The
ongoing controversy in Canada over the bureaucratic decision to
procure the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, in preference to conducting an
open competition to select a replacement aircraft for Canada's fleet
of obsolete and worn out CF-18A Hornets, bears careful scrutiny. The
parallels between the bureaucratic behaviours observed in Canada
surrounding the F-35, and like behaviours in the Canberra DoD
bureaucracy, are remarkable. The mismatch between the F-35 and
Canada's strategic needs is fundamentally no different from the
mismatch between the F-35 and Australia's strategic needs. Both
nations are gravitating into a black hole which will see their
respective air forces emasculated and unable to perform their primary
mission of protecting national airspace from foreign air forces1.

This
also means the Australian Defence Force will not meet the strategic
directives of successive Australian Defence White Papers, and will
not achieve air superiority in the regional environment.

The
F-35 is an aircraft which was defined as a battlefield interdictor,
intended to attack and destroy hostile battlefield ground forces,
once opposing air defences have been stripped away by the much more
capable, and now cheaper F-22 Raptor. The JSF aircraft was defined
for a very narrow niche role, and its intended performance and
capabilities were constrained to avoid overlapping other US Air Force
capability niches, such as “deep strike” occupied by the F-15E
and F-22A, and “air dominance”, occupied by the F-22A.

The
actual F-35 aircraft, as it has “devolved” through a problematic
and protracted development process, shows all the signs of falling
well below the promised and mediocre performance targets set in the
original definition document. This is largely the result of
cumulative and failed efforts to control weight and unit procurement
costs, and also the failed effort to achieve high commonality between
variants intended for radically different deployment regimes2.

The
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is now a prime example of a poorly defined
design which is being poorly implemented. It remains a funded program
primarily due to incessant political protection by the United States
OSD (Office of the Secretary for Defense) which has for the last
several years shielded the program from proper scrutiny, while
systematically working to shut down production of every possible
alternative design being built by US industry, including the vastly
superior and far more cost effective F-22A Raptor.

The
behaviour of the OSD in relation to the F-35 program is clearly
irrational from the perspectives of maintaining US and Allied
strategic weight in air power, and maintaining essential diversity in
the industrial base. However, it is the well understood behaviour of
a bureaucracy that has blundered badly and wishes to protect itself
from criticism. Such is the power of Janis' Groupthink, in
organisations where it is actively fostered and promoted by the
leader, in this instance the Secretary himself. By all conventional
measures applied in project management, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
clearly and unequivocally qualifies in all respects as a “failed
project”, but survives as the political credibility of the OSD and its
Secretary have been wedded by prior actions to the survival of
the project.

What
is remarkable about the Canadian government decision to pursue the
F-35 is that it occurred during a period where the failure of the
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is patently obvious, well documented
publicly, and provable by reading a myriad of US and non-US public
documents. While Australia's dysfunctional Canberra DoD bureaucracy
wedded itself to the F-35 program in 2001 - 2002, primarily through
the actions of a small internal cabal of civilian and some uniformed
senior bureaucrats, when only the failure of the F-35 JSF definition
could be proved, Canada's DND bureaucracy has improved upon this by
doing exactly the same when the failure of the program's
implementation is also provably obvious.

That
there has been intensive domestic public criticism of the Canadian
decision should come as no surprise, as many Canadians do read
overseas publications and are prepared to think critically about
their nation's future. A number of Canadians have complained
privately to APA about the behaviour of their DND bureaucracy, and
its unwillingness to put long term national defence needs above the
very short term political needs of the Washington OSD.

Contemporary
Foreign
Capabilities
Canada's
Fighters Must Defeat

Tu-160
Blackjack launching a Kh-55SM from its aft bay. Russia is currently
expanding its fleet of these formidable strategic bombers (Russian MoD).

The
Raduga Kh-55SM (above) is a Russian analogue
of the
never deployed AGM-109 air launched Tomahawk. It was reverse engineered
by the PLA to develop the CJ-10 Long Sword (below), an air launched
variant of which is expected (Russian Internet, Chinese Internet).

