FREE RIDERSouth Korea's Dual Dependence on
America

by Doug Bandow

Doug
Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former
special assistant to President Reagan and visiting fellow at
the Heritage Foundation, he is the author of Tripwire:
Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World.

Executive
Summary

The Republic of Korea is
finding the transition to political and economic maturity
difficult, and the government of newly elected president Kim
Dae Jung faces daunting challenges. Nevertheless, South
Korea's long-term future is bright, and Washington should
insist on a new political and strategic relationship.

The ROK remains militarily
underdeveloped and dependent on the United States, even
though Seoul has overtaken its northern antagonist by almost
every measure of power. And with security dependence has now
come financial dependence. A prominent argument used by the
Clinton administration to justify the $57 billion
international bailout of the ROK economy is that failure to
do so might destabilize the peninsula and put the American
troops stationed there in the middle of a new Korean war.

The United States will
ultimately be more secure if capable democratic countries
take charge of problems in their own regions. Thus,
Washington should begin withdrawing its forces from South
Korea and transfer primary responsibility for North-South
relations to Seoul.

There is no reason for South
Korea to continue being Washington's ward--much less to
broaden and deepen that dependence. Seoul and Washington
should negotiate a termination of America's force presence
and the "mutual" defense treaty. Only then will
South Korea's transformation from political child to adult be
complete.

Introduction

The world may have become a
friendlier place for democracy, but the Republic of Korea is
nevertheless finding the transition tempestuous. South Korea
has encountered severe economic turbulence, as Seoul pays the
price for decades of crony capitalism. Political discord has
arrived with the election of Kim Dae Jung as president. Kim,
the ultimate political outsider, confronts an
opposition-dominated assembly, which has forced him to
negotiate the first hostile leadership transition in modern
Korean political history. He must deal with an economy
bedeviled by structural weaknesses, political favoritism, and
unfinished reforms and implement an unpopular foreign bailout
directed by the International Monetary Fund.

Nevertheless, this stormy
passage represents something crucial: the ROK's maturation
from adolescent to adult. A mere decade ago Seoul was ruled
by a military dictatorship. Steady economic growth had pushed
South Korea past communist North Korea economically, but mass
street protests were necessary to force elections in 1987.
That contest was won by Roh Tae Woo, a former general favored
by the ruling establishment. Onetime dissident Kim Young Sam
was elected five years later, but as a candidate of the
ruling party, which had merged with his own. Kim purged the
military and eventually prosecuted his two predecessors for
their corrupt political practices and involvement in the coup
d'état that brought the military to power in 1980.

At the same time, Kim
discovered the fickleness of democracy. His popularity
collapsed amid administration blunders and corruption
charges. Even the ruling party candidate, Lee Hoi Chang,
turned on him during the 1997 campaign, threatening him with
prosecution.(1) But for the first time the prospect
of the election of Kim Dae Jung, the perennial dissident of
Korean politics (running in his fourth campaign), generated
no threat of a coup. A onetime leftist, Kim allied himself
with Kim Jong Pil, former head of the Korean intelligence
agency, and Park Tae Joon, a leading industrialist. Kim Dae
Jung won by only a razor-thin margin in a vote that was badly
splintered by region. But he quickly moved to reassure Korean
voters and foreign investors alike.(2) Although politics will almost
certainly remain highly fractious in coming years, the ROK no
longer seems unstable.

Economic progress has been
even more impressive. Years of double-digit growth have moved
the South into the lower ranks of industrialized states.
Although the ROK's per capita gross domestic product still
trails those of Hong Kong, Japan, and Taiwan, Seoul has
jumped ahead of most of its neighbors. South Korea's recent
economic travails actually highlight its long-term success:
it has become a major participant in the global economy. The
ROK has simply paid the price of extensive government
subsidies to the major chaebols, or industrial
conglomerates.(3) (The chaebols used cheap
credit to dominate national economic life. That discouraged
creation of venture capital start-ups like those in Silicon
Valley, which have given the United States such an economic
edge.)(4)

The crisis, though serious,
has made possible reforms that were until now politically
inconceivable.(5) The collapse of overextended
enterprises, as well as the banks that underwrote them, will
be costly, but Korea will not be the first country to
withstand severe economic problems. Indeed, indicative of the
South's continuing underlying strength was the rapid reentry
of some foreign investors into the South Korean stock market.(6)

Despite its economic and
political growth, however, Seoul remains underdeveloped
internationally. Militarily, South Korea is essentially where
it was in 1953--dependent on the United States. Washington
maintains a Mutual Defense Treaty that is mutual in name
only, stations 37,000 soldiers on the peninsula, and backs up
its commitment with forces throughout the Pacific and at
home. All told, Americans spend as much to defend the ROK,
about $15 billion annually, as the South Koreans spend.(7)

South
Korea's Metamorphosis

The genesis of Washington's
Korean commitment was the messy conclusion of World War II
and the ensuing Cold War. Artificially divided between U.S.
and Soviet occupation forces, the Korean peninsula in 1950
erupted into civil war--a war that quickly became
internationalized. Three years of combat left the borders
largely unchanged, but the armistice was never turned into a
peace treaty and the two Koreas remain formally at war.
American forces have since acted as the ultimate guarantor of
the ROK's security. South Korea also languished economically,
only beginning to escape abject poverty during Park Chung
Hee's dictatorship in the 1960s.

There were two keys to
Seoul's eventual economic success. The first was the move in
a broadly market-oriented direction. ROK economic policy was
never laissez faire, but South Korea generally relied on
private entrepreneurship and export-driven growth.(8) That contrasted sharply with
Pyongyang's autarchic policy of juche, which has led
to near economic collapse.

Almost as critical was the
South's decision not to respond to the North's military
buildup. The Ministry of National Defense of the ROK
acknowledges that Seoul did not begin its "force
improvement program" until "twelve years later than
North Korea."(9) Why? The ROK "concentrated on
its economic and social development."(10) In short, despite a dire military
threat, the South chose butter over guns, as it continues to
do today.

That strategy worked. All
estimates of North Korea's economic output are dubious, but
the International Institute for Strategic Studies figures the
ROK has about 24 times the GDP of the North.(11) South Korea has twice the North's
pop- ulation, the ability to borrow--heavily, as we have
recently seen--in international markets, and extensive
high-tech industries. The Democratic People's Republic of
Korea welshed on its international debts, has been suffering
through several years of negative growth, and cannot feed its
own people. Indeed, people in the North are literally
starving.(12)

Equally significant, Seoul
has lured away North Korea's allies. Russia is paying off its
debts to the South with military equipment; China has far
more trade with and investment in the South than the North.(13) Pyongyang is even losing the
allegiance of the Korean community in Japan, which has long
provided the North with much of its hard currency. (Those
remittances are estimated to have fallen by 90 percent since
1990.)(14) The matchup between the two Koreas
looks like the German battleship Bismarck versus a
minor Chinese junk.

