Suppression of dissent in
science

Published in Research in
Social Problems and Public Policy, Volume 7, edited by William R.
Freudenburg and Ted I. K. Youn (Stamford, CT: JAI Press, 1999), pp.
105-135. This version may have slight differences from the published
version.

Brian
Martin

Abstract

There are numerous documented
cases of attacks on dissident scientists, yet there is no established
body of literature or standard theoretical frameworks for dealing
with this phenomenon. Cases in three contentious areas - pesticides,
fluoridation, and nuclear power - are used to illustrate processes
and patterns of suppression. The evidence in these areas shows the
possibilities and difficulties in drawing links between suppression
and corporate, professional, and state power, respectively. Studies
of suppression can provide a convenient probe into the exercise of
power in science and more generally into the dynamics of expertise
and legitimacy in a technological society.

The deployment of scientific and
technological expertise is central to contemporary societies, and
hence it should follow that the exercise of power in society
routinely and pervasively infiltrates technical domains. In speaking
of power, it is possible to refer to several dimensions or faces
(Abell 1977; Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 1970; Lukes 1974), including
the overt exercise of power over others to get ones way, the
setting of agendas, and the shaping of peoples beliefs. In the
second and especially the third dimension of power, powerful people
and groups are able to get their way without the appearance of having
intervened in a blunt fashion: their power has been naturalized and
made to appear legitimate. Another way to conceive this is to say
that power is thus embedded in systems of knowledge and understanding
(Foucault 1973, 1977).

For any group that is able to
acquire a disproportionate share of societys wealth, power, or
status, it is advantageous for this inequality to be seen as
legitimate. One of the key bases or supports for legitimacy in
contemporary societies is scientific and technological expertise.
Because scientific knowledge is widely believed to have an authority
derived from nature, undisputed scientific knowledge claims can play
a powerful legitimating role. When technical experts unanimously
agree on a policy or practice, this provides a persuasive
justification for that state of affairs. If all experts say, for
example, that continents drift, that bridges are well designed, or
that vaccinations are beneficial, then opposition to these views, if
it exists, can be dismissed as uninformed. Unanimous expert support
helps bring rewards for certain groups. Sometimes these rewards are
primarily to expert researchers themselves, as in the case of funding
for geologists who undertake studies about or presuming the validity
of continental drift; sometimes they are also to companies, such as
bridge builders; and sometimes they are to several groups, such as
researchers, doctors, and pharmaceutical companies with a stake in
vaccination programs.

Legitimacy based on science is
precarious, however. A few dissenting experts are sometimes all it
takes to turn unanimity into controversy. The existence of
controversy, even when one side has many more numbers and prestige,
usually serves to undercut the legitimacy of the dominant position
(Mazur 1981; Scott, Richards, and Martin 1990).

When dissident experts challenge a
scientific or technological orthodoxy, this potentially becomes a
challenge to the privileges of groups associated with the orthodoxy,
since the legitimacy of those privileges may be thrown into question
along with the orthodoxy itself. In this situation, some of the
groups that are able to exercise power against challengers may, on
occasion, use their resources to do so. In other words, if a few
scientists break ranks and question received ideas or even support
the challengers, they pose a severe threat to interest groups
associated with the dominant position and, therefore, are potential
targets for attack. Many dissident scientists can be likened to
heretics, who are doctrinal critics working within the dominant
institution. Attacks on heresy can serve to articulate the belief
systems and social organization of both the institution and the
challengers (Kurtz 1983). It is to be expected that wherever
legitimacy supported by technical expertise is important - namely in
a vast range of areas - there is a reasonable chance that some cases
may be found of the exercise of power to suppress dissent from
dominant views.

What can be called suppression of
dissent in science typically has two components. Firstly, a scientist
does something - research, teaching, making public statements - that
is perceived as threatening to a powerful interest group such as a
corporation, government department, or professional group. Secondly,
agents or supporters of the powerful interest group make attempts to
stop the scientists activity or to undermine or penalize the
scientist, for example by censorship, denial of access to research
facilities, withdrawal of funds, complaints to superiors, reprimands,
punitive transfer, demotion, dismissal, and blacklisting, or threats
of any of these.

In one circumstance, suppression
of dissident scientists is well recognized: attacks on scientists
because of their political views. In the late 1940s and early 1950s,
during the period called McCarthyism, numerous left-wing scientists
came under attack in the United States and a few other countries
(Belfrage 1973; Buckley-Moran 1986; Caute 1978; Goldstein 1978). In
the Soviet Union and other state socialist countries, dissident
scientists have been repressed like any other group (Popovsky 1980).
Likewise, under authoritarian regimes scientists can become targets
of attack (Schoijet and Worthington 1993). However, in most of these
cases scientists have come under attack due to their political views
rather than their scientific views though in some cases, such as
Lysenkoism, scientific views have been defined as political by the
state.

To help clarify the concept of
suppression as presented here, it is useful to contrast it with
several related but distinct concepts: repression, discrimination,
whistleblowing, censorship, and self-censorship. When physical
violence is used against opponents - including beatings,
imprisonment, torture, and murder - this can be called repression,
restricting the term suppression to restraint or inhibition without
physical force (Martin et al. 1986, pp. 2-3).

Discrimination against people on
the basis of sex, ethnicity, or some other such criterion can be
considered suppression of a category of people. Alternatively,
suppression of dissent can be considered discrimination on the basis
of belief. Either way, there is a distinct difference: one
discriminates on the basis of who people are, the other on the basis
of what they say or do. Of course, in many practical situations these
ascribed and achieved characteristics are closely
interlinked.

Whistleblowing can be conceived of
as individual dissent that challenges a powerful interest group
(Anderson, Perrucci, Schendel, and Trachtman 1980; Bok 1980; De Maria
1995; De Maria and Jan 1996; Dempster 1997; Devine and Aplin 1986;
Elliston, Keenan, Lockhart, and van Schaick 1985a, 1985b; Ewing 1977;
Glazer and Glazer 1989; Graham 1986; Hunt 1995; Lampert 1985; Miceli
and Near 1992; Mitchell 1981; Nader, Petkas, and Blackwell 1972;
Perrucci, Anderson, Schendel, and Trachtman 1980; Peters and Branch
1972; Petersen and Farrell 1986; Vinten 1994; Westin, Kurtz, and
Robbins 1981). Almost all the whistleblowing literature is couched in
terms of individual employee dissent and thus misses much of the
insight to be gained by examining systems of power and patterns of
control. The concept of whistleblowing also fails to incorporate many
types of suppression, such as blocking of publications, that do not
involve principled organizational dissent. Whereas the study of
whistleblowing leads to a focus on individual behavior, the study of
suppression leads to a focus on the exercise of power. In spite of
differences in emphasis, though, there is much in common between
studies of whistleblowing and of suppression.

