We enclose herewith the items that require implementation, out of the plan of
action for 1992 AD sent to us by General Security. Please study its contents
and carry them out with all due precision. A conference shall be held for you
every three months to establish the extent to which the mentioned items have
been implemented, and you will be evaluated in the light of what has been
carried out. The plan must be held in your personal possession, and it is
prohibited to circulate it among the staff.

(signature)

Director of Ta'meem Governorate Security
20/1/1992 AD

EnclosurePlan of Action Annual plan for 1992 from 1/1/1992 to 1/1/1993

S/311

1. Adherence to the guidelines set forth by (His Excellency the Leader
President) during (his Excellency's) meeting with the Director of Intelligence,
which have been circulated to you by the letter General Security no. 3895 dd.
1/1/1991.

2. Officers of the Security organs are to distance themselves from the
atmosphere and relationships with business owners, contractors, and the
wealthy.

3. The personal relationships between Security organ personnel and Iraqis
living abroad, are to be conducted with the knowledge of their offices.

4. All Security organs personnel are obliged to distance themselves from
intercession and interference in affairs related to their Security work.

5. Security organs at the airport must be exhorted to deal in a humanitarian
fashion with our Egyptian and Arab brothers:

A. To make them forget the incidents which led to their humiliation in
Iraq.

B. Insinuate to them that the incidents involving them were prompted by
their governments' stance towards us.

C. Collect accurate data pertaining to some of them, within Egypt.

D. Imbue them with the notion that they are a substitute work force, replacing
those who belong to groups opposed to the Revolution in the Central and
Southern regions, and goad them into visiting places of worship and shrines,
entrusting them with the collection of information about those who have opposed
the Revolution and its glorious leader.

6. Instruct police and security organs to accept complaints from Egyptians and
Arabs, on an equal basis with Iraqis.

7. Affirming, during secret conversations with those among them who are
Baathist, that the Party's original plan, as described in its writings and
theoretical origins, is still in place. This being the reduction in the
percentage of populists (the Shiites) in the Republic of Iraq, as they are a
stumbling block standing in the way of the Revolution's development and the
achievement of its national goals. It is thus incumbent upon Arabs to
comprehend this fact and to work seriously in serving Iraq and in protecting it
from its enemies.

8. Affirming that the Revolution's Government's actions in deporting these
forces, forcefully divorcing Iranian women from their husbands, and dealing
with these populist factions with utmost brutality, are all expressions of the
Leadership's refusal to consider retrogression, or to surrender Iraq easily.

9. Every official, within his sphere of responsibility, shall gather the main
reins, and control the activities of his subordinates.

10. Continue looking after the families of the martyrs who fell against the
(rabble).

11. The student in his normal daily life, i.e. his daily life from the
beginning of his scholastic year, must feel and be brought up to feel, that his
biggest challenge is to succeed. That is, he must study and understand and
hence succeed (pass his exams), and any intervention by the party must weaken
his propensity for the opposite, in pursuit of this goal.

12. The need to constantly search for illuminating alternatives in our security
work (we search for alternatives because human effort is always in quest of
alternatives and is capable of finding them).

13. General Security must study every operation and identify the mistakes made
in each, as well as the good points.

14. The lack of precision and the lack of ability in dealing with criminals
results in major losses, whereas avoiding negligence in security work leads us
to positive results and important information.

15. Faith, as I understand it, is thought coupled with a program that elevates
society with regard to higher values and other principles and levels. We must
act in an understanding and artistic way to reap benefits for the Revolution
and the party, and even our practicing some aspects of worship are due to their
being a widespread popular hobby, and we must go along with these wishes.

16. The employee we want is the one who is capable and modern, always able to
develop in harmony with his other duties.

17. (The theory of) Capitalism is a condition that has been available to us
from the beginning, as expressed to us by the minority of those involved in
business and economics. In our avoidance of it, and our avoidance of Communism,
we have chosen a theory born from the womb of the Nation, and from its
suffering and its aspirations (I do not mean the theory of the ascendancy of
religious fundamentalism), and that its working principles can be sacrificed
for.

18. We believed that the activities of the security organs throughout the life
of the Revolution had affected the lives of the citizens of Kurdistan, Basra,
Najaf, and Al-Anbar, by driving them along the road of revolution,
construction, and standing in the way of evil. We now see a need for revising
their activities and methods, and for identifying mistakes and correcting
them.

19. The relationship between the people of Iraq and the people of Egypt, and
between the two countries on an official and popular level, is an excellent
one. This strong and excellent relationship must be raised to higher levels, by
confronting the evil emanating from the East.

20. In order for your work abroad to proceed normally and correctly, you must
arm yourself with the party's ideas and ideals, and have an influence on the
surroundings in which you live. Do whatever you please, provided that you serve
the security duty to which you have been assigned.

21. Leadership, in the view of those espousing the purebred Baathist
principles, is the dedication of their energies and efforts to the service of
the Party and the Revolution, and the avoidance of reactionary values, for the
Party has its own values and behavior.

22. Enhancing the presence of the specialized agencies - Intelligence, General
Security, Military Police, Internal Security Forces - at passenger bus depots,
some openly and others secretly. This matter is to be enforced, in order to
limit citizens' movements as much as possible, movements which facilitate the
speedy spread of news and rumors.

23. The placement of sharper eyes and surveillance on the Syrian regime's
agents and its schemes, especially the plots of assassinations and bombings,
whether individual or not individual.

24. The principle from which we launch our confrontation with our enemies, must
be the feeling we give to the masses that we show no mercy for the opponents of
the Revolution. Our stance in dealing with the rabble and in suppressing the
wayward groupings must be shown as the way we must deal with those who are
tempted. You, the Security organs, must expose the enemies' methods, bringing
your information and facts up to date, and present them to the Baathists,
spotlighting and exposing the foes' intentions, using both direct and indirect
methods, based on whichever is most effective.

25. Our responsibility is not limited to employing our available energies. We
must single out those who are faithful and find employment for them, leaving
the opponents who supported the rabble at the mercy of unemployment and
vagrancy, this being their due.

26. The most important way for us to discover our mistakes was our shock at
seeing the rabble stand up against the Party and the Revolution -- we used to
say that the most important element in our lives is the human being: we see
him, we listen to him, we run to him. But reality has shown us this lesson, and
the error of our comrades in implementing the slogan "With Life Without
Commitment".

27. It is not always sufficient to correctly describe a desired condition we
have passed through and improved upon. What we need is to correctly and
accurately describe and know what we want to overcome, and to accurately
visualize the alternative we desire.

