23.2.13

Mil Mi-8 in action

The Mi-8, a veritable
'aerial taxicab', has gained widespread use in Russia's military and civil
aviation; in this it has surpassed its predecessor, the Mi-4, and has become a
truly mass-produced machine. It is difficult to imagine a field of civil or military
operations where the Mi-8 does not find application. These multi-purpose
rotorcraft are used for civil transportation, oil and gas prospecting support,
supply of oil rigs and remote settlements, the transportation of working teams
to oil fields, flying-crane operations in civil engineering, search and rescue
operations, urgent cargo deliveries, ambulance and fire-fighting duties. They
serve the needs of police and customs authorities, in forestry and agriculture,
for the transportation of passengers etc.

The Soviet Armed
Forces put the Mi-8 into opera­tional service in 1965. Being regarded as 'light
trans­port helicopters', they were operated by independent helicopter regiments
and squadrons of the Air Force and of the Strategic Missile Forces. Mi-8 deliveries
to the Navy, various law enforcement agencies and gov­ernment services began a
while later. Starting in the mid-1960s, no major military actions in or by the
USSR were undertaken without the employment of these hel­icopters (this
included military exercises, natural disas­ter relief operations, conflicts on
the bor­der between the USSR and China, introduction of troops in
Czechoslovakia etc.)

The combat
capabilities of the Mi-8 in Soviet Air Force service were subjected to a
crucial test during the Afghan War. In the mountainous inaccessible areas of
Afghanistan these undemanding and incredibly tough rotary-wing machines earned
a reputation as the main 'workhorses'. They arguably bore the brunt of this
war, soldiering on from the first day to the last. Not infre­quently, the Mi-8s
turned out to be the only means of supporting the multifarious combat
activities of the Soviet 40th Army committed to action there. The chop­pers
created by the Mil' company saved the lives of thousands of Soviet soldiers in
Afghanistan.

Mi-8s were first used
for combating the insurgents in Afghanistan long before the Soviet invasion.
These helicopters were operated by the Government troops. The first Soviet
Mi-8T squadron was deployed in Afghanistan in the summer of 1979. At first it
did not take part in the hostilities and was used only for com­munications and
VIP transportation. However, on 25th December of that year Soviet helicopter
units started a massed airlifting of troops and delivery of assault groups
tasked with capturing airfields and key posi­tions. By the beginning of 1980
the 34th Mixed Air Corps attached to the Soviet troops in Afghanistan already
had 110 helicopters on strength; 85% of these were Mi-8s. Besides, Mi-8Ts
belonging to the Soviet Border Guard Troops operated in the areas adjoining the
Soviet-Afghan border.

The peculiarities of
Afghanistan's terrain and the course of the hostilities dictated a steady
build-up of the helicopter component of the Soviet troops. By 15th May 1988,
when the withdrawal of the Soviet troops was started, the Air Force component
of the 40th Army had 331 helicopters on strength - mostly Mi-8s. They were in
service with the helicopter regiments based in Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar and
Kunduz (the 50th Independent Composite Air Regiment, 292nd, 280th and 181st Air
Regiments and 335th Combat Air Regiment). The Mi-8s were also in service with a
grow­ing number of independent helicopter squadrons dis­persed all over the
country. To ensure closer co-oper­ation, helicopter squadrons were attached to
mecha­nized infantry and airborne assault divisions; smaller helicopter units
were attached to mechanized infantry brigades.

