INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS ON COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR:
A GAME THEORY EXPERIMENT
Richard K. Wilson
Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
in partial fulfillment of the requirement for
the degree Doctor of Philosophy in the
Department of Political Science
Indiana University
November 1982
Accepted by the faculty of the Graduate School,
Department of Political Science, Indiana University, in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy.
Doctoral Committee:
Elinor Ostrom, Ph.D.,
Chairperson
Edward G. Carmines, W.D.
V\ W ^ .
V
ith participant prefers x to y
x Li y ?> i is indifferent between x and y
x Ri y ?> x is at least as good for i as is y (but
y is never better than x).
c) Transitivity holds that an individual's connected
alternatives have a consistent pattern. That is, if:
xPi y and y Pi z, then x Pi z and not z Pi x.
2) Unlimited Domain.
This condition simply points out that all orderings of
preferences are admissible. That is, for a set of
alternatives: m = {x,y,z}, there are six possible orderings
that a participant might have (taking into account only
strongly dominated alternatives). A participant can then
have any of these orderings for preferences.
3) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
This condition has met with the greatest disagreement by
researchers. However, the point is that if a participant has
a preference ordering (x Pi y pi z) and one of the
alternatives becomes infeasible (y drops out as a viable
alternative), then the remaining alternatives retain their
connected order (that is, x Pi z and not z pi x).. This seems
a reasonable extension when participants maintain sincere
preference orderings, and do not anticipate the preferences
of others.
These conditions all relate to the autonomy of the individual in
arriving at a preference ordering. They are consistent with liberal
democratic conceptions that only individuals are capable of making
20
decisions. Further, the ordering of preferences over various
alternatives is internal to the individual. These preferences are not
imposed exogenously to the individual through some other mechanism.
These first conditions outline a model of individual decision making.
The second set of conditions point to the structural mechanisms
by which people rule. These conditions are concerned with the means
by which alternatives are compared and selected.
Social Conditions:
4) Positive Responsiveness.
In this case, if a set of individuals have well-defined
preferences over alternatives, and a single individual
changes their preferences, then the social decision either
remains as it is or changes in the direction of the
individual's change. That is, the outcome (social decision)
is dependent on the orderings that individuals have. As an
example, suppose participants have the following preference
orderings:
a:
b:
c:
X P
In this case, z would be the outcome (both b and c have z as
their first choice). Now, suppose c changes their mind and
the new ordering is:
a:
b:
c:
x P
z P*
x Pb y
Now c prefers x to z (and y). The alternative x would now be
the choice, since a and c both prefer it to any other
alternative. Further, the change in the "social outcome"
is consistent with the change by c.
5) Citizen Sovereignty.
This condition very simply states that the outcome cannot be
imposed. In other words, an outcome cannot occur regardless
of the preference orderings held by individuals. Such a
condition is quite consistent with the notion of democracy
used above ? that it is individuals who make decisions, and
outcomes are dependent solely on those individuals.
21
6) Nondictatorship.
This condition is related to citizen sovereignty in saying
that no single individual can impose his will (select an
outcome) irrespective of the preference orderings of all
others.
Those conditions build in many institutional features. First, it is
the aggregate of individual preferences that decides among alternate
proposals. The aggregation rule is deliberately left general.
Second, no outcome can be imposed contrary to the aggregate wishes of
the citizenry. Third, all citizens have an equal say ? that is, no
individual's preference ordering counts for more than another's. The
institution, then, is quite simple and on the surface satisfies the
dictum "Rule By the People." "The People" are well-defined ? they
are simply some set of individuals. This could easily be all
individuals, or some limited set of people. However, in the general
case it includes everyone. "Rule" obtains from comparing various
proposals. All alternatives are compared, with the most preferred
alternative becoming the collective decision. Finally, "By" is rule
by all the people. No single individual has extraordinary powers to
dictate the collective decision.
In some respects, this abstract model is similar to a fully
democratic institution. Individual preferences are taken as givens,
participants are weighted equally in their votes, and finally, no
individual is entitled to impose their will on the will of others.
Like all democratic institutions, the model requires that the
alternative accepted by the members be most preferred to all other
alternatives. In at least one important respect, this model varies
from a traditional democratic institution, such as the New England
Town Hall meeting sketched by Tocqueville. No provision for open
22
debate is included in the model. Debate can be important for two
reasons. First, it serves as a vehicle to compromise. Where
disagreements exist, debate and discussion is commonly perceived as a
means for reducing disagreement and breaking deadlock. Second, debate
is regarded as a means for altering preferences. Debate involves
presenting arguments to convince an opposition of the untenability of
their position and the soundness of one's own position. In short, the
aim is to sway the preferences of others. With this model,
preferences are assumed fixed. That is, each participant has well-
defined preferences over all alternatives. The aim of the model is
not to understand how participants strive to change these orderings ?
although this is important ? but rather to understand the outcomes
derived from a manifestly democratic institution.
Arrow's General Possibility Theorem
Once general boundaries are placed on an institution, preference
orderings are well-defined, and the decision procedure is established.
Arrow's results are a simple exercise in logic. Rather than repeating
Arrow's proof, it is only sketched here for a 3-person, 3-alternative
case.10 The point by Arrow is that for certain distributions of
preferences, there is no manner of selecting an outcome without
violating one of the conditions outlined above.
The proof relies on two features related to the conditions
elaborated above. First, the proof holds that some subset of
alternatives may be pareto optimal, such that:
If x Pi nY for all i members of n, then it followsthat xP y (x is preferred to y by all members of the
decision-making arrangement).
23
second, the proof relies on a decisive set. A decisive set contains a
group of individuals V such that for two alternatives {x,y}, x Pv y.That is, x is preferred to y by the decisive set. Everyone not in the
lecisive set V is in the set ~v which holds a strictly opposite
preference ordering y P x (this stands to reason since the
comparison is between x and y). Further, V is decisive since the
number of participants in V is greater than the number in ~v.
Suppose three individuals have the following preference
orderings:
V1 xPayPaz
V2 z Pb x Pb y
-V: y Pc z Pc x
The decisive set V - {V1>V2} and the members of V prefer x to y.
Meanwhile, ~v prefers y to x. Note that in this case it is impossible
for the collection of the individuals in the decision-making
arrangement to prefer z to y since only b has that preference
ordering, and for such to be the case, b would be the dictator,
violating the condition of nondictatorship. As a result, then, y R z.
Further, we know that x P y, so by the condition of transitivity it
follows that the members of the decision-making group prefer x to z.
However, and this is the crux of the proof, this makes a single
individual decisive ? the dictator ? in violation of the
nondictatorship condition. Thus, the contradiction is established.
Of course, the proof has further complexities, and here it has only
been sketched for the weak case. Yet, the results are quite general.
Paradoxical Democracy and Extensions
A large amount of work on the General Possibility Theorem has
been done.11 Much of this work turns to weakening Arrow's assumptions
24
in order to avoid those contradictions derived by Arrow. A somewhat
different approach concentrates on the likelihood that a voting
paradox will occur. For the relatively simple 3-person, 3-altemative
case alluded to above, the probability of a voting paradox is small
(p = .056). This assumes all preference orderings are equiprobable.
As the number of alternatives increases, the likelihood of a voting
paradox slowly increases to a limit of one. However, this rise is
extremely slow. On the other hand, as the number of alternatives
remains small and the number of individuals increases, the probability
of a paradox rises to a limit of .09 (May, 1971). The implication,
then, is that a voting cycle is relatively uncommon, and in this
respect outcomes from decision-making arrangements ought to regularly
appear. While this point does not counter the logical results derived
by Arrow, it is optimistic in its hope for the likelihood of empirical
outcomes.
Vote Cycling and Multidimensional Space
A reasonable supposition is that individuals generally do not
confront decisions pertaining to a single alternative, but rather they
face clusters of interrelated alternatives. Most policies are
characterized by complexity involving a large number of varied issues.
Decisions on defense spending should not be regarded separate from
foreign policy, unemployment policy, or social policy. With a finite
budget, money put into defense represents money that might be put into
social welfare (or roads, or a multitude of other problem areas). So,
individuals might be regarded as making comparisons across a wide
number of dimensions for any single policy alternative. A simple
25
example may suffice. Suppose there are three individuals and they are
to select an outcome. To take a traditional case, each individual is
confronted with choices between guns and butter (only two ways in
which money is to be allocated). They must agree on some allocation
of money for both guns and butter. The comparisons that a
representative individual, Mr. Alright, makes is illustrated by Figure
1-1. Mr. A has a point that he prefers the most ? point A. This is
Mr. A's ideal division of guns and butter. In this particular case,
Mr. A prefers that "f" amount of dollars go to buy guns and "h"
amount of dollars go toward buying butter. Mr. A prefers point A to
all other alternatives (he believes this division is the best possible
division). As alternatives move away from this ideal point, Mr. A
prefers those alternatives less and less. In fact, the further the
alternative from the point A (in any direction), the less Mr. A
prefers it. With three points in the two-dimensional policy space
(guns and butter), m = {A,V,W}, Mr. Alright has the following
preference ordering: A Pa v Pa w. Meanwhile, the circles on Figure
1-1 are representative indifference curves. That is, any alternative
lying on the same curve has the same value (utility) for Mr. Alright.
From Figure 1-1, it is apparent that there are a large number of
alternatives with which Mr. A must be concerned.
Mr. A's preferences are well-defined over this space. Given the
large number of alternatives available in the policy space elaborated
above, we need to identify where other participants (Mr. Best and Ms.
Checkered) are located. It is extremely rare when individuals have
exactly the same preference orderings ? especially where a large
number of alternatives are possible. Therefore, it seems reasonable
26
FIGURE 1-1
A'S PREFERENCES
200
150
100
50
w
50 100 150 200
BILLIONS OF DOLLRRS
GUNS
27
to represent the policy space with all three participants as in Figure
1-2. This figure repeats Figure 1-1, but now all three participants
are located in the space. Each individual also has a representative
set of indifference curves drawn on the figure.
This figure indicates that if individuals have differences in
preferences (which is a reasonable assumption), then agreement is
difficult. It is quickly noted that Ms. Checkered does not prefer
either Mr. Alright's ideal point nor Mr. Best's ideal point. They are
both at a considerable distance from Ms. C's own ideal point. The
same holds true with the other participants. However, a few points
have quasi-stable properties. In Figure 1-2, these are points X, Y,
and Z. They are quasi-stable in the sense that the participants hold
the following preference orderings:
Mr. A: X Ia z pa Y
Mr. B: Y Iab x Pab Z
Ms. C: Z IDC Y PDC X
Further, these points all have the property that at least one of them
can defeat any alternative different from that set of points.12 A
problem, however, is that no single alternative is an equilibria
outcome. That is, participants face an endless cycle of voting. The
alternative X is an alternative that both A and B can agree on.
However, C prefers either Z or Y (Ms. C is indifferent between the
two). Alternative Z is one that Mr. A finds as acceptable as X. On
the other hand, Mr. B prefers Y to Z, but Mr. A prefers Z much more to
Y, which results in alternative Y to which both Mr. A and Ms. C can
agree. However, B prefers . . . and so on. There is no single
outcome to which these individuals can agree. With single-dimensional
alternatives, the voting paradox appears infrequently. With
2S
FIGURE 1-2
. B. C'S PREFERENCES
: 200 -)
1150 -I
100 J
150 -|
o A
50 100 150 200
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
29
multidimensional alternatives, the paradox (and accompanying Arrow
results) are ubiquitous.
Niemi (1969) suggests a means for examining individual choices in
a multidimensional space using unfolding techniques that reduce
preference orderings to a comparable scale. In doing so, he finds
that as more indviduals are added to consider a small number of
alternatives, the likelihood of a voting cycle decreases. However,
reducing the complex array of alternatives over which individuals
commonly make decisions to a single scale, may also be overly
simplistic.
A number of scholars have indicated that the problem of cycling
endlessly in a multidimensional policy space is a very real problem.
Plott (1967) is one of the first to point out that an equilibria can
be located only under very rare circumstances. Extensions of this
work by Kramer (1973), Sloss (1973), McKelvey and Wendall (1976),
Cohen (1979), and Cohen and Matthews (1980) generalize Plott's work,
showing ? unlike the Arrow results where endless cycles occur in
relatively rare circumstances ? that cycling is ubiquitous and that
an equilibrium outcome is extremely rare. With the 3-person example,
an equilibria only emerges when one of the participants has an ideal
point which is a median (and colinear) of the other two individuals.
This is represented in Figure 1-3.
Further, results by McKelvey (1976) indicate that where no
equilibria exists, a single individual skilled in manipulating an
agenda (or with sole control over the agenda) can always have their
own ideal point chosen. The fundamental problem is that any
alternative can defeat (or be defeated by) any other alternative via
some agenda.
30
FIGURE 1-3
EQUILIBRIUM FOR A, B, AND C
200
150 -J
100 -I
50
50 100 150 200
BILLIONS OF DOLLflRS
31
For two alternatives s and y, it is possible to introduce another set
of alternatives {t,u} to an agenda such that:
s P t P u P y.
But, a different set of alternatives also exists {v,x} such that:
y P v P x P s.
From this, two contradictory results are obtained:
s P y and y P s.
Obviously, this indicates that a multitude of cycles are possible.
While majority rule cycles present a threat to democratic outcomes,
McKelvey's findings that an agenda setter can always have their way is
doubly threatening to notions of democratic rule.
It appears that cycling among alternatives is a pervasive
problem. Indeed, the lack of equilibrium results in a
multidimensional policy space has driven Riker (1980) to declare the
study of politics to be "the dismal science," dismal in the sense
that precise predictions of outcomes are unlikely. This is contrary
to the confidence Riker originally placed in the logical study of
politics where he argued that "If we know [the mathematical solution
to a game], then, if also we can assume players are rational
maximizers of utility, we can predict the political future with some
confidence" (1967a: 642). However, others have also turned their
attention to the lack of equilibrium results, arguing that the formal
results are not as serious as we are led to believe. In the next
section some of these arguments are laid out.
Empirical Work
While the formal results found by the researchers noted above are
unquestionable, some have questioned their usefulness. As Tullock
32
(1967; 1980) argues, decision mechanisms do yield decisions,
individuals do not endlessly cycle, vacillating between various
proposals ? in short, real world institutions yield outcomes.
Further, many of these outcomes are regarded and accepted as
"democratic." Many different interpretations are tendered to account
for such an observation. Tullock initially claims outcomes are
confined to a relatively narrow subspace (1967).13 Tullock (1980)
later argues that the dynamics of logrolling may contribute to very
stable outcomes, when a large number of individuals are involved in
making decisions across a multidimensional space. McKelvey and
Ordeshook (1978) argue that cycling may occur with some frequency, but
the number of alternatives is relatively small, as is the number of
possible coalitions. Empirical work using laboratory experimental
procedures appears to substantiate this point (McKelvey, Ordeshook,
and Winer, 1978). Other laboratory experimental work by Fiorina and
Plott (1978) also indicates that some mechanism is at work that
results in outcomes converging to smaller subspaces. Work by
Ferejohn, Fiorina, and Packel (1980) illustrates a different
convergence property as participants face a decision-making situation.
The empirical work indicates that where equilibria do not exist,
some patterns of regularity do occur. In a way, such patterns of
regularity lessen the threat posed by voting cycles. Fiorina and
Shepsle (1982) provide four examples that illustrate the regularity of
outcomes where no equilibria exists. The first case derives from
Riker's (1962) notion that looking solely at outcomes may be
misleading, and that researcher's attention should turn to the
dynamics of the coalitions that form. Coalitions are regarded as
33
fundamental for the exercise of power in a democratic decision-making
arrangement. Thus, understanding the composition of a coalition and
the interaction among coalitions should enable an understanding of the
outcomes of decision processes. Fiorina and Shepsle also point to the
work by Ferejohn, Fiorina, and Packel (1980) which examines "in a
systematic way the relative 'difficulty' of moving from one (typically
unstable) point to another, and the constraints such relative
difficulties might place on the majority decision process" (1982: 59).
Third, Fiorina and Shepsle point to the work by Kramer (1977; 1978) on
the minimax set, which details dynamic games, whereby any outcome is
simply part of a trajectory leading to the minimax set. Further, it
is thought this set is generally a small part of the set of feasible
alternatives (1982: 59). Fourth, Fiorina and Shepsle point to the
work by Shepsle (1979) on structure-induced equilibrium, in which
institutional arrangements are viewed as constraining the
decision-making process in such a way as to limit the set of feasible
alternatives. In each of these examples, disequilibrium results are
not seen as serious threats to democratic decision making. Instead,
various constraints on the set of feasible alternatives are viewed as
ways in which decision-making arrangements cope with the problems that
formal work has pointed out.
Structure and Outcomes
The notion that institutions are designed to enable decision-
making outcomes is not unusual. Liberal theorists from Hobbes to Hume
regard political institutions as a means for constraining individual
34
action to prevent the anarchy feared in a state of nature. The
arguments contained in The Federalist Papers are couched in similar
terms ? designing institutions to prevent the natural rapacity of
individuals from destroying the polity. V. Ostrom (1980) points out
that these thinkers view institutions as artifacts that control and
are subject to control by their artifacers (members). When
confronting collective choices, artifacers are quite adept at
constructing mechanisms that enable them to deal with conflicts.
Further, these thinkers share the view that the structure of decision-
making mechanisms is important for the ways in which alternatives are
put before a deliberating body, and the way decisions are made.
Indeed, the reform movements of the early twentieth century turned to
institutional tinkering to rid urban areas of the pernicious effects
of "bossism." Practitioners of politics are fully aware of the
importance of the "rules" of a decision-making body, and the important
role those rules play in completing the task of deliberation.
Therefore, one way to exorcize the "impossibility" results noted above
may be to turn to the structure of decision-making mechanisms.
This "institutional" approach is relied on extensively in the
remainder of this work. Using game theoretic tools and specifying a
generic decision-making arrangement, it is then possible to compare
the relative costs that particular institutional structures place on
participants. These formal conjectures are then subjected to
empirical tests using laboratory experimental methods.
35
Conclusion
This chapter raises the point that while democracy can be reduced
to "Rule By the People," the make-up of the institutions that yield
collective choices varies. Different rules and procedures are
prescribed in order to ensure that particular normative goals are met.
Further, some institutional arrangements that satisfy democratic
criterion may depend on particular historical, social, economic, and
political preconditions in order to survive. The framework of
political institutions, then, may vary, as will the outcomes derived
from those institutions. Differences between institutional
arrangements are based on the costs to citizens for engaging in
particular types of collective behavior.
Democracy as a pattern of rules and procedures governing behavior
is well accepted. The consensus is that most forms of democratic
arrangements yield satisfactory outcomes and fulfill some valuable
goals. However, work in social choice theory suggests that democratic
institutions will not yield regular outcomes. By abstracting crucial
elements of an institution that allows full "Rule By the People," and
tracing the logical relationships between these elements, it is
possible to show such an institution is likely to fail. Since the
institution is fully compatible with most democratic criteria, the
implication is that democracy is likely to fail. Either some outcome
will be imposed by a single person ? thereby violating a fundamental
tenet of democratic theory ? or else no outcome will be selected.
Decisions are made in societies that approximate democracies. By
and large, collective decision making is enhanced through
36
institutional rules and procedures that impose costs on different
forms of behavior. As political scientists, institutions are of
fundamental importance. Democratic governments are not autonomous of
the citizenry, but rather the fundamental premise of democracy is that
its institutions rest on the people. Further, the rules and
procedures of these institutions are subject to change. This study
concentrates on a limited set of institutional elements. It is argued
that collective decisions do emerge ? contrary to the predictions
found in social choice theory ? and that these decisions have
identifiable patterns. The succeeding chapters develop a notion of
constraints imposed by specific institutional rules and tests whether
differences in these rules result in different outcomes.
37
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE
???Of course, this brief characterization omits questions about the
way in which values or preferences are learned. However, Lockean
psychology indicates people enter the world with a tabula rasa, and
that their unique experiences teach them about the world. From these
learned experiences comes knowledge. Likewise, with knowledge comes
an understanding of the world, and an understanding of how to order
alternatives in the world. Locke's Essay Concerning Human
Understanding (particularly the sensationalist psychology in Book II)
explicitly spells this out. Contrast this with Rousseau's position in
Emile.
2For an alternative argument, see Mansbridge (1980).
Mansbridge's point is that not all collective decisions are
characterized by conflict. She refers to the liberal democratic
position as "adversarial democracy." Instead, at some levels of
society where substantial common agreement exists, alternative
institutions might be possible enabling "unitary democracy," which is
characterized by common interests, equal respect, consensus, and
face-to-face contact.
^Aside from simply accepting the assumption that individuals have
autonomous wills, there are other reasons for explicitly examining
liberal democratic theory. The primary concern here is with American
institutions.
Duncan (1973) and Ryan (1972). Also see the excellent
survey by Thompson (1976) on Mill's conception of democracy and the
place of Representative Government.
5See, for instance, Pateman (1970), Dahl (1970; 1971), and Joseph
(1981).
"The general conditions mentioned here are related to elements of
the decision situation discussed in Chapter 3. Much of my thinking on
these points stems from work by V. Ostrom (1979; 1980) and Kiser and
Ostrom (1982).
'Dagger's point relating to the decline of civic sense is well
taken. However, his argument relating the role played by the
fragmentation of a metropolis to a proposal to consolidate
metropolitan areas is contradictory. For a criticism of this view of
consolidation, see V. Ostrom (1973).
"Aside from the original exposition by Arrow, there are numerous
places where a reader can be enlightened about the GPT and the
numerous extensions and developments. One of the most readable works
is that by Abrams (1980). More technically oriented surveys include:
Sen (1970), Fishburn (1973), Kelly (1978), and MacKay (1980).
*Much of the discussion here relies extensively on Arrow (1963)
and Abrams (1980).
38
reader interested in the formal proof is referred to Arrow
(1963) or any subsequent commentators listed in Footnote 8.
11For surveys of this work, as well as extensions, see Sen (1970),
Harsanyi (1976), Fishburn (1974), Kelly (1978), and MacKay (1980).
familiar with game theory will quickly recognize that
Figure 2 is a two-dimensional representation of the von Neumann-
Morgenstern V-set and the Aumann and Maschler Bargaining Set. No
further detail is offered on this point. Interested readers are
referred to Luce and Raiffa (1957) or Rapoport (1970) for excellent
surveys on these solution sets.
the article by Simpson (1969) that comments on Tullock's
argument. This article extends some of Tullock's results, and shows
that the expected convergence of outcomes to a small subspace is
unlikely except under special conditions.
CHAPTER TWO
THE SEARCH FOR ORDER
"All mimsy were the borogoves .
- Jabberwocky
A basic tenet of liberal democratic theory holds that outcomes
are a function of individual wills. This implies two points. First,
collective decisions must be derived from individuals and not imposed
by others. Second, some set of rules and procedures exists whereby a
defined set of individuals make decisions. If these points hold, then
it follows that well-defined preference orderings yield regular
collective outcomes. This is precisely Arrow's point, although his
finding is that regular outcomes fail to occur under some
circumstances. This undermines the fundamental premise of democratic
theory that decisions will be made. Yet, it is apparent that
collective decisions are made, and that these decisions do not wander
aimlessly in n-dimensional policy space. This turns the table, asking
why, if the logic of formal democratic theory holds, do well-defined
preferences and well-understood arrangements yield regular outcomes?
Determining whether outcomes form patterns of regularity in
democratic institutions is the primary concern in this chapter. While
casual observation serves as an excellent heuristic, detailed
empirical work is more convincing. Considerable empirical work
examining the nature of outcomes in a collective decision-making
arrangement has been conducted with much of this work concentrating on
small group processes and relying on game theory as a theoretical
foundation. This chapter is a survey of empirical work that indicates
regular patterns of outcomes do occur. The succeeding chapters extend
40
some of this work, focusing on the effects of institutional costs on
behavior and the relation of costs to outcomes.
Is Regularity a Figment of Our Collective Imagination?
While the formal conjecture that equilibria should be rare or
vary considerably is well-established, evidence corroborating or
contradicting this conjecture is not. Real-world empirical studies of
outcomes in democratic decision-making arrangements are well-reviewed
(see Browne, 1973; Murnighan, 1978; Hinckley, 1981). Yet, those
studies do not precisely address the question of whether patterns of
regularity appear. These studies have focused on various legislative
systems and have generally turned toward explaining patterns of
coalition formation (see particularly Leiserson, 1968; Dodd, 1976).
From the way competing groups coalesce, inferences are made concerning
the types of policy outcomes likely to be adopted. One of the primary
concerns is with testing Riker's seminal model of coalition behavior
? the minimum winning coalition. Studies generally conclude that
while the model is powerful in its logical formulation, it is rarely
satisfied in the real world. More recent work has produced other
explanations of the coalition formation process, finding some support
for a model that coalitions form and distribute largesse (primarily
ministry seats in parliamentary systems) based on the proportional
strength a party candidate contributes to a winning coalition (Browne
and Frendreis, 1980). Generally, however, this work concentrates on
coalition activity and not on outcomes.
41
However, political scientists are not dissuaded from the study of
outcomes. A tradition of experimental research in political science
provides unique opportunities for such study through including,
controlling, and manipulating various influences on outcomes.
Experimental research allows for ready comparisons across different
decision-making contexts and allows precision in defining outcomes for
those contexts. It also provides the opportunity for inexpensive
testing and replication of well-specified hypotheses. In short, as
Plott (1979) notes, experimental methods provide a unique opportunity
for examining relationships between preferences, institutions, and
outcomes. The conceptual assertion that outcomes should be rare, and
the empirical observation that some regularities do occur, seems
particularly susceptible to empirical evaluation within an
experimental framework.
Since the mid-1960s, numerous experimental studies have been
conducted attempting to uncover patterns of regularity in the context
of small-group decision making. Although researchers generally agree
that some regularities exist, as Riker (1980) remarks, the research
has been marked by a fundamental dichotomy ? that between the study
of values which individuals bring with them in framing decisions and
the institutional rules that provide incentives or constrain the
collective decisions that individuals make. This point is also noted
by Hinckley (1981) who characterizes the study of values as
"social-psychological" experimentation and the study of institutions
as "empirical."1 However, these differences are important only for
the questions they ask and the relationships with which they are
interested. The aim of these different research programs is with
42
apping different components contributing to decision making. The
focus on values has led social scientists to ascribe influences on
outcomes to differences in the resources individuals bring with them
when making decisions. The focus on institutions has turned toward
understanding those external constraints on individuals that appear to
"induce" regularities into decision-making outcomes.-3
In this discussion I take Riker's advice that "we cannot leave
out the force of institutions" in studying decision making (1980:
432). To do so first requires the careful description and elaboration
of those elements that constitute an institution. Second, it requires
linking behavior to those institutional components. Game theory
provides a natural tool, indirectly allowing this second step through
describing strategies available to individuals within particular
decision-making contexts. This is accomplished through describing a
solution (or set of solutions). However, in order to uncover
solutions, the decision-making context ? including the structure of
institutions ? must be fully elaborated. Game theory provides such a
tool for linking behavior to institutions.
In addition, game theory is relied on since it is particularly
adept at bridging the gap between conceptual and empirical work.
The experimental study of group processes in political science relies
extensively on game theoretic processes. By and large, the
application of game theory to decision-making situations has the
effect of deducing solution concepts (outcomes) from some central set
of assumptions. These solution concepts, as von Neumann and
Morgenstern argue, are "plausibly a set of rules for each participant
which tell him how to behave in every situation which may conceivably
42
apping different components contributing to decision making. The
focus on values has led social scientists to ascribe influences on
outcomes to differences in the resources individuals bring with them
when making decisions. The focus on institutions has turned toward
understanding those external constraints on individuals that appear to
"induce" regularities into decision-making outcomes.
In this discussion I take Riker's advice that "we cannot leave
out the force of institutions" in studying decision making (1980:
432). To do so first requires the careful description and elaboration
of those elements that constitute an institution. Second, it requires
linking behavior to those institutional components. Game theory
provides a natural tool, indirectly allowing this second step through
describing strategies available to individuals within particular
decision-making contexts. This is accomplished through describing a
solution (or set of solutions). However, in order to uncover
solutions, the decision-making context ? including the structure of
institutions ? must be fully elaborated. Game theory provides such a
tool for linking behavior to institutions.