Censorship is one means of
suppressing dissent, but not all suppression takes the form of
censorship. Cases of overt, external censorship, which pose ample
methodological challenges of their own, are relatively
unproblematical compared to self-censorship, which is when people
consciously or unconsciously decide not to speak out due to the
likely consequences or because their beliefs have adapted to the
realities of what is commonly considered to be allowed.

As a result of conversations with
numerous scientists (Martin 1997), it is my observation that quite a
number of scientists avoid doing research or making statements on
sensitive issues because they are aware, at some level, of the danger
of being attacked if they do. This is compatible with the findings of
Wilson and Barnes (1995), who surveyed 70 senior Australian
environmental scientists asking, among other things, "Do you believe
that scientists may jeopardise their career prospects or research
funding success by speaking out on environmental issues?" More than
half replied "yes" and less than one in five replied "no," the rest
being unsure. Despite the importance of self-censorship, I have
restricted the focus in this paper to cases of overt suppression.
Dealing with self-censorship introduces psychological dimensions and
would require a theory of psychology, plus the need to theorize links
between direct suppression and self-censorship and between systems of
power and self-censorship.

In this context it is worth
quoting C. Wright Mills commenting on university teachers: "the
deepest problem of freedom for teachers is not the occasional ousting
of a professor, but a vague general fear - sometimes politely known
as discretion, good taste, or balanced
judgment. It is a fear which leads to self-intimidation and
finally becomes so habitual that the scholar is unaware of it. The
real restraints are not so much external prohibitions as control of
the insurgent by the agreements of academic gentlemen." (Mills 1963,
p. 297).

There are many cases in which
dissenting scientific expertise poses a threat to powerful interests
and, as shown later, there is extensive evidence about suppression of
dissent in science. Whatever ones assessment of charges about
suppression, it might be expected that this evidence would be the
subject of intense sociological investigation, given the light it
could throw on the uses of expertise in a technological society. To
the contrary, though, there is no body of work in sociology on the
topic and no standard theoretical frameworks for dealing with it.
Indeed, although in the sociology of science there are many different
approaches and schools of thought (Jasanoff, Markle, Petersen, and
Pinch 1995), in none is there significant attention to claims about
suppression. This includes early historical and philosophical studies
of how human concerns and social processes are deeply embedded in
scientific practice and knowledge (Feyerabend 1975; Hanson 1958;
Hesse 1974; Kuhn 1970; Polanyi 1958); the political critique of
science, which analyzes the influence of social structures, such as
capitalism, religion, and the state, on the development of science
(Arditti, Brennan, and Cavrak 1980; Bukharin et al. 1931; Dickson
1974, 1984; Merton 1938; Rose and Rose 1969, 1976a, 1976b);
controversy studies (Collins 1981; Engelhardt and Caplan 1987; Mazur
1981; Nelkin 1979); the sociology of scientific knowledge and related
constructivist analyses of science (Barnes 1974, 1977, 1982; Bloor
1976; Collins 1985; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Mulkay 1979; Pickering 1984;
Pinch 1986); actor-network theory, in which knowledge is seen as a
contingent, locally constructed, and historically situated outcome
that is intimately linked with the negotiations of human and nonhuman
actors (Callon and Law 1989; Callon, Law and Rip 1988; Latour 1983,
1987, 1988; Law 1986; Law and Callon 1988); and critiques of
scientific epistemology and power (Aronowitz 1988; Rouse 1987). Most
science studies analysts treat scientific discourse as relatively
"free" in the sense that there are influences and incentives but no
bludgeons affecting the ability of scientists to speak. The
possibility of systematic squashing of speech and activity in whole
areas of science in "free" societies is given little attention. In
spite of the large number of cases and considerable documentation,
few social analysts of science have investigated attacks on dissident
scientists. (Some exceptions are Abraham (1995), Hess (1992), and
Martin (1986, 1988, 1991).) The scarcity of treatment provides a
potent demonstration of the non-neutrality of the
literature.

The next section addresses the
issue of how to determine whether actions should be categorized as
suppression. In the following three sections, evidence is cited for
the existence of suppression in three contentious areas: pesticides,
fluoridation, and nuclear power. The links between suppression and
corporate, professional, and state interests, respectively, are
discussed, noting in particular the difficulties in drawing simple
connections. The semi-final section deals more generally with
suppression and power, in particular noting a link between
suppression and hierarchy in science. The final section suggests some
possibilities for future research in what can be called comparative
suppression studies.

Studying
suppression

A "system of power" is used here
as a shorthand for a set of patterned social relationships, usually
reaffirmed but sometimes challenged by the behavior of individuals,
which provides differential opportunities to groups and individuals
to influence the behavior of others. A system of power in this usage
is compatible with a nonreified interpretation of social structure;
it is intended to refer both to power associated with social
structure and to power exercised on a local scale, for example
between individuals within an organization. It is to be expected that
different frameworks for studying power - for example Barnes (1988),
Clegg (1989), Lukes (1974), Parenti (1978) and Wrong (1979) - will be
useful for different sorts of analyses. For analyzing suppression in
science, the concepts of interest and resource are quite
useful.

If a system of power provides
resources that might be used for attacking dissident scientists, it
is worthwhile investigating to see if there are actual cases that fit
this pattern. Three important systems of power are those involving
economic, status, and state interests. In the following sections,
three areas are examined, each one illustrating a potential link
between a category of interests and suppression of dissent in
science. In the case of pesticides, the financial interests of
pesticide companies are central; in the case of fluoridation, the
status interests of the dental profession are central; and in the
case of nuclear power, the interests of state agencies in control are
central. In each of these areas, there is considerable documentation
about suppression of dissent in science. One of the questions to be
addressed is whether it is possible to draw a connection between the
central interest group and the exercise of power to suppress dissent.
But before addressing the case studies, it is useful to address some
preliminary issues.

In any analysis of power and
dissent, it is vital to determine how to distinguish suppression from
actions taken for legitimate reasons. If a scientist is dismissed,
how can anyone tell whether it is due to suppression or simply to
poor performance? Ultimately, there is no way to prove that
suppression is involved in any particular case, but there are several
ways to determine whether suppression is a likely possibility. A
useful tool is the double standard test: is a dissident scientist
treated any differently from other scientists with similar records of
performance? If a scientist who has spoken out about a
chemicals potential to cause cancer is demoted for allegedly
poor performance, but other scientists with similar or worse
performance records are not demoted, then this suggests that
suppression is involved. The dissident scientist is apparently
treated according to a standard different from other
scientists.

Suppression is easiest to discern
when the action taken is unusual and information is available to
apply the double standard test. Dismissals of scientists are uncommon
and often records are available of publications, reviews of
performance and the like, so the double standard test can be applied
straightforwardly. Suppression can also occur through blocking of
publications, appointments, and research grants. But because
publications, appointments, and research grants are routinely denied
for conventional reasons (poor quality, better candidates available),
and because the information on which such decisions are made is
seldom publicly available, it is extremely difficult to show
suppression in these areas.

