Of roughly 300 million Americans, about 40 million are
immigrants (people born elsewhere), of whom about 11 million are
“illegal” (entered or stayed illegally). Most “illegals” are from
Mexico, others from Central America and Asia.

Current USA immigration rules have not met USA immigration needs
legally. Instead they have produced an unregulated black market of
“illegals..” Hence the need for “reform,” to align needs and rules
and to align rules and enforcement.

The most practical way to make most migration legal is to expand
legal quotas, which conservatives oppose. Attempting to restrict
migration would deprive the USA of needed labor, much of which
would still come anyway, illegally.

Currently there is little net illegal migration, because of
recent weakness in the American economy, strength in the Mexican
economy, and perhaps also stronger American enforcement of borders.
This “lull” in illegal immigration facilitates reform.

Under reform, legal immigration could rise from the current one
million a year to perhaps two or three million, if the American
economy revives and if generous allowances continue for legal
immigrants to bring in various types of family members.

Main interests 1.2

American BUSINESS (particularly agrobusiness) who want cheap
labor would prefer the status quo to highly restrictionist reforms
that deny them that labor. Some American business bring in
high-skilled labor and would like to bring in more.

American LABOR wants to protect its jobs, benefits, and
standards against such “guest workers.” So labor, usually
Democratic, has defeated previous Democratic attempts at
comprehensive immigration reform.

Many American LOCALITIES want to minimize the impact of
immigrants on local budgets and culture. Some want to restrict
immigration and services. Conservative local Republicans have
defeated previous national Republican attempts at comprehensive
immigration reform.

IMMIGRANTS want jobs, family reunification, and access to
education and other services. “Illegal” immigrants want quick
legalization, with some path to eventual full citizenship.
Immigrants support Democrats, but for many reasons besides
immigration.

In the 2008 and 2012 elections, immigrants strongly supported
Obama, who promised them comprehensive reform: not just the
restrictionist ENFORCEMENT on which Republicans insist but also
some expansionist ACCOMMODATION of immigrants’ needs.

During his first term, solving other problems, Obama failed to
deliver comprehensive reform. Nevertheless he laid the groundwork
by establishing a strong record on ENFORCEMENT. Now he has made
ACCOMMODATION a high priority.

In the 2012 election, SOME very restrictionist Republicans cost
ALL Republicans MOST minority votes. Now MOST Republicans realize
that they must support SOME form of comprehensive immigration
reform, in order to remain competitive in future elections.

Immigration divides both parties but, currently, Republicans
more than Democrats. In the 2000s Republicans used immigration as a
“wedge” issue to divide Democrats. In the 2010s, Democrats are
using immigration to divide Republicans.

Future prospects 1.4

In the 2000s, several “windows of opportunity” opened for
comprehensive reform. Proponents repeatedly crafted centrist
proposals. One succeeded in the Senate but none in the House. Any
new legislation that passed both chambers was piecemeal and
restrictionist.

Now a new window has opened. However, so far, rival proposals
remain at the level of principles. Specifics still need
negotiation. As specifics emerge, they provoke opposition. A “deal”
on reform could still be much delayed or could fail altogether.

Reform COULD be “bipartisan”: supported by both president and
congress, Senate and House, some Democrats and some Republicans.
Some leaders from those sides are seeking agreement, but also are
maneuvering over the details and over who gets credit for what.

Even if bipartisan leaders can agree on substance, they may not
be able to persuade their partisan colleagues and back-home
constituents. So leaders will bargain hard over MESSAGING: the
exact language used and what opposition or support it elicits from
whom.

Even with good messaging, immigration reform could again become
highly POLARIZING. Some extremists on both sides have little to
gain by supporting nationally popular measures and more to gain by
opposing measures that their political base – local or group –
opposes.

Likely measures 1.5

Restricters frame the issue as “legality,” persuasive to many
Americans. Expanders frame the issue as “rights,” less persuasive
to most Americans. Restricters claim that immigration is
economically costly. Expanders haven’t clearly explained how it is
economically beneficial.

To pass congress, immigration reform must contain both HARD
enforcement of existing restrictions and SOFT provision of some
legal status for migrants who desire to work here or are already
working here illegally.

SOFT measures: A legal way for foreigners to enter the USA for
temporary employment. Special paths to legal status for migrant
farm workers, high-skilled workers, and children of illegal
entrants. Some path to eventual full citizenship for all
“illegals.”

