The Views of the Swedish-American Press toward the United States - Japanese Relations 1914-1945

THE VIEWS OF THE SWEDISH-AMERICAN
PRESS TOWARD UNITED
STATES-JAPANESE RELATIONS
1914-1945
FINIS HERBERT CAPPS
Although the Swedish-American editors1 were primarily
interested in European developments during the period 1914-
1945, they also paid increasing attention to events in the Far
East and the Pacific area as friction between the United
States and Japanese governments grew. As in the case of
opinion concerning United States-European relations, the
attitudes of these editors appeared to be conditioned largely
by the rural, Lutheran background of the great majority of
Swedish-American immigrants. Skepticism toward idealism
and insistence on the practical, pessimism about the ability
of man to prevent war, mistrust of the banker and the
manufacturer, dislike of diplomats and the military—these
seemed the basic determinants of their views. Identification
of the United States with the smaller nations, such as Sweden,
and antagonism toward the "large" powers of Great Britain
and France also played a significant role in views toward
developments in the Pacific area. Sympathy toward Germany,
which was felt to be the victim of designs by the World War
I allies of the United States, added to prejudices against
"commercial" England and "Catholic" France. In fact, atti-
1 Files of available papers, including the larger ones, were incom­plete.
However, there were enough copies to give a representative
picture of editorial opinion.
133
tudes toward United States relations with Asian nations often
could not be understood without a knowledge of the editors'
reactions to current developments in Europe. Finally, the
Republican orthodoxy of all but a tiny minority of editors
influenced their outlook on foreign affairs greatly, and many
times the editors merely printed party propaganda handouts
or repeated statements of Republican Party leaders on inter­national
developments.2
Traditional isolationism that best suited the conservative
views of the bulk of editors was clearly evident in expressions
of opinion concerning United States policy toward the Far
East. However, in this area perhaps more than in views
toward European events, most editors, particularly the older
ones, showed a willingness to accept a policy of American
participation and leadership in foreign affairs if they were
convinced of its practical value and if it would not be directed
toward cooperation with Great Britain and France and
against Germany.
In fact, at times many editors displayed a willingness for
the United States to take strong action, military if necessary,
to protect its interests. Behind this attitude lay a fear of the
"yellow menace." It was generally felt by the editors that the
white and yellow races were pitted against one another and
that a final deciding struggle was almost inevitable. The out­come
of such a struggle seemed doubtful; the editors feared
that, if sufficiently aroused, the overwhelming numbers of
Asians could not be withstood and that the roles of the races
would be reversed: the white peoples would be cast under
the domination of the Asians. The United States should,
therefore, do all in its power to hold the "yellow horde" in
check.
The greatest dislike and distrust were reserved for the
2 For a fuller description of the editors and their papers see Finis
Herbert Capps, F r o m I s o l a t i o n i s m t o I n v o l v e m e n t ; t h e S w e d i s h I m m i ­g
r a n t P r e s s in A m e r i c a 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 4 5 (Chicago: The Swedish Pioneer
Historical Society, 1966), ch. ii.
134
Japanese. When the question of excluding the Japanese from
immigration to the United States was being debated in the
early 1920s, V e s t k u s t e n of San Francisco expressed fear that
the Japanese would quickly outnumber Americans in Cali­fornia
unless effective immigration barriers were erected.
Proposals for exclusion of the Japanese set forth in the
Republican electoral platform of 1920 had found support
among other editors as well, most notably Oliver Linder of
the Chicago S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n a r e n , by far the largest and
most influential of the Swedish-American newspapers. In an
editorial entitled "Yellow and White" Linder declared that
the Republican position was clear: "America first!"3 These
views were not shared by all editors, however. Among the
small minority of the more liberal editors, Alfred Haij of
C a l i f o r n i a V e c k o b l a d in Los Angeles disassociated himself
from attacks on the Japanese, and after the Japanese were
excluded in the 1924 Immigration Act expressed disapproval
of discrimination toward the Japanese.4
Asian peoples and American relations with them received
little attention, however, during World War I and the imme­diate
post-war years, since Swedish-Americans were princi­pally
concerned with the European scene. Many criticisms
of Japan arose during World War I and the peace talks that
followed it, but these were most often the result of the fact
that Japan had been allied with Great Britain before the War
and had taken advantage of Germany's defeat to gain addi­tional
territory. The provision of the Treaty of Versailles
which gave Japan the former German economic rights in the
Chinese province of Shantung was seized as a weapon by
the more conservative editors to attack the Treaty of Ver­sailles
and rally Swedish-Americans against the Wilson
administration during the bitter partisan struggles of 1919
and 1920. S v e n s k a M o n i t o r e n of Sioux City, Iowa, for instance,
accused the Japanese of taking Shantung province by force
3 S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n a r e n , October 14,1920.
4 California V e c k o b l a d , June 5,1924.
135
during World War I in spite of the "valiant" resistance of
German troops.5 Sympathy was aroused for China and many
articles were written throughout the 1920s on its "awaken­ing";
nevertheless, fear was expressed that the Chinese
masses might awaken too fast and turn against the white
man, particularly as a result of colonial policies. This argu­ment
was often used to attack British imperialism.6
Those editors who supported American membership in
the League of Nations, numerous at first but later reduced
to a few, attacked this exploitation of Swedish-American
mistrust of Japan. O. M . Nelson in O m a h a P o s t e n , for i n ­stance,
pointed out the inconsistency of critics of the Japanese
seizure of Shantung who had not protested when Germany
had taken the province by force. He suggested that the pre­tended
sympathy for the Chinese "Mongolians" was hypo­critical
and attempted to demonstrate objectively the strategic
importance of Shantung to Japan. How deeply the issue had
become embedded i n the partisan political struggle became
evident in the reaction to Nelson's editorial among other
Swedish-American editors. R o c k f o r d P o s t e n of Rockford,
Illinois, accused Nelson of supporting the Democratic Party.
Nelson countered by describing the R o c k f o r d P o s t e n attack
as an example of the "weakness" of the political thinking of
Swedish-American editors in giving way to partisanship.