28. The type who moves along with the overall movement is satisfactory to
people; the type who is considered to be without kinetic energy and direction
is unsatisfactory to people; the type who regenerates his energy and moves with
additional speed and additional energy is the type who must be loved by the
Iraqi soul.

29. The development of methods is reflected in results, and gives them forward
progress. Thus any progress at the scientific level will be positively
reflected on the special technical level.

30. During this stage we require the embodiment of the theory of work more than
we need to talk about principles and their overall picture as such, for our
Party's principles have been correct from the beginning, but they need to be
replenished with living viable elements. We must also prepare the cadres and
leaders who are capable of embodying decisions, and let the cadre which
extinguished the rabble with manly forcefulness, be a living picture and model
for all.

31. The party has taught us to respect time more properly, to organize our
energies more effectively, and to sharpen our abilities to their sharpest
penetration which cannot be attained except in a state of war, and to squeeze
our minds to the utmost in serving our people and our country during
peacetime.

32. A human being, even when all his physical energies are depleted, is not
deprived of all his energies because the energy of the mind and the intellect
are still able to produce, as they are an enormous boundless energy.

33. Anyone from the lower levels who contributes vital initiatives, earns the
thanks of the people and the appreciation of higher level officials, in
addition to the honor of a historical participation in the life of the great
Iraq.

34. The psychological feeling, in an atmosphere of improving opinions, has a
major positive effect on every individual, and based on this understanding,
leadership elements must be concerned with their comrades' situations, both at
work and in other fields.

35. It is necessary to foment differences amongst the splinter elements, based
on the fact that the struggle between Arabs and Persians has taken an Iraqi
aspect, in addition to the sectarian aspect.

36. We are required to be against disseminating religion by the state and in
society, and we do not accept that Islam, as preached by Khomeini, can be an
alternative to the Leading Baath. We must revert to our original beliefs.

37. The confrontation with the religious political phenomenon has been
haphazard and lacking in vision and action, and we must admit that we have
failed in it. We have however agreed to deal with this phenomenon by benefiting
from the experiences of others, who have coexisted with it and succeeded in
dispersing its black clouds. Such an attempted confrontation was carried out in
Egypt with the Islamists (the Ikhwan), during the late Jamal Abdul-Nasser era
and at the hands of his Intelligence Director, General Salah Nasr, and a
program for dealing with them has been formulated since 1978.

38. We must guard against disunity among the people, who are made up of Arabs,
Kurds, Turcomans, etc., and consisting of Muslims and Christians. There are
sects and groups amongst the Muslims, as there are sects and groups amongst the
Christians, but this does not mean that our people are unique in having these
colorings and sects. We are less than others in this regard, for there is no
nation on Earth devoid of the divisions we have, in one form or another.

39. Opposites often meet when such a meeting targets the Arab Baath Socialist
Party in Iraq. Thus, and based on this view, the Syrian regime's alliances have
been entered into, against our Party and our Revolution.

40. We must move quickly to curb the tributaries flowing into the opposing
forces' foundations, whether intellectual or behavioral. The best example would
be to begin with the youth.

41. A wise man cannot adopt the role of an observer for the purpose of defense
and attack, nor can a leader dash with his enemy without preparing a tributary
for regenerating capability, compensating for potential losses, and supporting
and dealing with weaknesses as they arise.

42. Religious reactionarism attempts infiltration through the social and
economic foundations of society, and will also attempt to extend its tongue to
any place of influence in our society.

43. We in the Leadership and the Party consider the factions that took up arms
against us during the rabble, as being irresponsible and as having failed to
comprehend the Leader Party's principles. Our articles in the Al-Thawra
newspaper, in the aftermath of what they called their uprising, are sufficient
for them, even if they did contain wounding and scratching of some of them, and
we have received some blame from their mothers before them.

44. With regard to families which have suffered loss, there are Iraqi families
who have had a son executed or an uncle imprisoned, making us responsible for
him. It is our duty to correct their thinking by entering into discussions with
them, to convince them of the justice of the decision, without allowing them to
delude themselves that the party is being hypocritical in the maker.

45. Your behavior, in all its particulars, must be based on the respect for the
individual's freedom, provided that he serves the Revolution in implementing
its policies which serve its axiomatic principles.

46. In dealing with the control of the situation (if you do not devour the
others, they will devour you), you must proceed first of all from your basic
values. Our encounters with those who oppose us are clear and witnessed, as
happened in the November retrogression in 1963 -1990 and others.

47. There is absolutely no Iraqi who believes in federalizing the Kurds, with
the exception of foreign-lackey minorities. We must have unity of the Iraqis as
a people, and the integrity of Iraqi soil and its sovereignty. It is your duty
to stand against the anarchists in the South and the idiots in the North.

48. We have interpreted rights with an axiomatic interpretation, saying that
they are interlinked with duties. He who does not perform his duties shall have
his rights diminished in proportion to the decrease in his performance of his
duties.

49. You must identify and observe the enemies of the Revolution and negative
elements amongst the people. The skills and capabilities of Security directors
shall be evaluated by the number of opposition elements arrested.

50. The Security organs are required to uncover opposing and servile behavior,
and contribute to creating stature and fear of the Revolution in the hearts of
those Iying in wait, to a point where their practices have been described as
brutal and fascist. Iraq is today involved in a deadly war of advance and
retreat with its enemies.

51. Mistakes by the Security organs, both now and in the coming stages, must be
fewer than they were in the past. They must always be mentioned in relation to
(the bogeyman), and must alter their behavior to become enforcers of punishment
in their movement and pursuit of the inner lining of citizen's behavior, and
that they possess, more than others, the authority and the means of uncovering
hidden matters.

52. You must operate under two central slogans:

A. Protect the Baathist principles to which the Founder Leader Michel Aflaq
sacrificed himself and in which he ended his life.

B. Use expedient measures as required, and depart when their time is over.

53. Avoid using social information in your possession as personal information
for use outside the circle of total secrecy and your position's difficult
tasks. This would result in major damage to the Party and the Revolution and
its reputation. Do not forget that you are part of the people's Party and part
of the people's great Revolution, and that you are targeted by sectors which
are not to be discounted, which raised their necks during the rabble, and you
saw what happened to some of you. I ask for caution, because the facts point to
life or death.

54. The transient or temporary opponent must not divert you from the principal
enemies, with whom we have been doing battle since the birth of the Revolution
in 1968.

The temporary opponents whom we have been facing since 1990 are a cloud that
has dispersed, leaving a clear sky. It has become clear to those temporary
opponents that we are their partners against our originally intended enemy.
Thus our love for progress and their love for their interests, allow us to move
forward together to bury the reactionaries and the rabble.

