No argument. The issue with wars nowadays is who is the enemy? As the "enemy" becomes less clear, so does the mission, which then becomes much more political and much less susceptible to military (or purely military) answers. In other words, messy as hell.

Yep. very good point.
I think that's a huge part - not knowing who your enemies are.

other things that I think that contribute to a different approach to war since WWII is not only not knowing who the enemy is/should be, but also no clear objectives, and ROE that basically neuters our soldiers.
I can't imagine being a solider over there right now, not knowing exactly what the objective is.

I think Vietnam was a catalyst; no objective, simply body count to determine if we were 'winning' - not taking territory etc. It seems like ever since then, things have been way out of wack. Personally, I'm not a fan of 'conflicts' and how the Commander in Chiefs essentially has free reign to send troops wherever, whenever, and for whatever reason he deems so (largely based on Politics) under the guise of a 'conflict' not a war.

RIP. I still remember some of those press briefings, including "the luckiest truck driver in Iraq".

Those were absolute gold.

I have this one forever etched in my mind.

The General in front of one fo those maps discussing the latest carpet bombing of the day. He's interrupted by a reporter:

"General, what do you think of Saddam Hussein's military tactics and strategy?"

The General: As far as Saddam Hussein being a great military strategist, he is neither a strategist, nor is he schooled in the operational art, nor is he a tactician, nor is he a general, nor is he a soldier.

Other than that he's a great military man-I want you to know that."

I was sitting in my living room and I thought my son was going to need to revive me after laughing so hard.

The General in front of one fo those maps discussing the latest carpet bombing of the day. He's interrupted by a reporter:

"General, what do you think of Saddam Hussein's military tactics and strategy?"

The General: As far as Saddam Hussein being a great military strategist, he is neither a strategist, nor is he schooled in the operational art, nor is he a tactician, nor is he a general, nor is he a soldier.

Other than that he's a great military man-I want you to know that."

I was sitting in my living room and I thought my son was going to need to revive me after laughing so hard.

This man deserves credit for more than just the victory of Desert Storm he also deserves some of the credit for restoring public confidence in the American military. His leadership in Desert Storm led to victory couped with low American casualties restored the US military's reputation that was severely tarnished by Vietnam.

Rest in peace General...Sir.

This is a great point. The overall moral and public confidence of the military was low during the 70s and 80s.

After the great success of Desert Storm the popularity of the military and veterans were high. Vets were treated completely different than Vietnam vets.Posted via Mobile Device

For references concerning the percieved differences between political influence and the limited U.S. wars of DS/DS vs. OIF see:http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontl...arzkopf/1.html
His oral history from DS/DS or his own book of course. See also frontline's episode called Swarzkopf's Dilemma. Howard and Trainer's book; The General's War compared to their book on OIF;Cobra II also illustrates relatively few differences in political approach and most of the players are the same but in different billets. The evolution of the Combatant Commander (COCOM) Central Command fighting the Ground fight in 91 to the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) in 2003. However, the center of gravity was the same: Saddam. So for results: the mission of liberating Kuwait in 91: Done of course. For terminating the Regime (Saddam) in 2003; Done of course. For Saddam and in particular the defeat of the Republican Guard in 91: Not done- I've got a theory why but that's a whole course.... And we never left the area: Southern Watch continued until OIF, Desert Fox in 98. For WMD search in 2003: Didn't exist or couldn't find it. Key difference is the concept of, "if you break it, you have to fix it," (Powell as SECSTATE vs. Powell as CJCS ) from OIF and OEF that did not exist in 91 and one of the lessons from Swartzkopf's dilemma: Termination criterea or endstate and what the military can and cannot do towards a political endstate. Military buildup in 80s for cold war (WWII parallels) and expansion in 2000s for Counter insurgency (Vietnam parallels) and needs for the future? General Swarzkopf was a solid mentor and he is missed.