Following Quine, ontology is here understood as the study of what there is. (Re: neo-Aristotelian ontology, the study of what grounds what, see the "Fundamentality" category.) Our focus is on the existence of the most generic things that populate many philosophers' ontologies, e.g., objects, properties, natural kinds, states-of-affairs, events, etc. We often talk of these things without thinking twice, but the existence of such entities can seem odd on reflection. For instance, it is natural to say that red roses and red firetrucks have something in common, the property of being red. But does this mean there is a single entity that is a constituent of *every* such rose and firetruck? A second example concerns composite objects: Suppose Abe Lincoln replaces the handle of his axe in 1825, and later in 1860 replaces the head. Does this mean he has owned more than one axe in his lifetime? In general, given a puzzling entity X, Realists about X will strive to minimize such oddities--whereas Anti-Realists often try to preserve ordinary talk of X, despite excluding X from their ontology. Questions about ontology can also lead to questions about these questions. Thus, ontology often bleeds into metaontology, the study of the study of what there is. In recent years, the ontology literature has grown dramatically, especially on metaontology and on composition.

Avicenna's notorious claim that God knows particulars only 'in a universal way' is argued to have its roots in Aristotelian epistemology, and especially in the "Posterior Analytics". According to Avicenna and Aristotle as understood by Avicenna, there is in fact no such thing as 'knowledge' of particulars, at least not as such. Rather, a particular can only be known by subsuming it under a universal. Thus Avicenna turns out to be committed to a much more surprising epistemological thesis: even humans (...) know particulars only in a universal way. (shrink)

In his philosophy, Aristotle, on the one hand, has created a close relation between existence and substance so that he can reduce questions about existence to those about substance, and, on the other hand, believes in the substance-essence relation. That is why it is very difficult in his philosophy to distinguish existence, substance, and essence from each other. This has led experts on Aristotle to wonder if there is a distinction between existence and essence in his philosophy. Moreover, they ask, (...) if there is any distinction, is it merely a mental/logical/epistemological one, or whether there is an objective/metaphysical/real one as well?In this paper, we intend to show that what we see in Aristotle's works is only a mental or subjective distinction between existence and essence. Therefore, there is no need to a metaphysical one, nor could he believe in such a distinction. We will also discuss that, in the world of Islam, Farabi and Ibn Sina, by moving from the Aristotelian mental distinction to the metaphysical distinction between existence and quiddity, managed to present a novel interpretation and explanation of ontology, cosmology, and theology so that we can new speak about an independent philosophical system for Muslims. (shrink)

A number of philosophers today endorse the view thatmaterial substances (ex. cats, stones, atoms) can be analyzed asbundles of “particular properties” or “tropes”. Among severaldevelopments, the theory that P. Simons proposed is seen as themost successful one. Simons’ theory seems to owe its high reputationto mainly two advantages which he claims for his theory: thecapacity for avoiding infinite regress, and the explanatory adequacyfor phenomenon of change. In this paper, however, I try to object tothis high appraisal, by showing that the (...) two alleged advantagesindeed cannot be simultaneously secured by Simons’ position. Tothis aim, I proceed as follows: First, I present Simons’ theory andexplain its alleged two advantages. Next, I take up A. Denkel’scriticism and show that the explanatory adequacy will be lost unlessSimons admits a certain revision of his theory. Finally, I show that asa result of the revision needed, Simons’ position comes to lose thecapacity for avoiding regress in turn. (shrink)

Despite the clichés which govern much of its current forms, the cinema continues to have a vital political and aesthetic significance. Our commitment to, and our sincerity towards, our ways of being in the world have become catastrophically eroded. Nihilism and despair have taken hold. We must find a way to renew our faith in our capacity to transform the world, a faith that will give us back the reality of a world eroded by the restrictive capitalist ontology of modernity. (...) How can we restore belief in the reality of a world when scepticism and universal pessimism have taken hold? Is it possible to find alternative ways of living, being and thinking? This book will discuss the means by which some filmmakers have grasped the vocation of resisting and transforming the present, of cultivating new forms of belief in the world when total alienation seems inevitable. (shrink)

A central part of academic inquiry and scholarly education, metaphysics was regarded as "the Queen of Sciences" even before the age of Aristotle. This multipart essay by the prominent philosopher examines the nature of existence, along with issues related to causation, form and matter, mathematics, and God.

A central part of academic inquiry and scholarly education, metaphysics was regarded as "the Queen of Sciences" even before the age of Aristotle. This multipart essay by the prominent philosopher examines the nature of existence, along with issues related to causation, form and matter, mathematics, and God.

A central part of academic inquiry and scholarly education, metaphysics was regarded as "the Queen of Sciences" even before the age of Aristotle. This multipart essay by the prominent philosopher examines the nature of existence, along with issues related to causation, form and matter, mathematics, and God.

A central part of academic inquiry and scholarly education, metaphysics was regarded as "the Queen of Sciences" even before the age of Aristotle. This multipart essay by the prominent philosopher examines the nature of existence, along with issues related to causation, form and matter, mathematics, and God.

A central part of academic inquiry and scholarly education, metaphysics was regarded as "the Queen of Sciences" even before the age of Aristotle. This multipart essay by the prominent philosopher examines the nature of existence, along with issues related to causation, form and matter, mathematics, and God.

A central part of academic inquiry and scholarly education, metaphysics was regarded as "the Queen of Sciences" even before the age of Aristotle. This multipart essay by the prominent philosopher examines the nature of existence, along with issues related to causation, form and matter, mathematics, and God.

A central part of academic inquiry and scholarly education, metaphysics was regarded as "the Queen of Sciences" even before the age of Aristotle. This multipart essay by the prominent philosopher examines the nature of existence, along with issues related to causation, form and matter, mathematics, and God.

A central part of academic inquiry and scholarly education, metaphysics was regarded as "the Queen of Sciences" even before the age of Aristotle. This multipart essay by the prominent philosopher examines the nature of existence, along with issues related to causation, form and matter, mathematics, and God.

In this paper I am going to try to prove that if-then-ism is not an option. I will focus on if-then-ism as a strategy to reduce ontological commitments in mathematics. I will start with the definition of if-then-ism in The Principles of Mathematics. Then I am going to discuss the Putnam’s criticism of if-then-ism. Next I will move on to some arguments of Cian Dorr that support it. In the end, I will talk about ontological parsimony as the general motivation (...) for adopting the if-then-ism. I will discuss ontological parsimony in connection with naturalism and argue that demand for ontological parsimony does not follow from naturalism. (shrink)

I used to think of the connection between a particular and a universal that it instantiates as a contingent one. Now I think that this is not quite right. This revision, as I now see it, is not a very large one. I still think that the states of affairs (Russell’s facts in his great Lectures on Logical Atomism) that unite particulars and universals are contingent beings. But the connection within states of affairs is, in a certain way, necessary.

As part of a series of workshops on different aspects of biomedical ontology sponsored by the National Center for Biomedical Ontology (NCBO), a workshop titled "Ontologies of Cellular Networks" took place in Newark, New Jersey, on 27 to 28 March 2008. This workshop included more than 30 participants from various backgrounds in biomedicine and bioinformatics. The goal of the workshop was to provide an introduction to the basic tools and methods of ontology, as well as to enhance coordination between groups (...) already working on ontologies of cellular networks. The meeting focused on three questions: What is an ontology? What is a pathway? What is a cellular network? (shrink)

Presented here is an investigation and expansion of reality, as based on a tautological approach to the laws of nature, an atomistic approach to truth and properties, cause and effect, and definitions.