Two scandals at Adelaide’s Parafield Airport have raised fears that the training loans debacle has infiltrated aviation, potentially endangering passengers and dashing the career dreams of would-be pilots and maintenance specialists.

On Saturday, The Weekend Australian revealed that a “serious training bungle” at TAFE SA’s aviation training campus had forced the Civil Aviation Safety Authority to suspend parts of the licences of about 90 aircraft maintenance engineers.

While details of the failure have not been disclosed, students blamed fast-tracking and incorrect documentation of practical components of the training in an effort to graduate as many as possible.

Today, The Australian reports that another college based at the airport faces closure over an audit finding that it misled students and regulators, and profiteered from state and federal training funding schemes.

The Australian Skills Quality Authority investigation found that Bruce Hartwig Flying School had issued students “multiple contradictory transcripts”. ASQA’s report suggests the school failed to establish students’ capacity to undertake the training, denied them access to vital study resources and blamed their inability to progress on “learning difficulties”.

Three former students have applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for the cancellation of debts — understood to be about $90,000 each — accrued under the VET FEE-HELP loans scheme.

They are understood to have been part of a class of 23 students who enrolled in late 2013, none of whom passed. Their requests for the college to cancel the debts were denied after reviews that dragged on for months.

South Australian senator Nick Xenophon took up the students’ cause during an estimates hearing last October. He told The Australian he had “serious concerns” about the treatment of students who had amassed huge debts under VET FEE-HELP.

He said the new revelations suggested a “broader issue” around aviation schools. “It’s such a high-profile, glamorous career, but people just don’t get work out of it.”

Some engineers affected by the TAFE SA bungle said it had cost them up to $1000 a week in wages. Others said they were in danger of missing out on job openings or promotions.

South Australian opposition spokesman David Pisoni called on the state government to conduct a full audit of TAFE SA processes and qualifications “to ensure this failure isn’t being repeated in other courses”.

Greens MP Tammy Franks, who was involved in two recent vocational education inquiries, warned the aviation training scandal was “likely to be the tip of the iceberg”.
Bruce Hartwig Flying School did not respond to The Australian’s requests for comment.

The ASQA investigation report suggests it played two funding schemes off against each other, incorrectly claiming money from both VET FEE-HELP and South Australia’s Skills for All scheme.

It had taught students certificate-level qualifications after enrolling them in an advanced diploma, with their hefty tuition fees covered by VET FEE-HELP — which is only available to students at diploma level and above. Meanwhile it had claimed state government subsidies for certificate training, even though it was not authorised to teach the certificates.

The school was an approved provider under the first six months of the VET Student Loans scheme that replaced VET FEE-HELP. A report last month found it had attracted almost $220,000 in loans and no students had passed any subjects. The school was left off the new approved provider list commencing in July.
&..

An aviation training scandal in South Australia has ensnared would-be pilots as well as aircraft maintenance engineers, with a private flying college adjoining a TAFE SA campus at Parafield Airport fighting moves to close it over multiple regulatory breaches.

Bruce Hartwig Flying School has commenced proceedings in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to overturn the national ­vocational training regulator’s May decision to cancel its registration. An investigation by the Australian Skills Quality Authority found the school taught courses it was not authorised to provide; gave contradictory documen­tation to regulators; and incorrectly claimed training funds from the federal and state governments.

The school also misled students about the requirements of the advanced diploma of aviation, issued them with “multiple contradictory transcripts” and blamed students’ “learning difficulties” when they failed to complete the course.

The AAT is processing appli­cations by three former Bruce Hartwig students seeking to expunge debts understood to exceed $80,000 each. The Australian understands they were among 23 students enrolled in late 2013 who did not pass after paying exorbitant tuition fees.

Debts were amassed under the now-scrapped VET FEE-HELP training loans scheme, which absorbed more than $8 billion of taxpayer funds and left thousands of students with massive debts.

Aviation courses were a key driver of this excess. Among the 96 students who accumulated $99,000-plus debts last year, while the program was supposedly being wound down, the most expensive course was a single subject from an aviation diploma at $45,389. The school did not respond to The Australian’s requests for comment. It was established in the 1960s in regional South Australia before relocating to Parafield, north of Adelaide.

It is believed it enrolled 25 to 30 students each year in courses costing upward of $90,000. The school claims its “unblemished” safety record has given it longevity at its base at Parafield Airport, where 17 other flying schools have closed their doors in recent decades. In May, its chief pilot, Paul Daw, died with two others in a plane crash in South Australia’s Riverland.Parafield is also the base of TAFE SA’s licensed aircraft maintenance engineer training, where about 90 students have had parts of their licences suspended after an audit by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.

As revealed by The Weekend Australian, South Australian Skills Minister Susan Close was informed of the scandal in late April.

Although the minister “sought immediate and comprehensive advice”, the public was never told.

Dr Close said legal advice was being considered on TAFE’s lia­bility. “The federal minister knows. If the minister (responsible) for CASA had felt (it) was necessary to go public, he was perfectly entitled to do that, but has not,” she told ABC radio.

Federal Transport Minister Darren Chester said the Weatherill government was accountable for the delivery of all courses at TAFE SA. “CASA’s role is to provide syllabus requirements and audit the course,” Mr Chester said.

“TAFE SA did not deliver the syllabus they agreed to deliver, to the required standard,’’ he said

Typical Chester - spin it around to politics and blame the Weatherill Labor government but you have got to wonder about CASA's oversight of this whole schmozzle...

(09-06-2017, 12:07 PM)MrPeaBody Wrote: Typical Chester - spin it around to politics and blame the Weatherill Labor government but you have got to wonder about CASA's oversight of this whole schmozzle...

You are not wrong there!!

The Australian Skills Quality Authority are an absolutely useless outfit when it comes to oversight and auditing of the education system; having had first hand experience of their ineptitude.

And yet a piss weak outfit manages to uncover this while in the mean time, the supposedly ultimate governing regulatory body uncovers F all. FFS!!!!!

[img=0x0]https://i1.wp.com/pixel.tcog.cp1.news.com.au/track/component/author/87cd1c5a9ea9d7fe70ed0978bfe815ea/?esi=true&t_product=the-australian&t_template=s3/austemp-article_common/vertical/author/widget&td_bio=false[/img]
An Adelaide aviation college has disputed accusations of regulatory breaches that have left its vocational training arm under a cloud.

Bruce Hartwig Flying School has challenged the national training regulator’s findings that triggered its May decision to cancel the college’s registration. That decision is now under review by the Adelaide registry of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

The Australian Skills Quality Authority found that the school had taught two certificates that it was not authorised to deliver, and broken other regulatory standards including failing to give students access to accurate records of their progress.

