British universities have in the last one hundred years produced a vast and unsurpassable body of doctoral and other postgraduate research relating to India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma, Afghanistan, Malaysia and other Asian countries.

The first table below contains almost 3,300 entries, each beginning with the date of award and the degree, followed by the University (and College), followed by the title of the thesis, followed by the AUTHOR in capital letters, followed by the name of the thesis supervisor where provided.

NB: There is a second table that follows containing a further 78 77 entries — these latter are, however, incomplete in that either the year or the degree appears not to be available.

If you are an author or thesis-supervisor or other academic representative and you are able to correct any inadvertent error or omission, please feel free to write to me promptly by email and I shall seek to account for it. For omissions, please also identify yourself clearly and send a comment to the post along with the necessary data that you believe should be accounted for. Numerous typos existed in the original transcription, several of which have been corrected though many might remain. In several cases, it is not impossible the original transcription has mis-spelt a name but authentication could require the original thesis to be checked.

This database has been created from public data and is published below with the aim of encouraging further research and reflection. It may be of special interest to notice the choice and quality of subjects in the context of particular times.

Subroto Roy

Postscript: More than one grateful reader has called this document someone’s “labour of love”. I agree though I have to say it was not mine — my contribution has been merely to transform a confused spreadsheet into HTML, editing it very slightly, removing some but not all typos yet, and publishing it. The spreadsheet was one of a million files on my computer, which must mean I downloaded it from some public source at some time though I am afraid I have no record where, most probably in British academia.

Degree University & College Title AUTHOR Supervisor

1909 MA Liverpool The interaction of England and India during the early years of George III Dorothy DUDLEY
1917 BLitt Oxford The history of the occupation and rural administration of Bengal by the English Company from the time of Clive to the permanent settlement under Cornwallis W K FIRMINGER
1917 MA Liverpool The constitutional relations of the Marquess Wellesley with the home authorities Beatrice L FRAZER
1917 BLitt Oxford Agricultural cooperation in British India J MATTHAI
1921 BA Cambridge Relations between the Bombay government and the Marathi powers up to the year 1774 W S DESI
1921 MA Manchester The movement of opinion in England as regards Indian affairs, 1757-1773 E EMMETT Prof Muir
1921 MA Manchester The relations of the Mahrattas with the British power I Kathleen WALKER Prof Muir
1922 BLitt Oxford The history of Burma to 1824 G E HARVEY
1922 PhD London Commercial relations between India and England, 1600-1757 B KRISHNA
1922 MSc London Agricultural problems and conditions in the Bombay Presidency, 1870-1914 M A TATA
1922 BLitt Oxford The Indian calico trade and its influence on English history P J THOMAS
1922 MSc London The cotton industry in India to 1757 J N VARMA Prof Sargeant
1922 PhD Manchester The administration of Bengal under Warren Hastings Sophia WEITZMAN Prof Muir
1923 MA Manchester The administrative and judicial reforms of Lord Cornwallis in Bengal (excluding the permanent settlement) A ASPINALL Mr Higham
1923 MA Manchester The Residency of Oudh during the administration of Warren Hastings C C BRACEWELL Prof Davis
1923 MLitt Cambridge Industrial evolution of India in recent times D R GADGIL
1923 PhD London The Punjab as a sovereign state, 1799-1839 GULSHAM LALL Prof Dodwell
1924 BLitt Oxford Development of the cotton industry in Indian from the early 19th century S DESOUANDE
1925 MA Liverpool Henry Dundas and the government of India, 1784-1800 Dorothy THORNTON Prof Veitch
1926 PhD Cambridge The North West Frontier of India, 1890-1909, with a survey of policy since 1849 C C DAVIES
1927 PhD Leeds A study of the development of agriculture in the Punjab and its economic effects K S BAJWA
1927 BLitt Oxford The military system of the Mahrattas: its origin and development from the time of the Shivaji to the fall of the Mahratta empire S SEN
1928 MA Birmingham The East India Company crisis, 1770-1773 R BEARD
1928 PhD Edinburgh A comparative study of the woollen industry in Scotland and the Punjab J W SIRAJUDDIN Dr Rankin
1929 PhD London The relations of the Governor-General and council with the Governor and council of Madras under the Regulating Act of 1773 A Das GUPTA Prof Dodwell
1929 PhD London, LSE The evolution of Indian income tax, 1860-1922: a historical, critical and comparative study J P NIYOGI
1929 PhD London Development of Indian ralways, 1842-1928 N SANYAL Prof Foxwell; Dr Slater
1930 PhD London Financial history of Mysore, 1799-1831 M H GOPAL Dr Slater; Prof Dodwell
1930 BLitt Oxford, St Cath’s Soc The development of political institutions in the state of Travancore, 1885-1924 V M ITTYERAH
1930 BLitt Oxford Sir Charles Crosthwaite and the consolidation of Burma Mys J MAY-OUNG
1930 PhD London, SOAS Revenue administration of the Sirkars under the East India Company down to 1802 Lanka SUNDERAM
1930 PhD London, LSE Hastings’ experiments in the judicial administration N J M YUSUF
1931 PhD London State policy and economic development in Mysore State since 1881 UDAYAM ABHAYAMBAL Miss Anstey
1931 PhD London The origin and early history of public debt in India P DATTA Prof Coatman
1931 MA London Lord Macaulay and the Indian Legislative Council C D DHARKAR Prof Dodwell
1931 MA London The bilingual problem in Ceylon T D JAYASURIYA
1931 PhD London; LSE Study of agricultural cooperation in India based upon foreign experience H L PASRICHA Prof Gregory
1931 PhD London, UC The administration of Mysore under Sir Mark Cubbon. 1834-1861 K N V SASTRI Prof Dodwell

1931/32 PhD Cambridge, St Cath’s English social life in India in the 18th century T G P SPEAR
1932 PhD London The growth and development of the Indian tea industry and trade S M AKHTAR Dr Anstey
1932 PhD London Anglo-Sikh relations, 1839-1849 K C KHANNA Prof Dodwell
1932 PhD London, LSE Indian commodity market speculation L N MISRA Prof Coatman
1932 PhD London, LSE Indian foreign trade, 1870-1930 Parimal RAY Prof Sargent
1932 PhD London, King’s Ceylon under the British occupation: its political and economic development, 1795-1833 C R de SILVA Prof Newton
1932 PhD London Post-war labour legislation in India – a comparison with Japan Sasadhar SINHA Dr Anstey
1932 PhD London Local finance in India G C VARMA Prof Coatman
1933 PhD Leeds Historical survey of the financial policy of the government of India from 1857 to 1900 and of its economic and other consequences H S BHAI
1933 PhD London The relations between the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India and the Court of Directors, 1784-1816 P CHANDRA Prof Coatman
1934 PhD London The influence of the home government on land revenue and judicial administration in the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal from 1807-1822 B S BALIGA Prof Dodwell
1934 MSc Leeds A survey of the resources of tanning materials and the leather industry of Bhopal State, India G W DOUGLAS
1934 PhD Edinburgh Human geography of Bengal Arthur GEDDES
1934 BLitt Oxford, Somerville A study of the legal and administrative records of Dacca as illustrating the policy of Warren Hastings in East Bengal F M SACHSE
1934 BLitt Oxford Biography of Maharaja DalipSingh K S THAPER
1935 DPhil Oxford The development of the Indian administrative and financial system, 1858-1905, with special reference to the relations F J THOMAS
1936 MSc London British Indian administration: a historical study K R Ramaswami AIYANGAR
1936 MA London Lord Ellenborough’s ideas on Indian policy Kathleen I GARRETT Dr Morrell
1936 MA London British public opinion regarding Indian policy at the time of the mutiny Jessie HOLMES Dr Morrell
1936 PhD London, SOAS The rise and fall of the Rohilla power in Hindustan, 1707-1774 AD A F M K RAHMAN
1936/37 PhD Edinburgh Indian foreign trade, 1900-1931, and its economic background: a study W B RAGHAVIAH
1937 PhD Cambridge, Gonville The national income of British India, 1931-1932 V K R V RAO
1937 PhD London, LSE Culture change in South-Western India A AIYAPPAN
1937 PhD London, UC Banks and industrial finance in India R BAGCHI
1937 PhD London Development of social and political ideas in Bengal, 1858-1884 B C BHATTACHARYA Prof Dodwell
1937 MSc Leeds An interpretation of the distribution of the population within the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh Nora Y BOYDELL
1937 PhD London, LSE Rise and growth of Indian liberalism M A BUCH
1937 PhD London, LSE Industrial finance and management in India N DAS
1937 MSc London, LSE The effect of the breakdown of the international gold standard on India R DORAISWAMY
1937 PhD London, LSE The problem of rural indebtedness in Indian economic life B G GHATE
1937 MSc London, LSE Indian coal trade J GUHATHAKURTA
1937 PhD London SOAS Reorganisation of the Punjab government (1847-1857) R C LAI

