The objective of this paper
is to provide a historical overview of the processes of communal identity
formation in Sri Lanka with special reference to the Muslim community [1]. Sri Lanka is a
multi-ethnic society in which Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims and others have
coexisted for centuries. However, in more recent times, ethnic relations on the
Island have been consistently strained by the rise of communalist politics which
have deepened ethnic and religious divides. Of course, communalisation and the
rise of identity politics are not unique to Sri Lanka. Ethnic and religious
identitarianism has acquired unprecedented importance in various parts of the
world.

It is
widely recognised that communal identity formation is a cultural-ideological
process. However, this process is driven by conflicts over the distribution of
political power and opportunities for and benefits of development among the different communities. The ideological
fashioning of exclusive communal identities takes place in an environment of
interaction generally characterised by mutual hostility. This interaction also
provides models of myth making and identity moulding which the ideologues of one
community may borrow from the other.

The Lankan polity and
society appear to be divided into four main communal blocks: Sinhalese, whose
identity is articulated in Sinhala Buddhist terms although there is a Christian
minority among them; Tamils whose identity is defined linguistically and
territorially with reference to a traditional homeland in the North and East
although a considerable number of them are settled outside this region;
Upcountry Tamils who are differentiated from the other Tamils because of their more
recent Indian origin and geographic location in the plantation areas of the
upcountry; and Muslims whose identity is expressed in religious terms and
comprise Moors and Malays settled throughout the country with the largest
concentration in the East. Today, these four groups are generally represented by
communal political parties in the country's legislature.

Communalisation began in
the British period when the colonial government imposed a classification of the
Lankan society along ethno-religious and regional lines. Its character changed
and its historical course became complex in the past hundred years or so as the
originally imposed communal identities were modified and at times challenged and
reconstructed by the emerging dominant groups within each community. During this
period, ethno-nationalism became both a cross-class unifier of particular
ethnies and a bulwark against the development of an overarching secular
corporate Lankan consciousness. The post-independence history of Lanka has been
characterised by the communalisation of the Lankan State by the rise of the
Sinhala Buddhist ideology to hegemonic stature, the further deepening of the
communal divides, and, in more recent times, the militarisation of ethnic
conflicts.

Furthermore, the various
ethno-nationalist projects in Sri Lanka have, as elsewhere, served to justify
and reinforce the subordination of women. The gender dimension of nationalist
ideological projects has remained neglected for too long by analysts of ethnic
conflicts. This is surprising as the construction of nationalist cultural
identity has almost universally involved the justification and reinforcement of
women's subordination. In their search for symbols and traditions to construct a
cultural identity that served their interests, the dominant groups in
ethno-nationalist movements tend to treat women as repositories of tradition.
Experience in many parts of the world suggests that even where women are part of
the armed struggle for national self-determination along with men, their role as
bearers of traditional values may not change so significantly. Thus one of the
features of the conflicting communal identities in Lanka and elsewhere in South
Asia is the conservation and reinforcement of patriarchal values.

After a brief conceptual
note on communal identity formation, this paper proceeds to address the
different phases of Muslim identity formation in Sri Lanka from the British
period to the present. Treating the Lankan Muslim identity question as a subject
dynamically linked to the formation of Sinhala and Tamil communal identities,
the paper also attempts to highlight the patriarchal underpinnings of specific
and selected issues, in the formation of the Muslim communalist ideology and
identity.

Communal Identity Formation in a Multi-Ethnic
Society. A Conceptual Note

A simple definition of a
multi-ethnic society would be that it is a social formation with more than a
single ethnic group sharing a common country. The vast majority of countries
that exist today are multi-ethnic, a situation that has the potential for both
ethnic conflicts and a harmonious pluralism. Unfortunately, the current dominant
trend in many of the multi-ethnic countries in the so-called Third World - not
to mention Eastern European countries like the former Yugoslavia - is one of
ethnic conflicts which have become militarised. Communalisation has been the
predominant tendency in these societies, rather than the evolution of a
multi-ethnic national identity enveloping the different ethnic
constituents.

Communalisation is a
process of formation of an exclusivist collective identity across
class-caste-gender divisions on the basis of language, and, or religion in a
multi-ethnic society, with the intent of mobilising the people for political
purposes under given historical conditions. It is engineered by ideologues who
construct an identity of segregation with the aid of cultural symbols and myths
in such a way as to conscientise people as members of a community distinct from
the others. Communal identities are characterised by varying degrees of
hostility toward each other. They are not constants by variables, their changes
being largely conditioned by changes in political economic conditions and the
balance of political continuity. However, changing communal identities is not
devoid of historical continuity. They are ideologically rooted in real and
imagined histories, and history is often invoked to justify current ideological
positions and shifts. An inevitable result of this is that history itself is
written and re-written by the communalists to meet present ideological needs.
Communalism generated its own historiography as it cannot survive without
mythologising and revising history. In Sri Lanka, an enduring myth which is
based on a real historical event is the communalist interpretation of the war
between Dutta Gamini and Elara as something akin to a 'national liberation war'
to free the Sinhala Buddhists, the real owners of Lanka, from the clutches of an
alien Tamil ruler. Even though this myth was exploded may years ago by eminent
Lankan historians, it continues to thrive as folklore and popular
history.

In
most instances, the establishment of modern multi-ethnic states did not occur
through any form of voluntary association of the constituent ethnies The
historical circumstances that brought multi-ethnic societies into being are
diverse. For instance, in the former colonies of Asia and Africa, new states
were often created by conquering Western powers carving out 'national'
territories according to their perceived administrative convenience and without
any regard for pre-existing territorialities and their autonomy.

Many of these countries
turned into hotbeds of ethnic conflicts and nationalist separatist agitations in
the post-colonial period. While avoiding a sweeping generalisation of the
patterns of genesis of ethnic conflicts in these countries as it runs the risk
of leaving out important specificities, we may identify some communalities that
can be helpful in conceptualising the historical processes of
communalisation:

- Colonial incorporation of
different groups into a centralised state while at the same time adopting
racial, linguistic, and religious divisions for reasons of political control and
administration;

- Competition between the
dominant elites of different communal groupings for colonial patronage and
recognition and to legitimize their status as leaders of their respective
communities;

-
The dominant elites of each community seeking to construct a cross-class
communal identity in such a way as to serve their own class
interests;

-
The emergence of new ethno-nationalist/communalist elites with popular support
who challenge the old colonial elites within their communities;

- The rise of a particular,
often majoritarian, ethno-nationalism leading to a progressive communalisation
and desecularisation of the State which in turn reinforces the former, and of
the reactive ethno-nationalism of the other groups;

- Selective dismantling or
modification of structures which served the interests of the colonisers and
their local allies, while glorifying and reinforcing patriarchal values and
symbols;

-
Resurrection of old and invention of new myths of origin and heroism to serve
communal identity creation.

That the construction of
collective identities takes cultural forms, and that the hallmark of the
hegemonic ethno-nationalist ideology is the cementing it provides across classes
should not obscure the importance of economic interests. The history of
communalist politics in Sri Lanka has always had strong economic underpinnings.
In a fundamental sense, communication is about economic opportunities and
distribution but it shifts class issues to a terrain of ethno-nationalism and
heritage, thereby displacing class with ethnicity at the ideological level. It
is not our point that nationalism and communalism can be reduced to class relations alone, but that the
economic is one of the key variables in communal conflicts and that the
ideological subsumption of class by communalism or nationalism should not be
misconstrued as an elimination of the economic itself.

The
Main Evolutionary Stages Of Muslim Communalisation

In the British colonial
period, the construction of communal identity took place within a framework in
which the political parameters were set by the needs of state formation and
administration in a non-settler colony.

The British had to create
local structures of political governance through which they could exercise power
over the whole island. Their approach to this challenge was one of innovatively
combining British and local institutions. The British divided the society into
communal or ethnic groups since they saw this as a feasible way to organise a
system of government. In Sri Lanka, this naturally took the most evident form:
Upcountry and Low country Sinhalese, Ceylon and Indian Tamils, Indian and Ceylon
Moors and Malays. Thus communal divisions were imposed for political and
administrative reasons.

The history of Muslim
ethno-nationalism follows a trajectory building on the existing social
formations and systems of governance which accommodated the local power
structures through communal representation. In this process the representation
of the community was constructed by the elites as a top down ideological
projection, which failed to address the internal social differentiation within
the community.