Nelson himself was not able to escape the force of partisan­ship,
however; renewed attacks forced him to admit that
Japan had "stolen" the province, although he reminded his
readers that America's and Sweden's greatest national heroes
also had "stolen" territory.7
The surrender of Shantung by Japan to China, following
the Washington Conference of 1921, was considered by the
Swedish-American editors as a triumph for the Republican
5 S v e n s k a M o n i t o r e n , August 1,1919.
6 S v e a of Worcester, Massachusetts, March 9 and April 24, 1927;
S v e n s k a J o u r n a l e n of Seattle, January 27, 1927; S v e n s k a T r i b u n e n -
N y h e t e r of Chicago, May 11,1927.
7 O m a h a P o s t e n , June 23, November 19, and December 17,1919.
136
administration and as a vital part of the success of that
conference. Earlier fears that Great Britain and Japan were
plotting to oust the United States from China8 were removed
by the Four-Power and Nine-Power treaties agreed on at
the Conference; it was asserted that the Open Door policy
of the United States had been respected by the big powers,9
Japan did not remain long in the favor of the Swedish-
American editors; its actions in the Pacific in the 1920s
aroused increasing alarm among them. Emil Meurling in
S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n s k a P o s t e n of Minneapolis, one of the more
liberal editors, had stated as early as 1923 that an eventual
measuring of strength by Japan with England and the United
States was inevitable.1 0 The Japanese protest over the exclu­sion
of Japanese immigrants in the Immigration Act of 1924
aroused belligerent statements even from editors who gener­ally
opposed the exclusion principle. The usually conciliatory
Linder in S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n a r e n and the independent but
often swash-buckling A l e x a n d e r J . Johnson in S v e n s ka
K u r i r e n (also of Chicago), for example, defiantly called on
all Americans to stand together to fight Japan if necessary.11
Nelson in O m a h a P o s t e n alone criticized the "precipitous"
action of the "hysterical Congress" in terminating the Gentle­man's
Agreement without waiting to see what public opinion
was on the matter. Japanese aggressive moves in China
further increased criticism and apprehension; by 1928 even
Nelson had reversed his attitude and called on the League
of Nations to stop any further encroachment by Japan on
China. Meurling was the most alarmed; he warned that a
Chinese-Japanese war could become a world war and during
the election campaign of 1928 persisted in calling attention
to the danger of Japanese aggression. He declared that the
8 E.g., S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n s k a P o s t e n of Minneapolis, July 27, 1921.
9 M i n n e s o t a S t a t s T i d n i n g , January 15,1922.
10 S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n s k a P o s t e n , October 3,1923.
11 S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n a r e n , April 24, 1924; S v e n s k a K u r i r e n , Decem­ber
11, 1924.
137
sooner America awakened to the danger of war, the better.12
By the time Japan seized Manchuria in 1931, however,
pacifism and isolationism had spread to such an extent among
the Swedish-American editors that some of them spoke out
against any action by the United States to check Japanese
aggression.13 S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n s k a P o s t e n of Minneapolis,
for instance, criticized General " B i l l y " Mitchell for wanting
to build up the air strength of the United States, maintaining
that Mitchell was thus promoting the very war he claimed he
was trying to prevent. The Methodist Sändebudet, on the
other hand, belligerently called on the big powers to stop
Japan by economic pressure, such as suspending both loans
and exports to Japan, while Fredin in S v e a stated flatly that
England and the United States must halt Japanese violence
and that any action necessary to do this would not mean a
departure from neutrality.1 4
The renewal of Japanese aggression in China in 1937, this
time in the Peking and Shanghai area, aroused universal
condemnation of Japan. Omaha P o s t e n , despite the fact that
by this time it was one of the most isolationist of all the
papers, even suggested that the Neutrality Act of 1937 should
not be applied to the conflict by the United States adminis­tration
on the ground that such action would aid Japan.1 5
Fear spread that the conflict would grow into world war.16
However, President Roosevelt's suggestion in a speech in
October 1937 at Chicago that aggressor nations be "quaran­tined"
received little support from the Swedish-American
press. The isolationist editors attacked the position of the
president as unnecessarily provocative. At their head was
Einar Ryden, who had taken over the editorship of T h e
12 O m a h a P o s t e n , April 24, 1924 and May 17, 1928; S v e n s k a A m e r i ­k
a n s k a P o s t e n , May 23, July 11, and July 18,1928.
13 S v e a , November 22, 1933; U t a h P o s t e n , February 16, 1932; M i n n e ­s
o t a S t a t s T i d n i n g , December 5,1934.
14 S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n s k a P o s t e n , January 12, 1932; S a n d e b u d e t,
February 18,1932; S v e a , February 24,1932.
15 O m a h a P o s t e n , August 26, 1937.
1 6 E.g., California V e c k o b l a d , August 5 and September 2,1937.
138
L u t h e r a n C o m p a n i o n in 1934. By 1939 the C o m p a n i o n had
replaced A u g u s t a n a as the chief spokesman for the Swedish-
American Lutheran community, and Ryden had come to
typify the more extreme pacifist and isolationist views of
second and third generation Swedish-Americans. The elderly
Abrahamson, still editor of A u g u s t a n a until 1940, thoroughly
disagreed with these views and at times felt obliged openly to
oppose them.
Despite his earlier severe criticism of Japanese actions,
Ryden was greatly alarmed at the President's suggestion for
a quarantine and questioned whether the administration was
not permitting the United States to "drift into another war."
He also hinted that the president's stand was due to the
efforts of the British, who, according to Ryden, had earlier
hindered Secretary of State Stimson's attempt to stop Japan­ese
aggression but now wanted the United States to help them
protect British interests in the Far East. "The British have
always been adept in getting other nations embroiled in her
[sic] own quarrels, and in securing allies to aid her when
she, needs them," he claimed. While it was true that Japan
had broken every pact and demonstrated that it was a "mad
dog," the problem was not simple.
