Defensive frailty

Throughout the buildup, the biggest question mark was over England’s defence. There was much consternation over whether the first-choice four would stay fit. As it turned out, even that didn’t help much.

Once England’s area of towering strength, it has become their biggest cause for concern. Glen Johnson and Leighton Baines offered attacking threat but were shown up defensively.

In the middle the relatively untested partnership between Gary Cahill and Phil Jagielka that rang alarm bells during the warm-up matches caused them to clang ever louder. The latter, an impressive Premier League presence all season, was left sadly exposed and throughout a sense of fragility abounded.

The abiding memory of São Paulo will be the route-one Luis Suárez goal that won the game for Uruguay. The unbroken line in central defensive dominance that stretches back to Terry Butcher has been definitively severed. It is pointless speculating on what difference John Terry may have made but worth reflecting what the sudden dearth of defensive talent says about our game.

Naivety of youth

Some will say it is typical double standards to call for boldness from Hodgson and then criticise his young players for not making the right decisions.

But as Steven Gerrard wondered if his side could have been a bit more “cute” in hanging on to what they had against Uruguay (and indeed against Italy), it was tempting to speculate on whether captain and coach should not have done more to ensure that was the case.

Hindsight is 20/20. But in chasing the winner against Uruguay and leaving themselves exposed at the back, when a draw would have been a more than satisfactory result and kept their chances very much alive, England signed their own death warrant.

Poor substitutions

The Belgium coach Marc Wilmots faced searching questions from his own media following an under-par opening performance against Algeria. But he still found a way to win by changing the game from the bench.

At 1-0 down, a bold half-time substitution and then the introduction of Marouane Fellaini and a tactical shake-up turned things round. His intervention contrasts sharply with Hodgson’s apparent inability to alight upon a Plan B in either game to date.

At 2-1 down to Italy, his only solution seemed to be to keep throwing on players in the hope something might change. Ross Barkley was given almost half an hour in both games but was unable to impose himself on proceedings.

There must be some room for mitigation. Hodgson could do little about the players he had at his disposal and perhaps shuffled his pack as best he could. But there was a nagging feeling in both matches that the performance was allowed to drift rather than proceed according to a pre-ordained plan.

Preparation

As has been extensively noted, it is difficult to fault the travelling cocoon built around the players that took them from Portugal to St George’s Park then to Miami and finally to Rio de Janeiro. No stone was left unturned and no “marginal gain” overlooked.

And yet. While Hodgson has displayed admirable open mindedness in professing to learn from other sports, there was something predictable about the way Dr Steve Peters was brought on board too late to have any meaningful effect and then blamed by some when things went wrong.

And on the pitch, again with the benefit of hindsight and with the caveat that he could only work with what he had, it is possible to wonder whether Hodgson could not have done more to explore alternative formations and personnel during the three warm-up matches.

Looking further back, the back-to-back defeats to Chile and Germany at Wembley in November should perhaps have been a warning that was heeded.

The ‘midfield two’

At the heart of England’s problems was the heart of the midfield. The Liverpool fans who loudly questioned Gerrard’s ability to play as one of a pair alongside Jordan Henderson, pointing to the way in which their midfield was overrun by Aston Villa at Anfield in January, had a point.

At times in both of England’s matches, the combination appeared to misfire in similar fashion. With Hodgson effectively selecting a front four, it was essential that both Gerrard and Henderson offered stout protection.

Too often, however, they found themselves outnumbered and Gerrard appeared a shadow of his all-action Liverpool self. With Jack Wilshere also looking more comfortable in a three-man midfield, perhaps it would have been sensible to begin with a more defensively minded base against Italy in the knowledge that he could switch to a more attacking lineup if required.