Jones v. United States

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-5739. Argued March 21, 2000 — Decided May 22, 2000

Petitioner Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail into a home owned and occupied by
his cousin as a dwelling place for everyday family living. The ensuing fire
severely damaged the home. Jones was convicted in the District Court of
violating, inter alia,
18 U.S.C. §
844(i), which makes it a federal crime to “maliciously damag[e] or
destro[y], … by means of fire or an explosive, any building … used in
interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or
foreign commerce.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Jones’s
contention that §844(i), when applied to the arson of a private residence,
exceeds the authority vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause.

Held: Because an owner-occupied residence not used for any
commercial purpose does not qualify as property “used in” commerce or
commerce-affecting activity, arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal
prosecution under §844(i). Pp. 3-10.

(a) In support of its argument that
§844(i) reaches the arson of an owner-occupied private residence, the
Government relies principally on the breadth of the statutory term
“affecting … commerce,” words that, when unqualified, signal
Congress’ intent to invoke its full Commerce Clause authority. But
§844(i) contains the qualifying words “used in” a
commerce-affecting activity. The key word is “used.” Congress did not
define the crime as the explosion of a building whose damage or destruction
might affect interstate commerce, but required that the damaged or destroyed
property itself have been used in commerce or in an activity affecting
commerce. The proper inquiry, therefore, is into the function of the building
itself, and then into whether that function affects interstate commerce. The
Court rejects the Government’s argument that the Indiana residence
involved in this case was constantly “used” in at least three
“activit[ies] affecting commerce”: (1) it was “used”
as collateral to obtain and secure a mortgage from an Oklahoma lender, who, in
turn, “used” it as security for the loan; (2) it was “used”
to obtain from a Wisconsin insurer a casualty insurance policy, which
safeguarded the interests of the homeowner and the mortgagee; and (3) it was
“used” to receive natural gas from sources outside Indiana. Section
844(i)’s use-in-commerce requirement is most sensibly read to mean active
employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a passive, passing, or past
connection to commerce. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States,
516 U.S.
137, 143, 145. It surely is not the common perception that a private,
owner-occupied residence is “used” in the “activity” of
receiving natural gas, a mortgage, or an insurance policy. Cf. id., at
145. The Government does not allege that the residence here served as a home
office or the locus of any commercial undertaking. The home’s only
“active employment,” so far as the record reveals, was for the
everyday living of Jones’s cousin and his family. Russell v.
United States,
471 U.S.
858, 862 -- in which the Court held that particular property was being used
in an “activity affecting commerce” under §844(i) because its
owner was renting it to tenants at the time he attempted to destroy it by fire
-- does not warrant a less “use”-centered reading of §844(i) in
this case. The Court there observed that “[b]y its terms,”
§844(i) applies only to “property that is ‘used’ in an
‘activity’ that affects commerce,” and ruled that “the
rental of real estate” fits that description, ibid. Here, the
homeowner did not use his residence in any trade or business. Were the Court to
adopt the Government’s expansive interpretation, hardly a building in the
land would fall outside §844(i)’s domain, and the statute’s
limiting language, “used in,” would have no office. Judges should
hesitate to treat statutory terms in any setting as surplusage, particularly
when the words describe an element of a crime. E.g., Ratzlaf v.
United States,
510 U.S.
135, 140-141. Pp. 3-8.

(b) The foregoing reading is in harmony with
the guiding principle that where a statute is susceptible of two constructions,
by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the
other of which such questions are avoided, the Court’s duty is to adopt
the latter. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S.
568, 575. In holding that a statute making it a federal crime to possess a
firearm within 1,000 feet of a school exceeded Congress’ power to regulate
commerce, this Court, in United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, stressed that the area was one of
traditional state concern, see, e.g., id., at 561, n. 3, and that
the legislation aimed at activity in which neither the actors nor their conduct
had a commercial character, e.g., id., at 560-562. Given the concerns
brought to the fore in Lopez, it is appropriate to avoid the
constitutional question that would arise were the Court to read §844(i) to
render the traditionally local criminal conduct in which Jones engaged a matter
for federal enforcement. United States v. Bass,
404 U.S.
336, 350. The Court’s comprehension of §844(i) is additionally
reinforced by other interpretive guides. Ambiguity concerning the ambit of
criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity, Rewis v.
United States,
401 U.S.
808, 812, and when choice must be made between two readings of what conduct
Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before choosing the harsher
alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is
clear and definite, United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit
Corp.,
344 U.S.
218, 221-222. Moreover, unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it
will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance in
the prosecution of crimes. Bass,
404 U.S.,
at 349. To read §844(i) as encompassing the arson of an owner-occupied
private home would effect such a change, for arson is a paradigmatic common-law
state crime. Pp. 8-9.