永康＋薄（熙来）: Yongkang + Bo (Xilai): Zhou Yongkang was a close ally of Bo Xilai, and reportedly Bo’s sole supporter when Bo was first investigated in 2012.

Jiang Zeming Rumors: Google search results for the following blocked keywords come most frequently from the websites of New Tang Dynasty Television, Aboluowang, and the Epoch Times.

二奸二（假）: two betrayals and two falsehoods—In 2009, historian Lü Jiaping published the article “About Jiang Zemin’s ‘Two Betrayals and Two Falsehoods’: Political Issues and a Request for Fraud Investigation.” In 2011, Lü was sentenced to ten years in prison for inciting subversion. Earlier this month, Lü was reportedly released from prison on bail for medical reasons [Chinese].

江＋苏俄奸细: Jiang + Soviet spy—Jiang Zemin allegedly had an affair with a Soviet spy during his time in Russia. “Carat Baby” (克拉娃), a reference to the supposed spy, is also frequently a sensitive search term.

网特: Internet agent—Typically implies CIA or Western agents, the foreign equivalent of the Fifty Cent Party in China.

今年＋2015年: this year + 2015—Unclear why this keyword combination is blocked. Reader tips are welcome.

不雅: indecency

CDT Chinese runs a project that crowd-sources filtered keywords on Sina Weibo search. CDT independently tests the keywords before posting them, but some searches later become accessible again. We welcome readers to contribute to this project so that we can include the most up-to-date information.

Pu has a knack for hitting the nail on the head when analysing problems, and great foresight for larger issues. He is generous in aiding friends facing difficulties. Tall, handsome, with a strong voice, he fought evil with fury and righteousness in court. In a democratic system, he would have been a charismatic leader.

[…] He attributed his ability to avoid persecution to his understanding of politics and his tact. He was so deeply moved by The Lives of Others, a film about the work of the secret police in East Germany, that he purchased many copies of the DVD and handed them out to secret police, hoping this would help them to retain a shred of their humanity. When they illegally put him under house arrest he still tried to calmly reason with them, knowing that to a certain degree these people who did evil things were also victims of the system.

[…] Despite the pressure, civil society in China is prepared to fight for its survival and growth. There will be detours, setbacks, low points and sacrifices, and more people such as Pu will pay a high price. But the motivation for this harsh crackdown is also the evidence that it will not stop China from moving towards becoming a free, democratic country. [Source]

The arrest and expedient trial of Beijing lawyer Li Zhuang shocked the legal community in China at the time. The eventual fall of Bo Xilai in one of China’s most high-profile corruption cases ever was applauded by the same legal community. What no one had predicted was that rights defense lawyers in China would fare even worse under President Xi Jinping, and that the media would likewise be put in a chokehold.

However one chooses to view it — in terms of the degree of repression involved, or in terms of the absurdity of the charges — the Pu Zhiqiang case today is far more shocking than the Li Zhuang case ever was in Bo Xilai’s Chongqing. Pu Zhiqiang, who through skillful debate, ingenuity and drama, defended the likes of Tan Zuoren (谭作人) and Ai Weiwei (艾未未), is now locked up behind bars, incriminated by his own words (因言获罪).

What we should find especially concerning is that Pu Zhiqiang’s own defense lawyer, Qu Zhenhong (屈振红) has also been detained. This being the case, it’s difficult to imagine anyone else daring to step forward to defend this defender. It took courage enough in the present climate to extend birthday wishes to Pu Zhiqiang on Weibo. [Source]

There is no publicly available credible evidence of illegal behavior in any of their cases, yet all three are likely to advance in the coming weeks as judicial personnel handle these cases with instructions from Communist Party authorities.

“Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the crackdown on dissent has netted some of China’s most respected critics known for their innovative activism developing the rule of law,” said Sophie Richardson, China director. “Prosecuting and imprisoning these well-established public figures indicates near-zero tolerance for independent activism.”

[…] All three focused on social issues recognized to be important by the government, including the rule of law, the fight against corruption, and inequality. All have carefully and painstakingly adhered to peaceful and lawful means in their activism. During a demonstration in January 2013 against the censorship of Southern Weekly, Guo Feixiong ensured the demonstrators did not block the gate of the publication, the road, or the pedestrian path, and that they left the demonstration promptly by the end of the workday.

“For years activists could mostly predict what kind of work or degree of pressure on authorities would eventually get them into trouble,” Richardson said. “But if these experienced and skillful moderates are prosecuted for their work, all bets on where the repression ends appear to be off.” [Source]

HRW went on to describe “procedural violations that are so blatant as to appear politically sanctioned,” and noted that Guo Yushan’s defense lawyer Xia Lin, like Pu’s, has also been detained. Both Xia and Qu have in turn been denied access to their own defense lawyers.

