Obviously it is impossible to go through this overwhelming compendium of legal idiocy within the limitations of a single topic but where to start? What part of the mass to chip away at first? Why not Bryfogle? His jurisprudence that I noted in the above discussion is comprised of a limited number of decisions related to one topic, Charles Bryfogle's obsession with practicing law although he's not a lawyer. Why not indeed! And, given this new discussion;

entirely topical. So we'll go through the Bryfogle saga from start to (hopefully) finish. But, before we do, here's an overview of what a British Columbia court thought of his legal acumen and good-faith in a case that he initiated on his own behalf;

65] The evidence before me presents an overwhelming case for dismissing this action; it is plain and obvious that the statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action; Mr. Bryfogle does not have the standing on the facts to bring a ratepayers’ action, if one existed, which it does not, and he has no personal cause of action. It is also plain and obvious that the action is vexatious and that it was brought for an improper purpose and is therefore an abuse of process. I find that the defendants’ motion succeeds on all three sub-sub-rules of Rule 19(24). If I had not so held, I would have dismissed the action under Rule 18(6) as I conclude it is bound to fail.

[66] An equally overwhelming case has been presented for granting the order sought under s.18 of the Supreme Court Act. I find that Mr. Bryfogle is out of control in abusing the process of the courts with unnecessary, frivolous and vexatious litigation. He has been running amok without regard for the needless stress and expense to defendants that his reprehensible conduct is creating, and without even accepting responsibility in ordinary costs for his failures. I am satisfied that an order under s.18 provides the only reasonable prospect of limiting the harm that he would otherwise inflict.

[67] The time is long overdue that special costs should be awarded to deter Mr. Bryfogle from the reprehensible abuse of process that this action represents.

[68] For all of the above reasons this action is dismissed and the order is granted under s.18 of the Supreme Court Act in the terms of that section requiring Mr. Bryfogle to obtain leave of the court before instituting any legal proceeding in any court. All with special costs to the defendants.

Also note the comment I made above. "His jurisprudence that I noted in the above discussion is comprised of a limited number of decisions related to one topic." That was specific wording because once I started checking into him I found more litigation, much much more litigation that he'd engaged in until forced to stop by a vexatious litigant order. So, on to the small sub-set of his litigation career that focused on his attempts to retain his supposed right to be a lawyer although he wasn't one. Although, to be entirely fair, he was more, much more than a fake lawyer. He was a fake attorney General for the band along with being the fake Solicitor General and the fake Minister of Child and Family Services.

On June 09, 2006 the Supreme Court of British Columbia, after a three day hearing, issued an order prohibiting R. Charles Bryfogle from practicing law in British Columbia. Here's a copy of the order;

This is his appeal of the above order. There were a few grounds for appeal I liked. One was that in one court hearing where he'd acted as a lawyer his client had given him a power of attorney to act on the client's behalf. In Bryfogle's understanding of law that made him an attorney. If he wasn't why did he have the powers of one? Another ground was that a judge had allowed him to act on a clients behalf in some issue. That made him a lawyer under the doctrines of res judicata and/or issue estoppel. Since a judge had allowed him to act as a lawyer no subsequent judge had the power to stop him from being one. The chambers judge had responded with this;

The matter, in my view, is not a matter of res judicata or issue estoppel. The Law Society has not been party to previous proceedings and would not, therefore, normally be governed by the doctrine of res judicata in respect of earlier rulings. More importantly, however, I do not understand any of the previous rulings to have decided that Mr. Bryfogle was in compliance with the Legal Profession Act in purporting to represent parties before the courts. The fact that the court has allowed Mr. Bryfogle to appear and argue cases in the past does not establish that he was in compliance with the Legal Profession Act in doing so. No previous decision of this court decided that Mr. Bryfogle was entitled to engage in the practice of law in this province.

He also argued that it wasn't true that he was incompetent. He'd apparently actually won some cases. However, apart from the fact that his win/loss record was irrelevant he'd failed to give evidence to the chambers judge of any wins. The appeals decision had this to say about that argument;

[29] While Mr. Bryfogle is obviously concerned about his reputation, there is a history of court proceedings and orders which support the finding of the chambers judge that the public has not been well served in many cases by Mr. Bryfogle’s representations of himself and others in legal proceedings. The fact that he may have enjoyed a measure of success from time-to-time cannot detract from the many instances in which judges have commented adversely on his conduct and legal abilities. I do not propose to add insult to injury by repeating those findings in these reasons. In my view, it was open to the chambers judge, based on his review of the pleadings, proceedings and prior court decisions to find that Mr. Bryfogle’s conduct was wanting, even in the absence of a full record of those proceedings.

He also argued that the Law Society had a duty to submit evidence to the chambers judge supporting his position against the Society and the Society had failed to do so. He apparently gave no authority for the novel argument that the opposing side of the lawsuit had to fight his case for him and submit evidence showing that he was right. The court of appeal was not impressed;

Before concluding, I note that Mr. Bryfogle submitted that there was an onus on the Law Society to lead evidence with respect to many of the matters for which there was no evidence, and that its counsel acted improperly in failing to lead such evidence (for example, the new evidence tendered by Mr. Bryfogle). In my view, if Mr. Bryfogle sought to assert either that he was a trustee, or acting under a power of attorney, or as an employee, it was up to him to lead evidence in that regard. He was fully aware of the allegations against him which were contained in the numerous affidavits filed by the Law Society in support of its petition. He filed several affidavits in reply which, in many instances, did not meet the substance of the allegations against him. He then attempted to challenge those allegations at the hearing simply by making statements which, in his view, the chambers judge should have accepted and relied upon in lieu of evidence. When that approach did not succeed, he sought to adduce new evidence on appeal without providing any legal foundation for the introduction of that evidence. While Mr. Bryfogle is obviously an intelligent and articulate individual, his approach to this case has been misguided in many respects and betrays a lack of both knowledge and judgment.