ASQA said had the college had also failed to comply with the rules of the VET FEE-HELP training loans program, by charging students fees for courses not permitted under the program.

College director David Johnston said the findings were untrue, and in any case related to a course established before he and fellow director David Blake bought the school in 2014.

“This is a historical issue relating to the previous owners,” he said.

Mr Johnston also disputed suggestions that the college had profiteered from state and federal skills funding schemes. He said the VET FEE-HELP rules had not been broken, with certificate-level training — which is not covered by the loan scheme — funded by extra “gap” fees paid by the students.

He said money obtained under South Australia’s Skills for All scheme had gone straight to the students. “Every cent of the Skills for All subsidy was applied to the students’ accounts in an effort to minimise their gap payments.”

Mr Johnston also disputed reports that none of a class of 20 students had passed an expensive advanced diploma course. He said 17 of them had opted to focus on obtaining flying licences rather than the vocational credential, after it became evident that some would struggle to finish the full course in time.

He said authorities had agreed to this “more flexible” arrangement, and more than ten of the students were now working as “fully qualified commercial pilots”.

An Australian Skills Quality Authority spokesman said the AAT had granted the college a stay, enabling it to operate without any restrictions until the review application was decided.

“As this matter is now before the tribunal, it would be inappropriate for ASQA to comment any further,” he said.

Executives at embattled TAFE SA say they are determined the ­organisation will remain as one of four training centres in Australia for licensed aircraft maintenance engineers, despite a serious bungle that has left students in limbo.

About 90 students have had parts of their licences suspended after an audit in April by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority found students at the Parafield Airport campus were not assessed to the correct standards and exams had raised questions as to whether they were taught the right skills. An ongoing CASA investigation is expected to be completed this month.

TAFE SA executive director of education Brian Rungie told The Australian that the issues, mainly around administration, identified by CASA were “critical in this environment”. He said the “training itself was where it needed to be, but we couldn’t demonstrate it”.

“We have students from all over the country and internationally,” he said.

“We have apologised to the students. This is not who we are ... we will continue to work with our students, the industry and CASA.

“TAFE SA is committed to staying within the aviation space as one of the training providers supporting South Australia both now and going forward, and nat­ionally. We need to ensure we drive that quality agenda and make sure students get the right experience.”

Mr Rungie said there were gaps in TAFE SA’s record keeping and they had accepted no new students since the audit in late March/early April.

The situation comes amid concerns about a looming shortage of trained maintenance workers and amid calls for funding for engineering apprentice training.

Aviation Maintenance Repair and Overhaul Association director Ken Cannane said the licensed aircraft maintenance engineers in general aviation was an ageing cohort.

“We need to get the younger people in and give them the experience before these blokes retire,” Mr Cannane said.

An issue for industry is that CASA part 66, which sets out the requirements for aircraft maintenance engineer licences, is not fully harmonised with the European Aviation Safety Agency system, which can cause problems getting the license recognised overseas.

CASA is looking at the issue as part of its review of part 66.

Regional Aviation Association of Australia chief executive Mike Higgins said he wanted to see funding for the training, which ­relies now on state funding to be supplemented by the federal government to ensure adequate and consistent funding is available nationally.

Conflicts between two “parallel” aviation training systems have prompted safety concerns and warnings that Australia risks squandering an opportunity to cash in on business opportunities from southeast Asia.

An Adelaide flight school has highlighted “unintended consequences” of a mismatch in aviation training, in which one stream ­focuses on Civil Aviation Safety Authority credentials and the other on vocational education and training qualifications.

The co-director of the college, Bruce Hartwig Flying School, said a VET focus on pass rates — appropriate for many disciplines but not the high-stakes world of aviation — had left colleges in a bind.

David Johnston cited Education Department requirements for colleges to achieve pass rates of at least 50 per cent in order for their students to qualify for Vocational Student Loans.

“This puts a flight school in an invidious position,” he said. “It can lose its accreditation to offer students VET funding, and potentially be out of business, if it sticks to its safety mandate.

“Or it can try to shove people through who ­potentially shouldn’t be flying, in an effort to maintain its business viability.

“The unintended consequences are horrific. I’m convinced there will be accidents if the policy’s not changed.”

Authorities shrugged off the warning. The Education Department did not comment.on safety concerns, while a Civil Aviation Safety Authority spokesman said issues relating to the loan scheme were “not under our area of responsibility”.

“If CASA has evidence of the required training standards not being met we will take appropriate action,” he added.

VET has become an important avenue for aviation students since the introduction of the VET FEE-HELP loans scheme in 2012. The HECS-style loans, which allowed students to defer paying their hefty tuition fees until they were earning reasonable wages, opened a new door into an occupation often previously reserved for ­people with sufficient cash.

The scheme was marred by wide-scale rorting, unsustainable growth and subterranean completion rates. Loans have been curtailed under the far more restrictive VSL program, which replaced VET FEE-HELP this year.

Bruce Hartwig Flying School has now lost access to VSL, and could be denied any VET funding, after the Australian Skills Quality Authority moved to cancel its registration over alleged breaches.

The school disputes ASQA’s findings, which mostly relate to activities before Mr Johnston and co-director David Blake bought the college in 2014.

The matter is being reviewed by the AAT.

A report into the first six months of the VSL scheme says no students at the school have passed any of their subjects, even though the college has attracted almost $220,000 in loans covering that period. Two other flight schools recorded similar results.

Mr Johnston said subjects typically took six months, and the students had been in the courses for only about three months of the ­period covered by the report.

He said VET measures often failed to capture the complexity of aviation training.

For example, a student might pull out of a course after earning a commercial pilot’s licence, and build up flying hours before re-­enrolling a couple of years later to obtain an instrument rating. “Statistically, we have to report that as a withdrawal,” Mr Johnston said. “That’s seen as a failure.”

He said the field was replete with “perverse” outcomes, such as students failing VET courses but nevertheless earning their aviation licences.

“Paradoxically, you can pass your course and come out with no licences. You may have a diploma, but you’re unemployable.”

Mr Johnston said problems like this could deny Australia a place in a growing export training market: southeast Asia is unable to skill up an estimated 228,000 ­pilots needed over the next 18 years. While they had traditionally trained in the US, the lower dollar had made Australia more competitive.

“From a safety and quality standpoint, Australia is arguably the best place to train in the world,” he said.

Executives at embattled TAFE SA say they are determined the ­organisation will remain as one of four training centres in Australia for licensed aircraft maintenance engineers, despite a serious bungle that has left students in limbo.

About 90 students have had parts of their licences suspended after an audit in April by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority found students at the Parafield Airport campus were not assessed to the correct standards and exams had raised questions as to whether they were taught the right skills. An ongoing CASA investigation is expected to be completed this month.