[…] Chinese lawyers enter the courtroom knowing that trials in their country are not conducted on a level playing field. In many cases, they find that the prosecutor is not their only adversary and that they are also faced with judges who ignore procedures, restrict the scope of debate, or limit the amount of time available to present defense arguments.

This environment has contributed to growing tension and conflict between judges and lawyers, especially lawyers who feel a moral responsibility to challenge hypocrisy and injustice within the country’s legal system. Sometimes, these conflicts escalate into heated arguments or lead lawyers to disrupt trial proceedings by refusing to speak or leaving the courtroom in protest. Lawyers risk losing their right to practice by pursuing such tactics, but many do so anyway to signal their refusal to be part of unfair judicial processes that fail to protect individual rights.

The authorities now appear to be raising the stakes even further, with a recent proposal to amend Article 309 of the Criminal Law that would make “insulting, defaming, or threatening a judicial officer” and “engaging in other acts that seriously disrupt the order of the court” subject to up to three years’ imprisonment. Many lawyers have interpreted the proposal as an attempt to “gag” them. More than 500 to date have signed an open letter (which I have translated below) calling on the National People’s Congress Standing Committee to reject the proposed provisions. Though tiny relative to the total number of registered lawyers in China, this collection of signatures nevertheless demonstrates a strong degree of professional solidarity extending well beyond those lawyers who identify themselves as human rights lawyers and reflects a common concern for preserving the rights of lawyers in China’s legal system. [Source]

Chinese President Xi Jinping secured the blessing of his still influential predecessor, Hu Jintao, before launching a corruption probe against a former senior aide to Hu – a sign that internal Communist Party harmony and respect for elders still holds sway in Xi’s historic crackdown on official graft.

[…] “In investigating Ling, Xi was not targeting Hu,” one individual with ties to the leadership told Reuters. “Hu did not (try to) block the investigation. He agreed to and supported it when consulted.”

[…] Ling was first demoted in September 2012 after sources said his son was involved in a fatal crash involving his Ferrari sports car in Beijing six months earlier [see prior CDT coverage].

[…] Speculation about Ling’s fate had been running high after a probe into his older brother, Ling Zhengce, was announced in June for suspected “serious discipline and law violations”. After Ling Zhengce fell, the official Xinhua news agency noted cryptically that “having somebody in the palace won’t help”, in pointed reference to his family connections. [see prior CDT coverage] […] [Source]

[…] The report said the meeting also reviewed a document on improving party control of groups such as the Communist Youth League—long considered a base of power for Mr. Hu.

[…] Cliques have long been a fixture of Chinese politics under the Communist party, but their existence undermines its sought-after image of united one-party rule. Mr. Xi has repeatedly called for party unity in the face of a two-year anticorruption campaign that has put thousands of Chinese officials under focus.

[…] The fall of Mr. Ling has put new scrutiny on Mr. Xi’s power to shake up the system because of the official’s close ties to Mr. Hu, who stepped down in late 2012—though it isn’t clear whether this week’s warning is related to Mr. Hu. “We have to know the Communist Youth League was controlled by Hu Jintao and people around him but it remains to be seen if it is a faction,” Mr. Cabestan said.

Mr. Hu in the 1980s officially headed the Youth League, which grooms cadres for leadership positions, and built strong associations from the group as he rose. Mr. Cabestan said that Youth League is a “stronghold” every party leader wants to control because of that role. […] [Source]

]]>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/ex-president-hu-approved-probe-former-aide-ling-jihua/feed/0Women of the Week: Severalhttp://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/women-week-several/
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/women-week-several/#commentsWed, 10 Dec 2014 19:39:33 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=179784Word of the Week comes from the Grass-Mud Horse Lexicon, a glossary of terms created by Chinese netizens and encountered in online political discussions. These are the words of China’s online “resistance discourse,” used to mock and subvert the official language around censorship and political correctness.

Internet meme emerging from accusations against former Chongqing Party secretary Bo Xilai and former security czar Zhou Yongkang.

In September 2012, the Chinese Communist Party expelled Bo, citing a number of misdeeds, including engaging in improper sexual relations with “several women.” The last accusation may be unseemly, but is not in violation of any law.

