Tag: WWII

Background

Just prior to WWII in Europe, the Soviet Union (Russia) and Germany jockeyed for strategic ground running from the Arctic Ocean through eastern Finland, through the Baltic states, splitting Poland, and down through Romania to the Balkans. The part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact) that agreed to split Poland is better known, but the Baltic states and Finland were to be part of this process too. The Baltic states were too small to fight off the Russians and gave in to lop-sided agreements. The Finns stood up for their borders and refused to give the Soviet Union the access to bases that they wanted. The Soviet Union invaded eastern Finland in late November 1939. The Russian goal was to secure the Gulf of Finland, the strategic rail lines from Murmansk to Leningrad (St. Petersburg), and the area around Lake Ladoga north of Leningrad. The Winter War would last a little over three months to early March 1940.

Battle of Raate Road

On 5 January 1940, The Finns began a counter-offensive on the Raate Road, near Suomussalmi that ended up destroying or capturing most of the Russian 44th Rifle Division. In an attempt to relieve the over-extended 163rd Rifle Division near Suomussalmi, the 44th had been halted at a roadblock southeast of Suomussalmi around the present day intersection of roads 912 and 843. The Russians hunkered down along the road between Suomussalmi and Raate in what the Finns called motti formations, a logging term doubling in meaning that the 44th’s sub units could be broken into smaller chunks, enveloped, and cut up individually like so many logs. The Finns operated in small units all along the road and spent days conducting close range grenade attacks and terrifying the Russian officers with highly selective sniper fire. The Russians were out of their mind with cold, hunger, and fear. A single sniper round fired by a Finn marksman would unleash totally undisciplined “mad minutes” from the Russians, normally killing nothing, but trees. Soon, ammunition ran short and re-supply from the air turned the starving troops into in-fighting hordes. After 2 days of this nightmare, the 44th dissolved in death, capture, or flight. It was the high water mark for the Finns and showed the Russians that taking the grossly outnumbered, but skilled Finns would not be a cake walk. Although the Finns lost the war and had to concede land within their borders to the Soviet Union, they retained their sovereignty. The weakness of parts of the Soviet Army also planted the seed of contempt in the German Army’s mind that would later lead the Germans to break the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and invade Russia in the summer of 1941. In his history of the Winter War entitled, Frozen Hell, William R. Trotter has an entire chapter dedicated to the Battle of Raate Road.

After a nearly unopposed beach invasion at Anzio and an impressive beachhead built up over a week, the Allied forces began their Anzio Beachhead Breakout Attempt on 30 January 1944.

Background

The decision to heavily fortify the intial beachhead, rather than advance on the Alban Hills, was the source of great rancor between British and Americans. The British Chiefs of Staff who planned the attack and General Henry Wilson who gave the orders for Anzio thought they had made it clear that it was their intent to get to the Alban hills ASAP. The Alban Hills commanded the road to Rome and would be the meeting place with the rest of the main assault coming up from the Cassino area further south. The British also felt an immediate push agains the Alban Hills would also relieve some of the pressure on the Rapido River crossing. General John Lucas (US VI Corps commander), who would command the Anzio campaign, and his commander General Mark Clark (US Fifth Army Commander), who would lead the US push from Cassino, thought the orders only meant a link up point and the timing would be determined later. Lucas and Clark also thought German counter-attacks would make getting to tha Alban Hills almost impossible immediately. Their idea was to fortify the beachhead to the point of impregnability, then move out. This is what they did. However, the Germans were not lax. They spent the week building up a force of 70,000 to oppose the breakout.

Anzio Beachhead Breakout Attempt

In the early morning of 30 January 1944, the Rangers under the command Colonel William O. Darby, began the assault by getting within a kilometer of their objective of Cisterna. That would be as close as they got that day. They were found out by the Germans and ambushed which drove them to ground. By mid-morning, they were being attacked by tanks of the Herman Goring Division and attempted a fighting retreat. By noon, only 6 out of 767 Rangers in the attack made it back to friendly lines. The US 3rd Division continued the attack, but still were a mile away from Cisterna by end of 31 January.

The other prong of the breakout was to capture the town of Campleone near the Alban Hills. Here the British 1st Division and a regiment from the US 1st Armored Division pushed forward with great difficulty. They spent a lot of time just reaching the start line, because of mines and obstacles. Over two days, they got tantalizingly close, but once again the Allied push was stopped short of the town objective. The Allied high command was surprised by the lack of progress and this led them to think the German were preparing a major counter-attack soon. The Allies rushed to re-enforce the Anzio beachhead.