Continuing
Dependence on the United States

South Korea continues to be
an American defense dependent even though Seoul possesses a
potent military, and the DPRK's military deficiencies are
legion. Central Intelligence Agency director George Tenet
told the U.S. Senate, "The [North Korean] military has
had to endure shortages of food and fuel, increased
susceptibility to illness, declining morale, often sporadic
training and a lack of new equipment."(15) However, the North possesses a
significant numerical edge, and the simple weight of numbers
could lead to the destruction of the city of Seoul, which is
just 30 miles from the border, even if North Korea ultimately
(indeed, quickly) lost the war.(16) Moreover, deficiencies tied to
reliance on American forces, such as inadequate air-to-ground
attack capability, would prevent the ROK from taking full
advantage of North Korean weaknesses.

Such problems do not bother
officials in either Seoul or Washington as long as the United
States protects the South. Most analysts believe that the
combined U.S.-ROK forces would achieve a quick victory in any
war.(17) However, foreign subsidies come at a
high price. Although the Combined Forces Command is no longer
under the control of an American general, long an insult to
South Korea, the United States remains the dominant defense
partner. When discussing defense decisionmaking for the
peninsula, William Taylor of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies recommended that we should "get an
agreement fast with our ROK ally on who pays what
share for the systems required to protect/limit damage to
Seoul," as if the protection of a foreign capital was
normally a subject of bilateral negotiation.(18)

The Onset of Dual
Dependence

The ROK's continuing defense
dependence seems to be leading, in turn, to economic
dependence. South Korea was a major recipient of U.S. foreign
aid into the 1970s; it wasn't until 1969 that the South
covered more than half the cost of its own defense budget.
Washington was still providing significant amounts of
security-oriented aid as late as 1986. That assistance, of
course, was in addition to the direct American military
subsidy in the form of the defense commitment and troop
deployments. The ROK spent years investing in its economy the
cash that it saved by relying on the United States. Some of
that money was obviously well spent, as evidenced by South
Korea's astonishing economic growth over the last two
decades. But some of it was wasted on the sort of industrial
policy schemes that came crashing down last year.

The financial crisis led the
International Monetary Fund and the United States to organize
a $57 billion bailout package, which included $1.7 billion
from the United States, in January 1998. Potentially, there
are many more billions to come, many of them through the IMF,
to which Washington is the largest contributor. (Originally,
the United States planned to contribute only $5 billion as
part of a financial backup, should it prove necessary; it
took barely a month for American taxpayers to be moved up to
the frontlines.) On top of the U.S. share of the IMF bailout
is $1 billion--the ROK originally asked for $1.6 billion--in
credit guarantees for the purchase of American agricultural
products, as well as a half billion dollar increase in
Export-Import Bank credit insurance. Exactly why America
should spend so much more to help a nation that it has
already helped so much for so many years is unclear. But
South Korea is committed to hanging on to its subsidies,
hiring the usual passel of D.C. lobbyists and publicity
agents.(19) Former U.S. ambassador to the ROK
William Potter described the situation aptly some three
decades ago: "They've got hold of our big fat udder and
they won't let go."(20)

The Korean economy did not
collapse; rather, the country ran short on foreign currency
reserves with which to pay its short-term debts, about $66
billion over the coming year. The obvious solution was for
creditors to extend their loans. (In fact, even with
international aid, the ROK was forced to seek debt
restructuring.)(21) Instead, citizens of other
industrialized states came up with the cash. Thus, the
primary beneficiaries of the bailout were, not South Koreans,
but South Korea's creditors. Here, as in previous bailouts,
U.S. taxpayers are acting as a foreign investment protection
service.

The Need for
Economic Reform

Of course, Seoul needs to
reform its economy. Observes Earl I. Johnson, an economist
with Chicago's Bank of Montreal, "We can get over this
crunch period, but there's still concern about additional
bankruptcies in the commercial and financial sectors. There's
going to have to be a major restructuring of the Korean
economy."(22) President Kim Dae Jung seemed to
shift from criticism of to support for economic
liberalization largely to placate foreign investors. He
declared the day after his election, "I will boldly open
the market. I will make it so that foreign investors will
invest with confidence."(23) His choice of cabinet ministers,
however, raised questions about the genuineness of his
commitment to market reforms.(24)

In any case, there is no
reason to believe that IMF lending is necessary for reform.
For 50 years the fund has generated permanent dependence
rather than economic growth.(25) The necessary changes are more likely
to be implemented by nations like South Korea if they are
generated locally, in response to economic crisis, than if
they are imposed from without, even if accompanied by a de
facto bribe. Moreover, fundamental reform would occur more
quickly and completely if the inefficient and often corrupt
managements of failing enterprises were removed, not
subsidized. As former federal reserve governor Lawrence
Lindsey points out, "Under the administration's bailout
plan, owners and their crony system would stay in
place."(26) Far better for overextended
enterprises to be purchased by outsiders, including
Americans. Lindsey observes, "We gain nothing by giving
the present owners and the political system that supported
them a fresh lease on life."(27)

Indeed, the most effective
pressure for reform comes from outside investors. Although
some have reentered the stock market, many are holding off on
direct investments until they see reforms being implemented.
Says former U.S. ambassador to South Korea Donald Gregg,
"The rhetoric has not yet hit the road."(28) Similar was financier George Soros's
promise to make substantial investments if the ROK government
adopted "radical restructuring of industry and of the
financial sector."(29)

The ROK's Economic
Problems Become a U.S. Security Issue

Given the dubious economic
rationale for supporting the IMF bailout, the Clinton
administration resorted to national security arguments for
treating South Korea as a financial as well as a military
dependent. Indeed, administration officials adopted the
security rationale only after they encountered substantial
congressional opposition to their request, based on economic
arguments, for additional IMF funding. Columnist Robert Novak
described the abrupt change that occurred during a White
House briefing of top Republicans in Congress: "Thoughts
of dissent vanished when the congressional leaders were
warned that failure to bail out South Korea could trigger a
communist invasion from the north."(30) Opined Treasury Secretary Robert
Rubin, "If you have economic instability, you run the
risk of political and social instability." He added that
"there are still enormous security concerns for the
United States" in Korea.(31) On another occasion he linked the
economic and security rationales even more explicitly:
"We have a vital national economic and security interest
in helping Korea to restore market stability as soon as
possible."(32) Defense Secretary William Cohen made
much the same argument: "If we don't lead on economic
issues, we won't be able to lead on other issues," such
as security.(33)

