Take a look on Google and you'll find more than 1,500 news items combining the words "Libya" and "stalemate". Repeating the search for Syria and "stalemate" reveals a mere 109 items, and for Yemen only 73.

This is rather strange, because the Yemeni and Syrian uprisings – unlike that in Libya – are both obvious examples of a state of stalemate. In Yemen and Syria, the regimes have no prospect of restoring the status quo, but at the same time it's difficult to see how their opponents can decisively gain the upper hand.

That has never really been the case in Libya, despite many articles predicting that stalemate would occur, and others treating it as an established fact. Once Nato intervened and the National Transitional Council (NTC) began winning international recognition, the writing was on the wall for Gaddafi.

It has turned into a drawn-out struggle and Gaddafi's forces have had successes as well as failures along the way, but the overall direction has always been clear: the regime's opponents have been getting stronger while the regime itself, under multiple pressures, has been steadily weakening. There is also no realistic possibility now that Gaddafi can reverse this trend.

Even after allowing for a degree of exaggeration, reports over the last few days show the anti-Gaddafi forces making significant military gains, which could seriously disrupt supplies to the regime's stronghold in Tripoli.

A meeting in Tunisia on Sunday evening between the warring sides has also given rise to speculation that Gaddafi's exit is under discussion again. On Monday, the regime seemed to suffer a further political blow when Gaddafi's interior minister turned up in Cairo with nine members of his family – ostensibly on a tourist visit, though defection seems more likely, as the Libyan embassy in Egypt was unaware of his arrival.

These may be signs that Gaddafi's fall is imminent, but there are still too many unknown factors for anyone to be sure. We don't, for example, know how much cohesion there still is within Gaddafi's inner circle. As they feel the squeeze, however, internal rifts are far more likely – and the interior minister's "holiday" may be an example of that.

Similarly, once Gaddafi's remaining supporters sense that his departure is inevitable, those who have depended on his patronage or supported him through fear of the alternatives will have to reconsider their options – and when that starts happening, the collapse could come quite suddenly.

Though the eventual outcome is not in doubt, frustration at the length of time it is taking has led to talk of a Libyan "quagmire" – as if, after 41 years of Gaddafi's rule, a few extra months are going to make some crucial difference.

Obviously, the conflict should not be prolonged unnecessarily, but there are also dangers in too much haste. In the early stages, the anti-Gaddafi forces tried to do too much too soon – and suffered the consequences. Since then, they have had more time to get their act together and give serious thought to the political transition. A document leaked to the Times last week shows that the NTC is much better prepared now than it was just a few months ago.

If it came to a choice between fighting for Tripoli and letting Gaddafi stew there for a while until there is an orderly handover, the latter would certainly be preferable.

A quick exit for Gaddafi is less important than a well-managed transition – one that minimises the risk of bloodletting and score-settling when Tripoli falls, and sets the country on a course for truly representative government.