Repeating a favorite theme of the more conservative
editors, Ryden declared that the blame for the Far Eastern
situation lay in the Treaty of Versailles, which had divided
Europe into two conflicting camps, thereby preventing any
concerted action against Japan. Revise the Versailles pact,
Ryden maintained, and the European conflicts would be
settled and the leading powers could then very quickly pacify
Japan. Short of that, however, the United States could avoid
war if it wished. Ryden concluded by advising the president
to call a conference of all nations to consider the major
international problems. He feared that the president's current
policies would lead to an alliance with England and France
139
and thence to war.1 7
The sinking of the American gunboat P a n a y by Japanese
war planes in early December 1937 and the reaction of the
American public to the sinking caused several editors to fear
that war was imminent. Some sought to counteract anti-
Japanese sentiment in order to preserve the peace. K a r l G.
Fredin, one of the few who fought isolationism but who also
leaned toward pacifism, declared emphatically in S v e a of
Worcester, Massachusetts, that he saw no need for war. He
expressed a willingness to support a boycott of Japanese
goods and a demand for reparations, but emphasized that no
action would resurrect the dead.18 When the affair was settled
peacefully, Ryden praised the administration: "the calm, yet
firm, manner in which Secretary of State Cordell H u l l con­ducted
the diplomatic exchanges with Japan regarding the
deplorable incident deserves the commendation of all peace-loving
Americans."1 9 This praise was exceptional for Ryden;
he very quickly reversed himself and returned to the attack,
declaring that while it could not be proved that the adminis­tration
had fostered war propaganda during the P a n a y crisis,
"the armament program is frankly the president's own policy,
and the precipitation of the initial war scare must also be
laid at his door as a result of his Chicago speech." Ryden's
misgivings increased. Secret Anglo-American naval talks,
joint notes to Japan, the dispatch of American war vessels
to Australia and Singapore, naval maneuvers near the A l e u ­tian
Islands—all these actions by the administration indicated
to him a new foreign policy. Such actions would bring "grave
misgivings to all who have hoped and prayed that the nation's
leaders will not again be drawn into the pitfall of European
alliances," he added pessimistically.20
17 T h e L u t h e r a n C o m p a n i o n , September 9, October 14, and October
21, 1937.
18 S v e a , December 15,1937; also Svenska Posten of Seattle, December
23, 1937.
19 T h e L u t h e r a n C o m p a n i o n , January 6,1938.
20 I b i d . , January 27 and February 17,1938.
140
Most editors assumed more critical attitudes toward the
Japanese action, and many indicated that they would not be
averse to avenging it. The Lutheran-oriented M i n n e s o t a S t a ts
T i d n i n g , for example, stated that Japan had been looking for
trouble and was lucky to get off so easily. California Vecko­blad
deplored the fact that Great Britain and the United
States had not backed up their words with steel, adding that
as a result Japan would now be the master of Asia and that
British and American markets in Asia were now endangered.
G. F. Hedstrand in the Mission Covenant Förbundets V e c k o ­t
i d n i n g , who wavered between an isolationist and an inter­nationalist
attitude toward foreign affairs, insisted that it
was shameful for a neighbor not to help resist attack, although
he added defensively that the United States should not be
motivated primarily by the financial interests of Americans
in China.21
Criticism of Japanese policies, particularly the penetration
of China, increased throughout the latter part of the 1930s,
although the editors' interest centered on events in Europe,
especially after war began there. Warnings of danger to
American interests in the Pacific appeared in nearly all the
Swedish-American papers. Criticism of American trade with
Japan was nearly universal; Hedstrand felt so deeply about
the matter that he advised his readers to write their congress­men
asking them to stop the administration from allowing
the sale of war materials to Japan. L. G. Abrahamson in
A u g u s t a n a , who had seldom commented on international
developments since World War I and whose leadership of
the Lutheran press was passing to Ryden, felt constrained
to express his belief that the struggle for markets, especially
as evidenced by Japanese actions in the Far East, equaled
the urge for power as a cause of war.22
In this atmosphere the administration's notification of abro-
1 2 M i n n e s o t a S t a t s T i d n i n g , January 5, 1938; California V e c k o b l a d,
January 20, 1938; Förbundets V e c k o t i d n i n g , January 18, 1938.
22 T h e C o v e n a n t W e e k l y , April 3, 1939; A u g u s t a n a , March 1, 1938.
141
gation of the 1911 commercial treaty with Japan in July 1939
received expressions of approval. Even Ryden, who had
three months previously applauded congress for refusing to
accept the administration's proposal to fortify the island of
Guam on the ground that such action would be an unfriendly
act toward Japan, approved the restriction of trade with
Japan. J . Oscar Backhand in the Baptist S v e n s k a S t a n d a r et
went so far as to advocate embargoing all war materials
destined for Japan, regardless of the effect on American
profits, since the United States should make it clear that it
wanted no part of Japan's "exploits in thievery."2 3
The formation of the Triple Alliance by Germany, Italy,
and Japan, following the military successes of the Nazi armies
in 1940, turned more attention toward the menace in the Far
East, and the tone of the press became sharper. Even S v e n s ka
A m e r i k a n a r e n - T r i b u n e n , which seldom commented on events
in the F a r East, was aroused. Editorials appeared warning
the United States to be on its guard and well armed. Reuben
Heidenblad, who had been editor of S v e a during World War I
and who returned to that post when Fredin died in August
1938, in contrast to his attitude in 1914 increasingly supported
the foreign policy of the administration. He declared that
"the United States' foreign policy, especially in what con­cerns
the Far East, has always been sound, honest, and
upright," and added that it was better to have Japan
engaged in China than free to strike elsewhere.24
The more isolationist editors, on the other hand, became
alarmed. They maintained that the United States had no
interests in the Pacific worth fighting for and that war could
be avoided if the United States would mind its own business
and not try to protect British interests. The most extreme
position during this period was taken by Joel Fridfeldt, editor
23 S v e a , August 9, 1939; T h e C o v e n a n t W e e k l y , August 8, 1939; T h e
L u t h e r a n C o m p a n i o n , March 9 and June 1, 1939; S v e n s k a S t a n d a r e t ,
February 6, 1940.'
24 S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n a r e n - T r i b u n e n , October 17, 1940; S v e a , Septem­ber
26 and October 3,1940.
