dijous, 27 de febrer de 2014

BERGEN, Norway - NATO’s submarine warfare Exercise DYNAMIC MONGOOSE 2014 (DMON 14) concluded today off the coast of Norway, as the ships, submarines, aircraft, and personnel from eight participating Allied nations wrapped up the simulations and began to take stock of the lessons the exercise provided for future operations.

Rough weather provided a challenging environment for the participants, who were given the opportunity to train for a variety of high end maritime warfighting skills. During the exercise, the participating surface ships also had the opportunity to conduct the difficult manoeuvres involved in replenishment-at-sea (RAS) training.

Submarines from Portugal, Norway and France, under operational control of Commander Submarines NATO (COMSUBNATO), and surface ships from Norway, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Poland under the command of Standing NATO Maritime Group ONE (SNMG-1) Commodore Nils Andreas Stensønes simulated combat against one another in a stressful multi-threat environment.

The increasingly challenging exercise scenario incorporated several warfighting areas, including submarine detection, tracking and engagements of surface units and other submarines, aircraft detection, tracking and attacking of submarines, as well as naval task groups escorting high value units and protecting them from the submarine threat. The exercise challenged participants’ ability to seamlessly integrate multinational forces, including submarines, ships and aircraft into a coherent fighting force.

“During this exercise, SNMG-1 has grown from two to a task group of ten vessels. This demonstrates how the group can seamlessly integrate vessels from Allied nations and expand in accordance with the demands of the current situation,” said Commodore Stensønes. “The contributions from all the nations have been outstanding. I believe we have made a significant step forward in anti-submarine warfare capability, as single units, as an integrated task group with ships and aircraft and as a task force.”

Maritime Patrol Aircraft and helicopters operating from Sola Air Base under operational command of NATO Maritime Air Command (COMMARAIR) added to the complexity and realism of the training by incorporating the air element of anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare.

“We appreciate the excellent host nation support Norway provided for ships, submarines, and aircraft from Haakonsvern Navy Base in Bergen and Air Station Sola in Stavanger. This is an ideal venue for such exercises, and our Norwegian Allies are superb hosts,” said Rear Admiral Bob Kamensky, COMSUBNATO. “Moreover, the contribution of all participating units and personnel from Norway, Portugal, Poland, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States provided a great opportunity for all units to test and hone their skills, equipment and tactical procedures in such a complex war environment.”

MOSCOW, February 26 (RIA Novosti) – Russia is planning to expand its permanent military presence outside its borders by placing military bases in a number of foreign countries, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said Wednesday.
Shoigu said the list includes Vietnam, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, the Seychelles, Singapore and several other countries.
“The talks are under way, and we are close to signing the relevant documents,” Shoigu told reporters in Moscow.
The minister added that the negotiations cover not only military bases but also visits to ports in such countries on favorable conditions as well as the opening of refueling sites for Russian strategic bombers on patrol.
Moscow currently has only one naval base outside the former Soviet Union – in Tartus, Syria, but the fate of this naval facility is uncertain because of the ongoing civil war in that country.
Post-Soviet Russia closed a large naval base in Vietnam and a radar base in Cuba in 2002 due to financial constraints.
However, Russia has started reviving its navy and strategic aviation since mid-2000s, seeing them as a tool to project the Russian image abroad and to protect its national interests around the globe.
Now, Moscow needs to place such military assets in strategically important regions of the world to make them work effectively toward the goal of expanding Russia’s global influence.

