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The big problem in Southeast Asia as seen by Washington is this: How to make sure the Communists understand that the U.S. means business in its commitment to hold Laos and South Vietnam at all costs? Last week, a change of American command in Saigon gave the Administration an opportunity to drive its point home again.

The change came about as a reeult of the resignation of Henry Cabot Lodge as Ambassador to South Vietnam. President Johnson reached for the apex of his military‐diplomatio establishment in picking replacements. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, was named Ambassador. A Deputy Under Secretary of State, U. Alexis Johnson, was given the specially created job of Deputy Ambassador. And the President accompanied his appointments with a forceful restatement of American determination to win, saying:

“ . . . America keeps her word. . . . The issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole. . . . This is [a] struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.”

The command change was not Washington's only warning signal to Peking last week—there were also naval deployments in the Pacific, reports of forward bases being built—but psychologically it seemed to have the most impact. Commitment of the nation's top soldier to the front line of the conflict was viewed in Saigon and other Asian capitals as the strongest evidence yet that the U.S. was not bluffing.

The President made the announcement at a “quickie” news conference Tuesday. He read out Mr, Lodge's letter of resignation, which said the greatest need now was to “persist” with present policies within South Vietnam. Mr. Johnson's reply to Mr. Lodge ended with the words: “As you say, we will persist”

In reply to a question, he said he was sure “our attitude has gotten through” to Peking.

The personnel shift came at a time of continuing danger in the general area—principally, at the moment, in Laos. The Communist Pathet Lao, who had halted their offensive last month when the U.S. began an air patrol over Laos, appeared to be resuming military activity. Premier Souvanna Phouma's neutralist army headquarters reported a new Communist build‐up on the edge of the Plaine des Jarres; Communist supply columns were said to be moving toward a neutralist base. The Government braced for possible new shocks.

In South Vietnam, there was nothing to suggest that the stiffening of the U.S. military posture was having any effect on the Vietcong program to “liberate” the country by long‐range guerrilla war. U.S. military officials reported a stepping up of the flow of supplies from North Vietnam.

And from Peking on Wednesday came what was widely regarded as a reply to President Johnson. Marshal Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, said:

“Nobody should have any misunderstanding. The Chinese people absolutely will not sit idly by while . . . the flames of war spread to their side. . . Should any people [think] they can do whatever they please in Indochina, they would repent too late.”

What can the U.S. do in Indochina to prevent a defeat which it believes could have disastrous consequences in all of Asia?

General Taylor's appointment to Saigon was regarded as a further sign of Washington's intention to “persist” —perhaps intensify—the present program of winning the struggle within South Vietnam's borders, rather than as a portent of an enlargement of the war. This was so because the general is one of the principal exponents of the view that combined economic, political and military measures on the village level are the only ones that can succeed in the end. Strikes at North Vietnam are apparently not ruled out, but not planned for the time being.

In Laos, U.S. intentions were less clear. A new Pathet Lao offensive would put the U.S. policy of deterrence to a critical test, since it would suggest that the Chinese had given the green light to the move and were prepared to escalate the conflict.

As to whether China was prepared to risk war with the United States, what new evidence was added last week was interpreted variously. Some Far East observers detected a marked toning‐down of Chinese propaganda on the Indochina crisis, and viewed Marshal Chen Yi's statement as more restrained than some earlier Chinese warnings. On balance, these observers thought, China was backing away from a confrontation with the U.S. after assessing the U.S. position.

Others were less aanguine. They recalled that Peking's warnings before its entry into the Korean war were widely misinterpreted, and they took Marshal Chen Yi's statement to mean a hardening of the Chinese stand.

First Britain, then the United Nations, tried without success to end the Cyprus crisis. The best they could do was put on a holding operation which has contained the violence that began last December. Meanwhile the political gulf hatweea the Greek Cypriots majority, who want to dominate a unified state, and the Turkish Cypriote minority, who want some form of separation to safeguard their rights, has widened.

Last week President Johnson made his effort to find a solution, but with no more success. In four days of separate meetings at the White House with the Greek and Turkish Premiers he talked over the issues and pointed out the danger that the continued friction between Greece and Turkey, as they supported the opposing communities in Cyprus, might shatter the southeastern flank of NATO.

