This article from the September 2002 issue Disarmament Diplomacy details what the authors consider
the "urgent" issues surrounding the governing of outer space and its possible "weaponization." "While intended as defenses against enemy ICBMs, [space-based missile defenses] would increase the chances that someday there will be an arms race, and possibly eventual conflict, in
space," the authors write.

Philip E. Coyle is senior adviser at the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C., and former director of operational test and evaluation at the Department of Defense. He also served as a consultant to FRONTLINE's "Missile Wars." John B. Rhinelander is senior counsel at Shaw Pittman in Washington, D.C., and former legal adviser to the SALT I delegation that negotiated the ABM Treaty.

Introduction

What positive and constructive role can the United States play in
controlling the weaponisation of space? Will leadership come from the
United States or will it come from the international community more
broadly? Is the weaponisation of space inevitable, and will it follow
inexorably from the historical weaponisation of land, sea and air? These
and related questions are becoming prominent as the United States and
other states make increasing investments in space both for military and
commercial purposes. This paper provides some answers to these
questions.

Bruce M. DeBlois and Richard L. Garwin recently articulated the
position of space-weaponisation enthusiasts that weaponisation of space
is inevitable. In the opening Proposition of their 'Six Incentives for
Space Weaponisation' White Paper, written for the Council On Foreign
Relations (CFR) Study Group on United States Space Posture for the 21st
Century, they wrote: "Where goes man goes the clash of opposing wills
and the instruments to effect that clash: weapons. This progression was
true of territorial frontiers throughout history, true of the high seas
in the Middle Ages, and true of the air realm in the 20th century. The
same is destined to be true in outer space." While this may not be the
view of the authors, the paper certainly makes the case that arms
control in space will not be easy.

But is human nature determinedly at cross-purposes with controlling
weapons in space? And is space different -- and is the value of space
for communication, commerce or travel different -- in ways that might
actually limit the extent to which space becomes weaponised?

Space Is Different!

First, unlike the land and the continents, no country "owns" space.
Space is not a sovereign territory. It could be likened to Antarctica
where the major powers have agreed to share responsibility for the
region's safe-keeping, but not to fight over it or weaponise it. The
1959 Antarctic Treaty pledges the continent to peaceful use, provides
for free exchange of scientific information, and bans new territorial
claims. Except for scientific exploration, the untapped oil and gas
reserves and minerals of Antarctica also are tightly controlled by the
treaty. But those hidden natural resources, no matter how extensive they
might turn out to be, are not Antarctica's greatest value; undoubtedly,
its supreme worth is as a sensitive beacon of the world's future climate
and of the planet's biological history and future.

Since it is not subject to sovereignty claims of any state, outer
space is different from land and even airspace. Remarkably, however, one
crucial aspect of this distinction -- especially that between airspace
and outer space -- remains uncodified. The altitude at which space
begins has never been defined internationally. Space is defined by the
US Department of Defense as "beginning" at an altitude of 100 miles, but
in the United States astronaut wings are awarded for flights that reach
50 miles or higher. (1) Eventually a more rigorous definition will be
needed.

Dependence on Space

The commercial use of space is already an inseparable part of our
daily lives. Our maps and clocks derive from the measurements from
imaging satellites and the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite
navigation network. Our telephones, televisions, computers, and bank
accounts depend on satellite communications. And our knowledge of the
weather comes from overhead satellites that track every cloud. According
to an ongoing study by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), the
United States has about 200 commercial and civil satellites in operation
today, followed by the European Space Agency (about 50), Russia (about
30), and Japan (about 25).

The rate of growth in space assets was dominated for decades by
military considerations. It was 44 years ago, on January 31, 1958, that
America conducted its first successful satellite launch into space, four
months after Sputnik. However, 40 years would pass before there were
"not only more commercial satellites on orbit than military satellites,
but also more commercial space launches than military." (2) Since then
the number of commercial launches has exceeded military launches, and
these days the US military depends on commercial satellites for many
functions. Satellites that are counted as "commercial" are in heavy use
by the US military, and it is sometimes difficult to say whether a
satellite is more "commercial" than "military." GPS is an example of a
system originally launched by the US military but now in heavy
commercial use. Conversely, satellites originally launched for
commercial purposes can be dominated by US military use.

