This just in - reposting here an all hands for widest dissemination per NHQ/DO.I find much in here to agree with regarding mutual accountability in little things, and avoiding the "Normalization of Deviance".You're not a jerk or a traitor to the "club" if you are stepping in to stop behavior that could impact a life.

R/sSpam

Quote:

"Good morning Commanders and Staff. Maj Gen Smith asked us to share this very important video offered by AOPA:

&feature=youtu.be with you. It is a message we have all probably heard before of a “rogue” general aviation pilot who flew outside the rules and the capabilities of the aircraft, with catastrophic results.

The very sad part about this, as with so many mishaps we see, is that it was preventable if someone had spoken up. As you watch the video, you will see statements, e-mails, and other evidence that this pilot’s fellow aviators and peers knew about his “rogue” tendencies and no one stepped up to say or do anything about it. There was talk behind the scenes, but no one made the effort to stop him.

There is one line in the video that we would like to repeat, and have you repeat, as often as we need to until everyone understands. “When the peers of a rogue pilot stand idly by they implicitly endorse his behavior.” As the video’s narrator states, this is an “admittedly extreme example” but it can be present and even prevalent to some degree in any flying organization or group, and even “one bad apple,” if allowed to continue, can influence the operations, and reputation, and safety, of an entire organization.

This topic isn’t JUST about rogue pilots. Have you seen a pilot in your unit that takes shortcuts with a checklist? Does someone in your wing allow the aircraft to “coast” into a hangar after shutting down the engines so they don’t have to push it? Perhaps there are pilots who swing a wing over the grass to take a shortcut into a parking place on the edge of the tarmac rather than pushing the aircraft into the parking place? Does everyone check their tire pressures before the first flight of the day? Is there someone in your unit who just isn’t as proficient as they should be? This isn’t just about rogue pilots … it could be about pilots who take shortcuts until shortcuts become the norm. The “official” name for that in safety circles is Normalization of Deviance. How do you fix it? You simply don’t accept it. You don’t allow it to continue.

Number 1 on the list of Gen Smith’s Command Areas of Emphasis is an organization-wide commitment to exhibiting and maintaining institutional excellence through professionalism. That means doing it by the book and doing it with a high level of integrity. It means setting the example even when others aren’t watching. It means one more thing also … it means standing up and protecting each other from the influence of those “rogue” pilots or those pilots who just seem to want to color outside the lines. None of us like making or taking those phone calls when there has been an accident or incident, especially ones that could have been avoided.

Peer pressure can be a very strong influence on behaviors. In this case, everyone should commit to using that “peer pressure” to speak up when needed. Do it as a team. You and your peers can steer your unit and your fellow pilots in the right direction. Accept nothing less than compliance, professionalism and excellence in everything you (and your fellow pilots) do.

WHAT’S NEXT? Help us get the word out to all of our aviators. We would like you to make sure, within all your units, that this video and this discussion are a monthly safety topic for July or August, with a discussion led by squadron safety officers, squadron DOs, and squadron commanders. Wing and Region DOs and DOVs, please work with your wing and region directors of safety to monitor your units and ensure they are briefing this topic (Your Safety Officer may use the Safety Briefings Wing Summary Report in SIRS to monitor the subjects your units are briefing). We will be working with CAP/SE to spot-check and assist in reporting results to the Command Team.

A memo was forwarded through channels today in regards to a 2007 non-CAP involved incident.The gist was that we all know a rogue pilot or similar who pushes the limits, takes shortcuts, etc., and that we all need to be holding them accountable.

On November 15, 2007, approximately 1500 central standard time (CST), a single-engine Piper PA-28R-200 airplane, N55307, was destroyed during an in-flight break up and subsequent impact with terrain, near Ranger, Texas. The flight instructor, foreign-certificated private pilot, and one passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by Skymates Inc., of Arlington, Texas. The 132-nautical mile cross country flight departed Arlington Municipal Airport (GKY), Arlington, Texas, about 1348 and was destined for the Abilene Regional Airport (ABI) near Abilene, Texas. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a visual flight rules flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight.

