Articles Posted in Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiff-inmate’s complaint to the extent Plaintiff asserted state tort claims under Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.031 and 41.0337 but reversed the district court’s dismissal as to Plaintiff’s claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, holding that, while a plaintiff must name the State as a party to any state tort claims to comply with sections 41.031 and 41.0337, this statutory requirement does not apply to section 1983 claims.
At issue in this case was how sections 41.031 and 41.0337’s requirement that the State be named by a plaintiff as a party to invoke a waiver of Nevada’s sovereign immunity operates when a plaintiff brings an action against state employee pursuant to both those state statutes and 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff asserted both state tort claims and section 1983 claims against state employees but did not name the State as party to any claims. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 41’s requirement that a plaintiff name the State as a party to any state tort claims does not apply to section 1983 claims, even when brought in the same complaint as a plaintiff’s state tort claims. View "Craig v. Donnelly" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed a district court order denying Appellant’s special motion to dismiss, holding that the district court properly denied Appellant’s special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes.
Appellant was sued under Nevada’s Deceptive Trade Practice and RICO statutes. In denying the special motion to dismiss, the district court found that Appellant failed to demonstrate that his conduct was “a good faith communication that was either truthful or made without knowledge of its falsehood,” one of the statutory requirements for anti-SLAPP protection. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appropriate standard of review for a district court’s denial or grant of an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss is de novo; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s special motion to dismiss because Appellant failed to demonstrate that the challenged claims arose from activity protected by Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.660. View "Coker v. Sassone" on Justia Law

At issue was the correct interpretation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 616B.578, under which an employer may qualify for reimbursement on a workers’ compensation claim if the employer proves that it retained its employee after requiring knowledge of the employee’s permanent physical impairment and before a subsequent injury occurs.
After noting that the statutory definition of a “permanent physical impairment” must support a rating of permanent impairment of six percent or more of the whole person the Supreme Court held (1) section 616B.578 requires an employer to prove that it had knowledge of a preexisting permanent physical impairment that would support a rating of at least six percent whole person impairment; (2) the statute cannot be reasonably interpreted to require knowledge of a specific medical diagnosis for an employer to successfully seek reimbursement; and (3) in the instant case, because it was unclear whether the employer knew of any permanent condition that hindered the employee’s employment and whether it could be fairly and reasonably inferred from the record that the employer knew of the employee’s preexisting physical impairment supporting a rating of at least six percent whole person impairment, this matter must be remanded for further proceedings. View "North Lake Tahoe Fire Protection District v. Board of Administration of Subsequent Injury Account for Associations of Self-Insured Public or Private Employers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s special motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint filed under Nev. Rev. Sta. 41.660(1), Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute, holding that an attorney’s statement on a website summarizing a jury’s verdict was not a statement in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a judicial body.
Under section 41.660(1), a defendant may file a special motion to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint if the complaint is based on a defendant’s “good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern,” including a “statement made in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a…judicial body.” Plaintiff brought an action asserting defamation per se for the attorney’s statement on a website. The district court denied Defendant’s special motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statement was not protected under section 41.660. View "Patin v. Lee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed a district court order denying a pro se plaintiff’s (Plaintiff) motion to set aside the judgment under Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b) that was filed five months and three weeks after the court dismissed Plaintiff’s case, holding that the district court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion.
Plaintiff sued Fiesta Palms, LLC (Defendant) for injuries he sustained at the Fiesta Palms sportsbook. Plaintiff appeared pro se at several hearings. The district court eventually granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss in an order stating that Defendant’s motion was unopposed and therefore deemed meritorious. Five months and three weeks later, Plaintiff moved to set aside the district court’s order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 60(b), recounting his efforts to obtain legal representation. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief to Plaintiff, an unrepresented litigant who knowingly neglected procedural requirements and then failed promptly to move for relief. View "Rodriguez v. Fiesta Palms, LLC" on Justia Law