1937 PhD London, External An economic and regional geography of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh S M T RIZVI
1937 PhD Wales Purposes and methods of recording and accounting as applied to agriculture, with special reference to provision and use of economic data relating to agriculture in India Arjan SINGH
1938 PhD London, SOAS The relations between Oudh and the East India Company from 1785-1801 P BASU
1938 PhD London, SOAS East India Company’s relations with Assam, 1771-1826 S K BHUYAN
1938 PhD London, LSE Discretionary powers in the Indian Government with special reference to district administration B CHAND
1938 MA London, SOAS The British conquest of Sind K A CHISHTI
1938 PhD Cambridge, Christ’s The working of the Bengal legislative council under the Government of India Act, 1919 J G DRUMMOND
1938 MA London British relations with the Sikhs and Afghans, July 1823 to March 1840 E R KAPADIA
1938 PhD London, SOAS The East India interest and the British government, 1784-1833 C H PHILIPS
1938 PhD London, LSE The position of the Viceroy and Governor General of India A RUDRA
1938 MA London British relations with the Sikhs and Afghans, July 1823 to March 1840 Charles WADE
1938/39 PhD Edinburgh Agricultural geography of the United Provinces B N MUKERJI
1939 PhD London, LSE Industrial development of Mysore R BALAKRISHNA
1939 MA London, LSE A general geographical account of the North West Frontier Province of India M A K DURRANI
1939 PhD Wales The international production and exchange of rice with special reference to the production, market demand and consumption of rice in India and Burma Ahmas KHAN
1939 BLitt Oxford, St Cath’s Soc The Governor-Generalship of Sir John Shore, 1793-1798 A W MAHMOOD
1939 PhD London, LSE Indian provincial finance (1919-1937) with special reference to the United Provinces B R MISRA
1940 PhD London, LSE Recent economic depression in India with reference to agriculture and rural life R K BHAN
1940 PhD Wales The future of agricultural cooperation in the United Provinces (with an examination of the cooperative experience)with special reference to the problems of agricultural cooperation in the United Provinces, India H R CHATURVEDI
1940 PhD London, LSE An administrative study of the development of the civil service in India during the Company’s regime A K GHOSAL
1940 PhD Wales The production, marketing and consumption of the chief oilseeds in India and the supply and use of oilseeds in the United Kingdom A S KHAN
1940 PhD Wales Principles of agricultural planning with reference to relationships of natural resources, populations and dietaries in India and with further reference to rural development in certain provinces of India Jaswant SINGH
1941 PhD London, LSE Financing of local authorities in British India A N BANERJI
1941 PhD London The political and cultural history of the Punjab including the North West Frontier Province in its earliest period L CHANDRA Prof Barnett
1941 PhD London, LSE Capital development of India, 1860-1913 A KRISHNASAWMI
1941 PhD London, LSE Influence of European political doctrines upon the evolution of the Indian governmental institutions and practice, 1858-1938 G PRASAD
1942 MLitt Cambridge, Fitzwilliam Economic and political relations of India with Iran and Afghanistan since 1900 T BASU
1942 PhD Edinburgh A study of missionary policy and methods in Bengal from 1793 to 1905 W B S DAVIS Prof Watt; Prof Buleigh
1943 PhD London, LSE Development of large scale industries in India and their localisation N S SASTRI
1944 BLitt Oxford, St Cath’s Communal representation and Indian self-government I J BAHADOORSINGH
1944 MA London, External The physiographic evolution of Ceylon K KULARATNAM
1946 MA London, SOAS The origins and development to 1892 of the Indian National Congress Iris M JONES
1947 PhD London, LSE The agricultural geography of Bihar P DAYAL
1947 PhD Cambridge, King’s Consumer expenditure in India, 1931/32 to 1940/41 R L DESAI
1947 MA London, LSE Power resources and utilisation in the United Provinces P K DUTT
1947 PhD London, LSE Cultural change with special reference to the hill tribes of Burma and Assam Edmund Ronald LEACH
1947 PhD London, SOAS The judicial administration of the East India Company in Bengal, 1765-1982 B B MISRA
1947 PhD London, LSE The monetary policy of the Reserve Bank of India with special reference to the structural and institutional factors in the economy K N RAJ
1948 PhD Wales The principles and practice of health insurance as applied to India J AGRAWALA
1948 MSc London, LSE International monetary policy since 1919 with special reference to India D C GHOSE
1948 DPhil Oxford, Balliol British policy on the North East Frontier of India, 1826-1886 S GUPTA
1948 DPhil Oxford, St Cath’s Local self-government in the Madras Presidency, 1850-1919 K K PILLAY
1948 PhD London, LSE The problem of the standards of the Indian currency A SADEQUE
1948 DPhil Oxford, Exeter The social function of religion in a south India community Mysore Narasimhashar SRINIVAS
1948 BLitt Oxford, St Cath’s Society Some aspects of agricultural marketing in India with reference to developments in western marketing systems R S SRIVASTAVA
1948 PhD London,. SOAS Muslims in India: a political analysis (from 1885-906) Rafiq ZAKARIA
1949 PhD London, LSE Settlements in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh E AHMAD
1949 PhD London, SOAS The growth of self-government in Assam, 1984-1919 A K BARKAKOTY
1949 PhD London, SOAS British administration in Assam (1825-1845)with special reference to the hill tribes on the frontier H BARPUJARI
1949 MA London An enquiry into the development of training of teachers in the Punjab during the British period Aquila B BERLAS
1949 PhD London, LSE The problem of federation in India with special reference to economic relations J N BHAN
1949 PhD London, LSE A study of methods of national income measurements with special reference to the problems of India V K CHOPRA
1949 PhD London, LSE An analysis of the Indian price structure from 1861 A K GHOSH
1949 DPhil Oxford, Keble The achievement of Christian missionaries in India, 1794-1833 Kenneth INGHAM
1949 PhD Wales The organization and methods of agricultural cooperation in the British Isles and the possibility of their application in the Central Province of India N Y KHER
1949 PhD London, LSE Industrial geography of Bihar S A MAJID
1949 PhD London, LSE Development of Indian public finance during the war, April 1939-March 1946 S MISRA
1949 PhD London, LSE A study of the methods of state regulation of wages with special reference to their possible applications in India S B L NIGAM
1949 PhD London, SOAS The development of marriage in ancient India B C PAUL
1949 PhD St Andrews The social and administrative reforms of Lord William Bentinck G SEED
1950 PhD London, LSE Jails and borstals with special reference to West Bengal B BHATTACHARYYA Dr Mannheim
1950 PhD London The growth of local self-government in Assam, 1874-1919 A K BORKAKOTY Prof C R Philips; Prof Hall
1950 DPhil Oxford, Lady Margaret Hall The problem of the Indian immigrant in British colonial policy after 1834 I Mary CUMPSTON
1950 PhD London, LSE Underemployment and industrialisation: a study of the basic problems with special reference to India B DATTA
1950 PhD London, UC The agriculture of Mysore G K GHORI
1950 PhD London, SOAS The influence of western, particularly English, political ideas on Indian political thought, with special reference to the political ideas of the Indian National Congress, 1885-1919 Sailesh C GHOSH
1950 PhD London, LSE Principles of unemployment insurance and assistance with special reference to their application to India D GUPTA
1950 PhD Newcastle Anglo-Afghan relations, 1798-1878, with particular reference to British policy in Central Asia and on the North West Frontier of India M KHAN
1950 PhD London, LSE The social consequences of imperialism with special reference to Ceylon P R PIERIS
1950 PhD London, LSE An experiment in the estimation of national income and the in the construction of social accounts of India, 1945-1946 D N SAXENA Mr Booker
1950 PhD London, SOAS The relations between the home and Indian governments, 1858-1870 Zahinuddin Husain ZOBERI
1951 PhD London, External Memoir of the geology and mineral resources of the neighbourhood of Bentong, Pahang and adjoining portions of Selangor and Negri Sembilan, incorporating an account of the prospecting and mining activities of the Bentong District J B ALEXANDER
1951 BLitt Oxford, Exeter The political organization of the plains Indians Frederick George BAILEY
1951 BLitt Oxford, Corpus Southern India under Wellesley, 1798-1805 A S BENNELL Mr C C Davies
1951 PhD London, LSE Problems of the Indian foreign exchanges since 1927 D GHOSH
1951 DPhil Oxford, Balliol The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, 1880-1884 S GOPAL Mr R C Davies
1951 MA Wales The problem of the Straits, 1896-1936 E W GRIFFITHS
1951 PhD London, LSE Sources of Indian official statistics relating to production O P GUPTA Dr Rhodes
1951 MA Manchester The administration and financial control of municipalities and district boards in the UP N K KATHIA
1951 PhD Glasgow The legal and constitutional implications of the evolution of Indian independence R KEMAL
1951 PhD Cambridge, Jesus An analysis of the Hindu caste system in its interactions with the total social structure in certain parts of the Malabar coast E J MILLER Prof Hutton
1951 PhD Cambridge, Girton Changes in matrilineal kinship on th Malabar coast E K MILLER Prof Hutton
1951 PhD Bristol Agriculture and horticulture in India – sundry papers K C NAIK
1951 MA Manchester An economic survey of West Pakistan A SHARIF
1951 PhD Cambridge The interpretation of legislative powers under the Government of India Act, 1935 S D SHARMA
1951 BLitt Oxford, St Cath’s Society Religion and society among some of the tribes of Chota Nagpur H N C STEVENSON
1951 London, SOAS The political development of Burma during the period 1918-1935 OHN TIN
1951 PhD London, LSE The working of the Donoughmore constitution of Ceylon, 1931-1947: a study of a colonial central government by executive committees Irripitwebadalge don Samaradasa WEERAWARDANA Mr W H Morris-Jones
1952 PhD London SOAS The career of Mir Jafar Khan, 1757-1765 AD Raya ATULA-CHANDRA Prof C H Philips
1952 PhD London, LSE The development of Calcutta: a study in urban geography M GUHA Prof L D Stamp; Prof O H K Spate
1952 PhD London, LSE The East India Company’s land policy and management in Bengal from 1698 to 1784 Mazharul HUQ Dr Anstey
1952 MA Leeds The social accounts relating to Ceylon E L P JAYTILAKA
1952 MSc London, LSE Rural industries in India: a study in rural economic development with special reference to Madras C K KAUSUKUTTY Dr Anstey
1952 MSc London, LSE India’s balance of international payments with special reference to her food and agricultural conditions G B KULKARNI Dr Anstey; Dr Raeburn
1952 PhD Cambridge Utilitarian influence and the formation of Indian policy, 1820-1840 E T STOKES
1952 PhD London, SOAS Local government in India and Burma, 1908-1937: a comparative study of the evolution and working of local authorities in Bombay, the United Provinces and Burma Hugh R TINKER Prof Hall
1953 PhD London, LSE Economic geography of East Pakistan N AHMAD Prof Stamp
1953 MSc London, UC the changing pattern of India’s foreign trade, with special reference to the impact of large scale industrial development since 1919 A ALAGAPPAN
1953 PhD London, SOAS The East India Company and the economy of Bengal from 1704 to 1740 Sukumar BHATTACHARYYA Prof C H Philips
1953 MA Wales National income of Pakistan for the year 1948-49 Z ul H CHAUDRI
1953 MLitt Cambridge, Fitzwilliam The influence of Western thought on social, educational, political and cultural development of India, 1818-1840 V DATTA Dr T G P Spear
1953 MSc Belfast The growth of trade unions in India S DAYAL
1953 PhD London The establishment of Dutch power in Ceylon, 1638-1658 K W GOONEWARDENA Prof Hall
1953 PhD London, LSE The submontane region of North West Pakistan: a geographical study of its economic development Maryam KARAM-ELAHI Prof Buchanan; Prof Stamp
1953 PhD London, LSE A study of rhe measurement of national product and its distribution, with special reference to Pakistan A H KHANDKER
1953 PhD Edinburgh A regional study of survival, mortality and disease in British India in relation to the geographic factors, 1921-1940 A T A LEARMONTH
1953 PhD London, SOAS Development of the Muslims of Bengal and Bihar, 1819-1856, with special reference to their education A R MAALICK Prof Philips
1953 DPhil Oxford, Jesus The study of the economy of self-subsisting rural communities: the methods of investigation, economic conditions and economic relations, with specific reference to India P K MUKHOPADHYAY
1953 PhD London, LSE The relationship of land tenure to the economic modernization of Uttar Pradesh W C NEALE
1953 PhD London, Bedford Social status of women during the past fifty years (1900=1950) T N PATEL Mrs B Wootton
1953 PhD London, LSE The state in relation to trade unions and trade disputes in India Anand PRAKASH Mr W H Morris-Jones; Mr Roberts
1953 MA London, SOAS The tribal village in Bihar SACHCHIDANANDA Prof C Haimendorf
1953 PhD London, UC Delegated legislation in India V N SHULKA Prof Keeton
1953 PhD London, SOAS The internal policy of the Indian government, 1885-1898 H L SINGH Prof C H Philips
1953 PhD London, SOAS The internal policy of Lord Auckland in British India, 1836-1842, with special reference to education D P SINHA Prof C H Philips
1953/54 MA Leeds Demand for certain exports of Ceylon K THARMARATNAM
1954 MA London The administration of Sir Henry Ward,Governor of Ceylon, 1855-1860 S V BALASINGHAM Prof Graham
1954 PhD London, SOAS Social policy and social change in Western India, 1817-1830 Kenneth A BALLHATCHET Prof C H Philips
1954 Dphil Oxford, St Hilda’s Lord William Bentinck in Bengal, 1828-1835 C E BARRETT Dr C C Davies
1954 MA London A historical survey of the training of teachers in Bengal in the 19th and 20th centuries S BHATTACHARYA
1954 MA London, SOAS Evolution of representative government in India, 1884-1909 Sasadhar CHAKRAVARTY Prof C H Philips

1964 PhD London, UCL, A Comparative Study of Pakistani Bilingual and Monoglot School Children’s Performance in Verbal and Non Verbal Tests Rafia HASAN Dr Charlotte Banks (added thanks to information of Naveed Hasan Henderson, PhD London 1995, in a comment below, and confirmed by the University of London Library)

Table 2: List of theses with incomplete data, listed alphabetically by the University and College followed by the AUTHOR (in capital letters) followed by the Supervisor(s) where available and the thesis Title. The Year and/or Degree were not available in the public database. If you are an author or supervisor or other academic representative, please write in with these details if possible.

