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Sunday, 24 May 2015

Sectarian Conflict Among the Muslims - Sunni & Shia

An ancient religious divide is helping fuel a resurgence of
conflicts in the Middle East and Muslim countries. Struggles between Sunni and
Shia forces have fed a Syrian civil war that threatens to transform the map of
the Middle East, spurred violence that is fracturing Iraq, and widened fissures
in a number of tense Gulf countries. Growing sectarian clashes have also
sparked a revival of transnational jihadi networks that poses a threat beyond
the region.

Islam’s schism, simmering for fourteen centuries, doesn’t explain
all the political, economic, and geostrategic factors involved in these
conflicts, but it has become one prism through which to understand the
underlying tensions. Two countries that compete for the leadership of Islam,
Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran, have used the sectarian divide to further
their ambitions. How their rivalry is settled will likely shape the political
balance between Sunnis and Shias and the future of the region, especially in
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen.

Alongside the proxy battle is the renewed fervor of armed
militants, motivated by the goals of cleansing the faith or preparing the way
for the return of the messiah. Today there are tens of thousands of organized
sectarian militants throughout the region capable of triggering a broader
conflict. And despite the efforts of many Sunni and Shia clerics to reduce
tensions through dialogue and counterviolence measures, many experts express
concern that Islam’s divide will lead to escalating violence and a growing
threat to international peace and security.

Sunni and Shia Muslims have lived peacefully together for
centuries. In many countries it has become common for members of the two sects
to intermarry and pray at the same mosques. They share faith in the Quran and
the Prophet Mohammed’s sayings and perform similar prayers, although they
differ in rituals and interpretation of Islamic law.

Shia identity is rooted in victimhood over the killing of Husayn,
the Prophet Mohammed’s grandson, in the seventh century, and a long history of
marginalization by the Sunni majority. Islam’s dominant sect, which roughly 85
percent of the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims follow, viewed Shia Islam with suspicion,
and extremist Sunnis have portrayed Shias as heretics and apostates.

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Origins of the Schism

Mohammed unveiled a new faith to the people of Mecca in 610. Known
as Islam, or submission to God, the monotheistic religion incorporated some
Jewish and Christian traditions and expanded with a set of laws that governed
most aspects of life, including political authority. By the time of his death
in 632, Mohammed had consolidated power in Arabia. His followers subsequently
built an empire that would stretch from Central Asia to Spain less than a
century after his death. But a debate over succession split the community, with
some arguing that leadership should be awarded to qualified individuals and
others insisting that the only legitimate ruler must come through Mohammed’s
bloodline.

A group of prominent early followers of Islam elected Abu Bakr, a
companion of Mohammed, to be the first caliph, or leader of the Islamic
community, over the objections of those who favored Ali ibn Abi Talib,
Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law. The opposing camps in the succession debate
eventually evolved into Islam’s two main sects. Shias, a term that stems
from shi’atuAli, Arabic for “partisans of Ali,”
believe that Ali and his descendants are part of a divine order. Sunnis,
meaning followers of the sunna, or “way” in Arabic, of Mohammed,
are opposed to political succession based on Mohammed’s bloodline.

Ali became caliph in 656 and ruled only five years before he was
assassinated. The caliphate, which was based in the Arabian Peninsula, passed
to the Umayyad dynasty in Damascus and later the Abbasids in Baghdad. Shias
rejected the authority of these rulers. In 680, soldiers of the second Umayyad
caliph killed Ali’s son, Husayn, and many of his companions in Karbala, located
in modern-day Iraq. Karbala became a defining moral story for Shias, and Sunni
caliphs worried that the Shia Imams—the descendants of Husayn who were seen as
the legitimate leaders of Muslims (Sunnis use the term “imam” for the men who
lead prayers in mosques)—would use this massacre to capture public imagination
and topple monarchs. This fear resulted in the further persecution and
marginalization of Shias.

Even as Sunnis triumphed politically in the Muslim world, Shias
continued to look to the Imams—the blood descendants of Ali and Husayn—as their
legitimate political and religious leaders. Even within the Shia community,
however, there arose differences over the proper line of succession. Mainstream
Shias believe there were twelve Imams. Zaydi Shias, found mostly in Yemen,
broke off from the majority Shia community at the fifth Imam, and sustained
imamate rule in parts of Yemen up to the 1960s. Ismaili Shias, centered in
South Asia but with important diaspora communities throughout the world, broke
off at the seventh Imam. Most Ismailis revere the Aga Khan as the living
representative of their Imam. The majority of Shias, particularly those in Iran
and the eastern Arab world, believe that the twelfth Imam entered a state of
occultation, or hiddenness, in 939 and that he will return at the end of time.
Since then, “Twelvers,” or Ithna Ashari Shias, have
vested religious authority in their senior clerical leaders, called ayatollahs
(Arabic for “sign of God”).

Many Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian converts to Islam chose to
become Shia rather than Sunni in the early centuries of the religion as a
protest against the ethnic Arab empires that treated non-Arabs as second-class
citizens. Their religions influenced the evolution of Shia Islam as
distinct from Sunni Islam in rituals and beliefs.

