5.
Conscience.

{246} IT seems, then, that there are extreme cases in which
Conscience may come into collision with the word of a Pope, and is to be
followed in spite of that word. Now I wish to place this proposition on
a broader basis, acknowledged by all Catholics, and, in order to do this
satisfactorily, as I began with the prophecies of Scripture and the
primitive Church, when I spoke of the Pope's prerogatives, so now I must
begin with the Creator and His creature, when I would draw out the
prerogatives and the supreme authority of Conscience.

I say, then, that the Supreme Being is of a certain character, which,
expressed in human language, we call ethical. He has the attributes of
justice, truth, wisdom, sanctity, benevolence and mercy, as eternal
characteristics in His nature, the very Law of His being, identical with
Himself; and next, when He became Creator, He implanted this Law, which
is Himself, in the intelligence of all His rational creatures. The
Divine Law, then, is the rule of ethical truth, the standard of right
and wrong, a sovereign, irreversible, absolute authority in the presence
of men and Angels. "The eternal law," says St. Augustine,
"is the Divine Reason or Will of God, commanding {247} the
observance, forbidding the disturbance, of the natural order of
things." "The natural law," says St. Thomas, "is an
impression of the Divine Light in us, a participation of the eternal law
in the rational creature." (Gousset, Theol. Moral., t. i.
pp. 24, &c.) This law, as apprehended in the minds of individual
men, is called "conscience;" and though it may suffer
refraction in passing into the intellectual medium of each, it is not
therefore so affected as to lose its character of being the Divine Law,
but still has, as such, the prerogative of commanding obedience.
"The Divine Law," says Cardinal Gousset, "is the supreme
rule of actions; our thoughts, desires, words, acts, all that man is, is
subject to the domain of the law of God; and this law is the rule of our
conduct by means of our conscience. Hence it is never lawful to go
against our conscience; as the fourth Lateran Council says, 'Quidquid
fit contra conscientiam, ędificat ad gehennam.'"

This view of conscience, I know, is very different from that
ordinarily taken of it, both by the science and literature, and by the
public opinion, of this day. It is founded on the doctrine that
conscience is the voice of God, whereas it is fashionable on all hands
now to consider it in one way or another a creation of man. Of course,
there are great and broad exceptions to this statement. It is not true
of many or most religious bodies of men; especially not of their
teachers and ministers. When Anglicans, Wesleyans, the various
Presbyterian sects in Scotland, and other denominations among us, speak
of conscience, they mean what we mean, the voice of God in the nature
and heart of man, as distinct from the voice of Revelation. {248} They
speak of a principle planted within us, before we have had any training,
although training and experience are necessary for its strength, growth,
and due formation. They consider it a constituent element of the mind,
as our perception of other ideas may be, as our powers of reasoning, as
our sense of order and the beautiful, and our other intellectual
endowments. They consider it, as Catholics consider it, to be the
internal witness of both the existence and the law of God. They think it
holds of God, and not of man, as an Angel walking on the earth would be
no citizen or dependent of the Civil Power. They would not allow, any
more than we do, that it could be resolved into any combination of
principles in our nature, more elementary than itself; nay, though it
may be called, and is, a law of the mind, they would not grant that it
was nothing more; I mean, that it was not a dictate, nor conveyed the
notion of responsibility, of duty, of a threat and a promise, with a
vividness which discriminated it from all other constituents of our
nature.

This, at least, is how I read the doctrine of Protestants as well as
of Catholics. The rule and measure of duty is not utility, nor
expedience, nor the happiness of the greatest number, nor State
convenience, nor fitness, order, and the pulchrum. Conscience is
not a long-sighted selfishness, nor a desire to be consistent with
oneself; but it is a messenger from Him, who, both in nature and in
grace, speaks to us behind a veil, and teaches and rules us by His
representatives. Conscience is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ, a prophet
in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness, a priest in its
{249} blessings and anathemas, and, even though the eternal priesthood
throughout the Church could cease to be, in it the sacerdotal principle
would remain and would have a sway.