In this workers’ compensation case, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Employer, holding that an injury arising from Employer’s failure to provide medical assistance to Employee suffering a stroke arose out of and in the course of the employment, and therefore, Employee’s sole remedy for the injury was workers’ compensation.
Employee sued Employer for failure to aid him during the “golden window” of diagnostic and treatment opportunity when he was suffering a stroke. The district court granted summary judgment for Employer, concluding that Employee’s exclusive remedy was workers’ compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employee’s exclusive remedy against Employer was workers’ compensation because his injuries occurred in the course of his employment and arose out of his employment. View "Baiguen v. Harrah’s Las Vegas, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that district court cannot deny attorney fees otherwise allowed by agreement, rule, or statute because a lawyer representing a client on a contingency fee basis does not provide proof of hourly billing records.
Plaintiff sought an attorney fees award under Nev. R. Civ. P. 68 after suing Defendant for negligence after she tripped and fell on Defendant’s property. Plaintiff requested $96,000 in attorney fees, which she calculated as forty percent of the reduced judgment amount based on a forty-percent contingency fee agreement with her attorneys. The district court denied her request because, in part, Plaintiff did not submit hourly billing records of the work performed by her counsel to show that the requested fee was reasonable.
The Supreme Court reversed the denial of Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees and remanded for a full hearing on the request, holding (1) a lawyer who represents a client on a contingency fee basis need not submit hourly billing records before he or she can be awarded attorney fees; and (2) the district court improperly analyzed certain factors set forth in Beattie v. Thomas, 668 P.2d 268, 274 (Nev. 1983) in otherwise denying Plaintiff’s fees request. View "O’Connell v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment based upon discretionary-act immunity in this action arising from a vehicular accident involving a police officer responding to an emergency.
A police officer collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle while responding to an emergency call early one morning. Plaintiff sued the officer and the City of North Las Vegas, alleging negligence and vicarious liability. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the doctrine of discretionary-act immunity provided them with qualified immunity.
In resolving this appeal, the Supreme Court considered the tension between Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.032(2), which provides immunity to government officials acting within their discretionary purview, and Nev. Rev. Stat. 484B.700, which allows a police officer to proceed past a red traffic signal in an emergency subject to certain conditions. The Court held (1) the discretionary-act immunity is unavailable in this case because the language of section 484B.700(4) mandates that the police officer drive with due regard for the safety of others, and this duty is not discretionary; and (2) the police officer in the instant case breached section 484B.700(4)’s duty of care. View "Glover-Armont v. Cargile" on Justia Law

The common law absolute privilege has been abrogated by the statutory conditional privilege in Nev. Rev. Stat. 616D.020 in the context of defamatory statements in a workers’ compensation claim to which section 616D.020 is applicable.
Appellant filed a complaint against Respondents, the company that employed him and the company's owner, for defamation. The allegedly defamatory statements regarded Appellant’s alleged abuse of the workers’ compensation program to obtain prescription pain medication, a violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 616D.300. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). The district court granted the motion, concluding that Respondents’ statements were absolutely privileged. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that all of Respondents’ statements were absolutely privileged justifying dismissal of the complaint, as a matter of law, without considering the impact of the conditional privilege provided in section 616D.020. View "Fitzgerald v. Mobile Billboards, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue was whether seven managers of an LLC were subject to suit for personal negligence as individual tortfeasors or under an alter ego theory of liability.
Petitioners brought a negligence suit against an LLC and its two LLC managing members (the member LLCs). Petitioners subsequently moved for leave to amend their complaint to add as individual defendants seven persons who had an ownership interest in, or managed, the member LLCs. Petitioners sought to assert direct claims for negligence against the managers in their individual capacities and sought to plead allegations supporting an alter ego theory of liability. The district court denied Petitioners’ motion, concluding that amendment would be futile because Nev. Rev. Stat. 86.371 protected the managers from any liabilities insured by the various LLCs, and Nevada’s LLC statues contained no alter ego exception to that statutory protection. The Supreme Court granted writ relief for Petitioners and directed that Petitioners be allowed to amend their complaint, holding (1) section 86.371 is not intended to shield members or managers of an LLC for liability for personal negligence; and (2) the corporate alter ego doctrine applies to LLCs. View "Gardner v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law