Reflections
on the Opposition in Zimbabwe: The Politics of the Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC). Brian Raftopoulos, Zimbabwe Institute in
collaboration with Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (SA)By
Brian RaftopoulosINTRODUCTION

THE dramatic schism
and implosion in the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Zimbabwe’s
main opposition party, in 2005/2006, has once again raised major questions
about the future of opposition politics not only at national level,
but also on the continent. The MDC represented the hope of millions
of Zimbabweans searching for a way out of the deep political and economic
crisis that characterises contemporary Zimbabwe.

For a short period
the party pointed to the possibilities of creating an alternative, democratic
non-violent, post-colonial politics, while confronting the enormous
legacy and legitimacy of a former liberation movement and its enigmatic
leader.

Founded on the basis
of a strong civic movement, enunciating the need for both political
and economic reforms, the MDC captured the growing disgruntlement of
Zimbabwe’s citizens over eroding economic conditions and the political
arrogance of the ruling party. The energy of a younger generation of
civic activists, no longer paralysed by the fear of confronting the
‘party of liberation’ and the ideological baggage that accompanied
it, brought a vibrant energy into Zimbabwean politics, and expanded
the subjunctive mood of the post-colonial milieu.

The combination
of the politics of constitutional reform and trade union activism provided
a national organisational reach and an expansive discursive opportunity
that radically challenged the increasingly moribund exclusivity of Zanu
PF’ nationalism. The politics of possibility dominated the discussions
of thousands of activists around the country, and the sense of imminent
victory, often of Panglossian dimensions, was everywhere apparent. The
huge weight of a political monolith appeared to be lifting, and opportunities
to pose new questions not only about the present and future, but also
about the legacies of the past, began to appear.

For some analysts
the emergence of this opposition was merely an ‘anti-Mugabe reaction’,
a counter to the glaring shortcomings of the ruling party. In short
it represented no positive alternatives. One response to this accusation
is that of course it was such a reaction; all opposition movements begin
in such ways. However it also generated the release of new energies
and possibilities and the construction of a novel democratic discourse
in the Zimbabwean context.

The ruling party
and its intellectuals have been loath to admit this, because in the
discursive world of Zimbabwe’s liberation politics the politics
of freedom can only emanate from the former liberation movement. This
form of ideological closure has been a central part of the authoritarian
politics that has marked the most recent period of Zimbabwe’s
politics.1 Despite the repressive response of the state to these challenges
such questions continue to be asked.

Notwithstanding
the possibilities and hopes that the emergence of the MDC created, the
opposition has also been marked by very serious shortcomings that have
reflected, both the ways in which dissenting politics often take on
the aspects of the political culture they are seeking to displace, and
the organisational and imaginative limits of the MDC challenge. These
are the issues that this paper will attempt to explore, as well as to
point to some of the challenges that are likely to confront any future
opposition initiative in Zimbabwe. However before tackling these central
concerns the paper will first provide a brief historical context to
the emergence of the MDC.

Historical Trends
in Nationalist and Opposition Politics.

Several studies
of African opposition politics in Zimbabwe during both the colonial
and post-colonial periods stress the importance of a triple legacy in
undermining the growth of a democratic tradition. This legacy includes
the influence of ‘traditional’, subject politics2, the authoritarian
structures of colonial rule and the commandist politics of the liberation
struggle with its attendant view that only liberation parties could
represent the ‘will of the people’ for the foreseeable future.3
Thus while nationalism provided a contingent discursive unity, usually
marked by tensions and cleavages, this mobilisational force also carried
with it a series of unpropitious tendencies undermining future democratic
politics. During the colonial period nationalist politics was often
characterised by violent ruptures both between and within nationalist
parties.

The 1963 split between
Zapu and its splinter organisation Zanu, was marked by a series of violent
clashes and mutual demonisation that continued until the formation of
the Patriotic Front on the eve of the 1979 Lancaster House Conference.
The rivalry between the two parties continued in the aftermath of the
post-1980 settlement, punctuated by the Gukurahundi violence of the
new state in Matabeleland and the Midlands in the mid- 1980’s.
This massive deployment of state violence effectively led to the formal
subsumption of PF Zapu to the ruling Zanu PF in the form of the 1987
Unity Accord, and thus the demise of a formidable opposition party.
Within the nationalist parties themselves, a number of violent power
struggles occurred in both Zanu and Zapu in the 1970’s that consolidated
the leadership of the ‘old guard’4, setting the precedent
for the violent marginalisation of dissenting voices within nationalist
politics.5 Ndlovu- Gatsheni describes the effects of these legacies
on post-colonial politics as follows:

The new Zimbabwean
state under Zanu PF failed miserably to make a break with the tradition
of nationalist authoritarianism and guerrilla violence as well as colonial
settler oppression. The ruling party itself failed to de-militarise
itself as a militarised liberation movement, not only in practice, but
also in attitude and style of management of civil institutions and the
state at large. The new Zanu PF government readily assumed the resilient
colonial and equally military oriented structures left by the retreating
settler state, with serious implications for democracy, human rights
and human security.6

For most of the
1980’s the political milieu was characterised by a combination
of repression, in particular the brutal state response to opposition
in Matabeleland, and a general deference to the authority and liberation
legitimacy of the new state. Most emergent civic bodies and NGOs regarded
their activities as complementing the developmental programmes of Zanu
PF, and the state could draw on a considerable amount of ideological
capital because of its liberation history.7 By 1987 the ruling party
had disposed of two opposition groups, the first, in 1986, by constitutionally
removing the entrenched white seats in parliament agreed to at the Lancaster
House Constitution, and the second through the brutal Gukurahundi campaign
against Zapu in the mid 1980’s and the pursuant 1987 Unity Accord
between the two major nationalist parties which effectively incapacitated
Zapu. Through these measures, the introduction of an executive president
in 1987 with immense power, and ready access to the repressive legacies
of the settler state, the outlook for opposition politics appeared dismal.8

However the combination
of a contracting economy, the erosion of state legitimacy through the
exposure of corruption in the ruling party, and the emergence of critical
social forces such as the labour movement, the student movement, along
with critical intellectual and media responses, led to the emergence
of another opposition party in 1989. Led by former Zanu PF stalwart,
Edgar Tekere, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) fought the ruling party’s
attempts to impose a one-party state in Zimbabwe, and performed favourably
in the 1990 Presidential election. Though the party did not survive
for long in the 1990’s, and was largely confined in terms of its
support base to a small urban and student base, particularly in Tekere’s
home area in Mutare, the ZUM both fractured the seeming unity of Zanu
PF and fought for the necessity of multi party politics. The various
attempts at opposition that followed in the 1990’s, such as the
Zanu Ndonga , the Democratic Party, the Forum Party and the Zimbabwe
Union of Democrats, were largely unsuccessful in constructing national
constituencies and in providing popular alternatives to Zanu PF. Moreover
in the face of determined state repression and an electoral system that
provided little space for them to score electoral victories, these parties,
with limited capacity to develop viable structures, remained little
more than political amusement for the ruling party.9 In sum by the mid
1990’s opposition politics were largely built around individuals,
prone to fractious outbreaks, and unable to develop both a popular message
and a national reach. As Masunungure notes, these parties ‘appeared
to be more aggressive in attacking each other than in directing their
firepower at Zanu PF.’10

