New York: MacMillan Company, 1937.

2, 1919, Under the journalistic caption, " 'Shall' or 'May': How We
Handled Verbal Dynamite Making the Peace Treaty."]

The Treaty of Paris may be either worse or better than what people think
about it now. It is hardly ever possible to anticipate the judgments of
history, but one thing is certain-that just as the War which it brings to
a close was the most difficult of all the wars that have ever been fought,
so the Treaty of Paris is the most difficult of Treaties that has ever been
made.

The Treaty has about 80,000 words and over 400 Articles. It deals with
almost every kind of problem in international affairs. About a thousand
specialists drawn from all parts of the world worked at it, and they were
not all there to help-some were there to block it, most were there to change
it from whatever else it might have been. There is hardly a clause in the
whole long document that has not been the object of controversy and debate.
It is difficult now when looking at the clauses as a whole to realize how
many other alternatives were examined and discarded before the final wording
was agreed upon.

It is especially the difficulties of detail which are likely to escape
attention; yet the Treaty is a mass of details. Principles may be agreed
upon but they can seldom be applied without conflicting with other principles
which in themselves have perhaps an equal claim to consideration. And yet,
a single decision must be reached and a single formula must be found which
will embody that decision.

In this finding of formula a single instance may furnish an indication
of the final difficulties even after general plans have been agreed upon.
Article 409 deals with the problem of erecting an International Labor Office
with a right of supervision over the carrying out of International Labor
Legislation. It states that a Governing Body "may communicate"the criticisms concerning Labor Legislation to the government involved,
"and may invite that government to make such statement on the
subject as it thinks fit." The question arose whether the verb "may"
was strong enough, and "shall" was suggested as a substitute.
Between the two verbs "may" and "shall" lie whole worlds
of discussion, and back of them the accumulated forces of national histories,
institutions and interests of the industrial nations of the world. Representatives
of some of the nations at the Conference felt that the Governing Body of
the International Labor Office should not be a mere agency for registering
pious resolutions. On the other hand, representatives of other governments
felt that if "shall" were used it might be interpreted as giving
power to send impertinent notes to the governments of the world, or else,
on the other hand, would lessen the discretion of the Governing Body by
forcing it to subscribe to complaints with which it would be unwise to be
identified.

There is many a point in the Treaty in which a single word contains the
explosive power of these divergent principles of "shall" and "may."
It is hardly too much to say that there are hundreds of instances where
the choice of words opens up as many possibilities as this. Indeed, the
art of drafting is only second in importance to the determination of the
principles themselves.

Take another instance from the same general section of the Treaty: In
Article 405, which was formerly Article 19 of the International Labor Proposals,
a paragraph is inserted stating that in the framing of International Labor
Legislation "the Conference shall have due regard to those countries
in which climatic conditions, the imperfect development of industrial organization,
or other special circumstances make the industrial conditions substantially
different." It was, to say the least, somewhat difficult to suggest
to the State which particularly profited by this clause (Japan) that its
industrial organization was below the standards of the great European powers-yet
the admission had to be secured in order to include the exception in a way
satisfactory to the more advanced nations.

Still another instance: That same important Article has another clause
which refers almost by name to the United States-"In the case of a
federal State, the power of which to enter into conventions on labor matters
is subject to limitations, it shall be in the discretion of that government
to treat a draft convention . . . as a recommendation only." This sentence
proved to be a formula to which the other nations could not take exception,
for in noting the privileged position of the United States it did so by
simply describing its government. In the earlier stages of the drafting
the exception was stated in an adverbial rather than an adjectival form
and other nations objected to its inclusion.

These are simple instances of the difficulties of finding a satisfactory
expression to items upon which there could in the last instance be little
disagreement, and they illustrate the difficulties of reaching a statement
even where the points at issue were relatively beyond dispute.