After this announcement, “several women” was often used in online parodies of famous quotations and poems. It has also been cited as one of the markers of a fallen official:

木木suger: How to identify a corrupt official: (1) land transactions; (2) multiple properties; (3) family has emigrated; (4) several women; (5) offshore accounts; (6) belts and watches; (7) shocking incidents; (8) has offended the media; (9) shocking statements; (10) video clips and photographs; (11) netizen targets; (12) friend of businessmen to the bitter end; (13) bossy relatives. One of the above is enough to bring down an official, and the officials who have already fallen exemplify almost all of these at once. It’s clear that the road to eliminating corruption is a long one! (December 28, 2012)

]]>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/12/women-week-several/feed/0Hu Deping on Rule of Law and Political Reformhttp://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/11/hu-deping-rule-law-political-reform/
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/11/hu-deping-rule-law-political-reform/#commentsFri, 14 Nov 2014 02:53:24 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=179113Economist and politician Hu Deping may be best known as the son of Hu Yaobang, the party leader and reformer whose death in April 1989 triggered student protests in Beijing and throughout China. The younger Hu accepted an interview with Beijing News today, and talked about the “sense of terror” he felt during Bo Xilai’s “beat black” campaign, and his thoughts on reform after the Third and Fourth Plenums of the 18th Party Congress. From a translation at China Media Project:

The Beijing News: One year on from the 3rd Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, which raised the issue of “comprehensive reform” (全面改革), could you talk about your ideas about reform?

Hu Deping: There was a period of time [recently], especially when Bo Xilai was in the midst of his “Singing Red and Striking Black” (唱红打黑) in Chongqing, when I felt truly terrified. Wang Lijun said publicly: If only political problems could be changed into legal questions and then be investigated, then we would have an absolute say (发言权). I once wrote a letter to the Central Committee saying that these words were quite terrifying. After that, I made my opinion known publicly, arguing that judicial work [in our country] was going wrong. After the 18th National Congress, the Central Committee talked about comprehensive reform, about punishing corruption, and rule of law started heading in a good direction . . . and my sense of terror started to abate. This time, the Central Committee raising the issue of comprehensively promoting rule of the nation according to law (依法治国), this is major progress.

The Beijing News: The 4th Plenum has just passed. What most made an impression on you about this meeting?

Hu Deping: What most made an impression was that the Party talked about using rule of law to promote the modernization of the country’s governance system and governing capacity. This suits the real circumstances in China, and it also adopts the fruits of the development of human civilization. For example, the emphasis on the authority of the constitution, on checking public power, and protecting individual rights, etcetera. [Source]

Hu Deping recently took over as publisher of Yanhuang Chunqiu, potentially saving the liberal magazine from more direct government oversight. Yanhuang Chunqiu is already under closer official scrutiny after it was forced to switch affiliation from the Association for Yan Huang Culture of China to the Chinese National Academy of Arts, the latter being administered directly by the Ministry of Culture.

I hope that the Wukan Incident can push society into establishing a system which takes democracy and the rule of law as its foundation. I hope that from now on, when society meets similar types of issues down the line, people will be able to solve them using rule of law and negotiations. The government has recognized the cadres and autonomous organizations chosen by the people of Wukan. I think this is significant. I hope this can continue and have a positive ending. [Source]

]]>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/11/hu-deping-rule-law-political-reform/feed/0Investigation of Zhou Yongkang Heats Uphttp://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/09/investigation-zhou-yongkang-heats/
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/09/investigation-zhou-yongkang-heats/#commentsSat, 13 Sep 2014 05:23:37 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=177152Chinese authorities are investigating the 2000 car crash which killed the ex-wife of disgraced security chief Zhou Yongkang, escalating a political struggle at the top echelons of Chinese power, according to a report by Benjamin Kang Lim, Charlie Zhu, and David Lague for Reuters:

That investigators are going to such lengths to discredit Zhou is one sign of the power struggle that has raged at the very top of the Communist Party since the reins were handed to Xi almost two years ago. It isn’t over. Another indication is that Xi is considering a proposal to let the 205-member Central Committee deliberate on whether to press criminal charges against Zhou, 71, rather than handle his case exclusively among top leaders, said one person with ties to the leadership.

This would be an unprecedented departure from the party’s usually more opaque decision making on internal discipline matters. It suggests that Xi believes he needs to ensure the backing of the wider leadership before moving to decisively neutralize Zhou.