Another way to assess whether
suppression is involved is to examine actions in relation to commonly
accepted standards of behavior. If someone disagrees with a
scientists research conclusions or public statements, an
accepted method of response is to criticize the argument, for example
by sending a letter to the scientist or to a journal. By contrast,
sending a letter of complaint to the scientists boss or funding
body attacking the scientists credibility or right to speak out
would be seen by many as an attempt to apply pressure on the
scientist rather than address the issues under dispute. Care has to
be taken in applying this method, since accepted standards of
behavior can vary from situation to situation. Abusive verbal attacks
on a scientists personal character might be considered
outrageous in one research culture but treated as an extravagant but
tolerable manifestation of vigorous intellectual jousting in
another.

Another reason to suspect
suppression is the existence of a pattern of attacks in a similar
area, as will be illustrated in the cases of pesticides,
fluoridation, and nuclear power, where there are theoretical reasons
to expect suppression - namely, the existence of a powerful interest
group that has established a routine connection with science, and a
challenge to this group from a subordinate or peripheral group. It is
only by considering many cases in a given area that it is possible to
demonstrate patterns of suppression. Any single case considered in
isolation is open to the criticism that it may have been an
exceptional occurrence or due to peculiar factors. There is
insufficient space in this paper to provide full detail on even a
single case, which itself may require a full article in itself, if
not a book, for example Adams (1984), Anderson et al. (1980), Bell
(1994), Dixon (1976), Efron (1972), and Sarasohn (1993). Hence cases
are only briefly described here and references given. The
availability of documentation is one reason for focusing on the the
areas of pesticides, fluoridation, and nuclear power. Although these
may seem to be "old" issues, the controversies continue and new
suppression cases have been reported in recent years. Although in
each controversy the opposition has made considerable advances, this
does not mean that suppression is unimportant in the dynamics of
these issues any more than the demise of McCarthyism in the United
States means that the techniques used against dissidents then were of
little significance and not worth studying.

Although the study of suppression
can be a powerful way of understanding the exercise of power in
science, investigators face several problems. It is no trivial matter
to collect information on cases of suppression. Most cases are not
well known; to uncover and analyze even a single case can be a
difficult and time-consuming task. Attacks on scientists are almost
never characterized, by the perpetrators, as suppression of dissent.
For an investigator to use such a label, or even to seek details
about cases, can be interpreted as demonstrating bias and, in
contemporary cases, is likely to be threatening to both elite
scientists and relevant interest groups. Just as there is no neutral
way to study scientific controversies (Scott, Richards, and Martin
1990), there is no neutral way to study suppression in science.
Arguably, in this case as in cases of power-knowledge generally, a
commitment by the analyst sometimes can be the foundation for, rather
than an obstacle to, a useful investigation (Jansen 1988, p. 183;
Martin 1996b; Shrader-Fréchette 1994).

Just because some participants on
one side in a controversy are suppressed does not necessarily make
that side either correct or virtuous. Suppression is the exercise of
power against dissent. Commonly, there are some on each side who
might be willing to suppress the other, in certain circumstances. The
cases recounted in Hentoff (1992) show this willingness in the case
of U.S. social movements. Typically only one side has the resources
to be able to do so. The social study of suppression is not a study
in virtue, but rather a study of the exercise of power. Of course,
this does not preclude the actors or the analyst from having views
about the phenomenon.

Many of the cases described and
cited here involve serious attacks on the careers of scientists, such
as formal reprimands, forced transfers and dismissals. Another
dimension to suppression operates at the level of belief systems and
manifests itself most commonly through peer review, such as blocking
of publications. This sort of suppression is difficult to document
and indeed difficult to distinguish from the "normal" operation of
science. One view is that closure in scientific controversies is
built on suppression of divergent viewpoints. This sort of
paradigm-level suppression is apparent in areas from continental
drift (Frankel 1987) to theories about the origin of AIDS (Martin
1993). In this paper, cases of suppression via paradigm commitments
and peer review are used only as supplements to suites of cases using
a range of other methods.

In each of the following three
sections, one case is described in a few paragraphs, then there are a
few briefer accounts, and finally there are references to many other
cases. The assessments and generalizations made are based on all the
cases cited, not just the ones recounted here. The brief treatments
here cannot begin to give an adequate description or analysis of any
case, and are intended only to give a flavor of the sorts of cases
about which documentation is available.

Pesticides

Pesticides are chemicals designed
to kill insects, plants, fungi, and other life that is considered to
be undesirable for human purposes, especially agriculture and public
health. Supporters argue that pesticides are essential for these
purposes whereas critics argue that many uses of pesticides are
unnecessary or harmful to the environment and human health. The
debate over pesticides has raged since the 1960s (Bosso 1987; Hay
1982; Ordish 1976; Perkins 1982).

 Dr Melvin Dwaine Reuber is
a research scientist who became one of the worlds leading
critics of pesticides through his studies of their link with cancer.
Through the 1960s and 1970s he had a productive and successful
career, publishing over 100 scientific papers and establishing
himself as a top scientist in a well-paying job. In 1981 he was head
of the Experimental Pathology Laboratory at the Frederick Cancer
Research Center, part of the National Cancer Institute in the United
States. Then, suddenly, he received a blistering attack on his
performance and professional behavior from the director of the
Center, Dr Michael G. Hanna, Jr. - who had previously given him the
highest commendations. The reprimand from Hanna questioned the
quality of Reubers studies of carcinogenicity of pesticides and
also called him to task for using Center letterhead for a letter that
allegedly reported his private work.

Even more seriously for Reuber,
the substance of Hannas letter appeared shortly afterwards in Pesticide & Toxic Chemical News (1981), a newsletter of
the petrochemical industry. Copies were circulated widely and used by
industry to discredit Reuber and his work (Honorof 1988; Marshall
1984; Martin 1996a; Nelson 1981; Rushford 1990; Schneider
1982).

The attack on Reuber served the
interests of the pesticide industry, given that his work was a
serious threat to it. His studies were important in bans placed on
leading pesticides aldrin, dieldrin, chlordane, and heptachlor, and
his work was used around the country by opponents of pesticides. He
was willing to write letters about his results, realizing that they
would be used in local anti-pesticide campaigns.

Reuber subsequently sued
Pesticide & Toxic Chemical News. (He won substantial
damages in a lower court but finally, a decade later, lost on appeal.
Whether winning or losing a court case tells anything about whether
suppression is involved is something that has to be examined in each
individual instance.) The court case revealed that pesticide
interests had complained to the National Cancer Institute about
Reuber. One of these complaints had led Hanna to make an
investigation that led to his reprimand.

 Clyde Manwell, professor of
zoology at the University of Adelaide in South Australia, coauthored
a letter published in the local newspaper which questioned some
aspects of government spraying for fruit fly. He was fiercely
attacked in state parliament and the university initiated an attempt
to dismiss him (Baker 1986).