When one turns from this set of difficulties to the subject-matter itself
we reach at once a set of most interesting and difficult problems. In the
first place there is the question of boundary making. Under the spell of
the map most people think of boundaries as something almost as real as the
rivers, mountains or seas along which they may run, with some one definite
principle determining them, almost like a law of nature. This is true, perhaps,
of districts like Alsace-Lorraine; but from the Rhine east there is hardly
a single boundary which can be drawn that does not do violation to some
important principle to which from one angle or another the Conference was
pledged.

The new nations in the east of Europe unfortunately do not live on different
sides of any clearly defined line. They fringe out into each other over
a wide borderland through which it is possible to draw several lines each
one of which would have a distinct justification. Still harder is the problem
of dealing with islands of people set in the midst of other races.

The City of Lemberg is solid Polish, but is surrounded by Ruthenians
who form the majority of the country population of that part of Galicia.
Add to this fact the further complication that many of the Poles are Jewish,
while on the other hand much of the land in the country of the Ruthenians
is owned by Polish nobles. The people themselves cannot decide the question
and are at war. What is to be done?

Take again the case of Greece. The real center of Greek civilization
is the Aegean Sea with a fringe of Greek settlements all around it. Shall
one consider that here we have a new form of state essentially maritime
with its frontiers fringing the land rather than the sea? Most states run
their frontiers from the land to the sea. This would reverse the process.
The Greeks, as traders, may claim the ports along the Aegean as definitely
as the American may claim the outlets for his railroads and compare the
water rights of the Aegean to the overland rights of a continental country.
It is a new point of view in political theory, but not without a good deal
of weight. Shall one, therefore, consider the Aegean civilization as a unit
and turn over to it the ports which are claimed as essential to its trade?
Or shall one regard the hinterland as of more importance since they may
claim that the Greeks shut them off from their own natural outlets to the
sea? One thing is clear-whichever way one decides, one is both right and
wrong.

Boundary making on the basis of statistics of population is difficult
enough in itself, but is doubly difficult when measured up against the claims
of culture and of history. It is possible for a small section of the population
to give the tone culturally to the whole and to dominate the country politically.
The Italians, for instance, claim that they have the cultural domination
in the Adriatic, and visitors to the Dalmatian Coast are struck with the
outer marks, at least, of this old Venetian quality of the maritime towns-while
the Czechoslovaks claim that the steady pressure of racial movement offers
a dynamic counterclaim less visible but more powerful. Magyars admit the
statistical claims of Rumanians in Transylvania and of Slovaks in Slovakia,
but cherish the proud memory of centuries of domination among these people
since the Turks were driven out. Should one count heads and decide upon
the basis of population, the result might lead to a distinct decline in
the standards of civilization.

Again, the sentimental claims of history are often just as real as the
demands of nationality. The fact that Upper Silesia had never belonged to
Poland since the rise of modern states is as real a fact in its way as the
national history of Bohemia. The century-long submission of the Slovenes
to the Hapsburgs makes difficult a correct reading of plebiscites in that
section of the new kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In planning
for the future one cannot ignore the bearing of these historic factors in
the erection of new states.

From more than one point of view there could be no settlement of these
problems that was not wrong, and when one adds to racial claims the legitimate
demands of economics, the need for provisions for transit and for markets,
the rival claims for territories with supplies of raw material, the geographical
and strategical elements in boundaries that would overrun cross-country
railroad lines, and a dozen other considerations varying with each new boundary,
one realizes that the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference, no matter
what they were, would leave the door open to further controversy.

It is quite possible, of course, that the actual boundaries drawn in
the Treaty are open to objection, but it should be remembered that no boundaries
can be drawn which will meet the approval of all parties concerned. This
being the case, it would surely be well for liberal minded people the world
over to concentrate a little less upon the map itself and more upon the
international policies of the new States which have been erected.

