Richard Whittall:

The Globalist's Top Ten Books in 2016: The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer

Middle East Eye: "

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“The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer has helped me immensely with great information and perspective.”

Bob Bradley, former US and Egyptian national coach: "James Dorsey’s The Turbulent World of Middle Eastern Soccer (has) become a reference point for those seeking the latest information as well as looking at the broader picture."

Alon Raab in The International Journal of the History of Sport: “Dorsey’s blog is a goldmine of information.”

Play the Game: "Your expertise is clearly superior when it comes to Middle Eastern soccer."

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Change FIFA: "A fantastic new blog'

Richard Whitall of A More Splendid Life:

"James combines his intimate knowledge of the region with a great passion for soccer"

Christopher Ahl, Play the Game: "An excellent Middle East Football blog"

James Corbett, Inside World Football

Friday, June 29, 2018

The Pakistani government’s removal of a virulently
anti-Shiite militant from its terrorism list at the very moment that an
international money laundering and terrorism finance watchdog was deciding to
put the country on a watchlist highlights Pakistan’s struggle to come to grips
with militancy.

Like China, Saudi Arabia has adopted contradictory attitudes
towards Pakistani militants, supporting those that serve its geopolitical
objectives while seeking to neutralize militants that either threaten its
interests or are of little value to the kingdom.

The grey listing means that Pakistan's financial system will
be designated as posing a risk to the international financial system because of
"strategic deficiencies" in its ability to prevent terror financing
and money laundering.

Pakistani officials downplayed the significance of the grey
listing, noting that the country was able to float international bonds, borrow
from multilateral bodies, receive or send remittances or conduct international
trade when it was listed between 2012 and 2015.

The government earlier cracked down on entities associated
with Hafez Saeed, an internationally designated terrorist, who is believed to
be responsible for the 2008 attacks in Mumbai in which more than 160 people
were killed.

Pakistani officials suggested that they had evaded
blacklisting by presenting a 26-point
action plan that would address FATF’s concerns in the next 15
months.

The plan promised
that Pakistan would share with FATF its steps to counter the Islamic
State, Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the Haqqani network; efforts to halt the
transfer of funds to militants via couriers; work to enhance the capacity of
prosecutors; and moves against illegal money changers and cross border
smuggling of currency.

The Pakistani effort however did not stop the government
from removing Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi, the head of Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat
(ASWJ), from its terrorism list on the day that FATF was discussing Pakistan in
Paris.

ASWJ, which is fielding dozens of candidates for Pakistan’s July
25 elections, is the successor of long-banned Sipah-e-Sahaba, a virulently
anti-Shiite group that has close ties to Saudi Arabia.

“Some things are natural. It’s like when two Pakistanis meet
abroad or someone from Jhang meets another person from Jhang in Karachi. It’s
natural to be closest to the people with whom we have similarities… We are the
biggest anti-Shiite movement in Pakistan,” Mr.
Ludhianvi said in 2016 over a lunch of chicken, vegetables and rice.

Mr. Ludhianvi sits at the intersection of both Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia’s two-pronged attitude towards militancy.

Madrassas or religious seminaries operated by ASWJ in the
Pakistani province of Balochistan that borders on Iran have benefiited from an
injection of funds from the kingdom in the last two years,
according to militants.

Saudi ambiguity is matched by a similar Chinese haziness in
its attitude toward Pakistani militants.

China’s sincerity will be put to the test when later this
year the United Nations Security Council is likely to again debate designating
Masoud Azhar, a fighter in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s
and an Islamic scholar who is believed to have been responsible for an attack
in 2016 on India’s Pathankot Air Force Station, as a terrorist.

Men like Messrs. Saeed and Azhar serve China’s interest of
keeping India off balance as well as the People’s Republic’s relations with the
powerful Pakistani military, which it views as a more reliable partner than
Pakistan’s unruly and rambunctious politicians.

Complicating the equation is the fact that Chinese and Saudi
selective support for Pakistani militants works at cross purposes.

China’s focus on India does not threaten Saudi interests but
Saudi support of anti-Shiite militants in a region that is key to China’s US$50
billion Belt and Road-relative investment in Pakistan could put Balochistan’s already
fragile security at risk.

The question is whether Saudi and Chinese acquiescence in
FATF’s grey listing of Pakistan signals that the two countries may have second
thoughts about their ambiguous approaches to Pakistani militants. If so, that
may be the key to untying Pakistan’s knots in its struggle with militancy.

Wednesday, June 27, 2018

Iran’s
Indian-back port of Chabahar, inaugurated months before the United
States re-imposed sanctions on the Islamic republic, is where Asia and the
Middle East’s multiple political conflicts and commercial rivalries collide.