During the first
winter of the war the main task of the Mi-8 helicopters consisted in supplying
the troops stationed in the country, but in the spring of 1980 the Mujahideen
sharply stepped up their activities, and from then on the Soviet helicopter
crews were flung into combat against the enemy. The fighting was get­ting
fiercer and more intensive with every passing day. Already from March 1980
onwards Mi-8Ts and Mi-8MTs were used for providing direct fire support to the
assault groups they delivered. During the Afghan War the Soviet Army Aviation,
which operated the helicopters, got its first Heroes of the Soviet Union. The
first helicopter pilots to receive this high title were V. K. Gainutdinov and
V. V. Schcherbakov from the 181th Air Regiment. Gainutdinov was hon­oured for
rescuing a reconnais­sance detachment, which had been surrounded by the
Mujahideen in a village. Having located it during a sandstorm, he landed his
Mi-8T in the middle of the insurgent village; while the group was retreating to
board the helicopter, he provided fire cover for it, rotating the machine
tucked to the ground on one wheel and using his machine-gun.

With every passing
year the enemy became more and more experienced and well-equipped. Accordingly,
the tasks shouldered by helicopters of the 40th Army became more and more
demanding. The crews of the 'eights' flew five to six missions daily, log­ging
up to 8 hours per day. In 1985 the average num­ber of sorties for each Mi-8
amounted to 426, the max­imum number reaching 906 sorties totaling 963 hours.
In the course of the hostilities the range of duties per­formed by the
helicopters became wider. In many operations the Mi-8 was used instead of other
types of military hardware, including both ground vehicles and aircraft. Very
quickly the 'workhorse from Mil's stable' came to be perceived by the Soviet
military personnel in Afghanistan not merely as an auxiliary transport, a sort
of 'aerial taxicab', but as an effective and indis­pensable multipurpose
weapon, a means of fulfilling all sorts of combat tasks that could not be
tackled by other means. The combat strength of the aviation com­plement came to
include more than twice as many hel­icopters compared to the number of attack
aircraft and fighter-bombers. Conducting combat operations with­out helicopters
became inconceivable. Helicopters turned into a natural, integral part of the
main arm of the Armed Forces - the Ground Forces - and were recognized as one
of their main components. The Mi-8s were the first to enter Afghanistan; they
were also the last among the Soviet military hardware to leave it. On 1 5th
February 1989, at 9:45 AM, having waited till the armoured personnel carrier
with the 40th Army's commander Gen. Boris Gromov on board had crossed the
bridge over the Pyandzh River along which the Soviet-Afghan border ran, the
crews of Mi-8 helicop­ters evacuated the last fire support groups covering the
pullout from Afghanistan.

The tasks fulfilled by
Mi-8 helicopters in Afghanistan were extremely varied. Their main missions
consisted in airlifting troops and delivering assault groups, accounting for 1
8% and 12% respectively of the sorties undertaken by the Army Aviation; this
percentage rose to 40-45% during active combat operations which sim­ply cannot
be effected in Afghanistan without the use of helicopter landing parties and
vertical replenishment (VERTREP). For example, during a large-scale 'comb­ing'
operation undertaken in January 1982 in the Foriab province bordering on the
USSR, 52 of the 72 helicopters involved were Mi-8s. They delivered assault
groups totaling 1,200 men. In the course of the second Panjshir operation aimed
at capturing and 'combing' the Panjshir valley, a decisive role was played by
air­borne tactical assault groups totaling 4,200 troops; they were landed by
more than one hundred helicopters, mainly Mi-8s. The main task of the assault
groups con­sisted in capturing the high ground with a view to breaking up,
surrounding and destroying the enemy forces. During this operation the
helicopters had to fly missions at an altitude of 3,500 m. Operation Poostynia
(Desert) conducted in July 1985 made it necessary to land as many as 7,000
troops in the mountains, and Operation Plotina (Dam) held in the autumn of that
year involved 1 2,000 troops! During the latter operation the heliborne assault
troops blocked the Kunar gorge at a stretch of 170 km. The last massed landings
of assault troops were per­formed by the Mi-8s during Operation Magistrahl'
(Main line) in November 1987, when a road to the besieged town of Khost had to
be unblocked. Each assault party landing operation was conducted under direct
opposition from the enemy. Helicopters catered for the replenishment and supply
of the assault groups landed by them, evacuated casualties and Mujahideen
prisoners and, in the event of an unsuc­cessful operation, evacuated the troops
from encir­clement under enemy fire.