In addition, game theory is relied on since it is particularly
adept at bridging the gap between conceptual and empirical work.
The experimental study of group processes in political science relies
extensively on game theoretic processes. By and large, the
application of game theory to decision-making situations has the
effect of deducing solution concepts (outcomes) from some central set
of assumptions. These solution concepts, as von Neumann and
Morgenstern argue, are "plausibly a set of rules for each participant
which tell him how to behave in every situation which may conceivably
43
arise" (1944: 31). The solution, then, is nothing more than a
prescriptive rationale for individual action informing a person how to
order available strategies within the context of a defined decision
situation. The result of this melding of institutions and behavior is
represented by an abstraction ? the solution. Riker (1967a)
illustrates one application of this abstraction to political science
by raising two questions.
1. What is the mathematical solution to a game?
2. What are the strategies which will ensure players of
achieving the solution?
Riker then argues:
An answer to the first question indicates what may be
anticipated as the outcome of political events. If we know
it, then, if also we can assume players are rational
maximizers of utility, we can predict the political future
with some confidence. An answer to the second question
(about strategies) permits political engineers to give
advice to politicians about how to behave successfully
(1967a: 642).
In seeking order, political scientists appear to have taken Riker's
advice, using experimental studies to uncover a game theoretic
solution which provides the best fit to the data. Yet, as shown
below, the results of many tests are less than conclusive. Rather
than a single solution concept serving to "predict the political
future with some confidence," it appears a variety of solutions work.
The implication of this, I suggest, is that predicted solutions vary
with the specific components modeled into an institution.
Equilibrium Solutions
A principal result of game theoretic literature is the dominance
of an equilibrium concept ? the Core. As a solution concept, the
44
Core is an excellent starting point for discussing patterns of
regularity. The Core requires individual preferences to be
distributed such that at least one individual's preferred alternative
is the median of all other individuals. Where the Core exists, no
strategy by any participant can better it.4 Experimental research
indicates that where the relatively strong (and rare) conditions for
an equilibria are met, outcomes occur there with some frequency. This
finding is especially pronounced in the work by Berl, et al. (1976).
This experiment is discussed at length here, since many of the
experiments discussed later utilize a similar format. Berl, et al.,
use a procedure that places either three or five persons into a simple
majority rule committee structure. The committee is charged with
reaching majority agreement on a single point in a well-defined
two-dimensional policy space. Individuals introduce proposals
(points) in that space until a majority of the committee votes to pass
a single proposal.
In its bare form the committee consists of five basic elements:
1. Individuals select a policy from a set of clearly
defined alternatives;
2. Every participant has well-defined preferences over the
set of alternatives;
3. Sidepayments are not allowed;
4. A defined aggregation rule exists for committee
decisions; and
5. Deliberations are made in face-to-face discussions with
all members present.
The set of alternatives is contained by a simple two-dimensional
Euclidian space, with axes labeled X and Y and marked off in discrete
numerical units. This space is displayed on a blackboard before the
45
full committee. All points in the space are real-valued, with each
individual assigned a different maximum point among the alternatives.
Further, each individual is given a payoff index that duplicates the
proposal space before the committee, and includes a set of
indifference curves with corresponding payoffs for those curves.
Payoffs are a monotonically decreasing function of distance radiating
out from the maximum point. The experiment does not allow
participants to discuss personal payoffs during negotiation, since, as
Berl, et al., argue, "the transferable utility assumption in
particular limits the social relevance of the resultant research"
(1976: 454). No player is excluded from a payoff in the experiment
(even if they vote against a winning proposal), although the structure
eliminates the possibility of sidepayments. Proposals are voted on
one at a time, and a proposal passed by a simple majority vote is the
winning proposal. Finally, all discussion takes place in a
face-to-face context. The only limit on this discussion is mention of
payoffs.
Figure 2-1 illustrates one of the proposal spaces (with
individual ideal points and a set of sample indifference curves) used
in the experiment. This example is that of a 5-person game with the
equilibria solution at C (which is committee member 5's ideal point).
Berl, et al., use this configuration of preferences and two related
configurations to test the power of an equilibrium to attract and
retain votes. Their results indicate that the Core, in fact, serves
as a good predictor of outcomes. First, they find that the Core
serves as the focal point for proposals and negotiation. While the
set of proposed points tends to be scattered across the space, the
46
Y Axis
Figure 2-1
Proposal Space Used in
Berl, et al., Experiments
X Axis
Adapted from Berl, et al. (1976), Figure 1 , p. 459,
47
proposals passed are nearer the Core than other proposals (1976: 468).
Roughly 65 percent of the final proposals appeared in the 95 percent
confidence interval for the true mean (i.e., the Core ? assuming
these outcomes are bivariate normally distributed, 1976: 467).
As Berl, et al., note, some participants thought it might have
been possible to better their payoffs, even though they were at the
Core. As they argue, the results "illustrate the power of the Core in
that even when players did not understand the theoretical properties
of the game they were playing, they tended to end up near it anyhow"
(1976: 478). The Core, then, appears to be a good predictor ? when
it exists. Although Berl, et al., note that deviations away from the
Core apparently are a function of "bargaining skill or intelligence"
(1976: 470), this does not detract from the observation that empirical
outcomes focus on this equilibrium concept, when it exists. An
experiment conducted at about the same time by Fiorina and Plott
(1978) also provides evidence that when an equilibrium exists,
decision-making outcomes tend to focus on it. This study uses the
format described by Berl, et al., with the exception that proposals
are voted on according to parliamentary procedure, with a status quo
proposal serving as an initial starting point. Fiorina and Plott also
are concerned with specific conditions, the first being whether or not
participants are able to discuss alternate proposals. In either case,
there is little apparent difference (see Table 2-1). The null
hypothesis that there is no difference between the mean outcomes under
different communications conditions cannot be disconfirmed using
two-way analysis of variance. This second concern is with the size of
payoffs individuals play for. Here, they differentiate between high
Communication
is of Fiorina and Plott Data
High Payoff
Core = (39,68)
Mean Outcome = (37,68)
Mean Distance
from Core =4.70
n = 10
= 7.28
Low Payoff
Core = (39,68)
Mean Outcome = (47,72)
Mean Distance
from Core
= 10
= 14.25
= 344.49
No
Communication
Core = (39,68)
Mean Outcome = (38,69)
Mean Distance
from Core = 5.76
a2 = 34.539
n = 10
Statistics for Two-Way ANOVA:
Core = (39,70)
Mean Outcome = (36,70)
Mean Distance
from Core = 12.30
a2 = 182.46
n = 10
HQ1: (iCommunication = uNo Communication
F(1,36) = .0413 sig .O25
Ho3: Interaction Effects:
F(1,36) = .586 sig .001
.427
.046
1.00
1.00
.001
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
oo
Adapted from McKelvey and Ordeshook (1979a, Table 3: 160).
59
their findings are at variance with previous tests for the Core and
other solution concepts. Even so, this variance provides insight into
the unanticipated effects of experimental structural components on
deviations from proposed solutions. Using a simple majority rule
committee game, McKelvey and Ordeshook's first series of experiments
concern vote trading in which players are presented with a list of
"bills" (for which they have different positive and negative payoffs).
Players were to reach a majority agreement as to the bills that are
passed and failed. Although the Core existed, it was chosen by
players only 45 percent of the time.13 This occurred when players
disaggregated the choices through making pair-wise comparisons between
alternatives. With a simple change in the procedural rules ? where
McKelvey and Ordeshook forced comparisons of bundles of passing and
failing alternatives ? the Core was obtained 100 percent of the time.
The conclusion by McKelvey and Ordeshook is that the alternative space
under this type of game was far too complex. Changing the structure
of the game to allow consideration of bundles of alternatives (which
simplified individual choices) resulted in outcomes which always fell
in the Core.
In a similar game, McKelvey and Ordeshook found that where
players have complete ordinal information over the preferences of
other players (although not knowledge of their payoffs), the Core
appeared only 43 percent of the time. However, where individuals do
not have this information, the Core was obtained 74 percent of the
time. McKelvey and Ordeshook argue that this interesting result is
largely due to the complexity of the dominance relations between the
alternatives they employ. Their claim is that:
60
The effect of incomplete information seems to be that
subjects are then forced to internalize the relevant
preferences of other players and, in doing so, learn better
the dominance relations in the game. They are forced to
consider all alternatives in the process of collecting
information and do not have the visual signal of alternative
E [an obvious alternative to the Core] 'high' on the list
for a majority (1979b: 15).
The tentative conclusion that they reach, although they admit it is
not readily susceptible to theoretical consideration, holds that where
individuals have a great deal of information about preferences, but no
incentive to uncover dominance structures, the Core is less likely to
occur. Where individuals do not have information concerning the
ordinal preferences of others the game converges to outcomes in the
Core.
The implication of these two experiments is that where changes in
the decision-making context of the game occur, one might expect
perturbations in outcomes (here ? in and out of the Core). McKelvey
and Ordeshook admit that they have no theoretical tool available to
them which would explain this variation. A broader implication of
these anomolous results is that no single game-theoretic solution is
possible. That is, the search for a single underlying solution that
predicts outcomes under all circumstances is not very useful.
Instead, as is hinted by the McKelvey and Ordeshook experiments, the
structure of the decision context may affect the outcomes. The
argument presented later is that carefully detailing this decision
context enables the deduction of regular patterns of outcomes that are
tied to the costs that various institutional structures impose on the
strategies that individuals adopt in making decisions. This approach
might aid in explaining the anomoly that a variety of (often mutually
exclusive) game-theoretic solutions are useful in predicting outcomes.
61
In general, there appears to be regular patterns to outcomes.
That is, experimental evidence indicates that outcomes decision-making
arrangements do not occur randomly. Instead, some process seems to
drive decision making, yielding well-behaved outcomes. Game-theoretic
tools capture some of the nuances of these processes and provide for
observable predictions. However, these solutions often are mutually
exclusive, with their corresponding game-theoretic models concen-
trating on different processes, and tied to different decision-making
contexts. In short, a variety of solutions exist, each of which
receive some support from different experiments (see Figure 2-2).
Instead of searching for a single solution that fits all decision
contexts, I concentrate on understanding the way in which
institutional elements of the decision situation yield regular
patterns of outcomes. In doing so, game theoretic-tools are employed
to predict those outcomes.
Regularity and Structure
Experimental work provides unique opportunities for manipulating
explanatory variables. Current game-theoretic experimental work
illustrates this quite well, as research focuses on controlled changes
over specific elements of the decision context. Research has focused
on two different changes in simple majority committees. The first is
concerned with variations as to individual agenda control powers. The
second is concerned with different types of procedural rules used in
making comparisons among alternatives and debating proposals. By
controlling all other aspects of the committee and introducing changes
only across these variables, researchers are providing insights as to
the effects of structure on outcomes.
62
Figure 2-2
Experimental Support for Game Theoretic Solutions
Core V-Set
Berl, et al.
(1976) + +
Fiorina and
Plott (1978) + +
Riker (1967a) - +
Riker (1967b) - +
Westen and
Buckley (1974) - +
Buckley and
Westen (1976)
McKelvey, et al.
(1978)
McKelvey and
Ordeshook (1978) -
Laing and
Olmsted (1978)
McKelvey and
Ordeshook (1980) -
Support for various solutions:
+ = strong
~ = weak
- = no support
Bargaining
Set
Competitive
Solution
Agenda Control
Since McKelvey's formal work on agenda control theory (1976), a
number of experimental studies have appeared testing McKelvey's claims
that a skilled agenda setter can induce an outcome anywhere in an
63
alternative space. Among this work is that by Plott and Levine
(1978), Issac and Plott (1978), Miller (1980), and Eavey and Miller
(1982). The formal work by McKelvey (1976) and Cohen and Matthews
(1980) indicates that for any committee with a clearly defined
alternative space, an agenda can be constructed that results in any
point being selected. Other work by Schofield (1979) argues that the
set of proposals is limited to a specific subspace of alternatives (in
the voting theoretic literature, the top cycle set). However, as he
also notes, this subspace generally is identical to the entire
proposal space. The implication of this formal work is that if agenda
power is placed solely in the hands of a single agenda setter, then
the outcome is likely to be the agenda setter's ideal point. ^
Experimental work by Plott and Levine (1978) tends to support the
conclusion that outcomes are at the mercy of the skillful manipulation
of an agenda. They provide a personal example demonstrating that
understanding the structural constraints of an institution enables the
imposition of a specific outcome. Their example involves an Aero Club
(to which they belonged) deciding to replace worn equipment. Plott
and Levine were able to use the Club's strict agenda rules to
successfully set an agenda yielding their most preferred outcome over
the objections of the Chairperson of the Club, and contrary to clear
majority support of other Club members (whose preferences were
distributed over a large number of alternatives). Observing (as
participants) the importance of the role of an agenda, Plott and
Levine argue that fixing an agenda has two effects. First, it limits
the information available to decision makers about preferences held by
other members of the group. Second, it determines the set of
64
strategies available to individuals (since the agenda determines which
strategies are available) (1978: 147-148).
Plott and Levine designed an experiment to test whether fixed
agendas have a strong effect on outcomes. Providing participants a
set of five alternatives, Plott and Levine preset the voting order
over these alternatives to determine whether a particular outcome can
be induced. One of the alternatives was a clear Condorcet winner,
another could be unanimously defeated, while the remaining
alternatives cycled among one another. Although four different
experimental series were conducted, the initial three were designed to
obtain probability estimates over various alternatives. In the final
series, Plott and Levine constructed an agenda that they predicted
would induce different alternatives (with the exception of the
universal loser). Commenting that the a priori probability of a
single alternative succeeding as the committee choice is .20, they
note that their a posteriori observations were .94 (1978: 153). Such
a finding far exceeds any traditional significance levels, and as such
should not be regarded as accidental. Their brief conclusion notes
"that within a range of circumstances the agenda can indeed be used to
influence the outcome of a committee decision" (1978: 156). This
finding, while perhaps not surprising to a political practitioner,
lends credence to McKelvey's (1976) point as to the importance of an
agenda.
A study by Isaac and Plott (1978) turns from the question of a
fixed agenda and its effects to an institutional setting that empowers
a single individual with agenda setting powers. The experiment
involves a 3-person committee game with all participants having
65
induced preferences over a finite set of alternatives. Isaac and
Plott contend that empowering a single individual with agenda control
is much like the process whereby a subcommittee acts for a larger
decision-making body, "gathering information, debating the issues, and
finally drafting motions for consideration and ratification by the
committee of the whole" (1978: 283). In this instance, a single
individual was granted sole power to introduce proposals. Once a
proposal was introduced, it could not be amended by the other
participants.
Three different experimental treatments were investigated. The
first series empowered a single individual and allowed that person to
send any proposal to the floor for consideration. Other committee
members were required to simply vote on proposals, according to the
way the "convenor" (agenda setter) arranged the agenda. The second
series replicated the first, except that the convenor could send only
a single proposal to the floor. In both series the Core existed, and
of 13 experiments, all settled on the Core (which was the single
undominated proposal out of 10 alternatives provided to the convenor).
In neither case does it appear that the convenor gains any additional
power (contrary to theoretical expectations), even though the convenor
has proposals that are preferred to the Core.
The third series of experiments are more interesting, since in
this case no individual has special agenda powers. This series also
had a Core, although it occurred only four times. Two other
alternatives occurred six times, both of which were close to the Core,
and one of which had unnoticed (by the experimenters) "fairness"
properties. The other proposal that occurred with some frequency was
66
quite "close" to the Core in terms of the preferences of individuals.
Finally, an alternative was selected that deviated substantially from
the Core. It appeared to be selected on the basis of a dominant
personality who was able to skillfully manipulate an agenda. In the
process of discussion, this player assumed the role of a moderator,
and was able to set an agenda which resulted in an outcome which was
their maximum.
Isaac and Plott conclude that exclusive agenda control is
important.
Relative to the outcomes of a free proposal and amendment
process, benefits accrue to an individual with the exclusive
power to make proposals. While the advantage to the
controlling individual is far short of dictatorship, it is
definitely more than a single vote (1978: 305).
At the same time, the importance of dominance relationships are noted.
In the experiment, the individual with agenda power could have been
left worse-off by accepting proposals lying near the Core, and as a
result, the Core became a reasonable outcome for the agenda setter.
As noted, in the third experimental series, deviations from the Core
occur with some frequency, and in most cases, individuals occupying a
position equivalent to the agenda setter in previous experiments, is
left worse off. Isaac and Plott conclude, then, that agenda control
plays some role in the outcomes selected.
Gary Miller (1980) also investigates the case where individuals
are granted agenda powers over other committee members. Using a
5-person committee game with a finite set of alternatives, Miller
finds that where no Core exists, a single agenda setter is able to
create an agenda which allows that individual to obtain a result quite
close to their maximum. In effect, such a result supports McKelvey's
67
(1976) contention that a "strong" agenda setter can move close to
their ideal point.
Miller then turns to a question concerned with oligopolistic
control over an agenda. In this case, he turns toward a dynamic
3-person committee game in which two individuals have agenda control,
while the third does not. The thrust of this research is to determine
whether oligopolistic control over the agenda results in a net gain
for either of the agenda setters. The results from this pilot study
are not entirely clear. However, a few general points do emerge. The
tentative conclusion that Miller offers is that a set of players
"found their ability to extract favorable decisions from the committee
to be directly related to their influence over the agenda" (1980: 22).
However, individuals with agenda control were not able to have their
maximal points accepted, since the need to form a coalition is crucial
to the committee and the selection of a point. Nonetheless,
individuals with agenda control powers were able to garner a better
payoff than could be expected. These results were from a pretest, and
some confusion was noted in the behavior of players. However, the
results are illustrative of the importance of agenda powers, and
appears to corroborate the Isaac and Plott conclusions that agenda
powers are important. Unlike the Isaac and Plott experiments, the
Core did not exist in Miller's set of experiments. Instead, a clear
set of Competitive solutions were identified. In the course of the
experiment, the proposals consistently deviated from Competitive
solutions, and as remarked, settled on points closer to one or the
other's agenda setter maximum.
68
A paper by Eavey and Miller (1982) does examine instances where
the Core exists, and where agenda setters are capable of creating an
agenda that moves outcomes away from the Core. Eavey and Miller
replicated the procedures used by Isaac and Plott ? although they
changed preference orderings to overcome an alternative that displayed
recognized "fairness" properties. Unlike the Isaac and Plott
experiments, the Core was never selected. The convenor's most
preferred alternative was selected four times, while alternatives that
were considered "fair" by the committee were selected six times.
Eavey and Miller note that in these experiments the Core ? even
though it exhibits a particular set of dominance relations ? is
vulnerable to the convenor's powers. Further, they argue that in the
context of a 3-person experiment, unanimity is an important
consideration. Although not all coalitions were unanimous, they did
occur with some regularity.
A different series of experiments with substantially altered
payoffs and no convenor yields outcomes that also appear outside the
Core. In these 3-person experiments, the Core was obtained only
twice, while an alternative with considerable fairness properties was
settled on eight times. Unanimity again appeared to have a strong
influence on the outcomes, since the fair alternative required only
slight concessions by two players to give considerable benefits to the
third participant.
A fourth experimental series increased the number of participants
to five and included a single person who was granted agenda powers.
Of five experiments, the Core was selected once, and three different
alternatives were chosen in the remaining experiments. Eavey and
Miller argue that,
69
as we continue to increase the size of the group, we also
increase the amount of variation in the outcomes of a game.
This was the first time in fifteen convenor experiments
(combining both the three person and five person games) that
the core was selected by a committee. But it should be
emphasized that three out of five times a particular
alternative was picked for reasons of fairness and this
result is consistent with the results of the 3-person
experiments (1982: 19).
The indication is that introducing a convenor has some effect on
outcomes. However, in these face-to-face experiments with competing
"fair" outcomes, unanimity also is important, diminishing some of the
agenda setter's powers.
Whether or not agenda power means absolute power is not resolved
by these different experiments. However, it is clear that alternate
processes occur that yield deviations from expected solutions. One
obvious place to search for these differences centers on the rules and
procedures of various decision-making arrangements.
Procedural Rules
Deviations from solution concepts also occur where changes in
procedural rules appear. Hoffman and Plott (1980) and Hoffman and
Packel (1980) investigate the effects of changes in the manner
proposals are introduced. As with alternate agenda control rules, the
way proposals are introduced, and how they are compared, makes a
difference for outcomes. Further, these procedural rules are embedded
in the structure of the institution.
Hoffman and Plott are interested in two changes in across
procedural rules: whether the formation of proto-coalitions has an
effect on outcomes, and whether the type of voting system makes any
70
difference. Both of these effects are cross matched to allow for
interaction effects. The first institutional effect tested a
situation where committee members either were or were not able to meet
prior to a debate. Allowing premeetings of participants enables
coalitions to form and consolidate prior to a formal binding vote. In
some respects this resembles the meeting of a caucus prior to a vote.
The second institutional change concerned the manner in which
proposals are voted on. One procedure ? using Robert's Rules of
Order, or the amendment procedure ? presupposes the existence of a
status quo (arbitrarily imposed by the experimenter). It follows a
strict agenda rule, where in order to change the status quo an
amendment must receive a majority vote. The status quo is accepted
once a majority of the committee votes to accept it. The second
procedure for introducing proposals is the agenda-free mechanism or
"successive" procedure, in which proposals are introduced, and then
voted either up or down by the committee. The proposal receiving a
majority vote is declared winning and the committee disbands. Hoffman
and Plott argue that by examining differences in the way proposals are
introduced, they might isolate some of the differences in findings
between the work by Fiorina and Plott (1978) that used an amendment
procedure and that by McKelvey, et al. (1978), that used the
successive procedure.
In this experiment, four different series were conducted (see
Figure 2-3). In cell 1 of Figure 2-3, the concern was with two main
effects, that of Robert's Rules and no premeeting caucusing.
Comparisons across these two effects can then be made with cells 2 and
3 where one of the effects is missing.
71
Figure 2-3
Design of Hoffman and Plott Experiment
No Premeeting Premeeting
1
3
2
4
Robert's Rules
Agenda Free
The Hoffman and Plott data can be analyzed based on the mean
distance of outcomes from the Core (which is the solution) and using
simple T-test comparisons among cell means (see Table 2-5). The null
hypothesis for each contrast is that there is no difference between
the cell means. At the .05 level (using a one-tailed test of
significance),15 contrasts (1) and (2) indicate there is little
difference between effects with an amendment and successive procedure
or between premeetings and no premeetings when using an amendment
process. However, with contrast (3), the means of premeeting and no
premeeting outcomes are significantly different. Hoffman and Plott's
observations are instructive as to differences in these institutional
designs. They argue that differences in communications either limit
or favor the accumulation of information. During premeetings, a
proto-coalition will form and tentatively agree to a proposal. A
successive procedure allows such a coalition to quickly terminate
discussion and implement a previously agreed upon decision. The other
combinations of institutional structures force committee members to
search for more information, and the search drives the winning
proposal closer to the Core. Even an amendment procedure with
premeetings, which requires that debate not be closed off, serves to
break up proto-coalitions, with the result that the game-theoretic
solution ? the Core ? predominates (Hoffman and Plott, 1980: 25-26).
72
Table 2-5
Test Statistics (Contrasts) for the Hoffman-Plott Data
Contrast 1
0: tJ= 1.417 sig. < .05 df 36
Contrast 2
x2 t = .346 sig. < .05 df 36
Contrast 3
H0: x3 =s x4
t = 1.82 sig. > .05 df 36
Data adapted from Hoffman and Plott (1980, Table 6: 21).
A further type of procedural change concerns the presence of
decision-making costs. Hoffman and Packel (1980) use a 3-person
committee experiment with discrete (finite) alternatives and examine
decisions in light of imposed opportunity costs on individuals for
making decisions. This explicitly recognizes that decision makers
generally do not have the luxury of unlimited time when making
decisions. In the experiment, 5 committees faced no decision costs
while 36 committees had decision costs imposed. Further, each
committee contained a single undominated proposal (a Core).
Like the Hoffman and Plott study, the finding from this test
indicates that the introduction of decision-making costs (a stopping
rule) results in differences among outcomes. The Core is settled on
in all five of the no-decision cost experiments. Where costs are
introduced, the Core is settled on only 68.6 percent of the time.
Further, they note that deviations from the Core, for the most part,
appear consistent with strategies designed to avoid decision-making
73
costs (1980: 24-25). Finally, Hoffman and Packel elaborate some of
the strategies committee members employ to avoid decision-making costs
when comparing proposals.
In sum, the work on agenda control and procedural rules indicates
that patterns of outcomes do vary. While a solution (generally the
Core) is imposed, a number of changes in institutional structure are
noted that result in deviations from the solution. Further, these
deviations do not appear to be random, but rather are tied to
particular incentives or constraints on individual behavior introduced
by changes in the decision-making arrangement. It appears, then, that
institutional incentives and constraints deserve further investigation
with regard to outcomes of decision-making arrangements.
Conclusion
Democratic institutions may vary considerably according to the
ends a polity seeks. However, general agreement has it that any
institution should enable decisions to be made. Social choice theory,
adopting central elements to an ideal democratic institution, contends
that under some circumstances no alternative will be selected. Recent
formal work examining decision making under similar conditions in a
multidimensional policy space indicates that if a decision is made, it
may appear anywhere. By and large, the work with social choice theory
is pessimistic for the likelihood of democratic institutions.
This pessimism is perhaps undeserved. Events in the world around
us indicate that many institutions that approximate democratic
mechanisms yield decisions. Further, when these decisions occur, they
74
have a pattern ? they are not random. Attempting to approximate the
conditions set by social choice theory, experimental work has
investigated whether the pessimism of social choice theory is
warranted. The experimental work clearly shows that decisions are
made and that patterns of decisions appear.
Borrowing from game theory, experimental research has attempted
to uncover a set of solutions that predict regular outcomes. Many
solutions have yielded fruitful results, yet it appears that many
different solutions work in a variety of circumstances. Even so,
experiments with different institutional mechanisms, yielding
different outcomes, show remarkable patterns of regularity in their
outcomes. Research that deliberately varies only a few institutional
mechanisms notes that the patterns of outcomes also vary
systematically. Further, this tends to support Riker's general point
that failing in a search for general equilibria,
there must be some institutional element in the regularities
Cor actual equilibria) we observe. . . . [T]he ways the
tastes and values are brought forward for consideration,
eliminated, and finally selected are controlled by the
institutions. And institutions may have systematic biases
in them so that they regularly produce one kind of outcome
rather than another (1980: 443).
A means for understanding outcomes, then, may be with understanding
the effects of institutional structure on the behavior of individuals.
If such is the case, understanding the effects of structure on
behavior may have important points to make for democracy and the
values derived for a democratic polity.
75
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO
^Rinckley's notion of empirical study reflects real-world study
of events, processes, or relationships (1981: 31). Much of the
experimental literature not included in this category or under
"social-psychological" experimentation is contained in a third
category ? game theory. Murnighan (1978), too, in his survey of
experimental research, differentiates between these three modes of
research: social-psychological, political, and game-theoretic. Both
regard the game-theoretic approach as overly theoretical. In truth,
the game-theoretic approach is used both in social-psychological and
institutional experimentation. For the former, see Rapoport, et al.
(1979), which develops an "apex" model of coalition formation; while
for the latter, see McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Winer (1978) on the
Competitive solution.
^Riker (1971) is a good example, offering an institutional
analysis to explain why an experimental committee consistently
deviated from an expected solution.
3See Shepsle (1979) for a discussion of structure- versus
preference-induced outcomes.
4In this section, game-theoretic solutions are glossed over.
This is due first to the complexity involved in establishing the
formal properties of each solution, and second due to many articles
and books devoted to establishing various solutions. When discussing
solutions, I provide an example of the solution congruent with
material in later chapters. I also provide readers with citations to
sources which are exclusively aimed at explaining the solution. For
the Core, readable presentations can be found in either Rapoport
(1970) or Abrams (1980). Figure 2-1 provides an illustration of the
Core for a two-dimensional, 5-person case. In this instance, x5 is
the Core.
5In game-theoretic terms this is the Core of the game. As
Fiorina and Plott (1978) note, in this circumstance the Core and the
voting theoretic solution ? the Condorcet set ? match.
6For an excellent formal development of the V-set, see Guiasu and
Malitza (1980), especially Chapter 3.
