Moreover,
a State bent on “secession” would have to adopt her alternative
sound currency well before “secession” took place,
because the State’s own operations and her private free market
would have to be allowed ample time in which to introduce the new currency,
to create a set of prices in the new currency for both public and private
goods, to make average people comfortable with using the new currency
in their day-to-day transactions, and to develop new private institutions
such as deposit- and loan-banks dealing in the new currency. This process
could not reasonably be expected to occur in the midst of a currency
crisis exacerbated by the political crisis “secession” itself
would cause.

It
is useless to suggest (as doubtlessly some people nonetheless will)
that a “seceding” State could set up her own “State
bank”, similar to the institution North Dakota established long
ago. True enough, if prudently managed, a “State bank”—or
any private bank, for that matter—can operate with Federal Reserve
Notes (and deposits solvable in such notes) as its currency, but
only until a currency crisis breaks out. At that point,
what could such a bank do—when the “soundness” of
its own operations (which to some degree it can control) are inextricably
tied to the “soundness” of the Federal Reserve’s currency
(which it cannot control at all)—except be swept away with the
rest of the economy in a tsunami of hyperinflation, or be buried under
the rubble of a depression, or suffer both fates, one immediately after
the other? And the “soundness” of the Federal Reserve Note
(such as it is) being entirely within the hands of the Federal Reserve
System and the other “usual suspects” in the fiat-currency
racket, how could such a bank protect itself against such an eventuality,
unless well before that eventuality occurred it had adopted
an alternative, economically sound currency? Of course, once upon a
time, this may have been only a long-term consideration. But the long
term has always had a disquieting propensity for suddenly and unexpectedly
showing up in the short term. And now, as to America’s monetary
and banking systems, the long term has arrived, and with a vengeance.

b.
A “seceding” State would have to hold the Power of the Sword,
too, firmly within her own grasp, because upon the exercise of that
power would depend all of her “homeland security”. For the
principle the Second Amendment sets out—that “[a] well regulated
Militia” is “necessary to the security of a free State”—would
apply just as much to a wholly independent State as to a State still
within the Union. Indeed, it probably would apply to a “seceding”
State to an even greater degree—because, if rogue officials in
the General Government did not acquiesce in “secession”,
the “seceding” State could expect those officials to dispatch
their armed agents to attempt to prove the impotence and futility of
“secession” by enforcing the General Government’s
laws directly against the State’s individual citizens, even within
the State’s own territory, as if “secession” had never
occurred. The credibility of resistance against this kind of aggression,
and therefore the extent to which officials within the General Government
might be deterred from such a reckless course, would inevitably depend
upon the extent of the “seceding” State’s actual
preparedness and her citizens’ manifest will to defend
themselves. Obviously, that the State had organized, armed, and disciplined
almost her entire adult population in a Militia according to the old
constitutional pattern would provide the most convincing evidence of
all that the State “meant business” in a manner that could
not be misinterpreted.

But,
of course, as with the adoption of an alternative currency, the establishment—or
as modern America’s Colonial forebears would have termed it, the
“settling”—of “[a] well regulated Militia”
could not be put off until the final confrontation between the “seceding”
State and rogue officials in the General Government took place. To have
any hope of serving as a credible deterrent, let alone a force capable
of meaningful resistance should deterrence fail, the State’s Militia
would have to be in place and fully functional well before
“secession” occurred—indeed, even before “secession”
were seriously considered. For, in the midst of the manifold crises
arising out of “secession”, far too little time for calm
reflection and careful preparation would be left in which to settle
the Militia properly.

It
is ridiculous to contend (as some people nonetheless will) that, “militia”
being a term routinely demonized today by the big media and various
subversive special-interest groups, the settling of a proper Militia
along true constitutional lines is politically impossible at the present
time, and therefore simply cannot be considered a practical condition
precedent to “secession”. If so, then what is the likelihood
that “secession” itself is politically possible today? Or
will be tomorrow? Or will be at any time before revitalization of the
Militia becomes politically possible? Is “secession”
a term any less demonized and vilified than “militia”? And
if “secession” without revitalization of the Militia is
not possible at all (which common sense confirms), but revitalization
of the Militia is not possible in the foreseeable future (which the
nay-sayers contend), then what is the point of talking about “secession”
until revitalization of the Militia somehow finally becomes possible?

C.
Perhaps the conclusive argument along these lines against “secession”
is that, if the absolutely necessary precondition for possibly successful
“secession” did obtain—namely, that a State contemplating
“secession” had first acquired firm control in her own hands
of the Power of the Purse and the Power of the Sword—further talk
of “secession” would almost surely abate, because it would
become purposeless. For once a State had proven that adoption of an
alternative currency and revitalization of her constitutional Militia
were possible—and once the positive effects on that State’s
ability to control her own economic and political destiny within
the present constitutional system from such adoption and revitalization
had appeared for all America to witness—then these reforms would
rapidly spread from State to State across the country, until the reassertion
of true federalism by the States and WE THE PEOPLE themselves became
a fait accompli beyond the ability of rogue officials in the
General Government even to challenge, let alone to reverse. (Of course,
perhaps “secessionists” could then take some credit for
this result, on the grounds that their agitation had caused patriots
to study the matter and come to the conclusion that, before “secession”
could ever be viable, and even to render “secession” irrelevant,
the States had to reassert their control over the Powers of the Purse
and the Sword.)

