Carter Dillard (Loyola University New Orleans) has posted Procreation, Harm, and the Constitution,
105 Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy 5 (2010) on SSRN.Here is the abstract:

This Essay provides relatively
novel answers to two related questions: First, are there moral reasons to limit
the sorts of existences it is permissible to bring people into, such that one
would be morally prohibited from procreating in certain circumstances? Second,
can the state justify a legal prohibition on procreation in those circumstances
using that moral reasoning, so that the law would likely be constitutional?

These questions are not new, but my
answers to them are and add to the existing literature in several ways. First,
I offer a possible resolution to a recent debate among legal scholars regarding
what has been called the nonidentity problem and its relation to the right to
procreate. Second, using that resolution, I provide a novel constitutional
argument that at least begins to justify limiting the right to procreate.

This Essay proceeds in three parts.
Part I introduces the nonidentity problem, explains why it creates seemingly
irresolvable dilemmas for constitutional law, and sketches out two opposing
positions in the legal debate. Part II uses a common exception to the
nonidentity problem to buttress Lukas Meyer’s solution: the notion of threshold
harm. If my argument holds true, one cannot admit there is such a thing as a
life not “worth living” without endorsing the notion that future persons
deserve lives above some minimum threshold of well-being. Finally, Part III
analogizes threshold harm to the state’s compelling interest in protecting the
welfare of living children. It demonstrates that if the state can limit the
fundamental right to parent children when the parenting would cause the
children’s lives to be below a defined threshold of well-being, then the state
can limit the fundamental right to procreate.