Bargaining set's stable solution is equivalent to the main
simple V-set. This is proved in Robert Wilson (1971), Theorem 3. For
a thorough, readable development of the Bargaining set, see Aumann and
Maschler (1964).
8Buckley and Westen were also interested in testing the Kernal ?
a solution concept that is a subset of the Bargaining set. In the
4-person case, the solutions are identical. In the 5-person case,
differences emerge when a coalition with more than a simple majority
arises. See their discussion (1976: 484).
76
9Data taken from McKelvey, et al. (1978, Table 3: 613).
example, see the work by M. Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation
(1976), also Rapoport and Chammah Prisoner's Dilemma (1965).
experiments were performed over two series of games. These
games differed only in the number of proposals under consideration,
with the second series adding two additional proposals and changing
the players' preference configurations.
Bargaining set, as previously demonstrated, is concerned
primarily with games with transferable utility. As such, using the
simple Bargaining set is probably inappropriate in these experiments
? as McKelvey and Ordeshook correctly point out. Instead, they use
the modified ordinal Bargaining set developed by Asscher (1976) in
their test.
13In a sense, this in itself is of interest. As noted, where the
Core exists it is generally selected, as it is a dominant strategy for
any set of players.
recent work by Shepsle and Weingast (1981b) and Denzau,
MacKay, and Weaver (1982) draws out some of these implications,
arguing the outcomes will not necessarily be the agenda setter's ideal
point, but under special conditions will fall into a more constrained
region near that ideal point.
this case a one-tailed test is appropriate since the measure
is based on the absolute distance from the Core which is hypothesized
to be the true mean. As a result, alternative means can move only in
a positive direction.
CHAPTER THREE
STRUCTURE FOR EVERYONE
"I wonder now what the Rules of
Battle are, . . . one Rule seems to
be, that if one Knight hits the
other, he knocks him off his horse,
and if he misses, he tumbles off
himself. ..."
- Alice
Contrary to the expectations of well-formed models, decision
making in democratic institutions does not result in endless cycles
among many alternatives. Experience informs us that decisions are
made with great frequency in institutions that allow "Rule By the
People." However, the pattern of those decisions is of fundamental
concern. The formal literature claims stable outcomes are rare and
that when decisions are made, they are likely to settle anywhere.
However, as Chapter 2 demonstrates, a good deal of experimental
research indicates these formal results are unduly pessimistic.
Patterns to outcomes emerge from decision-making arrangements,
although what they may be seems to vary with the context in which
decisions are made. There appears to be multiple patterns of
regularity. However, finding the rationale for these differences is a
perplexing problem.
This chapter tackles the problem by pointing to the context in
which decisions are made. To understand this context, it is crucial
to unfold the elements that make up the decision situation. Many have
noted the complexity that envelopes any decision situation.
Unraveling this complexity is what is important. This chapter then
turns to a particular set of components to a decision situation ? the
institutional elements. This returns to the discussion in Chapter 1
78
which argued that the structure of a decision-making institution may
have important effects on the ways people confront decision making.
Finally, this chapter lays out a set of structural rules that
appear to be common to all institutions. The discussion in this
chapter is at a very general level. Chapter 4 turns to a discussion
of a specific set of institutional elements, and develops models that
account for variations in patterns of outcomes. The remaining
chapters develop a test for these models.
The Decision Situation
People constantly face situations where they must make decisions.
The situations and decisions vary widely from a private decision to
drink another beer to a public decision to drive after drinking one
too many beers. The decision to have another beer is a relatively
private decision, where consumption has little affect on others.1
Meanwhile, the decision to drive while intoxicated is a public
decision as it consequently endangers others. Decisions that have a
consequence for others are of fundamental concern for political
science. Public, or collective, decisions can involve the exercise of
power, the allocation of goods, or the imposition of values. Whatever
the decision, it is made within a particular context; an environment
that is physically defined, historically dependent, and rule ordered.
This context, for simplicity, is called the decision situation.
If all individuals were Robinson Crusoe, inhabiting separate
islands, decision situations (and consequently decisions) would be
fairly simple. In short, a decision to collect firewood and gather
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food would be contingent on only a few things. First, Crusoe would be
limited only by the proximity of firewood and the type of food
available (assuming both exist). Past experience would guide Crusoe
as to the best means for collecting and gathering. The only rules
limiting Crusoe would be his own rules of thumb developed over time.
However, even with this simple decision situation, Crusoe still must
account for another actor ? Nature. Before deciding on an
appropriate strategy to obtain firewood and food, Crusoe must take
into account the potential wrath or beneficence of Nature. For
instance, climbing trees to hunt for bird eggs might be an
inappropriate strategy during a lightning storm. Even though the
decision situation generally will be stable for Crusoe, contingent
strategies are necessary to account for the whims of Nature.
If another individual, Friday, is added to the island, the
decision situation changes character. Now Crusoe must anticipate both
Nature and the actions of Friday. The decision to collect firewood
and gather food may take on a different meaning. It may be the case
that wood and food are both scarce. This may require a joint strategy
of conservation. Likewise, there may be efficiencies derived from
division of labor. In this instance bargaining might be a possible
strategy. In either case, 2-person collective decisions of this type
require that Crusoe and Friday can communicate. Any joint action by
two or more individuals demands joint understanding. Further, the two
examples above both require a set of rules that both will obey. If
conservation is necessary to preserve a wood and food supply, then
both need to establish how much each can take. With bargaining, both
need to know how much firewood can be traded for how much food and
vice versa.
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This simple example illustrates how the decision situation
changes once an individual confronts other individuals, each with sets
of contingent strategies. Joint strategies or even collective
decisions require a substantial and complex array of elements that
enable communication, the assessment of strategies, and the
implementation of strategies. The decision situation can be thought
of as a set of givens that fully describe any context within which a
decision takes place. Game theorists rely on the concept of a
decision situation in order to specify the full range of strategies
available to individuals. A strategy, as Rapoport notes,
is essentially a statement made by a player specifying which
of the alternatives he will choose if he finds himself in any
of the information sets which are associated with his moves.
It is shown in game theory that, once a strategy is chosen by
each of the players, an outcome of the game is thereby
determined (1970: 54).
As the examples illustrate, the strategies available to Crusoe change
once Friday arrives. Without Friday, Crusoe has a broad set of
strategies for collecting wood and gathering food that are constrained
only by the whims of Nature. Once Friday is cast onto the island,
Crusoe must also account for the potential actions of Friday. If wood
and food are scarce, and both act independently, then some strategies
for Crusoe (and Friday) are eliminated by the conflictual nature of
the situation. With common understanding and well-established rules,
new strategies are opened to Crusoe through the possibility of joint
action.
Game theorists rely extensively on an ability to specify the
decision situation. This allows a listing of the strategies available
to individuals and allows predictions as to the outcomes. As Rapoport
argues,
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The degree of 'conditionality of choice' is roughly the
degree of dependence of a player's choices on the situation
in which the choice is made. It is thus related to the
degree of 'flexibility' which characterizes a player's
performance. Usually one associates such flexibility with
rational decisions, that is, decisions which take into
account the special circumstance in which they are made
(1970: 56).
Rapoport continues that specifying these special circumstances amounts
to ascertaining the "rules of the game" ? that is, those things which
"specify the available alternatives and the several situations which
can result from the players' choices" (1970: 56-57). Generally, game
theorists make many simplifying assumptions when treating a particular
decision situation. However, they are generally aware of the
influence of the physical nature of the goods under consideration, the
cultural rules defining behavior, and in particular, the structure of
rules.
Plott (1979) suggests that outcomes can be analyzed through a
simple equation where:
preferences institutions physical possibilities = outcomes.
The abstract operation that Plott uses suggests an unknown
relationship between these variables of the equation. This form of
the equation appears to skip a step, and as E. Ostrom (1982) notes,
outcomes might better be represented by the twin equations:
1. goods community rules = decision situation, and
2. decision situation individuals = outcome.
Again, the abstract operation signifies an unknown transformation of
these variables. Elements of the decision situation may either
constrain or enhance the set of admissible strategies through
specifying those alternatives individuals may consider, enforcing
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particular modes of behavior, or by otherwise affecting the
environment in which individuals make decisions. Whatever the case,
the decision situation (and the available strategies) is generally
treated as a given over which individuals have little control.
Individuals, in turn, control their own set of choices from the set of
admissible strategies.
Vincent Ostrom (1979) points to two different levels of analytic
concern. The operational level has as a primary focus overt patterns
of behavior within a given set of rules. The constitutional level "is
concerned with alternative sets of rules used to structure different
games or variations in a game and the effects that can be expected to
flow from the different ways of ordering human activities" (1979: 1).
While analysis at the operational level is important for predicting
outcomes from a given situation, V. Ostrom (1980) later argues that
institutions (a fundamental component of a decision situation) are
designed and changed by individuals. If institutions are susceptible
to change and manipulation over time, then it is crucial to understand
how these constitutive elements at the constitutional level influence
outcomes at the operational level. Outcomes, then, cannot be
understood without accounting for those elements which are important
for defining the decision situation.
These two levels can be schematically represented by Figure 3-1.
The decision situation is treated as a given for any single decision.
The array of elements in a decision situation is not subject to change
during consideration and selection of an alternative. Any change of
these elements occurs at the constitutional level. Of course, over
time, outcomes may change the decision rules that individuals use and
This figure is adapted from Kiser and Ostrom (1982).
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may affect the decision situation itself. Generally, such changes are
not immediate, but evolve through the course of many decisions.
However, to account for these changes, feedback loops are included on
Figure 3-1.
Through determining the physical attributes of goods, the shared
customs and understanding of a group, and describing rules that
specify participants, their relative positions, the alternatives
available, the processes by which decisions are made, the information
about alternatives, and how decisions are adopted, one can begin to
predict sets of outcomes. Recent work in game theory points to a
specific conflict situation ? the Prisoner's Dilemma ? and draws
parallels to many public good problems. Such situations are
particularly relevant when individuals cannot be excluded from using
the good, yet use of the good subtracts from use by others. This
reflects the "commons" problem addressed by Hardin (1968).
On the other hand, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) stress the
impact of culture on individual strategies. Their notion of an
outcome (a solution) depends on the concept of an imputation (one of a
set of possible strategies). They argue that imputations correspond
to social "standards of behavior." By letting,
the physical basis of a social economy be given ? or, to
take a broader view of the matter, of a society ? according
to all tradition and experience human beings have a
characteristic way of adjusting themselves to such a
background. This consists of not setting up one rigid
system of apportionment, i.e., of imputation, but rather a
variety of alternatives, which will probably all express
some general principles but nevertheless differ among
themselves in many particular respects. This system of
imputations describes the 'established order of society' or
'accepted standards of behavior' (1944: 41).
85
Rather than a priori expecting individuals to order their strategies
in a particular fashion, the norms of society are crucial for
determining the choices individuals make.
Finally, the rules and procedures of decision-making arrangements
are important for defining the decision situation. Without rules and
procedures that impose limits on behavior and aggregate individual
strategies, outcomes would be less regular. Hobbes, Locke, and modern
social contract theorists like Rawls, argue that the central point to
political institutions (decision-making arrangements) is the certainty
they provide for interaction. While providing a foundation for
authority, property, and/or justice, contractarian thought expects
conflict between individuals. Institutions are regarded as
ameliorating this potential for conflict. This point was noted in
Chapter 2 where experimental work indicated that changes across
institutional rules influenced patterns of outcomes.
In sum, these variables are crucial for defining the decision
situation. Physical properties of goods, historical and cultural
patterns, and rules and procedures bounding individual action all
contribute to specifying the strategy set available to actors in a
decision situation. Earlier an abstract operative between those
variables was noted. To understand how these variables interact, an
abstract decision situation is developed, with different combinations
of these variables as building blocks.
Imagine the instance where two individuals jointly share a
pasture land. Each individual has a single cow, but both have an
option to add another. However, the pasture is capable of sustaining
only three cows. The addition of two extra cattle to the pasture will
86
result in a barren piece of land incapable of supporting any cattle.
In its simplest form, the situation can be represented in the
following way: if both individuals keep only a single cow on the
pasture, each receives a payoff from that cow (denote this by a single
unit each). If Farmer Able adds an extra cow and Farmer Brown does
not, the payoffs change, with Farmer Able gaining an extra unit, while
Farmer Brown receives a single unit.4 Finally, if both farmers add an
additional cow, the pasture will be ruined, their cows will die, and
their payoffs will be zero. This can be represented by the following
matrix:
Farmer Able
1 cow 2 cows
Farmer Brown
1 cow
2 cows
(1,1)
(2,1)
(1,2)
(0,0)
In this very simple case, each farmer has two strategies. Since
the situation only deals with two isolated farmers, each can remain
with a single cow, or add another. No assumptions are made whether
the farmers recognize the constraints imposed by Nature, know one
another's payoffs, or whether they share common interests. In this
case the decision is made independently. If the farmers are assumed
to be rational maximizers (that is, they prefer more to less), then
each would seek the additional gain, with the result that both would
lose everything. The outcome would then appear in the lower
right-hand cell of the matrix. Of course, this is a rather
shortsighted strategy, but the decision situation requires nothing
87
more than this: each rational farmer selects a strategy independent
of the other.
If greater complexity is added to this simple case ? a past
history of interaction between these farmers and a recognition of the
constraints of nature ? then the outcome may change. If this
historical pattern finds that both farmers raise only a single cow,
then the outcome might remain in the upper left-hand cell of the
matrix. However, if both farmers are rational maximizers, such a
solution is unstable. Either farmer at any time may elect to add a
cow, anticipating that the other farmer will continue to pursue a
strategy of raising only a single cow. If only one farmer thinks in
this way, then no problem arises. However, if both farmers think this
way, then again the result is disaster for the farmers, the land, and
the cattle.
If the historical relationship depends on reciprocity, with each
farmer taking a turn at raising an extra cow, a long-term stable
outcome might result. However, even this is no guarantee, since one
farmer may unilaterally declare that he is going to raise an extra
cow, regardless of the action of the other. This could upset a
precarious balance between the two that had extended for many years.
With the introduction of these different historical patterns of
relations, it is easy to see that the strategies considered by the
farmers change. In each case, the number of cows a farmer chooses to
raise is contingent on the actions of the other. Each recognizes
this, and in turn this gives rise to a strategy set of either raising
a single cow; raising a single cow and bowing to a long history of
both raising only one cow; alternating by raising a single cow some
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years and two cows other years; raising two cows, anticipating the
other will raise only one; or unilaterally raising two cows. In any
case, most of these strategies can quickly undermine past patterns of
joint behavior.
To this point the pasture land is implicitly assumed to be a
common good ? that is there is no legal limit on joint use by the
farmers. If the land is assumed to be partitionable (subject to
fencing), then each farmer can make do with the pasture as he desires.
In fact, such a transformation of common pasture land to private land
took place in the United States during the 1870s and 1880s with the
introduction of barbed wire as a cheap fencing alternative (a similar
event occurred much earlier in England with the Enclosure Acts). In
this event both farmers could split the land in half. However, such
an action reduces the reasonable set of strategies to a single
alternative ? raising only a single cow. Since half the land can
only support a cow and a half, no farmer can raise more than a single
cow (raising calves or goats is not considered in this instance).
Finally, if a set of enforceable rules are added to this simple
decision situation, the outcome could again change. In this case a
formal arrangement could be established that alternated the number of
cattle any farmer could raise during the year. However, establishing
such rules would require a common understanding between the farmers
allowing them to recognize the legitimacy and power of the agreement.
Further, the agreement might only succeed where it has the authority
to constrain action by one or both of the farmers. With such an
agreement it is possible that outcomes would oscillate between the
lower left cell and the upper right cell of the matrix, avoiding the
destruction of the pastureland.
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From this simple example it is possible to see how these various
elements of the decision situation might interact to produce
particular outcomes given the strategies available to individuals. To
avoid the outcome in the lower right-hand cell of the matrix may
require a very rich mileu of historical patterns of relationships and
institutions. This mixture may involve a considerable number of
elements, each of which contributes to common understanding and
provides means for resolving potential points of conflict between
Farmer Able and Farmer Brown. As the number of individuals increase,
or as the type of decisions individuals make changes, the situation
becomes increasingly complex. It is little wonder that with the
extremely complicated decisions facing most collective decision-making
arrangements that complexity thwarts most political analysis. The
next section dissects a crucial element to the decision situation ?
institutional structure.
Institutional Structure5
Political science has many concerns, but few are more fundamental
than the institutions that frame decision making. In Chapter 1 it was
assumed that individuals form their own preferences. Conflict between
individuals seems inevitable where many individuals have different
experiences and concerns. Much of politics is concerned with the
formation of rules which, if they do not ameliorate conflict, at least
systematize the means for resolving conflict. These institutions do
not materialize from thin air. As V. Ostrom (1980) argues, they are
products of conscious design by individuals. As such they are
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susceptible to manipulation, adaptation, and occasionally conscious
change. Institutions are artifacts that not only control a
collectivity, but are subject to control by the collectivity (V.
Ostrom, 1980). Institutional structure, however, does not impinge
directly on behavior. Instead it constrains the strategy set
available to individuals and likewise to a collectivity. Such an
arrangement remains part of a decision situation. It interacts with
other elements to yield an array of strategies for individuals and
provides an important key for understanding a particular outcome. At
this point, I step back to examine different configurations of
institutional structure to understand different outcomes. The
implication is that institutional structure has an effect on outcomes.
Further, these effects can be understood by controlling for other
aspects of the decision situation. Making comparisons between
different elements of institutional structure requires examining
differences between structure and outcomes at the constitutional
level.
Kiser and Ostrom (1982) define institutional arrangements as:
the sets of rules governing the number of decision makers,
allowable actions and strategies, authorized results,
transformations internal to decision situations, and
linkages among decision situations (1982: 191).
It is important to note that institutions and organizations are not
one in the same. Terms like "institutional structure" and
"decision-making arrangements" refer to abstract entities that are
composed of particular rule sets, not a particular class of
organization. Organizations share many of the same underlying
structural patterns ? that is, the value of using the typology of
rules discussed below. However, this distinction avoids confusion in
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treating general elements of institutions which may differ
dramatically from organization to organization. In general, rules are
the compositional elements of an institution. Organizations differ as
to the rules they contain. As Kiser and Ostrom point out, rules
variously identify:
(1) the entry and exit conditions for participating in
organizations; (2) allowable actions and allowable outcomes
from interaction within organizations; (3) the distribution
of authority among positions within organizations to take
particular actions; (4) the aggregation of joint decisions
within organizations; (5) procedural rules in complex
situations linking decision situations together; and (6)
information constraints within organizations (1982:
193-194).
Although these rules interact in complex ways in any organization,
they are treated separately in the discussion below.
Modern democratic polities encompass thousands of political
organizations at many different levels. On the surface most appear to
differ tremendously. However, such an initial view is misleading.
Most political organizations have an underlying pattern of commonality
? a set of institutional rules. Even something as simple as the
School Board of Elm Springs, South Dakota, and as complex as Congress
share these elements. Both are embedded in and contribute to defining
a decision situation. Both are characterized by a common set of rules
pertaining to who may act, what can be considered, how proposals are
compared, how proposals are selected, how information is transmitted,
and variations in positions of actors. Although both organizations
may vary substantially along these rules, the variance is one of
degree rather than one of kind. In the discussion to follow, both
organizations serve as examples of this variation of degree.
92
Before proceeding, a difficult point and a sticky point remain.
The former concerns a view that underlying rule structures are nothing
more than an arbitrarily imposed typology. First, typologies are
useful when they point out distinguishing features of the types being
classified. However, the value of a typology lies in the application
of those differing features to understand and predict larger scale
phenomenon. Explanation rather than listing is the thrust of this
work.
The sticky point concerns comparing various organizations. Most
political organizations are not autonomous, but rather they are bound
up in a tight web of interrelationships with other organizations.
This relates to the discussion of decision situations. Finding
boundaries to a decision situation is difficult. Although the example
of the farmers and their pastureland is well-defined, the decision
situations of the Elm Springs School Board and Congress are less well-
defined. Actors in the former are affected by actions of the latter.
The polycentric order pervading political organizations in the United
States makes specifying decision situations difficult. Interrelations
between organizations are important, but in this discussion such fine
points are ignored. Instead, political organizations and the decision
situations within which they are embedded, are treated as self-
contained units. Although this is a strong simplifying condition, it
makes it possible to study a subset of elements that are regarded as
important to decision situations ? institutional structure.
Meanwhile, more work needs to be done on the effect of these
interrelationships. By the same token, the work by historians,
anthropologists, sociologists, and economists must be integrated to
93
fully understand the nature of decision situations. However,
political science can make headway by focusing on the nature of
decision-making arrangements that are important for bounding
collective decisions.
Institutional Rules ? An Enumeration
Institutional rules impose boundaries and constraints on
individuals. These rules provide the basis for an organization that
enables decisions to be made. Further, these rules are artifactual,
created by the institution's participants. Finally, these rules
constrain individual action to provide order in individual
relationships. This harkens back to liberal contractarian theory
where conflict between individuals is assumed inevitable, and that the
mediation of an organization ameliorates conflict. Liberal theorists
from Locke to Rawls point to tradeoffs between liberty and security
brought about through political organization. They view individuals
willing to give up some of their liberty to ensure security,
protection of property, or other rights. In turn, rule-ordered
behavior ensures some semblance of predictability among interpersonal
interaction, which contributes to the regularization of (potential)
conflict. In this respect, institutional rules are regarded as
placing bounds on strategies available to individuals. In some
instances this means eliminating some strategies and rewarding others.
The structural rules of concern here include:
1. Who can be considered "covered" by the arrangement
(Boundary Rules);
2. What can be considered by individuals in the arrangement
(Scope Rules);
94
3. The voting rule used to implement some decision
(Aggregation Rules);
4. Channels available to transmit preferences, threats,
etc. (Communication Rules);
5. The methods by which proposals are compared (Procedural
Rules); and
6. Resource differences among players in considering,
ordering, or implementing proposals (Position Rules).
These rules are common to all organizations. They are important for
differentiating among particular classes of institutions. This set
may not be exhaustive, although this may not be required. If these
rules differentiate between organizations, and explain some of the
processes leading to outcomes, then the full explication of an
institution's structure may be unnecessary. These rules capture many
of the processes important for understanding and predicting outcomes.
Boundary Rules
Boundary rules are basic to any institution in that they define
the membership of the institution. Boundary rules simultaneously take
into account both the requirements on membership for entering an
institution and the limits on forfeiting (exiting) membership. Both
serve to partition a set of potential participants into those that are
eligible and those that are not. These distinctions are important
enough to deal with separately. Entry rules broadly define the
composition of membership within some institution. The point of
closure established by entry rules has important implications for the
distributions of costs and benefits among individuals within any
institution. Membership can be defined by an assortment of variables
ranging from paid fees (as with a private club) to cultural and
95
historical distinctions (many older nation states have this
characteristic). However membership is defined, the set of
individuals who are regarded as members has important implications for
the strategies available to individuals when making collective
decisions. For instance, where entry is easy, the strategies
available to an individual may be large. As more individuals enter
the institution, the set of admissible outcomes may increase. This in
turn increases the individual's strategy set. Such is clearly the
ease where outcomes are public goods and require some minimal level of
support before they can be provided. Conversely, where entry is
difficult, the set of alternatives (and as a result, the strategy set)
may be limited.
Exit rules are equally important for defining the boundaries of
an institution. These rules concern both the ability of an individual
to leave (exit) the institution, and the set of rules that enables a
collectivity to strip membership from an individual. Tiebout (1956)
and Hirschman (1970) point to the effect of exit on decisions made
within institutions. The ease or degree with which individuals can
withdraw their membership will affect the type of bargaining
individuals use while making collective decisions. If exit is easy
(and if other options exist), then individuals are unlikely to invest
in bargaining. That is, all bargaining entails costs. If exit
involves less cost, then individuals have little incentive to remain
in the institution (see Tiebout). On the other hand, if exit is more
costly than bargaining, then incentives exist for the individual to
remain in the institution (see Hirschman).
96
The Elm Springs School Board and Congress differ considerably
along this rule. First, each has a set of requirements establishing
eligibility for members. Second, both institutions have electoral
requirements for membership. For the School Board, eligibility rules
are relatively difficult, since members must either reside or own
property in a relatively small area of western South Dakota. School
Board members are then elected from this limited set of participants.
Congress is somewhat different, with eligibility defined first on the
basis of United States citizenship, and secondly, on district
residence. While citizenship excludes a large number of individuals
in the world, it includes a far greater number than does the School
Board. While almost all eligible members of the School Board are also
eligible members of Congress, only a tiny fraction of the eligible
members of Congress are eligible members of the School Board.
Finally, Congressmen are elected from this large set of individuals.
From this brief example, it is apparent that entry and exit rules for
institutions can vary substantially.
Scope Rules
In a simple sense scope rules are concerned with the extension of
authority to an organization. This includes both the domain of
decision making and the "extent" of authority wielded by the
organization. The domain of decision making concerns those matters
upon which a decision-making arrangement is entitled to act. The
domain of an organization is expressed by a set of rules that place
boundaries on the set of admissible alternatives. Scope rules, then,
may constrain decision makers to consider only a relatively narrow set
97
of issues or may endow decision makers with discretion over a wide
assortment of alternatives. For instance, the Elm Springs School
Board is empowered to act only on issues pertaining to the school in
that district. It is not empowered to act on site selection of MX
missiles (even though some may be housed in the same territory as its
jurisdiction). Meanwhile, Congress is empowered to act over a large
set of issues ? including MX missiles. However, in general, Congress
cannot set standards for textbook selection at Elm Springs.6
The admissible extent of power wielded in an institution concerns
the ability to coerce members (or sometimes nonmembers) to behave in
accordance with particular rules. Coercion entails those sanctions
that an institution may legitimately employ. While the Elm Springs
School Board is able to dismiss teachers who do not meet contract
obligations, Congress is able to use the ultimate sanction of taking
life through broad legislative powers. Both the extent of domain and
degree of coercion serve to differentiate decision-making
arrangements. The extent of authority contained within an institution
will influence the strategies individuals employ and the actions they
take.
Aggregation Rules
Aggregation rules relate to the means by which individual
decisions are transformed into collective decisions. Political
scientists have devoted considerable attention to the effect of rules
that aggregate preferences, and the outcomes that result from
different rules for aggregation (see Riker, 1982). These rules are
explicitly concerned with finding proportions of individuals necessary
98
to ratify or reject some collective outcome. Aggregation rules vary
from a single member to unanimity among the full membership. Most
fire and police departments employ an "anyone" rule where any single
individual may call on these services (enact a decision). Meanwhile,
constitutional changes, while not requiring unanimity, require
substantial agreement before enactment.
Differences in aggregation rules not only determine how many are
necessary to enact a decision, but some decision rules are established
to ensure that a subset of the membership can veto an alternative.
All aggregation rules entail costs to members. As Buchanan and
Tullock (1962) argue, they can be reduced to the costs associated with
arriving at a decision, and the deprivation costs borne by an
individual when a decision is enacted. A simple majority rule
minimizes costs under particular assumptions about the shapes of those
cost curves (see the formal generalizations of this point by Rae,
1969; Taylor, 1969; and Badger, 1972). Where potential deprivation
costs might be high, extraordinary voting rules can be used to
increase the costs to decision making. Meanwhile, extraordinary
voting rules and quorum rules may skew the ability of some subset of
individuals to veto or pass a proposal. A three-quarters voting rule
to pass an alternative provides a subset of individuals equal to 25
percent of the membership with power to veto a proposal. Meanwhile, a
10 percent quorum rule (with a simple majority rule for decision
reached by the quorum) may allow only 5 percent plus 1 of the
membership to enact a collective decision.
The School Board and both houses of Congress have recourse to a
number of aggregation rules. For some business (such as reading
99
minutes), unanimity is required, That is, a single person's objection
can cause the minutes to be subject to change. In the Senate, three
fifths of the members must vote for a cloture petition to shut off
debate. Numerous other special aggregation rules are used by those
organizations, although the norm for each is a simple majority rule.
However, this is not to say that the use of different aggregation
rules does not affect the set of strategies available to individuals.
This point is more fully developed in Chapter 4.