Aberdeen Sultan Ali ADIL An economic analysis of energy use in irrigated agriculture of Punjab PhD
Birmingham 0.365217391 S A KARUNANAYAKE An evaluation of the present system of local government in Ceylon in the light of national needs for unity and economic and social development and proposals for appropriate changes PhD
Birmingham 0.369264706 M G KANBUR Spatial equilibrium analysis of trhe rice economy of South India 2000
BradfordCambridge, Trinity Z KHAN The development of overt nuclear weapon states in South Asia PhD
Cambridge Katherine Helen PRIOR The British administration of Hinduism in India, 1780-1900 PhD
Cambridge G CHAKRAVARTY Imagining resistance: British historiography and popular fiction on the Indian Rebellion of 1857-1859 PhD
Cambridge 0.327375 Ajit Kumar GHOSE Production organisation, markets and resource use in Indian agriculture PhD
Cambridge 0.361285714 M J EGAN A structural analysis of a Sinhalese healing ritual PhD
Cambridge, King’s 0.301 J A LAIDLAW The religion of Svetambar Jain merchants in Jaipur PhD
Cambridge, Pembroke H T FRY Prof E E Rich Alexander Dalrymple, cosmographer and servant of the East India Company PhD
Cambridge, Trinity Magnus Murray MARSDEN Dr S B Bayly Islamization and globalization in Chitral, Northern Pakistan
Cambridge, Trinity Hall C J JEFFREY Dr S E Corbridge Reproducing difference: the accumulation strategies of richer Jat farmers in Western Uttar Pradesh, India 2002
Cambridge, Wolfson Gethin REES DrD K Chakrabarti Buddhism and trade: rock cut caves of the Western Ghats PhD
Cranfield, Silsoe Ariyaratne DISSANAYAKE J Morris Research and development and extension for agricultural mechanisation in Sri Lanka
De Montfort S JAIN The havelis of Rajasthan: form and identity PhD
Durham 0.401311475 M F A KHAN The arid zone of West Pakistan PhD
East Anglia John HARISS Technological change in agricultural and agrarian social structure in Northen Tamil Nadu, India PhD
Edinburgh N THIN High spirits and heteroglossia: forest festivals of the Nilgiri Irulas PhD
Edinburgh AKSHAY KHANNA Sexuality as a political object in civil society: active formations in India 2003
Edinburgh Rebecca WALKER Concepts of peace in conflict situations in Sri Lanka PhD
Glasgow Sana KHOKHAR Dr F Noorbakhsh; Dr A Paloni An evaluation of the structural adjustment and economic reform programme: a case study of Pakistan MPhil
Lancaster J A BURR Cultural stereotypes and the diagnosis of depression: women from South Asian communities and their experience of mental distress 1980
Leeds E K TARIN Health sector reforms: factors influencing the policy process for government initiatives in the Punjab (Pakistan) health sector, 1993-2000 PhD
Leeds 0.35375 A P A FERNANDO Agricultural development of Ceylon since independence (1948-1968)- an investigation into some aspects of agricultural development in Ceylon and an evaluation of major agricultural policies adopted in the peasant sector PhD
Leeds 0.35375 M S KHAN Policies and planning for agricultural development with a high population density: a case study of East Pakistan PhD
London F R M HASAN Ecology and rural class relations in Bangladesh: a study with special reference to three villages PhD
London B GHOSH Dr Anstey The Indian salt industry, trade and taxation PhD
London R L HATFIELD Management reform in a centralised environment: primary education administration in Balochistan, Pakistan, 1992-1997 MSc
London GAYAS-UD-DIN Medical library and information system for India PhD
London Sarmistha PAL Choice of casual and regular labour contracts in Indian agriculture: a theoretical and empirical analysis 2000London, SOAS Pillarisetti SUDHIR Mr Chaudhuri British attitudes to Indian nationalism, 1922-1935 2001 (Apropos the author’s correction in the Comments section, this entry has been moved to the main list.)
London, External 0.357464789 A A KHATRI Marriage and family relationships in Gujerati fiction PhD
London, Imperial Sinniah JEYALINGAWATHANI Thr utilisation of indigenous and imported Bos indicus breeds in the dry zone of Sri Lanka 2002
London, LSE A KUNDU Prof Allen; Mr Booker Statistical measures of five year plans in India 2003
London, LSE Flora Elizabeth CORNISH Dr C Campbell Constructing an actionable environment: colelctive action for HIV prevention among Kolkata sex workers MPhil
London, LSE 0.423157895 B P DUTIA Economic aspects of production and marketing of cotton in India PhD
London, LSHTM Margaret J LEPPARD Obstetric care in a Bangladeshi hospital: an organisational ethnography PhD
London, LSHTM Steven RUSSELL Can households afford to be ill ? the role of the health system, maternal resources and social networks in Sri Lanka PhD
London, LSHTM Syed Mohd Akramuz ZAMAN Cohort study of the effect of measles on childhood morbidity in urban Bangladesh PhD
London, LSHTM Mrigesh Roopchandra BHATIA Economic evaluation od malaria control in Surat, India: bednets versus residual insecticide apray PhD
London, SOAS A B M MAHMOOD Mr Harrison The land revenue history of the Rajshahi zamindari, 1765-1793 PhD
London, SOAS Oliver David SPRINGATE-BAGINSKY Dr S I Jewitt Sustainable development through particpatory forest management: an analysis of the long term role of the cooperative forest societies of Kangra District, Himachal Pradesh, India PhD
London, SOAS Isabella NARDI Dr G Tillotson The Citrasutras: the Indian theory of painting 1929? MA
London, SOAS Angela ATKINS Dr R Snell The Indian novel in English and Hindi PhD
London, SOAS Angela C EYRE Land, language and literary identity: a thematic comparison of Indian novels in Hindi and English MA
London, SOAS Rajit Kumar MAZUMDER Prof P G Robb The making of Punjab: colonial power, the Indian army and recruited peasants, 1849-1939 MA
London, SOAS Lalita Nath PANIGRAHI Prof a l Basham The practice of female infanticide in India and its suppression in the North Western Provinces PhD
London, SOAS 0.318795181 Terumichi KAWAI Freedom of religion in comparative constitutional law with special reference to the UK, US, India and Japan MPhil
London, SOAS 0.3432 W P KINNEY Dr M Caldwell; P C Ayre Aspects of economic development in Malaya MA
London, SOAS 0.35375 K D GAUR Economic crimes relating to income tax in India: a critical analysis of tax evasion and tax avoidance PhD
London, SOAS 0.35375 A GHAFFAR Protection of personal liberty under the Pakistan constitution BLitt
London, SOAS 0.35375 K P MISHRA Dr J B Harrison The administration and economy of the Banaras region, 1738-1795 BLitt
London, SOAS 0.382153846 K M KARIM The provinces of Bihar and Bengal under Shabjahan 2003
Manchester A BERADLEY Prof Muir Settlement of the Madras Presidency, 1765-1827 MA
Manchester W A G HARRINGTON The theory and practice of non-formal education in developing countries with case studies from India PhD
Manchester Jane HAGGIS Professional ladies and working wives: female missionaries in the London Missionary Society and its South Travancoe District, South India, 1850-1900 MPhil
Manchester 0.401311475 S T G FERNANDO A historical and analytical account of export taxation in Ceylon, 1802-1958 PhD
Manchester 0.411864407 R L KUMAR India’s post-war balance of payments sincce 1945-1955 DPhil
Manchester 0.417413793 T S EPSTEIN A comparative study of economic change and differentiation in two South Indian villages PhD
Manchester Metropolitan S PAREKH Relationships between children with cerebral palsy and their siblings: an ethnography in Kolkata, India
Newcastle Alice MALPASS Dr P Phillimore Hibred kala: the hybrid age of choice, dissent and imagination: contract faming and genetically modified cotton in Karnataka, South India MSC
Newcastle 0.373432836 K K KHOSLA Conditions of labour and labour legislation of industrial workers in India since 1947 2001
North London Jasmin ARA Ms R Glanville Primary health care facilities in Bangladesh: a method of planning and design taking account of limited resources, local technology, future growth and change 2000
Oxford W M KHAN An economic evaluation of the alternative uses of land under state forests in Baluchistan 1999
Oxford, Campion Hall P EKKE Dr D F Brook An ethnogaphic survey of the Oraons and the Mundas of Chota-Nagpur 1991
Oxford, Nuffield Alistair McMILLAN Dr N Gooptu; Prof A F Heath Scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and party competition in India 1991
Oxford, St Hilda’s H Vinita TSENG Prof R F Gombrich The Nidanavagga of the Saratthappakasini: the first two vaggas 1993
Oxford, Wolfson Somadeva VASUDEVA Prof A G J S Sanderson The yoga of the Malinivijayottaratantra 1994
Reading 0.38671875 M A KAMAL Balances and unbalanced growth as exemplified by a decade of planning experience in India 1994
Salford S CHOWDHURY Mr E K Grime Housing in Bangladesh 1998
Sheffield RITA SAIKIA Prof M F Lynch The utility of object-oriented domain specification in the context of a large organisation in India 1998
Southampton 0.369264706 Mohammad A MONDAL A suggested approach to the solution of the profit measurement and asset valuation with reference to the developing economies of India and Pakisttan 1999
Strathclyde 0.37358209 T G GEHANI A critical review of the work of Scottish Presbyterian missions in India, 1878-1914 1999
Sussex R G HESELTINE The development and impact of jute cultivation in Bengal, 1870-1930 2000
Wales Animesh HALDER Potential diversification in India’s export pattern 2000
Wales, Swansea S S MUKHERJEE Urban process in Calcutta: some planning implications 2004
Wales, Swansea Julia CLEEVES Gender and reproductive health: issues in hormonal contraception in India 2004
Wales, University College of Swansea 0.346621622 E A KUMARASINGHE Information for health planning in Sri Lanka 1965

The Government of Pakistan is said to be due to release its initial report on the involvement of Pakistanis in the Mumbai massacres. It is reportedly expected that the G o P will partly if not mainly or wholly attribute responsibility for the planning of the massacres to expatriate Pakistanis in other countries, perhaps in Europe and Britain. If so, a fact the Government of India might find prudent to recall is that the Government of Pakistan in bygone decades did deny citizenship to Rahmat Ali himself (who invented the acronym “P, A, K, I, S, T, A, N” ) and even deported him back to Britain from where he had carried out his vituperative and bigoted campaign against Hindus.

Rahmat Ali’s British grave has become a site of pilgrimage for expatriate Pakistani extremists and his ignorant hate-filled ideology from the 1930s has been inspiring their modern manifestos. I said this in an article published in Karachi’s Dawn newspaper in 2005, which also pointed to Iqbal and Jinnah’s disdain for Rahmat Ali’s views (see “Iqbal and Jinnah vs Rahmat Ali” republished here). American nationals and British subjects of Pakistani origin inspired by Rahmat Ali’s ghost are spreading theories of Pakistani territorial expansionism at the cost of the destruction of the Indian Republic and many other countries.

The fact that at one such website recently I myself, presumably because of my Hindu name and Indian nationality, have been referred to as a “monkey- or donkey-worshipper” 😀 may speak to the somewhat rabid nature of such ideologies. (Drat! And there I was expecting some elementary Pakistani courtesy and acknowledgment let alone gratitude for having created, at great personal cost at an American university twenty years ago, the volume with WE James titled Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s with its mundane chapters on agriculture, macroeconomics, education etc!)

An Indian Reply to President Zardari:

by

Subroto Roy

Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari’s recent argument in the New York Times resembles closely the well-known publications of his ambassador to the United States, Mr Husain Haqqani. Unfortunately, this Zardari-Haqqani thesis about Pakistan’s current predicament in the world and the world’s predicament with Pakistan is shot through with clear factual and logical errors. These need to be aired because true or useful conclusions cannot be reached from mistaken premises or faulty reasoning.

1. Origins of Pakistan, India, J&K, and their mutual problems

Mr Zardari makes the following seemingly innocuous statement:

“…. the two great nations of Pakistan and India, born together from the same revolution and mandate in 1947, must continue to move forward with the peace process.”

Now as a matter of simple historical fact, the current entities in the world system known as India and Pakistan were not “born together from the same revolution and mandate in 1947”. It is palpably false to suppose they were and Pakistanis indulge in wishful thinking and self-deception about their own political history if they suppose this.

India’s Republic arose out of the British Dominion known as “India” which was the legal successor of the entity known previously in international law as “British India”. British India had had secular governance and so has had the Indian Republic.

By contrast, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan arose out of a newly created state in international law known as the British Dominion of Pakistan, consisting of designated territory carved out of British India by a British decision and coming into existence one day before British India extinguished itself. (Another new state, Bangladesh, later seceded from Pakistan.)

The British decision to create territory designated “Pakistan” had nothing to do with any anti-British “revolution” or “mandate” supported by any Pakistani nationalism because there was none. (Rahmat Ali’s anti-Hindu pamphleteering in London could be hardly considered Pakistani nationalism against British rule. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s Pashtun patriots saw themselves as Indian, not Pakistani.)

To the contrary, the British decision had to do with a small number of elite Pakistanis — MA Jinnah foremost among them — demanding not to be part of the general Indian nationalist movement that had been demanding a British departure from power in the subcontinent. Jinnah’s separatist party, the Muslim League, was trounced in the 1937 provincial elections in all the Muslim-majority areas of British India that would eventually become Pakistan. Despite this, in September 1939, Britain, at war with Nazi Germany, chose to elevate the political power of Jinnah and his League to parity with the general Indian nationalist movement led by MK Gandhi. (See, Francis Robinson, in William James and Subroto Roy (eds), Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s.) Britain needed India’s mostly Muslim infantry-divisions — the progenitors of the present-day Pakistan Army — and if that meant tilting towards a risky political idea of “Pakistan” in due course, so it would be. The thesis that Pakistan arose from any kind of “revolution” or “mandate” in 1947 is fantasy — the Muslim super-elite that invented and endorsed the Pakistan idea flew from Delhi to Karachi in chartered BOAC Dakotas, caring not a hoot about the vulnerability of ordinary Muslim masses to Sikh and Hindu majority wrath and retaliation on the ground.

Modern India succeeded to the rights and obligations of British India in international law, and has had a recognized existence as a state since at least the signing of the Armistice and Treaty of Versailles in 1918-1919. India was a founding member of the United Nations, being a signatory of the 1945 San Francisco Declaration, and an original member of the Bretton Woods institutions. An idea put forward by Argentina that as of 1947 India and Pakistan were both successor states of British India was rejected by the UN (Argentina withdrew its own suggestion), and it was universally acknowledged India was already a member of the UN while Pakistan would have to (and did) apply afresh for membership as a newly created state in the UN. Pakistan’s entry into the UN had the enthusiastic backing of India and was opposed by only one existing UN member, Afghanistan, due to a conflict that continues to this day over the legitimacy of the Durand Line that bifurcated the Pashtun areas.

Such a review of elementary historical facts and the position in law of Pakistan and India is far from being of merely pedantic interest today. Rather, it goes directly to the logical roots of the conflict over the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) — a state that itself originated as an entity in the world system a full century before Pakistan was to do so and more than half a century before British India did, but which would collapse into anarchy and civil war in 1947-1949.

Britain (or England) had been a major nation-state in the world system recognized since Grotius first outlined modern international law. On March 16 1846, Britain entered into a treaty, the Treaty of Amritsar, with one Gulab Singh, and the “State of Jammu & Kashmir” came to arise as a recognizable entity in international law for the first time. (See my “History of Jammu and Kashmir” published in The Statesman, Oct 29-30 2006, available elsewhere here.)

Jammu & Kashmir continued in orderly existence as a state until it crashed into legal and political anarchy and civil war a century later. The new Pakistan had entered into a “Standstill Agreement” with the State of Jammu & Kashmir as of August 15 1947. On or about October 22 1947, Pakistan unilaterally ended that Standstill Agreement and instead caused military forces from its territory to attack the State of Jammu & Kashmir along the Mansehra Road towards Baramula and Srinagar, coinciding too with an Anglo-Pakistani coup d’etat in Gilgit and Baltistan (see my “Solving Kashmir”; “Law, Justice & J&K”; “Pakistan’s Allies”, all published in The Statesman in 2005-2006 and available elsewhere here).

The new Pakistan had chosen, in all deliberation, to forswear law, politics and diplomacy and to resort to force of arms instead in trying to acquire J&K for itself via a military decision. It succeeded only partially. Its forces took and then lost both Baramula and Kargil; they may have threatened Leh but did not attempt to take it; they did take and retain Muzaffarabad and Skardu; they were never near taking the summer capital, Srinagar, though might have threatened the winter capital, Jammu.

All in all, a Ceasefire Line came to be demarcated on the military positions as of February 1 1949. After a war in 1971 that accompanied the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, that Ceasefire Line came to be renamed the “Line of Control” between Pakistan and India. An ownerless entity may be acquired by force of arms — the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-1949 had become an ownerless entity that had been dismembered and divided according to military decision following an armed conflict between Pakistan and India. The entity in the world system known as the “State of Jammu & Kashmir” created on March 16 1846 by Gulab Singh’s treaty with the British ceased to exist as of October 22 1947. Pakistan had started the fight over J&K but there is a general rule of conflicts that he who starts a fight does not get to finish it.

Such is the simplest and most practical statement of the history of the current problem. The British, through their own compulsions and imperial pretensions, raised all the talk about a “Lapse of Paramountcy” of the British Crown over the “Native Princes” of “Indian India”, and of how, the “Native Princes” were required to “accede” to either India or Pakistan. This ignored Britain’s own constitutional law. BR Ambedkar pointed out with unsurpassed clarity that no “Lapse of Paramountcy” was possible even for a single logical moment since “Paramountcy” over any “Native Princes” who had not joined India or Pakistan as of August 15 1947, automatically passed from British India to its legal successor, namely, the Dominion of India. It followed that India’s acquiescence was required for any subsequent accession to Pakistan – an acquiescence granted in case of Chitral and denied in case of Junagadh.

