The UK government is expected to publish a draft bill on 28 May outlining a framework for the country’s referendum on EU membership. Andrew Glencross writes that UK politics is now increasingly defined by two different kinds of ‘exceptionalism’: a push within the UK for self-government outside of the EU, and Scottish demands for self-government within the UK. He argues that while neither the breakup of the UK nor a Brexit is inevitable, if they do occur it will be because of misplaced belief in the nostrum of self-government.

David Cameron’s unexpected triumph in the 2015 UK General Election means that British citizens will be asked to vote on whether to remain in the EU. On the surface, this referendum appears to be just another manifestation of Britain’s prolonged equivocations over European integration.

First there was the decision in the 1950s to remain aloof, only joining the then European Economic Community in 1973, a decision shortly followed by renegotiation as well as a referendum on membership in 1975. Subsequently, there have been periodic tumults over obtaining concessions, including a budget rebate and opt-outs from both the single currency and the borderless Schengen area.

Look more closely at the source of the current dispute, however, and a different picture emerges. Demands for renegotiating British membership prior to voting on the issue, combined with expectations of a “generous exit” if such wrangling fails, all imply that Britain is big enough to do better by going it alone. In this sense, the struggle against the EU is not about indecision, it is about loathing constraints on self-government, a narrative directly echoed in the demand for Scottish independence – an issue that is now intertwined with the EU question.

The relevance of the 1975 referendum

The 1975 precedent of asking the people to vote on Britain’s relationship with Europe is useful to illustrate the continuity in this sentiment of a frustrated desire for managing one’s own affairs. At the time though, European partners largely misunderstood the source of British dissatisfaction. A French satirical magazine ridiculed the British position, presenting the then Prime Minister Harold Wilson as an inept lover who left his mistress, Europe, uncertain of whether he was coming or going. More seriously, negotiators such as Gaston Thorn, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, worried that a future British government would simply change its mind once again and ask the people to vote anew. What such readings of the situation overlooked was the importance of the sovereignty question and its instrumentalisation in British Euroscepticism.

Credit: Anna Fruen (CC-BY-SA-3.0)

Peter Shore, who at the time was Secretary of State for Trade, articulated this kind of complaint most clearly when in 1974 he told a crowd in New Zealand that he hoped Britain “can face the future without any necessity of joining a particular trade bloc”. This is not the hesitation of Hamlet – unsure as to how to proceed decisively – but the rage of Caliban upon seeing his own reflection. What is troubling about European integration from this perspective is the implication that post-imperial Britain is incapable of governing its own affairs.

Today, buoyed by economic success in the past four decades, Conservative Party politicians imagine the EU to be a ball and chain for prosperity. London Mayor Boris Johnson (who also won a seat in the House of Commons at this election) speaks of potential withdrawal as a removal of red tape “turbo charged by new trading agreements with major partners such as China, Brazil, Russia, Australia and India”. This envy for unilateralism extends to couching EU reform as the process of asking for new exceptions to accommodate UK interests, including a unilateral veto for the British parliament that is anathema to consensus-based EU law-making.

Railing against the structural constraints of EU membership is thus an elite, mainstream position – unlike in other Western European countries, where it is associated purely with populist parties. Indeed, the Conservative Party’s Euroscepticism is inherently connected to a portrayal of the EU that misrepresents the strictures imposed by the terms of membership. Significantly, when it comes to product market regulation, OECD figures reveal that the UK already has less red tape than the US and the least in the EU apart from the Netherlands.

A similar tale applies to labour regulation, albeit with more rights for temporary workers than are present in the US and Canada. Moreover, the financial benefits of leaving are equally wrapped in mythologising as both Norway and Switzerland pay into the EU’s coffers in return for accessing the European single market. The costs involved are much lower than those for the UK as an EU member state because these non-members do not participate in the expensive Common Agricultural Policy. As acknowledged by even the most thought-through plan for UK withdrawal, savings in this area would be offset by having to funnel taxpayer money to support farmers and rural communities.

