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This doesn't sound right to me. In every 'real world' contradiction, the two
terms exclude each other and yet exist together. Male excludes female, female
excludes male; yet male and female obviously do exist (and act!) together.
Parent and child are mutually exclusive, in the sense that whoever is the parent
is not the child, whoever is the child is not the parent; yet the parent is the
parent of that child, the child is the child of that parent, etc. Master vs
servant, capital vs labor ... you get the drift.

So
perhaps in the real world all contradictions are 'dialectical' in this sense. If
Rosa objects to Marxists inflating this simple idea with fancy words, she may
have a point. But the idea itself seems correct.

And yet,
to state the obvious, males and females aren't contradictions! Nor do they turn
into one another (as the dialectical classics tell us they should -- dozens of
quotations to that effect can be found
here).

But, in
what sense do they 'exclude' one another? Does the existence of a male exclude
the existence of a female? Clearly not. So, either Marx was wrong, or we still
do not understand what a 'dialectical contradiction' is.

More-or-less the same can be said of the other examples Paula gives. [And I have heard
them all a thousand times. Is there nothing new in the 'dialectical' universe?]
Does parent A turn into his/her child B, and vice versa? Does
master C turn into servant D, and vice versa? Does capitalist E turn into
worker F, and vice versa?

2. Ian
Wright had this to say:

Your [i.e., Paula's -- RL] examples are relational properties, but I (perhaps
incorrectly) think the best way to understand "dialectical contradiction" is in
the sense of a "real contradiction" as described by Marx:

"The exchange of commodities cannot, as one has seen, take place without
fulfilling contradictory conditions, which exclude one other. Its development
which makes commodities appear as something with two aspects, use value and
ex-change value, does not make these contradictions disappear, but creates the
form in which they can move themselves. This is in any case the only method for
resolving real contradictions. It is, for example, a contradiction that a body
fall constantly toward another, and also constantly fly away from it. The
ellipse is one of the forms of movement by which this contradiction realizes
itself and resolves itself at the same time." Marx, Capital Vol 1.

We
have one force that makes bodies fall toward each other (stability). And we have
another force that makes them fly away (instability). So the attractor states of
each independent force are mutually exclusive. But both forces act to determine
the trajectory of the body, and the "dialectical contradiction" is resolved by
the appearance of new emergent and dynamic behavior, e.g. an orbit.

I
think this is also the way to understand the "law of value" in the economy. It
is a "force" that, if it operated in isolation, would push trajectories toward
an equilibrium point of prices proportional to labor-values. But it's not the
only "force" that acts in this complex system. So the actual trajectory does not
fully converge to this equilibrium, but is a complex outcome of the
interactions.

We
need the method of abstraction to consider the forces in isolation in order to
eventually fully explain the empirical trajectory or sequence of events. So it
is necessary to make assumptions that directly contradict empirical reality in
order to understand empirical reality (c.f. Newton's first law of motion that
states that, if undisturbed, a body will move with constant velocity forever: a
statement that is clearly in conflict with everyday experience). In Roy
Bhaskar's terminology this is creating an "experimental closure" that isolates
the action of a single mechanism.

I have
dealt with most of these points in Essay Eight
Part Two and Essay Three Parts
One and
Two.

However,
the quotation from Marx is no use at all in helping us understand what a
'dialectical contradiction' is. Marx, like so many others, simply helps himself
to this word without once explaining clearly what he means, nor does he
critically evaluate the
sub-Aristotelian 'logic' Hegel used to
derive his
own 'contradictions' (which, therefore, turn out
not to be contradictions, after
all, and so cannot be inverted to 'stand on their feet').

And
forces cannot be contradictions either.

Here is a
summary
of the argument I have used in Essay Eight
Part Two to show this:

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

In this Part of Essay Eight it is argued at length that
there is no way that "contradictions" can be interpreted as "opposing forces",
nor vice versa.

In fact, since most of the motion in the universe is governed by the action of
only one central force (i.e., in classical Physics, the force of gravity
which governs the motion of planets around stars, and stars around galactic
centres of mass, etc.), classical DM can't account for most of the bulk changes
that take place in nature. Now, even if this phenomenon is regarded as the result of the complex inter-relation
between gravitational fields, change in motion would still be caused by
only one force: the resultant. No contradiction has just one term.

