The average U.S. warplane finished production in 1979, the
same year that the last Chevy Nova rolled off the assembly line.1

But while most Novas have long been banished to the scrap heap,
the Air Force is still expected to keep its aging fleet of aircraft
running with insufficient spare parts or replacements. Despite
the cannibalization of downed aircraft for spare parts, our servicemen
are unable to keep more than 75% of our warplanes at flight status.2

The need for new equipment is not limited to the Air Force.
The average Marine Humvee (the armored jeep used during the Gulf
War) is 13 years old.3 Only 52% of these crucial vehicles in Marine
reserve forces are now in good repair. Merely 50% of U.S. naval
ships in port are considered ready for rapid deployment, a 30%
drop from just ten years ago.4 And these figures don't even tell
the whole story: these losses in military capabilities are in
addition to a 40% force reduction since the Reagan years.

The solution? The military must either repair its current equipment
or acquire new supplies - but the Clinton Administration appears
to have rejected both options.

Repair of the military's aging equipment is impractical due
to the shortage of spare parts. Air Force and Navy personnel report
high amounts of cannibalization, which is the act of taking parts
from one already grounded aircraft to repair another. This not
only serves to further disable an aircraft in need of proper repair,
but also increases ground crew workloads. Cannibalization takes
twice as long for a crew because it spends roughly the same amount
of time removing a part from a plane as it does installing the
part in another plane. Assuming some spare parts actually make
it through the pipeline, crews must then repair any aircraft cannibalized.

Sound complicated and costly? It should: the GAO estimates
that cannibalization wasted 178,000 man-hours over two years for
only three major aircraft types.5 Cannibalization is occurring
at a rate 75% higher than in 1995.6 Mismanagement and budget shortfalls
have made this wasteful maintenance virtually impossible to avoid.

The other possibility - procuring new equipment - also seems
unlikely due to the Clinton Administration's insistence on military
budget cuts. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger notes
that we spend "just over $40 billion a year on procurement,"
but observes that "depreciation on our military equipment
runs to over $100 billion per year."7 In other words, we
need to spend an additional $60 billion each year simply to maintain
our current readiness levels.

Funding shortfalls have taken their toll in other areas of
the military as well. With our foreign policy increasingly known
as "cruise-missile diplomacy," one would think that
the Clinton Administration would adequately fund the production
of such weapons. But shortages brought on by the Iraq and Kosovo
conflicts have left the Navy and Air Force scrambling. The Tomahawk
cruise missile production line, which closed early this year,
could take up to 30 months to restart. The Navy has only managed
to keep pace with the demand for such weapons by shuffling missiles
between fleets and upgrading older missiles.8

The Air Force, which uses the larger air-launched cruise missile,
has taken a far more disturbing approach to the shortage. Boeing
has now received government orders to refit nuclear cruise missiles,
substituting conventional warheads in place of the nuclear warheads.9

This is not the first time the Clinton Administration has unwittingly
undermined our nuclear forces. Federal statutes mandate that our
nuclear forces must be kept at the level of 6,000 warheads, the
maximum number allowed under START I (the Strategic Arms Reductions
Treaty). While the U.S. has proposed a further reduction in nuclear
warheads under the START II agreement, the Duma, the Russian governing
body, has not yet ratified the treaty. But the Clinton Administration
never expected that the treaty would take so long to be ratified.
As a result, the Center for Security Policy notes, the Administration
"failed to program into its future budgets funding for current
force levels."10 As the military cannot under federal law
reduce its nuclear warheads until the treaty is signed, our nuclear
forces are now faced with a funding crunch. It is unclear whether
the Clinton Administration will violate the law or divert funds
meant for other Pentagon programs to make up for the shortfall
in our nuclear arsenal.

Following the end of the Cold War, many in our government assumed
we could live off the Reagan buildup. They did not anticipate
that weapons systems do not last forever. As our machinery ages
and our weapons are expended, they must be replaced. Until our
President and Congress realize that fact, the problems our military
faces will only continue to grow. As Lieutenant General Peter
Pace observed, "the emphasis on current readiness has jeopardized
future warfighting capabilities."11 Our aging military is
badly in need of an overhaul, a fact to which many in our government
now seem oblivious.

Footnotes:

1 General Richard E. Hawley, Hearing Before
the Military Readiness Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Armed Services, March 22, 1999.

2 General Accounting Office, "Air Force
Supply: Management Actions Create Spare Parts Shortages and Operational
Problems," Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military
Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives,
April 1999.

3 Colonel Robert B. Neller, Hearing Before
the Military Readiness Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Armed Services, March 22, 1999.