These developments create a situation where communication and
commerce worldwide -- not to mention military operations -- are becoming
dependent upon space to a degree never imagined when the Outer Space
Treaty (OST) was being negotiated 35 years ago. In the United States,
and in much of the rest of the world, space communications have taken on
a personal, human intimacy that is different in kind and degree from
business communications 40 years ago.

It is not likely that the United States will be able to separate its
military interests in space from its commercial space interests, and in
that sense also the US military will not be able to "own" space, nor own
all the commercial satellites with military value. To put it
differently, the United States certainly has an interest in the military
use of space, and from a US point of view, space already is
"militarised" through the day-to-day use of satellites, whether military
or not. However, so far the United States has put relatively little of
its defence budget towards true space strike or attack weapons. Clearly,
the US needs to think carefully about the extent to which it wants to
see space weaponised, since it has so much at stake, both commercially
and militarily, and so much to lose in any outer space arms race.

A particularly important region of space is Low-Earth Orbit (LEO),
ranging from roughly 180 miles to 1,200 miles up. This is the most
crowded region of Earth-orbiting satellites for both military and
commercial/civil satellites, and home to everything from the Hubble
Space Telescope, the International Space Station, weather satellites,
and many military and mobile-phone satellites. LEO would also be home to
24 or so of the US Space-Based Infrared System-Low Earth Orbit
(SBIRS-Low) satellites, which with SBIRS-High would make up Washington's
proposed 30-satellite SBIRS system. Finally, in the longer-term LEO
could become home to perhaps as many as 1,500 US Brilliant Pebbles
anti-missile satellites, should they be developed and deployed. If war
in space is inevitable, it would likely start in LEO, if for no other
reason than that much of the potential conflict in space will be
clustered there.

Information vs. Shooters/Situational Awareness vs. Strike Attack

With respect to comprehensive agreements relating to outer space, it
is necessary to consider the options. While some people might favor the
notion that space, like Antarctica, should be a sanctuary with no
activities in, through or from outer space by the military, or of
utility to the military, of any state, that time has already passed.
Space Sanctuary ended years ago, even before the OST was negotiated in
1967. Broadly defined, Space Sanctuary would ban reconnaissance,
surveillance and communication assets operated by or used by the
military, including those with dual use. Any effort to roll the clock
back and prohibit these efforts is a non-starter. Similarly, it is too
late to draw the line at space utilisation for non-strike military
purposes -- including reconnaissance, surveillance and communication
satellites where the recipients of the information from the satellites
include military agencies. Space is already "militarised" by both
military and commercial satellites.

The only practical place to draw the line today is space
weaponisation, that is military strike vehicles -- "shooters" -- whether
located in space or otherwise, that are tested and deployed for warfare
in space or elsewhere. Space weaponisation with strike vehicles, as
opposed to space utilisation for non-strike military purposes, should be
the focus of the discussions of permitted and prohibited activities.

Space weaponisation, if defined as dealing with strike vehicles but
not sensors, is the classification that presumably would ban activities
of greatest concern and where agreement might be possible at some point
in time. To be fruitful, discussions should be focused on particular
functions (e.g., a LEO-based laser to intercept ground-based offensive
missiles that transit space), rather than general bans. While the latter
may appear an attractive approach, it is unlikely be productive due to
the complexity of the issue.