Sunnis dominated the first nine centuries of Islamic rule
(excluding the Shia Fatimid dynasty) until the Safavid dynasty was established
in Persia in 1501. The Safavids made Shia Islam the state religion, and over
the following two centuries they fought with the Ottomans, the seat of the
Sunni caliphate. As these empires faded, their battles roughly settled the
political borders of modern Iran and Turkey by the seventeenth century, and
their legacies resulted in the current demographic distribution of Islam’s
sects. Shias comprise a majority in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain,
and a plurality in Lebanon, while Sunnis make up the majority of more than
forty countries from Morocco to Indonesia.

1 / 17 Timeline: Origins of the
Sunni-Shia Schism

Early Muslims split into two camps following the
death of the Prophet Mohammed. This chronology explains how the sects evolved
from 632 until the late twentieth century. (Photo: Abbas Al-Musavi/Brooklyn
Museum

632 - The
Death of Mohammed

Early
followers of Islam are divided over the succession of the Prophet Mohammed, who
founded the religion in Arabia. Prominent members of the community in Mecca
elect Abu Bakr, a companion of Mohammed, with objections from those who favor
Ali ibn Abi Talib, Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law. Ali eventually becomes
caliph, or ruler of the Islamic community, in 656, and is assassinated in 661
after a power struggle with the governor of Damascus, Mu’awiya. Mu’awiya claims
the caliphate and founds the Umayyad dynasty, which rules the Muslim empire
from Damascus until 750.

661-1258 - Umayyad and Abbasid
Dynasties Target Shias

Umayyads,
and later Abbasids, who replace the Umayyads and rule from Baghdad after 750,
oppress and kill the successors of Husayn, known as Imams, who pose a political
threat to Sunni caliphs. The sixth Shia Imam, Ja'far al-Sadiq, orders his
followers to hide their true beliefs for the survival of the faith. Shia
branches such as Ismaili and Zaydi emerge from different interpretations of
succession for Imams. The Sunni caliphate becomes hereditary.

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661 - The Early Shias

The
partisans of Ali, or shi’atu Ali, grow discontented after the
murder of their leader in 661. They reject the authority of the caliphs during
the Umayyad dynasty, which rules over an expanding empire stretching from
Pakistan through northern Africa to Spain. Shias argue that the legitimate
leaders of Islam must be the sons of Ali and Fatima, Mohammed’s daughter. Husayn,
one of Ali’s sons, eventually leads a revolt from Kufa, in modern-day Iraq.

680 - The
Battle of Karbala

Yazid,
the Umayyad ruler, dispatches an army to crush the Kufa revolt. A battle in
Karbala, north of Kufa, ends with the massacre of Husayn and many of his
companions. Husayn's martyrdom and its moral lessons help shape Shia
identity, and the sect grows despite the murder of its leaders. Husayn’s death
is commemorated by Shias during the annual ritual of Ashura, which includes
practices, such as self-flagellation, that are distinct from Sunni Islam.

939 -) Occultation of the Mahdi

Most
Shias today are Twelvers. They believe that the line of Imams continued to the
twelfth Imam, Mohammed al-Mahdi, or the guided one, who entered a state of
occultation, or hiddenness, in 939. Shias expect the Mahdi to return at the end
of time. Sunni Islam becomes a broad umbrella term for non-Shia Muslims who are
united on the importance of the Quran and practices of Mohammed, though they
may differ in legal opinion.

969 -
Fatimids: The First Shia Dynasty

Ismailis,
who break off from the Twelver line after the sixth Imam, take control of Egypt
and large parts of North Africa and expand to western Arabia and Syria,
creating the Fatimid dynasty. The Fatimids, who assume the titles of both imam
and caliph, establish al-Azhar Mosque, which centuries later becomes the
intellectual center of Sunni Islam. The Shia Fatimid caliphate fades in the
twelfth century, and the Ismaili community spreads to Yemen, Syria, Iran, and
western India.

1268 - Ibn Taymiyya in
Damascus

By the ninth century,
Sunnis adhere to four schools of Islamic jurisprudence: Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki,
and Hanbali. Ibn Taymiyya, a religious scholar, moves to Damascus in 1268 and
studies the Hanbali school, which condemns Shias as rafidha, or
rejecters of the faith. He preaches a return to the purity of Islam in its
early days. Ibn Taymiyya opposes celebrating Mohammed’s birthday and other
practices that resemble Christian and pagan rituals. His ideas help shape Wahhabi
and Salafi thought centuries later. (Photo: Bernard Gagnon)

1501 -
Wahhabi Islam Emerges in Arabia

Mohammed
ibn Abd al-Wahhab establishes a religious movement on the Arabian peninsula in
the eighteenth century steeped in the Hanbali school of Sunni Islam. Wahhabis,
as his followers are known, preach a puritanical faith that puts them in
conflict with other Sunnis as well as Shias. Wahhabi fighters desecrate the
shrine of Husayn in Karbala and destroy Mohammed’s tombstone in Medina. They
join Mohammed bin Saud to found the first Saudi kingdom, which is defeated by
Ottoman forces in the early nineteenth century.

