SYRIA : Wither
the Syrian Muslim Brothers?

Through
a mixture of subtlety and intransigence, President
Hafez Assad has for the time being broken the
back of the Moslem Brotherhood, regarded not so
long ago as the most destabilising challenge to
his authority.

One faction of the Syrian Moslem Brothers, backed
by the Brotherhood’s pan-Arab international
organisation, has been cornered into endless (and
so far fruitless) negotiations with the government.
Another faction has sought the protection of Iraq,
but appears to be virtually impotent. Meanwhile,
the military wing of the Syrian Brotherhood is
for all intent and purpose out of action.

Assad scented victory when he managed to get
a delegation of Moslem Brothers to meet his representatives
in January 1985 in Frankfurt. Ali Duba, head of
Military Intelligence, brought two of the regime’s
security “specialists” on the Brotherhood,
Colonel Hassan Khalil and Major Issam Bucktiar,
to the negotiating table with Hassan Huweidi,
then general supervisor of the Syrian Brotherhood,
and one of his deputies, Munir Radban. The meeting
was something of a coup for Assad, since it came
less than three years after the bloody events
in Hama.

Debating future strategy

For
months, the leadership of the Brotherhood -- based
chiefly in Iraq and Saudi Arabia -- had been debating
future strategy. The organisation’s consultative
council and its political bureau were deeply divided
over the question of talking to the government.
The split has persisted until today, and Assad
has exploited it skilfully.

On the one hand, Hassan Huweidi and Ali Bayanuni
argued that some sort of negotiations were imperative.
They stressed the practical problems faced by
rank and file members. Many of them had been forced
to leave everything (homes, jobs, sometimes fortunes)
after Hama and now lived the dismal existence
of exiles in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Hundreds
more were prisoners of the regime of whose fate
little or nothing was known. As Ali Bayanuni is
reported to have told his colleagues in the leadership
late in 1984: “We have to re-evaluate our
resources and facilities. Do they permit us to
achieve our goal of overthrowing the regime? If
they don’t, we have no alternative but to
talk”.

Adnan Saadeddin, then deputy supervisor and head
of the political bureau, was deeply opposed to
the idea of negotiations. But the vote went against
the hardliners, and Adnan Saadeddin had to admit
the delegation sent to Frankfurt was legitimately
constituted. Despite rumours to the contrary,
however, he strongly denies taking part in the
talks with Ali Duba and his associates: “There
is nothing to discuss with these criminals; they
are not a government, they are a mafia”.

In
the event, Adnan Saadeddin’s scepticism
seems to have been justified. Hassan Huweidi presented
Ali Duba with a long list of demands, including
a general amnesty, freedom for all political prisoners,
abrogation of martial law, free general elections
and freedom of religion. According to witnesses
of the meeting, Ali Duba virtually laughed in
the Brothers’ faces. He is said to have
been “arrogant and haughty”, telling
the opposition delegation that he was only there
to lay down conditions for their return to Syria.
These included a complete report on all their
past activities in the country.

A crisis within the Brotherhood

The failure of the meeting led to a crisis within
the Brotherhood. Hassan Huweidi resigned, but
when the consultative council met in June 1985,
it was unable to agree on a successor. The international
organisation of the Moslem Brothers stepped in
and appointed Munir Radban, who had participated
in the Frankfurt talks. However, he was unable
to impose his authority on what was now a paralysed
Syrian Brotherhood.

The crisis came to a head at an election for
the post of general supervisor held in Bagdad
in May 1986. Out of 1.855 votes cast, the hardline
Adnan Saadeddin received 822, while 903 went to
his more conciliatory opponent, Sheikh Abu Gouddeh.
Since there were 89 blank votes, neither candidate
had the statutory 50 % required to win. So the
international leadership stepped in again, decided
the blank votes should not be counted and awarded
Sheikh Abu Gouddeh 51,1 % of the poll. Incensed,
Adnan Saadeddin turned to his supporters and simply
had himself proclaimed general supervisor of the
Moslem Brothers in Syria.

Since then the two factions have laid claim to
be the legitimate Syrian Moslem Brotherhood. Adnan
Saadeddin is based in Bagdad and is obliged to
follow the Iraqi line closely, especially on matters
such as the Gulf war and the political import
of the Iranian revolution. The moderates, headed
by Sheikh Abu Gouddeh, Hassan Huweidi, Munir Radban
and Ali Bayanuni, have taken refuge in Saudi Arabia
with the backing of the international organisatioon
of the Brotherhood.

For Hafez Assad, this has consecrated his success
in neutralising the Brotherhood. The political
wing is irrevocably split. The movement’s
historical leader, Issam al Attar, has lived in
exile for a long time in Germany and now plays
no part in its activities. The military wing (Talia
al Mukatila, the Fighting Vanguard) has been crippled
since its leader, Adnan Okla, was lured back to
Syria by a government agent and disappeared from
sight.

Is this the end for the Syrian Brotherhood? Probably
not entirely. There remains a strong undercurrent
of religious fundamentalism inside Syria waiting
to be exploited again, and some secret Brotherhood
cells are thought to remain. But Hafez Assad can
relax. For the foreseeable future, any challenge
to his rule will not come from the Brothers. Meanwhile,
he can afford to tantalise the moderates with
the prospect of a settlement. Ali Duba is reported
to have met Sheikh Abu Gouddeh three times in
Germany last year. Predictably, the regime continued
to be intransigent.