The Ayatollahs’ Illusion of
Invincibility

Transcript

Proponents of conciliation
maintain that engaging Tehran is the only practical way to
counter the nuclear and regional threats posed by the
ayatollahs. Why? Because, they say, Iran under the
ayatollahs’ rule is a “rising regional power,” stable at
home and hugely influential in Iraq. So the West must tread
carefully. Never mind that engaging a religious dictatorship
hell-bent on erecting an Islamic fundamentalist empire is
nothing short of capitulation and appeasement of the worst
kind.

But for all the talk about the ayatollahs’ power and
stability, there are times when a single crisis deflates
this myth and puts the inherit incompetence and
vulnerability of the Tehran regime on full display. The
ongoing heating oil crisis during one of Iran’s worst
winters in decades is a case in point.

The region’s “rising power,” which has the second largest
gas reserves in the world, is facing a political and social
crisis at home over shortages of natural gas. Riots have
been reported in several cities.

Unrestrained government corruption, mismanagement and utter
disregard for the well-being of ordinary citizens are the
main reasons. Although the ayatollahs’ coffers are
overflowing with cash from unprecedented oil prices, there
is no infrastructure or development program to supply
sufficient heating fuel. Indeed, Iran imports a significant
portion from Turkmenistan. There are even critics within
Ahmadinejad’s government, who say Iran's production should
have doubled current levels some two years ago.”

This should come as no surprise. We all know the ayatollahs
are spending Iran's money elsewhere: funding a nuclear
weapons program, financing the terror campaign against
Coalition Forces and Iraqis, subsidizing terrorist groups of
all stripes in the region and across the globe, and
sustaining a gigantic intelligence and security apparatus at
home to stifle the rising dissent.

Shortages have worsened in the wake of the dispute between
Iran and Turkmenistan over imports of natural gas; Tehran is
unwilling to pay market prices to Ashgabat. The current
crisis arose when Ahmadinejad’s government cut the fuel
supply to many provinces. Last week, Agence France Presse
reported that nearly 90 Iranians were killed by gas leaks
from faulty or badly installed domestic heaters. Desperate
residents are putting the blame squarely on the regime, and
several Iranian cities, including Qaemshahr and Gorgan in
the north, have been the scenes of anti-government riots.

As usual, the regime’s officials are scrambling to deflect
the public’s anger by blaming “the foreigners.” The
ayatollahs and their Trans-Atlantic fan club reproach
Washington and other capitals for promoting democracy and
the rule of law. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the ayatollahs’
former president who — along with his extended family — is
up to his eyeballs in corruption and plunder of Iran’s
wealth, last Friday said foreign companies were responsible
for the fuel crisis. As for the riots, he said "our enemies”
are exploiting the situation. Meanwhile, political
dissidents are being jailed by the hundreds.

The crisis underscores the ayatollahs’ vulnerability,
particularly at home. For all their populist claims, the
mullahs lack the capacity and will to fulfill the legitimate
social, economic and political demands of Iranians.
Cognizant of this inherent weakness, since coming to power
in 1979, they built their regime on domestic suppression and
crisis-making in the region and beyond. Their survival
depends on it.

While the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) is the
pillar of ayatollahs’ nuclear weapons drive and sponsorship
of terrorism abroad, its main task — as stipulated many
times by its leadership — is to guard the regime from Iran’s
democratic opposition. A true translation of IRGC is “the
Guardians of the Islamic Revolution.” Last September, IRGC
Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari stressed that the "main
responsibility" of the IRGC was to fight against "internal
threats," reported the Christian Science Monitor in
December. Quoting a regime’s analyst, it added that "The
whole security environment is intended to really suffocate
or torpedo any possible change from within.”

Acknowledging the regime’s internal fragility, a
state-controlled daily wrote after last summer’s riots over
gas rationing that “It does not matter what the event is: it
could be a loss by the national soccer team, a sudden
electricity blackout, a cut off of drinking water, or a
sudden and unexpected rationing of fuel ... They all can
spark riots ... Although most of these riots are put down
after the security and military agencies intervene, every
incident adds to the collective memory of the people, who
will use it as capital or a learned experience for the next
uprising.”

In Iran, there is a groundswell of dissent and desire for
change. But despite the regime’s vulnerability, Iran’s
democracy movement is being impeded by the severe
restrictions imposed on the main opposition organization,
designated as terrorist by the State Department nearly a
decade ago. In June 2003, when students led a large
anti-regime uprising, a European diplomat told Reuters,
''The pent-up anger is still there, beneath the surface. But
for it to seriously take off you need a catalyst … you need
organization and leadership.'' This is how the international
community, many Members of U.S. Congress believe, can
provide the biggest boost to democracy in Iran, by removing
the legal and political shackles it has placed on Iran’s
largest and most effective opposition, the People’s
Mojahedin.

Jafarzadeh has revealed Iran's terrorist network in Iraq and
its terror training camps since 2003. He first disclosed the
existence of the Natanz uranium enrichment facility and the
Arak heavy water facility in August 2002.

The Iran Threat: President Ahmadinejad and the Coming Nuclear Crisis by
Alireza Jafarzadeh