Since the introduction of One Belt, One Road as a national development strategy in 2013, China has been mobilizing its political, economic, and diplomatic resources to foster the positive reception of the strategy by the region. “One Belt, One Road” encompasses two development plans: the New Silk Road Economic Belt, which will link China with Europe through Central and Western Asia, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which will connect China with Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Through the strategy, China aims to further integrate itself into the world economy through trade, investment, infrastructure, connectivity, and other development projects. Recently, a campaign has emerged in China calling for the inclusion of Africa in the strategy. While the inclusion could surely bring more momentum to China’s economic cooperation with Africa, it does not resolve—and actually could amplify—the existing problems in current Sino-African relations.

The most cited proposal outside the government that calls for including Africa in China’s “One Belt, One Road” framework (making it “One Belt, One Road, One Continent”) came last month from Justin Yifu Lin, former chief economist of the World Bank. He argues that through infrastructure development, China could both foster the growth of African countries and transfer its labor-intensive industries to Africa. This general focus on infrastructure seems to be confirmed by the signing of an MOU between China and the African Union on January 27. The ambitious agreement plans to connect all 54 African countries through transportation infrastructure projects, including modern highways, airports, and high speed railways. While these developments are not officially a component of “One Belt, One Road,” many in China have begun to draw linkages between the two.

China’s general emphasis on infrastructure development seems to have received initial positive responses from African leaders. Chairperson of the African Union Commission Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma says the MOU will help accelerate the much needed regional integration and benefit ordinary Africans with skills transfer and job creation. The Chairman of the Egyptian African Association Ahmed Haggag went further, welcoming the possible inclusion of Africa in “China’s One Belt, One Road” strategy at an international symposium hosted in southern China. He criticized the suspicions in some African countries about China’s policy toward Africa, attributing them to pure misunderstandings about China’s intentions.

Does Africa need “One Belt, One Road”?

The “One Belt, One Road” strategy is centered on infrastructure development, especially regional transportation and connectivity projects. Chinese experts argue that the strategy would have two main applications in Africa. The first is the infrastructure development of the continent, which is closely associated with China’s need to boost exports, utilize its excess capacity in construction industries, and stimulate China’s slowing economic growth. The second is the transfer of labor-intensive industries, especially manufacturing businesses to Africa, so as to complement China’s own economic restructuring given its rising manufacturing costs (such as labor costs). Experts such as Justin Yifu Lin see the two components as the two pillars of Sino-African economic cooperation in the years to come.

To be fair, with or without the strategic framework of “One Belt, One Road,” China’s plan to pursue infrastructure development and industry transfer in Africa will continue to be carried out. China’s interests have been well-articulated by President Xi Jinping in his emphasis on job creation in Africa during his 2013 trip and by Premier Li Keqiang through his ambitious proposal to build African regional transportation networks in 2014. The introduction of the strategy itself does not change the overall direction of China’s Africa policy. Nevertheless, to include Africa in the grand national strategy of “One Belt, One Road” will generate more attention, emphasis, and, most importantly, more government money to boost the policy’s implementation. In this sense, the move could provide additional momentum to enhance the scope and depth of China’s economic initiatives in Africa.

Tensions around China’s Africa strategy still exist

However, including Africa in the grand scheme of “One Belt, One Road” does not solve many of the long-standing questions in China’s economic relations with Africa. Chinese analysts have painted a rather rosy picture on how Africa will greatly benefit from Chinese infrastructure projects and the transfer of labor-intensive industries. In their view, China’s development plans in Africa will not only improve the infrastructure conditions in Africa, but will also create jobs, improve the economic well-being of locals, and boost the industrial development of the continent. While some of these arguments might be valid, they do not at all address issues such as the controversial relationship between China’s infrastructure investment and its interests in African natural resources. Nor do they touch upon Chinese companies’ irresponsible investment behavior, especially in social and environmental regards. In fact, prominent Chinese experts have excluded the discussion of these issues in their analysis of China’s infrastructure development and industrial transfer to Africa.

Even within China, there is a widely shared sense of doubt about the financial risk associated with the ambitious infrastructure development in Africa. Since China’s development financing is not free grant, people wonder whether Africa is capable of repaying Chinese loans, and, if so, how. While some Chinese analysts would like to emphasize the trade promotion effect of this financing and its broader economic and strategic utilities in China’s policy toward Africa, to convince the central government, especially the state-owned banks, of uncertain projects will be a daunting task for Chinese companies and traders. In addition, the political risks and volatile investment environment in some African countries will inevitably affect the planning and implementation of Chinese projects. How China will address them is completely missing in its grand development strategy in Africa.

Beijing has stated that the transfer of labor-intensive industries and job creation in Africa is one of China’s priority tasks. However, how China will systematically pursue this goal remains to be seen. In Africa, there have been “model” projects of Chinese businesses’ training and hiring African workers. Some widely publicized examples include Hisense electronics manufacturing business in South Africa, CITIC’s real estate development in Angola and Huajian’s shoe factory in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, these cases are so sporadic and PR-imbued that they raise more questions about the scope, systematic design, and consistency of China’s plan to transfer its labor-intensive industries to Africa. Beyond the grand slogans and random cases, China needs to present more systematic, well-coordinated and industry-specific plans to convince Africa and the world that China is indeed committed to and vested in job creation in Africa.

While the proposal to include Africa in the “One Belt, One Road” strategy is still in its early stage, the Chinese government should not wait for its implementation to address the known problems in China’s economic ties with Africa. Otherwise, greater efforts in the wrong direction will only generate more problems for Africa, China, and their relations. For the United States, China’s policy orientation deserves its close attention. As Washington and Beijing explore the possibilities for cooperation on security and development issues in Africa, China’s policy designs, including the potential inclusion of Africa in the “One Belt, One Road” strategy, will potentially bring important opportunities for the two countries to work together in Africa for the better development of the continent.

Authors

]]>
Mon, 02 Mar 2015 10:06:00 -0500Yun Sun
Since the introduction of One Belt, One Road as a national development strategy in 2013, China has been mobilizing its political, economic, and diplomatic resources to foster the positive reception of the strategy by the region. “One Belt, One Road” encompasses two development plans: the New Silk Road Economic Belt, which will link China with Europe through Central and Western Asia, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which will connect China with Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Through the strategy, China aims to further integrate itself into the world economy through trade, investment, infrastructure, connectivity, and other development projects. Recently, a campaign has emerged in China calling for the inclusion of Africa in the strategy. While the inclusion could surely bring more momentum to China's economic cooperation with Africa, it does not resolve—and actually could amplify—the existing problems in current Sino-African relations.
The most cited proposal outside the government that calls for including Africa in China's “One Belt, One Road” framework (making it “One Belt, One Road, One Continent”) came last month from Justin Yifu Lin, former chief economist of the World Bank. He argues that through infrastructure development, China could both foster the growth of African countries and transfer its labor-intensive industries to Africa. This general focus on infrastructure seems to be confirmed by the signing of an MOU between China and the African Union on January 27. The ambitious agreement plans to connect all 54 African countries through transportation infrastructure projects, including modern highways, airports, and high speed railways. While these developments are not officially a component of “One Belt, One Road,” many in China have begun to draw linkages between the two.
China's general emphasis on infrastructure development seems to have received initial positive responses from African leaders. Chairperson of the African Union Commission Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma says the MOU will help accelerate the much needed regional integration and benefit ordinary Africans with skills transfer and job creation. The Chairman of the Egyptian African Association Ahmed Haggag went further, welcoming the possible inclusion of Africa in “China's One Belt, One Road” strategy at an international symposium hosted in southern China. He criticized the suspicions in some African countries about China's policy toward Africa, attributing them to pure misunderstandings about China's intentions.
Does Africa need “One Belt, One Road”?
The “One Belt, One Road” strategy is centered on infrastructure development, especially regional transportation and connectivity projects. Chinese experts argue that the strategy would have two main applications in Africa. The first is the infrastructure development of the continent, which is closely associated with China's need to boost exports, utilize its excess capacity in construction industries, and stimulate China's slowing economic growth. The second is the transfer of labor-intensive industries, especially manufacturing businesses to Africa, so as to complement China's own economic restructuring given its rising manufacturing costs (such as labor costs). Experts such as Justin Yifu Lin see the two components as the two pillars of Sino-African economic cooperation in the years to come.
To be fair, with or without the strategic framework of “One Belt, One Road,” China's plan to pursue infrastructure development and industry transfer in Africa will continue to be carried out. China's interests have been well-articulated by President Xi Jinping in his emphasis on job creation in Africa during his 2013 trip and by Premier Li Keqiang through his ambitious proposal to build African regional transportation networks in 2014. The introduction of the strategy itself ...
Since the introduction of One Belt, One Road as a national development strategy in 2013, China has been mobilizing its political, economic, and diplomatic resources to foster the positive reception of the strategy by the region.

Since the introduction of One Belt, One Road as a national development strategy in 2013, China has been mobilizing its political, economic, and diplomatic resources to foster the positive reception of the strategy by the region. “One Belt, One Road” encompasses two development plans: the New Silk Road Economic Belt, which will link China with Europe through Central and Western Asia, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which will connect China with Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Through the strategy, China aims to further integrate itself into the world economy through trade, investment, infrastructure, connectivity, and other development projects. Recently, a campaign has emerged in China calling for the inclusion of Africa in the strategy. While the inclusion could surely bring more momentum to China’s economic cooperation with Africa, it does not resolve—and actually could amplify—the existing problems in current Sino-African relations.

The most cited proposal outside the government that calls for including Africa in China’s “One Belt, One Road” framework (making it “One Belt, One Road, One Continent”) came last month from Justin Yifu Lin, former chief economist of the World Bank. He argues that through infrastructure development, China could both foster the growth of African countries and transfer its labor-intensive industries to Africa. This general focus on infrastructure seems to be confirmed by the signing of an MOU between China and the African Union on January 27. The ambitious agreement plans to connect all 54 African countries through transportation infrastructure projects, including modern highways, airports, and high speed railways. While these developments are not officially a component of “One Belt, One Road,” many in China have begun to draw linkages between the two.

China’s general emphasis on infrastructure development seems to have received initial positive responses from African leaders. Chairperson of the African Union Commission Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma says the MOU will help accelerate the much needed regional integration and benefit ordinary Africans with skills transfer and job creation. The Chairman of the Egyptian African Association Ahmed Haggag went further, welcoming the possible inclusion of Africa in “China’s One Belt, One Road” strategy at an international symposium hosted in southern China. He criticized the suspicions in some African countries about China’s policy toward Africa, attributing them to pure misunderstandings about China’s intentions.

Does Africa need “One Belt, One Road”?

The “One Belt, One Road” strategy is centered on infrastructure development, especially regional transportation and connectivity projects. Chinese experts argue that the strategy would have two main applications in Africa. The first is the infrastructure development of the continent, which is closely associated with China’s need to boost exports, utilize its excess capacity in construction industries, and stimulate China’s slowing economic growth. The second is the transfer of labor-intensive industries, especially manufacturing businesses to Africa, so as to complement China’s own economic restructuring given its rising manufacturing costs (such as labor costs). Experts such as Justin Yifu Lin see the two components as the two pillars of Sino-African economic cooperation in the years to come.

To be fair, with or without the strategic framework of “One Belt, One Road,” China’s plan to pursue infrastructure development and industry transfer in Africa will continue to be carried out. China’s interests have been well-articulated by President Xi Jinping in his emphasis on job creation in Africa during his 2013 trip and by Premier Li Keqiang through his ambitious proposal to build African regional transportation networks in 2014. The introduction of the strategy itself does not change the overall direction of China’s Africa policy. Nevertheless, to include Africa in the grand national strategy of “One Belt, One Road” will generate more attention, emphasis, and, most importantly, more government money to boost the policy’s implementation. In this sense, the move could provide additional momentum to enhance the scope and depth of China’s economic initiatives in Africa.

Tensions around China’s Africa strategy still exist

However, including Africa in the grand scheme of “One Belt, One Road” does not solve many of the long-standing questions in China’s economic relations with Africa. Chinese analysts have painted a rather rosy picture on how Africa will greatly benefit from Chinese infrastructure projects and the transfer of labor-intensive industries. In their view, China’s development plans in Africa will not only improve the infrastructure conditions in Africa, but will also create jobs, improve the economic well-being of locals, and boost the industrial development of the continent. While some of these arguments might be valid, they do not at all address issues such as the controversial relationship between China’s infrastructure investment and its interests in African natural resources. Nor do they touch upon Chinese companies’ irresponsible investment behavior, especially in social and environmental regards. In fact, prominent Chinese experts have excluded the discussion of these issues in their analysis of China’s infrastructure development and industrial transfer to Africa.

Even within China, there is a widely shared sense of doubt about the financial risk associated with the ambitious infrastructure development in Africa. Since China’s development financing is not free grant, people wonder whether Africa is capable of repaying Chinese loans, and, if so, how. While some Chinese analysts would like to emphasize the trade promotion effect of this financing and its broader economic and strategic utilities in China’s policy toward Africa, to convince the central government, especially the state-owned banks, of uncertain projects will be a daunting task for Chinese companies and traders. In addition, the political risks and volatile investment environment in some African countries will inevitably affect the planning and implementation of Chinese projects. How China will address them is completely missing in its grand development strategy in Africa.

Beijing has stated that the transfer of labor-intensive industries and job creation in Africa is one of China’s priority tasks. However, how China will systematically pursue this goal remains to be seen. In Africa, there have been “model” projects of Chinese businesses’ training and hiring African workers. Some widely publicized examples include Hisense electronics manufacturing business in South Africa, CITIC’s real estate development in Angola and Huajian’s shoe factory in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, these cases are so sporadic and PR-imbued that they raise more questions about the scope, systematic design, and consistency of China’s plan to transfer its labor-intensive industries to Africa. Beyond the grand slogans and random cases, China needs to present more systematic, well-coordinated and industry-specific plans to convince Africa and the world that China is indeed committed to and vested in job creation in Africa.

While the proposal to include Africa in the “One Belt, One Road” strategy is still in its early stage, the Chinese government should not wait for its implementation to address the known problems in China’s economic ties with Africa. Otherwise, greater efforts in the wrong direction will only generate more problems for Africa, China, and their relations. For the United States, China’s policy orientation deserves its close attention. As Washington and Beijing explore the possibilities for cooperation on security and development issues in Africa, China’s policy designs, including the potential inclusion of Africa in the “One Belt, One Road” strategy, will potentially bring important opportunities for the two countries to work together in Africa for the better development of the continent.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/02-riedel-bibi-addresses-congress-saudi-king-salman-summoned-pakistan-nawaz-sharif-on-iran?rssid=asia+and+the+pacific{1B8EFE8C-B51E-42D7-B7B6-DB39E0248D53}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86281018/0/brookingsrss/topics/asiaandthepacific~As-Bibi-addresses-Congress-the-Saudis-play-a-more-subtle-game-on-IranAs Bibi addresses Congress, the Saudis play a more subtle game on IranAs Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu plays center stage at the Congress this week to slam the Iran deal-in-the-making, the Saudis are playing a more subtle game. King Salman bin Abdulaziz has summoned the Pakistani prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, to Riyadh. The highly unusual and urgent public invitation is being linked to "strategic cooperation" against Iran in the Pakistani press. Salman visited Islamabad a year ago as crown prince and gave Sharif a $1.5 billion grant to reaffirm Saudi-Pakistani strategic accord.

The speculation in Islamabad is the King wants assurances from Sharif now that, if the Iran negotiations produce either a bad deal or no deal, Pakistan will live up to its longstanding commitment to Saudi security. That is understood in Riyadh and Islamabad to include a nuclear dimension. Salman apparently wants Sharif's assurance reaffirmed before the end of March.

Sharif also visited the Kingdom in January of this year. He was told that then-King Abdallah was at death's door, and he came to pay his respects and meet with Salman before the King passed. No other leader was given this advance notice, another sign of the critical importance of the Saudi-Pakistani axis.

Sharif is expected in the Kingdom this week. The exact details of what the Pakistani nuclear commitment to the Kingdom includes is, of course, among the most closely held secrets of our world.

Salman has also hosted the Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, this weekend as well as Jordanian King Abdallah II.

Iran is priority number one. It's more than just the nuclear issue. For starters, there's Yemen. Direct flights began in late February between Sanaa and Tehran, a first-ever development. The ambassadors from the Gulf Cooperation Council states have all relocated to Aden. A proxy war is developing with Iranian-backed Zaydi/Houthis against Saudi/UAE-backed Hadi remnants. Meanwhile al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is taking up the mantle of Sunni defenders. And then there's ISIS and what the Saudis call America's 'unholy' alliances with the Shia and Alawis.

The speculation in Islamabad is the King wants assurances from Sharif now that, if the Iran negotiations produce either a bad deal or no deal, Pakistan will live up to its longstanding commitment to Saudi security. That is understood in Riyadh and Islamabad to include a nuclear dimension. Salman apparently wants Sharif's assurance reaffirmed before the end of March.

Sharif also visited the Kingdom in January of this year. He was told that then-King Abdallah was at death's door, and he came to pay his respects and meet with Salman before the King passed. No other leader was given this advance notice, another sign of the critical importance of the Saudi-Pakistani axis.

Sharif is expected in the Kingdom this week. The exact details of what the Pakistani nuclear commitment to the Kingdom includes is, of course, among the most closely held secrets of our world.

Salman has also hosted the Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, this weekend as well as Jordanian King Abdallah II.

Iran is priority number one. It's more than just the nuclear issue. For starters, there's Yemen. Direct flights began in late February between Sanaa and Tehran, a first-ever development. The ambassadors from the Gulf Cooperation Council states have all relocated to Aden. A proxy war is developing with Iranian-backed Zaydi/Houthis against Saudi/UAE-backed Hadi remnants. Meanwhile al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is taking up the mantle of Sunni defenders. And then there's ISIS and what the Saudis call America's 'unholy' alliances with the Shia and Alawis.

It is a full agenda for the new Saudi king.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/02/27-getting-colder-cooperating-with-russia-arctic-baev?rssid=asia+and+the+pacific{38A3945B-F79D-4467-8698-A62D6680714C}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86097459/0/brookingsrss/topics/asiaandthepacific~Getting-colder-Cooperating-with-Russia-in-the-ArcticGetting colder: Cooperating with Russia in the Arctic

Is it possible to isolate the well-established mode of Arctic cooperation from the disruptive impact of the Ukraine crisis? Many stake-holders in cooperative projects with Russia keep insisting on an affirmative answer and seek to bracket out tensions emanating from such obscure locations as Debaltsevo or Mariupol. The European Union (EU), which is due to adopt a new Arctic Policy by the end of the year, would have been content to maintain the focus on environmental protection and economic development; the discussions in Brussels, however, have increasingly shifted to far less appealing “hard security” matters. Officials from the European Commission seem deeply reluctant to deal with Russia’s military activities in the high north but have to acknowledge that they are making it much more difficult to cooperate with Russia. As April’s Arctic Council ministerial meetings approach, the United States and Europe must be realistic about the ways in which far away events will negatively affect the possible achievement of their goals.

Moscow is expanding rather than camouflaging the scope of exercises undertaken by its newly-formed Arctic Joint Strategic Command. Russian President Vladimir Putin used to proudly proclaim Russia’s abiding interest in Arctic cooperation, but even the most pro-engagement Arctic partners cannot fail to see that Russia’s interest is clearly slackening. This may be partly due to the disappearing attractiveness of exploration of the Arctic resources, since the estimated production costs of the off-shore platforms go far beyond the expected returns on the current level of oil prices. Another reason may be the disappointment in the commercial prospects of the Northern Sea Route (or Sevmorput), where maritime transit contracted by an astounding 77 percent in 2014, after several years of promising growth. A further reason may be Moscow’s recognition that the much trumpeted (and still not submitted) claim for expanding its “ownership” over the Arctic shelf cannot be legally approved because Denmark has presented its own claim, and the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf cannot make any recommendations on clashing claims.

It is hard to find an active lobby in Russia for sustaining cooperative projects or at least the joint work in the Arctic Council, as many actors who promoted the Barents Cooperation in the 1990s, are either on a short leash (as is the case with regional governors) or branded as “foreign agents” (the NGOs that want to avoid such branding have to curtail or cut ties with Western colleagues). The appointment of Dmitri Rogozin as a chair of the new government commission on Arctic matters bodes ill for the cooperative endeavors because this firebrand “patriot” deservedly holds a spot on U.S., EU, and Canadian sanctions lists.