The first conference began on Monday when the Turkish Premier, Ismet Inonu, flew into Washington. The communiqud issued at the end of the talks on Tuesday night contained a reference to “the present binding effects of existing treaties,” which annoyed the Greeks. They regard the 1960 treaties of alliance and guarantee, on which Turkey bases its right to intervene militarily in Cyprus, as defunct.

The second conference was with the Greek Premier, George Papandreou, who arrived in Washington on Wednesday after Mr. Inonu had left for the U.N. in New York. The communiqud at the end of his visit was curt. Afterwards, before he too left for talks at the U.N., Mr. Papandreou told a news conference that no one was more competent to mediate in this dispute than the U.N. and added bluntly, “I do not see what services other people could offer.”

Another cause for concern was the reappearance in Cyprus last week of General Grivas, leader of the Greek Cypriote campaign for enosis (union with Greece) during the last years of British rule. In a rousing broadcast speech on Wednesday he called for selfdetermination for the Cypriote people. He also urged peaceful coexistence with the Turkish community but the Turks were not reassured, fearing that his return was the first step on the road to enosis and their complete subjugation to the Greek people.

U.N. officials were slightly embarrassed about the general's return but hopefully said that his presence might help to ease tensions. It was felt that he might be able to succeed where President Makarios had failed in disciplining the gangs of Greek Cypriote irregulars who at eresent are responsible for most of the violence.

On Friday Under Secretary of State George Ball reported the failure of the American attempt at mediation to U.N. Secretary General U Thant. Thus the responsibility for a solution had been turned back to the United Nations.

Four years ago—July 11, 1960 —Moise Tshombe, Premier of copper‐rich Katanga, took advantage of the chaos into which the Congo had fallen in its ten days of independence to proclaim his province independent. Just over a year ago with the seceseion of Katanga forcibly ended by U.N. troops Mr. Tshombe went into exile, his political career seemingly in ruins.

Last week Moise Tahombe returned to the Congo to a hero's welcome from a country once again on the verge of collapse. “I am convinced,” he said on arrival in the capital, Leopoldville, on Friday, “that sincere and total reconciliation between all Congolese is the only condition for saving the country from misery and anarchy.”

Thie Tuesday as the Congoless prepareto celebrate their fourth anniversary of independence, the last of the U.N. troops which have held the country together for most of that four years will depart. Already in recent months there have been uprisings against the authority of the central Government in several provinces which the Congolese Army has failed to put down. Last week a new rebellion was sprouting at Stanleyville, the Congo's third largeet city.

These revolts sprang from genuine local tribal and political feuds but they are being fostered by the National Liberation Committee, a group of Leftist exiles with Chi‐ nese Communist support. It is believed, however, that they could be bought off with Government posts. Mr. Tshombe took this up on Friday when he called on the Government to make peace with the rebel leaders, Gaston Soumialot and Pierre Mulelo, He nleo called for the release of all politioal prisoners, including Antoine Gizenga, the political heir of the Congo's first Premier, Patrice Lumumba, who was murdered in 1961 while in Mr. Tahombe's ciustody.

There waa much speculation last week in Leopoldville that when the constitutional referendum which began yesterday is over Mr. Tahombe will replace Cyrille Adoula as Premier of a “government of national reconciliation.” There twas doubt, however, whether an all‐party government would really aucceed in welding together the various tribal and political factions of this large and unwieldy country.

Italy, which has had 20 Cabinets since the end of World War II, appeared last December to be on the way to political stability. After nine months of maneuvering, a coalition government was formed through an apertura a sinistra, or opening to the left. That meant that Aldo Moro, Christian Democratic Premier, joined forces with the Left‐wing Socialists, as well as two left‐wing splinter parties. The combined vote of the four parties in the 630‐member Chamber of Deputies was 386,a clear majority.

Last Friday the alliance fell apart, Premier Moro and his Cabinet resigned, and Italy had a new Cabinet crisis. The coalition broke up over a relatively minor budget proposal—$238,000 in aid for private schools, most of them Catholic. The Italian Left vigorously opposes aid to established religion, and Mr. Moro's allies deserted him. A combination of Communists, dissident Left‐wing Socialists and rightists defeated the bill 228 to 221, Most Socialists abstained. Hours after the vote, Mr. Moro handed his resignation to President Antonio Segni.

