Katherine
M. Rucker, Respondent vs. Steven B. Schmidt, Appellant, Rider Bennett, LLP,
Appellant – Case No. A08-1730:Appellant Steven B. Schmidt, then a
lawyer with appellant Rider Bennett, LLP, represented Robert Rucker in marital
dissolution proceedings from respondent Katherine M. Rucker.About two years after the judgment and decree
of dissolution was entered, Katherine Rucker sued Robert Rucker for fraud,
alleging that Robert Rucker had misrepresented the value of his business during
the dissolution proceedings.After a
trial, the district court reopened the property settlement in the marital
dissolution action and granted Katherine Rucker judgment against Robert Rucker
in the full amount she requested.The Ruckers settled the dispute during the pendency of Robert
Rucker’s appeal.

Katherine Rucker then sued appellant Schmidt and the
Rider Bennett law firm for fraud, alleging that they had conspired with Robert
Rucker and the managers of his business to misrepresent the value of the
business.The district court dismissed
Katherine Rucker’s lawsuit under the doctrine of res judicata, concluding that
Robert Rucker and his counsel were in privity.The court of appeals reversed and remanded the matter for trial.The issue before the supreme court is whether
a lawyer and his law firm are in privity with their client where (1) the
unlawful conduct alleged by the opposing party arises from the lawyer’s actions
on behalf of the client and (2) the party against whom res judicata is
asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims against the
client and received a judgment in the full amount of the damages she sought. (Hennepin County)

State
of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Robert Vincent Larson, Appellant – Case No.
A05-118:Appellant Robert Larson was convicted after a
jury trial of first-degree murder.On
appeal from that conviction, Larson presents the following issues:(1) whether the state’s use of Larson’s
refusal to submit voluntarily to DNA testing as evidence of Larson’s guilt
violated Larson’s right to a fair trial; and (2) whether the district court’s
evidentiary rulings deprived Larson of the opportunity to present a reasonable
defense.(Ramsey County)

Tuesday, April 6, 2010, 9:00 a.m.

Supreme Court
Courtroom, State Capitol

State
of Minnesota, Appellant vs. Kasey Vo Cao, Respondent – Case No. A08-1932:Respondent Kasey Vo Cao was charged with
felony criminal sexual conduct.During
closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Minnesota law does not require
that the testimony of a victim of sexual assault be corroborated by other
evidence.Counsel for Cao did not object
to the prosecutor’s statement.Cao was
convicted and appealed his conviction to the court of appeals, arguing in part
that the prosecutor’s statement to the jury was prosecutorial misconduct.The court of appeals reversed the conviction
on grounds that the prosecutor had committed plain error. Under Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2008),
the testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in a prosecution for
criminal sexual conduct.However, in State v. Nelson, the supreme court
stated that “there may be cases in which the absence of corroboration might
mandate a holding by this court that the evidence was legally
insufficient.”326 N.W.2d 917, 918
(1982). The issue before the supreme
court is whether a prosecutor commits misconduct by stating during closing
argument that the law does not require the complainant’s testimony to be
corroborated.(Anoka County)

Pawn
America Minnesota, LLC, Appellant vs. City of St. Louis Park, Minnesota,
Respondent – Case No. A08-1697:In June 2007, appellant Pawn America
Minnesota, LLC, applied to respondent City of St. Louis Park for a license to
operate a pawn shop on Excelsior Boulevard.The city issued a zoning verification letter confirming that Pawn
America’s intended use of the property “complies with the zoning code and other
applicable city ordinances,” and Pawn America entered into a purchase agreement
for the proposed location with a closing date of October 31.After neighbors complained, the St. Louis Park
City Council adopted an interim ordinance placing a moratorium on the issuance
of new pawnbroker licenses while the council studied the adoption of additional
zoning regulations for pawn shops.Under
the city charter, a proposed ordinance must receive two readings at least seven
days apart and be published in the city’s official newspaper at least 15 days
before it becomes effective.The proposed
ordinance was read for the first time on October 1 and for the second time at a
special meeting of the city council held on October 8.The city also sent the interim ordinance to
the weekly official city newspaper, where it was published on October 11. The ordinance went into effect on October 26,
2007.

In February 2008, the city amended its zoning code to
limit the location and operation of pawnshops, the effect of which, the
district court found, is that a pawnshop cannot now be located on Pawn
America’s property on Excelsior Boulevard. Pawn America sued to force the city to issue
it a pawnbroker license. The district
court granted summary judgment to the city, ruling that the interim ordinance
was validly enacted and that the city was not required to issue a license to
Pawn America.The court of appeals
affirmed.Two issues are before the
supreme court on Pawn America’s appeal:(1) whether the court of appeals erred by affirming the validity of the
interim ordinance; and (2) whether the court of appeals erred by concluding
that the city was not required to issue a pawnbroker license to Pawn America. (Hennepin County)

Wednesday, April 7, 2010, 10 a.m.

