Boyling over: a commentary on the preceding papers [delivered at the 'Psychoanalysing Robert Boyle' meeting

Cantor, G.
(1999)
Boyling over: a commentary on the preceding papers [delivered at the 'Psychoanalysing Robert Boyle' meeting.
British Journal for the History of Science, 32 (3).
pp. 315-324.
ISSN 1474-001X

Abstract

[FIRST PARAGRAPHS]

When Michael Hunter first publicized the idea of `Psychoanalysing Robert Boyle' I
understood that his main aim was to test three competing psychoanalytical theories against
the historical evidence provided by the life and work of Robert Boyle. Although this would
have been a valuable exercise, and one that the British Society for the History of Science
meeting partly engaged, the papers by Brett Kahr, John Clay and Karl Figlio published here
raise some far more compelling issues which I shall explore in the ensuing discussion.
Before turning to this discussion I offer a few introductory remarks.

Like many historians of science who have worked on biographical material, I recognize
that the methods of analysis in which I was trained do not enable me to probe the
`personality ' of the scientist. Thus when writing on Michael Faraday I became aware of
some fundamental aspects of his personality that eluded me; in particular an aspect of his
` self ' that provided a connection between his approach to science and his religious
convictions. After many false starts I found a tentative answer in the writings of the
American psychologist George Kelly, who articulated a theory of development in terms of
the dynamic interaction of polar opposites. This seemed applicable to Faraday, who
appears to have approached both his science and his religion with the need to make firm
distinctions between opposites. Thus he stood for theism, order and (God-given) facts
against atheism, chaos and hypotheses of human construction. Moreover, in line with
Kelly's theory he suffered severe mental anguish on certain occasions when he was unable
to keep separate these opposing constructs." While pursuing that research I became aware
of several practical problems. First, how does the historian choose between the many
different and incompatible theories of mind? In my work on Faraday I made some use of
Kelly's theory because Faraday's view of the world involved the kind of conceptual
oppositions which Kelly discusses in his account of psychological development. Second,
when using any theory of mind, especially any theory of psychoanalysis, the historian or
biographer is confronted by a ready-made ontology; thus Kahr, Clay and Figlio devote
significant proportions of their articles to articulating the theories of Freud, Jung and Klein
respectively. So does the historian have to accept the whole intellectual package or can
these theories be used in a purely instrumental manner? Third, how intrusive should the use of psychoanalysis be? Should the historian present Newton as a case study in (say)
Freudianism or can Freudian ideas be used in a subtle and unintrusive manner to illuminate
Newton's life and work?