Words such as these are idle empty verbiage to the great world of
philosophy now. All through my day there has been a resolute warfare, I
had almost said conspiracy against the rights of conscience, as I have
described it. Literature and science have been embodied in great
institutions in order to put it down. Noble buildings have been reared
as fortresses against that spiritual, invisible influence which is too
subtle for science and too profound for literature. Chairs in
Universities have been made the seats of an antagonist tradition. Public
writers, day after day, have indoctrinated the minds of innumerable
readers with theories subversive of its claims. As in Roman times, and
in the middle age, its supremacy was assailed by the arm of physical
force, so now the intellect is put in operation to sap the foundations
of a power which the sword could not destroy. We are told that
conscience is but a twist in primitive and untutored man; that its
dictate is an imagination; that the very notion of guiltiness, which
that dictate enforces, is simply irrational, for how can there possibly
be freedom of will, how can there be consequent responsibility, in that
infinite eternal network of cause and effect, in which we helplessly
lie? and what retribution have we to fear, when we have had no real
choice to do good or evil?

So much for philosophers; now let us see what is the notion of
conscience in this day in the popular mind. {250} There, no more than in
the intellectual world, does "conscience" retain the old,
true, Catholic meaning of the word. There too the idea, the presence of
a Moral Governor is far away from the use of it, frequent and emphatic
as that use of it is. When men advocate the rights of conscience, they
in no sense mean the rights of the Creator, nor the duty to Him, in
thought and deed, of the creature; but the right of thinking, speaking,
writing, and acting, according to their judgment or their humour,
without any thought of God at all. They do not even pretend to go by any
moral rule, but they demand, what they think is an Englishman's
prerogative, for each to be his own master in all things, and to profess
what he pleases, asking no one's leave, and accounting priest or
preacher, speaker or writer, unutterably impertinent, who dares to say a
word against his going to perdition, if he like it, in his own way.
Conscience has rights because it has duties; but in this age, with a
large portion of the public, it is the very right and freedom of
conscience to dispense with conscience, to ignore a Lawgiver and Judge,
to be independent of unseen obligations. It becomes a licence to take up
any or no religion, to take up this or that and let it go again, to go
to church, to go to chapel, to boast of being above all religions and to
be an impartial critic of each of them. Conscience is a stern monitor,
but in this century it has been superseded by a counterfeit, which the
eighteen centuries prior to it never heard of, and could not have
mistaken for it, if they had. It is the right of self-will.

And now I shall turn aside for a moment to show {251} how it is that
the Popes of our century have been misunderstood by the English people,
as if they really were speaking against conscience in the true sense of
the word, when in fact they were speaking against it in the various
false senses, philosophical or popular, which in this day are put upon
the word. The present Pope, in his Encyclical of 1864, Quantā curā,
speaks (as will come before us in the next section) against
"liberty of conscience," and he refers to his predecessor,
Gregory XVI., who, in his Mirari vos, calls it a "deliramentum."
It is a rule in formal ecclesiastical proceedings, as I shall have
occasion to notice lower down, when books or authors are condemned, to
use the very words of the book or author, and to condemn the words in
that particular sense which they have in their context and their drift,
not in the literal, not in the religious sense, such as the Pope might
recognize, were they in another book or author. To take a familiar
parallel, among many which occur daily. Protestants speak of the
"Blessed Reformation;" Catholics too talk of "the
Reformation," though they do not call it blessed. Yet every
"reformation" ought, from the very meaning of the word, to be
good, not bad; so that Catholics seem to be implying a eulogy on an
event which, at the same time, they consider a surpassing evil. Here
then they are taking the word and using it in the popular sense of it,
not in the Catholic. They would say, if they expressed their full
meaning, "the so-called reformation." In like manner,
if the Pope condemned "the Reformation," it would be utterly
sophistical to say in consequence that he had declared himself against
all reforms; yet this is how Mr. Gladstone {252} treats him, when he
speaks of (so-called) liberty of conscience. To make this distinction
clear, viz., between the Catholic sense of the word
"conscience," and that sense in which the Pope condemns it, we
find in the Recueil des Allocutions, &c., the words
accompanied with quotation-marks, both in Pope Gregory's and Pope Pius's
Encyclicals, thus:—Gregory's, "Ex hoc putidissimo 'indifferentismi'
fonte," (mind, "indifferentismi" is under
quotation-marks, because the Pope will not make himself answerable for
so unclassical a word) "absurda illa fluit ac erronea sententia,
seu potius deliramentum, asserendam esse ac vindicandam cuilibet 'libertatem
conscientię.'" And that of Pius, "Haud timent erroneam illam
fovere opinionem a Gregorio XVI. deliramentum appellatam, nimirum 'libertatem
conscientię' esse proprium cujuscunque hominis jus." Both Popes
certainly scoff at the so-called "liberty of conscience," but
there is no scoffing of any Pope, in formal documents addressed to the
faithful at large, at that most serious doctrine, the right and the duty
of following that Divine Authority, the voice of conscience, on which in
truth the Church herself is built.

