A history of conflict between opposing ideals

par Alain Gresh,
octobre 2010

The philosopher Martin Buber (1878-1965) and the rabbi Judah Magnes (1877-1948), the first chancellor of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, were committed Zionists and “the question whether a Jewish nation really existed was never even posed, they started from the assumption that not only did it exist but it had the right to return to Palestine and a duty to the world to be an example of justice” [1]. And yet, for both, becoming “an example of justice” was incompatible with the suppression of indigenous peoples. Like other immigrants, they were surprised to discover that Palestine was not “a land without people” and so they had to devise a modus vivendi for Jews and Arabs.

Their binationalist position was essentially moral but it found a political conduit in the powerful organisation Hashomer Hatzair (the Young Guard), which adopted it as part of its programme in 1929. Rejecting the idea of establishing a Jewish spiritual centre in Palestine, it sought to respond to the “Jewish question” through the creation of a state. Its leaders, shaped by Marxism, were convinced that “the Zionist endeavour clashes with the interests of only a small fraction of the Arab nation, the exploiting class” [2]. Far from being marginal, the supporters of binationalism won 40% of Jewish support in 1944. But Hashomer Hatzair, like other Zionist organisations on the left, could not resolve the contradiction between their binationalist theory and nationalist practice, which targeted the expulsion of Arab farm workers from their land under the slogan “Jewish Work”. And in the interwar period it found no influential Arab partner ready to accept the legitimacy of the Jewish settlement of Palestine.

In 1947 Great Britain decided to relinquish the mandate of Palestine it had been granted by the League of Nations and the question was brought before the newly created UN. A commission was set up to study the options. It was boycotted by Arab organisations but heard depositions from Zionist movements. Hashomer Hatzair and Martin Buber expressed their support for a binational state, but the majority of members of the commission – with the exception of India, Iran and Yugoslavia – rejected it. On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly voted in favour of the partition of Palestine into two states and a zone under international control around Jerusalem, all linked in an economic union which would look after currency, transport, customs and so on.

At the time, the majority of Palestinian organisations rejected not only the principle of partition but also the granting of political rights to immigrants from Europe. Only the National Liberation League, a communist movement, advocated the creation of a state which would guarantee the equality of all its citizens, including the Jews. This project, which then lay dormant for two decades, was revived after the Israeli-Arab war of 1967, promoted by Yasser Arafat’s Fatah, basking in the glory of the fedayeens’ operations carried out from Jordan. On 1 January 1969 Fatah’s central committee declared that it “was not fighting against the Jews as an ethnic and religious community. It is fighting against Israel, an expression of colonialism based on a racist, expansionist theocratic system, an expression of Zionism and of colonialism. ... Fatah solemnly proclaims that the final objective of its struggle is the restoration of the independent, democratic Palestinian state, in which all citizens, whatever their faith, will enjoy equal rights” [3].

This was a major turning point as it marked Palestinian acceptance, not of the legitimacy of the Zionist project, but, as a fait accompli, of the presence of several million Jews on Palestinian soil who, Fatah acknowledged, it was absurd and unjust to expect to “go home” or face the fate of Algeria’s pieds noirs. The fifth national council of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) took place in January-February 1969 and elected Arafat president of its executive committee. A resolution confirmed that the PLO’s objective was “to establish a free and democratic society in Palestine for all Palestinians whether they are Muslims, Christians or Jews” [4].

In 1970, the French publisher Editions de Minuit republished some of Fatah’s writings in a book entitled La Révolution palestinienne et les juifs (The Palestinian Revolution and the Jews), which had a wide impact and helped Palestinian aspirations gain legitimacy in Europe. It contains the statement : “What is new is that exiled non-Jewish Arabs, expelled from their homes and driven from their homeland by Jewish settlers in Palestine can still ... call for a state which brings together the former victims and their former aggressors and persecutors. This idea is revolutionary.”

Revolutionary the idea is. But it is also ambiguous : what sort of state would be created ? What constitution would guarantee the rights of all its citizens ? What status would Hebrew and Jewish culture have ? By accepting that the Jewish presence in Palestine was irreversible, Fatah encountered a difficulty which it could never overcome : the creation of a single state supposes the cooperation of at least some Israeli Jews. But, despite discussions which got under way with small anti-Zionist groups such as Matzpen, Fatah never succeeded in building bridges with significant sectors of the Israeli population.

This major drawback caused the democratic state project to be abandoned and, through its recognition that the Jewish presence was there to stay, prepared the Palestinians for the idea of partition. The international recognition of Palestinian aspirations, especially after the war of October 1973 ; the position of those who supported the PLO, notably the USSR (which accepted the legitimacy of the state of Israel, as did most states) ; and the lack of support for the single state project in Israeli society, all gradually brought the PLO round to the idea of two states coexisting. The Oslo accords appeared to offer a path towards this objective approved by the western nations, especially Europe, and then the US. A UN Security Council resolution in 2003 confirmed a consensus, which would have been unimaginable in the 1990s. Finally, even if it was through gritted teeth, prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu gave it his backing on 14 June 2009.

By some quirk of history, only when partition seems to be an impossibility on the ground has it gained the support of the whole international community.