So yesterday I went to see an American game of Football, the way it was meant to be played; by high school students who haven't really got the game down well enough for professional football, but well enough to actually win a game.

So basically in order for a football game at the high school level you need the team, you need the coaching staff, you need the cheerleaders (too young for that other thread), the referees and the …

Unfortunately, the start of the game was delayed two minutes while the booth announcers asked if anyone from the stands would help out with the chain gang. Once the game was ready the game began.

The “Monarchs” in their Green and Gold were undefeated as they went to their homecoming game. The low benches on one side of the field provided ample seating for the few students, alumni, parents and siblings of the players.

The team itself was very “versatile.” That's a fancy way of saying that some of the players were playing both offense and defense.

It soon became apparent that the one part of American football the Monarchs had not really covered was in the kicking. At first, it seemed bold and brilliant for them to always try to make a play on the fourth down, as opposed to punting the ball. (Mind you, looking at the opposition, whose punts went 20 yards with a 10 yard return one wonders if they were really necessary.) Finally the Monarchs scored the first goal but failed to make the extra point so it was 6-0. Before the half was over they scored another goal without making the extra point making it 12-0.

Did I mention the cheerleaders? Oh that's right, too young for this group. And I had a lot of great photos too of the girls being lifted high in the air. Too bad.

Anyway, in the fourth quarter the opposition finally scored a touchdown and actually scored the extra point. Shock and horror as the game went to 12-7

The Monarchs tried to score a touchdown but were stopped. The opposition took the ball with most of the field to cover and very little time. Then suddenly, a series of penalties practically gave them 50 or so yards. A touchdown would give them them the game, but they were stopped at the 15 yard line. The Monarchs then made running plays to score the first down necessary to run the two minute clock down for the 12-7 victory!

tzor wrote:Unfortunately, the start of the game was delayed two minutes while the booth announcers asked if anyone from the stands would help out with the chain gang. Once the game was ready the game began.

That chain gang incident sounds like the VERY small town I grew up in. <smile>

tzor wrote:It soon became apparent that the one part of American football the Monarchs had not really covered was in the kicking. At first, it seemed bold and brilliant for them to always try to make a play on the fourth down, as opposed to punting the ball.

There's one coach somewhere, and I don't remember if he's high school or college, but I think high school...that essentially refuses to punt. He claims that statistically his team has a better chance if they don't punt. And he's apparently been very successful with it. Though I of course can't find a link now that I'm looking for it...<sigh>

tzor wrote:Not bad, for a team that can't kick the ball.

<grin> I do enjoy high school sports a great deal. Although I do feel some sadness when I see things like a team from Ohio traveling to play a team in Florida. Not that it's not kind of cool for those high school athletes, but it's almost always tied to "national rankings" and other things that really shouldn't be a part of high school sports, in my mind.

...I prefer a man who will burn the flag and then wrap himself in the Constitution to a man who will burn the Constitution and then wrap himself in the flag.

Punting has been a part of football since the game’s earliest days, but it was long considered so unimportant that teams simply trained safeties or running backs to do the task. The professionalization of punting arrived in the seventies, when the Oakland Raiders selected Ray Guy, a punter, in the first round of the N.F.L. draft. (It’s fitting that Al Davis made this choice, the only such selection in draft history; he later took Sebastian Janikowski, a kicker, with the seventeenth overall pick.) Today, their presence is expected and well remunerated. Punters and kickers now make, on average, more than tight ends. Shane Lechler—again, of the Raiders—earns $3.8 million a year. Lechler punted seventy-eight times last year, meaning the Raiders shelled out nearly fifty thousand dollars for each time he stepped on the field.

Yet there is growing statistical evidence to suggest that paying punters at all is, at best, a misallocation of salary-capped funds and, at worst, counterproductive. The Times recently cited a paper by David Romer (PDF), a professor of political economy at the University of California at Berkeley, that has become “the gospel for the antipunting faction.” Romer’s determination, after studying punt data from 1998 to 2004, was that teams should never punt when facing fourth down with less than four yards to go for the first, regardless of where they are on the field. Other analysis has suggested that teams should never punt from inside their opponent’s forty-yard line. As a corollary, they should always go for a touchdown, rather than a field goal, from inside the five-yard line.