 Robert L. Rudds book Pesticides and the Living Landscape (Rudd 1964), which raised
concerns similar to Rachel Carsons Silent Spring (1962)
and was completed earlier, was delayed and excessively scrutinized -
by 18 reviewers - before being published by the University of
Wisconsin Press. "He lost a promotion, and his very position with the
University [of California] was threatened" (Graham 1970, p.
168).

 After BioScience
published an article by Frank E. Egler (1964) that criticized
pesticides, both the journal and author were censured in a motion at
a meeting of the Entomological Society of America, a professional
body supported by pesticide manufacturers, even though the article
would not have been seen by most of those present (Graham 1970, p.
171; Judson 1965; van den Bosch 1978, p. 71).

These are a few of the many
documented cases of attacks on scientist critics of pesticides (see
also Baker and Manwell 1988; Boffey 1968, pp. 632-633; Carr 1986;
Coppolino 1994; Epstein 1978; Freeman 1993; Graham 1970; Martin
1996a; Martin, Baker, Manwell, and Pugh 1986, pp. 123-163; McKenna
1992; van den Bosch 1978, pp. 47, 61-71, 102-107, 119-137, 196-197).
In a typical case, a scientist does research that is potentially
threatening to the pesticide industry or speaks out critically about
pesticides, and is attacked in some fashion. Common methods include
withdrawal of research funding, threats, and attempts at
dismissal.

Suppression of scientist critics
of pesticides appears to serve the interests of the agrichemical
industry. The use of manufactured chemicals in agriculture,
especially pesticides and fertilizers, became a substantial industry
after World War II. This was part of a new model for agriculture,
based on large monocultures, expensive machinery, less labor, and
increased corporate control over the process of farming. The
preferred industry solution to the problem of pests was pesticides.
Vast amounts of money were poured into promotion of the "pesticide
paradigm," which became the scientific as well as the commercial
standard in a variety of ways (van den Bosch 1978).

There were some critics of these
developments, both scientists and nonscientists, but they had little
impact until the rise of the environmental movement. Rachel
Carsons classic book Silent Spring (1962), a prime
catalyst for the movement as a whole, was a sustained critique of the
abuse of pesticides. The synergistic combination of citizen activists
and scientist critics provided a formidable challenge to the
pesticide establishment. Activists without scientific credentials
could be dismissed as uninformed, while critical researchers without
community backing could simply be ignored. One way to undermine the
combined forces of activists and scientists is to attack the
scientist critics. The attacks on Reuber and others can be seen in
this light.

Linking the pesticide industry to
attacks on "dissident" scientists seems easy enough on the surface,
but a closer look shows many theoretical complications in using this
process to probe links between systems of power and social action. In
most general terms, the relevant system of power is capitalism, but
it would be difficult to argue that the interests of the pesticide
industry are identical to those of the capitalist class as a whole.
Arguably, alternatives to pesticides such as integrated pest
management might be just as valuable for the overall rate of profit.
(Explaining the success of pesticide interests compared to
alternatives is a major research project in itself - see Perkins
(1982).) So the terms need to be reduced to a sector of the
capitalist class, the pesticide industry.

In most documented cases of
suppression of scientist critics, the pesticide industry is involved
only indirectly, if at all. A direct involvement would be the
dismissal of a scientist critic who worked for a pesticide company.
Such cases may exist but they are seldom documented. A plausible
explanation for the lack of such cases is that scientists working for
industry, as well as being self-selected and acculturated to an
industry perspective, are also well aware that openly opposing their
employer is likely to mean loss of their jobs. Thus, it is those who
are least vulnerable to direct reprisals who are most likely to find
the support and freedom to undertake critical research and to speak
out. Arguably, if Reuber had worked for the chemical industry,
studies of the sort he actually did probably would not have been
funded, he would not have been allowed to publish his results, and,
if he had persisted in finding unwelcome results, his career would
have been terminated before he became prominent.

The industry, when it is involved
in attacks on scientists employed elsewhere - most commonly
government or universities - typically makes complaints to the
supervisor or employer of a scientist. It is a characteristic feature
of suppression cases that criticisms are made not directly to the
scientist - which would be a proper part of scientific dialogue and
debate - but to the scientists boss. It is undoubtedly the case
that there are many more informal complaints - for example, over the
telephone - than formal written complaints. When applying this sort
of pressure, the industry can only succeed to the extent that it has
allies or sympathizers in powerful scientific positions. Therefore,
an understanding of suppression of critics of pesticides requires an
understanding of the relationship between industry and the
bureaucratic structure of scientific workplaces, as will be discussed
later.

Yet another complication is that
many attacks on critics of pesticides come from government bodies.
For example, many of the attacks described by van den Bosch (1978)
involve the U.S. Department of Agriculture. In a number of examples,
government agencies seem more ardent in their support of pesticides
than do pesticide companies themselves. This can be explained as an
example of a "captured bureaucracy" (Mitnick 1980), as a feature of
the "capitalist state" (Jessop 1982), or as an aspect of the
inevitable state involvement in creating markets for capital
(Heilbroner 1985, pp. 78-106; Moran and Wright 1991).

In summary, in the case of
pesticides, it makes sense to speak of a link between the pesticide
industry and attacks on scientist critics of pesticides. Suppression
can be conceived of as a means that uses and reinforces the power of
a particular industry. It also highlights the many qualifications
necessary in drawing a link between systems of power and social
action.

Fluoridation

Fluoridation, the addition of one
part per million of fluoride to drinking water as a means of
preventing tooth decay in children, was endorsed by the United States
Public Health Service in 1950 and promoted heavily thereafter, with
strong support from the American Dental Association. A substantial
fraction of the population in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United States drinks water with added fluoride, but fluoridation is
uncommon elsewhere in the industrialized world. From the beginning,
there was substantial citizen opposition to fluoridation, but there
were few dentists, doctors, or scientists who openly opposed the
procedure.

 Dr George Waldbott was the
leading scientist opponent of fluoridation in the United States from
the late 1950s through the 1970s. He wrote articles and books,
testified at numerous inquiries, and was the focal point for the U.S.
antifluoridation movement. A prominent allergist and author of
hundreds of scientific papers, Waldbotts submissions concerning
hazards of fluoride to certain journals were routinely rejected, and
he had reason to believe that the editors and the U.S. Public Health
Service were in communication about this (Waldbott 1965, p.
323).

Much more threatening to Waldbott,
though, was the American Dental Associations dossier on
opponents of fluoridation. Compiled by the ADAs Bureau of
Public Information, this dossier contained letters and extracts from
newspapers and other sources. Many of those listed in the dossier,
such as the Ku Klux Klan and various fringe practitioners, were easy
to discredit or ridicule. The implication of the dossier was that all
opponents of fluoridation were cranks. As well as listing many
apparently dubious characters and organizations, the dossier listed
some whose credentials and professional achievements would normally
be seen as conferring respectability, but whose presence in the
dossier suggested guilt by association. Furthermore, the material in
Waldbotts entry was questionable. Some of it was based on a
visit to Waldbott by a visiting German profluoridationist who
misrepresented his intentions to Waldbott, gained access to
Waldbotts files on studies of patients with adverse reactions
to fluoride, and wrote a letter about his visit to a leading U.S.
profluoridationist; extracts from this letter appeared in the
dossier. The dossier was twice published by the prestigious Journal of the American Dental Association (Bureau of Public
Information 1962, 1965) and was circulated throughout the country and
even overseas, being used against Waldbott wherever he visited
(Waldbott 1965).