The question of policies is of course even more difficult than that of
boundary making. The one fact which stands out from history and geography
as well as from a study of the present situation is, that the whole Danube
Valley is intrinsically one and that the erection of new states with intensified
national feelings along that great international waterway may result in
retrogression rather than in progress, unless some means is found to unite
them to some degree in common policies. Their boundaries must not be rigid
barriers to trade or they will mutually suffer, and yet the one great solvent
for their difficulties is impossible- namely, Free Trade. Even a Zollverein
or Customs Union is perhaps beyond the limits of immediate possibility.
How can they be brought together, suffering still, as they do, from the
antagonisms of the War, to face the future constructively and in a co-operative
spirit? Obviously, the League of Nations cannot go too far in assuming the
supervision of this relatively incoherent mass of peoples. It is in no position
to succeed at a single step to an enlarged Hapsburg Monarchy. And yet, the
constructive scheme proposed must be elastic enough to include these possibilities,
or at least suggest ways for meeting them in the future.

It is this question of elasticity which is the most difficult to appraise.
If the international agreements of the Conference of Paris were to be made
rigid it would seem as though much more were accomplished than to leave
them frankly incomplete, but carried along as far as is possible now and
fixed so they can be adjusted to changing conditions.

The only institutions which last are living institutions; and the very
condition of living is change. It was the problem of constructive statesmanship
at the Peace Conference to set going rather than to set up understandings,
so that they would keep pace with changing events and secure the future
as well as the present. Two parts of the Treaty dealt specially with this
constructive planning, the one dealing with the League of Nations and the
other with International Labor. In both these sections two schools of thought
soon showed themselves even among the most ardent supporters of the general
plan. On the one hand there were those who wanted to see something like
a Super-State erected to which governments would abdicate some portion of
their sovereignty. On the other hand, there were those who felt that true
international action lay as much with the governments of the different States
as through the congresses which they should set up, and that it was a grave
mistake to lessen the authority and prestige of governments even in co-operative
enterprises. Upon the whole, the latter view prevailed. The international
arrangements in the Treaty are not of a kind to weaken governmental control,
but continue to use governments as national organs in the international
community. The national line-up on these questions was of great interest.
The Continental European Powers feel that in spite of the War which has
so divided them, there remains a need for a Continental community of nations.
Stimulated by the radical thought, and particularly by certain sections
of the syndicalists and socialists, they are prepared to enter into a closer
league with closer international guarantees and sanctions than the non-continental
Powers could entertain. In questions, for instance, of International Labor
Legislation it must not be forgotten that an almost imaginary line ran through
the great industrial regions at the north of France setting over some communities
into Belgium and some into France, and that different Labor laws will affect
the output of these two communities so that they feel obliged to come to
an international agreement. The case is far different with the British or
the American employers and workmen.

One of the most difficult problems to solve, however, in the League of
Nations was the setting in the League of what amounted to a League of Nations
in itself-the British Empire. The Dominions demanded to be regarded as nations.
They remained at the same time parts of the great imperial League. From
almost every standpoint excepting that of allegiance to a common sovereign
they were acting as independent nations- much too independent in fact, for
the comfort at times of the home government. There was every reason, therefore,
from that angle for giving Canada, Australia and South Africa at least as
much recognition as Jugoslavia, not to speak of a dozen or more smaller
States. The Dominions make their own tariff treaties, and they fought in
the War with distinct armies which they raised by their own free will according
to their own laws. But if each Dominion were to receive a single vote, that
would mean that the British Empire would have five votes in the League of
Nations and the United States one, which obviously does not seem fair. If
the British were to have only one vote, however, the Dominions would hardly
care to enter into the League for they do not wish to give up the independence
which they have already acquired, by surrendering to a purely British statesman
their participation in international affairs. The League of Nations was,
therefore, obliged to choose between the one and the other alternative.
It chose to recognize the different Dominions as States members of the League,
and America agreed to this, although with some misgivings on the part of
some Americans in Paris. That the decision to do so was wise is becoming
every day more and more apparent, for as far as the United States is concerned
the different Dominions, young democracies so similar in spirit to the American
and so analogous in institutions and traditions of liberty, are bound to
support in the main lines those policies which America will be supporting.
It is, therefore, in this group of young Anglo-Saxon States that America
will be likely to find its strongest allies in the councils of the League
in the future. If backward countries are to be admitted to the League, as
must be done, it is surely essential to have a fairly large proportion of
those peoples with the political experience and training which comes from
Anglo-Saxon history as a makeweight against the inexperience and theoretic
tendencies of the newer states.

