Having deliberated in private on 30
November 2004 and on 27 June 2006,

Delivers the following judgment, which
was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

PROCEDURE

1. The case originated in an application
(no. 53507/99) against the Kingdom of Sweden lodged with the Court under
Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the Swedish Transport
Workers Union (Svenska Transportarbetareförbundet - “the applicant”),
on 17 August 1999.

2. The applicant was represented by Mr
K. Junesjö, a lawyer practising in Stockholm. The Swedish Government
(“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs E. Jagander,
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

3. The applicant complained that its
lack of access to a court under Swedish law to challenge the Competition
Authority’s decision of 19 February 1990 had violated Article 6 §
1 of the Convention.

4. The application was allocated to the
Second Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within
that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 §
1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1.

5. By a decision of 30 November 2004,
the Court declared the application partly admissible.

6. The applicant and the Government each
filed observations on the merits and the question of just satisfaction
under Article 41 of the Convention (Rule 60). Subsequently, the Government
requested the Court to strike the application out of its list of cases.

THE FACTS

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

7. The facts of the case, as submitted
by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

8. As from 1976 there had been a clause
in the collective labour agreement (kollektivavtal – “the agreement”) between the applicant
union and the Swedish Association of Newspaper Publishers (Svenska Tidningsutgivareföreningen – “the Association”)
which read as follows:

“Companies which are bound by this
collective agreement and hire a contractor must draw up a separate contract
with the Swedish Transport Workers’ Union¹. ...

[Footnote 1: Distribution work on foot,
by bicycle or by car may not be carried out by contractors.]”

9. The clause was introduced on the initiative
of the applicant, under threat of industrial action, with a view to
preventing the agreement’s clauses on salaries being circumvented
by member companies of the Association hiring contractors not covered
by the agreement. According to the applicant, the clause served an important
purpose in that it protected a weaker party from being forced to abandon
the status of an employee covered by the social security system and
become a contractor not covered by this system.

10. In 1995 T., a company belonging to
the Association, hired a contractor, the L. company, to carry out the
distribution of newspapers by car in a district where a union member
had previously performed that task. As the applicant considered that
this action violated the relevant clause in the agreement, it sued the
Association and T. before the Labour Court (Arbetsdomstolen) in 1996, after negotiations between the parties
had failed. The Association and T. claimed that the clause adversely
affected competition in the newspaper-distribution market and thus violated
the Competition Act (konkurrenslagen, SFS 1993:20).

11. On 16 September 1998 the Labour Court,
by seven votes to two, found for the applicant, inter alia rejecting the argument that the disputed clause
infringed the Competition Act. The minority considered that the clause
was incompatible with section 6 of the Act.

12. In 1996 the L. company complained
to the Swedish Competition Authority (Konkurrensverket), claiming that the clause in question violated
the Competition Act, in that it prohibited the use of contractors and
thus restricted competition in a manner contrary to section 6 of the
Act. The Competition Authority heard evidence from the Association,
T. and four other member companies, as parties to the case. The applicant
was given the opportunity to submit its observations on the case but
was not formally a party to the proceedings.

13. In a decision of 19 February 1999,
the Competition Authority first observed that its examination of the
case was limited to considering whether the decision by the Association
and its member companies to include the clause in the agreement with
the applicant was contrary to section 6 of the Competition Act. It then
went on to consider the newspaper-distribution market, and the restrictive
effects which the clause had on that market. While taking note of the
Labour Court’s judgment, the Competition Authority found that the
decision had in effect noticeably hindered, limited or made difficult
competition in that market, and therefore violated section 6 of the
Competition Act. As a consequence, the Association and its member companies
were ordered, under section 23 of the Competition Act, to discontinue
applying the decision in question. Thus, in effect, the clause became
invalid.

14. Under section 60 of the Competition
Act, only a company affected by the Competition Authority’s decision
could lodge an appeal against it to the Market Court (Marknadsdomstolen). No appeal was lodged against the decision
of 19 February 1999.

15. According to information submitted
by the Government, a legislative review of the limitations on access
to a court implied by section 60 of the Competition Act is currently
being carried out and is due to be concluded by 1 November 2006 (Tilläggsdirektiv
till Utredningen om en översyn av konkurrenslagen (N 2004:19)
Dir. 2005:75). The review is made with specific reference to the above-mentioned
decision of 19 February 1999 by the Competition Authority and the Government’s
acknowledgment that there has been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention
in the present case.

THE LAW

APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 37 OF THE
CONVENTION

A. The Government’s invitation to the Court
to strike the case out and the applicant’s objections thereto

16. On 17 January 2006 the Government reiterated
their acknowledgment, made both before and after the Court had declared
the application partly admissible, that there had been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in the present case. Moreover, they confirmed their willingness
to review section 60 of the Competition Act, referring to an additional
directive of 30 June 2005 related to the ongoing review of the Competition
Act, the conclusions of which were scheduled to be reported no later
than 1 November 2006.

