Moscow - During the past day the situation on the US-Iraqi front remained largely
unchanged. The US is continuing to reinforce the attack group near Karabela
for a thrust toward Baghdad. By the morning of March 29 up to 20,000 coalition
troops were massed in the area of Karabela. This forces includes up to 200 tanks,
150 artillery systems and more than 250 helicopters. The order for the attack
will be given by the coalition commander Gen. Tommy Franks, who, according to
intercepted radio communications, will personally inspect the troops during
the next several hours.

Around 1900hrs yesterday an Apache attack helicopter crashed. Intercepted radio
communications show that the helicopter was heavily damaged in a combat mission.
The helicopter's pilot lost control during landing and the helicopter crashed,
causing serious damage to another helicopter that landed earlier.

The coalition troops have so far failed to take An-Nasiriya despite the categorical
orders from the command and more than 800 combat missions by the strike aircraft.
All attempts to break through the Iraqi defense were met by Iraqi counterattacks.
After 24 hours of fighting the coalition troops only managed to advance several
hundred meters in two sectors near An-Nasiriya at the cost of 4 destroyed armored
personnel carriers, no less than 3 Marines killed by sniper and mortar fire,
10 wounded and 2 missing in action. The exact Iraqi losses are being determined.

The Americans have also failed to advance near An-Najaf. Every coalition attack
was met by massive artillery barrages from the Iraqi side. Later during the
day the Iraqis mounted a counterattack, throwing the US forces back by 1.5-2
kilometers. No fewer than 10 Marines were killed or wounded. After exchanging
fire for six hours both warring sides remained in the same positions. Iraqi
losses in this area are estimated to be 20 killed and up to 40 wounded.

Near Basra the British troops pushed the Iraqi defense lines on the Fao peninsula
but were unable to capture the entire peninsula. The British advance was a maximum
of 4 kilometers from the highway leading to Basra. Radio intercepts show that
in this attack the Iraqis shot down a British helicopter. Additionally, two
tanks and one APCs were destroyed by landmines. At least 2 [British] servicemen
were killed, around 20 were wounded and 15 were captured by the Iraqis.

Exchange of fire continued in the area of the Basra airport. The Iraqis destroyed
one coalition APC, wounding two coalition soldiers. The Iraqi losses are difficult
to estimate, but available information suggests that up to 20 Iraqi soldiers
and local militia members might have been killed in the air and artillery strikes.

All attempts by the British troops to break through the Iraqi defenses from
the south along the Al-Arab river have yielded no results. The British command
reported that it is unable to storm Basra with the available forces and will
require no less than two additional brigades and at least five additional artillery
battalions. Thus, to avoid further casualties the British are adopting defensive
tactics, while trying to maintain a tight blockade around Basra and trying to
improve their positions with small localized attacks. The British are also maintaining
pressure on the Iraqi positions on the Fao peninsula.

The psychological levels among the city's residents, according to interviews,
is far from critical. The Iraqi military made several public announcements to
the residents offering them a chance to leave the city. However, most of the
residents do not want to leave, fearing example of the Palestinian refugees,
who, after losing their homes, gained pariah status in the Arab world. Basra's
residents were extremely depressed by the video footage aired by the coalition
command showing Iraqis on the occupied territories fighting for food and water
being distributed by the coalition soldiers. The city's population views this
as a sample of what awaits them if the Americans come...

At the Al-Kuwait airport the unloading of the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division
is continuing and is expected to be completed by the night of April 1. During
a night flight one of the US military transport aircraft requested an emergency
landing. What happened to the plane is still being determined.

Currently the coalition command is deciding how better use the 4th Infantry
Division. The complete deployment [of the division] and preparations for combat
are expected to take at least 10 days. However, the combat units require immediate
reinforcements and it is possible that the [4th Infantry} Division will be joining
combat in stages, as the units become ready. This will mean a considerable reduction
of the Division's combat effectiveness.

A report was obtained, prepared by the Al-Kuwait-based [coalition] Psychological
Operations Tactical Group for the [Coalition] Special Ground Forces Command.
The report analyzed the effectiveness of the information and propaganda war.
According to the report, analysis of the television broadcasts, intercepted
radio communications, interrogations of Iraqi POWs show that psychologically
the Iraqis are now "more stable and confident" that they were during
the last days before the war. This, according to the report, is due primarily
to the coalition's numerous military failures.

"...Following nervousness and depression [of the Iraqis] during the first
days of the war we can now observe a burst of patriotic and nationalistic feelings.
...There has been a sharp increase in the number of Iraqi refugees, who left
the country before the war, returning to Iraq. A "cult of war" against
the US and the UK is now emerging among the Iraqis...", the report states.
[Reverse translation from Russian]

[Coalition] analysts believe that if this attitude of the Iraqis is not changed
within the next 7 days, a "resistance ideology" may take over the
Iraqi minds, making the final [Coalition] victory even more difficult. In response
to this report the US Army Psychological Operations command decided to combine
all Iraqi POWs into large groups and to distribute the resulting video footage
to the world media. A more active use of the Iraqi opposition was suggested
for propaganda work in the occupied villages. The same opposition members will
be used to create video footage of the "repented" Iraqi POWs and footage
of the local [Iraqi] population "opposing Saddam."

Radio communications intercepted during the last five days suggest that the
coalition is using Israeli airfields for conducting night air strikes against
Iraq. Combat aircraft are taking off regularly from the [Israeli] Hatzerim and
the Navatim airbases do not return to the same bases but fly toward the border
with Jordan while maintaining complete radio silence.

Possibly these are just Israeli Air Force exercises, However, [Russian] radio
intercept and radar units observe increased intensity of radio communications
coming from the Jordanian air force and air defense communication centers during
such overflights, as well as changes in the operating modes of the US Army "Patriot"
tracking radars deployed in Jordan. This indicates the Israeli airbases are
used as forward airfield or that some of the coalition air force units are based
there. Normally the IAF F-15I fighter-bombers and A-4N strike aircraft operate
from the Hatzerim airbase and the F-16 fighter-bombers operate from the Nevatim
base.

Experts believe that these airbases may be used by the F-117 stealth bombers
"officially" based at the Al-Udaid airbase in Qatar. Using these two
locations minimizes the risk to the F-117s by allowing them to fly along the
left bank of the Euphrates (in the direction of Turkey) and to avoid the dangerous
maneuvering over Iraq.

The destruction of the telephone stations in Baghdad did nothing to disrupt
the communications of the Iraqi army. The Coalition command acknowledged this
fact after analyzing the dense [Iraqi] radio traffic. Because of that the USAF
was ordered to employ the most powerful available [conventional] munitions against
predetermined strategic targets. These attacks will be carried out immediately
before renewing ground advance.