The Russian Foreign Ministry is still circulating a message of commitment to the Arctic dialogue. The forthcoming session of the Arctic Council ministers in Iqaluit, Nunavut, Canada, might test this commitment with the issue of granting observer status to the EU. It was Canada who blocked the resolution of this issue at the previous meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, in 2013, but the controversy about seal products has been resolved, and Canada is ready to put the question on the agenda as its chairmanship of the Council expires. European Commission officials expect that during the 2015 meeting, Russia will raise objections because the EU is now seen as an antagonist, but EU officials still feel it is important to force Moscow to put their opposition on the record.

One external party that aims at enhancing and also at reformatting the Arctic cooperation is China, and while Moscow has to show eager attention to Beijing’s opinions, it cannot be comfortable with this “encroachment.” Russia’s traditional position has been that Arctic matters were the responsibility of the littoral states, but China insists on having a say and even entertains notions of the high north as a “global common,” a prospect which Moscow finds hard to swallow.

It is indeed futile to praise the value of cooperative ties when seven members of the Arctic Council are compelled to tighten step by step the regime of sanctions against the eighth member, which is sinking into a deep economic crisis but persists in building its power projection capabilities in the High North. The usefulness of engaging Russia is beyond doubt, but it would be irresponsible to expect that joint projects in monitoring climate change could reduce the risks from expanding Russian military activities. The high north is one area where Moscow fancies itself to be in a position of power, but so far it has not found a way to enjoy it. It is not my intention to give the Kremlin war-mongers ideas about putting this military advantage to good political use, but when the likes of Rogozin or Nikolai Patrushev (secretary of the Security Council and former head of the Russian Federal Security Service) profess particular interest in the Arctic, it is only prudent to expect a brainstorm of sorts. The technique of “hybrid war” is not only the continuation but also a driver of Putin’s politics of confrontation, and this drive transforms the unique Arctic landscapes into just another “theater.”

Authors

]]>
Fri, 27 Feb 2015 15:19:00 -0500Pavel K. Baev
Is it possible to isolate the well-established mode of Arctic cooperation from the disruptive impact of the Ukraine crisis? Many stake-holders in cooperative projects with Russia keep insisting on an affirmative answer and seek to bracket out tensions emanating from such obscure locations as Debaltsevo or Mariupol. The European Union (EU), which is due to adopt a new Arctic Policy by the end of the year, would have been content to maintain the focus on environmental protection and economic development; the discussions in Brussels, however, have increasingly shifted to far less appealing “hard security” matters. Officials from the European Commission seem deeply reluctant to deal with Russia's military activities in the high north but have to acknowledge that they are making it much more difficult to cooperate with Russia. As April's Arctic Council ministerial meetings approach, the United States and Europe must be realistic about the ways in which far away events will negatively affect the possible achievement of their goals.
Moscow is expanding rather than camouflaging the scope of exercises undertaken by its newly-formed Arctic Joint Strategic Command. Russian President Vladimir Putin used to proudly proclaim Russia's abiding interest in Arctic cooperation, but even the most pro-engagement Arctic partners cannot fail to see that Russia's interest is clearly slackening. This may be partly due to the disappearing attractiveness of exploration of the Arctic resources, since the estimated production costs of the off-shore platforms go far beyond the expected returns on the current level of oil prices. Another reason may be the disappointment in the commercial prospects of the Northern Sea Route (or Sevmorput), where maritime transit contracted by an astounding 77 percent in 2014, after several years of promising growth. A further reason may be Moscow's recognition that the much trumpeted (and still not submitted) claim for expanding its “ownership” over the Arctic shelf cannot be legally approved because Denmark has presented its own claim, and the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf cannot make any recommendations on clashing claims.
It is hard to find an active lobby in Russia for sustaining cooperative projects or at least the joint work in the Arctic Council, as many actors who promoted the Barents Cooperation in the 1990s, are either on a short leash (as is the case with regional governors) or branded as “foreign agents” (the NGOs that want to avoid such branding have to curtail or cut ties with Western colleagues). The appointment of Dmitri Rogozin as a chair of the new government commission on Arctic matters bodes ill for the cooperative endeavors because this firebrand “patriot” deservedly holds a spot on U.S., EU, and Canadian sanctions lists.
The Russian Foreign Ministry is still circulating a message of commitment to the Arctic dialogue. The forthcoming session of the Arctic Council ministers in Iqaluit, Nunavut, Canada, might test this commitment with the issue of granting observer status to the EU. It was Canada who blocked the resolution of this issue at the previous meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, in 2013, but the controversy about seal products has been resolved, and Canada is ready to put the question on the agenda as its chairmanship of the Council expires. European Commission officials expect that during the 2015 meeting, Russia will raise objections because the EU is now seen as an antagonist, but EU officials still feel it is important to force Moscow to put their opposition on the record.
One external party that aims at enhancing and also at reformatting the Arctic cooperation is China, and while Moscow has to show eager attention to Beijing's opinions, it cannot be comfortable with this “encroachment.” Russia's traditional position has been that Arctic matters were the responsibility of the littoral states, but China ...
Is it possible to isolate the well-established mode of Arctic cooperation from the disruptive impact of the Ukraine crisis? Many stake-holders in cooperative projects with Russia keep insisting on an affirmative answer and seek to bracket out ...

Is it possible to isolate the well-established mode of Arctic cooperation from the disruptive impact of the Ukraine crisis? Many stake-holders in cooperative projects with Russia keep insisting on an affirmative answer and seek to bracket out tensions emanating from such obscure locations as Debaltsevo or Mariupol. The European Union (EU), which is due to adopt a new Arctic Policy by the end of the year, would have been content to maintain the focus on environmental protection and economic development; the discussions in Brussels, however, have increasingly shifted to far less appealing “hard security” matters. Officials from the European Commission seem deeply reluctant to deal with Russia’s military activities in the high north but have to acknowledge that they are making it much more difficult to cooperate with Russia. As April’s Arctic Council ministerial meetings approach, the United States and Europe must be realistic about the ways in which far away events will negatively affect the possible achievement of their goals.

Moscow is expanding rather than camouflaging the scope of exercises undertaken by its newly-formed Arctic Joint Strategic Command. Russian President Vladimir Putin used to proudly proclaim Russia’s abiding interest in Arctic cooperation, but even the most pro-engagement Arctic partners cannot fail to see that Russia’s interest is clearly slackening. This may be partly due to the disappearing attractiveness of exploration of the Arctic resources, since the estimated production costs of the off-shore platforms go far beyond the expected returns on the current level of oil prices. Another reason may be the disappointment in the commercial prospects of the Northern Sea Route (or Sevmorput), where maritime transit contracted by an astounding 77 percent in 2014, after several years of promising growth. A further reason may be Moscow’s recognition that the much trumpeted (and still not submitted) claim for expanding its “ownership” over the Arctic shelf cannot be legally approved because Denmark has presented its own claim, and the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf cannot make any recommendations on clashing claims.

It is hard to find an active lobby in Russia for sustaining cooperative projects or at least the joint work in the Arctic Council, as many actors who promoted the Barents Cooperation in the 1990s, are either on a short leash (as is the case with regional governors) or branded as “foreign agents” (the NGOs that want to avoid such branding have to curtail or cut ties with Western colleagues). The appointment of Dmitri Rogozin as a chair of the new government commission on Arctic matters bodes ill for the cooperative endeavors because this firebrand “patriot” deservedly holds a spot on U.S., EU, and Canadian sanctions lists.

The Russian Foreign Ministry is still circulating a message of commitment to the Arctic dialogue. The forthcoming session of the Arctic Council ministers in Iqaluit, Nunavut, Canada, might test this commitment with the issue of granting observer status to the EU. It was Canada who blocked the resolution of this issue at the previous meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, in 2013, but the controversy about seal products has been resolved, and Canada is ready to put the question on the agenda as its chairmanship of the Council expires. European Commission officials expect that during the 2015 meeting, Russia will raise objections because the EU is now seen as an antagonist, but EU officials still feel it is important to force Moscow to put their opposition on the record.

One external party that aims at enhancing and also at reformatting the Arctic cooperation is China, and while Moscow has to show eager attention to Beijing’s opinions, it cannot be comfortable with this “encroachment.” Russia’s traditional position has been that Arctic matters were the responsibility of the littoral states, but China insists on having a say and even entertains notions of the high north as a “global common,” a prospect which Moscow finds hard to swallow.

It is indeed futile to praise the value of cooperative ties when seven members of the Arctic Council are compelled to tighten step by step the regime of sanctions against the eighth member, which is sinking into a deep economic crisis but persists in building its power projection capabilities in the High North. The usefulness of engaging Russia is beyond doubt, but it would be irresponsible to expect that joint projects in monitoring climate change could reduce the risks from expanding Russian military activities. The high north is one area where Moscow fancies itself to be in a position of power, but so far it has not found a way to enjoy it. It is not my intention to give the Kremlin war-mongers ideas about putting this military advantage to good political use, but when the likes of Rogozin or Nikolai Patrushev (secretary of the Security Council and former head of the Russian Federal Security Service) profess particular interest in the Arctic, it is only prudent to expect a brainstorm of sorts. The technique of “hybrid war” is not only the continuation but also a driver of Putin’s politics of confrontation, and this drive transforms the unique Arctic landscapes into just another “theater.”

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2015/02/27-china-security-foreign-policy-us-japan-perspectives?rssid=asia+and+the+pacific{2939004D-7DDC-4675-AEE0-1259C9621D2A}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/86056894/0/brookingsrss/topics/asiaandthepacific~Chinas-security-and-foreign-policies-Comparing-American-and-Japanese-perspectivesChina's security and foreign policies: Comparing American and Japanese perspectives

Event Information

As China’s economic power has grown, its foreign policy has evolved. It now has greater political influence in regional and global affairs, and is increasingly seeking the exercise that influence. This evolution in China’s role in the world will impact the United States and Japan, two close allies. Understanding the character and trajectory of a reviving China is a crucial task for Washington and Tokyo, which is made more complicated by a plurality of views on China in and between the two allies.

On February 27, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies hosted a seminar examining American and Japanese interpretations of China’s security and foreign policies. In two sessions, leading China specialists from the United States and Japan examined factors that may drive China’s policies, including domestic and institutional politics, increasing resources and capacities, and actions of other countries. They analyzed China’s approaches to countries in East Asia and outside the region. Panel moderators and participants analyzed the policy implications of gaps in interpretation.

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Fri, 27 Feb 2015 09:00:00 -0500http://7515766d70db9af98b83-7a8dffca7ab41e0acde077bdb93c9343.r43.cf1.rackcdn.com/150227_ChinaFP_64K_itunes.mp3
Event Information
February 27, 2015
9:00 AM - 12:00 PM EST
Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036 Register for the Event
As China's economic power has grown, its foreign policy has evolved. It now has greater political influence in regional and global affairs, and is increasingly seeking the exercise that influence. This evolution in China's role in the world will impact the United States and Japan, two close allies. Understanding the character and trajectory of a reviving China is a crucial task for Washington and Tokyo, which is made more complicated by a plurality of views on China in and between the two allies.
On February 27, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies hosted a seminar examining American and Japanese interpretations of China's security and foreign policies. In two sessions, leading China specialists from the United States and Japan examined factors that may drive China's policies, including domestic and institutional politics, increasing resources and capacities, and actions of other countries. They analyzed China's approaches to countries in East Asia and outside the region. Panel moderators and participants analyzed the policy implications of gaps in interpretation.
Join the conversation on Twitter using #USJapanChina
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- China's security and foreign policies - Panel 1- China's security and foreign policies: Panel 2
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- China's security and foreign policies: Comparing American and Japanese perspectives
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- Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)
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- 20150227_china_japan_transcript
Event Information
February 27, 2015
9:00 AM - 12:00 PM EST
Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036 Register for the Event
As China's economic power has grown, its foreign policy has evolved.

Event Information

As China’s economic power has grown, its foreign policy has evolved. It now has greater political influence in regional and global affairs, and is increasingly seeking the exercise that influence. This evolution in China’s role in the world will impact the United States and Japan, two close allies. Understanding the character and trajectory of a reviving China is a crucial task for Washington and Tokyo, which is made more complicated by a plurality of views on China in and between the two allies.

On February 27, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies hosted a seminar examining American and Japanese interpretations of China’s security and foreign policies. In two sessions, leading China specialists from the United States and Japan examined factors that may drive China’s policies, including domestic and institutional politics, increasing resources and capacities, and actions of other countries. They analyzed China’s approaches to countries in East Asia and outside the region. Panel moderators and participants analyzed the policy implications of gaps in interpretation.

The hunt for foreign investors is a fact of modern times. It is certainly a priority for many cash-strapped governments dealing with a sluggish economy. However, democratically-elected politicians cannot just call in foreign entities to help them rescue their public finances or even some of their industries. At the very least, politics need to be explained and justified, as events in Europe have shown in the past few months.

Four days after winning Greece’s January legislative elections, the left-wing Syriza-led coalition government declared that it was halting the privatization of a 67 percent stake in the Piraeus Port Authority. China’s shipping giant China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) was one of the suitors for the privatization.

China immediately asked the Greek government to protect the rights and legal interests of Chinese companies, including COSCO, which has already been managing two Piraeus terminals for the past five years. At €500 million, this has also been the biggest foreign direct investment (FDI) in Greece in modern times.

The Greek administration is not the only European government running a troubled economy and facing a dilemma—how to attract Chinese FDI while responding to an increasing uneasiness from the public about their local enterprises being managed by China? In Athens, public opinion seems split. Some say COSCO has been running its two terminals efficiently, increasing commercial traffic through the port and attracting multinationals such as ZTE and HP to use the cargo terminals as logistics centers for their products. Greece’s powerful unions—some of them with close links to Syriza—do not agree, and think the previous Samaras government did not run a fair game to COSCO’s competitors in exchange for badly-needed cash. In addition, they claim the Chinese company wants to enforce changes in the workforce that would roll back workers’ rights.

For the past five years, European governments have been cozying up to Chinese investors. One can say that the latter have also made use of a situation where debt-ridden countries were looking for financial help. In Portugal, a 21.3 percent stake of national grid Energias de Portugal has been bought by China Three Gorges; in Italy, the year 2014 saw a total of €3 billion invested through multiple deals in the energy sector including China State Grid’s purchase of a stake in CDP Reti, the country’s national grid agency; London has seen a massive flock of Chinese investments, especially in real estate; and in France, Club Med, a 65-year old leisure company has been acquired for almost $1 billion by Shanghai-based Fosun Group. Another Chinese consortium, Symbiose, bought 49.9 percent of Toulouse airport, located a stone’s throw from Airbus French headquarters.

We know how strong a debate has been taking place in the United States for some years about allowing or not Chinese investments, especially in telecommunications and high tech. In recent months, a debate has also taken place in France. Should the country allow China to invest in French infrastructures? Is it not counter-productive in the long run? When China announced it was investing in a new Brittany dairy factory (in order to export powder milk to China), local politician Richard Ferrand said workers thought their production facilities were taken away by a foreign power. (1) Meanwhile, Karine Berger, a Socialist party official in charge of economic affairs, said she was “not comfortable at all” with the sale of the Toulouse airport to a non-European investor. (2)

Amongst several European leaders who have prominently been advocating an “open-door policy” to Chinese investors stands Manuel Valls, French prime minister. “Huayin lai Faguo” (Welcome to France) was the message addressed—in Chinese—by Valls to his Chinese hosts during his trip at the end of January. “Why should we be able to sell Airbus planes to China, and not let the Chinese invest in France?” questioned Manuel Valls in an interview. Almost a year ago, British Prime Minister David Cameron had said he was “not embarrassed that China was investing in British nuclear power, or has shares in Heathrow airport or Thames water.”

With its falling currency (€1 against $1.12), Europe has become an even more attractive continent for Chinese firms, in line with Beijing’s plan to increase financial support to encourage overseas investment. For the year 2014, and for the first time ever in history, China’s outbound investment is expected to surpass its inbound investments and, according to a study by Deutsche Bank, Chinese investment stock in Europe has grown from €6.1 to €27 billion between 2010 and 2014.

But European politicians are having a hard time in explaining to their electorates that China—a country with a poor human rights record—is also a powerful investor that will help reviving local industries. Despite Beijing’s efforts in improving its image in the west, the country remains unpopular in most European countries. For example, according to a survey conducted last year by Pew Research (3), only 26 percent of Italians and 28 percent of Germans have favorable opinions of China. Italy is one of Europe’s largest recipients of Chinese investment, and Germany is China’s top European trading partner. Misunderstandings remain high and, in times of growing populism and austerity, European leaders should deal with China cautiously if they want to make their countries beneficiaries of Chinese foreign reserves. Chances are high that China will continue to be a visible actor in Europe’s troubled economies in the near future.

Authors

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Thu, 26 Feb 2015 11:30:00 -0500Philippe Le Corre
The hunt for foreign investors is a fact of modern times. It is certainly a priority for many cash-strapped governments dealing with a sluggish economy. However, democratically-elected politicians cannot just call in foreign entities to help them rescue their public finances or even some of their industries. At the very least, politics need to be explained and justified, as events in Europe have shown in the past few months.
Four days after winning Greece's January legislative elections, the left-wing Syriza-led coalition government declared that it was halting the privatization of a 67 percent stake in the Piraeus Port Authority. China's shipping giant China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) was one of the suitors for the privatization.
China immediately asked the Greek government to protect the rights and legal interests of Chinese companies, including COSCO, which has already been managing two Piraeus terminals for the past five years. At 500 million, this has also been the biggest foreign direct investment (FDI) in Greece in modern times.
The Greek administration is not the only European government running a troubled economy and facing a dilemma—how to attract Chinese FDI while responding to an increasing uneasiness from the public about their local enterprises being managed by China? In Athens, public opinion seems split. Some say COSCO has been running its two terminals efficiently, increasing commercial traffic through the port and attracting multinationals such as ZTE and HP to use the cargo terminals as logistics centers for their products. Greece's powerful unions—some of them with close links to Syriza—do not agree, and think the previous Samaras government did not run a fair game to COSCO's competitors in exchange for badly-needed cash. In addition, they claim the Chinese company wants to enforce changes in the workforce that would roll back workers' rights.
For the past five years, European governments have been cozying up to Chinese investors. One can say that the latter have also made use of a situation where debt-ridden countries were looking for financial help. In Portugal, a 21.3 percent stake of national grid Energias de Portugal has been bought by China Three Gorges; in Italy, the year 2014 saw a total of 3 billion invested through multiple deals in the energy sector including China State Grid's purchase of a stake in CDP Reti, the country's national grid agency; London has seen a massive flock of Chinese investments, especially in real estate; and in France, Club Med, a 65-year old leisure company has been acquired for almost $1 billion by Shanghai-based Fosun Group. Another Chinese consortium, Symbiose, bought 49.9 percent of Toulouse airport, located a stone's throw from Airbus French headquarters.
We know how strong a debate has been taking place in the United States for some years about allowing or not Chinese investments, especially in telecommunications and high tech. In recent months, a debate has also taken place in France. Should the country allow China to invest in French infrastructures? Is it not counter-productive in the long run? When China announced it was investing in a new Brittany dairy factory (in order to export powder milk to China), local politician Richard Ferrand said workers thought their production facilities were taken away by a foreign power. (1) Meanwhile, Karine Berger, a Socialist party official in charge of economic affairs, said she was “not comfortable at all” with the sale of the Toulouse airport to a non-European investor. (2)
Amongst several European leaders who have prominently been advocating an “open-door policy” to Chinese investors stands Manuel Valls, French prime minister. “Huayin lai Faguo” (Welcome to France) was the message addressed—in Chinese—by Valls to his Chinese hosts during his trip at the end of January. “Why should we be able to sell Airbus planes to ...
The hunt for foreign investors is a fact of modern times. It is certainly a priority for many cash-strapped governments dealing with a sluggish economy. However, democratically-elected politicians cannot just call in foreign entities to help them ...

The hunt for foreign investors is a fact of modern times. It is certainly a priority for many cash-strapped governments dealing with a sluggish economy. However, democratically-elected politicians cannot just call in foreign entities to help them rescue their public finances or even some of their industries. At the very least, politics need to be explained and justified, as events in Europe have shown in the past few months.