55. The easy ways and direct methods are not your principal path to uncovering
the truth. Patience and precise work, and your constant readiness to defend the
principles of the Revolution which has sated your hungry and enriched your
poor.

56. Our new standard requires that the Baathist seize his opportunity, through
his superior qualifications and his practical capabilities in his everyday
work, thus expressing his fidelity to the Revolution's and Party's program and
to his work duties, in the service of his comrades.

57. The shorter the time period between our discovering a negative circumstance
and dealing with it, the more we would gain in protecting ourselves from our
mistakes, and it is the most precious gain granted to us by heaven.

58. Enthusiasm and faith are two parallels. Constant precise diligent work is
required from us, in addition to further knowledge. No matter how advanced a
level of knowledge any one of us attains, he must seek more. More knowledge and
more discipline based on faith, and I mean faith in the Leader Party's
principles.

59. According to our comprehension, the Iraqi works well as long as the stick
is close by him. However we must not forget to advise the avoidance of
erroneous behavior in concert with others. We state that the Baath has its own
new morals and behavior, which are called Baathist morals.

60. The ideal model is he who is truthful with his party, does not lie to the
leadership, and who does not humor reactionary forces. We must amputate the
treasonous families. Pursue them as was done to their brothers, and do not
succumb to anyone's blame, for the protection of the Party is the most precious
thing in existence.
1. The guidance, advice, and talks of the unique leader Saddam Hussain, and
especially with regard to our security work, are major illuminations along the
road to creating the new Iraqi individual, and basic keys to a new life in
which rights and duties are clarified. We must absorb their meaning in the
spirit of creativity, and translate them into behavior and action.

2. The true vision of the leadership of the Comrade Leader Saddam Hussain
begins with a true vision of his stature, which is sometimes not ever-present
to the senses, as in the eyes of children whose parents belong to a party or
whose parents were killed by your honored hands, and who have been left as
orphans. Show concern for all of them, especially those who are orphans. Teach
them to love the Leader and the Revolution, and clarify to them the evil of
their sons and brothers who committed treason. Let them damn them as they lie
buried underground, and teach them that the pure air of Iraq is not deserved by
anyone other than a Baathist.

3. The degree of awareness and educational and psychological building of the
new Iraqi individual, especially after our clear victory over the evil
thirty-strong forces in the second Gulf war, places us face to face with our
massive historical responsibilities, since we have now discovered our
previously unknown enemies who were working amongst us -- it is the (Nadhum
Gzar) situation repeating itself; beware it, for it holds your life or your
death. We must understand the party's theory on this, in which there are the
means and the end in its pathfinding experiment and Revolution. We must
implement its broad dimensions, for it expresses a unique situation of twisting
the enemies' necks, as in the downfall of Nazism and Fascism which are still
hated by all mankind.

4. Those who work in the Security organ have shown themselves to be worthy of
the great attributes with which the Great Leader has honored them (the
dedicated strugglers, the select, the faithful, the glorious). Some of them
however, few though they may be, and according to comments reaching us from
higher levels or as a result of our own observations, have behaved
detrimentally toward the principles of the Party and its morality, in various
directions and far from the law. Thus they are far from the exquisite picture
in the Great Leader's mind, of his struggling striving sons, in that:

A. Some employees of the Security organ have initiated relationships with
business owners, contractors, and the wealthy who use the method of throwing
parties and soirees in order to enter into relationships with Security
personnel, to further their affairs and their designs.

B. Entering into personal relationships with foreigners or Iraqis living
abroad, without the knowledge of the office.

C. Illegally interceding on behalf of some citizens, and intervening in
affairs that are not related to Security work.

D. Taking advantage of their work in this office by some personnel, to
strike terror into the hearts of some citizens.

5. The leaking of information about the work of this office, especially in
exchange for bribes which have become the norm, and openly talked about by the
people.

6. Not dealing with negative situations, nor with the failures attributable to
most personnel and which are covered up by their superiors. Thus the people
have begun to see us as the symbol of evil and death and blood, and the terror
bogeyman in the land.

7. The presentation of improper applications to some offices, in excess of
legal entitlements, in exchange for a share with the applicant of the contracts
or the allocation of property in or around the capital.

8. Overt patronizing by most of the organ's personnel, of hotels and public
places, in a manner that is taunting to others. It may be a common trait among
Security personnel to enjoy getting drunk, to frighten and terrorize others,
and to fire a number of random shots into the air, and to seek recognition for
such heroics.

9. Engaging in dishonorable relationships with some female citizens, whether
they are part of our Security staff, or whether they are cooperators with us,
or whether they are Baathist strugglers. There have been repeated incidents and
scandals of this nature, and we have files about the matter which would block
noses, especially the incidents which have taken place in places of
incarceration and which have prompted the Leader President to order us to expel
some of them abroad.

10. Discussing Security matters which are being sought, with the very person
who is being interrogated about them.

11. The large number of rumors which are circulated by some personnel, which
represent the rabble and the traitors as a beast intending to devour us soon or
at an unknown time. They also circulate that each one of our homes shall be our
grave, and that we shall eat of each others meat.

12. We reaffirm the need for considering the Leader President's guidelines to
be a work program for the officers who interrogate the opposing parties' and
groupings' elements and forces. The logic of cutting and uprooting must be
used, in the spirit of the Leader's unshakable resolve. We must consider
standardization as our fixed working method in interrogation, as follows:

A. Confronting the hostile activities of the hostile movements and
political parties cannot be achieved with a single link, but rather by a series
of complementary links, beginning with getting to know the accused person (his
life, his positions, his relationships, the doctrines of the movement to which
he belongs, and the position of the west nations in relation to the movement or
the groups, and the effectiveness of our pressure on them, and whether
destroying them would incite the West against us or would they support us. We
want to keep these circles from becoming annoyed with us, insinuating to them
that the Fundamentalist movement is our common enemy with them, since it is
opposed to peace and civilization. We must seek their approval until they lift
the embargo on us.

B. The interrogation of party and opposition gang elements is nothing but
a science and an art at the same time. It demands that interrogators be
experienced, having wide cultural capabilities, powers of observation, memory,
and precision, and having had experience abroad. We prefer those who have
studied in Yugoslavia, because of their extensive reading about the Communist
party's confrontations with its enemies. It crushed their bones, or turned them
into lunatics because they could not be in harmony with the party's theory.
Thus, they were indefinitely confined to the beds of lunatic asylums. It is a
good and unique experience obtained from others by our youth, in preserving
security from a reactionary and treasonous group.

