2017年01月

2017年01月31日

Stratforの2017年の予測(2)

This will be a critical year for Europe. Elections in the pillars of the European Union — France and Germany — as well as potential elections in the third largest eurozone economy — Italy — will affect one another and threaten the very existence of the eurozone. As we have been writing for years, the European Union will eventually dissolve. The question for 2017 is to what degree these elections expedite its dissolution. Whether moderates or extremists claim victory in 2017, Europe will still be hurtling toward a breakup into regional blocs.

pillars：中心部分dissolve：解体するhurtling：突進する

European divisions will present a golden opportunity for the Russians. Russia will be able to crack European unity on sanctions in 2017 and will have more room to consolidate influence in its borderlands. The Trump administration may also be more amenable to easing sanctions and to some cooperation in Syria as it tries to de-escalate the conflict with Moscow. But there will be limits to the reconciliation. Russia will continue to bolster its defenses and create leverage in multiple theaters, from cyberspace to the Middle East. The United States, for its part, will continue to try to contain Russian expansion.

As part of that strategy, Russia will continue to play spoiler and peacemaker in the Middle East to bargain with the West. While a Syrian peace settlement will remain elusive, Russia will keep close to Tehran as U.S.-Iran relations deteriorate. The Iran nuclear deal will be challenged on a number of fronts as Iran enters an election year and as the incoming U.S. government takes a much more hard-line approach on Iran. Still, mutual interests will keep the framework of the deal in place and will discourage either side from clashing in places such as the Strait of Hormuz.

spoiler：有力チーム[選手]に番狂わせをさせる相手bargain ：交渉してとりきめるelusive：達成し難いdeteriorate：悪化するchallenged：疑問視するon a number of fronts：多方面にわたってdiscourage：することに同意しない

The competition between Iran and Turkey will meanwhile escalate in northern Syria and in northern Iraq. Turkey will focus on establishing its sphere of influence and containing Kurdish separatism while Iran tries to defend its own sphere of influence. As military operations degrade the Islamic State in 2017, the ensuing scramble for territory, resources and influence will intensify among the local and regional stakeholders. But as the Islamic State weakens militarily, it will employ insurgent and terrorist tactics and encourage resourceful grassroots attacks abroad.

The Islamic State is not the only jihadist group to be concerned about. With the spotlight on Islamic State, al Qaeda has also been quietly rebuilding itself in places such as North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, and the group is likely to be more active in 2017.

2017年01月29日

Stratforの2017年の予測

2017 Annual ForecastForecast DECEMBER 27, 2016 | 13:44 GMT

Stratforの2017年の予測

The convulsions to come in 2017 are the political manifestations of much deeper forces in play. In much of the developed world, the trend of aging demographics and declining productivity is layered with technological innovation and the labor displacement that comes with it.

China's economic slowdown and its ongoing evolution compound this dynamic. At the same time the world is trying to cope with reduced Chinese demand after decades of record growth, China is also slowly but surely moving its own economy up the value chain to produce and assemble many of the inputs it once imported, with the intent of increasingly selling to itself. All these forces combined will have a dramatic and enduring impact on the global economy and ultimately on the shape of the international system for decades to come.

These long-arching trends tend to quietly build over decades and then noisily surface as the politics catch up. The longer economic pain persists, the stronger the political response. That loud banging at the door is the force of nationalism greeting the world's powers, particularly Europe and the United States, still the only superpower.

long-arching：長い弧を持った 長期的な

Only, the global superpower is not feeling all that super. In fact, it's tired. It was roused in 2001 by a devastating attack on its soil, it overextended itself in wars in the Islamic world, and it now wants to get back to repairing things at home. Indeed, the main theme of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump's campaign was retrenchment, the idea that the United States will pull back from overseas obligations, get others to carry more of the weight of their own defense, and let the United States focus on boosting economic competitiveness.

roused：目覚めさせるdevastating：破壊的な・衝撃的なon its soil：アメリカの国土でoverextended：無理をするretrenchment：費用の削減

Barack Obama already set this trend in motion, of course. Under his presidency, the United States exercised extreme restraint in the Middle East while trying to focus on longer-term challenges — a strategy that, at times, worked to Obama's detriment, as evidenced by the rise of the Islamic State. The main difference between the Obama doctrine and the beginnings of the Trump doctrine is that Obama still believed in collective security and trade as mechanisms to maintain global order; Trump believes the institutions that govern international relations are at best flawed and at worst constrictive of U.S. interests.

