Plaintiff
Paul Mitchell Cotton seeks review under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (“the Commissioner”), which denied him
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income under sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of
the Social Security Act. Because the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is based on
legal error, the Commissioner's decision will be vacated
and the matter remanded for further administrative
proceedings.

I.
Background.

On
August 5, 2009, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income, alleging
disability beginning December 21, 2008. Plaintiff
subsequently amended his claim to a closed period of
disability, from September 6, 2008 through June 30, 2010. In
March 2012, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. In May
2013, the Social Security Administration Appeals Council
vacated and remanded. A second hearing occurred on October
17, 2014, where Plaintiff appeared by video with his attorney
and testified before the ALJ. A vocational expert also
testified. On January 23, 2015, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security
Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for
review, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's
final decision.

II.
Legal Standard.

The
district court reviews only those issues raised by the party
challenging the ALJ's decision. See Lewis v.
Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court
may set aside the Commissioner's disability determination
only if the determination is not supported by substantial
evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue,
495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is
more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and
relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion considering the record as a
whole. Id. In determining whether substantial
evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the
record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a
“specific quantum of supporting evidence.”
Id. As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence
is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one
of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's
conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).

Harmless
error principles apply in the Social Security Act context.
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir.
2012). An error is harmless if there remains substantial
evidence supporting the ALJ's decision and the error does
not affect the ultimate nondisability determination.
Id. The claimant usually bears the burden of showing
that an error is harmful. Id. at 1111.

III.
The ALJ's Five-Step Evaluation Process.

To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Social Security Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of
proof on the first four steps and the burden shifts to the
Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180
F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

At the
first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is
engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant has a “severe”
medically determinable physical or mental impairment. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ
considers whether the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt.
404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is
automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, the
ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the
claimant's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is
still capable of performing past relevant work. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to
the fifth and final step, where he determines whether the
claimant can perform any other work based on the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not
disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.
Id.

At step
one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the insured status
requirements of the Social Security Act through March 31,
2014, and that he has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity during the period of September 6, 2008 through June
30, 2010. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the
following severe impairments: lumbar degenerative disc
disease, hepatitis C, coronary arthrosclerosis status post
stent, and history of methamphetamine, crack cocaine, LSD,
alcohol, and marijuana use. At step three, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment
listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. At
step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to
perform “the full range of medium work as defined in 20
CFR 404.1567(c).” A.R. 17. The ALJ further found that
Plaintiff has no past relevant work. At step five, the ALJ
concluded that, considering Plaintiff's age, education,
work experience, and residual functional capacity between
September 6, 2008 and June 30, 2010, there were jobs that
existed in significant numbers in the national economy that
Plaintiff could have performed.

IV.
Analysis.

Plaintiff
argues the ALJ's decision is defective for four reasons:
(1) the ALJ erred in rejecting the assessment of
Plaintiff's treating physician, Kyle Norris, M.D., by
conflating his assessment with one of a treating physician
assistant; (2) the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff was
“not entirely credible” in the absence of
specific, clear, and convincing reasons supported by
substantial evidence; (3) the ALJ erred in determining
Plaintiff's work capacities without articulated reasons
supported by substantial evidence; and (4) the ALJ erred in
relying on the medical vocational guidelines in Appendix 2 of
the regulations, commonly known as the “grids, ”
to determine that Plaintiff could have performed a
significant number of jobs in the national economy.

A.
Weighing of Medical Source Evidence.

Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinions
of Dr. Kyle Norris and Mr. Greg Harris, PAC, by conflating
the two opinions and failing to even mention the latter by
name.

1.
Legal Standard

The
Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating
physicians, examining physicians, and non-examining
physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830
(9th Cir. 1995). Generally, an ALJ should give greatest
weight to a treating physician's opinion and more weight
to the opinion of an examining physician than a non-examining
physician. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,
1040-41 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when
evaluating opinion evidence, including length of examining or
treating relationship, frequency of examination, consistency
with the record, and support from objective evidence). If it
is not contradicted by another doctor's opinion, the
opinion of a treating or examining physician can be rejected
only for clear and convincing reasons. Lester, 81
F.3d at 830 (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418,
422 (9th Cir. 1988)).

A
contradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician can
be rejected only for “specific and legitimate reasons
that are supported by substantial evidence in the
record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citing
Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043). An ALJ meets this
standard “by setting out a detailed and thorough
summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence,
stating his interpretation thereof, and making
findings.” Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403,
1408 (9th Cir. 1986). “The ALJ must do more than offer
his conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations
and explain why they, rather than the doctors', are
correct.” Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22.

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