C. The selection of competent interrogators for the interrogation of
hostile elements, using frightening and terrifying psychological approaches,
and methods which contribute to the speedy breakdown of the accused. Threaten
him with violation of whatever he considers sacred, such as his honor, or with
the killing of a loved one such as his son or his brother, in order to extract
whatever we can from the interrogation. It is our job and our duty and our
responsibility to the beloved symbolic glorious Leader Saddam Hussain.

D. We have noticed that, in more than one directorate of Security,
interrogations are lacking in the methods of combining softness with instilling
fear, especially since the rabble and the traitors began to frighten our men by
promising them their unavoidable destiny. These directorates used expedient
methods in obtaining information from the accused, leading to their release
from prison, which is going to cause us trouble in the future.

E. We call upon the interrogator to exercise patience while interrogating
arrested elements, to enable us to identify and define our enemies. Those who
died as a result of interrogation methods are a loss, not because they are good
citizens, but because we lost a link in our investigations which could have led
us to their superior and his superiors. In fact, they were more patient than
the interrogators even though they were facing death. Maybe it is the belief of
those buried ones, that this is their cause in life.

F. In light of the above, political interrogation of hostile subversive
elements must take into account that they are sources of detailed information
about the movements to which they belong.

G. The most important event we are seeking is the elevation of
interrogation to a level where it becomes an example, striking fear into
traitors and informing our friends. This was the experience of Omar Abu
Al-Nasr, the head of Egyptian Intelligence, in dealing with the Islamic
Brotherhood: a lesson, an example, a method worth emulating in order to
overcome reactionarism and to protect the Revolution's achievements. It also
enables us to benefit from our previous security experiences in interrogating
the hostile movements, parties, and gangs.

13. Since the Baathist is a means and an end to Baath, he must be convinced of
his value, through the channels of indoctrination, follow-up, and the
instilling of principles. He must be made aware of past experiences, whether by
those who remember our plight after the November retrogression in 1963, or
those who experienced the rabble of 1990. He must know that a large number of
ignorant and illiterate sectors are unexpectedly demanding revenge on us, as a
result of your activities. We and these sectors are in a racing struggle for
initiatives, and we must hold the initiative, and dismember our enemies before
they can overcome us. The circumstance of your Baathist struggling comrades at
the hands of the savage rabble, is indescribable. Many were cut up and their
bodies were never found. Let us keep one eye on the surveillance and pursuit of
traitors, and the other on the tragic events that befell your brothers. Their
blessed bodies were, sadly, carried away in the buckets of wheel loaders and
placed with the garbage. Beware, beware.

14. At a time when the number of the organ's personnel is decreasing as a
result of the Party's circumstances, we have noticed that most of the
achievements of the past two years have been major in quality and quantity,
earning the generosity of the Glorious Leader. The pressure you applied on the
rabble and the events of your skirmishes with them, are an indication of the
depth of your sacrifice and devotion, and those who dared to break down prison
doors have been resumed to prisons that are more crowded and congested than
before. The number of interrogation files has multiplied, thanks to your
efforts and your dedication to protecting the Revolution and the Nation.

15. A security operation, in general, is a complex, intertwined, interlinked,
multi-faceted operation, requiring clear and broad visions. It doesn't trouble
us to say that the ones most accomplished and precise, are those who have
graduated from the universities of London and Oxford University. Our war with
Iran was the Spring of our intelligence science, as all the Western countries,
including America, opened their doors to you, resulting in a period of
development and learning and intelligence cooperation between us and them. Our
enmity with Iran served us in a manner that was not expected by anyone, and it
is known among the brothers who took part in security delegations that even the
cost of their missions was willingly paid for by the Gulf states.

16. Continued education and enlightenment about the dimensions of the blessed
Saddam's Qadisiya Battle, taking all its inspiring sufferings into account
during this period that is being experienced by our people.

17. We reaffirm the need for dedication, sacrifice, and the speedy completion
of work through the security operation's framework, both quantitatively and
qualitatively.

18. We affirm the need for adhering to the Presidency Office guideline,
requiring us not to respond at all to any letter or instruction or suggestion
issued to you by the Security organs, whether by telephone or in person, to
transfer or appoint or promote or discipline any government employee, in the
event that such a letter or instruction or suggestion did not originate in the
Ministry concerned. Such a matter should be raised to the Presidency.

19. On numerous occasions, and at all the annual periodic conferences, we
stressed the subject of proper and correct dealing with our secret sources, and
the need for constantly evaluating and testing them, while studying and
carefully analyzing the information they give us from time to time.

20. The secret sources must be well followed up, and not forgotten in the event
of rewards, in order to encourage them to provide a better output, in the
service of our great Iraq. Terror and temptation is a successful method in
security organs, and before they are bought by others, we must provide them
with gratuities. This is recommended by the Leader during his secret sessions
and meetings with Security and Intelligence personnel, especially after the
treason committed by the rabble, which resulted in the men of the leadership
losing their faith in many citizens whom we considered decent and defenders of
the Party and the Revolution.

21. The hostile parties in general, which have allowed themselves to live in
the mire of treason and depravity and servility to the foreigner, have shown us
that patriotic feeling has died in the consciences and minds of their members,
providing us with the opportunity to use the means and methods of sowing
dissent and suspicion amongst their elements. This contains the size of the
movement and buries their attempts at sabotage, nourishing division and strife
within these parties and gangs. This requires coordination with the specialized
units at Headquarters, where we have detailed studies and sufficient
information in the form of organized archives: their numbers, their work files,
the number of dead amongst them, and those who are incarcerated, whether
sentenced or still under interrogation. This, in spite of the unease in our
offices, which were their primary targets because they believe that it is the
only office which clipped their nails and forced them to follow the wise
Leadership in this precious land.

22. The use of all means to impel Kurdish pens to write, including our known
internal and external sources, according to the subject and its importance, in
a manner that is fair to, and insistent upon the national condition of Iraq.
This achieves two purposes for us: the first provides a service to the Party
and the Revolution; the second ensures the blockage of any possible path of
retreat for them, that would return them to working among the saboteurs.

23. Giving special attention to the question of statements and leaflets being
published by the hostile forces abroad, whether by tracking or by analysis and
rebuttal, and by using some of them to sow discord and conflict among the
hostile parties themselves, in coordination with the specialized units at the
Directorate General. We tell you frankly that you must be clever in igniting
discord among the parties and movements which are opposed to us, even more than
the fire you light in their skins from the harsh lashes of your whips in
extracting confessions and information. You have proven your superiority in
interrogation and the killing of opponents abroad, so you must prove your
ability to ignite discord and conflict between them.