The
Chinese
PLA almost acquired refurbished Russian Tu-95MS Bear H and Tu-22M3
Backfire C aircraft post 2001. The funding was later diverted into the
Xian H-6K turbofan Badger and development of an aircraft carrier fleet
(Tupolev bureau image).

Second prototype
of the
Su-35S
Flanker. This fully digital fighter is a deep redesign of the mature
T-10 Flanker family, and outclasses all Western fighters other than the
F-22A Raptor. Russia's KnAAPO intends to export hundreds of these long
range fighters (KnAAPO image).

The
stealthy supercruising PAK-FA was developed
to
directly compete against the F-22A Raptor and will outperform the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter in all key parameters. Its highly refined stealth
shaping indicates that its stealth performance will be similar to
that of the
F-35. Like the Su-35S, it is intended for volume exports (KnAAPO image).

This
begs the question of “What
are Canada's national strategic needs in air power?”.

The
geostrategic realities which Canada confronts today are in many
respects no different from those during the Cold War period, in the
sense that Canada is a geographical buffer space between the CONUS
and any nations which choose to compete against the US and are
located on the Asian continental mass.

During
the Cold War the Soviet Union threatened massive air attacks, to be
flown by strategic bombers over the Arctic wasteland to hit targets
in the CONUS. Canada, as a closely allied nation, would have been
treated by the Soviets no differently to the US. The imperatives
during that period, for the RCAF, were to provide a robust air
defence barrier to keep Soviet bombers away from Canadian and CONUS
air space. A secondary imperative during that period was for the RCAF
to support NATO forces in Europe with reinforcements, in the event of
war with the Warsaw Pact.

While
the Soviet Union is now gone, the geostrategic considerations remain.
Russia continues to operate its fleet of Tu-95MS Bear H and Tu-160
Blackjack A nuclear armed strategic bombers, and recently authorised
assembly of additional Tu-160 aircraft from stockpiled production
components to build up its fleet size. These bombers are armed with
the Kh-55SM strategic cruise missile, similar in design to the US
Tomahawk cruise missiles, but may also carry high yield free fall
nuclear bombs where target value is considered high enough. The
Russians have in recent times resumed aerial alert patrols by the
strategic bomber fleet, and have repeatedly tested NATO air defence
response times. The Russian Bear may no longer be driven by Soviet
ideological agendas, but it has not lost any of its strategic teeth,
nor its appetite for confrontational behaviours3.

The
bigger “grand strategic” consideration for Canada is China's
evident intention to become a strategic peer competitor to the United
States in the Asia-Pacific region. China has been conducting a major
and deep restructure of its military force structure, investing
heavily in capabilities to strike high value targets with nuclear and
conventional munitions, to a radius currently of around 2,500
nautical miles. This is intended to put at risk existing US basing
infrastructure across the Western Pacific region.

China
has yet to invest in true strategic air power, in the manner the
Soviets did, but have repeatedly flirted over the previous decade
with the Russians over the purchase of Tu-95MS Bear H strategic
bombers, and refurbished Tu-22M3 Backfire C “sub-strategic”
bombers. The Backfire C would have been operated now by the PLA-AF,
had it not been hobbled by domestic aerospace industry lobbying to
continue development of the extended range H-6K “turbofan Badger”
and PLA Navy lobbying to fund aircraft carriers. So at this time
China lacks the strategic bomber fleet required to hold at risk CONUS
and Canadian territory, in the manner the Soviets did, and Russia
continues to do.

Whether
the PLA-AF deploys a strategic bomber fleet along the lines of
Russia's Dal'naya Aviatsia
remains to be seen, and will depend on future perceived strategic
priorities in Beijing. China clearly has the capability to reverse
engineer Soviet era designs, and could develop a capability in the
medium term based on legacy Soviet bombers, or indigenous technology.
China already manufactures a diverse range of “Tomahawk-like”
cruise missiles, largely based on Soviet Kh-55SM technology,
illegitimately obtained from the Ukraine though a covert operation,
the subject of major controversy in the Ukrainian parliament some
years ago. Any future PLA strategic bomber fleet would fly profiles
against the CONUS over the northern Arctic region as this presents
the shortest great circle distance from northern Chinese basing
sites. Geography will drive the PLA into the same game plan the
Soviets played to.