And yet football teams continue to do the opposite. Those attempting to put the data into action are stuck, for now, in the lower ranks of the game. The archetype for non-punting football has become a high-school team in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Pulaski Academy Bruins do not return punts (fumbles and penalties outweigh big returns, they say), they perform onside kicks after almost every score, and they never, ever punt. Last season, they went undefeated and won the state title. But coaches at higher levels have been slow to buy in to their system. San Diego State coach Rocky Long has said he might consider going for it on fourth down once his offense crosses midfield this season, but he’s an exception, and there are few others. Anyone that tries it puts himself at risk. In 2009, Bill Belichick opted not to punt on fourth down from his own twenty-eight-yard line, late in the game, with his team leading by six points. The statisticians came to Belichick’s defense when the play failed and the Patriots lost, but he was still roundly mocked, stats be damned. This is common. Once, when the Pulaski Bruins actually did punt, their own fans gave them a standing ovation.

Punting has been a part of football since the game’s earliest days, but it was long considered so unimportant that teams simply trained safeties or running backs to do the task. The professionalization of punting arrived in the seventies, when the Oakland Raiders selected Ray Guy, a punter, in the first round of the N.F.L. draft. (It’s fitting that Al Davis made this choice, the only such selection in draft history; he later took Sebastian Janikowski, a kicker, with the seventeenth overall pick.) Today, their presence is expected and well remunerated. Punters and kickers now make, on average, more than tight ends. Shane Lechler—again, of the Raiders—earns $3.8 million a year. Lechler punted seventy-eight times last year, meaning the Raiders shelled out nearly fifty thousand dollars for each time he stepped on the field.

Yet there is growing statistical evidence to suggest that paying punters at all is, at best, a misallocation of salary-capped funds and, at worst, counterproductive. The Times recently cited a paper by David Romer (PDF), a professor of political economy at the University of California at Berkeley, that has become “the gospel for the antipunting faction.” Romer’s determination, after studying punt data from 1998 to 2004, was that teams should never punt when facing fourth down with less than four yards to go for the first, regardless of where they are on the field. Other analysis has suggested that teams should never punt from inside their opponent’s forty-yard line. As a corollary, they should always go for a touchdown, rather than a field goal, from inside the five-yard line.

And yet football teams continue to do the opposite. Those attempting to put the data into action are stuck, for now, in the lower ranks of the game. The archetype for non-punting football has become a high-school team in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Pulaski Academy Bruins do not return punts (fumbles and penalties outweigh big returns, they say), they perform onside kicks after almost every score, and they never, ever punt. Last season, they went undefeated and won the state title. But coaches at higher levels have been slow to buy in to their system. San Diego State coach Rocky Long has said he might consider going for it on fourth down once his offense crosses midfield this season, but he’s an exception, and there are few others. Anyone that tries it puts himself at risk. In 2009, Bill Belichick opted not to punt on fourth down from his own twenty-eight-yard line, late in the game, with his team leading by six points. The statisticians came to Belichick’s defense when the play failed and the Patriots lost, but he was still roundly mocked, stats be damned. This is common. Once, when the Pulaski Bruins actually did punt, their own fans gave them a standing ovation.

This is interesting. I wonder if coaches know about this and whether or not this affects their decisions to go for it on 4th down, punt or kick a field goal.

Though, the bad thing about the statistics is that they generalize instead of accounting for (what I'd imagine to be) intangible effects such as injuries, offensive strengths of teams, etc.

Punting has been a part of football since the game’s earliest days, but it was long considered so unimportant that teams simply trained safeties or running backs to do the task. The professionalization of punting arrived in the seventies, when the Oakland Raiders selected Ray Guy, a punter, in the first round of the N.F.L. draft. (It’s fitting that Al Davis made this choice, the only such selection in draft history; he later took Sebastian Janikowski, a kicker, with the seventeenth overall pick.) Today, their presence is expected and well remunerated. Punters and kickers now make, on average, more than tight ends. Shane Lechler—again, of the Raiders—earns $3.8 million a year. Lechler punted seventy-eight times last year, meaning the Raiders shelled out nearly fifty thousand dollars for each time he stepped on the field.

Yet there is growing statistical evidence to suggest that paying punters at all is, at best, a misallocation of salary-capped funds and, at worst, counterproductive. The Times recently cited a paper by David Romer (PDF), a professor of political economy at the University of California at Berkeley, that has become “the gospel for the antipunting faction.” Romer’s determination, after studying punt data from 1998 to 2004, was that teams should never punt when facing fourth down with less than four yards to go for the first, regardless of where they are on the field. Other analysis has suggested that teams should never punt from inside their opponent’s forty-yard line. As a corollary, they should always go for a touchdown, rather than a field goal, from inside the five-yard line.