TAFE SA executive director of education Brian Rungie told The Australian that the issues, mainly around administration, identified by CASA were “critical in this environment”. He said the “training itself was where it needed to be, but we couldn’t demonstrate it”.

“We have students from all over the country and internationally,” he said.

“We have apologised to the students. This is not who we are ... we will continue to work with our students, the industry and CASA.

“TAFE SA is committed to staying within the aviation space as one of the training providers supporting South Australia both now and going forward, and nat­ionally. We need to ensure we drive that quality agenda and make sure students get the right experience.”

Mr Rungie said there were gaps in TAFE SA’s record keeping and they had accepted no new students since the audit in late March/early April.

The situation comes amid concerns about a looming shortage of trained maintenance workers and amid calls for funding for engineering apprentice training.

Aviation Maintenance Repair and Overhaul Association director Ken Cannane said the licensed aircraft maintenance engineers in general aviation was an ageing cohort.

“We need to get the younger people in and give them the experience before these blokes retire,” Mr Cannane said.

An issue for industry is that CASA part 66, which sets out the requirements for aircraft maintenance engineer licences, is not fully harmonised with the European Aviation Safety Agency system, which can cause problems getting the license recognised overseas.

CASA is looking at the issue as part of its review of part 66.

Regional Aviation Association of Australia chief executive Mike Higgins said he wanted to see funding for the training, which ­relies now on state funding to be supplemented by the federal government to ensure adequate and consistent funding is available nationally.

Conflicts between two “parallel” aviation training systems have prompted safety concerns and warnings that Australia risks squandering an opportunity to cash in on business opportunities from southeast Asia.

An Adelaide flight school has highlighted “unintended consequences” of a mismatch in aviation training, in which one stream ­focuses on Civil Aviation Safety Authority credentials and the other on vocational education and training qualifications.

The co-director of the college, Bruce Hartwig Flying School, said a VET focus on pass rates — appropriate for many disciplines but not the high-stakes world of aviation — had left colleges in a bind.

David Johnston cited Education Department requirements for colleges to achieve pass rates of at least 50 per cent in order for their students to qualify for Vocational Student Loans.

“This puts a flight school in an invidious position,” he said. “It can lose its accreditation to offer students VET funding, and potentially be out of business, if it sticks to its safety mandate.

“Or it can try to shove people through who ­potentially shouldn’t be flying, in an effort to maintain its business viability.

“The unintended consequences are horrific. I’m convinced there will be accidents if the policy’s not changed.”

Authorities shrugged off the warning. The Education Department did not comment.on safety concerns, while a Civil Aviation Safety Authority spokesman said issues relating to the loan scheme were “not under our area of responsibility”.

“If CASA has evidence of the required training standards not being met we will take appropriate action,” he added.

VET has become an important avenue for aviation students since the introduction of the VET FEE-HELP loans scheme in 2012. The HECS-style loans, which allowed students to defer paying their hefty tuition fees until they were earning reasonable wages, opened a new door into an occupation often previously reserved for ­people with sufficient cash.

The scheme was marred by wide-scale rorting, unsustainable growth and subterranean completion rates. Loans have been curtailed under the far more restrictive VSL program, which replaced VET FEE-HELP this year.

Bruce Hartwig Flying School has now lost access to VSL, and could be denied any VET funding, after the Australian Skills Quality Authority moved to cancel its registration over alleged breaches.

The school disputes ASQA’s findings, which mostly relate to activities before Mr Johnston and co-director David Blake bought the college in 2014.

The matter is being reviewed by the AAT.

A report into the first six months of the VSL scheme says no students at the school have passed any of their subjects, even though the college has attracted almost $220,000 in loans covering that period. Two other flight schools recorded similar results.

Mr Johnston said subjects typically took six months, and the students had been in the courses for only about three months of the ­period covered by the report.

He said VET measures often failed to capture the complexity of aviation training.

For example, a student might pull out of a course after earning a commercial pilot’s licence, and build up flying hours before re-­enrolling a couple of years later to obtain an instrument rating. “Statistically, we have to report that as a withdrawal,” Mr Johnston said. “That’s seen as a failure.”

He said the field was replete with “perverse” outcomes, such as students failing VET courses but nevertheless earning their aviation licences.

“Paradoxically, you can pass your course and come out with no licences. You may have a diploma, but you’re unemployable.”

Mr Johnston said problems like this could deny Australia a place in a growing export training market: southeast Asia is unable to skill up an estimated 228,000 ­pilots needed over the next 18 years. While they had traditionally trained in the US, the lower dollar had made Australia more competitive.

“From a safety and quality standpoint, Australia is arguably the best place to train in the world,” he said.

Reeling from an aviation training bungle, South Australia’s public vocational colleges now risk losing the right to teach a bundle of trade and health courses.

The vocational education and training regulator has outlined its intention to suspend or revoke TAFE SA’s approval to offer 16 qualifications over unspecified breaches.

TAFE SA has been given 20 days to respond to the notice from the Australian Skills Quality Authority. An ASQA spokesman would not provide details of the failings ahead of the deadline.

“(TAFE SA) has been co-operating with ASQA to work through and rectify the noncompliances,” he said. “ASQA will consider any response before making a final decision on whether to impose the sanction.

“With very large providers with an extensive scope of registration — like TAFE SA — it is not unusual to identify areas requiring attention.”

TAFE SA’s executive director of education, Brian Rungie, said the agency would respond “quickly”, and would continue working with ASQA to address the issues it had raised.

He said the organisation took quality and compliance “extremely seriously” and its internal quality systems had already identified and rectified some of the issues. “We have made significant progress to address other elements.

“TAFE SA will provide additional information to ASQA on the corrective action taken both before and post the audit.”

The audit did not cover aviation training. However, ASQA said it was separately investigating problems in aircraft maintenance training raised by the air safety regulator.
Earlier this month the Weekend Australian revealed that a Civil Aviation Safety Authority audit five months ago had determined that the maintenance course, offered at a TAFE SA campus at Adelaide’s Parafield Airport, had failed to meet training and assessment standards.

The discovery led to the suspension of the course and parts of the licences of about 80 aircraft maintenance engineers, pending further investigation.

A CASA spokesman said the agency had last week reinstated its approval for some of the course activities. He expected other activities to be approved progressively, provided that TAFE SA managed “to address the issues successfully”.

Quote:...The course came under scrutiny five months ago after CASA found worrying issues with the courses assessment procedure during a routine check.

A Civil Aviation Safety Authority spokesman yesterday said its investigation into that issue was complete, but would not be made public.

“TAFE SA have taken corrective actions and a number, but not all, of their approvals have been reinstated. They need to do further work to get back all approvals but are going in that direction,” he said.

