Adoption is purely a creation of statute; it was
unknown at common law. Eder, 312 Or at 260; Zockert v. Fanning,
310 Or 514, 517, 800 P2d 773 (1990). This court long has held
that all jurisdictional requirements of the adoption statute must
be met. See, e.g., Burrell et ux v. Simpson, 203 Or 472, 474,
280 P2d 368 (1955); Williams et ux v. Capparelli, 180 Or 41, 44,
175 P2d 153 (1946) (both so holding); see alsoEder, 312 Or at
260 ("In a contested adoption, the requirement that the court
find by clear and convincing evidence an express statutory
exception to the consent requirement is a matter of extreme
importance").

In PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606,
859 P2d 1143 (1993), this court set out the statutory
interpretation process that Oregon courts follow. The court
recognized three levels of judicial inquiry in the search for the
object of statutory interpretation, viz., legislative intent.
317 Or at 610-12. At the first level of inquiry, the court
examines the text and context of statutory wording. Id. at 610-11. Among the rules applied at this level is the rule that, in
interpreting a statute, a court should neither insert in a
statute what has been omitted nor omit what has been inserted.
Id. at 611 (citing ORS 174.010). We turn to the statutory text.

The adoption statute, ORS 109.312, requires the written
consent of both biological parents to the adoption, "[e]xcept as
provided in ORS 109.314 to 109.329." ORS 109.314 to 109.329 list
six exceptions to the consent requirement. A biological parent's
consent is not necessary when (1) that parent does not have legal
custody of the child after a dissolution proceeding, ORS 109.314;
(2) the parent surrenders the child to the State Office for
Services to Children and Families or to an approved child-caring
agency of the state for the purpose of adoption or the child is
permanently committed to either agency by the court, ORS 109.316;
(3) an agency outside the state has authority to consent in loco
parentis, ORS 109.318; (4) the parent has been adjudged mentally
ill or mentally deficient or has been imprisoned for at least
three years, ORS 109.322; (5) the parent has willfully deserted
or neglected the child for one year prior to the filing of the
petition for adoption, ORS 109.324; or (6) the husband is not the
father of the child, ORS 109.326. In summary, the text states
that consent of the biological parents, or a statutory substitute
for that consent, is the jurisdictional foundation on which the
adoption statute is based. SeeBurrell, 203 Or at 474-75
(announcing principle).

Also considered at the first level of analysis under
PGE is the statutory context. We have found no contextual
statute that creates any question whether ORS 109.312 to 109.326
presents a complete summary of the prerequisites to the adoption
process.

The Michels concede that none of those statutory
alternatives to father's consent has been satisfied in this case
to date. It also is plain that the adoption statute does not
provide that a parent's consent is unnecessary when there are
grounds for terminating that parent's parental rights under ORS
chapter 419B, but termination has not yet occurred.

Finally, and also at the first level of analysis, this
court looks to its previous case law, when that case law has
construed authoritatively the relevant statutory wording. SeeRedman Industries, Inc. v. Lang, 326 Or 32, 35, 943 P2d 208
(1997) (stating principle). The Court of Appeals' opinions
focused on whether this court's earlier statements concerning ORS
109.312 were authoritative, a question to which we now turn.

It is clear from a careful reading of Eder, Moody, and
Simons that this court never has held that the existence of
grounds for termination of a person's parental rights under ORS
chapter 419B, in itself, confers subject-matter jurisdiction over
an adoption on a trial court. Rather, those cases stand for the
proposition that the ORS chapter 419B termination criteria may be
used to establish "conduct grave enough to justify forfeiture of
parenthood," thereby allowing an adoption to proceed over the
objections of a non-custodial parent, when the court already has
subject-matter jurisdiction under ORS 109.314. The Court of
Appeals' contrary interpretation of this court's prior case law
in this regard is incorrect.

From the foregoing, it follows that the meaning of the
relevant statutory text is "clear" at the first level of the PGE
analysis. A court has subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain a
petition for adoption only if one of the criteria in ORS 109.312
to 109.329 is present. The petition for adoption in this case
failed to allege grounds that conferred jurisdiction on the trial
court. The petition for adoption should have been dismissed.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss.

1. Judges Deits, Richardson, Riggs, and Haselton dissented
on the grounds that this court, in Eder, Moody, and Simons,
either held or strongly suggested that grounds for termination
can be pleaded and proved as a substitute for parental consent in
an adoption case. Michels, 146 Or App at 135-38.

"If the legal custody of the child has been
awarded in divorce proceedings, the written consent of
the person to whom custody of the child has been
awarded may be held sufficient by the court; but,
unless the parent not having custody consents to the
adoption, a citation to show cause why the proposed
adoption shall not be made shall be served in
accordance with ORS 109.330 upon the parent not having
the custody, and the objections of such parent shall be
heard if appearance is made. This section does not
apply where consent is given in loco parentis under ORS
109.316 or 109.318."

3. The Court of Appeals simply was incorrect when it
stated, below, that "[i]n Eder, the court held that the
petitioners had failed to establish any of the exceptions to
consent set out in ORS chapter 109." Michels, 146 Or App at 133.