Chabahar was destined to become a player in geopolitical and
economic manoeuvring between China, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates and Central Asian states even without the
re-imposition of sanctions.

The sanctions have, however, significantly enhanced its
importance as Iran struggles to offset the likely punishing impact of US
efforts to force the Islamic republic to alter its foreign and defense policy
and/or achieve a change of regime.

Iran sees the port together with the Indian-backed Chabahar
Free Trade Zone, that hopes to host a steel mill and a petrochemical complex, as
the motor of development
of the Iranian section of the Makran coast. Iran’s province of
Sistan and Balochistan shares the coast line with the Pakistani province of
Balochistan, home to the Chinese-backed rival port of Gwadar.

Saudi Arabia sees the Pakistani region as a launching pad of
a potential effort by the kingdom and/or the United States to destabilizing the
Islamic republic by stirring unrest among its ethnic minorities, including the
Baluch. Saudi Arabia has put the building
blocks in place for possible covert action but has to date given no
indication that it intends to act on proposals to support irredentist action.

A study written by Mohammed Hassan Husseinbor, an Iranian of
Baloch origin, and published by the International Institute for Iranian Studies,
formerly known as the Arabian Gulf Centre for Iranian Studies, a Saudi
government-backed think tank, argued that Chabahar posed “a direct threat to
the Arab Gulf states” that called for “immediate counter measures.”

Mr. Husseinbor said Chabahar would enable Iran to increase
market share in India for its oil exports at the expense of Saudi Arabia, raise
foreign investment in the Islamic republic, increase Iranian government
revenues, and allow Iran to project power in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

Saudi Arabia, months before the US re-imposition of
sanctions, already sought to thwart development of Chabahar by stopping South
Korea’s POSCO Engineering & Construction from moving ahead with a $1.6
billion agreement with Iranian steelmaker Pars Kohan Diar Parsian Steel (PKP) to
build a steel mill in Chabahar. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund has a 38
percent stake in POSCO.

“This project mandatorily requires the decision of the board
of directors. However, as relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia rapidly grew
worse after a severance of diplomatic ties last year, outside directors in the
board meeting are having negative stances on Iran projects, especially those
requiring investment and JVC (joint venture company) establishment,” POSCO
said in a letter to PKP. POSCO said it had difficulty “convincing
and reaching consent on the unfavourable opinion from the outside directors.”

The POSCO letter signalled that Chabahar’s success would
depend on the political will of governments with India and Iran in the lead
rather than on any hope to attract private sector investment.

India was earlier this month forced to drop a demand that
the winner of a bid to manage the Chabahar port pay an upfront US$8.52 million
premium.

Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj insisted last month
that her country would
not bow to US pressure to adhere to the Trump administration’s
sanctions. "India follows only UN sanctions, and not unilateral sanctions
by any country," Ms. Swaraj said.

For its part, Afghanistan sees the port as a way to reduce
its transport dependence on Pakistan with which it has strained relations.

Despite the US cloud hanging over it, Chabahar’s potential
significance goes beyond whether it will contribute to the Iranian effort.

India hopes that its US$500 million investment in the port
will offer it a gateway to Afghanistan and land-locked Central Asia that
constitutes an alternative to infrastructure related to China’s Belt and Road
initiative, including the $50 billion plus China Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC), and an anti-dote to Chinese investment in Indian Ocean ports.

Commercial competition between ports has been reinforced by
the Saudi-Iranian battle for regional hegemony as well as the Gulf spat between
Qatar and a Saudi-United Arab Emirates-led alliance that a year ago imposed an
economic and diplomatic boycott on the Gulf state and the war in Yemen.

As a result, commercial, military and geopolitical drivers
for port investment in the region have blurred and expanded the multiples
rivalries into the Horn of Africa with the UAE and others, including Saudi
Arabia, Turkey and Qatar jockeying for position in Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia,
Yemen and Djibouti.

Said NATO Defence College analyst Eleonora Ardemagni: “The
political rift in the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) weakens economic
integration prospects and as a consequence cooperation among commercial ports.
The Qatari crisis opened a new chapter in intra-GCC relations marking the
emergence of latent nationalism in the Arab Gulf region: the rising geopolitics
of ports is going to further unveil this trend.”

Sunday, June 24, 2018

Embattled former Malaysian prime minister Najib Razak was
the main loser in last month’s election upset that returned Mahathir Mohamad to
power as his country’s anti-corruption crusader. Yet, Mr. Razak is not the only
one who may be paying the price for allegedly non-transparent and unaccountable
governance.