Military Assets in Space

Military assets in space can be thought of in three broad categories:
communications satellites, sensor satellites, and shooters or strike
weapons. At present, the US has about 110 operational military assets in
space, Russia about 40, and the rest of the world (including Australia,
China, Europe, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey)
about 20. None of these assets are strike weapons. Their roles include
reconnaissance, surveillance and communications. (3) Satellites that
connect to ground stations, or to land, sea or aircraft based platforms,
to act as relays or transmit radio or television signals can easily have
both military and commercial applications. Satellites that only track
the weather, or provide pictures over land and sea, also fall into the
sensor category. Such satellites can also easily have both military and
commercial value. Thus satellites in the communications and sensor
categories are difficult to deal with from an arms control point of
view. While many communications satellites or space sensor platforms
have been and will be launched exclusively for military use, their
generic nature makes them problematic subjects for arms treaties, just
as radios or cameras are not regulated by such treaties. Communications
and sensor satellites can be thought of as "passive" even though they
would be an active part of battle.

Shooters are active military satellites with the direct capability to
launch projectiles or directed energy beams at targets for strike
purposes, whether offensive or defensive. An example is the Space-Based
Laser being developed as part of President George W. Bush's layered
missile defence plan. Also, the US Army has experimented with high-power
ground-based lasers that could damage a satellite in orbit. But more
realistically, for both defence and for offensive space weapons
capability, shooters will primarily mean anti-satellite weapons (ASATs).
These might be satellites carrying "kinetic kill vehicles," rockets,
space mines, or cannons. The Soviet Union and the United States each
tested ground-based and air-based ASATs into the 1980s. The US Air Force
has experimented with ASAT concepts where projectiles are launched
either from high-flying fighter aircraft or from satellites in space.
Space-based kinetic kill vehicles might shoot smaller interceptors from
platforms in space. Eventually, the administration intends to do a Space
"hit-to kill" experiment to demonstrate proof-of-concept of a kinetic
kill configuration.

Active, offensive anti-satellite platforms with "shooting"
capabilities clearly must be the next major focus in arms control
efforts. The number of military assets in space for non-strike purposes
is still relatively small, the United States has a commanding lead in
space, and strike weapons are not yet a factor, but soon could be if not
controlled. Not since the development of the atomic bomb has the United
States had an equivalent opportunity and incentive to show leadership
for restraint in the development of a new class of weapons, namely
weapons in space. Here, the restraint is in using space for offense, for
attack, not for knowledge. The concept of employing space assets for
knowledge and for situational awareness is already well established and
accepted.

Space Debris

The problem of space debris is a factor in the weaponisation of
space, and in the ability of arms control agreements to deal with
weapons in space for both defensive and offensive purposes. Reportedly,
the US Space Command currently tracks about 9,000 man-made objects
larger than four inches across. Most of these are small objects, the
result of shroud or stage separation, missile break-up, or other
phenomena. The exact number of man-made objects is impossible to
catalogue, but there are reportedly hundreds of thousands, or even
millions, of smaller man-made objects ranging from golf ball-sized
objects to flecks of paint. The increase in space debris has become such
a concern to the US military that it voluntarily constrains its
activities likely to further aggravate the problem. Obviously, weapons
fired at objects in space would very quickly and dramatically add to the
burden from space debris.

Just as space debris can "passively" destroy operational satellites,
so it can also be launched into space and used as a satellite killer.
One simple and relatively inexpensive concept for destroying a
constellation of US satellites would be for an adversary to launch
rocket-loads full of gravel to "intercept" them in orbit. This threat
alone would be justification for the US military to take a stronger role
in arms control in space.

Missile Defence and the Weaponisation of Space

A complicating aspect of the debate about the weaponisation of space
is the dedication of the current Bush II administration to deploy
missile defence systems capable of intercepting or shooting down
intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs). A land- or sea-based
system capable of such intercepts would almost automatically be capable
of also intercepting satellites in LEO. In addition, of course, a
space-based laser or space-based kinetic kill vehicle system would
already have such a capability. The Brilliant Pebbles concept, first
articulated clearly in the Bush I administration, could also be used
either for missile defence or as an attack system to destroy satellites
in orbit. The argument could be made that, if deployed, Brilliant
Pebbles, the Space-based Kinetic Kill system, or the Space-Based Laser,
while intended as defences against enemy ICBMs, would increase the
chances that someday there will be an arms race, and possibly eventual
conflict, in space.

