Arms Control: The End of an Era

am grateful to the members of this committe e for the opportunity
to discuss th e START Treaty and America's strategic nuclear
priorities in the years ahead. Due to the near-miraculous events of
past months, I find myself in the position of discussing a treaty
that history rapidly is passing by. Even as the Senate begins
the-formal p r ocess of ratifica- tion, we can look forward to a
new era in which the incrementalism of adversarial arms control is
left behind, and in which America safely will be able to steeply
reduce its level of nuclear arma- ments while maintaining its
security. E a st-West arms control as it has been practiced
untilhow borders on irrelevancy. The prob- lems it set out to solve
have been subject to a meta-solution that had little if anything to
do with the arms control process: the collapse of the Soviet regime
that f or forty years propelled the arms race and kept the world on
the edge of oblivion. Still, if recent events are reversed, the
START Treaty could again become a document with im- portant
implications for national security. Before it is ratified,
therefore, t he Senate should ensure that some potentially serious
issues are resolved. These include the question of who precisely am
America's partners in this treaty now that the Soviet Union no
longer exists, and whether all veri- fication provisions -
particularl y the ban on missile test data encryption - are
understood in the same way by all sides. Before taking a closer
look at these issues, however, I would like to re- flect on the
assumptions of the Cold War era just past - the "arms control" era
- and to see what lessons can be drawn for the new age before us.

Arms Control Past

The end of the Cold War has proved false many of the assumptions
underlying arms control theory, as set out by its pioneers in the
1960s. The first misconception of course was the "ar ms race"
itself. Looldng back, it becomes clear that there never was an
"arms race," at least not as it was understood by arms control's
most ardent advocates. There never were two blind goliaths
stumbling forward in mindless competition. Ile arms race wa s not a
misunderstanding, not driven by mistrust and suspicion. The real
arms race was propelled by Moscow's conscious and unabashed drive
for military superiority in pursuit of its imperial ambitions. The
final evidence, if ever we really needed it, is th a t the demise
of the Soviet regime, not arms control, has brought the arms race
virtually to a dead halt. To be sure, ending the arms race was only
one of the goals of arms control. There were others: increasing
strategic stability, decreasing the risks of war, and lessening the
damage should war occur. It achieved none of these. During the
1970s and 1980s, arms control rechanneled the arms competition,
often away from programs in which America might have had an
advantage like space-based defenses, and into other weapons like
tanks, artil- lery, and aircraft, all of which Moscow built in
prodigious numbers during the 1980s in pursuit of a military edge
over NATO allies.

J ay P. Kosminsky is the Deputy Director of Defense Policy Studies
at The Heritage Foundation. Ibis is his testimony to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on March 5,1992. ISSN 0272-1155. 0 1992
by The Heritage Foundation.

Strategic stability also proved an elusive quest. Efforts
through SALT I to control the volume and hence throw-weight of neW
Soviet missiles failed when Moscow deliberately misled Ameri- can
negotiators about the dimensions of its -new generation of ICBMs
and deployed them in circumvention of what it knew to be America's
understanding of the treaty. Even under START, U. S . land-based
forces will be marginally more vulnerable - despite cuts in
Moscow's heavy missile force - as a result of deadly enhancements
of the SS- 18's silo-busting capabilities, taken in combination
with cuts in America's ICBM force. Fatal Flaw. The f a tal Raw of
arms control theory was its implicit hope that it ultimately could
have a political effect, easing the climate of misunderstanding and
suspicion that was judged to be the real culprit behind the
superpower rivalry, and aiming to improve securit y on both sides.
But as it turned out, the real culprit was the Soviet regime
itself, which only became more hostile and expansionist with each
measure of security it gained. It is important to understand this.
be- cause for years the arms race was present e d as the problem,
and arms control - often in the form of unilateral arms restraint -
as the solution. Thus arms control advocates often went astray.
They opposed weapon programs, from SDI to the B- I bomber, that in
fact did more to bring the arms race t o an end - by frustrating
Moscow's drive for superiority - than all the arms control of the
post-World War H era. Before the arms race could end, the Cold War
had to be won. And it was. The result is that all the objectives of
anus control now are within r e ach. The arms race has ended, arms
expenditures are down, the risk of war is reduced, and there, is
every reason to believe that Moscow soon will give up its most
"destabilizing" weapons. Arms control had little to do with this
outcome. To continue to tal k the language of arms con- trol today
is to talk in terms of Newtonian physics after Einstein. The
language still all makes sense within its own narrow framework of
logic, but in the grand scheme of things it has been shown to have
little to do with the p owerfal forces that shape the universe of
war and peace.