Mr. Segni asked the Moro Cabinet to stay on until a new Cabinet could be organized, and immediately began consultations with various political leaders. Another left‐center alliance seems the only likely solution but it will be difficuit to achieve.

The traditional Roman Catholic position on artificial birth control was stated in these words by Pope Pius XI in a 1930 encyclical: “Since therefore the conjugal act is destined primarily by nature for the begetting of children, those who in exercising it deliberately frustrate its natural power and purpose sin against nature . .”

That does not mean that the church condemns family limitation as such. Roman Catholics are taught that they may limit the size of their families by continence or by the “rhythm method”—that is taking advantage of periode during which the wife cannot become pregnant. The encyclical does mean that the use of mechanical devices to prevent pregnancy is forbidden.

In recent years there has been rising debate among clergy and laity over whether the church's position ought to be adjusted. It has been argued that the church should take account of the grave problems confronting the world because of the “population explosion,” particularly in backward lands; that new definitions of dootrine are required because of the development of new methods of birth control, including oontraceptive vills.

In 1958, Pope Pius XII took account of the development of eantraceptive pills. He said it was “illicit” to use pilis if the purpose was to prevent pregnancy. Nevertheless there has been continuing debate within the church over the question. One argument has been that since contraceptive pills work by controlling ovulation, their use should be permitted because they are actually a device for making the rhythm method more reliable.

Last week Pope Paul VI announced in a major address in Vatican City that the birth control question was “under study, as broadly and profoundly as possible” in the light of “both theoretical and practical developments.” He said, however, that he had not yet seen sufficient reason to change Pius XII's rules, and that they would stand “at least for so long as we do not feel 1n conscience obliged to modify them.”

The problem of Germany is one that Russia and the Western Big Three seem to have put aside for the time being, insofar as serious negotiation is concerned. Periodicaliy, however, one side or the other finds it necessary to restate its positions. Last week there were two new restatements by Russia and one by the West.

The Western statement was a response to the signing of a Soviet‐East German Treaty of Friendship three weeks ago. The U.S., Britain and France rejected the treaty's reassertion of East German sovereignty. They reaffirmed their view of the West German Government as the only legal one in all Germany. They reminded Russia of her obligation to respect Western access rights to Berlin.

The Soviet statements, on the other hand, reasserted Moscow's claim that Western rights in Berlin are strictly limited. The Russians protested on Monday over the inauguration of a direct New York‐West Berlin flight by Pan American World Airways, claiming that only flights from West Germany were permitted. (The U.S. rejected the protest and the flights continued without incident.) Moscow also protested West Germany's plan to convene its Federal Assembly in West Berlin this week for the election of a new Federal President.

The statements, it seemed clear, were meant primarily for the record, and also as responses to German domestic pressures — East Germany's need for demonstrations of Soviet support and West Germany's need for reassurance that her cause was not being forgotten by the Western Allies.

For the past two weeks Premier Khrushchev has been on his fifth foreign trip within a year—a tour of Scandinavia. His objective in going, according to Western observers in Moscow, was to build up good will for the Soviet Union as a reasonable neighbor and for himself as a mature statesman.

Reports from the field Iast week were that Mr. Khruachev was not being altogether aucceaaful. Some of his remarks did nothing to add warmth to the restrained reception he received in Sweden, and, the previou, week, in Denmnark.

He told a crowd of 8,000 Danish shipyard workers that their best time to strike wa.s when big orders were in—advice described by Premier Jens Otto Krag as “not needed.”

In Sweden, he used an official . dinner to tell the thousands of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian exiles in that country that their homelands were better off as part of the Soviet Union than when they were free.

And he brushed aside an official Swedish inquiry into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who was arre.sted by the Russians in Hungary near the end of World War II and who was last reported alive in a Soviet mental institution in 1960.

Many Scandinavians found Mr. Khrushchev's remarks tactless and boastful, and his refusal to discuss the Wallenberg case infuriating. The tour was also marred by a number of anti‐Soviet incidents. None of this, however, appeared in the Soviet press. There the tour—which he completes this week with a visit to Norway—was portrayed as a “triumph” and the reception as “joyful.”

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