The most difficult issue is ANY path to full citizenship for
current “illegals.” Conservatives fear that would reward past
illegality and encourage future illegality. A difficult question is
how to agree when Enforcement is sufficient that Accommodation can
proceed.

PAST POLITICS 2

Immigration politics constitute an “immigration policy regime”
that persists but changes. Unexpected influences include
non-immigration events and new immigration problems, presidential
initiatives and populist rebellions, idealism and opportunism of
politicians. Immigration politics in 2013 are a replay of recent
rounds, but with variations. It is important to know the history of
recent rounds, in order to identify what is similar and different
about the present. (For a summary, see Rachel Weimer 130130 “How
immigration reform failed, over and over” at
washingtonpost.com.)

Many of the SIMILARITIES across rounds result from the fact
that, after components of a policy regime become established, they
persist into later rounds. These components include the objective
problems involved, the framings that partisans apply to those
problems, and even some of the individual politicians
participating. In American politics, passing a major law can
require a a decade or more of repeated attempts by determined
advocates. The key players are usually the President and the
chairmen of relevant committees in congress (acting through their
key staff).

The DIFFERENCES across rounds result from the ceaseless
evolution of both the general political environment and
specifically immigration politics. Political deals and their
political framings reflect general policy problems and their
changes. But the deals have to be refashioned for each successive
moment in politics, particularly the current political needs of the
key players. These needs change according to the offices for which
the players hope to run, how soon they must face reelection, and
whether they face strong electoral challengers.

(The current best general political science introduction to
American immigration politics is Daniel J. Tichenor
2002Dividing lines : The politics of immigration control in
America. Princeton N.J. : Princeton University Press, 378
pages.)

The 1965 regime 2.1

From the 1920s to the 1960s, the USA had a restrictionist
immigration regime based on quotas for particular nationalities
(mostly European). In 1965, the USA switched to an immigration
regime based on family unification (which most benefitted Hispanics
and Asians). This new immigration regime was designed by
then-dominant liberal Democrats, who claimed to expect the new
regime to not be particularly expansionist. In practice, the new
regime proved highly expansionist. Indeed, “the 1965 Act” redefined
American identity, from dominantly European, based on national
heritages, toward a broadly “multicultural” America, based on more
universal ideals. Therefore it is not surprising that, since 1965,
immigration has become an increasingly contentious issue that often
focuses on questions of “identity”: what does it mean to be an
“American” and who deserves to become an “American”?

1980s policy shifted emphasis slightly from families to refugees
and slightly restricted the expansionist 1965 regime. A 1980 act
reduced immigration to 270,000 annually while
establishing a quota for refugees of 50,000 annually. In 1986 a
“reform and control” act intended to restrict immigration by
imposing penalties on American employers who knowingly hired
illegal immigrants. Assuming future restriction, the act provided
“amnesty” for about 3 million illegal immigrants already in the
United States. The amnesty occurred but the enforcement did not,
allowing the accumulation of new “illegals.” Conservatives vow
never again to accept any form of “amnesty.”

1990s policy continued to shift emphasis between expansion and
restriction. In 1990 an act expanded annual immigration to
700,000 and increased visas by 40 percent. Family
reunification remained the main criterion, with significant
increases in immigration for employment. However, in 1996, acts
restricted both legal and illegal immigrants, increasing the kinds
of criminal activity for which immigrants can be deported and
making some types of deportation mandatory. Restrictionists
attempted to limit immigrant access to government services. Latino
support for Republicans dropped in the 1996 election, Republicans
rolled back most restrictions. In 2000, both Clinton and
Republicans offered bills to fix a technical flaw in the 1986 law,
Clinton eventually signing the Republican law after Republicans won
the 2000 election.

During the 1990s a commission studied immigration reform. It
recommended capping immigration to about 550,000
per year. It called for a shift from low-skilled toward
high-skilled immigrants and for a scaling back of family admissions
by establishing priorities among the types of family members to be
admitted. It demanded stronger enforcement, particularly more
systematic deportation of illegals. It advised stronger federal
planning for international migration emergencies and clearer
criteria for granting asylum to refugees. Few of the commission’s
suggestions were implemented. (For the full report see 970901
Becoming an American. Washington DC: U.S. Commission on
Immigration Reform, 230 pages. It is available – along with
associated reports – at numbersusa.com.)