Arms Control Present

Ile collapse of the Soviet regime for the time being has rendered
START obsolete, and ff all goes well in Moscow, it will remain so.
If, however, Russia's democracy fails, START again could become
central to America's national security equation. In this c o ntext,
I have several seri- ous reservations about the treaty that I
believe should be resolved fully before it is ratified. The first
is the question of with whom the United States is entering into
START. The State Department's current plan, as I underst a nd it,
is for Russia to sip the START Treaty and for the three other CIS
strategic nuclear powers - Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine - to
sip legally binding side agreements assuring access for inspections
and other verification provisions on their territ o ry. Under this
formula, Russian ownership of START-limited weapons would be estab-
lished and Russia ultimately would be responsible for bringing the
total number of weapons 'down to START limits. The problem is that
the CIS states themselves cannot agree on a formula, and I was told
just last week by a member of the Defense Committee of the Russian
Supreme Soviet that the issue has become rather heated, despite
assurances to the contrary from the State Department. Russia
apparently wants all START busines s conducted through Moscow.
Hence if the U.S. were to de- mand an inspection on Ukrainian soil,
it would make the request through Moscow and bypass Kiev. This is
unacceptable thus far to Ukraine, and should be unacceptable to the
United States, since it do es not respect the sovereignty of each
CIS state.

2

The Senate therefore- should delay ratification until all
outstanding issues have been resolved regarding the discrete
obligations and responsibilities of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia,
and Ukraine regard ing the Treaty. Before ratification, all
necessary implementing agreements should be drawn up and signed by
these states. These agreements should fully respect the sovereignty
of each state while establishing clear lines of responsibility for
verification and monitoring prqvis- ions, and central control and
authority over the weapons themselves. Also at issue of course is
the as yet unresolved question of whether and when the non-Russian
strategic nuclear powers of the CIS, particularly troublesome
Kazakhs t an, will rid themselves Of their strategic nuclear
weapons. The assumption on the U.S. side is that these weapons will
be dismantled as part of Russia's START reductions. I suggest to
the Senate that a unilateral U.S. statement be attached to the
treaty t h at makes explicit this understanding. A related issue is
whether the Russian government in fact has full authority over the
former So- viet military forces that have operational control over
START-controlled weapons. Technically, the military is under the
control of the CIS, an entity (or non-entity) with which the U.S.
will not be signing any agreements, and which is apt to have a
limited lifespan. The pre- sumption is that strategic nuclear
forces in practice will be under Russian control, but increasing l
y the military leadership is divided over the question of to whom
it owes its alle- giance, and elements of the officer corps are
taking on an independent-political role. The situation warrants
close watching and, I suggest, some further investigation by t his
Committee before the treaty is ratified. Further Reservations. My
second set of reservations concern the more technical issues of
"encryption" of data from ballistic missile test launches, and
secondly the production of mobile ballistic missile compon e nts.
As you Imow, Washington and Moscow upon signing START de- clared
their intention to cease encryption of missile test data beginning
on November 28, 199 1. But in December, an ICBM was launched from
Kazakhstan with test data encrypted. Moscow claimed t he ICBM
launch was a civilian "space launch" not covered by the treaty, and
that its declaration of intent therefore did not apply. Last year,
Moscow also conducted a series of SS-24 ballistic missile launches
without first giving prior notice as required by the 1988 Ballistic
Mis- sile Launch Notification Agreement - again on grounds that the
tests were of "space launch" vehicles. Hence even as it was
negotiating START, Moscow was trying to establish a precedent - as
yet not vigorously contested by the U. S . - for circumventing a
key verification provision of the treaty. Before ratification the
Senate should seek a formal statement by the Russian government
that henceforth no similar attempts to circumvent the treaty's "no
encryption" provisions will occur. The second technical issue is
mobile missile component production. While this issue is highly
sensitive, and I have no access to the classified information
needed to address it in depth, it is clear from the public record
that a problem exists. While the p roduction of mobile missiles is
sub- ject to verification procedures in the START Treaty,
production of components is not. Moscow apparently is producing
solid rocket motors and other components for mobile ICBMs in
numbers far higher than needed for plann e d deployments. As I
understand it, the Defense Intelligence Agency, as well as the
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Armed Services
'Committee, have expressed serious concern over this issue. I hope
that this committee will re- solve this issue to its satisfaction
before it recommends ratification of the START Treaty; in addition,
a unilateral U.S. statement should accompany the treaty to the
effect that a continued production of excess mobile missile
components could be considered an "ext raordinary event!' that
would jeopardize the treaty.

