Plaintiff Anna Repaskey filed a four count claim for injuries
suffered in a fall on an escalator of the Chicago Transit Authority
located in a subway station. Plaintiff appeals only the disposition
of Count I of the claim which alleged the negligence of defendant
Chicago Transit Authority in owning and operating a defective
escalator. Defendant Chicago Transit Authority was dismissed
for plaintiff's failure to provide it with formal notice
of the accident, within six months of the accident, as required
by Section 341 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act.
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 111 2/3, par.
341.1 )
The complaint alleged that plaintiff had provided actual notice
(in the form of an accident report) to Chicago Transit Authority
which sufficed for formal notice, and also that the Chicago
Transit Authority was estopped from asserting the notice
provision. After hearing testimony bearing on these
allegations, the trial judge dismissed the Chicago Transit Authority.

On appeal plaintiff argues (1) that the actual notice given to
the CTA in the form of a claim report satisfied requirements
of formal notice set forth in Section 341; (2) that Section 341
is unconstitutional, violating Article IV, Section 22 of the
1870 Illinois Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution; and (3) that defendant Chicago Transit
Authority was estopped from asserting the notice requirement.

Plaintiff was injured on July 11, 1966. She was a passenger
on defendant's subway, disembarked at the Jackson and Dearborn
Street station and boarded an escalator to reach street level.
As she neared the top of the escalator and prepared to
step off, she discovered that her left sandal was lodged in
the treadle on which she was standing. The sandal was lodged
in a gap created because several teeth were missing from the
treadle. When the treadle meshed with the stationary plat at
the top of the escalator, the sandal remained caught and plaintiff
was thrown forward on to her right knee. A man freed her foot from the
sandal and then removed the sandal from the escalator.

The day of the accident plaintiff went to the claim department
of the Chicago Transit Authority in the Merchandise Mart. A claim
adjustor, Howard Clark, took a statement from her describing
her accident. Plaintiff signed the report and Clark notarized
it. At Clark's suggestion plaintiff was then examined by a doctor
in the employ of the CTA with offices on the same floor. The
doctor x-rayed plaintiff's right knee. Plaintiff then returned
to Clark's office. She testified that Clark told her: "Now go
home and we'll take care of you. Don't worry about anything.
We'll let you know."

Some time in September plaintiff called Clark to see what progress
had been made on her claim. She testified that he told her that
there were many cases ahead of hers. He told her: "I told you
don't worry. The minute we take care of this case we'll send
someone to your home. We'll take care of you. Just go see the doctor."

Plaintiff testified that she called again in December. Clark
again told her: "We'll take care of everything."

Plaintiff made a third phone call in January. Plaintiff testified
that Clark stated: "Well, the man will look into this now." He
then continued: "We'll send the man there to talk with you but
like I told you don't worry about anything." Plaintiff testified that
she replied: "Don't worry about anything? There will be
bills." Clark replied: "Don't worry. We'll take care of everything."

Plaintiff had no further contact with the Chicago Transit Authority.
She continued to experience pain in her knee, made frequent visits
to her doctor and was given prescriptions to relieve the pain.
During this period she continued to work but occasionally had
to miss a day. She never filed the formal six month notice required
by the aforementioned statute. In April of 1967, ten months after
the accident, she underwent surgery on her knee. She filed her
complaint on July 7, 1967.

At trial the adjustor, Clark, identified the claim report which
he had written and plaintiff had signed. He testified that he
could not recall whether or not he had conversed with plaintiff
on the phone.

Plaintiff, in her effort to show actual notice by the Chicago
Transit Authority, introduced a CTA "Escalator Inspection Report"
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 12. The report, dated July 25, 1966, requests
an inspection of the escalator at Jackson and Dearborn because
of an "alleged accident" which occurred on July 11, 1966, 8:25
A.M., in which a woman's shoe became caught in the top of the
escalator. The report states that the escalator is inspected
every week as a matter of routine. It states that the escalator
was inspected on July 6, 1966, and on July 14, 1966, as part
of the routine inspections, and that on both occasions the escalator
was found to be in "good running condition." The inspection requested
because of the accident was conducted on August 8 and resulted
in a finding of "good running condition."