No matter the approach, retrenchment is easier said than done for a global superpower. As Woodrow Wilson said, "Americans are participants, like it or not, in the life of the world." The words of America's icon of idealism ring true even as realism is tightening its embrace on the world.

Revising trade relationships the way Washington intends to, for example, may have been feasible a couple decades ago. But that is no longer tenable in the current and evolving global order where technological advancements in manufacturing are proceeding apace and where economies, large and small, have been tightly interlocked in global supply chains. This means that the United States is not going to be able to make sweeping and sudden changes to the North American Free Trade Agreement. In fact, even if the trade deal is renegotiated, North America will still have tighter trade relations in the long term.

feasible：実現可能なtenable：維持できるapace：迅速に進展するinterlocked：絡み合う

The United States will, however, have more space to selectively impose trade barriers with China, particularly in the metals sector. And the risk of a rising trade spat with Beijing will reverberate far and wide. Washington's willingness to question the "One China" policy – something it did to extract trade concessions from China – will come at a cost: Beijing will pull its own trade and security levers that will inevitably draw the United States into the Pacific theater.

spat：口論reverberate：影響を及ぼすconcessions ：譲歩come at a cost：高くつくpull：レバーを引く 加速させる

But the timing isn't right for a trade dispute. Trump would rather focus on matters at home, and Chinese President Xi Jinping would rather focus on consolidating political power ahead of the 19th Party Congress. And so economic stability will take priority over reform and restructuring. This means Beijing will expand credit and state-led investment, even if those tools are growing duller and raising China's corporate debt levels to dangerous heights.

2017年01月28日

なぜJames Mattisが国防長官として人気のある選択なのか。

Why James Mattis is a popular choice for defence secretaryJan 17th 2017, 19:27 BY R.A.B. | WASHINGTON, DC

なぜJames Mattisが国防長官として人気のある選択なのか。

JAMES MATTIS, Donald Trump’s choice for secretary of defence, has held many titles in his long career in the American military. He has commanded front-line troops in Afghanistan, run a major NATO command, and overseen all American military personnel in the Middle East. But there is a new role that many appear eager to cast him in: saviour of American foreign policy in the Trump era. This sentiment was much in display at last week’s Senate hearings on the role of civilian control of the military.

saviour：救世主

The hearing was called at the behest of Democrats, some of whom were irked by Republican efforts to expedite a waiver to a law that forbids retired generals from serving as secretary within seven years of wearing a uniform. Since the creation of the position of secretary of defence in 1947, the Congress has only waived this requirement once, in 1950, during the Korean War, to permit the former secretary of state and five-star General George C. Marshall to serve in the role.

behest：の要請irked：イラだらせるexpedite：促進するwaiver ：免除・撤回forbids：強く禁じる

One of the expert witnesses called last week, Eliot Cohen, a former Bush-era State Department official and self-described “ring leader” of Republican foreign-policy experts who campaigned openly against Mr Trump, testified that although he was strongly opposed to the idea of former generals taking the army’s top civilian post, he favoured Mr Mattis largely because of the particular nature of the president-elect. A Secretary Mattis, he said, “would be a stabilising and moderating force, preventing wildly stupid, dangerous, or illegal things from happening, and over time, helping to steer American foreign and security policy in a sound and sensible direction”.

ring leader：首謀者・ボスtestified：証言するsteer：みちびくsensible：分別のある

It was perhaps similar reasoning that led Ash Carter, Mr Mattis’s would-be predecessor, to praise the retired general. Other Democrats have also pitched in with words of support for Mr Mattis. Seth Moulton, an Iraq war veteran and Democratic congressman from reliably blue-Massachusetts, wrote an op-ed in USA Today subtitled: “Democrats should make him Defence secretary before Trump changes his mind.”

pitched：協力する

The chorus of praise has rung out on the other side of the Atlantic, too. Michael Fallon, Britain’s defence secretary, took the unusual step of publicly praising Mr Mattis’s selection before any confirmation hearings had begun. When asked in interviews about potential conflicts between Britain and some of the more iconoclastic policies broached by Mr Trump, Mr Fallon has repeatedly downplayed potential clashes, citing Mr Mattis as evidence of continuity in key strategic areas, such as working with NATO, an alliance Mr Trump has at times disparaged, and standing up to Russia.