Shooting down a satellite in LEO is easier than shooting down an ICBM
in mid-course that may be equipped with various decoys and
countermeasures. In the case of an incoming ICBM, the defender may not
know the exact trajectory or the nature of countermeasures used. In the
case of satellites, such targets are essentially sitting ducks whose
orbit paths are known precisely and well in advance. Essentially,
therefore, missile defence systems are "shooters" in that they will have
an inherent capability to attack space assets in orbit as well as
missiles in flight.

Some Next Steps for Arms Control

In a paper delivered to a meeting of the Pugwash Conferences for
Science and World Affairs in Moscow in July this year (4), John
Rhinelander recommended a three-level focus on additional restraints on
space activities. The proposed steps are:

modest -- multilateral agreement on non-interference with
"peaceful" assets orbiting in space, enlarging upon the 30-year old
examples from Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) that prohibited interference
and concealment from National Technical Means (NTM), i.e. spy and early
warning satellites, perhaps in the form of a United Nations General
Assembly resolution;

intermediate -- one and perhaps two "permissible interpretations"
of the OST that would ban orbiting killers weapons, however armed, and
perhaps require mitigation of debris in space; and,

comprehensive, and furthest off -- a series of amendments to the
OST or a new freestanding treaty that would include forbidding attack
vehicles in space and establish the technical means of verification.

Caucus of State Parties to the OST

A caucus of states parties to the OST this fall in New York during
the United Nations General Assembly meeting would enable a first
discussion of these three elements. While, following consultations with
other states, China and Russia are not inflexibly committed to
restricting space weaponisation negotiations to the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) at Geneva, they continue to strongly value the benefits
of operating under the aegis of the United Nations. A caucus at the UN
in New York, which need not be subject to the CD's frequently-abused
consensus rule, would accommodate this preference and probably represent
the least costly alternative to Geneva discussions. The current US
position seems to be that it is willing to discuss, but not open
negotiations on, the issue; logically, therefore, the United States
could be expected to participate in such a caucus.

Initially, the caucus should agree to sponsor a UNGA resolution this
fall that builds upon the 30-party Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
treaty. Article XV of the CFE prohibits interference with national and
international technical means of verification. A General Assembly
resolution should universalise the obligation from the current 30 to all
states, and should expand its scope from photographic and other
technical means of verification to all current types of orbiting
satellites. This would include communication and other types of
satellite of prime interest to most of the world.

Secondly, any review of the OST should include targeted amendments in
addition to permissible interpretations of the current text. An
amendment would require the support of a majority of states parties.
Quite obviously, an amendment or permissible interpretation unanimously
or overwhelmingly endorsed by the treaty's 96 members would be very
significant, and could include an explicit prohibition on tests against
targets in space. (5) This would also open the way for discussion of the
ASAT capabilities being demonstrated in current anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) tests at relatively low altitudes in space, as well as those
planned at higher altitudes later.

The ultimate goal of these discussions would be step 3, listed above
-- a multinational agreement banning the testing and deployment of any
weapon strike system against orbiting satellites, whether ground-based,
sea-based, air-based or space-based, including weapons that blind or
disable but which do not entirely destroy a satellite. Such a ban could
also cover the testing and deployment in space of attack vehicles
(whether ASAT, anti-missile or ground/sea/air attack), but not any
ballistic missile defence system other than those with space-based
killers. This ban should not extend to various types of space-based
sensors, including SBIRS-Low. (6) The Pentagon is exploring the concept
of small attack satellites to defend SBIRS, and such attack satellites
would be forbidden under the recommended approach.

