Monday, December 6, 2010

I think you hit on two things of which we can pretend we have a cursory understanding. In your eariler section, I think you're calling up Heidegger's da-sein, the being that is concerned with its own being. As much as I'm enjoying "languification," we may not need that yet. I think da-sein is code for the human condition you describe, whereby we ask "what am I?" And of course, "what are you?" In that sense, I think we're not so much in the realm of phenomenology, but in basic existentialism.

We've already played something like that identity game in ethics, when Nietzsche suggests that any promise ("I will shovel the snow tomorrow") hides the unenforceable promise that my identity will not change ("I will be the same person tomorrow"). So really, if we accept this premise, then the teleporter and Spontaneously Occuring Lincoln arguments are an attempt to extend that promise paradigm (identity in some mental space) to question physical identity.

Reading back over our teleporter, Lincoln and society discussion I have had a thought. Mostly to do with socially constructed personal narratives. Your favorite.

We've addressed that identity is just another way in which people classify observed similarities; yet another symptom of the human condition (which just means human intellectualization in order to try and understand the universe. Or languagification (?)). Something like identity doesn't exists as much as something like morality doesn't exists, etc. (Which, by the way, is what I think I highjacked our teleporter conversation and turned it into. Which is probably a pretty academically dishonest thing to do. Sorry, bro.)

In any case, in regards to Spontaneously Occurring Lincoln, (yes, I do think it is a concept that deserves noun-ification) I kept shoving down your throat (fellatiating?) the idea that Lincoln for historical purposes and Lincoln for 'real' were essentially different people. Which is false. At least, from as biologically real a position as we can speak from (this caveat is probably the single thing that I wanted to justify by having most of that entire social identity discussion).

What I think part of our previous discussion elucidates, and the thing which I think is interesting, is just how flawed the term identity or even character really is. It fails to capture the changing nature of life as we understand it. Historical Lincoln being a prime example of the conceptualization of a person simultaneously creating human history and removing all distinguishing features of life.

What I want to address from examining this flaw in terminology is how it affects our personal understanding of ourselves. You may recognize, for example, that I have a tendency to self-depreciate, often choosing terms like narcissism to characterize myself. I would argue that this is a stagnant historical view of a person and not at all an appropriate view for discussing a life. There are periods of my life where I feel particularly self-involved and then I characterize myself as being a narcissist. This is certainly not a constant feeling yet we are trained to understand ourselves as being something rather than that we are beings (did I just now get phenomenology?).

So what does this mean? We as a species create categories to try and make sense and organize our universe. Unfortunately, we do not know everything and thus some categories are lacking. When you and I begin to recognize that the traditional norms from which we understand the world are arbitrary, inconsistent, imposing and limiting our faith in "categories" begins to deteriorate. We face and understand differently the idea that we are "beings" who "be" and not things which are.

Does this make sense? Is this what I was supposed to understand in Daniella's class(es) ("Understand").

Monday, September 27, 2010

But it's not just a post-theistic problem. The concepts of good, evil, justice, and morality aren't just monotheistic fragments. They're part of an overall social mythology. You can explain those terms with a genealogy ("good" really means "good for me," "justice" means "fairness," etc.), which reveals that the problem is really the use of the words, which is as arguments unto themselves, like "murder is evil." Though you can break that sentence into a definition that makes a lot of sense, it is unfortunate that the people saying it wouldn't be able to do that.

What would be better?

I think policy reasoning in legal theory is a good way to sidestep those sketchy terms. Maybe we should replace mens rea with whatever is Latin for "you should have known you were gonna get prosecuted for this."

As for lawmakers making allusions to scripture, some examples:

"Just like David facing Goliath, we must stay the course in the Middle East against all odds."

"Just like Sisyphus' insurmountable task, we must stay the course in the Middle East against all odds."

"Just like the old man reeling in that giant marlin, we must stay the course in the Middle East against all odds."

Why would a politician go with the first one? Besides the fact that it's the most positive analogy, followed by #3 and #2, respectively, the Old Testament is simply better known than Greek mythology or Hemingway. If the intent of the speech is to make an easy analogy, the Bible is a legit way to get it done. But when you're suspicious that it's mostly to inspire Christian rightiousness in the public, you're definitely right.

Monday, September 20, 2010

"The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil." -Justice Clarence Thomas on mens rea requirements in Criminal Law

"Mankind might still be in Eden, but for Adam's biting an apple." Welch v. State, (1970) in regards to causation of death requirements. e.g., The deceased would not be so "but-for" the actions of the defendant.

We live with a legal system built on lingering traditions of a religious past which now, outdated, requires amending by those who claim a secular living. As though we have built a square mold but are trying to create circles from them, we are constantly having to cut away pieces that no longer fit our desired design instead of choosing to rebuild the mold. though, could we have a legal system with which people approved of if it were devoid of 'morality'?