142
of the small religious paper, M i s s i o n s Vännen, and considered
a reactionary by the other editors. In early 1940 he even
attacked Chiang Kai-Shek, declaring that as long as Chiang
maintained relations with the "Godless Communists" he
should be prepared for defeat.25
As the Swedish-American editors became convinced,
particularly after the election campaign of 1940, that the
administration could not be dissuaded from supporting the
Allies, criticism of the administration's policies practically
ceased. Ryden alone continued openly to hammer on pacifist
and isolationist themes.2 6 In an editorial appearing four days
after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor but evidently
written before the event, he asked, "just why the United
States should be required to sacrifice its sons and waste its
resources in the defense of the Asiatic possessions of Euro­pean
imperial powers is one of those things that continue to
keep the minds of Americans confused." Ryden supplied his
own answer: "not a few Americans will suspect that it is an
astute move on the part of the interventionists to drag the
United States into World War II through the back door."27
Pearl Harbor swept aside all remaining isolationist and
pacifist sentiment, and the editors, without exception, gave
their full support to the prosecution of the war against Japan.
Ryden, while recalling that he had always fought for the
preservation of the peace, declared that all Americans would
now fight shoulder to shoulder against the invader.2 8 Toward
the end of the war new issues appeared. The use of the atom
bomb by the United States aroused criticism among the
editors of the religious papers. The Methodist Sändebudet
remarked that perhaps the use of the bomb was no worse
than killing by other means, but that nevertheless it was
2 5 Missions Vännen, January 16, 1940.
26 T h e L u t h e r a n C o m p a n i o n , January 23, May 8, May 29, and August
28, 1941.
2' I b i d . , December 11, 1941.
2 8 Ibid., December 18, 1941.
143
shocking and disclosed the lack of Christian influence in the
world. Ryden reacted far more violently. "No atrocity com­mitted
against civilized populations can hereafter be branded
by Americans as an act of barbarism," he maintained, adding
that the heads of the American military establishment seemed
to think that the end justified the means. This criticism
was not shared by A . T. Lundholm, who succeeded Abraham-son
on the latter's death in 1940 as editor of A u g u s t a n a and
who continued Abrahamson's policy of opposing pacifism.
He maintained that too many sermons had been preached
about the atom bomb. Atomic power did not need to be used
for destructive purposes; how it would be used would depend
on man's nature.29
Comments on Allied conferences preparing for the peace
indicated that the peace terms contemplated for the Euro­pean
settlement and the treatment accorded Germany aroused
traditional suspicions of the Soviet Union and Great Britain
and created pessimism over the prospects for peace. But in
contrast to attitudes toward developments in Europe no ex­pressions
of sympathy were recorded when peace terms for
Japan were discussed. Feeling against Japan still ran high,3 0
and the editors generally approved the armistice terms im­posed
on that country. One jarring note was introduced when
the report of the congressional committee which investigated
the military and civil preparations for the defense of Pearl
Harbor prior to December 1941 was made public in late 1945.
As might be expected, Ryden was shocked at the findings and
was enticed by the theory that the lack of preparation was
evidence of a desire on the part of the administration to
invite Japanese attack and thus to overcome objections to
entering the war against Germany. "We may yet hear more
of the diplomatic maneuvering in the State Department that
29 Sändebudet, September 3, 1945; T h e L u t h e r a n C o m p a n i o n , August
22,1945; A u g u s t a n a , November 5,1945.
3 0 E . g . , S v e a , November 8, 1945.
144
was deliberately designed to involve the United States i n the
European conflict," he declared, adding that the matter
needed more study. But Ryden expressed no sympathy for
Japan.3 1
While attitudes toward Europe indicated that isolationist
sentiment might revive in relation to United States policies
concerning that area, there was no reason to believe that the
editors would resist United States leadership in the establish­ment
and maintenance of a postwar peace arrangement in the
Far East. Throughout the period 1914-1945 they had usually
shown a willingness to support an active policy to protect
and further United States interests i n the Pacific and to
oppose the Japanese. Most criticism of American actions in
the Far East had seemed based on a tendency to regard
Far Eastern struggles as extensions of European ones. A
recurrent theme, for instance, was suspicion that the United
States favored British interests over those of Germany and
others, particularly in the field of trade. Some editors, repre­senting
largely second and third generation Swedish-Ameri­cans
in religious circles, had seemed genuinely opposed, on
isolationist and pacifist grounds, to United States actions or
adoption of policies in the Pacific that would run the risk of
war. This isolationist sentiment had reached its peak in the
early 1930s, but had waned as Japanese-United States clashes
increased. By 1940 most editors had seemed to accept the
necessity for the United States to take a strong stand against
Japan, even at the risk of war.
Why the Swedish-American press was more willing for the
United States to play a more active role i n the Far East than
in Europe is an intriguing question. This willingness seemed
based on the fact that Swedish-Americans had no strong ties
with any groups in Asia and were therefore emotionally
uninvolved, except for a somewhat abstract prejudice against
the "yellow race." As a result, they could more easily identify
31 T h e L u t h e r a n C o m p a n i o n , September 19,1945.
145
with administration efforts to increase American power in
the Pacific.
Also, traditional Swedish-American attitudes, despite the
fact that they ordinarily evidenced a preference for conserva­tive
policies, could actually foster support of an active foreign
policy if Swedish-Americans became convinced of its justness
and practical value and if it were put forward by a strong
man. Admiration for a strong and dramatic leader seemed
particularly ingrained and one of the most powerful determi­nants
of attitudes. Such a man as Theodore Roosevelt, whose
bold style was coupled with conservative nationalism, was
most attractive to Swedish-Americans; many of them had
ardently supported his efforts to increase United States
influence abroad. The dramatic leadership of Woodrow
Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, despite the fact that they
were Democrats, had also evoked a willingness to accept
United States involvement in international affairs. Con­versely,
the weak leadership of the Republican presidents
in the 1920s had been an important factor in the upsurge of
isolationism among Swedish-Americans during the inter-war
period. Thus, in the final analysis, the question of whether
Swedish-Americans would continue endorsement of United
States leadership in the establishment and maintenance of a
post-1945 world order seemed likely to turn largely on the
qualities of the American president and the manner in which
foreign policies were presented to them.
