The Latin term for an appeal to a magistrate to put his veto on the decision of an equal or inferior magistrate. Thus a consul could be appealed to against his colleague and all other magistrates except the tribunes, but a tribune both against his colleagues and all magistrates whatsoever. Another thing altogether was the Provocatio (q.v.) under the Republic, an appeal from a magistrate's sentence to the People as supreme judge. During the imperial period the two processes run into one, for the emperor held united in his person both the supreme judicial function and the plenary power of all magistrates, particularly the tribunician veto, so that an appeal to him was at once an appellatio and a provocatio. This appeal, in our sense of the word, was only permitted in important cases; it had to be made within a short time after sentence was passed, and always addressed to the authority next in order, so that it only reached the emperor if no intermediate authority was competent. If the result was that the disputed verdict was neither quashed nor awarded, but confirmed, the appellant had to pay a fine. As the power of life and death rested with the emperor and senate alone, governors of provinces were bound to send up to Rome any citizen appealing on a capital charge.

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The Roman term for the appeal from the verdict of the magistrate to the decision of the people. Under the kings the court of appeal was the comitia curiata; after Servius Tullius, the comitia centuriata. While, under the arbitrary rule of the kings, the right of appeal was allowed, on the establishment of the Republic, in 509 B.C., this was imposed on the consuls as a duty, and was repeatedly enjoined by special enactments in all cases where it was a question of life and death, or of corporal punishment. The appeal was only valid within the city, and the pomerium, but not in the camp. Moreover, no one could appeal against the dictator. When afterwards (454 B.C.), besides the consuls, the tribunes and aediles acquired the right of imposing a fine (multa, q.v.), a maximum limit was fixed for it, and if that was exceeded, there was an appeal to the comitia tributa. As this appeal was expected in all legitimate cases, trials of this kind were held immediately before the comitia concerned with such appeals; and after the verdict had been pronounced by the magistrate presiding, it was either confirmed or reversed by the votes of the people. About 195 B.C. the right of appeal was extended over the whole of Italy and the provinces. After permanent courts for certain offences had been established, the quoestiones perpetuoe (SeeQUAeSTIO), the jurisdiction of the people, and with it the appeal thereto, became more and more limited. For the provocatio under the Empire, SeeAPPELLATIO.

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