Four days after winning Greece’s January legislative elections, the left-wing Syriza-led coalition government declared that it was halting the privatization of a 67 percent stake in the Piraeus Port Authority. China’s shipping giant China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) was one of the suitors for the privatization.

China immediately asked the Greek government to protect the rights and legal interests of Chinese companies, including COSCO, which has already been managing two Piraeus terminals for the past five years. At €500 million, this has also been the biggest foreign direct investment (FDI) in Greece in modern times.

The Greek administration is not the only European government running a troubled economy and facing a dilemma—how to attract Chinese FDI while responding to an increasing uneasiness from the public about their local enterprises being managed by China? In Athens, public opinion seems split. Some say COSCO has been running its two terminals efficiently, increasing commercial traffic through the port and attracting multinationals such as ZTE and HP to use the cargo terminals as logistics centers for their products. Greece’s powerful unions—some of them with close links to Syriza—do not agree, and think the previous Samaras government did not run a fair game to COSCO’s competitors in exchange for badly-needed cash. In addition, they claim the Chinese company wants to enforce changes in the workforce that would roll back workers’ rights.

For the past five years, European governments have been cozying up to Chinese investors. One can say that the latter have also made use of a situation where debt-ridden countries were looking for financial help. In Portugal, a 21.3 percent stake of national grid Energias de Portugal has been bought by China Three Gorges; in Italy, the year 2014 saw a total of €3 billion invested through multiple deals in the energy sector including China State Grid’s purchase of a stake in CDP Reti, the country’s national grid agency; London has seen a massive flock of Chinese investments, especially in real estate; and in France, Club Med, a 65-year old leisure company has been acquired for almost $1 billion by Shanghai-based Fosun Group. Another Chinese consortium, Symbiose, bought 49.9 percent of Toulouse airport, located a stone’s throw from Airbus French headquarters.

We know how strong a debate has been taking place in the United States for some years about allowing or not Chinese investments, especially in telecommunications and high tech. In recent months, a debate has also taken place in France. Should the country allow China to invest in French infrastructures? Is it not counter-productive in the long run? When China announced it was investing in a new Brittany dairy factory (in order to export powder milk to China), local politician Richard Ferrand said workers thought their production facilities were taken away by a foreign power. (1) Meanwhile, Karine Berger, a Socialist party official in charge of economic affairs, said she was “not comfortable at all” with the sale of the Toulouse airport to a non-European investor. (2)

Amongst several European leaders who have prominently been advocating an “open-door policy” to Chinese investors stands Manuel Valls, French prime minister. “Huayin lai Faguo” (Welcome to France) was the message addressed—in Chinese—by Valls to his Chinese hosts during his trip at the end of January. “Why should we be able to sell Airbus planes to China, and not let the Chinese invest in France?” questioned Manuel Valls in an interview. Almost a year ago, British Prime Minister David Cameron had said he was “not embarrassed that China was investing in British nuclear power, or has shares in Heathrow airport or Thames water.”

With its falling currency (€1 against $1.12), Europe has become an even more attractive continent for Chinese firms, in line with Beijing’s plan to increase financial support to encourage overseas investment. For the year 2014, and for the first time ever in history, China’s outbound investment is expected to surpass its inbound investments and, according to a study by Deutsche Bank, Chinese investment stock in Europe has grown from €6.1 to €27 billion between 2010 and 2014.

But European politicians are having a hard time in explaining to their electorates that China—a country with a poor human rights record—is also a powerful investor that will help reviving local industries. Despite Beijing’s efforts in improving its image in the west, the country remains unpopular in most European countries. For example, according to a survey conducted last year by Pew Research (3), only 26 percent of Italians and 28 percent of Germans have favorable opinions of China. Italy is one of Europe’s largest recipients of Chinese investment, and Germany is China’s top European trading partner. Misunderstandings remain high and, in times of growing populism and austerity, European leaders should deal with China cautiously if they want to make their countries beneficiaries of Chinese foreign reserves. Chances are high that China will continue to be a visible actor in Europe’s troubled economies in the near future.

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Lee Kuan Yew has been a major figure in the development of Southeast Asia and in global international relations for over half a century. From 1959 until 2011, he served consecutively as prime minister, senior minister, and minister mentor of Singapore. He led Singapore’s rise from a new post-colonial state to global prominence, was a driving force behind the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and has been an important interlocutor for generations of world leaders.

On February 25, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings hosted presentations on Lee’s ideas on governance and his approach to foreign policy by Ambassadors Chan Heng Chee and Bilahari Kausikan, contributors to the new book The Big Ideas of Lee Kuan Yew(Straits Times Press, 2014). Among many attempts to describe and analyze Lee’s career, The Big Ideas of Lee Kuan Yew is unique in that its authors have worked closely with him in diplomacy, politics, governance, and law, and can provide first-hand observations. The book illustrates Lee’s emphasis of pragmatism over ideology, and practice over theory.

Audio

Transcript

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Wed, 25 Feb 2015 10:00:00 -0500http://7515766d70db9af98b83-7a8dffca7ab41e0acde077bdb93c9343.r43.cf1.rackcdn.com/150225_Pragmatism_64K_itunes.mp3
Event Information
February 25, 2015
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST
Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036 Register for the Event
Lee Kuan Yew has been a major figure in the development of Southeast Asia and in global international relations for over half a century. From 1959 until 2011, he served consecutively as prime minister, senior minister, and minister mentor of Singapore. He led Singapore's rise from a new post-colonial state to global prominence, was a driving force behind the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and has been an important interlocutor for generations of world leaders.
On February 25, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings hosted presentations on Lee's ideas on governance and his approach to foreign policy by Ambassadors Chan Heng Chee and Bilahari Kausikan, contributors to the new book The Big Ideas of Lee Kuan Yew (Straits Times Press, 2014). Among many attempts to describe and analyze Lee's career, The Big Ideas of Lee Kuan Yew is unique in that its authors have worked closely with him in diplomacy, politics, governance, and law, and can provide first-hand observations. The book illustrates Lee's emphasis of pragmatism over ideology, and practice over theory.
Join the conversation on Twitter at #LeeKuanYew
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- Pragmatism and practice: Presenting The Big Ideas of Lee Kuan Yew
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- Transcript (.pdf)
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- Lee Kuan Yew final transcript
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February 25, 2015
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST
Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036 Register for the Event
Lee Kuan Yew has been a major figure in the development of ...

Event Information

Lee Kuan Yew has been a major figure in the development of Southeast Asia and in global international relations for over half a century. From 1959 until 2011, he served consecutively as prime minister, senior minister, and minister mentor of Singapore. He led Singapore’s rise from a new post-colonial state to global prominence, was a driving force behind the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and has been an important interlocutor for generations of world leaders.

On February 25, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings hosted presentations on Lee’s ideas on governance and his approach to foreign policy by Ambassadors Chan Heng Chee and Bilahari Kausikan, contributors to the new book The Big Ideas of Lee Kuan Yew(Straits Times Press, 2014). Among many attempts to describe and analyze Lee’s career, The Big Ideas of Lee Kuan Yew is unique in that its authors have worked closely with him in diplomacy, politics, governance, and law, and can provide first-hand observations. The book illustrates Lee’s emphasis of pragmatism over ideology, and practice over theory.

A little over a year ago, Brookings and the China Development Research Foundation cohosted a discussion on how to best prepare future generations through early childhood development. Madame Liu Yandong, vice premier of the People’s Republic of China, and Hillary Rodham Clinton, former U.S. Secretary of State, presented dual keynote addresses emphasizing the importance of early childhood development programs and their potential for having long-term global impact.

Madame Liu anticipated that China would soon release a national plan for development of children in poor areas, with a goal “to ensure the healthy growth of every child in China.” She cited data demonstrating how China has met the U.N. Millennium Development Goals to reduce infant and child mortality rates. While acknowledging the “daunting challenge” of promoting children's development in China, which is home to nearly 310 million children, Madame Liu remarked that “investment in early childhood development is a human capital investment with the highest return.” She noted that Chinese President Xi Jinping “attaches great importance to early childhood development,” thus sharing a vision expressed by President Barack Obama.

In December, China’s State Council issued the National Child Development Plan (for 2014‒2020) for Poverty-Stricken Areas (link in Chinese), which aims specifically to reach 40 million rural children in 680 counties. This plan prioritizes early interventions not only to increase child survival, but also to promote healthy child development, from birth to the completion of compulsory education, through provision of quality care and comprehensive protection. The goals are to raise the level of child development in the targeted counties to or near the national average; to reduce under-5 stunting to 10 percent of children; and to reduce the rates of infant and under-5 mortality to 12 per 1,000 children and 15 per 1,000 children, respectively.

This directive encourages national, provincial, and local governments to innovate continually (by conducting pilot studies and then evaluating and revising them); disseminate the lessons learned; expand capacity in the “know-how” of healthy child development; apply and use data to inform policy and programs; and leverage increased funding from public and private sources. China’s success in innovation and implementation derives from its capability and flexibility to continually experiment with pilot initiatives, to leverage and translate lessons from these pilots to policy, and to scale up—as it did when introducing the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s.

As development agencies look beyond the goals for 2015 and on to 2030, how early child development is framed in the development architecture really matters. To move forward, there must be a shift from beyond child survival to children’s holistic development by promoting their capabilities. Among the key tasks to consider are redirection of social policies to focus on young children ages 0‒6 years, expansion of public health and education models to incorporate the science of early human development, and collection and use of data to track how well children are doing and to quantify levels of inequality in child development across population groups.

Population measures that are designed and used to track child development must focus on objective assessments of what children actually “look like,” as opposed to subjective appraisals of where they should be on a milestone chart. Such assessments would then provide evidence for making sound policy decisions and aligning policies with program impacts. Countries currently and routinely collect data on rates of infant, maternal, and child mortality, as well as breastfeeding and immunization. While it is essential to have reliable data on child survival and access to services, now is the time when governments can and should be seeking indicators that go beyond mere survival, and capture, in addition, how well children are developing.

Building on successful pilots, China’s recent National Nutrition Intervention Program expands coverage of freely provided nutritional supplementation to all young children in remote poor counties. This pilot-to-policy translation was led by the China Development Research Foundation (CDRF). CDRF is now piloting and evaluating a “nutrition plus parenting” intervention modelled after a successful program in Jamaica that has also been replicated in other Latin American countries. It is also planning an independent evaluation of a village-based family skills and child development program emphasizing nurturing care for “left-behind” children, ages 0-6, developed and implemented by the Half the Sky Foundation. With its emphasis on continual evaluation-feedback-revision and translation of effective programs into policy, China is uniquely positioned to share the knowledge and lessons it generates with other developing countries and, ultimately, to leverage increased investment and capacity in early child development both within China and globally.

Authors

Lu Mai

Mary Young

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Tue, 24 Feb 2015 16:28:00 -0500Lu Mai and Mary Young
A little over a year ago, Brookings and the China Development Research Foundation cohosted a discussion on how to best prepare future generations through early childhood development. Madame Liu Yandong, vice premier of the People's Republic of China, and Hillary Rodham Clinton, former U.S. Secretary of State, presented dual keynote addresses emphasizing the importance of early childhood development programs and their potential for having long-term global impact.
Madame Liu anticipated that China would soon release a national plan for development of children in poor areas, with a goal “to ensure the healthy growth of every child in China.” She cited data demonstrating how China has met the U.N. Millennium Development Goals to reduce infant and child mortality rates. While acknowledging the “daunting challenge” of promoting children's development in China, which is home to nearly 310 million children, Madame Liu remarked that “investment in early childhood development is a human capital investment with the highest return.” She noted that Chinese President Xi Jinping “attaches great importance to early childhood development,” thus sharing a vision expressed by President Barack Obama.
In December, China's State Council issued the National Child Development Plan (for 2014‒2020) for Poverty-Stricken Areas (link in Chinese), which aims specifically to reach 40 million rural children in 680 counties. This plan prioritizes early interventions not only to increase child survival, but also to promote healthy child development, from birth to the completion of compulsory education, through provision of quality care and comprehensive protection. The goals are to raise the level of child development in the targeted counties to or near the national average; to reduce under-5 stunting to 10 percent of children; and to reduce the rates of infant and under-5 mortality to 12 per 1,000 children and 15 per 1,000 children, respectively.
This directive encourages national, provincial, and local governments to innovate continually (by conducting pilot studies and then evaluating and revising them); disseminate the lessons learned; expand capacity in the “know-how” of healthy child development; apply and use data to inform policy and programs; and leverage increased funding from public and private sources. China's success in innovation and implementation derives from its capability and flexibility to continually experiment with pilot initiatives, to leverage and translate lessons from these pilots to policy, and to scale up—as it did when introducing the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s.
As development agencies look beyond the goals for 2015 and on to 2030, how early child development is framed in the development architecture really matters. To move forward, there must be a shift from beyond child survival to children's holistic development by promoting their capabilities. Among the key tasks to consider are redirection of social policies to focus on young children ages 0‒6 years, expansion of public health and education models to incorporate the science of early human development, and collection and use of data to track how well children are doing and to quantify levels of inequality in child development across population groups.
Population measures that are designed and used to track child development must focus on objective assessments of what children actually “look like,” as opposed to subjective appraisals of where they should be on a milestone chart. Such assessments would then provide evidence for making sound policy decisions and aligning policies with program impacts. Countries currently and routinely collect data on rates of infant, maternal, and child mortality, as well as breastfeeding and immunization. While it is essential to have reliable data on child survival and access to services, now is the time when governments can and ...
A little over a year ago, Brookings and the China Development Research Foundation cohosted a discussion on how to best prepare future generations through early childhood development. Madame Liu Yandong, vice premier of the People's Republic of ...

A little over a year ago, Brookings and the China Development Research Foundation cohosted a discussion on how to best prepare future generations through early childhood development. Madame Liu Yandong, vice premier of the People’s Republic of China, and Hillary Rodham Clinton, former U.S. Secretary of State, presented dual keynote addresses emphasizing the importance of early childhood development programs and their potential for having long-term global impact.

Madame Liu anticipated that China would soon release a national plan for development of children in poor areas, with a goal “to ensure the healthy growth of every child in China.” She cited data demonstrating how China has met the U.N. Millennium Development Goals to reduce infant and child mortality rates. While acknowledging the “daunting challenge” of promoting children's development in China, which is home to nearly 310 million children, Madame Liu remarked that “investment in early childhood development is a human capital investment with the highest return.” She noted that Chinese President Xi Jinping “attaches great importance to early childhood development,” thus sharing a vision expressed by President Barack Obama.

In December, China’s State Council issued the National Child Development Plan (for 2014‒2020) for Poverty-Stricken Areas (link in Chinese), which aims specifically to reach 40 million rural children in 680 counties. This plan prioritizes early interventions not only to increase child survival, but also to promote healthy child development, from birth to the completion of compulsory education, through provision of quality care and comprehensive protection. The goals are to raise the level of child development in the targeted counties to or near the national average; to reduce under-5 stunting to 10 percent of children; and to reduce the rates of infant and under-5 mortality to 12 per 1,000 children and 15 per 1,000 children, respectively.

This directive encourages national, provincial, and local governments to innovate continually (by conducting pilot studies and then evaluating and revising them); disseminate the lessons learned; expand capacity in the “know-how” of healthy child development; apply and use data to inform policy and programs; and leverage increased funding from public and private sources. China’s success in innovation and implementation derives from its capability and flexibility to continually experiment with pilot initiatives, to leverage and translate lessons from these pilots to policy, and to scale up—as it did when introducing the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s.

As development agencies look beyond the goals for 2015 and on to 2030, how early child development is framed in the development architecture really matters. To move forward, there must be a shift from beyond child survival to children’s holistic development by promoting their capabilities. Among the key tasks to consider are redirection of social policies to focus on young children ages 0‒6 years, expansion of public health and education models to incorporate the science of early human development, and collection and use of data to track how well children are doing and to quantify levels of inequality in child development across population groups.

Population measures that are designed and used to track child development must focus on objective assessments of what children actually “look like,” as opposed to subjective appraisals of where they should be on a milestone chart. Such assessments would then provide evidence for making sound policy decisions and aligning policies with program impacts. Countries currently and routinely collect data on rates of infant, maternal, and child mortality, as well as breastfeeding and immunization. While it is essential to have reliable data on child survival and access to services, now is the time when governments can and should be seeking indicators that go beyond mere survival, and capture, in addition, how well children are developing.

Building on successful pilots, China’s recent National Nutrition Intervention Program expands coverage of freely provided nutritional supplementation to all young children in remote poor counties. This pilot-to-policy translation was led by the China Development Research Foundation (CDRF). CDRF is now piloting and evaluating a “nutrition plus parenting” intervention modelled after a successful program in Jamaica that has also been replicated in other Latin American countries. It is also planning an independent evaluation of a village-based family skills and child development program emphasizing nurturing care for “left-behind” children, ages 0-6, developed and implemented by the Half the Sky Foundation. With its emphasis on continual evaluation-feedback-revision and translation of effective programs into policy, China is uniquely positioned to share the knowledge and lessons it generates with other developing countries and, ultimately, to leverage increased investment and capacity in early child development both within China and globally.

There is surprisingly little cross investment between the United States and China, the two largest economies in the world. Only 1 percent of the stock of U.S. direct investment abroad is in China, and in recent years the flow of direct investment from the United States to China has been close to zero. The stock of Chinese direct investment in the United States is also lower than would be expected given that the United States is the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI). In recent years, however, the flow of direct investment from China to the United States has accelerated rapidly, and if current trends persist within a short time, there will be a larger stock of Chinese investment in the United States than of U.S. investment in China.

The small amount of U.S. investment in China can be traced to two primary factors:

Poor protection of property rights, including intellectual property rights, which limits the potential benefits that U.S. firms can receive from their technology and brands;

China’s restrictions on direct investment in many sectors important to U.S. firms. Among G-20 countries, China is the most restrictive in terms of openness to direct investment.

The relatively small amount of Chinese investment in the United States can also be traced to two factors:

Much of the initial impetus for Chinese firms to go out was to secure natural resources, while the United States is not a resource-rich country relative to its gross domestic product or population;

The national security reviews of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States have soured many Chinese investors on the U.S. market.

The two countries have agreed to negotiate a bilateral investment treaty (BIT). This could open the doors to large amounts of investment in both directions if it addresses key issues. For U.S. firms, access to more sectors and better protection of IPR are crucial. Chinese firms seek a less politicized environment in which to invest. In its Third Plenum decision the Communist Party leadership indicated its intention to open more sectors to foreign investment and competition. A BIT could help lock in these necessary reforms.

The United States and China have been the two largest recipients of FDI in recent decades. At the end of 2011 the total stock of FDI in the world was around $19 trillion. Of this, 19 percent was in the United States and 10 percent was in China. These two biggest economies in the world are also major providers of direct investment. This is especially true for the United States, the most technologically advanced economy in the world. As of the end of 2012, the United States had a stock of outward direct investment of $4.5 trillion, about one-quarter of all the FDI in the world. China is a relative new-comer to outward investment, but its stock of outward direct investment has been growing rapidly. As of the end of 2012 China’s Ministry of Commerce reported an outward stock totaling $532 billion. By the end of 2013 this had grown to $660 billion.

While the United States and China are big players both as providers of direct investment and recipients of direct investment, there is less cross-investment between the two than one would expect. The U.S. Department of Commerce reports that China accounts for only 1.2 percent of U.S. outward FDI. That is, the world as a whole invests 10 percent of its FDI in China, but the United States puts only one-tenth that amount. China’s statistics indicate that China’s direct investments in the United States accounted for only 3.3 percent of its overseas investments at the end of 2013 (compared to 19 percent for the world portfolio). The Chinese figure is certainly an under-estimate because a large amount of China’s overseas investment is reported as going to Hong Kong and several other locations that are likely to be transit locations, not the ultimate destination of the investment. If we put aside the Chinese investment to Hong Kong, the share of China’s remaining outward investment going to the United States is 7.7 percent. Compared to the world portfolio this share is still low. So, an important question to research is why the United States severely underinvests in China and why China modestly underinvests in the United States. Understanding the factors behind the current dearth of cross-investment can help us form a judgment as to what a BIT between the two would need to include in order to mark a major step forward in the economic relationship.