What the Republic of India means by saying today that boundaries cannot be redrawn nor any populations forcibly transferred is quite simply that the division of erstwhile J&K territory is permanent, and that sovereignty over it is indivisible. What Pakistan has claimed is that India has been an occupier and that there are many people inhabiting the Indian area who may not wish to be Indian nationals and who are being compelled against their will to remain so ~ forgetting to add that precisely the same could be said likewise of the Pakistani-held area. The lawful solution I proposed in “Solving Kashmir, “Law, Justice and J&K” and other works has been that the Republic of India invite every person covered under its Article 370, citizen-by-citizen, under a condition of full information, to privately and without fear decide, if he/she has not done so already, between possible Indian, Iranian, Afghan or Pakistani nationalities ~ granting rights and obligations of permanent residents to any of those persons who may choose for whatever private reason not to remain Indian nationals. If Pakistan acted likewise, the problem of J&K would indeed come to be resolved. The Americans, as self-appointed mediators, have said they wish “the people of the region to have a voice” in a solution: there can be no better expression of such voice than allowing individuals to privately choose their own nationalities and their rights and responsibilities accordingly. The issue of territorial sovereignty is logically distinct from that of the choice of nationality by individual inhabitants.

2. Benazir’s assassination falsely compared to the Mumbai massacres

Secondly, President Zardari draws a mistaken comparison between the assassination last year of his wife, Benazir Bhutto, and the Mumbai massacres a few weeks ago. Ms Bhutto’s assassination may resemble more closely the assassinations in India of Indira Gandhi in 1984 and Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.

Indira Gandhi died in “blowback” from the unrest she and her younger son and others in their party had opportunistically fomented among Sikh fundamentalists and sectarians since the late 1970s. Rajiv Gandhi died in “blowback” from an erroneous imperialistic foreign policy that he, as Prime Minister, had been induced to make by jingoistic Indian diplomats, a move that got India’s military needlessly involved in the then-nascent Sri Lankan civil war. Benazir Bhutto similarly may be seen to have died in “blowback” from her own political activity as prime minister and opposition leader since the late 1980s, including her own encouragement of Muslim fundamentalist forces. Certainly in all three cases, as in all assassinations, there were lapses of security too and imprudent political judgments made that contributed to the tragic outcomes.

Ms Bhutto’s assassination has next to nothing to do with the Mumbai massacres, besides the fact the perpetrators in both cases were Pakistani terrorists. President Zardari saying he himself has lost his wife to terrorism is true but not relevant to the proper diagnosis of the Mumbai massacres or to Pakistan-India relations in general. Rather, it serves to deflect criticism and condemnation of the Pakistani state’s pampered handing of Pakistan’s terrorist masterminds, as well as the gross irresponsibility of Pakistan’s military scientists (not AQ Khan) who have been recently advocating a nuclear first strike against India in the event of war.

3. Can any religious nation-state be viable in the modern world?

President Zardari’s article says:

“The world worked to exploit religion against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan by empowering the most fanatic extremists as an instrument of destruction of a superpower. The strategy worked, but its legacy was the creation of an extremist militia with its own dynamic.”

This may be overly simplistic. As pointed out in my article “Pakistan’s Allies”, Gregory Zinoviev himself after the Bolshevik Revolution had declared that international communism “turns today to the peoples of the East and says to them, ‘Brothers, we summon you to a Holy War first of all against British imperialism!’ At this there were cries of Jehad! Jehad! And much brandishing of picturesque Oriental weapons.” (Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, 1990, p. 213). For more than half of the 20th century, orthodox Muslims had been used by Soviet communists against British imperialism, then by the British and Americans (through Pakistan) against Soviet communism. Touché! Blowback and counter-blowback! The real question that arises from this today may be why orthodox Muslims have allowed themselves to be used either way by outside forces and have failed in developing a modern nation-state and political culture of their own. Europe and America only settled down politically after their religious wars were over. Perhaps no religious nation-state is viable in the modern world.

4. Pakistan’s behaviour leads to schizophrenia in international relations

President Zardari pleads for, or perhaps demands, resources from the world:

“the best response to the Mumbai carnage is to coordinate in counteracting the scourge of terrorism. The world must act to strengthen Pakistan’s economy and democracy, help us build civil society and provide us with the law enforcement and counterterrorism capacities that will enable us to fight the terrorists effectively.”

Six million pounds from Mr Gordon Brown, so much from here or there etc — President Zardari has apparently demanded 100 billion dollars from America and that is the price being talked about for Pakistan to dismantle its nuclear weapons and be brought under an American “nuclear umbrella” instead.

I have pointed out elsewhere that what Pakistan seems to have been doing in international relations for decades is send out “mixed messages” – i.e. contradictory signals, whether in thought, word or deed. Clinical psychologists following the work of Gregory Bateson would say this leads to confusion among Pakistan’s interlocutors (a “double bind”) and the symptoms arise of what may be found in schizophrenic relationships. (See my article “Do President-elect Obama’s Pakistan specialists believe…”; on the “double bind” theory, an article I chanced to publish in the Journal of Genetic Psychology, 1986, may be of interest).

Here are a typical set of “mixed messages” emanating from Pakistan’s government and opinion-makers:

“We have nuclear weapons “We keep our nuclear weapons safe from any misuse or unauthorized use “We are willing to use nuclear weapons in a first strike against India “We do not comprehend the lessons of Hiroshima-Nagasaki “We do not comprehend the destruction India will visit upon us if we strike them “We are dangerous so we must not be threatened in any way “We are peace-loving and want to live in peace with India and Afghanistan “We love to play cricket with India and watch Bollywood movies “We love our Pakistan Army as it is one public institution that works “We know the Pakistan Army has backed armed militias against India in the past “We know these militias have caused terrorist attacks “We are not responsible for any terrorist attacks “We do not harbour any terrorists “We believe the world should pay us to not use or sell our nuclear weapons “We believe the world should pay us to not encourage the terrorists in our country “We believe the world should pay us to prevent terrorists from using our nuclear weapons “We hate India and do not want to become like India “We love India and want to become like India “We are India and we are not India…”

Etc.

A mature rational responsible and self-confident Pakistan would have said instead:

“We apologise to India and other countries for the outrageous murders our nationals have committed in Mumbai and elsewhere “We ask the world to watch how our professional army is deployed to disarm civilian and all “non-state” actors of unauthorized firearms and explosives “We do not need and will not demand or accept a dollar in any sort of foreign aid, military or civilian, to solve our problems “We realize our economic and political institutions are a mess and we must clean them up “We will strive to build a society imbued with what Iqbal described as the spirit of modern times..”

As someone who created at great personal cost at an American university twenty years ago the book Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s, I have a special interest in hoping that Pakistan shall find the path of wisdom.

The crime of murder is that of deliberate homicide, that of mass-murder is the murder of a mass of people. There is no doubt the lone captured Mumbai terrorist, “Kasab”, has committed mass-murder, being personally responsible for the murder of probably 20 or 30 wholly innocent people he had never met. He killed them by machine-gun fire and grenades at CST/VT railway station on November 26 2008 before being shot and captured by police. He is also a co-conspirator in the mass-murders carried out by his associate at the railway station and those elsewhere in Mumbai. There is no doubt he should serve rigorous imprisonment for life in an Indian prison for his crimes.

And yet…. And yet…

If the Government of India is sensible, it needs to describe and comprehend the moral subtleties of the circumstances surrounding Kasab’s life, especially during the last year. Here was a stupid, ignorant, rather primitive youth misguided by others first into becoming a petty robber, later into becoming a terrorist-trainee in hope of advancing his career in thievery!

Bakri-Id 2008 has just occurred – it is on Bakri-Id a year ago in 2007 that Kasab reportedly first ventured into volunteering for terrorist training as a way of learning how to use firearms! It is almost certain he had never met a Hindu or an Indian in his life before then, that he knew absolutely nothing about the subcontinent’s history or politics, that he would be ignorant about who, say, Iqbal or Jinnah or Maulana Azad or Sheikh Abdullah or Mahatma Gandhi ever were. Within less than a year, that same youth had been brainwashed and trained adequately enough by Pakistan’s terrorist masterminds to become a robotic mass-murderer in Mumbai’s railway station. Now having been caught and treated humanely by his captors, he has confessed everything and even expressed a wish to write a letter to his father in Pakistan expressing remorse for his deeds.

If I was the judge trying him, I would sentence him to a minimum of twenty or thirty years rigorous imprisonment in an Indian prison. But I would add that he should be visited in jail by a few of India’s Muslim leaders, and indeed he should be very occasionally allowed out of the prison (under police supervision) in a structured program to offer Namaz with India’s Muslims in our grandest mosques. He should learn firsthand a little of the lives of India’s Muslims and of India’s people as a whole. Perhaps he will become a model prisoner, perhaps he may even want to become in due course a potent weapon against the terrorist masterminds who ruined his life by sending him to murder people in India.

It bears to be remembered that in an incredible act of Christian forgiveness, the widow of the Australian missionary Graham Staines forgave the cold-blooded murderers who burnt alive her husband and her young sons as they slept in a jeep in Orissa. The family of Rajiv Gandhi may have done the same of those who assassinated or conspired to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi. This is the land of Mahatma Gandhi, who had woven a remarkable moral and political theory out of the Jain-Buddhist-Hindu doctrine of ahimsa as well as Christian notions from Tolstoy and Thoreau of forgiving the sinner.

Of course there cannot be forgiveness where there is no remorse. Kasab’s behaviour thus far suggests he will be remorseful and repentant; there are many other thieves and murderers in the world who are not.

Subroto Roy

Reported statement of Mohammad Ajmal Amir ‘Kasab’, 21, to police after arrest: “I have resided in Faridkot, Dinalpur tehsil, Ukada district, Suba Punjab state, Pakistan since my birth. I studied up to class IV in a government school. After leaving school in 2000, I went to stay with my brother in Tohit Abad mohalla, near Yadgar Minar in Lahore. I worked as a labourer at various places till 2005, visiting my native once in a while. In 2005, I had a quarrel with my father. I left home and went to Ali Hajveri Darbar in Lahore, where boys who run away from home are given shelter. The boys are sent to different places for employment. One day a person named Shafiq came there and took me with him. He was from Zhelam and had a catering business. I started working for him for Rs120 per day. Later, my salary was increased to Rs200 per day. I worked with him till 2007. While working with Shafiq, I came in contact with one Muzzafar Lal Khan, 22. He was from Romaiya village in Alak district in Sarhad, Pakistan. Since we were not getting enough money, we decided to carry out robbery/dacoity to make big money. So we left the job.

We went to Rawalpindi, where we rented a flat. Afzal had located a house for us to loot… We required some firearms for our mission… While we were in search of firearms, we saw some LeT stalls at Raja Bazaar in Rawalpindi on the day of Bakri-id. We then realised that even if we procured firearms, we would not be able to operate them. Therefore, we decided to join LeT for weapons training. We reached the LeT office and told a person that we wanted to join LeT. He noted down our names and address and told us to come the next day. The next day, there was another person with him. He gave us Rs200 and some receipts. Then he gave us the address of a place called Marqas Taiyyaba, Muridke, and told us to go to there. It was an LeT training camp. We went to the place by bus. We showed the receipts at the gate of the camp. We were allowed inside… Then we were taken to the actual camp area. Initially, we were selected for a 21 days’ training regimen called Daura Sufa. From the next day, our training started.

After the training, we were told that we will begin the next stage involving advanced training. But for that, we were told, we had to do some khidmat for two months (khidmat is a sort of service in the camp as per trainees’ liking). We agreed. After two months, I was allowed to go to meet my parents. I stayed with my parents for a month. Then I went to an LeT camp in Shaiwainala, Muzaffarabad, for advanced training… We were taken to Chelabandi pahadi area for a training programme, called Daura Khas, of three months. It involved handling weapons, using hand grenade, rocket launchers and mortars.

There were 32 trainees in the camp. Sixteen were selected for a confidential operation by one Zaki-ur-Rehman, alias Chacha, but three of them ran away from the camp. Chacha sent the remaining 13 with a person called Kafa to the Muridke camp again. At Muridke, we were taught swimming and made familiar with the life of fishermen at sea… We were given lectures on the working of Indian security agencies. We were shown clippings highlighting atrocities on Muslims in India. After the training, we were allowed to go to our native places. I stayed with my family for seven days. I then went to the LeT camp at Muzaffarabad. The 13 of us were present for training. Then, on Zaki-ur-Rehman’s instructions, Kafa took us to the Muridke camp. The training continued for a month. We were given lectures on India and its security agencies, including RAW. We were also trained to evade security personnel. We were instructed not to make phone calls to Pakistan after reaching India.

The names of the persons present for the training are: n Mohd Azmal, alias Abu Muzahid n Ismail, alias Abu Umar n Abu Ali n Abu Aksha n Abu Umer n Abu Shoeb n Abdul Rehman (Bada) n Abdul Rehman (Chhota) n Afadulla n Abu Umar. After the training, Chacha selected 10 of us and formed five teams of two people each on September 15. I and Ismail formed a team; its codename was VTS. We were shown Azad Maidan in Mumbai on Google Earth’s site on the internet… We were shown a film on VT railway station. The film showed commuters during rush hours. We were instructed to carry out firing during rush hours — between 7 am and 11 am and between 7 pm and 11 pm. Then we were to take some people hostage, take them to the roof of some nearby building and contact Chacha, who would have given us numbers to contact media people and make demands. This was the strategy decided upon by our trainers. The date fixed for the operation was September 27. However, the operation was cancelled for some reason. We stayed in Karachi till November 23. The other teams were: 2nd team: a) Abu Aksha; b) Abu Umar; 3rd team: a) Abdul Rehman (Bada); b) Abu Ali; 4th team: a) Abdul Rehman (Chotta); b) Afadulla; 5th team: a) Abu Shoeb; b) Abu Umer.