So indeed it is; did the Pope speak against Conscience in the true
sense of the word, he would commit a suicidal act. He would be cutting
the ground from under his feet. His very mission is to proclaim the
moral law, and to protect and strengthen that "Light which
enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world." On the law of
conscience and its sacredness are founded both his authority in theory
and his power in fact. Whether this or that particular Pope in this bad
world always kept {253} this great truth in view in all he did, it is
for history to tell. I am considering here the Papacy in its office and
its duties, and in reference to those who acknowledge its claims. They
are not bound by the Pope's personal character or private acts, but by
his formal teaching. Thus viewing his position, we shall find that it is
by the universal sense of right and wrong, the consciousness of
transgression, the pangs of guilt, and the dread of retribution, as
first principles deeply lodged in the hearts of men, it is thus and only
thus, that he has gained his footing in the world and achieved his
success. It is his claim to come from the Divine Lawgiver, in order to
elicit, protect, and enforce those truths which the Lawgiver has sown in
our very nature, it is this and this only that is the explanation of his
length of life more than antediluvian. The championship of the Moral Law
and of conscience is his raison d'źtre. The fact of his mission
is the answer to the complaints of those who feel the insufficiency of
the natural light; and the insufficiency of that light is the
justification of his mission.

All sciences, except the science of Religion, have their certainty in
themselves; as far as they are sciences, they consist of necessary
conclusions from undeniable premises, or of phenomena manipulated into
general truths by an irresistible induction. But the sense of right and
wrong, which is the first element in religion, is so delicate, so
fitful, so easily puzzled, obscured, perverted, so subtle in its
argumentative methods, so impressible by education, so biassed by pride
and passion, so unsteady in its course, that, in the struggle for
existence amid the various exercises and triumphs of the human
intellect, {254} this sense is at once the highest of all teachers, yet
the least luminous; and the Church, the Pope, the Hierarchy are, in the
Divine purpose, the supply of an urgent demand. Natural Religion,
certain as are its grounds and its doctrines as addressed to thoughtful,
serious minds, needs, in order that it may speak to mankind with effect
and subdue the world, to be sustained and completed by Revelation.

In saying all this, of course I must not be supposed to be limiting
the Revelation of which the Church is the keeper to a mere republication
of the Natural Law; but still it is true, that, though Revelation is so
distinct from the teaching of nature and beyond it, yet it is not
independent of it, nor without relations towards it, but is its
complement, reassertion, issue, embodiment, and interpretation. The
Pope, who comes of Revelation, has no jurisdiction over Nature. If,
under the plea of his revealed prerogatives, he neglected his mission of
preaching truth, justice, mercy, and peace, much more if he trampled on
the consciences of his subjects,—if he had done so all along, as
Protestants say, then he could not have lasted all these many centuries
till now, so as to supply a mark for their reprobation. Dean Milman has
told us above, how faithful he was to his duty in the medieval time, and
how successful. Afterwards, for a while the Papal chair was filled by
men who gave themselves up to luxury, security, and a Pagan kind of
Christianity; and we all know what a moral earthquake was the
consequence, and how the Church lost, thereby, and has lost to this day,
one-half of Europe. The Popes could not have recovered from so terrible
a catastrophe, {255} as they have done, had they not returned to their
first and better ways, and the grave lesson of the past is in itself the
guarantee of the future.

Such is the relation of the ecclesiastical power to the human
conscience:—however, a contrary view may be taken of it. It may be
said that no one doubts that the Pope's power rests on those weaknesses
of human nature, that religious sense, which in ancient days Lucretius
noted as the cause of the worst ills of our race; that he uses it
dexterously, forming under shelter of it a false code of morals for his
own aggrandisement and tyranny; and that thus conscience becomes his
creature and his slave, doing, as if on a divine sanction, his will; so
that in the abstract indeed and in idea it is free, but never free in
fact, never able to take a flight of its own, independent of him, any
more than birds whose wings are clipped;—moreover, that, if it were
able to exert a will of its own, then there would ensue a collision more
unmanageable than that between the Church and the State, as being in one
and the same subject-matter—viz., religion; for what would become of
the Pope's "absolute authority," as Mr. Gladstone calls it, if
the private conscience had an absolute authority also?