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Authors

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Mon, 23 Feb 2015 00:00:00 -0500David Dollar
There is surprisingly little cross investment between the United States and China, the two largest economies in the world. Only 1 percent of the stock of U.S. direct investment abroad is in China, and in recent years the flow of direct investment from the United States to China has been close to zero. The stock of Chinese direct investment in the United States is also lower than would be expected given that the United States is the world's largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI). In recent years, however, the flow of direct investment from China to the United States has accelerated rapidly, and if current trends persist within a short time, there will be a larger stock of Chinese investment in the United States than of U.S. investment in China.
The small amount of U.S. investment in China can be traced to two primary factors:
- Poor protection of property rights, including intellectual property rights, which limits the potential benefits that U.S. firms can receive from their technology and brands; - China's restrictions on direct investment in many sectors important to U.S. firms. Among G-20 countries, China is the most restrictive in terms of openness to direct investment.
The relatively small amount of Chinese investment in the United States can also be traced to two factors:
- Much of the initial impetus for Chinese firms to go out was to secure natural resources, while the United States is not a resource-rich country relative to its gross domestic product or population; - The national security reviews of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States have soured many Chinese investors on the U.S. market.
The two countries have agreed to negotiate a bilateral investment treaty (BIT). This could open the doors to large amounts of investment in both directions if it addresses key issues. For U.S. firms, access to more sectors and better protection of IPR are crucial. Chinese firms seek a less politicized environment in which to invest. In its Third Plenum decision the Communist Party leadership indicated its intention to open more sectors to foreign investment and competition. A BIT could help lock in these necessary reforms.
The United States and China have been the two largest recipients of FDI in recent decades. At the end of 2011 the total stock of FDI in the world was around $19 trillion. Of this, 19 percent was in the United States and 10 percent was in China. These two biggest economies in the world are also major providers of direct investment. This is especially true for the United States, the most technologically advanced economy in the world. As of the end of 2012, the United States had a stock of outward direct investment of $4.5 trillion, about one-quarter of all the FDI in the world. China is a relative new-comer to outward investment, but its stock of outward direct investment has been growing rapidly. As of the end of 2012 China's Ministry of Commerce reported an outward stock totaling $532 billion. By the end of 2013 this had grown to $660 billion.
While the United States and China are big players both as providers of direct investment and recipients of direct investment, there is less cross-investment between the two than one would expect. The U.S. Department of Commerce reports that China accounts for only 1.2 percent of U.S. outward FDI. That is, the world as a whole invests 10 percent of its FDI in China, but the United States puts only one-tenth that amount. China's statistics indicate that China's direct investments in the United States accounted for only 3.3 percent of its overseas investments at the end of 2013 (compared to 19 percent for the world portfolio). The Chinese figure is certainly an under-estimate because a large amount of China's overseas investment is reported as going to Hong Kong and several other locations that are likely to be transit locations, not the ultimate destination of the investment. If we put aside the Chinese investment to Hong ... There is surprisingly little cross investment between the United States and China, the two largest economies in the world. Only 1 percent of the stock of U.S. direct investment abroad is in China, and in recent years the flow of direct investment ...

There is surprisingly little cross investment between the United States and China, the two largest economies in the world. Only 1 percent of the stock of U.S. direct investment abroad is in China, and in recent years the flow of direct investment from the United States to China has been close to zero. The stock of Chinese direct investment in the United States is also lower than would be expected given that the United States is the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI). In recent years, however, the flow of direct investment from China to the United States has accelerated rapidly, and if current trends persist within a short time, there will be a larger stock of Chinese investment in the United States than of U.S. investment in China.

The small amount of U.S. investment in China can be traced to two primary factors:

Poor protection of property rights, including intellectual property rights, which limits the potential benefits that U.S. firms can receive from their technology and brands;

China’s restrictions on direct investment in many sectors important to U.S. firms. Among G-20 countries, China is the most restrictive in terms of openness to direct investment.

The relatively small amount of Chinese investment in the United States can also be traced to two factors:

Much of the initial impetus for Chinese firms to go out was to secure natural resources, while the United States is not a resource-rich country relative to its gross domestic product or population;

The national security reviews of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States have soured many Chinese investors on the U.S. market.

The two countries have agreed to negotiate a bilateral investment treaty (BIT). This could open the doors to large amounts of investment in both directions if it addresses key issues. For U.S. firms, access to more sectors and better protection of IPR are crucial. Chinese firms seek a less politicized environment in which to invest. In its Third Plenum decision the Communist Party leadership indicated its intention to open more sectors to foreign investment and competition. A BIT could help lock in these necessary reforms.

The United States and China have been the two largest recipients of FDI in recent decades. At the end of 2011 the total stock of FDI in the world was around $19 trillion. Of this, 19 percent was in the United States and 10 percent was in China. These two biggest economies in the world are also major providers of direct investment. This is especially true for the United States, the most technologically advanced economy in the world. As of the end of 2012, the United States had a stock of outward direct investment of $4.5 trillion, about one-quarter of all the FDI in the world. China is a relative new-comer to outward investment, but its stock of outward direct investment has been growing rapidly. As of the end of 2012 China’s Ministry of Commerce reported an outward stock totaling $532 billion. By the end of 2013 this had grown to $660 billion.

While the United States and China are big players both as providers of direct investment and recipients of direct investment, there is less cross-investment between the two than one would expect. The U.S. Department of Commerce reports that China accounts for only 1.2 percent of U.S. outward FDI. That is, the world as a whole invests 10 percent of its FDI in China, but the United States puts only one-tenth that amount. China’s statistics indicate that China’s direct investments in the United States accounted for only 3.3 percent of its overseas investments at the end of 2013 (compared to 19 percent for the world portfolio). The Chinese figure is certainly an under-estimate because a large amount of China’s overseas investment is reported as going to Hong Kong and several other locations that are likely to be transit locations, not the ultimate destination of the investment. If we put aside the Chinese investment to Hong Kong, the share of China’s remaining outward investment going to the United States is 7.7 percent. Compared to the world portfolio this share is still low. So, an important question to research is why the United States severely underinvests in China and why China modestly underinvests in the United States. Understanding the factors behind the current dearth of cross-investment can help us form a judgment as to what a BIT between the two would need to include in order to mark a major step forward in the economic relationship.

Downloads

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/research/podcasts/2015/02/kathy-moon-north-korea-south-korea-unification?rssid=asia+and+the+pacific{4C09085D-4275-444E-8423-2711E1349134}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/85659486/0/brookingsrss/topics/asiaandthepacific~Kathy-Moon-on-North-and-South-Korea-Pride-prejudice-and-unification-challengesKathy Moon on North and South Korea: Pride, prejudice, and unification challenges

"We have a deficit of knowledge about the Koreas" in both the academy and public discourse, says Kathy Moon, the SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies and a senior fellow in the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings. In this podcast, Moon, who is also a political science professor at Wellesley College, describes her own journey to becoming a scholar with a focus on Asia and the Koreas; talks about what she observed during her trip to North Korea; explains the sources of North Koreans' national pride; and offers her thoughts on the very serious challenges for Korean reunification.

Also in the podcast, a discussion between John Hudak of Governance Studies and Michael O'Hanlon in Foreign Policy about President Obama's request to Congress for an Authorization for Use of Military Force against ISIS.

"We have a deficit of knowledge about the Koreas" in both the academy and public discourse, says Kathy Moon, the SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies and a senior fellow in the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings. In this podcast, Moon, who is also a political science professor at Wellesley College, describes her own journey to becoming a scholar with a focus on Asia and the Koreas; talks about what she observed during her trip to North Korea; explains the sources of North Koreans' national pride; and offers her thoughts on the very serious challenges for Korean reunification.

Also in the podcast, a discussion between John Hudak of Governance Studies and Michael O'Hanlon in Foreign Policy about President Obama's request to Congress for an Authorization for Use of Military Force against ISIS.

Authors

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http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/02/20-us-bases-in-afghanistan-ohanlon?rssid=asia+and+the+pacific{9927B811-7B6E-40F6-8F3F-DFF9CC5D3596}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/85662392/0/brookingsrss/topics/asiaandthepacific~We-still-need-US-bases-in-AfghanistanWe still need U.S. bases in Afghanistan

On Feb. 9, a U.S. drone strike in Afghanistan’s Helmand province killed Abdul Rauf, an Islamic State leader attempting to spread the would-be caliphate’s influence into South Asia. While key operational details have not been made public, we can make reasonable educated guesses based on past patterns: Most likely, the drone flew out of Kandahar Airfield, some 60 miles away , after days or weeks of surveillance by other unmanned aircraft. Further, some of the information used to find Rauf may have come from a joint U.S.-Afghan special forces raid against an al-Qaeda leader, Abu Bara al-Kuwaiti, in Nangarhar province in October. According to the New York Times, that raid not only killed Kuwaiti but also netted a computer chock-full of information on other extremists.

All of the above-noted U.S. resources — armed drones, surveillance assets, commandos — would have to be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of next year under President Obama’s plan to zero out combat units in that country before he leaves the White House. Attacks against the United States’ most dangerous enemies would be much less effective in South Asia thereafter, because there is no other good place from which to stage them. The alternative would probably be to use aircraft carriers many hundreds of miles away in the Arabian Sea. Those distances would exceed the combat radius of almost all U.S. drones, require any helicopters making the trip to refuel in flight and add hours-long delays to missions. They also necessitate flying over countries that may not grant permission to use their airspace under such circumstances.

The Obama administration has the wrong mind-set on our future U.S. military posture in Afghanistan. Exit should not be the strategy or objective. Protection of the homeland is the right metric. Instead of trying to leave by a given date, we should be planning to stay. The guiding philosophy should be to build an enduring partnership with Afghanistan to finally provide a real payoff for all our investment there — in durable bases allowing our forces to continue to target our most dangerous enemies in a part of the world where they still organize and operate.

Such counterterrorism capabilities have little to do with the nation-building enterprise in Afghanistan of the past 13 years. That mission is nearly done to a practical extent, and while Obama is being ambitious in his hopes that it can be finished before 2017, there is logic in trying to largely complete the job by then. There is, however, little logic in eliminating our regional counterterrorism capability by that point. We will almost surely still need it. We should have learned from recent experiences in Iraq and Syria, as well as Libya, Mali and other countries, that we cannot end the terrorist threat in a given country on our own timetable.

Of course, the pace of drone strikes and raids in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, historically used by al-Qaeda and affiliates, can and should decline. Indeed, according to the Long War Journal, it already has — for example, after peaking at more than 100 in 2010, the number of U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan fell to 24 in 2014. But some need endures. Moreover, if extremists knew that the United States no longer had capabilities in the Pashtun belts, they would probably increase their presence there.

It is not realistic for the United States to expect Afghan forces to pursue al-Qaeda and its offshoots for us after we leave the country. First, Afghanistan has no capability to fly drones in Pakistan; even if we could successfully transfer the needed assets and expertise to the Afghans, an unlikely prospect, such strikes would probably cause a crisis in Afghan-Pakistani relations. Second, inside their own country, Afghanistan’s army and police will continue to have their hands full with the Taliban. They may not have the capacity to go after key al-Qaeda-linked targets, many of which matter much more to us than to them.

Keeping two to three U.S. bases in eastern Afghanistan — Bagram near Kabul, Kandahar in the south, perhaps Khost or Jalalabad in the east — would be adequate for counterterrorism purposes. With two or three operating areas, each with 1,000 to 2,000 Americans, the United States would have assets within 150 miles or less of the key areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. That is a comfortable tactical operating distance for both drones and helicopters carrying commandos.

Maintaining these bases might cost $5 billion to $10 billion per year. That is real money, but it is less than the effective cost of keeping naval assets in the Arabian Sea to do the same job much less well. It is far less than the $100 billion a year we spent at the peak of the war. And it is immeasurably less than the cost that could result from another large-scale terrorist attack against the United States.

Although the main purpose of such an enduring U.S. military presence in Afghanistan would be counterterrorism, there could be additional benefits. We could continue to mentor modest numbers of Afghan forces at those bases, above and beyond the training mission that will continue in Kabul under Obama’s plan. These added forces could also provide us with political leverage that could reduce the chances of civil war in Afghanistan. This is the kind of leverage that we lost in Iraq after our 2011 departure — with tragic results.

With this approach, Obama will still have ended the main combat phase of two major wars on his watch. This legacy would be secure. More important, the United States would be more secure, too.

Authors

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Fri, 20 Feb 2015 15:19:00 -0500Michael E. O'Hanlon
On Feb. 9, a U.S. drone strike in Afghanistan's Helmand province killed Abdul Rauf, an Islamic State leader attempting to spread the would-be caliphate's influence into South Asia. While key operational details have not been made public, we can make reasonable educated guesses based on past patterns: Most likely, the drone flew out of Kandahar Airfield, some 60 miles away , after days or weeks of surveillance by other unmanned aircraft. Further, some of the information used to find Rauf may have come from a joint U.S.-Afghan special forces raid against an al-Qaeda leader, Abu Bara al-Kuwaiti, in Nangarhar province in October. According to the New York Times, that raid not only killed Kuwaiti but also netted a computer chock-full of information on other extremists.
All of the above-noted U.S. resources — armed drones, surveillance assets, commandos — would have to be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of next year under President Obama's plan to zero out combat units in that country before he leaves the White House. Attacks against the United States' most dangerous enemies would be much less effective in South Asia thereafter, because there is no other good place from which to stage them. The alternative would probably be to use aircraft carriers many hundreds of miles away in the Arabian Sea. Those distances would exceed the combat radius of almost all U.S. drones, require any helicopters making the trip to refuel in flight and add hours-long delays to missions. They also necessitate flying over countries that may not grant permission to use their airspace under such circumstances.
The Obama administration has the wrong mind-set on our future U.S. military posture in Afghanistan. Exit should not be the strategy or objective. Protection of the homeland is the right metric. Instead of trying to leave by a given date, we should be planning to stay. The guiding philosophy should be to build an enduring partnership with Afghanistan to finally provide a real payoff for all our investment there — in durable bases allowing our forces to continue to target our most dangerous enemies in a part of the world where they still organize and operate.
Such counterterrorism capabilities have little to do with the nation-building enterprise in Afghanistan of the past 13 years. That mission is nearly done to a practical extent, and while Obama is being ambitious in his hopes that it can be finished before 2017, there is logic in trying to largely complete the job by then. There is, however, little logic in eliminating our regional counterterrorism capability by that point. We will almost surely still need it. We should have learned from recent experiences in Iraq and Syria, as well as Libya, Mali and other countries, that we cannot end the terrorist threat in a given country on our own timetable.
Of course, the pace of drone strikes and raids in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, historically used by al-Qaeda and affiliates, can and should decline. Indeed, according to the Long War Journal, it already has — for example, after peaking at more than 100 in 2010, the number of U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan fell to 24 in 2014. But some need endures. Moreover, if extremists knew that the United States no longer had capabilities in the Pashtun belts, they would probably increase their presence there.
It is not realistic for the United States to expect Afghan forces to pursue al-Qaeda and its offshoots for us after we leave the country. First, Afghanistan has no capability to fly drones in Pakistan; even if we could successfully transfer the needed assets and expertise to the Afghans, an unlikely prospect, such strikes would probably cause a crisis in Afghan-Pakistani relations. Second, inside their own country, Afghanistan's army and police will continue to have their hands full with the Taliban. They may not have the capacity to go after key al-Qaeda-linked targets, many of which matter ...
On Feb. 9, a U.S. drone strike in Afghanistan's Helmand province killed Abdul Rauf, an Islamic State leader attempting to spread the would-be caliphate's influence into South Asia. While key operational details have not been made public, we can ...

On Feb. 9, a U.S. drone strike in Afghanistan’s Helmand province killed Abdul Rauf, an Islamic State leader attempting to spread the would-be caliphate’s influence into South Asia. While key operational details have not been made public, we can make reasonable educated guesses based on past patterns: Most likely, the drone flew out of Kandahar Airfield, some 60 miles away , after days or weeks of surveillance by other unmanned aircraft. Further, some of the information used to find Rauf may have come from a joint U.S.-Afghan special forces raid against an al-Qaeda leader, Abu Bara al-Kuwaiti, in Nangarhar province in October. According to the New York Times, that raid not only killed Kuwaiti but also netted a computer chock-full of information on other extremists.

All of the above-noted U.S. resources — armed drones, surveillance assets, commandos — would have to be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of next year under President Obama’s plan to zero out combat units in that country before he leaves the White House. Attacks against the United States’ most dangerous enemies would be much less effective in South Asia thereafter, because there is no other good place from which to stage them. The alternative would probably be to use aircraft carriers many hundreds of miles away in the Arabian Sea. Those distances would exceed the combat radius of almost all U.S. drones, require any helicopters making the trip to refuel in flight and add hours-long delays to missions. They also necessitate flying over countries that may not grant permission to use their airspace under such circumstances.

The Obama administration has the wrong mind-set on our future U.S. military posture in Afghanistan. Exit should not be the strategy or objective. Protection of the homeland is the right metric. Instead of trying to leave by a given date, we should be planning to stay. The guiding philosophy should be to build an enduring partnership with Afghanistan to finally provide a real payoff for all our investment there — in durable bases allowing our forces to continue to target our most dangerous enemies in a part of the world where they still organize and operate.

Such counterterrorism capabilities have little to do with the nation-building enterprise in Afghanistan of the past 13 years. That mission is nearly done to a practical extent, and while Obama is being ambitious in his hopes that it can be finished before 2017, there is logic in trying to largely complete the job by then. There is, however, little logic in eliminating our regional counterterrorism capability by that point. We will almost surely still need it. We should have learned from recent experiences in Iraq and Syria, as well as Libya, Mali and other countries, that we cannot end the terrorist threat in a given country on our own timetable.

Of course, the pace of drone strikes and raids in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, historically used by al-Qaeda and affiliates, can and should decline. Indeed, according to the Long War Journal, it already has — for example, after peaking at more than 100 in 2010, the number of U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan fell to 24 in 2014. But some need endures. Moreover, if extremists knew that the United States no longer had capabilities in the Pashtun belts, they would probably increase their presence there.

It is not realistic for the United States to expect Afghan forces to pursue al-Qaeda and its offshoots for us after we leave the country. First, Afghanistan has no capability to fly drones in Pakistan; even if we could successfully transfer the needed assets and expertise to the Afghans, an unlikely prospect, such strikes would probably cause a crisis in Afghan-Pakistani relations. Second, inside their own country, Afghanistan’s army and police will continue to have their hands full with the Taliban. They may not have the capacity to go after key al-Qaeda-linked targets, many of which matter much more to us than to them.

Keeping two to three U.S. bases in eastern Afghanistan — Bagram near Kabul, Kandahar in the south, perhaps Khost or Jalalabad in the east — would be adequate for counterterrorism purposes. With two or three operating areas, each with 1,000 to 2,000 Americans, the United States would have assets within 150 miles or less of the key areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. That is a comfortable tactical operating distance for both drones and helicopters carrying commandos.

Maintaining these bases might cost $5 billion to $10 billion per year. That is real money, but it is less than the effective cost of keeping naval assets in the Arabian Sea to do the same job much less well. It is far less than the $100 billion a year we spent at the peak of the war. And it is immeasurably less than the cost that could result from another large-scale terrorist attack against the United States.

Although the main purpose of such an enduring U.S. military presence in Afghanistan would be counterterrorism, there could be additional benefits. We could continue to mentor modest numbers of Afghan forces at those bases, above and beyond the training mission that will continue in Kabul under Obama’s plan. These added forces could also provide us with political leverage that could reduce the chances of civil war in Afghanistan. This is the kind of leverage that we lost in Iraq after our 2011 departure — with tragic results.

With this approach, Obama will still have ended the main combat phase of two major wars on his watch. This legacy would be secure. More important, the United States would be more secure, too.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/02/19-united-states-must-resist-return-to-spheres-of-interest-international-system-kagan?rssid=asia+and+the+pacific{338B2AEF-9072-4DD6-A8B7-3AB6FBF9DD85}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/85590880/0/brookingsrss/topics/asiaandthepacific~The-United-States-must-resist-a-return-to-spheres-of-interest-in-the-international-systemThe United States must resist a return to spheres of interest in the international system

Great power competition has returned. Or rather, it has reminded us that it was always lurking in the background. This is not a minor development in international affairs, but it need not mean the end of the world order as we know it.

The real impact of the return of great power competition will depend on how the United States responds to these changes. America needs to recognize its central role in maintaining the present liberal international order and muster the will to use its still formidable power and influence to support that order against its inevitable challengers.