On November 23, the teams left from Azizabad in Karachi, along with Zaki-ur-Rehman and Kafa. We were taken to the nearby seashore… We boarded a launch. After travelling for 22 to 25 nautical miles we boarded a bigger launch. Again, after a journey of an hour, we boarded a ship, Al-Huseini, in the deep sea. While boarding the ship, each of us was given a sack containing eight grenades, an AK-47 rifle, 200 cartridges, two magazines and a cellphone. Then we started towards the Indian coast. When we reached Indian waters, the crew members of Al-Huseini hijacked an Indian launch. The crew of the launch was shifted to Al-Huseini. We then boarded the launch. An Indian seaman was made to accompany us at gunpoint; he was made to bring us to the Indian coast. After a journey of three days, we reached near Mumbai’s shore. While we were still some distance away from the shore, Ismail and Afadulla killed the Indian seaman (Tandel) in the basement of the launch. Then we boarded an inflatable dinghy and reached Badhwar Park jetty. I then went along with Ismail to VT station by taxi. After reaching the hall of the station, we went to the toilet, took out the weapons from our sacks, loaded them, came out of the toilet and started firing indiscriminately at passengers. Suddenly, a police officer opened fire at us. We threw hand grenades towards him and also opened fire at him. Then we went inside the railway station threatening the commuters and randomly firing at them. We then came out of the railway station searching for a building with a roof. But we did not find one. Therefore, we entered a lane. We entered a building and went upstairs. On the third and fourth floors we searched for hostages but we found that the building was a hospital and not a residential building. We started to come down. That is when policemen started firing at us. We threw grenades at them.

While coming out of the hospital premises, we saw a police vehicle passing. We took shelter behind a bush. Another vehicle passed us and stopped some distance away. A police officer got off from the vehicle and started firing at us. A bullet hit my hand and my AK-47 fell out of my hand. When I bent to pick it up another bullet hit me on the same hand. Ismail opened fire at the officers in the vehicle. They got injured and firing from their side stopped. We waited for a while and went towards the vehicle. There were three bodies in the vehicle. Ismail removed the bodies and drove the vehicle. I sat next to him. Some policemen tried to stop us. Ismail opened fire at them. The vehicle had a flat tyre near a big ground by the side of road. Ismail got down from the vehicle, stopped a car at gunpoint and removed the three lady passengers from the car. Since I was injured, Ismail carried me to the car. He then drove the car. We were stopped by policemen on the road near the seashore. Ismail fired at them, injuring some policemen. The police also opened fire at us. Ismail was injured in the firing. The police removed us from the vehicle and took us to the same hospital. In the hospital, I came to know that Ismail had succumbed to injuries. My statement has been read to me and explained in Hindi, and it has been correctly recorded.”

India’s Muslim Voices

(Or, Let us be clear the Pakistan-India or Kashmir conflicts have not been Muslim-Hindu conflicts so much as intra-Muslim conflicts about Muslim identity and self-knowledge on the Indian subcontinent)

by

Subroto Roy

Ill-informed Western observers, especially at purported “think tanks” and news-portals, frequently proclaim the Pakistan-India confrontation and Jammu & Kashmir conflict to represent some kind of savage irreconcilable division between Islamic and Hindu cultures.

For example, the BBC, among its many prevarications on the matter (like lopping off J&K entirely from its recently broadcasted maps of India, perhaps under influence of its Pakistani staffers), frequently speaks of “Hindu-majority India” and “Indian-administered Kashmir” being confronted by Muslim Pakistan.

And two days ago from California’s Bay Area arose into the Internet Cloud the following profundity: “What we’re dealing with now, in the Pakistani-Indian rivalry, is a true war of civilizations, pitting Muslims against Hindus…. the unfathomable depths of the Muslim-Hindu divide….”.

Even President-elect Obama’s top Pakistan-specialists have fallen for the line of Washington’s extremely strong Pakistan lobby: “Pakistan… sees itself as the political home for the subcontinent’s Muslim population and believes India’s continued control over the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley and denial of a plebiscite for its inhabitants represent a lingering desire on India’s part to undo the legacy of partition, which divided the British Indian Empire into India and Pakistan.”

The truth on record is completely different and really rather simple: for more than a century and a half, Muslims qua Muslims on the Indian subcontinent have struggled with the question of their most appropriate cultural and political identity.

The starkest contrast may be found in their trying to come to terms with their partly Arabic and partly Hindu or Indian parentage (the words Hindu, Sindhu, Indus, Indian, Sindhi, Hindi etc all clearly have the same Hellenistic root).

For example, there was Wali Allah (1703-1762) declaring “We are an Arab people whose fathers have fallen in exile in the country of Hindustan, and Arabic genealogy and Arabic language are our pride”.

But here has been Mohammad Iqbal (1877-1938), in his 1930 Allahabad speech to the Muslim League, conceiving today’s Pakistan as a wish to become free of precisely that Arab influence: “I would like to see the Punjab, NWFP, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state… The life of Islam as a cultural force in this living country very largely depends on its centralisation in a specified territory… For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power, for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilise its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and the spirit of modern times.”

In an article “Saving Pakistan” published last year in The Statesman and available elsewhere here, it was suggested Iqbal’s “spirit of modern times” may be represented most prominently today by the physicist/political philosopher Pervez Hoodbhoy: in a December 2006 speech Hoodbhoy suggested a new alternative to MA Jinnah’s “Faith, Unity, Discipline” slogan: “First, I wish for minds that can deal with the complex nature of truth…. My second wish is for many more Pakistanis who accept diversity as a virtue… My third, and last, wish is that Pakistanis learn to value and nurture creativity.” He has spoken too of bringing “economic justice to Pakistan”, of the “fight to give Pakistan’s women the freedom which is their birthright”, and of people to “wake up” and engage politically. But Pakistan’s Iqbalian liberals like Hoodbhoy still have to square off with those of their compatriots who sent the youthful squad into Mumbai last week with assault rifles, grenades and heroic Arabic code-names, as well as orders to attack civilians with the ferocity of the original Muslims attacking caravans and settlements in ancient Arabia.

What the extremely strong Pakistan lobbies within the British and American political systems have suppressed in order to paint a picture of eternal Muslim-Hindu conflict is the voice of India’s nationalist Muslims, who historically have had no wish to have any truck with any idea of a “Pakistan” at all.

Most eminent among them was undoubtedly Jinnah’s fiercest critic: Maulana Abul Kalam Azad whose classic 1946 statement on Pakistan is available in hisIndia Wins Freedom, the final version published only in 1988.

“I have considered from every possible point of view the scheme of Pakistan as formulated by the Muslim League. As an Indian, I have examined its implications for the future of India as a whole. As a Muslim, I have examined its likely effects upon the fortunes of Muslims of India. Considering the scheme in all its aspects, I have come to the conclusion that it is harmful not only for India as a whole but for Muslims in particular. And in fact it creates more problems than it solves. I must confess that the very term Pakistan goes against my grain. It suggests that some portions of the world are pure while others are impure. Such a division of territories into pure and impure is un-Islamic and is more in keeping with orthodox Brahmanism which divides men and countries into holy and unholy — a division which is a repudiation of the very spirit of Islam. Islam recognizes no such division and the prophet says “God made the whole world a mosque for me”.

Further, it seems that the scheme of Pakistan is a symbol of defeatism, and has been built on the analogy of the Jewish demand for a national home. It is a confession that Indian Muslims cannot hold their own in India as a whole, and would be content to withdraw to a corner specially reserved for them.

One can sympathise with the aspiration of the Jews for such a national home, as they are scattered all over the world and cannot in any region have any effective voice in the administration.. The conditions of Indian Muslims is quite otherwise. Over 90 million in number, they are in quantity and quality a sufficiently important element in Indian life to influence decisively all questions of administration and policy. Nature has further helped them by concentrating them in certain areas.

In such a context, the demand for Pakistan loses all force. As a Muslim, I for one am not prepared for a moment to give up my right to treat the whole of India as my domain and to shape in the shaping of its political and economic life. To me it seems a sure sign of cowardice to give up what is my patrimony and content myself with a mere fragment of it.

As is well known, Mr. Jinnah’s Pakistan scheme is based on his two nation theory. His thesis is that India contains many nationalities based on religious differences, Of them the two major nations, the Hindus and Muslims, must as separate nations have separate States, When Dr Edward Thompson once pointed out to Mr. Jinnah that Hindus and Muslims live side by side in thousands of Indian towns, villages and hamlets, Mr. Jinnah replied that this is no way affected their separate nationality. Two nations, according to M Jinnah, confront one another in every hamlet, village and town, and he, therefore, desires that they should be separated into two States.

I am prepared to overlook all other aspects of the problem and judge it from the point of view of Muslim interest alone. I shall go still further and say that if it can be shown that the scheme of Pakistan can in any way benefit Muslims I would be prepared to accept it myself and also to work for its acceptance by others. But the truth is that even if I examine the scheme from the point of view of the communal interests of the Muslims themselves, I am forced to the conclusion that it can in no way benefit them or allay their legitimate fears.

Let us consider dispassionately the consequences which will follow if we give effect to the Pakistan scheme. India will be divided into two States, one with a majority of Muslims and the other of Hindus. In the Hindustan State there will remain 35 million Muslims scattered in small minorities all over the land. With 17 per cent in UP, 12 percent in Bihar and 9 percent in Madras, they will be weaker than they are today in the Hindu majority provinces. They have had their homelands in these regions for almost a thousand years and built up well known centres of Muslim culture and civilization there.

They will awaken overnight and discover that they have become alien and foreigners. Backward industrially, educationally and economically, they will be left to the mercies to what would become an unadulterated Hindu raj.

On the other hand, their position within the Pakistan State will be vulnerable and weak. Nowhere in Pakistan will their majority be comparable to the Hindu majority in the Hindustan States. ( NB Azad could hardly imagine even at this point the actual British Partition of Punjab and Bengal, let aside the later separation of Bangladesh from West Pakistan, SR. )

In fact, their majority will be so slight that will be offset by the economical, educational and political lead enjoyed by non-Muslims in these areas. Even if this were not so and Pakistan were overwhelmingly Muslim in population, it still could hardly solve the problem of Muslims in Hindustan. Two States confronting one another, offer no solution of the problem of one another’s minorities, but only lead to retribution and reprisals by introducing a system of mutual hostages. The scheme of Pakistan therefore solves no problems for the Muslims. It cannot safeguard their rights where they are in minority nor as citizens of Pakistan secure them a position in Indian or world affairs which they would enjoy as citizens of a major State like the Indian Union.

It may be argued that if Pakistan is so much against the interest if the Muslims themselves, then why should such a large section of Muslims be swept away by its lure? The answer is to be found in the attitude of certain communal extremists among the Hindus. When the Muslim League began to speak of Pakistan, they read into the scheme a sinister pan-Islamic conspiracy and began to oppose it out of fear that it foreshadowed a combination of Indian Muslim and trans-Indian Muslim States. The opposition acted as an incentive to the adherents of the League. With simple though untenable logic they argued that if Hindus were so opposed to Pakistan, surely it must be of benefit to Muslims. An atmosphere of emotional frenzy was created which made reasonable appraisement impossible and swept away especially the younger and more impressionable among the Muslims. I have, however, no doubt that when the present frenzy has died down and the question can be considered dispassionately, those who now support Pakistan will themselves repudiate it as harmful for Muslim interests.

The formula which I have succeeded in making the Congress accept secures whatever merits the Pakistan scheme contains while all its defects and drawbacks are avoided. The basis of Pakistan is the fear of interference by the Centre in Muslim majority areas as the Hindus will be in a majority in the Centre. The Congress meets this fear by granting full autonomy to the provincial units and vesting all residuary power in the provinces. It also has provided for two lists of Central subjects, one compulsory and one optional, so that if any provincial unit so wants, it can administer all subjects itself except a minimum delegated to the Centre. The Congress scheme threescore ensures that Muslim majority provinces are internally free to develop as they will, but can at the same time influence the Centre on all issues which affect India as a whole.

The situation in India is such that all attempts to establish a centralized and unitary government are bound to fail. Equally, doomed to failure is the attempt to divide India into two States. After considering all aspects of the question, I have come to the conclusion that the only solution can be on the lines embodied in the Congress formula which allows room for development both to the provinces and to India as a whole. The Congress formula meets the fear of the Muslim majority areas to allay which the scheme of Pakistan was formed. On the other hand, it avoids the defects of the Pakistan scheme which would bring the Muslims where they are in a minority under a purely Hindu government.

I am one of those who considers the present chapter of communal bitterness and differences as a transient phase in Indian life. I firmly hold that they will disappear when India assumes the responsibility of her own destiny. I am reminded of a saying of Mr. Gladstone that the best cure for a man’s fear of the water was to throw him into it. Similarly, India must assume responsibilities and administer her own affairs before fears and suspicious can be fully allayed.

When India attains her destiny, she will forget the chapter of communal suspicion and conflict and face the problems of modern life from a modern point of view. Differences will no doubt persist, but they will be economic, not communal. Opposition among political parties will continue, but it will based, not on religion, but on economic and political issues. Class and not community will be the basis oaf future alignments, and policies will be shaped accordingly. If it be argued that this is only a faith which events may not justify, I would say that in any case the 90 million Muslims constitute a factor which nobody can ignore and whatever the circumstances, they are strong enough to safeguard their own destiny.”

Next must be Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah’s classic February 1948 Speech to the UN Security Council, four months into the initial Pakistani attack on Kashmir:

“Aggression, not accession, is the issue: I have heard with patience, attention and respect the statements made by the representative of Pakistan and members of the Security Council, as well as the statements made on various occasions by the members of my own delegation. The Security Council will concede that I am probably the one man most concerned in the dispute because I happen to come from that land which has become the bone of contention between the two Dominions of India and Pakistan.

I have been quoted profusely on either side, and rightly so, because I have had the fortune-or, should I say, misfortune of leading my countrymen to freedom from 1931 onwards. In this task, I have suffered a great deal. I have been imprisoned not once or twice, but seven times, and the last imprisonment carried with it an aggregate sentence of nine years.