Of course, if
General Relativity
is correct
(where gravity has been replaced by the motion of bodies along
geodesics and
world-lines, forces having been edited out of the picture) most of the bulk
motion in the universe would take place under the action of no forces at all.
This is underlined by Nobel Laureate,
Professor Wilczek (of MIT), who makes a more general point about forces
in modern Physics:

"The paradox deepens when we consider force from
the perspective of modern physics. In fact, the concept of force is
conspicuously absent from our most advanced formulations of the basic laws. It
doesn't appear inSchrödinger's equation, or in any reasonable formulation ofquantum field theory, or in the foundations ofgeneral relativity. Astute
observers commented on this trend to eliminate force even before the emergence
of relativity and quantum mechanics.

"'In all methods and systems which involve the
idea of force there is a leaven of artificiality...there is no necessity for the
introduction of the word 'force' nor of the sense−suggested ideas on which it
was originally based.'"

"Gravity is not a 'force,' but a relation between real
objects. To a man falling off a high building, it seems that the ground is
'rushing towards him.' From the standpoint of relativity, that observation is
not wrong. Only if we adopt the mechanistic and one-sided concept of 'force' do
we view this process as the earth's gravity pulling the man downwards, instead
of seeing that it is precisely the interaction of two bodies upon each other."
[Woods and Grant (1995), p.156.]

However, and despite what Woods and Grant say, a mere "relation"
between two bodies is incapable of making one or both of them move, unless there
is a force there (or
something else consequent on that relation -- such as a time-based
trajectory along a "world-line",
perhaps?) to bring it about.

Naturally, all this means that most of the changes
studied in Physics can't be the
result of "contradictions" -- if, that is, the latter are still to be
regarded as opposing
forces.

Merely Figurative?

In view of the above, it might be wise to interpret "opposing
forces" as figurative 'contradictions'. Alternatively, forces could be described as
'contradictions' as a part of a sort of shorthand, which would then enable the modelling
of different types of accelerated motion. Naturally, that approach would allow the word "force" to be
edited out of the picture as a physical entity in its own right. Indeed, Engels
seems to have had this in mind in the quotation below,
where he argues that attraction and repulsion should not be regarded as
forces, but as simple forms of motion. This retreat was perhaps
recommended to him by his admission that the concept "force" was derived from
ancient animistic/mystical views of nature, hence its use in DM could
smack of anthropomorphism:

"When two bodies act on each other…they
either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar
opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be
noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called
'forces', but as simple forms of motion.... [Engels (1954), pp.70-71.
Bold emphasis added.]

"The notion of force, however, owing to its origin from the action of the human
organism on the external world…implies that only one part is active, the
other part being passive…[and appearing] as a resistance." [Ibid., p.82.
Bold emphasis added.]

However, this revision has two untoward consequences
Engels appears not to have noticed:

(1) It makes his version of DM look even more positivistic
that it already seems (at least in DN). If the appeal to forces in nature is no
more than a shorthand for the relative motion of bodies, then forces will have
no real counterparts in nature. The whole idea would then be little more than a
"useful fiction", invented to account for the phenomena
instrumentally.
This would make the identification of forces with contradictions even more
problematic; plainly, and once again: if there are no forces, there can be no
DM-'contradictions'.

(2) Given this re-write of the word "force", the contradictory
relationship between bodies would become little more than a re-description of their relative
motion. [Woods and Grant seem to be thinking along these lines, as we saw
earlier.]

Anyway, the figurative reading of forces as
'contradictions' runs counter to the claim advanced by dialecticians that they
are offering a literal and 'objective' account of nature. It is not at all easy
to see how figurative language can fill in the physical gaps in an explanation,
any more than, say, the following can account for Juliet's beauty:

"But, soft! what light through yonder window breaks?
It is the east, and Juliet is the sun."

Or, at least, any more than would describing a man as a "pig"
imply he has a curly tail and is a potential source of bacon.

Nevertheless, even if this proves to be an acceptable resolution
of Engels's problem, it would still not provide DM-theorists with a
viable way
out of their difficulties. Taken literally or figuratively, the equation
of DM-'contradictions' with forces cannot work -- whether this applies to events in
nature or society. This is so for several reasons.

Contradictions As Mathematical Models?

