A scientific paper discussing the possibility of a terrorist
attack on the U.S. milk supply was scheduled for publication in
the prestigious Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
(PNAS) last month until the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) intervened, calling it a "road map for
terrorists," and asked the journal to withdraw the paper. In
response to the HHS objections, PNAS agreed to delay publication
for an indefinite period.

But some scientists who have reviewed the paper say it should be
rebutted rather than censored, since it is based on a series of
alarmist assumptions that are objectively unsupported.

Despite the HHS concerns, one of the paper's authors, Stanford
business professor Lawrence M. Wein, went on to make his case on
the New York Times op-ed page on May 30 in a piece entitled "Got
Toxic Milk?"

According to the scenario presented by Prof. Wein in the New York
Times, "a terrorist, using a 28-page manual called 'Preparation
of Botulism Toxin' that has been published on several jihadist
Web sites and buying toxin from an overseas black-market
laboratory, fills a one-gallon jug with a sludgy substance
containing a few grams of botulin. He then sneaks onto a dairy
farm and pours its contents into an unlocked milk tank, or he
dumps it into the tank on a milk truck while the driver is
eating breakfast at a truck stop."

Hundreds of thousands could die, he warned.

But this is a grotesque exaggeration, argued scientific critics
Milton Leitenberg and George Smith.

For one thing, the jihadi manual cited by Wein, which they
reviewed, "does not explain, except in the most general terms,
how to obtain a toxic strain of Clostridium botulinum in the
first place."

Moreover, "in the real world no 'black market' botulinum toxin
producer is known to exist."

Based on their review of the unpublished but widely circulated
PNAS paper, Leitenberg and Smith concluded that Wein may have
overstated the consequences of his proposed terrorist scenario
by a factor of one billion!

"There is therefore an extraordinary degree of uncertainty
associated with Dr. Wein's estimates," they wrote. "The
analysis of real and practical intelligence reveals a vastly
different, more complicated, and much less frightening picture."

Leitenberg and Smith prepared their own critique of Wein's op-ed
and submitted it to the New York Times op-ed page. The Times
declined to publish it, since "As a matter of policy, we do not
publish rebuttals on the op-ed page."

A copy of that rebuttal, with the authors' introduction, is
posted here:

With the breakdown of the deliberative process on every level --
from Congress to the New York Times op-ed page -- there are
fewer and fewer venues for identifying errors of fact or
judgment in policymaking, and correcting them. The result is an
efflorescence of weirdly inflated threats and half-baked
proposals to combat them.

There is the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) threat, whereby a
nuclear explosive detonated in the atmosphere could disable
unshielded electrical systems.

"Ninety-nine percent of Americans may not know very much about
EMP," said Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD) on the House floor last
week, "but I will assure you, Mr. Speaker, that 100 percent of
our potential enemies know all about EMP."

"Terrorists could steal, purchase, or be provided a nuclear
weapon and perform an EMP attack against the United States
simply by launching a primitive Scud missile off a freighter
near our shores."

From that it supposedly follows that the US should spend untold
billions of dollars to harden our infrastructure against such an
attack. See Rep. Bartlett's June 9 statement on the subject
here:

Then there is the fertilizer threat. Legislation introduced by
Sen. Thad Cochran last month would regulate the sales of
ammonium nitrate fertilizer. Such fertilizer was infamously
used as an explosive in the Oklahoma City bombing ten years ago.

But OKC bomber Timothy McVeigh used nearly five thousand pounds
of ammonium nitrate in his 1995 attack. Senator Cochran's
proposed legislation would require monitoring the sale of even
the smallest quantity of such fertilizer sold by innumerable
vendors to any home gardener.

"I believe this important legislation will effectively enhance
ongoing security measures and will help to keep ammonium nitrate
out of the hands of those who wish to harm our nation," Sen.
Cochran said.

See the text of the "Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate Act of
2005" (S. 1141), May 26, here:

Openness in scientific research is vital to national security and
must be preserved, argued a distinguished panel of senior
scientists and former national security officials in a new
report.

With the exception of research that is properly classified for
national security reasons, dissemination of other scientific
research should remain unrestricted as far as possible, the
Commission on Scientific Communication and National Security
said.

This policy "does not assert that the open dissemination of
unclassified research is without risk. Rather, it says that
openness in research is so important to our own security -- and
to other key national objectives -- that it warrants the risk
that our adversaries may benefit from scientific openness as
well."

The authors discuss in turn each of the five mechanisms of
control of scientific information: classification, export
controls, "sensitive but unclassified" controls, statutory
restrictions, and self-imposed restraints on publication.

The result is a concise and clear-eyed perspective on a
perennially contentious issue.

See "Security Controls on Scientific Information and the Conduct
of Scientific Research," a White Paper of the Commission on
Scientific Communication and National Security, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, June 2005:

"The construction of the National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasures Center (NBACC), with an estimated construction
cost of $128 million, will be the first Department of Homeland
Security laboratory specifically focused on biodefense,"
according to a recent report of the Congressional Research
Service.

The report describes the Center's mission and budget and
discusses related policy issues, including oversight of the
Center's activities.

See "The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center:
Issues for Congress," April 25, 2005: