Government harassment, repression, and persecution of religious
and spiritual adherents has increased during the five-year period
covered by this report. In 2004, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China reported that repression of religious belief and
practice grew in severity. The Communist Party strengthened its
campaign against organizations it designated as cults, targeting
Falun Gong in particular, but also unregistered Buddhist and
Christian groups, among other unregistered communities.1 The
Commission noted a more visible trend in harassment and repression of unregistered Protestants for alleged cult involvement starting
in mid-2006.2 The Commission reported an increase in harassment
against unregistered Catholics starting in 2004 and an increase in
pressure on registered clerics beginning in 2005.3 The government’s
crackdown on religious activity in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
Region has increased in intensity since 2001.4 New central government legal provisions and local measures from the Tibet Autonomous Region government intensify an already repressive environment for the practice of Tibetan Buddhism.5 Daoist and Buddhist
communities have been subject to ongoing efforts to close temples
and eliminate religious practices deemed superstitious, as well as
made subject to tight regulation of temple finances.6 Members of
religious and spiritual communities outside the five groups recognized by the government continue to operate without legal protections and remain at risk of government harassment, abuse, and in
some cases, persecution. China has remained a ‘‘Country of Particular Concern’’ because of its restrictions on religion since the
U.S. Department of State first gave it this designation in 1999.7
The Chinese government’s failure to protect religion and its imposition of limits on religion violate international human rights
standards. The Chinese Constitution, laws, and regulations guarantee only ‘‘freedom of religious belief’’ (zongjiao xinyang ziyou), but
they do not guarantee ‘‘freedom of religion.’’ 8 As defined by international human rights standards, ‘‘freedom of religion’’ encompasses not only the freedom to hold beliefs but also the freedom to
manifest them.9 Chinese laws and regulations protect only ‘‘normal
religious activities.’’ They do not define this term in a manner to
provide citizens with meaningful protection for all aspects of religious practice.10 Religious communities must register with the government by affiliating with one of the five recognized religions and
they must receive government approval to establish sites of worship.11 The state tightly regulates the publication of religious texts
and forbids individuals from printing religious materials.12 Statecontrolled religious associations hinder citizens’ interaction with
foreign co-religionists, including their ability to follow foreign reli(1)

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gious leaders.13 The government imposes additional restrictions on
children’s freedom of religion.14 Chinese citizens who practice their
faith outside of officially sanctioned parameters risk harassment,
detention, and other abuses. In 2006, a top religious official in
China claimed that no religious adherents were punished because
of their faith, but the Chinese government continues to use a variety of methods within and outside its legal system—including selective application of criminal penalties—to punish and imprison citizens who practice religion in a manner authorities deem illegitimate.15
As recognized in international human rights standards,16 including those in treaties China has signed or ratified,17 freedom of religion ‘‘is far-reaching and profound.’’ 18 It includes the freedom to
manifest one’s beliefs alone or in community with others; the freedom to believe in and practice the religion of one’s choice, without
discrimination; the freedom to build places of worship; the freedom
to print and distribute religious texts; the freedom to recognize religious leaders regardless of those leaders’ nationality; and the freedom of children to practice a religion.19
The Chinese government has failed to guarantee these freedoms
to its citizens both in law and in practice.
Party leaders manipulate religion for political ends. Like his
predecessor, President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao has
responded to an increase in the number of religious followers
through the use of legal initiatives to cloak campaigns that tighten
control over religious communities.20 Despite official claims in 2004
that the Regulation on Religious Affairs adopted that year represented a ‘‘paradigm shift’’ in limiting state intervention in citizens’ religious practice,21 it codified at the national level ongoing
restrictions over officially recognized religious communities and discriminatory barriers against other groups. In the area of religion,
the Party has used legal means as a tool for exerting tight control
over all aspects of citizens’ religious practice. Beyond overt measures of control, internal public security handbooks call for undercover teams to monitor the activities of religious communities.22 In
an essay on maintaining stability in western China, one public security analyst called for security officials to gather information on
religious communities by cultivating ‘‘secret . . . ‘friends’ ’’ from
within such communities.23
In recent years, top officials publicly have stated that religion
may play a positive role in society,24 but have maneuvered this
sentiment to meet Party goals. In its campaign to promote a ‘‘harmonious society,’’ the Party has emphasized ‘‘bringing into play the
positive role of religion’’ through greater control of internal religious doctrine.25 In July 2006, Ye Xiaowen, head of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, said the government would
direct religious leaders to provide correct interpretations of religious tenets to ‘‘convey positive and beneficial contents to worshippers
and direct them to practice faiths rightly.’’ 26 The announcement
builds on earlier policies to manipulate doctrine to suit Party policy. For example, the national Islamic Association has continued a
program to compile sermons that reflect the ‘‘correct and authoritative’’ view of religious doctrine in line with Party policy, making
imams’ confirmation contingent on knowledge of the sermons. The

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official Protestant church continues to promote ‘‘theological construction,’’ a guiding ideology designed to minimize aspects of
Christianity deemed incompatible with socialism.27 The government and Party continue to propagate atheism among Chinese citizens. In an August 2006 article, Ye Xiaowen called for strengthening propaganda and education on atheism.28
Despite controls over religion, unofficial estimates indicate that
the number of religious and spiritual adherents in China continues
to grow. In 2007, Chinese media reported on a poll by Chinese
scholars that found China has approximately 300 million religious
adherents, a figure three times as high as official figures.29 The
growth of religion in Chinese society presents potential challenges
to government authority, and government concerns over the rise of
religion intersect with broader apprehensions about perceived social instability and ethnic unrest. A summary of religious work
issued in 2005 listed ‘‘stability’’ as the ‘‘number one responsibility.’’ 30 As long as the government views religion as a potential
flashpoint for conflict or challenge to Party authority, it is unlikely
to ease restrictions on religious communities. Broader political liberalizations that address how China’s own restrictive policies exacerbate instability, however, could bring improvements in the area
of religious freedom, but a review of events from the past five years
indicates a trend in the opposite direction.
Legislative Developments
The central government has taken more steps to codify state and
Party policy on religion in recent years, particularly through the
2004 national Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) and subsequent provincial regulations. Though the regulations guarantee
some legal protections to registered religious communities, they
also condition many religious activities on government oversight
and approval. Codification of government procedures lends more
transparency and predictability about government actions, but as
legal controls over the internal activities of religious communities,
the regulations reflect rule by law rather than rule of law.
Implementation of the RRA has been uneven, resulting in a
confusing legal terrain for citizens who aim to understand the applicability of legal protections and restrictions imposed by the regulation. Though the State Administration for Religious Affairs
(SARA) and local governments have reported training local officials
in the RRA,31 the complete scope of the training and indicators for
measuring its progress are unclear. The central government has
not issued general implementing guidelines, but has promulgated
a limited number of legal measures that expand on specific provisions within the RRA. The new measures clarify some ambiguous
provisions in the RRA, but generally articulate more rigid controls.32 Although SARA also has promoted a handbook that provides a more detailed explanation of each article of the RRA, the
book does not appear to be widely distributed in training classes.33
The national government has not publicized a clear plan of action
for ensuring local regulations on religion are consistent with national requirements, and inconsistencies among regulations persist.
Most of the provincial-level regulations issued after the RRA entered into force promote consistency with the RRA by aligning

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many key provisions to national requirements, but at least one
province initially retained provisions that conflicted with those in
the RRA.34 Other provinces have yet to amend their regulations,
leaving intact provisions that conflict with the RRA and, in some
cases, impose harsher restrictions.35
Though the new provincial regulations have promoted uniformity
with national regulations, they also contain provisions that differ
from each other and from the national RRA. A new comprehensive
regulation from Hunan province, for example, is the first comprehensive provincial-level regulation on religion to provide limited
recognition for venues for folk beliefs.36 Measures from the Tibet
Autonomous Region provide detailed stipulations for the designation and supervision of reincarnated Buddhist lamas.37 Some
provincial-level regulations recognize only Buddhism, Catholicism,
Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. Others are silent on this
issue.38
Recognized and Unrecognized Religious Communities
The central government has not made progress in extending its
limited legal protections for religion to all Chinese citizens. The
Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) did not explicitly codify Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism as China’s
only recognized religious communities, but the government perpetuates a regulatory system that recognizes only these communities,
with limited exceptions.39 Although recognized groups receive limited guarantees to practice ‘‘normal religious activities,’’ they must
submit to state-defined interpretations of their faith as well as ongoing state control over internal affairs. The RRA and subsequent
regulations continue to subject recognized communities to onerous
registration and reporting requirements.40
Party-sponsored religious associations,41 with which religious
communities must affiliate, remain the state’s main vehicle for ensuring religious practice conforms to Party goals and for denying
religious communities doctrinal independence.42 The associations
vet religious leaders for political reliability, and religious leaders
who express sensitive political views have faced dismissal from
their posts. For example, in 2006, the national Buddhist Association, in coordination with government officials, expelled a Buddhist
monk from a temple in Jiangxi province after the monk led religious activities to commemorate victims of the 1989 Tiananmen
crackdown and took measures to address corruption among government officials and the Buddhist Association.43 Authorities in the
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region have enforced an ongoing
campaign to monitor imams and decertify religious leaders deemed
unreliable.44
Unregistered religious and spiritual communities continue to
practice their faith under the risk of harassment, detention, and
other abuses. Differences in legislation and regional variations in
the implementation of religious policy have allowed a limited number of unrecognized groups to operate openly.45 Without the clear
guarantee that all citizens have a right to openly practice their religion, however, all unregistered communities remain vulnerable to
official abuses and restrictions on their freedom. Religious and spiritual communities defined as ‘‘cults’’ remain subject to persecution.