So he lost again and the prohibition stood. So on to the next chapter in the saga where he's convicted of contempt of court for violating the court order. It's also where Suzanne Holland enters the picture.

But first a break from his desperate attempts to hold on to his non-designation. I'll slip this decision into the mix to show an example of Byfogle's brilliant legal acumen.

His apparent real career was as a public school teacher but, by 2007, he was not a full time teacher. He was trying to be accepted as a substitute teacher on call to fill in for full-time teachers but he didn't get called because the school district refused to put him on the substitute teachers list. So he sued the school district for the money he would have received had they called him. They responded that they were under no legal obligation to call him and had chosen not to. He agreed that they were under no legal obligation to put him on the list but sued anyhow. He lost that one but tried again by initiating a lawsuit as a concerned citizen where he accused the defendants in his prior case of various acts of mismanagement of public funds based on totally speculative accusations, amounting to accusations of fraud, that he had no evidence to back up. So he tried to get a court order allowing him to rummage through the school board records to try and find the evidence he needed. However, as part of his application to get the order, he had one concrete piece of evidence that the defendants were misusing public funds. They were wasting tax money by paying lawyers to defend the school board against his legal actions against the school board! Talk about a smoking gun! Brilliant in its simplicity. If they don't defend themselves they lose the case but if they defend themselves they've proven, just by the act of defending themselves, that they are guilty and lose the case. And the law society wanted to stop this man from practicing law! Just one problem with the argument. The judge didn't buy it. Note; it is not a good sign when the judge says that he will 'attempt' to explain the plaintiff's statement of claim;

[7] I will begin by attempting to describe the statement of claim filed by the plaintiff. The statement of claim commences by relating factual allegations to the effect that the Superintendent of Schools, Jerry Smit, and three other named individuals who are school principals (but not named as defendants) altered public documents on classification of special education students in order to obtain additional funding from the Ministry of Education (the “Ministry”) for students with behavioural or physical disabilities. The consequence of the document alteration was additional per-capita funding to which the School District No. 49 had no entitlement. The trustees were informed of the actions of Smit but did not take any action. It is implied that the Ministry then withdrew the funds the School district was not entitled to and Smit and the trustees used other public monies to cover educational funds lost. The statement of claim alleges negligence on the part of the trustees in not properly supervising Smit and allowing Smit to reclassify administrative functions to enable him to retain his own salary.

[8] It is also alleged that the trustees were derelict in their duty to manage public funds by allowing Smit to expend public funds for defending litigation brought by the plaintiff against Smit and the School District. (Mr. Bryfogle had instituted action in the Provincial Court in relation to not being hired as a substitute teacher. I will be describing that litigation in more detail later.) The following paragraphs of the statement of claim relate to the subject of legal services obtained by the defendants to defend the previous litigation instituted by Mr. Bryfogle:

[18] Mr. Bryfogle commenced his submissions with the statement that this action became necessary because in the prior litigation, no court took jurisdiction over his argument regarding the standing of the lawyers hired by the defendants. He said that he was not asking for a monetary award for himself but was seeking change. Mr. Bryfogle agreed that he has some suspicions but no evidence, and he asserted that if the documents that he suspects are available on discovery do not materialize, he will be “the first to drop [his] claim”. No doubt sensing that his objective might be categorized as a fishing trip, he asserted that he was not fishing generally but rather was looking for specific diversions of funds. He stated that his goal with this action was to obtain access to financial records so that he could conduct a forensic audit to “second guess” the statutory auditor for the school district. This was a reference to the fact that his examination of the financial information that was made public to comply with the School Act did not reveal the information on legal fees that he was expecting to find.

[19] Mr. Bryfogle’s submissions, taken together with the predominance in the statement of claim of the subject of the defendant’s lawyer’s fees from the prior litigation, confirm that this action is for the most part a collateral attack arising out of that litigation. It is a difficult to conceive that Mr. Bryfogle has a public interest motivation in searching for how much money was “diverted” to legal costs to defend against an unfounded action that he commenced, took through three levels of court, and in respect of which he has been assessed a total of over $10,000 in costs payable to the defendants. The assessed costs remain wholly unpaid. Mr. Bryfogle clearly did not have the ratepayers’ interests in mind in compelling the school district to defend his previous merit-less and purely personal action through to the Court of Appeal, and then failing to pay the costs awarded; he clearly does not have the rate-payers’ interests in mind now, as he puts the school district and the other defendants to even further expense to defend his allegation that their previous expenditure on legal fees was not lawfully authorized, and to question the standing and authority of present counsel.

Leading to this sad result for Bryfogle;

[65] The evidence before me presents an overwhelming case for dismissing this action; it is plain and obvious that the statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action; Mr. Bryfogle does not have the standing on the facts to bring a ratepayers’ action, if one existed, which it does not, and he has no personal cause of action. It is also plain and obvious that the action is vexatious and that it was brought for an improper purpose and is therefore an abuse of process. I find that the defendants’ motion succeeds on all three sub-sub-rules of Rule 19(24). If I had not so held, I would have dismissed the action under Rule 18(6) as I conclude it is bound to fail.

[66] An equally overwhelming case has been presented for granting the order sought under s.18 of the Supreme Court Act. I find that Mr. Bryfogle is out of control in abusing the process of the courts with unnecessary, frivolous and vexatious litigation. He has been running amok without regard for the needless stress and expense to defendants that his reprehensible conduct is creating, and without even accepting responsibility in ordinary costs for his failures. I am satisfied that an order under s.18 provides the only reasonable prospect of limiting the harm that he would otherwise inflict.