Competition in international affairs is natural. Great powers by their very nature seek regional dominance and spheres of influence. They do so in the first instance because influence over others is what defines a great power. They are, as a rule, countries imbued with national pride and imperial ambition. But, living in a Hobbesian world of other great powers, they are also nervous about their security and seek defense-in-depth through the establishment of buffer states on their periphery.

Historically, great power wars often begin as arguments over buffer states where spheres of influence intersect—the Balkans before World War I, for instance, where the ambitions of Russia and Austria-Hungary clashed. But today’s great powers are rising in a very different international environment, largely because of the unique role the United States has played since the end of the Second World War. The United States has been not simply a regional power, but rather a regional power in every strategic region. It has served as the maintainer of regional balances in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The result has been that, in marked contrast to past eras, today’s great powers do not face fundamental threats to their physical security.

So, for example, Russia objectively has never enjoyed greater security in its history than it has since 1989. In the 20th century, Russia was invaded twice by Germany, and in the aftermath of the second war could plausibly claim to fear another invasion unless adequately protected. (France, after all, had the same fear.) In the 19th century, Russia was invaded by Napoleon, and before that Catherine the Great is supposed to have uttered that quintessentially Russian observation, “I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.” Today that is not true. Russia faces no threat of invasion from the West. Who would launch such an invasion? Germany, Estonia, Ukraine? If Russia faces threats, they are from the south, in the form of militant Islamists, or from the east, in the form of a billion Chinese standing across the border from an empty Siberia. But for the first time in Russia’s long history, it does not face a strategic threat on its western flank.

Much the same can be said of China, which enjoys far greater security than it has at any time in the last three centuries. The American role in East Asia protects it from invasion by its historic adversary, Japan, while none of the other great powers around China’s periphery have the strength or desire now or in the foreseeable future to launch an attack on Chinese territory.

Therefore, neither Chinese nor Russians can claim that a sphere of influence is necessary for their defense. They may feel it necessary for their sense of pride. They may feel it is necessary as a way of restoring their wounded honor. They may seek an expanded sphere of influence to fulfill their ambition to become more formidable powers on the international stage. And they may have concerns that free, nations on their periphery may pass the liberal infection onto their own populaces and thus undermine their autocratic power.

The question for the United States, and its allies in Asia and Europe, is whether we should tolerate a return to sphere of influence behavior among regional powers that are not seeking security but are in search of status, powers that are acting less out of fear than out of ambition. This question, in the end, is not about idealism, our commitment to a “rules-based” international order, or our principled opposition to territorial aggression. Yes, there are important principles at stake: neighbors shouldn’t invade their neighbors to seize their territory. But before we get to issues of principle, we need to understand how such behavior affects the world in terms of basic stability

On that score, the historical record is very clear. To return to a world of spheres of influence—the world that existed prior to the era of American predominance—is to return to the great power conflicts of past centuries. Revisionist great powers are never satisfied. Their sphere of influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security. The “satiated” power that Bismarck spoke of is rare—even his Germany, in the end, could not be satiated. Of course, rising great powers always express some historical grievance. Every people, except perhaps for the fortunate Americans, have reason for resentment at ancient injustices, nurse grudges against old adversaries, seek to return to a glorious past that was stolen from them by military or political defeat. The world’s supply of grievances is inexhaustible.

These grievances, however, are rarely solved by minor border changes. Japan, the aggrieved “have-not” nation of the 1930s, did not satisfy itself by swallowing Manchuria in 1931. Germany, the aggrieved victim of Versailles, did not satisfy itself by bringing the Germans of the Sudetenland back into the fold. And, of course, Russia’s historical sphere of influence does not end in Ukraine. It begins in Ukraine. It extends to the Balts, to the Balkans, and to heart of Central Europe.

The tragic irony is that, in the process of carving out these spheres of influence, the ambitious rising powers invariably create the very threats they use to justify their actions. Japan did exactly that in the 30s. In the 1920s, following the Washington Naval Treaty, Japan was a relatively secure country that through a combination of ambition and paranoia launched itself on a quest for an expanded sphere of influence, thus inspiring the great power enmity that the Japanese had originally feared. One sees a similar dynamic in Russia’s behavior today. No one in the West was thinking about containing Russia until Russia made itself into a power that needed to be contained.

If history is any lesson, such behavior only ends when other great powers decide they have had enough. We know those moments as major power wars.

The best and easiest time to stop such a dynamic is at the beginning. If the United States wants to maintain a benevolent world order, it must not permit spheres of influence to serve as a pretext for aggression. The United States needs to make clear now—before things get out of hand—that this is not a world order that it will accept.

And we need to be clear what that response entails. Great powers of course compete across multiple spheres—economic, ideological, and political, as well as military. Competition in most spheres is necessary and even healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order uphold by the liberal powers, even if it is not itself liberal.

But security competition is different. It is specifically because Russia could not compete with the West ideologically or economically that Putin resorted to military means. In so doing, he attacked the underlying security and stability at the core of the liberal order. The security situation undergirds everything—without it nothing else functions. Democracy and prosperity cannot flourish without security.

It remains true today as it has since the Second World War that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide this security. There is no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And while we can talk about soft power and smart power, they have been and always will be of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest. Even in other great power’s backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to use military power to establish balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers.

Authors

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Thu, 19 Feb 2015 14:06:00 -0500Robert Kagan
Great power competition has returned. Or rather, it has reminded us that it was always lurking in the background. This is not a minor development in international affairs, but it need not mean the end of the world order as we know it.
The real impact of the return of great power competition will depend on how the United States responds to these changes. America needs to recognize its central role in maintaining the present liberal international order and muster the will to use its still formidable power and influence to support that order against its inevitable challengers.
Competition in international affairs is natural. Great powers by their very nature seek regional dominance and spheres of influence. They do so in the first instance because influence over others is what defines a great power. They are, as a rule, countries imbued with national pride and imperial ambition. But, living in a Hobbesian world of other great powers, they are also nervous about their security and seek defense-in-depth through the establishment of buffer states on their periphery.
Historically, great power wars often begin as arguments over buffer states where spheres of influence intersect—the Balkans before World War I, for instance, where the ambitions of Russia and Austria-Hungary clashed. But today's great powers are rising in a very different international environment, largely because of the unique role the United States has played since the end of the Second World War. The United States has been not simply a regional power, but rather a regional power in every strategic region. It has served as the maintainer of regional balances in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The result has been that, in marked contrast to past eras, today's great powers do not face fundamental threats to their physical security.
So, for example, Russia objectively has never enjoyed greater security in its history than it has since 1989. In the 20th century, Russia was invaded twice by Germany, and in the aftermath of the second war could plausibly claim to fear another invasion unless adequately protected. (France, after all, had the same fear.) In the 19th century, Russia was invaded by Napoleon, and before that Catherine the Great is supposed to have uttered that quintessentially Russian observation, “I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.” Today that is not true. Russia faces no threat of invasion from the West. Who would launch such an invasion? Germany, Estonia, Ukraine? If Russia faces threats, they are from the south, in the form of militant Islamists, or from the east, in the form of a billion Chinese standing across the border from an empty Siberia. But for the first time in Russia's long history, it does not face a strategic threat on its western flank.
Much the same can be said of China, which enjoys far greater security than it has at any time in the last three centuries. The American role in East Asia protects it from invasion by its historic adversary, Japan, while none of the other great powers around China's periphery have the strength or desire now or in the foreseeable future to launch an attack on Chinese territory.
Therefore, neither Chinese nor Russians can claim that a sphere of influence is necessary for their defense. They may feel it necessary for their sense of pride. They may feel it is necessary as a way of restoring their wounded honor. They may seek an expanded sphere of influence to fulfill their ambition to become more formidable powers on the international stage. And they may have concerns that free, nations on their periphery may pass the liberal infection onto their own populaces and thus undermine their autocratic power.
The question for the United States, and its allies in Asia and Europe, is whether we should tolerate a return to sphere of influence behavior among regional powers that are not seeking security but are in search of status, powers that are acting ...
Great power competition has returned. Or rather, it has reminded us that it was always lurking in the background. This is not a minor development in international affairs, but it need not mean the end of the world order as we know it.

Great power competition has returned. Or rather, it has reminded us that it was always lurking in the background. This is not a minor development in international affairs, but it need not mean the end of the world order as we know it.

The real impact of the return of great power competition will depend on how the United States responds to these changes. America needs to recognize its central role in maintaining the present liberal international order and muster the will to use its still formidable power and influence to support that order against its inevitable challengers.

Competition in international affairs is natural. Great powers by their very nature seek regional dominance and spheres of influence. They do so in the first instance because influence over others is what defines a great power. They are, as a rule, countries imbued with national pride and imperial ambition. But, living in a Hobbesian world of other great powers, they are also nervous about their security and seek defense-in-depth through the establishment of buffer states on their periphery.

Historically, great power wars often begin as arguments over buffer states where spheres of influence intersect—the Balkans before World War I, for instance, where the ambitions of Russia and Austria-Hungary clashed. But today’s great powers are rising in a very different international environment, largely because of the unique role the United States has played since the end of the Second World War. The United States has been not simply a regional power, but rather a regional power in every strategic region. It has served as the maintainer of regional balances in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The result has been that, in marked contrast to past eras, today’s great powers do not face fundamental threats to their physical security.

So, for example, Russia objectively has never enjoyed greater security in its history than it has since 1989. In the 20th century, Russia was invaded twice by Germany, and in the aftermath of the second war could plausibly claim to fear another invasion unless adequately protected. (France, after all, had the same fear.) In the 19th century, Russia was invaded by Napoleon, and before that Catherine the Great is supposed to have uttered that quintessentially Russian observation, “I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.” Today that is not true. Russia faces no threat of invasion from the West. Who would launch such an invasion? Germany, Estonia, Ukraine? If Russia faces threats, they are from the south, in the form of militant Islamists, or from the east, in the form of a billion Chinese standing across the border from an empty Siberia. But for the first time in Russia’s long history, it does not face a strategic threat on its western flank.

Much the same can be said of China, which enjoys far greater security than it has at any time in the last three centuries. The American role in East Asia protects it from invasion by its historic adversary, Japan, while none of the other great powers around China’s periphery have the strength or desire now or in the foreseeable future to launch an attack on Chinese territory.

Therefore, neither Chinese nor Russians can claim that a sphere of influence is necessary for their defense. They may feel it necessary for their sense of pride. They may feel it is necessary as a way of restoring their wounded honor. They may seek an expanded sphere of influence to fulfill their ambition to become more formidable powers on the international stage. And they may have concerns that free, nations on their periphery may pass the liberal infection onto their own populaces and thus undermine their autocratic power.

The question for the United States, and its allies in Asia and Europe, is whether we should tolerate a return to sphere of influence behavior among regional powers that are not seeking security but are in search of status, powers that are acting less out of fear than out of ambition. This question, in the end, is not about idealism, our commitment to a “rules-based” international order, or our principled opposition to territorial aggression. Yes, there are important principles at stake: neighbors shouldn’t invade their neighbors to seize their territory. But before we get to issues of principle, we need to understand how such behavior affects the world in terms of basic stability

On that score, the historical record is very clear. To return to a world of spheres of influence—the world that existed prior to the era of American predominance—is to return to the great power conflicts of past centuries. Revisionist great powers are never satisfied. Their sphere of influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security. The “satiated” power that Bismarck spoke of is rare—even his Germany, in the end, could not be satiated. Of course, rising great powers always express some historical grievance. Every people, except perhaps for the fortunate Americans, have reason for resentment at ancient injustices, nurse grudges against old adversaries, seek to return to a glorious past that was stolen from them by military or political defeat. The world’s supply of grievances is inexhaustible.

These grievances, however, are rarely solved by minor border changes. Japan, the aggrieved “have-not” nation of the 1930s, did not satisfy itself by swallowing Manchuria in 1931. Germany, the aggrieved victim of Versailles, did not satisfy itself by bringing the Germans of the Sudetenland back into the fold. And, of course, Russia’s historical sphere of influence does not end in Ukraine. It begins in Ukraine. It extends to the Balts, to the Balkans, and to heart of Central Europe.

The tragic irony is that, in the process of carving out these spheres of influence, the ambitious rising powers invariably create the very threats they use to justify their actions. Japan did exactly that in the 30s. In the 1920s, following the Washington Naval Treaty, Japan was a relatively secure country that through a combination of ambition and paranoia launched itself on a quest for an expanded sphere of influence, thus inspiring the great power enmity that the Japanese had originally feared. One sees a similar dynamic in Russia’s behavior today. No one in the West was thinking about containing Russia until Russia made itself into a power that needed to be contained.

If history is any lesson, such behavior only ends when other great powers decide they have had enough. We know those moments as major power wars.

The best and easiest time to stop such a dynamic is at the beginning. If the United States wants to maintain a benevolent world order, it must not permit spheres of influence to serve as a pretext for aggression. The United States needs to make clear now—before things get out of hand—that this is not a world order that it will accept.

And we need to be clear what that response entails. Great powers of course compete across multiple spheres—economic, ideological, and political, as well as military. Competition in most spheres is necessary and even healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order uphold by the liberal powers, even if it is not itself liberal.

But security competition is different. It is specifically because Russia could not compete with the West ideologically or economically that Putin resorted to military means. In so doing, he attacked the underlying security and stability at the core of the liberal order. The security situation undergirds everything—without it nothing else functions. Democracy and prosperity cannot flourish without security.

It remains true today as it has since the Second World War that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide this security. There is no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And while we can talk about soft power and smart power, they have been and always will be of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest. Even in other great power’s backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to use military power to establish balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers.

I ask here not about the New World Order, global power shifts, or whether the United States retains its position as a global hegemon. Nor do I mean the impact on the world economy, a colossal actual thing, but still a relatively abstract concept.

I mean: What does this slowdown in 2015 mean for you, in the rest of the world, looking to China as an export market; or you, in China, seeking employment as your economy’s labor market adjusts to its New Normal?

In 2014 China’s GDP grew 7.4 percent, its slowest rate of increase since 1990. This seems an epic change from when that economy regularly turned in double-digit growth. The effect of this slowdown on those who sell to China and on those working in China must be extreme.

But maybe not. Why? Let’s do the arithmetic.

Suppose the year is not 2015 but 2005, exactly a decade ago, and you are an exporter, somewhere in the rest of the world, predicting China will grow, say, 12 percent over the coming 12 months. China’s GDP then was $2.3 trillion at market exchange rates.

(Since you are selling to China, you don’t care about Purchasing Power Parity correction. What matters to you are nominal values at market exchange rates, i.e., in this case the size of China’s footprint in the global market place at rates of exchange that see actual financial value changing hands.)

You expect China’s marketplace will increase by $274 billion (12 percent of $2.3 trillion). Whatever fraction of that market you sell to, that’s what counts for your bottom line.

Now, fast forward to 2015. China’s growth might be as low as 7 percent these next 12 months. But, in the meantime China’s economy has become a lot larger than it was in 2005. How much larger? The IMF’s October 2014 World Economic Outlook forecasts that for 2015 China’s economy, at market exchange rates, will come in at $11.3 trillion. At this scale, growth of a mere 7 percent will increase the size of China’s footprint in the global economy by $790 billion over the next 12 months.

To put matters in perspective, this increase of $790 billion is 2.8 times the size of the increase of $274 billion 10 years ago. Thus, even at an expected growth rate a full five percentage points lower than what someone a decade ago might have optimistically forecast, China will generate economic growth in absolute magnitude almost 3 times larger than it did then.

But, wait, the world today overall, not just China, has changed. A representative exporter will gauge prospects for selling to China based not just on China’s scale, but also that of their own economy. Let’s do the arithmetic on that.

Suppose you are an exporting business in the United States. Ten years ago the U.S. GDP was $13.1 trillion; the IMF reckons that in 2015 the U.S. economy will produce GDP equal to $18.3 trillion. Relative to the size of the U.S. economy, China’s expected 7 percent expansion in 2015 will be an increase in a potential export market of 4.3 percent; ten years ago, that same ratio was just 2.1 percent. Put differently, China’s expansion over the next 12 months—even at only 7 percent—will represent for a typical U.S. exporter, relative to the economy he lives in, more than a doubling of the increase in size of this potential export market.

What if you are not in the U.S.? If you are in the EU, China’s expansion is even more of an increased opportunity. Only if you are a fast-growing economy like those of the ASEAN-5 does China’s 7 percent growth mean something not quite so large. But even then, the worst you can say is that China’s 7 percent growth means you can expect simply the same relative increase in export business with China as you did a decade ago. Hardly a catastrophe.

(Table 1 traces out a range of numbers, confirming that the positive outcome I have just described for the U.S. and the EU continues to hold even if China went to 6 percent growth—only a little bit less so. Of course if China’s growth comes in at 8 percent, the news is correspondingly better.)

Finally, what about the capacity of China’s economy to create jobs? In 2013, the latest year reported in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, China’s labor force numbered 793.3 million. China’s average productivity (using IMF World Economic Outlook GDP numbers) was, therefore, $11,900; this had grown by 12 percent from the previous year. If productivity were to continue to grow at that same rate, then an expansion of China’s GDP by $790 billion will generate 53 million new jobs. Since China’s rural population is about 500 million (slightly less than half of its total population), if all those 53 million new jobs were urban, this would still absorb 10 percent of the rural population as migrants.

(Again, Table 1 shows what would happen for variation around this scenario.)

The conclusion? China in 2015 is a very different economy from even just 10 years ago. It has changed far more than the world at large has in this time. A 7 percent growth rate is obviously lower than an 8 percent one. So, whatever good comes from a 7 percent growth rate, at the margin a growth rate a little higher will be even better. But, quantifying the changes that have taken place in the global economy, a 7 percent growth rate for China today means something even more positive than did a 12 percent growth rate 10 years ago.

One can of course imagine scenarios where China’s slowdown ends up much worse for, say, ASEAN, than that indicated here. If spillovers (not because of trade connections but something else) unfurled across the rest of the world as a consequence, then a China shock would come with far more damaging effects on ASEAN economies. But just as plausibly, a China slowdown might itself be caused by, perhaps, a resurgence in U.S. manufacturing. Then the overall effects on ASEAN countries or anywhere else in the world will depend on the relative strengths of the two opposing effects: the U.S. driving ASEAN exports against China slowing them. However that unfolds, the final effect on ASEAN will not be caused by just a slowdown in China’s growth. Finally, if China’s growth slows from having switched to greater reliance on domestic consumption, then export opportunities for the rest of the world will simply be correspondingly larger.

Authors

Danny Quah

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Wed, 18 Feb 2015 10:29:00 -0500Danny Quah
What does China's growth slowdown mean to you?
I ask here not about the New World Order, global power shifts, or whether the United States retains its position as a global hegemon. Nor do I mean the impact on the world economy, a colossal actual thing, but still a relatively abstract concept.
Figure 1. China's GDP (billions of U.S. dollars, market exchange rates)
I mean: What does this slowdown in 2015 mean for you, in the rest of the world, looking to China as an export market; or you, in China, seeking employment as your economy's labor market adjusts to its New Normal?
In 2014 China's GDP grew 7.4 percent, its slowest rate of increase since 1990. This seems an epic change from when that economy regularly turned in double-digit growth. The effect of this slowdown on those who sell to China and on those working in China must be extreme.
But maybe not. Why? Let's do the arithmetic.
Suppose the year is not 2015 but 2005, exactly a decade ago, and you are an exporter, somewhere in the rest of the world, predicting China will grow, say, 12 percent over the coming 12 months. China's GDP then was $2.3 trillion at market exchange rates.
(Since you are selling to China, you don't care about Purchasing Power Parity correction. What matters to you are nominal values at market exchange rates, i.e., in this case the size of China's footprint in the global market place at rates of exchange that see actual financial value changing hands.)
You expect China's marketplace will increase by $274 billion (12 percent of $2.3 trillion). Whatever fraction of that market you sell to, that's what counts for your bottom line.
Now, fast forward to 2015. China's growth might be as low as 7 percent these next 12 months. But, in the meantime China's economy has become a lot larger than it was in 2005. How much larger? The IMF's October 2014 World Economic Outlook forecasts that for 2015 China's economy, at market exchange rates, will come in at $11.3 trillion. At this scale, growth of a mere 7 percent will increase the size of China's footprint in the global economy by $790 billion over the next 12 months.
To put matters in perspective, this increase of $790 billion is 2.8 times the size of the increase of $274 billion 10 years ago. Thus, even at an expected growth rate a full five percentage points lower than what someone a decade ago might have optimistically forecast, China will generate economic growth in absolute magnitude almost 3 times larger than it did then.
But, wait, the world today overall, not just China, has changed. A representative exporter will gauge prospects for selling to China based not just on China's scale, but also that of their own economy. Let's do the arithmetic on that.
Suppose you are an exporting business in the United States. Ten years ago the U.S. GDP was $13.1 trillion; the IMF reckons that in 2015 the U.S. economy will produce GDP equal to $18.3 trillion. Relative to the size of the U.S. economy, China's expected 7 percent expansion in 2015 will be an increase in a potential export market of 4.3 percent; ten years ago, that same ratio was just 2.1 percent. Put differently, China's expansion over the next 12 months—even at only 7 percent—will represent for a typical U.S. exporter, relative to the economy he lives in, more than a doubling of the increase in size of this potential export market.
What if you are not in the U.S.? If you are in the EU, China's expansion is even more of an increased opportunity. Only if you are a fast-growing economy like those of the ASEAN-5 does China's 7 percent growth mean something not quite so large. But even then, the worst you can say is that China's 7 percent growth means you can expect simply the same relative increase in export business with China as you did a decade ago. Hardly a catastrophe.
(Table 1 traces out a range of numbers, confirming that the positive outcome I have just described for the U.S. and the EU continues to hold even if China ...
What does China's growth slowdown mean to you?
I ask here not about the New World Order, global power shifts, or whether the United States retains its position as a global hegemon. Nor do I mean the impact on the world economy, a colossal actual ...