dimarts, 25 de febrer de 2014

The Russian Navy will install advanced ultra-quiet propulsion system on the first Lada-class attack submarine within the next three years, the Russian naval commander Admiral Viktor Chirkov said.
RIA Novosti cited Chirkov as saying that the latest generation attack submarine will be integrated with the air-independent system by 2016 aimed to improve the submarine's range and stealth capabilities.
Being developed at the northern Sevmash shipyard, the new air-independent power plants enable submarines to stay submerged for weeks at a time, while providing significant advantages over diesel-electric submarines.
"The new air-independent power plants enable submarines to stay submerged for weeks at a time."
Following more than a decade of construction and sea trials, only operational Lada-class submarine, Sankt-Petersburg (B-585), entered into service with the Russian Navy four years ago.
Being built by Admiralty Shipyard, the Lada-class submarines are improved version of the Project 636 Kilo-class submarines, featuring much quieter, powerful propulsion and new combat systems.
The submarines can support missions such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (AsuW) operations, protection of naval bases, reconnaissance and patrol missions.
With submerged displacement capacity of 2,700t, the vessels have a maximum diving depth of 300m and can cruise at a surface speed of 10k and submerged speed of 21k.
The Russian Rubin Design Bureau-designed Lada-class boats are armed with club-S submarine launched cruise missiles, as well as six 533mm torpedo tubes to launch up to 18 torpedoes, tube-launched anti-submarine and anti-ship missiles.
Capable of defending naval bases, coastal waters and sea communication lines, the submarine features electronic support measures (ESM) system, radar warning receiver and direction finder.

FGS Bonn in Halifax harbour giving sailors, officers a look at the future of Canadian supply ships

Feb 21, 2014 4:17 PM AT

Rob Gordon, CBC News

The
German navy has pulled into Halifax with its latest warship to give
Canadian sailors a sneak peek at what they can expect within a few
years.

The Canadian government has bought the blueprints for the
Federal German Ship Bonn and the navy is hoping a promise to supply two
to three of the joint support ships (JSS) comes through by 2018.

Fregattenkapitan Bjorn Laue, is the commander of the 20,000-tonne supply ship FGS Bonn.(CBC)

The navy's quest for new supply ships has been a lengthy voyage, subject to dramatic course changes and even sudden reversals.
In the early summer of 2013, the federal government announced it was buying the blueprints of an existing supply ship from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems Canada.
Construction
on the new vessels, based on a German design, will begin in late 2016
with an in-service target of 2019 to 2020 — almost two years later than
the last estimate contained in the spring of 2012 federal budget.
That
delay could mean the navy's existing supply ships are removed from
service before the new ones arrive. That might force Canadian warships
to rely on other allies for fuel and ammunition when deployed overseas.
Canadian sailors are previewing the FGS Bonn, because they'll be working on vessels similar to it in the future.
"The
Canadian JSS team asked us to come here so they can show the sailors
and officers what they will get in a few years,'' the Bonn's commander,
Fregattenkapitan Bjorn Laue, told CBC News in an interview aboard the
20,000-tonne supply ship.

Ships to carry food and fuel

The
dark grey hull of FGS Bonn sticks out at the navy's dockyard on the
Halifax waterfront — not just because of its distinctly un-Canadian navy
colour, but also because of its huge size.
The Bonn looks like a
merchant ship, complete with large cranes that can easily lift any two
of the 73 sea containers the ship can carry. Large platforms, or
gantries, hold heavy lines that can pump fuel into warships sailing on
either side of the Bonn.
The ship can also carry two to four
helicopters and a mini-hospital, built into several sea containers, can
be lashed to the deck.
"It was a originally a kind of merchant design but changed for the military," said Laue.
Despite its merchant ship beginnings, the military ships are armed.
"Yes. We have some small guns," said Laue.
Unlike
a merchant ship, the Bonn has four 27-mm automatic cannons and Stinger
surface-to-air missiles to protect it from missile and aircraft attacks.
FGS
Bonn is only lightly armed because it’s not a fighting ship. Its main
mission is to supply destroyers and frigates at sea with fuel,
ammunition and food.