[67] The time is long overdue that special costs should be awarded to deter Mr. Bryfogle from the reprehensible abuse of process that this action represents.

[68] For all of the above reasons this action is dismissed and the order is granted under s.18 of the Supreme Court Act in the terms of that section requiring Mr. Bryfogle to obtain leave of the court before instituting any legal proceeding in any court. All with special costs to the defendants.

He of course appealed this decision but just got hammered again;

[19] Before us, Mr. Bryfogle has failed to demonstrate any reviewable error in the analysis of the learned judge in either the dismissal or the s. 18 applications. In my view, Mr. Justice Meiklem’s conclusions on the applications are unassailable.

[20] Mr. Bryfogle refers the Court to para. 42 of Mr. Justice Meiklem’s reasons where the judge concludes that “legal proceedings” in s. 18 of the Supreme Court Act includes interlocutory applications which raise a new matter or cause. Mr. Bryfogle asks that the extent of the s. 18 order against him be clarified by this Court. I would decline to do so. The s. 18 order is in the terms I set out above. Its reach will have to be the subject of judicial consideration as any specific cases arise in the future.

[1] This is an application for an order of contempt against Mr. Bryfogle brought by the Law Society of British Columbia. The Law Society alleges that Mr. Bryfogle knowingly and intentionally violated an order of Mr. Justice Groberman pronounced on June 9, 2006 and entered on June 19, 2006 (“the Order”), which Order was issued in connection with the within proceedings: Law Society of B.C. v. Bryfogle, 2006 BCSC 1092 (CanLII); upheld on appeal: 2007 BCCA 511 (CanLII).

But let's be fair, Mr. Bryfogle did it all for love. The four cited actions were done on behalf of Suzanne Holland, Mr. Bryfogle's wife at the time. Including one case where he assisted her in suing his own family!

And yet another example of his legal acumen;

[8] Mr. Bryfogle also filed a constitutional argument with regard to s. 15 of the Legal Profession Act alleging that if the Law Society claimed that communications between husband and wife concerning litigation or the law in general were prohibited, this provision must be unconstitutional as a violation of the freedom of speech. He conceded, however, that the Law Society was not taking this position and thus his constitutional argument was not relevant to the application for contempt.

So he submitted an argument at trial that even he conceded was irrelevant to the issues at trial. He plays a deep game.

Remember those accusations against the school board? Although he got smacked down over that one he must have thought the underlying legal tactic, making unsupported wild accusations against the opposing party was basically sound because he tried it again in one of the four cited cases;

[10] On June 5, 2008, Ms. Holland filed a notice of motion in the action addressing her examination for discovery. Thereafter Mr. Bryfogle swore a series of affidavits that were filed in the action in support of Ms. Holland’s motion. While the first affidavit merely attached documents without further comment, affidavits dated July 7 and 14, 2008, contained argument in support of various aspects of Ms. Holland’s litigation. Mr. Bryfogle argued that the evidence to date revealed that counsel for ICBC may be acting in bad faith and engaging in an abuse of process; that ICBC or a physician had suppressed evidence; that the statement of defence was without merit and should be dismissed under Rule 19(24); and that opposing counsel is seeking to delay and hinder the case on its way to trial. In the July 14, 2008 affidavit, Mr. Bryfogle deposed that he had read the clinical notes of Dr. Paisley and other documents produced by ICBC and argued that the existence of missing pages was proof of wilful suppression of evidence by opposing counsel. To support this argument, Mr. Bryfogle referred to his 30 years’ experience as a forensic auditor and fraud investigator. On August 6, 2008, Ms. Holland filed a new notice of motion for an order that ICBC was in contempt for failing to produce all relevant documents and, alternatively, an order that ICBC suppressed evidence. In support of this motion, Ms. Holland indicated that she would be relying on Mr. Bryfogle’s first three affidavits in the series.

But that damned injunction screwed him;

...I’m aware of the injunction against Mr. Bryfogle from appearing or giving legal advice in matters, and so I am very reluctant to accept anything from him, ... And in any event, I am not really going to do ... deal with anything substantive, today.
...
Ms. Holland you just keep those in your pocket. I am frankly not going to pay any attention to what Mr. Bryfogle might have to say. As far as I am concerned, he is bound by an injunction preventing him from representing anything in this court.

Then there is the Bryfogle v Bryfogle where our Bryfogle assisted Holland in suing his two sons and their mothers;

[20] On February 18, 2010, Ms. Holland filed this action in her married name against Mr. Bryfogle’s two adult children along with their respective mothers. The statement of claim alleges that the defendants engaged in defamation and conspiracy by making false statements to the Ministry of Children and Family Development about Mr. Bryfogle’s treatment of his daughter. These statements are alleged to have caused the termination of Ms. Holland and Mr. Bryfogle’s foster care contract with the Ministry. In the statement of claim, Ms. Holland claims damages on her own behalf and on behalf of Mr. Bryfogle. He is not a party to the litigation. The relief claimed also includes a reference to the American legal concept of “light invasion of privacy”. The demand for Interrogatories served on the defendants is signed by Ms. Holland; however, the questions posed are almost entirely concerned with the defendants’ actions towards Mr. Bryfogle. Ms. Holland’s correspondence with opposing counsel is in the same strident and caustic style used by Mr. Bryfogle in his correspondence with opposing counsel in other actions. Her correspondence also uses similar language to Mr. Bryfogle’s common parlance such as “proffer”.