I wish to answer this important objection distinctly.

1. First, I am using the word "conscience" in the high
sense in which I have already explained it,—not as a fancy or an
opinion, but as a dutiful obedience to what claims to be a divine voice,
speaking within us; and that this is the view properly to be taken of
it, I shall not attempt to prove here, but shall assume it as a first
principle. {256}

2. Secondly, I observe that conscience is not a judgment upon any
speculative truth, any abstract doctrine, but bears immediately on
conduct, on something to be done or not done. "Conscience,"
says St. Thomas, "is the practical judgment or dictate of reason,
by which we judge what hic et nunc is to be done as being good,
or to be avoided as evil." Hence conscience cannot come into direct
collision with the Church's or the Pope's infallibility; which is
engaged in general propositions, and in the condemnation of particular
and given errors.

3. Next, I observe that, conscience being a practical dictate, a
collision is possible between it and the Pope's authority only when the
Pope legislates, or gives particular orders, and the like. But a Pope is
not infallible in his laws, nor in his commands, nor in his acts of
state, nor in his administration, nor in his public policy. Let it be
observed that the Vatican Council has left him just as it found him
here. Mr. Gladstone's language on this point is to me quite
unintelligible. Why, instead of using vague terms, does he not point out
precisely the very words by which the Council has made the Pope in his
acts infallible? Instead of so doing, he assumes a conclusion which is
altogether false. He says, p. 34, "First comes the Pope's
infallibility:" then in the next page he insinuates that, under his
infallibility, come acts of excommunication, as if the Pope could not
make mistakes in this field of action. He says, p. 35, "It may be
sought to plead that the Pope does not propose to invade the country, to
seize Woolwich, or burn Portsmouth. He will only, at the worst,
excommunicate {257} opponents ... Is this a good answer? After all, even
in the Middle Ages, it was not by the direct action of fleets and armies
of their own that the Popes contended with kings who were refractory; it
was mainly by interdicts," &c. What have excommunication and
interdict to do with Infallibility? Was St. Peter infallible on that
occasion at Antioch when St. Paul withstood him? was St. Victor
infallible when he separated from his communion the Asiatic Churches? or
Liberius when in like manner he excommunicated Athanasius? And, to come
to later times, was Gregory XIII., when he had a medal struck in honour
of the Bartholomew massacre? or Paul IV. in his conduct towards
Elizabeth? or Sextus V. when he blessed the Armada? or Urban VIII. when
he persecuted Galileo? No Catholic ever pretends that these Popes were
infallible in these acts. Since then infallibility alone could block the
exercise of conscience, and the Pope is not infallible in that
subject-matter in which conscience is of supreme authority, no deadlock,
such as is implied in the objection which I am answering, can take place
between conscience and the Pope.

4. But, of course, I have to say again, lest I should be
misunderstood, that when I speak of Conscience, I mean conscience truly
so called. When it has the right of opposing the supreme, though not
infallible Authority of the Pope, it must be something more than that
miserable counterfeit which, as I have said above, now goes by the name.
If in a particular case it is to be taken as a sacred and sovereign
monitor, its dictate, in order to prevail against the voice of the Pope,
must follow upon {258} serious thought, prayer, and all available means
of arriving at a right judgment on the matter in question. And further,
obedience to the Pope is what is called "in possession;" that
is, the onus probandi of establishing a case against him lies, as
in all cases of exception, on the side of conscience. Unless a man is
able to say to himself, as in the Presence of God, that he must not, and
dare not, act upon the Papal injunction, he is bound to obey it, and
would commit a great sin in disobeying it. Primā facie it is his
bounden duty, even from a sentiment of loyalty, to believe the Pope
right and to act accordingly. He must vanquish that mean, ungenerous,
selfish, vulgar spirit of his nature, which, at the very first rumour of
a command, places itself in opposition to the Superior who gives it,
asks itself whether he is not exceeding his right, and rejoices, in a
moral and practical matter to commence with scepticism. He must have no
wilful determination to exercise a right of thinking, saying, doing just
what he pleases, the question of truth and falsehood, right and wrong,
the duty if possible of obedience, the love of speaking as his Head
speaks, and of standing in all cases on his Head's side, being simply
discarded. If this necessary rule were observed, collisions between the
Pope's authority and the authority of conscience would be very rare. On
the other hand, in the fact that, after all, in extraordinary cases, the
conscience of each individual is free, we have a safeguard and security,
were security necessary (which is a most gratuitous supposition), that
no Pope ever will be able, as the objection supposes, to create a false
conscience for his own ends. {259}