The first of these is connected with the way that forces are
already represented in mathematics and physics, for example --, which does not appear to be even remotely appropriate
for exportation and use in depicting contradictions as literal forces. Consider the
following:

(A) Forces often operate according to an
inverse square law.
It is not easy to see how the same could be true of contradictions.
Not much sense can be made, one presumes(!), of the idea that a contradiction could
operate with, say, only 25% of its former intensity (or whatever the
appropriate descriptor is here) if the distance between its oppositional elements is doubled. Do bosses
really become more conciliatory if workers walk away from them? Does
wealth cause less conflict if the rich move their money to the Cayman Islands?
Do appearances contradict reality any the more if someone uses a microscope, or
presses his/her face against a desk? And yet, no force in nature has its local or remote strength unaffected
by such changes.

Sure, dialecticians speak about the "contradictions" in the
capitalist system "intensifying", but this is not because the 'separation
distance' between the classes has decreased. Whatever DM-theorists in fact mean
by "intensification" here (which seems be that the alleged "contradictions"
become more obvious, intractable or crisis-ridden), they certainly do not mean
it in the same way that physicists mean it when they talk about, say, the
strength of a force field intensifying. Nor is there any mathematics involved.
Indeed, while a technician might be dispatched to measure the intensity of a force
field in genuine scientific research, no one ever seems to have been asked to do
the same with these
"intensifying" 'dialectical contradictions'. They (or at least their
'strength') appear to be permanently locked in subjective space, stubbornly impervious to scientific investigation.

(B) Forces in nature can be represented by
vectors,
the use of which is
governed by
well-understood rules. As such,
for example, they may be inclined at various angles to one another, added,
subtracted and multiplied (to give
inner,
vector or
scalar triple products, and
the like) -- and by means of which, diverse quantities, such as areas, volumes, field densities,
boundary flux (etc.), may be calculated. In addition, vectors may be parallel
or orthogonal,
to one another, or to previously defined axes, just as they may be decomposed into their components and
projected
onto a given direction, plane or surface. They can be used to identify and
classify the mathematical properties of
manifolds. Unit vectors can be defined
in a given vector space, providing it with a base and
spanning set.
Modulii can be
ascertained for any given vector, and so-called "Eigenvectors" can be
calculated. Furthermore,
matrices can be employed to represent vectors more
efficiently, their
determinants
and
inverses thus calculated. The ordinary and
partial derivatives
of vectors may be derived --
and, finally, they can be integrated (as part of
line,
surface or
volume
integrals), and so on.

It is difficult to see how any of the above (and a many
others) could be true of a single DM-'contradiction' interpreted (literally or
metaphorically) as a force.

This brings us to the third reason for questioning the connection
between forces and 'contradictions'.

Contradictory To What?

Let us assume that two forces
(say, F1 and F2)
'contradict' one
another. In that case, one of the following options would, it seems, have to obtain:

[There is a third option: that these forces
should "struggle" with one another; however, if that is to make sense, then it
must be explicated in terms of one or both of the other two.]

In the first case, F2must either:

(1a) Cease to
exist, or

(1b) confront F1 directly (as force on force) while
it exists -- if it is to be affected by F1, or if it is to be
prevented from operating by it.

However, if in (1a), F2
ceases to exist, it cannot contradict or be contradicted by anything, since it no longer exists to do anything.

Assuming, on the other hand, that F2
is contradicted by F1 up until it ceases to exist, then option
(1a) would become (1b).

In the latter case, therefore, the alleged contradiction
between F1 and F2
must see these forces
as directly oppositional in some way. If so, these two forces must confront one
another as forces of attraction and/or repulsion (or as a 'dialectical' mix of
the two).

But, once again, it is not easy to see how this configuration could be
a contradiction in anything other than a figurative sense. [This is
because a literal contradiction involves the gainsaying of the words of
another person.]

If, on the other hand, a literal
interpretation is still insisted upon here,
this sort of confrontation between forces could only take place if they were
particulate in some way -- that is, if they registered some sort of
resistance to one another. Alternatively, if they are not
particulate, it is equally hard to see how they could interact at all, let alone
'contradict' each other. Continuous media have no rigidity and no
impenetrability to exert forces of any sort (except, of course, as part of a
figurative extension to particulate interaction, after all).

Now, there are well-known classical problems
associated with the idea that forces are particulate (these are fully
referenced in Essay Eight
Part One and Part Two) -- not the least of
which is that if forces are particulate then they could only interact if they
exerted still other forces (contact forces, cohesive forces, forces of
reaction, etc.) on other particulates, initiating an infinite regress. That
is, in order to account for the ability of particles to resist one another, we
would need to appeal to forces internal to bodies to do that, to stop one body
penetrating the other, or to prevent distortions tearing that body apart. But,
if the forces internal to bodies are particulate too, we would plainly
need further forces to account for the
coherence of these new particles, and so on. Alternatively, if these forces are continuous, they would not be able to provide
such inner coherence.