It was the court's conclusion that it was really Bryfogle himself driving the litigation against his own children and ex-wives/girlfriends;

[60] In at least one action, Bryfogle v. Bryfogle, it is clear that Ms. Holland was a proxy for a claim that should rightfully have been filed by the spouses jointly. Indeed, Ms. Holland’s original statement of claim expressly acknowledged that Mr. Bryfogle was harmed by the acts alleged to have been committed by the defendants due to her claim for damages on his behalf. Her subsequent advice to Cole J. that Mr. Bryfogle may apply to be joined as a party to the action is further evidence that he was the driving force behind this litigation.

[76] Lastly, it is suspicious that Mr. Bryfogle used Ms. Holland as a proxy to commence an action against his family members for defamation; however, the decision to do so was likely to avoid the impact of the vexatious litigator order imposed by Meiklem J. When Ms. Holland commenced Bryfogle v. Bryfogle, she was not yet subject to a vexatious litigator order. Mr. Bryfogle’s compliance with the order of Meiklem J. is not before me.

And then there's this shitload of litigation;
'

4. Holland v. Marshall Litigation

[29] On January 7, 2005, prior to meeting Mr. Bryfogle, Ms. Holland commenced an action on behalf of her son Jonathon alleging, against multiple parties, acts of negligence at the time of his birth that caused brain injuries, including attention deficit disorder, hyperactivity disorder, and oppositional defiance disorder. This litigation has a long history. The primary issue has always been whether Ms. Holland, and latterly Mr. Bryfogle, should be permitted to represent Jonathon as litigation guardian and as legal representative. This issue has been addressed, along with a myriad of other issues by this Court and by the Court of Appeal on many occasions. Ms. Holland and Mr. Bryfogle have jointly managed the litigation on behalf of Jonathon as found by the Court of Appeal in Holland v. Marshall, 2009 BCCA 582 (CanLII) at para. 3:

Ms. Holland and Mr. Bryfogle have managed the litigation on the appellant’s behalf, and appeared for the appellant in most of the many proceedings in this Court and the Supreme Court of British Columbia. The appellant, who is now 22 years old, has had no direct contact with counsel for the respondents, nor has he appeared in any court proceedings. The appellant’s appeal from an order dismissing his action is scheduled for hearing in this Court in February 2010. The trial judge found there was no evidence to legally support the claims that he was brain-injured at birth. Despite being granted many opportunities through case management, adjournments and rehearings, rulings requiring the appellant to be represented by counsel, and suggestions that counsel be retained to assist in obtaining the evidence required to prove his claim, Ms. Holland and Mr. Bryfogle have instead continued to pursue multiple procedural objections and applications.

If you want to read Holland v Marshall go nuts. I've located 22 recorded decisions all essentially leading to the conclusion that the lawsuit had no merit;

Bryfogle's defense was that he was clueless and was just helping his wife in any case so who cares?

[47] Mr. Bryfogle argues that the assistance he provided to Ms. Holland does not amount to the “prosecution” of litigation or a legal matter that was prohibited by the Order. While Mr. Bryfogle acknowledges that he cannot prosecute an action for someone else, even where he is not being paid for his services, he argues that helping his spouse with the drafting of pleadings, filing affidavits in support of her claims, organizing her files and managing documents as a secretary would do, is not prohibited by the term “prosecution”. Alternatively, Mr. Bryfogle maintains that the broad definition given to the term “prosecution” by the court in Robbins was unknown to him and could not retroactively render his actions contemptuous. In this regard, Mr. Bryfogle notes that Robbins was issued by this Court in October 2011, long after the misconduct alleged by the Law Society.

[48] Mr. Bryfogle also raises several other defenses. First, Mr. Bryfogle maintains he had no notice that the Law Society and others regarded the assistance he provided to Ms. Holland as a breach of the Order. Second, Mr. Bryfogle argues that until he received the Law Society’s submission a few days prior to the hearing of this matter, he was completely unaware that the Law Society’s contempt application related to that part of the Order prohibiting prosecution of litigation. Instead, Mr. Bryfogle believed the Law Society’s complaint concerned the first part of the Order, which prohibited certain legal services for reward. Third, Mr. Bryfogle argued that due to comments by Hall J.A. during a Court of Appeal proceeding to the effect that the Order did not apply to that court, he believed there was no prohibition against appearances in the court in any capacity. Lastly, Mr. Bryfogle argues that he was only required to give notice to the Law Society if he intended to appear in court to make submissions on behalf of someone else. Mr. Bryfogle says that since the Order he has not made representations to the court on behalf of anyone. Nor has he provided legal services to another for a fee. Thus there was no need to notify the Law Society.

[49] In regard to sentence, Mr. Bryfogle argues that if he is found in contempt of the Order, he is unable to pay a fine given his financial circumstances. Further, he argues that a jail term is not warranted because the violation of the Order was not a conscious one and was not a course of conduct designed to circumvent the Order. He maintains there is no threat of future violations because he and Ms. Holland are divorced now and he is getting too old to provide competent legal services for anyone.

So the judge found Bryfogle guilty of contempt and considered him a menace to the legal system;

[79] Accordingly, I find Mr. Bryfogle guilty of civil contempt by failing to notify General Counsel of the Law Society of his involvement in the four actions described in the Notice: Holland v. James et al, Holland v. HMTQ et al, Holland v. Marshall, and Bryfogle v. Bryfogle et al. I also find Mr. Bryfogle guilty of contempt by failing to notify the General Counsel of the Law Society of the trust agreement dated October 24, 2007, in which he is named as the “creator”.

[80] Turning to the appropriate sentence, the following factors are relevant to punishment for civil contempt:

1. the gravity of the offence;
2. the need to deter the offender;
3. the past record and character of the offender and, in particular, whether this is a first offence;
4. the need to protect the public from the offender’s misconduct;
5. the extent to which the offender is able to pay a monetary penalty; and
6. the extent to which the breach was flagrant and wilful and intended to defy the court’s authority.

