The United States should work closely with Iraq’s leaders to support the achievement of specific
objectives—or milestones—on national reconciliation, security, and governance. Miracles
cannot be expected, but the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress. The Iraqi
government needs to show its own citizens—and the citizens of the United States and other
countries—that it deserves continued support.

The U.S. government must make clear that it expects action by the Iraqi government to
make substantial progress toward these milestones. Such a message can be sent only at the level
of our national leaders, and only in person, during direct consultation.

As President Bush’s meeting with Prime Minister Maliki in Amman, Jordan
demonstrates, it is important for the President to remain in close and frequent contact with the
Iraqi leadership. There is no substitute for sustained dialogue at the highest levels of
government.

During these high-level exchanges, the United States should lay out an agenda for
continued support to help Iraq achieve milestones, as well as underscoring the consequences if
Iraq does not act. It should be unambiguous that continued U.S. political, military, and
economic support for Iraq depends on the Iraqi government’s demonstrating political will and
making substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation,
security, and governance. The transfer of command and control over Iraqi security forces units
from the United States to Iraq should be influenced by Iraq’s performance on milestones.

The United States should also signal that it is seeking broad international support for Iraq
on behalf of achieving these milestones. The United States can begin to shape a positive climate
for its diplomatic efforts, internationally and within Iraq, through public statements by President
Bush that reject the notion that the United States seeks to control Iraq’s oil, or seeks permanent
military bases within Iraq. However, the United States could consider a request from Iraq for
temporary bases.

RECOMMENDATION 19: The President and the leadership of his national security team
should remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership. These contacts must
convey a clear message: there must be action by the Iraqi government to make substantial
progress toward the achievement of milestones. In public diplomacy, the President should
convey as much detail as possible about the substance of these exchanges in order to keep the
American people, the Iraqi people, and the countries in the region well informed.

RECOMMENDATION 20: If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes
substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security,
and governance, the United States should make clear its willingness to continue training,
assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces, and to continue political, military, and
economic support for the Iraqi government. As Iraq becomes more capable of governing,
defending, and sustaining itself, the U.S. military and civilian presence in Iraq can be reduced.

RECOMMENDATION 21: If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward
the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United
States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.

RECOMMENDATION 22: The President should state that the United States does not seek
permanent military bases in Iraq. If the Iraqi government were to request a temporary base or
bases, then the U.S. government could consider that request as it would in the case of any other
government.

Milestones for Iraq

The government of Iraq understands that dramatic steps are necessary to avert a downward spiral
and make progress. Prime Minister Maliki has worked closely in consultation with the United
States and has put forward the following milestones in the key areas of national reconciliation,
security and governance:

RECOMMENDATION 25: These milestones are a good start. The United States should
consult closely with the Iraqi government and develop additional milestones in three areas:
national reconciliation, security, and improving government services affecting the daily lives of
Iraqis. As with the current milestones, these additional milestones should be tied to calendar
dates to the fullest extent possible.

Given its own assessment of the current situation, the ISG
recommendations in this section seem less than serious. The administration has tried milestones, it’s tried ordering the Iraqis to do lots things it thinks would be good for them. It’s told the Shia leaders to embrace the moderate Sunni and visa versa; it has bent to Shia demands, then to Sunni, but all it has done is to convince both sides that the US can’t be trusted. The only thing it hasn’t tried is threatening the government with a withdrawal of support if it doesn’t do what is asked. Some US military commanders in Iraq believe such a threat – backed up by actual withdrawals – is the only way to convince Iraqis of the need for national reconciliation. Perhaps. But it seems just as likely – or more so – that, faced the threat of US withdrawals, Iraqi leaders may conclude that their only hope for security lies in beefing up their own militias – at government expense and with government police and army units. And if the threat of withdrawal doesn’t work, the US would be left with no leverage at all.

This preference for “temporary” bases (and, elsewhere in the report, “advisers” instead of combat troops) may go down well with an American public. But it is noteworthy that “bases” and “advisers” are exactly the concepts that historically have prompted the angriest Iraqi reactions against foreign powers’ interference, as seen during the British mandate and the subsequent period of “informal” influence that brutally came to an end in 1958.

Once again, Republican economic dogma tops all. This report is a veritable compendium of vague hopes, wishful ideas, and sketchy solutions…save when it comes to an anti-inflation program. Then we see hard numbers, and demand for a regimen that will come down hardest on the average Iraqi.

Given its own assessment of the current situation, the ISG
recommendations in this section seem less than serious. The administration has tried milestones, it’s tried ordering the Iraqis to do lots things it thinks would be good for them. It’s told the Shia leaders to embrace the moderate Sunni and visa versa; it has bent to Shia demands, then to Sunni, but all it has done is to convince both sides that the US can’t be trusted. The only thing it hasn’t tried is threatening the government with a withdrawal of support if it doesn’t do what is asked. Some US military commanders in Iraq believe such a threat – backed up by actual withdrawals – is the only way to convince Iraqis of the need for national reconciliation. Perhaps. But it seems just as likely – or more so – that, faced the threat of US withdrawals, Iraqi leaders may conclude that their only hope for security lies in beefing up their own militias – at government expense and with government police and army units. And if the threat of withdrawal doesn’t work, the US would be left with no leverage at all.

This preference for “temporary” bases (and, elsewhere in the report, “advisers” instead of combat troops) may go down well with an American public. But it is noteworthy that “bases” and “advisers” are exactly the concepts that historically have prompted the angriest Iraqi reactions against foreign powers’ interference, as seen during the British mandate and the subsequent period of “informal” influence that brutally came to an end in 1958.

Once again, Republican economic dogma tops all. This report is a veritable compendium of vague hopes, wishful ideas, and sketchy solutions…save when it comes to an anti-inflation program. Then we see hard numbers, and demand for a regimen that will come down hardest on the average Iraqi.

Given its own assessment of the current situation, the ISG
recommendations in this section seem less than serious. The administration has tried milestones, it’s tried ordering the Iraqis to do lots things it thinks would be good for them. It’s told the Shia leaders to embrace the moderate Sunni and visa versa; it has bent to Shia demands, then to Sunni, but all it has done is to convince both sides that the US can’t be trusted. The only thing it hasn’t tried is threatening the government with a withdrawal of support if it doesn’t do what is asked. Some US military commanders in Iraq believe such a threat – backed up by actual withdrawals – is the only way to convince Iraqis of the need for national reconciliation. Perhaps. But it seems just as likely – or more so – that, faced the threat of US withdrawals, Iraqi leaders may conclude that their only hope for security lies in beefing up their own militias – at government expense and with government police and army units. And if the threat of withdrawal doesn’t work, the US would be left with no leverage at all.

This preference for “temporary” bases (and, elsewhere in the report, “advisers” instead of combat troops) may go down well with an American public. But it is noteworthy that “bases” and “advisers” are exactly the concepts that historically have prompted the angriest Iraqi reactions against foreign powers’ interference, as seen during the British mandate and the subsequent period of “informal” influence that brutally came to an end in 1958.

Once again, Republican economic dogma tops all. This report is a veritable compendium of vague hopes, wishful ideas, and sketchy solutions…save when it comes to an anti-inflation program. Then we see hard numbers, and demand for a regimen that will come down hardest on the average Iraqi.