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B. SANAA 2534
C. SANAA 1945
D. SANAA 2440
E. SANAA 2434
F. SANAA 375
G. SANAA 521
Classified By: DCM Alan G. Misenheimer for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)
-----------------
POLITICAL VIOLENCE
------------------
1. (S/NF) Demonstrations
A. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country
that are capable of carrying out significant anti-American
demonstrations?
There are not organized, clearly defined communities as such,
but ad hoc groupings of Yemeni Muslims are predisposed to
oppose U.S. policy in Palestine/Israel, Iraq and elsewhere,
and occasionally demonstrate to express their views.
B. Have there been anti-American demonstrations in the
country within the last 12 months?
There were small demonstrations at mosques in Sanaa (not sure
about other places) to protest al-Moayad's extradition to the
U.S. in Fall 2003.
Since September 2003, there have been regular reports, in the
press and from other sources, of arrests following clashes
between police and worshippers at the Grand Mosque in Sanaa.
The disturbances during sermons include protesters shouting
"death to America death to Israel" and other anti-American
and anti-Jewish slogans.
On March 21, 2003, a march of 5-7,000 people protesting the
war in Iraq was stopped by police approximately 1/4 mile from
the U.S. Embassy; the demonstrators initiated violent
confrontations that resulted in the death of several police
and protesters.
In March, 2003, Yemenis held several demonstrations opposing
war in Iraq, most near the UN headquarters complex in Sanaa,
Tahrir Square and Old Airport Road, all several miles from
the Embassy.
In Winter 2002 - 2003, Yemeni women held demonstrations in
front of the German Embassy protesting the arrest of Sheikh
al-Moayed in Frankfurt, Germany, on terrorism charges.
C. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of
U.S. diplomatic facilities?
The usual sites for anti-American gatherings are in areas of
Sanaa away from the Embassy; however, the above-mentioned
March 21, 2003 event took place nearby.
D. What is the average size of an anti-American demonstration?
Depending on the location, up to several hundred people.
Peaceful demonstrations protesting the war in Iraq have
ranged from approximately 1,000 to 100,000, by some media
accounts. Local press routinely carry inflated estimates
ranging from half a million to one million-plus.
E. Are these anti-American demonstrations usually triggered
by U.S. foreign policy initiatives, military actions, or by
domestic issues?
U.S. foreign policy initiatives and military/law enforcement
counter-terrorism endeavors, as well as ROYG cooperation with
same.
F. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful?
Generally peaceful. Demonstrations must be coordinated and
approved by ROYG in advance; consequently, the vast majority
are peaceful. If not approved in advance, ROYG forces will
disband a demonstration.
G. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to
USG property or injuries to USG employees?
No; however, Yemeni police and protester fatalities in March
2003 were due in large part to the intervention of host
government security protecting the U.S. Embassy.
H. If violent, have any demonstrations ever penetrated our
perimeter security line?
No.
I. Have there been anti-government demonstrations in the
country within the last 12 months?
Yes, directed at specific policies, including child labor,
education and bringing mosques under government control.
Several anti-government demonstrations occurred in Sanaa and
Aden.
J. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of
U.S. diplomatic facilities?
No.
K. What is the average size of an anti-government
demonstration?
Fairly small, approximately 50 to 200 individuals, similar to
anti-U.S. protests.
L. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful?
Generally peaceful.
M. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to
USG property?
No.
2. (S/NF) Macro Conflict Conditions
A. Is the host country currently engaged in an interstate or
intrastate conflict?
No, Yemen is not engaged in any ongoing internal or external
conflict. Host country is cooperating with U.S. efforts to
identify and stop/attack terrorist targets within Yemen. In
this regard, the ROYG has demonstrated willingness to engage
in fairly large-scale police/military operations against
identified terrorist individuals or cells -- e.g. in Abyan in
July 2003 and February/March 2004.
B. If an intrastate conflict, is it an insurgency that is
limited to a specific region or a country-wide civil war?
N/A
C. If limited to a specific region, are any U.S. diplomatic
facilities located in this region?
N/A
D. Have any of the factions involved in these intrastate
conflicts signaled or demonstrated an anti-American
orientation?