In short, it is apparently
not enough to preserve a security umbrella, relieving Seoul
of the financial burden of defending itself. The United
States must also provide billions of additional dollars in
economic aid to South Korea to sustain that security
umbrella. Thus, Washington's commitment turns out to be a
double loss. Stanley Chan of Columbia University rightly
complains that the Pentagon's fixation on the possibility of
a North Korean invasion "is at best a waste of shrinking
financial resources on an unlikely crisis."(34)

Unchanging
Policy in a Changing World

U.S. policy
toward the ROK today looks an awful lot like U.S. policy in
1953. It is as if nothing had changed on the peninsula--as if
the South were still reeling from the war, Chinese troops
were still stationed in the North, Pyongyang still challenged
South Korea economically, the ROK still suffered under
unpopular dictatorships, and Seoul still lagged behind the
DPRK in the battle for diplomatic support. And it is as if
nothing had changed inter- nationally--as if the Cold War
still raged, would-be communist hegemons were still probing
the United States for weakness, and the future of Japan and
all of Asia was still clouded.

But both Korea and the world
have changed. True, Pyongyang's difficult straits create a
risk of either war or violent implosion.(35) That possibility has caused
inordinate breast beating by some U.S. analysts, who advocate
heightened American vigilance to deter any war.(36) However, South Korea can and should
defend itself against whatever threat exists. There is, in
fact, nothing to stop the ROK from building a military
sufficient to deter the North. For more than 20 years South
Korean officials, starting with President Park, have promised
that military parity is just a few years away.(37) But parity has never come because it
has never had to come. The South continues to concentrate on
economic and social development and to underinvest in defense
since America keeps the defense shield in place at its own
expense.

When privately confronted
with the possibility of having to defend themselves, South
Korean officials usually respond, "We'd have to spend
more," not "We'd be helpless." The amount that
would be required to build a more robust defense--estimates
run about $10 billion to $13 billion annually--would not be
unduly burdensome for a nation with a GDP approaching (based
on the previous exchange rate) $500 billion.(38) Obviously, today might not seem to be
an opportune moment for such an increase, but South Korea has
invariably acted as though there would never be an opportune
moment. As far back as 1979 an irritated President Jimmy
Carter asked ROK dictator Park Chung Hee why South Korea,
with a much larger economy than the North, did not match the
latter's military spending.(39) Park had no answer. A decade later,
at a conference in Seoul, an ROK legislator rebuffed the
suggestion that the ROK spend more on the military, observing
that "we have needs in health and education that must be
met."(40)

The South continues to
believe Washington has an obligation to pick up the security
tab. Even as its officials warn that the North could implode,
South Korea is contemplating significant reductions
in military spending and arms purchases, as well as
host-nation support for U.S. troops.(41) Moreover, during the recent Korean
election campaign, Kim Dae Jung announced that, because of
the ROK's difficulties, he would "ask the U.S. and Japan
to contribute more" to the $5 billion deal to keep
nuclear weapons out of the hands of North Korea.(42) After the election, Kim spokesman Lee
Jong Chang contended, "Our burden should be cut to the
minimum in view of the current financial difficulty we are
now suffering."(43)

Tokyo faces its own economic
woes and is unlikely to pony up more. That leaves Washington,
though Clinton administration officials have so far resisted
Seoul's entreaties.(44) The country that has the most at
stake in maintaining a nuclear-free peninsula is South Korea,
which remains capable of meeting its commitment as long as it
places a high priority on keeping the peninsula nuclear free.(45)

Shifting--and
Shifty--Justification for Dependence

The economic disparity
between the two Koreas has begun to embarrass even some ROK
analysts who defend their country's dependence on the United
States. Privately, many acknowledge that the American
military presence is no longer needed to deter the North.
Rather, they say privately, the United States should stay to
defend South Korea from . . . Japan. Indeed, the
South's defense white papers occasionally make ominous noises
about Tokyo's military expenditures. (Some U.S. observers
make much the same argument.)(46) That alleged concern about Japan
looks like a convenient search for the necessary enemy to
justify continuing to cling to the American security blanket.

The "Bad
Neighborhood" Argument

It is true that, as has often
been said, Korea is stuck in a bad neighborhood, surrounded
by major powers that have abused it. But that can be said of
many countries (Poland, Romania, and even Mexico might make
the same argument). However, neighborhoods can change. Today
Japanese aggression is about as likely as an invasion from
Mars.(47) Moreover, the South (and especially a
united Korea) could make the costs of any attempted invasion
far too high for even a remilitarized Japan to consider.(48) There is something pitiful about
Seoul's attempt to redirect its Cold War alliance with the
United States against another close American ally.

Not only has the balance of
power on the Korean peninsula changed; so has the
international context. The United States intervened in the
Korean War in 1953 not because of any belief in the intrinsic
importance of the peninsula--the Pentagon and even Gen.
Douglas MacArthur dismissed South Korea as insignificant--but
because of Korea's place within the larger Cold War struggle.(49) Even if President Harry S Truman was
correct in viewing the North Korean invasion as the first
step in a concerted Soviet plan for world conquest, no
similar threat exists today. To the contrary, even communist
China prefers stability on the peninsula and would likely
favor Seoul in anything but an invasion of the DPRK by the
South. A war between North and South Korea would be just
that--a war between North and South Korea. The obvious
humanitarian tragedy would generate few security concerns for
the United States. Presumably, it is for that reason that a
majority of Americans oppose the U.S. commitment to defend
South Korea; less than a third support the current security
guarantee.(50)

Exaggerating South
Korea's Strategic Importance

Some analysts contend that
America's presence in Korea offers an important base from
which to promote regional stability. Former assistant
secretary of state Richard Holbrooke once went so far as to
say that the loss of Korea "would be the end of our
position in the entire Pacific."(51) Similarly, Secretary of State Warren
Christopher contended that the alliance was "a linchpin
of America's engagement in the region."(52) Only slightly less unrealistic was
the joint communiqué of Secretary Cohen and ROK minister of
national defense Kim Dong-Jin, which stated that even after
threats from North Korea end, "the alliance will serve
to keep peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the
Asia-Pacific region as a whole."(53)

The reality is that the ROK
has only modest strategic value to the United States.
America's relationship with Japan is more important than is
that with South Korea, and the Korean "dagger"
pointed at Japan is not nearly so sharp today, after the end
of the Cold War. Moreover, Washington could maintain whatever
air and naval forces it desired in the region without bases
in Korea.