3

Arms Control Future The most important steps America can take today
to ensure its security and move the world to- ward a more peaceful
future have little to do with arms control, or for that matter w
ith arms building. Russia today stands midway between its
expansionist Soviet past and what we all hope will be its peaceful
democratic future. Helping the CIS states, particularly powerful
Russia, to- ward this future should be America's highest national
security priority. A democratic Russia can be a partner in trade,
science, and security, including anti-prolifera- tion and strategic
defense. Helping Russia's democrats today can help prevent the
Soviet Union or anything like it from arising again in our
lifetimes. This means humanitarian aid, financial ad- vice,
expertise and membership in international economic organizations,
large-scale joint scientific projects, and most of all, private
i'nvestment. Russia's democrats are engaged in a life- or-death s t
ruggle to demilitarize their society, gain control over ex-Soviet
armed forces and institutionalize civilian oversikht and control of
the military. We cannot ensure the success of their endeavor; too
much depends on forces out of our control. But we owe i t our best
effort. The most important type of "arms control" America will
engage in during this era will not in- volve sitting around a table
with potential adversaries, but cooperating with allies - hopefully
including Russia - to use all means to stop th e proliferation of
mass destruction weapons and technology to such outlaw regimes as
those in Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. In coming years
America will have an opportunity to completely restructure its
offensive and defensive nuclear forces. This sh o uld not be a
numbers game. The question is not how low can we go, but what
threats will America face and what forces will be needed to ensure
security. Bar- ring the rise of a neo-Soviet regime in Moscow, the
good news is that there is no nuclear threat c o mparable to the
Soviet threat on the horizon. Security therefore likely can be
achieved at far lower cost and with far fewer nuclear weapons than
has been the case in years past. In the near term, I suggest the
following steps: 1) Resolve outstanding STAR T issues before
ratifying the treaty. I hope the Senate will address the
outstanding issues I have just discussed before ratifying the START
Treaty. If these can be resolved to the Senate's satisfaction,
START then should be ratified, mainly because its ex tensive
verification and monitoring pro- visions will be useful during this
period of transition in the former Soviet Union. These provisions
are unprecedented for a treaty of this type, and on this account
the treaty is an advance over its predecessors.

2 ). Once START is ratified and forces reduced to START levels,
proceed via infor. mal arnis control to President Bush's proposed
level of 4,500 strategic warheads, and de-NURVing of ICBMs. As long
as a friendly regime remains in place in Moscow, deeper mut u al
cuts than those envisioned under START are de- sirable as long as
Moscow reciprocates. Bush should announce unilaterally the
U.S.-intention, once START limits have been reached, to further cut
U.S. forces to 4,500 warheads and to de-MIRV ICBMs and part of the
SLBM force, as he al- ready has proposed. He should outline
reciprocal steps he expects of Moscow, particularly concerning the
fate of its heavy missiles. Formal Russian agreement on all
details, including ultimate force levels, is not necessary. P
rolonged negotia- tions of the type that led to START are likely to
create an adversarial atmosphere and delay progress. America simply
should proceed toward its own force goals as long as Russian
reciprocity makes it safe to do so.

4

This informal arm s control approach is preferable to negotiating
new, lower numbers for the START accord. First, trying to change
START numbers now could entail a lengthy renegotiation, open new
questions about relevant negotiating partners, and delay putting in
place the useful verification and inspection procedures of the
START Treaty. Further, dangers could arise if the U.S. were to
negotiate far lower numbers with the current Russian government,
only later to have that gov- ernment overthrown by a militarist
regime tha t would seek to exploit every potential advantage. Then,
suddenly, issues like cheating, undeployed missiles, Backfire
bombers, and breakout potential again would surface - only this
time far more dangerously since America would be without the margin
of sa f ety pro- vided by START's relatively high numbers. If,
however, America proceeds toward lower numbers via informal
agreements, it will have the freedom to con- tinue working
cooperatively with Russia's democratic leaders, or if need be to
reverse course a nd fall back on a robust, START-compliant force in
the face of a newly-hostile Kremlin regime.

3) Declare an informal moratorium on new strategic weapon
development; request Russian reciprocity. America rightly has
shelved for the time being any plans to d eploy new types of
strategic weapons. Russia, however, still has at least one new ICBM
and cruise missile in development. The U.S. should declare a freeze
on the deployment of any strategic offensive systems not currently
in production, and re- quest Russ ian reciprocity.

