Tuesday, May 16, 2017

The Trump Regime & U-Turns on Syria

Confusion has been raised over the Trump
administration’s apparent U-turns on Syria. In April, the official position was
that Assad was a “political reality” that had to be dealt with, yet only weeks
later officials were calling for him to step down. Now Trump is
again stating that the US is not insisting on Assad’s departure.

The about-face seems confusing at first, but when
combined with an examination of the sectors of power that the administration
represents, as well as the actions that have been pursued on the ground, the
reality becomes much clearer.

The Trump Establishment

Despite promises to “drain the swamp,” the Trump
administration has turned out to be anything but anti-establishment. Instead,
it represents one of the most
wealthy, pro-corporate administrations in recent history, which includes a
former Goldman Sachs executive heading the Treasury and the former CEO of Exxon
Mobil as Secretary of State. While not anti-establishment, it does represent an
insurgency from within the
establishment, the coming to power of a radicalized and nationalistic element
of the ruling elite which had historically been sidelined by more powerful
sectors.

This faction has its roots in various
business-funded right-wing movements, such as the John Birch Society and the
Tea Party, which was heavily financed by the Koch brothers, who now hold
extraordinary influence over Trump through their
connections with Mike Pompeo, the current CIA director. It is heavily
centered around the manufacturing industry and Big Oil, and has historically
been antagonistic towards the more globally-oriented multinationals and financial
institutions which dominated the Obama administration. They are characterized as
well by an “undeniable element of racial resentment,” as investigative
historians have
documented.

Peter Dale Scott, the founder the study of “Deep
State” politics, in 1996 described this
power struggle within the establishment as “an enduring struggle between
‘America Firsters’ and ‘New world Order’ globalists, pitting, through nearly
all of this [20th] century, the industry-oriented (e.g. the National
Association of Manufacturers) against the financial-oriented (e.g. the Council on
Foreign Relations), two different sources of wealth.”

Scott further describes the division, roughly
speaking, as being “between those Trilateral Commission progressives, many
flourishing from the new technologies of the global Internet, who wish the state
to do more than at present about problems like wealth disparity, racial
injustice and global warming, and those Heritage Foundation conservatives, many
from finance and oil, who want it to do even less.” Decades later this
conservative faction, now better funded and organized than before, has been
revived through Trump, again taking up the banner of “America First!”

The sectors of industry represented in the
administration therefore are not opposed to globalization and imperialism, but instead
advocate for a different formulation of it which gives preference to certain
industries while also further tipping the balance in favor of US corporations
and banks.

Also prominently represented is the
military industrial complex; the nexus of powerful weapons manufacturers
and defense contractors, the influence of which is exemplified through the
amount of power
and discretion Trump has given to the Pentagon and the Defense Secretary. Historically
the more financial-sector-oriented CIA, given prominence during the Obama
administration, has maintained a
bitter rivalry with the Big Oil-dominated Pentagon, which now has come to
the fore under Trump.

The most prominent influence of Big Oil however is
represented in Trump’s Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who was the former CEO
of the Exxon Mobil.

Exxon and Tillerson have connections to the
Russian government and President Putin, most prominently through a
major deal that Exxon signed with Russia granting it access to vast
resources in the Russian Arctic in return for allowing OAO Rosneft, the
state-owned oil company, the opportunity to invest in Exxon’s overseas
operations. A major factor influencing Trump’s conciliatory stance towards
Russia therefore is the fact that the Exxon-Rosneft agreement was
frozen in 2014 when the US applied sanctions against Russia following the
annexation of Crimea. Exxon estimates that the sanctions have cost them at
least a
billion dollars, and therefore “Tillerson has argued strenuously for the
measures to be lifted” during his time as CEO.

It is these connections and the likelihood that
they would lead toward political détente with Russia that has motivated the
liberal antagonism toward Trump, displayed in the concerted
effort to pressure him away from any policy which could be deemed conciliatory
towards Russia. The FBI investigation into Trump’s campaign was never based in
evidence, but rather has been used as a means to guarantee that aggressive
policies towards Russia and Syria will continue to be implemented.