N/A
3. (S/NF) Host Country Capabilities
A. Are law enforcement agencies professional and well-trained?
U.S. assistance has enabled Yemen to develop a competent
counter-terrorism strike force (see below), but regular
police/law enforcement are often corrupt, poorly trained and
underpaid. For example, an average officer earns 60 USD per
month. A captain with 20 years experience earns only 120 per
month. A Brigadier General earns 300 USD per month. This
economic condition -- reflecting Yemen's widespread poverty
(average per capita income is less than USD 400 countrywide)
-- fosters widespread corruption that possibly could be
diminished with increased remuneration.
Further, law enforcement agencies face numerous challenges
regarding planning, coordination and execution of complex
counter-terrorism operations. Reliance on manpower is
emphasized over the use of technology. Agencies have
difficulty maintaining operations security and have
difficulty operating in a nighttime environment.
On the other hand, Yemeni law enforcement agencies have shown
a willingness to cooperate with U.S. and Western law
enforcement agencies -- e.g. in the relatively proficient
forensic investigation of the M/V Limburg attack in October
2002. The United States has provided equipment and extensive
training to the Central Security Forces (CSF), a
para-military unit of the Ministry of Interior.
In mid-September 2003, the ROYG disrupted an
al-Qaeda-affiliated cell operating in Sanaa targeting Western
interests. The cell was headed by Afghanistan-trained Amr
al-Sharif. The government provided further information on
the ROYG's investigation into the cell's activities and
members, particularly information on several arrests in Yemen
and Saudi Arabia. (Note: see answer to Transnational
Terrorist Indicators question 6B for additional information).
In cooperation with Yemeni officials, the FBI actively
participated in the investigation of the December 30, 2002
shootings of three American health care workers in Jibla.
The perpetrators -- Abed Abdulrazak al-Kamel, the shooter,
and Ali Ahmed Mohamed Jarallah, the planner -- were tried,
convicted and sentenced to death in separate trials in 2003.
On December 1, 2003, a three-judge panel affirmed the death
sentence of al-Kamel, who will appeal the decision to the
Yemen Supreme Court. Court officials expect that the
conviction will be upheld and passed to President Saleh, who
is likely sign off on the order to carry out the sentence.
Post representatives attended al-Kamel's trial and appeal
proceedings, which were relatively transparent and openly
reported in the local media.
Al-Kamel coordinated the attack with Ali al-Jarallah, who was
convicted of both the Amcit murders and the assassination of
Yemeni Socialist Party Deputy Secretary-General Jarallah Omar
in a separate trial in Sanaa in October 2003. Al-Jarallah is
also expected to appeal his conviction and sentence. No
specific date has been set for the executions.
B. Have they been trained by U.S. agencies?
Some officers have received DS/ATA training, however, the
full impact of this training will be manifest only over the
long term. The Regional Security Office does maintain
high-level contacts within the Ministry of Interior who
received ATA training.
In July - August 2003, 24 host government police
investigators from across the country participated in a
two-week DS/ATA Terrorist Crime Scene investigation course
taught by Evidence Response Team FBI special agents.
The CSF is the counter-terrorism (CT) arm of the Central
Security Organization (CSO). The CSF has been equipped by
the U.S. and trained by U.K./U.S. personnel for the past year
and will continue into the next fiscal year. They are ROYG's
intended primary CT force.
In June 2003, the newly-formed CSF CT unit was dispatched to
the Hattat mountains in Abyan province ostensibly to hunt
down and bring to justice those responsible for an attack on
a Red Crescent medical convoy the week before. However, this
was a cameo appearance. In fact, front-line CSO troops were
actually engaged. CSO troops were at the lead of this effort
when Ministry of Defense forces became bogged down by
harassing gunfire from the surrounding hills. Over a three
day period, CSO troops engaged those responsible and
completed their mission. CSO was sent out the following week
to complete mop-up operations.
Per reftel G, beginning in early March 2004, Yemeni
counter-terrorism operations were conducted by the CSF and
Ministry of Defense forces in the Abyan region for
approximately one week. Yemeni authorities informed Post of
the capture of al-Qaeda element Raouf Naseeb on March 3,
2004. The Minister of Interior and Yemen Special Operations
Forces commander noted on March 8, 2004, the capture of four
USS Cole escapees from Aden prison.
C. Are law enforcement agencies confronted with serious,
widespread corruption inside their agencies?