Xi and his allies are still uncertain how far they can go in their bid to eliminate the threat from a rival who once controlled China’s pervasive security apparatus and built a sprawling network of patronage with tentacles deep in politics and business, according to sources with ties to the leadership. More broadly, as his anti-corruption campaign begins to threaten powerful vested interests, Xi needs to weigh the danger of a backlash from some of China’s most politically connected families, who want to protect the vast wealth their proximity to power has afforded them. [Source]

I understand that the Chinese authorities are taking the line that this is a purely private matter, in which they have no responsibility. I find this quite astonishing. Let us turn things around and imagine a roughly analogous situation arising in the United Kingdom. The well-known wife of a successful and ambitious member of the British cabinet has befriended a Chinese businessman who is living in London with his English wife and two small children The friendship flourishes to the point where she becomes godmother to the daughter.

When, years later, the friendship sours, she murders the businessman by poisoning. Her husband, the cabinet minister, assisted by the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and a number of his senior deputies, conspires to cover up the murder. In such a case, one can be certain that the Chinese authorities would express public outrage, would hold the British government to account and would demand appropriate compensation for the family’s loss.

The Chinese authorities have, incidentally, told me that I could bring a civil case for compensation before the Chinese courts. This is absurd. As is well known, China does not enjoy the rule of law: the Chinese courts and the whole legal process are controlled by the Communist Party (or more accurately by people like Zhou Yongkang, his family, friends and associates, who are notorious for corruption and the abuse of power) and they are in no sense independent or trustworthy.

I find it difficult to understand China’s inertia and evasiveness in my family’s case. Is it because my grandchildren and I are English? Or is it just a question of callous indifference to our suffering? Or are there other factors, connected perhaps to factional or personal struggles or to Gu Kailai’s relationships with past and present members of the Chinese leadership? [Source]

All Chinese-language words are tested using simplified characters. The same terms in traditional characters occasionally return different results.

CDT Chinese runs a project that crowd-sources filtered keywords on Sina Weibo search. CDT independently tests the keywords before posting them, but some searches later become accessible again. We welcome readers to contribute to this project so that we can include the most up-to-date information.

It was not a coincidence that the investigation of former senior party official Zhou Yongkang over discipline violations and plans to discuss law reforms at the fourth full meeting of the 18th Central Committee were announced on the same day. They are directly linked and together could herald the start of a new phase in China’s history.

[…] The downfall of other dirty officials, big or small, will surely draw wide public attention. However, what is more important is to build a legal framework in the course of fighting graft. Since corruption is inevitable at a time when China’s economy is undergoing rapid development and transformation, it is even more necessary to remain on guard against it. As such, the rule of law is the most powerful tool available to fight this scourge.

[…] There are five ways to accelerate legal reform: the authority of the constitution and the law must be maintained; the reform of administrative and law-enforcement systems must be deepened; the powers of courts and prosecutors must be executed legally, separately and impartially; the authority of the judiciary must be strengthened; and the protection of human rights must be upgraded. [Source]

The tacit code that shielded members of the PSC from prosecution particularly included current members. When those in power go astray because of a lack of checks and balances, it is usually extremely difficult to correct the wrong while they occupy their posts. Justice usually goes into hiding when political power reigns; most of the time, only when political power is weakened or ceded can judicial proceedings get into gear.

Going the last mile to combat corruption means breaking that barrier as well: allowing disciplinary authorities to investigate or even prosecute current members of the PSC and take away their “get out of jail free card” too. This radical step would finally subject the most powerful seven men in China to the same standard as others. This could help prevent corruption from happening in the first place, and would constitute the most crucial step towards reforming the foundation of China’s current political system.

[…] Zhou’s case presents an important opportunity to reform the leadership system of the party and our nation, which is a necessary step if we are to fully establish rule of law in China. The core objective of reform is to completely rebuild a system in which power is highly concentrated in the hands of few men, with neither checks nor balances. Only with democracy and the rule of law can we have an orderly transition of power on a regular basis, overseen by an independent judiciary and other regulatory bodies. At the end of the day, democracy and the rule of law are the best auto-correct for our political system. [Source]

Earlier this month, Beijing released a 45-item list of legal reform goals, a significant aim of which is to reduce the influence of local government on local courts. Such an aim may seem modest, but if successful, it would mark an important step in addressing the weakness of rule of law in the country.

[…] Proposed reforms aim to reduce this local interference by giving provincial-level judicial bodies the power to nominate judges for the basic-level courts and by financing the lower courts out of provincial budgets.

The idea behind the reform is a good one that could go much to improve the Chinese legal system’s ability to deliver justice. Whether it will work very much remains to be seen.

