Additional ideas on the new role played by OSCE

Germany, especially through his Minister for Foreign Affairs Steinmeier, has long been saying to the Atlantic Alliance that a change of strategy towards the Russian Federation is needed. On June 18 last, The German Minister for Foreign Affairs warned NATO not to “inflame” the relations with Russia so as to avoid tensions which would also lead to open warfare. Vladimir Bokovsky, the dissident who was exchanged for the leader of the Communist Party of Chile, Luis Corvalan, in Zurich in 1976, said that “the Russians’ great power of endurance is their true secret weapon.”

Better not to corner Russia which, on the contrary, would be an ideal partner in the Mediterranean, in Central Asia and in the Middle East. Our truly global danger is the sword jihad, not the Russian desire to regain a global role.

Furthermore, the German military decision-makers are now considering a stand-alone doctrine towards Europe and, above all, towards the Eurasian project typical of the China-Russia pair.

Last August Minister Steinmeier stated he perceived a new version – although in new ways and with new tools – of the Cold War between the West and the Russian Federation, a project which would see Germany as first war victim and main war theatre, as in the old Cold War model.

It is also worth recalling that Minister Frank-Walther Steinmeier is the OSCE current Chairman-in-office.

The new “Cold War” would mark the end of the recent German reunification, as well as the end of Germany’s wellbeing and stability – a country which lives also on exports, especially to the East, and therefore intends to expand its own presence in Eurasia.

Even though on July 18 last Russia arrested the Ukrainian OSCE observer who monitored the ceasefire in Eastern Ukraine, on charges of espionage, the current OSCE Presidency invited also the Russian experts to monitor the forthcoming presidential elections in the United States.

Hence, while NATO is focusing on the project of a new “Cold War” to curb the Russian Federation’s expansion and relegate it to the role of a “medium power”, the European States are experiencing the gap between their strategic interests and the Atlantic Alliance’s. Hence a new forum for taking international decisions shall be envisaged, such as OSCE, which can temporarily put aside the North Atlantic Treaty and resume the thread of a Eurasian project from which Western Europe cannot remain alien.

Moreover, the NATO idea of compressing and relegating Russia in what Raymond Aron called “the great European plain” and of remotely controlling the People’s Republic of China in Central Asia is being accomplished in a phase in which the United States are de facto leaving the European Union to its fate, especially after Brexit.

The United States have decided to quadruple their military budget in Eastern Europe as early as March 2016 – and this has taken place out of the Atlantic Alliance’s framework and with a clear anti-Russian intention, even though masked by military projection onto the Persian Gulf and Iran, in particular.

The new Atlantic Alliance will be more asymmetrical than usual: there will be important countries, such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania, as well as less important countries, such as Italy, France, Spain and Germany itself, which will witness a reduction of NATO strategic commitment and shall necessarily think to defend themselves on their own.

As the Republican candidate, Donald Trump, explicitly stated, if he wins the US presidential elections, the United States will not accept the automatic mechanism of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty on the Alliance’s integrated defence.

Conversely, if Hillary Clinton becomes the new US President, she will increase the unfortunate and often irrational operations against the “tyrants” in the Middle East, by trying to involve the EU allies, although with mixed results.

And with long and dangerous destabilization in key areas, which would be detrimental especially for the EU Member States and the NATO European Pillar.

It is also worth adding that the very recent Italian project of a Unified Military Force between Italy, Germany and France – initially proposed by General Camporini – results from the rational assessment of a post-Brexit British indifference towards the European Continent and the awareness of a NATO ever more distant from the European interests and closer – more than usual – to the US projects.

Furthermore, in all likelihood, the new Tripartite Force will have a more rational posture towards the Russian Federation and the Mediterranean.

A project that is bound to be interesting also for Israel, which will be in a position to redesign its foreign and defence policy, thus becoming a Mediterranean player.

Hence Israel will later discover, in the Mare Nostrum, the security bulwark which can defend its territorial position, in the context of the new tensions generated by the Caliphate’s jihad and its upcoming end.

It is worth recalling that OSCE was created with another name by the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was held in the Finnish capital, was a success of the USSR – which saw the inviolability of national borders accepted – but also a success of the United States and the other Atlantic Alliance’s Member States, which saw the inviolability of human rights and democratic freedoms recognized in the Final Act.

Currently OSCE deals mainly with the monitoring of the election regularity and is mostly known for this activity.

However it must also check many other functions relating to the international balance of power, such as control over the spreading of tactical and strategic weapons, by maintaining ten missions in “hot spots” (Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova, Serbia, Skopje, Tajikistan, Ashgabat, Ukraine and Uzbekistan).