And yet football teams continue to do the opposite. Those attempting to put the data into action are stuck, for now, in the lower ranks of the game. The archetype for non-punting football has become a high-school team in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Pulaski Academy Bruins do not return punts (fumbles and penalties outweigh big returns, they say), they perform onside kicks after almost every score, and they never, ever punt. Last season, they went undefeated and won the state title. But coaches at higher levels have been slow to buy in to their system. San Diego State coach Rocky Long has said he might consider going for it on fourth down once his offense crosses midfield this season, but he’s an exception, and there are few others. Anyone that tries it puts himself at risk. In 2009, Bill Belichick opted not to punt on fourth down from his own twenty-eight-yard line, late in the game, with his team leading by six points. The statisticians came to Belichick’s defense when the play failed and the Patriots lost, but he was still roundly mocked, stats be damned. This is common. Once, when the Pulaski Bruins actually did punt, their own fans gave them a standing ovation.

This is interesting. I wonder if coaches know about this and whether or not this affects their decisions to go for it on 4th down, punt or kick a field goal.

Though, the bad thing about the statistics is that they generalize instead of accounting for (what I'd imagine to be) intangible effects such as injuries, offensive strengths of teams, etc.

Offensive strength of the team (and the defensive strength of the opposing team, really) is especially important. 4th and 3 is sometimes just an insurmountable obstacle. Then again, I mainly watch the Bears. Most of the offenses we've had in my lifetime couldn't convert a 4th and inches if their lives were on the line.

Punting has been a part of football since the game’s earliest days, but it was long considered so unimportant that teams simply trained safeties or running backs to do the task. The professionalization of punting arrived in the seventies, when the Oakland Raiders selected Ray Guy, a punter, in the first round of the N.F.L. draft. (It’s fitting that Al Davis made this choice, the only such selection in draft history; he later took Sebastian Janikowski, a kicker, with the seventeenth overall pick.) Today, their presence is expected and well remunerated. Punters and kickers now make, on average, more than tight ends. Shane Lechler—again, of the Raiders—earns $3.8 million a year. Lechler punted seventy-eight times last year, meaning the Raiders shelled out nearly fifty thousand dollars for each time he stepped on the field.

Yet there is growing statistical evidence to suggest that paying punters at all is, at best, a misallocation of salary-capped funds and, at worst, counterproductive. The Times recently cited a paper by David Romer (PDF), a professor of political economy at the University of California at Berkeley, that has become “the gospel for the antipunting faction.” Romer’s determination, after studying punt data from 1998 to 2004, was that teams should never punt when facing fourth down with less than four yards to go for the first, regardless of where they are on the field. Other analysis has suggested that teams should never punt from inside their opponent’s forty-yard line. As a corollary, they should always go for a touchdown, rather than a field goal, from inside the five-yard line.

And yet football teams continue to do the opposite. Those attempting to put the data into action are stuck, for now, in the lower ranks of the game. The archetype for non-punting football has become a high-school team in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Pulaski Academy Bruins do not return punts (fumbles and penalties outweigh big returns, they say), they perform onside kicks after almost every score, and they never, ever punt. Last season, they went undefeated and won the state title. But coaches at higher levels have been slow to buy in to their system. San Diego State coach Rocky Long has said he might consider going for it on fourth down once his offense crosses midfield this season, but he’s an exception, and there are few others. Anyone that tries it puts himself at risk. In 2009, Bill Belichick opted not to punt on fourth down from his own twenty-eight-yard line, late in the game, with his team leading by six points. The statisticians came to Belichick’s defense when the play failed and the Patriots lost, but he was still roundly mocked, stats be damned. This is common. Once, when the Pulaski Bruins actually did punt, their own fans gave them a standing ovation.

Punting has been a part of football since the game’s earliest days, but it was long considered so unimportant that teams simply trained safeties or running backs to do the task. The professionalization of punting arrived in the seventies, when the Oakland Raiders selected Ray Guy, a punter, in the first round of the N.F.L. draft. (It’s fitting that Al Davis made this choice, the only such selection in draft history; he later took Sebastian Janikowski, a kicker, with the seventeenth overall pick.) Today, their presence is expected and well remunerated. Punters and kickers now make, on average, more than tight ends. Shane Lechler—again, of the Raiders—earns $3.8 million a year. Lechler punted seventy-eight times last year, meaning the Raiders shelled out nearly fifty thousand dollars for each time he stepped on the field.