South Korea as a
U.S. Advance Base

Former assistant secretary of
defense Joseph Nye made a bit more sense when he argued that
pre-positioning equipment "is a terrific force
multiplier" that allows one to "add tremendous
additional capability in a very short time."(54) But only a bit more sense. The United
States could maintain a cooperative relationship with South
Korea even in the absence of a defense guarantee and U.S.
units based on Korean soil. Moreover, it is hard to imagine
an Asian conflict in which the United States would intervene
with ground forces, which makes the lone division stationed
in the ROK, and associated pre-positioned equipment,
superfluous.

China is, today at least, the
most obvious potential military adversary of America in East
Asia, and many U.S. officials now maintain that American
forces should remain in a reunified Korea to help contain
Beijing. "We're very hesitant to say the reason why our
troops are still there is China," says James Lilley,
former U.S. ambassador to both China and South Korea.
"But nobody in Asia is necessarily fooled by this."(55) However, if Washington ended up going
to war with China over, say, Taiwan, the Navy and Air Force
would do the heavy lifting.(56) A sizable American presence in South
Korea would merely turn that country into a military target
and would be likely to make Seoul hesitate to support
Washington in such a contingency, just as Japan lacked
enthusiasm for U.S. saber rattling over Taiwan in early 1996.

Moreover, the regional
"stability" argument fails to distinguish between
U.S. influence in East Asia and a defense commitment to the
ROK. America would remain the region's largest trading
partner; would retain significant cultural, historical, and
political ties; and could cooperate militarily with allied
states. It could even intervene militarily if it believed its
vital interests were threatened--say, by a potential hegemon
that could not be contained by allied powers. To do those
things Washington need not maintain an alliance and force
structure created in a different era to achieve different
ends. Nor need it intervene promiscuously in response to
every instance of instability in a world in which some
instability is inevitable. Explains Ted Galen Carpenter of
the Cato Institute, "A reasonable degree of order should
not be confused with the need to micromanage the region's
security affairs to ensure complete order."(57)

Indeed, the United States
will ultimately be more secure if other democratic countries
take the lead in dealing with potential conflicts that have
only minimal relevance to America. The Korean peninsula
remains a flashpoint, the one spot on earth where substantial
numbers of Americans could die. Letting manpower-rich South
Korea take over its own defense would reduce the likelihood
of America's finding itself at war. When it comes to disputes
over the Paracel or Spratly Islands, Japan, Korea, and the
Philippines should cooperate among themselves in responding
to China; there is no reason for the United States to
entangle itself in a quarrel so lacking in relevance to
America.(58) If Seoul really fears the highly
unlikely possibility of future Japanese aggression (Tokyo is
the quintessential satisfied, status quo power), then better
that the ROK develop the military wherewithal to deter an
attack than demand that the United States take its side in a
squabble over, say, Tokdo/Takeshima Island. It is even more
important that the solutions to civil conflicts and
insurgencies, like those in Cambodia and the Philippines,
come from within rather than from outside the region.

Turning South Korea's defense
over to South Korea would also enhance U.S. flexibility
elsewhere around the globe. America's early 1998 military
buildup against Iraq in the Persian Gulf led one newspaper
columnist to worry that North Korea might choose that moment
to strike south, "while we are least able to respond
effectively."(59) But why should the United States have
to worry about responding when Seoul so greatly overmatches
the DPRK?

A
Sober View of the North Korean Threat

Of course, North Korea
remains a scary actor--dangerous and unpredictable.
Paradoxically, although new South Korean president Kim Dae
Jung favors accommodation with the North, Pyongyang seemed to
intentionally undercut his candidacy by endorsing him during
the campaign.(60) (It may have preferred hard-liner Lee
Hoi Chang, since his election would have allowed Pyongyang to
more easily present the ROK as a continuing threat.) And
provocations continue, including the recent assassination of
a defector and the 1996 incident in which a North Korean
submarine--probably conducting espionage--ran aground off the
South Korean coast. Indeed, some observers predict that the
DPRK will increase its attempts to destabilize the South.
Contends Lilley, "The North will do [its] utmost to kick
them while they're down."(61)

Yet North Korea cannot gloat
over the South's temporary economic problems, since they pale
in comparison with the crisis facing the DPRK.(62) The North may also be suffering from
political instability. As well as well-publicized, high-level
defections, there have been reports of executions of leading
officials.(63)

Nevertheless, the North has,
so far, lived up to the essentials of the nuclear agreement
negotiated nearly four years ago; apologized for the
submarine incident in 1996; quickly released two villagers
who strayed across the demilitarized zone late last year;
joined four-power talks with China, South Korea, and the
United States; inaugurated the first phone and fax connection
with the South; and pursued various discussions with Seoul.
Indeed, the North has taken a number of modest steps
unthinkable a few years ago, such as allowing a group of
women to visit relatives in Japan, international humanitarian
groups to operate in the North Korean countryside, and South
Korean technicians to construct the nuclear plants under the
Framework accord.(64) Inter-Korean trade rose 4.6 percent,
to $250 million, in 1997.(65)

There is also at least some
(admittedly equivocal) evidence that Pyongyang is
increasingly open to modest market liberalization.(66) An IMF delegation visited last fall
and the World Bank is reportedly considering offering
technical assistance to Pyongyang.(67) Shortly before Kim Dae Jung's
inauguration, a senior North Korean official, Kim Yong Sun,
wrote 70 South Korea leaders appealing for their support to
promote inter-Korean reconciliation; Pyongyang also announced
a program to help locate members of families separated by the
war.(68)

Peace
Overtures

Modest though those actions
may be, they reflect a sea change in North Korea's once
unremitting hostility. In fact, Patrick Cronin of the
National Defense University worries most about "the
possibility of a peace overture from Pyongyang which, if not
met immediately, could be quickly followed by harsh bumps in
the road."(69) Why not respond to a peace overture
with a peace overture? Or, better yet, make one first?