The early phase of communal
identity represented by the elites was of a passive and subservient form and not
able to strike deep roots. However cultural revivalism as a form of resistance
to colonialism leading to communalisation, actively promotes a cultural identity
(like Sinhala Buddhism) which takes a more exclusivist form creating conflicts
with other communities. In fact, the content and evolution of Muslim identity
formation has to be understood in the context of the economic, political and
social changes that underlie given moments of Lankan history. This paper
attempts to examine critical components of this process through four distinct
but overlapping phases mainly:

In this phase the Colombo
Muslim elites endeavoured to differentiate the Lankan Moors from the Lankan
Tamils in ethnographic an racial terms. A major cause of this was the claim by
Tamil (Colombo) elites as represented by Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan[2] that the Moors of
Ceylon were Tamils who converted to Islam. Ramanathan articulated this view in
his thesis on the "Ethnology of the Moors of Ceylon" presented to the Royal
Asiatic Society in 1888 [Journal-Royal Asiatic Society (Ceylon) Vol. X]. This
led to the historic Ramanathan-Azeez debate in which the latter argued that the
Moors of Ceylon were of Arab origin and therefore racially distinct from the
Tamils who claimed to originate from South India. At the root of this conflict
was the question of communal political representation in the State Council which
will be taken up below.

This period was marked by
an emerging consciousness, and Muslims began to formulate central symbols of
their identity aimed at reviving religio-cultural traditions. Muslim personal
law, religious education and Arabic language became important facets to be
nurtured and protected.

The very first piece of
legislation was in the area of family law, to regulate Muslim marriages through
the Mohammedan Marriage Registration Ordinance [No 8 of 1886 and No 2 1888][3]. This Ordinance
was intended to keep a check on customary marriages and divorces - an indigenous
practice which existed among the Muslim community. The need for this Ordinance
was expedited as it was felt that lawful divorces could still exist even outside
the ambit of the "Mohammedan Code" of 1806[4]. The central
concern of the colonial state was to formalise a customary practise thereby
denying local agency to determine the affairs of its community. We also notice
the beginning of a covert homogenising program on the part of Muslim elites
intent on regulating 'tradition",
primarily on the basis of religion.[5]

During this period the
tendency of Muslims to pursue religious education at the expense of their
secular education has been highlighted (Azad, 1993). Arabic colleges/schools,
initiated as a reaction to the proselytising tendencies in Christian schools,
were already functioning. The Muslim Educational Society was founded in 1891 by
Siddi Lebbe, who emphasised the need for modern Muslim education and female
education [inspired by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and the Aligarh movement in India].
However the concept of seclusion of female education from the male was strictly
maintained in the schools that were created for this purpose.

Inadequate facilities in
Muslim schools and the presence of non-Muslim teachers in these schools acted as
barriers, especially where the schools were for Muslim girls. Some of the
schools had to be closed down due to internal conflicts and lack of sensitivity
towards female education. In 1891 the literacy rate for Muslim men was 30.5 % as
opposed to 1.5 % for Muslim women.[6] The
Administration Reports have also pointed out that the attendance of girls in the
outstation schools was satisfactory (though relatively low in general) while in
the Colombo region, "…conspicuous by the absence of any formalised provision
for education of girls of the Moorish community". This strongly contrasted
with the "... energy displayed by the Malay[7] community
for the education of girls..." (Administration Report 1892 - D14/Part
IV).

The lack
of access to education deprived the vast majority of Muslim women of a major
opportunity for awareness development and social mobility. The Malay community
favoured a more liberal attitude towards female education, thus providing for
greater mobility in interaction and in securing employment, i.e. visibility in
the public sphere.

Arabic was emphasised in
the Muslim schools and study of the Koran was made compulsory. The importance of
Arabic language denotes a preoccupation with the Arab heartland and
concentration of Muslim civilization around the Arab world and less concerned
with the Island's cultural history interwoven with the Indian Sub-continent.
Also, there emerged an interest and attention to Arab greatness through Orabi
Pasha's presence as a revered personality with the community[8] His social
interaction with the outside world was through the community elites. Even the
mode of dress acquired a new meaning with wealthy Muslims wearing the (Turkish)
fez cap. All these point to the ideological underpinnings of a homogenisation of
culture taking roots through such manifestations, while subsuming the variety of
local histories in the Muslim ethno-social formations.

However the homogenising
role of religion among Lankan Muslims was checked by the intervention of a
racial myth when 'Ceylon Moors' claimed a status superior to that of Indian or
Coast Moors and Malays. The Ceylon Moors felt a sense of racial superiority as
'indigenous Muslims' and always maintained this distinction very carefully,
despite the common religiousties.

This differentiation was
maintained even officially, as the 1911 Census Classifies Ceylon Moors and
Indian Moors separately - a colonial distinction accepted and encouraged by the
Muslim elite. This led to institutionalization of intra-communal perceptions and
was fundamental to the emergence of ethno-nationalist sub-categories as well,
which later on provided the basis for competitive representational
politics.

The
arguments put forward could be further illustrated through the significant
political factor during this phase which became a founding moment of "Moor"
political identity, beginning with P. Ramanathan's thesis presented before the
Royal Asiatic Society in 1888. Although evidence shows that there was a
tradition that the Muslim ancestors came from South India and also a tradition
that they originated from Arab migrants, it was the Arab tradition that took
political meaning and importance in the context of the time (Samaraweera,
1979).

Muslim
counter arguments (of which the most vocal has been I.L.M. Abdul Azeez)[9] have been put
forward and pointed out that:

- it cannot be denied that
culturally there were similarities between Tamils and Muslims, due to the
acculturation process;

However, the proponents
also claimed that there would have been a mixture of Arab and Tamil blood since
very few Arabs brought their wives along. The original Arab descent was
nevertheless upheld by the Muslim elites, which clearly denotes the patriarchal
underpinning of ethnicity and the exclusiveness of this ideology to keep out the
women as well as the Indian Moors (Ismail, 1995). By referring to Arab roots and
ancestry from the Hashemites clan (descendants of Prophet Muhammed) Abdul Azeez
in fact glorifies "Moorish blood" and racial purity, in similar vein as
his elite counterparts from the Sinhala and Tamil communities.[10]

The contention of the
Muslim elite was that Ramanathan's prime motive in drawing parallels with Tamil
ancestry was to keep Muslim representation out of the Legislative Council.
Created in 1833, the Legislative Council was a vehicle for unelected communal
representation (nominated by the Governor). Originally there was no separate
seat for the Muslims as this was satisfied by the Tamil member. Subsequently
there was agitation for a restructuring of the Legislative Council on account of
the predominance of the Sinhala Christians of the Govigama caste[11] by the Sinhala
Buddhist revivalists. In 1889, when it was restructured, the Muslims and the
Kandyan Sinhalese benefitted. M.C. Abdul Rahman (an elite merchant who remained
loyal to the British) was nominated as the first Mohammedan member. The Ceylon
Moors were thus considered a distinct race for purposes of colonial
administration while defining out the Indian Moors.

The other issue of historic
significance was the much publicised Fez issue of 1905, when the leadership was
able to mobilise Muslim opinion on this question through public assertion. In
this instance the Chief Justice forbade the Muslim Advocate from Batticaloa,
M.C. Abdul Cader, from appearing before the High Court wearing his fez when he
rose to address the court. It is interesting to note that the Chief Justice had
this to say: "In this case you have adopted an European dress and have your
shoes on. One end of your body must be bare" (Ceylon Daily News,
23.04.1969). Petitions were filed against this, and the final verdict of the
Supreme Court ruled that wearing of the fez was prohibited in court.

The community leaders
protested and organised a mass meeting at the Maradana Mosque grounds and even a
Fez Committee (comprising members of the Legislative Council and prominent
businessmen) was formed for this purpose. A lengthy memorandum was addressed to
the Queen pointing out the unjust ruling to Muslim lawyers, whereas in other
British colonies (India and Egypt) wearing the fez with European dress was
allowed. The chief speaker to this meeting was invited from India, a Muslim
lawyer (who was also a Moulavi), who claimed that he had worn the fez in the
presence of the King and the Queen. It has been reported that over 30,000
Muslims voted for the memorandum and the result was that the judgement was
reversed allowing the fez to be worn in court.

The consequent of all this
was religious issues/factors became an established pattern in the Muslim ethnic
formation with symbols of religious and ethno-identity drawn from the Arab
world, beginning to be formulated by the leadership. Preservation of elite
interests through assertion of an exclusivist community ideology becomes
predominant and this takes place without any resistance. As we shall see in the
subsequent sections, the boundaries and limits of this identity formation though
historically produced are in constant process of transformation, its
configurations being directly related to the other more comprehensive
configurations of ethno nationalisms and that of the State.

Muslims were the targets of
attack by early Sinhala Buddhist revivalists, and the anti-Muslim propaganda
culminated in the riots of 1915 in which Indian Moors were the victims. A major
causal factor in this conflict was the resentment of the Sinhala nationalist
petty bourgeoisie against trading interests of the Moors. In this phase Muslim
identity consciousness became highly conditioned by the rising majoritarian
Sinhala Buddhism and its intolerance towards the non-Sinhala Buddhists of Sri
Lanka.