By the latter half
of the 1990’s the fortunes of opposition politics took a different
turn. In to an apparent barren field of dissent emerged the most formidable
opposition party of the post-colonial period. In 1999 the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC) was born, the product of a combination of labour
struggles, constitutional politics and a generation of human rights
struggles, and built on the failures of previous attempts at opposition
politics. The new movement also attracted the support of the mainly
white large scale commercial farming sector. Constructed in the era
of debilitating structural adjustment programmes, the MDC drew on and
fed into a growing wave of political and economic disenchantment, and
provided a message of ‘change’ which found resonance through
nationally based structures.

Through the language
of political rights, constitutionalism and economic reform, the MDC
and its social partners confronted Zanu PF with its first mass opposition
party, and the threat of imminent defeat.11 Carried on the wave of the
constitutional movement’s referendum victory in 2000 against a
Zanu PF imposed constitution, and backed by the threat of popular mobilisation,
the MDC gained nearly 50% of the parliamentary vote in 2000 in the face
of enormous electoral obstacles, and state violence. Moreover as Laakso
points out, the organisational base of the MDC ‘was not merely
one of popular discontent with the executive, but an explicit agenda
to democratise the state through a peaceful transition.’12

Since its dynamic
ascension onto the Zimbabwean political stage in the 1990’s the
MDC has had to face the difficult tasks of building accountable party
structures, developing policy positions and peaceful political strategies,
and projecting a regional and international profile, against an authoritarian
state that has consistently closed down the spaces for opposition politics
in the country. Moreover the MDC has had to confront the effects of
the country’s authoritarian political legacies on its attempts
to develop an alternative political culture. It is to the analysis of
these issues that we now turn.

The MDC: Confronting
the challenges of opposition politics in an authoritarian state.

Soon after its launch
in September 1999 the MDC had to confront a number of organisational
and structural party problems. At a strategic meeting in early 2000
the leadership outlined the following challenges:

* The lack of coordination
of policy committees.
* Lack of coordination between the Presidents’s Office and the
Secretariat.
* Lack of accountability and procedures in the disbursement of funds.
* Need for clearer procedures in the appointment and discipline of the
security officials.
* Insufficient consultation between the President and the Vice President.
* Lack of coordination between the party Chairman and other departments.
* The need for more clarity on the functions of the Deputy Secretary
General.13

The meeting also
noted that the ‘President’s office should provide leadership
for the entire party, while facilitating the strengthening of particular
departments.’14 In order to deal with these problems the leadership
agreed to rationalise the functions of each position and improve the
communication within the leadership, as well as between the leadership
and the various levels of the party structures. In addition to these
problems the violent land occupations following the NCA/MDC victory
in the February 2000 constitutional referendum confronted the MDC with
three major strategic problems: The cordoning off of the rural areas
by the ruling party; the elimination of MDC structures and personnel;
and the lack of alternative sources of information in rural areas.15
In the face of these challenges the MDC set itself the following objectives:

* To facilitate
the reduction of levels of political violence and the creation of more
peaceful conditions for electioneering.
* To shift the mode of mobilisation to a low profile campaign.
* To provide information on the election process that would increase
voter confidence and the assurance of voter secrecy.
* To raise the profile of the MDC campaign message on the economy, particularly
land, jobs, indigenisation and investment.
* To re-engage the civic organisations that provided the bedrock for
the formation of the MDC.
* To isolate President Mugabe within his own party, at national level
and in the regional and international spheres.
* To pressure the police to carry out their duties.
* To maintain the international media focus on the primary goal of the
elections, and the monitoring of election violence.
* To minimise the security threat to the leadership of the MDC.16

A number of issues
emerge from these early assessments. Firstly the problems of organisation,
responsibility and accountability in party structures that would later
take on such explosive forms were already apparent. Secondly the party
was aware of the central strategic challenge that confronted it, namely
the commitment to a peaceful, electoral process of change, while understanding
the growing limitations of this approach in the face of the ruling party’s
intransigence. As a strategy update paper noted, while the ‘strongest
weapon’ of the MDC was ‘public adherence to the principles
of democracy and the rule of law’, the party ‘must not lose
sight of the fact that we may be in for a much longer and harder race
than we first envisaged.’17 Thirdly the MDC, as part of its commitment
to peaceful politics, was still optimistic, many would say naïve,
in its belief that it could hope for a certain minimum level of professionalism
from the organs of the state. Fourthly, as the ruling party was in the
initial stages of reorganising its party and state structures in the
face of the MDC threat, the opposition party believed that it was possible
to work on the divisions in Zanu PF and to isolate Mugabe. Attention
was paid particularly to the fractious Masvingo province where there
were long and well publicised differences between the Zanu PF provincial
strong man, Edison Zvobgo, and Mugabe.

In 2001 it was believed
that Zvobgo’s position could be summed up as, ‘We don’t
want Mugabe but we are not MDC.’18 Lastly, in addition to the
difficulties faced in attempting to develop its media capacity, the
MDC was clearly unsure of how to deal with the problem of rural penetration
given the enormous obstacles presented by the land occupations led by
the war veterans and supported politically and logistically by the ruling
party and state machinery. Some of its suggestions included engaging
the support of churches and approaching traditional leaders, but there
was little substance provided for the proposed strategies.19

Looking at the problem
of structures more closely provides some idea of the organisational
problems faced by the MDC in 2000. At an MDC District Workshop in August
2000, a number of problems were registered. It was noted that while
structures were in place at district level they were weak at branch
level. Conflicts were also reported by some of the committees over poor
time-keeping, lack of protocol and the influence of alcohol. A request
was made for a code of conduct to be passed on to the Secretary General
of the party. There was also a ‘strong feeling’ that all
MPs must communicate with their electorate, ‘even if they have
made promises that they cannot fulfil in the short-term.’ The
meeting warned that if the MPs ‘do not become visible any further
campaigning will be difficult.’ The members recommended that in
order to strengthen the party there was need for training in a number
of areas: The procedures for running meetings, minute taking; public
speaking; conflict resolution mechanisms; organisation; budgeting and
allocation of scarce resources; proposal writing; and writing internal
memos.20 These problems became apparent during campaign periods, when
the Party’s lack of coordination, strategy and discipline were
exposed. A report on the Marondera West campaign in late 2000, revealed
a series of operational problems. Youths and security were brought into
the area and ‘hijacked the campaign as a means to giving employment.’
The Provincial Chair ‘was allowed to use the campaign for his
personal campaign.’ In the end the party spent two million dollars
‘dealing with youth and security problems and logistics instead
of winning votes and getting voters to the voting stations.’ The
report on the campaign concluded that:

