Plaintiff is the mother and conservator of Kathy VanWormer. In March
1997, Kathy, then 16, was seriously injured in a two-vehicle collision while riding as a
passenger in a car driven by her grandmother. The driver of the other vehicle, Saens, had
crossed the centerline and collided head-on with the vehicle in which Kathy was riding.
Other people who were injured in the accident also made claims against Saens, whose
liability insurance limits were $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident. Kathy's
medical bills exceeded the per person limit of Saens' policy. With defendant's consent,
plaintiff settled Kathy's claim against Saens for $22,000, which was paid by Saens'
liability insurer. The remainder of the insurer's total liability coverage limit was paid to
other accident victims.

Because Kathy was an additional insured under her grandmother's motor
vehicle policy issued by one of the State Farm Insurance Companies, plaintiff next made
a claim for UIM benefits under that policy. The State Farm policy included a $100,000
per person limit for UIM coverage. State Farm paid the entire amount available under
that coverage, $78,000, to settle Kathy's claim. Kathy also was an additional insured
under three policies issued by defendant that separately insured three vehicles owned by
her parents. Each of defendant's policies was issued for a separate premium, and each
carried a $50,000 UIM coverage limit. After settling Kathy's UIM claim against State
Farm, plaintiff sought additional UIM benefits under defendant's policies. According to
plaintiff, she was entitled to stack the UIM coverages in all of defendant's policies to
achieve a total reservoir of $150,000 in UIM limits. Stacking, if successful, would thus
provide Kathy with an additional $50,000 in UIM benefits, the difference between the
combined UIM limits of defendant's policies and the UIM limits of the State Farm policy.

Defendant denied plaintiff's claim, relying on the following provisions
contained in each of its policies:

"3. Any insurance we provide to an insured person while occupying a
vehicle you do not own shall:

"a. be excess over any other collectible insurance, and

"b. apply in the amount by which the applicable limit of this
coverage exceeds the sum of the applicable limits of all other such
insurance.

"4. If any applicable insurance other than this policy is issued to you or a
family member by us or any other member company of the Farmers
Insurance Group of Companies, the total amount payable among all such
policies shall not exceed the limits provided by the single policy with the
highest limits of liability." (Bold in original.)

On appeal, plaintiff concedes that the anti-stacking provisions in
defendant's policies would, if enforceable, prevent her recovery in this case, because the
separate limit of each of those policies is less than the UIM limits of the State Farm
policy. However, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in its summary judgment
rulings, because the anti-stacking provisions are unenforceable. According to plaintiff,
those provisions violate the requirements of ORS 742.504, which establishes a complete
and comprehensive model policy that may not be varied to the detriment of the insured.
Vega v. Farmers Ins. Co., 323 Or 291, 300-01, 918 P2d 95 (1996). In particular, plaintiff
asserts that the policy provisions are less favorable than the statutory provision that
authorizes the prohibition of stacking for insureds who are injured while occupying non-owned vehicles. ORS 742.504(9)(a). That statute provides:

Plaintiff argues that "the insurance under this coverage" refers to the UIM
coverages of all of defendant's policies, rather than the UIM coverage of any individual
policy. Plaintiff also asserts that "any other insurance * * * which is similar to this
coverage" refers only to UIM coverage under policies issued by other insurers and does
not refer to any other policies issued by defendant. As plaintiff reads the statute, "the
applicable limit of liability of this coverage" is $150,000, which exceeds "the sum of the
applicable limits of liability of all such other insurance," the $100,000 limit of the State
Farm policy. Thus, plaintiff contends that she is entitled to recover benefits in the amount
of that excess, $50,000.

Defendant reads the statute differently. It argues that "the insurance under
this coverage" refers to the individual UIM limit of any specific policy to which the
statute applies, and that "any other insurance" refers to the UIM coverages of any other
policy, including policies issued by the same insurer. In defendant's view, plaintiff may
not recover additional UIM benefits, because the limit of that coverage under any of its
three policies--$50,000--does not exceed the total limits of other applicable insurance, in
this case $200,000 (the sum of the UIM limit of the State Farm policy and the combined
UIM limits of defendant's two remaining policies). The parties' disagreement thus
presents a problem of statutory construction. We first look to the text and context of the
statute to determine its meaning. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606,
611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). We begin with the parties' arguments about the meaning of
the term "this coverage."

ORS 742.504(9)(a) provides that "this insurance" applies "only in the
amount by which the applicable limit of liability of this coverage exceeds the sum of the
applicable limits of liability of all such other insurance." "This coverage" thus has a limit
of liability, whereas "all such other insurance" policies have limits. The legislature's
conscious shift from the singular to plural number suggests that it did not contemplate
stacking of the coverage "limits" of multiple policies. See Schuette v. Dept. of Revenue,
326 Or 213, 217-18, 951 P2d 690 (1997) (the choice of singular or plural number is
relevant to determination of legislative intent).

In addition, the formula for determining the availability of UIM benefits
contained in subsection (9)(a) undercuts plaintiff's argument. In plaintiff's view, UIM
coverage provided by other insurers is not included in "this coverage" but, instead, is
"other insurance" that must be subtracted from "this coverage" in order to determine
whether additional benefits are available. Plaintiff's construction thus depends on the
validity of a statutory distinction between UIM coverage provided under other policies
issued by the same insurer and UIM coverage provided by other insurers. If "this
coverage" refers to a type of coverage, however, there is no textual basis to limit its scope
to coverage in policies issued by a particular insurer. If the legislature had intended such
a limitation, it easily could have said so. It did not. See ORS 174.010 (the court may not
insert terms that are not contained in a statute).

Accordingly, if "this coverage" refers to UIM coverage in general, it would
refer to all UIM coverage under which the claimant is an insured. But if it did, the
formula in the statute would make no sense. The first figure in the calculation would then
be the sum of the limits of all UIM coverage under which Kathy is an insured, including
the limits of the State Farm coverage, which the parties agree must be subtracted from
that figure in order to determine whether excess UIM coverage is available. That
nonsensical result could not arise if "this coverage" is construed to mean UIM coverage
under a particular policy. The statutory calculus thus supports defendant's understanding
of the term's meaning.

The same intent is evident from the context of ORS 742.504(9)(a). The
preface to ORS 742.504 provides, in part:

The statute provides uninsured (UM) and UIM coverage requirements for any individual
policy to which it applies. It does not specify coverage requirements for clusters or
groups of policies. Because "the coverage" required by ORS 742.504 refers to UIM
coverage under an individual policy, there is no reason to conclude that "this coverage"
has a different meaning in subsection (9)(a).

3. ORS 742.504(9)(c) is an anti-stacking provision that governs injuries
incurred while an insured is occupying "a public or livery conveyance." That provision
does not apply to the circumstances here.

5. In view of that conclusion, we need not address the parties' further
disagreement concerning whether any of defendant's policies constitute "other insurance
available" to plaintiff under the facts of this case.