Sri
Lanka communal identities as represented by the colonial elites in the 19th
century were rather articulated and in ways that did not question the authority
of the State. Devoid of any elements of anti-colonialism, they merely served to
confirm the basic divisions adopted by the British. However, the situation
changes as we approach the turn of the century when Sinhala Buddhist cultural
revivalism emerged both as a form of resistance to colonialism and as a way of
asserting an exclusivist ethnic identity. Anagarika Dharmapala was perhaps the
first person to use the term Sinhala Buddhist in a racial-religious sense[12]. The notion of a
Sinhala Buddhist nation emerged in the early 20th century in the British
colonial period, and in the decades that followed it went through an
evolutionary transformation into a mass consciousness, overarching local,
regional and caste identities.

Dharmapala and other
Sinhala Buddhists like Ratnaweera (editor of the 'Aryan') propagated the myth
that the Sinhalese were of Aryan origin and therefore racially superior to the
non-Aryan Tamils and Muslims who inhabited the island. The ideology of Sinhala
Buddhist revivalism was predominantly cultural, with mild political overtones
directed on marginal issues like consumption of alcohol and privileges of
Christians under the colonial rule (Jayawardena, 1985). Dharmapala stood for
limited autonomy within the British empire with Sinhala Buddhists in key
administrative positions. It would seem that the belief in the Aryan origins of
the 'Sinhala race' made the Buddhist revivalists feel some sort of affinity for
the ruling British. "It is a consolation to see", remarked Ratnaweera,
"that we are governed by an Aryan nation".[13] Anagarika
once declared: "True that I criticise in my articles the officials; but my
loyalty to the British Throne is as solid as a rock and I have invariably
expressed sentiments of loyalty to the King..." (Guruge A., 1965:LIX). It is
no wonder, therefore, as Gunawardene (1985) notes, "that such an ideology did
not produce an anti-imperialist movement of mass proportions".

Sinhala Buddhist cultural
nationalism thus displayed a dual political character - it was more compromising
towards British colonialism while displaying a growing intolerance towards the
Lankan minorities. Anagarika Dharmapala stated in 1922: "Look at the
Administration Report of the General Manager of Railways... Tamils, Cochins and
Hambankarayas are employed in large numbers to the prejudice of the people of
the island - sons of the soil, who contribute the largest share" (Guruge A.,
1965:515).

Certain elements of
Buddhist revivalism served the growth of anti-minority sentiments. The Moors
became one of the first targets of Sinhala Buddhist intolerance. Dharmapala
portrayed Muslim traders as unethical exploiters of Sinhala Buddhists. The
presence of butchers' shops, which were mostly owned and run by Muslims, and of
mosques in sacred Buddhist cities like Anuradhapura was regarded by the
revivalists as an affront to Buddhism and Sinhala Buddhist culture. This kind of
hostility was also extended towards the Christian churches. The Temperance
movement and opposition to butchers' shops, churches, and mosques around cities
like Anuradhapura were driven by strong anti-minority sentiments. The following
quoted from Dharmapala's letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in
1915 epitomises this: "... What the German is to the Britisher that the
Muhammedan is to the Sinhalese. He is an alien to the Sinhalese by religion,
race and language. He traces his origin to Arabian, whilst the Sinhalese traces
his origin to India and Aryan sources" (Guruge, 1965:540).

In the period prior to 1915
these campaigns were so actively pursued that Governor Chalmers, explaining the
animosity of the Sinhala peasantry towards Muslim traders, stated that they had
"always been viewed by the villager with feelings entertained at all times
and in all lands towards transitory aliens who make money out of the local
peasantry by supplying their wants at the shop..." (Jayawardena,
1985).

The
single event which became a landmark in Lankan history with profound impact on
communal relations in the country was the anti-Muslim riots of 1915. At this
time, Sri Lanka was not a communalised society as we speak of today. The
outbreak of violence in Kandy, which spread to Colombo and the North Western,
Southern, Sabaragamuwa, and Central provinces was targeted at the Coast Moors[14]; trading rivalry
was the underlying and main cause of the immediate outbreak. According to
Kearney, the riots and the way in which the British suppressed the violence led
to a rise in anti-colonial feelings, and to the heightening of nationalist
sentiments among the Sinhala Buddhists (Ceylon Studies Seminar,
1969/70).

Some
historians have traced the background of the riots as flowing from the
inflammatory statements against the Moors published in the Sinhala newspapers,
especially the 'Sinhala Buddhaya' and the 'Sinhala Jathiya' which stirred
Sinhala nationalist feelings. There is also evidence to support the connection
between the Temperance movement[15] and the growth
of nationalism. The
leaders who were arrested during the riots were those who had been active in the
Temperance movement (Jayawardena, 1972; Azad, 1993).

It was Ponnambalam
Ramanathan, the 'educated Ceylonese' member of the Legislative Council, who
championed the cause of Sinhala Buddhists; criticising the colonial government
for its treatment of the Sinhalese especially drawing attention to the Riots
Damages Ordinance (though never published) which made provisions for the
Sinhalese in specified areas (whether implicated in the riots or not) to
indemnify all losses suffered by Muslims. He demanded a Royal Commission to
inquire into the riots and the excesses committed by the British force on the
Sinhala people.

In Colombo, rumour mongering was
typical of these times with the obvious cries that Sinhalese were being
massacred, bodies being suspended and that their women were being raped. The
Muslims decided to defend themselves if attacked, and a decision was taken at
the Mosque congregation that they would fight to the last, "... but if the tide turned against them, the women, rather
than be ravished, should jump into the wells and commit suicide, leaving only
the children..." (Thawfeeq, 1986). From time immemorial, history has
documented that women's bodies have been subjected to humiliation and attack in
times of war and violence, so as to revenge the hostile party in a manner that
would taint the honour and purity of their women. Muslim male thinking at this
time was quick to decide that the best course of action for their women should
be, not in the forefront of the struggle, but preservation of their honour and
chastity even if it meant ending their lives! Protection in this sense implied
exertion of male authority to which women had to submit.

It is worth noting that the Malay
community was not attacked, nor the Borah shops and stores (Azad, 1993). The
riots did not evoke strong emotional reaction among the Muslims in the North or
the East or the North-West. Jayawardena (1972) has observed that labour unrest
and political tensions contributed to the rioting in Colombo and concluded that
it also had impulses other than religious tension.

The Ceylon Moor community
panicked, and this marked the beginning of an awakening political consciousness
that was to shape the course of events that followed. The Muslim elites had
their own interests in mind, as evident from the following remarks by W.M. Abdul
Rahman, the unofficial member in the Legislative Council for Governor Chalmers,
in a report on the riot areas: "... for the insult
hurled at Islam some visible et abiding mark must be put upon Buddhist temples,
if for no other reason, at least to preserve the prestige of the British Raj."
(Blackton, 1970). The immediate response was for the Muslim leadership to
strengthen their collaboration with the British.

The Sinhala parties were being
defended by the well-known Tamil leader who clearly showed an antipathy towards
the Muslims. From a Muslim viewpoint it appeared as though there was an alliance
between the Sinhala and Tamil elites. So much so that the same alliance of
Tamil-Sinhala elites founded the Ceylon National Congress in 1917[16], the fears of the Muslims increased
as memories of 1915 were still very strong and the Muslim leadership kept out of
it. However the Sinhala-Tamil alliance was resting on fragile ground, as
revealed by the subsequent events which related to seats in the Legislative
Council and other aspects of political patronage from the colonial
government.

In the
foregoing section we have seen that collective action - in this case by the
Sinhala Buddhists through their communal ideology, was an attempt to create
"legitimate space" in the public domain, while questioning the legitimacy of
that very space which was occupied by the Coast Moors. They were at the same
time expressing their protest against the colonial regime. The Temperance
movement and Sinhala Buddhist revivalism have also demonstrated that movements
outside the democratic process seek to expand their control over public life
playing an instrumentalist role, drawing symbolic boundaries in which identities
are being constructed and contested. In such a political configuration, the
Muslims were deeply affected; forced to re-assess their role as a minority and
grapple with the new facts of representational politics where the dialectics of
their identity vis a vis the Indian Moors and the Malays had to be redrawn.
Based on our understanding that contending notions of collective identity exist,
and any one of these may become dominant over the other at a given point of time
(Hassan, 1994), the fluidity of Muslim identity - its definition and
redefinition - was essentially a function of the political and social
circumstances.

3. Towards a Common Muslim Identity or a Misplaced
Emphasis

Since the
advent of universal franchise in 1931 and the politics of communal
representation acquires a mass character, the upcountry - low country
distinction within the Sinhalese becomes weaker. The Muslims on the other hand
sought a unity between Moors, Malays and Indian Muslims. Yet the distinction
between the Southern and North-Eastern Muslims remains, with the latter not
enjoying any significant role in Muslim politics.