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In 2004, the Party increased its campaign against organizations it
designated as cults, targeting Falun Gong practitioners as well as
unregistered communities including Buddhist and Christian
groups.46 In July 2007, the central government instructed officials
to ‘‘strike hard against illegal religions and cult activities’’ as part
of a campaign to address perceived instability in rural areas.47 The
promulgation of the RRA may increase pressures on unregistered
groups. A district in Shanghai, for example, has set targets for carrying out work to eliminate ‘‘abnormal religious activity’’ in accordance with the RRA.48
Freedom To Interact with Foreign Co-religionists and Coreligionists Abroad
The Chinese government restricts Chinese citizens’ freedom to
interact with foreign citizens in China and with citizens abroad as
part of its policy to promote self-management and independence
from foreign religious institutions.49 Chinese officials have increased oversight of citizens’ contacts with foreign religious practitioners within China in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Summer
Olympic Games. In March 2007, Minister of Public Security Zhou
Yongkang said the government would ‘‘strike hard’’ against hostile
forces inside and outside the country, including religious and spiritual groups, to ensure a ‘‘good social environment’’ for the Olympics and 17th Party Congress.50 In 2006, local officials expelled a
registered church leader in Shanxi province after his church invited an American missionary to the church.51 According to the
nongovernmental organization China Aid Association, authorities
implemented a campaign in 2007 to expel foreigners thought to be
engaged in Christian missionary activities.52 National rules governing the religious activities of foreigners forbid them from ‘‘cultivating followers from among Chinese citizens,’’ distributing ‘‘religious propaganda materials,’’ and carrying out other missionary activities.53
Freedom of Religion for Chinese Children
The Chinese government failed to secure the rights of children
to practice religion in its recent codification of religious policy. Although a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official stated in 2005 that no
laws restrict minors from holding religious beliefs and that parents
may give their children a religious education,54 recent legislation
has not articulated a guarantee of these rights. Regulations from
some provinces penalize acts such as ‘‘instigating’’ minors to believe
in religion or accepting them into a religion.55 In practice, children
in some parts of China participate in religious activities at registered and unregistered venues,56 but in other areas, they have
been restricted from participating in religious services.57
Ambiguities in the law and variations in implementation have
created space for children in some parts of China to receive a religious education. Some Muslim communities outside the Xinjiang
Uighur Autonomous Region have established schools to provide secular and religious education to children.58 In some ethnic minority
communities, children receive education at Buddhist temples.59

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Some recent government campaigns against religion have targeted children. In 2004, authorities launched campaigns to educate
children against the evils of government-designated cults and to
encourage children to expose family members engaged in ‘‘illegal
religious activities.’’ 60 In 2006, Ye Xiaowen called for strengthening
education in atheism especially among children.61
Social Welfare Activities by Religious Communities
The government accommodates, and in some cases, sponsors, the
social welfare activities of recognized religious communities where
such activities meet Party goals. Article 34 of the Regulation on Religious Affairs allows registered religious communities to organize
such undertakings.62 In some cases, government offices and Partyled religious associations initiate and control the scope of social
welfare activities.63 In other cases, religious civil society organizations organize their work under other auspices or are able to operate without registering with the government.64
Government support for religious charity work is part of a broader
policy allowing civil society organizations to provide welfare services in certain areas. [See Section III—Civil Society for more information.] The government also has permitted some international
religious organizations to engage in charity work within China.65
In recent years, however, the government has increased pressures
on civil society organizations.66 Religiously affiliated civil society
groups in tightly controlled regions such as the Xinjiang Uighur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) face additional restrictions. For example, local authorities in the XUAR have banned meshrep, Islamcentered groups that have sought to address social problems.67
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR TIBETAN BUDDHISTS

Overview
The Chinese government creates a repressive environment for
the practice of Tibetan Buddhism. Two new sets of legal measures
increase legal bases for repression. Tibetan Buddhist monks and
nuns remain subject to expulsions from religious institutions and
imprisonment for refusing to accept government policy on issues
such as the legitimacy of the Dalai Lama as a religious leader, and
the identity of the Panchen Lama. For a detailed overview of
current conditions for Tibetan Buddhists in China, see Section IV—
Tibet.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR CHINA’S CATHOLICS

Overview68
The Chinese government continues to deny Chinese Catholics the
freedom to recognize the authority of overseas Catholic institutions
in a manner of their choosing. Authorities blocked Web sites in
2007 to prevent Catholic practitioners from viewing an open letter
from Pope Benedict XVI urging reconciliation between registered
and unregistered communities in China. Government harassment
against Catholic communities has escalated since 2004. The government continues to detain unregistered bishops and coerce registered bishops to exercise their faith according to Party-dictated

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terms. The return of property owned by the Catholic Church in the
1950s and 1960s remains a contentious issue. Officials and unidentified assailants have beaten people protesting slated demolitions of
church property.
Harassment, Detention, and Other Abuses
Both unregistered Catholics and registered clergy remain subject
to government harassment, and in some cases, detention. The Commission noted an increase in reported detentions of unregistered
Catholics in 2005, after the Regulation on Religious Affairs entered
into force.69 In June 2007, the public security bureau detained Jia
Zhiguo, underground bishop of the Diocese of Zhending, in Hebei
province, for 17 days.70 Authorities detained him again in August
as he prepared to lead meetings to discuss a letter Pope Benedict
XVI issued to Chinese Catholics in June.71 Jia previously spent
more than 20 years in prison.72 In 2006, the government increased
pressure on registered bishops and priests to coerce them to participate in bishop consecrations without papal approval. Authorities
detained, sequestered, threatened, or otherwise exerted pressure on
registered Catholic clerics to obtain compliance.73 Authorities have
pressured both unregistered clergy and lay practitioners to join registered churches or face repercussions such as restricting children’s
access to school, job dismissal, fines, and detention.74
Closures of Religious Structures and Confiscation of Religious
Property
The return of religious property remains a contentious issue. In
recent years, some registered Catholic groups have called on the
government to give back church property confiscated in the 1950s
and 1960s, and in separate incidents, officials or unidentified assailants have beaten people protesting the slated demolition of
such property. For example, in 2005, government officials assaulted
a group of Catholic nuns in a village near the city of Xi’an, in
Shaanxi province, after the nuns had attempted to prevent the
authorities from erecting a new building on property that the government confiscated from their religious order during the 1950s.
According to overseas sources, the nuns were not injured, and the
construction work was halted after the assault. In another incident
in 2005, unidentified assailants beat a group of Catholic nuns in
Xi’an after the nuns had organized a sit-in to prevent the demolition of a school formerly belonging to their religious order. In a separate incident, unidentified assailants beat a group of Catholic
priests in Tianjin who had occupied a building formerly belonging
to their Shanxi dioceses and demanded its return. At issue in all
three cases was the refusal of local authorities to abide by government instructions mandating the return of such property.75
China-Holy See Relations
The state-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) does not
recognize the authority of the Holy See to appoint bishops and has
continued to appoint bishops based on its own procedures, in some
cases coercing clerics to participate in consecration ceremonies.
While in recent years authorities had tolerated discreet involve-