What
is clear is that Canada's long term strategic needs in air power will
be dominated by capabilities to provide robust air defence against
strategic bombers and especially their cruise missile payloads,
accepting that strategic “needs” may be diametrically opposed to
DND bureaucratic “wants”.

In
terms of secondary strategic priorities, expeditionary warfare
campaigns supporting the United States and/or British Commonwealth
nations will produce an ongoing demand for Canadian air component
participation.

In
supporting expeditionary campaigns, needs become much less clearly
defined in comparison with the protection of Canada's landmass and
territorial ocean areas.

Expeditionary
campaigns can be broadly divided into two categories – those where
the opponent is an underdeveloped Third World “failed state”
where the fighting force are insurgents unable to contest control of
the air, and those where the opponent is a nation with an air force
and air defence system, and the capability to contest control of the
air.

The
former category encompasses Iraq, Afghanistan, and various African
nations, where fighting is exclusively limited to COIN (COunter
INsurgency) operations. Aircraft which are simple, rugged, easy to
deploy and support from remote sites, and capable of delivering good
firepower and endurance with a robust sensor payload work best. The
best performers in the United States fleet, in COIN operations, have
been the A-10 Thunderbolt II or “Warthog”, the F-15E Strike
Eagle, and the heavy B-52H Stratofortress and B-1B Lancer.

Expeditionary
campaigns in the latter category are now becoming problematic due to
the global proliferation of advanced Russian fighter aircraft such as
the T-10 Flanker series, T-50 PAK-FA, and advanced Surface to Air
Missile (SAM) systems such as the S-300PMU2 and S-400. In time, this
collection of potent Russian technology will be added to and further
diversified as China exports advanced modern systems like the
HQ-9/FD-2000, based on the Russian S-300PMU series, and the J-10B
Sinocanard and J-11B Flanker B+, based on modern Russian fighter
technology4, 5, 6,
7.

These
advanced systems are now available to any buyer with the funds, other
than Iran, the latter due to the recent UN embargo. They are, in
basic technology, comparable to American and European weapons
designs, but often outperform their Western competitors in key areas,
especially kinematics and/or radar power.

As
a result, defining a strategic need for Canadian expeditionary force
capabilities is a more complex problem, as the need depends
fundamentally on what types of expeditionary campaigns the Canadian
military is intended to participate in. If Canada only wishes to
partake in COIN campaigns, fighter capability choices would be driven
by costs primarily, whereas if Canada intends to partake in a wider
range
of expeditionary campaigns, fighter capabilities become absolutely
critical.

There
is one more consideration which applies to Canada's strategic needs
in fighter re-equipment, which is that of evolving doctrine and
fighter capabilities in non-Western nations.

Russia
is now in the early production phase of the Su-35S Flanker E+, and in
the flight testing phase for the T-50 PAK-FA stealth fighter. The
Su-35S is a formidable conventional fighter, which outperforms all US
and EU types other than the F-22A Raptor, and is intended for high
volume exports. The PAK-FA is Russia's answer to the F-22A Raptor,
which is expected to aerodynamically outperform the F-22A in key
flight regimes, but will not match the stealth performance of the
F-22A. The PAK-FA will almost certainly match the stealth performance
of the
much inferior F-35.

Both
of these Russian fighters are built to achieve an unrefuelled combat
radius of around 1,000 nautical miles, and can be refuelled by a
tanker aircraft. As a result, both could be used to escort other
aircraft into defended airspace.

Stated
Russian and Chinese strategic bombardment doctrine has yet to
incorporate the use of fighter aircraft to escort heavy bombers. As
the escort of heavy bombers by long range fighters is a practice
dating back to 1943, the notion that the Russians, Chinese or any of
their clients would not deploy fighter escorts when in possession of
long range fighters like the Su-35S or PAK-FA and aerial refuelling
tankers is simply naïve.

If
Canada does deploy the F-35 JSF as its primary fighter aircraft, the
Su-35S and PAK-FA could operate in and fly through Canadian sovereign
airspace with complete impunity.