24. Continuing to depend on accurate statistics and graphs, and the preparation
of charts for all the hostile political movements, their leaders and their
membership, in coordination with Headquarters.

25. Continuing to open special registers for the names of military people
related to those who have been executed, and registers for the names of
deserters and cowards and their families, and their influential relatives. Try
to intimate to the families of some of those with whom we had a special
situation and who have disappeared from existence, that they have fled to
Iran.

26. It is not necessary for people to praise us for being nice to them; people
should rather fear the swoop of your men, even if they talk about us as having
hearts without pity, for this is unimportant. The important thing is the Party
and its interests, which are above all else. Don't beat about the bush with
people, for we and they are like boxers, to see who can deliver the knockout
blow first.

In the days of the rabble, the first blow was theirs and they ended up
controlling most of the villages, the failure being ours, as determined by the
Leader President. Had it not been for the valiant Republican Guard forces, and
their use of all possible weapons, we would not be talking to you today, nor
would we have a meeting or recommendations.

27. There is a tenet which says "be wary of calm weather", and this means that
a man is killed on the day of his wedding. The security climate before the
rabble indicated our control of all aspects of life in the land, whether
political or economic or logistic or with regard to military drafting. It was a
delusion for us to think that everyone supported us, because silence can be a
wait for the right time to pounce, or it may be a scheming in darkness, for we
have not yet been able to discover intentions. Therefore it is my view that one
of our most successful methods is to taunt others, to expose what they conceal
against us. Even if we make a mistake in bringing in a citizen and subject him
to torture without reaching any conclusion with him in obtaining information, I
say to you that we have benefited from him in that he will describe the way he
was arrested and the methods to which he was subjected even though innocent,
then how would it have been if he had a conspiratorial or treasonous mind. Such
conspiracy shall be a horror screen before his eyes, giving him sleepless
nights, making him distance himself from even thinking about politics or
hostility to the Revolution. He will also flee from anyone around him who may
have inclinations of this nature.

28. We ask all of you to use your friends and those who cooperate with you, in
watching the enemies of the Revolution in the street and in the market and in
public places. I am telling you that we have accurate information about your
enemies whose capabilities have developed, and who are now capable of making
foolproof plans against you. The events which have occurred against our
country, whether they be the events of the North and the South, or the
activities of the hostile parties, or the outbreak of the Iran and Kuwait wars,
have all created special abilities among the people in this regard.

If I may say so, we are moving in a tiring and wearying security medium,
against which we plot and which plots against us. We have no choice but to
adopt the methods which can expose some of what we don't know and fear, such
as:

D. Entrap some of those of whom you are suspicious, and subject them to
strong and wearying interrogation, for you may obtain something from them which
is unknown, such as a conspiracy against the Party or the Leader President.

29. We have received news warning us that information is reaching the civilian
population, especially the families of prisoners, that their sons have been
transferred from the Directorate of Security to such-and-such hospital and
aren't we the ones who brought him to such a state. Another item mentions that
a person has been transferred from Security to General Intelligence, and from
there to Special Security or that he has been imprisoned in the dungeons of the
Presidential palace. They also say that the Leader President was annoyed when a
woman attempted to intercede with him regarding her husband, and told him about
his being transferred. If we knew who leaked this information, we would place
them together forever. I tell you, make it known that 70% or more of our
prisoners will probably never again emerge into the light of day, after having
betrayed the Party and the Revolution, and that their cells are preliminary
graves for them and whoever divulges information about them.

30. Continue to affirm that Salahuddin University be given special status in
terms of follow-up, since the hostile Kurdish movements and parties are still
working for establishing bases there.

31. Work toward establishing sources inside the transportation depots in
general, since they can be exploited by hostile forces in carrying out hostile
acts of sabotage.

32. Banning the presence of hostile organizations within National Defense
units, special units, and allied parties.

33. We reaffirm our previous instructions regarding the fugitive elements of
the various hostile parties, about whom there is no information. Such elements
must be catalogued and information about them must be followed up, and if it is
established or suspected that any one of them is in a particular place,
Headquarters must be informed in order to form the special assassination units,
which had the leading role in carrying out their duties of pursuing the
traitors and assassinating them, whether inside the Nation or outside it. Such
missions were most successfully and capably accomplished, striking terror into
our enemies. The events in Kuwait, Pakistan, and Sudan are but practical
evidence and a lesson for our men in the carrying out of their duties. The
pursuit of the Revolution's enemies is considered to be one of our most noble
tasks, even though in the eyes of world opinion, they cost us something with
regard to the Party's reputation and that of its fearless heroes.

34. Intensifying Security presence in residential complexes, such as using
special patrols and sources cooperating with us, because these complexes will
in the future become starting points for the internal cells of the saboteur
gangs. We ask, in the light of the Leader President's instructions, that you
establish a shadow in every house for its constant scrutiny, so that we may
have them for lunch before they can have us for dinner. A Baathist must not be
overcome, for his flesh and blood is from the Revolution, and he must therefore
shed the blood of others for it, even if this costs him his own blood and his
well-being.

35. Punitive action must be taken against residential complex dwellers, who are
either known to be or we suspect them of, helping fugitive and hostile
elements: seize their homes and banish them to wherever they may go, to become
an example for others; their homes are to become the property of the
Directorate General of Security.

36. Laying ambushes from time to time around the perimeters of residential
complexes, in the event of attempted infiltration by subversive elements. Do
not hesitate to open fire when arresting suspicious elements, to demonstrate
our audacity. Reports shall be made about the incidents, and promotion shall be
the reward for whoever is ardent in his work and who adheres to security
procedures and discipline.

37. People living in these residential complexes are to be forbidden from
carrying weapons within them. Severe and deterrent measures are to be taken
against them.

38. Banning and forbidding every kind of party recruitment activity within
residential complexes, regardless of its scope or nature. All are to be handed
over to the specialized agencies, which shall take the appropriate measures
against them to make examples of them. News of arrests is to be spread, thus
spreading terror and fear amongst the others, and we have no objection to the
release of one of them, after his arrest and torture, to enable him to tell
others what befell them, thus throwing the deluded into disarray.

39. Continue following the instructions of the Northern Organizational Bureau,
in coordination with Party organizations, in establishing registers of city and
residential complex dwellers. All dwellers must be informed that they are
required to register themselves and all members of their families, in addition
to registering all their visitors. They must send lists about their visitors:
name, place of residence, reason for the visit, whether or not he is a Party
member . It is our goal that homes be like hotels, sending us a form
identifying each arrival and each departure.