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ment by the Holy See in the selection of some bishops, in 2006 the
CPA moved to appoint more bishops without Holy See approval.
For example, in November 2006, the CPA appointed Wang Renlei
as auxiliary bishop of the Xuzhou diocese, Jiangsu province, without Holy See approval, and authorities reportedly detained two
bishops to force their participation in the ordination ceremony.76
In September 2007, the CPA ordained Paul Xiao Zejiang as coadjutor bishop of the Guizhou diocese. Though the CPA elected him
according to its own practices, the Holy See expressed approval of
his election to bishop.77 The same month, the CPA ordained Li
Shan as bishop of Beijing according to its own practices. The Holy
See expressed approval for the ordination.78
The ordinations follow a June 2007 open letter from Pope Benedict XVI to Catholic church members in China, urging reconciliation between registered and unregistered Catholic communities in
China and stating that ‘‘the Catholic Church which is in China
does not have a mission to change the structure or administration
of the State.’’ 79 After the letter was published on the Vatican Web
site, Chinese authorities blocked Internet access and ordered
Catholic Web sites within China to remove the letter.80 An overseas news agency reported that local authorities have since detained at least 11 unregistered church priests in an effort to assert
official authority in the aftermath of the letter’s publication.81
Government apprehension about Chinese Catholics’ relationship
with foreign religious communities and institutions also manifested
itself in 2007 in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR).
In July, the XUAR government announced it would strengthen
oversight of Catholic and Protestant communities to prevent foreign infiltration, a call reiterated in August by local authorities in
the XUAR’s Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture.82
The government has penalized members of the unregistered
Catholic community for their overseas travel. In 2006, authorities
detained two leaders of the unregistered Wenzhou diocese, Peter
Shao Zhumin and Paul Jiang Surang, after they returned from a
pilgrimage to Rome. Six months after their detention, Shao and
Jiang received prison sentences of 9 and 11 months, respectively,
after authorities accused them of falsifying their passports and
charged them with illegally exiting the country.83
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR CHINA’S MUSLIMS

Overview84
The government strictly controls the practice of Islam, and religious repression in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region
(XUAR), especially among the Uighur ethnic group, remains severe. In recent years the government has increased control over
Muslim pilgrimages and continued an ongoing project to author
sermons that reflect Party values. New confirmation rules for religious leaders require knowledge of the sermons. Authorities reportedly have tried to restrict the number of Muslim students who
study religion overseas. Within the XUAR, the government restricts access to mosques, imprisons citizens for religious activity
determined to be ‘‘extremist,’’ has detained people for possession of
unauthorized texts, and most recently has confiscated Muslims’

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passports. The XUAR government maintains the harshest legal restrictions in China on children’s right to practice religion. Religious
repression in the XUAR accompanies a broader crackdown in the
region aimed at diluting expressions of Uighur identity. [See Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights for more information on conditions
in the XUAR.]
Harassment, Detention, and Other Abuses
Authorities in the XUAR have intensified their crackdown on religion since 2001. Official records have indicated an increase in
Uighurs in the XUAR sent to prison or reeducation through labor
centers because of religious activity since the mid-1990s.85 XUAR
residents reported to overseas human rights organizations that police monitoring for illegal activity, including systematic door-to-door
searches within neighborhoods and villages, has increased in recent
years.86
In recent years, authorities have detained people for having
unauthorized religious texts. In 2005, authorities in the XUAR detained a religion instructor and her students, accusing the teacher
of ‘‘illegally possessing religious materials and subversive historical
information.’’ 87 XUAR officials also detained a group of people for
possessing an unauthorized religious book.88
Access to Religious Sites and Closures of Religious Structures
The government continues to enforce tight restrictions on XUAR
residents’ ability to enter mosques. Overseas media has reported on
restrictions on mosque entry enforced against minors under 18,
local government employees, state employees and retirees, and
women, among other groups. Authorities reportedly monitor attendance at mosques and levy fines when people violate the bans.89
Authorities in the XUAR continue to enforce earlier policies to
demolish ‘‘illegal’’ religious sites, and they have increased oversight
since 2001.90 Authorities reportedly have not allowed Uighurs in
the XUAR to build new mosques since 1999.91
Restrictions on the Freedom To Make Overseas Pilgrimages
The central government has increased its control over Muslims’
overseas pilgrimages in recent years, and public officials in the
XUAR have followed suit with further restrictions. The 2004
national Regulation on Religious Affairs charged the Islamic Association of China (IAC) with responsibility for organizing Chinese
Muslims’ overseas pilgrimages, and stipulated punishments for the
unauthorized organization of such trips.92 In 2006, the IAC established an office to manage pilgrimages to Mecca.93 It also signed
an agreement with the Saudi Ministry of Pilgrimage allowing Chinese Muslim pilgrims to receive Hajj visas only at the Saudi Embassy in Beijing and restricting visas to pilgrims in official Chinese
government-sponsored travel groups. The government announced
its agreement with Saudi Arabia after a group of Muslims from the
XUAR attempted to obtain Saudi visas via a third country. In addition, the IAC issued a circular in 2006 that regulates secondary pilgrimages (umrah) to Mecca outside the yearly Hajj.94 Some citizens
who have tried to take trips outside official channels reportedly

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have done so to avoid requirements to demonstrate political reliability to the government and to save money, among other factors.95 Authorities also reportedly have tried to restrict Muslims’
opportunities to study religion overseas.96
Local officials in the XUAR have used pilgrimage policy to further religious repression in that region. In June 2007, after XUAR
Party Secretary Wang Lequan announced that the government
would further increase its oversight of pilgrimages in the region,
overseas media reported that local authorities implemented a policy to confiscate passports from Muslims, and Uighurs in particular.97 In July, the XUAR government announced that the public
security bureau would strengthen passport controls as part of its
campaign to curb unauthorized pilgrimages.98
Religious Publications
The government continues to exert tight control over the publications of religious materials in the XUAR. In 2007, authorities in
the XUAR city of Urumqi reported destroying over 25,000 ‘‘illegal’’
religious books.99 During a month-long campaign in 2006 aimed at
rooting out ‘‘political and religious illegal publications,’’ XUAR authorities reported confiscating publications about Islam with
‘‘unhealthy content.’’ 100 In 2005, official news media reported that
XUAR authorities had confiscated 9,860 illegal publications involving religion, ‘‘feudal superstitions,’’ or Falun Gong.101
Children
Restrictions on children’s right to practice religion are harsher in
the XUAR than elsewhere in China. Legal measures from the
XUAR, unseen elsewhere in China, forbid parents and guardians
from allowing minors to engage in religious activity.102 Local governments throughout the XUAR continued restrictions on children’s
right to practice a religion during 2006. They enforced measures
during Ramadan to prevent students from fasting and participating
in other religious activities. Authorities also directed such measures at college students who are legal adults under Chinese law.103
Also in 2006, a county government in the XUAR began a campaign
aimed at monitoring and reforming the children of religious figures,
alongside other students including truants and children of those
released from administrative detention.104
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR CHINA’S PROTESTANTS

Overview105
The government and Party control the activities of its official
Protestant church, and the government continues to target unregistered Protestant groups for harassment, detention, and other forms
of abuse. The targeting of Protestant groups deemed to be cults intensified in 2004 and again in 2006. Authorities continue to close
house churches and confiscate property. The government has included in this crackdown groups with ties to foreign co-religionists.
Religious adherents serving prison sentences include clergy who
printed and distributed religious texts without government permission. Members of unregistered house churches have made some ad-

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vances in challenging government actions, but harassment and
abuses continue.
Harassment, Detention, and Other Abuses
Authorities continue to target some unregistered Protestant communities for harassment, detention, and other abuses. A July 2007
report from a district within Shanghai called on authorities to
strengthen control over grassroots religious activity and singled out
private Protestant gatherings for monitoring and regulation.106 The
China Aid Association (CAA), a U.S.-based nongovernmental organization that monitors religious freedom in China, recorded 600 detentions of unregistered Protestants in China during 2006. It noted
that the figure represents a decline from over 2,000 detentions recorded in 2005, but attributed the decrease to a new strategy of
targeting church leaders over practitioners and interrogating practitioners on the spot rather than formally arresting them.107 The
CAA found that 18 people were sentenced to more than a year of
imprisonment in 2006.108 In 2007, seven police officers attacked
and wounded Beijing house church pastor and farmer advocate
Hua Huiqi and his 76-year-old mother Shuang Shuying.109 Officials
charged Hua, who had been previously detained by local officials,
with obstruction of justice and sentenced him to six months in prison. Shuang was charged with willfully damaging property and
sentenced to two years in prison. An overseas report in August
2007 indicated that police were using Shuang’s imprisonment as leverage to pressure Hua to become a police informant. In September, authorities reportedly denied Shuang medical parole despite her poor health.110 In October, CAA reported that authorities
placed Hua under house arrest on October 1 and informed him that
his mother’s imprisonment was intended to pressure Hua to stop
his activism. CAA reported Shuang had been beaten in prison.111
Gong Shengliang, founder of the South China Church, continues to
serve a life sentence for alleged assault and rape, and is reported
to be in poor health.112 Authorities released Liu Fenggang from
prison in February 2007 after he served a three-year sentence for
reporting on the government demolition of house churches.113 CAA
reported that authorities later placed him under house arrest,
starting on October 1, 2007.114
Closures of Religious Structures and Confiscation of Religious
Property
The government states there are no registration requirements for
religious gatherings within the home,115 but public officials continue to target unregistered Protestant churches for closure and
demolition. For example, in July 2007, CAA reported that three underground church buildings in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province faced
imminent demolition by local government authorities. The government accused the believers of subscribing to an ‘‘evil cult’’ and
threatened to arrest them if they impeded the demolition.116 In
2006, a court case against religious adherents who had protested
the demolition of a church building in the Xiaoshan district of
Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, concluded with the sentencing of
eight house church leaders for ‘‘inciting violence to resist the

