The Big Bomb-RDS-220 was exploded on Krushchev personal order. It was intended as propaganda stunt at the time of growing international tension and Cold War in its peak intensity;Very interesting article- Link below;The Soviet Weapons Program - The Tsar Bomba

"The device offically designated RDS-220, known to its designers as Big Ivan, and nicknamed in the west Tsar Bomba (and referred to as the Big Bomb by Sakharov in his Memoirs[Sakharov 1990]) was the largest nuclear weapon ever constructed or detonated. This three stage weapon was actually a 100 megaton bomb design, but the uranium fusion stage tamper of the tertiary (and possibly the secondary) stage(s) was replaced by one(s) made of lead. This reduced the yield by 50% by eliminating the fast fissioning of the uranium tamper by the fusion neutrons, and eliminated 97% of the fallout (1.5 megatons of fission, instead of about 51.5 Mt), yet still proved the full yield design. The result was the "cleanest" weapon ever tested with 97% of the energy coming from fusion reactions. The effect of this bomb at full yield on global fallout would have been tremendous. It would have increased the world's total fission fallout since the invention of the atomic bomb by 25%."

"There was no previously existing military requirement for a 100 megaton weapon - such weapons are virtually useless for military purposes. The Soviet Union had only one delivery system capable of carrying a weapon of this size - a handful of the relatively slow prop-driven Tu-95 bomber - and it was incapable of intercontinental range with a payload this large. A 100 Mt weapon can level urban areas in a zone 60 km wide, cause heavy damage in a zone 100 km across, cause 3rd degree burns in a region 170 km across (only a bit smaller than the width of West Germany) and eye damage to 220 km. Such a weapon can only be used as a means of destroying an entire urban region - a major urban complex including suburbs and even neighboring cities. This scale of destruction is much larger than any discrete urban area in Western Europe. With its dense settlement, use of such a weapon in Europe is equivalent to an attack on a major portion of an entire nation and its population. Fallout from a low altitude or surface burst in central England could produce lethal exposures extending into the Warsaw Pact nations; a similar explosion in West Germany could create lethal fallout as far as the Soviet border. Even in the United States there were only three urban regions at that time large enough to conceivably merit attack with such a weapon - New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. On any smaller target it would be simple overkill. Even if the Tu-95 were able to reach Chicago, the closest plausible U.S. target, (which is doubtful given the enormous payload, far in excess of normal for long-range missions, and the added drag from the belly bulge required to house the bomb) it would have been detected crossing the North American early warning line and then been over U.S. and Canadian territory for 8 hours - ample time for jet fighters to intercept and shoot it down ""

Actually in the United States they are developing a system of computers able to simulate nuclear explosion. It's no more that necessary to cause a real detonation.

The main trouble o a similar system is that it has to work without a central "brain", because it can generate delays and a crowded central memory.

Researchers of the Purdue University have presented the results of their work at last Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks.

This is old hat. America (and Britain using American facilities and France independently) have been using "virtual" testing since 1996. The software was developed using the French Pacific tests as models with Anglo-American connivance.

This is old hat. America (and Britain using American facilities and France independently) have been using "virtual" testing since 1996. The software was developed using the French Pacific tests as models with Anglo-American connivance.

Do you have a source for that? I can certainly believe it - it sounds like the sort of thing we'd do - but I've never heard of the US getting an in to the 1996 French nuclear tests before.

Do you have a source for that? I can certainly believe it - it sounds like the sort of thing we'd do - but I've never heard of the US getting an in to the 1996 French nuclear tests before.

There was a lengthy article in "The Economist" at the time (1997 or so) as to why the British and American governments didn't put any pressure on the French over their nuclear tests and how the two powers were able to build a new generation of nukes without live testing. The timing co-incided with Cray Computers ( the supercomputer manufacturer) being pulled back from bankruptcy by strong government sales. The article (as usual with that magazine) appeared to have highly authoratative contributors, so has a high credibility value.
Here's a link to the French tae on simulations tests ( in French) Simulation (programme nucléaire) - Wikipédia