Although no witnesses reported seeing the events leading up to the in-flight break up, two witnesses reported hearing the airplane and observing falling debris.

One individual, located approximately 2 miles north of the accident site, was standing by his truck when he heard what he described as three "engine stalls" with several seconds spacing. The engine went silent after the third engine "stall" which was followed by an "unusual" sound. The sound drew his attention to the airplane and through binoculars he observed the airplane "wobbling" and descending in a slight nose down attitude with a slow clockwise rotation.

Another witness, located approximately 1 mile south of the accident site, was working in a barn when he heard "whirling sounds" as if an airplane was "circling" or "spinning." These sounds were followed by a "loud bang." When he walked out from the barn, he observed pieces of the airplane falling to the ground.

Five "maneuvers" of interest were identified in the radar data for the accident flight. In 4 of the 5 maneuvers, the airplane pitched nose down for 1,000 to 1,200 feet of altitude and increased airspeed from about 80 to 120 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS.) In three of the maneuvers, the airplane then regains 300 to 400 feet of altitude and decelerates back to about 90 KCAS.

The first "maneuver" begins when the airplane pitches over at 12,300 feet mean sea level (MSL) and descends to approximately 11,100 feet msl. It then pitches up and climbs to 11,500 feet msl where it momentarily levels off.

The second "maneuver" starts when the airplane pitches over at 11,500 feet msl and descends to 10,500 feet msl. It then ascends to 10,850 feet msl, momentarily levels off, and then climbs to 11,000 feet msl.

For the third "maneuver" the airplane pitches over at 11,000 feet msl and descends to about 9,950 feet msl. It then pitches up and climbs to 10,250 feet msl before leveling off.

During the fourth "maneuver" the airplane climbs to 11,400 feet msl where it again pitches down and descends to 11,100 msl before a pull up is initiated and the airplane climbs to 13,000 msl feet and levels off.

For the last "maneuver" the airplane climbs to 11,800 feet msl and pitches nose down. The airspeed exceeds 134 KCAS before starting to decrease. It was around this time that the aircraft disappeared from radar.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The instructor pilot held a certified flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. His last Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first-class medical was issued on February 27, 2007, with no limitations.

A review of the flight instructor's records indicated that he had received his private pilot certificate on January 22, 2004, with a total logged time of 56 hours. His next recorded flight was on February 28, 2007. The pilot received his temporary airman certificate for airplane single-engine land, multi-engine land, and instrument airplane on July 18, 2007. Two days later, July 20, 2007, he received his temporary airman certificate for flight instructor, airplane single-engine land, multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. He completed his "New Flight Instructor Training" at Skymates Inc., on July 25, 2007.

An examination of the flight instructor's logbook indicated an estimated total flight time of 595 hours; of which 37 hours were in this make and model of airplane. He logged approximately 307 hours in the last 90 days and 60 in the last 30 days.

The foreign-certificated private pilot's logbook indicated an estimated total flight time of 119 hours; of which 1 hour was in this make and model of airplane. He logged 64 hours in the last 90 days and 34 in the last 30 days.

AIRPLANE INFORMATION

The 1973-model Piper PA-28R-200, serial number 28R-7335213, was a low wing, semi-monocoque airplane, with retractable landing gear, and was configured for four occupants. The airplane was powered by a direct drive, air-cooled, horizontally opposed, fuel injected, normally aspirated four-cylinder engine. The engine was a Lycoming IO-360-C1C, serial number L-10313-51A, rated at 200 horsepower at 2,700 rpm, and was driving a two-bladed constant speed Hartzell propeller.

According to the airframe logbook, the airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on October 1, 2007, with an airframe total time of 7,260.5 hours.

The engine logbook revealed that the engine had been inspected in accordance with an annual inspection on October 1, 2007. At the time of this inspection, the engine had accumulated approximately 2,245.6 hours since its last major overhaul and a total time of 7,360.5 hours.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 1453, an automated weather station located at Mineral Wells, Texas, approximately 34 miles northeast from the accident site, reported winds from 350 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, skies clear, temperature 61 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 12 degrees Fahrenheit, and barometric pressure of 30.40 inches of Mercury.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

On site documentation of the wreckage was conducted by investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board, Federal Aviation Administration, and representatives from The New Piper Aircraft Company, and Lycoming Engines.