Aging vessels banned from some waters

Canada's navy is now supplied by two aging vessels that are approaching five decades of delivering food and fuel to the fleet.
HMCS
Protecteur and HMCS Preserver are banned from travelling into the home
waters of many countries because the ships have single hulls that could
allow fuel to spill into the sea if they were damaged.
The new
JSS ships, dubbed the Queenston class by the federal government, will
have double hulls that would better contain fuel if the ship runs
aground or is damaged in battle.
Despite a firm commitment and
projected funding from the federal government, the procurement of JSS
ships has been rough over the years.
The JSS project started in
2004 with a promise of supplying the navy with two or three all-Canadian
designed, state-of-the-art vessels. Those ships were to have the
capability of ferrying hundreds of soldiers and their equipment to a
potential hot spot and landing them ashore. The Queenston class doesn't
have that feature.
The 2004 JSS vessels should now be in the
Canadian fleet but the program was put on hold in 2008 because of rising
costs. There is a fear in the navy that any more delays might mean the
fleet would be without any supply ships while it waits for the
German-designed, Canadian built vessels.
But the German ambassador to Canada says not to worry.
"The
Canadian supply ships can be used until 2018 and that leaves plenty of
time to build the new ships,'' German Ambassador Werner Wnendt told CBC
News in an interview aboard the Bonn.
The Queenston-class ships
are part of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy and will be
built by the Vancouver Shipyards in British Columbia.

dijous, 20 de febrer de 2014

ASEAN countries are looking to bolster their submarine fleets, but this is not an arms race.

By Koh Swee Lean Collin

January 30, 2014

In early January this
year, Vietnam formally joined the Southeast Asian “submarine club” with
its first Russian-built Kilo-class submarine christened the Hanoi.
Not too long ago, Jakarta expressed interest in acquiring the same
model of submarines from Russia or more boats from South Korea,
ostensibly to augment the incoming new fleet of three SS-209 boats
purchased from South Korea back in August 2012. Just recently in
November 2013, Singapore contracted German shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp to develop the Type-218SG, the first of two boats slated to enter service in 2020.

Other Southeast Asian countries have evinced interest in acquiring an
undersea warfighting capability, but were prevented from doing so
largely because of budgetary constraints. In the case of Thailand, even
though no submarines were bought after the German offer of second-hand
Type-206A boats lapsed in March 2012, the Royal Thai Navy has reportedly
constructed submarine basing support and training facilities in
anticipation of future acquisitions. The Philippine Navy has been eyeing
submarines but for now, decided to prioritize the use of limited funds
to beef up surface and naval aviation forces, with anti-submarine
warfare capabilities tipped as the next major focus to substitute for a
submarine capability.

A “Submarine Race” in Southeast Asia?

This recent spate of submarine acquisitions being implemented or
planned has characterized Southeast Asian naval modernization efforts to
date, which could lead to observers highlighting the revival of a
“submarine race” in the region after the bout of submarine purchases
made in the 1990s to early-2000s. A superficial survey of open remarks
by the region’s defense and naval planners seemed to allude to this. For
example, Indonesian Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro reportedly
remarked that the submarine purchase, among other defense equipment, is
designed to signal Jakarta’s commitment towards Indonesian defense
modernization so that “we can keep up with ASEAN members.” Bangkok referred to the submarine programs of neighboring Southeast Asian navies when it emphasized the need for submarines as part of the country’s naval capabilities.

However, technical and geopolitical indications point to neither the
existence of a “submarine race” nor the prospective emergence of such a
phenomenon in the foreseeable future. Any negative effects of submarine
proliferation in Southeast Asia appear to be at least counterbalanced by
rising trends of regional cooperation in the submarine field.

Key Patterns in Submarine Capabilities

While there are evident efforts among regional submarine operators to
look beyond a mere “fleet-in-being” force to create a more effective
and sustainable force to guard their national waters, there are no
indications of a rapid expansion of submarine forces. The Vietnamese
submarine force will number six boats by 2016 while the Indonesians will
muster three new submarines around the same time, whereas the existing
pair of West German-built Type-209s will most likely be decommissioned.
With the progressive phasing out of the ageing Challenger-class boats by
then, Singapore will most likely have just two Archer-class submarines
in service before the first Type-218SG is inducted. In short, the number
of submarines in service throughout Southeast Asia will remain more or
less stable within the next decade, with new boats supplanting old ones
for existing submarine users while any expansion will take place over a
significant span of time, primarily dependent on the countries’ economic
health.

