LOCKEMY,
J.: In this Fourth Amendment search
and seizure case, Sandy Burgess appeals her convictions and sentences for
trafficking crack cocaine, possession with intent to distribute (PWID) cocaine,
PWID ecstasy and possession of marijuana. Burgess argues the trial court erred
in determining Investigator John Lutz had reasonable suspicion to stop her
vehicle. We affirm.

FACTS

On May 22, 2008, Narcotics
Investigator John Lutz drove through the parking lot of the Hardee's on
Rosewood Drive in Columbia, South Carolina. According to Lutz, the Hardee's
parking lot is a known meeting location for drug sales in Richland County. Lutz
explained a manager at the Hardee's complained to another investigator about
drug activity "every few months" over the course of a "couple of
years." According to Lutz, he personally spoke with the manager regarding
the drug activity, and he and other officers had made arrests stemming from
activity in the Hardee's parking lot.

As Lutz drove through the lot,
he observed a Jeep with lightly tinted windows backed into a parking space at
the back of the parking lot.Lutz noticed the passenger was
"looking around very intently and smoking a cigarette." Neither the
driver nor the passenger appeared to be eating. Based on Lutz's training and
experience he believed the pair was waiting to purchase drugs. Lutz explained he
formed this belief based on his twenty-two years of law enforcement experience,
including nine years in narcotics investigations, and his training at the South
Carolina Criminal Justice Academy. According to Lutz, he had overseen
"several hundred" undercover narcotics investigations during which an
undercover purchaser would typically have to wait for the supplier to arrive in
order to conduct a transaction.

After observing the Jeep and
its occupants, Lutz parked nearby in order to continue observation of the parking
lot and the Jeep and its occupants. A few minutes later, Burgess entered the
parking lot in a white car, backed up, and parked her car askew in a parking
space a few feet from Lutz's location. The Jeep proceeded toward Burgess's location,
waited for her to park, and pulled along the passenger side of her vehicle. The
passenger in the Jeep got out and entered the back passenger seat of Burgess's
vehicle while extending his hand toward Burgess. Lutz observed Burgess look
over her shoulder while the passenger in Burgess's car looked down towards
Burgess's lap. After approximately fifteen seconds, the passenger from the
Jeep exited Burgess's car and returned to the Jeep. Lutz explained the
complaints of drug activity in the parking lot, his training and experience,
and his "prior knowledge of people doing the exact same thing" led
him to conclude he had observed a drug transaction.

Burgess and the Jeep exited
the Hardee's parking lot traveling west on Rosewood Drive. Lutz followed both
vehicles but soon after, the Jeep turned off of Rosewood Drive.[1]
Lutz chose to follow Burgess's car because the fact that she arrived at the
Hardee's parking lot second led him to believe she was the supplier. Burgess
turned onto South Maple Street and after a short distance entered a driveway. Lutz
pulled in behind Burgess and initiated his blue lights. Burgess and the
passenger quickly exited the vehicle, and Lutz observed a small black bag in
Burgess's left hand. Lutz instructed Burgess and the passenger to reenter the
vehicle. Lutz explained as Burgess sat down in the driver's seat she leaned
over to her left "like she was trying to put something up under the left
side of the car." Lutz instructed Burgess to stand up and keep her hands
visible. As Burgess stood up she made a kicking motion with her right leg
"like she was trying to kick an object under the vehicle." Lutz
discovered a black bag containing several types of drugs on the driveway below
the driver's seat.[2]
Lutz arrested Burgess and the passenger.

