A New Playbook for China and ASEAN

The ruling in The Hague against China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea is a watershed moment for international law and an unmistakable warning to China about its strategic assertiveness in Southeast Asia. While China's leaders refuse to recognize the ruling, that doesn’t mean they are undisturbed by it.

KUALA LUMPUR – The ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague against China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea is a watershed moment for international law and an unmistakable warning to China about its strategic assertiveness in Southeast Asia. China says that it does not recognize the PCA ruling; but that doesn’t mean it is undisturbed by it.

The question now is how China will respond. Will it change its often-aggressive behavior in the region, or will it continue to view the South China Sea mainly in terms of US-China competition? If China assumes that a war-weary and risk-averse US will avoid conflict, it could simply assert its South China Sea claims by force.

But belligerence could backfire in several ways. First, it would force the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to choose between China and the US, a decision that all of them would prefer to avoid. Whereas ASEAN member states – particularly the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia – generally have deep military ties with the US, they also value their economic ties with China. The reality is that ASEAN states could choose to become independent players, rather than pawns in the US-China competition, implying that it is in China’s interest to maintain ambiguity in US-ASEAN relations.

It is odd that the presses keep saying erroneouly that the PCA had ruled against CHINA's territorial water. As a matter of truth, it did not. It only ruled against PRC's 9 dash line claim. At present, China consists of two independent political entities with two INDEPENDENT claim on the SCS, namely, the PRC's 9 dash line and the ROC's 11 dash line. The situation won't change until China is unified.
For argument's sake, let us assume that the PCA ruling is valid and legal. Under the One China Principle, it is still the PRC's right and responsible to defend the 11 dash line which is not invalidated by the PCA. Hence, China's position would not changed.

Chin Tong Liew and Wing Thye Woo have a "new playbook for China and the ASEAN" in resolving the disputes in the South China Sea - a bone of contention in recent years. Last week a ruling delivered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague asserts that China's territorial claims in the South China have no legal basis. The authors also point out that China "has fallen into a trap set unintentionally by the Kuomintang, it defeated in 1949. It was the crumbling Kuomintang that in 1947 drew and promulgated the original '11-dash line' map - subsequently reduced to nine dashes by Mao Zedong, in a fraternal gesture to Vietnam. " Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang leader fled to Taiwan after communist victory. The Court's ruling is hence of existential importance to Taiwan. It has rendered China’s claims null and void, which is beneficial for Taiwan and its quest to enhance its international standing.
ASEAN - the Association of Southeast Asian Nations - makes up of 10 member states - Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. Four of them - Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines - all have competing claims over territory in the South China Sea with China and - partially -Taiwan. The ruling is "a watershed moment for international law and an unmistakable warning to China about its strategic assertiveness." But China firmly rejected it. According to the authors, even if "China says that it does not recognize the PCA ruling; but that doesn’t mean it is undisturbed by it." China's response is expected - it can either signal restraint or belligerence. Perhaps it wants to keep a low-profile now, because it hosts the 2016 G20 Summit in Hangzhou in September. Any immediate and aggressive response would only cast a shadow over the atmosphere of world leaders' gathering.
The authors fear that China will "continue to view the South China Sea mainly in terms of US-China competition," and assumes that "a war-weary and risk-averse US will avoid conflict." Inspired by Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, "it could simply assert its South China Sea claims by force." Russia is grappling with sanctions, and falling oil prices have taken a toll on its economy. So China's "belligerence could backfire" as well.
Firstly, it would drive ASEAN members into the arms of America, "a decision that all of them would prefer to avoid." While enjoying "deep military ties with the US," many also "value their economic ties with China." Secondly, Beijing's military and island-building activities are "unwittingly strengthening ultra-nationalist groups in the ASEAN states. This development forces moderate leaders in these countries to adopt a tougher stance toward China than they otherwise would, in order to preempt attacks from the ultra-right and assuage their generals."
The authors say China's efforts to strike bilateral deals with each individual ASEAN member state would "not be enough to guarantee smooth diplomatic relations," as chauvinism and national interests outweigh "material advantages." In dealing with ASEAN China would have "to negotiate twice – first, through its closest allies within ASEAN in the formulation of common ASEAN positions, and then directly with an ASEAN team that could include one of its allies. Certain ASEAN countries clearly value their relationships with China more than their relationships with other ASEAN countries; so, unless China has already ruled out any negotiation on the South China Sea, it should not rule out meeting ASEAN as a bloc."
The authors say China might create the "impression" that it sought to divide the group and break it up, from which China wouldn't benefit, "because that would drive several now-neutral ASEAN states further toward the US." It is important that ASEAN must represent ten countries with one voice" and reach unanimity. The problem is that in the absence of cultural, political and even geographical cohesion among member states, China is more inclined to deal with each individual country, fearing that unity would make the bloc stronger - an example that the EU has shown. The authors say much will "depend on ASEAN and US actions. ASEAN and the US are highly skeptical of China’s repeated public promises of a non-hegemonic mode of international relations; but they should not be blind to China’s legitimate security concerns, which it will never neglect." What "security concerns?" Does ASEAN or the US pose any security threat to China?

This excellent analysis is yet another example how ineffective ASEAN is, economically, China being more important than partners and politically, each with its own agenda. The EU suffers from the second but at a lesser extent from the first! ASEAN IS ABOUT HOLDING HANDS AND PHOTO OPPORTUNITY!

The Chinese reaction to PCA ruling belies expectations of a climbdown of even marginal proportions. One curious aspect of the instant case is China's blatant contradiction in its words & actions. China is a member of UNCLOS & has ratified its rules & covenants. Thus, by rubbishing the PCA & UNCLOS, China seems to suggest it has little regard for international treaties, obligations & rules of law. In this scenario, no country, other than those entirely dependent on China, will be pleased or approve of China's position. This loss of credibility & trust is likely to inflict irreparable damage in the long run.
The assertiveness displayed by China towards the SCS littorals & Japan will perforce have to tone down if Beijing expects bilateral &/or multilateral relations to improve. ASEAN members have so far been ambivalent on their responses & would not want to further aggravate the situation. However, public opinion may force their hand to follow in the footsteps of Philippines with the belief that they could get similar positive outcomes. If this were to happen, China would feel it is being boxed in by the ganging up of neighbours further antagonising the ruling elite. One factor to contend with is slowing economies of not only ASEAN nations but also China's. As it is, Xi Jinping is facing civil unhappiness. Income disparities would further aggravate problems. A restive populace is dangerous for the rulers.
Hence, saner counsel ought to prevail in China for the sake of not only its neighbours but also itself.

'The question now is how China will respond.'
The answer has already come directly from President Xi: don't mess with China's core interests – and direct access to blue water is such an interest.
Because it's necessary for the country's survival, China is going to have direct access to blue water. There is no force capable of stopping – or even discouraging – them. If Tsai Ing-wen impedes it she will preside over a relentlessly declining economy (at best) and the inside a traitor's prison cell for 20 years at worst.
The USA has invaded 30 foreign countries since WWII – and that was just for fun. We didn't need to and our media cheered on the invasions. China can play hardball, too because, like Russia, China's preparing for the third World War we're threatening them with. It's their primary duty to ensure national survival and both governments have 80%+ approval from their people to do so.
Neighbors' bruised feelings will be salved with high-demo tourists. Thailand – where I live – recently refused to renew the United States' airbase and bought Chinese subs. Thais are now basking in Beijing's warm regard: our millions of well-dressed, well-heeled Chinese tourists are spending 50 percent more this year than last. Even the Thai Tourism Authority, quick to take credit for anything tourism-related, admitted they were flabbergasted by the unexpected billions flowing into local pockets and the national Treasury.
The Philippines are aware of this and Duterte needs an economic win now that will pay off before the next elections. The last thing on earth he needs is a standoff with his biggest beneficiary. Infrastructure, affordable financing and rich tourists. Hmmm. I smell a win-win deal.

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