Wednesday, January 6, 2010

Amrose Evans-Pritchard of Telegraph UK is known for writing cheerful topics like global depression and deflation (he is a deflationist) and coming fiscal, economic, and social crises if not downright catastrophe. In this article from January 4, 2010, probably intended as his New Year prediction, he argues that the sovereign debt crisis will be triggered by Japan, and that will finally stop the bear market rally of the global stock markets.

I regularly follow and read his writings (as you see the box to the left that has the feeds). But I have some problems with this one.

"The contraction of M3 money in the US and Europe over the last six months will slowly puncture economic recovery as 2010 unfolds, with the time-honoured lag of a year or so. Ben Bernanke will be caught off guard, just as he was in mid-2008 when the Fed drove straight through a red warning light with talk of imminent rate rises – the final error that triggered the implosion of Lehman, AIG, and the Western banking system. "

Right off the bat, I have a problem. He talks about M3 contraction in US and Europe. As you may know, the Federal Reserve stop publishing M3. But that's not my problem. Is M3 really contracting, as he says?

ECB (European Central Bank)'s definition of M3 is slightly different from the U.S. counterpart. It includes:

And here's the latest Euro area M3 numbers compiled by ECB. Do you see "contraction"? It was pretty much flat all year, but to call that a "contraction" is like calling a flat day in the stock market a rally because it didn't go down.

In both Europe and the U.S., monetary aggregates didn't contract in the last six months at all. The rate of change may have been decreased or gone slightly negative (in case of EU), but to call that a contraction is really stretching it.

My next problem is this:

"Weak sovereigns will buckle. The shocker will be Japan, our Weimar-in-waiting. This is the year when Tokyo finds it can no longer borrow at 1pc from a captive bond market, and when it must foot the bill for all those fiscal packages that seemed such a good idea at the time. Every auction of JGBs will be a news event as the public debt punches above 225pc of GDP. Finance Minister Hirohisa Fujii will become as familiar as a rock star.

"Once the dam breaks, debt service costs will tear the budget to pieces. The Bank of Japan will pull the emergency lever on QE. The country will flip from deflation to incipient hyperinflation. The yen will fall out of bed, outdoing China's yuan in the beggar-thy-neighbour race to the bottom..."

Too bad Fujii just resigned, and the post has gone to probably the worst possible person (in my opinion) in the administration: Naoto Kan. While Mr. Kan may be just the right person for Evans-Pritchard (extremely temperamental Mr. Kan wants weaker yen, more deficit spending), again that's not my problem. It's about Evans-Pritchard's contention that Japanese government cannot sell bonds at 1%.

Unlike US Treasury notes and bonds, almost all Japanese sovereign bonds are purchased in Japan by Japanese financial institutions (banks, postal banks, insurance companies, pension funds). Overseas buyers make up less than 4%, compared to over 30% for the U.S. Treasuries. The Japanese government has been trying to push "Kokusai" (sovereign bonds) to the general public, but the reception has been cool mostly due to the super-low interest rate. The issuance of the bonds more than doubled in the past 10 years, but the rates hardly budged.

If indeed the government has to raise rates to attract more buyers, then the general public may finally start to buy. It may finally drive up the rates for bank CDs, and people may be able to save again. Inflation? What inflation? Japan's population is decreasing, and the rate of decrease will accelerate. I don't think much inflation can happen without population pressure.

In the past 20 years, much household wealth was destroyed in Japan not from ongoing recession and deflation but from super-low interest rates. In their effort to preserve and increase their wealth as best they could, ordinary people were forced to chase the high-yielding investments such as CDs in US dollar. That carry trade by numerous households has spectacularly backfired. They were also driven into mutual funds that invested in U.S. commercial real estate, as these funds were sold by neighborhood banks as "safe and high yielding".

They would welcome bonds and CDs that would yield 5%. That would absorb money in circulation, therefore non-inflationary.

For Japan to flip from deflation to hyperinflation, it would need some other disaster than the government issuing more debt or Mr. Kan becoming the finance minister.

About my coverage of Japan Earthquake of March 11

I am Japanese, and I not only read Japanese news sources for information on earthquake and the Fukushima Nuke Plant but also watch press conferences via the Internet when I can and summarize my findings, adding my observations.

About This Site

Well, this was, until March 11, 2011. Now it is taken over by the events in Japan, first earthquake and tsunami but quickly by the nuke reactor accident. It continues to be a one-person (me) blog, and I haven't even managed to update the sidebars after 5 months... Thanks for coming, spread the word.------------------This is an aggregator site of blogs coming out of SKF (double-short financials ETF) message board at Yahoo.

Along with commentary on day's financial news, it also provides links to the sites with financial and economic news, market data, stock technical analysis, and other relevant information that could potentially affect the financial markets and beyond.

Disclaimer: None of the posts or links is meant to be a recommendation, advice or endorsement of any kind. The site is for information and entertainment purposes only.