[82] Applying these factors to Mr. Bryfogle’s case, I find the failure to notify the Law Society of his involvement in Ms. Holland’s litigation on numerous occasions is a serious violation of the Order. His failure to comply with the Order effectively insulated his actions from the Law Society’s supervision. The Law Society was forced to rely upon reports from opposing counsel concerning Mr. Bryfogle’s involvement in litigation. These reports would necessarily be after the fact. By failing to notify the Law Society himself, Mr. Bryfogle precluded the Law Society from taking proactive steps to prevent him from carrying out his intentions. Due to the large number of civil actions Ms. Holland commenced between 2007 and 2010, the Law Society could not reasonably be expected to monitor Mr. Bryfogle’s involvement in the litigation without timely and adequate notification by Mr. Bryfogle.

[83] Although this is the first order of contempt against Mr. Bryfogle, the numerous violations of the Order over a period of four years further aggravate his misconduct. There is also a need to protect the public and the integrity of the justice system by the sentence imposed. Mr. Bryfogle’s involvement in Ms. Holland’s litigation has caused considerable problems and unnecessary expense. Mr. Bryfogle consistently attacks opposing counsel with unfounded assertions of professional misconduct; he causes a considerable waste of public monies by supplying Ms. Holland with legal arguments that are bound to fail; and his lack of competence in legal process and advocacy have led to numerous costs awards that he and Ms. Holland are unable to pay. He is quite simply a menace to the justice system.

So what was his punishment? Essentially nothing at all. A free pass you'd think was custom designed to encourage him to continue;

[86] Balancing the factors outlined above, I find that a jail term is not necessary to denounce Mr. Bryfogle’s misconduct or to ensure future compliance with the Order. Further, a fine is not a suitable sentence due to Mr. Bryfogle’s inability to pay it. The appropriate sentence, in my view, is to bind Mr. Bryfogle to a recognizance in the amount of $5,000, without deposit or surety, for a period of one year. The conditions of the recognizance are as follows:

1. You will keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

2. You will report to a probation officer at The Moose Hall, 272 Highway 20, Bella Coola on January 18, 2012, and thereafter you will report as directed by your probation officer, but at least once each week by telephone.

3. You will provide your probation officer with your current address and telephone number and you will advise him or her of any changes in your address or telephone number forthwith.

4. You will have no communications, directly or indirectly, with Zsuzsanna Holland concerning any of the proceedings that she currently or in future may have in any court in this province.

5. You will provide your probation officer with a copy of the entered order in this proceeding on your first day of reporting or within 48 hours of receiving same from counsel for the Law Society, whichever occurs first, and you shall also provide your probation officer with a copy of the Order of Groberman J. in Law Society of B.C. v. Bryfogle, 2006 BCSC 1092 (CanLII) on your first day of reporting.

6. You shall not enter any courthouse in the province of British Columbia except if you are charged with an offence and must attend court for matters related to this offence or if you have the prior written permission of your probation officer to do so. You may not file any document in any court registry in British Columbia without the prior written permission of your probation officer, except if you are charged with an offence and must file a document in connection with the offence.

This is getting to be very much a wash, rinse repeat operation. Although he'd told the court in 2012 that he was 'getting too old to provide competent legal services for anyone.' It turned out that he wasn't so he went right back to it. At least he wasn't to old to provide legal services. The competent part was another issue.

I'm not going to go into detail on the above two decisions. Very much same old, same old. Law society proves he hasn't changed a bit, still breaching the order as if his past contempt conviction was meaningless (which, effectively, it was). Convicted of breaching the order again and so he got yet another sentence so trivial that it effectively wasn't punishment at all.

[44] This is the second time Mr. Bryfogle has been before the court for sentencing on a finding of contempt. As I have said, Madam Justice Bruce made a previous finding in 2012 of breach of the very same terms. Despite that and the recognizance imposed at that time, Mr. Bryfogle has persisted in breaching the court orders.

[45] Because Mr. Bryfogle is not in a position to pay a fine, there is a limit on the realistic options for the court in sentencing Mr. Bryfogle. The only realistic options here are:

(1) to impose a sentence of imprisonment to be served forthwith;

(2) to impose a sentence of imprisonment to be suspended and served only if Mr. Bryfogle is found to have committed a further breach;

(3) to impose a recognizance with terms such as community service; or

(4) some combination of those orders.

[46] Balancing the factors outlined above, I conclude that an immediate jail term is not necessary to denounce Mr. Bryfogle's misconduct or to ensure future compliance with the order.

[47] The appropriate sentence is a sentence of 21 days of imprisonment to be suspended and served only if Mr. Bryfogle is found to have committed a further breach of a court order within the next three years.

[48] It is also appropriate to impose a recognizance for one year, with terms including community service of 100 hours in that year. The community service should be in a non-law-related field, such as in a hospital.

This of course had no effect on Bryfogle at all and within a few months he was back at it. I only have this oblique reference to the case he tried to get involved in;

[8] Turning now to the applications, Mr. Bryfogle became involved with a Tsilhqot’in First Nation youth named S.A.B. who was in the care of the Ministry of Children and Family Development (“MCFD”). He purports to act as the youth’s advocate and makes allegations that S.A.B. is being abused by foster parents.

[9] On May 6, 2014, Church P.C.J. issued an interim ex parte protective intervention order prohibiting Mr. Bryfogle and his former wife from contacting S.A.B. pursuant to s. 28 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 46 [CFCSA]. Starting in November 2014, the judge heard the MCFD’s application for a permanent restraining order under s. 98 of the CFCSA and Mr. Bryfogle’s application to quash the protective intervention order. On September 17, 2015, Church P.C.J. set aside the protective intervention order and dismissed the MCFD’s application for a restraining order against Mr. Bryfogle. She granted a s. 98 restraining order against Mr. Bryfogle’s wife. I will call these the “CFCSA Proceedings”.