The bulk of the
youth are bad mannered, undisciplined, uncontrollable and only in it
for the money. They left the premises and vehicles they used in a disgusting
state and when asked to clean up said- ‘I am not the one’.
21

In a recent, useful
study of political parties in Zimbabwe LeBas has analysed the context
in which these organisational problems developed. She notes that given
the changed political environment from 2000-2003 and the increased ruling
party violence that characterised it ‘violence drove party activists
into the cities, and formal party structures subsequently collapsed.’
Furthermore she observes that the ‘most immediate response to
this problem was a turn from visible party structures to more amorphous,
socially embedded networks.’22 Assessing the state of the party
in the aftermath of the 2002 Presidential Election LeBas writes:

In a post-election
report, the MDC’s organising department noted that party structures
had ‘disintegrated’; further there was ‘very little
or no activity’ by provincial structures, due in some cases to
misappropriation of funds. Nor could the national executive remain well-informed
about conditions outside Harare: an audit in late 2002 found that most
provincial leaders were passing along false information about party
structures and membership. Members of the national executive pointed
to these problems to explain the failure of the planned post-election
mass action, saying that it was simply lost in the party structures.23

This problem of
adapting organisational structures to deal with state violence was not
only faced by the MDC but also by key civic movements such as the NCA
many of whose members also belonged to the MDC. Assessing the ‘mass
action’ strategy adopted but the National Constitutional Assembly
(NCA) after 2000, and the violence that was sometimes used by its membership,
McCandless concludes:

In the case of the
NCA the research…indicates that the use of violent strategies
(even if only by some of their members) undermines their message, which
causes disaffection of important NCA constituencies. Moreover, it is
ineffectual given their weak position vis-à-vis the violent capacity
of the state.24

The major organisational
response of the MDC to the repressive political environment was to create
a parallel structure within the party. LeBas describes this as a ‘shadowy
party structure, which would be designed to facilitate top-down organising
and speedy response to orders from national leadership.’25 The
activities of this structure not only resulted in major problems of
accountability and violence within the party structures, but became
a central site of struggle for the control of the party between the
President and the Secretary General. The first major sign of the problems
that were being caused by this parallel structure was the violence that
occurred at the Party headquarters in 2004, specifically the beating
up of party officials. One of the party officials that was affected
by these disturbances, the Director of Security, testified to an internal
Commission of Inquiry that this structure was formed by two of the Party
Presidents’ aides, ‘as part of the mass action,’ and
that over time this structure had ‘become a reliable source of
force or militia for use in party struggles by unscrupulous politicians..’
The official also believed that there was a ‘tribal clique of
people from Masvingo’ who were in control of the parallel structure
and who, during the period of Morgan Tsvangirai’s treason trial,

…..strongly
believed that the President would be convicted, leaving a vacuum which
in their view must never be filled by a Ndebele person contrary to the
MDC party constitutional provisions. Their argument was that even if
the Vice-President were to take over, the fact that he stays in Bulawayo,
the effective job of President would fall into the hands of Prof. Welshman
Ncube. This imagination frightened them because for a long time they
have been working on a programme to eliminate the Secretary General
and those deemed as his surrogates.26

Others who gave
evidence to this commission accused the Secretary General Welshman Ncube,
of wanting to sabotage the project of removing Mugabe, and claimed that
Ncube had a secret agenda to divide the party.’27 The report also
implied that there were conflicts between the ‘professionals’
in the Secretary General’s department and the ‘quasi-professionals’
in the President’s office who believed that the Secretary General
was ‘insubordinate to the President and is working to launch a
new party.’ 28 Among the major findings of the report was the
view that there is a ‘strong anti-Ndebele sentiment that has been
propagated, orchestrated and instilled into the innocent party members’
minds by a senior party leader under the guise of sheer hatred for the
Secretary General at a personal level.’29 One of the recommendations
made by the commission was that:

An investigation
into the plot by high-ranking officials around the President’s
treason trial and the build-up to congress be put in place without delay
with a view to establishing the extent to which ethnic hatred and division
has damaged the party. Throughout this inquiry direct reference was
made to senior leaders being involved in the promotion of tribalism.
It is this commission’s conviction that those leaders mentioned
must be given the opportunity to respond to such disturbing allegations
and appropriate action taken without fear or favour.’30

The findings of
this Commission were not made official within the party as the commissioners
failed to agree on the final report. The factionalism that emerged in
the party was reproduced on the Commission and effectively debilitated
the finalisation of the report. Notwithstanding the draft nature of
the report it did reveal the emergence of very serious cleavages in
the party, around the President, Morgan Tsvangirai and the Secretary
General, Welshman Ncube. Moreover these differences were being fed and
exacerbated by the parallel structures within the party and constructed
in both ethnic and at times ‘anti-intellectual’ terms.

In May 2005 new
outbreaks of party violence took place at the Party Headquarters in
Harare, the Bulawayo Provincial Office and in Gwanda, and another Commission
was set up composed of the Management Committee. The new Commission
noted that the 2004 Commission had ‘failed to reach a consensus
and therefore no punishment had been meted out to the offenders.’
As a result most of the youths who led the disturbances from 12-17 May
2005, had previously, by their own admission, been responsible for the
assault on the Director of Security in 2004. Once again aides in the
President’s office were accused of directing the activities of
the youth, and the objective of the violence was alleged to relate to
the political battles leading up to the forthcoming national party congress.
The allegations of the youth were that the ‘Secretary General,
the Deputy Secretary General, members of staff were working to replace
the President.’31 An important point made in the report was the
danger of party functionaries mobilising unemployed youth to carry out
party violence. It was further admitted that the party ‘has no
capacity to satisfy youth welfare needs’ and that there is a ‘general
lack of education and orientation on party objectives and values.’32
This point needs to be situated within the broader context of the culture
of violence established and perpetuated by Zanu PF. The central findings
of the report were:

* “It is
common cause that the greater majority of our youths in our structures
are activists and unemployed.”
* “They have no source of income, therefore they are destitute.
This makes them vulnerable to political vultures who are cash driven.”
* “Staff, some party leaders and the external forces are using
the youths for various political ambitions and devious goals.”
* “The party goal and values for which the MDC was founded have
been abandoned in pursuit of narrow selfish, self-satisfying ambitions
and greed.”
* “The congress agenda has hijacked the party focus.”
* “The issue of ethnic affinity is also being abused in the party
to form divergent groupings.”
* “The notion that there are some who are more equal than others
and falsely believe they are the only founders of the party, is a divisive
issue.”
* “Competing interests of politicians are a threat to the very
existence of the party.”33