A Poisoned Carrot
Strategy

The United States should
continue to offer modest carrots--fulfill the Framework
agreement, drop restrictions on trade and investment, and
move to full diplomatic recognition--to demonstrate that
Pyongyang gains from responsible behavior. (Washington
relaxed economic sanctions only slightly after negotiating
the Framework in October 1994; the two countries have spent
three years in unsuccessful negotiations over opening liaison
offices.) Obviously, the United States should take nothing
for granted when dealing with the North, but overly cautious
and preoccupied Washington policymakers missed, in the summer
of 1990, what appears to have been a window of opportunity
for improving relations with the DPRK, when, observes Washington
Post reporter Don Oberdorfer, Kim Il Sung's
"traditional alliance with Moscow was in shambles and
his alliance with Beijing was under growing stress."(70)

The United States risks
making the same mistake again. Administration negotiators
have reportedly urged the North to reduce tensions, thereby
allowing Washington to drop trade sanctions.(71) But as Michael Mazarr, editor of the Washington
Quarterly, observes, "U.S. officials have repeated
the phrase 'The ball is in North Korea's court' so many times
that it might as well be tattooed on their foreheads."(72) North Korean officials, not
unreasonably, make the same complaint. They say they have
already taken dramatic action to reduce tensions--namely,
frozen their nuclear program--in exchange for greater
economic and political contacts. Indeed, Woodrow Wilson
Center scholar Selig Harrison argues that "it was
primarily because the United States promised to remove these
sanctions that Pyongyang decided to conclude the nuclear
freeze agreement."(73) Yet the North has received little in
return.

DPRK officials have warned
Americans that hard-liners point to the lack of a U.S.
response as reason to abrogate the nuclear accord.(74) Such claims, though impossible to
verify, are credible. Washington could make a significant
symbolic, but essentially costless, gesture by lifting
restrictions on contact with North Korea. Ending sanctions
really would put the ball in the DPRK's court. Modest
economic exchanges would not materially aid the North's
military. As Mazarr explains, "Selling North Korea a
thousand new tank engines would enhance its military power in
a meaningful way; allowing a hotel chain to build a resort on
one of the North's picturesque mountains would not."(75)

The United States should also
offer limited humanitarian aid, both bilateral and
multilateral. For instance, the administration used the
promise of continuing assistance to help induce the North to
join four-power talks along with China and South Korea.(76) As is the case with ending sanctions,
the goal is not to prop up the North Korean regime.(77) But refusing to help--though
tempting, given the DPRK's awful human rights record(78)--risks losing the larger game of
maintaining peace until the communist regime in Pyongyang
disappears. Measured amounts of aid demonstrate to the North
that cooperation with the West gains more than do demands for
additional concessions.(79)

In conjunction with Japan and
South Korea, Washington should dangle the possibility of
investment, trade, and other benefits if the North undertakes
serious discussions with Seoul. The Basic Agreements signed
by the two Koreas in 1991 offer an obvious starting point for
reducing the volatility of the still tense peninsula. The
United States should indicate that economic ties with
American enterprises would grow naturally once North Korea
lost its pariah status. Japan would likely offer an aid
package upon normalization of relations with the DPRK, just
as it did to South Korea in 1965.(80) The new government of Kim Dae Jung
would also likely pay dearly, if more indirectly, to reduce
tensions.

Washington should also use
the prospect of an American troop withdrawal, something long
demanded by Pyongyang (which pressed to include the issue of
the U.S. troop presence on the agenda of the four-power
talks), and the promise of no first use of nuclear weapons to
challenge the North to respond in kind. Concessions by the
DPRK might include having its forces stand down from the
border and demobilizing some units of its extensive, if
underequipped, army.(81) The North has indicated its
willingness to consider force redeployments and reductions as
part of wider-ranging talks. If Pyongyang takes action, the
United States and South Korea should quickly respond in kind.
DPRK officials complain that American air superiority puts
their nation at a military disadvantage, forcing them to
position their military near the DMZ.(82) Their argument is not entirely
self-serving, given periodic ROK threats to march north and
Washington's overwhelming military capabilities.

Here, again, Washington and
Seoul need to test the DPRK's intentions. The message should
be clear: responding to U.S. disengagement by reducing North
Korea's threat to the South would yield a commensurate
reduction in the forces facing the North. If the DPRK refused
to reciprocate, Seoul ought to respond with whatever military
buildup it deemed necessary.

The Four-Power
Talks: Opportunity and a Potential Snare

The four-power talks, which
resumed in March, offer an opportunity to replace a temporary
armistice in a formal war with a permanent peace treaty.
Observed Chinese deputy foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan at the
conclusion of the first round last December, "This marks
a very good beginning. We hope the establishment of a peace
mechanism on the Korean Peninsula will not take another 43
years."(83) North Korea has, for the first time
since the war, formally committed itself to talks directed at
"the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula and issues concerning tension reduction
there."(84)

It is, however, critical that
the United States not offer a long-term guarantee of the
peninsula's security, with or without China. (Last December
president-elect Kim Dae Jung reiterated his support for
"four-power guarantees for Korean peace.")(85) That arrangement would entail
promises by the United States, China, Japan, and Russia to
act to prevent conflict on the peninsula. Unfortunately, such
a commitment would keep America enmeshed in Korean affairs at
least as long as two competing regimes existed on the
peninsula, and potentially forever. It would also maintain a
potential flashpoint with Northeast Asia's three major
powers. All of those nations should learn from World War I
and build firebreaks to war through nonintervention, rather
than create potential transmission belts of conflict through
promises of intervention. They should especially emphasize
that they will stay out of any conflict inaugurated by their
respective "clients."

Such a strategy would not
only isolate any war, it would reduce the likelihood of
conflict by making it clear that the aggressor would be on
its own, without even a faint hope of support from its
putative allies. Washington's goal should be to end its
current unnatural and dangerous military commitment in Korea,
not transform it into an equally unnatural and dangerous
multilateral commitment.

Transferring
Responsibility to the South

Most important, though, the
United States should turn responsibility for South-North
relations over to Seoul. Kim Dae Jung has already proposed
high-level meetings leading to a summit between the two
nations' leaders. (At the same time, he chose a known
hard-liner to be his unification minister.) Pyongyang, in
turn, seems to have lowered the volume of the usual stream of
insults directed at the South (the DPRK held former president
Kim Young Sam in special contempt).(86) Indeed, shortly before Kim Dae Jung's
inauguration, Kim Yong Sun stated, "We make clear that
we are willing to have dialogue and negotiation with anyone
in South Korea." He added that his government was ready
to "turn inter-Korean relations . . . into a
relationship of conciliation and unity."(87) The DPRK indicated a conditional
willingness to open direct talks with the South. Although
caution is certainly warranted, the ROK should test the
seriousness of Pyongyang's overtures.

