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The view from Berlin: Jamaica unlikely to trigger fundamental policy changes. The total additional fiscal impulse provided by a Jamaica coalition could in our view amount to between EUR 15 bn and EUR 20 bn in 2018. This would be only marginally more than the EUR 15 bn tax cuts "promised" by the outgoing Minister of Finance, which we had already taken into account in our 1.8% GDP forecast for 2018. Proposals in the FDP's election platform to scale back the ESM and to install an orderly EMU exit procedure have raised concerns among some EU politicians. We doubt that these two proposals will make it into the coalition treaty. Despite the FDP's insistence on more market- and rule-based procedure within EMU, it is very unlikely that Germany would not provide the necessary support if another EMU country slipped into acute crisis. (Also included in this issue: Public finances after the election, World trade) [more]

If you think of Germany in the night (and you are an economist) three questions will jolt you from your sleep. Will external demand recover? Will the auto industry overcome its WLTP-induced supply shock and (if you are a Keynesian economist) will the government launch a fiscal package? The answers, of course, are not independent of each other. (Included in this issue: German exports 2019, world trade, the automotive industry's performance, public finances and the view from Berlin) [more]

Although the negative effects from the WLTP roll-out are currently petering out in German auto statistics, the recent weakness of global demand argues against a swift recovery of auto production in Germany. In 2019, passenger car sales look set to shrink slightly or at best stagnate in some key markets (US, EMU, UK), whilst rising only moderately in others (China). A rebound is unlikely to materialise before H2 2019, when output is also expected to turn positive in year-over-year terms. Going by the production index, annualised automotive output in Germany ought to be more or less flat in 2019, in our view. [more]

The house price cycle in Germany should remain in place in 2019. But we expect much more divergence across regions and a heavily increasing complexity of causal impact channels. Led by immigration and the continuous labour market uptrend, house prices and rents will likely continue to rise. The risk of overvaluations and a full-blown price bubble in the German housing market is rising. However, the price uptrend is likely to continue for years to come, in Germany as a whole and in most major cities. In this report we look at the housing markets in Munich, Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Düsseldorf, Stuttgart and Leipzig and we comment on the German office market. [more]

Saving money is near and dear to Germans. Remarkably, Germans increase their saving rate in the second half of retirement. Those aged 75 and older save for a potential emergency situation and in order to bequeath and thereby improve their heirs’ living conditions. High intergenerational transfers might affect wealth distribution in a society in the long run. In 2018, banks in Germany benefited from record volumes of new retail loans (EUR 48.9 bn) and net flows into household deposits (EUR 108.7 bn). Mortgages accounted for the lion’s share of new loans. Consumer lending was above average in 2018, but lost momentum in the last quarter. [more]

The recession in German industry can be traced to the massive slowdown of global trade in 2018. Will the German service sector withstand the recession in industry, as some recent survey data seems to suggest? We doubt it. In previous downswings in the manufacturing sector services were pulled lower, too. Indeed, the two sectors' output trends during 2018 did already follow this pattern. (Also in this issue: Economic Minister Altmaier's National Industrial Strategy 2030, the German Federal Budget, lower total and rental inflation thanks to new basket, corporate lending in Germany, the view from Berlin) [more]

Despite broad-based weakness in recent months, the stock of orders in German manufacturing remained on the uptrend, partly led by the lack of skilled labour and one-off factors in the auto industry (WLTP, diesel). Whilst the high volume of unfilled orders should stabilise industrial production in the current year, the peak ought to be near, as suggested by recent results of the ifo business survey. On balance, manufacturing production in Germany looks set to be virtually flat in 2019. [more]

Robo-advice is a new breed in asset management. Robos’ assets under management have been growing quickly in Germany. However, the market is increasingly becoming concentrated and competitive. Robo portfolios have shown relatively robust performance recently. Yet the high costs of robo-advice in Germany are a drag on returns and may alienate potential customers. Current clients, meanwhile, are mostly middle-age, higher-income men rather than millennials. [more]

Given much weaker than expected January business surveys and in particular the slump in their more forward-looking components we are now expecting the German economy to contract again in Q1 2019. Due to the yet unknown Q4 GDP outcome and its contradictory signals we currently refrain from formally revising our 1% GDP forecast lower again, but are expecting to shave off several tenths of a percentage point come February 22nd, unless the Statistical Offices Q4 GDP breakdown – and the new monthly data available by then – provide us with substantial positive surprises. While a technical recession might be avoided by a hair’s breadth with a positive Q4 number, the development of several key cyclical indicators is telling us that the German economy is drifting towards recession right now. [more]

During the current cyclical upswing, which started in 2010, German manufacturing companies have increased their real gross capital expenditure by just above 3% p.a. In 2017, the industry accounted for 51% of total other capital spending (intellectual property) in Germany. This shows that manufacturing is the most important driver of research and development and thus of technical progress. The automotive and the pharmaceutical industries stand out from other sectors. The capital stock in energy-intensive industries has been shrinking for years now – a trend that gives cause for concern. While the German manufacturing industry is faced with long-term challenges, we believe that it is nevertheless sufficiently adaptable to remain competitive on a global scale. [more]

Dropping for the third consecutive year in 2018, nominal German exports to the UK were down by over 7% compared with 2015, the year preceding the Brexit referendum. The depreciation of the pound sterling and economic uncertainty in the UK were the key drivers behind the downturn. On the sectoral level, the pharmaceutical industry suffered the sharpest declines. In this sector, German exports to the UK look set to have nose-dived by more than 40% between 2015 and 2018, whereas auto exports to the UK plunged by over 20% in the same period. [more]

Berlin found it difficult to adapt to the market economy after Germany’s re-unification. Both parts of the divided city, the eastern and the western, had to cope with fundamental changes – the eastern for obvious reasons, the western because it had benefited from generous subsidies until then. Berlin has therefore been lagging behind the rest of western Germany for decades. By now, however, it is not only catching up with western German metropolitan areas, but even beginning to overtake them. Employment growth in cutting-edge industries suggests that Berlin is truly becoming an innovation hub. And this development serves as an excellent basis for the residential market. While we mainly focus on developments in 2018 in this article, the house price trends are likely to remain in place for some time to come. [more]

Germans are known as heavy cash users. In 2017, they paid cash for most of their purchase transactions. If they do not use cash, they prefer to pay by direct debit or card. Credit transfers and e-money payments are used less often. Germans initiated almost one fifth of cashless payments via the internet. Mobile payments were rarely used but this will likely change given a number of new mobile payment services came on the market in 2018. In Q3, German households took out an impressive EUR 16 bn in net new loans, the highest quarterly figure since the introduction of the euro. Of this, EUR 13 bn came from mortgages, while consumer lending lost some pace. Deposit inflows were buoyant for a Q3 and German households increased their savings rate to 10.7%. [more]