Today while eating lunch at the local cafe I witnessed two probable law students bickering. One over whether he thought intelligence necessitates 'goodness' the other arguing that even 'evil doers' can be intelligent. The 'conversation' inevitably broke down into a primitive assault on the first student's belief in God. I couldn't help but feel defensive for the first student whom, despite religious belief inherently with which I disagree, at least, his belief was consistent. The other student spouting nonsense about other religions and trying to catch the first student in a fallacy by conflicting definitions of commonly misunderstood words was, to me, a sophist practicing his trade and not someone who legitimately seeks understanding.

When we recognize the inevitable irrationality of God as truth do we not give up the right to claim 'morality', 'goodness' and 'evilness'?

The blaze:

What do people like you and me do with the fact that we may find a concept like morality, 'vacant'. We are setting ourselves up to work in a profession that depends to a certain degree on concepts like morality and justice and depends further on a common understanding of the meaning of those concepts. Sure, we can intellectualize and rationalize the terms to make them seem more realistic to ourselves but what did our law-makers intend? As it is so often discussed in court opinions, the law-makers intent is the end all for discussion when it comes to legality. Are words like this chosen precisely because they can be misconstrued and redefined as our society evolves (as we have discussed before). Or do we think the majority of legislators have a fairly nihilistic disposition and they choose words like this to placate to the mindless majority? Or are they (legislators) a part of the religious majority (not the same as the mindless majority)? Is it incredible foresight that grounds our legal system or religious tenacity?

Wednesday, August 25, 2010

Okay, we need to distinguish some thoughts here because I'm pretty sure I don't have a problem with using the teleporter, anymore (did I ever, really?). So first things first,

1. If the teleporter works 100% of the time, all the time, then I have no problem using it.2. We are in agreement that a concept like identity is exactly that, a concept (a way of organizing and augmenting 'information' received via sensory organs) , which human beings have created and utilized to perpetuate their own continued conglomeration of particles.

___________________________________________________

Now, I have a deep desire to address the things you bring up in the last post beyond the scope of whether or not we use teleporter technology and this may be an unfair analysis on my part. In the event that this is true I'm stating this as my caveat: What you have written previously may not have been meant for the scope of what I want to address with it, never the less, I think it provides interesting discussion...

My problem with the whole shebang is if we take this description of the world and try utilize it in other contexts. The way in which we are trying to characterize 'the world', in my mind, excludes the human endeavor of trying to 'make sense' of 'the world'. Restated: Because of the facilities a human possesses there is a very specific way in which we interact with our surroundings which allows us anything we might call 'intellect'. For instance; the fact that we use language to characterize almost everything delimits what we are discussing to the realm of logic and reason (as defined by man, for man), which under the Play-doh* metaphor, has no place in the 'real world' and in fact doesn't exist in it. Whether we like it or not we have to talk in language and to a certain extent about things like 'identity' or 'morality' because these are key concepts and facilities with which humans have to do (even if we are talking about them just to denounce them). Essentially, I'm assuming that by:

You meant that the 'necessity of our cultural biases' is actually unnecessary for you to determine that you would enter the telporter and that your resistance of cultural biases does not continue unto things like: having this discussion, enjoying the company of your family and friends over the company of others, studying law or choosing to partake in any part of society at all. Because any of those things necessitate that you interact within the cultural bias whether you are aware of it or not. Because we are situated within our cultural biases.

Hence why Spontaneously Occurring Lincoln, the question of his identity, memory and all that "paperwork" are relevant to a discussion involving human beings. And why social identity is relevant for human beings to survive, because as much as the 'real world' may be devoid of concepts, 'our world' is not (and by our world I mean a world in which human created endeavors matter, not the world in which everything is Play-doh). Our world is one where if you don't recognize yourself as a U.S. citizen and don't pay taxes then other people change your circumstances. And while this may, from the 'greater perspective', just be the adjusting of particles from one place to another, to you it matters deeply that you are at home and not in a Federal prison.

Lastly, I think a major argument against what I say here is that I'm trying to handicap any discussion about the 'truth' of existence by claiming that we only know 'truth' through our human filter. And I think we would both agree that it is a pretty lame position to claim "well, everything ever is only ever a human endeavor" as though it discounts what we do here (by having discussion), but the primary reason I choose this argument is not to put a stop to our discussion but to augment it. It seems to me that by understanding the necessity of human bias we can address concepts in a more humanly meaningful way. Which I think is a fair position to strive for in a discussion because it brings a certain amount of relevance and pragmatism. I.e. If we want to discuss something like morality it may require that we acknowledge it is a just human phenomenon but also that we don't discredit it solely because it is just a human phenomenon. Surely we still reserve the right to be choosy (Modern legal theory and Utilitarianism vs. scripture for a basis of morality) but none the less it requires a sort of acceptance of the 'human endeavor'.