There is also no indication of a qualitative submarine race. When
Singapore became the first Southeast Asian navy to introduce submarines
with the air-independent propulsion (AIP), designed to prolong the
underwater endurance of conventional submarines with reduced need for
snorkeling, the consequent submarine buys of the other regional navies
did not include that capability in response. The only area where there
is some “catching up with the Joneses” has been submerged-launch
anti-ship missiles. The Royal Malaysian Navy’s Scorpene-class submarines
touted the region’s first such capability in the form of SM-39 Exocet,
followed by Vietnam with the Klub-S, while Indonesia’s intent to
purchase Kilo boats from Russia is intricately linked to a similar
capability. In fact, new conventional submarines on the global market
are typically offered with submerged-launch anti-ship missiles as an
optional part of the entire sales package. This is an international
trend in contemporary proliferation of submarine technologies, by no
means unique to Southeast Asia. Navies in the Northeast and South Asian
sub-regions have in fact long possessed such a capability.

Submarine-launched cruisemissiles (SLCM) for land attack purposes,
however, represent a wholly different ballgame. Such weapons are
potentially destabilizing, especially when launched from a platform as
stealthy as a submarine, since they can project offensive firepower at
standoff ranges deep into another country’s territory. It is noteworthy
that whereas other major navies in the region have either acquired or
explored the SLCM option, at present no Southeast Asian navy is
seriously considering this capability. Another point is that none of the
ASEAN member states is partner to the Missile Technology Control
Regime, which restricts proliferation of missiles (and associated
technologies) with a 500-kilogram payload out to a minimum range of 300
kilometers.

It is not yet ascertained whether the Kilo boats, which Indonesia is
reportedly keen to purchase, will be armed with SLCM, such as the Klub-S
land-attack variant. Scant information has emerged thus far regarding
the capabilities of the Type-218SG. Nevertheless, SLCM is unlikely to
appear on the future wish-lists of Southeast Asian navies unless serious
evolution of geopolitical circumstances compels the introduction of
such a weapon into the region. For now and the foreseeable future, AIP
and submerged-launch anti-ship missiles constitute key submarine
capability patterns in Southeast Asia.

The Geopolitical Underpinnings

Perhaps more crucial is that a “submarine race” – embodying the
classical, arms-tension spiral consequences – emerging within a
political void looks unlikely. The geopolitical environment in Southeast
Asia has never been as benign as it has over the past decade or so. The
region was once fraught with maritime territorial and sovereignty
disputes, but since the early 2000s, Southeast Asian countries have
amicably resolved most of the pressing maritime disputes through
international law proceedings. The Sipadan and Ligitan Islands and the
Pedra Branca islet disputes are examples. Maritime boundary issues are
also addressed bilaterally, for instance the agreement reached in 2011
between Indonesia and Vietnam to jointly determine common fishing corridors
in their overlapping exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Bilateral
technical working groups continue to discuss outstanding maritime
boundary issues, as seen in the case of Indonesia and Singapore in the
Singapore Strait, and between Malaysia and Singapore concerning the
post-2008 International Court of Justice verdict on the Pedra Branca.
The various General Border Committees established back in the early
years of ASEAN continue to be active in addressing common bilateral
border issues, including areas of territorial contention and EEZ
jurisdictional problems.

Since the last reported naval incident in the disputed Ambalat offshore oil block
in the Sulawesi Sea between the Indonesian and Malaysian naval patrols
in 2009, there had been no other reported instances of close encounters
among Southeast Asian navies in disputed maritime zones. This tranquil
situation looks set to persist, especially given that the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has reiterated in recent years its
commitment towards a community, a geopolitical construct that envisions
refrain from the threat or use of force against fellow ASEAN member
states. Moreover, in the context of regional uncertainties arising from
ongoing geopolitical problems, for instance disputes in the East and
South China Seas, ASEAN strives to retain its relevance as the driver of
the regional security architecture. The threat or use of force among
ASEAN member states would be regarded as antithetical to this objective.