One of the most
important tasks for the Mi-8 was the delivery of supplies to encircled or
remote gar­risons and settlements. The most complicated sorties, from the
airmen's point of view, were associated with the delivery of supplies to
detachments and reconnais­sance outposts high up in the mountains deployed
there for controlling the roads and passes. They were often located at
altitudes close to the Mi-8's service ceiling and had no landing pads. The
pilot had to balance the helicopter in the hover, touching a cliff with one or
two wheels and waiting till the flight engineer had thrown the cargo out of the
cabin and had taken passen­gers on board.

The Mi-8 crews not
only airlifted troops and cargoes but also pro­vided CAS to the assault groups
they had disembarked. Their role as attack helicopters was especial­ly
significant during the first year of the war when there was a shortage of Mi-24
combat helicopters. Subsequently, the airmen operating in Afghanistan evolved
and brought to perfection a system of interaction of these two Mil' types which
com­plemented each other. Multi-mission combat groups comprising a flight of
two Mi-8s and two Mi-24s gained wide use.

When it came to
fulfilling combat missions, espe­cially when pinpoint bombing was required, the
'eights' could successfully supplant not only combat helicopters but also tactical
bombers. On many occa­sions the Mi-8s were sent to bomb small-size targets or
targets which could not be destroyed by fast aircraft. In the spring of 1980
the ground forces knocked the insurgents out of their strongholds on Mt.
Sanghi-Douzdan - the famous Mountain of Thieves near Farizbad which Alexander
the Great had failed to cap­ture in his time. The mountain was riddled with
caves and passages like a rotten log and had sheltered local bandits from time
immemorial, hence the name; now it was a major Mujahideen base. The assault
lasted a week, with heavy casualties among the Soviet infantry­men. A few
months later the rebels again 'took up res­idence' on the mountain. The new
storming of Mt. Sanghi-Douzdan which took place on 23rd August 1980 was preceded
by a strike delivered by a dozen Mi-8s and involving the use of bombs and
rockets. The 500-kg high-explosive bombs, 100-kg incendiary bombs and S-5
unguided rockets did their job. This second time the mountain was swept clear
of the enemy in just one day; among the attack­ers only one person was killed
and several were wounded. In June 1981, in response to the growing number of
sallies undertaken by the insurgents in the region of Gulkhana, six Mi-8
helicopters dropped 500-kg HE bombs on mountain passes governing the routes to
Pakistan; they destroyed the paths clinging to verti­cal cliffs and caused
landslides, and then scattered anti-personnel mines along the paths that still
remained intact.

Mining the mountain
paths and the vicinities of the insurgents' bases was an effective preventive
measure against the enemy's sallies. The Mi-8 could disperse up to 8,500
anti-personnel mines in just one minute, cov­ering a strip 15 to 25 m wide and
2 km long.

The Mi-8 proved highly
effective in 'search-cmd-attack' (i.e. armed reconnaissance) operations in sup­port
of the commando {Spetsnaz) troops. An independent helicopter squadron was
attached to each of the two Spetsnaz brigades commit­ted to action in
Afghanistan. Having received an intelligence report stating that an enemy
detachment or a suspicious-looking vehicle convoy had been spotted, the
Spetsnaz troops airlifted by heli­copters undertook a sudden and concealed
landing at a point on their route. The Mi-8s provided air cover for assault
troops, conducted reconnaissance and surveillance and cut off the enemy's
routes of retreat. A pair of Mi-8s with inspec­tion teams on board could
control an area with a radius of 100 to 120 km from base. Many a time during
such operations, Mijahideen commanders and foreign instructors were captured on
their way from abroad, as well as some of the latest types of armament,
including the famous General Dynamics FIM-92A Stinger man-portable air defense
system (MANPADS) which was captured in 1987.

