Morris is an idiot. If follow the events in the fall of 1941, it becomes obvious that war is coming to the Pacific. It is simply a matter of when and where.

Pearl Harbor was a surprise because the Japanese had excellent security and kept radio silence. It help to have a US Army commander (Short) who was a day late and a dollar short. It was also a surprise because of the distance from Japan to Hawaii and the logistics miracle they had to pull off to even make the raid possible.

FDR knew war was coming, he knew we were not ready yet. He ran out of time.

The Americans also abandoned the "let the Philippines go" at MacArthur's urging and moved a lot of war material there as a first line of defense, and thought sure the attack would come there - or in Malaya, but NEVER on stripped-down Hawaii.

MacArthur's overall strategy was feasible assuming the Philippines could be resupplied. Even if every American fighter in the Philippines had been protected from the initial attacks, the success of the attack at Pearl doomed the Philippines.

The Imperial Japanese Army aircraft sank USS Panay (PR-5), a US Navy Gunboat operating under treaty rights in China, in 1937 and a Kreigsmarine U-Boat (U-552) had sunk USS Ruben James (DD-245) just over a month prior to Pearl Harbor. If those incidents didn’t cause a war, a dinky yacht in the South China Sea won’t.

If the Japanese had only invaded French possessions, it might not have even lifted an eyebrow.

That's my thinking too. However, Japan also needed oil from Indonesia which meant attacking the Free Dutch which may have drawn in the U.S. and British. Then there was the tin in Malasia which would have brought Japan into direct conflict with Britian.

In December 1941, MacArthur had one re-enforced US Infantry Division and ten divisions of almost untrained Philippine Army troops. His fight them on the beaches strategy was doomed. His troops were not trained enough to get into a mobile fight with the Imperial Japanese Army.

He then followed this up with criminal mismanagement of his logistics by not moving supplies to the Bataan peninsula before the war started. In fact he didn’t start moving supplies to Bataan and Corrigedor until well after the start of the war. Thousands of tons of supplies were destroyed instead of being sent to where they were needed. One tank company in central Luzon could only attack with one platoon instead of the whole company due to a shortage of fuel.

As I’ve said on the World War II plus 70 years threads, he should have been court-martialed for his defense of the Philippines.

In December 1941, MacArthur had one re-enforced US Infantry Division and ten divisions of almost untrained Philippine Army troops. His fight them on the beaches strategy was doomed. His troops were not trained enough to get into a mobile fight with the Imperial Japanese Army.

Until the Kwantung army was defeated by the red Army at Khalkin Gol in August 1939, the Japanese drive for raw materials was west and north. At the same time, the entire U.S army totaled 187,893 men, the Philippines force was a garrison and no one was really expecting a Japanese drive to SE Asia.

It wasn't until the Aug 1941 embargoes of oil and other raw materials that Japan was thrown into crisis, unwilling to disengage from China as a prerequisite for lifting of the embargo, she chose war.

In the meantime, nothing had changed concerning the Philippines status, a small U.S. force was there and MacArthur had assurances of reenforcements and resupply, neither of which materialized although, on Dec 7, a number of units were either enroute or waiting to embark from the U.S. mainland to the Philippines.

MacArthur's overall strategy was feasible assuming the Philippines could be resupplied.

Key sentence. The Orange Plan called for a retreat to the Bataan peninsula and wait for the fleet. The tragedy was neither the govt or MacArthur did anything to beef up Bataan - not even cross-peninsula roads or defensive lines. That, combined with MacArthur's suicidal plan to stop the Japs at Lingayen doomed the troops. Even then, they held out almost until the Coral Sea battle. Another "If only" scenario had MacArthur immediately retreated to Bataan and dug in.

IMO, the definitive story of Bataan is "Bataan - Our Last Ditch" by John W. Whitman. I had no idea how tough a fight the troops put up, completely screwing up the Jap's plans. Sober and heart-breaking reading of the sacrifice of those abandoned troops.

31
posted on 12/10/2011 5:28:56 PM PST
by Oatka
(This is the USA, assimilate or evaporate.)

The Imperial Japanese Army aircraft sank USS Panay (PR-5), a US Navy Gunboat operating under treaty rights in China, in 1937That was four years before things really went into the crapper and I think then neither side wanted to inflame the incident.

and a Kreigsmarine U-Boat (U-552) had sunk USS Ruben James (DD-245) just over a month prior to Pearl Harbor. If those incidents didnt cause a war, a dinky yacht in the South China Sea wont.I think the lack of response was more on Hitler's side as Roosevelt was jabbing him in the eye to start something big enough that even the isolationists couldn't take. Neither the sinking of the Reuben James or the Niblick/Greer attacks seemed to do the trick either.

The yacht was a spy ship, and too little too late in December 1941. From what I have read of the Lanikai, it seems it WAS a sacrificial lamb as their intelligence potential could better be served by the PBY's monitoring the Japs. It seems at odds with Roosevelt's "let 'em make the first move" policy though. In either case, it doesn't make much sense.

32
posted on 12/10/2011 5:42:01 PM PST
by Oatka
(This is the USA, assimilate or evaporate.)

Ok. For the incredibly significant battles at Khalkin Gol, the easiest thing to do is a web search since historians inexplicably ignore this battle.

For the Aug 1941 embargo and demands for disengagement from China as prerequisite for lifting the embargoes, review FR daily postings by Homer J Simpson of NYT clippings.

For details on defense of the Philippines, read:

"They Fought With What They Had: The Story of the Army Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific, 1941-1942", 1951 by Walter D. Edmonds is a treasure trove of data and first hand accounts of the Army Air Corps in the Philippines.

