RUSSELL W. GLENN

For the moment, America's Army has not one but
two sets of principles for military operations. The first is the traditional
list of nine, last examined in 1993. The second contains principles for
operations other than war. The first formally appeared in US Army documents
in 1921 (albeit in a slightly different form); the principles of operations
other than war (OOTW) were introduced in the 1993 Operations manual.
The principles of war have assumed a character of permanence, but soldiers
and others have frequently challenged them, believing variously that nuclear
weapons, improved understanding of irregular warfare, or the enhanced influence
of public opinion and the media had made the list incomplete or no longer
of value. The principles have nonetheless changed but slightly. In an army
where change is the norm, the principles of war have remained largely unassailable.

Yet the sense of permanence is deceiving, for the history of the current
principles of war is a volatile one. Even their presentation as a brief
list with concise descriptions is a 20th-century phenomenon. John I. Alger
noted:

The term "principles of war" did not always connote the idea
of a list of rules intended to facilitate the conduct of war. In fact,
two distinct definitions of the term have been widely used. First, the
principles of war represented a commonly accepted philosophy concerning
the myriad of activities that collectively compose the conduct of war.
In the present century, however, the idea that the principles of war are
an enumerated list of considerations, few in number, capable of being simply
expressed and essential to the successful conduct of war, has become increasingly
accepted. The former definition was used by writers on war for centuries,
but the latter, though it has become the standard in English-speaking nations,
originated in the Napoleonic era--quite possibly with Napoleon himself.[1]

Strategist Bernard Brodie was less reticent when he wrote,

Although Clausewitz himself speaks loosely of certain "principles"
to be observed and followed, . . . he specifically rejected the notion
that there could be any well-defined body of particular rules or principles
that universally dictated one form of behavior rather than another. . .
. It was not until the twentieth century that various army field manuals
would attempt to encapsulate centuries of experience and volumes of reflection
into a few tersely worded and usually numbered "principles of war."
Clausewitz would have been appalled at such attempts, and not surprised
at some of the terrible blunders that have been made in the name of those
"principles."[2]

Perhaps Clausewitz would have been appalled; then again, he seems to
have recognized that a few words are far easier to recall after fatigue
and stress have blurred a leader's mind. "We must have recourse to
the relevant principles established by theory," Clausewitz wrote.
"These truths should always be allowed to become self-evident. . .
. We will thus avoid using an arcane and obscure language, and express
ourselves in plain speech, with a sequence of clear, lucid concepts."[3]
Clausewitz, it seems, would have had little problem with the tersely worded
principle of "simplicity."

The Army is now revising--for the second time since 1989--its fundamental
doctrine. FM 100-5, Operations, will have been updated nine times
since 1945--on average every six years--when the 1998 version is published.
Among the significant changes presented in the initial drafts of the 1998
edition were these: the "principles of operations other than war"
were eliminated, two current principles were revised and two new ones added,
and the resulting list was redesignated as "principles of operations."
After vigorous debate in the field, with some soldiers strongly favoring
the changes and others lending less support, the current draft of Operations
leaves the "traditional" nine principles unaltered from their
1986 form.

The inquiring mind might wonder at this support for the status quo.
Perhaps it was a reaction to seemingly uncontrollable change in the Army.
Perhaps there is a belief within the service that the durability of the
principles provides an anchor for Army doctrine. Conversely, the choice
for constancy may have been made in ignorance of the origins of the principles
and their historic mutability.

This article proceeds from the final proposition above. It has three
objectives: first, to describe how the "traditional" principles
assumed their current form, and second, to explain why eliminating "principles
of operations other than war" is essential. Finally, the article suggests
that the modifications and additions to the principles of war originally
proposed for the next version of the Army's operational doctrine deserve
one more look before we commit the Army's active and reserve components
to a set of operational principles that may not yet be quite "all
they can be."

The Origins of the Principles

The US Army first provided its soldiers a list of principles in 1921.
Training Regulation No. 10-5 listed nine principles of war identical to
those in use today with the exception that "movement" and "cooperation"
stood in the place of "maneuver" and "unity of command,"
respectively. This first appearance included no discussion of individual
principles. The single paragraph that described their purpose and use also
declared them to be "immutable." Charles A. Willoughby, who would
later make his name as Douglas MacArthur's World War II Intelligence Chief
in the Pacific, took the inviolate status of the principles a step further
in his Maneuver in War. "These principles are basic and immutable,"
he wrote; "the great commanders have been guided by them, and success
or failure has depended upon the extent and manner of their use. They are
not subject to exception. Their proper execution constitutes the true measure
of the military art."[4] Willoughby published his work in 1939, the
same year the principles reentered US Army doctrine. They had disappeared
after 1928, only to reappear in the 1939 FM 100-5, Tentative Field Service
Regulations, Operations.