Now as I have stated it may be deeply unfair of me to even have this discussion at all because I'm changing the context of which we are speaking but to address some pertinent things you brought up last time; and in an attempt to elucidate what it was we were discussing with this line of thought originally here is an excerpt from my last post followed by what I took as your response:

Surviving effectively means being part of social orders. If identity did not also include a historical understanding of oneself then memories would serve no purpose. Personal history is as much a evolutionary trick for survival as feeling hunger or a fear of heights. But it is extended to others as well. You remember who is the king of your village because it behooves you to know who's shoes not to shit on... for survival. I think also it creates the kings identity for himself when he knows that others don't shit on his shoes out of fear.

"Here's why I resist social identity. Social identity is the paperwork. You don't give justification to your claim that surviving effectively requires being a part of social orders. I submit that memories are not essential. I like them, but if I can't form memories about pain (thinking of Memento and the shock test), though I would probably die in a hazardous environment, that doesn't mean I couldn't have a rewarding life of thought[**] if I resided in a safe place."

If memories weren't essential for the survival of the human race why do we have them? We evolved with memories, why wouldn't they be necessary? Also, you and I both know people have lived in tribes for a long time, as Anthropologists can estimate--what makes you think that this isn't a necessary human behavior? I don't need to make justification for the necessity of human social orders as much as you need to justify us not needing them.

And further I propose that social memory is a composite part of social order. Social identity is wrapped up in it too. Essentially human beings seem defined socially by their social relations. I assume that if there were only one human we wouldn't have identity but that is not the case. I don't see where you mean to go with these points...

"Regarding your modifications to my earlier statements, is identity so difficult to reduce? We're already supposing the reducibility of the mind. Isn't anything we acknowledge as true reducible? (i.e. we can reduce that which we call the mind, but we don't bother reducing God because we don't acknowledge it as existent. Instead, we reduce the concept of God to logical (and illogical) conclusions of the workings of the brain.)"

Yes, identity is incredibly difficult to reduce. Because it is so socially ingrained. Something like morality (which I would argue is a composite part of personal and social identity) is not reducible to 1's and 0's. It changes daily because people's opinions on the matter change daily. And some peoples opinions on the matter--matter more. Like judges. A concept like morality is similar to a concept like God****--illogical. Yet it defines our society and is a sort of societal 'truth'*&%*. In that it is deeply important and relevant. I agree this isn't pretty or neat but I submit that it is the world in which we exist and necessarily defines our relationship to anything and everything.

*Play-doh's allegory of the cave would get all hard and flaky if you left it out...

**I call B.S. on your claim that you could live a "rewarding life of thought"If you had no memories. First, I doubt you can even begin to understand what a life like that might be like. Second, the word 'thought' is meant in a human context with memories and for that matter so is rewarding to compare a life without a facility so ingrained in (yes I'm going to say it again) human identity is just nonsense***.

***It may indeed not be nonsense at all... I'd just need convincing. Sorry heat-of-the-moment-emotion showing through in that sentence.

****If someone doesn't give me crap because of this then we know for sure that no one reads this blog.

*&%*I'm getting a lot of ambiguity from my CrimLaw class and its sneaking into my discussion of social identity.

Tuesday, August 24, 2010

Addressing the sidebar: We are doing philosophy, not studying philosophy. I don't remember textual reference in Zarathustra. Let's just write.

"Artificial" definitely should be dropped from the vocabulary. Logic and order don't pertain to "the world," they just describe the life of man. The point is exactly that once science provides an "artificial intelligence," man no longer corners the market on logic and order. This also does relate directly to my Antichrist essay. The man/nature dichotomy implies man's power over nature. When that power is exerted over women (the theology of the Antichrist film), we notice the problem.

Regarding the possibility of arriving in Japan and Singapore simultaneously: Reconsider in these terms- My existence is a phenomenon. In 40 seconds, my existence is a phenomenon. By my existence, I mean that my constituent elements are so arranged. Hell, I don't even really mean my existence. I don't mean existence either.

Since the substance of the Earth came from space in eons past, and we physically come from the same material by the rules of consumption and feeding, and return to that material because of decay, all of existence is one substance (like water. Oh, there's some H over here and some O over there and some dusty minerals in this area... shut up; it's water.) So I imagine all of existence as one substance, like Play-doh flattened on a table. You can pinch some of that doh up into a raised form, and you can name it something special, like "mountain," "Jackson," or "lamp." But that distinction doesn't change the fact that when the mountain erodes, or the lamp rust away, or Jackson dies and decomposes, it's analogous to smashing that lump back into the rest of the Play-doh and starting over. It's not that it's gone; it's that it was never separate.