What does China’s growth slowdown mean to you?

I ask here not about the New World Order, global power shifts, or whether the United States retains its position as a global hegemon. Nor do I mean the impact on the world economy, a colossal actual thing, but still a relatively abstract concept.

I mean: What does this slowdown in 2015 mean for you, in the rest of the world, looking to China as an export market; or you, in China, seeking employment as your economy’s labor market adjusts to its New Normal?

In 2014 China’s GDP grew 7.4 percent, its slowest rate of increase since 1990. This seems an epic change from when that economy regularly turned in double-digit growth. The effect of this slowdown on those who sell to China and on those working in China must be extreme.

But maybe not. Why? Let’s do the arithmetic.

Suppose the year is not 2015 but 2005, exactly a decade ago, and you are an exporter, somewhere in the rest of the world, predicting China will grow, say, 12 percent over the coming 12 months. China’s GDP then was $2.3 trillion at market exchange rates.

(Since you are selling to China, you don’t care about Purchasing Power Parity correction. What matters to you are nominal values at market exchange rates, i.e., in this case the size of China’s footprint in the global market place at rates of exchange that see actual financial value changing hands.)

You expect China’s marketplace will increase by $274 billion (12 percent of $2.3 trillion). Whatever fraction of that market you sell to, that’s what counts for your bottom line.

Now, fast forward to 2015. China’s growth might be as low as 7 percent these next 12 months. But, in the meantime China’s economy has become a lot larger than it was in 2005. How much larger? The IMF’s October 2014 World Economic Outlook forecasts that for 2015 China’s economy, at market exchange rates, will come in at $11.3 trillion. At this scale, growth of a mere 7 percent will increase the size of China’s footprint in the global economy by $790 billion over the next 12 months.

To put matters in perspective, this increase of $790 billion is 2.8 times the size of the increase of $274 billion 10 years ago. Thus, even at an expected growth rate a full five percentage points lower than what someone a decade ago might have optimistically forecast, China will generate economic growth in absolute magnitude almost 3 times larger than it did then.

But, wait, the world today overall, not just China, has changed. A representative exporter will gauge prospects for selling to China based not just on China’s scale, but also that of their own economy. Let’s do the arithmetic on that.

Suppose you are an exporting business in the United States. Ten years ago the U.S. GDP was $13.1 trillion; the IMF reckons that in 2015 the U.S. economy will produce GDP equal to $18.3 trillion. Relative to the size of the U.S. economy, China’s expected 7 percent expansion in 2015 will be an increase in a potential export market of 4.3 percent; ten years ago, that same ratio was just 2.1 percent. Put differently, China’s expansion over the next 12 months—even at only 7 percent—will represent for a typical U.S. exporter, relative to the economy he lives in, more than a doubling of the increase in size of this potential export market.

What if you are not in the U.S.? If you are in the EU, China’s expansion is even more of an increased opportunity. Only if you are a fast-growing economy like those of the ASEAN-5 does China’s 7 percent growth mean something not quite so large. But even then, the worst you can say is that China’s 7 percent growth means you can expect simply the same relative increase in export business with China as you did a decade ago. Hardly a catastrophe.

(Table 1 traces out a range of numbers, confirming that the positive outcome I have just described for the U.S. and the EU continues to hold even if China went to 6 percent growth—only a little bit less so. Of course if China’s growth comes in at 8 percent, the news is correspondingly better.)

Finally, what about the capacity of China’s economy to create jobs? In 2013, the latest year reported in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, China’s labor force numbered 793.3 million. China’s average productivity (using IMF World Economic Outlook GDP numbers) was, therefore, $11,900; this had grown by 12 percent from the previous year. If productivity were to continue to grow at that same rate, then an expansion of China’s GDP by $790 billion will generate 53 million new jobs. Since China’s rural population is about 500 million (slightly less than half of its total population), if all those 53 million new jobs were urban, this would still absorb 10 percent of the rural population as migrants.

(Again, Table 1 shows what would happen for variation around this scenario.)

The conclusion? China in 2015 is a very different economy from even just 10 years ago. It has changed far more than the world at large has in this time. A 7 percent growth rate is obviously lower than an 8 percent one. So, whatever good comes from a 7 percent growth rate, at the margin a growth rate a little higher will be even better. But, quantifying the changes that have taken place in the global economy, a 7 percent growth rate for China today means something even more positive than did a 12 percent growth rate 10 years ago.

One can of course imagine scenarios where China’s slowdown ends up much worse for, say, ASEAN, than that indicated here. If spillovers (not because of trade connections but something else) unfurled across the rest of the world as a consequence, then a China shock would come with far more damaging effects on ASEAN economies. But just as plausibly, a China slowdown might itself be caused by, perhaps, a resurgence in U.S. manufacturing. Then the overall effects on ASEAN countries or anywhere else in the world will depend on the relative strengths of the two opposing effects: the U.S. driving ASEAN exports against China slowing them. However that unfolds, the final effect on ASEAN will not be caused by just a slowdown in China’s growth. Finally, if China’s growth slows from having switched to greater reliance on domestic consumption, then export opportunities for the rest of the world will simply be correspondingly larger.

Event Information

During his second turn as Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe has promoted a policy of “proactive pacifism.” One of several strategic steps taken to further this policy has been to revise Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter. Japan has been a world leader in foreign aid since the 1960s, but the ODA Charter was only put in place in 1992. It was revised once in 2003 and this second round of revisions is expected to be approved soon by the Diet, the Japanese legislature. One of the main purposes of the revisions is to enable utilization of ODA as a tool for advancing some of Japan’s national security goals, through loosening some restrictions on the types of activities and organizations that can be funded. Changes to Japan’s overseas aid and development programs are inevitable; potential side-effects of these changes are unclear.

On February 13, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies hosted a discussion on the implications of the ODA Charter revisions for Japan’s foreign policy. A panel of experts offered insights into the main changes in the revised ODA Charter, what role ODA will now play in Japan’s national security strategy, and how the revisions will influence Japan’s implementation of economic assistance programs.

Audio

Transcript

Event Materials

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Fri, 13 Feb 2015 10:00:00 -0500http://7515766d70db9af98b83-7a8dffca7ab41e0acde077bdb93c9343.r43.cf1.rackcdn.com/150213_JapanODA_64K_itunes.mp3
Event Information
February 13, 2015
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST
Saul/Zilkha Room
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036 Register for the Event
During his second turn as Japan's prime minister, Shinzo Abe has promoted a policy of “proactive pacifism.” One of several strategic steps taken to further this policy has been to revise Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter. Japan has been a world leader in foreign aid since the 1960s, but the ODA Charter was only put in place in 1992. It was revised once in 2003 and this second round of revisions is expected to be approved soon by the Diet, the Japanese legislature. One of the main purposes of the revisions is to enable utilization of ODA as a tool for advancing some of Japan's national security goals, through loosening some restrictions on the types of activities and organizations that can be funded. Changes to Japan's overseas aid and development programs are inevitable; potential side-effects of these changes are unclear.
On February 13, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies hosted a discussion on the implications of the ODA Charter revisions for Japan's foreign policy. A panel of experts offered insights into the main changes in the revised ODA Charter, what role ODA will now play in Japan's national security strategy, and how the revisions will influence Japan's implementation of economic assistance programs.
Join the conversation on Twitter using #JapanODA
Audio
- Revising Japan's ODA charter: Aiding national security?
Transcript
- Uncorrected Transcript (.pdf)
Event Materials
- 20150213_JapanODA_transcript
Event Information
February 13, 2015
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM EST
Saul/Zilkha Room
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036 Register for the Event
During his second turn as Japan's prime minister, Shinzo Abe ...

Event Information

During his second turn as Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe has promoted a policy of “proactive pacifism.” One of several strategic steps taken to further this policy has been to revise Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter. Japan has been a world leader in foreign aid since the 1960s, but the ODA Charter was only put in place in 1992. It was revised once in 2003 and this second round of revisions is expected to be approved soon by the Diet, the Japanese legislature. One of the main purposes of the revisions is to enable utilization of ODA as a tool for advancing some of Japan’s national security goals, through loosening some restrictions on the types of activities and organizations that can be funded. Changes to Japan’s overseas aid and development programs are inevitable; potential side-effects of these changes are unclear.

On February 13, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies hosted a discussion on the implications of the ODA Charter revisions for Japan’s foreign policy. A panel of experts offered insights into the main changes in the revised ODA Charter, what role ODA will now play in Japan’s national security strategy, and how the revisions will influence Japan’s implementation of economic assistance programs.

The last decade has seen not one but two energy revolutions. The first, explosive growth in demand from Asia’s rising powers, fueled fears about scarcity and conflict. The second, an American revolution in technology and markets, is rapidly strengthening America’s hand in the world. There are major security consequences of these shifts, from Saudi Arabia to Africa to Russia, and the emerging powers are increasingly exposed to them—risks, as well as energy flows, are pivoting to Asia. All while a third revolution is struggling to be born, driven by climate change. Now, the United States faces a strategic choice. It has an enviable position in energy markets, and its naval presence at key chokepoints—from the Persian Gulf to Southeast Asia—gives it enormous potential leverage. But America will have to decide whether it wants to use energy as a stick, or to foster a more stable international system.

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Wed, 11 Feb 2015 13:02:00 -0500
The last decade has seen not one but two energy revolutions. The first, explosive growth in demand from Asia's rising powers, fueled fears about scarcity and conflict. The second, an American revolution in technology and markets, is rapidly strengthening America's hand in the world. There are major security consequences of these shifts, from Saudi Arabia to Africa to Russia, and the emerging powers are increasingly exposed to them—risks, as well as energy flows, are pivoting to Asia. All while a third revolution is struggling to be born, driven by climate change. Now, the United States faces a strategic choice. It has an enviable position in energy markets, and its naval presence at key chokepoints—from the Persian Gulf to Southeast Asia—gives it enormous potential leverage. But America will have to decide whether it wants to use energy as a stick, or to foster a more stable international system.
Learn more about The Risk Pivot's companion volume, The New Politics of Strategic Resources: Energy and Food Security Challenges in the 21st Century edited by David Steven, Emily O'Brien and Bruce Jones.
The last decade has seen not one but two energy revolutions. The first, explosive growth in demand from Asia's rising powers, fueled fears about scarcity and conflict. The second, an American revolution in technology and markets, is rapidly ...

The last decade has seen not one but two energy revolutions. The first, explosive growth in demand from Asia’s rising powers, fueled fears about scarcity and conflict. The second, an American revolution in technology and markets, is rapidly strengthening America’s hand in the world. There are major security consequences of these shifts, from Saudi Arabia to Africa to Russia, and the emerging powers are increasingly exposed to them—risks, as well as energy flows, are pivoting to Asia. All while a third revolution is struggling to be born, driven by climate change. Now, the United States faces a strategic choice. It has an enviable position in energy markets, and its naval presence at key chokepoints—from the Persian Gulf to Southeast Asia—gives it enormous potential leverage. But America will have to decide whether it wants to use energy as a stick, or to foster a more stable international system.

With only 20 percent of the population, the world’s 300 largest metropolitan economies account for nearly half of global economic output. Through our new Global Metro Monitor report and interactive, users can understand the individual trajectories of the world’s large metropolitan economies and gain new insights into sources of growth that national or regional assessments tend to obscure.

The fastest growing metro areas this year, as measured by our economic performance index that combines employment and GDP per capita growth, are concentrated in China, Turkey and the Middle East.

10. Fuzhou, China

Fuzhou is the political capital of Fujian province, located on China’s east coast. The metro economy specializes in the manufacture of chemicals, food, and textiles, but its fastest growing industry in 2014 was business, financial, and professional services. In an effort to lure higher order economic activity, China recently announced an expanded Free Trade Zone in Fuzhou.

9. Ankara, Turkey

Ankara, Turkey’s capital, is the first of four Turkish metro areas in the top 10. Turkish cities are growing fast due to significant infrastructure and construction investment, an emerging industrial base, and sound macroeconomic policies. In Ankara, while government continues to account for the largest share of the economy, manufacturing saw even greater annual output and employment gains of 4.1 and 6.8 percent, respectively. Many of the country’s largest aerospace and defense companies have their headquarters and industrial plants in Ankara.

8. Xiamen, China

Located just south of Fuzhou in Fujian province, Xiamen has been one of China’s fastest growing cities since 2000. In 1980, the Chinese government selected Xiamen as one of China’s five original special economic zones. Manufacturing accounts for nearly half of the metropolitan economy and Xiamen houses the world’s 18th busiest port.

7. Hangzhou, China

Hangzhou, a metro area near Shanghai, led all Chinese metro economies in 2014 with employment growth of 3.3 percent. Business, financial and professional services led employment growth in the region. Hangzhou is a promising e-commerce hub, anchored by Alibaba’s global headquarters.

6. Kunming, China

Kunming was the best performing mainland Chinese metro area, ranking sixth in this year’s performance index. About the size of Dallas, Kunming is the capital of Yunnan province in southeast China, where it has become a budding transportation gateway to Southeast Asia and is home to major universities.

5. Dubai, United Arab Emirates

The most populous city in the UAE, Dubai is a global hub for transportation, tourism, trade and professional services. Thanks to an ambitious strategy to diversify its economy Dubai no longer relies on commodities to power its economic growth, and today the service industry accounts for more than 70 percent of total GDP.

4. Bursa, Turkey

Bursa, located along Turkey’s west coast, is a manufacturing power house known internationally for its strong automotive cluster, which accounts for 60 percent of the national industry. International automakers such as Fiat and Renault, as well as a wide variety of suppliers make Bursa “Turkey’s Detroit.”

3. Istanbul, Turkey

Istanbul is Turkey’s economic and cultural center, as well as its most populous metropolitan area. Located amid historic land and sea trade routes that connect Central Asia with Europe, Istanbul has developed a diversified economy with strong services, trade, tourism and manufacturing sectors. The regional economy accounts for over one-quarter of Turkey’s economy.

2. Izmir, Turkey

Izmir has been a key trade hub since the 17th century, leveraging its easy access to Mediterranean and Aegean Sea shipping routes. The government has leveraged its geographic location through the promotion of industrial zones in and around the Izmir area. Izmir ranked first in our report for employment growth in 2014, and posted the second strongest employment growth of the 2009 to 2014 period.

1. Macau

Population: 574,200Employment Growth: 4.2%GDP Per Capita Growth: 8.0%

As in 2012, Macau topped our economic performance index, due to substantial GDP per capita growth. This relatively small metro area has become the world’s largest gaming center, attracting large global companies like Wynn, Sands and MGM.

Authors

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Tue, 10 Feb 2015 15:44:00 -0500Joseph Parilla and Jesus Leal Trujillo
With only 20 percent of the population, the world's 300 largest metropolitan economies account for nearly half of global economic output. Through our new Global Metro Monitor report and interactive, users can understand the individual trajectories of the world's large metropolitan economies and gain new insights into sources of growth that national or regional assessments tend to obscure.
The fastest growing metro areas this year, as measured by our economic performance index that combines employment and GDP per capita growth, are concentrated in China, Turkey and the Middle East.
10. Fuzhou, China
Population: 6,618,900
Employment Growth: 2.7%
GDP Per Capita Growth: 8.0%
Fuzhou is the political capital of Fujian province, located on China's east coast. The metro economy specializes in the manufacture of chemicals, food, and textiles, but its fastest growing industry in 2014 was business, financial, and professional services. In an effort to lure higher order economic activity, China recently announced an expanded Free Trade Zone in Fuzhou.
9. Ankara, Turkey
Population: 4,975,400
Employment Growth: 5.7%
GDP Per Capita Growth: 1.1%
Ankara, Turkey's capital, is the first of four Turkish metro areas in the top 10. Turkish cities are growing fast due to significant infrastructure and construction investment, an emerging industrial base, and sound macroeconomic policies. In Ankara, while government continues to account for the largest share of the economy, manufacturing saw even greater annual output and employment gains of 4.1 and 6.8 percent, respectively. Many of the country's largest aerospace and defense companies have their headquarters and industrial plants in Ankara.
8. Xiamen, China
Population: 3,715,900
Employment Growth: 2.6%
GDP Per Capita Growth: 8.6%
Located just south of Fuzhou in Fujian province, Xiamen has been one of China's fastest growing cities since 2000. In 1980, the Chinese government selected Xiamen as one of China's five original special economic zones. Manufacturing accounts for nearly half of the metropolitan economy and Xiamen houses the world's 18th busiest port.
7. Hangzhou, China
Population: 8,909,700
Employment Growth: 3.3%
GDP Per Capita Growth: 7.0%
Hangzhou, a metro area near Shanghai, led all Chinese metro economies in 2014 with employment growth of 3.3 percent. Business, financial and professional services led employment growth in the region. Hangzhou is a promising e-commerce hub, anchored by Alibaba's global headquarters.
6. Kunming, China
Population: 6,605,500
Employment Growth: 2.9%
GDP Per Capita Growth: 8.1%
Kunming was the best performing mainland Chinese metro area, ranking sixth in this year's performance index. About the size of Dallas, Kunming is the capital of Yunnan province in southeast China, where it has become a budding transportation gateway to Southeast Asia and is home to major universities.
5. Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Population: 3,332,500
Employment Growth: 4.7%
GDP Per Capita Growth: 4.5%
The most populous city in the UAE, Dubai is a global hub for transportation, tourism, trade and professional services. Thanks to an ambitious strategy to diversify its economy Dubai no longer relies on commodities to power its economic growth, and today the service industry accounts for more than 70 percent of total GDP.
4. Bursa, Turkey
Population: 3,722,600
Employment Growth: 6.4%
GDP Per Capita Growth: 1.8%
Bursa, located along Turkey's west coast, is a manufacturing power house known internationally for its strong automotive cluster, which accounts for 60 percent of the national industry. International automakers such as Fiat and Renault, as well as a wide variety of suppliers make Bursa “Turkey's Detroit.”
3. Istanbul, Turkey
Population: 14,023,500
Employment Growth: 6.5%
GDP Per Capita Growth: 2.0%
Istanbul is Turkey's economic and cultural center, as well as its most populous metropolitan area. Located amid ...
With only 20 percent of the population, the world's 300 largest metropolitan economies account for nearly half of global economic output. Through our new Global Metro Monitor report and interactive, users can understand the individual ...

With only 20 percent of the population, the world’s 300 largest metropolitan economies account for nearly half of global economic output. Through our new Global Metro Monitor report and interactive, users can understand the individual trajectories of the world’s large metropolitan economies and gain new insights into sources of growth that national or regional assessments tend to obscure.

The fastest growing metro areas this year, as measured by our economic performance index that combines employment and GDP per capita growth, are concentrated in China, Turkey and the Middle East.