1703 -
Sykes–Picot and the End of the Caliphate

The
secret Sykes-Picot agreement is reached between France and the United Kingdom
to divide the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which has been in decline
and weakens further during World War I. Colonial rulers elevate minorities to
powerful positions in Iraq and Syria, a policy which later contributes to
sectarian tensions in these countries. Tempering these tensions are new ideas
of secularism and nationalism that sweep through the Turkish and Arab province
of the former Ottoman Empire. The newly founded secular Republic of Turkey
abolishes the caliphate in 1924. In the Arab world, identity politics stressing
pan-Arabism and a unity among Muslims helps mute sectarianism, especially
during the fight for independence against the European

1916 -
Saud Dynasty Establishes a Kingdom

Abdul
Aziz Ibn Saud and his army of Wahhabi warriors consolidate control of the
Arabian peninsula and form the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. During the
founding battles, fighters attack fellow Sunnis in western Arabia and Shias in
eastern Arabia and southern Iraq. Wahhabi preachers go on to dominate the
kingdom’s judiciary and education system, and their teachings are spread first
in Saudi Arabia and then internationally as the country grows wealthy from its
large oil resources. The rise of Wahhabi and the related Salafi branches of
Islam fuels Sunni-Shia tensions today.

1932 -
Ottomans Conquer Iraq

Safavids
briefly gain control of Iraq, an Arab territory, but lose it in 1639 to the
Ottomans, who claim the title of the Sunni caliphate in Turkey. The
Ottoman–Safavid wars eventually establish the modern contours of Turkey, Iraq,
and Iran. Shia Islam dominates Iran, and Shia Muslims in Turkey are killed or
displaced, shifting the demography in favor of Sunnis, a development that makes
both these countries far more homogenous than their neighbors.

1501 -
Safavid Dynasty and the Rise of Shias in Persia

Ismail,
leader of the Safavid dynasty, defeats the Mongols and brings the territories
of former Persian empires under central authority, including modern-day Iran,
Iraq, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Turkey. Shi’ism becomes the official religion of the Safavids and is often
spread through force. As the Safavid dynasty declines in the eighteenth
century, the power of Shia clergy in civil affairs grows in Iran.

1947 -
Ba’ath Rule Begins in Syria

Syria’s
first years of independence are riddled with coups until Ba’athists in the
military seize power in 1963. The Ba’ath Party, popular in Iraq and Syria,
promotes a secular, pan-Arab, socialist ideology and is hostile to Islamists.
Hafez al-Assad, a Ba’ath leader and member of the heterodox Shia sect known as
Alawis, takes power in 1970 and rules until his death in 2000, after more than
a thousand years of Sunni dominance in Syria. His son Bashar continues to rule
the country amid civil war in 2014.

1963
- Lebanese Civil War

Lebanon experiences a sectarian civil war that (with important
exceptions at various times) pits the Christian minority that has held
political power since independence in 1943 against the Muslim majority. Syria
intervenes in the fighting in 1976 and Israel intervenes in 1982. After the
Israeli intervention, Iran sponsors the establishment of a Shia Lebanese
militia, Hezbollah, which over time becomes the most powerful force in Lebanese
politics. Under pressure from Hezbollah, Israel withdraws its last forces from
Lebanon in 2000. (Photo: AP)

1976-1989 Sectarian
Harmony: The Azhar Fatwa

Sheikh Mahmoud Shaltut, the rector of Cairo's al-Azhar Mosque,
which Sunnis view as the preeminent religious institution, issues a
religious ruling, or fatwa, that recognizes Shia law as the fifth school of
Islamic jurisprudence. After decades of colonialism and then secular
nationalism, many Sunni and Shia religious authorities throughout the Muslim
world unite to confront these common threats. This harmony is tarnished as
secular states weaken.

1947 -
The Birth of Pakistan

India’s
struggle for independence includes an Islamic awakening, resulting in the
creation of Pakistan in the partition of India at the end of British rule. The
Sunni-majority country is founded by a Shia, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who
emphasizes the need for a secular Pakistan where all citizens are equal
irrespective of "religion or caste or creed." Pakistanis elect prime
ministers from both sects. But the Islamization of the state, promoted by Saudi
Wahhabi clerics, accelerates after army chief General Zia ul-Haq, a Sunni,
seizes power in 1978. Sectarian violence escalates after the 1980s.

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Modern Tensions

Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 gave Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini the opportunity to implement his vision for an Islamic government
ruled by the “guardianship of the jurist” (velayat-e faqih), a
controversial concept among Shia scholars that is opposed by Sunnis, who
have historically differentiated between political leadership and religious
scholarship. Shia ayatollahs have always been the guardians of the faith.
Khomeini argued that clerics had to rule to properly perform their function:
implementing Islam as God intended, through the mandate of the Shia Imams.

Under Khomeini, Iran began an experiment in Islamic rule. Khomeini
tried to inspire further Islamic revival, preaching Muslim unity, but supported
groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Pakistan that had specific
Shia agendas. Sunni Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas,
admired Khomeini’s success, but did not accept his leadership, underscoring the
depth of sectarian suspicions.

