QUESTION: On Chechnya and Russia, do you have anything
to say on the report the Russians will not obey the CFE agreements
in the North Caucasus due to the situation in Chechnya?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, we are familiar with the North Caucasus
deployment issue. It is correct that the Russians have told us
and other CFE treaty partners that they seek to comply with the
Conventional Forces In Europe treaty but have exceeded limits
in Russia for the North Caucasus region. The Russians have promised
to provide us additional information about their military activities
in Chechnya with regard to these treaty limitations.

The good news is that Russia has come forward and discussed this
issue, demonstrating its commitment to notify pursuant to the
treaty. It also demonstrates that the treaty is an important tool
for constraining military equipment levels and ensuring international
scrutiny. The bad news is that they have exceeded the limits.

Let me say in that regard that, overall, Russian compliance with
the CFE Treaty has been generally good. The question of the flank
region has been a long-standing one. Their levels have exceeded
the flank limits for some time. We take compliance very, very
seriously. We're reviewing the details of the information they've
provided to us and we'll be taking this matter up with them on
a number of levels in the coming days.

QUESTION: How much have they exceeded the limits?

MR. RUBIN: Substantially. There are two limits. One limit
is the existing limit and the other limit is the larger limit
that would come into play if the treaty were adapted and approved
this November. We're talking about many, many hundreds of pieces
of equipment over the limits in the armored combat vehicle category.

QUESTION: Is there any way to bring them back to the limits?

MR. RUBIN: Well, they would have to bring themselves back
to the limits.

QUESTION: What about - what is the value of the treaty,
then, other than that they're now --

MR. RUBIN: Well, the treaty doesn't provide a military
enforcement mechanism to launch an invasion of Russia by which
we could take the Russian armored combat vehicles out of the Caucasus
and return them to Russia. That would be the standard that you're
suggesting there.

What the treaty can do is to identify the problems. It can require
that Russia notify and it can help bring international pressure
to bear on them to comply. That's what arms control treaties can
do. Those who create artificial suggestions or straw men as to
what a treaty can do, we can't answer those criticisms. Some of
that has come in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty debate. People
have sought a guarantee from us signing a treaty that another
country won't test. Treaties don't do that. Arms control treaties
don't do that. They don't have military enforcement measures that
the United States would use military force to guarantee such an
outcome.

What they can do is provide verification, provide international
legitimacy for certain rules and regulations that each country
is committed to, and that if they violate they are subject to
international pressure and, in certain cases, sanctions. So that's
what can be done in the real world. In I don't know whose world
we can guarantee that an exceeded limit in a country like Russia
could be reversed through military force.

QUESTION: Is this an out-and-out violation or is there
some clause in the agreement which the Russians can cite; for
example, emergency deployments or national interests?

MR. RUBIN: Well, they have been exceeding the flank limit
for a long time so they clearly have been exceeding that limit
for some time. This is not a matter of a temporary deployment
that gives them some provision under the treaty. They have been
exceeding it for a long time.

One of the ideas that we have been pursuing in the discussions
to adapt the treaty is to increase that limit, but what I can
tell you is that even the increased limit is below where they
are now by a significant number of armored vehicles. So what has
to happen here is we have to be very candid and honest and make
clear that the Russians are exceeding the limit; at the same time,
not throw the baby out with the bath water, as some might want
us to do in the case of such a violation; point out that Russian
compliance with the treaty has been generally good, with some
exceptions; and now begin a discussion, a serious discussion at
the appropriate levels, to try to ensure that the Russians come
back into compliance.

QUESTION: You say they have been exceeding it for a long
time. Can you be more precise on that? And why have they delayed
so long in informing you that they have exceeded it?

MR. RUBIN: Well, there are two issues. There is one issue
is that they have been above the limit for a long period of time,
the lower limit. They are now - we and they have been working
on an adapted treaty to have a higher limit that takes into account
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Soviet Union, and
adjusts this treaty, adapts it, to the modern situation. They
have not been in excess of that adapted limit, which we would
have expected to go into force beginning this November, two months
from now, at the OSCE Summit.

The point I am trying to make now is that their current deployment
is above even the adapted treaties limit, and that's why it is
such a matter of concern to us and something we will take up with
the Russians.

QUESTION: To East Timor, are you actively considering sanctions
against Russia for exceeding the limits substantially?

MR. RUBIN: Roy, you asked me a question about what we could
do to ensure that the Russians came back into compliance which
led me to give you a discussion of arms control treaties in general
- what can be done and what can't be done.

The mode that we would approach a violation in would be to discuss
with the Russians the reasons for exceeding of the limits, to
get an explanation of what their intentions are in the future,
and to try to bring them back into compliance. The question of
sanctions is not a question I am prepared to entertain at this
time.