Rising Trends of Concord Over Discord

While submarines feature prominently within the overall scheme of
Southeast Asian naval modernization efforts, often overlooked is the
recent intensification of cooperation among regional navies. Indonesia
and Singapore established a submarine rescue and cooperation agreement
back in 2012, followed by an equivalent pact between Singapore and
Vietnam in 2013. These bilateral efforts augment existing multilateral
arrangements in the region, such as Exercise Pacific Reach – a
multinational submarine rescue exercise since 2000 – and the
Asia-Pacific Submarine Conference (APSC) which first began in 2001 as a
platform designed to promote cooperation and mutual trust among
submarine operators and aspiring ones in the Pacific and Indian Ocean
regions. Considering the operationally sensitive nature of submarine
operations, these gradual, incremental steps are noteworthy. They can
facilitate the creation of wider multilateral participation and
institutionalized cooperative arrangements in the future, modelling on
foreign examples such as the NATO Submarine Escape and Rescue Working
Group (SMERWG).

With more submarine operators entering the scene, which means more
submarines roaming the waters of Southeast Asia, the risk of underwater
accidents is also multiplied. This calls for a further conceptualization
of regional submarine rescue cooperation.

Prospects for Further Submarine Cooperation

Because submarine operations are much more hazardous for naval
servicemen, a rescue capability is necessary. The recent mishap
revolving around the Indian Navy submarine INS Sindhurakshak
highlighted the necessity of a submarine rescue capability which is,
however, expensive to obtain, operate and maintain. Rudimentary
submarine rescue capabilities, such as a basic diving bell lowered by
the rescue vessel onto the submarine escape hatch, are limited by sea
conditions and depth. Modern submarine rescue techniques encompass the
use of more robust equipment such as a mobile diving bell, or more
commonly deep-submergence rescue vehicles (DSRVs) – essentially
mini-submarines designed to mate with the submarine in distress and
transport submariners to the rescue ship. DSRVs and their operations are
more complex to handle than diving bells. The entire package – the
“mother ship” and its DSRV payload, trained personnel and supporting
infrastructure altogether – may entail costs beyond the reach of many
regional navies’ budgets.

To date, in Southeast Asia only Singapore operates a DSRV-type
submarine rescue capability. Malaysia has in recent years expressed the
intent to acquire a similar capability but is apparently prevented from
proceeding with procurement due to a lack of funds. Nonetheless, the
bilateral agreements reached with Indonesia and Vietnam indicated
intra-regional attempts to share naval expertise and resources, at least
until more submarine-operating regional navies acquire their own
submarine rescue capabilities. The role of extra-regional navies cannot
be discounted, given that the Australian, Chinese, Japanese, South
Korean and U.S. naval forces all possess full-fledged submarine rescue
capabilities. An Asia-Pacific submarine rescue framework, perhaps
emulating NATO’s SMERWG,
can be established on the basis of existing arrangements such as
Pacific Reach and APSC. This is an interim arrangement after all, since
activating and deploying a submarine rescue capability from overseas
foreign bases requires time and colossal logistical efforts. The ideal
would be multiple submarine-operating navies in the region mustering
their own rescue capabilities and pooling them together under an
institutionalized framework. However, taking into account the budgetary
constraints faced by navies in Southeast Asia, sharing of submarine
rescue capacity will remain the way to go.

Final Thoughts

Because of the persistent interest in submarines, in no small part
influenced by the outstanding requirements to fill envisaged capacity
shortfalls, submarines look set to remain on the wish-lists of various
Southeast Asian navies. This proliferation pattern will continue in the
foreseeable future. But to label this as a “submarine race,” in view of
the technical and geopolitical trends observed so far in Southeast Asia
as well as evident growth in inter-navy submarine rescue cooperation,
may be a mischaracterization of what is more likely a concerted drive by
Southeast Asian navies to achieve balanced naval force capabilities.

Koh Swee Lean Collin is an associate research fellow at the
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological
University in Singapore. His primary research interests cover naval
modernization in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Southeast Asia.

dimarts, 18 de febrer de 2014

China plans to build four aircraft carriers in total to boost its naval power and exert its maritime claims, according to a Russian media report.

Official reports in January said that the PLA plans to have at least two aircraft carriers by 2015 or 2016 and said the country's second aircraft carrier is indeed under construction as previous unofficial reports had claimed. The country plans to build four aircraft carriers in total, the state newswire Xinhua citing a Russian weekly newspaper as reporting.

China commissioned the Liaoning, a refitted Soviet-era carrier purchased from Ukraine, in 2012. Future carriers are expected to be built domestically and take the Liaoning as their blueprint, at least initially.