Communication Rules
Economists and game theorists have long been concerned with the
effects of information on outcomes. Generally, models have focused on
situations where individuals act with perfect information ? that is,
they know all possible outcomes and strategies. Simon (1957),
however, argues that such a strong assumption fails to account for the
paucity of information under which individuals make decisions. Simon
attributed this to the incapacity of individuals to formulate and
solve complex problems. This seems a reasonable point since most
decisions take place in a decision situation far more complex than a
chess game. Yet, even the strategies available in a chess game are
beyond the capacity of most to calculate.7 Simon, then, offered a
notion that individuals operate under less than full knowledge,
arguing for a concept of bounded rationality. Recent work, trying to
come to grips with individual limits to full information, have
developed elaborate models dealing with search strategies under
incomplete information (see Radner, 1975, and Wilde, 1981). However,
information is not only constrained by human incapacities.
100
Information is constrained via the communication rules governing an
institution. Information does not materialize in the world. Instead,
it is relayed to individuals through their own experiences and by
communication channels that are defined by a set of rules.
The structure of communications within an institution is critical
for relaying information to members. Clearly, the information
available to individuals is crucial for them to choose among a set of
strategies. Communication rules channel information in complex ways.
First, these rules concern the language that a message is sent in ?
whether a set of easily ascertainable symbols (mathematics) or in
language subject to vastly different interpretations in meaning (the
ambiguities and misusages of English are quite apparent). Second,
these rules create channels that relay information. These channels
involve the way information is sent or limit the volume of information
transmitted. Third, these rules specify the conditions under which
communication channels are opened or closed.
While all individuals may be bounded as to the amount of
information they are able to process, different communication rules
can variously affect the amount of information available. Due largely
to the small membership of the Elm Springs School Board and its open
meeting rules, the communication channels are relatively open. As a
result, information concerning strategies is fairly complete (even
though the scope of alternatives is limited). With Congress,
communication channels are very different. They are highly
routinized, with formal hearings, constrained debate (once an
alternative is presented on the floor, highly stylized rules limit
debate in the House. The Senate differs on this point with unlimited
101
? to a point ? debate), and dependence on staff research.
Congressional committees, too, are designed to serve as communication
channels to the full Congress by distilling large numbers of
alternatives. As a result, the set of feasible strategies for any
member may be constrained by the alternatives presented. However, the
cost for limited strategies appears acceptable in order to enact
decisions. In any case, communication rules differently constrain
information, with the result of affecting the strategies available to
individuals.
Procedural Rules
Procedural rules enable a description of the operative mechanism
within institutions. Essentially procedural rules define the format
followed by organizations in ordering, processing, and terminating
decisions. While encompassing elements as varied as the access
individuals have to the institution's decision-making mechanism or the
number or points that must be hurdled before a decision is finalized,
the more general conception for democratic organizations is with "the
process whereby an outcome is selected as the result of voting"
(Farquharson, 1969: 9). Indeed, the mechanisms that characterize the
process of ordering, amending, and deleting proposals prior to a vote
go to the heart of any decision-making arrangement. Other elements of
the operative mechanism, such as decision points, serve to enhance the
process by which proposals are restructured or added. Decision points
concern the number of points at which proposals may be introduced or
amended. The procedural rules of any institutional arrangement are
fundamental for controlling the flow of proposals and, especially, for
102
politicking. As to this latter point, Redman (1973) has carefully
chronicled (as have many others) the opportunities for bargaining,
reshaping, and deleting legislation in Congress prior to a vote.
Differences between procedural rules can be seen in the School
Board and Congress. Both generally use Robert's Rules of Order as a
means for ordering, amending, and deleting proposals. However,
different procedures are possible. Instead of beginning with an
identifiable status quo and amending it under a well-specified format,
a series of successive alternatives could be introduced until one is
settled on using a particular aggregation rule (see Farquhaurson,
1969). However, substantial differences emerge as to the number and
type of decision points contained in each organization. Decisions by
the School Board are not final, but can be changed at different levels
? either by the State Board of Education or by State or Federal
Courts. However, the decisions by the School Board are relatively
final in comparison with Congress. There an alternative is not
finalized until agreed to by some majority in both levels of Congress.
Presidential veto power also plays an important role. Political
scientists also point to the role of bureaucracy in interpreting a
policy outcome, and there is always recourse to the courts. As a
result, decisions of Congress appear more vulnerable to the decision
points defined by procedural rules. Additionally, this set of
decision points often constrain the alternative set that Congress
considers, if it wishes an alternative to pass and be implemented.
Position Ru1es
The final set of institutional rules concerns position. Position
is concerned with the authority granted to different slots in an
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organization. Generally, authority devolves to individuals based on
their assignment to a particular position in an organization. In most
democratic arrangements, authority is invested in individuals who are
elected to a particular post. Representatives are granted special
powers to introduce, debate, and enact proposals that far exceed those
of their constituents. Aside from defining particular positions,
position rules also specify the powers accompanying these positions.
It is important to note that specific powers are assigned to
positions, not individuals. Differences in resources, which also
grant powers, are generally a function of historical happenstance,
though clearly political organizations, as they are concerned with
allocating values and goods, contribute to differences in resources
between individuals." More broadly, this is regarded as an integral
part of the decision situation, and something that must be dealt with.
Here position rules for most democratic institutions are not treated
as consciously discriminating among groups of individuals, although it
may well be that historical, social, and economic patterns do.
The authority relations assigned to particular positions in a
political organization are a fundamental concern. In most decision-
making arrangements this translates to who has control over particular
aspects of an agenda. If the procedural rules are well-defined, and
if a subset of individuals are able to add, order, or delete items to
an agenda, then the set of alternatives is likely to be quite
different than if all members have those powers. In most democratic
organizations representatives are granted sole powers to introduce,
change, and enact alternatives. However, there are differences in
position even at this level. A chairperson of a committee, for
104
instance, may have special positional powers that enable control over
the alternatives considered by the committee. Depending, then, on the
position rules, actors may vary considerably as to the authority they
are invested with.
Both the School Board and Congress are composed of
representatives. Differences between the two over this rule are
small. Although representatives within both organizations have
similar powers to add, order, and delete items from an agenda, it is
obvious that the position of a Congressional representative is very
different from that of a School Board representative. Here these
differences are amplified by other rules ? especially scope rules
defining the alternatives that may be considered, and differences in
communication channels between representatives and the represented.
Although it is the decision situation in its entirety that
describes the strategy set available to individuals, the preceding
discussion illuminates the effect of some elements to this context on
framing available strategies. Organizations share a common set of
institutional rules. These rules provide a structure for
organizations ? that is, develop a useful typology that enables
organizations to be differentiated along a set of common dimensions.
Moreover, institutional rules impose particular constraints (costs) on
strategies ? eliminating some and inducing others. This notion of
constraints enables prediction of sets of likely outcomes. Further,
an explanation of the process by which strategies are constrained can
be developed from this typology of institutional rules. Chapter 4
provides such an explanation and develops a set of predictions for a
group of well-specified organizations.
105
Notes on the Individual
To this point the constitutional level of analysis, which defines
some of the mechanisms constraining sets of strategies, has been
sketched. The operational level, where real outcomes are observed, is
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. However, before ending the
discussion of the decision situation some comments are necessary
concerning the fundamental unit of both levels of analysis ? the
individual. So far the individual has largely been ignored. In many
ways the decision situation has been presented as a mechanistic given,
operating independently of the individuals it encompasses. Rather
than simply choosing among options, individuals are the mechanics for
such a machine. They start it, they keep it in repair, they redesign
it, and generally they jury-rig it to keep it functioning. Therefore,
a model of the individual is crucial to interpreting what is occurring
within any decision situation.
Political theorists have long recognized the importance of a
model of the individual for theory. All models of the individual are
based on unobservable, but assumed, characteristics of behavior.
These assumptions play an important role in detailing differences as
to how situations should be approached. For instance, differences in
assumptions about individuals allow John Locke and Peter Kropotkin to
make contrary observations about political organizations. Locke
regards organizations as important for judging disputes, while on the
other hand, Kropotkin views organizations as imprisoning individuals
and creating criminals and disharmony. Thus, the model of the
individual is important for the role of politics.
106
A full model of the individual is not developed here. Only some
aspects are touched on. Any full discussion of a model would treat
subjects far beyond the scope of this study. Further, approaches to
understanding individual behavior are as varied as the literature is
voluminous. All approaches, whether economic, psycho-social, or
psychological, rely on abstractions, and this discussion is no
different. Here I sketch only a brief outline of a model. Chapter 4
further simplifies this sketch and delineates many of the properties
at work.
The approach taken here follows a model of the individual that
pervades neoclassical economics.9 This choice is largely based on the
similarities between these models and concepts of liberal psychology
noted in Chapter 1. At its heart this model contains a regard for
individual autonomy in action and thought. With this emphasis on
individuals as the center of action in the world, Kiser and Ostrom
point to three assumptions that must be made explicit:
1. The capacities of individuals to process and interpret
information;
2. How individuals construct preference orderings over
alternatives, and how they assign values to these
orderings; and
3. The decision rules individuals use when choosing among
strategies (1982: 184).
The first of these assumptions is hinted at above. Individuals
are limited in their capacities to assess the strategies available to
them. Both Simon (1957) and Leibenstein (1976) provide excellent
discussions of "bounded rationality" where individuals act possessing
incomplete information about the decision situation. The assumption
here is that all individuals suffer similar informational problems
when confronting an equally unknown decision situation.
107
The second assumption pertains to preferences. It is assumed
that individuals prefer more rather than less of a valued good. Such
a notion is elegantly presented by the concept of utility developed by
von Neumann and Morgenstern (see the readable discussion by Luce and
Raiffa, 1957). Further, individual's preferences can be thought of as
transitive. That is, an individual values object A over B and
likewise values B over C, then the individual also should value A over
C. However, it is recognized that individuals value many other things
besides goods. On occasion this may lead to peculiar
intransitivities. Intransitivities are also likely when many
combinations of goods are compared, especially if ? as assumption 1
holds ? individuals are limited in their capacities.
The third assumption pertains to the decision rules individuals
adopt in selecting strategies. The assumption here is that
individuals are "myopic maximizers." Essentially, individuals use
systematic search processes in choosing between strategies in order to
make a decision. However, due to incomplete knowledge about the range
of strategies available, a global maximum will not always be selected.
Differences in strategic choice also reflect different experiences
individuals bring with them and different perceptions of the decision
situation. Much of this notion is detailed in Ashby's cybernetic
theory. Ashby's model points to internal decision rules that allow
sampling many variables and adjusting choices until an equilibrium is
reached. Individuals, then, develop decision rules over time based on
reactions to an environment derived from empirical observation and
abstractions about the events in the environment.
108
On the whole, this model of the individual portrays a confused
individual adapting in a systematic manner to an incompletely known
environment. While not a fully informed rational maximizer, neither
is the individual a random actor. Patterns exist to individual
choices, and they can best be summed up by the notion that individuals
generally prefer more to less.
Conclusion
To this point a means of understanding the context within which
decisions are made has been developed. Clearly, any decision
situation encompasses a complex array of elements, all of which
interact to define a set of admissible strategies. Depending on the
decision rules that individuals use in making decisions, elaboration
of the decision situation allows an enumeration of possible outcomes.
This chapter concentrates on a subset of elements crucial to a
decision situation ? the institutional rules constraining an
organization. This set of elements is doubly important for political
scientists, since they not only describe the machinery which aggregate
an outcome from individual decisions, but these institutional elements
are also subject to conscious change and manipulation. In Chapter 1
it is suggested that understanding institutional rules might provide a
means for understanding why the pessimistic results of formal theory
do not occur. Instead, as a review of experimental work in Chapter 2
indicates, regular patterns of outcomes appear with some frequency.
These patterns do not seem to be associated with the construction of a
single game-theoretic solution, but rather seem to be tied to the
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constraints that institutional structure creates for individual
decision making. A set of institutional rules concerned with those
that can make decisions, what those decisions can entail, how
decisions are made and aggregated, and the amount of information
available, all seem to contribute to these constraints on decision
making. In Chapter 4 these institutional rules are formally developed
with respect to a generic decision-making organization. Later
chapters put these formal models to empirical test.
110
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE
1The effect of purchasing another beer and its marginal
contribution to total sales is ignored, as is the effect of consuming
the beer before members of the local Temperance League.
2See particularly the work by Orbell and Wilson (1978). See also
Frohlich, et al. (1975), and Schofield (1975). Somewhat related is
the special volume of Public Choice (1977) that examines various
demand-revealing mechanisms for public goods. Smith (1978) offers
interesting experimental work regarding these mechanisms.
3See also the discussion by Ostrom and Ostrom (1978) for insights
into common problems and the importance that attributes of a good have
for a decision situation.
4I do not address the question of whether one individual gains or
loses psychically due to changes in relative gains. Here I deal only
with each individual's payoff from the cattle they possess.
5Discussion in this section relies heavily on work which has been
ongoing in the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at
Indiana University for many years. In particular, it derives from
Ostrom and Hennessey (1975), V. Ostrom (1979; 1980), Kiser and Ostrom
(1982), and E. Ostrom (1982). Many other scholars have influenced
this discussion, including Arrow (1963), Buchanan and Tullock (1962),
Niskanen (1971), Olson (1965), Rawls (1971), Riker (1963; 1980; 1981),
and Shepsle (1979). The short discussion offered here is incomplete.
However, it develops many of the points which are considered useful in
analyzing collective action within the constraints of institutions.
The usual call for further research and thought needs to be trumpeted
here.
See Shepsle (1979) for a discussion of germaneness rules ?
rules which partition admissible outcomes in Congress. His formal
discussion is very much related to the points made here.
7Chess has a finite set of strategies. Yet the first player's
move contains 20 different plays. The second player has 20 moves
associated with each move by the first. Thereafter, the number of
moves increases even more dramatically. Each single player's move is
an element of a strategy. The number of possible strategies quickly
becomes astronomical. However, chess is a game with full information
since each player knows the moves of the other. It is obvious that
individuals quickly lose grasp of all possible strategies, even with
such a well-defined and limited game.
8This political fact has often been ignored by liberal
contractarian philosophers who regard political organizations as
"neutral umpires" presiding over conflict between individuals.
Marxist rightly point to the important role of the state in
contributing to inequalities in resources. In particular, see
Miliband (1977).
111
9Many political science examples adopt this model. The best
known of these is by Downs (1957). Riker and Ordeshook (1973) offer
an excellent discussion of this model of the individual with
applications to politics.
CHAPTER FOUR
PREDICTING OUTCOMES
''The time has come,'' the Walrus
said ''To talk of many things: Of
shoes - and ships - and sealing wax -
of cabbages - and kings - And why the
sea is boiling hot - And whether pigs
have wings . ''
- The Walrus and the
Carpenter
What strategies will a rational individual choose when
participating in a simple committee with well-specified, but changing
institutional rules? This chapter develops strategies that
individuals might choose when acting in simple committees with
particular configurations of rules. Much of the work examining
spatial committee games is concerned with locating equilibria or
demonstrating the conditions under which equilibria exist (see
particularly Plott, 1967; Sloss, 1973; McKelvey, 1976; Cohen, 1979;
and Cohen and Matthews, 1980). However, one observer, lamenting the
rarity of equilibria results, remarks that ''politics is the dismal
science'' (Riker, 1980). While equilibria may be elusive, the
structural elements detailed in Chapter 3 are thought to affect the
patterns of outcomes generated by collective action. The few formal
studies explicitly focusing on structure contend that the solution
space varies in predictable directions given particular structural
configurations (see Shepsle, 1979; Shepsle and Weingast, 1981b;
Denzau, MacKay, and Weaver, 1982). Elaborating how structure
constrains the strategies individuals choose is the concern of this
chapter.
113
The decision-making organization analyzed here is a simple
committee. First, general attributes of the decision situation are
established. This involves specifying a set of assumptions about the
nature of goods and historical patterns of interaction among
individuals, the preference orderings of individuals, and the
structure of a simple committee, concentrating on those institutional
rules outlined in Chapter 3. Second, sets of solutions are
established for a 5-person, two-dimensional spatial committee game.*
Using this game as a baseline model, changes are introduced one-by-one
across each of three institutional rules: aggregation rules,
communication rules, and position rules. Each change is compared with
the simple majority rule committee used as the baseline model. A
prediction is made for the likely outcomes to be achieved in each
game. Chapters 5 and 6 address the question of how closely related
laboratory behavior is to the outcomes predicted in this chapter.
An Abstract Decision Situation
A major thesis of this study is that institutional rules
contribute to ordering behavior and in turn yield particular patterns
of outcomes. Configurations of rules variously constrain or encourage
the use of particular strategies by individuals. If an institutional
configuration includes the means by which individuals transform their
strategic choices into outcomes, then it should be possible to infer
outcomes (solutions) from particular structural patterns. As
elaborated below, few of the derived solutions yield explicit point
predictions. Rather, they tend to narrow the space of outcomes.
114
While an outcome space may encompass a number of solutions, as
Rapoport (1970) suggests, this is not a serious flaw. Indeed,
reduction of the solution space to a subspace provides some insight
into the effect of institutions for generating outcomes.
To simplify matters, this discussion focuses on a particular
subset of organizations ? a 5-person committee. Two reasons can be
given for this choice. The first relates to theoretical
considerations and the second primarily concerns expedience. In a
democratic polity the committee is omnipresent. A committee typically
implies a relatively small group involved with making decisions. At
some levels these decisions affect only those involved, while at other
levels committees serve to develop an agenda for a large group based
on the expertise of the committee members, or serve as a time-saving
device for the larger membership. In many respects, however,
committees encapsulate many elements thought important for democratic
institutions. They are small enough to allow face-to-face discussion,
they allow each individual to clearly state and defend their preferred
alternatives, and they encourage reasoned discourse and debate. As
such, the structure of a committee should provide many insights into
different democratic arrangements.
As to the second reason for concentrating on committees, it is
apparent that they are generally small enough so as to be analytically
and empirically manageable. Simplicity and manageability are critical
when going from the abstract to the concrete. By the same token, much
of the formal work relied on in following discussions focuses on
committees. The rationale, when it is offered, is that committees are
a microcosm of many types of democratic organizations.
115
The committee elaborated here is highly abstract. It is similar
in many respects to spatial voting models developed by Hinich,
Ledyard, and Ordeshook (1973) and McKelvey (1976) or to game-theore tic
models developed by Berl, et al. (1976), and McKelvey and Ordeshook
(1978) . The simple committee under consideration resembles a club
where members are concerned only with choices for themselves (see
Buchanan, 1965). Outcomes (goods) are partitionable and subtractible.
That is, discrete units of the good can be gained by each member and
the more one individual gets (generally) the less others get. While
committee members share a common means of communication, there is no
assumption that these members share a past history of reciprocity or
exchange. In fact, these members are treated as rational individuals
pursuing their own gain through a collective decision-making
arrangement, They are treated as strangers knowing nothing of the
strategic choices of others. Each is assumed to act as if the others
are advancing their own self-interest. Each individual has a set of
defined preferences over all points in an n-dimensional policy space
and an associated utility function. The committee structure is
specified by a set of rules defining the set of members, the
alternative space, and how alternatives are formulated, debated, and
ratified.
These general points provide some insight into the background of
this particular form of a committee. A note of caution was sounded in
Chapter 3 regarding the necessity of fully specifying all elements to
a decision situation. Much of a decision situation can be reduced to
crucial sets of elements that are represented using a few simple
notions of set theory and algebra of sets. This allows a detailed
116
description of a committee, which in subsequent sections enables the
deduction of solution sets tied to the structure of the committee.
Assumptions About the Decision Situation
Even a decision situation as simple as an isolated committee
involves considerable complexity. To reduce complications in
interpretation, a number of assumptions are introduced here to
establish the basis for a simple majority rule committee. Subsequent
discussion refers back to these assumptions.
Assumption 1
The committee contains N = (1, 2, . . .,n) members.
Assumption 1 restricts the number of committee members to n. This
limits the number of people interacting in the committee to a finite
range. In later analysis, and with all empirical work, N = 5.
Assumption 2
Alternatives lie in where Q Rn. Rn is an n-dimensional
Euclidean space and is closed and convex.
117
Assumption 2 restricts the set of alternatives to a subspace of the
total possible alternatives contained in . In effect, only
alternatives belonging to can be considered by the committee.
Further, in being closed and convex, has well-defined topological
properties that are used later. Discussion later focuses on an
alternative space such that
Already Assumption 1 clearly establishes membership. It consists
of a finite set of individuals characterized by N. In this
discussion, neither entry nor exit is possible. The membership is
arbitrarily imposed and extends no further than to those contained in
the set. Likewise, Assumption 2 arbitrarily establishes the set of
admissible alternatives. While containing special characteristics,
such as being closed and convex, this assumption is intuitively
plausible since practically all decision-making bodies have some
limits on the extent of their domain. Hobbes set two upper bounds on
the domain of the state in the hands of the Leviathan ? taking an
individual's life, and acts against God. To this list Locke added
property. Here, all alternatives contained in the set Q are
admissible.
Assumption 3
a) Individual preferences are represented by a utility function
For any , there exists such that:
where: ;
118
is the standard
Euclidean norm; and
is a monotonedecreasing function.
b) For any and is differentiable. Then for
any vector of policies faced by the ith individual ?
? it is the case that:
This assumption provides a structure to individual preferences.
Although Assumption 3a imposes a particular preference structure on
individuals, other configurations are possible with no loss to
generality (see McKelvey and Wendall, 1976). Differentiability
provides further structure to the space holding that the space is
continuous in the region. The advantage gained from such an
assumption is that individuals have smooth preferences on
Assumption 4
a) A set of binary preference relations exist for each such
that: is defined on all X,Y The ith individual has an
ideal point such that:
b) Preference relations for any can be expressed as dominance
relations on where:
119
c) These dominance relations exhibit transitivity for individuals ?
that is, for an and
and
The relationships among alternatives noted in Assumption 4 charac-
terize individual rationality. Simply stated, if an individual
receives more utility from alternative X than alternative Y, then the
individual prefers alternative X.
Assumption 5
Payoffs to individuals are not transferable nor are sidepayments
allowed.
While goods are infinitely divisible, each unit is fully consumed by
the individual. Trading these units once a division is achieved at is
not allowed. This assumption characterizes the nature of the good.
This ensures that the committee remains noncooperative, and as
McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Winer (1978) note, it is more general than
the special case of games with transferable utility.
Assumptions 3, 4, and 5 are crucial for making statements about
the nature of goods under consideration and the characteristics of
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individuals who comprise the committee. These assumptions define a
set of constant elements to a decision situation. They remain
unchanged in the discussion below and in all subsequent references to
the simple committee. However, this shell of a decision situation
lacks any transformational machinery allowing an individual to act on
the set of alternatives and choose among strategies. The structure of
the institution places limitations on membership, defines the set of
admissible alternatives, details how alternatives are compared,
establishes the proportion of individuals necessary to ratify an
alternative, constructs the communication channels, and assigns
positions to individuals concerning agenda powers.
Assumption 6
a) The committee always considers a status quo proposal:
b) The committee has a binary choice procedure for comparing
alternatives. For this procedure is
This assumption details a crucial element of the procedural rules.
Alternatives are always considered in pairs. Further, any new
proposal is regarded as an amendment to a status quo alternative. The
winning outcome is compared with the next alternative for another vote
(winning is outlined with Assumption 7) . If there are m possible
alternatives, then the alternative surviving the (m-l)th vote is the
final outcome. Farquharson (1969) details this amendment voting
procedure (see also Miller, 1977; 1980).
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Assumption 7
Where: B is the set of all
possible combinations of
individuals varying from
size 1 to n.
is the cardinality of persons in coalition and
b) Winning coalitions are defined by the set W such that:
and
Where: k = a decision rule for aggregating votes,
i.e., k = 2 for simple majority rule, and
k = 1.5 for extraordinary majority rule.
c) For and then one of the following holds:
i)
ii)
This assumption establishes the aggregation rule for the committee.
Since alternatives are pairwise compared, all members can be
partitioned into two disjoint coalitions, those preferring one
alternative and those preferring the other. Further, a specific
proportion of individuals are required to belong to a coalition before
it can be considered winning.
Assumption 8
a) An ordered set of facts exist:
b) A one-to-one onto mapping exists for
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c) Each represents a distinct poll of all over a distinct
Knowledge over all polls yields perfect information.
That is: where knowledge can be represented along
an interval (0,1).
Then each contributes amount of information concerning
other's preferences (each is weighted equally).
d) The communication rule establishes an upper limit on the number
of polls which can be taken. This can be represented as a
simple metric: where
This metric constrains information as to other's preferences to:
If then knowledge is perfect, otherwise, knowledge is
only partial, since the communication rule constrains the number
of polls which can be taken on the space
Assumption 8 pertains to communication rules. Although such rules can
affect information to the individual in many ways, the information set
for this committee is relatively straightforward. Individuals already
have information as to the alternative space and concerning their own
preferences over alternatives. All that is lacking is information as
to the preferences of other members of the committee. By Assumption 5
(nontransferable utility), this information is not directly available.
As more alternatives are proposed, and coalitions form, information
about other's preferences on is increased. Increased information
about other's preferences is presumed to improve each person's own
strategic choices.
123
Assumption 9
a) A subset is empowered with selecting In
effect, a coalition can construct an agenda of alternatives
from the set of admissible alternatives
b) Some is empowered with selecting Some
coalition can selectively eliminate proposals from a subset of
c) Some is empowered to select Some
coalition can order the subset of proposals in any
permutation of the elements contained in the subset."
This assumption assigns powers to a particular coalition subset to
control the agenda. It grants three different powers:
1. Adding alternatives to the agenda;
2. Deleting alternatives to the agenda; and
3. Ordering the agenda.
If it is the case that the coalition granted these powers is for
all or all members of the committee, then the members share
equivalent powers of agenda control.
These assumptions generally characterize a simple committee
structure. It is clearly the case that such a structure is abstract
and lacks much of the institutional richness found in many such
organizations. After all, procedural rules generally entail much more
than a particular voting framework. Likewise, communication
structures are more complicated, introducing rules that define an
assortment of constraints on who may speak, how long, etc. Also, even
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the simplest committees have rules that assign special powers to a
chair. Nonetheless, these assumptions highlight important aspects of
many committees, and more crucially provide a well-specified
description of the structure. Later sections deduce solutions from
deviations in these structural rules (pertaining especially to
Assumptions 7, 8, and 9).
A Baseline Model
Assumptions 1 through 9 frame an elemental decision situation for
an isolated committee. Members are concerned with formulating,
debating, and ratifying an alternative located in an n-dimensional
policy space. Every individual has well-defined preferences over this
space, and it is presumed that individuals seek to maximize their
gain. However, to this point, some aspects of the committee's
structure have been left amorphous. No mention is made of the value
of the aggregation rule ' 'k' ' (it could range from 0 < k 0 for i = (2,3,4,5) and the |i| >
2n/3). At , no hyperplane can be constructed in which the criteria
is not met. The closest is a hyperplane running through the ideal
points of players 2 and 5. Even so the quasigradient for those
members is By assumption, they lie on the
closed halfspace. However, the same is true with a point which
lies on the interior of Any separating hyperplane through
satisfies the criteria and cannot be defeated by any other movement.
All points in satisfy the criteria, and since no point in yields a
single equilibrium, the set of points are cyclic. Further, all points
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in the space are stable against all points exterior to y. It appears,
then, that as an aggregation rule increases the proportion of members
necessary to pass a proposal, the basis over which individuals
negotiate, vote, and formulate proposals, changes.
Communication Channels
Concern now switches to effects on outcomes of changes across
communication rules. The institutional configurations of concern have
as structural elements:
1. Boundary rules are limited to a set N of participants.
2. Scope rules restrict the set of alternatives to
3. Procedural rules follow an admendment process.
4. Aggregation rules require simple majority rule.
5. Communication channels are open for all members. The
information set available to individuals is:
5*. Communication channels are constrained for all members. The
information set available to individuals is:
6. Position rules reflect equal agenda control powers among all
members.
The first institution is the baseline model while the second has a
configuration of elements The difference between these
two relates only to the number of communications that members of the
committee may send. Under the baseline model, individuals are
unlimited in the number of communications. Under the second model,
individuals are constrained to a finite number of communications from
which they may obtain information.