Earlier this month, speaking at the Council of Foreign Relations, a hotbed of traditionalist foreign policy, in Washington, DC, Adrian Bradshaw, a British general and the deputy military commander of NATO, praised Mr Mattis’s judgment and experience and said that: “An incoming administration could do a lot worse than to listen very carefully to his advice.”

hotbed：温床

It is easy to understand by so many regard Mr Mattis as a steadying force. Unlike the president-elect who is keen on the brevity afforded by Twitter, the general is an avid writer and reader, who is said carry a copy of Marcus Aurelius’s “Meditations”. He is well versed in working within America’s traditional alliance systems. He is no fan of the Kremlin, testifying before his confirmation hearing last week that there is an “increasing number of areas where we're going to have to confront Russia”.

But some who know Mr Mattis well are cautioning against the messianic view of the former general with the military call-sign “Chaos.” Kori Shake, another former Bush-era national-security official, who co-edited a book on civilian-military relations with Mr Mattis, took to Twitter this month to downplay the grand expectations being hoisted upon him. “Expectation [that] Mattis will fix foreign policy unreasonable [because] it’s not the SECDEF's primary job,” she wrote. She also noted that Mr Trump’s pick for national security adviser, Michael Flynn, a retired general whose views are more closely aligned with those of the president-elect, would be likely to have the “last word” on policy due to his influence over the president.

messianic：救世主的なcall-sign：無線局の呼び出し符号Chaos：大混乱downplay：控えめに言うhoisted：持ち上げるSECDEF：secretary of defence

Mr Mattis is not the only former general upon whom security-policy traditionalists are hanging their hopes. Claire McCaskill, the top ranking Democrat on the committee responsible for Homeland Security, signalled that she would be backing Mr Trump’s pick John Kelly, another retired US Marine general. “I’m confident he will be a moderating influence on the incoming administration,” she said. It was no doubt such a desire to introduce a check on Mr Trump that led members of the Senate to put aside their concerns about civilian control of the military and vote overwhelmingly to wave Mr Mattis through on January 13th, with 81 votes in favour to 17 against.

2017年01月27日

ロシアの次の敵は誰か？

And for the most part this approach worked well for Putin, aided in no small part by some U.S. policies, including NATO's expansion eastward. No matter how bad things got inside Russia, there was always someone else to pin it on. It wasn't always Washington, either. Europe was occasionally portrayed as Moscow's enemy, especially during Ukraine's Euromaidan uprising in 2014. Nevertheless, no country was as useful a scapegoat as the United States.

pin it on：責任・罪をなすりつけるeither：どちらにしても Euromaidan：literally "Euro[pean] Square" was a wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine, which began on the night of 21 November 2013 with public protests in Maidan Nezalezhnosti ("Independence Square") in Kiev, demanding closer European integration.

Opinion polls show just how successful Putin's strategy has been. While 73 percent of Russians think their economy has stagnated, 88 percent are confident in Putin's ability to handle international affairs. Thanks to the Kremlin's propaganda efforts, citizens have also grown nostalgic for their Soviet past; 69 percent believe the dissolution of the Soviet Union hurt Russia. Their views of the West, meanwhile, are at an all-time low: Only 15 percent of Russians see the United States in a positive light, and only 31 percent have a favorable opinion of the European Union. That's the result of a targeted media strategy. That's the result of having an enemy to blame.

stagnated：停滞するdissolution：解体meanwhile：一方では

Big Shoes to FillThe outcome of the United States' Nov. 9 election may have thrown out Putin's entire playbook. Trump is well-known among the Russian oligarchs: He has business ties with some, and once lived in the same building (the Miami Trump Tower) as others. By all appearances, the relationship between Washington and Moscow seems destined to get much friendlier once Trump takes office. Who, then, will Russian citizens hold accountable for their country's problems?

