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Elliott]15 was along our rear, and right column, at about 300
yards distance, he was well known by several persons in our
lines—The Indians horses were very difficult [i.e., different]16
from such as I have been accustomed to see them riding; they were
high and active—They were also supplied with pistols and
holsters. I have reason to believe the whole forced of the enemy
was very little, if any, inferior to our own—Of this I was well
convinced from the information of Capts. Hinkton & Wood, who
examined the number of their files, before we attempted to cross;
but from the advantage we had gained by our approach, and the
determined spirit of the Soldiers, I felt not the least
hesitation in attacking them; and well am I convinced,
that nothing [but]17 the situation of the river, prevented our
making a compleat slaughter of th[e]ir whole force, and securing
the Gun Boats and Batteaus loading with corn—
(From the time that had elapsed after Genl [James] Winchester
must have received my letter informing him of the force at the
Rapids, I had every reason to expect he would have ordered down a
sufficient number of Troops to maintain that post, or rout the
enemy—On the morning of the 14th. I sent an express to him
stating the impossibility of my crossing; that my Troops were out
of provision, and that I could not attempt to continue longer
than to the next day at that place. Whether he had sent down a
force I know not:)18 The troops under my command had consumed
their provisions; some on the evening of the 13th, and all on the
14th; and had then a distance of 40 miles to travel back before
there was a possibility of a supply. I was therefore, compelled

Elliott]15 was along our rear, and right column, at about 300
yards distance, he was well known by several persons in our
lines—The Indians horses were very difficult [i.e., different]16
from such as I have been accustomed to see them riding; they were
high and active—They were also supplied with pistols and
holsters. I have reason to believe the whole forced of the enemy
was very little, if any, inferior to our own—Of this I was well
convinced from the information of Capts. Hinkton & Wood, who
examined the number of their files, before we attempted to cross;
but from the advantage we had gained by our approach, and the
determined spirit of the Soldiers, I felt not the least
hesitation in attacking them; and well am I convinced,
that nothing [but]17 the situation of the river, prevented our
making a compleat slaughter of th[e]ir whole force, and securing
the Gun Boats and Batteaus loading with corn—
(From the time that had elapsed after Genl [James] Winchester
must have received my letter informing him of the force at the
Rapids, I had every reason to expect he would have ordered down a
sufficient number of Troops to maintain that post, or rout the
enemy—On the morning of the 14th. I sent an express to him
stating the impossibility of my crossing; that my Troops were out
of provision, and that I could not attempt to continue longer
than to the next day at that place. Whether he had sent down a
force I know not:)18 The troops under my command had consumed
their provisions; some on the evening of the 13th, and all on the
14th; and had then a distance of 40 miles to travel back before
there was a possibility of a supply. I was therefore, compelled