Surveillance of the
borders and large area objects remained an important task for the Mi-8s
throughout the war. Helicopters perpetually circling overhead deterred the
terrorists from launching sudden shelling attacks on airfields, garrisons and
built-up areas. During night sorties in Afghanistan the Mi-8 crews made trial
use of night-vision devices - the PNV-57E night-vision goggles for the first
time - with good results.

Together with the
Mi-24 combat helicopters the multipurpose Mi-8s were used with success for
escorting motor vehicle convoys; they could render support to the escorted
convoys not only by fire but also by delivering an assault group right to the
place where an ambush had been discovered. Patrolling escort of motor vehicle
convoys made up some 15 to 17% of all Army Aviation sorties. Such escort
missions often turned into veritable battles. For example, on 11th March 1981 a
flight of Mi-8s repelling an enemy attack on a convoy spent 806 S-5 rockets,
300 rounds for the AGS-17 automatic grenade launch­er and 14,200 rounds of
machine-gun ammunition.

In Afghanistan the
Mi-8s con­firmed that saving human lives is the main task for a rotary-wing
machine. Search-and-rescue mis­sions made up on average 10 per cent of the
total number of the army aviation sorties. For many a soldier the helicopter
remained the last hope. The history of the Mi-8's employment in the 40th Army
contains countless examples when airmen who had ejected after being shot down,
wounded or sick soldiers and personnel cut off from their units were sought out
and evacuated. In most cases such opera­tions were conducted under fierce fire
and were per­formed by the crews of the Mil' 'workhorses' at the immediate risk
of their own lives. It is the Mi-8 that allowed the Soviet forces in
Afghanistan to fulfill the order stipulating that not a single wounded,
shell-shocked or dead soldier should be left behind on the battlefield. On 17th
May 1982, when the village of Rookha turned into a Mujahideen stronghold was
'combed' during the abovementioned second Panjshir operation, a crew captained
by A. V. Surtsukov was assigned to an SAR helicopter group. To evacuate the
wounded and the dead, the courageous airmen broke their way into the Panjshir
gorge which was turned into a pocket of fire four times (!) within a few hours,
con­secutively changing three badly shot-up Mi-8s at a rear airfield. The
employment of the Mi-8 in Afghanistan enabled the Soviet/CIS helicopter airmen
to evolve a versatile and highly efficient system of rescue under both simple
and difficult natural and climatic condi­tions, and the helicopter constructors
to develop appropriate equipment.

Mi-8s not only saved
people, they also salvaged mil­itary hardware in Afghanistan. In October of
1982 50th Composite Independent Air Regiment CO V. Ye. Pavlov flying a Mi-8
evacuated a downed sister aircraft on a sling right from under the enemy's
nose.

The Mi-8 was also
widely used in Afghanistan for reconnaissance (up to 9% of the sorties), for
artillery spotting and target designation to bomber aircraft, as airborne
command posts for the control of troops, and as communications relay machines.
The unique high-altitude performance of the latest Mi-8 modifications allowed
these helicopters to climb to the utmost limit of their ceiling and remain on
station at these altitudes for four and a half hours. An important task for the
work­horses, especially during the concluding stage of the war, was the
transportation of refugees and of insur­gents who had given up hostile actions
to the places of their permanent residence, as well as supplying various
humanitarian aid to the local population.

Afghanistan has served
as a reliable test ground for checking the Mi-8's qualities; it revealed all
its advan­tages and latent reserves, helped discover and rectify faults. The
machine was operated under extremely harsh conditions of mountains and desert
areas char­acterized by a wide range of daily and yearly temper­ature
fluctuations, considerable solar radiation and ample dew formation. The ambient
temperature in summer was normally in excess of 40° C. Coupled with the
rarefied air, constant winds and turbulent airflow high up in the mountains,
this created extremely unfavourable operating conditions and especially
affected the powerplant. High temperatures cause the acid in the DC batteries
to boil. Hurricane-force winds twisted the rotor blades out of their hinges.
The dust permanently hanging in the air found its way to every nook and most
adversely affected the service life of assemblies and joints, causing intensive
wear of parts; it caused the weapons to jam, clogged fuel sys­tem piping and
filters, eroded the engine compressor blades. Afghanistan speeded up the
process of phas­ing out the Mi-8T in the Soviet Air Force in favour of the new
baseline model - the M-8MT with TV3-117MT engines and dust filters fitted as
standard, facilitating development of a further upgrade, the Mi-8MTV pos­sessing
unique high-altitude performance. The power output-to-weight ratio having been
increased half as much again, the flight performance and the survivability of
the helicopter were greatly enhanced and its combat capabilities were extended.