have big shoes to fill： 〔優秀だった前任者の後任として〕重責を担うthrown：却下するoligarchs：ロシアの新興財閥By all appearances：外から見る限りではhold accountable：国の問題に責任を持つ

Russia's new nemesis should match its ambitions, which are neither small nor insignificant. Europe might fit the bill, but at the moment it has been swept up in a wave of nationalism, a sentiment near and dear to Putin's heart. Europe's far-right political parties espouse socially conservative beliefs that the Russian president has advocated as well, and National Front leader Marine Le Pen has declared Putin a defender of European values. As these far-right parties gain momentum across the Continent, Europe's moderates may be loath to openly oppose Russia as they compete for re-election.

Perhaps China, then. But alienating the second-largest economy in the world, and a significant source of investment in Russian energy, transport and infrastructure projects, is not a good idea for a country already staggering under the weight of sanctions. Who else? Ukraine? Too small. Africa? Too poor. Australia or New Zealand? Too peaceful, and too distant. Clearly, finding a replacement for the United States is not so simple a task. Even terrorist groups like the Islamic State — a natural enemy to many countries — would not work, because the shared threat they pose encourages more cooperation than antagonism.

alienating：を疎外するstaggering：よろめくantagonism：敵対

The Threat From WithinSo, Russia will be forced to look inward, searching among its own for a political patsy. In many ways the hunt has already begun: Putin has labeled human rights activists "national traitors," while residents with dual passports or citizenship elsewhere can be fined and possibly deported as spies. Nonprofits, charities and independent polling companies are required to register as "foreign agents" if they receive funding from abroad and are said to be engaged in "political activity" (a term so vague it can be applied to nearly anyone).

Within：内部からpatsy：カモtraitors：反逆者polling：世論調査をする

These institutions are then barred from working with state organizations, and the financial reports they must submit are so complicated that they often get in the way of day-to-day operations. Although there are still a handful of independent media outlets in Russia, they are struggling to survive, and many have had to resort to self-censorship in an effort to avoid exorbitant fines, firings or closure.

resort：仕方なく頼るself-censorship：自主検閲exorbitant：途方もないfirings：解雇

The state has also found an ally in its crackdown: the Russian Orthodox Church. Several extremist groups belonging to the church have earned a reputation for trashing company offices, destroying books deemed heretical, vandalizing artwork and leveling accusations against atheist or opposition bloggers. This, coupled with the Kremlin's own measures, has woven an oppressive blanket over Russian society intended to stifle any voice of dissent. A student who attends his first protest, a man who plays Pokemon Go in a temple, a woman who texts her friend about military tanks passing by — all could be deemed enemies of the state and imprisoned. As it currently stands in Russia, freedoms of speech and expression end the moment they are found to be slanderous to the country or its history, values and way of life.

Under these circumstances every Russian is vulnerable, and it is only a matter of time until people start asking themselves why. In 2012 they did just that, and Putin told protesters that the United States was the cause of their troubles. Now, with no foreign target at the ready, Russia itself could become Putin's worst enemy. If the past five years are any indication, Russians have learned how to organize themselves into groups, whether small gatherings that help the elderly or large volunteer organizations that provide services more effectively than the state. And maybe, if Russians are given the chance to see how broken their country's institutions truly are after decades of government mismanagement, they can take the steps needed to fix them.

ロシアの次の敵は誰か？

The Hunt for Russia's Next EnemyGlobal Affairs JANUARY 14, 2017 | 14:11 GMT By Ksenia Semenova StratforRussian President Vladimir Putin speaks during his annual press conference in Moscow on Dec. 23, 2016.

