The Third People’s Party: Seven Theses on Western European Right Wing Populists

Much has been written on the reasons for the rise and fall or right-wing populist parties in Western Europe, as the French Front National (FN) or the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). However, most of these commentaries are not based on empirical research. In taking the German case and the currently rising right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) as example, the presented overview highlights the seven factors which comparative research defines as decisive for the electoral fortunes of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe.

All right wing populist parties in Western Europe differentiate themselves from other parties along clear programmatic lines. The international research sector have developed four central program points of right wing populist parties, that are only to be found in this distinct combination in parties from this party family: they are the conception of themselves as a democratic ‘protest party’, a rather weak focus on economic and welfare policy, and instead a strong emphasis on conservative social policy (with particularly conservative positions in relation to integration and migration policy), along with a clear rejection of the alignment with the West, the USA and the European integrationist project. The recently forming Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has this exact profile, which confirms their position as an integral part of the right-wing populist party family in Europe.

There are also programmatic overlaps with other parties, which explain why it is currently more difficult for political discourse to accurately define parties such as the AfD. Respectively, this also explains why it is occasionally simple for representatives of right-wing populist movements to embellish themselves with other notions – often in an attempt to draw connections to conservative and liberal parties, amongst other movements. In fact, right-wing populists share only their conservative position on social politics with conservative parties (for example, the German CDU/CSU), including their policies on issues such as integration and migration. With liberal parties (for example, the German FDP) no thematic crossover points are present. It gives many more programmatic similarities with extreme-right parties, such as the NPD in the German case: in the party families which right-wing populist and extreme-right parties belong to, one finds an equally limited focus on economic questions and a strong opposition to transatlantic partnerships with the USA and European integration. However, the principal difference between the AfD and the NPD (to stick with the German example) is that the AfD understands itself to be a protest party on the democratic spectrum, with concerns that will be well cared for by the parliamentary system. What they reject however, are the elites of the other parties, but they do not reject the democratic system per se. On the other hand, extreme-right parties of the caliber of the NPD want to abolish the democratic system as a whole, and wish to replace it with an authoritarian and totalitarian form of government. It is therefore to be noted that right-wing populist parties in Western Europe represent a clearly definable and distinguishable party family, to which the AfD also belongs.

The unifyingsubstantivefeature of right-wing populists is nostalgic nationalism

In keeping with the demarcation between extreme-right parties and right-wing populist parties is the fact that the electoral platforms of right-wing populists are not openly racist, and instead work hard to dress up nationalistic positions as though they are conservative, to make them seem more acceptable. The extreme-right NPD brandish placards stating ‘Muslims out’, while Marine Le Pen’s markedly right-wing populist Front National concern themselves with ‘protecting’ the separation between church and state (Laïcité), which they see as threatened by the immigration of Muslim citizens. At first glance, right-wing populist rhetoric is seemingly less aggressive, as they seldom emphasize who does not belong to the national community, and instead underline what constitutestheirsupposedcore-andin this wayoperatea similarmechanism of exclusion.

The main programmatic of such parties consists ergo of a ‘nationalism light’, whichdefines itselfprimarilyagainstallegedintrudersfrom the outside. In this way it is possible to discursively construct a supposedly protected national community, which many Europeans crave in a hyper-complex and globalized world.

Local ties and nostalgia are stressed through a rejection of all symbols that are associated withthe loss of“the good old days”: changing values, globalization (symbolized by the EU) and, above all, immigration, that has changed the social fabric of European societies. All three stand for the social change of the last 30 years, from which the right-wing populist parties offer a supposed way out: a nationalistic nostalgia that positions itself as aggressively opposed to these symbols of social change.

Right-wing populist rhetoric understands itself decidedly as an answer and reaction to a media-savvy, left-liberal discourse, which, amongst other things, is based on demands forindividualism, tolerance, multiculturalismandinternationalization. These will be understood by substantial parts of the electorate as elements of unsettlingsociopoliticalchange, which are perceived as ‘uncontrollable’. Right-wing populists use this uneasiness to their advantage, in that they exploitimmigration, multiculturalismandthe EU’s influenceasscapegoatsforthesignificant individualuncertaintyof many Europeans. Following this logic, they promise citizens a return to a supposedly culturally homogenous nation that offers the support and direction they had lost. The nation and, amongst others, the socially constructed cultural core must therefore “defend” themselves against any influence “from outside”.