148

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THE VIEWS OF THE SWEDISH-AMERICAN
PRESS TOWARD UNITED
STATES-JAPANESE RELATIONS
1914-1945
FINIS HERBERT CAPPS
Although the Swedish-American editors1 were primarily
interested in European developments during the period 1914-
1945, they also paid increasing attention to events in the Far
East and the Pacific area as friction between the United
States and Japanese governments grew. As in the case of
opinion concerning United States-European relations, the
attitudes of these editors appeared to be conditioned largely
by the rural, Lutheran background of the great majority of
Swedish-American immigrants. Skepticism toward idealism
and insistence on the practical, pessimism about the ability
of man to prevent war, mistrust of the banker and the
manufacturer, dislike of diplomats and the military—these
seemed the basic determinants of their views. Identification
of the United States with the smaller nations, such as Sweden,
and antagonism toward the "large" powers of Great Britain
and France also played a significant role in views toward
developments in the Pacific area. Sympathy toward Germany,
which was felt to be the victim of designs by the World War
I allies of the United States, added to prejudices against
"commercial" England and "Catholic" France. In fact, atti-
1 Files of available papers, including the larger ones, were incom­plete.
However, there were enough copies to give a representative
picture of editorial opinion.
133
tudes toward United States relations with Asian nations often
could not be understood without a knowledge of the editors'
reactions to current developments in Europe. Finally, the
Republican orthodoxy of all but a tiny minority of editors
influenced their outlook on foreign affairs greatly, and many
times the editors merely printed party propaganda handouts
or repeated statements of Republican Party leaders on inter­national
developments.2
Traditional isolationism that best suited the conservative
views of the bulk of editors was clearly evident in expressions
of opinion concerning United States policy toward the Far
East. However, in this area perhaps more than in views
toward European events, most editors, particularly the older
ones, showed a willingness to accept a policy of American
participation and leadership in foreign affairs if they were
convinced of its practical value and if it would not be directed
toward cooperation with Great Britain and France and
against Germany.
In fact, at times many editors displayed a willingness for
the United States to take strong action, military if necessary,
to protect its interests. Behind this attitude lay a fear of the
"yellow menace." It was generally felt by the editors that the
white and yellow races were pitted against one another and
that a final deciding struggle was almost inevitable. The out­come
of such a struggle seemed doubtful; the editors feared
that, if sufficiently aroused, the overwhelming numbers of
Asians could not be withstood and that the roles of the races
would be reversed: the white peoples would be cast under
the domination of the Asians. The United States should,
therefore, do all in its power to hold the "yellow horde" in
check.
The greatest dislike and distrust were reserved for the
2 For a fuller description of the editors and their papers see Finis
Herbert Capps, F r o m I s o l a t i o n i s m t o I n v o l v e m e n t ; t h e S w e d i s h I m m i ­g
r a n t P r e s s in A m e r i c a 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 4 5 (Chicago: The Swedish Pioneer
Historical Society, 1966), ch. ii.
134
Japanese. When the question of excluding the Japanese from
immigration to the United States was being debated in the
early 1920s, V e s t k u s t e n of San Francisco expressed fear that
the Japanese would quickly outnumber Americans in Cali­fornia
unless effective immigration barriers were erected.
Proposals for exclusion of the Japanese set forth in the
Republican electoral platform of 1920 had found support
among other editors as well, most notably Oliver Linder of
the Chicago S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n a r e n , by far the largest and
most influential of the Swedish-American newspapers. In an
editorial entitled "Yellow and White" Linder declared that
the Republican position was clear: "America first!"3 These
views were not shared by all editors, however. Among the
small minority of the more liberal editors, Alfred Haij of
C a l i f o r n i a V e c k o b l a d in Los Angeles disassociated himself
from attacks on the Japanese, and after the Japanese were
excluded in the 1924 Immigration Act expressed disapproval
of discrimination toward the Japanese.4
Asian peoples and American relations with them received
little attention, however, during World War I and the imme­diate
post-war years, since Swedish-Americans were princi­pally
concerned with the European scene. Many criticisms
of Japan arose during World War I and the peace talks that
followed it, but these were most often the result of the fact
that Japan had been allied with Great Britain before the War
and had taken advantage of Germany's defeat to gain addi­tional
territory. The provision of the Treaty of Versailles
which gave Japan the former German economic rights in the
Chinese province of Shantung was seized as a weapon by
the more conservative editors to attack the Treaty of Ver­sailles
and rally Swedish-Americans against the Wilson
administration during the bitter partisan struggles of 1919
and 1920. S v e n s k a M o n i t o r e n of Sioux City, Iowa, for instance,
accused the Japanese of taking Shantung province by force
3 S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n a r e n , October 14,1920.
4 California V e c k o b l a d , June 5,1924.
135
during World War I in spite of the "valiant" resistance of
German troops.5 Sympathy was aroused for China and many
articles were written throughout the 1920s on its "awaken­ing";
nevertheless, fear was expressed that the Chinese
masses might awaken too fast and turn against the white
man, particularly as a result of colonial policies. This argu­ment
was often used to attack British imperialism.6
Those editors who supported American membership in
the League of Nations, numerous at first but later reduced
to a few, attacked this exploitation of Swedish-American
mistrust of Japan. O. M . Nelson in O m a h a P o s t e n , for i n ­stance,
pointed out the inconsistency of critics of the Japanese
seizure of Shantung who had not protested when Germany
had taken the province by force. He suggested that the pre­tended
sympathy for the Chinese "Mongolians" was hypo­critical
and attempted to demonstrate objectively the strategic
importance of Shantung to Japan. How deeply the issue had
become embedded i n the partisan political struggle became
evident in the reaction to Nelson's editorial among other
Swedish-American editors. R o c k f o r d P o s t e n of Rockford,
Illinois, accused Nelson of supporting the Democratic Party.
Nelson countered by describing the R o c k f o r d P o s t e n attack
as an example of the "weakness" of the political thinking of
Swedish-American editors in giving way to partisanship.