Willoughby traced the origins of these fundamentals, at the time new
to the Army. He quoted Napoleon, who wrote that "Caesar's principles
were the same as those of Alexander and Hannibal: (a) to keep his forces
in junction, (b) not to be vulnerable in any direction, [and] (c) to advance
rapidly on important points." From these, Willoughby believed, "One
can hardly fail to recognize (a) the principle of concentration, (b) the
principle of security, and (c) the principle of the objective." Willoughby
went on to extract what he thought was a comprehensive and concise list
of Napoleon's principles by culling them from the emperor's writings, concluding
that they included objective, offensive, mass, surprise, security, and
movement.[5] British military theorist J. F. C. Fuller did not concur with
Willoughby's approach, believing that Napoleon laid "down no definite
principles, yet he apparently worked by well-defined ones."[6]

As Alger recognized, Napoleon and other pre-20th-century practitioners
and theorists of war believed that war had fundamental rules, but they
felt no compulsion to attempt their concise articulation.[7] Nor did these
earlier soldiers agree on the extent to which a commander was constrained
by such rules. Writing in the first half of the 19th century, Jomini asserted
that "the fundamental principles upon which rest all good combinations
of war have always existed, and to them all others should be referred for
the purpose of arriving at their respective merits. These principles are
unchangeable; they are independent of the arms employed, of times, and
of places."[8] His contemporary Clausewitz did not share this sense
of the principles' universality. Clausewitz concluded that the principles
were important as guides rather than Jomini's rules "upon which rest
all good combinations of war." Clausewitz continued:

Where the arch of truth culminates in such a keystone this tendency
will be underlined. But this is simply in accordance with the scientific
law of reason, to indicate the point at which all lines converge, but never
to construct an algebraic formula for use on the battlefield. Even these
principles and rules are intended to provide a thinking man with a frame
of reference for the movements he has been trained to carry out, rather
than to serve as a guide which at the moment of action lays down precisely
the path he must take.[9]

Both men agreed that principles of war existed; both discussed them
at some length; neither provided the brief list that today's soldiers have
come to expect.

Perhaps no Western military writer put more thought into the possibility
that war's actions could be characterized by a single set of principles
than J. F. C. Fuller. His lists evolved as he mulled over their nuances
in many of his books and articles written before, during, and after the
First World War. In his 1926 The Foundations of the Science of War,
he listed three groups of principles, each of which itself contained three
principles of war:

Principles of Control: direction, determination, and mobility

Principles of Pressure: concentration, surprise, and offensive action

Principles of Resistance: distribution, endurance, and security

Fuller explained the relationship among the groups as follows: "We
thus obtain a threefold order of control springing from a dual order of
pressure and resistance, each of these dual forces being in itself a threefold
one. Ultimately these three groups form one group--economy of force."[10]

Fuller's contemporary B. H. Liddell Hart joined what was a growing fascination
in Western armies with his discussion of maxims. Though Liddell Hart refused
to call them principles in his 1932 The British Way in Warfare (for
his were "practical guides, not abstract principles"), he nevertheless
concluded that "the principles of war, not merely one principle, can
be condensed into a single word--`concentration.' But for truth this needs
to be amplified as the `concentration of strength against weakness.'. .
. Here we have a fundamental principle whose understanding may prevent
the fundamental error (and the most common)--that of giving your opponent
freedom and time to concentrate to meet your concentration." Liddell
Hart went on to list his six maxims, saying "four are positive and
two negative. They apply both to strategy and to tactics":[11]

Choose the line (or course) of least expectation.

Exploit the line of least resistance.

Take a line of operations which offers alternative objectives.

Ensure that both plan and dispositions are elastic, or adaptable.

Don't lunge whilst your opponent can parry.

Don't renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after
it has once failed.

With their reemergence in the US Army's 1939 Tentative FM 100-5,the nine principles listed in the 1921 Training Regulation 10-5, Doctrine,
Principles, and Methods, took the form of seven "General Principles"
for use during the "conduct of war":[12]

Ultimate objective

Concentration of superior forces, which required "strict economy
in the strength of forces assigned to secondary missions"

Offensive action, though "a defensive attitude may, however,
be deliberately adopted as a temporary expedient"

Unity of effort

Surprise

Security

Simple and direct plans

There was no list of principles in the 1941 FM 100-5. The reader was
instead presented with several "doctrines of combat": ultimate
objective, simple and direct plans and methods, unity of effort, offensive
action, concentration of superior forces, surprise, and security.[13] Only
with the arrival of the 1949 FM 100-5 did the principles of war match those
in that manual's 1993 counterpart. The current, seemingly sacred, list
of nine principles is therefore only 49 years old.

The Principles of War and the Modern Environment of Conflict

Though the purpose and utility of principles of war were apparent to
many military theorists in the first half of the 20th century, the introduction
of nuclear weapons, increased influence of irregular warfare, and other
changes caused some to question their value. Writing during the second
decade of the Cold War, John Keegan concluded that "one of the purposes
behind the principles has been to make new and strange circumstances comprehensible,
to draw a thread from one war to another, to force events into a mold,
and to make conflicts obey the dramatic unities. . . . A point is reached
in the development of weapon systems beyond which one cannot compare the
present and the past." Keegan went on to argue that the principles
inherently implied "maximization of means," and therefore they
were applicable to neither limited nuclear war nor modern conventional
war. The latter demanded "subtle response, patience, self-control,
firmness but not ruthlessness, and an ability to settle for something less
than total victory,"[14] qualities Keegan implied were not supported
by the nine principles of war. That the application of those principles
demanded adjustment of the means to the political objective, notably that
all principles were ultimately subordinate to that of the "objective,"
did not enter into Keegan's argument. He seems to have had little faith
that Western military leaders of the era could apply the principles with
the skill Clausewitz, Fuller, and others required.