40. Continue following the instructions of the Northern Organizational Bureau,
in preparing the Family Register forms which comprise detailed information
about each family member, and whoever is permanently living with them in the
same building.

41 . Create suspicion around elements who might be won over by our enemies,
nullifying them before they can be won over, by showing them to be on good
terms with the Security organs or with the Party.

42. Visits are to be given exceptional and paramount importance, while staying
away from platitudes. A detailed report shall be submitted about each visit,
including a preliminary evaluation of the meeting, and recommendations for
future dealings. This is to be considered a second race in our work.

43. The need for coordination amongst Directors of Security in the Governorates
regarding documented aspects which are common to various Governorates, and the
exchange of relevant information, to select the best methods and to use them in
wiping out our opponents by any means. This can mean merciless beating to
death, threats, indefinite incarceration, raping of their loved ones in their
presence and in the presence of others, seizure of fixed and movable assets,
and liquidation through murder by persons unknown, or by running over with
cars.

44. It sometimes happens in some Governorates that minor incidents are hushed
up and are not pursued in the proper way, leading to these minor incidents
becoming more serious and more widespread - what is needed at this time is to
follow up matters, no matter how minor. In fact it is our duty to magnify the
small in order to expose much, and to incarcerate many and to frighten many.
The enemies of the Party and the Revolution are not few in number, and we must
always be on our guard, exposing them through any incident or by any means or
any action. Do not permit our enemies even a dot to pass by without scrutiny;
burden something with more than it can bear and you will get the unknown.

45. At the same time that we affirm the need for identifying and pursuing
hostile elements and taking legal action against them, we also have no
objection to informing their families at the time of their arrest or after the
completion of their interrogation, for no reason other than to warn them and
frighten them that this is one of them who has betrayed the Party and the
Revolution and that they should disavow him.

46. Adherence to objective accuracy, avoiding either exaggeration and
embellishment or minimizing, in dealing with such cases and incidents,
reporting them accurately and without neglect. Security personnel must take
this seriously, for otherwise they shall be considered to be in collaboration
with the enemies and the wheel of the Revolution shall grind them, and they
will be considered traitors and enemies of the Revolution and the Party.

47. Informing and coordinating with the Directorate of Residence regarding the
matter of some hostile party elements using Egyptian and Jordanian passports in
deploying their members, and to be aware of this. We regret that bribery plays
a role in these matters. Some Police networks have been captured taking bribes
for allowing many groups who were being sought by Security and Intelligence, to
escape with false passports.

48. Having our sources follow up and attend hostile conferences abroad to make
note of their presentations and their work, and to create differences amongst
them. This is to include some of our student sources, who are to attend
conferences and seminars conducted by student organizations abroad. Some of our
personnel have made an effective presence in this field in the Socialist and
West countries, and were rewarded and presented with gifts of appreciation,
having infiltrated themselves in talented and precisely clever ways without
being noticed by anyone..

49. It is not enough to adopt the defensive method of waiting for a hostile
gang's internally-directed activities to occur before defeating them. We must
turn to the offensive method by exploiting their poor situation, which has not
yet stabilized in Syria, in order to undermine their leadership's positions, to
affect their activities, and to weaken their relations with the Syrian regime
and with the other hostile political movements.

50. Serious scrutiny of libraries, especially those belonging to universities,
mosques, and places of worship. Banned books are to be quietly removed, by
stealing them if necessary, to prevent hostile forces from using them, with the
emphasis on Shiite literary books, and books which condemn the injustice of the
Omayyads and their followers, who stood up to the early and latter Shiites.

51. Avoiding groundless and unplanned impulsive reaction to events, incidents,
problems, and matters falling within your specializations, because this means a
loss to us and to our principles. We must learn patience from the prisoners in
our cells; they are Iraqis, but we find among them those whom we cannot annoy
or embarrass. He is joyful at the calls for his execution, and proceeds with
self-assurance, as if he were on his way to a recreation hall.

52. Some of our officers, nco's, and ranks are still talking about their
office's secrets and its administrative and security duties, in front of their
families and their friends and relatives. Since this has an adverse effect on
the speaker and on the quality of his performance of his assigned duties, and
on the security of the State, we ask you to regard this matter as a fundamental
duty in eradicating this behavior. By adopting such terrible behavior, we have
denigrated our principles to the point of becoming symbols of depravity.

53. We must also know what is behind the wall, and to determine the nature and
inclinations of the hostile parties and their methods of operation, in order to
attain the desired level of our work in reaching the farthest and most complex
points of our enemies' thinking. This will enable us to abort all their
despicable schemes, and to consolidate our clear victory which was achieved
with the precious blood of our brave martyrs. The rabble stepped on their blood
with their shoes and spat on it, out of spite and vengeance for their relatives
who were executed by your blessed hands, and had it not been for your boldness
in skinning the Revolution's and Party's enemies, we would have become relics
of the past and forgotten.

54. We reaffirm the need for tapping all citizens' telephones. Submit the
matter to us in detail including whatever methods are to be used, putting
everything in writing. Do not hesitate to tap anyone's telephone, because the
rabble of Najaf, Kerbala, Basra, and Amara have left us without trust of
anyone. The land was raped and destroyed, and our most precious person, the
Leader President, was insulted and his pictures were torn up.

55. We have noticed that some Directorates are requesting the delegation of
some of their personnel, and asking for pardon for their having deserted, to
use them in casting suspicion on hostile elements, especially those
infiltrating from Iran. Such cases would have an adverse effect on us in the
future and, as pointed out by the Leader President: Security must take into
account that such situations may be fumed into double-agents which may harm us
in the future, especially if he were allowed to return to Iran, assuming that
he was not originally sent for this purpose. Be informed that we have proof
that Iran's Intelligence has more depth and breadth and more patience than
ours. We must expose and know our enemy.

56. In view of current requirements, we affirm the need for urging your sources
and your personnel to gather accurate and objective information about persons
wanted for questioning, without relying in this matter on information from
Party organizations. This is in compliance with the Regional Secretariat
Office's instructions comprising the orders of the Leader President, the
Regional Secretary, whereby no information about persons is to be given out by
the Party organizations to anyone except the Regional Secretariat's Office. It
is known that our secret file contains evaluations of Party members, and any
organ which penetrates our organization, administration, and membership has his
current motives and interest in doing so, and this may have caused some
pressure in some parts of the country. He must not be allowed to access that
which is secret, and our view is correct, because most of those who fought
against us during the rabble, were Baathist Party members armed with Party
weapons.