Decision-makers in other EU countries no longer misunderstand the British position as the product of indecision. This is because they acknowledge how far the UK, notably by promoting enlargement, has shaped the development of the contemporary EU. In fact, the previous coalition government itself recognised this fact, albeit in a backhanded fashion. From 2012-14, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office conducted an exhaustive review of 32 policy areas affected by European integration so as to audit the EU’s overall impact on UK interests. The failure of this Review of the Balance of Competences exercise to vindicate the concerns of Eurosceptics led to the reports being buried – they were never mentioned by the Conservatives during the General Election campaign.

British exceptionalism meets Scottish exceptionalism

The exceptionalist British attitude towards Europe, best expressed in the words of Winston Churchill as meaning “we are in Europe, but not of it”, naturally gives rise to a utilitarian argument regarding integration. For instance, James Callaghan, who as Foreign Secretary oversaw the renegotiation of Britain’s terms of membership in 1974-75, understood the EEC as a “business arrangement”. Yet the utilitarian dimension explains only part of the current UK government’s attitude towards the EU as demonstrated – ironically enough – by the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) position on the fate of the country itself.

Both the closely-fought 2014 independence referendum in Scotland and the SNP’s capture of 56 out of 59 Scottish constituencies in the General election clearly reveal that British politics is home to another potent exceptionalist claim. Even pro-Union parties now back the further devolution of powers to Holyrood in order to satisfy demands for a form of autonomy unique in the UK. During the 2014 independence campaign, the Unionist camp emphasised the pragmatic, cost/benefit reasons for remaining a constituent part of the UK: currency stability, a larger tax base to absorb shocks such as banking crises or global recession, and foreign policy clout. These arguments narrowly won the day (the result was 55 per cent in favour of remaining in the British Union), but Cameron had expected a much more comfortable victory.

Unionists are confronted with the same ideological challenge facing British Europhiles: a semi-mythologised longing for self-government couched in an exceptionalist identity. SNP ideologues swat aside arguments about the merits of the Westminster state by labelling them “Project Fear”. Despite existing devolution – more is promised – that grants Scotland’s parliament autonomy over a swathe of policy areas, the British political establishment is derided as unreformable and prejudicial to true Scottish interests.

Equally important, the SNP considers the very notion of union to be an offensive claim that Scotland is too puerile to govern its own affairs. Nevertheless, the cry for independence is wrapped up with Scottish membership of the EU so as to retain the benefits of a single market and gain a seat at the table of EU diplomacy. The utilitarian benefits of the EU system, according to this logic, do not hold true for the defective British state, even though new members of the EU are obliged to adhere to the ever more tightly bound-rules governing the euro.

Hence the dynamic of the past five years is the development of two overlapping and ultimately irreconcilable constitutional demands. Since the UK’s status in the EU determines Scotland’s, SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon, has called for a veto on an English-majority vote to withdraw. In the absence of a veto, there is a realistic prospect of further constitutional crisis: if the UK votes to leave the EU without majority Scottish support, it will produce inevitable calls for a second referendum on Scottish independence based on the choice between membership of the UK or of the EU.

Battleground 2016: home and abroad

The double-helix of Scottish and British exceptionalism may finally unravel in 2016. This is the year for holding new elections to the Scottish Parliament, which in 2011 gave the SNP a majority that was accepted by Westminster as the platform for holding an independence referendum. It also now seems that Cameron’s idea is to hold the In/Out referendum on the EU that same year. Since polls consistently show that voters would prefer Britain to remain in a reformed EU, the onus is on the UK government to find concessions that can be packaged as particularly beneficial to Britain – the same tactic pursued prior to the 1975 referendum.