Whether Clark and Lucas were correct about the initial speed of the push out of Anzio or not is immaterial, but the fact remains that the Germans did not counter-attack quickly or decisively and this made the decision to stay near the beachhead potentially catastrophic. It is also conceivable that the lack of an immediate move out of the beachhead contributed to the fiasco at the Battle of the Bloody Rapido River.

A bloody introduction to modern armored warfare

The US Army got its first taste of the German Army in the Atlas Mountains of Tunisia in mid February 1943. It was not a glorious time for the untried American II Corps. Poor leadership by II Corps commander Floyd Fredendall led the Americans to a humiliating defeat in a series of defensives positions and ill-conceived counter-attacks. Almost 6,000 were killed or wounded and hundreds more were captured in the battles around Sidi Bou Zid (14th/15th), Sbeitla(16th) and the Kasserine Pass(19th). The whole action is often referred to in the aggregate as the Battle of Kasserine Pass.

In early February 1943, General Erwin Rommel and his German Africa Corps were in danger of being cut off from its provisions in Tunisia. The American Army’s II Corps had taken up positions in the passes of the Grand Dorsal section of the Aurès Mountains at the eastern end of the Atlas Mountain chain which were blocking Rommel’s way to his northern Tunisian supply ports. Rommel sent two Panzer Divisions to take the passes. They surprised The American 1st Armored Division, led by General Orlando Ward, on the morning of 14 February 1943 with a well choreographed air and land maneuver. The disarrayed Americans were ordered by Fredendall to regroup, with minimal re-enforcements, and counter-attack. Ward thought this was ill-advised, but did not object vigorously. Rommel was prepared and unleashed hell on the unsuspecting Americans with a classic ambush near Sidi Bou Zid. The 1st Armoured was mauled again.

The Battle of Kasserine Pass

Finally, the Americans were allowed to fall back and re-group. The next point of defense would be the Kasserine pass, which was an opening in the range where a road, a river and a railroad track went through…an obvious point to hold. Rommel knew this as well. After probing the line sufficiently, Rommel launched. Already learning the very hard lessons that Rommel was teaching them, the Americans held at first and Rommel had to try again. The Desert Fox’s second attempt was to prove successful and the way was open for his panzers to rush through the gap.

Rommel was in open conflict with the Italians and many of his German colleagues and superiors, so he did not hold the area for long. However, in conducting the actions around the Kasserine Pass, he had taught the Americans a great lesson and it was taken to heart fully.

The Battle of Kasserine Pass Motorcycle Ride Recommendation

I have not ridden this, but would love to some day. II Corps landed around Oran, Algeria in early November 1942 as part of Operation Torch. They traversed northern Algeria to enter Tunisia in late 1942 through early 1943. The ride I describe follows the Tell Atlas range running parallel to the Mediterranean coast. It is mostly on the new A1 highway from Oran to the Battle of Kasserine Pass battlefields in northern Tunisia.

On the 24th of July 1944, the German forces around St Lo, in Normandy, did not have a clue about the hell that was about to be unleashed upon them. Their dispositions looked like this:
To the west of St Lo, you can see the area that the Americans chose to breakout from the close hedgerow fighting that had so favoured the Germans for the months of June and July 1944.

The Allies delivered a devastating aerial bombardment on the German front lines in the area on 25 July 1944. The line did not immediately give way. This was due to the American infantry not pushing quickly at first. Who could blame them? They had just spent 2 months fighting in the hedgerows and had learned to be cautious. Additionally, the lingering shock of the bombardment, which also killed and wounded several hundred Americans was still wearing off.
However, the American Commander on the ground, General J. Lawton Collins, saw no need to delay and committed his exploitation forces on the morning of the 26th. This was risky, because if the Germans had managed to slow down the attack further, it would have meant an American traffic jam right on the front lines. Luckily, they couldn’t and the Americans pushed right through and found the German line disintegrating like it had not done for the Americans before in Normandy.
Thus began the great race from the beachheads to the German frontier that occurred over the next 2 months, including the liberation of Paris and most of the rest of France.

I rode through the breakout zone in 2008. The ride from Gavray to Avranches is an especially nice twisty rode

The Battle of of the Rapido River

In mid January 1944, the slow, hard slog up the Italian peninsula was into its fourth month already and the Allies were looking for innovative ways to break the formidable German defenses. With the plan for an amphibious operation at Anzio, US Fifth Army Commander Mark Clark feared the landing force being forced back into the sea by the German reserve forces around Rome. In an attempt to draw the Germans away from the Rome and Anzio area and further south, he ordered an attack by the 36th Infantry Division from Texas across the Rapido River to the south of Cassino. Secondarily, there was even some hope that the attack might succeed with an armored follow up by the 1st Armored Division that would storm up the Liri River valley and beyond. Clark met his first objective, but failed miserably with the secondary objective.