Burgess was indicted for trafficking
in crack cocaine, PWID marijuana, PWID cocaine, and PWID ecstasy. Prior to the
bench trial,[3] Burgess moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing Lutz lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop her. The trial court denied Burgess's motion and ultimately found
Burgess guilty of trafficking crack cocaine, PWID cocaine, and PWID ecstasy. The
trial court found Burgess not guilty of PWID marijuana, but found her guilty of
the lesser included offense of possession of marijuana. The trial court
sentenced Burgess to thirty days for possession of marijuana, and concurrent
sentences of eight years for the trafficking and PWID charges. This appeal
followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a Fourth
Amendment search and seizure issue, this court must affirm if there is any
evidence to support the trial court's ruling and will reverse only where there
is clear error. State v. Wright, 391 S.C. 436, 442, 706 S.E.2d 324, 326
(2011); State v. Brockman, 339 S.C. 57, 66, 528 S.E.2d 661,
666 (2000). In applying this standard of review, we must determine if the
record supports the trial court's assumed findings, and if those findings
support the trial court's determination regarding reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. State v. Tindall, 388 S.C. 518, 523 n.5, 698 S.E.2d
203, 206 n.5 (2010); State v. Khingratsaiphon, 352 S.C. 62, 70, 572
S.E.2d 456, 460 (2002) (applying the any evidence standard of review but
noting an appellate court may conduct "its own review of the record to
determine whether the trial judge's decision is supported by the
evidence").

LAW/ANALYSIS

Burgess argues the trial
court erred in determining Lutz had reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop
of her vehicle. We disagree.

The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const.
amend. IV. Evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be
excluded from trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).

Generally, a police officer
may stop and briefly detain and question a person for investigative purposes,
without treading upon his Fourth Amendment rights, when the officer has a
reasonable suspicion the person is involved in criminal activity. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Reasonable suspicion is a specific and
objective basis, supported by articulable facts, for suspecting another of
criminal activity. U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); Black's
Law Dictionary 1585 (9th ed. 2009). In determining whether reasonable
suspicion exists, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. Cortez,
449 U.S. at 417-18.

Initially, we note that
Burgess does not challenge the admission of the drug evidence on grounds that
Lutz exceeded the scope of the Terry stop. SeeState v.
Corley, 383 S.C. 232, 241, 679 S.E.2d 187, 192 (Ct. App. 2009), aff'd as modified, 392 S.C. 125, 708 S.E.2d 217 (2011) ("The
scope and duration of [the stop] must be strictly tied to and justified by the
circumstances that rendered its initiation proper."). Instead, Burgess
maintains Lutz lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her and the drug evidence
should have been excluded because it was the result of an illegal seizure. Therefore,
our analysis examines whether Lutz had reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop of Burgess and does not address whether the events that occurred after the
stop were proper.

We find the evidence in the
record supports the trial court's determination that Lutz had reasonable
suspicion to stop Burgess. At the time Lutz activated his blue lights, Lutz
was aware the Hardee's parking lot was a known meeting location for drug sales
and had personal knowledge of frequent complaints of drug activity in the
parking lot. Lutz observed the Jeep parked at the back of the parking lot.
Its occupants were not eating and appeared to be waiting for someone. Lutz
observed Burgess enter the parking lot and park haphazardly. The passenger
from the Jeep entered the rear passenger seat of Burgess's car with his hand
extended while Burgess looked in his direction. The events in Burgess's car
lasted fifteen seconds. Lutz explained this activity was suspicious because,
in his experience with several hundred narcotics investigations, buyers usually
arrive at a predetermined location to wait on a supplier in order to complete a
drug transaction. Lutz further explained he had prior knowledge of similar
drug transactions occurring in the same manner. In short, Lutz had personal
knowledge of complaints of drug activity at the Hardee's parking lot and observed
Burgess's behavior in the parking lot, which his training and experience
informed him was consistent with a drug sale.

Burgess's contention the
Hardee's parking lot cannot be a known location for drug activity because
Richland County's online arrest database includes only one drug arrest at the
Hardee's parking lot is without merit. This fact indicates only the database
contains one drug arrest which listed the Hardee's parking lot as the incident
location. It does not foreclose the existence of other arrests related to drug
activity in the Hardee's parking lot but not designating it as the incident
location. For instance, in this case the drug activity occurred in the
Hardee's parking lot; however, the incident location is listed as the location
where Burgess was arrested. Additionally, in finding Lutz had reasonable
suspicion, the trial court relied upon Lutz's personal knowledge of frequent
complaints by the Hardee's manager regarding drug activity in the parking lot.