The problem in satisfying this demand is that EU leaders are loathe to open the Pandora’s box of treaty change, much less to do so for the sole advantage of Britain. Angela Merkel, the maker and breaker of EU deals, has previous experience in outmanoeuvring Cameron. She side-stepped the UK’s veto of the Fiscal Compact in 2012 by steering this treaty through as an intergovernmental arrangement outside the EU legal order. This reluctance to concede ground to the UK will make it very difficult for the government to spin a story about obtaining a better deal, thereby playing into the hands of Eurosceptics who claim the EU is “unreformable” and heading towards federal union. By giving the SNP the ability to campaign for independence as the only guarantee of continued EU membership such Euroscepticism can only fuel divisions between mutually exclusive claims of Scottish and British exceptionalism.

As perplexing as these rival identity claims are to the casual outside observer, they are nothing when compared with the parochialism of the debate over the UK’s future as viewed from major Western capitals. Already in 2014 President Obama counselled the UK to remain “strong, robust, and united”. Now Washington has to contend with a key NATO ally that might not just split apart but also turn its back on the economic bloc with which it is negotiating the world’s biggest free trade deal, TTIP. This transatlantic drift is compounded by a continental drift within Europe itself. For while decision-makers in Brussels, Berlin, and Paris are still scrambling to save the Eurozone and contrive a cohesive front against Russia, British priorities clearly lie elsewhere.

Of course, the siren call of self-government is strong amongst the various populist parties of Europe such as France’s Front National or Greece’s Syriza. Yet their success is fundamentally linked to problems that those countries have in adapting to an interdependent economic order that makes a mockery of claims to retain sovereignty over key macro-economic policy levers. It is very odd then that the UK, which is far more prosperous than when it first wrestled with European integration fifty years ago, should be governed by the same anxieties. Neither the dissolution of the UK nor Brexit is inevitable, but if they do occur it will be because of misplaced belief in the nostrum of self-government.

Note: A version of this article originally appeared at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.

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7 Comments

We, in the UK, have never had a vote on membership of the EU, the referendum referred to in this article was on membership of the “common market”.
If our current administration is unable to gain concessions, particularly on freedom of movement within the EU, access to UK welfare benefits and immigration in general, then hopefully a majority of the citizens of the UK will vote to leave the EU.
If there is a yes vote without majority Scottish support, then let the Scottish people call for a second referendum on independence and, should this happen, I wish them well as an independent Nation if there is yes vote for independence. They will, of course, have to leave the EU and apply for membership as a separate sovereign entity

A pity the article does not even mention the democratic deficit created by an EU elite which has repeatedly (a) ignored the voters in States where they were allowed to express views (eg Constitution) and (b) lied (starting with eg Heath’s “There are some in this country who fear that in going into Europe we shall in some way sacrifice independence and sovereignty. These fears, I need hardly say, are completely unjustified.”)

And bear in mind most British voters have not seen (a) the same practical benefits of sweeping away borders – because we can’t just jump in the car and drive of to Paris etc or (b) loads of money – as in eg Ireland – because we have been and are net contributors.

We hear a lot about “EU elites” and not a lot about governments in these kinds of critiques. It’s up to national governments (not the Commission or any “Eurocrat”) how states ratify treaties. The implication always seems to be that there’s some group of bureaucrats sitting in a tower deciding to ignore referendums. In reality there are national governments coming to the (fairly reasonable) conclusion that having 28 national electorates ratify a treaty with a referendum is completely unworkable.

If the UK votes to stay in the EU in the next 18 months we’ll have had two referendums on this subject – one when we originally joined and one on staying part of the modern European Union (with everything that entails). I find it difficult to see how we’ll still be able to trot out these democratic deficit arguments if that happens – though I’m fully aware the old “the other side only won because they lied” argument will live on (just as it has in Scotland).

I’m sorry, but with all respect, you are wrong on this one aspect of a mandated government voting on treaties – especially on the Lisbon Treaty.