At the other extreme were arguments that the principles had universal
application, that they were "a collection of concise rules for warfare
intended to aid battle leaders from the low-ranking officer to the general.
Whether these rules are called principles, maxims, or axioms, they are
independent of time, place, and situation."[15] Such an argument was
alluring on the surface; it would have been convenient if true, but the
principles themselves had changed repeatedly both in appearance and substance
since their 1921 introduction. These changes were necessary to ensure that
the principles maintained pace with doctrinal changes, changes themselves
in part driven by advances in technology, adaptations by adversaries and
potential adversaries, better understanding of military theory, and revisions
in national strategy. The 1939 principle of "concentration,"
for example, was altered not only in form (later appearing as "mass"),
but in substance over the ensuing decades. Limited ranges and the direct-fire
nature of artillery in Napoleon's time meant that concentration required
the bringing together of many soldiers and weapons at a given place and
time on the battlefield. Later such concentration was not only unnecessary--technology
permitted massing effects while leaving the means dispersed--it was potentially
counterproductive. Rigid application of the principles, dictated rather
than demonstrated by previous applications, was likely to promote failure
rather than success.[16]

Writing in Military Review in 1991, William C. Bennett understood
the need for flexibility in applying the principles. He concluded that
the principles of warin fact applied to actions that were outside
the traditional scope of what was meant by war. Discussing Operation Just
Cause in Panama (1989-90), he noted, "Certain events indicate that
when the principles of war are applied to short-duration contingency operations
in a [low-intensity conflict] environment, the interpretation of the principles
must be viewed within a broader context than normal. The forms that some
of the principles may take are likely to be less traditional or `military'
and more `police' or `political' in nature." The earliest introduction
of the principles in the 1921 training regulations had shared this vision
of greater scope during application: "Their application varies with
the situation . . . not only in purely military work, but in administration
and business operation. . . . All active military operations will be planned
and executed in accordance with these principles."[17]

Like those of the Army, the principles of war for other US armed services
have changed over time. At one time the Air Force added "timing and
tempo," "logistics," and "cohesion" to the list
of nine it shared with the Army.[18] The Navy and Air Force currently use
the same nine principles of war listed in the Army's 1993 FM 100-5 and
Joint Pub 1, but unsurprisingly the definitions and applications vary somewhat.[19]
In Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1, Warfighting, the Marine Corps
speaks to "two concepts of such significance and universality that
we can advance them as principles: concentration and speed."
Otherwise the manual only alludes to the nine currently in use by the other
services in their primary operational manuals.[20] The Marine Corps also
refers (in FMFM 1-3, Tactics ) to "principles of tactics--gaining
a decisive advantage, moving faster than the enemy, trapping the enemy,
and the goal of all of them, achieving a decisive result." By implication,
cooperation appears to be another element in this list.[21]

The US Army's Principles in Application

Virtually all students of war have considered the principles and their
applicability to combat operations sometime during their careers. The value
of principles to such operations is readily apparent. It is less so, however,
when the nature of the operations in question varies from those from which
the principles evolved. This is the case when considering irregular warfare,
space operations, weapons of mass destruction, or military activities that
fall outside the range of those associated with traditional forms of conventional
conflict. Many agreed with Keegan that the principles had little value
when considering nuclear war. Others recognized the need for adaptation
rather than disposal; John O. Shoemaker concluded, "the principles
of war have definite application to the Cold War. . . . In the military
profession great stress is laid upon reducing problems to terms that can
be easily understood. More important perhaps is the effort devoted to defining
objectives, tasks, and desired goals in sufficient detail and clarity that
they cannot be misunderstood."[22] Josiah A. Wallace similarly concluded
that the principles were sufficiently robust to serve as guides to actions
in counterinsurgencies, finding they were an "excellent device for
the commander to use in analyzing all aspects of his counterinsurgency
plans. If his plans conform to the principles of war, he is on firm ground."[23]
James H. Mueller likewise concluded that the principles of war were applicable
to air, space, and aerospace doctrine and operations.[24]

Although military requirements and political objectives might differ
widely, conclusions that support application of the principles of war to
nuclear scenarios, irregular warfare contingencies, and space applications
are unlikely to surprise students of conflict. The capabilities needed
and technologies applied may differ profoundly from case to case, but the
fundamental subordinate relationship of military force to national objectives
is still the same as that explained by Clausewitz: "The political
object--the original motive for the war--will thus determine both the military
objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires."[25]

The Principles of Not Only War

Similar reasoning makes an apparent oxymoron logical: the application
of the principles of war to military operations not involving war. (See
Figure 1, page 58.) Many, if not all, of the principles appear to be of
value when executing non-wartime operations just as they have been during
war. Emory R. Helton concluded that six of the nine principles of war--objective,
offensive, security, unity of command, economy of force, and simplicity--applied
to Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq conducted after the 1991
Persian Gulf War, and that "five of these will probably apply to any
future humanitarian operations."[26] There is every reason to believe
that mass, maneuver, and surprise would apply to operations that focused
on stability or support requirements.