141
Economists have made the most use of the effect of communications
on outcomes. As Hurwicz (1973) notes, communications yield
information. Economists argue that information is presumed to enable
consumers to selectively search for goods, while open information
forces competitive bidding among producers. Many (particularly Simon,
1978; 1979) note that individuals rarely have full information about
all actions and outcomes of a decision situation. Instead, that
information is constrained. Individuals only gradually gain
information through communication channels that allow for the exchange
of information. Thus, it is expected that as communication channels
change from an unlimited to a constrained set of facts, the strategies
individuals employ also change.
Two predictions are offered. First, with the baseline model
(with unlimited communication channels) outcomes are expected to have
the weak stability characteristics of the K-set.
In the second case, where communications are limited, outcomes will
occur in partitions of the space of pareto optimal points, as
individuals will not have enough information available to negotiate
quasistable points. The prediction is:
Although individuals do not know the distribution of other
individuals' preferences, they do not act under complete ignorance in
the classical sense. Individuals know their own payoffs for any
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alternative in the policy space They gain information about the
preferences of others as alternatives are suggested and voted on.
Thus, information is limited by rules as to the number of alternatives
that can be discussed. The strategies individuals employ are
contingent on the information available, with important information
provided by knowledge of other's preferences.
This leads to the proposition that:
As the number of polls taken is reduced, so too is the
likelihood of uncovering a quasistable point.
To show this, recall that for an n-person game, McKelvey and Ordeshook
(1978) speculate the Competitive set contains n solutions (n-1 if n is
even) . Further, n < s (where s is equivalent to the number of
alternatives in by the one-to-one, onto mapping of by
Assumption 8b). The likelihood of uncovering a stable alternative
with a single poll is Since the number of polls is
reduced, assume that This reduces the probability of any
poll appearing in Further, this reduction is
independent of the likelihood of uncovering a stable alternative.
Then, the likelihood of uncovering a stable alternative, given this
reduced space is: Since and
then For the case it
follows that Where then
Finally, for it is the case that Each of
these cases illustrates the effect of differing amounts of information
on the likelihood of uncovering a stable alternative. Generally, it
can be observed that as the number of polls
the likelihood of locating a stable alternative decreases. The
converse is also true.
143
Although the likelihood of settling on a stable point is low to
begin with, locating one with a reduced sample space substantially
lessens its likelihood. Consequently, under limited communication
rules, it seems reasonable that committee members first attempt to
locate alternatives with optimality properties rather than stability
properties. This means that individuals first seek information about
the surface of If members have no knowledge as to other's
preferences in then a myopic search strategy might best
characterize an initial poll of the space In other words, the best
poll any individual can take is of their own ideal point:
If so, the information set becomes:
This information set provides a rough idea as to the surface of for
all members. 19 Subsequent alternatives proposed in (which also
serve as polls over each alternative) can focus on this set. However,
where the total number of polls is limited, and where no points
exhibit stability properties, then the ith member can do no
better than to agree to an alternative:
With the instabilities present in a pareto optimal subspace, the ith
person runs the risk of having a proposal Y selected such that:
The strategy of accepting an unstable alternative derives from two
points. First, the communication rules constrain the total amount of
information members can obtain about the preferences of other members
144
of the committee. Second, where the likelihood of choosing (on a
single move) a stable proposal is low under full information, under a
reduced sample space it is even lower. If all choices were made, full
information would provide information as to the location of these
points. Under reduced information, this is not the case.
Figure 4-4 illustrates the solution set for such a two-
dimensional case. The ideal points of the members
are the vertices of the pareto set The boundaries of the set are
defined by line segments joining these ideal points. The interior of
this bounded, convex set is the set The shaded area is a
pareto subset for coalition (123) and is a partition of That this
subspace is optimal, consider the points Both are optimal
for the coalition (123). However, movement from X to Y results in at
least one member of the coalition being left worse off. The same is
true with movement from Y to X. It seems reasonable to assume that
with a limited communication rule that instead of searching for a
stable point, once a pareto point is identified for a coalition, it
will settle on it.20
Position Rules
Much of formal theory illustrates that the most pernicious effect
of committee structure on outcomes results from agenda control power.
McKelvey (1976), while on the one hand demonstrating that a simple
committee (with equally dispersed agenda powers) can easily select a
point anywhere in a policy space, also concludes that a single
individual empowered with agenda control can ensure that their ideal
146
point is selected. That this result is not without consequence,
consider the Congressional uprising against Boss Cannon at the turn of
the century. The bulk of dissatisfaction by members of Congress was
with Cannon's seemingly unlimited agenda control powers. Political
practitioners everywhere recognize the importance of agenda control
for the manipulation, passage, and defeat of proposals.
In this section it is shown that expected outcomes differ under
different forms of agenda control. The institutional structure
includes:
1. Boundary rules are limited to a set of N of participants.
2. Scope rules restrict the set of alternatives to
3. Procedural rules follow an amendment process.
4. Aggregation rules require a simple majority.
5. Communication channels are open (for members empowered with
agenda control).
6. Position rules reflect equal agenda control powers among
members (here the number of individuals with agenda control
equals the number of committee members, i.e., f = N) .
Position rules reflect an unequal dispersion of agenda
control among committee memberswith k as
before).
Assumption 9 indicates that agenda control is concerned with
adding, deleting; and ordering alternatives. In this discussion the
ability of a set of individuals to add proposals to an agenda is
focused on. In a sense this implies two points. First, although no
ordered agenda exists, individuals empowered to add proposals
construct an agenda through the alternatives that they propose.
Second, the ability of individuals to add proposals to an unordered
agenda implies that each individual is able to selectively delete
(through their choices) other alternatives.
147
Again the prediction for the baseline model is that outcomes
appear in the K-set. Specifically:
The alternative model, where a subset of individuals have power to add
proposals, argues that outcomes will appear as solutions to a smaller
(finite) set of games among those individuals. The prediction is:
Again, all results are for cases where an equilibrium (the Core) does
not exist for the full committee.
It is possible to show as McKelvey (1976) demonstrates, that any
individual can construct an agenda in such a way as to reach any point
in the space of alternatives. McKelvey's point is that any proposal
is feasible, and since individuals have smooth preferences over all
points in the space, all points are cyclic. The result is that some
agenda can be constructed which dominates any point. McKelvey notes
that for a single agenda setter, that ith individual is likely to
construct an agenda extending from ? from some
initial point A to that individual's ideal point Although it may
be the case that for some winning coalition, there is some
and so on. The penultimate proposal J in the agenda is then
defeated (if the agenda is properly arranged) by according to
the agenda setter's wishes. The ability to construct an agenda
extends from an institutional rule which solely empowers the ith
individual with adding proposals. These results are generally known,
148
and the reader is referred either to McKelvey (1976), Miller (1977;
1980), or Shepsle and Weingast (1981b) for formal development.
Obviously, since a single individual empowered with agenda
control is able to select any point in the space of alternatives, the
same is the case for two individuals. However, in the case where
(the aggregation rule), then these players are forced to
compete with one another to attract majority agreement on a proposal.
Since two individuals both contribute to building an agenda, it is
unlikely the outcome will be either of the individual's ideal points.
Returning to an earlier discussion of hyperplanes and
quasigradients, there is:
It was noted that
which allows the description of a set of feasible directions of motion
away from X that are preferred by a subset of individuals:
Finally, there is a metric which provides a measure on the set of
quasigradients pointing into
149
Both instances follow directly from proofs by Plott (1967) and Sloss
(1973) for games without an equilibrium. In other words, some point
can always be proposed, where no equilibrium exists, that is always
preferred by a majority to the current point.
Players i and j, then, are engaged in a 2?person game, since they
are the only individuals adding proposals to an agenda. Other members
are only able to side with one agenda setter or the other. The game,
then, reduces to a 2-person game concerned with constructing an
optimal proposal. From Nash (1950) it is known that for every finite
strategy, 2-person game, there exists an equilibrium strategy (see
Luce and Raiffa, 1957). The outcome, then, for such a game is
For the special case of two players, is a median point such that:
By extension, for any set f of players,
a point 8 can be calculated for all f based on a system of linear
equations:
150
Any other point in the space is highly unstable. I speculate that for
the case with the game returns to a competitive
coalition game with f-persons. Here, alternative solutions, such as
those discussed in Chapter 2, come into play.
It appears to be the case, then, that as agenda control is
shifted, outcomes differ. For games where agenda powers are equally
dispersed among all members (f = N), outcomes are expected to be in
the Competitive solution. As agenda power is concentrated, actors in
the committee narrow the set of outcomes to a point with minimax
properties. Intuitively, this makes sense. Powerful, contending
individuals (factions, etc.), if unable to construct a majority on
their own, tend to draw agreements between themselves in order to
avoid being left out altogether.21
Figure 4-5 illustrates this process for a 5-person,
two-dimensional case. Here committee members 2 and 3 are granted
exclusive agenda control powers. A number of agendas exist that
provide a trajectory into the ideal points of either 2 or 3. However,
for any point proposed by 2, member 3 has an alternative that defeats
it, and betters 3. For instance, if 2 proposes 3 has a counter-
proposal that defeats via the coalition (345). However, at
neither member 2 or 3 has any incentive to move from the point. is
their minimax strategy, and such a strategy cannot be bettered for
152
either player 2 or 3. Any deviation from such a strategy creates
instabilities which can result in one or both players gaining less
than expected from
Summary
To this point three pairs of predictions have been established,
each with a set of outcomes linked to a particular institutional
configuration. Central to this linkage is the influence that
structure has for the strategic choices individuals make. Examining
three different structural elements, and comparing these elements with
changes across a baseline model, provides four different sets of
outcomes. By limiting these changes to changes across a single rule
at a time, interactions between rule sets are ignored. However,
logically unfolding constraints imposed on rational strategies by a
single rule enables the prediction of fairly narrow solution concepts,
and it enables comparisons between similar institutional structures.
The particular 5-person committee game in two-dimensional policy space
that is the focus of empirical study in this work easily yields sets
of solutions to the institutional rules noted above.
Conclusion
In this chapter individual strategic behavior is introduced to
the context and structure of a spatial committee game. The primary
concern is with deriving a set of solutions for four different
institutional structural configurations. Beginning with a baseline
153
model which has been the object of intense modeling efforts and
experimental work (see McKelvey, 1976; Fiorina and Plott, 1978;
McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Winer, 1978; and McKelvey and Ordeshook,
1978), a quasistable set ? the Competitive solution ? is described.
With a change in institutional rules from simple majority to
extraordinary majority rule, the basis over which individuals reach
agreements shifts from a set of competitive, coalitionally specific
points, to a larger set of cyclic points. With a change in
institutional rules defining the number of communications, committee
members are expected to shift from specific quasistable points for
full communications to points that are pareto optimal under limited
communications. Finally, a change in position rules from dispersed to
discriminatory agenda control powers results in a shift from the
Competitive solution to a smaller minimax sub game among committee
members.
These changes imply that structure does have an impact on the
choices among strategies individuals use when selecting outcomes.
Given the wide variation among solution sets for different
institutional configurations, it appears that this impact of structure
is not trivial. However, the models presented here are a far cry from
behavior in the real world. To begin to bridge this gap, a means of
operationalizing and testing these committee structures is turned
toward.
CHAPTER FIVE
ORGANIZING AND OPERATIONALIZING
"And a 'borogove' is a thin shabby-
looking bird with its feathers
sticking out all around ? something
like a live mop."
- Humpty Dumpty
The preceding chapters develop the background to a decision
situation, establish the basic structural components to a generic
committee structure, and predict a set of outcomes. At this point
this amalgamation of decision situation and individual action can be
put to empirical test. It is possible to uncover committees in the .
real world that exhibit very similar institutional configurations to
those of concern in this project. However, problems emerge if one is
to use "real" committees to undertake empirical study of different
institutional structures. The first problem is that it is unusual to
observe institutional rule changes of any committee during the course
of a relatively short research project. A notable point about the
structure of most collective decision-making mechanisms is the
gradualness of change. Transformations of organizations are typically
slow and in general constitute piecemeal adaptations to specific
problems. If committee structural changes are unlikely, it is
difficult to find a real empirical setting in which to study the
effects of structure on outcomes.
This leads to the second stumbling block, whether comparisons
between committees are possible. Committees encompass different
historical and cultural experiences for members, confront different
policies and goods, and involve individuals with different preferences
and valuations for policies. To return to the ubiquitous School Board
158
example, making comparisons between the actions of board members in
Elm Springs, South Dakota, and Omaha, Nebraska, would be difficult due
to differences of local political, economic, and social factors;
differences in the scope of the jurisdictions; and a host of other
differences.1 Attributing differences in outcomes to institutional
mechanisms is extremely difficult since many alternative explanations
are plausible. Given that the focus of this study is with the effects
of structural rules on outcomes, it is crucial to develop a design
testing these factors while controlling for other variables that might
also contribute to differences in outcomes. To this end, I turn to an
artificial committee structure that is controlled under strict
laboratory experimental conditions. While removed from the real
world, this enables the design and replication of a specific committee
structure. Controls over a wide variety of exogenous variables can be
imposed, while planned comparisons between endogenous variables are
made through ordered changes over these variables.
In this chapter a general overview of the experimental apparatus
is developed. First is a short discussion on the usefulness of
experimental research. Second, threats to experimental research are
discussed. Finally, a description of the experimental format is
presented, on the one hand, to illustrate how threats to internal and
construct validity are dealt with; and on the other hand, to show how
the artificial committee structure used here approximates the models
presented in Chapter 4. A discussion of predicted outcomes and
strategies for statistical testing is deferred to Chapter 6.
159
Experimental Research
Since 1976 there has been considerable concentration on
experimental work as a tool for testing particular configurations of
preferences, institutions, and outcomes. The primary use of
experimental data has focused on testing variations in game-theoretic
solution set concepts and an attempt at developing new concepts. The
experiment described below builds on the 5-person committee games
first reported by Berl, et al. (1976), and refined in McKelvey, et al.
(1978). Its general form closely parallels that established in the
preceding two chapters. The experiment has the general form of a
majority rule committee game.
The experiment is not a simulation of the way rational actors
would behave under a set of conditions. Simulations are extremely
useful when modeling previously identified behavior and subsequently
approximating that behavior under various conditions (see particularly
the work done by Ferejohn, Fiorina, and Packel, 1980). However, in
this case, the behavioral patterns are not entirely clear. A set of
structural constraints on behavior are noted in Chapter 4. Likewise,
a set of rational strategies and likely outcomes are detailed.
Nonetheless, it is impossible to know whether these elements fully
capture the behavior of individuals when exposed to such a decision
situation. For this project, letting real participants engage in an
abstract committee is a useful means for putting the predictions of
Chapter 4 to the test. This study relies on human actors within a
highly stylized environment to examine the effects of that environment
on the behavior and interaction of individuals.
160
In large part, experimental work provides researchers with
controls over variables that are not of theoretical interest and
enables flexibility in treating variables of interest. This
flexibility also enables a researcher to explore a wider array of
questions through planned changes over controlled variables. In the
standard reference on experimental design, Campbell and Stanley (1966:
1) turn to W. A. McCall's early work How to Experiment in Education to
drive home the point that the primary function of experimental
research is to ensure "methods of securing adequate and proper data to
which to apply statistical procedure." Although Campbell and Stanley
focus on educational research, there is no need to imagine that their
rationale for experimentation need not apply to other research
endeavors. They claim the experiment is:
the only means for settling disputes regarding educational
practice, as the only way of verifying educational
improvements, and as the only way of establishing a
cumulative tradition in which improvements can be introduced
without the danger of a faddish discard of old wisdom in
favor of inferior novelties (1966: 2).
While lavish in praise, Campbell and Stanley also strike a note of
caution, directing researchers to eschew grandiose generalizations and
"critical" tests. Further, if experimental research is to have value,
it must be carefully designed and subject to considerable replication
before inferring sets of relationships from accumulated data.
Experimental research, then, like other forms of social science
research, is based on a solid foundation of design and
conceptualization. Some of the more important problems facing
experimental design are discussed in the following section.
Commenting on research in political science, Richard Synder
(1962) notes four advantages accruing from the use of experimental
161
methods. The first is as a heuristic procedure. Experiments, he
argues, "provide us with a simplified universe of observation and an
opportunity for manipulation of what we suspect are crucial factors"
(1962: 115). In other words, experimentation provides useful insights
into specific sets of relationships. Second, experimentation tends to
force precision in theory construction (1962: 117). This arises
largely from the need to specify particular sets of relationships and
manipulate variables prior to their testing. Third, experimentation
allows for "probing" of specific elements to a theory (1962: 118).
Synder claims here that political science is faced with an imposing
variety of variables and relationships. Experiments have the facility
for weeding out less important variables and isolating those that
appear important under particular contexts. Finally, experimentation
has the potential to encourage the dynamic study of events (1962:
121). Much of political science research is static and cross
sectional. Experimentation allows situations to be repeated and
differently sequenced in order to assess the effects of many different
factors on outcomes.
Synder, like Campbell and Stanley, also recognizes the dangers
inherent in experimentation, primarily from overgeneralization, but
similarly from improper design and execution. Although favorably
inclined toward experimentation as a tool of political science. Synder
is not as strong in praise as Abraham Kaplan's claim that:
Experimentation is the consummation of the marriage between
reason and experience, and though it is not in itself the
life of the mind, it is the most passionate and fruitful
expression of our intellectual life and loves (1964: 147).
Charles Plott (1979) also has turned to the question of the
applicability of laboratory experimental methods. Plott claims that
162
laboratory experimental methods are particularly valuable for public
choice research. This follows from his twofold characterization of
such research as concerning:
1. The "choice between alternative modes of social
organization and institutions"; and
2. A view of the individual "as strategically applying
powers and information afforded by the institutional
structure in accord with his own independent preferences
rather than as having his preferences follow
endogenously from the social position, organizational
structure, or role in which he finds himself" (1979:
137-138).
Arguing that the existence of meaningful data is a chronic problem for
public choice research, Plott echoes Campbell and Stanley by noting
that laboratory experimentation can provide useful data for research.
In order to successfully study the relationships between
preferences, institutions, and outcomes, Plott argues that two basic
axioms must be accepted. The first holds that the behavior of
"various modes of organization is independent of the sources of
preferences as long as the preferences themselves remain unchanged"
. (1979: 139-140). The second axiom declares "that the relationship
between outcomes, preferences and institutions is (supposed to be)
independent of the nature of social alternatives" (1979: 140). Given
these axioms, which are central to most social choice models, Plott
contends it is possible to induce preferences on individuals by
providing them with a function that yields payoffs over some abstract
set of alternatives. As long as individuals prefer more of the payoff
to less, and as long as sidepayments are not possible, the
individual's preferences will be well-ordered and transitive.*3
Plott goes on to argue that the value of laboratory
experimentation lies in, first, the ability to test competing
163
principles. He explains that there are innumerable explanations in
the social sciences. Laboratory experiments provide a unique
opportunity to devise many different types of tests to compare
different explanations (1979: 141). While it may not be possible to
indicate which explanation is correct, it is possible in some
circumstances to reject some explanations. Plott's argument is that
if an explanation does not work in a context which is abstracted and
designed to allow it a maximal chance to work, then the explanation
should not be expected to work in the real world (1979: 151).
Finally, Plott also argues that laboratory experiments are valuable in
allowing the opportunity for structuring "synthetic" processes --
processes which have only historical antecedents, or which have never
existed (1979: 155). Plott, then, contends that laboratory
experimentation can be valuable when dealing with relationships
between preferences, institutions, and outcomes.
Laboratory experimental research is not a panacea for all
research concerns in political science. Clearly, it has its
limitations, as many critics have pointed out. Most particularly, as
a research tool, it forces an oversimplified abstraction of the world,
it cannot encompass all of the complexity of the world, and general-
izations about the world are difficult to derive from experimental
research. However, some of these limitations also point to the
strength of experimental methods. First, abstractions allow
particular sets of relationships to be singled out for manipulation
and test. Second, relationships that are not of theoretical interest
can be controlled, again to isolate what is important for the
researcher. Third, given a narrow focus, special insights can be
164
derived from this type of research. Fourths many tests can be
structured to test many different explanations. Finally,
experimentation provides a relatively inexpensive and replicable means
of collecting data. As Kaplan notes:
The meeting place between theory and experiment is one of
those dangerous intersections at which neither vehicle is
allowed to proceed till the other has gone by; the
remarkable thing is that traffic moves most freely only when
both roads are well traveled (1964: 161).
While experimental methods have these virtues, poorly designed and
executed experiments can be said to have no virtues at all. With
regard to Kaplan's metaphor, poorly designed experiments tend to
create havoc at the intersection.
Experimentation and Design4
The design and execution of experiments is critical for enabling
their interpretation. Since the primary task of an experimental
setting is to provide for the collection of data subject to analysis,
and since experimental settings enable reseachers flexibility in
controlling exogenous variables, it is imperative experiments be
properly designed and executed. Interpretability is primarily assured
in two ways. First through eliminating alternative explantions for
experimental outcomes through statistical controls or through design.
Second, interpretability is assured through replicability. If an
experiment is carefully detailed, and procedures explained so that
others can use the same design, then retesting those results is
possible. This assures that the initial set of results is not due to
special circumstances. This condition is further discussed in the
next section when elaborating this particular experiment.
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While the proper design of experiments enables interpretation of
results, generalization of those results presents an entirely
different problem. By its nature and intent, experiments abstract
particular contexts in order to test specific sets of relationships.
Generalizing from a relatively constrained and controlled environment
to a real-world situation requires either isomorphism with the
situation being modeled, or the strict satisfaction of specific
criteria relating to external, validity. Isomorphism is practically
impossible to achieve given the contextual complexity of real-world
situations. The experiment detailed below lacks the rich context of
real-world committee processes and cannot be considered isomorphic
with real committees. However, this is intentional since the
theoretical concern of this project focuses on a specific set of
variables and relationships.
Additionally, this experiment does not meet the rigid standards
for external validity established by Campbell and Stanley (1966).
They define external validity as the generalizability of findings, or
being able to extend findings to the full population (1966: 2). In
general, to satisfy claims for external validity, a researcher must be
certain that the findings hold across a wide context. Of course,
meeting the canons of external validity is no guarantee for
generalizability given problems of induction (see Campbell and
Stanley, 1966: 17). Most experiments that rely on a small,
unrepresentative sample rarely meet such standards. This in itself
does not undermine the thrust of experimentation. Although
generalizations from experimental results cannot be extended too
broadly, it is still possible that those results are valuable for
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corroborating a particular model. In turn, that model may provide
insights as to structures with similar properties in the world. At
the very least, failure or success in testing specific sets of
relationships may direct future research efforts ? whether
experimentally or in the world. As such, experiments are useful,
although what can be generalized is limited.
Since experiments do not meet rigid external validity criteria,
and because they strive to control rather complex influences of
exogenous variables, it is crucial that experiments meet rigid
standards relating to internal validity and construct validity.
Internal validity is concerned with curbing possible contaminating
influences to the experiment. The set of possible influences, then,
must be accounted for prior to conducting an experiment and the
experiment designed to minimize variation through planned controls,
through statistical design, or through randomization. Threats to
internal validity can emerge from individuals learning over the course
of the experiment. This may take such varied forms as participants
picking up behavioral cues from tests, from the researcher, or may be
a function of events and time transpiring between observations. Other
threats can emerge from the attributes of individuals. Differences
among those selecting into or those dropping out of an experiment can
easily threaten interpretation of data. Finally, interpretation is
threatened by events beyond the control of the researcher. Often it
is difficult to stop diffusion of a treatment, since control over
participants outside the experiment is generally impossible.
Likewise, unanticipated events during the course of an experiment
(such as a fire alarm) can detract an individual's attention to a
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treatment. Many different contingencies can be planned to grapple
with different circumstances. However, experiments follow social laws
as well as do day-to-day affairs. When all contingencies are planned,
Murphy's Law takes effect.
Construct validity concerns the specification of clear, testable
relationships that are not subject to alternate interpretations. With
proper specification and controls, alternative explanations can either
be rejected outright or be subjected to empirical test. Since
experiments primarily test prespecified sets of relationships, and
since experimentation allows flexibility in specification of
treatments as to time, quantity, and quality, it is incumbent on the
researcher to encourage the formulation of explicit, testable
propositions. Meeting conditions of construct validity contributes
toward assuring that the explanation under test is capable of
falsification or corroboration.
From this brief catalogue of threats to validity, it is apparent
that to guarantee reliability and replicability, experiments must
avoid a wide variety of problems. Fortunately, given the unique
opportunities for controls over a large assortment of variables, this
is not difficult. The rewards for overcoming these threats to
validity are manifold. Statistical reliability is increased, tests of
competing models are improved, and confidence in inferences about
treatment effects is heightened. With these threats to validity in
mind, the next section details the experiment used in this study. At
appropriate places, threats to validity are pointed out, and the means
for lessening those threats are elaborated.
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COMMITTEE: A Computer-Controlled Experiment
The experiment is designed to accomplish three things. First, to
approximate the committee structure outlined in Chapter 4. Second, to
meet threats to internal validity. And third, to simplify empirical
analysis. It is similar to the committee discussed in Chapter 2 and
outlined in Chapter 4. Members are charged with selecting an
alternative from a two-dimensional policy space. Each individual has
induced preferences over all points in the space (the set of
alternatives) while a subset of individuals (a majority) must
collectively select an alternative from the policy space. Typically
this involves participants introducing proposals (according to some
pre-established procedure) until agreement is reached. Although
similar to other committee games, participants do not have
face-to-face contact. Instead, participants are seated at individual
computer terminals. From their terminals, each member is able to
learn specific and controlled information about the experiment, is in
contact with other committee members, and is able to vote on different
proposals. All committee interaction is mediated by a computer system .
that displays the alternative space, various proposals, calculates
values, and tallies outcomes.
Face-to-face participation has been integral for many of the
committee experiments performed to date. However, this format entails
serious threats to internal validity because communications may
exhibit considerable (uncontrolled) variation. While transcripts of
most experiments are available, they do not capture inflections in
tone, strident refusals, or threatening demands.5 The intricacies of
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discussion may provide clues as to committee behavior and may be
important variables for predicting committee outcomes. By the same
token, nonverbal communication may be important as committee members
indicate their willingness to join a coalition, cajole others into an
agreement, or impress other members with the earnestness of their
threats. Nonverbal communication is difficult to decipher.
Inadequate documentation of these modes of communication is generally
the rule since it requires either highly skilled unobtrusive
observation and detailed notess or thorough video-taping of each
experiment. By routinizing and mediating communication with a neutral
umpire ? a computer ? these threats to validity are lessened. It is
hoped that the gain from extra controls (where these exogenous
variables are not of direct theoretical concern for the project) will
override any of the attendant difficulties with removing the "soul"
(unconstrained discussion and debate) from committee behavior.
Recruitment
The experiment uses participants responding to an advertisement
in the student newspaper. Respondents telephoned to volunteer for the
experiment and were read a short statement characterizing the
experiment. No cues were given as to who was conducting the
experiment (many thought it was a psychology experiment) nor as to the
operation of the experiment. This was to lessen hypothesis guessing
and other expectations on the part of participants. The primary focus
of the telephone exchange was to assure individuals that all data
collected would be kept strictly confidential, inform them they would
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make decisions within a committee, and stress that they would receive
compensation in cash at the conclusion of the experiment. Discussion
of the amount of compensation was deliberately kept vague, but if
pressed, some minimum and maximum ranges were suggested to ensure
participant recruitment.
Accepting volunteers on a first call, first accepted basis
presents two problems to the experiment: the randomness of the
population, and the ability to function with a highly technical piece
of machinery (PLATO). Randomness is an important way of lessening
important threats to internal validity. Randomness assures that the
participant population is well mixed, and that no serious group
effects are found between treatments. Because participants chose the
day they wished to participate, some threat to internal validity may
be posed by self-selection. To minimize this effect, more individuals
than required for each experiment were recruited. At that point
friends were sorted out, in an attempt to minimize the possibility of
pre-play strategies. Also, while the number of treatments was
limited, these treatments were randomized over groups. This
randomizing element should weaken threats of maturation,
self-selection, testing, instrumentation, statistical regression, and
interactions with selection.