[10] Mr. Bryfogle filed various notices and applications connected with the proceedings below without leave. In light of his vexatious litigant status and other court injunctions, they were all dismissed as nullities.

[11] On November 27, 2015, Associate Chief Justice Cullen dismissed Mr. Bryfogle’s applications for leave to commence two different proceedings—Kamloops File Nos. 052024 and 052057. He also made a final order sealing both files to protect the identity of S.A.B. His reasons are at: 2015 BCSC 2210 (“Redacted Reasons”).

Between:
The Law Society of British Columbia
Petitioner
And:
R. Charles Bryfogle
Respondent

O R D E R

Coming on before me today on appeal in the sovereign T’silhqot’in Territory is the issue of contempt of this Universal Supreme Court’s prior orders and breach of the Constitution of the Tsilqhot’in Nation by Associate Chief Justice Cullen of the BCSC;

THIS COURT ORDERS that:

1. The order of Mr. Justice Cullen dated December 2, 2015 from the BCSC, Canada as against the Respondent, Tsilhqot’in Attorney General R. Charles Bryfogle is hereby overturned and nullified.

2. The Petitioner Law Society of British Columbia and Michael J. Kleisinger are jointly and severally hereby ordered to pay the respondent his costs and punitive and exemplary damages in the amount of $100,000.

3. The Petitioner Law Society of British Columbia and Michael J. Kleisinger are jointly and severally hereby fined $500,000 for contempt of this court and reckless disregard for the authority of the Tsilqhot’in Nation, payable forthwith to this court.

By the Court:
________________________
The Honourable Chief Justice
of the Universal Supreme Court

A nice touch. The Universal Supreme Court of the T’silhqot’in found the Law Society of British Columbia and its lawyer in contempt of the Universal Supreme Court and Justice Cullen in breach of the constitution of the T’silhqot’in Nation! The Universal Supreme Court is constantly issuing court orders with big buck fines attached yet Bryfogle keeps complaining in court that he's broke. He must have a lot of expenses.

Ok, on to the last one I have. Another wash, rinse, repeat. I'm not going to go into details, little different from the previous decisions;

This time Bryfogle, possibly because he actually retained a real lawyer who had some understanding about mitigating, decide it was time to bail from the Chilcotin National Congress, and resign as the Attorney General and Solicitor General for the Chilcotin Nation.;

[15] Counsel for Mr. Bryfogle also filed new affidavits in support of his Amended Response to supplant those affidavits Mr. Bryfogle originally filed on his own. In his new affidavit, Mr. Bryfogle acknowledged his knowledge of and intentional disobedience of the orders he has been found in contempt of. He deposed as follows in paragraphs 10 to 14:

10. I accept that I should be subject to restrictions on my liberty in consequence of having committed contempt of court as alleged in the Law Society’s applications.

11. I accept that a penalty which includes a period of imprisonment is within the range of appropriate sentences for a repeat contemnor who has already served a sentence of imprisonment for contempt of court.

12. I will fully comply with either a conditional sentence order or a probation order with conditions such as those set out in paragraph 5(b) of the Law Society’s Notice of Application filed April 23rd, 2016.

13. I do not have the ability to pay $5,000 forthwith as a penalty for breach of the recognizance.

14. I have monthly income of approximately $1,800. I have monthly expenses of approximately $1,600. I have no savings. I own property in Bella Coola valued at approximately $30,000, but there are judgments in excess of that amount registered against the property.

[16] He also deposed as follows in paragraphs 20 to 23:

20. I acknowledge Justice Meiklem previously made an order under s. 18 of the Supreme Court Act declaring me to be a vexatious litigant. I further acknowledge the observations of Associate Chief Justice Cullen in his oral Reasons for Judgment in these proceedings on December 2nd, 2015, that:

Mr. Bryfogle’s relentless involvement in legal matters and causes, which either have no merit or no connection to him, seems almost pathological in nature.

21. I will comply with a condition having as its objective the determination of whether I might benefit from psychiatric counselling or treatment in connection with my behaviour as a litigant and to take such counselling or treatment at public expense as may thereby be determined to be beneficial.

22. Sometime in the week of May 2nd, 2016, I verbally informed Grand Chief Stanley Stump Senior, of the Chilcotin National Congress, that effective immediately I would not be engaging in any activity relating to the legal affairs of the Chilcotin National Congress, including in the capacity of Attorney General and Solicitor General for the Chilcotin Nation. Exhibit F to the little affidavit is a true copy of a letter I instructed my counsel Bradford F. Smith to send to Grand Chief Stanley Stump Senior giving him written notice in that regard.

23. I am remorseful for my actions. I fully and unconditionally accept responsibility for my actions.

So, with Bryfogle's own lawyer agreeing that a jail term was appropriate and Byfogle himself expecting one what did the judge do?

Same as always. The judge essentially let him go scott-free.

[25] In this case there are some mitigating or ameliorating features, the presence of which assists in shaping the appropriate penalty. In the first place, Mr. Bryfogle is 75 years old and not in good health. In the second place, he has, as his counsel puts it, crossed a personal Rubicon by acknowledging his wrongdoing and agreeing to be found in contempt. In the third place, he has relinquished his association with the Chilcotin National Congress by so informing its leadership orally and in writing. In the fourth place, and perhaps most importantly, he is willing to subject himself to psychological or psychiatric assessment, and, if necessary, treatment to attempt to curb and control his pernicious behaviour. Without those factors I would consider it necessary to incarcerate Mr. Bryfogle in an institution to fulfil the objectives of a deterrent penalty in the circumstances of this case.

