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About Me

I am a Ph.D. student at Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion. I study the History of Biblical Interpretation, which includes Jewish and Christian interpretations of the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament. My interests are religion, politics, TV, movies, and reading.

Saturday, March 19, 2016

Philo on Difficult Torah Passages about Rape and Slavery

When I was in college, I would discuss religion with an atheist
friend. He would criticize the Bible, while I would try to defend it. I
still look at the Bible as a source of wisdom, but I have to admit: I
still do not have good answers to my atheist friend's questions!
Speaking for myself personally, I no longer spend much time trying to
defend the Bible. I am still open to reading what apologists have to
say, though. I have Paul Copan's Is God a Moral Monster? on my Amazon Kindle.

In
this post, I will examine how the first century Jewish exegete Philo of
Alexandria, in Special Laws III, addressed two difficult passages in
the Torah. One concerns the rape of a betrothed woman, and the other
concerns slavery.

A. The law about the rape of a betrothed woman is in Deuteronomy 22:23-27:

23 If a damsel that is a virgin be betrothed unto an husband, and a man find her in the city, and lie with her;
24 Then ye shall bring them both out unto the gate of that city, and ye
shall stone them with stones that they die; the damsel, because she
cried not, being in the city; and the man, because he hath humbled his
neighbour's wife: so thou shalt put away evil from among you. 25 But
if a man find a betrothed damsel in the field, and the man force her,
and lie with her: then the man only that lay with her shall die: 26
But unto the damsel thou shalt do nothing; there is in the damsel no sin
worthy of death: for as when a man riseth against his neighbour, and
slayeth him, even so is this matter: 27 For he found her in the field, and the betrothed damsel cried, and there was none to save her. (KJV)

In
this law, there is a betrothed woman: she is engaged to be married. A
man who is not her will-be husband sleeps with her. If this occurs in
the city, then both the woman and the man are to be stoned. In the
city, the woman could have cried out for help, and there would be people
around to help her because cities have lots of people. The fact that
she did not cry out for help indicates that the sexual act was
consensual, not rape. It is adultery, and thus punishable by death. If
this act occurs in the field, by contrast, then only the man is to be
stoned. The woman may have cried out for help in the field, but there
was no one around to rescue her.

My atheist
friend had an objection to this passage. "What if that woman in the
city is mute?", he asked. "Should she be stoned for not calling out for
help, when she was unable to call out for help?"

Philo
has a similar question. In Special Laws III:72-78, he summarizes the
law in Deuteronomy 22:23-27 and explains why the location of the act is
significant: a woman can cry out for help and be rescued in the city,
whereas she cannot receive help in the country, even if she does cry
out. Philo then goes on to stress, however, that a judge should not
limit his consideration of the case to the location of the act but
should consider other factors as well. What these other factors are,
Philo does not specify (at least not here). He may have in mind such
questions as whether the man and the woman had a relationship in the
past.

Philo recognizes that the location of the act is not a
fully reliable indicator as to whether the act was consensual or rape.
The act could have been in the field and still been consensual. And it
could have occurred in the city and still been a rape. As Philo says,
suppose the man is stronger than the betrothed woman, and he ties her up
or gags her so that she cannot cry out. Even if this took place in the
city, or in a house where there are other people, the woman is
practically in a wilderness: she is in the same situation as a woman
raped in a field, unable to cry out.

Philo, of course, supports
the laws of the Torah and believes that they reveal God's will. But he
has practical questions about the law in Deuteronomy 22:23-27. Overall,
he affirms the law, while qualifying it. He thinks that Deuteronomy
22:23-27 mentions a relevant factor (namely, the location of the act),
but that other factors should be considered as well.

B. Exodus 21:20-21 states regarding a master smiting his slave:

20 And if a man smite his servant, or his maid, with a rod, and he die under his hand; he shall be surely punished. 21 Notwithstanding, if he continue a day or two, he shall not be punished: for he is his money. (KJV)

This passage was prominent in the 2013 movie Twelve Years a Slave.
The brutal master Edwin Epps reads this passage to a gathering of his
slaves to show them that God approves of their servitude. In an
especially disturbing scene, Epps is viciously lashing a female slave,
and another slave, Solomon, warns Epps that God will judge him for
this. Epps casually asks why God would judge him: the slave is Epps'
property!

In Special Laws III:139-143,
Philo addresses Exodus 21:20-21. Philo himself has no problem with
slavery: he has said that it is a useful institution. At the same time,
Philo also believes that a slave and a slave's master are equal,
according to their nature, not their fortune or condition.
Consequently, Philo is against masters being cruel or insolent with
their slaves. Not only does this violate natural equality, but it also
demonstrates that the master's soul is unhealthy: a person who mistreats
and is harsh to those under his power is in a wrong place, and who
knows what he will do if he gains more power?

Philo
believes that Exodus 21:20-21 limits a master's dominion over his
slave. For Philo, the law says that, if a master intentionally murders
his slave, then the master is to be punished by the tribunal. Exodus
21:20 does not specify what this punishment is, but Philo says that it
is the death penalty: a master who kills his slave deliberately is to be
put to death.

If a slave does something worthy of death, Philo
says, the master should take that slave to the judges and prove that the
slave committed the offense. The master should not take the law into
his own hands by killing the slave.

Philo
says that, even if the master who fatally smites his slave protests that
he was merely trying to correct the slave, not kill him, justice will
still catch up with the slavemaster.

Suppose that the slave
lives for a day or two after the beating and then dies? Philo, in
accordance with Exodus 21:21, gives the master the benefit of a doubt.
For Philo, if the slave lives on for a few days, that shows that the
master was not trying to kill the slave when beating him. The master
may have even tried to keep the slave alive as long as he could after
the beating. Philo states that a master would be hurting himself were
he to kill a slave: the master paid good money for that slave, and now
he is deprived of that slave's service. Philo doubts that a master
would deliberately do this.

Philo is rather
contradictory: he realizes there are cruel masters who would love to
demonstrate their power over the life and death of their slaves, yet he
doubts that masters would deliberately kill their slaves.

One
can ask if the law in Exodus 21:20-21, or Philo's interpretation of it,
is free of problems. When Epps was lashing the female slave in Twelve Years a Slave,
she'd probably live after the beating. Does that mean God is okay with
what Epps did? Philo would probably say no, since Philo would see Epps
as a person who is spiritually and morally sick, explaining why Epps is
brutal. Like Solomon in the movie, Philo may even have believed that
people like Epps would be judged for their brutality. But Philo seems
to be constrained by a law in the Torah that says something different:
if a man beats his slave and the slave survives for a few days, the
master is not to be punished. The law in Exodus 21:20-21 provides
fodder for Philo's humanitarian impulses, for the law presumes that a
master lacks absolute authority over a slave's life; but the law
arguably leaves the door open for abuse.