 John Colquhoun, of the
Department of Health in Auckland, New Zealand, spoke publicly about
the risk of fluoride poisoning from small children swallowing
toothpaste. He was formally warned to stick to official policy
(Colquhoun 1987, p. 231).

 Max Ginns was expelled from
his dental society in Worchester, Massachusetts in 1961 after he
circulated a petition of dentists and doctors opposed to fluoridation
(Waldbott, Burgstahler, and McKinney 1978, pp. 325-326).

 Mien Bulthuis wrote a
dissertation on fluorides role in inhibiting the enzyme
cholinesterase. The Chief Inspector of Health in the Netherlands
applied pressure on the Netherlands Health Board to prevent
publication of the dissertation because it might add to public
concern about fluoride (Moolenburgh 1987, p. 107).

Waldbott, because of his
prominence in the antifluoridation cause, was informed of numerous
other cases of suppression (Exner and Waldbott 1957, pp. 184-191;
Waldbott 1965; Waldbott, Burgstahler and McKinney 1978, pp. 318-352).
As well, there are many other documented cases (Caldwell and Zanfagna
1974; Colquhoun 1987, pp. 231-232, 311-312; Diesendorf 1996; Groth
1973, pp. 179-185; Martin 1988, pp. 337-342; Martin 1991, pp. 68-102;
Moolenburgh 1987, pp. 24-25, 47; Sutton 1980, pp. 23-33;
Yiamouyiannis 1986). Some of the common types of attacks include
threats to deregister dentists and warnings from superiors to desist
from statements about hazards of fluoridation. There are also a
number of instances in which editors or referees opposed publishing
articles because they might aid the antifluoridation cause, including
one in which submissions from a scientist known to oppose
fluoridation were returned without being opened (Waldbott,
Burgstahler and McKinney 1978, pp. 334-335).

The proponents of fluoridation
have been highly successful in stigmatizing critics as reactionary,
irrational, confused, and unscientific, and even in claiming that
fluoridation is so well verified that there is no scientific debate.
Most social scientists have accepted that fluoridation is
scientifically beyond question and have examined only social
explanations for opposition to fluoridation (Martin 1989). There is
indeed much reputable scientific research backing fluoridation
(Murray and Rugg-Gunn 1982; Newbrun 1986) but there is also some
scientific work arguing both that the health hazards of fluoridation
are significant and that the benefits are less than claimed
(Diesendorf 1986; Waldbott, Burgstahler and McKinney 1978). In the
struggle over fluoridation as a public health measure, the struggle
over knowledge claims concerning the benefits and hazards of fluoride
has played a key role. The few critics who are scientists, doctors,
or dentists have a significance beyond their numbers, since they
change the situation from one of unanimity concerning knowledge to
one of conflict. It is in this context that occasional instances of
suppression of scientist critics can be understood as an important
method of waging the struggle for fluoridation.

Arguably, the key driving force
behind the promotion of fluoridation has been the dental profession
(Martin 1991; Varney 1986). Rather than using the traditional idea of
professions as altruistic bodies of practitioners, professions are
treated here as systems of power, specifically as ways to organize an
occupation to garner status and wealth (Collins 1979; Freidson 1970;
Johnson 1972; Larson 1977; Willis 1983). Dentistry can be fruitfully
analyzed in this way: it involves lengthy training and certification
by the profession itself; it is oriented around professionals
treating individuals rather than changing social structures; and it
is built on a body of esoteric, scientifically validated knowledge
(Davis 1980).

The promotion of fluoridation,
while in conflict with the idea of individual treatment, did not pose
a threat to dental practice, since there are many more dental
problems than can be dealt with individually by dentists.
Fluoridation, whose justification is based on sophisticated
scientific methods such as epidemiology, promised to increase the
scientific status of dentistry, which was otherwise associated with
mechanical techniques such as filling of teeth. Finally, a number of
prominent dental researchers stood to and did build their reputations
on the promotion of fluoridation (Martin 1991; Varney
1986).

Thus, in contrast to the cases of
pesticides and nuclear power, the material interests of the key
system of power - the dental profession - are much less significant
than its status interests. Generally speaking, it is in those
countries where the dental profession has the greatest degree of
control over working conditions and entry to the profession, namely
the English-speaking countries, where fluoridation has been most
strongly promoted and widely adopted.

In some countries, the state has
played a supporting role in the promotion of fluoridation, by
providing endorsements, funding research, and, in some cases,
mandating fluoridation. This can largely be attributed to the efforts
by advocates within the dental profession. For example, it was
vigorous lobbying by fluoridation proponents that led to the original
endorsement of fluoridation by the U.S. Public Health Service (McNeil
1957). That there is no special state interest in fluoridation is
suggested by the decisions made against fluoridation by many European
governments in spite of support from the dental profession, and the
attempts by many local governments in the United States to offload
responsibility for making a decision about fluoridation, for example
by calling referenda (Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal 1969).

Many antifluoridationists argue
that industrial interests are behind fluoridation, notably the
aluminum industry (which produces fluoride wastes), toothpaste
manufacturers (for which fluoride is a promotional element), and
sugary food manufacturers (for which fluoride provides a magic-bullet
solution to tooth decay, diverting attention away from the
well-established role of sugar in tooth decay). There is little
evidence showing any direct involvement by the aluminum industry or
toothpaste manufacturers in promoting fluoridation of public water
supplies; some financial support comes from sugary food industries.
Almost all the direct promotion, and also almost all of the instances
of suppression of scientist critics of fluoridation, are linked with
the dental profession or its allies in the state. It can be argued,
though, that commercial interests have provided a context in which
the dental profession found the promotion of fluoridation a path of
least resistance from powerful interests, compared for example to
challenging the sale and consumption of sugary food (Martin 1991, pp.
115-130).

The fluoridation debate thus
provides a good case study of the dynamics of science as a system of
power-knowledge in which the key interest group is a profession.
Scientific knowledge and the authority to pronounce on scientific
knowledge have been crucial in the debate, both as resources in the
struggle and as outcomes of it. Suppression of scientific dissent
seems to have played a significant role in this struggle.

Nuclear
power

Nuclear power is a method of
producing electricity by harnessing the energy released by nuclear
fission. Proponents argue that it is a safe and economical way of
producing necessary energy; critics argue against nuclear power on
various grounds, including hazards (nuclear reactor accidents,
long-lived radioactive waste), proliferation of nuclear weapons, high
economic cost, and the political restrictions associated with a "plutonium economy."