In the battles of
Afghanistan the Mi-8 demonstrated its exceptional survivability. Small arms
fire posed no danger to it. The helicopter could also withstand numerous hits
by heavy-calibre machine-gun bul­lets. The Mi-8 came home safely with three out
of five main rotor blades damaged (the blades hav­ing up to five or six holes),
with fuels tanks and transmission shafts dam­aged by bullets, with broken fuse­lage
mainframes and spars, with fuel and oil piping and control linkages severed. On
one occa­sion, having inspected a Mi-8 after a combat mission, technicians
counted 82 holes caused by the shells of the M61A1 Vulcan 20-mm rapid-firing
can­non. The MANPADS were the only effective means of combating the Mi-8, but
even the formidable Stingers were not always capable of dealing a mortal blow
to the survivable machine. A case is on record when a Stinger passed close to a
Mi-8's fuselage right through the main rotor disc, smashing one of the engine
dust fil­ters with a direct hit, and exploded above the rotor head, the
splinters damaging the main gearbox, the rotor blades and the lubrication
system piping. The hel­icopter successfully made a forced landing; only twen­ty-four
hours were needed to get it back into service.

Afghanistan experience
confirmed the unique sim­plicity of repair and restoration of this machine.
Once two Mi-8s collided with their rotors while flying a com­bat mission.
Fortunately, both helicopters remained controllable; after force-landing
successfully their crews roughly trimmed the damaged parts of the blades with a
chisel and returned to base safely. On another occasion a Mi-8 crew was
disembarking a landing party during a dust storm and collided with a tank which
they had failed to notice in the whirling dust (!). The lower part of the nose
literally caved in. Undeterred by this, the pilot straightened the bent con­trol
rods with his foot and flew the damaged Mi-8 to base. Any damaged assembly or
system of the heli­copter could be easily replaced in field conditions with­out
summoning a repair team from the manufacturer. Most of the combat and
operational damage could be repaired in the course of one working day, the
labour expenditure not exceeding 50 man-hours.

Legends were current
in Afghanistan about how endurable, reliable and undemanding was the Mi-8. This
workhorse coped with inconceivable operational conditions. Operations were so
intensive that the heli­copters were sent on a mission with part of the equip­ment
out of function, some systems inoperative and bullet holes still to be patched.
The helicopters flew with their fuselages literally riddled with bullets and
even with rotor blades not checked for proper balancing. Combat sorties took
place every day, which made it impossible to adhere strictly to the rules of
servicing and maintenance; special days for pre-flight checking had to be
dispensed with and this work was done 'in passing', the servicing being reduced
to the barest minimum.

