Our Lady warned that if Her requests were not obeyed, Russia will spread its errors throughout the world, provoking wars, revolutions, and persecutions against the Church and the Holy Father. "The good will be martyred, the Holy Father will have much to suffer, various nations will be annihilated," Our Lady of Fatima said. This means that the whole surviving world, including whatever remains of the United States of America, will be overcome by Communist Russia if we do not obtain beforehand the conversion of "that poor nation".1

The only way the conversion of Russia will come about is by the Pope and the bishops obeying the specific request of Our Lady of Fatima to make a solemn and public act of consecration of Russia to the Immaculate Heart of Mary on the same day.

This reparatory act of consecration has not taken place, although Our Lady asked for it over 58 years ago, and it is more than 70 years ago that Our Lady asked us all to pray the Rosary for peace in the world.

As a result of this disobedience and delaying, today the world is in grave danger. Contrary to the false impression most people in North America have, the United States of America is far behind Soviet Russia in military power. And the Soviets still aim to dominate the world. The following article shows the threat today of being occupied by atheistic Soviet troops is very grave. The danger to our souls and our lives will be very great, indeed, under Soviet occupation.

by Gary North, Ph.D., and Arthur Robinson, Ph.D.

* In November of 1985, the United States spent $21 million to dismantle a Poseidon submarine. This was done in order to "stay within the limits of the SALT II treaty" that was never ratified by the U.S. Senate and is therefore not a treaty. In the spring of 1986, President Reagan announced that he intended to dismantle two more, for the same reason: "to go the extra mile" with the Soviet Union. (How many miles do we go before we walk over a cliff?)

What's going on here?

The facts in this chapter are known to very few voters. If voters were aware of the information in this chapter, they would be far more concerned about their futures. They might begin to demand national defense. We are paying $300 billion a year, and we are not being defended.

Our leaders are following a policy of appeasement toward the Soviet Union. They are afraid to defend us, even with the non-offensive methods of civil defense and strategic defense, lest that defense might upset the Soviets. Instead, our defense dollars are spent on bureaucracy, military pensions, offensive arms, and military adventures directed toward challenges that don't really threaten our survival.

After you have read this chapter, you'll understand why we are calling for immediate construction of a civil defense blast shelter system.

We are not apologists for the Pentagon. Our general assessment of all bureaucracies is that they live for their own sake, mainly to get fatter, and to feather the career nests of their employees, especially senior managers. A peacetime military establishment is one of the least reliable of all bureaucracies precisely because the general public really doesn't want to have its military prowess tested in the only meaningful way possible: a war. So of all bureaucracies, the military bureaucracies get fat. They also get slow.

Obviously, we need military defense. We know of no significant voting bloc or alignment that favors unilateral disarmament. But we aren't getting a nuclear defense with the hundreds of billions we are forced to pay each year. The fact is: we are not presently defended from nuclear attack.

Retired General Al Knight has reported that he has personally seen an airstrip in Cuba capable of launching jets that can carry nuclear bombs. He has seen photographs of a second airstrip. There are seven more, he says.

When he warned a senior military commander (now retired) of this threat, the man admitted that the United States has no AWACS radar observation planes to patrol the Cuban-U.S. air space. We sold them to the Arabs and to Europe (which really can't make good use of them). The commander admitted that he wanted several of them, but he couldn't get even one.

What's going on here?

Soviet military supremacy is not a popular topic these days. People don't want to think about it. But once in a while, we need to take inventory. We need to sit down and look at the balance sheet. In the field of military preparedness, it is an imbalance sheet. (In foreign policy, of course, it has been an imbalance sheet since the days of the Wilson Administration. But that's just our opinion. The statistics on today's military hardware are facts.)

Human history does not hinge exclusively on the number of "chariots" on two sides of a border. But the decisions of policy-makers are highly influenced by the statistics of chariots. This is why we need to be familiar with the numbers. The numbers will eventually have their effect on policy-makers.