Yes, see question 3A.
D. Are the intelligence services professional and capable of
deterring terrorist actions?
The intelligence services are moderately professional.
Despite ongoing engagement and considerable CT successes,
they have limited capability.
E. Have the intelligence services been cooperative with U.S.
Embassy requests or information and support?
Yes, but often grudgingly. Intelligence services rarely
volunteer information. Yet on some occasions the ROYG takes
the initiative to inform the USG of CT developments -- e.g.
in the case of ROYG success in September 2003 in disrupting a
Sanaa-based al-Qaeda cell.
F. Assuming there have been significant terrorist threats in
recent years, have host country security services been able
to score any major anti-terrorism successes?
Yes.
G. Has host country been responsive (re: timeliness and
allocation of resources) to Embassy requests for protective
security?
Yes.
H. How does the Embassy assess the overall security at major
airports in the country?
Poor, but the ROYG is receptive to additional U.S.-funded
equipment and security training. This view is corroborated
by an October 2003 visit to Sanaa by a two-person
Transportation Security Administration assessment team.
I. How effective are customs and immigration controls
agencies?
Ineffective but improving. Since February 2002, Somali and
Ethiopian refugees have been entering Yemen at a reported
rate of approximately 1,500 per month, adding to the 60,000
refugees previously registered. They are settling on the
southern and western coasts, forming criminal and
prostitution rings along clan lines. Criminal related
violence is on the rise. With USG assistance, the customs
and immigration services are attempting to standardize and
modernize equipment and coverage.
J. How effective are border patrol forces?
In the recent past ineffective; however, a current surge of
more than 7,000 troops from MOI/MOD resources and increased
cooperation by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (to include
collaboration on intelligence and smuggling information) has
generally improved the effectiveness of border patrol forces.
--------------------
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM
--------------------
4. (S/NF) Anti-American Terrorist Groups
A. Are there indigenous, anti-American terrorist groups in
country?
Yes.
B. If yes, how many?
Four are known: Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA); Yemen Islamic
Jihad; al-Qaeda Sympathizers; Yemen Hizballah.
C. Have these groups carried out anti-American attacks within
the last 12 months?
No.
D. Were any of these lethal attacks?
N/A.
E. Have these groups attacked U.S. diplomatic facilities?
N/A.
F. Have these groups attacked U.S. business, U.S. military,
or related targets?
N/A.
G. Have these groups limited their attacks to specific
regions or do they operate country-wide?
N/A.
H. If their attacks are limited to regions, are there any
U.S. diplomatic facilities located in these regions?
N/A.
5. (S/NF) Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups
A. Are there other indigenous terrorist groups (not
anti-American) in country?
Yes.
B. If yes, how many?
Two: National Liberation Front (MAWJ) and the Right to
Self-Determination Movement (HATM).
C. Have these groups carried out attacks in the capital or in
areas where U.S. diplomatic facilities are located?
No known incidents of this type.
D. Were these attacks lethal and/or indiscriminate?
None known.
E. Have any Americans ever been killed or injured in these
attacks?
No.
-----------------------
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
-----------------------
6. (S/NF) Transnational Terrorist Indicators
A. Are there any foreign terrorist groups that have a
presence in country?
Yes. Al-Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), al-Gama'a
al-Islamiyya (AKA: The Islamic Group), Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG), Algerian Islamic Group GIA), Salafi
Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), Hamas, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, PFLP, Hizballah. The Iraqi Intelligence
Service maintained a presence in Yemen prior to Operation
Iraqi Freedom.
In late February 2004, information indicated that the
militant wing of PLO faction al-Fatah was at a
meeting/seminar hosted by Kan'an, a charity that supports
Palestinian causes.
B. How does the EAC assess this presence? Is it an
operational cell? Financial cell? Support cell? Propaganda
cell?
Al-Qaeda: all of the above. Other groups may have links or
cooperate with al-Qaeda.
Per reftels D and E, on 09/28/2003, the ROYG Minister of
Interior held a meeting with the U.S. Ambassador and various
other Western ambassadors to discuss ROYG's disruption of a
Sanaa-based al-Qaeda cell targeting U.S, other Western and
Yemeni objectives. Highlighted was the targeting of the U.S.
Ambassador's motorcade and the British Embassy in Sanaa.