So is Saudi Arabia with a Saudi company having played a key
role in the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal in which Mr. Razak is
suspected to have overseen the siphoning off of at least US$4.5 billion and the
Saudi government seemingly having gone out of its way to provide him political
cover.

While attention has focussed largely on the re-opening
of the investigation of Mr. Razak and his wife, Rosmah Mansor, both
of whom have been banned from travel abroad and have seen their homes raided by
law enforcement, Saudi Arabia has not escaped policymakers’ consideration. Mr.
Razak has denied all allegations of wrongdoing.

“The ATM (Malaysian Armed Forces) presence in Saudi Arabia
has indirectly mired Malaysia in the Middle East conflict… The government will
make a decision on the matter in the near future after a re-evaluation has been
completed,” said Mr. Sabu, who is known for his critical view of Saudi Arabia.

In a commentary published late last year that suggests a
potential Malaysian re-alignment of its Middle Eastern relationships, Mr. Sabu noted
that Saudi wrath has been directed “oddly, (at) Turkey, Qatar, and Iran…three
countries that have undertaken some modicum of political and economic reforms.
Instead of encouraging all sides to work together, Saudi Arabia has gone on an
offensive in Yemen, too. Therein the danger posed to Malaysia:
if Malaysia is too close to Saudi Arabia, Putrajaya would be asked to choose a
side.”

Putrajaya, a city south of Kuala Lumpur, is home to the
prime minister’s residence.

Mr. Sabu went on to say that “Malaysia should not be too
close to a country whose internal politics are getting toxic… For the lack of a
better word, Saudi Arabia is a cesspool of constant rivalry among the princes.
By this token, it is also a vortex that could suck any country into its black
hole if one is not careful. Indeed, Saudi Arabia is governed by hyper-orthodox
Salafi or Wahhabi ideology, where Islam is taken in a literal form. Yet true
Islam requires understanding Islam, not merely in its Quranic form, but Quranic
spirit.”

The investigation is likely to revisit 1MDB relationship’s
with Saudi
energy company PetroSaudi International Ltd, owned by Saudi
businessman Tarek Essam Ahmad Obaid as well as prominent members of the
kingdom’s ruling family who allegedly funded Mr. Razak.

A three-part BBC documentary, The House of Saud: A Family at
War, suggested that Mr. Razak had worked with Prince Turki bin
Abdullah, the son of former Saudi King Abdullah, to syphon off funds from 1MDB.

The Malaysian election as well as seeming Saudi complicity
in the corruption scandal that toppled Mr. Razak has global implications,
particularly for the United States and China, global powers who see support of
autocratic and/or corrupt regimes as the best guarantee to maintain stability.

It is a lesson that initially was apparent in the 2011
popular Arab revolts that toppled the leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and
Yemen.

The rollback of the achievements of most of those revolts
backed by autocratic leaders in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates bent
on reshaping the Middle East and North Africa in their mould has contributed to
the mayhem, violence and brutal repression engulfing the region.

Elections, if held at all, more often than not fail to serve
as a corrective in the Middle East and North Africa because they are engineered
rather than a free and fair reflection of popular will. Elections in countries
like Iraq and Lebanon serve as exceptions that confirm the rule while Iran
represents a hybrid.

As a result, street protests, militancy and violence are
often the only options available to those seeking change.

Against that backdrop, Malaysia stands out as an example of
change that does not jeopardize stability.

It is but the latest example of
Southeast Asian nations having led the way in producing relatively peaceful
political transitions starting with the 1986 popular revolt in the Philippines,
the 1998 toppling of Suharto in Indonesia, and Myanmar’s 2010 transition away
from military dictatorship.

This is true even if Southeast Asia also demonstrates that
political transition is a decades-long process that marches to the tune of
Vladimir Lenin’s principle of two steps forward, one step backwards as it
witnesses a backslide with the rise in the Philippines of President Rodrigo
Duterte’s authoritarianism, stepped up jihadist activity, the 2014 military
coup in Thailand, increasingly autocratic rule in Cambodia, the rise of
conservatism and intolerance in Indonesia, and the plight of the Rohingya in
Myanmar.

Saturday, June 23, 2018

Yahya Staquf, a diminutive, soft-spoken leader of Nahdlatul
Ulama, the world’s largest Muslim movement, and Indonesian president Joko
Widodo’s advisor on religious affairs, has held a series of meetings in recent
weeks that reflect the Muslim world’s shifting attitudes towards Israel and the
Palestinians and a re-alignment of socially conservative Muslim and Christian
interests.

