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Breakdown of confidence

19. The Appeals Chamber previously explained that the matter of alleged fee-splitting had no bearing on the Trial Chamber’s decision to maintain Blagojević’s assigned counsel.[1] The Appeals Chamber nonetheless considered the nature and possible impact of such an allegation on the lawyer-client relationship “for completeness and to ensure finality”.[2] The Appeals Chamber noted that the assigned counsel did not breach any client confidence by raising the issue of fee-splitting, as he was ethically bound to bring such issues to the attention of the Registrar.[3] The Appeals Chamber also determined that this issue should not unduly impact the relationship, in particular, noting that Mr. Karnavas did not place blame on Blagojević for attempting to enter into a fee-splitting arrangement and instead explained that it resulted from “family pressures”.[4] The Appeals Chamber observed that this was consistent with Blagojević’s own explanation.[5] A review of the transcripts of the status conference pointed to by Blagojević does not, contrary to his submissions, indicate that Mr. Karnavas admitted to falsely accusing him of trying to engage in fee-splitting. Rather, Mr. Karnavas simply made clear, consistent with the submissions previously considered by the Appeals Chamber, that he never accused Blagojević himself of trying to engage in fee-splitting.[6]

21. Blagojević’s own submissions under the present ground of appeal reflect that the continued breakdown during the trial and the resulting complaints about the conduct of his defence also resulted from his unilateral refusal to communicate with his counsel, rather than from any action on the part of his counsel and Defence team.[7] The Trial Chamber’s decision on Blagojević’s request to testify is exemplary of Mr. Karnavas’s continued willingness to meet with and assist him and of Blagojević’s unilateral resistance to any cooperation.[8] The Appeals Chamber considers that an appellant cannot premise a request for a new trial on a claim of a total breakdown in communication in circumstances where the appellant unjustifiably refused to cooperate with his or her assigned counsel throughout the trial proceedings.

[6] T. 11858 (“I just want to reiterate, one, I have done nothing for which I need to explain or apologise. I have never divulged any attorney/client privileges, nor have I ever accused Mr. Blagojević of making any attempts to fee split as he seems to indicate. I've never accused him of that, nor has he ever made any efforts himself. So I want to make sure that's very clear on the record. I have nothing more, Your Honour.”).

[7] Blagojević Appeal Brief, para. 2.33 (“[…] the Decisions of both Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber were passed when the trial was at the beginning […] and […] it was expected that the rebuilding of confidence between the Accused and Mr. Karnavas would take place during the course of the trial or at least up to the beginning of the Defence case. It did not happen since the Accused stayed at his opinion against imposing Mr. Karnavas as his Defence counsel as from the very beginning[…]. Expectations that the change will take place in any of the procedure stage was really without any grounds.”); AT. 96 (“[Blagojević] abided by his position that he could have no contact with the counsel who had been appointed by the Registry against his will.”); AT 126 (“this was a complete breakdown of communication, making it impossible to cooperate because of the accusations that were made. After the serious accusation was made, no further contact was possible until the end of the trial.”).

[8] See, e.g., Blagojević and Jokić, Decision on Vidoje Blagojević’s Oral Request, [Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a/k/a “Dule”, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on Appellant’s Motion for the Extension of the Time-Limit and Admission of Additional Evidence, 16 October 1998], pp. 8-10 (“Considering Therefore that the Trial Chamber ordered the Accused to meet with Mr. Karnavas to discuss the three options available to him[…]. Considering that the Accused refused to meet with Mr. Karnavas, as instructed by the Trial Chamber[…]. Considering that Mr. Karnavas indicated he would be prepared to proceed with the direct examination on the next day of the proceedings, indicating that it would be Mr. Blagojević’s choice of whether to prepare for the direct examination with him[…]. Considering that after the Accused indicated that he needs preparation before his testimony but would not conduct any preparations with Mr. Karnavas […] the Accused responded that he would not answer any questions put to him on direct examination by Mr. Karnavas.”).