One might better conclude that Hamas set back this timetable by showing its Egyptian sponsor that it was not a good team player.

Naturally the question of who won any given war preoccupies people’s minds. And
I’m amused by those who think that Hamas won the recent conflict.

Winning
has to mean something real, not just bragging to reassure oneself.

Let’s
begin by examining the causes and goals of each side.

Hamas’s goal was to
be able to attack Israel as much as it wanted without significant retaliation.
This time, as in late 2008, the war began because Hamas escalated the level of
its attacks on Israel to unacceptable levels (more on that phrase in a moment).
The same might be said of Hezbollah in 2006.

Israel’s goal was to force
Hamas to the lowest possible level of attacks and to make such attacks as
ineffective as possible. Incidentally, that was also Israel’s strategy in
dealing with the PLO. Attempts to “solve” the problem once and for all, varying
from the 1982 invasion of Lebanon to the Oslo process, didn’t work too
well.

Nevertheless, Israel was able to achieve its more limited aims
against Hamas in the 2008-2009 campaign for four years. With Hezbollah, the goal
has now held for six years. That’s not bad given the reality of contemporary
international politics and the Middle Eastern situation, both of which keep
Israel from gaining a “total victory.”

Ideally, of course, there is no
good reason that the world should ensure the survival of a terrorist,
totalitarian, illegal and genocide-oriented regime in the Gaza Strip.
Nevertheless, that is the reality. If the idea of Israel going in on the ground
into the Gaza Strip provoked so much international horror, imagine the reaction
to Israel overthrowing Hamas altogether.

For Israel to overthrow Hamas it
would either have to govern the Gaza Strip itself, restarting the whole post-
1967 process and facing daily gun battles there, or turn over the territory to
someone else. Since the Palestinian Authority isn’t interested in such an
arrangement and is incapable of even making a serious effort to overthrow Hamas,
nobody else is going to do so.

So Hamas’s survival as the rulers of the
Gaza Strip was not some victory in a war that lasted a little over a week but is
guaranteed in effect by the international and regional order. After that very
significant factor, however, it’s all downhill for Hamas.

The amount of
regional support Hamas received during the recent war was remarkably low. The
anti-Islamist Arab states wanted Hamas to lose. Iran cheered and sent missiles,
which is quite significant but only gets you so far.

The Arab street
didn’t do much; Syria’s regime is busy with the civil war; Iraq is for all
practical purposes out of the conflict. Whatever lip service it gives, the Shia
Islamist Hezbollah didn’t lift a trigger finger to help Sunni Islamist
Hamas.

It was these factors that led Fareed Zaharia, the influential
American commentator – who is no friend of Israel – who has Obama’s ear, to
write a Washington Post piece entitled “Israel dominates the new Middle
East.”

As for Egypt, while the Muslim Brotherhood regime is 100 percent
pro-Hamas, it isn’t going to be dictated to by its much smaller brother. The
Egyptian government has bigger fish to fry. It is busy consolidating its
dictatorship and reeling in almost $10 billion in foreign aid.

Hamas
didn’t consult Cairo over the escalation that led to this war. Equally bad,
Hamas has become entangled with small jihadist groups that attack both Egypt and
Israel. Naturally, the Cairo government doesn’t care if Israel is the only
target but reacts strongly to being hit itself. So before the escalation the
Egyptian government was angry at Hamas.

There will be times when Cairo
gives Hamas full backing, but this wasn’t one of them. Moreover, it seems that
the Egyptian government has committed itself to crack down more on arms imports
across the Egypt-Gaza border.

Of course, that promise might well not be
kept – if only because of the bribes paid to Egyptian military officers by the
smugglers – but retaining the status quo is hardly a victory for
Hamas.

The supposed greatest military achievement of Hamas was sending
missiles in the direction of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Yet this was accomplished
by taking out more or all of the explosives in order to extend the range. The
Iron Dome system shot down most of these, albeit at a high cost for the
equipment, and little damage was done.

By the end of the war, Hamas was
apparently out of missiles (though not shorter-range rockets). It had lost a lot
of cadre and needs to rebuild part of its infrastructure and most of its
arsenal. Israel faces no such problems.

Of course, Hamas did manage to
terrorize a million Israelis in the south and close down normal life
there.

This is an accomplishment, but also something Hamas did in
2008-2009, possibly with more effectiveness since there was no real anti-missile
defense then. Everyone knows Hamas can do this. How does that advance Hamas’s
cause of wiping Israel off the map? And Hamas is no closer to taking over the
West Bank than it’s been in the past, in no small part because of Israel’s
behind-the-scenes efforts. Also of tremendous significance is the fact that the
war did not increase Hamas’s legitimacy with the West. While one can find plenty
of objectionable Western media coverage, it was less hostile to Israel than in
2006 or 2008-2009. Part of the gain is due to the fact that the Israeli
government and military have finally learned how to use social media
effectively.

At any rate, no one in the West is rushing to have
diplomatic relations with Hamas or help it out beyond letting it continue to
exist and, of course, terrorize the people of the Gaza Strip and teach children
to grow up to be terrorists.

It is a disgusting situation, but not one
amenable to change by Israeli action.

So Israel won the war. The problem
is that the word “won” has limited significance and “winning” doesn’t remove the
problem and bring long-term peace. That, however, is in the nature of the
situation, and not in the war itself.

The danger is longer-term. As the
Brotherhood consolidates control over Egypt and if a Muslim Brotherhood regime
comes to power in Syria, there might come a day when Hamas has real support from
two powerful Arab states. The situation might then resemble that which Israel
faced from Arab nationalist governments in the 1950s-1980s period.

But
again, that doesn’t reflect what has just happened.

One might better
conclude that Hamas set back this timetable by showing its Egyptian sponsor that
it was not a good team player. Perhaps the better way to put it is that Israel
won the battle but the war goes on, as indeed it has for our entire
lifetimes.

The writer is director of the Global Research in International
Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, and editor of The
Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) journal. His latest books
are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab
Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria
(Palgrave-Macmillan). GLORIA Center is at www.gloria-center.org