Matthew Carlson, "Financing
democracy in Japan: The allocation and consequences of
government subsidies to political parties," Party
Politics, 18 (May, 2012), 391-408. [Available at
http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/vol18/issue3/
]

First paragraph:
With the passage of the Law for Government Subsidies of
Political Parties (Seit o Josei H o) in 1994, Japan joined
the ranks of an increasing number of countries that have
implemented a system of public assistance for political
parties. The new law requires the national government to
allocate 250 yen per person times the total population of
the country to political parties each year. Japanese
political parties have thus received a significant annual
sum of more than 30 billion yen ($272 million) to their
coffers.1 Many hoped these funds would promote 'the sound
development of political activities of political parties',
secure 'their legal and fair activities' and encourage
party-centred rather than candidate-centred campaigns.2
However, the effects of the subsidy system on Japanese
politics are complicated by the strategic responses of
parties and politicians, including the successful efforts of
entrepreneurial politicians to acquire the funds intended
for political parties (Curtis, 1999: 166).

Figures and
Tables:

Table 1. Amount of political party subsidies,
1995-2008 (JPY and USD in millions)

Figure 1. Percentage of subsidy to total party
income, 1995-2007.

Figure 2. Percentage of subsidy and contributions to
total revenues (LDP).

Table 2. Average politicians' total income and
percentages from subsidy and contributions (JPY in
millions)

Table 3. Subsidy allocation to LDP incumbents and new
candidates

Table 4. Multivariate analysis of factors shaping
subsidy amounts

Last Paragraph:
A second lesson is the complexity in pinpointing the exact
effects of public funds, particularly when there are
multiple causes and rules are frequently altered. To add
another layer of complexity, the effects of the subsidy and
other rule changes are not uniform across and within
specific party organizations. This makes it challenging to
evaluate the consequences of any subsidy system once it is
implemented. Finally, the evidence examined from Japan seems
consistent with one of the main conclusions derived from the
broader literature on subsidies: they are an important
component of party politics; however, their effects tend to
be overstated by both advocates and critics. As Pierre and
his associates (2000) argue in the case of European
countries and the United States, subsidies are seldom a
sufficient or a necessary condition for the flow of funds in
politics. Reformers should bear these lessons in mind if
they adopt or consider a similar system.