Weekly Intelligence Notes (WINs) are
produced and edited by Roy Jonkers for non-profit educational uses by AFIO
members and WIN subscribers. RADM (ret) Don Harvey contributes articles to
selected WINs

CONTENTS of this
WIN

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TERRORIST STRIKES CAUSE NEW ALERTS ACROSS
GLOBE -- Islamic extremist terrorists,
reportedly associated with al-Qaeda, struck at multiple targets in
Morocco,
Saudi Arabia and
Chechnya (highest
number of casualties) during roughly the same time period, while Palestinian
suicide bombers executed attacks in Israel. In addition,
Pakistan reported
attacks on Shell and CALTEX gas stations, Lebanon was able to
prevent an attack on the US Embassy, the Algerian Army hunted terrorists who
abducted fifteen Europeans held in exchange for Islamic prisoners, and
Britain halted
flights to Kenya because of extreme
danger signals.

The attacks
in Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Chechnya all involved careful planning, preparation
and intelligence gathering, a team of terrorists working together, killing of
guards to gain entry, and suicide bombers to complete the mission, using trucks
laden with explosives. In SAUDI ARABIA there were
attacks on: (1) THE JEDAWAL
COMPOUND, which killed one Saudi Military Guard manning watch post at rear
corner of compound. The assailants then drove the explosive laden car up to the
next gate in the back of the compound, where it was detonated. The terrorist's
safe house -- which was raided by Saudi authorities on 6 May -- was only 400
meters from the Jedawal Compound. (2)
THE CORDOVAL COMPOUND, located on a Saudi National Guard (SANG)
controlled facility, was initially attacked with a Ford Crown Victoria sedan,
which attempted to ram through the gate. When the car became stuck, terrorists
from a pick-up truck dismounted and attacked the guard post. A firefight ensued,
killing all Saudi National Guard personnel. The terrorists then forced open the
gate, and drove the pick-up on the compound to residence housing, where it was
detonated (initial estimate suggests 400-500 kilograms of HE may have been
used). (3) THE AL-HAMRA COMPOUND,
attacked when a Toyota sedan pulled up to the
gate, followed by a GMC Suburban truck. An unknown number of terrorists
dismounted from the truck and attacked the unarmed guard force, forcing their
way into the compound after shooting and injuring one guard. Both vehicles then
drove toward the center of the compound, the terrorists shooting wildly into
buildings and at anything that moved. Upon reaching a housing area south of the
main recreation and sports complex, an explosive device in the GMC Suburban was
detonated by a suicide terrorist.

In MOROCCO, the
terrorist team reportedly was given its mission by Ayman Zuwahri’s Egyptian
Islamic Jihad, the most dangerous operational arm of al Qaeda. One of the
suicide bombers was identified as Egyptian, a second was a reserve officer of
the Abu Dhabi armed
forces. The team reportedly reached the Moroccan port of Tangiers several
months ago – without its trail being picked up - in two groups; one from Italy,
the second from Belgium, some of them wending their way from Egypt, Sudan and
Yemen. They were said to have been hosted by the radical Moroccan Assirat
al-Moustaquim (Followers of the Straight Path) who also supplied them with
weapons and explosives. The targets selected were two-edged -- one aimed
at Jewish targets (Casablanca Jewish community center, a Jewish-owned
restaurant, and a hotel frequented by Israelis), and one where Osama bin Laden
was implicitly striking at the Saudi royal presence in the kingdom of Morocco,
where almost every prince of any importance – from Crown Prince Abdullah down --
maintains a palace and harem for frequent recreational visits. Members of the
two royal houses are also joined by business ties accompanied by the inevitable
court intrigue.

