Campus Watch demands academic integrity in North American Middle East studies (MES) programs. It reviews and critiques MES bias with the aim of improving education – keeping watch on scores of professors at hundreds of universities. Our campus networks, research specialists and advocates confront the anti-Western politicization of scholarship, intolerance of alternative views, and apologetics for Islamism. Campus Watch respects free speech for all – but insists upon reciprocity.

Impact: Victor Davis Hanson, The Hoover Institution – “Campus Watch sheds light on often volatile and intemperate proclamations.” New York Times – Campus Watch monitoring is responsible for “damaging open inquiry and expression.” Ruth Wisse, Harvard – “[MES] benefit[s] from the presence of Campus Watch.”

Danielpipes.org is one of the most accessed sources of specialized information on the Middle East and Muslim history, with over 69 million page views. Daniel Pipes is founder and president of the Middle East Forum – he has served in five presidential administrations and authored sixteen books on the Middle East, Islamism and related topics. The site offers an archive of his writings, along with video and audio of his latest media appearances, and translations of his works in 38 languages.

Islamist Watch unveils and combats internal Islamist forces that exploit the freedoms of Western democracy to undermine from within. Lawful Islamists – in the media, courts, schools, public squares, and ballot boxes – seek the spread of Shari’a as governing law, although it is incompatible with Western democracy. Islamist Watch aims to make Islamists in suits and ties no more acceptable than ones wearing suicide vests – by countering corporate and governmental support, tracking tainted campaign contributions, and enhancing the presence and influence of anti-Islamist Muslims.

The Israel Victory Project steers U.S. policy toward backing an Israel victory over the Palestinians to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Decades of what insiders call “peace processing” have left matters worse than when they started. The time has come for a new approach, a complete re-thinking of the problem that draws on Israel’s earlier and successful strategy of deterrence. Stop pressuring Jerusalem to compromise and make “painful concessions.” Instead, support Israeli victory, convincing Palestinians and others that the Jewish state will endure.

Impact: Launched the bipartisan Congressional Israel Victory Caucus (CIVC) and the Knesset Israel Victory Caucus (KIVC), with 32 and 26 members respectively; influenced President Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and order the U.S. embassy moved there (according to The Guardian, Al-Monitor, and NPR).

Jihad Intel provides local law enforcement with tools to detect and prevent Islamist terrorism. At the behest of Islamists and leftists, references to Islam have been removed from law enforcement and national security training materials. Law enforcement needs to know what to look for while searching apartments, cars, computer hard-drives and personal effects of prisoners. Jihad Intel’s gratis database provides them with background, image identifiers and intelligence for over 150 Islamic terror groups, including 87 image identifiers for ISIS.

The Legal Project protects the public discussion of Islam and related topics – if Islamism can not be discussed, it can not be reformed. The project provides a lifeline to the growing number of individuals whose livelihood and freedom are threatened by predatory Islamist lawsuits and malign government policies. It maintains a legal defense fund and a database of pro-bono/reduced-rate attorneys; raises public awareness of the issue; and educates policy-makers on how they can protect this vital speech.

Impact:Djemila Benhabib, author – “From now on freedom of expression will be better off in our democratic society. In helping me, the Middle East Forum's Legal Project has played such an important part in that matter.”

The Washington Project works to translate the Forum’s ideas into U.S. policy. It identifies American interests toward the Middle East, Israel and Islamism, and influences policy-makers through intensive educational efforts in the capital. The project currently focuses on reforming UNRWA by re-defining a “Palestine refugee”; designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization; and finding support for an Israel victory over the Palestinians.

Impact: Held 157 separate meetings in the last year with members of Congress of their staff – impacting UNRWA’s policies, countering Muslim Brotherhood infiltration, and helping to prevent unilateral Palestinian statehood in Obama’s final days.

The Forum sponsors webinars, in-person briefings, and conference calls featuring its staff and fellows, former government officials, scholars, journalists, and others with insights into the Middle East and Islamism. Speakers delve deep into critical issues, surpassing what is found in mass media – and always with an eye toward American interests. Most briefings occur along the New York-Philadelphia-Washington, D.C. corridor.

