CHAP. IV.
Of the different ways of losing sovereignty.
I. LET us now inquire how sovereignty may be lost; and in this there is no
great difficulty, after the principles we have established on the ways of
acquiring it.
II. Sovereignty may be lost by abdication, that is, when the reigning prince
renounces the sovereignty, so far as it regards himself. Of this the history
even of latter ages furnishes us with remarkable examples.
III. As sovereignty derives its original from a covenant between the king
and his subjects; if, for plausible reasons, the king thinks proper to
renounce the supreme dignity, the people have not properly a right to
constrain him to keep it.
IV. But such an abdication must not be made at an unseasonable juncture; as
for instance when the kingdom is likely to sink into a minority, especially
if it be threatened with a war; or when the prince, by his bad conduct, has
thrown the state into a dangerous convulsion, in which he cannot abandon it
without betraying his trust, and ruining his country.
V. But we may safely say, that a prince very rarely finds himself in such
circumstances, as should engage him to renounce the crown. However his
affairs may be situated, he may ease himself of the drudgery of government,
and still retain the superior command. A king ought to die upon the throne;
and it is a weakness unworthy of him, to divest himself of his authority.
Besides, experience has shown, that abdication is too frequently attended
with unhappy catastrophes.
VI. It is therefore certain, that a prince may, for himself, renounce the
crown, or the right of succession. But there is great doubt whether he can
do it for his children.
VII. To judge rightly of this point, which has embarrassed so many
politicians, we must establish the following principles.
1. Every acquisition of right or power over another, and consequently of
sovereignty, supposes the consent of him, over whom this right is to be
acquired, and the acceptance of him, who is to acquire it. Till this
acceptance is settled, the intention of the former does not produce, in
favor of the latter, an absolute and irrevocable right. It is only a simple
designation, which he is at liberty to accept or not.
VIII. 2. Let us apply these principles. The princes of the blood royal, who
have accepted the will of the people, by which the crown has been conferred
on them, have certainly thereby acquired an absolute and irrevocable right,
of which they cannot be stripped without their consent.
IX. 3. With regard to those, who are not yet born, as they have not accepted
the designation of the people, they have not as yet acquired any right.
Hence it follows, that in relation to them, this designation is only an
imperfect act, a kind of expectancy, the completion of which entirely
depends on the will of the people.
X. 4. But it may be said, the ancestors of those, who are not yet born, have
consented and stipulated for them, and consequently received the engagement
of the people in their behalf. But this is rather an argument in favor of
renunciation, which it effectually establishes; for as the right of those,
who are not yet born, has no other foundation, than the concurrence of the
will of the people and of their ancestors, it is evident that this right may
be taken from them, without injustice, by those very persons, from the
single will of whom they hold it.
XI. 5. The single will of a prince, without the consent of the nation,
cannot effectually exclude his children from the crown, to which the people
have called them. In like manner the single will of the people, without the
consent of the prince, cannot deprive his children of an expectancy, which
their father has stipulated with the people for in their favor. But, if
these two wills unite, they may without doubt alter what they have
established.
XII. 6. It is true, this renunciation ought not to be made without a cause,
and through inconstancy and levity. Under these circumstances it cannot be
justified, and the good of the state does not permit, that, without
necessity, an alteration should be made in the order of the succession.
XIII. 7. If, on the other hand, the nation be so situated, that the
renunciation of a prince, or a princess, is absolutely necessary to its
tranquillity and happiness, then the supreme law of the public good, which
has established the order of the succession, requires it should be set
aside.
XIV. 8. Let us add, that it is for the general good of nations, that such
renunciations be valid, the parties interested should not attempt to
disannul them. For there are times and conjunctures, in which they are
necessary for the welfare of the state; and if those, with whom we are
treating, should come to think, that the renunciation would afterwards be
set aside, they certainly would have nothing to do with us. Now this must be
productive of bloody and cruel wars. Grotius decides this question nearly in
the same manner. The reader may see what he says of it.[1]
XV. 9. Since war or conquest is a method of acquiring sovereignty, as we
have seen in the preceding chapter, it is evidently also a mean of losing
it.
XVI. With regard to tyranny and the deposing of sovereigns, both which are
also ways of losing the supreme power, as these two articles bear some
relation to the duties of subjects towards their sovereigns, we shall treat
of them in the next chapter more particularly, after we have considered
those duties.
1. Book ii, chap. vii. § 26. and book ii. chap. iv. § 10.