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law.’’ 117 According to the CAA, closures of house churches increased between 2005 and 2006.118
The government also exerts control over the property of registered Protestant churches. In 2006, approximately 300 members
of a registered Protestant church in Gansu province engaged in a
peaceful demonstration to demand the return of property that had
been confiscated by the government in 1966.119
Religious Speech
Chinese authorities continue to punish citizens who publish religious materials without permission, including Protestant religious
leaders who have printed and given away Bibles. In separate incidents in 2005 and 2006, pastors Cai Zhuohua and Wang Zaiqing
received prison sentences of three and two years, respectively, after
each printed and distributed religious materials without government permission. In each case, the sentencing court found that the
preparation and distribution of the materials constituted the ‘‘illegal operation of a business,’’ a crime under Article 225 of the
Criminal Law.120 Authorities released Cai from prison upon completion of his three-year prison sentence on September 10, 2007.121
The government has also detained people for publicizing abuses
against house church members. In 2006, Chinese authorities detained a documentary filmmaker who was making a film about
house churches and detained a journalist after he posted reports
publicizing protests about a church demolition.122
Challenging Government Actions
Some members of unregistered churches have used the legal system to challenge government actions. In August 2006, a court in
Henan province rescinded a decision to subject a house church pastor to one year of reeducation through labor for participating in a
house church gathering authorities deemed illegal. In November
2006, a group in Shandong province that previously had been
placed in administrative detention for their attendance at a house
church service reached a settlement with the Public Security Bureau to rescind the administrative detention decision against them.
[See Section II—Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants for
more information.] In neither case did the rescission include recognition of practitioners’ right to assemble for worship outside of
registered venues for religious activity.123 Not all challenges to government actions have been successful. In 2007, local governments
in Henan province and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region rejected unregistered church leaders’ applications for administrative
review of their detentions.124 In addition, rights defenders who
have advocated on behalf of house church members and other
groups have faced repercussions.125
Outside of legal channels, international pressure has resulted in
advances for some house churches. CAA reported that international
pressure facilitated the release of 33 arrested house church leaders
and 3 South Korean church leaders who had been detained after
officials raided a house church study group in Henan province in
2007.126 Two days after two house church pastors appealed for administrative reconsideration regarding a 2007 raid on their church-

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es, local officials in Jiangsu province returned confiscated property,
citing concerns about negative international repercussions.127
Freedom To Interact with Foreign Co-religionists and Coreligionists Abroad
Authorities have promoted official exchanges with overseas
Protestant churches, including Chinese participation in a 2005
World Council of Churches conference,128 but have restricted citizens from participating in programs outside these official channels.
For example, authorities prevented house church members and
legal advocates Fan Yafeng, Gao Zhisheng, and Teng Biao from attending a Washington, DC-based forum on religious freedom in
2005.129
In July, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) government announced it would strengthen oversight of Protestant and
Catholic communities to prevent foreign infiltration in the names
of these religions.130 The announcement followed church service
raids in the XUAR during 2006 and 2007, including those with foreign worshippers and pastors.131 According to CAA, more than 60
of over 100 missionaries expelled from China between April and
June 2007 came from the XUAR.132
The government has punished some house church members for
traveling overseas. Unregistered Protestant church leader Zhang
Rongliang, who resorted to obtaining illegal travel documents after
the government refused to issue him a passport, was sentenced to
seven and a half years’ imprisonment in 2006 on charges of illegally crossing the border and fraudulently obtaining a passport.133
Also in 2006, authorities placed house church historian and former
political prisoner Zhang Yinan and his family under surveillance
after he applied for a passport to attend a religious function in the
United States.134
GOVERNMENT PERSECUTION OF FALUN GONG

The government has continued its campaign of persecution
against Falun Gong practitioners, which it began in 1999. In its
2007 report on religious freedom in China, the U.S. Department of
State noted past reports of deaths and abuse of Falun Gong practitioners in custody.135 Government officials have used both the
Criminal Law and administrative punishment regulations as legal
pretexts for penalizing Falun Gong activities.136 Citizens sentenced
to prison terms under the Criminal Law include Falun Gong practitioners who demonstrated in support of Falun Gong in 1999, as
well as practitioners who prepared leaflets about Falun Gong, including Wang Xin, Li Chang, Wang Zhiwen, and Ji Liewu.137 Authorities released Yao Jie in 2006 after sentencing her in 1999 to
seven years’ imprisonment for crimes related to organizing and
using a cult and for illegal acquisition of state secrets. The charges
stem from accusations that she organized an April 1999 rally of
Falun Gong practitioners outside the central government’s leadership compound.138
Falun Gong practitioners and rights defenders who advocate on
their behalf, as well as on behalf of other communities, including
house church members, face serious obstacles in challenging gov-

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ernment abuses. In 2006, authorities intensified a campaign of harassment against lawyer Gao Zhisheng, who has represented
numerous activists, religious leaders, and writers, after he publicized widespread torture against Falun Gong practitioners. A
Beijing court convicted him in 2006 to a three-year sentence, suspended for five years, for ‘‘inciting subversion of state power.’’ 139
Gao went missing immediately after an open letter that he sent to
the U.S. Congress was made public at a Capitol Hill press conference on September 20, 2007. Authorities also have harassed
members of his family.140 [For additional information, see Section
II—Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants.] Overseas organizations reported that on September 29, 2007, unidentified assailants beat rights defense lawyer Li Heping, who had advocated on
behalf of Falun Gong practitioners and house church members,
among others.141
In 2006, courts in Shandong province rejected appeals from Liu
Ruping and his lawyer that challenged Liu’s sentence of 15 months
of reeducation through labor for posting Falun Gong notices.142
In 2007, the government used possession of Falun Gong materials as a pretext for squelching a political activist. In March, a
court in Zhejiang province gave a three-year sentence to Chi
Jianwei, a member of the Zhejiang branch of the China Democracy
Party, for ‘‘using a cult to undermine implementation of the law’’
after authorities found Falun Gong materials in his home.143
OTHER RELIGIOUS AND SPRITUAL COMMUNITIES

Local governments continue to shut down unauthorized Buddhist
and Daoist temples. Towns and cities reported in 2006 on campaigns to address the presence of illegal temples through measures
that included closure and demolition.144 Some local governments
have targeted temples that include practices deemed as superstitious beliefs.145 Other temples have registered and submitted to
official control. At a forum evaluating implementation of the Regulation on Religious Affairs in 2007, the president of the Daoist Association of China noted that the regulation has led to the registration of previously unregistered Daoist temples.146
The government has supported some official interactions between
domestic and foreign Buddhist communities,147 but also limited
some foreign involvement. In 2004, authorities closed a Buddhist
temple renovated by an American Buddhist association and
detained the temple’s designated leader.148
Chinese religious adherents with ties to foreign religious communities not recognized within China have had leeway to practice
their religion in some cases. The U.S. Department of State reported
in 2006 that some Chinese citizens who joined the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) while living abroad met for
worship in a Beijing location that Chinese authorities permitted
expatriate LDS members to use.149 The central government continues to deny formal recognition to the LDS church as a domestic
religious community, however, as it does other religious communities outside the five recognized groups, including Christian denominations that maintain a distinct identity outside the Chinese
government-defined Protestant and Catholic churches. A few local
governments provide legal recognition to Orthodox Christian com-

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munities, but the central government has not recognized Orthodoxy
as a religion.150 In recent years, officials have met with representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church to discuss China’s Orthodox
communities.151
Central and local authorities have drawn some aspects of folk
beliefs into official purview. Since at least 2004, the State Administration for Religious Affairs has operated an office that undertakes
research and policy positions on folk beliefs and religious communities outside the five recognized groups,152 but the government
has neither extended formal legal recognition to any of these
groups nor altered its system whereby religious communities must
receive government recognition to operate. In 2006, Hunan province issued the first provincial-level regulation on religious affairs
to provide for the registration of venues for folk beliefs.153 The
Hunan provincial government’s decision to channel folk religions
into the government system of religious regulation provides some
limited legal protections, but also may subject more aspects of folk
practice to government control. To date, no other provincial regulation has regulated folk beliefs,154 but a central government official
has indicated that the government is studying the Hunan model
and may formulate national legal guidance on the regulation of folk
belief venues.155 Authorities continue, however, to express concern
over components within recognized religions deemed as folk beliefs,
and view some aspects of folk practice as superstitions subject to
official censure, and in some cases, legal penalties.156

