In
my presentation I will sketch the outlines of a new theory of physical
objects. On the proposed view there is exactly one physical object: the
world or, as Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč (2008) dubbed it, the
Blobject. The Blobject has no proper parts, yet it is structurally
complex and is in constant flux. According to the version of
blobjectivism I advocate, the Blobject is wholly present not only at
every time at which it exists but also at every region of space it
occupies. That is, the world is a multilocated elementary particle. I
will argue that Multilocational Blobjectivism (MB) is not only a
coherent theory but it also has some serious advantages over its
rivals. Besides being the most parsimonious account of physical objects
to date, it also explains (away) a number of puzzles concerning them,
including their apparent mereological fragility, the threat of worldly
vagueness and the paradoxes of co-location. I will attempt to show that
MB is not at odds with modern physics and squares nicely with more of
our common-sense beliefs than we would have thought at first glance.
Finally, I will consider some theoretical (that is, not common-sense
based) objections to the view and maintain that they are not decisive.
It will be concluded that MB is a viable and parsimonious theory that
is by all means worth taking seriously. It may even be true!

Certain
popular
epistemological
views
about the structure of reasons seem to be
subject to a bootstrapping problem. I examine how this problem
arises and argue that certain commitments built into the nature of
defeasible reasoning afford a solution. The solution comes with a
cost, but I argue that virtually every theory of reasons has to pay
this cost.