Now, I shall end this part of the subject, for I have not done with
it altogether, by appealing to various of our theologians in evidence
that, in what I have been saying, I have not misrepresented Catholic
doctrine on these important points.

That is, on the duty of obeying our conscience at all hazards.

I have already quoted the words which Cardinal Gousset has adduced
from the Fourth Lateran; that "He who acts against his conscience
loses his soul." This dictum is brought out with singular
fulness and force in the moral treatises of theologians. The celebrated
school, known as the Salmanticenses, or Carmelites of Salamanca, lays
down the broad proposition, that conscience is ever to be obeyed whether
it tells truly or erroneously, and that, whether the error is the fault
of the person thus erring or not [Note].
They say that this opinion is certain, and refer, as agreeing with them,
to St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, Caietan, Vasquez, Durandus, Navarrus,
Corduba, Layman, Escobar, and fourteen others. Two of them even say this
opinion is de fide. Of course, if a man is culpable in being in
error, which he might have escaped, had he been more in earnest, for
that error he is answerable to God, but still he must act according to
that error, while he is in it, because he in full sincerity thinks the
error to be truth. {260}

Thus, if the Pope told the English Bishops to order their priests to
stir themselves energetically in favour of teetotalism, and a particular
priest was fully persuaded that abstinence from wine, &c., was
practically a Gnostic error, and therefore felt he could not so exert
himself without sin; or suppose there was a Papal order to hold
lotteries in each mission for some religious object, and a priest could
say in God's sight that he believed lotteries to be morally wrong, that
priest in either of these cases would commit a sin hic et nunc if
he obeyed the Pope, whether he was right or wrong in his opinion, and,
if wrong, although he had not taken proper pains to get at the truth of
the matter.

Busenbaum, of the Society of Jesus, whose work I have already had
occasion to notice, writes thus:—"A heretic, as long as he judges
his sect to be more or equally deserving of belief, has no obligation to
believe [in the Church]." And he continues, "When men who have
been brought up in heresy, are persuaded from boyhood that we impugn and
attack the word of God, that we are idolators, pestilent deceivers, and
therefore are to be shunned as pests, they cannot, while this persuasion
lasts, with a safe conscience, hear us."—t. l, p. 54.

Antonio Corduba, a Spanish Franciscan, states the doctrine with still
more point, because he makes mention of Superiors. "In no manner is
it lawful to act against conscience, even though a Law, or a Superior
commands it."—De Conscient., p. 138.

And the French Dominican, Natalis Alexander:—"If, in the
judgment of conscience, through a mistaken conscience, a man is
persuaded that what his Superior {261} commands is displeasing to God,
he is bound not to obey."—Theol. t. 2, p. 32.

The word "Superior" certainly includes the Pope; Cardinal
Jacobatius brings out this point clearly in his authoritative work on
Councils, which is contained in Labbe's Collection, introducing the Pope
by name:—"If it were doubtful," he says, "whether a
precept [of the Pope] be a sin or not, we must determine thus:—that,
if he to whom the precept is addressed has a conscientious sense that it
is a sin and injustice, first it is duty to put off that sense; but, if
he cannot, nor conform himself to the judgment of the Pope, in that case
it is his duty to follow his own private conscience, and patiently to
bear it, if the Pope punishes him."—lib. iv. p. 241.

Would it not be well for Mr. Gladstone to bring passages from our
recognized authors as confirmatory of his view of our teaching, as those
which I have quoted are destructive of it? and they must be passages
declaring, not only that the Pope is ever to be obeyed, but that there
are no exceptions to the rule, for exceptions there must be in all
concrete matters.

I add one remark. Certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into
after-dinner toasts, (which indeed does not seem quite the thing) I
shall drink—to the Pope, if you please,—still, to Conscience first,
and to the Pope afterwards.