If
we take a hard analytical perspective on what Canada's long term
strategic needs in fighter aircraft are, as distinct from DND
bureaucratic “wants” in this area, several considerations become
prominent:

National air defence will
require a large twin engined fighter with superlative supersonic
performance, superlative radar performance, and a large missile payload
to defeat strategic bombers and their cruise missile payloads;

The proliferation of
advanced long range fighters such as the Su-35S and PAK-FA will put a
premium on combat agility for both beyond visual range (BVR) and within
visual range (WVR) engagements, supersonic agility, and stealth
performance;

Expeditionary campaigns
into “contested” airspace will require the ability to survive against
advanced SAM systems such as the S-400, S-300PMU2, HQ-9 and planned
S-500, putting a premium on high stealth performance;

Expeditionary campaigns in
COIN environments will require the ability to operate from shorter
airfields, with high endurance and large, varied weapon payloads.

The
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, by both definition and design, is
fundamentally unsuited to any one and every one of these basic needs.

The F-35 lacks the range,
missile payload, radar performance and especially supersonic
performance to be effective in the strategic air defence role, and with
a single engine puts the lives of Canadian pilots at unnecessary risk
in harsh Arctic conditions.

The F-35 lacks the
supersonic performance, missile payload, radar performance, agility and
stealth performance to be effective in combat against the Su-35S
Flanker E+, and has no ability to compete with the Sukhoi PAK-FA. This
makes the F-35 ineffective in strategic air defence, if fighter escorts
are deployed, and ineffective in expeditionary campaigns where the
opponent operates such fighters.

The F-35 lacks the stealth
performance to penetrate modern air defence systems armed with weapons
such as the S-400, S-300PMU2, HQ-9 and planned S-500, especially if
these SAMs are supported by modern “counter-stealth” radars operating
in the lower radar bands.

In uncontested COIN
operations, the F-35 lacks the payload and endurance to perform well,
does not have the ballistic survivability for Close Air Support (CAS),
and the CTOL variant demands long runways for operations, limiting
choices in deployment sites.

Against
each and every one of these clearly identifiable strategic needs for
Canada's future fighter force, the F-35 JSF is an abject failure.

Which
aircraft currently in production meet Canada's strategic needs?

The
only single type of fighter which can meet all of these needs is the
F-22A Raptor, which Canada can clearly afford to procure, given that
the DND is quite happy to fund the much inferior F-35 JSF at a
similar or higher unit cost. Canada was identified a decade ago in a
US Air Force study by Molloy as one of the nations to which the
F-22A Raptor could be safely exported8.

Are
there any genuinely credible alternatives for Canada, other than the
F-22A Raptor?

If
Canada wishes to limit its future air force roles to COIN and
strategic air defence against unescorted heavy bombers and cruise
missiles, then a derivative of the F-15E with the APG-82 AESA radar
could fill such a requirement. It would however leave Canada
vulnerable in any air defence scenario where Su-35S or PAK-FA fighter
escorts are present, and would deny Canada participation in
expeditionary campaigns where these advanced fighters, or advanced
SAMs are deployed.

If
the “Gates Doctrine” of stripping the US Air Force down and
optimising it for COIN operations persists beyond the Obama
Administration's term of office, then Canada will not be able to rely
on the Americans providing upper tier F-22A wings to supplement
Canadian air defence units, or protect Canadian fighters from
advanced SAMs and fighters in expeditionary campaigns, since the US
Air Force will not have enough F-22s to perform even its own basic
missions.

In
this respect Canada is confronting the same fundamental strategic
problem which Australia confronts. That is, advancing threat
capabilities leave only the F-22 Raptor as a viable aircraft in
contested airspace; yet, under the “Gates Doctrine”, even the US
Air Force is to be denied sufficient numbers of the these aircraft to
be effective in anything other than the smallest of contingencies.
Just as Australia's Canberra DoD has failed to study and articulate
national needs properly, so it would appear that the Canadian DND has
fallen into the very same trap.

Canadians
therefore need to ask some very serious questions about the DND's
performance in assessing fighter needs, and some equally serious
questions about why Canada appears to be espousing the completely
bankrupt and intellectually dishonest “Gates
Doctrine” for air power planning.