It is only by looking far ahead and considering the probable attitudes
of the different States when actual questions arise that one can judge the
wisdom of such decisions as these.

The more the objections that are raised to the Treaty, the greater the
importance grows of the League of Nations as the one means of readjusting
solutions and rectifying blunders. Otherwise there is chaos ahead; and chaos
means the end of civilization.

Appendix V
The "British Empire" In The League Covenant(1)

The arrangement which I suggested for listing the British Dominions and
India under "British Empire" in the signatures of the original
Members of the League of Nations turned out to be one of the revolutionary
acts of the Paris Peace Conference. Accepted by the various British governments
there represented and by all the other States as well, it was an official
recognition by all the world that the "British Empire" was a sovereignty
among the other sovereign States, a fact neither claimed nor granted in
diplomatic dealings before. Strictly speaking, the symbol of that sovereignty
has been a royal, not an imperial, Crown, although popular usage and even
ceremonial references at coronation employ the more exalted title.

The confusion is not of recent date. Anson has noted that "from
Athelstan to Canute imperial styles were used and 'emperor' is applied to
Edward I, Richard II, and Henry V."(2) Firth has traced the use of
the term "British Empire" through the early modern period, when
the new national sovereignties were rising to supplant the traditional claims
of the Holy Roman Empire.(3) But, as Keith has pointed out, there never
had been a formal legislative definition of it.(4) The King is also Emperor
of India but not "British Emperor." The congeries of dependencies
and autonomous governments over which he rules are, except India, united
under a Kingship. The Covenant was the first treaty with other States in
which the designation of Empire was used to cover the whole vast fabric.
As a matter of fact, it embraces more than British territory. "In addition
to the Indian States, it includes large areas of territory designated as
'Protectorates,' over which the Crown exercises full control, whae attached
to it in various degrees of relationship are 'Protected States' and 'Mandated
Territories."' (5)

The way in which all this came about has been described in the Diary.
The draft of the Covenant was being put together in printed form. It had
to be ready for the Commission in the morning. The night was already far
spent when the question of signatures came up. The American printing establishment
was in a somewhat remote part of Paris. There was no time for consultation,
and there was no precedent to follow. The British Members of the League
of Nations obviously had to be grouped together. It would not have done
to have listed them so that Australia would follow the United States of
America, and South Africa come between Salvador and Spain. Moreover there
was need of indicating the slightly different status of "States Members
of the League" from "Members of the League." Hence the indention
in the printed list, marking out this group of Members from the rest.

The term "British Empire" as the name for this group was especially
suggested by the presence at the Peace Conference of the "British Empire
Delegation." Indeed, this was the deciding factor. The way in which
that Delegation functioned has been described in some detail in the Diary.
But it, too, had its history. It was largely due to a direct migration from
London to Paris of the members of the Imperial War Cabinet, the one organ
of an imperial government that had been functioning. The antecedents of
this carry us back to Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee in 1887, when the
Colonial statesmen inaugurated the periodically recurring Conference, which
in 1907 changed its style to Imperial Conference. This slight and infrequent
mechanism had given the semblance of political and even of legal reality
to the concept of a British Empire, but the term remained somewhat indeterminate,
being confined to domestic use within the territories under the Crown. This
process of imperial development, slow and hesitant in peace time, had reached
its climax in the World War, in the Imperial War Conferences of 1917 and
1918 and the creation of the Imperial War Cabinet. At the close of the War
in which they had played so notable a part, Canada, Australia, New Zealand
and South Africa could not be denied status at the Peace Conference, and
their Prime Ministers made known in no uncertain terms their demand to participate
in the settlement. The result was that the Foreign Office was almost snowed
under in Paris and at times forced to yield to the vigorous leaders of the
Dominions. The descriptions of the scenes in the Hotel Majestic given in
the Diary show clearly enough the corporate existence at Paris of a British
Empire-puzzling, self-contradictory, but effective. The fact that India
was a part of the British Empire Delegation accounted for the inclusion
of India, an empire in itself, in the list of States within the British
Empire. The reason that this was left untouched was probably the uncertain
significance of the indented margin which grouped these states together.