Saudi Arabia has a sizable Shia minority of roughly 10 percent,
and millions of adherents of a puritanical brand of Sunni Islam known as
Wahhabism (an offshoot of the Sunni Hanbali school) that is antagonistic to
Shia Islam. The transformation of Iran into an overtly Shia power after the
Islamic revolution induced Saudi Arabia to accelerate the propagation of
Wahhabism, as both countries revived a centuries-old sectarian rivalry over the
true interpretation of Islam. Many of the groups responsible for sectarian
violence that has occurred in the region and across the Muslim world since 1979
can be traced to Saudi and Iranian sources.

Saudi Arabia backed Iraq in the 1980–1988 war with Iran and
sponsored militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan who were primarily fighting
against the Soviet Union, which had invaded Afghanistan in 1979, but were also
suppressing Shia movements inspired or backed by Iran.

The transformation of Iran into an agitator for Shia movements in
Muslim countries seemed to confirm centuries of Sunni suspicions that Shia
Arabs answer to Persia. Many experts, however, point out that Shias aren’t
monolithic—for many of them, identities and interests are based on more than
their confession. Iraqi Shias, for example, made up the bulk of the Iraqi army
that fought Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, and Shia militant groups Amal and
Hezbollah clashed at times during the Lebanese civil war. The Houthis, a Zaydi
Shia militant group in Yemen, battled the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh, a
Zaydi, several times between 2004 and 2010. Then, in 2014, the Houthis captured
the capital Sana'a with ousted president Saleh's support.

For their part, both mainstream and hard-line Sunnis aren’t
singularly focused on oppressing Shias. They have fought against coreligionists
throughout history, most recently in the successive crackdowns on the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia’s
battles against al-Qaeda and related Sunni
militant groups. Sharing a common Sunni identity didn’t eliminate power
struggles among Sunni Muslims under secular or religious governments.

But confessional identity has resurfaced wherever sectarian
violence has taken root, as in Iraq after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion removed
Saddam Hussein, a dictator from the Sunni minority who ruled over a
Shia-majority country. The bombing of a Shia shrine in Samara in 2006 kicked
off a cycle of sectarian violence that forced Iraqis to pick sides, stirring
tensions that continue today.

In the Arab world, Shia groups supported by Iran have recently won
important political victories. The regime of Bashar al-Assad, which has ruled
since 1970, relies on Alawis, a heterodox Shia sect that makes up about 13
percent of Syria’s population, as a pillar of its
power. Alawis dominate the upper reaches of the military and security
services in Syria and are the backbone of the forces fighting to support the
Assad regime in Syria’s civil war. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq
unseated Saddam Hussein and instituted competitive elections, the Shia majority
has dominated the parliament and produced its prime ministers. Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia militia
and political movement, is the strongest political actor in Lebanon. Shia
militants in Yemen, tenuously linked to Iran, have become the country's
dominant power. Iran’s regional influence has swelled as its allies in these
countries have accumulated power.

Sunni governments, especially Saudi Arabia, have increasingly
worried about their own grips on power, a concern that was exacerbated with the
protest movement that began in Tunisia in late 2010. The Arab
Awakening, as the uprisings are known, spread to Bahrain and Syria,
countries at the fault lines of Islam’s sectarian divide. In each, political
power is held by a sectarian minority—Alawis in Syria, where Sunnis are the
majority, and a Sunni ruling family in Bahrain, where Shias are the majority.
The civil war in Syria, which is a political conflict at its core, has exposed
sectarian tensions and become the staging ground for a vicious proxy war
between the region’s major Sunni and Shia powers. In Yemen, Houthi rebels have
expanded their territory south of Saudi Arabia, providing Iran a potential
beachhead along the strategic shipping routes in the Red Sea. Some analysts
view the Syrian conflict as the last chance for Sunnis to limit and reverse the
spread of Iranian power and Shia influence in the Arab world.

1 / 18

Timeline: Modern
Sunni-Shia Tensions

Iran’s
Islamic revolution, which brought Shias to power in 1979, and the Sunni
backlash have fueled a competition for regional dominance. This timeline
highlights Sunni-Shia tensions in recent decades. (Photo: Henri
Bureau/Corbis)

Iran’s Islamic
revolution, which brought Shias to power in 1979, and the Sunni backlash have
fueled a competition for regional dominance. This timeline highlights
Sunni-Shia tensions in recent decades. (Photo: Henri Bureau/Corbis)

JANUARY
16,1979

Ayatollah Khomeini
returns to Tehran in 1979 after fourteen years of exile. AP Photo

Iran’s
Islamic Revolution

Iran’s
ruler, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, flees the country after months of
increasingly massive protests. Exiled Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
returns and leads an Islamic republic based on a constitution that grants him
religious and political authority under the concept of velayat-e faqih (“guardianship
of the jurist”). Khomeini is named supreme leader and starts to export the
Islamic revolution, which is viewed with suspicion by Sunni rulers in countries
with significant Shia populations, such as Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United
Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon.