Counting Chariots

Almost nobody in the United States Congress wants to talk about the present military imbalance. The public isn't told of the extent of this imbalance. Voters assume that the President has things under control. So let's look at the statistics. If you haven't seen any of this before, you're in for a shock. It is assumed by our strategists that MAD will work. It won't.

The problem is, both sides are no longer equally vulnerable. The Soviets are barely vulnerable, and with each month, they become less vulnerable. Their anti-ballistic missile program (ABM) and their civil defense program see to that. They have thereby defeated MAD. They don't actually have to launch that first strike; they only have to persuade our decision-makers that they can and that they are willing to.

The United States has adopted a defensive strategy based on vengeance rather than defense. This is what General Daniel Graham's High Frontier (strategic defense) supporters claim is the heart of our weakness. We cannot defend our civilian population. Even our anti-ballistic missile system of the early 1970s, which has been completely dismantled, was going to be used primarily to defend our own offensive (retaliatory) missiles, not civilian populations.

Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missiles

The Soviets have just about completed an antiballistic missile radar system. They have at least 7,000 operational radar units. According to reports which were given to us in 1985, they now have a new anti-missile defense system in actual production which can hit any of our missiles or planes as they approach Soviet targets with half a dozen or more missiles. We have developed the same technology, but we have not deployed it.

After a Soviet first strike nuclear attack, we would be so weak that a successful invasion of the U.S. could be launched from Cuba. We don't think about it because there's nothing we can do about it.

At present, there is no U.S. anti-missile defense system whatsoever.

The Nuclear Arsenals

According to Secretary of Defense Weinberger, writing in Soviet Military Power, March 1986, U.S. Department of Defense, the Soviets have developed a stock of ready-to-launch Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, (ICBMs), with over 6,000 deliverable warheads capable of destroying U.S. missile silos. These are first-strike offensive weapons. They also have about 3,000 ready-to-launch submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads and about 2,000 bomber-launched nuclear weapons.

This totals 11,000 nuclear weapons that can be exploded by the Soviets over the United States in a first strike today. The delivery systems for these weapons are five years old or less.

Our Minuteman III missiles are about 15 years old on the average.

Moreover, Crommelin and Sullivan, writing in Soviet Military Supremacy, estimate that the Soviets have about 800 sea launched cruise missiles and the capability of launching an additional 11,000 nuclear weapons by reloading their first-strike missile launchers.

If these estimates are correct, we now face a 20,000 nuclear explosion threat. Even if only the facts that Secretary Weinberger has revealed are considered, then the current threat is 11,000 warheads, and the Soviet rate of production means that we may face a 20,000 warhead threat in the near future. Secretary Weinberger would, for security reasons, be unlikely to speak publicly about the reload possibility.

Soviet military doctrine calls for a first strike on the United States without warning. The United States has about 1,000 fifteen-year-old ICBM's, about 40 ballistic missile submarines, and about 300 thirty-year-old B-52 intercontinental bombers. Only those 20 submarines that are at sea (half are in port at any given time) have much chance to survive a Soviet first strike. Even these 20 are continuously hunted by the Soviet navy and are becoming vulnerable to satellite detection systems which the Soviets are developing. They may not survive either.

Therefore, our 1,000 ICBM's, our 300 bombers, our 40 submarines, and our 500 surface ship navy can be destroyed by less than 20% of the Soviet first-strike force. Even if they use three warheads for every military target, they will still have over 5,000 nuclear weapons left over for other strategic and civilian targets. With possible reloads or with future deployments, this figure rises to 10,000 to 15,000.

We do not have any defense whatsoever against these weapons. We know how to deploy antiballistic missiles and civil defense systems that would protect us from this threat, but we have deployed nothing.

We have initiated a "Star Wars" advanced defense technology research program. Our program has much less funding than the similar Soviet program and is, according to Dr. Edward Teller, about 10 years behind the Soviet program.