General Pershing perceived this wider application of the principles.
There were considerable changes in the character of war over the span of
his career, "but the principles of warfare as I learned them at West
Point remain unchanged," he wrote. "They were verified by my
experience in our Indian wars, and also during the campaign against the
Spaniards in Cuba. I applied them in the Philippines and observed their
application in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War."[27]

More recently, Richard Rinaldo argued that it was counterproductive
to separate principles guiding war and operations other than war (OOTW):
"This distinction seeks to create independence where there is interdependence,
division where there is unity."[28] Rinaldo went on to posit, much
as did Pershing, that "the principles of war . . . are robust enough
to withstand application across the full range of military operations.
. . . OOTW is an unnecessary category for doctrinal treatment in terms
of principles and fundamental guidelines."[29] Brodie concurred in
this regard, concluding that the principles were "essentially common
sense propositions which are generally but by no means exclusively pertinent
to the waging of war."[30]

The principles of war have indeed been more robust than a narrow interpretation
of their purpose would admit. Their application always demands careful
consideration of the requirements unique to a given situation; with adaptation
and exercise of the coup d'oeil so treasured by Clausewitz, however,
this application is feasible even beyond the bounds of the battlefield.

Such adaptation implies flexibility not only in application, but in
the definitions of the principles. Roger A. Beaumont believed "the
list should be continually reviewed and updated, and used as a working
tool for analysis. . . . New technologies of war may alter the balance
and make new factors paramount. The military art, like any other, is continually
in a state of evolution, with part of its nature formed by the past and
the materials, and its essence deriving from the innovative genius of the
artist."[31]

Well-considered combinations of the principles have been the recipe
for success whether applied to war or operations in other environments.
At times one or several principles have dominated our thinking. In some
instances a principle has been irrelevant or of greater value in its violation
than in its observation.[32] Again, however, more often than not the force
that better applied the wisdom inherent in the principles was the victor:

Successful strategists never knowingly violate the principles of war
unless they first evaluate the risks and estimate expenses. . . . Critics
notwithstanding, the principles of war are utilitarian and they
do make sense. The record shows that winners, by and large, took
heed of the principles. The losers, discounting those who were overcome
by sheer weight of manpower and material, by and large did not.[33]

With the publication of its revised doctrine in the 1998 FM 100-5, the
Army plans to close the philosophical gap that has developed between combat
operations and those not involving overt fighting. That is an essential
outcome of this round of analysis of its warfighting doctrine. The first
operation conducted by the fledgling US Army under the Constitution was
not during wartime; it was an action to restore peace and stability to
portions of Pennsylvania affected by the Whiskey Rebellion. Led by President
Washington himself, the Army's threatened intervention ended the trouble
in an operation that would today be considered a successful operation other
than war. The preemptive character of the threat of force did not fundamentally
alter the nature of the military action.

Similarly, soldiers preparing in 1998 for operations in Bosnia have
had to undergo the same personal and unit readiness training required to
prepare for armed conflict. Differences in rules of engagement altered
neither the need for thorough preparation nor the utility of the principles
during that preparation. Today's operational environment demands an expanded
role for soldiers; being a warrior is still a necessary, but no longer
a sufficient, qualification for service. The existing two lists of principles
simply fail to emphasize what is common to any Army operation in the field.

These two lists imply difference where there is similarity. Simplicity
is a principle of war, yet not of OOTW, to which it obviously applies in
equal measure. Legitimacy is the reverse, cited as a principle of OOTW
but not of war. It seems at first glance that legitimacy ought to be a
principle of both war and OOTW, but one must again consider the role of
principles. If they are in fact guides to action (rather than unquestioned
truths with universal application to every military operation), then legitimacy
is far better treated as an essential condition of any operation rather
than as a principle. Unlike a principle that a commander can ignore (albeit
at risk to success), no commander can reject legitimacy as the fundamental
basis for a military operation.

War is one form of military operations, the most demanding, expensive,
and traumatic of them all. But recent events reflect the historical experience
of the US Army: combat is one of the least common of the kinds of operations
conducted by the majority of those in the service. It is by no means the
most frequent, and in some respects it can be less complicated than armed
interventions in which the actions of a squad leader can have strategic
implications. Consequently, one list of principles--and we should call
them principles of operations--should serve the full range of military
operations. There would be no requirement for every principle to apply
in equal measure to every activity, nor for some to apply to given contingencies
at all. Yet each element on this established list would merit status as
a principle in part because it requires consideration during planning and
execution even if it is ultimately not applicable.

Toward Clarity and Synthesis

Review of the long-standing principles of war was a natural starting
point for developing a single list of principles of operations. But the
recommendations from the field to retain the pre-1993 set of principles
of "war" and simply to dispose of the principles of operations
other than war misses an opportunity. We have learned lessons in this post-Cold
War era that deserve to be incorporated into the Army's next statement
of land force doctrine. That we were coping with a flawed premise about
the common features of any Army operation, combat or other, in no way invalidates
those lessons. This section therefore provides the rationale for continuing
on the course previously charted for the next version of FM 100-5, Operations:take what's useful from our experiences in all recent operations, identify
opportunities to adapt, and do so.

Figure 1, below, lists the principles of war and operations other than
war as they appear in Army doctrine in early 1998, and identifies the principles
originally proposed for the next version. The discussion addresses principles--new
and modified--that ought to appear among those adopted by the Army in 1998.

Principles of War

Principles of Operations
Other than War

Principles of Operations

Objective

Objective

Objective

Offensive

Perseverance

Offensive

Mass

Legitimacy

Massed Effects

Economy of Force

Restraint

Economy of Force

Maneuver

-

Maneuver

Unity of Command

Unity of Effort

Unity of Effort

Security

Security

Security

Surprise

-

Surprise

Simplicity

-

Simplicity

-

-

Morale

-

-

Exploitation

Figure 1. Principles of War and Operations Other than
War
(as in 1993 FM 100-5, Operations) and Principles of Operations as
proposed in Initial Draft, 1998 FM 100-5, Operations.