The very intensive
operations confirmed the outstanding han­dling qualities of the Mi-8. It is one
of the few machines on which pilots experience no difficulties in regain­ing
their piloting skills. Young air­men quickly became aces of pilot­ing in Afghanistan.
Combat experi­ence made helicopter crews forget the numerous instructions and
man­uals with their prescriptions on piloting. The enemy's fire 'taught' them
to fly the Mi-8 in modes which its designers had not even dreamed of.
Experienced pilots took this excellent machine to the absolute limit of its
capabilities. High-G manoeuvres came to be widely practiced, including turns
with up to 90° bank, fighter-style yo-yos, steep climbs with negative G loads
theo­retically inadmissible for helicopters, and almost verti­cal dives. In
Afghanistan the helicopter crews mastered 'spirals', 'funnels', 'swings' and
other manoeuvres peculiar to helicopter aerobatics which subsequently became a
routine. To avoid being hit when landing an assault party, a special manoeuvre
called 'maple leaf was developed - the helicopter veered to the sides during
descent changing its bank angle at the same time. To counteract the portable
anti-aircraft missiles, the airmen perfected their technique of piloting the
Mi-8 at extremely low altitudes. In the course of hostilities the helicopter
crews evolved and perfected the tactics of operational employment of the Mi-8
in a group, practicing an attack with helicopters circling (the 'wheel of
death') and opening fire in a dive or in level flight; an attack in echelon
formation fhaircomb') or in line astern formation with minimum intervals, etc.

'The school of
Afghanistan' gave a lot of knowledge not only to airmen but to the designers of
rotary-wing machines as well. Probably no other helicopter design company can
rival Mil' in the practical experience of combat operation of choppers. The
designers and workers of the Mil' Plant regularly went to Afghanistan to obtain
firsthand information on the qualities of their progeny in combat conditions.
The specialists of the Mil' Moscow Helicopter Plant did much to extend the
Mi-8's flight envelope; together with the L.I.I. (Flight Research Institute)
they worked at increasing the maximum take-off weight by means of altering the
piloting technique and per­forming a rolling take-off and a landing with a
short run. The 'take-off on one wheel' technique was developed: the pilot
performed a rolling take-off with only the nose-wheels touching the airstrip.
Yet another take-off method was evolved at that time for helipads high up in
the mountains: the helicopter slipped down from the edge of a cliff, gained
sufficient speed while falling and then per­formed a transition to horizontal
flight.

The normal armament of
the Mi-8T proved to be effective enough. Experienced pilots managed to place
unguided rockets squarely into narrow embrasures or small ventilation windows
of the houses. Launching a rocket salvo to suppress the opposition, they
finally destroyed the target by dropping 100- and 250-kg fragmentation/high-explosive
bombs. However, the course of combat dictated the need to enhance the offensive
and defensive armament of the Mi-8 and expand the range of armament options.
Mi-8T crews began to take on board troopers armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles
and machine-guns. One of the troopers usually took up position near a hatch in
one of the rear clamshell doors to protect the very vul­nerable rear
hemisphere. The on-board armament fit of the Mi-8T was also supplemented by
some other types of weapons used by ground forces. Firearms that could be
installed in the sliding side door or in the floor hatch for the external sling
system included the AGS-17 Plamya (Flame) 30-mm heavy automatic grenade
launcher, the Kalashnikov RPK machine-gun and the 12.7-mm DShK heavy
machine-gun. Attempts were made to fit the 23-mm GSh-23 double-barrelled
aircraft cannon and even a 73-mm gun from the BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle
to the Mi-8. Mil' OKB specialists started work on further improvement of the
Mi-8, enhancing its armament and improving survivability. The flight deck was
protected by external armour shields and internal armour plating behind the
pilots' seats, on the sides and underneath ahead of the instrument panels.
Aircrews received new bulletproof vests and titanium protective helmets.
Kalashnikov PKT machine-guns taken from tanks were installed on flexible mounts
in the nose of the crew cabin instead of a front glazing panel and in a hatch
of one of the rear clamshell doors. Two more PKTs were mounted above the pylons
on the external store outriggers. The Mil' engineers also developed armament
options for the Mi-8 which envisaged the fitting of the NSV-12.7 Ootyos (Cliff)
flexible heavy machine-guns and AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers. Flexible
mounts were additionally fitted to the side windows to be used by troopers for
their assault rifles. New weapons that gained widespread use on the Mi-8
included the UPK-23-250 cannon pods with one GSh-23 23-mm cannon and GUV
multipurpose helicopter pods which could be configured with either one
Yakooshev/Borzov YakB-12.7 four-barrel 12.7-mm machine gun and two GShG-7.62
(TKB-621) 7,62-mm rapid-firing machine-guns or one AGS-17 grenade launcher;
they all were to be carried on the external racks.