 The U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) in 1965 funded a long-term study of the health
effects of low-level ionizing radiation under the supervision of Dr
Thomas Mancuso, an epidemiologist at the University of Pittsburgh. In
1974, before Mancuso had reported any results, another researcher,
Samuel Milham, reported an increase in cancers at the AECs
plant at Hanford, Washington. The AEC pressured Mancuso to repudiate
Milhams claims, but he refused on the grounds that his study
was not complete.

The AEC, apparently unhappy with
Mancusos refusal, arranged for a review of the study. ("AEC" is
used throughout here, though its name changed.) There were six
reviewers: four were favorable and only one recommended termination
and transfer to another school of public health. Nevertheless, the
AEC terminated the study, citing only the two negative reviews, and
transferred it to a private company, Battelle West, under the
supervision of the former AEC employee who, as a reviewer of
Mancusos study, had recommended its termination (Bertell 1985;
Bross 1981, pp. 217-222; Freeman 1981, pp. 41-42; Sterling 1980;
Wasserman and Solomon 1982, pp. 141-144).

 Ross Hesketh, a nuclear
physicist at the Central Electricity Generating Board in Britain,
spoke out about the use of plutonium from civil nuclear power plants
for military purposes. He was disciplined, harassed, transferred, and
finally dismissed (Dickson 1983; Edwards 1983).

 Jens Scheer, a nuclear
physicist at the University of Bremen, was a leftist and critic of
nuclear power. The university suspended him and tried to dismiss him
from his post (Nelkin and Pollak 1981, p. 92; Piper 1975).

 Atsushi Tsuchida, a
physicist working at the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research
(known as Riken) in Japan, was critical of nuclear technology and
wrote for a wide audience. Riken did not list his publications,
denied him a salary rise (considered a harsh punishment), and
prevented him giving outside lectures (Siratori n.d.).

These examples are among numerous
cases, from around the world, of attacks on scientists and engineers
whose work or statements aid the case against nuclear power (Clarke
1997; Craddock 1994; Freeman 1981; Grossman 1996; Hatzfeldt 1989;
Jungt 1979, pp. 85-107; Martin 1986; Pooley 1996; Sharma 1983, pp.
120-126; Sharma 1996; Sutcliffe 1987, pp. 38-58). Common types of
attacks on scientist critics of nuclear power include transfer to
different jobs, withdrawal of research funding and staff, blocking of
publications, and dismissal. A large number of these cases involve
employees of government research laboratories. Employees of private
firms in the nuclear industry may be even more vulnerable to attack
and hence are unlikely to try to retain their jobs while being openly
critical. Perhaps realizing this, three General Electric nuclear
engineers who openly criticized nuclear power in 1976 resigned at the
same time (Freeman 1981, pp. 258-292). Critics within universities
are more protected from dismissal, though research funding can be
withdrawn, as in the case of Mancuso.

The promotion of nuclear power is
closely linked to state power (Camilleri 1984; Gorz 1980; Jungk
1979). In nearly every country, nuclear power is state-owned and
state-run. Only in the United States has private industry played a
significant role; even so, the U.S. government has provided crucial
support via regulation, limiting legal liability in the case of
reactor accidents, and controlling key parts of the nuclear fuel
cycle (uranium enrichment, reprocessing). The central role of the
state in nuclear power stems from historical links with nuclear
weapons production (always a state enterprise), which have persisted
due to the potential role of civilian nuclear power in proliferation
of nuclear weapons. Also important are the enormous scale and
potential danger of nuclear power, which make private involvement
risky without government guarantees, and which have involved the
state in order to prevent terrorist and criminal use of nuclear
materials. Critics would also argue that nuclear power has seldom
been a commercial proposition and hence government backing, provided
for military, status, or social control purposes, has been essential.
When the British government privatized its electricity industry,
parts of the nuclear industry were exempted and remained under
government ownership.

In the 1960s and especially the
1970s, a worldwide movement against nuclear power developed (Falk
1982). Many of the key arguments raised against nuclear power
involved technical dimensions, such as the risk and consequences of
nuclear reactor accidents, the possibility of safe disposal of
long-lived radioactive waste, and the feasibility of alternative "energy paths" (Lovins 1977). Of nuclear scientists and engineers who
have been willing to take a stand, most supported nuclear power,
especially in the early years of the debate. Those few who questioned
the orthodoxy were a great threat, since they undermined the apparent
unanimity of expert support for the technology. The occasional
instances of suppression of nuclear dissidents can be interpreted as
a response to this threat.

Suppression and
power

The previous three sections cite
considerable evidence that some scientists critical of pesticides,
fluoridation, or nuclear power have been attacked because of this.
References to many cases of suppression were given, but these are
likely to be only a fraction of those that have occurred. No doubt
others are to be found in the unsystematic "literature" on
suppression, but, more importantly, documented cases are only a
fraction of actual ones, since many are hushed up by all parties. The
documented and publicized cases overrepresent certain types of cases
(such as dismissals and attacks on prominent individuals) and
underrepresent others (such as denial of appointments and blocking of
publications). In spite of these obstacles, the evidence in the three
areas chosen is substantial and revealing.

It can be argued that suppression,
while sometimes effective in silencing individual dissidents, is even
more effective in signaling to others what they might face if they
step out of line. It can also discourage investigators from
undertaking certain lines of research (Deyo, et al. 1997). On the
other hand, suppression sometimes can be counterproductive, for
example when it is grossly unfair, exposing the raw face of power and
stimulating greater dissent. The topics of the effectiveness of
suppression and strategies against it are beyond the scope of this
paper (Martin 1997; Pring and Canan 1996; Stewart, Devine, and Rasor
1989). Nevertheless, one irony is worth noting. As noted earlier,
legitimacy is enhanced when it seems to be natural, with no overt
exercise of power, and unanimity of scientific expertise is one
powerful way to establish legitimacy. Attacks on dissident scientists
are one way to try to enforce unanimity, yet, by their nature, many
of these attacks involve the blatant exercise of power and, if
publicized, potentially undermine the appearance of legitimacy based
on knowledge alone.

Suppression of dissent provides a
direct link between power inside and outside science and what is
accepted as scientific knowledge. In the controversies over
pesticides, fluoridation, and nuclear power, what is accepted as
scientific knowledge is central to the dispute: it is both affected
by the exercise of power in the controversy and is a tool used in it.
A few studies explicitly emphasize how scientific knowledge is deeply
embedded in these disputes (Diesendorf 1982; Martin 1991; Sterling
1980; see also Abraham 1993, 1994, 1995; Walker 1993).

The three case studies presented
here, of pesticides, fluoridation, and nuclear power, suggest a link
between suppression of dissent and three systems of power, namely
corporate power, professional power, and state power, respectively.
Several factors support the case for a linkage between a system of
power and a pattern of suppression: interests in a particular stance
on the issue in question; a challenge to the interests; a key role
for dissident experts in supporting the challenge; and direct or
indirect use of power to attack some of the dissidents. In the case
of pesticides, for example, certain chemical companies make a profit
by selling pesticides; the environmental movement has challenged the
use of pesticides; scientists who are critical of pesticides have
played a key role in providing legitimation to the environmental
movement challenge; and some of the attacks on scientists critical of
pesticides come directly from industry.