Yet there is growing statistical evidence to suggest that paying punters at all is, at best, a misallocation of salary-capped funds and, at worst, counterproductive. The Times recently cited a paper by David Romer (PDF), a professor of political economy at the University of California at Berkeley, that has become “the gospel for the antipunting faction.” Romer’s determination, after studying punt data from 1998 to 2004, was that teams should never punt when facing fourth down with less than four yards to go for the first, regardless of where they are on the field. Other analysis has suggested that teams should never punt from inside their opponent’s forty-yard line. As a corollary, they should always go for a touchdown, rather than a field goal, from inside the five-yard line.

And yet football teams continue to do the opposite. Those attempting to put the data into action are stuck, for now, in the lower ranks of the game. The archetype for non-punting football has become a high-school team in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Pulaski Academy Bruins do not return punts (fumbles and penalties outweigh big returns, they say), they perform onside kicks after almost every score, and they never, ever punt. Last season, they went undefeated and won the state title. But coaches at higher levels have been slow to buy in to their system. San Diego State coach Rocky Long has said he might consider going for it on fourth down once his offense crosses midfield this season, but he’s an exception, and there are few others. Anyone that tries it puts himself at risk. In 2009, Bill Belichick opted not to punt on fourth down from his own twenty-eight-yard line, late in the game, with his team leading by six points. The statisticians came to Belichick’s defense when the play failed and the Patriots lost, but he was still roundly mocked, stats be damned. This is common. Once, when the Pulaski Bruins actually did punt, their own fans gave them a standing ovation.

This is interesting. I wonder if coaches know about this and whether or not this affects their decisions to go for it on 4th down, punt or kick a field goal.

Though, the bad thing about the statistics is that they generalize instead of accounting for (what I'd imagine to be) intangible effects such as injuries, offensive strengths of teams, etc.

Offensive strength of the team (and the defensive strength of the opposing team, really) is especially important. 4th and 3 is sometimes just an insurmountable obstacle. Then again, I mainly watch the Bears. Most of the offenses we've had in my lifetime couldn't convert a 4th and inches if their lives were on the line.

I would suggest the logic is that if you can get to 4th and 3, it's definitely NOT an insurmountable obstacle. After all, it only took you 3 plays to get 7 yards, which is just over 2 yards per play. 4th and 10, on the other hand...

It is an interesting idea, and I am FASCINATED by the success the lone coach (that I'm aware of) who implemented it has had. But it just seems unworkable to me, though I suppose that could tie into my biases based on familiarity with the game and "how it's always been played".

...I prefer a man who will burn the flag and then wrap himself in the Constitution to a man who will burn the Constitution and then wrap himself in the flag.

Punting has been a part of football since the game’s earliest days, but it was long considered so unimportant that teams simply trained safeties or running backs to do the task. The professionalization of punting arrived in the seventies, when the Oakland Raiders selected Ray Guy, a punter, in the first round of the N.F.L. draft. (It’s fitting that Al Davis made this choice, the only such selection in draft history; he later took Sebastian Janikowski, a kicker, with the seventeenth overall pick.) Today, their presence is expected and well remunerated. Punters and kickers now make, on average, more than tight ends. Shane Lechler—again, of the Raiders—earns $3.8 million a year. Lechler punted seventy-eight times last year, meaning the Raiders shelled out nearly fifty thousand dollars for each time he stepped on the field.

Yet there is growing statistical evidence to suggest that paying punters at all is, at best, a misallocation of salary-capped funds and, at worst, counterproductive. The Times recently cited a paper by David Romer (PDF), a professor of political economy at the University of California at Berkeley, that has become “the gospel for the antipunting faction.” Romer’s determination, after studying punt data from 1998 to 2004, was that teams should never punt when facing fourth down with less than four yards to go for the first, regardless of where they are on the field. Other analysis has suggested that teams should never punt from inside their opponent’s forty-yard line. As a corollary, they should always go for a touchdown, rather than a field goal, from inside the five-yard line.