But there could hardly be both a British Empire on the list of States
Members of the League and a United Kingdom as well, without giving the appearance
of double representation. There was opposition enough already, especially
in the United States, to the number of votes that the various British governments
could mobilize in the League. That, in a word, was the chief reason for
leaving the United Kingdom off the list when inserting in it the new, as
yet undefined "British Empire." There was also the additional
fact, however, that the non-self-governing colonies were popularly referred
to as parts of the Empire, while their relation to the United Kingdom was
not always clear. Although governed from Whitehall, they differed in the
degree of achievement of autonomy on local rights and privileges.

But does the absence of the United Kingdom from the list of League Members
mean that the Mother State is not herself a Member of the League? Strangely
enough-or, perhaps, naturally enough-this question was not asked at the
time, so far as I know. Years later, however, Sir Cecil J. B. Hurst, who
was Legal Adviser to the British Delegation and who shared with Mr. David
Hunter Miller the editorship of the very draft of the Covenant in question,
commented upon the signatures as follows:

If you look at the Covenant, which is the charter or constitution of
the League, you will see that a list of the original members of the League
is given in an annex. The form in which British membership is provided
for satisfies both the two outstanding characteristics of the British Empire:
the unity of the whole and the autonomy of the parts.

The names of the states come in alphabetical order. When you reach the
words "British Empire," you will see immediately after them,
but set back a little so as to show that they constitute part of the British
group, the names Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and India.
The Irish Free State was only admitted as a member of the League at a later
date.

Satisfactory though the form is in one respect, in that it recognizes
the distinct international personality of the dominions, it is unsatisfactory
in another respect, in that it entirely omits Great Britain, and Great
Britain is not a wholly negligible part of the Empire. Great Britain only
finds herself within the League as an unmentioned element in the British
Empire.

How this came about it is a little difficult now to tell. It probably
originated in the fact that the plenipotentiaries representing Great Britatn
at the Peace Conference were furnished with full powers from the King which
contained no words of territorial limitation and enabled them to act on
his behalf generally. Their signature to the Peace Treaty was not limited
in its operation to Great Britain. Technically it applied to all the King's
dominions.

Whatever the purpose of this arrangement in the Annex to the Covenant,
it has not worked well in practice. If the object was to lay stress on
the unity of the Empire as a political entity, the effect has been the
opposite, because in the ordinary work of the League it has tended to render
the words "British Empire" synonymous with Great Britain and
to create the impression that the dominions were something outside the
Empire. If at a meeting of the Assembly the representatives are called
upon to come up to the tribune to cast their votes in, let us say, the
election of the president, and the South African delegate is seen to vote
in the name of South Africa while the delegate of His Majesty's Government
in Great Britain is seen to vote in the name of the British Empire, it
necessarily suggests that South Africa is no part of the Empire.

