Syria revolt doomed to sustained violence

By Jonathan Cheng

December 27, 2011 — 3.00am

The explosion of two car bombs in Damascus on Friday represents a shift of the ''Syrian Uprising'' into a new phase.

The opposition has accused the government of staging this attack, making the (very valid) claim that it seemingly validates the government's narrative - that the regime is fighting terrorists and extremists.

Devastation ... a man inspects a damaged vehicle at the site of a suicide bombing in Damascus on Friday.Credit:AP

On the other hand, bombings against state institutions in the middle of the capital make the regime look weak and incapable. For all we know, either side could be responsible.

What's more important is the context, which, as Syria expert Joshua Landis points out, ''is the growing frustration of the opposition''. Contrary to many external claims, this opposition has been losing momentum. The Assad regime still enjoys, in contrast to the opposition, big political, military, and social advantages.

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The only dimension in which the opposition is winning is in foreign propaganda and information. Only a few days ago, numerous outlets reported on the massacre of deserters, without clarifying whether these deserters were armed or whether they intended to fight against the regime.

These sensationalised articles present natural assumptions that the opposition is very strong, that pro-regime forces are responsible for all civilian deaths, and, until recently, that the opposition did not target or attack Assad's security forces. All three are fundamentally untrue.

On the latter issue, estimates suggest that at least 800 members of the state security apparatus have been killed. That the anti-regime Syrian Observatory for Human Rights is commonly cited as a non-partisan human rights source on Syria is a clear illustration of this distortion.

The situation is much more complex. Fighting for change is always more difficult than maintaining the status quo. The two main political opposition groups, the overseas Syrian National Council and Damascus-based National Co-ordination Committee for Democratic Change, suffer from factionalism, with the only common denominator being an ardent desire to change the Assad regime.

On the other hand, the close-knit political elite (about 3600 members) has remained relatively united in their objective of staying in power. A genuine tipping point, where supporters abandon the regime en-masse, would require citizens believing that first, the situation in post-Assad Syria would be better than today, and second, that the opposition has a fighting chance. While many agree with the former, very few believe in the latter.

On the military side, large-scale defections to the Free Syrian Army have not occurred. This means that the FSA remains a loosely organised and ill-equipped force, and this is not taking into account the Syrian Armed Forces' monopoly over sophisticated weaponry - aircraft and tanks.

Many regime elites and opponents believe they are fighting for survival in a zero-sum game, where losing would most likely result in loss of life, or exile at best. Unable to face the regime in open warfare, armed opposition elements are focusing on using guerilla warfare: ambushes and small tactical strikes against strategic targets. This blurs the distinction between the civilian and military spheres, offering the Assad regime a justifiable pretext to crack down even harder.

The sheltering of FSA forces by anti-regime Syrians, the general use of perfidy by the FSA, and the increasing sophistication and success of anti-regime combat operations will only force the regime to undertake a sustained counterinsurgency campaign.

This arming of the opposition presents a new set of dilemmas for the international community. It is very difficult for the US and its allies to condemn Syria for its use of military force when the opposition is openly doing the same.

With overt intervention off the table (at least for now), due to a lack of political willpower and military means, it is possible the US and Turkey, among others, are now in favour of clandestine support for the opposition. As such, Syria will likely be locked in a protracted and increasingly violent insurgency, where extreme elements of the opposition begin undertaking radical action in urban areas - ''terrorism'' and targeting civilian state installations - and small-scale guerilla confrontations between the regime and its opponents continue in the peripheral and mountainous areas of the country.

Jonathan Cheng is based at the centre for Arab and Islamic studies at the Australian National University.