Principle of Operations: Massed Effects (modified, previously "mass")

Though "mass" was one of the principles on the original 1921
Training Regulation 10-5 list, by the time FM 100-5 was published in 1939
"concentration" appeared in its stead. The 1993 FM 100-5 guidance
regarding mass is clear and pertinent: "Mass the effects of overwhelming
combat power at the decisive place and time."[34] Unfortunately, "mass"
is frequently neither understood nor applied in this manner. When Phillip
Meilinger wrote that "precision air weapons have redefined the meaning
of mass. . . . The result of the trend towards `airshaft accuracy' in air
war is a denigration in the importance of mass,"[35] he could not
have been more incorrect. First, firepower is but one capability that a
commander seeks to mass. Second, precision weapons are potentially a critical
component of mass as it is construed today: the concentration of effects
to accomplish the mission.[36] If one missile, bomb, or artillery projectile
can achieve a desired outcome, it is a supremely effective and efficient
application of the principle of mass. The principle of "mass"
no longer means what the concept seemed to mean in Napoleonic times:[37]
to bring together in time and space soldiers or supporting weapons. Such
practices now and in the future could create conditions more likely to
lead to disaster than to success by creating lucrative targets for an adversary's
air and surface fire capabilities.

Nor is mass only the concentration of all fires in time and space. The
concept implies the massing of the effects of all pertinent capabilities,
military and other: Army assets (armor, artillery, and aviation); joint
support (intelligence means, aviation, naval gunfire, and missiles); special
forces; psychological operations; electronic warfare, and other means that
could contribute to mission success. Whether it is steel, electrons, and
convincing words applied to defeat an enemy, or the use of food and water,
medical care, and engineering capabilities to aid refugees, the intent
is to create and maintain success through the massing of the effects inherent
in these capabilities. R. R. Battreall similarly misunderstood the application
of the principle of mass when he wrote, "When a sufficient amount
of armor is massed at one point, it becomes the critical point."[38]
"Mass" has too long been misunderstood; "massed effects"
is the better term.

As has been noted, "cooperation" rather than "unity of
command" was among the original principles of war in 1921. Unity of
effort, with unity of command and cooperation as supporting concepts, first
appeared in the 1939 manual as the preferred statement of this principle.
Unity of effort remained the principle in the 1941 Operations manual,
with subtle changes, but by 1949 the term was unity of command. This change
occurred despite the fact that words used to describe it were identical
to those used in the 1941 edition.[39] Consider how this principle (or
doctrine of combat, in the case of the 1941 manual) was defined between
1939 and 1949 as successive authors struggled with the distinction between
the desired form (unity of command) and function (unity of effort) over
the 11-year span (emphasis in the originals):

1939: "Unity of effort is necessary to apply effectively
the full combat power of the available forces. It is obtained through unity
of command. Where this is impracticable, dependence must be placed
upon cooperation."

1941: "Unity of command obtains that unity of effort which
is essential to the decisive application of full combat power of the available
forces. Unity of effort is furthered by full cooperation between
elements of the command."

1949: "Unity of command obtains that unity of effort which is essential
to the decisive application of full combat power of the available forces.
Unity of effort is furthered by full cooperation between elements of the
command. Command of a force of joint or combined arms is vested in the
senior officer present eligible to exercise command unless another is specifically
designated to command."

The principle of unity of command that appeared in the 1993 FM 100-5
stated that "for every effort," military leaders were to "seek
unity of command and unity of effort." Unity of effort under the principles
of operations other than war in the same manual directed soldiers to "seek
unity of effort toward every objective."[40]

Unity of command has historically been hard to attain. James Winnefeld
called it "the single most difficult principle to gain in combined
warfare. . . . Relinquishing national command and control of force is an
act of trust and confidence that is unequaled in relations between nations.
In a coalition it is achieved by constructing command arrangements and
task-organizing forces to ensure that responsibilities match contributions
and efforts. . . . It is cardinal that compromises not be permitted to
outweigh warfighting requirements."[41]

Anthony Rice found unity of command "more honored in the breach
than the observance" in recent American wars and joint doctrine. What
he called "parallel command" has been far more common, a situation
in which nations share common objectives but retain control of their forces.
Rice provided several examples, including Douglas Haig's World War I statement
in 1915 that "I am not under General Joffre's orders, but that would
make no difference, as my intention was to do my utmost to carry out General
Joffre's wishes on strategic matters as if they were orders." Haig
made that decision following guidance from the British War Minister Lord
Kitchener that his command "is an independent one and you will in
any case not come under the orders of any allied general."[42]

Rice concluded that unity of command "was never established among
the forces arrayed initially against the Nazis." Further, although
the United States was the "lead nation" during the Korean War,
in Vietnam "the command structure seemed to take a step back in time.
. . . A parallel command structure was adopted" instead. During Operation
Desert Storm, Rice observed, the coalition "achieved a marked improvement
on the command arrangements for Vietnam, but still did not achieve unity
of command."[43] The US Army failed to establish local unity of command
of even Army personnel in Somalia little more than two years later; the
deaths of 18 soldiers in combat on 3-4 October 1993 was in no small part
attributable to this failure.