Forums on Verification Means

Verification will be critical to a comprehensive approach, including
exchange of information, transparency, inspection, and shared
observations about the technology and future directions of
reconnaissance from space. The situation is aided by the fact that the
observation of platforms in space from high-resolution telescopes on the
ground or from space has become highly accurate. Nevertheless,
verification will be extremely difficult for certain types of prohibited
or constrained activities, such as space mines, which may be easily
disguised as something else. While the United States and the Soviet
Union readily accepted NTM as the baseline of their verification
activities in SALT, augmented after the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty by on-site inspections and other measures, a verification
approach based on NTM would likely be unacceptable in a multilateral
agreement unless access to some form of NTM data was available to all.
The United States and Russia do not regularly share NTM data with one
another, and when US-Soviet agreement on NTM was first reached in 1972
no comparable data was available to other states. (7) Now, there are
generally available commercial sources of data from space. However,
on-site inspections and other forms of transparency will be necessary in
certain instances. These will be difficult issues to handle.

Indeed, any comprehensive agreement, even if approached on a
step-by-step basis, will be difficult. (8) It would probably be wise to
begin exploration of each substantive issue with associated verification
measures. Track II discussions and non-governmental organisation
conferences could have important roles after initial discussions get
started among governments.

The Need for Leadership

The crucial point to emphasise is that outer space issues are
becoming urgent, and a forum must be found to start a dialogue as early
as possible. Groups of states should begin to wrestle with the issues,
including one or more Western groups mindful of, but not speaking for,
the United States. The New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland,
Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) might be one group, as
might the NATO-5 (Belgium Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Norway).

The United States has and will continue to have more interests in
space assets both civil and military than most countries, and it will
retain a net benefit if no one (including the United States itself) has
weapons in space. With the United States being more dependent on space
for television, cell phones, and communications than any other country,
most Americans -- and most members of Congress -- would support the
ability of the United States to defend its communications and
surveillance assets in space. Offensive space weapons, however, would
rightly be regarded as another matter.

Under an arms control regime prohibiting space weaponisation, the
United States would base its military "defence" of its space-based
assets on hardening, redundancy, and readiness to launch new platforms
if any systems were lost or attacked. Of course, if any state breached a
space treaty, the United States, and any other state, could suspend or
terminate its legal obligations if the breach were material. Also, the
United States would plan sufficient lead-times to offset any adverse act
through the deployment of replacement space assets. This approach is
similar to that first used successfully with regard to SALT I.

Conclusion

The United States and other states are at the point where they will
soon be adding scores of new military satellites to space for
reconnaissance and communications purposes. If history is any guide, the
military will press for strike weapons to defend those space assets, to
control space, and ultimately to be able to wage war in space, if deemed
necessary. The numbers of military satellites are still relatively small
but the number of objects in space that must be dealt with is enormous.
It is time to begin serious discussion in the international community
for ways to control weapons in space.

3. The most recent discussion in open literature on military
activities in space is an article by John Pike entitled "The Military
Uses of Outer Space", featured in in the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute's (SIPRI) 2002 Yearbook. Dr. Jonathan McDowell's
Space Home Page at Harvard University is another
excellent source.

4. "Strategic Stability and Arms Control After the ABM Treaty, John
B. Rhinelander", July 8, 2002, pp. 4-8. See also the letter to the
editor from George Bunn and John Rhinelander that first suggested
interpreting the OST to ban all orbiting weapons, however armed, in Arms
Control Today, June 2002.

6. This, incidentally, was the position of Paul Nitze at the SALT I
talks in 1971 before President Richard Nixon went further and agreed to
seek to ban space-based sensors substituting for anti-ballistic missile
radars in the ABM treaty.

7. The United States no longer opposes voluntarily sharing NTM data
on an ad hoc basis. Its NTM data has been critical to the IAEA in its
monitoring of North Korean nuclear activities. In addition, the CTBT,
which the US initially promoted but has not yet ratified, anticipates
receipt of national NTM data in the case of calls for special
inspections.

8. James Clay Moltz puts forward a five-element proposal in his
article "Breaking the Deadlock on Space Arms Control", in Arms Control
Today (April 2002), pp. 3, 8. The propisal sets out four prohibitions
and one permitted activity (testing of ground-, air- and sea-based
missile defense interceptors).

Reprinted with permission from the September 2002 issue of Disarmament Diplomacy.