DECEMBER
24, 1979 Soviet Army Invades Afghanistan

Soviet
forces invade Afghanistan after the communist government in Kabul requests
military aid to fight Islamist rebels. The insurgents, known as mujahadeen
(“those who fight jihad”), attract mainly Afghan fighters and are augmented by
thousands of foreign Sunni fighters, including a young Saudi named Osama bin
Laden. Weapons and cash for the mujahadeen are supplied through Pakistan by
Saudi Arabia and the United States. The war, which is framed as a resistance to
Soviet occupation, raises the profile of fundamentalist Sunni movements.

JULY
5, 1980 Shia Protests in Pakistan Exposes Sectarian Tensions

Tens of
thousands of Shias protest in Islamabad against the imposition of some Sunni
laws on all Muslims. Pakistan’s president gives Shias an exemption, but the
sectarian confrontation becomes an important political issue in the country.
Sunni groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba, funded by Wahhabi
clerics in Saudi Arabia, kill thousands of Shias over the next three decades.
Smaller Shia sectarian militant groups such as Tehrik-e-Jafria also emerge but
are responsible for fewer attacks.

SEPTEMBER
22, 1980 Iraq Sparks a War with Iran

Iraqi
president Saddam Hussein, a Sunni ruling over a majority-Shia country who fears
the spillover effects of the Iranian Revolution, sends his troops to occupy
part of an oil-rich province in Iran. The move sparks an eight-year war,
resulting in roughly one million deaths. Iraq is backed by Saudi Arabia and the
United States, the latter responding to hostility from Tehran’s new government
following the Islamic revolution and taking hostage of U.S. diplomats.

FEBRUARY
28, 1991 Saddam Crushes Shia Insurgency After Gulf War

Riots
erupt in the Shia cities of Basra and Najaf after U.S.-led allies drive Iraqi
troops from Kuwait and rout them on the battlefield in the first Gulf War. The
Shia protestors are in part motivated by a perception that they will receive
U.S. backing if they turn against Saddam. U.S. officials say this was never
promised. Saddam’s forces mount a brutal crackdown, killing
tens of thousands of Shias, shelling the shrines of Najaf and Karbala, and
razing parts of Shia towns.

AUGUST
8, 1998 Taliban Massacres Shia in Mazar-e-Sharif

Taliban
militants, Sunni fundamentalists who seized power after the defeat of Soviet
forces, capture the city of Mazar-e-Sharif in northwest Afghanistan. TheTaliban kills at least two thousand Shias in Mazar-e-Sharif and
Bamiyan in 1997 and 1998. The offensive in northwest Afghanistan, backed by Pakistan,
helps the Taliban consolidate power in the country. Militants kill eight
Iranian diplomats based in Mazar-e-Sharif, prompting Tehran to deploy its
troops to the border, but United Nations mediation averts a confrontation.

SEPTEMBER
11, 2001 Al-Qaeda Strikes the U.S., Killing Thousands

In
response to the attacks on New York and Washington, U.S. forces pursue al-Qaeda
leaders and militants to their bases in Afghanistan and overthrow the Taliban
government. U.S.-led international troops help set up a new order in the
country. The toppling of the anti-Iranian Taliban government in Afghanistan,
followed shortly thereafter by the U.S. invasion of Iraq that brings down
another Iranian foe, Saddam Hussein, fans Sunni fears in Jordan and Gulf states
of a Shia revival.

MARCH
19, 2003 U.S. Forces Topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq

A
coalition led by the United States invades Iraq and ends Saddam’s regime and
centuries of Sunni dominance in Iraq. Sectarian violence erupts as remnants of
the deposed Ba’ath party and other Sunnis, both secular and Islamist, mount a
resistance against coalition forces and their local allies, the ascendant Shia
community. Shia militias also emerge, some of which also oppose the U.S.
military presence. Foreign Sunni militants, many affiliated with al-Qaeda,
flock to Iraq to participate in what evolves into a sectarian war. Iranian
influence in Iraq grows dramatically as Tehran backs Shia militants, as well as
the Shia political parties that come to dominate the electoral process.

Former
Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri is killed in a car bomb after spearheading
an effort to raise international pressure on Syria to withdraw its forces,
which have been in Lebanon since 1976. His assassination is seen as a Syrian
plot supported by Syria’s Lebanese allies, including Hezbollah, and leads to
massive demonstrations that convince Syria to withdraw. The assassination and
subsequent mobilization pit the Lebanese Sunni community, whom Hariri had come
to represent, against Hezbollah and Lebanese Shias, who remain allied with
Syria. Lebanese Christians split, with some supporting the Hariri camp and
others supporting Hezbollah.

FEBRUARY
22, 2006 Bombing of Shia Shrine Escalates Iraq Violence

Sectarian
killings become normal in Iraq, with both Sunni and Shia militias targeting
civilians across the country. The bombing that destroys the golden dome of
al-Askari mosque in Samarra, home to the tombs of the tenth and eleventh Shia
Imams, triggers a more intense wave of violence that almost doubles the monthly
civilian death toll in Iraq to nine hundred.

DECEMBER
30, 2006 Saddam’s Execution Inflames Sunnis

Saddam
Hussein, responsible for the deaths of thousands of Shias and Sunnis in Iraq,
is executed amid taunts by witnesses who chant the name of Shia cleric and
Mahdi army militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr. The unruly scene, captured on video,
elevates Saddam’s status as a martyr among many Sunnis in the region and
underscores the new reality of rising Shia power in Iraq.