In the end nothing would be accounted for,
since at each level there would be
nothing to provide the required resistance/coherence.

So,
reducing the interaction between forces to that between bodies means that
particles could not 'contradict' one another without exerting non-particulate
forces on their operands -- which would once again mean that such entities were
incapable of exerting forces, having no rigidity to do so.

Even the exchange of particles (in
QM) would succeed in exerting forces only if there were reaction forces internal
to bodies which were themselves the result of rigidity, cohesion, contact, etc.
Of course, Physicists appeal to various
fields, energy gradients and the like, but if
these are continuous, the above problems simply re-emerge. If these are
particulate, this merry-go-round merely takes another spin around the
metaphysical floor.
[Some Physicists
recognise this problem; many just ignore it.]

[QM = Quantum Mechanics.]

Of course, it could be objected that the
above view adopts an out-dated mechanistic view of interaction, and hence is
completely misguided. However, the 'modern' mathematical approach in fact surrenders any
possibility of giving a causal, or physical account of forces --, or at least one
that does not depend on a figurative use of verbs we employ in everyday life to
give such an account in the macro-world. So, if a particle is seen as a 'carrier
of a force', and that 'force' can be given no 'physical bite', but it is still
regarded as being capable of making things happen, forcing particles to divert
their line of action (etc.), then
the words used must lose contact with those drawn from the vernacular -- such
as: "make", "force", "divert" --, as they are used to depict macro-phenomena. Now
there is no problem with this, but then such an account would become merely
descriptive; it could not explain how fields actually make things happen.
Differential equations and
vectors
cannot make things move, or alter their paths; they merely describe what does
happen, as well as perhaps help us balance nature's books and make predictions. (More details on this can be
found in the full Essay.)

If problems like these are put to
one side for the moment, it would seem that forces could interact only by
affecting the motion of bodies that are already under the control of other
forces. In that case, (1b) would now reduce to the action of F1
on the effects of F2, or vice versa
-- thus
becoming option (2).

(1b) F2must confront F1 directly (as force on force) while
it exists -- if it is to be affected by F1, or if it is to be
prevented from operating by it.

That being so, these forces would
'contradict' one another by preventing the normal effects of one or both of them
from taking place. But, once more, if the latter are prevented from happening, they
would not exist to be contradicted, and we would be back at square one.

If this
set of inferences is rejected for some reason, then if F1 does
indeed succeed in 'contradicting', say, the velocity of any body under the control of F2
(call this velocity V2), we would have a conflict between two
unlike terms: F1 and V2. Clearly,
given this scenario, the original contradiction between two forces will
have disappeared to be replaced by a new relationship between a force and a
velocity, which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be called
"contradictory". This is partly because the operating force merely alters a velocity -- in many
cases it might even augment it, or merely deflect it -- and partly because a
force cannot 'struggle' with a mere rate of change of place.

Nevertheless, for a force to alter the velocity of
a body, the force would have to be particulate, too, meaning that
inter-particulate forces would come into play once again. As already noted, continuous media have
no inner coherence to alter anything -- save they are surreptitiously viewed as
particulate, once more. This would then
collapse this scenario back into option (1), with all its associated
classical/figurative problems. Either way, the alleged contradiction here would evaporate
for want of terms.

This criticism would still apply if the word
"contradiction" were replaced by "conflict"; clearly, things cannot conflict if
they don't exist, nor can they "conflict" with what they have prevented from
taking place.

[And what exactly is the 'inner conflict' here that
is supposed to make things move? A
metaphysical motor of some sort? More on that in
Essay Five.

It could be argued that the "conflict" in
this case is precisely this: the fact that one force prevents another from
acting. That option, and every one of its ramifications, is considered in detail
in Essay Eight Part Two (especially
here). Their
consideration here will prevent this from being a mere summary!]

Also, the word "conflict"
lacks the logical multiplicity that the word "contradiction" possesses.
The whole point of using the word "contradiction" in DM was to emphasise the limitations of FL.
This extension to the term is what allows
dialecticians to argue that contradictory states of affairs can exist
simultaneously.
That was the thrust of the DL-claims
examined in Essay Four -- i.e., that "A
and not A" could be true. In this case, "A" and
"not A" are logically/dialectically connected. Now, if these
expressions are propositional, ordinarily the truth of one would
imply the falsehood of the other; however, their dialectical connection does not
imply this in any straightforward sense -- indeed, it goes beyond this. This is
what allows dialecticians to point to the superiority of DL over FL; their logic
allows them to "grasp" such contradictions in order to make sense of change.