This gives us a means to dissociate the things we want to say about identity from actual descriptions of the world. If it occurs that the phenomenon designated as "Jackson" is smashed back into the putty at the moment that in the zones designated "Japan" and "Singapore" there appear two phenomena that perfectly resemble the previously designated "Jackson," there is no burden of identifying "me." At least, not in any existential way.

The notion that identity is fluid across teleported bodies applies only in third-person, legal-style situations. If the teleporter creates a clone, does a prior standing warrant for arrest apply to both bodies? Our court system would say yes, though I would argue that it raises questions about the motivation of our justice system, which sees fit to execute people who are, very arguably, not the "same person" they were when they committed the crime.

Suppose you step into the teleporter, and two clones come out. Both will have their own first-person identities. Which one was Dan before stepping into the teleporter? Both. Which one is Dan after the teleporter. Neither.

Moral of the story: don't get cloned. It screws up the paperwork. That's the only reason not to get cloned.

Here's why I resist social identity. Social identity is the paperwork. You don't give justification to your claim that surviving effectively requires being a part of social orders. I submit that memories are not essential. I like them, but if I can't form memories about pain (thinking of Memento and the shock test), though I would probably die in a hazardous environment, that doesn't mean I couldn't have a rewarding life of thought if I resided in a safe place.

I guess I'm saying that talking about Lincoln's identity at all is folly, but if we were forced to decide...

Spontaneous Lincoln goes to court to decide whether or not he may collect the pension given to ex-presidents. I think Spontaneous Lincoln could demonstrate enough presidential characteristics in his testimony to have his right to the pension upheld. Likewise, if Spontaneous Lincoln manifested as having suffered the gunshot wound to the head inflicted by Booth, and was summarily treated in a modern hospital, where he made a full recovery except for the loss of his memory, the courts would likely not uphold the pension, not because he's not Lincoln, but because convincing evidence could not be produced.

Regarding your modifications to my earlier statements, is identity so difficult to reduce? We're already supposing the reducibility of the mind. Isn't anything we acknowledge as true reducible? (i.e. we can reduce that which we call the mind, but we don't bother reducing God because we don't acknowledge it as existent. Instead, we reduce the concept of God to logical (and illogical) conclusions of the workings of the brain.)

Friday, August 6, 2010

Sidebar: Does what we are doing count as philosophy? Since we aren't juxtaposing old timy philosophers and their ideas with our own for the purposes of supporting our ideas? Granted you and I both know we probably would not have the ammunition we do for these conversations if we had not spent the 2 ish years in the major but I think we're loosing street cred (in the world of philosophy) for not having all that 'textual support'. Not that I'm going to provide any in the following account. Just food for thought.

Sidebar2: Forgive me if the first part of this post is a bit repetitive of what we've been discussing for the past few posts but don't fret! towards the middle and end it really picks up steam.

Good points. I'll start with 'artificial'. I like the beaver dam analogy. The ready made synonym for artificial that comes up via google/wiki search is man-made but that is not necessarily helpful because after all isn't birth a type of man-making process. So you're right a more specified definition or a getting rid of the word altogether seems appropriate. Although I think colloquially (as you suggest with the beaver dam analogy) it could be assumed the word artificial seems to refer to things man creates via intellect and skill vs something man creates biologically. It's sort of like Anti-Christ where women represent the chaos of nature (biological functions/beavers? [is that pushing this too far?]) where as man represents logic and order (artificial). Though as teleporter tech becomes readily available to a store near you, we will probably need to get rid of the distinction or outline (as you suggest) detailed specifics. (also as lawyers we're probably going to have to figure out this whole "in stasis resulting from a lack of physical substance" thing for all the contract writing we're gonna be doing)

Now as for our teleporter continuous consciousness argument I'm beginning to feel cornered and this is usually a sign that you're on to something and I'm behaving like a adolescent... but we'll withhold judgment just a little longer.

I think a major opponent to my jumping on board the teleporter bandwagon (as you've hinted at) is that I'm still imagining ourselves having a sort of dualistic relationship between 'mind' and body. Your observations really short circuit any inclination that the consciousness needs to be continuous or rather that using the perfected teleporter would keep the consciousness from being continuous (or phrased differently--Hey! I think I finally get what you are saying and yeah it does seem to make sense). But by admitting this the whole cloning possibility this stuff gets really weird (for me as I know it did for you when it was first posited in this argument [Boy, I can't believe how long its taken me to understand what you were saying]). Supposing you stepped through a faulty teleporter that sent your 'image' to two different exit points (So instead of the traditional cloning scenario where the teleporter doesn't kill you but just creates a duplicate, we now have a situation where your first body does die but instead of one 'other-you' there are two)? What happens when you step out of the teleporter in Japan and in Singapore simultaneously? Where do you end up? If your consciousness is continuous then how do we describe this phenomenon of you arriving in two places at once from one starting place? I'm not sure if this point is clear but it strikes me as unusual. Though I do believe the discussion on identity later on helps clarify what we do with this situation.