In this phase there was a tendency
towards consolidating a community polity, the seeds of which had already been
sown. Although seen as externally antagonistic, the ethno-nationalist ideologies
were meant to be an internally homogenising project /process with the intention
of narrowing down the diversities within the demarcated social
boundaries.

•
Constitutional changes, elite competition and communal politics

Muslim communalisation was
initially loose and meant to serve the Colombo and Southern business elites. It
did not grow of a mobilisation based on popular demands or real/imagined
grievances of the larger sections of the population. But with time due to the
deepening of the communalisation of society it was transformed into an ideology
in a changed political context.

Further, the colonial
administrative structures allowed the elites to sustain their positions of power
and control in a mutually reinforcing fashion. For instance the voting criteria
[1921-1924] laid down that only adult males over 21 years, literate [English,
Tamil or Sinhala] and in addition satisfied any one of the three economic
criteria were eligible to vote, i.e.:

- a clear annual income of not
less than Rs. 600/=;

- immovable property in one's own right or in one's wife's
name (value not less than 1500/=);

- occupant as owner or tenant of
houses valued at Rs.400/= or Rs.200/= according to urban or rural situations (Roberts, 1979).

Under such conditions, not only did the voter's class, status and sex matter, but also his social marital status
which aggregated wife's property as husband's eligibility to vote[17]. Further, western education was one
of the determinants of elite status, and elite families did not hesitate to
consolidate through marriage their economic status, and accumulate capital and
property, thus ensuring upward social mobility.

The Manning reforms of 1920
exploited existing or potential communal disharmony through their collaboration
with minority elites. Communal electorates were brought about in order to adjust
the balance in favour of minorities. For the first time, the Malays began to
demand or thought it was opportune to claim a seat in the Legislative Council.
Their greatest concern was that their "ethnicity and
identity was being overshadowed by the numerically superior Moors", who were
trying to exploit them on the basis of a common religious identity. The Malays
decided to form the first political association, following a mass meeting in
Colombo in 1921, to agitate for a Malay seat in the Legislative Council
(Hussainmiya, 1987).

All these
events led to the emergence of the idea of Muslims as a minority to be
distinguished from the Tamils. However, the Malay-Moor division[18] persisted through the kind of
stereotyping projected that the Moors were engaged in trade and commercial
ventures and that the Malays were in government services such as the police and
clerical services. The Moor-Malay dichotomy was further hardened by the belief
among the Moors that they were of Arab origin, and the Malays of Javanese
origin. The Malays ardently defined their identity in terms of an Eastern
civilisation rather than inheritors of a Muslim civilisation who claimed to be
'descendants of Arabs'.

Perhaps
it is important to note that the Malays and Moors, though professing the same
religion, existed as two separate entities whose elites' interests overlapped at
times for common political purposes. Malay elites like T.B. Jayah[19] sometimes spoke in terms of a
unifying Muslim[20] community primarily on the issue of
representation.

Interestingly, though the two group leaders (Malays and
Moors) had differed before, the coalition, i.e. formation of the Ceylon Muslim
League in 1924 with a significant Indian Moor segment, was for collective
agitation. This was in respect of increased representation; responsible
self-rule; Safeguarding the cultural, social, and economic interests of the
Muslims; and, lastly, to promote inter-communal amity.

In spite of the hive of activity
that was being pursued at the political administrative level, the disparities at
the local level remained unaddressed.

On the eve of the Donoughmore
Commission (1927), the differences between the leadership in Colombo and the
Muslims in the regions (living outside the centre) became sharper due to
conflicts between the older and younger generations, on the issues of power and
control over community affairs. The territorial system of representation (as
opposed to the previous system of communal representation) recommended by the
Donoughmore reforms was opposed by the minorities as wall as the elites for
their own class reasons. It is not surprising that the Muslims in the Eastern
Province, being territorially concentrated, supported the Donoughmore proposals
(Azad, 1993) and expressed their disappointment with the Colombo based
leadership whose preoccupation was with trading interests.

While the Muslim leadership was
battling with its own set of contradictions, the Sinhala masses were being
mobilised through the Sinhala Maha Sabha (SMS)[21]. S.W.R.D. Bandarananaike (Founder of
the SMS), while accepting the pluralist nature of the Lanka polity, concentrated
on uniting the Sinhalese and forging stronger cohesion within the community. In
his speech in the State Council (March 1939) and address before the SMS
(December 1939), his intended course of action was clear: "We (the SMS) saw differences amongst our own people -
caste distinction, up-country and low-country distinctions, religious
distinctions and various other distinctions - and we therefore felt that we
should achieve unity, which is the goal of us all. Surely, the best method was
to start from the lower rung: firstly, unity among the Sinhalese; and, secondly,
whilst uniting the Sinhalese to work for higher unity of all communities..."
(Roberts, 1979).

The
Muslim leadership was thus forced into emulating and responding to the strong
communal overtones of the time. Historical circumstances demanded not only
forging alliances with the Sinhala/Tamil elites, but also maintaining the
general idiom of legitimacy within the Muslim community. For this purpose,
mobilising Muslim opinion in order to safeguard political interests, uniting all
shades of factionalism within (Moors and Malays) and taking a stand against the
reforms proposed in 1937-38 was achieved through the Political Conference
organised in 1939.

The
events that shaped the course of history during the decade after the Donoughmore
reforms further strained ethno-national relations, while the elites of the
different communal groups consolidated their own political bases. The Language
Bill [1944][22] marks a key event which set in
motion a vociferous campaign by the elites of each community for maintaining
their respective status quo.

J.R. Jayawardene in moving the
Bill expressed the inherent fears of the Sinhalese, quite explicitly:

"... I had always the intention that Tamil should be spoken
in Tamil speaking provinces, and that Tamil should be the official language in
the Tamil speaking provinces. But as two-thirds of the people of this country
speak Sinhala, I had the intention of proposing that only Sinhalese should be
the official language of the Island; but it seems to me that the Tamil community
and also the Muslim community, who speak Tamil, wish that Tamil should also be
included on equal terms with Sinhalese. The great fear I had was that Sinhalese
being a language spoken by only 3,000,000 people in the whole world would
suffer, or may be entirely lost in time to come, if Tamil is also placed on an
equal footing with it in this country..." (State Council
Debates, May 24, 1944).

Subsequently, when J.R. Jayawardene wanted Tamil also
included, the motion was vehemently opposed by Sinhala members in the Council
with arguments that the fundamental condition for national unity was the
existence of 'a national language' and not two languages. Accordingly it was
expected that the Muslims and the Tamils would integrate into the mainstream
Sinhala ideological thinking. The Tamil members were of the view that national
unity or national cohesion cannot be imposed by suppressing one of the languages
spoken by at least 2,000,000 people.

It is interesting to highlight
that the colonial state was instrumental in reinforcing the fears of the
Sinhalese and perpetuating the communal stereotyping of the times. Evidence from
the Soulbury Commission's report [1945] on constitutional reforms referred
to:

"... Edward Stubbs, Governor of
Ceylon 1933-37, my predecessors and myself have always recognised that, for good
government of the country, the brains and industry of the Tamils were as useful
in the past as they would be invaluable in the future. We shall always require
their assistance..."

As for the Moors, "... they had secured a virtual monopoly of the export and
import trade [...] through a considerable number as many as one third are
occupied as cultivators in the Eastern Province [...] they are thrifty and
industrious people [...] for various reasons neglected their secular education
and have not in that respect kept abreast of other communities [...] efforts are
being made to remedy the errors of past years..." (Soulbury report,
1945).

On the
eve of independence, the Muslim leadership had politically and economically
integrated into the Sinhalese dominated polity, in spite of displaying
resistance to total domination by the Sinhalese. We see two trends within the
Muslim elites: one that strongly advocated a Muslim bloc overarching the
Malay-Moor division and strengthening communal representation, and the other,
more nationalist, in fact serving the Sinhala nationalist cause. The traditional
Tamil leadership was confronted with the emerging Tamil leadership the Tamil
Congress. The Tamil Congress spokespersons were to steer the community's destiny
over the coming years. Their specific concern was the rising Sinhala
Buddhist cultural revival and its impact.

The contours of Muslim
consciousness and evolution of "a Muslim identity" traced through the various
historical epochs have been largely determined by the hegemonic control by the
leadership purported to be inclusive of all classes. In trying to understand the
interactive, shifting and selective nature of such a formation, elite
competition not only intra-community but also inter-community were critical
determinants. For the Muslim leadership, the preservation of a religio-ethnic
identity has been a 'bargaining process' in terms of: what aspects to give up;
what aspects to modify; what aspects to project, over given historical moments.
The sense of the past has provided justification for the present and precedents
for the future, by providing legitimacy to existing structures of authority even
if it had been invented (mare, 1993). Consequently the boundaries of "Muslim
ethno-nationalism" were defined through political moves which intended to
balance the primordial sentiments/attachments of the community (for support from
within) with the instrumentalist ideology of the leadership (Brass,
1991).