The OSCE additional functions include the fight against terrorism and the trafficking in human beings; the prevention and resolution of conflicts; the economic activities; the activities for environmental protection, for the protection of human rights and for guaranteeing the freedom of the press and of the other media; cooperation in the security sector and the rules against discrimination.

A sequence of tasks and functions mostly comparable to those carried out by NATO, which is also an organization coordinating military structures that are and will remain national.

Hence if we want to draw a comparison with the Atlantic Alliance, we can see that OSCE is present in ten hotbeds of crisis, namely those previously mentioned, while NATO is currently active in six strategic regions and particularly in Afghanistan, where it led the International Security Assistance Force (ASAF) from 2003 to 2014 joining as many as 51 NATO and non-NATO members – the longest operation ever conducted by the Atlantic Alliance.

Furthermore the Atlantic Alliance is also operating in Afghanistan with Resolute Support, active since January 1, 2015.

The effects of these two Atlantic Alliance’s operations are there for all to see: the Taliban, the “students” politically born in the Pakistani madrasahs, are still masters of the Afghan soil, while the “new Qaedists” keep on infiltrating from Syria, Tajikistan and even from the Chinese Islamist Xinjiang.

Currently the training of the Afghan security forces is certainly not an effective and rational military goal: the Kabul government is strongly linked to drug trafficking, as indeed many of the Taliban factions.

In Kosovo, the pseudo-State recognized by the United States one day after the declaration of independence of the Albanian statelet from Serbia, on February 17, 2009, things are no better.

Today, it is mainly a hub for the Daesh-Isis foreign fighters.

Kosovo has provided to Isis as many as 125 foreign fighters for every million inhabitants; hence it is the State most “rich” – so to speak – in Caliphate’s foreign fighters in the world.

A further Atlantic Alliance’s operation is Active Endeavour, which controls and protects the Mediterranean against terrorism.

Said NATO action will soon be transformed into the wider Operation Sea Guardian, which will see the contribution of countries not belonging to the Alliance.

In 2015 terrorism hit in over 100 countries, as compared to 59 in 2013. As stated by NATO itself, it is not particularly present in the Mediterranean region but, as is well-known, it operates in some Middle East countries and, with Isis, in continental Europe with the terrible attacks we all know.

The latest statistics indicate a toll in the West of 229 deaths for acts of terrorism, especially jihadist terrorism, including 49 in the United States, 44 in Turkey and even 292 in Iraq.

Indeed, if we want to be clear, “terrorism” does not exist. There rather exists the sword jihad, which is governed and evolves according to its own specific strategic doctrine, which is alien to the Clausewitzian Western universe.

The acts of terror are parts of this sequence of Islamist military operations; they are neither the jihad goal nor its primary combat technique.

Not surprisingly, so far the best fight against jihadism has been China’s, which has a military doctrine still ranging from Sun Tzu to the “36 Stratagems”. The same holds true for Russia, which has used a mix of traditional warfare and new “hybrid warfare” strategies to fight against its Chechen territorial jihad, and for Israel, which has always pursued an original mix of intelligence, preventive war and outright military action.

Therefore, according to NATO analysts, the Mediterranean is a means of terrorism, not a region marked by the presence of a homogeneous jihad based on coast-to-coast maritime operations.

Another NATO mission is active in Kosovo where there is the Atlantic Alliance’s operation which, in 1999, was initially called KFOR, until the Normalization Agreement between Serbia, Kosovo and the EU was signed in 2003.

An additional important operation is the anti-piracy one known as Ocean Shield, organized by the Atlantic Alliance in the Gulf of Aden, the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean – an activity which was officially started in 2008.

As scheduled, it will end in December 2016, although maintaining some early warning mechanisms in that region.

With a view to supporting the African Union (AU), since 2005 NATO has been operating with this organization, which has 54 members all belonging to the Black Continent.

Nevertheless the Atlantic Alliance’s primary goal is to support AMISOM (the AU Mission in Somalia) which heads the African Standby Force, always with the support of non-NATO countries.

Basically, the dangerous mix of “peace missions”, “interposition missions” and peace enforcement ones enables NATO to freeze problems, but not to solve them.

When the Atlantic Alliance mission goes away, the conflict starts again as before or, as happened in Kosovo, the local Albanians’ ethnicist nationalism is replaced by the jihad.

Something else would be needed, but the higher the number of countries from Africa or other crisis areas which participate in the Atlantic Alliance’s operations, the less likely a political solution is – as well as a real stabilization of the strategic areas in which each regional player continues to exert its hegemonic role.