The wreckage was located on hilly terrain, amongst scrub oak, and cacti. The debris field was scattered over an area approximately one mile long by one half mile wide. The airplane was broken into six major sections. These sections consisted of the fuselage cabin area, the cabin roof, the aft fuselage with the attached empennage, the outboard section of the left wing, the outboard section of the right wing, and the instrument panel forward. All major components of the airplane were accounted for with the exception of a section of the right aileron; however the fracture surfaces associated with this aileron exhibited overload failures.

The main wreckage consisted of the cabin area with all four seats, the inboard section of both wings, and the aft fuselage extending aft to, but not including the tail section.

About 115 inches of the inboard left wing was intact and attached to the fuselage. There was no obvious deformation evident on the left wing. The front spar was fractured about 115 inches outboard of the fuselage and the rear spar was fractured about 113 inches outboard of the fuselage. The left flap remained attached to the left wing in the retracted position and exhibited some minor upward deformation with paint flaked off at the trailing edge. The upper and lower skin and forward and rear spars were deformed downward at the break. Two prop slashes were evident in the upper skin at the break. The aileron was recovered separate from the wing. The inboard aileron hinge remained attached to the rear spar. There was a hole in the upper skin where the landing gear pushed through. The left main gear was found extended about 45-degrees. The left fuel tank was found to contain approximately four inches of a blue liquid consistent with 100LL fuel.

The outboard section of the left wing was located about 1,838 feet south from the main wreckage. This section exhibited deformation consistent with separation in a downward direction including buckling damage to the lower skin. There were 4 prop slashes evident in the upper and lower skin adjacent to the break. The outboard aileron hinge remained attached to the rear spar. There was impact damage to the outboard trailing edge of the left wing.

About 90 inches of the right wing remained attached to the fuselage. This section was deformed upwards along it length. The forward spar was fractured about 90 inches outboard of the fuselage at the production splice joint, was deformed forward beginning about 26 inches outboard of the fuselage, and was twisted in a leading edge up direction along its length. The rear spar was fractured about 84 inches outboard of the fuselage, deformed upwards and forward along its length and twisted leading edge up along its length. The wing was flattened due to the twisting of the spars. The damage at the spar fractures was consistent with separation of the outboard wing in an upward direction. There was a hole in the upper skin where the landing gear had pushed through. The right flap remained attached by the inboard mount to the wing and was extensively damaged. The pre impact flap position could not be determined. The right main gear was found extended approximately 45 degrees and bent forward. The right main fuel tank had been compromised and did not contain fuel.

The outboard section of the right wing was located 2,588 feet south from the main wreckage. This section of wing exhibited 45 degree buckling in the upper skin stringer bays adjacent to the fracture and the upper skin was curled upwards at the break. The spar fractures were consistent with failure in an upwards direction. The inboard 20 inches of right aileron was recovered separated from the wing while the rest was not recovered. The inboard hinge remained attached to a section of rear spar. The outboard aileron hinge was still attached to the rear spar and counterweight.

The front section of the fuselage separated at the production splice immediately forward of the front seats and was located about 650 feet southeast from the main wreckage. There was no directional evidence at the separation point. This section came to rest inverted, on a heading of 25-degrees, and exhibited heavy thermal damage associated with a post crash fire. This section consisted of the windshield window frames, the cabin door both control yokes, the instrument panel, engine and accessories, the nose landing gear and the propeller.

The cabin door remained attached to the fuselage via both forward hinges. The upper half of the door was found separated but next to the lower door half. Both parts exhibited heavy thermal damage.

The fuselage was intact from below the forward seats to the area just forward of the empennage. The aft fuselage was twisted in a clockwise direction at the empennage separation point. The cabin roof was found about 1,860 feet southeast of the main wreckage. The roof had separated from the cabin area and did not show any impact or wing slap evidence.