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Endnotes
1 CECC,

2004 Annual Report, 5 October 2004, 34, 36–37.
2006 Annual Report, 20 September 2006, 93.
2004 Annual Report, 39; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 49; CECC, 2006
Annual Report, 86–87.
4 See, e.g., CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 52; CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 91.
5 See discussion infra and in Section IV, ‘‘Tibet,’’ for more information on religion-related legislative developments in Tibetan areas of China.
6 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, International
Religious Freedom Report—2006, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 15 September
06. See discussion infra for more information on closures of Buddhist and Daoist temples.
7 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, International
Religious Freedom Report—2007, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 14 September
07. The International Religious Freedom Act mandates that the ‘‘Country of Particular Concern’’
designation be made for countries that ‘‘engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations
of religious freedom,’’ and sets out possible courses of action, including sanctions, toward these
countries. See International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq.,
6442(b)(1)(A), 6442 (c), 6445. In 2006, John V. Hanford III, Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, noted that the climate for religious freedom had improved in recent
decades but that ‘‘a number of setback[s]’’ have taken place in the past two to three years. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, On-the-Record Briefing on the Release of the Department of State’s Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, 15 September 06.
8 See, e.g., PRC Constitution, art. 36; Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) [Zongjiao shiwu
tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, art. 2; PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), enacted
31 May 84, amended 28 February 01, art. 11.
9 See, e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and proclaimed by
General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 18.
10 See, e.g., PRC Constitution, art. 36; RRA, art. 3; REAL, art. 11.
11 Registration requirements to form a religious organization and establish a venue for religious activities are found in RRA, art. 6 and art. 13–15. See also Measures on the Examination,
Approval, and Registration of Venues for Religious Activity [Zongjiao huodong changsuo sheli
shenpi he dengji banfa], issued 21 April 05.
12 See discussion on religious speech, infra, as well as ‘‘Prior Restraints on Religious Publishing in China’’ in the CECC Virtual Academy for more information.
13 See discussions on citizens’ freedom to interact with foreign co-religionists, infra.
14 See the discussion on children, infra.
15 ‘‘Head of Religious Association: Religious Adherents Not Arrested Due to Their Faith,’’
CECC Virtual Academy (Online), 26 June 06.
16 See, e.g., UDHR, art. 18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23
March 76, art. 18; the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into
force 3 January 76, art. 13(3) (requiring States Parties to ‘‘ensure the religious and moral education of . . . children in conformity with [the parents’] own convictions’’); and the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession
by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, art.
14; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief, General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81.
17 China is a party to the ICESCR and the CRC, and a signatory to the ICCPR. The Chinese
government has committed itself to ratifying, and thus bringing its laws into conformity with,
the ICCPR and reaffirmed its commitment as recently as April 13, 2006, in its application for
membership in the UN Human Rights Council. China’s top leaders have previously stated on
three separate occasions that they are preparing for ratification of the ICCPR, including in a
September 6, 2005, statement by Politburo member and State Councilor Luo Gan at the 22nd
World Congress on Law, in statements by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during his May 2005
Europe tour, and in a January 27, 2004, speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao before the
French National Assembly. As a signatory to the ICCPR, China is required under Article 18
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which it is a party, ‘‘to refrain from acts
which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty’’ it has signed. Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, enacted 23 May 69, entry into force 27 January 80, art. 18.
18 See General Comment No. 22 to Article 18 of the ICCPR for an official interpretation of
freedom of religion as articulated in the ICCPR. General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion (Art. 18), 30 July 93, para. 1. This section of the Commission’s Annual Report primarily uses the expression ‘‘freedom of religion’’ but encompasses
within this term reference to the more broadly articulated freedom of ‘‘thought, conscience, and
religion’’ (see, e.g., UDHR, art. 18; ICCPR, art. 18).
19 ICCPR, art. 18(1), (2), (4). See also General Comment No. 22, para. 1, 2, 4, 6; and CRC,
art. 14. See also Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.
20 For more background on government policy to ‘‘use law to strengthen management of religious affairs,’’ see, e.g., Ye Xiaowen, ‘‘Preface,’’ in Shuai Feng and Li Jian, Interpretation of the
Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli shiyi], (Beijing: Beijing Religious Culture
Press, 2005), 1–2 (pagination for preface); Beatrice Leung, ‘‘China’s Religious Freedom Policy:
The Art of Managing Religious Activity,’’ The China Quarterly, no. 184, 894, 907–911 (2005).
2 CECC,
3 CECC,

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21 Zhang Xunmou, Policy and Law Department of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, quoted in Nailene Chou Wiest, ‘‘Religious Groups Get More Room to Move,’’ South China
Morning Post (Online), 20 October 04.
22 See, e.g., Public Security Bureau Personnel Training Bureau, Lectures on Domestic Security
Defense Studies [Guonei anquan baoweixue jiaocheng] (Beijing: Mass Publishing Company,
2001), 141–142.
23 Wang Zhimin, ‘‘Thoughts on How To Safeguard Social Stability and Supply High-Grade
Service in the Course of Developing the West’’ [Dui xibu dakaifa zhong ruhe weihu shehui wending tigong youzhi fuwu de sikao], in Police Science Society of China, ed., Collected Essays on
Public Security Work and Developing the West, (Beijing: Chinese People’s Public Security University Press, 2002), 254.
24 See, e.g., Ye Xiaowen, ‘‘Give Play to the Positive Role of Religion in Pushing Forward Social
Harmony,’’ Study Times, 25 December 06 (Open Source Center, 8 January 07). For earlier statements, see, e.g., Sun Chengbin and Yin Hongzhu, ‘‘National Work Conference on Religious Affairs Held in Beijing, Jiang Zemin Stressed Need to Effectively Do a Good Job in Religious Work
at the Beginning of This Century To Serve the Overall Situation of Reform, Development, and
Stability,’’ Xinhua, 12 December 01 (Open Source Center, 12 December 01).
25 See, e.g., Ye, ‘‘Give Play to the Positive Role of Religion in Pushing Forward Social Harmony;’’ ‘‘SARA Director Calls for Continued Controls on Religion,’’ CECC China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update, September 2006, 8.
26 ‘‘SARA Director Calls for Continued Controls on Religion,’’ CECC China Human Rights and
Rule of Law Update, September 2006, 8.
27 For more information, see, e.g., CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 89, 93.
28 Ye Xiaowen, ‘‘Correctly Understanding and Handling the Religious Relationship in the Socialist Society—Studying Comrade Hu Jintao’s Important Speech at the National United Front
Work Conference,’’ Seeking Truth, 18 August 06 (Open Source Center, 23 August 06).
29 Wu Jiao, ‘‘Religious Believers Thrice the Official Estimate: Poll,’’ China Daily, 7 February
07 (Open Source Center, 7 February 07). Figures differ greatly. Unofficial estimates indicate a
rapid growth in numbers in some religious communities. For example, overseas sources have
estimated that up to 100 million people worship in unregistered Protestant churches and that
the number continues to grow. Official government sources have stated that China has 16 million Protestants and 4.5 million Catholics affiliated with the state-controlled Catholic church,
but State Administration for Religious Affairs director Ye Xiaowen also reportedly said that
China had 130 million Protestants and Catholics as of 2006. For an overview of official and unofficial statistics, see U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2006,
China, and U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report —2007, China.
30 ‘‘Diligently Strengthen the Foundation, Arouse the Passions To Serve the Situation—A Scan
of Religious Work in 2005’’ [Yongxin guben qiangji dongqing fuwu daju—2005 zongjiao gongzuo
saomiao], China Religions 2006 volume 1, reprinted on the State Administration for Religious
Affairs Web site, 27 January 06.
31 See, e.g., ‘‘SARA Holds First Term of Religious Work Cadre Training’’ [Guojia zongjiaoju
juban diyiqi zongjiao gongzuo ganbu peixunban], United Front Work Department (Online), 4 December 06; ‘‘Suzhou Daily: Our City’s Religious Personages Discuss Study and Implementation
of ‘Regulation on Religious Affairs’’’ [Suzhou ribao: woshi zongjiaojie renshi zuotan xuexi
guanche ‘zongjiao shiwu tiaoli’], Suzhou Daily, reprinted on the Suzhou Ethnic and Religious
Affairs Bureau Web site, 17 March 07.
32 Measures on the Examination, Approval, and Registration of Venues for Religious Activity;
Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism
[Cangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], issued 18 July 07; Measures on Establishing
Religious Schools [Zongjiao yuanxiao sheli banfa], issued 1 August 07; Measures for Putting on
File the Main Religious Personnel of Venues for Religious Activities [Zongjiao huodong changsuo
zhuyao jiaozhi renzhi bei’an banfa], issued 29 December 06; Measures for Putting on File Religious Personnel [Zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan bei’an banfa], issued 29 February 06. Measures Regarding Chinese Muslims Signing Up To Go Abroad on Pilgrimages (Trial Measures) [Zhongguo
musilin chuguo chaojin baoming paidui banfa (shixing)], undated (estimated date 2006), available on the SARA Web site. See Section IV—Tibet for an analysis of the Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism.
33 Shuai and Li, Interpretation of the Regulation on Religious Affairs. This book is written
by drafters of the Regulation on Religious Affairs. See p. 6 of the preface. The book includes
a preface by State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) director Ye Xiaowen and is advertised on the SARA Web site. A Web search of the book’s title, limited to Web sites with
‘‘gov.cn’’ in the Web address, found only three local governments reporting on having received
or used the text. Web search conducted July 16, 2007. While the text clarifies some ambiguous
provisions of the Regulation on Religious Affairs, it also leaves some ambiguities—such as the
question of whether religions outside the five belief systems are recognized in practice by the
central government—unanswered.
34 Between March 1, 2005, when the national RRA entered into force, and September 2007,
11 provincial-level areas issued new or amended comprehensive regulations on religious affairs
and made the texts available on legal databases and other Web sites. These regulations are:
Shanghai Municipality Regulation on Religious Affairs [Shanghaishi zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],
adopted 30 November 95, amended 21 April 05; Henan Province Regulation on Religious Affairs
[Henansheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 July 05; Zhejiang Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zhejiangsheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 6 December 97, amended 29 March
06; Shanxi Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Shanxisheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued
29 July 05; Anhui Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Anhuisheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],
issued 15 October 99, amended 29 June 06 and 28 February 07; Beijing Municipality Regulation
on Religious Affairs [Beijingshi zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 18 July 02, amended 28 July 06;
Chongqing Municipality Regulation on Religious Affairs [Chongqingshi zongjiao shiwu tiaoli],

