From ciac@rumpole.llnl.gov Fri Feb 19 15:01:03 1999
From: CIAC Mail User
To: ciac-bulletin@rumpole.llnl.gov
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 1999 13:15:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: CIAC Bulletin J-029: Buffer Overflows in Various FTP Servers
[ For Public Release ]
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__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
Buffer Overflows in Various FTP Servers
February 16, 1999 19:00 GMT Number J-029
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: Vulnerabilities have been identified in various FTP servers.
PLATFORM: Any server running ProFTPD (1.2.Opre1) or Wuarchive ftpd
(2.4.2-academ[BETA-18]).
DAMAGE: If exploited, a buffer overflow may occur which can lead to a
root compromise.
SOLUTION: Check below to see if there are patches, updates, or workaround
from your software vendor.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY The risk is high since the buffer overflow condition can lead
ASSESSMENT: to root compromise.
______________________________________________________________________________
[ Start Netect, Inc. Advisory ]
Netect, Inc.
General Public Security Advisory
% Advisory: palmetto.ftpd
% Issue date: February 9, 1999
% Contact: Jordan Ritter
% Revision: February 11, 1999
% Update: Appendices A and B corrected.
[Topic]
Remote buffer overflows in various FTP servers leads to potential root
compromise.
[Affected Systems]
Any server running the latest version of ProFTPD (1.2.0pre1) or the
latest version of Wuarchive ftpd (2.4.2-academ[BETA-18]). wu-ftpd is
installed and enabled by default on most Linux variants such as RedHat
and Slackware Linux. ProFTPD is new software recently adopted by many
major internet companies for its improved performance and reliability.
Investigation of this vulnerability is ongoing; the below lists
software and operating systems for which Netect has definitive
information.
[Overview]
Software that implements FTP is called an "ftp server", "ftp daemon",
or "ftpd". On most vulnerable systems, the ftpd software is enabled
and installed by default.
There is a general class of vulnerability that exists in several
popular ftp servers. Due to insufficient bounds checking, it is
possible to subvert an ftp server by corrupting its internal stack
space. By supplying carefully designed commands to the ftp server,
intruders can force the the server to execute arbitrary commands with
root privilege.
On most vulnerable systems, the ftpd software is installed and enabled
by default.
[Impact]
Intruders who are able to exploit this vulnerability can ultimately
gain interactive access to the remote ftp server with root privilege.
[Solution]
Currently there are several ways to exploit the ftp servers in
question. One temporary workaround against an anonymous attack is to
disable any world writable directories the user may have access to by
making them read only. This will prevent an attacker from building an
unusually large path, which is required in order to execute these
particular attacks.
The permanent solution is to install a patch from your Vendor, or
locate one provided by the Software's author or maintainer. See
Appendices A and B for more specific information.
Netect strongly encourages immediate upgrade and/or patching where
available.
Netect provides a strong software solution for the automatic detection
and removal of security vulnerabilities. Current HackerShield
customers can protect themselves from this vulnerability by either
visiting the Netect website and downloading the latest RapidFire(tm)
update, or by enabling automatic RapidFire(tm) updates (no user
intervention required).
Interested in protecting your network today? Visit the Netect website
at http://www.netect.com/ and download a FREE 30 day copy of
HackerShield, complete with all the latest RapidFire(tm) updates to
safeguard your network from hackers.
[Appendix A, Software Information]
% ProFTPD
Current version: 1.2.0pre1, released October 19, 1998.
All versions prior to 1.2.0pre1: vulnerable.
Fix: will be incorporated into 1.2.0pre2.
Currently recommended action: upgrade to the new version when it
becomes available, or apply the version 1.2.0pre1 patch found at:
ftp://ftp.proftpd.org/patches/proftpd-1.2.0pre1-path_exploit2.patch
% wu-ftpd
Current version: 2.4.2 (beta 18), unknown release date.
All versions through 2.4.2 (beta 18): vulnerability dependant upon
target platform, probably vulnerable either due to OS-provided
runtime vulnerability or through use of replacement code supplied
with the source kit. No patches have been made available.
Fix: unknown.
Currently recommended action: Upgrade to wu-ftpd VR series.
% wu-ftpd VR series
Current version: 2.4.2 (beta 18) VR13, released January 28, 1999.
All versions prior to 2.4.2 (beta 18) VR10: vulnerable.
Fix: incorporated into VR10, released November 1, 1998.
Available from:
ftp://ftp.vr.net/pub/wu-ftpd/
Filenames:
wu-ftpd-2.4.2-beta-18-vr13.tar.Z
wu-ftpd-2.4.2-beta-18-vr13.tar.gz
% BeroFTPD [NOT vulnerable]
Current version: 1.3.3, released February 7, 1999.