Plaintiff first contends that her claim report filed in the CTA
claims department satisfied the notice requirements of Section
341 and that actual notice will suffice for formal, written notice.
In addition to her report of the accident, plaintiff calls our
attention to Plaintiff's Exhibit 12, consisting of a request
by the CTA to inspect the escalator, giving further indication
that the CTA was aware of her accident.

The argument that actual notice will suffice for formal
notice was raised in the recent case of
Housewright v. City of LaHarpe,
51 Ill.2d 357, 282 N.E.2d 437.
That case involved Section 8-102 of the Local Government and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 85, par. 8-102), which
contains a notice provision almost identical to that of Section
341 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act. Since the defendant
in that case was the city marshall, the plaintiff argued that
the defendant city had actual notice and hence met the requirements
of Section 8-102. The court stated:

"Plaintiffs seek to avoid the effect of section 8-103 by alleging
facts that show the defendant city had actual notice of the occurrence,
of the damage to the plaintiff partnership's vehicle and the
individual plaintiff's personal injuries, and of all the information
which section 8-102 provides must be contained in the notice.
Section 8-102 is unambiguous and clearly expresses the legislative
intent that a local public entity be given certain
information, in writing, within the time
provided, and we hold that the allegation of actual notice does
not satisfy the statutory requirement of written notice."

Plaintiff's second contention is that the notice
provision is unconstitutional because it is a violation of
equal protection and due process and violates Section 22
of Article IV of the 1870 constitution. In
Housewright v. City of LaHarpe,
the court rejected the argument that notice provisions for
municipal bodies is a violation of equal protection and
due process. And in
King v. Johnson,
47 Ill.2d 247, 265 N.E.2d 874,
(again dealing with the analogous Section 8-102 of the
Tort Immunity Act) the court held that such notice
provisions did not constitute special legislation
in violation of Section 22 of Article IV of the 1870 constitution.

Finally, plaintiff contends that the Chicago Transit Authority
should be estopped from asserting the six month notice provision.
She argues that their repeated assurances that her case "would
be taken care of" created an estoppel. We do not agree.

In
McCarthy v. City of Chicago,
312 Ill. App. 268, 38 N.E.2d 519,
it was held that a municipal body cannot be estopped
from asserting notice provisions of the type at bar. In
McCarthy
the plaintiff submitted a claim to the "personal injury
division" of the Corporation Counsel. The claim described her
injuries, the circumstances of the accident, the name of
her physician and her expenses. Her claim was introduced
to the City Council and was subsequently rejected. She
did not file the required statutory notice
with the city clerk. Plaintiff argued
(312 Ill. App. 268, 279):

"[B]y reason of the conduct of the Corporation Counsel together
with the action of the City Council in this consideration of
the claim, the City should be estopped from urging the failure
to file a copy of the notice with the city clerk as a defense."

The court rejected this argument, stating at page 279:

"It is a sufficient answer to the instant contention to say that
it is the law of this State that `the city has no power to waive
the notice and is under no liability until it is given.'
(Walters v. City of Ottawa,
supra,
[240 Ill. 259] p. 263.)
Obviously, if a city cannot waive the notice no action
by any of its officials can estop the city from
urging the failure of a plaintiff to file the notice."

We therefore find that the Chicago Transit Authority was not
estopped from asserting the notice provision of
Section 341. Plaintiff cites cases from other jurisdictions in
which municipalities and other governmental bodies have been
estopped from asserting similar notice provisions as a
defense. Nevertheless we feel constrained to follow
what remains the established law of this state.

No civil action shall be commenced in any court against the
Authority by any person for any injury to his person unless
it is commenced within one year from the date that the injury
was received or the cause of action accrued. Within six (6)
months from the date that such an injury was received or
such cause of action accrued, any person who is about to
commence any civil action in any court against the
Authority for damages on account of any injury to his
person shall file in the office of the secretary of the
Board and also in the office of the General Attorney for the
Authority either by himself, his agent, or attorney, a statement,
in writing, signed by himself, his agent, or attorney, giving
the name of the person to whom the cause of action has accrued,
the name and residence of the person injured, the date and about
the hour of the accident, the place or location where the
accident occurred and the name and address of the attending
physician, if any. If the notice provided for by this section
is not filed as provided, any such civil action commenced against
the Authority shall be dismissed and the person to whom any such
cause of action accrued for any personal injury shall be
forever barred from further suing."
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