It is only just now, as I emphasized before, that the right
to the Corridor has been "recognized" for so long. On 28
April, Hitler demands consisted only of Danzig, the
Autobahn, and the railway. But now Hitler's aim was to
manufacture justification and to put forth proposals which
under no circumstances could either Poland or Great Britain
accept. The note states:

"The British Government attach importance to two
considerations: (1) that the existing danger of an
imminent explosion should be eliminated as quickly as
possible by direct negotiation, and (2) that the
existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it
would then continue to exist, should be adequately
safeguarded in the economic and political sphere by
means of international guarantees.

"On this subject, the German Government makes the
following declaration:

"Though skeptical as to the prospects of a successful
outcome, they are nevertheless prepared to accept the
English proposal and to enter into direct discussions.
They do so, as has already been emphasized, solely as
the result of the impression made upon them by the
written statement received from the British Government
that they too desire a pact of friendship in accordance
with the general lines indicated to the British
Ambassador."

"*******

"For the rest, in making these proposals the German
Government have never had any intention of touching
Poland's interests of questioning the existence of an
independent Polish State. The German Government,
accordingly, in these circumstances agree to accept the
British Government's offer of their good offices in
securing the despatch to Berlin of a Polish Emissary
with full powers. They count on the arrival of this
Emissary on Wednesday, 30 August 1939.

"The German Government will immediately draw up
proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and
will, if possible, place these at the disposal of the
British Government before the arrival of the Polish
negotiators." TC-72 No. 78)

That was at 7:15 in the evening of 29 August. As previously
explained, insufficient time was allowed for the Polish
Emissary to reach Berlin by midnight the following night.

Sir Neville Henderson's account of his interview on the
evening of 29 August summarizes what took place then:

"I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum,
but

[Page 718]

after some heated remarks both Herr Hitler and Herr von
Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to
stress urgency of the moment when the two fully
mobilized armies were standing face to face." (TC-72
No. 79)

Again the British Government replied and Sir Neville
Henderson handed this reply to Ribbentrop at the famous
meeting on midnight of 30 August, at the time the Polish
Emissary had been expected. The reply stated that the
British Government reciprocated the desire for improved
relations. It stressed again that it cannot sacrifice its
interest to other friends in order to obtain an improvement
in the situation. It understood that the German Government
accepts the condition that the settlement should be subject
to international guarantee. The British Government makes a
reservation as to the demands that the Germans put forward
in their last letter, and is informing the Polish Government
immediately. Lastly, the British understand that the German
Government is drawing up the proposals. (TC-72 No. 89)

Sir Neville Henderson gave this account of that interview at
midnight on 30 August:

"I told Herr von Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty's
Government found it difficult to advise Polish Government to
accept procedure adumbrated in German reply, and suggested
that he should adopt normal contact, i.e., that when German
proposals were ready to invite Polish Ambassador to call and
to hand him proposals for transmission to his Government
with a view to immediate opening of negotiations. I added
that if basis afforded prospect of settlement His Majesty's
Government could be counted upon to do their best in Warsaw
to temporize negotiations.

"Herr von Ribbentrop's reply was to produce a lengthy
document which he read out in German aloud at top
speed. Imagining that he would eventually hand it to me
I did not attempt to follow too closely the sixteen or
more articles which it contained. Though I cannot
therefore guarantee accuracy the main points were: ***"

"*******

"When I asked Herr von Ribbentrop for text of these
proposals in accordance with undertaking the German
reply of yesterday, he asserted that it was now too
late as Polish representative had not arrived in Berlin
by midnight.

"I observed that to treat matter in this way meant that
request for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin
on 30th August constituted in fact, an ultimatum in
spite of what he and Herr Hitler had assured me
yesterday. This he denied,

[Page 719]

saying that idea of an ultimatum was figment of my
imagination. Why then I asked could he not adopt normal
procedure and give me copy of proposals and ask Polish
Ambassador to call on him, just as Herr Hitler had
summoned me a few days ago, and hand them to him for
communication to Polish Government. In the most violent
terms Herr von Ribbentrop said that he would never ask
the Ambassador to visit him. He hinted that if Polish
Ambassador asked him for interview it might be
different. I said that I would naturally inform my
Government so at once. Whereupon he said while those
were his personal views he would bring all that I had
said to Herr Hitler's notice. It was for Chancellor to
decide.

"We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Herr
von Ribbentrop's demeanor during an unpleasant
interview was aping Herr Hitler at his worst. He
inveighed incidentally against Polish mobilization, but
I retorted that it was hardly surprising since Germany
had also mobilized as Herr Hitler himself had admitted
to me yesterday." (TC-772 No. 92)

Henderson of course did not know at that time that Germany
ad also given the orders to attack Poland some days before.
On the following day, 31 August, at 6:30 in the evening, M.
Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, had an interview with
Ribbentrop. This is M. Lipski's account of the conversation:

"I carried out my instructions. M. von Ribbentrop asked
if I had special plenipotentiary powers to undertake
negotiations. I said no. He then asked whether I had
been informed that on London's suggestion the German
Government had expressed their readiness to negotiate
directly with a delegate of the Polish Government,
furnished with the requisite full powers, who was to
have arrived on the preceding day, August 30. I replied
that I had no direct information on the subject. In
conclusion M. von Ribbentrop repeated that he had
thought I would be empowered to negotiate. He would
communicate my demarche to the Chancellor." (TC-7 No. 112)

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