FEBRUARY 11, 2011

Protests Erupt in the
Middle East, Exposing Sectarian Fault Lines

A wave of pro-democracy protests sweeps across
the region, starting with the overthrow of Tunisia’s president, and then Egypt’s
on February 11, eventually spreading to other Arab states in what is known as
the “Arab Spring” or the “Arab Awakening.” Iranian officials welcome the fall
of long-term U.S. allies like Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak, and unrest in
Bahrain, home to an oppressed Shia majority. As protests reach Syria in March,
Tehran backs the government, which is dominated by Alawis, a heterodox Shia
sect, while the opposition is dominated by members of the majority Sunni
community. Dormant sectarian tensions in Syria are revived and a regional
sectarian showdown begins. (Courtesy Reuters)

AUGUST
30, 2012 Egypt’s Morsi Visits Iran

President
Mohamed Morsi’s trip to Tehran, the first visit by an Egyptian leader since
Cairo’s recognition of Israel in the 1980s, signals the potential for a new
relationship between Iran and Sunni Islamists. Iran tries to rebrand the Arab uprisings as an “Islamic Awakening” and
an extension of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. But the visit by Morsi, of the
Muslim Brotherhood, exposes Islam’s deep cleavage. He praises Islam’s first
three caliphs, whom Shias reject, and says opposing the Assad regime is a
“moral obligation,”remarks that Iranian officials criticize.

OCTOBER
1, 2012 Hezbollah Commander Killed in Syria

Civil war
divides Syrians largely along sectarian lines, with Sunnis supporting rebels,
and Alawis, Shias, and other minorities backing the Assad regime. Foreign Sunni
fighters trickle and then flood into the country, and signs of increased
involvement from Iran and its Lebanese proxy militia, Hezbollah, emerge. The
death of Hezbollah founding member Ali Hussein Nassif comes months before the
group publicly acknowledges its role in the war. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
countries fund rebels, turning the fighting in Syria into a regional proxy war.

APRIL
8, 2013

8 April 2013 -
Al-Qaeda’s Iraq Affiliate Expands in Syria

The Islamic State of
Iraq, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in the country, extends its activities into Syria,
creating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Known for its brutality
against Shias and most Sunnis who oppose it, the group proves to be too extreme
for al-Qaeda and is eventually expelled from the network. ISIS attacks in Iraq
and Syria add an additional layer of sectarian violence to the region, and its
control of territory in both states threatens to dissolve borders and fracture
countries in the Middle East. (Yaser Al-Khodor/Courtesy Reuters)

20 April
2014 - Anti-Shia Sentiments Spread to Indonesia

Asian
Muslims, influenced by the sectarian violence in the Middle East and Pakistan,
aim to avoid potential tensions by suppressing the growth of their tiny Shia
communities. Indonesian clerics and radical Islamists hold an “Anti-Shia
Alliance” meeting in the world’s largest Muslim country, which is more than 99
percent Sunni. Malaysia, where Sunnis are also dominant, has implemented laws forbidding the propagation of the Shia
faith.

JUNE
10, 2014 Shia Militias Mobilize as ISIS Advances in Iraq

ISIS
militants and other armed Sunni groups seize Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city,
with little resistance from the Iraqi army. The Sunni insurgency, brewing for
years in response to what it sees as exclusionary policies of Shia prime
minister Nouri al-Maliki, expands toward Baghdad and the borders with Syria and
Jordan. ISIS threatens to destroy sacred Shia shrines, prompting a call to arms
by Iraq’s top Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Shia civilians
respond to a mass recruitment drive that swells the ranks of militias and
elevates sectarian tensions.

Practicing the Faith

Sunnis and Shias agree on the basic tenets of Islam: declaring
faith in a monotheistic God and Mohammed as his messenger, conducting daily
prayers, giving money to the poor, fasting during the Muslim holy month of
Ramadan, and performing the pilgrimage to Mecca.

There are divisions even over the precepts of Islam, but the main
difference relates to authority, which sparked the political split in the seventh
century and evolved into divergent interpretations of sharia, or Islamic law,
and distinct sectarian identities.

Shias believe that God always provides a guide, first the Imams
and then ayatollahs, or experienced Shia scholars who have wide interpretative
authority and are sought as a source of emulation. The term “ayatollah” is
associated with the clerical rulers in Tehran, but it’s primarily a title for a
distinguished religious leader known as a marja, or source of
emulation. Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, was appointed by an elected
body of Iranian clerics, while maraji (plural of marja) are
elevated through the religious schools in Qom, Najaf, and Karbala. Shias can
choose from dozens of maraji, most of whom are based in holy cities in Iraq and
Iran. Many Shias emulate a marja for religious affairs and defer to Supreme
Leader Ali Khamenei in Iran for political guidance. For Sunnis, authority is
based on the Quran and the traditions of Mohammed. Sunni religious scholars,
who are constrained by legal precedents, exert far less authority over
their followers than their Shia counterparts.