All versions prior to 1.2.0: vulnerable.
Fix: incorporated into 1.2.0, released October 26, 1998.
Available from:
ftp://ftp.croftj.net/usr/bero/BeroFTPD/
ftp://ftp.sunet.se/pub/nir/ftp/servers/BeroFTPD/
ftp://sunsite.cnlab-switch.ch/mirror/BeroFTPD/
Filename:
BeroFTPD-1.3.3.tar.gz
% NcFTPd [NOT vulnerable]
Current version: 2.4.0, released February 6, 1999.
All versions prior to 2.3.4: unknown.
Available from:
http://www.ncftp.com/download/
Notes:
% NcFTPd 2.3.4 (libc5) ftp server has a remotely exploitable bug
that results in the loss of the server's ability to log
activity.
% This bug cannot be exploited to gain unintended or privileged
access to a system running the NcFTPd 2.3.4 (libc5) ftp
server, as tested.
% The bug was reproducible only on a libc5 Linux system. The
Linux glibc version of NcFTPd 2.3.4 ftp server is NOT
vulnerable.
% The bug does not appear to be present in version NcFTPd 2.3.5 or
later. Affected users may upgrade free of charge to the latest
version.
Thanks go to Gregory Lundberg for providing the information regarding
wu-ftpd and BeroFTPD.
[Appendix B, Vendors]
% RedHat Software, Inc.
% RedHat Version 5.2 and previous versions ARE vulnerable.
Updates will be available from:
ftp://updates.redhat.com/5.2//
Filename:
wu-ftpd-2.4.2b18-2.1..rpm
% Walnut Creek CDROM and Patrick Volkerding
% Slackware All versions ARE vulnerable.
Updates will be available from:
ftp://ftp.cdrom.com/pub/linux/slackware-3.6/slakware/n8/
ftp://ftp.cdrom.com/pub/linux/slackware-current/slakware/n8/
Filenames
tcpip1.tgz (3.6) [971a5f57bec8894364c1e0d358ffbfd4]
tcpip1.tgz (current) [e1e9a9a50ad65bab1e120a7bf60f6011]
Notes:
% The md5 checksums are current for the above mentioned Revision
date only.
% Caldera Systems, Inc.
% OpenLinux Latest version IS vulnerable
Updates will be available from:
ftp://ftp.calderasystems.com/pub/OpenLinux/updates/
% SCO
% UnixWare Version 7.0.1 and earlier (except 2.1.x) IS vulnerable.
% OpenServer Versions 5.0.5 and earlier IS vulnerable.
% CMW+ Version 3.0 is NOT vulnerable.
% Open Desktop/Server Version 3.0 is NOT vulnerable.
Binary versions of ftpd will be available shortly from the SCO ftp
site:
ftp://ftp.sco.com/SSE/sse021.ltr - cover letter
ftp://ftp.sco.com/SSE/sse021.tar.Z - replacement binaries
Notes:
This fix is a binary for the following SCO operating systems:
% SCO UnixWare 7.0.1 and earlier releases (not UnixWare 2.1.x)
% SCO OpenServer 5.0.5 and earlier releases
For the latest security bulletins and patches for SCO products,
please refer to http://www.sco.com/security/.
% IBM Corporation
% AIX Versions 4.1.x, 4.2.x, and 4.3.x ARE NOT vulnerable.
% Hewlett-Packard
% HPUX Versions 10.x and 11.x ARE NOT vulnerable.
HP is continuing their investigation.
% Sun Microsystems, Inc.
% SunOS All versions ARE NOT vulnerable.
% Solaris All versions ARE NOT vulnerable.
% Microsoft, Inc.
% IIS Versions 3.0 and 4.0 ARE NOT vulnerable.
% Compaq Computer Corporation
% Digital UNIX V40b - V40e ARE NOT vulnerable.
% TCP/IP(UCX) for OpenVMS V4.1, V4.2, V5.0 ARE NOT vulnerable.
% Silicon Graphics, Inc. (SGI)
% IRIX and Unicos
Currently, Silicon Graphics, Inc. is investigating and no further
information is available for public release at this time.
As further information becomes available, additional advisories
will be issued via the normal SGI security information distribution
method including the wiretap mailing list.
Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters
http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/
% NetBSD
% NetBSD All versions ARE NOT vulnerable.
[Appendix C, Netect Contact Information]
Copyright (c) 1999 by Netect, Inc.
The information contained herein is the property of Netect, Inc.
The contact for this advisory is Jordan Ritter . PGP
signed/encrypted email is preferred.
Visit http://www.netect.com/ for more information.
[ End Netect, Inc. Advisory ]
______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Netect, Inc. for the
information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________
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