The report further said construction appears to be behind schedule, but Beijing has mapped out a clear plan for its development. China's aircraft carrier program is set to be implemented in two phases, the report said, the aim being to build two carriers to establish carrier battle fleets to operate while two more advanced carriers are developed.

The report said the first two planned conventionally powered aircraft carriers may have a displacement of between 50,000 to 55,000 tonnes. The second phase may see the construction of two nuclear-powered carriers with an electromagnetic catapult system and displacement of 65,000 tonnes. These could possibly enter service by the late 2020s.

In order to carry out the second phase, the government approved a plan in February to build vessels that use nuclear power, the report said.

However, the Ministry of National Defense denied claims that it has plans to build more aircraft carriers at present.

The Communist Party secretary of Liaoning province, Wang Min, had said in January that an aircraft carrier was being built in Dalian, the port city where the Liaoning carrier was refitted. But reports related to Wang's remarks were promptly deleted from the internet for unknown reasons.

dimecres, 12 de febrer de 2014

DCNS has successfully launched a new shore-based integration facility for the Brazilian Navy's next-generation conventional-propulsion submarines combat system at the French defence procurement agency's Saint-Mandrier-sur-Mer centre near Toulon.
Developed in cooperation between DCNS and the Brazilian Navy under a technology transfer agreement spanning submarine design, development and construction, the new facility will be used to test the submarines' sophisticated data processing systems prior to installation while providing significant time savings.
The combat system of the first Scorpene submarine of the Brazilian Navy will be integrated and interfaced with the shore integration facility in a technical configuration.
DCNS/Brazilian Navy teams will test combat systems for Brazil's Scorpene submarines, as well as train Brazilian officers and crew in accordance with the technology transfer agreement over the next two years.
"The Scorpene submarines will protect and defend Brazil's 8,500km coastline."
Following completion of testing, the components will be transferred for integration onto the submarines at the Itaguaí shipyard near Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
Brazil placed an order in December 2008, for the construction of four diesel-electric-powered submarines based on the Scorpene to joint venture company set up by DCNS and Odebrecht of Brazil.
Scheduled to enter service in 2017, the Scorpene submarines will protect and defend Brazil's 8,500km coastline, while meeting the detailed specifications of the Brazilian Navy.
The versatile vessels can conduct a full range of missions including anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare, special operations and intelligence gathering.

The Italian Navy vessel Borsini is in Mozambican waters for the next two months as it trains the southern African nation's small navy, following the signature of a maritime collaboration agreement between the two countries.

The 30th Naval Group of the Italian Navy, comprising the aircraft carrier Cavour (CVH550), frigate Bergamini (F590), patrol ship Borsini (P491) and supply ship Etna (A5326), left Italy on 13 November on a circumnavigation of the African continent. Commanded by Rear Admiral Paolo Treu, the Naval Group arrived in Maputo, Mozambique, on 27 January.

Titled "A Country on the Move", the Naval Group is a joint Italian Navy and industry campaign involving multiple objectives, such as training, maritime security operations, confidence building, naval diplomacy, humanitarian assistance and the promotion of Italian industry.

The technical agreement for collaboration with the Mozambique Navy was signed by the Italian Chief of Navy during his visit to Maputo between 28 and 30 January.

In terms of the agreement, the Italian and the Mozambican navies will carry out naval cooperation activities in Mozambican waters for two months. In particular, training will be organized at sea and on land with specific emphasis placed on anti-piracy and patrolling in Mozambican territorial waters. Other areas of cooperative training include protection of commercial shipping, the fight against trafficking and rescue at sea.

The Italian Navy has experience with anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean, being a participant in Operation Atalanta, the European Union's counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia.

As a result of the cooperation agreement, the patrol ship Borsini detached from the Naval Group on 1 February and will remain in Mozambican waters for the next two months.

Speaking to defenceWeb, Treu said that the Borsini will be helping the Mozambican Navy to grow. "It's a small navy, so we are trying to provide them (with) our experience in maritime security operations, in particularly in anti-piracy activities and protecting the ships from terrorist attacks," he said.

