and meritorious a cause?

The
smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest flame; because the materials
are always prepared for it. The avidum
genus auricularum,[v]
the gazing populace, receive greedily, without examination, whatever sooths
superstition, and promotes wonder.

How many
stories of this nature have in all ages, been detected and exploded in their
infancy? How many more have been celebrated for a time, and have afterwards
sunk into neglect and oblivion? Where such reports, therefore, fly about, the
solution of the phenomenon is obvious; and we in conformity to regular
experience and observation, when we account for it by the known and natural
principles of credulity and delusion. And shall we, rather than have a
recourse to so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of the
most established laws of nature?

I need
not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in any private or even
public history, at the place, where it is said to happen; much more when the
scene is removed to ever so small a distance. Even a court of judicature,
with all the authority, accuracy, and judgment, which they can employ, find
themselves often at a loss to distinguish between truth and falsehood in the
most recent actions. But the matter never comes to any issue, if trusted to
the common method of altercations and debate and flying rumors; especially
when men's passions have taken part on either side.

In the
infancy of new religions, the wise and learned commonly esteem the matter too
inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard. And when afterwards they
would willingly detect the cheat, in order to undeceive the deluded
multitude, the season is now past, and the records and witnesses, which might
clear up the matter, have perished beyond recovery.

No means
of detection remain, but those which must be drawn from the very testimony
itself of the reporters: and these, though always sufficient with the
judicious and knowing, are commonly too fine to fall under the comprehension
of the vulgar.

98. Upon
the whole, then, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of miracle has
ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof; and that, even
supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by another proof,
derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavor to
establish. It is experience only, which gives authority to human testimony;
and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws of nature. When,
therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do
but substract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one
side or the other, with that assurance which arises from the remainder. But
according to the principle here explained, this substraction, with regard to
all popular religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we
may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as
to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of
religion.

99. I
beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can
never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I
own, that otherwise, there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the
usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human
testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to find any such in all the
records of history. Thus, suppose all authors, in all languages, agree, that,
from the first of January 1600, there was a total darkness over the whole
earth for eight days: suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event
is still strong and lively among the people: that all travelers, who return
from foreign countries, bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the
least variation or contradiction: it is evident, that our present philosophers,
instead of doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain, and ought to
search for the causes whence it might be derived. The decay, corruption, and
dissolution of nature, is an event rendered probable by so many analogies,
that any phenomenon, which seems to have a tendency towards that catastrophe,
comes within the reach of human testimony, if that testimony be very
extensive and uniform.

But
suppose, that all the historians who treat of England, should agree, that, on
the first of January 1600, Queen Elizabeth died; that both before and after
her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole court, as is usual
with persons of her rank; that her successor was acknowledged and proclaimed
by the parliament; and that, after being interred a month, she again
appeared, resumed the throne, and governed England for three years: I must
confess that I should be surprised at the concurrence of so many odd
circumstances, but should not have the least inclination to believe so
miraculous an event. I should not doubt of her pretended death, and of those
other public circumstances that followed it: I should only assert it to have
been pretended, and that it neither was, nor possibly could be real. You
would in vain object to me the difficulty, and almost impossibility of
deceiving the world in an affair of such consequence; the wisdom and solid judgment
of that renowned queen; with the little or no advantage which she could reap
from so poor an artifice: All this might astonish me; but I would still reply,
that the knavery and folly of men are such common phenomena, that I should
rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence,
than admit of so signal a violation of the laws of nature.

But
should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion; men, in all
ages, have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind, that
this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and sufficient, with
all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it
without farther examination. Though the Being to whom the miracle is
ascribed, be, in this case, Almighty, it does not, upon that account, become
a whit more probable; since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or
actions of such a Being, otherwise than from the experience which we have of
his productions, in the usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past
observation, and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of
truth in the testimony of men, with those of the violation of the laws of
nature by miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely and
probable. As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony
concerning religious miracles, than in that concerning any other matter of
fact; this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and
make us form a general resolution, never to lend any attention to it, with
whatever specious pretence it may be covered.