If corporate power, professional
power, and state power can be linked to patterns of suppression, what
about other systems of power? Patriarchy is a promising area to
study. There are quite a number of studies of patriarchy and science
(Bleier 1986; Brighton Women and Science Collective 1980; Harding
1986; Keller 1985), but what about patterns of suppression? There is
certainly considerable evidence of discrimination against female
scientists and failure to give adequate recognition to their work
(Niven 1988; Rossiter 1993; Sayre 1975; Theodore 1986), but arguably
this sort of discrimination is different from suppression of dissent
as it is conceptualized here.

There is some evidence of
suppression of vocally feminist scientists and of suppression of
research that challenges beliefs about male biological superiority or
that in other ways challenges male privilege (Bleier 1984; Masson
1984). More research is needed into these types of suppression. Also,
it is likely that the way in which science interacts with patriarchal
power is quite different from the way it interacts with corporate,
professional, or state power. Other power systems worthy of study in
relation to suppression in science are racism, the military,
heterosexism, and oppression of and in the Third World.

One thing that is quite clear from
studies of suppression cases is the large role of discretion and
contingency. One dissident scientist may be harassed persistently
whereas another is left alone; speaking out on one occasion may be
greeted with tolerance or even praise, whereas on another occasion it
may trigger a serious attack. This variability can be attributed to
psychological and organizational variables. Sometimes an official
just happens to be aggravated, on a particular day, by a particular
person or behavior and this leads to an attack. To capture this
variability, it is useful to say that a system of power provides
resources for certain individuals to take certain types of actions,
for example for a laboratory manager to hire a particular scientist.
Thus, the system of power does not require suppression of dissent; it
simply makes it possible. At the same time, psychology is not
autonomous of power systems: certain belief systems and behavioral
styles may thrive in suitable organizational and social structures,
and in turn either reinforce or challenge those structures (House
1988).

None of the controversies
presented here provides a perfectly neat link between a discrete
system of power and cases of suppression. The links are messy for at
least two reasons. Firstly, in these examples, the systems of power
are not compartmentalized. Although particular chemical companies
have a strong interest in pesticides, some government bodies are
closely aligned to the industry. The dental profession may be the key
driving force behind fluoridation, but some government and corporate
bodies have strong interests in fluoridation as well. While state
power is a key force behind the promotion of nuclear power,
corporations are also heavily involved, and many nuclear scientists
and engineers have a career interest in the technology. These sorts
of linkages are virtually inevitable.

A second complication in making
links between systems of power and suppression in a certain field is
that attacks often are made by the bosses of dissident scientists.
For example, a common form of attack is for an industry or government
official to call the boss of an outspoken scientist and suggest that
action be taken. Sometimes there is no phone call at all: the boss,
worried about keeping on the good side of industry or government
because of grants, employment prospects and so forth, takes action
against a subordinate without any outside prompting. The action in
this case serves the interest of industry or government without the
necessity of overt intervention. It can still make sense in such
cases to speak of the influence of a system of power (Lukes
1974).

The frequent examples of attacks
by bosses provide an important insight into the exercise of power in
science, namely that hierarchy in science often tends to serve the
interests of powerful outside groups. Hierarchy in science refers
here to differences in power rather than knowledge (though these may
be linked), and is closely linked to the bureaucratic conditions in
which most scientific research is carried out. Those scientists with
the greatest say in decisions about research funding, research
priorities, top-level appointments, and editorial policies can be
called "political scientific elites" (Blissett 1972; Elias, Martins,
and Whitley 1982; Rahman 1972; Traweek 1988, pp. 126-156). More
commonly studied are "cognitive scientific elites," namely those
scientists whose research productivity and intellectual stature give
them great influence and status within science (Amick 1974; Merton
1973; Mulkay 1976; Polanyi 1951, p. 54; Zuckerman 1977). Many
political scientific elites are also cognitive elites.

A typical scientific career, as
well as involving a long apprenticeship, often provides little
security or scope for innovative or unorthodox research, especially
in the early years. This encourages conformity to the directions set
by scientific elites which are, in turn, shaped by sources of funding
and applications as well as their own career interests. Hierarchy
within the scientific community thus is an advantage to powerful
groups, though of course it does not guarantee that their interests
will be served. The direct influence of bosses over scientists and
scientific research is usually greatest within industry and
government; within universities, professional norms and collegial
interactions usually play a greater role, and it is no coincidence
that for academics dissent is somewhat easier, though often still
risky. While hierarchy within science facilitates attacks on
dissidents, it can also facilitate links between interests and
science in more routine ways, such as setting priorities for
research. Although studies are available of the political
machinations in and over science (Boffey 1975; Brickman, Jasanoff and
Ilgen 1985; Dickson 1984; Greenberg 1967; Jasanoff 1990; Primack and
von Hippel 1974), a thorough study of the rise of bureaucracy in
science and the links between political scientific elites and other
interests remains to be carried out.

To analyze the link between
scientific bureaucracy and suppression of dissent, a convenient
framework is the concept of bureaucracy as a political system
(Weinstein 1977, 1979; see also Collins 1975, pp. 286-347; Perrucci,
Anderson, Schendel and Trachtman 1980; Zald and Berger 1978). Rather
than treating bureaucracy as a rational administrative system, this
approach draws an analogy with the state: bureaucracy is like an
authoritarian state except that usually there is no capacity for
physical violence. By extension, bureaucratic elites can be faced by
opposition movements, coups détat, and so forth.
Whistleblowing - open individual dissent - is a special form of
principled opposition. Suppression of dissent within a bureaucracy is
then analogous to government attacks on political opponents or
movements, another area in which the role of contingent factors in
the exercise of power against dissent is important. This conception
of bureaucracy thus brings to the fore the phenomena of resistance to
bureaucratic elites and suppression of dissent. However, this model
remains to be applied systematically to scientific research carried
out in bureaucratic and semi-bureaucratic settings.

Social studies of science
certainly provide more than adequate tools for dealing with
suppression. There is a considerable literature showing how science
can be understood as growing out of and shaped by the organization of
society, including the state, capitalism, bureaucracy, the military,
and patriarchy, and how these systems of power are linked to the
internal power dynamics of science, involving elements including
hierarchy, division of labor, professions, male domination, and
cognitive authority. An approach along these lines (Abraham 1995;
Blume 1974; Collins 1975, pp. 470-523; Restivo 1988, 1994; Sklair
1973) can be called a "political sociology of science" (Blume 1974).
This sort of framework can be used to examine the development of
particular research fields (Clark and Westrum 1987; Forman 1971;
MacKenzie 1981; Wright 1994; Young 1973), to relate research to
funding by state and industry (Clarke 1971; Noble 1977), to analyze
the construction of boundaries within science and between science and
non-science (Gieryn 1983, 1995; Wallis 1979), to examine the
relationship between major scandals in science and its social
organization (Collins and Restivo 1983) and to determine the presence
of bias in science-based regulatory decision making (Abraham 1993,
1994, 1995). So far, though, it has seldom been used to examine
suppression of dissident scientists. One possible reason is that most
analysts of science, whether positivist or constructivist, basically
support science as it exists (Restivo 1988; 1994, p. 28).

