Your letter of November 15 gave me great pleasure. You must realise how
highly one in my position appreciates the opinions of comrades in Russia,
especially thoughtful people, who are thinking hard studying the subject. I
was therefore particularly pleased to get your early reply. One feels less
isolated when one receives letters like this. But poetry enough—let’s get
down to business.

1.
You are in favour of an official language in Russia. It, is
“necessary; it has been and will be of great progressive importance”. I
disagree emphatically. I wrote about this long ago in
Pravda,[1]
and so far have not been refuted. Your argument does not convince me in the
least. Quite the reverse. The Russian language has undoubtedly
been of progressive importance for the numerous small and backward
nations. But surely you must realise that it would have been of
much greater progressive importance had there been no compulsion. Is not an
“official language” a stick that drives people away from the
Russian language? Why will you not understand the psychology that
is so important in the national question and which, if the slightest
coercion is applied, besmirches, soils, nullifies the undoubtedly
progressive importance of centralisation, large states and a uniform
language? But the economy is still more important than psychology:
in Russia we already have a capitalist economy, which
makes the Russian language essential. But you have no faith in the
power of the economy and want to prop it up with the crutches of the rotten
police regime.
Don’t you see that in this way you are crippling the economy and
hindering its development? Will not the collapse of the wretched police
regime multiply tenfold (even a thousand fold) the number of voluntary
associations for protecting and spreading the Russian language? No, I
absolutely disagree with you, and accuse you of
k\"oniglich-preussischer
Sozialismus![2]

2.
You are opposed to autonomy. You are in favour only of
regional self-government. I disagree entirely. Recall Engels’s explanation
that centralisation does not in the least preclude local
“liberties”.[5] Why should Poland have autonomy and not the Caucasus,
the South, or the Urals? Does not the central parliament determine the
limits of autonomy? We are certainly in favour of democratic
centralism. We are opposed to federation. We support the Jacobins
as against the Girondists. But to be afraid of autonomy in Russia of all
places—that is simply ridiculous! It is reactionary. Give me an example,
imagine a case in which autonomy can be harmful. You cannot. But
in Russia (and in Prussia), this narrow interpretation—only local
self-government—plays into the hands of the rotten police regime.

3.
“The right to self-determination does not imply only the right to
secede. It also implies the right to federal association, the right to
autonomy,” you write. I disagree entirely. It does not imply the
right to federation. Federation means the association of equals,
an association that demands common agreement. How can one
side have a right to demand that the other side should
agree with it? That is absurd. We are opposed to federation in
principle, it loosens economic ties, and is unsuitable for a single
state. You want to secede? All right, go to the devil, if you can break
economic bonds, or rather, if the oppression and friction of
“coexistence” disrupt and ruin economic bonds. You don’t want to
secede? In that case, excuse me, but don’t decide for me; don’t
think that you have a “right” to federation.

“Right to autonomy?” Wrong again. We are in favour of autonomy
for all parts; we are in favour of the right to
secession (and not in favour of everyone’s seceding!).
Autonomy is our plan for organising a democratic state. Secession
is not what we plan at all. We do not advocate secession. In general, we
are opposed to secession. But we stand for the right to secede
owing to reactionary, Great-Russian nationalism, which has so besmirched
the idea of national coexistence that sometimes closer ties will
be established after free secession!

The right to self-determination is an exception to our general
premise of centralisation. This exception is absolutely essential in view
of reactionary Great-Russian nationalism; and any rejection of this
exception is opportunism (as in the case of Rosa Luxemburg); it means
foolishly playing into the hands of reactionary Great-Russian
nationalism. But exceptions must not be too broadly
interpreted. In this case there is not, and must not be
anything more than the right to secede.

I am writing about this in
Prosveshcheniye.[3]
Please do not fail to write to me in greater detail when I have finished
these articles (they will appear in three issues). I will send something
more. I was mainly responsible for getting the resolution passed. I
delivered a series of lectures on the national question in the
summer,[6] and have made some little study of it. That is why I intend
to “stick tight”, although, of course, ich lasse mich
belehren[4]
from comrades who have studied the question more deeply and for a longer
period.

4.
So you are opposed to “altering” the Programme; opposed to a “national
programme”, are you? Here, too, I disagree. You are afraid of
words. You must not let words frighten you. Everybody
changes it (the Programme) any way, surreptitiously, in an
underhand manner, and for the worse. We, however, define, make more
precise, develop and consolidate our position in keeping with the spirit of
the Programme, with the consistently democratic spirit, with the
Marxist (anti-Austrian) spirit. This had to be done. Let the
opportunist (Bundist, liquidator, Narodnik) scum
have their say, let them give their equally precise and
complete answers to all the problems raised, and solved,
in our resolution. Let them try. No, we have not “given way” to the
opportunists, we have beaten them on all points.

A popular pamphlet on the national question is very much
needed. Write. Looking forward to reply, I send you my very heartiest
greetings. Regards to all friends.