[FL = Formal Logic; DL =
Dialectical Logic.]

If now the meaning of the word "conflict" is
imported to work in
place of "contradict", the aforementioned logical connection
will be severed, and the alleged
superiority of DL over FL would vanish, since no Formal Logician of any sense
would deny that things can conflict -- nor indeed would they reject the claim that two propositions expressing conflict
cannot both be true (or false) at once. [Indeed, that would be tantamount to
them admitting that "conflict" was not synonymous with "contradict".]

On the other hand, if the old
FL-connections possessed by the word "contradiction" are exported and glued onto
the word "conflict", then the meaning of the latter must change
accordingly. In that case, this particular DM-thesis will have been made true
solely as a result of mere linguistic tinkering, and that would mean that
another DM-'fact' had been created by linguistic fiat, confirming DM's status as
a form of LIE. Hence, in this case, from doctored language,
Superscientific 'truths' would have flowed.

"It is expressly to be noted that attraction and
repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple
forms of motion." [Engels (1954), p.71.]

In other words it seems that forces should be regarded as
"useful fictions". As noted above, Engels was aware of the anthropomorphic origin of the scientific concept
of force. So, for once, his scientific intuitions seem to have been
working correctly.

But, even if this were a viable option, it is not easy to see how on
DM-grounds one form of motion could in fact 'contradict' another form of
motion. Classically, if one body alters another's motion, it would have to exert
a force on it, which would introduce the very things Engels tried to eliminate.

So, despite what Engels said, DM needs forces; it
cannot do without them. It requires them to provide the dialectical
'connective tissue' (as it were) and the motive power of the universe; without them there would be
nothing internal to bodies which would be able to connect their motion to
that of others, and nothing to interlink processes in the "Totality". In their
absence, DM would look little different from "crude materialism". Indeed,
without forces, dialecticians could
not even pretend to explain why anything moved or developed.

In that case, dialecticians cannot afford
to take heed of this rare example of Engelsian good sense. And that is why,
in discussion, they all ignore it.

On the other hand, if we acknowledge that forces
do in fact exist -- that is, we accept that they are more than just the
complex ways of speaking about the interaction of bodies (and thus if we reject
Engels's advice) --, then the DM-account will still not work. This is
because all such changes are in fact produced by a single
resultant force operating in the system, not by two contradictory forces.

In
that case, if nature must be populated with forces -- and if the present
author is allowed for a moment to indulge in some insincere a priori
Superscience of her own --, change would then be the result, not of struggle,
but of the cooperation, unity and harmony between forces as
they naturally combine to produce change (by means of this cooperatively formed
resultant), helpfully assisting particles on their
way. If so, we should rather raise an
analogy here with logical tautologies -- not contradictions -- and argue
alongside other ancient mystics (following the excellent precedent set by Hegel) that nature is indeed governed by forces of
empathy, affection and love.

The conclusion seems quite plain: since resultant
forces cause every change in nature (given the truth of the classical account),
movement in general must be the result of dialectical tautologies. This
new 'theory' at least has the advantage of being consistent with classical
Physics, and every known observation. The same cannot be said of DM.

Naturally, those critical of the above
(wholly insincere) flights-of-fancy would do well to turn an equally sceptical
eye on the similarly suspect anthropomorphic moves made by dialecticians all the
time.

Alternatively, if it is now argued that both
of the 'contradicted' forces(i.e., F1 and F2) still exist even while they
interact with one another to produce this resultant, change would then be the result of the operation of
at least three forces (the original two and the resultant); that
would, of course, create energy from nowhere.

[Needless to say, if this is so, there is a
pressing need for revolutionaries to identify this 'third force' since (on
this view) it appears to be the one that will put paid to Capitalism!]

In that case, it looks like that the
word "force" -- as it is used in DM-propositions -- must be figurative,
too. Hence, it now seems that DM can only be made to work if we adopt a poetic view of
nature.

The Real Source Of This
Theory

On the other hand, if it should turn out that these
forces are reminiscent of those found in mystical religious systems (which
forces personify 'god', or which carry out 'His' orders (in ancient astronomy, these were the
angels who supposedly pushed the planets about the place; in Newton's theory, they were
an expression of the direct or indirect action of 'God'), etc.), then it would
make eminent good sense to suppose they could 'contradict' one another (i.e.,
'argue' among themselves).