Per reftel F, on 02/14/2004, ROYG Minister of Interior held a
meeting with the U.S. Ambassador to advise that ROYG
officials were investigating a possible plot to attack the
Ambassador.
C. Is the host government sympathetic to these groups?
The Yemeni government is an active partner of the USG in the
war against al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. ROYG officially
supports Palestinian groups, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad
and Hizballah, but support is mainly rhetorical and does not
extend to operational activities.
D. Are there suspect non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
the country that have a relationship with any of these groups?
Per reftel C:
Organization, Nationality.
-- Al-Haramain al-Sharifain Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Al-Ihsan Association, Saudi Arabia
-- World Assembly for Muslim Youth, Saudi Arabia
-- Dar al-Arqam Stationary for Printing and Publication,
Saudi Arabia
-- Islamic Relief Organization, Saudi Arabia
-- Dubai Charitable Association, Saudi Arabia
-- Abu-Baker Salem Al-Sa'ari Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Supreme Authority for Muslims of Bosnia, Saudi Arabia
-- Tibah Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Saeed Qahtan Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- International Islamic Relief Organization, Saudi Arabia
-- League of the Islamic World, Saudi Arabia
-- Charitable Association in Fujaira, Saudi Arabia
-- Al-Bir Islamic Committee, Saudi Arabia
-- Zahra Al-Khalidiah Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Salem Omar Ba'ashem and Omar Badahda, Saudi Arabia
-- Mecca Association, Saudi Arabia
-- Al-Emir al-Khairiyah Committee (Al Haramain), Saudi Arabia
-- Islamic Union (Quebec), Saudi Arabia
-- Hamoud al-Hayyawi Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Al-Noor Charitable Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Bin Saynoon Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Bin Mahdi Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Bayelghoum Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Al-Fittrah Foundation, UAE
-- Al-Islah And Tawhid Social Association, UAE
-- Kuwait Joint Committee for Relief of the Global Islamic
Charitable Organization, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
-- United Arab Emirates Association, UAE
-- Bayt al-Shariqa al-Khairi (Sharja Charitable House), UAE
-- Omar Bin Yousuf, UAE
-- Qatar Charitable Association, Qatari
-- Islamic Relief, UK
-- Dubai Charitable Association, UAE
-- Al-Fikrah Center, UAE
-- Al-Islah Association, Kuwait
E. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country
that are sympathetic to these groups?
Public sympathy for pro-Palestinian/anti-Israeli groups is
widespread.
F. How does the EAC assess the level, intent, and scope of
hostile intelligence services (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Serbia,
Sudan, et. al.) in country relative to potential
anti-American terrorist acts?
Foreign hostile intelligence services, e.g. Syria, are
primarily focused on information gathering for their own
countries' interests, not to assist anti-American groups in
country with terrorist activity.
G. How does the EAC assess the availability of weapons and
explosives in country or from nearby countries for hostile
terrorist elements?
Yemen likely has among the highest number of weapons per
capita in the world, with easy access to varieties of
explosives. Weapons and explosives are easily attainable.
Gun markets are large and well stocked.
Though Yemen is awash in numerous types of weapons, the
Yemeni cabinet approved a series of amendments to a 1992 gun
control law intended to bolster regulation of weapons
possession and trafficking. These amendments must gain
approval by the Yemeni Parliament before becoming law.
Parliamentary opposition to the amendments remains
significant; more than 150 MPs have reportedly signed a
petition to quash the gun control law that is still under
discussion. Accordingly, Speaker of the Parliament Sheikh
Abdullah al-Ahmar has publicly described possession of
weapons as a Yemeni symbol of manhood.
In a separate effort, the ROYG has initiated a weapons
buy-back program, at a reported cost of 38 million USD,
intended to acquire Man Portable Air Defense Systems
(MANPADS), rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and a variety of
other heavy weapons from civilian weapons markets. Citing
the acquisition of over 1,400 MANPADS from January to June
2003, ROYG says the program is a success. There are
problems, however, such as: 1) cataloguing weapons; 2) ROYG
paying over market value; and 3) the sustainability of the
weapons buy-back program.