Just this month, Mr. Staquf, a staunch advocate of
inter-faith dialogue and religious tolerance, met in Washington with Vice
President Mike Pence, a devout evangelist Catholic who has described himself as
"a
Christian, a conservative, and a Republican, in that order,"
and in Jerusalem with Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu.

Messrs. Pence and Staquf were joined by Reverend Johnnie
Moore, an evangelist who in May was appointed
by US President Donald J. Trump as a member of the board of the US
Commission on International Religious Freedom.

Mr. Staquf’s discussions would likely raise eyebrows at any
given moment.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ Palestine Authority has
refused to engage with the Trump administration since the US recognition of
Jerusalem and Palestinian officials were unlikely to meet with Messrs. Kushner
and Greenblatt during their Middle East tour that focused on a draft US plan to
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Details of the plan, described by Mr. Trump as the ‘deal of the
century,’ remain under wrap, but Palestinians fear that it will be
heavily geared towards supporting Israeli negotiating positions.

Whether by design or default, Mr. Staquf’s meetings appeared
to reinforce efforts by close US allies like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates and Egypt to stifle opposition to Mr. Trump’s approach to
Israeli-Palestinian peace. Turkey has been in the forefront of condemnation of
US policy that resonates in Muslim public opinion, particularly in Asia.

Frustration with US and Israeli policies has undermined
popular Palestinian support for a two-state solution that envisions the
creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel.

Hamas, the Islamist group that controls the Gaza Strip, has
facilitated weeks
of protests along the border between Gaza and Israel in support of
the Palestinian right to return to lands within Israel’s boundaries prior to
the 1967 Middle East war during which Israel captured East Jerusalem, the West
Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights.

Israel has since annexed East Jerusalem and withdrawn from
Gaza, which it blockades together with Egypt in a bid to undermine Hamas’s
rule.

“Muslim states are becoming closer to Israel because of the
common struggle against the Iranian regime and because of Israeli technology. …
The prime minister hopes that there will be progress in our relationship with
Indonesia, too,” Mr. Netanyahu’s office said.

Indonesia and Israel do not maintain diplomatic relations
but do not stop their nationals and officials from travelling between the two
countries. Mr. Staquf has insisted that he was visiting Israel in his private
capacity rather than as an advisor to the Indonesian president.

Mr. Staquf insisted that his visit to Israel at the
invitation of the American Jewish Congress was intended to promote Palestinian
independence. “I stand here for Palestine. I stand here on the basis that we
all have to honour Palestine’s sovereignty as a free country,” he said in
a statement posted on his organization’s website.

Nonetheless, Mr. Staquf did not meet Palestine Authority
officials during his visit. Osama al-Qawasmi, a spokesman for Mr. Abbas’ Al
Fatah group, charged that his visit was “a crime
against Jerusalem, against the Palestinians and Muslims in the world, and
constitutes support for the criminal Israeli occupier against our fighting and
resolute people.”

Mr. Staquf was the second NU leader to visit Israel in the
past two decades. Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid travelled several times
to Israel before and after his presidency but not while he was Indonesia’s head
of state.

Muslim leaders, many of which have long reconciled
themselves to recognition of the State of Israel’s existence, have largely been
reluctant to publicly engage with Israeli officials as opposed to non-Israeli
Jews as long as Israel and Palestine have not made substantial progress towards
peace.

Mr. Staquf like Mr. Wahid before him broke ranks by
travelling to Israel, a move that sparked
criticism and condemnation on Indonesian social media and from some
members of parliament.

Lost in that criticism is the fact that Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman is being hailed by some evangelists as heralding a new era
with his projection of greater religious openness in the kingdom and his unprecedented
statement that both Palestinians and Israelis “have the right” to
have their own land.

"You know I couldn't believe my ears actually when I
was watching the news report where the crown prince of Saudi Arabia said
directly, verbatim, He said this kingdom will become a kingdom for all
religions. I had to watch it again and he was crystal, crystal clear.

Mr. Staquf projected his visit to Israel as promoting the
concept of rahma or compassion and mercy as the basis for a solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the forging of relations between Israel and
the Muslim world.

In practice, by design or by default, it supports US and
Saudi efforts to impose their will on the Palestinians and the larger Middle
East that potentially could produce as many problems as they offer solutions.

In doing so, it pays tribute to Prince Mohammed’s ability to
project himself as an agent of change in Saudi Arabia even if the precise
contours of his vision have yet to emerge.

In a twist of irony, it is a tribute by the leader of a movement
that was founded almost a century ago in opposition to Wahhabism, the ultra-conservative
Sunni Muslim worldview that long shaped Saudi Arabia and that Prince Mohammed
is seen as disavowing.