These are the NATO operations currently in place.

And what about OSCE’s? In addition to the OSCE actions already mentioned, there is for example the Forum on Security Cooperation, which regulates the exchange of military intelligence between the Member States and tries to keep the proliferation of “small weapons” under control. It also monitors the spreading of weapon of mass destruction and checks the implementation of multilateral reports and decisions among the 57 OSCE Member States.

Therefore the real problem is that also the Russian Federation – which had resumed its post-Soviet foreign policy with the NATO-Russia Council created in 2002 – is an OSCE member.

In the aftermath of the Soviet regime’s collapse, Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1999 after having joined the Partnership for Peace program a few years earlier, in 1994.

Today, the Georgian issue of August 2008 (which is considered by NATO a “disproportionate reaction”) and, above all, the Russian action in Ukraine of April 2014 have blocked any kind of relationship between the Atlantic Alliance and Russia.

A serious mistake: Russia has always considered both Georgia, where Stalin was born, and Ukraine (where Khrushchev was born) autonomous areas, although still subject to the Russian strategic design.

What would happen if an alliance close to NATO conquered Iran, a Russian traditional ally? Or if Moscow sent troops to Sicily?

Hence the Russian Federation operated against the US-led “orange revolutions” in the two Caucasian countries particularly with a view to protecting its own sovereignty and the autonomy of the oil and gas pipelines.

Georgia finally signed the Association Agreement with the EU on July 1, 2016, but Russia promptly diversified its oil and gas supply lines to the EU with the creation of the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline Project (TANAP) in mid-March this year – a transfer line which will bring also the Azerbaijani gas to European markets.

The TANAP gas will arrive in Turkey in 2018 and will be then distributed to Europe, while the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) starts from Kipoi, on the border between Greece and Turkey, transits through Greece and Albania and will connect to TANAP in Turkey.

For TANAP, Azerbaijan and Turkey will also open to Turkmenistan.

Hence, reacting to this geoeconomic project only with the “orange revolutions” seems, in principle, tantamount to taking a mallet to crack a peanut.

In fact, there is no possible counteraction of the Atlantic Alliance to this project of pro-Russian natural gas transfer lines – a project which can be controlled only by indirect strategic activities, particularly with the “hybrid warfare” techniques put in its place precisely by the Russian Federation.

It is worth recalling that, as early as 2011, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly expressed his intention of getting out of the dollar area used for energy transactions and creating a “parallel market” based on the rouble only.

Moreover OSCE is the only international forum in which all Member States are treated equally – hence it is the ideal organization to reopen the strategic dialogue with the Russian Federation,

Considering that the OSCE strength is also to monitor and manage regional conflicts, its already active 57 members should cooperate also with Israel, where the tension with the Palestinian Authority – which is bound to be a failed State – can be kept under control and limited precisely by using the full panoply of techniques, skilled staff and political authority the Organization has shown so far.

Hence reducing the OSCE role only to the monitoring of the election regularity is extremely simplistic, even though objectively necessary.

The German Foreign Minister and current OSCE Chairman-in-office suggested that OSCE must also deal with the monitoring and verification of conventional weapons, which are and will be the weapons actually used in future wars.

The nuclear balance is eminently political and strategic. Those “weapons are made for being never used”, as said many years ago by a NATO Secretary General, the British Lord Ismay.

In addition, OSCE could combine its environmental protection efforts with economic and “development” cooperation – a new function which could operate in a decisive context for the world’s future, namely the one uniting the Partnership for the Mediterranean with the wide Asian and Eurasian region.

While NATO is closing eastwards, thus repeating the conditioned reflex for which it was created, we now need effective and inclusive organizations, which open to the strategic, economic and military “new world” Asia will be, where the EU will regain its true geopolitical mission and the Mediterranean, but especially Israel, will be in a position to ensure their multilateral security.

It is worth recalling that Italy will chair the OSCE Mediterranean Dialogue throughout 2017 and it will be good not to reduce this opportunity to a sort of “European Semester”, full of conferences but which we hope will be soon over.

Italy as a means and instrument of the new OSCE life but, more importantly, as the country enlarging the Organization to Eurasia and, simultaneously, to the Mediterranean.

Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa
Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York.
He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group.
In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “

Cyber Warfare in the World

The concept of information warfare began as a technology oriented tactic to gain information dominance by superior command and control. This soon developed into a realization of the power of information as both a ‘weapon’ as well as a ‘target’. The importance of information rather than its associated vehicle – information technology − created a situation where influence became a critical factor in conflict. As the nature of conflict changed to being an almost ongoing situation, control over mass communication be-came a high priority task for governments as well as the military. As such, the manipulation of information became an essential function.

Information warfare is primarily a construct of a ‘war mindset’. However, the development of information operations from it has meant that the concepts have been transferred from military to civilian affairs. The contemporary involvement between the media, the military, and the media in the contemporary world of the ‘War on Terrorism’ has meant the distinction between war and peace is difficult to make. However, below the application of deception in the military context is described but it must be added that the dividing line is blurred.

Of course, deception has been an attribute of humans throughout history. Its informal use in war also has a history as long as war itself. However, only in the twentieth century with its formal use by governments and the military did the development of its theoretical base begin. The Soviet Union used Maskirovka to great effect during the Cold War and was first to develop it as an integrated part of normal diplomatic and military procedure (Smith, 1998). It also became a formal part of doctrine in Western militaries in that late twentieth century.

The U.S. Joint Doctrine for Information Operations defines deception as:

Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in manner prejudicial to his interests

However, the Joint Doctrine for Military Deception gives a fuller definition:

Military deception is defined as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

A later doctrine from the US Air Force (2005) on information warfare (actually, information operations) refers to ‘influence operations’ as one of the four major components of the information environment (network warfare operations, electronic warfare operations and integrated control enablers are the others). The components of influence operations are psychological operations, military deception, operations security, counter-intelligence, public affairs, and counter-propaganda. All of these activities have one aim: to influence the mind and behavior of the adversary in ways beneficial to the perpetrator. As such, all involve deception to a greater or lesser degree. This is in contrast to a decade earlier where the emphasis was on technology and its use. The objective of deception is to be used with the other tactics to gain ‘information superiority’ where this is defined as “the state that is achieved when a competitive advantage is derived from the ability to exploit a superior information position”. It is attempting to get the adversary to believe what the deceiver wants them to believe for the advantage of the deceiver and the disadvantage of the deceived. It is truly using information as a weapon. Information superiority is the raison d’être of information warfare. The theory of deception was also developed outside the formal doctrinal area. For instance, since the mid-1990’s investigators from RAND examined the use of deception and its theoretical basis and produced a model for deception planning.

In 1991, J Bowyer Bell and Barton Whaley published Cheating and Deception as an attempt to theorize about the nature of deception in its broadest sense. They created a classification of deception types. In it, they speculated that there were two basic types of deception: Level 1; that consisted of hiding the real, and Level 2; this showed the false. Of course, Level 2 is always a part of level 1.

These fundamental types are further divided into six categories. Hiding can be broken into: masking (basically means blending in for example, camouflage), repackaging (where something is given a new ‘wrapping’), and dazzling (which consists of confounding the target for example, using codes). Showing can be broken into: mimicking (this means producing replicas, which have one or more characteristics of reality), inventing (which involves creating new realities), and decoying (which involves misdirecting the attacker).

Information warfare is split into offensive and defensive modes. Deception has its place in the offensive mode although counter-deception is regarded in U.S doctrine as defensive. However, the distinction is somewhat artificial and, as will be illustrated below, it can be used in all the elements of information war-fare.

Information warfare (information operations) consists of various functions. These include defensive activities such as: operations security (this denies knowledge of your own operations to the enemy), counter deception (decreases the effect of an enemy’s deception activities), and counter propaganda or counter psychological operations (which attempts to counter the impact of the enemy’s messages). Offensive activities include: military deception (measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion and falsification of evidence), and psychological operations (measures to influence attitudes and behavior of allies and enemies).

Added to these are the closely aligned Public Affairs and Civil Affairs. Public Affairs is concerned with military/government interaction with the media, whilst Civil Affairs is concerned with those actions needed to influence the relations between the military and the civilian population in a military operation. American sources are used in this paper as they are the most published. For instance, the Australian and United Kingdom doctrines for information operations have a classification of ‘Restricted’.

By definition, information warfare has information and its use as a weapon as the core of its activities. As deception is about limiting access to and manipulation of information, it is a fundamental requirement for successful information warfare. This permeates all its levels: tactical, operational and strategic.

Arquilla and Rondfelt (1996) describe nations as being at different stages in the development of a networked society. They proffer four stages: clan/tribal, institutional, market, and organizational networks. Developed nations such as America, Australia, and the United Kingdom would fit into the latter category. As much of the data storage and processing, and communications is achieved by electronic networks in these nations, digital deception would take prime place. In other less developed nations, other methods would take prominence. In developed and developing nations, the combination of mass media and communication networks has provided a rich, if challenging, environment for information warfare and deception. Ironically, this ‘information rich’ environment makes deception both more and less achievable. The ubiquity of communications makes the dissemination of data much easier. Hence, people have access to various views. However, the context with which this information is interpreted is primarily determined by the mass media that is generally owned by small cartel of interests. It is in this paradoxical world that future deceivers will work.

The theory of deception was also developed outside the formal doctrinal area. For instance, since the mid-1990’s investigators from RAND examined the use of deception and its theoretical basis and produced a model for deception planning

How AlQaeda and ISIS Teach Central Asian Children: Different Methods, Common Goals

Some Western countries mistakenly think that the al Qaida-linked Salafi-jihadi groups from Central Asia and Chinese Xinjiang are fragmented, weak and less dynamic; therefore they do not pose a big threat compared to the Islamic state.However, in-depth study of their activities and ideological doctrine shows that the Central Asian al Qaida ally groups today are actively engaged in the ideological education of children and youth, which in the future will become faithful fighters of the global jihad.

The following comparison covers the methods of ideological education of Central Asia’s children and youth, and their use by ISIS and al Qaeda to achieve their goals.

It is known that during the bloody reign of the Caliphate, more than 10 thousand citizens from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and the Uyghurs from northwest China fought on the side of ISIS.Many of them made a Hijrah (the migration of Muslims for Jihad) to Iraq and Syria to “protect the values of true Islam” and brought their families with small children there.Subsequently, some of these children entered the battalion ‘Cubs of the Caliphate’ and became protagonists in the Islamic State’s Propaganda.

According to my statistical research, in 2013-2018, more than 55 video, audio, and text materials were released by the Islamic State’s media wings with the participation of Central Asia’s children in Arabic, Uygur, Uzbek, Russian, Kyrgyz, and Tajik.After the fall of the Caliphate, propaganda videos with the participation of Central Asian children almost ceased.But the ideological “virus” ISIS continues its mutation among the youth of the former Soviet republics.

With the diminishing possibilities of the Islamic state’s media resources, the propaganda and ideological activity of the al Qaida-linked Central Asian Salafi-jihadi groups have recently increased in contrast.As is already known, the Uzbek militants of Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ) and Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (KIB), as well as Uyghur jihadists of the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP)from the Chinese province of Xinjiang are affiliated with al Qaeda.All three groups regularly publish propaganda videos of children from the Syrian province of Idlib where they are fighting against the regime of Bashar al-Assad.Since 2013, al Qaeda has posted about 30 videos, audio and text materials in which Central Asia’s children made up the main plot.

It should be noted that in Syria and Afghanistan about 200 Uyghur and Uzbek children are now being raised, whose parents are associated with al Qaeda.Many of them came to the Middle East with their parents. However, among them, there are those who were born already in Syria.

Common aspects of the ideological school of al Qaeda and ISIS

Based on a comparative analysis of video, audio and text materials regarding the participation of Central Asian children, it is possible to point out the common and specific aspects of the alQaeda and ISIS ideological schools, and what different methodologies they use in raising children and youth.

The main common characteristic of the curriculum in al Qaeda’s and ISIS’ madrasas is learning the Quran by heart, Tawhid (monotheism), Fiqh (jurisprudence), Salat (prayers), Aqidah (creed), Hadith, and Sura (life of Prophet Muhammad).

The second common feature in the education of Central Asian children in alQaeda and ISIS’ camps is the call to Jihad.The doctrine of Jihad is the main place in the ideology of both Sunni terrorist groups, and accordingly, in the madrasas and training camps, children are brainwashed from early childhood with ideas of holy Jihad.Imams explain to children in detail about all forms of Jihad and the sacred purpose of the Shahid (martyr).As a result, children after training in such religious schools, as a rule, replenish the “reserve fund” of ideologically hardened jihadists.

Uyghur children in al Qaeda’s Madrasa in Syria

The difference between alQaeda and ISIS in the education of children and youth

A sharp ideological confrontation between the two main Sunni groups has escalated into armed conflict, which also affects the education of the younger generation of Islamists.To achieve victory in the struggle for hegemony in the global jihadist movement, the ideologists of al Qaeda use all means, including children’s education in madrasas.

Al Qaeda-sympathized Uzbek and Uyghur imams in madrasas in Syria tell children about the enemies of Islam, which they ranked on a par with the “Kafir regimes” of the USA, Russia and China also the Kharijites (those who defected from the Ummah and rebelled against the Caliph) of the Islamic state and its leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.

KTJ and TIP opened several madrasas to teach their children in Uzbek and Uyghur languages on the territory of the so-called “Liberated land of Sham”, which is controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), former al-Nusra Front.KTJ on the Internet often disseminates information about the activities of two madrasas: the Abdullah ibn Abbas Madrasa and the Umar ibn al-Khattab Madrasa.

