Contents

Principles of inference

A person’s assumptions or beliefs about the relationship between observations and a hypothesis will affect whether that person takes the observations as evidence.[1] These assumptions or beliefs will also affect how a person utilizes the observations as evidence. For example, the Earth’s apparent lack of motion may be taken as evidence for a geocentric cosmology. However, after sufficient evidence is presented for heliocentric cosmology and the apparent lack of motion is explained, the initial observation is strongly discounted as evidence.

When rational observers have different background beliefs, they may draw different conclusions from the same scientific evidence. For example, Priestley, working with phlogiston theory, explained his observations about the decomposition of mercuric oxide using phlogiston. In contrast, Lavoisier, developing the theory of elements, explained the same observations with reference to oxygen.[2] Note that a causal relationship between the observations and hypothesis does not exist to cause the observation to be taken as evidence,[1] but rather the causal relationship is provided by the person seeking to establish observations as evidence.

A more formal method to characterize the effect of background beliefs is Bayesian inference.[3] In Bayesian inference, beliefs are expressed as percentages indicating one’s confidence in them. One starts from an initial probability (a prior), and then updates that probability using Bayes’ theorem after observing evidence.[4] As a result, two independent observers of the same event will rationally arrive at different conclusions if their priors (previous observations that are also relevant to the conclusion) differ. However, if they are allowed to communicate with each other, they will end in agreement (per Aumann’s agreement theorem).

The importance of background beliefs in the determination of what observations are evidence can be illustrated using deductive reasoning, such as syllogisms.[5] If either of the propositions is not accepted as true, the conclusion will not be accepted either.

Utility of scientific evidence

Philosophers, such as Karl R. Popper, have provided influential theories of the scientific method within which scientific evidence plays a central role.[6] In summary, Popper provides that a scientist creatively develops a theory which may be falsified by testing the theory against evidence or known facts. Popper’s theory presents an asymmetry in that evidence can prove a theory wrong, by establishing facts that are inconsistent with the theory. In contrast, evidence cannot prove a theory correct because other evidence, yet to be discovered, may exist that is inconsistent with the theory.[7]

Philosophical versus scientific views

The philosophical community has investigated the logical requirements for scientific evidence by examination of the relationship between evidence and hypotheses, in contrast to scientific approaches which focus on the candidate facts and their context.[8]Bechtel, as an example of a scientific approach, provides factors (clarity of the data, replication by others, consistency with results arrived at by alternative methods and consistency with plausible theories) useful for determination of whether observations may be considered scientific evidence.[9]

There are a variety of philosophical approaches to decide whether an observation may be considered evidence; many of these focus on the relationship between the evidence and the hypothesis. Carnap recommends distinguishing such approaches into three categories: classificatory (whether the evidence confirms the hypothesis), comparative (whether the evidence supports a first hypothesis more than an alternative hypothesis) or quantitative (the degree to which the evidence supports a hypothesis).[10]Achinstein provides a concise presentation by prominent philosophers on evidence, including Carl Hempel (Confirmation), Nelson Goodman (of grue fame), R. B. Braithwaite, Norwood Russell Hanson, Wesley C. Salmon, Clark Glymour and Rudolf Carnap.[11]

Based on the philosophical assumption of the Strong Church-Turing Universe Thesis, a mathematical criterion for evaluation of evidence has been conjectured, with the criterion having a resemblance to the idea of Occam’s Razor that the simplest comprehensive description of the evidence is most likely correct. It states formally, “The ideal principle states that the prior probability associated with the hypothesis should be given by the algorithmic universal probability, and the sum of the log universal probability of the model plus the log of the probability of the data given the model should be minimized.”[12]

According to the posted curriculum for an “Understanding Science 101” course taught at University of California – Berkeley: “Testing hypotheses and theories is at the core of the process of science.” This philosophical belief in “hypothesis testing” as the essence of science is prevalent among both scientists and philosophers. It is important to note that this hypothesis does not take into account all of the activities or scientific objectives of all scientists. When Geiger and Marsden scattered alpha particles through thin gold foil for example, the resulting data enabled their experimental adviser, Ernest Rutherford, to very accurately calculate the mass and size of an atomic nucleus for the first time. No hypothesis was required. It may be that a more general view of science is offered by physicist, Lawrence Krauss, who consistently writes in the media about scientists answering questions by measuring physical properties and processes.

Concept of scientific proof

While the phrase “scientific proof” is often used in the popular media,[13] many scientists have argued that there is really no such thing. For example, Karl Popper once wrote that “In the empirical sciences, which alone can furnish us with information about the world we live in, proofs do not occur, if we mean by ‘proof’ an argument which establishes once and for ever the truth of a theory.”[14][15] Albert Einstein said:

The scientific theorist is not to be envied. For Nature, or more precisely experiment, is an inexorable and not very friendly judge of his work. It never says “Yes” to a theory. In the most favorable cases it says “Maybe”, and in the great majority of cases simply “No”. If an experiment agrees with a theory it means for the latter “Maybe”, and if it does not agree it means “No”. Probably every theory will someday experience its “No” – most theories, soon after conception.[16]