HULL

Raw content

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 SANAA 000626
SIPDIS
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/NEA, S/CT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2014
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: FEBRUARY 9, 2004, SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE
REF: A. SECSTATE 28688
B. SANAA 2534
C. SANAA 1945
D. SANAA 2440
E. SANAA 2434
F. SANAA 375
G. SANAA 521
Classified By: DCM Alan G. Misenheimer for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)
-----------------
POLITICAL VIOLENCE
------------------
1. (S/NF) Demonstrations
A. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country
that are capable of carrying out significant anti-American
demonstrations?
There are not organized, clearly defined communities as such,
but ad hoc groupings of Yemeni Muslims are predisposed to
oppose U.S. policy in Palestine/Israel, Iraq and elsewhere,
and occasionally demonstrate to express their views.
B. Have there been anti-American demonstrations in the
country within the last 12 months?
There were small demonstrations at mosques in Sanaa (not sure
about other places) to protest al-Moayad's extradition to the
U.S. in Fall 2003.
Since September 2003, there have been regular reports, in the
press and from other sources, of arrests following clashes
between police and worshippers at the Grand Mosque in Sanaa.
The disturbances during sermons include protesters shouting
"death to America death to Israel" and other anti-American
and anti-Jewish slogans.
On March 21, 2003, a march of 5-7,000 people protesting the
war in Iraq was stopped by police approximately 1/4 mile from
the U.S. Embassy; the demonstrators initiated violent
confrontations that resulted in the death of several police
and protesters.
In March, 2003, Yemenis held several demonstrations opposing
war in Iraq, most near the UN headquarters complex in Sanaa,
Tahrir Square and Old Airport Road, all several miles from
the Embassy.
In Winter 2002 - 2003, Yemeni women held demonstrations in
front of the German Embassy protesting the arrest of Sheikh
al-Moayed in Frankfurt, Germany, on terrorism charges.
C. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of
U.S. diplomatic facilities?
The usual sites for anti-American gatherings are in areas of
Sanaa away from the Embassy; however, the above-mentioned
March 21, 2003 event took place nearby.
D. What is the average size of an anti-American demonstration?
Depending on the location, up to several hundred people.
Peaceful demonstrations protesting the war in Iraq have
ranged from approximately 1,000 to 100,000, by some media
accounts. Local press routinely carry inflated estimates
ranging from half a million to one million-plus.
E. Are these anti-American demonstrations usually triggered
by U.S. foreign policy initiatives, military actions, or by
domestic issues?
U.S. foreign policy initiatives and military/law enforcement
counter-terrorism endeavors, as well as ROYG cooperation with
same.
F. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful?
Generally peaceful. Demonstrations must be coordinated and
approved by ROYG in advance; consequently, the vast majority
are peaceful. If not approved in advance, ROYG forces will
disband a demonstration.
G. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to
USG property or injuries to USG employees?
No; however, Yemeni police and protester fatalities in March
2003 were due in large part to the intervention of host
government security protecting the U.S. Embassy.
H. If violent, have any demonstrations ever penetrated our
perimeter security line?
No.
I. Have there been anti-government demonstrations in the
country within the last 12 months?
Yes, directed at specific policies, including child labor,
education and bringing mosques under government control.
Several anti-government demonstrations occurred in Sanaa and
Aden.
J. Have these demonstrations taken place near or in front of
U.S. diplomatic facilities?
No.
K. What is the average size of an anti-government
demonstration?
Fairly small, approximately 50 to 200 individuals, similar to
anti-U.S. protests.
L. Are these demonstrations generally violent or peaceful?
Generally peaceful.
M. If violent, have any demonstrations resulted in damage to
USG property?
No.
2. (S/NF) Macro Conflict Conditions
A. Is the host country currently engaged in an interstate or
intrastate conflict?
No, Yemen is not engaged in any ongoing internal or external
conflict. Host country is cooperating with U.S. efforts to
identify and stop/attack terrorist targets within Yemen. In
this regard, the ROYG has demonstrated willingness to engage
in fairly large-scale police/military operations against
identified terrorist individuals or cells -- e.g. in Abyan in
July 2003 and February/March 2004.
B. If an intrastate conflict, is it an insurgency that is
limited to a specific region or a country-wide civil war?
N/A
C. If limited to a specific region, are any U.S. diplomatic
facilities located in this region?
N/A
D. Have any of the factions involved in these intrastate
conflicts signaled or demonstrated an anti-American
orientation?
