Thursday, July 9, 2009

Little Changed In Security Situation In Mosul

Mosul remains the second most violent city in Iraq after Baghdad. From May to June 2009 little changed in the security situation. The number of attacks, deaths, and wounded only dipped slightly between the two months. In June there were a total of 73 attacks and incidents compared to 83 in May, which were reported in the press. The actual number of incidents is probably higher. The 73 attacks led to 181 casualties in June compared to 228 in June. The averages were roughly the same however with 1.93 deaths per day in June versus 2.06 per day in May, and 4.1 wounded in June against 4.7 in May. One major reason for the difference between the two months was that there was only one mass casualty bombing in June, which resulted in one killed, and 13 wounded. In May there were two such attacks, which resulted in 29 deaths and 40 wounded.

The reason attacks have remained largely unabated in Mosul over the last few months is the fact that it is one of the flashpoints between Arabs and Kurds. The Kurdistan Regional Government hopes to annex several areas in northern Ninewa province, which has raised the ire of the local Arabs. Kurdish forces were also used to retake the city in November 2004 from insurgents, and stayed there for several years afterwards. Together this has allowed the insurgents to portray themselves as the protectors of the Arab population, and maintain a foothold there. Many militants were also forced north during the Surge.

A close eye needs to be kept on the city to see how it fares after most U.S. forces have withdrawn to outside Mosul’s borders. If attacks increase it could show holes in the abilities of the Iraqi security forces. If things stay relatively the same, it would show that they are capable of doing their jobs with less U.S. support. This could be a blueprint for post-2011 Iraq as U.S. combat troops will have to be withdrawn from the country, but a large contingent of U.S. advisors is expected to stay.

Arraf, Jane, “US troops to exit Iraq’s cities but new role still evolving,” Christian Science Monitor, 6/29/09- “Why was top US general late for his own press conference? Iraqi security,” Christian Science Monitor, 6/15/09

4 comments:

You know, I am sure that someone must have thought of this, but I wonder why Maliki hasn't thought of standing up an Awakening in Mosul with al Hadbaa overseeing its formation like the IIP did in Diyala. That way, you get folks on the ground and in the neighborhoods and also give Maliki an ally and the Arabs a sense that the Dawa government has their backs.

Granted, the Kurds wouldn't be happy, but it seems like it would be a win-win for everyone else.

In Jan 08 the Kurdish led provincial xouncil rejected formation of SOI there so they've never been formed there. What Maliki did instead then was to move in a new army unit and transfer out the Kurdish officers. This is what al Hadbaa wants now as well. More army to replace the peshmergas though.

Well, Joel, since they've shaken up the arrangement of Ninevah's legislature, I kind of wonder why they haven't broached the topic again. Because the current process of bombings, shootings, arrests, ad inifinitum doesn't seem sustainable. But then, Maliki's been canny enough to outmaneuver all rivals to date, so I figure he's got something in mind.

Well there could be a variety of other reasons why they haven't set up an SOI program there.

1) Whatever group was created there Maliki would want to control. When the SOI were first brought up in Mosul it was by the Americans, and that's a major reason why Maliki hasn't trusted the SOI to begin with, they are an American rather than a Baghdad creation.

Also when Samarraie was elected new speaker of parliament he cut off funding for the Tribal Support Councils. The money for the SOI taken over from the U.S. also only lasts for one year, and the pay is late by months, so perhaps Maliki didn't have the money to pay for an SOI program and more importantly, to keep their loyalty.

2) Maliki has tried to reach out to the Sunni community in Mosul through reconstruction money. He put a prominent Sunni Arab in charge of the development money for the city.

3) There's lots of talk about Maliki aligning with al-Hadbaa and running with them in the 2010 parliamentary vote since Mosul is the 3rd largest city in Iraq. Not sure that will be possible if Maliki runs as part of a new United Iraqi Alliance, but it's another sign that Maliki was reaching out to the Arabs in Mosul.

4) Like I said before, Maliki also sent in a new mostly Arab Army unit and purged the Kurdish officers from it, so again, he's trying to show that he's for the Arabs rather than the Kurds in Mosul.

On the other hand, one major reason why the insurgency still has a foothold in Mosul is because of the Arab-Kurd divide, and all the steps above show that Malik is making the situation worse rather than trying to mediate. So unless al-Hadbaa and Maliki are able to kick out all the peshmerga from Ninewa, something that's probably impossible without fighting, the status quo will probably continue there for the foreseeable future.

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About Me

Musings On Iraq was started in 2008 to explain the political, economic, security and cultural situation in Iraq via original articles and interviews. I have written for the Jamestown Foundation, Tom Ricks’ Best Defense at Foreign Policy and the Daily Beast, and was responsible for a chapter in the book Volatile Landscape: Iraq And Its Insurgent Movements. My work has been published in Iraq via AK News, Al-Mada, Sotaliraq, All Iraq News, and Ur News, and I have been interviewed by Rudaw English. I was interviewed on CCTV and TRT World News TV, and have appeared in CNN, the Christian Science Monitor, The National, Columbia Journalism Review, Mother Jones, PBS’ Frontline, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for the Study of War, Radio Free Iraq, and others. I have also been cited in Iraq From war To A New Authoritarianism by Toby Dodge, Imagining the Nation Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq by Harith al-Qarawee, ISIS Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassahn, The Rise of the Islamic State by Patrick Cocburn, and others. If you wish to contact me personally my email is: motown67@aol.com