Friday, June 22, 2018

He’s been in and out of prison during Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s
rule and is running against the president in this weekend’s Turkish elections
with no chance of defeating him and little hope of winning a seat in
parliament.

Messrs. Erdogan and Perincek seem at first glance poles
apart. Mr. Perincek is a maverick socialist and a militant secularist whose
conspiratorial worldview identifies the United States at the core of all evil.
By contrast, Mr. Erdogan carries his Islamism and nationalism on his sleeve.

Nonetheless, Mr. Perincek’s philosophy and world of contacts
in Russia, China, Iran and Syria has served Mr. Erdogan well in recent years.
His network and ideology has enabled the president to cosy up to Russia;
smoothen relations with China; build an alliance with Iran, position Turkey as
a leading player in an anti-Saudi, anti UAE front in the Middle East; and
pursue his goal of curtailing Kurdish nationalism in Syria.

Tacit cooperation between Messrs. Erdogan and Perincek is a
far cry from the days that he spent in prison accused of having been part of
the Ergenekon conspiracy that allegedly involved a deep state cabal plotting to
overthrow the government in 2015.

It was during his six years prison in that Mr. Perincek
joined forces with Lt. Gen. Ismail Hakki Pekin, the former head of the Turkey’s
military intelligence, who serves as vice-chairman of his Vatan Partisi or
Homeland Party.

His left-wing ideology that in the past was supportive of
the outlawed Kurdish Workers Party (PPK) viewed as a terrorist organization by
the Erdogan government, has not stopped Mr. Perincek from becoming a player in NATO
member Turkey’s hedging of its regional bets.

Together with Mr. Pekin, who has extensive contacts in
Moscow that include Alexander Dugin, a controversial Eurasianist extreme
right-winger who is believed to be close to Russian President Vladimir Putin,
Mr. Perincek mediated the reconciliation between Moscow and Ankara following
the Turkish air force’s downing of a Russian fighter in 2015. The two men were
supported in their endeavour by Turkish businessmen close to Mr. Erdogan and ultra-nationalist
Eurasianist elements in the military.

Eurasianism in Turkey was buoyed by increasingly strained
relations between the Erdogan government and the West. Mr. Erdogan has taken
issue with Western criticism of his introduction of a presidential system with
far-reaching powers that has granted him almost unlimited power.

Eurasianism as a concept borrows elements of Kemalism, the
philosophy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the visionary who carved Turkey out of the
ruins of the Ottoman empire; Turkish nationalism; socialism; and radical
secularism.

It traces its roots to Kadro, an influential leftist magazine
published in Turkey between 1932 and 1934 and Yon, a left-wing magazine
launched in the wake of a military coup in 1960 that became popular following
yet another military takeover in 1980.

Eurasianism is opposed to liberal capitalism and
globalization; believes that Western powers want to carve up Turkey; and sees
Turkey’s future in alignment with Russia, Central Asia, and China.

Mr. Perincek’s vision is shared by hardliners in Iran,
including the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who advocate an
Iranian pivot to the east on the grounds that China, Russia and other members
of the Beijing-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) were more reliable
partners than Europe, let alone the United States.

The Guards believe that Iran stands to significantly benefit
as a key node in China’s infrastructure-driven Belt and Road initiative and
will not be confronted by China on its human rights record.

Some Iranian hardliners have suggested that China’s
principle of non-interference means that Beijing will not resist Iran’s support
of regional proxies like Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia, Shiite militias in Iraq,
and the Houthis in Yemen in the way the United States does.

Their vision was strengthened by US president Donald J.
Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the 2015 international nuclear agreement
with Iran. China, Russia and Europe have vowed to uphold the deal.

Mr. Perincek may, however, be pushing the envelope of his
influence in his determination to restore relations between Turkey and the
regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

“The first thing that we will do after victory in the
election is that we will invite Bashar Assad to Ankara and
we will welcome him at the airport. We see no limitations and
barriers in developing relations between Turkey and Syria and we will make our
utmost efforts to materialize this objective,” Mr. Perincek vowed in a campaign
speech.

More in line with Mr. Erdogan’s vision is Mr. Perincek’s
admiration for China. "China today
represents hope for the whole humanity. We have to keep that hope
alive… Every time I visited China, I encountered a new China. I always returned
to Turkey with the feelings of both surprise and admiration," Mr. Perincek
told China’s state-run Xinhua news agency.

Wednesday, June 20, 2018

Lurking in the background of a
Saudi-Moroccan spat over World Cup hosting rights and the Gulf crisis is a
more fundamental competition for the mantle of spearheading promotion of a
moderate interpretation of Islam.

