34 F. 355 -

34 F1d 355

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Case Text

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; tOhuit (Juurt,;1IJ.' D. Pen1Ul1ll-oania.
'TAX,!-hON-TAXABLlII

8, 1888.J

,oUhree mills "upon allpropetty,,' real or personal, (not, taxed under existing owned, u,se,d; Of in,yested,bY any P,eraon,co,mpany, or c,ol'pOrl't,ion. mtl'Q.st for the use, or advantage of any other Person, company, 01 corporaiion, "was not repealed by the act of 18'19 and supplements, passed inl88bmdJ885, in so far-as it relates to property in Pennsylvania, held by a corporation in trust for non-residents of the state. ,The a88.6ssmentof ,l\uch a tax upon property so held ill within, the literal scope of the act 'OOd'April, 1846. " ,, ,'
9. SlllE-NON-REfllDKNTBENIllwcIARIES.

J. The prayer of this bill is foran injunction to restrain the payment or collection, by John Hunter, reqeiyer of taxes, and ths other defendants, of a tax ostensibly imposed by the laws of Pennsylvania; upon mortgages for about $200,000, held by the Philadelphia Trust:&:Safe Deposit & Insurance Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, for the benefit· Of Mrs. Price, one of the. complainants, and a non-resident of the state ofPenIlsylvania. Two questions are involved irithe case, upon the decision of which its result depends: Firat. Is the tax cOq!plained,ofauthorized by the laws of ,the state? If it is, has the state the power to impose it? . 1. It is conceded by the counsel of the defendants that the taxis im· posed by the 1846, (P. L. 486,)and un· less that act is in force and covers it, it has no warrant ,.That act subjects to a tax ofthree mills "all property, or personal, (not taxed under existing laws,) held, owned, used, or ,by any person,'company, or corporation," in trust for the use, benefit, or advantage of any other person, company,or corporation." Argument comment cannot rnaketheimport of this act any clearer than is expressed in its own unambiguous and comprehensive phraseology. It incontestably enacts that all properW held by a trustee in the state, for the benefit of another, shall be stibje¢t the tax imposed,irrespective of the domicile ofthe beneficiarY',Btit it is urged that this act is repealed by the act of1879 and its supplements, passed in 1881 and This, however, is not so. Those acts repeal former acts in SO fat oIlly provisions are incon.sistent with those of previous acts. .While some of the provisions of the, act of 1846 are changed by these subseq'uent acts; the tax here' involved ;tt

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·Reported by C. Berkeley Taylor. Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.