Within this context, it’s not hard to see why the
administration’s policy in Syria had shifted away from Obama’s CIA-focused
regime-change efforts towards a more militaristic approach which prioritizes
fighting ISIS and political negotiations with Russia. It is also not hard to
see why Trump would respond in the way that he did following the chemical
weapons attack in Khan Sheikhoun, which in large part was a product of domestic
political pressure rather than an indication of a shift in strategy.

Divide and Rule

After taking office, Trump’s Ambassador to the UN
Nikki Haley made
it clear that “our priority is no longer to sit and focus on getting
al-Assad out,” while the White House Press Secretary elaborated
that “with respect to al-Assad, there is a political reality that we have to
accept in terms of where we are right now.”

The “political reality” was the fact that the
regime-change effort had failed. The US had flooded in an unprecedented amount
of advanced weaponry, tipping the balance in favor of the mainly
hard-line extremist rebels, Russia then intervened in response and reversed
the balance back in the governments favor. After the recent liberation of
Aleppo, the opposition is severely weakened, on the defensive, and wholly
unable to deliver regime-change to their backers.

Given this, the strategy of “Assad must go” had
shifted instead to “defeating ISIS.” Within this context, the battle
against ISIS served as a convenient justification for
occupying Syrian territory, establishing de-facto zones of influence over
areas re-captured from the group. These could then be utilized as leverage in
future negotiations, either to pressure for concessions or for Assad’s ouster.

This was not a new idea, and was proposed during
the Obama administration. Henry Kissinger, who secretly
helped formulate President Bush and Obama’s national security policies, who
also
advised Hillary Clinton while she served as Secretary of State, is now
acting as an unofficial
advisor to Trump, specifically
giving advice on the issue of Syria.

In 2015, Kissinger proposed
a plan calling for the annexation of Syrian territory taken from ISIS by
US-backed forces, which were then to be administered by US allies Saudi Arabia,
Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey, under the banner of fighting against
terrorism. He wrote that “a choice among strategies” was for ISIS-held
territories to be recaptured “either by moderate Sunni forces or outside
powers,” excluding Iran and its proxies. The reconquered territories should
then be “restored to the local Sunni rule that existed there before the disintegration
of both Iraqi and Syrian sovereignty,” suggesting that “the sovereign states of
the Arabian Peninsula, as well as Egypt and Jordan, should play a principal
role in that evolution,” while Turkey as well “could contribute creatively to
such a process.”

The plan called for the partition of the Syrian
state between government-held areas and those under the control of the US and
its allies, which would be codified within a federal structure dividing the two
zones of influence: “As the terrorist region is being dismantled and brought
under nonradical political control, the future of the Syrian state should be
dealt with concurrently. A federal structure could then be built between the
Alawite and Sunni portions.”

It is worth noting that Kissinger just recently
held an
informal meeting with Trump which centered around policy in Syria.

In any case, events
on the ground have revealed the beginning stages of such a plan already
taking root under Trump, with the US establishing a
myriad of military bases and airport infrastructure throughout the
Kurdish-held regions, signifying a long-term intention of remaining.

Opportunistic War Crime

The April 4th chemical weapons incident
resulted in what appeared to be a shift in US policy. Trump announced
that his “attitude toward Syria and al-Assad has changed very much,” while Nikki
Haley stated there
could be no political solution while Assad was still in power.

However, when seen in hindsight, it is clear these
statements did not represent an actual shift in policy, but instead were made to
justify the Tomahawk attack as a one-off incident while policy thereafter would
continue largely as it had before.

Trump is usually depicted as having been backed
into a corner in the wake of the attack. However, far from being forced into
anything, Trump and his administration seized upon the opportunity the incident
presented and used it as a justification for an attack against Syrian military
targets. Despite having ample evidence that Assad had not committed the crime,
Trump decided to lay blame anyway and to launch an attack in “response.”

In response to this knowledge, Trump side-lined
his CIA-director, who briefed him on the Agency’s belief that Assad was likely
not responsible, and instead allowed National Security Advisor McMaster
discretion to draw up plans for an attack.