The aft fuselage, with attached empennage, was located about 1,073 feet south from the main wreckage. The empennage remained essentially intact with the exception of the outboard right horizontal stabilizer. The outboard left horizontal stabilizer was deformed upwards and the damage to the separated outboard right horizontal stabilizer was consistent with separation in an upward direction. There were 45 degree buckling creases in the upper and lower skin of the horizontal stabilizer. The vertical stabilizer was deformed to the left with respect to the horizontal stabilizer (as looking forward). The left side of the vertical stabilizer was bulged outward. The stabilator with trim tab and the vertical stabilizer with rudder were all found attached via their respective hinges.

There was no evidence of any pre-existing cracks in any of the structure examined. In addition, there was no significant corrosion present in the wreckage. All fracture surfaces were consistent with overload separations.

The engine sustained impact and fire damage. The engine could not be rotated by hand due to impact damage. All cylinders were inspected using a lighted borescope. No pre-impact anomalies were noted. Three holes were drilled into the crankcase at the top right side to allow a visual inspection of the rotating assembly. Crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity were established.

The exhaust system, intake system, accessory housing, oil sump, and fuel system were destroyed during impact. The magnetos and ignition harness were thermally damaged and could not be tested. All observed spark plugs displayed a mid-service life, and a color consistent with normal combustion, when compared to the Champion Spark Plug Wear Guide P/N AV-27.

The propeller remained attached to the engine. One blade extended into the ground along its entire length. The other blade extended out of the ground and was twisted towards the feathered position. The spinner remained partially attached and did not exhibit rotation scoring.

The engine examination did not reveal any pre-impact anomalies that would have prevented it from producing power.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Office of the Medical Examiner of Tarrant County, located in Tarrant County, Texas, performed an autopsy on the flight instructor and foreign-certificated private pilot on November 16, 2007. The cause of death for both pilots was listed as "massive blunt force trauma of head, chest, abdomen, pelvis, and extremities due to light aircraft crash."

TESTS AND RESEARCH

The Investigator-In-Charge (IIC) conducted interviews at Skymates Inc. following the accident.

The first flight instructor reported that she had flown with the accident flight instructor in the past and felt completely safe with his flying abilities. The instructor continued that the flight instructor would occasionally do spins with his students; however, she felt it was unnecessary because it was not required for their stage of training.

The student who was riding in the back seat of the airplane at the time of the accident was her student. Since English was not his primary language, and he was having trouble with aircraft communications, she suggested that he ride along on the accident flight to observe the radio communications.

Before the accident flight, the instructor and the accident flight instructor had lunch together. The instructor reported that she asked the accident flight instructor to "not do any funny stuff" with her student on board. She didn't want him to learn any "bad habits." The instructor further reported that she had heard, before the accident, that the accident flight instructor had done a "barrel roll" in one of the flight school's airplane's.

According to a second flight instructor, the accident flight instructor was the best pilot he had ever flown with. This instructor recalled a conversation where the accident flight instructor revealed that he had performed a "snap roll" in a couple of flight school's airplanes. According to the instructor, he had expressed his displeasure to the accident flight instructor about his performing "snap rolls." The instructor reported that he had not heard anything further about the accident flight instructor performing this maneuver and assumed he had stopped.

When the IIC asked the instructor to describe how this maneuver was done, he responded with the following: The airplane is nosed over until 140 knots is reached. The pilot then pitches up until about 10 to 15 degrees above the horizon. The pilot then applies left rudder and aileron.

The second fight instructor further reported that the accident flight had been intended to be a time builder for the foreign-certificated pilot and that to the best of his knowledge there was no other flight training planned.

According to a primary flight student, the accident flight instructor had demonstrated a "barrel roll" and "spins" to him in a Cessna 172SP once or twice. The student described that to do a roll they would pitch the airplane's nose down until they reached 140 knots. At that point they would "pitch up and then turn." The student continued that the roll was "smooth" and "not violent." The student further reported that the accident flight instructor was a very good pilot.

The IIC received an email, dated November 7, 2007, that the rear seat passenger had sent to friends in Italy. Two translations of sections from the email are listed below:

"However,...yesterday I flew as passenger with an megalomaniac instructor ... I heard the radio communications while in flight and they are so amazing/incredible... Unfortunately, there are two air traffic controllers, whom one look(s) like he is dying when talking on the radio, the other talks in code...