[26] While I accept that Mr. Bryfogle’s conversion has been recent and may be tenuous, if he is subject to a significant conditional sentence of imprisonment any recidivism on his part by breaching any of the existing court orders or of any terms of the conditional sentence order will result in a warrant being issued for his arrest and the prospect of him serving some or all of the remainder of his conditional sentence in an institution. Because of the need for deterrence, and because a conditional sentence order is not as onerous a punishment as the imposition of actual incarceration, I will impose a conditional sentence order which is substantially longer than a conventional sentence of imprisonment would be.

[27] The conditional sentence order will be for a period of 12 months. The compulsory conditions will be imposed, as per s. 742.3, as follows.

[28] Mr. Bryfogle, during the currency of the conditional sentence order, will keep the peace and be of good behaviour. He will appear before the court when required to do so by the court. He will report to a supervisor within two working days, or such longer period as the court directs after the making of the conditional sentence order, and thereafter when required by the supervisor and in the manner directed by the supervisor. He will remain within the jurisdiction of the court unless written permission to go outside that jurisdiction is obtained from the court or the supervisor and he will notify the court or the supervisor in advance of any change of name or address and promptly notify the court or the supervisor of any change of employment or occupation.

[29] In addition to those conditions, for the first three months of the conditional sentence order Mr. Bryfogle will be under house arrest. He will not leave his house except in the case of a legitimate medical emergency or with the prior written permission of his conditional sentence supervisor. He will undergo such psychiatric or psychological assessment as directed by his conditional sentence supervisor and he will participate in any treatment program or counselling recommended as a result of the assessment and approved by the conditional sentence supervisor and by the province. He will have no contact or association with the Chilcotin National Congress or any of its representatives in their capacity as a representative of the Chilcotin National Congress and he will have no contact with any representatives of the Ministry of Children and Family Development. He will adhere to and not breach any of the existing court orders currently in force against him, including the following, the Groberman/Bruce JJ. order dated January 9, 2006, and January 17, 2012; the Meiklem J. order dated April 2, 2007; the Gray J. order dated June 12, 2015; and the Cullen ACJ order dated November 27, 2015.

[30] I have imposed this latter order for clarity even though any court order which Mr. Bryfogle breaches would constitute a breach of his conditional sentence order by virtue of the term that he keep the peace and be of good behaviour, but I want there to be no confusion about the fact that should he breach any of the existing orders which I specified, or any other order, it will result in a warrant being issued for his arrest and the prospect of serving the balance of his conditional sentence order.

[31] I will also incorporate the contents of paragraph 5(b), iii. to vi. inclusive, of the Law Society of B.C. Notice of Application into the conditional sentence order. In particular, he will not enter any courthouse in the province of British Columbia except if he is charged with an offence and must attend court for matters related to that offence; (b) if he is the respondent to a proceeding brought against him and must attend court for matters related to that proceeding; or (c) if he is attending court as a witness to a proceeding pursuant to a subpoena.

[32] Four: He will not file any documents in any court registry in the province of British Columbia, except (a) if he is charged with an offence and must file documents for matters related to that offence; (b) if he is the respondent to a proceeding brought against him and must file documents in response to that proceeding; and (c) if the documents are signed and filed by a member in good standing of the Law Society.

[33] Five: He will not involve himself in any proceeding or legal matter in any manner whatsoever on behalf of or relating to the Chilcotin Nation and its members, including those who identify with the Chilcotin National Congress; and six, he will not involve himself in any proceeding or legal matter in any manner whatsoever on behalf of or relating to Zsuzsanna Hegedus, except as to appear as a witness under subpoena to a criminal proceeding brought against Ms. Hegedus.

[34] After Mr. Bryfogle has completed his conditional sentence order he will be subject to a probation order for a further period of one year, with the following terms: (1) he will keep the peace and be of good behaviour; (2) he will report to a probation officer within two days of the termination of his conditional sentence order and thereafter as directed; (3) he will continue to participate in any treatment program or counselling as directed by his probation officer; and thereafter I will incorporate the same provisions as I did in the conditional sentence order arising from paragraph 5(b), iii. to vi., in the Notice of Application of the Law Society of British Columbia.

[35] I will award costs of these applications to the Ministry and to the Law Society of British Columbia, to be paid within two years of today’s date. Those costs will be assessed at $1,000 to the Ministry and $1,000 to the Law Society of British Columbia.

I posted this as part of my extensive (but not comprehensive) review of Bryfogle's litigation;

IN THE UNIVERSAL SUPREME COURT
OF THE T’SILHQOT’IN

Between:
The Law Society of British Columbia
Petitioner
And:
R. Charles Bryfogle
Respondent

O R D E R

Coming on before me today on appeal in the sovereign T’silhqot’in Territory is the issue of contempt of this Universal Supreme Court’s prior orders and breach of the Constitution of the Tsilqhot’in Nation by Associate Chief Justice Cullen of the BCSC;

THIS COURT ORDERS that:

1. The order of Mr. Justice Cullen dated December 2, 2015 from the BCSC, Canada as against the Respondent, Tsilhqot’in Attorney General R. Charles Bryfogle is hereby overturned and nullified.

2. The Petitioner Law Society of British Columbia and Michael J. Kleisinger are jointly and severally hereby ordered to pay the respondent his costs and punitive and exemplary damages in the amount of $100,000.

3. The Petitioner Law Society of British Columbia and Michael J. Kleisinger are jointly and severally hereby fined $500,000 for contempt of this court and reckless disregard for the authority of the Tsilqhot’in Nation, payable forthwith to this court.