N/A
3. (S/NF) Host Country Capabilities
A. Are law enforcement agencies professional and well-trained?
U.S. assistance has enabled Yemen to develop a competent
counter-terrorism strike force (see below), but regular
police/law enforcement are often corrupt, poorly trained and
underpaid. For example, an average officer earns 60 USD per
month. A captain with 20 years experience earns only 120 per
month. A Brigadier General earns 300 USD per month. This
economic condition -- reflecting Yemen's widespread poverty
(average per capita income is less than USD 400 countrywide)
-- fosters widespread corruption that possibly could be
diminished with increased remuneration.
Further, law enforcement agencies face numerous challenges
regarding planning, coordination and execution of complex
counter-terrorism operations. Reliance on manpower is
emphasized over the use of technology. Agencies have
difficulty maintaining operations security and have
difficulty operating in a nighttime environment.
On the other hand, Yemeni law enforcement agencies have shown
a willingness to cooperate with U.S. and Western law
enforcement agencies -- e.g. in the relatively proficient
forensic investigation of the M/V Limburg attack in October
2002. The United States has provided equipment and extensive
training to the Central Security Forces (CSF), a
para-military unit of the Ministry of Interior.
In mid-September 2003, the ROYG disrupted an
al-Qaeda-affiliated cell operating in Sanaa targeting Western
interests. The cell was headed by Afghanistan-trained Amr
al-Sharif. The government provided further information on
the ROYG's investigation into the cell's activities and
members, particularly information on several arrests in Yemen
and Saudi Arabia. (Note: see answer to Transnational
Terrorist Indicators question 6B for additional information).
In cooperation with Yemeni officials, the FBI actively
participated in the investigation of the December 30, 2002
shootings of three American health care workers in Jibla.
The perpetrators -- Abed Abdulrazak al-Kamel, the shooter,
and Ali Ahmed Mohamed Jarallah, the planner -- were tried,
convicted and sentenced to death in separate trials in 2003.
On December 1, 2003, a three-judge panel affirmed the death
sentence of al-Kamel, who will appeal the decision to the
Yemen Supreme Court. Court officials expect that the
conviction will be upheld and passed to President Saleh, who
is likely sign off on the order to carry out the sentence.
Post representatives attended al-Kamel's trial and appeal
proceedings, which were relatively transparent and openly
reported in the local media.
Al-Kamel coordinated the attack with Ali al-Jarallah, who was
convicted of both the Amcit murders and the assassination of
Yemeni Socialist Party Deputy Secretary-General Jarallah Omar
in a separate trial in Sanaa in October 2003. Al-Jarallah is
also expected to appeal his conviction and sentence. No
specific date has been set for the executions.
B. Have they been trained by U.S. agencies?
Some officers have received DS/ATA training, however, the
full impact of this training will be manifest only over the
long term. The Regional Security Office does maintain
high-level contacts within the Ministry of Interior who
received ATA training.
In July - August 2003, 24 host government police
investigators from across the country participated in a
two-week DS/ATA Terrorist Crime Scene investigation course
taught by Evidence Response Team FBI special agents.
The CSF is the counter-terrorism (CT) arm of the Central
Security Organization (CSO). The CSF has been equipped by
the U.S. and trained by U.K./U.S. personnel for the past year
and will continue into the next fiscal year. They are ROYG's
intended primary CT force.
In June 2003, the newly-formed CSF CT unit was dispatched to
the Hattat mountains in Abyan province ostensibly to hunt
down and bring to justice those responsible for an attack on
a Red Crescent medical convoy the week before. However, this
was a cameo appearance. In fact, front-line CSO troops were
actually engaged. CSO troops were at the lead of this effort
when Ministry of Defense forces became bogged down by
harassing gunfire from the surrounding hills. Over a three
day period, CSO troops engaged those responsible and
completed their mission. CSO was sent out the following week
to complete mop-up operations.
Per reftel G, beginning in early March 2004, Yemeni
counter-terrorism operations were conducted by the CSF and
Ministry of Defense forces in the Abyan region for
approximately one week. Yemeni authorities informed Post of
the capture of al-Qaeda element Raouf Naseeb on March 3,
2004. The Minister of Interior and Yemen Special Operations
Forces commander noted on March 8, 2004, the capture of four
USS Cole escapees from Aden prison.
