Russia's progress toward democracy is the issue that most divides optimists and
pessimists. The optimists argue that Russia has moved in important ways toward
liberal democracy, while the pessimists are convinced that Russia is reverting
to its traditional mechanisms of power and that it will always be a threat to
democratic civilization. Both sides can find evidence to support their views
in today's Russia.

Russian and Western analysts who study Russia's current transformation also
differ in their assessments. The Westerners tend to be less pessimistic, while
the Russians are usually more skeptical and even bitter, concentrating on the
failures and the miscalculations. It is difficult for those who live in Russia
to be unbiased and unemotional: they lament the lost opportunities and look
for someone to blame for the failures. Pointing out that Europe and America
also went through their own difficult historical transformations offers
Russians little comfort; it is hard for them to become reconciled to not seeing
a civilized and prosperous Russia in their own lifetimes.

Western observers, for their part, have the luxury of looking at Russia from a
distance and in a larger context. It is indeed true that, compared with the
not-so-distant communist past, Russia has made enormous progress toward
democracy since 1991. Many have been surprised at how eagerly the Russian
political class has rushed to hold elections, which are characterized by voter
turnouts so high that they put Western societies to shame. Electoral politics
in Russia is not, however, an outcome of the establishment's democratic
convictions but of the fact that the establishment is divided and weak and
cannot hold on to power by any other means. It is true that elections provide
a society with the possibility of making choices, but Russians have had very
limited options--and those not always reassuring ones. Although most Russians
vote, they expect nothing from those they elect. Both sides--the voters and
those who are elected--seem to be playing a game, silently agreeing to preserve
the status quo and to leave each other in peace. Such elections prompt
widespread cynicism, discrediting the concept of democracy.

Compared with the communist period, the Russian people today clearly enjoy far
greater freedom of expression and more secure human rights. Yeltsin has not
encroached on individual rights and freedoms as he might have done, given the
enormous powers he has acquired as president. On the other hand, he has done
little to expand or to strengthen the guarantees of these freedoms. Russia's
press did experience a relatively short period of real freedom; now, however,
the mass media have again become partisan and increasingly dependent on the
state or on financial groups. And freedom of expression loses much of its
significance if public opinion matters little to those in poser. Even more
troubling is the fact that basic civil rights established by the Russian
constitution--such as the rights to education, work, and compensation for
work--are constantly violated. Although significant repression is largely
absent, Russian citizens are defenseless before the governing structures,
especially in the provinces, where semi-authoritarian ruling groups have risen
to power. Moreover, the conflict in Chechnya demonstrated that the Russian
government is not constrained from resorting to the barbaric destruction of its
citizens at will.

After the October 1993 clash between parliament and the presidency, limits were
placed on the parliament's independence. Because the political parties no
longer influence the formation of the government, their role and power have
diminished. Decision making has moved behind the scenes, which increases the
role of interest groups at the expense of political parties. The public
appears to be disappointed with existing parties, but the government has no
interest in establishing mechanisms through which the will of the public can be
expressed. Political pluralism in Russia remains weak.

Russia also lacks a system of institutional checks and balances. This has led
to the overpersonalization of politics and to a political structure that is far
too dependent on the characteristics, capabilities, and physical condition of
the leader. The weakness of Russia's judicial system and the fragility of the
rule of law are likewise troubling. Many members of the elite appear to have
used public service as a vehicle for advancing their own private business
interests. That they do not seem to care how their actions are viewed by
ordinary citizens is perhaps an indication of how well their escape routes
already have been prepared.

One essential characteristic of a mature democracy is the regularity and
peacefulness of its political transitions. Although post-communist Russia has
yet to experience its first presidential succession, there are some signs that
leaders across the political spectrum understand the necessity of what a number
of political scientists call a "democratic bargain"--a pact to preclude
revenge-seeking after the current leader departs. Nonetheless, there is no
guarantee that the next Russian leader will not turn to the typical Soviet
model of survival through a new "cleansing" and reversal of the previous
leader's legacy. The absence of any guarantee that members of today's ruling
class will continue to have "life after power" means that the ruling team may
not be willing to give up its place voluntarily.

Most Russians today would be happy to hear their country described as a
democracy. In fact, Russia's present regime does not neatly fit any of the
familiar categories. It is a regime in which elements of democracy,
authoritarianism, post-totalitarianism, delegative democracy,
bureaucratic-authoritarianism, oligarchic rule, sultanism, and even monarchy
are intertwined in sometimes strange ways. A high degree of decentralization
and the asymmetry of the Russian Federation also increase the patchwork
character of Russia's political system. The system uses democratic rhetoric,
but it often turns to statist and populist ideas. Its leadership is produced
by elections, but the leader's rule is highly personal and arbitrary, without
legal constraints. The ruling elite is drawn from among family members,
friends of the family, or groups that anticipate some reward (as is
characteristic of sultanism), and citizen participation in the decision-making
process is minimal.

Russia's current political regime likewise resembles what Guillermo O'Donnell
(writing about Latin America) calls "delegative democracy": a system that
"rest[s] on the premises that whoever wins election to the presidency is
thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit." The model is also a useful
description of the Russian regime, which combines omnipotence and impotence,
although it is unlikely that the outcome in Russia will be a Latin
American-style military coup. There is also no reason to expect that a Russian
delegative democracy, combined with a powerless patrimonialism, will endure
once Yeltsin is gone.

Russia's elected presidency has a democratic legitimacy. With its immense
powers, however, it is absolutely independent of any political force. In
combination with Yeltsin's autocratic style of governance, it thus resembles a
monarchy--but an "elected monarchy" is political nonsense. This nonsense,
however, reflects the trap in which Russia finds itself. On the one hand, it
seems unable to overcome the tradition of personal rule, while on the other
hand, the political regime is required to take on some democratic procedures
because it has exhausted all other means of retaining power. The
incompatibility of the main features of such a regime makes it highly unstable
and fragile; its structure is itself a source of major conflicts.