I like the blanket statement that we must redefine or leave behind the traditional terms of life and death to understand this concept better. Or rather now that I'm thinking more along the terms of which you have been this whole time... death isn't really a problem at all. If we define death as cell death (that is vital cell death) then this (teleportation) is almost like an augmented (artificial?) form of cell replacement on a large scale (as you have suggested earlier).

Now-- what do we do with the man trapped in limbo? or in stasis? or temporarily dead? Does he still exist? of course the internet exists right...? and its not physical...

Which is why (I think) I'm so interested in socially created identities...

I'm bummed you reject social identity so fully. But then I do love community and you don't so I guess that makes sense...

I think you are wrong to so carelessly suggest that identity is just a mechanism for relating to oneself and I feel ashamed if I gave that impression. Because I think it is as much a social function of defining oneself as it is a personal way to survive effectively. Surviving effectively means being part of social orders (though I think you disagree with this point [sidebar: I've recently heard of this thing the government used to do and still may do that I think you'd be super interested in. Its called homestead homes]). If identity did not also include a historical understanding of oneself then memories would serve no purpose. Personal history is as much a evolutionary trick for survival as feeling hunger or a fear of heights. But it is extended to others as well. You remember who is the king of your village because it behooves you to know who's shoes not to shit on... for survival. I think also it creates the kings identity for himself when he knows that others don't shit on his shoes out of fear.

Perhaps including social in the word identity is asking too much of language and that is fine but I do believe that retaining the social-historical 'memory' of Lincoln is important to his identity, because his identity is relevant to other peoples identities. So, for example, when spontaneously occurring Lincoln appears at Gettysburg and finds lots of tourists and is not a standing group of 1800's people he ceases to be 'real' Lincoln simply because his historical identity is wrapped up in a different time. His own personal identity departs from that of original Lincoln when he finds himself in that situation. For perhaps the remainder of his life he is convinced he is 'real' Lincoln and his life now consists of raving like a lunatic and trying to 'get back to his time' or some such similar B sci-fi movie plot. His identity is shifted and he is shifted.

I agree that pinpointing historical Lincoln's identity would be foolish but similarly you could not identify Lincoln without a historical context in which he existed before.

Now lets clarify some of this nonsense. 1.) identity is a mechanism developed to keep our cells alive. 2.) however, identity is not necessarily a singular phenomenon and in fact is shaped dramatically by our relation to other 'identities'. 3.) Human beings have a habit of maintaning a long historical 'memory' of what past human beings have done and in fact use that memory as a way to help constitute their current identity.

I agree identity has no place if we could talk about people simply as organism unfortunately for science and objectivity (and I think as we will find in Law) it is very difficult to distinguish the organic procedures of the human body and the seeming social behavior. This is why I altered your previous statement as:

"The illusion of mind is theoretically reducible to functions, like complex equations that decide behaviors. Because it is just a complex configuration of neurons firing in certain alternating patterns."

And added:

There is nothing irreducible about man (no soul, no magic, no spirit). Though social concepts like identity may be incredibly difficult to reduce as they are dynamic and not inherently objective (though what is really objective?).

Please tell me if I'm doing that thing I do where I start to blabber nonsense.

So to answer some questions you posed: If we lost all the info about Lincoln, does he exist less? Well, from 'God's' perspective no, but from ours? Absolutely.

"What do you represent? To whom do you represent it? I don't think this branch of your argument gels with the rest. It sounds like you're trying to find an exterior locus of identity in other people, those who know or remember you." Yes.

"Problem of social identity. What do I have to do to encounter the historical Lincoln? If I see his body in the casket, have I "just missed him?" If I witnessed his birth, was he not yet the man he will become?"

I agree with what you are noticing that at different point during his life Lincoln was not the Lincoln we know today. I'm aware this seems fishy. I do not think it is. You seem to be suggesting that my argument for social historical identity is necessarily including the totality of his identity (the total memory of Lincoln as being necessary to understand Lincoln). We don't have that. We don't know Lincoln like his best friend may have and that changes Lincoln for us. This is the product of social historical memory-- we don't know a person like they would have been known if you'd known them personally and after they die you can't know them personally. It is not so bizarre to think that historical Lincoln is different than acutal Lincoln might have been. Isn't baby Jesus' identity radically different from that of Adult Jesus even though theoretically it was the same person?

You may want to argue then, that the historical identity of Lincoln is not Lincoln.