By the Court:
________________________
The Honourable Chief Justice
of the Universal Supreme Court

Which annoyed me because it indicated that Bryfogle had seen the inside of a jail cell as a result of an order from Justice Cullen but I'd not found the case sentencing him to actual jail time. So I did a more extensive review but still didn't locate it. It seems to be unreleased. However I did find this;

On June 12th, 2015, R. Charles Bryfogle, 78, found himself in contempt of court and was sentenced by Madam Justice Gray to 21 days in jail. The sentence was suspended and to be served only if Bryfogle was found to have committed a further breach of the orders against him.

On December 2nd, 2015, Associate Chief Justice Cullen found that Bryfogle breached his order and he was ordered to be incarcerated for 21 days. The court ordered that Bryfogle remain bound by the recognizance ordered by Madam Justice Gray and awarded the Law Society its special costs.

A very simple story. Bryfogle wanted to be put on the call list of teachers available to serve as substitute teachers in the Bella Coola school district. The school district refused and, instead, used individuals who did not have the teaching certificate that Bryfogle held. There's obviously a history here if the district refused to hire him and instead preferred hiring individuals who did not have his academic qualifications.

The decision rested on the interpretation of the word 'available'. Section 19 of the School Act stated;

19 (1) Subject to subsection (2), a board must not employ a person as a teacher, principal, vice principal, director of instruction, superintendent of schools or assistant superintendent of schools unless that person

(a) holds a certificate of qualification as a teacher, or

(b) holds a letter of permission to teach issued under section 25 (2) of the Teaching Profession Act.

(2) A board may employ a person who possesses qualifications approved by the board, but does not meet the requirements of subsection (1), if that person is

(a) employed for 20 or fewer consecutive teaching days and teaching a particular class or classes where no teacher holding a certificate of qualification is available, or

(b) instructing a general interest course that is not leading to school graduation.

Bryfogle argued that the highlighted portion above meant that the district could not legally hire any individuals who did not have a certificate of qualification because there was a teacher holding a certificate available. Him.

The case hinged on what 'available' meant in 19(2)9(b)(a). Bryfogle interpreted it to mean any certified individual available to teach without specific reference to section 19. The district said it meant that they could only hire non-certified teachers if certified teachers already approved and on the call list weren't available. Since Bryfogle wasn't on the call list he didn't qualify under 19(2)(a).

Mr. Bryfogle acknowledges there was no requirement on the part of the board to hire him, but asserts they couldn't then hire someone else who didn't have the certificate of qualification. He argues that the section fetters the School Board's right to hire whoever it wants as a TOC - that they can only hire a non-certified teacher if no teacher holding a certificate of qualification is available. Mr. McCann, counsel for the defendant, disagrees, arguing that an "available" teacher is someone already on the List.

Unfortunately for Bryfogle the district cited a prior case exactly to point with Bryfogle's argument where the court accepted the district's interpretation, Alberni School District No. 70 v. B.C. Teachers' Federation , (2002) BCCAAA No. 29 which said;

I return to section 19(2)(a). That section provides that a school board can hire a non-certified person to teach when "no teacher holding a certificate of qualification is available". In my opinion the definition of "teacher" found in section 1 must be applied when the language of section 19(2)(a) is considered. It follows that section 19(2)(a) must be understood to mean that a school board may employ a non-certified person when no person holding a certificate of qualification who is employed by the board is available. In other words, there cannot be an available certified teacher already within the employ of the board.

So Bryfogle's judge decided;

[4] I agree with those findings. And that really determines this matter. There is no basis in law to Mr. Bryfogle's claim and I dismiss it in its entirety.

But even then, at small claims court, on his initial hearing on the matter, Bryfogle was already making unsubstantiated claims about misuse of public funds;

[7] Mr. Bryfogle alleges dishonesty on the part of the Superintendent and collusion by the trustees regarding fabricating records to obtain public money. But I note the highlighted portion of the statute. What is relevant is the conduct that is the subject matter of the action - in this case, the Board's refusal to place the claimant on the TOC List.

[8] The action is dismissed with costs to the Defendants.

"Yes Burnaby49, I do in fact believe all process servers are peace officers. I've good reason to believe so." Robert Menard in his May 28, 2015 video "Process Servers".

SteveUK wrote:A true litany of utter failure. I wonder if he could be Canada's Mr Ebert, with his legendary 180+ 'wins' and a type of restraining order named after him.

Man, would I love to have the Supreme Court of British Columbia rename it's vexatious litigant order a Bryfogle! And it's not that he doesn't deserve the recognition and honour. But we don't do that kind of thing here.

"Yes Burnaby49, I do in fact believe all process servers are peace officers. I've good reason to believe so." Robert Menard in his May 28, 2015 video "Process Servers".

SteveUK wrote:A true litany of utter failure. I wonder if he could be Canada's Mr Ebert, with his legendary 180+ 'wins' and a type of restraining order named after him.

Man, would I love to have the Supreme Court of British Columbia rename it's vexatious litigant order a Bryfogle! And it's not that he doesn't deserve the recognition and honour. But we don't do that kind of thing here.

A 'Bryfogle Order' has such a beautiful ring to it, its a shame the horrid old judiciary will not comply. Put them on notice.....

The Observer wrote:Maybe it has already been mentioned and I missed it, but is Bryfogle still alive and kicking?

As far as I know. He'd be about 80 but I have no information that he's moved on to litigate in a different realm. Then again he's exactly the kind of person you'd expect to disappear into obscurity. Having the same thought a while ago I googled him but got nothing one way or the other.

"Yes Burnaby49, I do in fact believe all process servers are peace officers. I've good reason to believe so." Robert Menard in his May 28, 2015 video "Process Servers".