ACCESSION NUMBER:291693
FILE ID:EPF116
DATE:06/28/93
TITLE:WHARTON: CLINTON WILLING TO MEET SOEHARTO BILATERALLY IN TOKYO (06/28/93)
TEXT:*93062816.EPF
*EPF116 06/28/93 *
WHARTON: CLINTON WILLING TO MEET SOEHARTO BILATERALLY IN TOKYO
(Transcript: Wharton Press Conference June 28, 1993) (660)
Jakarta -- Deputy Secretary of State Clifton Wharton told reporters here
June 28 that President Clinton would be willing to talk with President
Soeharto in a bilateral meeting during the G-7 Summit in Tokyo.
Asked why the U.S. government has not been explicit in saying from the very
outset whether the Soeharto, as chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement,
should meet with the G-7 in Tokyo, Wharton said, "The United States from
the very beginning indicated that the decision with regard to participation
was a collective decision. It was not up to the United States. However,
President Clinton said that he himself personally would be very pleased to
meet in a bilateral with President Soeharto."
Following is transcript of Deputy Secretary of State Wharton's press
conference with local press after call on President Soeharto at the
president's residence on June 28:
(begin transcript)
WHARTON: It was a very fruitful meeting and discussion that we held. It
clearly reaffirmed the very good and strong relationships which the United
States has with Indonesia. I was very pleased by the discussion.
Q: Would you tell us your version of the attack yesterday on Iraq?
WHARTON: I don't think I can give you a separate version. All I can say is
that the U.S. government action was taken under the provisions of the UN
charter with regard to a direct attack on us and as viewed by us in terms
of the attempted assassination of a former president of the United States.
The evidence that was involved with regard to the participation by Iraqi
intelligence in that effort was absolutely overwhelming. On that basis,
the action was taken.
Q: What is the trade issue between Indonesia and the U.S. that still needs
to be adjusted?
WHARTON: The point which I was making was the fact that as you move into
greater globalization of trade, the countries that are involved in the
trading pattern necessarily have to adjust their own production patterns.
That's true in the United States as it is in the receiving nations --
whether it is two nations engaged in trade, three or four. The more
regionalization and the more globalization you have in trade, the more it
means that you have to adjust your trading patterns. What I was alluding
to in my discussions with the president was that given the move towards
greater regionalism, greater globalization, all countries, Indonesia
included, will have to adjust and accomodate to their trade. That was the
point that I was making.
Q: Sir, I'd like to go back to this attack on Iraq. Your reaction towards
Iraq is very swift, but very slow on Bosnia, would you comment on that
please?
1
WHARTON: There is a difference between a direct attack upon the United
States and its national interests and a situation in which there is a
collective approach to the situation in Bosnia. In the Bosnian case, it
has been an issue before the United Nations in which all of those nations
are involved in decision-making. In this particular case, it was a
specific incident with regard to the United States alone.
Q: You have said that the U.S. administration has given a very positive
response towards closer, not only South-South cooperation, but also
cooperation between the North and South. The question remains why is it
that the U.S. government has not been explicit in saying from the very
outset whether the chairman of NAM should meet with the G-7 in Tokyo?
WHARTON: The United States from the very beginning indicated that the
decision with regard to participation was a collective decision. It was
not up to the United States. However, President Clinton said that he
himself personally would be very pleased to meet in a bilateral with
President Soeharto. Thank you.
(end transcript)
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