It is estimated that, at best, less than 10% of our weapons could escape destruction and actually reach the Soviet Union. Moreover, those 10% could do little damage to the Soviets, who have deployed extensive civil defense and anti-missile defense systems.

In hope that something might get through, our missiles have been aimed at the suspected bomb shelters of Politburo members and some other "makes them nervous" targets. In response, the Soviets have hardened these shelters so thoroughly that extreme accuracy and luck would be necessary to damage them.

Over the past 20 years, the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal has decreased by 30% and the total mega tonnage has dropped by 75%. This trend would be expected from the increased efficiency of the weapons and accuracy of their delivery systems. The Soviet totals have, however, risen dramatically. They are still building. We aren't.

The average age of our missiles is 15 years. When the U.S. tried to launch two satellites with Titan missiles (the second one in the spring of 1986) they both blew up.

The U.S. has a fleet of B-52 bombers. They are flown by crew members who are much younger than the planes they fly. The B-52 is a plane designed in the late 1940s. Consider this: we are "defended" by the threat that we will retaliate with a fleet of bombers designed before the Korean War.

In June 1986, President Reagan announced that he planned to exceed the Salt II limits for deployment of cruise missiles on B-52's in December 1986. The administration is also deploying 50 MX missiles and a limited number of B1 bombers.

The MX and B1 are partially obsolete before deployment, since they have endured not only the usual bureaucratic delays in development but also a political delay. The government under the Carter administration refused to deploy them seven years ago. Moreover, these current deployment levels are dwarfed by the massive new Soviet systems currently being deployed.

Therefore, in June 1986, the United States is proceeding with limited, ineffective, new deployments of offensive weapons of retaliation in continuation of the failed and immoral MAD strategy of vengeance. No plans whatever are being made for deployment of either a strategic defense or a comprehensive civilian defense.

It is a fundamental military principle that the highest force level, in this case nuclear weapons, dominates the lower force fields. For example, the surface ships of an apparently strong navy can be easily eliminated by the higher force level of nuclear bombardment. For completeness, however, let's also look at the lower force comparisons.

Navy

How about the U.S. Navy? Here is one area since 1980 where there has been considerable improvement. We used to have 1,000 ships. They were mostly put into mothballs. Here is the grim reality in 1985, after five years of improvement:

The U.S. has built 27 attack submarines in the last ten years; the Soviets have built 61. From 1976 to 1983, the Soviets built 86 submarines, three times the U.S. production level. At the beginning of 1986, we had 36 major nuclear subs on duty, but only half of which are at sea at one time. The Soviets have over 100 nuclear attack subs, and over 150 diesel subs (less of a threat). They have over 250 attack submarines total. Even if half are in port being repaired, they have a lot left over to trail our 18 that are at sea at any time.

Army

What about the Army? Not so good. The numbers are as follows:

We have virtually no specialized forces in guerrilla warfare, which is a key form of combat in modern times. Here is where we are also losing — Central America is within walking distance of El Paso.

Rapid Deployment Force

Then there is the so-called Rapid Deployment Force, now referred to as CENTCOM. So far, it lacks equipment. If it had six weeks, it could transport one Army division to the Middle East. The Soviets, according to Dr. Angelo Codevilla, can send 20 divisions into Iran, if necessary. When asked how much the Soviets can do in Iran and get away with it, he replied, "Anything they want to: they're the 400-pound gorilla in the region."

Lt. Gen. Robert Kingston, the Commander-in-Chief of CENTCOM, said in 1984 that "the forces assigned are not as sustainable as they should be, nor will they be adequately sustained in the foreseeable future."

Could we support even a full-scale effort in the Middle-East? One estimate concludes that 80% of the U.S. sealift fleet capacity would be absorbed by such an operation in the Persian Gulf.

We have 21 minesweepers, barely enough to clear more than two of our nation's dozen major port cities. We plan to build 25 more over the next four years. The Soviet Union has 380 minesweepers, one third more than all NATO forces combined.