The bottomline appears to be
(1) that no one, not even the
Israelis dealing with a totally infiltrated captive target population, can
completely prevent these types of attacks; (2) that al-Qaeda is finding plenty of
recruits for its moralistic religious-extremist crusade against Western
(including Russian) interests in the Muslim world; (3) that the royal house of Saudi Arabia is
a prime target, along with Americans, Israelis and Russians; (4) that the terrorists remain capable of
mounting complicated, well-planned operations involving considerable lead-times
and many personnel, in spite of billions in US intelligence resources, and in
spite of frequent and considerable successes achieved by US and allied (and
Israeli) counter-terrorist operations, and lastly, (5) that given the above, it is vital to
restrain panic-driven excessive language, scape-goating or over-the-top actions
and reactions -- we need consistent, persistent, rational, effective national
and international collaborative counter-terrorism. (Jonkers) (Potential
Indicators of Threats Involving Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
(VBIEDs), May 15, 2003, Risk Assessment Div., Information Analysis Directorate,
Department of Homeland Security //FBI Special Agent G. Harter)(Debka File 19
May03) (http://www.debka.com/article_print.php?aid=492)

US COUP PLOTTING IN IRAQ-- With Iraq conquered
and Saddam Hussein's regime deposed, U.S. and Iraqi sources have now provided an
account of the unsuccessful strategy of deposing Saddam by a coup d'etat
during the 1990's, an effort reportedly known within CIA by the cryptonum
"DBACHILLES" . The failed coup efforts carry some important lessons. They show
that Iraqi intelligence penetrated the Iraqi exile-based operations. And they
illustrate the damage caused by a long-running feud between Iraqi exile groups
and their patrons in Washington. A media-based report follows.

The DBACHILLES project began in
1994. The CIA around that time appointed a new head of its Near East Division
named Stephen Richter (whose identity was long ago published), and proceeded on
the basic assumption that large parts of the Iraqi army might support a coup.
The CIA's new Iraq team is said to have met soon afterward with Gen. Mohammed
Abdullah Shawani, a former commander of Iraqi Special Forces. A Turkmen from Mosul, Shawani had many
contacts in the Iraqi military, including several sons still in uniform
(Shawani's name has previously been published too). As the CIA was drafting its
plans, the British encouraged the agency to contact an experienced Iraqi exile
named Ayad Alawi, who headed a network of current and former Iraqi military
officers and Baath Party operatives known as Wifaq, the Arabic word for "trust."
(Note: An Iraqi source now argues that by late 1995, some of Shawani's and
Alawi's operatives were already controlled by Iraqi
intelligence).

Complicating the CIA's coup planning
was a similar effort in northern Iraq by Ahmed Chalabi's
Iraqi National Congress. A CIA officer named Bob Baer was dispatched in January
1995 to coordinate the various covert efforts, but they only got more tangled.
Chalabi launched his coup attempt in March 1995, but it was unsuccessful and
Baer was summoned home to Washington. Chalabi
was convinced that the military-coup plan had been compromised and traveled to
Washington in March 1996 to see the new CIA director, John Deutch, and his
deputy, George Tenet. He told them the Iraqis had captured an Egyptian courier
who was carrying an Inmarsat satellite phone to Shawani's sons in Baghdad. When
the CIA officials seemed unconvinced, for their own good reasons, Chalabi then
went to his friend Richard Perle, a prominent neoconservative. Perle is said to
have called Tenet and urged that an outside committee review the Iraq situation.
But the coup planning went ahead. DBACHILLES succeeded in reaching a
number of senior Iraqi military officers, but was compromised and collapsed in a
blood bath in June 1996. The Iraqis began arresting the coup plotters on June
26. At least 200 officers were seized and more than 80 were executed, including
Shawani's sons. Top CIA officials reportedly blamed Chalabi for exposing the
plot, and the recrimination has persisted ever since.

As a follow-on to the coup plotting,
in the run-up to, and during the invasion, both Alawi and Shawani played
important roles in the US/UK effort to encourage Iraqi officers to surrender or
defect. It did not quite work out that way. The Iraqi military did not defect or
surrender, they just went home. (Jonkers) (Wash Post,16 May 2003, page A29 //David
Ignatius)

GUATEMALA 1952-1954 DECLASSIFIED -- The
State Department and the CIA have declassified and published thousands of pages
of documents concerning the U.S. covert action in
Guatemala that led to
the overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in
1954.

-A 1983 FRUS volume concerning Guatemala in the same period drew widespread
criticism because it omitted mention of the CIA- instigated coup. The
State Department has posted the relevant portions of that earlier volume here
-http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/ike/iv/.