"But Not in Shame" by John Toland has good first hand accounts of fighting in the Philippines including a chapter titled something to the effect of "Tallyho! Bandits over Clark".

"Reminiscences" by Douglas MacArthur also contains important account of not only events of Dec 8, but also an entire history of the U.S. involvement in the Philippines.

As for resupply info, the above three books I cited contain info. "They Fought With What They Had" contains quite a bit of supply/resupply data. Also, in my post 27, I copy-pasted info artillery and infantry units enroute/embarking to the Philippines from http://www.navsource.org/Naval/usarmy.htm

Key sentence. The Orange Plan called for a retreat to the Bataan peninsula and wait for the fleet. The tragedy was neither the govt or MacArthur did anything to beef up Bataan - not even cross-peninsula roads or defensive lines. That, combined with MacArthur's suicidal plan to stop the Japs at Lingayen doomed the troops. Even then, they held out almost until the Coral Sea battle. Another "If only" scenario had MacArthur immediately retreated to Bataan and dug in.

For an army that had so little .50 cal ammo that P-40 pilots had never even fired their machineguns, blaming MacArthur for not provisioning Bataan is a stretch.

IMO, the definitive story of Bataan is "Bataan - Our Last Ditch" by John W. Whitman. I had no idea how tough a fight the troops put up, completely screwing up the Jap's plans. Sober and heart-breaking reading of the sacrifice of those abandoned troops.

Thank's, if I come across it, I'll check it out. In general, the loss of the Philippines is so heavily politicized that relying on accounts other than first hand ones can be little more than an exercise in alternate history.

If you haven't already done so, I suggest reading:

"They Fought With What They Had: The Story of the Army Air Force in the Southwest Pacific, 1941-1942" by Walter D. Edmonds, 1951.

For an army that had so little .50 cal ammo that P-40 pilots had never even fired their machineguns, blaming MacArthur for not provisioning Bataan is a stretch.

Not blaming him for lack of provisioning, but for changing the Orange Plan to fight on the beaches instead of holing up on Bataan. They burned TONS of food before retreating, which would have had them holding out longer.

That being said, I find out that MacArthur told Gen. Marshall what he planned to do and Marshall concurred. He believed MacArthur when he said his Filipino troops were ready to go, when they weren't, by a long shot. Ego intervention here.

Rereading "Last Ditch" now - Jesu, the Filipino troops had WWI Stokes mortars whose ammo had a 70% dud rate, Enfields with broken extractors so they had to use a wood rod to knock out the fired case, etc. etc. It's a wonder they lasted as long as they did.

Thanks for the other titles - will check 'em out.

35
posted on 12/11/2011 9:19:12 AM PST
by Oatka
(This is the USA, assimilate or evaporate.)

Not blaming him for lack of provisioning, but for changing the Orange Plan to fight on the beaches instead of holing up on Bataan. They burned TONS of food before retreating, which would have had them holding out longer.

In France three years later, the understrength Rommel also wanted to meet any invasion on the beach.

Even if American and Filipino forces were able to hold out an additional 6 months, the outcome would have been the same. They could not be resupplied and were doomed.

That being said, I find out that MacArthur told Gen. Marshall what he planned to do and Marshall concurred. He believed MacArthur when he said his Filipino troops were ready to go, when they weren't, by a long shot. Ego intervention here.

MacArthur had an ego but in his defense, his overall strategy and planning was based on assurances from the highest level that his forces would be resupplied.

What also must always be considered when MacArthur is involved is that he is the American military figure most hated by the left and they have done more to slander his record than any other military man. Yes, he was human and as a human made mistakes but as one of the book titles went that I gave, you, he fought with what he had which was very little.

Rereading "Last Ditch" now - Jesu, the Filipino troops had WWI Stokes mortars whose ammo had a 70% dud rate, Enfields with broken extractors so they had to use a wood rod to knock out the fired case, etc. etc. It's a wonder they lasted as long as they did.

The Filipino's were worse off equipment wise than the Americans but much of that has to do with the fact that alarm bells didn't start going off in the Philippines until after the Aug 1941 embargoes and it became apparent that the Philippines lay in the path of the Japanese objectives in SE Asia and Indonesia.

While the poorly trained, badly equipped Americans were better off that their Filipino allies, it wasn't by much.

Much has been written about the number of aircraft destroyed on the ground on Dec 8, 1941 but very rarely is mention ever made that of the generally cited 300 planes in the Philippines, the vast majority of destroyed aircraft were obsolete, worn out and were best left on the ground as decoys.

On Dec 7 in the Philippines, there were 54 operational P-40E's, 18 P-40B's and 18 P-35's. The P-35's listed as operational were effectively useless due to worn out engines, worn out .30 cal machineguns, light armor and no self sealing fuel tanks. One of the P-40 squadrons had just arrived and the engines had not yet been broken in nor guns sighted. Many American pilots would fire their guns for the first time against Japanese aircraft.

None of the fighters, P-40 or P-35 had oxygen for the pilots. Lack of oxygen limited use to about 15,000 feet.

Even the P-40E's would not have lasted more than a few days of continual use because the Japanese bombers could fly much higher than the American fighters and bomb airfields with impunity. The 34 B-17's in commission had gunners that had never even fired a machinegun.

On and on the list of inadequate, obsolete equipment and supplies went. Shortages in every area prevented training and limited subsequent combat. That the Americans and Filipinos held out until May 1942, was a remarkable feat.

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