It’s a competition in which history and long-standing religious
diplomacy gives Morocco a leg up compared to Saudi Arabia, long a citadel of Sunni
Muslim intolerance and ultra-conservatism.

Saudi Arabia is the new, baggage-laden kid on the block with
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman asserting that he is returning the kingdom to
a top-down, undefined
form of moderate Islam.

To be sure, Prince Mohammed has dominated headlines in the
last year with long-overdue social reforms such as lifting the ban on women’s
driving and loosening restrictions on cultural expression and entertainment.

Yet, Prince Mohammed has also signalled the limits of his
definition of moderate Islam. His recurrent rollbacks have often been in
response to ultra-conservative protests not just from the ranks of the kingdom’s
religious establishment but also segments
of the youth that constitute the mainstay of his popularity.

Just this week, Prince Mohammed sacked
Ahmad al-Khatib, the head of entertainment authority he had established.
The government gave no reason for Mr. Al-Khatib’s dismissal, but it followed
online protests against a controversial Russian circus performance in Riyadh,
which included women wearing "indecent clothes."

The protests were prompted by a video on social media
that featured a female performer in a tight pink costume.

Saudi sports czar Turki bin Abdel Muhsin Al-Asheikh said “the
gym had its licence suspended over a deceitful video that circulated on social
media promoting the gym disgracefully and breaching the kingdom’s code of
conduct.”

To be sure, the United States, which repeatedly saw
ultra-conservative Islam as a useful tool during the Cold War, was long
supportive of Saudi propagation of Islamic puritanism that also sought to
counter the post-1979 revolutionary Iranian zeal.

Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia’s more recent wrestle with what it
defines as moderate and effort to rebrand itself contrasts starkly with
long-standing perceptions of Morocco as an icon of more liberal interpretations
of the faith.

Critics worry that Morocco’s promotion of its specific
version of Islam, which fundamentally differs from the one that was long
prevalent in Saudi Arabia, still risks Morocco curbing rather than promoting religious
diversity.

In doing so Morocco benefits from the fact that its
religious ties to West Africa date back to the 11th century when the
Berber Almoravid dynast converted the region to Islam. King Mohammed, who prides
himself on being a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, retains legitimacy as
the region’s ‘Commander of the Faithful.’

West African Sufis continue to make annual pilgrimages to a religious
complex in Fez that houses the grave of Sidi Ahmed Tijani, the 18th
century founder of a Sufi order.

All of this is not to say that Morocco does not have an
extremism problem of its own. Militants attacked multiple targets in Casablanca
in 2003, killing 45 people. Another 17 died eight years later in an attack in
Marrakech. Militants of Moroccan descent were prominent in a spate of incidents
in Europe in recent years.

Critics caution however that Morocco is experiencing
accelerated conservatism as a result of social and economic grievances as well
as an education system that has yet to wholeheartedly embrace more liberal
values.

“Extremism
is gaining ground,” warned Mohamed Elboukili, an academic and human rights activist,
pointing to an increasing number of young women who opt to cover their heads.

“You can say to me this scarf doesn’t mean anything. Yes, it
doesn’t mean anything, but it’s isolating the girl from the boy. Now she’s
wearing the scarf, but later on she’s not going to shake hands with the boy . .
. Later on she’s not going to study in the same class with boys. Those are the
mechanisms of an Islamist state, that’s how it works,” Mr. Elboukili said.

Mr. Elboukili’s observations notwithstanding, it is Morocco
rather than Saudi Arabia that many look to for the promotion of forms of Islam
that embrace tolerance and pluralism. Viewed from Riyadh, Morocco to boot has insisted
on pursuing an independent course instead of bowing to Saudi dictates.

Morocco refused to support Saudi Arabia in its debilitating,
one-year-old economic and diplomatic boycott of Qatar but recently broke off
relations with Iran, accusing the Islamic republic of supporting Frente
Polisario insurgents in the Western Sahara.

Moroccan rejection of Saudi tutelage poses a potential
problem for a man like Prince Mohammed, whose country is the custodian of Islam’s
two holiest cities and who has been ruthless in attempting to impose his will
on the Middle East and North Africa and position the kingdom as the region’s
undisputed leader.

Yet, Saudi Arabia’s ability to compete for the mantle of
moderate Islam is likely to be determined in the kingdom itself rather than on
a regional stage. And that will take far more change than Prince Mohammed has
been willing to entertain until now.

Sunday, June 17, 2018

Mounting anger and discontent is simmering across the Arab
world much like it did in the walk-up to the 2011 popular revolts that toppled
four autocratic leaders. Yet, this time round the anger does not always explode
in mass street protests as it recently did in Jordan.

