Recently viewed (1)

Edited by Robert Halvorsen and David F. Layton

The topics discussed in the Handbook on the Economics of Natural Resources are essential for those looking to understand how best to use and conserve the resources that form the foundation for human well-being. These include nonrenewable resources, modeling of biological resources, conservation of biological resources and water resources. The expert contributors of this Handbook provide solutions to many of the problems that growing populations now face, and sketch the likely future developments in the field of natural resource economics whilst paving the way for new thinking.

Chapter 10: Structuring rights and privileges in catch share systems

Handbook Chapter

Extract

The absence of property rights leads to the dissipation of resource rents in fisheries and, quite often, to depletion of fishery stocks below levels that can support maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Even when catches are strictly limited to maintain the biological productivity of the fishery, rent dissipation can be expected to persist as a result of overcapitalization and a race for fish which can both increase costs and decrease the value of landings (Homans and Wilen 1997). Economists have long recommended the assignment of property rights1 to the fishery as a means to internalize the stock externality2 that leads to rent dissipation (Gordon 1954; Scott 1955).

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.