There are many troubles in Kashmir. I have heard patiently the debate in the Security Council, but I feel that I am rather confused. After all, what is the point in dispute? The point in dispute is not that the sovereignty of the Prince is in question, as the representative of Pakistan stated yesterday. After all, I have suffered the punishment of being sentenced to nine years imprisonment for saying what the representative of Pakistan said with regard to the Treaty of Amritsar of 1846. I am glad that he said in the Security Council, where he is immune from any punishment. Therefore, I am not disputing that point and that it is not the subject of the dispute before the Security Council.

The subject of the dispute before the Security Council is not the mal-administration of the Princely State of Kashmir. In order to set right that mal-administration, I think I have suffered the most, and today, when for the first time, I heard the representative of Pakistan supporting my case, it gave me great pleasure.

After all, what is the dispute between India and Pakistan? From what I have learned from the complaint brought before the Security Council by my own delegation, the dispute revolves around the fact that Kashmir acceded legally and constitutionally to the Dominion of India. There was some trouble about the demarcation of the Kashmir administration within the State, and the tribesmen from across the border have poured into my country. They have been helped and are being helped by the Pakistan Government, with the result that there is the possibility of a greater conflagration between India and Pakistan. India sought the help of Security Council so that Pakistan might be requested to desist from helping the tribesmen, and to desist from supporting the inside revolt, should I say, against the lawful authority.

I should have understood the position of the representative of Pakistan if he had come boldly before the Security Council and maintained: “Yes, we do support the tribesmen; we do support the rebels inside the State because we feel that Kashmir belongs to Pakistan and not to India, and because we feel that the accession of Kashmir to India was fraudulent.” Then we might have discussed the validity of the accession of the State of Kashmir to India. But that was not the position taken by the representative of Pakistan. He completely denied that any support was being given by the Government of Pakistan to either the tribesmen or those who are in revolt within the State against the constituted authority.

How am I to convince the Security Council that the denial is absolutely untrue? I am sitting before the Security Council at a distance of thousands of miles from my country. I have fought many battles, along with my own men, on the borders of Jammu and Kashmir. I have seen with my own eyes the support given by the Pakistan Government, not only in supplying buses but in providing arms, ammunition, direction and control of the tribesmen and I have even seen the Pakistan Army forces from across the border.

The denial has come so flatly that it becomes very difficult for me to disprove it here before the Security Council, unless the Security Council accedes to our request to send a commission to the spot and to find out first whether the allegations brought before the Security Council with regard to the aid given by the Government of Pakistan are correct or incorrect. If they are incorrect, the case falls; if they are correct, then the Security Council should take the necessary steps to advise the Government of Pakistan to desist from such support.

But then, this simple issue has been confused. On the one hand, the Pakistan Government says, “We are not a party to the trouble within the State. The trouble within the State exists because the people are fighting against the mal-administration of the Jammu and Kashmir Government.” Yes, we are fighting, we have been fighting against the mal-administration of that State since 1931. We have been demanding democratisation of the Government there. But how is it that today Pakistan has become the champion of our liberty? I know very well that in 1946, when I raised the cry “Quit Kashmir,” the leader of the Pakistan Government, who is the Governor-General now, Mr.Mohammed Ali Jinnah, opposed my Government, declaring that this movement was a movement of a few renegades and that Muslims as such had nothing to do with the movement.

The Muslim Conference, which has been talked about so much, opposed my movement and declared its loyalty to the Prince. The representative of Pakistan now says that Sheikh Abdullah, once the supporter of “Quit Kashmir”, has joined hands with the Maharaja of Kashmir, and that in one of my public speeches I declared that I wanted the Maharaja to be the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir-not the Maharaja of Jammu only, but the Maharaja of entire State.

I should like to correct the misreporting of my speech. I did deliver that speech in Jammu, which is the winter capital of our country, but it was in a different context. As the members of the Security Council have already heard from the head of my delegation, some massacres did occur in the Jammu Province. After the Kashmir Province was raided by the tribesmen, and after thousands of Hindus and Sikhs were uprooted from the villages and towns in the Kashmir Province and found their way into the Jammu Province, there was some very bad retaliation. I could not go to Jammu Province to control that situation because I was busy with the raiders in Kashmir Province. However, as soon as I had some time, I flew down to Jammu Province, addressed a gathering of 60,000 Hindus and Sikhs in Jammu city, and gave them some plain advice.

I told them clearly that this policy of retaliation would bring no good to them as Hindus and Sikhs and would bring no good to their leader, because while they could retaliate in one or two districts where they formed the majority, and could even wipe out the Muslim population in these one or two districts, the State happens to have a population which is 80 per cent Muslim, and it would be impossible for them to wipe out the entire Muslim population. The result would be that the Prince, whom they wanted to support, would remain the Prince of only two districts, and not of the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir. I told them that if they wanted him to be the Prince of Jammu and Kashmir, they would have to change their behaviour. That was the speech I delivered, and that was the context in which it was made.

However, I have already stated how this trouble started. It is probable that the representative of Pakistan would admit that when India was divided into two parts, my colleagues and I were all behind prison bars. The result of this division of India was to start massacre on either side. Where Muslims in the West Punjab formed the majority, the killing of Hindus and Sikhs started and this was retaliated in East Punjab. All along our border, massacres of Hindus and Sikhs, on the one hand, and Muslims on the other hand were a daily occurrence. But the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and its people, kept calm. The result was that thousands of refugees, both Muslims and Hindus, sought refuge in our State and we rendered every possible help to all of them.

Why was that so? It was because I and my organisation never believed in the formula that Muslims and Hindus form separate nations. We do not believe in the two-nation theory, nor in communal hatred or communalism itself. We believed that religion had no place in politics. Therefore, when we launched our movement of “Quit Kashmir”, it was not only Muslims who suffered, but our Hindu and Sikh comrades as well. That created a strong bond of unity between all the communities, and the result was that while Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims were fighting each other all along the border, the people of Jammu and Kashmir State — Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs alike-remained calm.

The situation was worsening day by day and the minority in our State was feeling very nervous. As a result, tremendous pressure was brought to bear upon the State administration to release me and my colleagues. The situation outside demanded the release of workers of the National Conference, along with its leader, and we were accordingly set free.

Immediately we were liberated from prison we were faced with the important question of whether Kashmir should accede to Pakistan, accede to India, or remain independent, because under the partition scheme these three choices were open us as, indeed, they were open to every Indian State. The problem was a very difficult one, but I advised the people of my country that although the question was very important to us, it was a secondary consideration. The all important matter for us was our own liberation from the autocratic rule of the Prince for which we were fighting and had been fighting for the past seventeen years. We had not achieved that goal, and therefore I told my people that we must do so first. Then, as free men we should have to decide where our interest lay. Being a frontier State, Kashmir has borders with both Pakistan and India, and there are advantages and disadvantages for the people of Kashmir attached to each of the three alternatives to which I have referred.

Naturally, as I have indicated, we could not decide this all important issue before achieving our own liberation, and our slogan became “Freedom before accession”. Some friends from Pakistan met mein Srinagar. I had a heart- to- heart discussion with them and explained my point of view. I told them in plain words that, whatever had been the attitude of Pakistan towards our freedom movement in the past, it would not influence us in our judgement. Neither the friendship of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru and of Congress, nor their support of our freedom movement, would have any influence upon our decision if we felt that the interests of four million Kashmiris lay in our accession to Pakistan.

I requested them not to precipitate this decision upon us but to allow us time, supporting our movement for the while. I added that once we were free they should allow us an interval to consider this all important issue. I pointed out that India had accepted this point of view and was not forcing us to decide. We had, in fact, entered into a standstill agreement with both Pakistan and India, but the leader of the Indian delegation has already explained to the Security Council what Pakistan did to us.

While I was engaged in these conversations and negotiations with friends from Pakistan, I sent one of my colleagues to Lahore, where he met the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, and other high dignitaries of the West Punjab Government. He placed the same point of view before them and requested that they should allow us time to consider this vital question, first helping us to achieve our liberation instead of forcing us to declare our decision one way or the other. Then, one fine morning while these negotiations were proceeding, I received news that a full-fledged attack had been carried out by the raiders on Muzaffarabad, frontier town in the Kashmir Province.

The representative of Pakistan has stated that immediately upon my release I went down to Delhi to negotiate the accession of Kashmir to India. That is not a fact. He probably does not know that while in jail I was elected President of the All India States People’s Conference, and that immediately upon my release I had to take up my duties. Accordingly, I had called a meeting of the executive of that Conference in Delhi, a fact which I had conveyed to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Indeed, I had told the Prime Minister of Pakistan that immediately upon my return from Delhi I should take the opportunity of meeting him personally to discuss my point of view with him. I did not go to Delhi to conclude any agreement on behalf of Kashmir because, although released, I was still considered a rebel.

I might inform the representative of Pakistan that although I am beyond doubt the head of the Administration of Kashmir State, I am not the Prime Minister. I am head of the Emergency Administration, and that not because the Maharaja of Kashmir wished it. In fact, I do not know whether the Maharaja wishes it even now. I hold the position because the people of my country wish me to be at the helm of affairs in Jammu and Kashmir State.

When the raiders came to our land, massacred thousands of people—mostly Hindus and Sikhs, but Muslims, too—abducted thousands of girls, Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims alike, looted our property and almost reached the gates of our summer capital, Srinagar, the result was that the civil, military and police administrations failed. The Maharaja, in the dead of night, left the capital along with his courtiers, and the result was absolute panic. There was no one to take over control. In that hour of crisis, the National Conference came forward with its 10,000 volunteers and took over the administration of the country. They started guarding the banks, the offices and houses of every person in the capital. This is the manner in which the administration changed hands. We were de facto in charge of the administration. The Maharaja, later on, gave it a legal form.

It is said that Sheikh Abdullah is a friend of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. Yes, I admit that. I feel honoured that such a great man claims me as his friend. And he happens to belong to my own country;he is also a Kashmiri, and blood is thicker than water. If JawaharLal Nehru gives me that honour, I cannot help it. He is my friend. But that does not mean that, because of his friendship, I am going to betray the millions of my people who have suffered along with me for the last seventeen years and sacrifice the interests of my country. I am not a man of that calibre.

I was explaining how the dispute arose—how Pakistan wanted to force this position of slavery upon us. Pakistan had no interest in our liberation or it would not also have opposed our freedom movement. Pakistan would have supported us when thousands of my countrymen were behind bars and hundreds were shot to death. The Pakistani leaders and Pakistani papers were heaping abuse upon the people of Kashmir who were suffering these tortures.

Then suddenly, Pakistan comes before the bar of the world as the champion of the liberty of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The world may believe this, but it is very difficult for me to believe. When we refused the coercive tactics of Pakistan, it started full fledged aggression and encouraged the tribesmen in this activity. It is absolutely impossible for the tribesmen to enter our territory without encouragement from Pakistan, because it is necessary to pass through Pakistan territory to reach Jammu and Kashmir. Hundreds of trucks, thousands of gallons of petrol, thousands of rifles, ammunition, and all forms of help that an army requires, were supplied to them. We know this. After all, we belong to that country. What Pakistan could not achieve by the use of economic blockade it wanted to achieve by full-fledged aggression.

What do we request? We request nothing more than that the Security Council should send some members to this area to see for themselves what is happening there. If Pakistan comes forward and says, “We question the legality of accession”, I am prepared to discuss whether or not the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India was legal. However, now they say, “We want a plebiscite, we want to obtain the free and unfettered opinion of the people of Kashmir. There should be no pressure exerted on the people and they should make the free choice as to the State to which they wish to accede.”

Not only this the offer that was made by the people of Kashmir to Pakistan long, long ago, but it is the offer made by the Prime Minister of India at a time, I think, he had not the slightest need for making it, as Kashmir was in distress.

We realised that Pakistan would not allow us any time, that we had either to suffer the fate of our kith and kin of Muzaffarabad, Baramulla, Srinagar and other towns and villages, or to seek help from some outside authority.

Under these circumstances, both the Maharaja and the people of Kashmir requested the Government of India to accept our accession. The Government of India could have easily accepted the accession and could have said, “All right we accept your accession and we shall render this help.” There was no necessity for the Prime Minister of India to add the proviso, when accepting the accession, that India does not want to take advantage of the difficult situation in Kashmir. We will accept this accession, without Kashmir’s acceding to the Indian Dominion, we are not in a position to render any military help. But once the country is free from the raiders, marauders and looters, this accession will be subject to ratification by the people. That was the offer made by the Prime Minister of India.

That was the same offer which was made by the people of Kashmir to the Government of Pakistan, but it was refused because at that time Pakistan felt that it could, within a week, conquer the entire Jammu and Kashmir State and then place the fait accompli before the world, just as happened some time ago in Europe. The same tactics were used.

But having failed in these tactics, Pakistan now comes before the bar of the world, pleading, “We want nothing, we only want our people to be given a free hand in deciding their own fate. And in deciding their own fate, they must have a plebiscite.”

They then continue and say, “No, a plebiscite cannot be fair and impartial unless and until there is a neutral administration in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.” I have failed to understand this terminology with reference to a “neutral administration”. After all what does “neutral administration” mean?

The representative of Pakistan has stated that Sheikh Abdullah, because he is a friend of Jawahar Lal Nehru, because he has had sympathy for the Indian National Congress, because he has declared his point of view in favour of accession to India, and because he is head of the Emergency Administration, cannot remain impartial. Therefore, Sheikh Abdullah must depart.

Let us suppose that Sheikh Abdullah goes, who is to replace Sheikh Abdullah ? It will be someone amongst the 4 million people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. But can we find anyone among these 4 million people whom we can call impartial? After all, we are not logs of wood, we are not dolls. We must have an opinion one way or the other. The people of Kashmir are either in favour of Pakistan or in favour of India.