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issued 29 September 06; Hunan Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Hunansheng zongjiao
shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 September 06; Liaoning Province People’s Congress Standing Committee
Decision on Amending the Liaoning Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Liaoningsheng
renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xiugai ‘‘Liaoningsheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli’’
de jueding], issued on 28 November 98 as the Liaoning Province Regulation on the Management
of Religious Affairs, amended and name changed on 1 December 06; Sichuan Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Sichuansheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued on 9 May 00 as the
Sichuan Province Regulation on the Management of Religious Affairs, amended and name
changed on 30 November 06; and Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the
‘‘Regulation on Religious Affairs’’ (Trial Measures) [Zizang zizhiqu shishi ‘‘zongjiao shiwu tiaoli’’
banfa (shixing)], issued 19 September 06. In addition, the Hebei provincial government also
amended its 2003 Regulation on Religious Affairs, according to a report from the Hebei Province
Ethnic and Religious Affairs Department Web site, but a public copy appears to be unavailable.
Hebei Province Ethnic and Religious Affairs Department (Online), ‘‘Hebei Province Regulation
on Religious Affairs Revised and Promulgated’’ [‘‘Hebeisheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli’’ xiuding bing
gongbu], 14 February 07. The Anhui provincial government retained inconsistent provisions in
its first amendments, in 2006. For an analysis of the Anhui amendments and other regulations,
see ‘‘Anhui Government Amends Provincial Religious Regulation,’’ CECC China Human Rights
and Rule of Law Update, October 2006, 10–11; ‘‘Zhejiang and Other Provincial Governments
Issue New Religious Regulations,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June
2006, 9–10; ‘‘Beijing Municipality Amends Local Religious Regulation,’’ CECC China Human
Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2006, 8–9; ‘‘Chongqing Municipality and Hunan
Province Issue New Religious Regulations,’’ CECC Virtual Academy (Online), 4 January 07
35 Article 79 of the Legislation Law says that national regulations have higher force than local
ones, and Articles 64 and 88 call for amending or canceling local regulations that conflict with
national legal sources. PRC Legislation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lifafa], adopted 15
March 00. Nonetheless, out-of-date provisions remain within local-level legislation. For example,
the Guangdong Province Regulation on the Administration of Religious Affairs retains a provision requiring yearly inspections of venues for religious activities in accordance with a national
legal measure (banfa) on the topic, but subsequent legal developments have voided this legal
guidance. See Guangdong Province Regulation on the Administration of Religious Affairs
[Guangdongsheng shiwu guanli tiaoli], adopted 26 May 00, art. 15. See also ‘‘Beijing Municipality Amends Local Religious Regulation,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2006, 8–9; and Shuai and Li, Interpretation of the Regulation on Religious Affairs, 93. According to this book of interpretations, the national RRA annuls an earlier measure
requiring yearly inspections. This annulment is not explicit within the text of the RRA itself.
36 Hunan Province Regulation on Religious Affairs, art. 48. See also ‘‘Chongqing Municipality
and Hunan Province Issue New Religious Regulations,’’ CECC Virtual Academy (Online), 4 January 07.
37 Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the ‘‘Regulation on Religious Affairs,’’
art. 36–40.
38 See, e.g., ‘‘Zhejiang and Other Provincial Governments Issue New Religious Regulations,’’
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 9–10, for a comparison of regulations from four provincial-level areas.
39 The central government has referred to the five religions as China’s main religions, but in
practice the state has created a regulatory system that institutionalizes only these five religions
for recognition and legal protection. See, e.g., State Council Information Office, White Paper on
Freedom of Religious Belief in China, October 1997 (Online) (stating that the religions citizens
‘‘mainly’’ follow are Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism). Wording from
this White Paper is posted as a statement of current policy on the Web sites of the United Front
Work Department, the agency that oversees religious affairs within the Communist Party, and
the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA). Some local regulations on religious affairs define religion in China to mean only these five categories. See, e.g., Guangdong Province
Regulation on the Administration of Religious Affairs, art. 3, and Henan Province Regulation
on Religious Affairs, art. 2. There is some limited tolerance outside this framework for some
ethnic minority and ‘‘folk’’ religious practices. See text infra and see also Kim-Kwong Chan and
Eric R. Carlson, Religious Freedom in China: Policy, Administration, and Regulation (Santa
Barbara: Institute for the Study of American Religion, 2005), 9–10, 15–16. Some local governments have recognized the Orthodox church. See the discussion, infra, on Orthodoxy in China.
Officials told a visiting U.S. delegation in August 2005 that they were considering at the national level whether to allow some other religious communities, including the Orthodox church,
to register to establish organizations or religious activity venues, but no decisions in this area
have been reported. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), ‘‘Policy
Focus: China,’’ 9 November 05, 4. See also ‘‘A Year After New Regulations, Religious Rights Still
Restricted, Arrests, Closures, Crackdowns Continue,’’ Human Rights Watch (Online), 1 March
06 (reporting no decision on whether or not to recognize additional religions).
40 See, e.g., RRA, art. 6 (requiring religious organizations to register in accordance with the
Regulations on the Management of the Registration of Social Organizations); art. 8 (requiring
an application to the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) to establish an institute
for religious learning); art. 13–15 (imposing an application procedure to register venues for religious activity); art. 27 (requiring the appointment of religious personnel to be reported to the
religious affairs bureau at or above the county level and requiring reporting the succession of
living Buddhas for approval to governments at the level of a city divided into districts or higher,
and requiring reporting for the record the appointment of Catholic bishops to SARA).
41 These Party-led associations are sometimes also referred to as ‘‘patriotic religious associations.’’
42 For a description of the religious associations in Chinese sources, see Shuai and Li, Interpretation of the Regulation on Religious Affairs, 4–5.