ロシアの次の敵は誰か？

The election of a U.S. presidential candidate who is friendly to Moscow has undermined Putin's entire diplomatic strategy. (ALEXEI DRUZHININ/AFP/Getty Images)

undermined：蝕む

Editor's Note: The Global Affairs column is curated by Stratfor's board of contributors, a diverse group of thinkers whose expertise inspires rigorous and innovative thought. Their opinions are their own and serve to complement and even challenge our beliefs. We welcome that challenge, and we hope our readers do too.

curated：企画するrigorous：厳格な

Alexander III, the conservative Russian emperor who ruled from 1881 to 1894, once famously remarked to his ministers that Russia has only two allies: its army and its navy. "The others," he said, "will go against us at the first opportunity."

at the first opportunity：チャンスがあり次第

Russian President Vladimir Putin recalled these words in a 2015 speech, adding that he quite agreed with them. At the time, Putin held every card he needed to point to the West and proclaim that the world stood against Russia, leaving it with only its forces for protection. But as the incoming administration of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump moves to embrace Russia and question the West's assumptions about NATO — just as the Europeans have begun to look for warmer ties to the east — Russia's diplomatic environment has started to change. And one thing Putin certainly understands, as Alexander III did, is the Russian government's need for an external enemy. This raises the question: In the new strategic environment that is emerging, who will that enemy be?

proclaim：公然と述べる

Replacing a Longtime RivalFor a century, with the exception of a few brief moments, the United States has been Russia's main adversary. After all, blaming the Americans for all of Russia's woes was a matter of convenience: The Kremlin simply fanned the flames of hatred, keeping its population's attention fixed far from the problems unfolding inside its borders.

woes：苦難unfolding：展開する

But for the most part, Russia considers Trump a friend — at least from my vantage point in Moscow. During the presidential primaries, Russia's state-run television stations enthusiastically praised him, almost as if we Russians were preparing to vote for him, rather than the Americans. Many parts of the country — including the Kremlin, judging by its forgiving response to Washington's recent expulsion of 35 Russian diplomats — have since celebrated his victory.

vantage：有利な観点primaries：予備選挙

What is Global Affairs?In losing an enemy, though, Russia seems to have gained a new problem. The country's enmity toward America has long been the lifeblood of Russian politics, and without it, Moscow seems bent on finding a replacement — perhaps even one inside Russia.

enmity：敵意

Enemy of the StateIn 2011, then-President Dmitri Medvedev called on the ruling United Russia party to endorse Putin's decision to run for the presidency in 2012. He went so far as to declare that,

"By our common efforts we've managed to preserve and restore our beloved fatherland, our Russia. And we will not give it back to anyone. We will not give it back to those who want to destroy it, to those who deceive people by giving them empty and unfeasible slogans and promises."

beloved：最愛のfatherland：祖国deceive：騙すunfeasible：実現困難な

This blatant attempt to preserve the party's grip on power through unconstitutional means triggered massive protests. Unrest periodically flared from December 2011 to July 2013, leading to the arrests of more than 5,000 people in Moscow and its outskirts alone. Some of those protesters remain in prison today.

blatant：露骨なunconstitutional：憲法違反の

It is no surprise that Putin quickly criminalized protests, even those that were peaceful, after taking office. By July 2014, the Kremlin had instated a law that automatically slapped jail sentences of up to five years on anyone detained at unsanctioned demonstrations more than once in a 180-day span. (And of course, nearly all demonstrations with the exception of pro-government ones are unsanctioned.) Now even a single demonstrator can be considered a threat to the state. The Russian government has also taken to targeting the friends and families of prominent activists, an effort no doubt intended to avoid opposition figures making martyrs of themselves.

instated：任ずるunsanctioned：許可されていないmartyrs：自己を犠牲にする

Even so, the Kremlin's crackdown was intended to cow a fairly small audience — the "liberal opposition" — that historically has had little influence on the majority of Russian citizens. In fact, most of the population already supports Putin. But to ensure its continued loyalty, the president has traditionally relied on propaganda and foreign scapegoats.

cow：脅す

Shifting the BlameThis is by no means a new approach. The Soviet Union made generous use of propaganda — particularly against the United States — in the decades following the 1917 October Revolution. U.S. government hostility to the Soviet Union since its inception greatly aided Moscow's efforts. Washington, for example, backed small anti-Bolshevik groups like the White Army while Vladimir Lenin and his successors denounced the evils of American capitalism. Though the two countries established diplomatic ties in 1933, the acrimony between them remained.