Liberal Democratic senator Edward Kennedy had played a key role
in the foundational 1965 act, his biggest impact on America. In the
2000s, attempting to preserve that legacy through reform, Kennedy
partnered with a series of Republican senators (Brownback, McCain,
Kyl). However, as their electoral circumstances changed, those
successive Republican partners withdrew from the immigration issue
to avoid further antagonizing conservatives. (Brownback came up for
reelection in conservative Kansas in 2002 and McCain decided to run
for president in 2008.)

By around 2000, the 1965 immigration regime, as modified by
President Reagan, was widely regarded as “broken.” It was not
serving anyone’s interests well, creating potential support for
comprehensive reform. In early 2001 the new nonpartisan Migration
Policy Institute first recommended “comprehensive” reform. The MPI
framed immigration as a largely economic issue, but one that
required both a diplomatic “grand bargain” between the USA and
Mexico and domestic legalization of migrants already in the USA.
(See Demetrios Papademetriou 010214 “U.S.-Mexico migration panel
unveils recommendations,” Press Briefing at carnegieeurope.eu. Also
Kerry Boyd 010215 “ Conclusions of the U.S.-Mexico migration panel”
at carnegieendowment.org.)

Bush’s first term 2.2

Taking office in 2001, Republican Bush endorsed the MPI proposal
for comprehensive immigration reform – for diplomatic, economic,
and political reasons. As governor of Texas Bush had sought support
from Texas Hispanics and believed that the national Republican
party must accommodate national Hispanic aspirations. Bush’s
initiative soon received support from both business and labor and
from leading senators of both parties (liberal Democrat Kennedy and
conservative Republican Brownback).

However, the 9/11 terrorist attacks derailed that effort. The
attacks gave security priority in American politics and redefined
immigration issues largely in terms of security. By the end of 2001
the House had already passed a restrictionist Border Security Bill.
By early 2002, advocates of comprehensive reform began repackaging
their proposals as serving security. However, they would have to
accept some increase in restrictionist enforcement before they
could resume pursuit of expansionist reform. Accordingly, Senators
Kennedy and Brownback joined with more enforcement-oriented
senators to introduce a Border Security Bill in the Senate.
However, a single powerful senator placed a hold on the senate
bill, delaying its processing.

Then president Bush complicated matters by proposing an addition
that would allow “illegals” with family or job connections to the
USA to remain here while their status was being legalized, instead
of having to return home and wait years for reentry. The Bush
proposal alarmed both restrictionists and expansionists:
restrictionists as too great an accommodation and expansionists as
perhaps preempting more comprehensive reform. The Border Security
bills eventually became law, but the delay in its passage allowed
restrictionists to establish their “anti-amnesty” theme as a
permanent part of American immigration politics. Later efforts have
not been framed as collaborations with Mexico and the “grand
bargain” required has been not diplomatic but domestic, between
diverse American interests.

In mid-2002, with the Border Security bill passed, immigrant
advocates hoped to resume their efforts at comprehensive reform.
However, president Bush again complicated matters, this time by
proposing the merging of many government agencies into a huge
Department of Homeland Security. That reorganization would include
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, so political struggle
refocused on the substantive implications of that administrative
reorganization.

In spring 2002, liberal Democratic senator Dick Durbin and
conservative Republican Orin Hatch had co-authored a bill called
the Dream Act, to make it legal for states to offer in-state
tuition to students brought to the US by their parents illegally as
children, and to grant legal status to those undocumented students
after they graduated from college. Eligible students could
eventually attain citizenship after completing college or two years
of military service. Despite attempts in successive congresses, the
Dream Act has never passed. Nevertheless, just before the 2012
election, president Obama implemented many of its provisions by
executive order.

Following the November 2002 election, a new two-year congress
convened in early 2003, providing a “window” for legislative
initiatives. New immigration bills arose on both left and right: on
the radical left, a proposal to legalize “illegals,” on the
moderate right an innovative “guestworker” bill granting migrant
workers temporary visas that would allow them to move from job to
job, instead of being tied to one particular employer. Meanwhile,
liberal Democratic advocates of comprehensive reform had difficulty
reviving coordination between business, labor, and immigrant
advocates. All three of these efforts eventually failed. But one of
the three moderate Arizona Republicans who proposed the guestworker
bill (Jeff Flake), reintroduced moderate guestworker legislation in
the House in 2007 and, now in the Senate, remains an active
participant in 2013 immigration politics.

