After
a hearing before the Office of Administrative
Law has been held, and an initial decision has
been rendered by an Administrative Law Judge,
it is reviewed by the Director. The Director may
adopt the initial decision as rendered or modify
the decision prior to issuing a Final Order. The
final order may approve a settlement agreed upon
by the parties, may dismiss the case with no benefit
to the complainant, or may order the award of
appropriate damages, assessment of penalties and
other relief deemed proper by the Director.

April
23, 2003 The
Complainant filed a verified complaint
with the Division alleging that Respondent
denied her reappointment to her prior
position as municipal housing/zoning officer
based on her race (Caucasian). Following
an administrative hearing, the Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) issued an initial decision
in favor of Complainant, awarding her
backpay with interest, damages for pain
and humiliation, and assessing a statutory
penalty. Specifically, the ALJ determined
that Complainant presented sufficient
direct and circumstantial evidence to
establish that Respondent was motivated
by race in appointing a Black male to
the position instead of reappointing Complainant.
In evaluating the circumstantial evidence,
the ALJ noted that more rigorous prima
facie standards must be applied to reverse
discrimination cases, but found that Complainant
presented sufficient evidence to meet
that heightened burden.

The
Director agreed with the ALJ’s determination
that Complainant established both by direct
and circumstantial evidence that Respondent
unlawfully discriminated against her based
on her race. The Director adopted the
ALJ’s backpay award, but concluded
that the evidence presented, including
the testimony that Complainant suffered
physical manifestations of her emotional
distress which required medical treatment
and prescription medication, warranted
increasing the emotional distress damages
to $7,500. The Director also concluded
that the evidence presented warranted
a statutory penalty of $7,500 in this
case.

February
2, 2005 Respondent appealed the
Director’s decision to the Appellate
Division of the Superior Court of New
Jersey. On September 24, 2004, the Appellate
Division ruled that the Director’s
factual findings and legal conclusions
were amply supported by the credible evidence,
but remanded the case for the Director
to address the defense of legislative
immunity, which Respondent raised for
the first time on appeal. The Director
concluded that the doctrine of legislative
immunity could not protect Respondent
from liability for its race-based employment
decision, because its race-based decision
to replace Complainant with an African
American was an administrative or managerial
function rather than a legislative function.
Respondent has filed an appeal of the
Director’s decision on the legislative
immunity issue.

Case
Summary:
Complainant filed a verified complaint
with the Division alleging that her employer
discriminated against her and terminated
her employment based on her creed (Muslim)
in violation of the LAD. Specifically,
the complaint alleged that the owner of
the company, Diane Spencer, informed Complainant
that she would be terminated if she wore
Muslim attire to work, and that before
discharging Complainant, Ms. Spencer stated
that she could not deal with everyone’s
religion. Following an administrative
hearing, the administrative law judge
(ALJ) issued a recommended decision dismissing
the complaint. The ALJ concluded that
Complainant failed to prove that the employer’s
articulated reasons for discharging her
- - poor performance and a decline in
business - - were pretext for religious
discrimination.

After reviewing the ALJ’s recommended
decision, the Director concluded that
the ALJ failed to make factual findings
on certain material issues in dispute,
including some evidence which, if found
to be credible, would constitute direct
evidence of religious discrimination and
require application of different legal
standards. The Director found that, because
the record included conflicting testimony
on material issues, it was necessary for
the ALJ, who heard the testimony and had
the opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses, to assess witness credibility
and make factual findings based on those
assessments. For this reason, the Director
remanded this matter to the ALJ to make
credibility determinations and factual
findings on specific disputed issues,
and to apply the appropriate legal standards
based on those factual findings.

Case
Summary:
Complainant filed a verified complaint
with the Division alleging that Respondent
discriminated against her by paying
her less than similarly situated male
employees in violation of the Law Against
Discrimination. Complainant contended
that she was more highly educated than
her male counterparts, yet Respondent
offered them a higher starting salary.
Respondent asserted that no violation
of the LAD occurred because each employee
was offered starting salaries commensurate
to his or her municipal background,
or, unique experience which brought
different skills to the Department of
Treasury which were highly relevant
to its mandate, and therefore Complainant’s
gender was not a factor in determining
her starting salary. Following a hearing
at the Office of Administrative Law,
the ALJ dismissed Complainant’s
claim finding that the reasons proffered
by Respondents were credible, legitimate,
non-discriminatory, and sufficient to
rebut Complainant’s prima facie
case of gender discrimination.