The Education Fund is a project of the Forum established in 2008 that disburses about $2 million annually in separately earmarked funds to researchers, writers, anti-Islamist Muslims, investigators and activists who work to further the Forum’s mission – promoting American interests in the Middle East and protecting Western values from Middle Eastern threats.

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The Forum supplements its writings with in-depth webinars, briefings and conference calls. Non-partisan specialists take on the Middle East's most controversial and difficult issues with an eye toward American interests – questioning assumptions, provoking thought, and offering new solutions.

The Forum’s activism gets things done – in Congress, on campus, in court, in corporate boardrooms, and beyond. Forum activists have held 157 meetings with members of Congress or their staff, impacting UNRWA’s policies and Muslim Brotherhood infiltration, and promoting Israel victory. It has also won legal victories over Islamists; exposed Islamist-tainted politicians; persuaded corporations to end funding of Islamist groups; and uncovered San Francisco State University’s malign relationship with a Hamas-linked West Bank university.

Middle East Forum activists launch public campaigns to expose, embarrass and pressure Islamist-tainted politicians and corporations, and biased educational institutions, after friendly educational entreaties are refused.

Impact: We were twice attacked by one of the world’s largest charities after we launched a campaign against the Silicon Valley Community Foundation to stop its donations to Islamist groups. Our evidence shows SVCF supporting organizations that “regularly give platforms to speakers who incite hatred against women, Jews, Christians, and the LGBTQ community.”

The Forum Blog brings experts together, virtually, at one convenient blog-like site – a daily must-read for folks seriously interested in the Middle East, and the go-to gathering place when major events occur. A diverse range of specialists participate as members. They review, analyze and debate a wide array of issues, from major regional developments to boutique issues. Entries are short, interesting and controversial, educating policy-makers and the general public.

Full-text of every Quarterly issue since its founding in 1994. A valuable resource for historians and researchers. Read an interview with Charles Krauthammer from 1994; an article by Bernard Lewis from 1998; and commentary by Michael Rubin from 2007.

The Middle East Quarterly, founded in 1994, has become America's most authoritative journal of Middle Eastern affairs. Policymakers, opinion-makers, academics, and journalists turn first to the Quarterly, for in-depth analysis of the rapidly-changing landscape of the world's most volatile region.

The Quarterly, a peer-reviewed publication, welcomes submissions of original articles, and will consider pre-publication of chapters from forthcoming books. Priority is given to timely articles impacting today's critical issues. Detailed guidelines are provided.

Daniel Pipes is founder and publisher of the Quarterly; Efraim Karsh is its editor. They lead the Quarterly’s 17-member Board of Editors, which includes professors, think-tank experts, and former government officials.

Over the past year, Forum experts were quoted 1,226 times by 93 publications, from Agence France Press to The Washington Post. President Daniel Pipes was mentioned in The Economist; and interviewed by media in France, Germany, Italy and Russia; director Gregg Roman and fellow Raymond Stock appeared on Al-Jazeera; fellow Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi was quoted in the New York Times, the Jerusalem Post and the Washington Post, and on CNN; Campus Watch director Winfield Myers was quoted in the Los Angeles Times.

The Forum has been led by Daniel Pipes since its founding in 1994. Its global staff – working 24/7/365 from Philadelphia, as well as Atlanta, Boston, Jerusalem, San Francisco, Tel Aviv, and Washington, D.C. – includes scholars, authors, former government officials, political activists, attorneys, editors, and development professionals.