In the Fall of 2003, liberal Democratic efforts at comprehensive
reform continued. To attract a Republican co-sponsor, the bill
would have to include a temporary worker program, which alarmed the
liberal Democrats’ labor allies. Though some unions publicly
appeared to support comprehensive reform, in private the main union
lobbyist derailed it by forcing senator Kennedy to choose general
labor support instead of the guestworker provision. Democrats’
efforts at comprehensive reform stalled again.

In early 2004, Republicans seize the initiative, leaving
Democrats in disarray. President Bush called again for
comprehensive immigration reform, possibly to attract Hispanic
support in the 2004 presidential election. Bush’s proposal included
the 2003 moderate Republican guestworker plan. Another bipartisan
reform proposal quickly failed (by Republican Hagel of Nebraska and
Democrat Daschle of South Dakota ). Nevertheless, even the
possibility of such reform stirred populist opposition, fanned in
particular by Republican Tom Tancredo from Colorado. In the 2004
elections, the two moderate Republican congressmen from Arizona who
had originally proposed the guestworker plan were reelected, but
only after severe primary challenges from populist radical
Republicans opposing any form of additional immigration, not to
speak of anything that could be regarded as “amnesty.” Meanwhile,
three million Hispanic votes were pivotal to president Bush’s 2004
reelection.

Bush’s second term 2.3

In Spring 2005, Kennedy and McCain again co-sponsored
comprehensive immigration reform. This was the first “grand
bargain” bill ever introduced into congress on a bi-partisan,
bi-cameral basis. In 2005 senate Republicans unsuccessfully offered
their own more conservative version of comprehensive reform
(sponsored by John Cornyn of Texas and John Kyl of Arizona). In
late 2005, the conservative Republican House passed an extremely
restrictive anti-immigration bill. Among many restrictive measures,
the bill required constructing walls on heavily trafficked sections
of the border and strengthened detention of any “illegals”
apprehended. The bill raised illegal presence in the USA from a
civil offense to a criminal felony and made it illegal for any
other Americans to assist “illegals” to remain in the USA. This
House bill never passed the Senate, but many of its provisions
reappeared in later restrictionist legislation. For example, the
mandate to build fences reappeared in the Secure Fence Act of 2006
and was reiterated in the 2012 Republican platform. (SeeThe
Secure Fence Act of 2006, a Fact Sheet at
georgewbush -whitehouse.archives.gov and the relevant article in
Wikipedia.)

The restrictive House bill provoked widespread demonstrations by
immigrants against it. By May 2006 it also provoked the Senate into
passing a more expansionist alternative: most of the 2005
Kennedy-McCain bill, now formally sponsored by Republican Arlen
Specter, the chairman of the senate judiciary committee. This was
the first comprehensive reform bill ever to pass either chamber of
congress. The Senate bill could have passed the House too, with
bipartisan support (most Democrats, some Republicans). However,
House Republican leaders refused to bring up a bill that was not
supported by a majority of the Republican majority. So a minority
of the House blocked the bill. (On the relevance of 2006 to 2013,
see Ronald Brownstein 130131 “On immigration, what Obama can learn
from Bush's failed efforts” at nationaljournal.com.)

In the November 2006 elections, Democrats captured control of
both chambers of congress. That again raised liberals’ hopes for
comprehensive reform of immigration. In early 2007 the Democratic
majority leader of the Senate (Harry Reid) introduced a bill that
had been drafted by a dozen senators, including Kennedy and McCain.
The main new Republican input came from president Bush and senator
Kyl, who wanted to shift immigration from accommodating immigrants
to promoting economic development, through a point system that
favored educated English speakers, without regard to family
connections or (illegal) migrant status. This guest worker proposal
offended both pro-labor and pro-immigrant Democrats on the left and
anti-immigrant Republicans on the right. Enough conservative
Republican senators opposed the bill to prevent it from getting the
sixty votes necessary to bring it to a vote. (On the complexities,
see Jonathan Weisman 070518 “Deal on immigration reached” and
Jonathan Weisamn 070629 “Immigration bill dies in Senate,” both at
washigntonpost.com.)

Overall, in the early and mid-2000s, evidently liberals were
slow to recognize the extent of populist opposition to immigration,
which became one of the origins of later populist Republican
conservatism. At the same time, conservative Republicans were
beginning to launch the primary challenges against moderate
Republicans that gradually shifted the Republican party to the
right. Those challenges gradually entrenched the competition
between the relatively moderate national Republican establishment
and radical populist local Republican insurgents that continues
today.

(This summary of 2000s immigration politics draws on summaries
of twelve feature-length documentaries that brilliantly chronicle
those events. See the Story Guide (under Series) at
howdemocracyworksnow.com.)

