The Power Elite

In early 1987, the Syrian government remained an autocracy in which
power was concentrated in the hands of President Assad. Assad (the name
means "lion" in Arabic and was chosen by Assad to replace his
actual family name of Al Wahash, which means "beast") had
tightened his grip in sixteen years as chief of state. Assad's
leadership was legitimized through such governmental structures as the
Baath Party apparatus, the People's Council, and the Council of
Ministers. These institutions, however, were a veneer for military rule,
and the holders of nominally important political posts rarely wielded
independent power. Assad's true base of support lay in his control of
key military units, various praetorian guards, and the intelligence and
security services. The commando forces, bodyguards, and secret
police--referred to generically by Syrian citizens as the mukhabarat--were
instrumental in maintaining the Assad regime's power. The men Assad
entrusted with command of these forces often exerted political influence
disproportionate to their official positions and had a greater political
voice than civilian politicians. Ultimately, however, Assad was more
inclined to designate responsibility to his underlings than to delegate
authority to them.

Until the mid-1980s, the Syrian power elite was composed of Assad and
his family. The president's younger brother, Rifaat, commanded a
division-sized praetorian guard called the Defense Companies (Saraya ad
Difa), which was stationed in Damascus as a countercoup force. His older
brother, Jamil al Assad, commanded a militia called the Murtada. A
nephew, Adnan al Assad, commanded the Struggle Companies (Saraya as
Sira), while another nephew, Fawwaz, led a security force stationed in
Latakia. These commando forces were not under the command of the regular
armed forces; rather, they were constructed as counterweights to the
power of the regular military. Jamil was put under house arrest in 1981
after an unsuccessful challenge to his brother, and in 1984 Rifaat was
exiled to Europe and his Defense Companies incorporated into the army
when he likewise sought to attain power. Assad was therefore compelled
to dilute the power of his family members because they posed a threat to
him.

In 1987 Assad was not the apex of a pyramid of power nor had he
created a hierarchical power elite below him. Rather, he relied on a
coterie of about a dozen men with approximately equal power who
commanded key military units or security services. In competing to
protect their positions, they counterbalanced and neutralized each
other. Their areas of responsibility were compartmentalized and
overlapping, and they reported directly to the president rather than
coordinating with their counterparts. Consequently, they could not
easily build their own power bases or form coalitions that might pose a
threat to Assad's rule.

This cell structure allowed Assad to retain power in Syria for an
unprecedented period of time. Most of the elite group belonged to
Assad's Alawi minority, and many belonged to Assad's own Numaylatillah
clan and Matawirah tribe within the Alawi minority. Some were related to
the president and to each other by blood or marriage, further ensuring
their loyalty. Moreover, Assad reportedly had been assiduous in paying
homage to the Alawi traditional tribal elders to reinforce this minority
power base.

In theory, the most important men in Syria after the president were
the vice presidents. However, Assad's appointment of three vice
presidents in 1985 reflected the divide-and-rule strategy he applied
elsewhere in the government. In order to maintain family solidarity,
Rifaat al Assad was made vice president for security affairs, but by
1987, stripped of his military command, he had no real power. As a
matter of protocol to symbolize the continued importance of the party,
Baath Party functionary Zuhayr Mashariqa, a Sunni Muslim, was appointed
vice president for party affairs. Abd al Halim Khaddam, the former
foreign minister, was promoted to vice president for political and
foreign affairs. Of the three vice presidents, Khaddam acted as the true
deputy to Assad and was firmly ensconced in the president's inner
circle. In early 1987, foreign observers tended to view Khaddam as a
candidate to succeed Assad as a compromise leader.

Non-Alawis were also influential in the Assad regime. Khaddam, for
example, was a Sunni Muslim (athough his wife was a Matawirah Alawi).
Prime Minister Abd ar Rauf al Kassim, Speaker of the People's Council
Mahmud az Zubi, Baath Party assistant secretary general Abdallah al
Ahmar, and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Hikmat Shihabi were other Sunni
Muslims holding high government positions in 1987. Minister of Defense
Mustafa Tlas was also a Sunni Muslim, although his mother was an Alawi.
Most Sunnis who had risen to prominence in the military since the Baath
Revolution, including Shihabi and Tlas, had a similar background: they
were born in and grew up in rural villages, rather than in Damascus or
other large cities. Such men, although belonging to the nation's Sunni
majority, were never members of the old privileged Sunni elite and
shared a common socioeconomic class origin with the new minority elite.
Assad's refusal to designate a successor was typical of his refusal to
share political power. His mysterious demeanor seemed to justify his
nickname, "the sphinx," which he earned while a member of the
secret officers' conspiracy in Egypt in the late 1950s.

