Parker tells judge he travels by ‘common right’ in red pickup

Welder Gregory Parker is a family man who believes he has an absolute right to travel on the public right of way in his private automobile. His daughter is Jocelynn and his wife is Kasee. (Photo David Tulis)Sessions court judges, from left, Clarence Shattuck (now retired), Gary Starnes and Lila Statom attend a county commission meeting in Chattanooga. (Photo David Tulis)

Welder and family man Gregory Parker of Chickamauga, Ga., uses area roads freely as a matter of common right, and is prepared to make a case for personal liberty Tuesday in the sessions court of Hamilton County presided over by Judge Lila Statom.

His best course of action may be to ask any of a dozen Apollyon-slaying questions of the arresting officer who ordered his car impounded at the sure hand of Mosteller towing service.

The questions that throw back astounding state claims show the officer to be incompetent and ill-trained in the business of respectful law enforcement under his oath to God. The interrogatories of Mr. Parker are intended to show he lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Parker on the day he arrested this laboring man tootling along in a red Silverado pickup.

Judge Statom is vaguely familiar with the line of argument and inquiry proffered by people such as Mr. Parker.

On March 14 she sent the state’s high claims of criminal free travel to the grand jury, believing it might want to indict Jon Luman, a Red Bank man who bears a “private traveler” tag on the back of his ramshackle SUV. Mr. Luman uses the auto privately to get him to the Food City store and to his job sites as carpenter.

Mr. Parker has come to important point in his life. He is an American claiming his legal liberties despite the operation of rebuttable presumption against him by police, sheriff’s deputies and courts. He’s willing to fight back against ultra vires enforcement. That is, to put Latin into American English, police action outside the actual law, outside the view or scope of the law.

‘I am not a driver or operator’

In an affidavit, Mr. Parker says he “[does] not under any circumstances utilize the public highways for commercial purposes. I am not a 14th Amendment legal ‘person’ engaged in interstate commerce, nor do I derive income from the travel and transport of goods. I am not a ‘driver,’ nor am I an ‘operator’ of a ‘motor vehicle.’ The driver’s license is for motor vehicles involved in commerce only. My private, self-propelled contrivance/carriage is not involved in commerce, therefore, it is not a ‘motor vehicle.’ The corporate State of Tennessee department of motor vehicle code does not disclose the true intent and purpose of the statutes, though a “motor vehicle” is adequately and clearly defined in the United States Code.”

He cites 18 USC 31, “Motor vehicle means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes” (italics added) and that “The privilege of using the streets and highways by the operation thereon of motor carriers for hire can be acquired only by permission or license from the state or its political subdivision.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed, page 830.

Watch that false swearing

Mr. Parker is aware of the danger of sworn jurats on government documents. They trap the unwary, but also warn away people bent on asserting their rights and unwilling to swear to details of government paperwork that put them into a false position of certainty. A careful American who loves God and His grants of liberty will not swear to anything he knows to be untrue or about which he is strongly uncertain.

“I cannot in good faith apply for and accept a driver’s license, as I would be committing perjury” the affiant says.

“I would have to swear under oath that I am a member of, citizen of, franchisee of, or resident (agent) of [fiduciary, surety for] the corporate ‘State of’ Tennessee, when the already established facts by affidavit have evidenced that I am NOT a member of, citizen of, franchisee of, or resident (agent) of the corporate ‘State of’ Tennessee or the federal United States.”

Here, I fear, we are getting into the weeds. His arguments about state citizenship are a bit of pride that amounts to deep background — perhaps even patriot theory — that has no direct bearing on the state’s assault against Mr. Parker.

These line of analysis probably will hurt him only because it distracts from his main argument, the claims he makes there on the side of the road: That he is free to use the public right of way freely and apart from any state permission or contract, firstly because the nature of the statute the cop is enforcing. He is a private citizen for whom government exists to protect.

Where rubber meets the road

“I am NOT effectively connected with a trade or business in the corporate monopoly of the United States government, whether federal, state, county or municipal. I am not a resident ‘U.S. citizen,’ but a citizen of [any of] the several states[,] domiciled in the sovereign state of Tennessee republic 1850, an American state citizen of the united states of America. *** I have not knowingly or willingly waived ANY of my unalienable rights.”

He cites Thompson v. Smith, 154 SE 579.

The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his/her property thereon either by carriage or automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city [or State] may prohibit or permit at will, but a common right which he/she has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

He also cites another celebrated bit of judicial lingo: “Even the legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his/her property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience.” [Regulated means traffic safety enforcement, stop lights, signs etc.] Chicago Motor Coach v. Chicago, 169 NE 22

“I have determined and hereby affirm *** that I am not required to have government permission to travel, NOT required to have a driver’s license, not required to have vehicle registration of my personal property, nor to surrender the lawful title of my duly conveyed property to the state as security against government indebtedness and the undeclared federal bankruptcy. Any administrative rule, regulation or statutory act of any State legislature or judicial tribunal to the contrary is unlawful and clearly unconstitutional, thus null and void.”

Rights? Cannot convert into a crime

Mr. Parker mentions three excellent cases that establish the rights of people in Chattanooga and elsewhere to be free to travel apart from any state permission.

