You should read it. The book heavily emphasizes the British official position regarding a fleet in being in the Indian Ocean. In fact the intention was that both PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE were to be a part of it. According to Boyd, and backed up by his substantial research the British hoped to deter the Japanese from action against them in the area until about April 1942 when they believed that they could have enough resources based in Ceylon or Singapore to take on the IJN on an equal footing. But with the loss of the two ships, followed by the collapse of Malaya, the best the British could hope for was to maintain a deterent force, e.g. a fleet in being, and to ask the Americans to do something to take the heat off of them. According to Boyd one of the (several) reasons for the American carrier raids in February and March and the Doolittle Raid, was to take heat off the British in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal. Nagumo's raids on Ceylon were intended to take out the Eastern Fleet, but he failed, since Somerville knew he was coming and, for the most part, was able to avoid him. It doesn't appear that the early U.S. carrier raids had any impact on Japanese plans, but the Doolittle Raid did. That apparently convinced the IJN that knocking out the Eastern Fleet was no longer as important as dealing with the Americans. And then Coral Sea and Midway put an end to any further IJN plans for the Indian Ocean. And after that the Indian Ocean became a backwater until 1944.

--Previous Message-- : I agree. In hindsight there seems to be a : tendency to underrate the FAA relative to : the Japanese. The Japanese trained to : achieve superb coordination of large : strikes, but many sources have faulted their : early war search capability. It's not a slam : dunk that Nagumo would had better luck : getting a timely, accurate position report : on the British than Somerville was able to : get on the Japanese. At Midway, Spruance : sacrificed potential coordination of his : much bigger force in order to get in the : first blow, and it could have failed. The : smaller British force would have been easier : to coordinate, and we know their torpedoes : worked. : : Strategically, the "fleet in : being" argument would have been an : uncharacteristic one for the Royal Navy to : make--doesn't it relate to capital ships of : an inferior fleet, rather than to cruisers? : I would argue that even at this late date, : many planners still viewed aircraft carriers : as relatively expendable compared to the : battleships that would protect or contest : amphibious operations. Certainly the US Navy : was willing to risk half it's effective : carrier force in the Doolittle raid for the : chance of a morale-building win. It's : conceivable that had Somerville sent his : battleships back to Mombassa and risked only : his carriers (as they often were in the : Mediterranean), the Admiralty would have : approved. Perhaps Boyd argues otherwise; I : will have to read that book. : : : --Previous Message-- : For what it's worth, Malta based Swordfish : had : been making night torpedo attacks on Italian : convoys. Not sure they were ever trained for : it, but they got pretty good pretty quickly. : I would think the pre-war FAA *did* train : for night torpedo attacks. Bismarck was hit : in appalling weather, although not : technically at night. But, I agree, unless : Nagumo lost his never after a lucky hit on : one of the Japanese carriers, the next day : wasn't going to be a good one for the RN. : : :