“There is still some aviation engineer training and assessment they cannot deliver and they are working to make the necessary improvements to be able to reinstate these elements of their courses.”

Congreve, writing in 1697, is not, today at least, an easy read. The play could be related – in simple terms – to Romeo and Juliette. There is however more to it than that simple tangle.

HEL. Have Hopes, and hear the Voice of better Fate.I've learn'd there are Disorders ripe for MutinyAmong the Troops, who thought to share the Plunder,Which Manuel to his own Use and AvariceConverts. This News has reach'd Valentia's Frontiers;Where many of your Subjects long oppress'dWith Tyranny and grievous Impositions,Are risen in Arms, and call for Chiefs to headAnd lead 'em, to regain their LibertyAnd Native Rights.

I’ve no idea where Carmody thinks he’s heading; none. But, I know the beast he’s dealing with and the obstacles he must remove to achieve his stated goals. He has been witness to the beast defending itself; every day, more and more evidence of past travesties are revealed. Those, have long been evident. How will he deal with them? That, and only that, is the question which demands answer; for all else is platitude and time gaining.

The ‘problem’ is known, the crimes exposed, those responsible are known. Will he dare to deal with them, directly, forcefully , openly and honestly; in full public view?

I like Congreve; one of his most abused lines should sound the warning, clear and loud:-

"Heav'n has no rage like love to hatred turn'd Nor Hell a fury, like a woman scorn'd."

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has taken another important step in implementing its regulatory philosophy and ensuring a 'just culture' approach is taken to safety regulation.

A new instruction from the Director of Aviation Safety to CASA staff sets out limitations on the use of information that may show a contravention of the safety rules.

The instruction clarifies how information can be used when CASA makes decisions about whether enforcement action may need to be taken.

Individuals and organisations found to have violated a provision of the safety rules will be given an opportunity to address and correct safety issues without CASA initiating enforcement action.

Enforcement action will only be taken where there is a deliberate, wilful or reckless breach of the aviation safety rules, where there is a pattern of repeated misconduct or there is a failure to take appropriate corrective or protective action to address identified safety issues.

"It is vital that CASA does not simply talk about taking a 'just culture' approach to regulation but actively implements the principles into our day-to-day operations and decision making," Mr Carmody said.

"Our rational 'just culture' approach means that where honest errors or mistakes are made CASA looks to support the efforts of individuals and organisations to make necessary improvements, correct identified problems and ensure safety risks are effectively managed in the process.

"Individuals and organisations with an understanding and commitment to safety need to take responsibility for addressing safety shortcomings and where they demonstrate the ability and willingness to do this CASA need not take action.

"CASA is encouraging a proactive approach to safety by the aviation community by clearly setting out how we will use safety information and the basis on which we will refrain from taking enforcement action based on that information.

"Of course, if the safety rules are deliberately flouted or action is not taken to address safety issues then CASA must and will take appropriate action.

"I am making it very clear to CASA staff and the aviation community that we will use information in the interests of safety and in a manner consistent with the 'just culture' principles reflected in our regulatory philosophy."

7.1 A person who believes their interests have been or are likely to be adversely affected by CASA’s use of safety information in a manner that is inconsistent with the terms of this Instruction, may challenge CASA’s use of that information. Such a challenge may be made:

7.1.1before CASA takes action to vary, suspend or cancel a civil aviation authorisation, to refuse to issue a civil aviation authorisation, to issue a direction under the civil aviation legislation or to issue an infringement notice—by writing to CASA and specifying in sufficient detail:
•the particular safety information involved (including, if known, the source of thatinformation, and the means by which the person believes CASA obtained or acquiredthe information); and
•the particular provision(s) of the Instruction with which the person believes CASA’s useof the information involved is or would be inconsistent; or

7.1.2after CASA has initiated action to vary, suspend or cancel a civil aviation authorisation, to refuse to issue a civil aviation authorisation, to issue a direction under the civil aviation legislation or to issue an infringement notice—by raising that claim, including the information mentioned in 7.1.1 above, in:

•the person’s response to a show cause notice, or to a notice given for similarpurposes; or
•submissions in support of an appeal of CASA’s decision in the Administrative AppealsTribunal or an application for review in the Federal Court; or
•a request that an infringement notice be withdrawn in accordance with the provisionsof Part 17, Division 3 of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988.

7.2 In claiming that CASA intends to use, or has used, safety information in a way that is inconsistent with this Instruction, the person making that claim will be expected to provide sufficient information to suggest at least a reasonable possibility that the alleged misuse actually occurred.5

7.3 If the person’s claim meets the evidentiary requirements in 7.2, the onus will shift to CASA to show that the use to which the information has been, or will be, put is consistent with the relevant provisions of this Instruction.

Ok considering all of the above perhaps the perfect litmus test for the Carmody Instruction would be the still outstanding (McConvict era) tale of embuggerance of Dom James...

This algorithm was used by the ATSB to support an investigation of a serious weather-related incident at a remote Australian island. Specific hypotheses were put forward regarding the reliability of remote island forecasting, and the analysis conducted allowed definitive conclusions to be drawn regarding the relative reliability of these forecasts from the perspective of the historical likelihood of unforecast weather conditions below the landing minima.

This would seem to indicate that Willow's 'algorithm' will be featuring in the upcoming re-investigation final report into the ditching of VH-NGA...

So does this mean the ATSB finally acknowledge the very real parallel causal factors between the Mildura fog duck-up and the PelAir cover-up?

Well apparently not as it is rumoured that in the title of the 500+ page VH-NGA re-investigation final report, 'fuel management' is mentioned but not a serious weather-related incident (ditching).

&..

Quote:

Quote:An amended Norfolk Island TAF that was valid for the aircraft’s ETA was issued by the Australian BoM at 0803. In that TAF, the visibility was forecast to be 10 km or more, with Broken cloud at 1,000 ft above the ARP. Those conditions indicated that the weather would be below the alternate minima for Norfolk Island at the aircraft’s ETA, but above the landing minima. The flight crew were not advised, and were not required by any international agreement to be advised, of the amended forecast and they did not request an updated forecast for Norfolk Island during the flight.

So on one hand we had two crew that were (nearly) fully aware that their alternate airport had a TAF operational requirement (60 minutes TEMPO YMIA), but on the other hand we had a crew who had no idea that an amended TAF had been issued which automatically placed a operational (alternate) requirement on the conduct of the rest of the flight...

Next: In order to meet the 'evidentiary requirements' of Part 7 (see above) of Carmody's Instruction, we need to revisit the DJ TOE (timeline of embuggerance)...