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D.
Finally, not a few proponents of “secession” contend that
reasoning of the kind just presented is not to the point, because patriotic
Americans now find themselves in what could be styled “a Declaration
of Independence situation”, in which (as it were) “all constitutional
bets are off”. In support of this argument, they emphasize the
Declaration’s pronouncements that

whenever
any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends [i.e.,
men’s “certain unalienable Rights”], it is the Right
of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government,
laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers
in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety
and Happiness[;]

and
that

when
a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same
Object evinces a design to reduce them [i.e., the People]
under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to
throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future
security.

Now,
no American—no thinking man or woman anywhere on earth—can
doubt that these statements are indisputably correct: indeed, as the
Declaration itself rightly characterizes them, “self-evident”
“truths”. But the question remains whether they are as yet
germane to America’s present political predicament.

True
enough, rogue officials in the General Government (and, if the whole
truth be told, in some of the States as well) have engaged and continue
to engage in “a long train of abuses and usurpations, * * * evinc[ing]
a design to reduce [the People] under absolute Despotism”. But,
as bad as this thuggery has been, is, and threatens to be, it is not
by itself conclusive evidence that America’s “Form of Government
[has] become destructive” of the purposes for which WE THE PEOPLE
originally instituted it.

For
America’s “Form of Government” consists, not
of the General Government alone, and not of the General Government
and only some of the States, but instead of a federal system of government
composed of the General Government, all of the States, and WE THE PEOPLE
in their entirety, with THE PEOPLE themselves the executors of the highest
degree of human sovereignty under “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s
God”. So, until every component in this system has plainly
“become[ ] destructive of the[ true] ends [of government]”,
in a manner beyond human correction, no one can conclude with certainty
that the “Form of Government” itself has irretrievably failed.

And
as bad as America’s present plight may be, every component of
her federal system has not failed. WE THE PEOPLE—or at
least the tens and tens of millions of patriots among them throughout
this country—have not engaged in or condoned rogue officialdom’s
“long train of abuses and usurpations”. Many public officials
in many of the States have not lent, and never would lend, their hands,
their minds, or their hearts to “a[ny] design to reduce [the People]
under absolute Despotism”. Even more to the point, every component
of America’s federal system has not failed to provide a remedy
for the present perils threatening this country, because every component
of that system has not yet been fairly tried and put to the test.

Yes,
the present-day Congress—and possibly the entirety of the General
Government—may be political wastelands that cannot be reclaimed
within the immediate future. But have WE THE PEOPLE in any single State
single-mindedly organized themselves and demanded from their
State legislators the adoption of an alternative currency and the revitalization
of their own “well regulated Militia”? No! Have WE THE PEOPLE
throughout the several States organized themselves and brought the full
force of their collective talents, resources, and efforts to bear in
just one or two “target” States for those purposes? No!
So how can anyone reasonably condemn America’s whole “Form
of Government”—as the rationalization for “secession”
and the apology for all of the evils that any attempt at “secession”
can be expected to entail—until those specific steps have been
taken and proven unavailing?

Of
course, it is not impossible that all such endeavors will fail, finally
exposing popular self-government (at least in its American incarnation)
as a snare and a delusion. At that point, those with a bent for political
philosophy might turn to the wisdom of Augustine, who (as paraphrased
by Thomas Aquinas) counseled that:

If
the people have a sense of moderation and responsibility, and are most
careful guardians of the common weal, it is right to enact a law allowing
such a people to choose their own magistrates for the government of
the commonwealth. But if, as time goes on, the same people become so
corrupt as to sell their votes, and entrust the government to scoundrels
and criminals, then the right of appointing their public officials is
rightly forfeit to such a people; and the choice devolves to a few good
men.

See
De Libero Arbitrio Tres Libri, Book One, Chapter VI, §§
45 and 46. Yet, if patriotic Americans cannot muster the “few
good men” required to convince a single State’s legislature
to adopt an alternative currency and to revitalize her Militia, which
are relatively simple tasks, where and when will Americans ever be able
find a “few good men” to perform the far more difficult
duty to which Augustine would assign them? No—if America cannot
find such men now, she will never find them later on.

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So,
what must one conclude about “secession”? That it is an
idea the time for which has not yet arrived—and the time for which
need never arrive if Americans can perform the very political tasks
that would be necessary for “secession” to be arguably viable
at all. If Americans have an appetite for true reform now,
they will do far better by directing their intellectual and other scarce
resources towards the Constitution’s original “M&Ms”—sound
money and “well regulated Militia”. For part one or two
click below.

Edwin Vieira, Jr., holds four
degrees from Harvard: A.B. (Harvard College), A.M. and Ph.D. (Harvard
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences), and J.D. (Harvard Law School).

For more than thirty years he has
practiced law, with emphasis on constitutional issues. In the Supreme
Court of the United States he successfully argued or briefed the cases
leading to the landmark decisions Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, and Communications Workers of America
v. Beck, which established constitutional and statutory limitations on
the uses to which labor unions, in both the private and the public sectors,
may apply fees extracted from nonunion workers as a condition of their
employment.

He has written numerous monographs
and articles in scholarly journals, and lectured throughout the county.
His most recent work on money and banking is the two-volume Pieces
of Eight: The Monetary Powers and Disabilities of the United States
Constitution (2002), the most comprehensive study in existence of American
monetary law and history viewed from a constitutional perspective. www.piecesofeight.us

He is also the co-author (under
a nom de plume) of the political novel CRA$HMAKER:
A Federal Affaire (2000), a not-so-fictional story of an engineered crash
of the Federal Reserve System, and the political upheaval it causes. www.crashmaker.com