10. Fuzhou, China

Fuzhou is the political capital of Fujian province, located on China’s east coast. The metro economy specializes in the manufacture of chemicals, food, and textiles, but its fastest growing industry in 2014 was business, financial, and professional services. In an effort to lure higher order economic activity, China recently announced an expanded Free Trade Zone in Fuzhou.

9. Ankara, Turkey

Ankara, Turkey’s capital, is the first of four Turkish metro areas in the top 10. Turkish cities are growing fast due to significant infrastructure and construction investment, an emerging industrial base, and sound macroeconomic policies. In Ankara, while government continues to account for the largest share of the economy, manufacturing saw even greater annual output and employment gains of 4.1 and 6.8 percent, respectively. Many of the country’s largest aerospace and defense companies have their headquarters and industrial plants in Ankara.

8. Xiamen, China

Located just south of Fuzhou in Fujian province, Xiamen has been one of China’s fastest growing cities since 2000. In 1980, the Chinese government selected Xiamen as one of China’s five original special economic zones. Manufacturing accounts for nearly half of the metropolitan economy and Xiamen houses the world’s 18th busiest port.

7. Hangzhou, China

Hangzhou, a metro area near Shanghai, led all Chinese metro economies in 2014 with employment growth of 3.3 percent. Business, financial and professional services led employment growth in the region. Hangzhou is a promising e-commerce hub, anchored by Alibaba’s global headquarters.

6. Kunming, China

Kunming was the best performing mainland Chinese metro area, ranking sixth in this year’s performance index. About the size of Dallas, Kunming is the capital of Yunnan province in southeast China, where it has become a budding transportation gateway to Southeast Asia and is home to major universities.

5. Dubai, United Arab Emirates

The most populous city in the UAE, Dubai is a global hub for transportation, tourism, trade and professional services. Thanks to an ambitious strategy to diversify its economy Dubai no longer relies on commodities to power its economic growth, and today the service industry accounts for more than 70 percent of total GDP.

4. Bursa, Turkey

Bursa, located along Turkey’s west coast, is a manufacturing power house known internationally for its strong automotive cluster, which accounts for 60 percent of the national industry. International automakers such as Fiat and Renault, as well as a wide variety of suppliers make Bursa “Turkey’s Detroit.”

3. Istanbul, Turkey

Istanbul is Turkey’s economic and cultural center, as well as its most populous metropolitan area. Located amid historic land and sea trade routes that connect Central Asia with Europe, Istanbul has developed a diversified economy with strong services, trade, tourism and manufacturing sectors. The regional economy accounts for over one-quarter of Turkey’s economy.

2. Izmir, Turkey

Izmir has been a key trade hub since the 17th century, leveraging its easy access to Mediterranean and Aegean Sea shipping routes. The government has leveraged its geographic location through the promotion of industrial zones in and around the Izmir area. Izmir ranked first in our report for employment growth in 2014, and posted the second strongest employment growth of the 2009 to 2014 period.

1. Macau

As in 2012, Macau topped our economic performance index, due to substantial GDP per capita growth. This relatively small metro area has become the world’s largest gaming center, attracting large global companies like Wynn, Sands and MGM.

Authors

]]>
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2015/02/09-chinas-rise-and-us-defense-ohanlon?rssid=asia+and+the+pacific{2D578A7C-D177-430F-A66B-911EE21F0582}http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~/85004791/0/brookingsrss/topics/asiaandthepacific~Examining-Chinas-Rise-and-its-Implications-for-the-US-Defense-BudgetExamining China's Rise and its Implications for the U.S. Defense Budget

On February 6, the Center on 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings held an event on China’s Rise and its implications for the U.S. defense budget. Joining me were Richard Bush of the Brookings Center on East Asia Policy Studies, David Dollar of the John L. Thornton China Center, and Bud Cole of the National War College. Bush’s particular expertise is on regional security and diplomacy, Dollar’s on the Chinese economy, Cole’s on the Chinese military, and mine on the U.S. armed forces.

There was no effort to forge consensus across all the panelists and no uniformity of views on all subjects. But some of the themes that were heard frequently included the following:

China’s rise is impressive but is also occurring within various military and economic constraints—indeed, it appears to be spending no more than about 1.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on its armed forces, less than half the current percentage of the United States (respective annual military budgets are roughly $150 billion and $550 to $600 billion)

China’s regional role is ambitious and assertive but not necessarily revolutionary or highly aggressive, at least at present, and is focused mostly on western Pacific waters

Nonetheless, China’s rise poses enough of a challenge that American resoluteness and engagement are crucial

As such, sequestration of the defense budget, as might occur again this fall absent a budget deal between President Obama and the Congress, would be unfortunate in its implications for Asia. That would be true partly for its symbolic effects in the region, partly for the disruption it would produce in defense accounts that fund forward presence operations of the U.S. armed forces, and partly because if sustained over time it could lead to a U.S. military that was inadequate to help shape and balance China’s rise.

David Dollar added the further point that sequestration, or the equivalent, would be unfortunate because such austerity would weaken the kinds of investments in American infrastructure, science, and education that contribute to long-term economic growth and thus to long-term national power—the foundation from which military forces are built and sustained. He also argued that American trade and budget deficits are currently down to manageable size, even if there are risks that things could change in the future. Those facts make possible greater investments in the so-called discretionary accounts without causing damage to the economy. Dollar underscored that if U.S. real growth rates can be pushed closer to 3 percent a year than to just 2 percent, in future periods, that simple fact would do a great deal to ensure robust long-term American power and global influence.

In arguing against sequestration, I noted that the military underpinning of President Obama’s so-called Asia-Pacific rebalance is the plan to increase the percentage of Navy ships devoted to the Asia-Pacific region from the historical norm of 50 percent to 60 percent by 2020. But sequestration could effectively nullify the effects of this increase. If the fleet in 2020 were down to say 240 ships because of continued budgetary pressure, relative to today’s level of about 285 ships, the resulting fleet in the Pacific region could decline to less than 145 ships—meaning no net increase whatsoever in the region.

Dollar added several very useful ways to understand China’s economy and its military budget. He noted that while the IMF stated earlier this year that China’s GDP, expressed in so-called purchasing power parity terms, now slightly exceeded that of the United States, the more relevant measure of GDP for purposes of understanding China’s role in the international economy is traditional GDP as measured by official exchange rates. By that metric, the U.S. economy of $17 trillion a year is still about 70 percent larger than China’s $10 trillion. China may reach the U.S. level by about 2030, it is true—but it is also possible that the United States economy could subsequently again overtake China’s later in the century. As for China’s military budget, if it is roughly $150 billion according to traditional exchange-rate calculations today, a purchasing-power parity adjustment would increase it somewhat, but probably by less than 70 percent, since some of China’s costs for equipment are similar to those of the United States.

Bud Cole noted that China’s aspirations appear to be to have major influence in the three seas—the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea—and also to be able to contest waters of the Western Pacific out to the so-called second island chain, about 1,800 nautical miles from China’s shores, by mid-century. Both he and Richard Bush saw this as in many ways a natural aspiration for a rising power, even if they both expressed concern about China’s ambitions within the South China Sea, and its assertive behavior there in recent years. They viewed the protection of open-ocean commerce as the core American interest that the United States must seek to preserve and uphold in the region, placing a premium on continued U.S. resoluteness, military presence, and cooperation with allies in the region.

Both Cole and Bush believed China’s military capabilities vis-à-vis Taiwan, in domains such as missile attack and cyberwarfare to be much greater than in the past. This is potentially concerning should future China-Taiwan relations became more complex and dangerous, as they were in the period before the incumbent in Taipei, President Ma. Since Taiwan has a presidential election in about one year, this issue needs to be tracked carefully.

The overall tone of the conversation was serious but not somber. America’s strengths remain considerable and its potential to help shape a peaceful Asia-Pacific remains considerable as well.

Authors

]]>
Mon, 09 Feb 2015 14:00:00 -0500Michael E. O'Hanlon
On February 6, the Center on 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings held an event on China's Rise and its implications for the U.S. defense budget. Joining me were Richard Bush of the Brookings Center on East Asia Policy Studies, David Dollar of the John L. Thornton China Center, and Bud Cole of the National War College. Bush's particular expertise is on regional security and diplomacy, Dollar's on the Chinese economy, Cole's on the Chinese military, and mine on the U.S. armed forces.
There was no effort to forge consensus across all the panelists and no uniformity of views on all subjects. But some of the themes that were heard frequently included the following:
- China's rise is impressive but is also occurring within various military and economic constraints—indeed, it appears to be spending no more than about 1.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on its armed forces, less than half the current percentage of the United States (respective annual military budgets are roughly $150 billion and $550 to $600 billion) - China's regional role is ambitious and assertive but not necessarily revolutionary or highly aggressive, at least at present, and is focused mostly on western Pacific waters - Nonetheless, China's rise poses enough of a challenge that American resoluteness and engagement are crucial - As such, sequestration of the defense budget, as might occur again this fall absent a budget deal between President Obama and the Congress, would be unfortunate in its implications for Asia. That would be true partly for its symbolic effects in the region, partly for the disruption it would produce in defense accounts that fund forward presence operations of the U.S. armed forces, and partly because if sustained over time it could lead to a U.S. military that was inadequate to help shape and balance China's rise.
David Dollar added the further point that sequestration, or the equivalent, would be unfortunate because such austerity would weaken the kinds of investments in American infrastructure, science, and education that contribute to long-term economic growth and thus to long-term national power—the foundation from which military forces are built and sustained. He also argued that American trade and budget deficits are currently down to manageable size, even if there are risks that things could change in the future. Those facts make possible greater investments in the so-called discretionary accounts without causing damage to the economy. Dollar underscored that if U.S. real growth rates can be pushed closer to 3 percent a year than to just 2 percent, in future periods, that simple fact would do a great deal to ensure robust long-term American power and global influence.
In arguing against sequestration, I noted that the military underpinning of President Obama's so-called Asia-Pacific rebalance is the plan to increase the percentage of Navy ships devoted to the Asia-Pacific region from the historical norm of 50 percent to 60 percent by 2020. But sequestration could effectively nullify the effects of this increase. If the fleet in 2020 were down to say 240 ships because of continued budgetary pressure, relative to today's level of about 285 ships, the resulting fleet in the Pacific region could decline to less than 145 ships—meaning no net increase whatsoever in the region.
Dollar added several very useful ways to understand China's economy and its military budget. He noted that while the IMF stated earlier this year that China's GDP, expressed in so-called purchasing power parity terms, now slightly exceeded that of the United States, the more relevant measure of GDP for purposes of understanding China's role in the international economy is traditional GDP as measured by official exchange rates. By that metric, the U.S. economy of $17 trillion a year is still about 70 percent larger than China's $10 trillion. China may reach the U.S. level by about 2030, it is true—but ...
On February 6, the Center on 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings held an event on China's Rise and its implications for the U.S. defense budget. Joining me were Richard Bush of the Brookings Center on East Asia Policy Studies, ...

On February 6, the Center on 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings held an event on China’s Rise and its implications for the U.S. defense budget. Joining me were Richard Bush of the Brookings Center on East Asia Policy Studies, David Dollar of the John L. Thornton China Center, and Bud Cole of the National War College. Bush’s particular expertise is on regional security and diplomacy, Dollar’s on the Chinese economy, Cole’s on the Chinese military, and mine on the U.S. armed forces.

There was no effort to forge consensus across all the panelists and no uniformity of views on all subjects. But some of the themes that were heard frequently included the following:

China’s rise is impressive but is also occurring within various military and economic constraints—indeed, it appears to be spending no more than about 1.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on its armed forces, less than half the current percentage of the United States (respective annual military budgets are roughly $150 billion and $550 to $600 billion)

China’s regional role is ambitious and assertive but not necessarily revolutionary or highly aggressive, at least at present, and is focused mostly on western Pacific waters

Nonetheless, China’s rise poses enough of a challenge that American resoluteness and engagement are crucial

As such, sequestration of the defense budget, as might occur again this fall absent a budget deal between President Obama and the Congress, would be unfortunate in its implications for Asia. That would be true partly for its symbolic effects in the region, partly for the disruption it would produce in defense accounts that fund forward presence operations of the U.S. armed forces, and partly because if sustained over time it could lead to a U.S. military that was inadequate to help shape and balance China’s rise.

David Dollar added the further point that sequestration, or the equivalent, would be unfortunate because such austerity would weaken the kinds of investments in American infrastructure, science, and education that contribute to long-term economic growth and thus to long-term national power—the foundation from which military forces are built and sustained. He also argued that American trade and budget deficits are currently down to manageable size, even if there are risks that things could change in the future. Those facts make possible greater investments in the so-called discretionary accounts without causing damage to the economy. Dollar underscored that if U.S. real growth rates can be pushed closer to 3 percent a year than to just 2 percent, in future periods, that simple fact would do a great deal to ensure robust long-term American power and global influence.

In arguing against sequestration, I noted that the military underpinning of President Obama’s so-called Asia-Pacific rebalance is the plan to increase the percentage of Navy ships devoted to the Asia-Pacific region from the historical norm of 50 percent to 60 percent by 2020. But sequestration could effectively nullify the effects of this increase. If the fleet in 2020 were down to say 240 ships because of continued budgetary pressure, relative to today’s level of about 285 ships, the resulting fleet in the Pacific region could decline to less than 145 ships—meaning no net increase whatsoever in the region.

Dollar added several very useful ways to understand China’s economy and its military budget. He noted that while the IMF stated earlier this year that China’s GDP, expressed in so-called purchasing power parity terms, now slightly exceeded that of the United States, the more relevant measure of GDP for purposes of understanding China’s role in the international economy is traditional GDP as measured by official exchange rates. By that metric, the U.S. economy of $17 trillion a year is still about 70 percent larger than China’s $10 trillion. China may reach the U.S. level by about 2030, it is true—but it is also possible that the United States economy could subsequently again overtake China’s later in the century. As for China’s military budget, if it is roughly $150 billion according to traditional exchange-rate calculations today, a purchasing-power parity adjustment would increase it somewhat, but probably by less than 70 percent, since some of China’s costs for equipment are similar to those of the United States.

Bud Cole noted that China’s aspirations appear to be to have major influence in the three seas—the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea—and also to be able to contest waters of the Western Pacific out to the so-called second island chain, about 1,800 nautical miles from China’s shores, by mid-century. Both he and Richard Bush saw this as in many ways a natural aspiration for a rising power, even if they both expressed concern about China’s ambitions within the South China Sea, and its assertive behavior there in recent years. They viewed the protection of open-ocean commerce as the core American interest that the United States must seek to preserve and uphold in the region, placing a premium on continued U.S. resoluteness, military presence, and cooperation with allies in the region.

Both Cole and Bush believed China’s military capabilities vis-à-vis Taiwan, in domains such as missile attack and cyberwarfare to be much greater than in the past. This is potentially concerning should future China-Taiwan relations became more complex and dangerous, as they were in the period before the incumbent in Taipei, President Ma. Since Taiwan has a presidential election in about one year, this issue needs to be tracked carefully.

The overall tone of the conversation was serious but not somber. America’s strengths remain considerable and its potential to help shape a peaceful Asia-Pacific remains considerable as well.

Midway through Hong Kong’s second public consultation on the method of electing the next chief executive (CE), both pro-democracy “pan-democrat” legislators and the Hong Kong government and Chinese Central government are still holding their cards close. Following the current public consultation, members of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (LegCo) will cast an historic vote on political reform. Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law, states that “the ultimate aim is the selection of the CE by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures” (Basic Law Art. 45). Pan-democrat LegCo members currently plan to vote against the eventual resolution on political reform, given their dissatisfaction with the reform process to date. Observers predict that passage of a resolution will happen only if the Hong Kong and Central governments can swing a few pan-democrats over to their side in the final hour.

The problem is a prickly one: Is it possible to design an electoral system that is sufficiently open and democratic in the eyes of the Hong Kong people and, at the same time, that guarantees to the Central Government that the elected leader of this special administrative region accepts the supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party? Even as politicians on each side reiterate the near “impossibility” of changing their positions (see e.g., RTHK Backchat discussion with Justice Secretary Rimsky Yuen at 4:25), thought-leaders from Hong Kong’s universities are inventing creative proposals with the potential to break the deadlock.

The Ground Rules

A 2004 decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC), China’s national legislature, interpreted the Basic Law to require a “Five-Step Process” in order to amend the selection method for the CE. Hong Kong is now between Steps 2 and 3.

Step 1: The current CE must submit a report to the NPCSC on the need to amend the electoral system. That submission took place on July 15, 2014 after a five-month initial public consultation process. The CE’s report faced heavy criticism in Hong Kong for not accurately reflecting public opinion.

Step 2: The NPCSC must issue a decision affirming the need for the amendment. The NPCSC announced that decision on August 31, 2014. It endorsed a system by which citizens may directly vote for the CE but imposed restrictive conditions on the nomination procedure of eligible candidates. The decision triggered 79 days of protest and civil disobedience – what activists and the media have referred to as the “Umbrella Movement.”

Step 3: The Hong Kong government must introduce the political reform bill in LegCo, and two-thirds of legislators must endorse it. The vote in LegCo is scheduled to take place during the first half of 2015, although a precise date has not been set. The purpose of the second-round public consultation is to forge consensus behind political reform within the parameters set out in the August 31 NPCSC decision.

Steps 4 and 5: In the event that LegCo endorses the bill, the CE must provide his consent and report the amendment to the NPCSC for its final approval.

If the bill does not receive two-thirds endorsement of LegCo (or if it does, but the NPCSC does not approve) then political reform would fail. Hong Kong would be left with the status quo, and Hong Kong people would lose the opportunity to vote for their chief executive for at least the next seven years.

Limited Room for Negotiation

The terms set out by the August 31 NPCSC decision limit the range of possible political reform options. For that reason, one of the core demands of the Umbrella Movement was to scrap the decision and re-start the Five-Step Process; that didn’t happen, however. In January 2015, the Hong Kong government issued a public consultation document framing the discussion in the lead up to the vote in LegCo. The consultation document hews closely to the NPCSC decision:

The Nominating Committee (NC) will resemble the previous committee that elected the CE with the same number of members (1,200) belonging to the same limited number of subsectors (38).The Wall Street Journal recently described that committee as “a hodgepodge of special interests.” During the consultation, citizens may discuss adding new subsectors to make the committee more inclusive and representative (such as adding new subsectors to represent the interests of women or young voters), but restructuring will necessarily mean disrupting and eliminating the positions of existing subsectors or committee members. Therefore, the consultation document suggests these changes are unlikely to be achieved (Consultation Document, Chapter 3, Sec. 3.08 p. 10).

The NC will nominate two to three candidates, and each candidate will require endorsement from at least half of the NC membership. (Given the difficulty of restructuring the subsectors or their electoral bases, these terms would effectively exclude any pan-democrats from nomination.) In order to make this more palatable, the consultation document proposes that citizens discuss a two-stage nomination process. In the first stage, a quorum of 100-150 committee members would “recommend” individuals for nomination. The committee would then elect the nominees from this recommended group (Consultation Document, Chapter 4, Sec. 4.09 p. 14). In theory, the meetings when recommendation and nomination votes take place could be staggered in order to allow campaigning and public debate. The idea is that NC members would take public opinion into consideration before casting their second vote.

Both sides in this negotiation have fired shots across the bow. At the launch of the second public consultation on January 7, Chief Secretary Carrie Lam remarked, “there is no room for any concessions or promises to be made in order to win over support from the pan-democratic members.” For their part, the pan-democrats vowed to boycott the public consultation and veto a resolution that conforms to these terms. They argue that the proposed method of electing the chief executive does not improve upon the status quo.

Most pan-democrat legislators are directly elected from geographical constituencies, and public opinion could provide legitimate grounds for shifting their position. According to polling by the Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme last month, a plurality of respondents view the Hong Kong government’s proposal as neither a step forward nor a step backward for democracy. If the government were to commit to making the electoral system more democratic in the next CE election in 2022, a clear majority of respondents would then support the government’s plan.

Inventing Options and Finding Common Ground

The two-stage nomination mechanism in the government’s proposal is an acknowledgement that the NC ought to be responsive to public opinion. But without additional tinkering, this procedure does not materially change the incentives of NC members. What if the public had the power to reject the slate of candidates nominated by the committee?