Until the terms of the Covenant are amended and account is taken of
the existence of Great Britain it is bound to happen that for some purposes
the words "British Empire" are taken as meaning Great Britain-
for instance, the share of the expenses of the League which falls to the
lot of the Empire must be paid by Great Britain.(1)

One utterly unforeseen effect of this use of the term "British Empire"
in the list of League signatures has been a modification in the form of
treaties generally. At the Imperial Conference of 1916 Lord Balfour's Report
raised the issue in these terms:

Some treaties begin with a list of the contracting countries and not
with a list of Heads of States. In the case of treaties negotiated under
the auspices of the League of Nations, adherence to the wording of the
Annex to the Covenant for the purpose of describing the contracting party
has led to the use in the preamble of the term "British Empire"
with an enumeration of the Dominions and India if parties to the Convention
but .without any mention of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Colonies and Protectorates. These are only included by virtue of their
being covered by the term "British Empire." This practice, while
suggesting that the Dominions and India are not on a footing of equality
with Great Britain as participants in the treaties in question, tends to
obscurity and misunderstanding and is generally unsatisfactory.

As a means of overcoming this difficulty it is recommended that all
treaties (other than agreements between Governments) whether negotiated
under the auspices of the League or not should be made in the name of Heads
of States, and, if the treaty is signed on behalf of any or all of the
Governments of the Empire, the treaty should be made in the name of the
King as the symbol of the special relationship between the different parts
of the Empire.(2)

"In the name of the King." This was the only solution for the
Imperial Conference which laid the basis for the Statute of Westminster
of 1931, by which the "British Commonwealth of Nations" was at
last accepted as the proper term for the traditional "British Empire."
But the formula also had a counterpart in the practice of the American Government,
using the title "The President of the United States of America"
instead of the name of the country.

Notes:

1. See above, February 12.

2. Sir William R. Anson, TheLaw and Custom
of the Constitution (4th ed., Oxford, 1935), II, Part II, 255 n. "Empire"
in such cases was limited to England.

League of Nations Commission meets at the apartment of Colonel House, President Wilson presiding.

Feb. 11.

French member of the League Commission, Léon Bourgeois, proposes

that the League enforce its decision by an international army. On the ground
that the United States had recognized the political cohesion of Serbia,
Croatia, and Slavonia, on Feb. 7, the Jugoslav delegates ask President Wilson

to judge between them and the Italian delegates on the Adriaticquestion.

Feb. 14.

President Wilson expounds the League of Nations Covenant before the Conference.

Feb. 18.

Italian delegates decline to accept President Wilson as arbiter in the Adriatic

question on two grounds: The question is not a matter for arbitration and

the Croats and Slovenes, included in Jugoslavia, are still enemy peoples.

Mar. 10.

Supreme War Council formulates terms for German disarmament-100,000 effectives and a twelve-year enlistment.

Mar. 18.

Navigation of the Rhine to be controlled by an international commission
and Heligoland forts dismantled.

Mar. 21.

Italian delegation threatens to withdraw from Conference unless Fiume be
rendered to Italy. (In the Treaty of London, Fiume is given to Croatia, but on Oct. 30, 1918, the people had declared their union with Italy.)

April 6.

Report that owing to the military demands of France and Italy President
Wilson contemplated an immediate return to the United States.

April 8.

Commission of Responsibility for War, presided over by the American Secretary

of State, Lansing, excludes the death penalty from contemplated legal procedure

against William of Hohenzollern, the former German Emperor.

April 10.

The League Commission incorporates in the covenant a passage intended to
leave the Monroe Doctrine inviolate.

April 12.

Claim of France to the Saar Valley accepted by the conference.

April 14

President Wilson privately addresses Italian delegates on Fiume.

April 16.

Conference agrees to provision Russia under the Nansen Commission, provided the Whites and Reds cease fighting.

April 23.

President Wilson, emphasizing his statement of the 14th, tells the Italian
people that Fiume must go to Jugoslavia as the only available port for the nations of South Central Europe.

April 24.

Premier Orlando, the head of the Italian peace delegation, in a reply to
the foregoing, demonstrates Italy's claim to Fiume.

April 25.

The council settles Poland's access to the Baltic-a traffic highway is to
be opened through East Prussia to Danzig, which will be made a free city under the League.

April 26.