Nelson himself was not able to escape the force of partisan­ship,
however; renewed attacks forced him to admit that
Japan had "stolen" the province, although he reminded his
readers that America's and Sweden's greatest national heroes
also had "stolen" territory.7
The surrender of Shantung by Japan to China, following
the Washington Conference of 1921, was considered by the
Swedish-American editors as a triumph for the Republican
5 S v e n s k a M o n i t o r e n , August 1,1919.
6 S v e a of Worcester, Massachusetts, March 9 and April 24, 1927;
S v e n s k a J o u r n a l e n of Seattle, January 27, 1927; S v e n s k a T r i b u n e n -
N y h e t e r of Chicago, May 11,1927.
7 O m a h a P o s t e n , June 23, November 19, and December 17,1919.
136
administration and as a vital part of the success of that
conference. Earlier fears that Great Britain and Japan were
plotting to oust the United States from China8 were removed
by the Four-Power and Nine-Power treaties agreed on at
the Conference; it was asserted that the Open Door policy
of the United States had been respected by the big powers,9
Japan did not remain long in the favor of the Swedish-
American editors; its actions in the Pacific in the 1920s
aroused increasing alarm among them. Emil Meurling in
S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n s k a P o s t e n of Minneapolis, one of the more
liberal editors, had stated as early as 1923 that an eventual
measuring of strength by Japan with England and the United
States was inevitable.1 0 The Japanese protest over the exclu­sion
of Japanese immigrants in the Immigration Act of 1924
aroused belligerent statements even from editors who gener­ally
opposed the exclusion principle. The usually conciliatory
Linder in S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n a r e n and the independent but
often swash-buckling A l e x a n d e r J . Johnson in S v e n s ka
K u r i r e n (also of Chicago), for example, defiantly called on
all Americans to stand together to fight Japan if necessary.11
Nelson in O m a h a P o s t e n alone criticized the "precipitous"
action of the "hysterical Congress" in terminating the Gentle­man's
Agreement without waiting to see what public opinion
was on the matter. Japanese aggressive moves in China
further increased criticism and apprehension; by 1928 even
Nelson had reversed his attitude and called on the League
of Nations to stop any further encroachment by Japan on
China. Meurling was the most alarmed; he warned that a
Chinese-Japanese war could become a world war and during
the election campaign of 1928 persisted in calling attention
to the danger of Japanese aggression. He declared that the
8 E.g., S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n s k a P o s t e n of Minneapolis, July 27, 1921.
9 M i n n e s o t a S t a t s T i d n i n g , January 15,1922.
10 S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n s k a P o s t e n , October 3,1923.
11 S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n a r e n , April 24, 1924; S v e n s k a K u r i r e n , Decem­ber
11, 1924.
137
sooner America awakened to the danger of war, the better.12
By the time Japan seized Manchuria in 1931, however,
pacifism and isolationism had spread to such an extent among
the Swedish-American editors that some of them spoke out
against any action by the United States to check Japanese
aggression.13 S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n s k a P o s t e n of Minneapolis,
for instance, criticized General " B i l l y " Mitchell for wanting
to build up the air strength of the United States, maintaining
that Mitchell was thus promoting the very war he claimed he
was trying to prevent. The Methodist Sändebudet, on the
other hand, belligerently called on the big powers to stop
Japan by economic pressure, such as suspending both loans
and exports to Japan, while Fredin in S v e a stated flatly that
England and the United States must halt Japanese violence
and that any action necessary to do this would not mean a
departure from neutrality.1 4
The renewal of Japanese aggression in China in 1937, this
time in the Peking and Shanghai area, aroused universal
condemnation of Japan. Omaha P o s t e n , despite the fact that
by this time it was one of the most isolationist of all the
papers, even suggested that the Neutrality Act of 1937 should
not be applied to the conflict by the United States adminis­tration
on the ground that such action would aid Japan.1 5
Fear spread that the conflict would grow into world war.16
However, President Roosevelt's suggestion in a speech in
October 1937 at Chicago that aggressor nations be "quaran­tined"
received little support from the Swedish-American
press. The isolationist editors attacked the position of the
president as unnecessarily provocative. At their head was
Einar Ryden, who had taken over the editorship of T h e
12 O m a h a P o s t e n , April 24, 1924 and May 17, 1928; S v e n s k a A m e r i ­k
a n s k a P o s t e n , May 23, July 11, and July 18,1928.
13 S v e a , November 22, 1933; U t a h P o s t e n , February 16, 1932; M i n n e ­s
o t a S t a t s T i d n i n g , December 5,1934.
14 S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n s k a P o s t e n , January 12, 1932; S a n d e b u d e t,
February 18,1932; S v e a , February 24,1932.
15 O m a h a P o s t e n , August 26, 1937.
1 6 E.g., California V e c k o b l a d , August 5 and September 2,1937.
138
L u t h e r a n C o m p a n i o n in 1934. By 1939 the C o m p a n i o n had
replaced A u g u s t a n a as the chief spokesman for the Swedish-
American Lutheran community, and Ryden had come to
typify the more extreme pacifist and isolationist views of
second and third generation Swedish-Americans. The elderly
Abrahamson, still editor of A u g u s t a n a until 1940, thoroughly
disagreed with these views and at times felt obliged openly to
oppose them.
Despite his earlier severe criticism of Japanese actions,
Ryden was greatly alarmed at the President's suggestion for
a quarantine and questioned whether the administration was
not permitting the United States to "drift into another war."
He also hinted that the president's stand was due to the
efforts of the British, who, according to Ryden, had earlier
hindered Secretary of State Stimson's attempt to stop Japan­ese
aggression but now wanted the United States to help them
protect British interests in the Far East. "The British have
always been adept in getting other nations embroiled in her
[sic] own quarrels, and in securing allies to aid her when
she, needs them," he claimed. While it was true that Japan
had broken every pact and demonstrated that it was a "mad
dog," the problem was not simple.