C. Are law enforcement agencies confronted with serious,
widespread corruption inside their agencies?
Yes, see question 3A.
D. Are the intelligence services professional and capable of
deterring terrorist actions?
The intelligence services are moderately professional.
Despite ongoing engagement and considerable CT successes,
they have limited capability.
E. Have the intelligence services been cooperative with U.S.
Embassy requests or information and support?
Yes, but often grudgingly. Intelligence services rarely
volunteer information. Yet on some occasions the ROYG takes
the initiative to inform the USG of CT developments -- e.g.
in the case of ROYG success in September 2003 in disrupting a
Sanaa-based al-Qaeda cell.
F. Assuming there have been significant terrorist threats in
recent years, have host country security services been able
to score any major anti-terrorism successes?
Yes.
G. Has host country been responsive (re: timeliness and
allocation of resources) to Embassy requests for protective
security?
Yes.
H. How does the Embassy assess the overall security at major
airports in the country?
Poor, but the ROYG is receptive to additional U.S.-funded
equipment and security training. This view is corroborated
by an October 2003 visit to Sanaa by a two-person
Transportation Security Administration assessment team.
I. How effective are customs and immigration controls
agencies?
Ineffective but improving. Since February 2002, Somali and
Ethiopian refugees have been entering Yemen at a reported
rate of approximately 1,500 per month, adding to the 60,000
refugees previously registered. They are settling on the
southern and western coasts, forming criminal and
prostitution rings along clan lines. Criminal related
violence is on the rise. With USG assistance, the customs
and immigration services are attempting to standardize and
modernize equipment and coverage.
J. How effective are border patrol forces?
In the recent past ineffective; however, a current surge of
more than 7,000 troops from MOI/MOD resources and increased
cooperation by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (to include
collaboration on intelligence and smuggling information) has
generally improved the effectiveness of border patrol forces.
--------------------
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM
--------------------
4. (S/NF) Anti-American Terrorist Groups
A. Are there indigenous, anti-American terrorist groups in
country?
Yes.
B. If yes, how many?
Four are known: Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA); Yemen Islamic
Jihad; al-Qaeda Sympathizers; Yemen Hizballah.
C. Have these groups carried out anti-American attacks within
the last 12 months?
No.
D. Were any of these lethal attacks?
N/A.
E. Have these groups attacked U.S. diplomatic facilities?
N/A.
F. Have these groups attacked U.S. business, U.S. military,
or related targets?
N/A.
G. Have these groups limited their attacks to specific
regions or do they operate country-wide?
N/A.
H. If their attacks are limited to regions, are there any
U.S. diplomatic facilities located in these regions?
N/A.
5. (S/NF) Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups
A. Are there other indigenous terrorist groups (not
anti-American) in country?
Yes.
B. If yes, how many?
Two: National Liberation Front (MAWJ) and the Right to
Self-Determination Movement (HATM).
C. Have these groups carried out attacks in the capital or in
areas where U.S. diplomatic facilities are located?
No known incidents of this type.
D. Were these attacks lethal and/or indiscriminate?
None known.
E. Have any Americans ever been killed or injured in these
attacks?
No.
-----------------------
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
-----------------------
6. (S/NF) Transnational Terrorist Indicators
A. Are there any foreign terrorist groups that have a
presence in country?
Yes. Al-Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), al-Gama'a
al-Islamiyya (AKA: The Islamic Group), Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG), Algerian Islamic Group GIA), Salafi
Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), Hamas, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, PFLP, Hizballah. The Iraqi Intelligence
Service maintained a presence in Yemen prior to Operation
Iraqi Freedom.
In late February 2004, information indicated that the
militant wing of PLO faction al-Fatah was at a
meeting/seminar hosted by Kan'an, a charity that supports
Palestinian causes.
B. How does the EAC assess this presence? Is it an
operational cell? Financial cell? Support cell? Propaganda
cell?
Al-Qaeda: all of the above. Other groups may have links or
cooperate with al-Qaeda.
Per reftels D and E, on 09/28/2003, the ROYG Minister of
Interior held a meeting with the U.S. Ambassador and various
other Western ambassadors to discuss ROYG's disruption of a
Sanaa-based al-Qaeda cell targeting U.S, other Western and
Yemeni objectives. Highlighted was the targeting of the U.S.
