How to Contain Iraq

Published: October 15, 1994

The Clinton Administration's quick and firm response to Iraqi military maneuvers near Kuwait forced Saddam Hussein into an abrupt retreat. Though Iraq's intentions were scarcely innocent, the crisis eased without any shots being fired or borders crossed.

With good reason, Washington would like to avoid massive mobilization every time Mr. Hussein chooses to stir up a crisis. It would also prefer not having to wait until Iraqi troops actually cross the Kuwaiti border before the sheikdom's defenders can strike back.

Washington is now canvassing support for a Security Council resolution that would demand that Iraq withdraw the reinforcements and special units it recently moved south. From now on, under the resolution, Iraq would have to limit its forces in southern Iraq to those present before the latest crisis began, and even these would have to avoid threatening deployments near the Kuwaiti border. Those demands are justified, given Baghdad's repeated threats and menacing actions. The vote could come as soon as today.

Most other members of the international coalition that has worked together containing Iraq for the past four years support those demands. But how to enforce them is another matter. China, Russia and France, among others, are reluctant to follow up the resolution with an explicit threat of force against offending Iraqi troop movements so long as they are confined to Iraqi territory.

American interests in the region are strong enough to justify unilateral U.S. military action in certain circumstances. But the Clinton Administration should be extremely cautious about driving new wedges into an already divided coalition or setting precedents for unilateral action that others might exploit -- for example, Russia in the case of former Soviet Republics.

China's main concern is sovereignty and protection of its own freedom of action from U.N. intrusion. Russia and France are frankly interested in doing business with an internationally rehabilitated Iraq. All three also have good reasons to discourage future Iraqi aggression. But they insist that Saddam Hussein's behavior, including his cooperation with arms inspectors, can most effectively be influenced not merely by threats and punishments but by a careful combination of positive and negative incentives.

No doubt the U.S. and its British allies alone can manage the military defense of Kuwait. But denying Iraq the ability to sell its oil or buy new weapons on the international market requires maintaining a consensus of all major and Mideastern powers.

That consensus was already in danger of fraying a few weeks ago on the oil sanctions issue because of Washington's overly creative interpretation of U.N. resolutions spelling out what Iraq had to do to get relief. By rashly sending its troops southward, Baghdad reunited the allies and temporarily patched up the divisions over future oil sales.

But any new U.S. attempt to go beyond a Security Council consensus on enforcement risks doing more harm than good. It would move the U.S. military closer to the unenviable role of global police force, even as it weakened the long-term containment of Iraq.