In 1980, however, Assad began to cultivate the support of members of
the old Sunni Damascene elite, a class that contained many of Syria's
influential technocrats, intellectuals, and merchants. He propelled some
of these people into high-profile (if not powerful) positions in his
government. Assad's patronage gave the Sunni elite a vested interest in
accommodating itself to the new order, which helped legitimize and
stabilize his regime. For example, Prime Minister Kassim is from an old
Damascene family. Minister of Culture Najah al Attar is the sister of
exiled Muslim Brotherhood opposition leader Issam al Attar. Because the
Attar family is respected by Damascene Sunni Muslims, her appointment
served to discourage the Muslim fundamentalist opposition from operating
in Damascus.

Another less-known pillar of regime support was the tacit coalition
of minorities that Assad had constructed. Non-Muslims such as Christians
and Druze's, heterodox Muslims such as Ismailis and Yazidis, and
non-Arab Muslims such as Kurds and Circassians had made common cause
with the Alawi minority because of the shared fear that they would be
persecuted under an orthodox Sunni government. Consequently, members of
such minority groups were appointed to important posts in the Assad
government.

In addition to these groups, several important and influential
military figures supported Assad in 1987. Major General Muhammad Khawli,
chief of air force intelligence and head of the National Security
Council, was Assad's right-hand man. Khawli was a Matawirah Alawi and a
long-time trusted friend of Assad. His position was especially sensitive
because Assad rose to power through the air force, and this service has
been the breeding ground for several abortive coup attempts. Khawli's
deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Haitam as Said, was allegedly involved in
sponsorship of terrorism in Europe. Ali Aslan, also a Matawirah Alawi, was deputy
chief of staff of the armed forces. Aslan, a rising political star, was
promoted to army corps general in 1984, a rank shared only by the
minister of defense and the armed forces chief of staff. Both Khawli and
Aslan were elected to the Baath Party Central Committee in 1984. Adnan
Makhluf, the president's brother-in-law, commanded the Republican Guard,
a presidential protection force. Other core members of the Syrian power
elite in 1987 included Air Defense Commander Ali Salih and Army
Intelligence Chief Ali Duba, both Alawis of the Matawirah tribe. In 1987
Duba reportedly was leader of a clique that included Army First Division
Commander Ibrahim Safi and Syria's intelligence chief in Lebanon, Ghazi
Kanaan; this coterie was competing for influence with a group led by
Khawli and Aslan.

Members of the power elite occasionally fall from grace. After the
1984 power struggle, General Intelligence Directorate Chief Ahmad Diab,
a staunch supporter of Rifaat's bid for succession, was demoted.
However, Assad, pursuing his evenhanded policy, also chastised Rifaat's
rivals for power; Ali Haydar, commander of the Special Forces, and
commander of the army's Third Division Shafiq al Fayyad were removed
from their commands as well. Rifaat al Assad was exiled to Western
Europe once again in early 1986, where he remained in early 1987. These
men probably could be rehabilitated and restored to rank if they proved
their renewed loyalty to Assad.

In 1987 the power elite remained in a state of flux in which people
were rising to power, being demoted, being rehabilitated, and forming
and breaking alliances. Assad permitted and manipulated much of this
maneuvering because it both revealed and dissipated the ambitions of
potential rivals.

In 1987 the question of who will eventually succeed Assad as
president remained open. In a 1984 interview, Assad stated that his
successor would be nominated by the Baath Party and the People's
Council, which constituted the "supreme legitimate authority in the
country," and elected by public referendum. Although Assad has
governed Syria through a power elite, his answer expressed his desire
for Syria to be governed in the future by institutions rather than
personalities.