[…] Because the provincial as well as local governments have been able to resist the impact of national laws and policies, it is reasonable to wonder whether provincial governments—once they receive control over the local courts— will seek to influence the outcomes of legal disputes in the same manner that local governments have done. [Source]

If Zhou Yongkang could be said to represent a political vision, it was of a China where public security authorities would become so powerful that all levels of public security bureau chiefs would become members of standing committees; where the public security apparatus is more powerful than the law courts and prosecutors in the judicial system, allowing it to act without any scruples to “maintain stability”. In this dark vision for China, anybody who dares to press a legal claim or try to petition the higher authorities would be brutally suppressed, “black jails” would open up all across the country, and the whole system would be merely a cover for corrupt officials.

However, there are three problems with this. First, building a system to maintain stability is in line with the policy of creating a harmonious society as hailed by former president Hu Jintao, and Zhou was only an executor of this policy.

Second, there is no proof that the law courts and procuratorates are more capable than the public security authorities in safeguarding judicial independence and justice. If anything, the courts and state prosecutors have also acted as hatchet men in the persecution of dissidents.

Third, not only does Xi Jinping have no intention to deviate from the party’s line to “maintain stability”, in fact he has imposed even harsher controls to suppress dissidents and muzzle the news media. [Source]

Under his reign, China’s security apparatus greatly expanded, and the court became the party’s mere puppet. Police used extreme measures, such as kidnapping, torture and illegal confiscation of personal property to suppress pro-independence protests in Tibet and persecute Falun Gong practitioners, underground Christian church members, political dissidents, petitioners and human rights lawyers. Police would have activists “disappear” for months without notifying their relatives. Human rights organizations accused Zhou of turning China into a de facto police state.

Zhou’s victims are delighted that he will be accorded similar treatment. So far, the source says, Zhou has been accused of killing political opponents, including several businessmen and a prominent military figure—and even of plotting with Bo Xilai to assassinate and seize power from President Xi Jinping.

[…] In October, at one of the Communist Party’s top annual gatherings, Xi will reportedly make “ruling the country by law” its main theme. But, in reality, the party has never intended to rule China by law because an independent judicial would threaten its monopolistic rule. China’s legal system has been used to serve the interest of those in power and punish political opponents and dissidents. As a consequence, no one feels safe, not even those who are in power now. In Xi Jinping’s China, those who are investigating Zhou today could just as well end up in jail tomorrow. [Source]

The investigation of Zhou, a former Standing Committee member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, for suspected “serious disciplinary violations” will be conducted by the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI).

Top leaders are resolved to target both high-ranking “tigers” and low-ranking “flies” in their anti-corruption effort. After taking the helm at the CPC in November 2012, Xi Jinping has led efforts in fighting corruption, calling on the whole Party to stay on full alert, and describing corruption as a threat to the Party’s very survival. Xi vowed that there would be “no exceptions”: No leniency will be meted out no matter who is involved.

The downfall of a “big tiger” like Zhou could have a deterrent effect on Party members and corrupt officials who believe they are immune.According to the CCDI website, around 40 officials of provincial and ministerial level or higher have been investigated for corruption or other serious disciplinary violations since November 2012. [Source]

[A source with ties to the leadership] said Zhou had been accused of corruption involving family members and accepting bribes to promote officials.

“Not all charges against Zhou would be made public,” added the source, who requested anonymity to avoid repercussions for speaking to a foreign reporter without authorisation.

[…] It was unclear if Zhou would eventually be indicted.

“If that happens, there won’t be a high-profile trial like Bo Xilai’s,” the source with ties to the leadership said, referring to the purged party boss of the southwestern metropolis of Chongqing, whose trial the government provided regularly updated – though likely censored – transcripts for.

Any trial could also be some way off. Zhou would first have to be expelled from the party and then have formal criminal charges filed against him, which could take several months or longer. [Source]

Lam told The Financial Times that the unwritten rule had “provided a mutual protection clause for top leaders and allowed for orderly transitions of power [….] Now this rule has been broken Xi has given himself a powerful card he can use against political enemies. But it also means that everyone is fair game.” Zhou was reportedly targeted for attempting to subvert the succession conventions by prolonging his own power, but their outright violation may make such maneuvering more likely in future:

Post-89 leadership transition was based on retirement "rules". It works only if stepping down fm politburo is safe. It's not anymore.

Several commentators suggested, despite his high rank, Mr Zhou may not be the ultimate target of Mr Xi’s anti-corruption campaign.

“His case is big, but Wen Jiabao’s case is bigger,” said one observer, who cannot be named because of reprisals from the Communist party. “But it is hard to tell whether they will go after Wen because his case implicates so many others,” he added, referring to China’s former prime minister.