One of our philosophy professors explained once that a dictionary is only really a snapshot of what words are in common usage at a particular period in history. Similarly is our relationship to historical Lincoln only a snapshot of parts of what constituted his identity and probably would not give a person accurate knowledge of the kind of stuff Lincoln actually did on his free time. However, it is the only way in which we relate to Lincoln at all. Essentially what I'm saying is--the real Lincoln, the one who lived and died in the 1800's, he doesn't exist for us, he never did (for us? to us? can something exist for something else? that maybe the worst possible language I could have used there).

The man trapped in cyber limbo--does he exist? He sure does as long as we remember he's in that flash drive.

I believe I've (we've?) stumbled into an argument about whether or not we can have or rather should pretend to have and use a 'God's eye' view of things (completely objectively). Are we trying to circumvent the necessity of our socially constituted biases in our intellectual thought? In order to have intellectual thought?

Intellectual thought? that sounds pretty biased. (Intellectual masturbation? That sounds a little more accurate... though still biased)

"If I see any 5 of the total 17 past members of Scorpions, does society validate the identity of the band?"

The "separation" between consciousnesses needs explanation. What is this separation? Why are they necessarily separate? Every time you wake up, aren't you a new consciousness with old memories?

The concept of the machine we're discussing implies that the body is reconstructed exactly as it was, even with neurons in mid-fire and your lungs filled to the same volume. Walking out, you can finish a sentence or a breath.

Give up the attachment to "life" and "death." The argument redefines them. Let's say someone operates the teleporter for you, but turns it off before you get reassembled, and leaves with your information on his bazillionbyte flash drive. Are you dead? Are you imprisoned? Is this so different from the principles of cryogenic freezing? Maybe doctors or insurance providers would describe you as "in stasis resulting from a lack of physical substance."

(These are the workings of a Ray Bradbury meets John Grisham novel. Henceforth I'll be referring to law school as "research for my book.")

Problem: After rejecting the argument "existence is better than non-existence, thus a perfect being (God) must necessarily exist," we've concluded that a description of something does not qualify as its existence. So how does a description of a man held on a flashdrive constitute his continued existence? To address this new technology, we have to abandon our old assumptions. Phenomenology: in all of your relationships, with family, doctors, passersby, they don't deal with you. They deal with a description of you, an image drawn by their senses. Do you do any better for yourself? Do I still have that mole on my back? Can I say so for certain without having to check? The teleporter accounts for the mole even when I don't.

Your assertion that identity is bonded to historical context: I swear to you, I saw that coming. I started to address it in my last post, and then deleted it.

If Lincoln's identity is historical, what if all record of him is lost forever? Does he exist less? Lincoln represents a part of U.S. history. What do you represent? To whom do you represent it? I don't think this branch of your argument gels with the rest. It sounds like you're trying to find an exterior locus of identity in other people, those who know or remember you. That won't convince spontaneous-Lincoln that he's not who he thinks he is. Identity is just a mechanism, like you described before. Identity is a word for representing yourself to yourself.

Problem of social identity. What do I have to do to encounter the historical Lincoln? If I see his body in the casket, have I "just missed him?" If I witnessed his birth, was he not yet the man he will become? If I see any 5 of the total 17 past members of Scorpions, does society validate the identity of the band?

Things:Artificial needs a new definition in this context because the teleporter builds you a new body. The machine builds an organic body (teleportation). Artificial or not? An organic machine builds an organic body (birth). Artificial or not? Replace all of your organic body with inorganic components, one piece at a time. Is silicon-based Dan an artificial intelligence or not?

I have a lot of respect for Jackson for a whole host of reasons one of which is his ability to concisely and intelligently articulate out complex ideas (even from convoluted or vague sources--i.e. me). My biggest problem with this entire scenario involves answering the question of our continued consciousness (or the illusion of consciousness). Jackson is always concerned that I am trying to make some sort of metaphysical leap of faith (assigning something transcendent or 'magical' to the human being rather than just organic compounds). Rest assured Jack I'm not looking for a new faith based on the continuity of the human spirit. I am, however, concerned that once the continued consciousness in my first body is dissassembled that the re-created consciousness would not be a continuation of my previous thinking self but rather a new consciousness with old memories. Thus there could be a permanent separation between the old self and the new self which would prohibit a continuity over the teletransportation.

I'm afraid I do not know if we can resolve this issue. Either you feel this is addressed enough in your argument about the replacement of bodily cells and I have just not fully grasped the ramifications of your argument, or you have yet to quell my fear of death (the end of my continued consciousness).