Were this the 1980s, I certainly would have been before, you
arguing that START provis- ions require modernization of America's
strategic force. I would have argued that rail-MX and the,
Midgetman mobile ICBM were needed to counter improve ments in the
yield and accuracy of the SS-18. I would have argued for a full
complement of B-2s to take advantage of START counting rules that
discount non-ALCM bombers. If America faced a hostile regime in
Moscow todayt or if it faces one n, these system s would be needed.
But with a democratically elected govern- ment in Moscow committed
to 50 percent cuts this year in military procurement, they are not
needed today.

4) Allow the 1972 ABM Treaty to lapse and negotiate a new treaty
with Russia al- lowing f or deployment of effective limited missile
defenses. With the Soviet Union now gone, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty no longer is valid. It should not be revived. In a
televised speech on January 29, Russia's President Boris Yeltsin
called for the U nited States and Russia to "create and jointly
oper- ategs a global defense system. The first step in this
direction was taken during Secretary of State James Baker's trip to
Moscow this month when the two govern- ments agreed to a joint
monitoring center to track the launch of ballistic missiles
anywhere in the world. As the landmark bipartisan agreement forged
by the Sen- ate last year indicates, there now exists a consensus
among liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, that
at least some defenses am pru- dent as a hedge against an
accidental, unauthorized, or light missile attack from any of an
expanding number of ballistic missile states.

5

President Bush is right in asserting that in order for this defense
to be effective, the U.S. will have to deploy a system that goes
beyond the limits of the ABM Treaty. Pref-' erably, this can be
done through cooperative discussions with the Russian gove r nment
at the Defense and Space Talks. With Washington and Moscow mov- ing
away from their former adversarial relationship and toward
cooperation, no one need fear that defenses will spark an "arms
race." With patience and open- ness, there is no reason th a t
American defenses - particularly limited defenses should be viewed
as threatening by Moscow, any more than they are viewed that way by
London orTokyo. On the contrary, as suggested just this month by
former Soviet Defense and Space Talks delegate Alexan der Savelyev,
strategic de- fense cooperation with America offers Russia an
opportunity to-protect itself against expanding threats at a time
when it cannot bear the costs of such a defense itself.

Still Deeper Cuts? Where these steps ultimately will lead depends
mainly on developments within the former So- viet Union. If Russia
in particular moves in the direction of neo-Sovietism, these
initial steps may be as far as we can hope to go. If such a regime
were to revert to the militarism, secrecy, and cheat i ng of the
ex-Soviet Union, nuclear modernization programs would have to be
restored, including the mobile Midgetman missile and B-2 bomber. On
the other hand, if Russia over the next five or ten years
successfully transcends its milita- rist past and effe c tively
joins the West, even steeper reductions in America's nuclear
arsenal then will be possible. Criteria by which to judge Russia's
transformation from adversary to ally in- clude: continued
adherence to democratic principles; firm civilian control ove r a
drastically reduced military force; demilftarization of the Russian
economy; and compliance with START and informal agreements. If
Russia successfully makes this transition, issues like stability
and even deterrence - at least in relation to Russia - w o uld be
almost wholly irrelevant. The U.S. then would be able to struc-
ture its strategic nuclear offenses mainly tD deter a
hostile-upstart nuclear power. Contingent upon the success of
anti-proliferation efforts, this could be a small force of perhaps
2 , 000 total weapons or less. Defenses would guard against a
light, accidental, or unauthorized nuclear launch from anywhere in
the world, and hedge against an unexpected turn of events in Russia
or elsewhere in the CIS. With defenses in place and Russia fir m ly
in the Western camp, the U.S. could consider the elimination ftom
its arsenal of all ICBMs. Near-Term Scenario. In discussing this
scenario, I am not talking about a distant future, but what could
well be possible by the turn of the century, only eight years away.
This future would never have been conceivable had the Soviet Union
survived. It will not be possible if a militarist regime replaces
the courageous, struggling democrats now ascendent in the Kremlin.
To the ex- tent that it is in our power, Am e rica cannot allow
Russian democracy to fail. This objective is more important than
any arms control or strategic modernization programs now underway.
. As-we prepare to meet the inevitable threats of the future, let
us avoid the intellectual mistakes of t h e past. Let us never
again put ourselves on par with the tyrants of the world, accepting
equal responsibility for a blind "arms race" for which we were not
to blame. Let us never again think that we can further our own
security by making dictators feel mo re secure. Let us abandon,
that is,.the logic of arms control, and address the new world
through the logic of America's values, In- terests,and security
requirements.