The Gustav Line

The Allied plan was for a forceful movement against the Gustav Line, of which the Rapido River area around Sant’ Angelo was a central part of, to tie down the German defenses. Additionally, Clark wanted to inflict enough damage to bring out German Field Marshal Kesselring’s reserve forces away from Anzio. Clark instructed the British 10th Corps, led by Lieutenant General Richard McCreery, to attack the Gustav Line on 18 January at three places. The British 5th Divison would attack across the Liri River near Minturno on the west coast of Italy. The British 56th Divison would attack over the Liri near Castelforte. Finally, the British 46th Divison would attack over the Liri near Sant’ Ambrogia and most importantly continue to the area of Sant’ Apollinare and secure the high ground that overlooked the US 2nd Corps’ 36th Division’s assault area near Sant’ Angelo. The 36th’s Commander General Fred Walker had real reservations about his part of the operation and claimed (with some support) that Clark promised the 36th would not have to proceed if the southern high ground around Sant’ Apollinare had not been secured by the British 46th. This issue would prove disastrous.

Anglo-American Bickering

A little background is in order about the relations between the British and the Americans in Italy. British General Harold Alexander was in overall command of the Allied forces in Italy in the form of the 15th Army Group, which consisted of Mark Clark’ Fifth Army and Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese’s UK 8th Army. Fifth Army consisted, in part, of the US 2nd Corps under General Geoffrey Keyes and the British 10th Corps under McCreery. The British and the American military leadership often saw the same battlefield in two different ways. According to Carlo D’Este in Fatal Decision, the British were all about concentration of force, but the Americans liked to probe on a broad front, then exploit weak spots. More importantly, the key Generals in this fight exhibited their countrys’ worst stereotypical traits. Whereas Eisenhower was known first and foremost as a humble diplomat and a great smoother of Allied tensions, Clark seemed pathologically ambitious, vane and held contempt for anyone who might have the gall to cross him. Likewise, where Churchill’s manner was leavened by his American mother, Alexander showed the British aristocracy’s patronizing view of all things American. These traits combined with Clark’s coming of age in the Salerno campaign and finding that the Alexander controlled publicity machine made it out to be a British victory made the ground fertile for bad decisions. Clark held a deep distrust of the British and could not stomach the Brits getting any more glory in the Fifth Army sector. Therefore, Clark had made up his mind that the breaking of the Gustav Line, if it happened at all, would be led and exploited by the Americans.

The Liri Valley

In the Liri Valley plan, McCreery felt his 10th Corps had been spread too wide and did not want to force any particular area too hard for fear of getting in a fight with too few troops and taking heavy losses. This led to the tragically predictable consequence of McCreery’s Corps delaying their start by 24 hours, knowing full well it would enrage Clark, then, despite early success, not pushing to take the high ground near Sant’ Apollinare without having secured a bridge over the Liri behind them. Clark was livid, if not surprised, but was now presented with two decisions. First, Clark could, but not realistically, delay the 36th’s Rapido River assault, because he was already butting up against the 22nd of January which was the planned date for Operation Shingle, the Anzio landings. The Battle of the Rapido River assault was needed to ensure that Kesselring would have to deploy his reserves away from Rome and Anzio. Second, and ironically, Clark had a good choice and refused to take it. Clark could have followed American doctrine and re-enforced the British 10th Corps’s definite, but limited success, but just could not accept the idea of the British getting the credit for the break through. Clark declared the operation was to proceed as planned. The 36th Infantry’s Texans and General Walker would bear the brunt of this All-American bravado.

The Effects on the 36th Infantry

All of this high level bickering and positioning did not mean that the 36th were inevitably doomed to fail, but it surely seems that they were. The 36th had fought hard and painfully in the area around San Pietro in the bloody slog up to the Rapido. They were battle weary and filled with too many green replacements. However, most importantly, the 36th seemed to be filled with the belief that they drew all of the hard missions and the ones no one else wanted. In this case, they may have been right, but that belief in a combat unit is contagious and almost always self defeating. This included their General and at least one of their Colonels, who made their doubts about the operation public, without any notable objections up the chain. The 36th entered the battle looking for failure and they found it in spades.