As a protest against President Wilson's attitude on the Fiume question Premier
Orlando and his colleagues, Sonnino and Salandra, return to Rome to lay the matter before Parliament.

April 27.

The text of the labor article in the covenant is made public.

April 28.

President Wilson, as Chairman of the League Commission, expounds the revised text of the covenant before the conference.

April 30.

In answer to Japan's note verbale promising military and political surrender of Shantung, the Council agrees to the Chinese-Japanese arrangement in regard
to the former German lease of Kiao-Chau.

May 5.

Sir Eric Drummond takes office as Secretary General of the League, which
organizes its first committee.

May 6.

The council designates the mandatories for the former German colonies.

May 7.

The Italian delegates accept an invitation to return to the Conference,
their conduct having, meanwhile, been indorsed by the Italian Parliament and public demonstrations in Italy.

May 29.

The German delegates formally protest against the terms of the treaty presented to them at Versailles, May 7.

June 12.

Council to give qualified material aid to Admiral Kolchak, head of the All-Russian Government at Omsk.

June 15.

Council finishes changes in the Versailles Treaty.

June 26.

Council declares it can promise nothing in regard to Turkey.

July 18.

Council places General Allenby (British) in charge of the British, French,
Italian, and Greek armies of occupation in Asia Minor, the principal fields of operation being the British in Palestine and Mesopotamia, the French in Syria, the Italians south of Smyrna, and the Greeks in Smyrna.

Aug. 4.

Tokio Government in a statement to the Council ratifies the note verbale
given it by its delegates on April 3o.

Aug. 15.

Conference informs Rumania that it will make readjustments in Hungary and
not Rumania.

Aug. 22.

The Council orders the Magyar Archduke Joseph to retire from the head of
the new Hungarian Government.

Sept. 5.

The Council completes the text of the Bulgarian peace treaty.

Sept. 27.

Conference issues a note to Germany demanding evacuation of former Russian
Baltic provinces.

Oct. 16.

Council invites Germany and Baltic nations to join in a blockade against
Soviet Russia.

Nov. 7.

Council issues ultimatum to Rumania to withdraw from Hungary.

Nov. 21.

Council gives Poland mandate over Galicia for twenty-five years.

Dec. 22.

Supreme Council sends Germans ultimatum in regard to acceptance of protocol.

Appendix VII

The Organization Of The American Delegation

At The Paris Peace Conference

Looking back upon the preparations of the Inquiry for the Peace Conference,
it seems now that the problem of the organization of the American Delegation
and its relation to the Peace Conference as a whole was fundamental, because
it affected in a major way not only the procedure of the Peace Conference
but even the terms of the Treaty. Yet no adequate study of these problems
of organization has yet been made. Something of their nature may be gathered
from the short description given in the Retrospect of the way in which they
were dealt with by the Inquiry, and in the discussion attached to the entry
for January 29, at the time when the organization of the technical experts
began to be integrated with that of other similar bodies.

In this connection the following two charts will be found of interest.
The first one was prepared for the Research Committee of the Inquiry and
was discussed at its meeting on September 20, 1918. It is a modification
of one submitted to the Committee on September 10. These two plans did not
differ with reference to the place of the American Delegation in the Peace
Conference, but only with reference to the organization of the technical
bodies serving the American Delegation, especially the Inquiry and the Washington
"Central," that is, the Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics,
under the chairmanship of Dr. Edwin F. Gay. It is important to note that
the Inquiry at that date fully expected that the Peace Conference would
include representatives of the Central Powers, and that the American Delegation
would be composed of representatives of the Executive and the Senate, a
representative at large, and the Secretary of State. An additional blank
space indicated some uncertainty as to the size of the Delegation.

The second chart reproduced here was drawn at Paris to indicate the actual
structure of the American Delegation. As is evident from the narrative in
these pages, the relative places occupied by General Churchill's staff and
by the Division of "Intelligence" under Dr. Mezes and Dr. Bowman
should be reversed.