PRESENT POLITICS 3

Running for president in 2008, Obama promised comprehensive
immigration reform. (See the section on Immigration at
barackobama.com.)

Obama’s first term 3.1

In 2009 and 2010, Obama’s agenda was dominated by combating the
Great Recession, promoting reforms of health and finance, and
managing two wars. Nevertheless, Obama sketched a comprehensive
reform of immigration that would strengthen both external and
internal enforcement, adapt visa allocations to economic needs, and
accommodate migrants, both through legalizing their status and
helping them adjust to life in the USA. (See Comprehensive
Immigration Reform at immigrationamerica.org.)

Meanwhile, Obama paved the way toward accommodating immigrant
needs by vigorous enforcement of restrictionist measures mandated
by congressional legislation and begun under Bush. Obama invested
more in border security, increased border apprehensions, and
deported “illegals” who had committed crimes. However, as
conservative critics complained, Obama chose not to regard a single
illegal entry itself as a crime requiring vigorous deportation.

(See Peter Slevin 100726 “Deportation of illegal immigrants
increases under Obama administration” at washingtonpost.com. Also
Suzy Khimm 120827 “Obama is deporting immigrants faster than Bush.
Republicans don’t think that’s enough” and Suzy Khimm 130129 “Want
tighter border security? You’re already getting it,” both on
Wonkblog at washingtonpost.com. Also Elise Foley 130131 “Obama
deportation toll could pass 2 million at current rates” at
huffingtonpost.com. On the huge buildup of enforcement, see Doris
Meissner+ January 2013 Immigration enforcement in the United
States: The rise of a formidable machinery: The report in
brief. Washington DC: The Migration Policy Institute, 27
pages, available online at migration policy.org.. For a critique,
see Jessica Vaughan 130110 “New report offers deceptive assessment
of immigration enforcement” at cis.org.)

In 2010, two leading senators tried to initiate comprehensive
reform (Democrat Charles Schumer from New York and Republican
Leslie Graham from South Carolina). The effort collapsed when the
senate leader (Democrat Reid from Nevada) tried to accelerate the
process, alleged to promote his own reelection. (On the initiative,
see Spencer S. Hsu 100318 “Senators draft plan to rework U.S.
immigration policy.” Also Schumer & Graham 100318 op ed “The
right way to mend immigration.” Also Shailagh Murray and Anne E.
Kornblut 100428 “Reid amends his pledge for fast action on
immigration.” All at washington post.com.)

In May 2011 Obama issued a detailed set of principles for
comprehensive reform of immigration.

As a basis for further reform, the report cited progress in
border security, interior enforcement, and legal immigration. The
report framed reform as an economic issue: Immigrants create jobs
and pay taxes. Creating a more effective legal immigration system
would strengthen the USA’s economic competitiveness. The report
reaffirmed that securing borders was a federal not state
responsibility, presumably to discourage state intervention.
Businesses that hire “illegals” should be held accountable for both
undermining American workers and exploiting undocumented workers.
To avoid deportation, illegals themselves must take responsibility:
by paying back taxes, paying a penalty for having broken the law,
learning English, and passing criminal background checks. Having
done that, they should be allowed to get in line to apply for
citizenship. On the basis of those 2011 principles, Obama again
promised comprehensive immigration reform when running for
reelection as president in 2012. (Search Building a
21st Century Immigration System at
whitehouse.gov.)

Obama’s second term 3.2

After reelection, in early 2013 Obama has again issued general
principles for comprehensive immigration reform. Politically, Obama
now has the upper hand in several respects. He convincingly won
reelection with the support of expansionist voters and over the
opposition of restrictionist voters. American political demography
is gradually increasing the number of expansionists while
decreasing the number of restrictionists. Obama announced his
immigration proposals in Nevada to underline that Democrats intend
to continue moving that formerly Republican state toward Democrats.
Obama has reoriented the Democratic party away from conservative
lower-class whites and toward progressive multicultural voters, so
he does not have to fear that the immigration issue will split his
emerging new coalition. Conversely, whether Obama intends so or
not, immigration is a “wedge” issue that divides
nationally-oriented moderate Republicans from locally-oriented
conservative Republicans. Finally, as regards policy, Obama can now
“lead from above”: enunciating principles while observing
congressional initiatives. If they do not go well, he can submit
his own more liberal legislation, meanwhile holding conservatives
accountable