Comparative studies of
suppression

The incidence and dynamics of
suppression can vary according to many different factors, and hence
the study of suppression provides a window into the politics of
expertise and legitimacy. The examples in this paper suggest the
value of a field of study that could be called "comparative
suppression studies": studying the incidence and characteristic
features of suppression in different fields, organisations, or
polities, and relating this to social structure, interests, and other
relevant factors. Here several areas for comparative suppression
studies are outlined: suppression in different countries and
political systems; suppression of scientists versus suppression of
nonscientists; suppression and social movements; suppression and
technical saliency.

One type of comparative
suppression studies involves examination of the frequency and
characteristics of suppression in different countries. For example,
most documented cases of suppression of scientist opponents of
fluoridation are from those few countries with a substantial level of
fluoridation; in the case of nuclear power, which has been introduced
in numerous countries, there are cases of suppression from around the
world (Martin 1986). However, the available evidence is too
unsystematic yet to provide a basis for many conclusions. The
obstacles to collecting comparative suppression evidence, which
include language, culture, and organizational differences, are
formidable. On the other hand, there is much to be learned from such
studies, since insights about the effect of social structural and
organizational variables are likely to be more obvious than with
single-country studies.

It is also possible to compare
methods of suppression used in different sorts of political systems
and examine the relative roles of repression and suppression
(respectively, violent and nonviolent reprisals and deterrents).
There is ample documentation of both repression and suppression of
political dissidents in authoritarian regimes (see the journal
Index on Censorship and reports produced by Amnesty
International); there is also much information on suppression (and
some repression) of political and other dissent in liberal
democracies (Arblaster 1974; Belfrage 1973; Blackstock 1976; Bunyan
1976; Caute 1978; Cowan, Egleson, and Hentoff 1974; Donner 1980;
Fitzgerald 1972; Gelbspan 1991; Goldstein 1978; Halperin, Berman,
Borosage, and Marwick 1976; Harris 1976; Hillyard and Percy-Smith
1988; Hollingsworth and Norton-Taylor 1988; Parenti 1971; Schultz and
Schultz 1989; Wolfe 1973). But there is relatively little comparative
analysis of suppression and repression under different political
systems, much less of suppression in science.

Another comparative dimension is
scientists versus nonscientists. There are many documented cases of
workers or community activists, without credentials or special
status, who have opposed pesticides, fluoridation, or nuclear power
and have come under attack (Cutler 1989; Day 1989; Freeman 1981;
Peterzell 1980; Shoecraft 1971; Van Strum 1983). The limited
information available seems to suggest that the characteristic
methods used to attack nonscientists are different, in part, from
those used to attack scientists, no doubt because techniques such as
withdrawing grants can seldom be used against nonscientists. For
example, in liberal democracies, physical violence against dissident
scientists seems less common than violence against dissident
nonscientists. A comparative study of suppression of scientists and
nonscientists could yield insights into the exercise of power in
science.

One of the most promising types of
comparative suppression studies involves looking at different fields
or issues. For example, there is ample evidence of suppression in the
areas of pesticides, fluoridation, and nuclear power but, for
example, few publicized cases of suppression associated with the
automobile industry (McCarry 1972; Otake 1982). There are at least
two reasonable hypotheses worth exploring. One is that suppression is
more common and visible when a social movement makes a challenge to a
powerful interest group that has a near monopoly on scientific
credibility. The existence of a social movement makes technical
dissent more threatening, since it can be used to give the movement
greater credibility. Added to this, the existence of a movement
provides a receptive audience - both movement supporters and the
general public - for scientific work or statements challenging
orthodoxy, and thus can encourage critics to speak out. Thus there
are likely to be more cases of critics who speak out and more
incentive to suppress those who do. This dynamic could explain the
difference in the incidence or visibility of suppression in different
fields. There has been major citizen action against pesticides,
fluoridation, and nuclear power, but nothing comparable in the way of
an "anti-car movement."

An alternative or complementary
hypothesis is that suppression is more common in areas where
technical expertise is more crucial to the power of an interest
group. Many fields involve technical issues and actual or potential
technical disputes, but only in some are these of central importance.
In disputes over nuclear power, for example, the major arguments have
involved health and environment, such as reactor accidents and
radioactive waste, and have involved technical claims and
counterclaims. Compare this to the automobile industry, where the
technology is more familiar and where expertise is less monopolized
by the industry. It might be, then, that in the case of automobiles
technical criticisms are less salient, both to critics and to the
industry itself. Another comparison is between the debates over
nuclear power and nuclear weapons. In both cases there have been
significant social movements, but there seems to be more evidence of
suppression of scientists who are critics of nuclear power than of
those who are critics of nuclear weapons. This could be because
technical disputes are more central to legitimacy in the nuclear
power issue, whereas moral and military considerations have played a
much more prominent role with the nuclear weapons debate (although it
too has involved a series of technical disputes, from the hazards of
fallout to the accuracy of missiles).

An insight into the centrality of
technical issues is given by the rhetoric used in controversies. In
the pesticide, fluoridation, and nuclear power debates, opponents
have often been castigated as uninformed (scientifically),
unscientific, and even antiscientific. In the case of the automobile
industry, critics are more likely to be treated as threats to
economic prosperity or, in its equivalent in the U.S. context, as "unAmerican." In the debate over nuclear weapons, critics in the west
have been called ignorant of the realities of world politics or,
until the 1990s, communists or traitors.

More investigation is required to
determine whether these or other hypotheses can be sustained. Before
that can occur, though, there is a need for systematic studies of
technical dissent within the automobile industry, within the nuclear
weapons establishment, and in any other area with which comparisons
might be made. But as well as more evidence, there is also a need to
deal more systematically with methodological issues in suppression
studies, such as criteria for assessing alleged instances of
suppression and ways for going beyond publicized cases to those that
are hushed up. Studying suppression has the potential to reveal much
about the dynamics of expertise, power, and legitimacy in
contemporary society, but this type of investigation is bound to
remain controversial itself both because of definitional and
methodological challenges and because it draws attention to an
exercise of power that those exercising it would rather pass
unnoticed.

Acknowledgments

I thank the numerous people over
the years who have shared their experiences and insights about
suppression. Sharon Beder, Daryl Chubin, Randall Collins, Bill
Freudenburg, Isla MacGregor, Stewart Russell, Deena Weinstein and
anonymous referees provided helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this paper. I thank in particular one anonymous referee whose
insightful suggestions were used to recast the paper.

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