Such a policy shift would
offer a way out of today's unsatisfactory box: North Korea
has long attempted to ignore the ROK in favor of Washington
while the South has attempted to manipulate U.S. policy to
serve Seoul's objectives. Both Korean governments have proven
to be prickly, obstinate, and unreasonable. The result has
been incessant whining on the part of the South and
complaints by Seoul's American friends.(88) Indeed, with Washington offering a
seemingly permanent and cost-free defense guarantee, the ROK
has, according to former U.S. ambassador Richard Sneider,
tended "to ignore or discount the costs we have to
calculate in deciding how to react to North Korean
provocations."(89) The solution is for America to
announce that it plans to extricate itself from inter-Korean
affairs and promote good bilateral relations with both
countries (though its ties with South Korea are destined to
long remain stronger than those with the North, for economic,
historical, and political reasons).(90) Reunification seems inevitable; the
only question is whether the process will be messy.(91) The world has changed enough to allow
Washington to absent itself and wish the two involved parties
well.

Weaning
the ROK from Its Dependence

Placing responsibility for
Korea's future on the Korean people would encourage South
Korea to become a more serious player, both domestically and
internationally. First, Seoul would face pressure to complete
the process of democratization. The release of former
presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo probably improves
the prospects, not only of accommodation with the North,
since Pyongyang's leaders are unlikely to agree to any form
of reunification that puts them within the power of a
vengeful ROK, but also of domestic political reconciliation.
However, Seoul still needs to reform its repressive national
security law that limits civil liberties and authorizes the
arrest of political protestors, including those who favor a
less hostile policy toward the North.(92)

Second, the South would have
to take a more responsible role internationally. Relations
with Japan, for instance, remain tainted by Tokyo's
admittedly brutal but distant colonial rule.(93) President Kim Young Sam fanned
nationalistic passions in a dispute over Tokdo (Takeshima to
the Japanese) Island in the Sea of the Japan.(94) Without the U.S. security umbrella,
the ROK would have an incentive to work through historical
hatreds and cooperate with like-minded states, of which Japan
is the prime example.

To change U.S. policy,
especially to change it so dramatically, would admittedly
unsettle policymakers here and abroad. Those devoted to the
status quo often respond to reform proposals with ad hominem
rather than policy arguments.(95) But the world is changing. The U.S.
commitment to Seoul was established during the Cold War, when
an aggressive North Korea, backed by China and the Soviet
Union, had the capability and desire to destroy the South.
Today both sides of the equation have changed: the
adversary's threat is significantly less, and the ally's
ability to respond is dramatically greater. That has caused
even mainstream analysts like George Wilson, former national
defense correspondent for the Washington Post, and
Selig Harrison to suggest reducing U.S. force levels in
Korea.(96) A study group organized by scholars
at the Economic Strategy Institute and the Woodrow Wilson
Center endorsed an eventual full withdrawal of American
soldiers.(97)

Such an adjustment would not
be a retreat to "isolationism," the usual term of
opprobrium thrown at anyone who advocates the slightest
change in America's current foreign policy.(98) The United States would retain
interests in East Asia sufficient to warrant a continuing
active cultural, economic, and political role. Militarily,
the United States would retain a mid-Pacific presence with
the capability of intervening in East Asia to thwart a
hegemonic power, if necessary.(99)

South Korea need not be
America's perpetual security dependent--much less become an
economic ward as well. Emblematic of Seoul's overall success
is its $19.6 billion bullet train project (scaled back in the
aftermath of the economic crisis). The United States tosses
around such sums with wild abandon, but $19.6 billion is real
money in Korea. Indeed, $19.6 billion is about the annual GDP
of North Korea. While Pyongyang is struggling to feed its
people, the South can spend the equivalent of the North's
entire economy on a massive rail system. The ROK has
decisively won the competition between the two political and
economic systems.

Current economic and
political travails notwithstanding, South Korea has matured
as a nation. One characteristic of mature countries is that
they defend themselves, rather than remain dependent on
others. Indeed, the recent economic crisis has stirred up
South Koreans' latent xenophobia, causing anger about
supposed American and Japanese neocolonialism and a frenzied
(though perhaps only temporary) rejection of foreign
products.(100) A healthier response would be for
South Korean citizens to resent their unnecessary, unnatural,
and humiliating security dependence on the United States and
to take corrective steps.

Seoul and Washington should
negotiate the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces and the
termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty and establish
instead an informal cooperative military and political
relationship between equals. Only then will South Korea's
transformation from political child to adult be complete.

12. See, for example, Carroll
Bogert, "Secrets and Lies," Newsweek,
September 22, 1997, pp. 42-45. The relief organization World
Vision makes the astounding estimate of a 15 percent death
rate in North Korea. World Vision, "Survey Finds 15
Percent May Be Dead from Famine in North Korea," Press
release, September 15, 1997, pp. 1-3. Other estimates suggest
a mortality rate as high as 25 percent in the worst-hit rural
areas. Scott Snyder, "North Korea's Decline and China's
Strategic Dilemmas," United States Institute for Peace
Special Report, October 1997. The UN World Food Program hopes
to provide food to 7.5 million people, a third of the
population, in 1998. "UN to Provide More Food Aid for
North Korea," Washington Post, November 27,
1997, p. A40. See also Kevin Sullivan, "North Korea Says
It Is Running Out of Food," Washington Post,
March 2, 1998, p. A11; and "North Korea's Dreadful
Spring," The Economist, March 7, 1998, p. 42.

The international
Red Cross warns that North Korea's health system is also
"close to collapse." "Red Cross Seeks Aid for
North Korea," Washington Times, November 26,
1997, p. A16. Dr. Eric Goemaere, director-general of the
French humanitarian group Doctors Without Borders, says North
Korean hospitals have "nothing to offer to the
patients." "Medical Shortages Seen Killing N.
Koreans," Washington Times, December 8, 1997,
p. A13. The North does not even have enough money to pay for
health insurance for its diplomats; UN ambassador Kim Hyong U
received care only through the charity of Korean-Americans.
Barbara Crossette, "Korean-Americans Assist an Ailing
Envoy from the North," New York Times,
September 3, 1997, p. A3. The government is also scaling back
its diplomatic operations overseas, a significant blow to
Pyongyang's national esteem. "North Korea to Cut
Diplomatic Operations," Washington Post, March
15, 1998, p. A23. In short, the DPRK's "socialist
system," argues Washington Post reporter Keith
Richburg, "simply has ceased to function." Keith
Richburg, "Beyond a Wall of Secrecy, Devastation," Washington
Post, October 19, 1997, p. A1.

13. Recent studies of Russia's
and China's complex relationships with the two Koreas include
Mikhail Nosov, "Challenges to the Strategic Balance in
East Asia on the Eve of the 21st Century: A View from
Russia," Center for Naval Analyses, CIM 522, August
1997; and Snyder.