To be sure, fury at tax hikes in Jordan followed the classic
pattern of sustained public protests. Protesters, in contrast to the calls for
regime change that dominated the 2011 revolts, targeted the government’s
austerity measures and efforts to broaden its revenue base.

Now, with economists and analysts waiting to see how
Egyptians respond to this weekend’s austerity measures that include a
50 percent rise in gasoline prices, the third since Egypt floated its
currency in 2016, and further hikes expected in July, Morocco may provide a
more risk-free and effective model for future protest in one of the most
repressive parts of the world.

The boycott of the likes of French dairy giant Danone, mineral
water company Oulmes, and the country’s leading fuel distributor, Afriquia SMDC,
is proving effective and more difficult to counter. The boycott recently expanded
to include the country’s
fish markets.

The
boycott has already halved Danone’s sales. The company said it would post a
150 million Moroccan dirham ($15.9m) loss for the first six months of this
year, cut raw milk purchases by 30 percent and reduce its number of short-term
job contracts.

Danone employees recently staged a sit-in that blamed both
the boycott and the government for their predicament. Lahcen Daoudi, a
Cabinet minister, resigned after participating in a sit-in organized by
Danone workers.

The boycott has also impacted the performance of energy
companies. Shares of Total Maroc, the only listed fuel distributor, fell by
almost 10 percent since the boycott began in April.

The strength of the boycott that was launched on Facebook
pages that have attracted some two million visitors lies in the fact that identifying
who is driving it has been difficult because no individual or group has
publicly claimed ownership.

The boycott’s effectiveness is enhanced by the selectiveness
of its targets described by angry consumers on social media as “thieves” and “bloodsuckers.”

Anonymity and the virtual character of the protest, in what
could become a model elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa, has made it
difficult for the government to crackdown on its organizers.

Yet, even if the government identified the boycott’s
organizers, it would be unable to impose its will on choices that consumers make
daily. The boycott also levels the playing field with even the poorest being
able to impact the performance of economic giants.

In doing so, the boycott strategy counters region-wide
frustration with the fact that protests have either failed to produce results
or led in countries like Syria, Yemen, Egypt and Libya to mayhem, increased
repression, and civil war.

“While boycotts solve some of the problems of protest
movements,… they
also create new challenges…. Diffuse structures…limit their ability to
formulate clear demands, negotiate on the basis of these demands, respond to
criticism of the movement and, eventually, end the boycott. Boycotts against
domestic producers are likely to face criticism that they are hurting the
economy and endangering the jobs of their compatriots working in the boycotted
companies,” cautioned Max Gallien, a London School of Economics PhD candidate who
studies the political economy of North Africa.

Underlying the boycott is a deep-seated resentment of the
government’s incestuous relationship with business leading to its failure to
ensure fair competition that many believe has eroded purchasing power among rural
poor and the urban middle class alike.

Afriquia is part of the Akwa group owned by Aziz Akhannouch,
a Moroccan billionaire ranked by Forbes, who also
serves as agriculture minister, heads a political party and is one of the
kingdom’s most powerful politicians. Oulmes is headed by Miriem Bensalah
Chekroun, the former president of Morocco's confederation of enterprises, CGEM.

Saturday, June 16, 2018

Amid ever closer cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Israel’s
military appears to be adopting the kind of sectarian anti-Shiite rhetoric that
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is abandoning as part of a bid to
develop a national rather than a religious ethos and promote his yet to be
defined form of moderate Islam.

The Israeli rhetoric in Arabic-language
video clips that target a broad audience across the Middle East and North
Africa emerged against the backdrop of a growing influence of conservative
religious conscripts and officers in all branches of the Israeli armed forces.

The visit could determine when US President Donald J. Trump
publishes his long-awaited ‘art of the deal’ proposal for a resolution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict that despite Israeli and tacit Saudi and United
Arab Emirates backing is likely to be rejected by the Palestinians as well as those
Arab states that have so far refused to tow the Saudi line.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in tacit
cooperation with the Palestine Authority on the West Bank, have adopted a
carrot-and-stick approach in an as
yet failed bid to weaken Hamas’ control of Gaza in advance of the announcement
of Mr. Trump’s plan.

Citing a saying of the Prophet Mohammed, Major Adraee,
painting Hamas as an Iranian stooge, asserted that “whoever acts like a people
is one of them… You (Hamas) have officially become Shiites in line with the
Prophet’s saying… Have you not read the works of the classical jurists,
scholars…who have clearly warned you about the threat Iranian Shiism poses to
you and your peoples?”