-The CIA has published an impressive selection
of declassified documents reflecting its role in the 1954 Guatemala coup - see http://www.foia.cia.gov/guatemala.asp. (Secrecy News 19 May
03)

IN MEMORIAM -- SALUTE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS -- The FBI recently revealed, based
on its Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program, that 52 law-enforcement officers
nationwide were slain in line of duty during CY 2002, and another 76 officers
were accidentally killed on duty. Fourteen officers were slain in ambush, 10
were murdered answering disturbance calls, 10 during traffic pursuits and stops,
10 during arrest situations, 8 while investigating suspicious persons or
circumstances, and 4 by mentally deranged individuals. Firearms were used in 51
of these 56 deaths. Without law and order, there is no society and no
democracy, as the current situation in Baghdad again makes
clear. We value our colleagues in law enforcement, and render our salute to the
men (and women??) who did their duty and paid the ultimate price - for all of
us. (Jonkers) (WashTimes, 13 May 03, p. A7)

AFIO NATIONAL LUNCHEON: Tuesday, 24 June 2003
at the Holiday Inn, Tysons Corner, McLean, Virginia, 10:30 (registration
begins), Program - 11 a.m. our first speaker is John Prados, author of "Lost
Crusader" who will talk about his book on DCI Colby. After lunch (three course,
salad, roast beef, desert, coffee) the 1 pm speakers
will be Milt Bearden (CIA ret) and James Risen, NYTimes journalist, who will
talk about "The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with
the KGB." Should be a terrific session!

Registration $27.50 pp members and
their invited guests, via email or phone/credit card (703-790-0320 or
afio@afio.com. The authors' books
will be for sale and they are willing to autograph. (RJ)

Larry S. Writes on Hezbollah -- Incidental
Observation on Language: Pronunciation of Arabic Words. When I was at State, the
people who knew about these things pronounced the word Hisp-Allah (Party of
God). It made sense to me then and still does. Where Hezbollah came from I'll
never know. Trouble is, TV news readers pronounce it Hez Bollah rather than Hesb
Allah (a variation of Hisp Allah.) So does almost everyone else. But
Muslims worship Allah, not Bollah.

Roger W wrote ref. Shirley Obit (17Ap03) -- Jack
Shirley, who died a few days ago in Thailand, was liked
by almost everyone who met him. He was genial and gregarious and a favorite of
American expatriates in the bar scene in Patpong, the famous nightclub district
in Bangkok.

However, the obituary published in
the media is wrong on most of the major points. Jack Shirley didn't "help run"
the Laos operation. He was a
friend of the extraordinary but little-known paramilitary officer who did, a
hugely talented and soft-spoken Texan named Bill Lair. Mr. Shirley and Mr. Lair
arrived in Thailand about the
same time, in the early 1950s. But, whereas Mr. Lair became the CIA's most
successful organizer of indigenous armed forces in Southeast Asia - first with a
400-man special-operations unit of the Thai border police and then with an
irregular force of Laotian tribesmen that grew to 30,000 - Jack Shirley played
only a minor role. He helped run some training of Laotian tribesmen in 1961,
came under attack by North Vietnamese regulars, led his men ably in a retreat
under fire, then returned to the relative safety of Thailand for most of
the Laos war years
(1961-1973).

The real tragedy of the
Laos war was that a few key
CIA operatives, led by Bill Lair, tried to run an un-Vietnam-like war with as
few Americans as possible. In the early 1960s, they were trying to support
Laotian tribesmen in a legitimate, if secret, struggle against North Vietnamese
invaders. Then the war in Vietnam itself sucked in America and Laos, and the
whole thing went into a downward spiral from which it never recovered. The
personal tragedy of the CIA's Southeast Asia hands such as Bill Lair and Jack
Shirley is that they were highly loyal to the agency while quietly opposed to
the wrong-headedness and bureaucratic stupidity shown by their government. They
wanted to fight a much smarter, smaller and cheaper war, but there were too few
of these men to change the course of events. (RJ)

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