Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 17:11:20 -0800
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 08/19] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE
in get_user paths
This patch doesn't affect arch/x86/lib/getuser.S, which I find surprising.
Of all the user access functions, I actually think that get_user() is
the one most likely to have the result then used speculatively as an
index (the required second dependent read to actually leak data).
I do *not* see people doing "copy_from_user()" and then somehow using
the thing as an index to another array. I mean, it can happen (copy a
structure, use a member in that structure), but it doesn't seem to be
the most likely thing.
The most likely thing would seem to be some random ioctl() do a
"get_user()" to get an index, and then using that index. That would
seem to be one of the easier ways to perhaps get that kind of kernel
spectre attack.
Adding the ASM_IFENCE to __get_user_X() in arch/x86/lib/getuser.S
would seem to go naturally together with the copy_user_64.S changes in
this patch.
Is there some reason __get_user_X() was overlooked? Those are _the_
most common user accessor functions that do the address limit
checking.
Linus