In a twist of irony, Major Adraee quoted the very scholars
Prince Mohammed appears to be downplaying. They include 18th century
preacher Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab, whose ultra-conservative anti-Shiite
interpretation of Islam shaped Saudi Arabia for much of its history; Taqi ad-Din
Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, a 14th century theologist and jurist, whose worldview,
like that of Wahhabism, inspires militant Islam; andSheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Egyptian-born,
Qatar-based scholar, who was designated a terrorist by Saudi Arabia and the UAE
because he is believed to be the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.

“The enlightened Salafi scholar Imam Mohammed ibn Abdul
Wahhab warned you about the threat posed by these people to the Islamic faith
with the heresies that they adhere to. He says: ‘Look at this atheist’s words.
You will see that he employs rafidah (rejectionist) terms. They (the rafidah)
are more harmful to the faith than Jews or Christians….’ You follow the
Iranians who pose a greater danger to you than any other force,” Major Adraee said
referring to Shiites in derogatory language employed by ultra-conservative
Sunni Muslims.

Major Adraee went on to quote Ibn Tamiyyah as saying: “I
know that the best of them are hypocrites. They fabricate lies and produce
corrupt ideas to undermine the Islamic faith.” Hypocrites is a term often used
by ultra-conservatives to describe Shiites.

Major Adraee cited Sheikh Qaradawi as asserting that “the
threat of the Shiites is their attempt to penetrate Sunni society. They are
able to do so with their excessive wealth.”

Addressing supporters of Hamas, Major Adraee asked: “Do you
still want to be allies with these corrupt people while you claim to follow Islam…and
respect Islamic scholars whose teachings you proudly disregard? Don’t be hypocrites.”
Major Adraee concluded his remarks by warning that those who guided by Iran
caused disruption would “be punished in the hereafter.”

Major Adraee’s remarks reflected not only Israeli public
diplomacy tactics but also the Israeli military’s
changing demography. Religious recruits accounted for 40 percent of the
graduates from last year’s officer training course although they have yet to
graduate to the military’s most prestigious command posts.

As commander of Israel’s elite infantry Golani Brigade that
suffered high casualties in the 2014 war against Hamas, then Colonel. Winter
made headlines by declaring
holy war on the Palestinians. “The Lord God of Israel, make our way
successful. … We’re going to war for your people, Israel, against an enemy that
defames you,” the general told his troops.

Military sources said Brigadier General Winter was not
passed over because of his religious or political views but as result of General
Eizenkot’s desire to promote younger officers.

Major Adraee became the first serving Israeli military
officer to be published by a Saudi publication when Elaph, a London-based,
award-winning independent news portal established by Saudi-British businessman
and journalist Othman Al Omeir, published an anti-Hamas article
the Israeli had co-authored. Mr. Al Omeir is believed to have close ties to Prince
Mohammed’s branch of the Saudi ruling family.

While Israel and Saudi Arabia have found common ground in
their opposition to Iran, Major Adraee’s anti-Shiite rhetoric appeared to hark
back to language that Prince Mohammed has recently sought to avoid in his
effort to redress the kingdom’s image as a stronghold of ultra-conservatism and
sectarianism.

Although he accused Iran in an interview in April with The
Atlantic of wanting to spread “their extremist Shiite ideology,” he insisted
that “we don’t believe we have Wahhabism. We believe we have, in Saudi Arabia,
Sunni and Shiite… You will find a Shiite in the cabinet, you will find Shiites
in government, the most important university in Saudi Arabia is headed by a
Shiite… We
have no problem with the Shiites. We have a problem with the ideology of
the Iranian regime.”

Said Mohammed Husain F. Jassem, a Middle East analyst with
London-based research group Integrity UK, who translated
Major Adraee’s clips into English: “The rhetoric used by the IDF is exactly
the same as the one used by ISIS, al-Qaeda, and anti-Shia bigots in propaganda
videos and print.”

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About Me

James M DorseyWelcome to The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer by James M. Dorsey, a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Soccer in the Middle East and North Africa is played as much on as off the pitch. Stadiums are a symbol of the battle for political freedom; economic opportunity; ethnic, religious and national identity; and gender rights. Alongside the mosque, the stadium was until the Arab revolt erupted in late 2010 the only alternative public space for venting pent-up anger and frustration. It was the training ground in countries like Egypt and Tunisia where militant fans prepared for a day in which their organization and street battle experience would serve them in the showdown with autocratic rulers. Soccer has its own unique thrill – a high-stakes game of cat and mouse between militants and security forces and a struggle for a trophy grander than the FIFA World Cup: the future of a region. This blog explores the role of soccer at a time of transition from autocratic rule to a more open society. It also features James’s daily political comment on the region’s developments. Contact: incoherentblog@gmail.comView my complete profile