I believe that what we did in the CD this year was necessary and may
continue to be necessary for a longer period. It was, in my view, inevitable.
It is necessary that this loss of confidence be worked out of our systems.
This year, 61 countries have tried to identify issues on which their views
of their security concerns coincide. Our priorities, at the moment at least,
clearly differ. For example, those with nuclear weapons and those protected
by those weapons have one set of priorities ­ I respect that. Those
who have neither weapons nor umbrellas have different priorities, different
perceptions of national security. In my view, this is not deadlock or failure
of the CD. We just do not agree on the bases or objectives of the negotiations
on specific issues. There are others perhaps on which we may find agreement
and, if we do, the CD is there ready for our use.

There are, however, two other general issues which have intrigued me
during the entire time I have spent in the CD and I cannot but put this
before my colleagues here today. The first concerns the "logic" often promoted
in this forum. An annual report on the activities of the CD this year must
reflect the preferences for the programme of work next year, in the full
knowledge that the annual reports of one year have rarely affected the
following year's work. The logic of that completely misses me. A stand­alone
FMCT, it is said, is closely linked with the CTBT and has been mandated
by the NPT review process. Having had the personal pleasure of pressing
a red button on the CTBT last year and not being part of the NPT review
process, I have never understood the logic which leads any country to think
that we can somehow, perhaps with some clever drafting, be bound to negotiate
a stand­alone FMCT. Finally, and still on the intriguing logic in the
CD, we all accept that not all States are equal in power, whether through
the possession or non­possession or protection or non­protection
of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, whatever. There are some, indeed,
who are more equal than others. I accept that. What is, however, difficult
to comprehend is the logic of an approach that assumes that the security
interests of the powerful are more important than the security interests
of the less powerful, not only to the international community but to the
less powerful themselves.

.....................

Ms. CRITTENBERGER (United States of America):

.......................

I have asked for the floor today to offer a few reflections and comments
on the CD year we are now bringing to a close. Unlike last year, it is
not a year for which any of us should be proud. And, while not surprising,
it is nonetheless disappointing that the differences between participants
over priorities in 1997 prevented the CD from engaging collectively in
any substantive work on any of the issues related to its agenda.

It is clear that the divisions within the CD reflect genuine foreign
policy differences and priorities among the member States. These divisions
and the CD's concomitant lack of progress this year, however, should not
constitute a reflection on the Conference on Disarmament itself as an institution.
As we have all witnessed or are aware of, the Conference is as productive
as it is allowed to be ­ no more, no less.

Policy differences notwithstanding, there also seemed to be, at times,
a fundamental lack of desire and will to achieve any substantive results.
It is the hope of my Government that next year things will be different
and that the CD will resume work and find one or more issues on which to
begin substantive negotiations. For the United States, the obvious and
feasible choices for negotiations are a convention on the prohibition of
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, in the nuclear arena, and steps towards a global ban
on anti­personnel landmines in the conventional arena.

With or without the CD, the United States is moving forward on arms
control issues and is hard at work in the field of nuclear arms control
and disarmament. The recent agreement reached between the United States
and the Russian Federation after several years of hard work on theatre
missile defence issues is just the latest example of tangible progress.
We continue to believe that the most expeditious way to ensure continued
progress in nuclear disarmament, at least for the foreseeable future, is
for the United States and the Russian Federation to continue bilateral
negotiations. While there is a multilateral role on specific nuclear disarmament
issues such as CTBT and FMCT, multilateral efforts to programme nuclear
disarmament writ large would only serve to hinder the real progress already
well under way.

In the heat of the moment unfortunate remarks are sometimes made that
will remain for ever a part of our written record. These remarks will undoubtedly
cause scholars and historians in future years to wonder where the CD priorities
were in 1997. We heard one such unfortunate remark at last week's plenary
when it was asserted that the five declared nuclear Powers want the CD
to discuss only "small items" such as anti­personnel landmines and
a fissile material cut­off treaty. The root of the CD's problems, we
were told, was our trenchant refusal to acknowledge the "world will" to
negotiate nuclear disarmament in the CD.

..............................

The fissile material cut­off treaty was also referred to as a "small
item". Although those who call for nuclear disarmament negotiations in
the CD accept that FMCT is an integral component of nuclear disarmament,
they refuse to negotiate a separate treaty to halt the production of fissile
material which gives nuclear weapons their potential to kill. If delegations
honestly want the CD to work on nuclear disarmament, they should jump at
the chance to negotiate a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile
material. This treaty would be a vital step, a multilateral step, in the
path toward nuclear disarmament.

It is not surprising that the frustrations built up over a year of inactivity
have resulted in a series of statements attempting, to use an American
colloquialism, to remove the monkey from one's back and to shift the blame
for the 1997 CD failure to others. At the end of the day, of course, we
must all accept responsibility for the fact that 1997 is the first and
only year in which we were unable to convene an ad hoc committee or undertake
any collective substantive work.

What happened to us? In our view, the answer is quite simple. In any
negotiating situation ­ be it labour relations, a real estate transaction,
diplomacy, or even a marriage, so I am told ­ the parties must be committed
to a continuing relationship and a reasonably acceptable outcome. This
is the so­called "win­win" situation in which the parties achieve
some, if not all, of their objectives. The parties must work to narrow
their differences, to settle the issues that can be resolved, and to set
aside the issues on which there can be no agreement. The ideal outcome
is for the negotiators to leave the bargaining table reasonably satisfied
that all have won something and that no one has lost or capitulated. The
alternative is divorce, resulting from irreconcilable differences or, in
CD parlance, linkage and a time­bound framework, a sure recipe for
torpedoing any progress on substantive issues. By this "all or nothing
approach" practised in the CD this year, concrete progress on specific
and timely issues, issues ripe for multilateral negotiation, was held hostage
to demands for an agreement to negotiate multilaterally nuclear disarmament
in a time­bound framework.

I think that the negotiations of the past two days have shown that we
are all capable of being flexible and of compromise. My delegation has
certainly tried to show flexibility and a willingness, in principle, as
well as throughout the year, to discuss topics that we do not particularly
wish to discuss. Our flexibility was based on an individual appraisal of
each topic. If we are to negotiate in 1998, the Conference on Disarmament
will have to determine what it is realistically capable of negotiating,
and not what individual members see as their only priority. Without flexibility
and a significant change in attitude, our prospects for 1998 are no better
than the year we have just concluded.

On 21 August, when you opened the 775th CD plenary, you expressed optimism
that the 1998 Conference on Disarmament will get back to work. This is
a view my delegation shares.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States
for her statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at
this point in time? I give the floor to the distinguished representative
of Pakistan.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): I have not asked for the floor to respond
to the distinguished representative of the United States, although I must
say that there is much that could be said for the other point of view,
the point of view of the developing countries and the members of the Group
of 21. But I shall leave the record to speak for itself. I have asked for
the floor merely to announce that the Group of 21 will meet tomorrow morning
at 10 o'clock.