Once volunteers appeared for the experiment, and five
participants were selected, they were seated before different computer
terminals. To control for the possibility that coalitions might
develop associating each member with a particular terminal, the letter
identifying players was randomized during the course of the
experiment. On the one hand, this prevents participants from making
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choices based on knowledge of others in the game. This includes
developing patterns of reciprocity, since identities change from round
to round. On the other hand, this contributes to individuals pursuing
self-interested behavior ? in accordance with the models developed in
Chapter 4. Since individuals remain anonymous and all payoffs are
privately made, few incentives exist to act in a non self-interested
manne r.
To ensure that participants were equally prepared for the
experiment, instructions appeared in a packaged "lesson" prior to
beginning the experiment. The computer-controlled lesson is
self-paced, providing full instructions about the mechanics of the
terminals and the workings of the experiment. The instructions are
worded to provide only information relevant to play, and avoid
providing information about experimental hypotheses. This lessens
threats to validity derived from researcher expectancies and
hypothesis guessing. The lesson includes examples of situations
participants might face and instructs them in various means of
responding without evaluating their performance (see Appendix 5-1 for
instructions). These lessons served two purposes. First, by
presenting standardized instructions delivered via the "neutrality" of
the machine, all participants are treated to the same materials.
Second, it allows participants to acquire necessary skills prior to
playing the game. In general, participants are well-drilled before
beginning the experiment. A relatively small proportion of
participants complained of having problems following the instructions
(20 percent).6
In order to lessen confusion and to provide hands-on experience,
participants played a practice round with one another before starting
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the experiment. While similar to other rounds, this practice round
had a shorter time limit and had the Core as an expected solution.
Such a solution is known to converge and so is thought to be a good,
brief introduction to the mechanics of the experiment.
By randomizing treatments within groups, randomizing player's
identities, and limiting information as to the nature of the
experiment, a number of threats to validity are lessened. Recruitment
and initial contact with an experiment are important sources of
threats to validity, since it is at these junctures participants
develop their initial expectations about an experiment. Considerable
care was taken not to inflate or otherwise contribute to these
expectations.
Experimental Structure
The experiment is conducted on the PLATO interactive computer
system. The system is extremely flexible and adaptable to such
research. The PLATO system provides a number of benefits to
research. 7 One advantage is derived from the high resolution graphics
capabilities of PLATO. This enables simple, straightforward displays
of the policy space, preference curves, and locations of proposals.
Any information participants require is at their fingertips. Fast
plotting and constant updating of information make presentation of the
experiment relatively simple.
Second, at the heart of the experiment is communications among
players. Since participants are not allowed to speak with one
another, a means for communicating on proposals is necessary. PLATO
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is a highly interactive system that not only allows fast turn-around
between the terminal and the mainframe, but enables individuals to
access information common to the group. This feature allows
specification of information shared by the groups and that which is
unique to the individual. Third, data storage, handling, and
interpretation is simplified.
While the experiment is conducted over a computer, and involves
considerable programming complexity, task complexity is reduced for
participants. Participants face a proposal screen over which all
proposals are plotted. The screen includes the two-dimensional policy
space that proposals are mapped onto, and a set of boxes providing
individuals with five different options (see Figure 5-1). These
include options to: send proposals, bring a proposal to a vote,
display preference curves, operate a calculator giving specific point
and value readouts in the policy space, and see a full list of
proposals. These options are activated by touching the appropriate
box drawn on the PLATO screen. This interrupts a light grid, in turn
activating a subroutine. Such a touch mechanism substantially reduces
task complexity, and makes the experiment less formidable for those
8
unfamiliar with computers.
The major component of the experiment concerns the proposal
screen. This screen represents a two-dimensional policy space. It
has two axes each with 350 distinct units, marked off by increments of
25 points. The screen is blank, except for the axes. Each axis
represents an arbitrary policy, with no identifying characteristics.
This is to provide as few exogenous cues as possible to the
experiment. 9 The proposal screen provides visual cues to individuals
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as to where their own proposals lie and the proposals of other
committee members. When a proposal is sent it appears as a point on
the policy space. It is identified by a number indicating the
sequence of the proposal and a letter identifying who sent it.
The first option on the proposal screen allows participants to
propose alternatives. After choosing this option, participants must
enter coordinates of the proposal they wish to send. Once the
coordinates are selected, the value of that proposal is calculated for
them and displayed. Members then decide whether they wish to send
this proposal. If sent, it appears on the screen for all to see.
During the experiment, each player is limited to a maximum of 20
proposals per round. The upper limit for data storage is 72 messages
per round. However, this was no serious constraint to most
experiments. Only one experimental round ever reached the maximum.10
The second option brings proposals up for a vote. The voting
procedure in the experiment follows an amendment procedure, where an
initial status quo proposal is arbitrarily imposed. The current
status quo is always displayed as such on the proposal screen. As
with most committees, no proposal can be voted on without a seconding
motion. Individuals then have two seconding options. The first
allows a committee member to second an alternative proposal (not that
member's own). This alternative is then compared with the status quo
using a binary voting procedure. If the alternative beats the status
quo by a majority vote, it becomes the new status quo. Otherwise,
there is no change. The second option allows any member to call the
current status quo to a vote.11 The status quo is then voted either
up or down. If a majority votes to accept the status quo, then the
round ends. Otherwise, the round continues.
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Once a vote is called, members are warned that a vote is
impending. They are provided information as to the proposal number,
its coordinates, who sent it, who seconded it, and its value.
Additionally, its location is displayed on the proposal screen. After
30 seconds, all members are shifted to a display where they cast their
vote. Voting is by touch input on the screen, with each alternative
and its value to the individual clearly identified. Once the vote is
complete, all players are given information about how the committee
voted, including individual player's votes.
If no agreement is reached on a proposal during a round, the
current status quo becomes the final proposal. This implies a
stopping rule enforcing a time limit on each round. During the
experiment, each round was limited to 20 minutes. A countdown clock
was included showing the amount of time remaining in the round.
During voting the clock stopped, resuming following restart of the
round. Such a stopping rule is familiar in most real-world
institutions, where unlimited debate on a decision is a luxury.
Additionally, such a rule was necessary to make efficient use of
computer facilities and to keep total participant time in the
experiment to a reasonable length. On the whole, the stopping rule
did not appear to constrain participation in the experiment. The
average time taken to arrive at a decision was 14*3 minutes.12
The third option on the proposal screen enables individuals to
view an overlay of their preference curves. It draws a set of
representative preference curves on the policy space that encircle the
ideal point of the individual player. Players see only their own
preference curves, and not those of others. Further, they know only
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their own ideal point and not those of others. As a result, players
have no knowledge of payoffs to other players, nor their preferences.
The only information available to them is complete information as to
their own preferences.
Every individual has an ideal (''bliss'') point that is their
highest valued point in the policy space. Valuations for other
proposals drop off as a function of distance away from the player's
ideal point. Further, the shape of these valuations are circles whose
radius is the distance from the ideal point. Participants are
indifferent among proposals that lie on the ball of points defined by
the distance radius from the ideal point. In other words, an
individual receives the same payoff for any point that lies some
distance away from their ideal point
Preferences are not something participants bring with them to the
experiment. Instead, committee members are assigned specific ideal
points. Those points change during each round. Further, each player
is provided with a specific payoff function: Like ideal points,
these payoff functions vary with players and across rounds of the
experiment. In order to lessen boredom with the experiment, and in
order to preserve limited funding for payoffs, these payoff functions
are not linear with distance. Instead, they are based on logged
values. Figure 5-2 illustrates the payoff functions used during the
course of the experiment.
While it is difficult to entirely separate individuals from their
own valuations for objects, the structure of the experiment tries to
induce valuations over outcomes. Smith argues that induced valuation
only depends on the postulate of nonsatiation, where:
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Given a costless choice between two alternatives identical
except that the first yields more of the reward medium
(usually currency) than the second, the first will always be
chosen (preferred) over the second, by an autonomous
individual, i.e., utility is a monotone increasing function
of monetary reward. . . (1976: 275).
Smith qualifies this postulate, pointing to instances where subjective
costs are associated with decision making, when a "game value" is
attached to experimental outcomes, or where individuals may not be
"autonomous own-reward maximizers." The first case entails boredom
with the experiment, such that rewards do not sufficiently offset
tasks involved with the experiment. In this instance, rewards can be
substantial. Participants were informed that the amount they made for
the experiment depended only on the decisions made by a majority of
the committee. Payoffs could range from a low of $.04 to a high of
$48.00 for roughly 2 hours in the experiment. The expected value for
each participant ranged around $7.50. The potential rewards were
considerable in the experiment. Further, an overwhelming majority (96
percent) indicated they were willing to participate again, if they
were given the opportunity. By the same token, many stressed their
enjoyment in participating. Thus, it seems that subjective costs for
the bulk of the participants were low.
The second qualification concerns individuals attaching a value
to participating in the experiment rather than for the reward medium.
Smith points primarily to participant satiation with "point" profits.
In this experiment, all outcomes are real-valued, and not a function
of point accumulation. Individuals did not have to estimate distance
and peruse a table to calculate payoffs. These were constantly given
in dollar amounts. While one participant indicated she would play
again "even without money," most were quite eager to carry off their
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winnings. The design of the experiment apparently overrides this
qualification.
The third qualification concerns cases where individuals act with
regard to the gain by others, or what Smith characterizes as
"[interpersonal utility criteria" (1976: 278). In this experiment,
however, individuals know nothing of the payoffs to others, or even
who other participants are during any round. Similarly, changing
maximal payoffs and payoff functions further contributes to
individuals acting for themselves rather than seeking equitable
outcomes ? especially given that they have no idea as to the amounts
others are earning. In all, it appears this experiment meets the
objections to the satiation postulate, and that the reward structure
is sufficient to expect some form of induced valuation over proposals
in the alternative space.
The payoff function defining valuations and player's ideal points
changes throughout the course of the experiment. Laing and Olmsted
(1978) employ a number of different preference configurations in order
to test the applicability of the Competitive solution and to examine
dynamic processes across many rounds of an experiment. Their use of
face-to-face procedures, and the inability to mask players, force them
to employ many different preference configurations throughout the game
to ensure that individuals played "different games." In this
experiment, this is largely unnecessary, since individual identities,
payoff valuations, and ideal points are readily manipulated. Further,
this experiment is primarily concerned with testing changes across
structural variables, and not with uncovering solution set concepts.
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An important fourth option on the proposal screen is the
calculator. This option enables the use of a cursor to identify the
precise location and value of any point in the alternative space.
Once the calculator is engaged, either touch input, or a set of keys,
can move the cursor to any location in the policy space. Rather than
estimating locations and values for alternatives using the preference
curve overlay, this option provides a quick method for establishing
precise locations and values. Many participants used this option
almost exclusively, rather than dealing with preference curve
overlays.
The final option enabled individuals to view a sequential listing
of all proposals. By selecting the "See Messages" option,
participants are provided a sequential listing of proposal numbers,
who sent the proposal, its coordinates, and the value to them. Since
many proposals are usually sent, only the most recent five proposals
are displayed. However, pressing a key lists all proposals sent
during the round. The same is true with proposals displayed on the
main proposal screen. Whenever returning to the proposal screen, only
the most recent 10 proposals are displayed. However, pressing a key
plots all proposals sent during the round.13
Retrospection
The key to COMMITTEE is that participants make a series of
decisions under well-specified committee structures. During each
round, player identities change, individual preferences change, and on
occasion, the structural rules to the committee change. The reason
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for designing this experiment is to test the four committee structures
outlined in Chapter 4. The technology of PLATO allows replication of
important aspects of these structures, while at the same time reduces
task complexity for participants. Here, in Chapter 4, changes in the
experimental committees occurred only with respect to aggregation
rules, communication rules, and position rules. All other aspects of
the experiment are held constant in order to test only for the effects
of structure on outcomes.
Elements Held Constant to the Committee Decision Situation
Considerable care was taken to control for the effects of
individual differences within and between committees. Although
individuals may vary in the attitudes they bring with them, their
preferences are well-defined through inducing valuations for the
experiment's abstract policy space. Learned patterns of behavior,
too, are controlled since only first time participants are allowed.
Given the unique nature of the experiment, it is unlikely mixed groups
of participants had experience in similar situations, especially given
the abstract nature of the committee structures within which they
participated. By and large, it is doubtful that the individual's past
experiences dictated strategic behavior without regard to the
structure of the experiment itself.
As to constant structural elements of the committee, the first
concerns boundary rules. Only five individuals participated in any
experiment. No one dropped out during any of the experimental rounds.
The scope of the committee is clearly defined since members are
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charged with reaching majority agreement on a point in the alternative
space. This space is fixed in two-dimensions with 122,500 unique
alternatives. Because of the density of alternatives in this policy
space, individual preferences can be considered nearly continuous.
Finally, procedural rules are equally well-defined. A decision is
made once a majority agrees to the current status quo. If agreement
is not forthcoming, then the current status quo becomes the decision
once time is up. Comparing alternatives and sending proposals is
routinized by explicit rules (and enforced by PLATO) as to who can
second a motion and send a proposal. These constant elements to the
experiment approximate Assumptions 1 through 6 in Chapter 4.
Structural Variations
The primary purpose of the experiment is with testing predicted
outcomes derived in Chapter 4. While the bulk of the committee
structure remains constant throughout the experimental series,
variations do occur both within and between experimental groups.
These variations focus on aggregation rules, communication rules, and
position rules. Aggregation rules are simple to impose. They require
either a 3-person or a 4-person majority vote. This rule applies to
votes seeking to change an alternative to the status quo, or votes to
end the round by passing the status quo. This closely parallels the
distinction in Chapter 4 between simple and extraordinary majority
rule.
As to the communication rules, participants are constrained to
sending either 3 or 20 proposals. This variation in the rule concerns
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the exchange of information between players. Participants confront an
enormous policy space with an excellent understanding of their own
preferences, but with no idea as to the shape of other's preferences.
Sending proposals is regarded as serving two functions. First, it
advertises the participant's preferred policy space. Second, it
enables bargaining and negotiation. Since no alternative proposal can
be brought to a vote without a seconding motion by another player,
players' proposals usually must move away from their ideal point to
uncover majority support. As the number of proposals increases,
players have greater latitude in negotiating a decision. Belonging
versus not belonging to a winning coalition can mean a difference in
payoffs ranging between $1.50 and $4.50 per round. While sending 20
proposals is generally sufficient to search through the policy space,
a rule constraining participants to sending only 3 proposals strongly
limits bargaining and negotiation. This limitation resembles that
modeled in Chapter 4.
Finally, with position rules, constraints focus on agenda
control. A particular concern is whether individuals share similar
agenda powers or whether a subgroup of participants are assigned
special powers. Returning to the importance of sending proposals,
position rules are conceived as either the power for all participants
to send proposals, or the power of two participants to send proposals.
In this experiment, the agenda can only be formed where alternatives
are proposed to the status quo. Where all are able to send proposals,
then position rules do not assign specialized powers. Where agenda
control is placed in the hands of a limited subgroup of the
participants, then position rules do assign specialized powers.
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Again, this variation across structure approximates the model
discussed in Chapter 4.
To ensure that participants clearly understand the structure of
the committees, at the outset of each round participants are given
basic information about the round. They are told which committee
member they are. given an ideal point with representative preference
curves labeled in dollar amounts, told the number of votes required to
pass a proposal, and informed as to whether they can send proposals
(and how many) during the round. Also, a short quiz is given before
beginning to determine whether they understood the constraints imposed
during the round. The information and quiz are given by PLATO, and
participants cannot begin the round until responding correctly to each
question.
Conclusion
Aside from a few adjustments ? such as queuing proposals that
are voted on and setting a maximum time limit on a round ? these
experimental committees resemble those developed elsewhere in the
formal literature. It should be kept in mind that these experimental
committees are abstractions of the models developed in Chapter 4..
Likewise, those models are subsets of generalized meta-rules discussed
in Chapter 3. Although these structural components could be
represented in many different ways, this should not jeopardize
empirical work concentrating on a narrow question of whether
structural differences induce different sets of outcomes. Since the
experiment is an abstraction of a complex system of relationships, if
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any meaningful empirical relationships are to be uncovered, threats to
construct and internal validity must be lessened. This has been done
through specifying the outcomes and structural components under
consideration and through careful randomizing and masking procedures.
The discussion in this chapter sets the stage for the discussion of
empirical results in Chapter 6.
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FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE
1A properly constructed "most similar systems" design would
enable controls over many of these variations. However, two major
problems face such designs. First, there is a problem of locating
"similar" systems. Given the wide variation among research contexts,
it is a difficult task to select a proper research sample. Second,
the researcher has little control (if any) over variations once the
research samples are selected. Whether these variations are crucial
for hypothesis testing is something the researcher must anticipate.
However, research often obeys Murphy's Law.
2As to testing solution concepts, see Berl, et al. (1976),
Fiorina and Plott (1978), and McKelvey and Ordeshook (1979a). For the
development of new solution set concepts, see McKelvey, et al. (1978),
Ferejohn, Fiorina, and Packel (1980), and Hoffman and Packel (1980).
3 For an excellent discussion of the concept of "induced
preferences," see Smith (1976).
4The discussion of various types of validity criteria which need
be met follow from discussions by Campbell and Stanley (1966) and Cook
and Campbell (1976). Other works which have informed this particular
section include Kaplan (1964) and Kerlinger (1969).
5In many cases tape recordings are available. Even so, coding
problems emerge in differentiating between an express and implicit
threat conveyed by inflection when committee members are debating a
proposal.
6This data is taken from a post-experiment questionnaire.
Percentages are based on a total n of 105. A smaller proportion (10.5
percent) complained of having difficulty in participating in the game.
Many opportunities were provided for individuals to ask questions and
to use the options connected with the experiment. After an initial
period of frustration, most seemed very comfortable with the tasks
facing them during the experiment.
7For examples of the usefuleness of PLATO and its general
applicability to experimental literature, see Williams (1980); also
Murnighan and Roth (1982).
8An initial version of this experiment did not use the touch
input mechanism. Instead, participants typed in options. Confusion
and complaints about using the equipment dropped dramatically once the
touch mechanism was employed.
9Smith (1976) argues that in presenting goods or policies across
which individuals will have induced preferences, that it is best not
to provide extra cues to detract from the purpose of the game.
Labeling the axes with a traditional policy tradeoff such as "guns and
butter" might potentially influence individuals regardless of their
payoffs. Participants with an aversion to military accoutrements, or
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their counterparts with an aversion to useful production when it
threatens military strength, might bring a set of values to their play
. that transcends the payoffs they receive.
10An experiment was run with no time or proposal limits. Members
participated in a single round with substantial payoffs. Participants
familiarized themselves with the experiment by playing a number of
practice rounds. During this experiment, no player sent more than 10
messages, and a point was settled on and agreed to in under 10
minutes.
11There is a limit on bringing the status quo to a vote. The same
member cannot bring the same status quo to a vote twice in a row.
Another member must bring it to a vote or a different proposal must be
voted on before an individual can bring the same status quo to a vote
again. This rule was imposed to provide a queuing method for the
experiment. During pretests it was discovered that individuals
quickly learned to use the "seconding" option as a filibustering
technique. That is, they would wait until a status quo was settled on
close to their ideal point, then continue to have it voted on until
time ran out. This unanticipated rule effect points to the use
individuals make of rules when choosing their strategies.
12This excludes games with extraordinary majority rules. Here the
average time was substantially higher, taking 18 minutes. This was
due to the difficulty in moving the status quo. This dynamic is
discussed in Chapter 6.
1During pretests all proposals were displayed. Participants
complained that the screen became too cluttered, and that it was
difficult to decipher what was going on. Once this change was made,
complaints stopped.
APPENDIX 5-1
CHAPTER SIX
EMPIRICAL RESULTS:
PATTERNS OF COMMITTEE OUTCOMES
''She can't do substraction,'' said
the White Queen. "Can you do
Division? Divide a loaf by a knife
? what's the answer to that?"
- Alice
College students facing an abstract committee in an experimental
setting spend little time ruminating on the vicissitudes of collective
action. Instead, they appear to single-mindedly push ahead to earn as
much as possible. While they appear to be little constrained by
reflections, the empirical evidence suggests they are constrained by
the institutional features of the committee in which they participate.
Indeed, elements of those institutional features outlined in Chapter 4
appear to constrain individual strategic action in predictable ways.
This chapter presents results from a series of experiments using
volunteer participants and played over the PLATO interactive computer
system. The primary thrust of the experiment is to test for
differences in outcomes between committees with different
institutional features. Thus, this chapter returns to the discussion
raised in Chapter 1 concerning the effects of structure on democratic
outcomes as well as the issues raised in Chapter 3 relating to
institutional arrangements and collective action. Finally, the
empirical results are designed to test the models outlined in Chapter
4.
In this chapter a few general observations are first made about
the experiments and those who participated. Second, each
institutional variation and its attendant prediction is discussed at
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length. Finally, a general discussion and interpretation of this set
of results is offered. The relation between this experimental series
and the points raised in Chapter 1 concerning the role of structure
and democratic theory is reserved for Chapter 7. This set of
experiments, like all experiments, is a simplification ? in this case
of a particular collective decision-making situation. Yet, the
results discussed here have significance. They capture aspects of
real behavior and provide insights into the effects of structure on
that behavior.
General Observations
The series of experiments analyzed in this chapter were
conducted from May through June 1982. All data from the experimental
series was collected and stored on the PLATO computer system.
Subsequent analysis was conducted on the computer facilities provided
by the Department of Political Science Data Laboratory and the
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. During the
experimental series, a total of 105 individuals participated in 21
separate experiments. Although each experiment was designed to last 2
hours, with one practice round and four rounds with payoffs, only 96
distinct rounds were run. Because some groups took longer in studying
the instructions and used more time when reaching decisions, not all
groups participated in five rounds. As noted below, this is not a
serious threat to comparisons relying on pooled group data, and
explains subsequent differences in sample sizes as comparisons are
made.
191
All participants were recruited through the student newspaper
published over the summer sessions at Indiana University. Because of
this, seniors, matriculated students, and graduate students tended to
predominate, constituting 60.9 percent of the participant population.1
Self-recruitment did not result in any strong gender differences, with
49.5 percent of the experiment population being male. Minorities,
meanwhile, constituted 13.3 percent of the experiment population.
These variables are generally regarded as important in accounting
for within group differences. Arguments are made that more educated
college students tend to be more sophisticated in their strategic
calculations than their less educated counterparts, females tend to be
more reticent in their participation, and cultural differences in
problem solving may be related to race. Also, if participants did not
understand instructions or had difficulty using PLATO, these factors
might also account for within group differences. These conjectures
are tested using multiple regression techniques.2
The dependent variable ? IND ? is the mean distance from the
participant's ideal point to the final outcome for the round. This
measure is calculated only for rounds in which there is a payoff. 3
The independent variables were standard. The. gender variable needs no
explanation. Since the number of minority participants was small,
race is a composite variable accounting for blacks, Hispanics, and
Orientals. Education (EDUC) accounted for class standing in college
(although it also captured a few participants with only a high school
education). The dichotomous variable, USTAND, is also included. It
is based on a question asking participants whether they had difficulty
understanding the instructions to the experiment. A similar question
192
asked whether participants had problems using PLATO during the
experiments. The yes or no response to this constitutes the other
independent variable, USE.4 The standardized results are presented in
Table 6-1.
These results do not support the contention that social
characteristics differentiate participant performance during the
experiment. Examining the standardized coefficients in Table 6-1, it
is apparent that problems with using the equipment, education level
differences, and sex differences contribute the most to how
individuals performed during the experiment. However, none of these
coefficients are very strong. The contribution of these three
variables to explaining variations in the dependent variable is a
small r2 = .071. The remaining variables contribute even less to
193
explaining individual variations. From these results, it can be
inferred that these variables only minimally differentiate
participants as to their performance. Subsequent analysis, thus,
disregards these variables and turns to the structure of the committee
within which participants make decisions.
Predictions and Outcomes
In Chapter 4, a baseline model and three variant structures are
discussed and predictions developed for the likely outcomes of each
structure. In Chapter 5, the method for ope rationalizing these
structures is described. At this point, behavior in a laboratory
setting is analyzed to determine whether institutions constrain
participant choices to particular sets of outcomes. These predictions
and their associated values are given in Figure 6-1.
The focus of analysis in this chapter is with instances where
participants are motivated (i.e., are playing for cash) and where no
stable equilibrium exists. Individual preferences are considered
heterogeneous, with individual ideal points for all experiments
represented by the set of points in Figure 6-1.
The first prediction relies on the Competitive solution developed by
McKelvey and Ordeshook (1978). This prediction involves a baseline
committee structure with a predicted solution containing the set of
points: As the baseline committee is
transformed so that a 4-person aggregation rule is employed, the
predicted solution changes to encompass the space Meanwhile, for a
committee structure with a change from substantial communications to
195
limited communications, predicted outcomes fall in partitions of the
space This space is a convex set with its vertices the player's
ideal points, and it also constitutes the pareto space for all
participants. Like the predicted solution for the changed aggregation
rule, it encompasses a large set of points. The final predicted
solution entails a committee structure with limited agenda powers.
During these experiments, only players whose ideal points were or
were granted full agenda control. This convention was used to
facilitate empirical comparisons. The predicted solution, then,
contained the single point:
The discussion that follows analyzes empirical results for each
type of committee structure. Analysis is performed only for those
instances where the Core does not exist and participants face real
cash incentives. This reduces the number of cases under consideration
is 72 (see Table 6-2).6 Because the expected solutions vary, a single
test for differences between all committee variations is not possible.
The real concern of this analysis is with the baseline model and
comparing structural variations from it. This yields three distinct
tests between the baseline committee and committees with a change in
either the aggregation, communication, or position rule. Before
beginning these comparisons, outcomes are examined for baseline
committees.. Since later analysis relies on comparisons from the
baseline committees, understanding these patterns of outcomes is
useful.
196
Table 6-2
Totals of Experimental Treatments
Committee Structure Number of Cases (Rounds)
Baseline Committee 18
Aggregation Rule Changed 18
Communication Rule Changed 19
Position Rule Changed 12
Total 72
The Baseline Committee
Although the Competitive solution has been an efficient predictor
for many committee experiments, in this series it does not perform
exceptionally well. Figure 6-2 plots experimental committee outcomes
with respect to the set of points constituting the Competitive
solution. The Competitive solution not only predicts a set of
quasistable points, but also predicts the coalition that forms around
each point. Figures 6-3A through 6-3E plot committee outcomes from
specific coalitions and focus on the corresponding Competitive
solution. Examining these figures, it is apparent that outcomes of
specific coalitions tend to focus near the appropriate solution set.
However, as Figures 6-3A and 6-3C indicate, there is considerable
variation from the Competitive solution. Twenty percent of the
outcomes appear in the central pentagon interior to the pareto space.
Further, three coalitions form that are not contained in the
Competitive set. These deviations may be due to peculiarities in the
201
experiment ? time and message constraints. However, a single
experiment was conducted testing the Competitive solution with, no
constraints on time or messages. Although participants had two
practice rounds of experience prior to making a decision for money, a
coalition outside the Competitive set formed. The outcome seemed due
in part to one participant's confusion. There are indications that
the outcome selected would have been agreed to by the proper coalition
had the experiment continued.7 Neither time nor messages constrained
this particular experiment. However, since it was played only once
(and all other experiments were played a number of times), and the
stakes were high (ranging from $0.01 to $34.00), it is possible that
this too had some effect on the outcome.8
The Competitive solution does fare better than these initial
observations might indicate. It predicts two related elements ? an
outcome and a coalition. First, I deal with the coalition predictions
of the solution. Only ten different minimal winning coalitions can
form in this 5-person experiment. A reasonable a priori expectation
is that each of the possible minimal winning coalitions is
equiprobable. However, of these ten possible coalitions, the
Competitive solution predicts that only half are likely to form ?
these being the coalitions represented in Figures 6-3A through 6-3E.
A reasonable test of the solution uses the a priori set of
expectations. Simply put, coalitions predicted by the Competitive
solution should form as often as those not predicted by the solution.
If such is the case, it casts doubt on the Competitive solution.
During the baseline committee experiments, only 3 of 18 outcomes were
selected by coalitions different from those predicted by the
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Competitive solution. The cumulative binomial probability of having
three or fewer coalitions forming outside those predicted by the
Competitive solution is .0176.9 Such a low probability indicates the
result is unlikely to be accidental and leads support to the value of
the Competitive solution's predictions.