57. Using our special patrols to confront the subversive patrols which are
sometimes present on our territory. Detect them wherever they may be for they
have been planted everywhere, in the North, in the South, in Baghdad, and even
near your Directorate where we are now seated. It is our responsibility to
provide and maintain security, and be informed that they are armies and you are
armies, they are trained and you are trained, and you must precede them in
taking the initiative in your hands.

58. Identifying and following up elements which cooperate with the subversive
gangs, in the cities and the residential complexes. These hypocritical elements
have troubled the Party and the Revolution and Security organs, since they hide
behind the guise of the decent citizen. They had a shameful role in the war
with Iran at a time when Iraq was doing its national and pan-national duty.
They placed obstacles in the way of the fight, considering it to be between the
Baath Party and the Khomeini Islamic Movement. They played a dangerous role in
talking about the achievements of the Revolution and praising it, while saying,
at least to their friends and families, that it was intermixed with
ruthlessness and corruption.

And since your organization is present within the families, by way of their
older offspring and their smaller children, we were able to expose them and
brought some mothers and fathers to trial. When they asked us, after
confessing, about how we knew about their activities and their enmity to the
Revolution, we told them that a wall has ears, and they could feel nothing but
surprise at the Revolution's strength and the preservation of security within
it. Some even fled abroad, in fear of walls. This is our faith in you, that you
develop the methods of the Party and of the Revolution.

59. Pursuit of the remaining pockets and subversive patrols, while providing
the military with accurate information about them.

60. Continued observation of the Takya supervisors and those who attend them,
since the Dervish practices have been noticed spreading amongst the youth. We
must send some of our men with them as infiltrators, to discover their
locations. The actions of Mr. Izzat are along these lines.

61. Follow up the Revolution's enemies by pinpointing their addresses, in
cooperation with the administrative units, and by sullying their reputations in
the neighborhood, whether with regard to their honor or their past, keeping
track of them with a view to entrapping them.

62. The need for continued work among the Security directorates in overlapping
sectors, especially with regard to studying important operations they conduct,
with a view to identifying their weak points, their ramifications, their
circumstances, and their expected results.

63. Continued surveillance of in-country relatives of deportees, seeking
information from the other Governorates if any of the families should move, in
order to keep track of them.

64. You are aware of the importance of propaganda and its potential effects, to
be carried out with precise objectivity, in order to abort the hostile parties'
schemes.

65. One of the most important duties and centrally basic results which helped
the Security organ in accomplishing its various assigned tasks, especially
during the war, was its receptiveness and fruitful constructive cooperation
with the other security agencies.

66. Continued revision of the negative information recorded against some
people, and dealing with them in the light of their present stances; if they
join us, there is no problem. If not, then continue their tracking and
surveillance of them, searching for their mistakes even if these need to be
concocted, in order to submit and humiliate them.

67. Utilize the enmeshed organizations by working through them to fan the
differences and strife currently going on between the Kurdish Islamic movement
and the agents of Iran, giving funds and equipment for deepening the
differences between these parties.

68. In view of our expectation that Syria is going to become a principal center
of hostile activity aimed at our struggling country, we must affirm the need
for paying exceptional attention to it and to the activities of Syrian
Intelligence and its intentions, and the parties based there. This is to be
achieved through the gathering of information about them, by controlling border
crossings and limiting infiltration.

69. Maintain relations with old elements of the Islamic Brotherhood and the
Liberation Party, in order to learn the inclinations and intentions of these
parties, and to work at aborting their subversive intentions.

70. Deploying our secret sources to discover the activities of the Al-Muneer
group leaders, since there is the possibility of recruitment incursions into
the country.

71. Exploit the changes taking place in the Communist countries to influence
the convictions and leanings of Communist elements, including using them in
Security matters, and convincing them that we are with them in our liberation
direction, and in our negative view of the reactionary and mythical nature of
religion.

72. Hostile organizations must not be allowed to broaden their bases through
recruitment, and contain their efforts at retrieving their severed elements,
including completely avoiding the entrapment of some citizens for having joined
these parties.

73. Continue working in compliance with the instructions of the Northern
Organizational Bureau in informing families that they must inform the relevant
authority in the event of a split within the family as soon as it happens.

74. Continue using our sources in the search for saboteurs' weapons, and those
left behind by the Iranian enemy in the wake of the heroic Al-Anfal
operations.

75. Continue working through committees with the Turkish side, regarding
Kurdish elements who have fled to our territory.

76. Attach importance to the Ibrahim Al-Khaleel transportation, since it is
possible that some fugitive elements may infiltrate on Turkish trucks.

77. Evaluate the commanders of the special patrols in the Northern region from
time to time, to determine their allegiances.

78. In view of the recent decisions allowing Kurds to own property in all the
Governorates except Baghdad, Al-Ta'meem, Mosul, and Diyala, we affirm the need
for taking inventory of the Kurdish families which have moved to the above
Governorates. Gather information about them and pursue those who have negative
marks against them, taking the head of the family immediately to the prisons of
General Security and returning the family immediately to their places of
residence. There is no objection to spreading the rumor that their head of
family is to be executed, in order to frighten others from entering Baghdad or
the other Governorates mentioned above.

79. Keep serious watch over male and female students living in hotels or
boarding houses, lest these places be used as hideouts or meeting places by
hostile elements. In case of suspicion and in the absence of documentary
evidence to put pressure on them, rumors can be spread that this place is a den
of immorality and is frequented by prostitutes, or that weapons have been
hidden there, or that banned goods have been discovered there by Customs and
Excise.

80. Continue taking the following into account when visiting the families of
those executed, or sentenced, or who are fugitives:

A. Programmed planning of the visit by completing all necessary
information about the family to be visited.

B. Taking necessary security measures as a precaution, prior to the visit,
especially of some families known to have hostile leanings.

C. Choosing the appropriate and suitable time for the visit.

D. Determining at first hand the family's situation and Hs way of living,
by breaking the psychological barrier between them and the Party and Revolution
organs.

E. Emphasizing the educational and integral aspects, by working at
immunizing the family members against aberrant currents and malicious
rumors.

F. Identifying and selecting the elements which may be useful by putting
them under the effects of temptation and terror. Lure their sons to places of
entertainment which will distance them from the atmosphere of complexes and
religious dogmatism, and allocate the expenses required for this. Prevent them
from contacting their fathers' friends, and from frequenting places of worship
such as Hussainiyas and mosques. Organize pleasure trips for them which
coincide with Ashura' and the Forty and others. Regarding the terror aspect,
remind them of their dead father's destiny and how he deprived himself and his
family from the happy and contented life in the shade of the Party and the
Revolution. Explain how he was ignorant and retarded and a reactionary, and was
wooed by the reactionary hostile forces and groups.