In light of the recent natural gas deposits discovered in Mozambique, Treu noted that the country has to learn how to protect its resources.

"We are there just to help them grow as a navy, providing them with our experience," he explained. "We will show them how to perform operations (like anti-piracy patrols). If there is a real event going on, of course we could be tasked to do a real operation to fight piracy in case of need," he continued.

The South African Navy, supported by the South African Air Force, has maintained a permanent anti-piracy patrol in the Mozambique Channel since early 2011, under Operation Copper. The frigate SAS Spioenkop is currently on station.

Having departed Maputo on 31 January, the three remaining vessels of the Naval Group arrived in Cape Town on 5 February.

Following their departure from Cape Town on 11 February, the Naval Group will continue its circumnavigation of the African continent, visiting Luanda in Angola next.

Mozambique's small navy has only a few serviceable vessels, including two Namacurra boats (donated by South Africa), eight patrol vessels (including RHIBs) and a Conejera class patrol craft (Pebane - donated by Spain). However, last year French firm Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie (CMN) was given a $200 million contract to build three Ocean Eagle 43 patrol vessels, three HSI 32 interceptors and 24 CMN 23.5 trawlers for the Mozambican navy. Deliveries are scheduled to take place by 2016.

dimarts, 11 de febrer de 2014

Iran has ordered a number of its ships to approach US maritime borders in response to American vessels operating in the Persian Gulf, according to a naval official.

The Fars news agency reported overnight on Saturday that several ships are already in the Atlantic and are making their way to the edge of US territorial waters.

The agency said it was part of "Iran's response to Washington's beefed up naval presence in the Persian Gulf."

Admiral Afshin Rezayee Haddad is reported to have said: "Iran's military fleet is approaching the United States' maritime borders, and this move has a message."

Haddad, described as commander of the Iranian navy's northern fleet, said the vessels had started their voyage across the Atlantic Ocean via "waters near South Africa".

The report could not be confirmed independently.

In Washington, a US defence official, speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, cast doubt on the claims but added that "ships are free to operate in international waters."

Iran has a small navy, made up mostly of aging vessels at least 35 years old and a handful of home-built newer frigates. Some are fitted with Chinese ship-to-ship missiles.

It came as Iran agreed to start addressing UN nuclear agency suspicions that it may have worked on designing a nuclear weapon.
The International Atomic Energy Agency said Iran had agreed during talks in Tehran to take seven new practical measures within three months under a November transparency deal.

In a speech to mark the 35th anniversary of the 1979 revolution, he said American officials who claimed they did not want to see regime change in Iran were 'lying'.

He accused Washington of having a "controlling and meddlesome" attitude towards Iran.

America and Iran have had no official ties since 1980 when Iranian students occupied the US embassy in Tehran, taking 52 diplomats hostage.

Despite his apparent hostility, Mr Khamenei has given his guarded support to talks on Iran's nuclear programme being led by the new reformist government of President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.

The moves are seen as further signs that Iran is determined to exert its influence as an emerging regional economic and strategic power in the Middle East.

With its underwater arm severely depleted, India is preparing the ground to launch an indigenous submarine design and development plan.

In the first step, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) will set up an agency in Hyderabad to test and certify the steel that will be used in making the indigenous submarine.

The underwater vessel will be made using the same DMR-249A and 249B steel - manufactured by the Steel Authority of India Ltd - that was used to make aircraft carrier Vikrant and P-28 missile corvettes.

"For underwater applications, we need extensive certification while for surface ships, if the material’s property matches with the benchmark, it could be used. The new agency will have best equipment to test the properties of naval steel,” G Malakondiah, one of the chief controllers at DRDO, told Deccan Herald.

The first industrial scale trial of submarine steel was accomplished successfully. Now, the material needs intensive testing for which the agency would be set up in two years. "The unit would be located close to Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory, he said.

A parallel effort is on to develop suitable welding technologies and consumables for submarines at Naval Material Research Laboratory, Ambernath.

After the massive accident of INS Sindhurakshak last year, Navy currently has just about 10 functional submarines, most of which are pretty old. Realising the consequences, the government has decided to upgrade four Kilo-class and two HDW-class submarines.