In a similar manner, it is possible to test the Competitive
solution's prediction that only minimal winning coalitions form.
Greater than minimum winning coalitions can possibly form six times,
. compared with the five coalitions predicted by the solution. Using
this as an a priori basis to assign probabilities, greater than
minimum winning coalitions should form 54.6 percent of the time.
During the baseline committee experiments, only 3 of 12 coalitions
that formed were greater than minimum winning. The cumulative
binomial probability that three or fewer should occur is .044.10
Again, this indicates the success of the Competitive solution in
predicting the types of coalitions that form.
In a different vein, there are no discernable differences between
experimental groups with respect to outcomes chosen under baseline
committees. The first section of this chapter found no major
individual attributes that predicted variations in experimental
outcomes. Now attention is focused on outcomes at the committee
level. If results of baseline committees are to be pooled and
compared with other committee outcomes, then it must be shown that
there are no differences between groups. For this test, the 15
outcomes satisfying the Competitive solution are arbitrarily split in
half.11 Comparisons between specific participant groups is difficult
due to the small number of cases for each group. Therefore, pooling
203
participant groups and dividing them into two samples is a reasonable
procedure. Comparisons are then made on the mean distance of an
outcome from the expected solution, as well as means on the number of
proposals sent, vote totals, and time elapsed. Each of these measures
gauge important facts about the experiment. Obviously, the distance
measure is crucial as a performance measure of outcomes and their
distance from a predicted solution. The number of votes taken and the
number of proposals sent provides some insight as to the extent of
negotiation taking place during the experiment. Likewise, the amount
of time elapsed (in seconds) indicates how quickly a committee reached
agreement. Since the upper limit on time is 1,200 seconds, cases
where time expires should indicate the degree of difficulty that a
committee has in reaching agreement.
Beginning with a hypothesis that subsample means are equivalent
across distance, vote totals, proposal totals, and time elapsed, a
simple T-test indicates that none of the means are significantly
different (using a significance level measure of .05). The results in
Table 6-3 lend credence to the hypothesis that there are no
significant differences between groups in this experimental series.
That the Competitive solution did not fare too badly, consider
Table 6-4, which indicates all outcomes from the baseline committee
experiments. It lists the outcome, coalition, and distance of the
outcome from the solution. For those instances where time ran out,
distance was calculated on the basis of the closest Competitive
solution point. This is a reasonable approach since it implies that
such a coalition is satisfied with that status quo in contrast to
other proposals offered toward the conclusion of the round.
206
Overall, when participating in a baseline committee structure,
individuals generally tended to cycle in toward the Competitive
solutions. It should be kept in mind that choosing a point in the
Competitive set would be nothing short of a Herculean task.
Participants face a screen with 122,500 discrete points. Generally,
they do not propose small changes to the current status quo, since
such changes represent a change of only pennies in payoff. Instead,
points are proposed in increments of 10 or 25 units. In general, this
appears to be a device enabling good use of a finite set of messages
and meets the time constraints imposed by the experiment. Figure 6-4
depicts one such experimental round.
Figure 6-4 illustrates the votes taken on proposals during an
experimental round. Although a total of 42 proposals were sent, only
8 different proposals were voted on (although some proposals were
called to a vote more than one time). The dotted lines on the figure
indicate a change in the status quo and trace an agenda path to the
final outcome. With the exception of the 4th and 8th votes, the
status quo moved in toward various points of the Competitive solution.
With the 4th vote, it is possible player 5 was strategically voting to
push the status quo from where it settled and stayed following the
first vote.12 Meanwhile, players 1, 2, and 3 acted reasonably during
the 8th vote, pushing the status quo back to an area where the status
quo previously had rested. As can be noted from the figure, the
changes in the status quo involve large jumps across the policy space.
Also, these proposals typically fall on labeled units of the
coordinate axes. Yet, there remains a pattern to the movement. In
other rounds with a baseline committee structure, cycling and
movements toward the Competitive set are equally apparent.
208
Although the Competitive solution is not as successful in
predicting outcomes in this experimental series as in other
experiments, it still serves a useful purpose. It is a baseline model
with which to compare other committee structures. If institutional
rules constrain the strategies available to individuals, then the
patterns of those committee outcomes ought to differ from the baseline
model. That is the thrust of the analysis below.
Change in Aggregation Rules
When the committee structure has its aggregation rule changed
from the baseline model with a 3-person simple majority rule to a
4-person extraordinary majority rule, the pattern of outcomes change.
In Chapter 4 it was argued that as the aggregation rule requires a
greater proportion of individuals to pass a proposal, the decision
costs facing participants increase. Consequently, the basis over
which participants can find agreement shrinks. This has a number of
expected empirical manifestations. First, for the 5-person,
two-dimensional game, outcomes should be constrained to the interior
pentagon of the pareto space. Second, the increase in decision costs
should increase the number of votes cast and proposals made by the
committee, as well as increase the amount of time taken to reach a
decision. To test these conjectures, extraordinary majority rule
committee outcomes are compared with those of the baseline committee.
The only difference in treatments across these two committee
structures concerns the aggregation rule, so differences in patterns
of outcomes should be attributable to structural differences.
209
Before beginning analysis the possibility that there are between
group differences for extraordinary majority committees must be
examined. To do so, the set of outcomes are split into two samples.
T-tests are then performed comparing sample group means for distance,
vote totals, proposal totals, and time elapsed. The distance variable
is calculated as the distance of the outcome from the associated
Competitive solution. Since greater than minimal winning coalitions
are always necessary with an extraordinary majority voting rule, the
nearest Competitive solution to an admissible coalition subset of the
winning coalition is used. This measure provides a congruent measure
with the baseline committee distance measure. Table 6-5 provides the
set of results from these tests. There are no significant differences
between group means along any of these variables. This tends to
support the contention that these experimental groups were similar
over the experimental series.
Now it is possible to compare outcomes between the baseline
committee and the extraordinary majority rule committee. Comparing
Figure 6-5 with Figure 6-2 indicates that outcomes were more likely to
cluster in the interior pentagon of the pareto space for
the 4-person aggregation rule committee.. Only 20 percent of the
baseline's outcomes fall in the space compared with 61.1 percent of
the outcomes for the extraordinary majority rule committees (see also
Table 6-6), Further, these outcomes appear to be more densely packed
than those of the baseline committees. The average distance of
baseline outcomes from the Competitive solution is 37.3 units, while
the average distance of committee outcomes with a changed aggregation
rule is 27.2 units. As shown in Table 6-7, the difference in these
213
means is significant at the .05 level. A one-tailed test is used
since the expectation is that committee outcomes with changed
aggregation rules vary less than baseline committee outcomes in
distance from the Competitive solution. This conjecture is based on
the prediction that extraordinary majority rule committees will focus
within the subspace This conjecture is reinforced by noting that
the. variances of the two committees are significantly different
It appears that the extraordinary majority rule
shrinks the variation in distance among outcomes more so than the
simple majority rule.
When turning to other variables in Table 6-7, other significant
differences also emerge between the two committees. In each case it
is expected that the mean vote totals, proposals sent, and time
elapsed in an extraordinary majority voting rule are greater than that
for the baseline committee. This expectation is based on the
increased decision-making costs imposed by an extraordinary majority
voting rule. This is clearly the case for the number of votes cast.
Even more intriguing is the few number of times that the status quo
changed in extraordinary majority committees when compared to baseline
committees (a mean of 1.28 times for the former and 4.00 for the
latter). The number of proposals sent is greater in committees with
changed aggregation rules (38.4) than in baseline committees (30.7),
although the differences do not meet the test of significance used
here. Finally, the differences between the amount of time elapsed are
barely significant at the .05 level. However, buttressing the point
that these are different is the observation that baseline committees
only used the full allotment of time 20 percent of the time while
extraordinary majority committees ran out of time in 55.6 percent of
the cases.
215
In all, these general observations indicate that outcomes under
an extraordinary majority rule committee vary less than baseline
committee outcomes. These outcomes tend to fall in the predicted
solution space, as well as being packed around that space. Further,
an extraordinary majority rule committee seems to face significantly
greater decision costs as measured by the total number of votes taken
and the amount of time elapsed for the committee to reach a decision.
Some of these notions are captured by the experiment represented in
Figure 6-6. This extraordinary majority rule committee round used the
entire 20 minutes allotted for a decision. A total of 42 proposals
were sent during the course of the round, with a total of 19 votes
taken.
During the course of the experiment, the status quo steadily
converged toward the space until halting quite close to it. Further
movement from the final status quo was possible, but meant
constructing an agenda with extremely small steps from the final
status quo to the surface of However, uncovering this agenda was
unlikely since most participants did not discriminate among proposals
in such a fashion. The number of votes, the number of proposals sent,
and the time spent in this round is some indication of the constraints
an extraordinary majority aggregation rule places on outcomes.
Since the two committees vary only as to the number of votes
required to pass a proposal, it seems reasonable to attribute
differences in outcomes to this change. Since the pattern of outcomes
are different, it seems that the change in aggregation rules
constrains the strategies that individuals can successfully employ.
Further, the change from a 3-person to a 4-person aggregation rule
217
results in greater committee discussion as measured by the number of
votes and amount of time taken by such committees to reach agreement.
Finally, a large proportion of the outcomes from committees with a
changed aggregation rule appears in the sub space G. This is congruent
with the prediction tendered in Chapter 4.
Change in Communication Rules
Communication rules affect the type of information individuals
have available when making decisions. If a committee operates under
rules in which communications are curtailed, the presumption is that
outcomes will tend to scatter throughout the pareto space. More
precisely, as the number of polls are reduced in the space, so too is
the likelihood of uncovering a quasistable point. The resulting
prediction (taken from Chapter 4) is that committee members will
select points in coalition specific subsets of the pareto space
In effect, the outcomes of committees
with changed communication rules should be more dispersed than
outcomes of baseline committees.
Before beginning analysis, it can be shown that results from
different experimental groups can be pooled. Table 6-8 presents the
results from sample groups with limited communications. As can be
noted by scanning these results, the sample means are not
significantly different from one another. As with other committees,
this indicates that between groups effects are unlikely to need
attention in the following analysis.
219
Figure 6-7 plots outcomes derived from committees operating under
limited communication rules. In this instance, participants were
allotted three proposals. Once those were sent, participants could
only vote or bring proposals to a vote. Table 6-9 lists these
outcomes and provides data as to the coalition that formed and
distance of the outcome from the equivalent Competitive solution.
Time ran out in 10 out of 19 rounds with the current status quo
imposed as the committee's decision. One plausible explanation for
this (and an example is offered below) is that individuals use all
possible opportunities to vote on different proposals. In effect,
this amounts to a full search across available information. In those
instances where, time ran out, distance is calculated for the closest
Competitive solution on the presumption that coalition would have
enacted the proposal if forced to decide for or against the proposal
after time ran out.
On the surface, these outcomes generally appear in the proper
partitions of the pareto space. Of the nine outcomes selected by a
coalition, two-thirds fall into the correct partition. If rounds in
which time elapsed are included, and if the coalition voting for the
alternate proposal that subsequently became the imposed outcome are
taken into account, then 68.4 percent of the coalitions fell into
correct partitions of the pareto space. However, when comparing the
distance of baseline and limited communication committee outcomes,
there is little evidence that outcomes from the two committees are
different. Table 6-10 indicates there is no significant difference
between the two committee structures as to distance. This is contrary
to the expectation that outcomes would be more dispersed under a
223
limited communication rule. Likewise, there is no significant
difference as to the number of votes taken nor as to the amount of
time that elapsed. Even though one half of the limited communication
rounds ran out of time ? compared with only three cases for baseline
committees ? still the differences are not significant. Except for
the large number of outcomes appearing in the central pentagon, it
appears that the three communication limit had little effect on
outcomes.
However, this is not entirely the case. The three proposal
limitation resulted in participants spending a considerable amount of
time debating and cycling among proposals. Similar to rounds played
under baseline committees, limited communication committees changed
the status quo an average of almost four times (3.84). However, this
occurred for a much smaller set of proposals (an average of 13.74
compared with 31.94 for baseline committees). Also, limited
communication committees voted as often as baseline committees voted,
but again over a smaller set of proposals. In effect, the proposals
available to individuals were carefully scrutinized by the committees.
In turn, this provided an incentive for participants to offer
proposals that did not remove them ''from the action.'' This often
meant sending proposals far removed from the ideal point to ensure a
better than minimal payoff. This could partially explain the
comparatively large number of proposals falling in the central
pentagon of the pareto set.
Some of this strategic behavior is evident from the limited
communication experiment depicted in Figure 6-8. In this case, each
player sent the maximum number of proposals allotted. Participants
225
then called 17 votes over nine distinct proposals. Consequently, the
bulk of the proposals were subjected to a vote (with the exception of
some early proposals that represented proposals near the ideal points
of the players). With even these few alternatives to choose from, it
is apparent there is considerable effort exerted in searching for an
acceptable point. In fact, as illustrated in Figure 6-8, cycling
among proposals does occur in interesting ways ? as is evident with
votes 1, 5, 6, 7, 9. A new cycle was also set up with votes 10, 14,
and 16. Had time not run out, the proposal at vote 10 could have
defeated the final status quo. In general, limited communication
committees appeared to fall into voting cycles more often than
baseline committees. This is plausibly due to the limited number of
proposals available for scrutiny and the time remaining in the
experiment once all allotted proposals are made.
In all, the expected constraints imposed by limited
communications are not clearly manifested by the experimental
outcomes. While the expectation is that outcomes would be widely
divergent throughout the pareto space ? they were no more so than
with baseline committee outcomes. Glimpses of the effects of a
limited communication rule appear ? the large number of votes,
cycling among proposals, and generally falling into the correct
partition of the pareto space. However, these additional information
gathering techniques appear to undermine a communication rule aimed at
constraining information. In short, participants quickly developed
skills that enabled them to seek additional information in a structure
that sought to deprive them of information.
226
Changes in Position Rules
The institutional changes analyzed so far have been imposed on
all committee members without assigning any special powers to a subset
of participants. The structural constraint discussed now assigns
agenda control to two committee members whose ideal points lie in a
particular area of the policy space. In Chapter 4, it is argued that
participants with these agenda powers can successfully drive the
outcome to a specific point ? ? in the policy space. This point
is a minimax solution for the individuals having special agenda
powers. In general, the expectation is that such agenda power enables
those assigned to a special position considerable control over
outcomes.
As with other committees there appears to be few between group
effects among the principle variables of concern. Splitting the
limited position rule committees into two subgroups and conducting .
T-tests comparing means for the standard measure of distance, vote
totals, proposals sent, and time elapsed, little difference is found
between the subgroups (see Table 6-11). The only discrepancy is the
difference among means as to the number of proposals sent. This
difference approaches the .05 significance level used in this study.
However, given the lack of significant differences among the other
variables, it does not represent a serious threat to pooling the
grouped data.
Outcomes for the limited position committees are depicted in
Figure 6-9, with a list of those outcomes in Table 6-12. As can be
noted from the figure, only two outcomes cluster around the expected
229
outcome Otherwise, proposals scatter through the upper portion
of the policy space. In short, these outcomes do not lend any
credence to the predicted solution argued in Chapter 4. A reasonable
explanation, however, may account for this. Since agenda setters were
ignorant of other's ideal points, the initial proposals sent by agenda
setters determined the ensuing deliberations. If a proposal is sent
that falls within the pareto set, and if it is voted for, it cannot be
defeated by a proposal closer to the predicted solution. Only
proposals that are also in the pareto space and closer to the unknown
silent voters can subsequently defeat such a status quo. Since there
is no mechanism by which agenda setters can collude, competing for
others' votes seems to characterize much of the decision-making
process.
This is not to say that the limited position rule has little
effect on outcomes. Compared with the set of baseline committee
outcomes, these differences are considerable (see Table 6-13).
Comparing the relative distance of committee outcomes from the
Competitive set in this instance is not useful. The expected outcome
of the limited position rule committees does not consider all
coalitions or areas of the policy space to be equally likely. It
predicts outcomes will cluster in the upper right quadrant of the
policy space, close to the predicted solution Meanwhile,
baseline outcomes should disperse fairly uniformly around the central
pentagon of the pareto space. Two T-tests in Table 6-13 test this
notion by taking the mean X and Y outcome coordinates and comparing
between different committee structures. Interestingly, there is no
significant difference along the X axis coordinates. However, along
232
the Y axis, these differences are considerable and significant. The
implication is that the set of limited agenda committee outcomes are
manifestly different from baseline committee outcomes. As a whole,
constrained agenda control committees yield outcomes that are located
in the upper two quadrants, with emphasis on the upper right quadrant.
An initially surprising finding is that vote totals, the number
of proposals sent, and the time elapsed are consistently lower than
the baseline committee's totals, and that these are all significantly
different. However, this may be expected if it is taken into account
that position rules empower agenda setters with considerable powers.
Obviously, the number of proposals sent should be lower. More
importantly, although agenda setters cannot force other members to
vote for a proposal, they can refuse to send alternate proposals. In
a way this forces other members to vote on a much smaller set of
proposals (even less than the limited communications committees).
With a fewer number of proposals to consider, and with fewer votes,
the amount of time taken is also likely to be lower.
As briefly mentioned above, there is a tendency for agenda
setters to compete rather than collude during the experiment. As a
result, there is an identifiable tendency for outcomes to concentrate
around the ideal points of the agenda setters. Returning to Figure
6-9, it can be seen that 70.6 percent of the outcomes lie in an area
that is within a radius of (where i = {2,3}) units of the
ith agenda setter's ideal point. This competitive tendency can
partially be explained by the lack of any binding structure allowing
collusion. As argued in Chapter 4, any point in the policy space is
unstable for the agenda setters unless is settled on. Otherwise,
233
agenda setters can quickly undercut one another. The other supporting
point relates to the unknown position of other committee members in
the space. Their votes, which are crucial to passing any proposal,
remain uncertain quantities. As a result, agenda setters generally
tend to propose points fairly close to their own ideal points.
This tendency of keeping proposals in a defined area is evident
from the experimental round illustrated in Figure 6-10. This
experiment was not notable for the agenda skills of player 2 who early
on sent a proposal in the central pentagon of the pareto space.
Although 11 votes were taken, the status quo quickly moved to the
center and remained there. However, player 2 subsequently defined an
area that extended northeast of a line defined by proposals 7, 8, 10,
and 12. Meanwhile, player 3 kept his proposals narrowly clustered
around his ideal point. However, due to proposal 7 being accepted as
the status quo early on, movement of the status quo to the northeast
was very unlikely. In all, this experiment illustrates a distinct
disinclination for collusion between agenda setters. Not knowing the
position of others within the policy space, proposals focused in the
northeast quadrant. It was not until late in the round that player 2
sent proposals 21 and 25 in an attempt to better off his position,
while player 3 sent proposal 24 to attract other voters. However, by
this point time was running out and the status quo was well
entrenched. In the meantime, there was little bargaining among the
agenda setters.
In all, agenda setting powers appear to benefit those with power
? as expected. However, neither did that power result in agenda
setter's achieving their ideal points. 13 Although the prediction made
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in Chapter 4 was not borne out by this data, still special agenda
powers do appear to have some impact on outcomes. This is especially
so when comparing these committee outcomes with those of baseline
committees.
A General Retrospection
Rarely are predictions from formal models put to empirical test.
The experiment outlined in Chapter 5, and outcomes reported in this
chapter represent an effort at tackling that task. The thrust of the
experimental series was to control a large set of variables and
examine the effects of carefully controlled variations in structure.
In each instance, committees with institutional configurations
deviating from a baseline committee had outcomes that varied from
those obtained by baseline committees. Further, these variations were
in directions predicted by models established in Chapter 4. Although
predicted solutions did not always materialize, the variability of
outcomes in different committee structures was predictable.
In sum, the analysis in this chapter points to the role played by
institutional structure in changing patterns of outcomes. Presumably
the variations noted in outcomes can be attributed to these changes in
institutional structure, since all other elements of the experiment
were subject to strong controls over exogenous variables. Extraneous
effects due to individual characteristics do not explain a great deal,
nor do between group differences within particular committee
structures. Yet, the poor performance of many of the predicted
outcomes do need further investigation. A number of plausible
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explanations might be offered. Most concern task complexity and
motives of participants. Although the experiment was designed to
simplify task complexity, still it involved participants employing
skills in abstracting new information and putting it to use. The
experiences in the experiment were new to most of the participants.
Although some learning could be expected during the experiment, it may
have involved a process exceeding the five rounds that most committee
members participated in. Likewise, unfamiliarity with a new
environment could have resulted in relatively poor task completion.
Unfamiliarity with the equipment caused two participants to ''freeze''
at the start of the experiment. However, once they were comfortable
with the equipment following the practice round, those individuals
performed well. However, others could have suffered the same problems
without seeking or receiving guidance. Also, given the large policy
space confronting participants, it was little wonder that proposals
were viewed in terms of large increments rather than as somewhat
smaller units that would have enabled movements toward solutions.
Finally, constrained verbal communications bothered a few
participants. Understanding that sending a proposal was tantamount to
communicating was difficult for these individuals to understand. This
problem could possibly have been more widespread, contributing to
confusion.
On another front, individuals might not have been acting as
maximizers. Although the incentive structure was carefully designed
so that participants would pursue real-valued gain, on occasion
individuals voted against their best interests. Two types of answers
were given when these individuals were questioned following the
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experiment. On the one hand, a few participants appeared extremely
shrewd, demonstrating an innate sense of strategic voting in order to
cycle a status quo proposal. On the other hand, others remarked that
they wanted to effect a decision ?- the ' 'Henry Clay' ' syndrome ? in
which compromise was thought to be an integral part of their role.
Finally, it is possible that some participants set expectation levels
for what they would earn. In this respect, they acted as satisficers
rather than as maximizers. This is an interesting possibility
deserving further investigation, but outside the scope of this study.
One general suggestion for future work is that ''experienced''
participants be used in similar experiments. This approach has been
used extensively in economics for a number of years without resulting
in serious threats to internal validity. With a few early pretests,
participants were called back, and they appeared to do better.
However, this means developing and maintaining a stable participant
pool, which can be difficult in a university setting.
It may be the case that the models developed in Chapter 4 fail to
capture much of what is occurring in these abstracted committee
experiments. Other models (such as the Ferejohn, Fiorina, and
Packel's, 1980, Markov models) may explain some of the underlying
nuances at work. However, by and large, this experimental series does
provide important evidence for the effects of structure on outcomes.
It remains for the next Chapter to tie together these observations
with the discussions in the earlier chapters.
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= jth individual's ideal point.
All solutions are calculated on this basis.
6Two experimental rounds are missing from this total. Both
involved instances where the committee structure had limited position
rules. The first concerns an error in the setting experimental
parameters, resulting in participants having ideal points different
than those used in other experiments. The second instance involved a
lightning storm that forced wrecked havoc with the computer system.
Consequently, all data for that round were lost.
7In fact, there were technical difficulties with this round. The
winning vote on the outcome did not automatically end the game.
Before being called to a halt, the outcome again was brought to a
vote, and this time the proper coalition voted for it.
8Fiorina and Plott (1978) note that differences in stakes make a
significant difference in outcomes. During pretests this variable was
manipulated at length, but with no obvious changes in strategies on
the part of participants.
9This is calculated from the standard binomial probability
distribution:
The three instances where time ran out before a decision was reached
are excluded from analysis.
10Both coalitions falling outside the Competitive set and outcomes
that exceed the time limit are omitted from this calculation.
11Experiments were arbitrarily assigned to one of the two samples.
Because some committee members participated in three baseline
committees while others participated in only one, randomizing
procedures were not used. Taking two baseline committees with the
same membership, and placing one in each sample would negate the
effect of this test. It is assumed, of course, that members of a
committee are fairly consistent in their behavior, and, therefore,
their behavior in one round is similar to behavior in another round,
when confronting the same decision situation. The samples were chosen
with an eye to keeping membership unique to each sample. With this in
mind, sample 1 was composed of committees in experiments 10, 11, 12,
13, 15, 16, 17, and sample 2 from experiments 5, 9, 18, 20, and 21.
Subsequent group tests follow a similar procedure.
12Strategic voting was not an important consideration in most
experimental rounds, since participants generally voted to maximize
their payoffs. However, a few participants did vote for less money
(on occasion substantially less) in order to cycle the status quo back
to a point where they were better off. With this group, player 5 was
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observed to do precisely this a number of times. There is no evidence
this player was confused by the experiment, but on the contrary,
appeared rather adept.
13In one case a player did have her ideal point selected, and in
another the outcome was quite close. However, in both instances these
events occurred because of very quick decisions by others in the
committee. They were not due to sly manipulations of the agenda by
either participant.
CHAPTER SEVEN
BEYOND THE POLICY SPACE:
REASSESSMENTS AND DEMOCRACY
"And hast thou slain the
Jabberwock?"
- Jabberwocky
Analyzing experimental results obtained from a student population
based on models of institutional constraints may not shake the
foundation of political science. And yet. the narrow questions asked
in this study have broad implications for questions raised by
political philosophers and commentators. This study cannot pretend to
answer questions relating to the survival of a democratic polity, the
role of consensus, or the importance of information for decision
making, or the effects of inequalities on a polity. However, it can
provide a heuristic discussion of these questions. Further, some
observations are offered on the linkage between formal work in
political science and results obtained by this study.
Caution in Interpretation
While it is tempting to generalize from the empirical results of
this study to the world, such an enterprise would quickly collapse.
The results reported in this study are obtained under highly
antiseptic conditions. First, these experiments are abstractions of
particular mechanisms. Here, the object of study concerns committee
structures. Specific aspects of structure are deliberately changed so
as to provide variation across committees. All other aspects of
structure and other extraneous variables are either controlled or held
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constant. Rarely are such opportunities to compare treatments
available in the real world. Further, these stripped-down versions of
committees are unlikely to be found in the real world. Much of the
institutional richness of committees is missing as well as historical
patterns of interaction among participants. The committees here are
more akin to clubs in which members make private decisions that have
some value to them. In all, the structure of these committees is at
variance with their counterparts in the real world. Consequently,
generalizing to real-world committees is difficult.
Second, the models developed in Chapter 4 assume strict
rationality criteria. Actors are assumed to be self-interested
maximizers. Typically, this condition is regarded as too stringent
for the real world, and such appears to be the case for some of the
experiments in this study. On occasion, individuals acted in ways
peculiar to a rational model ? even when accounting for strategic
voting. This was particularly pronounced in an early pretest where
one participant twice voted against her ideal point (worth $8.00) and
agreed to a proposal worth $0.06. While odd cases can often be
attributed to confusion, they do tend to undermine a strong
rationality postulate.
Finally, the pool of participants is rather unique. It is
doubtful that college students are representative of the world at
large. In this series of experiments, most appeared unfamiliar with
many parliamentary conventions. Whether politicians or businessmen
accustomed to participating in collective decisions would behave
differently is an interesting empirical question. Yet, differences in
types of behavior is not a damning criticism of this study. Again,
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the concern is with the way that participants act when confronted with
different institutional arrangements. As such, college students
provide a relatively homogeneous population with which to test the
principal claims of the study. Problems arise when attempting to
generalize findings to the population at large based on results
obtained from a narrow group of participants.
In short, this experimental series lacks qualities of
representative populations and isomorphism with real-world processes.
As such, the results from these experiments ar.e not representative in
any real sense, and consequently, they do not translate to real-world
processes. However, these results are meant to be illustrative of a
set of particular models. Different committee structures are designed
to explicitly test changes across institutional configurations. As
such, the research is motivated by a specialized set of variables and
aims at providing insights into the ways institutional structure
affects outcomes. This heuristic intent of the research sets it apart
from other types of research seeking to make generalizations about the
world. Yet, this does not devalue its usefulness. Instead, the
relationships of interest are derived from metatheoretical questions
concerning the role of structure for the outcomes individuals select.
Analyzing and testing such questions is best accomplished through the
careful development and exposition of models and by imposing controls
on relationships that might yield competing (and jumbled)
explanations.
The empirical results discussed in Chapter 6 indicate
institutional constraints do have meaning for effects on outcomes.
The results also suggest that further research is necessary on
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collective decision-making arrangements with a richer institutional
context. If such research is conducted in the real world, with real
institutions and proper controls, then generalization might be
possible. In any case, the research discussed here serves as a
guidepost for making predictions and indicates directions that
researchers might take when conducting similar research.