81. Continue laying precise and accurate plans for the national and
pan-national occasions, so that they may compete with the Shiite reactionary
and mythical occasions, such as Ashura', the assassination of Imam Ali, the
Forty of Imam Al-Hussain, Al-Ghadeer Festival, 15th of Sha'ban the birthday of
their Missing One, the dates of birth and death of the Shiite Imams: Al-Sadiq,
Al-Kadhum, Al-Ridha, and others. We must divert people's minds toward the
Revolution's occasions, distancing them from the empty ideas of dogmatism, in
order to imbue them with modern ideas and to control the security situation.
This is to be done in advance of the targeted occasion, and is to become a
regular practice, in order to foil hostile intentions.

82. Attaching major importance to the question of granting documents permitting
the carrying of arms. We have noticed a recent increase in the number of
applications for such documents, while there are large numbers which have not
been returned. We therefore reaffirm recent instructions demanding a decrease
in the applications for weapons licenses, limiting them to extremely necessary
cases, and through Headquarters. We cannot hide from any of you that many of
our comrades were killed with our weapons.

83. Timely preparation in advance of the hostile parties' special occasions,
and laying plans for the effective aborting of their intended subversive
activities in pointing out the faults of the Revolution and the Leader Party,
and in exposing the graft and corruption engaged in by many of our Party
comrades.

84. Continuing to observe religious visits and occasions, using cultural and
propaganda interference on them. They are extinct and reactionary practices,
out of tune with the Party's culture which has adopted secularism as its
program, and has left the theologians by the wayside.

85. Paying special attention to information received regarding booby-trapped
vehicles, wireless detonation, and suicidal elements entering the country, as
these have wearied the Party and the Leadership.

86. We reaffirm the need for the security organs to move in on the student
medium, from outside the university and institute campuses, while planting eyes
for observing the activities of the hostile factions and parties, and by using
our sources to hunt and entrap the stubborn ones. This is to be achieved even
if it requires engaging in sexual acts, entering night clubs, or participating
in drunkenness sessions, and even if it requires insinuation into their
families or the families of the honorable Security personnel.

87. Paying special attention to our international boundaries, taking the
necessary steps to curb hostile infiltration in coordination with the agencies
concerned. Those involved must be educated with the Revolution's program,
without reminding them of the international treaties which were signed by the
Leader President and which were subsequently abrogated.

88. Identifying and following-up the broadcasting stations belonging to the
hostile parties and gangs, and informing the Ministry of Culture and
Information, in order to jam them.

89. In view of the present situation's requirements, and what we are seeing in
the way of democratic changes at all levels, we affirm that this must not be
exploited by the enemies of the Revolution in reversing our openness with
others. Thus our previous order still stands, with regard to the iron-fisted
control of citizens, the detention of any citizen, the investigation or search
of his home, or his arrest, remain within the authority of the Security forces,
the Intelligence bureaus, the Special Security, and Military Intelligence,
without recourse to the criminal courts. This is in view of the critical nature
of the situation, and for fear of losing security control, and remains in force
until further notice.

90. Choosing the appropriate time to strike at the lines of recruitment of
those who have subversive intentions, especially those who possess weapons and
explosives, and in coordination with Headquarters.

91. Paying special attention to the pursuit and attack of any hostile groupings
and their elements in the area of the Marshes. The Leadership does not want to
create a new North in the South, and in fact it is possible to meet with the
Kurds when there is a disagreement with them, even in the aftermath of vicious
fighting. But in the case of the people of the South, and in view of their
Shiite sectarianism, and reminding them of their bloody history with the
governments they lived under, H is difficult to meet and discuss with them,
especially if they are strong and have acquired a fighting foundation. They
have a special impact on the people when they cite their primitive slogans
about the Kerbala event, and when they ascribe the attributes of ruthless
rulers to the wise leadership of the Party and the Revolution. Leaflets issued
by their parties and movements reach us, as does all their propaganda about the
descendants of Yawed and Abdullah Bin Ziyad and Al-Hajjaj, and all the
persecution of the Prophet's family.

92. Coordination with government offices with a view to following up the
employees who are responsible for the preparation of documents, identity cards,
and stamps, for fear that they may be approached by some hostile elements.

93. With regard to the splinter gangs and the factions that affirm the spirit
of splintering, they are the most dangerous of the factions which have adopted
the ideas and grudges of the symbol of splintering (Syria's Hafedh Al-Asad). It
is relevant to add that they are the greatest source of danger to national and
pan-national security. Study and analyze the circumstances that helped the gang
in its activities, and learn its history and personalities while setting aside
the remainder who have resumed to the right path. Make great efforts in
investigating them because they and the Syrian regime will surely vastly
increase their hostile activities, and incite the movements and factions which
claim to be pan-nationalist.

94. In order to discover the recruitment connections achieved by the splinter
gang's leadership and which have not been severed with their current
organizations, we must make use of all our available security methods to make
the necessary security plans for foiling their schemes.

95. Continue updating the registers of Iraqi men who have married Syrian women
and keep track of them, especially the women of the Alawi sect who belong, one
way or another, to the Shiite sects which hold grudges against the Revolution,
whether in Southern Iraq or Syria or Iran. Show the advanced cadres of the
Party that the Alawis are not one of the Islamic sects. Rather, just as
Hafedh's gang has splintered from the pure Arab way, so is the Alawi sect a
group which has splintered from Islam and has crossed over to the side of
blasphemy. This does not mean that we are concerned with studying the Islamic
sects, but it is a political means and a way to disfigure the Syrian enemy who,
through Hafedh Al-Asad's gang, has usurped power there.

96. Continue moving in on the Syrians who have acquired Iraqi citizenship, and
keep them under observation, lest the lackey Syrian regime move in on them.
Coordinate with them in the best interests of our security work.

97. Moving in on the smugglers who engage in smuggling across the border, and
utilize them in obtaining precise information about the Syrian regime's
activities, and about the other parties aimed at us, and to discover their
instructions.

98. Keeping track of Iraqi truck drivers when they enter and leave the country,
since they may be recruited by the hostile forces.

99. Continue the total ban on any organizational nucleus by the hostile parties
and movements in the armed forces. Such organizations are to be struck
secretly, in coordination with Headquarters and the Directorate of Military
Intelligence.

100. Study the effects of negative cases which come to the surface, especially
in the student and youth sectors, in preparation of reporting them to the
Higher Authorities.