Furthermore, while the
activity in the Hardee's parking lot is capable of innocent explanation,
"[t]he fact that this activity was taking place in a location well known [for
drug sales] alters the landscape of reasonable inferences." SeeU.S.
v. Johnson, 599 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2010). Lutz was not required
"to ignore the relevant characteristics of [the] location in determining
whether the circumstances [were] sufficiently suspicious to warrant further
investigation." SeeIllinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124
(2000). Furthermore, Lutz's inferences regarding the degree of suspicion to
attach to Burgess's conduct are entitled to deference. SeeJohnson,
599 F.3d at 342. Failing to afford the proper weight to Lutz's inferences "borne
out of his experience would be to fail to consider the 'totality of the
circumstances.'" SeeU.S. v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 414-15 (4th
Cir. 2008). The Johnson court explained:

Getting
the balance right is never guaranteed, but the chances of doing so are improved
if officers, through training, knowledge, and experience in confronting
criminality, are uniquely capable both of recognizing its signatures, and by
the same token, of not reading suspicion into perfectly innocent and natural
acts. In this way, experience leads not just to proper action but to prudent
restraint. 'Reasonableness' is a matter of probabilities, and probability in
turn is best assessed when one has encountered variations on a given scenario
many times before.

Johnson, 599 F.3d at 343. To find as Burgess would have us do would be
to discount Lutz's training and experience with similar drug transactions.

Burgess argues United
States v. Sprinkle supports a finding Lutz lacked reasonable suspicion.
106 F.3d 613 (4th Cir. 1997). The Sprinkle court found reasonable
suspicion lacking where Sprinkle was observed huddling in a car with a known
drug offender in a high drug crime area. Id. at 617-19. The court noted
that as the officer walked by the car he was able to "actually see that
nothing of a criminal nature was happening in the car" thus dispelling his
suspicion. Id. at 618. Here, Lutz explained he was not able to see
what was exchanged between Burgess and the Jeep's passenger. In other words,
unlike the officer in Sprinkle, nothing that occurred before Lutz
stopped Burgess served to dispel his suspicion. Therefore, we conclude Sprinkle is distinguishable and lends Burgess no support.

We are mindful of concerns
regarding the State "using whatever facts are present, no matter how
innocent, as indicia of suspicious activity" and that the State "must
do more than simply label a behavior as 'suspicious' to make it so." SeeU.S. v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2011). The State must
"be able to either articulate why a particular behavior is suspicious or
logically demonstrate, given the surrounding circumstances, that the behavior
is likely to be indicative of some more sinister activity than may appear at
first glance." Id. Here, the State articulated why the events in
the Hardee's parking lot were likely indicative of criminal activity at the
time Lutz observed them: (1) the Hardee's parking lot was a known meeting
location for drug sales, and (2) Lutz's training and prior knowledge of similar
drug transactions led him to believe the activity he observed in the parking
lot was a drug transaction. SeeJohnson, 599 F.3d at 345
(relying on officer's conclusion, based on his training and experience, that
hand-to-hand contact between the defendant and several men in rapid succession in
a location known for drug sales was indicative of a drug transaction in finding
reasonable suspicion existed).

Finally, a finding that Lutz
had reasonable suspicion under the facts present here is consistent with the
recent decision by our supreme court in State v. Corley, 392 S.C. 125,
708 S.E.2d 217 (2011). There, Officer Futch observed Corley drive up to a
known drug house at 2:50 in the morning, walk to the back of the house, stay
for less than two minutes, and return to his car and leave. Id. at 126,
708 S.E.2d at 217. Futch followed Corley a short distance before stopping him
after he failed to use his turn signal. Id. Although the court noted
the traffic violation formed an independent basis for the stop, the court found
the stop was justified based on the presence of reasonable suspicion. Id. at 127-28, 708 S.E.2d at 218. In our view, the facts here are analogous to
those in Corley. Both the house in Corley and the Hardee's
parking lot are known locations for drug activity. Additionally, Futch and
Lutz both observed behavior that was consistent with the criminal activity the
location was known for. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court
properly determined Lutz had reasonable suspicion to stop Burgess.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the trial
court is

AFFIRMED.

FEW,
C.J and PIEPER, J. concur.

[1] Lutz requested the aid of another officer; however,
none were available to give assistance.

[2] Later testing determined the black bag held 20
tablets containing MDMA and/or BZP, 15.02 grams of crack cocaine, 7.44 grams of
cocaine, and 16.69 grams of marijuana. MDMA is commonly known as ecstasy and
BZP is a simulant comparable to amphetamine.