It is no surprise, therefore, to find once again that
this is precisely from where this 'dialectical' notion has been lifted. This we know
for a fact. [On that, see Essay Fourteen (summary
here).]

As such, and in this way, DM clearly represents the re-enchantment of nature
and society.

So, while modern science has banished will and intelligence from nature, DM
has simply re-introduced them.

'Real' Contradictions?

It could be argued that the real value of
'Materialist Dialectics' lies in its capacity to help revolutionaries understand
the contradictions in Capitalism, the better to help change the course of
history.

But, it is difficult to picture any
of these elements as opposites; the forces of production, it would
seem, are no more the opposite of the relations of production than a diesel
engine is the opposite of the person using it. And, as argued in detail in
Essay
Seven, these opposites do not turn into one another, as the dialectical
prophets assured us they must.
For example, when was the last time that the forces of production turned into
the relations of production? Or the proletariat turned into the capitalist
class?

Up until
now DM-theorists have been more intent on merely asserting that forces are
contradictory (seriously
overusing this term) than they have been with providing any evidence or argument to
show that they are -- or with clarifying what it could possibly mean to
assert that they are. Once again, it is clear that
DM-theorists have been quite happy to derive yet more a priori
Superscience from a set of inappropriate concepts and dubious analogies,
compounded by
a poetic view of the assorted antics of ancient mystical intelligences,
all subsequently confused with a precise logical principle.

Standard examples DM-theorists regularly
wheel-out to illustrate the analogy between forces and contradictions are
considered in detail in Essay
Seven and shown to be misconceived. For instance, the alleged UO
between the north and south poles of a magnet (or even that between positive and
negative electrical charges) fails to illustrate the opposition between
attractive and repulsive forces. In a magnet, two north poles, or two south
poles (i.e., two likes), repel -- whereas two opposites (a north
and a south pole), attract. So, if anything here, non-opposites 'contradict'
(i.e., 'conflict' -- two Norths or two Souths repel each other), while actualopposites do not
(North and South attract). Instead of struggle
between opposites here we see harmony once more, confirming that change
is indeed the result of those aforementioned 'internal tautologies'.

[UO = Unity of Opposites.]

Finally, several examples of "real material
forces" supposedly at work in Capitalism are considered in detail in Essay
Eight Part Two (here,
here,
here and
here). Under close scrutiny none of them turn out to be contradictions in any
meaningful sense of the term. In fact, they all turn out to be one or more of
the following: discursive paradoxes, unexpected events, complex
inter-relationships, injustices, irrationalities, contraries and/or mistakes.

Of course, if DM-theorists intend the word
"contradiction" to be taken in a special sense, all well and good (but see
below); however, to date, they have signally
failed to say clearly what this
'special' sense is. Or, perhaps more accurately, they have in fact sought to
equate it with "conflict", which verbal 'solution' does at least have
the advantage of making overt the covert animism in DM -- for only if inanimate
matter were sentient or intelligent could it enter into conflict with
itself (internally), or with anything else (externally).

As will be argued in detail in Essay Twelve
(summary here),
the tendency to see conflict in linguistic, moral or conceptual terms (in
traditional thought) was a direct consequence of the way that leisure-dominated
Greek Philosophers fetishised both language and the natural world, populating it
with surrogate discursive terms to give sense to their own mode of being (i.e.,
those connected with the issuing of orders to minions and the framing laws to run society,
which supposedly mirrored the laws of 'God', etc.).. No
surprise, therefore, to see this traditional view reappear in DM.

On the other hand, if DM-theorists
aim to re-define the word "contradiction" as "conflict" then their theory
would merely be a form of stipulativeconventionalism -- since
there is nothing in the meaning of either the everyday word "contradiction", or
in its logical twin, that remotely suggests such a connotation; nor is there
vice versa with "conflict".

In that case, it is now clear that this word has
been re-defined just to make dialectics work. But, we should be no more convinced of the
acceptability of that manoeuvre than we would be if, say, an apologist of
Capitalism 'defined' it as "natural" and "beneficial to all". If the
re-definition of terms provided a "royal road" to truth, those with the best
dictionaries would surely win Nobel Prizes.

~~~~~~oOo~~~~~~

These points are made in much more detail in Essay
Eight Part Two, where every
conceivable objection to my arguments has been neutralised.