Well, speaking of the megalomaniac instructor,...yesterday during the flight he took control and did two spin turns...without any warning...it looked like I was thrown out of the aircraft since I did not fasten the seat belt...we were not going to do acrobatics...well,...it was so amusing though..."

"...yesterday with a MEGALOMANIAC instructor I went up as a passenger to listen to the radio communications that are something to make you hallucinate. Unfortunately there are two air traffic controllers of which, when one speaks, he seems to be dying and the other speaks in code...

Well I was telling you about the megalomaniac...yesterday while we were going jolly good he takes over the controls and does 2 corkscrews...just like that without saying anything...I almost flew out of the airplane because I was wearing my seatbelt loose...after all we were not supposed to do acrobatics...Well...but it was a lot of fun..."

A review of the flight school records reveled that accident flight instructor had instructed the rear seat passenger for 1.1 hours on November 7, 2007; however, investigators were unable to determine, for certain, which flight instructor the email was referring to.

I find the word "rogue" an unfortunate choice: 14 CFR 91.13 says "Careless or Reckless Operation." Why not call the behavior what it is: reckless operation of an aircraft that endangers the life of another and that -- by the way -- violates the FARs.

I find the word "rogue" an unfortunate choice: 14 CFR 91.13 says "Careless or Reckless Operation." Why not call the behavior what it is: reckless operation of an aircraft that endangers the life of another and that -- by the way -- violates the FARs.

Because "rogue" is 5 letters, and I stopped counting at 29 after ".. of an aircraft...".

Brevity is the soul of wit, and "rogue pilot" easily encapsulates the concepts of disregard for rules and authority as well as reckless behaviour.

Didn't take long at all for this thread to get hijacked by semantics. LOL

As for "Normalization of Deviance" ... I think we'd be hard pressed to find any pilot, anywhere, that doesn't have bad habits. CAP flights are helpful in that when I'm MP, I almost always have another pilot acting as MO next to me. Its good to fly so often with another pilot who isn't afraid to say "if I was PIC I would .. "

I find the word "rogue" an unfortunate choice: 14 CFR 91.13 says "Careless or Reckless Operation." Why not call the behavior what it is: reckless operation of an aircraft that endangers the life of another and that -- by the way -- violates the FARs.

Redirecting to the topic of the OP:

While there is a motivational/cognitive difference between normalization of deviance (such as cumulative CAP deviance errors that culminated in the civilian Twin triple fatality that resulted in a multi-million dollar judgement against CAP) and "Rogue". CAP has had experiences with both types. Probably the most egregious example of a CAP Rogue I can think of is this one involving a Stand Eval pilot who liked to fly low:

It's tough to believe SOMEONE didn't know of his addiction to adrenalin and tree top flying. It's also regretable that no one present at the glider show spoke up. Unfortunately, the outcome of either (rogue, or normalization of "D") is often grim.

For some of our younger members who may not have heard of it, the Czar 52 crash at Fairchild AFB is a case study in the intersection between these hazardous attitudes and the failure of military leadership to step in and label such behavior as deviant. In that case, the mishap pilot was retained as Chief of Standards and Evaluation with a string of undocumented verbal hand slaps after a pattern of very hazardous incidents. Successive commanders did nothing, and perpetuated the problem. Once you find a problem, you cannot say nothing (which is a de facto endorsement) and be an ethical leader.

I have used, and highly recommend, the Czar 52 mishap (a B-52 fatal crash) as a cadet Character Development case study, as a cadet officer Leadership study, and I'd love to make it a mandatory element in Unit Commanders Courses. I think it would be perfect to devote an afternoon to, in Wing Commanders school, because it has so many USAF lessons learned for CAP. Do CAP commanders (as did the USAF ones) fail to implement written reprimands to document progressive discipline? Yep. Do CAP members with a record of reprimands see every change of unit or command as a "reset" or get out of jail card, because outgoing and incoming commanders don't pass a continuity file on problems? Yes, even more so than in the USAF, I believe.