Upholding a belief in local ties and rejecting social change may at first appear to be classical conservative positions, which would be well cared for by established, moderate Christian Democrats or Conservatives. It is therefore notsurprising thatpartyresearchers liketheSwedishprofessorJensRydgren, describe voters for right-wing populistpartiesas part of a“really classicconservativeelectorate“.

Those that vote for right-wing populist parties come from the middle of society

Given the assertions of party researcher Professor Jens Rydgren, it is not surprising that voters for right-wing populist parties by no means originate from lower incomeorless educatedclassesof society. On the contrary, the voter profile for right-wing populist parties is only marginally different from those of the other parties: men with lower levels of educational attainment are slightly overrepresented, yettheir appealreaches deep intoallvoter demographics, largely independent ofincome, educationallevelorage. The early electoral analysis from the state elections in East Germany, in which the AfD experienced significant growth, fits with the Europe wide electoral research: according to the voter profile, the AfD is on its way to becoming Germany’s Third People’s Party.

Right-wing populists are (at least) the third strongest political power in Europe

This status, as the third people’s party, has already been achieved by right-wing populist parties in most European states: recentopinion pollspersuasively attest to how seriously right-wing populistparties should be taken. A comparison of numbers concerning Western European shows that right-wing populists could receive anywhere between 20% and 30% of votes. In some countries (for example, Switzerland) they are the strongest power, and in many other countries that compete on the same level as social democrats and conservatives (for example in Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands and Austria).

Right-wing populists make it into Parliament in good economic good times

In blatant contradiction to an oft repeated argument, scientific studies prove unanimously that right-wing populist parties can rely on substantial electoral success in good economic times. This is for two main reasons: on the one hand, it is because in economically good times established conservative parties are inclined to lean towards liberal social policies, which opens up a niche for right-wing populist parties, and secondly, the voters themselves give priority to socio-political topics (such as migration and integration) in economicallygood times.

This explains why right-wing populists in the economically prosperous alpine republics, Scandinavia and the Netherlands persistently achieve great electoral successes. Even though the current economic hardships in Italy and France, which is occurring simultaneously with the growth of right-wing populists parties in these countries, appears to challenge this theory, ultimately they in fact confirm it, since the first clear electoral successes of the Front National and the Lega Nord occurred around 1990, in the heyday of the Italian and French economies. The fact that right-wing populists have had no chance in countries that were hit hard by the economic crisis, such as Spain, Portugal and Ireland, is a further indication of the verity of the theory. It is therefore no surprise that Germany, that from 1992 until the end of the 2000s was battling enormous economic problems, is only now, after a long phase of relative economic prosperity, confronted with the ascent of a right-wing populist party. Voters search for parties with strongly developed social policy profiles in bad economic times. That simply cannot be provided by right-wing populist parties like the AfD.

The Establishment of a right-wing populist party leads to a rightward shift

The entry into Parliament of right-wing populist parties triggers a complex set of political dynamics, which due to space constrains can only be briefly explored. In summary, it must be noted that electoral successes of right-wing populists have three clear consequences: firstly, a distinct intensification ofintegration, asylum, migrationlegislation, a clearsubsidenceofpolitical demands formoreEuropeanintegration, and thirdlya significant strengtheningof the strategic optionsof theconservativebourgeois parties. The firstand second consequences take placelessdue to directgovernmental participation byright-wing populistparties, but due to the factthatalmost all themoderatefactions incorporatekey elements ofright-wing populistmigration andEuropean policyintheirmanifestosin order to avoid losing even morevoters. Thus,for example,liberalizationofasylum and migrationlegislation, against an established right-wing populistparty isalmost impossible. Similarly, an aggressively pro-European party discourse is significantly complicated by the presence of right-wing populist parties. The bestexamplesof thisre-nationalization ofmigration andEuropean policyareItaly, France, theNetherlands and Switzerland- countriesthat are characterizedby numerousright-wing populistelectoral successes.