India has purchased six French Scorpene submarines, which are under construction at Mazgaon Dock Limited. The first one is expected in 2016, to be followed by a new submarine in every nine months.

The defence acquisition council approved a second submarine assembly line (P-75I) under which four submarines (out of six) will be built within the country (three at Mazgaon Dock and one at Hindustan Shipyard, Visakhapatnam on transfer of technology) while the remaining two will be made at the collaborator’s yard abroad.

"Tender requirements for P-75I (request for proposal) have been firmed up. It took some time as we wanted to involve four-five major shipyards and had detailed discussions with them,” said Rear Admiral LVS Babu, assistant chief of naval staff (submarine).

The two assembly lines would be the stepping stone for indigenous submarine production as engineers and technicians at the dockyards would receive training and gather experience to take up the challenge.

dilluns, 10 de febrer de 2014

Earlier this week, China held a three-ship naval exercise in the Indian Ocean, conducting a series of exercises including combat simulations. According to the Associated Press, the task force then sailed through to the western Pacific by way of the Lombok Strait near Indonesia’s Bali island, approaching the Philippines. Before conducting a five-day exercise in the Indian Ocean, the ships had additionally patrolled the James Shoal, which is currently disputed between China and Malaysia (although Malaysia military officials are reportedly disputing the idea that China patrolled the area in late January).

The task force consisted of the Changbaishan–China’s largest amphibious landing ship–and two destroyers–the Wuhan and Haikou. According to Chinese state broadcaster CCTV, the ships carried out counter-piracy, search and rescue, and damage control drills. The ships eventually left the Indian Ocean to continue their drills in the Western Pacific Ocean. The Changbaishan is one of the more advanced ships in the PLAN’s fleet and is capable of launching helicopters and amphibious landing craft.

China has conducted naval drills in the Indian Ocean in the past but has generally focused on restricting these to its western waters, by the Gulf of Aden. For example, an exercise in August 2013 saw the U.S. and Chinese navies jointly practice counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden which is generally a hot region for pirates based off the Horn of Africa.

These exercises by contrast are potentially far more provocative for India, Australia, and ASEAN states (even though Southeast Asia isn’t bereft of pirates by any means). For India, a Chinese approach in the eastern Indian Ocean raises anxieties about the reach of China’s navy. India regards the eastern Indian Ocean–the space between the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Sumatra–as its domain. Any Chinese exercises in this area, particularly combat simulations, will not be taken lightly by New Delhi.

Australia is generally content to accept the Indonesian archipelago as a comfortable buffer zone from the busy sea lanes of the South China Sea. By way of this exercise, China demonstrates an operational ability in Australia’s northern waters which could have implications for Australia in the future. Rory Medcalf of the Lowy Institute, an Australian think-tank, notes that “the precise strategic implications of the Chinese navy’s newly-demonstrated ability to operate in Australia’s northern approaches are open to debate.”

For China, the exercises make perfect sense in its bid to field a blue-water navy capable of operating outside China’s proximate waters. Medcalf notes that while these exercises will surely spook some observers in the region, there is “nothing illegal or fundamentally hostile about what the Chinese navy has just demonstrated.”

Indian observers appear to be more concerned by the exercise. One Indian commentator, Srikanth Kondapalli, notes that the exercise sends a signal to India that China “can come closer to the Andaman & Nicobar joint command through Lombok, and not just through Malacca.” He additionally notes that China could be testing the waters in the eastern Indian Ocean, including its ability to operate some distance away from its bases in the region.

The Hindu’s Ananth Krishnan notes that the exercises could also reflect China’s desire to hedge its reliance on the Strait of Malacca–a major waterway for Middle Eastern oil and other imports. 80 percent of China’s fossil fuel imports travel via the strait. Beijing has already invested heavily in Pakistan, Myanmar, and Bangladesh to better connect itself with the Indian Ocean. Generally speaking, China hasn’t seen the less-trafficked straits of Lombok, Sunda, and Makassar to the south as vital to its so-called “Malacca dilemma,” but this could be changing.