Repeating a favorite theme of the more conservative
editors, Ryden declared that the blame for the Far Eastern
situation lay in the Treaty of Versailles, which had divided
Europe into two conflicting camps, thereby preventing any
concerted action against Japan. Revise the Versailles pact,
Ryden maintained, and the European conflicts would be
settled and the leading powers could then very quickly pacify
Japan. Short of that, however, the United States could avoid
war if it wished. Ryden concluded by advising the president
to call a conference of all nations to consider the major
international problems. He feared that the president's current
policies would lead to an alliance with England and France
139
and thence to war.1 7
The sinking of the American gunboat P a n a y by Japanese
war planes in early December 1937 and the reaction of the
American public to the sinking caused several editors to fear
that war was imminent. Some sought to counteract anti-
Japanese sentiment in order to preserve the peace. K a r l G.
Fredin, one of the few who fought isolationism but who also
leaned toward pacifism, declared emphatically in S v e a of
Worcester, Massachusetts, that he saw no need for war. He
expressed a willingness to support a boycott of Japanese
goods and a demand for reparations, but emphasized that no
action would resurrect the dead.18 When the affair was settled
peacefully, Ryden praised the administration: "the calm, yet
firm, manner in which Secretary of State Cordell H u l l con­ducted
the diplomatic exchanges with Japan regarding the
deplorable incident deserves the commendation of all peace-loving
Americans."1 9 This praise was exceptional for Ryden;
he very quickly reversed himself and returned to the attack,
declaring that while it could not be proved that the adminis­tration
had fostered war propaganda during the P a n a y crisis,
"the armament program is frankly the president's own policy,
and the precipitation of the initial war scare must also be
laid at his door as a result of his Chicago speech." Ryden's
misgivings increased. Secret Anglo-American naval talks,
joint notes to Japan, the dispatch of American war vessels
to Australia and Singapore, naval maneuvers near the A l e u ­tian
Islands—all these actions by the administration indicated
to him a new foreign policy. Such actions would bring "grave
misgivings to all who have hoped and prayed that the nation's
leaders will not again be drawn into the pitfall of European
alliances," he added pessimistically.20
17 T h e L u t h e r a n C o m p a n i o n , September 9, October 14, and October
21, 1937.
18 S v e a , December 15,1937; also Svenska Posten of Seattle, December
23, 1937.
19 T h e L u t h e r a n C o m p a n i o n , January 6,1938.
20 I b i d . , January 27 and February 17,1938.
140
Most editors assumed more critical attitudes toward the
Japanese action, and many indicated that they would not be
averse to avenging it. The Lutheran-oriented M i n n e s o t a S t a ts
T i d n i n g , for example, stated that Japan had been looking for
trouble and was lucky to get off so easily. California Vecko­blad
deplored the fact that Great Britain and the United
States had not backed up their words with steel, adding that
as a result Japan would now be the master of Asia and that
British and American markets in Asia were now endangered.
G. F. Hedstrand in the Mission Covenant Förbundets V e c k o ­t
i d n i n g , who wavered between an isolationist and an inter­nationalist
attitude toward foreign affairs, insisted that it
was shameful for a neighbor not to help resist attack, although
he added defensively that the United States should not be
motivated primarily by the financial interests of Americans
in China.21
Criticism of Japanese policies, particularly the penetration
of China, increased throughout the latter part of the 1930s,
although the editors' interest centered on events in Europe,
especially after war began there. Warnings of danger to
American interests in the Pacific appeared in nearly all the
Swedish-American papers. Criticism of American trade with
Japan was nearly universal; Hedstrand felt so deeply about
the matter that he advised his readers to write their congress­men
asking them to stop the administration from allowing
the sale of war materials to Japan. L. G. Abrahamson in
A u g u s t a n a , who had seldom commented on international
developments since World War I and whose leadership of
the Lutheran press was passing to Ryden, felt constrained
to express his belief that the struggle for markets, especially
as evidenced by Japanese actions in the Far East, equaled
the urge for power as a cause of war.22
In this atmosphere the administration's notification of abro-
1 2 M i n n e s o t a S t a t s T i d n i n g , January 5, 1938; California V e c k o b l a d,
January 20, 1938; Förbundets V e c k o t i d n i n g , January 18, 1938.
22 T h e C o v e n a n t W e e k l y , April 3, 1939; A u g u s t a n a , March 1, 1938.
141
gation of the 1911 commercial treaty with Japan in July 1939
received expressions of approval. Even Ryden, who had
three months previously applauded congress for refusing to
accept the administration's proposal to fortify the island of
Guam on the ground that such action would be an unfriendly
act toward Japan, approved the restriction of trade with
Japan. J . Oscar Backhand in the Baptist S v e n s k a S t a n d a r et
went so far as to advocate embargoing all war materials
destined for Japan, regardless of the effect on American
profits, since the United States should make it clear that it
wanted no part of Japan's "exploits in thievery."2 3
The formation of the Triple Alliance by Germany, Italy,
and Japan, following the military successes of the Nazi armies
in 1940, turned more attention toward the menace in the Far
East, and the tone of the press became sharper. Even S v e n s ka
A m e r i k a n a r e n - T r i b u n e n , which seldom commented on events
in the F a r East, was aroused. Editorials appeared warning
the United States to be on its guard and well armed. Reuben
Heidenblad, who had been editor of S v e a during World War I
and who returned to that post when Fredin died in August
1938, in contrast to his attitude in 1914 increasingly supported
the foreign policy of the administration. He declared that
"the United States' foreign policy, especially in what con­cerns
the Far East, has always been sound, honest, and
upright," and added that it was better to have Japan
engaged in China than free to strike elsewhere.24
The more isolationist editors, on the other hand, became
alarmed. They maintained that the United States had no
interests in the Pacific worth fighting for and that war could
be avoided if the United States would mind its own business
and not try to protect British interests. The most extreme
position during this period was taken by Joel Fridfeldt, editor
23 S v e a , August 9, 1939; T h e C o v e n a n t W e e k l y , August 8, 1939; T h e
L u t h e r a n C o m p a n i o n , March 9 and June 1, 1939; S v e n s k a S t a n d a r e t ,
February 6, 1940.'
24 S v e n s k a A m e r i k a n a r e n - T r i b u n e n , October 17, 1940; S v e a , Septem­ber
26 and October 3,1940.