Also, the Uyghur Salafists of TIP own several madrasas in in Jisr al-Shugur in northwestern Syria.This was possible thanks to the fact that the Uyghur and Uzbek jihadists live compactly and separately in last major rebel stronghold of Idlib.In accordance with the guiding doctrine of al Qaeda, they have skillfully adapted to local conditions, and have virtually no conflicts with the local Arab population.

As is known, during the ideological confrontation, al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri accused ISIS of excessive cruelty towards other Muslims, an unjustified using of Takfir (accusation of apostasy), ignoring the high goals of the Shari’a, which split the Mujahideen ranks.In 2015, the ideologues of al Qaeda even published a special book entitled “The Islamic State is the succession of tyranny and corruption,” in which they raised the problem of excessiveness in Islam (Ghulu fid-deen) and called al-Baghdadi to moderation.Zawahiri brought to mind him the Hadith, in which Prophet said: “Beware of ghulu (excessiveness) in religion, for indeed, what devastated those before you was ghulu in religion.”

ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al Adnani replied that the Caliphate did not swear al Qaeda because it was not appropriate for the State to swear organizations. As a result, ISIS began to use mass executions and public beheadings with incredible cruelty.Unlike ISIS, al Qaeda advocated a more gentle approach to convince local Muslims to accept its views and not force them to do.Ayman al-Zawahiri noted that it is impossible to unite Muslims, trying to impose their power on them with the help of violence.

Indeed, during the peak of his reign in 2015–16, ISIS released dozens of videos with the participation of Central Asian children, who not only taught the Quran in the madrasas, but also cut off the heads of prisoners, executed “kafirs”, and blew themselves up as martyrs. Central Asia’s children were integrated into the military machine of the Caliphate as cruel executioners and suicide bombers, becoming an ideological tool in the struggle for leadership in the global jihad.

The ideological differences between the Islamic state and al Qaeda manifested themselves with the example of teaching children in madrasas.The Uyghur and Uzbek jihadists of TIP, KTJ and KIB, in organizing the teaching of children in the madrasas, took into account the recommendations of their spiritual leader Zawahiri to show a sense of practicality, pragmatism and not to demonstrate excessive cruelty.

When analyzing video plots, the “peaceful nature” of the educational process stands out and the excessive cruelty of the students of the madrasa does not appear.For example, in the Abdullah ibn Abbas Madrasa, in addition to studying the Quran, children also study mathematics, Arabic and Uzbek languages, military science and sports.Imam says that the madrasa is fully equipped with books and textbooks, and books on the Uzbek language brought from Central Asia.According to him, the goal of training is to bring up a new generation of educated and highly intelligent warriors of Allah so that in the future they can resist the technological know-how of the West and defeat the enemies of Islam.

Another video shows the educational process in the Umar ibn al-Khattab Madrasa, where the Uzbek children study among local Arab children. For Uzbek children, a bus-service has been organized that to take and pick children up from Madrasa.

On October 29, 2018, TIP published a video entitled “Protectors of the Quran”, where Uighur children demonstrate excellent knowledge of the Quran, social science classes, swimming in the pool, exercise and military training.The Imam tells them about the atrocities of the Chinese authorities against the Uyghur Muslims and sets the task that they must liberate the lands of East Turkestan from the yoke of Beijing in the future.An analysis of these videos shows that in madrasas, the learning process is organized according to the concept of al Qaeda and the upbringing of children is conducted according to its ideology.

The USA is the main enemy for al Qaeda-backed Central Asia’s jihadists

The fall of the Caliphate revealed that Ayman al-Zawahiri had strategically calibrated the priorities of al Qaeda and its affiliated groups from Central Asia, and managed to implement an action plan that allowed them to survive in the struggle for leadership of the global jihad.For him, it is important not the seizure of territories or the creation of his own state with Sharia rule, but the process of jihad against the USA and its allies, and the widespread of al Qaeda ideology in the Islamic world.

Al Qaeda’s tactic is that it tries not to draw enemy’s fire, slyly and prudently leads the game on its own survival, fundamentally creates its own ideological infrastructure and persistently teaches the next generation of jihadists.

The activities of TIP, KTJ and KIB showed that over the past five years the influence of al Qaeda among the Salafis of Central Asia has increased significantly. There is not only the rejuvenation of al Qaeda militants, but also the ideology of global jihadism is rejuvenating.