16. For instance, the DPRK's
active duty forces are thought to number 1,055,000, compared
to 672,000 for the South. There are similar disparities in
numbers of tanks and artillery pieces. International
Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 183-86.

18. William Taylor,
"American Economic and Security Interests in the Korean
Peninsula," Paper presented to the Study Group on
American Interests in Asia: Economic and Security Priorities,
Economic Strategy Institute, Washington, December 12, 1996,
p. 17. Emphasis Taylor's. Other analysts advocate improving
U.S. response capabilities in the event of a war. John
Cushman, "The QDR: Make a Bold Move," Proceedings,
September 1997, p. 6. Leading congressional Republicans talk
about enhancing U.S. security commitments and military
capabilities in Korea. Doug Bereuter, "Prospects for
U.S.-North Korean Relations: The Congressional
Viewpoint," Korea Economic Institute of America's Korea
Economic Update, June 1997, p. 3.

23. Quoted in Andrew Pollack,
"S. Korea Firms Face a Foreign Takeover Wave," San
Diego Union-Tribune, December 27, 1997, p. A19. If Kim
lives up to his word, South Korea's economy should rebound
quickly. Kim promised to end the existing system of crony
capitalism: "I will sever all businesses from political
shackles and protection. Businesses must survive in a
free-market economy and through global competition."
Quoted in "Kim Grants Amnesty to Ex-Presidents," San
Diego Union-Tribune, December 20, 1997, p. A12. He
voiced similar opinions after his inauguration. "A New
Helmsman," Far Eastern Economic Review, March
26, 1998, pp. 13-14.

25. Doug Bandow, "The IMF: A
Record of Addiction and Failure," in Perpetuating
Poverty: The World Bank, the IMF, and the Developing World,
ed. Doug Bandow and Ian Vásquez (Washington: Cato Institute,
1994), pp. 15-36. Aid from other institutions has been no
more effective. See, for example, Doug Bandow, "Help or
Hindrance: Can Foreign Aid Prevent International
Crises?" Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 273, April
25, 1997; and Doug Bandow, "A New Aid Policy for a New
World," Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 226, May 15,
1995.

45. President Kim has since
promised to fulfill the agreement, but some analysts have
suggested using South Korea's economic distress as an excuse
for reneging on the deal entirely. Victor Gilinsky and Henry
Sokolski, "A Silver Lining to Asia's Financial
Crisis," Washington Post, January 19, 1998, p.
A25. To do so, however, would be to risk reigniting the
nuclear crisis that previously brought the two Koreas and the
United States to the brink of war. Oberdorfer, pp. 316-26.
The nuclear issue is painfully complex, but the most
important goal should be to avoid any risk of military
action. Bandow, Tripwire, pp. 103-45. It makes far
more sense to play out the political endgame, which the
United States and the ROK have won, than to risk everything
to save the South Koreans, who have benefited so much from
American defense subsidies for so long, a little money.

48. Various models, ranging from
garrison state to Swiss neutrality, have been suggested as
possibilities for a united Korea. Ben Kremenak, Korea's
Road to Unification: Potholes, Detours and Dead Ends
(College Park, Md.: Center for International and Security
Studies at Maryland, May 1997), pp. 59-71. In any case, a
united Korea, especially one made more productive after the
North entered the world marketplace, that maintained existing
defense expenditures would prove very expensive to swallow.

50. Rasmussen Research,
"Most Think U.S. Defense Obligations Should Include Only
Three Countries--Canada, Mexico, and Great Britain,"
Press release, August 8, 1997, p. 1.

51. Quoted in David Pitt,
"Seoul, U.S. Forces and the North: The Balance Is As
Delicate As Ever," New York Times, April 8,
1987, p. A10.

52. Warren Christopher,
"Strengthening Ties between the United States and South
Korea, Remarks at the Inaugural Reception for the
Korean-United States Twenty-First Century Council,
Washington, February 17, 1994," U.S. Department of State
Dispatch, February 28, 1994, p. 104.

58. The prospect of Chinese
assertiveness, if not aggressiveness, poses a particularly
serious challenge for current U.S. policy since all of
America's allies desire protection from attack but are
unwilling to support U.S. policy in defense of any other
state, such as Taiwan. Warns Carpenter, "If China does
make a bid for regional hegemony at some point, there is
literally no power other than the United States that is
positioned to block that bid. That is a blueprint for a
U.S.-Chinese war in which China's neighbors conveniently
remain on the sidelines." Carpenter, p. 27.

62. As serious as the DPRK's
situation is, it would be unwise to assume that collapse is
either imminent or inevitable. See, for example, Marcus
Noland, "Why North Korea Will Muddle Through," Foreign
Affairs 76, no. 4 (July-August 1997): 105-18.

63. Sang-Hun Choe, "N. Korea
Accused of Executions," San Diego
Union-Tribune, February 19, 1998, p. A12. There have
even been unconfirmed reports of fighting between police and
military forces in Pyongyang. "Vague Reports of Unrest
in Shuttered North Korea," New York Times,
March 8, 1998, p. A4.

65. In fact, the North accounted
for $190 million of the trade, principally in gold and other
minerals. Seoul shipped $60 million worth of petrochemicals
and textiles. "Korea: Bilateral Trade Up," Far
Eastern Economic Review, February 5, 1998, p. 57.

66. Compare Nicholas Kristof,
"North Korea's Favorite Son Wins Top Title," New
York Times, October 9, 1997, p. A10, and Harrison,
"Promoting a Soft Landing in Korea," with "In
Other Words," Far Eastern Economic Review,
August 14, 1997, p. 11. Secretly recorded conversations with
Kim Jong Il indicate that while he desires to modernize his
country, he is aware of the political upheaval that could
result. See, for example, Oberdorfer, pp. 349-50. At the same
time, he worries that mass starvation could result in
"anarchy." Ibid., p. 395.

77. There is a long history of
food aid's being misused by other dictatorial states. John
Pomfret, "New Crisis, Old Pitfalls Loom in N.
Korea," Washington Post, September 23, 1997, p.
A12. There is also evidence that North Korea might have
diverted some humanitarian aid to the military. Mindy Belz,
"The Tin-Cup Tyranny," World, December 6,
1997, pp. 19-20. But humanitarian groups contend that
large-scale transfers have not occurred. See, for example,
Andrew Browne, "Foreign Aid Staves Off Famine in North
Korea," Washington Times, October 6, 1997, p.
A11. Seoul has seconded North Korean denials that Pyongyang
was selling donated food. "North Korea Accused of
Reselling Food," Washington Times, July 23,
1997, p. A12. Nevertheless, too much aid will not only save
helpless civilians but prop up the existing regime.