McMaster then produced
a report which was meant to prove Syria’s guilt, yet after analysis was
shown to be a
completely fraudulent document that no competent analyst would ever have
signed off on. Furthermore, by launching the attack before any evidence was
gathered, the US consciously prevented an independent UN investigation from
going forward.

The question then is why was this done? Especially
when there was enough evidence for Trump to back out from doing so, similar to
what Obama did in 2013 after the CIA had concluded that the evidence was not a
“slam
dunk.”

The decision can largely be explained as a
response to the domestic political pressure that had been building against
Trump with accusations of collusions with Russia. The attack was an effective
way to relieve the pressure against his administration coming from powerful
sectors of the domestic political establishment. After the attack, Trump’s
political opponents hailed him, forgetting all of their past grievances while proclaiming
that it was that day that he truly
became President of the United States. Relieved, at least temporarily, of
his domestic opponents, the attack as well increased Trump’s unprecedentedly
low approval ratings by
10 percent.

The decision had other benefits, such as sending a
message to China and North Korea, as well as garnering
large profits for Raytheon, the manufacturer of the missiles that were
used, which Trump apparently has a direct financial conflict
of interest with, yet in terms of the Syrian conflict it did not really
change much. The air base that was targeted, although it was announced
that a number of aircrafts were destroyed as a result, was up and running the
next day, and while US-Russia relations were temporarily harmed, deconfliction
communications and negotiations were eventually re-established not long after.

Current
Strategy

Following the chemical attack, Secretary of State
Tillerson explained
the US’ approach to Syria. The focus would be on defeating ISIS, and then to
use the territory regained from them as bargaining leverage in negotiations
with the government. He said, “the process by which Assad would leave is
something that I think requires an international community effort- both to
first defeat ISIS within Syria, to stabilize the Syrian country, to avoid
further civil war, and then to work collectively with our partners around the
world through a political process that would lead to Assad leaving.”

Similarly, after the Tomahawk strike, Defense
Secretary Mattis explained
that “our military policy in Syria has not changed. Our priority remains the
defeat of ISIS.”

Shortly afterwards, Trump himself confirmed that
the missile strike was a one-off attack, and that policy would proceed as
before. He
explained that Assad’s ouster was “going to happen at a certain point,” but
that the US was not insisting on it now. He said that while peace was not
impossible with Assad still in power, that it would be “hard to imagine.”

On the ground, the US had injected an
unprecedented number of its special forces to assist its Kurdish allies to
retake the strategic Tabqa Dam from ISIS, which has recently been fully
accomplished. This maneuver was meant to
cut off the Syrian army from advancing towards the ISIS capital of Raqqa,
to draw the line of a zone of influence the US would occupy while making sure
that it would be the US and its proxies who would eject ISIS from their main base
of influence. This would allow Trump to present his administration as
responsible for defeating ISIS, scoring a highly-coveted PR victory in the
process.

In response to this, Russia, Iran, and Turkey concluded
an agreement for the establishment of de-escalation
zones, areas of ceasefire covering all of the major zones of conflict
between the government and the opposition save against ISIS and the
Turkish-backed forces north of Aleppo.

The de-escalation zones free
up the Syrian army and the Russian air force to pursue newly-launched
offensives eastward against the Islamic State to counter the US efforts.
These offensives are being launched from Palmyra to capture the ISIS-stronghold
of Deir Ezzor, and from Damascus towards the Iraqi border to secure the
al-Tanaf border crossing.

In an effort to stifle the Syrian army’s attempts
to secure its southeastern border, US and Jordanian proxies have
been advancing from Daara and Sweida in the south. These interactive
maneuvers represent a race between the US and Russia to obtain as much
territory as possible from the decaying Islamic State before the other is able
to do so.

Syria’s offensives also represent a response to
the US’ actions in Iraq.

The US had ordered Prime Minister
Abadi to begin an operation to secure the al-Tanaf border crossing from the
Iraqi side, and specifically demanded that the Iranian-backed Popular
Mobilization Forces (PMF) would not participate. Instead, the PMF is engaging
in another operation further north near Mosul to seal the border from the
Islamic State. The main goal of excluding the PMF in the al-Tanaf operation was
to prevent the Syrian army from linking up with Iranian-backed forces there,
which would create a land-line connection between Iran, Syria, and Lebanon from
which Hezbollah could be supplied, further strengthening the “Shia Crescent”
bloc which rivals US power projection in the region.