“Wen’s case is hanging over the Party ever since the New York Times exposed his family wealth,” said another commentator, referring to an investigation which claimed Mr Wen’s family had amassed £1.5 billion in assets. [Source]

The Chinese-language hashtag “ZhouYongKangPutUnderInvestigation” rapidly rose to the top of microblogging service Weibo’s top trending items, scoring 4.3 million views barely two hours after the news broke. State broadcaster China Central Television’s post on the probe was reposted more than 14,000 times within an hour of the news.

[…] While most of the exuberance was limited to taking casual note of Mr. Zhou’s fate, some bloggers went cautiously farther in summing up the public mood of anticipation. “This is just lifting up one corner of the pot,” Ren Zhiqiang, a well-known property developer with a wide Weibo following, said on his verified blog. [Source]

Although the case sends a message the party will not hold anyone above the law, other past and current members of the [Politburo Standing] committee were unlikely to become a focus of Xi’s anti-graft campaign, analysts said.

The president remains limited by the principle of collective leadership, which arose under Deng Xiaoping as a way to end the political chaos of the Cultural Revolution.

[… The University of Nottingham’s Professor Steve] Tsang said although Xi had built up immense political capital, he “very much doubted Xi is also targeting other leaders like Wen and Jiang at the moment”.

“If there is any real indication of that as a possibility, Wen would have worked closely with Jiang to block the detention of Zhou,” Tsang said. “I do not expect other retired PSC members to be put in the same situation as Zhou.” [Source]

[…] Because practices such as giving cash gifts to gain official appointments and promotions and helping private businessmen secure contracts are widespread inside the party, a very large number of Chinese officials dread being hauled in for investigation or worse. The Chinese media has already noted a recent rise in the number of officials who have committed suicide.

[…] Mr Xi’s campaign has engendered an unprecedented degree of fear among Chinese officials. In politics, fear is a unifying force. If many of Mr Xi’s colleagues and rivals believe that they could be the next tigers to fall, their survival instinct might motivate them to challenge Mr Xi’s authority. The unity of leadership that has held the party together since Tiananmen could evaporate. [Source]

Until late on Tuesday, many doubted Xi and his colleagues’ readiness to take such a politically risky step.

One of the foremost reasons for such doubts was the suspicion that revealing abuse at the very top risks undermining public confidence in the CPC and the system. That Xi and his colleagues have finally chosen not to exempt Zhou from disciplinary scrutiny speaks volumes about the present leaders’ loyalty to their pledge of leaving no safe haven for abusers of power.

Besides convincing the doubters, Zhou’s fate will send shudders down the spines of other abusers who may be entertaining the illusion that their high positions and retirement will protect them. [Source]

The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee will discuss “governing the country according to law” on every front, it was announced after the Tuesday meeting, presided over by the CPC Central Committee’s general secretary, Xi Jinping.

It was agreed that the rule of law is a must if the country will attain economic growth, clean government, culture prosperity, social justice and sound environment, and realize the strategic objective of peaceful development.

A statement after the meeting said that the rule of law is an intrinsic requirement of socialism with Chinese characteristics and crucial to modern governance. Governing according to law holds the key to the CPC’s leadership, the people’s well-being, deepening reform and long-term stability. The statement emphasized, that governing according to law has become more significant in the entire agenda of the Party and the nation, due to new circumstances. [Source]

[… L]ike the 2013 prosecution of Bo Xilai, a top Community Party leader felled by a scandal involving bribery, embezzlement, and abuses of power, the investigation and expected prosecution of Zhou should not be confused with justice or the rule of law. Like Bo, Zhou has been detained for months outside of any formal legal process. Like Bo, the initial investigation of Zhou will be carried out by the Party, not the judicial authorities. And, like Bo, if Zhou’s case is actually transferred into the formal court system, it is equally unlikely that any of the basic legal protections that exist on paper – access to evidence, right to counsel of choice, and freedom from coerced confession – will apply.

There will almost certainly be another level of injustice in Zhou’s prosecution: that the victims of his abuses are unlikely to be able to bring cases against him or those who carried out his orders. The leadership’s imperative, as past cases have shown, will be to prosecute Zhou in way that serves their political aims, which means creating an impression of combating corruption. Will those people disappeared by police, beaten by urban para-police, imprisoned in black jails, or – irony of ironies – charged with “disturbing public order” for calling independently for corruption investigations during Zhou’s tenure have their day in court? [Source]

The important thing to understand about Xi is that he is at the heart of a leadership that has a collective purpose that arises from the demands of party unity. It is hard to see how else Xi and his team would be able to prosecute the anti-corruption purge that has been going on since early 2013, extending into the heart of some of the key institutions of power in China, from the military to government to the party itself. In this context, the party looks increasingly like the Catholic Church – an organisation that tries to be less a vehicle of specific interests and objectives and more a cultural/social/ideological entity – an entity that demands belief of some sort from its adherents and pursues a broad spiritual vision (in this case, a vision of a “rich, strong, powerful country”).