The issue of universal franchise
attracted the attention of the Donoughmore Commission, who had felt the need for
a widening of power to the larger masses. This was a critical departure from the
reforms of 1923-24 where only 4 % of the population had the right to vote
(Donoughmore Report, 1928; De Silva, 1981).

The recommendation was that all
males over 21 and females over 30 years should be eligible to vote, but when it
came to implementation in 1931, the colonial office decided to make the age
limit equal for both men and women. Sri Lanka thus entered a historic epoch as
the first British Colony in Asia and the first Asian country to advance
political emancipation through the right to vote to all citizens (De Silva,
1981). However, there was agitation and protest against the extension of the
franchise to females and to those of Indian origin. The question of suffrage and
its relevance to women's democratic rights was not raised by any group that gave
evidence before the Commission as a matter of political right, but only a
concession at a more parochial level.

Goonesinghe[23] and some radicals (within the Ceylon
National Congress) had continuously urged the Congress to take up the issue of
adult "manhood suffrage" which was not a matter of priority for the Congress
campaigners. When the Congress leaders had to give oral evidence before the
Donoughmore Commission, their stand on the franchise was that it should be
restricted to those with an income of at least Rs. 50/- per month. Their
contention was that if this income ceiling was further reduced, then "there was
the danger that they may get a class of person who could not use the vote with
any sense of responsibility and whose votes might be at the disposal of the
highest bidder" (De Silva, 1981). On extending voting rights to women, they
recommended that the age limit should be 25 years with "a rigid literacy test of
a property qualification"[24]

The other most
disturbing issue for the Sinhala leadership was the granting of the franchise to
the Indian immigrant plantation workers on equal terms. The immediate threat to
the interests of the Sinhala population in the plantation areas was raised. The
Kandyans were especially alarmed at the possibility of Indian domination of the
highlands, if permanent citizenship rights were conferred to the Indian
indigenous population. On the single issue of Indian enfranchisement, the CNC
and Kandyan leaders came together, although the Kandyans did not support the
demand for self government[25] The motives of the CNC were
certainly aimed at preserving the sectional interests of the capitalists and
landowners. Goonesinghe however supported the principle of adult suffrage, on
account of his activism in the trade union movement.

The minorities were bitterly
hostile to the Donoughmore Report because of its condemnation of communal
electorates. Elites representing minorities found that the safeguards to protect
their interests had been inadequate. On behalf of the Tamils, P. Ramanathan came
out strongly against universal suffrage (similar to the Sinhala leadership), but
his main plank of opposition was that it would result in the permanent
domination of the polity by the Sinhalese. T.B. Jayah became the protagonist of
the Muslims and a Memorandum on 'Muslims and Proposed Constitutional Changes in
Ceylon' was addressed to the Colonial Office.

Ramanathan's class, caste and
patriarchal values pervaded his statements on the voting right. He and his
conservative colleagues believed that giving the vote to the non-Vellala
castes[26] and to women was not only a grave
mistake, leading to "mob rule" but, according to Ramanathan, "an anathema to the
Hindu way of life" (P. Ramanathan, Memorandum on the Donoughmore Constitution,
1934, quoted by Russel, 1982).

Sandrasegera's[27] advice to the Jaffna male voters in
1930 was equally reprimanding: "I would advise the
people of Jaffna to see that during the next election they did not take their
women to the polls. I would ask them not even to register women as electors.
They should ask their women to mind their business in their own homes"
(Russel, 1982:87).

The
Muslim elites echoed in similar vein on the franchise issue, that is would be a
setback to their own political destiny. However, the Malay and Moor leadership
was divided: the Malays favoured the franchise while the Moors expressed
discontent, invoking 'custom and tradition' to prevent extension of franchise to
women. Wickremasinghe, in her book 'Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka' (1995),
documents "... it is the duty of men not to allow women
to plunge into unavoidable anxieties" and questions the praiseworthiness of
femininity as an asset. Thus women's role as citizens tends to be circumscribed
by notions of culturalism, and always subject to the customary definitions
governing women's conduct. The instances highlighted below give some insights
into this.

In the
General Elections held in 1931, Macan Markar (Galle bred Gem Merchant, settled
in Colombo) was elected to the State Council as Member for Batticaloa where the
Muslim community predominated. This was the first occasion when Muslim women
went to cast their votes, and Macan Markar took great pains to convince the
Muslim women that they could go out and cast their votes, by getting Alims[28] from Colombo and Galle to issue a "religious ruling" to that effect (Thawfeeq, 1986). A
phenomenon that is to be interpreted as legitimising women's secluded status
and, at the same time, manipulating the female voter constituency[29] to exercise a "hitherto guarded right" which was exclusively male
conditioned space.

It was
documented by Thawfeeq that in the 1942 be-elections for Colombo Central, Muslim
women came out of "their secluded purdah", wealthy
Muslims supporting their candidates by providing "heavily curtained cars, so that they (the women) may
observe their cherished purdah while coming to the polling station" (Thowfeeq, 1986). Norms of seclusion and honour are closely bound up with
the status of the family in both an economic and social sense. The urban values
and norms of seclusion were reinforced in this instance, through a subtle
subversion so as to allow women to move into the political-public
space.

A very
important development in the agitation for universal franchise from women came
with the formation of the Women's Franchise Union (WFU) in 1927, spearheaded by
Agnes de Silva (Jayawardena, 1986). The WFU[30] was in the forefront demanding
voting rights for women and their evidence before the Donoughmore Commission
stands out in remarkable contrast (vis a vis the other groups that gave
evidence) for its commitment to equal rights across class and
ethnicity.

"We went in the spirit of
crusaders and answered the questions in an inspired manner. Lord Donoughmore
asked if we wanted Indian Tamil labourers on the estates to have the vote. I
replied 'Certainly, they are women too. We want all women to have the vote'.
Agnes de Silva, leader of the women's deputation to the Commission on
Constitutional Reform, 1927" (Russel,
1981:58, quoted by Jayawardena, 1986).

The WFU clearly wanted a place in
the established power structure, and they also represented a protest against the
socio-political structures which excluded women's access to the seats of
power.

The other
vexed question - the status of the Indian Tamils and citizenship rights - had
been a highly controversial one. Both the Sinhala and Tamil spokespersons have
used the Indian Tamils as tools to gain political leverage. On the one hand,
Bandaranaike used the Indian Tamils as a scapegoat to whip up Sinhala
communalism; whilst Ponnambalam used the actions and statements of the Sinhalese
leaders towards the Indian Tamils as evidence of Sinhala chauvinism. The problem
of franchise for the Indians was therefore left unresolved.

In 1948, the Citizenship Act, the
Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act of 1949 and the Parliamentary
Elections (Amendment) Act disenfranchised Indian residents of their citizenship rights. The
background to the legislation was the deep sense of apprehension in the minds of
the Sinhalese especially the Kandyans, of Indian domination of the highlands.
The other fear amongst the Sinhalese was that Indian Tamils would add to the
political strength of the Ceylon Tamils. Furthermore, the new Government was
particularly concerned of the threat from the leftists and the trade unionists
who were trying to win over the plantation workers from the Ceylon Indian which
controlled them.

When the
Bill came to be debated in Parliament Senator Razik Fareed had his own interests
for supporting it.

"We the Ceylon Moors have suffered most in the past from
want of a citizen bill. We [...] have been treated badly by other people under
the guise of Muslim brotherhood. We have very unfortunately played ourselves
into the hands of other people..." (Hansard, vol.
ii, Sept. 1948, p 2718). His emphasis on a nationalist tone later on was
intended to appease the ruling Sinhalese elites and also we note an implicit
attack on the Indian Muslims:

"The Ceylon Moors had a
flourishing trade in Man street Pettah, barely forty years ago, but today you
find the whole of the trade in the Pettah, even the property which the Moors
owned in the Pettah, in the hands of non Ceylon Traders" (Hansard, vol.
ii, Nov. 1948, p 1171).

As for
the Muslim community, the disenfranchisement of the Indian Muslims significantly
affected their electoral strength. The 1947 Delimitation Commission had found
that in assessing the Muslim strength, the Indian Moors should be included under
the category 'Muslims'. For instance, in demarcating Colombo Central, the
Commission stated:

"... Without the Indian Moors the
percentage of the Muslims is 23.6. It would not be too much to rely on the
probability that there were would be added to this strength at least 1.5 out of
the 7.4 percent of Indian Moors, and in this way the Muslim strength would reach
the percentage of at least 25.1 necessary to secure a seat. We are however
inclined to the view that the religious tie is stronger than the racial tie and
that it is proper in assessing the Muslim strength to include Indian Moors under
the category of Muslims, and on this basis the Muslim strength is 31.8
percent..." (Sessional Papers XIII, 1946 Report of the Delimitation
Commission).

