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Bitcoin Facebook Virus Complete Analysis

As discussed in previous post now we will employ traditional
malware analysis technique in order to dissect this new virus. Figure 2 show
LOL zip virus message. Initially we have following information about this
malware:

·This message is sent from victim’s computer
without his knowledge to all his Facebook friends and

·Victims also reported sluggish performance of
system after the infection.

Fig. 2. Facebook Message containing
Malware

We will safely download this file on our virtual controlled
environment to carry the further analysis. After unzipping it we found a JAR
(Java Archived File) in it.

Fig. 3. JAR file inside Zipped folder

Using online
available java decompiler we have converted the byte code (JAR file) to
source code file.

Fig. 4. Decompiled Jar File

Decompilation and comprehension of JAR File

Source of JAR file is obfuscated so it is needed to decompile such
a file. We will use simple print instruction to find out the meaning of all the
functions. After analyzing each function we have following information. These
operations are performed by JAR file in order to download and install the
actual malware.

·Jar file creates a directory in C drive if not
present, namely C:\\TEMP\\

·Jar file created file name YQJHBJX.PWY as hidden
alternate stream of TEMP folder.

·Jar file then opened the http connection to
location https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/s/ +string1="f6pb6ya5e5vc0q5/d.dat?dl=1@@@21urb4zg9n2on4s/d.dat?dl=1@@@8h46y6oodr4dxxf/d.dat?dl=1@@@8opd2hw50b974mx/d.dat?dl=1@@@tix3692duv4yts9/d.dat?dl=1"

·"@@@" is splitter that means
fg6oxlrzau4egd5/d.dat?dl=1 constitutes one link. Jar will be downloading something
from one of these links. Jar file will try all the links in order to download
the malicious DLL.

·Jar file then downloads a file named d.dat. Then
the jar file copies the content of d.dat (Main malicious file) to 081C854F.dat

·final step is to run d.dat or 081C854F.dat. Lastly the Jar file installs
the malicious file as a system level service using following command:

regsvr32 /s C:\\temp: 081C854F.dat (/s stands
for silent install.)

Static Analysis

Next we will use strings utility to dump out all the ASCII
and UNICODE present in d.dat (DLL file) which we downloaded from the URL found
above.

Fig. 5. Strings.exe Output

We found temp directory using strings utility inside the
malicious DLL d.dat. This temp directory contains the Alternate Data Stream
which is denoted by :rnd. So the Temp directory confirms the previous
deduction.

If we go to TEMP and do "dir /r" then we can see the
hidden alternate data stream. We the used tools like alternate data stream
viewer to find out the contents of these alternate data streams.

These Facebook profile IDs are used by the virus to further
replicate to other users via Facebook. This virus replicates itself from victim
account to the accounts of people in victim’s profile.

If SRV file is opened then a link to a file containing a
message from the creator of this virus is found inside it: http://ideone.com/plain/74R13B
The message says virus aim is CPU mining.

In order to confirm that the virus actually performs CPU mining we
will dig further.

DLL (d.dat) will runs from a hidden alternate data stream.
So the malicious DLL is hidden on TEMP folder alternate data stream.

Fig. 7. Strings.exe Output

By carefully going through the strings we can conclude

·Virus injects minerd mining utility in
explorer.exe memory.

·Virus is registered as a service in system using
a DLL file stored in alternate data stream of C:/TEMP folder.

·Attacker have used curl module to automate LOL
zip message to Facebook friends of the victim.

Fig. 8. Minerd.exe Operation List

Dynamic Analysis

We will now run the malware sample to confirm the deductions made
above. Now will look at InetSim data to confirm the hypothesis made after doing
static analysis:

InetSim log shows and confirms the web address that we find
as ASCII string in Malicious DLL Figure 7 below show the site(wafflepool.com)
and confirm that explorer.exe is injected with minerd utility code.

Fig. 9. Wafflepool Website

Thus we can conclude form Figures 9 and 5 that explorer.exe
has been injected with malicious code. Explorer does not take any command
normally. Therefore the commands given to explorer in Figure 5 were able to run
because of the injected minerd utility. The injection was done by LOL file in
the main memory.

Conclusion

We concluded the following operations which are being performed by
this malware sample.

·Virus injects minerd mining utility in
explorer.exe memory. This executable is used for mining of bitcoins. These
BitCoins can directly be redeemed for money in digital world. BitCoins is a
peer to peer internet payment system in with the bitcoins serve as internet
money.

·Virus is registered as a service in system using
a DLL file stored in alternate data stream of C:/TEMP folder. This will ensure
that the malware gets system privilege and runs automatically every time victim
logs on in facebook.

·Attacker have used curl module to automate LOL
zip message to Facebook friends of the victim. This ensures that as soon as a
victim opens the LOL jar file, all the Facebook friends of the victim receive a
copy of LOL zip file as well.

This confirms that aim of attacker is to earn BITCOINS by CPU
mining which also fits with our initial information i.e. degraded CPU
performance in victim’s machine.

Both the static and dynamic analysis techniques were able to
uncover the details of the malware sample. Both the methods were used in
conjugation with each other to confirm the findings.

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