We shouldn’t underestimate the powers that Xi is exercising, but if we overestimate them then we are also making a mistake. Xi is no Godfather; he is the faithful servant of the party. As long as he continues to be so, his position will be secure. But if ever he tried to assert his own networks and interests over those of the party then there would be no nice protocol about how he would be dealt with. His felling would be as brutal as that meted out to Bo Xilai. This is the great secret of modern China. Individual political leaders are not the key. The institution of the party is. And the people who serve this better are the ones, in the end, who succeed. [Source]

In leading the Politburo in a well-publicized purge of Xu Caihou, a former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission who has been accused of selling military positions, Xi affirmed that his anti-corruption campaign is the boldest and most serious that China has ever experienced.

[…] Although the primary leaders of the campaign—namely Xi Jinping and Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Chief Wang Qishan— are both princelings in the faction led by former President Jiang Zemin, their factional association has not been a major driver of the campaign. In fact, the four largest corruption cases (namely Bo Xilai, Liu Zhijun, Xu Caihou and Zhou Yongkang) have all involved heavyweight leaders in the Jiang camp.

Despite having targeted these members of his own camp, it is also unlikely that Xi has strained his relationship with his two main patrons, former President Jiang and former Vice President Zeng Qinghong. Instead, he has most likely made a deal with them. Yet the majority of the prominent members of the Jiang camp, including some who were very close to Bo Xilai, Liu Zhijun and Xu Caihou, still remain in power. [Source]

[…] Cheng Li and Ryan McElveen make a concise case that the highest-profile individuals to fall came from the same Jiang Zemin–oriented network as Xi and Wang Qishan. But what if this is not the salient division, and what if different battle lines have been drawn that aren’t captured by asking who’s loyal to Jiang or Hu Jintao?

A truly comprehensive anti-corruption campaign would have to be much, much bigger than what we’re seeing, so there must be a reason some people are targeted and some are not. Indeed, former Politburo Standing Committee No. 2 Wen Jiabao and Xi himself have been shown to have family members with immense wealth. There are clearly choices made on whom to target, and political analysts clearly don’t know exactly how they’re made. [Source]

]]>http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/oh-xi-didnt-different-perspectives-chinas-leader/feed/0Sensitive Words: New Gang of Four and Morehttp://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/sensitive-words-new-gang-four/
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2014/07/sensitive-words-new-gang-four/#commentsFri, 18 Jul 2014 20:10:20 +0000http://chinadigitaltimes.net/?p=175272As of July 18, the following search terms are blocked on Sina Weibo (not including the “search for user” function).

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The new focus, according Xinhua, will be on quality rather than quantity. The new rules formalize a requirement floated in January 2013 to limit the size of the CCP to provide for more “prudent” and “balanced” growth. The current CCP has over 80 million members, but there’s a growing concern about the number of “unqualified members,” including corrupt officials as well as those who otherwise fail to meet Party standards. Accordingly, the new rules will seek to dismiss current members who are seen as undesirables, while also raising the standards for new members going forward.

[…] The new rules on recruitment are only part of a larger trend in which the CCP leadership attempts to assert more control over the Party. Last year, the Party changed the way Party rules are created — documenting formal procedures for the first time in the CCP’s history. As South China Morning Post reported at the time, many analysts saw the move as Xi’s attempt to bring the “rule of law” to bear on the CCP itself. As with many of X’s reforms, the reform of the Party itself is designed to give the central authorities more control over various local and grassroots branches. [Source]

In fact, no one is really sure that such “systems” and “processes” [for “selecting and promoting officials” and “decision-making and feedback collection,” referring to a recent Xinhua essay by Eric X. Li] exist. Of course the Party does these things — it selects new leaders, creates policy, and evaluates existing policies. But is there really a system in place for doing so? Or is the CCP, especially at the top level, simply a battleground among different factions, where personal influence determines the outcome? Was Xi Jinping, for example, selected as the CCP’s top leader through an institutionalized process (albeit one that has never been revealed), or did he simply emerge as the victor in a bruising political battle?