21
88 ‘‘Three Detained in East Turkistan for ‘Illegal’ Religious Text,’’ Uyghur Human Rights
Project (Online), 3 August 05.
89 See, e.g., ‘‘Xinjiang Government Continues Restrictions on Mosque Attendance,’’ CECC
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March 2006, 8. XUAR regulations forbid parents
from allowing children to engage in religious activities, and mosques have restricted children’s
entry. The U.S. Department of State noted in its 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for China, however, that such restrictions were not uniformly enforced in practice. U.S.
Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2006, China.
90 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Devastating Blows,’’ 55–56.
91 USCIRF, ‘‘Policy Focus: China,’’ 6.
92 RRA, art. 11, 43.
93 ‘‘Islamic Congress Establishes Hajj Office, Issues New Rules,’’ CECC Human Rights and
Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 12–13.
94 ‘‘Government Increases Controls Over Muslim Pilgrimages,’’ CECC Human Rights and Rule
of Law Update, December 2006, 20; Circular of Provisions Regarding Organizing and Carrying
Out Secondary Pilgrimage Activities [Guanyu zuzhi kaizhan fuchao huodong ruogan guiding de
tongzhi], August 2006.
95 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2007, China (noting
reasons why some Uighur Muslims in particular have avoided participating in official trips).
96 Jackie Armijo, ‘‘Islamic Education in China,’’ 9 Harvard Asia Quarterly, (Winter 2006) (Online).
97 Cheng Lixin, ‘‘Wang Lequan, Speaking at the Feedback Meeting of the United Front and
Religious Affairs Investigation and Study Team, Emphasizes the Need To Strengthen Management of Pilgrimage Activity To Safeguard the Masses Interests,’’ Xinjiang Daily, 19 June 07
(Open Source Center, 25 June 07); ‘‘China Confiscates Muslims’ Passports,’’ Radio Free Asia
(Online), 27 June 07; ‘‘Activist: Members of Muslim Minority Group in China Forced To Surrender Their Passports,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in the International Herald Tribune, 20
July 07.
98 Yang, ‘‘Ismail Tiliwaldi, While Speaking at an Autonomous Region-Wide Religion Work
Meeting, Calls for Stronger Management Over Pilgrimage and the ‘Two Religions’ To Safeguard
the Masses’ Interest.’’
99 ‘‘Over 70,000 Illegal Publications ‘Smashed to Dust’’’ [7 wan duo ce feifa chubanwu
‘‘fenshensuigu’’], Xinjiang Legal Daily (Online), 6 August 07.
100 ‘‘Xinjiang Government Seizes, Confiscates Political and Religious Publications,’’ CECC
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 7–8.
101 ‘‘Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region Destroys 29 Tons of Illegal Books’’ [Xinjiang weiwuer
zizhiqu xiaohui 29 dun feifa tushu], Tianshan Net (Online), 16 March 06.
102 Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region Implementing Measures of the Law on the Protection
of Minors [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu shishi ‘‘Weichengnianren baohufa’’ banfa], issued 25 September 93, art. 14. No other provincial or national regulation on minors or on religion contains
this precise provision. Devastating Blows, 58.
103 ‘‘Local Governments in Xinjiang Continue Religious Repression During Ramadan,’’ CECC
Virtual Academy, 12 December 06. Some local governments also extended these campaigns to
teachers.
104 Kashgar Government (Online), ‘‘Yopurgha County Implements ‘Mandatory Visits System’
Among Students in Elementary and Secondary Schools,’’ [Yuepuhuxian zai zhongxiaoxuesheng
zhong shixing ‘‘bifangzhi’’], 11 October 06.
105 This overview paragraph provides a summary of key issues of concern. See the text that
follows the paragraph for more information, including detailed citations.
106 The document says that meetings that are ‘‘purely’’ gatherings of family members within
the home should be placed under normal management, and non-family gatherings that are large
in scope and disruptive should be stopped and participants urged to go to approved sites of worship. Gatherings with elements of cult practices or foreign infiltration should be dispelled and
if necessary subject to penalties. ‘‘Our District’s Work on the Administration of Abnormal Religious Activities Is Taking on a Desirable Posture’’ [Woqu feizhengchang zongjiao huodong zhili
gongzuo xingcheng lianghao taishi], Baoshan Ethnicities and Religion Net (Online), 20 July 07.
107 ‘‘Annual Report on Persecution of Chinese House Churches by Province from January 2006
to December 2006,’’ CAA (Online), January 2007, 3.
108 CAA noted that while church members are often released after interrogation, authorities
have held church leaders for longer periods, in some cases imposing prison sentences. Ibid.,19.
109 ‘‘Beijing House Church Activist Hua Huiqi and His Mother Attacked and Detained by Police,’’ CAA (Online), 27 January 07. See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for additional information.
110 ‘‘Beijing House Church Activist Hua Huiqi Sentenced for 6 Months Secretly,’’ CAA (Online), 4 June 07; ‘‘House Church Christian Activist Hua Huiqi and Mr. Qi Zhiyong Were Removed from Home Before US Presidential Visit,’’ CAA (Online), 21 November 05; ‘‘Activist’s
Mother ‘Held Hostage’ for Information,’’ Human Rights In China (HRIC) (Online), 17 August
07; ‘‘Elderly Activist Denied Medical Parole,’’ HRIC (Online), 13 September 07. See the CECC
Political Prisoner Database for more information.
111 ‘‘Prominent Beijing Rights Defense Christian Lawyer Li Heping Kidnapped and Tortured;
Two Beijing Christian Activists Held Under House Arrest,’’ CAA, reprinted in Christian News
Wire, 3 October 07.
112 See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information. See also ‘‘UN Petition
Submitted for Jailed Ailing Church Leader; Medical Parole Appeal Filed by Family Members,’’
CAA (Online), 12 July 06. Gong’s accusers say they were tortured into signing allegations
against Gong. Authorities originally charged Gong with using a cult to undermine the implementation of the law, along with premeditated assault, and rape, but the cult charges were later

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dropped. Examples of cult activity included carrying out unauthorized missionary activities and
publishing and distributing a church periodical.
113 ‘‘Beijing House Church Activist Liu Fenggang Released,’’ CAA (Online), 7 February 07.
114 ‘‘Prominent Beijing Rights Defense Christian Lawyer Li Heping Kidnapped and Tortured;
Two Beijing Christian Activists Held Under House Arrest,’’ CAA.
115 White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China.
116 ‘‘Three House Church Buildings in Zhejiang Facing Imminent Destruction by Government,’’
CAA (Online), 14 July 07.
117 ‘‘Basic People’s Court of Xiaoshan District, Hangzhou City, Criminal Judgment’’ [Hangzhou
xiaoshanqu renminfayuan xingshi panjueshu], 22 December 06, reprinted on the CAA Web site,
15 January 07.
118 ‘‘Annual Report on Persecution of Chinese House Churches, ’’ CAA, 3–4.
119 ‘‘Church Property in Gansu Occupied by the Government, 300 Christians Protest by Sitting
Demonstration; 3 Singapore Christians Arrested & Released in Xinjiang, 5 Local Believers Still
in Detention,’’ CAA (Online), 31 October 06. Government officials threatened to withhold retirement benefits to church members and reportedly used violence against the demonstrators. The
group reportedly reached a compromise with authorities. ‘‘Annual Report on Persecution of Chinese House Churches,’’ CAA, 19.
120 See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information about these cases. CAA
reported in September 2007 that authorities arrested Zhou Heng, a house church leader in the
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, on August 31 after he received a shipment of Bibles reported to have been donated by an overseas church. Authorities accused him of illegally operating a business. ‘‘House Church Leader in Xinjiang Formally Arrested for Receiving Bibles and
Abused in Jail,’’ CAA (Online), 5 September 07. In March 2007, CAA reported that authorities
arrested unregistered church leader Chen Jiaxi in January 2007 for distributing religious literature, on the grounds he was illegally managing a business. CAA reported that Chen was expected to stand trial soon but has not reported further information on the case. ‘‘House Church
Leaders Arrested in Liaoning and Anhui Province,’’ CAA (Online), 31 March 07. In 2006, the
CAA reported that authorities levied a similar charge on pastor Liu Yuhua after he printed and
distributed religious literature. ‘‘Multiple Arrests of Protestants Occurred in Shandong and
Jiangsu; One South Korea Missionary Expelled from China; Prominent Chinese Legal Scholar
Banned to Go Abroad,’’ CAA (Online), 16 May 06.
121 ‘‘Renowned Beijing Church Leader Cai Zhuohua Released After Three Years Imprisonment
for Distributing Bibles; Forced Labor for Olympics Products Imposed,’’ CAA (Online), 14 September 07.
122 ‘‘Chinese Authorities Release House Church Filmmaker After 140 Days in Custody,’’ CECC
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September 2006, 9; ‘‘Journalist Arrested for Posting
Reports About Crackdown on Christians,’’ Reporters Without Borders (Online), 11 August 06.
123 ‘‘House Church Members Successfully Fight Detentions For Unauthorized Worship,’’ CECC
Virtual Academy, 19 December 06.
124 The church leaders have since filed lawsuits against the government. According to an April
report from the China Aid Association, Dong Quanyu and Li Huage of Henan province await
a decision on whether their case will be heard. In April 2007, the People’s Court of Duolun
County, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region accepted Zhi Ruiping’s case for an upcoming trial.
‘‘Released Church Leaders in Henan and Inner Mongolia File Lawsuit Against Abusers in the
Government,’’ CAA (Online), 18 April 07.
125 See the subsection on ‘‘Government Persecution of Falun Gong,’’ infra, for more information.
126 ‘‘Thirty-Three Chinese and Three Korea[n] Pastors Released in Henan After International
Religious Pressure; One Sentenced for 10 Days Detention,’’ CAA (Online), 7 March 07.
127 ‘‘Confiscated Church Properties in Jiangsu Returned after International Pressure,’’ CAA
(Online), 11 May 07.
128 ‘‘Delegation of Chinese Protestants Attends International Mission Conference,’’ CECC
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2005, 6.
129 ‘‘House Church Lawyers Promote Religious Freedom Through the Rule of Law,’’ CECC
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 3.
130 Yang, ‘‘Ismail Tiliwaldi, While Speaking at an Autonomous Region-Wide Religion Work
Meeting, Calls for Stronger Management Over Pilgrimage and the ‘Two Religions’ To Safeguard
the Masses’ Interest.’’ This call was reiterated by local authorities in Changji Hui Autonomous
Prefecture in August. ‘‘Autonomous Prefecture’s Religion Meeting Stresses Strengthening Management of Religion, Safeguarding Social Stability,’’ Changji Evening News.
131 See, e.g., ‘‘Massive Arrest of Chinese and American Christian Leaders in Xinjiang,’’ CAA
(Online), 24 April 07; ‘‘3 Singapore Christians Arrested and Released in Xinjiang, 5 Local Believers Still in Detention,’’ CAA (Online), 31 October 06; ‘‘35 Arrested Christians in Xinjiang Released after Interrogation; American Korean Pastor Put Under Surveillance in a Hotel,’’ CAA
(Online), 27 October 06; ‘‘On Christmas Day, Christmas Services Stopped in Xinjiang; House
Church Leaders Arrested; Persecution Against Beaten Christian Businessman Intensified,’’ CAA
(Online), 27 December 05.
132 ‘‘Over 100 Foreign Missionaries Expelled or Forced To Leave by Chinese Government Secret Campaign,’’ CAA (Online), 10 July 07.
133 ‘‘China Sentences Underground Pastor to 7.5 Years in Prison,’’ Agence France-Presse (Online), 12 July 06. See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information.
134 Timothy Chow, ‘‘Chinese House Church Historian Denied ID Card,’’ Compass Direct News,
reprinted on the CAA Web site, 17 February 06.
135 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2007, China.
136 ‘‘Head of Religious Association: Religious Adherents Not Arrested Due to Their Faith,’’
CECC Virtual Academy (Online), 26 June 06; ‘‘Falun Gong Practitioners To Be Punished Under