In regards to spontaneously occurring Lincoln: While biologically we may be able to call this being similar to Abraham Lincoln I think fundamentally the context in which he occurs changes his identity completely. Abraham Lincoln the 16th president no longer exists and despite his spontaneous clone standing over there, he still does not exist. The clone could not represent the same person because Abraham Lincoln is as much a socio-historical concept as he was a person with a personal sense of identity. Lincoln represents a particular part of U.S. history as well as the Civil War and The Emancipation Proclamation (I have my president flash cards handy!). This new version treads new ground in new history and though he may have shared a similar past history with Lincoln he is not Lincoln fundamentally because he is existing now, here beside me.

So the question is does historical temporal relationships matter when defining ones identity? I would say yes, because identity is a social concept not an attempted objective biological one (though that is full of problems as well).

Things:

1. The illusion of mind is theoretically reducible to functions, like complex equations that decide behaviors. Because it is just a complex configuration of neurons firing in certain alternating patterns. 2. There is nothing irreducible about man (no soul, no magic, no spirit). Though social concepts like identity may be incredibly difficult to reduce as they are dynamic and not inherently objective (though what is really objective?).3. Artificial intelligence is theoretically possible.

Sidebar:

"4. Artificial intelligence must be co-existant with the teleportation technology. 5. The word "artifical" needs a new definition. "--Why?

This argument arose a ways back when I brought up something I remembered from my first issue of "Nintendo Power" magazine, concerning a release called "Lode Runner 64." The game has a teleportation device that breaks down the player's character, destroying him in the process, and rebuilding him of new matter in the same configuration elsewhere. The question posed is, "would you use such a machine?"

I have always consented to hypothetical invitations to use the device. Dan has always declined.

My favored analogy is of the human flash drive. My philosophy thinks of identity as information, which should be transferable between bodies. Consider: when you lose a limb, does it change who you are? Or when you get a pacemaker? How about when your body gradually replaces its cells, until you no longer have anything in common physically with yourself at an earlier age? They say that the body totally replaces itself over a period of seven years. What would happen if it changed itself all at once? This is what the teleporter offers.

Dan always says, "When I step into the teleporter, I close my eyes, never to open them again, while elsewhere, something that is not me opens its own." To this, I ask what makes him think that that new thing couldn't be him. He responds by asking a new question, "what if the teleporter didn't destroy the original, but just made a clone? Which one would be me?" This is sticky territory.

They would both be you, and then neither would be you. While both would be identical momentarily, as soon as they have dissimilar experiences, they diverge. In response to the question of which is the original, what does it matter? Suddenly we have Dan^a and Dan^b. The world has seen twins before. We could handle it.

The fear of death strikes me as a refusal to consider that the machine would actually work. The body replaces itself slowly. What if it replaced half of itself all at once? Is that a death? How about 3/4? Completely?

To Dan, I ask: How do you feel about the scene in Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory when Mike is transported via "Wonkavision" through a television signal? If it didn't shrink you, would you use this technology? It reassembles the original physical elements.

Reacting more to what Dan has put forward about the subject of identity as continuity over time... I wonder, why must it be physical continuity? Physical continuity is an assumption anyway, given the changes that our bodies go through, and the fact that we can't be sure of them while unconscious. I think what matters most is a coherently linear narrative of experience, which constitutes and identity. If it can persist through blackouts and comas, I should think it could withstand a blip between bodies.

New problem: Quantum mechanics allows for the possibility that random particles can spontaneously form into, for instance, Abraham Lincoln. Let's say this configuration of particles is indistinguishable from Lincoln as he was about to give the Gettysburg address. Perhaps he's looking around confusedly, wondering what happened to the battlefield he was standing on moments before. But that doesn't change the fact that Lincoln's body is still encased in concrete in Illinois. So is this newly generated Lincoln really Lincoln, or not? I say he is, as much as any Lincoln could be. He is a Lincoln, just as the buried one is a Lincoln. It'd be easier to discuss if there was only one, but we just have to roll with the circumstances.

Things that my view on the teleporter implies:

1. The mind is reducible to functions, like complex equations that decide behaviors.2. There is nothing irreducible about man (no soul, no magic, no spirit).3. Artificial intelligence is theoretically possible.4. Artificial intelligence must be co-existant with the teleportation technology.5. The word "artifical" needs a new definition.

Wednesday, July 28, 2010

I feel like this is a pretty standard thought when addressing the prospect of infinite outcomes. We can compare this to Borges' "The Library of Babel," where there exists the physical accumulation of everything that could possibly be written. Borges, the thousand monkeys and their respective typewriters, the Internet... these are all speculations about the same principle. This factors into our concept of a nigh-infinite universe, where the possibility of intelligent life is all but certain. Science fiction plays heavily in the territory of alternate universes/realities, or planets with cultures that happen to have developed into something familiar to us.

So the question is, since we accept the possibility of infinite outcomes, does it really matter where those outcomes are "stored?" Borges puts them in an infinite library. You put them on the Internet. I say we already "have" them, simply because of our capacity to create them.