Generalizations to real-world phenomenon, then, are possible only
when meeting strict external validity criteria. However, making the
transition from highly abstract models to the real world is difficult
due to problems in controlling for variation among exogenous
variables, uncovering comparable decision situations, and developing
compatible measures. The value of experimental research lies in the
control of large sets of variables, the construction and manipulation
of particular contexts, and the fashioning of comparable measures.
The price of experimental research is the lack of generalizability.
However, the insights gained from this particular form of research may
outweigh this cost.
Democratic Theory and 5 Person Committees
Democratic theory serves a motivating role for this project. At
the outset it was asserted that "Rule By the People" is not a
precisely defined concept. On the one hand, in its least constrained
form, formal democratic theory establishes that the decision mechanism
may fail its most basic task ? arriving at a decision. On the other
hand, highly constrained models of "Rule By the People: ? such as
that offered by Schumpeter ? contend that decisions will be made,
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although debate and formation of those decisions must be limited to a
few elected officials. Democratic theory, then, embodies a number of
concepts that describe institutions that variously constrain
individual involvement in decision making.
These incentives or constraints are a function of the
institutional rules imposed on a decision-making arrangement.
Further, these incentives or constraints have important consequences
for the outcomes of decision-making arrangements. For instance, as
the admissible set of participants is limited to a specific set of
individuals (e.g., to those living in a geographical area such as a
. watershed), decisions across issues are likely to be different than if
the set of participants is differently defined. Clearly, decision-
making arrangements concerned with a restricted set of issues and
containing members with relatively homogeneous preferences will arrive
at different decisions than will arrangements concerned with a variety
of issues and characterized by a membership with heterogeneous
preferences. Likewise, if the number of individuals included in a
decision-making arrangement is small, then relatively open operational
rules as to participation and discussion may be possible. As the set
of participants grows larger, these operational rules are likely to
change since the size of the decision-making body may result in
prohibitive decision-making costs associated with open debate.
Democratic theory can be conceptualized across a number of
normative dimensions. Whether the normative focus be on increased
participation, greater citizen education, or salutary collective
decisions, those ends are only achieved through institutions. The way
decision-making arrangements are ordered lies at the heart of
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democratic governance. In a way, this returns to Aristotle's
observations as to the importance of the form of government, since
form signifies either vigor or infirmity for the polity. It also
returns to arguments offered during the American constitutional period
that the proper design of government can retard the ills of politics
derived from competing factions or the threat of majority tyranny.
The complex arguments in The Federalist Papers attest to the
importance of structure in achieving particular ends.
In sum, these observations stress the importance of means for
achieving ends. The general implication for democratic societies is
that particular attention needs to be focused on the institutions of
those societies. If the underlying institutional configuration
provides incentives or constrains decision making in particular ways,
then these influences should be accounted for. This is especially so
if these effects on behavior have important normative implications.
That is, if a participatory democratic society is desired, and yet the
institutional configuration constrains participation and yields
outcomes beneficial primarily to a subset of participants, then the
normative ends desired will not be attained. Instead, because of the
particular configuration of rules and subsequent outcomes,
participation is likely to decrease, and an elite is likely to develop
as outcomes benefiting a subset of individuals compound over time. By
focusing on the underlying organizational structure of a
decision-making arrangement, many incentives and constraints on
decision making can be uncovered. Piecing together these varied
institutional rules and conceptualizing their effects on outcomes is
an important enterprise ? especially when offering prescriptive norms
for a society.
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Consensus and Debate ? Extraordinary Majority Rules
Political scientists and commentators long have been fascinated
with the effects of voting rules on outcomes. Among the earliest
commentaries on the role of voting rules are the observations by the
Marquis de Condorcet and discussions in America's Constitutional
Convention concerning the protection of minority rights from
fundamental constitutional changes.1 Modern political scientists have
subsequently formalized many of the speculations of earlier thinkers.
Concepts pertaining to the opportunity costs involved in reaching
decisions and the costs of having decisions imposed on individuals are
important in modern democratic theory. Buchanan and Tullock (1962),
for example, conclude that as the proportion of votes necessary to
reach a decision increase, decision-making costs also rise. But, the
deprivations that can be imposed on the individuals fall. The net
effect is that individuals have a difficult time reaching agreement
when making decisions using an extraordinary majority rule, although
the decisions that are reached involve benefits for a larger
proportion of those involved.
Requiring participants in an experimental committee to make
decisions under an extraordinary majority voting rule enables an
examination of Buchanan and Tullock's predictions. Compared with
committees that employed a simple majority rule, extraordinary
majority rule committees settled on outcomes from a smaller subset of
the policy space, and this was closer to the preferred position of a
larger group of participants. This subspace corresponds to the
solution space predicted in Chapter 4. Further, these committees
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generally voted more often on proposals and typically ran out of the
time allotted to reach such a decision. Such experimental evidence
attests to the increased costs placed on participants by such a rule.
Two interesting points emerge from this particular institutional
configuration. The first relates to consensual decision making while
the second pertains to veto power. Committees employing an
extraordinary majority voting rule had great difficulty moving the
status quo. While many proposals tended to be voted on, most failed
to amend the status quo. However, once it became apparent that
amending the status quo was difficult, participants quickly lowered
their expectations and searched for an outcome agreeable to all. This
was especially the case once an amendent to the status quo received
support from a 3-person coalition. Following the unsuccessful vote,
one member typically would bring up for a vote or propose an amendment
moving toward the perceived position of one of those members voting
against the previous alternative to the status quo. In most cases
this meant that at least one member of the old 3-person coalition
ended up losing. Consequently, a new vote might find a different
3-person coalition forming. This in turn launched a new search with
the process generally driving the status quo toward the center of the
policy space.
In many instances boredom set in after it appeared the status quo
could not be changed. The mutterings occasionally voiced by
participants indicated that money no longer was an object, but that
reaching agreement was what mattered. As many alternate proposals
were voted on, individuals found themselves giving up more and more as
time pressed on. Even though those finally agreeing to an outcome did
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not appear entirely satisfied, there were clear expressions of relief
at reaching agreement. Rather than pressing for an outcome that was
individually preferred, participants operating under an extraordinary
majority voting rule seemed to turn their attention to locating a
consensual decision.
In a related sense, an extraordinary majority voting rule
exhibits the potential veto power available to minority coalitions.
In this particular instance, only two members needed to object to an
amendment to the status quo. More than anything, this veto power
contributed to keeping the status quo from changing too often.
Finding an agenda path by which at least four participants were better
off was extremely difficult ? especially when the status quo moved
into the general pareto set. As a result, movements took a
considerable amount of time and involved voting across a large number
of proposals. Players recognized this pattern. Once a status quo was
accepted near them, most players stopped sending proposals. They
waited for time to expire.
Veto power consequently emerged in two ways. First, it involved
at least two players voting against alternate proposals. Second, once
a relatively satisfactory status quo was reached, the player closest
to it stopped sending further proposals. On occasion, players adopted
a third strategy ? a filibuster tactic ? by calling for votes on
amendments that obviously could not defeat the current status quo,
then voting against the amendment. This was done to try to use up
time and ensure the adoption of a favorable status quo. Usually,
however, such a strategy did not succeed, since an agenda could be
constructed leading into the expected solution space. Once the status
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quo moved into that region, then further movement was impossible
(unless at least one member of the winning coalition was willing to
give up money for such a movement ? which seldom happened). Veto
power, then, became important for small subsets of participants to
prevent too great a movement of the status quo away from their
preferred positions.
The constraints imposed by extraordinary majority voting rules
exerted the clearest effects on participants during the experimental
series. This constraint suggests at least two implications for
democratic theory. First, it supports the view that such a rule
enables minority self-protection through implicit veto power. While
it may be the case that minorities could consistently be harmed by
this rule, as well as most other voting rules, filibustering and veto
powers are more effective under greater rather than simple majority
rules. Second, if the issue has considerable importance, then such a
rule is essential for extending debate. Extended discussion is
practically assured through increasing decision-making costs.
Extraordinary majority voting rules typically do not yield expeditious
decisions.
Communication Rules and Institutional Adjustments
The level of information that participants have with which to
make decisions has long dominated formal and game-theoretic models.
Typically, early models of decision situations assumed that all
participants have full information. Recent models have relaxed this
assumption in a variety of ways. However, concern with the level of
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information is contingent on the institutional mechanisms that
transmit or relay information. Information is not freely available to
individuals, but rather there are costs to gaining information, or it
is constrained in some other manner. Recent technological innovations
? such as the high speed computer and nationwide information networks
? may provide seemingly limitless, cost-efficient information.
However, use of such information systems requires substantial start-up
costs. Even with such a system, its use may be limited to particular
types of decisions. Also, there is a real danger that the amount of
information (even if it is transformed) will exceed the capacity of
the individual processing it. Still, for most collective decisions,
the institutional structure relaying information will have an effect
on the decisions individuals make.
Alternate communication structures can be discovered in different
conceptions of democratic theory. Participatory theorists idealize a
communication structure based on face-to-face communication. Although
such a structure is cumbersome, the theoretical expectation is that
participants will exchange all relevant information. Through the
process of information exchange and debate, a set of viable
alternatives will emerge, with subsequent discussion focusing on
those. The key here is an institutional mechanism by which
information can be exchanged. At the other extreme are the elite
democratic theorists who desire a relatively constrained communication
structure. This involves elected representatives making decisions
with tenuous lines of communications between representatives and
represented. Debate and discussion by the populace is highly
constrained, although the rationale is that the best ideas, like the
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best leaders, will emerge with this forestalling a good deal of
"noisy" information brought by the masses. These differences in
communication structures mean different things for the organization,
discussion, and debate of issues.
The results from the experimental series comparing committees
with highly constrained communication structures and those with much
less constrained structures are mixed. While limited communication
did seem to have an effect on the ways participants acted, the effects
on outcomes are less clear. However, two interrelated points do
emerge. The first is that information is necessary for decision
making, and the second is that individuals are very good at using
existing institutional rules to obtain information.
In committees with limited communication rules, participants were
able to send three proposals. Once these proposals were used up,
participants could only call other proposals to a vote, and then vote.
The three-proposal rule was steadfast, and it was thought such a rule
would constrain the amount of information individuals had to work
with. This was the case in terms of limiting the actual number of
proposals that were made. However, such a rule did not end the search
for information. Instead, participants were exceptionally clever in
using the voting process to provide information about the policy
space. These committees called up the bulk of the alternatives and
voted to see which had support of particular coalitions. In this
sense they used an existing set of institutional rules to uncover
additional information about the preferences of others. In those
committees there is evidence that cyclical voting is common.
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Stepping back from these results, some interesting implications
emerge from these experiments. A striking point concerns the
adaptability of individuals when confronting a strange environment.
By and large, individuals quickly use elements of a given structure to
supplement their decision making. Even though such an institution was
designed to constrain information, participants uncovered other means
for making decisions. This is in contrast to the expectation that
participants would succumb to the lack of information, resigning
themselves to accepting practically any proposal.
Adaptability implies a further point ?- the steadfastness of
institutions. Most institutional arrangements are thought of as
unchanging entities umpiring conflicts among participants. However,
since institutions are malleable, and if individuals are viewed as
adaptable, then institutions should be viewed as evolving structures.
Institutional arrangements tend to change as individuals learn new
patterns of behavior and restructure the meanings of old rules.
Although in many instances this process of institutional change is
slow, still it undermines the notion of building everlasting,
"perfect" institutions. Adaptation of institutions to meet human
needs are as important as the adaptability of individuals when
confronting strange situations.
Finally, these results generally point to the difficulty in
designing institutions with special characteristics. The intent of
this series of experiments was the construction of an institution with
a communication rule that severly limited information. Instead, what
was achieved was a committee structure with only partially limited
information. Here, a gap emerged between intended and resulting
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design. Like all human enterprises, attempts at design must be
regarded as incomplete. However, political scientists have at their
disposal tools to understand the connections between particular
institutional designs and failures of elements of those structures.
Again, it is essential to account for the constraints and incentives
produced by structural elements on individual behavior when designing
institutions. It seems doubly important to anticipate the
adaptability of individuals and their strategies when constructing
institutions. It is fundamental to keep in mind that institutions are
not machines stamping out invariant decisions. Further, individuals
are not automatons unreflective about their actions. But, individuals
acting as autonomous artifacers does not decry the logic of a positive
theory of politics. Individuals remain constrained by the
institutions within which they act.
Positional Advantage ? Agenda Control Rules
A primary tenet of democratic theory is that power ultimately
resides in the people. Specialized powers have always been an
anathema to popular rule. These powers can be viewed as granting a
subset of individuals the right to do something others cannot. In
politics this generally focuses on rights to make decisions or to
otherwise uniquely contribute to decision making. The general concern
with specialized powers relates to advantages that accrue to those
with power and the divisions this forms between those with and without
power. First, specialized powers are seen as providing unearned
advantages to a distinct set of individuals. With the decline of
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"divine right" arguments through the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, ruling power gradually devolved to the populace. One
variation of specialized political power relates to the institution of
representation. However, it has generally been defended either on the
basis of savings in political decision-making costs, or that
representatives owe their positions solely to an electorate.
Specialized powers are feared for their anticipated effects.
Tocqueville remarked that Americans are noted for jealously defending
their equality. A principle vehicle for widening inequalities
involves positional differences derived from an institution. Further,
advantages are viewed as compounding themselves, giving rise to larger
rifts. It was precisely this problem that disturbed both state and
national constitutional founders following independence. Although the
need for representatives was clear, there was widespread fear that
this would lead to a permanent ruling class. Slowly, representatives
would use their positions to fabricate differences between themselves
and the ruled. The end result would be a ruling class as pervasive as
that previously imposed by Britain. To forestall this, proposals as
varied as imposing elections every year, single terms, and delegate
instructions, were implemented in some states. The fear, then, of
power in the hands of others is deeply ingrained in liberal democratic
thought -? and especially in American political practice.
A set of experiments were conducted using a committee with only
two participants empowered to create an agenda. This is a highly
specialized power, and has attracted considerable attention in formal
theory. As mentioned, the implications of such powers are enormous
for democratic theory. Although the predicted results were not
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empirically observed, still it appears that agenda powers are
important for differentiating outcomes between committees with and
without such powers.
Outcomes concentrated in the upper quadrants of the policy space
where the agenda setters' ideal points were located. Most outcomes
were contained within a fairly small radial distance from the agenda
setters' ideal points. In all, it seems that agenda setters were most
advantaged by these special positions. An interesting pattern to note
concerns inequalities in gain from differences in position. This is
obviously expected since the tendency for agenda setting is to drive
outcomes closer to the agenda setters' ideal points. Yet such a
result, if carried out over a period of time, would quickly undermine
the relative equality initially possessed by those with and without
agenda control powers. The effects of this divergence in monetary
resources could only contribute to the power of agenda setters rather
than detract. A simple-minded explanation with respect to the
experiment is that as agenda setters amass more money, they have less
incentive to give up more in subsequent decisions. That is, they can
stick with points close to their ideal points, hoping to convince
others of their determination, while able to absorb short-term losses.
In effect, they can propose a set of points that leave little to those
without agenda power.
Another interesting pattern was observed during these
experiments. Those without agenda powers very quickly lost interest
in participating. Having little control over the outcomes (at least
in constructing an agenda), these participants seemingly voted for
anything, simply to end the round. This in part may explain the
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significantly lower times these committees took to obtain agreement on
an outcome. This has interesting parallels with political apathy. If
participants without agenda powers lose interest because they
contribute little to constructing an agenda (and as a consequence,
contribute little to decision making), then their apathy stems from
their perceived powerlessness. If similar events occur in the real
world (and there is some evidence they do), then the structure of
control in decision-making arrangements is important. A closed
structure could undermine popular involvement. This is part of the
claim that Pateman (1970) and other participatory theorists make.
In sum, it seems that special agenda control powers undermine
fundamental democratic values. Again, this points to the substantial
effects that changes in institutional rules can have on how
individuals behave.
The importance of normative democratic theory resides in the
ideals upheld and prescriptions made by such a theory. The dividing
line between democratic theory and democratic practice hinges on the
institutions constituting a polity. The bulk of this study aims at
developing a means of comprehending the effects of prescriptive reform
on behavior and outcomes. Since institutions that regulate human
behavior are subject to conscious (and unconscious) design, then
prescriptions for change must be carefully examined to determine if
they yield anticipated results. Reform of institutions is a central
concern for most normative theorists ? whether it involves piecemeal
reforms or major transformations of society. Prescriptions for reform
of democratic institutions are especially important given the complex
configurations of various institutions that regulate varying degrees
of participation, minority rights, and liberty.
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Two principal empirical results are apparent. The first
indicates institutional rules do variously affect outcomes. Although
the experiments are conducted in a relatively abstract environment,
simple changes of institutional constraints across aggregation,
communication, and position rules result in detectable differences in
individual strategic behavior. Second, variations in outcomes have
predictable patterns. Although the results do not correspond exactly
with the predicted solution sets, still, those results incline in
directions predicted by the models outlined in Chapter 4. If nothing
else, these results illustrate the importance of pinpointing essential
institutional features to uncover likely sets of outcomes. This has
an important implication for normative democratic theory. Reforms or
transformations of the machinery of democracy must account for the
constraints or incentives that will be imposed on the polity. Through
careful analysis it is possible to predict likely sets of outcomes.
Once these outcomes are known, the task is to determine whether they
are congruent with the normative ends being sought.
Implications for Game Theory and Formal Theory
The results of this series of experiments are more relevant to
the burgeoning formal literature in political science. This is so
since the study explicitly borrows predictions from other models, or
suggests predictions that can be derived from other models. Further,
the experiments sought to approximate those committee structures that
have been used extensively to study collective behavior.
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Variations in outcomes over practically identical committees
indicate differences among sets of outcomes can partially be explained
by structural variations between committees. Similarly, these
variations are congruent, by and large, with the models developed in
Chapter 4. A major implication of these results returns to the
discussion of game theory in Chapter 2. The assertion was that the
search for single game-theoretic solutions is misdirected. Uncovering
a single general solution concept is a quixotic enterprise at best.
Game-theoretic models, after all, are based on assessing available
strategies, ruling out sets of unlikely outcomes, and focusing on sets
of outcomes displaying some stability properties. Results from this
study indicate that institutional configurations have an important
impact on individual's calculations, and as such, should be accounted
for in any model predicting or prescribing particular sets of
solutions.
While there are infinitely many institutional configurations,
this does not mean that developing predictive models is a hopeless
task. As a social science concerned with general tendencies,
political science has at its disposal the tools with which to dissect
a decision situation. Obviously, a fundamental concern for political
scientists is with institutional variables that regulate collective
action. This study has examined only a few. very select institutional
mechanisms ? aggregation rules, communication rules, and agenda
powers ? and examined only two variants of each rule. It is not
obvious these are the most important set of variables, nor is it
obvious that these variables are conceptualized along their most
important dimensions. Nonetheless, the point remains that aspects of
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institutions affect the outcomes that might be predicted from
collective action. Game-theoretic models, then, must account for the
possibility that solution concepts will vary as the environment in
which individuals make decisions changes.
In a broader sense, these results illustrate the usefulness of
formal models ? particularly as they contribute to disentangling
complicated relationships. Institutions are complex arrays of rules,
with the interrelations among rules being equally complex. Only by
clearly specifying the component elements of an institution is careful
and elaborate analysis possible. Specifying a set of committee rules
made it possible to trace differences in rule changes across
committees to the strategic calculations of individuals, and finally
to different sets of outcomes. Such an approach appears quite
valuable in undertaking institutional analysis as well as with
examining general patterns of collective action.
Finally, the experimental method is extraordinarily useful for
examining the consequences of institutional variations. First,
controls over exogenous variables and the ability to manipulate
variations are such that they cannot be matched in the real world. In
some respects this is fortunate, since a restricted agenda control
rule would be distasteful when imposed on individuals without their
consent. Second, the number of experiments that can be conducted is
limited only by the researcher's time and budget. Further, this
budget need not be large (in this series the average payoff ranged
around $42.00 per 5-round experiment). This provides excellent
opportunities to construct reasonable statistical tests.
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A note should be added concerning experimental work. First, it
is essential that task complexity does not exceed the capacities of
participants. I suspect that with some participants, the experience
with the experiment was too much to digest over the period of 2 hours.
This could account for much of the variation in outcomes from a
particular predicted solution for a committee structure. However,
this would not account for the observed variations between committee
structures. A means for circumventing task complexity is the
development of a pool of participants familiar with the arrangement of
the experiment. Other than the problem of task complexity, a
computer-controlled experiment provides an excellent tool for
research. Aside from benefits derived from control over the
environment, it provides an excellent means for replication and
provides a simple means for making comparisons across a host of
parameters. Further, with the processing faculties of a computer,
future research designs can add real costs to decision making.
Whether this includes a decreasing valuation of proposals associated
with the passage of time, or real costs to making a proposal, many
variations with interesting implications are possible. Finally, this
mode of research provides an excellent crossroad for the "dangerous
intersection" of theory and research. Moreover, as this study has
repeatedly argued, it is especially appropriate for examining claims
made in the formal literature.
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A number of questions, approaches, and methods have been employed
in this study. Still, the normative questions are tied closely with
the formal models, and the experimental structure falls directly out
of those models. Although generalizations to the world at large are
impossible, inferences from the models and the experimental empirical
results do provide important insights into democratic theory.
Democracy remains a pervasive theme in American politics.
However, aside from prescribing a few structural reforms to achieve a
particular set of ends, political theorists and commentators are
notably lax in explicitly linking the effects of those structural
reforms to the strategic calculations of individuals and consequently
expected outcomes from a collective decision-making institution. This
concern with institutional structure and its effects on individual
behavior is the special province of political science. Any
suggestions for structural reform of collective institutions must be
based on normative prescriptions. Whether these notions be built on
efficiency or increased participation, change is likely to have some
effect on behavior and outcomes. Therefore, careful analysis of
changes across an institution is crucial before recommending or
implementing such change. The configuration of structural rules
composing an institutional arrangement interact in peculiar ways.
This often results in unanticipated effects on outcomes. Reform is a
treacherous process, but doubly so when little thought is given to the
normative reasons for reform or the effect of structural change on
outcomes.
263
Realizing that normative goals -- especially democratic goals --
are obtained by imposing or removing particular institutional
constraints on individual behavior, is a first step toward achieving
those desired ends. Analysis of the interplay between institutional
configurations and individual behavior is a second step. Clearly,
this discussion has ignored other equally important components of a
democratic social order. Obviously, history and political culture
cast a heavy hand as to what structural reforms are likely to achieve.
But, this does not mean that structural changes are insignificant.
Reforms at the turn of the twentieth century brought an end to
ward-based political machines in cities. Yet, these reforms carried
with them the seeds for new problems with respect to representation of
minorities and responsiveness.
Democratic goals and institutional mechanisms are tightly
interrelated. Dissecting these relations is paramount for introducing
reforms or changes designed to achieve particular ends. While
suggestions for institutional tinkering should not be based on
experimental evidence, such evidence does provide valuable insights as
to reasonable expectations from institutional changes. Experimental
study, then, has some potential contributions for the understanding of
political phenomenon.
264
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER SEVEN
1For good reviews of the extensive literature, see Black (1958)
or Riker (1960; 1982).
12/8/82
VITA
Rick K. Wilson
Department of Political Science
Washington University
Campus Box 1063
St. Louis, Missouri 63130
Office: (314) 889-5810 Home: (314) 781-5852
Born: September 19, 1953, New Underwood, South Dakota
Marital Status: Married, no children
Education: University of South Dakota, Vermillion, South Dakota,
(1971-1972)
B.A., Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska, (May 1975)
M.A., Creighton University, Department of History (August
(1977)
Ph.D., Indiana University, Department of Political Science
(Degree December 1982)
Areas of Specialization:
Policy Analysis:
(Urban Service Delivery; Research Methods and Quantitative
Analysis)
American Politics:
(Urban Politics; Political Behavior ? participation and
representation)
Political Theory:
(Game Theory; Formal and Empirical Democratic Theory;
Normative Democratic Theory)
Teaching Experience:
Visiting Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Washington
University, St. Louis. 1982-1983.
Associate Instructor, Department of Political Science, Indiana
University, Taught Y103, Introduction to American Politics,
Summer 1980; Taught Y315, Psychology of Politics, Summer 1979.
Associate Instructor, Department of Economics, Indiana
University, Team Taught E306, Research Seminar in Political
Economy, 1979-1980.
279
Associate Instructor, Department of Political Science, Indiana
University, Discussion Section Leader, Y103, Introduction to
American Politics, 1977-1978.
Teaching Associate, Department of History, Creighton University,
Discussion Leader, H131, H132, History of the Americas,
1975-1977.
Awards:
Post-Doctoral Research Award, Washington University, St. Louis.
Visiting Research Associate in the Center for the Study of
American Business. September 1982-May 1983.
National Science Foundation Grant (SES 81-04772) ? Doctoral
Dissertation Research in Political Science. Research award for
work on "Institutional Effects on Committee Behavior: A Game
Theory Experiment," August 1, 1981-January 31, 1983.
National Research Service Award (1T32MH15222); Research Training
in Institutional Analysis and Design, Workshop in Political
Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, January 1979-May
1982.
Research Experience:
Principle Investigator, "Institutional Effects on Committee
Behavior: A Game Theory Experiment." August 1, 1981- January
31, 1983. National Science Foundation Grant (SES 81-04372).
Research Assistant, Arthur D. Little, Inc. "The Juvenile Justice
System in Indiana." April 1982.
Research Associate, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy
Analysis, Indiana University, September 1979-June 1980.
Co-director (with Larry Kiser) of Apartment Services Study
evaluating effects of institutional structural variations on
patterns of service delivery. Supported by a grant from NIMH
(1T32MH15222).
Research Skills:
Languages: French ? Reading, Speaking.
Survey Research: Questionnaire Design and Testing; Sampling;
Interviewing and Interview Training.
Experimental Research: Experimental Design; Computer-Controlled
Research.
Data Analysis: Probability Theory; Multivariate Analysis;
Log-Linear and Categorical Data Analysis.
280
Publications and Professional Papers:
"Citizen Coproduction as a Mode of Participation: Conjectures
and Models," Journal of Urban Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 1981.
"Consumers as Coproducers of Public Services: Some Economic and
Institutional Considerations," with Roger B. Parks, et al.,
Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 9, No. 7, Summer 1981, 1,001-1,011.
"Institutional Arrangements and the Delivery of Urban Services ?
An Annotated Bibliography," Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana
University: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis,
1978.
"Institutional Effects on Committee Behavior: Or, You Can't Stop
to Smell the Roses When Playing a 5-person Game." Paper
presented at the Southern Political Science Association Meeting,
Memphis, Tennessee, November 5-7, 1981.
"Citizen Coproduction As a Mode of Participation:. Conjectures,
Models, and Cockroaches." Paper presented at the Annual
Conference of the Council of University Institutes of Urban
Affairs, Omaha, Nebraska, March 25-28, 1981.
Panel Discussant, "Political Participation in the Verba and Nie
Modes," Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago,
Illinois, April 18-20, 1980.
"Roy Medvedev's Concept of Socialist Democracy: A Critical
Analysis." Paper presented at the Western Social Science
Association Meeting, Lake Tahoe, Nevada, April 1979.
Teaching Interests:
My teaching interests include the following courses:
Introduction to American Government.
Introduction to Public Policy Analysis.
Urban Politics.
Research Methods and Design (including quantitative
analysis).
Introduction to Formal Modeling and Game Theory.
Formal and Empirical Democratic Theory.
Research Interests:
My current research interests stem from work on my dissertation.
This includes formally modeling the way institutional structure
constrains behavior in a committee setting. Laboratory
experimental methods are used to investigate those models. This
involves human participants making committee decisions over an
interactive computer system. Future work will involve
investigating dynamic and multiple committee decisions. Also, I
anticipate beginning work on representational processes in local
jurisdictions.
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Referees
Elinor Ostrom (Chairperson) James Kuklinski
Department of Political Science Department of Political Science
Indiana University Stanford University
Bloomington, IN 47405 Stanford, CA 943 05
(812) 335-6473
Gerald Wright
Department of Political Science
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47405