Rice strongly endorsed unity of command despite the historical record
and a joint doctrine that emphasized unity of effort.[44] Yet he acknowledged
that the emphasis in joint doctrine on unity of effort, despite ground
truth that unity of command is the much preferred condition, reflected
awareness that the latter has historically been difficult or impossible
to achieve. This difficulty has been increased by the lack of clearly articulated
national and international objectives during many operations. When military
commanders must attempt to define and justify such objectives based on
vague guidance or public statements, participants in operations may find
it difficult to come to a consensus on end states, much less on the manner
to achieve them.

Finally, there are organizations that may share general goals in a theater
of operations but refuse to subordinate themselves to military authority.
Some nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations (NGOs and PVOs)
might respond to coercion or cajoling, but others will invariably remain
autonomous. A commander might consider withdrawing security or other support
for these agencies in an attempt to compel compliance, but the strategic
implications of casualties among NGO and PVO personnel makes such a policy
infeasible.

Unity of command, then, is the preferred form of coordination and control.
Unity of effort, the desired effects of which are achievement of a "common
purpose and direction through unity of command, coordination, and cooperation,"
is the operational function that is the prerequisite to success. Without
unity of effort, any organization's work can negate the advances made by
others. Unity of effort is the function we require for success in any operation;
unity of command is the form we should seek to attain it. The operational
principle is unity of effort.

Principle of Operations: Morale (new)

In Ardant Du Picq's view, "Hannibal was the greatest general of
antiquity by reason of his admirable comprehension of the morale of combat,
of the morale of the soldier, whether his own or the enemy's."[45]
A lengthy discussion of leadership in the 1939 FM 100-5 asserted that "man
is the fundamental instrument in war. . . . War places a severe test on
the moral stamina . . . of the individual."[46] John Baynes,
in Morale, the classic study of the 2d Scottish Rifles in World
War I, concluded that "the maintenance of morale is recognized in
military circles as the most important single factor in war; outside these
circles there is sometimes difficulty in appreciating why this is so."[47]
Franklin D. Jones provided an explanation for both the soldier's recognition
of the paramount importance of morale and his civilian counterpart's lack
of appreciation of that importance: "Nowhere in civilian life is the
social group of such major and crucial importance in the life of the individual
as it is for the soldier in combat."[48]

Maintenance of soldier and unit morale requires the building, maintaining,
and restoration of fighting spirit.[49] Morale includes the willingness
to work together consistently for a common purpose, which in the Army is
frequently the accomplishment of whatever tasks are assigned to the group
of which the soldier is a member. Individuals and organizations have morale,
and the good morale of both is essential to success in any military operation.
The difficulty in building and maintaining this most desirable quality
is complicated by its multiple components. Self-confidence is crucial,
commitment to the unit essential, willingness to sacrifice for the whole
a requirement. Field Marshal Sir William Slim provided additional fundamental
elements that included those considered necessary by many others who have
studied the subject:[50]

Morale [has] certain foundations. These foundations are spiritual, intellectual,
and material, and that is the order of their importance . . .

1. Spiritual

(a) There must be a great and noble object.

(b) Its achievement must be vital.

(c) The method of achievement must be active, aggressive.

2. Intellectual

(a) [The soldier] must be convinced that the object can be attained;
that it is not out of reach.

(b) He must see, too, that the organization to which he belongs and
which is striving to attain the object is an efficient one.

(c) He must have confidence in his leaders and know that whatever dangers
and hardships he is called upon to suffer, his life will not be lightly
flung away.

3. Material

(a) The man must feel that he will get a fair deal from his commanders
and from the army generally.

(b) He must, as far as humanly possible, be given the best weapons and
equipment for his task.

(c) His living and working conditions must be made as good as they can
be.

Clausewitz considered victory in hand for the side that imposed its
will on the other. That concept applies to the full range of military operations
and to all parties who influence--or have the potential to influence--those
operations. The importance of robust morale to our own forces is apparent,
but other groups have a say in whether American military undertakings will
be successful. The first such group is the adversary. If operations truly
involve a struggle of wills, then undermining an adversary's morale complements
(and could be an alternative to) force destruction as a means of attaining
one's political and military objectives. The greater the success of psychological
operations, continuous pressure, imposed confusion, maintenance of information
dominance, and other assaults on his assurance, the less other means of
influence will be needed and the sooner opposition will cease. Successful
attacks on morale are likely to prove far less costly than destruction
of the personnel and equipment of an opposing force. In an era when even
enemy casualties may be counterproductive in achieving a desired end state,
undermining morale may be the only means of attaining or exploiting early
successes.

Second, noncombatants in an area of operations can be ambivalent toward
friendly military activities, can act in support of friendly force efforts,
or can actively resist them. The presence of diverse groups of noncombatants
means that all three conditions can occur simultaneously, and groups obviously
can change behavior over time. History has demonstrated that failure to
consider the effects of apparent noncombatants on military operations can
prove costly. Napoleon's forces in Spain and Germans in the Soviet Union
during World War II paid the price of failing to win the support, or at
a minimum the neutrality, of local citizens who later chose to become effective
partisans. The principle of morale, then, includes consideration of these
noncombatants. Their disposition must be continuously monitored and shaped,
if not to ensure support for friendly activities, then at a minimum to
foster the ambivalence that denies an adversary their support.