The Battle of of the Rapido River

The plan was for 2 line regiments of the 36th, the 141st and the 143rd to attack across the Rapido on the night of the 20th and in the early morning hours of the 21st of January. The lead elements would cross in boats, then be followed by the engineers who would build foot bridges for the remainder of the regiments’ troops to cross. It was a clear and simple plan, but the execution was under-equipped and ill practiced to the point of negligence. The fact that so much coordination was needed was obvious to many, but 36th officers were too busy feeling hard-done-to. Some basic exercises were practiced on the Volturno River, but nothing to the scale that was required of such a tough operation. It was as if the 36th felt the result was not in question, so no real effort should be spent in preparation. The engineers were woefully short on the proper equipment and got little support from Fifth Army. Rather than amphibious DUKWs and specially made foot bridges, the troops got rubber dingys, wooden scows and catwalks laid over pontoons. Adding to the mess was the fact that no roads led to crossing sites and the area was open to German observation all throughout the day. The engineers cleared the mines during the night as best they could, but the infantry had to drag all of the boats and equipment forward themselves.

The movement started as it was to follow, chaotically. Many of the boats had been damaged by German artillery and the infantry had not been trained how to handle them or even how many or what kind of oars were needed. The infantry stumbled through mine lanes in the dark, rattling boats and equipment all the way with at least one group straying into a minefield. The Germans were alerted by the sounds and started to bring fire down on the hapless Texans. When some did make it to the Rapido River, they found that it was narrow, but deep and fast. Many of the boats foundered or were hit by German fire. Shamefully for the 36th, a small number, but too many refused to go or fell in the river on purpose to avoid going. Many of those that did get to the western side of the river were drenched and exhausted. Each regiment got significant numbers across, but could not follow up with supporting battalions and the engineers could not keep their footbridges in tact for more than few hours. The tenuous positions on the western side of the river were quickly becoming untenable and the disaster was setting in by mid morning of the 21st. The lead battalion of the 143rd fell back across the river to their start point. This certainly helped them, but it allowed the Germans to concentrate all of their fire on the northern crossing and the 1st Battalion of the 141st. This battalion was stuck and would never be rescued.

By midday on the 21st, Clark and Keyes were demanding a renewed offensive. Walker wanted a new offensive too, but only to retrieve the lost 1/141st and Walker wanted it under the cover of darkness. Keyes demanded that the new offensive should take place in the mid afternoon, but various other foul-ups meant it did not happen for the 143rd until 15:00 and the 141st until 21:00 on the 21st. Both crossings established a perimeter on the German side, but not large enough to get armor across for fire support. These assaults worked no better than the earlier ones. In fact, the new was exactly like the old, only worse. By midday on the 22nd, the situation was dire and all units were looking to pull back, but had their bridges and boats destroyed. In Cassino: The Hollow Victory, John Ellis says Keyes was not having it and demanded that the Division reserve, the 142nd Regiment, be committed. Walker balked, but complied. Soon, however, the losses became too great and the attack was cancelled in the mid afternoon of the 22nd. What was left of the 2 regiments retreated as best they could, but the 1st of the 141st, as a unit, was never heard from again.

Battle of the Bloody River

The numbers tell the soldiers’ story. 143 killed, 663 wounded an 875 missing ( approximately 500 were confirmed later to have been taken prisoner by the German 15th Panzer Grenadier Division ). The 36th Texas Infantry Division ceased to exist as a combat capable unit. The German 15th Panzer Grenadier Division had 64 killed and 179 wounded. Clark achieved his goals of tying up the Germans prior to the Anzio landings and even managed to get the Germans to send their reserves south. However, embarrassingly for Clark, they were sent in response to McCreery’s 10th Corps assaults, not the 36th’s.

Churchill had pushed for the Italian campaign, calling it the “soft underbelly” of the German monster, but nothing could have been further than the truth. The German military machine was probably the best defensive army ever assembled and the succession of mountains on the Italian peninsula gave them a natural advantage. The Italian theatre was as grueling a campaign as anything in World War II and worst than most. The Battle of the Bloody River was its saddest moment for the Americans.

I know very little about the Pacific campaign in WWII, but have begun reading some of the online resources about it. I knew the Japanese had threatened mainland Australia from Papua and I knew the Australians fought hard in securing Papua, but I didn’t know any of the specifics. Anyway, enough of what I didn’t know, because there is a lot I don’t know.

Today is the anniversary of the Australians taking Gona, Papua. Read more, here.