The introduction of
the new Mi-8MT baseline model with a greater payload and six external stores
pylons instead of four made it pos­sible to replace the UB-16-57 rock­et pods
with 16 unguided rockets apiece with UB-32-57 pods with 32 rounds. The 57-mm
S-5 unguided rockets which proved to possess insufficient destructive power
were replaced by the S-8 rockets of 80-mm. Each B-8V20 pod contained 20 such
rockets. A wider range of bomb armament became available for the Mi-8. The
Mi-8MT could carry 500 kg bombs. For mine-laying, the VSM-1 modular heliborne
mine-laying system was introduced; each module was fitted with 29 KSF-1
cassettes holding 72 anti-personnel mines apiece.

To ensure protection
against MANPADS, Mil' engineers devel­oped, tested and installed infra-red
countermeasures (IRCM) equip­ment: three types of exhaust sup­pressors designed
to cool the efflux of the engines; ASO-2V IRCM flare dispensers; and the
SOEP-V1A Lipa (Linden) optoelectronic IR jam­mer. The exhaust suppressors mix­ing
the hot exhaust gases with the ambient air reduced the IR signa­ture of the
engines 2 to 3 times. The Lipa jammer mounted on top of the fuselage proved
extremely effective. The combined effect of all three systems reached 70-85%
(the ratio of decoyed missiles to the total number of launches). Mounting rear
view mirrors on the Mi-8 also proved to be a sufficiently effective means of
protection. Fuel tanks were self-sealing and were filled with polyurethane
foam; this completely ruled out the possi­bility of a fire or explosion in the
event of the tank being hit. The tail rotor control cables were moved apart,
hydraulic and lubrication system piping was shielded, etc. At the same time
many improvements were intro­duced to enhance the machine's serviceability:
rubber hoses were provided with protective wire mesh braid­ing, the rotor
blades were strengthened by adding pro­tective metal sheaths on the leading
edges, blade hinges were sealed to protect them from dust, etc.

Thus, thanks to the
experience gained in Afghanistan the Mil' OKB evolved the Mi-8 into a ver­satile
transport and combat aircraft unrivalled in the world in terms of power, combat
efficiency, reliability and survivability. Being simple and undemanding in
operation, and cheap to build, the Mi-8 has become unbeatable for all existing
and future competing machines. Effective use of the 'Mil' workhorses' in
Afghanistan had a decisive influence on the formation in 1989 of a new arm in
the Ground Forces - the Army Aviation.

After the collapse of
the Soviet Union the crews of the Mi-8 multi-pur­pose helicopters continue to
perform conscientiously their difficult soldiers' duty in 'hot spots' of Russia
and the CIS. The 'eights' have been widely used during the ethnic conflicts in
Nagornyy Karabakh and Abkhazia and the civil war in Tajikistan. The unique
high-altitude performance of the Mi-8MTV has made it indispensa­ble in
mountainous areas. Only this helicopter can support combat activi­ties at
altitudes exceeding 3,500-4,000 metres.

Unfortunately, the
'eights' also have to take part in military operations on Russian territory.
They have been widely used during the anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya.
Several Mi-8 squadrons saw action there in 1995. Direct combat employment of
these workhorses was limited in scope. The Mi-8s were used primarily for the
transportation of troops and their rotation at battlefield positions, for the
supply of ammunition and food, for casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), as well as
for evacuating refugees and rendering comprehensive humanitari­an aid to the
local population. Once again the good old Mi-8 was put to the test, being
subjected to all sorts of conceivable and inconceivable adverse factors. For
most of the winter the North Caucasus is characterized by low clouds, sudden
fogs, abrupt deterioration of visibility and intensive icing in flight. Coupled
with the sophisticated and considerably more skilled adversary, all this
created operational condi­tions that at times were more difficult than during
the Afghan war.