But the
problem confronted was lack of documentary proof in the case of the Indian Moors
as regards registration of births. Registration was made compulsory only after
1897, and that too was not perfect. Proof of citizenship was subject to
production of the birth certificates of either the father and grandfather, or
grandfather and great-grandfather, the paternal line being
institutionalised as proof of birth. Such proof was required whenever the Indian
Moor sought government employment, import licenses, trade permits, registration
for voting, passports, etc. It was regretted later that the Muslim leadership
had supported the Citizenship Act without considering the problems of the Indian
Moor population and, more important, the political implications for electoral
representation (Rizwie, 1970).

The disenfranchisement legislation
served to further distort the electoral balance in favour of the Sinhalese. As a
result, the Sinhala voter became the decisive and instrumental force in the
country's politics. Sinhalese over-representation enabled governments to enact
legislation obtaining the two third majority for constitutional
changes, thus satisfying the demands of the Sinhala constituency. The United
National Party (UNP)[31] was thus placed in an advantageous
position in the elections that followed.

Post-colonial phase and
intensified ethnic relations

In the post-independence period,
Tamil political parties in the North-East sought to incorporate Muslims as Tamil
speaking people. Tamil-Muslim relations in the North and East remained
harmonious, with cultural commonalities being naturally accepted by both
communities.

However,
the resurgence of Sinhala Buddhism and its institutionalisation became central
elements in the struggle for a democratic multi-ethnic polity. In fact, the very
idiom of democratic politics has become communalised and has reproduced
reinforcing communal ideologies.

The lack of a vibrant political
culture that could relate to the problems and aspirations of the people and help
to forge a multi-ethnic polity has been highlighted by many political analysts.
We may quote from an earlier work by one of us:

"We my be
justified in blaming the British for starting the dirty business of communal
politics, but we cannot go on fooling ourselves by blaming them for its
continuation and metamorphosis into militant and barbaric ethno-nationalist
forms in the post-independence period. Communalisation transforms a multi-ethnic
society into a hotbed of competing communal identities whose ideological
consolidation relies on targeting the "other" as the "real enemy". As this leads
to an unequal distribution of power between the different communal blocs, there
is the real danger of those with power victimising the powerless. The Lankan
society has become an extreme case of a vicious circle of communalisation and
imagined enemies, beginning with the majority Sinhala Buddhists and inevitably
engulfing the Tamils and Muslims" (Shanmugaratnam N., The Tamil Question in Sri Lanka. Some
Reflections. Tamil Times, vol., 1993).

Ethno-nationalism is the ideology
of communalism. Sinhala Buddhist majoritarian communalism was institutionalised
through parliamentary and other legal means. The majority ethno-nationalist
parties used the Westminster model and universal franchise to further the
communalisation of Sinhala society as a short cut to parliamentary power. The
disenfranchisement of the Indian upcountry Tamils in 1948 was the first major
instance of using the parliamentary system to manipulate the electoral balance
of forces in ethnic terms to enhance the relative strength of the Sinhala
constituency.

The
victory of the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP)[32] in the 1956 parliamentary elections
signified the resurgence of Sinhala Buddhist ethnonationalism and its
institutionalisation. The MEP was a cross class alliance cemented by an ideology
of Sinhala Buddhism and populist social welfarism.

In 1956, Sinhala only was declared
the official language of Sri Lanka by a majority vote in parliament. In 1957 a
separate Ministry for Buddha Sasana was established. Communalisation became
intensified and 1956 signified the beginning of the desecularisation of the Sri
Lankan State, with the revival of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism and the elevation
of Sinhala Buddhism to the status of a state religion. This period also marks
the rise of Sinhala Buddhism as the hegemonic ideology and the reactive
nationalism of the Tamils of the North and East. Here we wee a shift in the key
actors with the constituency taking over the elites.

The institutionalisation of
Sinhala Buddhism takes new forms which is different to the SLFP led Bandaranaike
era, when the SLFP in opposition to the UNP takes on a Sinhala nationalist line,
but at the same time anticipating minority support as well. In this phase,
religion, culture and language emerge as central issues, in addition to land
settlement and education.

The emergence of Dr Badiuddin
Mahmud as Muslim leader marks a new trend in the Muslim political scene. Mahmud
(supporter of the SLFP) becomes the spokesperson for the Muslims, a man who is
not from the South but who reflects some of the reformist characteristics of the
SLFP and the MEP. The dual character of the SLFP is worth noting here: on the
one hand was the Sinhala Buddhist ideology, and on the other democratic
reformism of a limited nature, for example in the field of social welfare, non
alignment in international relations and sympathy towards national freedom
struggles.

B. Mahmud
also represents a shift from the Muslim business elites towards a more majority
oriented leadership, a leader to whom the Eastern Muslims could relate to. In
the late 1960's he formed the Islamic Socialist Front (with a rural base) which
indicated his sensitivity to two main trends of contemporary thinking among the
youth and young Muslim intellectuals. This was a response to the widespread
discontent among them with the Traditional Muslim leadership from the South
which had exploited the Community for commercial concessions and special
privileges (Ceylon Daily News, 09.02.1967).

The issues that affected Muslim
communal sentiments were land policy and land settlement, especially in the
Eastern province. Colonisation schemes that were developed in the area were
largely for the benefit of the Sinhalese constituency. Available records showed
that there had been a progressive increase in the Sinhala voter population from
1947 to 1980, a with a climax being reached in the 1960's and also an increase
in the land area occupied by Sinhalese compared to Tamils and Muslims. This was
the result of State aided illegal settlements in addition to the Government
Settlement Schemes under the Gal Oya Development Project 1960-63 ('Problems of
Muslims in the Amparai district'. All Ceylon Muslim League files, 1984).
Takeover of lands used by Muslims had proceeded in stages from the 1960's for
about two decades. The total extent of land taken over had been estimated up to
14,000 cadres (Hoole, 1993).

As regards education, the
standardisation policy of the government in 1970-73[33], which introduced subject wise and
media wise standardisation for admission to Universities aroused great
controversy. In 1975 and 1976 came the district quota scheme where admission to
Universities varied according to the district population. The Tamils were
affected most adversely by this scheme while the Sinhalese benefited, and the
admission of the Muslims into Universities increased. The Government however was
compelled to recognise that the University admission system had become apolitical
liability and let to an aggravation of the ethnic conflict.

Tamil communalisation[34] sharpens with the problems thrown up
as a result of the Official Language policy of the Government (Swabasha-Sinhala
Only Act, 1956). At the time the bill was presented in Parliament, Razik Fareed
and other Muslim representatives voted for the bill, but the Federal Party
member M. Mustapha[35] voted against. It is obvious that
the Muslims in the East had more in common with their Tamil
counterparts.

The
plantation Tamils however were marginalised, suffering from the
disenfranchisement which was partially reverted with the Sirima-Shastri Pact in
1964.[36] Tamil ethno-nationalism grows to be
more and more exclusive turning very hostile towards the Muslims as it takes
militant forms. New symbols are added and stated in Dravidian terms excluding
the Muslims and gradually identifying them as a rival group, i.e. a
redefinition of Tamil ideology in pure militant terms.

Against such a backdrop, Muslims
began to feel their vulnerability as a minority. On the one hand was the State
consciously promoting the Sinhala ideology of majoritarian communalism, and on
the other the additional problem of majoritarian communalism of the Tamils in
the North and East. In the early phase it was noted that Tamil-Muslim relations
were never antagonistic, but in the post-1972 period the relations became more
strained, sharpened and communalised.

The rise of a Muslim
party

With
communalisation of the Sri Lanka polity reaching a peak, the Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress (SLMC) emerges as a logical phenomena in a country where parliamentary
politics is run by communal parties.

In this phase the issues that are
highlighted are more from an Eastern Muslim point of view, the centre stage of
politics being shifted to the North and East. Issues relating to the social,
economic and political structures are being articulated more concretely.
Tamil-Muslim relations are affected with the intensification of the ethnic
conflicts and increasing militarisation. The tragedy of multi-ethnicism in
Lankan communalisation has only led to mutual reinforcement of age old
reactionary and patriarchal values, strengthened the forces of religious
intolerance, class disunity and disintegration, and negation of the
possibilities for constructing a Lankan identity.

The Muslims (with the Sri Lanka
Muslim Congress as spokesperson) begin their own redefinition with recourse to a
religious identity and reconceptualisation in their search for a pure and
exclusivist ideology. The SLMC has arrogated to itself the role of propagating
Islamic values to the community (and to the country at large), whilst accepting
the sovereignty of the Holy Quran. The SLMC had also promised to institute
'Islamic rule' if elected to power (Ceylon Daly News, 26.04.88; Personal
Interviews, 1995).

