Nasa May Expand Offshore Safety Zone For Shuttle Launches

April 12, 1986|By John J. Glisch of The Sentinel Staff

CAPE CANAVERAL — Safety experts are examining data on the destruction of the Challenger to see whether the offshore zone barred to ships and planes during shuttle launches should be expanded in the future.

Marvin Jones, director of ground safety at Kennedy Space Center, said although experts originally thought the downrange safety zone was large enough, he ''wouldn't be surprised'' if it is increased.

Starting at the shoreline, the restricted zone is 10 miles wide and runs 40 miles to sea. Challenger's wreckage, however, fell over an area about 22 miles wide and 38 miles long.

The debris littered the huge area because the spaceplane was nearly 9 miles high and traveling 1,200 mph when it broke apart Jan. 28. High-altitude winds also scattered the wreckage.

Safety zones on the ground that form a 3-mile radius around shuttle launch pads 39A and 39B probably will remain the same, Jones said.

''Given what I know today, I don't feel the need to go out and start making any changes,'' he said. ''That's not to say we're not going to consider some things.''

The safety zones are under scrutiny while every aspect of the shuttle program is re-evaluated.

The zones have been used for all 25 shuttle launches and were established based on research by NASA, Air Force and Navy experts before the first shuttle flight in April 1981.

A number of scenarios were developed on how far debris would spread if a shuttle exploded on the ground, shortly after liftoff or while making its ascent, said Air Force Maj. Jerry Bieringer, a range officer at the Eastern Space and Missile Center at Patrick Air Force Base.

''We built a model that says at any given point in time it does this, this or that,'' he said.

NASA officials would not say whether any of those models accurately reflected the spread of Challenger wreckage.

One of the scenarios studied was the consequences of a massive launch pad explosion fed by 300,000 gallons of liquid fuel and 2.4 million pounds of solid booster rocket propellant aboard the shuttle.

Jones said such a blast would jolt and blow out windows at the nearby Vehicle Assembly Building, launch control room and press area.

The sites are 3.8 miles from launch pad 39A and 4.2 miles from pad 39B. Despite the proximity, Jones said computer studies showed debris would not scatter beyond the 3-mile safety line.

The safety line also was deemed a good protective margin even if just one booster rocket ignited and the shuttle began to cartwheel seconds after liftoff, he said.

Only a few specially trained rescue workers and technicians are allowed inside the ground security zone during launches. All are at least 1 mile from the pad huddled in sandbag bunkers.

''Nobody gets in there except absolutely essential people,'' Jones said. ''We know who they are and where they are.''

Any extension of the downrange safety zone would mean additional work for Coast Guard patrol boats and Air Force planes and helicopters that watch for intruders.

''They're not only looking for someone in it, they're looking for someone heading into it,'' said Air Force spokesman Lt. Col. Robert Nicholson.

The military had ''big problems'' keeping vessels and small planes out of the zone during the first dozen shuttle flights, Nicholson said.

The worst situation occurred in August 1984 when a plane circled off Cape Canaveral waiting the see the launch of Discovery. Its presence delayed the liftoff six minutes.