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This chapter focuses on language and mind, in their stereotypic sense, as relatively public and private forms of intentionality, respectively. It argues that the intentional stance of human kinds is grounded in a more fundamental semiotic stance. In particular, rather than understand intentionality in terms of representation, it is theorized in terms of inference and indexicality. Rather than arguing about the originariness or derivativeness of intentionality in human-centric and historically static terms, such issues will be treated in terms of interactions among processes occurring on...

This chapter focuses on language and mind, in their stereotypic sense, as relatively public and private forms of intentionality, respectively. It argues that the intentional stance of human kinds is grounded in a more fundamental semiotic stance. In particular, rather than understand intentionality in terms of representation, it is theorized in terms of inference and indexicality. Rather than arguing about the originariness or derivativeness of intentionality in human-centric and historically static terms, such issues will be treated in terms of interactions among processes occurring on phylogenetic, historical, developmental, and interactional time-scales. Rather than understand theory of mind and ethnopsychology (in the restricted sense) in terms of psychological kinds, both psychological and linguistic modes of intentionality are treated in terms of broader cognitive processes and cultural practices. Rather than focus on having intentionality and understanding the intentionality that others have, the focus is on sharing intentionality with others.