(About Obama’s strategy, on politics see Chris Cillizza 130129
“Why President Obama went to Nevada to talk immigration reform” on
The Fix at washingtonpost.com. Relatedly, see also Alexander Burns
130124 “Democrats launch plan to turn Texas blue” at politico .com.
On policy see Fawn Johnson 130128 “Can Obama make history on
immigration?” at nationaljournal.com. Also Julia Preston 130129
“Laying out broad principles, but leaving recourse open” at
nytimes.com. Also Zachary A. Goldfarb 130129 “President seeking to
balance bully pulpit with negotiations in immigration debate” at
washingtonpost.com.. Also Ezra Klein 130129 “Why Obama won’t get
specific on immigration — at least not yet” on Wonkblog at
washingtonpost.com. Also Michael D. Shear and Mark Landler 130130
“On immigration, Obama assumes upper hand” at nytimes.com.)

(For contrasting views on Obama’s proposal, from immigrant
advocates, see the section on Immigration under Issues and Programs
at nclr.org – the website of the National Council of La Raza, the
main Hispanic lobbying organization. From critics, see the blogs of
Mark Krikorian and others at the skeptical Center For Immigration
Studies, at cis.org.. CIS is “pro-immigrant, low-immigration,”
seeking “fewer immigrants but a warmer welcome for those admitted.”
On the situation of immigrants, see Pew Hispanic Research Center
130129A nation of immigrants: A portrait of the 40 million,
including 11 million unauthorized at pewhispanic.org.)

Meanwhile, immediately after the November 2012 election,
Republican senator Graham phoned Democratic senator Schumer to
resume their 2010 initiative. Again, a few key players are pivotal.
Others include two past presidential candidates: liberal Democrat
Obama and the man he defeated for president, moderate Republican
John McCain. At least one possible future presidential candidate is
also pivotal: newly elected Republican senator Marco Rubio from
Florida, a Cuban-American with great appeal to Republican
conservatives as a future bridge to Hispanic immigrants. (On senate
strategy, see Julia Preston 130128 “Senators offer a bipartisan
blueprint for immigration” at nytimes.com. Or Manu Raju 130128
“Senate group reaches immigration deal” at politico.com Also Brian
Bennett and Lisa Mascaro 310202 “How a discordant Senate band got
back together on immigration” at latimes.com. On key players see
Manu Raju 130128 “Chuck Schumer, John McCain: Immigration's odd
couple” at politico.com. Also Carrie Budoff Brown and Kate Nocera
130129 “President Obama, John McCain, Marco Rubio begin immigration
dance” at politico.com. Also Beth Reinhard 130129 “How Marco Rubio
evolved on immigration reform” at nationaljournal.com.)

The senate group had planned to make their proposal public in
February, but advanced their announcement to Monday 28 January to
precede Obama’s speech on immigration policy on Tuesday 29 January.
The Senators wanted to avoid any appearance of following Obama’s
lead and to avoid any association with liberal proposals that he
might make but they didn’t. Senate Democrats can’t sponsor too
liberal a package or they might lose the support of moderate
Democrats seeking reelection in conservative states in 2014.
Overall, Republics are clearly more amenable to comprehensive
immigration reform in 2013 than they were in 2007. Nevertheless,
the bipartisan Gang of Eight will not get bipartisan support from
all of their senate colleagues. The senate still contains
twenty-two Republicans and eight Democrats who voted against the
similar 2007 initiative. Some of those senators have already begun
speaking out against the 2013 proposal, mostly on the issue of
“amnesty.” (See Kate Nocera 130131 “Complicating matters: Pryor,
Landrieu and Baucus all are up for reelection in 2014" at
politico.com. Also Aaron Blake 130129 “Many big GOP voices changing
their tune on immigration” on The Fix at washingtonpost.com. Also
Manu Raju and Kate Nocera 130129 “Senate GOP raises eyebrows at
Gang of Eight plan” at politico.com.)

Meanwhile, moderate Republican House leader John Boehner has
indicated optimistically that the House too has had a bipartisan
group working on immigration reform for several years. Boehner
claims the group has now reached basic agreement, though not yet a
draft of legislation. In that group, a leading participant from the
far right is conservative Republican representative Raul Labrador,
a longtime immigration attorney from Idaho. A leading participant
from the far left is liberal Democrat Luis Gutierrez from Illinois,
chairman of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus’s immigration task
force. The group hopes to issue draft legislation just before
president Obama’s State of the Union address to congress on 12
February. (Russell Berman 130126 “Boehner says bipartisan group
'basically' has deal on immigration reform” at thehill.com. Also
Lois Romano 130130 “House group secretly crafts immigration plan”
at politico.com. Also Ashley Parker 130202 “House group works to
present its own immigration plan” at nytimes.com.)

