Syria’s raging civil war and the west’s inertia

The Syrian imbroglio is
very difficult, not intractable—and the west cannot continue to throw up its
hands in despair.

They should be in school: refugees in Aleppo. IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation / Flickr. Some rights reserved.After three years, more than 100,000
deaths, 9 million uprooted people and $140 billion damage, the Syrian civil
war has moved to the media back pages and off the political agenda, overtaken
by the establishment of the “caliphate” in Iraq, the downing of flight MH17 and
the inferno in Gaza. Terrible images circulating freely on Twitter—the plight
of refugees in Yarmouk, barrel bombings and brutal executions—have not changed
this. It has become just another interminable civil war. Despite their
proximity in some cases, western countries in particular seem frozen in the
spotlights of Syria’s extremity and complexity, unsure what to do and
hesitating to intervene.

Such caution is not without reason.
The fundamental unpredictability of war rapidly asserted itself as a domestic
uprising turned into a regional
proxy-conflict, providing another lease on life for militant Islamism and
reawakening colonial heritages. This has forced to the fore long-lingering but difficult-to-answer
questions about the role of Hizbullah in Lebanon, the future of the Kurds and
how to deal, beyond invasion and drones, with the appeal of Islamic radicalism.
The painful legacies of the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq must also weigh
heavily on the minds of western decision-makers, aggravated by the chaos into
which Libya has descended after the UN-sanctioned intervention.

Nor was it ever going to be easy to
manage coherently the international crisis which the Syrian civil war represents.
The global stand-off between the US and Russia has ensured that the full power
and legitimacy of the UN Security Council cannot be brought to bear. Their deadlock
has also created a strategic vacuum, giving various regional interests free
reign to support proxies. Iran and Iraq on the one hand and, on the other, Turkey,
the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saud Arabia and Qatar have done so with gusto.
In so doing they have ensured the survival of the president, Bashar Assad, and the opposition—albeit fragmenting and
radicalising the latter. These competing regional influences help perpetuate the
conflict.

Yet, the Syrian battlefields of this
zero-sum game are stalemated. The armed opposition—estimated to comprise more than 5,000 groups—seems
strong enough to ensure any further losses it faced would be hard-won. But the power of the regime, controlling Syria’s urban
heartland and most of its coastal areas, gives it an edge and few incentives to
compromise.

Options in short supply

Although there may have been a moment
when a strong international response might have made a difference, good policy
options to bring the fighting to an end anytime soon are in short supply. This
makes continued conflict, radicalism, crime and civilian misery the more likely
prospect. It also invites continuation of the western policy of relative inaction: some humanitarian aid, political
statements of abhorrence and surveillance of citizens who leave for jihad. This,
however, is supremely risky, for three reasons.

To start with, this approach will
ensure that the already calamitous refugee situation will not only worsen but
become institutionalised. About 3m refugees are registered in the region (mostly in Lebanon, Turkey
and Iraq). Many will remain for a decade or more. Syrian refugees may thus
acquire a status and presence similar to the Palestinian victims of the
Arab-Israeli wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973. As Lebanon and Jordan are states
whose government is contested to varying degrees, this will make them
susceptible to “Black September” episodes, with militants seeking
to expand their networks and exploiting refugees in the service of crime, politics
and violence. The fact that an entire generation of Syrian children is growing
up without much education will only exacerbate this.

Another risk of benign neglect is that
unrest, violence and radicalism could easily extend to Lebanon and possibly
Jordan. The structural factors behind the 1975-90 Lebanese civil war largely remain
in place. They provide fertile ground for politicisation and especially further
radicalisation of Lebanese Sunni groups, now that the standing of the Shia
Hizbullah in Lebanese politics is corroded by its participation in Syria on the
side of the regime. In Jordan, economic tensions were already on the
rise, deepening cleavages between Palestinians and citizens on the east bank,
with the influx of Syrian refugees bound to add to them. An Islamic State (IS)
incursion, whether via new cells or further encroachment on the Turaibil border
post, could also create trouble—encouraging direct Israeli, US and/or Saudi
intervention which would be more difficult to resist.