As with the 2004
report there was little action taken on the issues raised, apart from
the expulsion of several youth believed to have been responsible for
the violence. There was no attempt to hold to account the senior party
figures alleged to be the ‘handlers’ of these youth. The
party’s legal spokesperson David Coltart complained about this
failure in the report. In a statement to the National Executive of the
party Coltart noted:

I cannot believe
that the youths involved in these despicable acts acted independently.
It is common cause that they were unemployed and it is equally clear
that they had access to substantial funding. That money must have come
from people with access to resources. The instructions to act must have
come from people within the Party as no-one else would have the detailed
knowledge the youths had access to. In expelling the youths and relatively
low ranking members of the security team we have only dealt with the
symptoms of the problem, not its root cause.34

Coltart also charged
that it was ‘abundantly clear…that the Management Committee
either did not manage to find out who instigated these acts of violence
or it chose not to reveal those responsible’, and that whatever
the case ‘there has been an inadequate investigation into who
was behind the violence.’ Coltart then stated his explanation
for the compromised nature of the report:

It is common cause
that the principle reason behind the violence was an alleged power struggle
within the Management Committee. For that reason alone the Management
Committee should not have conducted the investigation. They were in
fact judges in their own cause.35

Finally Coltart
attempted to reassure Tsavangirai that his Secretary General, Welshman
Ncube, had no ambition to replace him as President.

Within the MDC only
Morgan Tsvangirai has sufficient stature to contest the presidency.
Welshman Ncube knows that; I know that. Those within the party who seriously
suggest that Morgan Tsvangirai’s presidency is under threat are
either being deliberately mischievous or simply do not understand basic
political reality within Zimbabwe.36

Discussions on these
problems continued amongst the leadership at a management committee
retreat in July 2005. Once again the issue of the parallel structure
was raised and the allegation was made that a ‘kitchen cabinet’,
made up of Presidential aides, had formed around the President and undermined
the decisions of the elected leadership:

Members of the Management
Committee explained that they felt decisions that were taken by the
team were changed after the President consulted with members of his
staff, or that staff counteracted their decisions, or took decisions
that were beyond their ‘brief’ or job descriptions.37

It is important
to note that these allegations were made by four of the six members
of the Management Committee, namely the Vice President Gibson Sibanda,
the Secretary General Welshman Ncube, the Deputy Secretary General Gift
Chimanikire and the National Treasurer Fletcher Dulini. Tsvangirai disagreed
saying that these concerns over the ‘kitchen cabinet’ ‘were
unsubstantiated…..due to rumour and miscommunication.’38
The Chair of the party Isaac Matongo, after some equivocation, lined
up behind his President. Thus the division within the leadership appeared
to be, and was constructed as, an ethnic divide with Tsvangirai’s
critics, except for Chimanikire, coming from Matabeleland. At the July
retreat the leadership were also fully aware that the party was losing
political ground, and that ‘deep concerns about the MDC’s
ability to lead itself, let alone compete effectively against the ruling
party exist and are growing monthly.’ The leadership then agreed
on the need to devise a programme of activities that would ‘demonstrate
unity, build relationships amongst members of civil society, and create
PR opportunities which contradict the consistent negative image of a
fractured party.’39 The Management Committee also noted the central
need to focus on the defeat of Zanu PF, because in the absence of this,

…………members
are worrying about consolidating existing positions, and any future
positions that maintain prestige or financial income. Although the situation
internally is precarious, members can still derive status and income
from positions within the MDC. The focus of maintaining these positions
is distracting from commitment to the political struggle.40

While the MDC leadership
had to deal with a growing factional struggle, it also had to continue
to contend with the strategic difficulties of confronting the Mugabe
regime. In the run up to the 2005 general election the leadership resolved
that the election message had to change:

The debate on participation
has revolved around the issues of governance. However, experience had
shown that elections are won by focussing on bread and butter issues
hence jobs and food had been put at the forefront of issues to be addressed
by the Party. The immediate challenge was in essence to send the right
message to the people that the MDC not only focuses on human rights
and intellectual liberties but day to day issues.41

Moreover, given
the limitations of electoral participation as a political strategy in
the repressive political climate, the party needed to ‘strike
a balance between voter expectations and the real situation on the ground’
Messages had to be communicated which did not create a ‘crisis
of expectations’ and people had to be ‘psyched up for a
bruising fight.’42 These statements represented the tension at
the heart of the MDC strategic dilemma: A commitment to participate
in elections, while recognising the limitations of this option, and
preparing its support base for the limits of electoral politics while
preparing for an alternative strategy based on mass action.

However, the problem
has been that as MDC supporters have grown increasingly disillusioned
with electoral politics, the party has been unable to develop a sustainable
strategy for mass action. This problem has also been true of its civic
partners such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the
National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). In April 2005, soon after the
MDC defeat in the general election Morgan Tsvangirai and his Deputy
Secretary General, Gift Chimanikire met with leaders from the NCA, the
ZCTU and the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition to discuss the way forward
after another electoral defeat. The NCA in particular argued at the
meeting that the MDC should not take up its seats in parliament, but
instead concentrate on extra-parliamentary struggles, and stop sending
confused signals to its support base. The MDC leadership pointed out
that there was a strong lobby within the MDC advocating the importance
of ‘occupying the democratic space in Parliament’, notwithstanding
the limitations o the electoral process. While the MDC was still unsure
of how to proceed, it was also clear that the civic groups had no clear
alternative strategy beyond the broad call for mass action.43

In addition to these
strategic and organisational challenges, the MDC has faced the problem
of developing an inclusive, non-tribal and non-racial post-nationalist
ideology, which was not a vulgar neo-liberalism. This has proved an
exceedingly difficult challenge with the hazards of tribalism, as noted
above, already apparent in the factional struggles within the party.
The problem of developing a non-racial party has also proved extremely
challenging. The ‘white face’ of the MDC has been heavily
exploited by Zanu PF in a country and region where the memories of settler
colonial rule are still fresh. This factor has also been an impediment
in the mobilisation and media strategies of the MDC. In a post by-election
campaign report in 2000, one party secretary made the following observation
on the role of white members in MDC campaigns:

They must not involve
themselves physically on the ground as has been the case. They should
occupy the back seats so that Zanu (PF) does not see them. Zanu (PF)
captures seats because it tells the people that the MDC is for the whitemen.
Through ignorance the people believe and they vote Zanu (PF) in.44

While this problem
was certainly not the same in all areas of the country, it is safe to
say that it represented a general challenge for the MDC. White political
participation in the politics of independent Zimbabwe was for most of
this period marked by the racist legacy of settler politics, and the
unofficial pact of the ruling party’s Reconciliation Policy. This
provided for whites to continue playing a key role in the economy, while
having to vacate the political sphere, aside from participation through
their various economic lobbying groups. The emergence of the constitutional
movement and the MDC, and the major challenge these represented to the
ruling party, provided new spaces for the involvement of whites in the
political arena. The land occupations and their direct threat to private
property rights certainly provided a strong impetus for involvement.
However the inclusive language of the opposition, which appeared in
stark contrast to the exclusive racialised discourse of Zanu PF, also
provided an invitation to non-racial politics. The following extract
is an example of how one individual responded:

