ERISA's "anti-cutback" rule, 29 U.S.C. 1054(g), generally prohibits any
pension plan amendment which has the effect of eliminating or reducing a
participant's early retirement benefit or a retirement-type subsidy with
respect to benefits attributable to service before the amendment. The
Seventh Circuit, expressly acknowledging its direct conflict with a 1998
decision of the Fifth Circuit, held that a pension plan amendment which
expands the types of post-retirement employment that trigger mandatory
suspension of early retirement benefits violates the anti- cutback rule when
applied to suspend the benefits of participants who retired before the
amendment.

The question presented is whether a "suspension" of early retirement
benefits pursuant to a multiemployer pension plan amendment is an
"elimination" or a "reduction" of such benefits which would be prohibited by
ERISA's anti-cutback rule.

Retroactivity of Rules in Judicial Decisions, Death Penalty, Habeas Corpus

Question:
In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002), this Court held that the
Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee extends to the determination of any
fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the maximum punishment
for first-degree murder from life imprisonment to death. In the instant case,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the rule
announced in Ring should be applied retroactively to cases on collateral
review.

Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring is substantive, rather than procedural, and therefore exempt from the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality)?

Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring applies retroactively to cases on collateral review under Teague's exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that alter bedrock procedural principles and seriously enhance the accuracy of the proceedings?

Petitioners are citizens of Great Britain and Australia. Seized abroad in apparent connection with the
United States' "War on Terrorism," they have been incarcerated in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, without
charges or proof of wrongdoing, and with no opportunity to establish their innocence, for over 18
months. The Government claims it may hold Petitioners under these conditions indefinitely, and that
no court has jurisdiction to review the cause for their detention. The courts below agreed. In this
context, the case presents the following question:

Whether United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba.

Foreign Tribunals, Commission of European
Communities, Antitrust, Production of Documents

Questions:28 U.S.C. 1782 authorizes the federal district courts to grant discovery to
"interested person[s]" for use "in a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal
accusation."

The questions presented are:

Whether section 1782 authorizes a federal district court to provide a
private person with discovery that the foreign jurisdiction itself does not
authorize.

Whether section 1782 allows civil discovery by a private person when no
"proceeding" before a foreign "tribunal" is pending or even imminent.

Whether section 1782 extends discovery rights in the United States to
private non-litigants.

Whether, in order to show that a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11 constitutes reversible plain error, a defendant must demonstrate
that he would not have pleaded guilty if the violation had not occurred.

Whether a presidential foreign-affairs action that is otherwise exempt
from environmental-review requirements under the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(1),
became subject to those requirements because an executive agency promulgated
administrative rules concerning implementation of the President's action.

This Court held over twenty years ago that "a district court must dismiss
habeas petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims." Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1981). The question presented is:

Whether the dismissal of such a "mixed" habeas petition is improper unless
the district court informs the petitioner about the possibility of a stay of the
proceeding pending exhaustion of state remedies and advises the petitioner
with respect to the statute of limitations in the event of any refiling.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), "[a]n amendment of a
pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when relation back
is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable to
the action, or [] ... the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted
to be set forth in the original pleading ...." The question presented is:

Whether a second, untimely habeas petition may relate back to a first habeas
petition, where the first habeas petition was dismissed and the first
proceeding is no longer pending.

The District of Columbia Circuit, in a divided opinion, interpreted the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. 6a, to permit U.S. antitrust claims by
foreign buyers based on transactions with foreign sellers conducted entirely in
foreign countries. Rehearing was denied by a 4-3 vote. The D.C. Circuit's decision
conflicts with decisions of other courts of appeals and with the views of the United
States. The question presented is as follows:

Whether the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA), 5 U.S.C. App. 1, 1 et seq., can be construed,
consistent with the Constitution, principles of separation
of powers, and this Court's decisions governing
judicial review of Executive Branch actions, to authorize
broad discovery of the process by which the Vice
President and other senior advisors gathered information
to advise the President on important national
policy matters, based solely on an unsupported allegation
in a complaint that the advisory group was not
constituted as the President expressly directed and the
advisory group itself reported.

Whether the court of appeals had mandamus or
appellate jurisdiction to review the district courts
unprecedented discovery orders in this litigation.

Does the Constitution permit Executive officials to detain an American
citizen indefinitely in military custody in the United States, hold him
essentially incommunicado and deny him access to counsel, with no
opportunity to question the factual basis for his detention before any
impartial tribunal, on the sole ground that he was seized abroad in a
theater of the War on Terrorism and declared by the Executive to be an
"enemy combatant"?

Is the indefinite detention of an American citizen seized abroad but held
in the United States solely on the assertion of Executive officials that he
is an "enemy combatant" permissible under applicable congressional
statutes and treaty provisions?

In a habeas corpus proceeding challenging the indefinite detention of an
American citizen seized abroad, detained in the United States, and
declared by Executive officials to be an "enemy combatant," does the
separation of powers doctrine preclude a federal court from following
ordinary statutory procedures and conducting an inquiry into the factual
basis for the Executive branch's asserted justification of the detention?