Courtesy of the FOI Act (note how many times Wodger et.al change the goal posts on DJ - ):

I would like to draw the courts attention to the following paragraph:-

"As the assessment not only involves a proficiency check but ‘an assessment of the holder’s management of an unplanned weather related diversion designed to assess the holder’s in-flight command decision making’ this will involve a flight of significant duration with a diversion near a critical point in the aircraft’s flight range. It would be impractical and unsafe to conduct this assessment during actual flight so the assessment will need to be conducted in a flight simulator."

To the uninformed; this may seem like a fair and reasonable requirement, placed on a pilot. To those who understand the ‘system’ it is an unmitigated stupidity. My learned colleague will object, however, with your indulgence, I will point out some salient details, which have been neatly been brushed over in the unseemly haste to justify an untenable position.

Item 1) ‘[an] assessment of the holder’s management of an unplanned weather related diversion designed to assess the holder’s in-flight command decision making’ this will involve a flight of significant duration with a diversion near a critical point in the aircraft’s flight range.

This ‘check’ is routinely conducted as part of the basic flight test for a Private pilot licence. The PPL flight test is a ‘navigation’ exercise; the diversion is called for at the discretion of the testing pilot. At some point during the planned flight from Mud-hut to Kickatinalong; the examiner will say “OK, the weather is lousy ahead; let’s divert to Mums Farm. The candidate then is obliged to execute the diversion, in a timely manner, without compromising any of the tenets of ‘safe navigation’.

The same pilot, a little later in his training will undergo exactly the same test to gain a basic ‘commercial’ pilots licence.

Further along the road to becoming a professional pilot the same man will undergo exactly the same test; only by reference to instruments and navigation aids, to gain an instrument rating.

Even further down the road, the pilot will require an Airline Transport Licence. To achieve this, there are some ferocious, theoretical, complex questions to be answered in the examination which require the calculation of Critical (Equal) time points and complex Point of No Return (PNR) questions. These questions involve engine and other systems failures, which further complicate the manual (head scratching) calculations. These questions must be resolved, under time pressure – in short, they ain’t easy.

The rubbish at Item 1 ignores the fact that the proposed ‘checks’ have been passed many times previously as have the examinations. To add insult to injury, the proposal ignores the basic pattern of any ‘jet’ class operation – the critical areas of flight are identified, pre departure, and there are no ‘unexpected’ or unanticipated ‘diversions’. The gateways are always identified; for all critical scenarios. Release points, if you like. If AB or C happens before X then we divert to Y. If AB or C happens after X then we divert to W.

So, I humbly ask the court to consider the value of the ‘safety case’ which will be served by this proposed ‘check’; particularly as the ‘victim’ is due for a routine proficiency check, which could be observed as part of the routine check flight system, approved by the CASA.

I call bollocks M’lud, with a dash of bastardy and a spoon full of embuggerance. I ask the court to order that CASA stick it where the sun don’t shine. Thank you.

Quote:..A delegate who is entrusted with a discretion must determine the matter for himself or herself and not merely adopt or rubber stamp a decision made by someone else...

Now in the 8 year DJ CASA embuggerance case I would query whether the former CASA delegate/decision-maker Greg Hood has in fact 'rubber stamped' his 27 March 2012 'notice of variation/notice of revocation'...

Quote:

...to reflect in whole the 'Standard Form Recommendation' from one Wodger Chambers (reference FOI 4):

Quote:

P2 comments:

1) Note that Hoody has straight up copied & pasted part b) of the RC SFR 'Available Options' to his 27 March 2012 notice to DJ.
2) Note that on page 4 next to 'Implications of taking recommended actions', Hoody has annotated 'Sydney to prepare'; and on page 1 Hoody has annotated - 'Roger will you be preparing a brief for DAS and Corporate'. This would appear to indicate that Hoody has 'rubber stamped'/delegated to Wodger to articulate the 'reasons for the decision' in a brief to the DAS, Corporate and therefore by association the Minister.

Besides appearing to be a COI by delegating this responsibility to a CASA Officer who was directly implicated in prosecuting an enforcement action against DJ; this also seems to conflict with part 3.6 to 3.8 of Appendix 3 of the Enforcement manual:

Quote:..Since that is the underlying purpose to the obligation to give reasons, any such statement of reasons should set out the decision-maker’s understanding of the relevant law, any findings of fact on which his or her conclusions depend and the reasoning process which led him or her to those conclusions. This must be done in clear and unambiguous language, not in vague generalities or the formal language of legislation. In particular, the decision-maker is under a clear obligation to explain his/her decisions in terms which can be understood by the persons affected by the decision (see Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v. Wraith (1983) 48 ALR 500 at 507; Commonwealth of Australia v. Pharmacy Guild of Australia (1989) 91 ALR 65 at 67).

Given the potential for any statement of reasons to be used in litigation, a statement of reasons should generally not be issued without first discussing it with Legal Services.

3) I note that it was agreed that the conditions on DJ's ATPL would not be recorded on his FCL (reference top of page 3 of Chambers SFR). however apparently they have since reneged on that part of the CEP agreement:

Extracts from CASA EM Download 009r03.pdf (139.46 KB); under Para 3.5.2 - 'Steps in the CEP and responsibility for reporting and recording information':

Quote:After the CEM and on an on-going basis

The Controlling Office Manager:

Once a course of action is agreed, either at the initial coordinated enforcement meeting or a subsequent meeting, arranges their administrative officer to:

 Amend the TRIM file title to show the course of action (see 3.10 for further details) and flowchart - Coordinated Enforcement Process A.

 Record the recommendation on the Coordinated Enforcement Referral Form and on-going action required:

o In relation to a new matter - on the Coordinated Enforcement – Referral Form;

or

o In relation to on-going matters – on the agenda/summary (for regular pre-arranged CEMs) and on the EAR (for all on-going matters).

As a matter proceeds, ensure that:

• Any interim action taken by the Controlling Office is recorded on the EAR;

• Dates of service of SCNs, counselling and other notices and decision letters are recorded on the EAR calendars;

• Dates of examinations and the result of examinations are recorded on the EAR calendars;

• All documents are TRIMed and placed on the appropriate Coordinated Enforcement –Referral file;

• Consistent with CASA’s regulatory philosophy, the relevant aviation participant is regularly informed as to CASA’s positon on the relevant issue, and provides ongoing opportunities for the participant to contribute to the resolution of safety issues (but this does not enable the participant to direct CASA’s regulatory response);

• Checklists are followed for the appropriate action taken (see the relevant checklists under Enforcement Forms on the CASA Intranet).
Where a decision involves the variation of an authorisation by the addition of conditions:

• Ensures that these conditions have preferably been drafted by and, in any event, cleared by the Manager Legal Branch and that the on-going monitoring, or any proposal to vary the conditions, is also carried out in consultation with the Manager Legal Branch.