Since the first public consultation, a few academics, including Simon Young at Hong Kong University (HKU), have considered at least two ways this could happen. An “active” approach would allow Hong Kong voters to cast blank votes and require a minimum percentage of affirmative votes for the winning candidate. A “passive” approach would require a minimum voter turnout rate for a valid election. NC members might then have to take public opinion into account.

Early last month, Albert Chen, also a professor at HKU and a legal advisor of the NPCSC, began to advocate publicly for a proposal that employs a ballot with a none-of-these-candidates option (see RTHK Jan. 13 edition of The Pulse). Under his proposal, if a majority of people vote for “none-of-these-candidates,” the slate of candidates put forward by the NC will be voided. When the public votes down the candidates, the NC could revert back to an election committee and choose a provisional CE. Alternatively, the Chief Secretary could assume CE duties during a six-month interim period prior to a new election (drawing upon Basic Law Art. 53). Chen argues that his proposal would give the Hong Kong people—not pan-democrat politicians—decision-making power to accept the new NC and its slate of candidates or to revert back to the status quo.

More recently, Johannes Chan, HKU professor and human rights advocate, floated a competing proposal that would provide voters with the option for negative voting. A 20 percent “no” vote for an otherwise leading candidate would trigger a re-vote. Between the first and second elections, the candidates would have additional time to campaign. If after the second election, still 20 percent of voters oppose the leading candidate, the candidate would be disqualified, and the NC would nominate new candidates. Given Hong Kong’s governance problems and increasing public polarization, the 20 percent veto ensures that no CE will be saddled with a substantial block of Hong Kong society affirmatively opposed to him or her from day one.

Albert Chen’s proposal received a tepid if supportive response in pro-Beijing quarters. Jasper Tsang, the Speaker of LegCo and member of the largest pro-establishment political party, and Rita Fan, a member of the NPCSC, affirmed their view that the none-of-these-candidates mechanism does not violate the Basic Law. While the government’s consultation document does not expressly mention the none-of-these-candidates concept, Hong Kong’s Justice Secretary indicated that the proposal should be considered. Starry Lee, another leader of the biggest pro-establishment party in LegCo, countered that technical difficulties and limited time for discussion would pose obstacles to the none-of-these-candidates ballot proposal.

Pan-democrats so far have tended to rebuff government overtures to engage on the topic. A few legislators, such as the Civic Party’s Ronny Tong, have been willing to engage (with Albert Chen on the Jan. 13 edition of The Pulse) but have reservations about what happens after a voided election, and feel that the threshold for public veto is too high. Law Chi-kwong, a founding member of Hong Kong’s Democratic Party and also a member of the HKU faculty, suggested that the winning candidate ought to receive an absolute majority of votes with blank votes counted. (E.g., when one candidate receives 45 percent, another receives 35 percent, and none-of-these-candidates receives 20 percent, that would lead to a void election.) However, other scholars associated with the Democratic Party have distanced themselves from the blank vote debate and Law’s statements.

The Merits of Blank Voting

The debate over blank and negative voting in Hong Kong unfolds in a global context where none-of-these-candidates has become an increasingly common political choice. Several democracies have institutionalized the practice. Proponents cite instrumental rationales, such as improved accountability and transparency. However, these benefits are not necessarily guaranteed. More broadly, people recognize the inherent value of the “no” vote as a form of political expression.

In the U.S. state of Nevada, for example, a none-of-these-candidates option has appeared on the ballot for all statewide and national elections since 1975. During the 2012 presidential cycle, the Secretary of State of Nevada argued that removing a none-of-these-candidates option would harm Nevada voters by taking away a “legitimate and meaningful ballot choice.” There is precedent for none-of-these-candidates winning a plurality of votes in a congressional primary; in that case, Republican Walden Earnhart finished behind the none-of-these-candidates option but still “won” the primary and got the nomination. More typically, the ballot option plays a “spoiler role.” In the 1998 Senate race, for example, 8,125 votes for none-of-these-candidates dwarfed the 395-vote margin between Harry Reid and John Ensign. This allowed Reid, the incumbent, to be re-elected.

It is hard to find examples where none-of-these-candidates has won a majority of the popular vote. Hong Kong’s pan-democrats may be right to question whether this possibility would meaningfully affect the calculus of the NC. Colombia is one of the few jurisdictions where blank votes can have institutional consequences. The right of citizens to cast a blank vote was established by the Colombian Constitution in 1991, and later codified in political reform statutes in 2003 and 2009. Similar to Albert Chen’s proposal in Hong Kong, if the number of blank votes equals a majority of the total number of votes cast, the election must be repeated. The original candidates cannot participate in the second election.

The Colombian experience suggests that the blank vote is more consequential in races with fewer candidates. Colombian voters have never nullified a slate of candidates at the national-level, where the field is crowded. In the city of Bello, however, the blank vote won the mayoral election in 2011. In that case, the electoral authority disqualified the one opposition candidate. This led to a one-man race and united all opposition forces around the blank vote in order to reject the establishment Conservative Party candidate. In the second round election, the replacement Conservative Party candidate (Carlos Alirio Muñoz López) won 59 percent of the vote. In the end, his party benefited with a resounding popular mandate. By this logic, the blank vote could matter in the two- to three-candidate race contemplated for Hong Kong.

Empirical evidence also suggests that local conditions in Hong Kong could support a relatively high turnout for none-of-these-candidates. Based on data from Spain and Italy, Chiara Superti at Harvard finds that blank voting is a sophisticated political choice, more likely to take place in municipalities with highly educated and politically engaged electorates. Hong Kong would qualify.

Beyond candidate selection, voting is a highly expressive act. A citizen’s vote is an expression of identity as well as a channel for protest. Echoing this view, the Supreme Court of India recently held that the country’s constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and expression confer on Indian citizens a right to reject all candidates and to exercise their right to affirmatively vote for none-of-these-candidates in secrecy. As a people who define themselves by “core values,” including freedom of expression, this resonates with Hongkongers. More fundamentally, the ballot serves a powerful safety-valve function. At the time universal suffrage was introduced in England and France, the vote was presented as a way to channel political turmoil into more moderate political expression—and this, too, resonates in Hong Kong today.

Views expressed in the article are the author's personal views.

Authors

David Caragliano

Image Source: Reuters

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Mon, 09 Feb 2015 00:00:00 -0500David Caragliano
Midway through Hong Kong's second public consultation on the method of electing the next chief executive (CE), both pro-democracy “pan-democrat” legislators and the Hong Kong government and Chinese Central government are still holding their cards close. Following the current public consultation, members of Hong Kong's Legislative Council (LegCo) will cast an historic vote on political reform. Hong Kong's mini-constitution, the Basic Law, states that “the ultimate aim is the selection of the CE by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures” (Basic Law Art. 45). Pan-democrat LegCo members currently plan to vote against the eventual resolution on political reform, given their dissatisfaction with the reform process to date. Observers predict that passage of a resolution will happen only if the Hong Kong and Central governments can swing a few pan-democrats over to their side in the final hour.
The problem is a prickly one: Is it possible to design an electoral system that is sufficiently open and democratic in the eyes of the Hong Kong people and, at the same time, that guarantees to the Central Government that the elected leader of this special administrative region accepts the supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party? Even as politicians on each side reiterate the near “impossibility” of changing their positions (see e.g., RTHK Backchat discussion with Justice Secretary Rimsky Yuen at 4:25), thought-leaders from Hong Kong's universities are inventing creative proposals with the potential to break the deadlock.
The Ground Rules
A 2004 decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC), China's national legislature, interpreted the Basic Law to require a “Five-Step Process” in order to amend the selection method for the CE. Hong Kong is now between Steps 2 and 3.
- Step 1: The current CE must submit a report to the NPCSC on the need to amend the electoral system. That submission took place on July 15, 2014 after a five-month initial public consultation process. The CE's report faced heavy criticism in Hong Kong for not accurately reflecting public opinion. - Step 2: The NPCSC must issue a decision affirming the need for the amendment. The NPCSC announced that decision on August 31, 2014. It endorsed a system by which citizens may directly vote for the CE but imposed restrictive conditions on the nomination procedure of eligible candidates. The decision triggered 79 days of protest and civil disobedience – what activists and the media have referred to as the “Umbrella Movement.” - Step 3: The Hong Kong government must introduce the political reform bill in LegCo, and two-thirds of legislators must endorse it. The vote in LegCo is scheduled to take place during the first half of 2015, although a precise date has not been set. The purpose of the second-round public consultation is to forge consensus behind political reform within the parameters set out in the August 31 NPCSC decision. - Steps 4 and 5: In the event that LegCo endorses the bill, the CE must provide his consent and report the amendment to the NPCSC for its final approval.
If the bill does not receive two-thirds endorsement of LegCo (or if it does, but the NPCSC does not approve) then political reform would fail. Hong Kong would be left with the status quo, and Hong Kong people would lose the opportunity to vote for their chief executive for at least the next seven years.
Limited Room for Negotiation
The terms set out by the August 31 NPCSC decision limit the range of possible political reform options. For that reason, one of the core demands of the Umbrella Movement was to scrap the decision and re-start the Five-Step Process; that didn't happen, however. In January 2015, the Hong Kong government issued a public consultation document framing the discussion in the lead up to the ...
Midway through Hong Kong's second public consultation on the method of electing the next chief executive (CE), both pro-democracy “pan-democrat” legislators and the Hong Kong government and Chinese Central government are still holding ...

Midway through Hong Kong’s second public consultation on the method of electing the next chief executive (CE), both pro-democracy “pan-democrat” legislators and the Hong Kong government and Chinese Central government are still holding their cards close. Following the current public consultation, members of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (LegCo) will cast an historic vote on political reform. Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law, states that “the ultimate aim is the selection of the CE by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures” (Basic Law Art. 45). Pan-democrat LegCo members currently plan to vote against the eventual resolution on political reform, given their dissatisfaction with the reform process to date. Observers predict that passage of a resolution will happen only if the Hong Kong and Central governments can swing a few pan-democrats over to their side in the final hour.

The problem is a prickly one: Is it possible to design an electoral system that is sufficiently open and democratic in the eyes of the Hong Kong people and, at the same time, that guarantees to the Central Government that the elected leader of this special administrative region accepts the supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party? Even as politicians on each side reiterate the near “impossibility” of changing their positions (see e.g., RTHK Backchat discussion with Justice Secretary Rimsky Yuen at 4:25), thought-leaders from Hong Kong’s universities are inventing creative proposals with the potential to break the deadlock.

The Ground Rules

A 2004 decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC), China’s national legislature, interpreted the Basic Law to require a “Five-Step Process” in order to amend the selection method for the CE. Hong Kong is now between Steps 2 and 3.

Step 1: The current CE must submit a report to the NPCSC on the need to amend the electoral system. That submission took place on July 15, 2014 after a five-month initial public consultation process. The CE’s report faced heavy criticism in Hong Kong for not accurately reflecting public opinion.

Step 2: The NPCSC must issue a decision affirming the need for the amendment. The NPCSC announced that decision on August 31, 2014. It endorsed a system by which citizens may directly vote for the CE but imposed restrictive conditions on the nomination procedure of eligible candidates. The decision triggered 79 days of protest and civil disobedience – what activists and the media have referred to as the “Umbrella Movement.”

Step 3: The Hong Kong government must introduce the political reform bill in LegCo, and two-thirds of legislators must endorse it. The vote in LegCo is scheduled to take place during the first half of 2015, although a precise date has not been set. The purpose of the second-round public consultation is to forge consensus behind political reform within the parameters set out in the August 31 NPCSC decision.

Steps 4 and 5: In the event that LegCo endorses the bill, the CE must provide his consent and report the amendment to the NPCSC for its final approval.

If the bill does not receive two-thirds endorsement of LegCo (or if it does, but the NPCSC does not approve) then political reform would fail. Hong Kong would be left with the status quo, and Hong Kong people would lose the opportunity to vote for their chief executive for at least the next seven years.

Limited Room for Negotiation

The terms set out by the August 31 NPCSC decision limit the range of possible political reform options. For that reason, one of the core demands of the Umbrella Movement was to scrap the decision and re-start the Five-Step Process; that didn’t happen, however. In January 2015, the Hong Kong government issued a public consultation document framing the discussion in the lead up to the vote in LegCo. The consultation document hews closely to the NPCSC decision:

The Nominating Committee (NC) will resemble the previous committee that elected the CE with the same number of members (1,200) belonging to the same limited number of subsectors (38).The Wall Street Journal recently described that committee as “a hodgepodge of special interests.” During the consultation, citizens may discuss adding new subsectors to make the committee more inclusive and representative (such as adding new subsectors to represent the interests of women or young voters), but restructuring will necessarily mean disrupting and eliminating the positions of existing subsectors or committee members. Therefore, the consultation document suggests these changes are unlikely to be achieved (Consultation Document, Chapter 3, Sec. 3.08 p. 10).

The NC will nominate two to three candidates, and each candidate will require endorsement from at least half of the NC membership. (Given the difficulty of restructuring the subsectors or their electoral bases, these terms would effectively exclude any pan-democrats from nomination.) In order to make this more palatable, the consultation document proposes that citizens discuss a two-stage nomination process. In the first stage, a quorum of 100-150 committee members would “recommend” individuals for nomination. The committee would then elect the nominees from this recommended group (Consultation Document, Chapter 4, Sec. 4.09 p. 14). In theory, the meetings when recommendation and nomination votes take place could be staggered in order to allow campaigning and public debate. The idea is that NC members would take public opinion into consideration before casting their second vote.

Both sides in this negotiation have fired shots across the bow. At the launch of the second public consultation on January 7, Chief Secretary Carrie Lam remarked, “there is no room for any concessions or promises to be made in order to win over support from the pan-democratic members.” For their part, the pan-democrats vowed to boycott the public consultation and veto a resolution that conforms to these terms. They argue that the proposed method of electing the chief executive does not improve upon the status quo.

Most pan-democrat legislators are directly elected from geographical constituencies, and public opinion could provide legitimate grounds for shifting their position. According to polling by the Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme last month, a plurality of respondents view the Hong Kong government’s proposal as neither a step forward nor a step backward for democracy. If the government were to commit to making the electoral system more democratic in the next CE election in 2022, a clear majority of respondents would then support the government’s plan.

Inventing Options and Finding Common Ground

The two-stage nomination mechanism in the government’s proposal is an acknowledgement that the NC ought to be responsive to public opinion. But without additional tinkering, this procedure does not materially change the incentives of NC members. What if the public had the power to reject the slate of candidates nominated by the committee?

Since the first public consultation, a few academics, including Simon Young at Hong Kong University (HKU), have considered at least two ways this could happen. An “active” approach would allow Hong Kong voters to cast blank votes and require a minimum percentage of affirmative votes for the winning candidate. A “passive” approach would require a minimum voter turnout rate for a valid election. NC members might then have to take public opinion into account.

Early last month, Albert Chen, also a professor at HKU and a legal advisor of the NPCSC, began to advocate publicly for a proposal that employs a ballot with a none-of-these-candidates option (see RTHK Jan. 13 edition of The Pulse). Under his proposal, if a majority of people vote for “none-of-these-candidates,” the slate of candidates put forward by the NC will be voided. When the public votes down the candidates, the NC could revert back to an election committee and choose a provisional CE. Alternatively, the Chief Secretary could assume CE duties during a six-month interim period prior to a new election (drawing upon Basic Law Art. 53). Chen argues that his proposal would give the Hong Kong people—not pan-democrat politicians—decision-making power to accept the new NC and its slate of candidates or to revert back to the status quo.

More recently, Johannes Chan, HKU professor and human rights advocate, floated a competing proposal that would provide voters with the option for negative voting. A 20 percent “no” vote for an otherwise leading candidate would trigger a re-vote. Between the first and second elections, the candidates would have additional time to campaign. If after the second election, still 20 percent of voters oppose the leading candidate, the candidate would be disqualified, and the NC would nominate new candidates. Given Hong Kong’s governance problems and increasing public polarization, the 20 percent veto ensures that no CE will be saddled with a substantial block of Hong Kong society affirmatively opposed to him or her from day one.

Albert Chen’s proposal received a tepid if supportive response in pro-Beijing quarters. Jasper Tsang, the Speaker of LegCo and member of the largest pro-establishment political party, and Rita Fan, a member of the NPCSC, affirmed their view that the none-of-these-candidates mechanism does not violate the Basic Law. While the government’s consultation document does not expressly mention the none-of-these-candidates concept, Hong Kong’s Justice Secretary indicated that the proposal should be considered. Starry Lee, another leader of the biggest pro-establishment party in LegCo, countered that technical difficulties and limited time for discussion would pose obstacles to the none-of-these-candidates ballot proposal.

Pan-democrats so far have tended to rebuff government overtures to engage on the topic. A few legislators, such as the Civic Party’s Ronny Tong, have been willing to engage (with Albert Chen on the Jan. 13 edition of The Pulse) but have reservations about what happens after a voided election, and feel that the threshold for public veto is too high. Law Chi-kwong, a founding member of Hong Kong’s Democratic Party and also a member of the HKU faculty, suggested that the winning candidate ought to receive an absolute majority of votes with blank votes counted. (E.g., when one candidate receives 45 percent, another receives 35 percent, and none-of-these-candidates receives 20 percent, that would lead to a void election.) However, other scholars associated with the Democratic Party have distanced themselves from the blank vote debate and Law’s statements.

The Merits of Blank Voting

The debate over blank and negative voting in Hong Kong unfolds in a global context where none-of-these-candidates has become an increasingly common political choice. Several democracies have institutionalized the practice. Proponents cite instrumental rationales, such as improved accountability and transparency. However, these benefits are not necessarily guaranteed. More broadly, people recognize the inherent value of the “no” vote as a form of political expression.

In the U.S. state of Nevada, for example, a none-of-these-candidates option has appeared on the ballot for all statewide and national elections since 1975. During the 2012 presidential cycle, the Secretary of State of Nevada argued that removing a none-of-these-candidates option would harm Nevada voters by taking away a “legitimate and meaningful ballot choice.” There is precedent for none-of-these-candidates winning a plurality of votes in a congressional primary; in that case, Republican Walden Earnhart finished behind the none-of-these-candidates option but still “won” the primary and got the nomination. More typically, the ballot option plays a “spoiler role.” In the 1998 Senate race, for example, 8,125 votes for none-of-these-candidates dwarfed the 395-vote margin between Harry Reid and John Ensign. This allowed Reid, the incumbent, to be re-elected.

It is hard to find examples where none-of-these-candidates has won a majority of the popular vote. Hong Kong’s pan-democrats may be right to question whether this possibility would meaningfully affect the calculus of the NC. Colombia is one of the few jurisdictions where blank votes can have institutional consequences. The right of citizens to cast a blank vote was established by the Colombian Constitution in 1991, and later codified in political reform statutes in 2003 and 2009. Similar to Albert Chen’s proposal in Hong Kong, if the number of blank votes equals a majority of the total number of votes cast, the election must be repeated. The original candidates cannot participate in the second election.

The Colombian experience suggests that the blank vote is more consequential in races with fewer candidates. Colombian voters have never nullified a slate of candidates at the national-level, where the field is crowded. In the city of Bello, however, the blank vote won the mayoral election in 2011. In that case, the electoral authority disqualified the one opposition candidate. This led to a one-man race and united all opposition forces around the blank vote in order to reject the establishment Conservative Party candidate. In the second round election, the replacement Conservative Party candidate (Carlos Alirio Muñoz López) won 59 percent of the vote. In the end, his party benefited with a resounding popular mandate. By this logic, the blank vote could matter in the two- to three-candidate race contemplated for Hong Kong.

Empirical evidence also suggests that local conditions in Hong Kong could support a relatively high turnout for none-of-these-candidates. Based on data from Spain and Italy, Chiara Superti at Harvard finds that blank voting is a sophisticated political choice, more likely to take place in municipalities with highly educated and politically engaged electorates. Hong Kong would qualify.

Beyond candidate selection, voting is a highly expressive act. A citizen’s vote is an expression of identity as well as a channel for protest. Echoing this view, the Supreme Court of India recently held that the country’s constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and expression confer on Indian citizens a right to reject all candidates and to exercise their right to affirmatively vote for none-of-these-candidates in secrecy. As a people who define themselves by “core values,” including freedom of expression, this resonates with Hongkongers. More fundamentally, the ballot serves a powerful safety-valve function. At the time universal suffrage was introduced in England and France, the vote was presented as a way to channel political turmoil into more moderate political expression—and this, too, resonates in Hong Kong today.