Friday, March 31, 2017

The Court of Appeals of California, Second District, recently held the dismissal of a borrower's breach of contract claim in a prior lawsuit did not bar a claim in subsequent lawsuit for violation of the federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. ("TILA"), even if the breach of contract and TILA claims were based on the same set of underlying facts, because the right to full disclosures under TILA was a distinct primary right from the common law rights in contract.

However, although the Appellate Court determined that the dismissal based on the doctrines of res judicata and issues preclusion was reversible error, the dismissal was affirmed because the borrower's claims, including the TILA cause of action, were barred by the statute of limitations or otherwise failed to state a valid cause of action.

In the first lawsuit, the borrower's complaint asserted causes of action for breach of contract, temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, violation of the California's unfair competition law in Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. ("UCL"), specific performance, and equitable rescission. The borrower alleged that the lender failed to disclose fees when she refinanced the loan, and it added additional sums for "escrow option insurance" when her loan was subsequently modified. The borrower claimed that these undisclosed sums made the loan unaffordable.

The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer based on several deficiencies in the complaint. The borrower filed an amended complaint that was virtually identical to the original complaint which, once again, did not attach any of the alleged agreements or describe their terms in any greater detail. The court sustained the defendants' demurrer to the amended complaint without leave to amend. The Appellate Court affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied the borrower's request for review.

The borrower then filed a new complaint, this time omitting the alleged breach of contract claim, and instead asserting causes of action for violation of TILA, the UCL, fraudulent omission/concealment, and injunctive relief. The general allegations in the complaint were identical to those in the prior lawsuit.

The borrower alleged that the lender violated TILA by failing to make required disclosures with respect to the "escrow option insurance," which was supposedly surreptitiously added to her monthly loan payment obligation. She also alleged that the lender's violation of TILA was an unlawful business practice in violation of the UCL, and the lender's alleged failure to disclose the "escrow option insurance" in the loan modification agreement constituted fraudulent concealment. According to the borrower, had she known the true facts, she would have considered other financing options, and thus requested injunctive relief preventing the sale of the property.

The lender demurred, contending that the borrower's new complaint was barred as a matter of law by the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion.

The lender argued that the borrower was asserting the same primary right in both actions (claim preclusion), and the issues alleged had been actually litigated and decided against the borrower on the merits (issue preclusion). The lender also argued that the TILA and fraud causes of action were untimely; the borrower lacked standing to assert a UCL claim because she failed to allege she had lost money or property as a result of the lender's actions; and the claim for injunction was improper because injunctive relief is a remedy and not a cause of action.

In her opposition, the borrower emphasized that she had not pleaded either violation of TILA or fraud in her prior lawsuit.

The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. In so ruling, it found that "[t]he 'primary right' of Plaintiff in both actions—the right to be free from increased loan payments that were not agreed to—is the same, which means the present proceeding is on the same 'cause of action' as the prior proceeding." The trial court also ruled the claims were barred by collateral estoppel because her claims "all involve the same underlying issue—the validity of the increased loan payments that Plaintiff allegedly did not agree to," and that issue had been litigated and decided. Moreover, the trial court held that the TILA and fraud claims were time barred; the borrower lacked standing to bring a UCL claim; and the cause of action for injunctive relief was not a valid cause of action. The borrower appealed.

First, the Appellate Court had to determine if the borrower's TILA cause of action was subject to claim preclusion or issue preclusion.

Claim preclusion prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. Claim preclusion arises if a second suit involves (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties [or those in privity with them] (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first case. DKN Holdings, 61 Cal.4th at 824. The bar applies if the cause of action could have been brought, whether or not it was actually asserted or decided in the first lawsuit. Busick v. Workermen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 967, 974.

Issue preclusion prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case even if the second suit raises a different cause of action. The doctrine applies "(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party." DKN Holdings, 61 Cal.4th at 825. The doctrine differs from claim preclusion in that it operates as a conclusive determination of issues; it does not bar a cause of action. Id.

The Appellate Court held that the trial court erred in its ruling because different primary rights may be violated by the same wrongful conduct. As support, the Appellate Court relied on Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 954-955, which held that an employer's racially discriminatory conduct may violate distinct primary rights under federal civil rights law and state tort law regarding defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

In this case, although the borrower's contract and TILA claims were largely based on the same set of underlying facts, the Appellate Court determined that the two actions do not involve the same primary rights

The Appellate Court held that the primary right at issue in the borrower's TILA cause of action was the right to full disclosure of the material terms of the loan and the subsequent loan modification. This was, according to the Appellate Court, a federal statutory right distinct from the common law right to have enforced only those contractual terms which the borrower had agreed to (the claim presented by her initial lawsuit). Thus, the Appellate Court concluded that the doctrine of claim preclusion did not bar the TILA cause of action.