Where LSD and the Controlling Office Manager do not agree on the recommendation and that recommendation includes action for which the Controlling Office Manager or their EM would ultimately make a decision (ie action which is not a criminal response such as AINs or referral to the CDPP):

• Follows the process set out at Paragraph 2.9.

Quote:

3.9 Role of the Legal Services Division (LSD) in relation to the Enforcement Process

Although it is only part of LSD’s functions, the Division plays a critical role in the conduct of, and the processes leading to, any enforcement action CASA may take. The Executive Manager, Legal Services Division and each of the Division’s two branches may be involved in those processes.

LSD Enforcement Officer: This officer is the starting point for all matters where, in accordance with the Coordinated Enforcement Policy, it becomes apparent to the technical or operational areas that enforcement action is or may be appropriate (see flowchart Coordinated Enforcement Process A and paragraph 3.5.2.) This officer will also arrange for the publication of decisions as set out paragraph 6.23.

1. Legal Branch: Once an initial Coordinated Enforcement Meeting has been conducted, and it has been agreed that some form of enforcement action (other than solely an AIN or request for a Part IIIA Investigation) is required, Assigned Legal Counsel (ALC) will ‘case manage’ the particular matter (ensuring time-limits are met) until the enforcement action is completed.

Manager, Legal Branch

Where the agreed recommendation is that the matter should proceed by, or include:

• Administrative Action;

• Serious and Imminent Risk;

• CAR 265 suspension;

• Enforceable Voluntary Undertaking (EVU);

• Counselling; or

• Any other action coming out of the CEM in which it is decided that legal assistance is appropriate,

the Manager, Legal Branch will:

• Assign legal counsel to assist;

• Ensure assigned legal counsel (ALC):

o Place their name on the register as ALC;

o Case-manage the matter assigned to them to its conclusion. Where the matter results in a decision that is appealed, either continues to case manage the matter or ensures that they brief any other ALC that is responsible for handling the appeal. Note: This new ALC must place their name on the EAR and is responsible in the same manner as the original ALC;

o Continue to update the EAR with any progress in relation to action for which they have responsibility ie writing to legal representatives of the party against whom a decision is being made or for whom an appeal has been lodged, notification of stay periods and results of tribunal hearings. This includes ensuring that the dates on the EAR calendar in relation to tribunal and court decisions are recorded;

o Arrange to TRIM any finalised versions of documents and place them on the appropriate Coordinated Enforcement - Referral file which has been opened by the referring office;

o Arrange to amend the EAR to show the offences for which such action is agreed to be taken (as shown in the SCN etc);

o Arrange to open a new TRIM file for any appeal to a tribunal or the Federal court; and

o Arrange to advise licensing/industry permissions when a matter is finally concluded or a stay period ended so that the relevant licence or certificate, and relevant CASA systems, can be updated appropriately.

• On receipt from the LSD Enforcement Officer, approve the wording of the paragraph summarising reasons for decision in relation to cancellations and suspensions in relation to decisions relating to authorisations normally held by an organisation for publication and advise the LSD Enforcement Officer.

LSD Enforcement Officer

The LSD Enforcement Officer will:

• Once notification is received through the Enforcement Policy and Practice Outlook Mailbox of any SCN, Serious and Imminent Risk suspension notice or CAR 265 suspension notice being served, or suspension, cancellation or variation of an authorisation, arrange to place alerts on CASA systems;

• Once notification is received through the Enforcement Policy and Practice Outlook Mailbox of a suspension or cancellation – (where the decision is in relation to an authorisation normally held by a corporate entity - even if the authorisation is in fact in the name of an individual) together with the paragraph summary of the reasons ensure the wording is approved by the Manager Legal Branch and request the webmaster to publish on the external CASA internet website.

• Ensure regular audits are carried out on the Enforcement Action Register and TRIM Enforcement files.

My reasons for extracting such a large slab of chapter 3 of the FF Embuggerance manual is to highlight how much the current actions within the DJ CEP (Coordinated Enforcement Process) have subverted the due legal processes as directed by the current EM.

"..In any event, the accident demonstrated deficiencies in your flight planning and judgment, and the weather related diversion, as is expressed on the condition, is designed to assess your “in-flight command decision making.” On this basis, CASA considers the condition is appropriate and reasonable..."

Now I have it on goodauthority rumour that there has been no recent (from 12 September 2017) entries that would normally be required for 'reporting and recording information' in the CEP.

We are also inquiring to whether there has been any entries that reflect the variation to the original agreed to CEP conditions on DJ's FCL(see previous post); and/or if there is any appropriate report/record/ 'delegate notice' that would reflect the change to the condition that the command CTL prof check now has to be conducted in the simulator...

Of course as "K" indicates in - "Ah, With your indulgence M’lud" - all of this is totally unnecessary and irrelevant as there is no such thing as an "unexpected" or "unplanned weather related diversions in high capacity and/or Jet AOC operations.

MTF...P2

P2 comment - The called for observed, practical demonstration could simply be displayed by watching DJ check all inputs to the aircraft FMS flight plan with references to the applicable PNR/CP pages and a brief from DJ outlining what his actions will be if a diversion is required prior to and after those calculated diversion points? - or am I missing something?

Quote: Wrote:New instruction on using safety informationDate of Publication:
Thursday 28th September

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has taken another important step in implementing its regulatory philosophy and ensuring a 'just culture' approach is taken to safety regulation.

A new instruction from the Director of Aviation Safety to CASA staff sets out limitations on the use of information that may show a contravention of the safety rules.

The instruction clarifies how information can be used when CASA makes decisions about whether enforcement action may need to be taken.

Individuals and organisations found to have violated a provision of the safety rules will be given an opportunity to address and correct safety issues without CASA initiating enforcement action.

Enforcement action will only be taken where there is a deliberate, wilful or reckless breach of the aviation safety rules, where there is a pattern of repeated misconduct or there is a failure to take appropriate corrective or protective action to address identified safety issues.

"It is vital that CASA does not simply talk about taking a 'just culture' approach to regulation but actively implements the principles into our day-to-day operations and decision making," Mr Carmody said.

"Our rational 'just culture' approach means that where honest errors or mistakes are made CASA looks to support the efforts of individuals and organisations to make necessary improvements, correct identified problems and ensure safety risks are effectively managed in the process.

"Individuals and organisations with an understanding and commitment to safety need to take responsibility for addressing safety shortcomings and where they demonstrate the ability and willingness to do this CASA need not take action.

"CASA is encouraging a proactive approach to safety by the aviation community by clearly setting out how we will use safety information and the basis on which we will refrain from taking enforcement action based on that information.

"Of course, if the safety rules are deliberately flouted or action is not taken to address safety issues then CASA must and will take appropriate action.

