SE Asia must engage political Islam

The Straits Times Interactive, A
perspective by Phar Kim Beng, 8 January 2000

IN THE West, the perception of Islam as a potential threat has
significantly increased since the end of the Cold War. The reason
frequently offered is that neither political Islam (otherwise known as
Islamic fundamentalism), nor Islam as a religion itself, is compatible
to liberal democracy.

In South-east Asia, the unease with political Islam is of another
form. At issue is not the contention over Islam's lack of democratic
attributes. Rather, the palpable concern of most governments,
especially Muslim ones in Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia, emanates
from the potential risk posed by certain groups' radical reading of
the Islamic scriptures.

The ease with which Islam can be radicalised is made all the more
apparent by the lack of any papal-like religious institution, to
mitigate authoritatively on pressing political questions. This is a
real dilemma faced by many Muslim societies.

The full effect of which was occasioned by events leading to Operation
Desert Storm. During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, there was literally
a war of fatwas (Islamic legal edicts). The fault- lines emerged with
one group of Muslim scholars in favour of launching a jihad against
Iraq--the aggressor which invaded Kuwait--pitched against another,
strictly opposed to any form of warfare that would include non-Muslim
forces (in this case, American-led Western forces) as principal
allies.

In the end, the groups issued two different fatwas each, declaring
their side's cause to be a just war, that is, jihad. More alarmingly,
fatwas, declarations and proclamations originated not only in Islamic
countries alone, but also in several Islamic communities in the Muslim
diaspora, including Europe and the United States.

The above controversies amply showed the internal confusion faced by
the Muslim world. Indeed, other than the consensus that jihad should
be defensive, Muslims themselves disagreed on the terms in which jihad
could be initiated or conducted.

What the above demonstrates are three key points. Firstly, jihad is a
term that can be used flexibly (or abused). Secondly, Islamic
authority remain decentralised, thus increasing the idiosyncrasies of
each judgment. Thirdly, Islamic groups can declare jihad too.

Within the context of South-east Asia, the last has obvious security
implications for Indonesia. The Acehnese, for one, have been using
Islamic symbols and rhetoric to justify their demands for complete
independence from Indonesia. Despite President Abdurrahman Wahid's
peaceful overtures to placate the Acehnese by agreeing to a referendum
on Islamic law, the independence movement has not abated.

In Malaysia, the Islamic Party (PAS) has also gained in ascendancy --
by retaining Kelantan, then capturing Terengganu in the recent
elections. Upon coming to power in the latter, Abdul Awang Hadi, the
new Chief Minister of Terengganu, immediately and predictably
proceeded to introduce religious enactments that would facilitate
Islamic rule in the state.

What are the reasons for the perpetual link between Islam and
politics? More precisely, what are the attributes that make for
Islam's unique brand of what eminent Islamic specialists call
religio-politics?

>From Morroco to Mindanao, Islam appears intimately entwined with
political struggle of various forms.

Even after almost 80 years of secular rule in Turkey, Islam still
remains a potent political force, not withstanding the ban that had
been imposed on the Islamic Refah Party in 1998.

Part of the vibrancy of religio-politics can be explained by the
internal characteristics of Islam, as well as the external milieu that
the religion operates in.

First of all, Islam is affirmed by Muslims as a complete faith. By
virtue of this holistic character, Islam has a stake in everything
from personal hygiene to national, even international, politics.

Secondly, Islam also functions as an important cultural identity.

The meshing of religious, cultural and ethnic identity has assured
Islam a central place in the political discourse of many nations.

Thirdly, the political activism of Islam, including those in
South-east Asia, is sustained and informed by the numerous crises the
Islamic world is currently confronting.

Of the 21 armed-conflicts proceeding at present, the Muslim world
takes the lion's share. It is involved in 17 of these conflicts,
including the present quagmire in Chechnya.

Saddled with a Muslim world wracked by violence and despair, Islamic
fundamentalists have universally become anti-Western and anti-
establishment too.

Predictably, the line advocated by these groups calls for nothing
except a complete return to ancient Islam, with the creation of an
Islamic state holding a position of central importance within the
scheme of Islamic politics.

That said, political Islam's policy on an Islamic state is evidently
flawed. The policy easily makes for the redundant role of an Islamic
state in the first place.

After all, if contemporary difficulties can be solved by the mere
return to antiquated religious practice, why then the need for the
creation of a powerful Islamic institution to arrest moral and other
forms of decline?

In other words, the call to go back to the time of the Prophet
represents a civilisational retreat, not advance.

An Islamic state, in this context, isn't the solution, but an act of
political escapism.

Nevertheless, in identifying the flaws of political Islam, one cannot
accuse it of not trying to be democratic, although this is one of the
most common invectives hurled at political Islam.

In fact, past records have shown that political Islam has accepted the
legitimacy of elections.

In 1992, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) even participated in
Algeria's parliamentary election.

However, just when the FIS looked set to emerge triumphant from the
polls, the incumbent military regime arbitrarily suspended the
exercise--a phenomenon not entirely different from what had taken
place in Myammar several years earlier.

Yet, while the world criticised the Myammar junta's decision, hardly a
single government registered a protest against Algeria's military
regime at all.

Invariably, the ambivalence of the international community has
reinforced the belief of some Islamic activists that they cannot rely
on the ballot to claim power.

If political Islam has been guilty of violence, as most recently
marked by the harrowing hijacking of the Indian Airlines jet by the
Kashmiri militants, the international community bears some blame.

In seeing political Islam as an unsalvageable political project, it
has failed to engage and understand the legitimate concerns of
political Islam.

To prevent the recurrence of religious violence in Aceh, Ambon,
Mindanao and even Pattani, South-east Asia is well-advised to take the
pulse of political Islam more seriously.

[The writer is a teaching fellow in international conflicts at Harvard
University. He contributed this article to The Straits Times.]