Wofford v. Unknown Austin

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan

October 27, 2016

KEHINDE WOFFORD, Plaintiff,v.UNKNOWN AUSTIN et al., Defendants.

OPINION

Paul
L. Maloney United States District Judge

This is
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave
to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action
brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A;
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read
Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently,
see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and
accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are
clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, Plaintiff's action will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.

Factual
Allegations

Plaintiff
KehindeWofford presently is incarcerated with the Michigan
Department of Corrections at the Muskegon Correctional
Facility, though the actions about which he complains
occurred while he was housed at the Oaks Correctional
Facility (ECF). He sues Correctional Officers (unknown)
Austin and (unknown) Iverson.

Plaintiff
alleges that he is a devout Muslim in the Nation of Islam. On
July 3, 2016, Plaintiff was provided his Ramadan meal to
break his fast. Plaintiff contends that the meal “was
in disarray and cross-contaminated and haram (forbidden) to
consume by [P]laintiff's sincerely held religious
beliefs.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff
brought his meal to Defendant Austin and showed Austin the
spilled food. Austin laughed at Plaintiff and said,
“[J]ust eat the damn meal[.]” Plaintiff refused
to eat the main meal. Austin called Defendant Iverson from
the food service department. Iverson stated, “I'm
not going to give you another bag so eat the one you have or
[]I'm going to write you a disobeying a direct
misconduct.” (Id.) Plaintiff explained that
consuming the meal would violate his beliefs. Both Defendants
allegedly laughed and told Plaintiff, “You
shouldn't have decided to fast or do Ramadan; maybe next
time you'll think twice before fasting.”
(Id.) Plaintiff asked Defendants why they were
punishing him for observing Ramadan and being a Muslim.
Austin responded, “I didn't tell you to become a
[M]uslim Wofford.” (Id.) Defendants also
yelled at Plaintiff, advising him to “become a
Christian or anything besides a [M]uslim because [P]laintiff
would be less of a target.” (Id.) Later that
day, Correctional Officer Lee provided Plaintiff a complaint
form against food service, which Plaintiff completed and
returned to Lee. Plaintiff also filed a grievance the
following day against both Defendants.

Plaintiff
alleges that, as a result of Defendants' actions, his
connection with Allah was broken and he was prevented from
successfully completing Ramadan, because the main purpose of
Ramadan is peace and requires abstaining from quarreling. He
contends that Defendants' actions violated the
free-exercise clause of the First Amendment and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA),
42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)(1)(b). Plaintiff also alleges that
Defendants' treatment of him as a Muslim was dissimilar
to their treatment of prisoners practicing other religions,
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

Discussion

I.
Failure to state a claim A complaint may be
dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails
“‘to give the defendant fair notice of what the .
. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more
than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.”). The court must determine whether the
complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability
requirement, ' . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility
of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not
‘show[n]' - that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630
F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to
dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(I)).

To
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549
(6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for
vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive
rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983
is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly
infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).

A.
First Amendment & RLUIPA

Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants violated the First Amendment and
RLUIPA by refusing to provide Plaintiff with a replacement
meal when his Ramadan meal was cross-contaminated by spillage
from one part of the meal onto another. He also alleges that
Defendants violated his rights under First Amendment and
RLUIPA by harassing him on the basis of his religion.

While
“incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or
limitation of many privileges and rights, ” inmates
clearly retain First Amendment protection to freely exercise
their religion, O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,
348 (1987), subject to reasonable restrictions and
limitations related to legitimate penological interests.
Id. at 350-53; accord Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 89 (1987). First Amendment protection extends to all
religious beliefs, and guaranties “religious liberty
and equality to the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of
a non-Christian faith . . . .”). County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 615 (1989). To state a
free exercise claim, a plaintiff must allege facts from which
an inference may be drawn that the government has placed
“a substantial burden on the observation of a central
religious belief or practice.” Hernandez v.
C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).

&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A
single instance of providing a cross-contaminated meal does
not amount to a violation of either the First Amendment or
the RLUIPA. See Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282,
293-94 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that isolated instances of
errors in the provision of a kosher meal do not state a claim
under the First Amendment or the RLUIPA); see also
Johnson v. Wilkinson, 229 F.3d 1152, 2000 WL 1175519, at
*2 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000) (unpublished table decision)
(holding that a prisoner&#39;s allegations about
&ldquo;random and isolated interference with [his]
mail&rdquo; did not rise to the level of a First Amendment
violation). Nor is there any evidence that the isolated
problem with Plaintiff&#39;s meal was willful. See
Colvin, 605 F.3d at 293 (citing Gallagher v.
Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009) (affirming
the dismissal of an inmate's claim that kosher utensils
were contaminated because, despite evidence that prison
officials might have “imperfectly implemented the
kosher requirements, or were even negligent, ” there
was “no basis to conclude that any of the defendants
...

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