Both sects have subdivisions. The divisions among Shias were
discussed above. Four schools comprise Sunni jurisprudence: Hanafi, Shafii,
Maliki, and Hanbali, the latter spawning the Wahhabi and Salafi movements in
Saudi Arabia. Sunnism, a broad umbrella term for non-Shia Islam, is united on
the importance of the Quran and practice of Mohammed but allows for differences
in legal opinion.

Dear Karbala, dear Najaf, dear Kadhimiyah, and
dear Samarra, we warn the great powers and their lackeys and the terrorists,
the great Iranian people will do everything to protect them.

IRANIAN PRESIDENT
HASSAN ROUHANI

Sectarian Militants

Communal violence between Islam’s sects has been rare
historically, with most of the deadly sectarian attacks directed by clerics or
political leaders. Extremist groups, many of which are fostered by states, are
the chief actors in sectarian killings today.

The two most prominent terrorist groups, Sunni al-Qaeda and Shia
Hezbollah, have not defined their movements in sectarian terms, and have
favored using anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, and anti-American frameworks to
define their jihad, or struggle. They share few similarities beyond the use of
violence. Hezbollah has developed a pragmatic political wing that competes
in elections and is part of the Lebanese government, a path not chosen by
al-Qaeda, which operates a diffuse network largely in the shadows. Both groups
have deployed suicide bombers, and their attacks shifted from a focus on the
West and Israel to other Muslims, such as al-Qaeda’s killing of Shia civilians
in Iraq and Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian civil war.

Conflict and chaos have played a role in the reversion to basic
sectarian identity. In Iraq, for instance, remnants of the Ba’athist regime
employed Sunni rhetoric to mount a resistance to the rise of Shia power
following the ouster of Saddam. Sunni fundamentalists, many inspired by
al-Qaeda’s call to fight Americans, flocked to Iraq from Muslim countries,
attacking coalition forces and many Shia civilians. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who
founded al-Qaeda’s franchise in Iraq, evoked ancient anti-Shia fatwas, or
religious rulings, to spark a civil war in hopes that the Shia majority would
eventually capitulate in the face of Sunni extremist violence. The Shia
community absorbed thousands of deaths before fighting back with their own
sectarian militias.

Syria’s civil war, which exceeded the casualty toll of Iraq’s
decade-long conflict in its first three years, has amplified sectarian tensions
to unprecedented levels. The war began with peaceful protests in 2011 calling
for an end to the Assad regime, which has ruled since 1970. The Assad family
and other Alawis have stirred resentment by Syria’s majority Sunnis after
decades of repression and a sectarian agenda that elevated minority Alawis in
government and the private sector. The 2011 protests and brutal government
crackdown uncovered sectarian tensions in Syria, which have rippled across the
region.

Tens of thousands of Syrian Sunnis joined rebel groups such as
Ahrar al-Sham, the Islamic Front, and al-Qaeda’s Nusra Front, which all employ
anti-Shia rhetoric; similar numbers of Syrian Shias and Alawis enlisted with an
Iran-backed militia known as the National Defense Force to fight for the Assad
regime. Foreign Sunni fighters from Arab and Western countries joined the
rebels, while Lebanon’s Hezbollah and some Shia militias from Iraq such as
Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Hezbollah backed the Syrian government. Even Afghan Shia refugees in Iran have
reportedly been recruited by Tehran for the war in Syria, pitting them against
Sunni foreign fighters who may have forced the Afghans into exile decades
earlier. Syria’s civil war has attracted more militants from more countries
than were involved in the conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Bosnia
combined.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq, decimated by the “Awakening” of Sunni Iraqis who
joined the fight against extremists, the U.S.-led military surge, and the death
of Zarqawi, found new purpose in exploiting the
vacuum left by the receding Syrian state. It established its own transnational
movement known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The
group expanded its grip on Sunni provinces in Iraq and eastern regions in
Syria, seizing Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul, in June 2014. It defied
orders from al-Qaeda’s top commanders to curtail its transnational ambitions
and extremism, which led to ISIS’s expulsion from al-Qaeda in February 2014.
ISIS rebranded as the Islamic State in July 2014 and declared its leader, Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi, as caliph. The group's highly publicized killing of
Western hostages triggered a campaign of air strikes by the United States and
its regional allies Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Extremist groups have come to rely on satellite television and
high-speed Internet over the past two decades to spread hate speech and rally
support. Fundamentalist Sunni clerics, many sponsored by wealthy Sunnis from
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, have popularized anti-Shia slurs. Shia
religious scholars have also taken to the airwaves, mocking and
cursing the first three caliphs and Aisha, one of Mohammed’s wives.

Sectarian rhetoric dehumanizing the “other” is centuries old. But
the volume is increasing. Dismissing Arab Shias as Safawis, a term that paints
them as Iranian agents (from the Safavid empire) and hence traitors to the Arab
cause, is increasingly common in Sunni rhetoric. Hard-line Sunni Islamists have
used harsher historic terms such as rafidha, rejecters of the
faith, and majus, Zoroastrian or crypto Persian, to describe
Shias. Iranian officials, Iraq’s prime minister, and Hassan Nasrallah, the
leader of Hezbollah, routinely describe their Sunni opponents as takfiris (code
for al-Qaeda terrorists) and Wahhabis. This cycle of demonization has been
exacerbated throughout the Muslim world.