Another essential component of noncombatant considerations is the American
public. Clausewitz acknowledged the importance of a nation's populace;
one part of his trinity was "primordial violence, hatred, and enmity,"
which he concluded "mainly concerns the people."[51] Thomas Vaughn
wrote that "in a democracy such as ours, morale is also a function
of national consensus."[52] Donn A. Starry noted the dangers of an
American tendency to call on the military in support of national objectives
"without first having laid the requisite groundwork to attain and
sustain strong public support for the policy course adopted."[53]
Herbert Wolff, writing in 1965, presciently declared "to win in Vietnam
we require public support" and concluded such backing would
prove to be so critical that public support should be "the tenth principle
of war."[54] And while the armed forces cannot exert direct influence
on the American public, US military leaders at the highest levels are in
a position to suggest that political leaders recognize the need to maintain
citizen support for their armed forces during an operation.

That morale was a necessary condition to success in military operations
was evident to George C. Marshall, who described it as "a state of
mind. It is steadfastness, courage and hope. It is confidence and zeal
and loyalty. It is élan, esprit de corps, and determination. It
is staying power, the spirit which endures to the end--the will to win.
With it, all things are possible, without it everything else, planning,
preparation, production, count for naught."[55] Morale is a primary
concern of commanders in peace and war. It deserves to be a principle of
operations.

Principle of Operations: Exploitation (new)

While US military forces have often demonstrated a superb ability to
identify objectives and accomplish missions, often they have done less
well at capitalizing on resultant successes.[56] Success, be it in the
form of military victory or mission accomplishment in a humanitarian operation,
may prove transitory if not seized upon quickly. The military must set
the conditions for exploiting successes, whether the exploitation is to
be completed through the execution of other American military actions or
after a transfer of operational responsibility to others. The principle
of exploitation, as it appeared in the initial draft of the 1998 FM 100-5,
advised soldiers to "take advantage of and make lasting the temporary
effects of battlefield success."[57]

Commenting on an earlier effort to add "exploitation" as a
principle of war, Wolff wrote that it failed "to stand on [its] own
merits. . . . Exploitation [is] subordinate to the principles of maneuver
and objective."[58] He was correct, for exploitation as a type ofoffensive operation is a function of other principles. However,
the concept of exploitation presented here has a much broader scope. It
is by no means limited to combat operations, for it applies equally to
any mission. It also pertains to capitalizing on all successes, and planning
to do so even before achievement of success. Too often commanders and staffs
develop plans for worst-case scenarios; they too rarely plan for greater
success than might normally be expected. The cumulative effects of multiple
sequential or simultaneous successes are also seldom wargamed. In discussing
exploitation as a potential principle of war, the authors of Military
Strategy: Theory and Application supported a wider application for
the concept:

The principle of exploitation encourages momentum. It makes it possible
for friendly elements to expand and consolidate gains, keeping the enemy
off balance and on the defensive. Sage strategists follow the lines of
least resistance that lead to vital objectives, pour on the pressure when
opponents falter, reinforce successes, and abandon failures. Strategic
exploitation involves far more than capitalizing on military advantage.
It profits equally from political, economic, or psychological primacy and
augments technological leads.[59]

These observations apply with equal validity at the operational and
tactical levels, in combat as well as noncombat operations. Exploitation,
in its broadest strategic and operational context, should be added to the
list of principles of operations.

Conclusion

The concept of adopting principles of operations as replacements for
principles of war at first glance seems simple, but there is little simple
about the conduct of war or any other aspect of the profession of arms.
Interventions in Haiti and Bosnia demonstrated that the absence of armed
opposition in an operational area does not lessen the rigor of activities
demanded of forces committed to such interventions. Principles of operations
assist in the study of the profession; understanding them and applying
them wisely in the field is in turn possible only after repeated, careful
analysis of their purpose and meaning. Experience may partially compensate
for lack of study, but application of the principles will likely suffer
from the unwilling student's inability to fully understand their value
in establishing desired operational end states and achieving national strategic
objectives. So too will soldiers suffer in executing the orders of those
who have failed to educate themselves.

History reveals that the principles of war have frequently been the
subject of long and often inspired debate; their character, number, and
definition have changed repeatedly. They took their present form in US
Army doctrine only 49 years ago. On the one hand, this span is but a fraction
of the years spent in their study. On the other, much has transpired since
1949. One may legitimately ask whether the principles as they stand could
meet the needs of US armed forces half a century from now.

The US Army has an unusual opportunity to expand and modify its list
of principles of operations. The absence of a major threat to the United
States and its allies makes such an effort both timely and feasible; it
would complement efforts to determine requirements for force structure
and weapon systems for the opening decades of the 21st century. This article
restates the need for the synthesis of principles of war and of operations
other than war in our operational doctrine, and demonstrates the benefits
of acknowledging that the basic tenets of doctrine transcend conflict.
As always, our doctrine must prepare us to prevail in war; the next version
can and should, however, be expanded to reflect the lessons we have learned
since the end of the Cold War.

NOTES

1. John Irvin Alger, "The Origins and Adaptation of the Principles
of War," thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth,
Kansas, 1975, pp. 2-3.

6. J. F. C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (Fort
Leavenworth, Kans.: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1993),
p. 209.

7. Though Fuller quoted Napoleon as having said, "If one day I
can find the time, I will write a book in which I will describe the principles
of war in so precise a manner that they will be at the disposal of all
soldiers, so that war can be learnt as easily as science." Fuller,
p. 209.

8. Marshall L. Fallwell, "The Principles of War and the Solution
of Military Problems," Military Review, 35 (May 1955), 50.

16. Clausewitz distinguished between an objective principle (one
that "rests on objective truth and is therefore equally valid for
all") and a subjective principle ("generally called a
maxim" and which "has value only for the person who adopts it").
Though a leader might mold the character of a principle to meet a situation,
it could be argued that some have changed little over time, e.g., surprise
and simplicity. Others, such as the example of mass used above, have undergone
definite, if subtle, changes that go beyond modifications made to meet
specific situational demands.

18. Stanley E. Griffith, "Principles of War," unpublished
paper written for the US Naval War College, 17 June 1988, p. 15.

19. Joint Pub. 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces (Washington:
GPO, 10 January 1995), III-1 to III-8; US Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5,
Operations (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May
1986), 173-77; Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare (Washington:
Department of the Navy, 28 March 1994), pp. 43-50; Air Force Manual 1-1,
Volume 1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force
(Washington: Department of the Air Force, March 1992), pp. 1-2.

20. Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1, Warfighting (Washington:
Department of the Navy, 6 March 1989), p. 31. The two principles are further
defined as follows:

"Concentration is the convergence of effort in time and space.
It is the means by which we develop superiority at the decisive time and
place. Concentration does not apply only to combat forces. It applies equally
to all available resources. . . . Similarly, concentration does not apply
only to the conduct of war, but also the preparation for war." (p.
31)

"Speed is rapidity of action. Like concentration, speed applies
to both time and space. And, like concentration, it is relative
speed that matters. . . . Superior speed allows us to seize the initiative
and dictate the terms of combat, forcing the enemy to react to us."
(p. 32, emphasis in the original)

"The combination of concentration and speed is momentum. . . .
It follows that we should strike the decisive blow with the greatest possible
combination of concentration and speed." (p. 32)

The principles are mentioned with a partial listing in FMFM 1-2, The
Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense (Washington: Department
of the Navy, 21 June 1991), p. 3-15: "Moreover, amphibious operations,
like any other operation, will succeed only if the principles of war are
observed. Surprise, security, simplicity, mass and its corollary economy
of force, and maneuver in the strategic sense are all key ingredients."

22. John O. Shoemaker, "The Principles of War: Sense or Nonsense
in the Cold War?" unpublished paper written for the US Army War College,
22 April 1966, p. 17.

23. Josiah A. Wallace, "The Principles of War in Counterinsurgency,"
Military Review, 46 (December 1966), 81.

24. James H. Mueller. "Developing a Foundation for Space Doctrine:
Do All the Principles of War Apply to Military Space Operations?"
unpublished thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth,
Kans., 1989, p. 96.

25. Clausewitz, p. 81.

26. Emory R. Helton, "Humanitarian Assistance--A Good Way to Lead
the World," unpublished paper for the US Naval War College, 22 February
1993, p. 20.

27. General John Pershing as quoted by Marshall L. Fallwell, "The
Principles of War and the Solution of Military Problems," Military
Review, 35 (May 1955), 52.

28. Richard J. Rinaldo, "Warfighting and Peace Operations: Do Real
Men Do MOOTW?" draft of article to be published in Joint Forces
Quarterly, p. 9.

32. Avraham Ayalon agreed in this regard: "There are principles
which are essential and others which are less so. . . . Nevertheless, one
should still treat the principles as a package deal. . . . It is obvious
that not in every case will all of the principles be relevant."
Avraham Ayalon, "Advantages and Limitations of the Principles of War,"
Military Review, 67 (July 1967), 44. Emphasis in original.

33. John M. Collins, "The Principles of War," in Military
Strategy: Theory and Application, ed. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. (Carlisle
Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, 1 May 1984), pp. 3-9.

36. The description of the principle in the 21 February 1997 version
of the 1998 FM 100-5, Operations, coordinating draft is "mass
the effects of combat power in a decisive manner in time and space."
(p. II-2-4)

37. Though the massing of capabilities or systems in space and time
seems to be a derivative of Napoleonic warfare, Napoleon himself demonstrated
awareness that the value of mass was tied to (one form of) effects rather
than physical presence of forces alone: "In battle, as in a siege,
skill consists in converging a mass of fire upon a single point. After
the combat has started, he that has the power to bring a sudden, unexpected
concentration of artillery to bear upon a selected point is sure to capture
it." From Napoleon I: Maxims of War (1831), quoted in Robert
Debs Heinl, A Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis,
Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1966), p. 186.

39. FM 100-5, Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations
(1939), p. 28; FM 100-5 (1941), p. 22. The extract from the 1949 FM 100-5
was quoted in John I. Alger, The Quest for Victory: The History of the
Principles of War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 254.

56. A sampling of outcomes that could have been better exploited in
recent US history includes the tactical battlefield successes of Vietnam
(including Tet 1968) and combat victories during Operation Desert Storm.

57. Coordinating draft, 1998 FM 100-5, p. II-2-6.

58. Wolff, p. 30.

59. Lykke, pp. 3-9.

Dr. Russell W. Glenn is a 1975 graduate of the US Military Academy.
His career included service with the 1st Infantry Division, 2nd Engineer
Group, and 3rd Armored Division as well as teaching assignments at West
Point, the British Army's Royal School of Military Engineering, and the
School of Advanced Military Studies. He is currently a RAND Senior Defense
and Political Analyst.