University of
St. Thomas Law School

State
of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Jose Miguel Chavarria-Cruz,
Appellant – Case No. A08-1036: As part of a murder
investigation, police twice questioned appellant Jose Miguel Chavarria-Cruz.Chavarria-Cruz was eventually indicted for the murder.Before trial, Chavarria-Cruz
moved to suppress the two interrogations on grounds that during the first
interrogation he had requested a lawyer.During the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the
interrogating officer testified that he did not realize that Chavarria-Cruz had invoked his right to counsel during the
first interrogation, because Chavarria-Cruz was so
soft-spoken.The motion to suppress was
denied and, after a jury trial, Chavarria-Cruz was
convicted of second-degree intentional murder.The court of appeals affirmed the conviction.At issue before the supreme court is whether
the district court erred in denying Chavarria-Cruz’s
motion to suppress.(Hennepin County)

Thursday, April 8, 2010

Supreme Court
Courtroom, State Capitol

Riverview
Muir Doran, LLC, Respondent vs. JADT Development Group, LLC, et al.,
Respondents, First Choice Bank, Respondent, Darg, Bolgrean, Menk, Inc., et al.,
Defendants and First Choice Bank, Respondent vs. JADT Development Company, LLC,
et al., Respondent, Riverview Muir Doran, LLC, Respondent, Darg,
Bolgrean, Menk, Inc.,
Defendant, KKE Architects, Inc., Appellant – Case No. A09-312:In 2003, appellant KKE Architects, Inc., was hired to design a
condominium project to be known as “River View Homes.”In 2005, respondents First Choice Bank and Darg, Bolgrean, Menk, Inc., agreed to lend funds for construction of the
project.At the mortgage closing, the
title company issued a check to KKE Architects in return for a receipt and
partial waiver of mechanic’s lien rights. However, the check issued to the architects was
for less than the value of the work that KKE had done prior to closing. Respondents’ mortgages were recorded in March
2005.In November 2006, the architects served
respondent JADT Development Group with a mechanic’s lien statement for nearly
$236,000, which was recorded as a lien against the property.Respondent JADT defaulted on the mortgages
before construction began and failed to pay the architects. Under Minn. Stat. § 514.05, subd. 1
(2008), mechanic’s liens “attach and take effect from the time the first item
of material or labor is furnished upon the premises for the beginning of the
improvement, and shall be preferred to any mortgage or other encumbrance not
then of record, unless the lienholder had actual
notice thereof.” The district court
concluded that the architects’ mechanic’s lien had priority over respondents’
mortgages because before the mortgages were recorded respondents had received
documents that referred to KKE and the architectural services it had furnished
and had actual knowledge of KKE’s prior mechanic’s lien.The court of appeals reversed, concluding
that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the lenders were aware of
any debt still owed to the architects at the time of closing and that KKE could
have indicated on its partial lien waiver that additional amounts were due to
it but did not do so.The issue before
the supreme court is whether, for purposes of determining priority between a
mortgagee and a design professional, the term “actual notice” in Minn. Stat. § 514.05,
subd. 1 (2008), refers to notice of the services provided by a design professional
or to notice of an unpaid bill for such services.(Hennepin County)

Sarah
Erdman, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Appellant vs.
Life Time Fitness, Inc., Respondent – Case No. A08-1993:While employed by respondent Life Time Fitness, Inc., appellant Sarah
Erdman received a base salary and was eligible to receive monthly bonus
payments based on year-to-date performance of the business unit she
managed.If the total bonus for the
year, calculated on the basis of performance of the business unit for the year,
was less than the bonus paid to the employee to date, Life Time reserved the
right to recover bonus overpayments by reducing the employee’s future
paychecks, but not below the amount of the employee’s annual salary.Some of Erdman’s paychecks were reduced in
2005 under this plan.Erdman sued,
claiming that she was entitled to overtime under Minn. Stat. § 177.25, subd. 1
(2008), because she was not paid a “salary” as defined by Minn. R. 5200.0211
(2007) (providing that an employee is paid a salary if the employee “is
guaranteed a predetermined wage for each workweek”).

After certifying the matter as a class action on behalf
of current and former managers of Life Time Fitness who participated in the
bonus plan, the district court certified three questions to the court of
appeals as important and doubtful:(1)
whether the Minnesota Payment of Wages Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 181.01-.171 (2008),
and specifically Minn. Stat. § 181.79 (requiring the employee’s written
authorization for deductions from wages for recovery of “any other claimed
indebtedness running from employee to employer”), applies; (2) if the Payment
of Wages Act applies, whether class members are limited to a remedy under Minn.
Stat. § 181.79 or whether class members also have a remedy under the Minnesota
Fair Labor Standards Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 177.21 - .35 (2008)
(requiring payment of overtime for workweeks longer than 48 hours); and (3) if
recovery is available under the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act, the scope
of that remedy.

Before the court of appeals, Life Time agreed that it
had violated Minn. Stat. § 181.79 by reducing class members’ wages
without authorization but argued that class members were limited to the remedy
available under section 181.79, namely, “twice the amount of the deduction or
credit taken.” The court of appeals
concluded that class members were not “employees” within the meaning of the
Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act and Minn. R. 5200.0211 because they were
guaranteed a predetermined amount for each workweek.Because Erdman’s complaint claimed only that
Life Time had violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and did not claim a
violation of Minn. Stat. § 181.79, the court of appeals did not reach
the second and third questions certified by the district court. The issue before the supreme court is whether
Minn. R. 5200.0211 requires that the amount of each individual
paycheck be guaranteed.

Monday, April 12, 2010, 9:00 a.m.

Courtroom
300, Minnesota Judicial Center

James
Kolby-Ralph
Lund, Respondent vs. Commissioner of Public Safety, Appellant – Case No.
A08-1408:Respondent James Kolby-Ralph
Lund was arrested for driving while impaired, and his driver’s license was
revoked, after he submitted to a breath-alcohol test administered using an Intoxilyzer.Lund
petitioned for judicial review of the revocation of his driver’s license and
sought discovery of the computer source code for the Intoxilyzer.The district court denied Lund’s discovery
motion and, after a hearing, sustained the revocation of Lund’s driver’s
license.The court of appeals reversed
and remanded, concluding that Lund had shown that discovery of the computer
source code for the Intoxilyzer was relevant to
Lund’s ability to challenge the results of his breath-alcohol test, and ordered
the State to pay costs and disbursements.On appeal to the supreme court, the issue is whether the State of
Minnesota is subject to taxation of costs and disbursements in civil cases in
which the State is a party in its sovereign capacity and where no statute
specifically authorizes the taxation of costs and disbursements against it.(Mower County)

State
of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Jamie Leigh Larson, Appellant – Case No. A05-31:Appellant Jamie Leigh Larson was convicted after a jury trial of aiding
and abetting first-degree murder.Three
issues are before the supreme court on Larson’s appeal:(1) whether she was deprived of a fair trial
by the district court’s limits on her counsel’s ability to cross-examine and
impeach the prosecution’s witnesses; (2) whether the district court erred in
its instructions to the jury; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to
convict her.(Ramsey County)

Wednesday,
April 14, 2010

EN
BANC NONORAL:Eden Prairie Mall, LLC,
Relator vs. County of Hennepin, Respondent – Case No. A09-2229:Relator Eden Prairie Mall, LLC, protested the
valuations of the mall and the Von Maur department
store within the mall for property tax purposes for the assessment dates of
January 2, 2005, and January 2, 2006.A
trial was held before a judge of the Minnesota Tax Court.Several weeks after the conclusion of the
trial, relator filed for bankruptcy protection.The tax court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the
taxable fair market value of the mall and the department store, from which
relator appeals. There are a number of
issues before the supreme court:(1)
whether the taxable fair market values for the mall as found by the tax court,
which were greater than the county’s assessed valuations and greater than the
range of values to which either of the parties’ respective experts testified,
lacked evidentiary support in the record; (2) whether the tax court erred as a
matter of law in finding that relator mall submitted sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumptive validity of the county’s assessed values; (3) whether the
tax court’s judgment increasing the mall’s property taxes for the years in
question violated federal bankruptcy laws, specifically, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)
(2000), which imposes an automatic stay on “the commencement or continuation .
. . of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the
debtor”; (4) whether the tax court erred by failing to properly apply generally
accepted appraisal methodology; and (5) whether the capitalization rate used by
the tax court was supported by the evidence.(Tax Court)

EN
BANC NONORAL:Brett Arnold Laine, petitioner, Appellant vs. State of
Minnesota, Respondent – Case No. A09-323:Appellant Brett Laine was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree
murder; his conviction and the denial of his first petition for postconviction
relief were affirmed on appeal.State v. Laine,
715 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 2006).Laine’s first petition for postconviction relief alleged
that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. In 2008, Laine filed
a second petition for postconviction relief, alleging among other things newly
discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel.The district court denied Laine’s
second petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. On appeal to the supreme court, the issue is
whether the district court erred by denying Laine’s
second petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. (St. Louis County)