"I am making it very clear to CASA staff and the aviation community that we will use information in the interests of safety and in a manner consistent with the 'just culture' principles reflected in our regulatory philosophy."

The following segment from Estimates yesterday is IMHO a real tell on the true nature and intent of DAS Carmody when it comes to his instruction ( i.e. the Leopard's walk), note in particular the final comment from:

DAS Carmody:"..I will not make a decision till after the ATSB report is finalised.."

Just think about that comment for a second..

Now although the intent by the DAS is to indicate that he will (unlike Malcolm Campbell) be not making any references or revealing any part of the DRAFT report (as per the conditions of section 26 of the TSI Act); he does appear to be indicating that he will be referencing the ATSB Final Report to inform his decision making process on DJ's request for the conditions on his ATPL be dropped...

Does this indicate that the DAS is contemplating breaching the spirit and intent of section 12AA of the TSI Act?

(a) cooperating with:
(i) an agency of the Commonwealth, a State or Territory that has functions or powers relating to transport safety or functions affected by the ATSB’s function of improving transport safety; and
(ii) a person who has, under a law of the Commonwealth, a State or Territory, functions or powers relating to transport safety or functions affected by the ATSB’s function of improving transport safety; and
(iii) a national authority or other body of another country that has functions or powers relating to transport safety or functions affected by the ATSB’s function of improving transport safety;
(b) doing anything incidental to its function of improving transport safety.

The following are some comments/observations I made on a PAIN email chain in relation to the ongoing CASA embuggerance of DJ :

Quote:From CASA LSD Officer:

Quote:...I refer to the documents released to you by CASA recently which included a copy of an SFR from March 2012 that was not signed by the delegate. I also refer to our recent telephone conversation where I identified a signed version of the SFR in CASA's records, and that is attached.

I note that even if the delegate had not signed the SFR, the fact of the delegate sending the attached decision letter to you would clearly have signified the delegate accepted the recommendations in the SFR...

AA refers to the wrong SFR. The one associated with the 27 March 2012 'notice of variation'; 'notice of revocation' letter (references pages 3 to 10 of Vol 1, 19 October 2017 released documents) was signed by Greg Hood (ref pg 7):

Quote:

The SFR that wasn't signed (or apparently even forwarded to Greg Hood) was dated 18 July 2012 (reference pages 20 to 22). Nor it would seem was it accompanied by a further 'notice of variation' (as I believe is required under the CASA EM) by the original delegate/decision-maker Greg Hood; or someone designated to act on behalf of Greg Hood. However the person who the SFR correspondence was addressed -re: Mark Taylor Manager Permissions Application Centre cc Joe Rule - has seemingly accepted the unsigned - by delegate - SFR as good enough to action placing the ATPL variation condition back on DJ's FCL (reference page 23):

Quote:

Now it could be Mark Taylor has the legal authority to take over the role as the delegate/decision-maker but if that was the case shouldn't he have counter-signed the SFR; and shouldn't Joe Rule as assigned legal counsel, then drafted a further amended 'notice of variation' on the conditions imposed on DJ's ATPL FCL?

Finally if you refer to page 68 of the Vol 1 released documents you will note the ALC (assigned legal counsel) Joe Rule would appear to have directed the 'Permissions application officer' to take down the alert on DJ's FCL:

Quote:

This would seem to indicate in the mind of the ALC that the CEP of DJ was expired/closed/irrelevant. This assumption would also seem to be indicated by the fact that there was no 'caveats'/ conditions mentioned or referred to in any of the Flight Safety 'command' Falcon 20 type rating (CASA approved) paperwork (reference page 37 onward:

It is also worth noting that had Flight Safety (probably at their amusement) been made aware of the condition on DJ's ATPL licence they more than likely could have arranged for the wx diversion exercise to be demonstrated and recorded in the final type rating test. Because remember that the exercise only has to be observed by a CASA FOI or FTE (ref IV below):

Quote:...But to put an end to the Carmody/ James argument consider this. At the time James accepted the conditions imposed (on legal advice – not mine) he had little option and it was the only way forward. Since then he has passed, at no less an August institution than Flight Safety a type rating, instrument rating and Command proficiency check. He is now asking, quite reasonably and politely for CASA to accept those qualifications as the evidence they demand of ‘competency’. They flatly refuse. Now they want a ‘CASA’ expert to oversight the same check.

This is a pure case of embuggerance and a double insult to Flight Safety. The notion that only a CASA nominated inspector may judge the James performance is risible; furthermore if FS say ‘Pass’ and the FOI says ‘Fail’ what then? If and it is a big IF the proposed CASA FOI was a ever a professional pilot with real experience, ever operated as Captain, multi crew, international operations or even as a charter pilot in ‘class’ turbine then maybe he could argue against the FS ‘Pass’. Problem is, the proposed man is not any of these things; is he CEO Carmody

Now I have been reliably informed that the many tell-tale aberrations, errors and deletions etc. in due processes normally required in the administration of a CASA enforcement process (referencing the CASA EM), are not necessarily legally compromised in the DJ case because of the CASA v DJ out of court agreement.

However I would argue that this fact was obviously not conveyed and/or completely ignored by Roger Chambers as he attempted, up to a point, to comply with the normal processes associated with an ongoing CEP i.e. the striking up of a new SFR etc.

The fact that Chambers omitted to CC. to the original delegate/decision-maker Greg Hood could be interpreted as an admission of guilt that the terms of the original CASA v DJ agreement had now been breached without proper consultation with DJ's legal counsel.

This guilt/admission is perfectly highlighted by the following extract from the 18 July 2012 SFR:
Because Chambers did not recommend (b), IMO from that point on CASA were operating in total 'legal' contradiction of the CASA v DJ out of court agreement. This should have automatically made that 'agreement' and any enforcement actions after the 18 July SFR letter NULL & VOID.

Reference this year's Malcolm Campbell reply email:

Quote:UNCLASSIFIEDDear Mr De Stoop,On 12 September 2017 you wrote to CASA on behalf of Mr Domenic James ARN 519777 requesting relief from the conditions attached to his ATPL as a result of his part in the Westwind accident on 18 November 2009.CASA has considered the request taking into account the adherence to the conditions placed on Mr James’ ATPL and the accompanying safety implications of the request.Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) 249 prohibits the carriage of passengers on certain flights. A proficiency check as required in the conditions involves practice of emergency procedures so could not be conducted during a charter/aeromedical flight as suggested.As the assessment not only involves a proficiency check but ‘an assessment of the holder’s management of an unplanned weather related diversion designed to assess the holder’s in-flight command decisionmaking’ this will involve a flight of significant duration with a diversion near a critical point in the aircraft’s flight range. It would be impractical and unsafe to conduct this assessment during actual flight so the assessment will need to be conducted in a flight simulator.To reduce the cost impact of this assessment CASA will not charge for the inspector’s time or travel however it would need to be coordinated with sufficient time for this travel to be combined with the inspectors recurrent training program.When you have some proposed dates for the assessment please let me know so we can confirm our availability.Sincerely,Malcolm CampbellCertificate Team ManagerSafety Assurance Branch

Again, here are the terms of the original agreement:

Quote:

Therefore M'Lud, the BRB defence rests and simply calls this a classic case of CASA embuggerance...

