Between July and December 1940 three contests were fought in
British skies. The first was a battle for aerial supremacy
between the Luftwaffe and the RAF. The second was a struggle
inside the Luftwaffe to plan and follow a coherent strategy of
attack. Third was a controversy among senior RAF commanders over
the tactics required for daylight defence. Until mid-September,
the Luftwaffe attempted alone to defeat Britain first by
overwhelming Fighter Command, then by heavy bombing. It failed,
partly, by starting too late and waging an unprepared campaign
with unsuitable equipment. Fighter Command, possessing the
world's best aerial defensive system, fought a tenacious battle
for which it had been designed, namely the protection of the Home
Base. From mid-September the Luftwaffe changed largely to night
bombing, confronting Britain with an offensive more difficult to
counter. For some months the RAF, lacking a suitable night
fighter, appeared impotent in defence. This weakness was a
catalyst for reservations felt by the Air council over the
leadership, strategy and tactics employed by Sir Hugh Dowding,
C-in-C, Fighter Command, who, in their eyes, had been uncooperative
since pre-war days. When Churchill and Beaverbrook,
previously his champions, appreciated that new leadership was
needed in Fighter Command, more in tune with the aggressive role
anticipated for the RAF in 1941, Dowding was replaced. With him
went his protege, Keith Park, AOC No. 11 Group, who had borne the
main burden of the daylight battle. Both later claimed that
their removal stemmed from the Big Wing controversy over day
fighting tactics, but other causes emerge from an examination of
Dowding's career after 1936. Valid reasons can then be
appreciated for his replacement; nevertheless, his later
treatment by the Air Ministry and politicians was less, than
honourable.