In his manifest address named General Guidelines for Jihad, Ayman al-Zawahiri outlined al-Qaida’s priority task of fighting against the far enemy – the United States and its allies.According to him, the local regimes and other Islamic movements (Rawafidh, Ismailis, Qadianis, and deviant Sufis, etc.) are nearby enemies for Al Qaida. He urged not to attack the “nearby enemies”, but instead focus on fighting the “far enemy.”

There is no doubt that TIP, KTJ and KIB will firmly adhere to the strategic line designated by Zawahiri.For them, the main priority remains a blow to the US and its military, diplomatic missions near the conflict zones in the future.But they are not in a position to carry out such an operation now and so far securely hide their true intentions.Therefore, the US should not underestimate the potential threat posed by the al Qaeda-affiliated Central Asian Salafi-jihadi groups

Related

The relations between Malta and Libya and economic crimes inside Libya

Since the beginning of hostilities against Gaddafi, operations – carried out mainly by the French intelligence services -started from Malta to send weapons, intelligence, instructors and trainers to the “rebel” forces in Cyrenaica who were fighting the Rais.

The French military reached the coast of Benghazi with two nuclear submarines and the Brigade Action of the intelligence services, while the links had already been established abroad, and sometimes just outside Rome – even with the help of the United States.

I also watched the first internal documentaries of the anti-Gaddafi rebel forces, trained with materials and means which were usually available to the best hit squads of the Western intelligence services.

It was hard to believe how the Libyan “rebels” were so able to use very refined weapons.

The French agents also used “covert” flights to monitor the arrival and distribution of weapons, especially to avoid they could end up in the hands of the wrong people. Since the first attacks in Tripoli, the French agents had also provided to their “rebels” as many as 9.1 billion US dollars of weapons and had later continued to supply other weapons to their local champions, for large sums of money and always using Malta as a base.

The preferred channel of the French agents was General Abdul Fatah Younis Al Obeidi, who had been the Head of the Libyan National Liberation Army, a force of Cyrenaica made up of approximately 13,000 soldiers originated from a tribal rebellion within Gaddafi’s army.

Yunis Al-Obeidi, however, had been murdered on July 28, 2011 near Benghazi.

As reported at the time, he had probably been killed by jihadists, who had already penetrated the pro-Western “rebel” armies – a 1968-style stupid terminology that immediately reveals what the operational and intelligence culture of Western politicians is.

Nevertheless, according to Wikileaks data, the United States also knew that Yunis was a very secret contact with Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, while it was very likely that the 9 billion US dollars for the French weapons sold to Malta came from Gaddafi’s frozen accounts in Belgian banks – accounts not yet fully investigated.

On the one hand, France was afraid that – after the fall of Gaddafi’s regime, the various Libyan “revolutionaries” could carry out a series of terrorist actions directly in France, but hence why promoting the anti-Gaddafi insurgency? We will never know.As Ennio Flaiano used to say, also stupidity has its mysteries and unfathomable depths.

On the other hand, France heavily controlled the migrant networks, already active at the time, and finally selected their forces of reference mainly to avoid the US hegemony in the fight against Gaddafi.

Nevertheless, everything started from Malta, which always acted as a support base and a remote intelligence and economic control area.

In fact, since its establishment, the Government of National Accord (GNA) secretly granted to France 35% of Libyan oil to thank it for its support in the “liberation” struggle. A 35% which added to the already used 15% of oil processed regularly by Total, much more linked to the French intelligence services than ENI is to the Italian ones.

France officially supports the National Transitional Council of Libya (NTC) (as well as Khalifa Haftarin Cyrenaica) and, in fact, believes that the issue of migrants – which financially also takes place in Malta – shall be central to Libya’s future economy: in fact, France believes that the issue must be solved only on the spot, namely in Libya.

This means that the refugees present on the Libyan territory, who possibly passed through the areas controlled by the French Armed Forces to Agadez and elsewhere between Chad, Niger and Mali, can be divided as it still happens today: since 2011 as many as 696,000 migrants have fled to neighbouring countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, Chad, Algeria and Sudan, while other 30,000 ones have left, by sea, to Italy or to Malta.

The migration issue that is solved on its own and to Italy’s detriment – this is the French strategic idea.

Many other migrants have reached Italy through other ways, often certainly not unknown to many of its traditional allies in Europe.

Great Britain, the other actor of the anti-Gaddafi conflict besides France, carried out a set of military actions between Zilla and Southern Libya – starting from Malta and with a series of forward bases along the coast – to collect and expatriate mainly non-British oil workers – the imaginary core of some hit squads active in the anti-Gaddafi “revolution”.