The enormousstrengtheningof the bourgeois partiesis based, however, ontwopolitical processes: firstly, the fact that social democratic parties lose almost their whole conservative electorate to right-wing populists after a few years; secondly, that only mid-right parties are capable of forming coalitions with right-wing populist parties. Both processes weaken the strength of the social democrats enormously. A social democrat led government is almost impossible when faced with an established right-wing populist party. The structural weaknesses of social democratic parties in Western Europe since the end of the 1990s provides useful evidence, along with the recent events in Sweden, which clearly show that the biggest winner of the rise of right-wing populists is thebourgeois camp.

The further advancement of the AfD is almost entirely dependent on the SPD and the CDU/CSU

The reasons for the strengthening, as well as the failure, of right-wing populist parties is veryclosely linked to thebehaviorof the established parties. The media access and the organizational structure of the right-wing parties do play a roll, however the latest studies by Antonis Ellinas at Princeton university suggest that the first successes of right-wing populist parties are almost only dependent on the behavior of established political powers. A large research project at the University of Zürich, under the leadership of Hans-Peter Kriesi, further shows that the abilityto establish itselfafterthe firstelectoral successesin the party system, isalsostrongly influencedby theconduct of the establishedconservativeandsocial democratic parties.

Right-wing populistparties always celebratesuccesses whenmajordebates on nationalsymbols are lacking a clearconservativepositionfrom an establishedparty. Thesenational symbolsalways appearin thepoliticalspherewhena nation is opposing change, and is “from outside” redefined; the two decisivetopics arethereforetheEuropeanUnionandissues ofimmigration and integration.

One can already notice this in the case of Germany: the only time when questions of immigration policy were highly controversially discussed, with liberal positions related by all the established parties, was in the late 1980s, when der Republikaner emerged. That the CDU/CSU, and also the SPD, in the two majorintegrationpolicy debates of theBerlin Republic – theasylum debate1992/93andthe Leitkultur Debate2000/2001– held clearconservative positionsin relationto the topic, no right-wing populistpartycouldestablishitself to theright of the CDU/CSU; the two Germanmajor parties ensured that conservative voterswere regained.

However, Europe questions were never part of a substantial political debate, so all German partieswerelargely unitedin theirpro-European course. This changed for the first time in recent years: Angela Merkel made the first departure of the CDU/CSU from a pro-European course and representedin recent years relatively national conservativeviewpoints. Once these were once again visiblyrelativized, and given the insistence of the SPDonEuropean solidarity, an electoral niche was formedfor the AfD.

The conservative-nationalistic spirits that are nowcollected by theAfD, were in some way called forth by Angela Merkel herself; however, this will not be permanent if she holds on to the national-conservativeagendaof theCDU / CSU.

Whether or not the established parties can lure back a substantial amount of potential AfD voters will mainly be dependent upon the European and immigration-related debates of the coming years. If both the CDU/CSU and the SPD hold fast to a conservative profile, they will rob the AfD of their decisive program point: the conservative position in debates over German national symbols, which, above all, will be relevant to crucial discussions over the European Union, immigration and integration.

Transatlantic fellow with the Europe Program where he directs GMF’s research activities on European diversity and party politics.

He studied social psychology and international politics in Germany, Norway, and the United States and holds a Ph.D. in comparative politics from the Humboldt University Berlin, where he is a lecturer for European Politics.

After two parliamentary victories in 2010 and 2014, Viktor Orbán has been breaching many democratic principles in Hungary, leaving the rest of the EU pondering how to react to the rising popularity of illiberal democracy.

The aim of the project is to look at the problem from a broader perspective and systematically compare anti-liberal political tendencies and populism in EU member states and to analyze the risks of the strengthening of authoritarian-majoritarian views in Central and Eastern European countries with special attention to Hungary.

The project is led by the Hungarian Europe Society.
Visit their website: http://www.europesociety.hu