The birth
of the SLMC in the 1980's and its phenomenal rise in the past decade signified
several things. Firstly, it meant a shift in leadership and the centre of Muslim
politics from Colombo and the South to the predominantly Muslim rural East. This
implied a dramatic alteration in the balance of political forces within the
Muslim community. Secondly, the SLMC represented the arrival of a distinct
Muslim political party in a polity in which all the major political parties have
been communally based in the past four decades. Thirdly, and in our view most
crucial, the SLMC is the Muslim reaction to Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil
communalisms, and the expression of a collective religious identity which has
been reconstituted so as to counter the threat of militant Tamil chauvinism in
the North and East.

The birth
and rise of the SLMC as a party of the Lankan Muslims based in the North and
East which is largely Tamil speaking could be explained by:

- the growing gap between the
Southern Muslim political elite and the Muslims of the East and the North in
terms of political and economic interests. The Southern Muslim political elites
had traditionally represented the interests of the Muslim business classes,
whereas the Muslim in the East and North are largely farmers and
fishermen;

- like
their Tamil counterparts, Muslims in the North and East faced problems due to
State aided colonisation and discrimination on the grounds of language. Sate
aided Sinhala colonisation was perceived by the Muslims as a project undermining
their future interests as it took away State land in their areas for alienation
to Sinhalese from outside. There was also the growing fear among the Muslims in
the East that Sinhala colonisation was reducing their electoral clout as
Muslims. Their mother tongue is Tamil and the vast majority of them did not
speak Sinhala (until very recently). These issues were not regarded as serious
by the traditional Muslim elites whose interests lay in the South;

- Tamil ethno-nationalism became
progressively communalist over the years, and it turned violently anti-Muslim
since the mid-1980s. The myths and symbols of Tamil ethno-nationalism had little
or no appeal to the Muslim people. The hard core of Tamil ethno-nationalism was
reconstituted by the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and other militant
groups to serve the ideological needs of the armed struggle. This
reconstitution, which involved the adoption of new myths of Tamil heroism and
martial exploits, made Tamil ethno-nationalism even more
exclusivist;

- the
ethnic cleansing campaigns of the LTTE took brutal forms which culminated in the
expulsion of the Muslims from their traditional homes in the North in October
1990. Earlier in the same year, LTTE militants massacred 150 Muslims in prayer
in two Mosques in the East. Such acts of the Tamil militants gave a strong
impetus to communalisation of the Muslim people and therefore strengthened the
justification for the SLMC's institutionalization as a party purporting to
represent the interests of the Muslim people.

However, the SLMC is not a Muslim
version of the LTTE. It is rather a loose parliamentalist political party which
may occasionally use militant slogans and may tolerate extremists within its
ranks. The SLMC has still to consolidate a popular mass base and uses
'populist-fundamentalist' slogans as its political strategy. Muslim homeguards
have been recruited and armed by the government to confront the Tamil militant
army. This was mooted by the SLMC in order to protect themselves in the face of
violence and changed circumstances. The consequences of this action have been
heavy on both sides.

There is
a tendency among critics of 'Muslim fundamentalism'[37] to assert that the rise of
fundamentalism among Sri Lanka Muslims is a direct outcome of a global
phenomenon. We think this is too simplistic a view. It cannot of course be
denied that the rise of 'Muslim fundamentalism' in the Middle East and elsewhere
has had an influence on Sri Lanka, but its actual impact has been rather mild
until the mid-1980s, when the Muslims in the North and East first experiences
the intolerance of militant Tamil ethnonationalism.

Today with its strategic position
in the People's Alliance government, the SLMC has become a political party with
young educated youth in its ranks, professing and using religious ideology to
satisfy its political agenda. This has to be seen as a distinct departure from
the "traditional religious right" groups who have been propagating religion (as
faith) in their own design and pace, but not embroiled in direct political
confrontation, due to a lack of power and access to resources including the
popular media. Political parties or vested interest groups or even powerful
individuals may use these groups to further their own political ends; such
groups therefore tend to remain on the periphery - of being useful allies - for
selected purposes. Nevertheless the SLMC's rise to power has taken place without
a mass politicization process and therefore remains elite oriented, but the
potential for mobilisation of such groups through ideological moulding remains
strong.

The SLMC
behaves as if it is the sole arbiter of Muslim interests and is therefore duty
bound to restore the purest and sacrosanct form of Islam to the people through
its propaganda. With this motive, it has projected an image whereby the basic
democratic freedoms of the individual have been subsumed and collective rights
emphasised.[38] The pace has already been
set, where the party has categorically stated that any
changes in the fundamental rights chapter of the Constitution (or introduction
of a Bill of Rights) must not perforce allow any individual to challenge Muslim
personal law (i.e. Family law) on constitutional grounds. Personal law is being
upheld as the fundamental symbol of religious identity. This is
clearly seen as an attack on women's rights to equality and identity. This is
clearly seen as an attack on women's rights to equality and justice given the
fact that personal laws as they now exist are discriminatory towards Muslim
women, and no attempt is being made to reform such laws to make it more
equitable. When the amendment to the Penal Code of 1883 was presented in
Parliament (September 1995), vehement opposition by the Muslim lobby for
excluding Muslims from the specific clause which related to violence against
women within marriage resulted in a diluted version of the amendment being
finally approved[39]. It is thus clearly evident that
there are calculated moves to legitimate the basis for religious arguments to be
used against Muslim women exercising their rights as full citizens under the
constitution.

This
brings us to the question of the role of the state as an institution and the
contradictory notions of equality and citizenship embodied at different levels
of society. Of course the extent to which the State is capable o guaranteeing
sexual equality to mean gender considerations across communities will matter
only if this is in line with its own political goals. Our past experiences in
the post-independence era have shown that the State and State structures have
played a complementary role in reproducing and legitimizing majority and
minority ethno-nationalisms. This has invariably let to a further undermining of
gender equity, negating social diversities, while strengthening the communal
forces to reaffirm politicised and overarching identities.

The
Challenge of Decommunalising the Lankan polity

The arrival of the SLMC in the
political scene marks an important stage in the long process of communalisation
of the Lankan society. It would seem that the division of political
constituencies along communal lines has now been more thoroughly
institutionalised. It was as though a tragic law of history was relentlessly
working itself out to a finish. The Sinhala Buddhist nationalists are highly
perturbed about the rise of the SLMC. The Tamil nationalists are perturbed too.
However, if militant Tamil ethno-nationalism was a logical reaction to the
institutionalised Sinhala majoritarian ethno-nationalism, Muslim communalisation
was the inevitable response to both Sinhala and Tamil ethno-nationalisms. Of
course one communalism needs the other for survival although it is a game
involving unequal players. The net result, however, is further disintegration of
the Lankan social fabric and loss of opportunities for social change and
progress.

We have
heard from numerous Tamils and Muslims in the North-East that the deepening
communal divide between the two communities is detrimental to their mutual
interests as minorities and as people sharing a common region and language.
However, at present, conflicts of interests and mutual distrust rather than
complementarities and mutual trust dominate the political relationship between
the two communities. Governments have often cynically exploited the Tamil-Muslim
conflict in the North-East for short term political gains. The anti-Muslim
behaviour of Tamil militant groups provided the justification for creating
Muslim home guards. The escalating militarisation of the Tamil-Muslim conflict
is threatening to destroy the collective memory of these two communities of
centuries of harmonious coexistence. However, we do not think that this conflict
can be resolved in isolation from the larger conflict that engulfs the whole of
Sri Lanka. There are no piecemeal solutions to the ethnic conflict that
characterize the Lankan national question.

There is a growing awareness among
the progressive sections in the country that communalism cannot be eliminated
without due recognition of the rights of the different ethnic
communities and without creating an environment conducive to the blossoming of
cultural and political pluralism. Devolution and power sharing are among the
necessary means towards this end. In this regard, a fundamental need is the
institutional and ideological reformation of the State to make it an ethnically
neutral institution. Decommunalisation has to be understood as a process
encompassing both the State and civil society. It involves the creation of
symbols that express the multi-ethnic character of Sri Lanka. Reforms in the
educational system particularly the school curriculum from the primary level
upwards to inculcate respect for each others cultures are a prerequisite to
eradicate ethnocentrism and intolerance.

Decommunalisation also implies an
active reconstruction of ethnic identities not in mutually exclusive terms, but
in a spirit of interdependence and mutual enrichment. After all, the history of
interdependence and mutual enrichment. After all, the history of interdependence
and cross cultural fertilisation between Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims is longer
than that of communalisation. Even though communalisation has seriously
disrupted the integument of interdependence, the mutualities of survival in
multi-ethnic areas serve to heal wounds and harmonise ethnic relations. This
history of organic coexistence provides the seeds for regenerating the
multi-ethnic consciousness that is no crucial to the formation of an all
inclusive Lankan identity. Class and gender are also two key areas which can
lend themselves to building multi-ethnic bridges.

