tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post293999113852607754..comments2015-02-27T21:26:26.660-07:00Comments on Atheist Ethicist: PrescriptionsAlonzo Fyfehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05687777216426347054noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-11314392708320334572010-04-29T18:00:59.865-06:002010-04-29T18:00:59.865-06:00..a &quot;moral prescription&quot; is a universal ...<i>..a &quot;moral prescription&quot; is a universal prescription which means &quot;that there are reasons to act for everyone to keep or bring about the state of affairs in question&quot;. (faithlessgod)</i><br /><br />Those don&#39;t exist, except where &quot;everyone&quot; shares the <i>underlying assumptions</i> that would prompt the moral ought.<br /><br />If &quot;everyone&quot; shares underlying assumption X, then - and only then - can such &quot;universal prescriptions&quot; be made.clhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05799095055208759535noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-7788912032897317152010-04-29T17:28:04.575-06:002010-04-29T17:28:04.575-06:00I deny that I am using moral terms in any way that...<i>I deny that I am using moral terms in any way that is substantially different from normal usage.</i><br /><br />I object, because,<br /><br />1) you define [the generic] &quot;good&quot; as &quot;such as to fulfill the desires in question,&quot; then<br /><br />2) you define &quot;the right act&quot; as the act the person with &quot;good desires&quot; would perform, but<br /><br />3) you use the generic definition of &quot;good&quot; as the base for your moral definition. <br /><br />The problem is that in my experience with normal usage, &quot;the right act&quot; is not necessarily &quot;the act a person with desires that are such as to fulfill the desires in question&quot; would perform.<br /><br />So, in my opinion, you are using moral terms in a way that is substantially different from normal usage.clhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/05799095055208759535noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-51756511587280802762010-04-29T17:25:10.929-06:002010-04-29T17:25:10.929-06:00This defense is not unique to desire utilitarianis...This defense is not unique to desire utilitarianism is it? Pretty much any moral realist who wants to talk about oughts (and this includes Sam Harris), should have the right to say they are talking about &quot;oughts,&quot; and that even a &quot;redefinition&quot; of ought isn&#39;t a real indictment of this or that brand of moral realism.josefhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06650991894634101445noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-16594468.post-4520678584706032832010-04-29T09:03:11.795-06:002010-04-29T09:03:11.795-06:00Hi Alonzo
I am not sure to whom you were addressi...Hi Alonzo<br /><br />I am not sure to whom you were addressing this post left dangling by no reply (yet) from Polymeron.<br /><br />Anyway AFAIKS what you have written is quite consistent with what I am <i>saying</i>, however maybe you have read my <i>writing</i> differently to the way I intended, in which case it would be useful for me to know this, since if you can charitably misread me this way, what about others less familiar and less charitable with desirism!<br /><br />Anyway as I am now putting it. A prescription means &quot;there are reasons to act of the kind such as to keep or bring about a state of affairs in question&quot;. <br /><br />I am now not making a strict distinction between a practical and moral ought, regarding them only as differences in scope, so I could say that a &quot;practical prescription&quot; (pought) means &quot;there are reasons to act that the agent has of the kind to keep or bring about the state of affairs in question&quot; and that a &quot;moral prescription&quot; is a universal prescription which means &quot;that there are reasons to act for everyone to keep or bring about the state of affairs in question&quot;.(mought)(lets assume ceteris paribus and provisionalism regarding &quot;everyone&quot; etc.)<br /><br />Polymeron translated this to &quot;“there are reasons for others to encourage these desires”&quot; which is not what I said but is the <i>outcome</i> of mought reasons to act lacking in the current pought reason of the agent unless and until the social forces are applied.<br /><br />Does this make sense?faithlessgodhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16952072422175870627noreply@blogger.com