Are CAP leaders reluctant to initiate personnel actions (from pulling quals, to reprimands, to separation actions)? So very much a yes, but those are what are sometimes required to save lives. I hate pulling ops quals, I hate filling out and processing termination actions, and I hate attending the funerals of my troops - but I have done all three now over the past 35+ years, and I know which one of those I hate the most.

The C-17 accident in Alaska at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson on July 28, 2010 was very similar to the B-52 crash at Fairchild Air Force Base. The pilot was a "good stick", chief of Stand Eval, and liked to create his own interpretation of the aircraft's envelope. He was practicing for an airshow, and all aboard "died instantly" according to the accident report. http://fairchildhospitalshooting.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/c-17a_elmendorf_28jul10.compressed.pdf It's clear from this, and other fatal and serious injury accidents in the armed forces since, that macho behavior exists and continues to be implicated in fatal mishaps in the Air Force, as well as other services. It's darned difficult to deal with that macho aspect when it is valued so highly by commanders.

The C-17 accident in Alaska at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson on July 28, 2010 was very similar to the B-52 crash at Fairchild Air Force Base. The pilot was a "good stick", chief of Stand Eval, and liked to create his own interpretation of the aircraft's envelope. He was practicing for an airshow, and all aboard "died instantly" according to the accident report. http://fairchildhospitalshooting.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/c-17a_elmendorf_28jul10.compressed.pdf It's clear from this, and other fatal and serious injury accidents in the armed forces since, that macho behavior exists and continues to be implicated in fatal mishaps in the Air Force, as well as other services. It's darned difficult to deal with that macho aspect when it is valued so highly by commanders.

It may be valued by some commanders, but it sure isn't valued by the people that fly with them.

I've sat in debriefs with (and have a few hours with) guys with many combat sorties and a few kills, and have grown to appreciate the measured ability to press into a fight and kill the enemy. Key word is "measured", as in "to evaluate and control to a desired limit". Many combat commanders value an aggressive, combatant attitude, which is absolutely priceless in a warrior culture - but need members who do not rush blindly in. What needs to come out in the summation is that we need to value warriors that can balance that aggressiveness with risk assessment and an informed adherence to the flight regs which are built on decades of testing and vicarious learning.

Vicarious learning (learning by watching others) is a Good Thing: you've all heard, "Don't be That Guy". So, ignoring safety of flight limits based on flight test results isn't "aggressive", its reckless and stupid. Especially so when the mishap pilot is less invested with winning the fight than looking good before others (e.g. airshows).

Don't be That Guy. The bottom line for CAP is the reminder that we are not a combatant organization. If you feel you sorta are, or can't make the mental distinction, don't be mad bro when we take action to separate you from CAP...

You also need to respect the fact that even the combat pilots are highly trained in the performance of their duties, and that's why they can make those aggressive calls that would seem absolutely ridiculous and novice to someone who hasn't learned in that environment and hasn't trained to perform to that standard.

For the most part, civilian flying is trained to pilot the aircraft and make decisions against presented hazards, not operating to accomplish a higher level mission outside from flying from Point A to Point B safely. Your CAP Form 5 is not unique to this.

So, where, exactly does piloting a large aircraft (either transport like a C-17, or a B-52 bomber) in a non-emergency/non-combat situation using on-the-absolute-envelope-edge for an airshow fall into this? Or piloting a Blackhawk into zero-zero-night IMC over open water as was the case with the fatal LOC-I a couple of years ago off Elgin? All of these accidents resulted from pilots (all "great sticks")who deliberately and repeatedly flew their aircraft in violation of established SOP for training or airshows, outside of the approved flight envelope, and contrary to specific pre-briefed procedures and flight limitations for these non-combat sorties.

Otto Von Bismarck observed "it is far better to learn from the mistakes of others. Only a fool wishes to learn from his own..." Were the pilots of these recent accidents "fools"? I don't think so. Toxic culture that promotes unwarranted risk taking and leadership failures that condone and even encourage that risky behavior are a poisonous combination.

