NEW BRUNSWICK — In his instructions to the jury in Dharun Ravi’s trial yesterday, Judge Glenn Berman explained the four counts of bias intimidation that could put Ravi in jail for 10 years.

Reading the statute, he defined words like “purpose” and “knowingly” and “intimidation,” the latter being to “cause fear.”

But what he could not verbalize were the behaviors or actions that would cause fear.

The New Jersey bias intimidation law — 2C:16-1 — doesn’t say a jury must find evidence of hateful language or slurs, physical intimidation or contact, written or spoken threats, or damage to property to convict someone of bias intimidation. Instead, it vaguely describes the intimidation as “conduct” and “circumstances” that can be perceived as biased.

On Monday, Berman called the statute “muddled.”

“I’ve read the statute and read the statute more times than I can count,” Berman said in open court but after the jury was excused. “I’ve studied it. The statute, to me, is muddled. If I had written it, I would have written it differently. But I didn’t write it. The Legislature did.”

Blair Zwillman, a partner with Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer in Woodbridge, and co-chair of the state’s Criminal Law Civil Rights team, was a little stronger in his opinion:

“This is a particularly egregious, bad piece of legislation,” he said. “New Jersey has a history of knee-jerk legislation, and this is one of them.”

The statute was adopted in 2001 and amended in 2008, and while it has been used in cases of assault, severe vandalism and other acts of violence, this is first time it’s been used in an invasion of privacy case.

“I think the statute has its place,” said veteran defense attorney Michael Robbins. “It opens up a dialogue on how people treat one another, and there is an appropriate application of this law in cases of egregious, biased behavior, or violence. But this (the Ravi indictment) wasn’t the case.”

Steven Goldstein, chairman of Garden State Equality, also defended the law. “The bias intimidation statute is one of New Jersey’s most important and effective criminal and civil rights laws,” he said. “The question isn’t whether it’s worthwhile. The question is whether it applies to this particular case.”

Goldstein said he and his organization were reserving comment on that question.

“We decided not to comment on the trial and let justice take its course,” he said.

Robbins called the law “a sentence enhancer.”

“It’s attached to other offenses to add jail time, which, when you look at it, is intimidating in itself,” he said.

Under the statute, adding “bias intimidation” to assault, robbery or invasion of privacy, or any other second-, third- or fourth-degree offense, moves the crimes up a degree.

Accordingly, if a defendant is found not guilty of the offenses the bias charge is piggybacked on, he cannot be found guilty of bias intimidation.

Ravi is charged with four counts of bias intimidation in conjunction with various charges of invasion and attempted invasion of privacy, crimes that do not carry the same sentencing weight as bias intimidation. The bias charge carries a maximum of 10 years. Prosecutors argued Ravi spied on Tyler Clementi and his unnamed male companion, M.B., with the purpose of causing intimidation. The defense says Ravi never intended to intimidate Clementi. Over four weeks of testimony, there was plenty of evidence Ravi never exhibited hatred for gays, but he did admit, through text messages to friends, he wasn’t exactly comfortable with having a gay roommate.

In court this week, assistant prosecutor Julia Mc-Clure argued that “being uncomfortable” could constitute bias. Because the statute has no examples of bias conduct, “biased” behavior is subject to wide interpretation.

“It basically says, ‘You’ll know it when you see it,’ ” Robbins said. “So there’s no clear guidelines on how to apply the law.”

In Ravi’s case, the members of the jury have to ask themselves this question: If Ravi’s roommate weren’t gay, would he still have attempted to spy on him?

Yesterday, in his instructions to the jury, Berman told them they could “infer” the “state of mind” of the defendant based on their own common sense and life experiences to determine if he acted with bias. Ironic, don’t you think, in that a juror’s own bias could lead to the conclusion a defendant is biased.

One attorney, who asked not to be identified while the jury was out, said, “It’s the only statute that makes the defendant’s motive an additional crime.”

Zwillman, a trial lawyer with 35 years of experience, said the “statute creates a ‘protected’ class of victims, so any crime against ‘protected’ people can be interpreted as a bias crime.”

Perhaps most troubling is the statute’s third section. The first two cite a defendant’s “purposeful” or “knowing” actions as criminal conduct. But the third section says a defendant can still be found guilty — absent of “purposeful” or “knowing” conduct — as long as the victim feels fear or becomes intimidated.

So, while the jury may find Ravi didn’t display bias toward Clementi, it can find him guilty if they determine Clementi felt intimidated.

“That’s a pretty slippery slope,” Robbins said. “In some ways, this is a test case of how broadly the statute can be applied.”