The advent of the
No Vote was a watershed in the history of Zimbabwe. Zanu PF and its
agents pitched a massive Vote Yes campaign along racial lines with prominent
newspaper advertisements like a photograph of two elderly whites with
the question “Are you going to allow them to continue to tell
you what to do?” The people, the overwhelming majority of them
blacks, rejected this propaganda, and in doing so showed just how politically
mature they have become, but most importantly to me, sent out a clear
signal that racism is not the burning issue that Zanu PF wants it to
be. Being part of the white minority which is constantly used as a punch
bag by the President when things go wrong, and with it the ill feeling,
the No Vote came as an emotional triumph.45

This euphoric embrace
of the politics of the opposition demonstrated both a lack of historical
perspective on the continuing resonance of race in a post settler society
and the sense of victim-hood which had begun to mark the narratives
of white discourse after 2000, in particular. Harris describes this
aspect of white narratives in Zimbabwe as follows:

Mugabe’s revocation
of the discourses of reconciliation has allowed for a white re-imagining
of the past that…..exculpates white Zimbabwean involvement in
racial tensions through dehistoricising that white identity.46

Dealing with the
weight of such racial legacies in the MDC structures has been immensely
difficult. While the MDC has been the party most committed to non-racialism
in Zimbabwean politics, the deepening crisis within the party has resulted
in less inclusive forms of politics. This has been the result both of
the withdrawal of white, particularly white farmer, involvement in the
party following the increased violence of the state, and an attempt
to deal with the labelling of the MDC as a ‘white controlled’
party. There is also an important sense in which Mugabe’s anti-white
message resonates with members of the MDC in the context of the legacies
of racism in Zimbabwe. In a critique of the party structures carried
out in 2005, the MDC leadership itself viewed the party as having ‘moved
away from its social democratic, all inclusive, non-tribalistic foundations.’47
Thus it is clear that one of the responses of the MDC to the authoritarian
nationalism of Zanu PF has been a more guarded approach towards its
public racial profile,48 and a greater sensitivity to the ruling party’s
accusations of foreign domination of opposition politics.

As the organisational
and strategic problems deepened in the MDC, the factional struggles
within the party intensified. For those in the leadership who were connected
to or controlled the parallel structure, the latter became the means
for isolating the members of the leadership opposed to Tsvangirai in
the run up to the proposed national congress in 2006. Most of the energies
of these structures have thus been turned on those perceived as enemies
within the party, rather than to developing a strategy to confront the
Mugabe regime. The last attempt to organise a mass Stay Away on the
9-10th June 2005 by the MDC and its civic partners, constituted as a
Broad Alliance, proved a dismal failure. Commenting on the role of the
MDC in this action, Atwood has written:

The MDC’s
involvement in the action was…half-hearted. In the run up to June
9 and 10, MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai issued a statement urging
the people to “mobilise themselves,” and warning government
that if it continued with Operation Murambatsvina, the people’s
reaction might be unpredictable. When questioned MDC Secretary General
Welshman Ncube distanced the organisation from the activities of the
Broad Alliance. Like the ZCTU, the MDC was at the time mired in its
own internal commission of inquiry regarding cases of indiscipline and
fracturing party unity. It did not take a strong leadership role in
coordinating the call to mass action.49

This failure was
particularly apparent in the light of the government’s Operation
Murambatsvina in May 2005, which constituted a brutal attack on the
livelihoods of a large section of urban workers, the major constituency
of the MDC. Thus for Ncube and his supporters the use of the parallel
structures within the party has been understood as largely a means of
isolating and pushing them out of leadership positions at the next congress.
It is against this background that the fateful debate over participation
in the Senate elections in 2005 took place.

The Senate Debate
and the Split in the MDC.

The issue that brought
matters to a head in the MDC was the decision on whether or not to participate
in the Senate election in late 2005. Mugabe’s major reasons for
re-introducing the senate into the political sphere were, both to accommodate
those in the ruling party who had lost in the parliamentary elections,
and to exacerbate to divisions within the MDC, divisions that had been
actively cultivated by Zanu PF. To many observers the senate debate
first appeared as a fairly innocuous issue which would be resolved within
the MDC’s top six and National Council. However, given the growing
conflict and division within the MDC, the Senate question became the
central battleground of the leadership for the control of the party.
On October 12th 2005, after the top six leadership had failed to find
a consensus on the issue, the MDC National Council voted 33-31 (with
2 spoilt papers) to participate in the Senate elections. Tsvangirai’s
response to the vote was:

Well you have voted,
and you have voted to participate, which as you know is against my own
wish. In the circumstances I can no longer continue……No
I cannot let you participate in this senate election when I believe
that it is against the best interests of the party. I am President of
this party. I am therefore going out of this and (will) announce to
the world that the MDC will not participate in this election. If the
party breaks so be it. I will answer to congress.50

The MDC President
then left the National Council meeting and soon after held a press conference
at which he misinformed the media that the National Council vote was
deadlocked at 50-50, and that he had then used his casting vote to decide
against senatorial participation. Following this meeting the Deputy
President of the party, Gibson Sibanda, wrote to Tsvangirai summoning
him to a hearing of the National Disciplinary Committee on the charge
that because of his actions at and after the National Council meeting
of October 12th, Tsvangirai had wilfully violated clauses 4.4 (a), 6.1.1
(a) and (d) of the MDC constitution as well as clause 9.2 of the Party’s
Disciplinary Code of Conduct. Sibanda’s letter also stated that
Tsvangirai had further violated the above clauses after the meeting
of the 12th by:

* “Writing
to all party provincial chairpersons on the 13th October 2005 instructing
them to ignore a letter written by the Party’s Deputy Secretary
General instructing provinces to commence selectivity of candidates.”
* “Writing to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission on 14th October
2005 falsely advising that the MDC had resolved not to participate in
the senate elections and calling upon the Commission to register as
Independents all MDC candidates that would offer themselves to contest
the election.”
* Addressing numerous rallies and meetings in various places throughout
Zimbabwe urging members and supporters of the party to boycott the senate
elections, contrary to the resolution of the National Council.”
* “Instructing the party secretariat to re-employ Nhamo Musekiwa
and Washington Gaga after they had been dismissed pursuant to a National
Council resolution. In doing so you acted in violation of a standing
resolution of the National Council contrary to clauses 4.4 (a) and 6.1.1
(d) of the party constitution.”51