For Sunni extremists, new technologies and social-media
channels have revolutionized recruitment opportunities. Fundamentalists no
longer have to infiltrate mainstream mosques and attract recruits
surreptitiously, but can now disseminate their call to jihad and wait for
potential recruits to contact them. These channels aren’t as useful for
recruiting Shia militants, who benefit from state support in Syria, Iraq,
and Iran, and can openly advertise their calls for sectarian jihad.

Terrorist violence in 2013 was fueled by
sectarian motivations, marking a worrisome trend, in particular in Syria,
Lebanon, and Pakistan.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE

Flash Points

Sunni-Shia tensions contribute to multiple flash points in Muslim
countries that are viewed as growing threats to international peace and
security. The following arouse the most concern among regional specialists:

Rising
Militancy

Notable
concern about the role of sectarian violence increased in 2013. Extremists were“fueled by sectarian motivations” in
Syria, Lebanon, and Pakistan, according to the U.S. State Department. After
years of steady losses for al-Qaeda–linked groups, Sunni extremist recruitment
is rising, aided by private funding networks in the Gulf, particularly in Kuwait, with
much of the violence directed at other Muslims rather than Western targets.
Shia militants are also gaining strength, in part to confront the threat of
Sunni extremism, miring many Muslim communities in a vicious cycle of sectarian
violence.

U.S.
officials such as FBI director James B. Comey have warned that the war in
Syria, which attracted thousands of fighters from Europe and the United States,
poses a long-term threat to Western interests. The eventual outflow of these
militants, battle-hardened and with Western passports, is viewed as a potential
“terrorist diaspora” that could eclipse the global terror networks that emerged
after the Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

Saudi-Iranian
Rivalry

Saudi
Arabia and Iran have deployed considerable resources to proxy battles,
especially in Syria, where the stakes are highest. Riyadh closely
monitors potential restlessness in its oil-rich eastern provinces, home to
its Shia minority, and has deployed forces along with other Gulf countries to
suppress a largely Shia uprising in Bahrain. It also assembled a coalition of
ten Sunni-majority countries, backed by the United States, to reverse the
growing influence of Houthis in Yemen. Saudi Arabia provides hundreds of
millions of dollars in financial support to the predominantly Sunni rebels in
Syria, while simultaneously banning cash flows to al-Qaeda and extremist jihadi
groups fighting the Assad regime.

Iran has
allocated billions of dollars in aid and loans to
prop up Syria’s Alawi-led government, and has trained and equipped Shia
militants from Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan to fight with various
sectarian militias in Syria. At the same time, the widening proxy battle may
also be stirring concern among leaders in Riyadh and Tehran about the
consequences of escalation. The two sides have repeatedly postponed efforts to
establish a dialogue for settling disputes diplomatically. Iran is fighting the
Islamic State in parts of Iraq, while Saudi Arabia and other Sunni-majority
countries joined a U.S.-led air campaign against the extremist group in Syria
and Iraq.

Humanitarian
Crisis

The
ongoing civil war in Syria has displaced millions internally, and almost three
million civilians, mostly Sunni, are now refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and
Turkey. The influx of more than a million Syrians into Lebanon, a state with a
historically combustible religious mix that experienced its own fifteen-year
civil war in the 1970s and 1980s, has burdened its cash-strapped government and
pressured communities hosting refugees. Jordan and Iraq are still struggling to
provide housing and services to an impoverished and traumatized population.
Turkey has the greatest capacity to provide humanitarian aid, yet Ankara must
increasingly balance “the public’s sympathy for and unease toward refugees,” the
International Crisis Group reports.

Fractured
States

Syria’s
civil war, as well as Iraq’s sectarian conflict, is threatening to redraw the
map of the Middle East bequeathed to the region by British and French colonial
authorities. The Assad regime in Syria has consolidated control over the
Mediterranean coast, the capital of Damascus, and the central city of Homs,
which together comprise a rump state that connects with Hezbollah strongholds,
threatening the territorial integrity of Lebanon. Other parts of the country
are contested or controlled by various rebel and Islamist groups, including
ISIS, which seeks to dominate the eastern regions of Syria that link to its
territory in Iraq. And Kurdish groups in northern Syria, which, like their
Iraqi cousins, have long campaigned for basic rights denied under the Ba'athist
government, are on the verge of gaining de facto independence. Yemen,
which was unified in 1990, is at risk of re-fracturing into two countries,
largely along sectarian lines.

The
United States spent more than one trillion dollars to stabilize Iraq, but
the country remains in a precarious state. Sectarian tensions are mounting in
Iraq as the newly ascendant Shia majority struggles to accommodate the Sunni
minority and deal with the Kurdish Regional Government in the north of the
country while confronting extremist Sunni groups. Most politicians and
activists in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon reject attempts to redraw the map of the
region, but the vanishing borders and emergence of new areas of influence based
on sectarian and ethnic identities are a growing existential challenge.

Sunnis had no other option but to defend
themselves and use arms. We reached a point of to be or not to be.