Notably, the opinion was silent on whether the borrower could have, or should have, raised the TILA cause of action in the first lawsuit. In fact, in the new complaint, the borrower alleged that she discovered the material omissions by May 2012 – well before she filed the original lawsuit in July 2013.

Turning next to issue preclusion, the Appellate Court held that the prior ruling on the merits of the borrower's contract claim did not preclude the TILA cause of action. This is because the adequacy of the disclosures at closing and in the loan modification agreement were neither actually litigated nor determined in the prior lawsuit. Instead, the trial court sustained the demurrer because the borrower failed to allege sufficient facts to state a valid cause of action. Thus, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court erred by applying the doctrine of issue preclusion to dismiss the TILA claim.

However, the Appellate Court agreed with the trial court that the TILA cause of action was untimely under the statute of limitations.

As you may recall, most TILA actions must be filed "within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation." 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). A violation of TILA based on specific disclosures, however, may be brought within three-years. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1639. The violations here allegedly occurred in 2007 and 2010. The borrower's current lawsuit was not filed until August of 2015. Under either the one year or three-year statute of limitations, the borrower's claim was untimely. Therefore, the Appellate Court concluded the untimely TILA cause of action was properly dismissed.

Next, the trial court had determined that the borrower lacked standing because she could not show any loss of money or property as a result of the allegedly unlawful business practices. The Appellate Court disagreed.

In a previous decision, the Appellate Court had held that "the existence of an enforceable obligation, without more, ordinarily constitutes actual injury or injury in fact." Sarun v. Dignity Health (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1167. Here, the borrower had alleged that she paid money to the bank in excess of what she should have owed. According to the Appellate Court, these allegations were sufficient to allege injury in fact to confer standing to assert a UCL cause of action.

However, an action to enforce the UCL must be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208. Because both the refinancing and the loan modification occurred more than four years before the new lawsuit was filed in August 2015, the Appellate Court concluded that the borrower's UCL claim was time-barred.

Relatedly, the borrower's fraudulent concealment claim, like her TILA and UCL claims, was based on the alleged nondisclosure of material terms of the loan refinancing and loan modification. A cause of action for fraud is governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Code of Civ. P. 338(d). Because the borrower alleged that she discovered the alleged fraud when her loan was supposedly forensically examined in May 2011, the cause of action filed in August of 2015 was barred by the three-year statute of limitation.

Finally, the Appellate Court ruled that the borrower's request for injunctive relief was properly dismissed because she failed to allege any valid cause of action.

Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the order dismissing the action.

Tuesday, March 21, 2017

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently
reversed an award of summary judgment in favor of a mortgage loan servicer,
holding that the evidence could support a verdict that the servicer engaged in
an unfair business practice by accepting trial modification plan payments when
it had previously determined the borrower was not eligible for a loan
modification.

A borrower defaulted on her mortgage loan, and later applied for
a loan modification. The mortgage loan
servicer sent her a letter offering her a “Trial Plan Agreement.” The letter specifically stated, “If you
comply with all the terms of this Agreement, we’ll consider a permanent workout
solution for your loan once the Trial Plan has been completed.” The Agreement required the borrower to remit
three equal payments of $3,280.05. The
borrower signed the Agreement and timely sent the payments.

Later, the servicer informed the borrower that she did not
qualify “at this time” for a modification under either the federal Making Home
Affordable Program (“HAMP”) or under the servicer’s in-house modification
program because her “income [was] insufficient for the amount of credit [she]
requested.” The letter also stated that
“we may be able to offer other alternatives to help avoid the negative impact”
of foreclosure.

The servicer did not provide additional reasons for its
denial. However, the servicer had also
denied the borrower for a modification because:
1) the unpaid principal balance on the loan was higher than the amount
allowed under the HAMP Guidelines and 2) the loan failed to satisfy the
servicer’s net present value (“NPV”) test.
The servicer’s NPV test compared the NPV expected from a modification to
the NPV of the unmodified loan. If the
cash flow from a viable modification exceeds that of a non-modified loan, HAMP
requires a servicer to offer a modification to a borrower. If the NPV test generates a negative result,
modification is optional.

The borrower then submitted a second application for a loan
modification.

In response to the second application, the servicer sent a
letter stating that it “want[ed] to help [the borrower] stay in [her] home” and
confirmed receipt and review of the borrower’s “verification of income
documentation.” The servicer also
provided three payment coupons in the amount of $2,988.49 with payment
deadlines notated and stated: “After successful completion of the Trial Period
Plan, [we] will send you a Modification Agreement for your signature which will
modify the Loan as necessary to reflect this new payment amount.”

