Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus summarized in a thousand short sentences and paragraphs the limits of logic and language to solve or dis-solve philosophical problems.

Although he spent the rest of his life wrestling with those problems, Wittgenstein could never get out of his fly-bottle of words, beyond what can be said to what can only be shown.

Dynamic and interactive information structures can be experienced without the mediation of language. The experience recorder and reproducer in the mind can capture the information and store it away for a lifetime of valuable guidance.

This book will perhaps only be understood by those
who have themselves already thought the thoughts which
are expressed in it—or similar thoughts. It is therefore
not a text-book. Its object would be attained if it
afforded pleasure to one who read it with understanding.

The book deals with the problems öf philosophy and
shows, as I believe, that the method of formulating these
problems rests on the misunderstanding of the logic of
our language. Its whole meaning could be summed up
somewhat as follows : What can be said at all can be said
clearly; and whereof one can not speak thereof one must
be silent.

The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking,
or rather—not to thinking, but to the expression of
thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we
should have to be able to think both sides of this limit
(we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot
be thought).

The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language
and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply
nonsense,

How far my efforts agree with those of other philosophers
I will not decide. Indeed what I have here
written makes no claim to novelty in points of detail;
and therefore I give no sources. because it is indifferent
to me whether what I have thought has already been
thought before me by another.

I will only mention that to the great works of Frege
and the writings of my friend Bertrand Russell I owe in
large measure the stimulation of my thoughts.

If this work has a value it consists in two things.
First that in it thoughts are expressed, and this value will
be the greater the better the thoughts are expressed. The
more the nail has been hit on the head. — Here I am
conscious that I have fallen far short of the possible.
Simply because my powers are insufficient to cope with

On the other hand the truth of the thoughts communicated
here seems to me unassailable and definitive. I
am, therefore, of the opinion that the problems have in
essentials been finally solved. And if I am not mistaken
in this, then the value of this work secondly consists in the
fact that it shows how little has been done when these
problems have been solved.

2.0121 It would, so to speak, appear as an accident, when
to a thing that could exist alone on its own account,
subsequently a state of affairs could be made to fit.
If things can occur in atomic facts, this possibility
must already lie in them.
(A logical entity cannot be merely possible.
Logic treats of every possibility, and all possibilities
are its facts.)

2.02331 Either a thing has properties which no other
has, and then one can distinguish it straight away
from the others by a description and refer to it;
or, on the other hand, there are several things
which have the totality of their properties in
common, and then it is quite impossible to point
to any one of them.
For if a thing is not distinguished by anything,
I cannot distinguish it—for otherwise it would be
distinguished.

We define relative identity as two things with the same intrinsic internal information, but numerically distinct.

2.15 That the elements of the picture are combined
with one another in a definite way, represents that
the things are so combined with one another.
This connexion of the elements of the picture is
called its structure, and the possibility of this structure
is called the form of representation of the picture

The representation is the isomorphism with information structure in the object. Cf. 2.022

3.323 In the language of everyday life it very often
happens that the same word signifies in two different
ways—and therefore belongs to two different
Symbols — or that two words, which signify in
different ways, are apparently applied in the same
way in the proposition.

Thus the word " is " appears as the copula,
as the sign of equality, and as the expression of
existence; " to exist " as an intransitive verb like
" to go "; " identical " as an adjective; we speak
of something but also of the fact of something
happening.

(In the proposition "Green is green "—where
the first word is a proper name and the last an
adjective—these words have not merely different
meanings but they are different symbols.)

"Is" as a copula predicates a property of the subject.

"Is" as the mathematical symbol of equivalence "=" means the proposition is symmetric.

"Is" as the sign of existence predicates nothing, so Kant said "exists" is not a predicate, to prevent the ontological argument "proving" God's existence.

4.002 Man possesses the capacity of constructing
languages, in which every sense can be expressed,
without having an idea how and what each word
means—just as one speaks without knowing how
the single sounds are produced.
Colloquial language is a part of the human
organism and is not less complicated than it.
From it it is humanly impossible to gather
immediately the logic of language.
Language disguises the thought; so that from
the external form of the clothes one cannot infer
the form of the thought they clothe, because the
external form of the clothes is constructed with
quite another object than to let the form of the
body be recognized.
The silent adjustments to understand colloquial
language are enormously complicated.

4.002 Man possesses the capacity of constructing
languages, in which every sense can be expressed,
without having an idea how and what each word
means—just as one speaks without knowing how
the single sounds are produced.

Colloquial language is a part of the human
organism and is not less complicated than it
From it it is humanly impossible to gather
immediately the logic of language.

Language disguises the thought; so that from
the external form of the clothes one cannot infer
the form of the thought they clothe, because the
external form of the clothes is constructed with
quite another object than to let the form of the
body be recognized.

The silent adjustments to understand colloquial
language are enormously complicated.

4.003 Most propositions and questions, that have been
written about philosophical matters, are not false, but
senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions
of this kind at all, but only state their senselessness.
Most questions and propositions of the philosophers
result from the fact that we do not understand the
logic of our language.
(They are of the same kind as the question
whether the Good is more or less identical than the
Beautiful.)
And so it is not to be wondered at that the
deepest problems are really no problems.