by no means：けっして〜ではない。inception：発足acrimony：とげとげしさ

World War II pulled the United States and Soviet Union into a marriage of convenience. But it did not last long, and when the war came to an end, it was clear that their ideological differences had not been resolved. By 1945, mutual distrust and the fear of Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe had laid the groundwork for the Cold War. The decadeslong struggle between two superpowers began, and a clash of ideological, economic, technological and geopolitical principles engulfed the world. From Moscow's point of view, America — the epitome of the decaying West — was inimical to the socialist paradise that awaited the Soviet empire.

groundwork：基礎engulfed：を襲うepitome：縮図decaying：腐敗するinimical：敵対している

When Russia undertook its brief, albeit volatile, democratic experiment in the 1990s, hope that the two states could get along was rekindled. Shortly after Putin rose to power in 2000, however, he began to rebuild the wall between them. Throughout his time in office, Putin has consistently stuck to a single message: When Russia tries to rise from its knees, the United States seeks to knock it back down.

2017年01月26日

テレサメイはイギリスは完全なBrexitを目指すと決意する。

FOR the past few months Theresa May and her ministers have allowed some ambiguities to swirl around Britain’s future relationship with the European Union. Yes, she confirmed in her conference speech in October, Brexit would take it beyond the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and the EU’s free movement regime. Some found this hard to square with reports that special arrangements would be sought for parts of the British economy (like the City of London and carmaking) or with Mrs May’s assurance to businesses that she would seek to avoid a “cliff edge” on Britain’s exit from the club. Many in other European capitals questioned whether Britain would leave at all.

To the extent that such uncertainties persisted despite her endless choruses of “Brexit means Brexit”, at a speech to EU ambassadors in London on January 17th Mrs May put them to the sword. Britain will leave the single market and the customs union, and will thus be able to negotiate its own trade deals with third-party economies. It will not pay “huge sums” to secure sectoral access (a phrase whose precise meaning now matters a lot). She wants this all wrapped up within the two years permitted by Article 50, the exit process she will launch by the end of March; ideally with a “phased process of implementation” afterwards covering things like immigration controls and financial regulation. In other words there will be no formal transitional period. There will, in fact, be a cliff edge of sorts.

This reflects two realities to which policymakers in Britain and on the continent must now get accustomed. First, Mrs May unequivocally interprets the vote for Brexit as a vote for lower immigration even at the cost of some prosperity. Never mind that the polling evidence supporting this assumption is limited: such is now the transaction at the heart of the new government’s political strategy. Second, even allowing for a certain amount of expectation-management, it seems Mrs May is not placing huge importance on the outcome of the talks. She wants a comprehensive free-trade agreement (FTA) based on the one recently signed between the EU and Canada; but where “CETA” took about seven years to negotiate, she has permitted herself two.

accustomed：することに慣れているunequivocally：曖昧でないtransaction：処置

She said that this might cover finance and cars, but also recognised the importance the EU places on the “four freedoms” (making freedom of movement a condition of market membership), suggesting a realism about the extent of any such FTA in the narrow time constraints available. Mrs May also wants some associate membership of the customs union but declared herself relaxed about the details. In short: she will do her best, but if the talks come to little or nothing, so be it.

relaxed：楽観してso be it：それならそれで仕方がない

Of course, they will be tough. The prime minister will want firstly to maximise the scope of the FTA, secondly to maximise the benefits of any associate relationship with the customs union and thirdly to minimise the precipitousness of the cliff off which British firms will fly in 2019. She hinted at how she intended to do so, characterising the country’s current defence and security co-operation with the continent as a possible negotiating chip and warning that her government could “change the basis of Britain’s economic model” (i.e. turn it into a tax haven) if the EU does not play nice. She also said that she would be willing to walk out on the talks: “no deal…is better than a bad deal.”

precipitousness： 急峻なことchip：切れ端

So Britain’s economy is in for a rough ride and, though the government will try to smooth it out, the priority is getting the country out of the EU in the most complete and rapid way possible. If the price of this priority is economic pain, then pay Britain must. All of which gives firms some of the certainty they have craved since June 23rd: those fundamentally reliant on continental supply chains or the EU “passport” for financial services, say, now have the green light to plan their total or partial relocation. It also means the Brexit talks will be simpler and perhaps even less fractious than they might have been had Britain tried to “have its cake and eat it”. The country will eat its cake and live with an empty plate afterwards. Brexit really does mean Brexit.