PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court?s order granting defendants? motion for a
directed verdict of plaintiff?s claims for breach of an express or implied contract, breach of
quasi-contract, misrepresentation or fraud, two counts of tortious interference with a business
relationship or economic advantage, civil conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. We affirm.
Plaintiff, a subcontractor, bid numerous jobs with defendant J.R. Heineman, a general
contractor, over the course of approximately ten years. At some point during the relationship,
plaintiff stopped obtaining contracts from J.R. Heineman. Plaintiff alleged that J.R. Heineman
and one of its owners, Dennis Rhem, began selling plaintiff?s bid numbers to competing
subcontractors in order to solicit lower bid numbers from those subcontractors. At trial, Donald
Hesse, one of plaintiff?s owners, and his brother, Ronald, testified about numerous jobs
(hereinafter referred to as the ?challenged jobs?), which allegedly were sold from underneath
plaintiff through the alleged bid-selling scheme.
Hesse testified that he believed that plaintiff?s bids were confidential before the bidding
deadline. Although he claimed that the written invitations to bid that plaintiff received from J.R.
Heineman contained confidentiality language, he failed to produce any written invitations that
contained confidentiality language, and he admitted that he never discussed bid confidentiality
with anyone from J.R. Heineman. With respect to the challenged jobs, plaintiff was unable to
offer any specific or documentary evidence to support the amount of its alleged bids. Plaintiff
apparently threw away all of its paperwork related to the amount of the alleged bids. Hesse?s
testimony about the alleged bid amounts for the challenged jobs was couched in terms of
probabilities, guesses, and approximations. Only one of the challenged jobs was supported with
any specific evidence. There was evidence that Tri-City Kontracting, one of defendant?s

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competitors, knew plaintiff?s bid number before the bid deadline on the Saginaw Juvenile Home
job. However, contrary to plaintiff?s theory of the case, the evidence established that Tri-City
Kontracting actually bid higher than plaintiff.
I
Plaintiff first argues that reversal is required because the trial court granted defendants?
motion for a directed verdict without stating the applicable standard of review or identifying the
deficiencies in the plaintiff?s proofs. We disagree.
MCR 2.515 provides:
A party may move for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence
offered by an opponent. The motion must state specific grounds in support of the
motion. If the motion is not granted, the moving party may offer evidence
without having reserved the right to do so, as if the motion had not been made. A
motion for a directed verdict that is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury,
even though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts.
Defendants presented the trial court with a written motion for a directed verdict at the
close of plaintiff?s proofs at trial. Defendants? motion set forth specific arguments in support of
their position that a directed verdict was appropriate for each count of plaintiff?s complaint. The
trial court subsequently heard extensive argument on the motion. Thus, it is apparent that the
trial court was aware of the facts of the case and the arguments of the parties. Further, it is
presumed that the trial court knew and followed the applicable law. See People v Farmer, 30
Mich App 707, 711; 186 NW2d 779 (1971) (absent proof to the contrary, trial judges are
presumed to follow the law). The trial court was not required to make any specific findings.
MCR 2.517(A)(4) provides that, ?[f]indings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary in
decisions on motions unless findings are required by a particular rule.? Plaintiff cites no
particular rule that required the trial court to state its findings and conclusions, or to expressly
articulate the applicable standards of review and failure of plaintiff?s proofs. More importantly,
our review is de novo. Candelaria v BC General Contractors, Inc, 236 Mich App 67, 71; 600
NW2d 348 (1999). Thus, our decision is not contingent on the trial court?s underlying analysis.
In its first issue on appeal, plaintiff presents two additional arguments. The first relates to
the trial court?s refusal to allow plaintiff?s proposed expert to testify about future lost profits.
This issue was not raised in the statement of the questions presented and, therefore, is not
properly before this Court. Weiss v Hodge, 223 Mich App 620, 634; 567 NW2d 468 (1997).
Additionally, the issue is briefed in a cursory fashion, and plaintiff fails to explain or rationalize
its position that the trial court improperly denied it the opportunity to call its expert. Plaintiff
also fails to cite any relevant authority in support of its argument. A party may not announce a
position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the claim. Caldwell v
Chapman, 240 Mich App 124, 132-133; 610 NW2d 264 (2000). Therefore, the issue is
abandoned.
The second additional argument raised in plaintiff?s first issue relates to plaintiff?s proof
of lost profit damages for the challenged jobs. Again, this issue was not raised in the statement

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of the questions presented and review is not appropriate. Weiss, supra. However, because the
issue is dispositive of other issues raised on appeal, we will consider it.