4.011 At the first glance the proposition—say as it
stands printed on paper—does not seem to be a
picture of the reality of which it treats. But nor
does the musical score appear at first sight to be a
picture of a musical piece; nor does our phonetic
spelling (letters) seem to be a picture of our spoken
language.
And yet these symbolisms prove to be
pictures—even in the ordinary sense of the word
—of what they represent.

Letters and words are in fact not pictures.

Words can stimulate the Experience Recorder in the mind to reproduce related experiences which may produce mental pictures.

Words only represent and mean through the intermediating mind and its experiences.

4.013 And if we penetrate to the essence of this
pictorial nature we see that this is not disturbed
by apparent irregularities (like the use of ♯ and ♭ in
the score).
For these irregularities also picture what they
are to express; only in another way.

4.014 The gramophone record, the musical thought,
the score, the waves of sound, all "stand to one
another in that pictorial internal relation, which
holds between language and the world.
To all of them the logical structure is common.
(Like the two youths, their two horses and their
lilies in the story. They are all in a certain sense
one.)

4.0141 In the fact that there is a general rule by which
the musician is able to read the symphony out of
the score, and that there is a rule by which one
could reconstruct the symphony from the line on
a gramophone record and from this again—by
means of the first rule—construct the score, herein
lies the internal similarity between these things
which at first sight seem to be entirely different.
And the rule is the law of projection which projects
the symphony into the language of the musical
score. It is the rule of translation of this language
into the language of the gramophone record.

4.016 In order to understand the essence of the
proposition, consider hieroglyphic writing, which
pictures the facts it represents.
And from it came the alphabet without the
essence of the representation being lost.

All alphabets, except the semitic, have forgotten the meanings of the symbols.

4.011 At the first glance the proposition—say as it
stands printed on paper—does not seem to be a
picture of the reality of which it treats. But nor
does the musical score appear at first sight to be a
picture of a musical piece; nor does our phonetic
spelling (letters) seem to be a picture of our spoken
language.

And yet these symbolisms prove to be
pictures—even in the ordinary sense of the word
—of what they represent.

Written and spoken representations are not pictures in the same sense as the dynamic interactive structures (animations) of information philosophy.

Words mediated through the ERR of the mind can only reproduce experiences associated with printed or spoken words. These experiences are isomorphic with the original reality.

4.241 If I use two signs with one and the same
meaning, I express this by putting between them
the sign "=".

"a = b" means then, that the sign "a" is
replaceable by the sign "b".

(If I introduce by an equation a new sign "b",
by determining that it shall replace a previously
known sign "a" , I write the equation—definition
—(like Russell) in the form " a=b Def.". A
definition is a symbolic rule.)

This is the problem of Frege's "identical" signs - Morning Star and Evening Star.

For the past few decades, Willard Van Orman Quine has shown how this mathematical "principle of substitutivity" fails in linguistic contexts because of "referential opacity," e.g, "the number of planets = 9."

5.1632 The freedom of the will consists in the fact that
future actions cannot be known now. We could
only know them if causality were an inner necessity,
like that of logical deduction.—The connexion
of knowledge and what is known is that of logical
necessity.

5.5301 That identity is not a relation between objects is
obvious. This becomes very clear if, for example,
one considers the proposition "(x) : fx. ⊃ . x = a".
What this proposition says is simply that only
a satisfies the function f , and not that only such
things satisfy the function f which have a certain
relation to a.

One could of course say that in fact only
a has this relation to a, but in order to express
this we should need the sign of identity itself.

5.5302 Russell's definition of "=" won't do; because
according to it one cannot say that two objects
have all their properties in common. (Even if
this proposition is never true, it is nevertheless
significant.)

5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to
be noted ?
You say that this case is altogether like that of
the eye and the field of sight. But you do not
really see the eye.
And from nothing in the field of sight can it be
concluded that it is seen from an eye

5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of
our experience is also a priori.
Everything we see could also be otherwise.
Everything we can describe at all could also be
otherwise.
There is no order of things a priori.

5.641 There is therefore really a sense in which in
philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I.
The I occurs in philosophy through the fact
that the "world is my world" .
The philosophical I is not the man, not the
human body or the human soul of which psychology
treats, but the metaphysical subject, the
limit—not a part of the world.

6.1222 This throws light on the question why logical
propositions can no more be empirically confirmed
than they can be empirically refuted. Not only
must a proposition of logic be incapable of being
contradicted by any possible experience, but it
must also be incapable of being confirmed by any
such.

6.211 In life it is never a mathematical proposition
which we need, but we use mathematical propositions
only in order to infer from propositions
which do not belong to mathematics to others
which equally do not belong to mathematics.
(In philosophy the question " Why do we really
use that word, that proposition ? " constantly leads
to valuable results.)

6.4312 The temporal immortality of the human
soul, that is to say, its eternal survival after
death, is not only in no way guaranteed, but
this assumption in the first place will not do
for us what we always tried to make it do.
Is a riddle solved by the fact that I survive for
ever? Is this eternal life not as enigmatic as
our present one? The solution of the riddle of
life in space and time lies outside space and time.