On the same day
another letter was written to Tsvangirai informing him that the National
Disciplinary Committee had met on the 20th November and resolved to
suspend him from his position as President of the party with immediate
effect pending his appearance before the Disciplinary Committee on misconduct
charges. The letter also instructed Tsvangirai that he was barred from
holding, addressing or attending any meetings, rallies or functions
organised under the name of the MDC, that he should not visit the party
headquarters, regional, provincial or district offices and that he should
surrender all party property except the two vehicles issued for his
use.52

In response to these
events Morgan Tsvangirai stated that the pro-senate group had ‘already
prepared the votes, the ballots and they had bought a lot of people,’
and also accused his opponents of not carrying out legitimate provincial
consultations.53 Moreover in response to the legal arguments of his
opponents, and accusations that he had ‘refused to respect the
founding values of the party’54, Tsvangirai pitched his arguments
at a populist level, arguing that his position on the senate expressed
the will of the people:

Even if I am left
alone, I will not betray the contract I made with the people. The issue
that is there is not about the senate only. It is about whether you
want to confront Mugabe or you want to compromise with Mugabe. Some
of us are now working towards a new unity accord. We are saying ‘no’
to unity accord number two. With us there is no unity accord….we
will not do what Nkomo did.55

In this statement
the MDC leader was not only identifying his views with ‘the people’,
he was also appealing to the sentiments of the people of Matabeleland
by distancing himself from the possibility of another unpopular ‘Unity
Accord’, and portraying the pro-senate faction as betraying the
people of this region. This message was emphasised by the MDC party
chair, Isaac Matongo, who accused the Ncube faction of complicity with
Zanu PF, stating that the latter wanted to ‘see Tsvangirai out
and then put someone who could play to the Zanu PF tune.’56 The
debate over the senate became an ugly public spectacle carried out in
the state-controlled and private press, and characterised by disturbing
levels of character assassination on both sides. Accusations and counter-accusations
of corruption,57 violence,58 tribalism59 and complicity with the ruling
party were thrown about liberally. Moreover in a further ironic twist
the internal battles in the MDC have ended up in the courts of the Mugabe
regime.60

As the leadership
struggle continued Tsvangirai expelled the ‘Senate rebels’
from the party61 and convened another National Council meeting which
passed a resolution to nullify the disciplinary proceedings instituted
against the MDC leader, and ‘dissociating the rest of the party
from Gibson Sibanda and others.’62 The response from the major
civic groups to the party struggles has largely been in support of the
Tsvangirai position. The boycott of elections coincided with the long-term
position of the NCA, while the ZCTU denounced the ‘creation of
the Senate and urges all workers to oppose it with all their might.’63
The ZCTU paper The Worker made its editorial position clear:

Now the onus is
on the opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) to reject
taking part in the senate election. All civic organisations have rejected
the constitutional amendments. The MDC did reject them in Parliament
and if they want to be taken seriously, they should not take part in
elections. Zimbabweans should also stay home during elections to show
their displeasure over the government action.64

Thus for both factions
in the MDC the senate debate took on a wider and more intense significance.
For Tsvangirai and the anti-senate campaigners, the boycott campaign
was important for several reasons. Firstly Tsvangirai’s political
base within the party was increasingly organised through the parallel
structure and the ‘kitchen cabinet’ against those in the
top six of the leadership who were thought to be contesting his leadership.
These structures had been built, outside of the control of the Management
Committee of the party, both to develop alternative mass action responses
to Mugabe’s rule and to avoid having to deal with the Secretary
General’s office. There was thus a reluctance to make them accountable
to an electoral strategy under the top six. Secondly, after another
electoral defeat in the 2005 general election the MDC was under growing
pressure to provide an alternative response to the Mugabe regime, or
face the prospect of political irrelevance. Thirdly Tsvangirai felt
that his views resonated with most of the party’s support base
in believing that there was little point in pursuing electoral politics
under the present conditions in Zimbabwe. It is in this context that
Tsvangirai called for the boycott of the senate elections and stated:

The Zimbabwean struggle
needs a paradigm shift. Parliament cannot be the main arena of our struggle.
Our experience in Parliament since 2000 shows that the struggle resides
outside ZANU PF.65

For the opposing
faction the decision to campaign for participation in the senate election
was based firstly on their unwillingness to surrender political strategy
to what was thought to be Tsvangirai’s ‘thuggish’
parallel structures, working against Welshman Ncube, Gift Chimanikire
and others in this faction. Secondly this group argued both that the
people of Matabeleland would not agree to ceding political ground to
the ruling party without a fight, and that in any case the anti-senate
argument presented no viable alternative strategy to participation in
the elections. Ncube’s reluctance to engage with mass action strategies
was thus based not only on the belief that the parallel structures were
working outside of party accountability through parallel funding, but
also that they were not able to develop organised mass action activities
in any coherent form. In short they were both unaccountable and ineffective
and only ended up exposing the party’s elected structures to state
harassment.66 It was against this background that Ncube declared:

There is no other
way of removing Robert Mugabe except through elections. Anyone who tells
you the other way is cheating you. Even if Zanu PF says there is an
election for a toilet caretaker we will participate.67

By February 2006
it was clear that the division in the MDC had solidified and the split
in the party would be formalised at the two forthcoming congresses of
the different factions. It is also clear from the analysis in this paper
that the senate issue, that provided the pretext for the party divide,
was not in itself the fundamental cause of the problems in the MDC.
It was merely the site on which the different factions fought out long-standing
problems of organisation, structure, accountability and strategy within
the party. At the mediation meeting held in October 2005 to try to resolve
the party crisis there was a consensus amongst the leadership that the
senate issue was a ‘tactical difference’ and ‘a symptom
of a disease.’

In the discussions
that ensued at this meetings the issues raised centred around the problem
of the parallel structure, the ‘mafia kitchen cabinet’,
the growth of youth violence, attacks on the authority of the President,
conflict and competition between the offices of the Presidency and the
Secretary General with the resulting lack of implementation of party
programmes, Tsvangirai’s perception of the ‘destructive’
effects of President Mbeki’s mediation efforts, infiltration by
the regime’s Central Intelligence Organisation, and the perception
that the division over the senate was based on tribal affiliation in
the party. There was of course a different emphasis on which problems
had proved to be most destructive, with Tsvangirai stressing the undermining
effects of the Secretary General’s office and arguing that the
‘consensus leadership’ at the top was not the most effective
way to confront an authoritarian regime. Alternately Ncube and three
other members of the top six concentrated on the destructive effects
of the ‘kitchen cabinet’ and the parallel structure on the
elected structures of the party.