356
not referred to, and hence is undisturbed. We are therefore of opinion that the act of 1846 is stin,in fCl)l'ce so far as it relates to the tax complained of, and that the asseBsnient of this tax is within its literal scope. 2. Has Ihe 'state the power.to impose this tax? In 'Ileveral of the state supreme courts this question has beel) the subject of consi,deration, and held ;is taxable bythestdtesasagaiust the trustee at, his place ofllesidence. where the cest'Wi8 que trustent are· nonAll8e88ot:8,40';N. Y. 154; Latrobe v. BaltimOre, 19 Md.'13; C¥tlinv.HaU, Vt.152;; Dorr v. Bo8tQri, 6 Gray, 131. In the act of 1846, the decisions of the supreme court are,of in BorOugh of Oarlisle v. Marshall, 36 Pa. St. 401, where the cestuis que trttBtent were non-residents, and the trustee Ii. resident of the state, the court declares that. the fund in the hands of the trustee was for state purposes at his place ofresidence under the act of 1846. See, also, West Ohesttl' v. Darlington, S8 Pa. St; 157. In the supreme court of the United States no case has been decided involving the <Iuestion presented 4ere., . Correlative questil;ms have arisen, and have been adjudicated.buUheydo, not furnish any authoritative guide to the ofthis Tc,za; on Foreign-Held Bonds (b,Se8, 15 Wall. 300, is the leading case of its class. By a law of the state of Pennsylvania, a tax was imposed, tJpon issued by a Pennsylvania railroad corporation, and held and owned by non-residents. It is to be noticedJhat the,' legal and beneficial ownership Of the subject of taxation were both in 'another state tllanPennsylvapia, determinable by the resIdence of 8w'ner;alld hence was beyond the jurisdiction of the lat:er. Thecourt held,that the law was invalid, as impairing the. obligation of the contract, between the corporation and its. creditors, and that as the situ8 of the pro}lerty'taxed was otltslde the state, it was beyond her jurisdiction.Speaking of the pO",er9f taxation,the court -say: "It may touch propertjin: every its natural condition, in its manufactured fOIT9, anq in its various ,It may business iri the almos.t intinite forms ip whiCh it is conclucted,:"-in professions, in .. Unless restrained by provlSlons of the consNutlOllJ the po",er of the mode, form, and extent of taxation is when. the subjeCts to which it applies are 'In ,the present case;. the trust property in question was trailsferred to the trustee, a PenIlsylv'ania corporation, by two of and by. tliy, will of Samuel Harlan, to be held for the benefit of his daughter, ¥rs.Price, during life, and then to be paid to her appointees or to her children. The legal title and ownership of the property was vested in the ti'ust company, and is its control, subject only to the terms of the trust. The trustee is in PennIlylvania,asacrea:ture of itslaw, and hence the situs of the property is in that state,wpete the trustee It is thus in their own jurisdiction, and reach of her taxing power. ' . , The .bill is dismissed, at the dosts. 'of the " , . . ,
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PULLMAN PALACE CAR

co.". (,'ENTIUL TRANSP. CO.

Co.l

357

PuLLMAN PALACE CAR CO. t7. CENTRAL TRANSP.

«(Jircuit Dourt, E. D. Pennaywania. March 2, 1888.)

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INJUNCTION-AGAINST PROCEEDINGS AT LAW.

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Equity will not interfere by injunction to restrain proceedings at law when all the matters of defense are as available at law as in equity, although complicated and more difficult of presentation.

'ACCOUNTING-BETWEEN PAR'tU:S NOT HOLDING FmUCIARYRELATIOis TO EACH OTHER-EvIDENCE.

In an action'between parties not holding a fiduciary relation towards each other, based upon a right to ali account of receipts and expenditures, the defendant cannot be called upon to produce vouchers or furnish a detailed statement.

In Equity. The complainant's bill was for an injunction to restrain the defendant from prosecuting at law a suit began by it against the complainant to recover rent reserved in a lease executed by them in 1870. Upon a motion for an injunction the court dismissed the bill. E-lward S. Isham, Gemge F. Edmwnds, Samuel Dickson, and Richard C. Dah, for complainants. . John G.John,son, for defendant.
BRADJ,EY, Justice. Upon the renewed application for an injunction in this case we do not think that any new facts are presented which that should induce us to change the conclusion formerly reached, the injunction should be denied as regards the action brought for rent ' accruing prior to the 1st day of July, 1886, when the complainants gav. notice of their election to determine the lease and contract of 1870. '1'he ground of relief set up in the bill is that when, at the expiration of the contract with the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, in January, 1885, the complainants contemplated giving notice of their election to terminate the lease, in view of the reduction of net revenues below 'the amount of. the rent reserved, the defendants, through their agents, inducedand persuaded the complainants to adopt the other alternative of paying thetn an equitable sum or share of the net revenues that might be realized, and as should be agreed upon; and that the complainants consented to this, and acted upon that understanding in concluding a new contract with the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. The complainants contend' that, after this arrangement had been gone into, it was inequitable and uujust for the defendants to claim and sue for the original rent. This ground was insisted upon on the former motion, but it is contended that since then the facts have been more funy elicited by the proofs, and that it has been shown that the complainants actually gave notice to terminate the lease, but were induced to withdraw it, and to proceed upon the other alternative. Th9ugh this is not the way in which the case is presented in the bill, we do not see that it makes any