And yet football teams continue to do the opposite. Those attempting to put the data into action are stuck, for now, in the lower ranks of the game. The archetype for non-punting football has become a high-school team in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Pulaski Academy Bruins do not return punts (fumbles and penalties outweigh big returns, they say), they perform onside kicks after almost every score, and they never, ever punt. Last season, they went undefeated and won the state title. But coaches at higher levels have been slow to buy in to their system. San Diego State coach Rocky Long has said he might consider going for it on fourth down once his offense crosses midfield this season, but he’s an exception, and there are few others. Anyone that tries it puts himself at risk. In 2009, Bill Belichick opted not to punt on fourth down from his own twenty-eight-yard line, late in the game, with his team leading by six points. The statisticians came to Belichick’s defense when the play failed and the Patriots lost, but he was still roundly mocked, stats be damned. This is common. Once, when the Pulaski Bruins actually did punt, their own fans gave them a standing ovation.

This is interesting. I wonder if coaches know about this and whether or not this affects their decisions to go for it on 4th down, punt or kick a field goal.

Though, the bad thing about the statistics is that they generalize instead of accounting for (what I'd imagine to be) intangible effects such as injuries, offensive strengths of teams, etc.

Offensive strength of the team (and the defensive strength of the opposing team, really) is especially important. 4th and 3 is sometimes just an insurmountable obstacle. Then again, I mainly watch the Bears. Most of the offenses we've had in my lifetime couldn't convert a 4th and inches if their lives were on the line.

Definitely. Though the Broncos are becoming very efficient at being able to get yards with their dual throwing and running offense.

Plus, it depends a lot on the defense. There's no way I'd try to convert a 4th and 4 against the 9ers on my side of the field.

Back in my schooling days, I loved High School football. I even played, until I broke my arm and leg...in different seasons, and decided I had enough bad luck so I became a practice and game manager since I still wanted to be close to the game and travel with all my friends. Lots of fun memories.

Punting has been a part of football since the game’s earliest days, but it was long considered so unimportant that teams simply trained safeties or running backs to do the task. The professionalization of punting arrived in the seventies, when the Oakland Raiders selected Ray Guy, a punter, in the first round of the N.F.L. draft. (It’s fitting that Al Davis made this choice, the only such selection in draft history; he later took Sebastian Janikowski, a kicker, with the seventeenth overall pick.) Today, their presence is expected and well remunerated. Punters and kickers now make, on average, more than tight ends. Shane Lechler—again, of the Raiders—earns $3.8 million a year. Lechler punted seventy-eight times last year, meaning the Raiders shelled out nearly fifty thousand dollars for each time he stepped on the field.

Yet there is growing statistical evidence to suggest that paying punters at all is, at best, a misallocation of salary-capped funds and, at worst, counterproductive. The Times recently cited a paper by David Romer (PDF), a professor of political economy at the University of California at Berkeley, that has become “the gospel for the antipunting faction.” Romer’s determination, after studying punt data from 1998 to 2004, was that teams should never punt when facing fourth down with less than four yards to go for the first, regardless of where they are on the field. Other analysis has suggested that teams should never punt from inside their opponent’s forty-yard line. As a corollary, they should always go for a touchdown, rather than a field goal, from inside the five-yard line.

And yet football teams continue to do the opposite. Those attempting to put the data into action are stuck, for now, in the lower ranks of the game. The archetype for non-punting football has become a high-school team in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Pulaski Academy Bruins do not return punts (fumbles and penalties outweigh big returns, they say), they perform onside kicks after almost every score, and they never, ever punt. Last season, they went undefeated and won the state title. But coaches at higher levels have been slow to buy in to their system. San Diego State coach Rocky Long has said he might consider going for it on fourth down once his offense crosses midfield this season, but he’s an exception, and there are few others. Anyone that tries it puts himself at risk. In 2009, Bill Belichick opted not to punt on fourth down from his own twenty-eight-yard line, late in the game, with his team leading by six points. The statisticians came to Belichick’s defense when the play failed and the Patriots lost, but he was still roundly mocked, stats be damned. This is common. Once, when the Pulaski Bruins actually did punt, their own fans gave them a standing ovation.

This is interesting. I wonder if coaches know about this and whether or not this affects their decisions to go for it on 4th down, punt or kick a field goal.

Though, the bad thing about the statistics is that they generalize instead of accounting for (what I'd imagine to be) intangible effects such as injuries, offensive strengths of teams, etc.

The article kind of argues that they know about it, but would get reamed by the fans if they didn't.

I think the article's big weakness is, as you suggest, that it doesn't deal with the issue of strength of offense and defense. The teams that have used that tactic (not punting) look to be generally more successful, but the tactic isn't popular for fans. That it hasn't really been tested for a while in the big leagues seems to be one of the problems.