The trial court ordered, and plaintiff does not challenge, that lost profit damages were the
only damages that plaintiff was entitled to seek at trial with respect to its contract claims. A
plaintiff must establish proof of lost profits with a reasonable degree of certainty. Joerger v
Gordon Food Service, Inc, 224 Mich App 167, 175-176; 568 NW2d 365 (1997); In the matter of
MCI Telecommunications Corp, 240 Mich App 292, 315; 612 NW2d 826 (2000). See also
Poirier v Grand Blanc Twp, 192 Mich App 539, 549; 481 NW2d 762 (1992). A jury should not
be allowed to speculate or guess on the amount of lost profits. Joerger, supra.
In this case, Hesse was unsure of the bid amounts for the challenged jobs. He phrased his
responses to questions about the bid amounts in terms of his beliefs, approximations, or guesses.
For some of the challenged jobs, he gave a range of numbers, which varied by substantial sums,
e.g., $300,000 to $400,000. At one point during his testimony, he candidly admitted that, ?[o]n
these numbers, I?m not stating that I?m positive.? With the exception of this equivocal testimony
about the alleged bids, there was no evidence to support the bid amounts. The only exception
was the Saginaw Juvenile Home job for which defendants produced evidence that plaintiff bid
$66,500, plus $8,500 for a water line.
Moreover, and more significantly, testimony about the amount of profit expected for each
job was lacking. Hesse?s brother, Ronald, testified that plaintiff liked to maintain a fifteen
percent profit margin. Hesse testified that plaintiff ideally liked its bids to include a twenty-five
percent margin. He made clear, however, that plaintiff sometimes bid jobs at cost, meaning that
no profit was to be made. The profit margins changed depending on the circumstances. Hesse
admitted that many of the challenged jobs were bid at cost, but he was not sure which ones. At
trial, he specifically testified that, in order to testify about the amount of profit lost on each of the
challenged jobs, he would ?have to study that deeply.? Clearly, Hesse was unable to offer
testimony at trial with respect to the anticipated profit margins for each of the challenged jobs.
The only job for which reasonably specific testimony was offered to establish the anticipated
profit margin was the Saginaw Juvenile Home. With respect to that job, plaintiff admitted that it
did not anticipate generating any profit at all.
As previously discussed, before lost profits are recoverable, they must be proven with a
reasonable degree of certainty as opposed to being based on mere conjecture or speculation.
MCI Telecommunications, supra; Joerger, supra. On the basis of the evidence and testimony
offered, the jury would have had to engage in speculation and guesswork to determine the lost
profits for the challenged jobs. Lost profit damages were therefore not recoverable. Plaintiff?s
claim on appeal, that it produced sufficient evidence of lost profits to enable a jury to calculate
damages, is without merit.
II
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict on its express,
implied, and quasi-contract claims. Plaintiff was only seeking lost profit damages on these
contract claims. Because plaintiff could not establish damages attendant to those claims, a
directed verdict was appropriate. See Vandendries v General Motors, 130 Mich App 195, 198-

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199; 343 NW2d 4 (1983) (a directed verdict may be affirmed where the proofs regarding
damages are highly speculative).
We additionally conclude that plaintiff has abandoned its arguments that the proofs at
trial were sufficient to submit the breach of express contract and the breach of quasi-contract
claims to the jury. Caldwell, supra. Further, we conclude that plaintiff?s breach of implied
contract claim was not viable even without consideration of the issue of damages. Plaintiff
claims that there was an implied contract to keep its bids confidential. An implied contract exists
where one engages or accepts beneficial services of another for which compensation is
customarily made and naturally anticipated. Elliott v Dep?t of Social Services, 124 Mich App
124, 131; 333 NW2d 603 (1983). The acts of soliciting bids and submitting bids are not acts for
which compensation is customarily made or naturally anticipated. More importantly, an implied
contract must satisfy the elements of mutual assent and consideration. Pawlak v Redox Corp,
182 Mich App 758, 765; 453 NW2d 304 (1990); Mallory v Detroit, 181 Mich app 121, 127; 449
NW2d 115 (1989). Valid consideration cannot be presumed merely because two parties received
benefit from each other. Higgins v Monroe Evening News, 404 Mich 1, 20; 272 NW2d 537
(1978). Rather, there must be a bargained-for exchange. Id. In this case, there was no evidence
that the parties bargained for a contract to keep the bids confidential. Thus, the implied contract
claim fails for want of consideration to contract to keep the bids confidential. An express
contract would fail on the same grounds. Thomas v Leja, 187 Mich App 418, 422; 468 NW2d 58
(1991) (legal consideration is an essential element of a valid contract).