Iran's Link to Al-Qaeda: The 9-11 Commission's Evidence

While the State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism—2003 report [1] labeled Iran "the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2003," the Bush administration has yet to agree on a national security presidential directive to define U.S. policy

While the State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism—2003 report[1] labeled Iran "the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2003," the Bush administration has yet to agree on a national security presidential directive to define U.S. policy toward the Islamic Republic.[2] Meanwhile, Tehran continues to edge closer to nuclear capability.[3]

The following are excerpts from the 9/11 Commission Report, an unclassified version of which was released to the public on July 22, 2004.[4] The commission interviewed more than 1,000 people in ten countries and conducted an unprecedented review of U.S. intelligence. Among its findings, excerpted below, was evidence of a significant and continuing relationship between al-Qaeda and the Islamic Republic of Iran.—The Editors

Iran and Khobar Towers—1996

On June 26, 1996, a truck bomb ripped through an apartment complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing nineteen U.S. servicemen. In 1997, the Washington Post reported that the Saudi Hezbollah operatives suspected of carrying out the attack were associated with Brigadier Ahmad Sharifi, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander.[5] In passing, the 9-11 Commission reiterated the likelihood that Iranian officials played a major role in attacking U.S. forces:

In June 1996, an enormous truck bomb detonated in the Khobar Towers residential complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that housed U.S. Air Force personnel. Nineteen Americans were killed, and 372 were wounded. The operation was carried out principally, perhaps exclusively, by Saudi Hezbollah, an organization that had received support from the government of Iran. While the evidence of Iranian involvement is strong, there are also signs that al Qaeda played some role, as yet unknown.[6]

Did Iran Train Al-Qaeda?

Between 1991 and 1996, Osama bin Laden lived in Sudan where he was protected by Hassan Abdullah at-Turabi, the leader of Sudan's National Islamic Front, an Islamist movement. According to the 9-11 Commission, Sudanese officials facilitated meetings between al-Qaeda operatives and Iranian officials, a relationship which blossomed into tactical training:

Turabi sought to persuade Shiites and Sunnis to put aside their divisions and join against the common enemy. In late 1991 or 1992, discussions in Sudan between al Qaeda and Iranian operatives led to an informal agreement to cooperate in providing support—even if only training—for actions carried out primarily against Israel and the United States. Not long afterward, senior al Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explosives. In the fall of 1993, another such delegation went to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon for further training in explosives as well as in intelligence and security. Bin Ladin reportedly showed particular interest in learning how to use truck bombs such as the one that had killed 241 U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1983. The relationship between al Qaeda and Iran demonstrated that Sunni-Shia divisions did not necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in terrorist operations.[7]

Did Iran Aid Terrorist Transit?

In 1996, after the Taliban seized power, Osama bin Laden relocated to Afghanistan where he established a number of terrorist training camps. Al-Qaeda training attracted a steady stream of young Islamists, many of whom transited Iran. While Iranian border officials normally stamp passports, they made an exception for many Al-Qaeda terrorists. The 9-11 Commission explained how this facilitated Al-Qaeda operations:

Certain al Qaeda members were charged with organizing passport collection schemes to keep the pipeline of fraudulent documents flowing. To this end, al Qaeda required jihadists to turn in their passports before going to the front lines in Afghanistan. If they were killed, their passports were recycled for use. The operational mission training course taught operatives how to forge documents. Certain passport alteration methods, which included substituting photos and erasing and adding travel cachets, were also taught. Manuals demonstrating the technique for "cleaning" visas were reportedly circulated among operatives. Mohammed Atta [a 9-11 hijacker] and Zakariya Essabar [an Al-Qaeda member whose U.S. visa was rejected, preventing him from participating in the 9-11 hijackings] were reported to have been trained in passport alteration. The purpose of all this training was twofold: to develop an institutional capacity for document forgery and to enable operatives to make necessary adjustments in the field. It was well-known, for example, that if a Saudi traveled to Afghanistan via Pakistan, then on his return to Saudi Arabia his passport, bearing a Pakistani stamp, would be confiscated. So operatives either erased the Pakistani visas from their passports or traveled through Iran, which did not stamp visas directly into passports.[8]

Iranian Support for the 9/11 Terrorists

Iranian support for Al-Qaeda continued to increase, even as Clinton administration officials sought to extend an olive branch to the Islamic Republic.[9] The 9-11 Commission documented at length Iran's continuing assistance to Al-Qaeda and recommended that the U.S. government further investigate Iranian links to Al-Qaeda:

While in Sudan, senior managers in al Qaeda maintained contacts with Iran and the Iranian-supported worldwide terrorist organization Hezbollah, which is based mainly in southern Lebanon and Beirut. Al Qaeda members received advice and training from Hezbollah. Intelligence indicates the persistence of contacts between Iranian security officials and senior al Qaeda figures after bin Ladin's return to Afghanistan. Khallad [bin Attash, a high-level Al-Qaeda operative[10]] has said that Iran made a concerted effort to strengthen relations with al Qaeda after the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole, but was rebuffed because bin Ladin did not want to alienate his supporters in Saudi Arabia. Khallad and other detainees have described the willingness of Iranian officials to facilitate the travel of al Qaeda members through Iran, on their way to and from Afghanistan. For example, Iranian border inspectors would be told not to place telltale stamps in the passports of these travelers. Such arrangements were particularly beneficial to Saudi members of al Qaeda. Our knowledge of the international travels of the al Qaeda operatives selected for the 9/11 operation remains fragmentary. But we now have evidence suggesting that 8 to 10 of the 14 Saudi "muscle" operatives traveled into or out of Iran between October 2000 and February 2001.

In October 2000, a senior operative of Hezbollah visited Saudi Arabia to coordinate activities there. He also planned to assist individuals in Saudi Arabia in traveling to Iran during November. A top Hezbollah commander and Saudi Hezbollah contacts were involved. Also in October 2000, two future muscle hijackers, Mohand al Shehri and Hamza al Ghamdi, flew from Iran to Kuwait. In November, Ahmed al Ghamdi apparently flew to Beirut, traveling—perhaps by coincidence—on the same flight as a senior Hezbollah operative. Also, in November, Salem al Hazmi apparently flew from Saudi Arabia to Beirut.

In mid-November, we believe, three of the future muscle hijackers, Wail al Shehri, Waleed al Shehri, and Ahmed al Nami, all of whom had obtained their U.S. visas in late October, traveled in a group from Saudi Arabia to Beirut and then onward to Iran. An associate of a senior Hezbollah operative was on the same flight that took the future hijackers to Iran. Hezbollah officials in Beirut and Iran were expecting the arrival of a group during the same time period. The travel of this group was important enough to merit the attention of senior figures in Hezbollah.

Later in November, two future muscle hijackers, Satam al Suqami and Majed Moqed, flew into Iran from Bahrain. In February 2001, Khalid al Mihdhar may have taken a flight from Syria to Iran, and then traveled further within Iran to a point near the Afghan border.

KSM [Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the 9-11 attacks who is now in custody[11]] and [Ramzi] Binalshibh [an al Qaeda operative captured in Pakistan a year after the attacks who acknowledged a planning role[12]] have confirmed that several of the 9/11 hijackers (at least eight, according to Binalshibh) transited Iran on their way to or from Afghanistan, taking advantage of the Iranian practice of not stamping Saudi passports. They deny any other reason for the hijackers' travel to Iran. They also deny any relationship between the hijackers and Hezbollah.

In sum, there is strong evidence that Iran facilitated the transit of al Qaeda members into and out of Afghanistan before 9/11, and that some of these were future 9/11 hijackers. There also is circumstantial evidence that senior Hezbollah operatives were closely tracking the travel of some of these future muscle hijackers into Iran in November 2000. However, we cannot rule out the possibility of a remarkable coincidence—that is, that Hezbollah was actually focusing on some other group of individuals traveling from Saudi Arabia during this same time frame, rather than the future hijackers.

We have found no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah was aware of the planning for what later became the 9/11 attack. At the time of their travel through Iran, the al Qaeda operatives themselves were probably not aware of the specific details of their future operation.

After 9/11, Iran and Hezbollah wished to conceal any past evidence of cooperation with Sunni terrorists associated with al Qaeda. A senior Hezbollah official disclaimed any Hezbollah involvement in 9/11. We believe this topic requires further investigation by the U.S. government.[13]