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Routing the rebels? Bashar al-Assad is hoping his forces will crush rebel fighters, like this gunman aiming his rifle from inside a school in Homs. Photo: AP

Routing the rebels? Bashar al-Assad is hoping his forces will crush rebel fighters, like this gunman aiming his rifle from inside a school in Homs. (AP)

As Syrians prepare to mark the first anniversary of their uprising against the despotic regime of Bashar al-Assad, there are few signs of a negotiated end to the crisis.

Assad appears to have developed a three-track strategy:

* He’ll continue trying to crush the rebellion by force. As the massacre in the central city of Homs enters its third week, pro-Assad units are encircling other rebel cities, notably Hama, Deraa and Idlib.

* He’ll attempt to divide the opposition into three camps. In the first camp are those who still hope that Assad can be eased out of office through negotiations. The despot’s presidential term ends in 2014, and members of his entourage suggest that he might step down then. A second opposition camp consists of those who want Assad to quit immediately, opening the path for transition to democracy. The third camp belongs to the armed groups, mainly composed of defectors from Assad’s army.

* He’ll try to divert international attention from his crackdown against the opposition onto Syria’s looming humanitarian disaster. On that score, Assad is sending signals that the outside world needs his cooperation to deal with the humanitarian crisis across Syria. He’s also holding hostage a number of Western citizens, including wounded journalists, to force the European Union to “cooperate” with his regime.

Further, Assad advertises the support he gets from Russia and Iran. Right now, an Iranian naval group is on a “friendly visit” to the Syrian port of Tarsus, using an old Soviet base. In the meantime, Russia and Iran have increased arms deliveries to Assad.

Could Assad’s new strategy save his regime?Although no one knows the future, the logical answer is no

Despite hard repression, including the destruction of whole neighborhoods in Homs and Idlib, people are coming out in the thousands to demand regime change.

Over the last few days, even Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city, which had remained relatively calm, has joined the revolution with anti-Assad marches last Thursday and Friday.

Bloodied but unbowed, the opposition appears determined to keep pressing the regime. It plans uprisings in dozens of new places, forcing Assad to ease the pressure on Free Syrian Army units in Homs, Hama and Deraa.

Last week’s conference of “friends of Syria” in Tunis may have been little more than a talkfest to silence the “something must be done” constituencies in the West. Nevertheless, it had a positive effect on the Syrian opposition’s morale. The conference provided an opportunity for some 70 countries to grant the Syrian National Council de facto recognition as a government in waiting.

Even there, the Assad faction had to knock on people’s doors early in the morning to ferry a few thousands to polling stations. Of the 13,000 polling stations, more than half were in just three cities: Damascus, Aleppo and Latakiya. More than a third of the 14.6 million people eligible to vote had no chance of doing so.

In any case, the proposed constitution may be nothing but a device to prolong Assad’s rule until 2028. The draft stipulates that, after Assad’s term ends in 2014, no one can serve for more than two consecutive terms as president. In theory, at least, Assad could stand again and act as president for another decade.

The draft is a hasty, and often hilariously inaccurate, translation of the constitution of the French Fifth Republic, designed to reaffirm a strong presidency alongside a weak parliament. The only concession offered is an end to six decades of one-party rule under the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party. But even that concession may be theoretical. While other parties would be allowed, there’s no guarantee that the Ba’ath wouldn’t “arrange” to win the presidency and secure control of the parliament and government.

Despite assertions by Western leaders that Syria is not “another Libya,” Assad’s three-track strategy may well produce just that. Prudence dictates that “friends of Syria” start preparing for such an eventuality.