Therefore, Pakistan’s position comes down to this that the 4 million people of that State should have no hand in running the administration of their own country. Someone else must come in for that purpose. Is that fair ? Is that just ? Do the members of the Security Council wish to oust the people of Kashmir from running their own administration and their own country ? Then, for argument’s sake, let us suppose that the 4 million people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir agree to have nothing to do with the administration of their country; some one else must be brought into the country for this purpose. From where do the members of the Security Council propose that such a neutral individual may be secured? From India? No, from Pakistan? No, from anywhere in the world? No, frankly speaking, even if the Security Council were to request Almighty God to administer the State of Jammu and Kashmir during this interim period, I do not feel that He could act impartially. After all, one must have sympathy either for this side or that side.

If elections were to be held in the United Kingdom sometime after tomorrow with the Labour Government in power, would anyone say to Mr Attlee: “The elections are now going on. Because you happen to belong to Labour Party, your sympathies will be in favour of the Labour vote. Therefore, you had better clear out. We must have a neutral man as Prime Minister until our elections are finished?

However, we have been told that Sheikh Abdullah must walk out because he has declared his point of view in favour of India. Therefore, he cannot be impartial. We must have some impartial man we must have some neutral man.

As I have submitted to the members of the Security Council, Sheikh Abdullah happens to be there because the people wish it. As long as the people wish it, I shall be there. There is no power on earth which can displace me from the position which I have there. As long as the people are behind me, I will remain there.

We have declared once for all, that there shall be freedom of voting and for that purpose we have said, “Let anyone come in, we have no objection. Let the Commission of the Security Council on India come into our State and advise us how we should take a vote, how we should organize it, and how it can be completely impartial. We have no objection.” My Government is ready to satisfy, to the last comma, the impartiality of the vote.

But to have an impartial vote is one thing; to have a say in the administration of the State is a different thing entirely. After all, with what are we concerned? We are concerned only with the fact that no influence shall be exercised over the voters, either in one way or in another. The people shall be free to vote according to their own interests. We are ready to accede to that.

It is then said: “You cannot have freedom of voting as long as the Indian Army remains in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.” It is probably very difficult for me to draw a full picture of what is going on in that country. There is absolute chaos in certain parts of the country, fighting is going on and thousands of tribesmen are there ready to take advantage of any weakness on the part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Once we ask the Indian Army, which is the only protective force in Kashmir against these marauders, to clear out, we leave the country open to chaos. After all, one who has suffered for the last seventeen years, in attempting to secure the freedom and liberation of his own country, would not like an outside army to come in and to remain in the country.

However, what is the present situation? If I ask the Indian Army to clear out, how am I going to protect the people from the looting, arson, murder and abduction with which they have been faced all these long months? What is the alternative? here need be no fear since the Indian Army is there, that this army will interfere in the exercise of a free vote. After all, a Commission of the Security Council will be there in order to watch. The Indian Army does not have to go into every village. It will be stationed at certain strategic points, so that in the event of danger from any border, the Army will be there to protect that border. The army is there to curb disorders anywhere in the State; that is all. The army will not be in each and every village in order to watch each and every vote.

It is then said: “Can we not have a joint control ? Can we not have the armies of Pakistan and India inside the State in order to control the situation ?” This is an unusual idea. What Pakistan could not achieve through ordinary means, Pakistan wishes to achieve by entering through the back door, so that it may have its armies inside the State and then start the fight. That is not possible. After all, we have been discussing the situation in Kashmir. I should say that we have been playing the drama of Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. The people of Kashmir are vitally interested in this question. Four million people in Kashmir are keenly interested in this entire affair. I have sympathies with the people of Poonch and Mirpur. The representative of Pakistan will probably concede that I have suffered greatly for the people of Poonch as well as for the people of Mirpur. There is no difference on this part of international democratisation of the administration between me, my party and the people of Poonch. We are one, we want our own liberty, we want our own freedom, we do not want autocratic rule. We desire that the 4 million people in Jammu and Kashmir—Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims— shall have the right to change their destiny, to control their country, and to administer it as best as they can. On that point there is absolutely no difference.

However, it is not a question of internal liberation. The Security Council should not confine the issue. The question is not that we want internal freedom, the question is not how the Maharaja got his State, or whether or not he is sovereign. These points are not before the Security Council. Whether Kashmir has lawfully acceded to India—complaints on that score have been brought before the Security Council on behalf of Pakistan—is not the point at issue. If that were the point at issue, then we should discuss that subject. We should prove before the Security Council that Kashmir and the people of Kashmir have lawfully and constitutionally acceded to the Dominion of India and Pakistan has no right to question that accession. However, that is not the discussion before the Security Council.

Indian and Kashmiri forces are ready to deal with tribesmen, to come to an understanding with the people of Kashmir and to establish ademocratic form of government inside the State. We shall do all that. We do not want Pakistan to lend us support to suppress an internal revolt or to drive out the tribesmen. We do not seek any support from Pakistan in that connection. Since Pakistan is a neighbouring country, we desire to remain on the friendliest possible terms with this sister Dominion. But we do ask that Pakistan shall have no hand, directly or indirectly, in this turmoil in Kashmir. The Government of Pakistan has said: “We have no hand in this turmoil.” The only course left to the Security Council is to send out the commission and to see whether or not Pakistan has any hand in this turmoil. If Pakistan has had any hand in this turmoil, then the Government of Pakistan should be asked to desist from such activity. If Pakistan has had no hand in this turmoil, then that can be proved.

This issue has been clouded by very many other issues and interests. I suggested at informal talks that according to my understanding there are two points at issue, first, how to have this neutral impartial administration; second, whether or not the Indian Army shall remain. It is not at all disputed that we must have a plebiscite and that the accession must be ratified by the people of Kashmir, freely and without any pressure on this or that side. That much is conceded, there is no dispute about that. The dispute arises when it is suggested that in order to have the free vote, the administration must be changed. To that suggestion we say, “No.”

I do not know what course future events will take. However, I may assure the Security Council that, if I am asked to conduct the administration of this State, it will be my duty to make the administration absolutely impartial. It will be my duty to request my brothers, who are in a different camp at this time, to come to lend me support. After all, they are my own kith and kin. We suffered together, we have no quarrel with them. I shall tell them: “Come on; it is my country; it is your country. I have been asked to administer the State. Are you prepared to lend me support? It is for me to make the administration successful; it is for me to make the administration look impartial.” It is not for Pakistan to say “No, we must have an impartial administration.” I refuse to accept Pakistan as a party in the affairs of the Jammu and Kashmir State. I refuse this point blank. Pakistan has no right to say that we must do this and we must do that. We have seen enough of Pakistan. The people of Kashmir have seen enough. Muzaffarabad and Baramulla and hundred of villages in Jammu and Kashmir depict the story of Pakistan to the people of Jammu and Kashmir. We want to have no more of this.

In concluding, I again request that in order to settle this issue of Kashmir, the Security Council should not confuse the point in dispute. The Security Council should not allow various other extraneous matters to be introduced. Very many extraneous matters have been introduced. The representative of Pakistan gave us the history of the Jammu and Kashmir State. He read to us some letters from Viceroys of India, asking the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir to behave, giving the Maharaja good advice, et cetera. However, we cannot forget that these States are the creation of British imperialism in India who has supported these states and this misrule for these 150 years? It is not going to convince me or the world for the representative of Pakistan to say: “These events have happened and these letters were written.” We know how the Princes have acted, how the states were brought into existence, and how the Princes were supported. This was all a game in the British imperialist policy. But this legacy has now fallen upon us. We are not here to discuss whether or not the Maharaja lawfully became the ruler of the State, whether or not there is moral administration in this State, whether or not the Maharaja is sovereign and whether or not Kashmir has legally acceded to India. These issues are not before the Security Council. The only issue before the Security Council is that Pakistan must observe its international obligations and must not support any outside raiders.

Pakistan should not encourage inside revolt. Pakistan has denied that it has in order to verify the statements made by the representatives of India and Pakistan, the Security Council must send a commission to the spot to see whether the complaint brought before the Security Council is valid or invalid. If the Security Council finds that the complaint brought before it by India is valid, then Pakistan should be asked to desist or India should be permitted to use its means to carry out the decision of the Security Council.

As far as I can speak on behalf of India, India does not want the help of the armies of Pakistan. What it wants from Pakistan is that Pakistan should not supply bases to the raiders on Pakistan territory across the border from Jammu and Kashmir State. All along the border on Pakistan territory, there are huge concentrations of these tribesmen who are Pakistani nationals. We request Pakistan not to allow its territory to be used by these raiders.

Pakistan should not provide ammunition, arms, direction and control to these tribesmen. It should stop the passage of these tribesmen through its territory. Pakistan should not supply arms and ammunition to the people who are fighting within the State because all these matters fall under an international obligation. Therefore, Pakistan should desist from that practice. That is all. We do not want any armed help from Pakistan. If Pakistan does what we have requested, the Indian Army, I am quite sure, will be capable of driving out the raiders and tribesmen. If Pakistan does not meddle in our affairs, we will be capable of solving all our own internal disputes with the Maharaja of Kashmir. However, as long as this unofficial war continues, it is very difficult for us to do any thing. Our hands are tied.

What is happening? The raiders are concentrated just across the border. They enter our State in large number—four or five thousand strong. They raid four or five villages, burn them, abduct women and loot property. When our army tries to capture them, they go across the border, and can not fire a single shot across the border, because if it does, there is the immediate danger of a greater conflagration. So our hands are tied.

We do not want to create this difficult situation without informing the Security Council and we felt honour-bound to inform it of the actual position. The Indian Army could easily have followed the raiders across the border and could have attacked the bases, which were all in Pakistan territory, but it desisted. We thought it would be better to inform the Security Council of the situation.

However, I did not have the slightest idea that when the case came before the Security Council, the representative of Pakistan would so boldly deny that Pakistan supplied all this help. Everybody knows that Pakistan is aiding these raiders and tribesmen and the people who are fighting with the State. However, Pakistan chose boldly to deny all these charges.

What is left for me to do? After all, I do not have any magic lamp so that I might bring the entire picture of Jammu and Kashmir State, along with the borders of Pakistan, before the eyes of the members of the Security Council so that they might see who is fighting and who is not fighting. Therefore, somebody must go to the spot. Then at that time it would be for us to prove that the charges we have brought before the Security Council are correct to the last word. That is the only help we want and no other help.”

Thirdly, though by no means lastly, may be placed the 14 August 1951 Memorandum of prominent Muslims led by Dr Zakir Hussain to the UN Representative Dr. Frank P. Graham:

“It is a remarkable fact that, while the Security Council and its various agencies have devoted so much time to the study of the Kashmir dispute and made various suggestions for its resolution, none of them has tried to ascertain the views of the Indian Muslims nor the possible effect of any hasty step in Kashmir, however well-intentioned, on the interests and well- being of the Indian Muslims. We are convinced that no lasting solution for the problem can be found unless the position of Muslims in Indian society is clearly understood.

Supporters of the idea of Pakistan, before this subcontinent was partitioned, discouraged any attempt to define Pakistan clearly and did little to anticipate the conflicting problems which were bound to arise as a result of the advocacy of the two-nation theory. The concept of Pakistan, therefore, became an emotional slogan with little rational content. It never occurred to the Muslim League or its leaders that if a minority was not prepared to live with a majority on the sub- continent, how could the majority be expected t o tolerate the minority.

It is, therefore, small wonder that the result of partition has been disastrous to Muslims. In undivided India, their strength lay about 100 million. Partition split up the Muslim people, confining them to the three isolated regions. Thus, Muslims number 25 million in Western Pakistan, 35 million to 40 million in India, and the rest in Eastern Pakistan. A single undivided community has been broken into three fragments, each faced with its own problems.

Pakistan was not created on a religious basis. If it had been, our fate as well as the fate of other minorities would have been settled at that time. Nor would the division of the sub- continent for reasons of religion have left large minorities in India or Pakistan.

This merely illustrates what we have said above, that the concept of Pakistan was vague, obscure, and never clearly defined, nor its likely consequences foreseen by the Muslim League, even when some of these should have been obvious.

When the partition took place, Muslims in India were left in the lurch by the Muslim League and its leaders. Most of them departed to Pakistan and a few who stayed behind stayed long enough to wind up their affairs and dispose of their property. Those who went over to Pakistan left a large number of relations and friends behind.

Having brought about a division of the country, Pakistan leaders proclaimed that they would convert Pakistan into a land where people would live a life according to the tenets of Islam. This created nervousness and alarm among the minorities living in Pakistan. Not satisfied with this, Pakistan went further and announced again and again their determination to protect and safeguard the interests of Muslims in India. This naturally aroused suspicion amongst the Hindus against us and our loyalty to India was questioned.

Pakistan had made our position weaker by driving out Hindus from Western Pakistan in utter disregard of the consequences of such a policy to us and our welfare. A similar process is in question in Eastern Pakistan from which Hindus are coming over to India in a large and large number.

If the Hindus are not welcome in Pakistan, how can we, in all fairness, expect Muslims to be welcomed in India ? Such a policy must inevitably, as the past has already shown, result in the uprooting of Muslims in this country and their migration to Pakistan where, as it became clear last year, they are no longer welcome, lest their influx should destroy Pakistan’s economy. Neither some of the Muslims who did migrate to Pakistan after partition, and following the widespread bloodshed and conflict on both sides of the Indo-Pakistan border in the north- west, have been able to find a happy asylum in what they had been told would be their homeland. Consequently some of them have had to return to India, e.g. Meos who are now being rehabilitated in their former areas.

If we are living honourably in India today, it is certainly not due to Pakistan which, if anything, has by her policy and action weakened our position. The credit goes to the broadminded leadership of India, to Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, to the traditions of tolerance in this country and to the Constitution which ensures equal rights to all citizens of India, irrespective of their religion caste, creed, colour or sex.

We, therefore, feel that, tragically as Muslims were misled by the Muslim League and subsequently by Pakistan and the unnecessary suffering which we and our Hindu brethren have to go through in Pakistan and in India since partition, we must be given an opportunity to settle down to a life of tolerance and understanding to the mutual benefit of Hindus and Muslims in our country – if only Pakistan would let us do it. To us it is a matter of no small consequence.