Lord
Bacon seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning. "We
ought," says he, "to make a collection or particular history of all
monsters and prodigious births or productions, and in a word of everything
new, rare, and extraordinary in nature. But this must be done with the most
severe scrutiny, lest we depart from truth. Above all, every relation must be
considered as suspicious, which depends in any degree upon religion, as the
prodigies of Livy: And no less so, everything that is to be found in the
writers of natural magic or alchemy, or such authors, who seem, all of them,
to have an unconquerable appetite for falsehood and fable."[vi]

100. I
am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered, as I think
it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the
Christian Religion, who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of
human reason. Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason; and
it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is, by no
means, fitted to endure. To make this more evident, let us examine those
miracles, related in scripture; and not to lose ourselves in too wide a
field, let us confine ourselves to such as we find in the Pentateuch, which
we shall examine, according to the principles of these pretended Christians,
not as the word or testimony of God himself, but as the production of a mere
human writer and historian. Here then we are first to consider a book,
presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age when they
were still more barbarous, and in all probability long after the facts which
it relates, corroborated by no concurring testimony, and resembling those
fabulous accounts, which every nation gives of its origin. Upon reading this
book, we find it full of prodigies and miracles. It gives an account of a
state of the world and of human nature entirely different from the present:
Of our fall from that state: Of the age of man, extended to near a thousand
years: Of the destruction of the world by a deluge: Of the arbitrary choice
of one people, as the favorites of heaven; and that people the countrymen of
the author: Of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most
astonishing imaginable: I desire anyone to lay his hand upon his heart, and
after a serious consideration declare, whether he thinks that the falsehood
of such a book, supported by such a testimony, would be more extraordinary
and miraculous than all the miracles it relates; which is, however, necessary
to make it be received, according to the measures of probability above
established.

101.
What we have said of miracles may be applied, without any variation, to
prophecies; and indeed, all prophecies are real miracles, and as such only,
can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not exceed the
capacity of human nature to foretell future events, it would be absurd to
employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine mission or authority from
heaven. So that, upon the whole, we may conclude, that the Christian Religion
not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be
believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to
convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it,
is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the
principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe
what is most contrary to custom and experience.

[ii] No Indian, it is evident, could have
experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature
in a situation quite unknown to him; and it is impossible for him to tell a
priori what will result from it. It is making a new experiment, the consequence
of which is always uncertain. One may sometimes conjecture from analogy what
will follow; but still this is but conjecture. And it must be confessed, that,
in the present case of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of
analogy, and is such as a rational Indian would not look for. The operations of
cold upon water are not gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but whenever
it comes to the freezing point, the water passes in a moment, from the utmost
liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event, therefore, may be denominated
extraordinary, and requires a pretty strong testimony to render it credible to
people in a war climate: But still it is not miraculous, nor contrary to
uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all the circumstances
are the same. The inhabitants of Sumatra have always seen water fluid in their
own climate, and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But
they never saw water in Muscovy during the
winter; and therefore they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be
the consequence.

[iii] Sometimes an event may not, in
itself, seem to be contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it
might, by reason of some circumstances, be denominated a miracle; because, in
fact, it is contrary to these laws. Thus if a person, claiming a divine
authority, should command a sick person to be well, a healthful man to fall
down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in short, should order
many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command; these might
justly be esteemed miracles, because they are really, in this case, contrary to
the laws of nature. For if any suspicion remain, that the event and command
concurred by accident, there is no miracle and no transgression of the laws of
nature. If this suspicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a
transgression of these laws; because nothing can be more contrary to nature
than that the voice or command of a man should have such an influence. A
miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a
particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible
agent. A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature
and essence. The raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle.
The raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force
requisite for that purpose, is as real a miracle, though not so sensible with
regard to us.