Let's say the perfect paper on Heidegger is out there on the Internet. All you have to do is locate it and print it. Would that be cheating? It wouldn't, because it would take all of your faculties as a student to locate it. Your search terms would have to be incredibly specific. Otherwise, you'd be turning up back issues of "Better Homes and Gardens" with the word "ereignis" crammed somewhere in between "coffee" and "table."

Unless you just happened to pull up the ideal paper on your first search, a possibility akin to emptying a truckbed full of icosahedral dice printed with letters on the highway, you're still gonna have to just write the thing.

So what if the Internet is loaded with random gibberish. It's already in your pen. The thinking work comes from sorting it out.

"Suppose that you enter a cubicle in which, when you press a button, a scanner records the states of all the cells in your brain and body, destroying both while doing so. This information is then transmitted at the speed of light to some other planet, where a replicator produces a perfect organic copy of you. Since the brain of your Replica is exactly like yours, it will seem to remember living your life up to the moment when you pressed the button, its character will be just like yours, and it will be in every other way psychologically continuous with you. Is it you?"

In "What if... Collected Thought Experiments in Philosophy", where I found this interesting little gem, the author suggests that Parfit is attempting to elucidate some questions concerning human identity. What it is that constitutes an individual human being and so forth. The author uses an analogy from Parfit between the human being and a club or regularly meeting group: "'Suppose that a certain club exists for some time, holding regular meetings. The meetings then cease. Some years later, several people form a club with the same name, and the same rules' (23). To ask whether its the same club or another but identical club is, he says, to misunderstand the nature of clubs." (89)

This hypothetical concept has been at the heart of some of the more 'intense' pow wows of which Jackson and I have been a part. I think it is safe to assume that it is interesting on many levels not all of which are specifically oriented around human identity (although I guess human identity is linked to everything we could discuss, isn't it?). A direction in which this conversation usually evolves with Jackson and I is to ask the question: Would you ever use such a machine? Which tends to lead the conversation away from a question about what constitutes human existences to a conversation about how-afraid-am-I-of-death. That is, I tend to find that entertaining the idea of other people using the teleporter as not being problematic at all, yet I could never in my right mind be convinced to enter the machine because I'm certain it would lead to my death (despite the identical replication that would continue to live my 'life').

However, there is something satisfying in the analogy to the club for me, in that, it allows for more emphasis to be placed on the idea of 'time' as it relates to teleportation (and human identity and death). That is to say, what seems to be very important in establishing 'human identity' is the human being's continuity over time. However just as, asking whether or not a club with the same name and rules started 30 years after the other ended is in actuality the same club is not really to understand what clubs are, asking if a person is the same if you can perfectly clone him or her is to miss what it is to be a person (Now I'm in dangerous territory! Can't let this get metaphysical). It would seem that what we call human identity is too often being linked to something physical about our bodies but I think what Parfit is getting at is that this is a misguided approach to understanding identity. Identity, instead represents a socio-evolutionary mechanism to help perpetuate our species. In the prioritizing of our cells over others we will fight to spread our seed so it would of course be useful to think of yourself as an individually important entity. This is why it is so difficult to try and pin hole what it is exactly that constitutes human identity (its not really there!) instead we have developed a method of thinking of ourselves in such a way in order that we may better spread our DNA.

Now where Jackson and I seem to most often disagree is in that I am not comfortable letting this body die so that another identical can take its place but Jackson does not seem to have this same reservation...

In my understanding computer software is written at a fundamental level as "code." Generally I understand this code to be a series of 1's and 0's in differing patterns which in turn constitute the programs. If this preliminary understanding is correct then does that mean that theoretically one could predict everything ever written as a computer program? Say for example you had a machine that generated code sequences and stored them. What are the odds that it would construct programs that people hadn't written "yet," as though the machine would generate code in differing sequences so that occasionally all the code would line up and create something meaningful? By meaningful I simply mean something coherent. If it was storing these sequences then imagine if you could search that database. Say for example I searched for sequences of code similar to those found in a word document with my name on it or even further the code of a paper I wrote. Could the machine have generated a duplicate just by trying every combination of code possible? If so then could I search the database for things I hadn't written? Like for a paper on Nietzsche and Heidegger that I needed to write? Would it be possible that I could search up bits of code enough to get a whole host of papers (most of which might be gibberish), some of which might say exactly something I might say about Nietzsche and Heidegger? If there ware infinite possibilities of code combinations then I don't see why this couldn't be the case.

This is not to say that the code predicts anything; rather it would just have all the possibilities already written so that I wouldn't have to.

Is this what the Internet may become? A database of code combinations? What are the chances that a real problem for future students may be that their authentic papers will already have been written? So that a professor could Google it and think the student plagiarized?