If nothing else, this group should help define what immigration
reforms can and cannot pass the house. As in 2006, the House might
well not accept reform as comprehensive as the senate proposes.
Relative to 2006, in 2013 even more House Republicans come from
districts that are mostly white and contain no natural pressure
groups favoring immigration reform. Of 233 House Republicans, 133
come from such districts. (Of 200 House Democrats, only 31 come
from such largely white districts.) Much may depend on whether
Republican Speaker Boehner will apply or suspend the Republican
rule that a Republican House will not consider bills not supported
by “a majority of the majority” of Republicans. (See Scott Bland
130130 “Why immigration reform could die in the House” at
nationaljournal.com.)

Overall, politically, immigration is important to minorities,
particularly Hispanics. Nevertheless, Hispanics oppose Republicans
and support Democrats for many reasons besides immigration, such as
Republicans’ restrictive view of the role of government. So
Republicans cannot count on gaining many Hispanic votes through
immigration reform alone. Moreover, struggle within the Republican
party over immigration can still produce conservative language that
can still harm moderates with Hispanics, even if the moderates
prevail in actual legislation. In any case, not only Hispanics but
also most Americans want immigration made more functional and more
fair. (Michael Catalini 130130 “Why immigration reform won't cure
the GOP's struggles with Hispanics” at nationaljournal.com. Also
Dylan Byers 130129 “The fight on the right over immigration” at
politico.com. Also Fawn Johnson 130130 “Taming the Tea Party on
immigration” at nationaljournal.com. Also Cameron Joseph 130130
“Republican party fears losing war of words on immigration reform”
at thehill.com.)

In sum, despite many difficulties, 2013 looks somewhat promising
for comprehensive immigration reform. (For a crisp summary, see
Niraj Chokshi 130130 “Why now is the right time for immigration
reform” at nationaljournal.)

Current issues 3.3

As of this week (130127-130202), the two main immigration reform
proposals on the table are the plan of the eight bipartisan
senators and the principles recently announced by Obama.

The SENATORS begin by declaring the present system “broken.”
They then announce four “pillars” for immigration legislation:

Create a tough but fair path to
CITIZENSHIP for unauthorized immigrants currently living in the
United States that is contingent upon securing our borders and
tracking whether legal immigrants have left the country when
required;

Reform our legal immigration system to
better recognized the importance of CHARACTERISTICS that will help
build the American economy and strengthen American families;

Create an effective employment
VERIFICATION system that will prevent identity theft and end the
hiring of future unauthorized workers; and,

Third, hold UNDOCUMENTED immigrants
ACCOUNTABLE before they can earn their CITIZENSHIP; this means
requiring undocumented workers to pay their taxes and a penalty,
move to the back of the line, learn English, and pass background
checks.

Fourth, streamline the LEGAL
immigration system for families, workers, and employers. Together
we can build a fair, effective and commonsense immigration system
that lives up to our heritage as a nation of laws and a nation of
immigrants.

Analysts identify five points of agreement in principle between
the Senate and Obama plans.

(See Ezra Klein 130129 “Immigration reform: Five places where
Obama and the Senate agree” on Wonkblog at washingtonpost.com.)

First, American BORDERS need to be as
secure we can make them. However, the USA may already have done
about 90% of what it can do, even though USA control of the border
is only about half effective.

Second, EMPLOYERS must check the
immigration status of employees. This sounds easy, but is
difficult. So far, employer verification of employee status is less
than 10% effective.

Third, immigrants need a genuinely
possible path to CITIZENSHIP. But they will have to meet tough
requirements and start from the back of the line (as in the May
2011 Obama plan outlined above, at the end of 3.1).

Fourth, the USA needs a sustainable
immigration SYSTEM for the future. The question is, what should
that system be? The Senate proposal includes a guest worker
program, Obama’s does not. (He opposed one in 2007.)

Fifth, REPUBLICANS need Latino votes
and, to earn them, they must support at least somewhat
accomodationist immigration reform. Will that provoke a backlash
within the party from conservative restrictionists as it did in
2007?

As these principles are specified into legislation, several
difficulties may arise.