Ambassador's motorcade and the British Embassy in Sanaa.
Per reftel F, on 02/14/2004, ROYG Minister of Interior held a
meeting with the U.S. Ambassador to advise that ROYG
officials were investigating a possible plot to attack the
Ambassador.
C. Is the host government sympathetic to these groups?
The Yemeni government is an active partner of the USG in the
war against al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. ROYG officially
supports Palestinian groups, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad
and Hizballah, but support is mainly rhetorical and does not
extend to operational activities.
D. Are there suspect non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
the country that have a relationship with any of these groups?
Per reftel C:
Organization, Nationality.
-- Al-Haramain al-Sharifain Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Al-Ihsan Association, Saudi Arabia
-- World Assembly for Muslim Youth, Saudi Arabia
-- Dar al-Arqam Stationary for Printing and Publication,
Saudi Arabia
-- Islamic Relief Organization, Saudi Arabia
-- Dubai Charitable Association, Saudi Arabia
-- Abu-Baker Salem Al-Sa'ari Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Supreme Authority for Muslims of Bosnia, Saudi Arabia
-- Tibah Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Saeed Qahtan Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- International Islamic Relief Organization, Saudi Arabia
-- League of the Islamic World, Saudi Arabia
-- Charitable Association in Fujaira, Saudi Arabia
-- Al-Bir Islamic Committee, Saudi Arabia
-- Zahra Al-Khalidiah Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Salem Omar Ba'ashem and Omar Badahda, Saudi Arabia
-- Mecca Association, Saudi Arabia
-- Al-Emir al-Khairiyah Committee (Al Haramain), Saudi Arabia
-- Islamic Union (Quebec), Saudi Arabia
-- Hamoud al-Hayyawi Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Al-Noor Charitable Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Bin Saynoon Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Bin Mahdi Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Bayelghoum Foundation, Saudi Arabia
-- Al-Fittrah Foundation, UAE
-- Al-Islah And Tawhid Social Association, UAE
-- Kuwait Joint Committee for Relief of the Global Islamic
Charitable Organization, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
-- United Arab Emirates Association, UAE
-- Bayt al-Shariqa al-Khairi (Sharja Charitable House), UAE
-- Omar Bin Yousuf, UAE
-- Qatar Charitable Association, Qatari
-- Islamic Relief, UK
-- Dubai Charitable Association, UAE
-- Al-Fikrah Center, UAE
-- Al-Islah Association, Kuwait
E. Are there any ethnic or religious communities in country
that are sympathetic to these groups?
Public sympathy for pro-Palestinian/anti-Israeli groups is
widespread.
F. How does the EAC assess the level, intent, and scope of
hostile intelligence services (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Serbia,
Sudan, et. al.) in country relative to potential
anti-American terrorist acts?
Foreign hostile intelligence services, e.g. Syria, are
primarily focused on information gathering for their own
countries' interests, not to assist anti-American groups in
country with terrorist activity.
G. How does the EAC assess the availability of weapons and
explosives in country or from nearby countries for hostile
terrorist elements?
Yemen likely has among the highest number of weapons per
capita in the world, with easy access to varieties of
explosives. Weapons and explosives are easily attainable.
Gun markets are large and well stocked.
Though Yemen is awash in numerous types of weapons, the
Yemeni cabinet approved a series of amendments to a 1992 gun
control law intended to bolster regulation of weapons
possession and trafficking. These amendments must gain
approval by the Yemeni Parliament before becoming law.
Parliamentary opposition to the amendments remains
significant; more than 150 MPs have reportedly signed a
petition to quash the gun control law that is still under
discussion. Accordingly, Speaker of the Parliament Sheikh
Abdullah al-Ahmar has publicly described possession of
weapons as a Yemeni symbol of manhood.
In a separate effort, the ROYG has initiated a weapons
buy-back program, at a reported cost of 38 million USD,
intended to acquire Man Portable Air Defense Systems
(MANPADS), rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and a variety of
other heavy weapons from civilian weapons markets. Citing
the acquisition of over 1,400 MANPADS from January to June
2003, ROYG says the program is a success. There are
problems, however, such as: 1) cataloguing weapons; 2) ROYG
paying over market value; and 3) the sustainability of the
weapons buy-back program.
HULL

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