Therefore, as international correspondent Elijah
J. Magnier reports,
“under the title of ‘defeating ISIS’, the multiple battles and the
confrontation of forces present themselves fundamentally as a confrontation between
the two superpowers [the US and Russia].” These operations “will aim to draw a
line between the two superpowers in Syria, hinting in effect that the war is
going to end.” Its conclusion would be marked by negotiations between the two powers
over their respective zones of influence. The race towards “defeating ISIS”
therefore emphasizing “that Syria will no doubt face partition.”

Partition or Peace?

However, following the recent meeting between the
Russian Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State, and a
hopeful phone call between Trump and Putin, there are indications that some
kind of deal has been reached and that both sides are pursuing diplomacy.

The Wall
Street Journalreported
that for the first time the Syrian Foreign Minister complimented the US-backed
SDF’s fight against ISIS and described their effort as legitimate. The Journal notes that the SDF is now “the
only ground force [fighting against ISIS] with both U.S. and Syrian government
approval.” In addition, Western diplomats are quoted as saying that the
post-capture plan is for the SDF to hand over administration to “a local
civilian council friendly to the Syrian regime” which could then “transfer
control of the city back to the regime.” Russia’s Foreign Minister voiced
support for this plan, so long as the local councils do not circumvent the
Syrian government’s authority. An American official involved in the
anti-Islamic State campaign said that the US “won’t be in Raqqa in 2020, but
the regime will be there.” However, rather ambiguously, he explains this under
the premise that the Syrian government has “a natural home-field advantage” and
therefore will “have a way of slowly getting back in” to the city post-Islamic
State.

This appears to leave open the possibility for the
US’ proxies to retain control when the time comes, if the local council decides
not to “eventually transfer control of the city back to the regime” and if the
regime does not succeed in “slowly getting back in.”

It seems unlikely that the US will simply hand
over these territories. For starters, the Kurdish fighters who have given their
lives to defeat ISIS will demand some
kind of autonomy for their efforts, which could be given in the other areas
in exchange for handing over Raqqa. However, the Gulf states and Turkey, which
have invested enormous resources trying to overthrow the government, will
vehemently oppose ceding any territories, and will likely pressure for a
federation process along the lines of the Kissinger plan, or to sabotage
negotiations completely. As well, there remains the domestic pressure from the
liberals and neocons, and that of the military which has
been pushing instead for a US military invasion. It seems much more likely
that the race to establish zones of influence will continue, and once the two
sides are divided there will be negotiations for some kind of resolution, the
likely result of which being the US handing its territories over to the
government in return for serious concessions.

Indeed, Mattis has
recently commented that deciding how to best “exploit [ISIS] being
banished” is what “occupied an awful lot of our time” in the White House. He
stresses that the “bottom line” is that “we’ve got to restore government
services,” and that the Secretary of State has “hosted 68 countries that are
committed to looking to the day after.” Not including, of course, the Syrian
government.

In closing, it must be noted that the
original motivation for regime-change against Syria was primarily an effort
by the ruling class in America to further extend its economic penetration into
a country which has historically prevented greater access. This is why it has
been US policy for
almost a century, since the 1940’s, to pursue regime-change in Syria. The
fact is that policy in America is not determined democratically, but instead is
decided by the
interests of a powerful business class, the owners of the major corporations
and financial institutions, the top 1%, while the majority of the population is
disenfranchised.

Despite the shift towards a more nationalistic
ruling elite under Trump, those long-standing and institutionalized interests
are unlikely to change. Although Exxon’s business interests lie in a
normalization of relations with Russia, there are also other
energy interests at play, those seekingto
connect the world’s largest natural gas deposit directly to European markets
via a
pipeline running through Syria. That natural gas reserve bisects both the
territories of Iran and Qatar, and the tug-of-war between the US and Russia in
Syria has largely been fought to determine who will be able to exploit these
reserves and reap their rewards. The final tug-of-war to be fought during the resolution
negotiations will likely concern the same issue.