Later, the servicer sent the borrower another letter informing
the borrower that she was not eligible for a federal HAMP modification “because
the current unpaid principal balance on [her] loan [was] higher than the
program limit.” This letter also stated
that the servicer was “happy” to tell the borrower that she “‘may be eligible
for other modification programs’ and that [the servicer] may be able to offer
‘other alternatives’ to stave off the negative impact a possible foreclosure
may have on [her] credit rating, the risk of a deficiency judgment … and the
possible adverse tax effects of a foreclosure.”

The borrower made all payments called for by the first letter
and continued making such payments for a total of seven months.

The borrower was served with a foreclosure notice listing a
foreclosure sale date. Prior to the sale
date, the servicer sent the borrower another letter encouraging her to continue
to seek a modification. The servicer
told the borrower that she might “qualify for monetary incentives that will be
used to pay down the principal balance of your loan if you make your modified
payments on time.”

Several months later, the servicer sent the borrower a letter
denying her application, stating: “We
are unable to offer you a modification through the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP) or any [of the servicer’s] modification programs … because you
did not provide us with the documents we requested.”

The borrower then filed an action for breach of contract, breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of
California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), and violation of the federal Truth
in Lending Act (“TILA”).

The servicer moved to dismiss the borrower’s complaint. The trial dismissed the borrower’s TILA claim
but denied the servicer’s motion with respect to the borrower’s remaining
claims. The trial court reasoned, “If
what [the borrower] alleges is true – that [the servicer’s] left hand sought
payments from Plaintiff pursuant to a plan designed to give her an opportunity
to modify her loan while, notwithstanding [the borrower’s] payment in
accordance with that plan, [the servicer’s] right hand continued all along with
foreclosure proceedings and both hands should have known from the start that
[the borrower’s] loan would not be eligible for modification in any event – the
Court can conceive of such allegations stating a [UCL] claim.”

Later, the servicer brought a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the servicer’s motion
on the ground that the borrower had failed to provide the servicer with the
“requested documentation to support her loan modification request.” The trial court also rejected the borrower’s
breach of contract claims because the borrower had only “conclusorily” asserted
that the “modification back-and-forth ripened into a contract with [the servicer]”
and remarked that the borrower had not included a breach of contract claim in
her first amended complaint.

The borrower appealed. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court’s order granting summary
judgment on the borrower’s breach of contract claim.

The Ninth Circuit held that the trial court “erred in failing to
acknowledge [the borrower’s] claim for breach of contract in her pro se
complaint.” The Ninth Circuit noted that
the borrower “explicitly styled her complaint on its first page as one for
“BREACH OF CONTRACT AND BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALINGS.” The Ninth Circuit also found
that “[o]nce [the borrower] made her three payments, [the servicer] was
obligated by the explicit language of its offer to send her an Agreement for
her signature ‘which will modify the loan as necessary to reflect this new
payment amount.’ [The Servicer] did not
call it either a HAMP agreement or [an in-house] agreement, just an
‘Agreement.’ What program the Agreement
was part of is irrelevant.”

The Ninth Circuit also reversed the District Court’s order
granting summary judgment on the borrower’s UCL claim. The Ninth Circuit noted that the borrower was
indeed ineligible for a HAMP modification, but that “instead of determining
eligibility before asking for money – a logical protocol called for by HAMP as
of January 28, 2010 – [the servicer] asked [the borrower] for more
payments.”

The Ninth Circuit held that “[t]he facts in this record would
amply support a verdict on this claim in [the borrower’s] favor on the ground
that she was the victim of an unconscionable process.” The Ninth Circuit reasoned that “[w]ith its
March 1, 2010 letter, [the servicer] deceptively enticed and invited [the
borrower] into a process with the demonstrably false promise that a loan
modification was within her reach if she were to make three monthly payments of
$2,988.49 each. The next day – and for
the first time – [the servicer] eliminated a HAMP modification from its menu,
but neither advised [the borrower] what [its in-house modification guidelines]
required nor suspended additional payments until it could determine her
[in-house modification] eligibility.”

Finally, the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court’s dismissal
of the borrower’s TILA claim. The Ninth
Circuit cited the Supreme Court of the United States’ ruling in Jesinoski v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790 (2015) which held that TILA’s
right to cancel may be exercised by a written notice from the borrower to the
lender within three years after the consummation of the transaction, without
need to also file a lawsuit within the three-year period.

The Ninth Circuit observed that the Supreme Court decided
Jesinoski after the trial court had dismissed the borrower’s TILA claim. As a result, the Ninth Circuit remanded the
action to the trial court “with instructions to permit [the borrower] to amend
her complaint to allege a right to rescind pursuant to Jesinoski.”

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