The Size of the Universe and Nihilism and ‘Ought implies Can’ implies Moral Rationalism at the OZSW conference in Groningen, December 2016.

Research

I have three main research projects:

Vagueness, Indeterminacy, and Choice

Standard models of decision-making assume total precision in our preferences
and beliefs. But there is a lot of debate about whether we can or should
be so precise. I am interested in the connections between phenomena including
imprecise preferences, vague projects, unsharp credences, and the Incommensurability of Value.

I am particularly interested in the implications of these for climate change: how can it be rational to forego a flight now, to mitigate climate change in fifty years, even as we admit that each flight has negligible climate effect? And can this question be answered publicly?

Internalism and Nihilism

I’m interested in Humean or internalist accounts of reasons, especially in what these ‘austere’ theories say about our place in the world, and how much they deserve to be called nihilist. How much support does modern science provide to a nihilist view of the world?

Impartialist Satisficing

Satisficing consequentialism is a natural response to ‘demandingness’ worries that beset its maximising cousins, but it has proved rather unpopular. Most defences of satisficing have adopted ‘agent-relative’ versions of the view, but I consider a full-blown agent-neutral satisficing normative theory.

Teaching

I am on research leave for the Autumn and Spring terms 2016-17, but
in Summer I will teach PP1EL: Elementary Logic.