[…] Currently, what little evidence we have suggests there are no formal policies for the highest-level decisions. According to Western media reports, the Bo Xilai scandal was resolved through backroom negotiations and bargains among different factions, some of whom supported Bo, some of whom wanted him gone. To many observers, the Bo case was proof positive that there are no institutionalized policies for dealing with problems. As CCP analyst Russell Leigh Moses told the Christian Science Monitor at the time, “The political culture here is like the traffic; there are just enough rules to prevent chaos.” [Source]

A Chinese state-run newspaper has accused British drugmaker GlaxoSmithKline Plc of evading at least 100 million yuan ($16.04 million) in taxes, adding to pressure on the firm which is already struggling with graft charges against executives.

[…] The Legal Daily newspaper, run by the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s Political and Legal Committee, reported on Friday that GSK intentionally imported Lamivudine, used to treat HIV as well as hepatitis, at an elevated cost.

Along with using tax loopholes for charitable donations, this helped GSK “avoid over 100 million yuan in import value-added tax and corporate income tax,” the report said.

The report followed less-detailed allegations by state news agency Xinhua saying GSK used transfer pricing to artificially reduce its profits and tax bill in China.

[…] The Legal Daily report also said that GSK had avoided import taxes by donating some of the imported drug to support state-backed treatment of the disease, adding GSK could have donated cheaper drugs that it produced at a plant in Suzhou instead. [Source]

This perception of politicized and selective prosecution is as bad for business as a genuine corruption crackdown would be good for it. Compounding the problem, Beijing is not aggressively pursuing the Chinese officials who participate in endemic corruption, despite efforts to tamp down on more overt displays of ill-gotten wealth. The few high-profile cases to emerge, such as last year’s trial of Chongqing Communist Party boss Bo Xilai, have centered on rivals to President Xi Jinping.

Meanwhile, authorities act against journalists and activists who expose corruption. In a case last year, a blogger known as “Boss Hua” was detained after pointing out that a local official had been photographed wearing an expensive watch. Earlier this year lawyer Xu Zhiyong was sentenced to four years in jail for “disturbing public order” by demanding officials publicly disclose their wealth.

[…] As for ordinary Chinese, they may cheer the prosecution of allegedly corrupt Western companies. But they also know the truth about their own leaders and their politicized courts. The longer Beijing pursues big graft cases against foreigners without rooting out corruption closer to the Communist Party’s heart, the more cynical and disillusioned they will become about their government. [Source]

But despite the scale of the case against Zhou and his network, his downfall may have little to do with corruption at all. In the end, Zhou Yongkang’s larger crime will have been running afoul of Xi Jinping, who has already established himself as arguably China’s most powerful leader in decades.

In a country without a free press, an independent judiciary, or elections to hold officials accountable, corruption across all levels of government is systematic. Chinese officials are paid meager salaries, yet investigations by Bloomberg and The New York Times over the past two years have revealed just how wealthy government leaders and their families have become. And rather than empower the country’s media and activists to police corruption, Xi Jinping has repressed criticism more than any other Chinese leader in decades.

Instead, Zhou Yongkang’s problems are almost purely the result of maneuverings within elite Chinese politics. Far from being the unified monolith of popular imagination, the Communist Party consists of powerful factions that compete with one another for important government posts. Xi Jinping, the son of a senior Party official, belongs to the “princeling” faction, while Li Keqiang, China’s premier, is affiliated with officials who got their start in the Communist Youth League. Their accession to China’s top two positions was assured in 2007, when they were introduced as vice president and vice premier during a carefully orchestrated procession. But when the Standing Committee voted to strip Bo Xilai of his position as Chongqing’s party secretary, Zhou cast the lone dissenting vote. Soon, rumors began to swirl that Zhou had plotted to upend Xi’s accession to power and install Bo, instead, as president-to-be. In August of last year, one month after Bo Xilai’s conviction, China launched an investigation into the newly retired Zhou. He was last seen in public two months later. [Source]

For the Chinese Communist Party, building a corruption case against a top Chinese official is a delicate science. Accuse them of too paltry an embezzlement, and it makes the charges seem like petty infighting. On the other hand, accuse them of “robbing the state and devastating the people,” as the expression goes — and it casts doubt on the establishment for allowing such massive looting to occur. The Goldilocks amount justifies the purge while maintaining the integrity of the system that husbands it. [Source]

More than 300 of Zhou’s relatives, political allies, proteges and staff have also been taken into custody or questioned in the past four months, the sources, who have been briefed on the investigation, told Reuters.

The sheer size of the asset seizures and the scale of the investigations into the people around Zhou – both unreported until now – make the corruption probe unprecedented in modern China and would appear to show that President Xi Jinping is tackling graft at the highest levels.

But it may also be driven partly by political payback after Zhou angered leaders such as Xi by opposing the ouster of former high-flying politician Bo Xilai, who was jailed for life in September for corruption and abuse of power. [Source]