Coincidentally, the airlift – useful for 150 foreign operators in the Libyan desert – was always based in Malta.

The Libyan oil smuggling from the coast of Tripolitania and Sirte to many small ports in Malta continues – a trafficking that, under the cover of the Sicilian Mafia and of some Maltese politicians and members of Parliament, has permitted annual earnings of over 82 million euros.

This was exactly what the investigative journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia had been dealing with before being killed in a car bomb attack – a technique well known to the Sicilian Mafia clans.

The oil is supposed to come from the port of Zuwara, mainly with the support of Ben Khalifa’s Libyan militia, but the oil hidden in vessels suitable for fishing and later sent off Malta’s coast – with ship-to-ship transfers – arrives at the ports controlled by the same Maltese company and is distributed throughout Europe in a traditional way.

The Maltese fishermen of Marsaxlokk have often noted how the ship-to-ship exchange of oil cargoes has never been stopped by the Maltese maritime police authorities, while the (fake) certificates held by the oil traffickers refer to products originating from “Saudi Arabia”.

Moreover, the Italian law enforcement agencies have well-grounded reasons to believe that the fake certificates have been regularized by a Maltese notary public and also signed by a Director of the Maltese Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

All this in favour of well-known Mafia families and clans from Catania.

According to local insurance experts, oil smuggling costs Libya at least 750 million US dollars a year, which is equivalent to the commercial tampering of 35-40% of the Libyan oil extracted every year.

Another issue to be analyzed in depth at the next conference on Libya.

Furthermore, the Italian and non-Italian investigators report that the Maltese smugglers, jointly with many Libyan ringleaders, always devise new traffic routes and new methods to conceal their trafficking, with a route that currently prefers the small ports in Southern Spain so as to later head for Cyprus.

Initially, until 2011 hashish left mainly from the Moroccan coast, with small ships (as is currently the case for migrant trafficking) and arrived directly on the Southern or Eastern-Southern coasts of Spain.

After the famous “revolution” against Gaddafi, currently all hashish leaves from Tobruk, where the big stacks of hashish for smoking are stored and protected by local militiamen.

Then the Sicilian Mafia clans distribute these loads in Italy and in the rest of Europe.

Nowadays, however, there is still something new: while, in the past,drugs were brought to Europe by large ships, often owned by Syria, now the small loads of drugs are transferred from the Libyan to the European coasts by Italian or Maltese fishing vessels, which later leave their royalties in the Maltese banks.

The mechanism is always the same: on the high seas, hashish is transferred from smaller to larger ships.

The same holds true for the illegal trafficking of cigarettes- an old Mafia business which, however, is always a source of excellent profits.

In this case, the third port used by smugglers is still the port of Bar in Montenegro.

It was the area where Slobodan Milosevic was hidden, while everyone was looking for him elsewhere, although NATO knew where he was.

In the past, smuggling – somehow permitted by Gaddafi for his most trusted friends – was mainly related to lawful goods, but rare on the Libyan market, while – after 2011 – smuggling has been no longer focused only on goods not available on the Libyan market, but rather on clearly illegal goods (weapons, drugs) and migrants.

The Libyan economy, however, is still a war economy, where the predatory and violent actions prevail over all the others.

Nevertheless, it is above all the smuggling of migrants that is still essential for Libya’s internal economy, regardless of the area considered.

In fact, in 2017 the Libyan factions obtained almost one billion US dollars from migrant trafficking, while in the current year they have already gained 985,000 dollars of net income, by using other routes and other methods.

According to the Libyan offices, 30% of the oil used for transport is traded illegally, with as many as 105 phantom distributors, while the oil for other types of consumption is traded illegally via Darfur or South Sudan to the sub-Saharan rich marketnot covered by large distributors.

Diesel is usually stolen at sea and later sold to Italian and other European distributors by people in contact with the Libyan gangs.

Every year 18% of the proceeds from Libyan oil is hence left in the hands of smugglers.

With specific reference to drugs, after 2011 Libya has become a point of transit, but also of consumption (as is currently the case with Afghanistan), particularly for heroin and cocaine, while there are signs that the internal market for methamphetamines is spreading, which are widely traded also towards Italy and the Spanish ports.

Moreover, the executives of the Central Bank of Libya in the Tobruk Parliament have accused as many as 24 foreign companies and 44 Libyan companies of being involved in currency trafficking from the areas for cash collection in Libya to the Maltese banks and, sometimes, to Cypriot and Spanish banks.

Hence this is the link between the EU illegal economies and the criminal economies of Libya, divided into factions fighting one another at military, but above all at economic levels, while the State disappears or is divided into two parts.