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New Administration Punishment Law,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
May 2006, 6.
137 See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information.
138 See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information.
139 See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information.
140 See China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ‘‘Demand Immediate Release
of Beijing Human Rights Lawyer Gao Zhisheng,’’ 27 September 07. For more information about
Gao’s open letter, which called on the Congress to take action against the Chinese government’s
human rights abuses, see Human Rights Torch Relay (Online), ‘‘Gao Zhisheng’s letter to the
Senate and the Congress of the United States,’’ 12 September 07; Bill Gertz, ‘‘Chinese dissident
urges boycott of Olympics,’’ Washington Times (Online), 21 September 07.
141 ‘‘Prominent Beijing Rights Defense Christian Lawyer Li Heping Kidnapped and Tortured;
Two Beijing Christian Activists Held Under House Arrest,’’ CAA; ‘‘Amnesty International’s Urgent Appeal for Beijing Human Rights Lawyer Li Heping, Who Was Abducted and Assaulted,’’
Amnesty International, reprinted in CAA (Online), 4 October 07.
142 ‘‘House Church Members Successfully Fight Detentions For Unauthorized Worship,’’ CECC
Virtual Academy, 19 December 06; ‘‘Court Officials Refuse Falun Gong Practitioner’s Appeal of
RTL Sentence,’’ CECC Virtual Academy, 3 November 06.
143 See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information.
144 See, e.g., ‘‘Dachang Demolishes Illegal Small Temple According to Law’’ [Dachang zhen yifa
chaichu yichu feifa xiao miao], Shanghai Baoshan Ethnicity and Religion Net (Online), 1 September 06; Mianyang City Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs (Online), ‘‘Govern According
to the Law for Good Results, Strength To Demolish ‘Illegal Small Temples’ Great,’’ [Yifa zhili
xiaoguo hao, chai ‘‘feifa xiao miao’’ lidu da], 08 June 06.
145 See, e.g., ‘‘Investigative Report on the Situation of Unregistered Small Temples and Convents’’ [Weijing zhengfu dengji de xiao miao xiao an qingkuang de diaoyan baogao], Xiaogang
Information Net (sponsored by the Beilun District People’s Government Xiaogang Neighborhood
Committee Office) (Online), 12 September 06; ‘‘Some Reflections on Rural Religious Work in a
New Period’’ [Xin shiqi nogcun zongjiao gongzuo de jidian sikao], Yixing United Front Web Site
(Online), 13 June 05.
146 State Administration for Religious Affairs (Online), ‘‘Forum for Religious Personages Opens
in Beijing at Second-year Anniversary of the Implementation of the ‘Regulation on Religious Affairs’’’ [‘‘Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli’’ shishi liang zhou nian zongjiaojie renshi zuotanhui zai jing
zhaokai], 3 March 07.
147 See, e.g., ‘‘China Exclusive: China Supports Buddhism in Building Harmonious World,’’
Xinhua, 12 April 06 (Open Source Center, 12 April 06).
148 Jim Yardley, ‘‘In Crackdown, China Shuts Buddhist Site and Seizes Catholic Priests,’’ New
York Times, 19 August 04.
149 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2006, China.
150 Among provincial-level areas, the Heilongjiang Regulation on the Management of Religious
Affairs and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the Management
of Venues for Religious Activity recognize the Orthodox Church. Heilongjiang Regulation on the
Management of Religious Affairs [Heilongjiangsheng zongjiao shiwu guanli tiaoli], issued 12
June 97, art. 2; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activity [Nei menggu zizhiqu zongjiao huodong changsuo guanli
shishi banfa], issued 23 January 96, art. 2.
151 For more information see ‘‘Religious Freedom for China’s Orthodox Christians’’ in the
CECC 2005 and 2006 Annual Reports.
152 In addition to work in these areas, it also oversees anti-cult work and addresses ‘‘foreign
infiltration.’’ The Web site of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) includes a
description of this office but does not indicate when it was established. The curriculum vitae
for a SARA staff members notes he was made head of this department in December 2004. The
Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao reported the establishment of this department in September 2005. Chan and Carlson write that authorities decided at a January 2004 conference
to establish a SARA department focused on folk beliefs. Chan and Carlson, 15–16. State Administration for Religious Affairs (Online), ‘‘Fourth Work Department’’ [Yewu sisi], last visited 6 October 07; State Administration for Religious Affairs (Online), ‘‘CV of [SARA Official] Jiang
Jianyong’’ [Jiang Jianyong jianli], last viewed 6 October 07. ‘‘Religious Affairs Bureau Establishes Special Department To Manage Folk Religions’’ [Zongjiaoju she zhuansi guanli minjian
zongjiao], Ta Kung Pao (Online), 20 September 05.
153 Hunan Province Regulation on Religious Affairs, art. 48. See also ‘‘Chongqing Municipality
and Hunan Province Issue New Religious Regulations,’’ CECC Virtual Academy (Online), 4 January 07. Some localities outside Hunan province also regulate folk beliefs. See, e.g., ‘‘Xiamen
Exchanges Experiences on Management of Venues for Folk Beliefs’’ [Xiamen jiaoliu minjian
xinyang huodong changsuo guanli jingyan], China Ethnicities News (Online), 6 February 07;
‘‘Yanping District, Jian’ou City Standardizes Financial Management of Venues for Folk Beliefs,’’
[Jian’ou shi yanping qu guifan minjian xinyang changsuo caiwu guanli], China Ethnicities News
(Online), 13 February 07.
154 ‘‘Chongqing Municipality and Hunan Province Issue New Religious Regulations,’’ CECC
Virtual Academy (Online), 4 January 07.
155 Hunan Provincial Religious Affairs Bureau (Online), ‘‘State Administration for Religious
Affairs Comes To Hunan To Investigate and Research Our Province’s Present Conditions for
Folk Beliefs and Experimental Management Situation’’ [Guojia zongjiaoju lai xiang diaoyan wo
sheng minjian xinyang xianzhuang he shidian guanli qingkuang], last viewed 6 October 07
(posted on the Hunan Provincial Religious Affairs Bureau Web site in 2007, in apparent reference to events in August 2006). See also ‘‘Popular Folk Beliefs and Religion’’ [Minjian xinyang
yu zongjiao], China Religion, September 2004 (indicating, within an official publication under
SARA, some support for protecting folk beliefs but also subjecting them to state control).

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156 State Administration for Religious Affairs, ‘‘Forum for Religious Personages Opens in Beijing at Second-year Anniversary of the Implementation of the Regulation on Religious Affairs;’’
‘‘Some Reflections on Rural Religious Work in a New Period,’’ Yixing United Front Web Site;
U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2006, China. Some activities related to ‘‘superstitions’’ or ‘‘feudal superstitions’’ are penalized under the Criminal Law
and administrative regulations. See, e.g., the PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended
14 March 97, art. 300, and the PRC Public Security Administration Punishment Law, enacted
28 August 05, art. 27(1).

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