Considerably more
intensive was the employment of the Mi-8 helicopters in the Caucasus in the
period of 1999-2000. This time the adversary was much better prepared and
armed. In September 1999, when the hostilities began, the aviation complement
of the Federal troops had 68 hel­icopters in its inventory, including 26 Mi-8s
and two Mi-9 ABCPs. In the course of combat activities the Mi-8Ts pos­sessing
insufficient high-altitude performance were replaced by improved Mi-8MTs and
Mi-8MTVs which once more demonstrated their excellent performance, high relia­bility,
effectiveness and survivability while operating in mountainous areas.

Compared to the Afghan
war, the helicopter inventory required for the support of the same number of
troops was four times smaller. The extremely intensive fighting on all
operational directions made the aviation complement's command relinquish the
centralized use of aircraft and assign aviation units to each of the specific
operational directions under the guidance of the respective commands: the
Northern, the Eastern and the Western command. A small reserve group remained
at the disposal of the supreme command. As the troops advanced, helicopter
groups were formed on a daily basis to ensure effective use of the aircraft and
prompt suppression of enemy fire; they comprised two or three Mi-8s and two to
four Mi-24s backed up by appropriate supplies and stationed at the forward
command posts of the operational directions. When the helicopters were tasked
with airlifting tactical assault groups in the mountains, some helipads were
des­ignated as base pads; in the course of an operation they accommodated eight
to ten Mi-8s. Their crews made land­ings on unprepared pads in the mountains at
2,000 to 3,000 m above sea level.

Despite adverse weather
conditions, the helicopters logged on average 4 to 6 hours per day. The flights
were performed at ultra-low level in poor visibility condi­tions and the crews
were subjected to heavy stress, both moral and physical. For example, when
airlifting tactical assault groups, some Mi-8 crews made as many as 52 landing
a day.

When fulfilling
missions associated with the delivery of tactical assault groups, conducting
aerial reconnaissance and rescuing military personnel, six to eight helicopters
sus­tained battle damage every day. Most of them were promptly repaired and put
back into service. Once again Mil' hardware demonstrated its unique reliability
and survivability. The powerplant and transmission of the 'eights' proved
especially reliable.

Apart from combat
activities, transport and troop-carri­er Mi-8s are widely used for performing
other important duties, such as search and rescue, urgent delivery of car­goes,
evacuation of sick persons, border surveillance etc. In 1986 Mi-8s from Army
Aviation units took an active part in the damage control activities in the wake
of the Chernobyl' nuclear disaster. They were used to spread radiation neu­tralizing
materials from under sling containers and to mon­itor radiation levels.
Mi-8 helicopters constitute the bulk of the aviation com­plement of
peace-keeping troops of the UN, Russia and some other countries. The 'eights'
have been operated side-by-side with rotary-wing machines from other coun­tries.
This has given the Mil' workhorses an excellent oppor­tunity to demonstrate
their best qualities. Sometimes funny episodes occur. On one occasion, two
helicopters were assigned to support the activities of the UN mission in
Cambodia; they included one Mi-8 and one French Eurocopter Puma, both of
approximately the same class. As usual, the Russian workhorse was operated from
early morning till late at night regardless of the weather; as for the French
chopper, it was immediately stowed away into a hangar as soon as a tropical
rain or a sandstorm set in. As a result, the Mi-8 logged 70 to 100 hours per
month as compared to 20 to 30 hours for the Puma. Cautious foreign employees of
the mission explained this fact by alleging that the Russians 'operated their
machine mercilessly, disregard­ing the airworthiness standards'; they demanded
that the reliability of the Mi-8 be subjected to a thorough check. One can
imagine their surprise when the most stringent checks did not reveal any
deficiencies or breaches of flight safety on the Russian helicopter.