Communications: We are totally dependent on our satellites for information and command. The Soviets have conducted at least 20 anti-satellite weapon tests involving the destruction of actual targets. The first test was in 1968. We have no operational anti-satellite weapon.

Then there was the neutron bomb. We stress the word "was". It killed soldiers, not cities, a good weapon for European terrain. We developed it and built it, but we didn't deploy it. Too destructive, you understand. Why, it might kill people! People such as invading Soviet tank crews.

But we've got the cruise missile, and they don't, right? Wrong. They've got a lot of them, and we are scrambling to catch up. We have ordered 1400 for the Navy, and we are installing cruise missiles on our 30-year-old B-52's.

Need we mention civil defense? We don't have any. Much of our economic production takes place in coastal cities. Most of the Soviet Union's production is far inland. A lot of their military production is underground.

The last area — potentially the most devastating — is chemical and biological warfare. The Soviets have a major production program.

The Soviets have 700,000 tons of chemical warfare agents stored already, according to Crommelin and Sullivan's book, Soviet Military Supremacy. NATO's estimate is lower. NATO estimates that the Soviets have 300,000 tons already stored.

Quality of Weaponry

What about our much-vaunted "smart weapons"? They are smart, and there are few in number. The Soviets do produce less fancy equipment, but they produce lots and lots of it. Furthermore, they steal our ideas.

But here is the important fact: in the U.S., it takes up to 15 years to design, test, and put into production a new weapons system. The Soviets can implement our technology much faster. Thus, our supposed technological lead over them is largely mythical, and our military leaders repeatedly testify to this. (By "our," we mean the U.S. and NATO; we are not speaking of the Israeli military, which does not labor under 15-year bureaucratic Defense Department procedures, and whose technological wonders are not easily stolen by the U.S.S.R.). Official testimony indicates that the Soviets have narrowed the technological gap in some areas from 8-10 years to 2-3 years. (Testimony of Admiral James Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1984.)

Lt. Gen. James Merryman, the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development & Acquisition says: "The only area we rate ourselves as close to parity to the Soviets is field artillery…. If we went to war tomorrow, they not only outnumber us, but most of what they have as equipment is better." (Defense Daily, 22 Nov. 1983, p. 1 13.)

On June 10, 1984, we successfully demonstrated a spectacular new anti-missile defense system called the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) vehicle. It has been described as the technological equivalent of hitting a bullet in flight with another bullet. As soon as it was demonstrated, the program was cancelled. The HOE works, but it was intended as a research program, not as a defense system.

This is standard operating procedure with the military today. They respond with a research program to demands that America be defended. When the research is finished — if it is ever finished — the developed technology is not put into production and deployed.

A First Strike Against Civilians

American civilians are hostage to a Soviet attack; Soviet civilians are safe from American attack. The MAD doctrine is, therefore, defunct, and we remain alive solely at the pleasure of Soviet generals and politicians.

This overwhelming Soviet force can have only one purpose — the complete destruction of the United States. It can be used to:

1. Destroy our military and kill 90% of our people in a first strike.

2. Destroy our military in a first strike and then demand the surrender of our civilians.

3. Demand the surrender of our military and our civilians under threat of first strike.

4. Coerce our leaders into continual surrender to Soviet interests around the world and then the eventual domination of America and actual surrender.

Any one of these possibilities leads to the end of our civilization in the near future.

Footnotes:

1. See Sister Lucy speaking to William Thomas Walsh in Our Lady of Fatima, Image books 1954, p. 221. See also her interview with Father Fuentes of December 26, 1957 published in Issue 19 of The Fatima Crusader, page 3.

* This article is taken from Fighting Chance, by Arthur Robinson and Gary North, published by the Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine, P.O. Box, 1279, Cave Junction, Oregon 97523; $5.95. It is also available from The Fatima Crusader.