79. For instance, Washington
donated 170,000 tons of food to the North in 1997. In the
same year, the United Nations World Food Program provided
360,000 tons to help feed 4.7 million people. The UNWFP hopes
to expand its work in 1998, and Pyongyang has agreed to allow
more intensive monitoring to ensure civilian use of the food.
John Goshko, "U.N. Asks for $378 Million in Food Aid for
North Koreans," Washington Post, January 7,
1998, p. A9.

81. Some North Koreans have
suggested that they don't oppose a continuing presence of
U.S. forces so long as they keep the South in check.
Oberdorfer, p. 402; Bandow, Tripwire, pp. 98-99;
Harrison, "Promoting a Soft Landing," pp. 69-71.
The possibility of aggression by South Korea stretches back
to Syngman Rhee, the ROK's first president. Some U.S.
officials had much the same fear as did Kim Young Sam.
Oberdorfer, p. 392. Of course, the last thing Washington
should do is perpetuate its Korean security presence by
partially directing it against its long-time ally,
Seoul.

Ruling out the use
of nuclear weapons may be particularly important in
encouraging the North to fulfill its pledge to allow
comprehensive inspections of nuclear facilities. As Harrison
explains, if Seoul and Washington "expect the North to
surrender its nuclear option, they must be prepared to give
up the concept of nuclear deterrence as the basis for the
South's defense." Selig Harrison, "U.S. Policy
toward North Korea," in North Korea after Kim Il
Sung, ed. Dae-Sook Suh and Chae-Jin Lee (Boulder, Colo.:
Lynne Rienner, 1998), p 75.

84. Steven Lee Myers,
"Starting on a 'Long Road,' North Korea Agrees to Talks
with Seoul, U.S. and China," New York Times,
November 22, 1997, p. A5. The process has been far from
smooth, for the DPRK still frequently practices diplomatic
brinkmanship. "North Korea Threatens to Leave Peace
Talks," Washington Post, March 22, 1998, p.
A24.

87. Quoted in Paul Shin, "N.
Korea Offers Line of Communication to Its Southern
Rival," San Diego Union-Tribune, February 19,
1998, p. A15.

88. See, for example, Daryl
Plunk, "A Silver Lining in Korea's Crisis: New Pledges
Signal Hope for Economic Recovery and Peaceful
Reunification," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder no.
169, January 15, 1998, pp. 5-6. Amazingly, the Clinton
administration felt the need to ask the ROK for permission to
hold bilateral meetings in Washington with North Korea's vice
foreign minister. South Korea should not be given veto power
over U.S. policy toward the North.

90. One of the most important
differences between America and Japan is the fact that ethnic
Koreans in the former, in contrast to the latter, have always
shared family and community ties with the South. See, for
example, Matt Miller, "Ties That Bind," Far
Eastern Economic Review, January 22, 1998, pp. 27-28.

91. The dramatic differences
between the systems alone ensure that the process will be
difficult. Kremenak, pp. 25-58. Thus, neither Korea is likely
to be in much of a hurry for reunification. Both countries
viewed the German experience with apprehension. During my
visit in August 1992, officials in Pyongyang expressed their
concern about the survival of their "social system"
and of being "swallowed" by the South. South
Koreans, in contrast, fear the cost of attempting to
reconstruct the DPRK, a burden that seems even harder to bear
after the recent financial crisis. Economist Marcus Noland
estimates that the expense could be as much as $1 trillion.
Noland, p. 114. See also Nicholas Kristof, "In South,
Korean Unity Appealing in Abstract Only," New York
Times, August 31, 1997, p. 10.

92. The ROK continues to
prosecute its own citizens for failing to treat official
South Korean policy as infallible. "Trial Begins of
South Korean Activist," Washington Post,
January 31, 1998, p. A16. Seoul is even willing to prosecute
American citizens for publishing information in the United
States. See, for example, Nicholas Kristof, "News in
U.S. Can Be 'Rumor' in Seoul, and Lead to Jail," New
York Times, January 7, 1998, p. A3. President Kim has
offered to change the law, but only if the DPRK takes a
"corresponding step." "Kim Won't Abolish
National Security Law," Washington Times, March
13, 1998, p. A14. Although Kim announced a sweeping amnesty,
he actually freed only a handful of political prisoners.
Kevin Sullivan, "S. Korea Frees 74 Political
Prisoners," Washington Post, March 14, 1998, p.
A19; Nicholas Kristof, "New South Korean Leader Grants
Sweeping Amnesty to 5.5 Million," New York Times,
March 14, 1998, p. A1; and Nicholas Kristof, "Seoul
Leader, Ex-Inmate Himself, Is Slow to Free Political
Prisoners," New York Times, March 10, 1998, p.
A1. Moreover, Kim has used his prosecutorial power to
intimidate the political opposition. Dane Lee, "S.
Korean Leader; Probe Is Pry Bar on Opposition," Washington
Times, March 10, 1998, p. A13.

93. In fact, the causes of
hostility go back even further--at least 400 years. Nicholas
Kristof, "Japan, Korea and 1597: A Year That Lives in
Infamy," New York Times, September 14, 1997, p.
3.

94. The third-place finisher in
December's presidential election, ruling party cabinet
minister turned independent candidate Rhee In Je, actually
journeyed to the barren rock to wave a South Korean flag.

95. See, for example, U.S.
Committee to Expand NATO, "Cato Study Fundamentally
Flawed, Claim Leading Experts on NATO Expansion,"
October 28, 1997, p. 1, which denounces my proposals to
withdraw U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula as being
"well outside the mainstream of responsible
opinion."

Some of the
resentment has taken on an explicitly anti-American tone,
which could rightly be regarded as incredibly ungrateful,
given 40 years of U.S. security assistance and the more
recent financial bailout. See Nicholas Kristof, "Many
Proud South Koreans Resent Bailout from Abroad," New
York Times, December 11, 1997, pp. A1, D4. By early 1998
the anti-American frenzy seemed to have abated a bit.
Nicholas Kristof, "Asians Worry That U.S. Aid Is a New
Colonialism," New York Times, February 17,
1998, p. A4. Ironically, anti-Americanism first arose last
year among Thais and Malays, in particular, who were angry
that the United States did not intervene to bail them out.
See, for example, Michael Vatikiotis, "Pacific
Divide," Far Eastern Economic Review, November
6, 1997, pp. 14-16.

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