Finally, a civil war which continues
unfettered will further intertwine the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts. The successes
of IS in Iraq have already enabled it to recapture much of the terrain it had lost
in Syria, including parts of Deir ez-Zour city, the two biggest oilfields and a
string of towns along the Euphrates including Albu Kamaal—its linchpin
connection with Iraq. The tenacity with which the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri
al-Maliki, is holding on to power sustains the appeal of IS among the disenfranchised
Sunni and is likely to buoy its proclaimed Caliphate.

Transitional deal

All this suggests that the passive
policy of the west comes at its own peril. Gaza provides a tragic reminder of how
violence can become self-perpetuating, as enemy images entrench and action-response
patterns become embedded and polarised. Avoiding a similar outcome for Syria
requires stronger international action. But western countries especially have
little leverage. Direct military intervention remains both unlikely and
undesirable: it would further galvanise militancy and offend local
sensitivities. And yet much could be initiated today to make a difference in
the medium term. A more active, three-pronged western policy, which combines
sticks and carrots in pursuit of a transitional deal—with a role for both Assad
and moderate Islamic groups—can help bring the Syrian civil war to an end.

First, reinforced
regional containment is required: much greater humanitarian engagement (the UN’s Syria Regional Refugee
Response Plan for 2014 is only one-third funded), much more conflict-sensitive support for the Lebanese and Jordanian
governments (the UN’s Interim Force in Lebanon can be better staffed and its
posture along the Syrian frontier elevated) and enhanced counter-terrorism and
intelligence-sharing, including with President Assad, to reduce the risk of radicalisation
crossing the Mediterranean. Such actions can make trans-border flows of goods,
money and people more difficult, re-establish informal relations with the
regime that can facilitate later negotiations, better mitigate some of the long-term
humanitarian risks and increase the resilience of the Lebanese and Jordanian
states.

Secondly, every
effort must be made discreetly to facilitate a Saudi-Iranian regional deal.
This could proceed in three steps. Much-needed initial confidence should be
built, with a “gentleman´s agreement” on domestic non-interference via religious
or ethnic minorities (such as the Shia in Saudi Arabia’s eastern quarter or
Arab groups in Iran). Subsequently, the two countries should exert influence
respectively on Iraq’s Sunni tribes and its major Shia organisations, to help key
Iraqi power brokers stabilise the country. A co-ordinated diplomatic effort,
backed by financial inducements, has potential to stimulate a more inclusive
approach to Iraq’s governance. If this worked, it would bring a transitional
deal in Syria closer. Key elements of such a deal would be maintaining Syria´s
territorial integrity on a (con)federal basis, with a role for Assad (to satisfy Iran) as well as strong
international guarantees of, and credible possibilities for, longer-term change
(to satisfy Saudi Arabia). As both countries have historically shown pragmatism in their foreign policy,
with patience such a regional deal might be struck, especially now that IS
represents a new and shared threat.

Thirdly,
greater support must be provided to parts of the Syrian opposition. This is not
straightforward. “Moderates” in the secular western sense no longer exist in
Syria and moderate Islamic groups will inevitably have to be engaged. The
fragmentation of the opposition means a first step will have to be a sustained
process to encourage political and operational coherence, requiring greater western
support via mediation, funds and sanctuaries. Lethal military equipment,
training and supplies should only follow such steps, as the risk of warlordism would
otherwise loom large. These actions would slowly increase the military pressure
on Assad, create stronger countervailing forces to IS and make radical spillover
less likely.

Putting such a policy in place will
be hard work, needing patience and perseverance. There will be no short-term
gratification. Yet it can reduce and manage the risks of spillover and
blowback, already of dangerous proportions. And for the mounting price paid in
blood by the Syrian people the international community and its inertia must take
some of the blame.

About the author

Erwin van Veen (@ErwinVeen)
is a senior research fellow in the Conflict Research Unit at Clingendael in The Netherlands.

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