At the end of the
first meeting a compromise position was placed on the negotiation table,
which included the following positions: Firstly the pro-senate faction
would withdraw from the senate election; secondly the Management committee
would deal with the problem of the ‘kitchen cabinet’ and
the parallel structure; thirdly the leadership would draw up a programme
on the way forward. Moreover, henceforth the public recriminations from
both sides were to cease. These issues were due to constitute the agenda
for the next meeting and were to be kept strictly confidential. The
day after this meeting full details of the discussion appeared on the
front page of the Independent newspaper. At the second mediation meeting
which lasted forty five minutes, both sides refused to shift from their
positions, with Tsvangirai unwilling to make a commitment on the problem
of his aides and the pro-senate faction unwilling to go back on the
senate issue.

The lack of trust
within the leadership was all pervasive, and it was clear that both
sides were at this point committed to a split in the party. However
it was also clear that neither faction had developed effective strategies
to confront the Mugabe government and also that both would have to face
the difficult task of once again developing the national constituencies
that the united MDC had once claimed. For the anti-senate group the
challenge would be to win over the Matabeleland region, while for their
opponents the lack of a credible Shona leader would constitute a huge
limitation in their efforts to develop a national profile.68

CONCLUSION

A great deal of
commentary has been dedicated to the break up of the MDC. Within Zimbabwe
the state media has wallowed in a sense of glib satisfaction and an
endless stream of false retrospective ‘wisdom’. The country’s
independent press and the internet news sources have staked their factional
claims in the ongoing controversy. However one of the issues that both
the state and independent media have concurred on is that the MDC crisis
emerged because of a lack of good leadership and ideological unity.69
While the opposition has certainly displayed leadership problems and
faces a huge challenge in constituting an ideological unity, these are
not problems peculiar to the MDC. The history of nationalist politics
was characterised by its own leadership deficiencies and ideological
struggles.

Moreover ideological
unity can only be constructed through long-term struggles and the project,
though at certain historical moments contingently stable, is never complete.
The challenge of the MDC has been to break the disciplinary hold of
the nationalist legacy and to develop a more democratic, inclusive and
plural discourse that is able to confront both national authoritarianism
and international dictat. This is the challenge for any progressive
movement in the contemporary world, and it is one that the MDC made
important progress on at national level. At continental level the opposition
party has had much more difficulty in presenting itself as a progressive
force against Mugabe’s Pan Africanist rhetorical stance. Its limitations
at this level have decreased the terrain on which it has been able to
operate and develop its vision.

More recently the
split in the MDC has bred speculation that the division has emerged
because of ideological differences between the more ‘radical populist’
anti-senate faction and the pro-senate ‘neo-liberals.’ There
is little evidence that this is the case with both factions espousing
broad social democratic positions and both likely to adopt some form
of neo-liberal economic recovery policy. Nevertheless the challenge
of developing ideological consistency in the party and the various ideological
trends apparent in its pronouncements, have caused problems for both
the supporters of the MDC and those commenting on its activities.

Notwithstanding
these limitations the central fact of the MDC crisis is that it has
taken place in an authoritarian national political culture that has
persistently closed down the spaces for democratic growth. The loss
of three national elections under these conditions, and the fact that
the MDC has not been able to successfully challenge these fraudulent
elections has led to increasing frustration in both the leadership and
general membership of the party. The corrosive effects of this persistent
defeat would be enough to challenge the future of most opposition parties.
The fact that Zanu PF has conducted its authoritarian politics under
a populist anti-colonial and anti-imperialist banner has provided little
solace to those forces in Zimbabwe struggling for more open national
political spaces.

The broader national
and international context of the Zimbabwe crisis has been discussed
elsewhere.70 This dimension has clearly played an important role in
shaping the politics of Zanu PF. External forces have also shaped the
form of the debacle in the MDC. Ill conceived international alliances
and reports of dubious funding by, and advice from, right wing organisations
such as the International Republican Institute and Freedom House71 are
likely to have had their effects on the strategies and leadership stances
taken in the party. Moreover the impact of South African interventions
in the MDC has yet to be fully explored.

What is clear thus
far is that the SA presidency has had serious doubts about the capacity
of the MDC to develop a national government and to gain the confidence
of the Zimbabwean armed forces, and these factors have underlay the
push by the SA government for a government of national unity in Zimbabwe.
Moreover President Mbeki’s dealings with the leadership of the
MDC have also contributed to the growing distrust between the two factions
within the party, with Morgan Tsvangirai feeling increasingly distrustful
of the South African leader’s relationship with the Ndebele leaders
in the MDC.

This paper has not
addressed these wider concerns and future discussions will need to penetrate
this important dimension. At present there is much speculation but little
evidence produced in the discussion of this factor, but clearly there
are disturbing questions that need to be answered. This discussion has
concentrated on the internal factors in the MDC crisis and both the
strengths and weaknesses of the paper stem from this emphasis. Nevertheless
it is hoped that the paper has provided a more informed basis for discussion
of the crisis in Zimbabwe’s major opposition party. At present
the future of opposition politics in Zimbabwe appears bleak, with neither
side in the MDC offering a viable strategy to confront the ruling party.
This current malaise in opposition politics is likely to have a broader
dampening effect on the politics of civil society at a time when the
major civic group are themselves struggling to survive state repression
and general public despondency. The challenge for opposition forces
is now to rethink and reconfigure the organisational structures and
strategic interventions that are needed both to confront a repressive
regime and build a sustainable alternative, democratic culture. In this
difficult process the lessons learnt from the fracturing of the MDC
will be invaluable.

POSTSCRIPT:
APRIL 2006

This paper was written
prior to the formal split in the MDC which took place after the two
factions held their respective congresses in February and March 2006.
In the light of the split with Tsvangirai, and given the ethnic dynamic
of Zimbabwean politics, the pro-senate faction was forced to look for
an electable Shona leader to oppose both Tsvangirai and Mugabe. Given
the lack of a suitable candidate within the existing ranks of the pro-senate
faction, the latter looked to a candidate outside of the existing leadership
structure and elected Arthur Mutambara, a university professor and former
leading student leader in the 1980’s. From his election speech
it was clear that Mutambara was keen to appropriate the language of
radical nationalism that had been seen as the preserve of Mugabe and
his party, and attempt link it to the discourse of human rights and
democratic accountability that had dominated the language of opposition
and civic politics since the 1990’s. Mutambara set out his vision
in the following terms:

We stand opposed
to any form of imperialism, violation of state human rights and unlilateralism.
We will not accept assistance at the expense of our dignity, values
and sovereignty. We make a clear distinction between strategic partners
and political allies.

We are anti-imperialist,
driven by nationalist interest and informed by Pan African ideals. I
do not believe in sanctions.72

Mutambara was also
keen to establish the links between the struggles of the MDC and the
legacy of the liberation struggle:

We are also coming
in with the tradition of the liberation war recognising the role played
by people like Chitepo, Tongogara, Nikita Mangena and John Nkomo. No
one owns the history of the liberation struggle. We are coming in the
tradition of ZANLA and ZIPRA fighters.73

For the future it
will be interesting to assess the ways in which Mutambara is able to
manage the discursive and strategic tensions in a political project
that requires the need for both a radical anti-imperialist stance and
a commitment to the civic struggles around democratisation and human
rights. It is however important that this project be attempted given
the distortions in Mugabe’s severing of the two discourses. At
the very least Mutambara’s new political language is an important
new development on the Zimbabwean political landscape.