142
of the small religious paper, M i s s i o n s Vännen, and considered
a reactionary by the other editors. In early 1940 he even
attacked Chiang Kai-Shek, declaring that as long as Chiang
maintained relations with the "Godless Communists" he
should be prepared for defeat.25
As the Swedish-American editors became convinced,
particularly after the election campaign of 1940, that the
administration could not be dissuaded from supporting the
Allies, criticism of the administration's policies practically
ceased. Ryden alone continued openly to hammer on pacifist
and isolationist themes.2 6 In an editorial appearing four days
after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor but evidently
written before the event, he asked, "just why the United
States should be required to sacrifice its sons and waste its
resources in the defense of the Asiatic possessions of Euro­pean
imperial powers is one of those things that continue to
keep the minds of Americans confused." Ryden supplied his
own answer: "not a few Americans will suspect that it is an
astute move on the part of the interventionists to drag the
United States into World War II through the back door."27
Pearl Harbor swept aside all remaining isolationist and
pacifist sentiment, and the editors, without exception, gave
their full support to the prosecution of the war against Japan.
Ryden, while recalling that he had always fought for the
preservation of the peace, declared that all Americans would
now fight shoulder to shoulder against the invader.2 8 Toward
the end of the war new issues appeared. The use of the atom
bomb by the United States aroused criticism among the
editors of the religious papers. The Methodist Sändebudet
remarked that perhaps the use of the bomb was no worse
than killing by other means, but that nevertheless it was
2 5 Missions Vännen, January 16, 1940.
26 T h e L u t h e r a n C o m p a n i o n , January 23, May 8, May 29, and August
28, 1941.
2' I b i d . , December 11, 1941.
2 8 Ibid., December 18, 1941.
143
shocking and disclosed the lack of Christian influence in the
world. Ryden reacted far more violently. "No atrocity com­mitted
against civilized populations can hereafter be branded
by Americans as an act of barbarism," he maintained, adding
that the heads of the American military establishment seemed
to think that the end justified the means. This criticism
was not shared by A . T. Lundholm, who succeeded Abraham-son
on the latter's death in 1940 as editor of A u g u s t a n a and
who continued Abrahamson's policy of opposing pacifism.
He maintained that too many sermons had been preached
about the atom bomb. Atomic power did not need to be used
for destructive purposes; how it would be used would depend
on man's nature.29
Comments on Allied conferences preparing for the peace
indicated that the peace terms contemplated for the Euro­pean
settlement and the treatment accorded Germany aroused
traditional suspicions of the Soviet Union and Great Britain
and created pessimism over the prospects for peace. But in
contrast to attitudes toward developments in Europe no ex­pressions
of sympathy were recorded when peace terms for
Japan were discussed. Feeling against Japan still ran high,3 0
and the editors generally approved the armistice terms im­posed
on that country. One jarring note was introduced when
the report of the congressional committee which investigated
the military and civil preparations for the defense of Pearl
Harbor prior to December 1941 was made public in late 1945.
As might be expected, Ryden was shocked at the findings and
was enticed by the theory that the lack of preparation was
evidence of a desire on the part of the administration to
invite Japanese attack and thus to overcome objections to
entering the war against Germany. "We may yet hear more
of the diplomatic maneuvering in the State Department that
29 Sändebudet, September 3, 1945; T h e L u t h e r a n C o m p a n i o n , August
22,1945; A u g u s t a n a , November 5,1945.
3 0 E . g . , S v e a , November 8, 1945.
144
was deliberately designed to involve the United States i n the
European conflict," he declared, adding that the matter
needed more study. But Ryden expressed no sympathy for
Japan.3 1
While attitudes toward Europe indicated that isolationist
sentiment might revive in relation to United States policies
concerning that area, there was no reason to believe that the
editors would resist United States leadership in the establish­ment
and maintenance of a postwar peace arrangement in the
Far East. Throughout the period 1914-1945 they had usually
shown a willingness to support an active policy to protect
and further United States interests i n the Pacific and to
oppose the Japanese. Most criticism of American actions in
the Far East had seemed based on a tendency to regard
Far Eastern struggles as extensions of European ones. A
recurrent theme, for instance, was suspicion that the United
States favored British interests over those of Germany and
others, particularly in the field of trade. Some editors, repre­senting
largely second and third generation Swedish-Ameri­cans
in religious circles, had seemed genuinely opposed, on
isolationist and pacifist grounds, to United States actions or
adoption of policies in the Pacific that would run the risk of
war. This isolationist sentiment had reached its peak in the
early 1930s, but had waned as Japanese-United States clashes
increased. By 1940 most editors had seemed to accept the
necessity for the United States to take a strong stand against
Japan, even at the risk of war.
Why the Swedish-American press was more willing for the
United States to play a more active role i n the Far East than
in Europe is an intriguing question. This willingness seemed
based on the fact that Swedish-Americans had no strong ties
with any groups in Asia and were therefore emotionally
uninvolved, except for a somewhat abstract prejudice against
the "yellow race." As a result, they could more easily identify
31 T h e L u t h e r a n C o m p a n i o n , September 19,1945.
145
with administration efforts to increase American power in
the Pacific.
Also, traditional Swedish-American attitudes, despite the
fact that they ordinarily evidenced a preference for conserva­tive
policies, could actually foster support of an active foreign
policy if Swedish-Americans became convinced of its justness
and practical value and if it were put forward by a strong
man. Admiration for a strong and dramatic leader seemed
particularly ingrained and one of the most powerful determi­nants
of attitudes. Such a man as Theodore Roosevelt, whose
bold style was coupled with conservative nationalism, was
most attractive to Swedish-Americans; many of them had
ardently supported his efforts to increase United States
influence abroad. The dramatic leadership of Woodrow
Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, despite the fact that they
were Democrats, had also evoked a willingness to accept
United States involvement in international affairs. Con­versely,
the weak leadership of the Republican presidents
in the 1920s had been an important factor in the upsurge of
isolationism among Swedish-Americans during the inter-war
period. Thus, in the final analysis, the question of whether
Swedish-Americans would continue endorsement of United
States leadership in the establishment and maintenance of a
post-1945 world order seemed likely to turn largely on the
qualities of the American president and the manner in which
foreign policies were presented to them.
148