October 14, 1954 -The Government of the USSR issues a resolution establishing the Western Ore Mining and Processing Complex under the direction of A.E.Stepanets based on Complex 6 1954 -The Air Defense Forces of the USSR are created February 1955 -A Scientific and Technical Board for missile defense is established within the MSM SSSR February 1955 - Air tests of the R-11FM, the first submarine ballistic missile take place at the Kapustin Yar missile testing ground February 25, 1955 - A.P.Zavenyagin is appointed Minister of Medium Machine Building March 8, 1955 -A nuclear reactor for the first atomic submarine is commissioned at Laboratory V March 14, 1955 -The Government of the USSR issues a resolution on transferring the Directorate for Industrial Construction (Glavpromstroi) headed by A.N.Komarovsky from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the MSM SSSR April 4, 1955 -The Soviet Government issues a resolution on transferring the Eighth Directorate that ensured operation of joint uranium mining and processing enterprises abroad to the MSM SSSR April 14, 1955 -Institutions involved in rocket building are separated from the MSM. A Special Arms Committee is established on their basis May 4, 1955 -The Government issues a resolution on constructing Northern Kazakhh Complex 4 in Stepnogorsk under the direction of S.A.Smirnov to mine uranium and other materials for the nuclear industry May 1955 -The Soviet Union approaches all nuclear states with a proposal to commit to stopping nuclear tests August 13, 1955 - The Government issues a resolution on building the R-12 (SS-4 Sandal) intermediate range ballistic missile August 8 through 20, 1955 -The first international conference on peaceful uses of nuclear energy involving Soviet specialists convenes in Geneva August 25, 1955 - The Government issues a resolution on building R-13 (SS-N-4), a new submarine ballistic missile November 14, 1955 -The Soviet Government issues a resolution on constructing Factory 825 for uranium isotope separation (Krasnoyarsk-45, now Zelenogorsk) November 22, 1955 - The USSR conducts the first tests of the RDS-37, a new high-power two-stage thermonuclear device December 1955 -The first fast neutron experimental reactor is put into operation at Laboratory V. A.I.Leipunsky is appointed Scientific Leader 1955 -The U-95A intercontinental heavy bomber is entered in the stockpile February 2, 1956 - Nuclear tests involving the R-5 ballistic missile are conducted March 17, 1956 - Rudoupravlenie 16 for uranium production under the direction of S.F.Zhiryakov (Zabaikalsk Ore Mining and Processing Complex) is incorporated into the MSM SSSR March 26, 1956 -An agreement is signed establishing the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, an international scientific organization in Dubna under the direction of D.I.Blokhintsev October 1956 -New York International Conference adopts the IAEA Charter November 1956 -A plan of construction in the USSR of a number of nuclear power stations in 1956 through 1960 is adopted December 17, 1956 - The Government issues a resolution on building the R-16 (SS-7 Saddler) intercontinental ballistic missile 1956 -The USSR proposes that stationing of nuclear weapons in the Central Europe be banned 1956 - R-5 (SS-3 Shyster), the first Soviet intermediate range ballistic missile is deployed May 25, 1957 – The Avangard Electromechanical Plant is established based on Factory 551 of KB-11 under the direction of M.A.Grigoriev April 30, 1957 -M.G.Pervukhin is appointed Minister of Medium Machine Building of the USSR July 24, 1957 -E.P.Slavsky is appointed Minister of Medium Machine Building of the USSR August 9, 1957 - The first atomic submarine of Project-627 is launched August 1957 -The USSR successfully tests the R-7 (SS-6 Sapwood), the first intercontinental ballistic missile 1957 - The R-12 (SS-4 Sandal) Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missile is tested September 29, 1957 - A radio-ecological accident occurs at Complex 817 October 10, 1957 - Nuclear tests of the T-5 submarine combat torpedo are conducted at the Northern Test Site December 5, 1957 -LENIN, the first atomic icebreaker is launched

Americans in general ,there is a cowardly nation. The american will sell of its mother for money.The Americans are despicable cowardly nation.

Yes, they do sell every think they could if somebody is so desperate to get it;

I’m not sure that this story is a true but it is very interesting and funny (in a sense). It comes from book “Under the Cloud-the Decades of Nuclear Testing” by Richard L. Miller

“Having an army that had always relied heavily on artillery, [the Soviets] were also particularly interested in the small shells similar to the one fired during the 1953 “GRABLE” shot. Thus, some time later, the Russians were delighted when a U.S. Army major walked into the Soviet residency in West Germany offering to rent them the latest model of a nuclear artillery shell.

The embassy immediately turned the matter over to the GRU, the supersecret Office of Military Intelligence. The officer in charge was suspicious; the major wanted a lot of money for the shell. And it had to be returned in two months so his supervisors wouldn’t miss it.

It was an unusual request, but two months would give the Soviet weapons specialists ample time to determine how Los Alamos had miniaturized its fission weapons. As proof of his intentions, the major had even turned over some documents detailing operations procedures for use with atomic equipment. Specialists in the GRU confirmed that the documents were genuine. To the Soviets, the deal began to look better and better.

They decided to rent the shell.

Key embassy personnel immediately boarded an Aeroflot plane for Moscow. There they were given a week-long crash course detailing what was known about American atomic weapon technology. Upon their return, they made plans to meet with the major and receive the merchandise.