III
Plaintiff next argues that the evidence was sufficient to submit its fraud or
misrepresentation claim to the jury. Relying on SJI2d 128.04, plaintiff argues that the evidence
was sufficient to establish innocent misrepresentation. To prove a claim of innocent
misrepresentation, it is necessary to prove that the plaintiff and the defendant were in privity of
contract. Forge v Smith, 458 Mich 198, 212; 580 NW2d 876 (1998). The record here does not
support that plaintiff and defendant were in privity. Therefore, a claim of innocent
misrepresentation was not established as a matter of law. A directed verdict on that claim was
appropriate.
We further note that, with respect to this claim, plaintiff argues that it established lost
profit and future lost profit damages. As previously discussed, plaintiff?s lost profit damages
were not supported by the speculative evidence. Recovery for speculative damages is not
permitted in a tort action. Law Offices of Lawrence J Stockler, PC v Rose, 174 Mich App 14, 33;
436 NW2d 70 (1989). Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence to support future lost
profits.
IV
Defendant next challenges the trial court?s grant of a directed verdict on the tortious
interference claims alleged against defendants Rhem and J.R. Heineman. We conclude that the
trial court?s decision was appropriate.
[A] claim of tortious interference with a contract or a prospective
economic advantage is complete upon a showing of the existence of a valid

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business relationship or the expectation of such a relationship between the
plaintiff and some third party, knowledge of the relationship or expectation of the
relationship by the defendant, and an intentional interference causing termination
of the relationship or expectation, resulting in damages to the plaintiff. [Blazer
Foods, Inc v Restaurant Properties, Inc, 259 Mich App 241, 254; 673 NW2d 805
(2003) (citations omitted; emphasis added).]
See also Mino v Clio School Dist, 255 Mich App 60, 78; 661 NW2d 586 (2003); BPS Clinical
Laboratories v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan (On Remand), 217 Mich App 687, 698-
699; 552 NW2d 919 (1996). ?To maintain a cause of action for tortious interference, the
plaintiffs must establish that the defendant was a ?third party? to the contract or business
relationship.? Reed v Michigan Metro Girl Scout Council, 201 Mich App 10, 13; 506 NW2d 231
(1993), citing Dzierwa v Michigan Oil Co, 152 Mich App 281, 287; 393 NW2d 610 (1986).
Plaintiff?s claim against J.R. Heineman does not involve a third party. Plaintiff did not
allege or argue that J.R. Heineman interfered with its relationship with any other general
contractors to which plaintiff submitted bids. In fact, Hesse agreed that J.R. Heineman did not
interfere in its other relationships. Plaintiff?s claim is essentially that J.R. Heineman interfered
with plaintiff?s business relationship with J.R. Heineman. Such a claim is not actionable.
Plaintiff?s claim against Rhem also fails. Rhem was an owner of J.R. Heineman and was
its vice president. It is well settled that ?corporate agents are not liable for tortious interference
with the corporation?s contracts unless they acted solely for their own benefit with no benefit to
the corporation.? Reed, supra. In this case, there was no proof that Rhem was acting strictly for
his own personal benefit. It was undisputed that, if Rhem sold the low bid in order to solicit
lower bids, this benefited J.R. Heineman directly. Use of the lowest possible subcontracting bid
kept J.R. Heineman?s bid lower as the general contractor. Plaintiff acknowledges this throughout
its arguments on appeal. We note that plaintiff also generally claims that Rhem engaged in work
slow downs and created other problems on job sites, which interfered with plaintiff?s relationship
with J.R. Heineman. The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, indicated that
Rhem caused trouble at only one project, the South Side Health Center. There was no evidence,
however, that Rhem did this for his personal benefit. More importantly, as with the other claims
on appeal, there was an absence of sufficient testimony with respect to damages to support a
recovery on that claim. Thus, a directed verdict was properly granted.
V
Finally, defendant challenges the grant of a directed verdict on its civil conspiracy claim.
?A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons, by some concerted action, to accomplish
a criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a purpose not unlawful by criminal or unlawful
means.? Cousineau v Ford Motor Co, 140 Mich App 19, 36-37; 363 NW2d 721 (1985). It is
well settled that a claim for civil conspiracy, standing alone, is not actionable. Id., 37. The claim
cannot ?exist in the air; rather, it is necessary to prove a separate, actionable tort.? Advocacy
Organization for Patients & Providers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 257 Mich App 365, 384; 670
NW2d 569 (2003), lv gtd 470 Mich 881 (2004), quoting Early Detection Center, PC v New York
Life Ins Co, 157 Mich App 618, 632; 403 NW2d 830 (1986). In other words, a civil conspiracy
claim may not be maintained where there are no legal and equitable claims remaining in the case.
See Detroit Bd of Ed v Celotex Corp, 196 Mich App 694, 713; 493 NW2d 513 (1992). Because