Friday, November 28, 2014

Window on Eurasia: ‘Russia Can Lose Belarus’

Paul
Goble

Staunton, November 28 – Analysts and
officials in both Moscow and the West have long operated under the assumption
that Russia will always be able to retain Belarus as a reliable satellite. But
recent statements by Alyaksandr Lukashenka and actions by Belarusian
nationalists are raising questions about that assumption.

In an article yesterday on the “Svobodnaya
pressa” portal entitled “Russian can lose Belarus,” commentator Andrey
Poluninsays that the anti-Russian
attitudes which dominate Ukraine are spreading to Belarus and that the loss of
Belarus could be entail far greater costs to Moscow than many assume (svpressa.ru/politic/article/105392/).

Polunin points out that in recent
months, Belarusian nationalists have become more active than the “systemic”
opposition, Lukashenka himself has spoken in defense of Ukraine against Moscow,
and the Belarusian media has been filled with articles criticizing Russia and
raising questions about Mensk’s current tight relationship with Moscow.

“All this,” the commentator says, “recalls
the Ukrainian scenario,” and thus deserves close attention. Specifically, he
says, it is time to ask “how probable is it that a Maidan will occur in Mensk
and that Belarus like Ukraine will choose a pro-Western course with a complete
break in relations with Russia?”

Bogdan Bezpalko, the deputy head of the
Center for Ukrainian and Belarusian Studies at Moscow State University, told
Polunin that a Maidan in Mensk was becoming “ever more probable,” not because
of the actions of the nationalists but because of the position of Lukashenka
and his regime.

Most Belarusians are not inclined to
rock the boat, he said, but “Belarusian elites themselves have taken up the
theme of nationalism in order to protect themselves … and they have begun an
era of ‘soft Belarusianization’ of the country.” That is “even more dangerous”
than the Ukrainization Kyiv carried out earlier because the Ukrainian version
was so crude.

Mensk is acting in a much more
sophisticated and careful way, gradually increasing Belarusianization in much
the same way and with the same results as the story about the difference
between a frog thrown in boiling water and one put in water that gradually is
heated makes clear.

Nonetheless, Bezpalko says, the
situation can change very quickly.“One
must keep in mind that Ukrainization cannot be reduced to the question of
language alone.This is a change of
identity which is much more dangerous.” Many who are now Ukrainian nationalists
speak Russian, and their language doesn’t prevent them from being so.

That shift in identity without an
immediate shift in language is precisely what one should be worried about in
the case of Belarus, the Moscow scholar says.

He adds that the Belarusian case
presents yet another threat: Because Belarusians do not have a national tradition
of dissent of the kind that Ukrainians do, young Belarusians may soon decide
that Belarusian nationalism is “a fake.”But that in fact is not something that makes the situation better for
Russia but rather worse.

If young Belarusians turn from
nationalism, they are likely to become “supporters of globalization, European
integration and will view European values as an alternative to the Russian
cultural-civilizational ones, including gay parades,” Bezpalko says.

He added that in his view, Russia’s
loss of Ukraine was not so disturbing as many think and that the potential loss
of Belarus could be much more serious than many now imagine.In the case of Ukraine, Moscow can stop
providing the kind of assistance it has been providing over the last 20 years
and walk away.

But the situation with regard to
Belarus is “somewhat different.” Belarus is “the single true ally of Russia in
the near abroad,” an ally which relies on Russian military power and has opened
its territory for Russian bases. If Belarus turned away from Moscow, the
situation would be dire indeed.

“In the case of the loss of Belarus,
we would completely return to the borders of the 16th century and
this would be our strategic loss.”

Tamara
Guzenkova, the head of the Moscow Center for Research on the Problems of CIS
and Baltic Countries, also spoke with Polunin. She said that “anti-Russian and
pro-Western attitudes are intensifying in Belarus,” something that can be seen
both in the official media and especially on the Internet.

She
suggested that there were two reasons for this. On the one hand, the West,
which had been seeking to find a champion among what she described as the “uncharismatic”
Belarusian opposition, has now turned its attention to Belarusian civil society
and its online manifestation.

And
on the other, the shift in Belarusian attitudes reflects Lukashenka’s reaction
to the Ukrainian crisis, one in which he has had to take into account Belarus’
location between Russia and the West, the upcoming presidential elections in Belarus,
and his need to refinance his debts next year.

According
to Guzenkova, “the real tragedy for the Belarusian people consists in the fact
that because of the way political realities have taken shape, any pro-European
rhetoric a priori automatically is transformed into anti-Russian language.” And
that is leading ever Belarusians to think that they stand before a choice.

That
is, “either with Russia or with the West,” and when the question is posed that
way, there is a very “serious danger” that Russia could “lose” Belarus.