Next and in reference to this SBG quote:

Quote:...Nope. James is simply the distraction, shifting focus away from the real story. Carmody dare not, indeed cannot undo the arbitrary restrictions placed on James; nor can he shred the evidence trail of some very shaky paper work doings to support the unseemly restoration to service of Pel-Air. Pel-Air remains untouched and unadmonished under the high speed, slippery edicts and decisions made by Chambers, supported by McCormack, approved by Hood, executed by Campbell, Worthington and others. The paper trail and supporting research all point to a major question? What the hell was CASA playing at? One could also ask why? Or; conversely one could speculate why a Virgin and Qantas crew got away with a slightly more dangerous, similar incident at Mildura, Scot free? The really bold questioner may even ask why is Hood running the ATSB?...

Inevitably this will bring PAIN to the next chapter of the PelAir re-cover-up investigation & DJ embuggerance, which I believe will call into question the original 24 December 2009 CAR 265 'NOTICE of SUSPENSION' decision letter to DJ...

Hint - extract from that letter:

Quote:

This line IMO is extremely important: "...Auckland reveals that you received a weather forecast for Norfolk Airport at 0904 UTC..."

P2 – “Inevitably this will bring PAIN to the next chapter of the PelAir re-cover-up investigation & DJ embuggerance, which I believe will call into question the original 24 December 2009 CAR 265 'NOTICE of SUSPENSION' decision letter to DJ... Hint - extract from that letter:

This line IMO is extremely important: "...Auckland reveals that you received a weather forecast for Norfolk Airport at 0904 UTC..."

Is it fair and reasonable to expect a CASA investigator, CASA manager, CASA decision maker and a CASA legal eagle to be concise in the use of terminology? A ‘weather forecast’ is the thing a TV station put on between advertisements. Not quite the same thing as the detailed weather analysis on which pilots rely, not only for operational ‘safety reasons’ but for ‘legal safety’ – against prosecution, for fuel miscalculations and several other fairly important items. Items such as nominating an Alternate destination; this may seem like a fairly straightforward matter – the weather at destination ‘A’ is lousy so pick an ‘Alternate’ and if a landing at ‘A’ is not possible, then proceed to ‘B’ and land there. Seems simple enough – but it ain’t. (With apologies to the purists).

1) Destination airport forecast is below acceptableminima.

a) When the onward or destination airport is not available the aircraft may depart but may not proceed beyond the Point of Safe Return Depressurised (CPD) unless the forecast for an onward airport is acceptable.

b) Acceptable Airport - an airport that has a forecast for weather conditions below the alternate minima, but at or above the landing minima for the duration of the flight being undertaken.

2) Destination airport forecast is below suitable minima.

a) When the onward or destination airport is not available the aircraft may depart but may not proceed beyond the Point of Safe Return Single Engine (CPI) unless the forecast for an onward airport becomes suitable.

b) Suitable Airport - an airport that has a forecast for weather conditions above the alternate minima for the duration of the flight being undertaken.

The use of a ‘general term’ i.e. ‘weather forecast’ is not nearly good enough. I wonder has the ‘second’ Pel-Air report provided an in depth analysis of the legal/technical information conveyed to James (and his FO) or the application of that information to his decision process.

IMO - P7 nailed it – the 0803 from Nadi was pivotal. Auckland wouldn’t think to confirm that the flight had an update issued an hour ago – and so another strand of the safety net was broken. I digress.

Is the use of ‘sloppy’ terminology deliberate or simple ignorant laziness? – Either way, it ain’t right. But then, the cost of this whole farrago would have paid the overtime for the met observer on Norfolk for a lifetime. Why – as a safety matter – can the MO at Norfolk not be on station when a flight is scheduled? A bit of overtime would not break the bank and it would be a definite positive. But hell, that would be proactive safety in action and we can’t have that now, can we children.

Before we start joining the dots and examining the legal premise of the original Greg Hood 24 December 2009 suspension letter to DJ; I'd like to touch on some further observations (OBS) - with regard to the two SFRs, associated records; and, correspondence Roger Chambers struck up in 2012 as part of a (Coordinated Enforcement Process (CEP) under DJ's enforcement file- (Trim EF10/496).

Note: in the 30 March 2012 'IN CONFIDENCE:LEGAL' correspondence from Chambers, the To & 'CC' addressees:

Now, note the To & CC addressee omissions with the 18 July 2012 'IN CONFIDENCE:LEGAL' correspondence from Chambers to Mark Taylor (2nd email):

Also, note that Chambers had inexplicably struck up another enforcement file for the CEP ref DJ (EF12/79980) and this was despite the fact that this enforcement action would appear to have been in direct conflict to the 'AAT appeal process agreement' -

Which brings me to yet another ?

I am not sure if I can totally explain this Pauline; but, I'll give it a shot...

It is worth remembering that while Roger Chambers, with DAS McComic's blessing, was desperately trying to prosecute the case of embuggerance of DJ; the ATSB investigation, with many stutters, starts and obvious conflicts of interest; was, finally, reaching the critical Directly Interested Party (DIP) phase.

This could have been one of the reasons why CASA were seemingly determined to keep DJ from proceeding with his AAT appeal.

It is also interesting to note that the DRAFT Final Report was released to the DIP the day before Hoody's 27 March, 2012 - 'notice' - correspondence to DJ. Note the TRIM ref No. - (at the top of the page).

Now fast forward to the 18 July 2012 Chambers email (above) and consider that by this time Hoody had now been privy to the ATSB DRAFT Final Report and probably discovered some pertinent facts like, for example :-

Extract from CAIR 09/3

...the 0803 amended Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) was never actually relayed to the flight crew; or that the 0904 from Auckland...

was not actually a 'weather forecast' but was really an auto METAR/SPECI and not a TAF (forecast) at all...

Mr. Carmody quote:-
“Enforcement action will only be taken where there is a deliberate, wilful or reckless breach of the aviation safety rules, where there is a pattern of repeated misconduct or there is a failure to take appropriate corrective or protective action to address identified safety issues.”
Mr. Carmody has a huge problem of credibility.
How to justify the continuing ill treatment of Captain James by CASA?
No one could possibly equate Mr. Carmody’s enforcement criteria with the actions of Captain James during his ill fated flight to Norfolk Island.