You would know that the Lisbon Treaty was a hurriedly, knocked-up replacement – that needed no vote – for the European Convention (Constitution) on which the UK people were promised a vote.

If the EU insists on trying to be a democratic Federation it must insist on democracy – denying people the means of deciding whether they wish to be a part of such a set-up is not democratic, and neither is overturning the votes that don’t accord with the EU’s wishes.

We have not had a referendum on being a member of the EU. We had a referendum on being a part of the Common Market. Ever since then further powers have been ceded to the EU without any consultation on whether or not the UK citizens wish to be part of, what in effect is an EU super state.

As net contributors to the EU it is difficult to see how we benefit from being part of the EU, apart from the dubious “honour” of paying for EU regeneration projects across the rest of Europe. We are also seeing hundreds of thousands of economic migrants from within (and without) Europe migrating to the UK, which is putting huge strain on our welfare, housing, transport, schools etc.

I have managed projects funded by the EU social fund and had direct experience of the costly and unnecessary EU bureaucracy and waste.

“As net contributors to the EU it is difficult to see how we benefit from being part of the EU, apart from the dubious “honour” of paying for EU regeneration projects across the rest of Europe.”

A few points:

1. The debate is much bigger than the UK’s net EU budget contribution (which is well under 1% of GNI). There’s an odd desire in some quarters to try and reduce the entire subject down to that issue, as if merely proving that we put more in than we get out means there’s no benefit to membership. That’s an extreme over-simplification: e.g. the recent CEP study includes budget contributions in the overall cost/benefit calculation and we still come out substantially worse off (even in an optimistic scenario) if we leave the EU, largely due to anticipated increases in non-tariff barriers to trade.

2. Another implication in these arguments is that the UK is being exploited, or in a uniquely undesirable position, in comparison to other states. In fact on a per capita basis we’re often well down the list of net contributors. In 2009, for instance, we were ranked 11th on that basis. The general principle is that countries that are better off make a net contribution, not that the UK alone has to pay more.

3. Finally, we have to be clear on what the purpose of the EU budget actually is. We act at times as though the reason we’re net contributors is that we’re simply terrible negotiators, or that we’ve been pushed into it by the rest of Europe. In reality the purpose of the EU budget is that resources are used for mutual benefit – e.g. improving a port in Croatia doesn’t just benefit the Croatians, but anyone who wants to export to Croatia.

Now the problem with the EU budget has always been that far too much of it is dedicated to things that aren’t mutually beneficial such as CAP or goes toward projects that aren’t justifiable. Nobody should ignore that (I do detest the way the argument for staying in the EU always seems to end up having to be an argument that the EU is flawless) but it’s equally misleading to act as though budget contributions are simply some kind of slush fund being redirected to foreigners. There’s nothing in principle wrong with the idea of a small (and it is small) EU-wide fund to improve certain aspects of infrastructure, promote research, and so on. What we should be pushing for is making sure that money is spent properly, not scrapping the principle altogether – and the idea that it’s a good reason to simply pull out of the EU altogether is a bit like advocating using a nuclear bomb to crack a nut.

1. It may be a simplification but I would not accept that it is an extreme one. This cost benefit analysis is misleading as it focuses only on trade.

2. I understand the principle that those countries who are “better off” pay more, however the reality is that those countries who are better off are subsidising those that are not.

3. The example of a port in Croatia is a good one but the reality is that a phenomenal amount of money is wasted, how many years has it been since the EU accounts were signed off?

I am not advocating that the UK leaves the EU purely on the amount of money the EU wastes, to me it is the whole package. At the moment there is no apparent benefit from the UK being within the EU and even the trading issue is questionable.
There is much more “wrong” with the EU than simply its accounts, we need to have a situation whereby the UKs legal systems cannot be superseded by any legislation passed by the EU, an end to freedom of movement within the EU, no access to UK welfare benefits by any economic migrants from within the EU until they have been living and working here for a number of years, and much, much more.