So, where, exactly does piloting a large aircraft (either transport like a C-17, or a B-52 bomber) in a non-emergency/non-combat situation using on-the-absolute-envelope-edge for an airshow fall into this? Or piloting a Blackhawk into zero-zero-night IMC over open water as was the case with the fatal LOC-I a couple of years ago off Elgin? All of these accidents resulted from pilots (all "great sticks")who deliberately and repeatedly flew their aircraft in violation of established SOP for training or airshows, outside of the approved flight envelope, and contrary to specific pre-briefed procedures and flight limitations for these non-combat sorties.

Otto Von Bismarck observed "it is far better to learn from the mistakes of others. Only a fool wishes to learn from his own..." Were the pilots of these recent accidents "fools"? I don't think so. Toxic culture that promotes unwarranted risk taking and leadership failures that condone and even encourage that risky behavior are a poisonous combination.

On crew aircraft this is why we have CRM (Cockpit Resource Management) classes. If you see something, say something...On both of these accidents no one in the aircraft attempted to intervene. This was backed up by the CVR on the C-17.

I don't think they were fools either. You can't believe that they're suicidal either, except in rare and declared instances. But I do believe that they were fooling themselves, lost in the gratification of their mental fantasies.

At the last moment, do they ask, "What have I done"? One of my favorite classic WW2 military flicks is "The Bridge On the River Kwai", in which a talented British officer (Alec Guinness) absolutely convinces himself that leading his troops to build a bridge (for their Japanese captors) is a Good Idea. At the very end he comes to his senses and struggles to right his mistake. See the clip at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tRHVMi3LxZE

Like his character, I believe that good men and women do often delude themselves into patterns of unsafe and destructive behavior. We support such behavior (encourage it) when we reward it with applause. We allow it to grow when we look the other way. We are all codependent in their aberrant behavior when we fail to call it for what it is.

So as PHall says, if you see something, say something.

Hence the root of what I hope is a consistent approach to coloring within the lines on the little things (like uniforms) because adherence to standards on the little things can set a command tone which then walks through all aspects of the organization, from cadet protection to flying standards. When you have someone who repeatedly has Core Values breaches, or who can't be bothered to stop wearing uniforms when he/she is obviously out of weight/grooming, that is a leading indicator of what the FAA calls a Hazardous Attitude, related to risk taking behavior, and we must step in gently but firmly to intervene.

(There! A mandatory uniform thread divert! Do I get a pass because Bob and I started this thread? )

Hence the root of what I hope is a consistent approach to coloring within the lines on the little things (like uniforms) because adherence to standards on the little things can set a command tone which then walks through all aspects of the organization... When you have someone who repeatedly has Core Values breaches, ... that is a leading indicator of what the FAA calls a Hazardous Attitude, related to risk taking behavior, and we must step in gently but firmly to intervene.

(There! A mandatory uniform thread divert! Do I get a pass because bob and I started this thread?)

I don't think they were fools either. You can't believe that they're suicidal either, except in rare and declared instances. But I do believe that they were fooling themselves, lost in the gratification of their mental fantasies.

At the last moment, do they ask, "What have I done"? One of my favorite classic WW2 military flicks is "The Bridge On the River Kwai", in which a talented British officer (Alec Guinness) absolutely convinces himself that leading his troops to build a bridge (for their Japanese captors) is a Good Idea. At the very end he comes to his senses and struggles to right his mistake. See the clip at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tRHVMi3LxZE

Like his character, I believe that good men and women do often delude themselves into patterns of unsafe and destructive behavior. We support such behavior (encourage it) when we reward it with applause. We allow it to grow when we look the other way. We are all codependent in their aberrant behavior when we fail to call it for what it is.

So as PHall says, if you see something, say something.

Hence the root of what I hope is a consistent approach to coloring within the lines on the little things (like uniforms) because adherence to standards on the little things can set a command tone which then walks through all aspects of the organization, from cadet protection to flying standards. When you have someone who repeatedly has Core Values breaches, or who can't be bothered to stop wearing uniforms when he/she is obviously out of weight/grooming, that is a leading indicator of what the FAA calls a Hazardous Attitude, related to risk taking behavior, and we must step in gently but firmly to intervene.

(There! A mandatory uniform thread divert! Do I get a pass because Bob and I started this thread? )