➤“Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

➤“The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.” Miller v. U.S., 230 F 2d 486, 489

➤“There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of constitutional rights.” Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 945

Belligerence is the tone of Mr. Parker’s affidavit as he touches on his rights and their abuse by officials acting without lawful authority. The high tone of this quiet-spoken but deep-voiced American commoner is almost frightening.

“Amy action by a police (i.e., executive) officer, officer of the court, public servant or government official to assert unlawful authority under the ‘color of law’ will be construed as a direct and willful violation of my constitutionally protected rights, and will be prosecuted to the full extent of American law.” That is, in a civil lawsuit by a private attorney serving on a contingency basis for his fee (usually 33 percent).

In city, cops ‘transcend their lawful authority’

The abuse by police and sheriff’s deputies is outside the scope of the black-letter law in Tennessee, though it is sanctioned by the Tennessee courts of appeal. But Mr. Parker is having none of it. He seems to be working on full auto.

He cites a case. “Public officials are not immune from suit when they transcend their lawful authority by invading constitutional rights.” AFLCIO v. Woodward, 406 F2d 137.

“Whoever under the color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any state, territory, or district to the deprivation of ANY rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution of laws of the United States *** shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.” 18 USC 242

With an eye to assuring his reader that he is a competent user of a car on the people’s roads, Mr. Parker says he has “previously completed and passed a test measuring my competency to safely control a motorized vehicle upon the public highways *** . I have also met or exceeded all common sense requirements concerning the ‘rules of the road’ and the ability to maneuver a motorized vehicle in a safe and responsible manner.”

About The Author

David Tulis hosts a talk show weekdays 1 to 3 p.m. on NoogaRadio 92.7 FM 95.3 FM HD4 (digital), covering local economy and free markets in Chattanooga and beyond. Nothing on this website should be construed as legal advice; all discussions about law and practices favoring a free people are opinion and educational; if you want legal advice consult a licensed attorney.

2 Comments

Is it a privilege to travel on a bus? is it a privilege to travel on a train, by taxi cab, by boat, on an air plane, on a horse? What makes it a privilege too travel by a auto? Maybe the next time someone is charged for driving without a license or failure to exhibit they need to ask the prosecutor to produce the law that makes it a privilege to travel by an auto when you are not using the road for commerce or business. But first tell the court you are traveling as a matter of right ,not as a privilege. Probable cause and due process have been kicked to the curb for to long in these cases.

The Georgia legislature has been quite clear and unambiguous as to its intentions.

§ 40-1-51. Legislative findings; construction

The General Assembly finds that the for-hire transportation of persons and property are a privilege that require close regulation and control to protect public welfare, provide for a competitive business environment, and provide for consumer protection. To that end, the provisions of this article are enacted. This is a remedial law and shall be liberally construed. The Department of Public Safety is designated as the agency to implement and enforce this article. Exceptions contained in this article shall have no effect on the applicability of any other provision of law applicable to motor vehicles, commercial motor vehicles, operators of motor vehicles, or carrier operations.

(2)”Chauffeur” means any person with a Georgia state driver’s license who meets the qualifications as prescribed in this part and who is authorized by the commissioner of driver services to drive a motor vehicle of a limousine carrier as provided in paragraph (5) of this Code section.

(5)”Limousine carrier” means any person owning or operating a prearranged service regularly rendered to the public by furnishing transportation as a motor carrier for hire, not over fixed routes, by means of one or more unmetered:

(A)Limousines;

(B)Extended limousines;

(C) Sedans;

(D) Extended sedans;

(E) Sport utility vehicles;

(F) Extended sport utility vehicles;

(G) Other vehicles with a capacity for seating and transporting no more than 15 persons for hire including the driver; or

(H) Any combination of subparagraphs (A) through (G) of this paragraph on the basis of telephone contract or written contract. A limousine carrier shall not use per capita rates or charges.

§ 40-1-100. Definitions

As used in this part, the term:

(1) “Carrier” means a person who undertakes the transporting of goods or passengers for compensation.

(8) “For compensation” or “for hire” means an activity relating to a person engaged in the transportation of goods or passengers for compensation.

(13) “Passenger” means a person who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of a contract, either express or implied, with the carrier as to the payment of the fare or that which is accepted as an equivalent therefor. The prepayment of fare is not necessary to establish the relationship of passenger and carrier, although a carrier may demand prepayment of fare if persons enter his or her vehicle by his or her permission with the intention of being carried; in the absence of such a demand, an obligation to pay fare is implied on the part of the passenger, and the reciprocal obligation of carriage of the carrier arises upon the entry of the passenger.

There is no parallel language in Georgia law indicating legislative intent to license ordinary travel so one is left with a conundrum. That is that while the Georgia legislature is quite capable of expressing its will in regard to carriers it is unable to do the same for viatic use of the ways in Georgia. It is more likely that the judges in Georgia (and every other State) hold the legislature in such abject contempt that they have never even troubled themselves with reading the laws which have been promulgated by the legislature. Further, there is no law precluding the use of a registered motor vehicle as a means of ordinary travel.