For illegals, how long and difficult
should the path to CITIZENSHIP be? Current proposals call for
quickly granting them some legal status. Conservatives complain
that, in practice, this amounts to immediate “amnesty” and
effective citizenship. Restrictionists demand that full citizenship
take long yo achieve, in order to avoid rewarding “illegals” for
breaking the law and to avoid disadvantaging others who are
following the law.

What ENFORCEMENT needs to be achieved
before accommodation can begin? Defining standards for future
enforcement could be a dealbreaker. Restrictionists could demand
impossible levels of perfection, thereby indefinitely delaying the
initiation of a “legal path to citizenship.”

How many GUEST WORKERS should be
allowed, and of what kind? In 2007 this issue provoked opposition
from both left and right.

Should family reunion apply to
SAME-SEX COUPLES, as evidently Obama intends? (He mentioned it in
his plan but not in his speech. The Senate statement does not
mention it at all.)

(See Ezra Klein and Evan Soltas 130130 “The emerging immigration
consensus — and its cracks,” the top story that day on Wonkbook at
Wonkblog at washingtonpost.com, with links. Also Josh Gerstein and
Anna Palmer 130128 “Pitfalls that could stop an immigration deal”
at politico.com. Also Rebecca Kaplan and Chris Frates 130130
“Pronouncements out of the way, immigration now faces uphill climb”
at nationaljournal.com. Also David Nakamura and Zachary A. Goldfarb
130202 “In immigration debate, same-sex marriage comes to the fore”
on Politics at washingtonpost.com.)

Some further notes:

On enforcement: Current proposals are for a panel of border
governors to advise the Secretary of Homeland Security on the
degree of enforcement at their state borders, measured according to
objective standards established in advance. The Secretary would
then make the final decision about whether or not enforcement was
adequate. Naturally, conservatives are skeptical that a liberal
Secretary would make a fair decision. In any case, some state
officials do not want federal officials making such a decision.
(Alexander Bolton 130202 “Senate plan would give Napolitano the
final say on border security” at thehill.org.)

On high skills: So far this is proceeding as a bill separate
from the rest of comprehensive reform. Labor opposition to
high-skilled guest workers helped scuttle the 2007 bill, so perhaps
advocates of comprehensive reform wish to segregate that issue into
its own compartment, so that it does jeopardize the chances for the
rest of reform. Alternatively, businesses wanting skilled employees
may prefer that this narrow bill not be jeopardized by the
difficulties of comprehensive reform. (See Jennifer Martinez 130127
“Technology firms holding out hope for high-skilled immigration
reform” at thehill.com. Also Niraj Chokshi 130129 “Tuesday's
proposed immigration bill would focus on high-skilled immigrants”
at nationaljournal.com. Also Jennifer Martinez 130202 “H-1B visa
cap battle looms on the horizon” at thehill.com.)

On the economics of immigration: For effective advocacy,
proponents of comprehensive reform probably need to shift their
emphasis from asserting immigrant rights to designing an
immigration system that will benefit the USA as a whole. Here it is
unfortunate that, amid partisan polemic, immigration politics has
not conveyed a clear picture of the economic costs and benefits of
immigration. Economists have concluded that immigration is very
good for both immigrants and for the economy as a whole. It also
promotes innovation. Even typical American workers probably
benefit. Low-skilled American workers probably do not experience
any ill effect. Another economic angle is that, as Mexico develops,
it becomes less of a source for cheap farm labor. Still another is
that the USA needs to expedite visa processes to facilitate tourism
and associated sales. (See Dylan Matthews 130129 “Five things
economists know about immigration” and Brad Plumer 130129 “We’re
running out of farm workers. Immigration reform won’t help,” both
on Wonblog at washingtonpost.com. Also Vicki Needham 130203
“Travel, retail groups push for White House immigration proposal
provisions” on On the Money at thehill.com.)

总访问量：博主简介

韦爱德Edwin A. Winckler (韦爱德) is an American political scientist (Harvard BA, MA, and PhD) who has taught mostly in the sociology departments at Columbia and Harvard. He has been researching China for a half century, publishing books about Taiwan’s political economy (Sharpe, 1988), China’s post-Mao reforms (Rienner, 1999), and China’s population policy (Stanford, 2005, with Susan Greenhalgh). Recently he has begun also explaining American politics to Chinese. So the purpose of this Blog is to call attention to the best American media commentary on current American politics and to relate that to the best recent American academic scholarship on American politics. Winckler’s long-term institutional base remains the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University in New York City. However he and his research have now retreated to picturesque rural Central New York.