The Director found that the ALJ’s
findings and conclusions were well supported,
and the objective documentary evidence
corroborated Respondent’s legitimate
non-discriminatory reasons for offering
Complainant a lower starting salary
than her male counterparts. The ALJ
also found that Respondent offered evidence
that both male and female applicants
who did not possess the unique municipal
experience were offered a lower starting
salary than other male and female applicants
who did in fact possess the skills that
Respondent deemed worthy of a higher
starting salary. The Director adopted
the ALJ’s initial decision and
dismissed Complainant’s claim.

Case
Summary:
This order addressed the issue
of attorney’s fees to be awarded
to a prevailing complainant. Complainant
had alleged that Respondent unlawfully
demoted him based on his disability in
violation of the Law Against Discrimination
and the Director issued an order concluding
that Respondent did discriminate against
Complainant, and a partial initial decision
was entered in which damages and penalties
were awarded to the Complainant. This
decision did not address the issue of
attorneys fees.

The
Office of Administrative Law subsequently
issued a decision awarding $380,068.86
in attorneys fees and costs. After review
of the exceptions and replies, the Director
issued an order in which the following
determinations were made:

Costs for expert witnesses were awarded;

Rates
for travel time were reduced by fifty
percent;

Historic
rates plus accrued interest instead
of current rates were awarded for
per diem attorneys utilized by a supervising
attorney;

An
enhancement of ten percent was added
to the lodestar amount awarded;

Fee
application work was excluded from
the lodestar, and remunerated at a
rate of two-thirds the rate awarded
for the case in chief;

In
certain circumstances, fees will not
be awarded for work performed on unsuccessful
motions;

While
a claim for attorneys fees which significantly
exceeds the amount awarded in damages
will not automatically be rejected,
those fees requested will be subject
to a higher level of scrutiny.

Case
Summary:
On September 20, 2001, Complainant filed
a verified complaint with the Division
charging that Respondents violated the
LAD by refusing to accommodate his disability
because of his of age, national origin,
and disability. Respondents denied the
charges. On July 15, 2005, Respondents
filed a motion to enforce a settlement
that they contended had been agreed to
by the attorneys representing the parties.
On August 17, 2005, the ALJ issued an
initial decision granting Respondents’
motion and ordering that the terms of
the settlement be given full force and
effect. Complainant filed pro se exceptions
on September 1, 2005 alleging that he
did not agree to settlement terms, and
that his attorney did not respond to his
concerns about the proposed settlement
agreement.

After
reviewing the record, the Director rejected
the ALJ’s order that the terms of
the proposed settlement be given full
force and effect. The Director found that
a settlement, like any contract, is enforceable
only if the parties agree on essential
terms and manifest an intention to be
bound by those terms. Moreover, negotiations
of an attorney are not binding on the
client unless the client has expressly
authorized the settlement or the client's
voluntary acts have given the attorney
apparent authority to enter into a settlement,
not just negotiations. Further, the Director
found that a hearing is to be held to
establish the intentions of the parties
unless the available competent evidence,
considered in a light most favorable to
the non-moving party (i.e., Complainant),
is insufficient to permit the judge to
conclude that there was no binding settlement.
Based on these legal standards and the
record before him, the Director concluded
that such a hearing is necessary to determine
if the parties entered into an enforceable
settlement. Accordingly, the Director
ordered that the parties independently
attempt to settle this matter within 30
days. If the parties fail to either settle
this matter or agree to participate in
mediation within 30 days of this Order,
this matter will be remanded to the OAL
for a hearing to determine whether the
parties have entered into an enforceable
settlement contract disposing of Complainant’s
LAD complaint.

Complainant
Margie Hall filed a verified complaint
with the Division alleging that The Reeves
Foundation terminated her employment based
on her age, in violation of the New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination. Following
an administrative hearing, the administrative
law judge (ALJ) issued an initial decision
dismissing the complaint. The ALJ found
that Complainant quit her job, and thus
failed to prove an essential element of
a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.
The ALJ further concluded that even if
Complainant had presented a prima facie
case, she presented insufficient evidence
that her employer’s articulated
reasons were pretext for age discrimination.

The
Director adopted the ALJ’s recommended
dismissal of the complaint. After adopting
the ALJ’s conclusion that Respondent
did not actually terminate Complainant’s
employment, the Director also evaluated
the evidence to determine whether the
events constituted a constructive discharge.
Based on the ALJ’s factual findings,
the Director concluded that Complainant
failed to prove that she was subjected
to employment conditions so intolerable
that a reasonable person would feel compelled
to resign, and thus concluded that Complainant
was not constructively discharged. Finally,
the Director concluded that even if Complainant
had established a prima facie case, she
failed to prove that her employer was
motivated by age discrimination in making
plans to replace Complainant after she
spoke of her intent to retire.