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Iraq: Elections and the Ongoing Debaathifacation Battle

Released on 2012-10-19 08:00 GMT

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2010-02-04 22:40:21

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Iraq: Elections and the Ongoing Debaathifacation Battle

February 4, 2010 | 2112 GMT
An Iraqi man holds up a poster of a Sunni lawmaker during an
anti-Baathist protest in Najaf on Jan. 21
QASSEM ZEIN/AFP/Getty Images
An Iraqi man holds up a poster of a Sunni lawmaker during an
anti-Baathist protest in An Najaf on Jan. 21

Iraq's electoral commission Feb. 4 asked the country's highest judicial
power to decide whether an appellate court ruling allowing disqualified
candidates to run in March 7 parliamentary elections is binding. On the
same day, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki met with the Speaker of
Parliament Iyad al-Samarrai, one of the country*s top Sunni leaders,
where al-Maliki called for an emergency parliament session to discuss
the legal controversy. Earlier, Iraqi National Coalition (INC) member
Hamam Hamoudi said Feb. 4 that an appellate court decision issued Feb. 3
permitting more than 500 candidates with alleged ties to the Baath Party
to participate in March parliamentary elections has no constitutional
basis. The INC is a predominantly Shiite coalition led by Iran's closest
ally in Iraq, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).

The appellate decision overturning the Baathist ban issued by the
Justice and Accountability Commission (JAC), a Shiite-led body
spearheading a national policy of debaathification, does not guarantee
that Sunnis who run will be able to take office. Without such a
guarantee, Iraq's security situation will remain in flux.

The United States has pushed for such a ruling to defuse sectarian
tensions ahead of the March vote. U.S. involvement in the matter has
created a controversy between the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and the JAC.
Commission chief Ali Faisal al-Lami called on the Iraqi government,
especially the Foreign Ministry, to ask the U.S. Embassy to stop
interfering in the matter. The embassy, however, welcomed the appellate
decision and brushed aside al-Lami*s criticism, saying the JAC chief
should approach the Iraqi judiciary on the matter.

U.S. involvement is related to concerns that Sunni disenfranchisement is
likely to spark a renewed Iraqi Sunni insurgency - something that would
severely complicate the U.S. withdrawal timetable from Iraq. Recent
attacks against Shiite pilgrims in Karbala have highlighted the danger
of a Sunni militant revival. According to a STRATFOR source, Iraqi
Baathist insurgents were in fact involved in the attacks.

To counter this risk, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden was in Iraq on
Jan. 23 working to convince al-Maliki to repeal the Baathist ban in the
interest of stability. To induce al-Maliki to comply, a STRATFOR source
says Washington transferred Ali Hassan al Majeed (aka Chemical Ali), who
was promptly hanged Jan. 25. Al-Maliki reportedly hoped the hanging of
Chemical Ali would improve al-Maliki's political standing ahead of the
elections. In any event, al-Maliki also has grown concerned over the
Baathist ban. This is because many of those on the blacklist, including
leading Sunni politician Salih al-Mutlak, are on good terms with Iyad
Allawi, a key Shiite rival of al-Maliki for the premiership.

Al-Maliki's State of Law coalition also expressed reservations Feb. 3
about the decision to overturn the Baathist ban, claiming that the
reversal was done "without much thought" and questioning whether
"interference and political pressure" motivated the ruling. Al-Maliki is
likely working to deflect criticism of a backroom deal between
Washington and al-Maliki to back off the Baathist ban by joining the
chorus of skeptics rejecting the decision. This political wrangling will
continue to intensify in the lead-up to elections. Ultimately, the lack
of guaranteed representation for Sunnis means Iraq's security situation
will remain volatile.

Iran's quiet moves in this controversy will play a critical role. Tehran
wants to signal to Washington that its influence over Iraqi Shiite
politicians can seriously derail U.S. disengagement plans. Iran can
exploit the political crisis in Baghdad for better or for worse in its
own back-channel negotiations with the United States.

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