The decommunalisation process
should effectively challenge the patriarchal values reinforced and sustained by
communalism. It has to be linked to the ongoing discourse on human rights and
gender relations. Communalism has never been an ally of the struggle for
individual freedoms. It rejects or disregards the fact that individuals have
multiple identities in real life.

Decommunalisation, which seeks to
provide a broader democratic underpinning to collective identities, should
expand the space for the individual to live as a person with multiple
identities.

Finally,
we wish to reassert that decommunalisation is a process involving mass
mobilisation, and attitudinal and institutional changes. While the process has
its specific agenda for each ethnic group in Sri Lanka, it is guided by a common
vision and a common project, and creating new multiethnic symbols. The challenge
remains that only a secular State could create and sustain a truly democratic
and multi-ethnic polity.

References

Asad, M.N.M. Kamil - The Muslims
of Sri Lanka under British Rule. Navrang Booksellers and Publishers, New Delhi,
1993.

Ismail, Q. - Unmaking the Nation,
The Politics of Identity and History in Modern Sri Lanka. Social Scientists
Association, Colombo, 1995.

Jayawardena, K. - "Some Aspects of
Class and Ethnic Consciousness in Sri Lanka in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries" in Ethnicity and Social Changes in Sri Lanka. Social Scientists
Association, Colombo, 1985.

Jayawardena, K. - Feminism and
Nationalism in the Third World. Zed Books, 1986.

Jayawardena, K. - The Rise of the
Labour Movement in Ceylon, Colombo, 1972.

Journal of Royal Asiatic Society
Ceylon, vol. X - "The ethnology of the 'Moors' of Ceylon". 23rd April
1888.

Kearney,
R. - An Introduction. A Symposium on the 1915 Riots. Ceylon Studies Seminar
1969/70 series. University of Sri Lanka. Peradeniya, June 1970.

[1] Throughout
this paper, the term 'communal' is used as understood in South Asia where
communal identity implies communalist segregation in the pejorative sense. An
ethnic group may have a collective identity which is not communal in this
sense.

[2] Ponnambalam
Ramanathan was the 'educated Ceylonese' member in the Legislative
Council.

[3] This
legislation was passed during the time of M.C. Abdul Rahman, the first
Mohammedan member in the Legislative Council.

[4] The Dutch
initially brought the Code to the country from Batavia [in 1770] as the law
pertaining to the followers of the Mohammedan faith. It was Sir Alexander
Johnstone in 1806 who formalised the system of personal laws for Muslims with
the approval of twenty signatories who were head Moormen of the
district of Colombo! Initially the Code was restricted to the Colombo district
and was extended to the whole island in 1852.

[5] For a
detailed analysis of the evolution of Muslim Personal law and legal status of
Muslim women, see National Report - Country Study Sri Lanka, forthcoming
publication of Muslim Women's Research and Action Forum.

[6] The literacy
rate of Sinhala women during the time was 25 % (Census report
1921).

[7] Malays
originally came as political exiles, but most of them were brought in as
soldiers from Somalia, java and Malacca in the late 16th century to help defend
Dutch positions in Sri Lanka.

[8] Orabi Pasha
was an exile from Egypt who arrived in Sri Lanka with his entourage
(1883-1901).

[9] A. Azeez set
up the Moors Union in 1900; he was a Trustee of the Maradana Mosque and editor
of the "Muslim Guardian".

[10] “... They
adopted the doctrine of racial superiority, glorified and idyllic past an
associated the Sinhala people with the chosen 'Aryan race' and the chosen
Buddhist faith... Racial purity and religious purity were thus combined and the
pure Aryan Sinhalese became the appointed guardians of Buddhism" (Jayawardena,
1985).

[11] Govigama
(Cultivator) is the uppermost category in the caste classification of Sinhala
social organisation.

[12] Dharmapala
founded the newspaper Sinhala Bauddhaya in 1906. See Gunawardene (1985) and
Jayawardena (1972 and 1985) for elaborate treatments of the origin and
development of the Sinhala Buddhist ideology in the colonial
period.

[14] The Muslim
population at this time was 6.4 % of the total population, 267,000 at the 1911
Census. Of this 33,000 were Indian Moors, also called Coast
Moors.

[15] The
Temperance movement was a means to express hostility to the government.
Temperance society meetings attracted large crowds in both urban and rural
areas. Though primarily religious, the movement was not without political
overtones.

[16] Inspired by
the Indian National Congress, the Ceylon National Congress was initiated with
professed liberal ideals, but could not be sustained as historical and political
circumstances unfolded.

[17] In 1921, the
total number of voters was 54,207 which was 5.2 % of the total adult male Ceylon
population. Bu 1914 the number of voters had increased to 189,335 i.e. 18.2 % of
the voting population (Roberts, 1979). In 1924, only 900 of the 76,000 Muslims
had the right to vote (Rizwie, Muslim Ethnopolitics in Sri Lanka, unpublished
thesis, 1970).

[18] The Council
debates, Maradana Ordinance July-August 1924 provide some very interesting
insights into the tussle for Moor authority and its institutionalisation over
the management of the Mosque.

[19] Leader from
the Malay community, founder of the Young Muslim League and elected member of
the Legislative Council (1924-1927).

[20] This was a
precursor to the usage of the term "Moor" and "Mohammedan" interchangeably in
the official terminology which had been carried from the Dutch times. A
Committee appointed in 1924 to report on the usage of the term unanimously
decided that the correct expression should be "Muslim" to designate a "person
professing the religion". (Sessional Paper No XXXV, 1924).

[21] SMS formed in
1927 and Ceylon Tamil Congress in 1938 under GG Ponnambalam marks an important
point in the communalisation of the Sinhala and Tamil elites.

[22] The focus of
the Sinhala leadership in the State Council was to make Sinhala the national
language. The motion put forward by J.R. Jayawardene was debated in 1944.

[23] A.E.
Goonesinghe founded the Ceylon Labour Union in 1922 - a leading Trade Union in
the country at the time.

[24] Given the low
level of literacy among the female population spread amongst the various ethnic
communities, this qualification would in fact mean that only a marginal
population of the highest social class would benefit by this. The equally
obnoxious property clause further reinforces the above.

[25] The Kandyan
Political Association kept its distance from the CNC. Their demand was for a
federal political structure, following from the grievances caused by the
amalgamation of government since 1833.

[26] Vellala is
the topmost layer in the Tamil caste hierarchy, to which Ramanathan belonged.

[29] No documented
records are available to assess the number of female voters at this election and
the actual number who voted.

[30] WFU comprised
of middle class and some professional women who were wives of recognised leaders
in national and labour-union activities.

[31] D.S.
Senanayake formed the UNP with the CNC.SMS, the Muslim League, the Moors
Association and the Colombo Tamil Union. The UNP's project was really an
idealised perception of exclusive Sinhala ethnicity, through evoking the Sinhala
heritage. The Indian Tamils were excluded.

[32] This was a
coalition of the SLFP, a section of the LSSP and two of the smaller Sinhalese parties.

[33] B. Mahmud was
Minister of Education from 1970 to 1977, when standardisation was introduced. It
was during this period that Muslim schools were created as opposed to Sinhala
and Tamil schools. He also tried his hand at introducing principles of socialism
as a subject for the Higher National Certificate of Examination (HNCE) and
Muslim Dancing which created a spate of protests from the
Community.

[34] At his
historical juncture the Tamil leadership was very much Jaffna centric and
engaged in consolidating the North-East blocks.

[36] An agreement
between the two governments (India and Sri Lanka) for repatriation of a section
of the Indian Tamils, while the rest would be conferred Lankan
citizenship.

[37] The term
'fundamentalism' cannot be defined in simple terms: as far as the paper is
concerned we would confine ourselves to mean-political use of religion [i.e.
return to a true Islam] that is internally homogenising and externally
antagonistic while negating and suppressing the divergent interest and rights of
individuals within the collective. The result could be grater or lesser degree
of oppression of women.

[38] The issue of
collective vs. individual rights is highly complex. In the ethno-nationalist
discourse, individual rights are subsumed into a vague notion of collective
rights or altogether disregarded. At the other extreme is the liberalist
position that rights by definition are individual rights and there is no such
thing as collective rights. The correct position however lies somewhere in
between.

[39] The Amendment
to the Penal Code was brought before Parliament after a process of consultation
with women's groups, medical, legal and other professionals and the National
Committee for Women. The bill covered wide-ranging issues which had remained
untouched for more than one hundred years, from incest, marital rape, sexual
harassment to increasing the age of statutory rape and enhanced punishments. The
intention was to recognise rights of women in situations of violence and crisis
within the family. The bill which was finally passed recognised marital rape in
situations of judicial separation only, which meant that the legislation failed
to tackle the real problem of domestic violence in a situation of de facto
separation, i.e. where due to irretrievable breakdown of marriage, the parties
live separately without obtaining a legal separation. In the case of Muslims
there is no concept of legal/judicial separation although breakdown of marriages
could result in long years of separation.