Shortly afterwards, the Soviets waited in a forest clearing on a dark rainy night, bank note-laden briefcase in hand, waiting for their shell. The major finally pulled up in the car and handed the GRU officers the weapon. Pulling out a Geiger counter, the GRU weapons specialist quickly determined that it was indeed radioactive. The size, weight, and markings matched perfectly. After turning over the bank notes to the major, the agents headed straight for their embassy with their new American bomb.

Within hours, the atomic weapon was on its way via armed diplomatic courier to GRU headquarters in Moscow.

The headquarters of Soviet military intelligence was (and still is) located in a drab, windowless brick building complex at one side of Kodinka airfield in the center of Moscow. Surrounded by armed police, guard dogs, and electrified barbed wire, it is a masterwork of security. Inside the fence is a wall-like, two-story building enclosing a central courtyard in which still another building is located, the nine-story head office.

Cars are not allowed inside the courtyard. All coming into the area are scrutinized thoroughly, their clothing checked for any bit of metal that may be a weapon or spy device. Briefcases, cigarette lighters, and “outside” fountain pens are forbidden. Even belt buckles are frowned upon; many of the operatchiks inside the GRU wear suspenders. Surveillance is complete and absolute. No object is too small or insignificant-appearing to be dismissed as a potential weapon.

Into this fortress of security the GRU chief carried an American atomic bomb. As soon as it was safe in the headquarters building, a call was made to the Soviet Central Committee at the Kremlin, not far away.

“Where is the bomb?” someone at the Kremlin asked.

“We have it in GRU headquarters!”

“In Moscow?”

“Yes!”

“And what happens if there is a little spring inside this shell and it explodes right in the middle of the Soviet capital and turns Moscow into Hiroshima?”

Silence. The GRU chief hadn’t thought of that.

The chief was soon on his way to the Kremlin to do some explaining. The shell, meanwhile, was headed for the island of Novaya Zemlya, the Soviet atomic testing site in the wilds of the arctic. Scientists there were ordered to tear the weapon apart.

Fearful of “the spring,” or some other booby trap, the scientists initially refused. After explaining the situation to them, the military officers finally persuaded the scientists that it was in their best interests to open the atomic shell. At first, the technicians were surprised at the radioactivity level; it was higher than expected. Perhaps the Americans were using the uranium or plutonium in a new configuration, one that was more radioactive.

When they finally opened the shell, the scientists had their answer: The weapon was a mock-up, a “standard weight equivalent” that had been skillfully painted to look like the real thing. As for the question of radioactivity, looking inside the scientists found the answer. For an exorbitant fee, the Soviet government had purchased several pounds of American nuclear waste.

Furious, the GRU chief tried to locate the American major, but he was too late. He—and the bank notes—had been transferred back to the States. After receiving his “service incompetence note,” the chief then petitioned the Soviet Central Committee for authorization to track down the major and have him killed. Permission was denied. In effect, the chief was told that the major had outsmarted him once, he could probably do it again.”

There was a lengthy article in "The Economist" at the time (1997 or so) as to why the British and American governments didn't put any pressure on the French over their nuclear tests and how the two powers were able to build a new generation of nukes without live testing. The timing co-incided with Cray Computers ( the supercomputer manufacturer) being pulled back from bankruptcy by strong government sales. The article (as usual with that magazine) appeared to have highly authoratative contributors, so has a high credibility value.

Do you remember the date? I'd like to see if I can get it out of the library.

I know that the US does do nuclear explosive simulation, although it's aimed at maintaining the reliability of our existing weapons, not designing new ones. That's not exactly a secret - there was a letter to the editor in the New York Times explaining that very fact from, IIRC, the director of Los Alamos lab. It's just I'd never heard of the French connection.

That said, there are other ways to get nuclear data than actual live-fire tests. I may be misremembering, but I believe both the US and Russia still do subcritical implosion tests, and half the purpose of the National Ignition Facility is replicating miniature nuclear explosions for testing purposes.

When they finally opened the shell, the scientists had their answer: The weapon was a mock-up, a “standard weight equivalent” that had been skillfully painted to look like the real thing. As for the question of radioactivity, looking inside the scientists found the answer. For an exorbitant fee, the Soviet government had purchased several pounds of American nuclear waste.

With Yucca mountain cancelled, I believe that's the new DoE plan for long-term waste disposal.

Yes, right in Arzamas-16 carried out experimenting with subcritical mass.
Why Russia and the U.S. want to resume testing but they does not do it?
Look around and you will see that in this crazy world, it's just unacceptable .