Despite continuous provocations, first from the Muslim League and since then from Pakistan, the Hindu majority in India has not thrown us or members of other minorities out of Civil Services, Armed Forces, the judiciary, trade, commerce, business and industry. There are Muslim Ministers in the Union and State cabinets, Muslim Governors, Muslim Ambassadors, representing India in foreign countries, fully enjoying the confidence of the Indian nation, Muslim members in Parliament and state legislatures, Muslim judges serving on the Supreme Court and High Courts, high-ranking officers in the Armed Forces and the Civil services, including the police.

Muslims have large landed estates, run big business and commercial houses in various parts of the country, notably in Bombay and Calcutta, have their shares in industrial production and enterprise in export and import trade. Our famous sacred shrines and places of cultural interest are mostly in India.

Not that our lot is certainly happy. We wish some of the state Governments showed a little greater sympathy to us in the field of education and employment. Nevertheless, we feel we have an honourable place in India. Under the law of the land, our religious and cultural life is protected and we shall share in the opportunities open to all citizens to ensure progress for the people of this country.

It is, therefore, clear that our interest and welfare do not coincide with Pakistan’s conception of the welfare and interests of Muslims in Pakistan.

This is clear from Pakistan’s attitude towards Kashmir. Pakistan claims Kashmir, first, on the ground of the majority of the State’s people being Muslims and, secondly, on the ground, of the state being essential to its economy and defence. To achieve its objective it has been threatening to launch “Jihad” against Kashmir in India. It is a strange commentary on political beliefs that the same Muslims of Pakistan who like the Muslims of Kashmir to join them invaded the state, in October 1947, killing and plundering Muslims in the state and dishonouring Muslim women, all in the interest of what they described as the liberation of Muslims of the State. In its oft-proclaimed anxiety to rescue the 3 million Muslims from what it describes as the tyranny of a handful of Hindus in the State, Pakistan evidently is prepared to sacrifice the interests of 40 million Muslims in India – a strange exhibition of concern for the welfare of fellow- Muslims. Our misguided brothers in Pakistan do not realise that if Muslims in Pakistan can wage a war against Hindus in Kashmir why should not Hindus, sooner or later, retaliate against Muslims in India.

Does Pakistan seriously think that it could give us any help if such an emergency arose or that we would deserve any help thanks to its own follies ? It is incapable of providing room and livelihood to the 40 million Muslims of India, should they migrate to Pakistan. Yet its policy and action, if not changed soon, may well produce the result which it dreads.

We are convinced that India will never attack our interests. First of all, it would be contrary to the spirit animating the political movement in this country. Secondly, it would be opposed to the Constitution and to the sincere leadership of the Prime Minister. Thirdly, India by committing such a folly would be playing straight into the hands of Pakistan.

We wish we were equally convinced of the soundness of Pakistan’s policy. So completely oblivious is it of our present problems and of our future that it is willing to sell us into slavery – if only it can secure Kashmir.

It ignores the fact that Muslims in Kashmir may also have a point of view of their own, that there is a democratic movement with a democratic leadership in the State, both inspired by the progress of a broad minded, secular, democratic movement in India and both naturally being in sympathy with India. Otherwise, the Muslim raiders should have been welcomed with open arms by the Muslims of the State when the invasion took place in 1947.

Persistent propaganda about “Jihad” is intended, among other things, to inflame religious passions in this country. For it would, of course, be in Pakistan’s interests to promote communal rioting in India to show to Kashmiri Muslims how they can find security only in Pakistan. Such a policy, however, can only bring untold misery and suffering to India and Pakistan generally and to Indian Muslims particularly. Pakistan never tires of asserting that it is determined to protect the interests of Muslims in Kashmir and India. Why does not Pakistan express the same concern for Pathans who are fighting for Pakhtoonistan, an independent homeland of their own ? The freedom-loving Pathans under the leadership of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib, both nurtured in the traditions of democratic tolerance of the Indian National Congress, are being subjected to political repression of the worst possible kind by their Muslim brethren in power in Pakistan and in the NWFP. Contradictory as Pakistan’s policy generally is, it is no surprise to us that while it insists on a fair and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir, it denies a fair and impartial plebiscite to Pathans.

Pakistan’s policy in general and her attitude towards Kashmir is particular thus tend to create conditions in this country which in the long run can only bring to us Muslims widespread suffering and destruction. Its policy prevents us from settling down, from being honourable citizens of a State, free from suspicion of our fellow-countrymen and adapting ourselves to changing conditions to promote the interests and welfare of India. Its sabre-rattling interferes with its own economy and ours. It expects us to be loyal to it despite its impotence to give us any protection, believing at the same time that we can still claim all the rights of citizenship in a secular democracy.

In the event of a war, it is extremely doubtful whether it will be able to protect the Muslims of East Bengal who are completely cut off from Western Pakistan. Are the Muslims of India and Eastern Pakistan to sacrifice themselves completely to enable the 25 million Muslims in Western Pakistan to embark upon mad, self-destructive adventures?

We should, therefore, like to impress upon you with all the emphasis at our command that Pakistan’s policy towards Kashmir is fraught with the gravest peril to the 40 million Muslims of India. If the Security Council is really interested in peace, human brotherhood and international understanding, it should heed this warning while there is still time.

Such have been the most eminent voices of India’s Muslims in times past. Sadly, they have no equivalent today when India’s Muslims need them with greater urgency. (Bollywood or cricketing celebrities hardly substitute!) This fault in the intellectual history of the modern subcontinent has been a principal factor causing the misapprehensions and distortions of Pakistan’s and J&K’s political reality to continue worldwide.

Fuzlul Huq was Prime Minister of undivided Bengal from 1937-1943. On 11 May 1942, he led the bridegroom’s procession when my father went to wed my mother. Here is Fuzlul Huq entering the car to do so, with my grandfather Manindranath Roy helping him into the car. My mother’s family were surprised; they were Bengali Brahmins from Jamshedpur and did not quite know what to make of all this. My mother, aged 16 at the time, remembers she was non-plussed to find Fuzlul Huq ‘s bulky frame seated for some reason between her and her new husband in the car on the return journey too!

Fuzlul Huq, having been a young colleague of Surendranath Roy in the Bengal Legislative Council, was a family friend and treated my grandfather, Manindranath Roy, with affection. (Manindranath was a Justice of the Peace, but unlike his father was not political.)

Fuzlul Huq would apparently make requests of my grandmother for delivered meals during political confabulations; my grandfather’s family had been forced to leave Behala as the family home had been requisitioned by the military to be a hospital during the war, and they lived instead in Ballygunge. My father recalls cycling from there with the requested food to the political confabulations in the middle of the wartime blackout (Japanese aeroplanes had apparently reached Calcutta on their bombing missions).

Here too is a note dated 9 August 1945 from Fuzlul Huq to my grandfather thanking him for food and sending his “best blessings” to my grandmother — a Muslim, one of the founders of Pakistan, sends his blessings to an orthodox Hindu Brahmin family and everyone remains completely cheerful and apolitical: such was normal Indian secularism in practice at the time. Partition between India and Pakistan and the ghastliness that accompanied it, and the hatred and bloodshed that has followed, were all quite beyond anyone’s imagination at the time.

(Author’s Note: This article was preceded by several others e.g. “Saving Pakistan”, “Understanding Pakistan”, “Pakistan’s Allies”, “Law, Justice & J&K”, “Solving Kashmir” , and has been followed by “Two Cheers for Pakistan”.)

Pakistan’s Kashmir obsessionSheikh Abdullah Relied In Politics On The French Constitution, Not Islam

Subroto Roy

First published in The Statesman, Feb 16 2008, Editorial Page Special Article

Indians would be naïve to suppose Pervez Musharraf has at any point shown friendliness towards India or willingness to come to a genuine permanent agreement over J&K fully consistent with law and justice. Musharraf tells everyone and himself every day that he is a soldier, and it is well to remember he is from the last generation of Pakistan military men motivated by visceral hatred of the Indian Union and a wish to inflict any kind of defeat upon us. Pakistan’s new Army Chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, being a decade younger than Musharraf, may have a less irrational, less belligerent outlook towards India, and it would be a wise Indian move to invite him officially to visit and receive the normal courtesies and honours due to a foreign military chief.

Musharraf, like Ariel Sharon, was visibly uncomfortable with the Hindu rituals we compel foreign leaders to carry out at Mahatma Gandhi’s Memorial; but General Kayani would visit purely as a military chief and not have to make any political gestures.

Lion of Kashmir

As long as Musharraf remains in power, we may expect him to continue to be motivated by his overtly anti-Indian 12 January 2002 speech. Yes, he said, Pakistan would cooperate against terrorism but it expected the USA to reciprocate by pressuring India on Jammu & Kashmir. “Kashmir runs in our blood. No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir… We will continue to extend our moral, political and diplomatic support to Kashmiris. We will never budge from our principle (sic) stand on Kashmir. Kashmir has to be resolved through dialogue in accordance with the wishes of the people of Pakistan (sic) and in accordance with the UN resolutions.” (BBC 12 January, 2002, Musharraf speech highlights). Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, during his 1950 visit to the USA had claimed “culturally… Kashmir ~ 80 per cent of whose people like the majority of the people in Pakistan are Muslims ~ is in fact an integral part of Pakistan”.

Now, as a matter of fact, Kashmir does not “run in the blood” of Pakistanis nor do the many diverse and ancient cultures of Jammu & Kashmir have much to do with that of a relatively newly created country like Pakistan. It was because Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah knew this and bluntly said so often enough, including at the UN, that Liaquat called him a “Quisling” and the Pakistan Government routinely defamed him as an “Indian stooge”. Yet the Sheikh was known by all in Srinagar Valley as the “Lion of Kashmir”, and had been the acknowledged voice of Muslim political awakening in the Valley ever since 1931.

J&K’s democracy today is the principal political legacy of Sheikh Abdullah. The Pakistan Government to this day denies legitimacy to the elected Government and Opposition of Indian J&K despite there never having been in the history of Pakistan a change of government more democratic in nature than that which occurred in J&K in 2002, bringing in the PDP-Congress Government in place of the National Conference.

Before Pakistan had started its series of military coups, Abdullah had led J&K to adopt an exemplary Constitution and ratify the State’s joining of the new Indian Union. The unbridgeable gulf between Abdullah and the Pakistan Government arose because Abdullah, a Koran scholar and devout Muslim known to intersperse his political speeches with Koranic wisdom, relied for J&K’s constitutional principles not on Islam but rather on the French Constitution. Pakistan’s constitutions by contrast say Pakistan’s sovereignty belongs to Almighty God, leading to perennial confusion over the mundane business of governance here on Planet Earth.

It was the tragic depraved Rahmat Ali, driven by his deep personal anti-Hindu bigotry, who put the “K” into “P, A, K, I, S, T, A, N” purportedly representing “Kashmir”. In his crank view of history, all of Punjab, Afghanistan, Iran, “Tukharistan” (sic) and more would be part of Pakistan too.

The new country might have been better named after a person (as are Colombia, America, Israel), viz., “Iqbalistan” after Mohammad Iqbal who conceived it. It was Iqbal’s seminal 1930 speech to the Muslim League at Allahabad that described the areas (aside from Indian Punjab) that actually constitute post-1971 Pakistan: “I would like to see the Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of Northwest India”. “Dar-e-Islami-Hind”, “Indus Islamic Republic”, “Indic Islamabad” or “Republic of North-Western India” also may have been alternatives to the random acronym Rahmat Ali coined in 1933 on a London bus.

Though Kashmiri himself, Iqbal made no reference to J&K or any of the so-called “princely states” (nor to what became East Pakistan). The legal theory later sold by Britain to both India and Pakistan was that a “Lapse of Paramountcy” over “princely states” would occur on 15 August 1947 before or after which their rulers must “accede” to one or other new Dominion of Britain’s Commonwealth. BR Ambedkar in a brilliant analysis showed this to be erroneous in law: “paramountcy” over any “princely states” which had not acceded passed automatically to the legal successor state of British India, and that was the Dominion of India.

The Dominion of Pakistan was a new state in international law, created out of certain designated territories of British India the day before British India extinguished itself. If, for example, Chitral or Junagadh acceded to Pakistan after that date, it would have to be with the acquiescence of British India’s legal successor, namely, the Dominion of India ~ an acquiescence granted in case of Chitral and denied in case of Junagadh. In case of J&K, all such matters became moot once hostilities broke out between India and Pakistan following the tribal invasion of J&K from Pakistan that commenced October 22 1947; Pakistan’s plan to take over Gilgit by force had been made months before that. The erstwhile State of J&K descended into civil war and chaos, becoming an ownerless entity whose territories came to be carved up by force of arms by both new countries (and in case of uninhabited Aksai Chin, by Communist China also some years later).

Bloated military
Pakistan’s failure to properly develop as a state today ~ in particular allowing its military to bloat in size relative to other social and political institutions and even to possess nuclear weapons intended against the Indian Union ~ has resulted out of the neurotic obsession with Kashmir. India owes a democratic responsibility to residents of the Indian State of J&K to choose their nationality freely under conditions of full information and individual privacy; if some, like Syed Geelani, choose to renounce Indian nationality and either remain stateless or seek the nationality of Pakistan, Iran or Afghanistan, they may still receive permanent residence in India and be legally akin to the many foreign nationals who live and work in India permanently and peacefully. That may be as much as India can realistically contribute to helping the Pakistan Government resolve its neurosis over Kashmir.

Pakistan’s military naturally possesses a fierce loyalty to Pakistan ~ the best way for that loyalty to be implemented in practice may be for General Kayani to allow the country’s public institutions to gradually normalize in size and function. Once Musharraf’s rule comes to an end or a legislature under new clear-headed leaders comes to exist some day, the military may be able to recognise that.

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