17. Furthermore, the Government stated their preparedness to pay the
applicant union compensation for the violation of Article 6 § 1, but
not for the original complaints under Articles 11 and 13 which the Court
had declared inadmissible. Their offer comprised the following items:
(1) SEK 40,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage resulting from
the applicant’s lack of access to a court; (2) SEK 140,000 (inclusive
of value-added tax – “VAT”) for its lawyer’s work in the Strasbourg
proceedings (80 hours at SEK 1,750 per hour); and (3) SEK 8,160 (VAT
included) for the costs of translating the applicant’s observations
in reply to those of the Government.

18. As regards item (1), the Government stressed that, whereas the
applicant had claimed SEK 500,000 for violations of Articles 6 § 1,
11 and 13 of the Convention, the complaints under the latter two provisions
had been declared inadmissible. With respect to item (2), the Government
submitted that they were not prepared to pay the SEK 20,000 claimed
in respect of domestic legal costs before the Competition Authority.
The applicant had not been a party to those proceedings. Nor had the number of
hours spent or the rate charged been specified.

19. In the light of the above, the Government invited the Court
to strike the case out under Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention,
which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:

“1. The Court may at any stage of the proceedings
decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances
lead to the conclusion that ...

(b) the matter has been resolved; or

(c) for any other reason established by the Court,
it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application.

However, the Court shall continue the examination
of the application if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention
and the Protocols thereto so requires.”

20. The applicant union objected to the
Government’s request to strike out the application, and invited the
Court to proceed with its examination of the case. It submitted that
the Government’s acknowledgment of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention had no legal value before the Swedish courts. Were the
applicant to seek a judicial order quashing the Competition Authority’s
decision of 19 February 1999, a finding of a violation by the Strasbourg
Court would have much more weight.

21. The applicant union moreover disputed
that the sum offered by the Government, SEK 40,000, would constitute
adequate just satisfaction for the damage caused by the violation of
the Convention; they had claimed SEK 500,000 on account of the violations
of Articles 6 § 1, 11 and 13 of the Convention. The ongoing review
of section 60 of the Competition Act did not in any way deal with the
problem and no action had been taken so far to remedy the damage caused.

22. Finally, the applicant contested
the fact that the Government were not prepared to reimburse the legal
costs of the domestic proceedings, nor any costs incurred in relation
to its complaints under Articles 11 and 13 of the Convention. The applicant
insisted that it should be reimbursed SEK 20,000 for the legal costs
incurred before the Competition Authority and SEK 257,031 (117.5 hours
at the rate of SEK 2,187.50, inclusive of VAT) for such costs incurred
before the Strasbourg Court.

B. The Court’s assessment

23. The Court reiterates that on 30 November 2004
it declared admissible the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 §
1 of the Convention concerning a lack of access to a court, and declared
the remainder of the application, including complaints under Articles
11 and 13 of the Convention, inadmissible.

24. In its examination of the Government’s request
to strike the case out under Article 37 § 1 (c ) on the basis of their
unilateral declaration, the Court will have regard to the (non-exhaustive)
principles stated in the Tahsin Acar v. Turkey judgment (Preliminary issue) [GC], no. 26307/95,
§§ 75-77, ECHR 2003-VI).

25. First, the Court observes that not only after,
but even before, it declared admissible the applicant’s complaint
about the lack of access to a court to challenge the Competition Authority’s
decision of 19 February 1999, the Government acknowledged unequivocally
that the matter had given rise to a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention. The Court also takes note of the ongoing legislative review
of section 60 of the Competition Act with specific reference to the
Competition Authority’s aforementioned decision, due to be completed
by 1 November 2006.

26. In this connection, the Court recalls that
in a number of previous cases it has had the opportunity to rule on
the scope of the right of access to a court implied by Article 6 §
1 of the Convention. Several such cases have originated in applications
lodged against Sweden, which has shown willingness to take general measures
(see for instance the 1988 Act on the Judicial Review of Certain Administrative
Decisions - lagen om rättsprövning av vissa förvaltningsbeslut 1988:205)
in the light of the Court’s judgments.

27. The Court is further satisfied that the amount
offered by the Government in compensation for non-pecuniary damage –
SEK 40,000 - would constitute adequate pecuniary redress for the impugned
absence of access to a court. Moreover, it considers that the sums proposed
by them for the reimbursement of costs and expenses – totalling SEK
148,160 - could reasonably be considered to correspond to what has actually
been incurred by the applicant union in order to obtain redress for
the alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and is acceptable
as to quantum.

28. Against this background, the Court considers
it no longer justified, within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (c) of
the Convention, to continue the examination of the present application,
and finds no reasons of a general character, as defined in Article 37
§ 1 in
fine, which would require the further examination of the case
by virtue of that provision. Accordingly, the application should be
struck out of the list.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

Decides
to strike the application out of its list of cases.

Done in English, and notified in writing
on 18 July 2006, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.