For Tsvangirai and
his camp the importance of their congress was to show the support of
large numbers of the MDC constituency, and to consolidate the power
of the presidency in the party structures. In his opening speech Tsvangirai
acknowledged the contribution of the pro-senate leadership:

Allow me to note
the work done by my colleagues who have chosen not to be with us today
but who pioneered and contributed to the growth of the MDC and this
democracy project with us for many years. Thanks you for risking life
and limb to try and rebuild Zimbabwe. We have not forgotten that contribution.74

Tsvangirai’s
speech also stressed the importance of ‘peaceful democratic resistance’.
He declared:

The options open
to us are very clear. We need a short sharp programme of action to free
ourselves. The call is made to you once again to intensify the peaceful
democratic resistance to the current tyranny. Your resilience to reclaim
your rights has shaken Mugabe’s corridors of power.75

Notwithstanding
the declarations of both MDC parties, the strategic, organisational
and ideological challenges that have been discussed in this paper remain
in different ways for both sides. The hard work of rebuilding an effective
opposition to confront Mugabe’s authoritarian regime remains to
be done, even as the latter puts in place further legislation on communications
surveillance of its citizenry, and an anti-terrorist law constructed
largely to further criminalise the activities of the opposition.

1 Amanda
Hammar, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen (Eds), Zimbabwe’s Unfinished
Business: Rethinking Land, State and Citizenship in the Context of Crisis,
Weaver Press, Harare, 2003; Brian Raftopoulos and Tyrone Savage (Eds),
Zimbabwe : Injustice and Political Reconciliation, Institute for Justice
and Reconciliation and Weaver Press, Cape Town and Harare, 2004; Terence
Ranger, “ Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the
History of the Nation: the Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe,”
Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol 30, No 2, June 2004, pp215-234.

2 See Mahmood
Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of
Late Colonialism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996.

4 David
Moore, ‘The ideological formation of the Zimbabwean ruing class,’
Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol, No. 3, 1991, pp. 472-495;
David Moore, ‘Democracy, violence and identity in the Zimbabwean
war of national liberation: Reflections from the realms of dissent,’
Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol, 29, No. 3, pp. 375-402;

5 The struggles
within Zanu have been well described by the recent autobiography of
Fay Chung, Re-Living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe’s
Liberation Struggle, Nordic Africa Institute and Weaver Press, Uppsala
and Harare, 2006.

26 Commission
of Inquiry into Disturbances at Party Headquarters (Draft Report), December
2004, pp. 4-5. The Commissioners were Dr. Tichanona Mudzingwa, the Hon.
Miles Mutsekwa and the Hon. Moses Mzila-Ndlovu.

27 Ibid
p. 20.

28 Ibid
pp. 27-28.

29 Ibid
p31.

30 Ibid
pp. 32-33.

31 Report
of the Management Committee of an Inquiry into the Disturbances and
Beatings at Harvest House, Bulawayo Provincial Office and in Gwanda
at the late Masera’s Funeral. 2005, p. 6.

32 Ibid
p12.

33 Ibid,
p16.

34 David
Coltart, “Statement of David Coltart: MDC National Executive Meeting:
15th July 2005.”

45 “Clear
Choice”: Letter from Bill Searle a businessman and member of the
MDC support group in 2000, support@mdc.co.zw Nd. Another example of
this kind of sentiment was a letter from an additional member of the
MDC support group, businessman Topper Whitehead: “I have never
involved myself in politics because like most whites, I did not believe
there was any hope of having an influence on the way I would like to
see things. I have now involved myself as I believe I can help change
things, and let me state clearly I have no intention of standing for
office or to be elected for any post.” support@mdc.co.zw Nd.

48 One
recent vehement assertion of this was made by Job Sikhala, the MDC MP
for St. Marys. In the course a newspaper interview with the government
controlled Herald Sikhala pointed to the problem of race as one of the
consequences of the MDC’s broad alliance of social forces. Referring
to one of the key white figures in the MDC Sikhala complained that in
the MDC alliance ‘we had people like Eddie Cross, who is a white
supremacist, an ardent follower of Rhodesian fundamentalism who believes
that everything begins and ends with Rhodesia.’ “Kitchen
cabinet destroyed MDC: Sikhala.” Herald, 7th January 2006.

59 This
accusation was fuelled by a report that the Deputy President of the
MDC, Gibson Sibanda, was alleged to have advocated for an independent
state for Ndebele speaking people. At a campaign rally Sibanda is alleged
to have said: 'Ndebeles can only exercise sovereignty through creating
their state like Lesotho, which is an independent state in South Africa
and it is not politically wrong to have the state of Matabeleland in
Zimbabwe.’ “Sibanda calls for Ndebele State”, Daily
Mirror 8th November 2005. Pro-senate MDC spokesperson Paul Themba Nyati
denied the report saying that ‘not only is the allegation untrue,
it also appears to be a deliberate attempt by the newspaper to fan ethnic
tensions in the MDC and the country as a whole.’ The Independent
18th November 2005.

60 The
most recent example is that the pro-senate faction has filed a Z$100
billion dollar suit against Tsvangirai for allegedly accusing them of
colluding with Zanu PF to assassinate the MDC leader. Njabulo Ncube,
“The saga continues… Tsvangirai files notice of appeal.”
Financial Gazette 2-8 February 2006.

68 This
writer was the mediator at the two meeting of the top six and the details
of the two paragraphs above are taken from the writers notes on the
meetings of the Management Committee held on the 26th and 31st October
2005.

69 As examples
see, Robert Mukondiwa, “MDC death: The post-mortem”, The
Sunday Mail, 20th November 2005, and Dumisani Muleya “MDC’s
problem is lack of ideology”, The Zimbabwe Independent 4th November
2005. Jonathan Moyo, one time government critic turned state propagandist
and now leader of a new party, the United People’s Movement, has
made the same point: “…infighting within the MDC was bound
to take place ever since the party was formed in 1999 as the ideological
question facing it, arising from not having a shared ideology was not
whether such a fight would happen but when. The proposition that the
root cause of the infighting is because of a lack of a common ideology
shared by the MDC leadership is demonstrated by the fact that the infighting
is very personalised and when it is not, the issues at stake are procedural
and not substantive.” “MDC infighting was bound to take
place.” The Zimbabwe Independent, 4th November 2005.

71 The
Herald reported that Morgan Tsvangirai and eight top officials his faction
were deported from Zambia on the 2nd February 2005 after meeting with
representative of Freedom House and losing Zambian presidential candidate
Anderson Mazoka. “ Zambia deports Tsvangirai”, Herald 3rd
February 2005.